Mr. Cheney, Try Mr. Nunn's Way

Published: April 29, 1990

Defense Secretary Cheney revealed a bit more this week about how he intends to reduce the Pentagon budget. He announced a cutback in procurement of some new aircraft, like the Stealth bomber. But he'll have to do more just to meet his own target of reductions of 2 percent a year in 1991 through 1995. And he'll have to do much more to meet the growing demand in Congress to cut the military budget substantially and establish a meaningful peace dividend.

Mr. Cheney's hold-the-line defense budget simply won't fly politically. That became abundantly clear in recent weeks when powerful Senators from both parties - John McCain of Arizona and William Cohen of Maine, both Republicans, and Sam Nunn, chairman of the Armed Services Committee, a Democrat - called for much sharper spending cuts. Mr. Nunn, for example, wants to slash up to $7 billion from the $295 billion proposed by Mr. Cheney for outlays in 1991, and $190 billion from the Pentagon's five-year projected outlays.

That three such prominent Senators have stepped forward, all staunch supporters of a muscular defense, reflects the basic judgment that Mr. Cheney has not gone far or fast enough. But Mr. Nunn's contribution went beyond his numbers. He offered budget-cutters simple, sensible guidelines to help frame the debate over how much is enough -something Mr. Cheney hasn't done. Congress will find Mr. Nunn's guidance useful, even as it looks for more places than he or Mr. Cheney found to cut.

What Mr. Nunn grasps is that to minimize haphazard cutting, the Government needs new principles for meeting a fundamentally altered military threat. He offers four core propositions: With a reduced threat of a Soviet tank attack on Western Europe, the U.S. no longer needs most of the heavy armored divisions it has deployed there. It does need smaller, more transportable conventional forces capable of reinforcing Europe or meeting threats elsewhere. With much longer warning times, America need not maintain its readiness at today's high levels. It can begin to rely more on reserve forces and reduce the frequency of expensive military exercises. With the pace of technological advance likely to slow in the Soviet military, the United States can afford to upgrade rather than replace existing weapons. It can also forgo modernizing some altogether. With negotiated cuts in nuclear forces in the offing, the U.S. can reduce the size of the nuclear deterrent and reliance on using it first.

Mr. Nunn proposes outright elimination of several proposed weapons - new advanced tactical fighters, new light helicopters, Seawolf attack submarines and advanced air-to-air missiles. He'd upgrade existing weapons instead. The only major new weapon that Mr. Cheney wants to cancel so far is the Marines' Osprey aircraft. They could both take advantage of the moment to go further and cancel other doubtful weapons like Bigeye chemical bombs, the advanced launch system and the Milstar satellite system.

Both men would slow procurement of the A-12 attack aircraft, C-17 transport plane and Stealth bomber. But stretching out procurement is a costly way to save. For example, Mr. Cheney cuts back procurement of Stealth bombers from 132 to 75, but saves only $14 billion. That's because the already exorbitant cost per plane rises sharply - from $530 to $815 million by one estimate. Why not cancel these programs altogether?

With his budget proposals and policy guidelines, Mr. Nunn has set the right terms for Congressional debate. Even though Mr. Cheney has begun a more serious bargaining process, he now has to come forward with deeper and more realistic cuts and a policy to shape them.