Anything
is possible in the murky politics of insurgency and
counter-insurgency. On July 24, 2007, Meghalaya Chief Minister D.D.
Lapang surprised journalists by presenting before them a fairly
important insurgent leader in northeastern India, Julius Dorphang,
Chairman of the banned Hynniewtrep National Liberation Council (HNLC),
and four of his colleagues. They had apparently ‘surrendered’
the day before, on July 23, 2007, after having crossed over into
Indian territory from Bangladesh.

The
HNLC, one of Meghalaya’s most potent insurgent groups,
representing the majority Khasi tribe, was formed in 1992,
following a split in the Hynniewtrep Achik Liberation Council (HALC),
the State’s first insurgent outfit. The HACL ceased to exist and
the other group that came into being with the split was the Achik
Matgrik Liberation Army (AMLA), comprising Garo tribes-people and
seeking to push the interest of their community.

The
HNLC, established a nexus with the Isak-Muivah faction of the
National Socialist Council of Nagaland (NSCN-IM),
and is known to have enjoyed the patronage of the Pakistani Inter
Services Intelligence (ISI).
The group was primarily involved in extortion and bank heists, and
had killed several policemen, besides attacking a paramilitary
post in Shillong, Meghalaya’s capital, with over 600 rounds of
automatic gunfire in August 2000. It was eventually banned on
November 16, 2000.

Before
assessing the impact of the rebel leader’s giving up on the
group itself as well as on insurgency as a whole in Meghalaya, it
is useful to take a look at the manner in which the
‘surrender’ took place. Local media reports give different
versions: some suggest that Dorphang surrendered to the Meghalaya
Director General of Police (DGP) B.K. Dey Sawian on the night of
July 23, while others claim he formally gave up before Chief
Minister Lapang.

Talking
to this writer, Sawian clarified that Dorphang’s surrender was
the result of a "process set in motion by the State
Government quite sometime back". The DGP said Dorphang
entered Meghalaya from Bangladesh through a point between Dawki
and Muktapur on the international border in the Jaintia Hills
District. "We had kept the Border Security Force in the know
of things and a Meghalaya police officer was the pointsman waiting
at the pre-arranged entry point to receive them before they were
brought in to Shillong," the police chief said. He denied
that the Indian authorities had received any assistance or
cooperation from the Bangladesh Rifles (BDR) or any other
Bangladeshi agency in this case.

Dorphang
has always been a moderate among the HNLC leaders and was sending
out regular peace overtures to the Indian authorities, indicating
his desire for a negotiated political settlement of the rebellion.
In that sense, his surrender has not come as a surprise, though
the denial of Bangladeshi facilitation is unexpected, particularly
after senior Meghalaya Police officials have admitted noticing a
‘definite change’ in Dhaka’s approach to the northeast
Indian insurgents operating from within that country after the
Army-backed Interim Government took over power in January 2007.
Dhaka, according to Indian officials, now seems prepared to
acknowledge that it was alive to the problem of northeast Indian
rebels operating from Bangladesh.

The
surrender has rightly generated no more than a cautious optimism
among the authorities in Meghalaya. As the Police Chief expressed
it, "The situation has just partially got better."
That’s because the group’s recalcitrant
‘commander-in-chief’, Bobby Marwein, and ‘general
secretary’, Cheristerfield Thangkhiew, have stayed back in
Bangladesh to carry on with the insurrection. This is the puzzle
that is rather hard to solve: here was a group of HNLC leaders led
by the Chairman himself who was supposed to have set out from
somewhere in Sylhet, in Bangladesh, on the morning of July 23
before entering Meghalaya, unnoticed by the Bangladeshi
authorities, and at the same time Dhaka remains apparently unaware
of the whereabouts of Marwein and Thangkhiew who have chosen to
stay back in that country. The jigsaw fits in place only if one is
to accept that the latest development in Meghalaya was part of a
secret deal resulting in an open surrender.

It
is difficult to hazard a guess as to what the deal could have
been, but one can easily deduce from comments made by senior
officials in Meghalaya that Dorphang was a surrendered rebel with
a difference. "We are not treating him like a surrenderee and
have not picked his brains yet on the internal rift within his
organization and things like that," the State Police chief
told this writer two days after Dorphang came over ground. The
fact that he was allowed to hold a news conference was a
demonstration of the extraordinary status he is being accorded.

Again,
the statements that Dorphang made at the news conference in
Shillong on July 26, 2007, were significant because they indicated
that he had charted out a course to push ahead with his pro-Khasi
demands by remaining over ground and shunning violence, while he
worked for a solution within the ambit of the Indian Constitution.
To that extent, the secret deal, if any, is welcome, but care must
be taken to ensure that the HNLC leader does not whip up emotions
and simply give another and new dimension to the sub-nationalist
movement in Meghalaya. Dorphang, for instance, said that his group
would press for an independent Khasi state through a
‘non-violent struggle’. Significantly, he emphasized the need
for a ‘special status’ for the Khasi people and made it clear
that he would like to achieve his goal through talks with the
State and Central governments.

To
what extent is the HNLC weakened by Dorphang’s exit? Meghalaya
Police chief Sawian described the uncertainty of the outcome
succinctly: "We can’t really say. But the fact remains that
its Chairman has come out. He was the group’s brain and was
himself a great organizer. To that extent, the HNLC has certainly
weakened." But if one is to examine what Dorphang himself
said on the matter, it appears that the HNLC is still far from a
spent force. For instance, Dorphang still maintains that the
recalcitrant Bobby Marwein and Cheristerfield Thangkhiew are the
main "stumbling blocks in the peace process." Dorphang
clearly recognizes the duo’s capacity to put up roadblocks to
the peace process in Meghalaya.

It
is, nevertheless, the case that the Government has got a much
needed breather in the Khasi and Jaintia Hills Districts with this
development and can hope to put the leftover HNLC elements under
check through normal Police operations. Authorities estimate that
between 75 and 100 HNLC cadres, including women’s wing members
and couriers, now remains to be tackled and this would not be too
great a challenge. The State Government’s strategy appears to be
clear: put the peace process on the fast-track now that Dorphang
has come over ground, and continue with the counter-insurgency
offensive against the anti-talks faction of the HNLC, even as
efforts are made to broaden the scope of negotiations. As Sawian
put it: "We shall continue with the police action, but the
Government has not shut its doors to anyone."

Problems,
of course, can arise once the stage is set for an agreement with
the HNLC rebels, say, with Dorphang’s group. That has the
potential to infuse new life into the otherwise rag-tag Garo rebel
outfits pushing for a separate Garo homeland. If the Khasis are
set to achieve something, how can the Garos be left behind? Such
is the politics of ethnic insurgencies in India’s northeast.