Document: Released to the Archive February 1991, this secret/sensitive
memorandum to Dr. Henry
Kissinger is the first verifiable source of U.S. government assessments confirming the non-proliferation community's
suspicions regarding Pakistan's nuclear capability.

Since the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945, the U.S. has wrestled with the issue of controlling the spread of nuclear weapons.
The U.S. military imperatives of preventing other countries from developing the ultimate weapon have conflicted with the political, economic, and commercial potential of selectively sharing its nuclear secrets. In past years, rumors and revelations of atomic testing
in South Africa, Israel, India, and other nations have heightened fears over the consequences of nuclear proliferation.
Most recently, exposure of Iraq's nuclear capabilities has led the non-proliferation community to reassess the impact of the U.S. government's policies throughout the nuclear age.

Nuclear Non-Proliferation, 1945-1990 provides a comprehensive documentary record of U.S. nuclear non-proliferation policy from the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki through the recent IAEA inspections of Iraq's nuclear program.

Over 2,700 documents, totaling approximately 14,000 pages, offer researchers the most complete collection of primary documents
related to U.S. non-proliferation policy available anywhere. Recently declassified and unclassified government documents--publis
hed here for the first time--provide scholars with immediate access to the historical record from three policymaking periods:

1945-1953

During the first part of this period, the focus of U.S. policy was on international control of atomic energy. Later, the U.S.
maintained its western monopoly through strict secrecy, refusing to share the technology even with its closest allies.

1954-1974

President Eisenhower's "Atoms for Peace" program ushered in the second period during which the U.S. aided the nearly unrestricted development of nuclear energy programs in other nations. The quid pro quo was a promise that those nations would use nuclear
technology only for peaceful purposes. This period ended abruptly with India's so-called peaceful nuclear explosion of an atomic device in April 1974--and the realization that the U.S. had provided the material necessary to conduct the test.

1974-1990

The post "Atoms for Peace" era is still evolving. Users of the collection will find documents illustrating
the conflict between policy priorities driven by foreign policy and trade considerations and those governed by the obligations established under the
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty of 1968.

Index: United States.Department of State--does not
believe that Pakistan--possesses Nuclear devices--
although the Kahuta Uranium Enrichment Plant(Pakistan)--is capable of producing Uranium--which
can be used for Nuclear weapons production

Official Visit of Pakistan Prime Minister Mohammad Khan
Secret Memorandum 9 pp.
Origin: United States Department of State
To: Kissinger, Henry
Lines with excisions: 0
Index: United States.Department of State--does not
believe that Pakistan--possesses Nuclear devices--
although the Kahuta Uranium Enrichment Plant (Pakistan)--is capable of producing Uranium--which
can be used for Nuclear weapons production

Presents a unique and comprehensive compilation of information from the first atomic test in 1945 to the recent investigations of
U.S. exports of dual-capable technology to India, Pakistan, Israel, and South Africa.

Provides the basis for all future inquiry into the evolution of U.S. non-proliferation policy as well as current policy.

Contains some of the earliest previously classified U.S. government assessments of the capability of de facto nuclear weapons
states and declaratory statements of U.S. non-proliferation policy towards those countries.

Documents the changes and growth of the U.S.-Soviet non-proliferation relationship in one of the earliest spheres of
cooperation between the superpowers.

Establishes a starting point for scholarly research on a variety of related topics in international security.

Establishes the link between alliance relationships and the spread of nuclear weapons capability.

"I have devoted several years to research on the history of the negotiation of the NPT--using presidential library materials and
Freedom of Information Act requests. Neither the libraries' nor the government's responses to my requests produced as many
useful documents as are in the National Security Archive's Nuclear Non-Proliferation collection. This collection is a gold mine
for scholars interested in how the NPT was negotiated."

George Bunn
Center for International Security and Arms Control
Stanford University

"An essential new source of information that will be invaluable to students of U.S. government efforts to curb the
spread of nuclear arms."

Reproduces on microfiche approximately 2,700 documents totaling over 14,000 pages recording U.S. nuclear non-proliferation
policy from 1945 to 1990.

Arrangement:

Microfiche are arranged chronologically. For ease of use, the unique identification numbers assigned to documents
are printed in eye-legible type at the top right hand corner and precede each document on the microfiche strip.

Standards:

Documents are reproduced on silver halide positive-reading microfiche at a nominal reduction of 24x in envelopes.
They are archivally permanent and conform to AIIM, BSI and ANSI standards. Any microfiche found to be physically substandard will be replaced
free of charge.

Access:

A printed guide and index totaling approximately 2,000 pages accompanies the microfiche collection. The Guide contains an
events chronology,
glossaries of names, organizations, events, legal and technical terms, and acronyms, a bibliography of secondary sources, and a
chronological listing of documents. The Index provides in-depth, document-level access to subjects, individuals, and
organizations.