Hello everyone, I copied Valsiner (2007) which has his final ideas on
abduction and specifically thinking as a cultural process
Please tell me if you cannot open these pages I have a limited technology
Denise
-----Original Message-----
From: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu] On
Behalf Of mike cole
Sent: 07 August 2010 19:21
To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
Subject: Re: [xmca] Valsiner and pseudoconcepts
Thanks Denise.
This time of year (in northern hemisphere) everyone is moving around in
every which direction. And when lots of people get into the discussion.
multi-voicedness goes ballistic!!
Will read Valsiner on abduction with interest. Mulling over the abduction/
imagination connection which intuitively works, although I had not connect
the two ideas before (the influence, too, of prior discussions about LSV and
imagination).
Sure a lot of threads entangled here. very interesting.
mike
On Fri, Aug 6, 2010 at 6:46 AM, Denise Newnham <dsnewnham@bluewin.ch> wrote:

Dear Michael,
I wrote to Jaan about your question as no where was it clearly stipulated
in
the earlier works and he has just replied so I forward his words and text
Denise
Dear Denise,
Good question! In 1998 I was somewhat naively optimistic about Peirce cand
abduction (see Pizarroso & V 2009 on overcoming that optimism).
But the 1998 quote from my book is indeed an embryonic form of what later
(2001 in Potsdam, and more thoroughly in my 2007 book CULTURE IN MINDS AND
SOCIETIES became clear-- words as POINT-LIKE CONCEPTS cannot be the

highest

level of semiotic mediation as they would close up further creativity of
meaning-making. So Vygotsky was basically limited.
Instead, the pseudo-concept translates in my terminology into field-type
sign (Level 4 in my system of semiotic mediation)
Jaan
From: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu] On
Behalf Of Michael Glassman
Sent: 05 August 2010 15:22
To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
Subject: RE: [xmca] Valsiner and pseudoconcepts
Hi Denise,
I was wondering, does Valsiner have an argument as to how and why
pseudo-concepts actally aids in Peirces ilogic of abduction. I am
currently
under the impresson that abduction is primarily about hypothesis

generation

- the ability to develop new hypotheses in response to unique problems.

So

I'm wondering what role pseudo-concepts, if we are going by Vygotsky's
definition, might play in all this.
Michael
_____
From: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu on behalf of Denise Newnham
Sent: Thu 8/5/2010 5:26 AM
To: ablunden@mira.net; 'eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity'
Subject: RE: [xmca] Valsiner and pseudoconcepts
Hello Andy, the reference as you saw to pseudoconcepts is in his book 'The
guided mind' 1998 and the other is : The development of the concept of
development: Historical and epistemological perspectives. In W. Damon, &

R.

Lerner(Eds), Handbook of child psychology. 5th Ed. VOl.1. Theoretical
models
of human development (pp. 189-232). New York: Wiley.
I quote (1998): 'Vygotsky and his colleagues (Luria would be the closest
example) attributed and overly idealized role to the role of concepts in
human reasoning. The role fitted with his emphasis on the hierarchy of
mental functions (i.e. higher mental functions regulating lower ones), yet
by this exaggerated emphasis the focus on the process of semiogenesis is
actually diminished. In contrast, it could be claimed that pseudo-concepts
(i.e. specific unified conglomerates of concept and complex qualities) are
the core (and highest form) of human psychological functioning. The claim
would fit with the unity of representational fields (of Karl Buhler,
described and extended earlier) and with the central focus of abduction
(rather than induction or deduction) in the process of making sense (along
the lines of Pierce).
I read you paper 'when is a concept really a concept' and heard that there
was a debate on XMCA but as I was not connected at that time have not

heard

or read this debate.
Denise
-----Original Message-----
From: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu] On
Behalf Of Andy Blunden
Sent: 05 August 2010 10:22
To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
Subject: [xmca] Valsiner and pseudoconcepts
Can you give us the full reference for "see Valsiner,
1997d", Denise, and maybe even the context? I just find it
incredible that someone could know as much about Vygotsky as
Valsiner does and place pseduoconcepts at the top of the
development hierarchy.
Andy
Denise Newnham wrote:

Dear Larry and others,
I am new to this game so perhaps am doing something out of turn so if so

let

me know. Larry I read your reply and this extract below made me think of
Valsiner's work on semiotic mediators and concepts where he states that
pseudoconcepts (1998, p.278-279) should be placed at the top to the
developmental hierarchy as the hierarchy should be seen as 'open to

changes

or formation of intrasensitive order- [see Valsiner, 1997d]' (2001, p.
85).This brings ot my mind Markova's discussion on the spontaneous of
intuitive in knowledge formation (2003) and I think that Cole's fifth
dimension attests to this argument. There is an interesting paper by
Galligan (2008) "using Valsiner" on the web.
Denise
'These reflections of linking up multiple perspectives lead to the
developmental question of how socially situated microgenetic

experiences

get "generalized" into "higher" levels of organization that organize
experience across situations [and organize the relation of the "lower"

agree that he has a fascinating perspective on the topic of "engagement"
that emphasizes a "non-mind reading interpretation" of engaging with
others. I will look up his earlier work discussing Vygotsky and Glick.

It

is also interesting that you mention Joseph Glick. Glick's articles on
Werner are also fascinating as they suggest that Werner was also focused

on

"microgenesis" as central to developmental accounts.
Katerina,
I'm not sure exactly what you mean by "accept metaphor" but generally I
accept metaphor as a central way of understanding "human science" as
interpretive and "perspectival". As I read Glick's interpretation of
Werner's microgenetic developmental theory, I was also REFLECTING on

Mike

&

Natalia's focus on the microgenetic social situation of development, and
also my attempt to link these perspectives with neo-Meadian notions of
social ACTS [interchangeability of actual social positions]. These
reflections of linking up multiple perspectives lead to the

developmental

question of how socially situated microgenetic experiences get
"generalized" into "higher" levels of organization that organize

experience

across situations [and organize the relation of the "lower" and "higher"
functions]?
Glick's article "Werner's Relevance for Contemporary Developmental
Psychology" points out that Werner thought developmental processes got
organized "at one of three different levels: the sensorimotor, the
perceptual, or the symbolic." (p.562) Metaphor organizes experience at

the

3rd symbolic level and at this level we can have metaphoric models of

"mind"

[for example: conversation, text, computers, dance, orchestra, etc.]
However, this still leaves us with questioning the RELATIONAL process

of

linking language and metaphor to the other levels of organization at the
sensorimotor and perceptual levels.
Stern, Reddy, Werner, Glick, Gillespie & Martin, Mike and Natalia, and
others are exploring the possible dynamic fluidity of the capacity for
organizing and structuring the 3 levels of experience that may be more
reciprocal [and possibly simultaneous assemby] than a linear

teleological

dynamic. The question becomes, how central are the sensorimotor and
perceptual ways of "constructing" or "forming" experience once social
situations of development are symbolic [and metaphorical]? As Glick

points

out, Werner believed these language and symbolic functions "undergo a
differentiation process from deeper sensorimotor roots." (p.562) However
these deeper roots are NOT TRANSCENDED but continue to organize

experience.

The notion of "leading activity" implies an INVARIANT linear process

where
a

specific leading activity DOMINATES each stage of development. An
alternative perspective emphasizes the fluidity of these "leading
activities" as continuing to remain central for development. For
example functions such as "affiliation" are not only dominant in one
specific stage of developmentand then recede into the background, but
ACTUALLY continue to ACTIVELY organize experience [depending on the

societal

microgenetic situation of development]. Whether the previous "leading
activity" recedes or remains active is dependent, not on the stage of
development [age determined] but rather on the particular social

situation

of development. Mike's point that particular school contexts correlate

with

particular ages of students allows 2 alternative models of development.
Stage theory that is age "determined" or layered development that is
socially situated [schools CONSTRAIN affiliative activity which recedes

into

the background] If the 2nd alternative guided how we structured schools

and

affiliation and interchangeability of social positions was VALUED,

identity

and concept development would be altered.
My personal fascination, working in schools, is the idea of the

possibility

of creating institutional structures which promote the

"interchangeability

of social positions in social acts" and how to facilitate social spaces
which nurture this interchangeability. An example of this is the

creation

of

the 5th dimension METAPHORICAL SPACES where interchangeability of

positions

is fluid and dynamic and leads to the development of "agentic capacity"
where ALL participants experience being recognized and experiencing

OTHERS

RESPONDING to their recognition. This affiliative activity is formative

of

particular "identity" characteristics [communal self] and also "concept
development" formed within microgenetic moments of development. The

reason
I

appreciate neo-Meadian accounts of development are
there privileging the centrality of ACTUAL INTERCHANGEABILITY of social
positions [which simultaneously organize and regulate sensorimotor,
perceptual, and symbolic experiences]. I also believe this "ideal" of
actual interchangeability is fundamentally affiliative and dialogical as

the

participants openly share perspectives. This also creates social
spaces where cognitive development [and reflective capacity] is nurtured

This topic of "mind-reading" vs "non-mind reading" models of young
infants
CAPACITY for attending to and ENGAGING with other "minds" [persons] is

a

fascinating topic which has been discussed previously in CHAT
conversations
on this listserve.
I recently read V. Reddy's book which recommends a 2nd person societal
interactional microgenetic model of non-mind reading. I have sympathy

for

this particular perspective. However, I would like to read more widely

on

this particular topic.
Do you or others on this listserve have any recommendations for

further

articles which engage with the pros and cons of the various models in

a

spirit similar to the proposed intent of the special issue of the

Review

of
Philosophy and Psychology?
I'm curious about the various theories of young infants capacity for
engaging with others within sociogenesis, ontogenesis, and

microgenesis.

However, I'm also interested in how the various models of "infants
engaging
with others" become transformed in the transition to
TRANS-situational understandings [the development of "higher" mental
functions.]
Larry
On Mon, Aug 2, 2010 at 12:57 PM, Martin Packer <packer@duq.edu> wrote:
Begin forwarded message:

Social Cognition: Mindreading and Alternatives
Special issue of the Review of Philosophy and Psychology
Guest Editors:
Daniel D Hutto, University of Hertfordshire
Mitchell Herschbach, University of California, San Diego
Victoria Southgate, University of London
CALL FOR PAPERS
Deadline for submissions: 1 December 2010
Human beings, even very young infants, exhibit remarkable capacities
for

attending to, and engaging with, other minds. A prevalent account of

such

abilities is that they involve "theory of mind" or "mindreading": the
ability to represent mental states as mental states of specific kinds
(i.e.,
to have concepts of "belief," "desire," etc.) and the contents of

such

mental states. A number of philosophers and psychologists question

the

standard mindreading and wider representationalist framework for
characterizing and explaining our everyday modes and methods of
understanding other people. One possibility is that infants may be
exhibiting sophisticated yet non-conceptual, and possibly
non-representational, mind tracking abilities that do not equate to

any

sort
of mindreading.

Proponents on both sides of this debate must adequately accommodate

recent work in developmental psychology. Experiments involving a

variety

of
nonverbal tasks - e.g., the "violation of expectation" paradigm and
anticipatory looking tasks, as well as nonverbal tasks involving more
active
responses -suggest that young infants can understand others' goals,
intentions, desires, knowledge/ignorance, and beliefs. Perhaps most
prominent are studies suggesting infants as young as 13 months of age

are

selectively responsive to the false beliefs of others, well before

they

are
able to reliably pass standard verbal false belief tasks around 4

years

of
age.

This special issue of the Review of Philosophy and Psychology aims

to

create a dialogue between the mindreading and non-mindreading

approaches

to
basic social cognition. Contributors are asked to clarify their
theoretical
commitments; explain how their accounts compare with rivals; and how

they

propose to handle the emerging empirical data, particularly that from
human
developmental psychology. Themes and questions to be addressed

include

but
are not limited to:

- Infants as young as 13 months old display a systematic

sensitivity to the beliefs of others. Does it follow that they must

be

operating with a concept of belief, or indeed, any concepts at all?

- Normally developing children become able to attribute false

beliefs to others between the ages of 3 and 5. Does it follow that

they

must
be operating with a "theory of mind" or the equivalent?

- What does mental attribution minimally involve? What exactly

distinguishes mindreading from non-mindreading approaches to early

social

cognition? Are there theoretical reasons to prefer one over the

other?

- What exact roles are mental representations thought to play

in

mindreading approaches? What kind of mental representations might be
involved? Can a principled dividing line be drawn between
representational
and non-representational approaches?

About the journal
The Review of Philosophy and Psychology (ISSN: 1878-5158; eISSN:

1878-5166) is a peer-reviewed journal published quarterly by Springer

and

focusing on philosophical and foundational issues in cognitive

science.

The
aim of the journal is to provide a forum for discussion on topics of
mutual
interest to philosophers and psychologists and to foster
interdisciplinary
research at the crossroads of philosophy and the sciences of the

mind,

including the neural, behavioural and social sciences.

The journal publishes theoretical works grounded in empirical

research

as well as empirical articles on issues of philosophical relevance.

It

includes thematic issues featuring invited contributions from leading
authors together with articles answering a call for paper.

Dr. Victoria Southgate
Wellcome Trust Research Career Development Fellow
Centre for Brain and Cognitive Development
Henry Wellcome Building
Birkbeck, University of London
Malet Street
London, WC1E 7HX.