How should the Dutch government prioritize partnerships with other nations? Which countries are strategically important? Which are compatible in terms of shared values? Traditionally, Dutch foreign policy has a dual orientation: the pursuit of Dutch interests on the one hand and the adherence to and promotion of norm-based values on the other. How to handle relationships in a increasingly connected and complex world? HCSS is developing a Dutch Foreign Relations Index (DFRI) as an analytical basis for a framework to provide guidance on this.

How should the Dutch government prioritize partnerships with other nations? Which countries are strategically important? Which are compatible in terms of shared values? Traditionally, Dutch foreign policy has a dual orientation: the pursuit of Dutch interests on the one hand and the adherence to and promotion of norm-based values on the other. How to handle relationships in a increasingly connected and complex world? HCSS is developing a Dutch Foreign Relations Index (DFRI) as an analytical basis for a framework to provide guidance on this.

This Monthly Alert presents the findings of a high-level analysis of this first current iteration of the DFRI. It offers, from the Netherlands’ perspective, an overview of the utility and compatibility of states worldwide and the changes therein over time. Clusters of countries are derived based on a combination of these two dimensions. The alert concludes with suggestions as to how the DFRI could be further developed and leveraged as an analytical input into the partnership prioritization process in Dutch official foreign and security policy making.

Previous HCSS monitors found India to be significantly less assertive than the other great powers. In our 2016 Great Power Assertivitis study, we even claimed that the subcontinent was the sole exception to the rule that great powers seem to exhibit a quasi-pathological proclivity to throw around their weight in negatively assertive ways.

Previous HCSS monitors found India to be significantly less assertive than the other great powers. In our 2016 Great Power Assertivitis study, we even claimed that the subcontinent was the sole exception to the rule that great powers seem to exhibit a quasi-pathological proclivity to throw around their weight in negatively assertive ways. In our recently published Changing International Order (Geodynamics) Alert, however, which covers the first half of 2017, some of the indicators we use to track global GPA - especially our global event datasets - started painting a different picture of India. An analysis of the quantitative and qualitative evidence over the last 6 months reveals a significant uptick in the country’s economic and military assertiveness, specifically towards its great North-Eastern neighbor, China. Since the Indian subplot of the great power story receives so much less attention from Western governments, institutions and media, HCSS decided take a closer look at some of the domestic and international dynamics at work here.

To many, the world seems to be on fire. A small, newly nuclear-armed authoritarian country is incessantly taunting the world's sole remaining superpower. That superpower itself is now increasingly seen even by some of its staunchest allies as a "threat to world peace". Russia's large military exercise along its Western borders has Europeans on their seat's edge. And less mediatized, but no less impactful for the world was the tense military standoff between the two giant and nuclear-armed Asian great powers.

To many, the world seems to be on fire. A small, newly nuclear-armed authoritarian country is incessantly taunting the world's sole remaining superpower. That superpower itself is now increasingly seen even by some of its staunchest allies as a "threat to world peace". Russia's large military exercise along its Western borders has Europeans on their seat's edge. And less mediatized, but no less impactful for the world was the tense military standoff between the two giant and nuclear-armed Asian great powers. In the midst of these events are unprecedented technological changes and climate-related cataclysms, that potentially herald fundamental shifts. Are all these events glimpses of a larger underlying iceberg or merely a statistical anomaly of our fascination with extreme events? And how can we even be sure?

These questions are not purely of academic interest - also not (limited) to the Netherlands. On January 1, 2018, the Kingdom of the Netherlands will take a seat at the most prominent and prestigious international table - the United Nations Security Council - for a period of one year. It will even chair the Security Council during the month of March 2018. As it prepares for this weighty responsibility, getting a better evidence-based understanding of the actual geodynamics behind the current international order is of the utmost importance. This alert presents a few selected highlights from our datasets in 'nowcasting' geodynamics in the period Jan- Jul 2017.

This study looks at the foreign and security policies of 17 Populist Sovereignist political parties and analyzes the implications for international security and defense.

This study looks at the foreign and security policies of 17 Populist Sovereignist political parties and analyzes the implications for international security and defense.

Populist Sovereignism (PopSov) did not begin with Brexit nor did it end with Marine Le Pen losing the French Presidential election in May 2017. PopSov Parties reject the current political establishment and advocate taking back national control. They are far from a fringe movement. Currently, populist sovereignist parties rule alone or are part of the governing coalitions in 8 countries, including the US, and they hold more than 10 percent of a total of 11 countries’ seats in the European Parliament.

Consequences: risky business or a healthy feedback signal?

Many observers warn that PopSov parties threaten to upend a decades old liberal consensus about the benefits of free trade in promoting economic growth and welfare, the importance of global and regional governance to solve transnational challenges, and the benefits of liberal democracy. Threats – and actions – to exit the European Union, leave NATO, and dissolve free trade agreements certainly sound like the death toll of that consensus.

Stephan De Spiegeleire, one of the authors of the study argues that Popsovism is best framed as ‘a potentially healthy feedback signal about certain negative aspects of the recent rush towards a supposed global liberal utopia that have been underestimated by national, European, and international policymakers.’ But he also adds a note of caution: ‘the health of a democracy depends on such signals being voiced and – even more importantly – heard.'

Foreign and security policies: what PopSov parties want

In order to better understand the potential consequences for the international order, the authors analyzed the party manifestos of 17 PopSov parties in Europe and the US and identified their positions on national security and foreign and security policy. Amongst the key findings are:

PopSov Parties are not illiberal per se, and they are not necessarily isolationist. Yet, their proposed reforms at times sit uncomfortably with the tenets of liberal democracy, in particular where it concerns protections for minorities.

Popsov Parties are strongly in favour of reasserting the sovereignty of the nation-state by reducing the power of international organizations and push back against a decades-old trend of increasing multilateral cooperation through strong, rules-based institutions.

Most PopSov Parties support NATO, but most are also supportive of warm relations with Russia. With the exception of 1, all parties want to significantly boost military and defense capabilities over current levels.

On the basis of a scenario analysis, the report offers four recommendations to policymakers in nation states and the EU:

Foreign and Security Policy Starts at Home. The real center of gravity of PopSovism is not formed by the political strongmen and -women who are spearheading them, but by those parts of our societies that are and/or feel left behind by technological change and globalization. The social contract between state and society must be restored by getting domestic policies ‘right’ for all constituencies.

Resist Knee-Jerk Reactions and Address Legitimate Grievances. Instead of dismissing the concerns of PopSov supporters as backwards or unfounded, policymakers should get better at parsing fact from fiction and legitimate from contrived grievance and – most importantly – at addressing both.

Give Democracy a Chance. Recent developments in the US and in various European countries show the resilience of the more traditional democratic model.

Develop Homeland Defense and Bolster Resilience. Societal, economical and political resilience is crucial. Aspects that may require specific and increased attention by defense and security organizations lie less in the realm of the ‘agents of conflict’ (’the enemy’) than in the realm of the ‘agents of resilience.’

Dutch foreign policies and the EU

With respect to Dutch foreign policies, the report concludes that its interests can best be upheld (ironically) through the vehicle of the European Union. The US is distancing itself from Europe, and the Dutch relationship with Russia is likely to remain difficult: there will be few alternatives but to pursue an even more proactive position in the European Union.

Energy transition, necessary for the successful implementation of the Paris Agreement and the delivery of the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals, requires development and large-scale deployment of low-carbon technologies. These will increase global demand for different minerals and metals, what mandates a wide range of adjustments at the state level. The need to re-think, reduce, replace, recycle, redesign and re-distribute the use of scarce commodities is particularly heightened.

Energy transition, necessary for the successful implementation of the Paris Agreement and the delivery of the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals, requires development and large-scale deployment of low-carbon technologies. These will increase global demand for different minerals and metals, what mandates a wide range of adjustments at the state level. The need to re-think, reduce, replace, recycle, redesign and re-distribute the use of scarce commodities is particularly heightened.

The message put forward at the 2017 Raw Materials Conference on June 23rd in The Hague was threefold: 1) realizing energy transition requires large amounts of raw materials and a significant upscaling of mining activities; 2) such activities have to be carried out in a sustainable manner, and should respect human rights, the needs of local communities, and the environment; 3) transition to a circular economy model in product chains is required to mitigate existing and emerging challenges in the short run. Circular design of windmills and solar panels is needed.

The challenges, takeaways and recommendations outlined in this policy paper were compiled on the basis of extensive in-house research, information gleaned at the round-table and the raw materials conference, and reflect the informed opinions of relevant stakeholders representing the government, private industry and knowledge institutes.

China’s One Belt One Road (OBOR) project was formally introduced by Chinese President Xi-Jinping in 2013. The project, aimed at integrating trade and investment in Eurasia, encompasses over $900 billion in planned investments of infrastructure across Central and South Asia, the Middle East, and Central and Eastern Europe (CEE).

China’s One Belt One Road (OBOR) project was formally introduced by Chinese President Xi-Jinping in 2013. The project, aimed at integrating trade and investment in Eurasia, encompasses over $900 billion in planned investments of infrastructure across Central and South Asia, the Middle East, and Central and Eastern Europe (CEE).

A dedicated forum for cooperation with CEE countries has been around now for several years. Originally created in April 2012, ‘the so-called ‘16+1’ framework constitutes a platform which brings heads of state together annually to strengthen dialogue and cooperation between China and the CEE region. Chinese investment interests within the CEE region appear strongly related to privatization opportunities, including large scale infrastructure projects and public procurement opportunities.

China’s interest in the CEE region, and the creation of the ‘16+1’ format in particular, also gives rise to concerns that China is attempting to use the region as a medium through which to influence the EU from within. This influence manifests itself primarily in the form of initiatives which aim to persuade and/or pressure CEE countries to adopt favorable policies vis-à-vis China. These concerns stem from two directions. First, there is a fear that some deals concluded with China may not comply with EU rules on public procurement, or other regulations and guidelines. Second, there is a fear of political influencing, which some see exhibited by the EU in avoiding direct references or statements towards China’s legal defeat over the South China Sea after the objection by some member states

China’s engagement in the Middle East is arguably the most important component of the OBOR initiative as far as its strategic objectives are concerned. Beijing enunciates a clear interest in developing strong structural ties within the region, particularly with fossil fuel exports being the centerpiece, at least for the initial stage. This also means of course that China will almost inevitably get embroiled in political matters, and thus pose a challenge to the interests of other key players such as Russia, the US and the EU. While China seeks to avoid becoming yet another outside power that meddles in the region’s affairs, it does already show signs of being prepared to become politically engaged. In its engagement in the Middle East, China’s policy is banked on the hopes of being the newish entrant in the region, which absolves it from any imperialist or interventionist baggage. This notwithstanding, regional players, are going to be tempted to play the China card when dealing with the other major (outside) powers, which will effectively pull China into the region’s political vortices.

Given OBOR’s unprecedented scale, this new study by The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies (HCSS) investigates the extent to which ‘Belt and Road’ related investments in CEE and the greater Middle East bring sufficient economic weight to both regions that at the same time can be turned into political influence. If this is indeed the case, a pertinent question to ask is whether China is prepared and willing to play a greater political (and/or security) role in CEE and the Middle East in the first place? In addition, the paper seeks to understand whether China’s role can be judged as positive or negative for regional security, as seen from the viewpoint of Europe and the Netherlands.

The study can be downloaded via the button on the right.

The report was also featured by the Morning Vertical; Radio Free Europe's daily Russia brief.

Political violence is real and present. How, why and when political violence manifests itself is crucial for turning early warning into early action. The earlier decision- and policymakers are made aware of the potential for imminent outbursts of violence, the sooner they can act to manage or mitigate the consequences or even deter the occurrence altogether. With a wealth of data and models available, it is time to reap the fruits of the data revolution. Looking at the HCSS Political Violence Monitor: what are the 10 countries most at risk of civil wars, coup d’états or state led mass killings?

The global commentariat has relentlessly bombarded international op-ed pages with accounts of crises, risks, and global dangers. And this is not without reason: we certainly live in times of great geopolitical upheaval. But we must not lose sight of the other side of the security coin, one that recognizes societal resilience as a counterweight to conflict and as a pillar of peace. This Monthly Alert counterbalances the gloom and doom that suffuses our current Zeitgeist.

The global commentariat has relentlessly bombarded international op-ed pages with accounts of crises, risks, and global dangers. And this is not without reason: we certainly live in times of great geopolitical upheaval. But we must not lose sight of the other side of the security coin, one that recognizes societal resilience as a counterweight to conflict and as a pillar of peace. This Monthly Alert counterbalances the gloom and doom that suffuses our current Zeitgeist. It flags 10 promising global trends and highlights the opportunities they yield for the global economy, security, governance, socio-economic development and global health. These trends pose groundbreaking possibilities for policymakers and can provide new avenues for future policies to make our world a better place. Each trend description includes hyperlinks to articles that offer background information and a list of ‘must read’ literature discussing their opportunities within their wider contexts.

The rising demand for natural resources including energy, minerals and agricultural products, has been driven mainly by population growth in developing countries and an improvement in living standards in many countries around the world. Various factors however serve to limit the availability of natural resources. First of all, resources are not equally distributed across the globe. Second, there are serious environmental consequences to expanding production and consumption of natural resources, such as climate change.

The rising demand for natural resources including energy, minerals and agricultural products, has been driven mainly by population growth in developing countries and an improvement in living standards in many countries around the world. Various factors however serve to limit the availability of natural resources. First of all, resources are not equally distributed across the globe. Second, there are serious environmental consequences to expanding production and consumption of natural resources, such as climate change. Third, natural resource extraction and export can be hampered by armed conflict. Finally, large exporters at times choose to restrict the export of certain commodities, for instance to promote domestic growth.

Open, transparent, and well-functioning markets for metals, minerals and other natural resources are essential for ensuring access to supply and to safeguard the economic wellbeing of nations worldwide. However, corruption, political instability and violence are factors that act as important constraints to growth in the production of natural resources and cause economic pain in countries that depend on their import.

As the second largest importer and transit hub of critical raw materials in the European Union (EU), the Netherlands has a vital interest in ensuring that global resource markets function in an open and transparent manner within a rule-based order. This report, commissioned by the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), takes a closer look at the global institutional architecture that focuses on the governance of natural resources, abiotic minerals and metals in particular. In doing so, this study seeks to identify gaps in the thematic coverage and actor representation, and come up with ways in which the Dutch MFA can improve the way it advances Dutch interests with respect to the functioning of natural resource markets. Thematically, the study devotes particular attention to the issue of security of supply, as well as sustainability (e.g., resource efficiency and environmental care) and transparency (due diligence, human rights etc.). Finally, the study identifies points of intervention in relation to specific organizations and raw materials where the MFA can exert the most influence.

In order to remain on top of the rapid changes in the international environment, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Defence have tasked The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies (HCSS) to conduct research on global trends and risks, within the framework of the Strategic Monitor. Over the past few years HCSShas provided for on-going analysis of relevant trends and conducted foresight exercises. Please find an overview of all Strategic Monitor reports below.

In order to remain on top of the rapid changes in the international environment, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Defence have tasked The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies (HCSS) to conduct research on global trends and risks, within the framework of the Strategic Monitor. Over the past few years HCSShas provided for on-going analysis of relevant trends and conducted foresight exercises. Please find an overview of all Strategic Monitor reports below.

For more information about the Strategic Monitor 2018, please click here.

Click on the image to download the PDF.

2016-2017 Volatility and Friction in the Age of Disintermediation

2015-2016: The Wheel of Fortune: Up and Down, Round and Round, Faster and Faster

2014-2015: The Return of Ghosts Hoped Past? Global Trends in Conflict and Cooperation

2013-2014: Four Strategic Challenges

2012-2013: De Toekomst in Alle Staten

Other reports part of the StratMon program that focus on specific topics:

The Vital European and Dutch Security Interests Alert considers key security discourses of principal stakeholders concerning vital European and Dutch security interests. Documents such as the Strategie Nationale Veiligheid, de Internationale Veiligheidsstrategie, Defense Strategy publications, the NATO Strategic Concept and the EU Global Strategy serve as the basis for this Alert.

The Vital European and Dutch Security Interests Alert considers key security discourses of principal stakeholders concerning vital European and Dutch security interests. Documents such as the Strategie Nationale Veiligheid, de Internationale Veiligheidsstrategie, Defense Strategy publications, the NATO Strategic Concept and the EU Global Strategy serve as the basis for this Alert. Based on a monthly summary of emerging affairs gathered through an annotated list of publications from think tanks, academic outlets, and expert blogs, the Alert also considers more specific issues as they emerge in the Dutch security discourse.

May 25th marks the first visit of U.S. President Trump to Europe. It will also be the first time the newly-elected U.S. President will attend a NATO gathering. Besides opening NATO’s new headquarters, leaders will discuss NATO’s burden sharing, counterterrorism actions and tense relations with Russia. High on the meeting’s agenda will be the 2% GDP defense spending pledge, a topic that has dominated NATO’s airwaves again since President Trump took office.

May 25th marks the first visit of U.S. President Trump to Europe. It will also be the first time the newly-elected U.S. President will attend a NATO gathering. Besides opening NATO’s new headquarters, leaders will discuss NATO’s burden sharing, counterterrorism actions and tense relations with Russia. High on the meeting’s agenda will be the 2% GDP defense spending pledge, a topic that has dominated NATO’s airwaves again since President Trump took office. The US administration has been clear about its demand for its European partners to spend more of their national budgets on defense and adhere to the Wales 2% GDP spending pledge. The EU-NATO partnership has meanwhile gained in importance. The potential of enhanced cooperation between the EU and NATO is clear: more efficient defense spending will yield both more and better capabilities, and in turn boost NATO’s defense posture. This alert sets out the key strategic challenges and opportunities and offers four recommendations for the leaders of state meeting in Brussels.

Read the alert by downloading the document via the button on the right.