Summary: Two PLA Air Force senior colonels
argue that modern warfare dissolves boundaries between the civilian and
military spheres. Victory will depend upon innovative combinations of weapons,
tactics, and arenas of engagement (often well off traditional battlefields).
Drawing on U.S. thinkers such as Brzezinski and Toffler, the two senior
colonels place their discussion of the revolution in military affairs in
the context of onrushing globalism that they see as weakening states and
strengthening international organizations and NGOs. "Unrestricted
Warfare" is a very abstract book. It offers no concrete prescriptions
for strategy and tactics or for the reorganization of the Chinese military.
Chinese military thinkers, faced with the problem of defending their country
against stronger foreign militaries, seem to see in this book inspiration
on how a weaker military can use superior tactics to defeat a stronger
enemy. During 1999 many military affairs books and web sites appeared.
"The Global Revolution in Military Affairs" published by the
PLA Publishing House in April 1999 complements "Unrestricted Warfare".

This summary translation concludes a four part
series on the February 1999 book "Unrestricted Warfare" written
by PLA Air Force Senior Colonels Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui. The first
three parts are on the U.S. Embassy Beijing website at http://www.usembassy-china.org.cn/english/sandt/index.html

World Military Affairs Interview with Author, Editor
of "Unrestricted Warfare" in January 2000 Issue

World Military Affairs [Shijie Junshi] in its
January 2000 issue (pp. 28 - 31) interviews "Unrestricted Warfare"
author Qiao Liang and his editor Xiang Xiaomi [STC: 7309 1420 4717]. Qiao
Liang said that during a 1996 military exercise along the southeastern
coast of China he and his co-author decided to write a book of reflections
on the revolution in military affairs that preoccupied military theorists.
Qiao said that "Unrestricted Warfare" had received considerable
attention in Russia, Europe and the United States. Xiao noted that during
Summer 1999, the western media including CNN, VOA, BBC reported on the
book. He added that New York Times and Washington Post reports that implied
that the authors were promoting terrorism had misunderstood the book.

Imaginative Thinking,Tactics: Hope for Weaker Militaries

Qiao said that the heart of "Unrestricted
Warfare" is breaking down the traditional ways of looking at war so
that one can think about war from a new perspective. According to Qiao,
the national security threat no longer comes from traditional military
forces but from non-military operations, trade wars, finance wars, etc.
Technology far outruns military thought, especially in the United States.
The big gap between generations of weapons makes it hard for decisive battles
to be fought between opponents that are at radically different technology
levels. Today many different generations of weapons coexist. The U.S. counts
on an extremely expensive military machine to fight "no casualty"
warfare for its security. "Unrestricted Warfare" points out,
according to author Senior Colonel Qiao, how a weaker country can take
advantage of the tactical lag of a great power by using imaginative strategies
and tactics.

[Note: The authors on p. 106 of "Unrestricted
Warfare" argue not that the U.S. lags other countries in strategy
and tactics but that its strategy and tactics lag far behind its own high
tech prowess. End note]

Recent PRC Books, Military Websites Discuss Modern
Warfare

Military books, magazines and websites are
fashionable in China today. Hobbyists run nearly all the military websites.
Postings and articles on these websites sometimes appear to be well-informed
and plausible albeit unsourced. These postings have become a security concern
for the Chinese government. Lists of Chinese military affairs websites
can be found on major PRC Internet portals such as Sina.Com (www.sina.com.cn),
Netease (www.netease.com) and Eastnet (www.eastnet.com.cn).

Many of the books on military affairs by Chinese
journalists merely introduce foreign military hardware and so are of limited
interest. Books written by the Chinese military, however are much more
interesting. The PLA Publishing House has thus far issued several volumes
in its series "Perspectives on Military Affairs in the Twenty-First
Century". The first four volumes in the series are:

Information War [Xinxi Zhanzheng] published in November 1998

Digital Troops [Shuzihua Budui]

The Weapons of 2020 [2020 Nian de Wuqi] by the PRC Defense S&T
Information Center [Zhongguo Guofang Keji Xinxi Zhongxin] in February 1999

New Global Revolution in Military Affairs" [Shijie Xin Junshi
Geming] by Wang Baocun [STC: 3769 0202 1317]" in April 1999.

A Better Book? A Capsule Summary of "The New
Global Revolution in Military Affairs" by Wang Baocun

The "New Global Revolution in Military
Affairs", overlaps considerably with "Unrestricted Warfare"
and in some ways it is a better book. Three chapters (50 pages) cover the
gestation, infancy and adolescence of the revolution in military affairs
(RMA). About fifty pages are devoted to the historical development of the
revolution in military affairs in the USSR, Europe, Japan and the United
States. The next several chapters discuss how new technologies, the faster
pace of change and especially information technologies have transformed
the world and military affairs.

One chapter surveys U.S. - USSR Cold War confrontations
that spurred the RMA and then notes that in the post Cold War years the
danger of a general war is far less than before. Another chapter discusses
on how The Gulf War showcased information warfare and information-enhanced
weaponry. New technologies and new weapons are giving birth to new technologies,
new ways of organizing military units, and new strategies. The "Global
RMA" concludes with chapters on

The characteristics and trends of the RMA,

Information warfare as the core of the RMA,

Digital troops and the digital battlefield,

The RMA's much greater demand for highly educated soldiers,

The effect of the RMA on the global strategic situation.

Comparing "The Global RMA" and "Unrestricted
Warfare"

"Unrestricted Warfare" gives an Olympian
view of the RMA, argues that the most important RMA is in the mind of the
commander and strategist and that RMA is not the same thing as information
warfare. "The Global RMA" takes the conventional (especially
in China!) approach of introducing the historical development of the RMA,
saying what the RMA is, and where it is going. The Olympian perspective
on RMA in "Unrestricted Warfare" is invaluable. However, the
reader (especially perhaps the Chinese reader without access to the abundant
English language material on the RMA) is left with the impression that
the two PLA senior colonels are more original than they really are.

"Unrestricted Warfare" and "The
Global RMA" are good books that complement one other. The scary title
may have contributed greatly to the success of "Unrestricted Warfare".
Another contributing factor may have been the senior colonels' challenge
to Chinese military thinkers. The authors called on them to strive to become
superior in tactics and strategy so that they could confront a materially
and technologically superior enemy. This message meshed well with the national
defense concerns aroused in the minds of many Chinese following the mistaken
NATO bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade in May 1999.

A Soldier's Military Novel: Breaking Out of
Encirclement

Chinese high tech warfare also has a novel.
A November 1998 novel on high tech warfare by Lt. Col. Liu Jianwei {STC:
2692 1696 0251], "Breaking Out of Encirclement" Tuchu Chongwei
[STC: 4499 0427 6850 0953] is in its third printing. The novel revolves
around a large-scale Chinese wargame. According to the dust jacket, the
novel examines the political, economic challenges including corruption
and technical backwardness faced by the Chinese military at century's end.
The novel was published by the People's Literature Publishing House. Chinese
Central Television just finished broadcasting a twenty-part series based
on this novel. The actors, according to a January 28, 2000 PLA Daily article,
were special forces troops of the Chengdu military district. According
to a advertisement during the broadcast, recordings of the series will
be available in the Video Compact Disk (VCD) format.

The Sources of "Unrestricted Warfare"

"Unrestricted Warfare" contains many
references to U.S. military doctrine on modern warfare as well as writings
on geopolitics, economics and society by writers such as Zbigniew Brzezinski
and Alvin Toffler. The two senior colonels quote approvingly Zbigniew Brzezinski's
books "Out of Control : Global Turmoil on the Eve of the Twenty-First
Century" and "The Grand Chessboard : American Primacy and Its
Geostrategic Imperatives". The footnotes to "Unrestricted Warfare"
bear witness to the strong influence of U.S. military and geopolitical
thinkers on Chinese thinking. Brzezinski's books have appeared in Chinese
translation. A full Chinese translation of "The Grand Chessboard"
is even available on the Internet at http://www.goldnets.com/zz/zz/b/burejinsiji/daqiju/index.html

"Unrestricted Warfare" has several
references to Col. Chen Bojiang's [STC: 7115 0130 3068] Spring 1998 interviews
with U.S. military leaders and academics. Chen's book "Interviews
with U.S. Generals and Famous Scholars: the Revolution in Military Affairs
on the Other Side of the Pacific" [Meiguo Gaoji Jiangling yu Zhuming
Xuezhe Fangtanluu] was published by the World Knowledge Publishing House
in November 1998. This same publisher also issued the same book in English
as an English study aid. Col. Chen spent the 1997 - 98 academic year in
the United States on a Ford Foundation grant. General Zhao Nanqi, a Vice
Chairman of the National People's Consultative Congress concluded his late
1998 foreword to Lt. Colonel Chen's book with a wish for improved friendly
exchanges between the militaries of China and the United States.

BEGIN SUMMARY TRANSLATION UNRESTRICTED WARFARE
PART 4

Some subheads are added for the convenience
of the reader

In Search of the Secrets of Victory

"Brilliant military maneuvers should
be routine, but once the enemy is expecting a brilliant movement, I hit
him with a very conventional attack. This is making conventional tactics
serve as brilliant maneuvers but once the enemy realizes that you are using
conventional tactics then I hit him with a brilliant movement." --
Li Shimin [Note: Founder of the Tang Dynasty. End note]

Certainly we can see that making a proper combination
of forces is important, but how do we decide what is the proper combination
of forces. The Golden Mean, the ratio of 0.618 remarked on in the writing
of the ancient Greeks is also to be found in Chinese military history and
throughout military history. We see it in the shapes of bullets and missiles
and in the trajectory of bombers about to drop their bombs. We can see
this ratio in the German war against the Soviet Union. The turning point
of the war was Stalingrad at the 17 month point of the 26 month long German
offensive campaign. After August 1943 the Germans were always on the defensive
on the Eastern Front. 17 divided by 26 gives us the Golden Section!

Searching For the Pattern Lying Beneath Incessant
Change

Before the Gulf War military experts estimated
that if the Iraqi Republican Guard lost 30 percent of its forces, it would
no longer be an effective fighting unit. Thus Desert Storm did not begin
until Iraqi strength was brought down to about 60 percent of where it was
at the beginning of Desert Shield. This 60 percent ratio is very close
to the Golden Section. Yet this should not be understood narrowly as a
certain number but rather as a pattern that can be discerned despite the
incessant variations of forms and circumstances. [pp. 166 - 179]

Methods, Tactics, Resources, Objectives Must Be
Compatible

Methods, tactics, resources and objectives
need to be compatible. Even a rich country like the United States must
pay attention to the efficient use of resources. Severe resource constraints
affect tactics. For example the Soviet Union as its strength declined came
to rely nearly exclusively on its nuclear forces while the United States
aimed for all round superiority. The USSR based these choices on obsolete
thinking. The killing power of a weapon is only one of its characteristics.
As terrorists such as Ben Laden have shown, military tactics are just one
kind of action. The increasing array of offensive tactics have brought
with them the increasing participation of civilians in warfare. The hacker
attacks against U.S. and Indian defense installations are examples. [pp.
180 - 183]

No matter what action is involved the main
problem is deciding the tactics to be used and the point of attack. And
the heart of this for Alexander, for Hannibal and for Nimitz as it was
for the ancient Chinese military strategists was to do the unexpected.
[pp. 183 - 184]

Patterns, Not Formulas

It is hard to explain what warfare is. Warfare
requires the support of technology but technology is no substitute for
morale and strategy. Warfare requires a sensitive appreciation of technology
but does not permit romanticism or sentimentality. Warfare requires mathematical
accuracy but such accuracy can sometimes lead it astray into mere mechanical
operations and rigidity. Warfare requires the abstraction of philosophy
but philosophical debates have no place amidst the blood and iron of the
battlefield. Not rules but patterns can be discerned in warfare. We do
see patterns such as the Golden Section of 0.618 but there are no constant
patterns. Someone who insisted on a strategy based always on the Golden
Section would certainly lose. For example, we might well choose a "golden"
deviation of 0.618 off center for our targeting but following any strategy
will not guarantee victory. This Golden Section of western wisdom coincides
very remarkably with the deviation concept of ancient Chinese strategic
thought. [pp. 185 - 188]

[Note: Footnotes include works on Pythagoreas
and Greek philosophy; Bevin Alexander's "How the Marshal Win's Wars",
Lidell Hart's "History of the Second World War", the U.S. Army's
"Concept of The Army in 2010", USAF late 1997 "Global Participation
USAF Strategic Concept", articles in PRC military journals on Col.
Chen Bojiang's visit to the Fort Irwin National Training Center. For a
discussion of quantitative methods, the authors refers to a 1993 book edited
by Li Hongzhi [Note: Not the Falungong Li. End note] entitled "Quantitative
Analysis Methods for International Politics and Military Problems".
End note]

"Today's wars affect the price of the
fuel that flows through the oil pipelines, the prices of food in the supermarket,
and the prices of stocks on the stock exchange. Wars can also destroy ecological
balances and through the television screen enter the homes of each one
of us." -- Alvin Toffler

[Note: The theories of Alvin Toffler are well
known and appreciated in China. End note]

Ten Thousand Methods Come Down to One: Unrestricted
Combinations

Understanding the patterns of victory does
not guarantee victory just as understanding the strategy of running in
a marathon does not ensure victory. The wars of the future will require
what most soldiers find themselves unprepared to do: to win the unconventional
wars and the battles off the battlefield. From this point of view even
Generals Powell, Schwarzkopf and Shalikashvili are not "modern"
but rather traditional military men. There is a big gap between the conventional
and the modern. A gap that can be bridged, but only by deep thinkers. What
soldiers need to do now is to be military Machiavellis.

The unlimited warfare thinking can be found
in the thought of the Italian Renaissance thinker Machiavelli and of course
much earlier in the Chinese military thinker Han Feizi.

Unlimited warfare means the overcoming of boundaries,
restrictions and even taboos that separate the military from the non-military,
the weapon from the non-weapon, and military personnel from non-military
personnel. Yet unrestricted warfare does not Mean that unlimited methods
are always suitable.

As we said before, combination is the Marshal's
cocktail. The narrow seeking of combinations only from elements within
the military arena is too narrow. To win the wars of today and tomorrow,
you must employ all the resources available to you to conduct war. This
is not enough, you have to see a pattern to guide you in determining the
most effective combination. [pp. 195 - 198]

Super National Combinations

We have been talking in this book about the
overcoming of restrictions. But every overcoming of restrictions must necessarily
take place with a limited arena. Unrestricted does not Mean unlimited.
Unrestricted warfare expands the limits to bring into play more resources
and methods in new combinations. When the national security is threatened,
resistance is not simply a matter of just choosing military action against
a foreign state. National security is the highest security concept. For
the Chinese, national security is equivalent to the "all under heaven"
[tianxia] . But for a geographically or ethnically defined state it is
nothing more than one of the links in the global village. States today
are ever more influenced by regional or global super-state organizations
such as the European Union, OPEC, the IMF, the World Bank, the WTO and
the organizations of the United Nations. NGOs including multinational corporations,
professional associations, Green Peace, the International Olympic Committee,
religious organizations, terrorist organizations, and hacker groups are
important too. These super-state, international and NGO organizations are
creating the new global power structure.

From Power Politics of States to Superstatal Organizations

We are now in a time of transition in which
great powers in politics are ceding place to super-state politics. Many
extremes manifest themselves and many processes are just beginning. It
is still not clear whether in the world today the power of states or the
power of the super-state organizations, international organizations and
NGOs will predominate. On one hand, states and especially the United States
-- a great power across the board --- and some other states such as Germany
and Japan as important economic powers still have a leading role. China
as a large developing country and Russia as a great country are trying
to exert their influence on world affairs. Some farseeing powers make use
of the power of the super-state - international organization - NGO combination
to augment their own influence to achieve otherwise unattainable objectives.
The introduction of the Euro as a European currency is an example.

[Note: Footnote references for this passage
to Chinese translations of two books by Zbigniew Brzezinski -- "Out
of Control : Global Turmoil on the Eve of the Twenty-First Century"
and "The Grand Chessboard : American Primacy and Its Geostrategic
Imperatives". Also referred to is Alvin Toffler's 1991 "Powershift
: Knowledge, Wealth, and Violence at the Edge of the 21st Century"
End note]

As Borders Become Permeable, Interest Defined More
Broadly

In a world in which politics, economics, ideology,
technology and culture penetrate national borders freely those who take
a very narrow definition of state interests and security will have a difficult
time. One example is idiots like Saddam Hussein who try to make a naked
grab for territory. This kind of move in doomed to failure in the late
20th Century. As far as a state seeking its own security and
interests, the United States is much more subtle than Iraq. Ever since
the U.S. had come onto the world stage, the U.S. has gotten far more advantages
from other countries that Iraq would have gotten from its conquest of Kuwait.
Grabbing an oil field isn't just a matter of "might makes right"
and is not just a matter of a violation of international principles.

The U.S. Strives to Act Through International Groupings

In all its actions, the U.S. is the one that
is always trying to pull together the largest number of allies so that
it won't become isolated. Except for its actions against small countries
like Grenada and Panama, the U.S. seeks to involve a super-state organization
to achieve its interests. The U.S. organized a group of 30 nations to counterattack
Iraq under the command of a U.S. general and got UN approval for its actions.
[p. 201]

Economic, Political, Cultural Globalization Good
and Bad

After the Gulf War the trend towards super-state
organization settling conflicts has become more pronounced. What we are
seeing is economic globalization, the internationalization of the domestic
politics of individual states, the networking of information resources,
the shortening of technology innovation cycles, the concealment of cultural
conflicts, and the strengthening of NGOs which brings humanity advantages
and disadvantages in equal measure.

Most of the national security threats today
come from non-state actors. Only a super-state combination can respond
to these threats effectively.

The U.S. Aims to Be Lead Every International Organization

The world's only remaining superpower, the
United States, is the country that has been best at using supernational
organizations as a weapon to achieve its objectives. The U.S. participates
in all the international organizations it can and strives to guide their
actions to put them in line with U.S. interests. No matter whether it be
in Europe, the Americas, or Asia, the U.S. wants to put part of every organization
so that it can take the lead within. The 1996 U.S. Department of Defense
annual report put it bluntly: "In order to protect and realize U.S.
interests, the U.S. government must have the ability to influence the policies
and actions of other states. This means that the United States must participate
in foreign affairs, particularly in those regions where U.S. interests
are most threatened."

APEC is An Example

One example of this is APEC. The Australian
Prime Minister's initial APEC concept was a grouping of Asian countries
to include Australia and New Zealand. President Bush strongly opposed this
concept, so the U.S. and Canada joined APEC. The U.S. has prevented Asian
economic cooperation from emerging by the conclusion of agreements between
the North American Free Trade Area and some Asian countries. This strategy
of pushing into Asia and pulling others out to NAFTA can be called a two
level strategy.

How The U.S. Profited From the Asian Financial Crisis

Most objectionable of all is the way the Americans
handled the Asian Financial Crisis. As the Crisis began the U.S. immediately
vetoed the Japanese suggestion that Japan set up an Asian Monetary Fund
while insisting that matters be handled through the IMF in which the U.S.
is a major stockholder. Then the U.S. set conditions on IMF assistance
aimed at forcing the Asian countries to accept the U.S. economic liberalization
policy. The USD 57 billion loan to South Korea required South Korea to
open up its market so that the U.S. could buy Korean companies cheaply.
This action of the developed countries with the U.S. at it head is a kind
of economic occupation.

We can put it all together and look at the
big picture. We see these the actions of the U.S. government, of people
like George Soros, in the rise in U.S. mutual funds in ten years from USD
810 billion to USD 5 trillion. We can also see it in the actions of Moody
and of Morgan Stanley in reducing the credit ratings of Japan and Hong
Kong at the most critical time. We can see it in the concerns raised by
Alan Greenspan on whether the anti-speculator counterattack by the Hong
Kong government was changing the playing rules. We can also see it in the
precedent shattering rescue of the Long Term Credit Management (LTCM) investment
company on the one hand and on the other the voices in Asia that said "no"
or called for an Asian Century. All these things fit together.

[Note: Footnotes cite the Japanese rightist
Ishihara Shintaro, Fortune magazine, and the Russian press as translated
in the PRC newspaper "Reference News" Cankao Xiaoxi. End note.]

Regardless of U.S. Intentions Were In Then, the
Asian Financial Crisis Showed the Potential Power of Financial Warfare

If we put all those things together, can we
say that it was the first coordinated action among super-state organizations,
international organizations and NGOs? Although there is no direct proof
that the U.S. government and the U.S. Federal Reserve made a detailed plan
beforehand we can see just how they could have used this immensely powerful
and silent weapon. But we can, from what can be seen, say that at least
some of these action got their active or at least tacit consent beforehand.
This is the heart of the question that we address here. Not whether the
U.S. consciously used financial warfare against the Asian countries but
whether this [combination] is practical as a weapon of financial war. The
answer is yes, it is. [pp. 198 - 204]

The Combination of The Superregional: Breaking Barriers

When we speak of supernational and superregional
combinations and than add the words "combat operations" [zhanzheng
xingdong] we get at an important concept. Only by breaking down regional
barriers can our thinking be free. This is the same concept as the Full
Dimensional Warfare of U.S. military theorists. Yet this U.S. concept,
the invention of some brilliant soldiers, does not have a solid intellectual
foundation so it may prove to be just a flash in the pan.

[Note. From the footnotes to this section:
"In the U.S. publication "Joint Forces Concept for 2010",
it can be seen that "Full dimensional warfare" is limited to
the military arena and really comes down to improving the information security
of U.S. forces. According to the head of the U.S. Army Quartermaster Corps,
full dimensional means a force that can go anywhere in the world. Clearly
for the U.S. forces the full dimensionsal concept has been emptied of its
meaning. Only the name remains." End note.]

The expansion of the scope of war is the natural
consequence of the expansion of the scope of human activities. The civilian
sector was once considered to be merely subordinate to military necessity.
We see this narrow thinking in General Kutuzov's burning of Moscow to prevent
Napoleon from getting supplies and in the bombings of Dresden, Hiroshima
and Nagasaki. Now all areas, the military and the civilian, should be seen
as one.

Death and Destruction No Longer Measure War Intensity

Destruction and slaughter are not the measure
of the intensity of war. That is an obsolete concept. War can now be intense
with low or even no casualties. For example, information warfare, financial
warfare, and trade warfare. One example is the sharp decline of the Taiwan
stock market in Spring 1996 when mainland China began a series of missile
tests in the Taiwan straits. While this wasn't planned as part of the mainland
Chinese strategy but if stock market attacks were to be combined with military
operations wouldn't that boost the effectiveness of an attack? [pp. 205
- 208]

The Combination of Super-Methods

Should special methods be used in a murderous
war say to carry out psychological operations against soldiers' families
in the rear? Should assassination be a tool in the protection of a country's
financial security? Should special funds be set up to influence the operation
of a foreign government or national assembly? Should stock purchase or
control be used to control the mass media of a foreign country? These questions
all involve the use of supernational or superregional use of methods. This
can be called the combination of super-methods.

What methods are at the level of individuals
is easy; at the level of the state it is a much more complex question.
means and ends can be hard to distinguish. For a super-state organization,
an individual state might be a means. The military, political, economic
and other areas can be seen as means. Economic assistance, trade embargoes
and cultural penetration can also be seen as means. Methods of science
and technology can be used as means for one's own benefit or to hurt an
enemy. As Liddell Hart said, strategy is "the artof distributing
military meansto fulfil the ends of policy."

A Broader Perspective is Needed

What is needed is a broadening of perspective
so as to understand that anything can be a means. For example when the
personnel at the U.S. Embassy in Iran were taken hostage, the U.S. first
used military means and then after that failed switched to freezing Iran's
foreign assets, stopping arms shipments and supporting Iraq in the Iran-Iraq
conflict. Finally, it made diplomatic efforts through a number of channels
to eventually win the release of the hostages.

[Note: Of course the failed rescue effort was
carried out only after several months of diplomatic efforts. The authors
cite "The Analysis of International Relations" by [transliteration
of foreign author: Ka-er Duo-yi] as the source of this misinformation.
End note]

From Broader Thinking Emerge New Means

States often don't understand how to combine
super-means and supranational approaches. NGOs do however. Terrorist organizations
and George Soros are examples. To free our thinking what first of all needs
to be overcome are ethics or principles which limit our thinking about
means. That is much harder than merely combining one method with another.
For example to harm the economy of another country, an attacking country
need not use military means or a blockade. Merely adjusting economic policy
to make exchange rates go up or down can create public pressure in the
attacked country for a policy change. We can see that this strategy is
possible from the way the Asian Financial Crisis dampened arms races in
the region although in this case there wasn't any big country trying to
change the monetary policy of other countries.

A Responsible Power, China Refused To Devalue Its
Currency

China, a country that is on the verge of becoming
a global power, has the power to influence the world economy. If China
were a selfish, self-seeking country and had betrayed its 1998 commitment
not to devalue the Renminbi, an RMB devaluation certainly would have deepened
the crisis. A devaluation would have upset world financial markets and
severely hurt the United States which as the biggest debtor nation in the
world depends upon net capital inflows. That result of an RMB devaluation
would have been greater than a military attack.

The intertwining of interests and the expansion
of the scope of war means that any country of sufficient importance has
the capacity to threaten other countries by non-military means. [pp. 208
- 212]

The Combination of Levels

Wars have stages. A war might progress from
a local war to a regional war and then to a world war. There might be battles
at each level. Victory or defeat is the result of an accumulation of victories
and defeats. The question is how to combine a tactical maneuver or a battle
directly or strategically with the level or war or strategy being employed.
In this we distinguish four stages that are essentially the same as those
of U.S. military thinkers.

[Note: Reference is made to USAF order AFM1-1
translated in "Fundamental Aerospace Ethics of the USAF"
published in 1992 by the Military Sciences Publishing House. End note]

Military thinkers need to think how to integrate
actions at all levels to win a war. Bin Laden with two car bomb attacks
-- a tactical level action -- was able to threaten U.S. security at the
strategic level. A hacker with a modem can cause an enemy as much damage
as a war. [pp. 213 - 218]

[Note: References include the Summer 1996 Armed
Forces Quarterly and the "Joint Forces Concept for 2010" End
note.]

Necessary Principles

"Principles are the precepts of behavior
but they are not absolute precepts" -- George Kennan

Sun Zi was the first to apply principles to
fix the ways of fighting war. His principles such as "Know yourself,
know your enemy and you will be victorious", "Hit them when they
are not ready and come out of where they are not looking", "Avoid
the strong and attack the hollow" are article of faith among soldiers
to this day. The English general J.F.C. Fuller distilled five principles
that still guide Western soldiers.

Precision guided missiles and non-lethal weapons
have reversed the course of war: the new trend of war is towards less death
and destruction. All military ideas arise from a certain time. Sun Zi's
ideas arose from China's Spring and Autumn Period. Fuller's are drawn from
the lessons of the Napoleonic Wars. The Full Dimensional War Fighting concept
of American military thinkers and our Unrestricted Combination War Fighting
grew out of the Gulf War.

As a patterns of fighting wars coalesce into
strategy, principles emerge. The worth of these principles and tactics
[of unrestricted warfare combination war fighting] will not be clear until
they have been tested in war. [pp. 223 - 225]

Here they are:

Full Dimensionsional -- This is the
starting point of unrestricted warfare thought. Its basic demand is that
in looking at battlefields and potential battlefields all methods, plans
and resources be brought into play. There is no distinction between on
and off the battlefield. Politics, economics and culture are also battlefields.

Simultaneity -- Operate in many different
spaces at the same time. Many kinds of tactics that were once down in stages
can now be done simultaneously. Modern communications made it possible
for one U.S. information warfare base to provide attack data for 4000 targets
to 1200 aircraft within one minute.

Limited Objectives -- Make an action
plan within the scope of available means. Always consider whether an objective
is practically attainable. Do not seek objectives that are not limited
in time and space. The mistake of General McArthur in the Korean War is
the classic case of expanding a limited objective. The experience of the
U.S. in Vietnam and of the USSR in Afghanistan prove the same point. Means
must be adequate to the objective in view.

National Interests and National Values Are Different

Yet not all political and military leaders
understand this. For example the "1996 U.S. Defense Department Report"
quoted President Clinton as saying " As the world's strongest country,
we have the responsibility of leadership, and to take action where our
interests and values are severely threatened." President Clinton didn't
understand that national interests and nations values belong to two different
strategic levels. The first is that the United States is able to take action
to achieve its objectives. But the second is unattainable and is not an
objective that the United States should pursue outside its own borders.
[p. 229]

Globalist Ideology Tempts USA to Unlimited Objectives

In the ideology of globalism, as opposed to
isolationism, the Americans are expanding their national strength in the
direction of unlimited objectives This will lead inevitably to tragedy.
A company with limited capital yet unlimited responsibility will inevitably
go bankrupt.

Unrestricted means -- Move in the direction
of no restrictions in the means used, but the means used are restricted
in that they must be proportional to the objective sought. Unrestricted
means is in opposition to restricted means and does not signify that any
and all means may be used. means must be suited to objectives. Unrestricted
warfare ideology is about expanding the scope of means and not about expanding
objectives. General Sherman's devastation of Savannah in order to break
the resistance of the Southerners in the U.S. Civil War is an excellent
example of the use of unrestricted means to achieve the war objectives
of the North.

Unbalanced -- Seek the action point
by moving along a direction opposite to that of balance and symmetry. This
ancient Chinese war fighting principle of deviating from the center aims
to find the enemy's weak point.

Minimal Expenditure -- Use the minimum
amount of battle resources needed to achieve an objective. A case of needless
expenditure was the war of attrition fought by the Germans and the French
at Verdun. An example of applying this principle is the German crossing
of the Maginot Line in World War II using the blitzkrieg strategy.

[Comment: The German forces went around the
Maginot Line and through Belgium in World War II. They did not cross the
Maginot Line. End note]

Multiple Dimension Coordination -- coordinate
all the military and non-military resources available to achieve an objective.
The battlefield can be anything and any force might be used in a war. Thus
multiple dimension coordination is essential.

Make Adjustments Throughout -- War is
full of chance and opportunities for creativity. Thus adjustments must
be made continually. The art of continual adjustment made possible by modern
communications has become even more of an art with the great increase in
the number of different elements involved in war.

[Note: Footnotes include references to a Chinese
translation of "The Theory and Conduct of War" by General Fuller;
the nine military principles of the U.S. military; the U.S. military "United
Forces Concept for the Year 2010". End note] [pp. 225 - 240]

Conclusion

Globalism is an growing trend. No longer is
the nation-state the top level of social, political, economic and cultural
organization because now there are supranational and super-regional organizations.
This development challenges conceptions of national sovereignty, national
interests and the very idea of nationhood more than ever before. War has
gone beyond being the business of soldiers and beyond the scope of merely
military affairs. War is becoming more and more the business of politicians,
scientists and even bankers. Clemenceau said at the beginning of the Twentieth
Century "War is far too important to be left to the military."

The revolution in military affairs brought
about a radical transformation in the last decade of the Twentieth Century.
War has expanded beyond the confrontation of two armies. Think of Lockerbie;
think of the bombings in Nairobi and in Dar es Salaam. This is the cruelty
of the new warfare. This is warfare in the age of globalism.

Soldiers Must Ask Themselves Just What Do I Do?

With the turn of the century, soldiers need
to ask themselves, "What do I do?" If Bin Laden and Soros are
military men, then who isn't? If Powell, Schwarzkopf, Dayan can be considered
politicians, then who is a politician? That is the question of globalism
and warfare in the age of globalism

The distinction between soldiers and non-soldiers
has broken down. The distinction between war and non-war has broken down.
All these questions are related to the onrush of globalism. The key to
resolving these questions must suit the requirements of strategy and tactics
and must be suitable for politicians and for the general down to the foot
soldier. That key is unrestricted warfare.

[Note: Footnotes refer to a US Army manual
TRADOC PAMPHLET 525-5: FORCE XXI OPERATIONS that "clearly refers to
'non-state forces" as the "future enemy" and to a Chinese
book entitled "Map of the World in the Information Age" by Wang
Xiaodong published by China Renmin Daxue Publishing House in 1997. End
note.]