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Testimony before the Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign
Affairs, Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, House of
Representatives:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
For Release on Delivery:
Expected at 2:00 p.m. EDT:
Wednesday, July 28, 2010:
National Security:
Interagency Collaboration Practices and Challenges at DOD's Southern
and Africa Commands:
Statement of John H. Pendleton, Director:
Defense Capabilities and Management:
GAO-10-962T:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-10-962T, a testimony before the Subcommittee on
National Security and Foreign Affairs, Committee on Oversight and
Government Reform, House of Representatives.
Why GAO Did This Study:
Recognizing the limits of military power in todayís security
environment, the Department of Defense (DOD) is collaborating with
other U.S. federal agencies to achieve its missions around the world.
DODís combatant commands, such as U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) and
U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM), play key roles in this effort. Both aim
to build partner nation capacity and perform humanitarian assistance,
while standing ready to perform a variety of military operations.
Among its missions, SOUTHCOM supports U.S. law enforcement and
intelligence agencies in the Americas and Caribbean in disrupting
illicit trafficking and narco-terrorism. As DODís newest command,
AFRICOM works with U.S. diplomacy and development agencies on
activities such as maritime security and pandemic response efforts.
Today GAO issued reports that the subcommittee requested on SOUTHCOM
(GAO-10-801) and AFRICOM (GAO-10-794), which in part evaluated how
each collaborates with U.S. interagency partners. This testimony
summarizes that work and provides observations from ongoing work on
U.S. counterpiracy efforts by focusing on 3 key areas essential for
interagency collaboration.
What GAO Found:
GAOís work has shown that developing overarching strategies, creating
collaborative organizations, and building a workforce that understands
how to fully engage partners are key areas where agencies can enhance
interagency collaboration on national security issues. GAO found that
DODís SOUTHCOM and AFRICOM have demonstrated some practices that will
help enhance and sustain collaboration, but areas for improvement
remain.
* Overarching strategies: SOUTHCOM and AFRICOM have sought input from
several federal agencies in creating their theater campaign plans,
which outline command priorities, and for other strategies and plans.
However, AFRICOM has not completed plans that detail its activities by
country and that align with embassy strategic plans to ensure U.S.
government unity of effort in Africa. Also, GAOís preliminary work
indicates that a U.S. action plan provides a framework for interagency
collaboration to counter piracy in the Horn of Africa region, but the
plan does not assign agencies their roles or responsibilities for the
majority of tasks in the plan.
* Collaborative organizations: Both commands have organizational
structures that encourage interagency involvement in their missions.
Each has a military deputy commander to oversee military operations
and a civilian deputy to the commander from the State Department to
oversee civil-military activities. Both commands also embed
interagency officials within their organizations, but limited
resources at other federal agencies have prevented interagency
personnel from participating at the numbers desired. However, AFRICOM
has struggled to fully leverage the expertise of embedded officials.
Moreover, while SOUTHCOMís organizational structure was designed to
facilitate interagency collaboration, the 2010 Haiti earthquake
response revealed weaknesses in this structure that initially hindered
its efforts to conduct a large-scale military operation.
* Well-trained workforce: AFRICOM has emphasized the need to work
closely with U.S. embassies to ensure that activities are consistent
with U.S. foreign policy and to contribute to a unity of effort among
interagency partners. In addition, the command has designated cultural
awareness as a core competency for its staff. However, some AFRICOM
staff have limited knowledge about working with U.S. embassies and
about cultural issues in Africa, which has resulted in some cultural
missteps. Further, limited training is available to enhance personnel
expertise. While GAOís work on SOUTHCOM did not focus on training,
personnel from the command also expressed the need for more
opportunities to improve their understanding of working in an
interagency environment.
What GAO Recommends:
GAO made recommendations to the commands aimed at improving their
capabilities to perform their missions through the development of
plans and training. DOD agreed with the recommendations.
View [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-962T] or key
components. For more information, contact John H. Pendleton at (202)
512-3489 or pendletonj@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:
I am pleased to be here today to discuss some of the ways that the
Department of Defense (DOD) is collaborating with other U.S. federal
government agencies to carry out its missions around the world. Recent
terrorist events and lessons learned from the ongoing wars in Iraq and
Afghanistan illustrate that today's global security challenges have
expanded beyond the traditional threats of the Cold War era. These new
threats can be unconventional and ambiguous, requiring enhanced
collaboration with interagency partners and other stakeholders. For
its part, DOD recognizes the limits of traditional military power in
today's security environment, which consists of a wide-range of
challenges (e.g., terrorism, illicit trafficking, organized crime,
piracy) that are often exacerbated by conditions of poverty and
profound cultural and demographic tensions. The military's approach to
these challenges requires increased collaboration with interagency
partners such as the Department of State (State) and the U.S. Agency
for International Development (USAID), with DOD often serving in a
supporting role to other federal agencies.
Two of DOD's geographic combatant commands, U.S. Southern Command
(SOUTHCOM) and U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM), play key roles in this
effort outside of the United States. Both SOUTHCOM and AFRICOM aim to
build partner nation capacity and conduct humanitarian assistance
projects, while standing ready to perform a variety of military
operations, as directed. Among its missions, SOUTHCOM supports U.S.
law enforcement and intelligence agencies in the Americas and the
Caribbean in disrupting illicit trafficking and narco-terrorism.
Having reorganized in 2008, in part to focus on interagency
collaboration, SOUTHCOM has been viewed as having mature interagency
processes and coordinating mechanisms. AFRICOM, as DOD's newest
combatant command, works with U.S. diplomacy and development agencies
on activities ranging from maritime security to pandemic response
efforts on the African continent.[Footnote 1] The 2008 National
Defense Strategy cites both SOUTHCOM and AFRICOM as pointing the way
toward a whole-of-government approach to achieving common goals.
Today we issued the reports you requested on SOUTHCOM and AFRICOM,
which in part evaluated how each command collaborates with interagency
partners.[Footnote 2] In addition, last September we issued a report
on key issues and actions needed to enhance interagency collaboration
on national security for Congress and the administration to consider
in their oversight and management agendas.[Footnote 3] My statement
today discusses findings from our SOUTHCOM and AFRICOM reviews in
three areas essential for interagency collaboration. In addition, the
statement provides some preliminary information from our ongoing
review of counterpiracy efforts in the Horn of Africa region that was
also requested by the subcommittee and will be completed later this
year.
This statement is based largely on completed GAO work, which was
performed in accordance with generally accepted government auditing
standards. To conduct our work, we reviewed relevant documents,
analyzed data, traveled to the regions, and interviewed officials from
various agencies including the Departments of Defense, Homeland
Security, Justice, State, Transportation, the Treasury, and the U.S.
Agency for International Development. Additional information about our
scope and methodology for our AFRICOM and SOUTHCOM work can be found
within the full reports.
Key Areas for Interagency Collaboration:
Our body of work on interagency collaboration has identified several
key areas that are essential for collaboration among U.S. federal
agencies in addressing security challenges. Three are particularly
important for SOUTHCOM and AFRICOM: (1) developing and implementing
overarching strategies, (2) creating collaborative organizations, and
(3) building a well-trained workforce. Underlying the success of these
key areas is committed and effective leadership.
* Developing and implementing overarching strategies: Our prior work,
as well as that by national security experts, has found that strategic
direction is required as a foundation for collaboration on national
security goals. The means to operate across multiple agencies and
organizations--such as compatible policies and procedures that
facilitate collaboration across agencies and mechanisms to share
information frequently--enhances and sustains collaboration among
federal agencies. Strategies can help agencies develop mutually
reinforcing plans and determine activities, resources, processes, and
performance measures for implementing those strategies. Moreover, a
strategy defining organizational roles and responsibilities can help
agencies clarify who will lead or participate in activities, help
organize their joint and individual efforts, facilitate decision
making, and address how conflicts would be resolved.
* Creating collaborative organizations: Given the differences among
U.S. government agencies--such as differences in structure, planning
processes, and funding sources--developing adequate coordination
mechanisms is critical to achieving integrated approaches. U.S.
government agencies, such as DOD, State, and USAID, among others,
spend billions of dollars annually on various defense, diplomatic, and
development missions in support of national security. Without
coordination mechanisms, the results can be a patchwork of activities
that waste scarce funds and limit the overall effectiveness of federal
efforts.
* Developing a well-trained workforce: Collaborative approaches to
national security require a well-trained workforce with the skills and
experience to integrate the government's diverse capabilities and
resources. A lack of understanding of other agencies' cultures,
processes, and core capabilities can hamper U.S. national security
partners' ability to work together effectively. However, training can
help personnel develop the skills and understanding of other agencies'
capabilities needed to facilitate interagency collaboration.
Effective leadership is essential to achieving success in each of
these areas. The 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review states that by
integrating U.S. defense capabilities with other elements of national
security--including diplomacy, development, law enforcement, trade,
and intelligence--the nation can ensure that the right mix of
expertise is at hand to take advantage of emerging opportunities and
to thwart potential threats. In addition, the 2010 National Security
Strategy calls for a renewed emphasis on building a stronger
leadership foundation for the long term to more effectively advance
U.S. interests.
Interagency Practices and Challenges at SOUTHCOM and AFRICOM, and with
U.S. Counterpiracy Efforts:
Our work on SOUTHCOM and AFRICOM found that both commands have
demonstrated some practices that will help enhance and sustain
interagency collaboration, but areas for improvement remain. Moreover,
our preliminary work on counterpiracy efforts in the Horn of Africa
region suggests that U.S. agencies have made progress in leading and
supporting international efforts to counter piracy, but implementation
challenges exist.
Interagency Partners Have Helped Develop Strategies and Plans, but
Some Remain Unfinished at AFRICOM and for Counterpiracy Efforts:
SOUTHCOM and AFRICOM have sought input from several federal agencies
in developing overarching strategies and plans, but AFRICOM has not
yet completed many specific plans to guide activities and ensure a
U.S. government unity of effort in Africa. In addition, our
preliminary work shows that a U.S. action plan has been developed
which provides a framework for interagency collaboration, but the
roles and responsibilities of the multiples agencies involved in
countering piracy in the Horn of Africa region are not clearly
assigned.
Commands Have Engaged Interagency Partners in Developing Strategies
and Plans:
In its Guidance for Employment of the Force,[Footnote 4] DOD required
both SOUTHCOM and AFRICOM, as prototype test cases, to seek broader
involvement from other departments in drafting their theater campaign
and contingency plans. To meet this requirement, SOUTHCOM held a
series of meetings with interagency officials that focused on
involving and gathering input from interagency partners. In developing
its 2009 theater campaign plan, which lays out command priorities and
guides its resource allocations, SOUTHCOM coordinated with over 10
U.S. government departments and offices, including the Departments of
State, Homeland Security, Justice, the Treasury, Commerce, and
Transportation and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence
(see figure 1). According to both SOUTHCOM and interagency partners,
this coordination helped SOUTHCOM understand the diverse missions of
its interagency partners and better align activities and resources in
the Americas and the Caribbean. As a result of this effort, SOUTHCOM's
2009 theater campaign plan includes 30 theater objectives, of which 22
are led by interagency partners with SOUTHCOM serving in a supporting
role. SOUTHCOM also provides input into State's regional strategic
plans. Both SOUTHCOM and interagency partners told us that this
coordination has helped ensure that SOUTHCOM and interagency partner
strategic goals were mutually reinforcing and has helped align
activities and resources in achieving broad U.S. objectives.
Figure 1: Partners from which SOUTHCOM Received Input during
Development of the 2009 Theater Campaign Plan:
[Refer to PDF for image: illustration]
2009 Theater Campaign Plan: Input received from:
* Department of Commerce;
* Department of Energy;
* Department of Homeland Security;
* Department of Justice;
* Department of State;
* Department of Transportation;
* Department of the Treasury;
* Environmental Protection Agency;
* Office of Director of National Intelligence;
* U.S. Agency for International Development.
Source: Joint Operational War Plans Division, Joint Staff.
[End of figure]
Similarly, AFRICOM met with representatives from many agencies to gain
interagency input into its theater campaign plan. We spoke with
officials from State, USAID, and the U.S. Coast Guard who stated that
they provided input into several additional strategy documents,
including DOD's Guidance for Employment of the Force and AFRICOM's
posture statement, and participated in activity planning meetings.
Federal agency officials also noted progress in AFRICOM's interagency
coordination since its establishment. State officials said that
AFRICOM had made improvements in taking their feedback and creating an
environment that is conducive to cooperation across agencies.
Similarly, USAID officials said that AFRICOM had improved its
coordination with their agency at the USAID headquarters level.
Notwithstanding this collaboration, AFRICOM officials told us that
aligning strategies among partners can be difficult because of
different planning horizons among agencies. For example, AFRICOM's
theater campaign plan covers fiscal years 2010 through 2014, whereas
the State/USAID strategic plan spans fiscal years 2007 through 2012.
Some AFRICOM Plans Remain Unfinished, Which Hinders Unity of Effort:
While AFRICOM has collaborated with partners on overarching
strategies, it has not yet completed some plans, which hinders
planning and implementation efforts with partners. AFRICOM currently
lacks regional engagement and country work plans for Africa, which are
called for in its theater campaign plan and would provide specific
information on conducting activities. One key requirement for the
country work plans, for example, is to align them with embassy
strategic plans to ensure unity of effort. Figure 2 shows AFRICOM's
plans in the context of national strategies, guidance, and other
federal agencies' planning efforts.
Figure 2: AFRICOM Strategic Guidance and Plans:
[Refer to PDF for image: illustration]
National strategies and guidance:
National Security Strategy and National Security Presidential
Directive-50 (Completed plan);
National Defense Strategy (Completed plan);
National Military Strategy (Completed plan);
Guidance for Employment of the Force (Completed plan);
Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (Completed plan).
Command vision and strategy:
Commanderís Vision (Completed plan);
AFRICOM Theater Strategy (Completed plan);
Non-DOD documents:
- State/USAID Joint Strategic Plan (Completed plan);
- State Africa Bureau Strategic Plan (Completed plan);
- USAID Strategic Framework for Africa (Completed plan).
Campaign plan and supporting plans:
AFRICOM Theater Campaign Plan (Completed plan):
- U.S. Air Force Africa Support Plan (Draft or uncompleted plan);
- U.S. Navy Africa Support Plan (Draft or uncompleted plan);
- U.S. Marine Corps Africa Support Plan (Draft or uncompleted plan);
- U.S. Army Africa Support Plan (Draft or uncompleted plan);
- Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa Support Plan (Draft or
uncompleted plan);
- U.S. Special Operations Command Africa Support Plan (Draft or
uncompleted plan).
Regional engagement plans:
Southern Regional Engagement Plan (Draft or uncompleted plan);
Central Regional Engagement Plan (Draft or uncompleted plan);
North Regional Engagement Plan (Draft or uncompleted plan);
West Regional Engagement Plan (Draft or uncompleted plan);
East Regional Engagement Plan (Draft or uncompleted plan).
Contingency and other plans:
Country Work Plans (Draft or uncompleted plan);
Non-DOD documents:
- Embassy Mission Strategic and Resource Plans (Completed plan).
(Draft or uncompleted plan)
Source: GAO presentation of DOD data.
[End of figure]
AFRICOM's Army component stated that perhaps the greatest challenge to
creating positive conditions in Africa is ensuring that U.S. defense
efforts remain synchronized; if plans are not coordinated, their
efforts could have unintended consequences, such as the potential for
Africans to perceive the U.S. military as trying to influence public
opinion in a region sensitive to the military's presence. At the time
we completed our audit work, AFRICOM's regional plans had not been
approved by the command, and the country plans were still in the
process of being developed. Therefore, we recommended that the
Secretary of Defense direct AFRICOM to expedite the completion of its
plans and to develop a process whereby plans are reviewed on a
recurring basis to ensure that efforts across the command are
complementary, comprehensive, and supportive of AFRICOM's mission.
[Footnote 5] DOD agreed with our recommendation, stating that some of
the plans are in the final stages of review and approval by AFRICOM's
leadership.
U.S. Government Has Action Plan to Counter Piracy, but Agencies' Roles
and Responsibilities Are Not Clearly Defined:
Our preliminary work on U.S. counterpiracy efforts off the Horn of
Africa shows that the United States has an action plan that serves as
an overarching strategy and provides a framework for interagency
collaboration, but roles and responsibilities have not been clearly
assigned. The action plan establishes three main lines of action for
interagency stakeholders, in collaboration with industry and
international partners, to take in countering piracy. These actions
are (1) prevent pirate attacks by reducing the vulnerability of the
maritime domain to piracy; (2) interrupt and terminate acts of piracy,
consistent with international law and the rights and responsibilities
of coastal and flag states; and (3) ensure that those who commit acts
of piracy are held accountable for their actions by facilitating the
prosecution of suspected pirates by flag, victim, and coastal states
and, in appropriate cases, the United States.
Figure 3: Search and Seizure Team Boarding a Suspicious Boat in the
Indian Ocean:
[Refer to PDF for image: photograph]
Source: U.S. Navy.
[End of figure]
While piracy in the Horn of Africa region emanates primarily from
Somalia, a country located within AFRICOM's area of responsibility,
most attacks are carried out in waters within U.S. Central Command's
jurisdiction. Outside DOD, many other stakeholders are involved in
counterpiracy efforts. Specifically, the action plan states that,
subject to the availability of resources, the Departments of State,
Defense, Homeland Security, Justice, Transportation, and the Treasury
and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence shall also
contribute to, coordinate, and undertake initiatives. Our preliminary
work indicates that the National Security Council, which authored the
plan, has not assigned the majority of tasks outlined in the plan to
specific agencies. As of July 2010, only one task, providing an
interdiction-capable presence, had been assigned to the Navy and Coast
Guard. Roles and responsibilities for other tasks--such as strategic
communications, disrupting pirate revenue, and facilitating
prosecution of suspected pirates--have not been clearly assigned.
Without specific roles and responsibilities for essential tasks
outlined in the action plan, the U.S. government cannot ensure that
agencies' approaches are comprehensive, complementary, and effectively
coordinated.
Commands Have Developed Structures to Facilitate Interagency
Collaboration, but Organizational Challenges Remain at Both Commands:
SOUTHCOM and AFRICOM have developed organizational structures to
facilitate interagency collaboration, but challenges include fully
leveraging interagency personnel and maintaining the ability to
organize quickly for large-scale military operations when necessary.
Commands Have Established Organizational Structures That Facilitate
Interagency Collaboration:
Both commands have established key leadership positions for
interagency officials within their organizational structures. In
addition to a deputy military commander who oversees military
operations, each command has a civilian deputy to the commander from
State who oversees civil-military activities. At SOUTHCOM, the
civilian deputy to the commander--a senior foreign service officer
with the rank of Minister Counselor at State--advises SOUTHCOM's
commander on foreign policy issues and serves as the primary liaison
with State and with U.S. embassies located in SOUTHCOM's area of
responsibility. At AFRICOM, the civilian deputy to the commander
directs AFRICOM's activities related to areas such as health,
humanitarian assistance, disaster response, and peace support
operations.
Both commands have also embedded interagency officials throughout
their organizations. As of June 2010, AFRICOM reported that it had
embedded 27 interagency partners into its headquarters staff from
several federal agencies (see table 1), and according to officials at
AFRICOM and State, it plans to integrate five foreign policy advisors
from State later this year. Moreover, DOD has signed memorandums of
understanding with nine federal agencies to outline conditions for
sending interagency partners to AFRICOM. As of July 2010, SOUTHCOM
reported that it had 20 embedded interagency officials (see table 1),
with several placed directly into key senior leadership positions.
SOUTHCOM has also created a partnering directorate, which among its
responsibilities, has the role of embedding interagency personnel into
the command. Decisions to embed interagency officials at SOUTHCOM are
made on a case-by-case basis, with most agencies sending a
representative to SOUTHCOM on a short-term basis to discuss needs,
roles, and responsibilities and to assess whether a full-time embedded
official would be mutually beneficial.
Table 1: Reported Number of Embedded Interagency Personnel at AFRICOM
and SOUTHCOM Headquarters:
Agency: Department of State;
AFRICOM: 5;
SOUTHCOM: 5.
Agency: U.S. Agency for International Development;
AFRICOM: 2;
SOUTHCOM: 3.
Agency: Department of Homeland Security;
AFRICOM: 6;
SOUTHCOM: 5.
Agency: Office of the Director of National Intelligence;
AFRICOM: 4;
SOUTHCOM: 3.
Agency: Department of Justice;
AFRICOM: 3;
SOUTHCOM: 4.
Agency: Department of the Treasury;
AFRICOM: 2;
SOUTHCOM: [Empty].
Agency: Department of Energy;
AFRICOM: 1;
SOUTHCOM: [Empty].
Agency: National Security Agency;
AFRICOM: 4;
SOUTHCOM: [Empty].
Agency: Total;
AFRICOM: 27;
SOUTHCOM: 20.
Agency: Percentage of command's headquarters staff[A];
AFRICOM: 2%;
SOUTHCOM: 3%.
Source: GAO presentation of SOUTHCOM and AFRICOM data.
Note: Data from AFRICOM are as of June 2010. Data from SOUTHCOM are as
of July 2010.
[A] SOUTHCOM's total number of headquarters' personnel provided to us
was approximate; thus, the 3 percent in this table is also
approximate. Further, percentages in this table have been rounded.
[End of table]
Both AFRICOM and SOUTHCOM have indicated that they currently do not
have a specific requirement for the number of embedded interagency
personnel at their commands but would benefit from additional
personnel. However, limited resources at other federal agencies have
prevented interagency personnel from participating in the numbers
desired. In February 2009, we reported that AFRICOM initially expected
to fill 52 positions with personnel from other government agencies.
[Footnote 6] However, State officials told us that they would not
likely be able to provide employees to fill the positions requested by
AFRICOM because they were already facing a 25 percent shortfall in
midlevel personnel. Similarly, SOUTHCOM has identified the need for
around 40 interagency personnel, but had only filled 20 of those
positions as of July 2010. According to SOUTHCOM officials, it has
taken about 3 years to fill its interagency positions because of lack
of funding at the command or the inability of partners to provide
personnel. Because many agencies have limited personnel and resources,
SOUTHCOM and its interagency partners have, on occasion, developed
other means to gain stakeholder input and perspectives. For example,
in lieu of embedding a Department of the Treasury (Treasury) official
at the command, SOUTHCOM and Treasury decided that providing a local
Treasury representative with access to the command and establishing a
memorandum of understanding would serve to improve communication and
coordination among the organizations.
AFRICOM May Not Fully Leverage Expertise of Interagency Partners:
While embedding interagency personnel into a DOD command can be an
effective means of coordination, interagency personnel serving at
AFRICOM may not be fully leveraged for their expertise within the
organization. AFRICOM officials told us that it is a challenge to
determine where in the command to include interagency personnel. For
example, an embedded interagency staff member stated that AFRICOM
initially placed him in a directorate unrelated to his skill set, and
he initiated a transfer to another directorate that would better
enable him to share his expertise. Moreover, several embedded
interagency officials said that there is little incentive to take a
position at AFRICOM because it will not enhance one's career position
upon return to the original agency after the rotation.
Difficulties with leveraging interagency personnel are not unique to
AFRICOM. We have previously reported that personnel systems often do
not recognize or reward interagency collaboration, which could
diminish interest in serving in interagency efforts.[Footnote 7]
AFRICOM officials said that it would be helpful to have additional
interagency personnel at the command, but they understand that
staffing limitations, resource imbalances, and lack of career
progression incentives for embedded staff from other federal agencies
may limit the number of personnel who can be brought in from these
agencies. Despite challenges, AFRICOM has made some efforts that could
improve interagency collaboration within the command, such as
expanding its interagency orientation process. Last fall, the command
conducted an assessment of the embedded interagency process to analyze
successes and identify lessons learned, including recommendations on
how to integrate interagency personnel into command planning and
operations. In July 2010, AFRICOM stated that it had established an
interagency collaborative forum to assess, prioritize, and implement
the recommendations from the assessment.
Haiti Response Revealed Weaknesses in SOUTHCOM's Organizational
Structure:
SOUTHCOM's recent experience in responding to the Haiti earthquake
serves as a reminder that while interagency collaboration is important
in addressing security challenges, DOD's commands must also be
prepared to respond to a wide range of contingencies, including large-
scale disaster relief operations. While our work found that SOUTHCOM
has taken significant steps in building partnerships to enhance and
sustain collaboration, the command faces challenges preparing for the
divergent needs of its potential missions. SOUTHCOM must have an
organizational structure that is prepared for military contingencies
and that is also effective in supporting interagency partners in
meeting challenges such as corruption, crime, and poverty.
In 2008, SOUTHCOM developed an organizational structure to improve
collaboration with interagency stakeholders, which included a civilian
deputy to the commander, interagency partners embedded into key
leadership positions, and a directorate focused on sustaining
partnerships. While SOUTHCOM's organizational structure was designed
to facilitate interagency collaboration, the 2010 Haiti earthquake
response revealed weaknesses in this structure that initially hindered
its efforts to conduct a large-scale military operation. For example,
the command's structure lacked a division to address planning for
military operations occurring over 30 days to 1 year in duration. In
addition, SOUTHCOM had suboptimized some core functions that were
necessary to respond to large-scale contingencies. For example,
SOUTHCOM's logistics function was suboptimized because it was placed
under another directorate in the organizational structure rather than
being its own core function. As a result, the command had difficulty
planning for the required logistics support--including supply,
maintenance, deployment distribution, health support, and engineering--
during the large-scale Haiti relief effort, which SOUTHCOM reported
peaked at more than 20,000 deployed military personnel, about 2 weeks
after the earthquake occurred (see figure 4).
Figure 4: Reported Buildup of Military Forces Supporting Relief
Efforts in Haiti as Part of Operation Unified Response in January 2010:
[Refer to PDF for image: line graph]
Date: January 16;
Number of personnel: 5,040.
Date: January 17;
Number of personnel: 6,038.
Date: January 18;
Number of personnel: 11,706.
Date: January 19;
Number of personnel: 11,524.
Date: January 20;
Number of personnel: 12,963.
Date: January 21;
Number of personnel: 13,101.
Date: January 22;
Number of personnel: 13,656.
Date: January 23;
Number of personnel: 18,163.
Date: January 24;
Number of personnel: 17,850.
Date: January 25;
Number of personnel: 18,346.
Date: January 26;
Number of personnel: 18,325.
Date: January 27;
Number of personnel: 19,732.
Date: January 28;
Number of personnel: 20,934.
Date: January 29;
Number of personnel: 20,413.
Date: January 30;
Number of personnel: 20,320.
Date: January 31;
Number of personnel: 20,448.
Source: SOUTHCOM.
[End of figure]
According to command officials, SOUTHCOM was able to integrate
additional interagency and international partners into its
headquarters as Haiti relief operations grew in scale; however, the
command had not identified the military personnel augmentation
required for a large contingency nor had it developed a plan to
integrate military personnel into its headquarters structure.
Ultimately, SOUTHCOM received 500 military augmentees to provide
additional capabilities to its existing command staff of about 800,
including an entire staff office from U.S. Northern Command, filling
vital gaps in SOUTHCOM's ability to support operations in Haiti.
However, augmented military personnel were not familiar with
SOUTHCOM's organizational structure and did not initially understand
where they could best contribute because many of the traditional joint
staff functions were divided among SOUTHCOM's directorates. To address
these challenges, SOUTHCOM's commander returned the command to a
traditional joint staff structure while retaining elements from its
2008 reorganization and plans to retain this structure for the
foreseeable future.[Footnote 8]
Our report made recommendations aimed at improving SOUTHCOM's ability
to conduct the full range of military missions that may be required in
the region, while balancing its efforts to support interagency
partners in enhancing regional security and cooperation.[Footnote 9]
DOD acknowledged the challenges it had faced and agreed with our
recommendations. In its response, the department noted that SOUTHCOM's
ability to respond to the Haiti crisis quickly was in part a by-
product of close, collaborative relationships developed with a range
of U.S. government interagency partners over many years.
AFRICOM Staff Could Benefit from More Comprehensive Training or
Guidance on Working with Interagency Officials in Africa:
AFRICOM, as a relatively new command engaged in capacity-building
efforts, has emphasized the need to work closely with U.S. embassies
to ensure that activities are consistent with U.S. foreign policy and
to contribute to a unity of effort among interagency partners (see
figure 5). In addition, the command has designated cultural awareness
as a core competency for its staff. However, we found that some
AFRICOM staff have limited knowledge about working with U.S. embassies
and about cultural issues in Africa, and the training or guidance
available to augment personnel expertise in these areas is limited.
While AFRICOM has efforts under way to strengthen staff expertise in
these areas, the limited knowledge among some staff puts AFRICOM at
risk of being unable to fully leverage resources with U.S. embassy
personnel, build relationships with African nations, and effectively
carry out activities.
Figure 5: AFRICOM Staff Work with Interagency and International
Partners at a Pandemic Response Exercise in Uganda in 2009:
[Refer to PDF for image: photograph]
Source: GAO.
[End of figure]
AFRICOM emphasizes the importance of collaborating with its
interagency partners, but some personnel's limited knowledge of
working with U.S. embassies can impose burdens on embassies' staff who
may be taken away from their assigned duties to help AFRICOM. For
example, a U.S. embassy official in Uganda stated that AFRICOM
personnel arrived in country with the expectations that the embassy
would take care of basic cultural and logistical issues for them.
Also, AFRICOM's Horn of Africa task force personnel have, at times,
approached the Djiboutian government ministries directly with concepts
for activities rather than following the established procedure of
having the U.S. embassy in Djibouti initiate the contact.
Additionally, while cultural awareness is a core competency for
AFRICOM, the limited knowledge of some personnel in the command and
its military service components regarding Africa cultural issues has
occasionally led to difficulties in building relationships with
African nations--such as when AFRICOM's task force distributed used
clothing to local Djibouti villagers during Ramadan, which offended
the Muslim population, or proposed drilling a well without considering
how its placement could affect local clan relationships.
While AFRICOM personnel and forces deploying for activities receive
some training on working with interagency partners and on African
cultural awareness--and efforts are under way to increase training for
some personnel--our review of training presentations indicated that
they were insufficient to adequately build the skills of its staff.
AFRICOM officials told us that training includes Web courses and
seminars, and that there are other training requirements for personnel
deploying to Africa such as medical and cultural awareness training.
Officials said, however, that while training is encouraged, it is not
required, and that the command does not currently monitor the
completion of training courses. Furthermore, officials from several
AFRICOM components voiced a preference for more cultural training and
capabilities.
In our prior work on AFRICOM's Horn of Africa task force, we similarly
reported that the task force's training on working with U.S. embassies
was not shared with all staff, and cultural awareness training was
limited.[Footnote 10] We recommended, and DOD agreed, that the
Secretary of Defense direct AFRICOM to develop comprehensive training
guidance or a program that augments assigned personnel's understanding
of African cultural awareness and working with interagency partners.
In addition, in our report on AFRICOM released today, we recommended
that the Secretary of Defense direct AFRICOM, in consultation with
State and USAID, to develop a comprehensive training program for staff
and forces involved in AFRICOM activities that focuses on working with
interagency partners and on cultural issues related to
Africa.[Footnote 11] DOD agreed with the recommendation, describing
some efforts that AFRICOM was taking and stating that the command will
continue to develop and conduct training to improve its ability to
work with embassies and other agencies. While our work on SOUTHCOM did
not focus on workforce training, command personnel have expressed the
need for more opportunities to improve their understanding of working
in an interagency environment.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my prepared remarks. I would be pleased
to respond to any questions you or other Members of the Subcommittee
may have at this time.
For future information regarding this statement, please contact John
H. Pendleton at (202) 512-3489 or pendletonj@gao.gov. Contact points
for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be
found on the last page of this statement. Key contributors to this
statement are listed in appendix I.
[End of section]
Appendix I: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contact:
John H. Pendleton, (202) 512-3489 or pendletonj@gao.gov:
Staff Acknowledgments:
In addition to the contact named above, Directors Stephen Caldwell and
Jess Ford; Assistant Directors Patricia Lentini, Marie Mak, and
Suzanne Wren; and Alissa Czyz, Richard Geiger, Dawn Hoff, Brandon
Hunt, Farhanaz Kermalli, Arthur Lord, Tobin McMurdie, Jennifer Neer,
Jodie Sandel, Leslie Sarapu, and Erin Smith made key contributions to
this statement.
[End of section]
Related GAO Products:
Defense Management: Improved Planning, Training, and Interagency
Collaboration Could Strengthen DOD's Efforts in Africa. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-794]. Washington, D.C.: July 28,
2010.
Defense Management: U.S. Southern Command Demonstrates Interagency
Collaboration, but Its Haiti Disaster Response Revealed Challenges
Conducting a Large Military Operation. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-801]. Washington, D.C.: July 28,
2010.
National Security: Key Challenges and Solutions to Strengthen
Interagency Collaboration. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-822T]. Washington, D.C.: June 9,
2010.
Defense Management: DOD Needs to Determine the Future of Its Horn of
Africa Task Force. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-504]. Washington, D.C.: April 15,
2010.
Homeland Defense: DOD Needs to Take Actions to Enhance Interagency
Coordination for Its Homeland Defense and Civil Support Missions.
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-364]. Washington, D.C.:
March 30, 2010.
Interagency Collaboration: Key Issues for Congressional Oversight of
National Security Strategies, Organizations, Workforce, and
Information Sharing. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-904SP]. Washington, D.C.: September
25, 2009.
Military Training: DOD Needs a Strategic Plan and Better Inventory and
Requirements Data to Guide Development of Language Skills and Regional
Proficiency. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-568].
Washington, D.C.: June 19, 2009.
Influenza Pandemic: Continued Focus on the Nation's Planning and
Preparedness Efforts Remains Essential. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-760T]. Washington, D.C.: June 3,
2009.
U.S. Public Diplomacy: Key Issues for Congressional Oversight.
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-679SP]. Washington,
D.C.: May 27, 2009.
Military Operations: Actions Needed to Improve Oversight and
Interagency Coordination for the Commander's Emergency Response
Program in Afghanistan. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-615]. Washington, D.C.: May 18,
2009.
Foreign Aid Reform: Comprehensive Strategy, Interagency Coordination,
and Operational Improvements Would Bolster Current Efforts.
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-192]. Washington, D.C.:
April 17, 2009.
Iraq and Afghanistan: Security, Economic, and Governance Challenges to
Rebuilding Efforts Should Be Addressed in U.S. Strategies. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-476T]. Washington, D.C.: March 25,
2009.
Drug Control: Better Coordination with the Department of Homeland
Security and an Updated Accountability Framework Can Further Enhance
DEA's Efforts to Meet Post-9/11 Responsibilities. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-63]. Washington, D.C.: March 20,
2009.
Defense Management: Actions Needed to Address Stakeholder Concerns,
Improve Interagency Collaboration, and Determine Full Costs Associated
with the U.S. Africa Command. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-181]. Washington, D.C.: February
20, 2009.
Combating Terrorism: Actions Needed to Enhance Implementation of Trans-
Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-860]. Washington, D.C.: July 31,
2008.
Information Sharing: Definition of the Results to Be Achieved in
Terrorism-Related Information Sharing Is Needed to Guide
Implementation and Assess Progress. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-637T]. Washington, D.C.: July 23,
2008.
Force Structure: Preliminary Observations on the Progress and
Challenges Associated with Establishing the U.S. Africa Command.
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-947T]. Washington,
D.C.: July 15, 2008.
Highlights of a GAO Forum: Enhancing U.S. Partnerships in Countering
Transnational Terrorism. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-887SP]. Washington, D.C.: July 2008.
Stabilization and Reconstruction: Actions Are Needed to Develop a
Planning and Coordination Framework and Establish the Civilian Reserve
Corps. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-39]. Washington,
D.C.: November 6, 2007.
Homeland Security: Federal Efforts Are Helping to Alleviate Some
Challenges Encountered by State and Local Information Fusion Centers.
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-35]. Washington, D.C.:
October 30, 2007.
Military Operations: Actions Needed to Improve DOD's Stability
Operations Approach and Enhance Interagency Planning. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-549]. Washington, D.C.: May 31,
2007.
Combating Terrorism: Law Enforcement Agencies Lack Directives to
Assist Foreign Nations to Identify, Disrupt, and Prosecute Terrorists.
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-697]. Washington, D.C.:
May 25, 2007.
Results-Oriented Government: Practices That Can Help Enhance and
Sustain Collaboration among Federal Agencies. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-15]. Washington, D.C.: October 21,
2005.
[End of section]
Footnotes:
[1] DOD designated AFRICOM fully operational on September 30, 2008.
[2] GAO, Defense Management: U.S. Southern Command Demonstrates
Interagency Collaboration, but Its Haiti Disaster Response Revealed
Challenges Conducting a Large Military Operation, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-801] (Washington, D.C.: July 28,
2010), and Defense Management: Improved Planning, Training, and
Interagency Collaboration Could Strengthen DOD's Efforts in Africa,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-794] (Washington, D.C.:
July 28, 2010).
[3] GAO, Interagency Collaboration: Key Issues for Congressional
Oversight of National Security Strategies, Organizations, Workforce,
and Information Sharing, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-904SP] (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 25,
2009).
[4] Guidance for Employment of the Force, May 2008.
[5] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-794].
[6] GAO, Defense Management: Actions Needed to Address Stakeholder
Concerns, Improve Interagency Collaboration, and Determine Full Costs
Associated with the U.S. Africa Command, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-181] (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 20,
2009).
[7] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-904SP].
[8] The traditional joint staff headquarters organization generally
includes directorates for manpower and personnel (J1), intelligence
(J2), operations (J3), logistics (J4), plans (J5), communications
system (J6), as well as additional directorates as deemed necessary.
[9] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-801].
[10] GAO, Defense Management: DOD Needs to Determine the Future of Its
Horn of Africa Task Force, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-504] (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 15,
2010).
[11] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-794].
[End of section]
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