McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334, 9 (1995)

McINTYRE v. OHIO ELECTIONS COMM'N

Opinion of the Court

taliation, by concern about social ostracism, or merely by a
desire to preserve as much of one's privacy as possible.
Whatever the motivation may be, at least in the field of literary endeavor, the interest in having anonymous works enter
the marketplace of ideas unquestionably outweighs any public interest in requiring disclosure as a condition of entry.5
Accordingly, an author's decision to remain anonymous, like
other decisions concerning omissions or additions to the content of a publication, is an aspect of the freedom of speech
protected by the First Amendment.

The freedom to publish anonymously extends beyond the
literary realm. In Talley, the Court held that the First
Amendment protects the distribution of unsigned handbills
urging readers to boycott certain Los Angeles merchants
who were allegedly engaging in discriminatory employment
practices. 362 U. S. 60. Writing for the Court, Justice
Black noted that "[p]ersecuted groups and sects from time
to time throughout history have been able to criticize oppressive practices and laws either anonymously or not at all."
Id., at 64. Justice Black recalled England's abusive press
licensing laws and seditious libel prosecutions, and he reminded us that even the arguments favoring the ratification
of the Constitution advanced in the Federalist Papers were
published under fictitious names. Id., at 64-65. On occasion, quite apart from any threat of persecution, an advocate
may believe her ideas will be more persuasive if her readers
are unaware of her identity. Anonymity thereby provides a
way for a writer who may be personally unpopular to ensure
that readers will not prejudge her message simply because
they do not like its proponent. Thus, even in the field of

5Though such a requirement might provide assistance to critics in evaluating the quality and significance of the writing, it is not indispensable.
To draw an analogy from a nonliterary context, the now-pervasive practice
of grading law school examination papers "blindly" (i. e., under a system
in which the professor does not know whose paper she is grading) indicates
that such evaluations are possible—indeed, perhaps more reliable—when
any bias associated with the author's identity is prescinded.