Monday, November 25, 2013

The Rebirth Of Al Qaeda In Iraq, An Interview With Jessica Lewis Of The Institute For The Study Of War

Al Qaeda in Iraq has gone through a resurgence this year. It
wasn’t long ago that the group was on the decline with much of its leadership
arrested or killed, and many of its cells broken up. Now it is responsible for
more and more mass casualty bombings, it has re-established its presence in the
provinces, and is operating in Syria that has allowed it access to new funds,
personnel, and material. To help explain the rebirth of Al Qaeda in Iraq is
Jessica Lewis the research director at the Institute for the Study of War and
author of several recent reports on the Islamist group.

1. After 2009 it
seemed like the Iraqi insurgency as a whole was on the decline with the number
of deaths and attacks at the lowest level since 2003. When was the first hint
that Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) was making a comeback?

In 2010, Gen. Ray Odierno remarked that AQI was still
present in northern Iraq and unyielding in its ultimate purpose. At the time,
their lethal capacity was estimated to be low. High yield explosive attacks
resumed in Iraq in late 2011, prior to the withdrawal of U.S. troops. The first
undeniable sign that AQI was reconstituting as a military force came in January
2012, when large-scale explosive attacks occurred against Shi’a civilians in
holy cities like Karbala, Nasiriyah, and Kadhimiyah during Arbae’en. February
2012 also saw a rise in Vehicle Born Improvised Explosive Devices (VBIED)
activity in Iraq, which corresponds with the first documented VBIEDS in Syria.
On June 4, 2012, AQI attacked the Shi’a Endowment in Bab al-Maotham in Baghdad.
With this attack, AQI’s potential to reignite sectarian war in Iraq became clear.
The first massive demonstration of AQI’s organizational depth came the
following month, with the announcement of the “Breaking the Walls” campaign and
the launch of many VBIED waves, the first comprised of 27 VBIEDS on July 22-23,
2012.

2. It seems like AQI
has been able to rebuild its manpower through several different means including
prisoner releases after the U.S. withdrawal, prison breaks, and Syria. Can you
explain how these have filled the group’s ranks?

At this time, I do not see that AQI’s activities in Iraq are
geared toward garnering popular support. We have seen them try to represent
themselves as a source of benevolent governance in Syria, which is a departure.
However, in both countries, I believe their manpower still comes from two
primary sources: prison breaks in Iraq and foreign fighters, the majority of
whom are flowing first into Syria.

3. Al Qaeda launched
two recent campaigns. You mentioned the first one called Breaking The Walls,
which started in July 2012. What were its goals, and was it successful or not?

The “Breaking the Walls” campaign involved two main
objectives: to reconstitute the veteran AQI network behind bars by executing
prison breaks; and to target Shi’a populations to stoke sectarian war. AQI was
successful at both. Of the eight prison attacks recorded during the July 2012 –
July 2013 period, two resulted in the release of many prisoners: 100 prisoners
escaped from Tikrit Tasfirat prison in September 2012, and over 500 prisoners
escaped from Abu Ghraib in July 2013. The campaign of successive VBIED waves
oriented on Shi’a neighborhoods in Baghdad by February 2013, and by May 2013,
there were indications in Baghdad of Shi’a militia remobilization.

Abu Ghraib Prison was the site of a major jailbreak by AQI
in July 2013 (Getty)

4. The newest
campaign started in July 2013 and is called The Soldiers’ Harvest. What is AQI
trying to achieve with that?

The “Soldiers’ Harvest” campaign involves two new
objectives: to target the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF); and to establish control
of terrain in Iraq and Syria. The Iraqi Security Forces have been targeted for
several months through an intimidation campaign involving house-borne Improvised
Explosive Devices (IEDs). Now they are being targeted through complex ground
assaults upon security compounds, especially in Anbar and northern Babel
province. There have also been attacks against ISF facilities in Mosul and
Iraqi Kurdistan. I believe AQI’s second objective to establish control of parts
of Iraq and Syria is much more significant than simply securing a rear support area
for further military operations. I think we should take Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi
seriously when he says he wants to establish an Islamic emirate in Iraq and
Sham. Right now, I estimate AQI is attempting to establish control in southern
Ninewa province, northern Diyala Province, and northern Babel province, along
with multiple locations in Syria, including the northern border downs and areas
of Aleppo province.

5. One of the
trademarks of both of these operations has not just been the use of suicide and
car bombings but coordinated attacks across several different cities on the
same day with increasing regularity. Can you provide some general figures to
show how these types of attacks have increased over the last few years, and
also what that says about AQI’s capabilities?

The first waves of VBIEDS resumed in July 2012. At this
time, the pattern involved 20+ VBIEDS detonating across a wide geographic area
in Iraq on the same day. A wave this size only occurred once every two months,
the next large wave occurring on September 9, 2012. The large waves dropped off
at this point for several months, I believe because AQI was working internally
to reorganize, which aligns with the absorption of 100 prisoners from Tikrit
Tasfirat prison in late September 2012. Small clusters of attacks still occurred
during this period, but the large waves resumed in February 2013. This time,
the waves were concentrated uniformly on Shi’a neighborhoods in Baghdad,
indicating not only that their VBIED construction and supply capabilities had
been established in close proximity to the capital, but also that the organization
had a clear intent to synchronize operations to meet a specific campaign goal. Beginning
in May 2012, these attacks began to occur once a week. This tells me that AQI has
become strong not only in terms of their lethal capacity, but also in terms of
their military organization.

6. Al Qaeda has shown
some more sophistication with some of its attacks this year as well
coordinating them with political events. Can you provide some examples of that?

A synchronized wave of VBIEDS detonating on the same day,
across Iraq or tightly formed in Baghdad, is a very sophisticated operation.
There have now been over 20 such waves, which means the organization has a
repeatable supply chain. This year, we have also seen combined arms attacks
against hardened facilities, such as Abu Ghraib prison, involving VBIEDS, Suicide
Vests (SVESTS), mortars, and small arms fire. I am particularly concerned about
attacks involving armed gunmen assaulting a fixed position, which has lately
begun to occur in Anbar province. In terms of political events, the rate of
VBIEDS in Mosul did increase ahead of provincial elections in 2013, and there
have been assassinations targeting political leaders, but there have also been
assassination campaigns targeting protest leaders. The latter concerns me greatly,
because it appears that AQI wants to deter constructive engagement between the
disenfranchised Arab Sunni population in Iraq and Maliki’s government.

7. Can these attacks
provide some intelligence on where in Iraq Al Qaeda might have cells located?

Yes, I think we can learn a great deal about AQI’s physical
disposition by studying the attacks they perpetrate. In 2012-2013, I primarily
studied the VBIED campaign, and as of October 2013 I estimated there were
between 5-7 VBIED cells operating in Iraq. I think three of these cells are
operating in the vicinity of the Baghdad belts. VBIED cells are tethered to
terrain, because VBIED re-supply and construction are fixed site operations
that likely require auto repair shop facilities in industrial areas. I am
working to understand what terrain insights can be gleaned from AQI’s recent
ground assaults by other parts of AQI’s military organization in Anbar. Right
now, I hypothesize that AQI exercises a degree of control in Jurf al-Sukhar,
northern Babel, in the upper Diyala river valley, and north of Salah ad Din in
the Za’ab Triangle.

This map shows AQI’s supply lines stretching from northern
and western Iraq into Syria and down into the center of the country. (Institute for the Study of War)

8. As Al Qaeda’s
operations have taken off the government has responded with one security
crackdown after another. What have been the tactics of the Iraqi forces and why
have they failed to stem the violence?

Countering AQI at its present strength is going to be very
difficult for the ISF. However, I see three primary weaknesses in their current
strategy that can be overcome: first, they are deploying into the deserts when
they should first protect major urban centers. It does not serve to expend
resources in remote areas while Baghdad is exposed. Second, the ISF should
target zones of AQI control, not support zones like the Jazeera desert. AQI
will evade contact in a support zone and live to fight another day. AQI will
defend terrain it means to control. We are seeing these behaviors in northern
Diyala and northern Babel. After Iraq’s cities are protected, the campaign to
counter AQI should focus on control zones. Third, I maintain that the ISF could
achieve a quick and vital win if they were to defeat AQI’s VBIED capability
first. Not only is it oriented primarily upon Baghdad, but it is also operating
apart from the rest of AQI’s military, and it should be regarded as AQI’s
primary and most sophisticated weapon system, without which they will be
significantly less effective. It may be disrupted by clearing auto repair shops
in the Baghdad belts.

The ISF has been targeting Sunni populations with mass
arrests, which is dangerous and counter-productive. While this has no affect
upon AQI’s military, it further enhances their cause by driving a wedge between
the Iraqi government and Iraq’s Arab Sunnis that could result in a violent
uprising.

9. Despite the
increased activity by AQI this year does it appear that the organization has
been able to garner any kind of popular support in Iraq?

I still think this is unlikely. AQI is targeting Sahwa,
Sunni protest leaders, Sunni politicians, the ISF, Shi’a neighborhoods,
minorities, and now the Kurds. I do not see them recruiting anyone. Prisons, on
the other hand, are prime environments for radicalization, and I do see this as
a strategic opportunity for AQI. It is important to acknowledge, however, that
AQI has recently begun to operate in the midst of the protest movement in
Ramadi, as reported by Ahmed Ali, our Iraq Team Lead at ISW. My first thought
about this is that the population in Ramadi is falling under AQI’s coercive
control. But if communities within Iraq turn to violent uprising as a means of
addressing longstanding grievances against Maliki’s government, a degree of
interest alignment and tolerance of AQI could result. I think it is more likely
that these grievances will push Iraq’s Arab Sunni population towards Jaysh
Rijal al-Tariq al-Naqshibandi (JRTN), which has a stronger connection to a
Sunni nationalist argument.

SOURCES

Lewis, Jessica, “Al-Qaeda In Iraq Resurgent, The Breaking
The Walls Campaign, Part I,” Institute for the Study of War, September 2013

IRAQ HISTORY TIMELINE

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About Me

Musings On Iraq was started in 2008 to explain the political, economic, security and cultural situation in Iraq via original articles and interviews. If you wish to contact me personally my email is: motown67@aol.com