3 The Latin American Program The Latin American Program and its Institutes on Brazil and Mexico work to address the most critical current and emerging challenges facing the Hemisphere. The Program sponsors relevant and timely research and uses its unparalleled convening power to provide a nonpartisan space for experts, decision makers, and opinion leaders to interact. Through its public events, briefings, and publications, the Program provides context, depth, and background to contribute to more informed policy choices in the United States and throughout the region. Broad outreach via print and on-line publications and traditional and social media extends this open dialogue to citizens of the United States, Latin America, and beyond. The Program is overseen by a distinguished international Advisory Board of preeminent scholars, public intellectuals, and business leaders and is chaired by former President of Uruguay Tabaré Vázquez. More information on the Latin American Program is available at Available from : Latin American Program Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars One Woodrow Wilson Plaza 1300 Pennsylvania Avenue NW Washington, DC , Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars ISBN: Cover photo: Members of Mexico s Federal Investigative Agency (AFI) arrest men on suspicion of drug possession during an anti-narcotics operation in the Morelos district in Mexico City June 26, Mexico demoted 284 federal police chiefs, the security ministry said on Monday in the government s latest attempt to contain a bloody drug war. REUTERS/Daniel Aguilar (MEXICO) ii

6 Introduction BY CYNTHIA J. ARNSON AND ERIC L. OLSON WITH CHRISTINE ZAINO* Transnational criminal organizations trafficking drugs from Mexico to the United States have existed since the Prohibition era in the United States. But the violence associated with this trafficking and related movements of other illicit goods as well as undocumented migrants increased exponentially beginning in the mid-2000s, threatening Mexico s national security. During the six-year administration of President Felipe Calderón ( ) estimates of those killed in drug-related violence reached 70,000, with an additional 20,000 disappeared. The upsurge in violence in many areas of the country reflected a combination of fighting between rival drug trafficking organizations seeking territorial control of criminal markets and dominance of lucrative trafficking corridors, as well as clashes between the traffickers and government security forces. By 2010, some Mexican cities registered homicide rates that were among the highest in the world and the public began to seriously doubt the government s strategy and its ability to guarantee public safety. The scope of the violence and its frequently gruesome and shocking character, and the government s seeming inability to bring it under control, brought forth memories of an earlier period in Latin America, when Colombia was besieged by the violence of the Medellín and Cali drug trafficking cartels. The Colombian crisis of the 1980s and 90s involved multiple ways the state was losing ground to guerrilla and paramilitary groups in addition to drug traffickers. But like Mexico, the cost in human lives and government legitimacy was huge. * We are grateful to Verónica Colón-Rosario of the Latin American Program for her superb editorial assistance and supervision of all stages of this publication. Arnson and Olson with Zaino v

7 Over the course of more than a decade, Colombia s security situation has improved dramatically. With significant international cooperation, the guerrillas have been weakened militarily and coca cultivation and cocaine production have been reduced. Most analysts agree that at least some of the security crisis in Mexico (as well as Central America) is due to ways that security advances and improvements in state capacity in Colombia forced traffickers to search for new smuggling routes and ways to market their illicit product. This is true even though, as several chapters in this publication indicate, organized criminal groups remain an important source of instability in Colombia, having mutated and fragmented in response to government pressure. Former paramilitary fighters, who demobilized in the early 2000s as a result of peace talks with the government, are important actors in the new manifestations of organized crime. Colombia is now a major player in South-South security cooperation, offering training to over 2,500 Mexican military and police officials between 2010 and 2012, as well as to over 5,000 members of the security forces from Central America and the Caribbean and over 2,000 from South America during the same time period. 1 A former director of the Colombian National Police, General Óscar Naranjo, served as an adviser to the administration of Mexican President Enrique Peña Nieto. The United States funds some of Colombia s programs abroad and U.S. officials have expressed satisfaction and pride in Colombia s success. In a May 2013 visit to Colombia, Vice President Biden paid personal tribute to President Santos and the people of Colombia for the remarkable, remarkable progress you ve made in dealing with the country s security concerns. Biden went on to mention Colombia s training of thousands of law enforcement officers and security officers from over 40 countries since But precisely what aspects of Colombia s strategy and tactics for fighting organized crime in its own territory offer useful lessons for Mexico? What might Colombia s steps and missteps offer by way of example or counterexample? What is unique about each case such that comparisons are misleading? What do current security challenges in Colombia suggest about the threat posed by organized crime more generally? To reflect on these questions, the Latin American Program commissioned a series of papers from international experts with a wealth of experience on vi Introduction

8 issues of security, violence, and transnational criminal organizations. This publication includes two chapters analyzing the usefulness of comparing Colombia and Mexico s experiences in combatting organized crime, as well as the potential for using Colombia s successes as lessons for Mexico s security strategy. Maria Victoria Llorente of Fundación Ideas para la Paz and Jeremy McDermott of Insight Crime argue that Colombia does not represent a ready template for Mexico s fight against violence and organized crime, although its long experience may provide insight into Mexico s future. The second paper, by Raúl Benítez Manaut, a researcher at the National Autonomous University of Mexico (UNAM), contends that Colombia does offer positive lessons about how reform of the defense sector and professionalization of the police can yield measureable results for Mexico. Commentaries by Marta Lucía Ramírez de Rincón, former Minister of Defense of Colombia, and John Bailey of Georgetown University, deepen and take issue with the analyses provided by Llorente and McDermott and Benítez. In their chapter on Colombia s Lessons for Mexico, Llorente and McDermott caution against seeing Colombia as a security model for Mexico and believe that both countries have a long list of successes and failures on which to draw from each other. The authors argue that the historic dynamics of the conflict and violence in these two countries share few similarities, as the drug trade in Colombia has been inextricably linked with its civil conflict. They maintain that Colombia has had numerous tactical victories the killing of Pablo Escobar and the dismantling of the Cali cartel along with reductions in coca cultivation, cocaine production, and trafficking in precursor chemicals. But they say that Colombia s great successes have been against the Marxist rebels, more in the context of a counterinsurgent war than a war on drugs. The latter is not close to victory, they argue, at least not yet. To the contrary, criminal syndicates linked to former paramilitary groups, known by their acronym BACRIM (bandas criminales), along with the FARC and ELN guerrillas, have deepened their involvement in the drug trade and represent new manifestations of insecurity and violence. An even more important example for Mexico, Llorente and McDermott maintain, is Colombia s decades-long experience with the transformation of Arnson and Olson with Zaino vii

9 drug trafficking organizations in response to sustained pressure from the security forces; that is, how different groups have evolved, fragmented, and re-constituted themselves into networks; how criminal organizations have militarized. The authors suggest that Mexico better anticipate the evolution of organized crime in order to protect national security. Llorente and McDermott see high levels of impunity in Mexico and Colombia as a common problem and therefore that a common solution can be found in a strong presence of state institutions throughout the country, an effective justice system and law enforcement, educational and economic opportunities to provide alternatives to illicit activities, all reinforced by transparency to undermine the corrupting influence of drug money. Raúl Benítez, in Mexico-Colombia: U.S. Assistance and the Fight against Organized Crime, also details the many divergences between Mexico and Colombia, both in the security challenges they face as well as key institutional and political differences within their security structures. Colombia s history of violence developed an ongoing culture of war from the 1950s on, which paved the way for a war on drugs approach that was politically acceptable to the public. Similarly, Colombia embraced the language of narco-terrorism in its fight against drug traffickers. Mexico on the other hand, has rejected the characterization of drug traffickers as terrorists and has struggled with the drug war rhetoric. Despite these and other differences between the two cases rural versus urban focus of criminal activities, production versus trafficking elements of the cocaine supply chain, and different experiences with human rights abuses Benítez believes that Colombia does hold positive lessons for Mexico, both centered on institutions. The first lesson is Colombia s reform of the national defense sector, including the appointment of civilians to head the Defense Ministry. Second, he cites Colombia s professional National Police as a model for Mexico and notes that the success of the police in reducing crime in large urban areas helped to generate public support for President Álvaro Uribe s overall security strategy. The Mexican case is different, Benítez argues, because police reform took place in the midst of rising crime and homicides, leading to a generalized sense of fear and rejection of the security strategy by Mexican elites. Finally, Benítez highlights other key differences between the two countries: Colombia s viii Introduction

10 defense budget is the largest in Latin America, its military is over twice as large as Mexico s in per capita terms, and Colombia has more of its police force centralized under federal command, whereas Mexico s is very decentralized. Marta Lucía Ramírez de Rincón s commentary, Drug Trafficking: A National Security Threat Similarities between Colombia and Mexico, begins with an overview of the havoc wreaked by drug trafficking organizations on Colombian society, politics, and security in the 1980s and 90s. She details numerous acts of terrorism, including the bombings of government agencies and a civilian airliner and the assassination of government ministers, political leaders (including presidential candidates), judges, magistrates, and journalists. The decision to keep the country s military intentionally weak in order to prevent coups had powerful consequences, she argues, in that the state was unable to prevent the growth of organized crime and guerrilla groups. As drug trafficking organizations began to grow and feel ever more powerful, they began their penetration of Colombian society, first via infiltration of the political class and later through threats, extortion, and the blatant corruption of officials in various state institutions. Non-state armed actors, including drug trafficking organizations and guerrilla and paramilitary groups, posed existential threats to Colombia s national security and democratic regime. Building on a substantial increase in the security and defense budget during the administration of President Andrés Pastrana, the Uribe government s Democratic Security Policy (DSP) continued the expansion of the armed forces to combat the full range of non-state armed actors. In addition to cooperation with the United States via Plan Colombia, she notes the importance of domestic resources mobilized via a wealth tax in order to finance improvements in the military s size, professionalization, and technological capacity. Ramírez details broad processes of consultation within and across government ministries and with academia, the private sector, and others in civil society in the development of the DSP s comprehensive vision, which held that military action had to be complemented by judicial reform that would guarantee the superiority of the state over actors in the conflict and over terrorism. Over time, she says, the security forces achieved a permanent presence on the highways and in Arnson and Olson with Zaino ix

11 rural areas and towns, shifting from reaction to prevention and the better protection of citizens lives and liberty. Echoing a conclusion of Llorente and McDermott, Ramírez notes that following the collapse of the major drug trafficking cartels and the demobilization of paramilitary groups, the police, the justice system, and other state agencies failed to react adequately, thereby allowing smaller, harder to detect groups to take over the business. She argues that like Colombia, Mexico initially misdiagnosed its problem with organized crime and proposes that Mexican society debate the advantages and disadvantages of classifying violent drug traffickers as terrorists in order to give the government additional tools to combat them. Based on Colombia s experience, Ramírez recommends that Mexico come to agreement on the nature of the problem and develop an action plan with the participation of the security forces, civil society, and academia, with unequivocal leadership from the president at the national level as well as the capacity for local action. She also calls for international cooperation to identify criminal networks and their modes of operation along all stages of the value chain, indicating that Mexican and Colombian organizations have become truly transnational organized criminal enterprises that present serious threats beyond national borders. In his commentary What Can Mexico Learn from Colombia to Combat Organized Crime? John Bailey argues that beyond focusing on the two countries shared problem of drug trafficking and violence, it is important to consider how these issues affect democratic processes and state institutions; that is, the ways in which the trafficking organizations engage with other types of criminal groups to penetrate and transform the institutions of the democratic state. Bailey advocates looking not only at the tools and techniques that Colombia may have to offer Mexico, but also how the contexts and constraints in each country impact their ability to share strategies or tactics. Like Benítez, Bailey cautions against the militarization of the fight against organized crime through a conflation of drug-related violence with insurgency and terrorism, even though he allows that over time, insurgent groups in Colombia have come to resemble profitoriented criminal organizations. x Introduction

12 Bailey sees as the major difference between Colombia and Mexico the fact that after 1992 the Colombian government built a much bigger security toolbox and developed more effective tools by investing heavily in its defense budget and strengthening its armed forces and police. He goes on to offer both positive and negative lessons from the Colombian experience. Among the positive lessons he notes are efforts to think in strategic terms; improvements in inter-agency coordination, including between the armed forces and police; reform and strengthening of the National Police; and improvements in intelligence and mobility. Among the negative lessons are the priority attached to high-value targets as opposed to the middle rungs of trafficking organizations; the weakness of the judiciary; and the absence of a long-term vision for citizen security which emphasizes prevention. Overall, Bailey recommends caution in drawing too tight a comparison between Mexico s and Colombia s security challenges, arguing as well for more research on the interactions between government officials and criminal groups and their impact on democratization and the state. Endnotes 1 According to Colombian Ministry of Defense figures, these included 1,008 police and military from Honduras, 563 from Guatemala, 357 from Costa Rica, 242 from El Salvador, 205 from the Dominican Republic, 974 from Ecuador, and 592 from Peru. 2 The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Remarks to the Press by Vice President Biden and Colombian President Santos, Casa de Nariño, Bogotá, Colombia, May 27, Arnson and Olson with Zaino xi

13

14 Colombia s Lessons for Mexico BY MARÍA VICTORIA LLORENTE AND JEREMY MCDERMOTT INTRODUCTION Both Colombia and Mexico are embroiled in drug-fuelled violence. Both countries face an array of diverse and powerful criminal syndicates, from street gangs to transnational criminal organizations (TCOs). Colombia has been fighting its war against powerful drug trafficking cartels since the early 1980s, while the battle against insurgent groups dates back to the early 1960s. Both TCOs and rebels fund themselves through criminal activities, including the narcotics trade and increasingly, illegal mining. Mexico advanced to an all-out war against its drug cartels after President Felipe Calderón took office in December 2006, although aspects of the government s security strategy are being reformulated under the new government of Enrique Peña Nieto, inaugurated in December Some commentators have described the situation in Mexico as a Colombianization, while others have described the violence in Mexico as a narco-insurgency. Washington has held up Colombia as a success story in the war on drugs and transnational organized crime, arguing that this Andean nation has a great deal to teach Mexico. In September 2010, U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton stated that Mexico is looking more and more like Colombia looked 20 years ago, and that the Mexican María Victoria Llorente and Jeremy McDermott 1

15 drug cartels are showing more and more indices of insurgencies. 1 This was followed by a statement from the then-chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Mike Mullen, who said during a visit to Colombia: There s a great deal to be learned from the success that has been seen here in Colombia. 2 In February of 2011 the theme was picked up again by then- Undersecretary of the Army Joseph Westphal, who told the University of Utah s Hinckley Center for Politics that there is a form of insurgency in Mexico with the drug cartels that s right on our border. 3 Colombia has had success in dismantling some of the most powerful criminal organizations in the world, such as the Medellín, Cali, and Norte del Valle cartels; it has reduced drug crop production; it has beaten back Marxist guerrillas which had threatened the viability of the state at the end of the 1990s; its policy of killing high value targets (HVTs) has removed the top leadership of certain criminal and rebel groups; it has worked hand-in-hand with U.S. authorities, extraditing hundreds of drug traffickers; and it has reduced homicide and kidnapping rates significantly over the last decade. Indeed, many credit the significant security advances over the last decade with creating the conditions for the peace talks between the Colombian government and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), which formally opened in Oslo, Norway in August 2012 and continue in Havana, Cuba. However, the situations in Colombia and Mexico are very different and it would be a mistake to think that Colombia provides a ready template for Mexico. The historic dynamics of the conflict and violence in these two countries share few similarities, as the drug trade in Colombia has been inextricably linked with its civil conflict. Of course, Colombia has experience it can share with Mexico. Colombia has had an enormous number of tactical victories taking down Pablo Escobar, dismantling the Cali cartel, and extraditing a whole generation of major drug traffickers. However, strategically speaking, it is difficult to view the war on drugs in Colombia as anything close to a victory, yet. Drug cultivation has been reduced, but this has been in part offset by a higher alkaloid yield per hectare of coca, i.e. higher purity cocaine. In addition, the integrated, hierarchical cartels no longer exist, but they have been replaced with more fluid networks that re-form every time a component or cell is removed. 4 2 Colombia s Lessons for Mexico

16 Mexico s drug war is all about territory, particularly the coveted ground that lies along the border with the United States. Territoriality is not the driving force behind Colombian violence today, although it has relevance. Groups in Colombia have fought for access to and control of drug crops, internal movement corridors, and embarkation points, but that fight has been much reduced since the demobilization of the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC), which was completed in There are still disputes over access to the big Colombian ports and the thousands of containers moved through them every day some of which host cocaine consignments. Only by understanding Colombia s civil conflict can one understand the country s drug trade. In 1980, coca crops began to emerge in force in Colombia, and by around 1997 Colombia became the primary producer of cocaine in the world. Since the 1980s and the exponential rise in the cocaine traded by Pablo Escobar, drug traffickers have been central actors in near five decades of civil conflict. This is not the case in Mexico. While Mexico has had small guerrilla groups the Popular Revolutionary Army (EPR) and the now dormant Zapatista Army of National Liberation (EZLN) they are not players in the drug-fuelled violence, nor involved in any significant way in drug trafficking, unlike their Colombian counterparts of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the National Liberation Army (ELN). It could be argued that Mexico will actually have more to teach Colombia. Since 2008, with the extradition of the leadership of the AUC and the subsequent reduction of the ideological conflict between Colombia s belligerent groups, the situation in the Andean nation is looking more like that of Mexico and less like a traditional insurgency. As the domestic drug market grows in Colombia, so the war between gangs for territorial control and distribution points in urban neighborhoods increases. This chapter argues that while Mexico and Colombia share most, if not all, of the symptoms of drug-fuelled violence, the conditions that generate this violence are very different. The solutions, however, may be similar: a strong presence of state institutions throughout the country; an effective justice system; and law enforcement, educational, and economic opportunities to provide alternatives to illicit activities, all reinforced by transparency to undermine the corrupting influence of drug money. Unfortunately, María Victoria Llorente and Jeremy McDermott 3

17 Colombia does not yet have these conditions fully in place, and therefore cannot be a model for Mexico. What Colombia does provide is a lesson in how organized crime can mutate under pressure from the security forces: how different groups have evolved, fragmented, and re-constituted themselves into networks; how criminal organizations have militarized. In these areas, there are lessons that Mexico can learn from Colombia, and perhaps better prepare its government to anticipate the evolution of the organized crime that presents a direct threat to national security. This paper will first look at the development and then achievements of Colombia s security policy, beginning with President Álvaro Uribe. It will be argued that many of these achievements were part of a counterinsurgency war rather than a war on drugs, and therefore less applicable to Mexico. The second part of the paper will look at how organized crime in Colombia has responded to security force pressure and how these organizations have evolved into the criminal networks which today dominate the cocaine trade in the country. Colombia s Successes In the late 1990s Colombia was one of the most violent nations in the world and was often considered, if not a failed state, then one stumbling in that direction. High levels of violence and human rights violations were linked to the four-decade old armed conflict, which had intensified in the 1980s and 90s thanks to the influx of cash from the cocaine industry. Irregular armed groups, from left-wing guerrillas to self-proclaimed rightwing paramilitaries, challenged the state s control over vast areas of the country. With the FARC rebels able to amass up to 1,500 fighters in one place to attack military installations and even a provincial capital, 5 Colombians placed their hopes on the 1999 peace process led by President Andrés Pastrana ( ). The collapse of this dialogue in 2002 resulted in the election later that year of Álvaro Uribe Vélez, a political outsider who promised to wage all-out war on the insurgency. 4 Colombia s Lessons for Mexico

18 Over two administrations ( and ), Uribe implemented a new security strategy dubbed the Democratic Security Policy (DSP). The strategy centered on recovering state authority and providing security to the Colombian people in order to regain investor confidence and thus propel the country s development forward. The DSP relied heavily on resources provided by the U.S. government through Plan Colombia and on the military reforms initiated by former president Pastrana, both of which began in The Colombian public widely embraced the DSP after it achieved significant reductions in violence, crime, and kidnapping as well as other improvements in security, which propelled President Uribe s re-election to a second term. 6 The DSP also received international acceptance as the result of a U.S. effort to portray the DSP as an unmatched success in the war against narco-trafficking and terrorism. The successes of the DSP have led many, in different situations and contexts, to idealize it as the recipe for regaining state authority and reducing violence. Understanding the Democratic Security Policy The DSP had two parallel agendas, both of which were aimed at countering the country s main illegal armed groups: the guerrillas, the paramilitaries, and drug traffickers. The first agenda consisted of a peace process with the paramilitary structures of the AUC. This process led to the demobilization of thousands of AUC troops between 2003 and 2006 and opened the door to a complex and controversial period of facilitating justice, truth, and victim reparation in the country, which is still underway, although proceeding at a glacial pace. This chapter, known as the Justice and Peace process, was established under the framework of Law 975 of 2005 (better known as the Ley de Justicia y Paz, or the Justice and Peace Law). In very simple terms, the law serves as a mechanism of transitional justice that grants judicial benefits (reduced sentences of five to eight years) to paramilitary leaders for crimes committed while belonging to an illegal armed group, on the condition that they agree to stop all criminal activity, tell the full truth about the crimes they committed (and the power structures enabling them), and hand over their assets to pay for the reparation of victims. María Victoria Llorente and Jeremy McDermott 5

19 The second agenda of the DSP had counterinsurgency and counternarcotics aspects set out in the two main security-related documents of Uribe s administration: the Defense and Democratic Security Policy and the Consolidation of Democratic Security Policy, issued by the Ministry of Defense in 2003 and 2007, respectively. These counterinsurgency and counter-narcotics policies were aimed at strengthening and guaranteeing the rule of law in the whole country through the enhancement of democratic authority. 7 The policy encompassed simultaneous efforts to strengthen and modernize the military, police, and intelligence capacity of security forces. This became possible thanks to a considerable increase in the security and defense budget, initiated by President Pastrana and continued through the two Uribe administrations 8 and by President Juan Manuel Santos (2010-present), financed by extraordinary resources provided under the banner of Plan Colombia as well as through a new tax on wealth known as the War Tax. The implementation of the DSP began by prioritizing areas based on the presence of insurgent groups and the need to consolidate the state s control over that territory. The first phase ( ) involved launching a series of military operations focused on territorial control that for the first time included joint combat units (army, air force, and navy) as well as the extensive use of air capacity and of special forces comprised of professional soldiers 9 and equipped for high mobility. 10 Operations were concentrated in three types of regions: The principal highways which, since the end of the 1990s, had been affected by piracy and the FARC s strategy of indiscriminately kidnapping civilians (Plan Meteoro); The focal points of national political and economic power. In this case the military and police carried out numerous offensives to: a) break the stranglehold that the FARC had sought to create around Bogotá in the department of Cundinamarca (Operations Libertad I and II of Plan Patriota); b) cripple the guerrillas in Antioquia, a strategic department both geographically and economically (Operation Marcial of Plan 6 Colombia s Lessons for Mexico

20 Patriota); and c) clear the guerrillas from Medellín, the capital of Antioquia and second biggest city in the country (Operation Orión); The FARC s strategic rearguard, in the jungles in the southeastern departments of Caquetá, Meta, and Guaviare, an area which at that time was one of the centers of coca production. In this case the biggest military offensive in the country was launched with 17,000 troops, aiming at a final victory against the rebels in this region (Operation J.M. of Plan Patriota). Simultaneously, a plan was developed to enhance the presence of the police, especially in rural areas. This included a program to build 160 reinforced police stations, 11 many of which had been abandoned after FARC offensives in the mid-1990s in which the guerrillas aimed at clearing the police presence out of the municipalities they dominated. In addition, Mobile Police Squads (known by their Spanish acronym, EMCAR) were created, with 9,000 officers trained specifically for operations in rural areas; they aimed to dismantle narco-guerrilla networks, support the eradication of illegal drug crops, carry out interdiction operations, destroy labs, and protect economic infrastructure. 12 As a result of the government s strategic revision, which acknowledged the capacity of insurgent groups to adapt to initiatives promoted by the DSP, the policy was modified and a second phase was put in motion ( ). In this phase, the goal was to maintain the gains of police and military efforts in terms of territorial control. Regionally-focused plans, based on the Integral Action Doctrine, were developed. 13 The most notable of these was the Integrated Consolidation Plan for La Macarena (PCIM, Plan de Consolidación Integral de la Macarena), focused on the Sierra de la Macarena (Meta department, south of Bogotá). This area had long been a bulwark of the FARC and also had a strong tradition of coca cultivation and cocaine production. This, along with its historical importance for the FARC, made it the target of intense military operations aimed at destroying guerrilla structures and leadership and eradicating coca fields as part of Plan Patriota. The PCIM started in 2007 as a pilot project seeking to integrate stabilization and control strategies (military, police, and judicial) with measures to create María Victoria Llorente and Jeremy McDermott 7

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