Generally speaking, the report (covering July, 2000 to December, 2001) contains a lot of good
information, some of which is buried within. Most of the recommendations are good, common
sense, and reflective of things members of the community have been saying for a long time. For the
most part, PARC is holding the Portland Police to the standards set in their first report in 2003
(which
covered January, 1997 to June, 2000), analyzing 28 of the 89 recommendations they made for
progress. However, the kind of details the report lacks continues to be disappointing, considering
the intensity of community interest in the specifics of some of the cases.

Because PARC has been cautioned by the City (for whatever reason) not to use the names of
specific officers or shooting victims, the report can be very hard to follow. It is much like reading a
fairy tale that states: "There was a girl and she went to a house and due to mistaken identity an
animal ate her" rather than, "Little Red Riding Hood went to her grandmother's house, where The
Big, Bad Wolf deceived her by dressing as her grandmother (whom he had previously devoured),
and ate her."

The report covers 14 of the 15 Portland Police-involved shooting incidents which occurred between
July, 2000 and December, 2001. It leaves out the case of Justyn Gallegos, a teenager who was shot
by Portland, Gresham and Troutdale police; PARC and the Auditor's office didn't want to
"complicate" matters by looking at other jurisdictions' reports. Never mind that another multi-
jurisdiction shooting occurred in February of this year and as far as we know there is no inter-
jurisdiction agreement on deadly force situations (despite the existence of such a policy for police
chases).

As with the 2003 report, the Citizen Review Committee (CRC) of the IPR was not allowed to review
the report before its final publication. City Council promised that such a review by Portland's
"civilian review board" would be a compromise to the CRC's desire to be part of the actual review of
the investigations of shootings and deaths cases. Drafts of the PARC report went out to the Mayor,
the Auditor, the IPR, the Portland Police Bureau, and the City Attorney before publication (p. 12),
but not to the CRC.

To be clear, PARC's efforts are useful and in some cases, quite alarming. Their recommendations
about improving the quality of investigations is supported with the statement that "the issue of
overriding concern...is one of a strong disinclination by [Portland Police] investigators to find that a
shooting was unjustified or that the officers' performance was deficient in any way" (p. 67).

One of the main points PARC has highlighted is the need for more civilian involvement in these
high-profile cases, including a non-police participant to show up on the scene of any incident and
track the investigation from the get-go (2003 recommendation #5.15), re-emphasized in the new
report. Referring to the IPR's limited scope over non-deadly force incidents, they state "The City
has recognized the value of civilian oversight of Internal Affairs investigations of police misconduct.
Cases where a life was taken or could have been taken deserve at least as much oversight,
particularly since the PPB investigations conducted from 1997 to 2001 were consistently
incomplete and/or biased" (p. 44).

One of the most critical questions involved in independent investigations of police, whether
compelled statements for administrative review will invoke immunity for officers in the criminal
investigations, is raised by several of PARC's recommendations. Chief Foxworth wrote in his
response that he is considering the idea of creating a "Force Investigation Team" to handle serious
use of force incidents. Though the idea isn't fully explained, it may entail some kind of hybrid
criminal/administrative investigation.

The new PARC report includes information on the shooting of Jose Victor Santos Mejia Poot, who
was mistakenly taken to a psychiatric hospital after a police beating and shot two days later (p. 58).
Despite the broad implications of this case, which began with a dispute over 20 cents of bus fare
and ended after a Crisis Intervention Team officer who came to the hospital on one call, but wasn't
available when Mejia was shot, the report only makes one formal and one informal
recommendation. The formal recommendation: That the police not respond to "routine patient
management situations in mental health facilities" not involving criminal activity (recommendation
#2005.6, p. 59), which Chief Foxworth says is essentially the current policy. The informal one: that
"officers dispatched to mental health facilities be appropriately equipped with less-lethal weaponry."
We wonder why PARC did not recommend a prohibition on taking firearms into hospitals; perhaps
next year the IPR can pay Portland Copwatch some of PARC's $55,000 annual fee for a more
thorough list of suggestions.

PARC mentions nothing easily identifiable about two situations in which police took shots at
African American men when they should not have--the case of Bruce Browne, who had disarmed an
armed potential criminal at a gas station and was shot, and the case of Tyrone Waters, who had
threatened police but was being negotiated with (and shot by "beanbags") by other officers
including now-Chief Foxworth when an officer shot at him and missed.

In the last report, PARC included charts with information about the suspects who were shot at or
who died in police custody, including that 35.5% of those suspects were people of color in a city
that is 77% white. Portland Copwatch made note of this in our analysis of the 2003 report,
wondering why the only other mention of race was that there was "no indication of racial or ethnic
bias." In the new report, they deal with the issue by not dealing with it: Not only is an analysis of
race absent, but there are no statistical tables. Portland Copwatch statistics show at least 4 of the 15
people shot or shot at in the time frame were people of color (26.7%).

Another statistic missing is the question of whether the suspects were armed. PARC showed that
eight of the 31 cases studied in 2003 (25.8%) involved unarmed citizens; this time we believe at
least 5 of the 15 (33%) had no weapon (other than the debatable use of their vehicle as a weapon),
while Jose Mejia pulled an aluminum rod from a door-locking mechanism during his (previously
unarmed) confrontation with police.

The report does note that at least 5 of the 15 cases involved people who were in emotional crisis,
reaffirming two of their recommendations from 2003 about putting more emphasis on the Crisis
Intervention Team (CIT). The section on emotional crisis does not mention names but covers the
cases (we believe) of Mejia, Waters, Daniel Brink (who had been threatening his grandmother with
a knife, and PARC wondered why the police didn't debrief her before confronting Brink [if we
correctly infer this is the same case]), Lawrence Ramirez (who was allegedly threatening suicide, but
was not holding a gun when he was killed), and George Waldum (who had threatened a cable
installer with a shotgun and was shot by an officer who killed another person in emotional crisis a
few years earlier). Although it does not list the recommendation separately, PARC does include the
idea we have put forward for years, "universal CIT certification should lessen the overall number of
officer-involved shootings, [so] the cost of certifying all ...officers would be at least somewhat
offset by the money saved from not having to deal with the consequences of those avoided officer-
involved shootings" (pp. 57-58). They note that of 1300 CIT-involved incidents in 2000-2001, none
ended with shootings.

Regarding possible alternatives to force, PARC asks these possibly hypothetical questions: "Would
a gun-toting suspect who was confronted in a poorly managed police operation been shot in any
event even if a well-managed strategy had been employed? Would a knife-wielding subject who was
shot with a firearm have been effectively subdued if a less-lethal weapon had been deployed?"
Sometimes, says PARC, "death or injury [is] truly avoidable," thus by properly managing situations
police can avoid "trauma, pain, and grief for officers and civilians alike" (pp. 48-49). They state that
in 7 of the 14 cases they reviewed, officers had advance notice they were heading into a dangerous
situation but did not use the extra time to create a plan, "thereby unnecessarily jeopardizing their
own safety as well as that of bystanders and suspects."* They say 10 of the 14 incidents needed more planning, 5 involved ineffective
communication, and 6 had insufficient supervision.

PARC's new recommendations to the Police Bureau not mentioned elsewhere in this analysis
include:

2005.1: Set a deadline for implementing the "Early Intervention System" (EIS) to flag trouble
officers (p. 22). During the debate over the creation of the IPR in 2000, Portland Police said their
"Early Warning System" (same concept as the EIS) was working just fine. Now it is five years later
and PARC says a fully working system could be "up to two years" away. For his part, Foxworth
agreed with the idea and says he thinks the system can be up and running by spring 2006.
Foxworth also wants to create yet another layer of oversight, further complicating an already
confusing system: an Office of Professional Standards.

2005.2: Create procedures for Internal Affairs (IAD) and Training Division personnel to conduct
their reviews of shootings and deaths in custody (p. 30). Chief Foxworth agrees and implies these
guidelines are in place, though no hard copies are included in the report.

2005.3: Make reviews of cases in which suspects are hospitalized mandatory (p. 30). The Chief
says the Bureau is making the change to include reviews of in-custody deaths and "hospitalizations
resulting in the patient being admitted." We are concerned that this means people who are treated
and immediately released to police custody (say, after receiving stitches) will not have their cases
reviewed.

2005.5: Officers should wait for a supervisor and backup before extracting unarmed people from
cars, and all tactics used for extraction should protect the officers and suspects (p. 55). Chief
Foxworth has mixed reactions, stating that the Bureau will not require a supervisor to be on scene,
but notes that training does currently "discourage" officers from extracting suspects from vehicles
by themselves. The Chief mentions tactics, but not safety in his response.

2005.7&8: The Bureau should be clear that officers who use deadly force need to get medical aid to
the wounded, and that Internal Affairs and the Use of Force Review Board should be sure officers
follow this policy (p. 63). PARC bases this recommendation on three (of the 14) cases where
medical attention was withheld for up to 90 minutes. (The longest was the case of Michael Jaquith,
who an officer said was driving at him with a van, yet who was shot in the side. After the shooting,
the officer could not see Jaquith's hand and thus did not try extracting him for an hour and a half-p.
60).

The report encourages compliance with medical aid policies to "demonstrate to members of the
community that the Bureau adheres to the value" of a reverence for human life. "The failure to assist
a seriously wounded suspect when it was safe to do so will upset the community." (This is one of
the four places that PARC mentions that the police can gain community credibility by following
their recommended procedures--up from two times in 2003.) PARC notes that the PPB initiated
some changes to their medical aid policies even though the issue wasn't raised in the 2003 report.
They were, however, raised by the Albina Ministerial Alliance and Joe Bean Keller, father of
Deontae who police shot and let bleed to death in 1996, as one of the major issues in the Kendra
James shooting. Chief Foxworth says he agrees with PARC and has incorporated the ideas into
policies, though what he cites directs officers to call for medical assistance "if any significant
changes are observed," rather than immediately calling for aid to an injured suspect when the
situation is safe.

2005.9: Supervisors should review the work done by detectives for appropriateness and proper
documentation (p. 66). This recommendation comes on the heels of a number of deficiencies
PARC found both in 2003 and this year's report, including:
--Witnesses who were not interviewed, and some who were interviewed but not taped
--Leading questions such as "Did you have some concerns about the person who got out of the
driver's seat regarding your safety, other officers' safety, or community safety?" (p. 69)
--Incomplete files, in some cases due to officers putting information in "personal files"
--Forensics tests which were not performed
--Attempts to influence witnesses' perceptions. Two witnesses said the officer who shot at Michael
Jaquith was trying to stop him from fleeing, not in fear for his life; despite detectives' efforts, the
witnesses stuck to their stories. In another case, a female witness originally said she felt an officer
was not justified in shooting, but modified her statements after being "pointedly" questioned by
detectives (p. 68).
--Important information not raised in interviews: The reserve officer who fired 4 of 19 shots at
robbery suspect Daniel Cromb did not mention discharging his weapon to detectives.
--Inconsistencies were not resolved, such as, if Cromb was pointing a pellet gun at the officers, why
was he only shot in the back and the back of the arm? (We are impressed that PARC raised this
provocative question.)
Chief Foxworth says he considers this recommendation completed with the revised Detective
"Standard Operating Procedure" (SOP); we won't know whether it is working until at least 2008,
the first year PARC can possibly have a report out regarding incidents investigated in 2005.

2005.10: Deadly force investigations, and individual interviews, should be led by officers of equal
or greater rank than involved officers (p. 67). PARC notes an instance where a Commander and
Lieutenant were on the scene, and were interviewed by lower ranking Sergeants. While the
interviews of involved officers are now directed to be done this way, the overall investigation and
witness officer interviews are not. The Chief says this is done, even though he has not incorporated
the specific changes PARC has requested.

The report also makes a number of recommendations about incident management which are not
enumerated like #2005.1-10.

Incident management: PARC suggests supervisors on critical incident scenes take charge and share
information; take account of risk factors; assemble sufficient resources before acting; alert officers
to danger; communicate tactical instructions and decisions; and over-rule inappropriate strategies
(pp. 47-53). They note: "A police department that consistently [responds to critical incidents in a
sound manner] will have gone a long way towards eliminating avoidable uses of deadly force and
frayed community relations." (This the second of the references to community reaction.)

PARC also includes strong recommendations regarding follow through after shootings, noting a
"lack of commitment to the review process" shown by the Bureau's "after action" practices.
--After action reports were not drafted--or lost--in 6 of the 14 cases; a seventh was only created
after PARC called attention to the Bureau that it should be done; a 50% rate of follow-up (p.
71).
--One report was written by a Lieutenant involved in the incident.
--Numerous tactical deficiencies were not highlighted, including a Sergeant who didn't back up his
officer in a solo confrontation, and an officer who engaged in a solo foot pursuit (p. 72).

Related to that, they point out that 4 of the 14 cases did not go to the "Review Level Committee" to
determine whether they were in or out of policy; two of the 10 reviews only happened after PARC
brought the issue to the PPB (four and half years after the incidents!-p. 73).

PARC believes, and Portland Copwatch agrees, that the Bureau adequately addressed issues around
restricting the Traumatic Incident Committee (TIC) from discussing facts of the case with officers
(#4.11, p. 31) and restricting officers from talking to anyone else inappropriate about the facts
(#4.6, p. 31). The previous qualifier of imposing such restrictions "when necessary" has been
removed. Another positive step are the new rules prohibiting officers from stepping into the path of
oncoming vehicles and seriously restricting their ability to shoot at (or from) moving vehicles
(#7.15, p. 18).

PARC praised the Bureau's work on adding a restriction prohibiting using faulty tactics to justify
the use of deadly force (#3.4, p. 16), calling the PPB a national leader on the issue. Interestingly,
they suggested that the Bureau could go farther by ensuring the principles of this policy are taught
in training and used as a guide in investigating incidents.

Similarly, they gave high marks to the Bureau's new investigative checklist for shootings and deaths
in custody, but suggested that a question be added regarding whether an officer could have effected
a "tactical retreat" (#4.16, p. 43).

Two other issues the Bureau has addressed to PARC's satisfaction are ones Portland Copwatch
embraces with reservations: the requirements for detectives to cover all areas on that checklist in (1)
shootings and (2) deaths in custody cases (#s 4.17&4.18, p. 43). The Bureau's policy says to use
"all applicable areas" of the lists, meaning the Detectives could use their discretion to avoid asking
important questions.

In four instances, we were surprised that PARC supported the PPB. A recommendation to tape
record involved officers or to note any reason they decline to be interviewed seems to have been
only partially implemented (#4.3, p. 37). While the detectives' SOP (#37) on these cases suggests
that they log "the request, date and time and response of the [officers]," this concept is not in the
shootings Directive (1010.10) and does not specifically address the question of why an officer
might decline an interview. Their response could be, "No, not right now," which does not cover the
reason for the declination. (We previously raised this concern to PARC in our June, 2004 analysis; future
references to this document will be marked "PCW 6/04".)

PARC's recommendation that the police use an "overlay model" to conduct administrative
interviews as soon as possible, whether or not criminal interviews are done (#4.5, p. 37) is explicitly
not being followed by the Bureau, yet PARC considers this item "in compliance." In his response
to the report, Chief Foxworth states that while he agrees with the concept, the PPB is "continuing to
work with the [police unions] to establish a binding agreement regarding timeliness of interviews."
Attached to his response are letters from the District Attorney explaining why administrative
interviews should not be done prior to the end of a criminal investigation in Oregon, and the
Portland Police Association (PPA) President's opinion that while investigations should be done
quickly, it is up to the individual officer and not the PPA to determine when to be interviewed. The
acceptance that this recommendation has been addressed is particularly odd since PARC takes up
these concerns in its review of recommendation 4.4 (below).

In the case of a recommendation to have supervisors consult with involved officers to be sure they
have not talked to anyone about the incident before being interviewed (#4.8, p. 33), PARC feels that
the Bureau's solution of having homicide detectives take on this responsibility adequately addresses
their concerns. However, since officers' supervisors are likely to be on scene long before the
detectives, we hope PARC will push the Bureau to follow its original recommendation (PCW 6/04).

The fourth "fully addressed" issue which is not truly adequate is the recommendation regarding
tape recording all officer and civilian witnesses (#4.12, pp. 39-40). The actual SOP (#37) says "all
interviews _should_ be tape-recorded" (emphasis ours), not "shall be," and the Directive (1010.10)
says detectives should "attempt to tape-record" witness statements. It seems this language gives
more leeway than what PARC recommended in the first place.

Portland Copwatch believes the following other 2003 PARC recommendations have been
completed reasonably: #5.1, 5.6, 5.7, 5.9, 6.12, 6.14, 7.18 (7); and these with some reservations:
#5.3, 5.5 5.13, 6.18, and 8.3 (5).

Despite our concerns on the above four recommendations, we find that PARC ably identified
problems with 10 other recommendations the Bureau claims are "Done" and one which is "in
progress" (which the Bureau previously claimed was "Done").

Most significantly, while the Bureau has included a statement about the "integrity and value of
human life," their statement does not go as far as other cities (#3.1, pp. 13-16). PARC notes that
police in Alaska state, New York City, and Los Angeles all make statements that deadly force
should only be used as a last resort, or when "the officer has no other reasonable and practical
alternative." Even though such a statement is still open to interpretation, it would likely help reduce
the number of shootings in Portland. PARC tells the PPB, "we fail to understand" why they have
adopted a similarly strict rule regarding shooting at vehicles but not for shootings in general. They
dismiss the police argument that the added language will cause "too complicated a thought
process."

PARC also notes that their recommendation that officers not use deadly force when an officer
knows the suspect can be apprehended later without causing danger to the community (#3.3, p. 17)
was not implemented. Another part of the same recommendation, to note whether the suspect poses
an "immediate" danger, was added. PARC suggests that the PPB still needs to add a phrase about
deadly force not being used "where other means of apprehension are reasonably available."
Certainly, this standard may have saved the life of Kendra James, who police claim was trying to
drive away from a traffic stop when she was shot and killed in 2003. (PARC cites a case where
officers used a radio tracking device to follow the car of a robbery suspect as an example of an
alternative tactic they can support on p. 48. In the James case, the police knew who she was and had
all relevant information on the car she was driving.)

The Bureau made a step forward, the report notes, when they required officers to report each time
they draw and point a firearm at a suspect, but they have not, as recommended, required reporting
each time a weapon is drawn without being pointed or clarified in what circumstances it is OK for
officers to draw their guns (#3.5, p. 19). While such requirements in Los Angeles, DC, or
Cincinnati have not hindered police, PARC argues, the Portland Police Association seems to feel
this requirement is just too much. In addition, when multiple officers draw and point weapons, the
PPB now only requires one officer to fill out a report, while PARC believes every officer should file
a report; we agree.

PARC notes that the PPB's implementation of a Use of Force Report separate from regular police
reports is just what they were asking for (#3.6, pp. 21-22), but part of their recommendation was
integrating that information into an "Early Intervention System," which isn't functional yet (see
above).

The PPB has agreed to require that the Detective Division investigate "negligent discharges" of
weapons, but not incidents in which officers shoot animals, as requested by PARC (#4.2, p. 30).
We understand that society places different values on human and non-human life; however, by
failing to investigate these incidents, the Bureau leaves itself open to police using deadly force in
inappropriate situations.

A recommendation that officers be interviewed "immediately" after an incident has been
implemented by a verbal agreement with the PPA, but not formally incorporated into any written
agreements (#4.4, pp. 37-39). As noted above, the PPA has made it clear that they will not direct
their members to participate, and state law makes it possible that by ordering the officer to be
interviewed, they can never be prosecuted if they committed a crime during the incident (because
they will have given up their Fifth Amendment rights). PARC notes that all but one of the PPB's
recent interviews have happened within 24 hours, but encourages the police to work toward holding
the interview before the officer goes off duty. They write, "Members of the community are more
inclined to presume good faith on the part of a police department investigating its own members if
the appearance and reality of the integrity of the investigation are present." (This is the third place
where PARC's report refers to community perception. It also mentions that the PPA's voluntary
cooperation is in "a product of public pressure.")

While the PPB has changed its policy to "sequester" officers by ordering them not to communicate
prior to being interviewed, PARC notes that the revised Directive allows officers leeway by merely
"recommending" they not obtain information through the news media or other sources (#4.7, pp.
32-33). It also only covers the officers for the criminal proceedings, meaning officers may compare
notes prior to the conclusion of an IAD investigation.

PARC suggested that officers and witnesses be separated at the scene to prevent their talking
amongst themselves; the PPB implemented this idea but made an exception for large numbers of
people (#4.9, p. 34). As part of the review of this recommendation, PARC noted in a new
recommendation that officers should be transported from the scene by a supervisor rather than just
any uninvolved officer, an idea rejected by Chief Foxworth (#2005.4, as above).

While the PPB has agreed to limit the discussions between TIC members and involved officers, the
Chief's response to the recommendation to keep TIC officers and others out of the investigation
scene does not mention the TIC (#4.10, pp. 43-44). Apparently the vagueness of the new policy is
clarified in the "Employee Assistance Program" procedures (now in draft form); we think it should
be spelled out in the Directives.

PARC appropriately applauds the Bureau for eliminating "pre-interviews" in which detectives
gathered some information before recording officer and witness statements (#4.15, pp. 39-40); they
also warn that procedural discussions, which are continuing to occur prior to recording devices
being turned on, should be taped as well.

The final cautionary acclaim from PARC is about a recommendation the Bureau previously claimed
was "Done" in 2004 but is now "in progress" on their chart. It suggests restricting the Critical
Incident Stress Debriefing (CISD) given to officers involved in shootings or deaths in custody
cases to occur only after an involved officer has been interviewed (#4.19, pp. 35-36). The Bureau
disallows the CISD until after a "Communiation Restriction Order" is lifted; PARC thinks this
should cover the time until IAD has finished its investigation, though the Chief has only extended
the restriction that long in one instance in the last two years.

Interestingly, PARC was not allowed by contract to respond to the Chief's matrix which explained
his position on their previous recommendations. However, they easily identified two of the four
recommendations the Chief rejected, the one he referred to City Council (#5.15, as above), and two
others which we believe are partially implemented but PARC thinks are not "done" at all.

The first 2003 recommendation rejected by Chief Foxworth is the idea of allowing a civilian witness
who refuses to be audio taped to review a written summary of their statement for accuracy (#4.13,
pp. 39-41). Though the Bureau rejected the idea for fear that the witness might change their
statement, PARC notes that such changes may occur anyway, but it would be best to adopt this
policy because they found instances where witness statement summaries did not match their
recorded statements. They put forward this radical notion: "If a detective distorts a summary of an
untaped statement, that distortion is unlikely to be discovered in the administrative review performed
by Internal Affairs."

The second rejected idea is seemingly simple; to video or audiotape an officer's "walk-through" of
the incident scene (#4.14, pp. 41-42). The Chief says this will "jeopardize the participation of the
involved member," and rejects the idea "due to the legal and contractual context." PARC rightly
points out the hypocrisy that the police are afraid of witnesses using a written summary as a means
to change their original statements, while officers may say one thing at the walk-through and change
their story later. (For some reason, the PPB has changed the name of the "walk-through" to an "on-
scene briefing." Often such renaming is a subtle way of eluding earlier criticisms.)

PARC hammers on the Bureau for not explicitly noting that impact weapons (batons, "beanbags,"
and the like) must be restricted from being used on the head (or other "vital areas") unless deadly
force is justified (#3.2, p. 21). Chief Foxworth replied that the current Directive on deadly force
(1010.10) lists "flashlights, batons, body parts, and other statutorily defined dangerous weapons" as
potential deadly weapons. In doing so, he leaves off the introductory phrase used in that section,
"depending on how they are used," which we believe PARC thinks needs to be clearly defined (PCW 6/04). So, while we feel
this is not fully implemented, PARC says "the PPB has not made the recommended addition to its
policy."

The final noted rejection overlaps with the previously mentioned questions regarding Oregon law
and compelling officers to give statements. It is PARC's recommendation to either conduct Internal
Affairs investigations at the same time as homicide investigations or to create a specialist team
model based on Washington, DC's model which investigates shootings and other serious incidents
for both criminal and administrative purposes (#4.1, pp. 25-29). While PARC acknowledges that
the PPB now conducts IAD investigations for all such cases, they note that some cases may not be
fully reviewed or make it to the newly formed Use of Force Review Board for consideration of
policy, training, tactics, and other factors. "The PPB's 'Homicide-plus' model suffers from the same
weaknesses of perspective as the pure Homicide-only model," they state. It appears Chief
Foxworth's reference to the Force Investigation Team is meant to address this section of the PARC
report; we look forward to more details on this concept.

The most disturbing news on this front, though, is that the Review Level Committee made a
recommendation in March, 2001 that a police training bulletin should address officers reaching into
vehicles to extract suspects; that bulletin was never issued (p. 73). In other words, like the current
national administration's ignoring the memo warning of "Bin Laden determined to attack inside the
U.S." prior to 9/11, the Bureau's failure to follow through on its own policy review may have
directly led to the death of Kendra James.

The Chief also seems to have taken away one function of the UFRB he promised in his May, 2004
matrix: The Board was going to review suggestions by the Awards Committee for appropriateness
as part of the response to recommendations that the Awards Committee gather all information in
serious cases and report back any new information they uncover about a case (#6.19 & 6.20). The
new matrix drops all references to the UFRB and instead allows the Chief to review information
from the Committee and requires the Committee to send new information to an Assistant Chief,
rather than to the Review Board. This is of concern because of the awards given to the officers who
shot Jose Mejia in the psychiatric hospital.

But maybe the most disturbing aspect of the Use of Force Review Board, which truly differentiates
it from this City's other review board, the Citizen Review Committee, is that the citizen/suspect
involved in the incident (or a representative, particularly in a case involving death) is not invited to
testify to the board. While it is clear that the UFRB is part of an internal administrative process, it
seems unfair that those deciding whether or not the officer acted properly never hear from a
survivor, a victim's family, or their representative.

The good news? Members of the Training Division, Internal Affairs, and the Independent Police
Review Division are allowed to sit in on the UFRB hearings as non-voting members.