January 14, 1979 -Braniff
Airlines began flying leased Concorde SST's between Washington
Dulles and Dallas-Fort Worth airports, under the terms of a unique
interchange agreement with British Airways and Air France.

Over Saginaw, Michigan

April 4, 1979 - A TWA B-727 departed from JFK to Minneapolis
with 82 passengers and a crew of 7.
At FL 390 (39,000'), above Saginaw, Michigan the B-727 began a
sharp roll to the right and started an uncontrolled descent in a steep
spiral. The roll continued despite the corrective measures taken by the
autopilot and the human pilot. The jet went into a spiral dive and lost
34,000' in 63 seconds. During the dive, the plane rolled through 360
degrees twice, and crossed the speed limit for the B-727 airframe.

At almost Mach speed, the jet began to shed parts, and the passengers
experienced up to 6-G's during the flight upset before the crew was able
to regain control back to level flight at 5,000', after the captain
decided to extend the landing gear in an attempt to slow the jet, and
following the loss of the #7 slat from the right wing.

This 34,000' drop
in just 63 seconds, seemed like an eternity to the passengers. The jet had
a maximum speed of about 0.96 Mach at 32,000'. When they made an emergency
landing at Detroit, they discovered a damaged landing gear, a missing
leading edge flap, flight spoiler and other missing parts. No fatalities
occurred among the 82 passengers and crew of 7, however 8 passengers
reported minor injuries relating to high G-Forces.

Industry reports
indicated that older B-727 Captains would pop the circuit breaker
for the leading edge slats and drop the flaps 2 degrees. This increases
the wing area with no added drag, letting the plane cruise higher by a
couple thousand feet, to save fuel while adding a few knots to the cruise
speed.

The NTSB established, after eliminating all individual and
combined sources of mechanical failure, that the extension of the slats
was due to the flight crew manipulating the flap/slat controls in an
inappropriate manner. The flight crew, including Captain Harvey "Hoot"
Gibson, denied that their actions had been the cause.

Captain Gibson:
"At no time prior to the incident did I take
any action within the cockpit either intentionally or inadvertently, that
would have caused the extension of leading edge slats or trailing edge
flaps. nor did I observe any other crew member take any action within the
cockpit, either intentional or inadvertent, which would have caused the
extension." The NTSB attributed the extension
of the flaps to the deliberate actions of the crew.

When retraction of
the flaps was ordered, the #7 leading edge slat failed to retract, causing
the uncommanded roll to the right. The NTSB said that the probable
cause of this incident was the isolation of the #7. leading edge slat in
the fully or partially extended position, and the Captain's untimely
flight control inputs to counter the roll resulting from the slat
asymmetry. The extension of the slats was the result of the flight crew's
manipulation of the flap/slat controls. Contributing to the Captain's
untimely use of the flight controls was distraction due probably to his
efforts to rectify the source of the control problem

Captain Harvey
"Hoot" Gibson appealed the NTSB's finding, first to the NTSB
itself, and then to the U.S. Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Both
petitions were rejected.

May 4, 1979 - The Federal Labor
Relations Authority ruled that a strike fund established by PATCO
was legal. While strikes or other overt job actions by Federal employees
where prohibited by statute, strike funds were not.

PATCO had established a National Controller Subsistence Fund in
May, 1978, "to provide for the financial support of members whose
participation in a nationally sanctioned job action has resulted in
suspension and/or dismissal." The FAA unsuccessfully filed an
unfair labor practice complaint against PATCO, believing the fund
was a war chest for financing illegal job actions.

May 25, 1979 -
- Chicago O'Hare, IL

May 25, 1979 - Chicago O'Hare,
IL - American Airlines DC-10, Flight #191 crashed
near O'Hare International Airport in Des Plaines, IL, following improper
maintenance and the loss of control of an engine. On the takeoff roll, the
left engine and pylon separated from the wing. The crew continued the
takeoff, but wing damage due to the engine separation also damaged the
aircraft hydraulic system and caused retraction of some flight control
surfaces. The jet rolled and crashed shortly after takeoff.

It was the deadliest single-engine aircraft accident in United States
history. All 258 passengers and 13 crew members were killed as well as two
people on the ground.
(273 Fatalities)

Everything appeared normal on the takeoff roll until just after rotation
speed, when the number one engine and the pylon assembly that attached it
to the wing separated from the aircraft ripping away a 3' section of the
leading edge of the left wing. Both the engine and pylon flipped over the
top of the wing and landed on the runway.

The pilots were aware that the number one engine had failed, but they
could not have known it had fallen off the plane, because the wings and
engines were not visible from the cockpit and the control tower did not
inform the crew of the problem. In addition to the engine failure, several
other related systems failed. The number one hydraulic system failed but
continued to operate via motor pumps which mechanically connected it to
hydraulic system three. but that was also damaged and began leaking fluid.

The number one electrical bus, whose generator was attached to the number
one engine, failed causing several electrical systems to go offline, most
notably the captain's instruments, stick shaker and slat disagreement
sensors. The first officer continued to fly the jet and his instruments
functioned normally. The left wing entered a full aerodynamic stall
causing the jet to roll rapidly to the left and enter a steep dive from
which it could not recover despite maximum opposite control inputs by the
first officer. The DC-10 crashed in a 112 degree bank in an open field
4,600' from the end of the runway. Large sections of aircraft debris were
hurled by the force of the impact into a trailer park, destroying five
trailers and several cards. The fuselage cut a trench into the empty
former airfield and the large amount of jet fuel generated a huge
fireball.

The NTSB determined that the loss of the engine by itself should
not have been enough to cause the accident. The jet should have been
capable of returning to the airport using its remaining two engines.
However, unlike other aircraft designs, the DC-10 did not include a
separate mechanism to lock the extended leading edge slats in place,
relying instead solely on the hydraulic pressure within the system.

The NTSB further determined that improper maintenance procedures
led to the failure of the pylon structure at a critical point during
takeoff. Additionally the FAA surveillance and reporting systems
failed to detect and prevent the use of improper maintenance procedures.
The NTSB determined that the damage to the left wing engine pylon
had occurred during an earlier (2 months) engine change at the American
Airlines aircraft maintenance facility in Tulsa, Oklahoma.

American Airlines was fined $500,000 by the U.S. government for improper
maintenance procedures.

Suspension
and Restoration of the DC-10 Type Certificate.

3 days after the accident visual inspections of the inside forward
flange of each wing engine pylon aft bulkhead for cracks were required, as
well as inspection or replacement of the bolts at the forward and
aft ends of each wing to pylon thrust link assemblies. Also inspections
were required of certain engine pylon to wing attachment structures. These
inspections identified the existence of cracks in the wing pylon
assemblies of mounting assemblies.

Consequently,
FAA Administrator Bond found that safety in air commerce or
air transportation and the public interest was at risk, and issued an
"Emergency Order of Suspension" of the Type Certificate for all Douglas
DC-10 series aircraft on June 4, 1979.
This order will be in effect until the DC-10 series aircraft meets
the applicable certification criteria of Part 25 of the FAR and is
eligible for a type certificate.

On June 7, 1979 two Orders of
Investigation and Demand for Production were issued. The first Order
concerned the maintenance and airworthiness procedures related to the
DC-10 and was directed to all operators of the jet. The second order
was directed to McDonnell-Douglas Corporation and concerned the type
certification of the Model DC-10 aircraft and other
maintenance-related matters.

After review of all the reports and investigations, FAA
Administrator Bond determined that the McDonnell-Douglas DC-10
met all the requirements and re-issued a type certificate for the
DC-10, and on July 13, 1979 the
Emergency Order of Suspension was terminated.

The National Transportation Safety Board
complete 103-page Accident Report for this accident may be found at:

DARC is a backup system when the IBM-9020 computer
goes down. Radar data is sent to DARC, that bypasses the old IBM.
The controller at the radar screen does not see any change from the
primary system. The blips continue to appear along with the 'data blocks'
containing flight number and computer ID of each plane, its altitude, and
its speed.

However, losing the IBM-9020 means that some features are no
longer available to the controllers:

'Conflict Alert' that warns of impending loss of separation between
planes. Route
projection that permits the controller to project a plane's intended
flight path on the screen. A
'Minimum Safe Altitude Warning'. (Important in mountainous regions). Radar
handoffs are not possible, and the controllers must use phones to talk to
controllers in adjacent sectors.

August 2, 1979 -
- Canton, OH

August
2, 1979 - Canton, Ohio - Yankees
catcher, Thurman Munson, 32, died trying to land his plane, a
Cessna-501 Citation at Akron/Canton Regional Airport. He crashed
short of the runway while practicing takeoffs and landings by stalling the
plane. The aircraft was allowed to get too low and too slow and Thurman
died. (2 others survived).

The NTSB determined that the probable cause of this accident was the
pilot's failure to recognize the need for, and to take action to maintain,
sufficient airspeed to prevent a stall into the ground during an attempted
landing. The pilot also failed to recognize the need for timely and
sufficient power application to prevent the stall during an approach
conducted inadvertently without flaps extended.

Contributing to the pilot's inability to recognize the problem and to take
proper action was his failure to use the appropriate checklist and his
nonstandard pattern procedures which resulted in an abnormal approach
profile.

(MD-80)

October 18, 1979 - The first prototype of the
McDonnell Douglas MD-80 made its initial flight. Originally
designated the DC-9, the aircraft was a "stretched" derivative of
the DC-9. The MD-80 was type certified by the FAA
on August 26, 1980 and the first production aircraft was delivered to
Swissair.

The MD-80 was not fuel efficient compared to the A320 and
B-737's, due to the aging JT8D engines. The MD-80 burns
1,050 gallons of jet fuel per hour, while the B-737 burns only 850
gallons per hour.

October 28, 1979 - Allegheny
Airlines changed its name to USAir, reflecting the growing route
system of this former local-service carrier.

Chicago, IL - Skyjacking

November
15,
1979 - An American Airlines B-727
from Chicago to Washington DC was attacked by the Unabomber. The bomb
planted in the cargo hold failed to detonate, but gave off large
quantities of smoke, and 12 passengers had to be treated afterwards for
smoke inhalation. It was determined that the bomb was powerful enough to
have destroyed the jet had it worked correctly

1979
- ARTS III-A after being tested at the Tampa Tower was installed at
the New York TRACON. ARTS III-A had the capability to generate
alphanumeric data on all targets, both beacon and primary radar, and the
electronic impulses from its computer can be remoted to satellite
airports.

A similar system for smaller commercial airports, known as ARTS II
was also developed and driven by minicomputers. ARTS II
generates alphanumeric readouts of identity and altitude but not ground
speed.

(1980)

- January 7, 1980 - John F. Leyden
resigned as president of PATCO after a bitter struggle for control of
the organization with regional vice president Robert E. Poli. Both
Poli
and Leyden submitted their resignations, but the PATCO board accepted only
Leyden's resignation.

Robert E. Poli became interim president and was elected to a
three-year term on April 24, 1980.

Skyjacking

January 25,
1980 - A Delta Airlines L-1011 was hijacked to Cuba. He demanded to be
flown to Iran, but eventually surrendered to Cuban authorities. This was
the first U.S. airline hijacking in which real weapons or high explosives
passed through the passenger screening system since the implementation of
the new airport security measures in 1972.

- April 15, 1980 - PATCO "STRIKE PLAN"

PATCO
distributed an "educational package" that many in FAA considered to
be a "STRIKE PLAN" to its membership.
The package included information on how to establish communications
networks and committees on security, welfare, and picketing,
recommendations for a variety of financial preparations in case of the
loss of wages during a job action, and advice to local PATCO
organizations on how to make arrangements for bail bondsmen and for other
legal services.

- August 15, 1980 - PATCO
controllers at Chicago O'Hare conducted a one-day traffic slowdown
that caused 616 delays of 30 minutes or more and cost air carriers more
than $1 Million in wasted fuel. The slowdown took place because
the FAA turned down a demand for an annual tax-free bonus of $7,500.

The Eastern B-727 was
ordered to Cuba and later returned to Miami in the afternoon, a few hours
before the other hijackings. The Eastern B-727 flight, bound from
Miami to Orlando, was commandeered by six disenchanted (with life in the
United States) Cuban refugees, and was carrying 40 other passengers and a
crew of six.

The Eastern crew and passengers returned to
Miami safely after three hours at Havana's Jose Marti International
Airport. The hijackers, all men, were taken into custody by Cuban
authorities. They had told the crew members that they would detonate a
"Doodle Bug" they claimed was a bomb and would ignite a liquid they said
was explosive. The "bomb" turned out to be a toy.

Two of
the hijackers sat in the cockpit, while the others paced nervously up and
down the aisles. A Venezuelan passenger, translated for the crew and the
hijackers told one that they were homesick.

Excerpts from an email received from one of the
flight attendants on Eastern:

"...the
hijackers paid cash for one-way tickets, which should have been a red
flag, and they did not have any luggage. I thought it very strange that
they all sat in different seats throughout the plane, yet they all looked
similar because they used paper bags to carry their personal belongings.
We had to drop our fuel over the ocean as we explained to the hijackers
that the jet was way too heavy to land on such a short runway. As soon as
our wheels went up they were screaming: 'Cuba, Cuba'.

They drenched
me in gasoline, which they had smuggled in a plastic generic cosmetic
bottle, and threatened to set me on fire. I was one of 3 flight
attendants. Before we landed, we were escorted in by a Russian military
plane, and we landed at their most remote runway. There were Cuban
soldiers in jeep-like vehicles with submachine guns mounted on top. They
were the first to board the plane and ushered out the hijackers. Next the
Russian soldiers took off the crew and all the passengers. They were
brought to the terminal in a holding room.

At the time
Eastern Airlines colors for flight attendants was an army green - very
military like. The Russian soldiers separated us from our crew and
passengers, then teased us for hours with sticking their guns in our
bellies and our backs.

The worst part
of the whole ordeal was the many hours that we were detained in
Miami being questioned by different organizations separately. The FAA, the
CIA the FBI and officials who did not identify themselves, plus
supervisors from the airlines all questioned us repeatedly with the same
questions, without getting us any nourishment or giving us time to recoup.
I felt like I was being treated as a criminal in the debriefing procedure.

I deadheaded
back to my home base, Washington D.C. with complete exhaustion, and was
back flying a few days later. In those days we were not given any
counseling, mainly because we were supposed to be trained for emergency
situations."

-- Barbara Januszkiewicz

October 20, 1980 - E-MSAW - The
FAA commissioned the first En Route Minimum Safe
Altitude Warning System at the Cleveland ARTCC. The
E-MSAW provides the controller with a displayed warning of a
potential collision between a tracked aircraft and terrain and/or ground
obstructions. It also contained the conflict alert function.

October 20, 1980 - Republican
presidential candidate Ronald Reagan wrote to PATCO
president Robert E. Poli, saying: "You can rest assured that if I
am elected President, I will take whatever steps are necessary to provide
our Air Traffic Controllers with the most modern equipment available and
to adjust staff levels and work days so that they are commensurate with
achieving a maximum degree of public safety."

The PATCO
executive board endorsed Reagan for President and at the same time charged
President Carter with ignoring serious safety problems that jeopardized
the nation's air traffic control system.

December 19, 1980 - New York Air began
operations, competing against Eastern Airlines Washington-New York shuttle
service. The new, non-union regional carrier was a creation of Texas Air,
a holding company created by Frank Lorenzo in 1980. Texas Air also owned
Texas International Airlines.

December 31, 1980 - The National
Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) reported that 1980 was the safest year in history for
U.S. certificated route and supplemental carriers.