12 May 2006

The Armenians Were A Dangerous People To Get Mixed Up With Allies Question Whose Side Armenia Is Really On . .

Hovannissian complains a year after the Supreme Council had announced that Armenia was to be separated from the Ottoman Empire, that decision remained unimplemented. In the meantime the allied armies demobilized, wartime concerns gave way to social and industrial unrest, the United States drew apart, and the Turkish resistance movement thrust itself into the political arena.

Under these circumstances, the Allies sought to discharge their moral obligations to the Armenians without making military commitments, by winning general acceptance of a relatively small Armenian state, incorporating the Yerevan republic and only the eastern border districts of the Ottoman Empire. In discarding plans for an Armenia from sea to sea, Allied leaders would attempt to guarantee the safety of Christians left within Turkey and to establish a special administrative regime in Cilitia. This line of reasoning sounded the Allied retreat toward the London Conference of 1920" (1).

There are several flaws in this position taken by Hovannissian. The Allied decision to create an independent Armenia after more than three thousand years without a state remained "unimplemented," because the Armenians tried to create a homeland justified by Armenian claims, not by Armenian possession. Folklore alone is hardly enough to rally the support of Allies, especially if there was not an Armenia on the stage of history. Myths are hardly enough to convince the Allies to send their boys in harm’s way.

The fact that the Allies hadn’t given the deadbeat Armenian leaders someone else’s land was, in and of itself, implementation. After all, the Allies had established and recognized small-nations such as Poland, Czechoslovakia, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, and other newly "liberated" states, as he noted.

Is there one good reason why the Allies shouldn’t demobilize their armies, stop thinking about killing other people, and begin thinking about their individual, social, and industrial issues at home after winning World War I?

During the same year the Allies were cutting the size of their military power, tiny Armenia started two wars and lost them both. First with Georgia, and then with Azerbaijan. The Armenian leaders proved they were unfit to govern a nation and the Allies had every reason not to give them someone else’s land on a silver platter. Hovannissian would have the Allies continue on full military alert, just to give the bandit leaders of Armenia protection while the Armenians attempted, by force of arms, to take their neighbor’s lands. Allied leaders had every rational reason to refuse Armenian land-grab attempts. The Armenians attempted a rebellion while a minority within the Ottoman Empire.

They complained they were discriminated against. Now, they would still be a minority in the lands they demanded and they wanted control over the majority Muslim population. This would be "apartheid," that is, rule of a majority by a minority. There is no way this wild scheme made sense and the Allies were wise to refuse to give in to the state of Armenia’s unjustified claims for more and more of someone else’s land and people. Otherwise, it would be the first "apartheid" of the twentieth century. The allies simply used good judgment by not backing the baseless Armenian demands.

Hovannissian refers to France’s Prime Minister Clemenceau the "erstwhile champion of Armenia because the latter stated that `the Armenians were a dangerous people to get mixed up with; particularly as they required a great deal of money and gave very little satisfaction. They could have a republic or whatever else they wanted but should not expect France to make any expenditures for this purpose» (P 438) This appears to be the bottom-line position of all the Allies. Can any fair person blame them?

The British Foreign Office prepared a treaty outline regarding Turks and Armenians. Sir Edwin S. Montagu headed the India office.He expressed "dismay at the implication that all Ottoman subjects in the new Armenian state who did not elect to become Armenian citizens should dispose of their properties and depart within a stipulated period of time. It seems to me to be a monstrous thing that Turks who do not wish to change their nationality should be expelled from the country in which they and their fathers may have lived for generations.... They may surely be allowed to remain in the country and the suggestion that all Turkish subjects would have to crowd into what remains of Turkey is [to] my mind little short of scandalous" (P 450-451).

Philippe Berthelot, secretary of the French Delegation, concluded:

The great difficulty in establishing Armenia is that the Armenians practically nowhere constitute a majority; the great objection to attributing to them countries such as Cilicia, where there is a strong national nucleus, situated more than 400 kilometers from Armenia, is that such an extension would certainly result in placing the Armenians in a definite minority in their State, and that when a genuine consultation of the inhabitants took place, they would elect a majority of representatives hostile to the Armenians…Reality and logic are equally opposed to the dream of a Great Armenia stretching from Trebizond to Alexandretta (P 454).

Hovannissian’s logic and personal evaluation of this French observation is that "Berthelot seemed to feel the need to repeat rationalizations for the Allied retreat” (P 454).

Of course the French based their decision on the belief that honest elections would take place. Hovannissian must have known that the Armenian leaders delayed elections for as long as they could, and when they were forced to have elections, they rigged them in such a way that they retained almost total control. Perhaps this is what the bandit Armenian leaders planned to do if they could just get control of Cilicia and have Allied troops protect them if they were forced to hold elections-crooked elections were their specialty.

On another front, "the Armenians hoped to persuade the Russians that a friendly, united Armenian state incorporating the Russian Armenian provinces would not impair the political, territorial, or economic strength of Russia and would actually he advantageous. As it happened, spokesmen of all Russian factions professed sympathy but few were willing to advocate Armenian independence publicly» (P 468).

Even though paid Armenian agents were working every side in the Russian internal war, common sense should have told them no Russian government, once established, would allow a gang of bandits to take lands that had been a part of Russia for more than 400 years. The Armenian-Russian flirtations complicated relations among the Trans-Caucasian states and stirred suspicions in British circles» (P 478). Other Allies had suspicions as well. Yet, these bandit Armenians could not understand why the Allies wouldn’t give them someone else’s land from sea to sea and provide troops for them to control it.

The Allies withheld recognition from the Trans-Caucasian republics so long as the outcome of the Russian civil war remained in doubt... (P 482). In 1920 the White Armies in Russia were in retreat. The Allies were forced to make a decision "whether an attempt should be made to fortify the Caucasus as a buffer against Bolshevism. Oliver Wardrop warned that only recognition of and material and moral assistance to the local republics could prevent the Bolsheviks from overrunning Trans-Caucasia and then working `their will in Persian and Transcaucasia and beyond`" (P 499).

This would be the background and the only reason any Caucasus state would be recognized by world powers. "Meeting in Paris on January 10, the Council of Foreign Ministers quickly granted recognition to Georgia and Azerbaijan...» (P 501).

Clearly the Allies, even faced with Bolshevism, had grave reservations about extending even de facto recognition to Armenia. Both Georgia and Azerbaijan celebrated their acceptance as de facto nations.

"Within an hour the Georgian capital was bedecked with flags and carpets, factories, officers, and shops were closed and traffic was stopped by joyous demonstrations" (P 501). Speeches were made and a national holiday was proclaimed on January 13.

"In Azerbaijan, Prime Minister Nasib Bek Usubbekov proclaimed to his people on January 13 that their country had been received into the family of `advanced nations`. The official Azerbaijani celebration began at dawn the next day with religious services at the Taza-Pir mosques, followed by a rally of Muslim workers at City Hall, where Musavat-orators hailed the Muslim political renaissance and the achievements of the world’s first Muslim Republic» (P 502).

"Foreign Minister Fathali Khan Khoiskii reflected upon the struggle of the past eighteen months for national independence and characterized recognition as a victory not only for the Azerbaijani people but for the entire Turkish race" (P 502).

Needless to say, the Armenian leaders who were busy working every side of the street within Russia were upset by not being recognized as a de facto country. However, these bandit Armenians saw an opportunity, took hat in hand, and went to work to be recognized. "On January 17 Avetis Ahoronian and Boghos Noubar, seeking `common justice/ complained to the British delegation and the peace conference that the prolonged Allied silence was encouraging elements hostile to the Armenian republic». These little dictators, even while trying to make deals with all sides in the Russian civil war promised that "the Armenian government, if given Allied military assistance would cooperate with Georgian and Azerbaijan to counter Bolshevik aggression» (P 511) In just a few months this proved to be one of Armenia’s greatest “big lies”.

Hovannissian attempts to explain the final acceptance of Armenia in this way:

The earlier recognition of Georgia and Azerbaijan created practical difficulties. It seemed absurd not to recognize Armenia while planning to arm and include it in the Caucasus barrier against Bolshevism. Hence, on January 19 Curzon told the Supreme Council that the decision to defer the recognition of Armenia should now be reversed, since the existing republic had been a pan of the old Russian empire and was ready to help defend the Caucasus. As no objections were forthcoming, the conference agreed that `the government of the Armenian State should be recognized as a de facto government on the condition that this recognition in no way prejudiced the question of the eventual frontiers of that state.` In this inauspicious manner did the Republic of Armenia at last receive its coveted recognition (P 512).

In plain words, Armenia "accidentally" became a de facto state. To listen to what the Armenian bandit dictators claimed, one would think this "accidental" recognition was the grandest thing in the world. "From the balcony of the Parliament building, Avetik Shakian saluted the assembled citizens and praised the army and the people for having made possible the historic day» (P 512). This would be a public relations tool to be used by the Armenian leaders.

…At Government House, the throng heard Minister of Interior Abraham Gialkhamdanian liken Armenia to a giant with his heart in Erevan, his hands in Alexandrople, his head in Karabakh, and his feet in Diarbekir and the Black Sea. The giant had slept through the centuries, and some wondered if he was still alive: But we know that his heart never ceased beating and his hands never stopped working. Today, the Allies have realized that fact, and we are confident that soon the titan will move his head, stretch his feet, and stand erect (P 513).

Within a matter of months the "titan" did move his head, stretched his feet, and stood erect, only to cut a deal and join the Soviet Union without firing a single shot. The Allies had every reason to fear what these Armenian bandits would do, because even with de facto recognition, these thugs started talking about conquest of their neighbors` lands.

Armenian newspapers in 1920 boasted of the time when they would write to all Armenian peoples:

The belated favor of the Allies had been influenced neither by Armenian diplomatic efforts nor by the aspirations of the Armenian workers and peasants; it was simply one link in the cordon sanitaire the Allies were stringing around Soviet Russia. The way of giving the "favor" was insulting to the Armenian people, for, after all their declarations about emancipating; the Allies now limited their recognition to "the existing state"; as if it were possible to disregard the determination.

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