From Facebook June 28 2011:

Hindus hear and enjoy the Azan as dusk falls, Muslims walk past and enjoy the smells of Hindu flowers and incense and the sounds of chants and temple bells — that is India, that is Kolkata, that is Indian secularism…

Revisiting “On Hindus and Muslims” (2009) November 3, 2009

It is four years exactly since I published “On Hindus and Muslims”. I have had cause to revisit it today while saying at Facebook:

“Subroto Roy does not mind at all that 150 million Muslim Indians have been forbidden by their clergy from singing Vande Mataram — in fact rather sees their point of view. The Supreme Court of India also once upheld the right of two Jehovah’s Witnesses children who declined to sing Jana Gana Mana at school. India is a free country in such respects.

The Muslim point of view is that Muslim patriotism can be one of *love* for India without having to be one of *worship* of India — worship having to be reserved for Allah alone.

Hindus, for their part, do not take their own worship quite so seriously, and there is a lot of it — being happy enough to worship the mountains, the seas, the rivers, the birds and beasts and even sometimes other humans too…Or, for that matter, nothing at all…”

“Subroto Roy feels that if he had been Muslim by faith and a believer he may have preferred to live in a society where Muslims are a minority rather than one where almost everyone is Muslim. A Muslim believer allowed to freely practise among a majority of non-Muslims constantly finds faith reaffirmed within every day, whereas in a society where everyone is Muslim the problem always arises as to who is a bad, good or better Muslim.”

On Hindus and Muslims November 6, 2005

On Hindus and Muslims

by

Subroto Roy

First published in The Statesman, Perspective Page, Nov 6, 2005

The one practical contribution made to India’s polity by the Hindu Mahasabha was to thwart the Sarat Bose/Suhrawardy idea in 1946-1947 of a “United Bengal”, which inevitably would have led to Kolkata and West Bengal becoming part of Pakistan. The one practical contribution made to India’s polity by the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh was to help defend against the Pakistani attack upon Jammu & Kashmir which commenced on 22 October 1947 and included the Rape of Baramulla a few days later. The RSS contribution may have been more than what Sheikh Abdullah and the National Conference or Jawaharlal Nehru and the Government of India cared to admit because it had had an offensive aspect as well; RSS attacks on Muslim civilians in the Mirpur-Pooncharea later formed the basis of Pakistan’s justification for the October 1947 attack and the origins of the “Azad Kashmir” idea. Practical contributions were also made by individuals like Shyama Prosad Mookerjee, who, for example, as a member of Nehru’s Cabinet, responded immediately to information received from a young Government of India officer in Karachi in September 1947, sending ships and Navy frigates from Bombay to retrieve thousands of Hindu refugees in danger of being massacred. The one theoretical contribution made by the Hindutvadi organisations in India has been to establish that it is not a matter of shame and can be a matter of pride to be a Hindu, or, more generally, to be an Indian in the modern world. This is important, even though most RSS and BJP members today may have altogether failed themselves to understand its nature and significance. Indeed, the small handful of Muslims who have been part of their organisations may have understood it rather better.

To be Muslim, a person has only to believe that God is One and Muhammad is the last of the prophets, i.e. to pronounce the Kalma. Nothing else is either necessary or sufficient. Praying daily, facing Mecca (or Jerusalem before it), going on pilgrimage, fasting during Ramzan, giving to the poor, circumcising boys, polygamy, inducing the modesty of women though seclusion or the veil, have all been part of Muslim practice for ever because they were aspects of the Prophet’s life. But if a Muslim did not pronounce the Kalma, everything else he/she might do is rendered meaningless. The Kalma is necessary and sufficient for Islamic belief. All else is incidental and logically superfluous.

The first half of the Kalma is a commitment to an austere monotheistic ontology; the second half is an oath of fidelity to the Prophet because he was the original exponent of this ontology (in Arabic). Muhammad (572-632 AD) was without a doubt among the greatest of men, as may be measured by his vast impact on human history. His total self-effacement and abhorrence of adulation was signified when at his death it was famously said “If you are worshippers of Muhammad, know that he is dead. If you are worshippers of God, know that God is living and does not die”.

Abul Kalam Azad understood well that there was no contradiction between being Muslim by faith and Indian by nationality. “My ancestors came to India from Herat in Babar’s time…” is how he began his autobiography. No one could think Azad anything but a proud Indian nationalist. No one ~ certainly not MA Jinnah ~ could think of Azad as anything but a Muslim and a scholar of Islam. Yet Azad’s respect and admiration (like that of Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan) knew no bounds for the only reformer since Vivekananda that Hinduism has seen in the 20th century: a Congress politician by the name of MK Gandhi,who came to be murdered by Hindu fanatics. By contrast, Jinnah, the political founder of Pakistan, could see Congress only as a Hindu party and Gandhi the Hindu leader using Hindu symbols against whom he was juxtaposed in a struggle for power after the British left: “Congress leaders may shout as much as they like that the Congress is a national body. But …(the) Congress is nothing but a Hindu body,” he declared in 1938. Jinnah’s ambition, and that of the separatist Muslim elite, demanded that they rule themselves in isolation in corners of India.

Throughout the period of Hindu Westernisation in response to the opening to the world presented by the British Raj, the Muslim elite were instead chafing under the idea that an India free of British rule could possibly have Muslims living under governments composed of people who were not “People of the Book” mentioned in the Muslim scriptures. Even if British rule had been almost intolerable in Muslim eyes ~ rendering India’s territory dar-ul-harb at worst or dar-ul-aman at best ~ the British were at least “People of the Book”. After a British departure, rule over Muslims by a Hindu majority, supported by the much-feared Sikhs (“kaffirs with beards” in Muslim popular perception), was felt to be psychologically intolerable. Not only were Hindus, in Muslim eyes, polytheistic believers in idol-worship and practitioners of a caste-system, but everyone knew that the vast majority of India’s Muslims had been themselves converts from the same Hindu social and cultural origins, and there would be constant danger of relapse of Muslims into Hindu beliefs and practices if the country was governed by a Hindu majority. The slogan “Islam in danger” has always had substance in the sense that the faithful have constantly had to mind the dangers of yielding to temptations around them, including scepticism, syncretism and pantheism. Hence, insularity and communalism ~ a psychological circling of the wagons in terms of the American Wild West ~ was a natural political response of Muslims to the Hindu (and Parsee and Christian) modernisation of India in the 19th and 20th centuries.

Such were the implicit unspoken premises driving the Pakistan Movement which Iqbal and Jinnah came to lead in the 20th century. The origins lay in the thoughts and deeds of Shah Wali Allah (1703-1762) and his Arab contemporary in Nejd, Mohammad Ibn Abdal Wahhab, the founder of Wahhabism. It continued with men like Sayyid Ahmed Barelvi(1786-1831), and Titu Mir (1782-1831), until we reach the Islamic “moderniser” Sayyid Ahmed Khan who, while being the founder of Muslim higher education at Aligarh, was also the fountainhead of the separatism that led to the Muslim League’s creation in 1906. “We are an Arab people whose fathers have fallen in exile in the country of Hindustan, and Arabic genealogy and Arabic language are our pride,” Wali Allah had said. Barelvi after him declared: “We must repudiate all those Indian, Persian and Roman customs which are contrary to the Prophet’s teaching.” “In the later 1820s, (Barelvi’s) movement became militant, regarding jihad as one of the basic tenets of faith. Possibly encouraged by the British, with whom the movement did not feel powerful enough to come to grips at the outset, it chose as the venue of jihad the NW frontier of the subcontinent, where it was directed against the Sikhs. Barelvi temporarily succeeded in carving out a small theocratic principality which collapsed owing to the friction between his Pathan and North Indian followers; and he was finally defeated and slain by the Sikhs (at the battle of Balakot) in 1831,” points out Aziz Ahmed, in AL Basham’s A Cultural Historyof India. Barelvi’s jihadi proto-Pakistan state near Peshawar was named Tariqa-yi Muhammadiya; it may have survived at Sittana until the First World War. Leaving to one side Rahmat Ali’s lonely scheming from England and invention on the top floor of a London bus of the name “PAKSTAN”, such was the genesis of Iqbal and Jinnah’s Muslim state.

Azad, on behalf of scores of millions of Muslim Indians including Sheikh Abdullah and Zakir Hussain and Ghaffar Khan among the most prominent, candidly raised objections to this entire exercise: “I must confess that the very term Pakistan goes against my grain. It suggests that some portions of the world are pure while others are impure. Such a division of territories into pure and impure is un-Islamic and is more in keeping with orthodox Brahmanism which divides men and countries into holy and unholy – a division which is a repudiation of the very spirit of Islam. Islam recognises no such division and the Prophet says `God made the whole world a mosque for me’.”

Azad had seen that India is or can be dar-ul-Islam or at least dar-ul-aman and not dar-ul-harb, because the Muslim in this land of ours –bounded by the mountains and the seas, with the rivers in between them, all of which the Hindu finds sacred and imagines to be the home of the Hindu pantheon – is in fact able to practise his/her faith freely despite the majority culture superficially being or seeming to be one which is polytheistic and pantheistic. The majority culture in India has had no theoretical or practical difficulty with the recitation of the Kalma anywhere or anytime in the country. The handful of Muslims in the RSS and BJP today may have understood something of the same. Visiting Pakistanis today are amazed by two things in India: the presence of women in public life and the fact that Muslims are free to practise Islam. Muslims may privately believe their Hindu compatriots or cousins to be hopelessly ignorant of the truth, and vice-versa, but nothing in public life needs to hinge on such mutual beliefs people have about one another. That is what was meant when the present author said in the Introduction to Foundations of Pakistan’s Political Economy that Jinnah’s address to Pakistan’s Constituent Assembly was as secular as any that may be found.

On Pakistan and the Theory & Practice of the Islamic State: An Excerpt from the Munir Report of 1954

From REPORT of THE COURT OF INQUIRY constituted under PUNJAB ACT II OF 1954 to enquire into the PUNJAB DISTURBANCES OF 1953 “Munir Report”

“ISLAMIC STATE
It has been repeatedly said before us that implicit in the demand for Pakistan was the demand for an Islamic State. Some speeches of important leaders who were striving for Pakistan undoubtedly lend themselves to this construction. These leaders while referring to an Islamic State or to a State governed by Islamic laws perhaps had in their minds the pattern of a legal structure based on or mixed up with Islamic dogma, personal law, ethics and institutions. No one who has given serious thought to the introduction of a religious State in Pakistan has failed to notice the tremendous difficulties with which any such scheme must be confronted. Even Dr. Muhammad Iqbal, who must be considered to be the first thinker who conceived of the possibility of a consolidated North Western Indian Muslim State, in the course of his presidential address to the Muslim League in 1930 said:

“Nor should the Hindus fear that the creation of autonomous Muslim States will mean the introduction of a kind of religious rule in such States. The principle that each group is entitled to free development on its own lines is not inspired by any feeling of narrow communalism”.

When we come to deal with the question of responsibility we shall have the occasion to point out that the most important of the parties who are now clamouring for the enforcement of the three demands on religious grounds were all against the idea of an Islamic State. Even Maulana Abul Ala Maudoodi of Jama’at-i-Islami was of the view that the form of Government in the new Muslim State, if it ever came into existence, could only be secular.

Before the Partition, the first public picture of Pakistan that the Quaid-i-Azam gave to the world was in the course of an interview in New Delhi with Mr. Doon Campbell, Reuter’s Correspondent. The Quaid-i-Azam said that the new State would be a modern democratic State, with sovereignty resting in the people and the members of the new nation having equal rights of citizenship regardless of their religion, caste or creed. When Pakistan formally appeared on the map, the Quaid-i-Azam in his memorable speech of 11th August 1947 to the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan, while stating the principle on which the new State was to be founded, said:—

“All the same, in this division it was impossible to avoid the question of minorities being in one Dominion or the other. Now that was unavoidable. There is no other solution. Now what shall we do? Now, if we want to make this great State of Pakistan happy and prosperous we should wholly and solely concentrate on the well-being of the people, and specially of the masses and the poor. If you will work in co-operation, forgetting the past, burying the hatchet, you are bound to succeed. If you change your past and work together in a spirit that every one of you, no matter to what community he belongs, no matter what relations he had with you in the past, no matter what is his colour, caste or creed, is first, second and last a citizen of this State with equal rights, privileges and obligations., there will be no end to the progress you will make. “I cannot emphasise it too much. We should begin to work in that spirit and in course of time all these angularities of the majority and minority communities—the Hindu community and the Muslim community— because even as regards Muslims you have Pathana, Punjabis, Shias, Sunnis and so on and among the Hindus you have Brahmins, Vashnavas, Khatris, also Bengalis, Madrasis and so on—will vanish. Indeed if you ask me this has been the biggest hindrance in the way of India to attain its freedom and independence and but for this we would have been free peoples long long ago. No power can hold another nation, and specially a nation of 400 million souls in subjection; nobody could have conquered you, and even if it had happened, nobody could have continued its hold on you for any length of time but for this (Applause). Therefore, we must learn a lesson from this. You are free; you are free to go to your temples, you are free to go to your mosques or to any other places of worship in this State of Pakistan. You may belong to any religion or caste or creed— that has nothing to do with the business of the State (Hear, hear). As you know, history shows that in England conditions sometime ago were much worse than those prevailing in India today. The Roman Catholics and the Protestants persecuted each other. Even now there are some States in existence where there are discriminations made and bars imposed against a particular class. Thank God we are not starting in those days. We are starting in the days when there is no discrimination, no distinction between one community and another, no discrimination between one caste or creed and another. We are starting with this fundamental principle that we are all citizens and equal citizens of one State (Loud applause). The people of England in course of time had to face the realities of the situation and had to discharge the responsibilities and burdens placed upon them by the Government of their country and they went through that fire step by step. Today you might say with justice that Roman Catholics and Protestants do not exist: what exists now is that every man is a citizen, an equal citizen, of Great Britain and they are all members of the nation. “Now, I think we should keep that in front of us as our ideal and you will find that in course of time Hindus would cease to be Hindus and Muslims would cease to be Muslims, not in the religious sense, because that is the personal faith of each individual, but in the political sense as citizens of the State”.

The Quaid-i-Azam was the founder of Pakistan and the occasion on which he thus spoke was the first landmark in the history of Pakistan. The speech was intended both for his own people including non-Muslims and the world, and its object was to define as clearly as possible the ideal to the attainment of which the new State was to devote all its energies. There are repeated references in this speech to the bitterness of the past and an appeal to forget and change the past and to bury the hatchet. The future subject of the State is to be a citizen with equal rights, privileges and obligations, irrespective of colour, caste, creed or community. The word ‘nation’ is used more than once and religion is stated to have nothing to do with the business of the State and to be merely a matter of personal faith for the individual.

We asked the ulama whether this conception of a State was acceptable to them and everyone of them replied in an unhesitating negative, including the Ahrar and erstwhile Congressites with whom before the Partition this conception was almost a part of their faith.

If Maulana Amin Ahsan Islahi’s evidence correctly represents the view of Jama’at-i-Islami, a State based on this idea is the creature of the devil, and he is confirmed in this by several writings of his chief, Maulana Abul Ala Maudoodi, the founder of the jama’at. None of the ulama can tolerate a State which is based on nationalism and all that it implies; with them millat and all that it connotes can alone be the determining factor in State activity.

The Quaid-i-Azam’s conception of a modern national State, it is alleged, became obsolete with the passing of the Objectives Resolution on 12th March 1949; but it has been freely admitted that this Resolution, though grandiloquent in words, phrases and clauses, is nothing but a hoax and that not only does it not contain even a semblance of the embryo of an Islamic State but its provisions, particularly those relating to fundamental rights, are directly opposed to the principles of an Islamic State.

FOUNDATIONS OF ISLAMIC STATE

What is then the Islamic State of which everybody talks but nobody thinks? Before we seek to discover an answer to this question, we must have a clear conception of the scope and function of the State.

The ulama were divided in their opinions when they were asked to cite some precedent of an Islamic State in Muslim history. Thus, though Hafiz Kifayat Husain, the Shia divine, held out as his ideal the form of Government during the Holy Prophet’s time, Maulana Daud Ghaznavi also included in his precedent the days of the Islamic Republic, of Umar bin Abdul Aziz, Salah-ud-Din Ayyubi of Damascus, Sultan Mahmud of Ghazni, Muhammad Tughlaq and Aurangzeb and the present regime in Saudi Arabia. Most of them, however, relied on the form of Government during the Islamic Republic from 632 to 661 A. D., a period of less than thirty years, though some of them also added the very short period of Umar bin Abdul Aziz.

Maulana Abdul Haamid Badayuni stated that the details of the ideal State would be worked out by the ulama while Master Taj-ud-Din Ansari’s confused notion of an Islamic State may be gathered from the following portion of his interrogation :—

“Q.—Were you also in the Khilafat movement ? A.—Yes. Q.—When did the Khilafat movement stop in India ? A.—In 1923. This was after the Turks had declared their country to be a secular State. Q.—If you are told that the Khilafat movement continued long after the Turks had abolished Khilafat, will that be correct? A.—As far as I remember, the Khilafat movement finished with the abolition of the Khilafat by the Turks. Q.—You are reported to have been a member of the Khilafat movement and having made speeches. Is it correct ? A.—It could not be correct. Q.—Was the Congress interested in Khilafat ?
A.— Yes.Q.—Was Khilafat with you a matter of religious conviction or just a political movement ? A.— It was purely a religious movement. Q.— Did the Khilafat movement have the support of Mr Gandhi ? A.—Yes. Q.— What was the object of the Khilafat movement ? A.— The Britisher was injuring the Khilafat institution in Turkey and the Musalman was aggrieved by this attitude of the Britisher. Q.— Was not the object of the movement to resuscitate the Khilafat among the Musalmans ?A.—No. Q.— Is Khilafat with you a necessary part of Muslim form of Government ? A.—Yes. Q.— Are you, therefore, in favour of having a Khilafat in Pakistan ? A.—Yes. Q.— Can there be more than one Khalifa of the Muslims ? A.— No. Q.— Will the Khalifa of Pakistan be the Khalifa of all the Muslims of the world ?
A.— He should be but cannot be.”

Throughout the three thousand years over which political thought extends, and such thought in its early stages cannot be separated from religion, two questions have invariably presented themselves for consideration : —

(1) what are the precise functions of the State ? and
(2) who shall control the State ?

If the true scope of the activities of the State is the welfare, temporal or spiritual or both of the individual, then the first question directly gives rise to the bigger question:

What is the object of human life and the ultimate destiny of man? On this, widely divergent views have prevailed, not at different times but at one and the same time. The pygmies of equatorial West Africa still believe that their God Komba has sent them into the forest to hunt and dance and sing. The Epicureans meant very much the same when they said that the object of human life is to drink and eat and be merry, for death denies such pleasures. The utilitarians base their institutions on the assumption that the object of human life is to experience pleasant sensations of mind and body, irrespective of what is to come hereafter. The Stoics believed in curbing and reducing all physical desires, and Diogenes found a tub good enough to live in. German philosophers think that the individual lives for the State and that therefore the object of life is service of the State in all that it might decide to undertake and achieve. Ancient Hindu philosophers believed in the logic of the fist with its natural consequence, the law of natural selection and the struggle for survival. The Semitic theory of State, whether Jewish, Christian or Islamic, has always held that the object of human life is to prepare ourselves for the next life and that, therefore, prayer and good works are the only object of life. Greek philosophers beginning with Socrates thought that the object of human life was to engage in philosophical meditation with a view to discovering the great truths that lie in nature and that the business of the others is to feed the philosophers engaged in that undertaking.

Islam emphasises the doctrine that life in this world is not the only life given to man but that eternal life begins after the present existence comes to an end, and that the status of a human being in the next world will depend upon his beliefs and actions in this world. As the present life is not an end in itself but merely a means to an end, not only the individual but also the State, as opposed to the secular theory which bases all political and economic institutions on a disregard of their consequences on the next life, should strive for human conduct which ensures for a person better status in the next world.

According to this theory Islam is the religion which seeks to attain that object. Therefore the question immediately arises : What is Islam and who is a momin or a Muslim ? We put this question to the ulama and we shall presently refer to their answers to this question. But we cannot refrain from saying here that it was a matter of infinite regret to us that the ulama whose first duty should be to have settled views on this subject, were hopelessly disagreed among themselves.

Apart from how these learned divines have expressed themselves, we conceive of Islam as a system that covers, as every systematic religion must, the following five topics :—
(1) the dogma, namely, the essentials of belief ;
(2) the cult, namely, religious rites and observances which a person must
perform ;
(3) ethics, i. e. rules of moral conduct ;
(4) institutions, social, economic and political ; and
(5) law proper.

The essential basis of the rules on all these subjects is revelation and not reason, though both may coincide. This coincidence, however, is accidental because human reasoning may be faulty and ultimate reason is known only to God, Who sends His message to humanity through His chosen messengers for the direction and guidance of the people. One must, therefore, accept the dogma, observe the cult, follow the ethics, obey the law and establish institutions which God has revealed, though their reason may not be apparent—nay even if they be opposed to human reason. Since an error by God is an impossibility, anything that God has revealed, whether its subject be something occult or preternatural, history, finance, law, worship or something which according to human thought admits of scientific treatment as for instance, birth of man, evolution, cosmology, or astronomy, has got to be accepted as absolute truth. The test of reason is not the acid test and a denial of this amounts to a denial of the supreme wisdom and designs of Allah—it is kufr. Now God has revealed Himself from time to time to His favoured people of whom our Holy Prophet was the last. That revelation is contained in the Qur’an and covers the five topics mentioned above. The true business of a person who believes in Islam is therefore to understand, believe in and act upon that revelation. The people whom God chooses as medium for the transmission of His messages are rasuls (messengers) or nabis (prophets). Since every action or saying of a prophet is, in the case of our own Holy Prophet it certainly was, prompted by Allah, it has the same degree of inerrancy as the formal revelation itself, because prophets are ma’sum, incapable of doing or saying something which is opposed to Divine wishes. These sayings and actions are sunna having the same infallibility as the Qur’an. The record of this sunna is hadith which is to be found in several books which were compiled by Muslim scholars after long, laborious and careful research extending over several generations.

The word hadith means a record of actions or sayings of the Prophet and his companions. At first the sahaba. i. e. people who had lived in the society of the Prophet, were the best authority for a knowledge of the sunna. Later people had to be content with the communications of the tabi’un, i. e. successors, people of the first generation after the Holy Prophet who had received their information from the sahaba, and then in the following generations with the accounts of the so-called successors of the successors (tabi’ul-tabi’un), i.e. people of the second generation after the Holy Prophet, who had concerted with the successors. Marfu’ is a tradition which contains a statement about the Prophet ; mawquf, a tradition that refers only to the sayings or doings of the sahaba ; and maqtu’ a tradition which does not at most go further back than the first generation after the Holy Prophet and deals only with sayings or doings of tabi’un. In some of the ahadith the actual word of God is to be found. Any such tradition is designated Hadith-i-Qudsi or Ilahi as distinguished from an ordinary Hadith-i-Nabvi.

A very large portion of sayings ascribed to the Prophet deals with the ahkam (legal professions), religious obligations, halal and haram (what is allowed and forbidden), with ritual purity, laws regarding food and criminal and civil law. Further they deal with dogma, retribution at the Last Judgment, hell and paradise, angels, creation, revelations, the earlier prophets. Many traditions also contain edifying sayings and moral teachings by the Holy Prophet. The importance of ahadith was realised from the very beginning and they were not only committed to memory but in some cases were reduced to writing. The work of compilation of hadith began in the third century after the Hijra and the Sihah Sitta were all compiled in that century. These are the musannifs of —
(1) Al-Bukhari, died 256/870,
(2) Muslim, died 261/875,
(3) Abu Dawud, died 275/888,
(4) Al-Tirmizi, died 279/892,
(5) All Nasa’i, died 303/915, and
(6) Ibn-i-Maja, died 273/886.

According to modern laws of evidence, including our own, the ahadith are inadmissible evidence of sunna because each of them contains several links of hearsay, but as authority on law they are admissible pro prio vigore. The merit of these collections lies not so much in the fact that (as is often wrongly stated) their authors decided for the first time which of the numerous traditions in circulation were genuine and which false but rather in the fact that they brought together everything that was recognised as genuine in orthodox circles in those days.

The Shias judge hadith from their own stand-point and only consider such traditions reliable as are based on the authority of Ali and his adherents. They have, therefore, their own works on the subject and hold the following five works in particularly high esteem—
(1) Al-Kafi of Muhammad b. Yaqub Al-Kulini, died 328/939,
(2) Man La Yastahdiruhu’ul-Fakih of Muhammad b. Ali b. Babuya Al-Kummi,
died 381/991,
(3) Tahdib Al-Ahkam,
(4) Al-Istibsar Fi-Ma’khtalafa Fihi’l-Akhbar (extract from the preceding) of
Muhammad Altusi, died 459/1067, and
(5) Nahj Al-Balagha (alleged sayings of Ali) of Ali b. Tahir Al-Sharif Al-Murtaza, died 436/1044 (or of his brother Radi Al-Din Al-Baghdadi.)

After the ritual, the dogma and the most important political and social institutions had taken definite shape in the second and third centuries, there arose a certain communis opinio regarding the reliability of most transmitters of tradition and the value of their statement. The main principles of doctrine had already been established in the writings of Malik b. Anas, Al-Shafi’i and other scholars regarded as authoritative in different circles and mainly on the authority of traditional sayings of the Holy Prophet. In the long run no one dared to doubt the truth of these traditions and this almost conclusive presumption of truth has since continued to be attached to the ahadith compiled in the Sihah Sitta.

We have so far arrived at this result that any rule on any subject that may be derived from the Qur’an or the sunna of the Holy Prophet is binding on every Musalman. But since the only evidence of sunna is the hadith, the words sunna and hadith have become mixed up with, and indistinguishable from, each other with the result that the expression Qur’an and hadith is not infrequently employed where the intention is to refer to Qur’an and sunna.

At this stage another principle, equally basic, comes into operation, and that is that Islam is the final religion revealed by God, complete and exhaustive in all respects, and that God will not abrogate, detract from or add to this religion (din) any more than He will send a fresh messenger. The din having been perfected (Akmalto lakum dinokum, Sura V, verse 3), there remains no need for any new code repealing, modifying or amplifying the original code; nor for any fresh messenger or message. In this sense, therefore, prophethood ceased with the Holy Prophet and revelation stopped for ever. This is the doctrine of the cessation of wahi-i-nubuwwat.

If the proposition that Muslim dogma, ethics and institutions, etc., are all based on the doctrine of inerrancy, whether such inerrancy lies in the Qur’an, the sunna, ijma’ or ijtihad-i-mutlaq, is fully comprehended, the various deductions that follow from it will be easily understandable. As the ultimate test of truth, whether the matter be one of a ritual or political or social or economic nature, is revelation and revelation has to be gathered from the Qur’an, and the sunna carries almost the same degree of inerrancy as revelation and the only evidence of sunna is hadith, the first duty of those who desire to establish an Islamic State will be to discover the precise rule applicable to the existing circumstances whether that rule is to be found in the Qur’an or hadith. Obviously the persons most suited for the purpose would be those who have made the Qur’an and hadith their lifelong study, namely, among the Sunnies, the ulama, and among the Shias, the mujtahids who are the spokesmen of the hidden Imam, the ruler de jure divino. The function of these divines would be to engage themselves in discovering rules applicable to particular situations and they will be engaged in a task similar to that in which Greek philosophers were engaged, with only this difference that whereas the latter thought that all truth lay in nature which had merely to be discovered by individual effort, the ulama and the mujtahids will have to get at the truth that lies in the holy Book and the books of hadith.

The ulama Board which was recommended by the Basic Principles Committee was a logical recognition of this principle, and the true objection against that Board should indeed have been that the Board was too inadequate a mechanism to implement the principle which had brought that body into existence.

Ijma’ means concurrence of the mujtahids of the people, i.e., of those who have a right, in virtue of knowledge, to form a judgment of their own, after the death of the Holy Prophet. The authority of ijma’ rests on the principle of a divine protection against error and is founded on a basal tradition of the Holy Prophet, “My people will never agree in error”, reported in Ibn Maja, By this procedure points which had been in dispute were fixed, and when fixed, they became an essential part of the faith and disbelief in them an act of unbelief (kufr). The essential point to remember about ijma’ is that it represents the agreement of the mujtahids and that the agreement of the masses is especially excluded.

Thus ijma’ has not only fixed unsettled points but has changed settled doctrines of the greatest importance.

The distinction between ijma’ and ijtihad is that whereas the former is collective, the latter is individual. Ijtihad means the exerting of one’s self to the utmost degree to form an opinion in a case or as to a rule of law. This is done by applying analogy to the Qur’an and the sunna. Ijtihad did not originally involve inerrancy, its result being always zann or fallible opinion. Only combined ijtihad led to ijma, and was inerrant. But this broad ijtihad soon passed into special ijtihad of those who had a peculiar right to form judgments. When later doctors looked back to the founding of the four legal schools, they assigned to their founders an ijtihad of the first rank (ijtihad-i-mutlaq). But from time to time individuals appeared who returned to the earliest meaning of ijtihad and claimed for themselves the right to form their own opinion from first principles. One of these was the Hanbalite Ibn Taimiya (died 728). Another was Suyuti (died 911) in whom the claim to ijtihad unites with one to be the mujaddid or renewer of religion in his century. At every time there must exist at least one mujtahid, was his contention, just as in every century there must come a mujaddid.

In Shia Islam there are still absolute mujtahids because they are regarded as the spokesmen of the hidden Imam. Thus collective ijtihad leads to ijma’, and the basis of ijma’ is divine protection against error—inerrancy.

ESSENTIALS OF ISLAMIC STATE
Since the basis of Islamic law is the principle of inerrancy of revelation and of the Holy Prophet, the law to be found in the Qur’an and the sunna is above all man-made laws, and in case of conflict between the two, the latter, irrespective of its nature, must yield to the former. Thus, provided there be a rule in the Qur’an or the sunna on a matter which according to our conceptions falls within the region of Constitutional Law or International Law, the rule must be given effect to unless that rule itself permits a departure from it. Thus no distinction exists in Islamic law between Constitutional Law and other law, the whole law to be found in the Qur’an and the sunna being a part of the law of the land for Muslim subjects of the State. Similarly if there be a rule in the Qur’an or the sunna relating to the State’s relations with other States or to the relations of Muslim subjects of the State with other States or the subjects of those States, the rule will have the same superiority of sanction as any other law to be found in the Qur’an or the sunna.

Therefore if Pakistan is or is intended to be converted into an Islamic State in the true sense of the word, its Constitution must contain the following five provisions:—

(1) that all laws to be found in the Qur’an or the sunna shall be deemed to be a part of the law of the land for Muslims and shall be enforced accordingly;
(2) that unless the Constitution itself is framed by ijma’-i-ummat, namely, by the agreement of the ulama and mujtahids of acknowledged status, any provision in the Constitution which is repugnant to the Qur’an or sunna shall to the extent of the repugnancy be void;
(3) that unless the existing laws of Pakistan are adapted by ijma’-i-ummat of the kind mentioned above, any provision in the existing law which is contrary to the Qur’an or sunna shall to the extent of the repugnancy be void;
(4) that any provision in any future law which is repugnant to Qur’an or sunna shall be void;
(5) that no rule of International Law and no provision in any convention or treaty to which Pakistan is a party, which is contrary to the Qur’an or the sunna shall be binding on any Muslim in Pakistan.

SOVEREIGNTY AND DEMOCRACY IN ISLAMIC STATE
That the form of Government in Pakistan, if that form is to comply with the principles of Islam, will not be democratic is conceded by the ulama. We have already explained the doctrine of sovereignty of the Qur’an and the sunna. The Objectives Resolution rightly recognised this position when it recited that all sovereignty rests with God Almighty alone. But the authors of that Resolution misused the words ‘sovereign’ and ‘democracy’ when they recited that the Constitution to be framed was for a sovereign State in which principles of democracy as enunciated by Islam shall be fully observed.

It may be that in the context in which they were used, these words could not be misunderstood by those who are well versed in Islamic principles, but both these words were borrowed from western political philosophy and in that sense they were both wrongly used in the Resolution. When it is said that a country is sovereign, the implication is that its people or any other group of persons in it are entitled to conduct the affairs of that country in any way they like and untrammelled by any considerations except those of expediency and policy. An Islamic State, however, cannot in this sense be sovereign, because it will not be competent to abrogate, repeal or do away with any law in the Qur’an or the sunna. Absolute restriction on the legislative power of a State is a restriction on the sovereignty of the people of that State and if the origin of this restriction lies elsewhere than in the will of the people, then to the extent of that restriction the sovereignty of the State and its people is necessarily taken away. In an Islamic State, sovereignty, in its essentially juristic sense, can only rest with Allah. In the same way, democracy means the rule of the demos, namely, the people, directly by them as in ancient Greece and Rome, or indirectly through chosen representatives as in modern democracies. If the power of the people in the framing of the Constitution or in the framing of the laws or in the sphere of executive action is subject to certain immutable rules, it cannot be said that they can pass any law that they like, or, in the exercise of executive functions, do whatever they like. Indeed if the legislature in an Islamic State is a sort of ijma’, the masses are expressly disqualified from taking part in it because ijma’-i-ummat in Islamic jurisprudence is restricted to ulama and mujtahids of acknowledged status and does not at all extend, as in democracy, to the populace.

OTHER INCIDENTS OF ISLAMIC STATE ACCORDING TO ULAMA

In the preceding pages we have attempted to state as clearly as we could the principles on which a religious State must be built if it is to be called an Islamic State. We now proceed to state some incidents of such State, with particular reference to the ulamas’ conception of it.

LEGISLATURE AND LEGISLATION

Legislature in its present sense is unknown to the Islamic system. The religiopolitical system which is called din-i-Islam is a complete system which contains in itself the mechanism for discovering and applying law to any situation that may arise. During the Islamic Republic there was no legislature in its modern sense and for every situation or emergency that arose law could be discovered and applied by the ulama. The law had been made and was not to be made, the only function of those entrusted with the administration of law being to discover the law for the purposes of the particular case, though when enunciated and applied it formed a precedent for others to follow. It is wholly incorrect, as has been suggested from certain quarters, that in a country like Pakistan, which consists of different communities, Muslim and non-Muslim, and where representation is allowed to non-Muslims with a right to vote on every subject that comes up, the legislature is a form of ijma’ or ijtihad, the reason being that ijtihad is not collective but only individual, and though ijma’ is collective, there is no place in it for those who are not experts in the knowledge of the law. This principle at once rules out the infidels (kuffar) whether they be people of Scriptures (ahl-i-kitab) or idolators (mushrikeen).

Since Islam is a perfect religion containing laws, express or derivable by ijma’ or ijtihad, governing the whole field of human activity, there is in it no sanction for what may, in the modern sense, be called legislation.

“Q.—Is the institution of legislature as distinguished from the institution of a person or body of persons entrusted with the interpretation of law, an integral part of an Islamic State?
A.—No. Our law is complete and merely requires interpretation by those who are experts in it. According to my belief no question can arise the law relating to which cannot be discovered from the Qur’an or the hadith.
Q.—Who were Sahib-ul-hall-i-wal-aqd
A.—They were the distinguished ulama of the time. These persons attained their status by reason of the knowledge of the law. They were not in any way analogous or similar to the legislature in modern democracy.”

The same view was expressed by Amir-i-Shari’at Sayyad Ata Ullah Shah Bukhari in one of his speeches reported in the ‘Azad’ of 22nd April, 1947, in the course of which he said that our din is complete and perfect and that it amounts to kufr to make more laws.

Maulana Abul Ala Maudoodi, however, is of the opinion that legislation in the true sense is possible in an Islamic State on matters which are not covered by the Qur’an, the sunna, or previous ijma’ and he has attempted to explain his point by reference to the institution of a body of persons whom the Holy Prophet, and after him the khulafa consulted on all matters relating to affairs of State. The question is one of some difficulty and great importance because any institution of legislature will have to be reconciled with the claim put forward by Maulana Abul Hasanat and some other religious divines that Islam is a perfect and exhaustive code wide enough to furnish an answer to any question that may arise relating to any human activity, and that it does not know of any “unoccupied field” to be filled by fresh legislation. There is no doubt that Islam enjoins consultation and that not only the Holy Prophet but also the first four caliphs and even their successors resorted to consultation with the leading men of the time, who for their knowledge of the law and piety could well be relied upon.

In the inquiry not much has been disclosed about the Majlis-i-Shura except what is contained in Maulana Abul Ala Maudoodi’s written statement which he supplied to the Court at its request. That there was a body of men who were consulted is true, but whether this was a standing body and whether its advice had any legal or binding force, seems somewhat doubtful. These men were certainly not elected in the modern way, though their representative character cannot be disputed. Their advice was certainly asked ad hoc, but that they were competent to make law as the modern legislatures make laws is certainly not correct. The decisions taken by them undoubtedly served as precedents and were in the nature of ijma’, which is not legislation but the application of an existing law to a particular case. When consulted in affairs of State, their functions were truly in the nature of an advice given by a modern cabinet but such advice is not law but only a decision.

Nor can the legislature in a modern State correspond to ijma’ because as we have already pointed out, the legislature legislates while the ulama of Majlis-i-Shura who were called upon to determine what should be the decision on a particular point which was not covered by the Qur’an and the sunna, merely sought to discover and apply the law and not to promulgate the law, though the decision when taken had to be taken not only for the purposes of the particular case but for subsequent occasions as a binding precedent.

An intriguing situation might arise if the Constitution Act provided that any provision of it, if it was inconsistent with the Qur’an or the sunna, would be void, and the intra vires of a law made by the legislature were questioned before the Supreme Court on the ground that the institution of legislature itself was contrary to the Qur’an and the sunna.

POSITION OF NON-MUSLIMS

The ground on which the removal of Chaudhri Zafrullah Khan and other Ahmadis occupying key positions in the State is demanded is that the Ahmadis are non-Muslims and that therefore like zimmies in an Islamic State they are not eligible for appointment to higher offices in the State. This aspect of the demands has directly raised a question about the position of non-Muslims in Pakistan if we are to have an Islamic Constitution.

According to the leading ulama the position of non-Muslims in the Islamic State of Pakistan will be that of zimmies and they will not be full citizens of Pakistan because they will not have the same rights as Muslims They will have no voice in the making of the law, no right to administer the law and no right to hold public offices.

A full statement of this position will be found in the evidence of Maulana Abul Hasanat Sayyad Muhammad Ahmad Qadri, Maulana Ahmad Ali, Mian Tufail Muhammad and Maulana Abdul Haamid Badayuni. Maulana Abul Hasanat on being questioned on the subject stated as follows :—

“Q.—If we were to have an Islamic State in Pakistan, what will be the position of the kuffar (non-Muslims)? Will they have a voice in the making of laws, the right of administering the law and the right to hold public offices? A.—Their position will be that of zimmies. They will have no voice in the making of laws, no right to administer the law and no right to hold public offices. Q.—In an Islamic State can the head of the State delegate any part of his powers to kuffar? A.—No.”

Maulana Ahmad Ali, when questioned, said:— “Q.—if we were to have an Islamic State in Pakistan, what will be the position of the kuffar? Will they have a hand in the making of the law, the right to administer the law and the right to hold public offices ? A.—Their position will be that of zimmies. They will have no say in the making of law and no right to administer the law. Government may, however, permit them to hold any public office”.

Mian Tufail Muhammad stated as follows :— “Q.—Read the article on minorities’ rights in the ‘Civil and Military Gazette’ of 13th October, 1953, and say whether it correctly represents your view of an Islamic State? (It was stated in the articles that minorities would have the same rights as Muslims). A.—I have read this article and do not acknowledge these rights for the Christians or other non-Muslims in Pakistan if the State is founded on the ideology of the Jama’at”.

The confusion on this point in the mind of Maulana Abdul Haamid Badayuni, President, Jami’at-ul-Ulama-i-Pakistan, is apparent from the following: —

“Q.—Have you ever read the aforesaid speech (the speech of the Quaid-i-Azam to the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan on 11th August, 1947)? A.—Yes, I have read that speech. Q.—Do you still agree with the conception of Pakistan that the Quaid-i-Azam presented to the Constituent Assembly in this speech in which he said that thereafter there would be only one Pakistan nation, consisting of Muslims and non-Muslims, having equal civic rights, without any distinction of race, religion or creed and that religion would be merely a private affair of the individual ? A.—I accept the principle that all communities, whether Muslims or non-Muslims, should have, according to their population, proper representation in the administration of the State and legislation, except that non-Muslims cannot be taken in the army or the judiciary or be appointed as Ministers or to other posts involving the reposing of confidence. Q.—Are you suggesting that the position of non-Muslims would be that of zimmies or any better ? A.—No. By zimmies are meant non-Muslim people of lands which have been conquered by an Islamic State, and the word is not applicable to non-Muslim minorities already living in an Islamic State. Such minorities are called mu’ahids, i.e. those people with whom some agreement has been made. Q.—What will be their status if there is no agreement with them ? A.—In that case such communities cannot have any rights of citizenship. Q.—Will the non-Muslim communities inhabiting Pakistan be called by you as mu’ahids? A.—No, not in the absence of an agreement with them. To my knowledge there is no such agreement with such communities in Pakistan.”

So, according to the evidence of this learned divine, the non-Muslims of Pakistan will neither be citizens nor will they have the status of zimmies or of mu’ahids. During the Islamic Republic, the head of the State, the khalifa, was chosen by a system of election, which was wholly different from the present system of election based on adult or any other form of popular suffrage. The oath of allegiance (ba’it) rendered to him possessed a sacramental virtue, and on his being chosen by the consensus of the people (ijma’-ul-ummat) he became the source of all channels of legitimate Government. He and he alone then was competent to rule, though he could delegate his powers to deputies and collect around him a body of men of outstanding piety and learning, called Majlis-i-Shura or Ahl-ul-Hall-i-wal-Aqd. The principal feature of this system was that the kuffar, for reasons which are too obvious and need not be stated, could not be admitted to this majlis and the power which had vested in the khalifa could not be delegated to the kuffar. The khalifa was the real head of the State, all power vesting in him and not a powerless individual like the President of a modern democratic State who is merely to sign the record of decisions taken by the Prime Minister and his Cabinet. He could not appoint non-Muslims to important posts, and could give them no place either in the interpretation or the administration of the law, the making of the law by them, as already pointed out, being a legal impossibility.

This being the position, the State will have to devise some machinery by which the distinction between a Muslim and a non-Muslim may be determined and its consequences enforced. The question, therefore, whether a person is or is not a Muslim will be of fundamental importance, and it was for this reason that we asked most of the leading ulama, to give their definition of a Muslim, the point being that if the ulama of the various sects believed the Ahmadis to be kafirs, they must have been quite clear in their minds not only about the grounds of such belief but also about the definition of a Muslim because the claim that a certain person or community is not within the pale of Islam implies on the part of the claimant an exact conception of what a Muslim is. The result of this part of the inquiry, however, has been anything but satisfactory, and if considerable confusion exists in the minds of our ulama on such a simple matter, one can easily imagine what the differences on more complicated matters will be. Below we reproduce the definition of a Muslim given by each alim in his own words. This definition was asked after it had been clearly explained to each witness that he was required to give the irreducible minimum conditions which, a person must satisfy to be entitled to be called a Muslim and that the definition was to be on the principle on which a term in grammar is defined.

Here is the result : —

Maulana Abul Hasanat Muhammad Ahmad Qadri, President, Jami’at-ul-Ulamai- Pakistan — “Q.— What is the definition of a Muslim ? A — (1) He must believe in the Unity of God. (2) He must believe in the prophet of Islam to be a true prophet as well as in all other prophets who have preceded him, (3) He must believe in the Holy Prophet of Islam as the last of the prophets (khatam-un-nabiyin). (4) He must believe in the Qur’an as it was revealed by God to the Holy Prophet of Islam. (5) He must believe as binding on him the injunctions of the Prophet of Islam. (6) He must believe in the qiyamat. Q.—Is a tarik-us-salat a Muslim ? A.—Yes, but not a munkir-us-salat”

Maulana Ahmad Ali, President, Jami’at-ul-Ulama-i-Islam, Maghribi Pakistan — “Q.— Please define a Muslim ? A.—A person is a Muslim if he believes (1) in the Qur’an and (2) what has been said by the prophet. Any person who possesses these two qualifications is entitled to be called a Muslim without his being required to believe in anything more or to do anything more.”

Maulana Abul Ala Maudoodi, Amir Jama’at-i-Islami — “Q.—Please define a Muslim ? A.—A person is a Muslim if he believes (1) in tauheed, (2) in all the prophets (ambiya), (3) all the books revealed by God, (4) in mala’ika (angels), and (5) yaum-ul-akhira (the Day of Judgment). Q.—Is a mere profession of belief in these articles sufficient to entitle a man to call himself a Musalman and to be treated as a Musalman in an Islamic State ? A.—Yes. Q.—If a person says that he believes in all these things, does any one have a right to question the existence of his belief ? A.—The five requisites that I have mentioned above are fundamental and any alteration in anyone of these articles will take him out of the pale of Islam.”

Ghazi Siraj-ud-Din Munir— “Q.—Please define a Muslim ? A.—I consider a man to be a Muslim if he professes his belief in the kalima, namely, La Ilaha Illalah-o-Muhammad-ur-Rasulullah, and leads a life in the footsteps of the Holy Prophet.”

Mufti Muhammad Idris, Jamia Ashrafia, Nila Gumbad, Lahore— “Q.—Please give the definition of a Musalman ? A.—The word ‘Musalman’ is a Persian one. There is a distinction between the word ‘Musalman’ which is a Persian word for Muslim and the word ‘momin’. It is impossible for me to give a complete definition of the word ‘momin’. I would require pages and pages to describe what a momin is. A person is a Muslim who professes to be obedient to Allah. He should believe in the Unity of God, prophethood of the ambiya and in the Day of Judgment. A person who does not believe in the azan or in the qurbani goes outside the pale of Islam. Similarly, there are a large number of other things which have been received by tavatir from our prophet. In order to be a Muslim, he must believe in all these things. It is almost impossible for me to give a complete list of such things.”

Hafiz Kifayat Hussain, Idara-i-Haquq-i-Tahaffuz-i-Shia— “Q.—Who is a Musalman? A.—A person is entitled to be called a Musalman if he believes in (1) tauheed, (2) nubuwwat and (3) qiyamat. These are the three fundamental beliefs which a person must profess to be called a Musalman. In regard to these three basic doctrines there is no difference between the Shias and the Sunnies. Besides the belief in these three doctrines, there are other things called ‘zarooriyat-i-din’ which a person must comply with in order to be entitled to be called a Musalman. These will take me two days to define and enumerate. But as an illustration I might state that the respect for the Holy Book, wajoob-i-nimaz, wajoob-i-roza, wajoob-i-hajj-ma’a-sharait, and other things too numerous to mention, are among the ‘zarooriyat-i-din’ ”

Maulana Abdul Hamid Badayuni, President, Jami’at-ul-Ulama-i-Pakistan : “Q.—Who is a Musalman according to you ? A.—A person who believes in the zarooriyat-i-din is called a momin and every momin is entitled to be called a Musalman. Q.—What are these zarooriyat-i-din ? A.—A person who believes in the five pillars of Islam and who believes in the rasalat of our Holy Prophet fulfils the zarooriyat-i-din. Q.—Have other actions, apart from the five arakan, anything to do with a man being a Muslim or being outside the pale of Islam? (Note—Witness has been explained that by actions are meant those rules of moral conduct which in modern society are accepted as correct.) A.—Certainly. Q.—Then you will not call a person a Muslim who believes in arakan-ikhamsa and the rasalat of the prophet but who steals other peoples’ things, embezzles property entrusted to him, has an evil eye on his neighbour’s wife and is guilty of the grossest ingratitude to his benefector? A.—Such a person, if he has the belief already indicated, will be a Muslim despite all this”.

Maulana Muhammad Ali Kandhalvi, Darush-Shahabia, Sialkot — “Q.—Please define a Musalman? A.—A person who in obedience to the commands of the prophet performs all the zarooriyat-i-din is a Musalman. Q.—Can you define zarooriyat-i-din ? A.—Zarooriyat-i-din are those requirements which are known to every Muslim irrespective of his religious knowledge. Q.—Can you enumerate zarooriyat-i-din ? A.—These are too numerous to be mentioned. I myself cannot enumerate these zarooriyat. Some of the zarooriyat-i-din may be mentioned as salat, saum, etc.”

Maulana Amin Ahsan Islahi — “Q.—Who is a Musalman? A.—There are two kinds of Musalmans, a political (siyasi) Musalman and a real (haqiqi) Musalman. In order to be called a political Musalman, a person must: (1) believe in the Unity of God, (2) believe in our Holy Prophet being khatam-un-nabiyin, i.e., ‘final authority’ in all matters relating to the life of that person, (3) believe that all good and evil comes from Allah, (4) believe in the Day of Judgment, (5) believe in the Qur’an to be the last book revealed by Allah, (6) perform the annual pilgrimage to Mecca, (7) pay the zaka’at, (8) say his prayers like the Musalmans, (9) observe all apparent rules of Islami mu’ashira, and (10) observe the fast (saum).

If a person satisfies all these conditions he is entitled to the rights of a full citizen of an Islamic State. If any one of these conditions is not satisfied, the person concerned will not be a political Musalman. (Again said) It would be enough for a person to be a Musalman if he merely professes his belief in these ten matters irrespective of whether he puts them into practice or not. In order to be a real Musalman, a person must believe in and act on all the injunctions by Allah and his prophet in the manner in which they have been enjoined upon him. Q.—Will you say that only the real Musalman is ‘mard-i-saleh’ ? A.—Yes. Q.—do we understand you aright that in the case of what you have called a political (siyasi) Musalman, belief alone is necessary, while in the case of a haqiqi Musalman there must not only be belief but also action? A.—No, you have not understood me aright. Even in the case of a political (siyasi) Musalman action is necessary but what I mean to say is that if a person does not act upon the belief that is necessary in the case of such a Musalman, he will not be outside the pale of a political (siyasi) Musalman. Q.—If a political (siyasi) Musalman does not believe in things which you have stated to be necessary, will you call such a person be-din ? A.—No, I will call him merely be-amal”.

The definition by the Sadr Anjuman Ahmadiya, Rabwah, in its written statement is that a Muslim is a person who belongs to the ummat of the Holy Prophet and professes belief in kalima-i-tayyaba.

Keeping in view the several definitions given by the ulama, need we make any comment except that no two learned divines are agreed on this fundamental. If we attempt our own definition as each learned divine has done and that definition differs from that given by all others, we unanimously go out of the fold of Islam. And if we adopt the definition given by any one of the ulama, we remain Muslims according to the view of that alim but kafirs according to the definition of every one else.

APOSTASY

Apostasy in an Islamic State is punishable with death. On this the ulama are practically unanimous (vide the evidence of Maulana Abul Hasanat Sayyad Muhammad Ahmad Qadri, President, Jami’at-ul-Ulama-i-Pakistan, Punjab; Maulana Ahmad Ali, Sadr Jami’at-ul-Ulama-i-Islam, West Pakistan; Maulana Abul Ala Maudoodi, founder and ex-Amir-i-Jama’at-i-Islami, Pakistan; Mufti Muhammad Idris, Jami’Ashrafia, Lahore, and Member, Jami’at-ul-Ulama-i-Pakistan; Maulana Daud Ghaznavi, President, Jami’at-i-Ahl-i-Hadith, Maghribi Pakistan; Maulana Abdul Haleem Qasimi, Jami’at-ul-Ulama-i-Islam, Punjab; and Mr. Ibrahim Ali Chishti). According to this doctrine, Chaudhri Zafrullah Khan, if he has not inherited his present religious beliefs but has voluntarily elected to be an Ahmadi, must be put to death. And the same fate should befall Deobandis and Wahabis, including Maulana Muhammad Shafi Deobandi, Member, Board of Talimat-i-Islami attached to the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan, and Maulana Daud Ghaznavi, if Maulana Abul Hasanat Sayyad Muhammad Ahmad Qadri or Mirza Raza Ahmad Khan Barelvi, or any one of the numerous ulama who are shown perched on every leaf of a beautiful tree in the fatwa, Ex. D. E. 14, were the head of such Islamic State. And if Maulana Muhammad Shafi Deobandi were the head of the State, he would exclude those who have pronounced Deobandis as kafirs from the pale of Islam and inflict on them the death penalty if they come within the definition of murtadd, namely, if they have changed and not inherited their religious views.

The genuineness of the fatwa, Ex. D. E. 13, by the Deobandis which says that Asna Ashari Shias are kafirs and murtadds, was questioned in the course of enquiry, but Maulana Muhammad Shafi made an inquiry on the subject from Deoband, and received from the records of that institution the copy of a fatwa signed by all the teachers of the Darul Uloom including Maulana Muhammad Shafi himself which is to the effect that those who do not believe in the sahabiyyat of Hazrat Siddiq Akbar and who are qazif of Hazrat Aisha Siddiqa and have been guilty of tehrif of Qur’an are kafirs. This opinion is also supported by Mr. Ibrahim Ali Chishti who has studied and knows his subject. He thinks the Shias are kafirs because they believe that Hazrat Ali shared the prophethood with our Holy Prophet. He refused to answer the question whether a person who being a Sunni changes his view and agrees with the Shia view would be guilty of irtidad so as to deserve the death penalty. According to the Shias all Sunnis are kafirs, and Ahl-i-Qur’an; namely, persons who consider hadith to be unreliable and therefore not binding, are unanimously kafirs and so are all independent thinkers. The net result of all this is that neither Shias nor Sunnis nor Deobandis nor Ahl-i-Hadith nor Barelvis are Muslims and any change from one view to the other must be accompanied in an Islamic State with the penalty of death if the Government of the State is in the hands of the party which considers the other party to be kafirs. And it does not require much imagination to judge of the consequences of this doctrine when it is remembered that no two ulama have agreed before us as to the definition of a Muslim. If the constituents of each of the definitions given by the ulama are given effect to, and subjected to the rule of ‘combination and permutation’ and the form of charge in the Inquisition’s sentence on Galileo is adopted mutatis mutandis as a model, the grounds on which a person may be indicted for apostasy will be too numerous to count.

In an earlier part of the report we have referred to the proscription of the ‘Ashshahab’, a pamphlet written by Maulana Shabbir Ahmad Usmani who later became Sheikh-ul-Islam-i-Pakistan. In that pamphlet the Maulana had attempted to show from the Qur’an, the sunna, the ijma’ and qayas that in Islam the punishment for apostasy (irtidad) simpliciter is death. After propounding the theological doctrine the Maulana had made in that document a statement of fact that in the time of the Caliph Siddiq-i-Akbar and the subsequent Caliphs vast areas of Arabia became repeatedly red with the blood of apostates. We are not called upon to express any opinion as to the correctness or otherwise of this doctrine but knowing that the suggestion to the Punjab Government to proscribe this pamphlet had come from the Minister for the Interior we have attempted to inquire of ourselves the reasons for Government’s taking a step which ex hypothesi amounted to condemning a doctrine which the Maulana had professed to derive from the Qur’an and the sunna. The death penalty for irtidad has implications of a far-reaching character and stamps Islam as a religion of fanatics, which punishes all independent thinking. The Qur’an again and again lays emphasis on reason and thought, advises toleration and preaches against compulsion in religious matters but the doctrine of irtidad as enunciated in this pamphlet strikes at the very root of independent thinking when it propounds the view that anyone who, being born a Muslim or having embraced Islam, attempts to think on the subject of religion with a view, if he comes to that conclusion, to choose for himself any religion he likes, has the capital penalty in store for him. With this implication Islam becomes an embodiment of complete intellectual paralysis. And the statement in the pamphlet that vast areas of Arabia were repeatedly bespattered with human blood, if true, could only lend itself to this inference that even when Islam was at the height of its splendour and held absolute sway in Arabia there were in that country a large number of people who turned away from that religion and preferred to die than to remain in that system. It must have been some such reaction of this pamphlet on the mind of the Minister for the Interior which prompted him to advise the Punjab Government to proscribe the pamphlet. Further the Minister who was himself well-versed in religious matters must have thought that the conclusion drawn by the author of the pamphlet which was principally based on the precedent mentioned in paras. 26, 27 and 28 of the Old Testament and which is only partially referred to in the Qur’an in the 54th verse of the Second Sura, could not be applicable to apostasy from Islam and that therefore the author’s opinion was in fact incorrect, there being no express text in the Qur’an for the death penalty for apostasy. On the contrary each of the two ideas, one underlying the six brief verses of Surat-ul-Kafiroon and the other the La Ikrah verse of the second Sura, has merely to be understood to reject as erroneous the view propounded in the ‘Ash-Shahab’. Each of the verses in Surat-ul-Kafiroon which contains thirty words and no verse of which exceeds six words, brings out a fundamental trait in man engrained in him since his creation while the La Ikrah verse, the relevant portion of which contains only nine words, states the rule of responsibility of the mind with a precision that cannot be surpassed. Both of these texts which are an early part of the Revelation are, individually and collectively, the foundation of that principle which human society, after centuries of conflict, hatred and bloodshed, has adopted in defining one of the most important fundamental rights of man. But our doctors would never dissociate chauvinism from Islam.

PROPAGATION OF OTHER RELIGIONS

Closely allied to the punishment for apostasy is the right of non-Muslims publicly to preach their religion. The principle which punishes an apostate with death must be applicable to public preaching of kufr and it is admitted by Maulana Abul Hasanat, Ghazi Siraj-ud-Din Munir and Master Taj-ud-Din Ansari, though the last subordinates his opinion to the opinion of the ulama, that any faith other than Islam will not be permitted publicly to be preached in the State. And Maulana Abul Ala Maudoodi, as will appear from his pamphlet ‘Punishment in Islam for an apostate’, has the same views on the subject.

Ghazi Siraj-ud-Din Munir, when questioned on this point, replied :—“Q.—What will you do with them (Ahmadis) if you were the head of the Pakistan State ? A.—I would tolerate them as human beings but will not allow them the right to preach their religion”.

The prohibition against public preaching of any non-Muslim religion must logically follow from the proposition that apostasy will be punished with death and that any attack on, or danger to Islam will be treated as treason and punished in the same way as apostasy.

JIHAD
Earlier we have pointed out that one of the doctrines on which the Musalmans and Ahmadis are at variance is that of jihad. This doctrine at once raises a host of other allied matters such as the meanings of ghazi, shahid, jihad-bis-saif, jihad fi sabili’llah, dar-ul-Islam, dar-ul-harb, hijrat, ghanima, khums and slavery, and the conflict or reconciliation of these conceptions with modern international problems such as aggression, genocide, international criminal jurisdiction, international conventions and rules of public international law.

An Islamic State is dar-ul-Islam, namely, a country where ordinances of Islam are established and which is under the rule of a Muslim sovereign. Its inhabitants are Muslims and also non-Muslims who have submitted to Muslim control and who under certain restrictions and without the possibility of full citizenship are guaranteed their lives and property by the Muslim State. They must, however, be people of Scriptures and may not be idolaters. An Islamic State is in theory perpetually at war with the neighbouring non-Muslim country, which at any time may become dar-ul-harb, in which case it is the duty of the Muslims of that country to leave it and to come over to the country of their brethren in faith. We put this aspect to Maulana Abul Ala Maudoodi and reproduce his views :—

“Q.—is a country on the border of dar-ul-Islam always qua an Islamic Statein the position of dar-ul-harb ? A.—No. In the absence of an agreement to the contrary, the Islamic State will be potentially at war with the non-Muslim neighbouring country. The non-Muslim country acquires the status of dar-ul-harb only after the Islamic State declares a formal war against it”.

According to Ghias-ul-Lughat, dar-ul-harb is a country belonging to infidels which has not been subdued by Islam, and the consequences of a country becoming darul-harb are thus stated in the Shorter Encyclopaedia of Islam :—

“When a country does become a dar-ul-harb, it is the duty of all Muslims to withdraw from it, and a wife who refuses to accompany her husband in this, is ipso facto divorced”.

Thus in case of a war between India and Pakistan, if the latter is an Islamic State, we must be prepared to receive forty million Muslims from across the border into Pakistan.

In fact, Maulana Abdul Haamid Badayuni, President, Jami’at-ul-Ulama-i- Pakistan, thinks that a case for hijrat already exists for the Musalmans of India. The following is his view on this subject :—“Q.—Do yon call your migration to Pakistan as hijrat in the religious sense ? A.—Yes”.

We shall presently point out why Mirza Ghulam Ahmad’s version of the doctrine of jihad is relied on as a ground for his and his community’s kufr, but before we do that it is necessary first to state how jihad has been or is understood by the Musalmans. There are various theories about jihad which vary from the crude notion of a megalomaniac moved by religious frenzy going out armed with sword and indiscriminately slaughtering non-Muslims in the belief that if he dies in the combat he becomes a shahid and if he succeeds in killing attains the status of a ghazi, to the conception that a Musalman throughout his life is pitted against kufr, kufr here being used in the sense of evil and wrong, and that his principal activity in life is to strive by argument a where necessary by force to spread Islam until it becomes a world religion. In the latter case he fights not for any personal end but because he considers such strife as a duty and an obligation which he owes to Allah and the only recompense for which is the pleasure of Allah. The Shorter Encyclopedia of Islam contains the following brief article on djihad :—
“DJIHAD (A), holy war. The spread of Islam by arms is a religious duty upon Muslims in general. It narrowly escaped being a sixth rukn, or fundamental duty, and is indeed still so regarded by the descendants of the Kharidjis. This position was reached gradually but quickly. In the Meccan Suras of the Qur’an patience under attack is taught ; no other attitude was possible. But at Medina the right to repel attack appears, and gradually it became a prescribed duty to fight against and subdue the hostile Meccans.

Whether Muhammad himself recognised that his position implied steady and unprovoked war against the unbelieving world until it was subdued to Islam may be in doubt. Traditions are explicit on the point ; but the Qur’anic passages speak always of the unbelievers who are to be subdued as dangerous or faithless. Still, the story of his writing to the powers around him shows that such a universal position was implicit in his mind, and it certainly developed immediately after his death, when the Muslim armies advanced out of Arabia. It is now a fard ala’l-kifaya, a duty in general on all male, free, adult Muslims, sane in mind and body and having means enough to reach the Muslim army, yet not a duty necessarily incumbent on every individual but sufficiently performed when done by a certain number. So it must continue to be done until the whole world is under the rule of Islam. It must be controlled or headed by a Muslim sovereign or imam. As the imam of the Shias is now invisible, they cannot have a djihad until he reappears. Further, the requirement will be met if such a sovereign makes an expedition once a year, or, even, in the later view, if he makes annual preparation for one. The people against whom the djihad is directed must first be invited to embrace Islam. On refusal they have another choice. They may submit to Muslim rule, become dhimmis (q. v.) and pay djizya and kharadj (q. v.) or fight. In the first case, their lives, families and property are assured to them, but they have a definitely inferior status, with no technical citizenship, and a standing only as protected wards. If they fight, they and their families may be enslaved and all their property seized as booty, four-fifths of which goes to the conquering army. If they embrace Islam, and it is open to them to do so even when the armies are face to face, they become part of the Muslim community with all its rights and duties. Apostates must be put to death. But if a Muslim country is invaded by unbelievers, the imam may issue a general summons calling all Muslims there to arms, and as the danger grows so may be the width of the summons until the whole Muslim world is involved. A Muslim who dies fighting in the path of Allah (fi sabil Allah) is martyr (shahid) and is assured of Paradise and of peculiar privileges there. Such a death was, in the early generations, regarded as the peculiar crown of a pious life. It is still, on occasions, a strong incitement, but when Islam ceased to conquer it lost its supreme value. Even yet, however, any war between Muslims and non-Muslims must be a djihad with its incitements and rewards. Of course, such modern movements as the so-called Mu’tazili in India and the Young Turk in Turkey reject this and endeavour to explain away its basis; but the Muslim masses still follow the unanimous voice of the canon lawyers. Islam must be completely made over before the doctrine of djihad can be eliminated”.

The generally accepted view is that the fifth verse to Sura-i-Tauba (Sura IX) abrogated the earlier verses revealed in Mecca which permitted the killing of kuffar only in self-defence. As against this the Ahmadis believe that no verso in the Qur’an was abrogated by another verse and that both sets of verses, namely, the Meccan verses and the relative verses in Sura-i-Tauba have different scopes and can stand together. This introduces the difficult controversy of nasikh and mansukh, with all its implications. It is argued on behalf of the Ahmadis that the doctrine of nasikh and mansukh is opposed to the belief in the existence of an original Scripture in Heaven, and that implicit in this doctrine is the admission that unless the verse alleged to be repealed was meant for a specific occasion and by the coming of that occasion fulfilled its purpose and thus spent itself, God did not know of the subsequent circumstances which would make the earlier verse inapplicable or lead to an undesired result.

The third result of this doctrine, it is pointed out, cuts at the very root of the claim that laws of Islam are immutable and inflexible because if changed circumstances made a new revelation necessary, any change in the circumstances subsequent to the completion of the revelation would make most of the revelation otiose or obsolete.

We are wholly incompetent to pronounce on the merits of this controversy but what has to be pointed out is the result to which the doctrine of jihad will lead if, as appears from the article in the Shorter Encyclopaedia of Islam and other writings produced before us including one by Maulana Abul Ala Maudoodi and another by Maulana Shabbir Ahmad Usmani, it involves the spread of Islam by arms and conquest. ‘Aggression’ and ‘genocide’ are now offences against humanity for which under sentences pronounced by different International tribunals at Nuremburg and Tokio the war lords of Germany and Japan had to forfeit their lives, and there is hardly any difference between the offences of aggression and genocide on the one hand and the doctrine of spread of Islam by arms and conquest on the other. An International Convention on genocide is about to be concluded but if the view of jihad presented to us is correct, Pakistan cannot be a party to it. And while the following verses in the Mecca Suras :—

Sura II, verses 190 and 193 :190. “Fight in the Cause of God Those who fight you,
But do not transgress limits ;
For God loveth not transgressors”.
193. “And fight them on
Until there is no more
Tumult or oppression,
And there prevail
Justice and faith in God ;
But if they cease,
Let there be no hostility
Except to those
Who practise oppression”.
Sura XXII, verses 39 and 40:
39. “To those against whom
War is made, permission
Is given (to fight) because
They are wronged;— and verily,
God is most Powerful
For their aid;—”
40. “(They are) those who have
Been expelled from their homes
In defiance of right,—
(For no cause) except
That they say, ‘Our Lord
Is God.’ Did not God
Check one set of people
By means of another,
There would surely have been
Pulled down monasteries, churches,
Synagogues, and mosques, in which
The name of God is commemorated
In abundant measure. God will
Certainly aid those who
Aid His (cause);—for verily
God is Full of Strength,
Exalted in Might,
(Able to enforce His Will),”

contain in them the sublime principle which international jurists have only faintly begun to discover, we must go on preaching that aggression is the chief characteristic of Islam. The law relating to prisoners of war is another branch of Islamic law which is bound to come in conflict with International Law.

As for instance, in matters relating to the treatment of prisoners of war, we shall have to be governed by Maulana Abul Ala Maudoodi’s view, assuming that view is based on the Qur’an and the sunna, which is as follows :—

“Q.—Is there a law of war in Islam? A.—Yes. Q.—Does it differ fundamentally from the modern International Law of war? A.—These two systems are based on a fundamental difference. Q.—What rights have non-Muslims who are taken prisoners of war in a jihad? A.—The Islamic law on the point is that if the country of which these prisoners are nationals pays ransom, they will be released. An exchange of prisoners is also permitted. If neither of these alternatives is possible, the prisoners will be converted into slaves for ever. If any such person makes an offer to pay his ransom out of his own earnings, he will be permitted to collect the money necessary for the fidya (ransom). Q.—Are you of the view that unless a Government assumes the form of an Islamic Government, any war declared by it is not a jihad? A.—No. A war may be declared to be a jihad if it is declared by a national Government of Muslims in the legitimate interests of the State. I never expressed the opinion attributed to me in Ex. D. E. 12:— “Raha yeh masala keh agar hukumat-i-Pakisten apni maujuda shukl-o-surat ke sath Indian Union ke sath apne mu’ahadat khatm kar-ke i’lan-i-jang bar bhi de to kya us-ki yeh jang jihad ke hukam men a-ja’egi ? Ap ne is bare men jo rae zahir ki hai woh bilkul darust hai – Jab-tak hukumat Islami nizam ko ikhtiyar kar-ke Islami nah ho jae us waqt tak us-ki kisi jang ko jihad kehna aisa hi hai jaisa kisi ghair Muslim ke Azad Kashmir ki fauj men bharti ho-kar larne ko jihad aur us-ki maut ko shahadat ka nam dediya jae – Maulana ka jo mudd’a hai woh yeh hai keh mu’ahadat ki maujudgi men to hukumat ya us-ke shehriyon ka is jang men sharik hona shar’-an ja’iz hi nahin – Agar hukumat mu’ahadat khatm kar-ke jang ka i’lan kar-de to hukumat ki jang to jihad phir bhi nahin hogi ta-an keh hukumat Islami nah ho jae.’

(translation)

‘The question remains whether, even if the Government of Pakistan, in its present form and structure, terminates her treaties with the Indian Union and declares war against her, this war would fall under the definition of jihad? The opinion expressed by him in this behalf is quite correct. Until such time as the Government becomes Islamic by adopting the Islamic form of Government, to call any of its wars a jihad would be tantamount to describing the enlistment and fighting of a non-Muslim on the side of the Azad Kashmir forces jihad and his death martyrdom. What the Maulana means is that, in the presence of treaties, it is against Shari’at, if the Government or its people participate in such a war. If the Government terminates the treaties and declares war, even then the war started by Government would not be termed jihad unless the Government becomes Islamic’.

About the view expressed in this letter being that of Maulana Abul Ala Maudoodi, there is the evidence of Mian Tufail Muhammad, the writer of the letter, who states: “Ex. D. E. 12 is a photostat copy of a letter which I wrote to someone whose name I do not now remember.”

Maulana Abul Hasanat Muhammad Ahmad Qadri’s view on this point is as
follows:—“Q.—Is there a law of war in Islam? A.—Yes. Q.—Does it differ in fundamentals from the present International Law? A.—Yes. Q.—What are the rights of a person taken prisoner in war? A.—He can embrace Islam or ask for aman, in which case he will be treated as a musta’min. If he does not ask for aman, he would be made a slave”. Similar is the opinion expressed by Mian Tufail Muhammad of Jam’at-i-Islami who says:— “Q.—Is there any law of war in Islamic laws? A.—Yes. Q.—If that comes into conflict with International Law, which will you follow? A.—Islamic law. Q.—Then please state what will be the status of prisoners of war captured by your forces? A.—I cannot reply to this off hand. I will have to study the point.” Of course ghanima (plunder) and khums (one-fifth) if treated as a necessary incident of jihad will be treated by international society as a mere act of brigandage.

REACTION ON MUSLIMS OF NON-MUSLIM STATES
The ideology on which an Islamic State is desired to be founded in Pakistan must have certain consequences for the Musalmans who are living in countries under non-Muslim sovereigns.

We asked Amir-i-Shari’at Sayyad Ataullah Shah Bukhari whether a Muslim could be a faithful subject of a non-Muslim State and reproduce his answer:—“Q.—In your opinion is a Musalman bound to obey orders of a kafirGovernment? A.—It is not possible that a Musalman should be faithful citizen of a non-MuslimGovernment. Q.—Will it be possible for the four crore of Indian Muslims to be faithful citizensof their State? A—No.”

The answer is quite consistent with the ideology which has been pressed before us, but then if Pakistan is entitled to base its Constitution on religion, the same right must be conceded to other countries where Musalmans are in substantial minorities or if they constitute a preponderating majority in a country where sovereignty rests with a non-Muslim community. We, therefore, asked the various ulama whether, if non-Muslims in Pakistan were to be subjected to this discrimination in matters of citizenship, the ulama would have any objection to Muslims in other countries being subjected to a similar discrimination. Their reactions to this suggestion are reproduced below:—

Maulana Abul Hasanat Sayyed Muhammad Ahmad Qadri, President, Jami’at-ul-Ulama-i-Pakistan:—“Q.—You will admit for the Hindus, who are in a majority in India, the right to have a Hindu religious State? A.—Yes. Q.—Will you have any objection if the Muslims are treated under that form of Government as malishes or shudras under the law of Manu? A.— No.”

Maulana Abul Ala Maudoodi :—“Q.—If we have this form of Islamic Government in Pakistan, will you permit Hindus to base their Constitution on the basis of their own religion? A—Certainly. I should have no objection even if the Muslims of India are treated in that form of Government as shudras and malishes and Manu’s laws are applied to them, depriving them of all share in the Government and the rights of a citizen. In fact such a state of affairs already exists in India.”

Amir-i-Shari’at Sayyad Ata Ullah Skak Bukhari :—“Q.—How many crores of Muslims are there in India? A.—Four crores. Q.—Have you any objection to the law of Manu being applied to them according to which they will have no civil right and will be treated as malishes and shudras? A.—I am in Pakistan and I cannot advise them.”

Mian Tufail Muhammad of Jama’at-i-Islami :—“Q.—What is the population of Muslims in the world? A.—Fifty crores. Q.—If the total population of Muslims of the world is 50 crores, as you say, and the number of Muslims living in Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Indonesia, Egypt, Persia, Syria, Lebanon, Trans-Jordan, Turkey and Iraq does not exceed 20 crores, will not the result of your ideology beto convert 30 crores of Muslims in the world into hewers of wood anddrawers of water? A.—My ideology should not affect their position. Q.—Even if they are subjected to discrimination on religious grounds and denied ordinary rights of citizenship ? A.—Yes.”
This witness goes to the extent of asserting that even if a non-Muslim Government were to offer posts to Muslims in the public services of the country, it will be their duty to refuse such posts.

Ghazi Siraj-ud-Din Munir :—“Q.—Do you want an Islamic State in Pakistan? A.—Surely. Q.—What will be your reaction if the neighbouring country was to found their political system on their own religion? A.—They can do it if they like. Q.—Do you admit for them the right to declare that all Muslims in India, areshudras and malishes with no civil rights whatsoever? A.—We will do our best to see that before they do it their political sovereignty is gone. We are too strong for India. We will be strongenough to prevent India from doing this.Q.—Is it a part of the religious obligations of Muslims to preach theirreligion? A—Yes. Q.—Is it a part of the duty of Muslims in India publicly to preach theirreligion? A.—They should have that right.Q.—What if the Indian State is founded on a religious basis and the right to preach religion is disallowed to its Muslim nationals? A —If India makes any such law, believer in the Expansionist movement as I am, I will march on India and conquer her.”

So this is the reply to the reciprocity of discrimination on religious grounds.

Master Taj-ud-Din Ansari :—“Q.—Would you like to have the same ideology for the four crores of Muslims in India as you are impressing upon the Muslims of Pakistan? A.—That ideology will not let them remain in India for one minute. Q.—Does the ideology of a Muslim change from place to place and from time to time? A.—No. Q.—Then why should not the Muslims of India have the same ideology as you have? A.—They should answer that question.”

The ideology advocated before us, if adopted by Indian Muslims, will completely
disqualify them for public offices in the State, not only in India but in other countries also which are under a non-Muslim Government. Muslims will become perpetual suspects everywhere and will not be enrolled in the army because according to this ideology, in case of war between a Muslim country and a non-Muslim country, Muslim soldiers of the non-Muslim country must either side with the Muslim country or surrender their posts.

The following is the view expressed by two divines whom we questioned on this point:—

Maulana Abul Hasanat Sayyed Muhammad Ahmad Qadri, President, Jami’at-ul-
Ulama-i-Pakistan :—
“Q.—What will be the duty of Muslims in India in case of war between India
and Pakistan?
A.—Their duty is obvious, namely, to side with us and not to fight against us
on behalf of India.”

Maulana Abul Ala Maudoodi : —
“Q.—What will be the duty of the Muslims in India in case of war between
India and Pakistan?
A.—Their duty is obvious, and that is not to fight against Pakistan or to do
anything injurious to the safety of Pakistan.”

OTHER INCIDENTS

Other incidents of an Islamic State are that all sculpture, playing of cards, portrait
painting, photographing human beings, music, dancing, mixed acting, cinemas and
theatres will have to be closed.

“Q.—What are your views on tashbih and tamseel ?
A.—You should ask me a concrete question.
Q.—What are your views on lahw-o-la’b?
A.—The same is my reply to this question.
Q.—What are your views about portrait painting?
A.—There is nothing against it if any such painting becomes necessary.
Q.—What about photography?
A.—My reply to it is the same as the reply regarding portrait painting.
Q.—What about sculpture as an art?
A.—It is prohibited by our religion.
Q.—Will you bring playing of cards in lohw-o-la’b?
A.—Yes, it will amount to lahw-o-la’b.
Q.—What about music and dancing?
A.—It is all forbidden by our religion.
Q.—What about drama and acting?
A —It all depends on what kind of acting you mean. If it involves immodesty
and intermixture of sexes, the Islamic law is against it.
Q.—If the State is founded on your ideals, will you make a law stopping
portrait painting, photographing of human beings, sculpture, playing
of cards, music, dancing, acting and all cinemas and theatres?
A.—Keeping in view the present form of these activities, my answer is in the affirmative.”

Maulana Abdul Haamid Badayuni considers it to be a sin (ma’siyat) on the part of
professors of anatomy to dissect dead bodies of Muslims to explain points of anatomy to the students.

The soldier or the policeman will have the right, on grounds of religion, to disobey a command by a superior authority. Maulana Abul Hasanat’s view on this is as follows :—

“I believe that if a policeman is required to do something which we consider to be contrary to our religion, it should be the duty of the policeman to disobey the authority. The same would be my answer if ‘army’ were substituted for ‘police’.

Q.—You stated yesterday that if a policeman or a soldier was required by a
superior authority to do what you considered to be contrary to religion, it would be the duty of that policeman or the soldier to disobey such authority. Will you give the policeman or the soldier the right of himself determining whether the command he is given by his superior authority is contrary to religion ?
A.—Most certainly.
Q.—Suppose there is war between Pakistan and another Muslim country and the soldier feels that Pakistan is in the wrong; and that to shoot a soldier of other country is contrary to religion. Do you think he would be justified in disobeying his commanding officer ?
A.—In such a contingency the soldier should take a fatwa of the ‘ulama’.”

We have dwelt at some length on the subject of Islamic State not because we intended to write a thesis against or in favour of such State but merely with a view to presenting a clear picture of the numerous possibilities that may in future arise if true causes of the ideological confusion which contributed to the spread and intensity of the disturbances are not precisely located. That such confusion did exist is obvious because otherwise Muslim Leaguers, whose own Government was in office, would not have risen against it; sense of loyalty and public duty would not have departed from public officials who went about like maniacs howling against their own Government and officers; respect for property and human life would not have disappeared in the common man who with no scruple or compunction began freely to indulge in loot, arson and murder; politicians would not have shirked facing the men who had installed them in their offices; and administrators would not have felt hesitant or diffident in performing what was their obvious duty. If there is one thing which has been conclusively demonstrated in this inquiry, it is that provided you can persuade the masses to believe that something they are asked to do is religiously right or enjoined by religion, you can set them to any course of action, regardless of all considerations of discipline, loyalty, decency, morality or civic sense.

Pakistan is being taken by the common man, though it is not, as an Islamic State. This belief has been encouraged by the ceaseless clamour for Islam and Islamic State that is being heard from all quarters since the establishment of Pakistan. The phantom of an Islamic State has haunted the Musalman throughout the ages and is a result of the memory of the glorious past when Islam rising like a storm from the least expected quarter of the world—wilds of Arabia—instantly enveloped the world, pulling down from their high pedestal gods who had ruled over man since the creation, uprooting centuries old institutions and superstitions and supplanting all civilisations that had been built on an enslaved humanity. What is 125 years in human history, nay in the history of a people, and yet during this brief period Islam spread from the Indus to the Atlantic and Spain, and from the borders of China to Egypt, and the sons of the desert installed themselves in all old centres of civilisation—in Ctesiphon, Damascus, Alexandria, India and all places associated with the names of the Sumerian and the Assyrian civilisations. Historians have often posed the question : what would have been the state of the world today if Muawiya’s siege of Constantinople had succeeded or if the proverbial Arab instinct for plunder had not suddenly seized the mujahids of Abdur Rahman in their fight against Charles Martel on the plains of Tours in Southern France. May be Muslims would have discovered America long before Columbus did and the entire world would have been Moslemised; may be Islam itself would have been Europeanised. It is this brilliant achievement of the Arabian nomads, the like of which the world had never seen before, that makes the Musalman of today live in the past and yearn for the return of the glory that was Islam. He finds himself standing on the crossroads, wrapped in the mantle of the past and with the dead weight of centuries on his back, frustrated and bewildered and hesitant to turn one corner or the other. The freshness and the simplicity of the faith, which gave determination to his mind and spring to his muscle, is now denied to him. He has neither the means nor the ability to conquer and there are no countries to conquer. Little does he understand that the forces, which are pitted against him, are entirely different from those against which early Islam, had to fight, and that on the clues given by his own ancestors human mind has achieved results which he cannot understand. He therefore finds himself in a state of helplessness, waiting for some one to come and help him out of this morass of uncertainty and confusion. And he will go on waiting like this without anything happening. Nothing but a bold re-orientation of Islam to separate the vital from the lifeless can preserve it as a World Idea and convert the Musalman into a citizen of the present and the future world from the archaic in congruity that he is today. It is this lack of bold and clear thinking, the inability to understand and take decisions which has brought about in Pakistan a confusion which will persist and repeatedly create situations of the kind we have been inquiring into until our leaders have a clear conception of the goal and of the means to reach it. It requires no imagination to realise that irreconcilables remain irreconcilable even if you believe or wish to the contrary. Opposing principles, if left to themselves, can only produce confusion and disorder, and the application of a neutralising agency to them can only produce a dead result. Unless, in case of conflict between two ideologies, our leaders have the desire and the ability to elect, uncertainty must continue. And as long as we rely on the hammer when a file is needed and press Islam into service to solve situations it was never intended to solve, frustration and disappointment must dog our steps. The sublime faith called Islam will live even if our leaders are not there to enforce it. It lives in the individual, in his soul and outlook, in all his relations with God and men, from the cradle to the grave, and our politicians should understand that if Divine commands cannot make or keep a man a Musalman, their statutes will not….

Subroto Roy notes that since Dr Manmohan Singh is the first Indian Prime Minister ever to have chosen with deliberation not to be a member of the Lok Sabha, he has been free to hold important summits at the White House, Kremlin, Copenhagen etc while the Lok Sabha debates mundane matters like the Liberhan Commission report, inflation etc.

Seventy Years Today Since the British Government Politically Empowered MA Jinnah

by

Subroto Roy

The bloated armies of Indian and Pakistani historians and pseudo-historians have failed to recognize the significance of the precise start of the Second World War upon the fortunes of the subcontinent. Yet, twenty years ago, in the book I and WE James created at an American university, Foundations of Pakistan’s Political Economy: Towards an Agenda for the 1990s, one of our authors, Professor Francis Robinson of the University of London, had set out the principal facts most clearly as to what flowed from the September 4 1939 empowerment of MA Jinnah by the British Government.

Germany invaded Poland on September 1 1939 and Britain declared war on Germany on September 3. The next day, Linlithgow, the British Viceroy in India, started to treat MA Jinnah’s Muslim League on par with the Congress’s nationalist movement led by MK Gandhi. Until September 4 1939, the British “had had little time for Jinnah and his League. The Government’s declaration of war on Germany on 3 September, however, transformed the situation. A large part of the army was Muslim, much of the war effort was likely to rest on the two Muslim majority provinces of Punjab and Bengal. The following day, the Viceroy invited Jinnah for talks on an equal footing with Gandhi” (Robinson, in James & Roy (eds) Foundations of Pakistan’s Political Economy 1989, 1992).

Jinnah himself was amazed by the new British attitude towards him: “suddenly there was a change in the attitude towards me. I was treated on the same basis as Mr Gandhi. I was wonderstruck why all of a sudden I was promoted and given a place side by side with Mr Gandhi.”

Jinnah’s political weakness had been made obvious by the electoral defeats the Muslim League had suffered in the 1937 elections in the very provinces which more or less came to constitute West Pakistan and today constitute modern Pakistan. Britain, at war with Germany and soon Japan, was faced with the intransigence of the Congress leadership. It was unsurprising this would contribute to the British tilt empowering Congress’s declared adversary, Jinnah and the Muslim League, and hence make credible the possibility of the Pakistan that they had demanded:

“As the Congress began to demand immediate independence, the Viceroy took to reassuring Jinnah that Muslim interests would be safeguarded in any constitutional change. Within a few months, he was urging the League to declare a constructive policy for the future, which was of course presented in the Lahore Resolution. In their August 1940 offer, the British confirmed for the benefit of Muslims that power would not be transferred against the will of any significant element in Indian life. And much the same confirmation was given in the Cripps offer nearly two years later…. Throughout the years 1940 to 1945, the British made no attempt to tease out the contradictions between the League’s two-nation theory, which asserted that Hindus and Muslims came from two different civilisations and therefore were two different nations, and the Lahore Resolution, which demanded that ‘Independent States’ should be constituted from the Muslim majority provinces of the NE and NW, thereby suggesting that Indian Muslims formed not just one nation but two. When in 1944 the governors of Punjab and Bengal urged such a move on the Viceroy, Wavell ignored them, pressing ahead instead with his own plan for an all-India conference at Simla. The result was to confirm, as never before in the eyes of leading Muslims in the majority provinces, the standing of Jinnah and the League. Thus, because the British found it convenient to take the League seriously, everyone had to as well—Congressmen, Unionists, Bengalis, and so on….”(Robinson in James & Roy (eds) Foundations of Pakistan’s Political Economy, pp. 43-44).

Even British socialists who were sympathetic to Indian aspirations, would grow cold when the Congress seemed to abjectly fail to appreciate Britain’s predicament during war with Germany and Japan (Gandhi, for example, dismissing the 1942 Cripps offer as a “post-dated cheque on a failing bank”).

By the 1946 elections, Muslim mass opinion had changed drastically to seem to be strongly in favour of the creation of a Pakistan. The intervening years were the ones when urban mobs all over India could be found shouting the League’s slogans: “Larke lenge Pakistan; Marke lenge Pakistan, Khun se lenge Pakistan; Dena hoga Pakistan; Leke rahenge Pakistan” (We will spill blood to take Pakistan, you will have to yield a Pakistan.)

Events remote from India’s history and geography, namely, the rise of Hitler and the Second World War, had contributed between 1937 and 1947 to the change of fortunes of the Muslim League and hence of all the people of the subcontinent.

The British had long discovered that the mutual antipathy between Muslims and Hindus could be utilised in fashioning their rule; specifically that the organisation and mobilisation of Muslim communal opinion in the subcontinent was a useful counterweight to any pan-Indian nationalism which might emerge to compete with British authority. As early as 1874, well before Allan Octavian Hume, ICS, had conceived the Indian National Congress, John Strachey, ICS, was to observe “The existence side by side of these (Hindu and Muslim) hostile creeds is one of the strong points in our political position in India. The better classes of Mohammedans are a source of strength to us and not of weakness. They constitute a comparatively small but an energetic minority of the population whose political interests are identical with ours.” By 1906, when a deputation of Muslims headed by the Aga Khan first approached the British pleading for communal representation, Minto the Viceroy replied: “I am as firmly convinced as I believe you to be that any electoral representation in India would be doomed to mischievous failure which aimed at granting a personal enfranchisement, regardless of the beliefs and traditions of the communities composing the population of this Continent.” Minto’s wife wrote in her diary that the effect was “nothing less than the pulling back of sixty two millions of (Muslims) from joining the ranks of the seditious opposition.” (The true significance of MAK Azad may have been that he, precisely at the same time, did indeed feel within himself the nationalist’s desire for freedom strongly enough to want to join the ranks of that seditious opposition.)

If a pattern emerges as to the nature of the behaviour of the British political state with respect to the peoples of this or similar regions, it is precisely the economic one of rewarding those loyal to them who had protected or advanced their interests, and penalising those perceived to be acting against their will. It is wishful to think of members of the British political state as benevolent paternalists, who met with matching deeds their often philanthropic words about promoting the general welfare of their colonial wards or subordinate allies. The slogan “If you are not with us you are against us” that has come to be used by many from the Shining Path Maoists of Peru to President George W. Bush, had been widely applied already by the British in India, especially in the form “If you dare not to be with us, we will be certainly with your adversaries”. It came to be used with greatest impact on the subcontinent’s fortunes in 1939 when Britain found itself reluctantly at war with Hitler’s Germany.

British loyalties lay with those who had been loyal to them.

Hence in the “Indian India” of the puppet princes, Hari Singh and other “Native Princes” who had sent troops to fight as part of the British armies would be treated with a pusillanimity and grandeur so as to flatter their vanities, Sheikh Abdullah’s rebellion representing the Muslim masses of the Kashmir Valley would be ignored. And in British India, Jinnah the conservative Anglophile and his elitist Muslim League would be backed, while the radicalised masses of the Gandhi-Bose-Nehru Congress would have to be suppressed as a nuisance.

(Similarly, much later, Pakistan’s bemedalled army generals would be backed by the United States against Mujibur Rehman’s impoverished student-rebels, and India’s support frowned upon regardless of how just the Bangladeshi cause.)

Altruism is a limited quality in all human affairs, never more scarce than in relations between nations. In “Pakistan’s Allies”, I showed how the strategic interests of Britain, and later Britain’s American ally, came to evolve in the Northwest of the subcontinent ever since the 1846 Treaty of Amritsar as long as a Russian and later a Soviet empire had existed. A similar evolution of British domestic interests in India is distinctly observable in British support for the Pakistan Movement itself, leading on August 14 1947 to the creation of the new Dominion of Pakistan.

Sheikh Abdullah’s democratic urges or Nehru’s Indian nationalism or the general welfare of the subcontinent’s people had no appeal as such to the small and brittle administrative machinery in charge of Britain’s Indian Empire — even though individual Britons had come to love, understand and explain India for the permanent benefit of her people. This may help to explain how Britain’s own long democratic traditions at home could often be found so wonderful by Indians yet the actions of the British state abroad so incongruent with them.

British universities have in the last one hundred years produced a vast and unsurpassable body of doctoral and other postgraduate research relating to India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, Burma, Afghanistan, Malaysia and other Asian countries.

The first table below contains almost 3,300 entries, each beginning with the date of award and the degree, followed by the University (and College), followed by the title of the thesis, followed by the AUTHOR in capital letters, followed by the name of the thesis supervisor where provided.

NB: There is a second table that follows containing a further 78 77 entries — these latter are, however, incomplete in that either the year or the degree appears not to be available.

If you are an author or thesis-supervisor or other academic representative and you are able to correct any inadvertent error or omission, please feel free to write to me promptly by email and I shall seek to account for it. For omissions, please also identify yourself clearly and send a comment to the post along with the necessary data that you believe should be accounted for. Numerous typos existed in the original transcription, several of which have been corrected though many might remain. In several cases, it is not impossible the original transcription has mis-spelt a name but authentication could require the original thesis to be checked.

This database has been created from public data and is published below with the aim of encouraging further research and reflection. It may be of special interest to notice the choice and quality of subjects in the context of particular times.

Subroto Roy

Postscript: More than one grateful reader has called this document someone’s “labour of love”. I agree though I have to say it was not mine — my contribution has been merely to transform a confused spreadsheet into HTML, editing it very slightly, removing some but not all typos yet, and publishing it. The spreadsheet was one of a million files on my computer, which must mean I downloaded it from some public source at some time though I am afraid I have no record where, most probably in British academia.

Degree University & College Title AUTHOR Supervisor

1909 MA Liverpool The interaction of England and India during the early years of George III Dorothy DUDLEY
1917 BLitt Oxford The history of the occupation and rural administration of Bengal by the English Company from the time of Clive to the permanent settlement under Cornwallis W K FIRMINGER
1917 MA Liverpool The constitutional relations of the Marquess Wellesley with the home authorities Beatrice L FRAZER
1917 BLitt Oxford Agricultural cooperation in British India J MATTHAI
1921 BA Cambridge Relations between the Bombay government and the Marathi powers up to the year 1774 W S DESI
1921 MA Manchester The movement of opinion in England as regards Indian affairs, 1757-1773 E EMMETT Prof Muir
1921 MA Manchester The relations of the Mahrattas with the British power I Kathleen WALKER Prof Muir
1922 BLitt Oxford The history of Burma to 1824 G E HARVEY
1922 PhD London Commercial relations between India and England, 1600-1757 B KRISHNA
1922 MSc London Agricultural problems and conditions in the Bombay Presidency, 1870-1914 M A TATA
1922 BLitt Oxford The Indian calico trade and its influence on English history P J THOMAS
1922 MSc London The cotton industry in India to 1757 J N VARMA Prof Sargeant
1922 PhD Manchester The administration of Bengal under Warren Hastings Sophia WEITZMAN Prof Muir
1923 MA Manchester The administrative and judicial reforms of Lord Cornwallis in Bengal (excluding the permanent settlement) A ASPINALL Mr Higham
1923 MA Manchester The Residency of Oudh during the administration of Warren Hastings C C BRACEWELL Prof Davis
1923 MLitt Cambridge Industrial evolution of India in recent times D R GADGIL
1923 PhD London The Punjab as a sovereign state, 1799-1839 GULSHAM LALL Prof Dodwell
1924 BLitt Oxford Development of the cotton industry in Indian from the early 19th century S DESOUANDE
1925 MA Liverpool Henry Dundas and the government of India, 1784-1800 Dorothy THORNTON Prof Veitch
1926 PhD Cambridge The North West Frontier of India, 1890-1909, with a survey of policy since 1849 C C DAVIES
1927 PhD Leeds A study of the development of agriculture in the Punjab and its economic effects K S BAJWA
1927 BLitt Oxford The military system of the Mahrattas: its origin and development from the time of the Shivaji to the fall of the Mahratta empire S SEN
1928 MA Birmingham The East India Company crisis, 1770-1773 R BEARD
1928 PhD Edinburgh A comparative study of the woollen industry in Scotland and the Punjab J W SIRAJUDDIN Dr Rankin
1929 PhD London The relations of the Governor-General and council with the Governor and council of Madras under the Regulating Act of 1773 A Das GUPTA Prof Dodwell
1929 PhD London, LSE The evolution of Indian income tax, 1860-1922: a historical, critical and comparative study J P NIYOGI
1929 PhD London Development of Indian ralways, 1842-1928 N SANYAL Prof Foxwell; Dr Slater
1930 PhD London Financial history of Mysore, 1799-1831 M H GOPAL Dr Slater; Prof Dodwell
1930 BLitt Oxford, St Cath’s Soc The development of political institutions in the state of Travancore, 1885-1924 V M ITTYERAH
1930 BLitt Oxford Sir Charles Crosthwaite and the consolidation of Burma Mys J MAY-OUNG
1930 PhD London, SOAS Revenue administration of the Sirkars under the East India Company down to 1802 Lanka SUNDERAM
1930 PhD London, LSE Hastings’ experiments in the judicial administration N J M YUSUF
1931 PhD London State policy and economic development in Mysore State since 1881 UDAYAM ABHAYAMBAL Miss Anstey
1931 PhD London The origin and early history of public debt in India P DATTA Prof Coatman
1931 MA London Lord Macaulay and the Indian Legislative Council C D DHARKAR Prof Dodwell
1931 MA London The bilingual problem in Ceylon T D JAYASURIYA
1931 PhD London; LSE Study of agricultural cooperation in India based upon foreign experience H L PASRICHA Prof Gregory
1931 PhD London, UC The administration of Mysore under Sir Mark Cubbon. 1834-1861 K N V SASTRI Prof Dodwell

1931/32 PhD Cambridge, St Cath’s English social life in India in the 18th century T G P SPEAR
1932 PhD London The growth and development of the Indian tea industry and trade S M AKHTAR Dr Anstey
1932 PhD London Anglo-Sikh relations, 1839-1849 K C KHANNA Prof Dodwell
1932 PhD London, LSE Indian commodity market speculation L N MISRA Prof Coatman
1932 PhD London, LSE Indian foreign trade, 1870-1930 Parimal RAY Prof Sargent
1932 PhD London, King’s Ceylon under the British occupation: its political and economic development, 1795-1833 C R de SILVA Prof Newton
1932 PhD London Post-war labour legislation in India – a comparison with Japan Sasadhar SINHA Dr Anstey
1932 PhD London Local finance in India G C VARMA Prof Coatman
1933 PhD Leeds Historical survey of the financial policy of the government of India from 1857 to 1900 and of its economic and other consequences H S BHAI
1933 PhD London The relations between the Board of Commissioners for the affairs of India and the Court of Directors, 1784-1816 P CHANDRA Prof Coatman
1934 PhD London The influence of the home government on land revenue and judicial administration in the Presidency of Fort William in Bengal from 1807-1822 B S BALIGA Prof Dodwell
1934 MSc Leeds A survey of the resources of tanning materials and the leather industry of Bhopal State, India G W DOUGLAS
1934 PhD Edinburgh Human geography of Bengal Arthur GEDDES
1934 BLitt Oxford, Somerville A study of the legal and administrative records of Dacca as illustrating the policy of Warren Hastings in East Bengal F M SACHSE
1934 BLitt Oxford Biography of Maharaja DalipSingh K S THAPER
1935 DPhil Oxford The development of the Indian administrative and financial system, 1858-1905, with special reference to the relations F J THOMAS
1936 MSc London British Indian administration: a historical study K R Ramaswami AIYANGAR
1936 MA London Lord Ellenborough’s ideas on Indian policy Kathleen I GARRETT Dr Morrell
1936 MA London British public opinion regarding Indian policy at the time of the mutiny Jessie HOLMES Dr Morrell
1936 PhD London, SOAS The rise and fall of the Rohilla power in Hindustan, 1707-1774 AD A F M K RAHMAN
1936/37 PhD Edinburgh Indian foreign trade, 1900-1931, and its economic background: a study W B RAGHAVIAH
1937 PhD Cambridge, Gonville The national income of British India, 1931-1932 V K R V RAO
1937 PhD London, LSE Culture change in South-Western India A AIYAPPAN
1937 PhD London, UC Banks and industrial finance in India R BAGCHI
1937 PhD London Development of social and political ideas in Bengal, 1858-1884 B C BHATTACHARYA Prof Dodwell
1937 MSc Leeds An interpretation of the distribution of the population within the United Provinces of Agra and Oudh Nora Y BOYDELL
1937 PhD London, LSE Rise and growth of Indian liberalism M A BUCH
1937 PhD London, LSE Industrial finance and management in India N DAS
1937 MSc London, LSE The effect of the breakdown of the international gold standard on India R DORAISWAMY
1937 PhD London, LSE The problem of rural indebtedness in Indian economic life B G GHATE
1937 MSc London, LSE Indian coal trade J GUHATHAKURTA
1937 PhD London SOAS Reorganisation of the Punjab government (1847-1857) R C LAI

1937 PhD London, External An economic and regional geography of the United Provinces of Agra and Oudh S M T RIZVI
1937 PhD Wales Purposes and methods of recording and accounting as applied to agriculture, with special reference to provision and use of economic data relating to agriculture in India Arjan SINGH
1938 PhD London, SOAS The relations between Oudh and the East India Company from 1785-1801 P BASU
1938 PhD London, SOAS East India Company’s relations with Assam, 1771-1826 S K BHUYAN
1938 PhD London, LSE Discretionary powers in the Indian Government with special reference to district administration B CHAND
1938 MA London, SOAS The British conquest of Sind K A CHISHTI
1938 PhD Cambridge, Christ’s The working of the Bengal legislative council under the Government of India Act, 1919 J G DRUMMOND
1938 MA London British relations with the Sikhs and Afghans, July 1823 to March 1840 E R KAPADIA
1938 PhD London, SOAS The East India interest and the British government, 1784-1833 C H PHILIPS
1938 PhD London, LSE The position of the Viceroy and Governor General of India A RUDRA
1938 MA London British relations with the Sikhs and Afghans, July 1823 to March 1840 Charles WADE
1938/39 PhD Edinburgh Agricultural geography of the United Provinces B N MUKERJI
1939 PhD London, LSE Industrial development of Mysore R BALAKRISHNA
1939 MA London, LSE A general geographical account of the North West Frontier Province of India M A K DURRANI
1939 PhD Wales The international production and exchange of rice with special reference to the production, market demand and consumption of rice in India and Burma Ahmas KHAN
1939 BLitt Oxford, St Cath’s Soc The Governor-Generalship of Sir John Shore, 1793-1798 A W MAHMOOD
1939 PhD London, LSE Indian provincial finance (1919-1937) with special reference to the United Provinces B R MISRA
1940 PhD London, LSE Recent economic depression in India with reference to agriculture and rural life R K BHAN
1940 PhD Wales The future of agricultural cooperation in the United Provinces (with an examination of the cooperative experience)with special reference to the problems of agricultural cooperation in the United Provinces, India H R CHATURVEDI
1940 PhD London, LSE An administrative study of the development of the civil service in India during the Company’s regime A K GHOSAL
1940 PhD Wales The production, marketing and consumption of the chief oilseeds in India and the supply and use of oilseeds in the United Kingdom A S KHAN
1940 PhD Wales Principles of agricultural planning with reference to relationships of natural resources, populations and dietaries in India and with further reference to rural development in certain provinces of India Jaswant SINGH
1941 PhD London, LSE Financing of local authorities in British India A N BANERJI
1941 PhD London The political and cultural history of the Punjab including the North West Frontier Province in its earliest period L CHANDRA Prof Barnett
1941 PhD London, LSE Capital development of India, 1860-1913 A KRISHNASAWMI
1941 PhD London, LSE Influence of European political doctrines upon the evolution of the Indian governmental institutions and practice, 1858-1938 G PRASAD
1942 MLitt Cambridge, Fitzwilliam Economic and political relations of India with Iran and Afghanistan since 1900 T BASU
1942 PhD Edinburgh A study of missionary policy and methods in Bengal from 1793 to 1905 W B S DAVIS Prof Watt; Prof Buleigh
1943 PhD London, LSE Development of large scale industries in India and their localisation N S SASTRI
1944 BLitt Oxford, St Cath’s Communal representation and Indian self-government I J BAHADOORSINGH
1944 MA London, External The physiographic evolution of Ceylon K KULARATNAM
1946 MA London, SOAS The origins and development to 1892 of the Indian National Congress Iris M JONES
1947 PhD London, LSE The agricultural geography of Bihar P DAYAL
1947 PhD Cambridge, King’s Consumer expenditure in India, 1931/32 to 1940/41 R L DESAI
1947 MA London, LSE Power resources and utilisation in the United Provinces P K DUTT
1947 PhD London, LSE Cultural change with special reference to the hill tribes of Burma and Assam Edmund Ronald LEACH
1947 PhD London, SOAS The judicial administration of the East India Company in Bengal, 1765-1982 B B MISRA
1947 PhD London, LSE The monetary policy of the Reserve Bank of India with special reference to the structural and institutional factors in the economy K N RAJ
1948 PhD Wales The principles and practice of health insurance as applied to India J AGRAWALA
1948 MSc London, LSE International monetary policy since 1919 with special reference to India D C GHOSE
1948 DPhil Oxford, Balliol British policy on the North East Frontier of India, 1826-1886 S GUPTA
1948 DPhil Oxford, St Cath’s Local self-government in the Madras Presidency, 1850-1919 K K PILLAY
1948 PhD London, LSE The problem of the standards of the Indian currency A SADEQUE
1948 DPhil Oxford, Exeter The social function of religion in a south India community Mysore Narasimhashar SRINIVAS
1948 BLitt Oxford, St Cath’s Society Some aspects of agricultural marketing in India with reference to developments in western marketing systems R S SRIVASTAVA
1948 PhD London,. SOAS Muslims in India: a political analysis (from 1885-906) Rafiq ZAKARIA
1949 PhD London, LSE Settlements in the United Provinces of Agra and Oudh E AHMAD
1949 PhD London, SOAS The growth of self-government in Assam, 1984-1919 A K BARKAKOTY
1949 PhD London, SOAS British administration in Assam (1825-1845)with special reference to the hill tribes on the frontier H BARPUJARI
1949 MA London An enquiry into the development of training of teachers in the Punjab during the British period Aquila B BERLAS
1949 PhD London, LSE The problem of federation in India with special reference to economic relations J N BHAN
1949 PhD London, LSE A study of methods of national income measurements with special reference to the problems of India V K CHOPRA
1949 PhD London, LSE An analysis of the Indian price structure from 1861 A K GHOSH
1949 DPhil Oxford, Keble The achievement of Christian missionaries in India, 1794-1833 Kenneth INGHAM
1949 PhD Wales The organization and methods of agricultural cooperation in the British Isles and the possibility of their application in the Central Province of India N Y KHER
1949 PhD London, LSE Industrial geography of Bihar S A MAJID
1949 PhD London, LSE Development of Indian public finance during the war, April 1939-March 1946 S MISRA
1949 PhD London, LSE A study of the methods of state regulation of wages with special reference to their possible applications in India S B L NIGAM
1949 PhD London, SOAS The development of marriage in ancient India B C PAUL
1949 PhD St Andrews The social and administrative reforms of Lord William Bentinck G SEED
1950 PhD London, LSE Jails and borstals with special reference to West Bengal B BHATTACHARYYA Dr Mannheim
1950 PhD London The growth of local self-government in Assam, 1874-1919 A K BORKAKOTY Prof C R Philips; Prof Hall
1950 DPhil Oxford, Lady Margaret Hall The problem of the Indian immigrant in British colonial policy after 1834 I Mary CUMPSTON
1950 PhD London, LSE Underemployment and industrialisation: a study of the basic problems with special reference to India B DATTA
1950 PhD London, UC The agriculture of Mysore G K GHORI
1950 PhD London, SOAS The influence of western, particularly English, political ideas on Indian political thought, with special reference to the political ideas of the Indian National Congress, 1885-1919 Sailesh C GHOSH
1950 PhD London, LSE Principles of unemployment insurance and assistance with special reference to their application to India D GUPTA
1950 PhD Newcastle Anglo-Afghan relations, 1798-1878, with particular reference to British policy in Central Asia and on the North West Frontier of India M KHAN
1950 PhD London, LSE The social consequences of imperialism with special reference to Ceylon P R PIERIS
1950 PhD London, LSE An experiment in the estimation of national income and the in the construction of social accounts of India, 1945-1946 D N SAXENA Mr Booker
1950 PhD London, SOAS The relations between the home and Indian governments, 1858-1870 Zahinuddin Husain ZOBERI
1951 PhD London, External Memoir of the geology and mineral resources of the neighbourhood of Bentong, Pahang and adjoining portions of Selangor and Negri Sembilan, incorporating an account of the prospecting and mining activities of the Bentong District J B ALEXANDER
1951 BLitt Oxford, Exeter The political organization of the plains Indians Frederick George BAILEY
1951 BLitt Oxford, Corpus Southern India under Wellesley, 1798-1805 A S BENNELL Mr C C Davies
1951 PhD London, LSE Problems of the Indian foreign exchanges since 1927 D GHOSH
1951 DPhil Oxford, Balliol The Viceroyalty of Lord Ripon, 1880-1884 S GOPAL Mr R C Davies
1951 MA Wales The problem of the Straits, 1896-1936 E W GRIFFITHS
1951 PhD London, LSE Sources of Indian official statistics relating to production O P GUPTA Dr Rhodes
1951 MA Manchester The administration and financial control of municipalities and district boards in the UP N K KATHIA
1951 PhD Glasgow The legal and constitutional implications of the evolution of Indian independence R KEMAL
1951 PhD Cambridge, Jesus An analysis of the Hindu caste system in its interactions with the total social structure in certain parts of the Malabar coast E J MILLER Prof Hutton
1951 PhD Cambridge, Girton Changes in matrilineal kinship on th Malabar coast E K MILLER Prof Hutton
1951 PhD Bristol Agriculture and horticulture in India – sundry papers K C NAIK
1951 MA Manchester An economic survey of West Pakistan A SHARIF
1951 PhD Cambridge The interpretation of legislative powers under the Government of India Act, 1935 S D SHARMA
1951 BLitt Oxford, St Cath’s Society Religion and society among some of the tribes of Chota Nagpur H N C STEVENSON
1951 London, SOAS The political development of Burma during the period 1918-1935 OHN TIN
1951 PhD London, LSE The working of the Donoughmore constitution of Ceylon, 1931-1947: a study of a colonial central government by executive committees Irripitwebadalge don Samaradasa WEERAWARDANA Mr W H Morris-Jones
1952 PhD London SOAS The career of Mir Jafar Khan, 1757-1765 AD Raya ATULA-CHANDRA Prof C H Philips
1952 PhD London, LSE The development of Calcutta: a study in urban geography M GUHA Prof L D Stamp; Prof O H K Spate
1952 PhD London, LSE The East India Company’s land policy and management in Bengal from 1698 to 1784 Mazharul HUQ Dr Anstey
1952 MA Leeds The social accounts relating to Ceylon E L P JAYTILAKA
1952 MSc London, LSE Rural industries in India: a study in rural economic development with special reference to Madras C K KAUSUKUTTY Dr Anstey
1952 MSc London, LSE India’s balance of international payments with special reference to her food and agricultural conditions G B KULKARNI Dr Anstey; Dr Raeburn
1952 PhD Cambridge Utilitarian influence and the formation of Indian policy, 1820-1840 E T STOKES
1952 PhD London, SOAS Local government in India and Burma, 1908-1937: a comparative study of the evolution and working of local authorities in Bombay, the United Provinces and Burma Hugh R TINKER Prof Hall
1953 PhD London, LSE Economic geography of East Pakistan N AHMAD Prof Stamp
1953 MSc London, UC the changing pattern of India’s foreign trade, with special reference to the impact of large scale industrial development since 1919 A ALAGAPPAN
1953 PhD London, SOAS The East India Company and the economy of Bengal from 1704 to 1740 Sukumar BHATTACHARYYA Prof C H Philips
1953 MA Wales National income of Pakistan for the year 1948-49 Z ul H CHAUDRI
1953 MLitt Cambridge, Fitzwilliam The influence of Western thought on social, educational, political and cultural development of India, 1818-1840 V DATTA Dr T G P Spear
1953 MSc Belfast The growth of trade unions in India S DAYAL
1953 PhD London The establishment of Dutch power in Ceylon, 1638-1658 K W GOONEWARDENA Prof Hall
1953 PhD London, LSE The submontane region of North West Pakistan: a geographical study of its economic development Maryam KARAM-ELAHI Prof Buchanan; Prof Stamp
1953 PhD London, LSE A study of rhe measurement of national product and its distribution, with special reference to Pakistan A H KHANDKER
1953 PhD Edinburgh A regional study of survival, mortality and disease in British India in relation to the geographic factors, 1921-1940 A T A LEARMONTH
1953 PhD London, SOAS Development of the Muslims of Bengal and Bihar, 1819-1856, with special reference to their education A R MAALICK Prof Philips
1953 DPhil Oxford, Jesus The study of the economy of self-subsisting rural communities: the methods of investigation, economic conditions and economic relations, with specific reference to India P K MUKHOPADHYAY
1953 PhD London, LSE The relationship of land tenure to the economic modernization of Uttar Pradesh W C NEALE
1953 PhD London, Bedford Social status of women during the past fifty years (1900=1950) T N PATEL Mrs B Wootton
1953 PhD London, LSE The state in relation to trade unions and trade disputes in India Anand PRAKASH Mr W H Morris-Jones; Mr Roberts
1953 MA London, SOAS The tribal village in Bihar SACHCHIDANANDA Prof C Haimendorf
1953 PhD London, UC Delegated legislation in India V N SHULKA Prof Keeton
1953 PhD London, SOAS The internal policy of the Indian government, 1885-1898 H L SINGH Prof C H Philips
1953 PhD London, SOAS The internal policy of Lord Auckland in British India, 1836-1842, with special reference to education D P SINHA Prof C H Philips
1953/54 MA Leeds Demand for certain exports of Ceylon K THARMARATNAM
1954 MA London The administration of Sir Henry Ward,Governor of Ceylon, 1855-1860 S V BALASINGHAM Prof Graham
1954 PhD London, SOAS Social policy and social change in Western India, 1817-1830 Kenneth A BALLHATCHET Prof C H Philips
1954 Dphil Oxford, St Hilda’s Lord William Bentinck in Bengal, 1828-1835 C E BARRETT Dr C C Davies
1954 MA London A historical survey of the training of teachers in Bengal in the 19th and 20th centuries S BHATTACHARYA
1954 MA London, SOAS Evolution of representative government in India, 1884-1909 Sasadhar CHAKRAVARTY Prof C H Philips

1964 PhD London, UCL, A Comparative Study of Pakistani Bilingual and Monoglot School Children’s Performance in Verbal and Non Verbal Tests Rafia HASAN Dr Charlotte Banks (added thanks to information of Naveed Hasan Henderson, PhD London 1995, in a comment below, and confirmed by the University of London Library)

1964 PhD London, External An appraisal of public investment policy in India, 1951-1961 J M HEALEY
1964 PhD London The formation of British land revenue policy in the ceded and conquered provinces of northern India. 1801-1833 M I HUSAIN Dr K A Ballhatchet
1964 PhD London, LSE Soviet Russia’s policy towards India and its effect on Anglo-Soviet relations, 1917-1928 Z IMAM Mr Schapiro
1964 PhD London, Wye Efficiency in agricultural production; its meaning, measurement and improvement in peasant agriculture with special reference to Pakistan M S ISLAM
1964 PhD London, LSE The urban labour movement in Ceylon with reference to political factors, 1893-1947 V K JAYAWARDENA Prof Roberts
1964 PhD London, External A study of the current trends in the industrial development of Ceylon V KANAPATHY
1964 PhD London, LSE The modern Muslim political elite in Bengal Abdul Khair Nazmul KARIM
1964 PhD London, LSE Iron and steel prices in India since independence S S MENSINKAI
1964 PhD London, SOAS Sir Charles Wood’s Indian policy, 1953-1866 R J MOORE Prof Basham
1964 PhD London, SOAS Lord Northwood’s Indian administration, 1872-1876 E C MOULTON Dr K Ballhatchet
1964 PhD London, LSE Some aspects of agrarian reorganizationin India with special reference to size of holding B MUKHERJEE D Anstey
1964 PhD Cambridge, Newnham British commercial interests and the expansion of the Bombay Presidency, 1784-1806 P NIGHTINGALE Dr T G P Spear
1964 PhD London, SOAS The rise of the Muslim middle class as a political factor in India and Pakistan A H M NOORUZZAMAN Prof H Tinker
1964 PhD London, SOAS The rev. James Long and Protestant missionary policy in Bengal, 1840-1872 G A ODDIE Prof K Ballhatchet
1964 PhD London, Inst Ed Some issues between the church and state in Ceylon in the education of the people from 1870 to 1901 A RAJAINDRAN Dr Holmes
1964 PhD London, LSE Rural development in India with special reference to agriculture, education and administration K RAJARATNAM Dr Anstey
1964 PhD Durham The central legislature in British India, 1921-1947 Md RASHIDUZZAMAN Prof W H Morris-Jones
1964 PhD London, LSE Land tenure as related to agricultural efficiency and rural welfare in India Paramahansa RAY Dr Anstey; Mr Joy
1964 PhD London The revenue administration of Chittagong from 1761 to1784 Alamgir Muhammad SERAJUDDIN Mr Harrison
1964 BLitt Oxford, St Hilda’s A study of representation in multi-lateral communities with special reference to Ceylon and Trinidad from 1946-1961 A SPACKMAN Dr A F Madden
1964 MSc London, LSE Trends in the pattern of distribution of consumer goods in India B K VADEHRA
1964 PhD London, SOAS British administration in the maritime provinces of Ceylon, 1796-1802 U C WICKREMERATNE Prof K A Ballhatchet
1964 MA Nottingham British policy and the defence of Asia, 1903-1905: with special reference to China and India B WILLCOCK Dr J A S Grenville
1964/65 PhD Manchester Revolution and counter-revolution: a study of British colonial policy as a factor in the growth and disintegration of national liberation movements in Burma and Malaya F NEMENZO
1964/65 PhD Nottingham Impact of the size of the organization on the personnel management function: a comparative study of personnel departments in some British and Indian industrial firms B P SINGH
1965 DPhil Oxford, New College Life and conditions of the people of Bengal (1765-1785) Z AHMA Mr C C Davies
1965 PhD London, External The commercial progress and administrative development of the East India company on the Coromandel coast during the first half of the 18th century R N BANERJI
1965 PhD London, SOAS The minorities of Southern Asia and public policy with special reference to India (mainly since 1919) J H BEAGLEHOLE Prof H Tinker
1965 PhD Manchester Urban unemployment in India RC BHARDWAJ
1965 DPhl Oxford, Balliol The governor-generalship of the Marquess of Hastings, 1813-1823, with special reference to the Supreme Council and Secretariat…Palmer Company Richard J BINGLE Mr C C Davies
1965 MSc London, SOAS Ministerial government under the dyarchical reforms with special reference to Bengal and Madras K A CHOWDHURY
1965 PhD London, SOAS The idea of freedom in the political thought of Vivekananda, Aurobindo, Gandhi and Tagore D G DALTON
1965 MA London, LSE Irrigation and winter crops in East Pakistan O HUQ Mr Rawson
1965 PhD London, SOAS Conditions of employment and industrial disputes in Pakistan A HUSAIN Prof A Gledhill
1965 PhD London, LSE Democratic decentralization and planning in rural India A C S ILCHMAN Dr Anstey; Prof Self
1965 MSc London, King’s A social geography of Chitral State ISRAR-UD-DIN Prof Jones
1965 MSc (Econ) London, LSE Economic problems and organisation of public enterprise in Ceylon, 1931-1963 A S JAYAWARDENE Mr Foldes
1965 PhD London, SOAS The rights and liabilities of the Bengal raiyats under tenancy legislation from 1885 to 1947 L KABIR
1965 MA Manchester The failure of parliamentary system of government in Pakistan M A KHAN
1965 PhD London, SOAS Curzon, Kitchener and the problem of India army administration, 1899-1909 J E LYDGATE Prof Robinson
1965 PhD London, SOAS A study of urban centres and industries in the central provinces of the Mughal Empire between 1556 and 1803 H K NAQVI Mr Harrison
1965 PhD London, SOAS Sir Charles Metcalfe’s administration and administrative ideas in India, 1806-1835 D N PANIGRAHI Prof C H Philips
1965 PhD Birmingham Peasant farming past and present in the wet zone of Ceylon P D A PERERA Prof H Thorpe; Dr W B Morgan
1965 DPhil Oxford, Merton Some aspects of British economic and social policy in Ceylon, 1840-1871 M W ROBERTS Prof J A Gallagher
1965 PhD London The rise of business corporations in India and their development during 1851-1900 R S RUNGTA Prof Paish; Dr V Ansty
1965 PhF London, SOAS The Sultanate of Jaunpur Mian Muhhammad SAEED Prof Basham
1965 BLitt Oxford, Lady Margaret Agricultural policy and economic development in India K N V SASTRI Mr G R Allen
1965 PhD London, SOAS A comparative study of the traditional political organisation of Kerala and Punjab S J SHAHANI Dr Mayer
1965 PhD London, SOAS The joint Hindiu family: its evolution as a legal institution Gunther-Dietz SONTHEIMER Dr Derrett
1965 PhD London, SOAS Nullity of marriage in modern Hindu law S K TEWARI Dr J D M Derrett
1965 MA London, Inst Ed The social and political significance of Anglo-Indian schools in India Rosalind TIWARI Dr King
1965 MA Manchester Federalism in south-East Asia with special reference to Burma Margaret YIYI
1965 PhD London, SOAS The partition of Bengal and its annulment: a survey of the schemes of territorial redistribution of Bengal, 1902-1911 S Z H ZAIDI Prof Basham
1965/66 PhD Cambridge, St John’s Economic geography of rubber production in Ceylon G H PEIRIS Mr B H Farmer
1965/66 PhD Leeds Impact of money supply on the Indian economy, 1950/51 – 1963/64 K PRASAD
1965/66 PhD Cambridge, Newnham The structure and working of the commercial banking system in Ceylon, 1945-1963 A J A N SILVA Miss P M Deane
1965/66 PhD Durham Aspects of hte administration of the Punjab, judicial, revenue and political, 1849-1858 S K SONI
1965/66 PhD Cambridge, Trinity House The public finances of Ceylon, 1948-1961 G USWATTE-ARATCHI Dr A R Prest
1966 PhD London, LSE Expenditure classification and investment planning with special reference to Pakistan K U AHMAD Dr Anstey
1966 PhD London, LSE The methodology of studying fertility differentials with reference to East Pakistan M AHMAD Prof Glass; Mr Carrier
1966 PhD Bristol The role of a higher civil service in Pakistan A AHMED
1966 PhD London, SOAS Conditions of employment and industrial disputed in Pakistan H AHMED
1966 MScEcon London, SOAS Political parties and the Labour Movement in India in the 1920s N BEGAM
1966 MLitt Edinburgh Patronage and education in the East India Company civil service, 1800-1857 J T BEYER
1966 PhD Cambridge, Churchill Regional cooperation for development in South Asia with special reference to India and Pakistan S R BOSE Mr W B Reddaway
1966 PhD London The constitutional history of Malaya with special reference toe Malay states of Perak, Selangor, Negri Sembilan and Pahong, 1874-1914 P L BURNS Prof C D Cowan
1966 PhD Cambridge, Girton The impact of planning upon federalism in India, 1951-1964 A CHATTERJI Prof Sir Ivor Jennings
1966 PhD London, UC Industrial conciliation and arbitration in India R L CHAUDHARY
1966 PhD London, UC Lahore: a geographical study M M CHAUDHURY
1966 PhD Manchester The approach to planning in Pakistan M K CHOWDHURY
1966 PhD London, LSE Jamshedpur – the growth of the city and its region M DUTT Prof Jones
1966 DPhil Oxford, Campion Hall The Tana Bhagats:a study in social change P EKKA Mr K O L Burridge
1966 PhD London, LSE The scope for wage policy as an instrument of planning in early stages of national economic development: a comparative study of the USSR, India and the UAR M A ELLEISI Prof Phelps Brown; Dr Ozga
1966 PhD London, SOAS The social condition of the British community in Bengal, 1757-1800 S C GHOSH Prof A L Basham
1966 PhD Cambridge, Girton The transfer of power to Pakistan and its consequences (1946-1951) M HASAN Prof N Mansergh
1966 PhD London, UC The Indian Supreme Court and the constitution M IMAM Dr D C Holland
1966 PhD London, LSE Cotton futures markets in India: some economic studies T ISLAM Prof Yamey
1966 PhD London, LSE The extensions of the franchise in Ceylon with some consideration of the their political and social consequences K H JAYASINGHE Mr Pickles
1966 MA London, External The control of education in Ceylon: the last fifty years of British rule and after (1900-1962) C S V JAYAWAWEERA
1966 PhD London, External A comparative study of British and American colonial educational policy in Ceylon and the Philippines from 1900 to 1948] S JAYAWEERA
1966 PhD Manchester Import substitution in relations to industrial growth and balance of payments iof Pakistan, 1965-1970 A H KADRI
1966 PhD London, SOAS Origins of Indian foreign policy: a study of Indian nationalist attitudes to foreign affairs, 1927-1939 T A KEENLEYSIDE Prof H Tinker
1966 PhD London, SOAS The transition in Bengal, 1756-1775: a study of Muhammad Reza Khan Abdul Majed KHAN Mr Harrison
1966 PhD London, SOAS The British administration of Sind between 1843 and 1865: a study in social and economic development Hamida KHUHRO Mr Harrison
1966 PhD London, SOAS The internal administration of Lord Elgin in India, 1984-1898 P L MALHOTRA Mr Harrison
1966 PhD London, SOAS A study of Murshidabad Distrrict, 1765-1793 K M MOHSIN Mr Harrison
1966 PhD London, SOAS The new province of Eastern Bengal and Assam, 1905-1911 M K U MOLLA Dr Hardy; Dr Pandey
1966 PhD London, SOAS The early history of the East Indian Railways, 1845-1879 Hena MUKHERJEE Dr Chaudhuri
1966 PhD London, King’s British military policy and the defence of India: a study of British military policy, plans and preparations during the Russian crisis, 1876-1880 A W PRESTON Prof M E Howard
1966 PhD London, LSE Changes in caste in rural Kumaon R D SANWAL Dr Freedman
1966 PhD London, SOAS The Christian missionaries in Bengal. 1793-1833 K SENGUPTA Prof Basham
1966 PhD London, LSE Central control and supervision of capital expenditure in the public sector in the UK and India Ram Parkash SETH Prof Greaves; Prof Self
1966 PhD London, King’s Surveying and charting the Indian Ocean W A SPRAY Prof G S Graham
1966 PhD London, SOAS Politics and change in the Madras Presidency, 1884-1894: a regional study of Indian nationalism R SUNTHARALINGAM Prof H R Tinker
1966 PhD London, External The law relating to directors and managing agents of companies limited by shares in Pakistan Muhammad ZAHIR Prof Gledhill
1966/67 PhD Cambridge, Trinity Planning and regional development: the application of a multi-sectoral programming model to inter-regional planning in Pakistan A R KHAN Dr J A Mirrlees
1966/67 MPhil London, Inst Ed The impact of the creation of Pakistan on Muslim education in Pakistan G NABI
1966/67 PhD Manchester A study of fiscal policy in Pakistan, 1950-51, with special reference to its contribution to economic development M NAYIMUDDIN
1966/67 PhD Edinburgh The fisheries of Pakistan: their present position and potentialities R NIAZI
1966/67 PhD Leeds An evaluation of the human impact on the nature and distribution of wild plant communities in the Ceylon Highlands N P PERERA
1966/67 PhD Reading Intra-party relationships and federalism: a comparative study of the Indian Congress Party and the Australian political parties Y A RAFEEK
1966/67 PhD Cambridge, St Cath’s The share of labour in value added during the inflation in the modern sector in under-developed economies: a comparative study of the experience of India, Peru and Turkey between 1939 and 1958 W M WARREN Mr J A C Bowen
1967 LLM Queen’s, Belfast A comparative study of the provisions for emergency powers in the constitutions of the Indian, Australian, Nigerian and Malaysian federations with special emphasis on the Malaysian constitution A ABIDIN
1967 PhD Edinburgh The peasant family and social status in East Pakistan Nizam Uddin AHMED
1967 BLitt Glasgow Foreign trade policy of India N M AMIN
1967 PhD London, SOAS English educated Ceylonese in the official life of Ceylon from 1865 to 1883 W M D D ANDRADI Mr J B Harrison
1967 PhD London, SOAS Some aspects of the relationship of political and constitutional theories to the constitutional evolution of India and Pakistan with special reference to the period 1919-1956 B P BARUA Prof H Tinker
1967 PhD Cambridge, Newnham Indian education and politics,1898-1920 A BASU Prof J A Gallagher

Table 2: List of theses with incomplete data, listed alphabetically by the University and College followed by the AUTHOR (in capital letters) followed by the Supervisor(s) where available and the thesis Title. The Year and/or Degree were not available in the public database. If you are an author or supervisor or other academic representative, please write in with these details if possible.

Aberdeen Sultan Ali ADIL An economic analysis of energy use in irrigated agriculture of Punjab PhD
Birmingham 0.365217391 S A KARUNANAYAKE An evaluation of the present system of local government in Ceylon in the light of national needs for unity and economic and social development and proposals for appropriate changes PhD
Birmingham 0.369264706 M G KANBUR Spatial equilibrium analysis of trhe rice economy of South India 2000
BradfordCambridge, Trinity Z KHAN The development of overt nuclear weapon states in South Asia PhD
Cambridge Katherine Helen PRIOR The British administration of Hinduism in India, 1780-1900 PhD
Cambridge G CHAKRAVARTY Imagining resistance: British historiography and popular fiction on the Indian Rebellion of 1857-1859 PhD
Cambridge 0.327375 Ajit Kumar GHOSE Production organisation, markets and resource use in Indian agriculture PhD
Cambridge 0.361285714 M J EGAN A structural analysis of a Sinhalese healing ritual PhD
Cambridge, King’s 0.301 J A LAIDLAW The religion of Svetambar Jain merchants in Jaipur PhD
Cambridge, Pembroke H T FRY Prof E E Rich Alexander Dalrymple, cosmographer and servant of the East India Company PhD
Cambridge, Trinity Magnus Murray MARSDEN Dr S B Bayly Islamization and globalization in Chitral, Northern Pakistan
Cambridge, Trinity Hall C J JEFFREY Dr S E Corbridge Reproducing difference: the accumulation strategies of richer Jat farmers in Western Uttar Pradesh, India 2002
Cambridge, Wolfson Gethin REES DrD K Chakrabarti Buddhism and trade: rock cut caves of the Western Ghats PhD
Cranfield, Silsoe Ariyaratne DISSANAYAKE J Morris Research and development and extension for agricultural mechanisation in Sri Lanka
De Montfort S JAIN The havelis of Rajasthan: form and identity PhD
Durham 0.401311475 M F A KHAN The arid zone of West Pakistan PhD
East Anglia John HARISS Technological change in agricultural and agrarian social structure in Northen Tamil Nadu, India PhD
Edinburgh N THIN High spirits and heteroglossia: forest festivals of the Nilgiri Irulas PhD
Edinburgh AKSHAY KHANNA Sexuality as a political object in civil society: active formations in India 2003
Edinburgh Rebecca WALKER Concepts of peace in conflict situations in Sri Lanka PhD
Glasgow Sana KHOKHAR Dr F Noorbakhsh; Dr A Paloni An evaluation of the structural adjustment and economic reform programme: a case study of Pakistan MPhil
Lancaster J A BURR Cultural stereotypes and the diagnosis of depression: women from South Asian communities and their experience of mental distress 1980
Leeds E K TARIN Health sector reforms: factors influencing the policy process for government initiatives in the Punjab (Pakistan) health sector, 1993-2000 PhD
Leeds 0.35375 A P A FERNANDO Agricultural development of Ceylon since independence (1948-1968)- an investigation into some aspects of agricultural development in Ceylon and an evaluation of major agricultural policies adopted in the peasant sector PhD
Leeds 0.35375 M S KHAN Policies and planning for agricultural development with a high population density: a case study of East Pakistan PhD
London F R M HASAN Ecology and rural class relations in Bangladesh: a study with special reference to three villages PhD
London B GHOSH Dr Anstey The Indian salt industry, trade and taxation PhD
London R L HATFIELD Management reform in a centralised environment: primary education administration in Balochistan, Pakistan, 1992-1997 MSc
London GAYAS-UD-DIN Medical library and information system for India PhD
London Sarmistha PAL Choice of casual and regular labour contracts in Indian agriculture: a theoretical and empirical analysis 2000London, SOAS Pillarisetti SUDHIR Mr Chaudhuri British attitudes to Indian nationalism, 1922-1935 2001 (Apropos the author’s correction in the Comments section, this entry has been moved to the main list.)
London, External 0.357464789 A A KHATRI Marriage and family relationships in Gujerati fiction PhD
London, Imperial Sinniah JEYALINGAWATHANI Thr utilisation of indigenous and imported Bos indicus breeds in the dry zone of Sri Lanka 2002
London, LSE A KUNDU Prof Allen; Mr Booker Statistical measures of five year plans in India 2003
London, LSE Flora Elizabeth CORNISH Dr C Campbell Constructing an actionable environment: colelctive action for HIV prevention among Kolkata sex workers MPhil
London, LSE 0.423157895 B P DUTIA Economic aspects of production and marketing of cotton in India PhD
London, LSHTM Margaret J LEPPARD Obstetric care in a Bangladeshi hospital: an organisational ethnography PhD
London, LSHTM Steven RUSSELL Can households afford to be ill ? the role of the health system, maternal resources and social networks in Sri Lanka PhD
London, LSHTM Syed Mohd Akramuz ZAMAN Cohort study of the effect of measles on childhood morbidity in urban Bangladesh PhD
London, LSHTM Mrigesh Roopchandra BHATIA Economic evaluation od malaria control in Surat, India: bednets versus residual insecticide apray PhD
London, SOAS A B M MAHMOOD Mr Harrison The land revenue history of the Rajshahi zamindari, 1765-1793 PhD
London, SOAS Oliver David SPRINGATE-BAGINSKY Dr S I Jewitt Sustainable development through particpatory forest management: an analysis of the long term role of the cooperative forest societies of Kangra District, Himachal Pradesh, India PhD
London, SOAS Isabella NARDI Dr G Tillotson The Citrasutras: the Indian theory of painting 1929? MA
London, SOAS Angela ATKINS Dr R Snell The Indian novel in English and Hindi PhD
London, SOAS Angela C EYRE Land, language and literary identity: a thematic comparison of Indian novels in Hindi and English MA
London, SOAS Rajit Kumar MAZUMDER Prof P G Robb The making of Punjab: colonial power, the Indian army and recruited peasants, 1849-1939 MA
London, SOAS Lalita Nath PANIGRAHI Prof a l Basham The practice of female infanticide in India and its suppression in the North Western Provinces PhD
London, SOAS 0.318795181 Terumichi KAWAI Freedom of religion in comparative constitutional law with special reference to the UK, US, India and Japan MPhil
London, SOAS 0.3432 W P KINNEY Dr M Caldwell; P C Ayre Aspects of economic development in Malaya MA
London, SOAS 0.35375 K D GAUR Economic crimes relating to income tax in India: a critical analysis of tax evasion and tax avoidance PhD
London, SOAS 0.35375 A GHAFFAR Protection of personal liberty under the Pakistan constitution BLitt
London, SOAS 0.35375 K P MISHRA Dr J B Harrison The administration and economy of the Banaras region, 1738-1795 BLitt
London, SOAS 0.382153846 K M KARIM The provinces of Bihar and Bengal under Shabjahan 2003
Manchester A BERADLEY Prof Muir Settlement of the Madras Presidency, 1765-1827 MA
Manchester W A G HARRINGTON The theory and practice of non-formal education in developing countries with case studies from India PhD
Manchester Jane HAGGIS Professional ladies and working wives: female missionaries in the London Missionary Society and its South Travancoe District, South India, 1850-1900 MPhil
Manchester 0.401311475 S T G FERNANDO A historical and analytical account of export taxation in Ceylon, 1802-1958 PhD
Manchester 0.411864407 R L KUMAR India’s post-war balance of payments sincce 1945-1955 DPhil
Manchester 0.417413793 T S EPSTEIN A comparative study of economic change and differentiation in two South Indian villages PhD
Manchester Metropolitan S PAREKH Relationships between children with cerebral palsy and their siblings: an ethnography in Kolkata, India
Newcastle Alice MALPASS Dr P Phillimore Hibred kala: the hybrid age of choice, dissent and imagination: contract faming and genetically modified cotton in Karnataka, South India MSC
Newcastle 0.373432836 K K KHOSLA Conditions of labour and labour legislation of industrial workers in India since 1947 2001
North London Jasmin ARA Ms R Glanville Primary health care facilities in Bangladesh: a method of planning and design taking account of limited resources, local technology, future growth and change 2000
Oxford W M KHAN An economic evaluation of the alternative uses of land under state forests in Baluchistan 1999
Oxford, Campion Hall P EKKE Dr D F Brook An ethnogaphic survey of the Oraons and the Mundas of Chota-Nagpur 1991
Oxford, Nuffield Alistair McMILLAN Dr N Gooptu; Prof A F Heath Scheduled castes, scheduled tribes and party competition in India 1991
Oxford, St Hilda’s H Vinita TSENG Prof R F Gombrich The Nidanavagga of the Saratthappakasini: the first two vaggas 1993
Oxford, Wolfson Somadeva VASUDEVA Prof A G J S Sanderson The yoga of the Malinivijayottaratantra 1994
Reading 0.38671875 M A KAMAL Balances and unbalanced growth as exemplified by a decade of planning experience in India 1994
Salford S CHOWDHURY Mr E K Grime Housing in Bangladesh 1998
Sheffield RITA SAIKIA Prof M F Lynch The utility of object-oriented domain specification in the context of a large organisation in India 1998
Southampton 0.369264706 Mohammad A MONDAL A suggested approach to the solution of the profit measurement and asset valuation with reference to the developing economies of India and Pakisttan 1999
Strathclyde 0.37358209 T G GEHANI A critical review of the work of Scottish Presbyterian missions in India, 1878-1914 1999
Sussex R G HESELTINE The development and impact of jute cultivation in Bengal, 1870-1930 2000
Wales Animesh HALDER Potential diversification in India’s export pattern 2000
Wales, Swansea S S MUKHERJEE Urban process in Calcutta: some planning implications 2004
Wales, Swansea Julia CLEEVES Gender and reproductive health: issues in hormonal contraception in India 2004
Wales, University College of Swansea 0.346621622 E A KUMARASINGHE Information for health planning in Sri Lanka 1965

The Government of Pakistan is said to be due to release its initial report on the involvement of Pakistanis in the Mumbai massacres. It is reportedly expected that the G o P will partly if not mainly or wholly attribute responsibility for the planning of the massacres to expatriate Pakistanis in other countries, perhaps in Europe and Britain. If so, a fact the Government of India might find prudent to recall is that the Government of Pakistan in bygone decades did deny citizenship to Rahmat Ali himself (who invented the acronym “P, A, K, I, S, T, A, N” ) and even deported him back to Britain from where he had carried out his vituperative and bigoted campaign against Hindus.

Rahmat Ali’s British grave has become a site of pilgrimage for expatriate Pakistani extremists and his ignorant hate-filled ideology from the 1930s has been inspiring their modern manifestos. I said this in an article published in Karachi’s Dawn newspaper in 2005, which also pointed to Iqbal and Jinnah’s disdain for Rahmat Ali’s views (see “Iqbal and Jinnah vs Rahmat Ali” republished here). American nationals and British subjects of Pakistani origin inspired by Rahmat Ali’s ghost are spreading theories of Pakistani territorial expansionism at the cost of the destruction of the Indian Republic and many other countries.

The fact that at one such website recently I myself, presumably because of my Hindu name and Indian nationality, have been referred to as a “monkey- or donkey-worshipper” 😀 may speak to the somewhat rabid nature of such ideologies. (Drat! And there I was expecting some elementary Pakistani courtesy and acknowledgment let alone gratitude for having created, at great personal cost at an American university twenty years ago, the volume with WE James titled Foundations of Pakistan’s Political Economy: Towards an Agenda for the 1990s with its mundane chapters on agriculture, macroeconomics, education etc!)

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