Written evidence submitted by Per M Norheim-Martinsen,
Centre of International Studies, University of Cambridge

OPERATION EUFOR IN
BIH: EUROPE'S
BACKYARD RECLAIMED

On 12 July 2004, the Council of the European
Union decided to launch a military operation (EUFOR) in Bosnia
in Herzegovina (BiH). With this operation, code-named "Althea",
the EU is set to take over the responsibilities of the NATO-led
SFOR after a transition period, starting on 2 December. The symbolic
value of the take-over is striking. It was the events that followed
the break-up of the former Yugoslavia which so painfully revealed
the shortcomings in Europe's military capabilities. Now, EUFOR
will provide the first real test case for the European Security
and Defence Policy (ESDP), the process towards which was spurred
by these very events. Europe is about to reclaim its backyard,
at the same time, signalling that the EU intends to look after
its own neighbourhood in the future. Trust, however, is something
you earn and the minor operations in Macedonia and the Democratic
Republic of Congo were not enough to erase the memories of Europe's
poor military track record. The two operations, code-named "Concordia"
and "Artemis", involved 400 and 1,800 troops respectively.
The upcoming EUFOR mission, on the other hand, involving a robust
force of 7,000 to 9,000 troops, will provide a proper test case
for the ESDP not only in terms of the sheer size of the operation,
but also in terms of the challenges posed by the need to co-ordinate
the activities of a plethora of actors on the ground. First of
all, the EU will have to co-ordinate its own approach, the process
towards which was initiated by the adoption of a comprehensive
EU policy towards BiH, by the General Affairs and External Relations
Council (GAERC) on 14 June 2004. Secondly, other actors, most
importantly NATO and the OSCE, will retain a strong presence,
leaving Lord Ashdown with the unforgiving task of co-ordinating
all activities. Ashdown is the EU's Special Representative to
BiH (EUSR) and head of the Office of the High Representative (OHR),
which was established after the 1995 Dayton/Paris Peace Accord.
This memorandum examines challenges to internal EU co-ordination,
before addressing some issues arising from EU cooperation with
other international actors in BiH.

INTERNAL CO-ORDINATION OF
EU ACTIVITIES

The decision to launch EUFOR follows the implementation
of the EU Police Mission in BiH (EUPM), replacing the UN-led police
force, earlier this year. Yet another in a line of ESDP "debuts",
EUFOR represents the Union's first joint civil-military crisis
management operation, hence also the first practical display of
the integrated approach, of which EU leaders speak so warmly.
The question is how integrated civilian and military elements
really are. The two operations report to separate chains of command
and are formally subject to co-ordination in the Political
and Security Committee (PSC). This reflects a general feature
of the ESDP framework, namely the lack of a clear hierarchy of
military and civilian sub-units that correspond to each other
and interact at lower levels. To alleviate this situation, Javier
Solana, the EU's foreign policy chief, has made it clear that
Lord Ashdown, as EUSR, is to be the de facto person in
charge of all ESDP operations in BiH, aiming also to co-ordinate
these with Commission activities. This means, in practice, that
the EUSR will meet regularly with the EU Force Commander, the
Head of the Commission Delegation and other EU representatives,
ensuring that his political advice and directives are taken into
consideration. However, in case of disagreement between the Force
Commander and the EUSRas could be the case, for example,
regarding the role of the military in the ICTY (International
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia) processthe
matter will have to be solved in the PSC. As has generally been
the case so far, the coherence and efficiency of the ESDP are
heavily dependent, thus, on informal channels of interaction,
pragmatism and interpersonal skills. In the same way that the
inter-pillar divide in matters of foreign and security policy
could hardly have been bridged so effectively over the last years
without the charismatic personalities of Javier Solana and Chris
Patten, the EU's Commissioner for External Relations, Lord Ashdown's
personal qualities and already influential role in Bosnia may
hopefully counter some of the institutional barriers to cooperation
on the operative level.

Another matter is the potential divergence between
the strategic priorities of the Commission and of the Council.
The former has been involved in BiH for several years already,
working towards reconstruction of the state within the framework
of the Stabilisation and Association process (SAP), on which it
has spent 4.6 billion euros. The Council, on the other hand, and
according to the EUSR's Mission Implementation Plan (MIP), will
have to concentrate on maintaining a secure and stable environment
for the implementation of the Dayton/Paris Peace Accorda
task which shall prove challenging enough, given the continued
undercurrent of instability in the country. In sum, objectives
and roles appear to be complementary; the Commission concentrates,
through the SAP, on long-term institution building and political
and economical development, while the Council, through the EUSR
predominantly, concentrates on keeping the peace. If only it was
that simple.

Although one has sought to streamline an overall
EU policy on paper, the traditional inter-pillar rivalry is likely
to ensue, as the lines between conflict prevention, generally
the Commission's domain, and crisis management, falling
under the ESDP, remains fuzzy. One example is the EU's police
related work in BiH, branches of which embody different approaches,
time spans, decision making structures, mandates, structures etc
The EUPM, which answers to the Council, has a small mentoring
and advisory role, but no executive powers. The responsibility
for executive police work is generally in the hands of the Bosnians.
However, EUFOR may engage in gendarmerie type operations. Complicating
the situation further, Bosnian police forces receive advice and
guidance also from 10 police and justice experts, employed by
the Commission under the SAP. In addition, come operations under
the external dimension of Justice and Home Affairs (JHA)also
the responsibility of the Commissionwhich target issues
such as corruption, organised crime and border control.

As long as the pillar structure remains, both
the Commission and the Council will guard their responsibilities
carefully, especially those falling in the grey-zone between crisis
management and conflict prevention. Herein can also be observed
a fundamental struggle over which approach is the betterthus,
who is to have the leading hand when objectives are adjusted to
fit each other. Some resentment on behalf of the Commission, for
which the SAP has been a prestige project, can be traced in the
words of a Commission representative, interviewed last year, who
said there is a lack of awareness and understanding of the Commission's
long-term commitment in the Western Balkans now that the Council
wants to play an active part in the region. Such sentiments will
not make Lord Ashdown's job any easier and, as an appointee of
Mr Solana, he shall struggle hard to gain the trust of the Commission
delegation, such that he can fulfil the seemingly lofty objective
of speaking on behalf of all of the Union in BiH.

THE ROLEOF NATO

NATO remains the EU's most important working
partner in BiH, due to EUFOR's reliance on NATO capabilities,
the recourse to which was ensured by the Berlin Plus agreement.
Paving the way for the long overdue operation "Concordia"
in Macedonia last yearafter Turkish opposition put the
operation off for monthsEUFOR will provide a first proper
test case for whether the mechanisms will work in practice.
Reflecting the strong strategic ties between the organisations,
General John Reith, currently Deputy Supreme Allied Commander
Europe (DSACEUR), has been appointed EU Operation Commander, while
Major General David Leakey is the EU Force Commander. The EU Operation
Headquarters has been located at NATO SHAPE, following a welcome
display of flexibility on behalf of the French, who initially
opposed such an arrangement. Non-EU NATO members, such as Norway,
Switzerland and Turkey, as well as other third countries, including
Canada, Chile, Argentina and Morocco, are expected to participate
in the operation. Third countries, in accordance with their contributions
respectively, will have co-decision making powers on an operative
level, while strategic direction is in the hands of
the PSC and the EU Military Committee (EUMC).

In practical terms, little more than a change
of badge on the soldiers' uniforms is to be expected, which is
also in line with the short-term objective of a "seamless
transition" from SFOR to EUFOR. Whether important elements
of the Berlin Plus arrangements do work, will be revealed first
in case of a crisis on the ground, when availability of resources
and the speed with which they are provided will represent the
yardsticks. Although SFOR has been terminated, NATO will undertake
counter-terrorism tasks and remain in charge of defence reform
under its Partnership for Peace (PfP) programme, thus keeping
a separate and independent office in Sarajevo. In this regard,
one of the most important objectives of the reforms is to end
the ethnic division of Bosnian armed forces. The EU Force Commander
will have a seat on the Defence Reform Commission, which is jointly
chaired by NATO and the Bosnian Ministry of Defence, aiming to
ensure compliance with Dayton. One may wonder, however, whether
such a division of labour is a sensible one, given the EU's heavy
involvement in institution-building and democratic reform in all
other aspects of the state. This said, all parties have made it
clear that NATO and EUFOR are not in competition.

On a general note, EUFOR may be seen to represent
another step down the path towards what some have referred to
as the "Europeanization" of Balkan peacekeeping, a notion
implying, on the one hand, continued American detachment from
the region. This trend has spurred some concern, not least among
Bosnian Muslims, who may have felt safer with the Americans around.
Others are worried about the potential implications of the American
focus on threats outside Europe, and the accompanying strains
on its military forces, on the access to crucial NATO capabilitiesthat
is American capabilities predominantlyin case of a crisis.
The process of "Europeanization" may, on the other hand,
be seen to reflect also a move towards a specific European way
of projecting forceie more integrated with other foreign
policy instruments and focusing on core European strengths, such
as peacekeeping, nation-building and counter-insurgency, as suggested,
for example, in a recent publication by the London-based Centre
for European Reform[29]
Nevertheless, the EU will remain reliant on NATO for years to
come, although transatlantic divergence over how, when and where
to apply military force is likely to put some strains on relations
in the future.

THE ROLEOF OTHER
INTERNATIONAL ACTORSIN BIH

With regard to other international actors operating
in BiH, structures for co-operation, as well as a rough division
of labour, exist already in accordance with Dayton. The principal
bodysince procedures for co-operation were streamlined
in 2002is the Board of Principals, which meets every week
in Sarajevo. Permanent members, before the implementation of EUFOR,
included OHR, SFOR, OSCE, UNHCR, EUPM and the European Commission.
With the merger of the positions of head of the OHR and EUSR,
as well as an even stronger EU presence, it is to be expected
that procedures and tasks to a larger degree will be dictated
by the Union hopefully with better co-operation as the result.
The aim is to avoid duplication and ensure coherence when tasks
are overlapping, which applies especially to the area of conflict
prevention. However, the need for co-ordination of resources applies
also to access to EUFOR military capabilities when, for example,
human rights breaches are reportedan area on which the
OSCE focuses heavily. Quick and decisive action in such cases
is a matter of accountability, but limits to co-operation are
inherent in the fact that half of the OSCE member states are not
members of the EU. Moreover, the OSCE and other organisations
have a treaty given right to perform the tasks assigned to them
by Dayton. This will have to be taken into consideration by the
EU now that its involvement in BiH is strengthened. Finally, several
UN branches are involved in BiH, most importantly the UN High
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the lead agency, as established
by Dayton, in accommodating the return of Bosnian refugees and
internally displaced persons. This process is reliant on a safe
and stable environment, which makes effective co-operation between
EUFOR and the UNHCR particularly important.

EXTENDINGTHE
ZONEOF
SECURITYAROUND
EUROPE

Since its birth at St-Malo in 1998, the ESDP
seems to have suffered from a "big words but little action"syndrome.
The ceremonious speeches at the 2001 Laeken summit, when the ESDP
was declared operational for "some crisis management
operations", did not seem to quite reflect actual accomplishments
with regard to, for example, the increase in capabilities. The
same goes for the EU's military debut in Macedonia, which was
not exactly a dashing display of force. In retrospect, however,
the ESDP process can be seen to have been one of steady growth
to meet the challenges at hand. As such, EUFOR is not only a timely
venturenext year it will be 10 years since NATO intervened
in BiHbut also a bold one, since another European failure
in the Balkans would probably bury the EU's military aspirations
for good. On a strategic note, EUFOR restates the EU's commitments
in the Balkans, as set out in the 2003 European Security Strategy
(ESS), and reflects the overall strategic objective of creating
stability in the EU's immediate neighbourhood. 38 The focus, prior
to the deployment, on streamlining EU policieswith particular
emphasis on the SAP as the overall framework for the European
course in BiHreflects also a turn towards a more comprehensive
approach than NATO has been capable of, providing it perhaps with
better a better chance of success. Depending on how well the EU
performs in BiH, one mightperhaps sooner rather than laterexpect
a take-over of NATO-operation KFOR in Kosovo as well. This would
revoke the somewhat arbitrary impression of ESDP operations so
far, while heeding the aspirations of the ESS of "extending
the zone of security around Europe". As tempting as this
may be, however, the EU should be careful not to bite off more
than it can chew. Reclaiming its backyard is perhaps yet a bit
premature.