Saturday, May 31, 2014

May 23, 2014 a husband in the Kalakji district of Dohuk
killed his 15 year old wife Dunia Selman. He was a 45 year old man with two wives. According to
the Kurdish News Network he cut of her breast and carved out her eyes. He then
shot
her several times with an AK-47, and then tied her body to a car dragging
her around before fleeing. There was a protest against this brutal murder on
May 29 outside the Kurdish Judicial Council in Irbil. These are pictures of the protest taken by AFP's Safin Hamed.

Thursday, May 29, 2014

Since Iraq held parliamentary elections on April 30, 2014
the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI) led by Ammar Hakim and the Ahrar
bloc led by Moqtada al-Sadr have moved to re-form the National Alliance, which
emerged during the last round of balloting in 2010. Hakim and Sadr have talked
about institutionalizing the alliance as the representative of the Shiite
religious parties and make it the main decision maker as to who should be
nominated prime minister. The problem is that it seeks to include Premier Nouri
al-Maliki’s State of Law (SOL), while opposing his third term in office. This
means that this entire exercise may be a futile act.

Sadr (left) and Hakim (right) have been trying to bring back the National Alliance to stop Maliki from a third term but it is unlikely to work (Al Kashf)

As soon as voting was over in Iraq the major Shiite
religious parties began talking about the National Alliance (NA). On April 30,
the day of the balloting ISCI head Ammar Hakim called
for the NA to be brought back. Ten
days later Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki and the Fadhila party made
similar comments, and then on May
13, members of the National Alliance met with Maliki. Since then much of
the talk has been about making
the coalition a formal organization that represents the Shiite parties, and
therefore has the right to name
the prime minister. The Sadrists and Supreme Council have been trying to set up formal rules to make this
happen. At the same time they want to include a two-term
limit on the premiership. Shiites are the majority of the population in
Iraq, and because of the ethnosectarian quota system they receive the
premiership. What ISCI and the Sadrists are trying to do is simply codify control
over that position. At the same time they want to prevent Maliki from
maintaining his office.

Therein lies the problem with the alliance. State of Law has
stated that since it won the most seats in the balloting the National Alliance should follow its
lead and approve Maliki as prime minister again. It has also mentioned
forming a government without
the coalition. Sadr and Hakim have little leverage over the situation right
now. Even if they were able to get Fadhila and Ibrahim Jaafari’s National
Reform Movement the two other members of the Alliance to join them they would
only have 77
seats compared to SOL’s 95. Only if Maliki came to them for support and
they were able to remain unified, which is not a given would they have some
say.

The National Alliance may have passed its prime. Sadr and
Hakim are hoping that the coalition will allow them to name the next prime
minister. The problem is that they oppose Maliki and he will never go along
with their attempts to block him from a third term. Instead of trying to bring
back the NA the Sadrists and ISCI would be better served if they started negotiations
with other Maliki opponents such as Kurdish President Massoud Barzani’s
Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), Speaker of Parliament Osama Nujafi’s
Mutahidun, and Iyad Allawi’s Nationalists. Together they could pose a real
counter to Maliki. Instead they are fighting a losing battle within the
National Alliance.

Wednesday, May 28, 2014

After coming in third place in Iraqi Kurdistan’s
Parliamentary Elections in 2013, the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK)
finished second in the region’s provincial balloting. Kurdish local voting took
place at the same time as Iraqis chose their new parliament on April 30, 2014.
This did not occur without controversy however as the other major parties all
accused the PUK of fraud. This would be quite a comeback if the results are
finalized, but the charges of cheating may hang over the party and make it an empty
victory in the end.

The PUK came in a surprising 2nd in Kurdistan's 2014 provincial elections

In May 2014 the Iraqi Election Commission released the
results of the Kurdish provincial elections with some surprising results. The
Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) came in first place with 34 seats total, after
winning in its strongholds of Irbil,
12 seats, and Dohuk,
19 seats, and placing third in Sulaymaniya
with 3 seats. The Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) finished second with 19
seats, 6 in Irbil, 2 in Dohuk, and a surprising 11 in Sulaymaniya. The Change
List won 17 seats with 4 in Irbil, 1 in Dohuk, and 12 in Sulaymaniya. The two
main Islamic parties, the Kurdistan Islamic Union (KIU) and Kurdistan Islamic
Group (KIG) came in with 6 and 4 seats respectively. The major change was the
comeback of the PUK. In the 2013 Kurdish
parliamentary vote it got 350,500 votes, but was able to gain over 175,000
this year with a total of 528,122. That increase didn’t seem to come at the
expense of either the KPD or Change that both saw increases from 2013 to 2014.

There are two main explanations for the PUK’s gain in the
balloting. The first is that after its humiliating defeat in the 2013 election
where it came in third place behind the KDP and Change the PUK went all out to rally its
base to get out the vote. That could have definitely happened as the party was
shocked by its poor showing, and did not want to go through that again as it
would have been a sure sign that it was on the decline. On the other hand, the
KDP, Change, the KIU and the KIG all issued statements about vote
rigging in Sulaymaniya. Change
officials elaborated by saying that their election observers reported that
they should have gotten around 376,000 votes, not the 359,000 they got in Sulaymaniya,
which would have led to 13 instead of 12 seats. The Election Commission supported
some of these charges. It seized 60 ballot boxes in Sulaymaniya, 20 in
Irbil, and 27 in Dohuk for alleged tampering. The majority of those taken were
linked to the PUK. More serious examples against the PUK have been rumored.
It’s likely that both of these events happened. PUK followers did come out in
force to try to save the party from political oblivion, while its leadership
orchestrated a campaign to fix the vote in Sulaymaniya to ensure that no matter
what it would come in first place there. It is now up to the Election
Commission to investigate the matter.

The 2013 governorate level elections in Kurdistan were
significant for a number of reasons. First, the regional government had
postponed the balloting again and again. They had not been held in eight years. That
was because the provincial councils had little power, and therefore the ruling
parties chose to ignore them in the name of maintaining the status quo. That
might all change as the councils now elect the governors instead of the Interior
Ministry. That may give them new authority within the region. Third, the new
local governments will include the Change List and its reformist agenda. That
means that a new understanding has to be created between it and the KPD and
PUK. Finally, that could be jeopardized if the Election Commission discovers
serious cheating by the PUK. That will lead to more accusations and mistrust
between Change and PUK, which has been going on for the last several years.
That could jeopardize the much coveted stability that the PUK and KDP have
attempted to forge in Kurdistan.

Maliki's State of Law came away as the big winner in the 2014 elections (BBC)

1. Maliki’s State of
Law walked away with 95 seats in this year’s election. Approximately how many
other parties are aligned with him right now and around how many seats will
that give him?

Maliki’s potential support base outside State of Law can be
conceptualized as a set of concentric circles with increasingly weaker loyalty
to him. Immediately outside State of Law with 95 seats, and with good chances
of future loyalty, is a stratum of a couple of deputies with a history of close
ties to the State of Law, who have continued to maintain friendly relations
with Maliki despite running separately. They include Haytham al-Jibburi of the
Kafaat & Jamahir movement and Ali Taleb Abd al-Hasan of the Solidarity in
Iraq movement, a party affiliated with the Dhi Qar cleric Muhammad Mahdi
al-Nasiri who is considered pro-Maliki, and Ali Subhi al-Maliki of the Just
State movement (who had Maliki’s picture on his own election poster). Subsequent
to the publication of the results, politicians from the two first of these
movements went on to claim they had formally enrolled in the State of Law
alliance, as did two deputies from a local list in Najaf with a somewhat more
secular profile. This segment also includes one seat for the Sadiqun party
considered close to the Asaib Ahl al-Haq militia, although it is noteworthy
that this movement, despite much hype about it in Western media, failed to make
much of an impression on the Iraqi electorate. Nothing is set in stone, though.
Another deputy from Kafaat & Jamahir, former interior minister Jawad
al-Bolani, first reportedly joined the pro-[Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq] ISCI
Muwatin bloc before subsequently joining Maliki, bringing the total of his
State of Law bloc to around 101 seats plus the 1 Asaib Ahl al-Haq seat (which
probably no one else will have anything to do with anyway).

Beyond these 102 deputies, I think the loyalties of the
parties considered close or potentially close to Maliki is far more open to
negotiation. Despite some points of contact in the past, there has also been
periods of friction with Maliki. This includes the 6 seats of the Shia Islamist
Fadhila, the one seat of the Tanzim
al-Dakhil branch of the Daawa (they broke acrimoniously with Maliki in August
2009 when they joined [Iraqi National Alliance] INA ahead of the 2010 general
election), and the 6 seats of Ibrahim al-Jaafari (whose role as unofficial PM
candidate of INA and thus a challenger to Maliki in 2010 is often forgotten).
That’s 15 extra seats, but their alliance with Maliki is no more of a foregone
conclusion than the case is with respect to some of the smaller secular and
religious minority parties such as the Iraq Coalition (5 seats) or the two
Anbar lists (3 plus 2 seats) often cited as potential Maliki allies.

2. There was some
talk before the vote about how many seats the prime minister would need to win
to give him the upper hand in the government formation talks. Do you believe there
was such a tipping point and if so did he achieve that amount?

Maliki would have needed closer to 120 seats in order to
truly achieve the upper hand. With the results that materialized, Maliki will
need to compromise with at least one (and probably two) of his main opponents –
the Kurds, Sadr, Hakim, Nujafi or Allawi.

3. For the last
several years Prime Minister Maliki has talked about forming a majority
government. Do you think that’s possible after the 2014 elections, and would it
make a more effective administration?

I think the concept of a political majority would be good
for Iraq if it was attainable. In 2010, Allawi and Maliki could have achieved
it if they hadn’t been strong personal enemies. This year, I don’t think the
numbers will add up but they are tantalizingly close to the required majority
and I fear Maliki’s hubris will make him expend a lot of energy trying to reach
such a majority anyway. It should be remembered that even in the previous Iraqi
parliament, State of Law deputies would frequently talk about a “political
majority” in contexts when they were very far from achieving this. One
potential variation of the theme would be Maliki joining with the Kurds, which
could be sufficient basis for a majority. The only thing that would keep them
united, though, would be agreement on a third Maliki term. Indeed, most of
Maliki’s rhetoric in favor of a political majority has focused on criticism of
Kurdish independent oil policy. Still, the possibility of Maliki turning around
and offering some concessions for a guarantee of a third term should not be
ruled out.

4. Maliki’s stated
opponents, Moqtada al-Sadr’s Ahrar/Liberals, Ammar Hakim’s Mowatin/Citizen’s
Alliance, Speaker Osama Nujafi’s Mutahidun/Uniters, Kurdish President Massoud
Barzani’s Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), and Iyad Allawi’s
Wataniya/Nationalist Coalition won 138 seats between them. That would seem to
give them the advantage over the prime minister, but as ever their main problem
is keeping a unified stance. Do you think they have any better chance to
achieve that than in 2012 when some of these same parties attempted a no
confidence vote against Maliki?

The relative numerical strength of these parties vis a vis
Maliki is less now than in 2012, where it may have been close to 160 out of 325
at its height – before Iran ordered the Sadrists to back down. When it comes to
manipulating the segment of parties in the range from 1 to 3 deputies, Maliki
probably has an advantage of incumbency compared to his enemies.

5. As a follow up to
that Speaker Nujafi is talking about creating a grand Sunni alliance consisting
of him, Allawi and Deputy Premier Saleh al-Mutlaq. What chance does that have
of working out?

I think the chances of it working out are limited, not least
because they have spent a good deal energy splitting up from the 2010 alliance.
Additionally, it is unlikely to become politically relevant since Maliki’s interest
in these groups mainly relates to the prospect of one of them breaking ranks
with the others and then joining Maliki.

6. In a similar vein,
Sadr and Hakim seem to be focusing upon reforming the National Alliance that
they were part of in 2010. What do you think they hope to achieve with that?

Sadr and Hakim may have been hoping to reconstitute the Shiite
alliance and then have Maliki replaced with someone they like better
personally. That plan lost some of its momentum because of Maliki’s relative
success in term of a good personal vote and an increase of his share of the
parliament seats despite the Najaf clergy clearly sending signals about the
desirability of replacing him with someone else. At the time of the election
there was much talk of Tareq Najm [parliamentarian from State of Law] as a
possible substitute for Maliki. Already that kind of talk has faded somewhat.

7. With every vote in
Iraq there come complaints about the winners cheating. Maliki’s opponents are
all claiming that he fixed the balloting one way or another, while most of the
Kurdish parties are accusing the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan of fraud as well.
Do you think there is any merit to these charges, and more importantly could
they change the results if the Iraqi Election Commission takes any of them up?

A couple of points on this. I think if IHEC was as corrupt
as some claim, Maliki would have got a bigger win and he would not have lost so
many key allies and friends (who lost out in the personal vote). It is still
unclear which way IHEC’s decision will go with respect to the complaints. They
have released data from the special vote for the security forces as well as the
“Baghdad belt” (where accusations of ballot-stuffing to Maliki’s advantage
materialized). Questions still remain after these attempts at creating enhanced
transparency. For example, in the security force vote, the Maliki vote in Diyala
and the PUK vote in Sulaymaniya seem artificially high. Similarly, with respect
to the “Baghdad belt” vote, IHEC has released data that show suspiciously high
participation at some stations, but it has released results only at the
aggregate level of the counting centers. To allay fears about ballot stuffing,
it should release results for individual stations in the “Baghdad belt”, and in
particular those with participation rates in the 80-95% range.

8. Quite a few
prominent Iraqi parliamentarians were defeated in this year’s balloting. Can
you name some of them, and do you think this points to some accountability
being established in the country?

Deputies who lost their seats include Hassan al-Sunayd, Ali
Shalah, Khalid al-Attiya, Yasin Majid, Walid al-Hilli, Ihsan al-Awwadi, Sami
al-Askari and Izzat al-Shabandar from the Maliki camp. Similarly Nassar
al-Rubayyie and Maha al-Duri, from the Sadrist list, lost their seats.

This is the beauty of the personal vote in Iraq, and,
incidentally, I think, an indication of the integrity of what IHEC is doing.
Using the personal vote has become the norm with 80-90% of all voters
expressing a candidate preference in the materials that I have been working
with. In the big cities, in particular, personal votes radically affect the
ranking of the candidates, with people far down on the lists promoted to top
positions through the actions of the electorates in places like Basra, Baghdad
and Mosul.

9. Internal issues
are only part of the picture when it comes to Iraqi politics. The United
States, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Iran all have tried to play a role in the
country. How might each attempt to influence the government formation process?

I think there is a real difference between these regional
powers as regards their ability to micro-manage the government formation
process. Iran may want to see the next Iraqi PM emerge as the result of a
decision by a united Shiite alliance. It can exercise leverage to have that
alliance reconstituted and in turn influence the process of PM candidate
selection within the alliance. Turkey may influence the preferences of the
Iraqi Kurdish parties, though it is noteworthy that in theory the Shiites can
form a government without Kurdish support this time. This fact somewhat reduces
Turkish leverage. Finally, the influence of Saudi Arabia is much less than the
two others, and primarily relates to the precise level, intensity and sourness of
discontent expressed by its friends among Iraqi Sunnis and seculars.

Monday, May 26, 2014

Iraq is the “Cradle of Civilization.” It is the home to
hundreds of ancient sites such as the Ziggurat of Ur, Taq- I-Kisra, the Citadel
at Irbil, and others. Much of this history was neglected due to the wars and
sanctions that Iraq suffered through over the last few decades. Now a new
organization Iraq Heritage has been formed to try to preserve this legacy. Here
is an interview with the Co-Founder and Executive Director of Iraq Heritage
Aymen Jawad. Iraq Heritage can be followed on Twitter @iraq_heritage, Facebook @www.facebook.com/iraqheritage, and on its webpage Iraq Heritage.

1. When was Iraq
Heritage founded and what is its goal?

Iraq Heritage was established
in January 2013 to meet a growing demand for accurate, timely and professional
information on the Iraqi Heritage and culture sector with particular emphasis
on the all-important archaeological discoveries, heritage sites, caring for
heritage, preserving future heritage sites, and the introduction of heritage
into the education system.

Iraq Heritage is made up of
leading Iraqi and international experts in the construction industry drawn from
a variety of fields including industry professionals, finance and banking
executives, Iraqi and multinational corporations, academics and scholars, and
consultants and policy advisers.

Iraq Heritage provides four
broad categories of services:

·Information Services

·Research &
Development

·Training &
Capacity Building Consultancy Services

Iraq Heritage prides itself upon
providing its clients with high quality impartial information, advice and
guidance services. As founders, facilitators and organizers of the Iraq
Heritage we aim to bring together annually the Iraqi Parliament, Government,
Service Providers, Investors, and all the stakeholders who matter most in the
development of Iraq.

2. Iraq has hundreds
if not thousands of historical places of interests. How has your organization
gone about identifying and cataloging all of these sites?

Iraq Heritage has begun to identify the heritage sites
throughout the country, these are categorized into five separate sections:

·Significant Discoveries

·World Heritage List

·Iraq Heritage Sites

·Holy Sites

·Other Sites

There are many sites that people aren’t even aware of and it
is our mission to educate the Iraqi future generations to be aware of their
heritage and more importantly to help them preserve Iraq’s heritage for the
future generations.

Significant Discoveries include this the royal tomb of Queen Puabi dating back to the Sumerian Period (2600-2500 BC) (Iraq Heritage)

World Heritage sites include the city of Hatra that became a battleground between Parthians and Romans in 2 BC (Iraq Heritage)

Agargoaf built by King Kurigalzo in 15th Cen BC is on the Iraq Heritage list (Iraq Heritage)

The Kadhimiya Shrine in Baghdad is one of Iraq's holy sites (Iraq Heritage)

3. Are there any
places that are considered especially endangered and need immediate attention?

The majority of the heritage sites are in need of urgent
attention due to the wars that have resulted in the heritage sites to be
neglected and unmaintained. Recently we launched a newsletter regarding two
sites that are in need of urgent attention, which I have attached below.

Al-Hadba also
known as the hunchback minaret is in danger.

Al-Hadba
minaret is the most popular heritage site in Mosul city and considered the
highest minaret in Iraq. It dates back approximately 9 centuries and now it is
falling down due to it being neglected and unmaintained. The name Al-Hadba has
always been associated with Mosul city and when entering the city the minaret
has its great presence and plays a major role as the icon of Mosul. Al-Hadba is
subsiding more and more everyday and will eventually result in collapse if
urgent maintenance is not carried out. Also Delal Bridge in Zakho, which dates
to the Roman era and is unfortunately on the verge of collapse.

Iraq Heritage
urges all lovers of Mesopotamia to stand together and support us on our mission
to save Iraq’s heritage sites before we lose them.

4. The looting of the
National Museum in Baghdad in 2003 was an infamous event following the U.S.
invasion. Has there been damage to other sites due to fighting since the fall
of the old regime?

The looting of the museum was a very upsetting event for
everyone. Unfortunately the majority of the heritage sites are located in
high-risk areas, so a lot of them have been damaged and affected by the
upsetting regular incidents we have on a daily basis. Due to the majority of
the heritage sites being in such high risk areas it is very difficult for
specialist teams to be sent out to do the work required to keep the sites from
deteriorating any further and to be preserved for future generations. The
majority of the sites require urgent maintenance and repair.

5. How has the
government responded to your effort to preserve Iraq’s historic sites?

Iraq heritage is an organization by the people and for the
people. Everybody has been supportive of our organization and our projects. The
government is currently being formed due to the new elections. However we are
working in partnership the Ataba al Haydariya and we are working towards “The
first International conference with regards to Architectural Heritage in the
Holy City of Najaf with special focus on the Holy Shrine.” This will take place
in mid September 2014. Five of our board members and two of our Senior fellows
will be participating in this joint event.

6. Have you gotten
support from the private sector and international organizations?

We have recently met with the British Institute for the
Study of Iraq, which is in memory of Gertrude Bell and they where very happy to
work in partnership with Iraq Heritage as we share the goal to revive Iraq’s
heritage and educate people of such and amazing places that everyone deserves
to know about.

Iraq Heritage is also working in partnership with Nature
Iraq which was created to protect, restore, and preserve Iraq’s natural
environment, and we are lucky enough to have the great founder Azzam Alwash as
a board member on Iraq Heritage’s advisory panel.

In addition we are working towards the first international
conference working in partnership to the Ataba Al-Alaywiya with specific
regards to architectural heritage of the holy city.

We are happy to work in partnership with any organization
that is working to help and regenerate Iraq as a whole and to revitalize its
rich heritage.

7. There are some
sites like the Karbala shrine, the citadel in Irbil, etc. that are still being
used and are therefore appreciated by the Iraqi public. Are people as
interested in some of the other places your group is working on?

All the heritage sites in Iraq are visited and are part of
every Iraqi. The current security situation doesn’t encourage anyone to visit
some of Iraq’s finest heritage sites due to the location they happen to be in.
We hope that the security will improve so that people from all over the world
can come and visit the great heritage sites of Iraq.

8. Are you interested
in creating more international interest in Iraq’s history and attracting
tourists?

We believe Iraq isn’t just for Iraqis it is the cradle of
civilization and it is the home to every one. Our dream is for people to come
from all over the world to come, visit, enjoy and more importantly learn more
about Iraq’s legacy. Our current duty is to educate people of such amazing
heritage sites so that people are aware of their history. More importantly our
mission is to educate Iraq’s future generations just how important their
heritage is and the importance of preserving such an amazing legacy.

Iraq is the future and we will work together as a team to
make it a better place for the future generations.

Sunday, May 25, 2014

May 2014 was the date of the annual pilgrimage to the shrine
of Imam Musa al-Kadhim in Baghdad’s Kadhimiya district. The event remembers his
death in the 8th Century. Despite being a favorite target of the
Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIS) each year, thousands of pilgrims make
the trip from around Iraq and the region to the capital. These pictures by AFP’s
Ahmad al-Rubaye and Sabah Arar document this event.

In March 1991 southern Iraq exploded in open
rebellion against Saddam Hussein following the Gulf War. The uprising
started in Basra and quickly spread to other cities such as Diwaniya, Hillah,
Amarah, Nasiriyah, Kut, Samawa, Zubayr, Kumait, Qalat Salah and others. The
revolt only lasted a few weeks. In its aftermath the regime killed thousands in
retaliation. It is estimated that anywhere from 100,000-180,000
people died as a result. Evidence of this massacre are still found to this day.
One mass grave was just discovered between Najaf and Karbala, and another outside of Najaf City. The latter is shown in these pictures
by AFP’s Haider Hamdani.

IRAQ HISTORY TIMELINE

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About Me

Musings On Iraq was started in 2008 to explain the political, economic, security and cultural situation in Iraq via original articles and interviews. I have written for the Jamestown Foundation, Tom Ricks’ Best Defense at Foreign Policy and the Daily Beast, and was responsible for a chapter in the book Volatile Landscape: Iraq And Its Insurgent Movements. My work has been published in Iraq via NRT, AK News, Al-Mada, Sotaliraq, All Iraq News, and Ur News all in Iraq. I was interviewed on BBC Radio 5, Radio Sputnik, CCTV and TRT World News TV, and have appeared in CNN, the Christian Science Monitor, The National, Columbia Journalism Review, Mother Jones, PBS’ Frontline, the Center for Strategic and International Studies, the Institute for the Study of War, Radio Free Iraq, Rudaw, and others. I have also been cited in Iraq From war To A New Authoritarianism by Toby Dodge, Imagining the Nation Nationalism, Sectarianism and Socio-Political Conflict in Iraq by Harith al-Qarawee, ISIS Inside the Army of Terror by Michael Weiss and Hassan Hassahn, The Rise of the Islamic State by Patrick Cocburn, and others. If you wish to contact me personally my email is: motown67@aol.com