The
trip came about due to the Pyidaungsu Institute (PI) Yangon Office’s plan to
launch its latest work,” English-Myanmar Glossary of Federalism Terms,” on 16
May.

It
came in the wake of the 5 sets of proposals produced by the Union Peace
Dialogue Joint Committee (UPDJC) for the 5 dialogue topics (Politics, Security,
Social, Economic, and Land and Natural resources Management) to be discussed at
the Union Peace Conference (UPC)#3, otherwise Union Peace Conference 21st
Century Panglong (UPC 21 CP) #2, scheduled for 24-28 May.

Naturally,
I had taken the opportunity to visit the country in order to seek advice from
my friends, both Shan and non-Shan.

The
following journal details what I had found out from them. Obviously, I will be
doing my best to follow the Chatham House rule.

Day One. Monday, 15 May 2017

In international experience since 1989, the likelihood of a military
solution to conflict drops to 25% after one year, or 10% after three tears.

Can Myanmar’s peace process learn from international experience? Frontier, 24 May 2017

The
Bangkok Airways lands at Mingladon at 12:10. Twenty minutes later, I arrive at
the office of the Shan Nationalities League for Democracy (SNLD), better known
as the “Tiger Head” party. I’m there to ask for its stance on the 12 May
propositions by the UPDJC, which were reported to the Peace Process Steering
Team (PPST), the highest organ of the 8 signatory EAOs on the following day:

§The propositions
on politics are based on the EAOs’ 8 point guideline that was adopted in 2005,
and acceded by the July 2016 Mai Jayang conference:

1.Sovereign power
(and its exercise)

2.Equality

3.Right of
Self-Determination

4.Structure and
division of power

5.Minority rights

6.Democratic right,
human rights, and gender equality

7.Secular state

8.Multiparty
democratic system

§At first, it was
agreed that the UPC#3 will discuss only 6 points: sovereign power, exercise of
sovereign power, equality, right of self-determination, structure and division
of power, secular state, and multiparty democratic system, leaving the rest for
UPC#4

§However due to a
press interview on 9 or 10 May by an ethnic politician that had reportedly
offended the Tatmadaw, it returned with a new parcel of proposals on the next
day, revoking everything it had agreed earlier. One of them was the Tatmadaw’s
original stand on secularism which is enshrined in the 2008 constitution, where
Buddhism, according to an EAO member, “is more equal than other religions.” In
the ensuing negotiations, each side refused to budge, so the point was removed
from the political sector for the upcoming session.

§The military also
insisted the clause “No part of the territory constituted in the Union
shall ever secede from the Union” which comes directly from the 2008
constitution, be the cardinal point in the proposal

Members of
the Peace Process Steering Team (PPST)

meet, 13-14 May, in Chiang Mai,
Thailand,

over the weekend to discuss the UPDJC proposals to be

submitted to
the Union Peace Conference, 24-28

May. (Photo: The Irrawaddy)

The EAOs’ arguments against this includes, among
others;

1.We have already
agreed to the Tatmadaw’s 3 main national causes: Non disintegration of the Union,
Non disintegration of National solidarity, and Perpetuation of national
sovereignty. There is therefore no need to insert this clause

2.We should choose
words that are positive, that promote a sense of unity, definitely not this one

The
Burmese military bloc wouldn’t yield an inch on this issue, saying:

§To fulfil your sense of spiritual security, we will
agree to your call for equality, right of self-determination, and state
constitutions

§In return, we want you to fulfil ours too, by agreeing
not to secede from the Union

In
brief, the military was offering a tradeoff between “equality, right of
self-determination, and state constitutions” and “non-secession”.

The
State Counselor reportedly decided to jump into the fray by announcing she
supported the military’s proposition.

The
result: the EAO UPDJC agreed to accept the unwanted clause as a Hobson’s choice
for the UPC#3 to make. As the PPST, being the signatory EAOs decision making
body, key EAO UPDJC representatives had flown to Thailand on 12 May evening to
report back to it on the following.

As
to be expected, the PPST didn’t have a Yes or No answer for the question.
Giving either one without consulting its own people, as one Karen participant
said on 14 May, would amount to a “political suicide.”

If
it is a difficult issue for the Karen National Union, that had conducted both ethnic
and local level national political dialogue (NDs), it is the more difficult for
EAOs like ALP and RCSS that have yet to do NDs. Moreover, this question, they
believe, must be answered not just by the NCA signatories but also the
non-signatories.

Gen
Yawd Serk, President of the RCSS, put it this way:

“I’m not agreeing or disagreeing to it. I think I understand the
military’s concern very well. But the military should also try to understand our
difficulties.”

Note: On 21 May, the RCSS
issued a statement saying it would “attend the UPC 21CP Second Session only as
one of the NCA signatories, but will not present any propositions. In addition,
if there is going to be a preliminary agreement as part of the planned Union
Accord, it will not be a participant or a signatory.”

My
question during the briefing was why the proposals weren’t publicized ahead of
the UPC. No answer came forth.

The
SNLD, known as a party for “principles,” is forthright:

·This demand (of
the military) contradicts the Panglong Agreement of 1947. We will not accept
it.

·If anyone or any
party is thinking of accepting it, please remember one is not giving up what
belongs to one, but what belongs to all of us.

In
the evening, I’m at the home of Sai Ai Pao, leader of the Shan Nationalities
Democratic Party (SNDP), popularly known as “White Tiger” party to meet its
leaders.

True
to its “in the interests of the nation” principle, its response is different
from the SNLD’s “stick to your principles” principle. “There should be lots of
better words than ‘not to secede,’ which is very negative. We are ready to
accept the deal, provided the wording is changed.”

I’m
back at the hotel by 21:00.

Day Two. Tuesday, 16 May 2017

The failure to honor the Panglong Agreement had led to strife and war.
It is clear that to bring peace, there is no way other than to honor Panglong.

Today,
we hold a launch for the PI booklet, which is blessed by the Swiss ambassador
Mr Paul Seger by his charming presence and opening remarks.

The
following are extracts from my brief statement:

How many types of federalism are out there? The booklet here says not
less than 12. We have here:

·Administrative
federalism

·Ethno
federalism

·Executive
federalism

·Fiscal
federalism

·Three layer federalism

And when we run in to “asymmetric federalism,” we will
want to know what ‘symmetric federalism” is. The same goes for “non-territorial
federalism.” We will be asking how it is different from “territorial
federalism.” Fortunately for us, all 4 types will be found in the booklet.

Apart from those already mentioned, there are also
intriguing types like “coercive federalism,” “competitive federalism,”
“cooperative federalism”, “double federalism,” and, to further confuse us, even
“dual federalism,”

And coming to this, the question arises: What type
of federalism will fit our country? Is it going to be “coercive federalism” or
“cooperative federalism”? Some are saying one thing, and others the other.
We will soon find out at the upcoming Union Peace Conference, also dubbed as 21st
Century Panglong.

The
rest of the day is spent in meeting friends to find out what they think about
the proposals from the UPDJC.

Here
are what two of them have to say.

Friend #1

·The UPDJC should
not be the ultimate arbiter.

Note: For
some time, we’ve been hearing from both sides of the fence that the UPC 21 CP
is only a “rubber stamp” to what the UPDJC decides. *

·The proposed
non-secession clause is technically not a problem. But politically it can hendanger
the whole process.

·The people must
be consulted. But if one part of them okays to the clause, while the others say
No, what do we do?

Friend #2 (who is a trained
lawyer)

·The military,
apart from “secession” is worried about calling the federal units “states”
instead of “regions and states”. Because if all become states,” then some will
be rekindling an “8 state” arrangement.

·I disagree with
both the 1947 constitution which allows states to secede “without any reason,”
and the 2008 which forbids states to secede “for whatever reasons.” Both are
extremes, and being extremes are hotbeds for rebellions

·My suggestion is
rewording: How about “The Union, established on the principles of equality,
right of self-determination and federalism, is one and indivisible”?

(I ask him what it means, and here is his reply: As
long as equality, right of self-determination and federalism are practiced,
there should be no secession, and vice versa, It is a mutually binding clause,
providing each party what is wants.)**

·As for the 9
point Panglong Agreement, he says Clause 5 (Full autonomy) and clause 7 (rights
and privileges which are fundamental in democratic countries) are still valid.

By
21:00, I’m back in my hotel room. It has been a very instructive day, so I say
to myself.

Day Three. Wednesday, 17 May 2017

Splinter factions emerge when security arrangements don’t satisfy the
political goals of all members.

Can Myanmar’s peace process learn from international experience? Frontier, 24 May 2017

Today’s
another day for duck hunting. But I only find one.

He’s
a veteran peacemaker, but out of touch with the day-to-day affairs of the
process. When I tell him what’s been reported to the PPST on 13-14 May, he
says:

“Is
that what really happened?” he asks. “And I have saying ‘Sadhu’ (Amen) every
time I hear the government announcing that significant achievements like
constitutions for the states have been reached.”

“I
know how the military feels about this secession issue,” he says. “It’s an
obsession

Drug Elimination Museum.

(Photo: www.vice.com)

with the generals, past and present. But during my days, I had always
tried to encourage words that carried the same meanings but put together
differently so both sides could agree. Please try to do the same. Always use
inoffensive words. And also value everything you manage to reach agreement.”

The
rest of the day is spent visiting the Drug Elimination Museum on the corner of Kyundaw Road and
Hanthawady Road in Kamayut Township.

I
find that, unlike its counterpart in Chiang Saen at the Golden Triangle, it has
been suffering from neglect.

To
be expected, there are no photos of General Khin Nyunt who fell from grace in
2004. And as to be expected, those of the late Gen Soe Win, who replaced him,
were there.

Almost
all the campaigns waged against the armed resistance naturally came under the
heading of anti-narcotics, including those against the Kuomintang forces in the
50’s. For example:

From 8-16 April 1983, the Mo Hein Campaign #7 was
launched against the Shan United Revolutionary Army (SURA), of which I was a
member.

A panel there informs us: 19.6 kg of raw opium and
74.5 kg of grey (cooked) opium were seized. A friend who was among the
attacking Burmese force later told me that several villagers were recruited to
carry the drugs and cooking utensils from all the way to Sanklang, opposite Mae
Hong Son’s Pai district.

I
wouldn’t say the Shan resistance was an innocent bystander when it came to
drugs. Only that a few days under attack gave ample time for the drug entrepreneurs
to make their getaway. What’s remarkable was the fact that the Burma Army was
ready and prepared for that eventuality.

I
have another meeting in the evening. But nothing to report without rocking
boats.

At
21:00, I’m back in my room again.

Day Four. Thursday, 18 May 2017

Between 1989-2012, 80% of security focused agreements globally have
broken down, if non-security issues were not also addressed. In contrast, more
than 80% of comprehensive peace agreements between 1989-2012 — that is,
agreements that include a wide range of social, economic, political and
security issues— have successfully guarded against a return to violence when
they are fully implemented.

Can Myanmar’s peace process learn from international experience? Frontier, 24 May 2017

At
08:00 in the morning, I’m with friends from the other side of the fence.

Their
advice:

Negotiation is basically not about who’s right and
who’s wrong. But how we are going to overcome the deadlock together.

Which
seems to go in line with what the great Indian teacher, the Buddha, said:

Speak only when it’s true and beneficial, whether it’s pleasant or not.

He
seemed to be telling us that being “principled” is not enough. And neither is being
“in the interests of the nation.” But the two must come together.

At
13:00 the Bangkok Airways takes off to Chiangmai, a little over one hour flight
away.

Note

*After
29 May 2017, when the 37 points of agreement were signed, some have accused
that the UPC 21CP isn’t even a “rubber stamp” but just a spectator.

**His
suggestion here was taken up for consideration during the UPC 21 CP, but was
later turned down. “You might think its your Trump card,” one later commented.
“But in the end it turns out to be a Hillary card.”