The study utilized data from a longitudinal self-report
survey (Growing Up with Media) which focused on the possible associations
between exposure to violent media and violent behavior. Information was obtained from youth-caregiver
pairs in 2010 and 2011 through questions about forced sexual contact, coercive sex,
attempted rape, and completed rape. Key
to the question about consent was the phrase “when I knew they did not want
to.” The results of the study indicated
9% of the sample reported some type of sexual violence perpetration in their
lifetime, which included:

8% (n = 84) who kissed, touched or made
someone else do something sexual when the youth knew the other person did not
want to do (defined by the researchers as forced sexual contact)

3% (n = 33) got someone to give in to
sex when he or she knew the other person did not want to have sex(defined as coercive sex)

3% (n = 43) attempted, but were not able
to force someone to have sex (defined as attempted rape)

2% (n = 18) forced someone to have sex
with him or her (defined as completed rape)

Overlap between the categories was noted
and, among perpetrators, 12% reported two different behaviors, 11% reported three
different behaviors, and 9% reported all four types of behavior

Other critical information noted by the authors was:

“…consumption of X-rated material significantly
differed for perpetrators and nonperpetrators of all types of sexual
violence. Differences were almost
entirely explained by whether the material was violent in nature.”

“Youth living in low income households
were less likely to report attempted rape than youth in higher income
households.”

And, the
most controversial of the findings:

·“By ages 18 or 19
years, the split of male to female perpetrators was nearly equivalent. More females reported older victims, and more
males reported younger victims.”

This research is invaluable and we applaud the
researchers for investigating such a difficult topic and providing some
important baseline information about national rates of sexual violence in
adolescence. However, the conclusions made from the data and even the title selected
for this article have been problematic and, in many ways, represent a lost important
opportunity for deeper discussion about this issue.

Despite the authors’ identification of sexual violence
as a public health problem and numerous recommendations about the need to
develop comprehensive education and bystander intervention strategies to
prevent sexual violence, the title of the article labeled all of these children
and youth as perpetrators and the text continued this labeling of children and
teens. Included in this perpetrator label
was the 2% who completed rape as well as kids as young as 12 who “kissed,
touched, or made someone else do something sexual when the youth knew the other
person did not want to.” The authors
also noted that “few perpetrators experience consequences: only 2 percent reported being arrested,” and then
continued to describe the need to enhance detection and investigation of sexual
violence cases. By their own definition,
many of these cases, even if reported, would not be legally considered sexual
violence and these children and adolescents would not be considered
perpetrators. In our opinion, this
speaks to the need to include other forms of intervention and accountability when
speaking about children and young teens who cannot be reported for their sexual
decisions. These teens clearly need to
be accountable for their actions and require instruction about the importance
of consent and how to negotiate these sexual questions with peers.

Not only does the media response reinforce
the incorrect focus on these youth as “perpetrators,” there was blatant misinterpretation
of the data which was then communicated to the public as fact. One of the more egregious examples of this
was the statement that “females are just as likely to be perpetrators as males”
– this conclusion was taken from the discussion about age of first perpetration
which indicated that, prior to age 18 or 19, the majority of perpetrators were
male and it was not until age 18 or
19 that the split between male to female perpetrators was nearly
equivalent. This does NOT translate that
females are just as likely to commit rape as males. Rather, it indicates that,
when a female in this sample first “engaged in perpetration”, the female was
more often 18 or 19 at the time rather than the younger ages of 12 to 17. And, for these females, the “victim” was also
most likely to be older, which again speaks to the concern about whether these
young women understand the concept of consent, victimization, and power in
sexual relationships. The data also
clearly indicated that females engaged in perpetration behavior at a lower rate
than males (attempted rape: n = 43, 35 were male; completed rape: n = 18, 13
were male), not that they are “just as likely to be perpetrators as males.”

The language used by the authors significantly impacted
the message they provided and/or how it was perceived by others. If our intent is to prevent sexual violence,
then our words need to be framed in a way that allows people to begin a
conversation about the behaviors we are trying to stop. In our writing and our publications we need
to begin to describe the behaviors that children and teens may engage in,
rather than label these youth as “perpetrators.” In a popular publication of the Association
for the Treatment of Sexual Abusers, an overview of children with sexual
behavior problems is labeled by the behaviors and not “child perpetrators.” If the focus is on behavior rather than
the label, those in a position to intervene will be much more likely to say
something or do something when they see behaviors that concern them. Imagine if this article and others that
follow were to use a true public health approach that focuses on and describes
behavior – the media will then be unable to respond just with shock, but will
instead need to begin to ask: what is the responsibility of adults, and
society, to stop the first time perpetration of these behaviors.

Katie Gotch, M.A.Coordinator of Public Affairs Association for the Treatment of Sexual Abusers

Friday, October 11, 2013

“…existing research indicates the vast majority of
sex offenders, including those with a relatively high sexual recidivism risk,
can be safely managed in the community.”

Dr.
Grant Duwe

Research
Director, MN DOC

With those words and supporting research, Grant Duwe has made it more
difficult to justify sexual offender civil commitment (SOCC). Duwe is the
Research Director of the Minnesota Department of Corrections – the source of
most of the SVP clients at the Minnesota Sex Offender Program (MSOP).
This new research[1] might provide the strongest empirical
evidence to date that the gateway into SOCC should be a little tighter, and the
exits out could safely be a little wider.

Duwe’s research briefly stated: Duwe administered the MnSOST-3 to 105 men under
SOCC at MSOP (about 15% of the census). He applied the results to data from
other recidivism studies to arrive at an estimated rate of future reoffending
(assuming SVPs were immediately and unconditionally discharged). The outcome
projected that, after four years, about one in ten men would reoffend. Using
extrapolation and the more sensitive measure of arrests, rather than convictions,
Duwe estimated that over ten years (an additional six years) one more SVP in
ten would reoffend. When he extended his estimates out over 50 years
(effectively the lifetime for most offenders), he determined that in the
subsequent 40 years another 10% would reoffend, for a total 50-year recidivism rate
of 30%. Duwe concluded that, in their lifetime, seven in ten released SVPs
would not reoffend.

When he applied the same data to
the higher threshold of conviction (rather than arrest) rate, he
determined, in their lifetime, four out of five (82.4%) SVPs would not
reoffend. He went further in making adjustments for guys[2] who had reoffended but not been
arrested, and still determined the overwhelming majority of SVPs in the sample
would not reoffend.

Duwe’s research projects lifetime
recidivism (re-arrests) of 28%, but notes that with estimation error and a CI
of 95%, 50-year (lifetime) recidivism has a lower bound of 21.4% and an upper
bound of 35.7%. With some measure of successful treatment, applications of RNR
principles, and prudent post-release monitoring and supervision, Duwe’s
research supports a lower actuarial risk of SVP reoffending than widely
believed. On an individual basis, some dynamic variables may be mitigating,
while others could be aggravating. Still, at face value, this outcome calls
into question one of the fundamental criteria for SOCC: establishing “likely”
or “highly likely” to reoffend.[3] This question of semantics was at issue in a recent case
before the Minnesota Court of Appeals. [4]

With the controversies swirling
around the use of certain diagnoses to establish the “mental disorder”
requirement for SOCC, concerns about the dynamic nature of “volition,” and
indications that most actuarial risk tools tolerate a high level of false
positives, Duwe’s research further confounds efforts to sustain a sound
empirical basis for SOCC.

Other recent research supports
the contention that actual recidivism for SVPs is much lower than public
perception or other actuarial predictions. In 2012, Robin Wilson, Jan Looman,
and their colleagues published research [5]
reporting 3.2% - 5.5% recidivisms for recently released SVPs. The study had a
short follow-up period (2.5 years), but in that time, 14 of 253 (5.5%) men released
from the Regional Treatment Centre [6]had
reoffended, and only one out of 31 guys released from the Florida Civil
Commitment Center had reoffended. The offenders in the Wilson et al. (2012)
study were selected for their completion of treatment, but the results indicate
that reoffending for these SVPs are consistent with low rates of sexual
reoffending found in other studies.

There are some SVP recidivism
data published in the annual surveys of the Sexual Offender Civil Commitment
Programs Network (SOCCPN).
Not all SOCCPN members contribute data to the annual survey, and the compiled
results have an anecdotal quality to them, but with about 17 of 20 SVP states
reporting outcomes, the annual surveys of programs have some empirical basis.
The 2011 Annual Survey
reports that 75 more men had been fully released and there was no reported
sexual or non-sexual recidivism. The 2012 Annual Surveyreported that four clients were
known to have sexually reoffended out of an apparent total of 159 discharges.
The latter survey did not indicate the time period for which those four clients
had been released.

In a 2011 review of SOCC in
the state of Virginia, it was reported that, of the 78 clients on conditional
release since the program’s inception in 2003, three (4%) have reoffended.[7] The same report cites SVP
recidivism rates ranging from zero to five percent in six other states. The
Virginia report indicates that some reoffending was of a technical nature,
further illustrating some of the problems with recidivism data. Even with some
ambiguity around outcome data, it would seem reasonable to conclude from these
studies that there is a low incidence of sexual recidivism, even among SVP
clients.

In the interests of accuracy,
there is research reporting much higher rates of sexual reoffending among
certain groups of sexual offenders, but if it is older research, it may simply
be outdated. From 1990 to 2002 the three year reconviction rate for sexual
offenders in MN dropped from over 16% to under 3%. [1] More
recent research from the MN DOC reveals a four-year reconviction rate of 2.8%,[8]
which is consistent with data from other states.[9] With some actuarial risk tools able to
distinguish risk factors that correlate to reoffending, some sexual offenders
can be determined to be at higher actuarial risk for reoffending, but the point
remains that sexual offending and reoffending has dramatically declined in the
last two decades,[10] and the data herein indicates that
trend appears to also hold for high-risk sexual offenders.

Duwe raises important questions about public polices with regard to
sexual offending and the cost of crime control. Actuarially, if ten guys were
released from MSOP today, four years from now nine of them will have not
reoffended. Is that acceptable risk management? Some would argue that reducing
sexual abuse at any cost is in the public interest, but public officials have a
responsibility for cost-effective public safety. With the 2013 cost of SOCC in
Minnesota, Duwe’s research supports the contention that actuarially, the public
cost of preventing one in ten SVPs from reoffending over four years is
$4,750,000. [11]

With 95% of all sexual offenses being committed by first time offenders [12], sexual abuse professionals
agree that we need to do a lot more on the side of preventing first time
offenders. Is it a good allocation of public funds to spend $4.75M to try to
stop one known offender from possibly reoffending? It seems investing $4.75M in broad sexual
abuse prevention efforts might save a great many more future victims from harm.

Given public intolerance for any incidence of sexual offending, a
prediction of one in ten guys reoffending over four years will not sit well
with many. Duwe’s estimate of “only” three in ten SVP clients reconvicted over
50 years may be of little comfort to the general public, but the courts, in
their need to reconcile “likely” to reoffend, may take another view of this
research.

Those that have been following the MSOP saga know that there has been
only one guy that has remained conditionally released out of almost 700 clients
over nearly 20 years. No one has ever completed the treatment program and, if
current conditions hold, clients are far more likely to die at MSOP than be
released. [13]This description is not to lay blame on the
doorstep of MSOP, but rather to illustrate the overwhelming sense of
hopelessness faced by MSOP clients, and a mandate for MSOP staff made
ineffectual by unresolved competing interests. SVP programs elsewhere in the US
face comparable challenges.

The oldest SVP program in the US, in the state of Washington, was under federal oversight from 1994-2007. In 2012 the federal courts also intervened in Minnesota,
certified all clients at MSOP to be part of a class-action lawsuit, and signaled
that immediate changes are needed. Some changes are in the works, but the
executive and legislative branches of Minnesota’s state government would be wise
to recognize the opportunity to take stock of Duwe’s research.

Duwe has provided empirical support for a more effective balance between
prudent public safety and effective management of SVPs. His report is
consistent with recommendations found in the 2011 report from the MN Office of the Legislative Auditor,
and with the December, 2012 report from the MN SOCC Advisory Task Force. To be sure, not all the clients
at MSOP should be immediately released into the community, but Duwe has
documented that there is every reason to believe that the low base rates for
sexual offending broadly, would also inure to SVP programs.

Principles of Risk-Need-Responsivity have empirical support for guiding
the treatment and management of sexual offenders; there’s every reason to
believe it would also be useful to guide SOCC. Courts might be able to use the
option of a judicial stay of commitment or order less restrictive alternatives,
when appropriate - perhaps community-based residential programs or outpatient
programs as in Texas
and other states. Outpatient or aftercare programs can track SVPs with active
GPS, to help ensure public safety. Good supervision and monitoring combined
with proven support programs such as Circles of Support and Accountability
offer alternatives to secure detention for SVPs.

Duwe has quite credibly documented that a majority of the clients at
MSOP could be safely managed in the community. If those who currently control
SOCC in Minnesota and other states ignore the relevance of Duwe’s compelling
research, it is quite likely that the state and federal courts will not.

Jon Brandt, MSW, LICSW

Note: Dr. Duwe has given permission to publish his email
address if readers have questions about his study or would like a copy of his
research: grant.duwe@state.mn.us

Abstract: This study examines the selective incapacitation
effects of civil commitment on sexual reoffending among 105 Minnesota sex offenders
who were civilly committed between 2004 and 2006. The Minnesota Sex Offender
Screening Tool-3, a sexual recidivism risk assessment instrument, was used to
estimate what the four-year sexual recidivism rate would have been for these
offenders had they been released to the community. Integration of Survival with
Quality of Life (iSQoL) software was used to extrapolate the survival curves
over a 50-year period to develop a lifetime sexual recidivism estimate. If the
105 civilly committed sex offenders had been released to the community, an
estimated nine percent would have been reconvicted of a new sex offense within
four years. Civilly committing these offenders therefore likely reduced the
overall four-year sexual recidivism rate by 12 percent. The results further
suggest that if these offenders had been released to the community, an
estimated 28 percent would be rearrested for another sex offense within their
lifetime. To better align the costs of civil commitment with its public safety
benefits, states operating these programs should emphasize the use of
intermediate alternatives in the community for a more positive return on
investment.

[2] There are over 4,200 men in SVP programs in the US and appear to be
fewer than ten females (SOCCPN, 2012); male pronouns and references are not
only appropriate, but because virtually all sex offender studies have male
cohorts, some studies may not be valid with females. Some guys enter SOCC
directly from the juvenile system, before they get a chance to be “men.” More
than 50
guys at MSOP do not have an adult sexual
offense.

[8] Of the 1,653 sex offenders released from Minnesota Prisons between 2004
and 2006, 47 (2.8 percent) had been reconvicted of a new sex offense within
four years of their release from prison. (Duwe, 2013) at p. 14. Among the 220 sex offenders released from prison
during the 1990s, by the end of 2010, 41 (18.6 percent) had been reconvicted of
a new sex offense. Among the 261 referred offenders who were not committed, 17
(6.5%) were reconvicted of a new sex crime within four years. Of the 1,392
offenders who were reviewed but not referred, 30 (2.2%) reoffended within four
years. (Duwe, 2013) at p. 15.

Thursday, October 3, 2013

The Punitive-Social Action Paradox

Kieran McCartan, Ph.D.

It is an interesting time in the world of sexual
offender policy and practice internationally, with what seems to be something
of a paradoxical turn. Governments are becoming more conservative in how they
respond to sexual offending (with increased and more punitive sentences) while
simultaneously investing in viable community engagement/partnerships in an
attempt to solve issues around sexual offender reintegration. This is
interesting because it raises the questions of why this has happened and what
the future is for sexual offender management, post-austerity? Is this truly an informed government
response based on what different “publics” want (e.g., more punitive sanctions,
greater public protection, and increased devolvement of criminal justice
responses so that they can feel engaged as well as represented), a complex
response to austerity, or too many political voices talking at the same time in
the run up to election?

If we look at the UK as a case in point, there has
been a series of changes in the structure, function, and role of the criminal
justice system in dealing with offenders. This has come as a result of government
policies (Conservative - Liberal Democratic coalition), heightened and ongoing
media discourses (resulting from the Wales care home scandal, increased
reporting of historical crimes, Operation Yewtree focusing on celebrity sexual abuse cases,
and a refocus on online sexual abuse and child sexual abuse imagery), and
austerity cuts. The outcome has been two interrelated but separate responses,
creating a paradox (of sorts):

1. Changes to the existing systems - During the life of the current coalition government (2010 onwards),
there has been financial change with continued reductions in police, probation,
and prison funding across the board. This has resulted in major changes in the
construction and layout in the criminal justice systems of the three judicial
areas (England & Wales, Scotland, and Northern Ireland). This has seen:

The introduction of Police and Crime Commissioners in
England & Wales, based on an American model;

The merging of the eight Scottish police forces into
one ‘national’ police force;

The restructuring of probation in England & Wales
from a multitude of probation areas into one probation board with local boards
empowered by self-determination and localism;

The closure of prisons in the UK resulting in the
restructuring of existing prisons (e.g., Ashfield prison has been converted
from a youth offenders prison to a sexual offenders over summer 2013) and the
resurfacing of conversations of a titan supermax prison for the UK; and

A new approach to offender management and
rehabilitation, including with respect to sexual offenders; touted by the
Ministry of Justice as focusing on social capital and desistance.

All of these issues contribute to a belief that
existing agencies are being asked to do more with less in an era when
sentencing guidelines regarding sexual violence are being re-examined and more
people are being prosecuted for sexual offences. These developments will
require that alternatives to ‘traditional’ criminal justice responses need to
be found.

2. Changes in the role of the public engagement - The current coalition government’s push towards greater community
engagement, localism, and social action in the field of criminal justice has
also presented challenges. The government believe that communities need to
assist the criminal justice system in the reintegration of offenders, because
offenders—especially sexual offenders—come from communities, and they will go
back to communities upon release. However, in many cases, communities have been
reluctant to assume these responsibilities.

This does not mean that community members will somehow
replace Probation, Police, or Social Work. Rather, the expectation is that they
will work in tandem, meaning that the public should play some key role in
assisting offenders to reengage with the larger community during re-entry. This
is based on the notion that positive social capital can help to reduce
reoffending through encouraging desistance; because offenders with community
engagement will feel less isolated, more integrated and are, therefore, more
likely engage with others in ways that are more pro-social and, ultimately,
less harmful. Such efforts can be seen in various restorative justice projects
in the UK and internationally; for example, A.I.M, New Leaf, and Circles of
Support and Accountability. The CoSA project in Hampshire and Thames Valley
(now known as Circles South-East) recently celebrated its 10th
anniversary, with an attendant evaluation.

The social action/community partnership approach also
has a secondary public health function, apart from offender reintegration. This
function is to educate the community about the realities of offenders and
offending, so that they are better able to detect, prevent, and report.
However, there is a real world misconception about social action and community
engagement—cost. In the age of austerity, community-centric, social action
approaches often use volunteers, who can be seen as cost-saving as opposed to
the cost-neutral or cost-deficit approach of using professionals (e.g.,
Probation, Social Workers, etc). In reality, this is not the case, as volunteer
programs have costs associated with design and implementation, training, and
program support (i.e., they require some aspect of supervision by a trained professional).
Cost-benefit analyses of CoSA projects in the UK and USA were recently published, each showing
substantial benefits to the use of volunteers in sexual offender re-entry.

Although the focus here has been on the UK example,
this punitive-social action paradox is truly a worldwide debate, with increased
regulation and debate, changing attitudes regarding reintegration, and an
increased public debate about “governmentality” and control in criminal
justice. For instance, we have seen the following issues and events unfold over
the recent past:

Punitive Action: The
investigation and prosecution of rape in India; a conservative turn in criminal
justice policy in Canada; increased conversations about the role and
responsibility of the internet internationally; and civil commitment, community
notification, and zoning restriction debates in the USA.

Social Action: The
international growth in movements like Circles of Support and Accountability;
increased public health debates worldwide regarding sexual violence prevention,
including but not limited to school education; and the development of outreach
programmes for persons at risk, like Project Prevention Dunkenfeld in Germany.

This leaves us with an interesting paradox, for on one
hand the government is saying that sexual offenders are problematic and, as
such, we need to be more punitive and their sentencing reviewed. On the other
hand, they are saying that criminal justice funding is being cut, services
restructured and, therefore, the community must play a greater role. So, which
is the correct answer/interpretation? The answer is, as we know, both and neither.
Sexual offenders are truly a heterogeneous population where a one size fits all
model struggles. We are keenly aware that approaches appropriate for one may
not be appropriate for another. How do we resolve this paradox? I am not sure
that we can, but what we can do is be politically and socially engaged so that
we offer clear, consistent, and informed advice to both statutory and community
groups so that reasonable decisions are made that have the potential to balance
public protection against offender rehabilitation, risk management, and
reintegration.

Dr.
Kieran McCartan is an Associate Professor in Criminology at the University of
the West of England in Bristol, UK.

Kieran McCartan, PhD

Chief Blogger

David Prescott, LICSW

Associate blogger

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The Association for the Treatment of Sexual Abusers (http://atsa.com/) is an international, multi-disciplinary organization dedicated to preventing sexual abuse. Through research, education, and shared learning ATSA promotes evidence based practice, public policy and community strategies that lead to the effective assessment, treatment and management of individuals who have sexually abused or are risk to abuse.

The views expressed on this blog are of the bloggers and are not necessarily those of the Association for the Treatment of Sexual Abusers, Sexual Abuse: A Journal of Research & Treatment, or Sage Journals.

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