Los Angeles Superior Court
Judge Mark Mooney did not abuse his discretion in denying a self-represented
defendant’s mid-trial attempt to revoke his waiver of counsel, the California
Supreme Court ruled yesterday in a 6-1 decision.

Reasoning that the
defendant failed to articulate a compelling reason, and that continuance of the
joint trial after the jury had been empanelled and the prosecution’s first
witness had begun to testify would cause delay and disruption, the justices
voted to reverse a contrary ruling by Div. Seven of this district’s Court of
Appeal.

The division’s presiding
justice, Dennis M. Perluss, wrote in 2008 that inconvenience to the jury,
codefendant and codefendant’s counsel was an insufficient basis for denial
given the early stage of trial, the reason for seeking appointment of counsel,
and defendant Ringo Lawrence’s evident inability to represent himself
effectively.

But the Supreme Court,
in an opinion by Justice Kathryn Mickle Werdegar examining the totality of the
circumstances, rejected both that conclusion, as well as the Court of Appeal’s
ruling that the denial deprived Lawrence of his constitutional right to
counsel.

Dissent Faults Analysis

Dissenting, Justice
Joyce L. Kennard faulted the majority’s analysis of the facts and agreed with
the Court of Appeal that automatic reversal of Lawrence’s convictions for
selling and possessing cocaine for sale was required without any further
showing of prejudice.

Lawrence was arrested
after a paid police informant indicated he bought rock cocaine from Lawrence at
a Los Angeles house. A subsequent search revealed more cocaine, and police
found the $20 bill the informant had used in codefendant Patricia Broomfield’s
sock.

Lawrence and Broomfield,
as well as another man, John Evans, were charged similarly, and when the case
was called before Judge David Wesley on the Sept. 28, 2005 calendar, Lawrence’s
attorney, Paul Cohen, sought a continuance, explaining that he needed two weeks
because he was selecting a jury in an attempted murder trial.

Cohen advised Wesley
that Lawrence wished to represent himself, and Wesley initially told
Lawrence—who said he wanted to dismiss Cohen because he “ain’t doing
nothing”—to be ready to proceed in two weeks.

However, after
Broomfield’s counsel, Joseph Walsh, observed that the continuance would cut
into his calendar, Wesley admonished Lawrence on the consequences of the waiver
and sent the case out for trial before Mooney.

Evans pled guilty, and
during jury selection on Lawrence and Broomfield’s joint trial, Walsh advised
the court that Lawrence had been asking him questions and wanted to withdraw
his waiver.

‘Cross-Examination’

When questioned,
Lawrence told the court “[t]he only reason is cross-examination. People are
saying something and I am not for sure able to, you know.”

Mooney admonished
Lawrence not to bother Walsh, and jury selection continued when Lawrence said
nothing more about revoking his in propria persona status.

On Oct. 3, 2005, after
jurors entered the courtroom, Lawrence told the court that he had talked to his
wife, who told Lawrence he needed counsel. The defendant asked to revoke his
waiver, but Mooney deferred responding until the next break.

Mooney then gave opening
jury instructions, and allowed both sides to give opening statements and the
prosecution’s first witness to begin testifying before he addressed Lawrence’s
request. Reasoning that Lawrence had been warned, and that a continuance would
be disruptive, Mooney denied the request, and Lawrence was convicted and
sentenced to seven years in prison.

However, Perluss, joined
by Justices Fred Woods and Laurie D. Zelon, concluded on appeal that Lawrence’s
reason for seeking appointed counsel was legitimate, and held that Mooney
abused his discretion and that the denial was prejudicial per se.

Request Not Unequivocal

On appeal to the Supreme
Court, Werdegar wrote that Mooney had not abused his discretion with respect to
Lawrence’s initial remarks on September 28, because they did not amount to an
unequivocal request to revoke his in propria person status.

“Defendant, if he did
not want to proceed without counsel, should have made an express request to
revoke his waiver and pressed for a final ruling at some point during jury
selection,” she said.

Turning to Lawrence’s
Oct. 3 request, Werdegar opined that the Court of Appeal was “mistaken in its
belief that no significant disruption or untoward delay would have been
threatened if defendant’s request had been granted and a continuance or
mistrial ordered to permit new counsel to prepare a defense.”

Noting that Lawrence
premised the request on what his wife—and not what he—wanted, and that Lawrence
had been warned of the consequences, the justice observed that “[b]uyer’s
remorse may not be an illegitimate reason for wanting to revoke a…waiver, but neither
is it a compelling one.”

Werdegar also explained
that Lawrence’s asserted ineffectiveness at self-representation did not
demonstrate an abuse of discretion.

“That defendant’s
defense would have been more effectively presented (or a better sentence obtained
through a negotiated plea) had he been represented is likely,” she commented.
“But if that fact were determinative, virtually all self-representing
defendants would have the right to revoke their counsel waivers at any time
during trial. That is not the law.”

Kennard countered that
the majority incorrectly concluded the critical date was Oct. 3, rather than
five days earlier, and said there would have been no prejudice had Mooney
granted Lawrence’s request on Sept. 28.