Attorney General Charles M. Condon, Chief Deputy
Attorney General John W. McIntosh and Assistant Deputy Attorney General
Robert E. Bogan, all of Columbia; and Solicitor Randolph Murdaugh, III,
of Hampton, for respondent.

STILWELL, J.: Nathaniel Williams
appeals his convictions for possession of a stolen vehicle and failure to stop
for a blue light on the ground that the trial court's Allen
(1) charge was unduly coercive. We affirm.

FACTS

Williams was tried on Tuesday, April 20, 1999.
The jury began deliberations at 3:45 p.m. At 5:10 p.m. the jury requested the
arresting officer's testimony be replayed, then resumed its deliberations at
5:30 p.m. At 6:00 p.m. the judge sent the jury home for the evening. The jury
resumed deliberations at 9:30 a.m. the following day. At 11:00 a.m. they sent
the judge a note stating they could not reach a verdict. The note in its entirety
read, "The jury has come to a deadlock at 11 to 1 and its (sic) not going to
change," and was signed by the jury foreman.

Williams moved for a mistrial and contended an
Allen charge would be inappropriate because the jury was "hopelessly
deadlocked." The judge denied the motion, brought the jury in, and gave them
the following instruction:

When you tell me-you use the word deadlocked. It's
always unfortunate when juries can't reach a verdict. I practiced law now
for-I practiced law 30 years and now I've been a judge for 19 years and in
all of that time all the trials I've been involved in and you can count the
number of mistrials on these two hands because jurors almost always reach
a verdict.

You haven't been deliberating that long and it's
always so unfortunate because if I declare a mistrial, then in this same courtroom,
in all probability; with the same witnesses; in all probability, the same
lawyers, 12 other people in this county will have to decide this issue and
I don't know of 12 better people to decide this issue than you 12.

Now, the law doesn't require that a juror violate
his or her conscience just to agree with the other jurors but the law does
ask that each juror listen to the other jurors with an open mind, willing
to be convinced, keeping in mind that you don't have to violate your conscience
just to agree on a verdict.

As I say, you haven't been deliberating very long.
I'll make provisions. If anybody smokes, you can smoke. When lunchtime comes,
if you're still deliberating, I can get you lunch. This afternoon if any of
you get tired, you all decide you want to get a motel room, we can make arrangements
to send home for your clothes and things. I can make arrangements for any
kind of telephone calls, those kind of things. I don't have a thing in the
world to do. We're gone (sic) be working anyway. Be working today, be working
tomorrow.

Now, I'm gone (sic) ask-I'm gone (sic) send you
back and ask you to begin deliberating. If you make any-if you need anything
to make you comfortable be sure to tell the bailiffs. They're fine people
and they're delighted to make you comfortable. I'm gone (sic) send you back
to room and tell you to begin your-continue deliberations.

Any testimony you want to hear again or any law
that you want to tell me, just tell me about it. Continue your deliberations
and let me know ahead of time whether or not you want lunch, and remember
what I said about if you get tired. I realize jurors very often cooped up
in a room get tired. If you need-feel like you need to rest some, let me know,
we'll make some arrangements for you.

Williams objected to the charge, arguing it was
a sweat box instruction, and requested an additional charge which the judge
denied. At 11:20 a.m. the jury once again asked to hear the testimony of the
arresting officer. The jury then deliberated from 11:35 a.m. until they reached
a verdict at 1:15 p.m.

LAW/ANALYSIS

Williams argues on appeal the trial judge's charge
coerced the verdict due to the time the jury deliberated and because the charge
implied the jurors would have to deliberate indefinitely. We disagree.

"The trial judge has a duty to urge the jury to
reach a verdict, but he may not coerce it." State v. Pauling, 322 S.C.
95, 99, 470 S.E.2d 106, 108-09 (1996); seeState v. Darr, 262
S.C. 585, 587, 206 S.E.2d 870, 870 (1974) ("It is the duty of the trial judge
to urge the jury to agree upon a verdict provided he does not coerce them.").
Review of an Allen charge requires this court to consider the charge
in light of the accompanying circumstances. See generallyState v.
Hale, 284 S.C. 348, 326 S.E.2d 418 (Ct. App. 1985).

Factors to be considered in determining whether
a charge is coercive include the length of the deliberations prior to the charge,
(2) the length of the deliberations following the Allen charge,
(3) and the total length of deliberations. (4)
The trial judge may not indicate to or threaten the jury that they must agree
or, failing to agree, they will remain in the jury room for a specified length
of time. SeeState v. Simon, 126 S.C. 437, 445-46, 120 S.E.
230, 233 (1923) (stating trial judge erred by telling the jurors they must remain
overnight in a small jury room for fifteen and a half hours unless they could
agree on a verdict).

In addition, a trial judge may not direct the Allen
charge towards the minority voter(s) on the panel. SeeState v. Elmore,
279 S.C. 417, 424, 308 S.E.2d 781, 785-86 (1983), overruled on other grounds
byState v. Torrence, 305 S.C. 45, 406 S.E.2d 315 (1991). However,
it is not necessarily coercive to give an Allen charge even though the jury
reports it is deadlocked eleven to one. SeeState v. Jones, 320
S.C. 555, 558-59, 466 S.E.2d 733, 734-35 (Ct. App. 1996) (concluding the trial
court gave a proper Allen charge even though the jury sent a note stating
it was "hung 11 to 1" because the charge, taken as a whole, was not coercive).

The jury deliberated for approximately two hours
on Tuesday before the trial judge sent them home for the evening. They resumed
deliberations for one hour and a half the following morning before notifying
the trial judge they were deadlocked. After the Allen charge, the jury
deliberated less than twenty minutes, reheard testimony, and deliberated for
approximately two more hours before reaching a verdict. The total deliberations
took less than six hours. We find no coercion in the timing of the Allen
charge or in the total length of deliberations. SeeTillman, 304
S.C. at 521, 405 S.E.2d at 612-13 (concluding the Allen charge was not
coercive when given after four hours of deliberation and the verdict was rendered
one and a half hours after the charge).

Williams invites our attention to the recent Fourth
Circuit Court of Appeals case of Tucker v. Catoe, 221 F.3d 600 (4th Cir.
2000). In Tucker, the Fourth Circuit found an Allen charge unduly
coercive, noting that "South Carolina has yet to specify circumstances under
which an Allen charge is coercive, but there are numerous decisions from
the federal courts that guide our consideration [of] Tucker's argument." 221
F.3d at 609. Any reliance on Tucker is misplaced for several reasons,
not the least of which is that the Allen charge in question was given
during the sentencing phase of a capital murder case and that fact, coupled
with other factual distinctions, clearly compelled the decision in Tucker.

We also find the trial judge did not coerce a verdict
by implying the jury would have to deliberate indefinitely. The judge informed
the jurors he would make arrangements for their comfort should the jurors get
tired or become hungry. In State v. Ayers, this court reviewed the propriety
of an Allen charge similar to that given by the trial judge in this case.
284 S.C. 266, 325 S.E.2d 579 (Ct. App. 1985). In Ayers, the jury deliberated
for a little over two hours, requested a recharge of a statute, and deliberated
further for more than an hour. Id. at 268-69, 325 S.E.2d at 580-81. The
jury then reported they could not reach a verdict. Id. at 269, 325 S.E.2d
at 581. The forelady told the judge, "no matter how long we stay in that room,
or if we stayed in here two long weeks or forever, we would never be able to
change some of the convictions." Id.

In Ayers, the judge responded, "I am prohibited
from declaring a mistrial until a substantial time has elapsed in terms of the
jury being able to consider the evidence and the testimony." Id. The
judge went on to say he could either make hotel accommodations for the jury
or let them continue deliberating, and he commented on the expense of operating
the judicial system and the importance of bringing matters to a conclusion.
Id. Defense counsel moved for a mistrial, arguing the verdict was being
coerced. Id. This court reviewed the Allen charge as a whole and
concluded the trial judge's instructions were not coercive. Id.

Considering the Allen charge as a whole,
it is clear that the judge was solicitous of the welfare of the jurors and his
remarks concerning getting a motel room for them or providing a rest period
for them were not calculated to be of a threatening nature, but were genuine
expressions of concern for their comfort and welfare. We therefore conclude
that the charge was not coercive.

AFFIRMED

HEARN, C.J., and ANDERSON, J., concur.

1. Allen v. United States,
164 U.S. 492 (1896) (defining charge used to encourage a deadlocked jury to
reach a verdict).

3. Hale, 284 S.C. at
355, 326 S.E.2d at 422 (finding the Allen charge taken as a whole, given
after four and a half hours of deliberations, was not coercive, even though
the jury returned a guilty verdict three minutes after the charge was given).

4. State v. Lynn, 277
S.C. 222, 228-29, 284 S.E.2d 786, 790 (1981) (finding trial judge did not force
a verdict when the jury deliberated for nine hours prior to the Allen
charge, and asked for further instructions two hours after the charge was given
before reaching a verdict). See alsoState v. Stephenson, 54 S.C.
234, 238-39, 32 S.E. 305, 307 (1899) (concluding trial court did not err in
declaring a mistrial after jury deliberated for sixteen hours, did not ask for
further instructions, and stated they could not reach a verdict).