Pre-State Israel:
Arab Riots of the 1920's

by Jacqueline Shields

At the end of World
War I, discussions commenced on the
future of the Middle East, including the
disposition of Palestine. On April 19,
1920, the Allies, Britain, France, Italy and Greece,
Japan and Belgium,
convened in San Remo, Italy to
discuss a peace treaty with Turkey.
The Allies decided to assign Great Britain
the mandate over
Palestine on both sides of the Jordan River,
and the responsibility for putting the Balfour
Declaration into effect. Arab nationalists
were unsure how best to react to British
authority. The two preeminent Jerusalem clans,
the el-Husseinis and the Nashashibis, battled
for influence throughout the mandate, as
they had for decades before. The former
was very anti-British, whereas the latter
favored a more conciliatory policy.

One of the el-Husseinis, Haj
Amin, who emerged as the leading figure
in Palestinian politics during the mandate
period, first began to organize small
groups of suicide groups, fedayeen (“one
who sacrifices himself”), to terrorize
Jews in 1919 in the hope of duplicating
the success of Kemal in Turkey and
drive the Jews out of Palestine, just as
the Turkish nationalists were driving the
Greeks from Turkey. The first large Arab
riots took place in Jerusalem in
the intermediary days of Passover,
April 1920. The Jewish community had anticipated
the Arab reaction to the Allies’ convention,
and was ready to meet it. Jewish affairs
in Palestine were then being administered
from Jerusalem by
the Vaad Hatzirim (Council of Delegates),
appointed by the World
Zionist Organization (WZO) (which became
the Jewish Agency in 1929). The Vaad Hatzirim
charged Ze’ev
(Vladimir) Jabotinsky with the task
of organizing Jewish self-defense. Jabotinsky
was one of the founders of the Jewish battalions,
which had served in the British Army during
the First World War and had participated
in the conquest of Palestine from the Turks.
Acting under the auspices of the Vaad Hatzirim,
Jabotinsky lead the Haganah (self-defense)
organization in Jerusalem,
which succeeded in repelling the Arab attack.
Six Jews were killed and some 200 injured
in Jerusalem in
the course of the 1920 riots. In addition, two Americans, Jakov Tucker and Ze’ev Scharff, both WWI veterans, were killed resisting an Arab attack on the Jewish settlementof Tel Hai in March 1920. Had it not
been for the preliminary organization of
Jewish defense, the number of victims would
have undoubtedly been much greater.

After the riots, the British
arrested both Arabs and Jews. Among those
arrested was Jabotinsky,
together with 19 of his associates, on a
charge of illegal possession of weapons.
Jabotinsky was sentenced to 15 years imprisonment
with hard labor and deportation from the
country after completion of his sentence.
When the sentence became known, the Vaad
Hatzirim made plans for widespread protests,
including mass demonstrations and a national
fast. Meanwhile, however, the mandate
for Palestine had been assigned to Great
Britain, and the jubilation of the Yishuv
outweighed the desire to protest against
the harsh sentence imposed on Jabotinsky
and his comrades.

With the arrival in Jerusalem
of the first High Commissioner, Sir
Herbert Samuel, British military government
was superseded by a civilian administration.
As a gesture toward the civilian population,
the High Commissioner proclaimed a general
amnesty for both Jews and Arabs who had been
involved in the April 1920 riots. Jabotinsky
and his comrades were released from prison
to an enthusiastic welcome by the Yishuv,
but Jabotinsky insisted that the sentence
passed against them be revoked entirely,
arguing that the defender should not be placed
on trial with the aggressor. After months
of struggle, the British War Office finally
revoked the sentences.

In 1921, Haj
Amin el-Husseini began to organize
larger scale fedayeen to terrorize
Jews. Colonel Richard Meinertzhagen, former
head of British military intelligence in
Cairo, and later Chief Political Officer
for Palestine and Syria,
wrote in his diary that British officials “incline
towards the exclusion of Zionism in
Palestine.” In fact, the British encouraged the Arabs
to attack the Jews. According to Meinertzhagen,
Col. Waters Taylor, financial adviser to
the Military Administration in Palestine
1919-23, met with Haj Amin a few days before
Easter, in 1920, and told him “he had
a great opportunity at Easter to show the
world...that Zionism was unpopular not only
with the Palestine Administration but in
Whitehall and if disturbances of sufficient
violence occurred in Jerusalem at Easter,
both General Bols [Chief Administrator in
Palestine, 1919-20] and General Allenby [Commander
of Egyptian Force, 1917-19, then High Commissioner
of Egypt]
would advocate the abandonment of the Jewish
Home. Waters-Taylor explained that freedom
could only be attained through violence.”

Haj Amin took the Colonel’s
advice and instigated a riot. The British
withdrew their troops and the Jewish police
from Jerusalem,
and the Arab mob attacked Jews and looted
their shops. Due to Haj Amin’s overt role
in instigating the pogrom, the British arrested
him. Yet, despite the arrest, Haj Amin escaped
to Jordan,
but he was sentenced to 10 years imprisonment
in absentia. A year later, however, British
Arabists convinced High Commissioner Herbert
Samuel to pardon Haj Amin and to appoint
him Mufti.

Samuel met with Haj Amin
on April 11, 1921, and was assured “that
the influences of his family and himself
would be devoted to tranquility.” Three
weeks later, however, riots in Jaffa and Petah
Tikvah, instigated by the Mufti, left
43 Jews dead. Following these riots England established
the Haycraft
Commission to evaluate the cause of these
riots. The appendix of the report reads,
“The fundamental cause of the Jaffa
riots and the subsequent acts of violence
was a feeling among the Arabs of discontent
with, and hostility to, the Jews, due to
political and economic causes, and connected
with Jewish immigration, and with their conception
of Zionist policy
as derived from Jewish exponents . . . the
Arab majority, who were generally the aggressors,
inflicted most of the casualties.”

Following these riots,
Haj Amin consolidated his power and took
control of all Muslim religious funds in
Palestine. He used his authority to gain
control over the mosques, the schools and
the courts. No Arab could reach an influential
position without being loyal to the Mufti.
As the “Palestinian” spokesman,
Haj Amin wrote to Colonial Secretary Winston
Churchill in 1921, demanding that restrictions
be placed on Jewish immigration and that
Palestine be reunited with Syria and Transjordan.
Churchill issued the White
Paper of 1922, which tried to allay Arab
fears about the Balfour
Declaration. The White Paper acknowledged
the need for Jewish immigaration to enable
the Jewish community to grow, but placed
the familiar limit of the country's absorptive
capacity on immigration. Although not pleased
with Churchill’s diplomatic Paper, the Zionists
accepted it; the Arabs, however, rejected
it.

Despite the disturbances
in 1920-1921, the yishuv continued to develop
in relative peace and security. Another wave of riots, however, broke out in 1924 after another wave of pogrom’s sent 67,000 Polish Jewish refugees to Palestine. After a week of skirmishes in Jerusalem between the Haganah and Arab mobs, 133 Jews and 116 Arabs lay dead. The yishuv’s
main concern at that time was its financial
difficulties; the economic crisis of 1926-1928
led many to believe that the Zionist enterprise
would fail due to lack of funds. Zionist leaders
attempted to rectify the situation by expanding
the Jewish Agency to incorporate non-Zionists
who were willing to contribute to the practical
settlement of Palestine.

The prospects for renewed
financial support for the yishuv upset Arab
leaders who feared economic domination by
the Zionists.
Led by Haj Amin al-Husseini once again, rumors
of a Jewish plot to seize control of Muslim
holy places began to spread. Violence erupted
soon after, causing extensive damage. Rioting
and looting were rampant throughout Palestine.
In Jerusalem, Muslims provoked the violence
and tensions by building and praying on or
near the holiest place in the world for Jews,
the Western
Wall. By late August, the Arabs, in well
organized formation, attacked Jewish settlements
near Jerusalem. The disturbances spread to Hebron and Tsfat,
including many settlements in between, and
on the Kfar Dorom kibbutz in
the Gaza
Strip. After six days of rioting, the
British finally brought in troops to quell
the disturbance. Despite the fact that Jews
had been living in Gaza and Hebron for centuries,
following these riots, the British forced
Jews to leave their homes and prohibited
Jews from living in the Gaza strip and Hebron
in an attempt to appease Arabs and quell
violence. By the end of the rioting, 135
Jews (including eight Americans) were killed,
with more than 300 wounded.

Like the riots earlier
in the decade, afterward the British appointed
Sir William Shaw to head an inquiry into
the causes of the riots. The Shaw
Commission found that the violence occurred
due to “racial animosity on the part
of the Arabs, consequent upon the disappointment
of their political and national aspirations
and fear for their economic future.” The
report claimed that the Arabs feared economic
domination by a group who seemed to have,
from their perspective, unlimited funding
from abroad. The Commission reported that
the conflict stemmed from different interpretations
of British promises to both Arabs and Jews.
The Commission acknowledged the ambiguity
of former British statements and recommended
that the government clearly define its intentions
for Palestine. It also recommended that the
issue of further Jewish immigration be
more carefully considered to avoid “a
repetition of the excessive immigration of
1925 and 1926.” The issue of land tenure
would only be eligible for review if new
methods of cultivation stimulated considerable
growth of the agricultural sector. The Shaw
Commission frustrated Zionists, but the two
subsequent reports issued on the future of
Palestine were more disturbing. The
Hope Simpson report of 1930 painted an
unrealistic picture of the economic capacity
of the country. It cast doubt on the prospect
of industrialization and incorrectly asserted
that no more than 20,000 families could be
accomodated by the land. The Hope Simpson
report was overshadowed, however, by the
simultaneous release of the Passfield
White Paper, which reflected colonial
Secretary Passfield’s deep-seated animus
toward Zionism. This report asserted that
Britain’s obligations to the Arabs were very
weighty and should not be overlooked to satisfy
Jewish interests. Many argued that the Passfield
Paper overturned the Balfour Declaration,
essentialy saying that Britain should not
plan to establish a Jewish state. The Passfield
Paper greatly upset Jews, and interestingly,
also the labor and conservative parties in
the British Parliament. The result of this
widespread outcry to the Secretary’s report
was a letter from British Prime Minister
MacDonald to Dr.
Chaim Weizmann, reaffirming the commitment
to create a Jewish homeland.

The Arabs found rioting
to be a very effective political tool becasue
the British attitude toward violence against
Jews, and their response to the riots, encouraged
more outbreaks of violence. In each riot,
the British would make little or no effort
to prevent the Arabs from attacking the Jews.
After each incident, a commission of inquiry
would try to establish the cause of the riot.
The conclusions were always the same: the
Arabs were afraid of being displaced by Jewish
immigrants. To stop the disturbances, the
commissions routinely recommended that restrictions
be made on Jewish immigration. Thus, the
Arabs came to recognize that they could always
stop Jewish immigration by staging a riot.
Despite the restrictions placed on its growth,
the Jewish population increased to more than
160,000 by the 1930s, and the community
became solidly entrenched in Palestine. Unfortunately,
as the Jewish presence grew stronger, so
did the Arab opposition. The riots brought
recognition from the international Jewish
community to the struggle of the settlers
in Palestine, and more than $600,000 was
raised for an emergency fund that was used
to finance the cost of restoring destroyed
or damaged homes, establish schools, and
build nurseries.