When
Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon announced his decision to withdraw
unilaterally from the Gaza Strip and dismantle 17 settlements, there was
reason, one might think, for celebration in certain quarters. Yet few
rejoiced. There is the uneasy feeling that his words do not bode an end to
the 37-year-old Occupation, rather further entanglement.

Some
call the would-be withdrawal an escape, some call it a threat against the
Palestinians, and some call it a means to strengthen Israel's hold on the
West Bank. One thing it is not: a step toward resolving the conflict.

In
Israeli eyes, Gaza was always damaged goods. The campaign slogan of Yitzhak
Rabin in 1992 was "Pull Gaza out of Tel Aviv". The Oslo Agreement originally
bore the title, "Gaza and Jericho First". (Hamas and others are mistaken,
then, when they present an Israeli withdrawal from Gaza as a victory for the
resistance.) It suits Sharon, whose approval rating has plunged, to propose
"disconnection" from this unwanted place. It makes a show of progress toward
security, and it may distract the public from corruption scandals in which
he is mired to the neck.

Under
present conditions, however, Sharon will find it almost impossible to
disconnect from Gaza. The hurdles are high:

Hurdle
1: The White House

First
Sharon needs to persuade the Americans. The Bush Administration is fixated
on the Road Map, which has won United Nations approval. If only for the sake
of its own prestige, the US cannot countenance a situation where its protégé
withdraws and leaves a vacuum of sovereignty, in which no one is legally
responsible for the area. (The PA, after all, does not preside over a
sovereign state.) That is why the Americans insist that Sharon "coordinate"
the move with the Palestinians. "Coordinate" means "negotiate". Once you
have to "coordinate," however, you can no longer be "unilateral".
Ex-mediator Dennis Ross has coined an oxymoron for the situation:
"coordinated unilateralism". Verbal blankets keep no one warm.

The
Bush Administration will not give voice to its opposition. It must
not appear to disagree with Sharon. Otherwise, the Arabs will sit back,
hoping for a rupture. The White House wants to keep the Palestinians under
pressure. It wants them to move forward on the Road Map. Of Sharon's
proposal it says, therefore, "Great idea! But coordinate." A White House
official has advised the Israeli leader, "Think about 'the day after'." Wise
words indeed from the folks who brought us the war against Iraq!

Hurdle
2: Sharon’s Coalition

Within
his own government, Sharon has no majority for a unilateral
withdrawal. He did not raise the proposal in his cabinet, therefore,
preferring to announce it in an interview with Yoel Marcus of Ha'aretz.
With a view to holding his right-wing government together, he has recently
broached the idea of a package deal. In return for withdrawal from Gaza, the
Americans should give him a "green light" for building in those West Bank
settlements that, under any "conceivable" agreement, will be annexed to
Israel. There is little chance that the Americans would grant him that,
forfeiting their relations with the Arab world – unless, of course, the
Palestinians agree. So again there is nothing unilateral here.

Without
such a package deal, the right wing will not go along. As for the Labor
Party, it is in dismal condition since the last national unity government.
It will not join Sharon in a new one unless it sees a chance for major
electoral gains. Labor too will insist on coordination.

There
is, then, little chance for unilateral disconnection. But if the first two
hurdles were somehow passed, there would still be:

Hurdle
3: The settlers

They
will resist.

Sharon's proposal, in short, does not make sense, except as a threat
to get a positive move out of Abu Ala, the Palestinian Prime Minister. The
hope may be that Abu Ala (and Yasser Arafat behind him), fearing the result
of unilateral disconnection (i.e., further chaos), will agree to coordinate,
taking responsibility for the Gaza Strip, as well as 40% (Areas A and B) of
the West Bank. That would be the beginning of a long-term interim agreement,
which is the kind of thing that Sharon might be able to sell to his party,
the Likud.

There
are indications that such is Sharon's thinking. For example, when Israeli
Chief of Staff Moshe Ya'alon first heard the idea of unilateral withdrawal
from Gaza, his response was that it "would only encourage terrorism." He
leaked his position to the press under the cover of "senior army officer".
After Sharon scolded him privately, Ya'alon changed his tune: "The
disconnection plan is a good one, as an act that will get negotiations
started." (Quoted by Nahum Barnea in Yediot Aharonot February 20.)
Sharon persuaded Ya'alon, it would seem, that the plan is a striptease to
get some movement out of Arafat and Abu Ala.

The
Palestinians have had their fill of interim agreements. Given the present
chaos in the Territories, however, it is (just barely) conceivable that they
might agree to such an arrangement, hoping then to stabilize the situation.

Two
historical footnotes:

1. In
going out on a limb with his "unilateral disconnection", Sharon will do well
to remember the fate of his predecessor, Ehud Barak. The parallels are
striking. Barak too tried to save his skin by means of a daring political
venture – against his coalition and against all odds. He attempted a
virtuoso stunt, leaping over the heads of his cabinet and the Knesset. After
stuffing them with bitter herbs, he sought to force the Palestinians to
confer at Camp David "until white smoke appeared," that is, until he
extracted an agreement to end all Palestinian claims in accordance with his
dictation. The talks collapsed. Barak fell from power. He had sown the seeds
of the chaos that grips the Territories today.

Barak
had one major asset, however, that Sharon does not: Bill Clinton in the
White House.

2.
There is one thing that the Americans and others find hard to grasp. If
Sharon is ready to disconnect from Gaza, why didn't he do this when Abu
Mazen was Palestinian PM, strengthening the latter by appearing to make a
concession? Israel was so unforthcoming with Abu Mazen that his government
collapsed. This caused loss of face to the Bush Administration, which had
supported him. It also derailed the Road Map. Yet now Sharon is willing to
pull out unilaterally – with nothing in return!

The
explanation for such odd behavior may lie, after all, with the scorpion who
wanted to cross a river. He asked the frog to carry him on his back. The
frog was wary: "You'll sting me," he said. The scorpion replied, "Why in the
world would I do that? If I sting you, I won't get to the other side!" The
frog was persuaded. In the middle of the river, however, the scorpion stung
him. "What have you done!" exclaimed the frog. "Now we'll both drown."
"Couldn't help it," said the scorpion. "It's my nature."

Unlike
the scorpion in this parable, Israel has reasons to sting – but the result
is the same. Israel regards the West Bank (not Gaza) as its strategic
hinterland. It has no interest in a peace accord that will establish, next
door, a sovereign state with real independence. It wants an entity that is
nominally sovereign but in fact dependent on it. That is why it stings all
the frogs that try to carry it across. The first was Yasser Arafat (the Oslo
Accords), and the second was Abu Mazen (the Road Map). The third, Abu Ala,
still hesitates on the river bank, but if he is persuaded, Israel will sting
him too.

With
the kind of arrangement Israel wants, no Palestinian leader can stay in
power. Both sides drown. The Palestinians sink into poverty and chaos, while
Israel makes memorials from bombed-out buses. The two societies are torn
apart. Havoc, so apparent in the one, has begun to undermine the other as
well.

Roni Ben Efrat
is one of the editors of
Challenge, a bi-monthly leftist magazine focusing on the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict within a global context, where this article
first appeared. Published in Jaffa by Arabs and Jews, Challenge features
political analysis, investigative reporting, interviews, eye-witness
reports, gender studies, arts, and more. Please visit their website and
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