¶1. (C) Abdelkader Bensalah was re-elected, 129-0, as thePresident of the Conseil de la Nation (Senate) on January 12.Bensalah remains first in line to succeed PresidentBouteflika in the event that he is unable to complete hiscurrent term. Bensalah's re-election became a foregoneconclusion when no other senator challenged him for the post.A reporter for French-language daily newspaper Liberte,XXXXXXXXXXXX, who covered all aspects of the election, toldus the result was predetermined once President Bouteflikasignaled to the senators that he wanted Bensalah to retainhis position. XXXXXXXXXXXX said senators privately complainedthat, out of respect to Bouteflika, no other candidates hadpresented themselves. Many told her the election became aformality rather than an exercise in democracy, which was ashame in their view.

¶2. (C) On the day of the election, eight new senators joinedthe Conseil de la Nation as part of the third of themembership appointed directly by President Bouteflika (refA). All have one characteristic in common: they are"moudjahidine," or veterans (like Bouteflika) of the war ofindependence against France. According to XXXXXXXXXXXX, thesenewly appointed senators, as members of the "revolutionaryfamily" and in a sense "siblings of President Bouteflika,"will be very loyal to him. Some senators quietly expressedto her their frustration that the president did not reach outto members of the younger generation who will need to leadthe country after Bouteflika and his generation pass from thescene.

¶3. (C) Bouteflika appointed just eight senators out of the 24allotted to him this year. XXXXXXXXXXXX, a former senatorfrom the presidential tier, told us Bouteflika made aconscious decision to leave 16 seats vacant for laterappointment. While it may be true that Bouteflika had notyet made up his mind in some cases, XXXXXXXXXXXX thought it more likely that he wanted to keep some Senate seats in reservefor ministers who are expected to be dismissed shortly fromthe cabinet. XXXXXXXXXXXX said the number of vacant seats was agood indicator that a cabinet shuffle was coming soon.

¶4. (C) COMMENT: Even though Bouteflika's illness is recedingin the minds of the public (thanks to television pictures ofan active president), the widely respected Bensalah isconsidered able to manage the presidential succession processshould Bouteflika not be able to finish his term. XXXXXXXXXXXXanalysis of the vacant Senate seats also strikes us as on themark.FORD

¶1. (S) SUMMARY: In February 26 and 27 meetings with NEAAssistant Secretary C. David Welch, President AbdelazizBouteflika and Prime Minister Abdelaziz Belkhadem emphasizedtheir familiar line on self-determination for Western Sahara,as well as the need to find a way out that would allowAlgeria to "save face." Bouteflika said that relations withMorocco were "brotherly" and that Western Sahara was the onlyissue standing between them. Because the U.S. was unburdenedby the colonial past of France in the region, Bouteflika feltit was ideally placed to serve as an informal referee inresolving the dispute. Although he said he understoodMorocco felt threatened by the prospect of Western Saharanindependence, Bouteflika said that Morocco only had itself toblame for the current situation, as it had proceeded in a"clumsy" manner. With a more "elegant" touch, he said,Morocco could have encouraged "a Puerto Rico" outcome, whereSahrawis would happily choose to remain a part of Morocco insome form. Welch underlined to the Algerian officials thatthe U.S. sought a practical approach that could help thecurrent negotiations make progress, and the Moroccan autonomyproposal offered such a possibility. END SUMMARY.

LOVE FOR BAKER PLAN DIES HARD-----------------------------

¶2. (S) In response to A/S Welch's assertion that the Moroccanplan served to move a frozen situation forward in the absenceof any alternative, Bouteflika asserted that the plan offormer Secretary of State James Baker was such analternative. He told A/S Welch that if another option wasnecessary, "self-determination is that alternative" and theBaker Plan should be discussed. A/S Welch replied that theBaker plan is dead because it, too, failed to generateprogress. In Bouteflika's view, Baker failed because it wasnot given a chance, and he blamed the U.S. for "not takingits UN Security Council responsibilities seriously."Bouteflika said the Moroccan plan offered less autonomy forWestern Sahara than an Algerian province currently enjoys(reftel). He conceded that Algeria does have influence inWestern Sahara, but swore he would not use it to violate whathe sees as international law.

MOROCCAN "CLUMSINESS" TO BLAME------------------------------

¶3. (S) Prime Minister Abdelaziz Belkhadem told A/S Welch onFebruary 26 that the stability of Morocco was in Algeria'sinterest, and that attempting "to transform an anti-colonialissue" was not the right path to take and was potentiallydestabilizing to the region. Bouteflika, meanwhile, saidthat he understood Morocco felt threatened by the prospect ofindependence for Western Sahara, but stressed that theMoroccans only had themselves to blame for current Sahrawidetermination. Bouteflika explained, saying that Moroccocould have easily used a more "elegant" approach to produce aWestern Sahara independence that could be controlled orsupervised. Instead, he said, "they want Anschluss likeSaddam Hussein with Kuwait." Bouteflika said he easily couldhave imagined an outcome in which Western Sahara chose toremain a part of Morocco after seeing the benefits ofMoroccan rule, in much the same way "as Puerto Rico chose toremain part of the U.S." According to Bouteflika, Morocconeeds to offer the Polisario something, since "you cannot askconcessions from people who have nothing in their pockets."Had it not been for Morocco's "clumsy" approach, Bouteflikasaid "they could have gotten what they wanted."

ON FRANCE AND U.S.------------------

¶4. (S) Burdened by its colonial history in the Maghreb,France is unable to play a constructive role in resolving theWestern Sahara dispute, according to Bouteflika. France "hasnever really accepted Algerian independence," Bouteflikasaid, and he claimed that France was trying to settle scoreswith Algeria by interfering in Western Sahara in support ofMorocco. In contrast, Bouteflika said the U.S. was an idealcounterweight to balance Morocco, as none of the parties

ALGIERS 00000261 002 OF 002

involved had any bone of contention with the U.S. Bouteflikacomplained that the U.S. treats Algeria as "second class"compared to the preferential treatment it gives to Tunisiaand Morocco. He said the U.S. should understand Algeriabetter, as "you also paid a price for your independence."Belkhadem told A/S Welch of Algeria's admiration for U.S.positions on the independence of East Timor and Kosovo. "Whydon't you share the same views on Western Sahara?" askedBelkhadem, "it leaves us wondering what our U.S. friendswant." With both Algerians, A/S Welch underlined that theU.S. sought practical approaches that would advance theWestern Sahara negotiations forward. The Moroccan proposal,he noted, offered a possibility. He urged the Algerians toconsider what they could do to help the current negotiationsmake concrete progress.

COMMENT: NEED TO SAVE FACE--------------------------

¶5. (S) Bouteflika repeated to A/S Welch several times theneed for Algeria to get itself out of the Western Saharadispute in a way that allowed it to "save face." Hereiterated that Algeria "has no claim" at stake, and spoke oflooking towards positive future relations with Morocco, as"one day we will need to get beyond this." In a February 27meeting with Foreign Minister Mourad Medelci, A/S Welchinvited the Algerian delegation to visit Washingtonimmediately following the next round of negotiations atManhasset, to continue the discussions.

¶1. (S) SUMMARY: In April 21-22 discussions led on theAlgerian side by Counselor to the President forCounterterrorism Issues Kamel Rezag Bara, the government ofAlgeria gave oral assurances to S/WCI Ambassador Williamsonand an interagency delegation to establish the terms for thetransfer of Algerian detainees from the U.S. Naval Base atGuantanamo to Algeria. A working group consisting of membersof both delegations encapsulated these oral assurances inwritten minutes of the meetings, which Williamson and RezagBara initialed at the end of the two-day dialogue. Themeetings and their output produced sufficient assurances topermit the repatriation of the seven Algerian detaineesscheduled for transfer, except with respect to ensuring thatthese individuals would not pose a security risk to the U.S.or international community. The Algerian delegationindicated that it took seriously its obligations, but thatAlgerian security services balked at providing suchguarantees in the written meeting minutes.

¶2. (S) SUMMARY (CONT'D): Ambassador Williamson explained toRezag Bara that we sought maximum effort from the securityservices, understanding that there could be no solidguarantees. Nonetheless, Rezag Bara said the securityassurances in writing sought by the U.S. on Algerianresponsibility for transferred detainees and potential travelrestrictions after their repatriation could not be givenwithout consulting the highest levels of the Algeriangovernment. In exchange for receiving additional time (untilMay 31) to coordinate on these outstanding points, Rezag Baraand the Algerian delegation agreed to the earliest possibletransfer of detainee Sofiane Haderbache, who suffers frommental illness and for whom the U.S. does not requiresecurity assurances. At the close of the bilateraldiscussions, both sides agreed that the remaining assuranceswould be worked out between the Algerian and U.S. delegationsthrough Embassy Algiers. End Summary.

COURTESY CALL ON FM BEDJAOUI----------------------------

¶3. (S) S/WCI Ambassador at Large J. Clint Williamson and aninteragency team consisting of Christopher Camponovo (NSC),Jay Alan Liotta (DoD), Andrew Morrison (S/WCI), and VijayPadmanabhan (State L) sought assurances from the governmentof Algeria during April 21-22 discussions that would permitthe return to Algeria of Algerian nationals detained atGuantanamo who have been approved for transfer. Williamsonopened the visit with a courtesy call on FM Bedjaoui duringwhich he delivered a letter from Secretary Rice seekingBedjaoui's assistance in providing the Algerian governmentassurances necessary for the transfers. Williamson alsoexplained the process by which the U.S. made decisions ontransferring detainees out of Guantanamo, including the 25Algerians on the naval base.

¶4. (S) Noting Algerian reluctance to enter into an exchangeof diplomatic notes offering assurances on security andhumane treatment of transferred detainees, Williamson toldBedjaoui he and his team could work with their Algeriancounterparts to record the necessary assurances in signedminutes of their discussions. The end goal, statedWilliamson, was to find an arrangement that both fulfilledthe Administration's policies and satisfied the Algeriangovernment. Bedjaoui responded that the Algerian team wouldaccommodate Williamson and his team, adding that signedminutes were a better vehicle for conveying the necessaryassurances than an exchange of diplomatic notes. The FMobserved that the travaux preparatoires for the UN Charterare as important as the Charter itself.

¶5. (S) The Algerian delegation led by presidentialcounterterrorism Counselor Kamel Rezag Bara includedrepresentatives from the Presidency, Ministry of Interior,National Police, security services, Ministry of Justice, andthe Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The senior MFA officialpresent was Director General for Consular Affairs HassaneRabehi. The U.S. representatives (paragraph 3) also includedAmbassador Ford and PolEc Chief. Ambassador Williamson notedthat the Algerians were a valued partner in counterterrorismcooperation and gave an overview of U.S. policy on Guantanamodetainees, explaining that the U.S had determined that sevenAlgerian detainees were eligible for transfer. He emphasizedour need for commitments concerning humanitarian treatmentfor returned detainees and assurances that persons

transferred do not re-engage in terrorist activity beforetheir transfer to Algeria could be effected.

¶6. (S) Rezag Bara said Algeria encouraged the U.S. to closethe Guantanamo detention facility, since its operationcreated image problems for the U.S. among its friends aroundthe world. The GOA, he continued, understood the need forinvestigations at Guantanamo on the detained individuals andsupported a resolution of all Algerian detainee cases. RezagBara said the Algerian delegation understood what kinds ofassurances and commitments the U.S. side sought and hoped toprovide them in the course of their bilateral discussions.The presidential counselor stressed the Algerian need toensure that any transferred detainees, unless previouslyarrested or charged in Algeria, were returning to the countryby their own choice. Finally, he noted that Algerian lawcriminalized terrorist acts committed outside Algeria, evenif Algeria was not a target of the activity. In this regard,the U.S. delegation should expect the Algerian government topursue investigations and charges for returned detainees.From its own experience with terrorism, Rezag Bara toldWilliamson, Algeria would take all measures possible toprevent re-engagement of the returned detainees in terroristactivity.

LIMITS ON FOREIGN TRAVEL------------------------

¶7. (S) Williamson responded that he saw very few differencesin approach between the two sides. Algeria's taking steps tocontrol detainees and keep them from returning to terrorismwould be sufficient for the U.S. Williamson made clear wewere not asking Algeria to detain or incarcerate the returneddetainees; it was sufficient for us to receive confirmationthat the transferred detainees would be treated in accordancewith Algerian law and international conventions. DoD'sLiotta expressed appreciation for the Algerian readiness toaccept responsibility for what would be in all cases medium-or high-threat detainees. He asked if based on Algerianreview of the detaineesQ, case files there was the likelihoodof prosecution. Liotta also inquired what measures could betaken to limit the foreign travel of returned detainees.

¶8. (S) To Liotta's first point, the justice ministryrepresentative responded that an investigative judge wouldreview facts related to the cases if the detainees once theywere returned. It would be up to the judge to determinewhether charges would be filed. Rezag Bara added that aspart of this judicial review process, the U.S. and otherthird parties could submit evidence for the judge toconsider. The national police representative, for his part,briefed that under Algerian law "convicted and subversivepersons" lose the right to a passport and are subject toadditional surveillance. Liotta requested further precisionabout non-convicted persons, since most Algerian detaineesfell into this category. Rezag Bara clarified that thepassport was lifted for all convicted persons. Persons who"otherwise present a threat but retain a passport" may beadministratively prevented from leaving Algeria regardless oftheir passport status, said Rezag Bara. He added that bothjudicial and security service reviews of the detainees' fileswould be undertaken following their return.

CASE OF SOFIANE HADERBACHE--------------------------

¶9. (S) Williamson noted that one of the seven detainees whomthe U.S. sought to transfer to Algeria did not pose asecurity threat and no security assurances were necessary inhis case. Sofiane Haderbache, said Williamson, had suffereda gunshot wound to the head in Afghanistan. As a result,this detainee had degenerative brain damage and would requireextensive medical care for the duration of his life.Williamson indicated that the U.S. sought to return thisdetainee quickly, since we believed the mental healthtreatment and attention he required would be well provided inAlgeria, where Haderbache could be near family and friendsand receive mental health care in his own language andculture. Asked how the Algerians would address Haderbache'smental incapacity, Rezag Bara retrieved the case file.Reading from it, Rezag Bara noted that Haderbache had oneoutstanding traffic violation but otherwise had no legalentanglements. He said the GOA was fully aware of his uniquemedical requirements and was prepared to provide Haderbache apsychological and medical evaluation and treatment in anappropriate facility upon his return.

returned detainees would be fully protected by Algerian lawand Algerian international human rights commitments.Returning to the other six detainees who posed a medium orhigh security threat, Williamson asked if third parties suchas the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) hadaccess to prisoners in Algeria in the event that some of thereturned detainees were held in penal facilities for a periodof time. Rezag Bara responded that through intelligencechannels the Algerian government could provide the locationof government facilities in which any returned detaineeswould be held and questioned under the oversight of aninvestigative judge and the Ministry of Justice. The GOA, hecontinued, had no problem with making that informationavailable or providing the ICRC access to the detainees underexisting agreements between the ICRC and the Ministry ofJustice. Rezag Bara added that ICRC personnel stationed inTunis visited Algerian prisons on a monthly basis to assessconditions under which prisoners were held.

¶11. (S) In a separate meeting, Williamson met April 22 withMohamed Amara, Director General of Juridical and JudicialAffairs at the Ministry of Justice. Amara noted as a pointof pride the strong cooperation between his government andthe ICRC, which he explained was critical to the reform ofjails and prisons in Algeria. He elaborated that the ICRCregularly visited Algerian prisons. In response to aquestion from Williamson, Amara explained that the Algeriansbegan allowing ICRC access to their detention facilities inthe 1990s. The ICRC currently, said Amara, has freedom tomove within Algerian prisons and have direct contact withprisoners. He added there are no restrictions on access ortopics of conversation. According to Amara, AlgeriaQ,s goalin cooperating with the ICRC is to ensure that Algeria meetsinternational standards of detention.

DEVIL IN THE DETAILS--------------------

¶12. (S) Following the discussions between the twodelegations, both sides assembled teams to prepare minutes ofthe conversations that would satisfy the U.S. need forassurances and the Algerian desire not to provide suchassurances through the exchange of diplomatic notes. Thefinal English-language version of the minutes, which appearsin paragraph 13 below, was initialed April 22 by both headsof delegation along with the final French-language version.After protracted discussions led to an impasse on theinclusion in the minutes of two security-related points vitalfor the U.S. side, Ambassador Ford proposed working throughEmbassy Algiers to provide acceptable assurances toWashington by May 31. (Note: Without additional internaldiscussions, the Algerian security services could not bepersuaded to lift their objection to including languageconfirming GOAQ,s responsibility for transferred detainees.End Note.) Rezag Bara stressed the security services wereuncomfortable guaranteeing that no returned detainee wouldlater leave Algerian territory or return to terroristactivity. Williamson emphasized that the U.S. was lookingfor 100-percent effort and understood no 100-percentguarantee is possible. If the Algerian authorities becomeaware that a detainee exited Algeria, we merely ask to beinformed, stated Williamson. The points in question whichdid not appear in the final minutes at GOA request follow:

-- The Algerian government has agreed to take responsibilityfor these persons in conformity with its legislation and itsinternational obligations, and will take all necessary andappropriate measures in conformity with its legislation andits international obligations to prevent the transferredpersons from becoming involved in or facilitating terroristactivities.

-- In response to an expressed request of the AmericanGovernment concerning the possibility of the restriction ofthe freedom to travel abroad of the transferred persons, theAlgerian Government indicated that measures of this naturewill be taken only in the framework of legislative provisionsin force.

FINAL MINUTES AS INITIALED BY HEADS OF DELEGATION--------------------------------------------- ----

Mr. John Clint WILLIAMSON, Ambassador at Large for WarCrimes Issues at the U.S. Department of State, conducted aworking visit to Algiers from April 20 to 22, 2007,accompanied by a delegation composed of representatives fromthe Department of State, the Department of Defense and theNational Security Council.

During his visit, Mr. John Clint WILLIAMSON called onMr. Mohammed BEDJAOUI, Minister of State, Minister of ForeignAffairs, to whom he delivered a letter from Secretary ofState Condoleezza RICE.

He was also received at the Ministry of Justice.

A bilateral meeting bringing together delegations fromthe two countries (the members of which appear on theattached list) took place at Residence El Mithak on April 21and 22, 2007, under the chairmanship of Mr. Mohamed KamelREZAG BARA, Counselor to the President of the Republic, andMr. John Clint WILLIAMSON, Ambassador at Large for War CrimesIssues at the U.S. Department of State.

The discussions concerned the situation of Algerian nationalsdetained at the U.S. Naval Base at Guantanamo.

The Algerian Delegation and the American Delegation expressedtheir great satisfaction with the quality of relations thatexist between the PeopleQ,s Democratic Republic of Algeriaand the United States of America and with the perspectivesfor their expansion and strengthening.

Both Delegations particularly expressed their joint will toreach a comprehensive settlement concerning the situation ofAlgerian nationals detained in the U.S. Naval Base atGuantanamo.

This settlement can be finalized according to a timetable andpractical modalities to be defined through discussionsbetween the two Delegations by the end of May 2007.

The Algerian Delegation indicated that it had no objection tothe transfer of the Algerian nationals whose Algeriannationality is established, to Algeria or to another countryof their choice.

The Algerian Delegation stated that in all cases, itsnationals will be brought before the national judicialauthority, which will ultimately determine their status.

The Algerian Delegation underscored that Algerian legislationcriminalizes membership by any Algerian national in aterrorist organization abroad, even if acts committed are notdirected against Algeria.With respect to the concerns expressed by the AmericanDelegation about the treatment of the Algerian nationalsafter their return to Algeria, the two Delegations, after anexchange of information, agreed that these concerns are dealtwith, at a political level, by the consistent commitment ofAlgeria to the fight against international terrorism and, ata legal level, by Algerian legislation as well as by virtueof the obligations assumed by Algeria in the framework of thedifferent pertinent international conventions to which it hasadhered, notably the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman orDegrading Treatment or Punishment, and the InternationalConvention on the Elimination of All Forms of RacialDiscrimination, as well as the body of internationalinstruments relating to human rights and the arrangementsconcluded with the ICRC.Within the framework of relevant UN Security CouncilResolutions for combating terrorism, particularly UNSCR1373/01, the two Delegations decided to reinforce theircooperation through necessary and appropriate measures,notably through the exchange of information and intelligence,with the goal of preventing these persons from being able tobecome involved in terrorist activities.

Taking account of the preceding, the two Delegations acceptedthe principle, as a first step, upon the agreement ofpractical modalities, of the transfer of detainees whosenames are as follows: