Federal Farmer I

8 October 1787

Abstract

In his first letter, The Federal
Farmer questions the urgency of replacing the
Articles of Confederation, and questions the motives of those who urge
rapid adoption of the Constitution. He asserts that the new government
would be national, rather than federal in nature, and that the states
would not have joined the Federal Constitutional Convention if they
had suspected this was the goal.

My letters to you last winter, on the subject of a well balanced national
government for the United States, were the result of free enquiry; when I
passed from that subject to enquiries relative to our commerce, revenues, past
administration, etc. I anticipated the anxieties I feel, on carefully examining
the plan of government proposed by the convention. It appears to be a plan
retaining some federal features; but to be the first important step, and to aim
strongly to one consolidated government of the United States. It leaves the
powers of government, and the representation of the people, so unnaturally
divided between the general and state governments, that the operations of our
system must be very uncertain. My uniform federal attachments, and the interest
I have in the protection of property, and a steady execution of the laws, will
convince you, that, if I am under any biass at all, it is in favor of any
general system which shall promise those advantages. The instability of our
laws increases my wishes for firm and steady government; but then, I can
consent to no government, which, in my opinion, is not calculated equally to
preserve the rights of all orders of men in the community. My object has been
to join with those who have endeavoured to supply the defects in the forms of
our governments by a steady and proper administration of them. Though I have
long apprehended that fraudalent debtors, and embarrassed men, on the one hand,
and men, on the other, unfriendly to republican equality, would produce an
uneasiness among the people, and prepare the way, not for cool and deliberate
reforms in the governments, but for changes calculated to promote the interests
of particular orders of men. Acquit me, sir, of any agency in the formation of
the new system; I shall be satisfied with seeing, if it shall be adopted, a
prudent administration. Indeed I am so much convinced of the truth of Pope's
maxim, that "That which is best administered is best," that I am much
inclined to subscribe to it from experience. I am not disposed to unreasonably
contend about forms. I know our situation is critical, and it behoves us to
make the best of it. A federal government of some sort is necessary. We have
suffered the present to languish; and whether the confederation was capable or
not originally of answering any valuable purposes, it is now but of little
importance. I will pass by the men, and states, who have been particularly
instrumental in preparing the way for a change, and, perhaps, for governments
not very favourable to the people at large. A constitution is now presented
which we may reject, or which we may accept, with or without amendments; and to
which point we ought to direct our exertions, is the question. To determine
this question, with propriety, we must attentively examine the system itself,
and the probable consequences of either step. This I shall endeavour to do, so
far as I am able, with candor and fairness; and leave you to decide upon the
propriety of my opinions, the weight of my reasons, and how far my conclusions
are well drawn. Whatever may be the conduct of others, on the present occasion,
I do not mean, hastily and positively to decide on the merits of the
constitution proposed. I shall be open to conviction, and always disposed to
adopt that which, all things considered, shall appear to me to be most for the
happiness of the community. It must be granted, that if men hastily and blindly
adopt a system of government, they will as hastily and as blindly be led to
alter or abolish it; and changes must ensue, one after another, till the
peaceable and better part of the community will grow weary with changes,
tumults and disorders, and be disposed to accept any government, however
despotic, that shall promise stability and firmness.

The first principal question that occurs, is. Whether, considering our
situation, we ought to precipitate the adoption of the proposed constitution?
If we remain cool and temperate, we are in no immediate danger of any
commotions; we are in a state of perfect peace, and in no danger of invasions;
the state governments are in the full exercise of their powers; and our
governments answer all present exigencies, except the regulation of trade,
securing credit, in some cases, and providing for the interest, in some
instances, of the public debts; and whether we adopt a change, three or nine
months hence, can make but little odds with the private circumstances of
individuals; their happiness and prosperity, after all, depend principally upon
their own exertions. We are hardly recovered from a long and distressing war:
The farmers, fishmen, &c. have not yet fully repaired the waste made by it.
Industry and frugality are again assuming their proper station. Private debts
are lessened, and public debts incurred by the war have been, by various ways,
diminished; and the public lands have now become a productive source for
diminishing them much more. I know uneasy men, who wish very much to
precipitate, do not admit all these facts; but they are facts well known to all
men who are thoroughly informed in the affairs of this country. It must,
however, be admitted, that our federal system is defective, and that some of
the state governments are not well administered; but, then, we impute to the
defects in our governments many evils and embarrassments which are most clearly
the result of the late war. We must allow men to conduct on the present
occasion, as on all similar ones. They will urge a thousand pretences to answer
their purposes on both sides. When we want a man to change his condition, we
describe it as miserable, wretched, and despised; and draw a pleasing picture
of that which we would have him assume. And when we wish the contrary, we
reverse our descriptions. Whenever a clamor is raised, and idle men get to
work, it is highly necessary to examine facts carefully, and without
unreasonably suspecting men of falshood, to examine, and enquire attentively,
under what impressions they act. It is too often the case in political
concerns, that men state facts not as they are, but as they wish them to be;
and almost every man, by calling to mind past scenes, will find this to be
true.

Nothing but the passions of ambitious, impatient, or disorderly men, I
conceive, will plunge us into commotions, if time should be taken fully to
examine and consider the system proposed. Men who feel easy in their
circumstances, and such as are not sanguine in their expectations relative to
the consequences of the proposed change, will remain quiet under the existing
governments. Many commercial and monied men, who are uneasy, not without just
cause, ought to be respected; and, by no means, unreasonably disappointed in
their expectations and hopes; but as to those who expect employments under the
new constitution; as to those weak and ardent men who always expect to be
gainers by revolutions, and whose lot it generally is to get out of one
difficulty into another, they are very little to be regarded: and as to those
who designedly avail themselves of this weakness and ardor, they are to be
despised. It is natural for men, who wish to hasten the adoption of a measure,
to tell us, now is the crisis—now is the critical moment which must be
seized, or all will be lost: and to shut the door against free enquiry,
whenever conscious the thing presented has defects in it, which time and
investigation will probably discover. This has been the custom of tyrants and
their dependants in all ages. If it is true, what has been so often said, that
the people of this country cannot change their condition for the worse, I
presume it still behoves them to endeavour deliberately to change it for the
better. The fickle and ardent, in any community, are the proper tools for
establishing despotic government. But it is deliberate and thinking men, who
must establish and secure governments on free principles. Before they decide on
the plan proposed, they will enquire whether it will probably be a blessing or
a curse to this people.

The present moment discovers a new face in our affairs. Our object has been
all along, to reform our federal system, and to strengthen our governments—to
establish peace, order and justice in the community—but a new
object now presents. The plan of government now proposed is evidently
calculated totally to change, in time, our condition as a people. Instead of
being thirteen republics, under a federal head, it is clearly designed to make
us one consolidated government. Of this, I think, I shall fully convince you,
in my following letters on this subject. This consolidation of the states has
been the object of several men in this country for some time past. Whether such
a change can ever be effected in any manner; whether it can be effected without
convulsions and civil wars; whether such a change will not totally destroy the
liberties of this country—time only can determine.

To have a just idea of the government before us, and to shew that a
consolidated one is the object in view, it is necessary not only to examine the
plan, but also its history, and the politics of its particular friends.

The confederation was formed when great confidence was placed in the
voluntary exertions of individuals, and of the respective states; and the
framers of it, to guard against usurpation, so limited and checked the powers,
that, in many respects, they are inadequate to the exigencies of the union. We
find, therefore, members of congress urging alterations in the federal system
almost as soon as it was adopted. It was early proposed to vest congress with
powers to levy an impost, to regulate trade, etc. but such was known to be the
caution of the states in parting with power, that the vestment, even of these,
was proposed to be under several checks and limitations. During the war, the
general confusion, and the introduction of paper money, infused in the minds of
people vague ideas respecting government and credit. We expected too much from
the return of peace, and of course we have been disappointed. Our governments
have been new and unsettled; and several legislatures, by making tender,
suspension, and paper money laws, have given just cause of uneasiness to
creditors. By these and other causes, several orders of men in the community
have been prepared, by degrees, for a change of government; and this very abuse
of power in the legislatures, which, in some cases, has been charged upon the
democratic part of the community, has furnished aristocratical men with those
very weapons, and those very means, with which, in great measure, they are
rapidly effecting their favourite object. And should an oppressive government
be the consequence of the proposed change, posterity may reproach not only a
few overbearing unprincipled men, but those parties in the states which have
misused their powers.

The conduct of several legislatures, touching paper money, and tender laws,
has prepared many honest men for changes in government, which otherwise they
would not have thought of—when by the evils, on the one hand, and by the
secret instigations of artful men, on the other, the minds of men were become
sufficiently uneasy, a bold step was taken, which is usually followed by a
revolution, or a civil war. A general convention for mere commercial purposes
was moved for—the authors of this measure saw that the people's
attention was turned solely to the amendment of the federal system; and that,
had the idea of a total change been started, probably no state would have
appointed members to the convention. The idea of destroying, ultimately, the
state government, and forming one consolidated system, could not have been
admitted—a convention, therefore, merely for vesting in congress power
to regulate trade was proposed. This was pleasing to the commercial towns; and
the landed people had little or no concern about it. September, 1786, a few men
from the middle states met at Annapolis, and hastily proposed a convention to
be held in May, 1787, for the purpose, generally, of amending the
confederation—this was done before the delegates of Massachusetts, and of the other
states arrived—still not a word was said about destroying the old
constitution, and making a new one—The states still unsuspecting, and
not aware that they were passing the Rubicon, appointed members to the new
convention, for the sole and express purpose of revising and amending the
confederation—and, probably, not one man in ten thousand in the United
States, till within these ten or twelve days, had an idea that the old ship was
to be destroyed, and he put to the alternative of embarking in the new ship
presented, or of being left in danger of sinking—The States, I believe,
universally supposed the convention would report alterations in the
confederation, which would pass an examination in congress, and after being
agreed to there, would be confirmed by all the legislatures, or be rejected.
Virginia made a very respectable appointment, and placed at the head of it the
first man in America: In this appointment there was a mixture of political
characters; but Pennsylvania appointed principally those men who are esteemed
aristocratical. Here the favourite moment for changing the government was
evidently discerned by a few men, who seized it with address. Ten other states
appointed, and tho' they chose men principally connected with commerce and the
judicial department yet they appointed many good republican characters—had
they all attended we should now see, I am persuaded a better system
presented. The non-attendance of eight or nine men, who were appointed members
of the convention, I shall ever consider as a very unfortunate event to the
United States.—Had they attended, I am pretty clear, that the result of
the convention would not have had that strong tendency to aristocracy now
discemable in every part of the plan. There would not have been so great an
accumulation of powers, especially as to the internal police of the country, in
a few hands, as the constitution reported proposes to vest in them—the
young visionary men, and the consolidating aristocracy, would have been more
restrained than they have been. Eleven states met in the convention, and after
four months close attention presented the new constitution, to be adopted or
rejected by the people. The uneasy and fickle part of the community may be
prepared to receive any form of government; but, I presume, the enlightened and
substantial part will give any constitution presented for their adoption, a
candid and thorough examination; and silence those designing or empty men, who
weakly and rashly attempt to precipitate the adoption of a system of so much
importance—We shall view the convention with proper respect—and,
at the same time, that we reflect there were men of abilities and integrity in
it, we must recollect how disproportionably the democratic and aristocratic
parts of the community were represented—Perhaps the judicious friends
and opposers of the new constitution will agree, that it is best to let it rest
solely on its own merits, or be condemned for its own defects.

In the first place, I shall premise, that the plan proposed is a plan of
accommodation—and that it is in this way only, and by giving up a part
of our opinions, that we can ever expect to obtain a government founded in
freedom and compact. This circumstance candid men will always keep in view, in
the discussion of this subject.

The plan proposed appears to be partly federal, but principally however,
calculated ultimately to make the states one consolidated government.

The first interesting question, therefore suggested, is, how far the states
can be consolidated into one entire government on free principles. In
considering this question extensive objects are to be taken into view, and
important changes in the forms of government to be carefully attended to in all
their consequences. The happiness of the people at large must be the great
object with every honest statesman, and he will direct every movement to this
point. If we are so situated as a people, as not to be able to enjoy equal
happiness and advantages under one government, the consolidation of the states
cannot be admitted.

There are three different forms of free government under which the United
States may exist as one nation; and now is, perhaps, the time to determine to
which we will direct our views. 1. Distinct republics connected under a federal
head. In this case the respective state governments must be the principal
guardians of the peoples rights, and exclusively regulate their internal
police; in them must rest the balance of government. The congress of the
states, or federal head, must consist of delegates amenable to, and removeable
by the respective states: This congress must have general directing powers;
powers to require men and monies of the states; to make treaties, peace and
war; to direct the operations of armies, etc. Under this federal modification
of government, the powers of congress would be rather advisary or
recommendatory than coercive. 2. We may do away the several state governments,
and form or consolidate all the states into one entire government, with one
executive, one judiciary, and one legislature, consisting of senators and
representatives collected from all parts of the union: In this case there would
be a compleat consolidation of the states. 3. We may consolidate the states as
to certain national objects, and leave them severally distinct independent
republics, as to internal police generally. Let the general government consist
of an executive, a judiciary, and balanced legislature, and its powers extend
exclusively to all foreign concerns, causes arising on the seas to commerce,
imports, armies, navies, Indian affairs, peace and war, and to a few internal
concerns of the community; to the coin, post-offices, weights and measures, a
general plan for the militia, to naturalization, and, perhaps to
bankruptcies, leaving the internal police of the community, in other
respects, exclusively to the state governments; as the administration of
justice in all causes arising internally, the laying and collecting of internal
taxes, and the forming of the militia according to a general plan prescribed.
In this case there would be a compleat consolidation, quoad certain
objects only.

Touching the first, or federal plan, I do not think much can be said in its
favor: The sovereignty of the nation, without coercive and efficient powers to
collect the strength of it, cannot always be depended on to answer the purposes
of government; and in a congress of representatives of sovereign states, there
must necessarily be an unreasonable mixture of powers in the same hands.

As to the second, or compleat consolidating plan, it deserves to be
carefully considered at this time, by every American: If it be impracticable,
it is a fatal error to model our governments, directing our views ultimately to
it.

The third plan, or partial consolidation, is, in my opinion, the only one
that can secure the freedom and happiness of this people. I once had some
general ideas that the second plan was practicable, but from long attention,
and the proceedings of the convention, I am fully satisfied, that this third
plan is the only one we can with safety and propriety proceed upon. Making this
the standard to point out, with candor and fairness, the parts of the new
constitution which appear to be improper, is my object. The convention appears
to have proposed the partial consolidation evidently with a view to collect all
powers ultimately, in the United States into one entire government; and from
its views in this respect, and from the tenacity of the small states to have an
equal vote in the senate, probably originated the greatest defects in the
proposed plan.

Independant of the opinions of many great authors, that a free elective
government cannot be extended over large territories, a few reflections must
evince, that one government and general legislation alone, never can extend
equal benefits to all parts of the United States: Different laws, customs, and
opinions exist in the different states, which by a uniform system of laws would
be unreasonably invaded. The United States contain about a million of square
miles, and in half a century will, probably, contain ten millions of people;
and from the center to the extremes is about 800 miles.

Before we do away the state governments, or adopt measures that will tend to
abolish them, and to consolidate the states into one entire government, several
principles should be considered and facts ascertained:—These, and my
examination into the essential parts of the proposed plan, I shall pursue in my
next.