01590cam a22002537 4500001000600000003000500006005001700011008004100028100002100069245013000090260006600220490004100286500001600327520051900343530006100862538007200923538003600995690009801031700001601129710004201145830007601187856003701263856003601300w4041NBER20150802195952.0150802s1992 mau||||fs|||| 000 0 eng d1 aBesley, Timothy.10aIncumbent Behaviorh[electronic resource]:bVote Seeking, Tax Setting and Yardstick Competition /cTimothy Besley, Anne Case. aCambridge, Mass.bNational Bureau of Economic Researchc1992.1 aNBER working paper seriesvno. w4041 aMarch 1992.3 aThis paper presents a theoretical and empirical investigation of tax competition when voters use the tax policy of neighboring jurisdictions as information to evaluate the performance of their incumbent politicians. We show that this has implications both for voter tolerance of high taxes and for the process of tax setting itself, Our empirical results, which use two different tax data sets, confirm the importance of neighbors' taxes both on the probability of incumbent reelection and on tax setting behavior. aHardcopy version available to institutional subscribers. aSystem requirements: Adobe [Acrobat] Reader required for PDF files. aMode of access: World Wide Web. 7aH71 - State and Local Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue2Journal of Economic Literature class.1 aCase, Anne.2 aNational Bureau of Economic Research. 0aWorking Paper Series (National Bureau of Economic Research)vno. w4041.4 uhttp://www.nber.org/papers/w404141uhttp://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w4041