Saturday, 25 July 2009

Might Intentions be Reasons? (Ben Mitchell-Yellin)

In this post, I want to gesture at a sense in which intentions might be reasons that is consistent with the view defended by John Brunero (“Are Intentions Reasons?” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 88: 424-44), that intentions do not provide reasons for actions or for adopting other intentions. I will begin by briefly presenting Brunero’s view. Then I will make a distinction between different “directions” in which a reason may “push” and suggest that intentions might be reasons that push in one direction even if not the others.

Brunero rejects both the intentions-provide-reasons view and the tie-breaker view, according to which intentions are reasons only in tie-break situations. He puts forward the following positive view:

[I]n cases where we are dealing with some already reasonable end, there is a reason to do what would facilitate that end (a reason that exists not because you intend the end, but because the end is reasonable), but your intending the end may be relevant to whether this reason transfers to the specific actions which are necessary, but not sufficient, for the realization of the end.

Brunero’s idea of a reason transferring from an adopted end to a necessary (but not sufficient) means relies on the notions of the “facilitative principle” and “facilitating plans,” borrowed from Raz. A facilitating plan is a set of actions that are individually necessary and jointly sufficient for achieving some end. According to the facilitative principle, given reasonable end E, agent A has a reason to perform each individually necessary (but not sufficient) means M1, M2, …, Mn, as part of his facilitating plan P. But this does not mean that A has a reason to perform M1 by itself. That “would seem a pointless and unreasonable waste of time.” This is where intentions affect our reasons. A’s intention to E “provides us with some assurance that he will undertake the other parts of the plan that, along with [M1], will jointly suffice to bring it about that he can” E. So A’s adoption of the intention to E transfers the reason for P as a whole to each of its individual parts M1, M2, …, Mn.

Notably, on Brunero’s view, the intention to E does not give A any new reasons. Instead, it affects the structure of the reasons he has. Both E and E’ may be reasonable ends. So A has reason to undertake both facilitating plans P and P’. But supposing A adopts E, and not E’, we do not want to say that he has a reason to M and M’, where these are individual parts of P and P’, respectively. Brunero’s view allows us to say that A’s adopting E, and not E’, makes it the case that A has a reason to M (as a part of P) but not M’, and this is so because A’s adopting E makes it reasonable to suppose that A will complete all the necessary and jointly sufficient means to E, of which M is one. I think this view is reasonable. I also think it allows that intentions might be reasons, albeit in a different sense than concerns Brunero.

Brunero follows the literature in concerning himself with the question whether intentions might be considerations that favor performing actions (that are necessary (but not sufficient) means to executing the intention) or adopting other intentions. We might say that in the first case the question is whether intentions are reasons that “push down” and in the second case whether intentions are reasons that “push across.” Such talk makes sense if we think of levels of rational agency (perhaps along the lines of Bratman’s theory of planning agency). We might delineate the various levels as follows. At bottom, we have facts. Then we have actions, facilitating plans, intentions, non-facilitating plans and policies, in ascending order of hierarchy. One natural question, given this hierarchy, is whether the adoption of an intention exerts rational pressure that “pushes down” to the level of facilitating plans. Does A’s adopting the intention to E give her a reason to M, where M is a necessary (but not sufficient) means to E? This is the sort of question that concerns Brunero. He gives a negative answer. A’s adopting E does not give her a reason in this sense. She already has a reason to M, but only as a part of facilitating plan P. A’s adopting E transfers the reason for P to each of the jointly sufficient actions that constitute it. One may even think this claim can be generalized, such that no reasons “push down.”

But, it seems to me, even if the general claim is correct in answer to the above question, we might also ask a different question. We might wonder whether the adoption of an intention to E exerts rational pressure that “pushes up” to the level of non-facilitating plans. Does A’s adopting the intention to E give her a reason to adopt non-facilitating plan X, where E is a necessary (but not sufficient) means to X? Perhaps we can give a positive answer. So intentions can be reasons in a sense. They can be considerations that favor adopting non-facilitating plans. The claim that reasons “push up” is not at all foreign. Facts are commonly thought to favor actions, for example. So a negative answer to the general question whether reasons ever “push up” is not likely forthcoming. This adds interest to the question about intentions in particular.

Let us take as basic the notion of a reason as a consideration that favors something (following Scanlon). If A’s adopting an intention favors something (in a way that thing was not favored before the adoption of the intention), then we can say that A’s adopting the intention gives A a reason. This is consistent with Brunero’s view because he accepts the claim that reasons are basic and denies that A’s adopting an intention favors anything (in a way that thing was not favored before the adoption of the intention). I want to suggest (but not argue for the claim) that once we notice the above hierarchy, we might see that the adoption of an intention might favor something (in a way that thing was not favored before), namely, a non-facilitating plan. We are familiar with the notion that a fact can favor an action. So we are familiar with the notion of reasons that “push up” from facts to actions. Indeed, it is because some fact F already favors M that we need not take A’s adopting E to favor M in order to say that A has a reason to M. And we can say that E is reasonable because it is favored by certain facts. This is another familiar way that reasons “push up.” So what stands in the way of our saying that another way reasons “push up” is by intentions favoring non-facilitating plans?

Here is one possible objection. We might think that only facts can stand in the favoring-relation to things (e.g., actions, intentions, etc.). The two familiar ways that reasons “push up” both appeal to facts favoring something. We might say that facts, not intentions, favor non-facilitating plans in just the same way that facts favor actions and intentions. Call this a “buck-passing” account of rational agency. At each level, the relevant thing is reasonable only if favored, but it is always facts that do the favoring. So intentions do not favor non-facilitating plans, facts do. Thus, intentions do not give reasons.

This is an interesting objection. Let me conclude by suggesting one reason why we might not want a buck-passing account of rational agency. I think we want our adopted goals to factor into the reasonableness of our higher-order agential attitudes. We want our intentions to affect the reasonableness of our non-facilitating plans and our non-facilitating plans to affect the reasonableness of our policies. This is not to deny that the facts affect the reasonableness of our non-facilitating plans and policies. But the facts may not (do not?) determine uniquely reasonable non-facilitating plans and policies. And this is where we might find that intentions are reasons. That A adopts an intention to E might favor her adopting certain reasonable (according to the facts) non-facilitating plans over others.

2 comments:

Hey Ben,This is a very insightful and carefully worded post. I haven’t read the Brunero paper, so my comments and questions will be primarily clarificatory.

You say:Does A’s adopting the intention to E give her a reason to adopt non-facilitating plan X, where E is a necessary (but not sufficient) means to X? Perhaps we can give a positive answer.

This seems right to me. Consider the following example. Suppose I have a reason to purchase book X today (because I need it to complete a term paper). Moreover, let us suppose that I adopt the intention to purchase the book at Borders (which requires that I take the bus) rather than Barnes and Noble (which would require that I take the subway). According to your reading of Brunero, my intention to purchase the book at Borders does not give me a reason to take the bus rather than the train (i.e., one facilitating plan as opposed to another), but it is relevant to whether or not my reason for purchasing book X today tranfers to my taking the bus. Now, even if we grant Brunero’s point, it still seems that my intention to purchase the book at Borders may constitute a reason relevant to some other (non-facilitating plan or intention). For example, suppose that there is some book Y that I have little reason to purchase today since I won’t need it for another two weeks. However, I know that Borders carries book Y. It seems plausible that my intention to purchase book X at Borders today may favour my adopting the intention to purchase book Y today. That is, my intention to purchase book X at Borders gives me a reason to intend to purchase book Y today that I did not have before adopting said intention.

Now, the objection you consider and respond to at the end of your post is that only facts may serve as reasons. For example, it may be argued that it is the fact that I am going to purchase book X at Borders that is a reason for me to adopt the intention to purchase book Y today. However, this need not be the case. Suppose that I am struck and killed by a taxi cab shortly after exiting the bus in front of Borders. In such a case, there is no fact vis-à-vis my purchasing book X. Even so, we would not say that this retroactively removes what reason I had for forming the intention (when I left my house) to purchase book Y today. I still had a reason to adopt the intention to purchase book Y today (when I left my house), and my reason is that I intended to purchase book X at Borders today. If this is right, it is my intention to purchase book X at Borders, rather than the fact that I will purchase book X at Borders, that gives me a reason to adopt the intention to purchase Book Y today.

Would this represent the kind of case you have in mind? If not, do you think it works?

One quick clarificatory question relating to Brunero’s position. You say that you wish to articulate a sense in which an intention may be a reason that is “consistent” with Brunero’s view. But later you say that Brunero “denies that A’s adopting an intention favors anything (in a way that thing was not favored before the adoption of the intention).” Is your point, then, that Brunero’s example still allows for intentions to be reasons in a certain sense and that his example does not have the consequences he takes it to have. Or is your point actually that Brunero does not wish to flatly deny that intentions may be reasons, but only wishes to deny that intentions are a certain kind of reason – namely, the “push down” kind. This is a minor (exegetical) point, but it was not entirely clear (to me) which of the two views you wish to attribute to Brunero.

Thanks for the comments. Sorry to get to them so late, but I'll try to respond anyway.

Let me begin with your clarificatory question. Brunero's position is that intentions do not give reasons (of any sort). So, strictly speaking, it seems incompatible with the position I put forward. And this sits awkwardly with my wish to present a position consistent with Brunero's view. However, I think that Brunero has a narrow sense of reasons in mind, namely, only those that "push down." So while the view he expresses makes a blanket denial, I think he is best read as denying that intentions are reasons of a certain sort. And that this position may be consistent with them being reasons of another sort. I hope that helps clear things up a bit.

As for your example of my intention to buy book X today giving me a reason to buy book Y today, it is not the sort of case I had in mind. Your case seems to me one of reasons "pushing across." I hoped to be making a case for reasons that "push up" from intentions to non-facilitating plans (and possibly policies).

I take a non-facilitating plan to be of a higher-order than intentions for action. So an intention to buy a book today would be part of (but not identical to) a non-facilitating plan. Perhaps the relevant non-facilitating plan is (to borrow an example from Brunero) to become a lawyer (as opposed to a doctor). The intention to buy book X may be a part of this plan.

The point about facts is that one might think that it is in virtue of certain facts (e.g., I am good at memorizing facts, I want a desk job, etc.) that I have reason to become a lawyer rather than a doctor. And my intention to buy book X is favored by these (and perhaps other) facts as well. The intention does not favor one career path over another but rather is favored by facts that may (or may not) favor one career path over another.

What I want to say against this "buck-passing" account is that it seems that with respect to certain non-facilitating plans we should want our intentions to have a say, as it were. Suppose the facts favor plan A as much as they do plan B. And suppose they favor intention X, which is part of plan A, as much as they do intention Y, which is part of plan B. And suppose I adopt intention X. Then it seems that I have more reason to adopt plan A than I did before. To make this more concrete, once I intend to go to law school and begin taking the necessary means to this end, it seems that I have more reason than I did before to become a lawyer. (Of course, I might find out that I have less reason to become a lawyer (e.g., because I hate the subject matter now that I have waded knee deep into it), but let us focus on the less complicated case).

What Brunero argues against is the view that if I adopt plan A (over B), then I have more reason than I did before to adopt intention X (over Y). So if I adopt the law plan over the medicine plan, he wants to say that I have no more reason to go to law school than I did before. I have as much reason as before to go to law school (as this is favored buy the facts in the same way as before), but I now have reason to do this as part of a larger plan to become a lawyer. And this all seems to me to be consistent with what I have said. Perhaps this illustrates the clarificatory point above.

The Reasoner

Today my self-esteem hit an all time low when I stumbled across an argument proving conclusively that I don't exist. I’m quite distressed. This probably explains why my jeans are so loose-fitting. What’s equally upsetting is that I learned that non-existence does not exempt one from local or federal taxes.