Sunday, November 30, 2008

The University of Baghdad and the Iraqi Al-Amal Association recently released a public opinion poll they conducted on poverty in Iraq. Khalid Kahntoush Sachet of the College of Arts oversaw the study. It surveyed 11,198 families from ten provinces. The survey found that there were a large number of female-headed households due to wives losing their husbands because of violence. Iraqi families also had large numbers of children. Together these increased the poverty level in the country, as women can’t provide as much as men, and the size of Iraqi families have increased while the economy has not. Almost two-thirds of the families interviewed were found to be below the international poverty line, and few receive any help. They still believed in the government however, and most wanted to participate in the upcoming elections.

Families

The first questions were about the state of the families. 59.4% were headed by males, while 39.9% were headed by women. Most Middle Eastern families have male heads of households, so this was a very high percentage led by women. The cause is the violence that has wracked the country. Of those women leaders, 65.6% were widowed. The number of people in each family was also large, usually between 6-10, 49.3%, followed by 1-5, 43%. This increased poverty, as the economy has not as grown as fast as the size of families, leading to unemployment. 65.9% of families earned 250,000 dinars or less. That equaled roughly $420 a year for each family member, below the $500 international poverty level. 60.5% of those interviewed were displaced. Of those, 87.1% said they wanted to return to their homes if security improved.

Aid and Needs

The majority of families were in need of basic services, but received little aid official or otherwise. In terms of the government, only 31.5% of those surveyed received aid from any ministries or local governments. The Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs, which is responsible for the poor, only helped 12.9%. The Ministry of Displacement and Migration only helped 9.3%. Local councils assisted 6.5%. 68.5% received no government assistance at all. Non-government organizations (NGOs) did much better, aiding 50.8%. That still left a large percentage of the population sample without any help. Despite this, 74.3% believed that the government could assist them in some way.

The basic needs of the families broke down into three groups, which the study called security – electricity 22.3%, water 20.3%, and housing/shelter 10.1%, employment – food 9.3%, jobs 9.3%, money 9.2%, and services – fuel 8.9%, health care 7.8%, and schools 2.4%.

Provincial Elections

58.1% of respondents said they wanted to vote in the upcoming elections, with 23% were undecided, and 18.9% said they would not participate. When asked what kind of party they would vote for independents came in first, 26.3%, followed by democratic-secular groups 23.7%, and religious parties 22.7%. Tribal figures 7.3% and national blocs 6.3% came in last. When broken down by province, the democratic-secular parties fared the best, coming in first in Baghdad, Diyala, and Sulaymaniya, and second in Salahaddin, Anbar, Najaf, and Qadisiyah. Independents came in first in Basra, and second in Baghdad, Tamim, and Diyala, while the religious parties came in first in Qadisiyah, Salahaddin, and Najaf, and second in Babil. Basra had the most telling responses. The Shiite Fadhila party currently runs the province, but 70.2% said they would vote for independent figures instead. When unidentified was added to that the number came to 90.3% who did not support the current ruling parties. Tribal figures were also only popular in Anbar due to the Awakening. As discussed before, Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki is currently forming Tribal Support Councils across much of the country. According to this poll, that may not help him much as they registered less than 10% or less in every province outside of Anbar.

Saturday, November 29, 2008

On November 27 Iraq’s parliament agreed to two deals with the United States. The first was a Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) that allows the U.S. military to operate in Iraq until the end of 2011 when they are suppose to withdraw. The second was a Strategic Framework Agreement (SFA) that set diplomatic relations between the two countries. Both deals can be renegotiated by Baghdad if it pleases. The Sunni parties also had the Iraqi legislature pass a bill that creates a referendum on the SOFA by the end of July 2009. The task ahead for the government of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki is to build up public support for the agreement so that it passes the vote.

The general public was even less informed. An October 2008 public opinion poll by the Iraq Centre For Research & Strategic Studies that did face to face interviews with 3,000 Iraqis from all 18 provinces found that 49.8% of respondents didn’t know about the SOFA. Of the 46.2% that had heard of the agreement, opinions were evenly split over whether it would be good or bad for the country. In the end though, 61.3% disagreed with the deal, compared to only 28.5% being for it. The poll was conducted in September and October however, before the government had been able to get a series of concessions from the United States that greatly increased its power over American forces within Iraq. The government run Al-Sabah paper published another poll on November 23 that found 46% of Iraqis for the SOFA, 34.5% against, and 19.4% replying that they didn’t know. Their poll asked 5,576 Iraqis from 10 provinces. Of those, the majority of respondents in Babil, Qadisiyah, and Diyala were against the agreement, while Baghdad, Dhi Qar, Basra, Karbala, Wasit, Maysan, and Irbil were for it.

In the run up to the parliamentary vote, the government tried to inform the public about the agreement to garner support, which will continue to be its job. Officials released copies of the SOFA to reporters and began reading parts of it on government owned TV. Whether this public relations campaign was responsible for the shift in opinion between the two polls is unknown. The Iraq Centre is a non-partisan Iraqi based think tank, while Al-Sabah operates out of the Green Zone, so the latter could’ve been propaganda. Either way, there is still not a majority in favor of the agreement according to the two, which is necessary to get pass the July referendum. Maliki’s government will then have its hands full trying to win over more people, while the United States needs to make sure it doesn’t have any breaches of the agreement that will turn Iraqis against the SOFA.

Friday, November 28, 2008

The northern city of Mosul in Ninewa province remains one of Iraq’s most troubled. It is divided between Arabs and Kurds with a large minority population, and still has a strong insurgent presence as a result. It is caught in the middle between the Kurds that want to expand southwards and Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki who wants to contain them to Kurdistan. The lack of reconciliation has caused violence to continue there, and blocked any meaningful reconstruction effort.

There has also been little reconstruction in Mosul, which adds to the lack of reconciliation. Baghdad is trying to launch a new development program in the city, but it is has been politicized to try to win over the Arabs. Another factor is that the central government has come through with very little of its promised money after its security crackdowns this year across the country, so there is no guarantee that Mosul will actually see any real rebuilding, especially with on-going violence there.

As reported before, Mosul will remain a violent city until the underlying ethnic tensions between Kurds and Arabs is resolved. The Kurds have no intention of withdrawing from the city as long as they have plans for northern Ninewa province. The Prime Minister’s recent attempts to push them out, has only increased tensions between the two sides, and could cost Maliki his job in the end if the Kurds feel like they are being pushed too far. Overall, the city shows the on-going divisions and violence that remain a daily occurrence in parts of Iraq.

There are several more steps that Baghdad has to follow now on the SOFA. The agreement is to be sent to the Presidential Council, which is made up of President Jalal Talabani of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, Vice President Adel Abdul-Mahdi of the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council, and Vice President Tariq al-Hashemi of the Iraqi Islamic Party, for final ratification. The Council is expected to pass it. The SOFA will then go into affect on January 1, 2009. The parliament also passed a bill calling for a referendum on the agreement to be held in July 2009. If the Iraqi public votes against it, Iraq will have one year to withdraw from the agreement, and U.S. troops will have to leave. That will be the real test of the SOFA.

Winners And Losers

There are some clear winners and losers of this entire process. Although the Sunnis got their bill passed, they will probably come out on the bottom again as the Kurds and Shiites still monopolize most of the power in the government. The Sadrists also remain on the outside. They have promised to continue their protests against the agreement, but that will have little actual affect, as the Sadr Trend appears to be a fading movement at this time. Fadhila was the other party that was in the opposition, but remains a small regional Shiite party. The U.S. also turned out to be a major loser. President Bush once rejected any timeline for a U.S. withdrawal from Iraq. Now he has agreed to one. The White House was always in a position of weakness in the negotiations because Bush wanted an agreement before he left office, so he gave in on almost every demand that Iraq made.

On the other hand, the biggest winner was Prime Minister Maliki. He has established himself as the nationalist leader of Iraq. He can now claim that he got the U.S. to agree to pull out of the country. He will use this to his advantage in the January 2009 provincial elections and the parliamentary ones that are to follow. As reported earlier, Maliki is already the most popular politician in the country. He now appears to be on a role after cracking down on his opponents within the country, and taking on his allies, he has now won a victory against the Americans. He still has to worry about his coalition members the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council and the Kurds who were making moves to remove him before the SOFA vote. This may accelerate now that Maliki has improved his position again, but might run into opposition from Grand Ayatollah Sistani and the United States who stand behind him. Either way, they are dealing with a strengthened Prime Minister who was almost pushed out of office in late 2007.

Wednesday, November 26, 2008

Today November 26, Iraq’s parliament showed up to work expecting to vote on the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) in the morning, which would set military relations between the U.S. and Iraq for the next several years. Instead they were told that they would vote on the agreement tomorrow November 27, along with a separate bill put forward by the Sunni Iraqi Accordance Front. The recent negotiations over the deal point to several important facts. First, the Sadrists recently received a lot of press for demonstrating against the SOFA, but they really had no say on whether it would pass or not. It was the Sunni parties that were the real swing votes. Second, the Sunni demands may derail the entire process. Third, the fact that the Americans gave in to so many concessions showed that the White House was always working from a position of weakness vis-a-vis the Iraqis. Fourth, the Iranians may have finally agreed to the deal, and last, many of the compromises Baghdad recently was able to gain may be largely symbolic and upset many later on.

While Sadr was trying to rally his followers against the SOFA, the real deciders on the matter were the Sunni parties. In the summer of 2008 Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani said that he would sign off on the agreement if it protected Iraq’s sovereignty, was passed by parliament, and all major parties agreed upon it. By November the Kurdish Alliance and the United Iraqi Alliance, the two largest coalitions in parliament, had come out for the SOFA. Together they had enough votes for a straight majority, 138 votes, to pass the agreement. However, because of Sistani’s insistence on national consensus on the SOFA, the Shiites and Kurds had to bring the Sunnis on board. That put the Iraqi Accordance Front in the driver's seat. They demanded that they receive more say in the government and the security forces, that prisoners held by the U.S. that are not charged with a crime be released, and a national referendum is held on the SOFA. As the vote on the agreement came down to the wire, they were able to get these concessions.

Whose Demand For A National Referendum May Undermine the SOFA …

Tomorrow when parliament reconvenes they will vote on the SOFA, and a separate bill that includes the Sunnis’ demands. If the bill is passed there will be a special election on the SOFA in July 2009. The problem is that U.S. forces are operating in Iraq under a United Nations mandate that expires on December 31, 2008. If the referendum bill is passed, that means the agreement won’t come to a conclusion until the summer of 2009, and even then the Iraqi public may veto it. That would mean the Americans would have to go back to the U.N. for another yearlong authorization, undermining the whole point of the SOFA, which is to take the place of the U.N. deal.

The last major problem with the SOFA is how the Americans and Iraqis interpret the SOFA when and if it is passed. Many of the concessions that Baghdad was able to gain may be more symbolic than real. McClatchy Newspapers for example, pointed out three articles in the agreement that the U.S. sees differently than Baghdad. First, the Americans have agreed to allow U.S. soldiers that commit crimes when they are off duty and off base to be tried by joint U.S. and Iraqi courts. This is a largely meaningless article meant to appease Iraqis because U.S. forces rarely go off base when they are off duty, not to mention that Baghdad and Washington have to negotiate over how these joint courts would work, which could take years. By that time, the U.S. may be out of the country. Second, the agreement says that the U.S. cannot use Iraq as a base to attack other countries. The Americans believe this does not prohibit hot pursuit and the right of self-defense, which could make the point mean nothing. Finally, the U.S. military believes that the Iraqi security forces are full of insurgents, Sadrists, and people who simply want to make a buck, and therefore do not trust them with advance warning and detailed information on military operations. This is becoming less of an issue as the U.S. is moving from conducting their own operations to supporting Iraqi ones. Still, the Pentagon does not want to give Baghdad control over their planning. These last two could make many Iraqis and Iran mad if they are implemented in the way the U.S. sees them. The White House in fact, is withholding its version of the agreement until it is passed by Iraq’s parliament because they are afraid it will undermine support for the SOFA.

Conclusion

Tomorrow will be another important date in the process of passing the SOFA, but it will not be the last. The agreement still needs to go to the Presidential Council for approval, and if the parliament agrees on it, there will be a referendum in July 2009. That may force Iraq to go back to the United Nations for a new mandate to legalize America’s presence in the country, something that Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki has said he is loath to do. Either that or the U.S. and Iraq may have to come up with some kind of ad hoc interpretation of the SOFA. That means there is still much to watch for as the agreement proceeds along.

Al Qaeda in Iraq is generally considered to be behind this new terror tactic. Using women came out of desperation for the group. Before, foreign fighters were the favorite means to carry out suicide attacks. Most of these came through Syria, and entered Iraq through Anbar province. As security improved this supply shriveled up. From February to June 2007 for example, the U.S. estimated that between 80-110 foreigners came to Iraq. By 2008 that dropped to 12-15. Forced to adjust, the Islamists turned to women because they were easier to get passed security checkpoints.

The U.S. and Iraq have attempted to foil these attacks using a combination of defensive tactics, and going on the offensive in Diyala. The Americans started a new program called the Daughters of Iraq in the province in July 2008. As of October 80 women have graduated. At the same time, Iraq launched a security offensive in the province towards the end of July meant to flush out Al Qaeda in Iraq from the countryside where they are based. While some attacks have been foiled, and a few women have been arrested before they could detonate their bombs, ultimately, there is probably nothing that can be done to completely end these suicide bombings. On the one hand they show the weakness of the insurgency because their traditional methods have dried up, while on the other their ability to survive in a new security environment.

2008 Female Suicide Attacks In Iraq

1. 1/2/08 a women bomber killed chief Abu Sajad, head of a local Sons of Iraq unit in Baquba, Diyala province along with six others. Twenty-two were wounded. This was the second attack in three days using a female bomber against tribal Sons of Iraq forces.

2. 1/16/08 a women bomber killed eight and wounded seven in a market in the Shiite town of Khan Bani Saad near Baquba, Diyala province.

3. 1/29/08 a women set off her bomb at a police checkpoint to a market in Baghdad killing two and wounding five.

16. 5/17/08 a woman suicide bomber blew herself up attacking a Sons of Iraq unit in Diyala province killing one and wounding sixteen.

17. 5/20/08 a woman blew herself up outside of the house of Sheikh Mutlib al-Nidawi, the head of a Sons of Iraq group in Mandili, Diyala province, killing one family member and wounding al-Nidawai and two of his guards.

18. 5/20/08 a female suicide bomber killed a Sons of Iraq fighter and wounded seven others outside a police station in Rutba.

19. 5/21/08 two police and four others were wounded when a woman set off her bomb outside of a Sons of Iraq headquarters in Anbar City.

20. 6/7/08 four policemen and two civilians were wounded in Khalidiya by a female bomber outside a police station in Anbar province.

21. 6/14/08 in the town of Qara Tappah outside of Baghdad, a woman bomber targeted a café where people were watching the Iraqi soccer team play China in the World Cup. 34 were wounded.

22. 6/22/08 a woman set off her bomb near a government office building in Baquba killing thirteen people and wounding 30. The bomb was aimed at a police patrol.

23. 6/29/08 a female bomber blew herself up near a Sons of Iraq council in Baquba wounding three.

25. 7/24/08 a woman attacked a Sons of Iraq (SOI) unit in Baquba killing eight SOI fighters, and wounding 24. The target was Sheikh Naaim al-Dulaimi, the SOI leader of western Baquba, who was killed along with several of his bodyguards.

26. 7/28/08 Three female suicide bombers attacked a crowd of Shiite pilgrims in the Karrada neighborhood of Baghdad as they were traveling to the Kadhimiya Shrine. 32 people were killed, 100 wounded. This was the third deadliest attack by a woman bomber of 2008.

27. 8/11/08 a woman walked up to a police checkpoint at a market in Baquba, Diyala province and detonated her bomb killing one and wounding fourteen.

31. 10/17/08 Sons of Iraq (SOI) guards fired on a woman who refused to stop in the town of Dhuluiya, north of Baghdad. She detonated her bomb before being killed injuring five SOI members.

32. 11/8/08 a suspicious woman was chased by the police. She detonated her bomb outside of a hospital in Fallujah killing 3, wounding 10, most of which were medical personnel.

33. 11/9/08 a thirteen-year-old girl detonated a bomb by a Sons of Iraq checkpoint in Baquba, Diyala. Killed four Sons of Iraq members and wounded 15.

34. 11/24/08 three bombs were set off in Baghdad. One was by a woman outside an entrance to the Green Zone that targeted employees of the country’s intelligence service. The woman’s bomb killed five and injured 17.

The United States has already spent $4.65 billion on the electricity industry, while Iraq has appropriated $1.3 billion. That has added 550 new projects, and 2,500 megawatts to the system, but it has not been enough. Since the invasion Iraqis have gone on a spending spree with consumer appliances that has increased demand greatly.

One major question about this plan is if Iraq can handle all of these new projects on its own. North of Baghdad companies are finishing work on the Al-Quds power plant. It is the last major project the U.S. is funding in the country. When completed it will provide electricity to 180,000 households in central Iraq. Next to Al-Quds is an abandoned plant with brand new turbines. The equipment cost $20 million, but broke a few months ago because the Iraqis could not fix it. The plant may never work again. The capabilities of Iraqis have been a major problem, especially with a huge brain drain of professionals, which leads to poor maintenance and breakdowns. Iraq also lacks an integrated power plan. Electricity plants rely on oil for fuel, but there is no coordination with the Oil Industry to provide it. These could cripple Maliki’s power plan.

Sunday, November 23, 2008

Since March 2008 Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki has been forming Tribal Support Councils. Originally, these were created to help the security forces crackdown on the Mahdi Army militia of Moqtada al-Sadr. Beginning in the summer however, Maliki has been creating councils across the south and north to establish his control over the country, and increasingly to challenge the rule of his main coalition partners, the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council (SIIC) and the Kurdish parties, in the provinces. This is coming to a boiling point as both groups are increasingly criticizing Maliki’s rule, and rumors are beginning that they might even make a move to unseat him from power.

That followed a public dispute between Maliki and the Presidential Council, which consists of President Talabani, Vice President Tariq al-Hashemi of the Iraqi Islamic Party, and Vice President Abdel-Mahdi. On November 18, they sent a letter to Maliki suggesting that the government should stop wasting money forming Tribal Support Councils, and instead use the funds on the existing security forces. They also said that the Prime Minister should stop forming the councils until there is a formal framework to integrate them into the government. Two days later, Maliki gave a televised speech in which he said that Talabani was picking on the Support Councils, while the Kurds were breaking the constitution by deploying their Peshmerga militia outside of Kurdistan, and signing oil contracts without government approval. Maliki also said that the constitution needed to be amended so that the central government could have more power, implying that the Kurdish Regional Government needed its authority to be curtailed. That was an empty threat since the changes to the constitution have been held up for over a year, but upped the war of words between the two sides. The Presidential Council was not pleased by Maliki’s comments, and told him on November 21 that he shouldn’t have made their differences public.

All of this began back in March 2008 when the government moved against the Sadrists. During the crackdowns in the south, Maliki reached out to various tribes to help deal with the Mahdi Army. This first happened in Basra when Maliki gave 10,000 tribesman jobs in the provincial police in return for fighting the militias. Tribal Support Councils were also formed in Babil, Karbala, Maysan, and Dhi Qar as the fighting spread across the south. After that initial wave, the Prime Minister moved ahead creating councils in Qadisiyah Wasit, Najaf, Kirkuk, Muthanna, and other areas. Each was paid $21,000 by the government, and then $10,000 a month afterwards. They reported to the Committee for National Reconciliation in Baghdad, although there is talk of forming a National Tribal Support Council. Tribal sheikhs have been eager to join these councils because it gives them power and new standing, as well as jobs for their followers. As reported earlier, many of the country’s tribes were weak after the invasion because they had become dependent upon Saddam and his patronage to maintain their positions. Working for Maliki then, is an all too familiar relationship for many of these sheikhs. Many of these tribes are also national in character, which means that the Prime Minister is building up support not only in the individual provinces where the councils are, but across the country.

The Supreme Council was the first to object to this policy. As they rule most of the south, they saw the Support Councils as a brazen attempt by Maliki to build up his support and challenge their authority in the upcoming provincial elections, scheduled for the end of January 2009. SIIC officials in Babil, Wasit,Karbala, Dhi-Qar, Basra, Muthanna, and Qadisiyah have all protested the tribal groups. Governors and provincial councils have all complained that Maliki never consulted with them when forming the Support Councils, and that they are not part of the local governments, answering to Baghdad rather to them.

The Kurds and SIIC have been close allies since before the 2003 U.S. invasion. They were the main reason why Maliki was able to stay in power in 2007 when various factions were trying to unseat him. The Prime Minister has been emboldened after his successful crackdowns on the Sadrists earlier this year however, and now feels as if he can take on his allies in the provinces that they control. He is building up support across the country before the provincial elections, but it could come at a cost. If the Kurds and SIIC want, they can depose him in parliament with a no confidence vote. Worse, his moves could lead to violence between the Tribal Support Councils and local police and Peshmerga controlled by the SIIC and Kurds. So far these disputes have stayed verbal, but the rhetoric is increasing, and shows the deep divisions that remain in Iraq.

For more on the Tribal Support Councils, Inter-Shiite Power Struggles, and the Kurdish-Baghdad Dispute see:

Iraq History Timeline

About Me

Musings On Iraq was started in 2008 to explain the political, economic, security and cultural situation in Iraq via original articles and interviews. I have written for the Jamestown Foundation, Tom Ricks’ Best Defense at Foreign Policy and the Daily Beast, and was responsible for a chapter in the book Volatile Landscape: Iraq And Its Insurgent Movements. My work has been published in Iraq via NRT, AK News, Al-Mada, Sotaliraq, All Iraq News, and Ur News all in Iraq. I was interviewed on BBC Radio 5, Radio Sputnik, CCTV and TRT World News TV, and have appeared in CNN, the Christian Science Monitor, The National, Columbia Journalism Review, Mother Jones, PBS’ Frontline, the Center for Strategic and International Studies, the Institute for the Study of War, Radio Free Iraq, Rudaw, and others. I have also been cited in Iraq From war To A New Authoritarianism by Toby Dodge, Imagining the Nation Nationalism, Sectarianism and Socio-Political Conflict in Iraq by Harith al-Qarawee, ISIS Inside the Army of Terror by Michael Weiss and Hassan Hassahn, The Rise of the Islamic State by Patrick Cocburn, and others. If you wish to contact me personally my email is: motown67@aol.com