Machiavelli received a humanist education and served as a bureaucrat and diplomat
for the Florentine Republic from 1498 until 1512, when the Republic was overthrown
and replaced with Medici princely rule. During his service as a diplomat, Machiavelli
had personal experience with many of the princes that he later discussed in
The Prince. Machiavelli wrote The Prince between 1513 and 1516.
-fl

NB. Paragraph numbers apply to this excerpt, not the original
source. W. K. Marriot translated the text, and Project Gutenberg published it in electronic form.

DEDICATION

To the Magnificent Lorenzo Di Piero De' Medici:

{1}Those who strive to obtain the good
graces of a prince are accustomed to come before him with such things as
they hold most precious, or in which they see him take most delight; whence
one often sees horses, arms, cloth of gold, precious stones, and similar
ornaments presented to princes, worthy of their greatness.

{2}Desiring therefore to present myself
to your Magnificence with some testimony of my devotion towards you, I have
not found among my possessions anything which I hold more dear than, or
value so much as, the knowledge of the actions of great men, acquired by
long experience in contemporary affairs, and a continual study of antiquity;
which, having reflected upon it with great and prolonged diligence, I now
send, digested into a little volume, to your Magnificence.

{3}And although I may consider this
work unworthy of your countenance, nevertheless I trust much to your benignity
that it may be acceptable, seeing that it is not possible for me to make
a better gift than to offer you the opportunity of understanding in the
shortest time all that I have learnt in so many years, and with so many
troubles and dangers; which work I have not embellished with swelling or
magnificent words, nor stuffed with rounded periods, nor with any extrinsic
allurements or adornments whatever, with which so many are accustomed to
embellish their works; for I have wished either that no honour should be
given it, or else that the truth of the matter and the weightiness of the
theme shall make it acceptable.

{4}Nor do I hold with those who regard
it as a presumption if a man of low and humble condition dare to discuss
and settle the concerns of princes; because, just as those who draw landscapes
place themselves below in the plain to contemplate the nature of the mountains
and of lofty places, and in order to contemplate the plains place themselves
upon high mountains, even so to understand the nature of the people it needs
to be a prince, and to understand that if princes it needs to be of the
people.

{5}Take then, your Magnificence, this
little gift in the spirit in which I send it; wherein, if it be diligently
read and considered by you, you will learn my extreme desire that you should
attain that greatness which fortune and your other attributes promise. And
if your Magnificence from the summit of your greatness will sometimes turn
your eyes to these lower regions, you will see how unmeritedly I suffer
a great and continued malignity of fortune.

CHAPTER I

HOW MANY KINDS OF PRINCIPALITIES THERE ARE, AND BY WHAT
MEANS THEY ARE ACQUIRED

{6}All states, all powers, that have
held and hold rule over men have been and are either republics or principalities.

{7}Principalities are either hereditary,
in which the family has been long established; or they are new.

{8}The new are either entirely new,
as was Milan to Francesco Sforza, or they are, as it were, members annexed
to the hereditary state of the prince who has acquired them, as was the
kingdom of Naples to that of the King of Spain.

{9}Such dominions thus acquired are
either accustomed to live under a prince, or to live in freedom; and are
acquired either by the arms of the prince himself, or of others, or else
by fortune or by ability.

CHAPTER II

CONCERNING HEREDITARY PRINCIPALITIES

{10}I will leave out all discussion
on republics, inasmuch as in another place I have written of them at length,
and will address myself only to principalities. In doing so I will keep
to the order indicated above, and discuss how such principalities are to
be ruled and preserved.

{11}I say at once there are fewer difficulties
in holding hereditary states, and those long accustomed to the family of
their prince, than new ones; for it is sufficient only not to transgress
the customs of his ancestors, and to deal prudently with circumstances as
they arise, for a prince of average powers to maintain himself in his state,
unless he be deprived of it by some extraordinary and excessive force; and
if he should be so deprived of it, whenever anything sinister happens to
the usurper, he will regain it.

{12}We have in Italy, for example, the
Duke of Ferrara, who could not have withstood the attacks of the Venetians
in '84, nor those of Pope Julius in '10, unless he had been long established
in his dominions. For the hereditary prince has less cause and less necessity
to offend; hence it happens that he will be more loved; and unless extraordinary
vices cause him to be hated, it is reasonable to expect that his subjects
will be naturally well disposed towards him; and in the antiquity and duration
of his rule the memories and motives that make for change are lost, for
one change always leaves the toothing for another.

CHAPTER VII

CONCERNING NEW PRINCIPALITIES WHICH ARE ACQUIRED EITHER BY THE
ARMS OF OTHERS OR BY GOOD FORTUNE

{13}Those who solely by good fortune become princes
from being private citizens have little trouble in rising, but much in keeping
atop; they have not any difficulties on the way up, because they fly, but
they have many when they reach the summit. Such are those to whom some state
is given either for money or by the favour of him who bestows it; as happened
to many in Greece, in the cities of Ionia and of the Hellespont, where princes
were made by Darius, in order that they might hold the cities both for his
security and his glory; as also were those emperors who, by the corruption
of the soldiers, from being citizens came to empire. Such stand simply elevated
upon the goodwill and the fortune of him who has elevated them--two most inconstant
and unstable things. Neither have they the knowledge requisite for the position;
because, unless they are men of great worth and ability, it is not reasonable
to expect that they should know how to command, having always lived in a private
condition; besides, they cannot hold it because they have not forces which
they can keep friendly and faithful.

{14}Concerning these two methods of rising to be a
prince by ability or fortune, I wish to adduce two examples within our own
recollection, and these are Francesco Sforza and Cesare Borgia. Francesco,
by proper means and with great ability, from being a private person rose to
be Duke of Milan, and that which he had acquired with a thousand anxieties
he kept with little trouble. On the other hand, Cesare Borgia, called by the
people Duke Valentino, acquired his state during the ascendancy of his father,
and on its decline he lost it, notwithstanding that he had taken every measure
and done all that ought to be done by a wise and able man to fix firmly his
roots in the states which the arms and fortunes of others had bestowed on
him.

. . . .

{15}[Pope] Alexander the Sixth, in wishing to aggrandize
the duke, his son, had many immediate and prospective difficulties. Firstly,
he did not see his way to make him master of any state that was not a state
of the Church; and if he was willing to rob the Church he knew that the Duke
of Milan and the Venetians would not consent, because Faenza and Rimini were
already under the protection of the Venetians. Besides this, he saw the arms
of Italy, especially those by which he might have been assisted, in hands
that would fear the aggrandizement of the Pope, namely, the Orsini and the
Colonnesi and their following. It behoved him, therefore, to upset this state
of affairs and embroil the powers, so as to make himself securely master of
part of their states. . . .

{16}When the duke occupied the Romagna he found it
under the rule of weak masters, who rather plundered their subjects than ruled
them, and gave them more cause for disunion than for union, so that the country
was full of robbery, quarrels, and every kind of violence; and so, wishing
to bring back peace and obedience to authority, he considered it necessary
to give it a good governor. Thereupon he promoted Messer Ramiro d'Orco, a
swift and cruel man, to whom he gave the fullest power. This man in a short
time restored peace and unity with the greatest success. Afterwards the duke
considered that it was not advisable to confer such excessive authority, for
he had no doubt but that he would become odious, so he set up a court of judgment
in the country, under a most excellent president, wherein all cities had their
advocates. And because he knew that the past severity had caused some hatred
against himself, so, to clear himself in the minds of the people, and gain
them entirely to himself, he desired to show that, if any cruelty had been
practised, it had not originated with him, but in the natural sternness of
the minister. Under this pretence he took Ramiro, and one morning caused him
to be executed and left on the piazza at Cesena with the block and a bloody
knife at his side. The barbarity of this spectacle caused the people to be
at once satisfied and dismayed. . . .

{17}As to the future he had to fear, in the first
place, that a new successor to the Church might not be friendly to him and
might seek to take from him that which Alexander had given him, so he decided
to act in four ways. Firstly, by exterminating the families of those lords
whom he had despoiled, so as to take away that pretext from the Pope. Secondly,
by winning to himself all the gentlemen of Rome, so as to be able to curb
the Pope with their aid, as has been observed. Thirdly, by converting the
college more to himself. Fourthly, by acquiring so much power before the Pope
should die that he could by his own measures resist the first shock. Of these
four things, at the death of Alexander, he had accomplished three. For he
had killed as many of the dispossessed lords as he could lay hands on, and
few had escaped; he had won over the Roman gentlemen, and he had the most
numerous party in the college. And as to any fresh acquisition, he intended
to become master of Tuscany, for he already possessed Perugia and Piombino,
and Pisa was under his protection. And as he had no longer to study France
(for the French were already driven out of the kingdom of Naples by the Spaniards,
and in this way both were compelled to buy his goodwill), he pounced down
upon Pisa. After this, Lucca and Siena yielded at once, partly through hatred
and partly through fear of the Florentines; and the Florentines would have
had no remedy had he continued to prosper, as he was prospering the year that
Alexander died, for he had acquired so much power and reputation that he would
have stood by himself, and no longer have depended on the luck and the forces
of others, but solely on his own power and ability.

{18}But Alexander died five years after he had first
drawn the sword. He left the duke with the state of Romagna alone consolidated,
with the rest in the air, between two most powerful hostile armies, and sick
unto death. Yet there were in the duke such boldness and ability, and he knew
so well how men are to be won or lost, and so firm were the foundations which
in so short a time he had laid, that if he had not had those armies on his
back, or if he had been in good health, he would have overcome all difficulties.
. . . On the day that [Pope] Julius the Second was elected, he told me that
he had thought of everything that might occur at the death of his father,
and had provided a remedy for all, except that he had never anticipated that,
when the death did happen, he himself would be on the point to die.

{19}When all the actions of the duke are recalled,
I do not know how to blame him, but rather it appears to be, as I have said,
that I ought to offer him for imitation to all those who, by the fortune or
the arms of others, are raised to government. Because he, having a lofty spirit
and far-reaching aims, could not have regulated his conduct otherwise, and
only the shortness of the life of Alexander and his own sickness frustrated
his designs. Therefore, he who considers it necessary to secure himself in
his new principality, to win friends, to overcome either by force or fraud,
to make himself beloved and feared by the people, to be followed and revered
by the soldiers, to exterminate those who have power or reason to hurt him,
to change the old order of things for new, to be severe and gracious, magnanimous
and liberal, to destroy a disloyal soldiery and to create new, to maintain
friendship with kings and princes in such a way that they must help him with
zeal and offend with caution, cannot find a more lively example than the actions
of this man. . . .

CHAPTER VIII

CONCERNING THOSE WHO HAVE OBTAINED A PRINCIPALITY BY WICKEDNESS

{20}. . . . Agathocles, the Sicilian, became King
of Syracuse not only from a private but from a low and abject position. This
man, the son of a potter, through all the changes in his fortunes always led
an infamous life. Nevertheless, he accompanied his infamies with so much ability
of mind and body that, having devoted himself to the military profession,
he rose through its ranks to be Praetor of Syracuse. Being established in
that position, and having deliberately resolved to make himself prince and
to seize by violence, without obligation to others, that which had been conceded
to him by assent. . . . One morning he assembled the people and the senate
of Syracuse, as if he had to discuss with them things relating to the Republic,
and at a given signal the soldiers killed all the senators and the richest
of the people; these dead, he seized and held the princedom of that city without
any civil commotion. . . .

{21}Some may wonder how it can happen that Agathocles,
and his like, after infinite treacheries and cruelties, should live for long
secure in his country, and defend himself from external enemies, and never
be conspired against by his own citizens; seeing that many others, by means
of cruelty, have never been able even in peaceful times to hold the state,
still less in the doubtful times of war. I believe that this follows from
severities being badly or properly used. Those may be called properly used,
if of evil it is possible to speak well, that are applied at one blow and
are necessary to one's security, and that are not persisted in afterwards
unless they can be turned to the advantage of the subjects. The badly employed
are those which, notwithstanding they may be few in the commencement, multiply
with time rather than decrease. Those who practise the first system are able,
by aid of God or man, to mitigate in some degree their rule, as Agathocles
did. It is impossible for those who follow the other to maintain themselves.

{22} Hence it is to be remarked that, in seizing a
state, the usurper ought to examine closely into all those injuries which
it is necessary for him to inflict, and to do them all at one stroke so as
not to have to repeat them daily; and thus by not unsettling men he will be
able to reassure them, and win them to himself by benefits. He who does otherwise,
either from timidity or evil advice, is always compelled to keep the knife
in his hand; neither can he rely on his subjects, nor can they attach themselves
to him, owing to their continued and repeated wrongs. For injuries ought to
be done all at one time, so that, being tasted less, they offend less; benefits
ought to be given little by little, so that the flavour of them may last longer.

{23}And above all things, a prince ought to live amongst
his people in such a way that no unexpected circumstances, whether of good
or evil, shall make him change; because if the necessity for this comes in
troubled times, you are too late for harsh measures; and mild ones will not
help you, for they will be considered as forced from you, and no one will
be under any obligation to you for them. . . .

CHAPTER XV

CONCERNING THINGS FOR WHICH MEN, AND ESPECIALLY PRINCES,
ARE PRAISED OR BLAMED

{24}It remains now to see what ought to be the rules
of conduct for a prince towards subject and friends. And as I know that many
have written on this point, I expect I shall be considered presumptuous in
mentioning it again, especially as in discussing it I shall depart from the
methods of other people. But, it being my intention to write a thing which
shall be useful to him who apprehends it, it appears to me more appropriate
to follow up the real truth of the matter than the imagination of it; for
many have pictured republics and principalities which in fact have never been
known or seen, because how one lives is so far distant from how one ought
to live, that he who neglects what is done for what ought to be done, sooner
effects his ruin than his preservation; for a man who wishes to act entirely
up to his professions of virtue soon meets with what destroys him among so
much that is evil.

{25}Hence it is necessary for a prince wishing to
hold his own to know how to do wrong, and to make use of it or not according
to necessity. Therefore, putting on one side imaginary things concerning a
prince, and discussing those which are real, I say that all men when they
are spoken of, and chiefly princes for being more highly placed, are remarkable
for some of those qualities which bring them either blame or praise; and thus
it is that one is reputed liberal, another miserly, using a Tuscan term (because
an avaricious person in our language is still he who desires to possess by
robbery, whilst we call one miserly who deprives himself too much of the use
of his own); one is reputed generous, one rapacious; one cruel, one compassionate;
one faithless, another faithful; one effeminate and cowardly, another bold
and brave; one affable, another haughty; one lascivious, another chaste; one
sincere, another cunning; one hard, another easy; one grave, another frivolous;
one religious, another unbelieving, and the like. And I know that every one
will confess that it would be most praiseworthy in a prince to exhibit all
the above qualities that are considered good; but because they can neither
be entirely possessed nor observed, for human conditions do not permit it,
it is necessary for him to be sufficiently prudent that he may know how to
avoid the reproach of those vices which would lose him his state; and also
to keep himself, if it be possible, from those which would not lose him it;
but this not being possible, he may with less hesitation abandon himself to
them. And again, he need not make himself uneasy at incurring a reproach for
those vices without which the state can only be saved with difficulty, for
if everything is considered carefully, it will be found that something which
looks like virtue, if followed, would be his ruin; whilst something else,
which looks like vice, yet followed brings him security and prosperity.

CHAPTER XVI

CONCERNING LIBERALITY AND MEANNESS

{26}Commencing then with the first of the above-named
characteristics, I say that it would be well to be reputed liberal. Nevertheless,
liberality exercised in a way that does not bring you the reputation for it,
injures you; for if one exercises it honestly and as it should be exercised,
it may not become known, and you will not avoid the reproach of its opposite.
Therefore, any one wishing to maintain among men the name of liberal is obliged
to avoid no attribute of magnificence; so that a prince thus inclined will
consume in such acts all his property, and will be compelled in the end, if
he wish to maintain the name of liberal, to unduly weigh down his people,
and tax them, and do everything he can to get money. This will soon make him
odious to his subjects, and becoming poor he will be little valued by any
one; thus, with his liberality, having offended many and rewarded few, he
is affected by the very first trouble and imperilled by whatever may be the
first danger; recognizing this himself, and wishing to draw back from it,
he runs at once into the reproach of being miserly.

{27}Therefore, a prince, not being able to exercise
this virtue of liberality in such a way that it is recognized, except to his
cost, if he is wise he ought not to fear the reputation of being mean, for
in time he will come to be more considered than if liberal, seeing that with
his economy his revenues are enough, that he can defend himself against all
attacks, and is able to engage in enterprises without burdening his people;
thus it comes to pass that he exercises liberality towards all from whom he
does not take, who are numberless, and meanness towards those to whom he does
not give, who are few.

{28}We have not seen great things done in our time
except by those who have been considered mean; the rest have failed. Pope
Julius the Second was assisted in reaching the papacy by a reputation for
liberality, yet he did not strive afterwards to keep it up, when he made war
on the King of France; and he made many wars without imposing any extraordinary
tax on his subjects, for he supplied his additional expenses out of his long
thriftiness. The present King of Spain would not have undertaken or conquered
in so many enterprises if he had been reputed liberal. A prince, therefore,
provided that he has not to rob his subjects, that he can defend himself,
that he does not become poor and abject, that he is not forced to become rapacious,
ought to hold of little account a reputation for being mean, for it is one
of those vices which will enable him to govern.

{29}And if any one should say: Caesar obtained empire
by liberality, and many others have reached the highest positions by having
been liberal, and by being considered so, I answer: Either you are a prince
in fact, or in a way to become one. In the first case this liberality is dangerous,
in the second it is very necessary to be considered liberal; and Caesar was
one of those who wished to become pre-eminent in Rome; but if he had survived
after becoming so, and had not moderated his expenses, he would have destroyed
his government. And if any one should reply: Many have been princes, and have
done great things with armies, who have been considered very liberal, I reply:
Either a prince spends that which is his own or his subjects' or else that
of others. In the first case he ought to be sparing, in the second he ought
not to neglect any opportunity for liberality. And to the prince who goes
forth with his army, supporting it by pillage, sack, and extortion, handling
that which belongs to others, this liberality is necessary, otherwise he would
not be followed by soldiers. And of that which is neither yours nor your subjects'
you can be a ready giver, as were Cyrus, Caesar, and Alexander; because it
does not take away your reputation if you squander that of others, but adds
to it; it is only squandering your own that injures you.

{30}And there is nothing wastes so rapidly as liberality,
for even whilst you exercise it you lose the power to do so, and so become
either poor or despised, or else, in avoiding poverty, rapacious and hated.
And a prince should guard himself, above all things, against being despised
and hated; and liberality leads you to both. Therefore it is wiser to have
a reputation for meanness which brings reproach without hatred, than to be
compelled through seeking a reputation for liberality to incur a name for
rapacity which begets reproach with hatred.

CHAPTER XVII

CONCERNING CRUELTY AND CLEMENCY, AND WHETHER IT IS BETTER TO BE
LOVED THAN FEARED

{31}Coming now to the other qualities mentioned above,
I say that every prince ought to desire to be considered clement and not cruel.
Nevertheless he ought to take care not to misuse this clemency. Cesare Borgia
was considered cruel; notwithstanding, his cruelty reconciled the Romagna,
unified it, and restored it to peace and loyalty. And if this be rightly considered,
he will be seen to have been much more merciful than the Florentine people,
who, to avoid a reputation for cruelty, permitted Pistoia to be destroyed.
Therefore a prince, so long as he keeps his subjects united and loyal, ought
not to mind the reproach of cruelty; because with a few examples he will be
more merciful than those who, through too much mercy, allow disorders to arise,
from which follow murders or robberies; for these are wont to injure the whole
people, whilst those executions which originate with a prince offend the individual
only. . . .

{32}Upon this a question arises: whether it be better
to be loved than feared or feared than loved? It may be answered that one
should wish to be both, but, because it is difficult to unite them in one
person, it is much safer to be feared than loved, when, of the two, either
must be dispensed with. Because this is to be asserted in general of men,
that they are ungrateful, fickle, false, cowardly, covetous, and as long as
you succeed they are yours entirely; they will offer you their blood, property,
life, and children, as is said above, when the need is far distant; but when
it approaches they turn against you. And that prince who, relying entirely
on their promises, has neglected other precautions, is ruined; because friendships
that are obtained by payments, and not by greatness or nobility of mind, may
indeed be earned, but they are not secured, and in time of need cannot be
relied upon; and men have less scruple in offending one who is beloved than
one who is feared, for love is preserved by the link of obligation which,
owing to the baseness of men, is broken at every opportunity for their advantage;
but fear preserves you by a dread of punishment which never fails.

{33}Nevertheless a prince ought to inspire fear in
such a way that, if he does not win love, he avoids hatred; because he can
endure very well being feared whilst he is not hated, which will always be
as long as he abstains from the property of his citizens and subjects and
from their women. But when it is necessary for him to proceed against the
life of someone, he must do it on proper justification and for manifest cause,
but above all things he must keep his hands off the property of others, because
men more quickly forget the death of their father than the loss of their patrimony.
Besides, pretexts for taking away the property are never wanting; for he who
has once begun to live by robbery will always find pretexts for seizing what
belongs to others; but reasons for taking life, on the contrary, are more
difficult to find and sooner lapse. But when a prince is with his army, and
has under control a multitude of soldiers, then it is quite necessary for
him to disregard the reputation of cruelty, for without it he would never
hold his army united or disposed to its duties.

{34}Among the wonderful deeds of Hannibal this one
is enumerated: that having led an enormous army, composed of many various
races of men, to fight in foreign lands, no dissensions arose either among
them or against the prince, whether in his bad or in his good fortune. This
arose from nothing else than his inhuman cruelty, which, with his boundless
valour, made him revered and terrible in the sight of his soldiers, but without
that cruelty, his other virtues were not sufficient to produce this effect.
And short-sighted writers admire his deeds from one point of view and from
another condemn the principal cause of them. That it is true his other virtues
would not have been sufficient for him may be proved by the case of Scipio,
that most excellent man, not only of his own times but within the memory of
man, against whom, nevertheless, his army rebelled in Spain; this arose from
nothing but his too great forbearance, which gave his soldiers more license
than is consistent with military discipline. For this he was upbraided in
the Senate by Fabius Maximus, and called the corrupter of the Roman soldiery.
The Locrians were laid waste by a legate of Scipio, yet they were not avenged
by him, nor was the insolence of the legate punished, owing entirely to his
easy nature. Insomuch that someone in the Senate, wishing to excuse him, said
there were many men who knew much better how not to err than to correct the
errors of others. This disposition, if he had been continued in the command,
would have destroyed in time the fame and glory of Scipio; but, he being under
the control of the Senate, this injurious characteristic not only concealed
itself, but contributed to his glory.

{35}Returning to the question of being feared or loved,
I come to the conclusion that, men loving according to their own will and
fearing according to that of the prince, a wise prince should establish himself
on that which is in his own control and not in that of others; he must endeavour
only to avoid hatred, as is noted.

CHAPTER XVIII

CONCERNING THE WAY IN WHICH PRINCES SHOULD KEEP FAITH

{36}Every one admits how praiseworthy it is in a prince
to keep faith, and to live with integrity and not with craft. Nevertheless
our experience has been that those princes who have done great things have
held good faith of little account, and have known how to circumvent the intellect
of men by craft, and in the end have overcome those who have relied on their
word. You must know there are two ways of contesting, the one by the law,
the other by force; the first method is proper to men, the second to beasts;
but because the first is frequently not sufficient, it is necessary to have
recourse to the second. Therefore it is necessary for a prince to understand
how to avail himself of the beast and the man. This has been figuratively
taught to princes by ancient writers, who describe how Achilles and many other
princes of old were given to the Centaur Chiron to nurse, who brought them
up in his discipline; which means solely that, as they had for a teacher one
who was half beast and half man, so it is necessary for a prince to know how
to make use of both natures, and that one without the other is not durable.
A prince, therefore, being compelled knowingly to adopt the beast, ought to
choose the fox and the lion; because the lion cannot defend himself against
snares and the fox cannot defend himself against wolves. Therefore, it is
necessary to be a fox to discover the snares and a lion to terrify the wolves.
Those who rely simply on the lion do not understand what they are about. Therefore
a wise lord cannot, nor ought he to, keep faith when such observance may be
turned against him, and when the reasons that caused him to pledge it exist
no longer. If men were entirely good this precept would not hold, but because
they are bad, and will not keep faith with you, you too are not bound to observe
it with them. Nor will there ever be wanting to a prince legitimate reasons
to excuse this non-observance. Of this endless modern examples could be given,
showing how many treaties and engagements have been made void and of no effect
through the faithlessness of princes; and he who has known best how to employ
the fox has succeeded best.

{37}But it is necessary to know well how to disguise
this characteristic, and to be a great pretender and dissembler; and men are
so simple, and so subject to present necessities, that he who seeks to deceive
will always find someone who will allow himself to be deceived. One recent
example I cannot pass over in silence. Alexander the Sixth did nothing else
but deceive men, nor ever thought of doing otherwise, and he always found
victims; for there never was a man who had greater power in asserting, or
who with greater oaths would affirm a thing, yet would observe it less; nevertheless
his deceits always succeeded according to his wishes, because he well understood
this side of mankind.

{38}Therefore it is unnecessary for a prince to have
all the good qualities I have enumerated, but it is very necessary to appear
to have them. And I shall dare to say this also, that to have them and always
to observe them is injurious, and that to appear to have them is useful; to
appear merciful, faithful, humane, religious, upright, and to be so, but with
a mind so framed that should you require not to be so, you may be able and
know how to change to the opposite.

{39}And you have to understand this, that a prince,
especially a new one, cannot observe all those things for which men are esteemed,
being often forced, in order to maintain the state, to act contrary to fidelity,
friendship, humanity, and religion. Therefore it is necessary for him to have
a mind ready to turn itself accordingly as the winds and variations of fortune
force it, yet, as I have said above, not to diverge from the good if he can
avoid doing so, but, if compelled, then to know how to set about it.

{40}For this reason a prince ought to take care that
he never lets anything slip from his lips that is not replete with the above-named
five qualities, that he may appear to him who sees and hears him altogether
merciful, faithful, humane, upright, and religious. There is nothing more
necessary to appear to have than this last quality, inasmuch as men judge
generally more by the eye than by the hand, because it belongs to everybody
to see you, to few to come in touch with you. Every one sees what you appear
to be, few really know what you are, and those few dare not oppose themselves
to the opinion of the many, who have the majesty of the state to defend them;
and in the actions of all men, and especially of princes, which it is not
prudent to challenge, one judges by the result.

{31}For that reason, let a prince have the credit
of conquering and holding his state, the means will always be considered honest,
and he will be praised by everybody; because the vulgar are always taken by
what a thing seems to be and by what comes of it; and in the world there are
only the vulgar, for the few find a place there only when the many have no
ground to rest on.