During the final stages of
World
War II in 1945, the
United States conducted two atomic bombings against the cities of
Hiroshima and Nagasaki in
Japan, the first
on August 6, 1945 and the second on August 9, 1945. These two events are the
only active deployments of nuclear weapons in war to date.[2]

Within the first two to four months of the bombings, the acute effects killed
90,000–166,000 people in Hiroshima and 60,000–80,000 in Nagasaki,[1]
with roughly half of the deaths in each city occurring on the first day. The
Hiroshima prefectural health department estimates that, of the people who died
on the day of the explosion, 60% died from flash or flame burns, 30% from
falling debris and 10% from other causes. During the following months, large
numbers died from the effect of burns,
radiation sickness, and other injuries, compounded by illness. In a US
estimate of the total immediate and short term cause of death, 15–20% died from
radiation sickness, 20–30% from
flash burns, and 50–60% from other injuries, compounded by illness.[5]
In both cities, most of the dead were civilians.[6][7][8]

The target was larger than three miles in diameter and was an important
target in a large urban area.

The blast would create effective damage.

The target was unlikely to be attacked by August 1945. "Any small and
strictly military objective should be located in a much larger area subject
to blast damage in order to avoid undue risks of the weapon being lost due
to bad placing of the bomb."[15]

These cities were largely untouched during the nightly bombing raids and the
Army Air Force agreed to leave them off the target list so accurate assessment
of the weapon could be made. Hiroshima was described as "an important army depot
and port of embarkation in the middle of an urban industrial area. It is a good
radar target and it is such a size that a large part of the city could be
extensively damaged. There are adjacent hills which are likely to produce a
focusing effect which would considerably increase the blast damage. Due to
rivers it is not a good
incendiary target."[15]
The goal of the weapon was to convince Japan to surrender unconditionally in
accordance with the terms of the
Potsdam Declaration. The Target Committee stated that "It was agreed that
psychological factors in the target selection were of great importance. Two
aspects of this are (1) obtaining the greatest psychological effect against
Japan and (2) making the initial use sufficiently spectacular for the importance
of the weapon to be internationally recognized when publicity on it is released.
Kyoto had the advantage of being an important center for military industry, as
well an intellectual center and hence better able to appreciate the significance
of the weapon. The
Emperor's palace in Tokyo has a greater fame than any other target but is of
least strategic value."[15]

"...the only person deserving credit for saving Kyoto from destruction
is
Henry L. Stimson, the
Secretary of War at the time, who had known and admired Kyoto ever since
his honeymoon there several decades earlier."[17]

The Potsdam ultimatum

On July 26, Truman and other Allied leaders issued the
Potsdam Declaration outlining terms of surrender for Japan. It was presented
as an
ultimatum and stated that without a surrender, the Allies would attack
Japan, resulting in "the inevitable and complete destruction of the Japanese
armed forces and just as inevitably the utter devastation of the Japanese
homeland". The atomic bomb was not mentioned in the communique. On July 28,
Japanese papers reported that the declaration had been rejected by the Japanese
government. That afternoon, Prime Minister
Kantaro Suzuki declared at a press conference that the Potsdam Declaration
was no more than a rehash (yakinaoshi) of the
Cairo Declaration and that the government intended to ignore it (mokusatsu,
lit. "kill by silence").[18]
The statement was taken by both Japanese and foreign papers as a clear rejection
of the declaration.
Emperor
Hirohito, who was waiting for a Soviet reply to noncommittal Japanese peace
feelers, made no move to change the government position.[19]
On July 31, he made clear to his advisor
Kōichi
Kido that the
Imperial Regalia of Japan had to be defended at all costs.[20]

In early July, on his way to Potsdam, Truman had re-examined the decision to
use the bomb. In the end, Truman made the decision to drop the atomic bombs on
Japan. His stated intention in ordering the bombings was to bring about a quick
resolution of the war by inflicting destruction and instilling fear of further
destruction in sufficient strength to cause Japan to surrender.[21]

Hiroshima

Hiroshima
during World War II

At the time of its bombing, Hiroshima was a city of some industrial and
military significance. A number of military camps were located nearby, including
the headquarters of the Fifth Division and Field Marshal
Shunroku Hata's 2nd General Army Headquarters, which commanded the defense
of all of southern Japan.[22]
Hiroshima was a minor supply and logistics base for the Japanese military. The
city was a communications center, a storage point, and an assembly area for
troops. It was one of several Japanese cities left deliberately untouched by
American bombing, allowing a pristine environment to measure the damage caused
by the atomic bomb.[23][24]

The center of the city contained several
reinforced concrete buildings and lighter structures. Outside the center,
the area was congested by a dense collection of small wooden workshops set among
Japanese houses. A few larger industrial plants lay near the outskirts of the
city. The houses were constructed of wood with tile roofs, and many of the
industrial buildings were also built around wood frames. The city as a whole was
highly susceptible to fire damage.

The population of Hiroshima had reached a peak of over 381,000 earlier in the
war, but prior to the atomic bombing the population had steadily decreased
because of a
systematic evacuation ordered by the Japanese government. At the time of the
attack, the population was approximately 340,000–350,000.[1]
Because official documents were burned, the exact population is uncertain.

The bombing

Seizo Yamada's ground level photo taken from approximately 7 km
northeast of Hiroshima.

After leaving Tinian the aircraft made their way separately to
Iwo Jima
where they rendezvoused at 2,440 meters (8,010 ft) and set course for Japan. The
aircraft arrived over the target in clear visibility at 9,855 meters (32,333
ft). During the journey, Navy Captain
William Parsons had armed the bomb, which had been left unarmed to minimize
the risks during takeoff. His assistant, 2nd Lt.
Morris Jeppson, removed the safety devices 30 minutes before reaching the
target area.[26]

The dark portions of the garments this victim wore during the flash
caused burns on their skin.[27]

About an hour before the bombing, Japanese early warning radar detected the
approach of some American aircraft headed for the southern part of Japan. An
alert was given and radio broadcasting stopped in many cities, among them
Hiroshima. At nearly 08:00, the radar operator in Hiroshima determined that the
number of planes coming in was very small—probably not more than three—and the
air raid alert was lifted. To conserve fuel and aircraft, the Japanese had
decided not to intercept small formations. The normal radio broadcast warning
was given to the people that it might be advisable to go to air-raid shelters if
B-29s were actually sighted. However a reconnaissance mission was assumed
because at 07.31 the first B29 to fly over Hiroshima at 32,000 feet (9,800 m)
had been the weather observation aircraft Straight Flush that sent a
morse code message to the Enola Gay indicating that the weather was good
over the primary target and because it then turned out to sea the 'all clear'
was sounded in the city. At 08.09 Colonel Tibbets started his bomb run and
handed control over to his bombardier.[28]

The release at 08:15 (Hiroshima time) went as planned, and the
gravity
bomb known as "Little
Boy", a
gun-type fission weapon with 60 kilograms (130 lb) of
uranium-235, took 43 seconds to fall from the aircraft flying at 31,060 feet
(9,470 m)[29]
to the predetermined detonation height about 1,900 feet (580 m) above the city.
The Enola Gay had traveled 11.5 miles away before it felt the shock waves
from the blast.[30]

Due to
crosswind, it missed the
aiming
point, the
Aioi
Bridge, by almost 800 feet (240 m) and detonated directly over
Shima Surgical Clinic.[31]
It created a blast equivalent to about 13
kilotons of TNT (54 TJ). (The U-235 weapon was
considered very inefficient, with only 1.38% of its material fissioning.)[32]
The radius of total destruction was about one mile (1.6 km), with resulting
fires across 4.4 square miles (11 km2).[33]
Americans estimated that 4.7 square miles (12 km2) of the city were
destroyed. Japanese officials determined that 69% of Hiroshima's buildings were
destroyed and another 6–7% damaged.[34]

70,000–80,000 people, or some 30%[35]
of the population of Hiroshima were killed immediately, and another 70,000
injured.[36]
Over 90% of the doctors and 93% of the nurses in Hiroshima were killed or
injured—most had been in the downtown area which received the greatest damage.[37]

Although the U.S. had previously dropped leaflets warning civilians of air
raids on 35 Japanese cities, including Hiroshima and Nagasaki,[38]
the residents of Hiroshima were given no notice of the atomic bomb.[39][40][41]

Japanese
realization of the bombing

Hiroshima before the bombing.

Hiroshima after the bombing.

The Tokyo control operator of
the Broadcasting
Corporation of Japan noticed that the Hiroshima station had gone off the
air. He tried to re-establish his program by using another telephone line, but
it too had failed.[42]
About 20 minutes later the Tokyo railroad telegraph center realized that the
main line telegraph had stopped working just north of Hiroshima. From some small
railway stops within 16 kilometers (10 mi) of the city came unofficial and
confused reports of a terrible explosion in Hiroshima. All these reports were
transmitted to the headquarters of the
Imperial Japanese Army General Staff.

Military bases repeatedly tried to call the Army Control Station in
Hiroshima. The complete silence from that city puzzled the men at headquarters;
they knew that no large enemy raid had occurred and that no sizeable store of
explosives was in Hiroshima at that time. A young officer of the Japanese
General Staff was instructed to fly immediately to Hiroshima, to land, survey
the damage, and return to Tokyo with reliable information for the staff. It was
generally felt at headquarters that nothing serious had taken place and that the
explosion was just a rumor.

The staff officer went to the airport and took off for the southwest. After
flying for about three hours, while still nearly 100 miles (160 km) from
Hiroshima, he and his pilot saw a great cloud of smoke from the bomb. In the
bright afternoon, the remains of Hiroshima were burning. Their plane soon
reached the city, around which they circled in disbelief. A great scar on the
land still burning and covered by a heavy cloud of smoke was all that was left.
They landed south of the city, and the staff officer, after reporting to Tokyo,
immediately began to organize relief measures.

By August 8, 1945, newspapers in the U.S. were reporting that broadcasts from
Radio Tokyo had described the destruction observed in Hiroshima. "Practically
all living things, human and animal, were literally seared to death," Japanese
radio announcers said in a broadcast received by Allied sources.[43]

Post-attack casualties

A victim with severe burns.

According to the U.S. Department of Energy the immediate
effects of the blast killed approximately 70,000 people in Hiroshima.[44]
Estimates of total deaths by the end of 1945 from burns, radiation and related
disease, the effects of which were aggravated by lack of medical resources,
range from 90,000 to 166,000.[1][45]
Some estimates state up to 200,000 had died by 1950, due to cancer and other
long-term effects.[3][6][46]
Another study states that from 1950 to 1990, roughly 9% of the cancer and
leukemia deaths among bomb survivors was due to radiation from the bombs, the
statistical excess being estimated to 89 leukemia and 339 solid cancers.[47]
At least eleven known
prisoners of war died from the bombing.[48]

Survival of some
structures

Small-scale recreation of the Nakajima area around ground zero.

Some of the reinforced concrete buildings in Hiroshima had been very strongly
constructed because of the
earthquake
danger in Japan, and their framework did not collapse even though they were
fairly close to the blast center. Eizo Nomura
(野村 英三,Nomura Eizō?)
was the closest known survivor, who was in the
basement of
a reinforced concrete building (it remained as the
Rest House after the war) only 170 m (560 ft) from
ground
zero (the
hypocenter)
at the time of the attack.[49][50]
Akiko Takakura (高蔵
信子,
Takakura Akiko?)
was among the closest survivors to the hypocenter of the blast. She had been in
the solidly built Bank of Hiroshima only 300 meters (980 ft) from ground-zero at
the time of the attack.[51]
Since the bomb detonated in the air, the blast was directed more downward than
sideways, which was largely responsible for the survival of the
Prefectural Industrial Promotional Hall, now commonly known as the
Genbaku, or A-bomb Dome. This building was designed and built by the Czech
architect
Jan Letzel, and was only 150 m (490 ft) from ground zero. The ruin was named
Hiroshima Peace Memorial and was made a
UNESCO
World Heritage site in 1996 over the objections of the U.S. and China.[52]
The Memorial monument for Hiroshima was built in Hiroshima for bombing victims.[53][54][55]

Events of August
7–9

After the Hiroshima bombing, President Truman issued a statement announcing
the use of the new weapon, and promising that:

If they do not now accept our terms, they may expect a rain of ruin from
the air, the like of which has never been seen on this earth. Behind this
air attack will follow sea and land forces in such numbers and power as they
have not yet seen and with the fighting skill of which they are already well
aware.[56]

The statue in front of the
hypocenter to mark the date and time of the historic bomb
explosion in Nagasaki

The Japanese government still did not react to the
Potsdam Declaration. Emperor Hirohito, the government, and the war council
were considering four conditions for surrender: the preservation of the kokutai
(Imperial institution and national
polity),
assumption by the Imperial Headquarters of responsibility for disarmament and
demobilization, no occupation of the
Japanese Home Islands, Korea, or
Formosa, and delegation of the punishment of war criminals to the Japanese
government.[57]

Responsibility for the timing of the second bombing was delegated to Colonel
Tibbets as commander of the
509th Composite Group on Tinian. Scheduled for August 11 against Kokura, the
raid was moved earlier by two days to avoid a five day period of bad weather
forecast to begin on August 10.[58]
Three bomb pre-assemblies had been transported to Tinian, labeled F-31, F-32,
and F-33 on their exteriors. On August 8, a dress rehearsal was conducted off
Tinian by Maj. Charles Sweeney using Bockscar
as the drop airplane. Assembly F-33 was expended testing the components and F-31
was designated for the August 9 mission.[59]

Nagasaki

I realize the tragic significance of the atomic bomb... It is an awful
responsibility which has come to us... We thank God that it has come to us,
instead of to our enemies; and we pray that He may guide us to use it in His
ways and for His purposes.

Nagasaki during
World War II

The Bockscar and its crew, who dropped the "Fat Man" atomic
bomb on Nagasaki.

The city of
Nagasaki had been one of the largest
sea ports in southern Japan and was of great wartime importance because of
its wide-ranging industrial activity, including the production of
ordnance, ships, military equipment, and other war materials.

In contrast to many modern aspects of Hiroshima, almost all of the buildings
were of old-fashioned Japanese construction, consisting of wood or wood-frame
buildings with wood walls (with or without plaster) and tile roofs. Many of the
smaller industries and business establishments were also situated in buildings
of wood or other materials not designed to withstand explosions. Nagasaki had
been permitted to grow for many years without conforming to any definite city
zoning plan; residences were erected adjacent to factory buildings and to each
other almost as closely as possible throughout the entire industrial valley.

Nagasaki had never been subjected to large-scale bombing prior to the
explosion of a nuclear weapon there. On August 1, 1945, however, a number of
conventional high-explosive bombs were dropped on the city. A few hit in the
shipyards and dock areas in the southwest portion of the city, several hit the
Mitsubishi
Steel and Arms Works, and six bombs landed at the
Nagasaki Medical School and Hospital, with three direct hits on buildings
there. While the damage from these bombs was relatively small, it created
considerable concern in Nagasaki and many people—principally school
children—were evacuated to rural areas for safety, thus reducing the population
in the city at the time of the nuclear attack.

To the north of Nagasaki there was a camp holding
British Commonwealth prisoners of war, some of whom were working in the coal
mines and only found out about the bombing when they came to the surface.

The bombing

A Japanese report on the bombing characterized Nagasaki as "like a
graveyard with not a tombstone standing".

On the morning of August 9, 1945, the U.S.
B-29 SuperfortressBockscar, flown by the crew of 393rd Squadron
commander Major
Charles W. Sweeney, carried the nuclear bomb code-named "Fat Man", with
Kokura as the
primary target and
Nagasaki
the secondary target. The mission plan for the second attack was nearly
identical to that of the Hiroshima mission, with two B-29s flying an hour ahead
as weather scouts and two additional B-29s in Sweeney's flight for
instrumentation and photographic support of the mission. Sweeney took off with
his weapon already armed but with the electrical safety plugs still engaged.[61]

Observers aboard the weather planes reported both targets clear. When
Sweeney's aircraft arrived at the assembly point for his flight off the coast of
Japan, the third plane,
Big Stink, flown by the group's Operations Officer,
Lt. Col. James I. Hopkins, Jr. failed to make the rendezvous. Bockscar
and the instrumentation plane circled for 40 minutes without locating Hopkins.
Already 30 minutes behind schedule, Sweeney decided to fly on without Hopkins.[61]

By the time they reached Kokura a half hour later, a 70% cloud cover had
obscured the city, prohibiting the visual attack required by orders. After three
runs over the city, and with fuel running low because a transfer pump on a
reserve tank had failed before take-off, they headed for their secondary target,
Nagasaki.[61]
Fuel consumption calculations made en route indicated that Bockscar had
insufficient fuel to reach
Iwo Jima
and would be forced to divert to
Okinawa. After initially deciding that if Nagasaki were obscured on their
arrival the crew would carry the bomb to Okinawa and dispose of it in the ocean
if necessary, the weaponeer Navy
Commander
Frederick Ashworth decided that a radar approach would be used if the target
was obscured.[62]

At about 07:50 Japanese time, an air raid alert was sounded in Nagasaki, but
the "all clear" signal was given at 08:30. When only two B-29 Superfortresses
were sighted at 10:53, the Japanese apparently assumed that the planes were only
on reconnaissance and no further alarm was given.

At 11:01, a last minute break in the clouds over Nagasaki allowed
Bockscar's bombardier, Captain
Kermit Beahan, to visually sight the target as ordered. The "Fat Man"
weapon, containing a core of ~6.4 kg (14.1 lbs.) of
plutonium-239,
was dropped over the city's industrial valley. It exploded 43 seconds later at
469 meters (1,540 ft) above the ground exactly halfway between the Mitsubishi
Steel and Arms Works in the south and the Mitsubishi-Urakami Ordnance Works
(Torpedo Works) in the north. This was nearly 3 kilometers (2 mi) northwest of
the planned hypocenter; the blast was confined to the
Urakami Valley
and a major portion of the city was protected by the intervening hills.[65]
The resulting explosion had a blast yield equivalent to 21 kilotons of TNT (88
TJ).[66]
The explosion generated heat estimated at 3,900 degrees Celsius (4,200 K,
7,000 °F) and winds that were estimated at 1005 km/h (624 mph).

A photograph of
Sumiteru Taniguchi's back injuries taken in January 1946 by a
U.S. Marine photographer.

Casualty estimates for immediate deaths range from 40,000 to 75,000.[67][68][69]
Total deaths by the end of 1945 may have reached 80,000.[1]
At least eight known
POWs died from the bombing and as many as 13 POWs may have died:

At least two POWs reportedly died postwar from cancer thought to have
been caused by the atomic bomb.[76][77]

The radius of total destruction was about a mile (1–2 km), followed by fires
across the northern portion of the city to two miles (3 km) south of the bomb.[78][79]

One American POW,
Joe
Kieyoomia, was in Nagasaki at the time of the bombing but survived,
reportedly having been shielded from the effects of the bomb by the concrete
walls of his cell.[80]

An unknown number of survivors from the Hiroshima bombing had made their way
to Nagasaki, where they were bombed again.[81][82]

The Mitsubishi-Urakami Ordnance Works, the factory that manufactured the type
91 torpedoes released in Pearl Harbor, was destroyed in the blast.[83]

There is also a peace monument and Bell of Nagasaki in the Kokura.[84]

Gallery

A replica of the "Fat Man" atomic bomb

A child with facial and head injuries is nursed by an adult
Japanese wearing a face mask.

A mother and daughter burnt on the Urakami station.

Plans
for more atomic attacks on Japan

The U.S. expected to have another atomic bomb ready for use in the third week
of August, with three more in September and a further three in October.[85]
On August 10, Major General
Leslie Groves, military director of the Manhattan Project, sent a memorandum
to
General of the Army
George Marshall,
Army Chief of Staff, in which he wrote that "the next bomb . . should be
ready for delivery on the first suitable weather after 17 or August 18." On the
same day, Marshall endorsed the memo with the comment, "It is not to be released
over Japan without express authority from the President."[85]
There was already discussion in the War Department about conserving the bombs in
production until
Operation Downfall, the projected invasion of Japan, had begun. "The problem
now [August 13] is whether or not, assuming the Japanese do not capitulate, to
continue dropping them every time one is made and shipped out there or whether
to hold them . . . and then pour them all on in a reasonably short time. Not all
in one day, but over a short period. And that also takes into consideration the
target that we are after. In other words, should we not concentrate on targets
that will be of the greatest assistance to an invasion rather than industry,
morale, psychology, and the like? Nearer the tactical use rather than other
use."[85]

Tibbets, in an interview with historian Studs Terkel, stated that because
there was silence from Japan following both the first and second atomic bombing,
he was ordered by General Curtis LeMay back to Utah from Tinian to pick up
another atomic bomb. But when his crew got to California, the debarkation point,
the war was over.[86]

Surrender of Japan and subsequent occupation

Until August 9, the war council had still insisted on its four conditions for
surrender. On that day Hirohito ordered
Kido
to "quickly control the situation ... because the Soviet Union has declared war
against us." He then held an Imperial conference during which he authorized
minister
Tōgō to notify the Allies that Japan would accept their terms on one
condition, that the declaration "does not compromise any demand which prejudices
the prerogatives of His Majesty as a Sovereign ruler."[87]

On August 10, the Japanese government presented a letter of protest for the
atomic bombings to the government of the United States via the government of
Switzerland.[88]
On August 12, the Emperor informed the imperial family of his decision to
surrender. One of his uncles,
Prince Asaka, then asked whether the war would be continued if the kokutai
could not be preserved. Hirohito simply replied "of course."[89]
As the Allied terms seemed to leave intact the principle of the preservation of
the Throne, Hirohito recorded on August 14 his
capitulation announcement which was broadcast to the Japanese nation the
next day despite a short
rebellion by militarists opposed to the surrender.

In his declaration, Hirohito referred to the atomic bombings:

Moreover, the enemy now possesses a new and terrible weapon with the
power to destroy many innocent lives and do incalculable damage. Should
we continue to fight, not only would it result in an ultimate collapse
and obliteration of the Japanese nation, but also it would lead to the
total extinction of human civilization.

Such being the case, how are We to save the millions of Our subjects,
or to atone Ourselves before the hallowed spirits of Our Imperial
Ancestors? This is the reason why We have ordered the acceptance of the
provisions of the Joint Declaration of the Powers.

In his "Rescript to the soldiers and sailors" delivered on August 17, he
stressed the impact of the Soviet invasion and his decision to surrender,
omitting any mention of the bombs.

During the year after the bombing, approximately 40,000 U.S. troops occupied
Hiroshima, while Nagasaki was occupied by 27,000 troops.

Depiction and
public response

During the war "annihilationist and exterminationalist rhetoric" was
tolerated at all levels of U.S. society; according to the UK embassy in
Washington the Americans regarded the Japanese as "a nameless mass of vermin".[90]
Caricatures depicting Japanese as less than human, e.g. monkeys, were common.[90]
A 1944
opinion poll that asked what should be done with Japan found that 13% of the
U.S. public were in favor of the
extermination
of all Japanese: men, women, and children.[91][92]

News of the atomic bombing were greeted enthusiastically in the U.S.; a poll
in
Fortune magazine in late 1945 showed a significant minority of
Americans wishing that more atomic bombs could have been dropped on Japan.[93]
The initial positive response was supported by the imagery presented to the
public (mainly the powerful mushroom cloud) and the censorship of photographs
that showed corpses incinerated by the blast as well as photos of maimed
survivors.[93]
As an example, a member of the U.S.
Strategic Bombing Survey, Lieutenant Daniel McGovern, used a film crew to
document the results. The film crew's work resulted in a three-hour documentary
entitled The Effects of the Atomic Bombs Against Hiroshima and Nagasaki.
The documentary included images from hospitals showing the human effects of the
bomb; it showed burned out buildings and cars, and rows of skulls and bones on
the ground. When sent to the U.S., it was mentioned widely in the U.S. press,
then quietly suppressed and never shown. It was classified "top secret" for the
next 22 years.[94]
During this time in America, it was a common practice for editors to keep
graphic images of death out of films, magazines, and newspapers.[95][96]

Imagery of the atomic bombings was suppressed in Japan during the occupation[97]
although some Japanese magazines had managed to publish images before the Allied
occupation troops took control. The Allied occupation forces enforced censorship
on anything "that might, directly or by inference, disturb public tranquility",
and pictures of the effects on people on the ground were deemed inflammatory. A
likely reason for the banning was that the images depicting burn victims and
funeral pyres evoked similarities to the widely circulated images taken in
liberated Nazi concentration camps.[98]

Among the casualties were found many unintended victims, including Allied
POWs,
Korean and Chinese laborers, students from
Malaya on scholarships, and some 3,200
Japanese American citizens.[99]

One of the early studies conducted by the ABCC was on the outcome of
pregnancies occurring in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and in a
control city,
Kure located 18 miles (29 km) south from Hiroshima, in order to discern the
conditions and outcomes related to radiation exposure. One author has claimed
that the ABCC refused to provide medical treatment to the survivors for better
research results.[100]
In 1975, the Radiation Effects Research Foundation was created to assume the
responsibilities of ABCC.[101]

Hibakusha

Panoramic view of the monument marking the hypocenter, or ground
zero, of the atomic bomb explosion over Nagasaki.

Citizens of Hiroshima walk by the Hiroshima Peace Memorial, the
closest building to have survived the city's atomic bombing.

The survivors of the bombings are called hibakusha(被爆者?),
a Japanese word that literally translates to "explosion-affected people." As of
March 31, 2010[update],
227,565 surviving hibakusha were recognized by the Japanese government,
most living in Japan.[102]
The government of Japan recognizes about 1% of these as having illnesses caused
by radiation.[103]
The memorials in Hiroshima and Nagasaki contain lists of the names of the
hibakusha who are known to have died since the bombings. Updated annually on
the anniversaries of the bombings, as of August 2010, the memorials record the
names of more than 420,000 deceased hibakusha; 269,446 in Hiroshima[104]
and 152,276 in Nagasaki.[105]

Double survivors

People who suffered the effects of both bombings are known as nijū
hibakusha in Japan. On March 24, 2009, the Japanese government officially
recognized
Tsutomu Yamaguchi (1916–2010) as a double hibakusha. He was confirmed
to be 3 kilometers from ground zero in Hiroshima on a business trip when
Little Boy
was detonated. He was seriously burnt on his left side and spent the night in
Hiroshima. He arrived at his home city of Nagasaki on August 8, a day before Fat
Man was dropped, and he was exposed to residual radiation while searching for
his relatives. He was the first officially recognised survivor of both bombings.[106]
Tsutomu Yamaguchi died on January 4, 2010, after a battle with stomach cancer at
the age of 93.[107]
The 2006 documentary Twice Survived: The Doubly Atomic Bombed of Hiroshima
and Nagasaki documented 165 nijū hibakusha, and was screened at the
United Nations.[108]

Korean survivors

The cenotaph for Korean atomic bomb victims in Hiroshima

During the war, Japan brought many Korean conscripts to both Hiroshima and
Nagasaki to work as
forced labor.[109]
According to recent estimates, about 20,000 Koreans were killed in Hiroshima and
about 2,000 died in Nagasaki. It is estimated that one in seven of the Hiroshima
victims was of Korean ancestry.[7]
A Korean prince of the
Joseon Dynasty,
Yi Wu, also died from the Hiroshima bombing.[110]
For many years, Koreans had a difficult time fighting for recognition as atomic
bomb victims and were denied health benefits. However, most issues have been
addressed in recent years through lawsuits.[111]

The role of the bombings in
Japan's surrender and the U.S.'s ethical justification for them has been the
subject of scholarly and popular debate for decades. J. Samuel Walker wrote in
an April 2005 overview of recent historiography on the issue, "the controversy
over the use of the bomb seems certain to continue." Walker wrote that "The
fundamental issue that has divided scholars over a period of nearly four decades
is whether the use of the bomb was necessary to achieve victory in the war in
the Pacific on terms satisfactory to the United States."[10]

Supporters of the bombings generally assert that they caused the Japanese
surrender, preventing massive casualties on both sides in the planned invasion
of Japan:
Kyūshū was to be invaded in October 1945 and
Honshū five months later. Some estimate Allied forces would have suffered
1 million casualties in such a scenario, while Japanese casualties would have
been in the millions.[113]
Although thousands of Japanese were taken prisoner,[114]
most fought until they were killed or committed suicide.[115]
According to Risa Brooks and Elizabeth A. Stanley, "One scholar estimated that
kamikaze
attacks could have sunk or damaged a full third of the invasion armada destined
for Kyūshū."[114]
As the chief commander of the Japanese army,
Korechika Anami was outspoken against the idea of surrender. Even after the
bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Anami opposed talk of surrender, and
proposed instead that a large-scale battle be fought on the Japanese mainland
causing such massive Allied casualties that Japan would somehow be able to evade
surrender and perhaps even keep some of what it had conquered.[116]
Eventually, his arguments were overcome when
Emperor Hirohito directly requested an end to the war himself.[117]

Those who oppose the bombings, among them many US military leaders as well as
ex-president
Herbert Hoover argue that it was simply an extension of the already fierce
conventional bombing campaign[118]
and this together with the sea blockade and the collapse of Germany (with its
implications regarding redeployment) would also have led to a Japanese
surrender, therefore, the atomic bombings were militarily unnecessary.[11]

J. Samuel Walker, chief historian of the U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission has stated: "The consensus among scholars is
that the bomb was not needed to avoid an invasion of Japan and to end the war
within a relatively short time. It is clear that alternatives to the bomb
existed and that Truman and his advisers knew it."[119]

As the United States dropped its atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in
August 1945, 1.6 million
Soviet troops launched a surprise attack on the Japanese forces occupying
eastern Asia. "The Soviet entry into the war played a much greater role than the
atomic bombs in inducing Japan to surrender because it dashed any hope that
Japan could terminate the war through Moscow's mediation," said Japanese
historian
Tsuyoshi Hasegawa, whose recently published Racing the Enemy: Stalin,
Truman, and the Surrender of Japan is based on recently declassified Soviet
archives as well as U.S. and Japanese documents.[120]

Legal situation in
Japan

... (b) that the dropping of atomic bombs as an act of hostilities was
illegal under the rules of positive international law (taking both
treaty law and customary law into consideration) then in force... (c)
that the dropping of atomic bombs also constituted a wrongful act on the
plane of municipal law, ascribable to the United States and its
President, Mr. Harry S. Truman;

...The aerial bombardment with atomic bombs of the cities of
Hiroshima and Nagasaki was an illegal act of hostilities according to
the rules of international law. It must be regarded as indiscriminate
aerial bombardment of undefended cities, even if it were directed at
military objectives only, inasmuch as it resulted in damage comparable
to that caused by indiscriminate bombardment.

Further reading

There is an extensive body of literature concerning the bombings, the
decision to use the bombs, and the surrender of Japan. The following sources
provide a sampling of prominent works on this subject matter.

Hamai, Shinzo (2010). A-Bomb Mayor:
Warnings and Hope from Hiroshima.

The Committee for the Compilation of
Materials on Damage Caused by the Atomic Bombs in Hiroshima and Nagasaki
(1981). Hiroshima and Nagasaki: The Physical, Medical, and Social
Effects of the Atomic Bombings. Basic Books.
ISBN 046502985X.
ISBN046502985X.

Campbell, Richard H. (2005). "Chapter 2:
Development and Production". The Silverplate Bombers: A History and
Registry of the Enola Gay and Other B-29s Configured to Carry Atomic
Bombs. McFarland & Company, Inc..
ISBN0-7864-2139-8.

In accordance with Title 17 U.S.C. Section 107, any copyrighted work in the
American USSR Library is archived here under fair use without profit or payment
to those who have expressed a prior interest in reviewing the included
information for personal use, non-profit research and educational purposes
only.
Ref.
http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/17/107.shtml