[209] According to the appellant, the application judge’s most
serious error is his finding there was no juristic reason for the
appellant’s enrichment. The appellant argues this case turns on
the application of one of the accepted categories of juristic reasons that justify the respondent’s enrichment, being a “
disposition of law”, referred to in Rathwell, at p. 455 S.C.R.; and
Garland, at para. 44. The irrevocable designation in her favour
under s. 191 of the Insurance Act was just such a juristic reason,
the appellant asserts, based on this court’s decision in
Richardson Estate, which is binding and is sufficient to dispose of
the appeal.

[210] I would reject this submission, for three reasons: first,
a purposive approach to the interpretation and application of
s. 191 of the Insurance Act does not lead to the conclusion that it
was intended to operate as a juristic reason for the appellant’s
enrichment on the facts of this case. Second, the application of
the principled approach to unjust enrichment leads to the contrary conclusion. Third, Richardson Estate does not drive the
outcome of this case and should be distinguished. I explain each
in turn, after a short description of the juristic reason analysis.

( i)The juristic reason element of the unjust enrichment test

[211] The “juristic reason” element has evolved since it was
first expressed by Dickson J. in Rathwell, and repeated by him
in Pettkus. In Garland, Iacobucci J., at para. 46, acknowledged
that “this area is an evolving one” and predicted that new cases
“will add additional refinements and developments”: see, also,
Pacific National Investments, per Binnie J., at paras. 23-24.
To succeed, it must be shown that “there is no reason in law or
justice for the defendant’s retention of the benefit conferred by
the plaintiff, making its retention ‘unjust’ in the circumstances
of the case”, as Cromwell J. noted in Kerr, at para. 40.

[212] In Garland, the court established a two-step analysis for
the absence of juristic reason, taking its lead from the decision of
McLachlin J. in Peel, at para. 32, p. 784 S.C.R., where she contrasted the old “categorical approach” to claims for unjust
enrichment with the new “principled” approach the court took in
Pettkus. At the first step, the court considers the established
categories of juristic reasons. If none applies, then at the second
step the court assesses “the reasonable expectations of the parties and public policy considerations to assess whether recovery
should be denied”: Kerr, at para. 43.