A Mohammedan Game of Thrones: Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the Fight for Regional Hegemony

The people in the United States didn’t think well of those living in the Soviet Union during the Cold War. There was a basic mistrust and a lack of kind words on both sides. But what you didn’t hear was anyone excitedly talking about wanting to completely annihilate the other side despite both having the capacity to do just that. Fast forward to 2018: to Saudi Arabia and Iran and a new regional Middle East version of Mutually Assured Destruction, where it takes on a whole new meaning. Both of these nations maintain terrible images of each and neither would probably shed a tear if the Earth suddenly opened up and swallowed the other. Forgive the propensity to reach hyperbole, but in truth this rivalry goes back 1,385 years when, just after the death of the prophet Mohammed in AD 632, there arose among the faithful a disagreement concerning the issue of succession. Mohammed drafted a Last Will & Testament and set up an ancient version of a Trust Fund for the kids’ college/ lifeneeds, but never said a word about succession. In hindsight we now know what colossally poor planning this was as it led to a split between two key factions that would come to be known as the Sunni (who favored a vote for succession) and the Shi’a (who favored keeping it in Mohammed’s bloodline). “The Sunnis prevailed and chose a successor to be the first caliph.” (Shuster, 2017, 1) What followed was a swinging pendulum of tension with hundreds of years of both war and peace interspersed between the two sides. Today, it looks like they’re heading back to war in some form. But the real question is, are they heading back to war because of a 1,000+ year old religious grudge match? Many experts think not. Some say that the bad blood that has been forming between Saudi Arabia and Iran is not about religion, but something else: competing and hostile legitimizing myths. “With the aim of uniting peoples behind their leaders in distinction to ‘the other’, as it is so often the case, religion is misused as a dividing tool in order to enforce a political agenda.” (Reimann, 2016, 3) Not surprisingly, there are religious overtones embedded within these regional hegemonic politics pushing both sides continuously to greater episodes of dangerous tension.

The House of Al Saud, the ruling royal family of Saudi Arabia, is composed of the descendants of Muhammad bin Saud, founder of the Emirate of Diriyah, which was known as the First Saudi state (1744–1818), and his brothers. The ruling faction of the family, however, is primarily led by the descendants of Ibn Saud, the modern founder of Saudi Arabia. The government of Iran is a modern Shia theocracy that was forged in part by the overthrow of Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, the last Shah of Iran, in 1979. Today, “Iran is considered a unitary Islamic republic with one legislative house. The country’s 1979 constitution put into place a mixed system of government, in which the executive, parliament, and judiciary are overseen by several bodies dominated by the clergy. At the head of both the state and oversight institutions is a ranking cleric known as the rahbar, or leader, whose duties and authority are those usually equated with a head of state.” (Editorial Staff, 2017. 1) Ironically, many have argued that Iran has one of the most democratically structured Constitutions in the world, if not for these extra-constitutional religious oversight bodies that sit over all of the constitutional structures. Even putting the religious affiliations and religio-political structures aside, these two countries are as different as Persian night and Saudi day.

Both Saudi Arabia and Iran view themselves through the legitimizing myth of being the purer form of Islam and true holder of Mohammed’s legacy. As if that wasn’t conflictual enough, to make matters worse, the Wahhabist theocratic leadership in Riyadh sees the government and family of Saud as secular barbarians that strategically use their Sunni Wahhabist religious connections as a hedge to maintain power. The royal family of Saudi Arabia, for its part, views the theocracy of Iran as a bastardized form of Islam led by illegitimate Imams that hold a potentially progressive nation hostage to outdated religious edicts that have no relevance in the modern Islamic world. Even more dismissively, the Saudi royal family sneer at how this ‘Iranian backwardness’ has led directly to decades of crippling American sanctions against the people. Of course, the theocracy in Iran sees the cozy relationship between the Saudis and Americans as proof of the infidel fall of the keepers of the Prophet’s two great cities, Mecca and Medina. The Saudis are in bed with the Great Satan.

These underlying myths that debate ancient religious legitimacy may be fueling the hatred and Muslim-on-Muslim discrimination found on both sides. But disturbingly, there is one more legitimizing myth that might actually rule over all the others and it’s tied to the massive political power and influence greased by black crude. Saudi Arabia comes in as number 2 in terms of the world’s known oil reserves. Iran sits at number 4. That oil, and the wealth and political power it translates to, is not lost on either side. Oil is easily the top revenue-producing commodity in both countries. While ups and downs in the global market can have serious consequences for both countries, it means more damage for Iran than Saudi Arabia. The royal Saudi family has wisely/secretly over the past half century stashed away over half a trillion dollars to uniformly smooth out the revenue curves that are innate to the natural resource market in a volatile global economy. Since Tehran has been the subject of severe sanctions, due to its association with Islamic extremism and terrorism, it simply has not been able to create the same safety net/golden pillow of economic protection. Consequently, Iran has not been able to capitalize on its vast reserves of oil, selling much of it on the black market for rock bottom prices to less-than-ideal market consumers. This disparity in oil wealth, the freedom of action within the world market, and the subsequent ability to wield enhanced political power in the region is the real legitimizing myth that acts as a true political hammer separating the two and concretizing their strife with one another.

Iran’s political and military expansion into Syria, and its alliance with Russia, is another facet of its hegemonic intentions and desire to unseat Saudi Arabia as the real regional power broker. Iran appears willing to become a client or “dependent” ally of Russia, much as Saudi Arabia has a similar arrangement with the United States. Obviously, this is a dangerous recipe: regional power pretenses, advanced weapons from larger global powers, divergent religious positions, and political gamesmanship operating in the middle of another country’s civil war. Both Russia and the United States have cautiously moved their respective chess pieces as events develop in Syria, but unfortunately this caution does not exhibit the press for peace: rather, the American-Russian chess game in Syria only seems to exacerbate the animosity between the Saudis and Iranians. The alleged chemical weapon attacks on rebel positions inside Damascus by Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, backed by Russian forces, caused a direct but limited military response by Washington. American cruise missile attacks on Syrian chemical weapons plants, though marginally effective, nevertheless was a message to Russia and Iran that the U.S. would defend its interests in the region. Those interests are decidedly in favor of a Saudi regional hegemonic leadership. Thus, what we have are cross-competing and hostile legitimizing myths being created in real time about what the future role of each of these players is going to be, America supporting the Saudi myth and Russia supporting the Iranian one.

Clearly, Saudi Arabia and Iran are going to remain deeply entrenched in hostile efforts for political and military dominance in the region. Though ancient religious strife seems like a convenient excuse for continued bad feelings between the two powers – and is focused on to a heavy extent by world media – modern strategic reasons are more dangerous and multi-layered. What we can recognize is an old fashion game of power politics in which both sides have aligned themselves with powerful and protective allies. This game is being made manifest in a critical region of the world where resources are converted to global wealth and power. The parties should remember that oil is combustible. Politics built on oil even more so. But politics built on oil, doused in religious fervor, and shaken vigorously by outside players with their own agendas is the most combustible of all. For the time being, this Mohammedan Game of Thrones seems to have a plotline that will be as deadly and bloody as its more famous Hollywood moniker.

*Dr. Matthew Crosston is Executive Vice Chairman of ModernDiplomacy.eu. He is Senior Doctoral Faculty in the School of Security and Global Studies at the American Military University and was just named the future Co-Editor of the seminal International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence. His work is catalogued at: https://brown.academia.edu/ProfMatthewCrosston/Analytics

James J. Rooney, Jr. is the Boeing Senior Manager of the Guidance, Navigation and Control Subsystem of the International Space Station in Houston, Texas. Prior to joining Boeing in 1997, he spent twenty-eight years in the United States Air Force as a Command Pilot and Program Director for Air Force Space Systems. He is now a doctoral candidate Strategic Intelligence in the School of Security and Global Studies at the American Military University.

New Horizons of the Iran Nuclear Deal

At the beginning of the 21st century, we were able to
talk with some confidence about the obvious success of the nuclear
non-proliferation regime, the foundations of which had been laid by the signing
of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (Non-Proliferation
Treaty, or NPT). Back in the 1960s, the expert community was
extremely critical of the regime that was being established, predicting that by
the turn of the century, some 30 countries would possess nuclear weapons. Despite these
pessimistic forecasts, at present, there are only four countries (apart from
the officially recognized nuclear powers) that have the nuclear capability:
India, Israel, North Korea, and Pakistan. Now, however, it is difficult to be
confident about the reliability of the non-proliferation regime, even though
its system of guarantees has been brought up to date by the Additional Protocol.

Today, the generation and utilization of nuclear
energy is no longer restricted to a small group of countries capable of
financing the construction of expensive nuclear facilities. Even though nuclear
power plants continue to be extremely costly to build, an increasing number of
countries are entertaining plans to construct their own nuclear facilities
thanks to technological progress, improved nuclear security guarantees and the
objective need for new sources of energy. For example, the Rosatom State Atomic
Energy Corporation in Russia has been contracted to build nuclear reactors in a number of countries, including China, Egypt, Hungary, Iran, and Turkey.
The list of countries thinking about developing their own nuclear programs
continues to grow, especially among those nations that require sources of cheap
clean energy. However, the specific nature of nuclear energy is such that its
peaceful use poses a threat to non-proliferation.

The problem is that nuclear power generation involves
uranium enrichment as one of the stages in the technological process. The
danger here is that the same enriching equipment (centrifuges) used to
manufacture nuclear fuel can be used to obtain weapons-grade uranium suitable
for military use. The difference lies in the enrichment
level: 0.7–5 percent is sufficient
for loading uranium into most existing reactor models while obtaining a
critical mass requires enriching uranium to approximately 90 percent. In fact,
states do not need to enrich uranium on their own to provide fuel for their
nuclear power plants (off-the-shelf nuclear fuel is available in large
quantities on the international market), but many nations insist on maintaining
their enrichment facilities as a measure to ensure their energy independence.
The very presence of uranium enrichment centrifuges creates the danger of their
being used to obtain weapons-grade uranium. The case of
Iran indicates that the existing
system of curbing nuclear weapons proliferation cannot fully guarantee the
exclusively peaceful use of nuclear energy.

One way or another, the risk always remains that
countries will actively attempt to create nuclear arsenals under the pretext of
ensuring their energy independence. The more countries that turn to nuclear
power as their preferred energy source, the higher the likelihood of new
nuclear powers emerging. It is evident that the existing non-proliferation
regime no longer meets the realities of the 21st century, and that it requires
additional guarantees. It appears appropriate to adopt the restrictions
stipulated by the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) to create a new non-proliferation regime.

What the JCPOA is about

The JCPOA was the result of years of negotiations
between the international community and Iran over the latter’s nuclear program.
The plan provides for a broad range of restrictions on Iran’s nuclear activity,
its primary purpose being to prevent the country from obtaining nuclear
weapons. The JCPOA was never meant to be the final solution to the problem of
Iranian nuclear weapons; instead, it is a temporary solution limited to a
period of 15 years. This circumstance caused a wave of criticism on the part of
the international community.

The JCPOA sets limits on two categories of radioactive
substances that can be used in manufacturing nuclear weapons: uranium and
plutonium. Uranium is the most common type of reactor fuel, and it is
especially dangerous from the standpoint of its potential as a weapon. To
ensure the use of nuclear energy exclusively for peaceful purposes, the JCPOA
introduces both quantitative and qualitative restrictions on the use of
uranium. For example, Iran does not have the right to enrich uranium to more
than 3.67 percent, and its reserves of enriched uranium cannot exceed 300kg. To
meet this requirement, Iran had to get rid of 98 percent of its accumulated
enriched uranium stockpile and significantly restrict its enrichment activity.
In addition, the JCPOA imposes a temporary ban on Iran using advanced
centrifuges that are capable of quickly enriching significant amounts of
uranium.

There are also certain safeguards about plutonium.
This element is not often used as fuel for nuclear reactors, so restrictions on
its stockpiling are much easier to justify. Nevertheless, controlling the use
of plutonium is difficult due to the specific nature of its production. Unlike
uranium, plutonium is not extracted but rather synthesized from spent fuel
produced by nuclear reactors of a specific type. Heavy-water reactors have a
particular capacity for plutonium production, and the JCPOA reflects this by
imposing restrictions on Iran’s only heavy-water reactor – the Arak Heavy Water
Reactor Facility.

The JCPOA is not intended as the final solution to the
problem of the Iranian nuclear program. Its main objective is to temporarily
prevent Iran from developing a nuclear capability by handicapping the country’s
progress in that area. According to some experts, at the time of signing the JCPOA, Iran had
sufficient motivation and resources to create an atomic bomb within three to
six months. The terms of the agreement forced Iran to downscale its resources
and technical capabilities to such an extent that, if the JCPOA were to be
terminated today, the country would need around 12
months to build a nuclear weapon.
Thus, the JCPOA does not provide any perpetual non-proliferation guarantees,
but it does ensure a buffer period for international actors to apply diplomacy
or force to cull the Iranian nuclear weapons program.

Criticism of the JCPOA

The urgency with which the JCPOA was adopted drew a
spate of criticism over the guarantees offered by the new
non-proliferation regime. One of the reasons for the unilateral withdrawal of
the United States from the Iranian deal was Washington’s concern about Iran’s
actions after the expiration of the NPT. As the United States views it, once
the 15-year period stipulated by the JCPOA is up, Iran will be free to go on
with its nuclear program without any restrictions, so the sanctions on Tehran
can only be lifted on the condition that the JCPOA remains in force
indefinitely. This development would certainly secure more guarantees of Iran’s
peaceful intentions, and could make the United States reconsider its position
as to the reliability of the regime being proposed, but the prospects for
prolonging the JCPOA appear to be dubious.

The difficulty of prolonging the treaty indefinitely
is primarily linked to Iran’s interests in the Middle East. Tehran is
positioning itself as a regional power that is capable of exerting significant
cultural and political influence on Middle Eastern countries in general, and on
the region’s Shiite population in particular. Iran perceives the current
temporary limitation imposed on its nuclear program as a compromise with the
West – it is making nuclear concessions in exchange for concessions from the
international community in the form of a partial lifting of the sanctions. In
this sense, Iran is an equal party to the deal, and it limits its activities
proportionately to the concessions offered by its counterparts. An indefinite
JCPOA would go beyond that deal and into the category of “requirements,
which would strip Iran of its status as an equal party to the agreement. A
situation is emerging in which Iran will have to voluntarily limit its
sovereign right to the use of nuclear energy in exchange for an easing of the
economic pressure. At the same time, other countries that have developed
nuclear weapons by obviating the provisions of the NPT are not being subjected
to similar pressure. In addition, prolonging the JCPOA deal indefinitely would
put Iran at a disadvantage compared to its regional rivals. The restrictions
imposed on the Iranian nuclear sector in no way affect Israel, Saudi Arabia,
and Turkey, and they do not provide Iran with any significant guarantees
against the nuclear programs of those countries.

Iran unilaterally waiving its rights can hardly be
viewed as the basis of an agreement on limiting its nuclear program.
Nevertheless, the problem of Iran’s nuclear potential remains relevant. On the
contrary, it is posing an increasing threat to the non-proliferation regime. The
renewed U.S. economic pressure is endangering the JCPOA regime, even though all
the other parties to the deal have expressed
their firm intent to observe it even
with the United States withdrawing from it. Should Iran decide that the renewal
of the U.S. sanctions makes the self-imposed restrictions futile, its attempts
to develop nuclear weapons may continue. This is the most dangerous scenario,
and it was precisely to prevent it from happening that the JCPOA was introduced
in the first place.

The sanctions pressure being exerted by the United
States is increasingly affecting Iran’s economy, meaning that Tehran is even
more likely to go back on the JCPOA and resume its nuclear program. In this
case, the international community will face a difficult choice between
increasing economic pressure, which could provoke the emergence of new nuclear
power, and resorting to armed violence to destroy the Iranian nuclear program.
Both scenarios are fraught with numerous risks and are highly undesirable for
both Iran and the international community. Seeing as there is no acceptable
alternative, the only option is to search for other possibilities to preserve
the non-proliferation regime established by the JCPOA.

Making the JCPOA global

Preserving the Iranian deal is closely linked to
modernizing the global non-proliferation regime. Taken together, these two
issues may lead to the conclusion that their possible solutions would
complement each other. On its own, the JCPOA creates an effective system for
preventing non-nuclear powers from developing nuclear weapons. This is achieved
through significantly limiting the level of uranium enrichment, restricting
plutonium production, and giving IAEA experts sweeping rights in terms of
monitoring and inspections. The main drawback of the Iranian deal is its
limited scope. Iran might agree to it being in place indefinitely, but only on
the condition that its provisions are scaled up to the global level to become a
world standard for nuclear non-proliferation.

To begin with, replicating the Iranian deal globally
would effectively stop Iran from being treated like a pariah state when it
comes to the use of nuclear energy. The restrictions on the use of radioactive
substances and the IAEA’s extensive rights to carry out inspections at nuclear
facilities as provided for by the agreement would become a new norm, adopted by
a number of developed states, rather than an instrument specifically aimed at
containing Tehran’s nuclear program. Second, if the requirements become global,
Iran will get much more substantial guarantees concerning the nuclear programs
of its rivals in the Middle East. Applying similar restrictions to Iran’s
regional opponents would provide equal guarantees of nuclear energy being used
exclusively for peace in the Middle East.

Thus, adopting JCPOA globally could resolve several
issues at once. First, indefinite restrictions would be imposed on Iran’s
nuclear program (as well as on the other signatories of the planned agreement),
thus eliminating fears of Tehran relaunching its uranium enrichment program.
Second, promoting the new rules to the international level would update the
obsolete global nuclear non-proliferation regime, making it more suited to the
realities of the 21st century.

It would certainly be naive to expect the entire
global community would voluntarily adopt such a system of deterrence. However,
this does not mean that steps should not be taken in this direction. Promoting
the JCPOA to the global level should occur gradually and with support of the
nuclear states and the world’s leading economies of the world. It should also
take the importance and practicability of the JCPOA’s conditions at the global
level into account.

The current JCPOA regime, which is geared specifically
towards the Iranian nuclear program, may well represent a very reliable system
of checks and balances, but it still cannot be brought up to the global level
in its original format. Imbuing it with a universal character would require
identifying the priority restrictions, with due attention paid to the specific
requirements of potential new players in the non-proliferation regime.

The process of establishing such restrictions at the
global level will present a serious challenge to the diplomatic capabilities of
those countries that are most interested in maintaining the nuclear
non-proliferation system (even though, to some extent, the existing regime is
essential for all countries). We may assume that this task is a priority for
nuclear states seeking to preserve their monopoly on nuclear weapons, thereby
minimizing the risk of their use for military purposes. This calls for the
process to be led by recognized nuclear powers, namely Russia, the United
States, China, France and the United Kingdom (and also by the European Union as
an influential political association). If these countries accept the conditions
for limiting Iranian uranium enrichment, this could help achieve several goals
at once. First, such major and reputable countries could help to establish a
kind of “standard” for other nations. Second, such a strategy does not
contradict the political vector of the movement of the nuclear powers (they all
declare, in one way or another, their desire to reduce their nuclear arsenals).
Third (which is particularly important), the recognized nuclear states are
permanent members of the UN Security Council. If the Security Council approves
a new non-proliferation regime, the issue will be brought to a qualitatively
new level of consideration. As practice shows, the recognition of the need for
certain actions at such a high level contributes to the creation of a consensus
on such issues.

The success of the strategy is directly dependent on
the readiness of the members of the Security Council to move to a new stage of
the non-proliferation regime. Of particular concern are Israel, India,
Pakistan, and North Korea as states that have acquired a nuclear arsenal
despite the non-proliferation regime, as well as non-signatories of the NPT. It
is difficult to expect that the international community will be able to
convince them to abandon nuclear weapons shortly, and it will be challenging to
achieve any restrictions in this area. In this regard, it would seem that the
operation of the agreement should not be made dependent on the fact of its
signing by these states. Unfortunately, the presence of nuclear weapons among
these powers should be viewed as a fait
accompli, the reversal of which will require an individual
approach. The main goal of the new non-proliferation regime should be to
prevent the emergence of new “nuclear” states, and not to correct the mistakes
of the past.

The Middle East as a factor in the new non-proliferation
regime

Special attention should also be paid to ensuring that
the non-proliferation regime covers the maximum number of countries in the
Middle East. As a country with colossal military and economic opportunities,
and one that has historically played a prominent role in the fate of the
region, claims a dominant position among the Middle Eastern countries. In this
regard, an agreement that binds Iran’s competitors in the region to accept
similar restrictions would be a critical condition for reaching a mutual
understanding of the project. As some of Iran’s most fierce opponents in the
Middle East, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey should become key signatories to such an
agreement, especially because both states have ambitious
nuclear plans. It would only be
logical to expand this list to include Israel, which, despite the constant
denials that it possesses a nuclear arsenal and the numerous
reports to this effect, is known to
have had nuclear weapons for several decades now.

Nevertheless, it would be difficult to expect an
agreement on disarmament with a state that already possesses nuclear weapons
(as is the case with Pakistan, India and North Korea). The importance of paying
special attention to the non-proliferation regime in the Middle East is also
linked to the region’s specific challenges. The Middle East is more at risk of
large-scale military conflicts and terrorist activities than any other region
in the world. In this sense, this region needs extra guarantees to prevent the
prevention of nuclear weapons.

Besides, this kind of list of restrictions may
eventually become the foundation for turning the Middle East into a
nuclear-free zone. Such proposals have long been discussed by the international community, but a consensus has
never been reached. The specific characteristics of such areas lie in the fact
that they do not just ban the production of nuclear weapons, but also their
deployment and delivery platforms. Iran’s ballistic missile program is one of
the main reasons for the U.S. criticism of the JCPOA’s limitations since the
development of such carriers often precedes or accompanies the creation of a
nuclear charge. The prospect that the proposed non-proliferation regime will
serve as the foundation for the complete liberation of the Middle East from
nuclear weapons may contribute to the United States revising its position on
the future of the system of guarantees of the JCPOA.

The importance of reaching an agreement on the
establishment of new guarantees before the 2020 Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty Review Conference is particularly noteworthy. The withdrawal of the
United States from the intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) system and the
temporary suspension of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF Treaty)
between the United States and Russia have jeopardized both the success of the
2020 Review Conference, and the nuclear non-proliferation regime as a whole. In
2015, the NPT suffered significant damage since no visible progress had been
made at the conference on improving the non-proliferation regime. The main
sticking point was the negotiations on the creation of a nuclear-weapon-free
zone in the Middle East. The conference ended with the adoption of only some
procedural documents, and no real progress was achieved in the field of
denuclearization. The unwillingness of the international community (especially
the nuclear powers) to take steps towards nuclear disarmament and the creation
of additional safeguards in the field of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons
are a serious threats to the NPT.

The lack of any significant progress towards improving
the NPT can be compensated by the adoption, by the international community (or
at least part of it), of the limitations set out in JCPOA as global
responsibilities in the framework of the nuclear non-proliferation regime. At
the same time, successful worldwide promotion of the provisions of the JCPOA
would be an important step towards the continuation of negotiations on turning
the Middle East into a zone free of nuclear weapons.

A special role in reaching a compromise on the new
non-proliferation regime should be assigned to Russia. Over the past several
years of its diplomatic and military presence in the Middle East, Russia has
been able to establish friendly relations with all the major players in the
region, despite the fact that Moscow frequently neglects the interests of some
of them. Russia is perceived as a relatively neutral player in the region, one
that seeks to maneuver between the interests of the regional states while not
giving an obvious preference to any of them. This situation is perfect for
playing the role of a mediator between the states of the Middle East, without
which reaching a compromising on the issue of non-proliferation in the region would
be an almost impossible task.

New non-proliferation regime

It is difficult to talk about accepting the conditions
of the JCPOA in full because any non-proliferation regime is a direct attempt
on the sovereign rights of the state, which can only be removed by absolute
necessity. In this regard, it appears that restrictions should concern only the
priority areas of nuclear activity during the early stages of the adoption of a
new regime.

The most important (and at the same time fairly
achievable) area of limitation would be uranium enrichment. This is because
uranium is the most common component of a nuclear charge. At the same time,
uranium enrichment is much easier to explain away than plutonium production.
Regular operation of a reactor does not require a given country to maintain an
expensive enrichment infrastructure since uranium is available in large volumes
on the international market. What is more, establishing worldwide limits on
enrichment levels should not damage the operation of nuclear reactors, since
low-enriched uranium is quite suitable for use as a fuel. It should be enough
to put a cap on the enrichment limits for uranium at 5 percent, and this would
guarantee that the substance cannot be used in weapons, without interfering
with the operation of nuclear power plants. It thus appears that the first
stage in the formation of a new non-proliferation regime should be the adoption
of uniform standards as applied to permissible uranium enrichment.

The JCPOA also sets limits on the amount of enriched
uranium that Iran can store at any given time. While these restrictions could
strengthen the reliability of the non-proliferation regime, they can hardly
outweigh the diplomatic efforts that could make this restriction universal. The
only reason this condition was introduced with regard to Iran was that Tehran
had already been accused of trying to obtain nuclear weapons. Iran keeps small
stockpiles of uranium to offset the creation of a nuclear charge under the
international deal. For most countries, the presumption of such a desire does
not exist, and the establishment of the maximum amount of a stored substance
would unduly limit the sovereign rights of the signatory states. Also, the
establishment of such restrictions would require a separate study of the
nuclear industry of each state and the development of individual restrictions
for each party to the agreement. It appears that, at least in the first stages
of the introduction of the new non-proliferation regime, the measures for
limiting storage volumes should be applied exclusively to Iran. At the same
time, as Iran meets its obligations, quantitative restrictions should be
gradually lifted. After having successfully limited the degree of uranium
enrichment and created the foundation for a new regime, negotiations can then
begin on the introduction of quantitative restrictions. An alternative option
would be to consider transferring Iran’s stockpile of enriched uranium to
independent international institutions (such as the IAEA Low Enriched Uranium
Bank).

Certain difficulties may also arise with regard to
limitations on plutonium production. As noted above, plutonium can be used both
for the manufacture of a nuclear charge and as nuclear fuel. At the same time,
unlike the uranium enrichment process, the production of plutonium is much more
difficult to track since it is directly related to the normal operation of a
nuclear reactor. Moreover, while plutonium may not be among the most popular
nuclear fuels, it is still used in a broad range of different reactor types.
Russia and some other countries are unlikely to be prepared to limit their
domestic production and use of plutonium, as this would severely limit their
fleet of nuclear reactors.

Despite the danger of plutonium as a substance with
large nuclear potential, the wisest thing to do would be to not extend the
Iranian restrictions to the international community. First, the specifics of
plutonium production mean that IAEA experts can, given the proper monitoring
framework, distinguish between it being manufactured for peaceful or military
purposes. Second, it would not be a good idea to overload the signatory states
with excessive restrictions as the new non-proliferation regime is just
settling in. Such pressure may force the potential parties to the convention to
refrain from signing it. In the future, after the proposed system is
implemented on a wider scale, plutonium restrictions (both qualitative and
quantitative) can be resolved in the course of further negotiations.

Ensuring that states comply with the limitations of
the non-proliferation regime will be granted by the broad rights of the IAEA to
monitor the nuclear activities of the signatories. The JCPOA pays special
attention to the IAEA’s supervisory powers, obliging Iran to provide experts
with virtually unlimited access to its nuclear facilities, as well as creating
conditions for 24-hour remote monitoring of the implementation of its JCPOA
obligations. Granting the IAEA broad rights to monitor the nuclear industry of
the signatory states should be a prerequisite for the creation of a new
non-proliferation regime.

Promoting the JCPOA globally could immediately solve
two tasks facing the international community: preserving the restrictions on
Iran, which would prevent Tehran from obtaining nuclear weapons; and generally
renewing the global non-proliferation regime, which is not fully capable of
responding to modern nuclear threats. The existing non-proliferation regime
leaves too many opportunities for violations, while not providing for any
significant response to the violating state. Seeing as it is difficult to apply
appropriate measures against a potential intruder under the agreement,
non-proliferation could be guaranteed with the help of preliminary measures
aimed at setting up a “buffer” period during which the international community
would take over economically and, if needed, enforce sanctions. At the same
time, the JCPOA should also significantly expand the powers of the IAEA, giving
the organization greater access to nuclear facilities and storages of
radioactive material.

Naturally, the implementation of such a large-scale
project will be a long and laborious process. The position of the United States
as one of the key parties in shaping the new non-proliferation regime has
caused a number of doubts. Despite the fact that the urgent nature of the JCPOA
has become one of the main causes for concern on the part of the United States,
criticism of the plan is not limited to this. In particular, as follows from
the 12 demands voiced by Mike Pompeo, the United States believes
that the list of conditions for lifting the economic sanctions against Iran
should also include the withdrawal of Iranian troops from Syria, restrictions
of Iran’s ballistic missile program, the termination of its support for what
the United States sees as terrorist organizations, etc. All this suggests that
the United States has a unique vision of the problem, implying a more global
consideration of the Iranian topic, without any specific reference to the
proliferation of nuclear weapons. For the United States, partially lifting the
sanctions on Iran in exchange for restrictions on the latter’s nuclear program
would mean a total disregard for the threat Iran poses to the United States’
allies in the region.

Despite Washington’s desire to consider the Iranian
issue as a cluster of various threats, it is unlikely that all the existing
problems can be resolved at the same time. The current threats Iran presents in
the region pale in comparison to the risk of Tehran laying its hands on weapons
of mass destruction, which, in addition to threatening the countries in the
region, would have a significant potential to destroy the already fragile
non-proliferation regime. The main objective for preserving the security in the
region, and in the world as a whole, should be to search for ways to prevent
Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons. As time passes and the parties involved
refuse to continue to search for a compromise solution, the possibility of a
peaceful resolution narrows. The proposed non-proliferation regime may not
eliminate all the threats associated with Iran, but it would prevent Tehran from
creating a nuclear weapon. This is what the international community should view
as its highest priority.

Is Iran Testing Trump With Little Attacks in Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and the Persian Gulf?

The sound
of an explosion echoed through the Green Zone on Sunday night around 9:00 p.m.,
a reminder that this most secure part of the Iraqi capital is not, in fact, all
that safe. The projectile appears to have been aimed at the United States
embassy and, after the blast, embassy sirens went off, accompanied by repeated
warnings blaring on loudspeakers instructing everyone to take immediate cover.

Within
the hour the missile was reported to have been fired from the Amana bridge in
Baghdad, missing its likely intended target and landing in an empty field near
the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier, with no casualties reported.

But for a
brief and highly fraught moment alarms were going off in Washington, as well,
where the much-publicized threat of Iranian “proxy” attacks on U.S. interests
and personnel, and the American response positioning bombers and aircraft
carriers, have conjured the specter of a new Middle Eastern war. One breaking
news service breathlessly reported National Security Adviser John Bolton “just
seen arriving at the White House amid rocket attack possibly aimed at the U.S.
Embassy in Baghdad, Iraq.”

President
Trump, meanwhile, tweeted: “If Iran wants to fight, that will be the official
end of Iran. Never threaten the United States again!” It is not clear if he was
responding to the rocket, a Katyusha that might have been fired by any number
of players in Iraq, or to threatening rhetoric by some Iranian officials, or
both.

In any
case, non-essential American personnel at the embassy had already been ordered
to depart days earlier, many moving to posts in nearby countries to continue
their work, and the U.S. embassy was already expecting a possible attack.

Our team
of researchers for the International Center for the Study of Violent Extremism
(ICSVE) landed in Baghdad on May 14, 2019, the day before the U.S. State
Department issued the
security alert to the “non-essentials” in Baghdad and Erbil, recommending they “depart
Iraq by commercial transportation as soon as possible, avoid U.S. facilities
within Iraq, monitor local media for updates, review personal security plans,
remain aware of surroundings.”

An earlier
security alert on May 12 advised
all U.S. citizens of heightened tensions in Iraq and the requirement to remain
vigilant. It recommended not traveling to Iraq, avoiding places known as U.S.
citizen gathering points, keeping a low profile and, once again, being aware of
your surroundings.

For those
of use who have been visiting Iraq since 2006, this seems at once familiar and
strange. Is the threat greater now than it was when the U.S. embassy was housed
in Saddam’s former palace, and frequently underwent mortar fire? In those days
none of the 5,000 embassy personnel were ordered home.

Despite
President Trump saying he does not want war, does this action signal that
something more than just mortar fire is about to come?

A former
senior diplomat who served in Iraq following the 2003 invasion warned that if
the U.S. or Israel had decided to launch air strikes on Iran, emptying the
embassy might be a smart move. Iran could strike back at a close and
convenient target—the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad—and its ballistic missiles would
be much more dangerous and difficult to withstand than mortars or Katyushas.

According
to a senior official in the Iraqi Counter Terrorism Services (CTS) the rocket
Sunday night was launched by the Iranian-backed Kataib Hezbollah. If it came on
Iranian orders, the lone, ineffectual projectile may have been intended as a
pin-prick provocation testing reactions without triggering full-fledged war.
Other recent incidents—a drone attack on a Saudi pipeline; minor explosions on
Saudi and other oil tankers—could fall into the same category.

Iraq,
liberated from the tyranny of Saddam Hussein by the U.S.-led invasion of 2003,
has come under increasing Iranian influence ever since, and the Iran-backed
militias played a key role fighting the so-called Islamic State after the
national army virtually imploded in 2014. They have since become a major
element in the Iraqi defense apparatus, even though some 5,000 U.S. military
personnel are on the ground training and working with other elements of the
Iraqi military.

The
threat inside Iraq to U.S. personnel was revealed in part to Iraqi leaders
during Secretary of State Mike Pompeo’s surprise visit here on May 7.

The
secretary is reported to have told Iraqi officials that U.S. intelligence
detected that Iranian-backed militias moving missiles near bases housing
American forces. Reuters
reported that,
according to a senior Iraqi official privy to the substance of the talks,
Pompeo asked the Iraqi government to rein in the Shiite militias. Pompeo also
expressed U.S. concern about these militias’ increased presence and influence
in Iraq and warned that the U.S. would use force to tackle the security threats
if necessary, without first consulting Baghdad.

Iraq’s
pro-Iranian military factions have long been a concern for U.S. personnel
deployed in the region. Harakat Hezbollah al-Nujaba, a radical Shiite militia
in Iraq has, for example, long been cooperating with the Iranian Islamic
Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), a group that was just declared by the U.S.
State Department as a terrorist organization.

The newly
appointed IRGC leader, Hossein Salami, replied that his people are proud
to be called terrorists by
President Trump while also threatening the U.S. and Israel.

The Iraqi
militia, Nujaba, also was added by the U.S. State Department to the U.S. list
of global terrorist organizations on March 7 this year and its leader Akram
Kaabi was sanctioned.

Nujaba
has been demanding that U.S. troops leave Iraq for quite some time. On May 12,
Nujaba’s leaders proclaimed, “Confrontation with the United States
will only stop once it is eliminated from the region, along with the Zionist
entity,” while also stating that Iraqi resistance factions are ready to target
U.S. interests in Iraq.

The
Iranian-backed Kataib Hezbollah militia, which our source says was behind the
Sunday night rocket attack, warned
in February 2018 that it
might engage in armed confrontation with US forces in Iraq at any moment.
According to one Iraqi source, the Kataib Hezbollah is one of the militias that
recently placed missiles near U.S. military bases.

The
New York Times reported the the U.S. government was picking up an
increase in conversations between the Revolutionary Guards and foreign militias
discussing attacks on American troops and diplomats in Iraq.

The
New York Times also reported that American officials cited intelligence from
aerial photographs of fully assembled missiles on small boats in the Persian
Gulf as cause for the U.S. administration to escalate its warnings about a
threat from Iran. This created concerns that the Islamic Revolutionary Guards
Corps would fire them at United States naval ships or American commercial
ships.

An Iraqi
source confirmed on May 18 that ExxonMobil was evacuating its personnel of 30
to 50 employees from Basra, Iraq, and that the Bahrain embassy had also
evacuated its employees from both Iraq and Iran. And U.S. embassies
disseminated a warning from the Federal Aviation Agency that U.S. commercial
airliners flying over the waters of the Persian Gulf risk being misidentified
and by implication shot down amid rising tensions between the U.S. and Iran.

A
potential conflict much larger than Iranian-backed Shia militias throwing
mortar fire at the now fortress-like U.S. Embassy appears to be brewing amid
credible intelligence coupled with heated anti-American rhetoric.

Yet,
security threats to U.S. personnel serving in Iraq are nothing out of the
ordinary and date back to the 2003 U.S. invasion. At the height of its
activities, the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad had thousands of personnel, including
contractors. They regularly suffered all sorts of threats from IED attacks when
they ventured out on the road, RPG fire when they used helicopters, snipers
when they were out in public view and intermittent but regular mortar fire that
rained down on the temporary trailers that served as housing near the old
Saddam palace where they worked. One mortar penetrated a window to the bathroom
of the Deputy U.S. Ambassador’s office, situated inside the palace, destroying
the brick wall around the window. It was later bricked up completely. The
walkway from the trailers to the palace was mortared so often and so hard that
it was nicknamed “death alley” by embassy personnel serving there.

While
embassy personnel received danger and hardship pay, none were ordered home
during those years, and danger was considered a part of the assignment. IED’s
and mortars occasionally killed embassy personnel, but that did not stop the
mission.

At
present, the U.S. Embassy Baghdad is housed in a complex on a closed street
that only badged officials can enter. The grounds are heavily walled walled and
difficult to enter and inside, the buildings appear strongly built to withstand
assault.

In Erbil,
in Iraqi Kurdistan, which also fell under the non-essential personnel
evacuation order, a restaurant nearby was attacked by a
car bomb in 2015, killing
three non-Americans. But, while less robustly built, the consulate also is
behind a concrete walled-off security space.

U.S.
Embassy diplomatic personnel posted in both Baghdad and Erbil infrequently
leave their fortresses and when they do travel around Iraq, their security
requirements require using armored cars, wearing bullet proof vests and flack
helmets and traveling with armed security guards, sometimes with chase and lead
cars in a convoy.

Likewise,
U.S. Embassy Baghdad and the consulate in Erbil are not family
postings—diplomatic personnel serve for one or two years, leaving their family
members behind.

The new
embassy building, not far from the old one, was planned during the time of
frequent attacks and was undoubtedly built to withstand mortar storms. Long and
short-range ballistic missiles however constitute a whole different threat and
it’s not publicly known if the new embassy has bomb-hardened resistant bunkers
to protect embassy personnel.

Whether
U.S. embassy non-essential personnel will return to post anytime soon remains
to be seen, and given the dangers such personnel have faced in the past and the
fortress in which they currently serve, why they were really ordered home is
also still an unanswered question. With ships coming to the region and troops
readying for potential travel, serious troubles may well be on the horizon.

While the
saber rattling on both sides continues, Baghdad has also made clear that it
doesn’t want to become the battlefield.

Related

Iran vs. US: Bracing for war?

On May 8, 2018, President Donald Trump withdrew the United States from
the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), better known as the Iran
nuclear deal, and imposed tough unilateral sanctions on Tehran. Exactly a year
later, this move looks dangerously fraught with unpredictable and potentially
catastrophic consequences for the Middle East.

Britain, France and Germany, as participants and co-sponsors of the
JCPOA, strongly criticized Trump’s anti-Iranian policy and, with Russian and
Chinese support, they established, registered and set in motion, albeit in a
test mode, the Instrument in Support of Trade Exchanges
(INSTEX) – a special-purpose vehicle (SPV) to facilitate non-dollar trade with
Iran.

Tehran took its time hoping for European support. However, on April 22,
2019, Trump ended waivers that Washington had earlier granted China, India,
South Korea, Turkey, Italy, the United Arab Emirates, Japan and Taiwan that
allowed these countries to import Iranian oil. A complete ban on the purchase
of Iranian crude came into force on May 2, 2019. The United States’ ultimate
goal is to stop all Iranian crude exports. Whether this is actually possible is
not clear. What is clear, however, is that the US is ramping up economic
pressure on Tehran.

Meanwhile, Europe will hardly be able to resist Washington’s sanctions
against Iran, which are almost as hard-hitting as the ones that were in effect
between 2012 and 2016 when the Iranian economy was going through hard times. Still,
the EU’s foreign affairs commissioner Federica Mogherini recently went on
record saying that “we will continue to support [JCPOA] as much
as we can with all our instruments and all our political will.”

Just how much will the EU really has to resist US pressure is a big
question though.

Iran found itself in a real fix with President Hassan Rouhani saying
that the situation the country is in today is no different from what it
experienced during the 1980-1988 war with Iraq.

“During the war, we had no problems with our banks, oil sales, imports
and exports. There were only sanctions for the purchase of arms,” he noted.

Hassan Rouhani emphasized the US sanctions’ strong impact on the
country, and called for a concerted effort by all to minimize their effect.

“The enemies’ sanctions against our banking sector also affect our oil,
petrochemicals, steel and agricultural exports, impair the work of Iranian
seaports, shipyards and sea carriers. Our shipping companies have been
blacklisted by the US Treasury,” Rouhani added.

He said that Iran would not bow to US pressure and will be looking for a
way out of this situation.

What can Iran do?

First, it could exit the nuclear deal. Not
immediately, like the US did, but gradually, refusing to fulfill the specific
terms of the accord. Iran is already doing this now.

On May 8, President Rouhani announced that Iran would no longer observe
two key commitments under the JCPOA accord, namely to sell to Russia and the US
uranium enriched to 3.76 percent at volumes exceeding the storage allowed in
Iran (over 300 kilograms). By the time the JCPOA was signed in 2015, the
Islamic Republic had accumulated 10,357 kilos of such low-grade uranium, and
410.4 kilos of uranium enriched to 20 percent. To date, Iran has destroyed its
entire stock of 20-percent-enriched uranium and has shipped surplus
low-enriched uranium (LEU) to Russia and the United States. According to the
JCPOA, Tehran was allowed to enrich limited quantities of uranium for
scientific purposes and sell any enriched uranium above the 300-kilogram limit
on international markets in return for natural uranium. Now Iran will start stocking up on low-enriched uranium again.

Neither will Tehran consider itself
committed to the caps agreed under the deal on the mandatory sale of excess
heavy water used in the production of military-grade plutonium. Iran has a working facility to produce heavy water, which is not
covered by the JCPOA. However, it can store no more than 130 tons of heavy
water. Tehran has already exported 32 tons to the US and 38 tons to Russia. Now it will start storing heavy water again.

President Rouhani gave the other signatories to the 2015 nuclear deal 60
days to make good on their promises to protect Iran’s oil and banking
sectors. The Iranian move is certainly not directed at Washington but, rather,
at Brussels in order to make it more actively and effectively resist US
sanctions or see Iran resume higher levels of uranium enrichment, potentially
all the way to bomb-making capability.

He added that if the EU fails to address Iran’s concerns, Tehran will
suspend the implementation of two more commitments under the JCPOA.

If its demands are not met, Tehran will no
longer be bound by its commitment to enrich uranium up to 3.76 percent. Ali-Akbar Salehi, director of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran,
said in January that the country had already taken the necessary steps to
resume enrichment in larger volumes and with a higher level of enrichment.

Tehran will also reject help from the 5+1
group of initiators of the JCPOA (Russia, US, Britain, France, China and
Germany) in the reconstruction of the heavy water reactor in the city of Arak.

The R-1 heavy water reactor was designed to produce up to 10 kilograms
of weapons-grade plutonium a year, which is enough to build two plutonium
nuclear weapons. The terms of the JCPOA accord require redesigning the reactor
in such a way as to make it incapable of producing weapons-grade plutonium. To
oversee the process, they set up a working group of representatives of the Atomic
Energy Organization of Iran, the Atomic Energy Authority of China and the US
Department of Energy. In 2017, a UK representative moved in to fill the void
left by the departing US representative. According to an official Iranian
report issued in April 2018, the country had already completed a “conceptual
reconstruction of the reactor.” Still, the reconstruction process is slow
and can easily be reversed. At least for now.

If, however, the EU comes across, then,
according to Hassan Rouhani, Iran will honor its commitments under the JCPOA
deal. “If [the five JCPOA co-signatories] could protect our main
interests in oil and banking sectors, we will go back to square one [and will
resume our commitments],” Rouhani said.

The question is whether the European Union can fully activate INSTEX
and ensure continued oil exports and imports. Many people doubt this.

According to analysts, by demanding that Europeans “bring down to zero”
their purchases of Iranian oil, the United States threatened to slap sanctions
on European companies paying for Iranian oil. Shortly afterwards, almost all
European banks refused to finance Iranian crude imports. The EU thus
inadvertently joined the US sanctions, even though it continued to stick to the
terms of the JCPA accord.

At the same time, European companies were all too happy to go ahead with
the implementation of the part of the agreement that had not yet been banned,
selling unauthorized goods to Iran. Tehran then complained that the deal
allowed Europeans to make money inside Iran while preventing Iranians from
selling their oil in the EU – a violation of the fundamental provision of the
nuclear accord.

Tehran’s threat to walk out of the 2015 nuclear deal is sending a clear
signal to the dithering Europeans to resume Iranian oil imports or see Tehran
restarting nuclear production.

However, preoccupied by more pressing problems, the Europeans have other
things to worry about. Moreover, no one is looking for a showdown with the EU’s
main ally, the United States. According to Russian Oriental affairs expert
Nikolai Kozhanov, Europeans consider
the issue of circumventing US sanctions as an important part of their search
for a mechanism of counter-sanctions in similar situations with more important
economic partners, such as China or Russia.

Therefore, Iran is likely to press ahead with
suspending its obligations under the JCPOA, which include the activation and
acceleration of R&D in the field of improving centrifuges and building more
of them in the future. Tehran could also hold up the implementation of the
Protocol Additional to the Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA. Signed in 2003, the Protocol gives the UN nuclear watchdog greater
access to Iran’s nuclear facilities and provides for surprise inspections. Iran
has not yet ratified this document, even though it fulfilled its requirements
until 2006 and has done so since 2016.

Of course, Iran will go about additional suspensions very carefully (if
it will at all), mindful of their possible consequences, because it would hate
to see Europe turning its back on it and siding with Washington, adding its own
sanctions to the American ones, thus essentially making them international.

Ever since the US’ exit from the JCPOA, Iran has issued a flurry of
serious warnings that it might end its participation in the Treaty on the
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and the IAEA. On April 28, Iranian
Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif went on record saying that Tehran was
mulling an exit from the NPT as a response to US sanctions. He added that
Tehran “has many options” of response. “Exit from the NPT is one such
option,” Zarif noted.

This was only a rhetorical threat, however, meant to prod the European
Union towards closer cooperation with Iran as a means of countering US
sanctions. Therefore, it is highly unlikely that Iran would withdraw either
from the NPT or the IAEA, because this could make it an absolute outcast and
the butt of scathing criticism worldwide.

Second, to demonstrate strength and
willingness to resist and safeguard the country’s interests. Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei never tires of emphasizing
the need for a tough policy of “resistance,” based on:

an active and effective search for ways to
circumvent crippling economic sanctions;

strengthening the armed forces with an
emphasis on the development of a missile program;

active promotion of Iranian interests in
the region.

The “resistance” policy is primarily built around the Islamic
Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), which brings together the country’s military,
intelligence, police, political, ideological, as well as financial and economic
structures. The IRGC is actually an all-embracing mega holding, led directly by
the Supreme Leader and members of his inner circle. The Revolutionary Guards,
who have proved highly efficient in countering sanctions, modernizing the
armed forces and promoting Iranian activities in the region, are all Tehran
actually needs to implement a strict “resistance” policy.

With the situation developing as it is, Ayatollah Khamenei’s recent
decision to replace the IRGC commander, General Mohammed Ali Jafari, who led
the Corps for more than 11 years, with Brigadier General Hossein Salami looks
pretty natural. The IRGC’s former deputy commander, General Salami is
ideologically closer to Khamenei and is known for his radical statements.
Ayatollah Khamenei also replaced about 60 officers both in the IRGC central
office and local administrations with relatively young, ambitious,
ideologically tested and competent officers. They are tasked with turning the IRGC into an indispensable and
all-embracing institution that dominates the entire gamut of Iranian life: from
ensuring internal and external security all the way to economic activity and
cyberwarfare.

According to Mehdi Khalaji, a researcher at the Washington Institute for
Near East Policy, Ayatollah Khamenei is strengthening the IRGC, which he sees
as the cornerstone of the country’s triad of advanced missile technology, a
nuclear program and asymmetric military capabilities to ensure reliable defense
against any potential aggression by anyone.

Tehran’s decision to strengthen the IRGC was certainly prompted by
President Trump’s statement on April 8, which branded the Corps as a “foreign
terrorist organization.” Until recently, President Rouhani sought to keep the
IRGC in check and limit its impact on many aspects of the country’s life. In
fact, Trump’s recent statement played right into the hands of diehard radicals
within the IRGC and in Iran as a whole.

Iran’s Supreme National Security Council responded to President Trump’s
statement by putting on the list of terrorist organizations the United States
Central Command (CENTCOM), whose area of responsibility includes the Middle
East and Central Asia. Simultaneously, the General Staff of the Iranian Armed
Forces said that the Iranian military was ready to use any means at its
disposal against US troops in the region who are now likewise designated by
Tehran as terrorists. This is putting Americans in peril all across the Middle
East region, primarily in Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan and in the Persian Gulf –
wherever Iranian and US military might cross their paths.

Washington’s latest anti-Iranian move seriously exacerbated the already
very strained relations between the two countries.

Third. To ramp up anti-American propaganda and
warlike rhetoric in order to demonstrate Iran’s strength to the United States
and its readiness to defend its interests even with the use of military force.

Increasingly frustrated with the situation around the JCPOA and doubting
the EU’s ability to resist the US pressure on Iran, Tehran has been rolling
back its participation in the nuclear deal, which is dangerously fraught with a
new nuclear crisis and heightened tensions with the United States.

Meanwhile, an escalation is already happening. The United States is
sending a battery of Patriot air defense missiles and an amphibious warship,
USS Arlington, to CENTCOM’s operational responsibility zone. The Arlington will
join a naval strike carrier group led by the world’s largest warship, the
aircraft carrier Abraham Lincoln (5,680 crew, 90 combat aircraft and
helicopters on board) and a tactical group of B-52 strategic bombers.

Moreover, an updated plan that has just been presented by the Acting US
Secretary of Defense, Patrick Shanahan, envisions the dispatch of up to 120,000
troops to the Middle East if Iran steps up the development of nuclear weapons,
or attacks the US military. However, the plan does not provide for a ground
operation against Iran, which would require a lot more troops.

Iran has promised serious response to any use of force by the United
States, with the IRGC commander, Brigadier General Hossein Salami, warning that
“if America takes a step against us, then we will strike a blow to the head.”
He believes, however, that the United States will not risk using its aircraft
carriers against Iran, and added that since Iran’s defense capabilities are
adequate and sufficient, US aircraft carriers are quite vulnerable.

Military experts know better of course, but when it comes to politics,
chances of resolving the current crisis between Iran and the United States look
pretty slim. In fact, the conflict may be beneficial to both President Trump
and the IRGC.

Trump could use the standoff as a chance to show the opposition Democrats
how tough he is with Iran, which is equally loathed by his supporters and many
of his opponents alike.

Meanwhile, a US military buildup close to the Iranian borders would play
right into the hands of local hardliners who have always been up in arms against
any negotiations concerning the Iranian nuclear program and the nuclear deal
itself.

With the situation favoring the opponents of President Rouhani, the IRGC
is ruling out any possibility of negotiations with the US. The head of the
IRGC’s political bureau, Yadolla Javani, said that “there will be no
negotiations with the Americans,” in a remark that could also be aimed at
politicians inside Iran who would like to maintain a dialogue with the US no
matter what.

Still, according to unconfirmed reports, the Iranians are negotiating
behind closed doors with American representatives in Oman, which is a
traditional meeting place for both.

The IRGC needs tensions running high because this is turning it into the
country’s foremost institution.

What is also clear is a dangerous psychological war now raging between
Washington and Tehran. Just where things may go from now is hard to tell, but
it still looks like the sides will not come to blows after all. The
Iranian-American brinkmanship with concentrations of troops and military
hardware in the region is fraught with unpredictable accidents that can force
the parties to go overboard. Hopefully, things will not go beyond bellicose
rhetoric.

“There will be no war, the Iranian people have chosen the path of resistance
to America, and this resistance will force it to retreat,” Ayatollah Khamenei
said, emphasizing, however, that this resistance is not military in nature.
Neither side wants a military showdown.

Tehran and Washington realize full well that if the situation comes down
to a military flare-up, then this, regardless of the real scale of the
fighting, would spell disaster for the entire Middle East with equally dire
consequences for the rest of the world.