There has to have been a multiple breakdown to produce part of Ben M. CarterÝs
"The Salvation of Your Souls: But What Is a Soul?" (PSCF 52
[December 2000]: 242˝54,). There are errors that a review or proofreading
should have caught and corrected.

Psucho
(pp. 243f) is not a noun. Indeed, I do not find a corresponding
form for any ancient Greek noun, though it is a possible modern katharevusa
dative of the adjective meaning "cool." It is a verb which means
"to breathe or blow" (recognized on p. 243), "to make cool
or cold," and hence "to refresh." In modern Greek, it means
"to cool." In the New Testament, it occurs only once, tropistically,
of waning love (Matt. 24:12). It occurs a few times, only three certain, in LXX.

Psuchon
in 1 Peter 1:9 (p. 243) is the genitive plural of psuche.
Only the latter is the citation form. The word may also be the genitive plural
of psuchos, meaning "coolness," "chill," or
"frost." This word, though not in the form Carter gives, occurs three
times in the New Testament and three or four times in LXX. It has nothing to do
with the soul except in being derived from the same root. What may mislead is
that psychon looks like a second declension neuter. However, psuche
is first declension and psuchos is third.

Psuche, like the Latin anima, basically meant "breath."
Then, because breathing is connected to animal life, it came to mean the
principle of life, then a living entity, and finally the continuing portion of a
human being.

The situation with Aristotle is not quite as presented. Body is potentiality
because it is on the material side. Soul is actuality because it is another term
for the eidos or form. All that is combines form and matter except at the
extremes: prime matter, which is totally irrational, and Pure Form, which is his
deity. At the lowest level, prime matter is formed into the four elements, which
in turn are formed into inanimate and animate entities. At the animate level,
the eidos may be termed a soul.

In generation, according to Aristotle, the female provides the matter and the
male provides the form. Among human beings, if the form is vigorous, the result
will be a boy who will become a proper man. A lesser form will produce a girl or
a slave. But, because the eidos or soul can only exist embodied, Aquinas,
in adopting Aristotle as "the Philosopher," had a problem with an
immaterial soul that survives the dissolution of the body. This is a major
reason why Catholics usually hold that the soul of each infant is specially
created rather than generated along with the body. The two views are known as
creationism and traducianism, respectively. There is a third view, infusionism,
which is more likely to be associated with metempsychosis.

Aquinas did not originate the notion that there is only one soul in a person
(p. 245). He found that in Aristotle, where every entity has but one eidos,
though the constituents may also have their forms. Some living things have only
a nutritive soul, while others have a soul that has both nutritive and sensitive
powers, etc.

Noting such problems in matters with which I am familiar, I can only hope
that those knowledgeable in other areas will not find additional errors.