Yemen after Saleh’s Death: Moscow on Standby

On 4 December 2017, former President of Yemen Ali Abdullah Saleh was assassinated in his home country. His murder came after clashes in the Yemeni capital of Sana’a and a schism within the tactical alliance Ansar Allah (often termed “the Houthi movement” in the media) and supporters of Saleh, primarily, the Republican Guard.

Ali Abdullah Saleh agreed to step down as president following mass protests in 2011–2012 in exchange for full immunity from prosecution for the actions he took during his term in office. The deal was supported by the Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf (Gulf Cooperation Council, GCC). The process of transferring power from Saleh to his Vice President Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi (a native of South Yemen) was launched. According to Sergei Serebrov, Saleh’s removal was largely linked to a tribal rift in the country’s political elites, which had been latent and deepening since 2007.

In 2015, President Hadi was forced to flee the capital after Houthi forces seized control. Later on, the Houthi movement and the former president, Ali Abdullah Saleh, formed a tactical alliance. Hadi, in turn, took refuge in Saudi Arabia, which intervened in Yemen’s domestic conflict. The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, in conjunction with the Gulf Coalition (hereinafter, the “Coalition”) and enjoying the full support of the United States, the United Kingdom, etc., commenced bombing the positions of the Houthis and their followers. Not only did the operation aggravate the humanitarian situation, it also failed to facilitate any kind of political process. The Yemen peace talks in Kuwait were similarly unsuccessful. The United Nations described the ongoing situation in Yemen as catastrophic: the healthcare system was destroyed; 7 million people were on the verge of famine; and there were some 300,000 confirmed cases of cholera. The humanitarian situation in Yemen has continued to deteriorate.

The clashes that took place last week were triggered by Saleh’s decision to switch allegiances, as well as by his harsh rhetoric against the Houthis. He announced that he was ending cooperation with Ansar Allah and was ready to support the officially recognized government led by Hadi, accusing the Houthis of crimes against the Yemenis. However, to most of the country’s population and part of the Republic of Yemen Armed Forces, it sounded like their former President had betrayed them. The sentiment was carefully stoked by Houthi-controlled media and other Yemeni communications channels, with the Coalition announcing its support for Saleh further fanning the flames. What is more, the Hadi government made an announcement promising a new law that would pardon everybody who severed ties with Ansar Allah. Essentially, the situation was spun in such a way as to make it appear that Saleh had succumbed to the temptation to support rich Arab monarchies that had been blockading and bombing Yemen for three years.

Another factor, though not a key driver in the political processes, still deserves to be mentioned. The Houthis also see the killing of Ali Abdullah Saleh as revenge for the founder of their movement, Hussein Badreddin al-Houthi, who died in the Yemeni war in 2004 (during the 1990s and 2000s, Saleh led around six wars against the Houthis). Hussein al-Houthi is considered a martyr to the Houthis and is often referred to as Hussein of Yemen, a reference to one of the central figures in Shia Islam – the grandson of Prophet Muhammad Husayn ibn Ali killed by the forces of the Umayyad Caliph Yazid in Karbala in 680.

Saleh’s forces were defeated, and Ahmed Ali Saleh will now have to bring together what is left of them.

Regional Forces in Yemen and the Possible Balance of Power after Saleh’s Death

The United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia (and, to a certain extent, Qatar) are the most influential actors in the history of Yemen. Western and pan-Arab media often refer to Iran, and more specifically, to Hezbollah, as the Houthi’s main sponsors. However, many Russian experts regard this position as a completely intentional and hysterical exaggeration of Iran’s role in Yemen. Although the Gulf Coalition has continued as a united front for a while, it soon became clear that each party is pursuing its own interests and goals. As such, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates are known to have certain tensions which are not obvious from their joint rhetoric. While Riyadh supported President Hadi and took part in military operations in Yemen, albeit quite erratically, the United Arab Emirates gained more influence in South Yemen in pursuit of its own project to establish control over major ports in the Gulf of Aden. To illustrate, the United Arab Emirates already has military bases deployed on the Mayyun (Perim) and Socotra (both in Yemen) islands, in the port of Assab (including its airport, Eritrea), Djibouti (including its airport) and the military base in Berbera (Somalia).

The differences between Abu Dhabi and Doha are even more irreconcilable when it comes to the United Arab Emirate’s uncompromising position on Qatar’s Muslim Brotherhood (many experts argue that domestic Yemeni actors should not be associated with the Muslim Brotherhood). They have also added fuel to the ongoing crisis within the GCC, since tensions remain between Qatar and other GCC monarchies.

Reportedly, President Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi has appointed Ali Abdullah Saleh’s son, Ahmed Ali Saleh, head of the Republican Guard. It should be mentioned that Ahmed Ali Saleh has been at the helm of the Republican Guard before, but has been residing in the United Arab Emirates as of late. Before the Coalition took up arms against the Houthis, he was Yemen’s ambassador to Abu Dhabi. He was then arrested in the United Arab Emirates. Ahmed Ali Saleh is believed to have been the liaison between his father and the powerful Al Nahyan family (who have a strong influence on the position of the Saudi-led Coalition through their close ties with the Crown Prince of Saudi Arabia Mohammed bin Salman). It is possible that the unexpected shift in Ali Abdullah Saleh’s rhetoric was brought about by certain agreements between him and the United Arab Emirates (and, through the United Arab Emirates, with the Coalition), but he ended up making a miscalculation. Saleh’s forces were scattered, and it is up to Ahmed Ali now to bring together what is left of them.

The collapse of the Saleh–Houthi alliance will without a doubt tip the balance of Yemeni political forces. This does not mean, however, the change will be for the better, and the Coalition will finally be able to destroy all the Houthi forces. We will most likely see further fragmentation of the political forces within the country. This article will not dwell on the role of the Al-Islah Party, the Southern Movement (al-Hirak), or even Islamic State or Al-Qaeda. The Houthis emerge as a fairly solid force against this background, even if they have been weakened somewhat by recent events. Even taking the intended merger of the forces of Ahmed Saleh, Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi and the Coalition into account, the Houthis will still enjoy strong positions in the north and remain a key player in Yemen. As for the General People’s Congress, led until recently by Saleh, Ansar Allah said: “The General People’s Congress remains our partner in the Supreme Political Council and in counteracting aggression. We need to intensify our cooperation.” Iranian politicians like to add another factor into the mix when the Houthis are defined as “rebels.” According to some political figures in Iran, Zaydis (followers of the Zaidiyyah sect of Islam widely represented in North Yemen) and Zaydi imams have ruled Yemen for centuries, and the Houthis represent this very part of the Zaydi population which is so essential for the Yemen political scene.

Moscow: Keeping Tabs

According to a press statement published by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, on August 21, 2017, Russia’s Special Presidential Representative for the Middle East and Africa Mikhail Bogdanov received the newly appointed Ambassador of the Yemen Arab Republic to Moscow Ahmed Salem Al-Wahishi, who presented his diplomatic credentials. The move established an official Yemeni representative in Moscow, although, given the deep political crisis tearing the country apart, it was unclear exactly which side Al-Wahishi was intended to represent. On July 13, 2017, President of Yemen Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi, acting largely with the backing of Saudi Arabia, appointed him ambassador to Moscow. The new ambassador is believed to be a compromise between Mansur Hadi and former President of Yemen Ali Abdullah Saleh. The appointment was in large part made possible by the fact that Moscow blocked almost every other candidate for the position from the Hadi government if they were known to be exclusively pro-Saudi in their political leanings.

What does Moscow stand to gain from issuing accreditation to a Hadi-appointed ambassador? Russia has shown it is ready to mediate in the crisis, but nothing more. Moscow has sought to alleviate some of the tensions in its relations with Saudi Arabia on the Yemen matter, while maintaining a multi-faceted approach. It has continued to work with all the actors in the crisis on different levels. Pragmatists on every side of the conflict benefitted from Russia’s move, since it put them on a path towards political dialogue. However, it is likely that Russia will abstain from any actual action on the ground to reinforce its diplomatic efforts due to its limited resources and current foreign policy priorities. Therefore, Russia’s commitment to promoting the political process can be defined as long-term.

In this context, we cannot avoid mentioning the Syrian conflict and possible relevant trade-offs between Saudi Arabia and Russia. However, it would be unreasonable to tie the conflicts in Syria and in Yemen together, even though some Russian experts believe that Syrian armed groups with connections to certain Saudi circles pose the greatest threat to the so-called de-escalation zones.

It should be noted that the Yemen crisis involves a variety of regional forces. If Russia were looking to take on a more active role, it would have to synchronize its interests with those players. Until recently, Russia was generally aligned with Iran and the domestic Yemeni forces it supported (in words rather than deeds, but occasionally also with some actual “ground” support), i.e. the Houthis and Saleh. The latter repeatedly urged Russia to return to Yemen by building a military base. However, despite Yemen’s logistical value, Russia, as we have pointed out above, has no reason to become actively involved in the matter and spend its resources in this part of the region. Moscow is quite satisfied with the current terms of access to the Gulf of Aden. Furthermore, Russia having a presence in Syria gave Russia the opportunity to influence key regional players (where the Astana process started), something which Yemen did not have. In any event, the Houthis will command strong positions in North Yemen and remain a key player on the country’s political scene.

The accreditation of the ambassador was thus an entry point to regional processes for Moscow. While this involvement has to be maintained, although it is not worth taking serious steps in circumvention of the UN Security Council. Furthermore, Moscow should revisit the security of Russian representatives in Sana’a. There should not be any radical changes in Russia’s politics in this area. Moscow will maintain working contacts with all the players involved, while taking the actual circumstances into account. This will help prepare Moscow for any possible further changes.

Why is Iran meeting with Arab Gulf States?

KSA and UAE
differences on Syria and Yemen: Reasonable Differences or a Clash?

How the Media
Created an Impression of a Major Rift and Widened Misunderstandings

In recent
months, Western media has bombarded the policymakers with rumors about an
alleged divide inside the Arab Coalition, the supposedly irreconcilable
differences that are driving UAE and KSA towards an inevitable and irreversible
drift, dooming their effort in Yemen.
Indeed, the countries have individual national security concerns that
have at times pushed them to focus on some issues while others remained an
apparently more urgent concern for their counterpart.

However, much
of the current discourse about divisions between the Gulf states has been
fueled by a campaign focus on exploiting and exaggerating real divisions to the
detriment of all, rather than bringing the countries back to the same page and
strengthening their partnership with the United States. That goes against the Iran
and Muslim Brotherhood agenda in driving the Coalition – and especially the US
– out of Yemen, as soon as possible.

For that
reason, mutual recriminations and attacks have been encouraged, and the
situation has been portrayed in the most dire terms. Indeed, if the divide
continues, it will only strengthen t he Muslim Brotherhood influence in Yemen,
and give further fodder to assorted terrorist groups and Iran-induced chaos. To
avoid that possibility, the US government should stop listening to what appears
to be a clearly divisive political campaign and instead take the time to
understand the positions of each country.
US leadership may soon discover that the apparent differences are far
from irreconcilable, and that UAE and KSA ultimately wish for a stable region and are both
against any sort of radicalism or fanaticism.

The Arabic
language media wars between the various columnists from the two states has not
been helpful either. Rather than attacking each other and mounting potentially
baseless accusations, these analysts would do well to emphasize common ground
as well as use the power of their keyboards to clarify the nature of the misunderstandings
and to elucidate their countries’ positions in a rational way that will help
arrive at common sense solutions – already evident in some of the discourse
emerging from both sides.

Perceived
Differences, Unexplained, Are Played Up
Causing Confusion

In the midst
of tensions between Iran and the United States in the Gulf – tensions which
involve oil smuggling, attacks on and hijacking of tankers, and the downing of
drones – Iran appears to be pursuing a parallel diplomatic track with some of the
regional stakeholders.

Iran’s recent
meeting with UAE’s Sheikh Abdullah bin Zayed generated a great deal of
discussion and controversy; meetings with Qatari officials, on the other hand,
went by largely unnoticed. Is UAE really looking to abandon Saudi Arabia in its
stand off against the ayatollahs? And
what is Tehran ultimately seeking to accomplish?

The rare
visit by UAE officials to Iran came in the context of other developments, which
have raised questions about the possible fissions within the Anti-Terrorism
Quartet.

While
visiting Moscow after the May attacks on Emirati and Saudi oil tankers,
Abdullah bin Zayed refused to name Iran as the culprit, which to many signaled
UAE distancing itself from the more confrontational position taken by the United
States and Saudi Arabia, as reported
by Tom O’Connor in Newsweek on June 26, 2019.
This development came after UAE and Bahrain split from Saudi Arabia in
reestablishing diplomatic relations with Syria’s pro-Iran Bashar al-Assad;
although even with Russia’s lobbying on Syria’s behalf, there was not enough
support to readmit Syria into the Arab League as explained by Youssef Igrouane
in Inside Arabia on February 27, 2019. The discussion on whether reopening
embassies in Damascus would “normalize” al-Assad, and whether
al-Assad, who already was receiving limited political support from Egypt
vis-a-vis Turkey, as explained by the author and Mohammed
Maher in Modern Diplomacy on May 6, 2019,
was considered a fait accomplit for Syria for the time being by some of
the pragmatists in the Arab world and thus the reestablishment of diplomatic
relationship was at that point merely a formality acknowledging that Assad is
there to stay remains an open question. Was Saudi Arabia being
“unreasonable” in refusing to restore relations with Assad, where the
other three members of the Anti-Terrorism Quartet chose to pursue a different
path? And did that decision create or further divisions between Riyadh and the
other three countries? Or was this step merely a reasonable and agreed upon approach
given the differences in the countries’ interests, that did not affect much
their cooperation on other points?

The reality
is, in fact, it was a bit of both. For Saudi Arabia, Iran is a central and
existential danger. Although KSA’s Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman had
articulated that Iran, along with the Muslim Brotherhood, and Turkey are part
of a triangle of evil, in terms of policy, Saudi Arabia clearly has prioritized
opposing Iran over complete eradication of the other two “sides” of the
triangle. Although the Saudi government has gone to great lengths to eradicate
the Muslim Brotherhood from within the country, it has cooperated with the
Islamist brigades that are fighting on behalf of the Yemeni government as a a
part of the Arab Coalition against the Houthi terrorists in Yemen.

Saudi Arabia,
despite tensions with Turkey, which escalated after the death of Jamal
Khashoggi, retained diplomatic relations with Ankara, and although there has
been a limited boycott of some Turkish products, the majority of Saudi
investments have remained in place. Turkey remains a political challenge to
Saudi Arabia’s interests in Middle East and Africa; Erdogan is looking for
Sunni primacy through populist Islamism, and has invested heavily in various
operations in Africa and Asia, to counter Saudi soft power with defense and
humanitarian investments.

How Turkey
and Muslim Brotherhood overshadow Iran threat for UAE

However,
Erdogan has also suffered recent defeats and setbacks, primarily through the
fall of his ally Omar al-Bashir in Sudan, and through the stalemate in
Libya. Turkey is a political threat to
Saudi Araabia’s influence; however, Erdogan has suffered political blows inside
the country, such as the loss of his candidate in Istanbul, the economic
fallout from the rising tensions with the United States, and other problems.
For that reason, while Erdogan may be a longer-term concern, (any nationalist,
even without Erdogan’s Islamists connection, in pursuit of a renewed Ottoman
empire will not be looked upon kindly), he is not an immediate existential
threat. Furthermore, most of his Arab following comes solely on the basis of
his strongman, anti-Israel, anti-American image, but will not likely remain
loyal to a non-Arab leader with a vision of reimposition of the Ottoman system
from which many of their ancestors have suffered.

Saudi Arabia
views Erdogan’s incursions into Syria quite negatively; however, Assad has
become increasingly dependent on Iran as a result of the civil war, and Iranian
presence in Syria has grown substantially.
Where the various jihadist and Muslim Brotherhood factions are mere
annoyances used by state actors to attack each other, Assad is opening doors to
Iran’s ideological and political influence, in addition to a military build up
and the building of “land bridges” that will facilitate the influx of
fighters and weapons into the area. From that perspective, and given the
Saudis’ concern with countering that threat above all, not cooperating with
Assad in any substantial way makes perfect sense. Turkey is unlikely to take
over Syria completely; however much damage it can cause with its presence,
Assad is likely to retain control over most of the country. Quite simply, Assad
and Iranians are the stronger forces.

For UAE,
however, the analysis was quite different, as its tensions with Turkey have
intensified over time, with the arrests of UAE-based Palestinian workers (one
of whom was found dead and disemboweled in a Turkish jail cell), attacks on
Emirati bases in Somalia by Turkey and Qatar-backed militias, as explained by
the New
York Times on July 22, 2019, as well as Turkey’s support for the Arab
Spring, which threatened UAE, a relatively small country, as well as Bahrain,
which nearly suffered a coup, as well as the view of the UAE, that Turkey’s
incursions into Syria represents an attack on the sovereignty of Arab lands, as
written by Bilo Biskan
for the Middle East Institute on May 1, 2019.

Erdogan’s
support for Muslim Brotherhood and his backing of UAE’s regional rival, Qatar,
contributed significantly to this deterioration in relations, as well as a
perception of an immediate attack on UAE’s interests. Muslim Brotherhood’s ideological proclivities
have received a zero-tolerance treatment from Abu Dhabi, which has supported
Southern separatists in Yemen and has had disagreements with Saudi Arabia over
cooperation with the Islamist brigades within the Coalition. Furthermore, UAE
has spared no expense in lobbying efforts and backing think tanks in the West
to counter Qatari and Turkish backing of the spread of ISlamist ideology,
whereas Saudi Arabia has taken a step back from involvement in these
ideological battles.

By contrast,
Dubai has had a sizeable Iranian community and while UAE has sided with Saudi
Arabia against Iran politically, its trade relations with Iran are lively and
ongoing. UAE was one of the eight countries to receive a temporary waiver for
oil trade with Iran from the United States; the exports from UAE to Iran are
four times the number of imports. UAE
considers Iran a threat; it has largely withdrawn its forces from Yemen in
response to the increasing tensions in the Gulf and to secure its own citizens
from any potential attacks by Iranian forces. However, ultimately, countering
Turkey and Sunni ISlamists in Syria may simply have been more of a political
priority, and if Assad did not present a direct threat to the Arab states, from
UAE perspective, having modest political presence in the country could be
beneficial to ensuring that other Emirati interests in countering additional
primary threats could be protected.

By the same
token, Emirati and Bahraini presence in Syria could be the bridge to keep Saudi
Arabia informed and its interests observed if only by proxy. In either case,
this minor presence inside the country might not ultimately make much of a
difference, particularly if Syria remains outside the Arab League and otherwise
largely isolated by the coalition members. From the Western perspective,
however, these pragmatic differences that ultimately may not matter all that
much on the strategic level of countering primary threats by the ATQ may signal
to the West a deepening rift within the Quartet, which makes formulating
coherent policy by the White House, already fraught with internal
controversies and contradictions, still
more difficult. If, for whatever reasons, some of the Arab partners are
staunchly opposed to any convergence with Assad, whereas others find any
compromise with Turkey unacceptable while limited dialogue with Assad appears
to be not only within reason, but essential to making progress, no matter what
the White House ends up doing in Syria, one or more of the parties will be
dissatisfied with the outcome.

Recent
clashes in Aden expose and exacerbate fissions inside the Arab Coalition,
alarming the West

Yemen further
complicates the situation. UAE withdrawal, although allegedly coordinated, has
been largely interpreted by the Western press, the cadre of analysts, and the
political establishment as a significant difference, if not a rift, among the
Coalition members. Increasingly, from Western perspective, Saudi Arabia appears
to be isolated, and the war, at least in the manner it is being handled today,
hopeless and chaotic. Although the Trump administration has recognized the
dangers from various non-State actors inside Yemen, as well as Iran’s role in
backing the Houthis, the White House has not deemed it necessary either to
designate the Houthis as a terrorist organization, even after multiple, and in
some cases, lethal attacks on Saudi civilian sites, nor has it pushed for a new
AUMF that would allow combat troops to counter Hizbullah and Houthi forces in
addition to Al Qaeda and ISIS. While the
White House appears to count on the Saudis to settle the issue, the situation
is complicated by the UAE-backed separatists who have intervened in Aden,
demanding independence.

The Houthis,
at the same time, demanded the expulsion of the Sunni Islamist fighters and
separatists as reported in The
Daily Star on August 15, 2019. The talks over managing and settling the new
conflict in Saudi Arabia appear to be thwarted by the refusal of the various
parties to compromise on the solution. The Islamists, from the Saudi
perspective, appear to be a necessary lesser evil to counter the Hizbullah
trained Houthis; furthermore, the Yemeni government has taken a step back , with
the Saudis shouldering most of the burden.
UAE has attempted to mediate between the Southern Transitional Council writes
Bel
Trew for The Independent on August 14, 2019, and the other parties in an
attempt to avoid further violent clashes.

However, so
long as the separatists feel they have backing there appears to be no reason
for them not to continue taking advantage of the seeming splintering among the
allies to push their own agenda. The
optics of it all are chaotic, and the only party benefiting is Iran, which
thrives on mayhem and divisions among anyone who opposes Tehran’s agenda. The
natural question of course arises is why would UAE continue backing a group
that clearly has less of an interest in
broader agenda of the coalition than pushing for its own bid that could only
strengthen Iran’s goal.

The Houthis
which largely reside in the lesser developed Northern part of Yemen seek
continuity into the South. Dividing the country which had been held together,
albeit imperfectly, under Ali Saleh, would not change the goals of Iran, the
Houthis, or the various other terrorist groups on the ground, and would only
create additional political complexities on top of the existing military and
humanitarian difficulties. Furthermore, the unseemly vision of UAE forces
clashing with the Saudi-backed forces in Aden and elsewhere are already being
exploited by Iran for propaganda value and to create additional tensions and
distrust between UAE and KSA.

Contradictory
Coverage of the UAE Meeting with Iran Underscores the Role of Information
Warfare

Putting aside
these considerations for a moment, it is worth examining the dynamics between
UAE and Iran outside Yemen. Of course, the meetings between the officials were
spun very differently by the pro-Iran media and former Obama officials, now
firmly ensconced in the Western foreign policy establishment, and the Gulf
responders. Much of the Western media
covered the story as a political rapprochement between Iran and UAE, a
political and diplomatic victory to Tehran, and a heavy blow to KSA, which is
being stabbed in the back in the midst of a crisis. as reported by Washington
Post on July 31, 2019. The Gulf press, on the other hand, disputed the
version of significant maritime security agreements that would position UAE as
having bought off its own safety in exchange for throwing Saudis under the bus,
and instead pointed out that the meetings were routine and focused on
relatively trivial fishing issues that do not affect the larger calculus nor
change the nature of the relationship.

See for
example Khaleej Times coverage on July 31, 2019. One can argue whether such
coverage is merely a face saving measure by the ATQ in light of this turn of
events; a cynical viewer could even make claim that UAE withdrawal from Yemen
had less to do with the apparently hopelessness of the situation or the threat
emanating from Iran than with some secret backchannel dialogue with Iran, which
would preserve or even grow the trade relationship between the countries in
exchange for the PR victory UAE would grant Iran by withdrawing its relatively
small forces from Yemen (without necessarily ceasing its backing for the
Southern forces). That interpretation would make sense if indeed the more
significant nature of the meeting between the two countries were confirmed.
However, following the Aytollah Khamenei’s public support for the Houthis, UAE
officials publically linked Iran with the Houthis, which Iran had previously
denied as Arab News
points out on August 14, 2019.

Furthermore,
the Emiratis and the Saudis accused Qataris and Turkish media of deliberately
fabricating non-existent details to advance Iran’s agenda of creating divisions
where there are not any, and fomenting tensions between the close allies, which
have consistently pushed for diplomacy and opposed military confrontation with Iran
as Radio
Farda reported on August 3, 2019. Regardless of what is actually going on
behind the scenes, however, neither version of events ultimately answers the
question of what exactly Iran is hoping to achieve through this chain of events.
Of course, it may have achieved a propaganda victory against the ATQ through
the gossipy coverage which exploits or creates differences between UAE and KSA.

How does Iran
benefit from the controversy over UAE meeting?

Certainly,
whatever the actual reason for UAE’s withdrawal, it is to Iran’s advantage to
have fewer people opposing the HOuthis in Yemen, particularly if they do not
also change the strategy to become more effective in countering the ground
forces with the intimate knowledge of the land and far greater information
warfare skills. And most definitely, even a very minor meeting with Emirati
officials, sends a strong signal to the rest of the world that Iran is a
“reasonable” country that looks to cooperate with its neighbors if not
major issues than on routine ones, and that the view of it as a regional
aggressor with nothing of value to offer to the region is at the very least
exaggerated. In other words, even if from a practical perspective it made sense
for the Emiratis to meet with Iranians and to address diplomatically whatever
is possible to address, it very likely was a mistake to agree to do so during a
public visit to Iran rather than in some neutral and benign location.

The most
likely view of the situation by Iran is as follows: regardless of UAE’s
interests in the matter, it is clear that Iran has its geopolitical agenda of
dominating the region and rebuilding the Persian empire, however long that will
take. UAE, most likely, is not its primary target, as Iran has been consistent
in pushing for the creation of a “Shi’a crescent”, and UAE simply
would not fall into that category. Furthermore, at the current juncture, Iran
needs all the financial help it can get, and attacking its trading partner’s
territory does not make sense until such point as Tehran has secured its
positions sufficiently elsewhere. Attacks on tankers will not warrant much of
an international reaction, but a direct attack on UAE could be altogether
different.

Likewise,
Iran has no intention of stopping Houthi or Iraqi militia attacks against the
Saudis; if anything, for the first time Iran’s reach to its proxies is
sufficiently strong that it can now coordinate among these different bodies
without facing much of a response from the US or anybody else. However, creating and fomenting distrust
among all allies, and making the White House confused and cross with all the
parties involved, ruining any possibility of creating some version of an Arab
NATO, and ensuring that no coordinated political action, such as a blockade,
can be taken against its own interests is the most likely aim of all of this
maneuvering. The meeting with UAE may
not have been of much strategic value in and of itself; particularly if Iran
had no intention of attacking UAE to begin with, securing maritime agreements
would be rather a symbolic and useless step. All agreements can be violated in
a blink of an eye if Iran so chooses, as some have discovered through the folly
of the nuclear deal.

However,
creating the optics of a meeting and a dispute has furthered the tribalist
differences Iran has long since alleged against its rivals, ensuring that any future steps in the Gulf area may
not encounter an unanimous response, because some may feel more invested in preserving
a potential symbolic defense than others. If UAE believes that the
rapprochement with Iran, even a minor one, is to its benefit in protecting it
from physical harm, it will be less likely to be vocal in pushing for
additional measures against Iran, and could be even used to oppose further
tough actions by the United States, if it ever chooses to launch a military
strike for instance.

UAE may not
view the situation that way at all; for all anyone knows, the sole point of
that expedition was to determine that Iran, once again is playing games, check
off this last-resort attempt at peacemaking from the list, and go on business
as usual in close coordination with Saudi Arabia. But UAE’s intentions here are
irrelevant to Iran; most of this charade is aimed at generating panic among the
Gulf masses and to for the benefit of the West, that will now be less sure of
its Arab allies because they appear to be splintered, hedging their bets in
light of Trump’s relative inaction, or else untrustworthy even towards each
other, as some are already alleging. Iran may have engineered the entire
situation for the benefit of the West and to create further distrust in the
Arab allies and their ability and willingness to advance effective anti-Iran
agenda and their overall worth to the United States.

Qatar meeting
with Iran may underscore Qatar’s support for Iran agenda in Yemen

As for the
meeting with Qatar? FM Zarif, recently
sanctioned by the United States, notably visited with Qatari officials right
after visit by a Houthi official as reported by The
National, on August 11, 2019.. NOt only is Iran flagrantly demonstrating
the depth of its relationship with the Houthis, but it is now fairly open about
Qatar’s support not merely for some trade with Iran in light of the boycott by the ATQ, but
Qatar’s support for Iran’s political positions and agenda in the region, which
includes the backing of the Houthis. The de facto finance minister of the
Houthis was killed during the factional clashes in Sanaa, but the HOuthis
blamed his death on the US. Houthis, too, appear to be experiencing infighting.
One of their leaders may have been killed during a power struggle. Qatar, which
is right across from Iran has a front row view of the attacks on the Emirati
and Saudi tankers; it also shares a gas field with Iran.

Despite
Qatar’s stated concerns over Iran’s supposed threat, none of Qatari sites or
tankers have been attacked by Iran or any of its proxies. Left out from the
background to the meeting is that Qatar
has retained ties to both the Houthis and the Islah (ISlamist) brigades in
Yemen, funding and backing both sides of the war, though ultimately the ISlamists
are hostile to Saudi and Emirati interests in Yemen, writes Samuel
Ramani in Al Monitor on November 19, 2018. Qatar’s support for the
anti-Houthi Islamists has not appeared to have alarmed Iran, because this step
ultimately only creates further friction between the Saudis and Emiratis and
further advances Iran’s agenda. In other words, Iran is happy to have a fifth
column inside the Arab Coalition, without which, nevertheless, countering the
Houthis is unimaginable for lack of sufficient forces with knowledge of the
physical landscape, especially after withdrawal by many of the other former Coalition
members (including Egyptians, Moroccans, and Sudanese, and now the loss of most
Emirati fighters).

However, the
meeting with Qatar’s Emir Tamim bin Hamad Al-Thani has not raised much interest
in the Western press, primarily because it is a dog bites man situation and
there is less controversy to be explored. The meeting very well may have been
planned to coordinate the agenda on Yemen, and certainly on the information
warfare campaign in smearing the Arab Coalition members, and setting them up
against one another. It is a shame that none in the press have stepped away
from sensationalism to ask deeper, more troubling questions about this steadily
growing relationship and Qatar’s apparent support and approval of Iran’s
backing of the Houthis and their terrorist activity. Instead, they have focused
on exploiting perceived divisions and fueling attacks against the allies in
Yemen, with the hope of undermining their mutually important relationship and
their partnership with the US.

UAE and KSA
should ignore such provocations; instead of playing into the hands of
adversarial propaganda, they should issue joint statements emphasizing common
goals on the ground; then quietly sit down and hammer out the challenges that
have prevented them from unifying behind the same forces. As mentioned above,
there is already evidence that much of that has been caused by miscommunication
and social pressures of various types, rather than any bad intent or blind
unwillingness to embrace the strategically sound positions. However, if there is anything to be learned
from these episodes is that Iran is a ruthlessly deceptive and calculating
manipulator which will go to any lengths to clear its path to dominance, and
that no matter the priorities and the political differences, the members of the
ATQ should not fall for its dirty tricks.

Related

Death of female Iranian soccer fan puts FIFA and Asian soccer body in the dock

When Sahar Khodayari this week set herself alight in front of a Tehran
courthouse, she indicted world soccer body FIFA, its Asian regional group, the
Asian Football Confederation (AFC), and their presidents, Gianni Infantino and
Sheikh Salman bin Ebrahim Al Khalifa.

Messrs. Infantino and Al Khalifa have been selective in their support
for women’s soccer rights.

Mr. Infantino was in the White House to urge US president Donald J.
Trump to endorse equal pay for male and female players on the same day that
FIFA expressed regret at the death of Ms. Khodayarí, but did nothing to force
Iran to lift its ban on women attending male sporting events.

Ms. Khodayari was charged after being stopped by security in March as
she sought to enter Tehran’s Azadi stadium dressed as a man to watch Esteghlal
play an AFC Asian Cup match against the United Arab Emirates’ Al Ain FC.

Ms. Khodayari’s disguise is standard practice for activist female soccer
fans in a football-crazy country that has the questionable honour of being the
world’s only nation to bar women from attending male sporting events.

Saudi Arabia, the only other country that long maintained a similar ban,
abolished the restriction in 2017 as part of Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman’s
social reforms.

Taken together, the two tweets put responsibility on the Iranian
government for its discrimination of women and on global and regional soccer
governors for allowing Iran to get away with it.

FIFA announced this week that it was sending a delegation to Iran to
monitor Iranian moves to allow women to attend World Cup qualifying matches.

The problem is that FIFA has exerted punitive pressure only regarding
World Cup matches rather than threatening to ban Iran from all international
soccer events if it fails to completely lift the ban.

FIFA’s push on World Cup matches could open the door to a complete
lifting of the ban. Past experience, however, suggests that Iran could well
treat granting women fans access to World Cup matches as an exception that
confirms the rule.

FIFA and the AFC are missing an opportunity to potentially force Iran to
lift the ban given that barring Iranian participation in international
tournaments would add to the government’s woes at a time that it is struggling
to dampen the impact of harsh US economic sanctions designed to persuade Iran
to renegotiate the 2015 agreement that curbed the Islamic republic’s nuclear
program.

The sanctions were imposed last year after Mr. Trump withdrew from the
agreement.

Speaking to reporters, government spokesman Ali Rabiei suggested that a
threat by FIFA to exclude Iran from international matches could push the
country’s rulers over the hump.

Ms. Khodayari’s self-immolation alongside the refusal by an Iranian
judoka to withdraw from the 2019 Judo World Championships in Japan on orders of
the government sparked a Twitter hashtag, #BanIRSportsFederations, that this month has been used tens of thousands of times.

Taking the call for a ban on Iranian participation in international
tournaments and their qualifiers literally, Ali Karimi, a past Asian footballer
of the year and top Iranian player opted to lead the way and set an example for
FIFA and the AFC.

Mr. Karimi advised his 4.5 million followers on Instagram that he would
boycott soccer matches in protest against the ban on women. His post was liked
more than 100,000 times in less than 30 minutes.

The , #BanIRSportsFederations hashtag constituted a protest against government interference, a
no-no under the rules that govern global sports governance and insist on
maintaining a largely fictitious separation of sports and politics.

The online protest was sparked when top-ranking judoka Saeid Mollaei said he feared for his
safety because he had rejected a demand to withdraw from the
tournament in Japan to avoid the risk of having to face an Israeli athlete.

Mr. Mollaei was spared facing the Israeli after being defeated in the
semi-final.

Iran extends its refusal to recognize Israel to barring its athletes
from competing against Israelis in international tournaments – a violation of
rules governing those competitions.

Related

Yemen Conflict and OIC: The role of the powerful states

Yemen is an important Muslim state located
on southern border of Saudi Arabia. It is situated adjacent to Red Sea, which
is most important trade route between East and West .Despite its important
geographical location Yemen is not on the path of prosperity. In fact it is
plunged into civil war which had destroyed the country. Thousands of people had
been died so far and million have been replaced in the last few years of the
conflict.

Internal conflict Yemen is a long story
now, it was present during the time of President Ali Abdullah Saleh. Roots of
it can be found in the in conflict of 1962 when Zaydi Shia Imam was removed
from power, who was ruling the country since many decades. Houthi’s claimed
that when Imam removed from power they were not given equal opportunities.
Resentment was always present in different sections of Houthi population but a
full scale campaign against government started in 2014. (Key facts about the
war in Yemen, 2018)

Many local Sunni fighters those who were
not happy with the policies of President Hadi joined hands with Houthi rebels.
President Hadi fled to southern city of Aden from where he left Yemen.

Houthis victory in Sana produced a major
concern for Saudi Arabia who saw it as result of expansionist policies adopted
by Iran. Saudis believe that the Houthi rebels are supported and funded by
Iran. Saudi Arabia started air strikes targeting Houthis, along with its allies
who are mostly Arab States,. They were supported logistically by US, UK and
France. These extra regional powers are also sharing intelligence information
with Saudi led coalition.. Houthis are pushed out from capital Sana but still
they are controlling large swathes of land. (Yemen crisis: Why is there a war?,
2018)

Continuous fighting has produced terrifying
humanitarian crisis in Yemen. While rebels are determined that they will not
stop fighting until they can completely overthrow president Hadi’s government.
Saudi Arabia is doing its best to crush these rebels. It has used even cluster
bombs to stop the rebels advance. Local Yemeni population is suffering a lot
due to this relentless fighting between two parties.

This prolonged war in Yemen has produced a
severe humanitarian crisis. Ever since the start of the conflict more than
15000 thousand people have been killed and almost 3 million people are forced
to leave their home; 22.5 million are in need for humanitarian aid. If aid is
not be provided to them we might see a famine in near future. Due to air and
naval blockade by Saudis led coalition forces it is very difficult for
international organizations to supply food and other supplies to Yemeni people.
(YEMEN: THE FORGOTTEN WAR)

This worsening situation in Yemen have put
some serious question on credibility of OIC. Organization of Islamic conference
(OIC) which is now termed as organization of Islamic cooperation is second
largest intergovernmental organization in the world after United Nation. It
consists, a total of 57 Islamic Countries. Idea for establishing an
organization for Islamic Countries was put forward during Islamic Conference of
Rabat in 1969.Basic purpose for the creation of OIC is to secure an independent
state for Palestinian people. But it has included many other subjects in the
agenda as well. That includes more cooperation between Muslim states, conflict
management among them and to have a common voice on issues of mutual interest.
Iran and Saudi Arabia are two most important countries of this organization
because of their geopolitical position and as leaders of the two most important
sects of Islam. (Johnson, 2010)

Organization of Islamic Cooperation, which
always had supported solidarity in the Muslim world and had also tried to
mediate between Shia-Sunni conflicts, is now taking side. It is the most
important reason that OIC is failed to solve Yemen conflict.OIC is continuously
supporting Saudis .Saudi Arabia is a dominant state in the Muslim world and
also in the OIC. Domination of Saudi Arabia in OIC has few imperative reasons.

First of all Saudi Arabia is a leading
state of Arab League and Arab Leagues have strong block in OIC. So if OIC wants
to take any decision it should respect the best interests of Arab States.
Secondly, Saudi Arabia who is birth place of Islam, is exploiting its religious
position for it political purposed. Every Muslim, even he is present in any
part of the world will always show sympathy for Saudi Arabia because of the
holy places of Islam are present there. They have also made The Islamic
Military Counter Terrorism Coalition. Its primary purpose is to counter
terrorism but Saudi Arabia is using it for its own geopolitical benefits. It
consist total of 41 states and most of them are part of OIC .Thus anything done
by this alliance cannot be condemned by OIC because most of OIC members are
part of this alliance. This military alliance had carried out many deadly air
strikes in Yemen. Despite the claims that they are targeting only terrorist groups
many times it resulted in civilian causalities too. But we have not seen any
condemnation by OIC about these attacks.

Last but not the least Saudi Arabia is
providing huge sum of money to OIC to carry out its activities. Current
Secretary General of OIC is also Saudi national .His name is Madni who was
formerly serving at position of minister of culture and information. Due to
Saudi dominance in OIC has been supporting Saudi Arabia in Yemen conflict.
During 2016 summit of OIC it has accused Iran of promoting terrorism in the
region especially in Yemen. (Ilishev, 2016) But this resolution was silent on
human rights abuses by Saudi led coalition forces in Yemen. This is now routine
work of OIC members to condemn Houthis and their supporter in Yemen but paying
no attention to humanitarian crisis. As in 2018 they have again urged
international community to take serious action against Houthi and their
masters’ .but still deep silence on humanitarian crisis.(AL-KHUDAIR, 2018)

Pakistan’s former ambassador to Iran once said that “OIC is now dead and Muslim countries should find a new organization for the settlements of their disputes”. (OIC ‘dead’; Pakistan, Iran need find new Muslim alliance: diplomat, 2017)Prevailing situation in Yemen is reflecting his statement. Infect OIC had a negative role in Yemen. This situation also demonstrates that how great powers use International Organization for their own vested interests.

*Tajjalla Munir is research scholar of MS
International Relations at COMSATS University Islamabad