Middle East

New layer of workers, youth and poor has entered the scene with the
promise: “This is just the beginning – the struggle continues”

“Warlike violence” - that’s how ‘Taksim Solidarity’ the committee
coordinating 127 groups in protest against Turkey’s prime minister
Erdogan described the actions of the police who stormed and cleared Gezi
Park near Taksim Square in Istanbul on Saturday, 15 June.

“There was a concert by a well-known musician with hundreds of people
and families in a festival atmosphere in the square and then suddenly
from all sides the police came with water cannons and tear gas,” Martin
Powell-Davis, member of the teachers’ union (NUT) executive and Socialist
Party (CWI England & Wales), reports from a trade union delegation
to Gezi Park (see Martin’s
reports). Thousands had been gathering peacefully in the heart and
centre of the city, after more than two weeks of protests.

The police, who had been bussed in from all over the country, violently
ended the peaceful occupation that had started on 31 May. They used
rubber bullets, stun grenades and intense tear gas; even carrying out
attacks on the hotels around Taksim Square which were used as emergency
hospitals and places of refuge. Erdogan later praised himself for having
given the order to attack.

The movement started as a protest against construction plans to fell
trees to make space for a shopping mall on the site of the park next to
a reconconstruction of an Ottoman-style military barracks. The attempt
to violently suppress this protest sparked an uprising of millions all
over Turkey, with daily demonstrations, occupations of squares and local
protests. On the 4th and 5th June, KESK, the public sector trade union
federation, called a public sector strike in protest against the actions
of the police. Strike action was also called on 16th June against the
renewed police brutality, this time not only supported by DISK, the left
wing trade union federation (representing more than 300,000 members, one
of the four main federation), but also by a number of professional
groups representing doctors, engineers and dentists.

For more than two weeks, riot police tried to silence the protests. On
15 June the Turkish doctors’ association reported that 5 people had been
killed, 7,478 injured, four critically; ten people had lost an eye
through as a result of being shot by police using tear gas canisters.

The movement is now in decline.

However, despite the huge repression and arrests, even clamping down on
people using their blogs, tweets and facebook accounts, there is still
resistance. People are entering the squares in silent protest. This
shows the strong determination of the activists and the disgust at the
state violence.

New brutalities might re-inflame the protests. More likely is that a new
period will now open up and conclusions will be drawn about the movement.
Sosyalist Alternatif (CWI Turkey) calls on the parties and
organisations on the left and the left trade unions to organise debates
and discussions on the strengths and weaknesses of the protest movement.
This could be through a country-wide congress in Istanbul to bring all
the activists together, with the aim of building a strong socialist
movement which could offer an alternative to the authoritarian Erdogan
regime based on the interests of the workers and the poor.

A new generation entering the scene

3 weeks of protests showed the changes in Turkey over the last decade.
The economic boom after the collapse of Turkey’s economy in 2001 has
allowed Erdogan to strengthen his support and remain in power for more
than a decade. But it has also created a new generation of workers and
youth, who are not satisfied with precarious jobs, low wages and
unemployment.

A new layer of middle class and working-class people understand their
role in society and do not accept the paternalism of this state, that
seeks to dictate in questions of drinking alcohol or which clothes to
wear.

Erdogan’s insistence that people should have three children was met with
utter cynicism: “Do you want to have more children like us?” young
demonstrators asked.

Working-class and middle-class women have developed a new
self-confidence. They don’t accept Erdogan’s attacks on abortion rights,
interference in family policies and instructions on how to dress.

While the main squares were occupied by lower middle-class people and
the youth of the working class, bitter battles between police and
working-class people unfolded day by day with little media attention in
the poorer areas of Istanbul, Ankara and many other cities.

Erdogan attempted to blame foreign powers and their media (“big game” by
“outside forces”) as well as the opposition parties, mainly the CHP
(Republican People’s Party) for the protests. He is looking for
scapegoats and his comments show that he does not understand the
fundamental change that has taken place in Turkish society.

Over decades, Turkish politics appeared as a product of two wings of the
ruling classes fighting each other. On the one side were the Kemalists,
the wing of the ruling class using secular ideology and deeply rooted at
that time in the state bureaucracy, judicary and military. They were
responsible for the brutal military coup in 1980, that crushed the left.
On the other side were the so-called moderate Islamic forces around
Erdogan’s AKP who for more than ten years have pushed back the
Kemalists. They have succeeded in purging the once mighty military
leadership of its former Kemalist domination and established their own
networks. But this movement is not just the re-appearance of the
Kemalists who rallied in 2007, expressing the fear of Islamisation when
AKP’s Abdullah Gül took office as the new president with his wife
wearing a scarf.

A big section of the demonstrations used the symbols of the Kemalists –
Turkish flags, Kemal Atatürk pictures – to show their anger. However, it
was no accident that none of the Kemalist parties dared to lead the
protests. The CHP leader, Kilicdaroglu together with the president Gül,
called for restraint on all sides. The fascist MHP, also Kemalist,
denounced the movement, claiming it to be dominated by the radical left.
Some groups, like the right-wing youth organisation TGB, tried to
intervene but with very limited success.

For the very first time many people found themselves holding up the
Turkish flag or Kemal Atatürk banners and to their surprise alongside
them they saw Kurdish flags and symbols – they were fighting together.

The strong feeling of unity was often expressed by the fact that the
fans of Istanbul’s three football clubs, Besiktas, Galatasaray and
Fenerbahce, buried their tribal allegiances and linked arms in “Istanbul
United”.

A survey conducted by Bilgi university found that 40% of the protesters
were between 19 and 25 years old, and almost two thirds were aged 30 or
under. More than half had been on their first demonstration and 70% said
that they were not close to any political party.

This new generation of young people have had their first taste of the
Turkish state and its brutality. The movement brought completely
different layers together, united by the feeling that “enough is
enough”. Environmentalists started the battle. Then came public-sector
workers, under threat of privatisation, job cuts and wage cuts; Turkish
Airline workers demanding strike action and trade unionists demanding
their democratic rights. Young people alienated by the paternalism of
the government crowded the squares. Women took to the streets against
the effects of the creeping attacks on their rights. Kurdish people
demanded change, as despite the unofficial peace talks taking place
between the government and the PKK(Kurdish Workers’ Party) - Kurdish
guerillas, 8,000 journalists, politicians and activists remain in prison.

All of them came together under the slogan “Tayyip istifa” - “Erdogan
resign”, which dominated the streets at the beginning of the
country-wide wave of protests.

They may use symbols of the past but their aspirations extended far
beyond the limited offers of the rotten politicians of the CHP. The
determination of the protestors was striking.

The dynamic of the movement

On Friday, 31 May, the police brutality turned the environmental protest
into an uprising. Spontaneous demonstrations took place all over the
country. Every evening people banged their pots and pans in the
working-class areas and suburbs. During the first weekend 67 cities
witnessed demonstrations. On Saturday, 1 June, the police were withdrawn
from Taksim Square. A feeling of euphoria, spread within the movement;
people were saying that the movement had won. A festival atmosphere
prevailed in the big, occupied squares, not only in Istanbul but
elsewhere.

While the speed with which the protests spread all over the country and
the willingness to take to the streets every day despite the police
violence and tear gas was inspiring, the protests were hardly
coordinated.

Action committees were set up but they mainly focussed on practical
questions of how to organise first aid, doctors, food, tents and the
many questions arising. They were set up by left groups and
organisations, but did not offer a way to include the majority of people
in the squares and in the demonstrations in the debates and decision
making.

Unfortunately, there were no assemblies which were so visible in the
Spanish protests or in Greece. For example in Syntagma Square in Athens
in front of the Parliament building in June 2011, on a daily basis,
discussions were held, everybody was able to express their opinion which
allowed a real debate to develop and enabled the movement to draw
conclusions in relation to the demands and strategy required.

Sosyalist Alternatif (CWI in Turkey) argued for such assemblies in the
squares, in the workplaces and neighbourhoods, towns and villages, to
form committees of elected representatives, subject to recall at all
levels. A democratically controlled and elected leadership was necessary.

Without such structures the movement, which had rapidly spread to 88
provinces and all major cities, then stagnated and was not able to
develop a strategy of how to achieve its demands. Erdogan’s strategy of
attrition had some effect, wearing down the movement with daily clashes
with the police.

General strike

The two day strike of the public sector union federation, KESK, on 4 and
5 June, was an important step to bring the struggle to a higher level.
The organised working class is potentially the strongest power in
society. KESK called on other unions to use this power and join in. Only
DISK, the most left wing trade union federation did so, but they also
limited their call for a symbolic participation in KESK’s struggle to a
few hours on the 5th.

The trade unions then made little attempt to organise, co-ordinate and
develop the struggle further. KESK only called for a new strike for 17
June, when the movement had already suffered severe setbacks.

KESK and DISK alone were not in a position to announce a general strike.
However, they could have offered more direction and co-ordination to the
movement. They could have embarked on a series of strikes of their
associated unions to put pressure on other trade unions to join in and
offer a viable strategy to force Erdogan into retreat. Unfortunately,
this was not done.

Erdogan resign!

On the sixth day of mass battles with the police, Wednesday, 5 June,
“Taksim Solidarity” announced five key demands. This coalition of 127
groups based on Taksim Square became the de facto leadership of the
movement. Eyup Muhcu, president of Turkey’s chamber of architects was
the spokesperson of this umbrella group which officially had no leaders;
again and again he limited the demands to stopping construction in Gezi
Park, punishing those responsible for violence against demonstrators,
banning the use of tear gas, and releasing those detained during the
protests.

These are important demands – but this was not what had unified the
movement in the days before. “Tayyip istifa” - “Erdogan resign” was the
main slogan, directed against the policies and ideology of the AKP
government.

Presenting the five demands as the lowest common denominator, the
leadership argued that this could unify the movement. However the
leadership of the protests failed to raise the perspective of
mobilisations to oust the AKP government. ‘Gezi Park and the defence of
the movement against the police is important – but is this enough to be
beaten up for day by day?’, workers and youth asked themselves.

Reducing the aims of the movement to the five demands, “Taksim
Solidarity” went into retreat politically at a time when the momentum
was with the movement, the KESK strike was still running and a desperate
search for a strategy to achieve the aims of the demonstrators had
started. This was a turning point.

It allowed Erdogan – for example in the negotiations with “Taksim
Solidarity” on 13 June – to reduce everything to environmental questions
linked to Gezi Park or some police having gone too far. Thus he was able
to downplay other social issues. He used it to divide the movement into
the good environmentalists and the “terrorists” who raised further
demands.

Lowering the demands also did not appease the government. The retreat of
the protest movement only encouraged the ruling elite to fully crack
down. Reuters quoted (15 June) Koray Caliskan, a political scientist at
Bosphorus University in Gezi Park, after Taksim Square had already been
cleared: "This is unbelievable. They had already taken out political
banners and were reducing to a symbolic presence in the park”. This was
exactly the time for Erdogan to go for the attack and clear Gezi Park –
with full force.

Erdogan’s support

Was it necessary to drop the demands to bring down Erdogan, as he still
had and has huge support and as he stated 50% had voted for him?

In a trial of strength, Erdogan mobilised tens of thousands to support
him on a demonstration in Ankara on Saturday, 15 June. On 16 June,
protesters were blocked on motorways from entering Istanbul, police
cordoned off Taksim Square and tens of thousands once again fought
brutal battles with the police. At the same time buses laid on by the
Istanbul municipality and the AKP carried people to a pro-Erdogan rally.
More than 200,000 of his supporters came and listened to his speech for
hours.

In the absence of a strong working-class force, the AKP was able to
build its support in the last decade in opposition to the old parties
and in opposition to the military and the constant threats of new coups.
People were fed up with the repression of the old Kemalist elite – and
had turned at that time to Erdogan as he himself was seen as a victim of
those circles.

Erdogan has support and as a result of a ten year boom can draw on
social reserves, although economic growth slowed down significantly last
year. However, his election successes rely heavily on the enforced
conformity of the media, repression and the absence of any credible
opposition.

CNN Turk vs. CNN

When the protest started, Turkish TV stations showed cooking shows,
historical documentaries or – in the well-known case of CNN Turk –
penguins. Four stations who dared to report on the movement are now
threatened with fines. The authorities tried to close Hayat TV, a left
wing channel.

Turkey has more journalists in jail than China and Iran together. Trade
unions’ and workers’ rights are violated.

Turkey’s 10% election threshold, which was originally intended to keep
pro-Kurdish parties, Islamist parties and splits from the old,
right-wing Kemalist parties out of parliament, is now used against new
forces. The old opposition is seen as rotten and linked to the old
political system that crashed when the economy did in 2001.

Given the authoritarian crackdown on the protest movement, there is
every reason to call for an end to this government and deny its
legitimacy.

Alternative to Erdogan?

This poses the question of an alternative to Erdogan. As the
demonstrators did not want to see a future CHP led government, what
could be the result of the demand for Erdogan to resign?

On the one side, local, regional and national committees formed out of
the movement could have laid the basis for a further development of the
struggle. Such bodies could also form the basis for a government based
on the interests of workers, youth and the poor.

On the other side a there needs to be a political force in these
committees that can propose such a strategy, explain it and fight for
it. A rebuilding of the workers’ movement linked to a broad socialist
movement is therefore necessary. This is linked to the task to form a
mass workers’ party with a socialist programme.

HDK/HDP (Peoples’ Democratic Congress/Peoples’ Democratic Party) is a
promising step in this direction. It developed out of an election
alliance of left forces around the BDP, the main left-wing pro-Kurdish
party. HDK, Halk Evleri (a left wing movement around community centres,
coming from a Stalinist tradition) and other left organisations need to
come together with the left trade unions and trade unionists, including
new activists and workers and develop such a party.

Challenging Erdogan

The task for the workers’ movement and the left is also to offer those
people who still support Erdogan a clear alternative.

The government imposed neo-liberal policies even when the economy was
still growing. While in some ways increasing the living standard of
people, Erdogan’s policies also increased inequality. His government
adopted a policy of privatisations, attacks on workers rights and sent
in police against striking workers. The section of the capitalist class
close to the AKP was allowed to enrich themselves.

He tries to mobilise support by presenting himself as a defender of
Islamic values, against alcohol, against kissing in public and in favour
of building a mosque on Taksim Square. These are attempts to divert
attention, defending himself by relying on more conservative and
religious layers in society. However, they are also affected by
Erdogan’s economic attacks.

The movement must reject any attempt at interference by the state in
people’s personal lives. At the same time it has to stop the attempts of
Erdogan to divide and rule. This is not a battle of non-religious people
against religious people. Demands like an increase of the minimum wage,
decent houses for all, democratic and workers’ rights can help to
undermine Erdogan’s support.

Perspectives – the economic outlook

The economic boom of the last years is the basis for Erdogan’s support
and social reserves, yet it also gave rise to higher expectations and a
certain self-confidence amongst workers and youth. However, Turkey’s
economy is fragile and heavily dependent on foreign capital. “It is not
just the size of the [current account] deficit that is vexing, but its
nature. Only a fifth is covered by sticky [lasting] foreign direct
investment, while the rest is plugged by portfolio flows, or ‘hot
money’”, according to the Financial Times (6 June), the same article
then summarises the IMF’s argument: that “Turkey’s external financing
needs are about 25% of its annual economic output, and warns this will
‘continue to pose a significant vulnerability’.”

The current account deficit grew by one fifth in the first four months
of this year. The slowdown in growth rates (from +8.8% in 2011 to +2.2
in 2012) is significant, given the crisis in Europe, which is still
Turkey’s main market. Compared to the situation with neighbouring
countries in Europe like Greece and Cyprus or in the Middle East, there
is still a feeling of economic progress. However, growth rates will only
return to 3.4% in 2013 according to IMF forecasts, falling short of the
4% target of the government. These predictions were made before the
clampdown on the protests and their effect on domestic consumption and
tourism were taken into account.

In his speeches against the movement in the squares Erdogan also hit out
against speculators with a certain religious undertone (levying interest
is not allowed according to Islam). “The interest [rate] lobby exploited
my nation for years, but no longer,” he proclaimed. “I am telling this
to whomever – one bank, two banks, three banks . . . you have started
this fight, you will pay for it . . . Those who try to bring the stock
exchange down . . . we will throttle you.” (quotes from FT, 10 June.)

The growth rates of last year and the expectation for this year are not
enough to absorb a growing population into the labour market. They are
not enough to meet the needs of the working masses. This is already
pointing towards future battles.

Given the fragile economic background and on the basis of possible sharp
contractions due to shock waves flowing from Europe and a reduction of
foreign investment future battles over pieces of a shrinking cake are
certain.

The economic outlook does not herald social stability in the coming
month and years – the opposite is far more likely.

International framework

The Arab Spring, the movements in Europe and Occupy in the US – all had
an effect on the youth in Turkey. Despite all the significant
differences of the social support Erdogan can still mobilise, the mass
movements for democratic and social rights will learn from each other.
The Turkish movement will be an inspiration for the Middle East and
beyond.

A right-wing regime, which was presented as a model for the rest of the
Sunni countries, was challenged by the people. The much-praised model of
a modern, Islamic state was exposed as a cover for a society in turmoil.

Turkey is a Nato ally with its own ambitions to act as a regional power.
The warmongering of the Turkish regime towards Syria increased the
tensions there, with a whole wave of refugees now in Turkey. People in
the protest movement repeatedly expressed their fears of being dragged
into the Syrian civil war, which has turned from a people’s uprising
into a nightmare of bloody ethnic and religious battles.

The AKP regime tried to exploit the fragmentation in Iraq: oil deals are
conducted with the Kurdish north, trying to establish a zone of Turkish
influence throughout the Kurdish areas. The outlook remains uncertain.
Unless the working class intervenes with its own programme against
sectarianism and nationalism, new ethnic and religious clashes are
inevitable in Iraq over regions like Kirkuk. This will find
repercussions in Turkey itself.

While Erdogan tries to use the Kurdish question to gain influence in the
region and bases himself on an alliance with Kurdish leaders to change
the constitution (to allow him to become president with increased
powers), he keeps thousands of Kurdish people imprisoned for demanding
Kurdish rights. But the Kurdish aspirations to end oppression will clash
with Erdogan’s aims to turn them into a part of a new Ottoman-style
empire, run from Ankara.

Further tensions in the region, flowing from Israel’s involvement in the
Syrian civil war and the spreading of this war into Lebanon or Turkey
itself, alongside conflicts between Israel and Iran with possible US
involvement, can all further undermine stability in Turkey and Erdogan’s
regime and trigger new movements as well as religious or ethnic
conflicts.

However, the primary effect of the Turkish uprising in the region is to
encourage workers, youth and the poor again to turn back to the origins
of the Arab Spring: the active involvement of the masses themselves to
struggle for democratic and social demands.

All sections of society moving into action

The protest movement did not only push the lower middle-class layers and
the children of the working class into action – which were the most
visible parts of the movement, especially in foreign media.
Working-class people in all the urban centres fought hard against the
police. The new layers of the working class and the youth just started
to get a sense of their strength and the urban middle classes, like
architects, doctors and others were also present in the protest movement.

At the same time Erdogan tried to mobilise the more rural population – a
step that may backfire on him in the future. The polarisation in society
itself is so strong, that it will encourage a process of further
politicisation of a new generation, including in the countryside.

But even at the top of society, splits and moves are becoming visible.
Just when Erdogan thought he achieved his aims in removing the old
Kemalists from the strategic positions in the state bureaucracy, new
splits within his own ranks were opening up.

Erdogan’s plans not only to run for president next year (as he is not
allowed to stand as a prime minister a third time), but also to alter
the constitution towards a presidential system that allows him to hang
on to his powers. But the incumbent president Gül, of the AKP,
significantly proposed a more emollient strategy to deal with the
movement. He might not just step aside, as Erdogan has planned.

Over years of his ascendancy the Gülen movement, a moderate Islamic
trend based around the millionaire Gülen living in the US, supported
Erdogan. For example his religious schools benefited from the
privatisation of education, a policy introduced by Erdogan. However, the
splits between Erdogan and Gülen which developed over the last year
became much more visible during the protests and leading Gülen
politicians criticised Erdogan’s authoritarian style of government.

On the one side, the AKP government felt confident enough to use the
military, having purged the Kemalists from the tops of the army. Police
were accompanied by military gendarmes. The deputy prime minister even
threatened to use the military to crush the movement on 17 June. On the
other side, on the first weekend of clashes, soldiers handed out
surgical masks to help protesters to deal with the tear gas. Police
expressed their hesitation, displeasure and indignation in acting
against the movement according to foreign media.

These are the first signs of the revolutionary process behind this
movement: all classes and forces in society are beginning to actively
engage in the fate of the country. Even if there is a pause prior to the
next stage in the struggle, the process that has begun is profound.

Despite the temporary defeat, workers will feel encouraged to raise
their demands and to move into struggle. The all mighty Erdogan might
have succeeded in the end – but the black eye he got from the movement
shows that he’s not invincible.

A big debate has begun on how society should be run. Huge polarisation
is pushing people into political debate. The old parties of the
Kemalists are unable to express the anger and aspirations of a new
generation – and these new layers know it. As long as no mass
alternative is built, middle layers and workers may still vote for them.
However, there will be attempts now to form new parties of struggle. HDK
could offer a way forward if it manages to penetrate deep into the
Turkish working class. Left-wing forces are needed to assist workers and
youth to find the best possible way to build the workers’ movement.
Marxist ideas are needed in this process to build towards a mass party,
rooted in the working class, to show a way out of the nightmare of
capitalism and repression.

A new layer of young people have entered the scene. They are there to
stay and change Turkey. As one of the slogans most often shouted in the
streets of Istanbul and Ankara has it: “This was just the beginning –
the struggle continues”.

Sosyalist Alternatif (CWI Turkey) demands:

Full democratic rights

Immediate release of all those imprisoned during the protests

An independent commission to investigate the police violence composed
of elected representatives of trade unions and the movement

Freedom for all political prisoners

Full democratic rights including the right to demonstrate, to gather,
to form parties and trade unions

Full workers’ mobilisation against any intervention of the military;
full democratic rights including the right to form trade unions for
all soldiers and police.

Abolish all anti-terror laws and special courts as well as all
repressive and reactionary laws, implemented by the AKP government
over the last years

No censorship, free media – end repression against journalists,
bloggers, tweeting people and TV stations, no closure of Hayat TV

Freedom and equal rights to practice or not practice any religion, end
paternalism of the state, end all attempts to divide and rule. For the
democratic rights for all to live their lives as they decide.

End the oppression of Kurds, equal rights for all including the
recognition of minorities and minority rights. Right of
self-determination up to and including the right to form an
independent state.

Foreign troops out of Syria, no military intervention of Turkey or
imperialist powers in the region.

For a constituent assembly of representatives, democratically elected
in workplaces, neighbourhoods, cities and villages to guarantee full
democratic rights and social security for the mass of the population

Jobs, decent wages, social security

End the enrichment of a few, end the plans to re-develop Taksim
Square, end all profit-driven projects

End privatisations, re-nationalisation of privatised property

End the attacks on workers in the public sector

Significant increase of the minimum wage

Decent houses and living for all

Nationalise the banks and companies dominating the economy under
workers’ control and management

For a democratically decided, socialist plan to organise and develop
the economy in the interest of the working and poor people without
harming the environment.

For a government of and in the interests of workers, youth and the
poor.

International fightback against exploitation, oppression and
capitalism. For a socialist democracy, for a socialist con-federation
of states of the Middle East and Europe on a voluntary and equal basis.