Some are
wondering whether it's time to declare this mission accomplished -- or with
Afghanistan so troubled, perhaps it's mission impossible? In fact, it is
mission incomplete: The Afghanistan mission is going worse than we had all hoped, but
better than many understand. With patience and perseverance, we can still
struggle to a tolerable outcome.

The plan for 2012 and 2013 focuses on
several key priorities. First, international forces will work to secure areas south
of Kabul, so the country's ring road connecting it to Kandahar can be safely
traveled and so the capital can be better protected from insurgents by a
layered defense. Most of the ring road is already reasonably secure, or at
least usable; international forces now need to work with Afghans to complete the job.

Second, the
International Security Assistance Force will deepen its hold over the south, while
gradually handing off more responsibility there and elsewhere to Afghan forces.
Major developments are in the works already on this front, and in the course of
2012 we will see major U.S. and other NATO troop reductions in Helmand and
Kandahar.

Third, international forces will continue their efforts
to strengthen Afghan security forces to their requisite size and
capability --
a process that will remain intensive for about two more years, before
reaching
the goal of at least 350,000 trained and equipped Afghan army and police
members
who have not only gone through basic training, but spent at least a year
in the
field in a form of apprenticeship with NATO forces. It is important that
the U.S. administration stay committed to this goal, which will be
reached by late 2013
or early 2014 based on current trends.

None of the above is requitable less foreign combatty NATO cats are in the hood

We can go on trying to preserve as much of the past
strategy as possible. We can continue setting impossible goals for
transforming the Afghans and for continuing levels of U.S. and allied
funding and support.We can ignore all of the pressures building up on both sides as
mistrust continues to rise, pledges are made and not kept, and outside
forces and spending drops faster than planned. We can focus on empty
policy statements, concepts, and conferences. We can continue to report
nothing but good news or spin reality as best our public affairs
officers can manage. We can waste much of the limited time left before
2014, play out a partisan debate through November 2012, and then join our allies in blundering out as best we can.

Honest Exit

We do not put political cosmetics and face-saving gestures first. We
accept the fact that we will not sustain the level of effort needed
through 2014, much less beyond. We accept what this means for peace
negotiations. We don’t promise the Afghans more money and forces than
they will really get.

We deal with the human consequences of these actions and ensure that
those Afghans who worked with us are safe. We provide at least enough
money and support so that, if there is a chance that the Afghan
government and forces can survive with a far lower level of resources,
they have at least that much support.

We try to work with Pakistan, China, Russia, the Central Asian states, and even Iran
to do as much as possible to limit the role of the Taliban and other
insurgents, protect the non-Pashtun areas in the north and the large
numbers of urban and other northern Pashtuns, and give Kabul a
meaningful role. These efforts may well fail, but they at least offer
the Afghans some chance.

Real Transition Exit

The most challenging. Plan with real resources through a period that is likely to last at
least through 2020. This does not mean going on with the current
strategy. It means a comprehensive and honest reassessment of what can
be done to enable the Afghans to do things their way and largely on
their own as soon as possible.

It means dealing with Afghan anger and perceptions by ending much of the
criticism and calls for reform. It means accepting the fact that
continued aid will have to go to the same power structure that now
exists and facing the reality that most current abuses of government,
policing, human rights, and the justice system will only change when
Afghans are ready to change them.

It means a zero-based examination of what kind of Afghan security forces
can really be created with the money and time available, as well as
what level of U.S. and allied advisory and partnering presence is both
needed and feasible given the security problems and tensions on both
sides and real world future resource constraints. It means accepting a
narco-economy, power brokers, and Afghan management of development and
operating aid funds, where the most that can be done from the outside is
penalize gross waste and corruption.

Unfortunately, there is no real way to know how feasible such a strategy
really is. It requires a transition plan we have failed to develop, a
level of interagency and international cooperation and realism that does
not yet exist, and a far more honest dialogue with the Afghans than has
taken place to date. It is the most responsible strategy of the three,
in theory, and the one most likely to serve our longer-term strategic
interests, but it is far from clear that we can go from “exit by denial”
to a “real transition” plan in practice.

1 comments:

SteveS
said...

I've never seen Sherman's letter to citizens of Atlanta before. Not quite the warmongering madman he is usually portrayed as. And as good an explanation of "We'll kick your ass until you give up" as an exit strategy as you'll find. I think they called that 'winning' in the olden days.

wHoA!

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