Wednesday, November 26, 2014

Prime Minister Haider Abadi had the unfortunate experience
of becoming Iraq’s leader after the fall of Mosul. When he stepped into office
the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) had collapsed in the north in the face of the
insurgency. This was due to deep institutional problems and the politicization
of the force by his predecessor Nouri al-Maliki. Abadi has attempted to reform
the ISF by getting rid of Maliki loyalists and those deemed unqualified. This
is a necessary step in a very long process to create a professional military
and police that can defend the country.

(EPA)

Given the dire security situation in the country cleaning up
the ISF was going to be Premier Abadi’s top priority. He got right to business
by retiring the Ground Forces Commander General Ali Ghidan and the deputy chief
of staff of operations General Abboud Qanbar al-Maliki on September 23, 2014 shortly
after coming into office. At the same time, Abadi got
rid of the Office of Commander in Chief, which Nouri al-Maliki had used as
an alternative chain of command to directly give orders to officers and units.
On September
25, he replaced the commander in Salahaddin General Ali Furaiji with
General Abdul Wahab. Four
days later, Abadi took a more sweeping step when he dismissed 132 officers
including three senior ones and 24 brigade commanders. The next
month he fired another 150 high-ranking officers, most of which were in
Ninewa, Salahaddin and Kirkuk when insurgents overran those provinces in June. Then
on November
12 the premier cleaned out another 36 top officers in what he said was to
increase professionalism and get rid of corruption. Some of those dismissed and
retired included the Army Chief of Staff General
Babaker Zebari, four
of his deputies, the secretary general of the Defense Ministry General
Ibrahim al-Lami, chief of the Baghdad Operations Command General Abed
al-Amir Shammari, the head of the Anbar Operations Command General
Rasheed Flayh, commander of the Samarra Operations Command General Sabah
Fatlawi, and the director of Military Intelligence at the Defense Ministry
General Hatem Magsusi. Then on November
17 the two top officers at the Babil Operations Command were reassigned to
the Defense Ministry. Finally, on November
23 the prime minister replaced the deputy Interior Minister Adnan Asadi who
ran the ministry for Maliki, and a new head
of intelligence was appointed as well. These were all necessary moves to reform
the ISF. Many of these men like General Ghidan and Adnan Asadi were Maliki
loyalists who owed their positions to the former premier. Generals Ghidan and al-Maliki
were also blamed
for the fall of Mosul. Others like General Flayh were known for stealing
supplies from his men, while the majority of Anbar the province under his
command fell to insurgents. If Abadi is intent upon cleaning up the police and
army he had to start at the top.

All these officers were symptomatic of the deeper problems
facing the Iraqi Security Forces. First, corruption is endemic. Many soldiers
and police do not want to serve and pay their officers a portion of their
salaries so they don’t have to show up to work. In turn, their commanders
register fake names to collect more money. Another issue is that officers are
in charge of requisitioning supplies for their units, but often take the funds
for themselves. Some of these men bought their positions as well from their
higher ups. This creates a culture of graft and abuse within the police and
armed forces, and leads to a leadership gap as well as many commanders are in
it for the money rather than to serve their country. Additionally, Maliki
politicized the ISF. Like many leaders in developing countries he was afraid of
a coup, so he placed his own men in leadership positions, many of which had no
right to be there. He also used the Office of Commander and Chief and the
operations commands to get around the chain of command, so that he could
directly control the forces. Abadi’s moves have attempted to address some of
these problems, but ultimately he has to repair the institutions. If not then new
officers will simply fall into the same pattern as their predecessors. It will
take years to really solve these problems, and require more firings, court
martials, retraining and other steps to create a professional, competent and
accountable security forces in a country where those attributes are sorely
lacking in the government overall.

Tuesday, November 25, 2014

Anbar was where fighting first broke out in Iraq at the very
end of December 2013. The conflict split many of the province’s tribes with
some supporting the government, some revolting against the authorities but
opposing the Islamic State (IS), and some throwing in their lot with the
Islamists. Since then some of those tribes have re-aligned again as many had
bad relations with IS previously, and when it became the main fighting force in
Anbar they decided to fight them as well and went to Baghdad for support. New
Prime Minister Haider Abadi has come out for recruiting and training tribes in
the governorate and incorporating them into the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF).
The U.S. has been pushing this idea as well. Not all in Abadi’s coalition agree
however, and the implementation of the strategy has gone anything but smoothly.

Premier Abadi and the Americans have both been pushing the
formation of tribal fighting forces in Anbar. In the middle of October the
Interior Ministry okayed
the creation of a new 3,000 member Special Task Force Brigade for the province.
It would consist of three brigades of 1,000 fighters each drawn from local
tribes. The idea for the brigade came after meetings
between representatives from Abadi’s office and sheikhs in Jordan. The
Americans facilitated
these talks as they have been pushing Baghdad to reach out to tribes and others
to create Sunni allies to fight the insurgency. Both before and after this
announcement, sheikhs in Anbar had complained
that the central government was not supporting them, and were not giving them
weapons despite their fighting the insurgents and the worsening security
situation in the province. The problem is the Shiite parties are split over
this idea. Some do not trust the tribes, some of which were once with the
insurgents. They worry that if any weapons are given to them they could later be
used against the government. There are also those that oppose decentralization
of the security forces out to the provinces believing that it could lead to the
break up of the country. These are long time concerns and existed under the
former government of Nouri al-Maliki when the Awakening emerged in Anbar and
later the Americans formed the Sahwa.

Despite these worries, Abadi and the Americans are pushing
forward with this plan, but it is being criticized. First, the U.S. sent in
advisers to the Habaniya and Al-Assad bases in central Anbar. The provincial
council claimed
this occurred in the middle of October, but the Americans didn’t officially announce this
move until the start of November. At the same time, tribesmen from Ramadi,
Haditha, Ana, Rawa, and Qaim began
arriving at Al-Assad. 200 were to be trained every
two weeks. When all 3,000 have completed this process they are supposed to assist
with a major military push in Anbar. Sheikh Gaood from the Albu Nimr tribe,
which has recently experienced mass executions by the IS complained on November
18 that this new brigade was not getting the support it was supposed to. He
claimed that the unit received no ammunition and only 100 guns. A local
official told Al
Mada that the tribesmen had no weapons at all. If these charges are true
they could have been the result of several factors. As already stated, some
ruling parties are against the formation of this unit, and may be holding up
its completion. The ISF’s logistics are horrendous and they may not have been
able to come up with the equipment for the new unit in such as short amount of
time. Whatever the case the lack of adequate supplies for the new brigade
perpetuates the belief amongst many sheikhs that Baghdad is unwilling to stand
behind them.

The creation of Sunni allies is a must if Baghdad hopes to
turn around the security situation. Clearing out cities alone will not stop the
insurgency or turn people away from supporting it. Only with local allies
within the Sunni community can things be reversed. The creation of the Special
Task Force Brigade in Anbar is a step in the right direction, but all the
issues it is facing points to the problems in making this policy a reality.
Members of Abadi’s ruling coalition do not trust the tribes’ loyalty. The
institutional deficiencies within the ISF may delay the equipping of the unit.
The fighters are also only scheduled for two weeks of training, which cannot
provide them with much besides basic weapons training. That may mean the
Brigade is just for show and will remain an auxiliary force like the current
tribal forces are doing now in the province. Whatever the case, until there is
full political and military backing for this plan there is little hope that it
will be successful.

SOURCES

BBC, “Islamic state crisis; US
troops sent into Iraq’s Anbar,” 11/11/14

Al Mada, “Abadi in dialogue with the elders of Anbar:
competition between the two groups over recruiting 30 thousand fighters ..
stuck on political demands,” 10/30/14

- “Americans are training “special missions” brigade in
Anbar for the Liberation of cities,” 10/18/14

- “Americans are training volunteers from the clans but
Baghdad only gave 200 guns,” 11/18/14

National Iraqi News Agency, “Anbar provincial council: /100/
American military personnel arrived to the province to train the security
forces and the sons of the tribes,” 10/15/14

- “MoI approves forming a special force in Anbar under the
supervision of US,” 10/17/14

Monday, November 24, 2014

The third week of November 2014 saw a sizeable decrease in
both dead and wounded in Iraq. This was due to the continued low rate of
reported security incidents in the country. In the provinces the Iraqi Security
Forces (ISF) and insurgents continued to fight for control of central and
eastern Anbar. In Babil, the Islamic State (IS) has been pushed out of its long
time base in Jurf al-Sakhr and has relocated to the north. The capital saw more
car bombs, while there was a sizeable clash in Abu Ghraib to the west. The ISF
and peshmerga launched a coordinated campaign in eastern Diyala, and were both
at work in Kirkuk. Kurdistan saw a rare attack as IS tried to strike the
governor of Irbil’s office with a suicide car bomb. Finally, Salahaddin remains
the other main battlefront between the government and armed factions as the ISF
finally broke the siege of the Baiji refinery. Overall, violence was way down
for the week, while the ISF continued to make sizeable gains in the northern
section of the country.

Attacks remained at a low level during the third week of
November. There were 134 security incidents reported in the press from November
15-21. That was the second lowest amount of the year with the previous week
having the lowest at 128. Baghdad witnessed the most attacks with 42. Next was
Anbar with 30, followed by 27 in Salahaddin, 12 in Diyala, 10 in Ninewa, 6 in
Babil, 5 in Kirkuk, and one each in Qadisiyah and Irbil.

Those attacks led to 283 dead and 453 wounded. The fatalities
were made up of 77 members of the ISF, 9 Sahwa, and 197 civilians, while the
injured consisted of 70 ISF, 21 Sahwa, and 362 civilians. The last time there
were roughly 200 killed was back in May 15-21. Likewise, the 449 wounded was
the second least of 2014 with only the 426 of May 15-21 lower. Anbar had the
most deaths at 94 due to continued executions by the Islamic State. 68 were
killed in Salahaddin, 61 in Baghdad, 22 in Ninewa, 18 in Diyala, 10 in Irbil, 8
in Babil, and two in Kirkuk.

Violence
In Iraq By Week 2014

Date

Incidents

Dead

Wounded

Jan 1-7

244

363

733

Jan 8-14

272

364

676

Jan 15-21

205

358

616

Jan 22-28

236

305

618

Jan 29-31

57

93

237

JAN

1,014

1,483

2,890

Feb 1-7

211

306

706

Feb 8-14

229

258

505

Feb 15-21

264

347

703

Feb 22-28

251

374

617

FEB

955

1,285

2,531

Mar 1-7

252

412

702

Mar 8-14

205

323

610

Mar 15-21

216

423

736

Mar 22-27

211

279

580

Mar 28-31

108

169

261

MAR

992

1,606

2,889

Apr 1-7

238

259

550

Apr 8-14

224

362

646

Apr 15-21

241

406

805

Apr 22-28

226

347

744

Apr 29-30

61

82

179

APR

990

1,456

2,924

May 1-7

198

246

483

May 8-14

257

466

752

May 15-21

183

256

426

May 22-28

203

403

810

May 29-31

64

91

131

MAY

905

1,462

2,602

Jun 1-7

228

612

1,020

Jun 8-14

234

1,889

890

Jun 15-21

179

803

759

Jun 22-28

203

733

777

Jun 29-30

59

127

236

JUN

901

4,172

3,701

Jul 1-7

203

526

651

Jul 8-14

214

577

628

Jul 15-21

230

444

1,009

Jul 22-28

224

589

801

Jul 29-31

66

163

230

JUL

937

2,299

3,319

Aug 1-8

269

1,122

885

Aug 9-14

179

710

1,152

Aug 15-21

150

354

499

Aug 22-28

156

523

798

Aug 29-31

59

125

289

AUG

813

2,834

3,623

Sep 1-7

168

616

751

Sep 8-14

156

433

722

Sep 15-21

166

620

749

Sep 22-28

153

395

573

Sep 29-30

47

112

252

SEP

690

2,176

3,047

Oct 1-7

170

451

687

Oct 8-14

188

532

875

Oct 15-21

156

449

770

Oct 22-28

159

345

592
+ 1,230

Oct 29-31

68

570

227

OCT

741

2,347

3,151 + 1,230

Nov 1-7

153

601

828

Nov 8-14

128

420

593

Nov 15-21

134

283

453

Violence
In Iraq By Province Nov 2014

Province

Nov 1-7

Nov 8-14

Anbar

29 Incidents

290 Killed: 12 ISF, 3 Sahwa, 275
Civilians

191 Wounded: 28 ISF, 163 Civilians

14 Shootings

2 Car Bombs

1 Suicide Car Bomb

19 Incidents

107 Killed: 9 ISF, 98 Civilians

62 Wounded: 11 ISF, 2 Sahwa, 51
Civilians

9 Shootings

1 IED

1 Car Bomb

2 Suicide Car Bombs

Babil

11 Incidents

30 Killed: 5 ISF, 25 Civilians

84 Wounded: 5 ISF, 79 Civilians

3 Shootings

4 IEDs

1 Sticky Bomb

2 Car Bombs

9 Incidents

16 Killed: 7 ISF, 9 Civilians

48 Wounded: 21 ISF, 27 Civilians

1 Shooting

5 IEDs

1 Sticky Bomb

1 Suicide Car Bomb

Baghdad

41 Incidents

172 Killed: 14 ISF, 158 Civilians

389 Wounded: 9 ISF, 380 Civilians

10 Shootings

22 IEDs

1 Sticky Bomb

4 Car Bombs

2 Suicide Car Bombs

41 Incidents

145 Killed: 12 ISF, 133 Civilians

359 Wounded: 24 ISF, 335 Civilians

9 Shootings

16 IEDs

3 Sticky Bombs

8 Car Bombs

4 Suicide Car Bombs

Basra

1 Incident

2 Incidents

1 Killed: 1 Civilian

1 Shooting

Diyala

7 Incidents

4 Killed: 4 Civilians

5 Wounded: 4 ISF, 1 Civilian

5 Shootings

2 IEDs

9 Incidents

18 Killed: 5 ISF, 3 Asayesh, 10
Civilians

47 Wounded: 24 ISF, 10 Asayesh,
133 Civilians

4 Shootings

1 IED

1 Sticky Bomb

1 Car Bomb

2 Suicide Car Bombs

Kirkuk

3 Incidents

2 Killed: 2 Civilians

8 Wounded: 8 Civilians

2 Shootings

2 IEDs

9 Incidents

31 Killed: 1 Peshmerga, 30
Civilians

24 Wounded: 20 Peshmerga, 4
Civilians

7 Shootings

1 IED

1 Suicide Car Bomb

Maysan

-

2 Incidents

1 Killed: 1 Civilian

1 Shooting

1 Stun Bomb

Ninewa

11 Incidents

13 Killed: 2 ISF, 11 Civilians

9 Shootings

1 IED

12 Incidents

26 Killed: 4 Peshmerga, 22
Civilians

5 Shootings

Qadisiyah

-

1 Incident

1 Killed: 1 Civilian

1 Shooting

Salahaddin

49 Incidents

87 Killed: 31 ISF, 56 Civilians

136 Wounded: 75 ISF, 61 Civilians

15 Shootings

73 IEDs

1 Car Bomb

4 Suicide Car Bombs

24 Incidents

74 Killed: 35 ISF, 1 Sahwa, 38
Civilians

51 Wounded: 40 ISF, 4 Sahwa, 7
Civilians

9 Shootings

26 IEDs

3 Suicide Car Bombs

Wasit

1 Incident

3 Killed: 3 Civilians

15 Wounded: 2 ISF, 13 Civilians

-

Province

Nov 15-21

Anbar

29 Incidents

90 Killed: 37 ISF, 2 Sahwa, 51
Civilians

54 Wounded: 10 ISF, 10 Sahwa, 34
Civilians

18 Shootings

1 IED

2 Suicide Bombers

Babil

6 Incidents

8 Killed: 1 ISF, 7 Civilians

26 Wounded: 6 ISF, 20 Civilians

5 IEDs

Baghdad

42 Incidents

61 Killed: 8 ISF, 2 Sahwa, 51
Civilians

211 Wounded: 28 ISF, 2 Sahwa, 181
Civilians

9 Shootings

22 IEDs

3 Sticky Bombs

3 Car Bombs

2 Suicide Car Bombs

Diyala

12 Incidents

18 Killed: 12 ISF, 6 Civilians

30 Wounded: 2 ISF, 28 Civilians

6 Shootings

3 IEDs

1 Sticky Bomb

Irbil

1 Incident

10 Killed: 2 Police, 10 Civilians

23 Wounded: 23 Civilians

1 Suicide Car Bomb

Kirkuk

5 Incidents

2 Killed: 2 Civilians

2 Shootings

1 IED

1 Car Bomb

Ninewa

10 Incidents

22 Killed: 22 Civilians

5 Shootings

1 IED

Qadisiyah

1 Incident

1 IED

Salahaddin

27 Incidents

68 Killed: 16 ISF, 2 Sahwa, 50
Civilians

109 Wounded: 24 ISF, 9 Sahwa, 76
Civilians

12 Shootings

34 IEDs

2 Suicide Car Bombs

Not
only were overall attacks down for the week, but so were the number of vehicle
borne improvised explosive devices (VBIEDs). There were just twelve during the
week, down from 23 during the 2nd week of November and 16 seen from
November 1-7. IS has been carrying out more car bombs overall however and
November 11-17 saw one of the longest waves in recent months with a total of 25
across Anbar, Babil, Baghdad, Diyala, Kirkuk, and Salahaddin. Another wave did
not start during the rest of the week, which was unusual.

Car
Bomb Attacks In Iraq Nov 2014

Date

Location

Dead

Wounded

Nov 1

Yusifiya,
Babil

Dora
& Palestine St, Baghdad

47

119

Nov 2

Yusifiya,
Babil

Bayaa,
Sadoun St, Sadr City, Baghdad

38

103

Nov 3

Tunis,
Baghdad

36

Nov 4

Nov 5

Baiji
Refinery, Salahaddin

4

7

Nov 6

Hit
& Baghdadi, Anbar

Baiji,
Salahaddin

18

26

Nov 7

Baghdadi,
Anbar

Baiji
x3, Salahaddin

11

30

1st
Wk Totals

16

154

285

Nov 8

Southeast
of Hit, Anbar

Sadr
City, Amin, Amil x2 & Zafaraniya, Baghdad

42

125

Nov 9

Nov 10

Nov 11

Shaab,
Baghdad

Kirkuk,
Kirkuk

Tarmiya,
Salahaddin

36

27

Nov 12

Yusifiya,
Babil

Mansour
x2 & Rasheed, Baghdad

Edheim,
Diyala

26

68

Nov 13

Mamil,
Baghdad

Bani
Saad & Kirfri, Diyala

13

33

Nov 14

Ramadi
x2, Anbar

Adhamiya
& Morocco St, Baghdad

Baiji
& Tikrit, Salahaddin

42

83

2nd
Wk Totals

23

159

336

Nov 15

Hamamiyat,
Baghdad

Taji,
Salahaddin

18

54

Nov 16

Abbas
Ibn Firmas Sq & Amiriya, Baghdad

2

8

Nov 17

Jubba
x2, Anbar

Meshtal
& Amiriya, Baghdad

14

42

Nov 18

Nov 19

Irbil,
Irbil

Kirkuk,
Kirkuk

Tarmiya,
Salahaddin

19

37

Nov 20

Ramadi,
Anbar

6

7

Nov 21

3rd
Wk Totals

12

59

148

(Institute for the Study of War)

Heavy fighting has been going on in central and eastern
Anbar since October. During that month insurgents seized several towns and an
army base in the middle of the governorate in an attempt to take the entire
province. The government promised a counter attack, but so far has only been
carrying out small scale operations outside of the major urban centers. For
example, on November
15, an adviser to the governor said that the ISF had cleared Albu Nimr and
then Dolab on November
20 both outside of Hit. Pro-government forces were also moving on Barwana near
Haditha, continued operations in the southeast towards Karbala, and was
clearing up the area
between Amiriya Fallujah and Jurf al-Sakhr in Babil in the east. During the
week there were also reports of fighting inside and out of Ramadi, in Baghdadi,
Amiriya Fallujah, Habaniya, and Fallujah. The government claims it is waiting
for tribal forces to be trained for a new brigade before it starts a major
campaign in Anbar, but that’s still weeks away. Until then the insurgents and
ISF and aligned tribes will continue to battle it out. Finally, the IS carried
out more executions of the Albu Nimr tribe with 36 killed on November 15
in Hit, and another 6 on November
16.

(IraqSlogger)

The recent clearing operation in Babil’s northeastern Jurf
al-Sakhr has had two main impacts upon security not only there, but in the
south. First, IS has relocated to the northern section of the governorate. From
November 15-21 there were 6 incidents with five IEDs and a mortar attack in Mahmudiya,
Iskandiriya and Yusfiya. That’s where most of the violence in the province is
going to be centered from now on as IS attempts to re-coup its losses. Second,
Jurf al-Sakhr was a major staging area for VBIEDs into southern Iraq. None has
occurred there since the area was secured drastically improving the situation
in the south, which was getting hit a couple times a month by car bombs.

Baghdad remained a major target of car bombs, and also saw a
large clash in the western section of the province. During the week there were
five VBIEDs. The first was on November
15 in Hamamiyat, followed by an attack upon a U.N.
convoy outside of Baghdad airport the next day. Amiriya was then bombed on November
16 and 17,
along with Meshtal.
IS aims to stir sectarian tensions with most of these attacks. November
15 there was also a firefight in Abu Ghraib that left two soldiers dead and
17 wounded. In recent weeks there have been similar incidents with the ISF getting
hit by IEDs and assaults upon checkpoints. The insurgents have been active
there for quite some time and are letting their presence being known.

The government and peshmerga forces carried out several
clearing campaigns in Diyala during the third week of November. On November
18 a new operation began in Sadiya in the northeast by the ISF, militias,
and the Kurds. That
same day the army moved into Imam Weis
just to the south of Baquba. Finally from November
20-21
there was a battle for Babilan with the army and militias victorious. Right
after the fall of Mosul Diyala was a major front in the battle against the
insurgents, but it has faded in importance since then. There are still a good
number of attacks there, but it appears that the militants might be using the
governorate more as a staging area for operations in the rest of the country
rather than looking to gain territory there.

Similarly the peshmerga and ISF are trying to clear out
areas of Kirkuk. November
15 the Kurds said it had gone into Kharaba Rot in the Dibis district in the
northwest, while the ISF took control of Fatha
Bridge in Hawija in the south. November 19
Jarabrot in Dibis was also said to have been freed by the Kurds. In June IS
swept into the southern section of the province as the security forces
collapsed after the fall of Mosul. Violence has been going down there since
then.

Kurdistan witnessed a rare attack in November. The Islamic
State carried out a suicide car bombing in Irbil on
November 19
killing 10 and wounding 23. It appeared that the bomber was trying to get into
the governor’s compound, but after being turned back detonated the bomb at a
checkpoint instead.

Mount Sinjar continues to be surrounded by the Islamic
State. The peshmerga said it would break the siege, but has been making very
slow progress. November 16
it claimed it had freed three areas in the region including Kilma, Saraya and
Monaya. The peshmerga may be waiting for heavy weapons to arrive from the west
before it does much more in the region.

(Wikipedia)

Salahaddin has been where the ISF and militias have made big
strides recently. In the middle of the month the government forces and militias
made their way into the Baiji district in the north and broke the siege of the Baiji
refinery, which had been holding out for months. After that the ISF and
militias move to secure important
roads in the area in preparation for a move on Tikrit. On November 20
the ISF also began an operation in Balad in the south. The insurgents are not
going without a fight. At the end of the week there were heavy clashes in Dujail,
Dhuluiya, Samarra,
Ishaqi, Ramailat,
and Balad.
That showed that militants were still active in different parts of the province
despite the progress of the ISF and militias. The attacks might have also been
an attempt to draw forces away from Baiji, which is important for the militants
to maintain their supply lines. The fighting in Salahaddin is far from over and
will remain a center of the conflict in the coming months.

SOURCES

Alsumaria,
"The killing and wounding of 23 elements of the Awakening and army,
including an officer in detonation north of Baghdad," 11/20/14

Associated
Press, "Car bombings in Baghdad kill 14 people," 11/17/14

Iraq
Times, "Armed clashes between the army and Daash west of Baghdad leave 19
martyrs and wounded," 11/15/14

-
"martyrs and injured in suicide bombing north of Baghdad 47," 11/15/14

Al
Mada, "Daash executed five people form the Albu Nimr tribe western Anbar
and threw their bodies in the Euphrates River," 11/16/14

-
"Killing and injuring ten elements of the popular brigades in clashes
south of Tikrit," 11/21/14

IRAQ HISTORY TIMELINE

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About Me

Musings On Iraq was started in 2008 to explain the political, economic, security and cultural situation in Iraq via original articles and interviews. If you wish to contact me personally my email is: motown67@aol.com