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United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee on Oversight of Government
Management, the Federal Workforce, and the District of Columbia,
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, U.S. Senate:
September 2011:
UN Internal Oversight:
Progress Made on Independence and Staffing Issues, but Further Actions
Are Needed:
GAO-11-871:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-11-871, a report to the Chairman, Subcommittee on
Oversight of Government Management, the Federal Workforce, and the
District of Columbia, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental
Affairs, U.S. Senate.
Why GAO Did This Study:
The United States has long advocated for strong oversight of the
United Nations (UN). In 2005, GAO raised long-standing concerns that
the ability of the UNís Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS)
to carry out its mandate was constrained in scope and authority, and
in 2006, GAO found that funding arrangements impeded OIOSís ability to
operate independently. The U.S. Mission to the UN also expressed
concern that OIOSís independence is limited in that it cannot make
final hiring decisions for senior staff. In response to such concerns,
the UN General Assembly in 2006 created an Independent Audit Advisory
Committee (IAAC). GAO was asked to examine actions taken to address
(1) impediments to OIOSís ability to provide independent oversight and
(2) staffing issues that may have hindered its performance. GAO
assessed OIOSís independence based on internationally recognized
auditing standards, analyzed OIOS and other UN documents and data, and
interviewed agency officials.
What GAO Found:
The UN has taken worthwhile steps to enhance OIOSís independence, but
certain UN funding and oversight arrangements continue to impede OIOSí
s ability to provide independent oversight. The General Assembly has
supported OIOSís independence by creating the IAAC, which reviews OIOSí
s budgets and work plans for audits of the Secretariat and
peacekeeping missions, and by recommending that OIOS base its planning
and budget requests on risk in accordance with standards of the
Institute of Internal Auditors (IIA). The General Assembly also
clarified the role OIOS plays in internal oversight of funds and
programs by adopting a resolution that reaffirmed the prerogatives of
separately administered funds and programs to decide their own
oversight mechanisms and relationship with OIOS. However, an
independent review found that the arrangements for funding OIOS audits
of those entities that choose to utilize its audit services do not
meet IIA standards for independence. OIOS also remains constrained in
its ability to issue consolidated audit reports for joint UN
activities that include entities over which it does not have oversight
authority, even when directed to do so by the General Assembly.
High vacancy rates for authorized positions have hindered OIOSís
ability to provide sufficient oversight, but the UN and OIOS are
taking steps to address this issue. As of July 2011, 19 percent of
OIOS staff positions were unfilled (see figure below), and 30 percent
were vacant for investigations of peacekeeping activitiesóthe most
challenging positions to fill. The UNís external auditor found that OIOS
ís staffing shortages hampered its Internal Audit Divisionís
completion of its work plans. The UN and OIOS have made filling vacant
positions a priority, and OIOS has hired 82 staff members since the
start of the term of the new Under-Secretary-General for Internal
Oversight Services in September 2010. The IAAC also expressed concern
that vacancies at the senior management level would make it difficult
for OIOS to accomplish its work. In August 2011, OIOS filled two
director-level positions that had been vacant for more than a year.
Further, the Under-Secretary-General has begun an initiative to
strengthen OIOSís management and coordination and has requested an
additional staff position for her front office. The Secretary-General
has concurred with this request.
Figure: Percentage of Unfilled OIOS Staff Positions, Fiscal Biennium
2010-2011 (as of July 31, 2011):
[Refer to PDF for image: horizontal bar graph]
Staff Positions: Total;
Filled positions: 265;
Unfilled positions: 62 (19%);
Total: 327.
Staff Positions: Internal Audit Division;
Filled positions: 152;
Unfilled positions: 34 (18%);
Total: 186.
Staff Positions: Investigations Division;
Filled positions: 72;
Unfilled positions: 24 (25%);
Total: 96.
Staff Positions: Inspection and Evaluation Division;
Filled positions: 22;
Unfilled positions: 4 (15%);
Total: 26.
Staff Positions: Office of the Under-Secretary-General and Executive
Office;
Filled positions: 19;
Unfilled positions: 0 (0%);
Total: 19.
Source: GAO analysis of OIOS data.
[End of figure]
What GAO Recommends:
GAO recommends that the Secretary of State and the U.S. Permanent
Representative to the UN work with the General Assembly and member
states to address remaining impediments to OIOSís ability to provide
independent oversight resulting from its relationships with certain UN
funds and programs and other clients. State and OIOS generally
concurred with GAOís findings and recommendation. However, State
misinterpreted the reportís discussion of OIOSís oversight authority.
GAO added language to the report to clarify this discussion.
View [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-871] or key
components. For more information, contact Thomas Melito at (202) 512-
9601 or melitot@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Contents:
Letter:
Background:
OIOS Role Clarified and Independence Strengthened, but Some Funding
and Oversight Issues Remain:
Staffing Shortages Have Hindered OIOS Performance, but Efforts Are
Under Way to Address Them:
Conclusions:
Recommendation for Executive Action:
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology:
Appendix II: OIOS's Locations and Staffing:
Appendix III: Timeline for the Preparation, Approval, and Execution of
OIOS's Regular Budget:
Appendix IV: UN Resolutions and Administrative Issuances Affecting
OIOS:
Appendix V: UN Organizations, Their Relationship with OIOS, and Their
Oversight Capacity:
Appendix VI: Status of Recommendations from Our 2006 Report:
Appendix VII: Comments from the Office of Internal Oversight Services:
Appendix VIII: Comments from the Department of State:
Appendix IX: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
Glossary:
Related GAO Products:
Tables:
Table 1: OIOS's Oversight Relationships with Separately Administered
Clients:
Table 2: UN Resolutions and Administrative Issuances Affecting OIOS:
Table 3: UN Organizations, Their Relationship with OIOS, and Their
Oversight Capacity:
Table 4: Status of Recommendations from Our 2006 Report:
Figures:
Figure 1: Number and Location of OIOS Staff by Division as of
September 2011:
Figure 2: U.S. Share of Contributions to the UN Secretariat Regular
Budget, Fiscal Biennia 1994-1995 through 2010-2011:
Figure 3: U.S. Share of Contributions to the OIOS Regular Budget,
Fiscal Biennia 1994-1995 through 2010-2011:
Figure 4: Sources of OIOS Appropriations, Fiscal Biennia 1994-1995
through 2010-2011:
Figure 5: UN Organizations That Are OIOS's Clients and Those with
Their Own Oversight Capacity, 2011:
Figure 6: Filled and Unfilled OIOS Staff Positions, Fiscal Biennium
2010-2011 (as of July 31, 2011):
Figure 7: OIOS Staff Locations as of September 2011:
Figure 8: Authorized Staff Positions in OIOS Divisions, Fiscal
Biennium 2010-2011 (as of July 31, 2011):
Figure 9: Budgetary Allocation of OIOS Staff Positions, Fiscal
Biennium 2010-2011 (as of July 31, 2011):
Figure 10: OIOS Authorized Staff Positions for Each Division, Fiscal
Biennia 2006-2007 and 2010-2011 (as of July 31, 2011):
Figure 11: OIOS Authorized Staff Positions, Fiscal Biennia 1994-1995
through 2010-2011:
Figure 12: OIOS Authorized Staff and Budget Trends, Fiscal Biennia
1994-1995 through 2010-2011:
Figure 13: Timeline for the Preparation, Approval, and Execution of
OIOS's Regular Budget:
Abbreviations:
IAAC: Independent Audit Advisory Committee:
IIA: Institute of Internal Auditors:
MOU: memorandum of understanding:
OIOS: Office of Internal Oversight Services:
UN: United Nations:
[End of section]
United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
September 20, 2011:
The Honorable Daniel K. Akaka:
Chairman:
Subcommittee on Oversight of Government Management, the Federal
Workforce, and the District of Columbia:
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs:
United States Senate:
In 1994, the United Nations (UN) General Assembly established the
Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS) for the purpose of
assisting the UN Secretary-General in fulfilling internal oversight
responsibilities.[Footnote 1] To carry out its role as the UN's
internal oversight unit, OIOS has over 300 staff positions worldwide
and provides oversight services to multiple entities within the UN
system that reported a total budget of about $15 billion in 2009.
[Footnote 2] In 2005, we raised concerns that OIOS's internal audits
of the Oil for Food Program were constrained in scope and authority,
preventing auditors from scrutinizing and reporting problems with the
program.[Footnote 3] In 2006, we found that funding arrangements
impeded OIOS's ability to operate independently, as mandated by the
General Assembly and called for by international auditing standards,
severely limiting OIOS's ability to reallocate resources among revenue
streams, locations, and operating divisions.[Footnote 4] Additionally,
we found that OIOS depended on the provision of auditing resources by
specific UN funds and programs[Footnote 5] and, therefore, it could
provide oversight only when requested by the management of these funds
and programs, hindering its ability to identify waste, fraud, and
abuse. The U.S. Mission to the UN has also expressed concern that
OIOS's operational independence is limited in that it cannot make
final hiring decisions for high-level staff positions. In response to
these and similar issues raised by the UN's Advisory Committee on
Administrative and Budgetary Questions,[Footnote 6] the General
Assembly in February 2006 established the Independent Audit Advisory
Committee (IAAC) to assist it in fulfilling its oversight
responsibilities.[Footnote 7] One of the IAAC's key roles is to advise
the General Assembly on the effectiveness of OIOS by reviewing OIOS's
proposed budgets and work plans.
The United States, as the largest contributor to the UN--with assessed
and voluntary contributions[Footnote 8] totaling about $4 billion in
fiscal year 2010 for UN activities over which OIOS has audit
authority[Footnote 9]--has long advocated for strong oversight of the
UN and supported the establishment of both OIOS and the IAAC.
Responding to your request for a follow-up study on the internal
oversight function at the UN, we examined actions taken to address (1)
impediments to OIOS's ability to provide independent oversight and (2)
staffing issues that may have hindered its performance.
To address our objectives, we reviewed relevant UN and OIOS reports,
policies and procedures manuals, and other documents, and assessed
OIOS's independence by applying internationally recognized standards
such as those of the Institute of Internal Auditors (IIA),[Footnote
10] which OIOS formally adopted in 2002. We met with State Department
officials in Washington, D.C., and officials in New York from the U.S.
Mission to the UN. In New York, we also met with OIOS management and
staff, representatives of Secretariat departments and UN funds and
programs, and members of the UN's external oversight body, the Board
of Auditors.[Footnote 11] We also spoke with senior OIOS audit and
investigations officials based in Geneva and Vienna via
videoconference; with the IAAC Chairman in Washington, D.C., in person
and via video and teleconference; and with a Joint Inspection Unit
official in Geneva via teleconference.[Footnote 12] In addition, we
evaluated the reliability of UN and OIOS budget data taken from UN
source documents and concluded that they were sufficiently reliable to
present trends of the regular, peacekeeping, and extrabudgetary
appropriations for the biennia 1994-1995 through 2010-2011. We used
staffing data provided by OIOS, which we determined were reliable for
our purposes of presenting staffing levels as of July 31, 2011. We
conducted our work between October 2010 and September 2011 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Those standards require that we plan and perform our work to obtain
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our objectives. We believe that the
evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and
conclusions based on our objectives. (Appendix I provides a detailed
discussion of our objectives, scope, and methodology.)
Background:
Internal Oversight in the UN System:
The UN system includes the General Assembly, the Secretariat,[Footnote
13] peacekeeping missions throughout the world, and separately
administered funds, programs, and specialized agencies that have their
own governing bodies.[Footnote 14] The General Assembly established
the separately administered funds and programs with responsibility for
particular issues, such as children (United Nations Children's Fund)
or the environment (United Nations Environment Program), that are
funded mainly by voluntary contributions. While separately
administered, these entities are under the authority of the Secretary-
General, who appoints the heads of each entity, but they have their
own governing bodies instead of being governed by the General
Assembly. In contrast, the heads of the specialized agencies are
elected by their own governing bodies, and these autonomous agencies
do not fall under the authority of the Secretary-General and therefore
are not within OIOS's purview.
OIOS is part of the Secretariat and is under the authority of the
Secretary-General, who reports to the General Assembly. According to
its mandate, OIOS's purpose is "to assist the Secretary-General in
fulfilling his internal oversight responsibilities in respect of the
resources and staff of the Organisation,"[Footnote 15] and OIOS's
chief executive, the Under-Secretary-General for Internal Oversight
Services, reports directly to the General Assembly. The Secretary-
General has therefore stated that OIOS is mandated to provide
oversight only of activities that fall under the Secretary-General's
authority.[Footnote 16] These include activities of the Secretariat in
New York, Geneva, Nairobi, and Vienna; the UN's five regional
commissions; peacekeeping missions and humanitarian operations; funds
and programs administered separately under the authority of the
Secretary-General (including the Office of the United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees, the United Nations Environment Program, the
United Nations Human Settlements Program, and the Office of the United
Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights); and other entities that
have requested OIOS services such as the United Nations Convention to
Combat Desertification and the United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change.[Footnote 17] In addition to the OIOS mandate, the
Financial Regulations and Rules of the United Nations designate OIOS
as the financial management internal auditor for the UN.[Footnote 18]
OIOS's Organizational Structure:
OIOS is composed of the Office of the Under-Secretary-General, an
Executive Office, and three divisions, namely, Internal Audit,
Investigations, and Inspection and Evaluation.[Footnote 19] Figure 1
provides the number and location of staff for each of these divisions
as of September 2011. Appendix II provides additional information on
OIOS's locations and staffing.
[Side bar:
OIOSís Three Divisions:
The Internal Audit Division provides assurance and advice designed to
improve and add value to the UNís operations. Internal audits bring a
systematic approach to evaluating and improving the effectiveness of
risk management, control, and governance processes.
The Investigations Division follows up on reports of possible
violations of rules or regulations, mismanagement, misconduct, waste
of resources, or abuse of authority.
The Inspection and Evaluation Division assists UN intergovernmental
bodies and program managers in assessing the relevance, efficiency,
effectiveness, and impact of UN Secretariat programs. The divisionís
role is twofold: to help assure that these programs follow their
mandates and to foster institutional learning and improvement through
reflection by program officials and UN member states on performance
and results.
Source: GAO summary of OIOS information. End of side bar]
Figure 1: Number and Location of OIOS Staff by Division as of
September 2011:
[Refer to PDF for image: illustration]
Office of the Under-Secretary-General:
Executive Office:
Location of staff: New York;
IAD: 67;
ID: 30;
IED: 26.
Location of staff: Peacekeeping missions;
IAD: 70;
ID: 15;
IED: 0.
Location of staff: Geneva;
IAD: 36[A];
ID: 0;
IED: 0.
Location of staff: Vienna;
IAD: 0;
ID: 27;
IED: 0.
Location of staff: Nairobi;
IAD: 13;
ID: 24;
IED: 0.
Source: GAO analysis of OIOS information.
Note: Some of the ID staff in New York, Vienna, and Nairobi
investigate peacekeeping activities. In addition, some of the IAD and
IED staff in New York are also dedicated to peacekeeping activities.
[A] These IAD positions include 22 UNHCR-funded positions that are
administered by the Geneva office, but 10 of them are actually located
in Nairobi, Pakistan, Senegal, Sri Lanka, Sudan, and Syria.
Abbreviations:
IAD: Internal Audit Division;
ID: Investigations Division;
IED: Inspection and Evaluation Division
UNHCR: Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.
[End of figure]
OIOS Funding:
The majority of OIOS funding comes from two budgets approved by the
General Assembly: one for normal, recurrent activities such as the
core functions of the Secretariat (regular budget), and the other for
peacekeeping activities (peacekeeping account).[Footnote 20] Both the
regular and peacekeeping budgets are financed largely through assessed
contributions from member states. A small portion of the peacekeeping
account, the peacekeeping support account, provides funds for OIOS to
conduct audits, investigations, inspections, and evaluations of
peacekeeping activities.[Footnote 21]
In addition to funding from the regular budget and peacekeeping
account, OIOS receives funds from "extrabudgetary" sources. These are
voluntary contributions from member states that pay for the activities
of UN funds, programs, and other entities.[Footnote 22] The United
States contributes a fixed percentage to the regular budget, which was
25 percent prior to 2000 and 22 percent thereafter, and which funds
the UN Secretariat and its various activities and functions, including
OIOS (shown in figs. 2 and 3, respectively). For example, the United
States contributed about $1.2 billion to the UN Secretariat regular
budget in the current biennium (2010-2011). The United States also
contributes annually to peacekeeping operations and to extrabudgetary
items. For example, in 2010, the United States contributed about $2.6
billion to peacekeeping operations (about 27.3 percent of the total
peacekeeping budget) and about $4.4 billion to other UN activities,
including those funded through extrabudgetary sources.
Figure 2: U.S. Share of Contributions to the UN Secretariat Regular
Budget, Fiscal Biennia 1994-1995 through 2010-2011:
[Refer to PDF for image: stacked vertical bar graph]
Nominal U.S. dollars:
Fiscal biennium: 1994-1995;
U.S. contributions: $658 million;
Non-U.S. contributions: $1.974 billion.
Fiscal biennium: 1996-1997;
U.S. contributions: $636 million;
Non-U.S. contributions: $1.907 billion.
Fiscal biennium: 1998-1999;
U.S. contributions: $622 million;
Non-U.S. contributions: $1.866 billion.
Fiscal biennium: 2000-2001;
U.S. contributions: $640 million;
Non-U.S. contributions: $1.921 billion.
Fiscal biennium: 2002-2003;
U.S. contributions: $653 million;
Non-U.S. contributions: $2.315 billion.
Fiscal biennium: 2004-2005;
U.S. contributions: $804 million;
Non-U.S. contributions: $2.852 billion.
Fiscal biennium: 2006-2007;
U.S. contributions: $923 million;
Non-U.S. contributions: $3.721 billion.
Fiscal biennium: 2008-2009;
U.S. contributions: $1.056 billion;
Non-U.S. contributions: $3.744 billion.
Fiscal biennium: 2010-2011;
U.S. contributions: $1.181 billion;
Non-U.S. contributions: $4.186 billion.
Source: GAO analysis of UN data.
Note: The amounts shown for fiscal biennia 1994-1995 through 2008-2009
are derived from the final appropriations for each biennium. The
amounts for the 2010-2011 biennium are estimates. The U.S. share for
each biennium is derived by multiplying the total appropriation by the
U.S. assessment rate in effect during the period.
[End of figure]
Figure 3: U.S. Share of Contributions to the OIOS Regular Budget,
Fiscal Biennia 1994-1995 through 2010-2011:
[Refer to PDF for image: stacked vertical bar graph]
Nominal U.S. dollars:
Fiscal biennium: 1994-1995;
U.S. contributions: $2.8 million;
Non-U.S. contributions: $7=8.3 million.
Fiscal biennium: 1996-1997;
U.S. contributions: $3.7 million;
Non-U.S. contributions: $11 million.
Fiscal biennium: 1998-1999;
U.S. contributions: $4.5 million;
Non-U.S. contributions: $13.4 million.
Fiscal biennium: 2000-2001;
U.S. contributions: $4.6 million;
Non-U.S. contributions: $14 million.
Fiscal biennium: 2002-2003;
U.S. contributions: $4.7 million;
Non-U.S. contributions: $16.7 million.
Fiscal biennium: 2004-2005;
U.S. contributions: $5.2 million;
Non-U.S. contributions: $18.5 million.
Fiscal biennium: 2006-2007;
U.S. contributions: $6.6 million;
Non-U.S. contributions: $23.2 million.
Fiscal biennium: 2008-2009;
U.S. contributions: $7.9 million;
Non-U.S. contributions: $27.9 million.
Fiscal biennium: 2010-2011;
U.S. contributions: $8.6 million;
Non-U.S. contributions: $30.4 million.
Source: GAO analysis of UN data.
Note: The amounts shown for fiscal biennia 1994-1995 through 2008-2009
are derived from the final appropriations for each biennium. The
amounts for the 2010-2011 biennium are estimates. The U.S. share for
each biennium is derived by multiplying the total appropriation by the
U.S. assessment rate in effect during the period.
[End of figure]
As shown in figure 4, OIOS funding from all three sources--regular
budget, peacekeeping, and extrabudgetary--has generally increased over
time. The peacekeeping portion has been the fastest growing component
over the last 10 years due to the rapid rise in peacekeeping
activities around the world, while the regular and extrabudgetary
portions have grown more slowly. OIOS's total appropriations for the
2010-2011 biennium were over $100 million, approximately five times
what they were when OIOS was established in 1994.
Figure 4: Sources of OIOS Appropriations, Fiscal Biennia 1994-1995
through 2010-2011:
[Refer to PDF for image: stacked vertical bar graph]
Nominal U.S. dollars:
Fiscal biennium: 1994-1995;
Regular Budget: $11;
Extrabudgetary: $5.3585;
Peacekeeping: $2.2258 million;
Total: $18.584 million.
Fiscal biennium: 1996-1997;
Regular Budget: $14.627;
Extrabudgetary: $4.2741;
Peacekeeping: $2.2797 million;
Total: $21.181 million.
Fiscal biennium: 1998-1999;
Regular Budget: $17.878;
Extrabudgetary: $6.4071;
Peacekeeping: $3.6122 million;
Total: $27.897 million.
Fiscal biennium: 2000-2001;
Regular Budget: $18.476;
Extrabudgetary: $6.2076;
Peacekeeping: $7.431 million;
Total: $32.115 million.
Fiscal biennium: 2002-2003;
Regular Budget: $21.38;
Extrabudgetary: $8.558;
Peacekeeping: $10.5596 million;
Total: $40.498 million.
Fiscal biennium: 2004-2005;
Regular Budget: $23.76;
Extrabudgetary: $8.01;
Peacekeeping: $31.6757 million;
Total: $63.445 million.
Fiscal biennium: 2006-2007;
Regular Budget: $29.803;
Extrabudgetary: $8.071;
Peacekeeping: $43.2552 million;
Total: $81.129 million.
Fiscal biennium: 2008-2009;
Regular Budget: $35.767;
Extrabudgetary: $14.0879;
Peacekeeping: $50.3497 million;
Total: $100.205 million.
Fiscal biennium: 2010-2011;
Regular Budget: $38.925;
Extrabudgetary: $17.9531;
Peacekeeping: $48.6697 million;
Total: $105.548 million.
Source: GAO analysis of UN data.
Notes: The regular budget amounts shown for fiscal biennia 1994-1995
through 2008-2009 are derived from the final appropriations for each
biennium. The amount for the 2010-2011 biennium is an estimate. The
peacekeeping, extrabudgetary, and regular budget amounts for some
periods (1994-1995 and 2004-2005) do not add to the total shown due to
rounding.
The following caveats pertain to the peacekeeping data:
For fiscal biennia 1994-1995 through 2000-2001: these figures are
taken from biennium budget proposal documents covering the calendar
year of each year of the biennium.
For fiscal biennia 2002-2003 through 2008-2009: these figures are
taken from single-year budget documents covering July 1 to June 30 of
each fiscal year and are thus not directly comparable to data for the
prior biennia in the table.
For fiscal biennium 2010-2011, the peacekeeping figure is taken from
the IAAC report on OIOS's proposed budget for the 2012-2013 biennium.
We have chosen to include the 2002-2003 and 2008-2009 data because
they reasonably depict the overall trend of peacekeeping funding
during this period.
[End of figure]
OIOS's authorized staffing levels have also increased, due in part to
the expansion of UN peacekeeping activities (see figure 11 in appendix
II). We have previously reported that OIOS has had difficulty filling
its authorized staff positions.[Footnote 23]
IAAC Role in Internal Oversight:
The UN General Assembly strengthened internal oversight of the
Secretariat and peacekeeping missions by creating the IAAC, which is
responsible for advising the General Assembly on the scope, results,
and effectiveness of audit and other oversight functions, especially
OIOS. The IAAC is also responsible for advising the General Assembly
on measures to ensure management's compliance with audit and other
oversight recommendations, as well as with various risk management,
internal control, operational, and accounting and disclosure issues.
The committee examines OIOS's work plans, taking into account the work
plans of other UN oversight bodies, reviews OIOS's proposed budget,
and makes recommendations to the General Assembly through the Advisory
Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions. (See appendix III
for a timeline showing the preparation, approval, and execution of
OIOS's regular budget and the IAAC's role in that process.) The
committee also advises the General Assembly on the quality and overall
effectiveness of risk management procedures, on deficiencies in the
internal control framework of the UN, and on steps to increase and
facilitate cooperation among UN oversight bodies.
The General Assembly in 2007 appointed three members to serve a 3-year
term and two members to serve a 4-year term on the IAAC, all beginning
on January 1, 2008; the committee, which generally meets four times a
year, held its first session in February 2008. It has issued 11
reports, including one on vacant positions at OIOS.[Footnote 24] The
IAAC held its 15th session in July 2011, during which it discussed
with the Under-Secretary-General for Internal Oversight Services a
wide range of issues, including funding arrangements, risk assessments
conducted, value provided by OIOS, and performance audits. In
addition, the committee covered standard agenda items with OIOS, such
as relationships with management, high risks identified by OIOS,
coordination with various oversight bodies, implementation of
oversight recommendations, and OIOS staff vacancies. The committee is
scheduled to hold its next meeting in December 2011.
The U.S. Mission to the UN strongly supported the establishment of the
IAAC and has also supported other initiatives to improve transparency
and accountability in the UN system. For example, it has endorsed a
new UN effort to consolidate the management of all financial, human,
and physical resources, including for peacekeeping and field missions,
under one integrated information management system.
OIOS Role Clarified and Independence Strengthened, but Some Funding
and Oversight Issues Remain:
The UN General Assembly is addressing some previously identified
impediments to OIOS's ability to provide independent oversight, but
certain UN funding arrangements and oversight relationships continue
to limit the independence and authority of OIOS. In January 2003, the
General Assembly reaffirmed the prerogatives of separately
administered funds and programs to decide their own oversight
mechanisms and their relationship with OIOS. The UN Secretariat's
Office of Legal Affairs stated that this action clarified the role
OIOS plays in the internal oversight of separately administered funds
and programs, with these entities deciding their own oversight
mechanisms and their relationship with OIOS. An independent review of
UN oversight commissioned by the Secretary-General noted, however,
that the arrangements used to fund OIOS's audits of those separately
administered entities that choose to utilize its audit services do not
meet Institute of Internal Auditors (IIA) standards for independence.
[Footnote 25] OIOS also reported that it is not able to issue
consolidated audit reports for joint UN activities that included
entities over which OIOS does not have oversight authority, even when
directed to do so by the General Assembly.
The General Assembly Has Clarified OIOS's Role in Internal Oversight
of Funds and Programs:
The General Assembly has addressed OIOS's oversight authority several
times since the creation of the office (see appendix IV), and the new
Under-Secretary-General for Internal Oversight Services requested a
legal opinion from the UN Secretariat's Office of Legal Affairs
regarding OIOS's oversight responsibility for funds and programs.
OIOS's founding mandate states that OIOS's purpose is to assist the
Secretary-General in fulfilling his internal oversight
responsibilities with respect to the resources and staff of the
organization.[Footnote 26] The Secretary-General has stated that the
resources and staff of the organization include separately
administered organs. The General Assembly also stated that OIOS has
the authority to initiate, carry out, and report on any action that it
considers necessary to fulfill its responsibilities with regard to
monitoring, internal audit, inspection and evaluation, and
investigations. In January 2003, the General Assembly adopted a
resolution that reaffirmed the prerogatives of separately administered
funds and programs to decide their own oversight mechanisms and their
relationship with OIOS.[Footnote 27] In May 2011, in response to her
request, the UN's Office of Legal Affairs issued a memorandum to the
Under-Secretary-General stating that the General Assembly, through the
2003 resolution, clarified OIOS's jurisdiction over the funds and
programs, which suggested that the involvement of OIOS in their
internal oversight functions is contingent on the consent of the funds
and programs.
According to OIOS's website and audit manual, OIOS provides internal
oversight to UN organizations that are under the direct authority of
the Secretary-General, including departments and offices within the
Secretariat and peacekeeping missions and related offices, and to
funds, programs, and other organizations under the authority of the
Secretary-General, but administered separately, that have requested
OIOS's audit services (see figure 5). The amounts these organizations
pay for internal oversight are based on negotiated fees for services,
sometimes defined in a memorandum of understanding (MOU). Some UN
funds and programs, including, for example, the United Nations
Development Program and the World Food Program, have their own
internal oversight offices, which they use to oversee their activities
instead of using the services of OIOS. Others, such as the
International Trade Center and the Office of the United Nations High
Commissioner for Human Rights, have partial or no internal audit
capacity. Funds or programs with their own internal oversight capacity
may also use certain OIOS services, for example, if they determine
that they need outside experts to conduct a sensitive investigation.
(Appendix V provides a more detailed listing of UN organizations,
their relationship with OIOS, and their oversight capacity.) According
to OIOS, as of September 2011, it provided oversight to a number of
separately administered entities, including seven funds and programs
that have partial or no internal oversight capacity. The Under-
Secretary-General for Internal Oversight Services told us that she is
conducting a review of all separately administered entities under the
authority of the Secretary-General to determine their internal
oversight capacities, which conforms with her mandate to support the
Secretary-General in his oversight responsibilities.
Figure 5: UN Organizations That Are OIOS's Clients and Those with
Their Own Oversight Capacity, 2011:
[Refer to PDF for image: illustration]
UN organizations under the authority of the Secretary-General:
UN Secretariat[B]:
* OHCHR[A];
* UNOG;
* UNOV; and;
* Other Secretariat departments and offices.
UN Peacekeeping[B]:
* Missions and related offices worldwide.
Regional commissions[B]:
* ECA;
* ECE;
* ECLAC;
* ESCAP;
* ESCWA.
Administered separately:
Other UN entities:
* ICJ[B];
* ICTR[B];
* ICTY[B];
* UNCCD[B];
* UNFCCC[B];
* UNJSPF[B];
* 4 UN research and training institutes[B]:
- UNICRI[B];
- UNIDIR[B];
- UNITAR[B];
- UNRISD[B];
* UNCC[C];
* UNSSC[C];
* UNU[C].
Funds and programs, Administered separately:
Funds and programs with partial or no internal oversight capacity[B]:
* ITC;
* OHCHA[A];
* UNCTAD;
* UNEP;
* UN-Habitat;
* UNHCR;
* UNODC.
Funds and programs with their own oversight capacity[D]:
* UNDP;
* UNFPA;
* UNICEF;
* UNOPS;
* UNRWA;
* UN-Women;
* WFP.
Source: GAO analysis of UN and OIOS information.
Notes: For definitions of the abbreviations, see Glossary at the end
of this report.
OIOS does not oversee specialized agencies and other autonomous
organizations linked to the UN through special agreements, such as the
Food and Agriculture Organization, the International Atomic Energy
Agency, the World Health Organization, and other such entities. These
entities have their own oversight capacity and are not clients of OIOS.
[A] OHCHR is listed on OIOS's website and in its audit manual as one
of several "Funds and Programmes administered separately under the
authority of the Secretary-General" that "have requested OIOS audit
services." OHCHR is also shown as a Secretariat department in an
organization chart posted on the UN's website.
[B] UN organizations listed by OIOS as clients, and also specifically
mentioned in OIOSís Audit Manual as clients.
[C] UN organizations not listed by OIOS as clients.
[D] UN organizations listed by OIOS as clients, but not mentioned in
OIOSís Audit Manual.
[End of figure]
OIOS Independence Strengthened, but Impediments to Independence Remain:
The General Assembly Strengthened OIOS's Independence by Creating the
IAAC and Recommending Fully Risk-Based Work Plans and Budget Requests:
[Side bar:
Audit Committee Purpose, Membership, and Responsibilities according to
Best Practices:
Purpose:
* To assist the governing body in its oversight responsibilities;
* To act as an independent safeguard on management;
Membership:
* Independent from the organization
* With specialized skills in financial reporting, corporate
governance, and internal control;
* Selected by the governing body;
Responsibilities:
* Reviewing and approving the internal audit activityís charter;
* Ensuring communication and reporting lines between the chief
internal auditor and the audit committee;
* Reviewing internal audit staffing and ensuring that the function has
the necessary resources;
* Reviewing and assessing the annual internal audit plan;
* Overseeing the coordination of the internal auditor and the external
auditor;
* Reviewing periodic reports on the results of the internal auditorís
work;
* Reviewing senior managementís responsiveness to internal audit
findings and recommendations;
* Monitoring and assessing internal audit effectiveness.
Source: GAO analysis of IIA guidance. See GAO, United Nations
Organizations: Oversight and Accountability Could be Strengthened by
Further Instituting International Best Practices (GAO-07-597, June 18,
2007). End of side bar]
The UN General Assembly has supported OIOS's independence in audits of
organizations within the Secretariat and peacekeeping missions by
creating the Independent Audit Advisory Committee (IAAC), which
reviews OIOS's audit plans and budget requests, and compares them to
the Secretary-General's proposed budgets for oversight to ensure that
they reflect the resources OIOS needs to audit identified risks. In a
July 2006 report to the General Assembly, OIOS noted that a main
obstacle to the independence of its audits was that it was responsible
for auditing departments in the Secretariat, such as the Department of
Management, which reviews its budget.[Footnote 28] While OIOS did not
report any specific examples of budget restrictions that had been
imposed, the IAAC mitigates the potential impairment to OIOS's
independence caused by its dependence on funding from entities it
audits by making recommendations that would ensure that OIOS has
sufficient resources, and keeping the General Assembly apprised of
issues related to OIOS's operational independence. The IAAC became
operational in 2008 and serves some of the functions of an independent
audit committee, which the IIA considers critical to ensuring strong
and effective processes related to independence, internal control,
risk management, compliance, ethics, and financial disclosure.
The IAAC advises the General Assembly in accordance with terms of
reference adopted by the General Assembly in 2007. The IAAC reviews a
proposed budget for internal oversight prepared by the Secretary-
General and compares that to the resources requested by OIOS. The IAAC
then provides independent comments directly to the budget committee of
the General Assembly on the resources OIOS will need (see appendix III
for a timeline showing the preparation, approval, and execution of
OIOS's regular budget). An IAAC official reported that, while part of
its function is to ensure OIOS's independence, the committee does not
automatically take OIOS's side in disputes over resources with the
Secretary-General. In some instances, the IAAC has advised the General
Assembly that OIOS needed more resources and independence; in others,
it has advised that OIOS resources were sufficient or excessive.
[Side bar:
Some Basic Principles Related to IIA Standards for Managing the Internal
Audit Activity, Planning, and Risk Management:
* Managing the internal audit activity: The chief audit executive must
effectively manage the internal audit activity to ensure it adds value
to the organization.
* Planning: The chief audit executive must establish risk-based plans
to determine the priorities of the internal audit activity, consistent
with the organizationís goals.
* Risk management: The internal audit activity must evaluate the
effectiveness and contribute to the improvement of risk management
processes.
* Definition of risk management: A process to identify, assess,
manage, and control potential events or situations to provide reasonable
assurance regarding the achievement of the organizationís objectives.
Source: IIA. End of side bar]
The UN also strengthened OIOS's independence by supporting its efforts
to improve its risk-based planning and budgeting process in accordance
with IIA standards, but OIOS is still working to improve its risk
assessments in response to IAAC concerns. As part of the outcome of a
2005 World Summit gathering at the UN, the General Assembly requested
that the Secretary-General submit an independent external evaluation
of the auditing and oversight system of the UN, with recommendations
for improving these processes. The external review commissioned by the
Secretary-General recommended that OIOS improve its annual risk-
assessment methodology, and specified several improvements, including
building an inventory of risks in consultation with its clients, and
ranking the risk of each item in OIOS's audit universe.[Footnote 29]
As the Secretary-General reported, in addition to ensuring that
oversight resources are prioritized for high-risk areas, a risk-based
approach also provides the General Assembly with a basis for
determining the level of risk it is willing to accept for the
organization. In its 2006 report to the General Assembly, OIOS
committed to having fully risk-based work plans by 2008.[Footnote 30]
OIOS was able to meet this schedule, completing risk assessments of
approximately 90 percent of its clients from July 2007 to September
2008. An OIOS official also reported that its separately administered,
extrabudgetary clients were included in its risk assessments.
In 2008, its first year of operation, the IAAC reported that OIOS's
risk-assessment methodology provided a reasonable basis for
establishing preliminary work plans. However, in 2009, the IAAC
reported that OIOS's risk assessments were not practical for
determining OIOS's resource requirements because they did not take
into account its clients' efforts to mitigate these risks and
therefore gave an inflated estimate of risks and oversight needs. The
IAAC recommended that OIOS modify its risk assessments to include the
effect of controls that its clients have already put in place, and in
February 2011, OIOS officials reported that they are working to change
OIOS's methodology in accordance with the recommendations.
Oversight Arrangements for OIOS's Separately Administered Clients May
Limit Its Ability to Provide Independent Oversight:
[Side bar:
Some Basic Principles Related to IIA Standards for Independence:
* Definition of independence: The freedom from conditions that
threaten the ability of the internal audit activity to carry out
internal audit responsibilities in an unbiased manner.
* The internal audit activity must be independent, and internal
auditors must be objective in performing their work.
* Threats to independence must be managed at the individual auditor,
engagement, functional, and organizational levels.
* The internal audit activity must be free from interference in
determining the scope of internal auditing, performing work, and
communicating results.
* If independence or objectivity is impaired in fact or appearance,
the details of the impairment must be disclosed to appropriate
parties. Impairment to organizational independence may include, but is
not limited to, personal conflict of interest, scope of limitations,
restrictions on access to records, personnel, and properties, and
resource limitations such as funding.
Source: IIA. End of side bar]
The Secretary-General found that OIOS's funding arrangements with
separately administered organizations do not meet IIA standards for
independence because OIOS must negotiate oversight agreements with
these organizations without an independent review to ensure that the
oversight resources provided are sufficient.[Footnote 31] These
negotiations include discussions of the number and level of staff and
resources that will be used for an audit based on an amount of funding
that the individual fund or program is able to provide OIOS. The IAAC
mitigates this potential impediment to OIOS's independence within the
Secretariat and peacekeeping missions; however, the IAAC Chairman
stated that although the IAAC reviews OIOS's budget requests for
separately administered organizations, it does not have the authority
to work with the governing bodies of these entities to resolve funding
issues, and thus potential impediments to OIOS's ability to provide
independent oversight remain.[Footnote 32]
OIOS officials stated that some of these clients have provided limited
audit resources to assist OIOS in its efforts. OIOS officials
emphasized that these resource limitations have not impeded the
office's audit activities because improvements to risk-based planning
have allowed it to better prioritize audit work and manage resources
more effectively and economically. However, OIOS officials reported
that several smaller entities that have adopted the UN financial
regulations and rules (and therefore fall under OIOS's audit authority
for financial management audits) have not provided OIOS with resources
for conducting audits. These entities include the United Nations
Convention to Combat Desertification, the United Nations Interregional
Crime and Justice Research Institute, the United Nations Institute for
Training and Research, the United Nations Research Institute for
Social Development, the United Nations System Staff College, and the
United Nations University.
Compounding the potential for limitations to OIOS's ability to provide
independent oversight, developing oversight relationships on a case-by-
case basis has also created inconsistent funding arrangements, and the
IAAC has recommended that these funding arrangements be revised. OIOS
has MOUs formalizing its relationships with only seven of the
separately administered entities it lists as clients (see table 1).
These MOUs describe OIOS's oversight activities and resources, but the
IAAC does not review the MOUs and they do not necessarily ensure
independent oversight. OIOS has not established formal MOUs with its
other separately administered clients, including three funds and
programs--the United Nations Environment Program, the United Nations
Human Settlements Program, and the United Nations Conference on Trade
and Development. In its report pending with the Secretariat, the IAAC
is recommending that the General Assembly reconsider OIOS's current
funding arrangements with separately administered entities.
Table 1: OIOS's Oversight Relationships with Separately Administered
Clients:
Funds and programs listed by OIOS as clients[A]:
ITC;
Provides funding for OIOS? Funds and programs listed by OIOS as
clients[A]: Yes;
Established MOU with OIOS? Funds and programs listed by OIOS as
clients[A]: Yes-established in 1999;
Adopted UN Financial Regulations and Rules? Funds and programs listed
by OIOS as clients[A]: Yes;
Number of recent audits (2006-June 2011): Funds and programs listed by
OIOS as clients[A]: 2.
OHCHR;
Provides funding for OIOS? Funds and programs listed by OIOS as
clients[A]: Yes;
Established MOU with OIOS? Funds and programs listed by OIOS as
clients[A]: Yes-established in 2005;
Adopted UN Financial Regulations and Rules? Funds and programs listed
by OIOS as clients[A]: Yes;
Number of recent audits (2006-June 2011): Funds and programs listed by
OIOS as clients[A]: 11.
UNCTAD;
Provides funding for OIOS? Funds and programs listed by OIOS as
clients[A]: Yes;
Established MOU with OIOS? Funds and programs listed by OIOS as
clients[A]: No;
Adopted UN Financial Regulations and Rules? Funds and programs listed
by OIOS as clients[A]: Yes;
Number of recent audits (2006-June 2011): Funds and programs listed by
OIOS as clients[A]: 4.
UNEP;
Provides funding for OIOS? Funds and programs listed by OIOS as
clients[A]: Yes;
Established MOU with OIOS? Funds and programs listed by OIOS as
clients[A]: No;
Adopted UN Financial Regulations and Rules? Funds and programs listed
by OIOS as clients[A]: Yes;
Number of recent audits (2006-June 2011): Funds and programs listed by
OIOS as clients[A]: 10.
UN-Habitat;
Provides funding for OIOS? Funds and programs listed by OIOS as
clients[A]: Yes;
Established MOU with OIOS? Funds and programs listed by OIOS as
clients[A]: No;
Adopted UN Financial Regulations and Rules? Funds and programs listed
by OIOS as clients[A]: Yes;
Number of recent audits (2006-June 2011): Funds and programs listed by
OIOS as clients[A]: 10.
UNHCR;
Provides funding for OIOS? Funds and programs listed by OIOS as
clients[A]: Yes;
Established MOU with OIOS? Funds and programs listed by OIOS as
clients[A]: Yes-established in 2001, followed by letter of agreement
in 2007. However, UNHCR does not consider the letter to be currently
valid;
Adopted UN Financial Regulations and Rules? Funds and programs listed
by OIOS as clients[A]: Yes for regular budget-UNHCR has its own
financial regulations and rules for voluntary contributions;
Number of recent audits (2006-June 2011): Funds and programs listed by
OIOS as clients[A]: 118.
UNODC;
Provides funding for OIOS? Funds and programs listed by OIOS as
clients[A]: Yes;
Established MOU with OIOS? Funds and programs listed by OIOS as
clients[A]: Yes-established in 1999;
Adopted UN Financial Regulations and Rules? Funds and programs listed
by OIOS as clients[A]: Yes;
Number of recent audits (2006-June 2011): Funds and programs listed by
OIOS as clients[A]: 15.
Other UN entities listed by OIOS as clients (not including Secretariat
departments and offices, peacekeeping missions and offices, and
regional commissions, all of which fall under the authority of the
Secretary-General and are not separately administered):
ICJ;
Provides funding for OIOS? Funds and programs listed by OIOS as
clients[A]: Yes;
Established MOU with OIOS? Funds and programs listed by OIOS as
clients[A]: No;
Adopted UN Financial Regulations and Rules? Funds and programs listed
by OIOS as clients[A]: Yes;
Number of recent audits (2006-June 2011): Funds and programs listed by
OIOS as clients[A]: 0.
ICSC;
Provides funding for OIOS? Funds and programs listed by OIOS as
clients[A]: status as OIOS client not clear;
Established MOU with OIOS? Funds and programs listed by OIOS as
clients[A]: No;
Adopted UN Financial Regulations and Rules? Funds and programs listed
by OIOS as clients[A]: Yes;
Number of recent audits (2006-June 2011): Funds and programs listed by
OIOS as clients[A]: 0.
ICTR;
Provides funding for OIOS? Funds and programs listed by OIOS as
clients[A]: Yes;
Established MOU with OIOS? Funds and programs listed by OIOS as
clients[A]: No;
Adopted UN Financial Regulations and Rules? Funds and programs listed
by OIOS as clients[A]: Yes;
Number of recent audits (2006-June 2011): Funds and programs listed by
OIOS as clients[A]: 10.
ICTY;
Provides funding for OIOS? Funds and programs listed by OIOS as
clients[A]: Yes;
Established MOU with OIOS? Funds and programs listed by OIOS as
clients[A]: No;
Adopted UN Financial Regulations and Rules? Funds and programs listed
by OIOS as clients[A]: Yes;
Number of recent audits (2006-June 2011): Funds and programs listed by
OIOS as clients[A]: 15.
UNCC;
Provides funding for OIOS? Funds and programs listed by OIOS as
clients[A]: Yes;
Established MOU with OIOS? Funds and programs listed by OIOS as
clients[A]: Yes-established in 1997;
Adopted UN Financial Regulations and Rules? Funds and programs listed
by OIOS as clients[A]: Yes;
Number of recent audits (2006-June 2011): Funds and programs listed by
OIOS as clients[A]: 8.
UNCCD;
Provides funding for OIOS? Funds and programs listed by OIOS as
clients[A]: No;
Established MOU with OIOS? Funds and programs listed by OIOS as
clients[A]: Yes-established in 2010;
Adopted UN Financial Regulations and Rules? Funds and programs listed
by OIOS as clients[A]: Yes;
Number of recent audits (2006-June 2011): Funds and programs listed by
OIOS as clients[A]: 3.
UNFCCC;
Provides funding for OIOS? Funds and programs listed by OIOS as
clients[A]: Yes;
Established MOU with OIOS? Funds and programs listed by OIOS as
clients[A]: Yes-established in 2009;
Adopted UN Financial Regulations and Rules? Funds and programs listed
by OIOS as clients[A]: Yes;
Number of recent audits (2006-June 2011): Funds and programs listed by
OIOS as clients[A]: 6.
UNICRI;
Provides funding for OIOS? Funds and programs listed by OIOS as
clients[A]: No;
Established MOU with OIOS? Funds and programs listed by OIOS as
clients[A]: No;
Adopted UN Financial Regulations and Rules? Funds and programs listed
by OIOS as clients[A]: Yes;
Number of recent audits (2006-June 2011): Funds and programs listed by
OIOS as clients[A]: 1.
UNIDIR;
Provides funding for OIOS? Funds and programs listed by OIOS as
clients[A]: Yes;
Established MOU with OIOS? Funds and programs listed by OIOS as
clients[A]: No;
Adopted UN Financial Regulations and Rules? Funds and programs listed
by OIOS as clients[A]: Yes;
Number of recent audits (2006-June 2011): Funds and programs listed by
OIOS as clients[A]: 3.
UNITAR;
Provides funding for OIOS? Funds and programs listed by OIOS as
clients[A]: No;
Established MOU with OIOS? Funds and programs listed by OIOS as
clients[A]: No;
Adopted UN Financial Regulations and Rules? Funds and programs listed
by OIOS as clients[A]: Yes;
Number of recent audits (2006-June 2011): Funds and programs listed by
OIOS as clients[A]: 1.
UNJSPF;
Provides funding for OIOS? Funds and programs listed by OIOS as
clients[A]: Yes;
Established MOU with OIOS? Funds and programs listed by OIOS as
clients[A]: No;
Adopted UN Financial Regulations and Rules? Funds and programs listed
by OIOS as clients[A]: Yes;
Number of recent audits (2006-June 2011): Funds and programs listed by
OIOS as clients[A]: 29.
UNRISD;
Provides funding for OIOS? Funds and programs listed by OIOS as
clients[A]: No;
Established MOU with OIOS? Funds and programs listed by OIOS as
clients[A]: No;
Adopted UN Financial Regulations and Rules? Funds and programs listed
by OIOS as clients[A]: Yes;
Number of recent audits (2006-June 2011): Funds and programs listed by
OIOS as clients[A]: 1.
UNSSC;
Provides funding for OIOS? Funds and programs listed by OIOS as
clients[A]: No;
Established MOU with OIOS? Funds and programs listed by OIOS as
clients[A]: No;
Adopted UN Financial Regulations and Rules? Funds and programs listed
by OIOS as clients[A]: Yes;
Number of recent audits (2006-June 2011): Funds and programs listed by
OIOS as clients[A]: 0.
UNU;
Provides funding for OIOS? Funds and programs listed by OIOS as
clients[A]: No;
Established MOU with OIOS? Funds and programs listed by OIOS as
clients[A]: No;
Adopted UN Financial Regulations and Rules? Funds and programs listed
by OIOS as clients[A]: Yes;
Number of recent audits (2006-June 2011): Funds and programs listed by
OIOS as clients[A]: 2.
Source: GAO analysis of OIOS information.
Note: For definitions of the abbreviations, see Glossary at the end of
this report.
[A] These entities, which have requested OIOS audit services, are
described in OIOS's audit manual as funds and programs administered
separately under the authority of the Secretary-General.
[End of table]
OIOS May Not Be Able to Provide Sufficient Oversight of Joint UN
Activities When Directed to by the General Assembly:
Since OIOS does not have oversight authority over all separately
administered UN entities, it may not be able to provide sufficient
oversight of crosscutting activities undertaken jointly by multiple UN
entities even when it is directed to do so by the General Assembly. UN
humanitarian, reconstruction, and development program activities can
involve multiple entities not covered by OIOS's existing mandate,
which have their own internal oversight offices. For example, the
United Nations Development Group Iraq Trust Fund has 22 separate
participating UN organizations, and some of these entities also have
their own internal oversight capacity. In August 2006, an external
review commissioned by the Secretary-General found that OIOS could not
fully assess risks in joint activities involving entities not covered
in its mandate, and it recommended that OIOS be given audit authority
over joint activities that include entities within its mandate, with
support from other audit organizations.[Footnote 33] In 2007, OIOS and
other internal audit offices in the UN system adopted a framework for
auditing multi-donor trust funds,[Footnote 34] in part to address this
issue. The framework established that a summary report of all internal
audit work would be prepared after the completion of the individual
audits, and OIOS officials stated that OIOS has subsequently
participated in a summary report of a joint audit of the Common
Humanitarian Fund for Sudan that was issued by the United Nations
Development Program.
While OIOS is not responsible for coordinating the internal oversight
of all joint activities, the General Assembly has previously directed
it to prepare the consolidated report of the audit and investigative
reviews undertaken by other UN organizations. However, in December of
2006, OIOS reported that it had been unable to issue a consolidated
report on the audits of tsunami relief efforts, as directed by the
General Assembly, because the internal auditors of funds, programs,
and specialized agencies were unable to share their audit reports with
OIOS. In 2010, OIOS reemphasized its recommendation that the Secretary-
General, in collaboration with the heads of funds, programs, and
specialized agencies, specify in a single policy document the
applicable rules and regulations, coordination mechanisms, and
reporting systems for oversight of interagency activities.[Footnote
35] OIOS officials noted in the summer of 2011 that it still would not
be possible for OIOS to issue a consolidated audit report because
funds and programs, and specialized agencies cannot share their audit
reports.
Staffing Shortages Have Hindered OIOS Performance, but Efforts Are
Under Way to Address Them:
High vacancy rates for authorized positions, for both rank-and-file
and senior staff, have historically hindered OIOS's ability to provide
sufficient oversight.[Footnote 36] In addition, the Under-Secretary-
General for Internal Oversight Services reported that she has
insufficient staff in the Office of the Under-Secretary-General to
manage OIOS's operations. The UN Secretariat and OIOS are taking steps
to address these staffing issues. OIOS has had staffing shortages in
its three divisions, and the UN's external auditors (the Board of
Auditors) found that these shortages hampered the Internal Audit
Division's completion of its work plans. The UN Secretariat and OIOS
have prioritized filling vacant positions, particularly since the
start of the new Under-Secretary-General's term in 2010. The IAAC also
expressed concern that vacancies at the senior management level would
make it difficult for OIOS to accomplish its work, but OIOS has
recently filled the two director-level positions that had been vacant
for more than a year.[Footnote 37] Further, the Under-Secretary-
General has begun an initiative within OIOS to strengthen OIOS's
management and coordination; this involves a comprehensive review of
the office's responsibilities and capabilities, and may result in
requests for additional management resources. To facilitate this
effort, the Under-Secretary-General has requested staff and additional
consultant positions through the end of 2011, and the Secretary-
General has concurred with this request.
Staffing Shortages Have Constrained OIOS's Oversight Capabilities:
Since our last report on OIOS in 2006, OIOS has had staffing shortages
due to authorized but unfilled positions that have limited the
office's ability to provide sufficient oversight. (See appendix VI for
the status of our 2006 recommendations.) According to the UN Office of
Human Resources Management, OIOS's vacancy rate for professional
service staff was 21 percent, as of September 2010,[Footnote 38] an
increase from the period between 2006 and 2009 when rates were between
12 and 17 percent. As of the end of July 2011, OIOS data indicated
that 19 percent of its approved staff positions were unfilled and
that, as shown in figure 6, the vacancy rates were highest in the
Internal Audit and Investigations Divisions, with the highest rate (30
percent) for investigations of peacekeeping activities. According to
the Board of Auditors, staffing shortages hampered the Internal Audit
Division's completion of its planned audits in 2008 and 2009.[Footnote
39] In 2009 and again in 2010, the IAAC also expressed concern that
the high rate of unfilled positions in OIOS would make it difficult
for OIOS to accomplish its work. The Under-Secretary-General for
Internal Oversight Services noted that this is because OIOS is
required to submit a work plan based on 100 percent of its authorized
positions, rather than filled positions. She further stated that OIOS
should be allowed to submit a work plan based on anticipated staffing
shortages.
Figure 6: Filled and Unfilled OIOS Staff Positions, Fiscal Biennium
2010-2011 (as of July 31, 2011):
[Refer to PDF for image: horizontal bar graph]
Staff Positions: Total;
Filled positions: 265;
Unfilled positions: 62 (19%);
Total: 327.
Staff Positions: Internal Audit Division;
Filled positions: 152;
Unfilled positions: 34 (18%);
Total: 186.
Staff Positions: Investigations Division;
Filled positions: 72 (Peacekeeping: 40; Regular budget: 29;
Extrabudgetary: 3);
Unfilled positions: 24 (25%); (Peacekeeping: 17 (30%); Regular budget:
6 (17%); Extrabudgetary: 1(25%));
Total: 96.
Staff Positions: Inspection and Evaluation Division;
Filled positions: 22;
Unfilled positions: 4 (15%);
Total: 26.
Staff Positions: Office of the Under-Secretary-General and Executive
Office;
Filled positions: 19;
Unfilled positions: 0 (0%);
Total: 19.
Source: GAO analysis of OIOS data.
Note: These data incorporates approved positions under the
peacekeeping account (effective July 1, 2011, through June 30, 2012).
[End of figure]
As reasons for high vacancy rates, OIOS officials cited complexities
in the hiring process, difficulty filling oversight positions in
peacekeeping missions, and a new online system for human resources
management that was unfamiliar to OIOS staff. OIOS officials stated
that the human resource policies of the Secretariat require that
vacancies be posted individually, preventing OIOS from conducting a
single hiring process for multiple positions, and that this
requirement makes reducing the vacancy rate more difficult.
Compounding this problem, OIOS officials added that when a high-level
position becomes vacant, it is often filled internally, which creates
a new vacancy at a lower level. Thus, the filling of one position can
result in the creation of a new vacancy, which requires another
extended recruitment period. OIOS officials also stated that it is
difficult to fill vacant positions in peacekeeping missions due to
challenging working and living conditions. According to a high-level
official in the Investigations Division, OIOS staff in peacekeeping
missions feel isolated by their remote locations and by the fact that
they are seen as outsiders by the peacekeeping staff. Finally, OIOS
officials said the Secretariat had difficulty implementing the new
online human resources recruitment tool, and that this contributed to
delays in filling vacancies in the most recent biennium. UN Office of
Human Resources Management officials confirmed that there had been
some technical problems with the rollout of the new system and that
vacancy rates had increased systemwide.
The UN and OIOS have made reducing staffing shortages a priority. The
new Under-Secretary-General for Internal Oversight Services stated
that she has hired 82 new staff since the beginning of her term in
September 2010 and has received clearance to bring in consultants to
work on recruitment through December 2011. The Under-Secretary-General
noted that the UN financial regulations and rules do not provide her
the flexibility to redeploy funds to hire consultants, as may be
necessary. To reduce the number of unfilled positions, the Under-
Secretary-General requested an exemption from Secretariat hiring
policies in order to conduct mass recruitment to identify qualified
candidates. She said that a key to this effort would be the ability to
interview and prequalify candidates at the appropriate level in order
to be able to fill multiple vacancies at once. She reported that she
did not have to use the exemption because, in the final analysis, she
was able to work within current policies to permit selection of
prequalified candidates more expeditiously.
Officials from the UN Office of Human Resources Management stated that
in April 2010, the UN revised its recruitment policy to expedite the
process for departments with high vacancy rates. The revised policy
allows department managers (including the Under-Secretary-General for
Internal Oversight Services) to place qualified candidates that are
not selected for a particular position onto a roster, which they or
other department managers can then use to fill similar vacancies
without repeating the full recruitment process. The new policy
provides the Office of Human Resources Management with incremental
resources to fully verify credentials and references of rostered
candidates (with their permission), rather than waiting until they
have been selected for a position to complete this verification
process, as this can delay their placement for up to 6 months. This
revision is expected to expedite future placement of prequalified
candidates. OIOS also reported that the difficulties with the online
human resources recruitment tool are being resolved, and that the
office expects vacancy rates to decline over the next year.
Prolonged Vacancies at Director Level Resolved, but Underlying
Weakness in Hiring Process Remains:
OIOS had prolonged vacancies at the director level in two of its three
divisions, one of which persisted for 5 years, but both positions have
now been filled. In its 2008-2009 report, the IAAC expressed concern
that these vacancies would make it difficult for OIOS to accomplish
its work. Vacancies at the director level differ from other vacancies
because OIOS cannot fill director-level vacancies without the approval
of the Secretary-General, in accordance with a Secretariat-wide human
resources policy. According to this policy, the head of a department
or office must submit at least three candidates--one of which must be
a woman--to the Secretary-General, who ultimately decides which
candidate to appoint. This process was a point of contention between
the previous Under-Secretary-General and the Secretary-General and
resulted in prolonged vacancies at the director level in two of OIOS's
three divisions. In 2009, the IAAC proposed a definition of
operational independence for OIOS that includes the ability to select
staff for appointment and promotion, and the General Assembly will
consider this proposal during its 66th session starting in September
2011. However, the new Under-Secretary-General was able to nominate
candidates in accordance with the Secretariat's policy. She stated
that the process was not overly restrictive and that it was
appropriate for an internal auditor to follow the policies of the
Secretariat. In the spring of 2011, the Secretary-General approved the
candidates she had recommended to fill both the Director of
Investigations and the Director of Inspection and Evaluation
positions, who assumed their positions in August 2011.
Under-Secretary-General for Internal Oversight Services Has Reported a
Need for More Staff to Assist Her in Managing OIOS:
Since assuming her position in September 2010, the new Under-Secretary-
General for Internal Oversight Services stated that she has not had
the ability to sufficiently oversee OIOS activities because the Office
of the Under-Secretary-General is under resourced. She said she has
made reviewing all of OIOS's reports prior to release a priority for
quality control, and that OIOS issues about 300 reports per year. In
2011, the Office of the Under-Secretary-General has been reviewing all
reports before they are released, but this has strained available
resources. This office is authorized seven staff, including the Under-
Secretary-General, and all of these positions are currently filled. In
May 2011, the IAAC endorsed a new Assistant Secretary-General
position, which OIOS had included in its budget submission. OIOS
reported that it will request additional staff as needed after
completing a comprehensive review of OIOS's responsibilities and
capabilities. The Under-Secretary-General also stated that additional
management staff could improve collaboration between the divisions to
better share information on risk assessments and internal control
shortfalls--such as risk of fraud identified by the Internal Audit
Division, or systemic control weaknesses found by the Investigations
Division--and is developing a team to identify potential areas for
collaboration among OIOS divisions.
Conclusions:
The United States and other member states have long advocated a wide
range of UN management reforms that have included a call for greater
transparency and accountability throughout the UN system. As part of
its efforts to advance UN reforms, the U.S. Mission to the UN has
included among its priorities strengthening the UN's main internal
oversight body--OIOS--to better identify, obtain, and deploy the
resources needed to ensure that the billions in U.S. and international
contributions are spent wisely and that UN programs are managed
effectively. Although OIOS plays a vital role in improving the UN's
effectiveness, OIOS's ability to provide sufficient oversight of UN
entities under the authority of the Secretary-General is limited due
to impediments to its operational independence in providing full
oversight of funds and programs and high rates of unfilled staff
positions.
The UN General Assembly has taken steps to help strengthen OIOS--most
notably, by creating the IAAC to review OIOS's budgets and work plans
for audits of entities within the Secretariat and peacekeeping
missions to ensure that OIOS resources are sufficient to address risks
in the UN. However, in order to provide essential internal oversight
services, OIOS still has to negotiate individual agreements with
funds, programs, and other clients under the authority of the
Secretary-General but administered separately and funded with
extrabudgetary resources. This practice may unduly limit the scope of
OIOS's oversight. As the United States and other member states place
new demands for fiscal discipline and cost-effective management on the
UN and the myriad funds and programs under it, strengthening OIOS
oversight will help the UN be more responsive to these demands.
Improvements in these areas can help OIOS address some of the
difficulties it faces in effectively carrying out its mandate.
Recommendation for Executive Action:
We recommend that the Secretary of State and the Permanent
Representative of the United States to the United Nations work with
the General Assembly and member states to address remaining
impediments to OIOS's ability to provide independent oversight
resulting from its relationships with certain UN funds and programs
and other clients.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
OIOS and State provided written comments on a draft of this report. We
have reprinted their comments in appendixes VII and VIII,
respectively. These agencies also provided technical comments and
updated information, which we have incorporated throughout this
report, as appropriate.
OIOS agreed with the overall conclusion of the report that progress
has been made in addressing independence and staffing issues and that
further actions are needed in some areas. OIOS stated that it has
developed a comprehensive plan to address the issues we identified and
is currently working to systematically examine options and
implications for their resolution within the scope of OIOS's authority
and responsibility as mandated by the General Assembly. OIOS also
stated that the report fairly reflected its efforts and current views
and noted that the efforts invested by GAO, OIOS, and others have
contributed to the usefulness of the reported results.
State endorsed most of our main findings and conclusions, noting that
it agreed that OIOS's budgetary and operational independence could be
strengthened further. State also accepted our recommendation that
impediments to OIOS's ability to provide independent oversight be
addressed. However, State appears to have misinterpreted our
discussion of OIOS oversight authority over the separately
administered UN funds and programs that have opted to use OIOS as
their internal auditor. State attributed to GAO the assertion that
OIOS's involvement in the internal oversight of funds and programs is
contingent on the consent of the funds and programs. This
interpretation was made instead by the UN Secretariat's Office of
Legal Affairs. We have added language to make this distinction clearer.
As agreed with your office, unless you publicly announce the contents
of this report earlier, we plan no further distribution of it until 30
days from the report date. At that time, we will send copies of this
report to appropriate congressional committees, the Secretary of
State, and the Permanent Representative of the United States to the
United Nations. This report will be available at no charge on the GAO
website at [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov].
If you or your staff members have any questions about this report,
please contact me at (202) 512-9601 or melitot@gao.gov. Contact points
for our Office of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be
found on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made major
contributions to this report are listed in appendix IX.
Signed by:
Thomas Melito:
Director, International Affairs and Trade:
[End of section]
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology:
Our objectives were to examine actions being taken to address (1)
impediments to OIOS's ability to provide independent oversight and (2)
staffing issues that may have hindered its performance.
To address our objectives, we reviewed relevant United Nations (UN)
and Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS) reports, policies and
procedures manuals, and other documents, as well as internationally
recognized standards such as those of the Institute of Internal
Auditors (IIA). We met with Department of State (State) officials in
Washington, D.C., and officials in New York from the U.S. Mission to
the UN. In New York, we also met with the Under-Secretary-General for
Internal Oversight Services, OIOS management officials and staff in
each of the Office's divisions (the Internal Audit Division, the
Investigations Division, and the Inspection and Evaluation Division),
and with staff from the Office of the Under-Secretary-General. In
addition, we met with representatives of UN Secretariat departments
and UN funds and programs, and the members of the UN Board of
Auditors, which carries out external audits of the accounts of the UN
organization and the funds and programs that are under the authority
of the Secretary-General. Through in-person interviews,
videoconference, and teleconference, we spoke with senior OIOS audit
and investigations officials based in Geneva and Vienna; with the
Independent Audit Advisory Committee (IAAC) Chairman in Washington,
D.C.; and with an official from the UN's Joint Inspection Unit in
Geneva, which conducts evaluations and inspections of the UN system.
To assess the reliability of UN and OIOS funding and staffing data, we
reviewed the office's budget reports for fiscal biennia 1994-1995
through 2010-2011 and vetted the data with relevant OIOS and UN budget
officials and interviewed an international relations specialist at the
Congressional Research Service who reports on U.S. contributions to
the UN; however, we did not independently verify the underlying source
data. We determined that UN and OIOS budget data were sufficiently
reliable to present trends of the regular, peacekeeping, and
extrabudgetary appropriations for the biennia 1994-1995 through 2010-
2011. We used staffing data provided by OIOS, which we determined were
reliable for our purposes of presenting staffing levels as of July 31,
2011.
To assess OIOS's consistency with key international auditing
standards, we reviewed relevant internationally accepted standards for
oversight such as the International Standards for the Professional
Practice of Internal Auditing issued by the IIA, which OIOS adopted in
2002. The IIA standards apply to internal audit activities--not to
investigations, inspections, or evaluation activities. However, we
applied these standards OIOS-wide, as appropriate. We also reviewed
the International Standards of Supreme Audit Institutions issued by
the International Organization of Supreme Audit Institutions, as well
as guidelines for oversight such as the Uniform Guidelines for
Investigations issued by the Conference of International
Investigators, and the Norms for Evaluation in the UN System issued by
the United Nations Evaluation Group. Finally, we examined
documentation for OIOS's risk-based planning methodology and annual
work plans, recommendations tracking, and ethics practices.
We conducted our work from October 2010 to September 2011 in
accordance with generally accepted U.S. government auditing standards.
Those standards require that we plan and perform our work to obtain
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our objectives. We believe that the
evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and
conclusions based on our objectives.
[End of section]
Appendix II: OIOS's Locations and Staffing:
Figure 7 displays the locations of OIOS staff, as of September 2011,
including the UN's peacekeeping missions.
Figure 7: OIOS Staff Locations as of September 2011:
[Refer to PDF for image: illustrated world map]
Regular duty stations:
Geneva (26);
Nairobi (40);
New York (142);
Vienna (27).
Peacekeeping mission or other duty station:
Afghanistan (5);
Cite d'Ivoire (6);
Democratic Republic of Congo (12);
East Timor (3);
Germany (1);
Haiti (8);
Kuwait (4);
Liberia (12);
The Netherlands (2);
Pakistan (1);
Senegal (1);
Sri Lanka (1);
Sudan (29);
Syria (1);
Tanzania (3);
Uganda (2).
Source: GAO based on OIOS information; Cartesia MapArt (map).
Notes:
The five audit staff positions located in Afghanistan (for auditing
the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan) and the four
audit staff positions located in Kuwait (for auditing the United
Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq) are funded by the respective
missions' budgets, not by OIOS. They are therefore not included in the
327 authorized staff positions as of July 2011 funded by OIOS.
Five of the staff in Nairobi, one of the staff in Sudan, and all of
the staff in Pakistan, Senegal, Sri Lanka, and Syria audit the Office
of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. The Netherlands-
based staff oversee the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia and the Tanzania-based staff oversee the International
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda. The staff in Germany audits the United
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change.
[End of figure]
The Internal Audit Division is by far the largest OIOS division,
comprising 57 percent of the office's authorized staff; the
Investigations Division is second in size, at 29 percent (see figure
8).
Figure 8: Authorized Staff Positions in OIOS Divisions, Fiscal
Biennium 2010-2011 (as of July 31, 2011):
[Refer to PDF for image: pie-chart]
Internal Audit Division (57%): 186;
Investigations Division (29%): 96;
Inspection and Evaluation Division (8%): 26;
Executive Office (4%): 12;
Office of the Under-Secretary-General (2%): 7.
Source: GAO analysis of OIOS data.
Note: These data incorporate approved positions under the peacekeeping
account (effective July 1, 2011, through June 30, 2012).
[End of figure]
More staff positions are tied to oversight of peacekeeping activities
(47 percent overall, or 153 of 327) than activities funded by the
regular budget (37 percent, or 121 of 327) or extrabudgetary sources
(16 percent, or 53 of 327). The Internal Audit Division is the only
division with a significant number of staff positions financed by
extrabudgetary sources (26 percent, or 49 of 186). (See figure 9.)
Figure 9: Budgetary Allocation of OIOS Staff Positions, Fiscal
Biennium 2010-2011 (as of July 31, 2011):
[Refer to PDF for image: stacked horizontal bar graph]
Staff positions: Total;
Regular budget positions: 121 (37%);
Peacekeeping budget positions: 153 (47%);
Extrabudgetary positions: 53 (16%).
Staff positions: Internal Audit Division;
Regular budget positions: 38;
Peacekeeping budget positions: 89;
Extrabudgetary positions: 49.
Staff positions: Investigations Division;
Regular budget positions: 35;
Peacekeeping budget positions: 57;
Extrabudgetary positions: 4.
Staff positions: Inspection and Evaluation Division;
Regular budget positions: 23;
Peacekeeping budget positions: 3;
Extrabudgetary positions: 0.
Staff positions: Office of the Under-Secretary-General and Executive
Office;
Regular budget positions: 15;
Peacekeeping budget positions: 4;
Extrabudgetary positions: 0.
Source: GAO analysis of OIOS data.
Note: These data incorporate approved positions under the peacekeeping
account (effective July 1, 2011, through June 30, 2012).
[End of figure]
OIOS's authorized staff positions have increased slightly (by 12
percent, or 34 new positions) from 5 years ago, largely due to a 30-
percent increase (43 new positions) in Internal Audit Division
positions, whereas the positions in the Investigations Division
dropped by 15 percent (17 positions). (See figure 10.)
Figure 10: OIOS Authorized Staff Positions for Each Division, Fiscal
Biennia 2006-2007 and 2010-2011 (as of July 31, 2011):
[Refer to PDF for image: horizontal bar graph]
Staff positions: Total;
2010-2011: 327 (12% increase);
2006-2007: 293.
Staff positions: Internal Audit Division;
2010-2011: 186 (30% increase);
2006-2007: 143.
Staff positions: Investigations Division;
2010-2011: 96 (15% decrease);
2006-2007: 113.
Staff positions: Inspection and Evaluation Division;
2010-2011: 26 (24% increase);
2006-2007: 21.
Staff positions: Office of the Under-Secretary-General and Executive
Office;
2010-2011: 19 (19% increase);
2006-2007: 16.
Source: GAO analysis of OIOS data.
Note: These data incorporate approved positions under the peacekeeping
account (effective July 1, 2011, through June 30, 2012).
[End of figure]
Total authorized staff positions have generally increased over the past
nine UN fiscal biennium budget cycles, from 1994-1995 through 2010-2011,
growing from just over 100 positions in 1994-1995 to over 300 in 2010-
2011, due largely to an increase in authorized positions for
overseeing the UN's expanding peacekeeping activities around the world
(see figures 11 and 12).
Figure 11: OIOS Authorized Staff Positions, Fiscal Biennia 1994-1995
through 2010-2011:
[Refer to PDF for image: vertical bar graph]
Year: 1994-1995;
Authorized staff: 110[A].
Year: 1996-1997;
Authorized staff: 124.
Year: 1998-1999;
Authorized staff: 132.
Year: 2000-2001;
Authorized staff: 155.
Year: 2002-2003;
Authorized staff: 167.
Year: 2004-2005;
Authorized staff: 255.
Year: 2006-2007;
Authorized staff: 293.
Year: 2008-2009;
Authorized staff: 344.
Year: 2010-2011;
Authorized staff: 327[B].
Source: GAO analysis of OIOS data.
[A] The figure for the 1994-1995 biennium does not incorporate
temporary positions established during the course of the biennium.
[B] As of July 31, 2011.
[End of figure]
Figure 12: OIOS Authorized Staff and Budget Trends, Fiscal Biennia
1994-1995 through 2010-2011:
[Refer to PDF for image: combined stacked vertical bar and line graph]
Year: 1994-1995;
Regular Budget: $11 million;
Extrabudgetary: $5.4 million;
Peacekeeping: $2.2 million;
Authorized staff: 110.
Year: 1996-1997;
Regular Budget: $14.6 million;
Extrabudgetary: $4.3 million;
Peacekeeping: $2.3 million;
Authorized staff: 124.
Year: 1998-1999;
Regular Budget: $17.9 million;
Extrabudgetary: $6.4 million;
Peacekeeping: $3.6 million;
Authorized staff: 132.
Year: 2000-2001;
Regular Budget: $18.5 million;
Extrabudgetary: $6.2 million;
Peacekeeping: $7.4 million;
Authorized staff: 155.
Year: 2002-2003;
Regular Budget: $21.4 million;
Extrabudgetary: $8.6 million;
Peacekeeping: $10.6 million;
Authorized staff: 167.
Year: 2004-2005;
Regular Budget: $23.8 million;
Extrabudgetary: $8.0 million;
Peacekeeping: $31.7 million;
Authorized staff: 255.
Year: 2006-2007;
Regular Budget: $29.8 million;
Extrabudgetary: $8.1 million;
Peacekeeping: $43.3 million;
Authorized staff: 293.
Year: 2008-2009;
Regular Budget: $35.8 million;
Extrabudgetary: $14.1 million;
Peacekeeping: $50.4 million;
Authorized staff: 344.
Year: 2010-2011;
Regular Budget: $38.9 million;
Extrabudgetary: $18.0 million;
Peacekeeping: $48.7 million;
Authorized staff: 327.
Source: GAO analysis of UN and OIOS data.
[End of figure]
[End of section]
Appendix III: Timeline for the Preparation, Approval, and Execution of
OIOS's Regular Budget:
Figure 13 is a timeline showing the process of preparing, approving,
and executing OIOS's regular budget. As shown in this figure, we have
updated this timeline since our 2006 report to reflect IAAC's creation
and its role in that budget process.
Figure 13: Timeline for the Preparation, Approval, and Execution of
OIOS's Regular Budget:
[Refer to PDF for image: timeline]
Budget preparation and approval for fiscal biennium 2010 - 2011:
September-November 2008:
OIOS divisions formulated proposed budget requests and submitted them
to OIOS/Office of the Under-Secretary-General (OUSG).
October 2008:
OIOS/OUSG and OIOS Executive Office reviewed budget estimates.
November 2008:
OIOS/OUSG submitted proposed budget to Office of Program Planning,
Budget, and Accounts (OPPBA).
December 2008-January 2009:
OPPBA reviewed, sought clarifications, and made recommendations.
January-February 2009:
OPPBA drafted budget report and released it for comments.
February 2009:
Independent Audit Advisory Committee (IAAC) reviewed OIOS budget
proposal in consultation with OIOS and OPPBA.
March 2009:
OPPBA submitted final budget report to IAAC and Advisory Committee on
Administrative and Budgetary Questions (ACABQ) for review.
June 2009:
09IAAC issued its comments and recommendations on the budget proposal.
July 2009:
OIOS and OPPBA justified OIOS proposed budget to ACABQ and IAAC.
December 2009:
Administrative and Budgetary Committee (Fifth Committee) issued draft
resolution.
December 2009:
OPPBA issued the first year of the 2010-2011 biennium allotments.
February 2010:
General Assembly (GA) formally adopted the Fifth Committee Resolution.
Budget execution for fiscal biennium 2010 - 2011:
November-December 2010:
Fifth Committee and IAAC reviewed first performance report and
approved the revised appropriations and issued draft resolution.
December 2010:
09OPPBA issued the second year of the 2010-2011 biennium allotments.
November-December 2011:
Fifth Committee and IAAC review second performance report.
December 2011:
GA approves the final appropriations for the biennium.
Source: GAO based on information provided and validated by OIOS and
OPPBA.
Note: The budget process for trust funds and special accounts is the
same as that for the regular budget. However, the budget cycle for the
peacekeeping operations support account is on a July to June fiscal
year, and the budget is prepared annually. The Peacekeeping Finance
Division provides budget instructions in September of each year. OIOS
submits its budget to the controller in November. The Peacekeeping
Finance Division provides comments on OIOS's proposed budget in
December; subsequently, they meet in January to discuss the budget.
The ACABQ reviews the proposed budget in March, and the General
Assembly reviews and approves the budget around May or June of each
year.
[End of figure]
[End of section]
Appendix IV: UN Resolutions and Administrative Issuances Affecting
OIOS:
Table 2 lists the UN resolutions and administrative issuances
affecting OIOS, including its establishment in 1994, a 2003 resolution
reaffirming the prerogative of the funds and programs to decide on
their own oversight mechanisms and their relationship with OIOS, and
the 2006 resolution establishing the IAAC.
Table 2: UN Resolutions and Administrative Issuances Affecting OIOS:
Resolution or issuance: A/RES/48/218 B [Significant milestone];
Date: 8/12/1994;
Significance to OIOS: General Assembly resolution establishes OIOS.
Resolution or issuance: ST/SGB/273;
Date: 9/7/1994;
Significance to OIOS:
* Describes OIOS functions;
* States that OIOS's responsibilities "shall extend to the resources
and staff of the (UN) Organization, which includes separately
administered organs."
Resolution or issuance: ST/AI/397;
Date: 9/7/1994;
Significance to OIOS: Informs staff and others of the procedures for
reporting possible misuse of funds, waste or abuse of United Nations
facilities or privileges.
Resolution or issuance: ST/AI/401;
Date: 1/18/1995;
Significance to OIOS: Outlines the administrative arrangements and the
authority of the Under-Secretary-General for Internal Oversight
Services in personnel matters.
Resolution or issuance: ST/IC/1996/29;
Date: 4/25/1996;
Significance to OIOS: Provides terms of reference for OIOS
Investigations Division.
Resolution or issuance: ST/SGB/1998/2;
Date: 2/12/1998;
Significance to OIOS: Establishes four OIOS divisions: Central
Evaluation, Auditing and Management Consulting, Investigations, and
Central Inspection and Monitoring.
Resolution or issuance: A/RES/54/244;
Date: 1/31/2000;
Significance to OIOS:
* Requests that the Secretary-General transmit OIOS reports to the
General Assembly and that the Secretary-General comments as
appropriate;
* States that OIOS should not suggest legislative changes to the
General Assembly while recognizing that the Secretary-General can
submit proposals for legislative changes through the appropriate
channels.
Resolution or issuance: ST/SGB/2002/7;
Date: 5/16/2002;
Significance to OIOS:
Reorganizes OIOS into three divisions-Internal Audit;
Monitoring, Evaluation, and Consulting, and Investigations;
* Establishes that the OIOS Geneva Office is headed by a Head of
Office who is concurrently the Chief of the Office of the United
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees Audit Service;
* States that the core functions of OIOS's Internal Audit Division
include "conducting financial, operational and management audits for
all UN activities under the administrative responsibility of the
Secretary-General."
Resolution or issuance: A/RES/57/287 A-B [Significant milestone];
Date: 1/31/2003;
Significance to OIOS: Reaffirms the prerogatives of the funds and
programs to decide on their own oversight mechanisms and their
relationship with OIOS.
Resolution or issuance: A/RES/59/272;
Date: 2/2/2005;
Significance to OIOS:
* Establishes that original versions of OIOS reports that are not
submitted to the General Assembly are available to any member state
upon request;
* The General Assembly concurs with the view that a high-level follow-
up mechanism should be established to incorporate the findings of
OIOS, Board of Auditors, and Joint Inspection Unit into the executive
management process.
Resolution or issuance: A/RES/60/1;
Date: 10/24/2005;
Significance to OIOS: Allows OIOS to examine the feasibility of
expanding its services to provide oversight to UN agencies when
requested. Asks the Secretary-General to submit an independent
external evaluation of the entire internal oversight system in the UN,
including for specialized agencies.
Resolution or issuance: A/RES/60/248 [Significant milestone];
Date: 2/1/2006;
Significance to OIOS: Establishes the IAAC to assist the General
Assembly in discharging its oversight responsibilities.
Resolution or issuance: A/RES/60/259;
Date: 6/15/2006;
Significance to OIOS: Notes with concern OIOS's description of its
mission in its 2005 annual report and reiterates that the mission of
OIOS should be in full conformity with its mandate.
Resolution or issuance: A/RES/61/245;
Date: 3/7/2007;
Significance to OIOS: Requests that the Secretary-General submit a
report to the General Assembly on strengthening OIOS.
Resolution or issuance: A/RES/61/275;
Date: 8/31/2007;
Significance to OIOS:
* Removes management consulting from OIOS;
* Provides updated, more detailed terms of reference for the IAAC;
* Requests revised, pooled funding arrangements for OIOS based on
A/61/880, par. 31-40.
Resolution or issuance: A/RES/64/263;
Date: 5/5/2010;
Significance to OIOS: Endorses some IAAC recommendations on OIOS
operational independence and defers others to the 66th session of
General Assembly (in the fall of 2011).
Source: GAO analysis of UN documents.
[End of table]
[End of section]
Appendix V: UN Organizations, Their Relationship with OIOS, and Their
Oversight Capacity:
Table 3 lists the organizations that comprise the UN system and
information about their relationship with OIOS and their internal
oversight capacity.
Table 3: UN Organizations, Their Relationship with OIOS, and Their
Oversight Capacity:
Name of entity[A]: Secretariat[D];
OIOS has no oversight authority: [Empty];
OIOS has oversight authority: [Check];
Has own oversight capacity: [Empty];
Has partial oversight capacity: [Empty];
OIOS provides oversight: [Check];
OIOS provides partial oversight[B]: [Empty];
OIOS provides oversight in special situations[C]: [Empty].
Name of entity[A]: Peacekeeping[E];
OIOS has no oversight authority: [Empty];
OIOS has oversight authority: [Check];
Has own oversight capacity: [Empty];
Has partial oversight capacity: [Empty];
OIOS provides oversight: [Check];
OIOS provides partial oversight[B]: [Empty];
OIOS provides oversight in special situations[C]: [Empty].
Funds and programs, research and training institutes, and other
entities:
Name of entity[A]: ICJ;
OIOS has no oversight authority: [Empty];
OIOS has oversight authority: [Check];
Has own oversight capacity: [Empty];
Has partial oversight capacity: [Empty];
OIOS provides oversight: [Check];
OIOS provides partial oversight[B]: [Empty];
OIOS provides oversight in special situations[C]: [Empty].
Name of entity[A]: ICSC;
OIOS has no oversight authority: [Empty];
OIOS has oversight authority: ?[F];
Has own oversight capacity: [Empty];
Has partial oversight capacity: [Empty];
OIOS provides oversight: ?[F];
OIOS provides partial oversight[B]: [Empty];
OIOS provides oversight in special situations[C]: [Empty].
Name of entity[A]: ICTR;
OIOS has no oversight authority: [Empty];
OIOS has oversight authority: [Check];
Has own oversight capacity: [Empty];
Has partial oversight capacity: [Empty];
OIOS provides oversight: [Check];
OIOS provides partial oversight[B]: [Empty];
OIOS provides oversight in special situations[C]: [Empty].
Name of entity[A]: ICTY;
OIOS has no oversight authority: [Empty];
OIOS has oversight authority: [Check];
Has own oversight capacity: [Empty];
Has partial oversight capacity: [Empty];
OIOS provides oversight: [Check];
OIOS provides partial oversight[B]: [Empty];
OIOS provides oversight in special situations[C]: [Empty].
Name of entity[A]: ITC;
OIOS has no oversight authority: [Empty];
OIOS has oversight authority: [Check];
Has own oversight capacity: [Empty];
Has partial oversight capacity: [Empty];
OIOS provides oversight: [Check];
OIOS provides partial oversight[B]: [Empty];
OIOS provides oversight in special situations[C]: [Empty].
Name of entity[A]: OHCHR;
OIOS has no oversight authority: [Empty];
OIOS has oversight authority: [Check];
Has own oversight capacity: [Empty];
Has partial oversight capacity: [Empty];
OIOS provides oversight: [Check];
OIOS provides partial oversight[B]: [Empty];
OIOS provides oversight in special situations[C]: [Empty].
Name of entity[A]: SCSL;
OIOS has no oversight authority: [Check];
OIOS has oversight authority: [Empty];
Has own oversight capacity: [Empty];
Has partial oversight capacity: [Empty];
OIOS provides oversight: [Empty];
OIOS provides partial oversight[B]: [Empty];
OIOS provides oversight in special situations[C]: [Empty].
Name of entity[A]: UNAIDS;
OIOS has no oversight authority: [Check];
OIOS has oversight authority: [Empty];
Has own oversight capacity: [Check];
Has partial oversight capacity: [Empty];
OIOS provides oversight: [Empty];
OIOS provides partial oversight[B]: [Empty];
OIOS provides oversight in special situations[C]: [Empty].
Name of entity[A]: UNCC;
OIOS has no oversight authority: [Empty];
OIOS has oversight authority: [Check];
Has own oversight capacity: [Empty];
Has partial oversight capacity: [Empty];
OIOS provides oversight: [Check];
OIOS provides partial oversight[B]: [Empty];
OIOS provides oversight in special situations[C]: [Empty].
Name of entity[A]: UNCCD;
OIOS has no oversight authority: [Empty];
OIOS has oversight authority: [Check];
Has own oversight capacity: [Empty];
Has partial oversight capacity: [Empty];
OIOS provides oversight: No funding[G];
OIOS provides partial oversight[B]: [Empty];
OIOS provides oversight in special situations[C]: [Empty].
Name of entity[A]: UNCTAD;
OIOS has no oversight authority: [Empty];
OIOS has oversight authority: [Check];
Has own oversight capacity: [Empty];
Has partial oversight capacity: [Empty];
OIOS provides oversight: [Check];
OIOS provides partial oversight[B]: [Empty];
OIOS provides oversight in special situations[C]: [Empty].
Name of entity[A]: UNDP;
OIOS has no oversight authority: [Empty];
OIOS has oversight authority: [Empty];
Has own oversight capacity: [Check];
Has partial oversight capacity: [Empty];
OIOS provides oversight: [Empty];
OIOS provides partial oversight[B]: [Empty];
OIOS provides oversight in special situations[C]: [Check].
Name of entity[A]: UNEP;
OIOS has no oversight authority: [Empty];
OIOS has oversight authority: [Check];
Has own oversight capacity: [Empty];
Has partial oversight capacity: [Check];
OIOS provides oversight: [Empty];
OIOS provides partial oversight[B]: [Check];
OIOS provides oversight in special situations[C]: [Empty].
Name of entity[A]: UNFCCC;
OIOS has no oversight authority: [Empty];
OIOS has oversight authority: [Check];
Has own oversight capacity: [Empty];
Has partial oversight capacity: [Empty];
OIOS provides oversight: [Check];
OIOS provides partial oversight[B]: [Empty];
OIOS provides oversight in special situations[C]: [Empty].
Name of entity[A]: UNFPA;
OIOS has no oversight authority: [Empty];
OIOS has oversight authority: [Empty];
Has own oversight capacity: [Check];
Has partial oversight capacity: [Empty];
OIOS provides oversight: [Empty];
OIOS provides partial oversight[B]: [Empty];
OIOS provides oversight in special situations[C]: [Check][H].
Name of entity[A]: UN-Habitat;
OIOS has no oversight authority: [Empty];
OIOS has oversight authority: [Check];
Has own oversight capacity: [Empty];
Has partial oversight capacity: [Check];
OIOS provides oversight: [Empty];
OIOS provides partial oversight[B]: [Check];
OIOS provides oversight in special situations[C]: [Empty].
Name of entity[A]: UNHCR;
OIOS has no oversight authority: [Empty];
OIOS has oversight authority: [Check];
Has own oversight capacity: [Empty];
Has partial oversight capacity: [Check];
OIOS provides oversight: [Empty];
OIOS provides partial oversight[B]: [Check];
OIOS provides oversight in special situations[C]: [Empty].
Name of entity[A]: UNICEF;
OIOS has no oversight authority: [Empty];
OIOS has oversight authority: [Empty];
Has own oversight capacity: [Check];
Has partial oversight capacity: [Empty];
OIOS provides oversight: [Empty];
OIOS provides partial oversight[B]: [Empty];
OIOS provides oversight in special situations[C]: [Empty].
Name of entity[A]: UNICRI;
OIOS has no oversight authority: [Empty];
OIOS has oversight authority: [Check];
Has own oversight capacity: [Empty];
Has partial oversight capacity: [Empty];
OIOS provides oversight: No funding[G];
OIOS provides partial oversight[B]: [Empty];
OIOS provides oversight in special situations[C]: [Empty].
Name of entity[A]: UNIDIR;
OIOS has no oversight authority: [Empty];
OIOS has oversight authority: [Check];
Has own oversight capacity: [Empty];
Has partial oversight capacity: [Empty];
OIOS provides oversight: [Check];
OIOS provides partial oversight[B]: [Empty];
OIOS provides oversight in special situations[C]: [Empty].
Name of entity[A]: UNISDR;
OIOS has no oversight authority: [Empty];
OIOS has oversight authority: [Empty];
Has own oversight capacity: [Empty];
Has partial oversight capacity: [Empty];
OIOS provides oversight: [Empty];
OIOS provides partial oversight[B]: [Empty];
OIOS provides oversight in special situations[C]: [Empty].
Name of entity[A]: UNITAR;
OIOS has no oversight authority: [Empty];
OIOS has oversight authority: [Check];
Has own oversight capacity: [Empty];
Has partial oversight capacity: [Empty];
OIOS provides oversight: No funding[G];
OIOS provides partial oversight[B]: [Empty];
OIOS provides oversight in special situations[C]: [Empty].
Name of entity[A]: UNJSPF;
OIOS has no oversight authority: [Empty];
OIOS has oversight authority: [Check];
Has own oversight capacity: [Empty];
Has partial oversight capacity: [Empty];
OIOS provides oversight: [Check];
OIOS provides partial oversight[B]: [Empty];
OIOS provides oversight in special situations[C]: [Empty].
Name of entity[A]: UNODC;
OIOS has no oversight authority: [Empty];
OIOS has oversight authority: [Check];
Has own oversight capacity: [Empty];
Has partial oversight capacity: [Check];
OIOS provides oversight: [Empty];
OIOS provides partial oversight[B]: [Check];
OIOS provides oversight in special situations[C]: [Empty].
Name of entity[A]: UNOPS;
OIOS has no oversight authority: [Empty];
OIOS has oversight authority: [Empty];
Has own oversight capacity: [Check];
Has partial oversight capacity: [Empty];
OIOS provides oversight: [Empty];
OIOS provides partial oversight[B]: [Empty];
OIOS provides oversight in special situations[C]: [Empty].
Name of entity[A]: UNRISD;
OIOS has no oversight authority: [Empty];
OIOS has oversight authority: [Check];
Has own oversight capacity: [Empty];
Has partial oversight capacity: [Empty];
OIOS provides oversight: No funding[G];
OIOS provides partial oversight[B]: [Empty];
OIOS provides oversight in special situations[C]: [Empty].
Name of entity[A]: UNRWA;
OIOS has no oversight authority: [Empty];
OIOS has oversight authority: [Empty];
Has own oversight capacity: [Check];
Has partial oversight capacity: [Empty];
OIOS provides oversight: [Empty];
OIOS provides partial oversight[B]: [Check];
OIOS provides oversight in special situations[C]: [Empty].
Name of entity[A]: UNSSC;
OIOS has no oversight authority: [Empty];
OIOS has oversight authority: [Check];
Has own oversight capacity: [Empty];
Has partial oversight capacity: [Empty];
OIOS provides oversight: No funding[G];
OIOS provides partial oversight[B]: [Empty];
OIOS provides oversight in special situations[C]: [Empty].
Name of entity[A]: UNU;
OIOS has no oversight authority: [Empty];
OIOS has oversight authority: [Check];
Has own oversight capacity: [Empty];
Has partial oversight capacity: [Empty];
OIOS provides oversight: No funding[G];
OIOS provides partial oversight[B]: [Empty];
OIOS provides oversight in special situations[C]: [Empty].
Name of entity[A]: UN-Women;
OIOS has no oversight authority: [Check];
OIOS has oversight authority: [Empty];
Has own oversight capacity: [Check];
Has partial oversight capacity: [Empty];
OIOS provides oversight: [Empty];
OIOS provides partial oversight[B]: [Empty];
OIOS provides oversight in special situations[C]: [Empty].
Name of entity[A]: WFP;
OIOS has no oversight authority: [Empty];
OIOS has oversight authority: [Empty];
Has own oversight capacity: [Check];
Has partial oversight capacity: [Empty];
OIOS provides oversight: [Empty];
OIOS provides partial oversight[B]: [Empty];
OIOS provides oversight in special situations[C]: [Empty].
Regional commissions:
Name of entity[A]: ECA;
OIOS has no oversight authority: [Empty];
OIOS has oversight authority: [Check];
Has own oversight capacity: [Empty];
Has partial oversight capacity: [Empty];
OIOS provides oversight: [Check];
OIOS provides partial oversight[B]: [Empty];
OIOS provides oversight in special situations[C]: [Empty].
Name of entity[A]: ECE;
OIOS has no oversight authority: [Empty];
OIOS has oversight authority: [Check];
Has own oversight capacity: [Empty];
Has partial oversight capacity: [Empty];
OIOS provides oversight: [Check];
OIOS provides partial oversight[B]: [Empty];
OIOS provides oversight in special situations[C]: [Empty].
Name of entity[A]: ECLAC;
OIOS has no oversight authority: [Empty];
OIOS has oversight authority: [Check];
Has own oversight capacity: [Empty];
Has partial oversight capacity: [Empty];
OIOS provides oversight: [Check];
OIOS provides partial oversight[B]: [Empty];
OIOS provides oversight in special situations[C]: [Empty].
Name of entity[A]: ESCAP;
OIOS has no oversight authority: [Empty];
OIOS has oversight authority: [Check];
Has own oversight capacity: [Empty];
Has partial oversight capacity: [Empty];
OIOS provides oversight: [Check];
OIOS provides partial oversight[B]: [Empty];
OIOS provides oversight in special situations[C]: [Empty].
Name of entity[A]: ESCWA;
OIOS has no oversight authority: [Empty];
OIOS has oversight authority: [Check];
Has own oversight capacity: [Empty];
Has partial oversight capacity: [Empty];
OIOS provides oversight: [Check];
OIOS provides partial oversight[B]: [Empty];
OIOS provides oversight in special situations[C]: [Empty].
Specialized agencies:
Name of entity[A]: FAO;
OIOS has no oversight authority: [Check];
OIOS has oversight authority: [Empty];
Has own oversight capacity: [Check];
Has partial oversight capacity: [Empty];
OIOS provides oversight: [Empty];
OIOS provides partial oversight[B]: [Empty];
OIOS provides oversight in special situations[C]: [Empty].
Name of entity[A]: ICAO;
OIOS has no oversight authority: [Check];
OIOS has oversight authority: [Empty];
Has own oversight capacity: [Check];
Has partial oversight capacity: [Empty];
OIOS provides oversight: [Empty];
OIOS provides partial oversight[B]: [Empty];
OIOS provides oversight in special situations[C]: [Empty].
Name of entity[A]: IFAD;
OIOS has no oversight authority: [Check];
OIOS has oversight authority: [Empty];
Has own oversight capacity: [Check];
Has partial oversight capacity: [Empty];
OIOS provides oversight: [Empty];
OIOS provides partial oversight[B]: [Empty];
OIOS provides oversight in special situations[C]: [Empty].
Name of entity[A]: ILO;
OIOS has no oversight authority: [Check];
OIOS has oversight authority: [Empty];
Has own oversight capacity: [Check];
Has partial oversight capacity: [Empty];
OIOS provides oversight: [Empty];
OIOS provides partial oversight[B]: [Empty];
OIOS provides oversight in special situations[C]: [Empty].
Name of entity[A]: IMF;
OIOS has no oversight authority: [Check];
OIOS has oversight authority: [Empty];
Has own oversight capacity: [Check];
Has partial oversight capacity: [Empty];
OIOS provides oversight: [Empty];
OIOS provides partial oversight[B]: [Empty];
OIOS provides oversight in special situations[C]: [Empty].
Name of entity[A]: IMO;
OIOS has no oversight authority: [Check];
OIOS has oversight authority: [Empty];
Has own oversight capacity: [Check];
Has partial oversight capacity: [Empty];
OIOS provides oversight: [Empty];
OIOS provides partial oversight[B]: [Empty];
OIOS provides oversight in special situations[C]: [Empty].
Name of entity[A]: ITU;
OIOS has no oversight authority: [Check];
OIOS has oversight authority: [Empty];
Has own oversight capacity: [Check];
Has partial oversight capacity: [Empty];
OIOS provides oversight: [Empty];
OIOS provides partial oversight[B]: [Empty];
OIOS provides oversight in special situations[C]: [Empty].
Name of entity[A]: UNESCO;
OIOS has no oversight authority: [Check];
OIOS has oversight authority: [Empty];
Has own oversight capacity: [Check];
Has partial oversight capacity: [Empty];
OIOS provides oversight: [Empty];
OIOS provides partial oversight[B]: [Empty];
OIOS provides oversight in special situations[C]: [Empty].
Name of entity[A]: UNIDO;
OIOS has no oversight authority: [Check];
OIOS has oversight authority: [Empty];
Has own oversight capacity: [Check];
Has partial oversight capacity: [Empty];
OIOS provides oversight: [Empty];
OIOS provides partial oversight[B]: [Empty];
OIOS provides oversight in special situations[C]: [Empty].
Name of entity[A]: UNWTO;
OIOS has no oversight authority: [Check];
OIOS has oversight authority: [Empty];
Has own oversight capacity: [Empty];
Has partial oversight capacity: [Empty];
OIOS provides oversight: [Empty];
OIOS provides partial oversight[B]: [Empty];
OIOS provides oversight in special situations[C]: [Empty].
Name of entity[A]: UPU;
OIOS has no oversight authority: [Check];
OIOS has oversight authority: [Empty];
Has own oversight capacity: [Check];
Has partial oversight capacity: [Empty];
OIOS provides oversight: [Empty];
OIOS provides partial oversight[B]: [Empty];
OIOS provides oversight in special situations[C]: [Empty].
Name of entity[A]: WB Group;
OIOS has no oversight authority: [Check];
OIOS has oversight authority: [Empty];
Has own oversight capacity: [Check];
Has partial oversight capacity: [Empty];
OIOS provides oversight: [Empty];
OIOS provides partial oversight[B]: [Empty];
OIOS provides oversight in special situations[C]: [Empty].
Name of entity[A]: WHO;
OIOS has no oversight authority: [Check];
OIOS has oversight authority: [Empty];
Has own oversight capacity: [Check];
Has partial oversight capacity: [Empty];
OIOS provides oversight: [Empty];
OIOS provides partial oversight[B]: [Empty];
OIOS provides oversight in special situations[C]: [Empty].
Name of entity[A]: WIPO;
OIOS has no oversight authority: [Check];
OIOS has oversight authority: [Empty];
Has own oversight capacity: [Check];
Has partial oversight capacity: [Empty];
OIOS provides oversight: [Empty];
OIOS provides partial oversight[B]: [Empty];
OIOS provides oversight in special situations[C]: [Empty].
Name of entity[A]: WMO;
OIOS has no oversight authority: [Check];
OIOS has oversight authority: [Empty];
Has own oversight capacity: [Check];
Has partial oversight capacity: [Empty];
OIOS provides oversight: [Empty];
OIOS provides partial oversight[B]: [Empty];
OIOS provides oversight in special situations[C]: [Empty].
Other organizations:
Name of entity[A]: CTBTO;
OIOS has no oversight authority: [Check];
OIOS has oversight authority: [Empty];
Has own oversight capacity: [Check];
Has partial oversight capacity: [Empty];
OIOS provides oversight: [Empty];
OIOS provides partial oversight[B]: [Empty];
OIOS provides oversight in special situations[C]: [Empty].
Name of entity[A]: IAEA;
OIOS has no oversight authority: [Check];
OIOS has oversight authority: [Empty];
Has own oversight capacity: [Check];
Has partial oversight capacity: [Empty];
OIOS provides oversight: [Empty];
OIOS provides partial oversight[B]: [Empty];
OIOS provides oversight in special situations[C]: [Empty].
Name of entity[A]: OPCW;
OIOS has no oversight authority: [Check];
OIOS has oversight authority: [Empty];
Has own oversight capacity: [Check];
Has partial oversight capacity: [Empty];
OIOS provides oversight: [Empty];
OIOS provides partial oversight[B]: [Empty];
OIOS provides oversight in special situations[C]: [Empty].
Name of entity[A]: WTO;
OIOS has no oversight authority: [Check];
OIOS has oversight authority: [Empty];
Has own oversight capacity: [Check];
Has partial oversight capacity: [Empty];
OIOS provides oversight: [Empty];
OIOS provides partial oversight[B]: [Empty];
OIOS provides oversight in special situations[C]: [Empty].
Sources: GAO analysis of UN information and validated by OIOS.
Note: For definitions of the abbreviations, see Glossary at the end of
this report.
[A] This is not an all-inclusive list of UN organizations. We have
included all the organizations listed in the organization chart on the
UN's website, which notes that the chart is not intended to be all-
inclusive.
[B] Along with the entity's own internal oversight structures.
[C] For example, if the entity determines that it needs outside
experts to conduct a sensitive investigation.
[D] Secretariat departments and offices.
[E] Peacekeeping missions and offices around the world.
[F] According to OIOS, the ICSC's status as a client is not clear.
[G] According to OIOS, these entities are clients but have not
provided OIOS with any funds for oversight services.
[H] UNDP also provides oversight for UNFPA in some instances.
[End of table]
[End of section]
Appendix VI: Status of Recommendations from Our 2006 Report:
Our 2006 report made seven recommendations to State and the U.S.
Mission to the UN--of these, we closed three recommendations as
implemented and four as not implemented. (GAO practice is to close out
all recommendations within a 4-year period.) Table 4 summarizes the
status of each of our recommendations as of July 31, 2011--including
the three recommendations that were implemented within the GAO 4-year
time frame, and four that have not been fully implemented, but actions
have been taken.
Table 4: Status of Recommendations from Our 2006 Report:
Implemented within the GAO 4-year time frame:
Issue: 1. Risk management framework;
Recommendation: Complete the implementation of OIOS's risk management
framework to ensure that its annual work plans address those areas
that pose the highest risks.
Status: As discussed in this report, OIOS has adopted a risk-based
approach to its annual work plans and continues to refine it under the
IAAC's guidance. This recommendation is also related to developing a
workforce planning methodology.
Issue: 2. Reporting on risks and control issues;
Recommendation: Report to the General Assembly on the status of
significant risks and control issues facing the UN organization, the
resources necessary to address these issues, and the consequences to
the organization if any risks and control weaknesses are not addressed.
Status: In its annual reports to the General Assembly, OIOS reports on
seven categories of risk (strategy, governance, compliance, financial,
operational, human resources, and information) and notes the status of
any significant risks and control weaknesses and potential
consequences if these are not addressed.
Issue: 3. Training;
Recommendation: Institute a mandatory training curriculum for OIOS
professional staff, including auditors and investigators.
Status: All three OIOS divisions have developed training curricula:
the Internal Audit Division developed mandatory training for all
staff, as well as specialized training for different staff job grades,
and has conducted training on fraud, performance audits, governance,
and writing audit reports;
the Investigations Division has established an Investigations Learning
Program for its staff and other staff who may be involved in
conducting investigations;
and the Inspection and Evaluation Division has developed an internal
training policy and guidelines and, as part of the UN Evaluation
Group, has established a core curriculum for evaluation training for
the UN system.
Not fully implemented but actions have been taken:
Issue: 4. Funding arrangements;
Recommendation: Ensure reliable funding arrangements for OIOS that do
not undermine the independence of OIOS and provide it with sufficient
resources that it can effectively reallocate and deploy, as may be
necessary, to meet high-risk areas as they arise.
Status: The UN is making progress toward implementing this
recommendation. As this report indicates, actions taken by the IAAC
are enhancing OIOS's independence. However, further actions are needed.
Issue: 5. Workforce planning methodology;
Recommendation: Develop a workforce planning methodology to
systematically assess and determine appropriate staffing levels for
OIOS.
Status: OIOS has begun to implement this recommendation by basing its
work plans and budget requests on risk. In addition, the
Investigations Division instituted new controls in January 2011 that
will facilitate its efforts to restructure the division.
Issue: 6. Data reliability;
Recommendation: Establish guidance and procedures for assessing the
reliability of data used in support of significant findings in OIOS
reports.
Status: GAO previously reported that OIOS's Internal Audit Division
lacked guidance and procedures for assessing the reliability of data
used in support of significant findings in OIOS reports. In 2009, the
Information and Communications Technology Section in the Internal
Audit Division developed two audit practice guidelines to support
auditors in assessing the reliability of data. These practice
guidelines are included in OIOS's Audit Manual and identify
requirements for assessing internal controls for data origin, input,
processing, output, and storage. The guidelines cover software for
data analysis, training auditors how to assess the reliability of
data, preparing work papers, and identifying risks in information
systems. However, they do not provide auditors with specific steps for
assessing data reliability or guidance on how to determine whether the
data are reliable. For example, the guidelines do not provide criteria
for defining sufficiently reliable data as compared with data that are
not sufficiently reliable or data of undetermined reliability.
Issue: 7. Statements of independence and financial disclosures;
Recommendation: Require all OIOS professional staff to file statements
of independence and financial disclosures.
Status: GAO previously reported that OIOS was vulnerable to potential
conflicts of interest since it did not require all staff to submit
formal statements of independence or complete financial disclosure
forms, as required by international auditing standards. In response to
our recommendation, OIOS now requires staff from the Internal Audit
and Investigations Divisions to sign formal statements of independence
prior to the start of each assignment. However, staff from the
Inspection and Evaluation Division do not have this requirement. In
May 2011, the Acting Director of the Investigations Division issued a
new protocol on conflicts of interest that requires investigators to
document their assessment of potential conflicts of interest in the
work plan of an investigation, and to provide information on any
conflicts identified. Only senior OIOS staff at the director level or
above are required to submit financial disclosure forms. According to
OIOS, requiring all staff to submit such forms would be too costly to
justify any reduction in risk.
Source: GAO analysis of OIOS information.
[End of table]
[End of section]
Appendix VII: Comments from the Office of Internal Oversight Services:
United Nations:
Headquarters:
New York, NY 10017:
Reference: OUSG-11-00387:
2 September 2011:
Mr. Thomas Melito:
Director, International Affairs and Trade:
Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC:
Dear Mr. Melito,
Re: GAO Report on UN internal Oversight dated September 2011
OIOS appreciates being allowed the opportunity to review the draft
report and provide comments prior to its publication.
We agree with the overall conclusion of the report that progress has
been made on addressing independence and staffing issues, and that
further actions arc needed in some areas. We also appreciate that our
efforts and current views on many issues have been fairly reflected in
the report, and that it acknowledges the strong support provided to
OIOS by senior management, and in particular the Secretary-General, in
assisting us to examine options and find solutions. Such support is a
critical element in realizing internal oversight's potential to
contribute to greater transparency, effectiveness and accountability
in the operations of the United Nations and its funds and programs.
OIOS has developed a comprehensive plan to address the issues outlined
in the report and many others, and is currently working to
systematically examine options and implications for their resolution
within the scope of OIOS authority and responsibility as mandated by
the General Assembly. We will continue to consult with the U.S-.
Mission and other member states, senior management and interested
stakeholders to examine all relevant aspects and impacts in arriving
at proposals for solutions.
We appreciate the efforts and professionalism of-the GAO team members
involved in this review, and the additional insights and perspectives
our many discussions and feedback sessions have enlightened. I also
wish to acknowledge the significant efforts invested by both the GAO
and OIOS teams as well as other Secretariat and oversight
participants. in ensuring that information and clarifications provided
are accurate and well understood. These efforts, which are highly
appreciated, have no doubt contributed to the usefulness of the
reported results.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
Carman L. Lapointe:
Under-Secretary-General for Internal Oversight Services:
[End of section]
Appendix VIII: Comments from the Department of State:
Note: GAO comments supplementing those in the report text appear at
the end of this appendix.
United States Department of State:
Chief Financial Officer:
Washington, D.C. 20520:
September 7, 2011:
Ms. Jacquelyn Williams-Bridgers:
Managing Director:
International Affairs and Trade:
Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20548-0001:
Dear Ms. Williams-Bridgers:
We appreciate the opportunity to review your draft report,
"UN Internal Oversight: Progress Made on Independence and
Staffing Issues, but Further Actions Are Needed," GAO Job Code 320809.
The enclosed Department of State comments are provided for
incorporation with this letter as an appendix to the final report.
If you have any questions concerning this response, please contact
Matt Glockner, Program Analyst, Bureau of International Organizations,
at (202) 647-6413.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
James L. Millette:
cc: GAO ó Thomas Melito:
IO ó Esther D. Brimmer:
State/OIG ó Evelyn Klemstine:
[End of letter]
Department of State Comments on GAO Draft Report:
UN Internal Oversight: Progress Made on Independence and Staffing
Issues, but Further Actions Are Needed (GA0-11-871, GAO Code 320809):
Thank you for the opportunity to comment on your draft report entitled
UN Internal Oversight: Progress Made on Independence and Staffing
Issues, but Further Actions Are Needed. The Department of State has
been a strong supporter of the Office of Internal Oversight Services
(OIOS) since its creation in 1994 and welcomes the latest GAO report
on UN oversight. This is the third GAO review of OIOS, and it provides
an update on how internal oversight is conducted in the United
Nations. The report provides timely and useful information on several
aspects of OIOS' operations.
The Department of State endorses most of the main findings and
conclusions contained in the GAO report. We agree that OIOS' budgetary
and operational independence could be strengthened further and accept
GAO's recommendation to work with other member states "to address
impediments to OIOS's ability to provide independent oversight
resulting from its relationships with certain UN funds and programs
and other clients." The Department of State will continue to support
measures that bolster OIOS' capacity to provide independent oversight of
UN activities. A discussion of the GAO's findings follows.
We appreciate the report's acknowledgment that the General Assembly
has supported OIOS' independence by taking a number of actions
including in particular the establishment of the Independent Audit
Advisory Committee (IAAC). The United States was a driving force
behind the establishment of the IA AC in 2007. The GAO report notes a
number of areas where the IAAC has contributed significantly to
strengthening OIOS' independence.
The Department of State disagrees with GAO's conclusion that OIOS may
only exercise oversight authority over those separately administered
UN funds and programs "that have opted to use OIOS as their internal
auditor." [See comment] The GAO report bases its conclusion upon a
memorandum by the UN Legal Adviser. GAO seems to accept the validity
of the legal opinion without examining or questioning its basis. The
assertion that General Assembly Resolution 57/287 supersedes earlier
resolutions concerning OIOS' authority is incorrect. While Resolution
57/287 "reaffirms" that UN funds and programs may establish their own
internal oversight functions, this merely confirms a fact known and
understood at the time that OIOS was created. OIOS' founding
resolution, General Assembly Resolution 48/218B, allows for
jurisdiction over the funds and programs not as a replacement or
substitute for their respective internal oversight functions but to
enable OIOS to provide oversight services when and where appropriate.
Resolution 57/287 did not alter or diminish 010S' authority to conduct
audits and investigations of the funds and programs. Prior to the
legal opinion cited by GAO, Resolution 57/287 had been interpreted by
never the UN Secretariat, funds and programs, IAAC, General Assembly
or any member state as having rescinded OIOS' jurisdiction over the
funds and programs. Indeed, the General Assembly and the IAAC have
repeatedly acknowledged the authority of 010S over the funds and
programs (e.g., General Assembly resolution 61/275). In sum, OIOS was
established by the General Assembly, and as such, the General Assembly
is the competent authority to determine the scope of OIOS' role and
responsibilities.
We agree that OIOS faces significant bureaucratic and cooperation
issues when providing cross-agency oversight of activities undertaken
by multiple UN organizations. This is an area that we will seek to
address within the General Assembly and the governing bodies of the
various UN organizations.
We share GAO's concerns about the high vacancy rate and the prolonged
vacancies at the director level. We appreciate GAO's assessment that
the Under-Secretary-General for Internal Oversight Services has made
progress in both areas. The U.S. Mission has repeatedly raised these
matters with UN officials at the highest levels, and we are pleased to
see the significant improvements made by Under-Secretary-General
Lapointe since taking office in September 2010. We will continue to
monitor the vacancy situation at OIOS.
Finally, we appreciate GAO calling attention to the need to strengthen
the Office of the Under-Secretary-General. The scope and breadth of
OIOS' activities have increased significantly since its creation in
1994. Resources for the Office of the Under-Secretary-General have not
kept pace with the increased workload. We will seek to support 010S'
request for additional resources.
As the report illustrates, OIOS is important to the UN's credibility
and reputation. Oversight reform is part of the U.S. government's
ongoing commitment to strengthening management at the United Nations.
The report accurately recognizes that such reforms will require the
United States to work with other member states to build support. The
United States maintains partnerships with other like-minded UN
members, and we look forward to continuing to work with these members
with the goal of further strengthening OIOS.
The following are GAO's comments on State's letter dated September 7,
2011.
GAO Comment:
We believe that State misinterpreted our discussion of OIOS oversight
authority over the separately administered UN funds and programs that
have opted to use OIOS as their internal auditor. Our report did not
conclude that OIOS may only exercise oversight authority over those
separately administered UN funds and programs that have opted to use
OIOS as their internal auditor; we reported that this was the
interpretation of the UN Secretariat's Office of Legal Affairs. We
have added language in the report to make this distinction clearer.
[End of section]
Appendix IX: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contact:
Thomas Melito, (202) 512-9601, or melitot@gao.gov:
Staff Acknowledgments:
In addition to the individual named above, Joy Labez, Assistant
Director; Kay Halpern; Jeremy Conley; David Dayton; Etana Finkler;
Jack Hufnagle; Marya Link; Grace Lui; and Steven Putansu made key
contributions to this report. Other contributors to this report
include Kirsten Lauber, Jeremy Sebest, Barbara Shields, and Phillip J.
Thomas.
[End of section]
Glossary:
This glossary of abbreviations and acronyms contains the full names of
the United Nations entities referred to in figure 5 and tables 1 and 3.
CTBTO:
Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty
Organization:
DM:
Department of Management:
ECA:
Economic Commission for Africa:
ECE:
Economic Commission for Europe:
ECLAC:
Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean:
ESCAP:
Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific:
ESCWA:
Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia:
FAO:
Food and Agriculture Organization of the UN:
IAEA:
International Atomic Energy Agency:
ICAO:
International Civil Aviation Organization:
ICJ:
International Court of Justice:
ICSC:
International Civil Service Commission:
ICTR:
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda:
ICTY:
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia:
IFAD:
International Fund for Agricultural Development:
ILO:
International Labor Organization:
IMF:
International Monetary Fund:
IMO:
International Maritime Organization:
ITC:
International Trade Center:
ITU:
International Telecommunication Union:
OHCHR:
Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights:
OPCW:
Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons:
SCSL:
Special Court for Sierra Leone:
UNAIDS:
Joint United Nations Program on HIV/AIDS:
UNCC:
United Nations Compensation Commission:
UNCCD:
United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification:
UNCTAD:
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development:
UNDP:
United Nations Development Program:
UNEP:
United Nations Environment Program:
UNESCO:
United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization:
UNFCCC:
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change:
UNFPA:
United Nations Population Fund:
UN-Habitat:
United Nations Human Settlements Program:
UNHCR:
Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees:
UNICEF:
United Nations Children's Fund:
UNICRI:
United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute:
UNIDO:
United Nations Industrial Development Organization:
UNIDIR:
United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research:
UNISDR:
United Nations International Strategy for Disaster Reduction:
UNITAR:
United Nations Institute for Training and Research:
UNJSPF:
United Nations Joint Staff Pension Fund:
UNODC:
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime:
UNOG:
United Nations Office at Geneva:
UNON:
United Nations Office at Nairobi:
UNOPS:
United Nations Office for Project Services:
UNOV:
United Nations Office at Vienna:
UNRISD:
United Nations Research Institute for Social Development:
UNRWA:
United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the
Near East:
UNSSC:
United Nations System Staff College:
UNU:
United Nations University:
UN-Women:
United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women:
UNWTO:
United Nations World Tourism Organization:
UPU:
Universal Postal Union:
WB Group:
World Bank Group:
WFP:
World Food Program:
WHO:
World Health Organization:
WIPO:
World Intellectual Property Organization:
WMO:
World Meteorological Organization:
[End of section]
Related GAO Products:
United Nations Organizations: Oversight and Accountability Could Be
Strengthened by Further Instituting International Best Practices.
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-597]. Washington, D.C.:
June 18, 2007.
United Nations: Management Reforms Progressing Slowly with Many
Awaiting General Assembly Review. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-14]. Washington, D.C.: October 5,
2006.
United Nations: Weaknesses in Internal Oversight and Procurement Could
Affect the Effective Implementation of the Planned Renovation.
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-877T]. Washington,
D.C.: June 20, 2006.
United Nations: Oil for Food Program Provides Lessons for Future
Sanctions and Ongoing Reform. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-711T]. Washington, D.C.: May 2,
2006.
United Nations: Internal Oversight and Procurement Controls and
Processes Need Strengthening. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-710T]. Washington, D.C.: April 27,
2006.
United Nations: Funding Arrangements Impede Independence of Internal
Auditors. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-575].
Washington, D.C.: April 25, 2006.
United Nations: Lessons Learned from Oil for Food Program Indicate the
Need to Strengthen UN Internal Controls and Oversight. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-330]. Washington, D.C.: April 25,
2006.
United Nations: Procurement Internal Controls Are Weak. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-577]. Washington, D.C., April 25,
2006.
United Nations: Preliminary Observations on Internal Oversight and
Procurement Practices. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-226T]. Washington, D.C.: October
31, 2005.
United Nations: Sustained Oversight Is Needed for Reforms to Achieve
Lasting Results. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-05-392T].
Washington, D.C.: March 2, 2005.
United Nations: Oil for Food Program Audits. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-05-346T]. Washington, D.C.: February
15, 2005.
[End of section]
Footnotes:
[1] G.A. Res. 48/218 B, U.N. GAOR, 48th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/RES/48/218
B (1994).
[2] This represents about 41 percent of the UN system's total
expenditures of about $37 billion in 2009 and includes expenditures
for some of the largest UN entities and activities for which OIOS
provides oversight services, including the UN Secretariat,
peacekeeping operations, the United Nations Environment Program, the
Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, the
United Nations Human Settlements Program, the International Criminal
Tribunal for Rwanda, the International Criminal Tribunal for the
Former Yugoslavia, and the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime.
[3] GAO, United Nations: Sustained Oversight Is Needed for Reforms to
Achieve Lasting Results, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-05-392T] (Washington, D.C.: March 2,
2005) and GAO, United Nations: Oil for Food Program Audits,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-05-346T] (Washington,
D.C.: February 15, 2005). In 1996, the UN and Iraq established the Oil
for Food Program to address Iraq's humanitarian situation after
sanctions were imposed in 1990. In April 2004, the UN established the
Independent Inquiry Committee to investigate the administration and
management of the UN Oil for Food Program. See Independent Inquiry
Committee into the United Nations Oil-for-Food Program, Interim Report
(New York, N.Y.: Feb. 3, 2005), and The Management of the Oil-for-Food
Program (New York, N.Y.: Sept. 7, 2005).
[4] GAO, United Nations: Funding Arrangements Impede Independence of
Internal Auditors, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-575]
(Washington, D.C.: Apr. 25, 2006).
[5] The General Assembly established a number of distinct entities,
called funds and programs, that have responsibility for particular
issues, such as development (the United Nations Development Program),
children (the United Nations Children's Fund), the environment (the
United Nations Environment Program), refugees (Office of the United
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees), and other issues.
[6] The advisory committee advises the General Assembly on the budget
submitted by the Secretary-General, examines the administrative
budgets of the specialized agencies, and reports to the General
Assembly on the auditors' reports on the accounts of the UN and of the
specialized agencies.
[7] G.A. Res. 60/248. U.N. GAOR, 60th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/RES/60/248
(2006).
[8] Assessed contributions are legal obligations accepted by UN member
states that finance the day-to-day operations of the UN. Voluntary
contributions finance the funds and programs; member states are not
legally obligated to make these contributions.
[9] U.S. funds obligated in fiscal year 2010 for the Secretariat,
peacekeeping operations, the United Nations Environment Program, the
Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, the
United Nations Human Settlements Program, the International Criminal
Tribunal for Rwanda, the International Criminal Tribunal for the
Former Yugoslavia, and the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime,
as reported in FY2010 U.S. Contributions to the United Nations System,
Executive Office of the President, Office of Management and Budget,
June 6, 2011. (OIOS oversees additional UN entities, but U.S.
contributions to these entities were not specified by the Office of
Management and Budget.)
[10] The IIA is recognized as the internal audit profession's leader
in certification, education, research, and technological guidance.
[11] The Board of Auditors carries out external audits of the
financial accounts of the UN organization and the funds and programs
that are under the authority of the Secretary-General. It is presently
composed of high-level representatives from the national audit offices
of China, South Africa, and the United Kingdom.
[12] The Joint Inspection Unit conducts evaluations and inspections of
the UN system, including the specialized agencies; it is also mandated
to conduct investigations but has only recently begun to develop the
capacity to do so.
[13] The General Assembly is the UN's main policymaking body and
comprises all 193 member states. The Secretariat, headed by the
Secretary-General, carries out the day-to-day work of the
organization, such as administering peacekeeping operations, mediating
international disputes, surveying economic and social trends, and
preparing studies on human rights and sustainable development.
[14] Specialized agencies include entities such as the Food and
Agriculture Organization and the World Health Organization. A
governing body is composed of member state representatives who are
responsible for steering and directing the entity by setting and
maintaining its strategic direction and overseeing its management,
resource allocations, and operations.
[15] G.A. Res. 48/218 B, U.N. GAOR, 48th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/RES/48/218
B (1994).
[16] United Nations General Assembly Report of the Secretary General:
Comprehensive Review of Governance and Oversight within the United
Nations and its Funds, Programmes and Specialized Agencies, A/60/883/
Add.2 (Aug. 28, 2006).
[17] Source: OIOS's website. OIOS's audit manual specifies these
entities along with several others as included in OIOS's mandate: the
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and the
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda; the International Court of
Justice; UN research and training institutes; the United Nations
Office on Drugs and Crime; the United Nations Conference on Trade and
Development; the International Trade Center; and the United Nations
Joint Staff Pension Fund.
[18] These regulations and rules stipulate that OIOS shall conduct
internal audits in accordance with regulation 5.8. (d), which relates
to maintaining internal financial control. They are promulgated by the
Secretary-General and approved by the General Assembly and govern all
the financial management activities of the UN except as explicitly
provided by the General Assembly or exempted by the Secretary-General.
See United Nations, Financial Regulations and Rules of the United
Nations, Secretary-General's Bulletin ST/SGB/2003/7 (May 9, 2003).
[19] OIOS's structure has changed only slightly from the information
presented in our 2006 report. The General Assembly in 2007 approved
the transfer of the consulting service from the Monitoring,
Evaluation, and Consulting Division to the UN's Department of
Management; in 2008, the division was renamed the Inspection and
Evaluation Division.
[20] The UN Secretariat operates on a 2-year budget cycle encompassing
two calendar years, with the General Assembly adopting a proposed
regular budget every 2 years. The peacekeeping budget runs on an
annual cycle, from July 1 to June 30, and is approved separately by
the General Assembly.
[21] Peacekeeping activities--including military and civilian
personnel costs, facilities, infrastructure, transportation,
equipment, and supplies--are distinct from the administrative
functions related to peacekeeping performed by the Secretariat and
funded by the regular budget.
[22] UN officials also use the term "extrabudgetary" when referring to
any item not covered in the regular budget. UN budget documents
describe extrabudgetary resources as covering peacekeeping operations,
funds and programs, the international criminal tribunals for Rwanda
and the former Yugoslavia, and other activities. However, the UN
officials we met with used "extrabudgetary" to refer to the activities
of UN funds and programs and other entities paid for primarily through
voluntary contributions from member states, and not to peacekeeping
operations, and that is how we use the term in this report.
[23] See, for example, United Nations: Renovation Schedule Accelerated
After Delays, but Risks Remain in Key Areas, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-513R] (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 9,
2008), p. 18, and United Nations: Renovation Still Scheduled for
Completion in 2013, but Risks to Its Schedule and Cost Remain,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-870R] (Washington,
D.C.: July 30, 2009), p. 15.
[24] In addition to the report on vacant positions at OIOS, the IAAC
has issued two annual reports on its activities and one report
covering the first 6 months of its operation; four reports on OIOS's
yearly budgets for oversight of peacekeeping activities and one
addendum; and two reports on OIOS's proposed regular program budgets
(for the 2010-2011 and 2012-2013 fiscal biennia, respectively).
[25] United Nations, Comprehensive Review of Governance and Oversight
within the United Nations and its Funds, Programmes and Specialized
Agencies, Report of the Independent Steering Committee, A/60/883/Add.2
(Aug. 2006).
[26] G.A. Res. 48/218 B, U.N. GAOR, 48th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/RES/48/218
B (1994).
[27] G.A. Res. 57/287 A-B, U.N. GAOR, 57th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/RES/57/
287 A-B (2003).
[28] United Nations, Report of the Office of Internal Oversight
Services on Proposals for Strengthening the Office of Internal
Oversight Services, UN Document A/60/901 (July 14, 2006).
[29] United Nations, Comprehensive Review of Governance and Oversight
within the United Nations and its Funds, Programmes and Specialized
Agencies, report of the Independent Steering Committee, A/60/883/Add.2
(Aug. 2006).
[30] GAO previously found that while OIOS had adopted the IIA
standards in 2002, its annual work plans were not fully based on a
systematic risk assessment process, as the standards require. See GAO-
06-575.
[31] United Nations, Comprehensive Review of Governance and Oversight
within the United Nations and Its Funds, Programmes, and Specialized
Agencies, Addendum 2, Volume 5. Report of the Secretary-General, UN
Document, A/60/883/Add.2 (Aug. 28, 2006).
[32] In commenting on this report, OIOS stated that the IAAC mandate
need not cover the adequacy of budget requests or resource
requirements for, or resource agreements with, entities not within its
mandate, when entities (such as the Office of the United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees or the United Nations Joint Staff Pension
Fund) have an audit or oversight committee that considers these
matters to ensure adequacy and independence of the audit activities.
[33] United Nations, Comprehensive Review of Governance and Oversight
within the United Nations and its Funds, Programmes and Specialized
Agencies, Report of the Independent Steering Committee, A/60/883/Add.2
(Aug. 2006).
[34] Multi-donor trust funds are established by the UN system,
national authorities, and other donors to support specific country
and/or global priorities, such as UN development assistance
frameworks. Participating organizations appoint an administrative
agent that receives, administers, and transfers donor funds in
accordance with memoranda of understanding.
[35] According to an IAAC official, as of July 2011, OIOS had not
brought this recommendation to the IAAC's attention.
[36] United Nations, Financial Report and Audited Financial Statements
for the Biennium Ended 31 December 2009 and Report of the Board of
Auditors, General Assembly Official Records, Sixty-fifth Session,
Supplement No. 5, A/65/5 (Vol. 1).
[37] In commenting on this report, OIOS stated that the division
director positions have been continuously staffed on an acting basis
for several years, and therefore have not been technically "vacant,"
nor has this situation hampered OIOS's ability to provide sufficient
oversight.
[38] OIOS itself reported a higher rate for that period (26 percent
for professional staff, including director-level positions).
[39] United Nations, Financial Report and Audited Financial Statements
for the Biennium Ended 31 December 2009 and Report of the Board of
Auditors, General Assembly Official Records, Sixty-fifth Session,
Supplement No. 5, A/65/5 (Vol. 1).
[End of section]
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