Cohen on Hamas and Hezbollah

The
1988 Hamas Charter is vile, but I think it's wrong to get hung up on
the prior recognition of Israel issue. Perhaps Hamas is sincere in its
calls for Israel's disappearance -- although it has offered a
decades-long truce -- but then it's also possible that Israel in reality
has no desire to see a Palestinian state.

Perhaps Cohen would be served by reading their charter a little more closely. He also insists the U.S. "should initiate diplomatic contacts with the political wing of Hezbollah."

First off, who is this "political wing?" Does he mean Hizballah
parliamentarians? If that's who he is talking about, then fine, I
understand. The seven-man Shura Council, though, has operational
control over both what Ahmad Nizar Hamzeh calls the "Political and
Administrative Apparatus" as well as the "Military and Security
Apparatus." So while there is a clear division of labor between
Hizballah's activities in the government and its military activities,
the command is more or less unified. (I have no idea how Hamas is set
up, so someone feel free to jump in here.)

Second, why on Earth would Hizballah want to talk to us? What would they want from us?

Third,
it would be one thing if the only thing Hizballah has ever said about
armed resistance was said in the Open Letter of 1985, but Hizballah
leaders have repeatedly and consistently defined the organization as an
armed resistance movement first and foremost. What's more, this armed
resistance is no longer tied into concrete territorial demands that we
could conceivably help out with, such as the Shebaa Farms. So that
complicates things, both for us in dealing with them and also for them
as they try to figure out what the future of their party holds.

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