Risks from nuclear power and weapons are on the rise

Even established power faces a riskier nuclear environment.

Like the boiling water reactors at Fukushima Daiichi, the Vermont Yankee nuclear power plant uses Mark I containment.

The risks posed by both nuclear weapons and nuclear energy are increasing. Nowhere is immune from these risks, and the methods used to assess them are imperfect. This is the message from theoretical physicist and arms control specialist Sidney Drell in an article published in Science today. In the article, "A Safer Nuclear Enterprise," Drell and his co-authors (including former Secretary of State George P. Shultz) address these issues through a series of recommendations to improve nuclear safety, with the "clear goal" of global disarmament of nuclear weapons among them.

Contextualized both by Fukushima, which the article claims "demonstrates the fragility of the civil nuclear enterprise," and by growing apprehension surrounding nuclear terrorism, the authors set out three "guiding principles" for leaders in nuclear enterprises, though these might more accurately be described as warnings against complacency.

Increasing risk, imperfectly assessed

The first is that the calculations used to assess risks posed by nuclear weapons and nuclear power are "fallible." There is no implicit criticism of the analysis methods used; rather, the article warns against over-confidence in what are inevitably imprecise methods, and urges governments, nuclear industries, and concerned citizens to "reexamine the assumptions" upon which nuclear energy production, safety, security, and emergency procedures are founded.

Secondly, the article warns that the risks posed by nuclear accidents, regional war, and nuclear terrorism are increasing. The article attributes this increasing risk, at least in part, to emerging nuclear powers that may have insufficient measures in place to keep nuclear weapons or civil nuclear reactors safe, secure, or properly regulated.

Finally, as if preempting the conclusion that established nuclear powers are beyond such concerns, the article warns that "no nation is immune from risks involving nuclear weapons and nuclear power." By way of illustration, Drell points to more than 30 "serious accidents" involving US nuclear weapons, with a footnote citing a DoD report (PDF) listing incidents that occurred between 1950 and 1980. In the context of the report, the DoD defines an accident as any event involving nuclear weapons in which they were accidentally launched, detonated (though not necessarily implying nuclear explosion), lost or stolen, or caused a radioactive contamination or other public hazard. (c.f. the Wikipedia list of military nuclear accidents, which partly overlaps the DoD list.)

The authors also highlight the need for nations with well-established nuclear energy programs to increase safety. Though acknowledging the "admirable" record of the US since Three Mile Island, the article states that Fukushima has highlighted that urgent action is required to address the problem of existing reactors that require the rapid restoration of power in the event of an accident. The safety of such reactors, including boiling water reactors employing aging Mark I containment, has been a point of contention in the US since the Fukushima accident.

Safety, independence, and disarmament

To address theses concerns, the group makes four recommendations. The first is an almost ideological plea to nuclear enterprises and organizations, both military and civilian, to "embrace" safety and security. Though this may sound obvious, the article points out that improving safety brings with it greater regulation and cost, the implication being that such concerns might conceivably suffer if left to those with a financial interest.

This leads to the article's second recommendation: that nuclear regulation be independent. Again using the example of the United States, Drell warns that, although the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's (NRC) has a reputation for high standards, attention should be paid to "regulatory capture" by vested interests, which the report claims fund "a high proportion of the NRC budget." The NRC's precursor, the Atomic Energy Commission, was abolished in 1974 due to such a conflict of interest.

Along similar lines, the third measure proffered is that "all aspects" of nuclear enterprise be subject to peer review, although the piece is a bit vague on exactly what that should entail. The authors suggest that the example set in the US by the Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (which provides on-site peer reviews to evaluate nuclear power plants) be adopted internationally by the World Association of Nuclear Operators to shore up safety in the global nuclear power industry. Drell et. al. also recommend peer review in the weapons industry by independent experts to "rigorously challenge weapons and safety systems."

The article's fourth and final recommendation is that measures to reduce the threat of nuclear weapons be "organized around a clear goal." The authors call for global efforts to reduce nuclear proliferation, and to see that they are not obtained by "potentially dangerous hands." Ultimately the authors claim that catastrophe can be avoided by building international trust—trust that could be fostered by "progress towards a world free of nuclear weapons."

The report concludes by calling for a better-informed public—a prerequisite, it argues, for a proper response to future nuclear incidents, and essential in increasing public confidence in the nuclear industry.

In addition to Sidney Drell, Professor Emeritus at Stanford University's SLAC National Accelerator Laboratory, the report was coauthored by economist and former US Secretary of State George P. Shultz, and nuclear proliferation specialist and former Director for Defense Policy and Arms Control on the White House National Security Council Steven P. Andreasen.

34 Reader Comments

It seems to me that this paper is aimed broadly at the world, but at the same time many of the recommendations made are modeled on what the US is already doing with our civil and military nuclear enterprises. Do we really have our atomic ducks in a row the extent that we should be the model for other nations, many of which have a far more extensive civilian nuclear capacity?

Not sure where MAD stopped being effective. Nuke us, we glass whatever nation initiated or supported the action. Make it clear enough to nations that support terrorism that their internal controls on whatever they support don't include nukes, because if it does, we won't care and we will light them up, and not bother sending in a single soldier.

It seems to me that this paper is aimed broadly at the world, but at the same time many of the recommendations made are modeled on what the US is already doing with our civil and military nuclear enterprises. Do we really have our atomic ducks in a row the extent that we should be the model for other nations, many of which have a far more extensive civilian nuclear capacity?

You'd be amazed at the contingencies engineers plan for. Some of it run of the mill stuff and some of it bat shit crazy. The NRC runs a fairly tight ship but like in every field, there are some clueless imbeciles who have no business being in the jobs they are in. I've learned to keep my mouth shut in a lot of cases. Sad but true. Also, despite all efforts, the human tendency to do something incredibly stupid while not thinking things through is astounding. Reminds me of this report: http://www.ucsusa.org/assets/documents/ ... ry-2-i.pdf

I fear there is a distinct gap between the article and well.... feasible solutions in the sociopolitical climate. Personally, I would rather see technological improvements make nuclear power a logical safe option and phase out the old unsafe reactors. I vehemently disagree with the "The only move is not to play" war game style ideology on nuclear power.

Weapons on the other hand are a more challenging one. There's the deterrent factor, and the question of whether we have the ability to really ensure that other countries do not have the capabilities to make them to use against us. It's now technology that will win wars or maintain peace.

Well, that's not really what I'm asking about. France, to use the popular example, gets far more of its energy from nuclear power than we do. But all the example brought up in the article were from the US's management and oversight structure. Surely the French have at least as much experience in the area of safety and time-tested regulation?

The major problem of civilian Nuclear facilities for energy generation is making sure that (a) the whole process of mining to spent fuel rod storage (energy and economics wise) is actually worth it - if you add spent fuel re-processing to that then it makes it more energy + $$ intensive) and (b) that no one lays their hands on the spent fuel (burying deep or sinking in cast RCC containers in the ocean depths).

The energetics and economics of fission based nuclear power is iffy at best with mining less and less economically feasible mines. That is a very real barrier. In the event fusion becomes possible the equation will change. Till then renewable power sources are the way to go for large scale sustainable energy generation.

Vis-a-vis weapons, it is good rule to make sure that no unstable regime gets access to nuclear materials and technology (period). As of today Pakistan, DP Korea and Iran are the only candidates of that. Deny them even civilian nuclear use.

Yes, George Shultz, lets all hide from the dragon. I have read your mystic tome, and I seek the truth through reading chicken bones and from being told what to think by other mystics, wizards, and elders.

the more we think like people did in the Middle Ages, the sooner we shall return to the Middle Ages.

The title of this (Risks from nuclear power and weapons are on the rise) seems awfully alarmist... The Science paper, in fact, doesn't even say this. The closest thing it says is:

Quote:

[...] there is growing apprehension about terrorists acquiring weapons or nuclear material."

Apprehension and actuality are distinct; terrorism isn't exactly a new thing, and nor are nuclear weapons, and the safeguards around them have improved over time (as discussed in the paper). Of course, that just means that whether or not risks have increased is not determinable from the paper at hand.

The Science paper is actually a short read -- shorter than this article itself. I'd encourage anyone interested to just read the paper (if they have access through a library or university).

Anyway, the article itself never says anything against the use of nuclear power, just against nuclear weapons. It offers a few suggestions on how to improve the current regulatory environment so as to improve the safety of nuclear power and weaponry beyond what it currently is.

I take issue with the title of this article. "Risks from nuclear power and weapons are on the rise." You make it sound like the risks of nuclear weapons or civil nuclear have gone up. this is FALSE.

Instead, we've revised our estimates of what the risks are. this is NOT the same thing as the risk going up, however. Risks would go up if we were using shittier materials for containment, or if there was a significant rise in chances of terrorist attacks or monster earthquakes near power plants. But the title makes it sound like the accident in fukushima made all of our existing nuclear plants riskier, and that is a gross misunderstanding of probabilities. the risk is the same as it ever was.

Mutually Assured Destruction, to be effective, assumes a rational adversary. It won't work to prevent accidents with nukes and it won't work against crazies with nukes, both of which are highly probable.

Another Big Oil infomercial dutifully copied down by Big Oil's favorite stenographers here at ARS. Note as always ARs's policy paid for Big Oil is to never mention nuclear when discussing energy issues unless FUKU can be brought into it.

Why else is that there is always a big layout on nuke safety whenever a couple of dudes write a short little peace of obvious fluff on nuke safety? Note that that worst possible accident to a nuke power reactor at Fuku caused by corruption and impossible in a modern nuke, injured not a soul and caused no long term damage outside of the plant itself.

Where are the articles on natural gas, chemical plant and hydro safety all far more dangerous than nukes and all of which kill thousands of folks every year in routine accidents.

Never seen an article on those natural gas storage facilities and regular LNG tanker traffic into Boston Harbor. A single terrist missile and well no need for an evacuation route from Boston, everything in the city will be vaporized.

And those convenient Chlorine gas storage facilities just across from New York City in Jersey. Think what a clever terrist could do with that. New York would be uninhabitable for years. Never an article about that.

And didjy'all hear what might happen when the Big One hits the Hoover Dam. The thing is so rickety a few good shakes and it's gone baby gone. What a million dead?

When was the last time you saw an article on the dangers of oil drilling blowouts Didn't we just miss wiping out the Gulf of Mexico by an incredible stroke of luck?

Nope Big Oil wants to scare the hell of folks about nuclear and extoll the myths and hide the truth about renewables backed up by gas and "Clean" gas. Its all good to them.

The major problem of civilian Nuclear facilities for energy generation is making sure that (a) the whole process of mining to spent fuel rod storage (energy and economics wise) is actually worth it - if you add spent fuel re-processing to that then it makes it more energy + $$ intensive) and (b) that no one lays their hands on the spent fuel (burying deep or sinking in cast RCC containers in the ocean depths).

The energetics and economics of fission based nuclear power is iffy at best with mining less and less economically feasible mines. That is a very real barrier. In the event fusion becomes possible the equation will change. Till then renewable power sources are the way to go for large scale sustainable energy generation.

Vis-a-vis weapons, it is good rule to make sure that no unstable regime gets access to nuclear materials and technology (period). As of today Pakistan, DP Korea and Iran are the only candidates of that. Deny them even civilian nuclear use.

Nope the EROEI of nukes is the highest of any form energy - 50 today and well over a thousand when the waste starts getting burned in Gen IV reactors.

Read British physicist David Mackay "Energy Sustainability without the Hot Air" and learn.

The actual cost of the 2 new reactors build with no loan guarantees at VCSummer is currently set at $4B/Gw or about 4 cents a kwh if built by public power. That is twice the cost of the 4 90% complete twin units built on time and on budject in China. It is also twice the cost of 7 Candu's build in the last twenty years also on time and on budget.

With modern efficient generation 3.5 reactors able to use reprocessed and thorium fuels, a huge supply of natural uranium easily extracted from seawater and coal ash and orders of magnitude more efficient fast breeder reactors India's new plant there is sufficient nuclear fission fuel to last hundreds of years. Thorium is five times as abundant as uranium.

Today's subsidized renewable builds are little more than an effort to sell more gas with wind and solar backed up as they are by inefficient gas plant run inefficiently. Far less money less gas less GHG's building efficient CCGT plant or nukes. Notice almost no Obama subsidy money goes to solving this with Green storage- an anathema to Obama's Big Oil gravy train.

Mutually Assured Destruction, to be effective, assumes a rational adversary. It won't work to prevent accidents with nukes and it won't work against crazies with nukes, both of which are highly probable.

Oh God. If somebody is convinced that a nuclear attack is righteous, and that they're going to a better place anyway when the inevitable retribution happens, then yeah, MAD isn't a deterrent, is it?

The major problem of civilian Nuclear facilities for energy generation is making sure that (a) the whole process of mining to spent fuel rod storage (energy and economics wise) is actually worth it - if you add spent fuel re-processing to that then it makes it more energy + $$ intensive) and (b) that no one lays their hands on the spent fuel (burying deep or sinking in cast RCC containers in the ocean depths).

The energetics and economics of fission based nuclear power is iffy at best with mining less and less economically feasible mines. That is a very real barrier. In the event fusion becomes possible the equation will change. Till then renewable power sources are the way to go for large scale sustainable energy generation.

Vis-a-vis weapons, it is good rule to make sure that no unstable regime gets access to nuclear materials and technology (period). As of today Pakistan, DP Korea and Iran are the only candidates of that. Deny them even civilian nuclear use.

Pakistan is an established nuclear power with an established nuclear arsenal. Without criticizing the spirit of what you are trying to say, your suggestion is a practical impossibility. It is a nuclear power, and ANY solution must accept that as reality. The same for North Korea.

MAD depended on the idea that the powers involved each had a significant civilian populace that they were committed to defending. When you're dealing with people who couldn't give a damn about civilians then MAD becomes worthless. When you're dealing with people who would invite a US nuclear response on their host country (which would trigger a massive international backlash and prove a potent tool for recruitment), then MAD becomes a liability.

heftysmurf wrote:

Pakistan is an established nuclear power with an established nuclear arsenal.

Right now, yes. But maintaining nuclear capability is an expensive and onerous task. Nuclear weapons aren't the sort of thing you can throw in a vault and rely on to work in twenty years' time. There's ample scope for both Pakistan and India to allow their nukes to decay below effective levels while maintaining the political fiction of being a nuclear power.

Well, that's not really what I'm asking about. France, to use the popular example, gets far more of its energy from nuclear power than we do. But all the example brought up in the article were from the US's management and oversight structure. Surely the French have at least as much experience in the area of safety and time-tested regulation?

I'm sure they would. I guess in my view, which is rooted in the nuclear industry to be honest, is that there is primarily three groups involved in these power plants. Simplified, excuse me, but you have the designers, operators, and oversight. Design teams, generally in the form of a multitude of engineering firms, draw up the plans, do the theoretical work, studies, and are tapped for design of upgrades. Operators generally tend to be the business that owns the plant and are on site for day to day operation. Oversight is simply regulation. While each country has it's own oversight bureau, L'Autorité de sûreté nucléaire in the case of France, best practices and lessons learned go all the way to the international level, so I'm pretty sure France is on par with the US as far as safety and regulation.

Mutually Assured Destruction, to be effective, assumes a rational adversary. It won't work to prevent accidents with nukes and it won't work against crazies with nukes, both of which are highly probable.

Oh God. If somebody is convinced that a nuclear attack is righteous, and that they're going to a better place anyway when the inevitable retribution happens, then yeah, MAD isn't a deterrent, is it?

In other words, in a way we got really lucky with the technologically advanced, rational Soviets...

Mutually Assured Destruction, to be effective, assumes a rational adversary. It won't work to prevent accidents with nukes and it won't work against crazies with nukes, both of which are highly probable.

Oh God. If somebody is convinced that a nuclear attack is righteous, and that they're going to a better place anyway when the inevitable retribution happens, then yeah, MAD isn't a deterrent, is it?

In other words, in a way we got really lucky with the technologically advanced, rational Soviets...

Or really any sufficiently-large nation. Very few actual governments are suicidal enough to say they'll let their whole country go up in glowing smoke, especially if they have an agenda like the Soviets of spreading their system around the world. The kind of people that are crazy and fanatical enough to do that don't tend to wind up running countries, but insurgency or terrorist groups.

In other words, in a way we got really lucky with the technologically advanced, rational Soviets...

Or really any sufficiently-large nation. Very few actual governments are suicidal enough to say they'll let their whole country go up in glowing smoke, especially if they have an agenda like the Soviets of spreading their system around the world. The kind of people that are crazy and fanatical enough to do that don't tend to wind up running countries, but insurgency or terrorist groups.

Interestingly enough, the Soviets predicated their entire strategy on *defence* against capitalist aggression. They saw capitalism "spreading around the world" and took a defensive posture to stop it.

Not saying that view is "correct" -- howsoever illuminating -- just further reinforcing the "two rational actors required for MAD".

Mutually Assured Destruction, to be effective, assumes a rational adversary. It won't work to prevent accidents with nukes and it won't work against crazies with nukes, both of which are highly probable.

Oh God. If somebody is convinced that a nuclear attack is righteous, and that they're going to a better place anyway when the inevitable retribution happens, then yeah, MAD isn't a deterrent, is it?

In other words, in a way we got really lucky with the technologically advanced, rational Soviets...

Or really any sufficiently-large nation. Very few actual governments are suicidal enough to say they'll let their whole country go up in glowing smoke, especially if they have an agenda like the Soviets of spreading their system around the world. The kind of people that are crazy and fanatical enough to do that don't tend to wind up running countries, but insurgency or terrorist groups.

My point is that the actual governments out there that harbor terrorists understand that if a nuke hits us and it passed through one of their camps, they are going to get a return delivery of radioactive glass. The government then instead of harboring nuclear terrorists, takes steps to keep their terrorists below that threshold of terrorism.

My point is that the actual governments out there that harbor terrorists understand that if a nuke hits us and it passed through one of their camps, they are going to get a return delivery of radioactive glass. The government then instead of harboring nuclear terrorists, takes steps to keep their terrorists below that threshold of terrorism.

Because it would be totally fair, ethical, and moral to "glass" tens of millions of people who have democratically elected a secular government and are desperately fighting -- with international help -- against a violent religious terrorist insurgency funded from overseas.

Just to describe eight of the most likely targets of your murderous, immoral, idiotic policy of collective punishment (illegal under international law, by the way) and misdirected vengeance.

Although I'm unclear how the paper measures or evaluate risks, I don't doubt there are some worthwhile safety improvements. For starters, let's remove government subsidies for irresponsible risks (liability caps and other government "insurance"). The NRC doesn't bear the costs or the benefits of it's policies and regulations for successful risk assessment and economical risk mitigation, which can only lead to inferior results.With all the real costs factored in, nuclear energy would be more expensive, reflecting reality and inviting energy innovations (better designs, audit processes, standards, and possibly energy sources like Thorium).