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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 PARIS 007202
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/20/2015
TAGS: PRELPGOVSRINFRKO
SUBJECT: U/S BURNS DISCUSS INDIA NONPRO, BALKANS, CENTRAL
ASIA WITH RUSSIAN DFM KISLYAK
Classified By: POLITICAL MINISTER COUNSELOR JOSIAH ROSENBLATT, FOR REAS
ONS 1. 4 B/D
¶1. (C) Summary: Under Secretary Burns met with Russian DFM
Sergei Kislyak on October 19 in Paris to discuss, among other
issues, India nonproliferation, the Balkans (especially
Kosovo), and Secretary Rice's recent trip to Central Asia.
Kislyak raised Russian concerns regarding access for its
diplomats to the Green Zone in Baghdad, saying the current
situation in which only the Ambassador and DCM received
expedited access privileges was "absolutely unacceptable."
On India nonproliferation, U/S Burns previewed his trip to
India. Both agreed that the U.S. and Russia shared the same
interests in ensuring Indian acceptance of a civil/military
nuclear separation. U/S Burns reviewed his recent trip to
Kosovo and Belgrade, emphasizing the importance of using U.S.
and Russian influence to pressure parties involved in final
status negotiations to compromise. End summary.
¶2. (SBU) Under Secretary Burns met October 19 in Paris with
Russian DFM Sergei Kislyak at the Russian Ambassador's
Residence. DAS Kramer, P staff Toby Bradley and Poloff Peter
Kujawinski (notetaker) accompanied. Kislyak was joined by
Russian Embassy Political Counselor Leonid Kadyshev and two
staffers.
----------------------
INDIA NONPROLIFERATION
----------------------
¶3. (C) Kislyak emphasized that Indian external and internal
stability depended on access to a steady supply of energy.
He speculated that in 5-10 years, India would be a "huge"
presence in the market for fossil fuels, given its relative
lack of domestic supply. Given these pressures, India needed
to increase its reliance on nuclear energy. Kislyak added
that he had been in India four months ago, and had encouraged
the Indians to stop their "war against the NPT" although he
understood their opposition. Still, India had acted
responsibly on WMD issues, said Kislyak. They had introduced
a number of changes in their legislation and had put into
place substantial export controls.
¶4. (C) Kislyak outlined three points regarding the Indian
nonproliferation issue. First, he said a Russian redline was
that the case of India at the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG)
should be treated as an exception, and that all efforts
should be made to dissuade other countries from following
India's example. He added that Pakistan's cooperation
regarding nonproliferation was "terrible." Russia wanted
more information on Pakistan's clandestine networks, said
Kislyak, but the Pakistani government had been "less than
transparent." Kislyak said Russia had developed an argument
he hoped would convince other NSG members that India should
be given an exception based on reasons of economic and
political stability, as well as India's nonproliferation
record. He said Brazil, South Africa and Ukraine would be
tough to convince, given that they had already renounced
nuclear weapons. Second, Kislyak said Russia did not support
giving India nuclear weapon status. He said the
international community must invent an "exceptional status"
for India. Regarding verification, Kislyak proposed a
"quasi-153" verification system that would be similar to the
IAEA's 153 verification system for non-nuclear weapons
states, but would only apply to India's civilian nuclear
energy sector. Third, Kislyak argued that India must clearly
and credibly demonstrate its commitment to separating its
civilian and military nuclear sectors before the NSG and the
U.S. and Russian legislatures could move to grant India an
exception.
¶5. (C) U/S Burns agreed that India had acted responsibly
regarding proliferation concerns. He welcomed the Russian
decision to discuss India nonproliferation during the Russian
G-8 Presidency and said he hoped to hear concrete proposals
from the Indians during his upcoming visit on how they
planned to separate the civilian and military nuclear
facilities. Kislyak said Russia would have two distinct
discussions on South Asia within the G-8; one on peaceful
nuclear cooperation with India, and the other on the
Pakistani/Indian nuclear competition. Russia had no interest
in mingling the issue of the Indian nuclear exception with a
discussion of competition between Pakistan and India, said
Kislyak. U/S Burns said it would be helpful if both the U.S.
and Russia proceeded on parallel tracks to encourage India on
civil and military nuclear separation. Kislyak agreed, and
added that any Indian actions must be transparent and
credible. It is one of the few cases, said Kislyak, where
the U.S. and Russia can easily reinforce each other.
-----------------------------
U.S.-RUSSIA C/T WORKING GROUP
-----------------------------
¶6. (C) U/S Burns said most C/T working groups were doing well
and that S/CT Ambassador Crumpton had been in touch with his
Russian counterparts. However, he said the working group on
bioterrorism had not met. Kislyak replied that, for experts
to meet, they must have a mandate of issues to discuss. The
two agreed that a step forward would be for Ambassador
Crumpton to meet with Russian Special Envoy Anatoly Safanov
to conduct exploratory talks aimed at laying a foundation for
bioterrorism discussions.
-----------
THE BALKANS
-----------
¶7. (C) U/S Burns previewed USG plans to commemorate in
Washington the 10th anniversary of the Dayton Accords. The
USG was focused, said U/S Burns, on convincing Muslim, Serb
and Croatian stakeholders to decide at a political level to
begin discussions on modernizing the Dayton structure through
constitutional reform. A modern Bosnian state would have a
single President, a strong Prime Minister, and a more
efficient parliament. U/S Burns said he had discussed this
with Bosnian Serb leaders, and was told they were open to
committing to a political process. U/S Burns also told
Kislyak that he had expressed to Bosnian Muslim leaders USG
concern about the continued presence of foreign Muslim
fighters who had gone there in the early 1990s to fight. He
urged Bosnian Muslim leaders to pass tough citizenship laws
that would restrict the citizenship requests and possibly
revoke the Bosnian citizenship of these foreigners. Kislyak
said this was helpful and returned to the subject of the
Washington 10th anniversary commemoration, asking whether
Russia would be invited. U/S Burns said the involvement of
other Dayton participants, including Russia and the EU, was
being discussed, and that he awaited further proposals from
A/S for European Affairs Dan Fried. Given the largely
ceremonial nature of the event, U/S Burns said it might be
easier if Washington-based Ambassadors were invited.
¶8. (C) Turning to Kosovo, U/S Burns said he had spoken
recently with UN SYG Kofi Annan and soon-to-be-named UN
Special Envoy Martti Ahtissari regarding the importance of
consultations with the Contact Group. The U.S. planned on
naming a mid-level diplomat to serve as a member of
Ahtissari's expert staff and would also name a U.S. envoy to
the final status discussions. The envoy would support
Ahtissari's work 100 per cent and would speak for the U.S.
Kislyak asked what role U/S Burns envisioned for the U.S.
envoy, especially in the event of any differences of opinion
between Ahtissari and the USG. U/S Burns said the U.S. envoy
would wholeheartedly support Ahtissari's efforts, given that
the U.S. had not prejudged the outcome of final status
discussions. He added that both the U.S. and Russia had
particular influence in the region, and it was important for
both countries to use that influence to move all parties
closer to an agreement.
¶9. (C) U/S Burns said his recent visit to the region had left
him with a clear understanding of how difficult final status
negotiations would be. It seemed impossible that the Serbian
government would support Kosovar independence, and the Serbs
had not elaborated any further on their proposal for "less
than independence, more than autonomy." On the Kosovar
Albanian side, the two most powerful leaders, the ailing
President Rugova and accused war criminal Ramush Haradinaj,
were not available to push for consensus, and the other
leaders were not playing helpful roles. U/S Burns said he
had warned Kosovar Albanian leaders that they must compromise
and take into account the need to safeguard Serb religious
sites and the Serb minority presence. Kislyak agreed that
Serb Prime Minister Kostunica would not agree to Kosovo
independence and added that no Serb government could agree to
independence and expect to survive. In a related final
status issue, Kislyak said the paper on guiding principles
was almost complete. He suggested it be adopted by the UNSC
as soon as it was ready. U/S Burns said this was not a
problem, but he suggested that Ahtissari be given a chance to
review the paper before the UNSC adopted it. Kislyak said he
"did not disagree."
------------
CENTRAL ASIA
------------
¶10. (C) Kislyak said FM Lavrov and President Putin
appreciated the Secretary's readout of her trip to Central
Asia. However, he had the impression that during her trip,
the Secretary was advocating for a regional forum on
cooperation, to include Central Asian countries and
Afghanistan, that would clearly exclude Russia and China.
Russia had a problem, given its significant interests, in
regional cooperation that did not include it, said Kislyak.
U/S Burns said the Secretary had focused on the need for the
region to better its economic ties and to work with
Afghanistan against narcotic flows. However, the U.S. had
not considered any formal grouping that would exclude Russia.
---------------------------------------
GREEN ZONE ACCESS FOR RUSSIAN DIPLOMATS
---------------------------------------
¶11. (C) At the end of the meeting, Kislyak raised Russian
diplomat access to the Green Zone in Baghdad. Coalition
military authorities, said Kislyak, had recently told the
Russian Embassy that only the Ambassador and the DCM would be
allowed unimpeded access. All other personnel would need to
stay in a security line before entering. This was extremely
dangerous for Russian diplomats, said Kislyak, and was
"absolutely unacceptable." The Russian government had raised
this with Ambassador Burns in Moscow and had been told
subsequently that if the Russian Ambassador were accompanied
by note takers, they could still be given unimpeded access to
the Green Zone. However, this did not help those Russian
diplomats who had meetings that the Ambassador and the DCM
did not attend. Furthermore, said Kislyak, the DCM had still
not been given a full access badge. FM Lavrov asked Kislyak
specifically to raise this with U/S Burns. Russia has not
gone public, said Kislyak, and wants to solve this problem
amicably. He noted as well that FM Lavrov had sent a letter
to the Secretary 12 days ago regarding this issue, and had
not yet received a response. U/S Burns said he understood
the seriousness of the issue, and would get back to Kislyak
shortly.
Please visit Paris' Classified Website at:
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm
STAPLETON