Russia develops a world beating first class aircraft. China steals the design and builds it...

Not "produced" but only "designed" now, with years for it to reach production stage. The task of designing own wide-body long-range passenger jet from scratch is too expensive for Russia, and China do not have this experience at all, so cooperation is quite logical. Also, without China this plane would be limited to Russian internal market by Western sanctions that surely will be in place by the time it is developed, while China taking part is automatically making this plane appropriate for international market (as economic leverage of China is now so huge West can't block major Chinese project)

As the Boeing 737 Max controversy rolls on, the American planemaker has now been embroiled in a fresh row – after it was revealed it wants to shorten and replace some physical certification tests with software-powered processes.

Specifically, Boeing is “reducing the scope and duration of certain costly physical tests used to certify the planemaker’s new aircraft,” Reuters reported over the weekend.

We're thus told that engineers working on Boeing's new 777X airliner project are intending to use computer simulations instead of real-world flight tests to validate their engineering decisions.

The manufacturer wants to switch to software-based trials for things such as wing load testing, according to three sources who spoke to Reuters, instead of doing things like bending actual, and highly expensive, components until they snap.

Boeing spokesman Paul Bergman didn’t comment on the newswire’s report, though he did say that the aerospace giant is “looking holistically at our design and certification processes.” This is in light of the 737 Max crashes, which have been linked to Boeing’s infamous MCAS system, which was designed to stop airliners stalling by automatically pushing the nose down in certain circumstances, somewhat too effectively.

It has since come to light that the version of MCAS installed aboard production 737 Maxes was not the same version initially demonstrated to regulators overseeing the development of the jet.

In related news, Boeing is reportedly open to changing the name of the 737 Max, given the wall-to-wall bad publicity it has had over the past few months following its global grounding.

It could be less nefarious than it sounds, in that the regulators saw an earlier version, then problems were found, and fixed. Should that not go into production? Of course, the right thing to do would have been to inform the FAA about such changes before greenlighting them for production.

(...)
The coders from HCL were typically designing to specifications set by Boeing. Still, “it was controversial because it was far less efficient than Boeing engineers just writing the code,” Rabin said. Frequently, he recalled, “it took many rounds going back and forth because the code was not done correctly.”

Boeing’s cultivation of Indian companies appeared to pay other dividends. In recent years, it has won several orders for Indian military and commercial aircraft, such as a $22 billion one in January 2017 to supply SpiceJet Ltd. That order included 100 737-Max 8 jets and represented Boeing’s largest order ever from an Indian airline, a coup in a country dominated by Airbus.

Based on resumes posted on social media, HCL engineers helped develop and test the Max’s flight-display software, while employees from another Indian company, Cyient Ltd., handled software for flight-test equipment.

Costly Delay
In one post, an HCL employee summarized his duties with a reference to the now-infamous model, which started flight tests in January 2016: “Provided quick workaround to resolve production issue which resulted in not delaying flight test of 737-Max (delay in each flight test will cost very big amount for Boeing).”
Boeing said the company did not rely on engineers from HCL and Cyient for the Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System, which has been linked to the Lion Air crash last October and the Ethiopian Airlines disaster in March. The Chicago-based planemaker also said it didn’t rely on either firm for another software issue disclosed after the crashes: a cockpit warning light that wasn’t working for most buyers.
“Boeing has many decades of experience working with supplier/partners around the world,” a company spokesman said. “Our primary focus is on always ensuring that our products and services are safe, of the highest quality and comply with all applicable regulations.”
(...)

In the 1960's, we built the VC10. It was fairly efficient, reliable, could land on a postage stamp, and carry a good passenger load. Nobody, other than some African nations that couldnt afford it, bought it because the Boeing 707 dominated the market. Or the HS Trident, which again was reliable, had a good passenger load in later versions, and had a blind landing system that was more efficient than anything else in the world at the time. And hardly anyone, other than China, bought it, because the Boeing 727 was preeminent.

The words 'Too big to fail' spring to mind. This is precisely why you should never allow monopolies of this scale. They get complacent because they feel, rightly, the world cant do without them.

In the 1960's, we built the VC10. It was fairly efficient, reliable, could land on a postage stamp, and carry a good passenger load. Nobody, other than some African nations that couldnt afford it, bought it because the Boeing 707 dominated the market. Or the HS Trident, which again was reliable, had a good passenger load in later versions, and had a blind landing system that was more efficient than anything else in the world at the time. And hardly anyone, other than China, bought it, because the Boeing 727 was preeminent.

The words 'Too big to fail' spring to mind. This is precisely why you should never allow monopolies of this scale. They get complacent because they feel, rightly, the world cant do without them.

When in trouble, the Pentagon is going to jump in and buy some overpriced warbirds. They simply cannot afford to lose another manufacturer.

On the civilian side it is not the aeroplane alone. You also have the support infrastructure around it. Training courses, technicians, tools etc. etc. And the boeings were good enough for the purpose.

Also: how was the pricing of the British planes compared to the Boeings? How the after sales support?

In the 1960's, we built the VC10. It was fairly efficient, reliable, could land on a postage stamp, and carry a good passenger load. Nobody, other than some African nations that couldnt afford it, bought it because the Boeing 707 dominated the market. Or the HS Trident, which again was reliable, had a good passenger load in later versions, and had a blind landing system that was more efficient than anything else in the world at the time. And hardly anyone, other than China, bought it, because the Boeing 727 was preeminent.

The words 'Too big to fail' spring to mind. This is precisely why you should never allow monopolies of this scale. They get complacent because they feel, rightly, the world cant do without them.

When in trouble, the Pentagon is going to jump in and buy some overpriced warbirds. They simply cannot afford to lose another manufacturer.

On the civilian side it is not the aeroplane alone. You also have the support infrastructure around it. Training courses, technicians, tools etc. etc. And the boeings were good enough for the purpose.

Also: how was the pricing of the British planes compared to the Boeings? How the after sales support?

That is how Boeing ended up being such a preeminent manufacturer. They had Government subsidy. The Boeing 707 was built on the back of the military tanker contract, which is a subsidy, though the American Government will never own up to it. Meanwhile the former aircraft factory in Belfast that used to be called 'Shorts' is closing, because Boeing managed to browbeat the US Government into tarrifing its product, because of a non existent Government subsidy.

The day Boeing falls over dead will be a good day for world trade. Not that it will ever happen. Too big to fail.

I cant comment on price, I simply dont know. I do know the main selling point of the VC10 was short airports, and when it came out, they were all being lengthened due to the presence of the 707. The Trident is a more complicated case, but it may well be corporate espionage played a part. DH unwisely invited Boeing representives around the plant and showed them a new model of the Trident. Several months later Boeing were selling the 727, which looked remarkably similar....

Complete coincidence im sure. Particularly as they never built an aircraft of that configuration again.

That is how Boeing ended up being such a preeminent manufacturer. They had Government subsidy. The Boeing 707 was built on the back of the military tanker contract, which is a subsidy, though the American Government will never own up to it.

RAF also ordered VC10's...

Look, the problem with British airliners was always that they were designed for specific niche roles within the Empire. Hey, BOAC needs a plane for Karachi flights, we're guaranteed to get sales. This meant that they were not economical on most routes, most airliners had no incentive to buy them and economies of the scale were crappy. Brits were not the only ones to do it, Soviets did much of the same, also see Dassault Mercure or Convair 880/990.

When Finnair selected its first post-piston era airliner in 1958, British ones were rejected right away. They were so outdated and they went with Caravelle.

I think the majority (if not all) the RAF VC10's were actually bought up from trade, particularly the Super VC10's which were recovered from an African airline which folded and couldnt afford to pay for them. So their coming into the RAF was substantially different from the 707. It wasnt developed FOR the RAF, they just happened to buy it when it arrived. VC10 was specifically designed for BOAC african routes. This was not the case with the 707, where it was military investment that made it happen.

I can point to problems with the Trident which were largely down to having engines specified by the Department of Transport, who clearly knew bugger all about designing airliners. It meant the later stretched versions had 5 engines. 3 for flight, one for apu, and another for boost to get the bugger off the ground. OTOH< when you got airborne, you could put the reverse thrust out and drop like a rock from altitude, and land in fog right down to 300 feet. For its flaws, it was a great airliner. But who was interested in a niche product?

But before anyone says the British couldnt design airliners, you have the BAC111. Which would probably be in production now if BAE had gone with developing it like MD went with the DC9, rather than tooling around with the impressive, but dead ended 146. The 111 was a worldbeater. The only problem with it was that it was noisy, which for a 1960's jet airliner wasnt a bug, it was a feature.

IMO Douglas was the conservative one. They were always kinda one step behind Boeing. But they had massive experience about what airlines needed. DC-8 did not sell as quickly as 707, but in the end it was better aircraft with more development potential.

Boeing did not screw Trident, British screwed the Trident. It was yet another example of "lets tailor the aircraft for specific need of a British airline, which might disappear in few years". It didn't help that at that point R-R was becoming uncompetive vs American engine manufacturers.

One-Eleven was the one which they got right, I agree. But they could not follow it up. Airbus eventually got the right idea - focus on what matters. Lets use latest technology to make the plane as economical as possible. That made way too much sense for HM Government, so they dropped out.

I have always had a soft spot for BAE 146. It's such a cute design, and bold one. But it was inevitable that suitable engines would arrive to power 2-engined regional jets, and then it would be goner.

IMO Douglas was the conservative one. They were always kinda one step behind Boeing. But they had massive experience about what airlines needed. DC-8 did not sell as quickly as 707, but in the end it was better aircraft with more development potential.

Boeing did not screw Trident, British screwed the Trident. It was yet another example of "lets tailor the aircraft for specific need of a British airline, which might disappear in few years". It didn't help that at that point R-R was becoming uncompetive vs American engine manufacturers.

One-Eleven was the one which they got right, I agree. But they could not follow it up. Airbus eventually got the right idea - focus on what matters. Lets use latest technology to make the plane as economical as possible. That made way too much sense for HM Government, so they dropped out.

I have always had a soft spot for BAE 146. It's such a cute design, and bold one. But it was inevitable that suitable engines would arrive to power 2-engined regional jets, and then it would be goner.

Certainly werent IMHO, right up to the DC4. Stratocruiser was innovative but a complete dog. Also, compare and contrast quite how innovative the DC9 was compared to the Boeing 737. The DC9/MD80 still had bags of development room in it, which is presumably why Boeing shut it down and continued with the 737. Go figure.

Trident 1 and 2 were fine. The problem was that the Department of Transport as I already said specified the engines, which were not powerful enough to stretch it. So its was less the British than the British Government, but you still have to explain the Boeing configuration which they arrived at right out of the blue after visiting the DH plant. It as little more than corporate espionage. And still it lagged in blind landing capablity. British Airways said that when they withdrew Trident, the 737's blind landing capablity was actually a step backwards from the Smiths industries system in Trident.

I like the 146 too, but it probably had less development room in it than any postwar British airliner. Even concorde was envisaged as building a Mk2 to carry more passengers. I dont know any way you could stretch the 146. Clever aeroplane though.

Well, I was talking about post-war development. I think Douglas kinda peaked at about DC-6 and although they had wildly successful aircraft after that for decades (most notably DC-9), they always seemed to play catch-up.DC-9 came after Douglas had collaborated with Sud Aviation about possible license production of Caravelle - coincidence? You decide!

Boeing 737 and DC-9 did not fully overlap in the markets. 737 was bigger, DC-9 was better suited for smaller routes. Finnair evaluated Boeing designs in the '90s when Boeing made an offer for all-Boeing fleet, and came to conclusion that 737-500 was not economical for their 'thin' routes.

I think they were hedging their bets, to see if this jet craze really catches on before investing on development (I don't know if they ever planned a turboprop as a DC-6/7 successor, but seems logical they might have). They did make a study for 'DC-9' regional jet in the '50s but airlines were not interested at the time.