Geneva,
22 Dec (Chakravarthi Raghavan*) - When the WTO's Nairobi Ministerial
Conference (MC10) ended Saturday, Director-General Roberto Azevedo
and Kenya Foreign Affairs Cabinet Secretary were beaming that they
had pulled off a coup of sorts in a successful Conference, with a
Declaration and decisions (with the US and the EU, acclaiming both
of them).

And
the Trade Editor of the Financial Times gleefully proclaimed at the
end of MC10 in a news report headlined, "Trade talks lead to
โ€Death of Doha and birth of new WTO', while its edit
said in the title: "The Doha round finally dies a merciful death...."
And dutifully even some columnists in Indian media have taken it as
gospel and echoed it (column by Vivek Dahejia in Mint , New Delhi
of 21 December).

"The
report of my death was an exaggeration," Mark Twain famously
said in a cable from Europe to the Associated Press (published in
the New York Journal of 2 June 1897).

The
FT and its reports and writers (including its Martin Wolf), who once
promoted the Doha Work Programme (as the Doha Ministerial of November
2001 characterised the programme of multilateral trade negotiations
lanched at Doha in November 2001, and decided it would be a "Single
Undertaking"), has for some time now declared it to be dead,
and advocated its formal closure - since it no longer suited the US,
the EU and US-British financial interests behind the FT (and more
recently, Japan's, after ownership passed from the Pearson publishing
to the Japanese Nikkei group).

Challenging
the FT report and view, in a letter to the FT, published on 22 Dec,
Timothy Wise (of the Global Development and Environment Institute,
Tufts University, Medford, MA, US) has said: "In fact, Kenyan
chair Ms. Amina Mohamed, in her post-closure press conference, went
out of her way to say quite the opposite. She was asked if this meant
that the Doha round is over and new issues can be brought on to the
agenda. She stated quite clearly that the language of the declaration
specifically prioritised "outstanding Doha issues" and that
no new issues, such as investment and public procurement, could be
taken up unless all WTO members agree. She presented that language
as a firewall intended to keep new issues from supplanting the many
outstanding Doha issues โ€” domestic support, manufacturing
and so on."

The
Indian Minister, Ms. Nirmla Sitaraman, on return from Nairobi, has
sought to reassure her domestic constituencies, including the more
nationalistic party faithfuls, via the social media, twitter and facebook,
by posting therein the letter of the Indian Permanent Representative,
Mrs. Anjali Prasad to the Director-General on India's disagreement
with parts of the Declaration. Some of her own party supporters in
twitter comments appeared to be questioning its utility, including
on whether it was before or after the Declaration was declared adopted.

However,
newspaper headlines, posts on social media like twitter and facebook
aside, former trade negotiators and long-time trade observers, in
comments to writer suggest that when the trade delegations and ambassadors
return to Geneva, and begin to consider the Nairobi Ministerial Declaration,
and engage in trying to reach consensus, they can still retrieve ground.

Behind
all the hype (of the USTR and EU) and gloom and doom elsewhere, a
careful reading of paragraphs 30, 31 and 34 of the Nairobi Ministerial
Declaration (NMD) as published on the WTO website [WT/MIN(15)/W/33/Rev.3],
seem to bear out these views (see further below).

The
three paras suggest that neither side has walked away from Nairobi
with success, but that in the three paras of the NMD, they have merely
acknowledged the stalemate and reflected the reality of their deep
divides; and both sides return to Geneva to continue their fight -
whether on the Single Undertaking's negotiating agenda of the Doha
Work Programme (DWP) or the "new issues". Nor can ANY conditional
(non-MFN) plurilaterals (as envisaged by the US and EU) be incorporated
into the WTO treaty framework, except when there is a consensus on
it at a Ministerial Conference.

True,
key developing countries, particularly the major ones of Asia and
Africa, have returned from Nairobi empty-handed, insofar as their
efforts at rectifying the inequities of the Marrakesh accords, in
particular on agriculture, through decisions at Nairobi have not borne
fruit.

While
WTO DG, Roberto Azevedo and, to some extent, Kenya Cabinet Secretary
and MC10 Chair, Ms. Amina Mohammad, have flaunted the various "decisions"
out of Nairobi on the socalled "deliverables", these are
not enforceable at the WTO, until and unless a protocol is adopted
incorporating all the results into the WTO framework, and accepted
by all Members.

And
Brazil, which joined hands, or was a silent supporter of the US and
EU in the final days of the Nairobi negotiations, against its G-20
group, would soon realise the wisdom of Raul Prebisch, who, in 1963
and 1964, repeatedly advised Brazil and other members of the Latin
American group of nations in 1963 and 1964 at the time of UNCTAD-I,
not to view themselves as stronger or superior, and that they need
AfroAsian groups and their support, and not the other way around,
since politically Africa and Asia had collectively more clout.

It was
this wisdom of Prebisch that Brazil (under President Lula and Foreign
Minister Amorim) remembered and understood in 2003, on the eve of
WTO's Cancun MC. At that time, the US and EU joined hands to ditch
the entire WTO agriculture reform agenda (a treaty commitment), accommodate
each others farm subsidy programs, and join hands to attack developing
countries and their agriculture sector from development or future
competition. Lula, Amorim, and Brazil's then Ambassador to UNOG and
WTO, Mr. Luiz Felipe de Seixas Correa, fell back on the Prebisch advice,
and approached China, India and South Africa to form the G-20 alliance,
and tabled alternative proposals (see Raghavan, โ€Agriculture
: Key developing countries formulate modalities approach' SUNS #5401
21 August 2003; and Martin Khor, "G-17' get broad developing
country support, attacked by EC, SUNS #5402 of 22 August 2003).

This
alliance, and need to maintain it, prevailed in Brasilia and its Itamarty
(Brazilian foreign office), during the tenure there of Foreign Minister
Celso Amorim and his successor, Mr. Antonio Patriota. However, on
the eve of Nairobi, Brazil unilaterally abandoned the G20 alliance
to join US and EU, in trying to act against China and India, and in
time will find it "a costly error."

Shorn
of verbiage, and self-praise of the WTO's achivements in its 20-years
(virtually miniscular, if not nil, visavis the developing nations,
and the billions of their poor and hungry), the core of the Nairobi
Ministerial Declaration is in paras 30, 31 and 34. And the three paras
merely reflect the existing deep divisions within the membership,
including on the DWP and its Single Undertaking, where negotiations
are at an impasse.

There
is no roadmap or agreed way forward out of Nairobi on the impasse.

The
status of the DWP (the formal name of the agenda of the Doha Ministerial
Declaration and the agenda of MTNs that was launched there, though
since then it has acquired other names DDA or Doha Development Agenda,
and DDR or Doha Development Round), remain the same. However, its
status as a Single Undertaking or SU (legal concept) has been considerably
diminished, though not altogether buried for good. There is still
some scope to retrieve ground lost and uphold its single undertaking
character. The text in para 31 of the NMD, notwithstanding the disagreement
on that score in the text of para 30, gives scope to breath some life
into the SU.

Undoubtedly,
there is a bit of a contradiction between paras 30 and 31.

However,
for the fight to uphold the SU of the DWP, it is not material that
para 31 mentions 'Doha issues' rather than "Doha Development
Agenda" or "Doha Round issues".

The
real problem for developing countries is that they gave up the single
most effective leverage they had in the negotiations by conceding
at Bali 2013 the TFA as an separate accord, and agreed at Geneva in
2014 to a protocol for its incorporation into WTO Annex I-A, without
resolving other issues of concern to them or tying it into the SU.

However,
if developing countries don't band together NOW to enforce the SU
nature of the mandate of the Doha Declaration, the developed countries
would have managed to change the basic character of the Multilateral
Trade System as it has been known since 1948 (when GATT 1947 came
into being as a provisional agreement, arising out of the Havana Charter).

It was
rather strange, and difficult to explain, why in the 5-nation "green
room" at Nairobi on 18-19, India and China seemed unable to say,
"NO" and refuse to make any concessions to the US-EU, aided
by Brazil, Kenya Chair and the WTO DG. If China-India-South Africa
at least now do not stand together, and mobilise other developing
countries, particularly in Asia and Africa, against the neo-mercantilist
onslaughts of the US and EU, they would have betrayed their people.

If the
WTO and its MTS are allowed to take on the new "shape" that
the US and EU, and their media shills are now pushing, the major players
will only pick up issues of interest to them one by one from now onwards.

And
if and when that happens the legitimacy of the WTO, which it sought
to establish at MC2 Geneva in May 1998, by claiming lineage from Havana,
will also be at an end ("The Birthday Party that hosts didn't
plan" in Chakravarthi Raghavan, 2014, The Third World in the
Third Millennium CE, Vol 2, pp 183-187).

And
one more nail would have been hammered into the coffin of the post-War
Order, an order whose principal pillars in the UN Charter and System,
the US and EU have been so busy dismantling (in their regime change
interventions around the world) in the Middle East, Eastern Europe
and elsewhere.

And
the collapse of the MTS will hit the US and EU too, notwithstanding
the flamboyance of USTR Froman. For, in this twentyfirst century,
no trade and investment rights can be enforced anywhere through exercise
of military power or gunboat diplomacy, unlike in the 18th and 19th
centuries, but only through international accords - negotiated, concluded
and implemented in good faith. At the WTO, this last has been lacking
on the part of the US, EU and the secretariat acting to promote their
interests, rather than that of the membership as a whole.

Developing
countries thus have to ensure that no consensus gets developed at
WTO, in Geneva, on new issues, either taking them up for study or
on the agenda at the General Council, or negotiations allowed to begin
at the WTO (by not giving their "unanimous agreement", as
stipulated in the last sentence of para 34 of the NMD), until the
successful conclusion of the DWP agenda. They also have to resist
the temptation to get their issues addressed by paying a further price
for them through new issues. Developing nations have paid enough since
Marrakech to the US, EU and its coat-tail allies, whether in developed
or developing nations.

They
have to use their leverage in the various processes in Geneva, including
budget processes, to call the secretariat to order, and ensure they
do not continue with their partiality and advocacy role on behalf
of the United States.

As stated
earlier, the only conclusion from paras 30, 31 and 34 in the NMD is
that the Single Undertaking is diminished, but not dead, though China,
India and others have a strong fight on their hand in Geneva.

At Nairobi,
Kenya Cabinet Secretary for Foreign Relations and Trade, Ms. Amina
Mohamad, hyped up the benefits of the TFA and more trade, and repeatedly
appealed to all those nations who have not yet done so, to ratify
the TFA protocol and convey their acceptance to bring it into force.

However,
Kenya's leading newspaper, The Daily Nation, in its edit on the Nairobi
outcome, said the TFA "... would allow Africa and other developing
nations to access markets in Europe and the United States. On paper,
this would be a boost to the developing world, but, in reality, it
is not. Most exports from Africa are largely agricultural and raw.
They hardly fetch good prices on the international market. At any
rate, agricultural subsidies in the West mean products from Africa
have little chance to compete in those markets. Not surprisingly,
the West has resisted attempts to eliminate subsidies because they
give their farmers a competitive advantage."

As noted
earlier, the developing nations have given away the leverage of TFA
they had, and as China said before Nairobi at Geneva, enabled the
US and EU "to pocket the TFA" and walk away. However, if
enough of them withhold depositing instruments of ratification/acceptance
of the TFA to prevent its coming into force, until they secure their
own other demands and incorporate all the results (including the decisions
on Nairobi "deliverables") into a single protocol incorporating
the results of the DWP, and ensure that the two protocols are accepted
by a sufficient number of members to bring them both into force.

It is
a difficult task, like trying to catch an elephant by its tail, but
not impossible.

The
NMD, operative paras 30-34 stipulate:

"30.
We recognize that many Members reaffirm the Doha Development Agenda,
and the Declarations and Decisions adopted at Doha and at the Ministerial
Conferences held since then, and reaffirm their full commitment to
conclude the DDA on that basis. Other Members do not reaffirm the
Doha mandates, as they believe new approaches are necessary to achieve
meaningful outcomes in multilateral negotiations. Members have different
views on how to address the negotiations. We acknowledge the strong
legal structure of this Organization.

"31.
Nevertheless, there remains a strong commitment of all Members to
advance negotiations on the remaining Doha issues. This includes advancing
work in all three pillars of agriculture, namely domestic support,
market access and export competition, as well as non-agriculture market
access, services, development, TRIPS and rules. Work on all the Ministerial
Decisions adopted in Part II of this Declaration will remain an important
element of our future agenda.

"32.
This work shall maintain development at its centre and we reaffirm
that provisions for special and differential treatment shall remain
integral. Members shall also continue to give priority to the concerns
and interests of least developed countries. Many Members want to carry
out the work on the basis of the Doha structure, while some want to
explore new architectures.

"33.
Mindful of this situation and given our common resolve to have this
meeting in Nairobi, our first Ministerial Conference in Africa, play
a pivotal role in efforts to preserve and further strengthen the negotiating
function of the WTO, we therefore agree that officials should work
to find ways to advance negotiations and request the Director-General
to report regularly to the General Council on these efforts.

"34.
While we concur that officials should prioritize work where results
have not yet been achieved, some wish to identify and discuss other
issues for negotiation; others do not. Any decision to launch negotiations
multilaterally on such issues would need to be agreed by all Members."

Paras
30 and 31 are in effect contradictory. Para 30 merely records the
differences of positions and views on Doha Development Agenda (DDA)
and its reaffirmation. Para 31 notes despite the differences, Members
are committed to "advance negotiations in remaining Doha issues".

As pointed
out earlier, whether the remaining issues are referred to as DWP,
DDR, DDA or only as "Doha issues" remain irrelevant. The
SU can end only if and when, the outcome of all the negotiations and
decisions since 2001, are incorporated into a protocol for ratification
and acceptance by members, the protocol is accepted by all, before
any of the decisions become enforceable under the WTO and its DSU.

In sum,
as a result of the Nairobi Ministerial Declaration, the Multilateral
Trade Negotiating agenda of the Doha Work Programme as a Single Undertaking
remains somewhat diminished, but not dead. However, China, India,
South Africa and other developing nations can still retrieve it, and
prevent any new issues being brought on the agenda for study or discussion
by withholding consensus in the General Council, and block negotiations
which under para 34 needs "agreement of all members."