This book consists of five essays. Essays one to three I call Round One of
the debate. It remains to be seen who becomes the champeen in the end, but I
declare Norman the hands-down winner of Round One.

Sean Sayers' initial defense of dialectical materialism is pretty much the
standard one: the laws of dialectics, metaphysics vs. dialectics, etc. As such
it is the usual hash of valid insights and conceptual confusion. Worse, Sayers
completely discredits himself with copious citation of Mao, which is enough
to merit perdition in my estimation. Sayers is thus the perfect embodiment of
how not to present dialectics.

By contrast, Norman's treatment is exemplary. Norman is sympathetic to some
conception of dialectics, but he intends to clearly and logically straighten
out the mess of confusions and conflations within the usual presentations. At
times I have made presentations almost exactly like his, but I was too lazy
to write out my ideas and publish them. I'm glad Norman did.

Norman sees the initial kernel of rational truth in the notion of dialectics
as a conceptual dialectic that serves as an alternative both to reductionism
and dualismi.e., the recognition of the distinction and unity of polar
opposites. Norman begins by treating various notions presented in Hegel.

Especially exemplary is Norman's treatment of the paradoxes of motion (pp.
30-31). Norman correctly analyzes the problem of motion: to leave motion as
a logically contradictory phenomenon is to leave it unexplained. The paradox
arises because we have viewed motion the wrong way, as an infinite series of
states of rest, which it cannot be.

Norman then analyzes how Hegel builds up his system of the progression of categories.
But then Hegel's metaphorical expressions take over, and he sometimes conflates
logical progressions with real progressions. Nonetheless, Norman is willing
to grant the value of Hegel's conceptual dialectic, but here is where
Engels mistakenly criticizes Hegel: Hegel sees dialectics as the self-development
of concepts, but his dialectics needs to be turned upside down and viewed materialistically
as the development of real things. But Engels is wrong! Hegelian conceptual
dialectic is not incompatible with materialism.

One must first understand the distinction between conceptual truths and empirical
truths, and how the former can sometimes also be the latter. To take a trivial
example, a bachelor is always an unmarried man purely logically, by the definition
of the concepts themselves, independent of empirical realities, while it may
also be true of actual bachelors in the real world (p. 35). Hegel's analysis
of the relation between particular and universal would be a non-trivial example.
Lenin's treatment of the relation between particular and universal is an analogous
example (p. 36).

Hegel actually denies in his writings the possibility of evolution in the physical
world, for example the evolution of species (pp. 37-38). But worse is his analysis
of history as a logical progression of the conceptual dialectic, e.g. his analysis
of the historical progression from the ancient, feudal, and modern worlds "as
deriving from the logical relations between the concepts 'universal' and 'particular'
(p. 40).

Why should Hegel have held such a strikingly implausible view of historical
change? The answer lies in his philosophical idealism . . . .(p. 41)

If the real world is the unfolding of Reason or God through time, then the
conceptual dialectic can be identified with the temporal dialectic. And this
is where Engels' criticism of Hegel is proper (pp. 41-42).

The empirical-temporal dialectic should then be considered separately, and
it boils down to the pedestrian yet valid recognition of change and development
as opposed to a static, unchanging conception of the world or of systems within
it.

In chapter 3, Norman continues by analyzing the problem of contradiction. This
chapter too is a paragon of clarity and incisiveness.

Norman first of all stresses the necessity to distinguish between dialectical
contradiction and the logical law of non-contradiction, and argues why the latter
must be upheld even if the former is admitted (p. 49). The very notion of rational
argument is at stake if one equinanimously accepts "that one and the same
proposition can be both true and false."

On the other hand, opposed to Popper, Norman does accept the fruitfulness of
paradoxes (p. 50). But while paradoxes may be important and profound, and acceptable
as fruitful statements, they cannot be left to stand logically as they are.

And now we get to the nuts of what dialectical contradiction is all about.
Here the tender testicles of dialectics lie delicately poised in the scrotum
of their mutual interdependence: section II: contradiction as interdependence
of opposed concepts (see esp. pp. 52-54). The issue is the interdependence of
united yet mutually opposed categories! (Hopw many times have I said this?)
There are trivial examples and there are better examples:

The relation between these opposed categories is tighter than that between
the rather trivial examples I have previously quoted. here the point is not
just that, for the one concept to be applicable, the opposed concept must
be applied to something else, but rather that, for the one concept
to be applicable, the opposed concept must also be applied to the same
thing." (p. 53)

The contradiction which is involved could, with more plausibility, be said
to require the assertion of a self-contradictory statementfor the statement
that one and the same thing possesses opposite characteristics looks like
a self-contradictory statement. However, I still want to resist this suggestion.
In all these cases the same thing can possess opposite characteristics because
they are ascribed to it under different aspects, from different points of
view. (pp. 53-54)

In the text that follows, Norman's resistance is rather feeble; however, in
the footnotes on pp. 65-66, he admits that the question of logical formal contradiction
is appropriately raised here. Study carefully, folks because here is the essence
of the whole issue of dialectical logic!

In section III of the same chapter: Norman proceeds to analyze the notion as
contradiction as conflict of opposed forces, as it is usually seen by Marxists.
Here Norman agrees with Sayers that the notion of contradiction properly goes
beyond the mere notion of conflict and opposed forces to included an interdependence
of opposed concepts as well (p. 57, 59). Norman nonetheless warns as viewing
this kind of contradiction as a logical law. When one sees an interdependence
of concepts as well as forces, then:

. . . the vocabulary of 'contradiction' becomes appropriate. But this does
not entitle us to say that one force 'contradicts' another force. The term
'contradiction' still refers to the relation between the concepts by
which the forces are characterized. The relation between the concepts 'inciting
force' and 'incited force' is one of contradiction because it is a meaning-relation.
The two have opposite meanings but at the same time each depends for its meaning
on its relation to the other. this is what makes the relation between them
an interdependence of opposites, an opposition within a unity, a contradiction.
(p. 59)

Norman clarifies beautifully what I clumsily attempted to say long ago about
the tricky relation between objective and subjective dialectics. Norman, wherever
you are, I could kiss you, but no tongues.

To wind up this chapter, there is a discussion of self-contradiction in human
behavior and society. Norman promises to return to the dialectics of nature
in a future chapter, but he distinguishes it from contradiction in human affairs.

End of Round OneNorman wins pants down.

ROUND 2

Battered and reeling from round one, Sayers comes charging into the ring for
round two, or, as the book would have it, essay four: "Dualism, materialism,
and dialectics". Sayers is hot to inflict some punishment, but his vision
is blurry, he staggers about the ring, and he spends most of his time flailing
away at empty space, too dizzy and confused to keep track of his opponent. He's
about to go down, but he angrily puts up an aggressive fight. This is the longest
chapter of the book, and by far the worst.

Sayers sees Norman as an exemplar of analytical philosophy. There are irreconcilable
differences between analytical and dialectical philosophy. Norman's distinction
between conceptual and empirical matters is a dualistic philosophy incompatible
with Marxism (p. 68). What a surprise. I thought I hated analytical philosophers
(see my satirical poem about Quine and my haiku
on analytical philosophy), but now my hero Norman is being lowered to their
level. Not a good sign.

Hegel and Engels recognize a distinction between the dialectics of concepts
and of the real world (p. 71), but Norman has a rigidly dualistic view of their
relation and has an atemporal, aprioristic notion of the logic of concepts characteristic
of analytical philosophy.

Desperate to land a blow, Sayers makes a fantastic linkage of Sayers and Althusser,
who also enforces a rigid distinction between science and philosophy (which
has no history) (p. 82). Sayers is punch-drunk now. Sayers charges that Hegel
is wrongly taken to task for his infamous formulation that the rational is actual
and the actual is rational (p. 83). This proposition encapsulates everything
that bodes most odious in Hegel, and Sayers is eager to defend him. But then
Sayers is still quoting Chairman Mao. Bad medicine.

Hegel has been badly understood. Hegel stresses the contradictions between
reason and actuality as well as their identity. Incredibly, Sayers claims that
the identity of reason and reality is materialist, not idealist! Then he drags
in Colletti to slam him as a dualist for daring to claim that the identity of
thought and being is an idealist notion! (p. 85) Sayers is only beating himself
up here, while Norman is off somewhere relaxing, sipping on a Coke.

And now, claiming a connection I cannot see, Sayers equates Norman's view with
Althusser's treatment of the inversion metaphor (pp. 86-87). For the first time
in my life I find myself in agreement with Althusser and admire his perspicacious
criticism of the inversion metaphor.

Sayers goes on to deny that either Hegel or Marx were reductionists of an idealist
or materialist variety, and that the inversion of Hegel does not lead to reductionism.
Sayers then spends several pages on the relation between base and superstructure,
arguing for a subtle understanding of the interaction of the different spheres
of social existence without collapsing them into one another and without keeping
them separate and unrelated. This is all very fine, but it is a distraction
from the subject of the debate.

Then there is the question of dialectics of nature. Norman is brave for even
acknowledging the validity of the very notion, swimming against the tide of
universal condemnation by the likes of analytical philosophers, Sartre, Merleau-Ponty,
Colletti, etc., who, if they even they admit the possibility of any respectable
notion of dialectic, restrict it exclusively to the subjective, human realm.
Sayers sees Norman ultimately being swallowed up by this tide in refusing to
see contradiction in nature and acknowledging only the clash of opposing forces
(p. 99).

Thinking to oppose a mechanistic approach to the natural world, Sayers argues
for negativity in things themselves. He treats the question of more complex
organization of matter beyond the laws of physics and chemistry. There are several
valid observations here, but none of his objections apply to the real Norman.

Section III: the sphere of reason: Norman's treatment of human behavior, i.e.
that contradiction is the occasion for a critical view, is wrong, according
to Hegel and dialectical materialism. Contradiction is not a blemish. Norman
is wrong to want to keep opposites logically apart and non-contradictory. Sayers
opposes Norman's superficial paradoxes. Sayers insists on the interpenetration,
not the mere interdependence of opposites (p. 115). He denies non-contradiction
as a necessary law of thought. The scientific method in practice (cf. Kuhn)
doesn't work like this.

In mathematics, in calculus, contradictions were consciously accepted from
the beginning. However, Sayers confutes his own claim that logical contradictions
are not a blemish by then saying:

Had this not been so, Weierstrass and others would not have bothered to try
to produce a more coherent formal theory of the calculus. (p. 119)

Sayers further claims: Contradiction is not purely negative, but the negative
aspect necessitates change and development (p. 121). Formal logic has limited
validity: formal inconsistency is invalid, but is indifferent to truth and considerations
of content (p. 123).

Now comes the world of man, of activity and social institutions. Norman posits
a duality of the natural and human world, says Sayers. In human affairs, Norman
considers contradiction as a manifestation of irrationality. The notion of human
behavior as normatively rational is Kantian, un-Hegelian and un-Marxist (p.
126).

Again, Sayers goes off on a tangent, ascribing views to Norman which he has
not adopted. Sayers argues that being determines consciousness and reason is
a product of history and social activity, not of sui generis reason.
It would have been apt of Sayers instead to prove, as can be easily done, that
in human affairs, in the sphere of ethics, for example, contradiction is objective
and irredeemable and not merely a defect of inconsistency.

Sayers properly trashes Althusser's history without a subject and theoretical
anti-humanism (pp. 128-129), but this has nothing at all in common with Norman.
Then Sayers shoots himself in the foot (pp. 130-131) by claiming that Marxism
does reject humanism (Maoist asshole!) and a fixed human nature, but not by
simply discarding it.

Sayers goes on to examine the Hegelian notion of the ontogenesis of reason
in individual human development (p. 132) and the Marxist notion of development
from the realm of necessity to the realm of freedom.

Norman's notion of dialectic as a normative critical concept is accused of
being purely Kantian (p. 135). Again, contradiction is seen as a defect rather
than part of the objective world. But no abstract utopia free of contradiction
is possible.

The spate of footnotes at chapter's end (all on Mao) remind us of Sayers' fatal
attraction to Chairman Mao, a sure sign of intellectual bankruptcy.

This chapter is a confused mixture of valid insights and mixed-up and even
harmful notions, and Sayers rarely ever approaches a critique based on Norman's
real position. In my estimation, Norman has made only a minor error in confining
human self-contradiction to a defect of the individual or of society, as I indicated
above, but Sayers' rants are all over the place. He ends up shadow-boxing with
himself alone.

For Norman is no opponent of dialectical materialism, as we shall see in the
final round, where Norman defends the rational core of Engels' dialectics of
nature, where he opposes both sloppy formulations of nature-dialectic AND its
dogmatic opponents. Here Norman will deliver the fatal blow, but the contest
is already over: Sayers has virtually knocked his own self out.

ROUND 3

Finally, we come to essay five: "Dialectical concepts and their application
to nature" by Richard Norman. Norman begins by acknowledging that Sayers
represents the orthodox diamat position, which is now unfashionable and has
been supplanted by a new orthodoxythe denial of the validity of the very
concept of a dialectics of nature. Norman announces that he aims to defend a
version of the dialectics of nature and a tenable core of Engels' philosophy.
Norman promises to offer a more satisfactory account of the positive connection
between the conceptual and empirical-temporal dialectic.

Norman then analyzes the problematic features of Engels' Dialectics of Nature
and his use of Hegel's categories, which are not taken from the Philosophy
of Nature but from the Logic. Engels criticizes the Procrustean conformation
of empirical facts to an a priori system instead of the deduction of the laws
of dialectics from the history of nature and human society (p. 149). Norman
does not believe that Engels really reverses Hegel's procedure, so he critiques
Engels' use of examples from the natural sciences, arguing that Engels' appeals
to scientific examples do not in themselves vindicate dialectical interpretations,
for Engels really "appeals to Hegelian arguments in order to interpret
the scientific results dialectically" (p. 151). This does not make Engels,
or Norman, for that matter, dualists through their inherent recognition of a
distinction between conceptual and empirical enquiry (pp. 151-152). This is
a general feature of the relation between dialectical philosophy and science,
in fact between most philosophy of science and science.

Norman argues that Engels tries to establish a non-mechanistic, non-reductionist,
and non-dualist materialism.

The connection of the conceptual and empirical-temporal dialectic is to be
established by seeing them united in the general dialectical world-picture.
There are empirical facts of nature, e.g. biological evolution, or the levels
of organization of matter, out of which all kinds of bad philosophical conclusions
can be drawn, but Engels' general world-picture, a monist but non-reductionist
view of motion, matter, its forms and transformations, and his treatment of
the categories of quality, quantity, identity, and difference, guide us toward
a proper interpretation of the empirical facts (p. 157). Norman backs up Engels
100% and opposes the dualism of the idealist Marxists who accept a mechanical
materialist picture of nature while reserving dialectics for the mind and end
up making a mystery of both and of their relation to one another (p. 158)!

This is the tenable core of Engels' dialectic of nature and it is authentically
Hegelian.

Norman insists that dialectical concepts have not only users but applications.
Norman is especially keen on the interpenetration of opposites and the quality-quantity
relation. For Norman, contradiction means the unity of opposed concepts, and
means essentially the interpenetration of opposites. Contradiction is a relation
between concepts, but the concepts have empirical applications (p. 160).

And in saying that the term 'contradiction' describes the relation between
concepts applicable to natural processes, we are not thereby committed
to saying that the term also describes a relation between natural processes
themselves." (p. 161)

Engels is often guilty of this confusion of nature and concepts. Even more
so Norman criticizes Engels' spurious examples of negation in nature (grain-barley,
etc.) (p. 162). However, there are processes of organic life which subsume yet
transcend lower-order physical and chemical processes which are authentic applications
of the notion 'negation of the negation' (p. 162). But this is not to say that
natural processes negate one another. This is the defensible core in Engels:
we need concepts of contradiction and negation "to describe the relations
between dialectical concepts applicable to nature."

Norman then defends the notion of dialectics from the charge of idealism, by
showing that Hegel, though idealist and aprioristic, is not irredeemably so
much so that his ideas cannot be altered and used productively in a materialist
form . . . as Engels does, and Lenin. Norman then blasts Colletti! (pp. 164-165)

Norman admits distinctions between nature and human agency, but he refuses,
in opposition to Lukàcs, Kojeve, Schmidt, and Gunn, to confine dialectics
to the relation between subject and object (pp. 166-167). On the contrary, one
needs to comprehend dialectics more broadly in order to understand what is dialectical
about the subject-object relation!

Furthermore, the philosophical importance of praxis (I use this term, not Norman)
is also acknowledged in Engels (p. 168).

There are key reasons for defending a dialectic of nature. A non-reductionist,
non-mechanistic, non-dualist philosophy is needed to deal with the polarities
within Marxist socialist theory between determinism and voluntarism, between
science and humanism, and between the obliteration of qualitative distinctions
(of which Sayers is ultimately guilty) and dualism (p. 169). It is also important
for philosophy as an academic discipline, which itself wavers between the extremes
of mechanical materialism and anti-scientific lebensphilosophie.

In a footnote (p. 173), Norman mentions that he has treated the relation between
conceptual and temporal dialectic only as pertains to dialectics of nature.
The connection between the two in Marx's economic theory requires a separate
analysis.

Sayers was already reeling from his own shadow-boxing. But in defending a cleaned-up,
de-confused version of dialectical materialism, Norman has vaporized him!

CONCLUSION

This book, though it dealsbecause it deals!with the most
elementary philosophical notions of Marxism, is an exemplar of the issues surrounding
writing introductory texts in Marxist philosophy. It is in essence two textbooks
cut and pasted into one, for comparison. In one book we are shown how to do
an intelligent exposition of dialectical logic (Norman) and how not to
(Sayers), the latter regrettably having been standard practice for too long.

Additionally, this elementary-level book simply and straightforwardly (without
impenetrable jargon à la Roy Bhaskar) presents some basic issues, thanks
to Norman, in a way that can guide the most advanced and sophisticated investigations
into unraveling the mysteries of the relationships between the Hegelian dialectic
and the dialectical conceptions of Marx and of Engels.