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Saturday, April 18, 2015

The Middle Eastern Balance of Power Matures?

http://aliqapoo.com/2012/05/02/peoples-of-the-middle-east/

If operating through open warfare can be called maturing, then i suppose it is. Effectively any threatened tribe gets armed and this dilutes any form of central government. Iraq has three separate centers of military power now. Turkey is trying to avoid this fate as well with the Kurds and is likely to fail. Yemen and Libya follow this tendency. Jordan only maintains a cap on this potential.

What i have suggested to resolve the Palestinian problem can actually be applied everywhere. We have designated tribal cities which provide citizenship. Everything else becomes a managed land base not providing citizenship. In that way land simply become a commercial commodity and national boundaries can become irrelevant.

What is maturing is that with every last tribe stepping up for their share of power, we have strengthening of tribal polities rather than the hoped for weakening. The Arab culture actually works against an alternative solution. Thus establishing national urban centers puts real distance between the so called tribes and eliminates meaningful land conflicts. It even lets them then work together as they have done for centuries.

Last week, a coalition of predominantly Sunni Arab countries,
primarily from the Arabian Peninsula and organized by Saudi Arabia, launched airstrikes in Yemen that
have continued into this week. The airstrikes target Yemeni al-Houthis,
a Shiite sect supported by Iran, and their Sunni partners, which
include the majority of military forces loyal to former President Ali
Abdullah Saleh. What made the strikes particularly interesting was what
was lacking: U.S. aircraft. Although the United States provided
intelligence and other support, it was a coalition of Arab states that
launched the extended air campaign against the al-Houthis.

Three things make this important. First, it shows the United States'
new regional strategy in operation. Washington is moving away from the
strategy it has followed since the early 2000s — of being the prime
military force in regional conflicts — and is shifting the primary burden of fighting to
regional powers while playing a secondary role. Second, after years of
buying advanced weaponry, the Saudis and the Gulf Cooperation Council
countries are capable of carrying out a fairly sophisticated campaign,
at least in Yemen. The campaign began by suppressing enemy air defenses —
the al-Houthis had acquired surface-to-air missiles from the Yemeni
military — and moved on to attacking al-Houthi command-and-control
systems. This means that while the regional powers have long been happy
to shift the burden of combat to the United States, they are also able
to assume the burden if the United States refuses to engage.

Most important, the attacks on the al-Houthis shine the spotlight on a
growing situation in the region: a war between the Sunnis and Shiites.
In Iraq and Syria, a full-scale war is underway. A battle rages in Tikrit with
the Sunni Islamic State and its allies on one side, and a complex
combination of the Shiite-dominated Iraqi army, Shiite militias, Sunni
Arab tribal groups and Sunni Kurdish forces on the other. In Syria, the
battle is between the secular government of President Bashar al Assad —
nevertheless dominated by Alawites, a Shiite sect — and Sunni groups.
However, Sunnis, Druze and Christians have sided with the regime as
well. It is not reasonable to refer to the Syrian opposition as a
coalition because there is significant internal hostility.
Indeed, there is tension not only between the Shiites and Sunnis, but
also within the Shiite and Sunni groups. In Yemen, a local power
struggle among warring factions has been branded and elevated into a
sectarian conflict for the benefit of the regional players. It is much
more complex than simply a Shiite-Sunni war. At the same time, it cannot
be understood without the Sunni-Shiite component.

Iran's Strategy and the Saudis' Response

One reason this is so important is that it represents a move by Iran to gain a major sphere of influence in the Arab world. This is not a new strategy.
Iran has sought greater influence on the Arabian Peninsula since the
rule of the Shah. More recently, it has struggled to create a sphere of
influence stretching from Iran to the Mediterranean Sea. The survival of
the al Assad government in Syria and the success of a pro-Iranian
government in Iraq would create that Iranian sphere of influence, given
the strength of Hezbollah in Lebanon and the ability of al Assad's Syria
to project its power.

For a while, it appeared that this strategy had been blocked by the
near collapse of the al Assad government in 2012 and the creation of an
Iraqi government that appeared to be relatively successful and was far
from being an Iranian puppet. These developments, coupled with Western sanctions, placed Iran on the defensive, and the idea of an Iranian sphere of influence appeared to have become merely a dream.

However, paradoxically, the rise of the Islamic State has reinvigorated Iranian power in two ways. First, while the propaganda of the Islamic State is
horrific and designed to make the group look not only terrifying, but
also enormously powerful, the truth is that, although it is not weak,
the Islamic State represents merely a fraction of Iraq's Sunni
community, and the Sunnis are a minority in Iraq. At the same time, the
propaganda has mobilized the Shiite community to resist the Islamic
State, allowed Iranian advisers to effectively manage the Shiite
militias in Iraq and (to some extent) the Iraqi army, and forced the
United States to use its airpower in tandem with Iranian-led ground forces.
Given the American strategy of blocking the Islamic State — even if
doing so requires cooperation with Iran — while not putting forces on
the ground, this means that as the Islamic State's underlying weakness
becomes more of a factor, the default winner in Iraq will be Iran.

A somewhat similar situation exists in Syria, though with a different
demographic. Iran and Russia have historically supported the al Assad
government. The Iranians have been the more important supporters,
particularly because they committed their ally, Hezbollah, to the
battle. What once appeared to be a lost cause is now far from it. The
United States was extremely hostile toward al Assad, but given the
current alternatives in Syria, Washington has become at least neutral
toward the Syrian government. Al Assad would undoubtedly like to have
U.S. neutrality translate into a direct dialogue with Washington.
Regardless of the outcome, Iran has the means to maintain its influence
in Syria.

When you look at a map and
think of the situation in Yemen, you get a sense of why the Saudis and
Gulf Cooperation Council countries had to do something. Given what is
happening along the northern border of the Arabian Peninsula, the Saudis
have to calculate the possibility of an al-Houthi victory establishing a
pro-Iranian, Shiite state to its south as well. The Saudis and the Gulf
countries would be facing the possibility of a Shiite or Iranian
encirclement. These are not the same thing, but they are linked in
complex ways. Working in the Saudis' favor is the fact that the
al-Houthis are not Shiite proxies like Hezbollah, and Saudi money
combined with military operations designed to cut off Iranian supply
lines to the al-Houthis could mitigate the threat overall. Either way,
the Saudis had to act.

During the Arab Spring, one of the nearly successful attempts to topple a government occurred in Bahrain.
The uprising failed primarily because Saudi Arabia intervened and
imposed its will on the country. The Saudis showed themselves to be
extremely sensitive to the rise of Shiite regimes with close relations
with the Iranians on the Arabian Peninsula. The result was unilateral
intervention and suppression. Whatever the moral issues, it is clear
that the Saudis are frightened by rising Iranian and Shiite power and
are willing to use their strength. That is what they have done in Yemen.

In a way, the issue is simple for the Saudis. They represent the
center of gravity of the religious Sunni world. As such, they and their
allies have embarked on a strategy that is strategically defensive and
tactically offensive. Their goal is to block Iranian and Shiite
influence, and the means they are implementing is coalition warfare that
uses air power to support local forces on the ground. Unless there is a
full invasion of Yemen, the Saudis are following the American strategy
of the 2000s on a smaller scale.

The U.S. Stance

The American strategy is more complex. As I've written before, the United States has undertaken a strategy focused on maintaining the balance of power.
This kind of approach is always messy because the goal is not to
support any particular power, but to maintain a balance between multiple
powers.

Therefore, the United States is providing intelligence and
mission planning for the Saudi coalition against the al-Houthis and
their Iranian allies. In Iraq, the United States is providing support to
Shiites — and by extension, their allies — by bombing Islamic State
installations. In Syria, U.S. strategy is so complex that it defies
clear explanation. That is the nature of refusing large-scale
intervention but being committed to a balance of power. The United
States can oppose Iran in one theater and support it in another. The
more simplistic models of the Cold War are not relevant here.

All of this is happening at the same time that nuclear negotiations appear to be coming to some sort of closure.
The United States is not really concerned about Iran's nuclear weapons.
As I have said many times, we have heard since the mid-2000s that Iran
was a year or two away from nuclear weapons. Each year, the fateful date
was pushed back. Building deliverable nuclear weapons is difficult, and
the Iranians have not even carried out a nuclear test, an essential
step before a deliverable weapon is created. What was a major issue a
few years ago is now part of a constellation of issues where
U.S.-Iranian relations interact, support and contradict. Deal or no
deal, the United States will bomb the Islamic State, which will help
Iran, and support the Saudis in Yemen, which will not.

The real issue now is what it was a few years ago: Iran appears to be
building a sphere of influence to the Mediterranean Sea, but this time,
that sphere of influence potentially includes Yemen. That, in turn,
creates a threat to the Arabian Peninsula from two directions. The
Iranians are trying to place a vise around it. The Saudis must react,
but the question is whether airstrikes are capable of stopping the
al-Houthis. They are a relatively low-cost way to wage war, but they
fail frequently. The first question is what the Saudis will do then. The
second question is what the Americans will do. The current doctrine
requires a balance between Iran and Saudi Arabia, with the United States
tilting back and forth. Under this doctrine — and in this military
reality — the United States cannot afford full-scale engagement on the
ground in Iraq.

Turkey's Role

Relatively silent but absolutely vital to this tale is Turkey. It has the largest economy in the region and
has the largest army, although just how good its army is can be
debated. Turkey is watching chaos along its southern border, rising tension in the Caucasus, and conflict across the Black Sea.
Of all these, Syria and Iraq and the potential rise of Iranian power is
the most disturbing. Turkey has said little about Iran of late, but
last week Ankara suddenly criticized Tehran and accused Iran of trying
to dominate the region. Turkey frequently says things without doing
anything, but the development is still noteworthy.

It should be remembered that Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has hoped to see Turkey as a regional leader and
the leader of the Sunni world. With the Saudis taking an active role
and the Turks doing little in Syria or Iraq, the moment is passing
Turkey by. Such moments come and go, so history is not changed. But
Turkey is still the major Sunni power and the third leg of the regional
balance involving Saudi Arabia and Iran.

The evolution of Turkey would be the critical step in the emergence
of a regional balance of power, in which local powers, not the United
Kingdom or the United States, determine the outcome. The American role,
like the British role before it, would not be directly waging war in the
region but providing aid designed to stabilize the balance of power.
That can be seen in Yemen or Iraq. It is extremely complex and not
suited for simplistic or ideological analysis. But it is here, it is
unfolding and it will represent the next generation of Middle Eastern
dynamics. And if the Iranians put aside their theoretical nuclear
weapons and focus on this, that will draw in the Turks and round out the
balance of power.

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18 years old, having cleaned out my HS library, I concluded the only ambition worth having was becoming a great genius. An inner voice cheered. Yet it is my path I have shared much to the Human Gesalt. Mar 2017 - 4.56 Mil Pg Views, March 2013 - Posted my paper introducing CLOUD COSMOLOGY & NEUTRAL NEUTRINO described as the SPACE TIME PENDULUM. Sep 2010 -My essay titled A NEW METRIC WITH APPLICATIONS TO PHYSICS AND SOLVING CERTAIN HIGHER ORDERED DIFFERENTIAL EQUATIONS has been published in Physics Essays(AIP) June 2010 quarterly. 40 years ago I took an honors degree in applied mathematics from the University of Waterloo. My interest was Relativity and my last year there saw me complete a 900 level course under Hanno Rund on his work in Relativity. I continued researching new ideas and knowledge since that time and I have prepared a book for publication titled Paradigms Shift. I maintain my blog as a day book and research tool to retain data, record impressions, interpretations and to introduce new insights to readers.