Vested Interests Block Reconciliation in Tibet

posted Dec 20, 2013, 8:35 AM by The Tibetan Political Review

By Thubten Samphel (Dharamsala, India)

(Photo: TAR Party Secretary Chen Quanguo in Tibet)

China's anti-splitism bureaucracy is up in arms. This time the Chinese
Communist Party bureaucracy's fight against separatists is turning
against scholars within party think tanks who dare to suggest
accommodation and reconciliation with the Dalai Lama is needed for when
the time comes to identify his reincarnation.

This is not a bureaucratic turf war. It is a frontal assault with big
guns firing. Both at home and abroad in shrill, "don't talk back" tones,
the anti-splitism bureaucracy is engaged in a largely one-sided
shouting match.

On 22 October, the Information Office of the State Council, China's cabinet, released another white paper on the development and progress of Tibet. The message like all other incarnations of the
white paper before it, is the same. Old Tibet suffered under feudal
serfdom and theocracy. New Tibet, the white paper claims, has "gained
freedom, equality and dignity" and is "fully enjoying the fruits of
modern civilization".

However, there is a little problem. The latest white paper complains,
"The 14th Dalai Lama and his clique in exile are conducting separatist
activities for a long time to sabotage the development and stability of
Tibet ... They have put forward the so-called concepts of Greater Tibet
and high degree of autonomy, which in fact go against China's actual
conditions, and violate the constitution and relevant laws."

The party journal Qiushi ("Seeking Truth") in its 21st edition of 2013
carried a lengthy article by Chen Quanguo, Tibet's party secretary, who
called for more restrictive measures to stop the flow of all online
information between Tibet and the outside world. Barely able to combat
the influence of the Dalai Lama in Tibet, Chen Quanguo sets himself a
lofty goal in his anti-Dalai Lama struggle. He said, "We should educate
and guide cadres and ordinary people of various ethnic groups to
separate Tibetan Buddhism from the fourteenth Dalai Lama and separate
the fourteenth Dalai Lama from the title of the Dalai Lama so that they
will consciously make a clear break from the fourteenth Dalai Lama's
clique."

Separating Tibetan Buddhism from the 14th Dalai Lama is, even for the
Communist Party, a tall order. However, trying to de-link the 14th Dalai
Lama from the post of the Dalai Lama seems to be the depth of
desperation of China's anti-Dalai Lama bureaucracy. It is like trying
to separate the Pope from Catholicism.

The work of the anti-Dalai Lama bureaucracy like trying to separate Mao
from Maoism or, saying Mao is not Mao. For those who wish the Chinese
Communist Party well, they can only say best of luck in its new
spiritual quest. But discerning Buddhists around the world - and there
are plenty in China - see that behind the Tibet party secretary's
spiritual goals lies a dark ulterior motive: a life-and-death struggle
against the Tibetan spiritual leader.

Chen's diatribe and other missives are aimed at China's domestic
audience. Explaining China's current hardline policy on Tibet to the
rest of the world is left to Zhu Weiqun, China's principal interlocutor
with the envoys of the Dalai Lama from 2002 to 2010.

During his trip to Europe in October, Zhu, the director of China's
ethnic and religious affairs, gave a series of interviews to the media.
These interviews have subsequently been reprinted in China's domestic
media. In one, he said the only purpose of the meetings between the two
envoys of the Dalai Lama and the Chinese authorities was to "persuade
the Dalai Lama to stop separatist activities ... and arguing for the
so-called Tibet issue". Zhu Weiqun said, "The fact is that the fate and
future of Tibet are in the hands of the Chinese."

If the party is so confident it has the right medication for its Tibet
headache, why doesn't it go about doing it silently? Why all this noise?

One reason is the ongoing spate of self-immolations that are engulfing
the plateau. Kunchok Tseten, a father of two, was the latest Tibetan to
set himself on fire on December 3 in Ngaba in Sichuan province, where
most self-immolations have taken place. This brings the count of those
who set themselves on fire on the Tibetan plateau to 123 since February
2009. All had called for the return of the Dalai Lama to his homeland
and freedom in Tibet.

Against this background of fiery protests, the party needs to explain if
its policies in Tibet are so correct why is the issue ablaze? In this
case and in other cases of anything going wrong in Tibet, the party's
accusing finger is pointed at the Dalai Lama's clique. This easy way of
absolving responsibilities for failed Tibet policies carries weight and
conviction with China's online public. The party's propaganda that it is
the Dalai Lama who is forcing these young Tibetans to self-immolate
have provoked some on Weibo, Chinese Twitter, to ask, why doesn't the
Dalai Lama self-immolate?

It is easy for the party to hide its failed policies on the plateau
behind the smokescreen of Chinese nationalism. It is also easy for a
well-funded bureaucracy to blast Tibetans who only ask to be treated
decently with the full force of Chinese nationalism and drown their
already silenced voices in the din of official rhetoric.

Internal dissent

The hard part is how to respond to those within the party who call for a
change of tack on Tibet. What makes officials who handle the party's
Tibet policy nervous are suggestions expressed within the party
establishment for China to adopt a more accommodating attitude to the
Dalai Lama. Suggestions for change in policy, expressed in scattered
interviews, might become a clamour and then transform itself into a
trend. There are reports that this sentiment enjoys widespread support
within the party's intellectual circle.

A significant salvo against the party's hardline policy on Tibet was
fired by Jin Wei, a professor at the Central Party School in Beijing.
This June and October in comments made to Asia Weekly, a Chinese
language publication in Hong Kong, Jin Wei said that treating the Dalai
Lama as an "enemy" alienates all six million Tibetans who believe him to
be the "living Buddha". She said, "The Dalai Lama is the key to the
issue of Tibet."

Professor Jin Wei's idea in re-establishing contacts with the Dalai Lama
is to gain his co-operation in identifying his successor to enable
Beijing to install a Dalai Lama of its choice to stabilize its rule on
the plateau and avoid the embarrassment of two Dalai Lamas.

For Chinese policy makers who are trying to find alternative policy
choices to resolve the issue of Tibet in the most cost-effective manner,
Jin Wei's suggestions may look attractive, even tempting. But such
suggestions send the party's anti-splitism bureaucracy into apoplexy.
Why?

The reason is that the party's anti-splitism bureaucracy functions as
one vast vested interest. China's fight against separatism commands a
force of at least 400,000 cadres - drawn from the party, government and
army - whose careers flourish or founder on how well they wage war
against separatists. The case of Hu Jintao, the former president, is a
clear precedent. His decisive clampdown when party chief in Tibet on
protests that rocked the area in 1988 and the imposition of martial law
in Lhasa set the stage for how the party would behave when student
protests shook Beijing in 1989. Hu was assured a spot in the politburo
in the following years to become China's top leader.

Any reconciliation between the Dalai Lama and Beijing would make the
careers of those involved in the anti-separatist struggle go up in
smoke.

Bapa Phuntsok Wangyal, who lives in Beijing, is the founder of the
Tibetan Communist Party. He joined the Long March, served as the
interpreter between the Dalai Lama and Mao Zedong in 1954-1955 and held
important posts within the party. He wrote a series of letters from 2004
to 2006 to Hu Jintao, then president of the People's Republic of China,
pleading for a softer approach to Tibet. These letters were smuggled
out and translated into English and published in India. In one of these
letters, Baba Phuntsok Wangyal said:

These people live on anti-separatism, are promoted due to
anti-separatism, and they hit the jackpot by anti-separatism ... The
longer the Dalai Lama keeps on staying abroad, and the bigger his
influence, the more long-lasting the period of high ranks and great
wealth for those anti-separatist groups ... On the contrary, when the
Dalai Lama restores relations with the Central Government, these people
will be terrified, tense and lose their jobs.

President Xi Jinping is in the best position to overhaul China's
hardline Tibet policy. He is untainted by any heavy-handed crackdown on
Tibetan protests. For him to develop a robust and healthy Tibet policy
that leads to reconciliation between the Tibetan people and Beijing, he
needs to first overcome internal bureaucratic resistance and inertia.

Thubten Samphel is the director of the Tibet Policy Institute,
a research centre of the Central Tibetan Administration.