Once again, whatever hope the world held for settled peace between Palestine and Israel has been obliterated in a blaze of bullets, bombs, and kidnappings. Yet another cycle of reaction-counterreaction violence has gripped Israel and Gaza, with the violent murders of three Israeli teenagers precipitating this current bout of violence. While many commentators may wish to see Israel supplant Hamas once and for all, it's likely that Operation Protective Edge will end without a fundamental change to the status quo in either Gaza or Israel. Like Operations Pillar of Defense and "Hot Winter" which proceeded it, this operation is likely to have no clear winner or loser. Rather, both sides will eventually begin backing down to prevent tensions from reaching critical-mass, which would force both combatants to begin making major moves.

A History of the Israeli-Gaza conflictThe roots of this violent tale derive from a feud between the Fatah party and a radical political party supported by Iran, called Hamas. Hamas wished not only to obtain complete independence, but also to reclaim all of Israel for a Palestinian state. Their irredentist goals were disputed by the more moderate Fatah party, which sought to seek out a compromise with Israel and live in peaceful, if uneasy, coexistence. Following Hamas' victory in 2006 legislative elections, factional fighting between the Fatah and Hamas broke out. Saudi Arabia managed to broker peace between Fatah President Mahmoud Abbas and Hamas Prime Minister Ismail Haniyeh. However, tensions continued to brew until they reached a head in the summer of 2007, as both sides began to increase the tempo of operations against one another. On June 14, Abbas declared a state of emergency, dismissed Haniyeh from his position, and dissolved the unity government. Both Gaza and the West Bank were ruled by martial law, under the direct auspices of Presidential Abbas. However, Palestinian Authority forces proved unable to maintain control of the Gaza Strip. By June 15, Hamas had obtained mostly undisputed control of the territory.

What makes the conflict finicky is the lack of a clean political divide. There exists a somewhat sizable Hamas supporting base in the West Bank, and Fatah supporters still exist in Gaza. Each party merely outnumbers the other in their respective territories, enabling each to establish political dominance. As such, it becomes dangerous to identify with your territory's minority party. Following Hamas' success in unseating the Palestinian Authority, factional fighting began occurring within territories, not between them. Each side is preoccupied with quelling internal dissidents and consolidating power, with Israel serving as a physical buffer between both territories.

Why Hamas and Israel do not want this to pass the 'rubicon'In political science parlance, 'passing the rubicon' refers to a point where conflict is inevitable between two actors. Neither Hamas nor Israel wish to pass the rubicon, as neither have an interest in seeing conflict escalate to the level of a Third Intifada. Gazans, racked by economic destitution due to the Israeli blockade, are primarily concerned with social and economic revitalization in the strip. Hamas rose to political prominence partially because of its emphasis on social welfare programs. Many in America and elsewhere hold a myopic view of Hamas, as if its only element is militancy. In reality, it's actually a multifaceted organization responsible for a wide range of projects. Aside from its vitrolic Islamist pursuits, the group also routinely builds hospitals, schools, and shelters. They also host community organizations, increase social capital, and possess public relations departments to work with citizen's needs. Their political base was build upon social activism, and Gazans increasingly want them to return to their roots. Without broad-based support of confrontation with Israel, Hamas will likely stick to rhetoric and sporadic missile attacks.

As a former Israeli Admiral noted after Operation Pillar of Defense, while military operations come with military gains, they can also come with political consequences. Following Operation Cast lead from late 2008 to early 2009, Israel experienced severe condemnation from the international community. While Israel is no stranger to criticism, their position is severely undermined when the IC works overwhelmingly against it. Furthermore, it's likely that Netanyahu does not want to be drawn into a close-quarters ground war. The confined spaces of Gaza constrain the maneuverability of Israeli forces, and conflict is an economically poor decision at this point. It's ultimately better for Israel if deescalation occurs in the near future. With that said, Netanyahu has also declared Israel's intent to resist international admonishment of its actions. The mobilization of 40,000 soldiers along Israel's border with Gaza is meant a clear warning sign to Hamas: We don't want ground operations, but we will launch incursions if necessary.

ConclusionWhile both sides may be exchanging blows, it's likely that conflict will begin tapering off in the near future. Israel does not want to get bogged down in moral condemnation and street-to-street fighting, and Hamas lacks broad domestic support for internal confrontation with Israel. However, should conflict continue to escalate, no one should question Israeli resolve to step in and target Hamas with ground forces.

The name "ISIS", "ISIL", or in Arabic, "da'ash", is no more. On June 29th, 2014, the top leaders of the group announced the reestablishment of the Khalifah (Caliphate) in the areas under their control in Syria and Iraq. Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, the emir of the group, was subsequently appointed Khalifah Ibrahim (Caliph Ibrahim) after his real name, Ibrahim ibn Awwad ibn Ibrahim ibn Ali ibn Muhammad al-Badri al-Husayni al-Qurashi. They have since dropped the "fil-Iraq wash-Sham" part of their name and are now calling themselves simply, "The Islamic State", or "ad-Dawlat al-Islamiyah" in Arabic. The term "Islamic State" will be referred to as "IS".

Indeed, al-Baghdadi has certainly fulfilled what he calls his "duty to Usama bin Laden". The move to reestablish the khalifah could have substantial positive consequences for the group in the world of global jihad; at the same time, however, it could also have adverse effects.

Positive: Looking at the positive possibilities, this move could attract larger amounts of foreign jihadists to the cause of IS. While IS already has a large contingent of foreign fighters, with whole brigades made up of certain nationalities (of which, Australians make up the largest number of foreigners per capita), this move could further highlight to other foreigners that the IS is the more "exciting" and "successful" group.

Moreover, it could attract more defectors from al-Qaeda into the fold of IS. Being that both groups want to reestablish the khalifah and both share the same ideology, al-Qaeda (AQ) has never been successful in doing so. While AQ has held significant ground in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Mali, Yemen, and Somalia, none has never been as significant as ash-Sham. The Umayyad Caliphate, the largest of the caliphates and fifth largest empire in history, had its capital in Damascus. The mere fact that they have claimed to reestablish the khalifah in the same area of the center of the Umayyad Caliphate wields a huge propaganda and even religious significance. IS will undoubtedly use this as propaganda to attract more AQ defectors.

Even further than individual defectors of al-Qaeda, IS could potentially see entire groups within the al-Qaeda Network or the al-Qaeda sphere of influence switch teams. If this scenario were to actually become true, it is more likely that groups in or near the Levant stands the biggest chances of actually switching sides. Earlier in the year, Ayman al-Zawahiri, the emir of al-Qaeda, issued a statement entitled "The Liberation of the Circle of Inefficiency and Failure". In this statement, he explicitly mentioned three areas that are and should be the main destinations for jihad: Syria, Egypt and Chechnya. The omission of areas like Yemen, the Sahel, Somalia or the areas of Afghanistan and Pakistan (AfPak) could alienate some groups to the point of defection.

Negative: Switching over to the negative side of things, this move could further the jihadist infighting currently happening in Syria (and there have been some reports of small-scale infighting in Iraq). From the official statement of the creation of IS, "We clarify to the Muslims that with this declaration of khilāfah, it is incumbent upon all Muslims to pledge allegiance to the khalīfah Ibrāhīm and support him (may Allah preserve him)". This level of perceived arrogance is likely to further alienate the group from moderate Muslims and even enrage those jihadists who see this move as a power-grab and/or a premature move. The aforementioned groups within the al-Qaeda Network or sphere of influence also has the possibility of not even occurring. Throughout the infighting, most groups within these two al-Qaeda-headed tiers remained relatively quiet about the fighting between ISIS and Jabhat al-Nusra, the official AQ group in Syria. Those groups who did comment on the infighting, like Mokhtar Belmokhtar's al-Mulathameen Brigade, often sided with Zawahiri rather than Baghdadi. Being that Nasir al-Wuhayshi, the emir of al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) is also the general manager of the entirety of the AQ Network, I find it hard to think that AQAP will defect to IS. In the same light, the AfPak-based groups are so intertwined with al-Qaeda in the region it would make it hard for them to shift allegiance elsewhere. Many state-actors in the region, namely Iraq, Iran, Lebanon, Israel, and Jordan (one might be able to argue Turkey, but they have been accused of supporting ISIS in the past), will undoubtedly see the reestablishment of the khalifah as an even bigger threat to their security coupled with the military advances of IS inside Iraq. Military action by state actors, while is already happening by Iraqi, sometimes Syrian and quite possibly Iranian troops, has a greater chance of happening now that Jordan, Lebanon, and Israel all feel threatened. If IS begins to take the fight to Lebanon and/or Jordan, like some analysts fear, it becomes almost a near certainty for more military action against IS.Another downside that comes along with controlling large swaths of ground: Not being able to hold on to said ground for very long. Like al-Qaeda forces in Mali, or Somalia, or Yemen, or Iraq in the days of al-Qaeda in Iraq, or even like the Taliban in Afghanistan, IS will probably not be able to hold on to their khalifah for very long. Daveed Gartenstien-Ross of the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies says: "Although non-state militants are formidable, they have no real response to their enemies’ air-power advantage, and haven’t been able to hold territory against the advance of professional militaries". When IS begins to lose ground, their propaganda value could begin to downgrade. Furthermore, the loss of ground could prompt IS to take a less egotistical approach to both the global jihad and al-Qaeda.

Relationship with Rivals: Like the above paragraph implies, IS is now in a position where they will need to hold on to their captured territory. Despite having a number of grievances with various groups inside both Iraq and Syria, they might need to start relying on them to help. For instance, Ansar al-Islam (AAI), a group founded in 2001 that is within the al-Qaeda sphere of influence, is a regional rival of IS. However, AAI is taking part in the "blitzkrieg" led by IS. Even though they are rivals, IS needs AAI to relieve pressure from them to take over various northern cities and avoid the risk stretching themselves too thin. In return, AAI gets to take the fight to the Iraqi military and government with the backing of a strong, well-equipped group that has numerous other allies taking part in the fighting.

The same might happen with Jabhat al-Nusra (JN) in parts of Syria. For example, IS could promise JN to not attack them in (insert city here) if JN lets them take this road or that crossing. In the same light, JN could promise ISIS to help them (insert city here) if ISIS retreats from "this". While they have been fighting, both share a mutual goal here. Ideology can and has historically been put aside to further mutual goals between two opposing groups. Without some levels of coordination between the two (or any other al-Qaeda group in the region, like Ahrar ash-Sham or Ansar Sham or Sham al-Islam), victory cannot be achieved. These small agreements could, potentially, lead to larger agreements for reconciliation. Continuing to fight each other does no one good.

However, the "requirement" for all Muslims to swear bayah (allegiance) to Baghdadi certainly ups the chances of more infighting occurring in both Syria and Iraq. In fact, nine different groups and coalitions of Syrian rebel groups, including Jabhat al-Nusra, refused to swear allegiance to Baghdadi. Those groups in Iraq fighting alongside IS now have a serious choice to make: Swear allegiance or fight them.

Conclusion:While IS supporters will rejoice that Baghdadi has finally achieved what he set out to do, their jubilation may not last long. The reestablishment of the khalifah poses both positive and negative possibilities for the group from everyday, moderate Muslims, to jihadists, to other terrorist groups and even to state-actors. IS might also have to reach out to its rivals if it wishes to be successful at this reestablishment. One thing is for certain though: Only time will tell what happens.

-- Caleb

Note: The picture above is allegedly the new flag of IS.Note v2: I added an analysis of the refusal of allegiance by nine rebel groups in Syria.

The developing situation in Iraq has taken another negative turn, as reports have surfaced that the Iraqi and Syrian governments have been cooperating with one another to strike the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria. There have been two confirmed joint operations: the first was when Syrian and Iraqi forces worked with one another to strike ISIS positions last week, the second was more recent when a Syrian strike on an Iraqi border town which killed 57 occurred. On one hand, I don't think anyone should be surprised. Iraq and Syria both share both a common enemy and religious orientation, which naturally makes a cooperative relationship appear beneficial to their respective securities. However, while this may result in tactical victories, pursuing stronger ties with Damascus and Tehran will ultimately prove to be strategically foolish for Baghdad.

During the last iteration of civil strife in Iraq, security was restored not only due to a surge in American forces from 2007-08, but also the Anbar Awakening. Following the initial invasion of Iraq, a political vacuum emerged that coalition forces were unable to fill. The result was Al-Qaeda flowing into the country, quickly establishing links with Sunni tribes. However, in 2005, the Sons of Iraq formed as a counter movement to Al-Qaeda and Sunni militias that were fighting against America and the nascent Iraqi government. Within a year, the Sons of Iraq was a nation-wide movement. As violence steadily increased throughout 2006, ﻿Sheik Abdul Sattar Buzaigh al-Rishawi﻿ established the Anbar Awakening Council to unite Sunni tribes against Al-Qaeda in Iraq. This was ultimately integral in ending the civil war in Iraq. Following our withdraw from Iraq in 2011, the Sons of Iraq were slowly disbanded. While this was a sensible move, because no country should have two religiously distinct armies, Maliki failed to provide ample job opportunities for returning members. As a result, many former members were left unemployed by 2013. Furthermore, his increasingly sectarian policies served to ostracize the Sunni community. After America withdrew, there was a purge of Sunni officers among the upper echelons of Iraq's military command structure. Many Sunnis not only feel as if the Army's composition does not adequately reflect their demographic, but also that Maliki was persistently using their sect as a scapegoat.

A synthesis of unemployment and marginalization provided the perfect pool for recruitment by ISIS and other terrorist groups operating in Syria. As a result, by early 2014, ISIS managed to seize Fallujah and Ramadi. Maliki's lethargic military response, inability to protect Sunni populations from abuse, and belligerent sectarian remarks only served to worsen the situation. Sunnis increasingly viewed the Iraqi government as a hateful, inept entity. As VICE News reported, many citizens in captured cities feel safe under ISIS, which they could not say when the military handled the security situation. While we may not like Al-Qaeda, their affiliates, or their breakaways, we should sympathize with the yearning many Sunnis have to live peaceful, safe lives--even if that's under a Wahabbist terrorist group they don't particularly agree with.

Now, Iraq's government is coordinating with an unpopular Shiite regime to kill Sunnis. Instead of decrying Syria's actions against Iraqi citizens, it appears as if Maliki was complicit in their attack. This will only further reinforce present resentment in Sunni populations, making a fruitful counter-insurgency strategy even more difficult to implement. Without a wide attempt at reapprochement between the Iraqi government and Sunni tribes, combating the insurgency will be unnecessarily long, casualty-intensive, and destabilizing for the entire region. Further worries stem from Baghdad's ties with Tehran. Several articles have surfaced alleging that Iran has deployed 500 members of the elite Quds Force and the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps' commanding officer to assist Iraq in its defense of Baghdad. Not does this supplement Maliki's blatant sectarian policies, but it also allows Iran far more influence in the Middle East. Maliki's actions signify a realignment that leaves Iraq even closer to Iran's political clout.

But Iraq is not the only actor that can be blamed, America's dithering policy in Syria ultimately allowed for Jihadist organizations like ISIS to become so large and well-equipped. If America had initially worked more closely with the Free Syrian Army, then perhaps the situation in both Iraq and Syria would be different. Now, it appears as if we've passed the golden opportunity to fund religiously moderate Syrian groups, and we're certainly reaping the consequences of that failure. If we intend on ensuring that the epicenter of the world's energy market remains somewhat stable, then it is necessary that we increase our involvement with Syria's opposition. For his part, it seems as if Obama has begun to do just that by proposing 500 million dollars in aid to Syrian rebels. However, without Iraq agreeing to domestic policy reforms, it appears as if a great deal of developments in both Syria and Iraq will happen outside of our control.

On April 18th, 1983, sixty-three people, including seventeen Americans, were killed in a car bomb attack at the US Embassy in Beirut, Lebanon. A group called the Islamic Jihad Organization (IJO) and its leader, Imad Mughniyah, quickly took responsibility for the attack. To be positive, the IJO is the international wing of Hezbollah activities. However, Hezbollah is much more than just a terrorist organization; they are a political party, they are a social organization, they are a militia and they are a terrorist organization--this article will focus on the latter.

While at one point, Hezbollah (In Arabic, Hizb Allah means "Party of God") was the best group at killing Americans, Hezbollah focuses a lot of attention on fighting Israel. Indeed, to act as a resistance to Israeli occupation is an outlining factor into why they were formed. In recent years, however, their attention has faded away from Israel and to helping Bashar al-Assad stay in power in Syria, as well as supporting Iran's shadow war with the West. Having said that, the Party of God could begin to shift back to fighting Israel.

Brief background: Hezbollah was formed in the early 1980's as a result of Iran wanting a Lebanese-proxy against Israel (Levitt). As I said before, Hezbollah was formed, in part, to be the resistance against Israeli occupation following the 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon. Iran, for their part, made sure each new recruit attended an Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corp-Quds Force (or simply, Quds Force) training camp in the Bekaa Valley (Levitt). Hezbollah is also known to vehemently support an Iranian ideology called velayat-e faqih (guardian ship of the jurist). This ideology essentially says that a Shia cleric can also serve as the head of government. It is thought that Iran still gives Hezbollah around $200 million to fund their terrorist activities, their political and social activities, as well as their media wing (Levitt).

Since the 1980's, however, they have developed an extensive network of global connections and ties to various militant groups and even Mexican drug cartels. Utilizing these connections allows for Hezbollah to support Iranian activities around the globe. For instance, it is thought Hezbollah acted upon the behest of Iran when they launched the Burgas terrorist attack in Bulgaria in 2012. Even further, several Hezbollah operatives were arrested in Baku, Azerbaijan in 2006 and 2008 and charged with plotting against Israeli and American interests there (Levitt).

These international connections are thought to be as a result of both Iranian influence of the group and the ambitions of the leader of their international wing, Imad Mughniyah. Mughniyah, born in Lebanon, was not only in charge of their international wing, but also their military and intelligence wings (Levitt). Mughniyah was thought to be behind some of the groups most spectacular and devastating bombings and hijacking in the 1980's. In fact, the CIA has accused him of killing more Americans than any other militant before 9/11. He was killed in 2008 in Damascus, Syria by an assumed Mossad assassination.

Their activities now: "Over the course of the always intimate relationship between Iran and Hezbollah, the head of the Quds Force or other senior Iranian leaders might have told Hezbollah to "jump" and the response would have been, "How high?" (Levitt). Based on what this passage tells us, it is easy to surmise that Hezbollah does the bidding of whatever Iran wishes. This is why we saw Hezbollah operatives perpetrating a terrorist attack in Bulgaria, why several operatives were arrested in Azerbaijan plotting an attack, and why several members were arrested in Thailand and Cyprus for the same thing (Levitt). It should come as no surprise as to why Hezbollah is currently fighting on the side of the regime in Syria. The Assad regime is a key partner to both Iran and Hezbollah, and Iran needs Assad to stay in power. Hezbollah seems more than happy to intervene in Syria at the behest of their masters in Iran.

Even further, Iran asked the same of Hezbollah during the US-led War in Iraq. During the fiercest time of sectarian killings in Iraq (2006-2007), a Hezbollah operative by the name of Ali Moussa Daqduq was charged by Iran to be their liaison in the coordination of the training of several Shia militant groups (Levitt). But not only that, Hezbollah operated several training camps for several Iraqi Shia militant groups--these groups were dubbed the "Special Groups" by the United States. This only further shows their commitment to Iran.

Returning the Focus to Israel: Despite being a force to be reckoned with in the battlefields of Syria, Hezbollah's activities in the country are not coming without a price. Indeed, several car bombings attributed to Sunni al-Qaeda organizations, Abdullah Azzam Brigades and Jabhat al-Nusra in Lebanon have targeted both Hezbollah and Iranian assets. As a result, Hezbollah's popularity has been seemingly declining among the Lebanese people. The people do not want to upset the fragile balance between Sunni's and Shi'ites in Lebanon; this is something Hezbollah is seen as toying with in their intervention in Syria. As more bombings, fighting and chaos occurs in Lebanon due to spillover in Syria, Hezbollah will probably continue to lose support. In the event that Hezbollah feels like they need to regain support from the Lebanese Shia community, their crosshairs could turn back to Israel. This could be already happening with a recent bombing on Israeli military outpost by Hezbollah. Hezbollah will have to prove to the people of Lebanon, whom they have been supporting since the 80's with various social services, that their focus is still on Israel.

Returning to Iraq?Being that Hezbollah has operated in Iraq before, it stands to reason that Hezbollah could begin to be involved yet again in the wake of the Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham's blitzkrieg in Iraq. The ISIS blitz has since set off a fervor of sectarian passion among both Sunni's and Shi'ites. In fact, the head Shia cleric in Iraq has issued a call to arms and Moqtada al-Sadr's infamous Mahdi Army has thought to have been mobilized again. If push comes to shove in Iraq and we start to see another sectarian civil war in Iraq, I would not doubt Hezbollah will again be operating in Iraq at the behest of Iran. Now, being that they want to rollback their negative image in Lebanon, we may not see the same levels of intervention as in Syria or previously in Iraq. I believe training of troops would be the most obvious contribution to the crisis by Hezbollah. I also do not rule out the possibility of this already happening being that the Quds Force is thought to be helping in the fight against ISIS.

Conclusion: By going to Syria at the behest of their patron Iran to defend their mutual ally Bashar, it removes any doubt that they most certainly are a global organization doing the bidding of Iran--leaving the citizens of Lebanon, whom they are supposed to protect, susceptible to more violence. This violence will be from Sunni groups, like the AQ-linked Abdullah Azzam Brigades or even al-Nusra, fighting between Sunnis and Shi'ites in the Bekaa because of Syria, or even the Lebanese state. This will most definitely upset the balance Hezbollah has tried to maintain.

Moreover, I see Hezbollah trying to attack Israel to be even more likely the longer they are in Syria. This has nothing to do with expanding that war; rather, its about shifting the focus, or appearing to shift it, back to Israel, the original enemy. Inadvertently in doing so, however, this will probably result in the expansion of the war in Syria. But the thinking in doing so, in Hezbollah's eyes, would be to show the Shi'ites of Lebanon that they are still the vanguard against Israel and maintain the power and influence they wield in Lebanon. Hezbollah also stands a good chance of getting involved in Iraq the more Iran gets involved in Iraq.

-- Caleb

Book Source: Hezbollah: The Global Footprint of Lebanon's Party of God by Matthew Levitt.

On June 16th, 2014, ash-Shabaab, the Somali-branch of al-Qaeda, murdered forty-eight people watching the World Cup in a coastal Kenyan town. What was once thought of as a local organization primarily focused on fighting inside Somalia, the group shattered this narrative when they and their Kenyan-affiliate al-Hijra, attacked the Westgate shopping mall in Nairobi and killed almost seventy people. But what does this mean for the region and can the United States do anything to stymie the threat?

Brief background on ash-Shabaab: Al-Qaeda has always been active in east Africa dating all the way back to the early 1990's. Sayf al-Adel, a top military commander for al-Qaeda and a suspect in the 1998 US Embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania, was active in Somalia as early as February of 1993 and established a training camp on the Kenyan border. It is thought that some of his graduates took part in bloody Battle of Mogadishu (1993)--better known as "Black Hawk Down".

Another top al-Qaeda commander, Fazul Muhammad, another suspect in the 1998 US Embassy bombings, also took part in the battle. Fazul would later be named the leader of al-Qaeda East Africa (AQEA), as well as the military commander of ash-Shabaab before his death in 2011. Even further, Usama bin Laden (UBL) officially took refuge in Sudan after his exile from Saudi Arabia in 1992 (read: "Understanding Terror Networks" by Marc Sageman).

The group ash-Shabaab, however, traces its origins back to a group called the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) and an earlier group by the name of al-Itihaad al-Islamiyya (AIAI). AIAI was a radical jihadist group operating in Somalia, that received funds from wealthy Saudi's (including one Usama bin Laden). AIAI also reportedly helped AQEA launch the coordinated suicide attacks on the two embassies; something that landed them on the UN's list of al-Qaeda associated individuals and entities in the wake of 9/11.

The leader of AIAI, Hassan Dahir Aweys, would later go on to found the Islamic Courts Union. The ICU officially took over Mogadishu and large swaths of ground in southern Somalia in 2006. The Transitional Federal Government (TFG), a makeshift government set up in Mogadishu by Western powers, along with Ethiopian troops as a part of AMISOM effectively ran the ICU out of all their major strongholds and the ICU was disbanded.

Their militant-wing ash-Shabaab however, remained committed to the fight. Starting in 2009 when Ethiopia withdrew, Shabaab quickly began to retake lost ground. Clicking here will show you how much ground Shabaab took back after their offensive on the TFG began in 2009 and almost a year later (on the right). Fortunately, this tide has since been turning with Shabaab losing more ground to the US-backed AMISOM mission, including their main financial hub Kismayo.

While al-Qaeda had long since praised and published propaganda pieces on the ICU, Shabaab officially joined al-Qaeda in 2012. The link also provides a slew of names of top al-Shabaab/AQEA operatives, which provides an excellent insight into the groups connections and prowess--it should also be noted that there are several American members of Shabaab. Some of the leaders have since been killed, but I don't think that takes away from their potency. I also want to take the time (this could go on and on for a few posts) to point out that Shabaab also has at least one state supporter: Eritrea.

Local to Transnational: Like mentioned above, the notion that Shabaab is just a local group should be long since gone by now. It should have been gone in 2010, when they killed seventy-four people in Uganda, but I digress.

Since a renewed US-backed AMISOM mission started in 2012, Shabaab has threatened retaliatory attacks across the Horn of Africa. Besides the aforementioned attacks in Kenya, Shabaab has also been responsible for attacks in Djibouti. Djibouti, a tiny country neighboring Somalia to the north, also hosts the only US military base in the region. As a result, Shabaab has threatened more attacks there. Not only that, but they have threatened to conduct more attacks in Kenya, Uganda and even the United States; the latter of which sometimesdirectly intervenes.

But let's also look at Shabaab's connections to other al-Qaeda groups.

Looking specifically at the "terror partnership" with AQAP, this could be a dangerous scenario if both of these groups begin to seriously work together to target the United States. A "terror partnership" between the two should also come as no surprise. With close proximity and knowing al-Qaeda branches share resources and fighters, it only makes sense. Pooling their resources together, they would be able to effectively use AQAP's bomb making methods and Shabaab's excellent recruiting methods in the United States to conduct terrorist attacks here.

By "synchronizing their actions with Boko Haram and AQIM", Shabaab could extend their reach from the Horn of Africa to the heart of Nigeria and even into Mali and Algeria. All three could pool their resources together and effectively threaten US interests in a large portion of Africa.

What can the United States do? The United States can continue to work with regional partners in the area to combat the threat of Shabaab and to mitigate the relationships between Shabaab and various other al-Qaeda affiliates and branches. Working with African troops to build up their capabilities, assisting them in battle with intelligence support and even aerial support, as well as conducting military raids and drone strikes when needed. The United States also need to be investing in the political, social and economical factors of terrorism; working with the regional governments to clamp down on recruitment efforts, to help their economies grow, to work with political and social leaders, and to encourage religious leaders to speak out against Shabaab. The United States will also need to work to influence state actors, like Eritrea, to stop funding Shabaab and/or discouraging their citizens from doing so as well.

The threat emanating from Somalia extends beyond the region of the Horn of Africa; It is expanding across Africa and even into the Arabian Peninsula. One day, it could even begin to stretch westward. We should be trying to stymie their aspirations of attacking us.

--Caleb

Note: It is usually seen as "al-Shabaab", but as a student of Arabic I prefer the correct way of transliteration. In Arabic there are essentially "sun" and "moon" letters. "Sun" letters absorb the lam (the l in al) into the initial sound of the following noun. So, shiin (the "sh" sound) is a "sun" letter. Knowing this, it should be "ash-Shabaab". There's your Arabic lesson for today.

In early 2014, the world witnessed something never before done by al-Qaeda: expulsion of a formal branch, formally ending all ties to and distancing themselves from the even-more-radical Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham (ISIS or the Arabic acronym Da'esh). The group, led by a man named Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, has its roots in the former Islamic State of Iraq--also known as al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI). Nowadays, however, they seem to be playing by their own rules in their rampage of swallowing up towns and cities in western and northern Iraq. While they may have lost and are losing ground in Syria, the exact opposite seems to be taking place in Iraq.

Brief background on ISIS and their expulsion from al-Qaeda:

Before they were known as ISIS, the group had its origins in Jama'at aT-Tawhid wal-Jihad. The group's leader, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, a shadowy figure with a long history of ties to al-Qaeda, swore allegiance to Usama bin Laden after the US-led invasion of Iraq. The swearing of bayat (loyalty) effectively made them change their name to Tanzim Qaedat al-Jihad fi bilad ar-rafiydan--better known as al-Qaeda in Iraq. AQI was one of the fiercest groups fighting the American-led coalition of troops. One perfect example of their effectiveness in Iraq was the bloody Battle of Fallujah in 2004, in which around fifty US servicemen lost their lives and more than 400 were wounded.

In 2006, al-Zarqawi was killed in an US airstrike. A man named Abu Ayyub al-Masri then took the helms, who quickly established the Mujahideen Shura Council (MSC). The MSC, who's leader was Abu Omar al-Baghdadi, was a coalition of several Sunni jihadist groups, including AQI. Eventually, however, the MSC disbanded and the Islamic State of Iraq was born. In a joint-American-Iraqi raid in 2010, both al-Masri and al-Baghdadi were killed. A little known man with the kunya (a teknonym) Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi then took the helms of the Islamic State.

Since early this year, al-Qaeda (AQ) forces in Syria, notably Jabhat al-Nusra (JN), have been fighting against their former brothers-in-arms in the ISIS. To summarize these events, al-Baghdadi tried to merge JN into his own organization calling it the Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham; it is, however, worth noting that JN is thought to have been formed from former al-Qaeda in Iraq fighters. When the emir of JN, Abu Mohammad al-Julani, refused to be merged into al-Baghdadi’s group and instead pledged allegiance, or rather publicly declared his allegiance to the emir of al-Qaeda Ayman al-Zawahiri, all hell broke loose inside Syria. Al-Zawahiri, knowing full well the consequences of Julani’s actions, tried to reconcile the two fighting emir’s problems in a letter addressed to both of them. Al-Baghdadi then subsequently denied Zawahiri’s request; Zawahiri was then forced to send trusted individuals, like Abu Khalid al-Suri, to mediate the differences. When nothing positive came into fruition, al-Zawahiri then issued a statement that kicked ISIS out of al-Qaeda.

Renewed focus in Iraq:

In January of 2014, ISIS effectively took control of both Ramadi and Fallujah. This established a foothold of territory stretching from ar-Raqqa in Syria to the heart of al-Anbar Province in Iraq. Following the capturing of these two cities in the heart of the Sunni Triangle, ISIS has been pushed out of several towns and cities inside Syria. While they still control some areas near Dier az-Zour and all of ar-Raqqa, ISIS seems pretty content with leaving other towns and cities and focusing on the Kurds in Rojava (Syrian Kurdistan). It is in Rojava where they just recently massacred fifteen Kurdish civilians, many of them children. On the Iraq front, however, there seemed to have been lull in the fighting for ISIS. Until now.

Conclusion: If Samarra is taken, ISIS will be only78 miles awayfrom Baghdad. It appears to be almost certain Samarra will be the next to fall and then it will be only a matter of time before they try and take Baghdad. If one thing is for sure: Iraq's capital is in al-Baghdadi's crosshairs. One must wonder if al-Baghdadi is beginning to comply with Ayman al-Zawahiri'sdemandsof returning to Iraq; something al-Baghdadi has vehemently opposed in the past. It may be too early to tell, but I believe we should not rule out this possibility knowing ISIS's reversal in Syria. We should keep a keen eye out for any statements or addresses confirming or denying this possibility. Iraq now faces a large problem from not only this large, existential threat from ISIS, but also in now having to do what they seem to not want to do: work in cooperation with the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), Peshmerga forces (Kurdistan's military), and Sunni tribes to work together to combat a mutual threat. Hopefully, this will come as a realization for the Maliki government in the need for unity and cooperation between all sects and parties in his country.ThisWashington Institute report outlines exactly what needs to be done between the Shia-dominated Maliki government, the KRG and the Sunni's of Iraq. The United States can also help Iraq in this dire situation. While no one in Washington really wants to go back to Iraq, it may be in our best interests to at least fast-track weapons sales to Iraq, expand a training program for elite Iraqi soldiers, and offer logistical and intelligence support. Too many Americans lost their lives fighting for a stable Iraq for us to sit back and let Iraq implode. We need not send troops back, but we should at least assist Iraq in their fight.

-- CalebNote: The map above belongs to The Long War Journal. I take no credit for the making of the map; all credit goes to those responsible at the LWJ.

On May 22 of 2014, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) added Boko Haram (or Jaam'atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda'awati wal-Jihad) to their al-Qaeda Sanctions list; a list reserved for those organizations and individuals associated with al-Qaeda. Despite attempts to downplay the group as nothing more but a local jihadist group with minimal ties to al-Qaeda, it does not take long for one to find evidence to the contrary. Referring to a congressional testimony to the US House committee on Homeland Security dated November 30, 2011, a whole new light is shown on Boko Haram's (BH) international links and ties. Much like the UN designation reports, the testimony mentions BH's links to al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb in which BH gained "valuable knowledge on the construction of improvised explosive devices"; not only that, but some fighters of BH “fought alongside Al-Qaida affiliated groups in Mali in 2012 and 2013 before returning to Nigeria with terrorist expertise”. The testimony goes further than the UN report, noting that “The use of a suicide VBIED on the Abuja police barracks in June 2011 marked the first time on record a suicide attack was carried out in Nigeria. The bomb used was large enough to destroy 40 other vehicles in th﻿e parking lot”. The tactical use of VBIEDs is eerily similar to AQIM’s tactics in Mali and Algeria--not to mention AQIM is also notorious for kidnapping. Perhaps BH picked that up tactic from AQIM, as well? Even more worrying, BH has established ties to al-Shabaab in Somalia. This should not come as a surprise as al-Qaeda affiliates often times share resources, fighters, and knowledge with each other (look at Ansar al-Sharia (Libya), AQIM, Muhammad Jamal Network and AQAP doing the same in Libya). The testimony reports that BH issued a statement reading, “We want to make it known that our jihadists have arrived in Nigeria from Somalia where they received real training on warfare from our brethren who made that country ungovernable”. So it seems BH has ties to both AQIM and al-Shabaab. But are there others? According to the Combatting Terrorism Center (CTC), a Nigerian named Khalid al-Barnawi, an influential leader in Ansaru (a breakaway faction of BH) and BH, is a former kidnapping accomplice of Mokhtar Belmokhtar, an Algerian al-Qaeda leader. Another leader within the BH/Ansaru network, Mamman Nur, not only has ties to AQIM and Shabaab, but also AQAP, al-Qaeda Central Command and even the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan. If the reports are true in the CTC’s report, we are dealing with a well-connected group within the al-Qaeda network; not just some local group with al-Qaeda inspirations. Going back to the UN designation, they note that the leader of BH, Abubakr Shekau, has “expressed Boko Haram’s solidarity with Al-Qaida affiliates in Afghanistan, Iraq, North Africa, Somalia and Yemen. He also encouraged fighters across Africa and other areas to continue engaging in terrorist attacks." These statements were then subsequently disseminated to popular jihadist forums. If all these reports are true—and I have no reason to doubt the validity of them—Boko Haram most definitely deserves to be on the UNSC’s al-Qaeda Sanctions list. Sadly, the designation, alone, will not be enough to stop the violence being propagated by these well-connected jihadists.

Since early this year, al-Qaeda (AQ) forces in Syria, notably Jabhat al-Nusra (JN), have been fighting against their former brothers-in-arms in the Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham (ISIS). To summarize these events, the emir of ISIS, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, tried to merge JN into his own organization; it is worth noting that JN is thought to have been formed from former al-Qaeda in Iraq fighters. When the emir of JN, Abu Mohammad al-Julani, refused to be merged into al-Baghdadi’s group and instead pledged allegiance, or rather publicly declared his allegiance to the emir of al-Qaeda Ayman al-Zawahiri, all hell broke loose inside Syria. Al-Zawahiri, knowing full well the consequences of Julani’s actions, tried to reconcile the two fighting emir’s problems in a letter addressed to both of them. Al-Baghdadi then subsequently denied Zawahiri’s request; Zawahiri was then forced to send trusted individuals, like Abu Khalid al-Suri, to mediate the differences. When nothing positive came into fruition, al-Zawahiri then issued a statement that kicked ISIS out of al-Qaeda. Fast forward a few months and a few new letters and tapes by Zawahiri to end the fighting, al-Suri is dead, ISIS has launched an offensive in Iraq, ISIS has been pushed out of a few places in northern Syria, JN has been almost pushed out of Deir az-Zour, and JN says it will only fight ISIS in self-defense.

But what does this mean for al-Qaeda or even ISIS? A few weeks ago, I had a conversation with Mr. Bill Roggio of The Long War Journal about what this all meant. Essentially, what he had to say is that this is a “big problem” for both AQ and ISIS. For either of them to be successful terrorist organizations and/or insurgent groups, they have to be able to (a) attract enough recruits to continue to operate and (b) to direct enough attention to a certain goal. Let us look at these two things in depth. ISIS does not seem to have a problem with attracting foreign fighters in both Syria and Iraq, as this can be seen with large contingents of fighters from the Caucasus, the Arab World and even the West. To make matters more interesting, ISIS’s military commander inside Syria is a Chechen by the name of Abu Omar al-Shishani—which certainly showcases how much they depend on foreigners. JN, while they also attract their fair share of foreigners, seem to attract a large number of native Syrians, as well. Of course, this is probably correlated to JN being more focused on the fight against Assad than other rebel groups unlike ISIS. This is also not to say that ISIS does not attract native Syrians--they do, albeit not as much as JN. Speaking of which, ISIS inside Syria seems to be more focused on fighting AQ/JN and rebel factions other than the Assad regime, which certainly hurts their recruitment efforts inside Syria. However, their fight against the more moderate groups makes them an ideal group to join for those radical foreigners wishing to get involved in Syria. So what is next for the infighting? Mr. Roggio explained to me that he sees a few possibilities regarding the infighting, with three really standing out to me. He sees that the infighting will either continue indefinitely, al-Baghdadi will eventually repent, if you will, and fold back into AQ, or al-Baghdadi will simply be whacked by those inside his group wishing to end the fighting. Out of these three, he seemed to favor the latter two with the first being “bad for business” for both AQ and ISIS. Either way, he sees the fighting being resolved at some point. I cannot help but to agree with his assessment. The infighting is certainly not helping either entity to advance their interests; if either party wishes to continue to be relevant and successful, something will have to give that will stop the infighting. Al-Qaeda is losing foreign recruits and ground inside Syria to ISIS, and ISIS is further distancing themselves from other groups inside al-Qaeda’s umbrella. Like Mr. Roggio said about this, “neither group wants this”. Sooner or later, something will happen. The direction in which that “something” will take the infighting is yet to be seen. With supposed breaks within ISIS, AQ-affiliates and figures siding with Zawahiri and ISIS again rejecting a reconciliation offer from Zawahiri, it seems like a complete toss-up of which way this whole ordeal will go. The quotations and subsequent references to Bill Roggio were paraphrased from a phone call I had with him a few weeks back. The analysis primarily focuses on what was discussed in said conversation and not the fighting between al-Qaeda and the Islamic State in general. - Caleb