NARASIMHA Rao's statement last week that "Kashmir would soon be restored to its earlier status of paradise on earth" was typical, even if cruel, in its inherent irony. His Government's handling of the Hazratbal crisis has pushed the clock back in Kashmir but he seems oblivious to its implications, just as he was when he received the first intelligence reports about the siege from the governor's office in Srinagar. On that evening of October 15, he was involved in ticket allocation in Uttar Pradesh and dismissed the report as just another of those irritants that Kashmir governors tend to dramatise. His priorities were to prove costly.

At that stage, Rao had the option of drawing lessons from Operation Black Thunder and using the siege to force the militants to surrender without too much bloodshed. The other option of flushing them out by a commando operation was also available. The fears that such an operation would have brought the ire of the Islamic world were unfounded. When in 19 79 a militant group occupied the Grand Mosque enshrining the Kaaba in Mecca, the Saudi government, after obtaining the sanction of the ulema, had even used French experts to storm the mosque to clear it of militants, thus resanctifying it. Instead, as is his wont, Rao dithered and left the decisions to Kashmir Governor K.V. Krishna Rao. He, as is well known in official circles, feels it is below his dignity to talk to anybody other than the prime minister himself. So, when Home Secretary N.N. Vohra called him the next day, he refused to come on the line. By the time communications were established between the Raj Bhavan in Srinagar, the pmo in Delhi and the Home Ministry, crucial time had elapsed and the militants had prepared their strategy.

The confused signals from the Centre were matched by those emanating from Srinagar, where the so-called 'Unified Command' was proving to be a farce. The result was that the impression of the Centre's handling of the most serious crisis in Kashmir since the Rubaiya Sayeed kidnapping in 1989 was one of groping in the dark.

Even as the Hazratbal crisis assumed ominous proportions, it was the usual confusion in Delhi. The pmo gave no clear instructions to the Home Ministry. There were no signals as to who was in command in Srinagar, and there was confusion even about how to deal with the crisis in the initial stages.

In fact, sources in the pmo confirm that Rao's initially reluctant attitude towards the Hazratbal crisis was because he had little time for anything but the crucial assembly polls in the Hindi heartland. The nominees list in Delhi had just been released and Ra4 was busy trying to pacify the rebels.

Moreover, the man entrusted with Kashmir policy, Minister of State for Internal Security Rajesh Pilot, was away in Assam tackling the Bodoland issue. Pilot found out about the siege from newspaper reporters. He wanted the crisis to be sorted out that night itself, through a secret and swift operation, but there were no takers. Pilot and Krishna Rao have been at war with each other so much so that Pilot now actually regrets having lobbied to make him Kashmir governor. From then on, he pulled out of the Home Ministry meetings, preferring to sulk in silence. As a Home Ministry official said: "What can we do when we are not even informed about a major move like laying the siege?"

The relationship between Pilot and Krishna Rao had gone beyond repair over the appointment of a new dgp for the state. B.S. Bedi's term was ending and Pilot had cleared K.P.S. Gill's name even with the prime minister. Afraid that a strong personality like Gill would undermine his office, Krishna Rao preempted the move by announcing the name of M.N. Sabharwal, who took over on the day the siege was laid. The result: the governor and Pilot are today not even on talking terms.

Pilot, Home Ministry officials reveal, has distanced himself from the entire Hazratbal crisis, for he was not even in favour of the siege to begin with. Arch rival S.B. Chavan, the home minister, jumped into the fray to take control of the situation and he took no time in putting his foot into his mouth by accusing the US of instigating Pakistan into fomenting trouble in Kashmir, a statement that was hastily denied by the Government later.

The confusion was characteristic of the Government's Kashmir handling in the past few years. Rao had initially encouraged Pilot to open channels with the militants and Kashmiri leaders to evolve some kind of mechanism for a long-term policy on Kashmir. But this led to an ego clash with Chavan. Chavan scuttled Pilot's forays into Kashmir with the result that the Government lost its only political contact with the Valley.

Pilot, in the last few years, had developed contacts, both among the civilians and the militants of Kashmir, even to the extent of visiting the so-called 'liberated zones' like Sopore to open a dialogue with the local population. The only problem was that his differences with Chavan diluted the effect of his efforts. Nevertheless his attempts helped the Government in a crisis situation like the police revolt in Srinagar, which Pilot successfully tackled. With him out of the picture, the situation was tailor-made for the militants to mount the Hazratbal operation.

MOREOVER, the Government was caught in a cleft stick, between the two different pulls of opposition pressure. The bjp, naturally, advocated a get-tough line with the abrogation of Article 370. The centrist and the left parties were pressing for a political initiative. The non-Bjp parties had, in fact, met Rao in August and suggested a three-point plan which included the formation of an all-party committee of Kashmir politicians at the state level to initiate a dialogue on greater autonomy for Kashmir. Rao promised to get back shortly with his response. Predictably, no such thing happened. Says cpi(m) General Secretary Harkishan Singh Surjeet: "He never bothered to get back to us."

Even when the Hazratbal crisis broke, Rao hardly spoke at all during the first Cabinet meeting to discuss the options. A senior minister later informed india today: "The prime minister kept mum while Pilot briefed the Cabinet about the latest situation in the Valley." Surjeet again met Rao on October 20 and tried to dissuade him from taking any hasty action in Hazratbal. Only after Surjeet's meeting did Chavan get in touch with opposition leaders and convene the National Integration Council (nic) meeting.

By the time the nic meeting started, the Bijbehara firing had already taken place. The Government knew the details but did not bother to inform nic members about the latest setback, thus allowing bjp President L.K. Advani to charge the Government with "hiding facts" from the members. Despite the blunder, the consensus in the nic meeting was to protect the holy relic of the Prophet at all costs.

The potential of the Hazratbal crisis to become an issue in the polls in the Hindi heartland is another factor adding to the confusion in dealing with the crisis. Congress(I) leaders fear that the Government failure to resolve the crisis quickly may give a convenient handle to the bjp. Advani has already stated that "the Kashmir problem brings into focus the overall issue of Hindu-Muslim relations" in the country.

The bjp is aware that the absence of a Muslim factor fails to generate a Hindu backlash. With the Babri Masjid gone and Muslim leaders like Abdullah Bukhari discredited among most Muslims, the Ayodhya issue alone cannot win elections for the bjp. Now, with the Kashmir issue and Pakistan's role in it having bounced back into public focus, the bjp is again out to exploit the resulting insecurity among the Hindus.

The Government, whose priority will continue to be the assembly elections for another month, will have an impossible task controlling the damage that the siege has caused in the Valley. It will have to contend with the re-enthused Kashmiri masses and the more determined militants, who will try and extract as much mileage as they can in the given new mood in the state, where tempers are running high. And, to effectively enforce law and order, the administration will have to think of better ways to take control, other than the customary 'curfew approach' that they are so used to following.

Further, the Centre will also have to rethink the Unified Command structure that Pilot had worked out in May when the situation took a critical turn. At that time, M.A. Zaki was recalled as adviser to the governor and put in charge of anti-terrorist operations. The army, the bsf and the local police were to work in unison with Zaki. But now that will have to be reassessed, especially since differences have crept up between Zaki, the army and the civil administration.

Above all, the Centre will have to seriously get down to formulating a clear-cut policy for Kashmir, one that goes beyond the fire-fighting approach it has so far been following. Before any of that can happen, however, Rao will first have to sort out the Chavan-Pilot rift which he cannot ignore any longer, considering the crucial role of the Home Ministry in Kashmir. There are some signs that Rao realises this. Pilot was asked to attend the high-level meeting chaired by the prime minister on October 27 which included Chavan and senior Home Ministry officials. According to sources, this time, it was Chavan who hardly spoke while Pilot appeared more assertive. But the rift cannot be papered over so easily unless Rao decides to sort out the mess in the Home Ministry.

In any event, whichever way the Hazratbal crisis is resolved, there are bound to be the inevitable scapegoats. Rumours doing the rounds in South Block and Srinagar indicate that Krishna Rao and Zaki will be the most likely candidates once a decent interval has passed. What this means is that yet another set of officials and a new governor will have to be dispatched. Meanwhile, Kashmir will continue to defy India. And any more bungling means that Kashmir will soon reach a stage when it will defy solutions as well.

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