Jarvis Properties, a limited partnership, owns a parcel of land. Its general partners, Todd and James (brothers), each own a 50 percent interest in the partnership, which is less than the majority consent required to act on behalf of the partnership (Corp. Code, 15904.06(a)). The brothers cannot agree on what to do about the parcel. Their partnership agreement does not address decision-making deadlocks. James sought partition by sale, naming Todd and Jarvis Properties as defendants. Todd hired his own lawyer and hired a separate lawyer, Roscoe, to represent the partnership. James objected to having Roscoe represent the partnership and moved to disqualify Roscoe. James argued that Roscoe was not authorized to act by the requisite majority of the general partners and that Roscoe, who took the position that he was not subject to the direction of either partner and was being paid by Todd, was not acting in the best interests of the partnership and would run up unnecessary litigation costs and deplete the partnership’s limited assets. The court of appeal affirmed an order disqualifying Roscoe. James had a sufficient interest to challenge Roscoe’s authority, having demonstrated a risk that Roscoe's representation may advance Todd’s interests and may not be in the Partnership's best interests. On remand, the court may wish to explore options for resolving deadlock at the entity level and consider appointing a receiver or other neutral. View "Jarvis v. Jarvis" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's order enjoining Reed Smith's action for tortious interference and unjust enrichment in New York state court against Wohl & Fruchter, in a dispute arising from the two firms' concurrent representation of the plaintiff class in the now-settled litigation. The court held that the district court had ancillary jurisdiction over the motion to stay the state court proceedings; the district court properly declined to abstain from exercising jurisdiction where all six factors in Woodford v. Cmty. Action Agency of Green Cty., Inc., 239 F.3d 517, 522 (2d Cir. 2001), favored retaining jurisdiction; the injunction was proper under the Anti-Injunction Act where the district court properly issued the injunction to prevent Reed Smith from relitigating the terms of the Fee Order; and Wohl & Fruchter's cross appeal was procedurally untenable. View "Kaplan v. Reed Smith LLP" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that Rule 6 of the Rules of the Supreme Court of Hawai’i (RSCH) did not prohibit Dentons US LLP from practicing law in Hawai’i through its Hawai’i-licensed attorneys because the portions of RSCH Rule 6 that prohibit non-Hawai’i-licensed attorneys from serving as directors or officers of Hawai’i law firms with a multi-jurisdictional presence were repealed by implication by other rules of the Court.
When the RSCH Rule 6 was first promulgated, only Hawai’i-licensed attorneys could serve as partners or shareholders in Hawai’i law corporations. The Court’s ethical rules governing the practice of law changed thereafter to eliminate the requirement that only Hawai’i-licensed attorneys could serve as partners in Hawai’i law firms and to allow law firms practicing in Hawaii to have non-Hawai’i-licensed members. The Supreme Court held that RSCH Rule 6 did not prohibit a former law firm partners’ practice of law in Hawai’i as part of Dentons US LLP because the portions of RSCH Rule 6 at issue have been superseded, by implication, by other rules of the Court that permit law firms composed of Hawai’i-licensed and non-Hawaii-licensed attorneys to practice law in Hawai’i, to mean “in this state or in any other state or territory of the United States or the District of Columbia.” View "Sheveland v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A." on Justia Law

Richmond issued its first medical marijuana collective permit to RCCC. Three other permits were later issued. The ordinance was amended to reduce the number of dispensary permits from six to three; if a permitted dispensary did not open within six months after the issuance of a permit, the permit would expire. RCCC lost its permit. RCCC filed an antitrust complaint under the Cartwright Act, alleging that the other dispensaries paid for community opposition to RCCC’s applications and also purchased a favorably zoned property. Defendants filed a joint anti-SLAPP (strategic lawsuit against public participation) motion to strike (Code of Civil Procedure 425.16), which was granted as to allegations related to protected activity--statements made before the city council and defendants’ actions in opposing RCCC’s application. Allegations related to the property purchase were not stricken. Some defendants sought attorney fees. The trial judge determined that “defendants prevailed on their” anti-SLAPP motions and awarded 7 Stars $23,120 plus costs of $688.12. The court of appeal affirmed. There is no conflict between the anti-SLAPP statute, which permits an award of attorneys’ fees to a defendant and the Cartwright Act, which permits only a plaintiff to be “awarded a reasonable attorneys’ fee together with the costs of the suit” (Bus. & Prof. Code 16750(a)). View "Richmond Compassionate Care Collective v. 7 Stars Holistic Foundation" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs were all former members of the Fundamentalist Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints (“FLDS”), which illegally practiced polygamy. In 2016, plaintiffs filed suit against the FLDS Prophet, Warren Jeffs, and Jeff’s lawyers, the law firm of Snow Christensen & Martineau (“SC&M”) and one of its partners, Rodney Parker, alleging defendants: (1) directly worked with Jeffs to create a legal framework that would shield him from the legal ramifications of child rape, forced labor, extortion, and the causing of emotional distress by separating families; (2) created an illusion of legality to bring about plaintiffs’ submission to these abuses and employed various legal instruments and judicial processes to knowingly facilitate the abuse; (3) held themselves out to be the lawyers of each FLDS member individually, thus creating a duty to them to disclose this illegal scheme; and (4) intentionally misused these attorney-client relationships to enable Jeffs’ dominion and criminal enterprise. Jeffs defaulted, and the district court dismissed every cause of action against the remaining defendants under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). The issue before the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals stemmed from the district court’s dismissal of all claims against SC&M and Parker (collectively “defendants”). Reviewing the facts in the light most favorable to plaintiffs, the Court affirmed in part and reversed in part. For fifteen plaintiffs who brought legal malpractice and breach of fiduciary duty claims, the Court determined they pled facts sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss: a factual question remained for each of these plaintiffs regarding whether (and how long) equitable tolling applies to their limitations periods, and whether individual implied attorney-client relationships existed. Twelve plaintiffs pled facts sufficient to survive dismissal of their fraudulent and negligent misrepresentation claims, again, there was a factual question regarding when they discovered their claims, thereby starting the running of the statutory period, and whether an implied attorney-client relationship existed. Civil RICO claims were deemed forfeited as inadequately presented in plaintiffs’ opening brief. With respect to TVPRA claims, nine plaintiffs pled facts sufficient to pass muster under the plausibility standard and thus survived dismissal. View "Bistline v. Jeffs" on Justia Law

Mendoza-Garcia, then 16, came to the U.S. from Guatemala in 2004. In 2011 removal proceedings, he sought asylum and withholding of removal, stating that he was afraid to return to Guatemala because his hometown had been torn apart by violence after a mayoral election won through fraud. His merits hearing was scheduled for November 2017. One week before that hearing, his attorney moved to withdraw, stating that he told Mendoza-Garcia six week earlier about an outstanding obligation related to their 2011 representation agreement. Mendoza-Garcia was unable to pay and requested more time. The IJ informed him that financial difficulty would not justify a continuance. When asked a third time if he objected to his attorney’s withdrawal, Mendoza-Garcia said no. The IJ granted the motion; the attorney left. The hearing proceeded, with interpreters translating from English to Spanish and from Spanish to Aguacateco, Mendoza-Garcia’s indigenous language. Mendoza-Garcia stated, “I don’t fear any person in particular or a group, per se,” but “they made us" "get involved with a group to protect the village,” giving him a gun. He stated that he had been expelled from the village and had “no idea what might happen.” The IJ again refused a continuance. The BIA and Sixth Circuit upheld the denial of relief. Denying a continuance was not irrational, discriminatory, or a departure from established policies. This type of procedural due process claim requires a showing of prejudice; Mendoza-Garcia could not show that his “claims could have supported a different outcome.” View "Mendoza-Garcia v. Barr" on Justia Law

In 2005, Evangelos Dimitrakopoulos retained the law firm of Borrus, Goldin, Foley, Vignuolo, Hyman and Stahl, P.C. ("Borrus firm"), for help with a business dispute with Steven Eleftheriou. Represented by the Borrus firm, Dimitrakopoulos and his wife filed a complaint against Eleftheriou and his wife. For undisclosed reasons, the Borrus firm filed a motion to withdraw as counsel shortly after it was retained. Days later, the Borrus firm filed a complaint against Dimitrakopoulos, alleging that its former client owed it $93,811.95 in fees for legal services and that payment had been demanded and not made. Dimitrakopoulos, acting pro se, filed an answer to the collection complaint but filed no counterclaim or third-party claim. In a proceeding before an arbitrator six months after the collection action was filed, the Dimitrakopouloses and the Eleftherious settled their dispute. In light of the settlement, the arbitrator did not issue an award. Months later, the court in the collection matter granted the Borrus firm’s unopposed motion for a final judgment by default in the amount of $121,947.99 for legal services, interest, attorneys’ fees, and court costs. Dimitrakopoulos did not appeal. A total of sixteen months elapsed between the filing of the Borrus firm’s collection action and the entry of the default judgment in that action. After the resolution of the business dispute between the Dimitrakopouloses and the Eleftherious, the collection action remained pending for an additional ten months. On September 10, 2015, approximately three years after the entry of judgment in the collection action, the Dimitrakopouloses sued the Borrus firm and the principal attorneys who worked on their matter for legal malpractice. Defendants moved to dismiss the complaint based on the "entire controversy" doctrine and the doctrine of waiver. The Dimitrakopouloses argued that the damages claimed in the malpractice action were known to them as of September 6, 2011, the day that they settled their dispute with the Eleftherious. The trial court concluded that the Dimitrakopouloses could have asserted their malpractice claim in the collection matter. An Appellate Division panel affirmed that judgment and stated that under Olds v. Donnelly, 150 N.J. 424 (1997), legal malpractice claims were exempt from the entire controversy doctrine to the extent that they need not be asserted in the underlying action. The New Jersey Supreme Court concluded the collection action at issue in this matter was not an “underlying action” as that term was used in Olds, and that the entire controversy doctrine could bar the claim. The record of this appeal, however, was inadequate for an application of the equitable rules that governed here. The Court therefore reversed the Appellate Division, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Dimitrakopoulos v. Borrus, Goldin, Foley, Vignuolo, Hyman and Stahl, P.C." on Justia Law

In a judicial disciplinary proceeding, the Colorado Supreme Court considered the exceptions of now-former Colorado Court of Appeals Judge Laurie Booras to the Colorado Commission on Judicial Discipline’s (the “Commission’s”) recommendation that Judge Booras be removed from office and that she be ordered to pay the costs incurred by the Commission in this matter. The Commission’s recommendation was based on the factual findings and conclusions of law set forth in the December 12, 2018 Report of the Special Masters in this case. That report concluded that Judge Booras had violated Canon 1, Rule 1.2, Canon 3, Rule 3.1, and Canon 3, Rule 3.5 of the Colorado Code of Judicial Conduct by (1) disclosing confidential information belonging to the court of appeals (namely, the vote of a court of appeals division on a case prior to the issuance of the decision in that case) to an intimate, non-spousal partner and (2) using inappropriate racial epithets in communications with that intimate partner, including a racially derogatory reference to a court of appeals colleague. Judge Booras filed exceptions to the Commission’s recommendation, contending that her communications with her then-intimate partner were protected by the First Amendment and that the recommendation that she be removed from office was too severe under the circumstances of this case. In addition, by letter dated January 2, 2019, Judge Booras advised the Chief Justice that she was resigning her position as a Colorado Court of Appeals Judge, effective as of the close of business on January 31, 2019, although no party contended Judge Booras’s resignation rendered this matter moot. Having now considered the record and the briefs of the parties, the Supreme Court concluded the Commission properly found Judge Booras’s communications with her then-intimate partner were not protected by the First Amendment. Furthermore, given Judge Booras’ resignation, which she tendered and which became effective after the Commission made its recommendation, the Court did not decide whether Judge Booras’s removal from office was an appropriate sanction. Rather, the Court concluded the appropriate sanction in this case was acceptance of Judge Booras’s resignation, the imposition of a public censure, and an order requiring Judge Booras to pay the Commission’s costs in this matter. View "In the Matter of Laurie A. Booras" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the Board's decision upholding the ALJ's decision striking, as untimely, a petition for payment of a claimant's attorneys' fees under the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act. The panel held that the ALJ properly used the excusable neglect standard in evaluating the circumstances for the untimely fee petition, and applied the four-factor test in Pioneer Investment Services Co. v. Brunswick Associates Ltd. Partnership, 507 U.S. 378 (1993), to find that there was no excusable neglect in this case. View "Iopa v. Saltchuk-Young Brothers, Ltd." on Justia Law

A jury awarded Oracle damages after finding that Rimini had infringed Oracle copyrights. The court awarded Oracle fees and costs, including $12.8 million for litigation expenses such as expert witnesses, e-discovery, and jury consulting. The Ninth Circuit affirmed, acknowledging that the award covered expenses not included within the six categories of costs identified in 28 U.S.C. 1821 and 1920, and citing the Copyright Act, which gives district courts discretion to award “full costs” to a party in copyright litigation, 17 U.S.C. 505. A unanimous Supreme Court reversed in part. The term “full costs” in the Copyright Act means costs specified in the general costs statute (sections 1821 and 1920), which defines what the term “costs” encompasses in subject-specific federal statutes such as section 505. Courts may not award litigation expenses that are not specified in sections 1821 and 1920 absent explicit authority. The Copyright Act does not explicitly authorize the award of litigation expenses beyond the six categories; the six categories do not authorize an award for expenses such as expert witness fees, e-discovery expenses, and jury consultant fees. Oracle has not shown that the phrase “full costs” had an established legal meaning that covered more than the full amount of the costs listed in the applicable costs schedule. View "Rimini Street, Inc. v. Oracle USA, Inc." on Justia Law