India Biannual Fraud Update – published by the US State Department

REF: A) 07 State 171211, B) 08 New Delhi 2915, C) New Delhi 1364, D) Mumbai 293, E) 08 Mumbai 17, F) 07 Chennai 695, G) 08 Chennai 372, H) 08 Chennai 212, I) 07 Chennai 704, J) 08 Mumbai 367, K) 08 Kolkata 73, L) Chennai 157, M) Mumbai 117, N) Chennai 173, O) Mumbai 293, P) New Delhi 1299, Q) Chennai 91, R) Chennai 13, S) New Delhi 175, T) Chennai 158, U) New Delhi 638, V) Chennai 174, W) Mumbai 151, X) New Delhi 1429
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¶A. COUNTRY CONDITIONS
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¶1. India-wide consular operations are among the busiest in the world. In FY-2008,
Mission India processed more than 756,000 non-immigrant visa applications and
27,000 immigrant visa applications. While the majority of applicants from India are
bona fide travelers and migrants, the volume of fraudulent applications is still
significant. Some states, such as Gujarat and Punjab, are traditional sources of
migration out of India and fraudulent applications from these areas are more
common than from other regions of India. The state of Andhra Pradesh, and in
particular its capital of Hyderabad, has been identified as a large center of
documentary fraud which affects all India posts.
¶2. The world economic crisis affected the travel environment in India in FY-2008
and FY-2009. The domestic civilian aviation industry struggled to manage costs
amidst slower traffic and rapid expansion, with even the traditionally most successful
airlines looking for alliances and partnerships. Discretionary travel – including
international travel — was off and affected Mission India NIV demand. Economic
observers in India predict that the global slowdown will reduce India’s GDP growth
from about 9.0 percent to around 6.5 percent this fiscal year and 5.5-6 percent next
fiscal year (starting April 1).While U.S., Indian, and multinational businesses with
strong ties to the U.S. economy have slowed down their expansion plans, they are
continuing to hire – albeit at a slower pace.

¶3. Despite this difficult economic climate, demand for visa appointments from the
intending immigrant population in northern India has remained strong. An opinion
poll published in the popular Times of India in January 2007 noted that 37 percent of
the 1.1 billion Indians would emigrate if they had the chance. Many Indians have
tried to migrate using non-immigrant visas, and a greater number of Indian nationals
apply for employment-based H and L visas than any other nationality worldwide.
Mission India processes more H and L visas than any other country in the world,
more than 30 percent of the world total in FY-2008. Although H and L visa
applications were down slightly in FY-2009 due to the worldwide economic
environment, Mission India still processed 120,320 H and L visa applications in the
first three quarters of FY-2009, including 60,725 in Chennai alone. Mission India
processed 192,332 H and L visa adjudications in FY-2008 and 190,087 in FY-2007.
Chennai, Mumbai and New Delhi have been the three busiest H-1B visa processing
posts in the world for the past five fiscal years, and we project that India posts will
comprise the top four in the world now that the new Consulate General in Hyderabad
is adjudicating visas.

¶4. In FY-2009, the non-immigrant visa classes most often targeted for fraud were
B1/B2 business travelers/tourists, H-1B temporary workers, F1 student visas, and P3
culturally unique artists. Since the implementation of the new petition requirement
for R-1 religious workers, Mission India has seen very few fraudulent R-1 cases. The
most commonly targeted immigrant visa classes were IR-1s and CR 1s in Delhi and
F-2B and F-2A visas in Mumbai and Chennai. During the six month period from
March through August 2009, Mission India’s consular sections identified a total of
3,596 cases of suspected visa fraud (Chennai – 1,237, New Delhi – 949, Mumbai –
809, Hyderabad – 523, Kolkata – 78). 5. Most of India’s fraudulent applicants come
from specific and easily defined regional areas within each consular district. These
states have some of the most mobile populations in India and the largest
concentrations of expatriate communities overseas, including in the United States. In
New Delhi, cases originating from the Punjab comprise the majority of its IV and
fraud caseloads, while the same can be said in Mumbai with Gujarat. Chennai and
Hyderabad’s fraud workload comes principally from Andhra Pradesh.
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¶B. NON-IMMIGRANT VISA FRAUD
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¶6. Fraudulent NIV applications make up a small portion of the total NIV cases but
constitute the vast majority of cases referred to FPU. During the reporting period,
Mission India identified 3,083 total cases of possible NIV fraud. Just over half of
those cases resulted in a finding of confirmed fraud (Chennai – 1,182 cases , 60
percent confirmed fraud rate of completed investigations; New Delhi – 685, 34
percent; Mumbai – 615, 56 percent; Hyderabad – 523, Kolkata – 78, 30 percent).
¶7. B1/B2 visa fraud is the most commonplace. Regionally-based fraud rings
throughout the country, but especially in Hyderabad, continue to produce fraudulent
documents for visa application and travel purposes. Some visa “consultants” and
travel agents specialize in fraudulent experience letters and fake document
packages, which include passport copies of false relatives, bogus financial
documents, and affidavits of support.

¶8. In the last six months the number of reported B1/B2 fraud cases throughout the
Mission has nearly doubled from 1,089 to 2,121. The increase is mostly due to an
increased use of the “suspicious docs” function in the NIV system, although several
posts have increased their fraud detection in B1/B2 cases. If an applicant admits to
submitting a fraudulent document package, Chennai uses extensive text searches to
identify additional cases with the same fraudulent details. New Delhi uncovered an
extensive network of fraudulent Lions Club conference attendees (ref C). Mumbai
recently discovered a scam involving unqualified children being misrepresented as
attending different schools in an attempt to boost their financial credibility as Space
Camp attendees (ref D). As a result, Mumbai now requires signed affidavits by
chaperones and has physically canceled the visas of several large camp groups. In
FY-2008, Mumbai confirmed an overstay rate of less than one percent for male
B1/B2

H-1B Visa Fraud
—————
¶8. H-1B fraud is one of the top two visa categories for fraud throughout Mission
India. All posts regularly encounter inflated or fabricated educational and
employment qualifications. The vast majority of these documents come from
Hyderabad. In the 18 months prior to the start-up of consular operations in
Hyderabad, FPU Chennai investigated 150 companies in Hyderabad, 77 percent of
which turned out to be fraudulent or highly suspect (ref F). Most of those cases
slated for site visits were to verify the experience letters for H-1B applicants who did
not meet minimum educational qualifications. 9. The state of Andhra Pradesh, and
Hyderabad in particular, has long been the hub for fraudulent document vendors in
India. Hyderabadi applicants comprised over one-third of Chennai’s total visa
workload in FY-2008, but well over half of the FPU workload. In its first three months
of adjudications, investigations by Consulate General Hyderabad have already led to
the arrests of several document vendors, to be reported septel. FPU Mumbai has
identified several Hyderabad-based fraud schemes whereby Hyderabadi applicants
claimed to work for fictitious companies in Pune in order to apply in Mumbai’s
consular district and avoid Chennai. During recent site visits in Bangalore (ref G),
FPU Chennai encountered several fictitious companies staffed by Hyderabadis. The
Hyderabadis claimed that they had opened shell companies in Bangalore because
“everyone knows Hyderabad has fraud and Bangalore is reputable.” 10. Mission India
continues to be at the forefront of H and L adjudications and training. Over the last
three years, Mission India has hosted successful country-wide and international H
and L conferences to harmonize adjudication techniques and fraud prevention
strategies. In the last two months of FY-2009 alone, Chennai hosted and conducted
H and L training for officers and LES Fraud Assistants from Kuala Lumpur, Colombo,
Auckland, Shanghai, Hyderabad, New Delhi, Mumbai, and Kolkata. Numerous other
posts communicate regularly with Mission India on problematic H and L cases. In
April 2008, Mission India’s Country Fraud Prevention Coordinator attended a KCC
conference on “The Future of H and L Processing,” and in May 2008 Chennai hosted
a worldwide H and L fraud conference (ref H) attended by DHS, KCC, CA/VO,
CA/FPP, DS and multiple posts that adjudicate large numbers of Indian H-1B
applicants. Presentations from that conference are available on the intranet at
http://intranet.ca.state.gov/ fraud/resources/niv/hl/20107.aspx. At the end of FY-
2007, Mission India hosted a countrywide H and L fraud conference in New Delhi (ref
I) and hosted another in September 2009. 11. FPU Mumbai identified a recent trend
of “mix-and-match” couples where multiple H-4 spouses pretended to be married to
the same H-1B spouse resident in the United States. These applicants were to pay
upon issuance approximately $70,000 to the smuggler that arranged their
documentation.

Religious Workers
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¶13. Prior to the USCIS requirement that R-1 applications be petition-based, India
detected considerable fraud among applicants for R-1 and R-2 visas traveling to the
United States for religious purposes. During the last two years, most R-1 fraud was
detected amongst Tibetan refugees, Sikh raagis, and Hindu priests. Mission R-1 fraud
includes both fraudulent beneficiaries and fictitious inviting parties. Since DHS began
requiring petitions for R-1 applicants in November, R-1 fraud referrals have almost
completely dried up. Since DHS requires 100 percent on-site verification of
petitioners, however, many potential R-1 applicants now apply for B1/B2 visas in an
attempt to avoid closer scrutiny.
¶14. Chennai, Mumbai and Kolkata have all recently reported on R-1 fraud trends
(refs J, K and L). Mumbai noted that following numerous FPU site visits in the states
of Gujarat and Maharashtra in which none of the purported Sikhs were legitimate
religious workers, CY-2008 R-1 visa refusals have climbed to nearly 70 percent.
Mumbai and Kolkata noted similar findings that Sikhs and Tibetan monks had the
highest percentage of confirmed fraud during this period. Kolkata confirmed that 85
percent of R-1 Buddhist monks from the Northern District of West Bengal did not
belong to the monasteries as they claimed. Most of these fake priests were from
Nepal or from the south Indian state of Karnataka. FPU Kolkata observed that
Buddhist priests and monks from this region all speak Hindi, and Buddhist monks
who claim to speak only Tibetan are not from West Bengal. A recent Mission-wide
study of stateless B1/B2 applicants, most of whom were purportedly Tibetan monks,
confirmed an overstay rate of over fifty percent.
¶15. Coordination between the FPUs throughout Mission India has been highly
effective in preventing fraud in many religious worker visa cases. An astute catch by
the FPM in Kolkata caught several fraudulent R-1 applicants applying the same week
in Mumbai and New Delhi. Based on an A/RSO-I investigation in New Delhi that
uncovered fake stamps for an organization in Michigan, Chennai arranged the arrest
of three fake Sikhs, and the Kolkata FPM used Watch Phrase to alert U.S. Mission
New Zealand about its applicants connected to the same Michigan organization.
These cases are now under investigation by DS. Technology tools, such as Watch
Phrase and Text Search, have proven invaluable in combating R-1 fraud.
————-
Student Visas

¶16. Many student applicants, even legitimate ones, are taken in by document
vendors. They present fraudulent packages of bank statements and land documents
in their interviews, and they are guided by advertising and news articles, such as the
one in Hyderabad which declared, “Study Part-Time, Work Full-Time” on an F-1
student visa. In May, police arrested a document vendor in Hyderabad who provided
fraudulent financial records for nearly 100 visa applicants, including many well
qualified students. In June 2008, Chennai conducted an open house for local
journalists to dispel the myths surrounding the visa process and to encourage
CHENNAI 00000306 005 OF 017
students in particular not to rely on visa facilitators. CA/FPP has been instrumental in
identifying schools that have a bad track record of students not maintaining status
once in the United States. Mumbai confirmed a very low overstay rate in its recent
Summer Work and Travel validation study (ref M).
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Performer Visas
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¶17. Chennai, Mumbai and New Delhi have all been active in combating fraud of
cultural performers and reporting on P3 fraud trends (Refs N, O, and P). The highest
rate of fraud is in New Delhi, which has developed a mandatory FPU prescreening
program for these types of cases. Its study validated an overall refusal rate of 56
percent and confirmed an overstay rate of five percent. Mumbai found that while P3
holders did not overstay their visas, several did report being mistreated and
underpaid.
¶18. An investigation by the Chennai FPU in 2008 uncovered a visa fraud racket
through which famous Tamil film actors and industry associates assisted mala fide
applicants to obtain B1/B2 visas, purportedly to scout movie locations (ref Q). Over
two hundred applicants applied for visas under this scheme, and 95 were issued.
Thirty-eight of those applicants are confirmed overstays who are currently illegally
present in the United States. FPU revoked the visas of 56 other individuals, mostly
Tamil film stars and industry associates, for their direct role in this visa scheme. The
case generated significant press attention throughout India and appeared on all of
the major news networks, thereby creating a very high-profile anti-fraud awareness
campaign.
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¶C. IMMIGRANT VISA FRAUD

¶20. During the reporting period, Mission India identified 513 potential cases of IV
fraud (New Delhi – 264, 30 percent confirmed fraud rate; Mumbai – 194, 32 percent;
Chennai – 55, 30 percent). Kolkata and Hyderabad, which do not process IVs,
assisted with several site visits in their respective consular districts. Although all
posts face similar fraud trends (i.e. fraudulent relationships, fake civil documents,
etc.) and have almost identical confirmed fraud rates, the volume of IV cases in New
Delhi and Mumbai is significantly larger than that of Chennai.
¶21. The F and CR categories are particularly troublesome throughout Mission India,
and posts see false family relationships and fictitious marriages and divorces every
day. The Indian custom of arranged marriages makes adjudicating IR and CR cases
particularly difficult, as the husband and wife often do not meet until just before their
marriage. Many of the IV fraud referrals in Mumbai are CR-1 or F-21 cases stemming
from “arranged” marriages between U.S. citizens or LPRs and Indian nationals. Thus,
much of the FPUs’ time is dedicated to determining the legitimacy of the family
relationships that sustain the claim to immigrant status.
CHENNAI 00000306 006 OF 017
¶22. New Delhi FPU investigates cases through a combination of Lexis-Nexis and
PIERS checks on the petitioner side, and CCD checks, voters ID checks and calls to
villagers. The majority of Post’s IV fraud originates in Punjab state. Over the past
year New Delhi FPU has broken numerous cases in which the beneficiary provided a
false Voter’s ID by searching the official voter registration on-line at
http://www.ceopunjab.nic.in/. This site indicates who lives in the voter’s house, their
ages and marital status and/or father’s name. Local police accepted three such cases
of Voter’s ID fraud for investigation. Calls are still the unit’s most valuable resource.
Using the online phone lists, the FPU can locate phone numbers in the area in which
the applicant lives and call those neighbors for information about the beneficiary and
sometimes petitioner. This is more effective in rural areas; city residents are less
informed/less willing to talk about their neighbors.
¶23. Posts also frequently encounter misrepresentations of marital status in order to
benefit from later “current processing dates” (e.g. falsely claiming to be single by
denying the applicant has a spouse and children in order to qualify for F1
classification) and misrepresentations of the age of children in order to qualify as
part of the family eligible to immigrate. Chennai has seen the largest number of
these cases originating from the state of Kerala (ref R).
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¶D. DIVERSITY VISA FRAUD
¶24. Although Indians are generally ineligible to participate in the Diversity Visa
program, Kolkata conducted five DV investigations for Nepalese nationals. All five
cases were confirmed fraudulent.
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¶E. ACS AND U.S. PASSPORT FRAUD
—————
¶25. Although passport and CRBA-related fraud exists, few cases have been
reported. During the rating period, New Delhi and Mumbai reported 42 fraud checks,
39 of which were for DNA. Only one of these cases resulted in a confirmed fraud
finding. The rise in DNA verifications in Mumbai is primarily due to fraud concerns in
surrogacy cases. Mumbai, New Delhi and Hyderabad have all noted increasing
numbers of surrogacy cases, to be reported septel.
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¶F. ADOPTION FRAUD
—————
¶26. During the reporting period, no posts referred any adoption cases for review.
Recent media accounts have focused attention on reportedly fraudulent adoptions in
India by Australian parents. Other countries have also expressed concerns about
cases stemming from questionable orphanages in the late 1990s and early 2000s.
Indian authorities are investigating these claims (Ref S).
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¶G. Use of DNA Testing
CHENNAI 00000306 007 OF 017
—————
¶27. Mission India does not currently have any fraud concerns with DNA testing.
Guidance for all posts is to utilize DNA testing as a last resort, and most cases are
resolved through interviews, phone calls and site visits. During the rating period,
Mission India conducted DNA testing in 91 cases, and in only five Mumbai IV cases
was fraud confirmed. This does not include DNA tests on behalf of DHS, or cases for
which DNA was recommended but the applicant did not submit a sample.
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¶H. Asylum and Other DHS Benefits Fraud
—————
¶28. All posts now refer FDNS requests to FDNS HQ for appropriate dissemination.
Since those cases should be routed to the USCIS, ICE and CBP representatives at
Embassy New Delhi, the number of DHS referrals has decreased significantly in the
past six months to only 32 cases (Mumbai 22, Chennai – 6, Hyderabad – 2, New
Delhi – 2). Twenty-three of those requests were for DNA. DHS New Delhi processes
DNA cases only in the Delhi consular district.
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¶I. Alien Smuggling, Trafficking, Organized Crime, Terrorist Travel
—————
¶29. Alien smuggling from and through India using fraudulent travel documents is
one of the most serious challenges facing posts in the region. Smuggling ranges from
individual document vendors to sophisticated criminal organizations that move
hundreds of people to the U.S. each year. Delhi and Mumbai have become key
transit points for illegal migrants proceeding to the U.S. from India. DS/CR/VPAU, in
consultation with DRSO/I New Delhi, and the Austrian, Canadian, British, and New
Zealand High Commissions continue to monitor third-country nationals transiting
New Delhi with counterfeit documents. Individuals of numerous nationalities,
including Armenians, Iraqis, Moroccans, Georgian, Bangladeshi, Congolese,
Nepalese, and Sri Lankans have been intercepted attempting to transit New Delhi
with fraudulent documents. Other Indian airports have also been reporting similar
patterns. From 10/2008 to 04/2009, there were 32 encounters/off-loads involving
Nepalese/Tibetans via New Delhi enroute to JFK alone.
¶30. Trafficking in persons (TIP) remains an area of concern. India is a source,
destination, and transit country for men, women, and children trafficked for the
purposes of commercial sexual exploitation and forced labor. Internal trafficking of
women and girls for the purposes of commercial sexual exploitation and forced
marriage is prevalent. The GOI estimates 90 percent of India’s sex trafficking is
internal, although estimates of the number of trafficking victims vary widely and are
generally unreliable. Recent years have seen an increase in trafficking to mediumsized cities and satellite towns of large cities. India is also a destination for women
and girls from Nepal and Bangladesh trafficked for the purpose of commercial sexual
exploitation.
—————
¶J. DS Criminal Fraud Investigations
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CHENNAI 00000306 008 OF 017
¶31. The single greatest development in combating fraud in India has been
expansion of the RSO-I program and the close relationship between A/RSO-Is and
FPMs throughout Mission India. All posts have an A/RSO-I, and since FY-2008, the Iprogram in India has facilitated the arrests of over 380 mala fide applicants and
vendors. All of the RSO-Is and FPMs attended the Mission-wide fraud conferences at
the end of FY-2007 and FY-2009 and the H and L Conference in Chennai in May
2008. All RSO-Is and FPMs are included in a common email group that is used daily,
and the D/RSO-I and Country Coordinator for Fraud Prevention Programs plan their
quarterly trips to each post in consultation with one another.
¶32. As the A/RSO-I/FPU program expands in India to move beyond arrest statistics
and personnel growth, the program has inevitably encountered challenges in another
stage of criminal prosecutions; court trials. Permission to testify in foreign courts
must be sought and obtained according to international treaty standards and
stringent FAM regulations. Seeking such permission has been an infrequent
requirement since most officers are long gone by the time cases reach their court
dates. However, these summons are anticipated to occur much more frequently now,
particularly given the high volume of arrests in FY-2008. In a recent case, ARSO/I
Mumbai obtained such approval after much guidance and consultation with D/RSO-I
and L/DL and was able to testify in January 2009 in a large-scale smuggling case
involving H4 visa fraud. A procedure has since been established to facilitate future
summons delivery, immunity, and testimonial issues.
¶33. ARSO/Is have also sought to address the “transferred officer” syndrome, by
encouraging the use of FSNI’s as complainants in fraud cases brought to local law
enforcement for investigation; a practice in use by other ARSO/I-FPU programs in
Indonesia and Colombia. Based on initiatives by ARSO/Is in India, L/DL recently
made an important decision to allow FSNs to sign and file the initial police reports
with Indian law enforcement. By the time these cases reach the courts, there is a
much greater likelihood that the FSNs on the report will still be available to act as
witnesses than there is for the ARSO/I. This will help ensure that cases generated by
ARSO/I and FPU efforts will complete the full cycle of crime detection, investigation,
and prosecution.
¶34. Finally, as a result of an increasing amount of pressure both from the U.S.
government and from other diplomatic missions, primarily the U.K., Canada,
Australia, Germany, and New Zealand, Indian law enforcement is slowly beginning to
address smuggling and trafficking issues in India. Recently, ARSO/I Mumbai met with
the Joint Commissioner of Police to discuss alien smuggling schemes. The meeting
resulted in the creation of a Special Cell for Human Trafficking and Smuggling within
the Mumbai Crime Branch. The result is that cases referred from the US Consulate
will now be worked by trained investigators as opposed to local constables who do
not have the training or experience to deal with complex document fraud cases.

¶35. Indian Passport fraud is a significant and continuously worrisome fraud
challenge. For all of the security features and improvements in quality control of
current Indian passports, quality and issuance control are lax and penalties are so
inadequate that virtually anyone can obtain a genuinely issued, but fraudulent
passport with near impunity.
¶36. The design of the Indian passport incorporates many good security features
that would normally lead to a more favorable rating of this document’s vulnerability.
The problem lies in production inconsistency and vulnerable source documents.
Quality control is lax at production locations. Thus, genuine passports sometimes are
partially or completely missing security features. Genuine passports issued on the
same day at the same place can look entirely different – a different batch but the
numbers are sequentially close.
¶37. The only documentation required for a passport is proof of birth and proof of
residency. Easily reproduced school records can suffice for the former, while a bank
statement or utility bill can be used to “prove” the latter. Although police are
supposed to verify the information on each application by visiting the applicant’s
neighborhood and interviewing neighbors, such checks are often cursory at best. In
most cases, police officials will only check warrant records and then hand over a
clean record to passport authorities. Notwithstanding these problems, the fact the
application process requires a police check is positive.
¶38. Ironically, another positive is the cumbersome Indian bureaucracy. The
application process for a passport can be extremely time consuming and laborious.
Anyone with an urgent desire for a fraudulent Indian passport may thus pursue an
alternative to acquiring a legitimate passport with fake source documents. Finally,
Indian passports are issued through regional offices. One benefit of this is that
individuals applying outside of their ‘normal’ region would attract additional attention
and scrutiny.
¶39. Fraudulent civil documentation is common in India, both in terms of documents
that have been fabricated outright, and documents issued improperly. Posts see a
myriad of fraudulent documents, including fake civil registry documents, counterfeit
entry/exit stamps and third-country visas, employment letters, sponsorship and
financial documents, bogus degrees and entrance examination scores, and altered
marriage and site photographs. Visa consultants sell such documents to applicants
who seek their advice about how to qualify for visas. Peddlers of fraudulent
documents abound and operate quite openly in major Indian cities and even some of
the smaller towns. Government officials are not above fraudulent issuances either.
Virtually all birth certificates, death certificates, and marriage registration documents
can be purchased from corrupt local government officials or brokers.
—————
¶L. Cooperation with Host Government Authorities
CHENNAI 00000306 010 OF 017
40. All posts have increased efforts to work more closely with Indian authorities in a
number of areas of common interest, such as making Indian documents more
secure, establishing fraud prevention strategies, verification of civil registry
information, and the apprehension of criminals. Airport police and immigration
authorities in Mumbai have been aggressive in detaining individuals who DHS
deported for fraudulent documents. Law enforcement in New Delhi has been actively
involved in arresting visa vendors but has not taken a general interest in arresting
persons denied boarding at the airport for presenting fraudulent documents, in part
due to the absence of a U.S. presence at the airport. 41. In Mumbai, the consulate
looks forward to further cooperation with the newly established Anti Human
Trafficking and Smuggling Cell (AHTSC) of the Mumbai Police Crime Branch. This new
unit has already uncovered a racket where women posed as the wives of Air India
employees using photo-substituted passports. To date, nine arrests have been
reported in connection with this case. 42. In Chennai, law enforcement officials
investigate cases involving Chennai applicants but are hesitant to do so with
applicants from other states. The opening of Consulate General Hyderabad has
greatly improved interaction with local government officials. The Chairman of the
State Board of Education in Andhra Pradesh has been instrumental in developing and
maintaining the integrity of OLIVE, the Online Verification system for high priority
educational degrees in the state. A similar program, MARTINI, has been set up in the
state of Karnataka.
—————
¶M. Areas of Particular Concern

¶43. Mission India appreciates the considerable support it has received from the
Department in combating visa fraud. All Mission FPUs are now better equipped, and
most will soon have appropriate offices from which to operate. The Chennai and
Kolkata FPUs have completed their physical expansion, while phase one of the New
Delhi
reconstruction project was completed in March. All of consular section Mumbai
eagerly awaits the completion of a new consulate compound, currently scheduled for
FY2010. Consulate General Hyderabad officially began visa processing in March.
¶44. The possibility of submitting large validation studies for entry/exit checks with
the USVISIT program has significantly enhanced Mission India validation studies.
During the reporting period, Mission India conducted validation studies for referrals
(ref T), non-English applicants (refs U and V), and C1/D applicants (refs W and X).
—————
¶N. STAFFING AND TRAINING
—————
¶45. Mission India lists below for each post the names, position titles and consularspecific training each FPU member has received. Each post has a full-time FPM,
except for Kolkata where the FPM is a part-time portfolio, and an A/RSO-I. The FPM
in Chennai is also the Country Coordinator. The FPM position in Mumbai has been
ceded to Entry Level until at least 2011. Each post has its own in-house

CHENNAI 00000306 011 OF 017

training for new FPU staff. All officers have taken basic consular training.

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Shah Peerally is an attorney licensed in California practicing immigration law and debt settlement. He has featured as an expert legal analyst for many TV networks such as NDTV, Times Now and Sitarree TV. Articles about Shah Peerally and his work have appeared on newspapers such as San Jose Mercury News, Oakland Tribune, US Fiji Times, Mauritius Le Quotidien, Movers & Shakers and other prominent international newspapers. His work has been commended by Congress women Nancy Pelosi and Barbara Lee. He has a weekly radio show on KLOK 1170AM and frequently participates in legal clinics in churches, temples and mosques. His law group, Shah Peerally Law Group, has represented clients all over the United States constantly dealing with the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS), Immigration and Custom Enforcement(ICE) and CBP (Customs Border Patrol (CBP) under the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). This department was formerly known as the Immigration and Nationality Services (INS).

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Immigration Legal Blog (ILB) is a blog dedicated to US immigration law, US immigration news, and immigration updates. ILB was created by attorney Shah Peerally. Shah Peerally is an attorney licensed in California practicing immigration law and debt settlement. He has featured as an expert legal analyst for many TV networks such as NDTV, Times Now and Sitarree TV. Articles about Shah Peerally and his work have appeared on newspapers such as San Jose Mercury News, Oakland Tribune, US Fiji Times, Mauritius Le Quotidien, Movers & Shakers and other prominent international newspapers. His work has been commended by Congress women Nancy Pelosi and Barbara Lee. He has a weekly radio show on KLOK 1170AM and frequently participates in legal clinics in churches, temples and mosques. His law group, Shah Peerally Law Group, has represented clients all over the United States constantly dealing with the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS), Immigration and Custom Enforcement(ICE) and CBP (Customs Border Patrol (CBP) under the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). This department was formerly known as the Immigration and Nationality Services (INS).