Since the introduction of a commitments procedure in EU antitrust policy (Article 9 of Council Regulation 1/2003), the European Commission has extensively settled cases of alleged anticompetitive ... [more ▼]

Since the introduction of a commitments procedure in EU antitrust policy (Article 9 of Council Regulation 1/2003), the European Commission has extensively settled cases of alleged anticompetitive practices. In this paper, we use a formal model of law enforcement (Bebchuk, 1984; Shavell, 1988) to identify the optimal procedure to resolve cases in a context of uncertainty related to the law (L-uncertainty) and to the facts (F-uncertainty). We show that commitments are suboptimal when L-uncertainty is high. Furthermore, the generalized use of commitments creates an additional risk of under-enforcement when F-uncertainty is significant. [less ▲]

In recent years, the Credit Rating Agencies (“CRAs”) have been in the eye of the storm. Some argue that CRA rating errors—symptomatized by rating inflation or deflation—originate in excessive competition ... [more ▼]

In recent years, the Credit Rating Agencies (“CRAs”) have been in the eye of the storm. Some argue that CRA rating errors—symptomatized by rating inflation or deflation—originate in excessive competition. This paper argues that the low level of competition in credit rating is a better explanation for rating this phenomenon. [less ▲]

in GERADIN, D.; LIANNOS, I. (Eds.) Research Handbook in European Competition Law (2013)

This paper offers a complete overview of the oligopoly problem in competition law and economics, with a specific focus on European Union (EU) law. A related purpose of the paper is to challenge the ... [more ▼]

This paper offers a complete overview of the oligopoly problem in competition law and economics, with a specific focus on European Union (EU) law. A related purpose of the paper is to challenge the dominant view that merger control is the ultimate preventive remedy against tacit collusion. On close analysis, the merger-only enforcement paradigm against tacit collusion generates a systemic risk of type II errors. Part of this enforcement gap may, however, be alleviated through a more muscular enforcement of the rules on coordinated conduct (i.e. Article 101 TFEU) and on unilateral conduct (i.e. Article 102 TFEU). In this later respect, the paper formulates a possible theory of harm that would entitle agencies and courts to apply Article 102 TFEU to specific types of conduct by oligopolists. The concept of abuse of collective dominance may in particular be applied to the artificial tactics which oligopolists adopt to protect an observed collusive equilibrium from the natural, disruptive effect caused by an external shock (entry, natural disaster, change in tax rate, etc.). In this sense, the paper is different from other scholarly proposals that recommend applying rules on unilateral conduct to excessive oligopoly prices and/or facilitating practices. [less ▲]