The U.N. Security Council (UNSC) is the main body of the United
Nations charged with maintaining international peace and security. Ten of its
fifteen seats are held by temporary members that serve two-year terms, and five
seats are held by permanent members (China, France, Russia, the United
Kingdom, and the United States). Substantial evidence in the literature suggests
that these temporary members of the UNSC receive side payments in exchange
for votes. Most of these studies limit their scope to foreign aid, however, and few
explore other means by which permanent UNSC members may provide economic
benefits to temporary UNSC members. Expanding upon existing literature, this
thesis investigates whether temporary UNSC members engage in more bilateral
trade with permanent UNSC members and, if the relationship is positive,
whether these patterns of increased bilateral trade are consistent with votebuying.
I use a panel data set of 727,562 observations between 1946 and 2004
and a gravity model of trade for my analyses. My findings are mostly consistent
with the literature: I find that temporary members trade 20% more with
permanent members on the UNSC than do UNSC nonmembers. Furthermore,
this effect is even greater during years in which key diplomatic events occur and
when the permanent-temporary member dyad shares a defense pact. Lastly, the
timing of these increases in trade mirror the election to, serving on, and exit from
the UNSC; in fact, I estimate trade dips below ex ante levels when a country
finishes its two-year tenure on the council. I also find reliable evidence that the
Cold War increased permanent-temporary member trade. Overall, these results
emphasize the importance of political factors that influence trade and indicate
that scholars may have underestimated the ways in which countries exchange
economic benefits for political support in international institutions.