Robin Greenwood

Robin is the George Gund Professor of Finance and Banking at Harvard Business School. He works in behavioral and institutional finance, with a particular focus on "macro-level" market inefficiencies. He received a Ph.D. from Harvard in Economics, and B.S. degrees in Economics and Mathematics at MIT. He has taught in both years of the MBA curriculum as well as the PhD. program. He was the chair of the Finance for Senior Executives Program, developed the Behavioral and Value Investing Elective Course, and now runs the first semester of finance in the MBA program. He is a Research Associate at the National Bureau of Economic Research and an editor of the Review of Financial Studies.

Publications

This paper re-examines government debt management policy in light of the U.S. experience with extraordinary fiscal and monetary policies since 2008. We first document that the Treasury's decision to lengthen the average maturity of the debt has partially offset the Federal Reserve's attempts to reduce the supply of long-term bonds held by private investors through its policy of quantitative easing. We then examine the appropriate debt management policy for the consolidated government. We argue that traditional considerations favoring longer-term debt may be overstated, and suggest that there are several advantages to issuing greater quantities of short-term debt. Under current institutional arrangements, neither the Federal Reserve nor the Treasury is caused to view debt management policy on the basis of the overall national interest. We suggest revised institutional arrangements to promote greater cooperation between the Treasury and the Federal Reserve in setting debt management policy. This is particularly important when conventional monetary policy becomes constrained by the zero lower bound, leaving debt management as one of the few policy levers to support aggregate demand.

We study the link between investment boom and bust cycles and returns on capital in the dry bulk shipping industry. We show that high current ship earnings are associated with high used ship prices and heightened industry investment in new ships, but forecast low future returns. We propose and estimate a behavioral model of industry cycles that can account for the evidence. In our model, firms over-extrapolate exogenous demand shocks and partially neglect the endogenous investment response of their competitors. As a result, firms overpay for ships and overinvest in booms and are disappointed by the subsequent low returns. Formal estimation of the model suggests that modest expectational errors can result in dramatic excess volatility in prices and investment.We study the link between investment boom and bust cycles and returns on capital in the dry bulk shipping industry. We show that high current ship earnings are associated with high used ship prices and heightened industry investment in new ships, but forecast low future returns. We propose and estimate a behavioral model of industry cycles that can account for the evidence. In our model, firms over-extrapolate exogenous demand shocks and partially neglect the endogenous investment response of their competitors. As a result, firms overpay for ships and overinvest in booms and are disappointed by the subsequent low returns. Formal estimation of the model suggests that modest expectational errors can result in dramatic excess volatility in prices and investment.

We study optimal government debt maturity in a model where investors derive monetary services from holding riskless short-term securities. In a setting where the government is the only issuer of such riskless paper, it trades off the monetary premium associated with short-term debt against the refinancing risk implied by the need to roll over its debt more often. We then extend the model to allow private financial intermediaries to compete with the government in the provision of short-term, money-like claims. We argue that if there are negative externalities associated with private money creation, the government should tilt its issuance more towards short maturities. The idea is that the government may have a comparative advantage relative to the private sector in bearing refinancing risk and, hence, should aim to partially crowd out the private sector's use of short-term debt.

Survey evidence suggests that many investors form beliefs about future stock market returns by extrapolating past returns. Such beliefs are hard to reconcile with existing models of the aggregate stock market. We study a consumption-based asset pricing model in which some investors form beliefs about future price changes in the stock market by extrapolating past price changes, while other investors hold fully rational beliefs. We find that the model captures many features of actual prices and returns; importantly, however, it is also consistent with the survey evidence on investor expectations.

We present a model in which fire sales propagate shocks across bank balance sheets. When a bank experiences a negative shock to its equity, a natural way to return to target leverage is to sell assets. If potential buyers are limited, then asset sales depress prices, in which case one bank's sales impact other banks with common exposures. We show how this contagion effect adds up across the banking sector, and how it can be estimated empirically using balance sheet data. We compute bank exposures to system-wide deleveraging, as well as the spillovers induced by individual banks. Applying the model to European banks, we evaluate a variety of interventions to reduce their vulnerability to fire sales during the sovereign debt crisis.

We examine empirically how the maturity structure of government debt affects bond yields and excess returns. Our analysis is based on a theoretical model of preferred habitat in which clienteles with strong preferences for specific maturities trade with arbitrageurs. Consistent with the model, we find that (i) the supply of long- relative to short-term bonds is positively related to the term spread, (ii) supply predicts positively long-term bonds' excess returns even after controlling for the term spread and the Cochrane-Piazzesi factor, (iii) the effects of supply are stronger for longer maturities, and (iv) following periods when arbitrageurs have lost money, both supply and the term spread are stronger predictors of excess returns.

We analyze time-series of investor expectations of future stock market returns from six data sources between 1963 and 2011. The six measures of expectations are highly positively correlated with each other, as well as with past stock returns and with the level of the stock market. However, investor expectations are strongly negatively correlated with model-based expected returns. The evidence is not consistent with rational expectations representative investor models of returns.

The U.S. financial services industry grew from 4.9% of GDP in 1980 to 7.9% of GDP in 2007. A sizeable portion of the growth can be explained by rising asset management fees, which in turn were driven by increases in the valuation of tradable assets, particularly equity. Another important factor was growth in fees associated with an expansion in household credit, particularly for residential mortgages. This expansion was itself fueled by the development of non-bank credit intermediation (or "shadow banking"). Whether the growth of the financial sector has been socially beneficial depends on one's view of active asset management, the increase in household credit, and the growth of shadow banking. While recognizing some of the benefits of professional asset management, we are skeptical about the marginal value of active asset management. We then raise concerns about whether the potential benefits of increased access to household credit—the main output of the shadow banking system—are outweighed by the risks inherent in this new approach to credit delivery.

We show that the credit quality of corporate debt issuers deteriorates during credit booms, and that this deterioration forecasts low excess returns to corporate bondholders. The key insight is that changes in the pricing of credit risk disproportionately affect the financing costs faced by low quality firms, so the debt issuance of low quality firms is particularly useful for forecasting bond returns. We show that a significant decline in issuer quality is a more reliable signal of credit market overheating than rapid aggregate credit growth. We use these findings to investigate the forces driving time-variation in expected corporate bond returns.

We show that characteristics of stock issuers can be used to forecast important common factors in stocks' returns such as those associated with book-to-market, size, and industry. Specifically, we use differences between the attributes of stock issuers and repurchasers to forecast characteristic-related factor returns. For example, we show that large firms underperform following years when issuing firms are large relative to repurchasing firms. While our strongest results are for portfolios based on book-to-market, size (i.e., we forecast the HML and SMB factors), and industry, our approach is also useful for forecasting factor returns associated with distress, payout policy, and profitability.

Standard theories of corporate ownership assume that because markets are efficient, insiders ultimately bear all agency costs that they create and therefore have a strong incentive to minimize conflicts of interest with outside investors. We argue that if equity is overvalued, however, mispricing offsets agency costs and can induce a controlling shareholder to list equity. Higher valuations may support listings associated with greater agency costs. We test the predictions that follow from this idea on a sample of publicly listed subsidiaries in Japan. Subsidiaries in which the parent sells a larger stake and subsidiaries with greater scope for expropriation by the parent firm are more overpriced at listing, and minority shareholders fare poorly after listing as mispricing corrects. Parent firms often repurchase subsidiaries at large discounts to valuations at the time of listing and experience positive abnormal returns when repurchases are announced.

We investigate the relationship between ownership structure of financial assets and non-fundamental risk. We define an asset to be fragile if it is susceptible to non-fundamental trading shocks. An asset can be fragile because of concentrated ownership or because its owners face correlated liquidity shocks, i.e., they must buy or sell at the same time. Two assets are co-fragile if their owners have correlated trading needs, even if the holdings of these owners do not directly overlap. We formalize this idea and apply it to the ownership of U.S. stocks between 1990 and 2007. Consistent with our predictions, fragility strongly predicts future price volatility, and co-fragility predicts cross-stock return comovement.

We argue that time-series variation in the maturity of aggregate corporate debt issues arises because firms behave as macro liquidity providers, absorbing the large supply shocks associated with changes in the maturity structure of government debt. We document that when the government funds itself with relatively more short-term debt, firms fill the resulting gap by issuing more long-term debt, and vice-versa. This type of liquidity provision is undertaken more aggressively: i) in periods when the ratio of government debt to total debt is higher; and ii) by firms with stronger balance sheets. Our theory provides a new perspective on the apparent ability of firms to exploit bond-market return predictability with their financing choices.

We use firm-level data from 34 countries covering the 1995-2006 period to analyze how the characteristics of public markets shape the process by which firms become widely held. Firms in all countries in the sample tend to have concentrated ownership at the time they go public. Decreases in ownership concentration are more likely for firms in countries with stronger protections for minority shareholders, lower block premia, and more liquid stock markets. In these countries, firms are more likely to issue equity when investment opportunities are high, becoming widely held in the process. We find scant evidence, however, that changes in percentage blockholding forecast future returns, inconsistent with market timing theories. Our results suggest that liquidity-based theories of corporate ownership may have been underemphasized in previous cross-country studies.

We propose and test a catering theory of nominal stock prices. The theory predicts that when investors place higher valuation on low-price firms, managers will maintain share prices at lower levels, and vice-versa. Using measures of time-varying catering incentives based on valuation ratios, split announcement effects, and future returns, we find empirical support for the predictions in both time-series and firm-level data. Given the strong cross-sectional relationship between capitalization and nominal share price, an interpretation of the results is that managers may be trying to categorize their firms as small firms when investors favor small firms.

We use mutual fund manager data from the technology bubble to examine the hypothesis that inexperienced investors play a role in the formation of asset price bubbles. Using age as a proxy for managers' investment experience, we find that around the peak of the technology bubble, mutual funds run by younger managers are more heavily invested in technology stocks, relative to their style benchmarks, than their older colleagues. Furthermore, young managers, but not old managers, exhibit trend-chasing behavior in their technology stock investments. As a result, young managers increase their technology holdings during the run-up, and decrease them during the downturn. Both results are in line with the behavior of inexperienced investors in experimental asset markets. The economic significance of young managers' actions is amplified by large inflows into their funds prior to the peak in technology stock prices.

Firms can manipulate their stock price by limiting the ability of their investors to sell. I examine a series of corporate events in Japan in which firms actively reduced their float—the fraction of shares available to trade—for periods of one to three months, locking investors into their long positions. Standard theory predicts that the greater are the restrictions, the greater is the impact of trading on price. Particularly severe restrictions are associated with positive event returns of over 30 percent, most of which are reversed when the restrictions are removed. Firms are more likely to issue equity or redeem convertible debt during the restricted period, suggesting strong incentives for manipulation.

Recent work documents large positive abnormal returns around the time that a hedge fund announces its activist intentions with a publicly listed firm. We show that these returns are largely explained by the ability of activists to force target firms into a takeover: In a comprehensive sample of 13D filings by portfolio investors between 1993 and 2006, we find that announcement returns and long-term abnormal returns are high for the subset of targets that are acquired ex-post, but not detectably different from zero for firms that remain independent eighteen months after the initial filing. We show that firms that are targeted by activists are more likely to get acquired than those in a control sample. Finally, we show that the portfolios managed by activist investors perform poorly during a period in which market-wide takeover interest declined.

In the presence of limits to arbitrage, cross-sectional variation in periodic investor demand should be related to the degree of comovement of returns. I exploit the unusual weighting system of the Nikkei 225 index in Japan to identify cross-sectional variation in periodic demand for index stocks. Relative to their weights in a value weighted index, some stocks in the Nikkei are overweighted by a factor of ten or more. Using overweighting as an instrument for the proportionality between demand shocks for index stocks, I find a strong positive relation between overweighting and the comovement of a stock with other stocks in the index, and a negative relationship between index overweighting and comovement with stocks outside of the index. Put simply, overweighted stocks have high betas. The results suggest that excess comovement of stock returns is a consequence of an institutionalized commonality in trading behavior, rather than inefficiencies related to the speed at which index stocks incorporate economy-wide information.

n April 2000, 30 stocks were replaced in the Nikkei 225 Index. The unusually broad index redefinition allowed for a study of the effects of index-linked trading on the excess comovement of stock returns. A large increase occurred in the correlation of trading volume of stocks added to the index with the volume of stocks that remained in the index, and opposite results occurred for the deletions. Daily index return betas of the additions rose by an average of 0.45; index return betas of the deleted stocks fell by an average of 0.63. Theoretical predictions for changes in autocorrelations and cross-serial correlations of returns of index additions and deletions were confirmed. The results are consistent with the idea that trading patterns are associated with short-run excess comovement of stock returns.

I develop a framework to analyze demand curves for multiple risky securities at extended horizons in a setting with limits-to-arbitrage. Following an unexpected change in uninformed investor demand for several assets, I predict returns of each security to be proportional to the contribution of that security's demand shock to the risk of a diversified arbitrage portfolio. I show that securities that are not affected by demand shocks but are correlated with securities undergoing changes in demand should experience returns related to their hedging role in arbitrageur's portfolios. Finally, I predict a negative cross-sectional relation between post-event returns and the initial return associated with the change in demand. I confirm these predictions using data from a unique redefinition of the Nikkei 225 index in Japan, in which 255 stocks simultaneously undergo significant changes in index investor demand, causing more than ¥2,000 billion of trading in one week and large price changes followed by subsequent reversals for all of the reweighted stocks.

The maturity of new debt issues predicts excess bond returns. When the share of long-term debt issues in total debt issues is high, future excess bond returns are low. This predictive power comes in two parts. First, inflation, the real short-term rate, and the term spread predict excess bond returns. Second, these same variables explain the long-term share, and together account for much of its own ability to predict excess bond returns. The results are consistent with survey evidence that firms use debt market conditions in an effort to determine the lowest-cost maturity at which to borrow.

Once a sleepy old boys' club, the U.S. financial sector is now a dynamic and growing business that attracts the best and the brightest. It is tempting to declare the industry a roaring success. But its purpose is to serve the needs of U.S. households and firms, and by this standard its performance has been mixed. The sector's growth has been beneficial for U.S. corporations, which enjoy ready access to the deepest capital markets in the world. Venture capital, for example, and the public equity markets that support it, has channeled money to innovative ideas that have transformed industries and generated new ones. The rest of the economy, however, has not been well served by the financial sector's boom. First, the shift from deposit-based banking to a market-based "shadow banking" system, without adequate regulatory adjustments, has left the financial system vulnerable to crisis. Second, trillions of dollars have been steered into residential real estate and away from more productive investments. Third, the cost of professional investment management is too high, which drains talent from other industries. The financial sector could promote the health and competitiveness of the U.S. economy by increasing capital and liquidity requirements, reorienting the discussion around housing finance reform from keeping mortgage credit cheap to ensuring financial stability, and instituting measures that compel asset managers to compete on the true value of the services they provide.

Williams, a Tulsa, Oklahoma-based firm in various energy businesses, must decide whether to accept a financing package offered by Berkshire Hathaway and Lehman Brothers. The proposed one-year credit facility would provide the firm with financial resources in a difficult period.

This case explores reasons for Blackstone Alternative Asset Management's (BAAM's) growth from 2007-2013, a time when the overall fund of hedge funds industry contracted substantially. Additionally, the case analyzes evolving business models and value propositions within the fund of hedge funds industry. J. Tomilson Hill, CEO of BAAM and Vice-Chairman of The Blackstone Group, is the protagonist. At the time of the case, BAAM was considering two potential directions for future growth: 1) providing hedge fund products for the defined contribution pension space, and 2) beginning direct internal "manufacturing" of investments. In the context of the current fund of hedge funds industry, the case considers challenges and opportunities for these potential new areas for growth.

In late December 2011, Hayman Capital founder and portfolio manager Kyle Bass was reviewing Japanese government budget projections for 2012. The projections appeared contrary to Hayman Capital's views on Japan, where the fund had built a bearish position. Japan had the world's highest debt burden, whether expressed as a percentage of GDP or government revenue. Guided by recent global events, Bass forecast that Japan would soon experience increases in interest rates, a devaluation of the currency, and eventually, a restructuring of the country's debt.

Citigroup faced considerable distress in early 2009. In late 2008, the bank had accepted $45 billion in preferred equity from the United States government via the Troubled Assets Relief Program (TARP). Yet, the stock had continued to slide in early 2009. In late February, the company announced that it would convert as much as $50 billion of preferred stock into common stock, at $3.25 per share. The case asks students to evaluate the pricing of preferred stock relative to common stock at this time. As the case takes place during a period of considerable uncertainty in global capital markets, and conventional sources of arbitrage capital have been depleted, the apparent mispricing may not be as attractive as it initially seems. In the B and C cases, students must decide whether their view of the appropriate pricing changes, when the apparent mispricing worsens. A final additional teaching point relates to the formation of a synthetic short position using the options markets.

Citigroup faced considerable distress in early 2009. In late 2008, the bank had accepted $45 billion in preferred equity from the United States government via the Troubled Assets Relief Program (TARP). Yet, the stock had continued to slide in early 2009. In late February, the company announced that it would convert as much as $50 billion of preferred stock into common stock, at $3.25 per share. The case asks students to evaluate the pricing of preferred stock relative to common stock at this time. As the case takes place during a period of considerable uncertainty in global capital markets, and conventional sources of arbitrage capital have been depleted, the apparent mispricing may not be as attractive as it initially seems. In the B and C case, students must decide whether their view of the appropriate pricing changes, when the apparent mispricing worsens. A final additional teaching point relates to the formation of a synthetic short position using the options markets.

Citigroup faced considerable distress in early 2009. In late 2008, the bank had accepted $45 billion in preferred equity from the United States government via the Troubled Assets Relief Program (TARP). Yet, the stock had continued to slide in early 2009. In late February, the company announced that it would convert as much as $50 billion of preferred stock into common stock, at $3.25 per share. The case asks students to evaluate the pricing of preferred stock relative to common stock at this time. As the case takes place during a period of considerable uncertainty in global capital markets, and conventional sources of arbitrage capital have been depleted, the apparent mispricing may not be as attractive as it initially seems. In the B and C case, students must decide whether their view of the appropriate pricing changes, when the apparent mispricing worsens. A final additional teaching point relates to the formation of a synthetic short position using the options markets.

This conceptual note describes a series of cases on the investor demand approach to investment strategy and management. The cases demonstrate how and why securities market dislocations are driven by non-fundamental demand. I use the cases to progressively build a decision making framework for active investing in public markets. This note serves as an extended guide to the ideas in the cases, and is aimed at instructors forming their own course in Behavioral Finance or Investment Management.

Rehan Jaffer, the founder of hedge fund H Partners, is considering what to do with his investment in Six Flags. H Partners had invested a significant amount of the firm's capital in the senior bonds of U.S.-based Six Flags, following that company's bankruptcy filing.

Rehan Jaffer, the founder of hedge fund H Partners, is considering what to do with his investment in Six Flags. H Partners had invested a significant amount of the firm's capital in the senior bonds of U.S.-based Six Flags, following that company's bankruptcy filing.

MacroMarkets co-founder and CEO Samuel Masucci III is meeting with a strategic partner for his firm. Co-founded with Yale University Professor Robert Shiller, MacroMarkets' main innovation is the "MacroShare," which allows investors to take long or short, levered or unlevered, positions based on the value of any index. Both Shiller and Masucci are hopeful that MacroShares can help investors hedge all kinds of macroeconomic risks, including exposure to residential housing. The firm has ”battle-tested” two products—one linked to oil, and one linked to housing—with mixed success and is evaluating its strategy going forward. Specifically, Masucci wonders whether the MacroShare structure might come to replace the ETF as the predominant technology for index trading.

Why do shares in NEC Electronics, a publicly listed subsidiary of Japan conglomerate NEC, trade at a discount to their fundamental value? Can Perry Capital, a U.S. hedge fund, restructure this subsidiary and generate significant returns? This case provides students with an opportunity to analyze Perry's decision to invest in NEC Electronics. In doing so, it asks for the reasons that NEC might take actions that destroy value and shift value away from NECE's minority shareholders. The events covered allow for a discussion of how ownership concentration constrains restructuring alternatives, how hedge fund investors might confront controlling shareholders, and how the mispricing of agency costs can give rise to ownership structures that allow for minority shareholder expropriation.

A New York-based hedge fund must decide whether to invest in TravelCenters of America (TA), a recent spin-off from a U.S.-based real estate investment trust. The case confronts students with the question: To what extent is this spin-off opportunity attractive from a value-investing standpoint? Historically, spin-offs have been attractive investments because of supply-demand dynamics associated with their investor base. The case is an opportunity to ask whether the same dynamics will operate for TA.

Brett Barakett, CEO and founder of Tremblant Capital Group, a New York-based hedge fund, must decide what to do with his fund's position in Green Mountain Coffee Roasters, which has dropped in value by more than 40 percent in recent months. Tremblant is a hedge fund that specializes in forecasting consumer behavioral change, and capitalizes on the disconnect between stock prices and consumer behavior. In the case of Green Mountain Coffee, many other sophisticated investors have taken short positions in the stock, leading Barakett to question whether his fund had the right trade thesis.

Brett Barakett, CEO and founder of Tremblant Capital Group, a New York–based hedge fund, must decide what to do with his fund's position in Green Mountain Coffee Roasters, which has dropped in value by more than 40% in recent months. Tremblant is a hedge fund that specializes in forecasting consumer behavioral change and capitalizes on the disconnect between stock prices and consumer behavior. In the case of Green Mountain Coffee, many other sophisticated investors have taken short positions in the stock, leading Barakett to question whether his fund had the right trade thesis.

Outlines the mechanics of calculating free cash flows from historical and proforma financial statements. Focuses on the mechanical process of transforming numbers from financial forecasts into cash flows.

Washington Mutual issues 6 billion Euro of covered bonds in 2006. The objective of the case is to ask whether these bonds are mispriced in late 2008. The case is set in September 20008, and Washington Mutual is facing considerable distress due to mounting losses on its mortgage portfolio. Following investment bank Lehman Brother's Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection filing in mid September, the price of Washington Mutual's covered bonds has fallen to 75 per 100 of face value. As these bonds are over-collateralized, the case asks students to evaluate the underlying collateral portfolio in the event of liquidation, as well as assessing the likelihood of different outcomes. The case takes place during a period of considerable uncertainty in the global capital markets.

Washington Mutual issued 6 billion euro of covered bonds in 2006. The objective of the case is to ask whether these bonds are mispriced in late 2008. The case is set in September 2008, and Washington Mutual is facing considerable distress due to mounting losses in its mortgage portfolio. Following investment bank Lehman Brother's Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection filing in mid-September, the price of Washington Mutual's covered bonds has fallen to 75 per 100 of face value. As these bonds are overcollateralized, the case asks students to evaluate the underlying collateral portfolio in the event of liquidation, as well as assessing the likelihood of different outcomes. The case takes place during a period of considerable uncertainty in the global capital markets.

Steel Partners is a U.S.-based hedge fund that has made a large investment in Japan-based wigmaker Aderans. The case is set at the close of the annual meeting in May 2008, when shareholders have voted against all incumbent board members. Steel Partners must act quickly. The case serves as an overview of corporate governance issues in Japan, as well as describing the costs and benefits of the "stakeholder" view of corporate governance.

Why do shares in NEC Electronics, a publicly listed subsidiary of Japan conglomerate NEC trade at a discount to their fundamental value? Can Perry Capital, a U.S. hedge fund, restructure this subsidiary and generate significant returns? This case provides students with an opportunity to analyze Perry's decision to invest in NEC Electronics. In doing so, it asks for the reasons that NEC might take actions that destroy value and shift value away from NECE's minority shareholders. The events covered allow for a discussion of how ownership concentration constrains restructuring alternatives, how hedge fund investors might confront controlling shareholders, and how the mis-pricing of agency costs can give rise to ownership structures that allow for minority shareholder expropriation.

Philip Goldstein, the principal in a growing hedge fund and prominent activist investor, has taken a position in a Mexico-based closed-end fund. Following a hard-fought proxy contest in which he advocated for management to eliminate the fund's substantial discount, Goldstein earns a seat on the board of directors. Now he and the board are faced with the decision of how best to "unlock value" in the fund by delivering Net Asset Value to shareholders. The case, which provides rich detail on the workings of closed-end funds, invites students to examine the trade-offs among liquidating the fund, converting it to an open-end fund, or carrying out a self-tender offer. It also raises topics of fund selection and investing in country-specific funds such as Mexico.

In 2001, James O'Connell, president of Holyoke Japan, an affiliate of Larson Capital, a distress debt private equity firm, wants to bid on a 90 billion yen loan currently in default by the borrower, Sanjo Enterprises, for a popular wedding and banquet facility with an adjacent office tower in downtown Tokyo. O'Connell has to determine a bidding strategy, consider the competition, and price the deal.

Taka Haneda, a proprietary trader at the Tokyo office of Goldman Sachs, has just learned that the Nikkei 225 will undergo a significant redefinition over the coming week. He faces several billion dollars of customer orders, as well as the opportunity to commit the firm's capital to provide liquidity for the event. He must decide what positions to establish, and at what price he is willing to get out.

Activist investors Carl Icahn and Barry Rosenstein acquire a stake in Oklahoma-based company Kerr-McGee. They demand two board seats and ask the company to make several operational and financial changes, including the repurchase of equity and divestiture of their chemicals business. The case protagonist, Luke Corbett, CEO, opposes these changes.

The president of Fuji Television must decide how to respond to a competing bid for the shares of Nippon Broadcasting Systems (NBS). Livedoor, the other bidder, is a highly valued Internet company that has been accused of financial wizardry to keep its stock price high.

Awards & Honors

Winner of a 2014 Jack Treynor Prize from the Institute for Quantitative Research in Finance for "X-CAPM: An Extrapolative Capital Asset Pricing Model" (Journal of Financial Economics, 2015) with Nicholas Barberis, Lawrence Jin, and Andrei Shleifer. The Treynor Prize recognizes superior academic working papers with potential applications in the fields of investment management and financial markets.

Runner up for the 2014 Pearson/Prentice Hall Prize for Best Paper published in Financial Management in the previous two years for
"Agency Costs, Mispricing, and Ownership Structure" (2012) with Sergey Chernenko and C. Fritz Foley.