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C O N F I D E N T I A L MANAGUA 002158
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR WHA/CEN
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/25/2026
TAGS: KDEMNUPGOVPINR
SUBJECT: MONTEALEGRE TELLS CODEL HE'S NICARAGUA'S BEST
CHANCE FOR DEMOCRACY
¶1. (C) Summary: Congressman Burton, the Ambassador, and
DCM met with Eduardo Montealegre, Adolfo Arguello, and
Mario Rapacciolli on 23 September to discuss the progress
of Montealegre's presidential campaign, the strength of his
Nicaraguan Liberal Alliance (ALN) party, and the corrosive
effects of the political pact between Arnoldo Aleman and
Daniel Ortega. Montealegre started by asserting that local
polls consistently demonstrate the race is between he and
Ortega. He discounted the viability of Liberal Constitutional
Party (PLC) candidate Jose Rizo, claiming that it was clear
Rizo is nothing more than Aleman's puppet. Montealegre and
his advisers cited as their biggest challenge the attempts
by the Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN)-PLC
pact (pacto) to undermine his campaign by launching
politicized
corruption allegations against him. He fears that the
Sandinistas
will exploit their control of the courts to initiate a trial
on politicized corruption allegations in an effort to nullify
his campaign.
The ALN members suggested Burton could help their cause by
reminding voters of
the disastrous economic consequences an Ortega administration
implies. End Summary.
Montealegre: I'm the Only One Who Can Beat Ortega
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
¶2. (C) Eduardo Montealegre and advisers Adolfo Arguello
and Mario Rapacciolli told Congressman Burton, Ambassador,
and DCM over breakfast on 23 September that their
Nicaraguan Liberal Alliance (ALN) party is the country's
best hope for defeating Daniel Ortega and his Sandinista
National Liberation Front (FSLN) in the 5 November
Presidential election. Citing an internal ALN poll,
Montealegre argued that 72% of Nicaraguans do not want Ortega
to win in November, and that most of these people have yet
to decide who they will vote for. Nevertheless,
Montealegre said he typically places about 22 to 25% in the
polls, followed by Sandinista Renovation Movement (MRS)
candidate Edmundo Jarquin with about 19%, and that Liberal
Constitutional Party (PLC) Jose Rizo typically trails with
numbers in the low teens. Montealegre said that local
polling trends indicate that he is the only one who can be
assured victory against Ortega in the second round; polls
also suggest Rizo would lose such a contest, that Jarquin
could
not decisively beat Ortega, but that he (Montealegre)
would best Ortega by about 12 points.
¶3. (C) Montealegre and his advisers were upbeat on the
strength of their campaign, although they acknowledged
difficulties in fundraising. They were
positive over the ALN's ability to mobilize supporters
throughout the country. Montealegre cited the ALN's
ability to field a large numbers of candidates to staff the
local polling places (JRVs) in the municipality of
Chinandega where each party was able to name three
candidates to man each of the 80 JRVs. The ALN came
forward with a full roster of 240 nominees, while noting
that the PLC only came up with 80. The ALN members
informed the Codel that the PLC has been "resting on their
laurels" and that the organizational capacity of the PLC is
not as strong as many assume. Indeed, Montealegre and his
colleagues claimed that their party has won over PLC
supporters in many areas. Asked whether the ALN was making
use of the internet in its campaign, the ALN members said
that while they have websites, they have not made this a
focal point of the campaign as only about 5% of the
population enjoys access to the web. However, the party
has used cell-phone marketing (i.e. calls to random
numbers to tout the ALN's campaign platform).
¶4. (C) The ALN members avoided citing specific funding
levels, but
said they need more resources for the campaign. Initially
denying having received funds from Taiwan, they then hinted
that they had received some limited contributions from the
Taiwanese. They also alluded to having received support from
the private
sectors in Guatemala and El Salvador, as
businesspeople there "understand the negative implications"
of the return of Sandinista rule on the isthmus. That said,
the ALN members noted that while they have received some
funding
from the Nicaraguan business sector, the largest financiers
are hedging their bets by also backing other candidates.
Rapacciolli
described the mentality amongst these donors is one of 'I am
going
to pay the most to those I know can hurt me (if I do not
support them).'
Montealegre estimated that his campaign has spent only one
third of
what Bolanos spent at the same point in his 2001 campaign.
Montealegre: The CSE Is Stacked Against Us
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
¶5. (C) Montealegre predicted that Ortega's influence in the
Supreme Electoral Council (CSE) would help him
steal some of the vote, or hamstring his opponents. He
noted that the Sandinistas and the CSE are cooperating on
"little things that go unnoticed" and that the real danger
will be if PLC and FSLN JRV members -- who will compose two
out of three seats in most JRVs -- cooperate to strengthen
their positions while weakening those of their opponents.
The ALN members expressed their frustration with a recent
CSE decision to make it easier for votes to be challenged,
and claimed that JRV members could purposefully commit errors
in their paperwork in order to throw out entire ballot
boxes. Montealegre and his colleagues pointed out that
this is exactly what happened in Granada in the 2004
municipal elections. Montealegre commented that the
previous day he had been working in Chichigalpa to
select ALN members for positions on the local JRVs, and
that while his party had named candidates for each of the
108 JRVs, they were only given 14 seats. In contrast, the
MRS presented only 60 names and received 60 spots; Eden
Pastora's Alternative for Change party received all ten of
the slots they applied for.
¶6. (C) Nevertheless, Montealegre said
the ALN has been trying to address the problem of CSE
partisanship. He noted that his party has been reaching
out to local PLC JRV representatives to form positive
relationships so that things go smoothly on election day.
Montealegre said that his party was also working closely
with the Carter Center and other NGOs to point out
weaknesses in the process. (Comment: Article 16 of the
Electoral Code clearly states that the top two JRV positions
will be doled out to the two dominant parties of the last
elections - in this case the PLC and FSLN. The same
article says that the PLC and FSLN-controlled CSE has
the ability to divvy the third JRV slots as it sees fit
among the remaining political parties participating in
the election -- the Alternative for Change (AC), ALN,
or the MRS. End Comment.)
Montealegre: The Pacto Is Gunning For Me
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
¶7. (C) Montealegre alleged that Arnoldo Aleman is
doing everything in his power to help Ortega win the
election. He said such an alliance could be the only
possible
explanation for Aleman's decision to remove Montealegre --
the most popular center-right candidate -- from the PLC and
choose instead the relatively weak Rizo. Rizo, said
Montealegre, "takes enough votes for us not to be assured
of at least a second round." Montealegre also blamed the
Ortega-Aleman pact (known locally as the "pacto") for
launching politicized allegations of wrongdoing. He reported
that in early 2006 Aleman and Ortega agreed to re-examine
Montealegre's role in a banking scandal in 2000 when he was
serving as Finance Minister.
¶8. (C) Montealegre explained that the
same motives were behind recent allegations launched by the
CSE and the FSLN that the ALN was working with President
Elias Antonio Saca of El Salvador to print false ballots.
Montealegre said that the economic unit of the National
Police are now investigating the case. Montealegre told
his audience that the FSLN is prepared to exert their
influence in the judiciary to bring Montealegre to trial
should the election go to a second round. Montealegre said
that a trial would legally invalidate his candidacy and
require that he step down -- and that, as runner-up, Ortega
would win the presidency. (Comment: The Electoral Code does
not address the implications of what would happen to a
candidate
involved in a legal trial. However, Article 47 Chapter 2 of
the
Constitution states that a candidate who is found guilty of a
crime will have his political rights suspended, and thus would
no longer be able to run for office. It is unclear whether
the
ALN would be able to replace Montealegre in this eventuality.
Moreover, FSLN and PLC control over the judicial and electoral
institutions give them the ability to manipulate the
law in their favor, and thus to force Montealegre from
the race even before a verdict is issued in any trial. End
Comment.)
¶9. (C) Burton mentioned that he had heard Aleman was in
poor health and asked whether that would impact his
involvement in the campaign. The ALN members had no news
on Aleman's health, but insisted that regardless he will
remain
a key factor throughout the election season.
The Rizo Factor
- - - - - - - -
¶10. (C) Montealegre characterized Rizo as a weak puppet of
Aleman -- someone guided more by his own ambitions than
ideology or values. To back this up, Montealegre cited the
fact
that Rizo has turned against both Bolanos and Aleman in the
past.
Montealegre argued that while Rizo claims he is independent
of Aleman, it is clear he is not. Montealegre recalled a
meeting between he and Rizo in early May during which he
offered to become Rizo's running mate in exchange for the
right to name half of the Assembly candidates and a commitment
to marginalize Aleman. Rizo replied that Aleman would have to
approve any deal; Aleman's subsequent answer was that Rizo
had no authority to negotiate with Montealegre. (Comment:
The
Ambassador confirmed that he had heard a similar readout of
this meeting from former President Calderon Sol of El Salvador
who had been involved in attempts to bring Rizo and
Montealegre
together. End Comment.)
¶11. (C) Despite their wariness of Rizo, the ALN members
indicated that they continue to try to pressure Rizo into
stepping down. Burton asked whether Rizo's departure would
have a positive impact on the campaign. Montealegre
responded that the move would probably have some value
because it would cause turmoil within the PLC,
although he pointed out that the party would name a
successor rather than admit defeat. Montealegre speculated
that Rizo might be amenable to an offer of a cushy
Ambassadorial position in Chile or Spain. (Comment: We
assess that Rizo's departure is unlikely as he is beholden
to Aleman. That said, in the event that he would consider
such a move, he would almost certainly demand far more
compensation than an ambassadorial position which, in
effect, would amount to little more than a political exile
-- something the ambitious Rizo would probably find
unappealing. End Comment.).
¶12. (C) Rapacciolli said that a defection by Jorge Antonio
Alvarado, Rizo's running mate, would be another way to
derail the PLC campaign. He speculated that Alvarado would
be susceptible to the argument that by continuing to run
against Montealegre he could be blamed for allowing Ortega
to win, and thus can be induced to quit. His defection, in
turn, would increase the pressure on Rizo to do the same.
(Comment: Rapacciolli has personal ties to Alvarado --
they both got their start with the Conservative Party --
and thus sees him in a somewhat positive light. We assess
that Alvarado is even more politically opportunistic than
Rizo, and that should Rizo resign, Alvarado would almost
certainly step forward to helm the ticket. In any event,
Alvarado would be a dangerous partner for Montealegre given
his history of changing alliances to suit his own personal
interests. End Comment.).
ALN Issue Uncharacteristically Strong Criticism of the MRS
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
¶13. (C) Montealegre and his advisers took the opportunity
to criticize the leftist origins of the MRS and its weak
organizational capacity. The ALN members told their audience
that the MRS is weak, and lacks a strong nation-wide
organization,
including at the JRVs. Elaborating, the ALN members said
that the MRS does not have enough supporters to field
observers at all of the
voting centers on election day. Led by Rapacciolli --
whose tone was more aggressive than Montealegre's or
Arguello's -- the ALN took a very critical posture against
the MRS. Rapacciolli said that Herty Lewites's candidacy
had been part of a scheme by Humberto Ortega to reunite the
Sandinista family. While not going as far, Montealegre
opined that if Jarquin makes it to a second round with
Ortega, there will be little difference regardless of the
outcome as both are Sandinistas. Asked by Burton for his
opinion, the Ambassador said clearly that he does
not view Jarquin's campaign as a plot to unite the left,
pointing out that Jarquin does hold a leftist-bent, but
is committed to standing up against the entrenched and
corrupt domination of the left by Daniel Ortega.
¶14. (C) Montealegre, Arguello, and Rapacciolli countered
that
Jarquin was a diehard Sandinista, citing his service during
the Sandinista government of the 1980s as an Ambassador to
Mexico and Spain, and as an FSLN deputy in the Assembly
from 1990 to 1992. They said the only reason he moved to
Washington in 1992 was because his wife's son needed
medical care. (Comment: The ALN's strident criticism of
the MRS was clearly an attempt to dissuade the audience
from seeing the MRS as an independent alternative. In
previous meetings, the ALN has expressed frustration with
the Embassy's policy of speaking of both the ALN and the
MRS as positive alternatives to the PLC and FSLN. The ALN
quite rightly view the MRS as a serious competitor as the
MRS is competing with them for the moderate and undecided
vote. End Comment.)
ALN to Codel: Remind Nicaraguans of the Negative
Consequences of An Ortega Win
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
¶15. (C) Rapacciolli told the Codel that local polls
consistently show Nicaraguans are very pro-American, and
suggested that a strong reminder from the United States on
the negative points of an Ortega presidency could do some
good. Specifically, he pointed out that with over one
million Nicaraguans living in the United States, it would
be "effective to announce that a Sandinista government could
endanger the flow of remittances." He reported that Ortega
could choose
to take a page out of Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez's
playbook by
trying to impose legislation that would crack down on foreign
currency.
That said, Rapacciolli warned against taking on an aggressive
critique
condemning the corruption of Nicaragua's institutions; doing
so
antagonizes national sensitivities and plays to Ortega's
anti-interventionist rhetoric. By way of example, he cited
the recent
case of Eva Zetterberg, Sweden's Ambassador to Nicaragua
against whom
the CSE recently filed an official complaint. (Comment:
Zetterberg
in mid-September publicly decried the partisan bias of the
CSE, prompting
that institution to file a complaint with Sweden's foreign
ministry and
slam Zetterberg in the press. End Comment.).
¶16. (C) Instead, the ALN leaders recommended citing the
economic
consequences of an Ortega government, including a decline in
foreign
investment and economic assistance. They also said that a
clear message
reminding people of the poor economic track record of the
Sandinistas. In
response to a question from Congressman Burton over what the
economic
impact of an FSLN administration might look like, Montealegre
cited
the following figures:
--Inflation in the 1980s reached 33,000%; GDP during the
same timeframe was reduced by half.
--The average monthly salary fell from $159 to $13.
--Coffee exports in 1978 totaled 1.5 million tons; shipments
were down to 600,000 in 1988. 2006 was the first year
exports
reached pre-Sandinista levels.
--450,000 head of cattle were slaughtered in 1978, compared
to 200,000 in 1990. Only now has the economy been
restored to pre-FSLN levels.
--The international community has spent $15 billion to bring
Nicaragua's economy back to pre-1980 conditions.
Burton: "You Are An Honorable Man."
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
¶17. (C) Congressman Burton concluded the meeting by
thanking Montealegre and his colleagues for their frank
discussion, and by complimenting Montealegre, saying "you
are an honorable man." Burton said that he shared their
fears about an Ortega victory, indicating that the return
to power of the Sandinistas "would be a disaster."
Comment: Atmospherics A Microcosm of Larger Internal ALN
Communication Difficulties
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
¶18. (C) Montealegre has often been criticized for not
sufficiently coordinating the disparate members of his
alliance, which has at times resulted in chaotic campaign
planning sessions and other communication problems.
Montealegre's visual frustration with having to reign in
one of his colleagues -- Rapaccioli -- during this meeting
drove this point home. Although the meeting was cordial
and relaxed, the dynamic between Montealegre, Arguello, and
Rapacciolli demonstrated the challenge Montealegre faces in
ensuring that his campaign of disparate backers speaks with
one voice. Rapaccioli is a former president of the
Conservative
Party, a Montealegre relative, and a key Alliance member.
His outspoken comments, dramatic flair, and a penchant for
interrupting Montealegre, however, appeared to increasingly
try Montealegre's patience.
¶19. (C) While he never directly
contradicted the candidate, Rapacciolli frequently
attempted to hammer home certain points he felt Montealegre
had not fully addressed. Rapacciolli's excitable
nature -- he occasionally resorted to squirming in his chair
and waving his arm in the air trying to interject
something -- and several exaggerated points prompted
Montealegre
to lower his tone at times. During one point in the
breakfast
Rapacciolli stopped talking, waited until a waiter had left
the
room, and then dramatically announced that the wait staff were
Aleman or Ortega spies, which elicited a sigh from the visibly
perturbed Montealegre. The candidate, however, handled the
situation
with humor, and at one point said wryly that "Mario is the
one who makes the points." Arguello, by contrast, was
low-key, kept his comments to the point, and never
interrupted Montealegre.
End Comment.
TRIVELLI