Letters from the Federal Farmer to the Republican

V

October 13th, 1787

Dear Sir,

Thus I have examined the federal constitution as far as a few days leisure
would permit. It opens to my mind a new scene; instead of seeing powers
cautiously lodged in the hands of numerous legislators, and many magistrates,
we see all important powers collecting in one centre, where a few men will
possess them almost at discretion. And instead of checks in the formation of
the government, to secure the rights of the people against the usurpations of
those they appoint to govern, we are to understand the equal division of lands
among our people, and the strong arm furnished them by nature and situation,
are to secure them against those usurpations. If there are advantages in the
equal division of our lands, and the strong and manly habits of our people, we
ought to establish governments calculated to give duration to them, and not
governments which never can work naturally, till that equality of property, and
those free and manly habits shall be destroyed; these evidently are not the
natural basis of the proposed constitution. No man of reflection, and skilled
in the science of government, can suppose these will move on harmoniously
together for ages, or even for fifty years. As to the little circumstances
commented upon, by some writers, with applause — as the age of a
representative, of the president, etc. — they have, in my mind, no weight
in the general tendency of the system.

There are, however, in my opinion, many good things in the proposed system.
It is founded on elective principles, and the deposits of powers in different
hands, is essentially right. The guards against those evils we have experienced
in some states in legislation are valuable indeed; but the value of every
feature in this system is vastly lessened for the want of that one important
feature in a free government, a representation of the people. Because we have
sometimes abused democracy, I am not among those men who think a democratic
branch a nuisance; which branch shall be sufficiently numerous, to admit some
of the best informed men of each order in the community into the administration
of government.

While the radical defects in the proposed system are not so soon discovered,
some temptations to each state, and to many classes of men to adopt it, are
very visible. It uses the democratic language of several of the state
constitutions, particularly that of Massachusetts; the eastern states will
receive advantages so far as the regulation of trade, by a bare majority, is
committed to it: Connecticut and New-Jersey will receive their share of a
general impost: The middle states will receive the advantages surrounding the
seat of government: The southern states will receive protection, and have their
negroes represented in the legislature, and large back countries will soon have
a majority in it. This system promises a large field of employment to military
gentlemen, and gentlemen of the law; and in case the government shall be
executed without convulsions, it will afford security to creditors, to the
clergy, salary-men and others depending on money payments. So far as the system
promises justice and reasonable advantages, in these respects, it ought to be
supported by all honest men: but whenever it promises unequal and improper
advantages to any particular states, or orders of men, it ought to be opposed.

I have, in the course of these letters observed, that there are many good
things in the proposed constitution, and I have endeavoured to point out many
important defects in it. I have admitted that we want a federal system —
that we have a system presented, which, with several alterations may be made a
tolerable good one — I have admitted there is a well founded uneasiness
among creditors and mercantile men. In this situation of things, you ask me
what I think ought to be done? My opinion in this case is only the opinion of
an individual, and so far only as it corresponds with the opinions of the
honest and substantial part of the community, is it entitled to consideration.
Though I am fully satisfied that the state conventions ought most seriously to
direct their exertions to altering and amending the system proposed before they
shall adopt it — yet I have not sufficiently examined the subject, or
formed an opinion, how far it will be practicable for those conventions to
carry their amendments. As to the idea, that it will be in vain for those
conventions to attempt amendments, it cannot be admitted; it is impossible to
say whether they can or not until the attempt shall be made; and when it shall
be determined, by experience, that the conventions cannot agree in amendments,
it will then be an important question before the people of the United States,
whether they will adopt or not the system proposed in its present form. This
subject of consolidating the states is new; and because forty or fifty men have
agreed in a system, to suppose the good sense of this country, an enlightened
nation, must adopt it without examination, and though in a state of profound
peace, without endeavouring to amend those parts they perceive are defective,
dangerous to freedom, and destructive of the valuable principles of republican
government — is truly humiliating. It is true there may be danger in
delay; but there is danger in adopting the system in its present form; and I
see the danger in either case will arise principally from the conduct and views
of two very unprincipled parties in the United States — two fires, between
which the honest and substantial people have long found themselves situated.
One party is composed of little insurgents, men in debt, who want no law, and
who want a share of the property of others; these are called levellers,
Shayites, etc. The other party is composed of a few, but more dangerous men,
with their servile dependents; these avariciously grasp at all power and
property; you may discover in all the actions of these men, an evident dislike
to free and equal government, and they will go systematically to work to
change, essentially, the forms of government in this country; these are called
aristocrats, M[onarch]ites [?], etc. etc. Between these two parties is the
weight of the community; the men of middling property, men not in debt on the
one hand, and men. on the other, content with republican governments, and not
aiming at immense fortunes, offices, and power. In 1786, the little insurgents,
the levellers, came forth, invaded the rights of others, and attempted to
establish governments according to their wills. Their movements evidently gave
encouragement to the other party, which, in 1787, has taken the political
field, and with its fashionable dependants, and the tongue and the pen, is
endeavouring to establish in great haste, a politer kind of government. These
two parties, which will probably be opposed or united as it may suit their
interests and views, are really insignificant, compared with the solid, free,
and independent part of the community. It is not my intention to suggest, that
either of these parties, and the real friends of the proposed constitution, are
the same men. The fact is, these aristocrats support and hasten the adoption of
the proposed constitution, merely because they think it is a stepping stone to
their favorite object. I think I am well founded in this idea; I think the
general politics of these men support it, as well as the common observation
among them. That the proffered plan is the best that can be got at present, it
will do for a few years, and lead to something better. The sensible and
judicious part of the community will carefully weigh all these circumstances;
they will view the late convention as a respectable assembly of men —
America probably never will see an assembly of men of a like number, more
respectable. But the members of the convention met without knowing the
sentiments of one man in ten thousand in these states, respecting the new
ground taken. Their doings are but the first attempts in the most important
scene ever opened. Though each individual in the state conventions will not,
probably, be so respectable as each individual in the federal convention, yet
as the state conventions will probably consist of fifteen hundred or two
thousand men of abilities, and versed in the science of government, collected
from all parts of the community and from all orders of men, it must be
acknowledged that the weight of respectability will be in them — In them
will be collected the solid sense and the real political character of the
country. Being revisers of the subject, they will possess peculiar advantages.
To say that these conventions ought not to attempt, coolly and deliberately,
the revision of the system, or that they cannot amend it, is very foolish or
very assuming. If these conventions, after examining the system, adopt it, I
shall be perfectly satisfied, and wish to see men make the administration of
the government an equal blessing to all orders of men. I believe the great body
of our people to be virtuous and friendly to good government, to the protection
of liberty and property; and it is the duty of all good men, especially of
those who are placed as centinels to guard their rights — it is their duty
to examine into the prevailing politics of parties, and to disclose them —
while they avoid exciting undue suspicions, to lay facts before the people,
which will enable them to form a proper judgment. Men who wish the people of
this country to determine for themselves, and deliberately to fit the
government to their situation, must feel some degree of indignation at those
attempts to hurry the adoption of a system, and to shut the door against
examination. The very attempts create suspicions, that those who make them have
secret views, or see some defects in the system, which, in the hurry of
affairs, they expect will escape thee ye of a free people.

What can be the views of those gentlemen in Pennsylvania, who precipitated
decisions on this subject? What can be the views of those gentlemen in Boston,
who countenanced the Printers in shutting up the press against a fair and free
investigation of this important system in the usual way. The members of the
convention have done their duty — why should some of them fly to their
states — almost forget a propriety of behaviour, and precipitate measures
for the adoption of a system of their own making? I confess candidly, when I
consider these circumstances in connection with the unguarded parts of the
system I have mentioned, I feel disposed to proceed with very great caution,
and to pay more attention than usual to the conduct of particular characters.
If the constitution presented be a good one, it will stand the test with a well
informed people: all are agreed there shall be state conventions to examine it;
and we must believe it will be adopted, unless we suppose it is a bad one, or
that those conventions will make false divisions respecting it. I admit
improper measures are taken against the adoption of the system as well [as] for
it — all who object to the plan proposed ought to point out the defects
objected to, and to propose those amendments with which they can accept it, or
to propose some other system of government, that the public mind may be known,
and that we may be brought to agree in some system of government, to strengthen
and execute the present, or to provide a substitute. I consider the field of
enquiry just opened, and that we are to look to the state conventions for
ultimate decisions on the subject before us; it is not to be presumed, that
they will differ about small amendments, and lose a system when they shall have
made it substantially good; but touching the essential amendments, it is to be
presumed the several conventions will pursue the most rational measures to
agree in and obtain them; and such defects as they shall discover and not
remove, they will probably notice, keep them in view as the ground work of
future amendments, and in the firm and manly language which every free people
ought to use, will suggest to those who may hereafter administer the
government, that it is their expectation, that the system will be so organized
by legislative acts, and the government so administered, as to render those
defects as little injurious as possible. Our countrymen are entitled to an
honest and faithful government; to a government of laws and not of men; and
also to one of their chusing — as a citizen of the country, I wish to see
these objects secured, and licentious, assuming, and overbearing men
restrained; if the constitution or social compact be vague and unguarded, then
we depend wholly upon the prudence, wisdom and moderation of those who manage
the affairs of government; or on what, probably, is equally uncertain and
precarious, the success of the people oppressed by the abuse of government, in
receiving it from the hands of those who abuse it, and placing it in the hands
of those who will use it well.

In every point of view, therefore, in which I have been able, as yet, to
contemplate this subject, I can discern but one rational mode of proceeding
relative to it: and that is to examine it with freedom and candour, to have
state conventions some months hence, which shall examine coolly every article,
clause, and word in the system proposed, and to adopt it with such amendments
as they shall think fit. How far the state conventions ought to pursue the mode
prescribed by the federal convention of adopting or rejecting the plan in toto,
I leave it to them to determine. Our examination of the subject hitherto has
been rather of a general nature. The republican characters in the several
states, who wish to make this plan more adequate to security of liberty and
property, and to the duration of the principles of a free government, will, no
doubt, collect their opinions to certain points, and accurately define those
alterations and amendments they wish; if it shall be found they essentially
disagree in them, the conventions will then be able to determine whether to
adopt the plan as it is, or what will be proper to be done.

Under these impressions, and keeping in view the improper and unadvisable
lodgment of powers in the general government, organized as it at present is,
touching internal taxes, armies and militia, the elections of its own members,
causes between citizens of different states, etc. and the want of a more
perfect bill of rights, etc. I drop the subject for the present, and when I
shall have leisure to revise and correct my ideas respecting it, and to collect
into points the opinions of those who wish to make the system more secure and
safe, perhaps I may proceed to point out particularly for your consideration,
the amendments which ought to be ingrafted into this system, not only in
conformity to my own, but the deliberate opinions of others — you will
with me perceive, that the objections to the plan proposed may, by a more
leisure examination be set in a stronger point of view, especially the
important one, that there is no substantial representation of the people
provided for in a government in which the most essential powers, even as to the
internal police of the country, is proposed to be lodged.

I think the honest and substantial part of the community will wish to see
this system altered, permanency and consistency given to the constitution we
shall adopt; and therefore they will be anxious to apportion the powers to the
features and organization of the government, and to see abuse in the exercise
of power more effectually guarded against. It is suggested, that state
officers, from interested motives will oppose the constitution presented —
I see no reason for this, their places in general will not be effected, but new
openings to offices and places of profit must evidently be made by the adoption
of the constitution in its present form.