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Operation
Epsom, Baron-sur-Odon and the Battle for Hill 112

Background

The River Odon
runs from south-west to north-east, and enters the river Orne at Caen.
Both north and south of the Odon are ridges of high ground, which dominate
the surrounding area. The sides of the Odon valley roll gently down
to the Odon river, which is more of a narrow stream than a broad river.
Though not deep, it is an obstacle for vehicles, including tanks, because
of the boggy flood plains and many trees along each bank. A few narrow
stone bridges crossed the Odon, but most had been destroyed by the Germans.
Access to the intact bridges was through killing zones of anti-tank
guns and minefields. The numerous small villages in the area consisted
of a few stone farms and cottages, clustered round a church. Most of
the buildings were old, well constructed of local stone, and natural
fortresses for the defending Germans. The northern ridge of the Odon
valley was dominated by the British, but the start line for the operation
was further back, along the line of the Bayeux-Caen railway. The aim
of Epsom was to secure the southern ridge, culminating in Hill 112,
which overlooked Caen to the east (still in German hands). Hill 112
is not really a hill at all. It is the highest point on a ridge with
many false crests, but the view from the trig point reveals its tactical
importance.

On June 18th 1944,
Montgomery issued a directive for the capture of Caen, ordering an attack
principally to the west, with the aim of capturing the high ground above
the Orne and Odon rivers, which overlooked the city. He allotted the
four divisions of Lieutenant-General Dempseys VIII Corps to the
task  7th and 11th Armoured, 15th Scottish
and 43rd Wessex, totalling some 60,000 men and 600 tanks.
The attack was due to begin on 22nd June, and was code-named
Epsom.

The Channel storm
of 19-22 June delayed the arrival of the three new divisions (the 7th
Armoured had already landed), with the result that Epsom was
postponed until 26th June. Because of strong German positions
on high ground to the west (the British right flank), 49th
Division (known as the Polar Bears after their distinctive shoulder
badge) were to attack Fontenay and Rauray a day before the main assault
to secure the high ground the Germans occupied. This attack went in
on 25th June, so by 26th, the German defenders
 mostly 12th SS Hitlerjugend Division (Hitler Youth)
 on Hill 112 were expecting an attack. The attack was launched
at 0730 hours with a tremendous artillery barrage, rather like a First
World War set-piece infantry attack. Amongst the indirect fire support
assets were three RN cruisers anchored offshore and firing shells accurately
fifteen miles inland! The first objective was to reach and force a crossing
over the Odon river. As the opening barrage crept forward one hundred
yards every three minutes, the infantry of the 15th Scottish
division, moved confidently forward, supported by Churchill tanks. John
Keegan describes the advance of the Scotsmen:

" The
division was attacking two brigades up, which meant that six of
its infantry battalions were in the first wave, with the other
three waiting in the rear to support the leaders. As each brigade
also attacked two up, however, this meant there were in fact only
four battalions on the start line, each strung out along a front
of about 1000 yards. And since each battalion, about 750 men strong,
likewise kept two of their four companies in reserve, the true
number of men who started forward into the cornfields that morning
was probably no more than 700. They are best pictured, as they
would have looked from the cockpit of any passing spotter aircraft,
as 24 groups of 30 riflemen, called platoons, separated by intervals
of about 150 yards Each platoon consisted of three smaller
groups, called sections, which were led by a corporal, and were
based on the Bren machine gun which gave them their firepower ".

The Germans - initially
the 12th SS Panzer Division - had turned the route of the
advance into three lines of fortifications of barbed wire entanglements,
machine gun nests, trenches, minefields and artillery and mortar positions.
Battle-hardened on the Eastern front, the SS had been taught to with-hold
their fire until point-blank range, to inflict maximum casualties, then
switch positions so that they would seem more numerous to the attackers
than they actually were. Sometimes, as the British swept past the German
positions, snipers who had laid low opened up on the British second
wave, aiming for the infantry officers leading their men, and tank commanders.

The Scottish battalions,
supported by the tanks, had battled their way through the bocage as
far as Cheux by nightfall and the following morning (27th)
had advanced through Mondrainville, and surprised the Germans troops
guarding the bridge over the Odon river at Tourmeauville. This route
became known as the Scottish Corridor. When all the
battalions of the 15th Scottish Division had been committed
to the battle and the exhausted Scotsmen had advanced as far as Baron,
they were relieved by the infantry of the 11th Armoured Division,
following close behind. Here, we look at the experience of the 4th
Kings Shropshire Light Infantry (4KSLI) of 159th Infantry
Brigade at Baron in detail.

The
Plan

The
basic aim of Epsom was to sweep round to the west and south
of Caen and reach the main Caen-Falaise road. This would almost
encircle the German defenders around Caen, particularly those at
the Carpiquet aerodrome who were preventing any further progress
on Montys left flank. Despite the Field Marshals claims
after the war that his intention was to fix, or hold,
the enemy armour in the east whilst the Americans swept round from
the west, Epsom was clearly designed for the British to achieve
the breakthrough. The Corps plan was to advance on two axes. The
left one stretched from Cheux, via Baron, to Hill 112. On the right,
the axis was from Grainville, via Gavrus, to Evrecy. Heavy German
defensive fire meant that the right axis could make no headway towards
Gavrus, and the major effort became the advance to Baron. The Scottish
Corridor thus stretched from Mondrainville, via the Tourmeauville
bridge. This little stone bridge was rushed by a company of the
2nd Argyll & Sutherland Highlanders at 1700 hrs on
the afternoon of 27th June, and taken intact. For much
of Epsom it was the only crossing point over the Odon, and
thus a considerable bottleneck. Armoured support in the form of
the 23rd Hussars followed, whilst 4KSLI, who had been
following the Scottish advance in lorries, were waiting their turn
to advance. 4KSLI left their trucks at Cheux, and advanced on foot
via Mondrainville, crossing the bridge at 2130 and arrived in Baron
at 2330 hours on 27 June.

The advance
down the Mondrainville-Baron road (which was not then metalled)
was like this:

" the
march up was one of the most unnerving actions of all, with all
the wounded coming back on jeeps; dead, mutilated bodies lying
around; blazing up-ended Bren carriers with their crews still
in them; refugees with their few pitiful belongings pouring back;
the stench of dead cattle "

As they got
closer to the Odon river, the scene became more dangerous:

" The
route, which was not easy to follow, was under small arms fire;
shells and mortar bombs were dropping astride the track, while
close by a self-propelled gun was having a duel with one of our
tanks darkness was falling and the Germans were firing white
Verey lights (signal flares) all the while, and it seemed as though
we were setting off into the unknown " .

As soon as
the 4 KSLI reached Baron, they dug slit trenches along the southern
edge of the village, facing Hill 112. These were two or three-man
trenches for protection against artillery fire. The battalion,
which had landed in France on 14th June, had never
been in battle before, and started suffering casualties from mortar
fire as soon as it arrived at Baron. Three rifle companies (about
100 men each) dug in along the edge of the village, C on the right,
from the calvary cross to the church, A Company beyond them, and
B further along the left flank. D Company and HQ were around the
Chateau de Baron to the rear.

The fields
in front were full of corn, waist-high, which obscured any vision,
and Hill 112 dominated the area. On the morning of 28th
June, whilst the KSLI were digging in, tanks of the 23rd
Hussars and infantry of the 8th Rifle Brigade moved
up to the crest of Hill 112. On reaching the little wood at the
top, German Panzer IVs of 12th SS Division,
based in Esquay, ambushed them. The 23rd Hussars, and
Rifle Brigade troops fought off three SS attacks during the day,
but running short of ammunition, withdrew to beyond Baron that
night.

The Fighting

Withdrawing at
night was common practice amongst tank crews of both sides. With no
night-fighting capability, and vulnerable to enemy infantry tank-hunting
teams, tanks withdrew from the battlefield at last light, when they
could rearm and refuel. That night the Germans surrounded the Scottish
Corridor and counterattacked its base from Mondrainville in
the west, and Mouen in the east. This counter attack failed, and the
following afternoon, 29th June, the 3rd Monmouths
(also part of 159 Brigade) crossed the Odon south of Mouen, widening
the base of the corridor.

At the same time,
the 8th Rifle Brigade and tanks of 3 RTR ground up the long,
dusty slope of Hill 112 again. To the West, tanks of 44 RTR and infantry
from 2 KRRC took Hill 113 and Evrecy, but were forced to retreat by
units of 10th SS Panzer Division. With the 9th,
10th and 12h SS Panzer Divisions all identified
in the area, a major German counter attack was expected  supported
by Ultra Enigma decrypts  and at 2200 that night all 11th
Armoured Division tanks were ordered back north, across the Odon, to
meet this new threat. As the tanks gave up Hill 112 for the second time,
this left just the infantry, including 4 KSLI, south of the Odon river,
and very exposed. The armour had to be withdrawn because it was needed
to protect the flanks and base of the corridor. Also, it had little
room in which to manoeuvre and only the narrow bridges as escape routes
over the river Odon. As the tanks withdrew, the SS immediately reoccupied
Hill 112.

Being overlooked
for most of their time in Baron, 4 KSLI was subjected to near-continuous
mortaring and shelling, usually indirect fire guided by observers in
trees and church towers. These shells and mortar rounds caused many
casualties. Major G. Edwards, commanding C Company, recalled:

" In
the churchyard were several German graves, with a helmet on each wooden
cross. Mortar stonks blew these off, and after each barrage,
a Frenchman would appear and solemnly replace each helmet on its cross The
church spire was an early casualty, which denied our observers a useful
platform "

Just two days into
Epsom, on 28th June, Brigadier JG Sandie, commanding 159
Brigade, which included 4 KSLI, was sacked for not driving his brigade
hard enough. This was a not uncommon reaction by Montgomery in the Normandy
campaign; the neighbouring 49th Division also lost two brigadiers
in this way, whilst the axe later fell on Major-General Erskine, GOC
of 7th Armoured Division, one of his brigadiers and CRA,
and Lieutenant-General Bucknall, GOC of XXX Corps.

Apart
from the shelling, the days were quiet, but everyone was thirsty
as water was short, and the heat was intense, and rations could
only be brought up at night. The battalion was unable to move about
during the day, as all movement attracted shellfire, and battalion
HQ was hit several times; this was later attributed to a civilian
seen moving about the area. He was assumed to be a local Frenchman,
but the discovery of a military wireless in the attic of his house,
led to his arrest, from which he eventually escaped. Interviews
by this author with the current inhabitants who remembered the war
reveal that most villagers were evacuated to Bayeux during the Epsom
battles and returned to find their houses shattered, livestock killed
and crops destroyed by the fighting. Unsurprisingly, nearly all
the houses in Baron are new. 4 KSLIs HQ was originally in
an orchard, then it moved into the walled garden of the Chateau,
finally ending up in the cellars: each time it was shelled, and
many of its signallers and intelligence staff were killed or wounded.

When the British
armour was withdrawn from Hill 112 on 30th June, the Baron-Hill
112 salient protruded like a finger into the German front. As there
was no armour protection between the KSLI and the enemy, C Company brought
up two 6-pounder anti-tank guns and sited them north of the calvary,
which was then a sunken lane. These were to provide flank protection
against the expected Panzer counter-attack.

During the night
of 30th June/1st July, SS soldiers attacked C
Company out of the cornfield and destroyed the anti-tank guns, killing
their crews and setting fire to the two Bren carriers which had towed
them there. The battalions 3-inch heavy mortars, sited in the
field behind Baron church, were also attacked, and destroyed, the bright
glare of their exploding ammunition lighting up the night sky. Pre-arranged
defensive artillery fire was called-for by the KSLI, and the divisional
[medium] 5.5-inch artillery fired at three DF (defensive fire) targets,
code-named Dainty, Dorothy and
Duchess, which helped break up the German assault.
Several Germans infiltrated behind C Companys trenches and Major
Edwards recalled patrolling his company area with Company Sergeant Major
Baker the following morning:

" We
heard a whimpering coming from a bush like a wild animal. CSM Baker
pushed his Sten gun into the branches and flushed out two young SS soldiers,
both only about 16, who were shaking and obviously bomb-happy. They
were led to the rear A while later, we were passing a small slit
trench, when Baker pointed and said Look at that sir. A
German was lying full length neatly in the bottom, with his head under
cover at one end, and his feet his covered at the other. Better
not take any chances sir, he said and put a bullet into the German.
The corpse came to life and more bullets followed the first Later
on, some tanks appeared and helped clear the position, after which we
felt more secure...".

Withdrawal

C Company counted
25 dead SS within their perimeter and had captured a further 10 during
1st July, and collected 23 machine guns abandoned by the
Germans. Eventually, the corn was set on fire by phosphorus grenades
thrown by the KSLI, and several more Germans were caught and burned
by this. Searching the bodies of the dead and prisoners, the KSLI realised
they were not up against 12th SS as they had thought, but
9th and 10th SS Panzer Divisions as well. This
meant that the Germans were concentrating their armoured reserves on
the British left flank (around Caen), leaving very little to resist
the Americans in the west. 4th KSLI stayed in their positions
at Baron under continuing, sporadic shellfire for exactly 7 days, being
relieved by the 4th Hampshires on the night of 4/5th
July, when they marched back to their lorries at Cheux.

The 11th Armoured Division

11th
Armoured Division lost 100 tanks between 26-29th June and
suffered 1,000 casualties (including 33% of all tank crews). This included
25 of the KSLI killed at Baron, whilst 80 were wounded  25% of
their fighting strength. The 15th (Scottish) Division lost
over 2,700, an overall 18% casualty rate (but 80% of the fighting troops).
They had protected the British bridgehead over the Odon river, whilst
more units crossed and assembled behind them. On leaving Baron, 4 KSLIs
CO, Lieutenant-Colonel Miles, suffered the same fate as his brigadier
as was replaced by his 2IC. The continued shelling had eventually got
to both. Epsom had gained ground, but not as much as hoped. More importantly,
all the reserves of German armour were getting sucked into the battles
around Caen, such as at Hill 112, denying the Germans a strategic reserve
to combat an Allied breakthrough. Why was Hill 112 so important? On
the morning of 1st July, Sgt. Moppett of the 1st
Herefords (the third battalion in 159th Brigade, with the
3rd Monmouths, and dug in on the right of the KSLI), was
sent to patrol up the road which leads to Hill 112 in a Bren Carrier:

" Arriving
at what I thought was the crest, I ordered the men to dismount. We went
forward on foot The sun shone in a blue sky. We could forget there
was a war on. Then I saw the turret of a tank on our left. I crawled
through the corn with L/Cpl. Morten. It was knocked out. Behind were
several more. We returned to the road and moved over the crest. Then
I realised why the Germans wanted the hill. You could see for miles
 over to Esquay and on to Evercy and right over the Orne river ."

The Germans held
onto Hill 112 for over a month, and were never forcibly removed, despite
British air superiority and greater numbers of tanks, guns and troops.
Later in July, Operation Jupiter was launched by 43rd
(Wessex) Division to retake the Hill, but it was never captured. A patrol
of 53rd Welsh Division found it abandoned on the night of
3/4th August.