The learning curve in the South African War : soldiers’ perspectives

Abstract:

The British military performance in the South African War not only confounded prewar
expectations but also aroused controversy about what had caused the
underestimation of a well-armed, mobile enemy and the failure to anticipate the
tactical challenges posed by fire zones, swept by smokeless magazine rifles. Although
the sweeping criticisms of Leo Amery, which held sway for over 70 years, have been
modified by more recent historiography, this essay uses the correspondence of British
soldiers to argue that the British victory was not simply a product of numerical
superiority and an ability to deny any foreign intervention on behalf of the Boers. It
claims that the British army, and its much-maligned soldiery, proved resilient and
adaptable in South Africa, capable of learning in the field, and of conducting counterguerrilla
operations across a vast terrain in a way that would ultimately undermine the
enemy’s will to resist. While the more perceptive Boers recognised that the British
had improved in their field craft and tactical skills neither the British press,
disenchanted with a protracted war, nor the military themselves, valued this learning
process inasmuch as the war seemed to be largely anomalous with only limited
lessons for the future.