Humans have been changing their physical environment since there
have been humans. Since the Industrial Revolution we have had the
ability to change the physical world radically and quickly. The last
half of the twentieth century saw humans begin to reclaim and restore
much of the natural world. Going into that reclamation process, humans
had many preconceived notions based on what scientific knowledge offered
at that time. The natural world sometimes offered some unexpected
responses to reclamation efforts that pointed out to the scientists and
the non-scientific communities of governments and concerned citizens
where human ignorance about the natural world existed. Matthias
Gross's book, Ignorance and Surprise: Science, Society, and
Ecological Design, takes a long look at how humans react and are forced
to adjust to the unexpected reactions, or surprises, that nature
sometimes offers. In addition, he attempts to define the role that
unexpected events play as scientists, governments, and citizen groups
adjust their policies and approaches to meet the new parameters. Gross,
a senior researcher in the Department of Urban and Environmental
Sociology at the Helmholtz Center for Environmental Research-UFZ,
recognizes that humans cannot know everything, and the surprising
response is an opportunity for them to learn and gather more data. That
knowledge and response cycle sets in motion a perpetual learning curve.
As the author puts it, "new knowledge also means more
ignorance" (p. 1). Ignorance, then, becomes the foundation for
surprising events.

"Ignorance creates new research questions" (p. 169). This
statement sums up Gross's ultimate conclusion to what surprising
events contribute to the scientific world, but also to human society as
a whole. Where ecological systems are concerned there is always action
based on the known facts of the moment. Ignorance of the natural
world's responses to action always changes the known data;
therefore, future actions must be based on the responses of the natural
world. Gross points out that scientists usually do not speak or plan in
terms of absolute certainties. He also notes that politicians and
bureaucrats often quote scientific data as absolutes in order to achieve
their agendas. He does not excuse the scientific world completely from
that certainty, either. While the author does not exactly quote the
ramifications of the Quantitative Revolution, he does make it clear that
all human groups, whatever their composition, are often lured into
action or non- action based on what are perceived as scientific truths.
His examples of the natural world's responses to human activity
always point out that the natural world is not bound by scientific
certainties. The examples are actually amusing in some cases. The
surprises that an ecosystem can throw at human certainty make the
assuredness of what can be measured a little less certain. Gross uses
those examples to great effect when he compares knowledge to ignorance
in ecological reclamation.

Gross's two field studies, restoring the ecosystem of
Chicago's shoreline and reclaiming a safe environment in eastern
Germany, are superb examples of the interaction of science, social
responses, and nature's responses. He outlines the simplest form of
a cycle of acquired knowledge, knowledge surprise new knowledge in using
these examples. Both case studies examine how planners from both science
and societal groups use existing knowledge to formulate an action plan.
Those people then respond when surprises occur. Gross uses his own
models to explain various reactions to surprise, and how ignorance can
promote new approaches to action in the example of reclaiming
Chicago's shoreline. It is in the example from eastern Germany that
Gross begins to truly put forth his own definitions. In his description
of responses from both government and businesses to surprise events, it
becomes clear that with ecological reclamation, top down responses do
not work. How bureaucracies evolve is beautifully explained. Gross uses
the term "locked in" to explain that once bureaucratic goals
are involved, the reclamation slows down, sometimes coming to a complete
halt.

The author further points out that science often assumes a
rationality of action that neither humans nor nature often follow. He
explains how scientific rationality is based on what is known at the
time. The surprise, or ignorance, when it occurs, creates a new field of
scientific responses. Science has no option except to work with the
known data of the present moment, but it is an assumption that either
humans or nature will stay rational. The example of the honeysuckle
hedgerow and bird habitats from Chicago's Montrose Park shows that
humans will make non-rational decisions when faced with surprising
events. The hedge was actually an invasive species that had entered the
park because of human activity. The surprise was that birds, also
non-native, had started using the hedge as a stopping off point in their
migration patterns. Another surprise was that humans enjoyed the hedge
and the birds, so the planning for reclamation adapted to the new
knowledge and incorporated the hedge and the birds as part of that
process.

Humans in the end are not bound by logical arguments when their
emotions enter the mix. Studies in economics have examined the
non-rational decision-making of humans since Martin Hollis and Edward J.
Nell's Rational Economic Man (1975). Gross never states clearly
that although science truly can only work with rational approaches
humans and nature will always provide surprises in their coping
strategies. What Gross says plainly is that as we begin a reclamation
process, we must assume that there are things about which we are
ignorant. If we are wise, we will be open to learning from the new data
and formulate plans with new knowledge, accepting that now we are
ignorant again. He also makes a strong case that human responses to
surprise events are more flexible the lower on the societal/bureaucratic
structure that those decisions are made.

Ignorance and Surprise definitely has a place in the library for
works that examine how societies learn. From a teaching perspective, it
is heavily laden with secondary sources to the point that some sections
are difficult to read. On the other hand, the book presents an excellent
historiography of social science philosophies of learning. It could
contribute a great deal to upper level or graduate classes that focus on
how societies respond and change when information and access to new
information creates changes in the paradigm. Perhaps the greatest
contribution that Gross makes with this book is examining how learning
occurs in societies as ignorance is replaced with knowledge.