The upshot seems to be that there is no ontologically real, intrinsic intentionality available to her, to help address how our mental states truly can be together with their intended objects in reality, or to preserve the essential features of intentional states.

If it is true that Brentano never meant to put forward a theory of intentionality, then he might be exempt from answering such sticky questions as how intentional states can contain their objects immanently within themselves.

A fully satisfying account of 1st person authority should satisfy two desiderata: (1) explain the privileged relation we bear to our own intentional states sufficient to justify a default presumption of authority; (2) explain why such authority matters for our ability to function well as rational agents.

In this paper, the author urges caution against this view, as well as against the somewhat weaker thesis of intentional dualism, the thesis that the intentional profile of unconscious mental states is categorically distinct from that of conscious intentional states.

I am troubled in the first place by the extent to which Chrudzimski relies on two questions of contemporary analytic philosophy as a framework for understanding Brentano's early theory of intentionality, concerning existential generalization and intersubstitution of coreferential terms and logically equivalent sentences salva veritate in intensional linguistic contexts expressing intentional states or so-called propositional attitudes.

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