487. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President
Johnson1

Washington, October 24,
1967.

SUBJECT

Your Talk with Eban—5:30
p.m. Today

Our original plan was to tell Eban
frankly that we've been disturbed by Israeli actions that make Israel
look as if it is being so hard-nosed that it doesn't care whether it
kills chances for a peace settlement or not. While we had no intention
of lowering the boom and provoking a sharp reaction, we did not want
Eban to go away feeling that
our silence amounted to a blank check.

With Secretary Rusk yesterday,
Eban turned aside discussion
of thorny issues and talked out the clock. He made just about the same
pitch to Secretary Rusk as he had
to me.2 While Eban did most of the talking, the Secretary did manage
to put across the following: We understand Israel's desire to maintain a
common front, but this depends on our knowing where that front is.
Israel has gone its own way, consulting us little. The Secretary also
made clear that our support for secure permanent frontiers doesn't mean
we support territorial changes. (Memcon at Tab A of the attached.)3

Nick Katzenbach this morning was able to take the offensive. He argued
against too great Israeli rigidity on the mechanics of negotiation. He
pressed Israel's obligation to assure Hussein that Israel wanted to live in peace with Jordan,
since some of Israel's acts since the war left doubt in Jordanian minds.
He pointed out that Israel's position on boundaries creates the
impression that Israel feels free to keep everything it has conquered.
He reminded Eban of Arab interests
in Jerusalem. (Memcon at Tab B of the attached.)4

The one surprise in this morning's meeting was a message for you from
Eshkol (Tab C of the
attached).5
This is designed to undergird Eban's presentation with a formal statement of Israel's
position, which boils down to this: (1) Israel needs arms to take care
of itself; (2) Israel hopes we can convince the Sovs that they must not
continue to fan the flames of tension; (3) Israel wants the kind of
security it believes only direct negotiations with the Arabs will
provide. The best tack until you've had a chance to study the message is
probably just to say you've read it. You might want to say we're
studying the arms requests urgently.

Nick's memo to you is attached.6 He suggests you say you're
familiar with Eban's earlier talks
and see no need to go over the same grounds and then make these points:

1.

Nobody knows better than we how hard it is to make peace. We
also know it takes a lot of restraint to avoid
escalation.

2.

But, as you said on 19 June, we can't afford to lose this real
opportunity to build a permanent peace. Hard as it is, we have
to find the way to peace this time.

This is where Nick's recommendation stops. If you feel you can go a step
further, I'd recommend adding this: We don't kid ourselves about what
the Arabs are trying to do (make Israel withdraw without paying the
price of a permanent settlement). But we're frankly afraid Israel will
take such a hard position that it will kill chances for a settlement. We
don't believe time is indefinitely on the side of Israel or of
peace.

We'd hate to see the discussion get bogged down in a debate over the
merits of Israeli retaliation for the sinking of their destroyer,7 but we do want to make a clear record of
urging restraint as Nick did this morning. We do not know whether the
shelling along the Suez Canal today will satisfy the Israelis or not.
But we feel strongly that any systematic retaliation will only make
peace negotiations harder.

Walt

Source: Johnson Library, National Security
File, Special Head of State Correspondence File, Israel,
7/1/67–2/28/68. Secret. A handwritten “L” on the memorandum indicates the President saw
it.↩

The attachment, not printed, is a draft of telegram
58955 to Tel Aviv, October 24. (Ibid.)↩

The message from Eshkol was
transmitted in an October 23 note from Harman to Rusk, sent to the President with an undated memorandum
from Katzenbach stating that
it had been handed to him that morning by Eban. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Special
Head of State Correspondence File, Israel, 7/1/67–2/28/68)↩

Israeli forces shelled Egyptian refineries
and installations at Suez on October 24. A memorandum Rostow sent to
the President at 5 p.m. on October 24 informed him of this and
commented, “This gives you a chance not only to lean on Eban on the necessity of their
struggling for peace, but letting it be known quietly that that was
your message to him: there is no future for Israel or the Middle
East in this kind of mutual violation of the cease-fire.” (Johnson Library, National Security
File, Country File, Israel, Vol.
VII)↩