"Carts and Horses"--Strategy and Arms Control for a New Europe

JEFFREY D. McCAUSLAND

From Parameters, Spring 1999, pp. 25-42.

The adage that one should never place the cart
before the horse is as true for states and organizations as it is for people.
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization faces dramatic developments as it
confronts simultaneously the daunting tasks of adopting a new strategic
concept, incorporating new member states, ending conflict in the Balkans,
and coping with enormous difficulties in the Russian Federation. When the
Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) is added to the mix,
the hope of completing all these efforts in the time projected may seem
to some rather forlorn, especially in the absence of an agreed strategic
concept to guide work on the related tasks.

In a more nearly perfect world, NATO would have sorted out its strategic
thinking well before attempting another round of accessions, and would
have found the means to move beyond the status quo with the Russian Federation,
particularly with respect to enlarging the Alliance. A new strategic concept
would have addressed and clarified, if not settled, issues related to armed
interventions by Alliance states, such as in the Balkans, and would conceivably
even have established a basis for revisiting the CFE Treaty in response
to Russian initiatives and the problems created by enlargement. But none
of this was to be, and so NATO nations face the challenge of deciding just
where to hop onto this diplomatic and strategic merry-go-round.

The pressures on the Alliance to deal with the foregoing challenges
as a new strategic concept is being developed are revealed most clearly
in the evolution of the CFE Treaty. After a brief review of the issues
and processes marked for review, this article examines changes agreed or
under way in the treaty, itself a symbol of the hopes and fears of nations
and international institutions regarding the role of the Russian Federation
in European affairs. Other aspects of the convergence of NATO-related initiatives
are analyzed and summarized.

Context

There are two fundamental processes related to European security--developing
Alliance strategy and adjusting the CFE Treaty--that are both driving and
being driven by other activities within the Alliance. Foremost among the
latter are the enlargement of NATO, the Alliance's search for consensus
on dealing with conflicts outside NATO territory, and the evolution of
the Russian Federation as a regional entity and as a partner in NATO activities.
With all of these matters changing simultaneously, the risk is that the
outlines of each may appear to be about right, but all could be deficient
in the details, particularly in how each relates to the others.

Alliance member states agreed that they would have a new strategic concept
ready for the Washington Summit in April 1999 to mark the 50th anniversary
of the establishment of NATO. This document, intended to reflect enlargement
and the new realities of European security, will be significantly different
from the one that guided NATO throughout the Cold War (MC14/3) and from
the strategic concept that was adopted at the Rome Summit in 1991. During
its 1998 debate on enlargement, the US Senate took particular note of the
strategy development process, and stated its views clearly in the resolution
that endorsed the change to the existing NATO treaty that allowed new member
states to join. The Senate underscored the fact that NATO remained a military
alliance based on collective defense, promoted American vital interests,
and must serve in the future to consider new emerging threats beyond its
borders. Congress also required the President to report on the new strategic
concept, describing proposed changes to NATO strategy, within 180 days
of the passage of this particular resolution.[1]

A new strategic concept for NATO will inevitably describe an environment
in which the defense of territory, the fundamental concern during the Cold
War, has been replaced by the defense of common interests and values. Some
experts have described this as a shift from an "alliance of necessity"
(under the threat of Soviet attack) to an "alliance of choice."
If this is true, future operations could be much more ad hoc and include
nonmember states as well as Alliance members.[2]

The new strategic concept must also define NATO's role in words that
retain collective defense as a core Alliance requirement, a concept that
will affect relations between the United States and its European partners.
The changed nature of the security landscape and the demise of the Soviet
Union demand that the future relationship between NATO and the Russian
Federation be considered at every step in this process of strategic reappraisals.
The ongoing strategic dialog includes collective defense and additional
missions for the Alliance that should include deterrence and crisis management,
NATO operations with or without a mandate from the UN or from the Organization
for Security and Cooperation in Europe, cooperative security relationships
with Russia, and NATO enlargement now and in the future.

Besides starting a quest for a new statement of purpose, the 1997 Madrid
Summit also launched NATO on its most significant membership expansion.
It is useful to recall that NATO enlargement is not an objective of Western
security; NATO's purpose is to improve European security in general and
to establish a basis for future stability in Central and Eastern Europe.
Enlargement is seen as a method, a way to achieve an objective of far greater
value than merely increasing the number of nations formally enrolled in
the Alliance. While this may strike some as a matter of semantics, it underscores
the fact that enlargement is a continuing process, one that started with
the invitations to Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Poland, and is far
from completed. Thus the April 1999 NATO Summit will end discussion of
the entry of these particular states into the Alliance, but it will be
only the beginning of two other difficult tasks: transforming them into
effective members and deciding which states will be in the second group
invited to join.[3]

Insofar as the CFE Treaty is concerned, the West has demonstrated repeatedly
that "Russia-handling," as it's called, is of great importance
during enlargement and the development of strategy, and there have been
many attempts to assuage Moscow's concerns about the growth of the Alliance
and the prospect of operations outside NATO territory. The Founding Act
signed between Russia and the Alliance in May 1997 was an essential part
of this effort. It provided for consultations, cooperation, possible joint
action, and a NATO-Russia Council, but so far it has not been successful
in solving disagreements such as the crisis in Kosovo. Western policymakers
have described enlargement as non-threatening, but most (if not all) Russian
leaders disagree.[4]

Various concepts have been proposed to give substance to the desire
for cooperation with Russia--one is a mixed NATO-Russia military brigade--that
would build upon the experience of combined military operations in the
former Yugoslavia. But Russian fears about NATO enlargement will likely
require radical revisions of the CFE Treaty. From the Russian perspective
the treaty provides legal assurances about the size and deployment of NATO
forces; those assurances are key assumptions in Russian appraisals of regional
security. Consequently, while adjustments to the CFE Treaty are warranted
by the dramatic changes that have occurred in Europe since its signing,
the enlargement process has added new dimensions to Russian strategic assessments.
The expected review of the CFE Treaty will include the initial proposals
of the West and the Russian Federation as well as the July 1997 agreement
on basic elements for a revised treaty.[5]

It would of course be preferable to have an agreed Alliance strategy
to help define political interests and appropriate policies for enlargement,
military operations outside Alliance territory, and relations with Russia,
but the cart is truly before the horse in this work in progress. It remains
to be seen whether assembling the parts of the puzzle in the absence of
a unifying (strategic) concept will do NATO more harm than good. The first
place to start that appraisal is with the CFE Treaty itself.

The Treaty in Perspective

The Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, signed in November
1990, limits the number of tanks, artillery, armored combat vehicles, combat
aircraft, and attack helicopters--known collectively as treaty-limited
equipment (TLE)--in an area stretching from the Atlantic Ocean to the Ural
Mountains. Bloc limitations for NATO and the former Warsaw Pact were further
circumscribed by a series of geographic zones. Subsequent national limits
for each treaty signatory were determined before the demise of the Warsaw
Pact in negotiations among the members of the two organizations. The successor
states of the Soviet Union (within the area of application) met in Tashkent
in May 1992 and determined their respective limits from the total allocated
to the Soviet Union.

Though the agreement was signed in November 1990, implementation was
delayed by the end of the Warsaw Pact, the demise of the Soviet Union,
and problems associated with Soviet treaty-limited equipment. The USSR
had moved a sizable amount (roughly 14,000 items) of such equipment east
of the Ural Mountains (outside of the area of application) and transferred
other equipment to its naval infantry and coastal defense forces during
the final year of negotiation. This caused serious disquiet among many
Western states, as they argued Moscow had failed to negotiate in good faith
in the period immediately preceding the actual signing of the treaty. Implementation
began in November 1992 with the signing of two additional protocols covering
this equipment movement and ratification by the final two states, Belarus
and Kazakhstan. Despite this delay, by November 1995 (the end of the implementation
period) more than 58,000 pieces of TLE had been destroyed and approximately
2700 inspections conducted to insure compliance.[6] The Russian Federation
had the greatest burden of destruction, roughly 20 percent of this total.

Curiously, the CFE Treaty has produced unanticipated benefits. Some
contend that inspections may have contributed more to reducing tensions
during this transitional period than the actual reductions. For example,
under the terms of the agreement, short-notice inspections were conducted
of US forces in Germany as they were preparing for deployment to the former
Yugoslavia in 1995. Furthermore, though the stated purpose of the agreement
was to reduce the possibility of short-warning conventional attacks, the
treaty proved particularly valuable in assuaging concerns about German
unification and in facilitating the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Eastern
Europe. The treaty has also been adapted to political changes besides the
reunification of Germany and collapse of the Soviet Union. Lithuania, Latvia,
and Estonia were removed from the CFE area of application on 18 October
1991, once they regained their independence, and the Czech and Slovak Republics
agreed on respective limitations as part of the dissolution of Czechoslovakia
on 12 January 1993. The greatest value of the agreement may be the entire
CFE "system" that provides a forum for the major European states
to establish, discuss, and maintain a set of rules about conventional military
power on the continent.[7]

Full and final compliance with the CFE Treaty was, however, endangered
in late 1995 by Russian insistence that it could not comply with the limits
on its forces in the "flank zone," which includes both the Leningrad
and North Caucasus military districts. As the 17 November 1995 deadline
for full implementation approached, it became clear that Russia would comply
with its overall national limit, but not the flank requirement. In the
waning moments, the 30 parties agreed to resolve this problem as quickly
as possible based on specific agreed principles, thereby precluding the
possibility of having to declare the Russian Federation in "non-compliance."
A final compromise was achieved at the initial Review Conference (May 1996)
that permitted Russia higher force levels in the flank zone, extended the
period of time allowed to meet these adjusted levels until May 1999, and
reduced the overall size of the flank zone.[8] The US Senate subsequently
ratified this compromise in May 1997.

The West indicated its willingness to consider further adjustments to
the treaty at the May 1996Review Conference in Vienna. This intent
was reiterated by then-Secretary of State Warren Christopher in a speech
entitled "A New Atlantic Community for the 21st Century," delivered
in Germany early in September 1996. In his address Secretary Christopher
stated that the United States fully supported a policy of "launching
negotiations to adapt the CFE Treaty to Europe's new security landscape."
A formal decision to start adjustment discussions in the Joint Consultative
Group (JCG) in Vienna was adopted at the Lisbon Summit of the OSCE in December
1996, and the parties agreed to a document covering the scope and parameters
of the negotiations. The actual discussions began in Vienna early in 1997.

Treaty Adaptation

From the onset the NATO states agreed that CFE adaptation could make
a useful contribution to the consolidation of European security if it met
the following objectives:

assuage to some degree Russian concerns about NATO enlargement

consider how adjustments would affect relations between NATO and new
members

reflect security concerns of East and Central European states not admitted
(this applies particularly to the Baltic states and Ukraine)

enhance Alliance cohesion while fostering public support for enlargement

NATO members repeated the notion that the original CFE mandate sought
a stable balance at lower numerical levels of conventional forces and the
elimination of the capability for launching surprise conventional attacks.
The Review Conference final communiqué in May 1996 noted the achievement
of these objectives and suggested that the focus should become that of
cementing these gains and building upon them. Furthermore, it seemed obvious
as the JCG began its discussions that political goals would now have greater
salience than the military objectives that had been the basis for the original
negotiations.

NATO countries have agreed that four essential aspects of the extant
agreement must be maintained:

ceilings on the five categories of TLE

the inspection regime

regular information exchange between treaty signatories

a treaty structure that allows for political change

Alliance countries also have accepted the need for progress in these
discussions to parallel the NATO enlargement process, though they steadfastly
oppose any artificial deadlines or direct linkage between the two.

In February 1997 NATO presented an initial proposal to adjust the treaty
to reflect the dramatic changes in East and Central Europe since the treaty
was adopted in 1990. NATO proposed replacing the existing concept of bloc-to-bloc
and zone limits on TLE with "national" and "territorial"
limits. This acknowledges that one of the original groups (the Warsaw Pact)
had disappeared; it also takes into account the emerging European security
architecture. Every country would declare its "national limits"
for each equipment category at or below the level of its current entitlement.
It also would be allowed "stationed forces" (the forces of another
country on its soil), but the total of a nation's own equipment plus permanently
stationed hardware could not exceed its "territorial" ceiling.
As with current zone limits, these stationed forces restrictions would
apply only to the three categories of ground equipment (tanks, artillery,
and armored combat vehicles).

Each state also would have a maximum entitlement for air systems, but
there would be no territorial limit on the number of attack helicopters
or combat aircraft that NATO could place on the territory of new members.
This obviously buttressed the arguments of military planners concerned
about the Alliance's ability to capitalize on the rapid mobility of aerial
weapon systems in order to provide the collective defense guarantee if
required. Finally, all signatories would have to agree that the declared
national and territorial levels were acceptable before they would be codified
in an adjusted treaty.

This series of proposals implies that each state would certify its willingness
to allow existing stationed forces on its territory, which has a potential
effect on the United States, the Russian Federation, and others. US forces
(primarily in Germany) are allowed under the current treaty text based
on the United States receiving entitlement as a treaty signatory. It is
logical to believe that an adjusted treaty text would specify national
totals for each signatory, including the United States, though those countries
where American forces are stationed would have to acquiesce. It is also
important to consider that NATO forces (including American) are currently
not allowed to be stationed in the territory of the former German Democratic
Republic as part of the "Two Plus Four" agreement that resulted
in German reunification. In similar fashion the Russian Federation would
have to receive endorsements from Moldova, Armenia, Georgia, and Ukraine
to continue stationing forces in those countries.

The replacement of the existing Cold War-based treaty zones with national
and territorial ceilings would adjust the treaty in a fashion consistent
with the emerging security landscape. One of the inherent problems with
the arms control tool in post-Cold War strategy is that it has traditionally
been used as a means to reduce tensions between current or potential antagonists.
Arms control, almost by its nature, is confrontational; between allied
states (for example, the United States and Canada) it makes little more
sense than an arms control proposal between states engaged in open conflict.
If, however, the new treaty structure rests on concepts of "cooperative
security," in which the primary threat is instability instead of national
rivalry, then this proposal would create 30 separate "zones"
and would seem more appropriate to current and prospective strategic challenges.

The NATO proposal also included a clear definition of so-called "temporary
deployments" for exercises and recommended a new stabilizing zone
that encompasses the Visegrad Four (Hungary, Czech Republic, Poland, and
Slovakia), the Kaliningrad military district in the Russian Federation,
Belarus, and western Ukraine. Greater restrictions would apply for "stationed
forces" in this area: territorial ceilings for ground equipment could
not be set any higher than current national maximum levels; additional
information would be provided on stationed forces or temporary deployments
in the zone; and special inspection quotas would apply to certain sites.

Finally, the Western proposal recognized that adding an "accession
clause" to allow other European states to enter the CFE regime was
appropriate. If adopted, such a proposal could have positive ramifications
for both the Baltic and Balkan regions. For while the departure of Lithuania,
Latvia, and Estonia from the treaty was primarily an issue of sovereignty,
Baltic leaders have argued that they were neither signatories to the original
agreement nor successor states to the Soviet Union. Consequently, they
were unwilling to participate in the Tashkent Conference that negotiated
residual national ceilings from the entitlements of the USSR. It seems
logical that entry into the CFE regime now would underscore their sovereignty,
offer additional security reassurances, and be viewed as a prerequisite
to future entry into NATO.

As regards the Balkans, the December 1995 General Framework Agreement
on Peace for Bosnia and Herzegovina (the Dayton Peace Accords) called for
confidence and security building measures (CSBMs) and force reductions
which mirror the CFE agreement. These treaties were signed in the spring
of 1996 and implemented over a period of roughly 18 months. This portion
of the Dayton Agreement also calls for future sub-regional discussions
with the goal of establishing a regional balance in and around the former
Yugoslavia. A mandate for these negotiations, proposed in mid-1998, included
not only the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), Croatia,
and Bosnia-Herzegovina, but also the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia
(FYROM), Greece, Hungary, Italy, Germany, the United States, Spain, France,
the United Kingdom, Romania, Turkey, Albania, Austria, Bulgaria, and Slovenia.[9]
A CFE accession clause would offer signatories to the Bosnian peace accords
the opportunity to enter the CFE regime along with those countries participating
in these discussions, such as Bulgaria, that are already members of the
treaty regime.

NATO has also proposed lower equipment entitlements throughout the area
of application, and made a commitment that the total of Alliance ground
equipment entitlements under an adjusted treaty will be less than what
NATO members are currently allowed. The Alliance has attempted throughout
these discussions and elsewhere to emphasize the view that NATO poses no
threat to the Russian Federation. Despite this fact, many Russian leaders
continue to view NATO with undiminished suspicion, especially in light
of enlargement. Consequently, a reduction in NATO entitlements would diminish
not only the disparity between NATO and Russian forces (currently greater
than two-to-one in some categories) but also serve to reduce lingering
security anxieties. If this occurs, a large portion of the reductions would
likely be from American TLE entitlements. This would bring the US entitlements
closer to what is actually present on the continent (see Figure 1) and
require little actual destruction of equipment.

Figure 1. US holdings reported at the annual information
exchange (1 January 1998) and overall entitlements.

Alliance members also agree on two other issues. First, they seek verification
enhancements and an improved flow of information to all signatories. These
must include changes to the allocation of inspection quotas related to
the elimination of the group structure. NATO countries agreed in 1989 and
1990, during their initial negotiations to establish national holdings,
that there was no need for one NATO country to inspect another. Since the
demise of the Warsaw Pact, however, its former members have frequently
requested so-called "East-on-East" inspections. This has reduced
the available inspection quotas for NATO countries, and several eastern
states (most notably the Russian Federation) have complained that the resulting
schedule of inspections is especially burdensome. Second, the negotiations
to achieve a compromise over Russian force levels in the flank zone were
both difficult and divisive. Consequently, all NATO members agreed that
this issue should not be reopened in the adjustment discussions until at
least 1999, by which time Russia would have complied with the adjusted
flank totals.

The initial NATO proposal for revising the CFE Treaty responded to Russian
fears in several respects. The first was to prevent the Alliance from dramatically
expanding its own collective arsenal with weapon systems from new members.
The second acknowledged that the proposed stabilizing zone, coupled with
the system of national and territorial ceilings, would preclude force concentrations
that might be deemed destabilizing. Furthermore, an adjusted treaty consistent
with this proposal would not engender significant supplemental costs because
of the modest requirement to destroy additional equipment. Finally, relatively
minor adjustments to the verification regime would help to ensure that
there would be few opportunities to cheat or advantages in doing so.

The Russian Position

Moscow presented its ideas for CFE modification during the May 1996
Review Conference, and Russian officials complained throughout the remainder
of 1996 that NATO's failure to respond suggested a lack of political willingness
in the West.[10] Moscow's recommendations at the Review Conference included,
among other things, a shift toward national ceilings and an accession clause
for new members. A formal Russian proposal was presented in March 1997
to the Joint Consultative Group which reflected many of Moscow's preliminary
thoughts and demonstrated areas of agreement with what NATO had presented.
For example, Russia continued its support for shifting from group to national
totals, the addition of an accession clause, and elimination of separate
counting rules for equipment placed in storage.

The Russian proposal also included several areas that were counter to
the basic concerns of NATO members:

limits on stationed forces that would largely preclude the Alliance
from placing any equipment on the territory of new members

an "alliance sufficiency rule" that would place a limit on
the total TLE any alliance could have

Russian negotiators also suggested the addition of new pieces of equipment
to the combat aircraft category (such as electronic warfare, refueling,
and transport aircraft) and limitations on improvements to such infrastructure
as airfields, harbors, and railways.

In the presentation of their proposals Russian officials argued that
the full implementation of the treaty and the demise of the Warsaw Pact
resulted in an asymmetrical force balance. Consequently, they asserted
that an alliance sufficiency rule and restraints on stationed forces on
new members' territories were appropriate. Moscow maintained that under
the existing treaty (and subsequent Tashkent negotiations) Russia was allowed
the TLE depicted below in Figure 2 (as compared to NATO), and that this
disparity would grow following the Alliance enlargement.

The Russian analysis, however, is flawed in several ways. First, NATO
is not a party to or signatory of the CFE Treaty. Certainly the Alliance
has been involved in the negotiation and implementation of the agreement
in several respects and is mentioned a number of times in the actual treaty
text. But the treaty is still based on negotiations among 30 sovereign
states. Second, actual force comparisons are based on a Cold War environment.
This is no longer accurate, a point that is clearly stated in the 1997
NATO-Russia Founding Act. Russia is also a member of the Partnership for
Peace (PfP), and the NATO-Russia Council was established to provide Moscow
a voice (but no veto) over European security issues. Third, NATO stated
in its proposal and in the Founding Act that it sought lower force levels
as an objective in the adjustment discussions.

Fourth, as can be clearly seen in Figure 2 below, NATO currently maintains
force levels that are far below its entitlements in every TLE category.
It is certainly true that the total entitlement for all NATO members would
increase with the addition of new members, but the sum of the current holdings
of NATO members plus the Czech Republic, Poland, and Hungary would still
be far below the entitlement for the membership as it exists prior to enlargement.
It is also difficult to imagine NATO countries expanding their arsenals
so actual holdings more closely approximate their entitlements given current
economic conditions and budgetary pressures.

TLE

Russian Federation

NATO

NATO(+)

Tanks

6400 \ 5693

20,000 \ 13,591

23,522 \ 17,101

Artillery

6415 \ 6128

20,000 \ 13,439

23,217 \ 16,626

ACVs

11,480 \ 10,299

30,000 \ 21,344

35,217 \ 25,338

Helicopters

890 \ 805

2000 \ 1194

2288 \ 1394

Aircraft

3416 \ 2868

6800 \ 4118

7670 \ 4684

The initial number is the full entitlement. The second
number indicates actual holdings as of 1 January 1998. "NATO(+)"
refers to the Alliance with the addition of Poland, Czech Republic, and
Hungary.

Fifth, Russia currently maintains fewer forces than it is allowed under
the ceilings established for each category of equipment. Furthermore, the
treaty applies only to Russian forces west of the Ural Mountains and has
no bearing on forces positioned in the east. Consequently, Russia can (if
it desires) expand its forces significantly within the limitations of the
agreement. Finally, Russian spokesman are quick to portray their position
as totally isolated in comparison to a NATO of 16 and soon 19 states. This
ignores the close relations that exist between the Russian Federation and
Belarus, plus the sizable CFE force entitlement for the Belarussian army.

On 23 July 1997, in fulfillment of a requirement in the military portion
of the NATO-Russia Founding Act, the 30 states involved in the adaptation
negotiations announced a decision on certain basic elements for treaty
adaptation (referred to as the "Basic Elements Document" or BED).[11]
In this document all parties agreed that the original bloc-to-bloc structure
of the agreement was outmoded and should be replaced by national limits
for all categories of treaty-limited equipment. They further concluded
that:

National ceilings for each country should not exceed its existing allocations.

Rules governing equipment in storage must be changed.

Stabilizing measures were required to preclude force concentrations.

Each state should adopt a territorial ceiling that equaled the total
of national and stationed forces.

Rules governing "temporary deployments" must be clarified.

An accession clause should be added to the treaty.

Most NATO countries also indicated a willingness to take at least a
five-percent reduction in current entitlements.

There can be no doubt that this was a significant development. Still,
it was clearly "a lowest common denominator" agreement based
on the initial positions previously discussed, and it was timed to occur
at approximately the same moment as the Madrid Summit to demonstrate Alliance
efforts to acknowledge Russian security concerns. But the July 1997 Basic
Elements Document still left many important issues unresolved and suggested
that a final adjusted treaty would require difficult negotiations. All
sides had already indicated their willingness to move to national totals
and to constrain stationed forces by using an additional territorial limit
that would be the sum of national and stationed forces. NATO and Russia
had both also proposed the addition of an accession clause for other countries.
The remaining areas of the BED simply underscored those things that remained
to be clarified in an adjusted treaty--such as rules for temporary deployments,
stabilizing measures, and new rules for equipment in storage--and many
of these were particularly contentious.

Some Western observers argued that the BED showed the willingness of
the Russian Federation to drop its insistence on an "alliance sufficiency
rule" and accept several other aspects of NATO's original proposal.
Some experts even suggested that achieving a framework agreement by the
Copenhagen OSCE Summit (in December 1997) was feasible. Moscow, however,
was far more cautious in response to the BED than the West,[12] and it
is still unclear whether Moscow ever considered the Basic Elements Document
"inclusive or exclusive." The OSCE meeting came and passed without
resolution, so it was reasonable to believe that Russian negotiators accepted
the areas described in the BED as essential for the adjusted treaty text.
But they have not totally forsaken other issues, such as an alliance sufficiency
rule, removal of the flank limitations, expanding the definition of "combat
aircraft," and limits on the deployment of NATO forces on the territory
of new members. While Moscow embraced the need for stabilizing measures,
it steadfastly rejected the NATO proposed "stabilizing zone"
that would place special limits on another portion of the Russian Federation
(in this case Kaliningrad) not unlike those applied to the flank zone.

1998--A Period of Alliance Introspection

As talks in Vienna on the CFE Treaty passed their first anniversary
in early 1998, it became clear that NATO had a serious problem defining
what its member states considered appropriate operational flexibility in
temporary deployments. This matter was important because NATO had stated
it had no immediate intention or need to deploy forces permanently on the
territory of new member states. The NATO announcement had clear implications
for carrying out its new strategic concept, for absent stationed forces,
temporary deployment would be the only mechanism that would allow policymakers
in times of crisis to legally position ground forces in Hungary, Poland,
or the Czech Republic, whether to prevent conflict or to conduct collective
defense.

Discussions in the spring and early summer of 1998 revealed not only
disagreements among members related to negotiating tactics but also serious
differences in strategic thinking. American military officials sought a
level of temporary deployments at approximately two divisions, insisting
that this could occur absent a mandate from either the United Nations or
OSCE. They argued that this position was necessary to allow NATO to undertake
preventive or deterrent deployments without violating the treaty. Many
European officials (led by Germany) argued that this level of forces was
too high and would be destabilizing. These same officials professed to
believe that any effort involving NATO in collective security or peace
support operations, such as in Bosnia, would require an OSCE or UN mandate.

As time progressed it became clear that Europeans believed improved
stability was derived from reduced operational flexibility, while Americans
believed the opposite: that the maintenance of operational flexibility
provided the possibility for greater security. Furthermore, many Europeans
were openly disturbed by the fact that the United States would be allowed
to take unilateral military action on the European continent without first
requiring an endorsement by other Alliance members or a mandate from the
UN or the OSCE. Finally, some observers worried that while temporary deployments
might provide reassurance to new NATO countries in Central Europe, they
could potentially be used by the Russian Federation to assert greater control
over states on its own borders, particularly in the North Caucasus region.

These obvious differences in strategic perspective between the United
States and its European allies accentuate the challenge to achieve unity
not only in arms control but also in the new NATO strategic concept. There
can be little doubt that the United States will seek to insure that the
strategic concept describes: a strong US presence and leadership in Europe;
NATO as the ultimate guarantor of European security; collective defense
through deterrence, crisis management, and possible reinforcement; possible
expanded missions, particularly due to peace support requirements with
or without a mandate; and operational and strategic flexibility.

NATO finally was able to agree to a package of force flexibilities largely
along the lines of what Washington had proposed. It also included provisions
that if a temporary deployment exceeded certain levels, a conference of
the treaty signatories would be convened, at which time the states involved
would explain the rationale for the exceptional circumstances that required
this action. This proposal was provided to all the Joint Consultative Group
participants shortly before recess in July 1998. While this document had
the support of all NATO states, roughly six months had transpired during
which little of true substance actually occurred in Vienna. Furthermore,
it became clear that it would be extremely difficult to reach closure on
an adapted treaty or even on a framework agreement prior to the Washington
Summit in April 1999 while maintaining an implicit balance between enlargement
and "Russia handling."

Prospects

Arms control negotiations do not occur in a vacuum; they are affected
by other aspects of international relations, sometimes even by domestic
events. Consequently, several related issues may affect discussions of
a revision to the CFE Treaty. From the onset some treaty signatories have
harbored resentment over the manner in which the flank problem was resolved
at the CFE Review Conference in May 1996. Many Europeans and others believed
the United States became frustrated with NATO's inability to achieve consensus
on a compromise and conducted bilateral negotiations with Russia in search
of resolution. The resulting agreement was then forced on the Alliance
and other signatories.[13] Consequently, there is concern in Europe that
Washington might adopt this approach again if progress stalls in the CFE
Treaty adjustment negotiations.

Continuing economic and political turmoil in the Russian Federation
may make it difficult for Moscow to agree internally on an adapted CFE
Treaty. It would appear logical that Russia cannot afford to maintain the
level of forces it now has and may not need forces of this size for its
security. Many studies, even before the recent downturn in the economy,
have reported the poor state of Russian military forces. Russian military
and civilian leaders have urged military reform for the past several years
that included a significant reduction in force totals, but to little avail.[14]
Consequently, an agreement that would allow Russia to be reassured that
additional force reductions were not inimical to its security would seem
appropriate. The continuing economic crisis, the weakened state of President
Yeltsin (both physically and politically), the mid-1998 move of Primakov
from the Foreign Ministry to the Prime Minister's office, and the serious
decline in the general state of the army make it increasingly problematical
that Moscow can truly find a policy it deems appropriate. Even if the Yeltsin
government was able to produce one, ratification of an adapted CFE Treaty
could face serious opposition in the Duma.

Russia might look to other policy options should an adapted treaty not
be concluded by April 1999. Under one scenario Moscow might announce that
enlargement had created a new situation, and the treaty was no longer applicable
or legally binding. Russian leaders also could argue that they considered
the agreement to be politically important, and would make a "political
commitment" to observe most parts of it while ignoring others, most
notably the flank restrictions. Russia also could call for an "extraordinary
conference," allowed under the current agreement, in order to assert
its position and make demands. Finally, Moscow could consider withdrawing
from the treaty altogether.

Two other aspects may also affect the calculus in Moscow. First, Russia
is still required under the adjusted flank agreement reached at the Review
Conference in May 1996 to reduce its forces in the Leningrad and North
Caucasus military districts by May 1999. So far there have been only marginal
reductions, and this could become a major stumbling block as the deadline
approaches. The failure of the Russian Federation to meet these force levels
could result in Moscow being in noncompliance. Second, while Russian leaders
realized their opposition to enlargement had failed to forestall it, they
may well believe that preventing a so-called "second tranche"
of NATO enlargement that could potentially include some or all of the Baltic
states is Russia's most important objective in the coming year. As a result,
concluding an adapted treaty prior to the Washington Summit might be considered
poor strategy.

While these observations may appear pessimistic, some European experts
take a more optimistic view. They believe that the general outline of an
agreement between Russia and the West has taken form and that concerted
action between now and the spring of 1999 could yield success. They believe
that the central issue for Moscow is the removal or at least the loosening
of the flank limits. Consequently, Russia might be willing to accept Western
proposals on matters such as temporary deployments and national and territorial
ceilings if the flank restrictions were lifted or reduced. While this may
appear to be a "quid pro quo," it presupposes that NATO states
in the flank areas (most notably Turkey and Norway) and other countries
(Ukraine, Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan) would concur. Azerbaijan, for
example, has raised repeated objections since its independence from the
Soviet Union to the presence of Russian forces in the North Caucasus (Georgia
and Armenia). In the past the Azeris have often accused Moscow of providing
arms to Armenia without announcing such transfers in accordance with existing
rules on data exchanges. Turkish leaders are also concerned that concessions
to Moscow are a green light to deploy more forces in the Caucasus in exchange
for certain concessions in Central Europe.[15]

The Federal Republic of Germany also has recently completed national
elections that could fundamentally alter German security policy. The election
of Gerhard Schroeder as the new Chancellor and the departure of Helmut
Kohl after 16 years in office came as somewhat of a surprise to many policymakers.
Schroeder's governing coalition--it includes his own Social Democratic
Party (SPD) as well as the Greens--will be a dramatic change for Bonn and
all of Europe. Though foreign policy issues played very little role during
this campaign, it is highly likely that the new German government will
not be able to respond quickly to many issues, not the least of which are
the ongoing adaptation negotiations. This will be particularly true with
Joschka Fischer (head of the Green Party) as Foreign Minister.[16]

There are further indications that problems in the US-German relationship
could arise in the near term. Mr. Schroeder's initial pronouncements as
Chancellor reiterated the belief of many European leaders that the use
of force in Europe in future required a UN or OSCE imprimatur, and his
suggestion that NATO should renounce the first use of nuclear weapons was
immediately rejected by Washington. Furthermore, it is likely that the
Schroeder government will continue to reduce defense spending in order
to maintain the budgetary requirements of the Euro. These potential policy
shifts could be caused by several factors: possible future economic difficulties
in Germany due to the crisis in Russia and elsewhere, significant deficit
spending by the Kohl government to create jobs in the period immediately
preceding the elections, and the stated intent of the SPD to reinstate
even the modest cuts in social programs enacted by the Kohl government
in the last few years.

Finally, time itself could become an issue. Though as previously mentioned
there is no direct link between adjusting the CFE Treaty and NATO enlargement,
achieving agreement on CFE adjustments at roughly the same pace as the
actual entry of new states into the Alliance in April 1999 is certainly
a goal. Secretary of State Madeline Albright noted in her remarks at the
OSCE in early September 1998:

Our nations must also make steady progress towards completing the adaptation
of the CFE Treaty. This week in Moscow, Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin
highlighted the importance of this goal. They affirmed the importance of
full compliance with existing CFE obligations until the adapted treaty
takes effect . . . . We should seek to record significant progress by the
Oslo Ministerial this December, and we should make signature of an adapted
treaty a centerpiece of the 1999 OSCE Summit.

Such hopes have been raised before, but to little avail. Many Western
officials had hoped in early 1997 that the framework of an adjusted CFE
Treaty could be in place prior to the Madrid Summit. This did not occur
due largely to intense efforts to resolve many outstanding issues surrounding
the NATO-Russia Founding Act. The Russian Federation did make significant
concessions from its initial position for the Founding Act, but some experts
believe that the act would not have been concluded had the Russians not
seen CFE adjustment as the final escape hatch for any demands related to
the Founding Act that were not satisfied.

Implications

NATO enlargement is a way to improve European security, not an objective
in isolation. In this context the effort to adjust the CFE Treaty is simply
a policy tool in this overall process and not a panacea. While it certainly
would have been preferable to have the strategy "horse" clearly
in front of the policy "cart," circumstances dictated otherwise.
Many of the seemingly tactical disagreements that have colored the intra-Alliance
discussions during the negotiations suggest issues that must be addressed
in the new strategic concept. Consequently, it is important for the Alliance
to consider the role of arms control in its revised strategy while remembering
that it remains only one means for enhancing security.

Renewed interest in a revised CFE Treaty is not based solely on Western
altruism, since NATO remains in a position of military strength in the
region. It is, rather, based on the view that the foundations of European
security have been inextricably altered. The NATO communiqué from
the Brussels Summit in January 1994 announcing NATO enlargement clearly
suggested this goal:

We expect and would welcome NATO expansion that would reach to democratic
states to our East, as part of an evolutionary process, taking into account
political and security developments in the whole.[17]

The efforts described in the NATO proposal and 1997 Basic Elements Document
for adjusting the CFE Treaty move the process in the direction of an adjusted
security architecture. They further reflect the requirements of assuaging
Russian concerns, considering relations with new members, reflecting the
fears of those states not offered admission, and enhancing Alliance cohesion.

Adjusting the CFE Treaty is essential to reducing Moscow's concerns
over NATO enlargement and may also enhance the chances for serious Russian
military reform. It would be a serious error to interpret Moscow's acceptance
of the NATO-Russia Founding Act as support for NATO enlargement. Russian
elites remain firmly opposed to enlargement, and turmoil in the Russian
Federation provides opportunities for those seeking power to blame Russia's
ills on external forces. It remains to be seen whether populist leaders
in the Russian Federation, to gain electoral support, will continue to
trumpet their opposition to the nexus defined by NATO enlargement, Russian
military reform, and adjustment of the CFE Treaty. An adjusted CFE Treaty
can offer greater security not only for Russia but also for all signatories
if handled properly. Treaty revisions that consider these vital concerns
must be accompanied by a coordinated effort to breathe greater life into
the NATO-Russia Founding Act as well as the agreement between the Alliance
and Ukraine.

While this process seeks to create a greater sense of cooperative security
on the continent, the system in place to reach that goal has become increasingly
more complex. Negotiations in 1989 and 1990 were essentially between the
two alliances; discussions today underscore the new reality of 30 truly
sovereign states at the table. The fears of new NATO member states (the
Czech Republic, Poland, and Hungary) must also be considered; these countries
must feel that they are entering NATO as full and not second-class members.
Consequently, the Alliance must be steadfast in protecting the right to
station forces on their territory (at least for exercise purposes) while
underscoring the fact that the West sees no need for the permanent stationing
of a large number of forces in those countries. It is important, however,
to remind these states that while the collective defense guarantee is still
an essential part of the Alliance, the NATO of 1999 is far different from
the NATO of 1987. CFE Treaty adjustment in concert with other efforts (i.e.,
an enhanced Partnership for Peace program) will help to reshape NATO as
it considers new problems of conflict prevention and cooperative security.

If an adapted CFE Treaty is to be accepted and make a contribution to
security issues in Europe, it must find support among states that have
not sought or been offered NATO membership as well as states currently
outside the regime. Obviously, the support of those states will be based
on their calculations of how well an adapted treaty improves their individual
security. The possibility of acceding to the CFE Treaty will not only provide
modest security assurances for the Baltic states (and potentially the Balkans)
but must be considered an essential preliminary step toward eventually
joining NATO. Both these groups will benefit from the move toward national
totals, which makes every country a "zone" and thereby reduces
the possibility of large-scale force concentrations in one state threatening
a neighbor. This outcome must be coupled with a mechanism to handle the
thorny issue of "stationed forces," as many of the former members
of the Soviet Union fear any legal basis for the potential (or continuing)
presence of Russian troops on their territory. Furthermore, enhanced transparency
measures and data exchanges will further the security of all.

Ultimately the effort to determine a new strategic concept for NATO
must answer the key question: What is the purpose of the Alliance? Despite
shared values and interests, alliances historically have not been able
to maintain unity absent an external threat. NATO enlargement and adaptation
of the CFE Treaty may solve the strategic problem of northern and central
Europe by bringing stability to the region between Germany and Russia.
NATO may find that its future mission is to extend that region of stability
to the southern and eastern Mediterranean.[18] This will require careful
consideration of the role that arms control plays in future strategy, including
an examination of how to use agreements that now exist--Open Skies, Vienna
Document, Waasenaar Accord, and others--in addition to the CFE Treaty.

Alliance cohesion in this effort is both a prerequisite and an objective.
Despite intra-Alliance disagreements that characterized most of 1998, NATO
has shown surprising solidarity in the initial phase of the negotiations
and creation of a NATO-agreed position on the CFE Treaty. It is less certain
that this cohesion will endure the pace of the negotiations, which will
intensify as external issues press upon policymakers. Ultimately, the success
of this process can be measured only in how well NATO satisfies conflicting
requirements and sets a course for the future.

2. Edward B. Atkeson, "The Changing Face of NATO and the Need for
Change in Responsibilities," in NATO After Enlargement: New Challenges,
New Missions, New Forces, ed. Stephen J. Blank (Carlisle Barracks,
Pa.: US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 1998), p. 43.

6. Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), "Final
Document of the First Conference to Review Operations of the CFE Treaty
and the Concluding Act of the Negotiations on Personnel Strength"
(Vienna: OSCE, May 1996), p. 2.

12. "Russia Applauds Progress on CFE But Still Cautious,"
Reuters, 24 July 1997.

13. Paul A. Goble, "Outflanked: How Non-Russian Countries View
the Proposed CFE Flank Modifications," testimony prepared for a hearing
of the Committee on Foreign Relations, US Senate, 29 April 1997.

14. For a comprehensive discussion of the problems of Russian military
reform, see: Stuart D. Goldman, Russian Conventional Armed Forces: On
the Verge of Collapse? (Washington: Congressional Research Service,
4 September 1997).

15. "Azerbaijan: Moscow Sent Warplanes to Armenia," The
New York Times, 18 December 1998, p. A8; General Cevik Bir, Deputy
Chief of Turkey's General Staff, "Turkey's Role in the New World Order,"
Strategic Forum, No. 135 (February 1998), p. 4.

Colonel Jeffrey D. McCausland is Dean of Academic Affairs at the US
Army War College. He has been selected to serve from 1 March to 15 July
1999 as Director for Defense Policy and Arms Control on the National Security
Council Staff. Colonel McCausland commanded 3d Battalion, 17th Field Artillery,
during Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm. He previously taught
in the Department of National Security Studies at the Army War College
and is a former professor of social science at the US Military Academy.
He is a graduate of the Military Academy and the USAWC, and he holds M.A.
and Ph.D. degrees in international relations from the Fletcher School at
Tufts University. He has published earlier articles in Parameters,
European Security, Military Review, and The Fletcher Forum.