Establishment
critics of the war on Iraq restricted their comments
regarding the attack to the administration arguments they took to be
seriously intended: disarmament, deterrence, and links to terrorism.

They scarcely made
reference to liberation, democratization of the
Middle East, and other matters that would render irrelevant the weapons
inspections and indeed everything that took place at the Security
Council or within governmental domains.

The reason, perhaps,
is that they recognized that lofty rhetoric is the
obligatory accompaniment of virtually any resort to force and therefore
carries no information. The rhetoric is doubly hard to take seriously
in
the light of the display of contempt for democracy that accompanied
it,
not to speak of the past record and current practices.

Critics are also
aware that nothing has been heard from the present
incumbents -- with their alleged concern for Iraqi democracy -- to
indicate that they have any regrets for their previous support for
Saddam Hussein (or others like him, still continuing) nor have they
shown any signs of contrition for having helped him develop weapons
of
mass destruction (WMD) when he really was a serious danger.

Nor has the current
leadership explained when, or why, they abandoned
their 1991 view that "the best of all worlds" would be "an
iron-fisted
Iraqi junta without Saddam Hussein" that would rule as Saddam did
but
not make the error of judgment in August 1990 that ruined Saddam's
record.

At the time, the
incumbents' British allies were in the opposition and
therefore more free than the Thatcherites to speak out against Saddam's
British-backed crimes. Their names are noteworthy by their absence from
the parliamentary record of protests against these crimes, including
Tony Blair, Jack Straw, Geoff Hoon, and other leading figures of New
Labour.

In December 2002,
Jack Straw, then foreign minister, released a dossier
of Saddam's crimes. It was drawn almost entirely from the period of
firm
US-UK support, a fact overlooked with the usual display of moral
integrity. The timing and quality of the dossier raised many questions,
but those aside, Straw failed to provide an explanation for his very
recent conversion to skepticism about Saddam Hussein's good character
and behavior.

When Straw was home
secretary in 2001, an Iraqi who fled to England
after detention and torture requested asylum. Straw denied his request.
The Home Office explained that Straw "is aware that Iraq, and in
particular the Iraqi security forces, would only convict and sentence
a
person in the courts with the provision of proper jurisdiction,"
so that
"you could expect to receive a fair trial under an independent
and
properly constituted judiciary."

Straw's conversion
must, then, have been rather similar to President
Clinton's discovery, sometime between September 8 and 11, 1999, that
Indonesia had done some unpleasant things in East Timor in the past
twenty-five years when it enjoyed decisive support from the US and
Britain.

Attitudes toward
democracy were revealed with unusual clarity during the
mobilization for war in the fall of 2002, as it became necessary to
deal
somehow with the overwhelming popular opposition.

Within the "coalition
of the willing," the US public was at least
partially controlled by the propaganda campaign unleashed in September.
In Britain, the population was split roughly fifty-fifty on the war,
but
the government maintained the stance of "junior partner" it
had accepted
reluctantly after World War II and had kept to even in the face of the
contemptuous dismissal of British concerns by US leaders at moments
when
the country's very survival was at stake.

Outside the two
full members of the coalition, problems were more
serious. In the two major European countries, Germany and France, the
official government stands corresponded to the views of the large
majority of their populations, which unequivocally opposed the war.
That led to bitter condemnation by Washington and many commentators.

Donald Rumsfeld
dismissed the offending nations as just the "Old
Europe," of no concern because of their reluctance to toe Washington's
line. The "New Europe" is symbolized by Italy, whose prime
minister,
Silvio Berlusconi, was visiting the White House. It was, evidently,
unproblematic that public opinion in Italy was overwhelmingly opposed
to
the war.

The governments
of Old and New Europe were distinguished by a simple
criterion: a government joined Old Europe in its iniquity if and only
if
it took the same position as the vast majority of its population and
refused to follow orders from Washington.

Recall that the
self-appointed rulers of the world -- Bush, Powell, and
the rest -- had declared forthrightly that they intended to carry out
their war whether or not the United Nations (UN) or anyone else "catches
up" and "becomes relevant." Old Europe, mired in irrelevance,
did not
catch up. Neither did New Europe, at least if people are part of their
countries.

Poll results available
from Gallup International, as well as local
sources for most of Europe, West and East, showed that support for a
war
carried out "unilaterally by America and its allies" did not
rise above
11 percent in any country. Support for a war if mandated by the UN
ranged from 13 percent (Spain) to 51 percent (Netherlands).

Particularly interesting
are the eight countries whose leaders declared
themselves to be the New Europe, to much acclaim for their courage and
integrity. Their declaration took the form of a statement calling on
the
Security Council to ensure "full compliance with its resolutions,"
without specifying the means.

Their announcement
threatened "to isolate the Germans and French," the
press reported triumphantly, though the positions of New and Old Europe
were in fact scarcely different. To ensure that Germany and France would
be "isolated," they were not invited to sign the bold pronouncement
of
New Europe -- apparently for fear that they would do so, it was later
quietly indicated.

The standard interpretation
is that the exciting and promising New
Europe stood behind Washington, thus demonstrating that "many Europeans
supported the United States' view, even if France and Germany did not."

Who were these "many
Europeans"? Checking polls, we find that in New
Europe, opposition to "the United States' view" was for the
most part
even higher than in France and Germany, particularly in Italy and Spain,
which were singled out for praise for their leadership of New Europe.

Happily for Washington,
former communist countries too joined New
Europe. Within them, support for the "United States' view,"
as defined
by Powell -- namely, war by the "coalition of the willing"
without UN
authorization -- ranged from 4 percent (Macedonia) to 11 percent
(Romania).

Support for a war
even with a UN mandate was also very low. Latvia's
former foreign minister explained that we have to "salute and shout,
'Yes sir.' . . . We have to please America no matter what the cost."

In brief, in journals
that regard democracy as a significant value,
headlines would have read that Old Europe in fact included the vast
majority of Europeans, East and West, while New Europe consisted of
a
few leaders who chose to line up (ambiguously) with Washington,
disregarding the overwhelming opinion of their own populations.

But actual reporting
was mostly scattered and oblique, depicting
opposition to the war as a marketing problem for Washington.

Toward the liberal
end of the spectrum, Richard Holbrooke stressed the
"very important point [that] if you add up the population of [the
eight
countries of the original New Europe], it was larger than the population
of those countries not signing the letter." True enough, though
something is omitted: the populations were overwhelmingly opposed to
the
war, mostly even more so than in those countries dismissed as Old
Europe.

At the other extreme
of the spectrum, the editors of the Wall Street
Journal applauded the statement of the eight original signers for
"exposing as fraudulent the conventional wisdom that France and
Germany
speak for all of Europe, and that all of Europe is now anti-American."

The eight honorable
New European leaders showed that "the views of the
Continent's pro-American majority weren't being heard," apart from
the
editorial pages of the Journal, now vindicated. The editors blasted
the
media to their "left" -- a rather substantial segment -- which
"peddled
as true" the ridiculous idea that France and Germany spoke for
Europe,
when they were clearly a pitiful minority, and peddled these lies
"because they served the political purposes of those, both in Europe
and
America, who oppose President Bush on Iraq."

This conclusion
does hold if we exclude Europeans from Europe, rejecting
the radical left doctrine that people have some kind of role in
democratic societies.

Noam Chomsky is the author, most recently, of Hegemony or Survival:America's
Quest for Global Dominance,
from which this commentary is
adapted. For more information on the book, published by Metropolitan
Books, see http://www.hegemonyorsurvival.net