Seattle-based writer and Millennial scum

Academic

The nations of the Southern Caucasus have had a longstanding history of territorial disputes, Armenia and Azerbaijan being of no exception. The Christian Armenians have had a long history of animosity with the Muslim Azerbaijanis, but the strife became greatly exacerbated by Soviet policies that divided up Armenian-majority territories, specifically Nagorno-Karabakh, in the early twentieth century.1 The source of conflict in this case is that Nagorno-Karabakh falls physically within Azerbaijani states lines but its inhabitants consist of 94% ethnic Armenians.2 Both sides believe they have legitimate claims over the land, which has ignited many acts of aggression. The conflict is on-going to this day but this paper will focus on the beginning of the twentieth century, largely when the violence began.

The Collective Security Treaty Organization was developed in 1991 by Moscow after the collapse of the Soviet Union as a means to give Central Asian states, like Kyrgyzstan, the overarching security framework to replace what the Soviet Union had left behind. Given basic security framework these states went on to pursue their respective interests in the years following, resulting in a clash of national interests. Moscow then further developed the CSTO as a way for Russia to discretely gain more regional control, with the title of “security manager”1 always in mind. The organization has failed to do what it was originally intended for. This paper will serve to explain how Russia’s covert desire to be viewed as a security manager in Kyrgyzstan through its pretext of the Collective Security Treaty Organization has negatively impacted Kyrgyzstan’s development as a sovereign nation by forcing its dependent on Russia.

The Southern Caucasus region has consistently been infamous for its endless territorial disputes throughout history. The age-old conflict between the state of Georgia and its breakaway nation of Abkhazia remains a crucial issue that has pressured world powers to take sides in order to exert influence. The European Union is no different in this regard; it has clearly demonstrated its support for Georgia’s territorial integrity while trying to promote peacekeeping efforts in Abkhazia, but simultaneously refuses to actually recognize Abkhazia as a sovereign state in solidarity with Georgia. The EU has implemented a few policies, including the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP), and the Non-recognition and Engagement Policy (NREP), in order to meet its goals in EU-Georgia relations and in preventing Abkhazia’s worst fear of becoming completely isolated on the world stage. This paper will serve to analyze the impacts and effectiveness of two recent policies that the European Union has put into place in attempt to help remedy the pressing territorial conflict between Georgia and Abkhazia.

The Republic of Uzbekistan has a rich history full of an eclectic mix of cultures from around the region, as well as the remnants of some of the oldest human civilizations in the world. It is safe to say that the nation is a fascinating one to which few Westerners have ventured, but the former Soviet Republic of Uzbekistan has had its share of skirmishes throughout history. After the fall of the Soviet Union in 1989, a constitution that guaranteed basic freedoms was adopted. The Constitutional Court serves to interpret the Constitution and determine the constitutionality of laws in Uzbekistan.1