Resuming the subject of the last paper, I proceed to enquire
whether the Foederal Government or the State Governments
will have the advantage with regard to the predilection
and support of the people. Notwithstanding the
different modes in which they are appointed, we must
consider both of them, as substantially dependent on the
great body of the citizens of the United States. I assume
this position here as it respects the first, reserving the
proofs for another place. The Foederal and State Governments
are in fact but different agents and trustees of the
people, instituted with different powers, and designated
for different purposes. The adversaries of the Constitution
seem to have lost sight of the people altogether in
their reasonings on this subject; and to have viewed these
different establishments, not only as mutual rivals and
enemies, but as uncontrouled by any common superior in
their efforts to usurp the authorities of each other. These
gentlemen must here be reminded of their error. They
must be told that the ultimate authority, wherever the derivative
may be found, resides in the people alone; and
that it will not depend merely on the comparative ambition
or address of the different governments, whether either,
or which of them, will be able to enlarge its sphere of jurisdiction
at the expence of the other. Truth no less than
decency requires, that the event in every case, should be
supposed to depend on the sentiments and sanction of
their common constituents.

Many considerations, besides those suggested on a former
occasion, seem to place it beyond doubt, that the first
and most natural attachment of the people will be to the
governments of their respective States. Into the administration
of these, a greater number of individuals will expect
to rise. From the gift of these a greater number of
offices and emoluments will flow. By the superintending
care of these, all the more domestic, and personal interests
of the people will be regulated and provided for. With the
affairs of these, the people will be more familiarly and
minutely conversant. And with the members of these, will
a greater proportion of the people have the ties of personal
acquaintance and friendship, and of family and
party attachments; on the side of these therefore the popular
bias, may well be expected most strongly to incline.

Experience speaks the same language in this case. The
foederal administration, though hitherto very defective, in
comparison with what may be hoped under a better system,
had during the war, and particularly, whilst the independent
fund of paper emissions was in credit, an activity
and importance as great as it can well have, in any
future circumstances whatever. It was engaged too in a
course of measures, which had for their object, the protection
of every thing that was dear, and the acquisition of
every thing that could be desireable to the people at large. [Volume 1, Page 280]
It was nevertheless, invariably found, after the transient
enthusiasm for the early Congresses was over, that the attention
and attachment of the people were turned anew to
their own particular government; that the Foederal Council,
was at no time the idol of popular favor; and that opposition
to proposed enlargements of its powers and importance,
was the side usually taken by the men who
wished to build their political consequence on the prepossessions
of their fellow citizens.

If therefore, as has been elsewhere remarked, the people
should in future become more partial to the foederal
than to the State governments, the change can only result,
from such manifest and irresistible proofs of a better administration,
as will overcome all their antecedent propensities.
And in that case, the people ought not surely to be
precluded from giving most of their confidence where
they may discover it to be most due: But even in that case,
the State governments could have little to apprehend, because
it is only within a certain sphere, that the foederal
power can, in the nature of things, be advantageously administered.

The remaining points on which I proposed to compare
the foederal and State governments, are the disposition,
and the faculty they may respectively possess, to resist and
frustrate the measures of each other.

It has been already proved, that the members of the foederal
will be more dependent on the members of the State
governments, than the latter will be on the former. It has
appeared also, that the prepossessions of the people on
whom both will depend, will be more on the side of the
State governments, than of the Foederal Government. So
far as the disposition of each, towards the other, may be
influenced by these causes, the State governments must
clearly have the advantage. But in a distinct and very important
point of view, the advantage will lie on the same
side. The prepossessions which the members themselves
will carry into the Foederal Government, will generally be
favorable to the States; whilst it will rarely happen, that the
members of the State governments will carry into the public
councils, a bias in favor of the general government. A
local spirit will infallibly prevail much more in the members
of the Congress, than a national spirit will prevail in
the Legislatures of the particular States. Every one knows
that a great proportion of the errors committed by the
State Legislatures proceeds from the disposition of the
members to sacrifice the comprehensive and permanent
interest of the State, to the particular and separate views
of the counties or districts in which they reside. And if
they do not sufficiently enlarge their policy to embrace the
collective welfare of their particular State, how can it be
imagined, that they will make the aggregate prosperity of
the Union, and the dignity and respectability of its government,
the objects of their affections and consultations? For
the same reason, that the members of the State Legislatures,
will be unlikely to attach themselves sufficiently to
national objects, the members of the Foederal Legislature
will be likely to attach themselves too much to local objects.
The States will be to the latter, what counties and towns
are to the former. Measures will too often be decided according
to their probable effect, not on the national prosperity
and happiness, but on the prejudices, interests and
pursuits of the governments and people of the individual
States. What is the spirit that has in general characterized
the proceedings of Congress? A perusal of their journals
as well as the candid acknowledgments of such as have had
a seat in that assembly, will inform us, that the members
have but too frequently displayed the character, rather of
partizans of their respective States, than of impartial
guardians of a common interest; that whereon one occasion
improper sacrifices have been made of local considerations
to the aggrandizement of the Foederal Government;
the great interests of the nation have suffered on an
hundred, from an undue attention to the local prejudices,
interests and views of the particular States. I mean not by
these reflections to insinuate, that the new Foederal Government
will not embrace a more enlarged plan of policy
than the existing government may have pursued, much
less that its views will be as confined as those of the State
Legislatures; but only that it will partake sufficiently of the
spirit of both, to be disinclined to invade the rights of the
individual States, or the prerogatives of their governments.
The motives on the part of the State governments,
to augment their prerogatives by defalcations from the
Foederal Government, will be overruled by no reciprocal
predispositions in the members.

Were it admitted however that the Foederal Government
may feel an equal disposition with the State governments
to extend its power beyond the due limits, the latter
would still have the advantage in the means of defeating
such encroachments. If an act of a particular State, though
unfriendly to the national government, be generally popular
in that State, and should not too grossly violate the
oaths of the State officers, it is executed immediately and
of course, by means on the spot, and depending on the
State alone. The opposition of the Foederal Government,
or the interposition of Foederal officers, would but inflame
the zeal of all parties on the side of the State, and the evil
could not be prevented or repaired, if at all, without the
employment of means which must always be resorted to
with reluctance and difficulty. On the other hand, should
an unwarrantable measure of the Foederal Government be
unpopular in particular States, which would seldom fail to
be the case, or even a warrantable measure be so, which
may sometimes be the case, the means of opposition to it
are powerful and at hand. The disquietude of the people,
their repugnance and perhaps refusal to co-operate with
the officers of the Union, the frowns of the executive magistracy
of the State, the embarrassments created by legislative
devices, which would often be added on such occasions,
would oppose in any State difficulties not to be
despised; would form in a large State very serious impediments,
and where the sentiments of several adjoining
States happened to be in unison, would present obstructions
which the Foederal Government would hardly be
willing to encounter.

But ambitious encroachments of the Foederal Government,
on the authority of the State governments, would
not excite the opposition of a single State or of a few States
only. They would be signals of general alarm. Every Government
would espouse the common cause. A correspondence [Volume 1, Page 281]
would be opened. Plans of resistance would be concerted.
One spirit would animate and conduct the whole.
The same combination in short would result from an apprehension
of the foederal, as was produced by the dread
of a foreign yoke; and unless the projected innovations
should be voluntarily renounced, the same appeal to a trial
of force would be made in the one case, as was made in
the other. But what degree of madness could ever drive
the Foederal Government to such an extremity? In the
contest with Great Britain, one part of the empire was employed
against the other. The more numerous part invaded
the rights of the less numerous part. The attempt
was unjust and unwise; but it was not in speculation absolutely
chimerical. But what would be the contest in the case
we are supposing? Who would be the parties? A few representatives
of the people, would be opposed to the people
themselves; or rather one set of representatives would be
contending against thirteen sets of representatives, with
the whole body of their common constituents on the side
of the latter.

The only refuge left for those who prophecy the downfall
of the State Governments, is the visionary supposition
that the Foederal Government may previously accumulate
a military force for the projects of ambition. The reasonings
contained in these papers must have been employed
to little purpose indeed, if it could be necessary now to
disprove the reality of this danger. That the people and
the States should for a sufficient period of time elect an
uninterrupted succession of men ready to betray both;
that the traitors should throughout this period, uniformly
and systematically pursue some fixed plan for the extension
of the military establishment; that the governments
and the people of the States should silently and patiently
behold the gathering storm, and continue to supply the
materials, until it should be prepared to burst on their own
heads, must appear to every one more like the incoherent
dreams of a delirious jealousy, or the misjudged exaggerations
of a counterfeit zeal, than like the sober apprehensions
of genuine patriotism. Extravagant as the supposition
is, let it however be made. Let a regular army, fully
equal to the resources of the country be formed; and let it
be entirely at the devotion of the Foederal Government;
still it would not be going too far to say, that the State
Governments with the people on their side would be able
to repel the danger. The highest number to which, according
to the best computation, a standing army can be carried
in any country, does not exceed one hundredth part
of the whole number of souls; or one twenty-fifth part of
the number able to bear arms. This proportion would not
yield in the United States an army of more than twenty-five
or thirty thousand men. To these would be opposed a
militia amounting to near half a million of citizens with
arms in their hands, officered by men chosen from among
themselves, fighting for their common liberties, and united
and conducted by governments possessing their affections
and confidence. It may well be doubted whether a militia
thus circumstanced could ever be conquered by such a
proportion of regular troops. Those who are best acquainted
with the late successful resistance of this country
against the British arms will be most inclined to deny the
possibility of it. Besides the advantage of being armed,
which the Americans possess over the people of almost
every other nation, the existence of subordinate governments
to which the people are attached, and by which the
militia officers are appointed, forms a barrier against the
enterprizes of ambition, more insurmountable than any
which a simple government of any form can admit of.
Notwithstanding the military establishments in the several
kingdoms of Europe, which are carried as far as the public
resources will bear, the governments are afraid to trust the
people with arms. And it is not certain that with this aid
alone, they would not be able to shake off their yokes. But
were the people to possess the additional advantages of
local governments chosen by themselves, who could collect
the national will, and direct the national force; and of officers
appointed out of the militia, by these governments
and attached both to them and to the militia, it may be
affirmed with the greatest assurance, that the throne of
every tyranny in Europe would be speedily overturned, in
spite of the legions which surround it. Let us not insult the
free and gallant citizens of America with the suspicion that
they would be less able to defend the rights of which they
would be in actual possession, than the debased subjects of
arbitrary power would be to rescue theirs from the hands
of their oppressers. Let us rather no longer insult them
with the supposition, that they can ever reduce themselves
to the necessity of making the experiment, by a blind and
tame submission to the long train of insidious measures,
which must precede and produce it.

The argument under the present head may be put into
a very concise form, which appears altogether conclusive.
Either the mode in which the Foederal Government is to
be constructed will render it sufficiently dependant on the
people, or it will not. On the first supposition, it will be
restrained by that dependence from forming schemes obnoxious
to their constituents. On the other supposition it
will not possess the confidence of the people, and its
schemes of usurpation will be easily defeated by the State
Governments; who will be supported by the people.

On summing up the considerations stated in this and the
last paper, they seem to amount to the most convincing
evidence, that the powers proposed to be lodged in the
Foederal Government, are as little formidable to those reserved
to the individual States, as they are indispensibly
necessary to accomplish the purposes of the Union; and
that all those alarms which have been sounded, of a meditated
or consequential annihilation of the State Governments,
must, on the most favorable interpretation, be ascribed
to the chimerical fears of the authors of them.