Great generals lead great armies, or so it has seemed throughout history. In
Vietnam neither the fledgling ARVN nor its often corrupt and highly politicized
leadership appeared destined for greatness. Yet to succeed in building an army
capable of withstanding the North Vietnamese, ARVN needed generals able to
inspire war-weary troops, leaders who could somehow stretch their own
personalities to help fill the gaps left by the withdrawal of U.S. forces.

When MACV issued a "report card" on Vietnamese division commanders in early
1970, many of the ARVN generals received failing grades. Quoting anonymous U.S.
senior advisers, the report minced no words in its descriptions. A few of the
evaluations read, "coward," "super defensive," "weak," "the Vietnamese
generals... hate his guts,", and "domineering-scares his commanders."
Paradoxically, an effective and popular general with loyal troops often came to
be considered a political threat in a country that had experienced more than its
share of military coups. "This is a country that won't allow anyone to remain a
hero very long," an American observer in Saigon explained. "But they sure could
use one."

For a time, ARVN got its hero; in fact two outstanding fighting (as opposed
to political) generals emerged from the packs of mediocre officers to take
command of III and IV Corps shortly after the 1968 Tet offensive. Both young,
confident, and aggressive, Lieutenant General Do Cao Tri and Major
General Nguyen Viet
Thanh proved themselves capable military strategists and inspiring leaders.

In the post-Tet shakedown of the ARVN officer corps- part anticorruption
campaign, part political maneuver by President Thieu to remove officers loyal to
Vice President Nguyen Cao Ky- Generals Tri and Thanh received command of the two
densely populated and politically sensitive southern corps tactical zones. They
faced daunting problems. Though rated best of the three divisions in IV Corps,
the 7th Division, from which General Thanh was promoted, was unable to shake the
reputation it had picked up as the "Search and Avoid Division." The other IV
Corps divisions, the 9th and the 21st performed no better.

Despite the 7th's lackluster record, Thanh had earned high praise from
General William C. Westmoreland as the best ARVN division commander.
Westmoreland and senior U.S. advisers had high hopes for him, but they feared
that obvious American "sponsorship" might taint Thanh in the eyes of political
and military leaders in Saigon. Fortunately, President Thieu not only recognized
Thanh's dynamic leadership, but he also appreciated his lack of political
ambition and so backed the general wholeheartedly.

Thanh commanded the loyalty of his troops, and during the Tet offensive
Thanh's popularity nearly cost him his life. In an attempt to exploit the 7th
Division's devotion to its commanding general, Vietcong troops took Thanh and his
family prisoner, hoping to induce the demoralized troops to defect. But their
ploy failed, and, curiously, Thanh was released unharmed.

General Thanh's senior IV Corps adviser in 1968 and 1969, Major General
George S. Eckhardt, recounted another tale of Thanh's popularity. On one
occasion the two generals flew to My Tho, Thanh's former divisional
headquarters, in search of a quiet lunch. But when word of their arrival got
out, townspeople crowded into the restaurant to welcome their former commander.
For forty-five minutes Gen. Thanh bowed and shook hands with the stream of
well-wishers; most South Vietnamese senior officers never fraternized with their
peasant soldiers or with the rural population.

In III Corps Tactical Zone to the north, Gen. Do Cao Tri struggled to work
his corps' ragged divisions, the 5th, 18th, and 25th, into shape. One U.S.
general dismissed the 5th Division as "absolutely the worst outfit I've ever
seen," And the 25th Division had the ignominious distinction of being considered
by one adviser "the worst division in any army anywhere."

Gen. Tri had the personality to achieve the near-impossible. Having survived
three assassination attempts, a mid-1960s exile at the instigation of Nguyen Cao
Ky, and a barrage of corruption charges, Tri thrived on adversity. Not one to be
deterred by Saigon's displeasure, Tri spent months trying to replace two
incompetent division commanders, who were favorites of Thieu's. He succeeded.
Tri promised to have his three infantry divisions in fighting trim by the end of
1970.

The two generals and their infantry divisions face their greatest challenge
with the Cambodian incursion of May 1970. President Thieu awarded Gen. Tri
command of the ARVN operation to clean out enemy bases in the Parot's Beak and
appointed Gen. Thanh to lead four infantry-armor task forces from IV Corps on a
sweep north to link up with Gen. Tri's troops. The infantry units selected for
the two operations were mustered in part from the improved 5th, 25th, and 9th
Divisions.

On the first day of his troops' operation, Thanh flew to the battlefield as
usual, knowing that his presence insured a disciplined and speedy advance. Ten
miles inside Cambodia, his helicopter collided in midair with a U.S. Cobra. No
survivors escaped the fiery crash. Thanh's death cast a pall over operation. As
if to repay his dedication to them, Thanh's troops performed with an unexpected
aggressiveness in Cambodia.

As reports of ARVN success reached Saigon, Thanh's death was overshadowed by
the exploits of Tri, who catapulted to the status of national hero. Hard work
and careful planning were as much a part of his accomplishment as his inspiring
presence on the battlefield. Tri achieved effective results with his use of
armor. A sound tactician, he was not satisfied unless he personally directed the
battle. More than one hesitant tank commander found the excited three-star
general in camouflage jungle suit, baseball cap, and sunglasses dashing through
machine-gun fire, shouting "Go fast, man! Go fast." For men starved for
leadership, the assurance that Tri's helicopter might set down whenever they
were in trouble or stalled worked marvel with their morale. "Tri was a tiger in
combat, South Vietnam's George Patton", Gen. Westmoreland later wrote in
admiration.

His flamboyant style of command, however, irritated many of his fellow ARVN
generals. They cited Tri's actions during the battle for the Chup rubber
plantation in Cambodia - Tri had nonchalantly taken a dip in the plantation pool
in the midst of the fierce fighting - as evidence that Tri cared more for his
own heroics than for sound military judgment. His extravagant lifestyle and
growing wealth fueled jealousies and raised suspicions in Saigon. Called
"flagrantly corrupt" by two South Vietnamese senators, Tri was accused of being
a partner in a money-smuggling ring even as Saigon still buzzed with news of his
victories in Cambodia.

Despite controversy over his private life, Tri's renown as South Vietnam's
best field commander continued to grow after the Cambodian incursion. Under his
direction, ARVN troops repeatedly performed well in their cross-border raids
into Cambodia. When the ARVN incursion into enemy strongholds in Laos in 1971
began to flounder, President Thieu turned to Tri. Calling him to Saigon, Thieu
ordered him to assume command of the Laotian operation. His new orders in hand,
Tri boarded his helicopter. Shortly after leaving Bien Hoa, his helicopter lost
power and plummeted to the ground, killing Tri and the other passengers.

"When the ARVN troops were well led they fought as well as anyone's
soldiers," recalled Brigadier General George Wear. "They simply needed
commanders who would support them properly and who could win their confidence
and make them believe that their cause was worth risking their lives for."
Generals Tri and Thanh had been two such commanders.

David Fulghum, Terrence MailandSouth Vietnam on Trial - The
Vietnam Experience.Boston Publishing Company