Military Professionalism Studies

Untruthfulness is surprisingly common in the U.S. military even though members of the profession are loath to admit it. Further, much of the deception and dishonesty that occurs in the profession of arms is actually encouraged and sanctioned by the military institution.

On July 26, 1948, President Harry Truman signed Executive Order 9981, ending the practice of segregating the military services by race. That same year, the Army allowed women to join the services on an equal basis with men. Both of these steps preceded the larger societal changes that allowed fully equal treatment of all types of American citizens in military service. Just over 2 years ago, Congress repealed the Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell policy, allowing for gays and lesbians to take their place openly in the military. While we have a long way to go, one of the hallmarks of a profession is its continued efforts to improve. To that end, this monograph shares a few of the lessons West Point has learned on the prevention of sexual harassment and assault.

Despite talk about regional alignment, the Army has taken few concrete steps to prepare for this dramatic change. While enormous in its implications, the Army’s current regional alignment plan seems to be little more than directing units to “focus regionally” and aligning them with the appropriate combatant command.

The Army’s Office of Economic and Manpower Analysis published a series of monographs during 2009 and 2010 intended to provide a theoretical and conceptual framework for an Army Officer Corps Strategy. The present volume supplements that effort, providing an overview of some key developments and assumptions that have guided and shaped the officer corps and the way it has been managed over the last century.

Former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates characterized the "greatest challenges facing the Army" as the "institutional and bureaucratic constipation" of its officer management systems. In this book, Mike Colarusso and Dave Lyle examine the Army's industrial-era personnel practices and prescribe a senior officer talent management approach that they believe is better suited to the demands of tomorrow.

In a time of extraordinary fiscal and national security uncertainty, it seems naïve to assume that all, or even most, of a strategic leader’s current assumptions will be just as relevant several years into the future. This monograph highlights the need for Army senior leaders, in the midst of change, to periodically question their deep-seated beliefs on critical issues—and perhaps change their minds—rather than relying solely on what they have long believed to be true.

If transparency and forthright communication are valued within the Army, why is candor nearly absent in doctrine and supporting literature? Stewards of the Profession build trust through authentic communication—educated, trained, and modeled in application. Candor cannot be muted, creating a chasm between what is espoused and communicated.

This monograph suggests the U.S. Army profession’s most worrisome cultural shortcoming is the lack of a codified institutional ethic and a means of peer-to-peer self-governance. This paper describes the problem, provides a review of the literature, and supplies and justifies a proposed institutional and individual Army Ethic.

The exact shape of the recently initiated Department of Defense reductions and the defense strategy that our down-sized land forces are to execute in the future are only now becoming clear. How can the U.S. Army best meet these challenges?

This is a case study of a cavalry squadron struggling with operational adaptability. Through this struggle, the study provides a means for analyzing the complexity of organizational leadership in the contemporary security environment. The case study provides an example where hard fought lessons learned resulted in a more holistic approach to leadership, because the leader transcended that of simply being an authority figure, and instead, become a real leader who provided a safe and creative learning environment where the organization was able to tackle and solve complex problems.

The Western way of war has come full circle. After centuries, indeed millennia, of evolution toward increased totality and brutality, it has turned back once again to the ritualistic and restrained methods of primitive warfare.

In this provocative monograph, COL Tony Pfaff argues that the challenges of combating irregular threats have fundamentally challenged the traditional “ethics of war,” and he offers a number of measures and policies that the Army must adopt if it is to not only successfully, but ethically, respond to these challenges.

Since trust is the coin of the realm for an Army in a democratic society, it is important that as the Profession of Arms study proceeds that it includes a broad exploration of just what exactly the Army as profession means by the concept of trust.

Drawing on the literature on military innovation and reform, the author examines an important case of military change: the transformation of the U.S. Army in the 2 decades preceding the Persian Gulf War of 1991. The findings of this study have significant implications for how the U.S. Army should think about implementing changes needed today to meet new strategic, economic, and technological challenges.

In this study of the organizational culture of the U.S. Army, Dr. Pierce has reviewed a previously assumed but unverified connection between organizational culture and professional development. The study has uncovered a lack of congruence between the dominant type of organizational culture of the U.S. Army and the professional managerial/leadership skills of its senior level leaders. This observed lack of congruence may be inhibiting performance and unconsciously perpetuating a cycle of caution and an overreliance on stability and control. The data indicate that the U.S. Army is illustrative of an organization that emphasizes stability and control, and one that attempts to comprehend the ambiguity of the future through an unconscious reliance upon the successful solutions employed in the past.

Having the right "who" to devise strategy is critical to success in counterinsurgency or any asymmetric, cross-cultural encounter. This monograph contends that if we do not get the "who" right, none of the "whats," in terms of what we do, matters.

Historically, the U.S. Army has employed its officers to good effect, but is there need for improvement? Does its current assignments paradigm lead to optimal career satisfaction and productivity? Does it allow officers to develop the depth and breadth of talent the Army needs? Perhaps most importantly, does the Army really know enough about the officer talent it possesses, as well as the requirements for that talent?

The U.S. Army is almost universally acknowledged as an organization that powerfully develops talent in areas such as leadership, teamwork behavior, work ethics, adaptability, fitness, and many others. Employers know that the Army invests substantially in its people, and that this investment translates directly into enhanced productivity. Despite this well-earned reputation, however, are the Army’s current officer development programs equal to tomorrow’s challenges? Does it suffer from a growing imbalance in talent supply versus demand? Perhaps most importantly, is there an effective relationship between its developmental and employment strategies?

Organizations often focus their recruiting efforts on high-payoff markets--how does the Army identify the right market in which to focus its officer accessions efforts? What role does education play in officer accessions? How does the Army identify and go about meeting its officer diversity requirements? Why is establishing the proper ratio between commissioning sources so important?

Do you think the Army officer corps needs a clear statement of its professional ethic? Colonel Matthew Moten does, and he has written it in one page. Join the debate.

NB:
In the Fall of 2013, the author of this monograph, Army Colonel Matthew Moten, chose to retire amid reports of his reprimand for misconduct and removal as head of the U.S. Military Academy's History Department, following an investigation of allegations made against him. Published in 2010, this monograph presents the results of Colonel Moten's critical analysis of an issue important to the Army: deepening our understanding of what the Professional Military Ethic means to the profession today. The monograph remains a solid contribution to the dialogue among professionals the Army leadership sought to ignite. In particular, readers should note well Moten's closing paragraphs:

"Before the Army accepts such a statement of its professional ethic, much debate is in order. Should we use hard phrases such as "total accountability" and "unlimited liability?" What are officers' core responsibilities as leaders and how far do they extend?

How concisely should we explicate our adherence to the principle of civilian control? Should we espouse nonpartisanship as part of our ethic? The debate required to answer such questions will provide impetus for an Army-wide discussion about the profession, its ethical values, and the role that it should play as a servant of American society in the future. Let it begin."

We, at the U.S. Army War College believe the conversation on the Army's professional ethic must continue, and still find value in Moten's 2010 work, notwithstanding the situation that led to his relief.

Why have Army junior officer retention rates plummeted since 1983? Are the root causes truly understood? What are the long term consequences of failing to retain talented young officers? What steps has the Army taken to meet this challenge, and how effective have they been? What must the Army do to restore junior officer retention rates to previously healthy levels?

Education in strategy is feasible and important. Few would-be strategists are beyond improvement by some formal education. However, for such education to be well-directed, it needs to rest upon sound assumptions concerning the eternal nature yet ever shifting character, meaning, and function of strategy, and the range of behaviors required for effective strategic performance.

What is the difference between competent and talented? What is talent, and which people have it? What talents should the United States Army seek in its officers? Most importantly, what are the consequences of failing to create an officer talent management system?

As the character of conflict in the 21st century evolves, the Army’s strength will continue to rest on our values, our ethos, and our people. Our Soldiers and leaders must remain true to these values as they operate in increasingly complex environments where moral-ethical failures can have strategic implications.

The China Dragons of the 28th Combat Support Hospital deployed in support of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM from September 2006 until November 2007. Their service epitomizes the strides that have been made in military combat medicine.

Using different weapons and different skill sets, the military officer serving as an advisor can win--or lose--important battles. His relationship with foreign officials affects overall American strategy, and can translate into long-term victory for the United States.

The participants in this colloquium sought to examine three general areas: the roles and responsibilities of military leaders and changes in the relationship between civilian and military leaders. Experts from the military, government, and academia presented their not-for-attribution assessments and recommendations for further increasing U.S. effectiveness in civil-military relations.

Were the actions in 2006 by the senior military leaders who participated in the “Revolt of the Generals” justified? Or were there real costs incurred by the military professions they represented, costs that can only be seen when examined in terms of the critical trust relationship that empower such professions?

Today's U.S. soldiers, much like soldiers of the past, fight for each other. Researchers also found that soldiers cited ideological reasons such as liberation, freedom, and democracy as important factors in combat motivation.

The author examines the current company commander experience and concludes that the Army values innovation in its rhetoric, but the reality is that junior officers are seldom given opportunities to be innovative in planning training; to make decisions; or to fail, learn, and try again.

The author addresses the issues regarding the ideal relationship between the commander and the statesman in time of war and the balance between political control and military operational expertise by examining what Carl von Clausewitz has to say about civil- military relations and the use of force. She looks in depth at Clausewitz s arguments, reviews his theoretical approach, and discusses four key implications of the basic idea that political purposes govern war.

The authors first describe the ethical, technical, and political components of military professionalism and then address the causes for the decline. They conclude by proposing a set of principles which, if adhered to, will reinvigorate the vision of the officer corps and motivate the corps to selfless service.