Fooloso4 wrote:The claim that we cannot experience the consciousness of others is not the same as the claim that we have no experiential evidence by which we can know that others are conscious.

Here we differ. I maintain that we have no experiential evidence of the consciousness of others. We have to employ inference in the way we interpret observations in order to derive that others and animals and computers have consciousness, and that inference includes assumptions that may or may not be true.

Therefore our inability to experience the consciousness of others allows logically the claim to arise that we have no experiential evidence by which we can know that others are conscious.

This does not prove or disprove that others don't have a conscious mind. It only proves that much like we have no way of experientially telling whether others have conscious minds, the same way we have no way of experientially telling whether computers have a conscious mind. And experientially telling that is an integral part of actually telling that or its opposite.

Ergo, the entire exercise of trying to decide that is completely futile.

"You can always live without a lover, but you can't love without a liver."

Therefore our inability to experience the consciousness of others allows logically the claim to arise that we have no experiential evidence by which we can know that others are conscious.

But this is deductive logic in fact it's a tautology.

Inductive logic depends a lot upon coherence of theories with evidence and hypotheses. The theory which is in vogue is modern science which is predicted to exponentially increase in power of explanation for the foreseeable future.

Modern science uses inductive logic as well as formal logic. That is to say that modern science is empirical and probabilistic so that when correlations constantly occur between subjective mind events and physical brain events we assume that mind events and brain events are identical or at least are constantly associated with each other so they are as near as dammit identical.

If -1- chooses to live her life according to what she can be 'logically' certain about she will very soon die.

-1- wrote:
Therefore our inability to experience the consciousness of others allows logically the claim to arise that we have no experiential evidence by which we can know that others are conscious.

Belindi wrote:
But this is deductive logic in fact it's a tautology.

Technically speaking, you are wrong. One is an inability, the other is a claim. A tautology is complete equivalence. When there are differences, even minor ones, between the two statements, they are not tautologies.

The first part revolves around an inability to experience; the claim allows us to have knowledge otherwise, if only we knew how. (This is not spelled out; but the first part does not branch into this.)

No, I would not say this is a tautology. It looks like one to the untrained eye, I do admit that.

Belindi wrote:
That is to say that modern science is empirical and probabilistic so that when correlations constantly occur between subjective mind events and physical brain events we assume that mind events and brain events are identical or at least are constantly associated with each other so they are as near as dammit identical.

You missed the mark. Again. If the mind event itself is in question, then similarities in experimental data can't establish a mind event examining two subjects the conscious mind of either is debated to exist. Your statement only has credence, and only to you, if your brain was manipulated the same way as the other guy's with electrodes poking into your brain on the operating table in a real event.

Let's say, that in probabilistic terms, you accept that your mind reactions are replicated in other subjects, so they have a conscious too. But that does not prove to me anything. It may convince you, but the experiment is an experiential one, and you are the one experiencing it, not me.

Probabilistic terms are great in science, because they make the predictions by science possible. But they are subject to complete rejection by philosophy without any penalty or restriction.

Belindi wrote:
If -1- chooses to live her life according to what she can be 'logically' certain about she will very soon die.

Prove it!!

I don't follow this... I see your bitter hope in your post, borne of belligerent ill will, but no logic.

1. How soon is "soon"? A week? A year? Twenty years? Sixty years? With that vague expression your prediction is valueless.

2. How does one choose to live one's life? I thought it's been settled there is no choice, as there is no free will.

"You can always live without a lover, but you can't love without a liver."

-1- wrote:
Therefore our inability to experience the consciousness of others allows logically the claim to arise that we have no experiential evidence by which we can know that others are conscious.

Belindi wrote:
But this is deductive logic in fact it's a tautology.

Technically speaking, you are wrong. One is an inability, the other is a claim. A tautology is complete equivalence. When there are differences, even minor ones, between the two statements, they are not tautologies.

The first part revolves around an inability to experience; the claim allows us to have knowledge otherwise, if only we knew how. (This is not spelled out; but the first part does not branch into this.)

No, I would not say this is a tautology. It looks like one to the untrained eye, I do admit that.

Belindi wrote:
That is to say that modern science is empirical and probabilistic so that when correlations constantly occur between subjective mind events and physical brain events we assume that mind events and brain events are identical or at least are constantly associated with each other so they are as near as dammit identical.

You missed the mark. Again. If the mind event itself is in question, then similarities in experimental data can't establish a mind event examining two subjects the conscious mind of either is debated to exist. Your statement only has credence, and only to you, if your brain was manipulated the same way as the other guy's with electrodes poking into your brain on the operating table in a real event.

Let's say, that in probabilistic terms, you accept that your mind reactions are replicated in other subjects, so they have a conscious too. But that does not prove to me anything. It may convince you, but the experiment is an experiential one, and you are the one experiencing it, not me.

Probabilistic terms are great in science, because they make the predictions by science possible. But they are subject to complete rejection by philosophy without any penalty or restriction.

Belindi wrote:
If -1- chooses to live her life according to what she can be 'logically' certain about she will very soon die.

Prove it!!

I don't follow this... I see your bitter hope in your post, borne of belligerent ill will, but no logic.

1. How soon is "soon"? A week? A year? Twenty years? Sixty years? With that vague expression your prediction is valueless.

2. How does one choose to live one's life? I thought it's been settled there is no choice, as there is no free will.

I agree it's not a tautology. The first clause is ontological the second epistemolological..

Not only scientists but all of us learning-capable animals choose what we will do next according to predictions based upon empirical reasoning, that is when our choices are not entirely reactions to emotions and other non-cognitive forces. You are right about the experimental situation. It would be unethical limit variables in experiments on humans. Perhaps -1- would agree that clinical practice now depends upon collusion of neuroscience and psychiatry and is significantly successful, all the more so for advances in neuroscience.

If I have offended you by calling you a woman I intended no offence . I had not understood that the photo of a man was yourself, and I try to be gender neutral by varying the pronouns.

"Soon" means as long as it takes to die by not eating, not moving around, not hoping, not interacting with others etc. These are reasons why clinical depression is potentially a morbid condition.

In answer to your third and last question , choosing is something that people do. Choice is not a synonym for Free Will but is the noun form of the verb to choose. There is no verb form of the noun 'Free Will' and that alone should arouse our suspicion.

No, you have not offended me by calling me a woman. I fully support the view that men and women are equal in dignity, in human worth, at the work place, in front of the law, and should be given equal opportunity to successfully actualize themselves in life. So please don't worry, your calling me a woman was not offensive to me at all.

"You can always live without a lover, but you can't love without a liver."

Adam, the first of Mankind, having been born of the dust of the ground, the laws of Nature, cause effect, was born incomplete, was not born a fully functioning Humane Being, was not born fully dressed, was born flawed, was born bare, less than, a mere animal.

The Law of cause and effect, only allowing man to react to his environment, while the wise man responds to his and her environment.

Eve being born of the side of Adam, born of the air, the nothingness, was a creation, was born to be the help mate of Adam, Mankind, he and she; don't forget because speak in Metaphors out Knowledge of Reality, language is also flawed, is an abomination.

Eve, Woman, Wisdom, the Consciousness of the Rational Mind is Mankind's Salvation. It is the Rational Mind, Consciousness that allows Mankind to step out of the Animal Kingdome in order to become the Ultimate Survivor.

Mankind can not survive by following his and her animal, nature, soul, Spirit, the Ways of the Flesh, by reacting to his environment, the Laws of Cause and Effect.

-1- wrote:Therefore our inability to experience the consciousness of others allows logically the claim to arise that we have no experiential evidence by which we can know that others are conscious.

eh.. That doesn't quite follow....

Let's say we have a set of brainscans that shows that, for every task which triggers conscious experience X in us, there is a matching activity in our Brain Area A. We then scan someone else's brain, and discover that whenever they report a conscious experience that sounds very much like X, then they also have a matching activity in Brain Area A. Furthermore, we find that if we stimulate Brain Area A artificially, subjects reliably report associated conscious experiences.

All that is evidence that other people are conscious. It's not proof, but it's certainly evidence in favour.

Let's say we have a set of brainscans that shows that, for every task which triggers conscious experience X in us, there is a matching activity in our Brain Area A. We then scan someone else's brain, and discover that whenever they report a conscious experience that sounds very much like X, then they also have a matching activity in Brain Area A. Furthermore, we find that if we stimulate Brain Area A artificially, subjects reliably report associated conscious experiences.

All that is evidence that other people are conscious. It's not proof, but it's certainly evidence in favour.

I agree, of course.

When , not if, machines become totally conscious selfs*** it will be necessary to treat them as beings with personal responsibility and include then in the general rights and responsibilities of society.

*** "totally conscious selfs" I do of course include that part of brain-mind that deals with kindness issues, sometimes known here as 'morality issues'.

You could divide awareness into 3 levels, and understand that if awareness is increasing, you cannot skip a level.

1) The awareness of non-living things (virtually non-existent, and much smaller than the awareness of an amoeba).

2) The awareness of living organisms (as we define "life").

3) The awareness of a conscious entity (we like to believe we're on this level, but really it's #2).

You cannot go straight away from level 1 to level 3. This means that, if you wish a computer to become conscious, you'd first have to make it alive, and science doesn't know how to do that...

But what's the difference between the awareness of an amoeba and the awareness of a roomba?

*

I wouldn't know how to describe the difference, other than to speculate that it must be vast. By interacting with a microbe and a non-living object one could possibly ascertain the gist of this. The amoeba will definitely reveal a higher level of awareness by its response to various "probing" by a scientist, which will reveal a certain "internal motor" or "internal animation" which will not be detected in the roomba, an animation which we ordinarily associate with "life" or "being alive". The respective awareness in each entity must also be correspondingly different.

Atreyu, that sounds a lot to me like wishful thinking. You speculate a vast difference, but what would that difference look like? Would it be a difference in the number of inputs that can be responded to? Or the number of different ways a single input can be responded to?

Wayne, I'll bite. What's the difference between reacting and responding?