I worked in Japan for more than 12 years in the eighties and nineties, in Osaka, Nagoya and Tokyo with the U. S. State Department, Citibank and Merrill Lynch. After many more years in China in banking (Deutsche Bank and Ping An Bank) and consulting, I am back in Tokyo conducting the business of Yangtze Century Ltd. (Hong Kong/Shanghai) and producing this blog. E-mail me at smharnerco@yahoo.com.

'Pivoting' To Prop Up U.S. Alliances, Obama's Asian Trip Will Not Serve U.S. Interests

It is a fact that no objective observer can deny: the rise of China over the past 30 years is an epochal development that has fundamentally altered global economics and politics.

Realism, and pursuit of American national interests, dictates that the aim of U.S. policy should be to take maximum advantage of China’s rise, and adjust other relationships as necessary to this objective.

Yet, what we have saw during the first Obama administration term, and continue to see during the second, is an economic, political, and defense policy toward Asia fundamentally denies, if it does not actually challenge, China’s rise.

If casual followers on U.S. foreign policy will find these statements shocking, if not absurd, it is because they will have been listening to official rhetoric, rather than carefully analyzing concrete U.S. policies and actions.

The rhetoric is reassuring. In the past few days, we have heard Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel speaking in Beijing and Deputy Secretary of State William Burns speaking to the Asia Society in New York declaim in almost identical words that relations between the United States and China will be the most important factor in world politics in the 21st century

During his trip to Asia in February Vice President Joe Biden effused that the forging a constructive U.S.-China relationship will be the “central organizing principle” in international relations—including, of course, U.S. foreign policy—during the 21st century.

Expect similar rhetoric from President Obama who will make an unusually high-profile and policy-focused visit later this month to South Korea, Japan, Malaysia, and the Philippines. The most sensitive and important stop will be in Japan where he will arrive the night of the 23rd and enjoy a full day of “state visit” protocol-filled ceremonies, including a meeting with the Emperor and Empress.

The trouble –and it is major, serious trouble, indeed a deep contradiction—is that basic Obama administration policy toward Asia, a shorthand for which would be the Asian “pivot,” aims not to accommodate and adjust to the rise of China, but to bolster a fundamentally anti-China security structure and regional geopolitical status quo, of which the hallmark is a hegemonic American alliance system, and particularly the U.S.-Japan alliance.

The contradiction has come clearly into view during Hagel’s just completed 10-day Asian trip–including not just Japan and China, but also Mongolia. Hagel began on April 2 by co-hosting (with Pacific Command Admiral Samuel J. Locklear III) for the first time meeting of ASEAN defense ministers in Hawaii. Robert Gates was the first U.S. defense secretary to attend an ASEAN defense ministers’ meeting, in 2010.

Hagel has taken the opportunity to reiterate many times during his trip that U.S. has defense alliances with South Korea, Japan, the Philippines, Australia, and Thailand, and will honor treaty commitments.

The question that is rarely asked is whether this 60 year old alliance structure is justified and net-net, considering the actual and potential costs vs. benefits, it serves U.S. interests. (A larger and more important question, is whether military alliances are not fundamentally dysfunctional and perniciously anachronistic as an ‘organizing model’ of inter-state relations in the 21st century. I believe not.) China’s concept of a “new type of great power relations” eschews alliances on either side of the relationship.

The many times that Secretary Hagel reiterated the U.S. commitment to these alliances, and U.S. determination to strengthen them, was a declaration that the U.S. has not and will not adjust to and seek a new balance with a stronger China.

As long as this historically Cold War/anti-China security structure remains, the rhetoric of U.S. goodwill and a truly equal and harmonious U.S.-China relationship will be empty.

If not “strengthening alliances” and buttressing an unstable status quo, what should be the goal of U.S. policy and diplomacy? The answer is clear: it should be positively working to promote (and, most of all, to avoid obstructing) the evolution of a new Asian strategic equilibrium.

What would a new Asian strategic equilibrium look like? I have previously presented the vision of Australian National University professor of strategic studies, Hugh White, elaborated in his excellent book, The China Choice: Why American Should Share Power. White sees abolition of the U.S.-Japan alliance and Japan’s reemergence as an independent power in a “concert of Asia” security order.

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Based on what the CCP has been say in terms of theories of history, its clear they feel the fall of great European powers is caused by military over stretch. So one has to wounder if China wants the usa to build more military bases in the western pacific. China knows that the USA will not attack china. I wounder whats the real military budget balance is like if one removes american over seas spending and adjust for wage costs.

The real purpose for china’s navy build up is because they saw the lack of sea power as the reason why the late Qing was weak. That is not directed toward the usa but all other powers for the rest of history. Also with the demographic problems of Japan and Russia, a strong navy is important for any reunification of outer Manchuria and maybe in a one hundred years bring Ryukyu back in orbit.

Eventually the usa will run out of money to fund these alliances. It costs 30k to just take off and land an carrier aircraft once. The usa navy is good for china, because it secures oil routes and trade and deters Japanese military infrastructure development. If china is expending anywhere, its to take back outer Mongolia and Manchuria. There are very few people there and nearly all Mongolians and Manchus see themselves as chinese or even han.

I have no idea why people compare china to germany and other European powers. Even Huge White’s concert of Europe might be the wrong view. China has re-risen 5 times (han, sui/tang, song, maybe yuan, ming, and qing). The key question is if china views it self and its position in the world as pre qin or post qin? Do they view the fall of the USSR as the partitioning of Jin or the fall Xiongnu? If the the former than they might expend aggressively but if the latter is true than they will not. China’s view of the world is also influenced by how the usa views it. All this comparison to post rome and pre EU Europe is not helping.

XP. You have laudably read about the various dynasties of Chinese history. May I suggest the use of “China has re-risen 5 times” lacks proportion because broad-stroking thousands of years becomes unintelligible semantics. However, in general you do not even have to ask about pre-Qin or post-Qin for Qin Shi Huang’s 3 decades is generally looked upon as a tyranny though full of impactful legacies. Most historians and commoners of the Chinese World considers Tang the ultimate best practice, rightly or wrongly, so much so that we in the Diaspora call our Chinatowns after Tang [Tang ren jie]. The current Chinese characteristics that you need to focus on is pragmatism. Deng has defined it well:”No matter whether a cat is black or white. If it catches mice, it is a good cat.” If you try to ask you have not been informed in proper details and are imprisoned by the rigid view of China as simply “commies”.

what i meant by pre qin or post qin is does china consider the world as a part of all under heaven or just china? as china grows does it view its reforms as similar to the Qin reforms? if china is united than there wouldn’t be any aggressive war but if they have imported too much European universalism than they might think they can expend. Has globalization eroded the hau yi distinction? In many ways the post rome and pre eu europe was very similar to the spring and autumn period/ warring states. Right now china does not have fantasies of world domination. But the china threat theory says that some day it will. So is it possible that china might see the world as in a spring and autumn period? I think this is important because china thinks unity is the only way for peace and each civil war is kind of a war to end wars. The wwi analogy comes back.

“Another structure, for many reasons the most promising and ideal, would be a fully independent and neutral Japan, a non-nuclear and basically pacifist “Asian Switzerland” between China and the United States.”

There’s a fundamental misunderstanding of Switzerland at work here. Switzerland is neutral, but it’s an armed neutrality. Without NATO countries around it, Switzerland would be armed to the teeth. It was that military preparedness, coupled with terrain difficulties, that deterred Hitler from invading. A neutral Japan would not only have to spike defense spending – it would need a nuclear deterrent.

Fei Zhang, I do not agree that Japan needs, or would ever seek, a “nuclear deterrent.” In fact Japan recently voted in the UN in favor of a resolution denouncing nuclear weapons, disavowing the legitimacy of use of nuclear weapons under any circumstances, and renouncing any intention to possess nuclear weapons. Japan had for many years aligned itself with the United States opposing such a declaration. Last year, in a clear break with and no doubt against the wishes of the U.S., it joined the pacifist global concensus. It was a true expression of Japan’s deep pacifism and anti-nuclear commitment.

S Harner: “I do not agree that Japan needs, or would ever seek, a “nuclear deterrent.” In fact Japan recently voted in the UN in favor of a resolution denouncing nuclear weapons, disavowing the legitimacy of use of nuclear weapons under any circumstances, and renouncing any intention to possess nuclear weapons.”

What countries do when they fall under some other country’s protection, and what they do when that protection falls away, might be different things. Japan’s self-pitying view of itself as the greatest victim of WWII certainly doesn’t say much about its capacity for either self-reflection or empathy. When the alliance is abrogated, the Japanese will look to Number 1 as they have always done. The Japanese record of self-interest in international relations – especially in sticking it to US exporters – is such that it is doubtful they will acquiesce to becoming a de facto (and eventual de jure) Chinese province.

By an Asian Switzerland, Japan has to accept their smaller status, as neutral in-between and not “top-dog”, not “I’m back!” By taking on a name as Zhang Fei, please do not imitate the legendary Zhang Fei’ knee-jerk hot headed character in 3 Kingdoms. Japan has taken on the kookoo clock watch-maker’s finess that the Swiss are known, so that Japan has watch-making down pat. Precision and attention to detail. Back in the heydays of 60s and 70s, Japan’s industries had to focus ona limited number of industries to invest in, such as cameras, machine-tools, cars, electronics, and fibre-optics when it came along. Switzerland also took a strong position in Pharmaceuticals. So Japan can be a focused nation with more niches than Switzerland, but stay away from wanting to dominate, to subjugate or to use business as war. For a small nation in an interconnected world, the game should be niches, not Empire [as in the WWII era]. The niches of Japan have much to be admired by China and everyone else. The Ugly Banzai Japanese should be banished forever or else.

When Nixon went to China in 1972, he broke the concept of Ally for a reason, China was valued more to America than Taiwan.

Today, China is 200 times more stronger than 1972 in terms of GDP, twice as much as population. The trade between US and China is 10,000 times stronger. China’s relationships with all US allies are also drastically improved.

Today’s China equals to 400 times China of 1972.

If one has to sacrifice the relationship with China for an ally, like what it was before 1972, what is the reason?

USA can not leave asia because of pride. Which is always a bad way to determine strategy.

Why would china want the usa to leave? 1 the more overseas bases the more the usa has the more it will be impoverished at home. This causes domestic turmoil and low morale. 2 it keeps japan low on morale and dependent on foreign military suppliers. 3 it keeps peace and maintains the flow of oil and goods 4 it doesn’t stop china from building up her military and might make it easier to steal technology from poorly defend SE asian bases 5 it gives time for china to reach GDP per capita parity

Make a sound in the east, then strike in the west middle east and central asian energy is much more important than these islands. Control them and you also control east asia

Create something from nothing uninhabited islands with rocks can be used to waste american money and diplomatic effort

Replace the beams with rotten timbers make strategic withdraw and fiscal soundness seem unpatriotic and thus rational people are replaced with chicken hawks.

Deck the tree with false blossoms use history to make japan think china will actually attack it. while no one really wants war and everyone trades with japan. everyone who has ever gone to japan likes it. Analogies to WWI can give “rotten timbers” intellectual ammunition to replace “beams”