Approximately three and a half years ago, pursuant to the Class Proceedings Act, 1992, [Plaintiff] commenced a proposed class action against H. Lundbeck A/S and Lundbeck Canada Inc. (collectively “Lundbeck”), which are pharmaceutical companies that manufacture the drug “citalopram,” under the brand name Celexa®.

[2] Citalopram is an SSRI (selective serotonin reuptake inhibitor) indicated for the treatment of depression, and the thrust of [Plaintiff]’s proposed class action is that Lundbeck failed to warn women that Celexa® may be a “teratogen,” which is any agent that can disturb the development of an embryo or fetus and thereby cause congenital malformations, which, in turn, can cause the pregnancy to spontaneously abort or the child to be born with birth defects.

[3] This is a motion for certification of the action. The motion was fiercely and rudely contested. The parties asserted the routine arguments about the certification criteria, but they asserted them ad nauseum, and they asserted innumerable straw man arguments (knocking down an argument their opponent had not made) and innumerable ad hominem, mean, and taunting arguments. They distorted and misapplied the “some basis in fact” or the “no basis in fact” tests that are applied to four of the five certification motion, and they took much of the evidence and argument outside the boundaries of what is appropriate for a certification motion.

[4] Only the oral argument in court of the motion was polite. It proceeded over four days. I reserved judgment.

[5] I have now decided that [Plaintiff]’s action satisfies only two of the five criteria for certification; therefore, her motion for certification should be dismissed without costs.

[1] This appeal involves the discoverability of claims for damages arising out of construction deficiencies. The question for determination on this appeal is whether the motion judge erred by finding that the appellants’ claims were statute-barred because they were discoverable more than two years before the appellants issued their statement of claim.

[2] The appellants appeal from the dismissal of their action. The respondents successfully moved for summary judgment of the appellants’ action against them on the basis that the applicable two-year limitation period under s. 4 of the Limitations Act, 2002, S.O. 2002, c. 24, Sched. B, (the “Act”), had expired.[1]

[3] The appellants assert that the motion judge erred in his approach to discoverability, specifically, that he erred in finding that by 2009 the appellants had all the material facts they needed to start a claim against all of the defendants.

[1] [Plaintiff] was bitten by a dog, and seeks compensation for his injuries.

[2] [Plaintiff] owns and operates a waste removal business in the City of Calgary. He was asked to remove waste from a house located in the Country Hills area of Calgary [the “Property”] and went to the Property on August 5, 2011. [Plaintiff] entered the backyard area to look at the waste to be removed and was attacked by a German Shephard dog [the “Dog” and “Dog Attack” respectively]. [Plaintiff] was bit on his left thumb, as well as his right thigh and calf area, and left buttocks.

[3] [Plaintiff] sued the Defendants…

[…]

[56] Given my findings, [Plaintiff] shall have judgment against both Defendants, jointly and severally, in the sum of $15,127.89, plus costs. Costs are awarded to [Plaintiff] in accordance with Column 1 of Schedule C of the Alberta Rules of Court.