The example of successful employment pacts in other European states in particular that in the Netherlands, suggest that such an effort is also needed in Germany. The new Social Democratic government made such an alliance a core element of its policy. This paper assesses the probability for success of the current Alliance for Labor measured against the hard criteria of unemployment reduction. Drawing on both negotiation and neocorporatism theory, two preconditions for the success of such pacts are derived. An empirical examination is then made to evaluate whether, indeed, both these preconditions – namely the willingness and ability of associations to negotiate – actually exist. In a situation where both conditions do not hold, such neocorporatist arrangements produce a dilemma: measures which are easily made binding do not solve the employment problem and simultaneously a consensus cannot be reached on employment – effective measures. This does not mean there will not be any agreement in the alliance; however, it does make the specific selectivity of such negotiating system clear. This point is depicted with the example of working time policy which is one topic in the alliance and in my opinion an extremely effective instrument for reducing unemployment.