Wednesday, January 25, 2012

January , 2012 -- State Department in-depth report on Israeli kiosk vendors in U.S.

On January 25, 2010, the U.S. State Department issued an in-depth report on the operations of Israeli kiosk vendors in shopping malls across the United States. Although the report, released in the tranche of cables exposed by WikiLeaks, did not mention the links of these Israeli vendors to Israeli intelligence operations in the United States, the report does provide an insight into the vendors' ties to money laundering, organized crime, and visa violations.

The U.S. embassy in Tel Aviv recommended a ban on U.S. visas for any Israeli having just completed military service. Most of the Israelis operating in shopping malls recently completed their obligatory military service. But as numerous U.S. intelligence reports have stated on these vendors, many specialized in demolitions, signals intelligence, and counter-intelligence operations/

The kiosk vendors are also active in Canada, as cited in this CBC report from December 22, 2010:

"A man accused of bringing illegal workers to Halifax will be allowed to stay in Toronto until his next court appearance.

Iftash Jacob was released from custody Thursday after surrendering his passport and posting a $7,500 bond.

He must report to the Canada Border Services Agency every week and return to Halifax provincial court in February to enter a plea . . .

Jacob and nine others — all from Israel — were arrested Wednesday in a raid on a home in Halifax and kiosks at three shopping malls in the region.

Eight people — two women and six men — pleaded guilty Wednesday to working in Canada without authorization, and each was ordered to pay a $1,000 fine. They are allowed to stay in the country but not work here."

The fact that the leaked cable on the Israeli operations was merely designated as "Sensitive" unclassified information may indicate that there was an addendum with a higher classification that discussed the intelligence angle of the Israeli kiosk operations.

On August 7, 2005, WMR reported:

“In November 2001, the INS arrested several Israelis, including some with military backgrounds, selling Puzzle Car and Zoom Copter toys from shopping mall kiosks and vending carts. Many of the malls were located near U.S. government facilities, including the Pentagon and CIA. A majority of the Israelis, arrested for visa violations instead of espionage, worked for a Florida-based company called Quality Sales. A spokesman for the company admitted the company hired vacationing Israeli students but they had thr wrong visas. The spokesman also revealed the Israelis were deemed “special interest” cases by INS – a new government designation applied to terrorism suspects in the wake of 911. Federal authorities suspect the Israelis were using the kiosks as intelligence fronts in the same manner that Israelis were using door-to-door art sales as covers. The National Counterintelligence Center (NCIX) stated in a report issued in March 2001 that, ‘In the past six weeks, employees in federal office buildings located throughout the United States have reported suspicious activities connected with individuals representing themselves as foreign students selling or delivering artwork. Employees have observed both males and females attempting to bypass facility security and enter federal buildings.’ The report was temporarily removed from the NCIX web site.

1.(SBU) SUMMARY: Tel Aviv has been investigating visa fraud in the U.S. Dead Sea Cosmetics and skincare industry since 2007, when itbecame a noticeable problem. From September 2008, Dead-Sea relatedfraud has been one of Tel Aviv's Fraud Prevention Unit's (FPU)andAssistant Regional Security Officer-Investigator's (ARSO-I) mainfoci. Since then Tel Aviv has learned a great deal about themulti-million dollar industry and its fraudulent activities. Ofparticular concern is that the majority of the workers in thisindustry are Israeli, whether they are B1B2 visa holders, LPRs ordual American-Israelis; key companies have told us that they preferto hire Israelis instead of Americans. Of late, the industry hasbeen using its KIOSK marketing experience to branch out into relatedfields: hair straighteners, hair extensions, hair accessories andother assorted items such as other types of cosmetics, perfumes,pillows, toys, wind spinners and even, roasted nuts.

The Dead Sea industry has spread to more than 36 states, creating a major presence across America. This industry also operates incountries like Australia, New Zealand, the UK, and Germany.Unfortunately, its U.S. presence is not entirely "clean," for thereare known issues of B1B2 visa holders working illegally; illegalworker exploitation; no federal or local taxes being paid onworkers' earnings; filing applications for extensions and/or changesof status as a means of continuing illegal work; bogus marriages tokeep key staff in the United States; B1 in lieu of H3 letter and H3visa scams; non-transparent corporate structures established tocreate distance from illegal workers; transport of huge sums of cashto Israel suggesting organized crime and money laundering; as wellas an increased number of real estate ventures that suggest thesame. Moreover, it is culturally acceptable for post-army Israelisto work illegally in the United States; key parts of the Dead Seaindustry have been able to base a large part of their businessmodels upon the employment of illegal workers.

These issues and other important topics of concern will be delineated in this lengthy background cable. The unifying factor isthat all of these issues have wider implications. Aside from thecriminal aspects of this fraud, a key implication is the increasedvisa revocation/refusal and denial of entry rates for post-armyIsraelis, which among other things, complicate Israel's high-profiledesire to join the Visa Waiver Program. Contact information forreaders who wish to receive e-mail updates is available at the endof this cable. END SUMMARY

-------------------------------------------- H2B Workers Capped - B1B2 Workers Essential--------------------------------------------2.(SBU)The number of H2B workers has been capped at 66,000 perfiscal year, with 33,000 to be allocated for employment beginning inthe 1st half of the fiscal year. From 1 Oct-31 Dec 2009, Tel Avivissued 283 H2Bs-all for the Dead Sea industry. Our experience tellsus that there are far more than 283 Israelis working at KIOSKsacross the United States--we suspect the numbers to be in thethousands; those additional, illegal workers are mainly B1B2 visaholders as that path is far cheaper and less hassle than filingpetitions, and etc. The Dead Sea industry knows it cannot sustainitself with just H2B, H3, J1 SWT, E and L visa and American-Israeliworkers. Thus, B1B2 workers (B1B2ers) are vital to their oft-statedplans to employ only Israelis. Further, an argument can be madethat these companies are hiring in a discriminatory fashion in thattheir main goal is to hire Israeli workers to the exclusion ofothers. To illustrate how crucial B1B2ers are to these companies:say a Dead Sea company has 2-4 KIOSKs in nine medium-sizedmetropolitan-area malls with 2-3 workers per KIOSK. Assume 3 KIOSKsper mall and 2-3 workers per KIOSK. The number of workers rangesfrom 54-81 in this area with just ONE company. Now, extrapolatethat scenario across the United States. With the hundreds of DeadSea companies and thousands of KIOSKs in existence, it becomes clearthat Israeli-Americans, H2Bs, Js, etc. cannot sustain the Israeliworkforce plan--B1B2ers do. Given that there are many more KIOSKsnow than several years ago, it becomes more obvious that the declinein H2Bs and the rise in B1B2ers enabled the H2B program to become a"fig leaf" for these companies and their illegal workers.

3.(SBU)Bolstering the above scenario is Document Benefits Task Force (DBTF) information (passed to ARSO-I) containing names of 50 IsraeliB1B2 or VWP workers who had been working in the Houston area. Postis currently analyzing these 50 cases: 22 B1B2s were issued by TelAviv in 2008-9 alone; 11 B1B2s were issued by Tel Aviv prior to2008; 11 are thought to be VWP nationals and, 6 names were toocommon to distinguish. Further, the DBTF's activities have led to aparticular company's scramble to replace/move elsewhere their B2workers with those holding H2Bs.

4.(SBU)ARSO-I has been notifying the Government of Israel (GOI) of all incoming criminal deportations from the United States. He alsoreceives notification of all deportations and has noticed a sharpincrease in young Israelis being deported for overstays or visastatus violations. Though anecdotal evidence, it points to a widerproblem.

5.(SBU) The list of 50 Houston-based workers is not the first or only one Tel Aviv's Fraud Prevention Manager (FPM) has received; CBPsent a list of 60+ workers who had been discovered working illegallyat a Florida-based company. As part of a multi-faceted fraudstrategy, FPM has since revoked (and sent revocation requests to CA)a large number of B1B2s belonging to known workers. Tel Aviv'sinterviewing officers are constantly trying to find ways to detectIsraelis who intend to work; needless to say, coaching and otherassistance has made it very difficult to detect these cases. Ananalysis of case notes pertaining to the applicants on both listsshowed that most of these Israelis had given solid stories, therebyconvincing consular officers to overcome 214b. The toughest aspectfor 214b is not determining whether the applicant will return, butwhether s/he will abide by their visa's terms. Tel Aviv FPU is opento ideas on improving its detection of those intending to work; weare continually brainstorming solutions, but none have proveneffective thus far.

6.(SBU) H2B statistics: In the past several fiscal years, Tel Aviv's overall H2B workload has dropped from a high of 1,658 cases in FY2008 down by more than half to 528 cases in FY 2009. Reflectingenhanced scrutiny of these applications is the increase in the FY2010 H2B refusal rate to 45 percent from 10.9 percent in FY 2008.

-------------------------------------------- Recruitment of B1B2 Workers: Well-Organized--------------------------------------------7.(SBU) Recruitment of B1B2ers is largely peer- and Internet-oriented and occurs year-round; not surprisingly, recruiters andDead Sea managers themselves are usually former illegal KIOSKworkers. It also begins while they are still in the military;recruiters have participated in job fairs for those finishing theirmandatory service. The hiring process is highly organized and donewith no paper trail.

8.(SBU)Israelis preparing to leave the army generally want to earn money (whether domestically or abroad) to pay for school, travel andother life goals. Israelis have a close-knit social network and assuch, it is not hard to find peers who have worked illegally and bereassured by the fact that they were not caught. FPM spoke with anIsraeli who had been swept up in a raid, and he said that the vastmajority of his peers obtain a tourist visa with intentions ofworking and that a majority are not caught. This situation createsa relatively permissive recruitment environment. While in theUnited States, an Israeli can walk up to a KIOSK and ask aboutemployment; they also can utilize online social networks such asFacebook to find jobs.

9.(SBU) With a few variations, recruiters rosily promise such things as the ability to earn USD 3-4,000 per month, 20-30 percentcommission, payment of half of the airfare, housing at resort-likeapartment complexes and availability of a car. In some locations,rent is a token sum and in others, upwards of USD 500 per month ischarged. Qualifications are minimal: strong English skills and aU.S. visa.

10.(SBU)Companies advertise in newspapers and online; an interested worker only needs to complete a questionnaire and wait until someonecalls them. Typically, they are given a number to call when theyland in the United States. One variation is that recruiters willmeet the prospective worker at a local cafe or mall to finalizedetails. Others call Web-site listed telephone numbers and leave amessage; someone returns their call and then convinces them to work.If they don't have a U.S. visa, recruiters have been known to coachthem on how to evade our scrutiny.

11.(SBU)Prior to arrival in the United States, workers typically are given an address to write on their I-94-which may or may not exist.Upon arrival in the United States, they usually are met at theairport and taken to their housing. Should there be problems atimmigration, they are provided with a number for someone closelyconnected to this industry. As described by a former Israeliworker, the entire process was "all well organized." Substantiatingthis is an I275 Q/A comment, "They know when we are coming. Theycome to the airport to collect us."

--------------------------------------------- -- B1B2ers: Lack of Consequences Helps Dead Sea Industry andPerpetuates Israelis' Cultural Acceptance of Illegal Work--------------------------------------------- --12.(SBU)There is an array of reasons why post-army Israelis workillegally in the United States; a key part of this fraud problem isthese young Israelis' cultural acceptable of illegal work. Theprevailing perception amongst these Israelis is that selling DeadSea products is a simple way to earn a lot of money, can be doneeasily and that most are not caught. One turnaround said, "people[in Israel] told me it was ok [to sell Dead Sea products]. Thereare a lot of people [who] sell Dead Sea products in the UnitedStates." According to another Israeli who was caught and jailed,most of his peers know they intend to work well before applying forU.S. visas and obligingly tell interviewing officers that they knowthis work is illegal. Illustrating the situation's pervasiveness isthat some Israelis travel annually to work; others travel every twoyears. This Israeli also estimated that there are "thousands ofB1B2 workers across the United States"; statistics and anecdotalevidence cited in this cable strongly support this estimate. Healso theorized that quite a few come from the lower end of thesocioeconomic scale--not poor, and not upper middle class. Post hasseen cases of Israelis relinquishing good jobs, such as those withthe National Police, to work illegally and cases of illegal Israeliworkers with a high-profile government or corporate parent. Of noteis that, due to the preference for Army service, Israeli-Arab KIOSKworkers are rare.

13.(SBU)The deception by those intending to work illegally begins well before they arrive at the visa interview window and repeats atPOEs. In a secondary interview with CBP, one turnaround said,"....I don't remember who told me what to say, but everyone inIsrael knows about going to America to work, and they say to tellthe U.S. Embassy that you're going on vacation. It's easier to getthe via." Companies and recruiters have been known to adviseapplicants to: create a fake reason for the trip, such as attendinga friend's wedding (in one case, CBP discovered the friend wasalready married!); and not to worry as "[After entering] as atourist... they would take care of my paperwork." Other examplesare instructions to: "...tell US consular officials that he intendedto visit a friend's aunt in NYC so that he could obtain a US visaand, "...to tell POE that I was coming for "retail manager intraining program" (she worked as a secretary for a Dead Sea CEO).In addition to the lies, this B1B2 applicant pool tends to write ontheir DS 156's "None" for their U.S. destination and contactinformation (they know that if they were to put Ohio, we'd know theyintended to work). Interviewing officers have a hard time pinningthem down to an exact U.S. address or contact as they generally saythey are going to New York or some other common destination to seefamily such as an uncle or aunt (when they intend to work in AZ, TX,OH, TN or even in AL). By contrast, H2B applicants diligentlyprovide this information as given to them by the companies.

14.(SBU)In general, KIOSK workers are not a static bunch. Some workseveral weeks or months at a KIOSK in one area, say Cleveland, andthen shift to another area such as Las Vegas for a few weeks ormonths and so on. A strong network of Israelis paves the way fortheir job moves-if things do not work out at one KIOSK, an Israelican call upon the network to help his/her transfer to a anotherKIOSKwhich could be local or out of state.

-------------------- Paying B1B2 Workers--------------------15.(SBU) KIOSK area managers and/or U.S.-based recruiters usuallytake care of compensating their illegal workers. Pay tends to rangefrom USD 1,000-3,200 per month, with the majority paid on the mid tolower end of this scale. It is rare to earn a lot of money and, asexpected, the higher end is occupied by those who excel at sales.Tel Aviv is aware of situations in which workers end up owing theiremployers money.

16.(SBU)The most common method of payment is cash "under the table."

Per I275 reports, an assortment of cash payment methods exists:having the worker establish a U.S. bank account and then depositingcash or checks; pay worker USD 1,000 for the first month while stillin Israel and then thereafter, pay USD 300 per week--the USD 1,000would be deposited into an Israeli bank account and USD 300 given incash once state-side; having their pay wired to an Israeli bankaccount; having the worker open a U.S. credit card account andtransferring money to the card, and etc. Some workers know that nolocal or federal taxes are being deducted from their pay; others aretold that "that has been taken care of."

-------------------------------- B1B2 Worker Exploitation Issues--------------------------------17.(SBU)The methods of exploitation we have seen are:

a. Payment of prohibited H2B fees. Those who withdraw from H2B work early state-side or while still in Israel have been unable toreceive refunds of the extra, and prohibited, monies they had paid.Exemplifying this situation is a company that is known to chargeIsraeli H2B applicants a $100 fee as collateral for visa approval;if denied their H2Bs that company refused to return that money tothe applicants on the basis that the failure to obtain a visa wasthe applicants' fault, not theirs. In addition, that same companycharges H2B candidates half of the $1,000 cost to petition for thevisa; the candidate pays $100 prior to leaving Israel and theremaining $400 is deducted from their first four salary payments.

b. "Legal" status: Company told person that s/he could work legally on the B-1; told him/her it was "ok to work and that nothing wasgoing to happen." When that person asked the recruiter about a workvisa, s/he was told "not to worry about it." One company even toldB1B2ers that "[they] can work for 3 months legally and after 3months, [they] can't."

c. Job deceit: One person thought he had started a real job with an Israeli company and that he was being sent to the United States fortraining; he soon discovered that the "training" would be work andthat there was no job waiting for him back in Israel. Thesecompanies have been known to move their employees around as they see fit. An Israeli, originally recruited to work in the logisticsdepartment, was transferred to a KIOSK when the company needed more cart workers. Another variation is to promise to send a worker to,say, Los Angeles, and upon arrival, send them to, say, El Paso.

d. Long hours, little pay. Six day workweeks and 11 hr workdays are not uncommon. Some workers are paid only their commission, e.g. nominimum wage salary. The majority are not paid anywhere near the$3-4,000+ a month promised by recruiters. An Israeli who quit hisH2B job this month informed us that he and his colleagues had beenpaid only a basic salary of $1500 a month and that their companytook $500 a month from each of them to cover living expenses, suchas rent. After adding in other expenses, they ended up having topay their employer money when they left, earning nothing, contraryto what was promised.

e. No local or Federal taxes paid. Given that the tendency to be paid in cash, most workers do not know that taxes must be paid onmoney earned. Nor do the companies enlighten them.

f. Social Security Numbers (SSNs). Illegalities abound in this area as shared SSNs, fraudulent SSNs and having no SSN are not uncommon.

g. Employment Eligibility Verification I-9 forms not completed for workers. Dead Sea companies have failed to complete I-9s for theirworkers. All U.S. employers must complete and retain an I-9 foreach worker-including citizens and noncitizens. On the I-9, thecompany must examine the employment eligibility and identitydocument(s) a worker presents to determine whether the document(s)reasonably appear to be genuine and relate to the individual andrecord that document information on the I-9. This documentationprovision is likely the sticking point for these companies as theydo not want any evidence of hiring B1B2ers.

h. Organized Crime enforcement tactics: ARSO-I and FPM are aware of recruiters who threaten workers if they do not do their work asintended. One such recruiter threatened a worker's family back inIsrael with harm if the worker did not continue working at theKIOSK. ARSO-I is looking into these cases for prosecutorialpotential.

i. Department of Labor violations. Examples include assigning workers to employment locations different from those listed on theDOL certifications. As mentioned above, companies have been knownto move workers around at will, according to current needs.

j. And, no doubt, there are other methods of exploitation not described here.

--------------------------------------------- - I-539 Extensions Filed to Continue Unauthorized Work--------------------------------------------- -18.(SBU)Many B1B2ers fail to disclose unlawful employment on theirI539s to extend current status or switch to H2B or even H3 status.These applications are filed as a way to buy time to continueworking. To reduce scrutiny, Israelis have been known to file I539sin a different state from where they had been residing.

19.(SBU)Another known tactic to keep Israeli workers in the United States is petitioning for a change of status for their workers fromB2 to H3 in April since the companies have typically claimed their"peak load" occurs during the Christmas holiday season. Tocomplicate things further, they even petition to change the sameH2Bs who entered as B2s and then worked in the KIOSKs during theholiday season over to H3 trainees after they re-enter the UnitedStates as B2s again in April and May. The H3 classification is veryproblematic; see paragraphs 22-30.

--------------- Marriage Fraud---------------20.(SBU) There seems to be an overwhelming indication that theowners, principal partners and area managers of Dead Sea-relatedcompanies are enlisting U.S. citizens to commit marriage fraud inorder to enable their open-ended "legal" U.S. stays. These"couples" knowingly engage in fraud, with payments to the U.S.citizen and pre-organized meetings to prepare for their USCISinterviews. In October, Tel Aviv investigated a marriage fraud caseon behalf of USCIS Phoenix that resulted in the withdrawal of boththe I130 and I485 forms. USCIS is investigating other cases of DeadSea-related marriage fraud and Tel Aviv is willing to assist asnecessary.

---------------- Crooked Lawyers?----------------21.(SBU)Lawyers appear to very much a part of the Dead Sea fraudscheme. FPU is aware of a lawyer who advised an Israeli to obtain anew PPT to hide his/her lengthy U.S. stay. Another lawyer reassureda group of B1H3 workers that they were in "legal status" whilsttheir I539s were pending with USCIS. Skating close to ethical"lines," one lawyer even advised a high-level Dead Sea company owner(who was denied a visa in both Tel Aviv and Jerusalem) as to whetherattempting to cross illegally from Mexico was preferable to Canada.That individual was caught trying to cross the U.S.-Mexican borderby making false claim to U.S. citizenship; ARSO-I is working withDS/LAFO/DS on this case. Such is the draw for Israelis working inthis industry in the United States that they are willing to riskdetention and possible prison time to work there. Most tellingly,ARSO-I and Tel Aviv FPM have noticed that there are a handful oflawyers who have been filing the vast majority of the Dead Seaindustry's petitions, I539s and I130s/I485s with USCIS. Sometimes,new lawyers pop up, though they, too, appear to have connections tothese key lawyers.

--------------------------------------- Recent Arrests of Israeli B1B2 Workers---------------------------------------22.(SBU)Tel Aviv CONS and ARSO-I are pleased with the uptick inattention various Department of Homeland Security (DHS) agencies and U.S. Attorneys have given to the B1B2er problem. In November,Houston's ICE Documents and Benefits Fraud Task Force (DBTF)arrested 11 Israeli B1B2ers as part of a wider operation; ICESeattle (Tri-cities office) arrested 11 more in late December andanother Seattle office had arrested 5 earlier. These arrests'timing has been fortuitous to Tel Aviv's ongoing educationalcampaign targeted to the post-army demographic about the potentialconsequences of working illegally in the United States. We hopethese arrests and Tel Aviv's recent 214B revocations of largenumbers of B1B2ers' visas will filter through the close-knitpost-army community and encourage them to think twice about working illegally. On a side note, these revocations ensure that B1B2ers cannot re-enter the United States; some have been admitted despite TECS and other lookout entries for them.

------------------------------------------ B1 in Lieu of H3 Training Letter and H3 Scam------------------------------------------23.(SBU) On B1 in Lieu of H3 trainee (B1H3) issues, 9 FAM 41.31N11.9 says: a. Aliens already employed abroad, who are coming toundertake training and who are classifiable as H3 trainees. Theregulations state that in order for an alien to be classifiable asH3, the petitioner must demonstrate that:(1) The proposed training is not available in the alien's owncountry;(2) The beneficiary will not be placed in a position which is in thenormal operation of the business and in which citizens and residentworkers are regularly employed;(3) The beneficiary will not engage in productive employment unlesssuch employment is incidental and necessary to the training; and(4) The training will benefit the beneficiary in pursuing a careeroutside the United States.

24.(SBU)Note that ALL four conditions in 9 FAM 41.31 N11.9 must be met to qualify for H3 status. The most difficult item to overcomeis condition 1. Israel does have a Dead Sea skincare and cosmeticsindustry in which Israelis sell to American tourists, people fromall over the world and to local customers. Thus, per thisinterpretation, this H3 training field IS available in Israel. Inaddition, 9 FAM 41.31 N11.9 (4) says the training is supposed tobenefit the Israeli's career abroad--however that standard is alsotough to meet as these Israelis tend not to have had DeadSea-related careers prior to going to the United States for theirB1H3 "training." Their work back-grounds tend to encompass portableemployment fields such as bartending, working at a gas station, cellphone sales/service, working as a secretary, etc.

25.(SBU) It is rare that young, post-army Israelis present a visa application to us requesting B1 in lieu of H3 status. In fact, TelAviv's Fraud Prevention Manager (FPM) is aware of only one such visacase at post since the summer of 2008--that one was refused on 214bgrounds. Of concern is the situation in which Israelis in thisdemographic present B1H3 letters to CBP officers at Ports of Entryfor admission for 3-6 months' training, misleading both CBP andEmbassy Tel Aviv consular officers.

26.(SBU) Often, these Israelis apply for a visa under the guise of going to the United States on a 2-3 week vacation (it is now rarefor us to see requests for trips of longer duration) to visitfamily, friends, travel, etc. Tel Aviv consular officers, despitethe employment of a variety of interviewing tactics, have no way ofknowing which ones were specifically told by local recruitingcompanies to not reveal their true intention to work in the UnitedStates to them. It is known that recruiters have no interest inIsraelis who do not already possess a U.S. visa as that is one oftwo key job requirements; the other is possession ofEnglish-language skills. After they receive their U.S. visa, thecompany will then furnish them with B1H3 training letters and coachthem to tell CBP that they are coming for "just for training," etc.so as to facilitate their entry into the United States.

27.(SBU)To combat the B1H3 letter scam, tools we employ include: the stapling of a card onto passports of those issued B1B2 visasadvising against unauthorized employment in the United States; andextensive CCD notes that include a key phrase "vacation only," tripinformation as presented (e.g. location and duration) and joboccupation. The latter is important as those who present B1H3letters will almost always say they have been working for a localDead Sea company for at least a short period. If they recentlyapplied for a visa at Tel Aviv, these applicants usually do notindicate during the interview or on the application itself that theyalready have been working for these local Dead Sea companies. Inother words, a different employer is likely listed in the CCD.

28.(SBU)Regarding remuneration of B1H3 workers, 9 FAM 41.31 N11 says: There are cases in which aliens who qualify for H1 or H3 visasmay more appropriately be classified as B-1 visa applicants incertain circumstances, e.g., a qualified H1 or H3 visa applicantcoming to the United States to perform H1 services or to participatein a training program. In such a case, the applicant must notreceive any salary or other remuneration from a U.S. source otherthan an expense allowance or other reimbursement for expensesincidental to the alien's temporary stay....it is essential that theremuneration or source of income for services performed in theUnited States continue to be provided by the business entity locatedabroad, and that the alien meets the following criteria:(1) With regard to foreign-sourced remuneration for servicesperformed by aliens admitted under the provisions of INA101(a)(15)(B), the Department has maintained that where a U.S.business enterprise or entity has a separate business enterpriseabroad, the salary paid by such foreign entity shall not beconsidered as coming from a "U.S. source;"(2) In order for an employer to be considered a "foreign firm" theentity must have an office abroad and its payroll must be disbursedabroad. To qualify for a B-1 visa, the employee must customarily beemployed by the foreign firm, the employing entity must pay theemployee's salary, and the source of the employee's salary must beabroad; and....Going against 9 FAM 41.31 N11.9 (2) and (3), the B1H3 "trainingprogram" in reality has these Israelis engaging in unauthorized fulltime employment selling Dead Sea products at mall KIOSKs across theUnited States. In general, they are paid in cash based upon theirlevel of sales, which can range from USD 250 to USD 800 per week.Wire transfers from the United States to workers' Israeli accounts,payments to Israeli credit card accounts, and checks deposited to aU.S. bank account are among the other known means of payment. Allof these payment methods are considered U.S. source, thus notforeign as they should be.

-------------- E and L Visas--------------32.(SBU)E visas: Shell companies have been known to be establishedin order to "qualify" an Israeli for E1 status. E1 visas, ingeneral receive close scrutiny in Tel Aviv; Dead Sea-related cases,due to their non-transparent corporate structure, receive evenfurther scrutiny. As a fraud prevention measure and, mainly becauseof their low volume, ConGen Jerusalem agreed to transfer their Ecases for Tel Aviv to process. Of its own cases, Tel Aviv approvedeight and rejected six such E1 visa cases; rejections were due tolack of qualifications.

33.(SBU)L visas: Tel Aviv recently returned to USCIS a Dead Sea company's L petition because additional information that we receivedrevealed there was no intra-company connection between the Israelientity and the U.S. entity other than a distributor relationship.As with E visas, Tel Aviv will be keeping a close eye on thesecases.

----------------------------------- Q4 Visas for Israeli KIOSK Workers?-----------------------------------34.(SBU) A Dead Sea company, one that may have organized crime (OC)connections, continues to tell us they are pushing for the creationof a Q4 visa category to permit Israelis to work at U.S. KIOSKsselling Dead Sea products. FPM first heard of this idea back in thefall of 2008 from this company's owner and continues to hear aboutQ4 plans. The argument for the Q4 visa rests upon the "uniqueness"of having an Israeli sales force within the Dead Sea industry. TelAviv does not view this proposed visa category as credible, for itcould be used as a way to legitimize B2 workers and continue thepattern of not being open to hiring U.S. citizens.

35.(SBU)Moreover, there is nothing intrinsic to the Dead Sea that Israelis are privy to that other people in the world cannot findout. In fact, company representatives repeatedly have stated toARSO-I and FPM that only Israelis are capable of working for themand that they do not hire Americans because they are lazy. Theirattitude has more to do with high pressure sales techniques andcontrolling a vulnerable work force; ARSO-I and FPM have seen theseelements in these companies' instruction manuals.

-------------------------------------- I275s - Dead Sea Information Goldmine--------------------------------------36.(SBU)Dead Sea-related denials of entry easily top Tel Aviv's listof reasons for POE turnarounds. Two hundred and sixty-one (261)such I275s have been received here since October 2007. In Jan-Nov2009, FPM received 162 I275s, reflecting POEs' increased scrutiny ofpost-army Israelis--the group that is most likely to work withoutauthorization. Since we probably do not receive every DeadSea-related I275 from each and every POE, the total number we havelikely does not represent the total number of Israelis denied entry.Newark, with 65 cases, processed the most I275s in Jan-Nov 2009;Atlanta Hartsfield and Chicago O'Hare are second and third,respectively, for the same period. The November 2009 CBP TravelIndustry Bulletin spotlights Atlanta, which is one of the busiestairports in the world, and the mention of Israeli fraud on page twosays something about the level of their concern regarding thisissue. Previously, as described in reftel A, Israelis intending towork were advised by their companies and recruiters to avoidAtlanta. Disseminating this type of information has become moresophisticated due to online videos advising which airports to avoid,and etc. As with Atlanta, Israelis are beginning to avoid Newark.Where will they go next?

37.(SBU)To help close the communication gap, FPM has reached out to POEs that handle Israeli arrivals and shared information in theattempt to maintain an "advantage." The outreach is done via theFPM's ad-hoc Dead Sea e-mails that share trends/data and informationwith CBP, FDNS, ICE, USCIS and others. FPM maintains severale-distribution lists. Represented in the CBP POE list are: ATL,BOS, CHI, DET, HOU, IAD, JFK, LAX, MIA, MSP, NEW, PDX, PHI, PHX, SEA and SFO. If you would like to receive these Dead Sea e-mails,please write to vincentwm@state.gov.

38.(SBU) All 261 of our I275 cases have been analyzed extensively for intel- and data-gathering purposes, and shared internally andexternally. What's noteworthy?

21-24 is the main age cluster; 57.5 percent are females and 42.5 percent males;46 percent are from central Israel (interesting as the north andsouth are less well-off areas);75.5 percent applied for B2 status upon entry;16.9 percent presented B1H3 letters;

POE denials: 52.5 percent worked on a previous trip;31 percent intended to work if admitted to the United States;47.9 percent were caught on the second entry attempt due to havingworked on the first entry; and

POE denial grounds per INA: 77.4 percent were 7A1, and 17.6 percent were 6C1 in addition to 7A1.

39.(SBU) We suspect that quite a few Israelis manage to evade CBP successfully and, for every I275er caught, there are likely severalB1B2ers. Via word of mouth, the smart ones come for a short, 1-2month stay to work, earn money and leave. They then return thefollowing year for the holidays, which is the principal money makingseason. According to our CBP contacts, these individuals are muchharder to catch.

---------------------------- Validation Studies Underway----------------------------41.In October 2008, Tel Aviv implemented changes in its evaluationof post-army visa applicants, and as a result, its refusal ratebegan to climb sharply. FPM requested an ATS/ADIS validation studyof B1B2ers in April 2009. The results indicated it was too earlyfor an informative study as many of these Israelis were still in theUnited States. We plan to follow up on this group at the 18 monthmark; we suspect we'll see lengthy stays, numerous extensions andchanges of status. Meantime, we continue to flag issued caseswithin this demographic by adding particular phrases into NIV casenotes for additional validation studies.

------------------------------------------ Transport of Cash Connected to Dead Sea Industry------------------------------------------42.(SBU) Transport of cash from the United States to Israel has longbeen a concern of FPM and ARSO-I as it not only implies illegalemployment, but also money laundering, and thus, potential organizedcrime connections to the industry. Information gathered from theI275s and from CBP show that Israelis, including relatives orfriends of illegal workers, have been caught outbound transportinglarge sums of money back to Israel. In one case, a young Israelicouple was discovered transporting over USD 26,000 for their illegalworker friends to Israel; they had lied about the amount to preventthe money's seizure. Further, ARSO-I has discovered through asource that young Israeli workers returning to Israel have beentasked with carrying back money for the company. These workers arethen met by a contact in Israel; the money is collected at or nearthe airport and is delivered to a local company representative.

43.(SBU)At Newark, Israelis regularly have been caught by its Outbound Currency Enforcement Team (OCET). Generally, theseIsraelis have been in the United States for four to six months andare carrying about USD 8,000 to USD 9,800, just under the reportinglimit. In addition to carrying cash for the companies, theseworkers also have been known to wire some of the money to Israel orhave someone carry some of it home for them or buy items with theirillegal earnings such as laptops, i-Phones, clothing, etc. OCETplaces long-term lookout on these cash-carrying individuals andreports those who admit to and/or have proof of working illegally toTel Aviv. Tel Aviv FPM then evaluates these individuals for 214Bvisa revocations and adds corporate intel gleaned by OCET from thesecases to the Dead Sea Excel file. Tel Aviv welcomes submissionsfrom other OCET teams.

44.(SBU) There is a catch-22 situation in which CBP knows that Israelis had worked illegally, with or without proof of employmentand/or admission of unauthorized employment. If the Israelideclares under $10,000 or over that amount--as long as they declare,they are free to return to Israel. Per Newark's OCET's experienceand TECS records, Newark estimates that roughly 800 Israelis whocarried $5,000 or more and stayed four to six months were eitherstopped, interviewed and/or had outbound examinations in CY 2009.The scale of this cash transport is not small-for just one POE: 800Israelis multiplied by $5000 minimum, equals a lot of money--atleast $4 million!

--------------------------------- Dead Sea and Organized Crime (OC)---------------------------------45.(SBU) Organized Crime in the Dead Sea industry is a real concern.Tel Aviv has consistently received information that large sums ofmoney are allegedly being laundered and transported between theUnited States and Israel. Due to the amount of money beinglaundered and transported, Tel Aviv has long suspected a linkbetween the Dead Sea industry and OC. In early December, FPUreceived an e-mail from an informant who said he had informationalleging that a key Dead Sea company is connected to OC. ARSO-I andFPU subsequently interviewed this informant; the ARSO-I's report ofthis interview states: "The SUBJECT stated that s/he is inpossession of computer disks with all of this company's accounts,money totals, smuggled bulk cash from the United States to Israeland has a complete understanding of the alleged illegal activitiesto include the employing of illegal workers, suspected drugsmuggling, money laundering, intimidation, threats, extortion, andtax evasion. The SUBJECT also claimed that this company isallegedly owned by a major organized crime family in Israel that hasthreatened SUBJECT'S life, extorted money from SUBJECT, and has sent people to physically assault SUBJECT." Due to the ongoing criminalinvestigation in the United States, no additional details can bereleased at this time.

46.(SBU)Further adding credibility to our suspicions, is an arrest case from this past summer in Japan where KIOSKs run by youngIsraelis were allegedly being used by an OC organization to launderits drug money and real estate investment deals. As noted above,some Dead Sea companies have real estate and investment companies as part of their overall structure.

47.(SBU)Shell and holding companies are all part of the industry's corporate strategy, designed mainly to distance themselves from theillegal workers at the KIOSKs. To exemplify, one Dead Sea holdingcompany has 60+ companies under it. Now, assume that one of those60+ companies has a contract with another company and that othercompany then hires the illegal workers. This scenario is quitecommon, complicating our efforts to combat and uncover Dead Seafraud. Furthermore, once a company is found to be employing illegalworkers it merely changes its name or creates a new owner for ashell company and applies for H2B petitions. As mentioned earlier,there are a handful of attorneys who have been filing the majorityof the Dead Sea industry's petitions and I539s. They appear to bepassionate lobbyists for these new companies--almost as if there hadbeen a previous working relationship (as in, with the "old"company).

48.(SBU) Sometimes, key Dead Sea players have been "caught-out" by their own non-transparent corporate structures. Recently, Tel Avivreceived an e-mail complaint from one of the known Dead Sea lawyersthat also included the CEO's angry e-mail to that lawyer. Problem:that CEO had, in theory, nothing to do with the petitioning companyas he was the CEO of a different company. FPM investigated anddiscovered that the CEO's company sub-leases the KIOSKs to thepetitioning company. Furthermore, the CEO's company has a TECSrecord that says it doesn't exist.

49.(SBU) As a side note: Tel Aviv FPU has a large and growing list of known OC figures identified through open source materials andconfirmed by ARSO-I through Israeli Law Enforcement sources. TelAviv FPU and ARSO-I are working with the Legal Attach on possiblestrategies to combat OC in conjunction with FPU's revocation ofvisas for convicted OC members.

---------------------------------- Dead Sea Industry and Real Estate----------------------------------50.(SBU)Increasingly, we are seeing signs of involvement in realestate by many of the key Dead Sea players. One example is therecruiter mentioned in the 6E deterrent section. In addition, ourARSO-I recently interviewed someone with extensive knowledge of aparticular Dead Sea company; this person alleged that moneylaundering is occurring through the real estate arms of thesecompanies. The real estate arms of these companies are alsoinvolved in employing young Israelis to work for them in violationof their visa status. Further, substantiating this trend, ARSO-Ireported that his source stated that the real estate business wasbecoming as important as the KIOSKs.

51.(SBU) Another aspect of the real estate issue is these companies' provision of housing for their workers, whether legal or not.Industry-wide, there are a large number of apartments and,increasingly, houses, located near the malls where they work.Placing at least four or more workers in a two bedroom place andcharging each person USD 500 a month has made housing anotherpotential money-maker. As the addresses of these apartments/housesmay indicate intent to work, Tel Aviv FPM has been tracking them inan Excel document that contains comprehensive information on theDead Sea industry. Addresses are gleaned from I275s, H2B DS 156s,and received from other inter-agency sources.

--------------- Made in Israel?---------------52.(SBU)Given the shrinking Dead Sea, labor/shipping costs and theincreasing volume of products being sold, Tel Aviv FPM and ARSO-Isuspect that some of these "made in Israel" cosmetic and skincareitem are actually made elsewhere. Supporting this is ARSO-I'sdevelopment of a source who informed him that one of the largercorporate groups was manufacturing soaps in the United States usingpossible illegal workers from Central America and then selling theproduct as from the Dead Sea, i.e. made in Israel. Another likelysource is China, which has both "dead seas" and cheap labor. Lastbut not least, ICE Rome reported to ARSO-I and Tel Aviv that theysuspect these companies may be importing soaps and creams in bulk toIsrael and labeling them here before shipping to the United Statesusing Israel's "most favored trading nation" status to save money.

54.(SBU)It is now rumored that the company being investigated by DBTF Houston has shuttered operations; Tel Aviv continues to monitorchat rooms and message boards for Dead Sea workers. Indications arethat this company's B1B2ers already have been moved to other areasand new companies (including shells) have been created to fill thiscorporate gap. Moreover, Tel Aviv discovered that thisHouston-based company has very close ties to another Dead Seaoperation in Arizona. ARSO-I has passed information to DBTF Houstonas part of their ongoing investigation.

55.(SBU)ARSO-I, ICE Rome and Tel Aviv have consistently waged an information campaign to enlist other regulatory and law enforcemententities to investigate this seemingly fraud-riddled industry on anation-wide basis. However, given the lack of interest in anational investigation, ARSO-I and Tel Aviv highly recommend thatDBTFs nation-wide consider duplicating the Houston-based DBTF'srecent successful efforts.

56.(SBU) Tel Aviv believes that interagency efforts are crucial to combating and preventing Dead Sea Fraud. FPM has developed anetwork of working contacts across the United States with variousagencies such as CBP, ICE, FDNS and USCIS. Tel Aviv greatlyappreciates CBP's inclusion of its fraud prevention efforts in theirofficial publications such as the New York/Newark TacticalAnalytical Unit (TAU) Weekly Intelligence Brief and the Office ofIntelligence and Operations Coordination's Weekly IntelligenceNotes. As one prong of a multi-faceted fraud situation, ourcontinued inter-agency sharing of information, trends and analyseshave and will continue to tighten the noose on Israelis workingillegally. Complementing the FPM's efforts is the ARSO-I's ongoingcommunications with Law Enforcement entities to facilitateinformation-sharing and to track a growing number of arrestedIsraelis and Dead Sea companies under investigation.

----------------------------------------- 6C and 6E Ineffective: Stronger Deterrents Needed-----------------------------------------57. (SBU) 9 FAM 40.65 INA 212(A)(6)(E)(6)Illegal entrants and immigration violators.(E) Smugglers.(i) In general.-Any alien who at any time knowingly has encouraged,induced, assisted, abetted, or aided any other alien to enter or totry to enter the United States in violation of law is inadmissible.

Per 9 FAM 40.65 N5, 6E could be incurred for offering an alien a job under circumstances where it is clear that the alien will not enterthe United States legally in order to accept employment.

58.(SBU)Post is looking into either P6E- or 6E-ing known Israeli recruiters of B2 workers. One recruiter recently applied for avisa, saying that he was in real estate and no longer in the DeadSea business. The applicant, because of his prior Dead Sea history,was vetted more closely by FPU. FPU discovered that he hadrecruited B2 workers and was still doing so; a second interview bythe ARSO-I and FPU resulted in a 6E finding. Using the 6E provisioncan deter recruiters from traveling to the United States, howeverthey would still be free to recruit B2 workers in Israel and online.

59.(SBU)Per the above I-275 analyses, almost 18 percent of those denied entry are found ineligible under 6C1. Israelis 6C1'd tend tobe recent cases in which they obtained a visa from Tel Aviv tellingone story (vacation) to the interviewing officer and another story(work) to CBP officers--misrepresentation. Post has seen cases inwhich CBP could have and, for their own reasons, did not do so.Post is unable to make 6C1 findings unless the applicant wasdetermined to have cut off a line of questioning with a materialfact-in reality, this determination is made after the visa'sissuance. Due to Tel Aviv's lack of information as to when B1B2ersstart work, it is difficult to apply the 30/60 day rule per 9FAM40.63 N4.7-1 and 9FAM 40.63 N4.7-2. It is also not yet clearwhether 6C1 will be a strong deterrent as most of those recentlydenied entry have been barred for at least five years. After fiveyears, they'll certainly learn first-hand the severity of thelifetime consequences of their 6C1 ineligibility when they apply fora new visa.

-------------------------------------- New, Old Deterrent: Limit B1B2 Validity?--------------------------------------60.(SBU)The essence of Tel Aviv's 214b problem is not whether theapplicant will return, but whether the applicant will abide by theterms of his/her B1B2 visa. This cable presents strong evidencethat many post-Army Israelis violate the terms of their visas. Asthis practice is culturally acceptable, Tel Aviv thus far has beenunable to determine a pattern that would help interviewing officersidentify mala-fide applications. Several years ago, Tel Avivlimited visas issued to middle- and high-school aged students to theapproximate end of their military service so as to prompt a look attheir post-army situations. Per CA's request this practice stopped.Being able to review the applications of Israelis who previouslyreceived limited visas has been helpful in identifying patterns andin collecting crucial information about illegal recruitment and workpractices. This, combined with the large number of post-armyIsraelis who work illegally on their B1B2 visas, has led Tel Aviv tore-examine the efficacy of limiting young Israelis' visas, with afocus on those who recently finished their military service. Welook forward to a dialogue with CA on this issue.

61.(SBU)There are a variety of reasons described in this cable for Tel Aviv to re-consider limiting visas of those in the post-militaryservice age group. Of note is that, while in the military, Israelismust obtain special permission to vacation abroad and return tomilitary service or face being charged as a deserter. And forpost-army Israelis, given the widespread and culturally acceptedintentions to work illegally, the idea would be to limit post-armyissued visas to one- or multiple- entry for one year (un-annotated),sharply reducing the time and opportunities to work illegally. Thisone year visa limitation idea would also give us more informationabout their actual travel versus their stated plans, helping usbetter identify mala-fide first time applicants. It should be notedthat Tel Aviv's interviewing officers have been consciouslyevaluating each applicant as an individual and trying not todiscriminate against a broad age-group category. Frustratingly, weregularly receive reports on Israelis known to be working whoappeared to be solid visa issuance cases during their interviews,which were based on the best available information regarding theirties.

--------------------------------------- Visa Waiver Program (VWP) Implications---------------------------------------62.(SBU) While security and biometric requirements are Israel's keyhurdles to joining the VWP, it now has the added complication ofbeing over the three percent refusal rate threshold due to post-armyIsraelis' tendency to abuse their visas. Predictably, dual nationalIsraeli workers with VWP country passports have bypassed Tel Avivand entered the United States on their VWP passports. Tel Aviv'sadjusted refusal rate for host country nationals for B1B2 visasincreased from 1.27 percent in FY 2007 to 4.38 percent in FY 2009.It appears this rate will climb further; for FY 2010, as of December30, it was 5.91 percent. Worldwide, the refusal rate for allIsraelis is higher yet. Although our refusal rate continues torise, we are still taking great pains to interview each applicant asindividual cases.

-------------------------------------------- Annotations as a Fraud Prevention Tool: Israelis Prove to be Cleverand Adaptable--------------------------------------------63.(SBU)As an innovative fraud prevention tool, Tel Aviv, inconsultation with 9FAM 41.113 PN6, 9FAM 41.31 N19 and CBP officers,began adding a particular, positive annotation on some full-validityB1B2 visas issued to those within this problematic demographic. Dueto a lack of "tells," Tel Aviv has not been able to distinguishdefinitively between those who intend to abuse their visas byworking illegally from those who do not; as mentioned above,recruiters are coaching applicants on what to do/say in theirinterviews. Our annotations were intended to give CBP officers, whoare able to talk to our applicants several weeks/monthspost-interview, an opportunity to prevent B1B2 visa abuse. Allapplicants in this age group are potentially "at risk" forrecruitment, especially after being granted B1B2 visas; because ofthis risk, CBP officers have told FPM that they appreciate our useof such annotations. It should be pointed out that only a minorityof visas for this demographic were annotated.

64. (SBU) The first annotation employed was "First Trip: travelling to XYZ with XYZ relative." This proved ineffective, for Israelislearned to create stories to cover discrepancies with the annotationand it applied only to the first trip. To replace this, the moregeneric "B2 CCD" annotation informed CBP that the Israeli hassufficient ties to qualify for visa and told us their trip's intentwas B2 purposes, tourism. At any rate, clever Israelis figured outthat B2 CCD meant they needed to be consistent with the falsetourism story sold to Tel Aviv with CBP. Given CA's aversion toannotations, we have ceased the use of B2 CCD annotations.

65.(SBU) Predictably, Israelis are chatting online at sites devoted to working in the United States about perceived patterns of TelAviv's actions, including annotations. While reviewing "Forums forJob Advertisements in the U.S.," FPU discovered this posting: "Ihave an important question: I got a visa in the mail for 10 yearsand the visa was annotated 1st trip with parents. I am really notplanning on traveling with my parents. Can anyone help? Tell me whatcan I do?" The response was: "you have been busted...this is a newpolicy that the Embassy has taken in order to make sure no one foolsthem. Applicants say they are traveling with parents in order tomaximize their chances in getting a visa. No way in getting aroundthis cause it appears in their computers. Best idea for you is toask your mother if she wants to join you in this trip."

------------------------------------ Facebook as a Fraud Prevention Tool------------------------------------66.(SBU)The Internet has "gifted" us with new fraud tools for ourtoolbox. Facebook (FB) is a prime example as we use it in many ways.

67.(SBU) Confirming Identities and/or Affiliations (assumes public access): Not surprisingly, Dead Sea-related FB pages exist-most arein Hebrew: two examples are "Carts in San Diego" and "Dead Sea inMiami." FPU checks which "location" or "network" with which theperson in question might be associated. If an applicant signed upfor the Houston network (or other area known for Dead Sea workers),it raises a red flag that they should be interviewed more thoroughlyas to the trip's true purpose. FPU also trawls through FB's DeadSea-related groups to spot-check members or "fans" of a particularpage against the CCD to see what type of visa, if any, theyreceived. Likewise, surfing through an applicant's list of"friends" for familiar Dead Sea names and/or for that person's U.S.contact's listing as a "friend" can be fruitful. These searcheshelp determine whether or not the applicant or the applicant'scontacts are connected to Dead Sea-related activities.

68.(SBU) FB pages have helped official investigations, too. At the request of ICE, Tel Aviv, armed with some bio data, was able toverify the identity of a person who was working at a KIOSK byfinding that person's FB page photo and comparing it to his/her CCDphoto.

69.(SBU) Recruiters and job listings: FB has pages for Dead Sea job listings and one such site is "Nova USA." To investigate, the FPUvisits that page and looks at the names of the administrators andthe contact e-mail addresses for job listings (which can lead us torecruiters) and then checks the information against the CCD via atext search. If there are "hits," then the information within thesecases, such as other e-mail addresses are text searched to see wherethe information trail leads. Ultimately, all key information iswatch-phrased.

------------------------------------ Outreach as a Fraud Prevention Tool------------------------------------70.(SBU)In September, Tel Aviv publicly launched a consular video,"Illegal Work in the U.S.: Price is Too High"(usembassy-israel.org.il/consular/niv/index.a spx). This video hasbeen viewed on the Embassy's You-Tube channel over 5,700 times,easily making it Tel Aviv's most popular one. In addition to alsoposting it on the consular section's FB page, the video is beingplayed in the visa waiting room in a loop, along with a video thatexplains the application process. Some Israelis who have beendenied entry told CBP that they had seen the video while in thewaiting room and that they still intended to work despite itswarnings!

71.(SBU)The video's debut launched an active, ongoing campaign by FPU to educate post-army Israelis about how to work legally in theUnited States. The video was publicized on national radio, leadingto a spate of national media articles on Israelis working in theUnited States. In November, Channel 2, a key TV channel, picked upon this issue and invited two Israelis who had been denied entry totell their stories in a live, five minute segment. The moral: theconsequences (barred from entering the United States for at leastfive years) are not worth the illegal work. Right after their TVsegment aired, FPU and ARSO-I met with one of these two Israelis.This meeting was an eye-opener, for we learned more about how youngIsraelis lie in their visa interviews. FPU is currently schedulingadditional individual meetings with I275ers to glean moreinformation on how they succeeded in obtaining B1B2s when their trueintent was to work. As a counterfoil to meetings with I275ers, FPUhas requested through ARSO-I to meet with several Embassy localguard force (LGF) staff, who also belong to this problematic agegroup; the RSO's office is currently reviewing this request.

72.(SBU)Post has had positive results from its campaign against illegal work. FPU has received e-mails from numerous Israelisinquiring as to whether the work opportunities that they have beengiven are legal or not; most have not been. Also, we have receivede-mail from informants, one of whom may crack a high-profile DeadSea company wide open. Still others have e-mailed to let us knowthey had quit their H2B jobs as they either didn't like the work orsuspected the employer was not legitimate. ARSO-I and FPU havefollowed up on every email and contact in the attempt to glean asmuch information as possible from those actually recruited by orworking for these companies.

73.(SBU)Phase II of the campaign is about to commence. Included in this phase is the production of a second video. Instead of havingthe Embassy produce, it will be produced by a group of students froma noted Israeli film school. These students are in the same agedemographic as Dead Sea workers, and, because of this, we hope thisvideo will resonate even more strongly with post-army Israelis. TheNovember and December 2009 arrests of Israelis working at KIOSKs inHouston and Seattle also will reinforce the video's message.

74.(SBU) As in phase I, Tel Aviv continues to work with our Public Diplomacy colleagues to alert Israelis to the consequences ofworking illegally via mainstream media outreach. Thus far, severalarticles have been published and received wide distribution.Previously, journalists from papers such as the Wall Street Journalhave reported on this industry (and quoted illegal Israelis);additional, mass-audience articles should also help push thiscampaign forward.

-------------------------------------- New Mailing Address for Official Mail--------------------------------------75.(SBU) The Department of State and the U.S. Postal Service (USPS)changed the unclassified Diplomatic Pouch regulations for sendingand receiving official mail. No longer are we to use the DiplomaticPost Office (DPO/APO) for sending and receiving official mail. Allofficial mail sent to Tel Aviv should use this Diplomatic Pouchaddress:

----------- Conclusion-----------76.(SBU) The Dead Sea industry is continually adapting to neweconomic opportunities in addition to playing their corporate"games." Prior to the establishment of the Dead Sea industry,Israelis were known to work illegally for moving companies. Thoughnot as widespread as the Dead Sea industry, as mentioned in reftelA, B1B2 locksmiths also are of concern. Tel Aviv's dedicated,motivated fraud team and ARSO-I are working hard to stay on top offraud trends--it is not easy. Tel Aviv greatly appreciates itsclose ties with numerous DHS agencies and officers--together we formpart of the "global" effort to combat fraud within thisfraud-riddled industry. As part of these closer ties, we thankthose CBP and USCIS officers who contributed important text andstatistics to this cable. For future fraud efforts on this issue,Tel Aviv looks forward to working with additional partners from thelaw enforcement community.

77.(SBU)Tel Aviv's FPM, Wendy Vincent, looks forward to hearing from others who have been working on Dead Sea industry fraud and iswilling to share information accordingly. As mentioned above, shemaintains a distribution list for Tel Aviv's ad-hoc e-mails on DeadSea trends, issues and data updates to her extensive Excel documenton the Dead Sea industry. Should you wish to join thise-distribution list or establish contact with Tel Aviv, pleasee-m

Thursday, January 19, 2012

After the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, the people of Kazakhstan, like those in the rest of the former Soviet Republics, experienced a revival in religious affiliation.

In some sectors of Kazakh society, the repression of spiritual life in the Soviet days was reversed when Kazakhstan became independent in December of that year. Previously non-existent elements of Saudi-Wahhabi inspired crazy Salafism crept to the surface in Kazakhstan and are now apparent, especially in the southern and western regions of the country located near the Caspian Sea and the volatile North Caucasus....

Salafism is a reform movement of Islam in which followers believe that the life of their Prophet Mohammad and the earliest Muslim community constitutes a universal paradigm for interpreting world events and history. Salafists consider the founding years of Islam to be the prototype for their cultural and religious validation and use examples from that era as a template to build relationships with "infidel" or non-Salafist Muslim communities in the contemporary world.

"Jihadi-Salafists" see historical evolution as the unfolding of a single contest: the struggle of Good (true Islam) versus Evil (false Islam and Disbelief). [1] Although Salafist doctrine is largely rejected by the Islamic world, Saudi Arabia and Qatar stand apart as the leading country that preaches the doctrine.

Although "Salafists", or "Wahabbis" - as Central Asians and Russians commonly call them - are still a small minority at less than 1% of the population in Kazakhstan, they are having a more significant impact on the country than this would suggest.

Increasing numbers of Salafists in Kazakhstan are being influenced by calls to violence from jihadis in the North Caucasus and from Jund al-Khilafa (JaK - Army of the Caliphate), a terrorist group led by Kazakhs based in the Afghanistan-Pakistan border region.

According to its online statements, JaK is comprised of "mujahideen from different nationalities, but is made up 90% Kazakh nationals who are interested in the military, faith, intellectual, and political support for our brothers in order for them to rise to an acceptable level of ability to wage the fight" against the regime of President Nursultan Nazarbayev.

Three videos that JaK released in 2011 attest that the group has operated in Khost province, Afghanistan, against US forces along with Taliban-supported foot soldiers.

While not all Salafists promote violence and not all aspiring jihadis are Salafists, there is a link between Salafist fundamentalist interpretations of Islam and terrorist attacks that have been carried out in Kazakhstan. In 2011, three terror incidents in claimed by JaK - in Atyrau, Taraz and Boraldai, Almaty - bore the mark of Jihadist-Salafist influence.

Terror let looseOn November 12, 2011, in Taraz, southeastern Kazakhstan, Maksat Kariyev went on a noontime rampage killing five security officers, one gun shop guard, and himself in a suicide bombing that he detonated when a police commander approached him.

The interrogation of six members of the cell that prepared Kariyev for the attack revealed that one was a "spiritual mentor" who drew up the attack plan for Kariyev and helped purchase and store the RPG-26 grenade launcher, RGD-5 grenade, Makarov pistol and two sawed-off shotguns that Kariyev used in the attack, which lasted several hours.

Kariyev, who has a background as former senior rifleman in the Kazakh army, was an ideal fighter to carry out the attack from an operational standpoint. However, from an ideological standpoint, Kariyev was weak. He was a drinker who suffered from fits of temper tantrums and could not hold a job or live in a permanent residence after leaving the army.

Kariyev consulted with local imams prior to his attack and asked about the consequences of him committing a suicide attack to kill infidels. The cell’s "spiritual leader" ultimately persuaded Kariyev and the other cell members to conduct jihad and kill police officers in order to establish an Islamic caliphate. When Kariyev carried out the attack, he drugged himself up on narcotics and followed those orders.

JaK said in a statement the day after the attack that:

In Taraz, you saw with your own eyes what one soldier did to you, and God willing you will see horrors by the hands of men who don't fear death and give their souls easily to support the religion of Islam and defend the honor of the Muslims.

On October 31, in Atyrau, a port city on the Caspian Sea in western Kazakhstan, a terrorist blew himself up next to an apartment building near the intended target - the Prosecutor-General's office - and another bomb detonated in a garbage can blocks away. The terrorist who blew himself up did so by mistake. A claim of credit by JaK following the attack stated that:

We refute that the last attack was carried out as a martyrdom-operation. It seems that the bomb exploded accidentally, which led to the martyrdom of its carrier. We ask Allah to accept him among the martyrs.

The cell responsible for the two explosions in Atyrau was formed in 2009 by 20-year-olds who were inspired by the ethnic Buryat Russian-born Islamic convert Said Buryatsky, who became a jihadi leader in the North Caucasus before Russian forces killed him in 2010.

In 2011, the Atyrau cell connected with JaK's leadership in the Afghanistan-Pakistan border region and received orders to carry out the bombings.

That Atyrau was the site of the October 31 explosions is symptomatic of the growing extremism in the province. According the Director of Religion Department in Atyrau, 90% of Atyrau province's 8,000 practicing Muslims are between the ages of 13 and 30 and 70% of those 8,000 young people are influenced by Salafism. If those numbers are correct, then there are more than 5,000 Salafists in Atyrau alone. In the case of these Atyrau bombings, it required only four of those young Salafists to carry out what could have been a deadly attack.

In Boraldai Village outside of Alamaty, five JaK fighters were killed on December 3, 2011, when Kazakhstan security forces surrounded them inside their safe house. Kazakh authorities suspected the cell of carrying out a drive-by shooting that killed two police officers on November 8 and possibly another November 11 shooting in Almaty in which two other police officers were killed.

The cell was reportedly planning additional terror attacks in Almaty before its elimination.

Only the leader of the cell, Yerik Ayazbayev, escaped from Boraldai at the time of the shootout, but he was killed on December 29 in Kyzylorda, southern Kazakhstan after police investigated what appeared to be an accidental explosion that Ayazbayev set off in his apartment building.

Like Kariyev's cell, the Boraldai cell also had a "spiritual mentor", Aghzan Khasen, who died in the shootout in Boraldai. This appears to be a standard model of Jak cells in Kazakhstan: six or seven fighters under the lead of a "spiritual mentor" who is a Jihadist-Salafist.

On December 6, three days after the Boraldai shootout, JaK issued a statement saying that JaK fighters were "ready to be killed in the thousands in order to support [Islam]" and that "losing our lives is a cheap price that we pay for this cause". JaK asked that "God give glory" to the fighters who were killed by "the apostate forces of the Nazarbayev regime" at "a base where the five lions of the al-Zahir Baybars Battalion of Jund al Khilafa were gathered".

Members of the Salafist community in western Kazakhstan, were also suspected of killing policemen in the Aktobe region on July 1, 2011, and another special unit officer on July 2 during the raid to capture the killers. Although no connection with JaK has been proven, six suspects were alleged to have taken part in the attacks, which is consistent with the size of JaK cells.

In an effort to curb Salafist influence in the country, Nazarbayev introduced a bill in September, 2011, to combat religious extremism, but one that also restrains basic religious freedoms. The bill, which has been approved by the lower house of parliament and the senate, requires religious organizations to dissolve and register again through a procedure that is virtually guaranteed to exclude smaller religious groups, including most Muslim groups and also minority Christian groups.

Trying to turn the tideThe merits of clamping on down on religion in the wake of the rising Jihadi-Salafist undercurrent in Kazakhstan needs to be weighed against the risks of alienating practicing Muslims with new religion law. But regardless, one thing is for certain. Any policy or law that affects religion will become propaganda for JaK and possibly a recruiting boon for the terror group.

On October 26, 2011, JaK released a video in which it said:

We call upon you to abolish these laws, and we also demand that you offer an apology to the people for that mistake. We demand complete freedom for Muslims to carry out their rituals of worship. In the event you insist on your position, then we will be forced to make a move against you. Know that the policy that you are following is the same that was applied in Tunisia, Libya and Egypt; however, as you have seen, it only caused loss to those who exercised it.

Five days after delivering this message, the Atyrau bombers attempted their attack. This showed that JaK could follow up on its warnings and that its words were not hollow. With JaK cells entrenched in Kazakhstan, Nazarbayev will have to add JaK's capabilities to his calculus when he considers other measures to combat the growth of Salafism in his country.

TASHKENT - When newly elected Kyrgyz President Almazbek Atambayev traveled to Turkey for his first official bilateral visit from January 12 to 15, many Kyrgyz watchers were looking for clues on Kyrgyzstan's future foreign policy course in the next six years - the duration of the single term allowed for a Kyrgyz President.

Others immediately criticized former prime minister Atambayev, who took over as president on December 1, for making his first blunder by not traveling to Russia, which Atambayev has often in the past called Kyrgyzstan's "main strategic partner".

Since the first foreign visit of any newly elected president carries with it great symbolic meaning, should we also expect the resurgence of Turkey's influence in Central Asia in general and in Kyrgyzstan in particular in the near future, in a rerun of the heady early 1990s? Then, Turkey unsuccessfully attempted to position itself as a "big brother" for newly independent Turkic countries of Central Asia, only to abandon such ambitions when it became clear that Turkey was trying to punch above its weight given the limitations of its economic strength.

Turkey's foremost priority and preoccupation for the past 40 years or so has been integration into the European Union, so Ankara's periodic surges of interest in other regions, including Central Asia, have waxed and waned based on the progress or lack of thereof in its talks with the EU.

This time, the new-found love between Kyrgyzstan and Turkey seems to suggest that it is not Turkey that is trying to reengage its Central Asian cousin more strongly; rather, President Atambayev is attempting to diversify Kyrgyzstan's foreign policy away from superpowers such as Russia, the United States and China and thus lessen his country's heavy dependence on them. Cultivating the so-called second-tier countries like Turkey may look a better bet, as they emerge as strong economies with increasing technological and investment potential.

In the past, the main foreign policy strategy of former Kyrgyz presidents has been to play one superpower against the other in order to gain maximum benefit for Kyrgyzstan and its ruling regimes. Such political brinkmanship and attempts to juggle superpower interests have been detrimental for Kyrgyzstan. They have led to two forced regime changes in a decade, each time as the balance was perceived to be tilting too much towards one superpower at the cost of the other.

It is widely believed that US threw its weight behind the so-called bloodless "Tulip Revolution" in May 2005, when president Askar Akaev was ousted - he then found asylum in Russia. The bloody overthrow of Kurmanbek Bakiev in April 2010 was the result of a combination of economic sanctions and political pressure from the Kremlin.

In the aftermath of the violent regime change in 2010, former president Bakiev's all-powerful son, Maxim Bakiev, who was the central figure in his father's regime, found safe haven in London, while Kurmanbek himself is believed to have fled to Belarus.

Superpowers like Russia, US and China have looked at Kyrgyzstan with a view of furthering their own strategic and geopolitical aims. As such, the US has not really been interested in investing much into the Kyrgyz economy, largely limiting itself to securing its strategic and geopolitical interests related to continued access to the Manas airbase near Bishkek; Russian investments and economic assistance came with political and economic domination.

Politically, China has sought the Kyrgyz government's support for its repression of ethnic Uyghurs in its restive western Xinjiang province, and economically it has been interested in marketing its products in Kyrgyzstan and using the country Kyrgyzstan to penetrate the markets elsewhere in the region.

The week before traveling to Turkey, President Atambayev played host to Japanese Deputy Foreign Minister, who was in Kyrgyzstan's capital, Bishkek, as part of a bilateral exercise to commemorate the 20th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries.

Atambayev and Prime Minister Omurbek Babanov spared no effort in trying to convince their Japanese guests that Kyrgyzstan was safe for foreign investments in various sectors, including, first and foremost, mining.

Therefore, Kyrgyz government's recent attempts at courting Japan, Turkey and other second-tier countries are meant to diversify Kyrgyzstan's foreign partners and aim at attracting much-needed foreign investments into the economy, which was severely damaged by the violent regime change and bloody ethnic clashes in 2010.

A similar foreign policy strategy has benefited neighboring Uzbekistan, whose best friends in terms of economic and investment cooperation and transfer of technologies are South Korea, Germany, India, Japan, Singapore, Malaysia, Vietnam, Turkey, Oman and some other countries which have been courted and cultivated by Uzbek government over many years.

Uzbekistan has a number of inherent advantages over Kyrgyzstan, such as vast natural gas reserves, a rich mineral base, a larger market, relatively better infrastructure and internal transportation system - and most importantly political stability, which is the bedrock for attracting foreign direct investment.

Therefore, even if Uzbekistan's humble success is used as a yardstick, Kyrgyzstan will still have a tall order to follow since successful implementation of such a strategy will require many years, if not decades, of patient and persistent work and maintenance of political stability and continuity of reforms in Kyrgyzstan. A single six-year term is not really enough to see through such a long-term strategy.

To translate the political goodwill and warm inter-personal relations between the two leaders, President Atambayev and Turkish President Abdullah Gull have agreed that both sides will work towards increasing bilateral trade turnover between the two countries to US$1 billion by 2015 from $300 million in 2011. It is an ambitious plan given the size of the Kyrgyz economy and small total volume of its foreign trade, which reached $4 billion last year.

The Turkish president also promised to help Kyrgyzstan to attract Turkish investments to the amount of $450 million in the next few years - provided the Kyrgyz authorities create favorable conditions for foreign investors.

Foreign investors' confidence in Kyrgyz economy has been shaken recently not only because of the political instability in the country but also as a result of the weak government protection of foreign investments. Some businesses established with the participation of foreign direct investment during the rule of Kurmanbek Bakiev fell prey to the Kyrgyz authorities' "nationalization campaign" carried out in the aftermath of his violent overthrow.

This campaign targeted all businesses considered to have enjoyed too cozy a relationship with the former regime or which were illegally seized by the Bakiev clan and cronies. The new Kyrgyz authorities have refused to acknowledge that it was not possible to establish and run a successful business in Kyrgyzstan during the time of Bakiev without entering some kind of deal with Maxim Bakiev or some other high-profile representatives of the regime.

Some critics of the Kyrgyz government have accused the new authorities of "flagrant disrespect for private property and asset grabbing", which was actually just history repeating itself - since former president Bakiev and his team used the same tactic in taking over various businesses and property after the overthrow of the former Askar Akaev in 2005.

If President Atambayev's pronouncements made in Turkey are any indication of what might be in store for foreign investors, then we can expect that the biggest and most lucrative foreign investment in the country - the Canadian-owned Kumtor gold mine, which contributes around 60% of Kyrgyzstan's exports - might become the next target for Kyrgyz authorities in the near future.

While addressing the Turkish Parliament, Atambayev said that in the last 10 years gold worth of $10 billion was extracted from the Kumtor mine while Kyrgyz state coffers received only 3% of that money. Such coded accusations usually precede some real arm-twisting at a later stage.

As Turkey engages Kyrgyzstan more strongly both economically and politically, its immediate responsibility will be to apply strong but well-meaning brotherly pressure on Kyrgyz leaders to bring about genuine reconciliation among the ethnic majority Kyrgyz and Kyrgyzstan's largest ethnic minority Uzbeks. Both are Turkic speaking Muslim people.

So far, Turkish leaders have conveniently chosen not to raise this issue in their bilateral talks; or if it was discussed during the recent bilateral summit, that was not publicized.

If Turkey continues to remain an indifferent bystander and look the other way when it comes to the repression and systematic violence against ethnic Uzbeks by the Kyrgyz state in the southern provinces of Osh and Jalalabad, such a policy will be short-sighted and ultimately untenable.

So far, Turkey has only sponsored one conference on the 2010 ethnic clashes in the southern part of Kyrgyzstan, which was held in the Kyrgyz Issik-Kul lake resort in their immediate aftermath. That is definitely too little for a country that considers itself as the champion of the unity and brotherhood of Turkic peoples.

Turkey will not be able to replace Russia as Kyrgyzstan's "main strategic partner" any time in the future, and Turkey does not seem to entertain any such plans. But if Turkey does indeed start to invest in the Kyrgyz economy and assist Kyrgyzstan in capacity building and military training with the prospect of establishing a complete visa-free regime between the two countries in the future, as was announced during the bilateral meetings, then Kyrgyzstan will definitely be able to lessen its dependence on Russia or any other superpower.

For that to happen, President Atambayev will be expected to ensure political stability, and a transparent and predictable environment for foreign investment in the country.

Fozil Mashrab is a pseudonym used by an independent analyst based in Tashkent, Uzbekistan.