The main waves of
immigrants from Muslim
countries began in the
early 1960s when
migration agreements
were signed with Morocco
and Turkey and then at
the end of the 1960s
with Algeria and
Tunisia. In contrast
with the Netherlands,
Belgium had no relations
with the Muslim world
during the colonial
period. In 1974 Belgium
imposed strict
conditions on the entry
of foreign labor but
remained one of the most
liberal countries in
Europe for family
reunion policy.

Reliable demographic data on
Belgian Muslims are difficult to
find. The government no longer
conducts a national census, and
even when it existed, no
questions were asked about
religious affiliation.

The number of Muslims in Belgium
is estimated to be between
320,000 to 450,000-about
4% percent of the total
population of the country. As in
the other countries of the EU
the Muslim population in Belgium
is very young. Almost 35 percent
of the Turks and Moroccans, the
largest Muslim groups in the
country, are below 18 years old,
compared with 18 percent of the
native Belgians. As a result of
the age and spatial
distribution, very high
proportions of the youth in
certain areas are Muslim. One
quarter of Brusselians under 20
years are of ‘Muslim origin’,
and in 2002 in the region of
Brussels the most popular names
given to babies were Mohammed
and Sarah. Statistical
data from 2003 showed a heavy
concentration of Moroccans
(125,000) and Turks (70,000)
with smaller numbers from
Algeria (8,500), Tunisia
(4,000), Bosnia-Herzegovina,
Pakistan, Lebanon, Iran, Syria
and Egypt. According to Marechal,
113,842 people from the ‘Muslim
countries’ had acquired Belgium
citizenship between 1985 and
1997.

Between
2003 and 2007, estimates show
that these populations have
almost doubled.

In 2007,
sociologist Jan Hertogen
published statistics indicating
that Moroccans (264,974) had
replaced Italians (262,120) as
the largest immigrant group in
Belgium as of January 1, 2004.
Turks are in third place with
159,336 people.
Hertogen’s methodology has been
criticized by the Belgian Center
for Equal Opportunities and
Opposition to Racism, headed by
Jozef De Witte, for being too
simplistic, leading to distorted
results.

According to
a study brought by the Center
for Equal Opportunities and
Opposition to Racism, on January
1st, 2005 there were 279,180
Italians and 242,802 Moroccans.
The Center agrees with
Hertogen’s claim that Moroccans
will eventually be the largest
immigrant group.

The Muslim
population is most concentrated
in Brussels (20% of the total
population)
with most other Muslims living
in the industrial areas of the
French-speaking south. The
Brussels conurbation is home for
more than 50 percent of the
Moroccans. They can be also
found in Antwerp, Liege, Hainaut,
in the region of Charleroi and
in Limburg. Half of the Turks
have settled in Flanders,
especially Antwerp, Ghent and
Limburg. They live also in
certain districts of Brussels
(ex. Schaerbeek, Saint-Josse)
and in the Walloon area of
Belgium in the region of Hainaut
and Liege (Bousetta 2003:8).

Although
there are no statistics for
Muslim employment levels,
according to the OECD, the
foreign-born have unemployment
rates more than twice that of
indigenous Belgians.Systemic
discrimination arose as the
primary concern of Belgian
Muslims during a 2005 dialogue
hosted by US Ambassador to
Belgium Tom Korologos and
Ambassador Claude Mission, the
Director General of the Royal
Institute for International
Relations. Scholars and
activists alike reported cases
where Muslims with law degrees
remained unemployed for years
and job and apartment
applications were rejected based
on Muslim names.

Employment
discrimination affects primarily
the North African communities
(including both immigrant and
first-generation). Muslims of
Turkish and other national
origins appear to be far less
frequently the targets of such
prejudice, indicating that
discrimination may be more
ethnic than religious.

The OECD
collects data on education from
various statistical agencies
within the country, the majority
of which comes from census data
from the year 2000. The OECD
classifies educational
achievement using the
International Standard
Classification of Education (ISCED):
ISCED 0/1/2: Less than upper
secondary; ISCED 3/4: Upper
secondary and post-secondary
non-tertiary; ISCED 5A:
“Academic” tertiary; ISCED 5B:
“Vocational” tertiary; ISCED 6:
Advanced research programs. 0-2
are considered low, 3-4 as
medium, and 5 and above are
considered high. This data is
not reported by religion, but
does have country of origin as
reported by the respondent. It
is thus possible to construct an
approximate picture of the
educational achievement of the
population in the country with
ancestry from predominately
Muslim countries. One
significant problem is that some
countries, such as India and
Nigeria, have large Muslim
populations but the immigrant
population cannot be readily
classified as predominately
Muslim or non-Muslim. As such,
the educational data is split by
predominately Muslim origin,
predominately non-Muslim origin,
and a separate category for
those whom classification would
not seem justified. Proportions
are for all reported data,
individuals with no reported
ancestry or education are
excluded.

Educational
Achievement using the
International Standard
Classification of Education (ISCED)

High

Medium

Low

Muslim

12 %

23%

65%

Non-Muslim

23%

30%

47%

Indeterminate

43%

31%

26%

State and ChurchAlthough there is religious
freedom in Belgium, the state
formally recognizes seven
religions; Roman Catholicism,
Protestantism, Judaism,
Anglicanism, Islam, and Orthodox
Christianity. Secular humanist
groups serve as a seventh
recognized “religion” and their
organizing body, the Central
Council of Non-Religious
Philosophical Communities of
Belgium, receives funds and
benefits similar to those of the
six other recognized religions.

Recognized
religions provide teachers at
government expense for religious
instruction in schools. The
state pays the salaries,
retirement, for clergy and
subsidizes the construction and
renovation of church buildings.
Positions of clerics are
allocated by royal decree, but
there are no training
requirements. Although there are
exceptions, in general the state
has tried to ensure that new
imams come from the Belgian
population. In Flanders, foreign
clergy are required to take part
in the Inburgeringstrajet, a
state integration curriculum.

Subsidies are
received at the federal,
regional and municipal levels.
The ecclesiastical
administrations of recognized
religions have legal rights and
obligations, and the
municipality in which they are
located must pay any debts that
they incur. According to an
independent academic review,
government at all levels spent
$523 million (23 billion Belgian
francs) on subsidies for
recognized religions in 2000
(3.5 percent of this funds went
to Muslims). For many years
Muslims did not receive their
share of these funds because
there was no representative
institution to negotiate with
the state. In part due to this
problem, Belgium facilitated the
creation of an Islamic
organization intended to
represent the needs and
interests of the Muslim
population in Belgium. In 2001,
the Muslim Executive Council
applied for the first time for
subsidies and in 2002, the
government recognized 75 mosques
and began paying salaries to
imams assigned to these mosques
(Religious Freedom Report 2002).
However, conflicts between the
Muslim Executive and the state
have led to problems
distributing the money for
mosques and imams (US State
Dept., 2004). Although Islam
became a state-recognized
religion in 1974, Muslim
institutions have gone largely
unfunded by the state because of
such conflicts.

Since 2004,
there have been a series of
shifts in Muslim relations with
the state. There was an overhaul
of leadership in the Muslim
Executive Council, largely at
the urging of government
officials who were suspicious of
radical tendencies of the
Council’s former leaders. The
government pledged that once a
new Council and Executive were
formed, funding to clergy and
teachers would begin (Dept. of
State, 2006).

In January
2005, the administration of the
Flemish region mandated that
mosques would be required to
meet certain conditions for
public funding. Outside of
rituals conducted in the Arabic
language, Dutch should be used,
there must be tolerance for
women and homosexuals and no
preaching of extremist ideas.
This applies only to Islam.

In the fall
of the same year, two important
infrastructural reforms
occurred: first, decrees were
issued by the Flemish regional
parliament (September) and the
Walloon regional government
(October) elucidated the process
for recognition of mosques and
local religious communities. The
Flemish decree clarified this
process for all recognized
religions (U.S. Dept. of State,
2004). The second change came in
the form of an overhaul of the
Muslim Executive (Controversy
surrounding this election is
described in the Muslim
Organization section below).

In November
2006, the Belgian government
announced plans to open an Imam
school by the close of the
2006-2007 academic year.
The Muslim Executive Council was
a driving force behind the
conception of the mosque; the
Council has requested that a
mufti preside at the school to
interpret and implement Shar’ia
(Islamic law). The mufti would
also be capable of issuing
fatwas (religious rulings), but
will not be granted this right
because this would conflict with
Belgium’s judicial system. A
similar school already exists in
France. The Imam school would be
subsidized by the state.

The school’s
formulation came at a time when
disagreements between the Muslim
Executive Council and the
government posed a significant
obstacle to the allocation of
state funding to Muslim schools
and religious organizations.
Experts on religious
organizations and the state have
pointed to “a lack of
transparency and fairness” in
regard to state subsidies of
religious groups.
Due to discontent related to the
allocation of state resources,
the government, as of November
2006, was contemplating a
reorganization of subsidies for
religious groups.

As of
November 2006, the government
was also considering legislation
to control the foreign financing
of mosques in Belgium to reduce
“outside ideological influence”
of Belgium’s Muslim
institutions.

Over the
summer of 2007, the Muslim
community’s institutional
relationship with the state
experience was significantly
improved. On June 24, 2007,
Belgian officials announced
their plans to officially
recognize 43 mosques in
French-speaking Wallonia, and
promised that other regions were
to follow (including
Dutch-speaking Flanders in the
North, and the bilingual
Brussels region). Mosque
recognition by the state was one
of the most significant barriers
standing between mosques and
state subsidies. Of the 43
Wallonian mosques, 26 are
Turkish. This recognition is an
important step toward the
provision to Muslim religious
leaders of monthly wages and
housing costs by the government.
Officials anticipated that eight
additional mosques in Flanders
were to be recognized by the end
of the year. Interior Minister
of the Wallon region, Philippe
Courard, expressed
disappointment that such
recognition and the funding that
will follow had taken 33 years
for the state to grant.

In March
2007, the French-speaking
regional government began
funding a program organized by
the Catholic University of
Louvain-la-Neuve on Imam and
Islamic Formation.
This program is a response to
the interests of the Executive
Board and by the public
authorities. The Executive Board
has long been advocating for a
new academic institute of global
scope since 2006. The public
authorities want to make
attendance at the institute
mandatory, and aim for
curricular stress on the subject
of pluralism and democracy.

Since 2003,
Belgium has seen four election
cycles, two federal cycles in
2003 (May 18) and 2007 (June10),
and two municipal and provincial
elections in 2004 (June 13) and
2006 (October 8). Information on
the prominence and success of
Muslim candidates is available
for the two federal elections.

After the
elections of 2003, six Muslims
served in the national
parliament; Fauzaya Talhaoui,
Dalila Douifi, Nahima Lanjri,
Fatma Pehlivan, Meryem Kacar and
Talbia Belhouari. As of 2003
Said El Khadraoui serves in the
European Parliament.

Two Islamist
parties ran in the Brussels
constituency in the May 2003
elections, NOOR and the PCP (Parti
Citoyenneté et Prospérité)
(Stephen Roth Institute). The
PCP obtained over 8,000 votes
which gave the party a good
chance of winning a seat in the
next regional elections. The
party suffered, however, after
its founder, Jean-François
Bastin, (alias Abdullah Abu
Abdulaziz), resigned as Party
leader. Bastin claimed that his
resignation was unrelated to the
accusation of the involvement of
his son (Muhammed el Amin Bastin)
in the terrorist attacks in
Turkey in November 2003. A third Party,
Resist, was a coalition of the
leftist Maoist PTB/PVDA and the
Arab European League; they won
10,059 votes in the May 2003
election (Stephen Roth
Institute) and were relatively
unsuccessful.

The 2007
federal elections revealed the
growing political representation
of Turkish Muslims in Belgium.
Out of the 160,000 Turks living
in Belgium, 120,000 have Belgian
citizenship. Nearly 90,000 of
them voted in the Belgian 2007.

There were 36
Turkish candidates on the 2007
ballot; nine ran for
Parliamentary seats while the
rest were candidates for the
federal council. A majority of
these candidates were women, and
younger candidates dominated the
list.

The 2007
election was also boycotted by
some Muslims, although this time
there was no connection to the
Muslim Council. Prior to the
June 10 national election, an
anonymous twelve-page document
entitled, “Participer aux
elections” began circulating
online and among the Arab Muslim
community in Brussels. The
document, supposedly from Salafi
authors, called for a boycott on
the 2007 elections since “only
Allah has the authority to make
absolute laws” and claimed
“every Muslim who takes part in
the elections is unfaithful.”
The document was supposedly
based off a British fatwa from
an earlier UK election.

Brussels

After the
October 2006 elections in
Brussels, one-fifth (21.8%)
of the elected municipal
councilors were of
non-European origin and of
this group the majority were
Muslim. They were mostly
Socialist candidates,
reflecting the
overwhelmingly Socialist
orientation of non-European
immigrants. The Socialist
Party has significant
non-European representation
in several boroughs of
Brussels, including
Sint-Joost-ten-Node where 19
of the borough’s 27
councillors are non-European
and 11 of the Socialist
Party’s representatives are
non-European.

From 2000
to 2006, the percentage of
Brussels voters who were
either foreigners of
naturalized Belgians has
risen from 32% to 50%. In
Antwerp, one-third of the
Socialist councilors and
one-third of the so-called
Christian-Democrat
councilors are Muslim; in
Gent, that figure is
one-quarter; in Vilvoorde
(Flemish suburb of
Brussels), the figure in
one-half.

Although
Islam has been recognized since
1974, the Muslim community has
had no formal representation
with the state until 1998, due
to a lack of agreement between
various ethnic and sectarian
groups in the society on a
common leadership. Discord
between the Moroccan and Turkish
communities is especially
prominent. The state’s desire to
avoid having any
‘fundamentalists’ in the
assembly made the situation even
more complicated. The Islamic
Center of Brussels, financed by
Saudi Arabia, used to play the
role of interlocutor to the
state.

The Muslim
Council and the Executive
Committee of the Muslim Council
were the representative and
mediating bodies of the Muslim
community until early 2008, when
it was dissolved after years of
unresolved controversy.
Elections of the Council were
first held in 1998 and council
members appointed an executive
board which was soon contested
by the government. Government
intervention threatened the
legitimacy of the Executive
Board in 1999 and in 2003.
This committee was to be
selected in a mostly democratic
fashion to represent the ethnic
and religious breakdown of
Muslims in Belgium. However, the
state screened candidates for
ideological extremism, thereby
seriously eroding the legitimacy
of the council (Cesari, 2004).
Candidates were also required to
speak fluently the language of
the region they were
representing.

Controversy
surrounded the October 2, 2005
Muslim Council elections, in
which seventeen members were
elected to its Executive Council
and a Turkish-born Muslim became
chairman. New parliamentary
legislation required that
candidates for the Muslim
Executive undergo security
screening; an Antwerpian imam
was excluded from consideration
for membership in the Executive
Council on account of this
security check. Tensions also
arose during the transfer of
power from the old executive to
the new. The outgoing executives
refused to surrender their
headquarters to the new
leadership. State officials
searched the premises and
brought charges of embezzlement
against two former executive
chairpersons. Thought the Muslim
executive has been working more
closely with the government,
internal tensions within the
Muslim Executive Council have
hindered its ability to approach
the government with coherent
demands.

On July 25,
2003, the King of Belgium
recognized the executive body of
Belgian’s Muslim Council,
putting an end to four years of
controversy over the 1998
executive body. Over 45,000
Belgian Muslims out of 70,000
enfranchised voters participated
in the 2003 election.
Sixty-eight members were elected
to the Council that in turn
elected 17 members to the
Executive.

Government
intervention and distinctive
responses by the Muslim Council
and the Turkish community have
made the Muslim Council a
polarizing issue. According to
Mohammad Boulif, then Chairman
of the executive committee, the
Justice Minister excluded half
of the council’s 2003 elected
members under the “pretext of
close links with ‘Islamists’.”
This intervention has lead the
leadership of the Executive
Board to call for boycotts,
while Turks are becoming
increasingly involved in the
electoral process.

Although
there were protests from the
existing executive body and
almost all of the Muslim
organizations, the Minister of
Justice Laurette Onkelinx
decided to organize new
elections for the general
assembly on March 13, 2005. This
would require the appointment of
a new Executive Board, which
would be subject to vetting by
the State Security. In response
to the Justice Minister’s
decision and to recently passed
legislation that gave legal
validity to security checks on
candidates, members of the
Executive Board called for a
boycott. The March 20, 2005
election for Muslim Council
seats saw a relatively low
turnout of only 45,000
registered voters.

Several
mosques in Brussels and the Arab
European League, which
represents a large ethnic North
African Arab constituency,
actively promoted the boycott.
Turkish Muslim experienced a
landslide victory, winning 40 of
the 68 Council seats. Moroccans
won only 20 seats, despite the
fact that the majority of
Muslims in Belgium are of
Moroccan heritage. Six seats
went to candidates from other
countries, and two Belgian
converts won the remaining two
seats (US Dept. of State 2005).

Young Turks
were the most successful
candidates and five of the new
Council members were women.
Hacer Duzgun was especially
successful, winning 3,640 votes
compared to 307 votes won by the
leading Moroccan candidate from
Brussels (home to the largest
Muslim community in Belgium).
She is now Vice President of the
Executive Council with Kissi
Benjelloun, a French-Moroccan.

The EMB –
l’Executif des Musulmans de
Belgique – was responsible for
administrative managing of the
Muslim worship in Belgium and
was intended to play the role of
a mediator between the state and
Muslim communities. The
establishment of a Muslim
Executive was modeled after the
French government’s approach.
Its responsibilities ranged from
providing religious education at
schools and educational training
for imams to appointment of
Muslims chaplaincies in
hospitals and prisons. The EMB
has been receiving state
subsidies since 2001. In 2002
the State supported the
organization with 420,000 Euros,
while the Catholic Church was
given 350 million Euros.

On February
23, 2008, the Justice Ministry
confirmed that the Muslim
Executive would be dissolved.
Financial problems and
complaints that the Muslim
Executive did not adequately
represent the diversity of the
Muslim population in Belgium
were cited as explanations for
the decision.

With the
formation of the EMB, The
Islamic Cultural Center of
Belgium, which had been de facto
representative of Muslims in
Belgium, lost its formerly
central role. Its board of
trustees is chaired by the
ambassador of Saudi Arabia and
it is attached to the Grand
Mosque of Brussels.
The land for the Center was
handed over to King Faisal in
1967 as a gift in exchange for
donations he has made. The
center was build with the
financial support of the Muslim
World League.

The Arab
European League aims to defend
the civil rights of Arabs in
Europe and has attracted a
following of thousands of
jobless, frustrated young
immigrants since its creation in
Antwerp in 2000.The leader Dyab
Abou Jahjah, a charismatic
debater with MA in international
politics and fluency in 4
languages, is often portrayed by
the media as Belgium’s Malcolm
X. Along with a leftist party,
the organization established the
party ‘Resist’ to run in the
elections in 2003, but was
relatively unsuccessful.
However, Abou Jahjah has already
announced the creation of a new
political party, Muslim
Democratic Party. The AEL now
has growing branches in France
and the Netherlands. In June
2002, the Centre d’Egalité des
Chances et Lutte contre le
Racisme (CECLR) filed a
complaint against Abou Jahjah
for holding a pro-Palestine
demonstration after which anti-semitic
vandalism occurred (Stephen Roth
Institute).

Similar to
the AEL is the MJM (Mouvement
des Jeunes Musulmans) which also
established a political party.
The Parti de la Citoyennete et
de la Prosperite did
surprisingly well in the local
elections in Brussels in May
2003, winning more than 8,000
votes and making it a potential
contender for seats.

Public school
students under 17 have the
option of participating in
either non-denominational ethics
classes or classes for religious
instruction (of the state’s
recognized religions). For older
students, these classes are
voluntary. The Muslim community
has the right to provide
teachers at government expense
for religious instruction. Since
at least 1975, some students
have been able to receive
instruction in Islam.

Since 1998,
public school teachers are
appointed by the state after
recommendation of the Muslim

Executive
Council.
The curriculum as well is
developed by the MEC and then
subject to approval by the
state. Religious communities
have the right to establish
private schools that can receive
state funding. Due to conflicts
with the state since its
inception in 1998, the MEC has
been unable to channel state
funding toward Islamic
schooling; state subsidies for
Islamic education and the
training of imams fall far
behind educational subsidies for
Belgium’s other recognized
religions.

In the fall
of 2007, the first Islamic
School in Belgium opened its
doors. Situated in Molenbeek,
the Avicenna Islamic school is a
private institution that
receives no subsidies; it is yet
to be recognized by the state,
meaning the school’s diplomas
have no official value and
graduating students must first
pass a test by the public
examination board to receive an
officially-recognized
certificate. The school is
theoretically open to Muslim and
non-Muslim boys and girls and
the enrollment fee is 1,800
euros.

According to
De Standaard, the
Islamic Platform League is the
“driving force” behind the
school. In its press release
concerning the school’s opening,
the League stated that in no way
did it intend for the Avicenna
School to be a “ghetto school.”
Its mission is as follows: “to
prepare the students for taking
an active place in society, and
it intends to insure equal
opportunities for emancipation
for all students.”

Some
outsiders see the school as a
refuge for female students who
wish to wear a headscarf. Johan
Leman, of the Brussels Foyer
integration Centre described the
school’s affiliated mosque as
“Islamist…it employs a
conservative interpretation of
the Koran, and adopts rigid
stances as far as matters of
faith are concerned.” Leman
suggests that the mosque’s
leaders, though very
conservative, are concerned with
practicing Islam within the
limits of democracy, adding that
they are certainly not militant.

One parent
interviewed by the internet news
service Mediascrape
about his decision to send his
child to the Avicenna Islamic
School cited his primary concern
as being the poor quality of
public schools in the
neighborhood.

In general,
Belgium’s approach toward
immigration has been fairly
liberal as reflected in findings
by an October 2007 poll released
by the EU rating Belgium third
among twenty-five EU countries
in helping immigrants settle in.
The poll considered factors such
as employment rights,
anti-racism laws, and
opportunities for permanent
residence and family
reunification.

Belgium also
stands out for a February 2004
decision by Parliament to grant
foreigners living in Belgium the
right to vote in local
elections, legislation that was
expected to enfranchise an
estimated 120,000 foreigners.

The most
recent significant body of
immigration legislation, which
further liberalized the right to
Belgian citizenship, came in
force in 2000. Under this law,
all those born in Belgium,
having at least one Belgian
parent, or residing in the
country for at least seven
years, may become citizens. This
can be done by registering in
the community. Those in the
country for over three years
must fulfill language and
cultural requirements to qualify
for citizenship.

The past
decade has seen a sharp decrease
in the number of asylum
applications and an increase in
the rate of approval for asylum.
From 2000 to 2007, the number of
applicants has dropped from
42,691 to 11,115. Between 2006
and 2007, the number of
applications dropped by almost
500, yet the number of asylum
applicants approved increased
over this period. The increase
in acceptances in 2007 can be
attributed in part to resolution
of backlog from the previous
year. Most asylum seekers come
from Chechnya (20%), Rwanda,
Iraq, Kosovo, and Congo. There
has been a significant decrease
in the number of asylum
applicants from Congo since
2007, due largely to a campaign
by the Congolese government to
discourage emigration.

Approximately
21,000 Congolese live legally in
Belgium.

Since 2007,
immigration policy and policy
discourse has become more
reserved and concerned with
economic issues. In October
2007, Christian Democrats and
Liberals, groups normally in
opposition, agreed on a tough
approach to immigration, asylum,
and economic migration. Under
their agreement, migrants from
outside the EU will be able to
fill jobs only if there are not
enough EU candidates. They also
proposed the tightening of
income, language, and time
requirements as immigration
criteria.

The business
community in Belgium has become
a vocal advocate of opening the
Belgian labor market to illegal
immigrants. Citing figures of
job vacancies that double those
of available workers, small
businesses in particular have
advocated granting legal
employment rights to illegal
immigrants who have integrated
into Belgian society.

A study by
the Center for Equal
Opportunities and Opposition to
Racism prepared by the
Universities of Antwerp and
Leuven (2006) found that
stricter immigration laws had
left immigrant women from Turkey
and Morocco distinctly
disadvantaged and vulnerable to
abuse by their partners.
Compared to other immigrant
groups from the former Eastern
bloc and South-East Asia,
Turkish and Moroccan women were
the most likely to be marriage
immigrants. The study found that
female marriage immigrants who
arrived in Belgium in 2000 were
the most socio-economically
disadvantaged: only one-third
were employed three years later
compared to higher rates of
Asians and Eastern Europeans and
a rate of 90% for immigrants
from the Mediterranean region.
The stricter immigration law
makes especially women extra
vulnerable to abuse by their
partner. The Migration
Policy Institute has a
comprehensive overview of
Belgian immigration policy
available on their
.

In Belgium,
the 1981 Law on the Suppression
of Racist Acts, plus
anti-Discrimination Law 2003
criminalizes the public or
witnessed incitement to
discrimination, hate or violence
against a person, a group of
people (community) or its
members, incitement to
segregation on the basis of
race, making one’s intent to
discriminate on the basis of
race or to segregate or to
commit violence on the basis of
race, color of skin, ethnicity
or nationality.

In Belgium,
various anti-Muslim incidents
have continued over the past few
years. In 2002 the apparently
racist murder of a Moroccan man
led to several days of rioting
in Antwerp. Controversially, the
leader of an Arabic group was
blamed for the incident by the
government.1 The number of
complaints about racism has
increased over the last years,
many having to do with
employment problems. In recent years and
especially after the September
11th terrorist attacks, there
were several cases reported of
women and girls wearing
traditional dress or headscarves
being publicly insulted.

Those of
foreign origin in Belgium are
reportedly subjected to
discrimination in employment, in
housing, in access to public
services and in contacts with
police. The Center for Equal
Opportunity and Opposition to
Racism, an independent
government body, received about
2,500 complaints about racist
discrimination in 2003. The
majority of cases were seen as
stemming from racial and ethnic
rather than religious
motivation. Continuing reports
suggest police misconduct,
including offensive language,
arbitrary identity checks, and
violence may be relatively
common.

The Center
for Equal Opportunity and the
Fight against Racism, an
independent government agency,
reported that 7.5 percent of the
discrimination complaints filed
with the Center during 2002
cited religion as the basis of
the alleged discrimination. In
June 2005, the Center released a
report covering 2004, which
provided, among other topics,
information on anti-Semitism.

At the
national level, there is an
annual general assembly of the
National Ecumenical Commission
to discuss various religious
themes. The Catholic Church
sponsors working groups at the
national level to maintain
dialogue and promote tolerance
among all religious groups. At
the local level, every Catholic
diocese has established
commissions for interfaith
dialogue. The president of the
National Ecumenical Commission
maintains contacts with leaders
of other faiths, including both
recognized and unrecognized
religious groups.

The European
Commission Against Racism and
Intolerance reports that
anti-Muslim rhetoric has
affected discrimination of
Muslims in the employment and
housing sectors. The commission
also found that Muslims have
targeted by police; although
this has been warranted in some
cases, as a rise in anti-Semitic
violence has been attributed to
Muslim students.

According to
a 2005 Free University of
Brussels study, about 10% of the
Muslim population are
“practicing Muslims.”
Today the Muslim community
continues to grow through
marriage migration. More than
60% of Moroccan and Turkish
youth marry partners from their
home countries.

Mosques: In 2004,
there were 328 mosques in
the country: Flanders (162),
Wallonia (80), Brussels
(77). These worshipping
areas are generally
organized by ethnicity and
are most often in discreet
buildings that have been
converted. Only a few
mosques have classical
architecture with domes and
minarets.
Most Turkish imams are from
the Diyanet, while the North
African imams tend to be
from more rural backgrounds
and not to have formal
training. Imams can be
punished for making
statements attacking the
state.

Cemeteries:
Municipal government have
the option to set aside
areas for Muslim burial in
public cemeteries.

Halal Slaughter:
Halal slaughter is not
subject to extensive
legislative restriction in
Belgium, but it is only
allowed in recognized
slaughterhouses.

Finance: At the end
of 2007, several Fortis
banks announced investment
options for Muslims based on
sharia law. The investment
funds exclude companies
linked with tobacco, pork,
alcohol, weapons, and
entertainment.

Holidays: Islamic
religious festivities are
not recognised, but specific
arrangements may be made by
single schools, where there
is a numerous Muslim student
population. In Droixhe, for
example, students are
released from school to
participate in the Aid
festivities.

The Headscarf:
Controversy surrounding the
headscarf in schools is
especially contentious in
Belgium compared to most
other EU countries. There is
no national ban against the
headscarf, although this was
proposed by two senators who
were unable to gather enough
parliamentary support.
In January 2001, Belgium’s
high court has ruled that a
Muslim woman wearing a
headscarf cannot be denied
an identification card
(Religious Freedom Report
2002). In December 2004, the
Belgian government announced
it was considering a ban on
conspicuous religious
symbols for civil servants. Wearing
religious symbols is
currently prohibited for
selected public service
officials, such as judges,
police, and other uniformed
officials.

In
November 2007, the
government of Belgium’s
third largest city, Ghent,
banned all public employees
from wearing headscarves or
any other religious or
political symbol. The ban
was proposed by the Liberal
party and approved by the
city council. Librarians,
child care workers, and
other city personnel will
not be allowed to wear any
religious symbols when if
they have contact with the
public.

Each
municipality and school has
the right to decide whether
or not to ban the headscarf
in particular or religious
symbols more generally. Most
schools in Belgium have
chosen to ban headscarves.

A survey
released in 2004 showed that
in Brussels, of 110 surveyed
schools, only 8 allowed
headscarves. The chador is
banned in all schools in
Wallonia, while a proposed
ban on the headscarf was
ultimately rejected in 2004
in the same region. The Antwerp
Appellate Court, the highest
to address the headscarf
issue, ruled in June 2005
that the state did not have
jurisdiction to determine
whether the Muslim faith
requires the headscarf. The
Court declared that girls in
public schools have a right
to wear a headscarf; they
also recognized the right of
school boards to restrict
that right, although the
board is responsible for
justifying this decision in
terms of the good
functioning of the school.
Catholic schools, which
comprise the largest
subsidized educational
institution, permit
religious symbols.

In April
2005, two Muslim teachers in
Brussels were fired for
wearing a headscarf after
being issued a warning. The
School Board argued that the
teachers should be held to
the same rules as the
students, who were banned
from wearing headscarves.

Walking
the streets fully veiled has
been banned by approximately
twenty municipalities (as of
December 2005). The fine for
ignoring the ban is 150
euros and has been enforced
in just a few cases.

In
January 2005, the King of
Belgium, in an important
symbolic gesture, offered
public support to an
employer who had received
death threats for defending
a woman wearing the
headscarf. King Albert
invited both the employer
and the female employee to
the royal palace for a
televised event in which he
condemned religious
intolerance.

According to
the 2000 Eurobarometer survey,
25% of Belgians show intolerant
attitudes, above the EU average
of 14%.
The European Commission Against
Racism and Intolerance finds
that hostility toward Muslims in
Belgium has intensified in the
aftermath of 9/11.

According to
a study by the religious
faculty’s Center for Psychology
at Catholic University of
Louvain-La-Neuve, one in three
native Belgians is bothered by
women wearing headscarves in
public. One half would like to
see them banned in certain
places. The study also found
that 69% view the headscarf as a
sign of oppression; 53.3%
believe that wearing it goes
against modern western values;
44.6% are disturbed by the
headscarf in schools;
and 20% said the headscarf is
not appropriate anywhere. Only
17.5% of those surveyed were not
disturbed by women wearing a
headscarf.

The Muslim
Executive suggests that the
mainstream media have generally
had a balanced approach when
reporting on violence committed
in the name of Islam, and that
care has been taken to
distinguish between extremist
and moderate Muslims. However, a
certain sensationalism in the
media tends to emphasize
violence and extremism, at the
potential cost of
misrepresenting the more general
trend of Muslim integration into
Belgian society.

Political
discourse surrounding Islam and
immigration in Belgium has been
dominated by the extreme
anti-immigration party, Vlaams
Belange, which has experienced
steadily increasing popularity
since the early 1990s. Most
other political parties and the
monarch have been working to
balance their appeal with calls
for moderation and tolerance.

Belgium’s
most vehement anti-immigration
party, Vlaams Belang, first rose
to political power in the 1991
federal election (under the name
Vlaams Blok), taking 10.3% of
the votes on what came to be
known as “Black Sunday.”
Following this election, all
other Belgian political parties
formed a cordon sanitaire (an
agreement of refusal invite or
join in coalition government)
against Vlaams Block, but this
has done little to slow down the
growing popularity of the party.
Their support has slowly grown
from 12.6% (1994 European
elections) to 15.4% (1999
European elections) to 24% (2004
regional elections).

In 1992, the
party published its
recommendations for immigration
policy, which included a call
for the forced repatriation of
all immigrants up the third
generation. The party describes
immigration as a threat to “the
Flemish people and culture.”
While speaking of the danger of
religious fundamentalism, it has
also protested the growing
number of mosques and state
funding for Muslim
organizations. Their campaign
slogan in 2003 was, “our people
first.”

In 2004, the
Court of Cassation upheld a
lower court ruling that found
Vlaams Blok guilty of violating
anti-racist legislation by
regularly depicting foreigners
as “criminals” and by
“permanently inciting” racism.
The party lost state funding and
was forced to dissolve. Party
leadership immediately
reorganized under a new name,
Vlaams Belang, and somewhat
moderated its stance. The cordon
sanitaire is still stands.

The party now
insists on the assimilation of
Muslims and immigrants to
Western values. They claim that
Islam is incompatible with
democracy and that Muslims must
choose between religion and
democracy. After the October
2006 municipal elections, a
teenager linked to the party
went on a shooting rampage,
wounding a Turkish woman and
killing a Mali nanny and her
two-year-old charge.
This party seems to be gaining
popularity rapidly, and is the
strongest party in the Flemish
region.

King Albert
II has spoken on several
occasions of the importance of
tolerance and equality. In
addition to his impromptu
support in January 2005 for an
employer who received death
threats for defending the right
of one of his female workers to
wear a headscarf, King Albert has
also introduced the rhetoric of
“the multi-culture Belgium” in
place of the word “immigrants.”
The first time he used this
terminology was July 21, 2003.