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THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BULLETIN
Volume LXIX
No. 1775
Julv 2, 1973
CHANGE AND CONSTANCY IN U.S. COMMITMENTS
Address by Deputy Secretary Rush 1
RESTORING EUROPE'S SENSE OF UNITY
Address by Counselor Richard F. Pedersen 16
PRESIDENT NIXON AND PRESIDENT POMPIDOU OF FRANCE
HOLD TALKS IN ICELAND 7
THE OFFICIAL WEEKLY RECORD OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY
For index see inside back cover
Ph.K crA
'/
THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BULLETIN
Vol. LXIX, No. 1775
July 2, 1973
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The Department of State BULLETIN,
a loeekly publication issued by the
Office of Media Services, Bureau of
Public Affairs, provides the public and
interested agencies of the government
with information on developments in
the field of U.S. foreign relations and
on the work of the Department and
the Foreign Service.
The BULLETIN includes selected
press releases on foreign policy, issued
by the White House and the Depart-
ment, and statements, addresses,
and news conferences of the President
and the Secretary of State and other
officers of the Department, as well as
special articles on various phases of
international affairs and the functions
of the Department. Information is in-
cluded concerning treaties and inter-
national agreements to ivhich the
United States is or may become a
party and on treaties of general inter-
national interest.
Publications of the Department of
State, United Nations documents, and
legislative material in the field of
international relations are also listed.
Change and Constancy in U.S. Commitments
Address by Deputy Secretary Kenneth Rush
I have been asked to discuss U.S. commit-
ments in a changing world. I know of no
better place to start than President Nixon's
words three years ago: "Peace in the world
will continue to require us to maintain our
commitments — and we will." - The Presi-
dent went on to say that it is "misleading" to
pose fundamental questions of foreign policy
in terms of our commitments. Rather, he
said: "Our objective ... is to support our
interests .... We are not involved in the
world because we have commitments; we
have commitments because we are involved.
Our interests must shape our commit-
ments. . . ."
The first question must be: What are the
interests of the United States? It has been
said, and I would agree, that it is possible to
reduce those interests to three fundamental
elements:
— First, to preserve the physical security
of the United States ;
— Second, to maintain the pluralism, the
freedom, and the democracy of the United
States; and
— Third, to sustain the economic well-being
of the American people.
No one of these elements is sufficient to
explain U.S. interests. But each is necessary.
Together they don't tell us much about
what we should do in foreign policy. They do
tell us a great deal about what we should not
' Made before the Industrial College of the Armed
Forces at Washington on June 5 (press release 193).
" The complete text of President Nixon's foreign
policy report to the Congress on Feb. 18, 1970, ap-
pears in the Bulletin of Mar. 9, 1970; the intro-
duction begins on p. 274.
do. We cannot undertake defense policies
which would sacrifice economic well-being to
establish maximum physical security. We
cannot so emphasize butter over guns that
we become vulnerable to attack by a real or
presumptive enemy. We cannot be indiffer-
ent to the fate of freedom abroad without
cheapening our regard for it at home.
Abstraction of our interests makes it no
less difficult to resolve the real or the appar-
ent conflicts among them. Someone once said,
"Every choice is an injustice." As we exam-
ine our interests, we will have to continue
to make choices. And as we make choices in
foreign policy we will be dealing with the
question of past and future commitments.
We have viewed our commitments chiefly
in military terms — most recently, in terms
of the threat to our interests posed by the
Soviet Union and by Communist China. Thus,
beginning first in Europe and then extending
to other areas of the world, we undertook a
series of collective and bilateral mutual se-
curity agreements designed to deter and to
contain our antagonists. These commitments
were useful, necessary, and successful in de-
terring aggression.
When we undertook these defense com-
mitments, we supplied the military strength
our allies could not provide. And our eco-
nomic position was unique in the free world.
Times have changed. Our nuclear umbrella
is still the chief strategic deterrent in the
world. But Europe and Japan now have at-
tained renewed economic vigor. They now
clearly have less need to rely on us.
President Nixon came to office heir to a
large number of international commitments
forged earlier. As he promised, he has main-
July 2, 1973
tained those commitments. But the United
States has done two other things:
— First, we encouraged our partners to do
more. For example, in Viet-Nam we com-
pleted the successful Vietnamization pro-
gram. In Europe our allies are assuming a
larger share of the defense burden and now
supply 90 percent of NATO's manpower.
— Second, we have worked hard and suc-
cessfully to alter the nature of our relations
with Communist China and the Soviet Union.
Today cooperation is replacing the confron-
tation that characterized our relations when
President Nixon took office.
I would like to say a few words about this
second element because our changing rela-
tions with our former antagonists have
caused some people to question the value of
our continuing commitments to our allies.
It is clear to me that the progress we have
made with the Soviet Union and with China
has only come about because both they and
our allies have had faith in our honesty and
reliability. Both friend and foe knew that we
would live up to our commitments. Because
they did, we have been able to negotiate with
the Soviet Union and with China without
undermining either our allies' confidence or
our adversaries' respect for our determina-
tion.
While I was Ambassador to Germany I
had the privilege of negotiating the Berlin
agreement, which eliminated that city as a
source of permanent tension in East-West
relations. It was clear to me throughout
those negotiations that the reality of our
commitments to NATO was a major factor
in the successful conclusion of the talks.
For the past quarter century the United
States has suiiplied the nuclear umbrella on
which Eurojiean security has depended. It
has been in our mutual interest that we do
so. If that nuclear umbrella were withdrawn,
European nations would have to choose be-
tween either vastly increasing their own nu-
clear caiiabilities or seeking accommodation
with the Soviet Union. These alternatives
are not in our interest nor in the interest of
our allies. The Soviet Union, however, would
welcome a reduction in our ties to western
Europe — a development that it would see
both as enhancing its hegemony in eastern
Europe and as increasing its influence in
western Europe.
The same unacceptable choice between en-
larged nuclear capabilities and accommoda-
tion would be forced on European nations
were they to lose confidence in our commit-
ment to the principle that European security
and U.S. security are indivisible. Our uni-
lateral withdrawal from our commitments
in western Europe would almost certainly
produce such a loss in confidence.
Instead, we are seeking to reduce tensions
across the continent without lowering Eu-
rope's defenses. Thus, within a few weeks
Secretary of State Rogers will participate
with the Foreign Ministers of 32 other Euro-
pean nations and Canada in the Conference
on Security and Cooperation in Europe. Our
aim and that of our allies is to increase the
freedom of movement of people, information,
and ideas across the continent and to affirm
the sovereign equality of each European na-
tion regardless of its participation with
others in the same social or political system.
Preparatory talks are also underway for a
mutual and balanced reduction of the mili-
tary forces facing each other across central
Europe. These two sets of talks are critical
elements as we seek to move further from
confrontation to negotiation in Europe. If
these talks are to succeed, both our allies and
the Soviet Union must have continuing high
regard for our determination to live up to
our commitments.
Our continued strength is an important
element in the world's perception of our re-
liability. In nuclear terms that means essen-
tial equivalence in nuclear forces between
ourselves and the Soviet Union. It is precisely
this sort of equivalence that we seek in the
current round of SALT talks [Strategic
Arms Limitation Talks]. And as we seek in
these negotiations to bring about further
strategic arms limitations, we must continue
to bargain from a strong position.
In Asia, a new relationship is developing
among all the nations involved. We have
Department of State Bulletin
been and will continue to be a Pacific power.
Today as we seek responsibly to play our
role in the development of a more peaceful
and more cooperative Asia, we will scrupu-
lously observe our commitments there. It is
worthwhile noting that we have not sacri-
ficed our commitments to Taiw^an as we im-
proved our relations with Peking. In fact,
our determination to live up to those com-
mitments has contributed to peaceful evolu-
tion in Asia.
The Berlin agreement, the President's
trips to Moscow and Peking, SALT One, the
end of the war in Viet-Nam, General Secre-
tary Brezhnev's coming visit to the United
States, all indicate the degree and the direc-
tion of change in international politics. But
they also share a common lesson: Progress is
only possible in a world where other nations
confidently act on the assumption the United
States will do as it is pledged. Where such
basic confidence is lacking, it is next to im-
possible to build constructive relations be-
tween nations — negotiations in the Middle
East are stymied because parties there lack
this sort of confidence.
The United States reputation for stable,
reliable commitments has been built up over
many years and at great cost. We cannot
and we will not allow this precious asset to
be frittered away by those who believe that
our commitments can be put behind us now
that the apparent threat to our security has
been reduced.
Obviously, of course, our commitments
must be related to the nature and the level
of the threat and the cost of countering that
threat. As the threat changes, so must our
ways of dealing with it. Thus, our assessment
of the strategic threat is different now from
what it w^as before SALT One. And it will
change again if SALT Two achieves long-
range agreements which will limit strategic
weapons systems.
If the Conference on Security and Cooper-
ation in Europe and the negotiations aimed
at mutual and balanced reductions in central
Europe between NATO and Warsaw Pact
forces succeed, we will have enhanced Euro-
pean stability. The situation in Asia is aLso
evolving rapidly, requiring close examina-
tion as to the best ways to pursue and pro-
tect our interests.
As we determine how changed circum-
stances affect our commitments, we will re-
main in closest contact with our allies. We
and they together will reassess how best to
shape our mutual commitments so they con-
tinue to serve our mutual interests.
In the past we have defined commitment
chiefly in terms of our defense needs. We
will, as I have said, stand by our mutual de-
fense commitments. But we do not foresee
making new military commitments.
Instead, we will be adding new dimensions
to the word "commitment." One such dimen-
sion must cover our evolving relations with
China and the Soviet Union. We are almost
daily adding to the ways we are productively
engaged with Moscow and with Peking.
These new means of engagement are, in
effect, a new kind of mutual commitment —
we to them and they to us.
The summit meetings last year in China
and the Soviet Union produced a commitment
by ourselves and by each Communist power
on the general principles that would govern
relations between the United States and each
of them. We and they have since been guided
by these concepts. And since those summits
considerable muscle has been added to the
skeleton provided by those principles. Last
year, for example, we signed more agree-
ments with the Soviet Union than in any
year since 1933, when we resumed diplo-
matic relations. And who would have been so
bold as to imagine 15 months ago that in
May 1973 China and the United States would
have established Liaison Offices.
It is clear that our strategic nuclear rela-
tionship with the Soviet Union will continue
to demand of us close and continuous in-
volvement in international affairs. The im-
mediacy of the nuclear threat may have been
reduced somewhat but it has not been elim-
inated — and that prospect is not in sight.
But even in the absence of a nuclear threat,
the United States will inevitably become
more and more involved in the world. This
July 2, 1973
involvement adds another facet to the con-
cept of commitment.
International relations are becoming in-
creasingly comijlex and the world increas-
ingly interdependent. It is impossible to
preserve our national interests — as I de-
scribed them earlier — and at the same time
cut ourselves off from the world. This is true
because:
— No nation which seeks to act alone is
going to be able to sustain a decent quality
of life for its citizenry;
— No nation can alone bring about the re-
forms of world trade and monetary struc-
tures on which an expanding and equitable
global economy depends ;
— No nation independently is going to be
able to make the oceans' resources a source
for cooperation rather than conflict among
nations;
— No nation alone is going to be able to
assure that the world's limited energy re-
sources will be both adequately and equitably
distributed to consumers at a fair price to
the producer; and
— No nation acting alone is going to be
able to save its environment from the threat
of pollution.
Concerted action by nations having like
ideologies or like political systems will not
suffice; nor will attempts to pit developed
against developing or race against race.
Policies based on such negative approaches
are easier to implement than creative inter-
national efforts at cooperation. But they will
produce little more than sterile confronta-
tion. The world demands instead that nations
reach across differences to concert action in
pursuit of common goals.
The United States must participate in the
efforts to devise constructive international
api)roaches to global issues. Otherwise our
interests will suffer serious consequences.
And if we are to jmrticipate we must also
be prepared to undertake new, clearly defined
commitments, because there can be no solu-
tions to the challenges of the 20th century
without such commitments by ourselves and
by others.
All issues on the international agenda de-
mand one commitment from the global com-
munity — a commitment to mutual accommo-
dation and restraint. No nation is expected to
sacrifice basic national interests. But all na-
tions must act on the principle that mainte-
nance of reliable relations is more important
than triumph on any particular issue. These
are the qualities that must prevail whether
the issue is pollution of the environment or
arms reductions agreements between the
United States and the Soviet Union. If the
international community is governed by flex-
ibility, restraint, and rational adjustment
among its members, the more cooperative and
]ieaceful world we seek will be brought
closer.
In conclusion, let me summarize the U.S.
approach to commitments now and in the
future:
— With our allies, we will continue to re-
examine and reassess and when necessary
redefine our mutual commitments to make
them relevant to present circumstances;
— With our adversaries, w-e will continue
to seek to involve them in mutually beneficial
commitments, building further our produc-
tive relationships; and
— With the broader world community, we
will seek to engage in and provide leadership
for the kind of commitments which can as-
sure a more stable, more humane, and more
peaceful world.
We do not expect or intend to be able to
disengage ourselves, or to "de-commit" or
"un-pledge" unilaterally. We will not rescind
our promises. Isolationism — pure, neo, quasi,
or pseudo — is simply not an option. The trend
is necessarily and unavoidably and benefi-
cially toward more involvement, toward
more complex engagement, toward greater
interdependence. As the President has said,
"We can forge a network of relationships
and of interdependencies that restrain ag-
gression and that take the profit out of
war." ' This must be our aim.
' For an pxcerpt from President Nixon's address
to the Nation on Nov. 2, 1972, see Bulleti.n of Nov.
20, 1972, p. 605.
Department of State Bulletin
Secretary Discusses Development
of U.S.-U.S.S.R. Relations
Folloiving are questions submitted by
Vkidimir Vashedchenko, chief of the Wash-
ington bureau of TASS, to Secretary Rogers
before his departure for Tehran and Copen-
hagen and the Secretary's replies, released
by the Department on June lU.
Press release 207 dated June 14
Q. Mr. Secretary, in a few days General
Secretayn/ of the Central Committee of the
CPSU L. I. Brezhnev ivill make an official visit
to the United States. President of the United
States Mr. Richard M. Nixon visited the So-
viet Union last May. What in your opinion is
the sigiiificance of these summit meetings
for the development of Soviet-American re-
lations and what is their influence on ivorld
affairs?
Secretary Rogers: The American people
will welcome the visit of General Secretary
Brezhnev as a confirmation of the historic
change in Soviet-American relations signaled
by President Nixon's visit to the Soviet Union
last year — a turning away from the confron-
tation and tensions of the past quarter
century.
The United States has a deep and abiding
desire for peace. Since the beginning of his
administration President Nixon has pursued
improved relations with the Soviet Union in
the interest of a stable world for the benefit
of all mankind.
The events of the past year give substance
to this hope. The range and importance of
agreements arrived at during the 1972 summit
and the subsequent actions implement-
ing these decisions are demonstrable achieve-
ments. For the first time two adversaries
divided by conflicting ideologies and political
rivalries have been able to agree to significant
limitations of the armaments on which their
survival depends. For the first time two such
nations have been able to agree on written
principles as the basis for regulating their
competition and channeling their eff'orts to-
ward more constructive endeavors. The scope
and depth of cooperative projects between
the two countries has been increased. These
are hopeful signs and a good beginning to
what President Nixon has called a "momen-
tum of achievement" in which progress in
one area can contribute to progress in others.
In projecting onto the world scene the ef-
fect of improved U.S.-Soviet relations one
must recognize that we are only two nations,
however powerful in relative terms. We can-
not attempt to impose solutions for problems
involving the national interests of other
countries. We do believe, however, that prog-
ress between the United States and the
U.S.S.R. will support and encourage efforts of
other nations to resolve differences and relax
international tensions. We hope that the
forthcoming summit will give renewed im-
petus to the worldwide search for true and
lasting peace.
Q. What are, in your opinion, practical re-
sidts achieved in the U.S.S.R.-U.S. relations
after the summit meeting in Moscow last
year?
Secretar-y Rogers: The 1972 summit set in
train a long and impressive list of cooperative
activities. The last 12 months have been
marked both by the implementation of the
understandings reached at the first summit
meeting and by continued activity in reach-
ing further agreement. The several accords
signed during the President's visit to Mos-
cow — limitations on strategic weaponry,
basic principles to govern our relations, and
five bilateral cooperation agreements — set the
stage for more stable relationships between
the two countries. We have successfully
avoided major confrontation, begun negotia-
tions on a permanent treaty limiting offen-
sive strategic weapons, and carried forth an
impressive list of bilateral projects covering
such diverse fields as medicine, environment,
science, culture, and space.
In addition, on the basis of decisions at the
summit, several accords were negotiated and
signed in the economic field, including a trade
agreement, a maritime agreement, and a set-
tlement of lend-lease obligations. From
1971 to 1972 the volume of trade be-
tween the two countries tripled. The
United States is strengthening its commer-
July 2, 1973
cial representation in the Soviet Union, and
some new firms are opening offices there.
There has also been relatively intensive explo-
ration of trade possibilities by both American
business and Soviet trade representa-
tives, and important long-range contracts
have been concluded or are under considera-
tion.
Altogether, the significance of the past
year's events is that cumulatively they rep-
resent consolidation of the changes embodied
in the decisions of the Moscow summit. More
and more officials and citizens of both coun-
tries are learning to work together and un-
derstand each other's problems and view-
points after years of relative isolation and
repeated frustrations. A fabric of common
interests and instruments of cooperation is
being created which can help sustain better
relations.
Q. What in your opinion are the prospects
for ftirther development of the Soviet-Amer-
ican relations ?
Secretary Rogers: We expect that the com-
ing meeting of the Soviet and American
leaders will give further impetus to advances
already made. Considerable support has de-
veloped for the idea of cooperation for mu-
tual benefit and exercise of restraint in areas
of possible contention. Increasingly it is ap-
parent that the exploitation of short-term
advantages to the detriment of long-term
peaceful goals is not in the national interest
of either country.
We recognize that fundamental differences
remain and will persist for a long time. But
recent events have shown that with persever-
ance along our present course these differ-
ences need not prove an insuperable barrier
to improved relations between our peoples
and our governments.
We will be engaged for some time in
momentous and wide-ranging negotiations in
the security field. Negotiations on a pemia-
nent strategic and comprehensive offensive
arms agreement are the most important bi-
laterally. In addition, broad multilateral ne-
gotiations, such as a conference on European
security and cooperation and a conference
on mutual and balanced force reductions in
central Europe, promise to advance the secu-
rity and well-being of the world community.
In any look forward, trade and other forms
of economic activity loom large as areas ca-
pable of expanded, mutually beneficial devel-
opment. The world's biggest economies can
clearly sustain a higher level of commercial
interchange. The trebling of bilateral trade
in 1972 compared with 1971 and the several
recent agreements involving private U.S.
firms as well as government-to-government
arrangements constitute significant develop-
ments.
Another positive trend that seems certain
to carry forward into the future is the steady
upswing in exchanges of people and informa-
tion. More and more citizens of both coun-
tries are traveling back and forth while at
the same time advances in communications
technology have facilitated a concomitant
transfer of information and ideas.
The progress in improved relations over
the past year is concrete and demonstrable.
I am hopeful that as this trend continues we
will see a diminution in the areas of confron-
tation and an expansion in the areas of co-
operation between the United States and the
Soviet Union. Progress along these lines
would render significant service to the cause
of world peace.
Department of State Bulletin
President Nixon and President Pompidou of France
Hold Talks in Iceland
President Nixon held talks with President
Georges Pompidou of France at Reykjavik,
Iceland, May 31-June 1 and met with Ice-
landic President Kristjan Eld jam, Prime
Minister Olafur Johannesson, and Minister
of Foreign Affairs Einar Agustsson on May
30. Folloiving is an exchange of toasts by
the three Presidents at a dinner given by
President Eldjarn on May 31, together with
the transcript of a news conference held that
afternoon by Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant
to the President far National Secunty
Affairs.
EXCHANGE OF TOASTS
President Eldjarn ^
Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated June 4
It is a great pleasure for myself and my
wife to bid you and your companions wel-
come to this house.
It is clear to the Icelandic people that your
meeting in this country is worldwide news.
It focuses world attention on our country in
a special manner. This is to our liking; for
we wish to make our country known among
others, to broaden their knowledge of our
nation, its struggle for survival, and its so-
cial and cultural aims, as well as our histor-
ical and natural rights to this country with
all its resources. We believe that your stay
in this country will contribute to the
strengthening of an understanding of our
situation and our endeavors.
In Iceland we attach much importance to
the fact that a democratic way of thinking
is rooted with us and based on an ancient
foundation, even reaching back to the age
' President Eldjarn spoke in Icelandic.
of the settlement when our ancestors dis-
covered and inhabited this country which
had remained unknown and uninhabited. We
are agreed in wishing to strengthen equality
and justice among the people in our society.
You, our distinguished guests, are leaders of
two large and powerful nations which have
contributed in a historic manner to paving
the way for modern conception of freedom
and the rights of man. The Icelandic nation,
like others, has thanks to tender for this cul-
tural influence. I would recall this on the
present occasion and also the fact that our
nation has at least since last century been in
considerable direct contact with your nations
and derived a fertile influence from them
in many fields, among others in the arts and
literature. During the past decades we have
had extensive relations in the international
arena which leave us with memories of last-
ing values which will be recalled in future.
I W'Ould make an expression of my respect
for your great nations.
It is necessary for every nation to follow
the development of international affairs as
closely as possible. We in Iceland are fully
desirous of doing so. Your meeting and dis-
cussions here in our midst will add further
strength to this our will. I would like to ex-
press the sincere wish that our country may
offer you desirable facilities for your discus-
sions, that your stay and that of your com-
panions will give you pleasure, and that you
will leave us with good memories of this your
visit to Iceland. I would echo the wish of all
people of good will to the effect that your
meeting in Iceland may result in blessings
for the world which we all jointly inhabit.
I drink your toast, Messrs. Presidents,
wishing happiness and welfare to yourselves
and your nations.
July 2, 1973
President Nixon
White House press release ( Roykjavikf dated May 31
Mr. President, Mrs. Eldjarn, President
Pompidou, Mr. Prime Minister, and all of
our distinguished guests : This is a very his-
toric moment for me, both personally and in
my official capacity, because I am the first
American President ever to visit this coun-
try.
I want to thank you, Mr. President, and
your wife for the gracious hospitality you
have extended to us on this occasion and also
for all of our visit.
I would remind you that it was several
years ago in 1956 as Vice President, along
with Mr. Rogers, we visited your country.
It was in the dead of winter at Christmas-
time. The snow was 12 feet high. It was the
coldest winter, I think, in history. And now
we are here on one of the most glorious days
at the beginning of summer.
But whatever the differences in the
weather, whether it be in the cold of winter
or in the beautiful warmth of summer, there
is one thing that does not change, and that
is the warmth of an Icelandic welcome. We
thank you for that. We have seen it on every
occasion, and we have seen it tonight.
As we come to your capital, we are aware,
of course, of the proud tradition of this
country and of its modern significance as
well. We realize that this house in which
we have dinner tonight is older than the
White House, which for America is a very
old house.
We also know that you are a member of
our Atlantic community and, in a sense, you
are in the center of it. That is why it was a
very appropriate place for President Pompi-
dou and me to meet. Each of us came half-
way, but I should point out to President
Pompidou I came a little more than halfway
because his trip was only four hours and
mine was five and a half. Now, whether I
came more than halfway in our discussions
will remain to be seen.
Also, I would like to say on this occasion
that I have appreciated the opportunity to
again have very serious and constructive
talks with Pi-esident Pompidou. In these
meetings and in others we have had, we have
carried on a continuing and comprehensive
European-American dialogue.
Now, that dialogue is designed to
strengthen our relationship, to reinvigorate
it.
France, as everybody know's, is America's
oldest ally, and it is an ally with whom we
have stood side by side on many occasions.
Lafayette, in the very early days of our
country, once told George Washington that
Franco-American friendship would live for-
ever. But we know that even the oldest and
staunchest alliance, even the oldest and
staunchest friendship, must constantly be
renewed if it is to be of the greatest possi-
ble effectiveness in our changing world.
President Pompidou put it very well when
he said that we believe we can achieve gen-
uine European-American unity only while
respecting the individual personality of each
sovereign nation. That is my philosophy as
well.
Within our unity there can be individual-
ity; and if there is not individuality, that
unity will mean nothing in the world in
which we presently live, in which so many
proud peoples play a pai't.
Looking at our present situation, as Pres-
ident Pompidou and I agreed today, it is
our interests that unite us. We have so
many things in common : our common poli-
tical heritage, our common cultural tradi-
tion, our common concern for the security
of the Atlantic community.
And so what differences we have, which
are inevitable even among friends, pale into
insignificance as they are compared with
those great interests which reunite us in this
great community which we share.
I am confident that the conversations we
have had on this occasion will result in an
even closer appreciation of our common in-
terests and of our common objectives and also
a greater determination to see that those
interests and those objectives are always
foremost and that the tactics designed to
meet them will be only supplemental to those
interests.
It is in this spirit of European-American
Department of State Bulletin
friendship — French, Icelandic, American
friendship — that I offer a toast this evening,
a toast which has never been offered before
because such a meeting as this never oc-
curred before and may never occur again :
A toast to the President of Iceland, a toast
to the Prime Minister of Iceland, and a toast
to the President of France and to this great
community which we are proud to share
again.
President Pompidou -
Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated June 4
I am moved indeed by the kind words you
have spoken and by the welcome we have
received in Reykjavik. We already knew how
much your people has always married a deep
sense of hospitality with its virtues of char-
acter and drive. We witness it again today.
Together with my gratitude, I would like
to express the pleasure and honor I feel in
being here, the first French head of state to
come to Iceland. One could hardly find a
better example of sincere friendship and
cloudless relationship as they exist between
our two countries. They originated in a re-
mote past, as you know well, Mr. President,
being an archeologist and historian. Since
the very start they have been placed under
the aegis of cultural relations, and so they
remain today. Is it not symbolic in this con-
nection that Halldor Laxness, your Nobel
Prize winner, whose works are very popular
in France, is also the author of a remarkable
adaptation of "Candide"? I could not claim
to be complete, but I shall recall that in the
19th century our relations were enriched by
very close contacts between ports of Iceland
and Brittany. As you know, Pierre Loti
found there the subject of one of his best
books. One could not fail also to recall the
memory of Commandant Charcot and the
part he took in the discovery of Arctic
regions.
Nowadays our exchanges are diversify-
ing. In the economic, scientific, and techno-
logical fields they develop in a way which,
for my part, I sincerely hope will be
continued.
• President Pompidou spoke in French.
Our foreign policy options also bring us
together. In the last war, Iceland unfortu-
nately lost hundreds of her best sailors. We
were allies in the past, and we still are
within the Atlantic alliance. In trade, Ice-
land and the European Community have
signed an agreement, and I hope that the
conditions will soon be fulfilled for its com-
plete implementation. Furthermore, we sit
side by side in the Council of Europe, in
OECD [Organization for Economic Coop-
eration and Development], the United Na-
tions, and for several months now at the
Helsinki preparatory multilateral discus-
sions on the European Conference on Secu-
rity and Cooperation. In these several
forums, thanks to a thousand years' practice
of democracy on their own soil and to the
determination of their stand, Iceland repre-
sentatives offer a constant example of the
part a country can play in the world, what-
ever its size or power, a country concerned
both with asserting its own personality and
being opened to the largest cooperation.
Such manifold participation of Iceland in
international life stems from a very old
tradition. Around the year 1000, Leif the
Happy, son of Eric the Red, was the first
European to reach the New World, in North
Newfoundland. About the same period,
Saemundur Sigfusson, one of the most fa-
mous scholars in the sagas' era, was in Paris.
Mr. President of the United States, we have
both made conversely Leif's and Saemundur's
journeys in order to meet in Reykjavik. I
dare say it is of excellent augury for success-
ful talks.
The ocean wind blowing on our meetings
at the Azores a year and a half ago and now
in Iceland is perhaps but the breeze of
friendship uniting our two countries for
quite some time now. Born on the battlefields
of the War of Independence, consecrated in
two World Wars by the brotherhood of arms,
felicitously strengthened in the numerous
activities of peace, this friendship is today
as fruitful and necessary as ever.
Doubtless there are several and swift
changes on the face of the world. Many of
them, among the most decisive ones, are due
to your initiative, Mr. President.
July 2, 1973
As world relations alter, Europe gradually
and patiently discovers the road toward unity,
a unity which is necessary but not thereby
easier to achieve. There, again, there is
marked progress.
Would it mean that relations between the
United States and Europe, and more specif-
ically the United States and France, have lost
some of their urgency or interest? Certainly
not. We know the place of Europe in your
concern. For our part, however favorable
may developments be in the world situation,
we believe that it is still too fraught with un-
certainties for the need for our alliance to
decline.
Happily enough, my dear sirs and Presi-
dents, wide is the pattern of all kinds of
links to be established between free and ac-
tive peoples. It comes as no surprise that
the ever-changing needs in the international
situation should often raise new problems.
It is life itself which puts forth new chal-
lenges. It is up to us to stand up to them by
overcoming them; that is, by placing them
in the perspective of our future.
Such is, fellow Presidents, my strongest
wish. It is therefore with confidence and
friendship that I drink this toast in honor of
His Excellency Mr. Kristjan Eldjarn, Presi-
dent of the Republic of Iceland, in honor of
His Excellency Mr. Richard Nixon, Presi-
dent of the United States, and to the pros-
perity of our three countries.
DR. KISSINGER'S NEWS CONFERENCE
White House press release (Reykjavik) dated May 31
Mr. Ziegler [Ronald L. Ziegler, Press Sec-
retary to President Nixon]: You know the
meeting this afternoon lasted two hours,
just over two hours. So the two Presidents
have met now for close to five hours. We will
post the precise amount of time they have
met today following the briefing.
Dr. Kissinger, as you know, participated
in both the morning session and the after-
noon session with President Nixon and
President Pompidou, and he is here this
afternoon to brief you on the discussions and
to answer some of your questions. We do
have a dinner to attend, so we want to keep
this to about a half an hour. Dr. Kissinger
will begin the briefing with an opening
comment.
Dr. Kissinger: Ladies and gentlemen, I
will begin by reading my notes on what
President Pompidou and President Nixon
agreed at the end of the meeting could be
said. It is not a formal statement, but it was
agreed to by both sides that this statement
would be made and here it is. I repeat, this is
not a formal statement. These are the notes
to which both President Pompidou and Pres-
ident Nixon agreed as reflecting the tenor
of their conversations.
As Ron Ziegler already told you, this morn-
ing the two Presidents carried out a review
of the world situation and of relations within
the Atlantic alliance in a useful and con-
structive spirit.
In the course of this review. President
Pompidou stressed the important role by the
U.S. forces in Europe and the danger of a
unilateral reduction of such forces.
President Nixon indicated that he fully
concurred with President Pompidou's assess-
ment.
In connection with what we in the United
States have called the "Year of Europe," the
two Presidents have agreed that this concept
should be carried out in the closest coopera-
tion between France and the United States
by means of bilateral talks, exchanges at a
high level.
Foreign Minister [Michel] Jobert and I
will conduct some of these exchanges, and
our first meeting on that subject will take
place on June 7 in Paris, when I am there
for the Vietnamese negotiations.
Negotiations within the alliance on specific
issues which are now underway or which
may be started will continue in established
forums. As progress is made in these forums,
the two Presidents agree that a meeting at
the Deputy Foreign Minister level, on an ad
hoc basis, might be desirable to see how the
results of those bilateral exchanges and the
multilateral exchanges going on in the other
forums fit together for i)ossible incorporation
in a declaration of principles.
10
Department of State Bulletin
Whether or not there should be a summit
of the European leaders with the President
will be decided after the results of all these
other negotiations can be evaluated.
In any event, President Nixon will go to
Europe to carry on his contacts on a bilateral
basis with the various leaders.
On trade matters, the two sides agreed to
proceed in a cooperative and constructive
spirit. On monetary matters, the French
President gave a thorough presentation of
his views, and President Nixon agreed that
we would study them most attentively and
with a helpful attitude.
The two Presidents agreed that our inter-
ests are identical and that the only differ-
ence between our two nations concerns how
we can best achieve common objectives.
Now, this was the substance of the discus-
sions today.
In addition to the subjects which I have
read to you, there was a brief discussion of
Southeast Asia and the Middle Ea.st, subjects
that were covered at greater length in the
meeting of the Foreign Ministers.
Tomorrow President Nixon and President
Pompidou will address the bilateral relations
between the United States and France, and
we are confident that these talks will be
characterized by the same constructive and
friendly spirit that was so evident today.
Now I will be glad to answer some
questions.
Q. Dr. Kissmger, 7oas there a date, or a
rough date, set for the President's trip to
Europe ?
Dr. Kissinger: No, but we talked in general
terms of the time frame I gave you at our
last meeting — the end of October or early
November.
Q. Dr. Kissinger, in expressing the state-
ment about whether or not there woidd be a
summit meeting depends on these results,
could President Pom}>idou speak for Brandt,
Heath, and others?
Dr. Kissinger: Obviously President Pom-
pidou speaks for France. Obviously the
utility of the summit meeting depends on the
willing participation of the principal leaders.
President Pomjndou did not pretend to speak
for Heath or Brandt, both of whom have ex-
pressed their views on the subject before.
But it has always been our view that the
summit was not an end of itself. You remem-
ber I said this at the White House before we
left. What we feel is necessary is a discus-
sion of the future of the Atlantic alliance and
of the Atlantic relationship.
The first step in this direction was to es-
tablish procedures by which this review
could be carried out. These procedures have
now been substantially established, and what
the next step should be we will leave to the
evolution of these discussions.
Q. Dr. Kissinger, this sounds like a con-
cession on the part of France in terms of
setting a framework of principles. Is that
true, ivas this ivorked out today? It sounds
like it is more conciliatory than you had be-
fore. And also the linkage betiveen the midti-
lateral and bilateral.
Dr. Kissinger: No. There has never been
any debate about the fact that bilateral
talks could go on side by side with multi-
lateral talks. Our position has always been
that we did not intend what we have called
the "Year of Europe" either to undermine
European unity — on the contrary, we want to
foster it — or to push it through against the
opposition of major allies.
And therefore we had always envisaged
and had never found any oiiposition to the
idea that bilateral talks and multilateral
talks would go on side by side.
As for these results, we have not a]>
proached today's discussion from the atti-
tude that one side would win and another
side would lose. Each side had expressed cer-
tain views prior to the meetings. I told you
on Tuesday that I did not believe that the
French views and ours were as antithetical
as some of the reports had indicated.^
I think what we can say is that the two
'' For the transcript of a news conference held
by Dr. Kissinger at Washington on May 29, see
White House press release dated May 29, 1973.
July 2, 1973
11
Presidents talked in a spirit of allies and of
men who had been meeting for a long time
and looked at the practical methods by which
we could determine what there was in our
proposal and set up the jn'ocedures by which
they could be realized.
Q. Did you submit a draft of the frame-
work of principles to the President ?
Dr. Kissinger: We have not submitted a
draft of the framework of principles to
anybody at this point, and we will not do so
until we have had some preliminary bilateral
discussions with some of the countries most
concerned.
Q. Henry, could you spell out in some de-
tail tvhat you talked about as differences and
how ive can best achieve our common objec-
tives — what are those differences?
Dr. Kissinger: I said that the differences,
such as they are, concern disagreement
on how to achieve common objectives. The
meetings today were not really conducted in
a contentious spirit. It was not a catalogue
of disagreement. It was rather in order to
understand what the approach of each side
was.
For example, we know the difference on
the monetary question between our two coun-
tries. But I think also that we both aim for a
stable system that brings into the monetary
field the same degree of stability that we are
hoping to bring into the international field
by our political initiative.
There has been some discussion or some
disagreement — I can't really say disagree-
ment, but there has been perhaps a difference
in emphasis as to how rigidly one should
commit oneself to a particular procedure to
follow in the discussions that are foreseen
for this year.
It was resolved on the basis the results of
these discussions would guide the commit-
ments to particular forums rather than tie
ourselves now to a fixed forum.
But as I have tried to point out, the dif-
ferences were not as absolute as had been
presented previously and the attitude was
such to show this degree of progress.
Q. Do the French now seem more clearly
to see the larger political realities you have
talked about in terms of putting it all to-
gether in the three major areas of concern?
Dr. Kissi7iger: I think the fact of the
matter is that some of the problems that we
have been reading about will, without any
question, reappear in the actual discussions
that are now going on.
The two Presidents spoke more in terms of
basic objectives than in terms of solving
every issue before the alliance and before the
two countries.
I think the French understand better
now — but they of course will have to speak
for themselves — what we had in mind, which
was not to use one area as blackmail for the
other area, but rather to proceed to a general
discussion by examining each of the areas
and then seeing how they related to each
other.
Q. Can you say they agree on the basic
objectives?
Dr. Kissinger: I am not the best man
to speak for the French point of view. They
have their own spokesman here.
I would say that we have worked out
satisfactory procedures so that we can go
ahead with the examination of the issues
that we have wanted to put before the allies.
Whether the basic objective will then emerge
identical or different, we should leave to
these negotiations.
We have never said that we knew now
what the common objective was. What we
have said is that there is a need to attempt to
define it and to establish a method for ex-
amining it. That I believe we have made some
progress toward ; and we shall pursue it
with conviction and with energy, and we will
begin our talks with Monsieur Jobert — I will
begin the bilateral talks — next Thursday in
Paris.
Q. How do you now assess the prospects
of getting a set of principles?
Dr. Kissinger: I will want to see how
the discussions that are starting in the de-
fense field, that are going on in the trade
12
Department of State Bulletin
field, how the bilateral talks going on between
us and the French and other European coun-
tries, will develop.
Let me add it is clearly understood by the
two Presidents that while we will conduct
bilateral talks with France, we will also con-
duct bilateral talks with several other Euro-
pean countries as these negotiations proceed
and I would rather leave the estimate of how
well they will go for later.
We believe it is in the common interest
to proceed. We will proceed very seriously
with the attitude that nothing we develop
will have any meaning unless it has the will-
ing support of our European allies. So we
are not going to hand them an American
blueprint. We are not going to proceed on
the basis that we know best, and we ai-e
not doing it from the basis of undermining
European unity — but rather strengthening
it — or detracting from those areas in which
the Europeans believe autonomous action
is desirable.
Q. Henry, you made a reference at one
point to not tying ourselves too rigidly to
fixed procedures or fixed deadlines, some-
thing fixed. Was this a reference — can rve
infer from that that you tvere talking about
any specific or fixed commitment for a re-
turn to convertibility? Is that the reference
there?
Dr. Kissinger: No, that was not the
reference.
The question is, when I said that we are
not wedded to fixed procedures and fixed
deadlines, did I mean convertibility?
Of course convertibility is one of the issues.
Another issue is this: We don't want to
say that there must be, for example, a sum-
mit meeting by October 15 or November 15
and then gear everything to an artificial
deadline that we have established. It is pos-
sible that this could happen.
It is also possible the discussions this year
will lead to a point where, at the time of the
President's trip to Europe, some further
bilateral talks are needed and the time is
not yet ripe for such a meeting.
We are not wedded to one fixed procedure
in achieving the general objective that we
have set or in defining its attainability.
Mr. Apple [R. W. Apple, Jr., New York
Times].
Q. You said whether there would be a sunv-
mit ivould depend on whether the bilateral
and multilateral talks go ivell. That is ex-
actly irhat the French and British said after
the Heath -Poinpidou meeting publicly, and
then privately they said they saw no pros-
pect whatever where the bilateral and midti-
lateral negotiations could be brought to a
point where a summit would be possible
late this year. Would you comment on that
in light of this morning's meeting?
Dr. Kissinger: I would have no estimate
on that on the basis of this morning's
meeting. I think we will be in a much better
position to judge this around July when some
of the discussions will have actually been
taking place and w^hen perhaps the Deputy
Foreign Ministers meeting is in the process
of being organized or taking place.
Q. Do you think it toill be possible to de-
velop a rational, reasonable possibility that
a European summit can take place this fall?
Dr. Kissinger: I think there is a possi-
bility, but I wouldn't want to tie ourselves to
it. It really is too early to tell. I think that
is the best answer I can give you.
Q. Is it fair to say that we are more in-
terested in having this summit in the fall
than the French or some of the other Euro-
peans, and why ivould that be?
Dr. Kissinger: We are agnostic on the
issue of the summit. It depends on what
progress there has been made.
The French, I think it is correct to say, are
somewhat more reluctant about the sum-
mit. The other Europeans, like the British
and Germans, are perhaps a little closer to
our point of view.
But I don't think it is important to fight a
theological battle on that issue. It has never
been put forward as a principal American
objective. It was first stated as a possible
means by Chancellor Brandt on the occasion
of his visit to Washington.
We are prepared to examine it and we are
prepared to participate in it if it is going
July 2, 1973
13
to be useful, but we do not want to invest
now in a great deal of debate on the issue of
a forum when we have so much substance
that needs to be discussed.
Q. Do we have an agreement tvith other
allies on these procedures you have outlined?
Dr. Kissinger: We have had preliminary
talks with some other countries on these
procedures and we believe they will look
favorably on them, but I said the two
Presidents envisaged this and it will of
course have to be discussed in greater de-
tail with all the other countries, including
those with whom we did not have preliminary
exchanges.
Mr. Zicgler: We have time for two more
questions. We will go to Jim and then over
here.
Q. Wluit ideas or concepts might be in-
clvxled in this declaration of principles?
Dr. Kissinger: First of all, we have to
see whether the negotiations as they pro-
gress lend themselves to a declaration of
principles.
As I said, I can only tell you what our idea
is and this is not a subject we have had an
opportunity to discuss fully with all the
others. It is to state some goals and purposes
in the major areas — political, military, and
economic — which then can guide the negotia-
tions in these areas and the structures of the
alliance over the next few years.
Again, we will be able to be more precise
on this when the other negotiations are
somewhat further advanced.
Q. What could be a possible framework
for this summit? You mentioned in Wash-
ington the EEC [European Economic Com-
munity] or NATO, or an ad hoc framework.
What are you thinking of now ?
Dr. Kissinger: I can't answer the question,
because the two Presidents obviously did
not discuss the framework of a summit
when they had not decided on a summit.
My personal guess would be it is more
likely to be on an ad hoc basis than on
a basis within the framework of existing
institutions if it takes place. I want to re-
peat, that is a decision that has deliberately
been left for later.
Q. Speaking of a European summit, what
countries do you have in mind that would he
included?
Dr. Kissinger: I find it amazing at this
press conference most questions concern an
issue which I said has not been decided yet.
The composition of a conference that has
not been agreed to is awfully hard to deter-
mine.
Q. Are you going to talk to several coun-
tries about it?
Dr. Kissinger: I would think it is the
NATO countries plus those members of the
EEC that are not members of NATO.
Q. Are all of these negotiations going to
take place within an existing organism?
Dr. Kissinger: The trade and defense
negotiations will take place within existing
organizations. The political discussions will
take place through diplomatic channels.
In addition, there will be intensive bilateral
discussions and then of course there is this
idea of the Deputy Foreign Ministers.
Mr. Ziegler: Thank you very much. We
have copies of the President's toast for
tonight which will be available immediately
after this meeting.
Q. You have been talking of great poivers,
but you have not mentioned any small power.
You are in Iceland now. Fi7-st, does the Presi-
dent of the United States know that the
British are shooting Iceland out of NATO,
and what is he going to do about it? I am
from the biggest newspaper in Iceland.
Dr. Kissinger: I understand the question,
which was, does the United States under-
stand there is shooting going on —
Q. No. Does your government know that
the British are shooting Iceland out of NATO
because of their behavior in Iceland, and
what are the Americans doing about it?
Dr. Kissinger: The United States is aware
of the tensions that exist between Brit-
ain and Iceland at this particular moment.
14
Department of State Bulletin
The President had an opportunity to discuss
this subject yesterday with your President,
Prime Minister, and Foreign Minister, who
stated the Icelandic case very ably and very
passionately.
I don't think it is appropriate on the oc-
casion of a visit to Iceland for the purpose
of discussions with France to take a formal
U.S. position on this dispute. But I will say
it pains us that two good friends of ours are
in this controversy, that we hope veiy much
that it can be amicably resolved, and that we
will do our best to contribute to a construc-
tive solution.
The Press: Thank you.
U.S. Swimmers and Divers Tour
People's Republic of China
The Department of State announced on
May 18 (press release 161) that 10 top Amer-
ican swimmers and divers, including five
Olympic gold medalists, would tour the Peo-
ple's Republic of China for three weeks be-
ginning June 2. (For a list of team members,
see press release 161.)
The group, consisting of eight swimmers
and two divers, is the first American athletic
team to visit the People's Republic of China
since the U.S. table tennis team tour in April
1971. Earlier in May it was announced that
U.S. men's and women's basketball teams
would tour the P.R.C. starting in mid-June.
The American aquatic team is visiting the
P.R.C. at the invitation of the All-China
Sports Federation. Arrangements for the
tour were made with the assistance of the
National Committee on U.S.-China Relations
in New York City. The American team will
not engage in oflicial competition with
Chinese swimmers but will hold demonstra-
tions, clinics, exhibitions, and discussions of
swimming and diving techniques.
World Environment Day
A PROCLAMATION'
As the astronauts of Skylab I orbit the earth in
America's first manned space station, we are mind-
ful once again of the essential unity of mankind —
bound together by the finite resources of one small
planet. One of the chief concerns of this and sub-
sequent space missions will be the resources of the
earth and the quality of its environment. As before,
our findings will form the basis for positive contri-
butions to our fellow man.
But we do not have to rely upon the results of
space research to improve the earth's environment.
All men and women have a personal role to play in
this vital endeavor. The United Nations Conference
on the Human Environment held last June, with the
participation of one hundred and thirteen nations,
was a reflection of the increased understanding of
all mankind that environmental quality is every-
body's business — superseding any temporary dif-
ferences which may hamper relations between
nations.
In response to a resolution of the Conference on
the Human Environment, the United Nations Gen-
eral Assembly last December endorsed a recommen-
dation reading, in part, as follows:
"The General Assembly . . . designates 5 June as
World Environment Day and urges Governments
and the organizations in the United Nations System
to undertake on that day every year world-wide
activities reaffirming their concern for the preserva-
tion and enhancement of the environment, with a
view to deepening environmental awareness and to
pursuing the determination expressed at the Con-
ference."
Now, THEREFORE, I, RiCHARD NiXON, President of
the United States of America, do, in support of the
action of the United Nations General Assembly, call
on the people of the United States and United States
Government agencies to observe June 5 as World
Environment Day with appropriate ceremonies and
activities emphasizing the concern of Americans for
a better environment in which to live.
In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my
hand this fourth day of June in the year of our Lord
nineteen hundred seventy-three, and of the Inde-
pendence of the United States of America the one
hundred ninety-seventh.
C^ZjL^-^K:/^
' No. 4219; 38 Fed. Reg. 14739.
July 2, 1973
15
Restoring Europe's Sense of Unity
Address by Richard F. Pedersen
Counselor of the Department ^
In his foreign i^olicy report last March
President Nixon called 1973 the year of
Europe, not because he felt we could over-
come the problems of the Atlantic community
in any single year, but because changes in
the international situation would pose both
new problems and oi5i)ortunities in our
European relations. Subsequently Dr. [Henry
A.] Kissinger described our goal as one of
making the Atlantic relationship a force less
geared to crisis and more conscious of op-
portunities, drawing its inspiration from
goals rather than from feai's. And in dis-
cussing European affairs in his own report
to the Congress, Secretary of State Rogers
stressed that a substantially higher level of
worldwide cooperation is required among
Japan, Canada, western Europe, Australia,
New Zealand, and the United States in solv-
ing common trade and monetary problems,
assisting in the growth of the developing
world, and contributing toward a politically
sounder world.
Central to all of these statements was our
intention to build new relationships among
our closest associates that will contribute to
a durable structure of peace for the rest of
this century.
At the same time the so-called year of
Europe also retains a large dimension be-
yond that of cooperation among allies and
close friends. It is that dimension which I
wish to discuss with you today.
Improvements in U.S.-Soviet relations, in-
creasingly normalized relations between
' Made before the Commonwealth Club at San
Francisco, Calif., on June 8 (press release 200).
eastern and western European states, the
agreements which are eliminating Berlin as
a source of tension, and expanding trade and
human relationships are creating prospects
for a decisive lowering of barriers to Eu-
rope's sense of unity. Consequently, 1973 will
not only be a year of renewed cooperation
with western Europe. It is a year in which
we are seeking to engage the countries of
eastern Europe in an expanding set of close
and individual relationships — with ourselves
and with western European nations alike. We
are on the verge of a quite different relation-
ship with eastern Europe than the one of the
past quarter century. Our intention is to
move as rapidly toward it as the countries of
eastern Europe are prepared to do.
We will be pursuing our effort through a
series of negotiations — in the President's
talks with General Secretary [Leonid I.]
Brezhnev this month, in the Conference on
Security and Cooperation in Europe sched-
uled to convene this summer, and in the
negotiations on mutual and balanced force
reductions (MBFR) in the fall. We will be
])ursuing the effort also through a substan-
tial number of bilateral negotiations and
consultations already in process with the
countries of eastern Europe.
There are three areas in which advances
need to be made: in bringing about greater
freedom of movement of people and ideas
throughout Europe, in lowering the level of
forces confronting each other on the con-
tinent, and in expanding trade, investment,
and commercial relations.
Last December at a session of Foreign
Ministers in Brussels we and the other mem-
16
Department of State Bulletin
bers of NATO concurred upon a major
allied objective of bringing about a wider
flow of information and ideas and a closer,
more open, and freer relationship among all
people in Europe. The United States was
particularly pleased. We are convinced that
lasting improvements in relationships with
eastern Europe must be grounded in a re-
newal of the human exchange and open con-
tacts that have been curtailed over the past
25 years. The opening session of this sum-
mer's European conference will provide the
opportunity for us to test the degree of prog-
ress that is currently possible.
To be truly useful in opening up a new
period of European relationships, the con-
ference must avoid simply hortatory or sym-
bolic results. It must be directed toward
concrete and practical accomplishments. Our
experience in preparatory meetings this
spring makes us cautiously optimistic that
such progress will be made. We hope that the
political barriers that have divided eastern
Europe from the rest of the continent can
be lowered in the process.
I say this because preliminary agreement
has already been reached not only to estab-
lish committees on security and on economic
and technical cooperation but also to estab-
lish a committee to deal with increased hu-
man contacts. Mandates to govern the
operations of these committees — which will
be set up by this summer's opening session —
are currently in the final stages of prepara-
tion. We anticipate that the committee on
human contacts will establish working sub-
committees to produce concrete proposals,
and we are currently developing specific sug-
gestions with our allies on how the flow of
information and of people can be increased.
It would be foolish to pretend that substan-
tial diff'erences do not exist between Commu-
nist and democratic societies with respect to
this item. But in the last two yeai's we have
concluded a substantial number of new agi'ee-
ments with eastern European countries that
are already enlarging cooj^eration and con-
tacts among our peoples. We believe that ex-
perience under those agreements will demon-
strate that such contacts, far from being a
threat to anyone's security, will contribute
to the welfare of all.
Last December Mr. Brezhnev indicated
that the possibilities of progi-ess in this area
were "quite broad." We hope that this atti-
tude and the progress we have subsequently
made in preparatory talks will lead to sub-
stantial results this summer. Certainly that
will be an important objective of ours.
The conference will be develoijing a set of
principles to govern relations between states
in Europe, of which freer movement will be
a part. The countries of eastern Europe also
attach considerable importance to a provision
concerning the inviolability of territorial
boundaries. We understand this concern, just
as we believe they understand our concern
that this concept not be used as a pretext for
ratifying a political division in Europe. What
is needed is not something that emphasizes
diff'erences but something that enhances co-
operation among all states and that assures
each state of its political and territorial in-
tegrity vis-a-vis each other state.
Europe is slowly evolving toward a con-
tinent no longer divided into two blocs but
characterized by more open contacts among
all states. This of course is an objective we
have long held. It is one which has now been
endorsed — though with some differences of
intent — by the Warsaw Pact early in 1972
when it called for a transformation of rela-
tions that would make it possible to over-
come the splitting of the continent into
military-political groupings.
Such a process will be assisted by the
agreement we made with the Soviet Union
in Moscow last spring that each of us would
contribute to the "positive trends on the
European continent toward a genuine de-
tente and the development of relations
of peaceful cooperation among states in
Europe." - And by the agreement we both
reached to recognize equality of all states;
to make no claim to a«y special rights or
" For text of a joint communique issued at Moscow
on May 29, 1972, during President Nixon's visit, see
Bulletin of June 26, 1972, p. 899.
July 2, 1973
17
advantages in world affairs; and to seek to
promote conditions in which no country will
be subject to outside interference in its in-
ternal affairs.'
The Moscow summit laid the foundation
for a markedly im]iroved relationship be-
tween our two countries. It can also have an
important effect upon the evolution of all
contacts among Europe's sovereign states.
We do not deal with nations of eastern
Europe through Moscow. Indeed, we have
made explicitly clear our intention to deal
with each of them separately in its own dis-
tinct sovereign right. But it is obviously
easier for the governments of eastern Europe
to expand their cooperation with us and
with states in western Europe as the Soviet
Union moves in the same direction.
We anticipate that the summit soon to take
place in Washington will facilitate further
substantial improvements.
And we will seek to insure that this sum-
mer's conference will reinforce the territorial
integrity of each state of Europe against in-
tervention from any other state, whatever
their social systems and regardless of
whether or not they are members of the
same political grouping.
Lowering the Level of Military Forces
A balanced reduction in the level of mili-
tary forces would also make an important
contribution toward lowering barriers be-
tween countries in eastern and western
Europe by reducing the intensity and risks
of confrontation their presence implies.
The remarkable progress made on the Ber-
lin problem and the recent lowering of politi-
cal tensions make it both possible and de-
sirable to bring about a reduction in the
forces stationed in central Europe. Indeed,
we see this as an important parallel step
that should accompany progress in the Euro-
pean conference so that ijresent favorable
trends may be given momentum. Such a
' For text of the Basic Principles of Relations
Between the United States and the U.S.S.R. signed
at Moscow on May 29, 1972, see ibid., p. 898.
process would be advantageous to the states
of eastern as well as of western Europe.
Since January we and our allies have been
meeting in Vienna with eastern European
representatives to plan for formal negotia-
tions. These talks have not always been easy,
and differences of view persist, particularly
on the states which should ultimately partici-
pate in the agreements. But a basis for open-
ing negotiations has been arrived at. It is
now important that agreement be reached for
formal negotiations to begin no later than
this October.
Parallel with the preparatory talks in Vi-
enna we have been developing in Brussels
with our NATO allies a common approach to
the specific types and scopes of reduction we
would wish to negotiate. Substantial concur-
rence has now been reached in NATO on a
guidelines paper covering these and other
negotiating issues. Remaining unresolved
questions will be discussed by the Foreign
Ministers in the meeting Secretary Rogers
is attending next week and subsequently by
the NATO Council.
I might note that while a simple mathe-
matical approach would be to seek equal
reductions on both sides, it could also result
in an inequitable result because of other fac-
tors favoring the Warsaw Pact, such as
differences in the size, composition, and of-
fensive orientation of Warsaw Pact forces
and geographic advantages in reinforcement
of the Soviet Union over the United States.
To reduce these advantages, allied objectives
in MBFR could include achieving comparable
overall levels in ground forces. American and
Soviet forces, which are not indigenous to
central Europe, are likely to be initial can-
didates for reduction.
It will also be an important allied goal, and
should be a common objective of all parti-
cipants, to insure that the provisions of an
MBFR agreement will not be circumvented
or undermined. Constraints that would lower
risks stemming from the presence of troops
might even precede reductions. And con-
straints and noncircumvention provisions
should be an integral part of the reduction
18
Department of State Bulletin
agreement, for adequate verification of per-
tinent military activities of each side would
furtlier increase political confidence.
We are aware that in the United States
there are still some who would like to see us
reduce our own forces in Europe unilaterally,
while in western Europe some remain con-
cerned that we may make a separate bi-
lateral agreement with the Soviet Union. We
intend to do neither, for either of these steps
would contribute to insecurity, the opposite
of the result we seek.
The new deficit of payments for the main-
tenance of our military deployment in
Europe last year was about $iyo billion. The
alliance has already recognized the desira-
bility of alleviating balance of payments
deficits arising from military expenditures
in the common defense. In addition to our
negotiations on MBFR we will therefore be
seeking further allied action to provide a
lasting solution to this problem.
Advances in Economic and Commercial Area
In the area of economic and commercial
relations — which must accompany improved
security and greater freedom of people and
ideas as relations with eastern Europe pro-
gress — substantial advances have already
been made. And even more substantial
changes are in prospect.
In the decade of the 1960's the trade of
eastern Europe in CEMA [Council for Eco-
nomic Mutual Assistance (COMECON)]
with the rest of the continent increased from
a level of about $3 billion to a level of over
$9 billion. Our own trade with them has
reached a level of about $.500 million. Still it
remains limited, totaling less than 1 percent
of our foreign trade; and though we antici-
pate even greater increases, it would be un-
realistic to expect our trade with eastern
Europe to become a significant proportion of
our foreign trade.
Nevertheless we enjoy a favorable balance
in our trade with eastern European states of
over two to one — and we could expect to re-
tain a favorable balance under the doubling
or tripling of trade that can be foreseen over
the next few years.
We also strongly desire a normalization of
our economic relations with eastern Europe
in the conviction that economic interdepend-
ence and expanded East-West trade can be-
come a pivotal element in building a structure
of peace.
Last fall Secretary Rogers instructed our
Ambassadors in eastern Europe to place
trade promotion at the very top of the list of
our policy priorities. We are increasing the
number of commercial oflJicers in our Em-
bassies throughout eastern Europe. Last fall
we opened a trade information office in Po-
land, and in a few days we will open a new
East- West trade center in Vienna. Our policy
has already begun to show results. Exports
to eastern Europe and the U.S.S.R. in 1972
were more than double those in 1971, and we
anticipate steady future growth.
Significant improvement in trade and com-
mercial arrangements with eastern Europe
now requires further action on our own part.
Since 1951, principally for political reasons,
no Communist state other than Yugoslavia
and Poland has received most-favored-nation
(MFN) treatment from the United States.
In 1971 we infoi'med Romania of our in-
tention to seek most-favored-nation treat-
ment for it as part of a commercial
agreement. In 1972, in our new trade and
lend-lease debt agreements with the Soviet
Union, we undertook to seek from Congress
a similar status for it. More recently we have
informed Hungary of the administration's
intent to seek approval to negotiate the ex-
tension of such treatment to them also. In
April, in the Trade Reform Act, the Presi-
dent requested requisite authority to extend
MFN to them and to other states where it
would serve our interests. The executive
branch will make every eff'ort to obtain
congressional approval of this bill so that we
may proceed toward the accelerated trade
relations with eastern Europe that we desire.
We will, of course, expect similar treat-
ment in return. While in most countries with
July 2, 1973
19
centrally directed economies tariff provisions
do not have gi-eat practical significance, in-
creasing- diversification of eastern Europe
makes generalizations inappropriate. In a
country w^ith a relatively liberalized system
such as Hungary, for example, the 100 per-
cent higher tariffs our exporters face over
those from western Europe is a real obstacle
which reciprocal extension of MFN would
overcome.
As a further step toward normalization of
economic relations we are also substantially
reducing the U.S. export control list to bring
it more closely into line with the common
strategic embargo list maintained by NATO
countries and Japan. This step will at the
same time maintain necessary security con-
trols while reducing barriers to eastern
European acquisition of industrial technol-
ogy in which we are competitive.
We are also ready to consider a broader
availability of Export-Import Bank credits
and guarantees for the sale of U.S. goods —
beyond the recent extensions to Romania and
the Soviet Union — as relations with indivi-
dual countries improve and as outstanding
claims and defaulted bonds are settled.
But trade normalization is a two-way
street, and we also will be seeking improve-
ments which would facilitate the functioning
of free enterprise traders with state-
managed economies.
An important element will be to insure
that normal facilities which will automati-
cally be available to their representatives
here also will be available to U.S. business-
men in eastern European countries:
— To be physically represented on a perma-
nent basis, through their own offices as well
as through local agents;
— To have direct trading access to end
users and not to be restricted to specially
created foreign trading companies;
— To have rights to multiple entry visas
and unrestricted use of such normal business
facilities as telex lines; and
— To be given equitable exchange rate and
tax treatment.
We will seek provisions for arbitration of
commercial disputes through impartial third-
country sources. And we will need to provide
for the right to protect ourselves against
market disruptions along the lines which the
President has requested in his proposed
changes to our own foreign trade laws.
In the past few years we have already
made substantial progress in relations with
states in eastern Europe. Just two days ago
the Secretary of State exchanged ratifica-
tions of new consular agreements with Po-
land, Romania, and Hungary. We have
initiated consultations on similar agreements
with Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria.
We have a new joint trade commission, a
scientific-technological agreement, and an air
transport agreement with Poland; scientific
cooperation, air transport, and claims agree-
ments with Hungary; reduced travel con-
trols and cultural exchange agreements with
Romania.
Normalization is also evident in the in-
creasing integration of eastern Europe into
the world payments and trade system. Better
relations are developing between banks and
other financial institutions of East and West.
Poland, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, and Ro-
mania have become members of the GATT
[General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade].
Hungary is expected to do so this year. Yugo-
slavia and Romania have become members of
the IMF and IBRD [International Monetary
Fund; International Bank for Reconstruction
and Development]. And Hungary has floated
a bond issue in western Europe.
We welcome all of these steps. For it is our
firm conviction that by bringing eastern
Europe into more normal contact with other
nations we will take a long step toward a
permanent structure of peace.
Industrial Cooperation With Eastern Europe
The degree toward which cooperative eco-
nomic endeavor is progressing may be most
visibly seen, however, in an area of coopera-
tion I have not yet touched on — that of indus-
trial coojDeration through joint ventures and
investments in eastern Europe.
For some time co-production — with West-
20
Department of State Bulletin
ern partners providing l<now-how, machinery,
and components on credit against subsequent
delivery of finished products — has been in-
creasing. We estimate that roughly a thou-
sand industrial cooperation projects are
already in existence — though few exist with
American firms outside the fields of hotel
construction and operation.
Nevertheless joint projects are anticipated
under recent agreements with the Soviet
l^nion by Occidental and General Electric
and already exist with Clark and Interna-
tional Harvester in Poland, Food Machinery
Corporation and Corn Production Systems in
Hungary, and throughout eastern Europe by
our cola companies.
Yugoslavia, Romania, and Hungary have
also announced rules for an even more far-
reaching step — permitting management and
equity participation up to a 49 percent share
by Western firms in joint ventures in their
country. Poland has a comparable law under
consideration. At least a few joint equity
ventures in Yugoslavia and Romania have
already been established. In Romania an
American firm, Control Data Corporation,
acquired a month ago a 45 percent interest in
a joint corporation established with the Min-
istry of Machine Tools and Electronics under
the name of Romcontroldata — a company
that will produce card punchers and card
readers both for domestic use and for export.
Several such equity ventures were previously
established in Yugoslavia.
Whether full equity participation in a
Western sense can be expected in enterprises
located in a centrally planned economy re-
mains to be ascertained through practice.
But the experimentation now underway of-
fers new prospects for economic cooperation
across ideological barriers hardly conceivable
only a few years ago. We would like to see
more U.S. comimnies active in a field which
can help to create lasting ties of mutual
economic benefit.
In speaking today of our desire to con-
tribute to a new sense of unity throughout
Europe and to improve our own relations
with the states of eastern Europe I have
necessarily done so in broad terms which
encompass the region as a whole.
I do not want to end, however, without
emphasizing the diversity and distinctiveness
of eastern Europe's various states. Inherit-
ors of a long history of struggles for inde-
pendence among themselves and with other
powers, victims of terrible physical destruc-
tion in two world wars (Poland and Yugo-
slavia had the highest fatalities per capita
of any states in World War II), and posses-
sors of strong national identities, they are
states of proud and courageous peoples.
They encompass countries with active roles
in international affairs such as those long
played by Yugoslavia and Romania in inter-
national oi'ganizations and currently, though
with some impact in our own relations, by
Poland and Hungary in Southeast Asia. They
differ substantially in internal economic pol-
icies (encompassing such differences as Hun-
gary's new economic mechanism with its
emphasis upon local enterprise responsi-
bility, Poland's successful agricultural pro-
gram with 80 percent of the farms in
private hands, and a highly centralized Ro-
manian economy). And they even diverge on
occasion in foreign policies — as the markedly
different perspectives of Albania and Bul-
garia make apparent.
Thus we are dealing and intend to deal
with each state in eastern Europe differently,
determining our policy in accordance with
the specific attitudes and actions of each, and
looking forward to a return to our once
wider association with all the nations of the
area.
July 2, 1973
21
U.S. Economic Policies and Their Implications
for Latin America and the Caribbean
Statement by William J. Casey
Under Secretary for Economic Affairs
It is a pleasure to be here for the opening
session of the third annual CIAP review of
U.S. economic policies and their implications
for the countries of Latin America and the
Caribbean. I come to this meeting fresh
from the very interesting and rewarding
journey through Latin America and the Car-
ibbean which I have just made with Secre-
tary Rogers. During the 17 days of that visit
I had the opportunity to meet with many
people in government and business engaged
in the economic and development activities
of that region. I have listened to their ideas.
I was greatly impressed by a great sense of
purpose, by a generally clear perception of
where they want to go and what they need to
do to get there, and by a keen interest and
extensive knowledge of economic develop-
ments in their own countries and in the
world.
I know that the two previous reviews of
my country's economic developments and
policies have been fruitful ones. Much of the
credit goes to you, Dr. Sanz de Santamaria
[Carlos Sanz de Santamaria, Chairman of
CIAP], for your able leadership. We expect
to do all that we can, together with the Com-
mittee, to make the third annual review an
equal success.
We are pleased to note that this year's
background document for the review dif-
' Made before the Inter-American Committee on
the Alliance for Progress (CIAP) on May 31 (press
release 189). Under Secretary Casey was head of
the U.S. delegation to the third annual CIAP re-
view of U.S. economic policies.
fered from the earlier reports in that it put
forward a series of proposals for modifica-
tions in our policy. While we probably can-
not accept all of them, we will give them
careful consideration. We share the general
concept behind CIAP 605 in its thrust — to
coordinate economic policies contributing to
development — and its concern that, given the
uncertain future of official development as-
sistance, more attention should be given to
the changing composition of capital flows
with increased private lending to increase the
flow of resources to the region. Recognizing
the internal and external constraints on the
U.S. economy, many of the specific policy
measures cannot be implemented immedi-
ately but will be considered by us as we pur-
sue the task of updating our policy toward
LDC's [less developed countries] to coor-
dinate various economic and assistance ele-
ments. I would like to commend the staff of
this Committee for the constructive outlook
and the salient thought which have gone into
their document.
President Nixon, in his message to the
OAS General Assembly, renewed our con-
tinued commitments to hemisphere coopera-
tion and reaffirmed our purpose to build and
strengthen a mature partnership among na-
tions of this hemisphere. He has underscored
our dee\) interest in Latin America with Sec-
retary Rogers and with his announcement
that he will visit the region himself soon.
Today I will undertaJ\e to assess for you the
current economic posture of the United
States and our broad objectives in improving
22
Department of State Bulletin
the international economic order in a manner
which will further facilitate economic prog-
ress for all of us. My colleagues on the dele-
gation will discuss the U.S. domestic econ-
omy, our balance of payments, our trade and
commodity policies, our approach to the up-
coming multilateral trade negotiations and
reform of the world monetary system, and
our policies on multilateral and bilateral de-
velopment financing and assistance, elabo-
rating in greater detail on subjects I will
touch on broadly.
A review of U.S. international economic
policies and their objectives must take into
account our domestic economic situation,
which I would like to briefly outline. Nine-
teen seventy-two was the first full year of
the innovative set of programs implemented
in August 1971 to expand economic activity,
reduce unemployment, and lower the infla-
tion rate. As the President stated in his
annual economic report, 1972 was "a very
good year." The real growth of GNP, 6.5
percent, was the highest since 1966. Civilian
employment rose sharply, with 2.3 million
more people employed than in 1971, the
largest yearly percentage increase since
1955; and the unemployment rate declined,
although it was still higher than desired.
Both real wages and corporate profits rose.
Labor productivity was up significantly.
While progress was made in the fight against
inflation, prices were higher at the end of the
year than the level at which the administra-
tion had aimed.
The situation during the first months of
1973 has been somewhat mixed. The economy
has continued to expand at an annual rate of
8 percent in real terms; but a series of fac-
tors, some of them temporary, led to rising
inflation once again. Consumer spending in-
creased significantly during the first quarter,
and the nation's factories were operating at
more than 80 percent of capacity, the highest
level since 1969. However, the GNP deflator
rose in the first quarter at an annual rate of
about 6 percent. Inflation is thus the most
critical current problem.
Our anti-inflation program of 1973 is ad-
dressed to these three main elements of this
problem:
— First, as the principal defense against a
revival of excess demand we have proposed
a very restrained budget plus moderation of
the pace of monetary expansion. We are now
moving very close to a balanced budget.
— Second, the leaders of organized labor,
along with leaders of management, are par-
ticipating in the development of wage poli-
cies. These leaders have subscribed to our
goals of a reduced rate of inflation and rec-
ognized the need for stabilization of wage
increases and for industrial peace to achieve
that goal. So far, wage settlements seem
likely to be consistent with a moderate rate
of inflation.
— Third, the government has taken major
steps to increase the supply of food and
thereby to hold down food prices. We have
increased the acreage available for produc-
tion of crops and livestock, we have sold
most of the government-owned stock of food
commodities, we have eliminated subsidies
to exports, and we have opened our doors to
more imports of food. Big rises in food prices
have reflected worldwide supply shortages
and a rapid rise of incomes in the United
States and elsewhere. We believe that the in-
creased supplies that will be forthcoming,
as a result of the natural response of farm-
ers and the measures taken by government,
will bring this rapid food price rise to an
end in the second part of this year.
Thus, our Council of Economic Advisers
now believes that the most rapid part of the
expansion has been passed and is estimating
a significantly declining rate of inflation for
the rest of the year. This estimate is based
on the fact that the most rapid part of food
price rises is behind us, that we probably
will not encounter a wage explosion in 1973,
that a decline of residential construction may
be at hand, and that the rate of growth of
demand will be less. In addition, the Febru-
ary devaluation of the dollar has presum-
ably already had most of its effect on our
price level. Somewhat more restrictive fiscal
July 2, 1973
23
and monetary policies are also being imple-
mented to fight price increases. The prognosis
for the rest of the year is for a rise in GNP
of about 11 percent on an annual basis, of
which 7 percent would be an increase in real
output.
The U.S. balance of payments remained
in heavy deficit in 1972. The chief element
was the deterioration in the trade balance to
a record annual deficit of more than $6
billion. Exports were up about 12 percent,
but imports rose by more than 21 percent. The
Smithsonian agreement of late 1971 had not
yet had the time to favorably affect our trade
patterns. Another partial reason for the
large deficit was the divergence between the
high growth rate of the U.S. economy and
the lower increases in Japan and Europe.
Other factors were more positive. Progress
was made in lowering some trade barriers
and in preparing for the multilateral trade
negotiations which should benefit our trade
account. The capital account deficit was de-
creased from more than $25 billion to about
$2 billion, and the official reserve transactions
deficit fell from about $30 billion to about
$10 billion.
During the first quarter of 1973 the mer-
chandise trade deficit narrowed sharply to
about $900 million, compared to a $1.6 bil-
lion deficit in the last quarter of 1972. This
first-quarter deficit was the smallest since
the third quarter of 1971. A further substan-
tial improvement occurred in April, and the
trade balance has turned positive for the
first time in more than 18 months.
In my brief outline of the U.S. economy
and our balance of payments, I have at-
tempted to sketch some of the major domes-
tic factors which control and affect our
overseas activities and objectives. No one
will question that the U.S. economy no longer
has the preeminence of earlier years. While
our economy remains the largest and most
productive in the world, the growth of Eu-
rope and Japan greatly reduced or eliminated
many aspects of U.S. primacy. Many devel-
oped countries have per capita incomes ap-
proaching that of the United States, and
several developing countries have broken
their cycles of poverty and are well on the
way to a high level of development. These
new realities have created the need for mone-
tary reform, which is already underway, and
trade negotiations, which will begin later
this year.
Importance of Monetary Reform
We are all familiar with the changes in
relative international economic positions in
the last few years which finally required two
dollar devaluations and set the stage for the
monetary discussions which are being car-
ried on in the Committee of Twenty (C-20).
The challenge of monetary reform is of para-
mount importance to all. The disequilibrium
of recent years can too easily lead to restric-
tions on public and private capital flows and
especially on trade. A better balance of re-
serves among countries is essential to correct
this. The first step — a more realistic ex-
change rate — has already improved not only
the U.S. trading position but the competitive
position of Latin American countries as well.
The Treasury representative will be pre-
pared to discuss monetary questions more
fully, but I can say briefly and in general
terms that: The United States and Latin
America are in substantial agreement on the
close interrelationship between monetary re-
form and trade, investment, and aid. Both
the United States and Latin America desire
monetary reform that jjrovides for adjust-
ment by countries with surpluses as well as
those with deficits in their balance of pay-
ments. Both areas seek exchange rate rela-
tionships that provide stability and thus
encourage world trade, and there is interest
in obtaining a larger flow of development re-
sources to Latin America from all of the de-
veloped countries.
There are some differences as to how ex-
change rate stability can best be achieved
and how objective indicators might be ap-
plied to achieve symmetrical surplus and
deficit balance of jiayments adjustment, but
these are being discussed in the C-20, in
24
Department of State Bulletin
which Latin America is very ably repre-
sented.
Development Assistance
The United States is prepared to work with
each nation of Latin America on a one-to-one
basis to improve the flow of trade and tech-
nology and capital, both private and public,
to accelerate its development and enhance
the contribution which its markets and its
products make to the world's progress and
in-osperity.
We will pursue a comprehensive aid policy
designed to help stimulate social and eco-
nomic progress, particularly higher rates of
per capita economic growth, in the develop-
ing world — a policy not of aid alone but em-
ploying a wide variety of economic relation-
ships, a policy involving coordination with
other develo])ed countries and requiring seri-
ous efforts from the developing countries
themselves. We will pursue it in recogni-
tion of the fact that just as the developing
nations need access to the capital and cooper-
ation of the developed countries, so will we
increasingly need their cooperation and ac-
cess to what they can produce. The rapidly
burgeoning needs of the industrialized world
for energy and raw material resources offer
new trade jiossibilities that will both aug-
ment production and foreign exchange earn-
ings in the developing world.
We are reviewing our development policies
to make them more effective by the fullest co-
ordinated use of international investment,
trade expansion, preferences, financing pro-
vided by multilateral institutions, bilateral
grant and loan assistance, technical assist-
ance and training, debt relief, and collabora-
tion in social and economic institution
building.
While on the subject of development as-
sistance, I would like to comment on one of
the proposals discussed in the staff docu-
ment — the flow of resources to the interna-
tional financial institutions. These institu-
tions will receive continued support from the
U.S. Government. It is regrettable that con-
tributions to the Inter-American Develop-
ment Bank (IDB) have lagged, but the
administration is making a strong effort to
persuade Congress to correct the shortfall
and provide the appropriations to meet our
pledge. We agree that the IDB should have
adequate callable capital in order to facili-
tate the transfer of resources. We have sup-
ported the IDE's efforts to bring other
developed countries into the IDB with sub-
stantial contributions to the resources of the
IDB and will continue to do so.
As a complement to conventional aid flows,
the CIAP document proposes more flexible
use of debt relief. This complex subject has
long been debated within our government.
Debt relief is considered an extraordinary
measure to be undertaken only in exceptional
circumstances. It is not clear that debt re-
lief provides additional resources for less
developed countries over and above the nor-
mal capital flows, and the allocation of re-
sources provided by debt reschedulings may
not be in accordance with the greatest need
for development finance. We expect the com-
mitments made when a loan is granted to be
met. Otherwise the flow of credit will falter.
Situations will develop where we have to con-
sider i-escheduling. This is a complex prob-
lem, and in some situations difficulties in
meeting payment schedules may have to be
resolved ultimately through some combina-
tion of policies involving debt relief, resource
flows, trade, and debtor self-help.
Foreign Private Direct Investment
Now I would like to turn to the area of
investment. Although attitudes toward for-
eign direct investment in Latin America are
changing as development proceeds, foreign
investment, including increasing amounts
from Europe and Japan, is clearly playing a
significant role in Latin American develop-
ment, particularly in those countries which
show the most rapid growth rate. I found
general agreement in our discussions with
Latin American oflicials that foreign private
direct investment is important and that ef-
forts to clear up the differences that separate
investors and host countries and thereby in-
July 2, 1973
25
crease the flow of capital are in the interests
of both. If this is to be done, it is clear from
the discussions during our trip that as a
first essential, in order to create a secure
and responsible climate for investment, host
countries must develop ]iolicies and regula-
tions regarding remittances, technology
transfer, ownership, local borrowing, and
the various other asi^ects of investment,
make these policies clear to the investors,
and then maintain them consistently.
The idea of an international effort to define
investment guidelines which is recommended
in the CIAP document prepared for this
meeting is one ajiproach to the question of
providing more consistent environments for
investors. This and other efforts at a ra-
tional apjn-oach to investment are useful and
in keeping with our jiolicy that foreign pri-
vate direct investment should be encouraged
as a primary means of furthering develop-
ment in Latin America and other developing
countries. I might add, however, that encour-
agement does not extend to involving the U.S.
Government in the terms under which in-
vestments are made other than in a technical
advisory caiiacity as for example by our gov-
ernmental investment insurance agency, the
Overseas Private Investment Corporation.
Further, the encouragement refers to those
countries where investment is welcome and
treated fairly when expropriation, earnings
remittance, and similar problems arise.
The CIAP document this year stresses an-
other aspect of investment; namely, portfolio
investment, particularly via the U.S. capital
market. Latin American efforts to raise capi-
tal, not only in the United States, but on the
other developed country capital markets as
well, should be of high priority. In fact, these
markets already are being used by the Latin
American countries to a significant degree.
Since 1962, the less developed countries have
succeeded in raising $1.6 billion in the bond
markets of various developed countries, with
Argentina and Mexico accounting for some-
thing more than half of this amount. Fui--
ther, of the top 10 LDC borrowers, eight
were from Latin America (Mexico, Argen-
tina, Panama, Venezuela, Jamaica, Brazil,
Peru, and Trinidad and Tobago, in that or-
der). About one-third of this borrowing was
obtained in the U.S. capital market. As Latin
American development moves forward, this
source of financing should become more im-
portant. We are prepared to work to reduce
barriers to the access of Latin American
issues to these markets.
It is becoming increasingly clear that both
the developed and the developing countries
have a mutual stake in strengthening capital
markets ai'ound the world and in increasing
their interrelationships. Although Latin
America now finances approximately 90 per-
cent of total investment from its own domes-
tic savings, as the region industrializes the
need for large-scale external financing will
not be fully met by the capabilities of domes-
tic capital markets or the resources of the
multinational lending agencies.
The capital markets program of the OAS —
funded by a special $5 million U.S. grant —
and of the IDB is helping Latin American
countries to make rapid and practical im-
provements in their domestic capital markets.
These programs are well underway, and we
hope full advantage will be taken of them. It
is obvious that many of the same measures
which Latin countries can adopt to increase
the investment in domestic portfolios by
their own citizens — improved disclosure
standards and accounting practices, more
efficient regulatory laws and institutions,
rationalization of interest rates, appropriate
taxation and depreciation policies, and re-
sponsible fiscal and monetary measures —
will also increase the confidence of foreign
investors in Latin American issues. Improve-
ments in local capital markets might also
encourage the return of the large Latin
American capital holdings held abroad.
The OAS and CIAP have raised the idea
of establishing a new independent organiza-
tion to promote Latin American capital mar-
ket development. This might duplicate activ-
ities already being handled by other entities
such as the OIF [International Monetary
Fund] (debt management), the IFC [Inter-
26
Department of State Bulletin
national Finance Corporation], and the IDB.
Also the OAS itself already has its capital
markets development program. A related
suggestion concerning the creation of a new
financial intermediary which would purchase
Latin American official bonds and resell them
or sell its own issues in world markets
is an interesting one which may warrant
further consideration, although it lacks the
detail necessary for a full-scale analysis.
The Issue of Trade Relations
Let me very briefly turn to the issue of
trade relations, which we must all work to
resolve satisfactorily if we hope to meet the
challenges presented by the rapidly changing
international economic scene. The reform
and improvement in those areas I have al-
ready discussed will not be sufficient unless
we are also successful in the multilateral
trade negotiations which will occur later this
year.
President Nixon has proposed broad new
legislative authority for trade negotiations.
The legislation has as its fundamental prem-
ise that every nation can and should bene-
fit from expanding trade and open trade
practices.
It is in the elimination of nontariff bar-
riers that the mutuality of objectives be-
tween the United States and Latin American
nations is perhaps greatest. A reduction in
the barriers to agricultural imports world-
wide can bring major benefits to all the econ-
omies in this hemisphere.
During my recent Latin American trip I
found great interest in the countries in trade
relations in general and with the United
States in particular. Considering the rela-
tively greater importance which trade (as a
share of GNP) has in the Latin American
economies and the predominant position
which Latin American exports to and imports
from the United States occupy, this interest
was not surprising; and I welcomed the
opportunities that arose to exchange openly
and seriously our respective views.
There is mutual recognition that U.S.-
Latin American trade is developing quite
well. Between 1969 and 1972 Latin American
exports to the United States and U.S. exports
to Latin America both increased by about 35
percent. Last year our duty-free imports
from Latin America accounted for 40 percent
of total im]oorts from the region. The average
incidence of duty on the dutiable imports was
under 8 percent.
The United States realizes that developing
countries face special difficulties in entering
world markets, particularly when first at-
tempting to diversify into nontraditional ex-
ports. For that reason the trade bill would
permit the United States to join with other
industrialized countries in providing develop-
ing countries access to the markets of indus-
trialized nations. A broad range of manufac-
tured products now regulated by tariffs
would be accorded duty-free treatment in
instances where countries in the early stages
of industrialization are beginning to enter
world markets.
Generalized preferences have long been a
goal of the Latin American countries, and
there was general satisfaction that a U.S.
proposal had been submitted to Congress.
But some concerns were expressed, especially
with respect to the authority proposed for
the President to designate beneficiaries and
to the so-called competitive need limitation.
Preferences are a unilateral, nonreciprocal
grant by the United States of trade privileges
to certain countries. We have requested au-
thority to join other industrialized countries
in extending these preferences because we
believe that this would contribute to economic
development.
The preference schemes of the other major
industrialized countries impose quantitative
limitations on most if not all preferential im-
ports. The United States could have pro-
posed this kind of a system, too, but elected
instead to devise a scheme that would be more
consistent with the basic objectives of gen-
eralized preferences; namely, to encourage
the development of new export industries.
This is to be done by permitting unrestricted
entry into the U.S. market up to the point
where a country's exports of a particular
July 2, 1973
27
product exceed either 50 percent of U.S.
imports or $25 million. A product that has
reached these levels of export success would
not continue to have the incentive provided
through a preference unless the President
used his discretionary authority to grant it.
We think this is a fair and open system pre-
serving the benefits for those countries most
in need of them.
In coming months we will engage each
other in negotiations on monetary reform,
trade, investment, development assistance,
and energy. From these negotiations we must
create a realistic and durable system which
assures the equitable and orderly conduct of
international economic affairs in an inter-
dependent world in which no nation holds a
dominant economic position. We have a
unique opportunity. Failure to take advan-
tage of it would risk the progress which we
have achieved.
As we undertake this task, we welcome a
dialogue with you in the spirit of matui-e
partnership and shared responsibility which
now characterizes the relationship between
us. This third annual CIAP review of U.S.
economic policies can make an important
contribution to what needs to be done.
Trademark Treaty Signed
at Vienna
Press release 212 dated June 15
At the conclusion of the Vienna Diplomatic
Conference on Industrial Property, the
Trademark Registration Treaty was signed
on June 12 for the United States by Robert
Gottschalk, Commissioner of Patents.
The treaty is designed to simplify the pro-
cedures for obtaining international registra-
tion of trademarks for U.S. companies doing
business abroad.
The treaty was unanimously adopted at
the final plenary session. In addition to the
United States, the United Kingdom, the Fed-
eral Republic of Germany, Italy, Portugal,
Hungary, San Marino, and Monaco also
signed. Some 46 countries were represented
at the conference. In their closing statements
most of the other delegations present indi-
cated their intent to confer with their gov-
ernments and expressed their hope to sign
before the end of the year. The treaty re-
mains open for signature through Decem-
ber 31.
The negotiations at Vienna represent the
climax of the work of several committees of
experts and working groups which have met
at Geneva since 1970 with the assistance of
the World Intellectual Property Organiza-
tion (WIPO). The U.S. delegation to the
Vienna Conference was composed of officials
from the Department of State, the U.S. Pat-
ent Office, and advisers from the private
sector.
Under the provisions of the treaty, a single
application either in the English or French
language with a single fee and one set of
standard formal requirements is filed with
the International Bureau (under WIPO) and
results in an international registration with
initial effect as an application in each state
designated therein and subsequent registra-
tion in each state later, unless registration
is refused within 15 months. Each state may,
within the 15-month refusal period, refuse to
register a mark on the same grounds for re-
fusal as are specified in its own national law.
The treaty will require a change in U.S.
law to permit registration of marks without
use in commerce for a period of three years
after the filing of an application. The pos-
sibility of this three-year period being ex-
tended to as much as five years was eliminated
as a mandatory requirement.
The treaty is subject to ratification, which
will take place for the United States only
after the Senate has given its advice and
consent and the U.S. law has been amended.
28
Department of State Bulletin
THE CONGRESS
Department Discusses the Arab-Israeli Conflict
and the Arabian Peninsula-Persian Gulf Area
Statement by Joseph J. Sisco
Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs
Mr. Chairman : I welcome this opportunity
to discuss and to answer questions about the
present situation in the Middle East. I will
concentrate my opening remarks on two parts
of the area which are often discussed inter-
changeably but which, while they do in some
degree interact with each other, nevertheless
constitute in fact two separate sets of prob-
lems, each of which should be viewed pri-
marily in its own context. I refer to the
immediate area of the Arab-Israeli conflict
and, secondly, to the region of the Arabian
Peninsula and the Persian Gulf.
I do not believe there is need to give to you
and the members of the subcommittee an ex-
haustive review of the Arab-Israeli problem
or our position with respect to it. The present
military and diplomatic situations are well
known to you. Despite periodic and dan-
gerous flareups, the overall level of violence
in the area remains low, with the Israel-
Egypt cease-fire we helped to arrange near-
ing the end of its third year and the situation
on Israel's other cease-fire lines without
serious incident for a number of weeks now.
There is, of course, sporadic terror. But
horrible and heartrending as it is, it has not
had, nor do we believe it can have, any de-
cisive effect on the fundamental evolution of
' Made before the Subcommittee on the Near East
and South Asia of the House Committee on Foreign
.•\ffairs on June 6 (press release 197). The complete
transcript of the hearings will be published by the
committee and will be available from the Superin-
tendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing
Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.
the Arab-Israeli conflict. It is sovereign inde-
pendent governments, most directly involved
with the problem, which will make the hard
decisions whether there is to be more fight-
ing, a continuance of the unstable status
quo, or the beginning of real progress to-
ward peace. None of these governments gives
indication it will permit its fate to be dictated
by the practitioners of terror, although the
recent troubles in Lebanon, where the situa-
tion is stabilized for the present, ai'e a re-
minder that violence is never very far below
the surface and remains always a potentially
disruptive factor. In saying this, I want to
distinguish between the minority which has
turned to mindless, futile terrorism and the
masses of Palestinian Arabs, whose legiti-
mate concerns must be taken into account
in any settlement and cannot be ignored by
the governments of the area or the interna-
tional community if such a settlement is to be
just and durable.
On the face of it, the present diplomatic
deadlock offers little that is encouraging.
Israel and the Arabs — and here we speak
principally of Egypt — cannot agree on the
form of a peace process and are far apart
on substance. The two main diplomatic tracks
toward peace, by an interim agreement as a
step toward a final settlement or by negotia-
tions under Ambassador Jarring [U.N. Spe-
cial Representative Gunnar Jarring] for
a final settlement in accordance with the
mandate given him in Resolution 242, are ob-
jectionable for various reasons to one or the
July 2, 1973
29
other of the parties. Menacing rhetoric con-
tinues to emanate from the area.
I believe, however, there are good reasons
for us not to give way to despair. The parties
remain interested in seeking alternatives to
war. Today is the first day of the Security
Council's debate on the Middle East. What-
ever our serious doubts about the likelihood
of this debate producing some dramatic break-
through to peace, we .should note that the
initiative for this review by the Security
Council came from Egypt. Israeli Foreign
Minister Eban in a recent speech before the
Israeli Parliament reaffirmed that Israel ac-
cepts the principle of compromise in settling
its differences with the Arabs and that Israel
remains ready for negotiations without pre-
conditions. In recent months. King Hussein
has often reiterated his readiness for a peace-
ful solution.
This continued desire of the parties for
a peaceful settlement has been essential to
our own diplomatic efforts. Secretary Rogers
said in January that we would be active in
ascertaining if and how we can help the
parties initiate a genuine negotiating process.
We have been and we will continue to be
active. The absence of dramatic, visible new
initiatives on our part should not be inter-
preted as reflecting any want of vigor or
seriousness or active diplomatic efforts. Our
by now lengthy experience since 1967 in try-
ing to further the cause of peace in the Mid-
dle East convinces us that outsiders cannot
impose peace, that the key is for the parties
to begin a serious negotiating process, direct
or indirect. Once this beginning is made, we
believe the United States can play a con-
structive role and practical step-by-step prog-
ress should be possible toward the just and
lasting settlement called for in Security
Council Resolution 242. We ourselves remain
available to help the parties get such a
process started if they wish, through an in-
direct negotiating process looking toward
agreement on some Israeli withdrawal in
Sinai and reopening of the Suez Canal by
Egypt. Let me emphasize again that we
would view, and the parties would have to
view, such an agreement as a beginning and
not an end in itself, as a first stage in a proc-
ess leading to a final overall settlement recon-
ciling Egyptian sovereignty and Israeli
security concerns.
Mr. Chairman, on another occasion I have
referred to the history of the Arab-Israeli
problem as one of lost opportunities. But not
all opportunities have been lost, squandered,
or ignored. There is still a chance for peace
in the Middle East, and we are, as the Presi-
dent has promised, giving the highest prior-
ity to that area.
U.S. Objectives in Persian Gulf Region
Mr. Chairman, growing concern about the
world's energy requirements has focused in-
creased public attention on the second area
I want to discuss today, that of the Arabian
Peninsula-Persian Gulf. This is an area un-
dergoing rapid economic and social change,
where there has been a dramatic evolution of
the terms of financial and concessional
arrangements between international oil com-
panies and producer states, and where con-
cerns for security and stability have looked
larger since the British terminated their pro-
tective treaty relationships.
The increased international focus on the
gulf has also been marked by greater Soviet
presence in the periphery. In this area of
U.S. -Soviet negotiations on matters vital to
both our national interests, we do not think
the Soviets are seeking any direct confronta-
tion with us in the gulf area. They do. how-
ever, seek to augment their influence there.
They have increased their presence and sup-
ply of military supplies to the People's Demo-
cratic Republic of Yemen (South Yemen),
Somalia, and Iraq.
Mr. Chairman, as you will recall, I dis-
cussed at some length before the committee
last year U.S. interests and policy in the
Persian Gulf. I anticipated that U.S. inter-
ests in this area would increase and have a
bearing on our principal policy objectives.
Briefly stated, these objectives are:
— Support for indigenous regional collec-
tive security efforts to provide stability and
to foster orderly development without outside
30
Department of State Bulletin
interference. We believe Iranian and Saudi
Arabian cooperation, inter alia, is of key im-
portance as a major element of stability in
this area. We also welcome the fact that
Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, and
North Yemen are each in their own way
seeking to strengthen their defensive capac-
ities.
— Peaceful resolution of tei-ritorial and
other disputes among the regional states and
the opening up of better channels of commu-
nication among them.
— Continued access to gulf oil supplies at
reasonable prices and in sufficient quantities
to meet our growing needs and those of our
European and Asian friends and allies.
— Enhancing of our commercial and finan-
cial interests.
Over the past year, our requirements for
oil from the gulf have begun to rise, and now
account for about 10 percent of our imports.
or 3 percent of our total consumption. This
growing dependence has come as the interna-
tional oil companies and the oil-producer
governments in the gulf region have reached
mutually acceptable formulae. These now
give the producer countries a greater role in
and control over the operations of their most
important industry but at the same time
assure a continued role for the oil companies
in the production and marketing of a sub-
stantial portion of the oil coming from the
gulf. We believe these agreements, if ratified,
will meet our requirements that investments
by American oil companies be fairly treated.
Mr. Chairman, given our important and
significant political, economic, and strategic
interests in this area, the question of oil and
access to oil by the Western world, including
the United States, inevitably comes up. At
the outset, in terms of the energj' situation of
the future, I believe it is important to bear
in mind two fundamentals :
— First of all, in the long range the United
States has the potential resources to meet its
future energy needs, be it oil, gas, fusion,
shale, solar energy, nuclear reactors, or other
sources. The United States has the capacity
to develop whatever it needs in the long
range, and it is important to keep this in
mind. Self-suflliciency or close to it is essential
to our security and well-being.
— Second, it is not in the national interest
of the United States to be overly reliant on
any one source or any one area for our energy
needs. It is not in our interest on security
grounds, nor is it in our interest for balance
of payments reasons. Therefore, in the short
run, it is essential that Congress act
promptly on the recommendations made in
the President's energy message of April 18.
If action is taken promptly, this will limit
expected shortages of energy supplies over
the next decade.
How, then, does the question of oil relate
to the whole question of the Arab-Israeli
dispute? It is possible to take either an overly
optimistic or overly pessimistic view of the
situation. It can be dismissed out of hand,
which would be foolhardy. On the other hand,
the possible implications can be overdrawn,
which distorts the realities of the situation.
We believe there is a mutuality of interests
that has been manifest for several decades
between producers and consumers of oil, and
we have seen adjustments in financial ar-
rangements between both. These adjustments
will go on, but we do not think the mutuality
of interests between the producer and the
consumer should be jeopardized by whatever
differences may or may not exist over the
question of the Arab-Israeli dispute.
The way to avoid our energy needs being
exploited by others for political or other pur-
poses is to assure our own sources of supply
in this country. That means an all-out effort
to develop the variety of sources available to
us in this country — a diversification of such
sources. To the degree to which we assure
ourselves of our own resources here in this
country, it will also help to assure that
sources outside the country, to the degree to
which we desire or need them, will remain
available to us in the foreseeable future.
Security and Defense
Mr. Chairman, as the states in the gulf
and the peninsula have taken on more respon-
sibilities for their economic destiny, they, too,
July 2, 1973
31
have become increasingly aware of threats
they see to their security and of the need to
improve their defense. These concerns have
intensified as a result of the conflict between
South and North Yemen last September ; the
continuing insurrection in Oman's Dhofar
Province which has its base of support in
South Yemen ; the arrest in recent months in
the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, and
Oman of a number of members of the sub-
versive South Yemeni-supported Popular
Front for the Liberation of Oman and the
Arab Gulf; the increasing supply of Soviet
arms, equipment, and technicians to South
Yemen and to Iraq; the March 20 border
skirmish between Iraq and Kuwait; and the
March 22 attack by South Yemeni aircraft on
a Saudi border outpost.
One of the principal U.S. policies in the
gulf since the British announced in 1968 their
intention to end their protective treaty rela-
tionship there has been to encourage
friendly states in the area to assume increas-
ing responsibility for collective security in
the region. In the gulf, this has been shared
primarily by Iran and Saudi Arabia. Else-
where in the peninsula, Saudi Arabia now
bears the primary responsibility. These coun-
tries have turned to the United States for
military equipment and supplies, and it is in
this context that we have responded posi-
tively in helping them build up their own de-
fensive capabilities. We have sought to assist
them through sales of military equipment
and services appropriate to their defense
needs. This has been the policy for some time ;
the arms assistance arrangements being dis-
cussed or being implemented with Iran and
Saudi Arabia are not knee-jerk reactions of
the last few weeks to a so-called energy crisis
as some contend. We have had a military
modernization and supply relationship with
Iran and Saudi Arabia for two decades and
have been discussing the needs of Kuwait,
in response to its request, also for over a year.
To give some current examples, we are
going forward with the Saudis with plans
to hel]) them develop a modest naval force of
small ships suitable for the protection of
their extensive coastlines; we are selling
F-5 Freedom Fighters to replace older Amer-
ican aircraft; we are now initiating a sales
program to reorganize and equip elements of
the National Guard (a paramilitary internal
security force) ; and American companies are
continuing to assist in improving Saudi
Arabia's air defense capabilities. Recently
we have agreed in principle to consider the
sale of a limited number of F-4 aircraft.
In Iran, where our relationship has shifted
from aid to sales, we have underway a sub-
stantial program for the sale of defense
materiel, particularly aii'craft. Equipment
deliveries under these sales will take place
over the next few years. We are sending
Technical Assistance Field Teams to Iran in
phase with equipment deliveries to provide
instruction in the operation and maintenance
of the new equipment.
With the Kuwaitis, we have been discuss-
ing at their request for over a year ways in
which we could help them improve their own
defensive capabilities. These negotiations
have intensified since the border skirmish
with Iraq, but no contractual commitments
have yet been undertaken. Some aspects of
the discussions are well advanced ; for exam-
ple, the possible sale of F-8 Navy Crusaders
as well as equipment for Kuwait's ground
forces and air defense system. With respect
to the F-4, we have had inquiries from the
Kuwaitis regarding our willingness to sell,
and this matter is now under active consider-
ation.
As for the other friendly countries in the
Arabian Peninsula, we have made them eligi-
ble for foreign military sales. However, as
I pointed out last year, we expect that these
smaller states will meet their more limited
requirements mainly from other friendly
sources.
Political and Economic Changes
Mr. Chairman, the political transition in
the gulf still leaves many uncertainties. Un-
resolved boundary issues remain for all the
countries of the area, and an uneasy truce
exists between the two Yemens as they dis-
cuss a possible unity agreement. There has
nevertheless been an encouraging trend to-
ward regional cooperation. Saudi assistance
32
Department of State Bulletin
in North Yemen, one of the poorest countries
in the world, has increased markedly in the
past year ; and the Saudis are now beginning
to help Oman, whose economic development
has been hindered by the costs of the Dhofar
insurrection. The seven-member United Arab
Emirates is slowly building federal institu-
tions, and it, too, has pledged to use some of
its oil wealth to help Yemen and Oman.
There are a growing number of visits by
high-level dignitaries among the gulf and
peninsula states. Other neighboring coun-
tries, such as Iran and Jordan, are providing
technical personnel or teachers to help im-
prove the security or the economic develop-
ment of several lower gulf states. The British
have continued to take an important interest
in the stability of the region despite their
relinquishment of their former defense
treaties. France, Japan, and other indus-
trialized countries are increasingly active
commercially. While this increases commer-
cial competition for us, these countries share
our interest in the stability of this area and
in continued free and unhindered access to
its markets as well as its energy resources.
With rising income, the Persian Gulf rep-
resents a rapidly growing market for Amer-
ican goods and services. Such sales already
are well in excess of $1 billion. In spite of
our growing imports of crude from the gulf,
we still have a favorable balance of trade
with countries of the region. In order to
maintain this balance, we have increased our
commercial activities. There have been sev-
eral very successful U.S. Government-spon-
sored trade missions to Saudi Arabia,
Kuwait, and the lower gulf states; we are
opening a Regional Trade Development Cen-
ter in Tehran ; and we now have a diplomatic
presence in all of the newly independent gulf
states. These are very small posts, however,
and we must find ways to increase their
ability to support our commercial activities.
Mr. Chairman, the rapid growth in oil
production, while it is a guarantor of great
prosperity for the region, has also brought
with it new economic as well as political prob-
lems. The Saudis and other oil-rich penin-
sular states have begun to accumulate large
foreign exchange reserves well beyond their
needs. They have now indicated that if pro-
duction is to rise beyond their income re-
quirements, they must find productive outlets
at home or aboard to invest their surplus
revenues. This is a challenge to the consumer
countries generally and to our American
businessmen specifically. We are giving con-
siderable thought to how we can find ways to
encourage these pai'ticular countries to con-
tinue to produce oil in sufficient quantities
to meet free world needs and to use their
large foreign exchange reserves to help meet
the world's growing capital requirements.
At the same time, these countries are not
immune from the nationalist and political
crosscurrents in other parts of the Arab
world, including those arising out of the
Arab-Israeli conflict. For this reason, the
United States will continue to make every
feasible effort to encourage the parties to
start a serious negotiating process to resolve
the Arab-Israeli dispute. In the meantime,
we will do all we can to maintain and
strengthen our cooperative relations with the
countries in the important Arabian Penin-
sula-gulf area, seeking to demonstrate
through our actions the mutual benefits de-
riving from those relations and from insulat-
ing them to the extent possible from tensions
and destabilizing forces elsewhere in the
region.
July 2, 1973
33
Secretary Rogers Discusses Objectives of Foreign Assistance Program
Statement by Secretary Rogers^
It is a pleasure to appeal' before you this
morning to support the foreign assistance
program. Last week this committee proposed
a series of amendments to the Foreign As-
sistance Act designed to redirect and rein-
vigorate our economic assistance program.
We welcome the committee's thoughtful
and positive approach. In the next few days
we will comment more fully on various de-
tails of your constructive proposals. We be-
lieve the committee intended to allow suffi-
cient flexibility to respond to particular bi-
lateral issues within its overall approach, and
we shall examine together with you how best
to assui'e this.
Our overall agreement with the commit-
tee's proposals to focus bilateral develop-
ment assistance on critical human problems
and encourage the poorest people to partici-
pate more effectively in development is re-
flected in Dr. Hannah's [John A. Hannah,
Administrator, Agency for International
Development] statement last week. We agree
that the problem areas on which the bill con-
centrates are among the most critical for
helping people of the developing countries.
We commend the committee for supporting
the President's budget request for foreign
assistance.
We agree with the committee's goal of
promoting new flows of development capital
and U.S. exports to the developing countries.
' Made before the House Committee on Foreign
Affairs on .Tune 5 (press release 192). The complete
transcript of the hearings will be published by the
committee and will be available from the Superin-
tendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing
Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.
We believe we must give your proposal for
an Export Development Credit Fund careful
study to insure that it is consistent with
other U.S. Government policies and pro-
grams. We will have detailed reactions on
this proposal shortly.
We recognize the need for better coordi-
nation of development assistance, trade, and
financial policies. I am especially pleased at
the committee's reaffirmation of the central
role of the Department of State in overall
guidance of U.S. development policies. With
respect to the specific nature and member-
ship of the coordinating committee proposed,
we shall comment soon in more detail. In
general, I believe in a flexible approach to
the necessary interdepartmental coordina-
tion. '-
Within a few days we will be ready to
give you the results of our review of all of
the committee's amendments. I hope you will
understand that I am not in a position this
morning to discuss these amendments in any
detail.
Let me turn now to the relation of devel-
opment assistance to the national interests
of this country.
In the first four years of this administra-
tion, we believe we made important progress
toward our fundamental goals of a durable
structure of peace.
A settlement in the Viet-Nam conflict, al-
though still imijerfect, has been negotiated.
Relations have turned from confrontation
to negotiation, as our contacts with the
U.S.S.R. and the People's Republic of China
have entered a new, less sterile phase. Steps
34
Department of State Bulletin
are underway to reduce the threat of nuclear
war. Association with traditional allies and
trading partners is being reinvigorated.
Encourag-ing as these developments with
the industrialized nations are, they do not
obscure the condition or importance of the
poor nations. The developing countries oc-
cupy two-thirds of the earth's land and con-
trol vast amounts of its natural resources.
They contain 74 percent of the world's total
population.
Some of the developing countries have
made significant economic progress in recent
years. These gains have been unevenly real-
ized and too often overwhelmed by un-
checked population growth. The gap between
small groups of citizens who have benefited
from modernization and the much larger
groups who remain trapped in conditions of
severe deprivation continues to grow.
This situation appeals to American sympa-
thies. But it is more than a moral dilemma.
The long-term structure of peace is inevi-
tably threatened by the persistence of mass
poverty. Peace cannot be sustained in condi-
tions of social upheaval or a growing con-
frontation between rich and poor.
Equally important from the perspective of
our own interests, the United States and the
other industrial countries are linked to the
developing countries by consideration of
trade, investment, and critical resource
needs. We share with them a common inter-
est in an open international economic system
in which all nations benefit from an increased
flow of goods and services.
With 6 percent of the world's population,
the United States consumes nearly 40 percent
of the world's annual output of raw materials
and energy. Increasingly, we depend on the
developing countries for these supplies.
On the other side of the trade ledger, the
developing countries are becoming increas-
ingly important as markets for U.S. goods.
In 1970 they accounted for 30 percent of all
U.S. exports. The investments of U.S. cor-
porations in the developing countries pres-
ently total some $30 billion and are growing
at about 10 percent a year. Fifty percent of
our foreign investment income comes from
the developing countries.
The solution of such world problems as
environmental pollution, narcotics control,
and security of travel requires broad inter-
national cooperation with the developing
countries. And the development of a satis-
factory international monetary system re-
quires the participation of the developing
countries.
The development assistance program con-
tains direct benefits for the United States.
Eighty percent of the funds are spent in this
country, creating additional jobs and income
for Americans. Undoubtedly in each one of
your districts there are farms, factories, or
universities that directly benefit from this
program.
For all of these economic, political, and
moral reasons, a sustained U.S. response to
the challenge of underdevelopment is as
much in our interest as it is in that of the
developing nations.
I should like now to comment on the Pres-
ident's proposed security assistance program
for fiscal year 1974. I am convinced that
American support for these defense efforts
of other nations is essential if we are to build
a stable international system in the years
immediately ahead.
I can well understand how, after a long
and frequently frustrating military struggle,
a desire to withdraw from the burdens of an
active role in world affairs can exist. When
this administration took office, the President
determined that a reordering of our relation-
ships with other nations was needed. But we
were not prepared to sacrifice U.S. interests
to the growing desire among some Ameri-
cans for withdrawal — a desire that might
well lead to isolationism. As the President
has observed: -
Heedless American abdication of its responsibil-
ities to the world would destroy the global balance
and the fabric of peace we had worked so hard and
- The complete text of President Nixon's foreign
policy report to the Congress on May 3 appears in
the Bulletin of June 4, 1973; the section entitled
"Asia and the Pacific" begins on p. 770.
July 2, 1973
35
so long to develop. Those who relied on us to help
assure their security would be gravely concerned.
Adversaries who had shown a willingness to recon-
cile long-standing differences would promptly revise
their calculations and alter their actions.
The administration decided instead to
chart a course between overcommitment and
withdrawal. At the same time, the President
launched a number of initiatives to bring
the cold war to an end. As I noted earlier,
the consistent pattern of confrontation that
has lasted for a quarter of a century is now
being altered. Based on progress to date, we
are most hopeful about the future. However,
we will continue to need firmness, a deter-
mination to protect our own security, and a
fidelity to our friends and allies as they move
to assume more of the burden for their own
defense.
Within this framework, security assistance
continues to be a vital instrument of the U.S.
foreign policy.
The program that the President has pre-
sented to the Congress for fiscal year 1974
is well organized and balanced. We are pro-
posing several basic changes in the struc-
ture and direction of security assistance for
FY 1974. I believe that Under Secretary Tarr
has discussed these with you during his ap-
pearance on May 24, 1973.^ However, I
should like to cover several aspects of the
proposed in-ogram that warrant close atten-
tion.
The first I'elates to the IVIiddle East. This is
a key region in our efforts to develop a global
structure of peace. It has been three years
now since the initiative by the United States
resulted in a cease-fire between Egypt and
Israel. Our major immediate objective is to
get negotiations started, whether direct or
indirect. At the same time, however, we feel
it is essential to provide nations in the area
with the equipment and help needed for their
self-defense and internal security. The pro-
grams which the administration is proposing
are intended to maintain the stabilitv and
^ For a statement made before the committee on
May 24 by Under Secretary for Security Assistance
Curtis W. Tarr, see BULLETIN of June 18, 1973,
p. 892.
military balance essential to our ongoing ef-
forts to encourage a meaningful Arab-Israeli
negotiating process, as well as to promote
regional security in the area of the Arabian
Peninsula and Persian Gulf, where we have
important interests.
The second area of concern is Cambodia.
We are requesting $180.6 million in grant
military assistance for Cambodia in FY 1974.
As I have pointed out in previous appear-
ances before various committees of Congress,
the last area in Indochina to achieve a cease-
fire is Cambodia. This has necessarily been
addressed during last month's talks and will
be again this week in Paris. We very much
want a settlement here, too, both for the sake
of Cambodia and because of its importance
to the success of the Viet-Nam cease-
fire and peace throughout Indochina. How-
ever, until the talks are concluded and we
have been able to as.sess the results, it is es-
sential that we maintain our present policies.
Precipitate action by the Congress at this
point can only hinder and not hasten the
chances for a lasting peace.
Once a reasonable peace is achieved
throughout the states in Indochina, I believe
that there will be a major role for U.S. eco-
nomic assistance in the transition from the
devastation of war to the tasks of recon-
struction and reconciliation. This does not
mean that we should bear the entire burden
by ourselves. We expect that aid from other
donors will meet from one-third to one-half
of Indochina's economic assistance needs
within two to three years. But it is highly
probable that in the interim our assistance
will be vital to these countries.
Finally, I urge the Committee on Foreign
Affairs to support the President's program
for Latin America. The United States should
no longer attempt to determine for the Latin
Americans what their reasonable military
needs should be. We have put such paternal-
ism behind us. President Nixon has recently
exercised the waiver authority granted him
by Congress to find five Latin American
countries eligible to jiurchase the F-5E
fighter aircraft. These countries are Argen-
36
Department of State Bulletin
tina, Brazil, Chrle, Colombia, and Venezuela.
But we must also raise the ceiling which
current legislation imposes upon military
sales and grants. This ceiling is offensive to
the Latin Americans, who consider it an at-
tempt to control their sovereign right to de-
termine their own defense requirements. The
only result of the ceiling has been to encour-
age the Latin Americans to make their pur-
chases outside the United States. I hope the
committee will support the legislation that is
needed. We must avoid the kind of political
alienation that could occur if Latin Ameri-
can governments were to feel that the United
States is not prepared to operate on a mature
partnership basis with them.
In conclusion let me just say that we look
forward to working closely with this com-
mittee in support of our shared objectives:
to assist the developing countries to assume
a larger share of the responsibility for their
own defense, to help the poorer countries
meet the basic human needs of their citizens,
and to further this country's growing and
mutually beneficial trade and investment re-
lations with the developing countries.
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND CONFERENCES
Calendar of International Conferences
Scheduled July Through September
OECD Environment Committee Expert Group on Oxidants in the
Atmosphere.
U.N. ECOSOC Joint Meeting of the Committee for Program and
Coordination and the Administrative Committee on Coordina-
tion.
FAO Intergovernmental Group on Tea Subgroup of Exporters:
6th Session.
U.N. ECOSOC Statistical Commission Working Group on Inter-
national Statistical Programs and Coordination.
FAO Executive Committee of the Codex Alimentarius Com-
mission: 19th Session.
Joint IMCO/ILO Committee on Training
ECE Group of Rapporteurs on Customs Questions Concerning
Containers.
Paris . . .
. . July 2-4
Geneva . .
. . July 2-4
Rome . . .
. . July 2-4
Geneva . .
. . July 2-4
Geneva . .
. . July 2-6
London . .
Geneva . .
. . July 2-6
. . July 2-6
' This schedule, vifhich was prepared in the Office of International Conferences on June 15, 1973, lists
international conferences in which the U.S. Government expects to participate officially in the period July-
September 1973. Nongovernmental conferences are not included.
Following is a key to the abbreviations: CCC, Customs Cooperation Council; ECE, Economic Commis-
sion for Europe; ECOSOC, Economic and Social Council; FAO, Food and Agriculture Organization;
GATT, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade; IAE.4, International Atomic Energy Agency;
lA-ECOSOC, Inter-American Economic and Social Council; IBE, International Bureau of Education;
ICAO, International Civil Aviation Organization; ICEM, Intergovernmental Committee for European
.Migration; ICES, International Council for the Exploration of the Sea; IHO, International Hydrographic
Organization; ILO, International Labor Organization; I.MCO, Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative
Ox-ganization; IOC, Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission; ISVS, International Secretariat for
Volunteer Service; ITU, International Telecommunication Union; NATO, North .Atlantic Treaty Orga-
nization; OECD, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development; PAHC, Pan American Highway
Congresses; PAHO, Pan American Health Organization; SEATO, Southeast Asia Treaty Organization;
UNCTAD, United Nations Conference on Trade and Development; UNESCO, United Nations Educational,
Scientific and Cultural Organization; UNIDO, United Nations Industrial Development Organization; WHO,
World Health Organization; WIPO, World Intellectual Property Organization; WMO, World Meteorolog-
ical Organization.
July 2, 1973
37
UNESCO/WIPO 3(1 Committee of Government Experts on Prob-
lems Raised by Transmission Via Space Satellites.
GATT Preparatory Committee for the International Trade
Negotiations.
U.N. Committee on the Peaceful Uses of the Sea-Bed and the
Ocean Floor Beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction.
GATT Committee on Trade in Industrial Products
UNCTAD Committee on Invisibles and Financing Related to
Trade.
ICAO Technical Panel on Supersonic Transport Operations:
4th Meeting.
U.N. Economic and Social Council: 55th Session
FAO Intergovernmental Group on Tea
ECE Meeting on Transport of Perishable Foodstuffs
UNCTAD Advisory Committee to the Trade and Development
Board.
Inter- .-American Telecommunications Conference: 3d Meeting of
the Permanent Executive Committee and 1st Meeting of Perma-
nent Technical Committees III and IV.
IMCO Conference on Space Requirements for Special Passenger
Ships.
IOC/UNESCO Working Group on International Oceanographic
Data Exchange: 7th Session.
Permanent International Association of Navigation Conferences:
23d Congress.
FAO Intergovernmental Group on Bananas, 5th Session, and Sub-
Group on Statistics, 6th Session.
UNCTAD Working Group on the Charter of Economic Rights
and Duties of States.
WIPO/U.N. Negotiation on Relationship Agreement Between
U.N. ECOSOC and WIPO.
IOC/UNESCO International Coordinating Group for Cooperative
Investigation of the Caribbean and Adjacent Regions: 6th Ses-
sion.
NATO Joint Communication-Electronics Committee
ECE Meeting on Ship-Borne Barge Transport
ECE Group of Rapporteurs on Safety Provisions of Motor
Coaches and Buses.
PAHC Technical Committee on Planning: 6th Meeting
PAHO Executive Committee: 70th Meeting
UNIDO Ad Hoc Committee of 27
UNCTAD Cocoa Council
ICAO Automated Data Interchange Systems Panel : 5th Meeting.
ICAO Meteorological Operational Telecommunications Network in
Europe, Regional Planning Group: 9th Meeting.
UNCTAD Advisory Committee to the Board and to the Com-
mittee on Commodities.
UNCT.\D Preparatory Committee on a Convention on Intermodal
Transport.
OECD Consumer Policy Committee Working Party
Inter- American Permanent Technical Committee on Ports: 8th
Meeting.
14th Pan American Child Congress
lA-ECOSOC Ad Hoc Working Group to Study the Possibility of
Establishing a Technical Advisory Council of Campesino Orga-
nizations.
U.N. ECOSOC Group of Experts on Explosives
WMO Commission for Instruments and Methods of Observation:
6th Session.
U.N. Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination . .
UNCTAD Committee on :\Ianufactures
Inter-American Children's Institute Directing Council: 53d
Meeting.
IOC/UNESCO Joint lOC/WMO Planning Group for Integrated
Global Ocean Station System : 2d Session.
Nairobi . . .
. July
2-11
Geneva . . .
. July
2-25
Geneva . . .
. July
2-Aug. 24
Geneva . . .
Geneva . . .
. July 3-4
. July 3-13
Montreal . . .
. July 3-20
Geneva . . .
Rome ....
Geneva . . .
Geneva . . .
. July 4-Aug. 3
. July 5-6
. July 9-13
. July 9-13
Rio de Janeiro .
. July
9-13
London . . .
. July 9-13
New York . .
. July 9-13
Ottawa . . .
. July
9-18
Bremen . . .
• July
10-20
Geneva . . .
• July
13-27
Geneva . . .
. July
16-18
Cartagena . .
• July
16-21
Brussels . . .
Geneva . . .
Geneva . . .
• July
• July
• July
17-18
23-27
23-27
Rio de Janeiro .
Washington . .
Vienna . . .
Geneva . . .
Montreal . . .
Paris ....
. July
. July
. July
. July
. July
. July
23-27
23-Aug. 3
25-Aug. 1
30-Aug. 10
Geneva . . .
. July
Geneva . . .
• July
Paris ....
Asuncion . . .
. July
• July-August
• Aug.
■ Aug.
5 11
Caracas . . .
6-10
Geneva . . .
Helsinki . . .
. Aug.
. Aug.
6-10
6-18
New York . .
Geneva . . .
Santiago . . .
• Aug.
• Aug.
. Aug.
6-24
7-17
13-15
Geneva . . .
• Aug.
13-17
38
Department of State Bulletin
ECOSOC Group of Rapporteurs on the Packaging of Dangerous
Goods.
WMO Regional Association I (Africa) : 6th Session
UNCTAD Trade and Development Board: 13th Session ....
ECE Group of Rapporteurs on Safety Belts
I.MCO Working Group on Revision of Safety of Life at Sea Con-
vention.
WHO Regional Committee for the Western Pacific: 24th Session.
ICAO Diplomatic Conference on Air Law and 20th Session (Ex-
traordinary) of the Assembly.
I FAO/LAE.^ Symposium on Isotopes and Radiation Techniques
in Studies of Soil Physics, Irrigation and Drainage in Relation
to Crop Production.
IMCO Legal Committee: 20th Session
WMO Executive Committee: 25th Session
1 OECD Financial Marketing Committee Working Party on Ad-
I mission of Securities.
1 ICAO Asia/Pacific Regional Air Navigation Meeting
I ECE Group of Rapporteurs on Air Pollution
IMCO Panel of Experts on Maritime Satellites: 3d Session . .
IMCO Subcommittee on Safety of Fishing Vessels: 14th Session.
'< ECE Committee on Housing, Building, and Planning
South Pacific Commission: 13th South Pacific Conference and
36th Session of the Commission.
WIPO Diplomatic Conference on the European Patent Convention
UNCTAD Sugar Conference: 2d Session
GATT Ministerial Meeting To Initiate International Trade Nego-
tiations.
IAEA Board of Governors
ITU Plenipotentiary Conference
ICEM Subcommittee on Budget and Finance: 27th Session . . .
CCC Working Party of the Permanent Technical Committee . . .
FAO Intergovernmental Group on Hard Fibers: 6th Session . .
IMCO Maritime Safety Committee: 28th Session
ILO Textile Committee: 9th Session
UNESCO Executive Board: 93d Session
UNESCO/IBE Council: 9th Session
U.N. General Assembly
UNESCO International Conference on Education: 34th Session
NATO Heads of Defense Ministry Information Sections ....
International Coffee Council
FAO Intergovernmental Group on Jute, Kenaf and Allied Fibers
ECE Group of Rapporteurs on Container Transport
WIPO Committee of Experts on Mechanized Trademark Search .
IMCO Subcommittee on Subdivision and Stability: 15th Session .
CCC Permanent Technical Committee: 81st and 82d Sessions . .
UNESCO/IOC Joint ICES/FAO/IOC Coordination Group for the
Planning and Execution of Cooperative Investigations of the
Northern Part of the Eastern Central Atlantic: 3d Session.
SEATO Council: 18th Meeting
International Atomic Energy Agency: 17th General Conference.
lA-ECOSOC: 13th Special Meeting
ICAO Legal Committee: 21st Session
WIPO Headquarters Building Subcommittee
WHO E.xecutive Board : Special Session
ISVS Council: 15th Session
Geneva
Geneva
Geneva
Geneva
London
Wellington
Rome . .
Nicosia
Aug. 13-17
Aug. 21-Sept. 1
Aug. 21-Sept. 14
Aug. 27-31
Aug. 28-Sept. 1
Aug. 28-Sept. 5
Aug. 28-Sept. 21
Sept. 3-4
London . . . .
Sept. 3-7
Geneva . . . .
Sept. 4-7
Paris
Sept. 4-7
Honolulu . . . .
Sept. 5-28
Geneva . . . .
Sept. 10-14
Paris
Sept. 10-14
London . . . .
Sept. 10-14
Geneva . . . .
Sept. 10-14
Guam ....
Sept. 10-28
Brussels or
Munich . .
Sept. 10-Oct. 6
Geneva
Sept. 10-Oct. 10
Tokyo ....
Sept. 12-14
Geneva
Sept. 12-14
Torremolinos
Sept 14-Oct. 26
Geneva
Sept. 15-30
Brussels . . .
Sept. 17-21
Rome ....
Sept. 17-21
London
Sept. 17-21
Geneva
Sept. 17-28
Paris ....
Sept. 17-Oct. 12
Geneva . . .
Sept. 18-28
New York . .
Sept. 18-December
Geneva . . .
Sept. 19-27
London . . .
Sept. 20-21
London . . .
Sept. 24
Rome ....
Sept. 24-26
Geneva . . .
Sept. 24-28
Geneva . . .
Sept. 24-28
London . . .
Sept. 24-28
Brussels . . .
Sept. 24-Oct. 5
Lisbon ....
Sept. 26-28
New York . .
Sept. 28
Undetermined .
September
Undetermined .
September
Montreal . . .
September
Geneva
September
Geneva
September
Geneva
September or
October.
July 2, 1973
39
U.S. Calls for Stronger Enforcement of U.N. Sanctions
Against Southern Rhodesia
Following are statements made in the
U.N. Security Council on May 16 and 22 by
U.S. Representative John Scali, together
ivith the texts of a resolution adopted by the
Council on May 22 and a draft resolution
which was vetoed by the United States and
the United Kingdom that day.
STATEMENT OF MAY 16
USUN press release 46 dated May 16
The special rejiort of the Sanctions Com-
mittee ' gives me my first opportunity to
speak to an issue to which the U.S. delega-
tion attaches great importance.
At the outset I wish to reaffirm my gov-
ernment's full support for majority rule in
Southern Rhodesia and the sooner the better.
This is the objective fixed by this Council
and is the reason that it voted for sanctions
in the first place.
That objective has not yet been achieved.
At the same time there is no doubt that sanc-
tions have inflicted hardships on the illegal
regime in Southern Rhodesia. The original
framework of sanctions as set out in Resolu-
tion 25.3 is a valid one.- What is required is
to act now to make the present sanctions
more eff'ective rather than to expand or
widen their scope. For the first time the
Sanctions Committee has come to grips with
some of the fundamental stumbling blocks to
full implementation. The agreed recommen-
dations and suggestions in the report offer
a serious prospect of making sanctions more
' U.N. doc. S/10920.
- For text of the resolution, see Bulletin of June
24, 1968, p. 847.
effective. Therefore they have our full
support.
What has the committee accomplished?
If we accept its recommendations and sug-
gestions, the Council would request states to
take effective measures to examine cargoes
which, because of their nature or because
they were shipped from Angola, Mozam-
bique, or South Africa, can reasonably be
suspected to be of Southern Rhodesian origin.
States would also be asked to report on meas-
ures taken to jirevent sanctions evasions.
With the cooperation of governments, ex-
perts would be made available to an im-
porting country, if so desired, to inspect
suspicious cargoes to determine their true
origin. If it is established that such cargoes
originated in Southern Rhodesia, they would
be seized or disposed of in accordance with
domestic laws and regulations. These recom-
mendations are fundamental and can be ef-
fective if we, the members of the U.N.,
respond quickly and positively without ex-
ception.
The committee has also recommended that
it urgently produce a manual containing in-
formation on the necessary documentation
and clearing procedures to help determine
the true origin of suspected cargoes. My dele-
gation will cooperate fully in the preparation
of such a manual. We will, for example, pass
on to the committee the lessons that we have
learned in testing products that might be of
Southern Rhodesian origin. I would point
out, however, that while such tests can be
very effective for such i^roducts as chrome
ore, ferrochrome, and asbestos, we have not
yet develojied technical tests to determine
the oiigin of some other products.
40
Department of State Bulletin
Members of the Council may recall Am-
bassador Phillips' statement of September 29
in which he noted that close study of trade
statistics contained in the committee's own
report would be illuminating.^ He under-
scored the fact that impoi-t statistics of cer-
tain materials — produced both in Rhodesia
and neighboring countries — provided by im-
porting states show considerably higher fig-
ures than export statistics provided by
Rhodesia's neighbors. The natural inference
is that transshipment of Rhodesian commodi-
ties through those areas accounts in large
part for the discrepancies.
My delegation welcomes the fact that this
point was stressed in paragraph 21 of the
committee's report. That paragraph noted
the discrepancies in trade statistics in the
committee's fifth annual report and recom-
mended that the Secretary General bring
them to the attention of countries trading
with Angola, Mozambique, and South Africa.
It also recommended that the comments of
countries concerned be solicited along with
information on those countries' procedures
to insure that products from Southern Rho-
desia are not being imported disguised as
products of Angola, Mozambique, and South
Africa. These replies are to be published.
However, it would have been more appropri-
ate to ask states to take the necessary action
to insure that such discrepancies do not mask
the importation of disguised Rhodesian
goods. This would have gone to the heart of
the problem and been consistent with other
recommendations of the committee. We hope
the committee will give fuller attention to
this matter with jjarticular reference to the
relevant sections of the fourth and fifth an-
nual reports. In this connection the compen-
dium on South Africa's external trade for the
years 1965 and 1971 prepared for the com-
mittee as working paper 65 of April 9, 1973,
is also a useful document.
The Sanctions Committee has worked long
and hard to prepare its report and, I am glad
" For statements made in the Council on Sept. 29,
1972, by U.S. Representative Christopher H. Phillips,
see Bulletin of Nov. 6, 1972, p. 543.
to say, my delegation actively participated in
its i)rei)aration. I wish to express our appre-
ciation to the delegations of Guinea, Kenya,
and the Sudan for making a wide variety of
]n-oposals for the committee's consideration.
All these proposals were genuinely intended
to obtain wider compliance with sanctions.
If we could not accept all of them it was be-
cause they raised certain practical and legal
difficulties. For the most part, however, the
l)roposals were accepted, and we hope they
will contribute to tightening sanctions
against Southern Rhodesia.
The United States, Mr. President, has con-
stantly reiterated its belief that sanctions
could have more effect on the policies of the
Smith regime if they were thoroughly imple-
mented in the spirit which lies behind Reso-
lution 253 — the achievement of self-deter-
mination and majority rule in Southern
Rhodesia. We commend the committee for
its efforts, which are a concrete and realistic
step toward that end.
STATEMENT OF MAY 22
USUN press release 47 dated May 22
When I spoke in the Council May 16, I
underlined the importance that my govern-
ment places on the sanctions against South-
ern Rhodesia. Looking at the resolution con-
tained in document S/10927 as a whole, I
wish to emphasize that my delegation is in
sympathy with its general aims. We strongly
hope that the recommendations it contains
will contribute significantly to making sanc-
tions more effective.
We would therefore have liked very much
to have voted in favor of the resolution, but
were unable to do so because of our domestic
legislation and practical problems with some
of the recommendations which were dis-
cussed but not agreed to in the Sanctions
Committee.
The importation of certain strategic mate-
rials from Southern Rhodesia into the United
States has again been raised in the Council.
I wish it noted that these materials in 1972
amounted to less than 5 ]?ercent of the
July 2, 1973
41
projected total of Rhodesian export earnings
for that year. My government has cooper-
ated with the Sanctions Committee in fully
reporting these imports. We wish other im-
porters of Rhodesian commodities would do
the same. We would then know a great deal
more than we do now about how Southern
Rhodesia is surviving sanctions. This does
not detract, however, from our complete sup-
port for the recommendations for improving
sanctions made in paragraphs 10 through 22
of the Sanctions Committee's second special
report. We are also fully in favor of opera-
tive paragraphs 2 and 8 of the resolution.
In particular, we believe the information
called for in operative paragraph 8 will prove
useful in evaluating the sanctions program,
and we hope all states will cooperate.
Our difficulties with paragraphs 5, 6, and 7
were made clear by my delegation during the
Sanctions Committee's long deliberations,
and there is no need to elaborate further.
However, I wish to assure this Council we
will adhere strictly to the basic purposes and
intents of these paragraphs.
The subject of the sale of three Boeing
aircraft to Southern Rhodesia has been
raised by several speakers during this session
of the Security Council. The U.S. Represent-
ative noted before the Sanctions Committee
on April 16 that three Boeing aircraft, actu-
ally 720's, had appeared in Southern Rhode-
sia. It was explained that the United States
had authorized neither the sale of any Boeing
aircraft to Southern Rhodesia nor the reex-
port of such aircraft to Rhodesia. I can add
that the United States will not authorize the
servicing of these aircraft or the sale of spare
parts. It was also explained that the United
States would look into the details of when
and how the sale took place. This investiga-
tion continues, and we assume that govern-
ments whose nationals may be involved are
also looking into the matter.
There is less to say about the second reso-
lution. We regret that it was introduced for
Council consideration. It includes several pro-
posals that were debated fully in the Sanc-
tions Committee on which my delegation and
others expressed their strong reservations.
While we can well understand the sentiment |
behind the draft resolution, we consider it I
unrealistic to call for broader sanctions until I
the full membership of the United Nations
has demonstrated its willingness to take more
seriously the sanctions already in force. In
the circumstances we do not believe this |
resolution would enhance the ability of the
United Nations to act effectively. In our view,
to pass a resolution which is clearly unen-
forceable would seriously damage the repu-
tation and credibility of the United Nations
and further erode public confidence in the
U.N.'s ability to act in a meaningful way.
This consideration, and this consideration
alone, underlies my government's decision to
vote against this resolution. Those who im-
pute other motives stray far, far, far from
the facts, and I reject these accusations. They
have no foundation and deserve no further
reply.
TEXT OF RESOLUTION^
The Security Council,
Recalling its resolutions 320 (1972) and 328
(1973),
Noting that measures so far instituted by the
Security Council and the General Assembly have not
brought an end to the illegal regime in Southern
Rhodesia,
Reiterating its grave concern that some States,
contrary to Security Council resolutions 232 (1966),
253 (1968) and 277 (1970) and to their obligations
under Article 25 of the Charter of the United Na-
tions, have failed to prevent trade with the illegal
regime of Southern Rhodesia,
Condenining the persistent refusal of South
Africa and Portugal to co-operate with the United
Nations in the effective observance and implemen-
tation of sanctions against Southern Rhodesia
(Zimbabwe) in clear violation of the United Nations
Charter,
Ha%nng considered the second special report of
the Committee established in pursuance of resolution
253 (1968) (S/10920),
Taking note of the letter dated 27 April from the
Chairman of the Special Committee on the Situation
' U.N. doc. S/RES/333 (draft resolution S/10927) ;
adopted by the Council on May 22 by a vote of 12 to
0, with 3 abstentions (U.S., France, U.K.).
42
Department of State Bulletin
with regard to the Implementation of the Declara-
tion on the Granting of Independence to Colonial
Countries and Peoples (S/10923),
1. Approves the recommendations and suggestions
contained in paragraphs 10 to 22 (S/10920) of the
second special report of the Committee established
in pursuance of resolution 253 (1968);
2. Requests the Committee, as well as all Govern-
ments, and the Secretary-General as appropriate,
to take urgent action to implement the recommen-
dations and suggestions referred to above;
3. Requests States with legislation permitting
importation of minerals and other products from
Southern Rhodesia to repeal it immediately;
4. Calls upon States to enact and enforce immedi-
ately legislation providing for imposition of severe
penalties on persons natural or juridical that evade
or commit breach of sanctions by:
(a) Importing any goods from Southern Rho-
desia;
(b) Exporting any goods to Southern Rhodesia;
(c) Providing any facilities for transport of goods
to and from Southern Rhodesia;
(d) Conducting or facilitating any transaction or
trade that may enable Southern Rhodesia to obtain
from or send to any country any goods or services;
(e) Continuing to deal with clients in South
Africa, Angola, Mozambique, Guinea (Bissau) and
Namibia after it has become known that the clients
are re-exporting the goods or components thereof
to Southern Rhodesia, or that goods received from
such clients are of Southern Rhodesian origin;
5. Requests States, in the event of their trading
with South Africa and Portugal, to provide that
purchase contracts with those countries should
clearly stipulate, in a manner legally enforceable,
prohibition of dealing in goods of Southern Rho-
desian origin; likewise, sales contracts with those
countries should include a prohibition of resale or
re-export of goods to Southern Rhodesia;
6. Calls upon States to pass legislation forbidding
insurance companies under their jurisdiction from
covering air flights into and out of Southern Rhode-
sia and individuals or air cargo carried on them;
7. Calls upon States to undertake appropriate
legislative measures to ensure that all valid marine
insurance contracts contain specific provisions that
no goods of Southern Rhodesian origin or destined
to Southern Rhodesia shall be covered by such
contracts ;
8. Calls upon States to inform the Committee of
the Security Council on their present sources of
supply and quantities of chrome, asbestos, nickel,
pig iron, tobacco, meat and sugar, together with
the quantities of these goods they obtained from
Southern Rhodesia before the application of sanc-
tions.
TEXT OF DRAFT RESOLUTION ■
The Security Council,
Recalling its resolutions on the situation in South-
ern Rhodesia, in particular, resolutions 320 (1972)
and 328 (1973),
Noting the measures called for in resolution. . .,'
Considering the urgent and simultaneous need for
more stringent measures in order to meet the re-
quirements of paragraph 4 of resolution 320 (1972),
Deeply disturbed at the deteriorating situation
in Southern Rhodesia, which constitutes a serious
threat to international peace and security,
Reiterating its deep concern that measures
adopted by the Council have failed to bring to an
end the illegal regime and its conviction that sanc-
tions cannot terminate the illegal regime unless
they are comprehensive, mandatory and effectively
supervised and unless measures are taken against
States which violate them,
Reaffirming that effective action must be taken
to end open and persistent refusal of South Africa
and Portugal to implement sanctions against the
illegal regime in Southern Rhodesia which has
undermined the effectiveness of the measures
adopted by the Security Council and which con-
stitutes a violation of the obligations of South
Africa and Portugal under Article 25 of the
Charter,
1. Decides that all States should limit, with im-
mediate effect, any purchase of chromium ores,
asbestos, tobacco, pig iron, copper, sugar, maize
and any products from South Africa, Mozambique
and Angola to the quantitative levels prevailing
in 1965;
2. Requests States to take the necessary measures,
including enacting legislation denying or revoking
landing rights to national carriers of countries
that continue to grant such rights to aircraft from
Southern Rhodesia or operate air services to South-
ern Rhodesia;
3. Decides to extend the Beira blockade to cover
all commodities and products from or destined to
Southern Rhodesia to the port of Laurengo Marques;
4. Urges the Government of the United Kingdom,
as the administering Power, to take all effective
measures to implement fully paragraph 3 above
and to seek such co-operation of other States in
this task as they may require;
5. Condemns all those Governments, in particular
South Africa and Portugal, that encourage, assist
or connive at any violation of sanctions against
Southern Rhodesia.
'U.N. doc. S/10928; the draft resolution was not
adopted owing to the negative votes of two perma-
nent members of the Council, the vote being 11 in
favor, 2 against (U.S., U.K.), with 2 abstentions
(Austria, France).
" Draft resolution S/10927. [Footnote in original.]
July 2, 1973
43
TREATY INFORMATION
Current Actions
MULTILATERAL
Antarctica
Recommendations relating to the furtherance of the
principles and objectives of the Antarctic treaty
of December 1, 1959 (TIAS 4780). Adopted at
Wellington November 10, 1972 at the Seventh
Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meeting.'
Notification of approval: Belgium, May 30, 1973,
recommendations VII-I through VII-IV, VII-
VI through VII-IX.
Atomic Energy
Amendment of ai-ticle VI of the statute of the In-
ternational Atomic Energy Agency of October 26,
1956, as amended (TIAS 3873, 5284). Done at
Vienna September 28, 1970. Entered into force
June 1, 1973.
Proclaimed by the President: June 14, 1973.
Conservation
Convention on international trade in endangered
species of wild fauna and flora, with appendices.
Done at Washington March 3, 1973.'
Signature : Colombia, June 4, 1973.
Oil Pollution
Amendments to the international convention for the
prevention of pollution of the sea by oil, 1954, as
amended (TIAS 4900, 6109). Adopted at London
October 21, 1969.'
Acceptance deposited: Philippines (with a decla-
ration). May 16, 1973.
Amendments to the international convention for the
prevention of pollution of the sea by oil, 1954, as
amended (TIAS 4900, 6109). Adopted at London
October 15, 1971.'
Accepta7ice deposited: Philippines, May 16, 1973.
Peace in Viet-Nam
Joint communique implementing the agreement, with
protocols, of January 27, 1973 (TIAS 7542), on
ending the war and restoring peace in Viet-Nam.
Signed at Paris June 13, 1973.
Signatures : United States, Republic of Viet-Nam,
Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam, Provisional
Revolutionary Government of the Republic of
South Viet-Nam.
Entered into force: June 13, 1973.
Property — Industrial
Trademark registration treaty, with regulations.
Done at Vienna June 12, 1973. Enters into force
six months after five states have deposited their
instruments of ratification or accession.
Signatures: Federal Republic of Germany, Hun-
gary, Italy, Monaco, Portugal, San Marino,
United Kingdom, United States, June 12, 1973.
War
Geneva convention for amelioration of condition of
wounded and sick in the armed forces in the field;
Geneva convention for amelioration of the condi-
tion of wounded, sick and shipwrecked members
of armed forces at sea;
Geneva convention relative to the treatment of
prisoners of war;
Geneva convention relative to protection of civilian
persons in time of war.
Done at Geneva August 12, 1949. Entered into
force October 21, 1950; for the United States
February 2, 1956. TIAS 3362, 3363, 3364, and
3365, respectively.
Accession deposited: Singapore, April 27, 1973.
War, Renunciation of
Treaty providing for the renunciation of war as an
instrument of national policy. Signed at Paris
August 27, 1928. Entered into force July 24, 1929.
46 Stat. 2343.
Notification of succession: Fiji, May 21, 1973.
BILATERAL
Colombia
Agreement amending the agreement for sales of
agricultural commodities of April 24, 1973 (TIAS
7623). Effected by exchange of notes at Bogota
May 11, 1973. Entered into force May 11, 1973.
Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam
Joint communique implementing the agreement, with
protocols, of January 27, 1973 (TIAS 7542), on
ending the war and restoring peace in Viet-Nam.
Signed at Paris June 13, 1973. Entered into force
June 13, 1973.
Ireland
Agreement relating to recognition of charterworthi-
ness of charter traffic during June 1973. Effected
by exchange of notes at Washington June 7 and
8, 1973. Entered into force June 8, 1973.
Agreement amending the agreement of February 3,
1945, as amended (59 Stat. 1402, 61 Stat. 2872,
TIAS 4007), relating to air transport services.
Effected by exchange of notes at Dublin June 11,
1973. Entered into force June 11, 1973.
Japan
Agreement concerning an international observer
scheme for whaling operations from land stations
in the North Pacific Ocean. Signed at Tokyo May
29, 1973. Entered into force May 29, 1973.
' Not in force.
44
Department of State Bulletin
INDEX JhUi ^. I97.J Vol. LXIX. Nn. 1775
Asia. Change anil ronstimcv in U.S. Commit-
ments (Rush) ... 1
China
Change and Constancy in U.S. Commitments
(Rush) 1
S. Swimmers and Divers Tour People's Re-
public of China 15
I ingress
1 icpartment Discusses the Arab-Israeli Conflict
and the Arabian Peninsula-Persian Gulf Area
(Sisco) ; T.- • ^^
Secretary Rogers Discusses Objectives of For-
eign Assistance Program (Rogers) .... 34
Kconomic Affairs
Kestoring Europe's Sense of Unity (Pedersen) . 16
■Pia(lemarl< Treaty Signed at Vienna .... 28
i.S. Economic Policies and Their Implica-
tions for Latin America and the Caribbean
(Casey) 22
Educational and Cultural Affairs. U.S. Swim-
mers and Divers Tour People's Republic of
China 15
Environment. World Environment Day (procla-
mation) '^
Europe
Change and Constancy in U.S. Commitments
(Rush) V, •, • \ ■ ,1
Restoring Europe's Sense of Unity (Pedersen) . lb
loreign Aid. Secretary Rogers Discusses Ob-
jectives of Foreign Assistance Program
(Rogers) 34
Trance. President Nixon and President Pompi-
dou of France Hold Talks in Iceland
(Eldjarn, Nixon, Pompidou, Kissinger) . . 7
Iceland. President Nixon and President Pompi-
dou of France Hold Talks in Iceland (Eld-
jarn, Nixon, Pompidou, Kissinger) .... 7
International Organizations and Conferences.
Calendar of International Conferences ... 37
Latin America. U.S. Economic Policies and
Their Implications for Latin America and
the Caribbean (Casey) 22
Middle East. Department Discusses the Arab-
Israeli Conflict and the Arabian Peninsula-
Persian Gulf Area (Sisco) 29
Military Affairs. Restoring Europe's Sense of
Unity (Pedersen) 16
Presidential Documents
President Nixon and President Pompidou of
France Hold Talks in Iceland 7
World Environment Day (proclamation) ... 15
.-Southern Rhodesia. U.S. Calls for Stronger En-
forcement of U.N. Sanctions .Against South-
ern Rhodesia (Scali, texts of resolution and
draft resolution) 40
Treaty Information
' urrent Actions 44
1 rademark Treaty Signed at Vienna .... 28
U.S.S.R.
Change and Constancy in U.S. Commitments
(Rush) • 1
Secretary Discusses Development of U.S.-
U.S.S.R. Relations (written interview for
TASS) 5
United Nations. U.S. Calls for Stronger En-
forcement of U.N. Sanctions Against South-
ern Rhodesia (Scali, texts of resolution and
draft resolution) 40
Name Index
Casey, William J 22
Eldjarn, Kristjan 7
Kissinger, Henry A "
Nixon, President '^' Jc
Pedersen, Richard F 16
Pompidou, Georges r q3
Rogers, Secretary 5, 34
Rush, Kenneth 1
Scali, John 40
Sisco, Joseph J ^^
Check List of Department of State
Press Releases: June 11-17
Press releases may be obtained from the Of-
fice of Press Relations, Department of State,
Washington, D.C. 20520.
Releases issued prior to June 11 which ap-
pear in this issue of the Bulletin are Nos.
161 of May 18, 189 of May 31, 192 and 193
of June 5, 197 of June 6, and 200 of June 8.
Subject
U.S. and Ireland reach agreement
on landing rights (rewrite).
Rogers: arrival statement, Teh-
ran, June 9.
Rogers: CENTO ministerial con-
ference, Tehran, June 10.
Rush : Senate Committee on For-
eign Relations.
Rogers: news conference, Tehran,
June 11.
Rush : World Affairs Council, Los
Angeles.
Rogers: TASS interview.
CENTO communique, June 11.
Newsom: Senate Subcommittee
on Africa.
Joint Committee on U.S.-Japan
Educational and Cultural Co-
operation, Hilo, Hawaii, June
16-18.
Rogers : interview for Danish tel-
evision.
Trademark treaty signed at
Vienna.
No.
Date
t201
6/11
t202
6/11
t203
6/11
t204
6/12
t205
6/12
1-206
6/14
207
t208
t209
6/14
6/14
6/15
t210 6/15
1211
212
6/15
6/15
tHeld for a later issue of the Bulletin.
Superintendent or Documents
U.S. government printing office
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20402
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of Media Services (PA/MS), Department of State,
Washington, D.C. 20520.
THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BULLETIN
Volume LXIX • No. 1776 • July 9. 1973
COMMUNIQUE SIGNED AT PARIS ON IMPLEMENTATION
OF VIET-NAM AGREEMENT U5
THE UNITED STATES WITH EUROPE
Address by Deputy Secretary Rtish 54
INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION ON ENERGY
Address by Under Secretary Casey 59
FOR A PEACEFUL AND PROGRESSIVE LATIN AMERICA
Address by Assistant Secretary Kubisch 68
THE OFFICIAL WEEKLY RECORD OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY
For index see inside back cover
THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BULLETIN
Vol. LXIX, No. 1776
July 9, 1973
Kor sale by the Superintendent of Documents
U.S. Government Printing Office
Washington. D.C. 20402
PRICE:
52 issues plus semiannual indexes,
domestic $29, foreign $36.25
Single copy 66 cents
Use of funds for printing this publication ap-
proved by the Director of the Office of Man-
agement and Budget (January 29, 1971).
lyote: Contents of this publication are not
copyrighted and items contained herein may be
reprinted. Citation of the DEPARTMENT OF
STATE BULLETIN as the source will be
appreciated. The BULLETIN is indexed in
the Readers' Guide to Periodical Literature.
The Department of State BULLETIN,
a weekly publication issued by the
Office of Media Services, Bureau of
Public Affairs, provides the public and
interested agencies of the government
with information on developments in
the field of U.S. foreign relations and
on the work of the Department and
the Foreign Service.
The BULLETIN includes selected
press releases on foreign policy, issued
by the White House and the Depart-
ment, and statements, addresses,
and news conferences of the President
and the Secretary of State and other
officers of the Department, as well as
special articles on various phases of
international affairs and the functions
of the Department. Information is in-
cluded concerning treaties and inter-
national agreements to which the
United States is or may become a
party and on treaties of general inter-
national interest.
Publications of the Department of
State, United Nations documents, and
legislative material in the field of
international relations are also listed.
Communique Signed at Paris on Implementation
of Viet-Nam Agreement
Follotving is the transcript of a news con-
ference held at Paris on June 13 by Hem-y A.
Kissinger, Assistant to the President for Na-
tional Security Affairs, together with the
texts of joint communiques signed at Paris
that day by the four parties to the January
27 Viet-Nam agreement and by the United
States and the Democratic Republic of
Viet-Nam.'^
DR. KISSINGER'S NEWS CONFERENCE
White House press release dated June 13
Dr. Kissinger: Ladies and gentlemen, first
of all, I want to thank those of you who have
been following me around in these many ses-
sions in November, December, January, Feb-
ruary, and now, for your patience, sometimes
for risking your necks. I regret I haven't
been able to be more communicative at the
end of each session, but these negotiations
are somewhat complex and involve many
parties.
I understand that there has already been
a previous briefing which went to the details,
but let me say very briefly what we consider
to be the significance of this communique,
what is in the communique, and then I will
take your questions.
As you know, during the course of March
and April the United States became quite
concerned about the manner in which the
cease-fire agreement was being implemented.
' For texts of the Agreement on Ending the War
and Restoring Peace in Viet-Nam and protocols
signed at Paris on Jan. 27, see Bulletin of Feb.
12, 1973, p. 169.
We were specifically concerned about the fol-
lowing points: •
— One, the inadequate implementation of
the cease-fire.
— Secondly, the continued infiltration into
South Viet-Nam and the continued utiliza-
tion of Laos and Cambodia as corridors for
that infiltration.
— Three, we were concerned about the in-
adequate accounting for the missing in
action.
— Fourth, we were concerned about the
violations of the demilitarized zone.
— Fifth, we were concerned about the in-
adequate cooperation with the International
Control Commission and the slow staffing of
the Two-Party Military Commission.
— Sixth, we were concerned about the vio-
lations of article 20 requiring the withdrawal
of foreign troops from Laos and Cambodia.
Needless to say, the other side had its list
of complaints, and in these circumstances we
proposed that Mr. Le Due Tho and I meet
again to review the implementation of the
agreements that had been so painfully nego-
tiated last fall.
There was a preliminary meeting between
Ambassador Sullivan [William H. Sullivan,
Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East
Asian and Pacific Affairs] and Vice Minister
[for Foreign Affairs Nguyen Co] Thach, and
then on May 17 Le Due Tho and I met again
and reached some preliminary conclusions.
We were in daily contact with the Govern-
ment of South Viet-Nam through its delega-
tion here and through our Embassy in Sai-
gon. We then sent Ambassador Sullivan to
July 9, 1973
45
Saigon for further consultations. I returned
here. The negotiations continued. There was
a slight interruption last Saturday, and we
reached a final conclusion today.
As far as the content of the joint communi-
que is concerned, we believe that we have
achieved a satisfactory conclusion of the
points that were of principal concern to the
United States.
There is, as you know, to be issued a new
order on the cease-fire, which is to go into
effect roughly 36 hours from now, which we
hope and expect will be implemented fully.
Second, there is a clear repetition of the
prohibitions against the infiltration of per-
sonnel and materiel into South Viet-Nam,
except as replacements under article 7 of the
original agreement and according to pro-
cedures agreed to by the two parties with
reference to respect for the demilitarized
zone and to the prohibition of transiting the
demilitarized zone except in accordance with
the replacement provisions of the agreement.
Under the provisions for missing in action,
all sides have pledged that they would make
major efforts to help each other to account
for the missing in action throughout Indo-
china, and this is a matter which is of great
concern to the United States.
The Two-Party Military Commission is to
be fully staffed, and special assurances have
been given in paragraph 12 about coopera-
tion with the International Control Commis-
sion by all the parties to grant them reason-
able freedom of movement.
With respect to Laos and Cambodia, the
communique says that the provisions of
article 20 are to be scrupulously observed,
and there have been long discussions about
the whole complex of issues raised by Laos
and Cambodia. However, since the final re-
sults depend on the sovereign decision of
other parties, we will not discuss this sub-
ject here, and we will leave it to the results
and to events to testify to progress.
The other subject which has been dis-
cussed and which I have left separately is
that of political evolution in South Viet-
Nam. As you know, the United States has
always taken the view that the political evo-
lution of South Viet-Nam is to be decided
by the South Vietnamese.
Therefore the United States has always
believed — and that is reflected in the com-
munique — that the political future of South
Viet-Nam should be determined by a process
of free and democratic general elections. The
other provisions regarding political evolu-
tion reafl^rm what is said in chapter IV of
the cease-fire agreement.
Now, we have today signed the communi-
que, ladies and gentlemen; and the history of
Indochina is replete with agreements and
joint declarations. I am not naive enough to
pretend to you that the mere fact of having
again agreed to certain words in itself guar-
antees peace; but I will also say that since
all parties have worked so seriously for the
last three weeks, we have every hope that
they will match this effort with performance
and therefore there is fresh hope, and we
hope a new spirit, in the implementation of
the agreement, which in itself is maintained.
What was signed today is an amplification
and a consolidation of the original agree-
ment. It is not a new agreement. Now, the
people of Indochina, and especially the peo-
ples of Viet-Nam, have suffered conflicts for
a generation, and our greatest ambition has
been to end their suffering and to restore
peace, and it is our hope that by what has
been done today a significant step has been
taken in the consolidation of peace in Viet-
Nam and in Indochina.
Now I will be glad to answer your ques-
tions. For my own education, will you iden-
tify yourselves.
Q. What were the changes in the communi-
que in the last jew days that made it accept-
able to the South Vietnamese Government?
Dr. Kissinger: I don't think it is useful to
go through all the details of the negotiation
and to provide a scorecard. In any negotia-
tion there are sometimes impasses reached
that afterward are rather complex to explain.
46
Department of State Bulletin
I will be glad to explain one difficulty that
existed which was perhaps not of monu-
mental substantive significance but which
was extremely time consuming and which
concerned the formal signing of the com-
munique.
The United States began by proposing
that it should be a two-party communique
between Hanoi and the United States as a
recommendation to the South Vietnamese
parties. The North Vietnamese proposed that
it should be a two-party communique signed
with the concurrence of the South Vietnam-
ese parties. The South Vietnamese proposed
that it should be a four-party communique.
We accepted a four-party communique, at
which point Saigon proposed that it should
be a two-party communique with recommen-
dations to the two South Vietnamese parties,
which in turn induced Hanoi to accept the
four-party communique. We then, as a com-
promise, accepted Hanoi's proposal of a two-
party communique with the concurrence of
the South Vietnamese parties.
So there was one fleeting moment where
Saigon had our position, we had Hanoi's
position, and Hanoi had Saigon's position. So
you must not believe that every time that a
great deal of time is spent, it always con-
cerns final issues of war and peace. This was
one of the issues that took some time, but I
will not discuss every issue that arose.
Q. Lou Cioffi, ABC Neivs. Besides the fact
that the other parties did negotiate seriously,
ivhat else makes you think that they are now
willing to work together seriously for a
political solution in Indochina and not a mili-
tary one?
Dr. Kissinger: I think, Mr. Cioffi, that the
whole evolution of the Indochina tragedy and
of the Vietnamese war has been a slow reali-
zation by all the parties that they could not
impose a military solution on each other.
This has been a very painful process for all
concerned, because I think it is safe to say
that the art of compromise is not the most
highly developed quality in Viet-Nam.
I believe that the realities of the situation,
both before the cease-fire agreement and, I
think it is fair to say, since the cease-fire
agreement, may have brought home to the
parties concerned the necessity of, first,
peaceful coexistence and eventually some po-
litical solution.
I repeat, I did not say that this was guar-
anteed. It is undoubtedly a process which
will have its ups and downs. But we are
entering this new phase with the intention
of contributing what we can to easing the
situation and promoting the peace.
Q. The communique today deals witfi the
tivo sides' military leaders getting together
to agree on what areas are controlled. If
since the January agreement of the 27th they
have not been able to agree even on an
agenda in the political discussions, why is
there reason to believe they will be able to
agree on what areas the military control?
Dr. Kissinger: Well, of course, events will
show very quickly whether they will be able
to agree. One of the reasons why the Two-
Party Military Commission has not worked
as efficiently as was originally hoped was be-
cause of the difficulty of agreeing on location
and immunity; and that problem has been
substantially resolved by this agreement, or
should have been substantially resolved by
this agreement.
With respect to areas controlled and mo-
dalities of stationing, it is our view that this
is determined by the military presence, and
on that basis both sides, after a clear cease-
fire is achieved, should be able empirically to
determine where the forces are located and
on that basis delimit the zones of military
control.
One reason it has not worked previously
is because the cease-fire was not fully ob-
served. To the extent that this new cease-
fire order — which will go into efi^ect at 4
o'clock Greenwich mean time on the 15th — to
the extent that that is observed, the delimita-
tion of areas of control should be substan-
tially eased.
July 9, 1973
47
Q. Do you feel now that with the signing
of the document you have mere or less ended
your work in the Indochina area or that you
will still have a lot of difficulties, especially
concerning Cambodia?
Dr. Kissinger: The remaining issues in In-
dochina will still require significant diplo-
matic efforts, and we expect to continue
them. Of course, we remain committed to the
strict implementation of the agreement, and
we will maintain our interest in it. I hope to
be able to reduce my own participation in
this process in order to preserve my emo-
tional stability. [Laughter.]
Q. If the question that was just asked had
to do rvith American aerial military opera-
tions in Cambodia, that is ivhat I was going
to ask also. If it was not, what I tvould like
to ask is, is there anything in this agreement,
this communique, which substantially com-
mits the United States to cease such opera-
tions ?
Dr. Kissinger: There is nothing in this
communique that commits the United States
to cease such operations. It is our hope, and
we will make major efforts in that direction,
to continue the diplomacy that will produce
a cease-fire in Cambodia.
Q. Jim Browning, Westinghouse Broad-
casting. Can I ask you what there is in the
communique that was released today, besides
the good will and seriousness of the people
tvho negotiated it, that will make it work
better than the agreement that rvas negoti-
ated on January 27 ?
Dr. Kissinger: There is nothing in any
communique that makes a communique work.
A communique works because the parties
concerned intend to implement it, and there-
fore all a communique can do, or an agree-
ment can do, is to prescribe what the obliga-
tions of the various parties are.
To the extent that this communique pre-
scribes the specific obligations and reaffirms
them, it can contribute to the consolidation
of peace. But it is never words alone that
produce peace; it is the combination of words,
the intention, and the consequences of per-
formance.
Q. I am with Economic Review, Dr. Kis-
singer. I find in the com-munique one new
point, and that is that your government has
agreed to conclude the first phase of the
talks on the Joint Economic Commission with
the North Vietnamese within 15 days after
the signing of the accord. If I understand the
American negotiation process correctly, I
was under the impression that in fact the
negotiations on the joint economic aid ivere
to some extent meant to be a guarantee that
North Viet-Nam does apply the accords.
Have you managed to obtain some under-
standing or some guarantees from the North
Vietnamese, apart from tvhat ive have found
in the communique, that they will apply the
accords — because I am rather siwprised by
this concession, if we can call it that?
Dr. Kissinger: The Joint Economic Com-
mission had substantially completed its work
at the point when we suspended negotiations.
So that the schedule which is indicated in the
communique is inherent in the resumption of
negotiations.
The United States has always made clear
that the final implementation of the economic
clauses of the agreement has to be seen as
part and parcel of the total implementation
of the agreement.
Of course, many of you know that even
after the Joint Economic Commission com-
pletes its work, its results will first have to
be submitted to the Congress and, secondly,
will have to be approved by the Congress,
which is not an automatic process.
So, there will be sufficient time in which
to assess the implementation of the agree-
ment. This administration has left no doubt
that its support for the in'ogram in the vari-
ous forums is related to the overall imple-
mentation of the agreement.
48
Department of State Bulletin
Q. May I ask you a question off the subject
of the immediate subject of the Viet-Nam,
communique?
Dr. Kissinger: Preferably not.
Q. Preferably not, but I may?
Dr. Kissinger: Well, you can ask it, and
then I will determine whether I will answer
it.
Q. I wondered if you would be prepared to
say why you went to see Mr. Chi P'eng-fei
today, and at whose initiative, and what you
talked about.
Dr. Kissinger: The Foreign Minister of
China is an old friend whom I have seen re-
peatedly in Peking, and since we found our-
selves in the same town, a courtesy visit was
arranged. It lasted 50 minutes, but you have
to allow time for translation. [Laughter.]
Q. I am with the Los Angeles Times. I
ivoidd like to ask, Dr. Kissinger, what kind
of an estimate you have over the last few
months in connection with the cease-fire vio-
lations, the extent to tvhich they are inten-
tional or accidental; that is to say, coyitroUed
or uncontrolled, on the other side, naturally.
Dr. Kissinger: In a situation, as in Viet-
Nam, where many of the forces are mingled
together in very close contact, an implemen-
tation of the cease-fire is of course extremely
difficult. The first thing to remember is that
the level of violence since January 27 has
dropped very markedly and is at the lowest
level that it has been in a decade.
I would say that there are daily reports of
major and minor violations. I think it is safe
to say that, of the minor violations, a signi-
ficant percentage is produced by the proxim-
ity of the forces and not necessarily by a
deliberate design.
In the case of the major violations, which
have averaged around 15 a day, I think it is
safe to say that a significant majority are
produced by the deliberate decision, often of
local commanders, but in any case by de-
liberate decisions.
Q. Scott Sullivan, Newsweek. Both the
Saigon government and I believe the Ameri-
can Government have said they ivere very
eager to tie dotvn a date for free and demo-
cratic elections in South Viet-Nam. On the
surface of the communique, there doesn't
seem to be any such tying doivn or linking.
Are you satisfied that significant progress
has been made in that particular direction?
Dr. Kissinger: We have two separate prob-
lems. One is the desirability of the dates for
general elections and the suitability of a four-
party document to tie such a date down. Last
fall, when we negotiated this agreement, the
Saigon government very properly took the
view that it would be inappropriate for the
United States or for an international docu-
ment to prescribe the specific date for elec-
tions, and we spent many days on that issue
because it was at that time that the North
Vietnamese wanted to tie down the date and
it was we who, following the recommenda-
tions of the Saigon government, did not do so.
In these circumstances, it is impossible
for the United States to insist now on what
it refused in December. Nevertheless, we
have always taken the view that the political
future of South Viet-Nam should be left to
the South Vietnamese and that free and dem-
ocratic general elections should be a central
element in determining that future.
Individually, we support the South Viet-
namese proposal that a time should be fixed
for that election. We think it is a reasonable
proposal. But in the light of the negotiating
history, it was not appropriate to introduce
into a communique which is supposed to
bring about the implementation of the agree-
ment a clause which was not part of the orig-
inal agreement and which was not part of
the original agreement at the request of the
South Vietnamese Government.
But nevertheless, as far as the internal
negotiations are concerned, we think the
South Vietnamese demand is reasonable, and
we hope it will be accepted.
July 9, 1973
49
Q. John Harris, Hearst Papers. If this
agreement doesn't work out, do you envisage
negotiating a third agreement?
Dr. Kissinger: It is a prospect I cannot
face today. [Laughter.] When we sign an
agreement, we hope that it will be imple-
mented, and whatever difficulties, arise should
be principally discussed between the Viet-
namese parties, and I don't want to address
now the question of what happens if there
should be violations before we have even
concluded the two-party signature.
We have negotiated this in good faith,
after a long war and a great deal of suffer-
ing, with the hope that at last the parties
concerned will draw the conclusion from the
overwhelming reality in Viet-Nam that no-
body can have his way by force.
Thank you very much, ladies and gentle-
men.
TEXTS OF JOINT COMMUNIQUES
Four-Porty Joint Communique
Joint Communique
The Parties signatory to the Paris Agreement
on Ending the War and Restoring Peace in Viet-
Nam, signed on January 27, 1973,
Considering that strict respect and scrupulous
implementation of all provisions of the Agreement
and its Protocols by all the parties signatory to them
are necessary to ensure the peace in Viet-Nam and
contribute to the cause of peace in Indochina and
Southeast Asia,
Have agreed on the following points (in the
sequence of the relevant articles in the Agreement) :
1. In conformity with Article 2 of the Agreement,
the United States shall cease immediately, com-
pletely, and indefinitely aerial reconnaissance over
the territory of the Democratic Republic of Viet-
Nam.
2. In conformity with Article 2 of the Agreement
and with the Protocol on Mine Clearance:
(a) The United States shall resume mine clear-
ance operations within five days from the date of
signature of this Joint Communique and shall suc-
cessfully complete those operations within thirty
days thereafter.
(b) The United States shall supply to the Demo-
cratic Republic of Viet-Nam means which are agreed
to be adequate and suflficient for sweeping mines in
rivers.
(c) The United States shall announce when the
mine clearance in each main channel is completed
and issue a final announcement when all the opera-
tions are completed.
3. In implementation of Article 2 of the Agree-
ment, at 1200 hours, G.M.T., June 14, 1973, the
High Commands of the two South Vietnamese
parties shall issue identical orders to all regular and
irregular armed forces and the armed police under
their command, to strictly observe the cease-fire
throughout South Viet-Nam beginning at 0400
hours, G.M.T., June 15, 1973, and scrupulously
implement the Agreement and its Protocols.
4. The tsvo South Vietnamese parties shall strictly
implement Articles 2 and 3 of the Protocol on the
Cease-Fire in South Viet-Nam which read as
follows:
"Article 2
(a) As soon as the cease-fire comes into force
and until regulations are issued by the Joint
Military Commissions, all ground, river, sea and
air combat forces of the parties in South Viet-
Nam shall remain in place; that is, in order to
ensure a stable cease-fire, there shall be no
major redeployments or movements that would
extend each party's area of control or would
result in contact between opposing armed forces
and clashes which might take place.
(b) All regular and irregular armed forces
and the armed police of the parties in South
Viet-Nam shall observe the prohibition of the
following acts:
(1) Armed patrols into areas controlled by
opposing armed forces and flights by bomber
and fighter aircraft of all types, except for
unarmed flights for proficiency training and
maintenance;
(2) Armed attacks against any person, either
military or civilian, by any means whatsoever,
including the use of small arms, mortars,
artillery, bombing and strafing by airplanes
and any other type of weapon or explosive
device;
(3) All combat operations on the ground, on
rivers, on the sea and in the air;
(4) All hostile acts, terrorism or reprisals;
and
(5) All acts endangering lives or public or
private property.
Article 3
(a) The above-mentioned prohibitions shall
not hamper or restrict:
(1) Civilian supply, freedom of movement,
freedom to work, and freedom of the people to
engage in trade, and civilian communication and
transportation between and among all areas
in South Viet-Nam;
(2) The use by each party in areas under its
control of military support elements, such as
engineer and transportation units, in repair
50
Department of State Bulletin
and construction of public facilities and the
transportation and supplying of the population ;
(3) Normal military proficiency training con-
ducted by the parties in the areas under their
respective control with due regard for public
safety.
(b) The Joint Military Commissions shall
immediately agree on corridors, routes, and
other regulations governing the movement of
military transport aircraft, military transport
vehicles, and military transport vessels of all
types of one party going through areas under
the control of other parties."
5. The Two-Party Joint Military Commission shall
immediately carry out its task pursuant to Article
3(b) of the Agreement to determine the areas con-
trolled by each of the two South Vietnamese parties
and the modalities of stationing. This task shall be
completed as soon as possible. The Commission shall
also immediately discuss the movements necessary
to accomplish a return of the armed forces of the
two South Vietnamese parties to the positions they
occupied at the time the cease-fire entered into force
on January 28, 1973.
6. Twenty-four hours after the cease-fire referred
to in paragraph 3 enters into force, the commanders
of the opposing armed forces at those places of
direct contact shall meet to carry out the provisions
of Article 4 of the Protocol on the Cease-Fire in
South Viet-Nam with a view to reaching an agree-
ment on temporary measures to avert conflict and to
ensure supply and medical care for these armed
forces.
7. In conformity with Article 7 of the Agreement:
(a) The two South Vietnamese parties shall not
accept the introduction of troops, military advisers,
and military personnel, including technical military
personnel, into South Viet-Nam.
(b) The two South Vietnamese parties shall not
accept the introduction of armaments, munitions, and
war material into South Viet-Nam. However, the
two South Vietnamese parties are permitted to make
periodic replacement of armaments, munitions, and
war material, as authorized by Article 7 of the
Agreement, through designated points of entry and
subject to supervision by the Two-Party Joint Mili-
tary Commission and the International Commission
of Control and Supervision.
In conformity with Article 15(b) of the Agree-
ment regarding the respect of the Demilitarized Zone,
military equipment may transit the Demilitarized
Zone only if introduced into South Viet-Nam as re-
placements pursuant to Article 7 of the Agreement
and through a designated point of entry.
(c) Twenty-four hours after the entry into force
of the cease-fire referred to in paragraph 3, the Two-
Party Joint Military Commission shall discuss the
modalities for the supervision of the replacements
of armaments, munitions, and war material per-
mitted by Article 7 of the Agreement at the three
points of entry already agreed upon for each party.
Within fifteen days of the entry into force of the
cease-fire referred to in paragraph 3, the two South
Vietnamese parties shall also designate by agreement
three additional points of entry for each party in the
area controlled by that party.
8. In conformity with Article 8 of the Agreement:
(a) Any captured personnel covered by Article
8(a) of the Agreement who have not yet been re-
turned shall be returned without delay, and in any
event within no more than thirty days from the date
of signature of this Joint Communique.
(b) All the provisions of the Agreement and the
Protocol on the Return of Captured Personnel shall
be scrupulously implemented. All Vietnamese civilian
personnel covered by Article 8(c) of the Agreement
and Article 7 of the Protocol on the Return of Cap-
tured Personnel shall be returned as soon as possi-
ble. The two South Vietnamese parties shall do their
utmost to accomplish this within forty-five days
from the date of signature of this Joint Communique.
(c) In conformity with Article 8 of the Protocol
on the Return of Captured Personnel, all captured
and detained personnel covered by that Protocol shall
be treated humanely at all times. The two South
Vietnamese parties shall immediately implement
Article 9 of that Protocol and, within fifteen days
from the date of signature of this Joint Communi-
que, allow National Red Cross Societies they have
agreed upon to visit all places where these personnel
are held.
(d) The two South Vietnamese parties shall co-
operate in obtaining information about missing per-
sons and in determining the location of and in taking
care of the graves of the dead.
(e) In conformity with Article 8(b) of the Agree-
ment, the parties shall help each other to get infor-
mation about those military personnel and foreign
civilians of the parties missing in action, to deter-
mine the location and take care of the graves of the
dead so as to facilitate the exhumation and repatria-
tion of the remains, and to take any such other meas-
ures as may be required to get information about
those still considered missing in action. For this pur-
pose, frequent and regular liaison flights shall be
made between Saigon and Hanoi.
9. The two South Vietnamese parties shall imple-
ment Article 11 of the Agreement, which reads as
follows :
"Immediately after the cease-fire, the two
South Vietnamese parties will:
— achieve national reconciliation and concord,
end hatred and enmity, prohibit all acts of re-
prisal and discrimination against individuals or
organizations that have collaborated with one
side or the other;
— ensure the democratic liberties of the peo-
ple: personal freedom, freedom of speech, free-
dom of the press, freedom of meeting, freedom
July 9, 1 973
51
of organization, freedom of political activities,
freedom of belief, freedom of movement, free-
dom of residence, freedom of work, right to
property ownership and right to free enterprise."
10. Consistent with the principles for the exer-
cise of the South Vietnamese people's right to self-
determination stated in Chapter IV of the Agree-
ment:
(a) The South Vietnamese people shall decide
themselves the political future of South Viet-Nam
through genuinely free and democratic general elec-
tions under international supervision.
(b) The National Council of National Reconcilia-
tion and Concord consisting of three equal seg^ments
shall be formed as soon as possible, in conformity
with Article 12 of the Agreement.
The two South Vietnamese parties shall sign an
agreement on the internal matters of South Viet-
Nam as soon as possible, and shall do their utmost to
accomplish this within forty-five days from the date
of signature of this Joint Communique.
(c) The two South Vietnamese parties shall agree
through consultations on the institutions for which
the free and democratic general elections provided
for in Article 9(b) of the Agreement will be held.
(d) The two South Vietnamese parties shall im-
plement Article 13 of the Agreement, which reads
as follows:
"The question of Vietnamese armed forces in
South Viet-Nam shall be settled by the two
South Vietnamese parties in a spirit of national
reconciliation and concord, equality and mutual
respect, without foreign interference, in accord-
ance with the postwar situation. Among the
questions to be discussed by the two South
Vietnamese parties are steps to reduce their
military effectives and to demobilize the troops
being reduced. The two South Vietnamese par-
ties will accomplish this as soon as possible."
11. In implementation of Article 17 of the Agree-
ment:
(a) All the provisions of Articles 16 and 17 of
the Protocol on the Cease-Fire in South Viet-Nam
shall immediately be implemented with respect to
the Two-Party Joint Military Commission. That
Commission shall also immediately be accorded the
eleven points of privileges and immunities agreed
upon by the Four-Party Joint Military Commission.
Frequent and regular liaison flights shall be made
between Saigon and the headquarters of the Regional
Two-Party Joint Military Commissions and other
places in South Viet-Nam as required for the op-
erations of the Two-Party Joint Military Commis-
sion. Frequent and regular liaison flights shall also
be made between Saigon and Loc Ninh.
(b) The headquarters of the Central Two-Party
Joint Military Commission shall be located in Saigon
proper or at a place agreed upon by the two South
Vietnamese parties where an area controlled by one
of them adjoins an area controlled by the other. The
locations of the headquarters of the Regional Two-
Party Joint Military Commissions and of the teams
of the Two-Party Joint Military Commission shall
be determined by that Commission within fifteen
days after the entry into force of the cease-fire re-
ferred to in paragraph 3. These locations may be
changed at any time as determined by the Com-
mission. The locations, except for teams at the points
of entry, shall be selected from among those towns
specified in Article 11(b) and (c) of the Protocol
on the Cease-Fire in South Viet-Nam and those
places where an area controlled by one South Viet-
namese party adjoins an area controlled by the
other, or at any other place agreed upon by the
Commission.
(c) Once the privileges and immunities mentioned
in paragraph 11(a) are accorded by both South
Vietnamese parties, the Two-Party Joint Military
Commission shall be fully staflFed and its regional
commissions and teams fully deployed within fifteen
days after their locations have been determined.
(d) The Two-Party Joint Military Commission
and the International Commission of Control and
Supervision shall closely cooperate with and assist
each other in carrying out their respective functions.
12. In conformity with Article 18 of the Agree-
ment and Article 10 of the Protocol on the Interna-
tional Commission of Control and Supervision, the
International Commission, including its teams, is al-
lowed such movement for observation as is reason-
ably required for the proper exercise of its functions
as stipulated in the Agreement. In carrying out these
functions, the International Commission, including
its teams, shall enjoy all necessary assistance and
cooperation from the parties concerned. The two
South Vietnamese parties shall issue the necessary
instructions to their personnel and take all other
necessary measures to ensure the safety of such
movement.
13. Article 20 of the Agreement, regarding Cam-
bodia and Laos, shall be scrupulously implemented.
14. In conformity with Article 21 of the Agree-
ment, the United States-Democratic Republic of
Viet-Nam Joint Economic Commission shall resume
its meetings four days from the date of signature of
this Joint Communique and shall complete the first
phase of its work within fifteen days thereafter.
AflSrming that the parties concerned shall strictly
respect and scrupulously implement all the pro-
visions of the Paris Agreement, its Protocols, and
this Joint Communique, the undersigned representa-
tives of the parties signatory to the Paris Agreement
have decided to issue this Joint Communique to re-
cord and publish the points on which they have
agreed.
Signed in Paris, June 13, 1973.
52
Department of State Bulletin
[Separate Numbered Page]
For the Government of For the Government of
the United States of the Republic of Viet-
America : Nam :
Henry A. Kissinger
Assistant to the Presi-
dent of the United States
of America
Nguyen Luu Vien
Representative of the
Government of the
Reptiblic of Viet-Nam
[Separate Numbered Pagel
For the Government of For the Provisional Rev-
the Democratic Republic olutionary Government
of Viet-Nam: of the Republic of South
Viet-Nam :
Le Due Tho
Representative of the
Government of the
Democratic Republic of
Viet-Nam
Nguyen Van Hieu
Minister of State of the
Provisional Revolution-
ary Government of the
Republic of South
Viet-Nam
Two-Party Joint Communique
Joint Communique
From May 17 to May 23, from June 6 to June 9,
and on June 12 and June 13, 1973, Dr. Henry A.
Kissinger, on behalf of the Government of the United
States of America, and Mr. Le Due Tho, on behalf
of the Government of the Democratic Republic of
Viet-Nam, reviewed the implementation of the Paris
Agreement on Ending the War and Restoring Peace
in Viet-Nam and its Protocols and discussed urgent
measures to ensure the correct and strict imple-
mentation of the Agreement and its Protocols.
The Government of the United States of America,
with the concurrence of the Government of the Re-
public of Viet-Nam,
The Government of the Democratic Republic of
Viet-Nam, with the concurrence of the Provisional
Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South
Viet-Nam,
Considering that strict respect and scrupulous im-
plementation of all provisions of the Paris Agree-
ment and its Protocols by all the parties signatory
to them are necessary to ensure the peace in Viet-
Nam and contribute to the cause of peace in Indo-
china and Southeast Asia,
Have agreed on the following points (in the
sequence of the relevant articles in the Agreement) :
[Texts of paragraphs 1-14 as above]
Affirming that the parties concerned shall strictly
respect and scrupulously implement all the provi-
sions of the Paris Agreement, its Protocols, this
Joint Communique, and a Joint Communique in the
same terms signed by representatives of the Govern-
ment of the United States of America, the Govern-
ment of the Republic of Viet-Nam, the Govern-
ment of the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam, and
the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the
Republic of South Viet-Nam, the representative of
the United States of America, Dr. Henry A.
Kissinger, and the representative of the Democratic
Republic of Viet-Nam, Mr. Le Due Tho, have de-
cided to issue this Joint Communique to record and
publish the points on which they have agreed.
Signed in Paris, June 13, 1973.
For the Government of
the United States of
America:
Henry A. Kissinger
Assistant to the Presi-
dent of the United States
of America
For the Government of
the Democratic Republic
of Viet-Nam:
Le Due Tho
Representative of the
Government of the
Democratic Republic of
Viet-Nam,
July 9, 1973
53
The United States With Europe
Address by Deputy Secretary Kenneth Ritsh
The United States is embarked upon one of
the most exciting- periods of foreign relations
in its history. Today, we are building- the
relationships that will determine the course
of American foreign relations and, to no
small degree, of world politics and economics
for the remainder of the century. Some be-
lieve that the United States is entering a
new period of isolationism. This is not true.
Nor should it be true.
What is taking place is a search for new
forms of involvement, new forms of engage-
ment, new forms of cooperation with the
rest of the international community. Pres-
ident Nixon is trying, as he has said, to
"forge a network of relationships and of
interdependencies that restrain aggression
and that take the profit out of war."= This
interdependence can provide the framework
for the "generation of peace" the President
seeks.
Our changed relationships with the Soviet
Union and with China were among the most
dramatic accomplishments of President
Nixon's first term. Cooperation has increas-
ingly come to replace confrontation. General
Secretary Brezhnev's impending visit to this
country highlights the kind of change that
has come about. With Moscow and with
Peking we are demonstrating that adver-
saries need not be antagonists. At the same
time, we are determined not to involve our-
selves in any way in the quarrel between
Moscow and Peking.
' Made before the Los Angeles, Calif., World Af-
fairs Council on June 14 (press release 206).
■ For an excerpt from President Nixon's address
to the Nation on Nov. 2, 1972, see Bulletin of Nov.
20, 1972, p. 605.
The new relationships with our foi'mer
antagonists, and the end of the war in Viet-
Nam, have enabled us to turn our energy
and our imagination toward reshaping and
reinforcing our ties to our closest allies else-
where in the world. Today, I would like to
focus on our relations with western Eu-
rope — an area with which we are intimately
tied by history, by intei'est, and by friendship.
Twenty-five years ago fear, crisis, and eco-
nomic ruin marked the European Continent.
The United States alone among major indus-
trial countries escaped the devastation of the
war — and it held undisputed primacy in nu-
clear weapons.
Today Europe has recovered economically
and i)olitically. The gross national product of
the nine members of the European Com-
munity is 78 percent of that of the United
States. Europe as a whole is now the
United States principal trading partner ; the
European Community alone absorbs about
one-fourth of our exports. It is also a major
commercial rival. The European Community
provides 22.1 percent of the world's exports
and consumes 17.7 percent of its imports.
The United States, by comparison, supplies
12.4 percent of the world's exports and 12.5
percent of its imports.
Economic recovery has been paralleled by
political revival. The Europeans have a nat-
ural desire to play an equal role in the de-
cisions that aff'ect them. U.S. leadership is
necessarily being replaced by U.S. participa-
tion with our allies in common decisions.
The tensions across Europe have been
greatly reduced. The continent no longer lives
in constant fear. At the same time the United
States is no longer the sole possessor of a
54
Department of State Bulletin
credible nuclear deterrent; instead there is
approximate parity between the United
States and the Soviet Union.
There has been a tendency in some quar-
ters to view this period of transition in terms
of contradictions: a contradiction between
defense and detente; between European
unity and Atlantic cooperation; between bi-
lateral consultation and multilateral coopera-
tion; between Europe's economic vitality and
the economic interests of the United States.
To pose the issues of our Atlantic partner-
ship in these terms is misleading-. It is also
dangerous, because to do so encourages the
latent tendencies against cooperation that
exist on both sides of the Atlantic.
The ease and candor with which we and
Europe discuss our differences make it all the
more important to set forth concrete objec-
tives as we seek to strengthen our Atlantic
partnership. I would like to list for you our
six objectives:
First, we seek to reinforce and reaffirm
our close ties with each European nation.
This year's series of bilateral consultations
between President Nixon and European lead-
ers is a critical part of that process. The
President intends to travel to Europe in the
fall to carry forward his bilateral contacts.
Our strong bilateral ties are essential build-
ing blocks in NATO, in our cooperative ef-
forts in the Organization for Economic Co-
operation and Development, and, for ex-
ample, in our mutual endeavor to restructure
the world's trade and monetary systems. We
intend to keep each of our European allies
fully informed of the result of our bilateral
consultations to assure that these talks con-
tinue to supplement the strength of our
broader association.
Second, we seek a common effort to rede-
fine the principles that can guide Atkintic
relations in the future. Equality among the
Atlantic partners calls for a new consensus
on our common objectives and how to attain
them. Such principles must be the result of a
mutual effort among all the allies. Security,
economic, and political issues must continue
to be discussed in appropriate organizations
and through high-level consultations, both
bilateral and multilateral. But agreement on
general jirinciples will enable all of us to re-
inforce our mutual interests as we address
specific issues. As each nation in the alliance
reviews the many ways and many places we
are involved with each other, the United
States is hopeful that all will contribute to
the formulation of common principles, com-
mon interests, and an agreed approach to our
relations. However, we do not intend to force
the pace of discussions.
Third, we will continue to welcome western
Europe's march totvard economic and politi-
cal unity. A belief that a united Europe would
be in the interest of the United States, as
well as of the Europeans, has been a consis-
tent thread in American foreign policy for
the past 27 years. We acted on that belief to
support western European efforts at greater
unity. Experience has shown the wisdom of
our policy. Today a more united Europe is a
better trading partner, is a more secure home
for democracy, and is more able to assume a
greater responsibility for the common de-
fense. We hope, as the Secretary of State has
said, to build a relationship with the Euro-
pean Community that "will in time become
a solid pillar of U.S.-European association
such as we already have in NATO." " Thus,
we have welcomed the decision last fall by
the members of the European Community to
make their objective European union by the
end of the decade. We look forward to the
day, to borrow a phrase, when somebody will
be able to answer the phone for Europe when
we call.
Fourth, we want to develop with Japan,
Europe, Canada, and An-stralia a more com-
plete relationship among all of us. We all
share democracy and market economy. To-
gether we produce about 70 percent of the
world's goods and services. Together we have
many common political and economic inter-
ests; our common energy requirement is one.
The need to further concert our policies to-
' For text of the introduction to United States
Foreign Policy 1972: A Report of the Secretary of
State, transmitted to the Congress on Apr. 19, see
Bulletin of May 7, 1973, p. 545.
July 9, 1973
55
ward the developinjr world is another. Our
many common economic, political, and secu-
rity interests suggest the necessity for devel-
oping fuller consultation among us all.
Fifth, in close cooperation ivith our NATO
allies ive will be building neiv relations with
the Soviet Union and East Europe. The
United States and its allies are presently en-
gaged with the Soviet Union and its allies in
two separate sets of talks which center on
the reduction of the chronic tensions in
Europe. The first of these is the Conference
on Security and Cooperation in Europe,
where a total of 34 nations are participating
in Helsinki. Secretary Rogers, who is today
attending a meeting of NATO Foreign Min-
isters in Copenhagen, will be attending a
ministerial-level meeting of this conference
within a few weeks. We and our allies are
seeking to have this conference take concrete
measures to increase the freedom of move-
ment of people, information, and ideas across
the continent and to affirm the right of each
European nation to self-determination.
Meanwhile, in Vienna, preparatory talks
are underway for a conference on mutual and
balanced reduction of NATO and Warsaw
Pact forces facing each other in central
Europe. We and our allies have worked inti-
mately and successfully to develop common
positions in both sets of talks. The candor,
the self-confidence, and the mutual trust dis-
played in our talks is evidence of the vigor of
our alliance.
The United States is also negotiating bi-
laterally with the Soviet Union in SALT
Two [Strategic Arms Limitation Talks], with
the aim of enhancing strategic stability and
further reducing the risk of nuclear war. As
you know, SALT One achieved an anti-
ballistic-missile treaty placing strict low
limits on strategic defense systems and an
interim agreement limiting strategic offen-
sive weapons. In SALT Two we are seeking
a permanent accord based on essential stra-
tegic equivalence between ourselves and the
Soviet Union. Such an agreement would re-
move the incentive for an arms race while
maintaining our security. The European
allies have a vital interest in the progress of
these talks. And for that reason we have
consulted closely with them.
Sixth, we will seek to work with the na-
tions of western Europe in defining and coor-
dinating our actions on broad global con-
cerns. We both are generating the capital,
the technology, the exports, the imports, and
the ideas that assure our continued involve-
ment with the broader world community. We
all look to global monetary and trade talks
as the proper places to assure that we will
continue to enjoy an expanding and equitable
international economy. We all are anxious to
protect the world's threatened environment.
There are many other global issues in which
we are involved. Moreover, Europe's cul-
tural force, its economic strength, and its
other strengths mean it must play a major
role in bringing about a more secure and
more cooperative world. We will need to co-
operate closely as Europe continues to as-
sume broad global responsibilities.
As we seek these six goals we will expect
differences in perception and approach. No
nation has a monopoly on wisdom, just as no
nation today enjoys either military or eco-
nomic predominance. But differences on cer-
tain specific issues do not mean that we will
lose sight of the fact that our interests and
those of Europe are essentially congruent.
Two wars have taught us that our security
and Europe's security are indivisible; our
economies are all but inextricably tied; and
we are all heirs to a belief that free societies
are each others' best friends.
We note with interest that the Greek Gov-
ernment has pledged a return to parliamen-
tary rule, and free and fair general elections
before the end of 1974. We have consistently
held that the form of government that pre-
vails in Greece is a matter for the Greek
people to decide. However, I am sure that
friends and allies of Greece share a common
interest in the referendum on constitutional
revisions scheduled for the coming month
and the elections which should provide the
56
Department of State Bulletin
Greek people an opportunity to exercise free
ciioice in determining their future.
In the United States some have been
temi)ted to use the lessening of tensions be-
tween ourselves and our adversaries to jus-
tify a reduction of our defense expenditures,
including a unilateral cutback of our forces
in Europe. In fact, our strong defense pos-
ture has been essential to our successes in
bringing about a more normal relationship
with the Soviet Union and with China.
While I was serving as President Nixon's
Ambassador to Bonn from 1969 to 1972, I
repeatedly witnessed the importance of our
determination to live up to our commitments.
That determination gains the confidence of
our allies. And that determination commands
the resiject of our adversaries. That con-
fidence and that respect were essential in-
gredients in the negotiations of the 1971
Berlin agreement, negotiations in which I
was privileged to participate. As we seek in
Helsinki and in Vienna to further lower
Euroijean tensions without lessening western
European security, we must continue to en-
joy the confidence of our allies and the re-
spect of our adversaries — and that means no
unilateral reduction in our forces stationed in
Europe.
Those who advocate unilateral reductions
forget that the major reason our troops are
in Europe is for our own defense. Of course
we seek greater allied participation in Euro-
pean defense. We also want to work out
measures which offset the balance of pay-
ments effects on the United States — some
$1.5 billion this year — of our troops sta-
tioned in Europe. As essential as these steps
are, we should not lose sight of the fact
that our European allies maintain 3 million
men under arms, 25 percent more than the
United States, that for every American
soldier in Europe there are nine allied sol-
diers, and that they have approximately the
same percentage of their population in the
militai-y as we do. Therefore the emphasis
must be upon qualitative improvements and
better reserve forces. All of us will be facing
greatly increased costs for new and more
sophisticated equipment and higher person-
nel costs.
Defense expenditures are but one area in
which the United States and Europe will be
doing some very hard bargaining. Others are
trade relations, monetary arrangements, bal-
ance of ])ayment adjustment mechanisms. We
will be searching for cooperative solutions to
these issues. Such a positive outcome will not
be easy. Each of the issues affects income,
employment, and general well-being in each
nation. Even clearer than the difficulty of the
issues is the cost to each of us if we fail to
develop cooperative solutions. In that case
all will be worse off.
We must also remember that continued co-
operation can yield great benefits for us all.
In trade, for example, the growing compe-
tition between ourselves and our allies can
yield greater prosperity for each. As Presi-
dent Nixon has said, there is a great advan-
tage to economic competition "because in
economic competition every participant can
win — there need be no losers." ' That is why
we should not be afraid of the growing eco-
nomic competition between ourselves and our
allies. And that is why we and the Euro-
peans and the Japanese reached understand-
ings in 1972 to negotiate trade and monetary
questions "on the basis of mutual advantage
and mutual commitment with overall reci-
procity." '■ These principles should allow us to
minimize conflicts while seeking greater
prosperity. The trade bill President Nixon
submitted to Congress is essential to our
country's successful participation in this
hopeful process.
I believe there is another lesson we all
must keep before us — that each of our econ-
omies is dependent on the others; all are in-
terdependent. On the one hand, this suggests
that the option of protectionism can be pur-
' For an excerpt from President Nixon's economic
report transmitted to the Congress on Jan. 31, see
Bulletin of Feb. 26, 1973, p. 225.
^ For backg-round, see Bulletin of Apr. 3, 1972,
p. 512 and p. 515.
July 9, 1973
57
sued only at very high cost. The United
States now exports 14 percent of its indus-
trial production and 31 percent of its crop.
These exports would be cut in a protectionist
world. On the other hand, it compels us all to
remember that the economic decisions we
each make have effects not only on our own
citizens but also on those of our closest allies.
Interest rates set in Washington cause money
movements in Bonn and Paris. Trade bar-
riers in Europe have a direct impact on Cali-
fornia. Energy decisions in New York cause
price variations in London. Recession here
causes slowdown there. We and Europe will
necessarily have to coordinate our own do-
mestic economic policies if they are going to
achieve our mutual ends.
The challenges and opportunities before
both the United States and Europe are un-
precedented. I hope what I have said today
suggests how the United States will proceed
as it seeks to enhance cooperation between
ourselves and our developed partners — Eu-
rope, Japan, Canada, and Australia. Our
common democratic institutions and our
many common interests suggest that we can
bring such improved cooperation within our
grasp. But there is nothing in our relation-
ship that makes such a hopeful prospect in-
evitable. Only through the support of out-
ward-looking men and women like yourselves
will we achieve greater intimacy, trust, and
cooperation between the United States and
Europe and the other industrial countries.
With that support, and with the contribution
of Europe, we can achieve what President
Nixon described as "a structure of peace to
which all nations contribute and in which all
nations have a stake." "
° The complete text of President Nixon's foreign
policy report to the Congress on Feb. 9, 1972, ap-
pears in the Bulletin of Mar. 13, 1972; "Part I —
1971 — The Watershed Year — An Overview" begins
on p. 314.
Meeting of Committee on U.S.-Japan
Educational and Cultural Cooperation
The Department of State announced on
June 15 (press release 210) that the Joint
Committee on U.S.-Japan Educational and
Cultural Cooperation would meet at Hilo,
Hawaii, June 16-18.
Distinguished Japanese and American
panelists including government officials, jour-
nalists, broadcasters, and representatives
from business and academia discussed recent
developments in the U.S. and Japanese sec-
ondary educational systems, foreign student
counseling, Japanese and American studies
programs and library and museum ex-
changes. They also discussed advances in
interpretation and translation and the role
of the mass media in communicating cultural
differences.
Professor John W. Hall of Yale University
led the U.S. panelists and Mr. Yoshinori
Maeda, president of the NHK network,
headed Japan's panel. They issued a sum-
mary report of the deliberations at the con-
cluding session of the meeting on June 18.
The Joint Committee, which assists in co-
ordinating ongoing U.S. and Japanese ex-
change programs, is responsible for planning
the U.S.-Japan Conferences on Cultural and
Educational Interchange whigh are held ev-
ery two years. During the last conference,
held in Washington and New York in June
1972, the Japanese announced their decision
to establish a foundation to administer a
multi-million-dollar international exchange
program. These conferences and the meet-
ings of the Joint Committee are part of a
series of meetings inaugurated after the 1961
conference between the late President John
F. Kennedy and former Prime Minister
Hayato Ikeda to study and expand cultural
and educational cooperation between the
United States and Japan.
58
Department of State Bulletin
International Cooperation on Energy
Address by William J. Casey
Under Secretary for Economic Affairs '
The international oil situation has changed
significantly over the ]iast year. These
changes have heightened the concern con-
suming countries have about the security of
their oil supply. They have also put into
sharper focus the need for intensified inter-
national cooperation to deal not only with
shortrun concerns but with the longer run
energy requirements of the world. The de-
velopments of the past year may be summa-
rized as follows:
— The worldwide supply situation has be-
come even tighter than it was last fall and
is becoming increasingly focused on the Per-
sian Gulf area. Competition between buyers
has contributed toward continuing rising
prices.
— The structure of international markets
is changing. For example, the Iranian-
consortium agreement as well as the partici-
pation agreements that will ultimately result
in 51 percent control for Saudi Arabia and
other gulf producers has shifted control away
from the international oil companies and to-
ward the producer country governments.
— Price schedules have been further re-
vised as a result of changes in currency pari-
ties, and there has been a substantial increase
in prices paid for oil by buyers to whom
availability of crude is more important than
its price.
President Nixon in his energy message of
April 18 spelled out the policy of the United
States in dealing with the energy crisis. This
' Made at Fordham University, New York, N.Y.,
under the auspices of the Center for the Study of
the Presidency, on June 21 (press release 222).
message concentrated on assessment of our
domestic requirements and resources and
proposed a series of domestic measufes to
meet our needs for clean and reliable energy
sources in the decades ahead. This concentra-
tion on domestic policies was based on the
realization that our primary response to the
energy challenge must lie in the pursuit of
national policies and measures to more fully
and more rapidly develop existing energy re-
sources within the United States and its
off'shore areas as well as new energy technol-
ogies while utilizing energy resources in the
most frugal manner.
At the same time, the President directed a
comprehensive effort to develop cooperation
with other nations in sharing the impact of
energy shortages in the short run and in
working to develop new sources of energy.
He has also reiterated the policy of the
United States to maintain cooperative rela-
tions with oil-exporting countries.
We are interested in the development of
an effective continuing mechanism among the
oil-consuming nations for sharing the loss of
oil in an emergency curtailment of supply.
In the past we have done this on an ad hoc
basis to deal with shortages arising from the
Suez crisis of the late fifties and from the
Israeli-Arab war in 1967. The subject of oil
sharing in times of critical shortage, along
with collateral questions of storage and ra-
tioning, has been and continues to be under
intensive study in Washington.
We favor participation by all parties in
some sort of emergency sharing scheme
based on oil imports carried over interna-
tional waters.
July 9, 1973
59
The issues involved in the matter of sup-
ply sharing are complex and difficult. The
essence of a sharing arrangement is that it
be equitable. Among the criteria which will
need to be considered in this connection are
the measures countries are taking to help
themselves through stockpiling or production
and the burdens that these measui-es involve.
Then there is the question of the extent to
which rationing or demand curtailment
should be a part of the schemes. Countries
participating in an import-sharing arrange-
ment should probably also have petroleum
stocks and standby rationing arrangements
available to support their participation. Each
of these are mutually supportive means of
reducing the nation's vulnerability to supply
interruption. Studies are investigating ways
in which these three schemes could be inte-
grated. It will take close study to determine
how stockpiling and rationing steps can best
be reflected in the commitment to absorb the
burden of curtailed supplies so as to provide
incentives to stockpile and so as to induce or
compensate for rationing.
Collaboration in Research and Development
A second area for international collabora-
tion is in research and development [R. &
D.]. We must increasingly direct our com-
bined efforts toward longer term measures to
develop energy-conserving technologies and
to increase energy supplies and to diversify
their resources.
International cooperation in research and
development projects can best be handled
through specific arrangements between two
or more countries which are directly sponsor-
ing specific research programs and have spe-
cific technological assets to contribute to
those programs. There is today a reasonable
amount of international cooperation in en-
ergy technologies on which we can build a
more comprehensive program. For example,
the United States has had longstanding co-
operative programs with a number of coun-
tries in the nuclear reactor field. We have
bilateral research projects with other coun-
tries in coal technology, in geothermal en-
ergy, in magnetohydrodynamics, thermal and
hydro power stations, power transmission
technology, and solar and geothermal energy.
Our common task now is to enlarge and
expand the scope and scale of international
R. & D. cooperation. International coopera-
tion in the development of new energy
technologies holds great promise. There is
significant competence in many of these tech-
nologies in other countries.
Research and development will be the basis
for the long-term solutions to our mutual
energy problems. Cooperative bilateral and
multilateral R. & D. projects between nations
can avoid duplication, reduce costs, and help
hasten the day when solutions will be
attained.
We should pay particular attention to in-
ternational cooperation at an industrial level.
Experience has shown that as technologies
approach a commercial stage, cooperation at
a government-to-government level becomes
more difficult. Cooperation at the industrial
level is therefore especially pertinent to those
technologies that might provide nearer term
solutions to energy needs.
Cooperative efforts, whether between in-
dustry and government or between com-
panies or between governments, will for the
most part be developed ad hoc depending on
the priorities, the technologies, the budgets,
the scientific assessments, and the objectives
of the particular parties. The OECD [Or-
ganization for Economic Cooperation and
Development], however, can contribute sig-
nificantly to stimulating and guiding this
process.
We know that many countries are per-
forming significant research and develop-
ment work on their own in the energy field.
The OECD, representing 24 of the more ad-
vanced nations, can play a valuable role in
collecting, cataloging, and disseminating in-
formation on what research work is being
done. This could be a useful first step toward
meaningful cooperation in the R. & D. field.
A major gap exists in our own knowledge of
each country's efforts in energy research. An
up-to-date inventory and exchange of infor-
60
Department of State Bulletin
mation on ongoing projects would go far in
assisting us all to set priorities and reduce
expensive duplications of effort and could
lead to mutually beneficial coordination of
our research efforts.
Financial Implications of Energy Problem
The need for international cooperation in
energy goes far beyond collaboration on re-
search and development.
In the more complex and delicate area of
price and supply, measures for international
cooperation must be designed to include pro-
ducing as well as consuming nations. Coop-
eration among consuming nations will also
be necessary, but it cannot seem to be or be-
come confrontation with producer nations.
Let me specify some further areas of co-
operation. One of them relates to the growing
financial resources of oil-producing countries.
This general subject of the financial implica-
tions of the energy problem is one which is
frequently attended by more rhetoric than
clarity of thought. Governments need to un-
derstand better the financial implications of
the energy problem so as to offer constructive
responses. As Secretary [of the Treasury
George P.] Shultz suggested to the interna-
tional monetary conference of the American
Bankers Association meeting in Paris re-
cently, the international banking community
has an unprecedented opportunity to develop
the techniques which will facilitate the in-
vestments of oil-producing states so as to
transform their national oil assets to other
types of earning assets.
There can be important commercial oppor-
tunities in cooperation with the oil-producing
countries in the use of their financial re-
sources, their raw materials, and their cheap
energy to develop industry, markets, and jobs
for their people. We must work with the oil-
producing states to meet these needs in ways
that bring about and sustain the willingness
of these countries to produce the oil the con-
sumers of the world will require through the
next two decades.
The companies that comprise the inter-
national oil industry no longer have complete
control over production to meet the demand
requirements of their customers as they see
them. They now must have the agreement of
their new partners in management — the pro-
ducer governments. Already some producing
governments have set a limit on production,
and others may be finding mounting financial
reserves less and less attractive in assuring
their long-term future.
The more industrialized nations should be
ready to assist producing nations in their
desire to marry their vital oil with the
equally valuable technology, engineering,
management, and markets of other countries
in order to reap lasting benefits for their
peoples during this one brief generation
when they are in a highly favorable market
position. We know their desires for the loca-
tion of high-energy-using export industries
in their countries. We can all help here, not
only in providing the plants but also in mar-
keting the product of those plants. It is criti-
cal, however, that in our efforts we not let
our requirements to sell plant, equipment,
and services cloud the judgments and advice
we offer these developing nations.
All of us should want this process to de-
velop into cooperative endeavors that result
in mutually beneficial multilateral flows of
oil and money adequate to meet the great
needs of a peaceful, prosperous, less waste-
ful, and more conserving world and guaran-
tee the long-term viability of the producer
countries' economies — even after today's
tight oil market has eased.
It seems to us that producer as well as con-
sumer nations also have a clear and vital
stake in cooperating to find additional
sources of hydrocarbons, bring them to mar-
ket in a prudent and orderly manner, mini-
mize waste in their use, and bring on
supplementary sources of energy at a rate
and in a way which will maintain the pi'os-
perity of the oil-rich nations as their wasting
hydrocarbon assets diminish. If together
with the producing nations we focus our at-
tention on these common objectives we will
improve the prospects for constructive coop-
July 9, 1973
61
ei'ation and minimize the risk of confronta-
tion.
Our immediate and urgent need is for more
oil. We should first of all recognize the re-
markable role played by commercial firms
and enterprises of all nationalities in find-
ing, developing, transporting, and marketing
petroleum around the world. We believe it to
be in the interest of both producer and con-
sumer nations to encourage the oil industry
to invest its talents, experience, and capital
in the quest for more oil.
Importance of Maintaining an Open System
We believe that the long-term interests of
both consumer and producer nations will be
served best by an open system in which all
those capable of finding, developing, and mar-
keting oil resources can have an opportunity
to do so. Nationalization without prompt,
adequate, effective compensation by pro-
ducing nations, bilateral deals between pro-
ducing and consuming governments, and
anything else that dries up capital and
freezes out experienced oil organizations will
be counterproductive to all.
We are under no illusions about the ability
of consuming countries to reverse the trend
toward greater government participation in
oil-producing operations. At the same time,
we can avoid policies which would serve only
to accelerate this trend. For example, we be-
lieve that assumption of a negotiating role
by governments would weaken the role of the
companies. By destroying the very useful
bufi'er role played by the companies, govern-
ments would also increase the risk of gov-
ernment-to-government confrontation with
oil producers. We believe as well that gov-
ernments should discourage the purchase of
oil from nationalized properties which have
not been adequately compensated.
How do we deal with the problem of de-
structive competition? Competition per se is
not bad, and we obviously do not wish to pur-
sue a policy of eliminating competition. How-
ever, we all need to exercise great care to
avoid steps which merely bid up prices with-
out expanding supply, as would result from
a scramble for exclusive supply or investment
arrangements.
The United States has refrained from en-
tering into special bilateral agreements for
special supply or market access arrange-
ments with oil-producing .states. We have felt
that to do this could have stimulated other
nations to seek similar arrangements and
destabilized the contractual business struc-
tures between producer governments, inter-
national oil companies, and all the elements
which make up the distribution channels
through which crude oil is brought out of the
ground to bunkers and gas stations. We be-
lieve it is not in the individual and collective
interest of consuming governments to seek
exclusive bilateral oil supply arrangements
with oil producer governments. The policies
of each government in this regard will de-
pend in large measure on the postures of
other consuming governments.
This leads to my conclusion on the broad
issue of cooperation among consumer coun-
tries on oil supplies, purchases, and prices on
which there has been so much talk lately.
Everything I have said requires that con-
sumer countries intensify consultation among
themselves and with producer nations on
their policies and avoid misunderstandings of
each other's positions which could lead to a
competitive scramble for exclusive arrange-
ments. At the same time we all have a
common concern lest this kind of increased
consultation activity be seen to be leading to
a consumer country confrontation with
producer countries. We should therefore pro-
ceed pragmatically, without fanfare, building
on our present institutions.
The program I am suggesting is not dra-
matic, but I do not believe drama is called
for in this delicate stage in international oil
relations. Instead we need to proceed with
care and deliberation to build a foundation
for international cooperation designed to
meet the world's requirements for energy in
the months as well as decades ahead. We need
to work constructively to build a structure
of international cooperation with producers
and consumers alike.
62
Department of State Bulletin
President Tolbert of Liberia
Visits Washington
President William R. Tolbert, Jr., of the
Republic of Liberia -met tvith President Nixon
and other officials at Washington June i-8
during a pnvate visit to the United States.
Folloiving is an exchange of toasts betiveen
President Nixon and President Tolbert at a
dinner at the White House on June 5.
Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated June 11
PRESIDENT NIXON
Mr. President, Mrs. Tolbert, and all of our
distinguished guests: Secretary Rogers and
I were just remarking about the fact that two
weeks from tonight in this room and at this
place, we will be welcoming Mr. Brezhnev, the
leader of a great and powerful nation. And
tonight, just two weeks before that visit, we
welcome another very distinguished guest,
President Tolbert.
When we met today, he said that he rep-
resented a very small country, but I think
what this visit signifies to all of us is that
at a time when the United States, we think
quite properly, in the interest of peace for our
children and all the generations to come, is
developing a new relationship with the Peo-
ple's Republic of China and a new relation-
ship with the Soviet Union, that we not forget
our old friends.
Our first visitor in this room in the year
1973 was Prime Minister Heath, and as all of
us know, it has been said for many, many
years that we have a special relationship
with Britain. I should point out tonight that
we have, and that I particularly have, a very
special relationship with Liberia and with
our distinguished guest.
This is true not only because for 150 years
we have enjoyed the closest relations, but it
is true also for very personal reasons. Presi-
dent Tolbert and I served together as Vice
Presidents, and when people serve as Vice
Presidents, they learn a great deal.
Little did we dream that one day we would
serve together as Presidents. Of course, all
Vice Presidents dream of being President,
but few make it. And I suppose this is one
of those rare cases in history when two men
who have served as Vice President meet to-
gether as President. And so that makes our
relationship very special.
It is very special for another reason. We
share the same view of the world, not only
of the necessity to develop a new and peaceful
relation between the great powers, the United
States and the Soviet Union, the United
States and Europe, the United States and
Peking and Japan, but also the necessity to
think of the world as it will be 25 years £rom
now, 50 years from now. We think of the
new nations of Africa, and we think of the
older nations. And we think of our friend.
President Tolbert, and the leadership that
he is giving to all of those new nations trying
to develop a way to bring progress to their
people, bring it with freedom and at the same
time maintaining their independence.
I could simply say in presenting him to you
tonight that it would be enough to mention
him alone, but I must not forget his wife.
When I was in Liberia — and my wife, who
has been there since, last year on a good-will
trip — but when we were there together in
1957, I remember going, Mr. President, out
into the countryside. You were Vice Presi-
dent at that time, and we met a paramount
chief and he was a very old man, and he
was veiy kind to me and proceeded to desig-
nate me as a paramount chief. And he told
me that one of the rights of a paramount
chief was to have as many wives as he liked.
I have only one wife, President Tolbert has
only one, and she is a lovely lady, and we are
glad to have her here.
So as we drink our toast tonight, let us
think of the relations between Liberia and
America that go back so many years. Let us
think of the broader concept of the relations
between the United States and all the new
states of Africa that have had their inde-
pendence over the past 10 to 15 years, and
let us think finally of our very good friend.
President Tolbert, one who has been a friend
of this country from the time he has been in
public life, and one who is now a leader of
July 9, 1973
63
Africa, and being a leader of Africa, one who
speaks for the best that is in Africa and
also the best for us, too. To President Tol-
bert: Mr. President.
PRESIDENT TOLBERT
President Nixon, Mrs. Nixon, distin-
guished ladies and gentlemen: In a world
of demanding challenges, there is responsi-
bility enough for everyone, and all must wel-
come the opportunity to change for the better
the tenor of human life. In line with this
vision, therefore, men in open relief are
moving away from years of protracted con-
frontation into an era of reconciliation and
responsibility.
We seem now, after so long, actually to
be building that better world, and there is no
greater builder than you, Mr. President. That
is why it is so fulfilling to come here to the
White House to break bread and sip wine to-
gether, even though I sip water, with men
and women who in fact must share a deep
sense of dedication to the welfare of this
planet.
It is also fulfilling to be here because we
know that we are in the company of good,
old friends. Our trip has been a long one,
starting on the west coast of Africa, speed-
ing on that chartered aircraft, really speed-
ing. We first attended in Ethiopia the 10th
anniversary celebration of the Organization
of African Unity. Then a few days ago we
arrived on the west coast of America, having
been invited to speak to the graduating class
of California State University at San
Francisco.
Our government has had a 10-year con-
tract with that institution under which we
have been building together a consolidated
school system for our capital city, Monrovia.
From the west coast of the United States,
another jet craft symbolizing the Spirit
of '76 brought us to this place and this time.
And tonight we are gathered here in this
most significant, historic setting to savor a
few moments of quiet intimacy with friends
we have known and highly esteemed for a
long time.
Richard Nixon and I first met when he
served President Eisenhower as a faithful
Vice President, and in that capacity he
visited Liberia. Again, it was my pleasure
to enjoy his company when he paid a private
visit to our country. Even as a private citi-
zen, his interest and affection for Africa con-
tinued to be positively demonstrated.
Over the interim years our contacts have
remained most cordial and fruitful, and no
moment in this long relationship was more
pleasant than when we had the singular
honor of receiving Mrs. Nixon, the charming
wife of our dear friend, at my inauguration
in Monrovia in January of 1972, on which
occasion she indeed represented you, Mr.
President, with warmth and distinction. Her
visit to Liberia and to the Republics of the
Ivory Coast and Ghana, so widely heralded
in various news reports, will long be cher-
ished in the hearts of African people.
So Mrs. Tolbert and I are extremely de-
lighted to be here, and we highly appreciate
and are grateful to our friends, President
and Mrs. Nixon, for this splendid oppor-
tunity.
At one single setting we can recognize that
the record of long private friendship with
historic Americans is inclusive of a longer
national relationship between our two coun-
tries, and we can declare with sincerity that
our exhilaration in the company of old
friends is matched in intensity only by our
steadfast quest for new aspirations and new
destinies.
At the celebration of its bicentennial in
1976, the United States of America will be
only 71 years older than the Republic of
Liberia, her traditional ally in Africa.
Throughout the years, the relationship be-
tween our two countries has been repeatedly
described as unique, as special. We befittingly
acknowledge the special quality of that re-
lationship.
After all, the whole concept of the found-
ing of Liberia as an asylum for black men
was born in the minds of Americans, and
where else do you have a capital city of one
country named after a President of another?
But what I ask now : What will be the na-
64
Department of State Bulletin
ture of our special relationship in the future,
and very special relationship at that? Will it
mean more than strategic expediency? Will
it mean more than unwavering support at
every international forum, or will the friend-
ship between the United States and Liberia
come to rest, in fact, upon a solid fulcrum of
purpose, of progress, and of continuity as
we face the future?
President Nixon has stated, and we are
heartened by his statement, that in the years
ahead the United States will not only main-
tain old friendships, but will also reach out
for new relationships. We are particularly
heartened by that, because as old and trusted
friends, we hope the United States and
Liberia will indeed continue in very special
ways to reach out for each other.
In Liberia, however, we are determined
today to take the first steps in a new direc-
tion : to help ourselves, to lift ourselves. And
speed is truly the symbol of the new Liberia.
For while in other developing countries, men
would speak of the revolution, in the Republic
of Liberia our people are seeking a speedy
evolution.
Today, Liberians are impatient to proceed
with the work of development and progress.
They are impatient with illiteracy, with pov-
erty, with hunger, with disease, with the ir-
ritating old problems of social imbalance.
Liberians can no longer tolerate the living
conditions of people, young and old, who
must sleep on mats laid on floors of clay. They
find it intolerable that their children must
walk for miles in the rain to inadequate rural
schools. They find it even agonizing that a
majority of the children cannot go into school
at all. They are truly frustrated by the eflfects
of economic strangulation.
But there is a compelling question which
arises here. That question is. How? How do
we fulfill the urgent aspirations of our peo-
ple? How will we order our national priori-
ties? Just how will we obtain the necessary
facilities for accelerated development so
urgently needed?
There is a twofold answer, Mr. President.
Realistically, we must, with appropriate ap-
preciation, encourage and effectively utilize
any development cooperation and assistance
that is available to us. Then, with greater
faith in the supreme source, we must self-
reliantly come to depend more and more upon
ourselves.
We believe the time has truly come to
create new structures and to activate the
latent resources of our institutions and peo-
ples so that we may eventually transform
their lives.
Recently in Liberia, we launched a new
effort, the National Fund-Raising Rally. We
called upon our people to consider together
the urgent goals of their own development.
We called upon them to rekindle the pioneer-
ing spirit of self-reliance. We called upon
our people to reawaken within themselves a
new national consciousness. And they have
responded, Mr. President.
On a sunny day a few weeks ago, after
nine months of voluntary contributions, yield-
ing about $4.5 million, the people of Liberia
undertook simultaneous groundbreaking cere-
monies across the country for the construc-
tion of farm-to-market roads, for schools,
for hospitals, and for clinics.
It was much more than a symbolic ven-
ture. These people have truly inspired them-
selves with this unprecedented effort to create
a more decent and respectable way of life,
thus enhancing their human dignity.
But in the largest sense, we understand,
too, that our praise and our resolve are the
heart of this whole matter. We have seized
the faith to uphold the free heritage of a
small but proud nation. We have assumed
the responsibility to preserve that heritage
not only for Liberia but also for citizens of
the world, for the fate of mankind is our
challenge.
When Richard and Pat Nixon visit Liberia
again — and we hope they soon do — they will
find an energized Republic on the move. They
will meet a nation not looking only beyond
the horizon for ideas and resources, but work-
ing primarily herself with imagination, with
zest, and with zeal, with creativity and pro-
ductivity, to uplift the standard of human
life.
Richard and Pat Nixon will meet a Repub-
lic caught up in the spirit of pride, of real
July 9, 1973
65
independence, and of self-reliance, a mani-
festation of the unique American spirit,
somehow securely embedded in the African
dream.
Men of all times have dreamed dreams,
some simple, some fantastic, some utterly un-
imaginable.
As I propose a toast to the President of
these great United States, I wonder if my
grandfather, D. Frank Tolbert — freed over
a century ago by the signature of a man who
occupied the seat that Richard Nixon, the
noble architect of peace, now occupies — I
wonder if D. Frank Tolbert could have
dreamed that his grandson would ever have
had the honor of being toasted in this place
by so great a personality, as you, Mr.
President?
Thank God it happened to me, the repre-
sentative of a grateful people committed to
work together with all men of good will in
structuring a better world for all men to live
together in peace, with justice, happiness,
and with human dignity. Ladies and gentle-
men : The President of the United States.
U.S. Responds to U.N. Appeal
for African Drought Relief
Following is the text of a letter dated
June 20 from President Nixon to United
Nations Secretary General Kurt Waldheim.
Press release 223 dated June 21
Dear Mr. Secretary General: I fully
share the concerns which you have expressed
to Ambassador [John A.] Scali for the mil-
lions of persons who are suffering from the
terrible drought in the Sahelian nations of
West and Central Africa. For many months
reports from United States and United Na-
tions representatives and from the govern-
ments themselves have related graphically
the growing effects of the worst drought
of this century in the African Sahel. Those
of us who have been spared this scourge
have been responding to the crisis, but more
must be done, as you have said. The United
States stands prepared to commit further
resources as needs are identified.
As you know, the United States response
has been carried out on several fronts. We
have increased the amounts of foodgrains
destined for these nations through both
American programs and the World Food
Programs. By mid-summer, 156,000 tons of
grain valued at nearly $19 million will have
arrived in West African ports or in the in-
terior states of Mali, Upper Volta, Niger
and Chad. Two million dollars in disaster
relief funds have also been made available.
United States Air Force aircraft, and those
of other donors, are airlifting grain to
stricken nomads and farmers in remote
districts of Mali and Chad. Animal feed and
vaccines are being distril)uted to save as
much livestock as possible. Medicines are
being provided to combat malnutrition and
potential epidemics. In response to a request
from Director General [of the FAO Addeke
H.] Boerma, the Agency for International
Development has provided a logistical plan-
ning expert to the Food and Agriculture
Organization of the United Nations and our
staffs in West Africa are being augmented
to improve our ability to deliver what is
needed to the right place at the right time.
We share your concern that the problems
of dealing with the immediate emergency
will become even more difficult as the rains
begin and road transport problems increase.
We therefore stand ready to provide further
support for internal transport, as specified
needs are identified.
As you have recognized, this region is
faced not only with the immediate needs of
feeding the hungry but also of rehabilitating
water and forage resources, livestock herds
and grain producing facilities to permit a
long range recovery from the devastating
effects of the drought. This effort will require
close collaboration among African leaders
and the donor community. As specific re-
habilitation needs are more clearly identified,
and as it becomes clearer what others are
ready to do, the United States will be pre-
pared to provide additional assistance for
66
Department of State Bulletin
the Sahel to help overcome the profound
effects of this tragedy.
In order to coordinate more effectively
our emergency relief efforts and to plan our
part in a rehabilitation program, I intend
to designate Mr. Maurice J. Williams as a
Special United States Coordinator. He will
cooperate closely in his work with Director
General Boerma and with other governments
— so that the work of relief and rehabili-
tation can go forward as expeditiously as
possible.
Letters of Credence
India
The newly appointed Ambassador of the
Republic of India, Triloki Nath Kaul, pre-
sented his credentials to President Nixon
on June 14. For texts of the Ambassador's
remarks and the President's reply, see De-
partment of State press release dated
June 14.
Jordan
The newly appointed Ambassador of the
Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, Abdullah
Salah, presented his credentials to President
Nixon on June 14. For texts of the Ambas-
sador's remai'ks and the President's reply,
see Department of State press release dated
June 14.
Khmer Republic (Cambodia)
The newly appointed Ambassador of the
Khmer Republic, Um Sim, presented his cre-
dentials to President Nixon on June 14. For
texts of the Ambassador's remarks and the
President's reply, see Department of State
press release dated June 14.
Malawi
The newly appointed Ambassador of the
Republic of Malawi, Robert Bernard Mbaya,
presented his credentials to President Nixon
on June 14. For texts of the Ambassador's
remarks and the President's reply, see De-
partment of State press release dated
June 14.
Nepal
The newly appointed Ambassador of*the
Kingdom of Nepal, Yadu Nath Khanal, pre-
sented his credentials to President Nixon on
June 14. For texts of the Ambassador's re-
marks and the President's reply, see Depart-
ment of State press release dated June 14.
Oman
The newly appointed Ambassador of the
Sultanate of Oman, Faisal Bin Ali al-Bu-
Sa'id, presented his credentials to President
Nixon on June 14. For texts of the Ambas-
sador's remarks and the President's reply,
see Department of State press release dated
June 14.
Yemen Arab Republic
The newly appointed Ambassador of the
Yemen Arab Republic, Yahya H. Geghman,
presented his credentials to President Nixon
on June 14. For texts of the Ambassador's
remarks and the President's reply, see De-
partment of State press release dated June
14.
July 9, 1973
67
For a Peaceful and Progressive Latin America
Address by Jack B. Kubisch
Assistant Secretary for Inter- American Affairs '
Last week I returned from participating
in tiie most extensive trip to Latin America
by a Secretary of State in almost 40 years.
Also last week, I took my oath of office as
Assistant Secretary after my own absence
from the hemisphere of nearly two years.
Today I would like to make some observa-
tions about our just-completed trip and then
to discuss our relations with Latin America,
including the main elements if our overall
policy for the period just ahead.
As for the trip, I can tell you that every-
where we went we were well received. Be-
fore departing Washington we had been
hopeful that we would be able to hold quiet
and serious discussions in each capital. Our
hopes turned out to be fully reciprocated by
our hosts.
All in all, we visited eight countries in the
area, meeting with Presidents, Foreign Min-
isters, and other high government officials.
In addition, the Secretary and I also had the
opportunity to meet during the inaugural
period in Buenos Aires with top officials of
many of the countries we were unable to in-
clude on our itinerary. I can tell you that all
these meetings were characterized by realism
and frankness, were uniformly constructive,
and that no subject was excluded from dis-
cussion.
We found the vigorous nationalism in Latin
America also to be for the most part construc-
tive and a force with which we can work.
Each of the nations we visited is proud of its
own distinctiveness. And each nation is de-
termined to control its own destiny. It neither
' Made before the Council of the Americas at Wash-
ington on June 6 (press release 196).
can nor should be any other way. But that
pride and that determination also seem to be
accompanied by an awareness that solutions
to many of the challenges confronting the
Americas must be found in international co-
operation.
We also found that the pursuit of economic
and social development continues to be of
highest priority and the task of bringing a
better life to all the peoples of this hemi-
sphere remains immense, but progress is
evident almost everywhere. Success in devel-
opment of course must come principally from
the efforts of each nation, a fact well under-
stood by them. It is also clear that the United
States must continue to assist generously and
understandingly in Latin American develop-
ment efforts.
Almost everywhere we found a willingness
to seek mutual accommodation and negotiated
solutions to those issues that exist between
some of the Latin American nations and the
United States. There is no doubt that the trip
increased mutual understanding between us.
We were able to put to rest many differences
based on mere misunderstandings or miscon-
ceptions. More deeply rooted issues became
the subject of important discussions. We
went with an attitude of good will and a
desire to make real progress on points of
difference. We found that our Latin Amer-
ican counterparts felt the same way.
Now let me turn briefly to the state of our
overall relations with the hemisphere, the re-
cent past, and the main lines of our policy
for the period ahead.
This requires some generalizing, with all
the dangers of generalization, particularly
68
Department of State Bulletin
with respect to a region as diverse as Latin
America — notwithstanding the deeply en-
trenched and regrettable myth in the United
States that Latin America is one homo-
geneous mass. I intend on future occasions to
speak in greater detail on specific issues and,
if time allows, will be glad today to try and
answer any questions you may have.
My absence from the area for the past
two years has given me the opportunity to
look at Latin America, an area of the world
with which I have been associated for more
than 25 years, with fresh eyes and to see
U.S.-Latin American relations in their broad
sweep over recent decades, rather than in
their most recent details.
One of the strong impressions that I have
is that there have been and are still certain
enduring themes underlying U.S. policy to-
ward Latin America. These constants are
often lost sight of in the day-to-day ebb and
flow of our relationships.
First of all, there remains a general recog-
nition that the forces of geography, economy,
and heritage have combined to produce de
facto a special relationship between the
United States and the countries of Latin
America. Second, the United States continues
to feel — quite correctly, in my view — that its
own national interests are deeply involved
in the political independence and the eco-
nomic and social progress of the other coun-
tries of the hemisphere.
The United States has acted upon its sense
of a special interest in Latin America and
the Caribbean with a variety of styles and
methods ranging from the high degree of
U.S. leadership and direction typical of much
of the 1960's to the so-called lower profile
and more unobtrusive posture that has been
attempted thus far in the 1970's.
I would like to emphasize, however, that
it would be a gross error to conclude that the
United States does not have a clear and firmly
based Latin American policy simply because
there is no special title or slogan which can
be applied to all of our relations and pro-
grams with Latin America. In fact, in the
light of the recent past and the more sophis-
ticated, critical, and varied environment in
which we now find ourselves in Latin Amer-
ica, I question the desirability of such a
single title or slogan.
Early in 1969 President Nixon determined
that our policies toward Latin America had
not responded sufficiently to the rapid
changes taking place in that area. The very
processes of economic development were ex-
erting destabilizing effects on political and
social institutions. There was general dis-
satisfaction in Latin America with the rate
of economic and social progi'ess. Nationalism
intensified and was often directed at the
United States as the dominant power in the
hemisphere. Regardless of how well moti-
vated the United States might have been,
many in Latin America perceived the need
for more self-assertion and less dependency
on the United States.
In response, the President made a basic
decision to work toward a more realistic and
mature relationship with the countries of
Latin America. We consciously sought to
lower our voices and reduce our prominence,
while maintaining support for their develop-
ment. We tried to curb our didactic and tu-
torial tendencies. Official U.S. presence, in-
cluding military presence, was reduced. We
encouraged interested Latin Americans to
come forward with their own proposals for
self-help and reform which we could support.
We urged Latin America as a whole to
broaden its relations with the rest of the
world, especially Europe and Japan. We
sought a larger role for the inter- American
system, particularly in the economic area.
We worked with the Latin American gov-
ernments to formulate a generalized prefer-
ences proposal. We shifted the greater part
of our development assistance to multilateral
agencies, and we sought to strengthen those
institutions.
These were sound plans based on good in-
tentions. While we were not able to imple-
ment all of these plans as fully as we had
hoped, neither was the Latin American re-
sponse to our policy shift always as full or as
positive as we expected. The reduction in
U.S. presence was sometimes interpreted as
proof of indifference. Nevertheless, to a con-
July 9, 1973
69
siderable extent our effoi-ts have borne fruit.
Our role has indeed become much less pa-
tronizing and paternalistic. U.S. imports
from Latin America have increased in the
aggregate. Latin America's relations with
friendly extra-hemispheric powers have ex-
panded rapidly.
U.S. economic assistance has also con-
tinued to play an important role in the eco-
nomic and social development of the area.
Although our bilateral-type assistance has
been declining, this has been more than com-
pensated for by increased lendiilg through
the international financial institutions.
Now where do we go from here ?
The Secretary of State's recent trip to
Latin America has set the stage, I believe,
for a vigorous new effort to overcome our
shortfalls. The effort wi'l have to come from
both sides. For the United States, the policy
we intend to follow for the period just ahead
was set forth in Secretary Rogers' May 18
speech at the Casa Bolivar, in Bogota.^ I
commend the text to your careful attention.
The Secretary pointed out that with the
world more secure than it was four years ago
we intend to increase our attention to our
closest associates: Latin America, western
Europe, and Japan. As Deputy Secretary of
State Rush said last week, if 1973 is the year
of Europe, it is also the beginning of the four
years of Latin America.
Citing President Nixon's definition of U.S.
policy toward the Americas as "a modem
policy of mature partnership," the Secretary
set forth in his speech in Bogota the follow-
ing basic seven elements of that policy :
— First, he said, our policy is based on
respect for the sovereignty and independence
of each nation in Latin America. In our bi-
lateral relations the reality is that there are
23 nations, each with its own policies, each
different from the other, and each expecting
the United States to deal with it separately.
We respect that diversity. At the same time
we also recognize the need and mutual ad-
vantage in dealing with many matters of
' For text, see Bulletin of June 25, 1973, p. 912.
70
regional interest on a fully multilateral basis
in the hemisphere.
— Second, it is our policy to make our re-
lations with each Latin American state as
equal as friends can make them.
— Third, our policy is to encourage re-
gional cooperation. We favor such coopera-
tion both in those instances in which we are
involved, such as the OAS, and in those in
which we are not, such as the subregional
groupings.
—Fourth, our policy is to resolve differ-
ences among us with mutual good will. The
United States intends, of course, to uphold
its interests, and we expect the other nations
of the area to do likewise. But we do not
seek to impose our views on others. We know
of no dispute in the hemisphere which can-
not be resolved through negotiation and good
will.
— Fifth, the United States intends to con-
tinue to give substantial support to Latin
American efforts to assure a decent life for
all the people of this hemisphere.
— Sixth, it is our policy to strengthen the
inter-American system and the Organization
of American States. We are prepared to ex-
amine with our Latin American friends how
the OAS can be restructured and improved,,
and we are likewise prepared to excludei
nothing from these deliberations.
— Seventh, our policy is to encourage in-
creased hemispheric leadership in building'
a more peaceful and cooperative world. As
examples, the Secretary suggested that an
outward-looking American community can
make decisive contributions to the world in
monetary matters, the upcoming trade nego-
tiations, the U.N. Law of the Sea Conference,
the fight against international terrorism, the
common endeavor to destroy the interna-
tional drug traffic, to name but a few.
These, then, are the main lines of our
overall jjolicy toward Latin America. They
flow from our global policy and the way
we see the world, and they are reinforcedjj
by our bilateral policies and relationships'
with each of the countries of the hemisphere.
This is not a razzle-dazzle policy, and it
Department of State Bulletir
is not intended to be. The realities of this
hemisphere call for a realistic, realizable, and
down-to-earth policy, and that is what we
are pursuing.
It is also a living policy for a very much
alive and rapidly changing area. For while
we have had — and no doubt will continue to
have — short-term differences and disagree-
ments, I am absolutely convinced that the
true and long-term interests of the countries
of Latin America and the United States
either coincide or run closely in parallel.
Having in mind the topics of other
speakers, I have not discussed today the role
of U.S. business in Latin America. In any
case, I think my views on that subject are
well known, and Secretary Rogers spoke out
on this specific point many times during
the course of our recent trip.
However, in closing, I would like to say
just a woi-d about how I think the U.S.
Government can best help American busi-
nessmen and their operations in Latin
America.
That is, in my view, for us to do all we
can to promote a peaceful, stable, friendly,
dependable, progressive, and prosperous
framework in Latin America within which
U.S. business can operate and make its own
unique and vitally important contribution
to the further development of the region.
I recognize that we have special problems
in some industries and in some countries,
and we will do our part in dealing with these
problems. My door will always be open to
any suggestions or views any of you may
wish to express on these problems or, for
that matter, on any other subject.
Sales, Credits or Guaranties to Peru
Under Foreign Military Sales Act
Presidential Determination No. 73-13 '
Sales, Credits or Guaranties to the Government
OF Peru Under the Foreign Military Sales Act
Memorandum for the Secretary of State*
The White House,
Washington, May H, 1973.
In accordance with the recommendation contained
in your memorandum of April 25, I hereby deter-
mine that the waiver of the provisions of Section
3(b) of the Foreign Military Sales Act, as amended,
with respect to the Government of Peru is impor-
tant to the security of the United States and, there-
fore, the provisions of that Section are hereby waived
insofar as they relate to sales, credits or guaranties
to the Government of Peru.
You are requested on my behalf to report this
determination and waiver to the Speaker of the
House of Representatives and to the Chairman of
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, as required
by law.
This determination shall be published in the
Federal Register.
"■ 38 Fed. Reg. 16019.
July 9, 1973
71
THE CONGRESS
Deparfment Urges Continued Government Support
of Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty
Statement by Deputy Secretary Kenneth Riish '
It is an honor for me to appear before you
in support of S. 1914, the Board for Inter-
national Broadcasting bill. The purpose of
this bill is to authorize continued govern-
ment grants in fiscal years 1974 and 1975 in
support of the broadcasts of Radio Free
Europe (RFE) and Radio Liberty (RL) and
to establish a sound mechanism for adminis-
tering those grants. It is, in our view, the
best way to make sure that these essential
nonofficial radios maintain their professional
independence while continuing to broadcast
in a manner not inconsistent with broad U.S.
foreign policy objectives.
Just a little more than a year ago, there
was a sharp debate over the current role of
Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty in
the present period. A number of views were
expressed at that time, in the Congress and
elsewhere, as to the present role of this type
of broadcasting, the appropriate mechanism
for providing support to the radios, and the
possibility of broadening the base of finan-
cial support. Over a period of several months,
nearly 600 editorials favorable to con-
tinuation of the stations appeared in the
American press while some 30 to 40 were un-
favorable. Scores of distinguished private
specialists in Communist affairs and interna-
tional communications testified to the unique
and valuable purpose served by the stations.
In March 1972, a substantial number of mem-
bers of the Senate, 67 to be exact, cospon-
sored a resolution expressing the sense of the
Senate on this matter. In the resolution, they
expressed their "intention to provide ade-
quate support to these two radios while the
methods for future support to these two
radios are carefully examined within the
framework of the United States foreign pol-
icy objectives." By the end of March 1972,
both Houses of the Congress had voted to
continue government grants to the stations
for FY 1972.
The President understood that support as
a firm decision not to terminate these valu-
able broadcasting services without a careful
examination of their function and relation-
ship to the U.S. Government. In August 1972,
he therefore appointed a Study Commission
on International Radio Broadcasting con-
sisting of five distinguished Americans to
study this matter and report their findings to
him. Dr. Milton Eisenhower, Chairman of
the Commission, and his distinguished col-
leagues, Edward W. Barrett, John A. Gro-
nouski, Edmund A. Gullion, and John P.
Roche, submitted their report "The Right to
Know" earlier this year, and the President
released it May 7 with a strong endorse-
ment.- They are here today to answer any
' Made before the Senate Committee on Foreign
Relations on June 12 (press release 204). The com-
plete transcript of the liearings will be published by
the committee and will be available from the Super-
intendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing
Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.
- For a statement by President Nixon issued on
May 7, see Bulletin of June 18, 1973, p. 875; copies
of the Commission's report are available from the
Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government
Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402 (stock no.
4000-00289; 70 cents postpaid).
72
Department of State Bulletin
questions on their findings. I would like to
take this occasion to thank them for the very
conscientious job they did, including? the care
with which they studied the workings of the
radios in Munich.
The principal findings of the report are
embodied in the bill before this committee in
paragraphs (4) and (5) of section 2. These
state:
(4) That the continuation of Radio Free Europe
and Radio Liberty as independent broadcast media,
operating in a manner not inconsistent with the
broad foreign policy objectives of the United States
and in accordance with high professional standards,
is in the national interests; and
(5) That in order to provide an effective instru-
mentality for the continuation of assistance of Radio
Free Europe and Radio Liberty and to encourage
a constructive dialogue with the peoples of the Union
of Soviet Socialist Republics and Eastern Europe,
it is desirable to establish a Board for International
Broadcasting.
Anyone who believes that these radios are
irrelevant or detrimental to the improved
climate of East-West relations in the past
few years or the prospects for further im-
provement should carefully study this report.
The reasons for the Commission's finding
that the continuation of Radio Liberty and
Radio Free Europe broadcasting is in the na-
tional interest are cogently argued in its re-
port, especially on pp. 26-29, which I would
like to summarize briefly here and introduce
in full into the record at this point, if I may.
Addressing itself to the viewpoint that re-
cent improvements in relations between the
Soviet Union and the United States dictated
termination of the two radios, the Commis-
sion stated:
The Commission is satisfied that the two radio
operations have adjusted progressively to meet the
requirements of changing times, that they do not
operate to keep alive Cold War animosities, and
that they contribute to detente by adding to knowl-
edge and understanding.
The report pointed out that Soviet and
East European leaders and media have made
it clear, even after the thaw in East-
West relations began, that the principles of
coexistence do not "off"er possibilities of i-e-
laxing the ideological struggle." The Presi-
dent, in his June 1972 report to Congress on
his visit to the Soviet Union, called attention
to the fact that "Soviet ideology still pro-
claims hostility to some of America's most
basic values" and that Soviet leaders "will
continue to be totally dedicated competitors
of the United States."
The recent improvement in East-West re-
lations has taken place while the stations
have been operating, the report pointed out,
and the Soviet Union apparently does not
think its own major effort of "ideological
struggle against imperialism" is damaging to
such relations.
The Commission pointed to the efforts of
the two radios to keep their audiences fully
informed on events both in the world outside
and within their own countries, and it consid-
ered that East European leaders have been
obliged increasingly to take popular "pres-
sures" into consideration. The Commission
said it was confident that the radios, by pro-
viding information and interpretation, "will
continue to be of help in future negotiations
and coo])eration between the Soviet Union
and the United States in such areas as stra-
tegic arms limitation, trade, European secu-
rity and environmental protection."
The Commission concluded that it is in the
interests of the United States that the sta-
tions continue until the Soviet Union and
East European countries permit a free flow
of truthful information.
Mr. Chairman, the welcome readiness of
the Soviet leadership to enter into agree-
ments relating to arms control and to seek
a reduction of tension in Europe is not the
result of a change of heart or of ideology.
It is related very directly to the increasing
need recognized by them and by leaders in
eastern Europe to meet the rising demands
of their peoples for a fuller, more satisfying
daily existence, more nearly comparable to
that enjoyed by Europeans in the West. This
is, I strongly believe, a highly positive devel-
opment. We will shortly welcome the Soviet
leader Mr. [Leonid L] Brezhnev to Washing-
ton to pursue the fruitful dialogue the Pres-
ident started with him last year on issues of
arms control, broader exchanges, and trade.
We have good reasons of U.S. national inter-
July 9, 1973
73
est to encourage this trend and to maintain
and broaden the dialogue with the leaders of
eastern Europe as well.
We have, in view of their important role
in this process, equally good reasons for
maintaining a dialogue with the peoples of
the Soviet Union and eastern Europe by
means of radio broadcasting. Until there is a
considerably freer movement of persons from
East to West, a considerably greater range
of human contacts, and a considerably
broader internal dissemination of informa-
tion and opinion to the peoples of these
countries, international radio broadcasting
will remain the principal source of informa-
tion and analyses about the current negotia-
tions in Europe. While they can receive
international news and analyses from official
Western radios (like the Voice of America),
the real meaning of detente to them is its
effect, and this gets into areas difficult to
handle in official broadcasting. These people
want to know the relationship between de-
tente and the improvement of their own con-
ditions of life. They want to know how their
own government's priorities are affected.
They want to know how the opportunities
provided by an era of negotiation are being
used by their leaders. They want to know if
they are to receive only some material bene-
fits from detente and be deprived of most of
the non-material benefits such as freer move-
ment and more varied and complete informa-
tion. These are some of the significant issues
relevant to the aspirations of these peoples
for a meaningful and lasting detente, not one
which can be turned on and oflF for temporary
political advantage. These are the issues to
which Radio Free Europe's experienced
newsmen and analysts have been giving their
greatest attention, the issues on which Radio
Liberty has broadcast, during the past year,
a significant body of analytical material em-
anating from independent thinkers in the
Soviet Union whose product otherwise re-
ceives very little circulation. This is the type
of information which is not and should not
be analyzed in detail by the Voice of Amer-
ica, the official international broadcaster of
the U.S. Government.
Does the broadcasting of information
about and analyses of events inside the Com-
munist world disrupt detente? Certainly the
Soviet leaders and some of the leaders of
eastern Europe would prefer to have a mo-
nopoly of the channels of information to their
people. In all cases except Hungary and
Romania, they continue to jam these broad-
casts. But there is absolutely no evidence
that their continuation has slowed the evolu-
tion of detente. On the contrary, we believe
these important channels of communication
to the peoples of the area have contributed
to this process and that their continuation
will help keep that process from being a
short-term phenomenon. The degree to which
our allies and other non-Communist states in
Europe share our view of the importance of
a freer exchange of ideas and information
and closer human contacts to a meaningful
in-ocess of detente has been amply demon-
strated in the ]>reparatory talks in Helsinki
for the Conference on Security and Coopera-
tion in Europe. At general Western insist-
ence, provision has been made at Helsinki
for these matters to be highlighted in a major
agenda item at the conference and in ways
which should provide an opportunity to ne-
gotiate specific practical improvements.
Mr. Chairman, I anticipate that some
might quite logically ask at this point: Why,
then, do not the Europeans participate in the
financial support of Radio Free Europe and
Radio Liberty, and why is it that the United
States must now establish a Board for Inter-
national Broadcasting to supervise their
financing?
These are legitimate questions. On the
matter of the Board, I believe the Commis-
sion's report speaks persuasively in favor of
it. The Commissioners can, I believe, further
elaborate their rationale. It is convincing to
us precisely because we believe that the Com-
mission correctly identified the objectives
governing the U.S. Government's relation-
ship with the radios, and I would like here to
cite those listed on pp. 37-38 of their report
and enter them in the record:
— The professional independence and hence the
74
Department of State Bulletin
credibility and effectiveness of the stations must be
preserved.
— Organizational arrangements and procedures
must be such as to insure that publicly funded facil-
ities are not used in a manner inconsistent with
United States foreign policy objectives.
— The organizational structure should permit the
use of funds from American and non-American
sources, both public and private, and must provide
for appropriate accountability. All funds should be
openly provided and publicly reported.
— The organizational structure should be shaped
to stimulate maximum efficiency and economy in the
operations of the stations.
— Since the condition of free movement of infor-
mation into and within the Soviet sphere, which
could make the stations unnecessary, is not likely
to be achieved soon, the organizational structure
should be sufficiently strong and flexible to serve for
at least a decade, if necessary.
The report makes clear why a small Board
for International Broadcasting is the best
way to meet these objectives.
There was substantial sentiment expressed
in this committee a year ago in favor of
European financial support for RFE and RL.
The Department concluded at that time, how-
ever, that formal approaches to European
governments by the United States should
await thorough consideration of the matter
by the Presidential Study Commission.
Mr. Chairman, I am pleased to inform you
that, with the President's endorsement of
the Commission's recommendations, we have
moved to encourage strongly the participa-
tion of European governments in the financ-
ing of Radio Liberty and Radio Free Europe
research. Furthermore, the annual corporate
fundraising drive of the Radio Free Europe
Fund is underway, and we expect this will be
supplemented this year by efforts of Radio
Liberty.
With respect to European support from
private sources, a group of leading private
citizens established last year the West Euro-
pean Advisory Committee on the Free Flow
of Infoi-mation and is now in the process of
exploring the possibilities and methods of
seeking private contributions in Europe.
We do not know at this point whether gov-
ernments which decide to support the ra-
dios' research will wish to do so directly
in exchange for research produced, through
the European nongovernmental fundraising
body, through the Board for International
Broadcasting, or through other bilateral or
multilateral instrumentalities of their own
choosing. But the Board, as proposed in sec-
tion 7 of the bill before you, will have among
its competences the right to receive contri-
butions and to use them for the purposes of
the bill. I believe that a small Board of dis-
tinguished citizens with few administrative
expenses and functions limited to those out-
lined in section 4 of the bill would be, in the
eyes of many nongovernmental or foreign
contributors, a preferable recipient of^contri-
butions to a large U.S. Government depart-
ment which has a wide range of functions
and responsibilities.
Mr. Chairman, I cannot at this point pre-
dict what success we will have in raising
funds from the above-described sources for
the two radios, especially since the action
taken by Congress will have a significant
bearing on these efforts. Given the best of
circumstances, I do not expect that we can,
in the coming year, reach a high level of Eu-
ropean participation. The Commission, for
reasons outlined in its report, recommended
that the effort with foreign governments fo-
cus on the radios' excellent research product,
which many of them have used for years at
little or no cost. Should we succeed during
the coming year in raising sufficient funds
in this way to finance research fully, we
would be able to reduce cost to the U.S. Gov-
ernment of the radios in FY 1975. We would
hope to raise additional funds from non-
governmental sources here and abroad which
could be used to reduce demands for U.S.
Government expenditure on the radios. We
are prepared, if it appears appropriate, to
consider the use of contributed nongovern-
mental funds for operating costs or for trans-
mitter improvement as well as for research,
depending on the wishes of the donor and the
needs. We hope to lessen in every way we
can, including the proposed Board's function
of searching for economies, the burden on
the U.S. taxpayer. But we share the basic
judgment in the report that we must realis-
tically see these radios as an activity which
will continue to be largely U.S. financed. In
July 9, 1973
75
looking to the principle of burden sharing
for a reduction of U.S. costs, we must ob-
viously place our emphasis in our approaches
to Europe on the much more significant area
of defense costs.
I do not wish to avoid the fact that, as in
the case of European defense costs, devalua-
tion has made these radio operations more
expensive for us. This is clear already in
this fiscal year, during which the February
realignment of currencies has obliged us to
seek the authorization request now before
you for a $1.8 million supplemental appro-
priation for RFE and RL for the present
year. The $50.3 million funding request for
FY 74 contains $31.6 million for RFE, $18.3
million for RL, and $275,000 for the Board
for International Broadcasting proposed in
the legislation. The radio figures do not pro-
vide for any increase in present goods, per-
sonnel, or new equipment (other than
replacement equipment) but will maintain
the same level of programing as FY 73. The
increase over the radios' FY 73 costs — $9.6
million — is needed for the following reasons :
1. We need to meet increased costs esti-
mated at $3.5 million caused by the dollar
devaluation. The radios spend over 80 per-
cent of their budgets in foreign currencies.
2. We must reinstate or partially restore
payments to pension plans of $2.4 million
which went unfunded in the prior two years
due to insufllicient funds.
3. We need to cover normal wage and
price increases which will total $3.2 million
given the rising salary scales both here and
in Germany attributable to the impact of
inflation.
4. Expenditures to maintain equipment
and facilities will require an added $500,000.
The radios, a significant factor adding to
the pressures which moved the U.S.S.R. to-
ward a policy of reduced tensions in Europe,
can be maintained for less than the price
of four F-14's.
I think that there is no question that this
is a price worth paying. While we should
definitely seek a European participation in
the manner outlined by the Presidential
Commission, we should be clear in our own
minds that we are supporting an activity
definitely in our own interest. We are sup-
porting an activity whose cost, in the burden-
sharing context, is not comparable to the
much more significant defense cost sharing
we are seeking. We are supporting an activ-
ity which, not just in our view but also in
the view of authoritative spokesmen for the
Communist side, is not in conflict with an
era of negotiation. Tamas Palos, Deputy
Head of the Agitation and Propaganda De-
partment of the Central Committee of the
Hungarian Communist Party, quite explicitly
stated the Communist case in a Budapest
radio symposium last November 21 :
If we want the support of the masses, if we want
them to be convinced of our truth, then we must tell
them this truth. Thus, mobilization — within the
country but also on an international scale — requires
an intensified ideologrical struggle. . . . The intensi-
fication of the ideological struggle is a normal de-
velopment under conditions of peaceful coexistence.
Because, what is peaceful coexistence? Countless
relations, and these countless relations have an ideo-
logical basis. . . . Thus, the ideological struggle goes
hand in hand with peaceful coexistence. Therefore,
it is in our interest that this ideological struggle be
expanded.
I do not quote Mr. Palos to argue for the
expansion of Radio Free Europe and Radio
Liberty broadcasting. I quote him to demon-
strate that we are talking about a type of
activity which our Communist negotiating
partners could hardly disclaim as incompati-
ble with the present period. The unrestricted
sale of Soviet newspapers and magazines in
the West continues. The distribution of So-
viet assessments in the Daily Worker in the
United States goes on. The support rendered
by the Soviet Union to Communist parties
abroad in the name of "proletarian interna-
tionalism" has not stopped. Moscow Radio's
substantial broadcasting continues to be sup-
plemented by the so-called "unofficial" Soviet
station "Peace and Progress." The weekly
250 hours continues to be beamed to North
America by eastern European and Soviet
radios in English and in languages familiar
to ethnic groups here. Moscow domestic me-
dia continue to give a picture of America,
according to the New York Times corre-
spondent in Moscow on June 1, which por-
76
Department of State Bulletin
trays it as — and I quote — "A land of racism,
social injustice, unemployment, crime, vio-
lence, and youth unrest."
The myriad channels of communication in
the United States and in the West open to
the Soviets and their allies are full of evi-
dence that they do not consider the flow of
information from East to West to be in con-
tradiction with their concept of peaceful co-
existence or of detente. Therefore we need
not be self-conscious or anxious about the
continuation of radio broadcasting by Radio
Free Europe and Radio Liberty to the peo-
ples of eastern Europe and the Soviet Union.
We need only consider whether it continues
to be in our interest. Our own most experi-
enced academicians, diplomats, and journal-
ists reach the conclusion that it is not the
time to reduce the free flow of information
from West to East. A report by the Atlantic
Council's Advisory Committee on CSCE and
MBFR [Conference on Security and Cooper-
ation in Europe; mutual and balanced force
reductions] issued last November stated, in
the section on Freedom of Communication,
that:
A weighty argument for retaining the stations,
in our opinion, would be that East-West relations
have improved significantly over the past ten years
while these stations were operating and caused a
demonstrable measure of political liberalization in
the Soviet Bloc countries in which their broadcasts
have a wide audience. It should be kept in mind that
the East European party rulers formulate their
policies under popular pressures, even while they
seek to maintain their control by means of coercion.
To abolish these radio stations now in the interest
of improving the political environment would be to
deprive the peoples of Eastern Europe of the truth
and of their communication with the West, but more
importantly, it would return to the communist re-
gimes the monopoly of communication In their coun-
tries. It is very likely that this would result in a
regression of communist domestic policies toward
"totalitarianism." In this context, any improvement
which the abandonment of these Western broadcast-
ing stations might bring to East-West relations
would probably prove shallow in the long run. Euro-
pean security cannot be served by the re-isolation
of Eastern Europe.
The Washington Post summed it up
soundly and succinctly when it said: "De-
tente, if it means anything, means widening
the West's contacts with the East, not help-
ing the East seal off its people from the
West. It means the exchange of people, goods,
words and ideas. This is the essential busi-
ness of RFE and RL."
Drought Relief and Rehabilitation
for West and Central Africa
Statement by David D. Newsom
Assistant Secretary for African Affairs '
I am most grateful for the opportunity to
discuss the disastrous effects of the worst
drought in this centuiy in several west and
central African states, a geographic zone
called the Sahel. The disaster has not had
the dramatically sudden impact of an earth-
quake, a tidal wave, or a flood but it is none-
theless a true disaster; famine and misery
face millions of persons. Because the effects
of the drought have been creeping, world
attention has not focused on it until recently.
The countries thus far most seriously
affected are Mauritania, Senegal, Mali,
Upper Volta, Niger, and Chad. Neighboring
states have been hurt as well but to a lesser
extent. We enjoy excellent relations with all
of these governments. Over a period of years,
we have worked with them on the problems
of their economic development. Trust and
confidence mark these efforts.
Several years of unusual dryness capped
by a severe drought this past year have
brought large expanses in this region to the
edge of disaster.
On November 2, 1972, we drew the atten-
tion of high-level authorities of our own gov-
ernment to the seriousness of the problem
which was developing, and later that month
interagency efforts began to deal with the
problem. Our response, which my colleague
' Made before the Subcommittee on African Affairs
of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on
June 15 (press release 209). The complete transcript
of the hearings will be published by the committee
and will be available from the Superintendent of
Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Wash-
ington, D.C. 20402.
July 9, 1973
77
Don Brown [Donald S. Brown, Deputy As-
sistant Administrator, Bureau for Africa,
Agency for International Development] will
present in detail, springs from fundamental
humanitarian considerations as well as our
friendly relations with these admirable peo-
ple. What many Americans do not realize is
that from the earliest Middle Ages until the
coming of the European colonizers this area
of Africa was the home of great kingdoms
which flourished on world trade. In the
fourth century A.D. the Kingdom of Ghana,
which spread into the Sahel zone, was al-
ready a rich and powerful state. In the Mid-
dle Ages, the University of Timbuktu in the
Kingdom of Mali was renowned as one of the
world's great centers of learning. Tides of
history shift and modern history left these
kingdoms behind, so that poverty and illiter-
acy predominate today and the countries
stricken by this drought are, under the best
of circumstances, among the economically
poorest in the world by all the usual stand-
ards of judgment such as gross national
product and per capita annual income. The
latter would scarcely average $100. They re-
main, however, proud and self-reliant people.
Approximately 25 million people inhabit
the six countries which I have mentioned
above. Most of the population is rural and
has been affected by the drought. Farmers,
herders, and nomads have seen their crops
fail, forage disappear, wells dry up, and their
livestock suffer and, in serious proportion,
die. The way of life for millions has been
severely dislocated. It is clear from all re-
ports that hunger and malnutrition are wide-
spread and will grow. The drought has thus
struck heavily at the resource base of these
nations. Moreover, commercial crops such as
peanuts in Senegal and cotton in Mali have
been greatly reduced. Thus, the local food
base has been greatly diminished, exports
have fallen, foreign exchange reserves re-
duced, and the entire productive framework
weakened.
Preoccupying as well to the area's leaders
is a grave fiscal threat: Tax collections based
on agriculture have dropped drastically. In
some instances it has been necessary simply
to waive tax obligations of the hard-hit farm-
ers and herders. This will have serious re-
percussions on the total economy of each of
these countries.
There has been an energetic response from
the donor community. U.S. efforts to provide
food and other forms of assistance have thus
far surpassed $20 million. The European
Community has had a more important role,
a leadership role, which is appropriate in
view' of the many ties which it has with the
region. Also participating are the U.S.S.R.,
the People's Republic of China, Saudi Arabia,
Japan, several neighboring African nations,
and others. U.N. Secretary General Wald-
heim, deeply concerned by the situation, des-
ignated Director General Boerma of the FAO
[Food and Agriculture Organization] to co-
ordinate donor activities and has appealed to
the United States and other donors for more
help.
Recipient governments have been deeply
grateful for U.S. assistance thus far ren-
dered. For example, the Senegalese Govern-
ment has publicly acknowledged its thanks.
Ambassadors from the area, who are here
today, have told me personally of their grati-
tude. And President Diori of Niger has
written President Nixon stating in part:
... I wish to express to you, on behalf of my gov-
ernment, that of the people of Niger and of myself
personally, our profound gratitude for the extent,
effectiveness and speed of the various forms of
assistance which the United States has willingly
given Niger for the relief of its suffering people.
Since the nutritional equilibrium in Niger can
hardly be re-established before October, we must
continue to rely on international cooperation, nota-
bly that of the friendly government of the United
States.
While the foregoing may appear to be an
impressive response to a human tragedy, it is
not enough. The next few weeks are critical,
as the rainy season begins in this area and
the need to plant crops recurs. The farmers
must be strong enough to plant, tend, and
eventually harvest their crops. In many areas
78
Department of State Bulletin
the able-bodied must be returned to their
normal settlements to carry out the planting.
Feeding assistance must continue through
the rainy season until harvests begin in Sep-
tember and October, and thereafter a major
rehabilitation effort must be undertaken.
Herds must be reconstituted, grazing areas
restored, water sources reestablished, and a
dispirited population encouraged to go on.
To review rehabilitation needs of the
months and years ahead, the United Nations
has called for a conference in Geneva at the
end of June. From this meeting and from the
needs which we will identify through the
efforts of our missions in the Sahel we will
define our proper role in a multidonor pro-
gram. And at the same time we participate
in rehabilitation we will encourage other
donors to join with us in a long-range attack
on the basic problem of the desertification of
the Sahelian zone. From the present tragedy
we hope to seize an initiative which will dem-
onstrate our interest in coping with the nat-
ural problems of man living in the arid
lands of the Sahel.
Parenthetically, Mr. Chairman, I think
this crisis and the need for a comprehensive
response — short-term emergency feeding,
medium-term rehabilitation, and long-range
preventative measures to help overcome hu-
man and natural deficiencies — point up the
merits of a functional approach on a regional
basis to a major human problem. This ap-
proach is, as I understand it, one of the key
objectives of the amendments to the Foreign
Assistance Act which have been tabled by a
majority of the membership of the House
Foreign Affairs Committee. I heartily en-
dorse this objective.
Before concluding, I would like to stress
that the drought crisis and our response is
not just an effort to help friends who have
turned to us in their misfortunes but it is also
a demonstration that we, the richest people
of the earth, can extend a helping hand to
the poorest. We need your committee's sym-
pathetic support in meeting the responsi-
bilities which this crisis places on us today
and in the future.
TREATY INFORMATION
Current Actions
MULTILATERAL
Astronauts
Agreement on the rescue of astronauts, the return
of astronauts, and the return of objects launched
into outer space. Opened for sifrnature at Wash-
ington, London, and Moscow April 22, 1968. En-
tered into force December 3, 1968. TIAS 6599.
Ratification deposited: Republic of China, June 15,
1973.
Customs
Convention establishing a Customs Cooperation
Council, with annex. Done at Brussels December
15, 1950. Entered into force November 4, 1952;
for the United States November 5, 1970. TIAS
7063.
Accession deposited: Saudi Arabia, May 8, 1973.
Health
Constitution of the World Health Organization, as
amended. Done at New York July 22, 1946. En-
tered into force April 7, 1948; for the United
States June 21, 1948. TIAS 1808, 4643.
Acceptance deposited: Democratic People's Repub-
lic of Korea, May 19, 1973.
Ocean Dumping
Convention on the prevention of marine pollution
by dumping of wastes and other matter, with an-
nexes. Done at London, Mexico City, Moscow, and
Washington December 29, 1972.^
Signatures: Japan, Morocco, June 22, 1973.
Safety at Sea
Convention on the international regulations for pre-
venting collisions at sea, 1972. Done at London
October 20, 1972.^
Signature: Brazil, May 23, 1973 (subject to rati-
fication).
BILATERAL
Canada
Arrangement supplementary to the agreement of
December 20, 1971, and February 23, 1972 (TIAS
7281), concerning the establishment and operation
of a temporary space tracking facility in connec-
tion with Project Skylab. Effected by exchange
of notes at Ottawa March 14, April 11, and June
5, 1973. Entered into force June 5, 1973.
' Not in force.
July 9, 1973
79
Agreement on reciprocal fishing privileges in cer-
tain areas off the coasts of the United States and
Canada. Signed at Ottawa June 15, 1973. Entered
into force June 16, 1973.
France
Agreement relating to the establishment, operation,
and maintenance of an Omega navigational sta-
tion on the island of La Reunion, with annex.
Effected by exchange of notes at Paris June 7,
1973. Enters into force on the date of the notifi-
cation by France that it has complied with all of
its constitutional procedures for entry into force.
Hungary
Consular convention. Signed at Budapest July 7,
1972. Entered into force July 6, 1973.
Proclaimed by the President: June 18, 1973.
Philippines
Agreement relating to the relinquishment of certain
land at the United States Naval Communications
Station, San Miguel. Effected by exchange of notes
at Manila June 4 and 7, 1973. Entered into force
June 7, 1973.
Poland
Agreement regarding fisheries in the western region
of the middle Atlantic Ocean, with annexes and
agreed minutes. Signed at Warsaw June 2, 1973.
Entered into force July 1, 1973.
Consular convention, with protocols and exchanges
of notes. Signed at Warsaw May 31, 1972. Entered
into force July 6, 1973.
Proclaimed by the President: June 18, 1973.
Romania
Consular convention, with protocol. Signed at Bu-
charest July 5, 1972. Entered into force July 6,
1973.
Proclaimed by the President: June 18, 1973.
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
Agreement on cooperation in the field of transpor-
tation. Signed at Washington June 19, 1973. En-
tered into force June 19, 1973.
Agreement on cooperation in the field of agriculture.
Signed at Washington June 19, 1973. Entered into
force June 19, 1973.
General agreement on contacts, exchanges, and co-
operation, with annex, and related notes. Signed
at Washington June 19, 1973. Entered into force
June 19, 1973.
Agreement on cooperation in studies of the world
ocean. Signed at Washington June 19, 1973. En-
tered into force June 19, 1973.
Convention on matters of taxation, with related let-
ters. Signed at Washington June 20, 1973. Enters
into force 30 days after the exchange of instru-
ments of ratification.
Basic principles of negotiations on the further lim-
itation of strategic offensive arms. Signed at
Washington June 21, 1973. Entered into force
June 21, 1973.
AgT-eement on scientific and technical cooperation
in the field of peaceful uses of atomic energy.
Signed at Washington June 21, 1973. Entered into
force June 21, 1973.
Agreement on the prevention of nuclear war. Signed
at Washington June 22, 1973. Entered into force
June 22, 1973.
Check List of Department of State
Press Releases: June 18-24
Press releases may be obtained from the Of-
fice of Press Relations, Department of State,
Washington, D.C. 20520.
Releases issued prior to June 18 which ap-
pear in this issue of the Bulletin are Nos.
196 of June 6, 204 of June 12, 206 of June 14,
and 209 and 210 of June 15.
No. Date Subject
t213 6/18 NATO ministerial meeting com-
munique, June 15.
t214 6/19 Rogers: news conference, Copen-
hagen, June 15.
*215 6/19 Paul Taylor Dance Company to
perform at Istanbul festival
June 22-25.
*216 6/19 Study groups 10 and 11 of U.S.
National Committee for CCIR,
Washington, July 12.
*217 6/19 Government Advisory Committee
on International Book and Li-
brary Programs, Washington,
July 13.
*218 6/19 Study group 6 of U.S. National
Committee for CCIR, Boulder,
Colo., July 13.
*219 6/19 National Review Board for East-
West Center, Honolulu, July
30-31.
*220 6/20 John Hope Franklin to tour East
Asia and the Pacific as Lincoln
lecturer.
t221 6/21 Rush : Country Day School Head-
masters Association, Carlisle,
Pa.
222 6/21 Casey: Fordham University, New
York.
223 6/21 Nixon: letter to U.N. Secretary
General on West African
drought relief.
*Not printed.
fHeld for a later issue of the Bulletin.
80
Department of State Bulletin
INDEX Jubj 9, 1973 Vol. LXIX, No. 1776
Africa
r light Relief and Rehabilitation for West
nd Central Africa (Newsom) 77
-. Responds to U.N. Appeal for African
irought Relief (Nixon) 66
nbodia
imunique Signed at Paris on Implementa
mn of Viet-Nam Agrreement (Kissinpi
lur-party and two-party communique) .
ters of Credence (Sim) iiT
leress
•artment Urges Continued Government Sup-
irt of Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty
Rush) 72
ught Relief and Rehabilitation for West and
entral Africa (Newsom) 77
'iiomic Affairs. International Cooperation on
iiergy (Casey) 59
Kilucational and Cultural Affairs. Meeting of
'ommittee on U.S.-Japan Educational and
ultural Cooperation 58
Energy. International Cooperation on Energy
(Casoyl 59
artinent Urges Continued Government Sup-
port of Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty
Rush) 72
United States With Europe (Rush) ... 54
Foreign Aid. Sales, Credits or Guaranties to
Peru Under Foreign Military Sales Act
Presidential determination) 71
India. Letters of Credence (Kaul) 67
Japan. Meeting of Committee on U.S.-Japan
Educational and Cultural Cooperation ... 58
Jordan. Letters of Credence (Salah) .... 67
loos. Communique Signed at Paris on Imple-
entation of Viet-Nam Agreement (Kiss-
iger, four-party and two-party communique) 45
[in America. For a Peaceful and Progressive
Latin America (Kubisch) 68
Liberia. President Tolbert of Liberia Visits
Washington (exchange of toasts with Presi-
dent Nixon) 63
Malawi. Letters of Credence (Mbaya) .... 67
Middle East. International Cooperation on
Energy (Casey) 59
Military Affairs. Sales, Credits or Guaranties
to Peru Under Foreign Military Rales Act
(Presidential determination) 71
Nepal. Letters of Credence (Khanal) .... 67
Oman. Letters of Credence (al-Bu-Sa'id) ... 67
Peru. Sales, Credits or Guaranties to Peru
Under Foreign Military Sales Act (Presi-
dential determination) 71
Presidential Documents
President Tolbert of Liberia Visits Washington 63
Sales, Credits or Guaranties to Peru Under
Foreign Military Sales Act (Presidential de-
termination) 71
U.S. Responds to U.N. Appeal for African
Drought Relief 66
Treaty Information. Current Actions .... 79
United Nations. U.S. Responds to U.N. Appeal
for African Drought Relief (Nixon) ... 66
Viet-Nam. Communique Signed at Paris on
Implementation of Viet-Nam Agreement
(Kissinger, four-party and two-party com-
munique) 45
Yemen Arab Republic. Letters of Credence
(Geghman) 67
Name Index
al-Bu-Sa'id, Faisal Bin AH 67
Casey, William J 59
Geghman, Yahya H 67
Kaul, Triloki Nath 67
Khanal, Yadu Nath 67
Kissinger, Henry A 45
Kubisch, Jack B 68
Mbaya, Robert Bernard 67
Newsom, David 'D 77
Nixon, President 63, 66, 71
Rush, Kenneth 54, 72
Salah, Abdullah 67
Sim, Urn 67
Tolbert, William R., Jr 63
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THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BULLETIN
Volume LXIX
No. 1777
July 16, 1973
SECRETARY ROGERS ATTENDS CENTO AND NATO MEETINGS 81
U.S. FOREIGN RELATIONS IN A PERIOD OF TRANSITION
Address by Deputy Secretary Rush 91
THE UNITED NATIONS: A MIRROR OF THE REAL WORLD
Address by Ambassador Scali 96
THE OFFICIAL WEEKLY RECORD OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY
For index see inside back cover
THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BULLETI
Vol. LXIX. No. 1777
July 16, 1973
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Note: Contents of this publication are not
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appreciated. The BULLETIN is indexed in
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The Department of State BULLETI.
a weekly publication issued by th
Office of Media Services, Bureau o\
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interested agencies of ifie governmeni
witfi information on developments i
tfie field of U.S. foreign relations and
on tlie work of tfie Department and
tfie Foreign Service.
Tfie BULLETIN includes selected
press releases on foreign policy, issued
by tfie Wfiite House and ttie Depart
ment, and statements, addresses,
and news conferences of tlie President
and tfie Secretary of State and otfier
officers of tfie Department, as well as
special articles on various pfiases of
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of tlie Department. Information is in-
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United States is or may become a
party and on treaties of general inter-
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Publications of tlie Department of
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legislative material in tfie field of
international relations are also listed.
Secretary Rogers Attends CENTO and NATO Meetings
Sccretarii Rogers headed the U.S. observer
delegation to the meeting of the Council of
Ministers of the Central Treaty Organiza-
tion (CENTO) at Tehran June 10-11, made
an official visit to Denmark June 12-13, and
headed the U.S. delegation to the regular
North Atlantic Council rninisterial meeting
at Copenhagen June U-15. Following are
statements and news conferences by Secre-
tary Rogers and the texts of the communi-
ques issued at the conclusion of the meetings.
ARRIVAL STATEMENT, TEHRAN, JUNE 9 >
Press release 202 dated June 11
I am pleased to be once again in Iran, a
beautiful and dynamic country making rapid
progress under its farseeing leadership. Re-
lations between the United States and Iran
are excellent. Both of our countries have
benefited from our years of close cooperation
based on our mutual respect and shared
interests.
We have noted with pleasure the growing
spirit of cooperation among Iran and its
neighbors across the Persian Gulf. We wel-
come this responsible and constructive ap-
proach to the security and development of
this vital region. We also welcome the agree-
ment recently concluded between Iran and
the oil consortium, which should assure a
stable and mutually beneficial relationship.
I am here to attend the annual meeting of
the CENTO Council of Ministers. I look for-
ward to exchanging views with Foreign Min-
ister Khalatbary and the representatives of
other CENTO member countries. We will be
discussing a variety of subjects concerning
this area, including our shared view that
' Issued to the press.
outside powers should not interfere in the
affairs of CENTO member countries, and
the useful role CENTO plays in regional
economic cooperation and development.
I also look forward to an audience with
His Imperial Majesty the Shahanshah. We
have learned to value his counsel and will be
most interested in having the benefit of his
wisdom before the summit meetings between
President Nixon and Soviet General Secre-
tary [Leonid I.] Brezhnev later this month.
Thank you.
CENTO COUNCIL OF MINISTERS MEETING
Statement by Secretary Rogers, June 10
Press release 203 dated June 11
First I would like to join with my col-
leagues in expressing appreciation to His
Imperial Majesty the Shahanshah for his
inspiring message, to the Prime Minister for
his gracious words, and to the Secretary
General for the very excellent report that he
has given us.
It is with pleasure that I return to Tehran
and to another meeting with my colleagues
of the CENTO Council of Ministers. Each
visit to this country creates a lasting impres-
sion of the graciousness of Iranian hospital-
ity, the vitality of the country, and the
friendliness of its people.
Mr. Chairman, the United States finds
much of value in its association with the
Central Treaty Organization, both as a re-
gional organization and as a means of rein-
forcing the close and cordial bilateral ties
we have with each of the member states.
It is true that the world in which CENTO
was born differs substantially from the world
of today. The phrase which dominated our
July 16, 1973
81
thoughts in the 1950's was "cold war." The
poHcy which guides us today is to substitute
negotiation for confrontation and to achieve
a generation of peace. The changes in the
world scene, however, make CENTO no less
relevant than before.
The attainment of that goal, the goal of
peace, demands our unwavering attention
and sustained effort. The search for peace
must be universal. All countries, large and
small, can contribute to the emerging global
structure of peace. The United States is
striving to maintain the momentum that has
built up in recent years. In that connection,
this meeting is particularly opportune for
it provides an opportunity for an exchange
of views on the eve of President Nixon's
talk with General Secretary Brezhnev in
Washington. We believe, as I know you do,
that improved relations between the Soviet
Union and the United States should contrib-
ute to the security and stability of the
CENTO region.
I want to join particularly with my col-
leagues and especially with what Sir Alec
[Douglas-Home] said about the necessity for
maintaining our strength. At a time when
the prospects for peace seem bright, at a
time when the world is a much safer place
than it was foui- years ago, a much more
peaceful world than it was four years ago,
it is vital to maintain our strength and our
resolve. Certainly, if there is any lesson we
have learned in history, it is that military
weakness, lack of resolve, is an invitation to
aggression. And really, that is what this
meeting is about, it seems to me.
I look forward to my discussions with you
on the Arab-Israel conflict, too, because the
situation in the Middle East remains tenuous
and fragile — although we are approaching
three years of cease-fire between Eg>-pt and
Israel. During the first months of this year
we have vigorously pursued a series of diplo-
matic contacts with the parties concerned.
We are convinced that what is required is
the beginning of a serious and genuine nego-
tiating process between the parties. It is
within a negotiating framework that the
United States believes it can be most helpful
to the parties in achieving the agreement
called for by the November 1967 resolution
of the United Nations, a resolution which
neither endorsed nor precluded the pre-June
1967 lines as the final lines. The main ques-
tion facing the parties is how to reconcile
the principle of sovereignty on the one hand
and the needs of security on the other. These
are both legitimate and understandable con-
cerns of the parties in the area. It is not un-
important that both sides remain committed
to the Security Council Resolution 242, re-
gardless of their differing interpretations.
For this reason, the United States will do
everything it can to help assure that the deli-
cate balance of this resolution will be main-
tained throughout the current proceedings
of the United Nations Security Council.
We continue to give full support to the
resolution. We will continue to assist the
parties in making progress toward peace — a
peace that meets the legitimate concerns of
all of the states and peoples of the area, in-
cluding the Palestinians.
I think, Mr. Chairman, it is interesting
that the Middle East seems to be the one area
in the world where there is a major conflict
where the parties have not been able to di-
rectly or indirectly discuss their differences.
It is the only area in the world now remain-
ing where no negotiations have been con-
ducted, where the parties have not actually
actively exchanged views. And we think
there is no substitute for that process. We
do not believe that there is anything the
United Nations can do as a body to make the
parties come to an agreement, reach a settle-
ment. We think it is vitally important that
the parties start a serious negotiating proc-
ess of some kind.
In the Persian Gulf we see an area of vast
dimension, great vitality, and substantial
resources. We look primarily to the states
in the area to produce new patterns of re-
gional cooperation and stability in the area
of increasing importance to the free world.
We are greatly encouraged to see so many
indications of regional cooperation. These
new relationships can help build a solid foun-
dation for the future prosperity and stability
of all .states and peoples in the gulf.
We pay particular tribute to Iran and His
82
Deparfment of Stale Bulletin
Imperial Majesty for the leadership he has
taken in this area of the world, which is so
important to peace and stability.
We believe that significant progress has
been made toward reconciliation in South
Asia in the aftermath of the Indo-Pakistan
war. Pakistani, India, Bangladesh made con-
siderable progress at Simla. Such a negotiat-
ing process, we hope, will also lead to a
solution of the delicate questions which have
been raised here this morning of prisoners
of war and detainees to the satisfaction of
all concerned. It is from reconciliation among
South Asians themselves and their respective
efforts to economic development that a strong
bulwark of security can be built.
We realize, too, that the transition from
confrontation to negotiation and cooperation
both in the CENTO area and other parts of
the world will not be without new problems.
Thus prudence dictates that we must remain
vigilant and strong in legitimate defense of
our respective interests.
Mr. Chairman, peace has many components.
One of them assuredly is cooperation among
countries. In few parts of the world has this
been more apparent than in the CENTO re-
gion, where cooperation has become a habit.
The substance of cooperation may have
changed from time to time — as indeed it
should if it is properly to reflect new develop-
ments and new interests — but the spirit un-
derlying it has not. We in the United States
enter these discussions with that spirit in
mind and in the belief that CENTO today,
facing changed circumstances, is more im-
portant than ever as an instrument of co-
operation and as an instrument of peace.
Text of Final Communique, June 1 1
Press release 208 dated June 14
The Council of Ministers of the Central Treaty
Organization (CENTO), which was inaugurated by
the message of His Imperial Majesty the Shahanshah
Aryamehr, read by His Excellency Mr. Amir Abbas
Hoveyda, Prime Minister of Iran, held their 20th
Session in Tehran on June 10 and 11, 1973.
The Delegations were led by:
His Excellency Mr. Abbas All Khalatbary
Minister for Foreign .\ffairs
Iran
His Excellency Mr. Aziz Ahmed, H.PK., HQA.,
S PK
Minister of State for Defense and Foreign Affairs
Pakistan
His Excellency Mr. Umit Haluk Bayulken
Minister for Foreign Affairs
Turkey
The Right Honorable Sir Alec Douglas-Home,
K.T., M.P.
Secretary of State for Foreign and Common-
wealth .Affairs
The United Kingdom
The Honorable William P. Rogers
Secretary of State
The United States
Following an address by the Prime Minister of
Iran, opening statements were made by the leaders
of the Delegations and the Secretary General of
CENTO, expressing their appreciation of the Shah-
anshah's gracious message and the warm hospitality
of the host country.
His Excellency Mr. A. A. Khalatbary, Minister of
Foreign Affairs of Iran, presided at the session.
The Council of Ministers conducted a comprehen-
sive review of the international situation, paying
particular attention to the matters of interest to the
CENTO area. The Ministers recognized the strength
and vitality of political and economic development
achieved by the member countries, the importance of
peaceful and just settlement of disputes, and the
need to maintain vigilance in the region.
The Ministers affirmed the vital importance they
attach to the preservation of the independence and
territorial integrity of each of the member states in
this region. .
The Ministers noted the success with which Paki-
stan was meeting the problems which faced her, fol-
lowing the conflict with India. They expressed the
hope that lasting peace on the Subcontinent could
be secured through a just settlement of differences
between Pakistan and India and they reaffirmed
their support for Security Council Resolution No.
307 of 21 December 1971. In particular the Ministers
urged the early release of prisoners of war.
The Ministers viewed with concern the continuing
critical situation in the Middle East. They reaffirmed
their support of Security Council Resolution No. 242
of 22 November 1967, and welcomed efforts being
made to resolve the Arab-Israel dispute along the
lines of the Resolution.
Considering the continuing subversive threats in
the region, the Ministers expressed the determination
of their Governments to meet such efforts with all
the means at their disposal.
The Ministers viewed with favor current negotia-
tions for the purpose of reducing armaments and
fostering conditions for peace and stability in Eu-
rope. They expressed the hope that these negotiations
would not fail to take into consideration the interests
of the CENTO region.
July 16, 1973
83
In approving the report of the Military Committee,
the Ministers noted the continuing improvement
in cooperation among the armed forces of their
countries.
The Ministers expressed satisfaction with the rapid
economic development of the regional countries. In
reviewing the report of the Economic Committeo,
they directed the Committee to consider ways of
expanding its work with a view to strengthening and
promoting economic cooperation in CENTO.
In concluding their review of the activities over
the past year, the Ministers noted with satisfaction
the annual report of the Secretary General. They
reiterated their determination to continue to cooper-
ate for peace, security and stability to promote fur-
ther social and economic development in the CENTO
region.
The Ministers accepted the invitation of the Gov-
ernment of the United States to hold the next session
of the Council in May 1974 in Washington.
NEWS CONFERENCE, TEHRAN, JUNE 11
Press i-elease 205 dated June 12
I wanted to take this opportunity just be-
fore I left to meet with you briefly. When I
arrived, I said that I would try to have a
short meeting with you, and I am happy to
do it.
I think it has been a very useful short stay
which I had in Iran. As you know, I was able
to meet with His Imperial Majesty and had
a very satisfactory discussion for almost
two hours. I had meetings with the Prime
Minister and the Foreign Minister, and I
merely want to say that as far as relations
between the United States and Iran are con-
cerned, they have never been better. They
are excellent.
President Nixon is looking forward to the
visit of the Shahanshah to Washington. They
have been good friends for a long time, and
President Nixon holds His Imperial Majesty
in the highest esteem. So I consider on the
bilateral basis that this has been a very
successful visit. I am very privileged myself
to have had the opportunity to be here again,
and I want to express my thanks to all of
the members of the Iranian Government for
their hospitality.
As far as the CENTO meeting was con-
cerned, it gave me an opportunity first to
meet with all of the Foreign Ministers repre-
sented in CENTO on a bilateral basis. We
had, I think, very useful discussions. The
meeting itself, on the basis of a consensus
that was expressed at the conclusion of the
meeting, was the best one I have attended.
This is my fifth CENTO meeting. The dis-
cussions were very direct and frank, and we
had an exchange of views which in some re-
spects was quite unusual for an international
conference. I think that the communique will
reflect the satisfactory nature of the meeting,
and particularly it will stress, as the conver-
sations themselves stressed, the importance
that is attached to the sovereignty of all the
member states. We believe in the United
States, and I think it was generally con-
cluded, that this is a very valuable alliance.
It is an alliance that is valuable not only for
itself but because it is one of a number of
alliances that we have throughout the world
which we believe has laid the foundation for
improvement of the relations that have oc-
curred between the East and the West. It
provides a continuation of the stability that
we think is necessary for improved relations.
So I am veiy pleased indeed that the meet-
ing went so well. I think that CENTO is go-
ing to continue to be a very important
alliance, and it will deal especially with the
problems that exist today in the world.
I also would like to say that I have been
very much impressed with the developments
in the Persian Gulf area. I think the cooper-
ation that exists, the growing cooperation
among the nations in the area, is of greatest
importance. Certainly the Persian Gulf is
going to assume greater and greater impor-
tance as the years go by. And Iran is playing
a major role in that area. It is essential, we
believe in the United States, that the nations
in the area cooperate together, provide re-
gional cooperation, that they put aside their
difl'erences — and there are a lot of diff"erences
that have existed for a long time, but in the
overall they are fairly minor. The overriding
considerations are for peace and stability in
the area and the ability of the nations in the
area to get along with each other, to be sure
that there is no outside interference, that
there is no subversion that upsets the sta-
84
Department of State Bulletin
bility of the area. I am very pleased to see
the developments in the area since I was
last here.
I want to again thank all the members of
the government who are here. I appreciate
their coming to the airport, and I will be
glad to answer some questions, if you have
some.
i Q. Mr. Secretary, you said the exchange
of views was, in some respects, quite unusiml
for an international conference. Could you
\ tell us what you mean by that?
Secretary Rogers: Yes. Usually at interna-
tional conferences every Minister has a set
speech that has been written for him by
somebody, and he reads it. And it is pretty
dull. This time there were no set speeches.
Everyone spoke the things that were on his
mind. After each Minister had the opportu-
nity to say what was on his mind and to
speak quite frankly, there was an exchange
of views. Questions were asked, and we had
a lively exchange of opinion. The result was,
I thiniv, that there was quite a different cli-
mate. In fact the Foreign Minister of Iran,
who said that he had attended meetings in
CENTO for 10 years, said this was by far
the most interesting, the most satisfactory,
meeting that he had ever been to. I think
that was reflected by the comments of the
Secretary General. Certainly it is true as far
as I am concerned. This was the fifth year
that I have attended.
Q. Mr. Rogers, to what will you ascribe the
sicccess of this meeting of an alliance lohich
some years ago the regional countries were
tending to tvrite off as a paper alliance?
Secretary Rogers: Well, I think that there
is a tendency, when the world is moving in
the direction to detente, to feel that somehow
alliances are not important and to say, "Well,
now things are going very well in the world ;
let's just put aside these organizations that
have served us well in the past." This meet-
ing provided a realistic assessment, it seemed
to me, of the necessity of continuing the alli-
ances that have made it possible for the East
and West to improve relations. We also rec-
ognize that as the world moves away from
active conflict and nuclear confrontation,
and hopefully away from any major conflicts
among the nations, there are other dangers
that occur, dangers of subversion, things of
that kind. And also, you realize the necessity
of equilibrium— stability, if you will— in an
area. That can only be brought about by re-
gional cooperation. This Organization con-
sists of nations in the region that work well
together. I am speaking about Iran, Turkey,
and Pakistan. It also includes the United
Kingdom and the United States. You put
those nations together ; it serves a very use-
ful purpose. The discussions focused on what
I think is a realistic appraisal of the value
of this kind of alliance— not an old-fashioned
appraisal, not an appraisal that might have
been relevant 20 years ago or 15 years ago
or 10 years ago, but an appraisal that is
relevant today. Therefore I believe we left
the meeting with a sort of renewed inspira-
tion, a renewed spirit about the necessity of
CENTO.
Q. You mentioned or you stressed the im-
portance of stability in the Persian Gulf.
Does the United States consider the arms
buildup in all these states or the richer states
along the gulf to be part of this stability?
Secretary Rogers: That really depends
upon what is meant by arms buildup. If arms
buildup means an arms race, so that every-
one is madly attempting to get a tremendous
amount of arms, that is an undesirable situa-
tion. On the other hand, history certainly
teaches us that if there are nations which are
strong in an area — or the nations that
have ulterior purposes in an area are strong
and there are weak nations nearby — that
is an invitation to trouble. So a reason-
able development of military strength vis-
a-vis the military strength of possible
adversaries is not a bad situation; it is a
stabilizing situation. In a sense that is what
has happened between the United States and
the Soviet Union or, to put it differently,
between the Warsaw Pact and NATO. So we
do not think that the strengthening of the
armed forces in Iran, the desire on the part
of Saudi Arabia to be stronger militarily,
July 16, 1973
85
causes any danger. We think it is stabilizing
to that extent.
Q. Were the Soviet Union to supply arms,
say, at the same level to the Iraqis, would this
not cause the arms race ivhich you say would
be a bad thing?
Secretary Rogers: It depends upon the ex-
tent. But what about the converse? Suppose
you have a situation where the Soviet Union
is supplying tremendous amounts of arms
to one country and the neighbor counti-y does
not have any. That is a dangerous situation.
In other words, if you have a strong nation,
strong militarily, that has aggressive designs
and a very weak nation next to it, that is an
invitation to trouble.
Q. Mr. Secretary, a document distributed
by the public relations division of CENTO
defines the purpose of CENTO in the begin-
ning as to guarantee protection against the
Soviet Union if it should threaten the terri-
torial integrity of the region after World
War II. Does that continue to be the purpose
of CENTO?
Secreta^-y Rogers: Well, I am sure you
would have to read the whole pamphlet to
get its thrust. Certainly that was one of the
purposes that was behind CENTO at its in-
ception. But, as I say, I do not think it is
necessary every time we have a meeting to
restate the purposes. We think this alliance,
our alliance with the NATO countries, and
our alliance with SEATO are important as-
pects of the policy we developed after World
War II of mutual security. We think the de-
velopment of strength in these areas, the
ability to work together closely as we are
doing, provides an equilibrium, if you will,
which makes for stability in the world. That
is why we think the alliances are important.
That is why we wanted, at a time when we
are entering into much better relations with
the Soviet Union, much better relations with
the People's Republic of China, that we not
forget that the alliances have contributed to
the very success that we are now seeing in the
world. And we want to continue to maintain
those alliances.
Q. Are we correct to assume that Pakistan
has agreed to continue the alliance? There
was some thought that the Pakistanis are
not too happy with the alliance.
Secretary Rogers: I would not want to
speak for Pakistan. I will merely say that
we're very pleased about the level of repre-
sentation at this meeting.
Q. Let me put it another tvay. Have all the
members of the alliance agreed to continue
it?
Secretary Rogers: Well, as I say, there is
no change in the alliance as a result of this
meeting. It was a very successful meeting,
and we are very happy at the level of repre-
sentation of Pakistan.
Q. Mr. Secretary, some of the regional
members, in fact, all of the regional mem-
bers, seemed quite concerned if not alarmed
about the threat of subversion. Now, you
have not mentioned this yourself. Are you —
Secretary Rogers: Oh, yes. I mentioned it.
I mentioned subversion.
Q. Is it serious?
Secretary Rogers: Certainly subversion is
a matter of concern to the nations in the re-
gion. Certainly subversion occurs in many
Ijarts of the world. It is one of the things
that has to be guarded against, as I said a
little earlier. As the threat of nuclear war
diminishes — and I believe it has — and the
threat of war between the major powers is
lessened, subversion is a natural way to
spread ideology-. It is not unexpected, and I
think it is important for nations in the re-
gion to consider it, to guard against it, and
to be sure it does not cause instability. The
answer to your question is yes.
Q. Do you think, Mr. Secretary, it is par-
ticularly important to watch out for subver-
sion at this time when the Soviet Union ap-
pears to be moving toward detente, or at least
following the policies of detente?
Secretary Rogers: Here again I want to
be sure we understand definitions. We are
convinced in the United States that the
Soviet Union seriously desires to improve its
86
Department of State Bulletin
relations with us. And we are inclined to
think that the Soviet Union is serious about
improving its relations with the western
European countries. People refer to that as
detente, if you will, and we are very pleased
about that." We are going to do everything
we can to move in that direction. But that
does not suggest that they have changed their
ideology. It does not suggest that they are
not going to attempt to extend their influ-
ence in other parts of the world. And it does
not suggest that military strength is no
longer necessary.
As a matter of fact, it suggests just the
opposite to us. The fact that we have been
able to improve our relations with them is
because we have been strong as a nation and
because we have alliances that are strong.
So we think that it is necessary to maintain
our military strength. It is necessary to
maintain our military alliances, if you will,
and to guard against subversion.
If we see as time goes on that the improved
relations that we are witnessing throughout
the world mean that subversion is not going
to be an instrument of extending influence
throughout the world, if the world all of a
sudden is going to be a place of high ideals
and governments are not going to have con-
flict and there is going to be no attempt to
extend ideologies by one means or another,
fine. But until that time comes, we want to
be sure that we move sensibly in the direc-
tion of improved relations, not being euphoric
about it but being realistic about it and doing
the things I have suggested. I will take one
or two more questions.
Q. The Secretary General, in a press con-
ference just before ijours, speaking aboxd the
dangers of subversion and ranging from
Oman, the Persian Gulf— how far does this
area go, the Arabian Peninsula — / mean,
how far does this overlap 7cith the CENTO,
how far does this come tvithin CENTO's
orbit or —
Secretary Rogers: I do not know if we
have ever attempted to make such specific
delineations. Obviously if the Persian Gulf
became an area of serious conflict, it would
have serious repercussions in the CENTO
July 16, 1973
region. So yes, we are concerned about it ; I
guess you can say we are more immediately
concerned about action in the member states.
But certainly the conditions that occur, the
situations that develop in the region, affect
the member states. So we are concerned.
I will take one or two more questions.
Q. \^Inaudible.'\
Secretary Rogers: Well, did I understand
your question? Do I think that CENTO
should concern itself with development in
the region? Yes, and I think that we are. I
think that we are pleased to see the develop-
ment in the region. Since I was here last, I
think there has been tremendous develop-
ment and it is very favorable.
Thank you very much.
NEWS CONFERENCE, COPENHAGEN, JUNE 15
Press release 214 dated June 19
I would just like to make a few prelimi-
nary comments, and then I'll answer some
questions. First, I think this Council meeting
has been a very successful one. As you know,
I'm getting to be an oldtimer, and I think this
is probably the best meeting that we've had.
By that, I mean the spirit was particularly
good ; there was really no acrimony ; the res-
olution of the final communique was easily
achieved; and I think all of us recognize
certain important facts.
First, I think there was a complete and
acknowledged recognition of the fact that
the alliance has contributed very substan-
tially to peace and stability in the world;
that because it has been so successful we
have a special duty — now as we enter nego-
tiations this fall, both in July and October,
on the Conference on European Security
and Cooperation and on mutual and balanced
force reductions — to maintain the unity and
solidarity of the alliance, to recognize its
importance, never losing sight of it for a
moment, and by common resolve to maintain
its strength. I think that was accomplished.
Secondly, I think that there was general
agreement that, although these negotiations
are going to be difficult in view of the fact
that there are so many nations involved and
87
there are so many complex questions involved
in the negotiations, we have been very suc-
cessful in our common effort to appi'oach
these negotiations in a united way. Prepara-
tory talks that have led up to the conference
on European security have been, I think, con-
ducted very satisfactorily. There was a rec-
ognition to that effect by the Ministers.
Third, I think there was a very positive
response to the initiative that President
Nixon has taken about the year of Eui'ope.
There were a great many statements to the
effect that this was a good time to examine
our objectives, to underscore the principles
on which we agree, and to restate them in
the light of current realities. I particularly
appreciate the attitude of the French For-
eign Minister. I thought his interventions
were very constructive, and I was pleased to
notice that he felt just as I do— that the
meeting was a very successful one.
With that preliminary statement, I'll take
a few questions.
Q. Mr. Secretary, all we've done then, if
I understand right, is restate the principles
on which we already agree. Is that really
progress ?
Secretary Rogers: No, I didn't say restate
them. I said examine the principles that are
ones that we have to have in the light of
current realities. We want to undertake an
examination of them and, if we can, to have
a declaration of principles which will serve
to emphasize our common interests, the goals
that we hold in common, and the importance
of the relationships that exist among us and
in the alliance itself.
Q. Mr. Secretary, ivill this no7v go forward
in the context of NATO or in a broader con-
text involving other European countnes as
well?
Secretary Rogers: Well, in my statement I
pointed out that we are not going to be hung
up on procedures. The important thing is
substance. Now we will go ahead with an
examination of these matters in the alliance,
among the permanent representatives, but
not nece.ssarily in an exclusive manner. We'll
have, obviously, a lot of bilateral discussions,
and we'll have discussions in other areas. The
important thing is not how we proceed; the
important thing is to proceed, to continue
the momentum that has started, and to be
sure that when we arrive at the declaration
of principles we will have had the opportu-
nity to consider them fully and they will rep-
resent our common views on the principles
that should guide us in the years ahead.
Q. [Inaudible] Watergate question — Wash-
ington. Can you say anything about the
Beirut incident, sir, when you learned about
it and where it stands notv ?
Secretary Rogers: I don't even get the
question. Has it intruded in the State
Department?
Q. The story of the FBI representative in
the American Embassy in Beirut exerting
influence on Ambassador [William R] Buf-
fum to intervene on Mr. [Robert L.] Vesco's
behalf?
Secretary Rogers: Well, you don't state it
correctly. Quite the opposite. The story was
just the opposite. The story was that there
was no influence. The story as I read it was
that there was a call made to the FBI rep-
resentative and the State Department rep-
resentative had nothing to do with it. So you
can't say that the State Department is in-
volved. This is a situation where the State
Department said absolutely no.
Q. During the meeting, did you change
your mind about Greece?
Secretary Rogers: No, my mind hasn't
been changed on Greece.
Q. One question about Iceland. You said
on Danish Television two days ago that there
might be a possibility to find a form for the
Keflavik Base that woidd be more palatable
to the Icelandic Government. What form did
yo7i think of when you said that ?
Secretary Rogers: I don't know. We're go-
ing to talk to the government about it. Really
there isn't much dissatisfaction with the base
itself. I was there recently, but I think that,
as you know, the present government prom-
ised some time back — I guess in the cam-
paign — that they would consider the base
88
Department of State Bulletin
question. What we are going to do is consider
it with them. I don't believe we'll have a
major problem with them.
Thank you very much. I am soriy I have
to leave.
TEXT OF NATO COMMUNIQUE, JUNE 15
Press release 213 dated June IS
1. The North Atlantic Council met in Ministerial
session in Copenhagen on 14th and 15th June.
2. Ministers underlined the essential contribution
which the Alliance has rendered over the years to
the maintenance of international peace and security.
The progress being made toward better East/West
relations and the reduction of tensions in Europe
could not have been achieved without the unshake-
able resolve of the West to defend itself and a sound
military capability to do so. Ministers asserted that
an effective defense system remained a fundamental
prerequisite for further progress. Consequently, the
Allies must continue to make the efforts necessary to
ensure their defense and security.
3. Ministers reaffirmed the principles and objec-
tives of the Alliance established a quarter of a cen-
tury ago. They noted, however, the profound changes
which were taking place in every field of interna-
tional activity. With this in mind, Ministers decided
that the time had come, without prejudice to con-
tinuing negotiations in other fora, for their Govern-
ments to examine in a spirit of solidarity and by a
common effort their relationships in the light of
these changes. They entrusted the Council in perma-
nent session with this task. Ministers expressed full
confidence that the Alliance would continue to be a
vital force for maintaining peace, improving East
West relations, and promoting greater security and
well-being.
4. Ministers considered the outcome of the Multi-
lateral Talks in Helsinki in preparation for the
Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe
[CSCE]. Recalling the purpose of their Govern-
ments in entering into these talks. Ministers were
'. satisfied that it had been possible at Helsinki to
I agree on arrangements for this Conference which
' would ensure that their proposals were examined
I fully and in depth.
5. Ministers stressed the need for the Conference
to be conducted with all due deliberation befitting
the range, complexity and importance of the sub-
■ jects to be discussed, including security; economic,
I scientific, technological and environmental coopera-
' tion; cooperation in humanitarian and other fields
and, in particular, in the field of human contacts.
Tliey reaffirmed that constructive and specific results
could be achieved only through a process of detailed
and serious negotiations without artificial time limits.
They felt that given these circumstances there were
reasonable hopes that the Conference could produce
satisfactory results. Consequently, they expressed
their willingness to begin the first phase of the Con-
ference in Helsinki on July 3rd. They noted that a
decision on the opening date for the second phase of
the Conference remains to be taken and agreed to
consult further on this matter.
6. Ministers representing countries which partici-
pate in NATO's integrated Defense Program noted
with satisfaction that the initiative for mutual and
balanced force reductions in Central Europe which
they took at Reykjavik in 1968 has led to Multi-
lateral Exploratory Talks in Vienna. The agreements
reached there thus far are useful steps forward.
These Ministers expect negotiations on specific force
reduction and associated measures in Central Europe
to begin in October 1973 as previously agreed. They
reaffirmed the importance they attach to the prompt
fulfilment of this commitment.
7. In such negotiations, it will be the aim of the
Allied Governments concerned, bearing in mind the
indivisibility of the security of the Alliance, to se-
cure step by step practical arrangements which en-
sure undiminished security for all parties at a lower
level of forces in Central Europe. The readiness of
the Warsaw Pact countries to contribute to balanced
results would, together with a successful outcome of
the parallel negotiations in CSCE, open the way to
a more fruitful and stable relationship in Europe.
These Ministers reaffirmed the conviction of their
Governments that unilateral action on the part of
countries of the Alliance to reduce or withdraw
forces would undermine the negotiation of satis-
factory agreements aimed at enhancing military
stability.
8. These Ministers noted with approval the ex-
tent of agreement already reached within the Alli-
ance in preparation for negotiations on mutual and
balanced force reductions. They requested the Coun-
cil in permanent session to continue this work and
to develop further an Alliance program for the
forthcoming negotiations.
9. Ministers expressed satisfaction that the nego-
tiations between the United States and the USSR
seeking permanent limitations on strategic offensive
arms (SALT TWO) were being pursued. They rec-
ognized the importance of this subject for the Al-
liance and reaffirmed the continuing need for close
Allied consultation.
10. Ministers considered the latest developments
in questions concerning Germany. They noted the
conclusion of the legislative process in the Federal
Republic of Germany approving the Treaty on the
basis of relations between the Federal Republic of
Germany and the German Democratic Republic of
21st December, 1972, whose signature Ministers
welcomed at their last meeting. They also noted the
conclusion of the legislative process to empower the
July 16, 1973
89
Government of the Federal Republic of Germany to
apply for entry to the United Nations. They ex-
pressed the hope that relations between the two
German States would develop steadily in a satisfac-
tory manner, taking into account the special situa-
tion in Germany.
11. As regards Berlin, Ministers share the view
that the strict observance and full application of the
Quadripartite Ag-reement of 3rd September, 1971
constitute a condition for lasting detente and stability
in Europe. They noted the practical improvements
in the Berlin situation which the Agreement has
produced and were in agreement that the opportuni-
ties which it affords for the continuing well-being
of the city should be fully utilized.
12. Ministers took note of the report on the situ-
ation in the Mediterranean prepared on their instruc-
tions by the Council in permanent session. They
reiterated their concern at the developments in this
area which could have dangerous consequences for
the countries of the Alliance. They accordingly in-
structed the Council in permanent session to con-
tinue its consultations on this question and to
report to them at their next meeting.
13. Ministers received with interest a report by
the Conference of National Armaments Directors
on steps to improve armaments cooperation. Noting
that the need to collaborate in the areas of stand-
ardization, development and procurement has be-
come more pressing, they instructed the Council in
permanent session to take the necessary action.
14. Ministers representing countries which partic-
ipate in NATO's Integrated Defense Program wel-
comed the reaffirmation by the United States that,
given a similar approach by their Allies, they would
maintain and improve their forces in Europe and
not reduce them except in the context of an East/
West Agreement. These Ministers also recalled
their previous Agreement that member nations were
entitled to bring to the attention of the Alliance any
special problems arising from balance of payment
problems resulting from military expenditures for
collective defense, and that Alliance solidarity can
be strengthened by cooperation between members to
alleviate these problems. They noted that permanent
representatives have been directed to study these
issues and to offer whatever recommendations seemed
appropriate.
15. The next Ministerial session of the North
Atlantic Council will be held in Brussels, on 10th
and 11th December, 1973.
Credit for F-5 Aircraft Sales
to Five Latin American Nations
Presidential Determination No. 73-14 '
Presidential Determination — Argentina, Brazil,
Chile, Colombia, and Venezuela
Memorandum for the Secretary of State
The White House,
Washington, May 21, 1973.
In accordance with the recommendation in your
memorandum of April 3, 1973, I hereby determine,
pursuant to Section 4 of the Foreign Military Sales
Act, as amended, that the extension of credit to the
Governments of Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia,
and Venezuela, in connection with the sale of F-5
military aircraft, is important to the national secu-
rity of the United States.
You are hereby requested on my behalf to report
this determination to the Congress as required by
law.
This determination shall be published in the
Federal Register.
'38 Fed Reg. 16021.
90
Department of State Bulletin
U.S. Foreign Relations in a Period of Transition
Address by Deputy Secretary Kenneth Riish '
I am sure that many of you will recall an
English play some years ago, "Look Back in
Anger." One of the many things that made
characters in the play angry was their belief
that the older generation of English leaders
handed on to them an England diminished in
its greatness, with its great tasks already be-
hind it. I would like to talk to you today of my
belief that the young Americans you are
educating will inherit an undiminished
America — an America with great tasks be-
fore it.
As with the postwar England in which
"Look Back in Anger" was set, the United
States is today in a period of transformation.
And today America's foreign relations are
in a period of transition. Change comes
quickly these days. But before describing
changes that are taking place let me pause
a moment and look back on the period we
are leaving behind, if only to reflect on its
accomplishments. In an era when doubt has
become fashionable, recent experience can be
reassuring about the ability of our nation to
deal effectively and realistically with both
problems and opportunities.
Twenty-five years ago we also lived in a
time of doubt. The cold war was entering a
very cold phase indeed, and there were those
who wondered whether the world would man-
age to avoid a nuclear war. Certainly, two
global wars in less than 30 years were not an
encouraging precedent. And even if war were
averted, our closest associates in Europe
still lay in economic ruin. There was reason
to doubt the survival of free institutions on
' Made before the Country Day School Head-
masters Association at Carlisle, Pa., on .Tune 21
(press release 221).
the continent. Some thoughtful men pondered
whether the United States could survive as
an isolated democracy.
The threats, the dangers, and the grim pos-
sibilities were apparent. There were some
who were ready to succumb to them. A little
over a decade ago a President of the United
States thought it necessary to explain that
there were other alternatives to the equations
"better red than dead" and "better dead than
red."
It has been shown that there were other
alternatives. And the grim prospects of 25
years ago have been avoided. Europe has re-
gained its economic and political vitality. In
fact, the nine members of the European Eco-
nomic Community have set for themselves the
goal of economic and political union by the
end of the decade. In Asia, Japan has
emerged from the destruction of the war
with an economy that has impressed the
world and with equally impressive democratic
institutions.
Bipartisan American foreign policy had a
great deal to do with these accomplishments.
It enabled us to support European recovery
through the Marshall plan and to assist re-
building and reform in Japan. And it made
it possible to maintain our own strength and
to engage in alliances which deterred and at
times turned back aggression.
The United States enjoyed a unique posi-
tion for much of the past quarter century.
We had sole possession of a credible nuclear
deterrent. We were the world's economic ar-
biter — you will recall the many popular
articles about the gold reserves in Fort Knox,
which at one time approached nearly 70 per-
cent of the free world's monetary gold re-
July 16, 1973
91
serves. Washington was clearly the center of
decisionmaking for the Western world. And
fear had helped weld alliances between our-
selves and our allies in Europe and Asia.
That world is now clearly receding. Europe
and Japan now have a combined GNP equal
to that of the United States and share with us
economic leadership. Political self-confidence
and natural assertiveness have accompanied
that growth. With our allies, U.S. leadership
has given way to a condition of equality. And
U.S. nuclear dominance has been supplanted
by approximate parity between ourselves and
the Soviet Union.
In the past four years President Nixon has
brought about dramatic changes that make
the fears of a quarter century ago appear re-
mote. The current visit of General Secretary
[Leonid I.] Brezhnev to the United States
emphasizes the direction of those changes.
The President's trips to Moscow and to
Peking started a process in which productive
relations are rapidly replacing confrontation
in our relations with each of these countries.
We are showing that adversaries need not
be antagonists.
Strengthening Our Relations With Allies
Change marks our relations in both Europe
and Asia. That said, it must be emphasized
that defense remains the handmaiden of
detente. As you may know, I had the priv-
ilege of serving as President Nixon's Ambas-
sador to Germany from 1969 to 1971. In that
capacity I participated in the negotiations
which produced the 1971 Berlin agreement—
an agreement which removed that city as a
permanent source of tension between East
and West. It was clear that our allies in that
negotiation gained strength from their con-
fidence in our continuing commitment to their
defense. And the Soviet Union's respect for
that commitment was no less important to
the success of that negotiation. In Asia a
similar situation prevails. For example, both
we and Japan believe that our continuing
security ties have been assets rather than
liabilities as we have gone about establishing
more normal relations with Communist coun-
tries.
92
Because we and our NATO allies enjoy
mutual confidence, we are able to proceed to-
gether with negotiations with the East that
should lower tensions across Europe without
lessening European security. Thus in early
July Secretary Rogers will join the Foreign
Ministers of 34 other nations in Helsinki.
Our objective and that of our allies is to in-
crease the movement of people, ideas, and in-
formation across the frontiers of Europe and
at the same time further establish the right
of each nation to self-determination. And in
the fall we and others will join members of
the Warsaw Pact in Vienna, where we will
pursue mutual and balanced reduction in the
forces facing each other in central Europe.
It is possible that the initial stage of these
talks could focus on U.S. and Soviet forces
stationed in the area.
The meeting of the NATO Foreign Minis-
ters attended by Secretary Rogers last week
concluded, and I quote: -
The progress being made toward better East/West
relations . . . could not have been achieved without
the unshakeable resolve of the West to defend itself
and a sound military capability to do so. . . . an ef-
fective defense system remained a fundamental pre-
requisite for further progress.
U.S. troops stationed in Europe are a vital
part of the defense system and a tender of
our resolve. We cannot unilaterally withdraw
them as some in the Congress are advocating
without weakening the chances for further
progress — and we should not forget that we
have them there for our own defense. At last
week's NATO meeting our allies agreed to
examine ways of relieving the balance of pay-
ments burden on us of maintaining those
stationed troops.
In Asia a healthy relationship between our-
selves and Japan is essential to both Asian
stability and to our role in the area. Economic
issues have produced some friction in these
relations. However, both sides are aware of
the importance of controlling these issues,
and the Japanese have taken several steps to
get at their cause.
In the future we expect to see Japan's role
in Asia continue to grow. Its economic assist-
-'See p. 89.
Department of State Bulletin
ance to and its trade with other Asian nations
have expanded greatly. Japan will be par-
ticipating in postwar reconstruction efforts
in Viet-Nam. Political relations with Peking
now more truly reflect the longstanding rela-
tions between China and Japan. And the
Japanese are contemplating long-term in-
vestment arrangements in Siberia.
In Asia we are determined to resist hegem-
ony by any one power. Japan and China are
similarly committed. If all powers who are
involved in the area are guided by the prin-
ciple that we each have a legitimate role to
play, Asia will at last enjoy the first period
of peace it has known in 40 years.
Advantages of an Open Trading System
The new economic balance between our-
selves and our partners demands attention to
our trade and financial relations. Our mutual
aim must be to enhance cooperation and rein-
force a relationship which has yielded so
much to us both. The economic strength of
Europe and Japan has made them our best
customers and also our most formidable com-
petitors. We and they both believe that world
trade is an area in which all parties gain.
Trade has in fact expanded at 8 percent a
year, twice as fast as the global economy. As
President Nixon has said, there is a great ad-
vantage to economic competition "because in
economic competition every participant can
win — there need be no losers." ' That is why
we will be working with the Europeans and
the Japanese and other nations to restructure
the world's trade and monetary system so
that they will support an expanding and
more equitable global economy. That is why,
too, it is essential that Congress approve the
trade bill President Nixon submitted to it
earlier this year. That trade bill will enable
the United States to participate effectively
in the multilateral trade negotiations that can
bring about the more open trading system
that we all seek.
There has been some concern about the
U.S. ability to compete in such an open sys-
' For an excerpt from President Nixon's economic
report transmitted to tlie Congress on Jan. .31, 1973,
see BULLETIN of Feb. 26, 1973, p. 225.
tem. Those concerns are not well founded.
Even before the exchange realignments the
United States was well able to compete in
such items as computer technology, aircraft,
heavy machineiy, petroleum, exploratory
equipment, nuclear technology, farm and
forest products. With the new currency align-
ments there are undoubtedly other areas in
which we will be competitive.
The emphasis in the United States is all
too often on the competition from abroad.
People seldom stop to think that we export
14 percent of our industrial product and 31
percent of our agricultural crop. How often
do we reflect on the fact that Canada is our
best single trading partner? Or as we con-
template Japanese goods in our stores do
we consider that: (1) Japan is our best for-
eign market after Canada; (2) Japan is our
fastest growing foreign market ; and (3) our
exports to Japan of machinery and equipment
totaled $1.2 billion, almost as much as our ex-
ports of agricultural goods?
As we seek to perfect our economic rela-
tions with our friends, each nation will be
faced with difficult decisions — decisions that
affect income, employment, and production at
home. But we will have to make those de-
cisions if we are to continue to enjoy the
benefits of an interdependent global economy.
Otherwise we will all be the poorer.
Changed Relationship With U.S.S.R. and China
While strengthening our relations with
allies, we are also seeking to elaborate and
reinforce the trend toward productive rela-
tions with our adversaries. The most impor-
tant single achievement of President Nixon's
visits to Moscow and Peking was the agree-
ment between ourselves and each of them on
a formal set of principles which would guide
our relations with each. In the intervening
period we have proceeded to elaborate that
bare structure.
Few would have imagined the speed with
which this progress has taken place in our
relations with Peking. The formal establish-
ment of Liaison Offices in each of our capitals
was a singular achievement for us both. And
this year we hope to continue to build our
July 16, 1973
93
developing economic relationship. Thus trade,
which totaled $5 million in 1971 and reached
nearly $100 million in 1972, may climb to well
over $500 million this year. The Chinese are
particularly interested in our farm products
and certain high-technology items — comput-
ers, synthetic fiber plants, and communica-
tions systems among them. This rapid in-
crease in our trade should not suggest the
existence of great untapped Chinese markets,
because the Chinese are not a major trading
nation. Nevertheless expanding trade will
contribute importantly to the more normal
relationship we both seek.
The changed relationship with the Soviet
Union is most dramatic. Americans who have
failed to catch this drama will have it driven
home this weekend when they will perhaps
view General Secretary Brezhnev addressing
them on national television. This indeed is a
development that would have seemed implau-
sible even five years ago. You of course are
daily witnessing on television and in the
press the new dimensions that are being
added to our relations with Moscow.
Accelerating the Development Process
Thus I would like to turn briefly to our
relations with the developing world, where
the United States must be a participant and
not a mere bystander.
Three-fourths of mankind lives in the de-
veloping world. Much of the world's natural
resources are in the developing world. The
diversity of the developing world is difficult
to comprehend. Levels of economic develop-
ment range from the most primitive to nearly
developed. Cultures, religions, economic,
social, and political structures are incredibly
varied.
Yet all these nations share at least two
common qualities — unacceptably high levels
of poverty and very well developed deter-
mination to be masters of their own destinies.
I think we in this country are familiar
enough with our own well-developed sense
of nationalism and with the manifestation
of that nationalism in other countries that
this asiiect of the developing world needs no
further elaboration from me. But consider
for a moment some of the facts of the devel-
oping world's poverty :
— Half the world's population is living on
$100 or less per year.
— Half of all deaths in the developing
world occur in children under six years old.
— The gap between rich and poor is widen-
ing. Per capita income in the developing
world grew by less than $50 in the 10 years
from 1960 to 1970. During the same decade
per capita income in the United States grew
by $1,000.
In the past, the United States and other
developed countries have helped several na-
tions successfully set out toward develop-
ment. The recent experience of nations as
diverse as Taiwan, Israel, and Brazil show
both that development is possible and that
developed nations can contribute usefully to
the process.
But over the next few years we, our devel-
oped partners, and the developing world are
going to have to examine the ways and the
means by which we all can contribute to ac-
celerating the development process.
Questions that are almost certain to come
up are:
— First, how can developed countries as-
sure trade opportunities in their economies
for the developing world? Expanded trade
can make the most important single contri-
bution to development. We need to make
trade opportunities available to poorer na-
tions. That is why President Nixon included
a request for authority to grant special tariff
preferences to goods from developing coun-
tries in his trade bill.
— Second, under what terms and with what
assurance are developing countries going to
seek foreign private investment? Foreign in-
vestment brings badly needed capital, tech-
nology, and managerial skills to the develop-
ing world. But it will only move into areas
where it does not fear confiscatory nation-
alization.
— Third, what should the response be of aid
donors to countries which make no reason-
able effort to limit the rate of expansion of
their population? And what are developing
94
Department of State Bulletin
countries' responsibilities in tiiis vital mat-
ter?
— Fourth, what is a reasonable balance be-
tween arms expenditures and expenditures
on development, health, and education in each
developing country?
These are some of the issues that will cer-
tainly be the subject of a dialogue between
ourselves, our allies, and the developing
world. Throughout this necessary exchange
it is essential that we in this country keep one
fact before us : that we cannot hope for the
support of the developing world on issues of
importance to us— from terrorism and drugs
to energy and new global monetary and trade
structures — if we do not convincingly demon-
strate to developing nations that we share,
support, and understand their desire to bring
a better life to their citizens.
Congress has a very important role to play
in this effort. The House Foreign Affairs
Committee, for example, has proposed some
thoughtful and constructive amendments to
the foreign aid bill. One amendment would
focus our aid on the particularly acute human
needs in developing countries such as food
and nutrition, population and health, and
education, while retaining the flexibility we
need to keep these programs effective on a
country-to-country basis. Another amend-
ment — and this one is quite imaginative —
would establish an Export Development
Credit Fund for the relatively poorest coun-
tries of the world.
Gentlemen, many of us in this room have
spent most of our adult lives in a world in
which aggression, actual or feared, was the
dominant quality of international life. Today
we face the hopeful prospect that a sense of
fear can be replaced by a sensitivity to op-
portunity — the opportunity to build a more
peaceful, a more cooperative, and more secure
world.
This is President Nixon's purpose in work-
ing with our adversaries — a process that is
being advanced during General Secretary
Brezhnev's visit. As fear recedes we are seek-
ing with our allies to continue to build a re-
lationship that gives us all so much. And we
must increasingly turn our attention to the
developing world where there is so much
potential for beneficial collaboration.
As we seek the generation of peace Presi-
dent Nixon has made his goal, we are search-
ing out new and ever broader means of en-
gagement with the world. The same broad
support that made it possible for this nation
to rise to the challenges of a quarter century
ago will enable us to seize the opportunities
before us.
In maturity, the generation you are now
educating will undoubtedly face new and dif-
ferent problems and opportunities. But if we
are equal to the tasks before us, they will do
so from an undiminished America.
U.S. and Ireland Reach Agreement
on Landing Rights
The Department of State announced on
June 11 (press release 201) that by an ex-
change of diplomatic notes at Dublin that
day, the Government of Ireland granted to
the United States landing rights at Dublin
for an airline to be designated by the U.S.
Government. The United States in its turn
restored to the Government of Ireland cer-
tain rights at New York which had been
withdrawn on August 18, 1972. The notes
were signed by U.S. Ambassador John D. J.
Moore and Irish Foreign Minister Dr. Garret
FitzGerald. (For texts of the notes, see press
release 201.)
This agreement marks the culmination of
efforts extending over many years to secure
U.S. landing rights at Dublin. U.S. airlines
have heretofore been restricted to landing at
Shannon, while the Irish airline had landing
rights at New York, Boston, and Chicago.
The addition of Dublin will improve the serv-
ices U.S. airlines can offer to travelers be-
tween the United States and Ireland.
July 16, 1973
95
The United Nations: A Mirror of the Real World
Address by John Scali
U.S. Representative to the United Nations '
It is a very special satisfaction for me to
address so large an audience of distinguished
representatives of American business and
labor. You are men and women whose con-
crete achievements in the real world of the
American economy have helped make it the
most productive economy on earth. In a real
sense you are people whose achievements
move America. At the same time I am aware
that your being here tonight demonstrates
that you are also profoundly attached to
ideals — to those cherished fundamental
American goals and dreams enshrined in our
own Constitution, which in turn have helped
inspire the Charter of the United Nations.
It is this blend of realism and idealism that
makes us proud of our national heritage as
we approach our 200th birthday. President
Nixon, in naming me U.S. Permanent Repre-
sentative to the United Nations, has charged
me with the responsibility of promoting con-
crete results within the family of the United
Nations — 132 member countries, each proud
of its identity, its cultural background, and
its right to share the riches, both spiritual
and material, of our planet.
Those of us who were young when the
United Nations was born back in 1945 in
the aftermath of a terrible war hoped that
man would be wise, creative, and inspired
enough to create a magnificent structure of
international peace. We dreamed of one that
would guard the safety of all nations, large
' Made at New York, N.Y., on June 7 before the
annual dinner of the United Nations Association of
the United States of America, Inc., inaug^urating the
national United Nations Day program (USUN press
release 52).
and small, and create a new world order. The
lofty goal was proudly proclaimed in the
charter in these words : "to practice tolerance
and live together in peace with one another
as good neighbors and to unite our strength
to maintain international peace and secu-
rity." This was and is a noble goal.
But as we look back now, 28 years later,
we recognize that perhaps our dream of uni-
versal justice exceeded the strength of the
structure we created to fulfill our yearnings.
We can see now clearly that we did not create
an instant world government. Instead what
we put in place was an international forum
where the separate, often conflicting foreign
policies of member governments collided, at
a time when the tidal wave of nationalism
became a dominant force in relations between
governments. And collide they did, with re-
sulting arguments, tension, and deadlock —
but occasional visible agreement and prog-
ress. In other words, the United Nations has
turned out to be a mirror of the real world.
As a newsman back in 1945, I watched as
the United Nations structure was put to-
gether word by word. But perhaps I and
others failed at that time to recognize that
the final structui'e laboriously pieced together
after millions of words of discussion and de-
bate and reconciling of diverging views was
a compromise, albeit the best a war-weary
mankind could devise at that time.
In those days, as a newly returned young
war correspondent, I firmly believed in the
need for a United Nations. Almost 28 tur-
bulent years later, as a man who prides him-
self in being a pragmatist, one who seeks to
specialize in what works, I can still tell you
96
Department of State Bulletin
I believe profoundly in the United Nations.
I am honored that our President has offered
me the opportunity to support his effort to
make faith in the United Nations a realistic
faith.
I am committed, and I can assure you the
President is committed, to bringing- this
about. In his most recent report to the Con-
gress, President Nixon puts it like this : "
Unable to retreat into isolation in a world made
small by technology and shared aspirations, man
has no choice but to reach out to his fellowman.
Together we must build a world order in which we
can work together to resolve our common problems.
I have observed before that this is what
the United Nations is all about. It is a truism
to say that the world community, and particu-
larly the American people, have been disap-
pointed in the achievements of the United
Nations thus far. If at times we appear to be
criticizing rather than praising the United
Nations, it is because we need it and because
we want to make it a more dynamic instru-
ment for promoting a lasting peace in a
world where nuclear weapons can incinerate
a hemisphere. Yes, nearly 28 years have gone
by. But 28 years, ladies and gentlemen, rep-
resent a speck in the march of civilization.
The Search for a Middle East Solution
At the very moment that you have con-
vened in New York, the Security Council of
the United Nations is once again grappling
with an issue that has resisted ultimate solu-
tion for 25 years — the Middle East question.
In the days ahead we will be solemnly review-
ing the agonizing history of this conflict and
searching for a solution that has defied the
wisdom and the best efforts of many distin-
guished statesmen.
Critics can rightfully claim that during
this quarter of a century the United Nations
has achieved only limited success in moderat-
ing the fear and suffering of the people of
the Middle East. Yet, even as we sit around
the United Nations conference table and ex-
- The complete text of President Nixon's foreign
policy report to the Congress on May 3 appears in
the Bulletin of June 4, 1973; the section entitled
"The United Nations" begins on p. 822.
amine this problem anew, we do so with the
assurance that the guns are silent while the
statesmen talk of a new beginning. A cease-
fire, promoted by the Government of the
United States, has stopped most of the kill-
ing for 33 months and eased the grave danger
that this conflict can engulf other nations
in a larger and bloodier war.
The fact that eight Foreign Ministers have
come to New York to join the members of
the Security Council in this new search for
peace within the Security Council Chamber
is testimony to mankind's continuing hope
that this great international organization can
move toward its most important goal as the
guarantor of peace. I cannot predict for you
tonight that this newest review of the melan-
choly history of this war will succeed. But I
can assure you that I and the members of my
delegation and, I am sure, others of good
will will do their best to bring about the kind
of negotiations between the parties that one
day will bring real peace to this region which
has known more than its share of sorrow.
I mentioned earlier that an American ini-
tiative in the United Nations framework, a
cease-fire proposed and accepted by all par-
ties, has at least provided an atmosphere
where statesmen can seek to convert this
fragile cease-fire into a permanent peace.
So I reject the judgment that the Middle
East represents a record of United Nations
failure and futility. The present Security
Council review is moving ahead under the
leadership of Ambassador Yakov Malik of
the Soviet Union, whose turn it is to preside
as President over this 15-nation organ of the
United Nations.
To many of us who are only too familiar
with the harsh, often ugly vituperation of
the cold war, it was a source of deep satisfac-
tion to hear Ambassador Malik open the de-
bate yesterday morning with words which
are new evidence of the winds of peace that
are stirring around the world. Ambassador
Malik said :
The necessity for the establishment of a just and
lasting peace in the Middle East without delay is
particularly obvious to all in the conditions of the
auspicious changes which have been achieved in the
July 16, 1973
97
international situation, the perceptible improvement
in the political climate on our planet and the con-
tinuing further easing of international tension. The
world is going through an important turnabout in
international relations, a turning away from the
dangerous tension of the cold war towards detente
and peace.
I welcome these words by Ambassador
Malik. If there is to be a lasting peace in the
Middle East, it will be partly because of co-
operation between the United States and the
Soviet Government in encouraging both sides
to negotiate their differences before it be-
comes an explosive threat to international
peace and security.
Cooperation Among the Major Powers
The words of Ambassador Malik are a re-
flection of the search for a step-by-step im-
provement in Soviet-American cooperation
for peace, to which President Nixon and Gen-
eral Secretary [Leonid I.] Brezhnev are now
committed.
As one who has stood at the President's
side for the past several years as he launched
and followed through with his historic initia-
tives to open the door to China and to Moscow
while he ended American involvement in an
agonizing war in Southeast Asia, I perhaps
can be forgiven if I give full credit to our
President for the initiatives that have led
to the improving international climates.
Within a few weeks. General Secretary
Brezhnev will be meeting face-to-face with
the President in talks that will, I am con-
fident, move us further on the road toward
a better understanding with the Soviet Gov-
ernment. This newest move, as you are
aware, comes only a few weeks after the
United States and the People's Republic of
China after years of isolation from one an-
other have set in motion a series of impor-
tant moves to normalize relations, the newest
of which is the establishment of Liaison
Oflices in each other's capitals.
I mention these bilatei-al achievements be-
cause it is inevitable that these daring, imag-
inative initiatives by our President inevitably
will be I'eflected some day in greater cooper-
ation among the major powers within the
framework of the United Nations. I am not
naive enough to believe that some reasonable,
encouraging words by Ambassador Malik in
themselves guarantee a new spirit of cooper-
ation in achieving a settlement of the Middle
East crisis. But it at least is an augury of
hope for those who believe that the success
of the United Nations depends on less rivalry
and more working together by larger nations
to help the smaller ones whose security some-
times depends on membership in the United
Nations and the conscience of mankind.
It is my belief, as a man whom it is some-
times difficult to persuade, that we could be
on the threshold of the generation of peace
to which the President has dedicated most of
his life and leadership.
I am conscious, as you are, that I am
speaking in the presence of the distinguished
Secretary General of the United Nations,
Dr. Kurt Waldheim. He knows that I hold
him and his statesmanship in great respect. I
hope he will forgive me if I turn for a mo-
ment to matters that are of special concern
to you and to me as Americans.
At a time when everyone is preoccupied
with the question of morality in public af-
fairs, let us examine briefly the role of
morality, the role of principle, in American
foreign policy. I submit that when historians
look back on these troubled years they will
discover a record of which Americans can be
proud.
As President Nixon moves with careful
planning from one foreign policy initiative to
another, to the applause of Democrats and
Republicans alike, I submit it is because this
policy is firmly grounded in morality — in the
search for an enduring peace.
In the words of the Charter of the United
Nations, the President's policy seeks "to reaf-
firm faith in fundamental human rights, in
the dignity and worth of the human person,
and in the equal rights of men and women
and of nations, large and small, to establish
conditions under which justice and respect
for the obligations arising from treaties and
other sources of international law can be
maintained. ..." This is a search for a way
to live with one another as good neighbors.
I mention this before a gathering of those
98
Department of State Bulletin
who believe in the United Nations because
the waves emanating from the success of the
President's individual initiatives will one
day make this United Nations house a
stronger, more enduring structure.
Economic Sanctions Against Rhoclesic
It is on this foundation of principle that
I hope to shape our conduct in the United
Nations. Our goal will not be a selfish short-
term one which relies on superior economic-
military might or geographic position. At the
United Nations we will seek to build on
principle liecause our tradition and our herit-
age demand it and mankind expects it.
This same concern for principle has moti-
vated our conduct in the United Nations. We
are prepared to forgo shortrun advantages to
do the momentarily unpopular thing if in so
doing we can contribute in the longer run
to a world at peace, if we can make of the
United Nations a more realistic and effective
instrument of peace.
As an example of this approach, I would
cite my recent veto of a resolution calling for
an extension of economic sanctions, now in
force against trade with Rhodesia, to cover
South Africa and Portuguese territories. I
vetoed because we were convinced the pro-
posed new sanctions would be ignored by
many countries, large and small, inevitably
weakening the credibility of the United Na-
tions.
There were those in the United Nations
who disagreed with us. I am morally certain
that time will demonstrate that our vote was
a constructive step toward liberty and jus-
tice in a troubled part of the world.
In this connection, I have respectfully in-
vited the Congress of the United States to
reconsider the amendment to the Defense
Appropriation Act which two years ago
placed the United States in open violation of
international law. At that time the Congress
voted legislation making it impossible for
the executive branch to prevent imports of
chrome and other strategic commodities from
Rhodesia as required by the Security Council,
a decision for which the United Statas voted
and which is legally binding on the United
States.
The evidence is mounting that this amend-
ment not only damages America's image and
reputation as a law-abiding nation but that
it has net economic disadvantages as well.
The United Nations Association has itself
made public studies suggesting that the
amendment's repeal would be advantageous
from the point of view of our economic
health, of increasing employment, and of the
national security. I would urge you, leaders
in American business and labor, to acquaint
yourselves with this issue and to address it.
This is only one modest issue. It is only one
example of the kind of concern for our posi-
tion in the international community to which
I would bespeak your attention. It is the na-
ture of the American political system that the
effectiveness of your representatives depends
ultimately on the wisdom and energy of the
public and its leaders. I urge you most ear-
nestly to bring that wisdom and energy to
bear on the issues before us. There is no
magic in the United Nations, but working
together we can make it increasingly effec-
tive as an instrument of peace and well-being
and, pray God, worthy of our noblest dreams.
July 16, 1973
99
THE CONGRESS
Department Gives Views on Bill Proposing Establishment
of International Commerce Service in Commerce Department
Statement by Deputy Secretary Kenneth Rush '
I appreciate the opportunity to appear be-
fore you today to present the further views
of the Department of State on the proposed
bill to establish an International Commerce
Service within the Department of Commerce.
We are also prepared to answer questions on
the other bills you are considering. This is
my first appeai-ance before your committee. I
look forward to working: with you toward the
common goal of improvement in U.S. foreign
trade.
The Department of State fully agrees with
the underlying objective of S. 1485 — export
expansion. The expansion of exports and
improvement of our balance of payments
position is a fundamental objective of U.S.
foreign policy. The administration, however,
does not agree that these ends would be bet-
ter served by the establishment of a separate
International Commerce Service.
In January of last year, Nathaniel Sam-
uels, then Deputy Under Secretary for
Economic Affairs, testified before your com-
mittee on the proposed Export Expansion
Act of 1971. This act included as title I a
provision to create an International Com-
merce Service along the lines of the Foreign
Service and to operate commercial and eco-
nomic offices abroad and in the United States.
Subsequent to the testimony of Mr. Samuels,
' Submitted to the Subcommittee on Foreign Com-
merce and Tourism of the Senate Committee on Com-
merce on June 7. The complete transcript of the
hearings will be published by the committee and
will be available from the Superintendent of Docu-
ments, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washing-
ton, D.C. 20402.
Secretary Rogers, in a letter to Senator
Inouye dated March 6, 1972, explicitly op-
posed the adoption of title I. He also sug-
gested that the committee defer consideration
of the bill pending completion of a study of
the subject by the Office of Management and
Budget (0MB).
The 0MB repoil entitled "Commercial
and Economic Representation Abroad" was
released this spring. In our view, it is a
thorough, deliberate, and impartial study. In
addition to the sound recommendations it
makes, many of which we have already begun
to implement, the re])ort presents various
organizational options. Based on this study,
the President has determined that the De-
partment of State and the Foreign Service
should retain their present responsibilities
for commercial and economic rejiresentation
abroad.
We strongly support the President's deter-
mination, for the reasons cited in the 0MB
report, which I would like to summarize:
1. A change in organization is not needed
to effect improvement in trade promotion and
business assistance activities. A major reor-
ganization would delay these improvements
and disrupt current reform effoits.
2. Present organizational arrangements
best permit the flexible application of our
overseas economic-commercial personnel to
accomplish high-priority tasks.
3. The Department of State and the For-
eign Service of the United States would re-
main fully involved in the whole range of
international economic and commercial af-
100
Department of State Bulletin
fairs and better understand them as a vital
element in our foreign relations and domestic
policy.
4. The addition of a large staff of another
agency would make the Ambassador's man-
agement and diplomatic responsibilities more
difficult. Although all aspects of the U.S. mis-
sion are under the Ambassador's formal au-
thority, in practice this authority has been
more easily and directly exercised over For-
eign Service personnel than over the over-
seas representatives of domestic departments
and agencies.
Overseas export promotion and business
assistance abroad relates directly to U.S.
foreign policy, especially as we face the
task of restructuring the international
economic and monetary system. For ex-
ample, trade with eastern Europe and the
Soviet Union depends on our government's
negotiating outstanding political as well as
economic issues with those countries. Addi-
tionally, our Foreign Service officers have
on many occasions stepped in and quietly
but effectively persuaded other governments
to take actions beneficial to U.S. business
interests or not to adopt policies harmful
to such interests.
The 0MB cited two disadvantages of re-
taining overseas commercial and economic
activities in State:
1. The feeling that Foreign Service atti-
tudes toward the importance of trade pro-
motion and business assistance programs are
firmly established, making improvement
without organizational change more difficult.
2. The fact that the many overseas respon-
sibilities and duties of the Foreign Service
may prevent appropriate priority and em-
phasis being given to business assistance and
trade promotion.
Both State and Commerce have taken steps
to improve the services to American business
overseas, taking into account many of the
points noted in the 0MB .study, in GAO | Gen-
eral Accounting Office] comment, and in our
own evaluation of current needs. Your com-
mittee has played a constructive role in this
regard, stressing the importance of the com-
mercial function and stimulating both agen-
cies to improve their performance.
Improving Economic-Commercial Activities
I would like to report to you the improve-
ments that have been and are being made in
economic and commercial activities. All
areas, including organization, personnel man-
agement, programing, and analysis have been
aflfected.
We have filled top management positions
in State with individuals who have strong
economic and commercial backgrounds:
— Our highest ranking economic position
was upgraded from Deputy Under Secretary
to Under Secretary. William Casey was se-
lected for the position. Mr. Casey has exten-
sive experience in financial and business
matters, making him particularly suited to
lead our efforts to promote trade and to ne-
gotiate a more balanced relationslii]) with our
principal trading partners.
— In February 1972, the Assistant Secre-
tary for Economic and Business Affairs posi-
tion was filled by Willis Armstrong, who
combines a very strong background in both
business and the Foreign Service.
— The Director General of the Foreign
Service, William Hall, who is responsible
for administering the Foreign Service per-
sonnel system, has economic-commercial cre-
dentials from both academic training and his
experience as Ambassador and as a senior
officer in our foreign assistance programs.
— Two Deputy Directors of Personnel,
with responsibilities for personnel policy
and recruitment, and the Chief of the Per-
sonnel Evaluation Staff, are themselves ex-
l)erienced senior economic-commercial of-
ficers.
— The Director General has also estab-
lished a special group in his office to develop
and monitoi- imj^rovements in the economic-
commercial function as these affect per-
sonnel.
— Our new Dejuity Assistant Secretary for
Commercial and Business Activities, Daniel
July 16, 1973
101
Searby, has extensive international business
experience.
We have taken actions to strengthen and
enhance the organization of commercial ac-
tivities and business assistance:
— Secretary Rogers has urged each mis-
sion to study carefully the possibility of re-
organizing its economic and commercial
work into a more fully integrated function,
as recommended in the 0MB study. Some
posts already manage themselves in this
manner. We believe the payoff is more effec-
tive implementation of trade and commercial
policies and export promotion activities.
— During meetings with our Ambassadors,
the Secretary and I, and other senior officers
of the Department, have stressed the im-
portance we attach to our economic-commer-
cial activity overseas. We have urged each of
our Ambassadors actively to participate in
trade promotion work. I believe this message
is getting through.
— Commercial coordinators have been des-
ignated in the five regional bureaus in the
Department of State. These senior Foreign
Service officers are responsible for commer-
cial programs and policies in their bureaus.
They also serve as liaison between their
bureaus and the Bureau of Economic and
Business Affairs.
— The Deputy Assistant Secretary for
Commercial and Business Activities has been
designated the senioi- officer responsible in
the Department of State for developing com-
mercial programs, managing commercial ac-
tivities, and coordinating our commercial de-
velopment efforts with other agencies, par-
ticularly the Department of Commerce. His
office serves as a home base for commercial
officers serving abroad. Mr. Searby's staff
regularly briefs and debriefs commercial of-
ficers between assignments.
— Last year, in consultation with Com-
merce, we in'epared a functional commercial
budget for presentation to the 0MB. This
budget reviewed and justified commercial re-
sources on a global rather than on a regional
basis. We plan to present a similar budget
for fiscal year 1975.
Personnel Programs
We have enhanced the attractiveness
of the economic-commercial career path
through a number of actions designed to at-
tract and hold the best talent available for
this function:
— Twenty-eight overseas posts have been
designated "commercial interest posts" and
will normally be headed by officers with an
economic-commercial specialization or by
others having significant economic-commer-
cial experience.
— It is our objective to have one-fourth of
the Deputy Chief of Mission positions filled
by oflncers with such backgrounds. Since this
objective was announced, 27 Deputy Chief of
Mission assignments have been made. Five
were economic-commercial officers, and nine
were officers from another function but with
significant economic-commercial experience.
— Assignment officers have been instructed
to assure that economic-commercial oflncers
receive full consideration for executive and
program direction positions in geographic
bureaus. These positions were formerly
reserved almost exclusively for political
oflncers.
— Overseas positions are being repro-
gramed. By June 30, 1973, we will have re-
programed 20 American positions and 16
local employee positions from other areas to
commercial activities. For example, five com-
mercial oflicer positions were recently repro-
gramed to the high-priority areas of the
U.S.S.R. and eastern Europe, which as of last
September did not have a single full-time
commercial officer.
— Senior officers posted to economic-
commercial minister positions in London,
Paris, Bonn, Rome, Saigon, and Tokyo are
now eligible to qualify for the rank of Career
Minister by virtue of this assignment.
— Recruitment efl'orts aimed at attracting
the best candidates with economic-commer-
cial credentials have been strengthened. Pub-
licity has been specially targeted at people
with business backgrounds. The written ex-
amination is being i-evised to reveal eco-
102
Department of State Bulletin
nomic-commercial expertise and potential
more fully.
We believe that State has further demon-
strated its increased emjihasis on trade pro-
motion and business assistance in personnel
evaluation:
— One of the factors now in the promotion
rating of all Foreign Service officers, what-
ever their specialty, is the demonstrated con-
cern for American business interests. Thus,
the careers of our officers are linked to their
performance in assisting U.S. business. This
is in addition to the "end-user reports" pre-
pared by the Dejiartment of Commerce on
economic-commercial officers which become
part of the officer's performance file.
— Senior officials from the Department of
Commerce serve as full members of Foreign
Service promotion panels.
— Commerce officials also participate on in-
spection teams that evaluate our overseas
missions. Our Foreign Service inspectors
have been instructed to pay i:;articular atten-
tion to the commercial performance of over-
seas missions.
Commerce Department officials continue to
participate actively in various other essential
Foreign Service personnel operations. They
work with our recruiters and examiners. One
Commerce official is physically located in
the State Department and works on a full-
time basis with our career counseling and
assignments officers. The Department of
Commerce also has a jiermanent representa-
tive on the Board of the Foreign Service,
which establishes personnel policies. We wel-
come the contributions that Commei'ce makes
through this day-to-day involvement in our
personnel system.
We recognize training as vital to the effec-
tive performance of our economic-commer-
cial officers and as a valuable rung on their
career ladders:
— A 26-week course in economics and com-
mercial affairs is offered at the Foreign Serv-
ice Institute twice each year. The course
includes major treatment of corjiorate fi-
nance, multinational operations, and the tax
framework which affects exporting and over-
seas investment. Classes average 25 officers.
— A new series of one-week seminars has
been instituted to provide senior political and
other officers with a better understanding of
economic-commercial considerations in U.S.
policy formulation.
— The senior training programs of both
the Foreign Service Institute and the Na-
tional War College are now devoting in-
creased time to the study of economic and
energy matters.
— A new six-week workshop on interna-
tional business is being developed, in consul-
tation with Commerce, for officers assigned
to commei'cial jobs. The workshop will in-
clude discussions led by businessmen, presen-
tations by qualified academics, and visits to
manufacturing plants and Commerce field
offices.
— Commerce and State now jointly plan
and fund economic-commercial conferences.
The most recent conferences were held in
Singapore and Tokyo, with an upcoming
conference in Vienna next week. We are
planning three to four regional conferences
in fiscal year 1974. We attach great im-
portance to these conferences as an effective
means of training and advising our officers
on matters being considered in Washing-
ton and oijenly hearing their views and
suggestions.
— There are plans to send 10 officers to
universities in fiscal year 1974 to study eco-
nomics and business subjects at the graduate
level. This 25 percent increase over the pres-
ent fiscal year was achieved by transferring
resources from other training functions.
— The Director General's office is actively
reviewing the State-Commerce personnel
exchange program to determine possibilities
for improving administration and for in-
creasing the number of officers exchanged
between the two agencies. The current pro-
gram, in effect since 1956, provides for an
exchange of 20 officers from each agency.
Progress in Increasing Services
For the past year we have been working
July 16, 1973
103
closely with the Department of Commerce to
improve the mechanics of commercial pro-
grams and trade promotion. In May 1972,
State and Commerce established 11 working
groups: personnel; World Traders Data Re-
port; Agent Distributor Service; trade op-
portunities program; major projects; country
commercial programs; communications; com-
puters; publications; commercial libraries;
trade inquiries.
The following are some of the specific ac-
complishments to date:
— "Early Warning" reporting by overseas
posts on prospective large foreign projects
has increased substantially.
— Trade opportunities are now in the
hands of U.S. businessmen in seven days,
compared to the previous time of 26 days. In
April 1973 an automated system of distribu-
tion by Commerce for six high-potential tar-
get industries went into operation. This
automated system will serve as a pilot model
for a fully automated subscription system for
all trade opportunities to be introduced by
Commerce in September 1973.
— The World Traders Data Report, pro-
viding U.S. businesses with credit and other
commercial information on foreign firms, has
been streamlined and made more timely by
two-way telegraphic transmission.
— The Agent Distributor Service, designed
to assist American manufacturers and ex-
porters in locating agents and distributors
in foreign markets, has been expanded world-
wide from the 35 countries available pre-
viously.
— Equipment and technical guidance has
been provided to establish a new secure com-
munications facility for direct electrical com-
munications between Commerce and State.
For several years Commerce has had direct
electrical communications with our posts
abroad for unclassified operational traffic.
— The delivery of nontelegraphic commer-
cial materials, both incoming and outgoing,
between Commerce and overseas posts has
been expedited.
Another important aspect of our commer-
cial program is to inform U.S. business of
foreign relations developments which bear on
their commercial activities abroad.
— As an example, on April 19 we hosted a
conference for 365 key business executives.
Secretary Rogers, Under Secretaries Casey
and Porter, Assistant Secretary Armstrong,
and other senior officials of the Department
participated in panel presentations which
focused on trade, investment, monetary poli-
cies, and export promotion.
— We are working with numerous other
business groups including the Chamber of
Commerce of the United States, the National
Association of Manufacturers, the Secre-
tary's Business Advisory Committee, the
United States Council of the International
Chamber of Commerce, the Pacific Basin
Economic Council, the Business Council for
International Understanding, and others, as
well as the trade promotion offices of indi-
vidual states and cities.
— Officers of all levels, when in the United
States, participate in business consultations
arranged cooperatively by State and Com-
merce. These bring the officers into direct
contact with senior businessmen and bankers
all over the country as well as with Depart-
ment of Commerce field offices.
This is a sketch of a large number of spe-
cific actions that have been initiated or given
new impetus largely since our January 1972
meeting with this committee. We are con-
fident that we have made real progress and
that economic-commercial activities have a
very high priority in the Department as well
as overseas. We have been told by many
members of the business community and by
other U.S. Government organizations that
the improvements are substantial.
New Management Tools and Programs
The immediate question is: Where do we
go from here ? Each country is a separate and
identifiable market. Specific programs must
be tailored to these markets. We believe that
each of our overseas missions should have
major responsibility for the allocation of its
104
Department of State Bulletin
resources to achieve commercial objectives in
a given country. Our officers abroad are in
daily contact and are familiar with the pe-
culiarities and commercial operations of local
markets. We intend to pay close attention to
the commercial policies and practices of for-
eign governments so that we may continue
to expand opportunities for American firms
to export and to bid successfully on overseas
projects. We are surveying the total range of
commercial resources available to the govern-
ment so as to maximize their effective use.
State and Commerce are developing jointly
a new management tool, the country com-
mercial program (CCP) . The CCP will estab-
lish commercial objectives in a given country,
set priorities and quantifiable goals, and
jirovide the framework to enable the post to
program its commercial resources accord-
ingly. The CCP will also measure the post's
commercial effectiveness. The two agencies
are well along in the development of five
pilot country commercial programs, for
Zaire, Colombia, Netherlands, Australia, and
Iran. These programs will identify key com-
mercial objectives for each country so that
all U.S. Government efforts can be coordi-
nated to meet these objectives. We expect
other agencies to become involved in this
process so that the final programs will permit
all elements of the U.S. Government overseas
to work together toward agreed goals. What
we learn by this experience will be quickly
expanded to other countries where there is a
significant U.S. commercial interest.
Simultaneously, State and Com.merce will
be concentrating on a few key commercial
countries, such as Japan, Germany, and
Brazil, to develop targeted export programs
for these major markets. These programs
will proceed in concert with basic U.S. eco-
nomic policies toward these important
trading partners.
Much of what I have said thus far con-
cerns what we and the Department of Com-
merce have done since January 1972. Dur-
ing this period our Embassies and consulates
around the world have been working for
economic policies that are fair to American
business. They have been searching out and
reporting on export and investment oppor-
tunities. They have provided prompt and
effective assistance to American firms seek-
ing major export contracts. They have been
sending back trade leads, company reports,
and assessments of agents and distributors.
They have been encouraging foreign firms to
make capital investments in the United
States which can simultaneously reduce im-
ports and provide jobs here. Our Embassies
and consulates also prepare reports on busi-
ness conditions that are often the major
source for publications distributed to the
business community by the Commerce De-
partment.
As you can see, our joint efforts with the
Department of Commerce cover an excep-
tionally wide range of services to the Ameri-
can business community. It is in the interest
of our government to insure that knowledge
of these services is as extensive as possible
so that their utility may be maximized.
A few weeks ago, several members of this
committee saw firsthand the comprehensive
balance of payments program implemented
by our Embassy in the Netherlands. It is a
fully integrated program that capitalizes on
the expertise of all mission members. It rec-
ognizes that assessing economic policy,
spotting commercial opportunities, and re-
porting on political developments are fre-
quently different aspects of the same thing.
Under the Ambassador's active leadership,
all elements of the mission are engaged in
promoting industrial exports, agricultural
exports, contract and other service income,
tourism to America, and portfolio invest-
ment.
We are pleased that committee members
were able to see our activities not only in
the Netherlands but in other countries as
well. You were able to talk with the officers
who develop information for the Export-
Import Bank and other government agencies,
who line up appropriate contacts for trade
exhibits and trade missions, and who per-
form a myriad of services for businessmen,
frequently on very short notice. We believe
July 16, 1973
105
you will agree that these officers are compe-
tent, capable, and professional and that they
view commercial objectives as a priority
task.
Obviously, however, the Foreign Service
must be backed by effective Washington
support from the Departments of State and
Commerce and other agencies. Most im-
portant of all, government efforts are with-
out avail if American business does not rise
to the challenge and vigorously engage in
export trade. The role of government in our
international economic affairs is an im-
portant one. We are determined to make it
effective. Government can set a congenial
framework for economic activity by a well-
functioning international monetary system,
export access to foreign markets, reduction
of trade barriers, and export promotion ef-
forts. But it is not the government that in-
creases exports; the primary impetus must
come from the business community.
We now have a particularly favorable
policy framework. Our government has been
pressing the governments of other countries
to open their doors more widely to U.S. ex-
ports. The trade bill now before Congress
constitutes a major initiative to expand trade
generally on a most-favored-nation multi-
lateral basis. The realignment of the value
of the dollar in relation to other major cur-
rencies means our exports are more com-
Iietitive. We have opened new markets for
our exporters in the Soviet Union and the
People's Republic of China. Other countries
have rising incomes and a high level of busi-
ness activity which should increase their ca-
pacity to absorb even larger quantities of
American products and services. It is en-
couraging to note that in April, for the first
time in 18 months, the United States enjoyed
a balance of trade surplus.
Over the longer term, the improvement of
the U.S. foreign trade ])osition will require
that we continually reassess our economy and
those of our trading partners to take advan-
tage of changing comparative advantage. Be-
cause of the changes in our economy, which
has become more service-oriented and short
on energy and raw materials, we will have
to redirect somewhat our economic and com-
mercial efforts. To encourage new investment
and capitalize on the sale of services and
high-technology exports, we must be open to
new ways of doing business, more imagina-
tive in reformulating our policies, and more
vigorous in implementing them.
We believe that the fonnulation of trade
policies, trade negotiations, monetary re-
alignments, and trade promotion should be
harnessed in tandem to provide an effective
government response to the trade imbalance
and to create a healthy international econ-
omy. Segregation of these related functions
could result in the isolation of the individual
components. Those engaged in the commer-
cial function might neglect policies and eco-
nomic analysis which have a critical bearing
on trade promotion efforts. Likewise, those
engaged in economic analysis could lose sight
of trade expansion. Our object is the inte-
gration of overseas activity to improve polit-
ical as well as economic officers in behalf
of American business. By making all the
officers in an Embassy commercially sensi-
tive, we can make them more effective in
influencing, assessing, and reporting on
economic policy.
Each aspect of foreign economic relations
is important, and each can make its maxi-
mum contribution when the whole is coor-
dinated effectively. The administration be-
lieves that the interests of the United States
are better served when our economic policies
and trade programs ai-e coordinated and
directed overseas by the Foreign Service and
the Department of State.
In conclusion, let me say that we in State
believe that we have benefited from the in-
terest that your committee has taken in our
work and that we have gained added under-
.standing of your concerns as a result.
Frankly, we have not thought, nor do we now
think, that the fragmentation of responsibil-
ity in foreign affairs that the bill would cre-
ate is wise or likely to improve the export
performance of the United States. But we
are convinced that your criticism and your
wisdom have been good for us and have con-
tributed to our doing the job that we all want
done.
106
Department of Slate Bulletin
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND CONFERENCES
U.S. Outlines Views on Future Inter-American System
Statement by Jack B. Kubisch
Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs^
I very much appreciate this opportunity to
make a general statement to this Special
Committee prior to my departure tomorrow.
If you will permit me a personal word, this
past week in Lima has been extraordinarily
interesting to me. Although I have been as-
sociated with Latin American affairs for
more than 2.5 years, I have been absent from
the hemisphere for the past two years; and
these meetings have given me a rapid rein-
troduction to the hemisphere and the state
of the inter- American system.
I do not want to make a long speech, and
in line with the consensus reached at our
first day's meeting last Wednesday, I will
not attempt to restate well-known positions
of my government on a wide range of
matters.
Mr. Chairman, gentlemen, my government
wants this committee's work to be construc-
tive and fruitful. We intend to participate
actively in the proceeding. We are prepared
to consider any proposal and examine any
issue.
We firmly believe in the need for a living
and relevant inter-American system which
is solidly based on today's realiti&s and fully
responsive to the needs and aspirations of
all the people of the Americas. We do not
believe, however, that the system should be
merely a forum for debate — although even
that has substantial merit in international
' Made at Lima on June 25 before the OAS Special
Committee To Study the Inter-American System and
To Propose Measures for Restructuring It (press re-
lease 225).
affairs. Even less do we think our meetings
should be exijloited for narrow political
purpose.
During these past few days I have been
surprised at times to observe how certain
views or policies are incorrectly attributed
to the U.S. Government. I hope I may be
allowed a brief comment on several of these.
One is that the U.S. Government desires
hegemony in this hemisphere. Gentlemen,
nothing could be farther from the truth.
Time and time again the President of the
United States, the Secretary of State, and
many other high U.S. officials have made this
quite clear. From the standpoint of the
United States it is neither practical, neces-
sary, attainable, nor in our interest to have
or to seek hegemony in this hemisphere, and
we are not seeking it. Nor do we seek depend-
ency from anyone.
I have also heard criticized our concept of
mature partnership. Let me be quite clear on
this aLso : I do not think we have successfully
arrived at such a partnership in our inter-
American relations.
But such is the goal of overall U.S. policy
in this hemisphere. We earnestly seek a con-
structive, close, rational, and cooperative re-
lationship with the other countries of the
Americas. This goal is the absolute opposite
of a policy of hegemony that has incorrectly
been attributed to us.
If we do not have such a relationship with
ail the countries of this hemisphere — al-
though I believe we do have with most of
them — nor within the inter-American system
July 16, 1973
107
as a whole, it is precisely this committee's
work and proposals that can help to i-emedy
the situation, to bring about a greater ma-
turity and reasonableness on all sides. That
is one of the challenges and one of the op-
portunities we have.
A surprising — to me, at least — amount of
misunderstanding has also arisen concerning
U.S. views of bilateralism versus multilater-
alism. Mr. Chairman, delegates, let me try to
clarify our position on this point.
My government sees both necessity and
value in interacting with other nations in a
variety of ways, depending on the nature of
the matter to be considered. Some matters
concern only two countries and are therefore
bilateral ; others concern many countries and
are multilateral in scope.
It is not at all a question of which is better,
but rather which level of relationship and
which forum is best suited to consideration
of the matter at hand. One of the principal
reasons for several recent U.S. references to
the importance of bilateral relations was to
take account of a charge often made against
the United States; namely, that we tend to
lump all the Latin American countries to-
gether in our policy formulations and do not
distinguish sufficiently among them.
Nevertheless, the broad nature of some of
our most urgent pi'oblems and objectives
clearly requires that they be addressed by
multilateral communities as a whole. Our
presence and active participation in various
bodies of the inter-American system, as in a
variety of multilateral forums all over the
world, is a reflection of the high importance
we attach to multilateralism.
The Hemispheric Community
Let me turn now to express some views as
to how my delegation envisages the inter-
American system of the future. These are
preliminary thoughts of ours and are offered
for consideration now as a contribution to
this first phase of the committee's work.
We believe that historical, geographical,
and sociopolitical forces have combined over
several centuries to shape a community of
nations in this hemisphere, one with unique
108
characteristics which distinguish it clearly
from other groupings of nations. Like a com-
munity of neighbors in a city or town, our
hemispheric community consists of individ-
uals with distinct personalities, widely vary-
ing tastes and interests, different standards
of living, diverse occupations, and different
philosophies of life. Yet there is a permanent
bond which requires that we live and work
together as a community, as well as individ-
ually, in order to advance our general well-
being.
The inter-American system, in our view,
represents the overall pattern of our relations
as a community of nations. Just as any
neighborhood must organize itself to define
certain elemental standards of behavior, to
provide community services, and to foster
harmonious relations among its members, so
too our hemispheric community has adopted
a pattern of activities which define our inter-
dependent relationship :
Its charters and treaties codify commonly
accepted standards of behavior governing our
intercourse with each other.
Its forums afford us the means of exchang-
ing ideas and viewpoints on matters of
common concern and for improving our un-
derstanding of each other.
Its organs and agencies provide us with
instruments for joining forces to deal with
specific problems or to achieve specific goals
of common interest to members of the
community.
And, ideally at least, its dispute-settlement
mechanisms should enable us to resolve the
differences and conflicts which inevitably
arise in a community of sovereign individuals
in a peaceful manner which preserves the
dignity of each individual member.
The U.S. Role Within the System
The United States considers itself to be a
member of this hemispheric community and
a participant in the pattern of relationships
which we know as the inter-American system.
Because it wishes to take part in the ac-
tivities of the community, it values the order
and definition which the instruments of the
system give to our relationship. Indeed, it
Department of State Bulletin
accords these particular value because of its
distinctive character and individuality, as an
essential means of accommodating the great
disparities in size, levels of economic devel-
opment, and interests between itself and
other members of the community.
It subscribes to the standards of behavior
embodied in the charter, including particu-
larly the principles of nonintervention and
self-determination of peoples.
It values the forums and agencies of the
system as a means whereby it can join mul-
tilaterally in the activities of the community
and thereby enhance both its own interests
and those of other members.
It takes great satisfaction from the
uniquely peaceful character which our system
of mutual security, embodied in the Rio
Treaty, has given our hemispheric commu-
nity for over a generation.
It aspires to see the community's system
of relations further refined and improved,
particularly those mechanisms aimed at re-
solving disputes and differences among indi-
vidual members, at improving coordination
and understanding through the consultative
process, and at implementing the develop-
mental efforts we have agreed to undertake
together.
We believe that the system and its various
instruments have been and continue to be of
great value to the community as a whole as
well. We strongly reject the view that the
system itself has somehow been rigged to in-
sure the predominance of the United States
and to im]5ose conditions of inferiority upon
other members of the community. To the
contrary, we believe that the system has
generally served to guard against excesses on
the part of any individual member and has
helped to keep our disparities and differing
interests within a manageable framework.
Strengthening the System
No system of relations among men or
among nations is perfect and immutable. As
circumstances change and the interests of
individual members evolve, the system itself
must adapt — and adapt promptly. We share
the desire of the members that the system
which structures our relationship reflect the
needs and realities of our association.
We would like to see the purposes and func-
tions of the various instruments of the sys-
tem more clearly defined in present-day
terms, taking into account the vast changes
in the world at large, the global character
of many of our problems, and the realistic
limits upon our ability to solve those prob-
lems by ourselves.
We would like to see new imagination and
creativity applied to the problem of resolving
disputes among members of our community,
including those involving private foreign
investment, so that these will not impinge
upon other aspects of our cooperation.
We would like to see the outward reach
of our community extended so as to encour-
age greater interchange and cooperation
with other friendly nations, taking into ac-
count the increasingly active role now being
played in the world by other members of the
community.
We would like to see a reexamination of
our basic premises regarding the system's
role and function in developmental cooper-
ation and a search for new ways of insuring
that our cooperative programs accord with
each nation's needs and priorities.
And we would like to see the management
and operations of the various organs of the
system modernized so as to prevent waste
of our limited resources, improve internal co-
ordination, increase eflnciency, guard against
duplication of effort, and enhance their
image and stature in the eyes of the peoples
of the Americas.
In our coming weeks of work, we expect
to refer more specifically to each of these
areas, and we look forward to hearing spe-
cific proposals which other delegations will
no doubt wish to advance along similar lines.
Mr. Chaii-man, delegates, we have great
faith in the future of this hemisphere and
in our joint abilities to devise a means of
living together peacefully and with mutual
benefit.
The U.S. delegation to this Special Com-
mittee has come to Lima with the intention
of giving the most serious consideration to
July 16, 1973
109
the views and proposals of every other dele-
gation, and we trust that our own views and
proposals will be received in a similar spirit.
We agree that mistakes have been made
in the past — who among us has not made
them? — and we believe the task ahead is to
learn from those mistakes and to correct
them. We are prepared to play an active part
not only in this committee's work but, con-
sistent with the desires of other member na-
tions, in the new inter-American system
that we are trying to create.
It is our firm intention that our point of
view throughout these meetings be positive,
constructive, and openminded.
U.N. Membership for FRG and GDR
Supported by United States
FoUov'ing is a statement made in the U.N.
Security Council on June 22 by William E.
Schaufele, Jr., Senior Adviser to the U.S.
Representative to the United Nations, to-
gether with the text of an announcement
issued by the U.S. Mission to the United Na-
tions on June 18.
STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR SCHAUFELE
USUN press release 61 dated June 22
My delegation wishes to associate itself
with the statements made this morning by
the Permanent Representatives of France
and the United Kingdom. We, too, are
pleased that the Federal Republic of Ger-
many and the German Democratic Republic
have submitted applications for membership
in the United Nations. My government will
continue to support those applications.
The United States views the spirit of co-
operation displayed by the consensus in the
Security Council today as a further indica-
tion that patience and good will can help
develop new relationships in areas long char-
acterized by frictions. These new relation-
ships can serve not only the cause of peace
but also the day-to-day well-being of millions
of people. This has a positive impact on the
United Nations, the two German states, and
the cause of international peace.
The United States has sought to bring
about improvements in international rela-
tions through careful negotiations, to replace
hostility with mutual understanding. Today's
action by the Security Council is evidence
that we are making significant progress to-
ward accomplishing these goals. ^ Obviously
this is not and cannot be the work of one
country or one group of countries. In the
present case we have sought to cooperate
with the Soviet Union as well as with the
Federal Republic of Germany and our other
Western allies who share with us, and with
the international community in general, a
common interest in eliminating the causes
of tension in central Europe.
The Federal Republic of Germany has
earned in this process our particular admi-
ration. Its leadership has sought — we believe
successfully — to deal constructively with na-
tional problems while taking into account the
responsibilities which it and others bear for
the maintenance of peace, stability, and
security in Europe. We can, I believe, count
on this same constructive attitude on the
part of the Federal Republic of Germany in
the work of the United Nations.
We also welcome the declared intention of
the German Democratic Republic to work un-
reservedly in fulfilling the United Nations
mission of peace and in promoting the eco-
nomic and social advancement of all peoples.
Each German state has great resources in
scientific capacity, a skilled population, and a
strong economy. Both states have indicated
a desire to be of assistance in bringing about
economic and social progress around the
' The Security Council on June 22 adopted with-
out objection a resolution (S/RES/335 (1973)) rec-
ommending to the General Assembly that the German
Democratic Republic and the Federal Republic of
Germany be admitted to membership in the United
Nations.
110
Department of State Bulletin
I
world. We are convinced that they will be
able to do so. We are particularly gratified
that as members of the United Nations they
will be able to work with each other in con-
tributing to the successful achievement of
United Nations programs and objectives.
The admission of the Federal Republic of
Germany and the German Democratic Re-
public to full United Nations membership
this fall, when they will receive the approval
of the 28th General Assembly, will add im-
portant new strength to the United Na-
tions — a development of historic importance
to this world body and to the goals it pursues
in the interests of us all.
U.S. MISSION ANNOUNCEMENT
USUN press release 60 dated June 18
The Permanent Representatives of the United
States, the United Kingdom, France, and the Soviet
Union sent to the United Nations Secretary General
on June 16 the text of a quadripartite declaration
on Germany negotiated by Ambassadors of the four
governments last fall in Berlin and issued as an
agreed text on November 9 in the respective capitals."
The four governments agreed at that time to request
that this declaration be circulated as an official doc-
ument to the members of the United Nations in con-
nection with the submission of applications for
United Nations membership by the Federal Republic
of Germany and the German Democratic Republic.
The quadripartite declaration records the agree-
ment of the four governments to support simulta-
neous admission to the United Nations of the Federal
Republic of Germany and the German Democratic
Republic and affirms that their membership shall
not affect the rights and responsibilities and related
quadripartite agreements, decisions, and practices of
the Four Powers regarding Berlin and Germany as
a whole. The declaration is an important element in
the recent series of events in Germany and has
helped open the way for the Federal Republic of
Germany and the German Democratic Republic to
apply for membership in the United Nations. The
declaration will be of immediate relevance as the
members of the United Nations consider the two
German applications.
TREATY INFORMATION
' For text of the declaration, see Bulletin of Nov.
27, 1972, p. 623; the four Representatives' letters
transmitting the declaration to the Secretary General
were circulated as U.N. docs. S/10952-5 dated June
18.
United States and El Salvador
Sign Cotton Textile Agreement
The Department of State announced on
May 30 (press release 184) that notes had
been exchanged at Washington to amend and
extend the U.S.-El Salvador bilateral cotton
textile agreement. As a result of this ex-
change of notes, up to 6.2 million square
yards equivalent of cotton textile imports
from El Salvador will be permitted entry for
the 12-month period beginning April 1, 1973.
This is a 1.1-million-square-yard increase
over the preceding year's level. The term of
the agreement is extended by two years
through March 31, 1979. (For texts of the
U.S. note dated April 10 and the El Salvador
note dated May 16, see press release 184.)
Current Actions
MULTILATERAL
Atomic Energy
Amendment of article VI of the statute of the In-
ternational Atomic Energy Agency of October 26,
1956, as amended (TIAS 3873, 5284). Done at
Vienna September 28, 1970. Entered into force
June 1, 1973.
Acceptance deposited: Switzerland, June 27, 1973.
Aviation
Convention on the international recognition of rights
in aircraft. Done at Geneva June 19, 1948. Entered
into force September 17, 1953. TIAS 2847.
Accession deposited: Libya, March 5, 1973.
Protocol relating to certain amendments to the con-
vention on international civil aviation (TIAS
1591). Done at Montreal June 14, 1954. Entered
into force December 12, 1956. TIAS 3756.
Ratifications deposited: Fiji, April 4, 1973; Iran.
February 19, 1973.
Protocol relating to amendment of the convention on
international civil aviation (TIAS 1591). Done at
July 16, 1973
in
Montreal June 21, 1961. Entered into force July
17, 1962. TIAS 5170.
Ratification deposited: Fiji, April 4, 1973.
Protocol relating to an amendment to the convention
on international civil aviation, as amended (TIAS
1591, 3756, 5170). Done at New York March 12,
1971. Entered into force January 16, 1973. TIAS
7616.
Ratification deposited: Syria, March 26, 1973.
Convention on offenses and certain other acts com-
mitted on board aircraft. Done at Tokyo Septem-
ber 14, 1963. Entered into force December 4, 1969.
TIAS 6768.
Accession deposited: Jordan, May 3, 1973.
Convention for the suppression of unlawful seizure
of aircraft. Done at The Hajrue December 16, 1970.
Entered into force October 14, 1971. TIAS 7192.
Accession deposited: Iceland, June 29, 1973.
Convention for the suppression of unla\vful acts
against the safety of civil aviation. Done at Mon-
treal September 23, 1971. Entered into force Jan-
uary 26, 1973. TIAS 7570.
Accession deposited: Iceland, June 29, 1973.
Economic Cooperation
Convention on the Organization for Economic Co-
operation and Development and supplementary
protocols Nos. 1 and 2. Signed at Paris December
14, 1960. Entered into force September 30, 1961.
TIAS 4891.
Accession deposited: New Zealand, May 29, 1973.
Narcotic Drugs
Protocol amending the single convention on narcotic
drugs, 1961 (TIAS 6298). Done at Geneva March
25, 1972.^
Ratification deposited: Brazil, May 16, 1973 (with
declaration and reservation).
Wheat
International wheat agreement, 1971. Open for sig-
nature at Washington March 29 through May 3,
1971. Entered into force June 18, 1971, with re-
spect to certain provisions, July 1, 1971, with
respect to other provisions; for the United States
July 24, 1971. TIAS 7144.
Accessio7is to the Food Aid Convention deposited:
Denmark, June 28, 1973; Ireland, June 29, 1973.
Ratification of the Wheat Trade Convention de-
posited: Federal Republic of Germany, June 27,
1973.-"
Ratification of the Food Aid Convention deposited:
Federal Republic of Germany, June 27, 1973.=
' Not in force.
"Applicable to Berlin (West).
BILATERAL
Belgium
Agreement relating to the reciprocal acceptance of
airworthiness certifications. Effected by exchange
of notes at Brussels February 12 and May 14,
1973. Entered into force May 14, 1973.
Arrangement for the acceptance of certificates of
airworthiness for imported aircraft. Effected by
exchange of notes at Brussels July 19 and Decem-
ber 3, 1957. Entered into force December 3, 1957.
TIAS 3954.
Terminated: May 14, 1973.
Iran
Agreement relating to the privileges and immunities
granted American military and non-military tech-
nicians assisting in the modernization program of
the Imperial Iranian Armed Forces. Effected by
exchange of notes at Tehran May 24 and 30, 1973.
Entered into force May 30, 1973.
Japan
Arrangement providing for Japan's financial con-
tribution for United States administrative and
related expenses for Japanese fiscal year 1973
pursuant to the mutual defense assistance agree-
ment of March 8, 1954 (TIAS 2957). EflFected by
exchange of notes at Tokyo June 19, 1973. Entered
into force June 19, 1973.
Malta
Supporting assistance loan agreement, with annex.
Signed at Valletta June 15, 1973. Entered into
force June 15, 1973.
Tunisia
Agreement for sales of agricultural commodities, re-
lating to the agreement of March 17, 1967 (TIAS
6323). Signed at Tunis June 13, 1973. Entered into
force June 13, 1973.
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
Protocol relating to the possibility of establishing a
U.S.-U.S.S.R. Chamber of Commerce. Signed at
Washington June 22, 1973. Entered into force
June 22, 1973.
Protocol relating to expansion and improvement of
commercial facilities in Washington and Moscow.
Signed at Washington June 22, 1973. Entered into
force June 22, 1973.
Protocol on questions relating to the expansion of air
services under the civil air transport agreement of
November 4, 1966, as amended and extended (TIAS
6135, 6489, 6560, 7287, 7609), with annex and
agreed services. Signed at Washington June 23,
1973. Entered into force June 23, 1973.
112
Department of State Bulletin
INDEX ./"/)/ Id, 197J Vol. LXIX. A'o. 1777
Argentina. Credit for F-5 Aircraft Sales to
Five Latin American Nations (Presidential
determination) 90
Asia. U.S. Foreign Relations in a Period of
Transition (Rush) 91
Aviation. U.S. and Ireland Reach Agreement
on Landing Rights 95
Brazil. Credit for F-5 Aircraft Sales to Five
Latin American Nations (Presidential de-
termination) 90
Chile. Credit for F-5 Aircraft Sales to Five
Latin American Nations (Presidential de-
termination) 90
(Dlombia. Credit for F-5 Aircraft Sales to
Five Latin American Nations (Presidential
determination) 90
( ongress. Department Gives Views on Bill Pro-
posing Establishment of International Com-
merce Service in Commerce Department
(Rush) 100
Department and Foreign Service. Department
Gives Views on Bill Proposing Establishment
of International Commerce Service in Com-
merce Department (Rush) 100
Developing Countries. U.S. Foreign Relations
in a Period of Transition (Rush) .... 91
Fconomic Affairs
partment Gives Views on Bill Proposing
[establishment of International Commerce
Service in Commerce Department (Rush) . . 100
•lited States and El Salvador Sign Cotton
Textile Agreement Ill
^l Salvador. United States and El Salvador
Sign Cotton Textile Agrreement Ill
hurope. U.S. Foreign Relations in a Period
of Transition (Rush) 91
I'oreign Aid. Credit for F-5 Aircraft Sales to
Five Latin American Nations (Presidential
determination) 90
Cermany. U.N. Membership for FRG and GDR
Supported by United States (Schaufele, U.S.
.Mission announcement) 110
I ri'land. U.S. and Ireland Reach Agfreement on
Landing Rights 95
Latin .\merica. U.S. Outlines Views on Future
Inter-.A.merican System (Kubisch) .... 107
Middle East
Secretary Rogers Attends CENTO and NATO
Meetings (Rogers, texts of communiques) . 81
The United Nations: A Mirror of the Real
World (Scali) 96
Military Affairs. Credit for F-5 Aircraft Sales
to Five Latin American Nations (Presiden-
tial determination) 90
North .Atlantic Treaty Organization. Secretary
Rogers Attends CENTO and NATO Meetings
(Rogers, texts of communiques) 81
Organization of American States. U.S. Outlines
Views on Future Inter-.\merican System
(Kubisch) 107
Presidential Documents. Credit for F-5 Air-
craft Sales to Five Latin American Nations
(Presidential determination) 90
Southern Rhodesia. The United Nations: A
Mirror of the Real World (Scali) .... 96
Treaty Information
Current Actions Ill
United States and El Salvador Sign Cotton
Textile Agreement Ill
U.S. and Ireland Reach Agreement on Landing
Rights 95
United Nations
The United Nations: A Mirror of the Real
World (Scali) 96
U.N. Membership for FRG and GDR Supported
by United States (Schaufele, U.S. Mission
announcement) 110
Venezuela. Credit for F-5 Aircraft Sales to
Five Latin American Nations (Presidential
determination) 90
Name Index
Kubisch, Jack B 107
Nixon, President 90
Rogers, Secretary 81
Rush, Kenneth 91, 100
Scali, John 96
Schaufele, William E., Jr 110
Check List of Department of State
Press Releases: June 25— July 1
Press releases may be obtained from the
Office of Press Relations, Department of State,
Washington, D.C. 20520.
Releases issued prior to June 25 which ap-
pear in this issue of the Bulletin are Nos. 184
of May 30, 201, 202, and 203 of June 11, 205
of June 12, 208 of June 14, 213 of June 18, 214
of June 19, and 221 of June 21.
No. Date Subject
t224 6/25 U.S.-Soviet fisheries agreement
signed at Copenhagen June 21.
225 6/25 Kubisch: OAS Special Committee,
Lima.
t226 6/27 $50 million to assist Soviet mi-
grants to Israel.
*227 6/27 Ghana selects chancery site in
International Center.
*228 6/29 Department of State Advisory
Committee on Science and For-
eign Affairs, July 13-14.
*229 6/29 Study group 4 of the U.S. Na-
tional Committee for CCIR,
July 18.
*230 6/29 U.S. Advisory Commission on In-
ternational Educational and
Cultural AiTairs, July 20.
*231 6/29 Assistant Secretary Newsoni to
visit Africa.
t232 7/1 Rogers: news confej-ence on de-
parture for CSCE.
* Not printed.
t Held for a later issue of the Bulletin.
Superintendent of Documents
U.S. covernhent printing office
WASHINGTON. O.C. 20402
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mediate attention if you write to: Director, Office
of Media Services (PA/MS), Department of State,
Washington, D.C. 20520.
\
THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BULLETIN
Volume LXIX
No. 1778
July 23, 1973
GENERAL SECRETARY BREZHNEV'S VISIT TO THE UNITED STATES
Renmrks by President Nixon and Genetxil Secretary Brezhnev 113
Text of Joint U.S.-U.S.S.R. Communiqxie 130
Neivs Conferences of Presidential Assist""* Kissinger 134
Texts of Agreements Signed During the Visit 158
THE OFFICIAL WEEKLY RECORD OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY
For index see inside hack cover
i^/^i
THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BULLET!
Vol. LXIX, No. 1778
July 23, 1973
For sale by the Superintendent of Documents
U.S. Government Printing Office
Washington, D.C. 20402
PRICE:
52 issues plus semiannual indexes,
domestic S29. foreign $36.25
Single copy 65 cents
Use of funds for printing this publication ap-
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note: Contents of this publication arc not
copyrighted and items contained herein may be
reprinted. Citation of the DEPARTMENT OF
STATE BULLETIN as the source will be
appreciated. The BULLETIN is indexed in
the Readers' Guide to Periodical Literature.
The Department of State BULLETIN
a weekly publication isatied by th
OtHee of Media Services, Bureau of
Public Affairs, provides tfie public and
interested agencies of tfie government
uitfi information on developments i/i£
tfie field of UJS. foreign relations ant^
on tfie work of tfie Department ani^
tfie Foreign Service.
Tfie BULLETIN includes selectei
press releases on foreign policy, issuea
by tfie Wfiite House and tfie Depart-
ment, and statements, addresses,
and news conferences of tfie President
and tfie Secretary of State and otfier
officers of tfie Department, as well as
special articles on various ptiases of
international affairs and tfie functions
of tfie Department. Information is in-
cluded concerning treaties and intet'^ i
national agreements to wfiicli tfijf\
United States is or may become a
party and on treaties of general inter-^
national interest.
Publications of tfie Department of|
State. United Nations documents, ani
legislative material in tfie field of
international relations are also listed.
I
General Secretary Brezhnev Visits the United States
Leonid I. Brezhnev, General Secretary of the Central Com-
mittee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, arrived in
the United States on June 16 for an official visit June 18-25.
Folloiving are remarks by President Nixon and General Secre-
tary Brezhnev at a welcoyning ceremony on the South Lawn of
the White House on June 18; their exchanges of toasts at a din-
ner at the White House on June 18 and at a dinner at the Soviet
Embassy on June 21: their remarks at a poolside reception at
the Western White House at San Clemente, Calif., on June 23 and
at a departure ceremony there on June 2h; an address by General
Secretary Brezhnev broadcast on television and radio on June
2i; and the text of a joint communique released on June 25 upon
General Secretary Brezhnev's departure from the United States.
REMARKS AT WELCOMING CEREMONY
AT THE WHITE HOUSE, JUNE 18
Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated June 25
President Nixon
Mr. General Secretary and all of our dis-
tinguished guests : Mr. Brezhnev, it is a very
great honor for me to welcome you on your
first visit to the United States. It was just a
year ago that we met in Moscow, and on that
occasion we entered into a number of agree-
ments that changed the relationship between
our two great countries in a very profound
way.
What has happened since those agreements
have been entered into, and the preparations
that have been made over many, many
months, the correspondence that we have
had, and other meetings, lead me to conclude
that this year at the summit in Washington
we will not only build on the foundation that
we laid last year but that we have the op-
portunity to make even greater progress than
we made last year toward the goals that we
share in common — the goals of better rela-
tions between our two governments, a better
life for our people, the Russian people, the
American people, and above all, the goal that
goes beyond our two countries, but to the
whole world— the goal of lifting the burden
of armaments from the world and building
a structure of peace.
As you know, Mr. General Secretary, these
television cameras mean that right now mil-
lions in America and millions in the Soviet
Union are seeing us as we appear together
and as we speak.
I could also add that not only are the Rus-
sian people, the Soviet people, and the Amer-
ican people watching, but all the world is
watching as we meet on this occasion, be-
cause the people of the world know that if
the leaders of the two most powerful nations
of the world can work together and their
governments can work together, the chance
for a world of peace is infinitely increased.
The hopes of the world rest with us at this
time in the meetings that we will have. I am
confident, Mr. General Secretary, that in our
meetings this week we shall not disappoint
those hopes.
July 23, 1973
113
We wish you a good stay in our country,
but above all, on this, which is a trip of such
great significance to our two peoples and to
the world, we trust that at the end not only
the Soviet people and the American people
but the people of the world will look on this
event as a great step forward in the goal we
all want — not only peace between our two
countries but peace and progress for all the
people of the world.
General Secretary Brezhnev'
Esteemed Mr. President, esteemed Mrs.
Nixon, ladies and gentlemen : I am happy to
have a new meeting with you, Mr. President,
and I thank you for the warm words ad-
dressed to us, representatives of the Union
of Soviet Socialist Republics.
This is my first visit to your country, my
first direct acquaintance with America and
the American people. We have made a long
journey from Moscow to Washington. Our
two capitals are separated by over 6,000
miles.
But international politics has its own con-
cepts of relativity, not covered by Einstein's
theory. The distances between our countries
are shrinking, not only because we travel
aboard modern aircraft following a well-
charted route but also because we share one
great goal, which is to insure a lasting peace
for the peoples of our countries and to
strengthen security on our planet.
One year ago in Moscow we jointly took a
major step in that direction. The results of
our first meeting laid a good and reliable
foundation for peaceful relations between
our two countries.
But even then we both took the view that,
building on that foundation, we should move
further ahead. During the past year a good
beginning has been made in that sense. And
now we regard our visit to the United States
and the forthcoming meetings with you as an
expression of our common determination to
make a new contribution to what was jointly
initiated.
I and my comrades who have come with me
' General Secretary Brezhnev spoke in Russian
on all occasions.
are prepared to work hard to insure that the
talks we will have with you, Mr. President,
and with other American statesmen justify
the hopes of our peoples and serve the inter-
ests of a peaceful future for all mankind.
EXCHANGE OF TOASTS AT A DINNER
AT THE WHITE HOUSE, JUNE 18
Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated June 25
President Nixon
Mr. General Secretary, members of the
Soviet delegation, and all of our distinguished
guests and friends : As all of these lights
were turned on, the General Secretary, with
his delightful sense of humor, said, "At the
end of the dinner, Mr. President, you de-
cided to fry our guests."
As all of you came through the receiving
line tonight, the General Secretary noted that
you came from all parts of the country, from
both political parties, from business, from
labor, from all segments of our society. And
the question that he asked on several occa-
sions was whether the individuals concerned
supported the new initiatives with regard to
Soviet-American friendship and cooperation
which we have undertaken. And I would like
to say to our very distinguished guest tonight
that not only in this room but across this
country, regardless of political party, regard-
less of whatever the organization may be, the
overwhelming number of Americans support
the objective of Soviet-American friendship.
Now, I am told that in the Ukraine, where
we were so very well received on our visit to
Kiev last year and where our guest of honor
this evening lived as a young man, there is
a proverb which says, "Praise the day in the
evening."
I take this bit of advice as my text this
evening for a few reflections on the first day
of the very important week of meetings and
also on the first year of an historic new de-
parture in the relations between the United
States and the Soviet Union.
The results of our discussions today allow
us to praise, indeed, our day today. We have
resumed the talks that ended just over a year
ago. We have resumed those talks on a new
114
Department of State Bulletin
foundation of significant accomplishments in
reshaping relations between our two peoples
and between our two countries. Our common
starting point was the document that you,
Mr. Brezhnev, and I signed on May 29, 1972,
in which we agreed on basic principles of our
relations and the agreements to limit strate-
gic weapons.- On this basis, a year ago we
set a course toward a move constructive and
mutually beneficial relationship.
We have been able to embark on this course
because we have recognized certain funda-
mental factors. We have recognized that
despite the differences in our ideology and
our social systems, we can develop normal
relations. We have agreed that in the nuclear
age there is no alternative to a policy of peace
for any nation. We have recognized that we
have special responsibilities to work for the
removal of the danger of war, and of nuclear
war in particular. We have accepted the
great task of limiting strategic arms. We
have recognized that our responsibilities in-
clude the scrupulous respect for the rights
of all countries, large or small.
Today, in the discussions we have had, we
have reconfirmed these principles. We have
laid the groundwork for a significant im-
provement in our relations that will result
from the discussions and agreements under-
taken this week.
We receive you and your colleagues to-
night, and for this week, with the firm inten-
tion of building on our past successes. A
year ago, when I reported to the Congress
upon my return from the Soviet Union, I
described the principles we had agreed to as
a roadmap — a map which would be useful
only if both our two countries followed it
faithfully. Tonight, looking back over the
first 12 months of our journey along the
route which that map marks out, I believe
there is good reason to be encouraged. Now
we have another profound opportunity to
advance along this course that we set for
ourselves in Moscow a year ago.
It is America's hope that the coming days
of our meetings will carry forward the prom-
- For text of the basic principles, see Bulletin
of June 26, 1972, p. 898.
ising start that we have made on this first
day.
Our two peoples want peace. We have a
special responsibility to insure that our re-
lations—relations between the two strongest
countries in the world— are directed firmly
toward world peace.
Our success will come to be measured not
only in years but in decades and in genera-
tions and probably centuries.
Mr. General Secretary, many American
Presidents and many very distinguished for-
eign leaders over a period of 180 years have
dined together in this room, and they have
worked together for peace within these walls.
But none of them, 1 believe, have borne a
heavier responsibility or faced a more mag-
nificent opportunity than we do today and
this week.
The question is: Shall the world's two
strongest nations constantly confront one
another in areas which might lead to war,
or shall we work together for peace? The
world watches and listens this week to see
what our answer is to that question. Mr.
General Secretary, I know that your answer,
based on our acquaintanceship and our dis-
cussions today and a year ago, is the same as
mine to that question. We shall be worthy of
the hopes of people everywhere that the
world's two strongest nations will work to-
gether for the cause of peace and friendship
among all peoples regardless of differences
in political philosophy.
So to all of our distinguished guests, will
you join me in a toast to the General Secre-
tary, his colleagues, to the friendship of the
Soviet and American peoples, and peace be-
tween our countries and among all nations.
General Secretary Brezhnev
Esteemed Mr. President, esteemed Mrs.
Nixon, ladies and gentlemen : Permit me first
of all to thank you, Mr. President, for the in-
vitation to visit your country, for the kind
words you have just said here, and for the
hospitality you are according us on the soil
of the United States.
Taking this opportunity, I should like to
say that it gives me great satisfaction to be
able to continue my talks with you aimed at
July 23, 1973
115
the further improvement of Soviet- American
relations initiated in Moscow in May of last
year.
The time that has elapsed since our Mos-
cow meeting has, I feel, convincingly con-
firmed the correctness of the jointly taken
line of invigorating the relations between
the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A. and of reshaping
them in accordance with the principles of
peaceful coexistence which were set out in
the document you and I signed a year ago. I
trust you will agree, Mr. President, that we
are on the right track, as it is one that meets
the fundamental interests of the peoples of
our countries and of all mankind.
And what has already been done and is
being done to give effect to the basic prin-
ciples of mutual relations between our coun-
tries laid down in Moscow is of no small
significance. Life is the best counselor. The
results of the past year suggest the direction
for further advance. They inspire us to take,
in the course of this meeting, new major
steps and give Soviet-American relations
greater stability and thereby increase the
contribution of our countries to the cause
of peace and international detente.
Of course, the reshaping of Soviet-Amer-
ican relations is not an easy task. And the
crux of the matter lies not only in the fact
that the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A. have differ-
ent social systems. What is also required is
to overcome the inertia of the cold war and
its aftereffects in international affairs and
in the minds of men.
However, mankind's development requires
positive and constructive ideas. I am con-
vinced, therefore, that the more persistently
and speedily we move toward the mutually
advantageous development of Soviet-Amer-
ican relations, the more tangible will be the
great benefits of this for the peoples of our
countries and the greater will be the number
of those in favor of such a development, and
they are known to be in the majority even
today. That is why we are in favor of build-
ing relations between the Soviet Union and
the United States on a properly large scale
and a long-term basis.
We have come here to Washington with a
firm desire to give, together with the leaders
of the United States, a new and powerful
impetus to the development of Soviet-
American relations along precisely those
lines, and this fully accords with the peace
program adopted by the 24th congress of
our party. In its resolution, the congress
stressed in the most definite terms the Soviet
Union's readiness to develop relations with
the United States of America proceeding
from the assumption that this meets both
the interests of the Soviet and American
peoples and the interests of universal peace.
I would like our American partners and all .
Americans to be fully aware that this de- I
cision by the supreme forum of our party, the
ruling i)arty of the Soviet Union, reflects the
fundamental position of principle of the So-
viet Government and of our entire people
in matters bearing on relations with the
United States of America. And that deter-
mines the policy we are pursuing.
In today's discussion with the President,
I spoke of the favorable feelings of our
people in all parts of the country as regards
the decisions taken last year during our sum-
mit meeting in Moscow, and I spoke of the
friendly feelings, the desire of the Soviet
people for friendship with the United States.
Now, Mr. President, the peoples are indeed
expecting a great deal from our new meet-
ing. And I believe it is our duty to live up to
these expectations. The first discussions we
have had with you here at the White House
do, I feel, confirm that this is the mutual de-
sire of both sides.
And I would venture in this connection to
express the hope, and even the confidence,
that our present meeting will play an impoi'-
tant role in further strengthening mutually
advantageous cooperation between our coun-
tries and in improving the international cli-
mate as a whole.
And let me make one more point. It is well
known that the initiated process of bettering
Soviet-American relations is evoking a broad
response throughout the world. Most com-
ments indicate that the peoples and the
governments of other countries are welcom-
ing this improvement. And this is quite
natural. They see in it an encouraging factor
for the invigoration of the international sit-
116
Department of State Bulletin
uation as a whole and a major contribution
by the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A. to a stronger
universal peace.
It is absolutely clear to anyone who is at
least slightly familiar with the real course
of events and with the real nature of the
development of Soviet-American relations
that their improvement in no way prejudices
the interests of any third country.
Naturally, the development of good rela-
tions between the Soviet Union and the
United States will have, and already has, no
small a bearing on world affairs. But this in-
fluence is one that promotes the strengthen-
ing of peace, security, and international co-
operation. In building through joint effort a
new structure of peaceful relations, we have
no intention of turning it into a secluded
mansion completely fenced off from the out-
side world. We want to keep this spacious
edifice open to all those who cherish the peace
and well-being of mankind.
Mr. President, present-day political reali-
ties show in practice how arduous and toilful
can at times be the tasks involved in carry-
ing out the foreign policy of nations. But
when our thoughts and practical deeds are
directed toward achieving the noble goals of
peace, the burden is not oppressive, but
rather gives strength and confidence.
The start of our negotiations — and I have
in mind both their content and the atmos-
phere in which they are proceeding — gives
reason to hope that their results will be fruit-
ful and will become a new landmark in
Soviet-American relations.
Ladies and gentlemen, permit me to offer
a toast to the health of the President of the
United States of America and Mrs. Nixon,
to the health of all the members of the Amer-
ican Government present here, to all Ameri-
cans who support the great and noble cause
of peace among nations.
EXCHANGE OF TOASTS AT A DINNER
AT THE SOVIET EMBASSY, JUNE 21
Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated June 25
General Secretary Brezhnev
Esteemed Mr. President, esteemed Mrs.
Nixon, ladies and gentlemen, comrades : To-
night it is my very pleasant duty to welcome
you, Mr. President, and your wife and mem-
bers of the U.S. Government and other dis-
tinguished American guests here at the So-
viet Embassy in Washington.
On behalf of my comrades and myself, I
would like first of all to cordially thank you
personally, Mr. President and Mrs. Nixon,
and other members of your family, for the
warmth and consideration with which you
have been surrounding us from the very start
of our visit to your country.
At the same time I would like to say that
we are grateful to all Americans who have
shown their friendly feelings toward us and
taken a lively interest in our visit and our
negotiations. In all this we see a confirmation
of the respect harbored by the people of the
United States toward Soviet people and evi-
dence of the mutual desire of our two peoples
to live together in peace and friendship.
An awareness of our high duty and respon-
sibility is permeating the entire course of our
meetings. Our talks bear the hallmark of a
vigorous pace, a broad scope, and a business-
like and constructive spirit. Each day, all
this is yielding tangible results, bringing us
closer to the jointly set objectives of securing
a further major advance in the development
of Soviet-American relations, of lessening
the threat of war, and of strengthening peace
and security on our planet.
The contribution made by our two nations
to the attainment of this paramount goal
will undoubtedly raise Soviet-American re-
lations to a new level. In May of last year
we agreed that in the nuclear age there is
no alternative to conducting relations be-
tween our countries on the basis of peaceful
coexistence. We can now confidently say that
this fundamental principle is being increas-
ingly imbued with concrete substance.
We are convinced that the results of our
talks will strengthen still more the relations
of peace and mutual trust between the Soviet
Union and the United States. At the same
time, new vistas will be opened for the con-
structive development of those relations.
The new step forward which it has proved
possible to take through joint efforts in so
vitally important and at once so complex a
July 23, 1973
117
problem as the limitation of Soviet and
American strategic arms is also something
that cannot fail to cause satisfaction.
The agreement achieved on the basic prin-
ciples for further negotiations on this prob-
lem contains everything to give a new
impetus and a clear direction to joint work
on important agreements designed not only
to curb but also to reverse the race of the
most formidable and costly types of rocket
nuclear arms and thus to permit our coun-
tries to switch more resources to constructive
purposes and use them to better man's life.
Atomic energy, too, must ever increasingly
serve the aims of peace. The readiness of our
two nations to promote that objective through
joint efforts has been reflected in the agree-
ment on cooperation in the field of the peace-
ful uses of atomic energy which President
Nixon and I also signed today.
In pursuance of the line jointly initiated
during last year's meeting in Moscow, a new
series of agreements on cooperation between
the U.S.S.R. and the United States in several
other fields of science, technology, and cul-
ture was signed in the course of this visit.
This we also value highly. It will give Soviet-
American relations still greater diversity and
stability. At the same time, we are sure the
development of such cooperation will benefit
other peoples, too, since it is aimed at solving
problems that are important for all mankind.
Of course, in the relations between our two
countries there are still quite a few out-
standing problems and, I would say, some
unfinished business. In particular this relates
to the sphere of strategic arms limitation
and also to commercial and economic matters.
We are optimists, and we believe that the
very course of events and an awareness of
concrete interests will prompt the conclusion
that the future of our relations rests on their
comprehensive and mutually advantageous
development for the benefit of the present
and coming generations.
But I wish especially to emphasize that we
are convinced that on the basis of growing
mutual confidence we can steadily move
ahead. We want the further development of
our relations to become a maximally stable
process, and what is more, an irreversible
one.
Mr. President, in our discussions — and we
value their businesslike and constructive
character — I have already had an opportunity
to tell you, and I want to repeat this for the
benefit of all the American guests present
here tonight, that the Soviet Union's line at
improving relations with the United States
is not some temporary phenomenon. It is a
firm and consistent line reflecting the per-
manent principles of Soviet foreign policy
formulated by the great founder of the So-
viet state, V. I. Lenin. It is a line that rasts
on the full support of our people. I
Soviet people believe that most Americans, •
too, approve of the jointly initiated line
aimed at strengthening peace and coopera-
tion between the peoples of the Soviet Union .
and of the United States. |
Unfortunately the tight schedule of our
talks has not left me much of a chance to
learn more about your great country and to
get a closer look at the life of Americans. But
the little I have managed to see seemed to
me to be very interesting indeed. To some ex-
tent I hope to be able to fill in that gap when,
at your invitation, Mr. President, we go to
the west coast of the United States, to Cali-
fornia, long famous for the beauty of its na-
ture and more recently for its surging
indu.strial development.
I would like to use this very pleasant op-
portunity when we are all together here at
the Soviet Embassy to confirm the invitation
conveyed to you, Mr. President, on behalf of
the Presidium of the U.S.S.R. Supreme
Soviet and the Soviet Government to make an
ofl^cial visit to the Soviet Union in 1974. I
am confident that your new trip to the Soviet
Union will also mark another important stage
in the successful development of relations
between our two countries. We will be happy
to repay the hospitality shown to us by the
President, the government, and the people of
the United States.
And permit me to express the hope that
this time, Mr. President, you will familiarize
yourself moi-e closely with our country and
with its nature and with the life of Soviet
people.
118
Department of State Bulletin
The cause of developing Soviet-American
relations is indeed moving forward. In two
years Soviet and American astronauts will
fly into outer space to carry out the first
major joint experiment in man's history.
Now they know that from up there in space
our planet looks even more beautiful, though
small. It is big enough for us to live in peace,
but too small to be subjected to the threat of
nuclear war.
I shall be making no mistake if I say that
the spirit of our talks and the main direction
of our joint efforts were determined by an
awareness of one major factor: Everything
must be done for the peoples of the world to
live free from war, to live in security, co-
operation, and communication with one an-
other. That is the imperative command of
the times, and to that aim we must dedicate
our joint efforts.
Allow me to propose this toast to the health
of the President of the United States of
America and Mrs. Nixon, to the further suc-
cess of the great cause which we have suc-
ceeded in advancing during our present
meeting, to the docking on earth as well as in
outer space of man's efforts and talents for
the good of the peoples, to peace, friendship,
and cooperation between the Soviet and
American peoples, to peace throughout the
world.
President Nixon
Mr. General Secretary, our hosts from the
Soviet Union, and all of our friends from the
United States : We want to express our ap-
preciation to you, Mr. General Secretary, and
to our hosts for this splendid dinner. There
is a saying in our country on occasion when
one is a guest, "Make yourself at home." To-
night we had that somewhat reversed, be-
cause Mrs. Dobrynin told me that all the
things that were served tonight, including
the wines in this magnificent banquet, were
brought from the Soviet Union. So we had a
chance this evening to be, in a sense, in the
Soviet Union, and we thank her for her
thoughtfulness in giving us that opportunity.
On this occasion I am reminded of the fact
that it marks several events. This is the last
day that Secretary Rogers will be 59 years
of age. He will be 60 tomorrow ; so we wish
him a happy birthday in advance. Also, Mr.
General Secretary, this happens to be the
33d wedding anniversary for Mrs. Nixon
and me, and we appreciate your arranging
this dinner on this occasion.
And of course, as you know, all over the
world June 21 is the longest day in the year.
I remember just a little over a year ago a
very long day, almost as long as the longest
day in the year. Just before midnight, Mr.
General Secretaiy, you and I signed the first
agreement on limiting nuclear arms in the
Kremlin. To show how our relations have
moved forward since that time, we signed
the second agreement with regard to limiting
nuclear arms at 12 :30, in the middle of the
day, today.
And in addition to that, as you pointed out
in your remarks, we signed a parallel agree-
ment with regard to cooperation in the field
of the peaceful uses of atomic energy.
You have spoken eloquently about these
two agreements. There is little I can add ex-
cept to say that all of us know that this
enormous source of nuclear power can either
destroy the world or it can build a new world
with the peaceful energy which can be un-
leashed for the benefit of all mankind.
Today we have taken a very important step
in limiting the power of destruction and in
unleashing the power of creation.
As idealistic men — and I know, Mr. Gen-
eral Secretary, from our long talks in Mos-
cow and the talks we have had at Camp
David and here in Washington, we both share
the ideal of building a world of peace — we are
pleased with the progress we have made so
far in the agreements that we have signed in
limitation of nuclear arms. But as practical
men, as we are both practical men, we realize
that we have taken two steps but there is
still a long way to go. We recognize that we
must dedicate ourselves toward going further
in not only limiting this great power of de-
struction but also of eventually, we trust,
reducing the burden of arms which bears
down so heavily on the world and on our two
peoples.
This will not come easily. It will come
only after extensive negotiation. But with
July 23, 1973
119
continued contact, with continued discussion
such as the kind of discussions that we have
had on this occasion and in Moscow a year
ago, we can move forward in that direction
between our two countries and thereby set
an example for other countries in the world.
And for that reason, it is with a great deal
of pleasure that I accept the very generous
invitation you have extended for me to re-
turn to Moscow next year for a third meeting.
In that third meeting I will of course look
forward to what will be my fifth visit to the
Soviet Union, to see more of your country
and to meet more of your people, but also I
shall look forward again to the kind of dis-
cussions we have had on this occasion and
concrete results toward the goal that we have
dedicated ourselves to jointly on this occa-
sion — the goal of not only better relations
behveen our two countries, not only peace be-
tween our two countries, but recognizing the
rights of all countries, large and small, to
live in a world of peace without threat from
any of their neighbors.
It is this goal to which we are dedicated.
And if our two great countries can set an
example in this direction and have concrete
results following it in the various meetings
that we will have, perhaps annually, it means
that a great step will be taken toward the
objective that we all share.
I would not for one moment suggest to
this audience, or to those who may be listen-
ing on television or radio, that one meeting
or two meetings at the summit brings instant
peace, instant relaxation of tensions, and
instant reduction or limitation of arms.
But I do know this : that these two summit
meetings have brought us closer together,
have brought greater understanding of our
differences and greater determination to re-
duce those differences, and certainly, at the
very least, to solve those differences without
confrontation. And this indeed is an historic
change in the relations between our two
countries which the General Secretary and I
are dedicated to continue.
And now, ladies and gentlemen, here in the
Soviet Embassy, it is my privilege to return
the toast that the General Secretary has
given.
On this occasion, I, in addition to asking
you to drink to his health — he obviously be-
ing our host, being the ranking guest — I
think it is appropriate also to drink to the
health of those who have been in this city
so many years as the Ambassador, Ambassa-
dor Dobrynin and Mrs. Dobrynin, to Foreign
Minister Gromyko, who has also been in our
city and knows our country so well, and so
many others of our Soviet guests. You have
made us feel, tonight, most welcome. And we
can only say that, as we drink to your health,
we drink to it not simply in the casual way
that one raises a glass of champagne, be it
California or New York or French or, in this
case, Russian champagne, but we drink to
your health, having in mind what you have
said and what I have tried to reaffirm: the
desire of the two strongest nations in the
world, through their top leaders, to work
together for peace rather than for continued
confrontation which could lead to destruction.
This is a goal worthy of great nations, and
it is a goal that we are proud, Mr. General
Secretary, to work with you so that we can
achieve it for the benefit of the Soviet people,
of the American people, and all of the people
of this world.
Now, ladies and gentlemen, since we can't
repeat all those words in raising our glasses,
may I suggest, to Mr. Brezhnev and to Mrs.
Brezhnev, who could not be here but who
talked on the telephone with him today, to
their children, and all of our children : Mr.
Brezhnev.
General Secretary Brezhnev
Mr. President, and ladies and gentlemen,
and dear guests : Believe me, I am not trying
to make a new, long toast. [Laughter.] But
let me just add to the kind words said here
by the President and to what I said a little
earlier that great ideas bear fruit in the form
of a great will and great energy and vigor,
and I therefore want to assure you, Mr. Pres-
ident, and the American Government and the
American people — and I trust that the Pres-
ident will reciprocate my feelings — that we
for our part will go on working toward this
great goal that we have set ourselves with
great vigor and energy, a great goal that we
120
Department of State Bulletin
both mentioned in our remarks a little while
ago. And therefore permit me yet again, with
great sincerity, to ask you to join me in a
toast to the very good health of the Presi-
dent and to the great vigor of both our
countries in our efforts to reach our goal of
peace and cooperation.
EXCHANGE OF REMARKS AT A RECEPTION
AT SAN CLEMENTE, CALIF., JUNE 23
White House press release (San Clementel dated June 23
President Nixon
Mr. General Secretary and all of our dis-
tinguished guests : We have met in Washing-
ton and also at Camp David, and as this
historic week is concluded we think it is most
appropriate that we meet here in California.
Mr. General Secretary, I told you a lot
about California, our most populous State,
our most diverse State. There are 20 million
people who would like to be here tonight to
welcome you, but these are representative of
California, and they receive you, as you note,
very warmly.
As you have pointed out, the name of this
house is La Casa Pacifica, which means "The
House of Peace," and in Russian, I just heard
him translate it, that is Dom Mira.
The General Secretary thought this was a
particularly appropriate place— this house
and this State on the Pacific— to have our
concluding talks. We believe that the agree-
ments that we have reached this week will
contribute to the peaceful world that every-
body here wants and that the General Secre-
tary and I have been working for in our
respective positions.
As we look back to this day, we hope that
this name, "The House of Peace," will be a
reality— a reality in terms of the agreements
that have been reached and in terms of the
promise those agreements mean for not just
the Soviet people and the American people
but for all the people of the world.
Mr. General Secretary, we are going to
meet all the guests, but I should point out to
our guests that we will have in our receiving
line, in addition to Mrs. Nixon and the General
Secretary, Foreign Minister Gromyko, Am-
bassador and Mrs. Dobrynin, both of whom
have come from Washington, and Secretary
of State and Mrs. Rogers.
Incidentally, the Secretary of State is cel-
ebrating his birthday, and nobody has cele-
brated his 60th birthday more often and in
more auspicious places than the Secretary of
State. We celebrated it Wednesday when the
General Secretary toasted him two days in
advance at Camp David. The next day we
celebrated it in the Soviet Embassy at the
brilliant dinner party given there when both
the General Secretary and I toasted him,
thinking that was either the day or the day
before. We finally learned from Mrs. Rogers
that today is the day, so we say, "Happy
birthday to the Secretary of State."
Then, finally, in this distinguished com-
pany, our leaders from political and business
life, as well as some of the people that both
of us have seen and admired on the screen.
I find in my personal chats with the General
Secretary that he likes western movies as well
as some others, but he likes westerns in par-
ticular, and so do I. We have several western
movie stars that you will recognize. But be-
cause this is a house of peace, everyone of
them has checked his holster belt with the
pistols at the door before he came in. [Laugh-
ter.]
General Secretary Brezhnev
Ladies and gentlemen, I have spent already
several days in the United States of America.
Every day President Nixon arranges for me
and for the comrades who are accompanying
me on this trip new surprises. I would also
say that we are conducting very necessary
and important negotiations and we have al-
ready managed to sign quite important
agreements which are confirming and con-
solidating the good, friendly relations which
are existing between our peoples and between
our states, and I might stress that especially
significant in this respect is the agreement
we have concluded yesterday on the preven-
tion of nuclear war.
Every day I meet old acquaintances in
America and I make new friendships, and
this is a fact which is a fact of great pleasure.
July 23, 1973
121
I would like to stress that it is important
that today I am here in the home of the Pres-
ident and Mrs. Nixon, and I feel happy. We
are continuing with our serious and beneficial
work here, and we have spent many hours in
businesslike negotiations.
Today, here on the territory of California
near to the home of the President, I have
addressed the American people through
American television. I am not sure when
they will have this program, today or to-
morrow, but when you see it you will hear
my thoughts and the thoughts of the Soviet
people.
I would very much like that the name of
this house. La Casa Pacifica, would be sym-
bolic. I would very much like that our rela-
tions go down in history as relations of peace,
of friendship, of mutual respect between our
peoples so that there is no more war.
And in conclusion, I would like to exprass
my gratitude to the President and Mrs. Nix-
on for this wonderful party which he ar-
ranged for us today. I believe that this
gathering will permit me to acquaint myself
with the representatives of various walks of
life, of various professions, and I feel very
happy and grateful.
And to all of you, I would like to wish good
health, personal happiness, and success in all
your endeavors.
Mr. President, I would also like to con-
gratulate you and all the American people on
the successful completion of the heroic space
flight, on the occasion of the successful re-
turn of your astronauts; and I would like
to wish them new successes in this very im-
portant area of human discovery and knowl-
edge, and please convey my best greetings
to them.
I would like to wish that our space men
continue their cooperation. I would like to
wish them new, brilliant successes in their
wonderful profession which combines cour-
age with science.
Of course, I cannot but mention what has
happened here — by the way, I was the first
who congratulated Secretary of State Rogers
on his birthday, and now I am all confused.
What is really the day when Secretary of
State Rogers was born? [Laughter.] But
anyway, I would like to say that I also con-
gratulate Mr. Rogers and wish him all the
best.
President Nixon
You will be interested to know that the
General Secretary's speech on television,
which was filmed right here at the Western
White House this afternoon, will be carried
Sunday night. When I was in the Soviet
Union, my remarks were carried to the So-
viet audience, and his remarks will be carried
to the American people.
REMARKS AT DEPARTURE CEREMONY,
SAN CLEMENTE, CALIF., JUNE 24
White House press release (San Clemente) dated June 24
President Nixon
Mr. General Secretary, all of our distin-
guished guests from the Soviet Union, and
ladies and gentlemen : Just last Monday when
you, Mr. General Secretary, arrived in Wash-
ington, I made the remark that in addition
to the millions of people in the Soviet Union
and in the United States who were seeing us
on television, that millions more throughout
the world were watching what we might do
this week.
As we have just completed our visit by
signing this joint communique, I think we
can say with great satisfaction that in our
actions this week we have not disappointed
the hopes of the people of the world.
First, we have built on the strong founda-
tion that we laid a year ago in the relations
between our two countries in adopting a
number of significant agreements for coop-
eration. We have also built on the begin-
ning that we made a year ago with regard
to the limitation of nuclear arms. But the
most significant agreement was the one we
signed Friday, which was truly a landmark
agreement, not only between the relations of
our countries but also a landmark agreement
for the whole world.
When the two strongest nations of the
world agree not to use force or threats of
122
Department of State Bulletin
force in their relations with each other and
also not to use force or threats of force in
their relations with other nations, this action
indeed gives profound hope to those through-
out the world who want peace, because there
can only be true peace in a world in which
the weak are as safe as the strong and by our
agreements we have dedicated ourselves to
building that kind of world.
In speaking of this I think, too, that the
agreement that we have signed, all of the
agreements, take on added meaning because
of the personal relationship that we developed
a year ago and that we have built on this
year.
All who have studied history know that an
agreement means nothing unless there is the
will of the parties to keep it, and Mr. General
Secretary, as you know from our long talks
at Cam]) David, in Washington, and here at
San Clemente, we have the will to keep all
the agreements we have made and particu-
larly the one that we signed Friday.
And having that will, it means that we
are dedicating ourselves to build a new era
not only of peace between our two great
countries but of building an era in which
there can be peace for all the people of the
world.
When you return to the Soviet Union, I
would appreciate it very much if you would
extend to the millions of people in your coun-
try the good wishes, the friendship, of the
millions of people in the United States,
because I am sure that there are many Amer-
icans who would like personally to give that
message to your people. And you can tell
them that the American people — not just the
American leaders, but the American people —
welcome the opportunity to work with the
people of the Soviet Union to build peace be-
tween each other and peace for the world.
General Secretary Brezhnev
Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen : To-
day when our visit draws to an end and the
day of our departure grows closer, I am very
hapiiy indeed to have this opportunity once
again to express my gratitude to the Presi-
dent of the United States for the hospitality
that was accorded to me and all my colleagues
present here in California. It has been very
pleasant indeed for me to be able to visit
this wonderful part of the United States, and
I want also to express my gratitude to all
Californians and to all the people of the
United States. I had an opportunity to do so
in the television address which, however, you
will only be seeing tonight, so I do want to
do that again, to express my gratitude again
on this wonderful morning.
As we said at the start of our meeting, we
must work hard in the interests of our peo-
ples, in the interest of the great and noble
aims of defending peace and developing
friendly relations between our peoples, and
we can now say quite safely that we certainly
did that.
We have done some very serious work to-
gether, and we have achieved complete agree-
ment on several important issues which are
of prime concern to our peoples, and I can
certainly say that all the people in the Soviet
Union will welcome what has been achieved.
All of the agreements that we and our col-
leagues signed in the course of this week are
important, but those that you and I signed,
Mr. President, last Friday were particularly
important, and they were indeed happy
events not only for the peoples of the
Soviet Union and the United States. I am
certain that all the people of the world will
salute and welcome the agreements we
signed.
In these very pleasant days spent in the
United States, I had a very good opportunity
to meet with some of your Senators, with
representatives of the business community,
and yesterday I had the very great pleasure
of meeting quite a few Californians belong-
ing to various walks of life and various pro-
fessions.
But apart from all the talks we had and
all the formal meetings, I was very happy to
note, and I was also told this by my col-
leagues, who, too, have been meeting with
many Americans during this visit — and I
am particularly happy that I was able a
couple of days ago to chat briefly with a group
of American correspondents — and everyone
July 23, 1973
123
I talked to have said that they are happy over
the results achieved during this visit.
And so, that is a source of very special
joy. I am therefore leaving the United States
with very good feelings and with the convic-
tion that the agreements and documents we
signed will be unanimously approved in the
United States as they undoubtedly will in the
Soviet Union and that, moreover, they will
be approved and welcomed by the nations of
the entire world. And that is something that
gives us added strength and new vigor and
a desire to go on working hard so that may-
be in six or eight months' time, as the Presi-
dent wishes, we will be able to meet again
when the President comes to Moscow and
when we do that we will move still further
ahead the very important achievements
started last year in May. And he will come
to the Soviet Union confident that we will
prepare and sign new and more important
agreements which will develop all that was
started so well last year in Moscow.
In conclusion, permit me once again to ex-
press my very sincere gratitude to you, Mr.
President, to Mrs. Nixon, to all your col-
leagues, and to all those who have come here
to be with us this morning. For that, I am
indeed grateful, and so as I leave you I wish
to say not farewell, but goodby until we meet
again.
Mr. President, you will agree with me if
I say in all of our work during this visit, you
and your colleagues, American statesmen,
just as I and all of my colleagues here did not
strictly observe the rules of protocol and
we devoted the greater part of our time to
hard work. In fact, suffice it to say that last
night we went on working until the early
hours of this morning, and we did some very
good work together.
But perhaps for that reason I simply omit-
ted to say one thing in my remarks and that
is the following: The United States is a very
great, a very big country, a country with a
population of over 220 million people, and
I and all my colleagues in Moscow and those
who are with me on this visit would like to
express our deep appreciation and gratitude
to all Americans who support what we have
done and are doing and who take a correct
view and correctly appreciate our policy and
our line of conduct and who, in thus doing so,
are helping us in our work, and I therefore
trust that the peaceful policies pursued by
the President and by the U.S. Government
under him will be supported by the people.
It is a policy aimed at insuring and
streno-thening peace, cooperation, and secu-
rity in the interests of our two countries but
also in the interests of all other nations, big
and small, throughout the world, and for this
I wish to express my appreciation also.
I ask all of your colleagues, Mr. President,
and mine, to draw up closer to us so that we
could all be in this historic picture together.
ADDRESS BY GENERAL SECRETARY BREZHNEV
ON TELEVISION AND RADIO, JUNE 24^
Dear Americans: I highly appreciate this
opportunity of directly addressing the people
of the United States on my visit to your
country.
I would like first of all to convey to all of
you the greetings and friendly feelings of
millions of Soviet people who are following
with great interest my visit to your country
and our talks with President Nixon and who
are looking forward to this new Soviet-
American summit meeting making a fruitful
contribution to better relations between our
countries and stronger universal peace.
Our discussions with President Nixon and
other U.S. Government oflicials have been go-
ing on for several days, and they have been
very intensive indeed. We came to this coun-
try anticipating that these would be respon-
sible negotiations devoted to major questions
bearing on the development of Soviet-Amer-
ican relations and to a search for ways in
which our two nations could promote the
further invigoration of the entire interna-
tional atmosphere. Today I have every reason
to say that those hopes were justified. We
are satisfied with the way the talks went
and with the results alreadv achieved. New
' Recorded at San Clemente, Calif., on June 23
and broadcast June 24 (text made available by the
White House Press Office).
124
Department of State Bulletin
agreements have been signed in Washing-
ton, and in many respects they broaden the
sphere of peaceful and mutually advanta-
geous cooperation between the United States
of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics. Another big step has been taken
along the path that we jointly mapped out
a year ago during our meeting in Moscow.
Let me say frankly that personally I am al-
so pleased that this visit has given me an op-
portunity to gain some firsthand impressions
of America, to see some aspects of the Ameri-
can way of life, to meet with prominent gov-
ernment and public leaders of your country,
and to have some contact with the life of
Americans.
You are well aware that, in the past, re-
lations between our countries developed very
unevenly. There were periods of stagnation ;
there were ups and downs. But I guess I
would not be making a mistake if I said that
the significance of good relations between
the Soviet Union and the United States has
always been quite clear to the more far-
sighted statesmen. In this connection we have
good reason to recall that this is the year
of the 40th anniversary of the establishment
of diplomatic relations between our countries
on the initiative of President Franklin D.
Roosevelt.
In World War II the Soviet Union and the
United States became allies and fought side
by side against nazism, which threatened the
freedom of nations and civilization itself. The
jubilant meeting of Soviet and American
soldiers on the Elbe River at the hour of
victory over Hitlerism is well remembered
in our country.
The wartime alliance could have been ex-
pected to usher in a new era of broad peace-
ful cooperation between the Soviet Union and
the United States. I can tell you with confi-
dence that that is what our country wanted.
We wanted to cement and develop the good
relations whose foundations had been laid
during the war.
Things went differently, however. What
came was not peace, but the cold war, a poor
substitute for genuine peace. For a long time
it poisoned relations between our countries
and international relations as a whole. Some
of its dismal influence can unfortunately be
felt in certain things to this day.
Under the circumstances, it was no easy
task indeed to make a turn from mutual dis-
trust to detente, normalization, and mutually
advantageous cooperation. It took courage
and political foresight ; it took a lot of pains-
taking work. We appreciate the fact that
President Nixon and his administration
joined their efforts with ours to really put
Soviet-American relations on a new track.
I have heard that the American political
vocabulary includes the expression "to win
the peace." The present moment in history
is, I believe, perhaps the most suitable oc-
casion to use that expression. We jointly won
the war. Today our joint efforts must help
mankind win a durable peace. The possibility
of a new war must be eliminated.
The outcome of the two meetings between
the leaders of the Soviet Union and the
United States and the practical steps taken
in the intervening year convincingly show
that important results have already been at-
tained. It transpired that a reasonable and
mutually acceptable approach to many prob-
lems, which previously seemed insoluble, can
in fact be found. Not so long ago I suppose
it would have been hard even to imagine the
possibility of such progress.
Last year's agreements are, on the whole,
being successfully implemented. Tangible
progress is being made in almost all spheres
and it is a progress secured through joint
efforts. The inauguration of a regular pas-
senger shipping line between Leningrad and
New York, the establishment of consulates
general in Leningrad and San Francisco, the
initiation of friendly ties between Soviet
and American cities, and livelier athletic ex-
changes are all becoming part of the daily
lives of the peoples of our two countries to-
day.
The best possible evidence that Soviet-
American relations are moving ahead, and
not marking time, is provided by the impor-
tant document signed the other day by Pres-
ident Nixon and myself, the agreement be-
tween the Soviet Union and the United States
July 23, 1973
125
on the prevention of nuclear war. I trust I
will not be accused of making an overstate-
ment if I say that this document is one of
historic significance. The Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics and the United States of
America have concluded an agreement to
prevent the outbreak of nuclear war between
themselves and to do their utmost to prevent
the outbreak of nuclear war generally. It is
surely clear how important this is for the
peace and tranquillity of the peoples of our
two countries and for the improvement of the
prospects for a peaceful life for all mankind.
Even if our second meeting with the Pres-
ident of the United States yielded no other
results, it could still be said with full grounds
that it will take a fitting place in the annals
of Soviet-American relations and in inter-
national affairs as a whole. The entire world
can now see that, having signed last year the
fundamental document entitled "Basic Prin-
ciples of Relations Between the Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics and the United
States of America," our two nations regard
it not as a mere declaration of good intent
but as a program of vigorous and consistent
action, a program they have already begun
to implement, and one which they are deter-
mined to go on implementing.
It is also of no little significance that our
countries have agreed on the main principles
of further work to prepare a new agreement
on strategic arms limitation, a broader one
this time and of far longer duration. This
means that the exceptionally important job
begun in May 1972 in Moscow is continuing.
It means that political detente is being
backed up by military detente. And this is
something from which all the peoples and the
very cause of peace stand to gain.
The other day representatives of our two
governments also signed new agreements on
Soviet-American cooperation in several spe-
cific fields. Together with the earlier agree-
ments concluded during the past year, they
make up an impressive file of documents on
cooperation between our two nations and our
two great peoples in some widely ranging
fields : from the peaceful uses of atomic
energy to agriculture and from outer space
to the ocean depths.
Of course, the Soviet Union and the United
States are countries which are, so to speak,
self-sufficient. Until recently that was, in
fact, how things were in our relations. How-
ever, we, as well as many Americans, realize
only too well that renunciation of coopera- .
tion in the economic, scientific, technological, I
and cultural fields is tantamount to both
sides turning down substantial extra bene- ,
fits and advantages. And most important, |
such a renunciation would be so pointless as
to defy any reasonable argument. This is ,
particularly true of economic ties. Today, I
believe, both you and we would agree that in
this area it is not enough simply to over-
come such an anomaly generated by the cold
war as the complete freezing of Soviet- Amer-
ican trade. Life poses questions of far
greater importance. I have in mind, above
all, such forms of economic relations as
stable large-scale ties in several branches of
the economy and long-term scientific and
technological cooperation, and in our age
this is very important. The contacts we have
had with American officials and businessmen
confirm that it is along these lines that the
main prospects for further economic coop-
eration between our countries can be traced.
It is alleged at times that the development
of such cooperation is one-sided and only
benefits the Soviet Union. But those who say
so are either completely ignorant to the real
state of affairs or deliberately turn a blind
eye to the truth.
And the truth is that broader and deeper
economic cooperation in general and the
long-term and large-scale deals which are
now either being negotiated or have already
been successfully concluded by Soviet or-
ganizations and American firms are bound to
yield real and tangible benefits to both sides.
This is something that has been confirmed
quite definitely by American businessmen
whom I have had an opportunity to talk with
both in this country and earlier in Moscow.
It was in that context that we discussed the
matter with President Nixon, too.
To this I would like to add that both the
Soviet leadership and, as I see it, the U.S.
Government attach particular importance to
the fact that the development of long-term
126
Department of Stote Bulletin
economic cooperation will also have very
beneficial political consequences. It will con-
solidate the present trend toward better So-
viet-American relations generally.
Prospects for the broad development of
Soviet-American exchanges in culture and
the arts are, as we see it, also good. Both our
countries have much to share in this field. To
live at peace we must trust each other, and
to trust each other we must know each other
better. We, for our part, want Americans to
visualize our way of life and our way of
thinking as completely and correctly as
possible.
By and large, we can say that quite a lot
has already been done to develop Soviet-
American relations. Yet we are still only at
the beginning of a long road. Constant care
is needed to preserve and develop the new
shoots of good relationships. Tireless efforts
are needed to define the most essential and
most suitable forms of cooperation in various
fields. Patience is needed to understand the
various specific features of the other side
and to learn to do business with each other.
I believe those who support a radical im-
provement in relations between the Soviet
Union and the United States can look to the
future with optimism, for this objective
meets the vital interests of both our nations
and the interests of peace-loving people all
over the world.
The general atmosphere in the world de-
pends to no small extent on the climate pre-
vailing in relations between our two coun-
tries. Neither economic or military might
nor international prestige give our countries
any special privileges, but they do invest
them with special responsibility for the des-
tinies of universal peace and for preventing
war. In its approach to ties and contacts
with the United States, the Soviet Union is
fully aware of that responsibility.
We regard the improvement of Soviet-
American relations not as an isolated phe-
nomenon, but as an integral and very
important part of the wider process of radi-
cally improving the international atmosphere.
Mankind has outgrown the rigid cold war
armor which it was once forced to wear. It
wants to breathe freely and peacefully. And
we will be happy if our efforts to better
Soviet-American relations help draw more
and more nations into the process of de-
tente—be it in Europe or Asia, in Africa or
Latin America, in the Middle or the Far
East.
We regard it as a very positive fact that
the normalization of Soviet-American rela-
tions is contributing to the solution of the
great and important problem of consolidat-
ing peace and security in Europe and of
convening the all-European conference.
The improvement of Soviet-American re-
lations undoubtedly played its useful role in
promoting the termination of the long-drawn-
out war in Viet-Nam. Now that the agree-
ment ending the Viet-Nam war has come into
effect and both our countries, together with
other nations, are signatories to the docu-
ment of the Paris Conference on Viet-Nam,
it seems to us to be particularly important
that the achieved success be consolidated and
that all the peoples of Indochina be given
the chance to live in peace.
There still exist hotbeds of dangerous ten-
sion in the world. In our discussions with
President Nixon we touched upon the situa-
tion in the Middle East, which is still very
acute. We believe that in that area justice
should be assured as soon as possible and a
stable peace settlement reached that would
restore the legitimate rights of those who
suffered from the war and insure the security
of all peoples of that region. That is im-
portant for all the peoples of the Middle East,
with no exception. It is also important for
the maintenance of universal peace.
In short, the ending of conflicts and the pre-
vention of new crisis-fraught situations is an
essential condition for creating truly reliable
guarantees of peace. And our two countries
are called upon to make a worthy contribu-
tion to that cause. In our discussions Presi-
dent Nixon and I have devoted a great deal
of attention to these matters.
I would like to emphasize at this point
that in discussing questions of our bilateral
relations and international problems of a
general nature we invariably took into ac-
count the fact that both the Soviet Union and
the United States have their own allies and
July 23, 1973
127
their own obligations toward various other
states. It should be stated quite definitely
that our talks, both in their spirit and in the
letter of the signed agreements, fully take
that fact into consideration.
But the main purport of all that we dis-
cussed and agreed upon with President Nix-
on in the field of international afi'airs is the
firm determination of both sides to make
good relations between the U.S..S.R. and
the U.S.A. a permanent factor of interna-
tional peace.
In our time — and I am sure you know
this — there are still too many people who
would rather make noise about military prep-
arations and the arms race than discuss prob-
lems of detente and peaceful cooperation in
a constructive spirit.
What can be said on that account?
The Soviet people are perhaps second to
none when it comes to knowing what war
means. In World War II we won a victory
of world-historic significance. But in that
war over 20 million Soviet citizens died.
Seventy thousand of our towns and villages
were devastated, and one-third of our na-
tional wealth was destroyed.
The war wounds have now been healed.
Today the Soviet Union is a mightier and
more prosperous country than ever before.
But we remember the lessons of the war only
too well, and that is why the peoples of the
Soviet Union value peace so highly, that is
why they strongly approve the peace policy
of our party and government.
For us peace is the highest achievement to
which all men should strive if they want to
make their life a worthy one. We believe in
reason, and we feel that this belief is shared
also by the peoples of the United States and
of other nations. If that belief were lost, or
if it were obscured by a blind faith in
strength alone, in the power of nuclear arms
or some other kind of weapon, the fate of
civilization — of humanity itself — would be
miserable indeed.
Our path has not been an easy one. Our
people are proud that in a historically short
period of time, after the victory of the So-
cialist Revolution, backward Russia trans-
formed itself into a major industrial power
and achieved outstanding successes in sci-
ence and culture. We take pride in having
built a new society — a most stable and con-
fidently developing society — which has as-
sured all our citizens of social justice and has
made the values of modern civilization the
property of all the people. We are proud that
dozens of previously oppressed nations and
nationalities in our country have become
genuinely equal and that in our close-knit
family of nations they are developing their
economy and culture.
We have great plans for the future. We
want to raise considerably the living stand-
ards of the Soviet people. We want to make
new advances in education and medicine.
We want to make our villages and towns
more comfortable to live in and more beauti-
ful. We have drafted programs to develop
the remote areas of Siberia, the North and
the Far East, with their immense natural
resources. And every Soviet individual is
deeply conscious of the fact that the realiza-
tion of those plans requires peace and peace-
ful cooperation with other nations.
Of course, like any other countiy, we have
quite a few problems and quite a few short-
comings. But the solution to all the problems
we face requires, as in the case of other na-
tions, not war or an artificial fanning of
tensions, but peace and creative labor, which,
we are convinced, are the only things that
can guarantee well-being and abundance of
material and spiritual benefits for all mem-
bers of society.
I have attempted to give a brief account of
the thoughts and plans of the Soviet people
and to explain the nature of the Soviet
Union's foreign policy. Its peaceful essence
stems from the very core of our society. And
it is by no mere chance that the very
concept of peaceful coexistence, which today
is turning more and more into a universally
recognized basis for the development of re-,
lations between states with different social
systems, was evolved by Vladimir Ilyich
Lenin, the founder of the Soviet state.
You probably know that two years ago
the 24th congress of our ruling party, the
128
Department of State Bulletin
Communist Party of the Soviet Union, ap-
proved the Soviet peace program, which is
a concrete embodiment of the policy of peace-
ful coexistence in modern conditions. It is a
program of active contribution to interna-
tional detente and to securing a truly lasting
peace on earth for many generations to come.
It expresses not only the convictions and
intentions of our people but also, we are
sure, the aspirations of millions and millions
of peace-loving people all over the world. We
are implementing this program, working
hand in hand with our friends and allies, the
Socialist countries. On the basis of this pro-
gram we seek to build relations of good will
and mutually beneficial cooperation with all
countries that have a similar desire. And
the improvement of Soviet-American rela-
tions occupies its rightful place in that pro-
gram.
Dear viewers: The importance and com-
plexity of the problems on the agenda of
our talks with President Nixon, of our meet-
ing and discussions with members of the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee, headed
by Senator Fulbright, and with prominent
representatives of the American business
community, called for a tight work schedule
on this visit.
As I have already pointed out, these were
fruitful discussions held in a good atnios-
phere. This gives us a feeling of satisfaction.
At the same time, I do personally regret
that the extreme pressure of business has
not given me and my colleagues who accom-
panied me and took part in our woi-k a chance
to see more of your country. While still in
Moscow, and then here, in the United States,
I received many warm letters from various
American cities, organizations, companies,
and private citizens kindly inviting me to
visit this or that town, to see plants, farms,
and universities, or to be a guest in the
homes of Americans. I am taking this op-
portunity to express my sincere gratitude to
all those who wrote such letters. I regret
that, for the reasons I have just mentioned,
I was unable to take up those invitations.
Of course, it would have been interesting
to visit New York and Chicago and Detroit
and Los Angeles, to see some of your indus-
trial projects and farms, to talk to American
working people, whose achievements are ad-
mired by Soviet people. Perhaps the future
will offer such an opportunity, especially
since President Nixon and I have definitely
agreed that in the future our contacts will
be placed on a regular footing. We are look-
ing forward to President Nixon's visit to
the Soviet Union next year.
But even though this brief visit did not
give me a chance to see as much as I would
like to in America, I nevertheless have every
reason, when I return home, to tell my col-
leagues and all Soviet people both about the
important political results of the visit and
about the atmosphere of good will and the
trend in favor of peace, of detente, and of
improving relations between our two coun-
tries. It is a trend which we felt during our
stay in the United States and during our
contacts with government and public lead-
ers of your country and with many American
citizens. I can assure you that these feelings
are fully shared by Soviet people.
I do not believe I will be divulging a major
secret if I tell you that in my talks with
President Nixon over the last few days we
not only addressed ourselves to current po-
litical problems but also tried to look ahead
and to take into account the future interests
of the peoples of both our countries. In so
doing we proceeded from the assumption
that in politics those who do not look ahead
will inevitably find themselves in the rear,
among the stragglers. A year ago in Moscow
we laid the foundation for improving Soviet-
American relations. Now this great and im-
portant objective has been successfully
brought closer. It is our hope that this trend
will continue, for it meets the interests of
our two great peoples and of all mankind.
In conclusion, I want to express my sincere
gratitude to the American people, to the
President and the Government of the United
States for their hospitality, for their kind-
ness and numerous expressions of warm feel-
ings toward the Soviet people and us, their
representatives.
Dear Americans, please accept my wishes
for well-being and happiness to all of you.
Thank you.
July 23, 1973
129
TEXT OF JOINT U.S.-U.S.S.R. COMMUNIQUE'
Joint US-USSR Communique
At the invitation of the President of the United
States, Richard Nixon, extended during his official
visit to the USSR in May 1972, and in accordance
with a subsequent agreement, General Secretary of
the Central Committee of the Communist Party of
the Soviet Union, Mr. Leonid I. Brezhnev, paid an
official visit to the United States from June 18 to
June 25. Mr. Brezhnev was accompanied by A. A.
Gromyko, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR,
Member of the Politbureau of the Central Commit-
tee, CPSU; N. S. Patolichev, Minister of Foreign
Trade; B. P. Bugayev, Minister of Civil Aviation;
G. E. Tsukanov and A. M. Aleksandrov, Assistants to
the General Secretary of the Central Committee,
CPSU; L. I. Zamyatin, General Director of TASS;
E. I. Chazov, Deputy Minister of Public Health of
the USSR; G. M. Korniyenko, Member of the Col-
legium of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the
USSR; G. A. Arbatov, Director of the USA Institute
of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR.
President Nixon and General Secretary Brezhnev
held thorough and constructive discussions on the
progress achieved in the development of US-Soviet
i-elations and on a number of major international
problems of mutual interest.
Also taking part in the conversations held in
Washington, Camp David, and San Clemente, were:
On the American side William P. Rogers, Secre-
tary of State; George P. Shultz, Secretary of the
Treasury; Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the
President for National Security Affairs.
On the Soviet side A. A. Gromyko, Minister of
Foreign Affairs of the USSR, Member of the Polit-
bureau of the Central Committee, CPSU; A. F.
Dobrynin, Soviet Ambassador to the USA; N. S.
Patolichev, Minister of Foreign Trade; B. P.
Bugayev, Minister of Civil Aviation; A. M. Alek-
sandrov and G. E. Tsukanov, Assistants to the Gen-
eral Secretary of the Central Committee, CPSU;
G. M. Korniyenko, Member of the Collegium of the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR.
I. The General State of US-Soviet Relations
Both Sides expressed their mutual satisfaction
with the fact that the American-Soviet summit
meeting in Moscow in May 1972 and the joint de-
cisions taken there have resulted in a substantial
advance in the strengthening of peaceful relations
between the USA and the USSR and have created
the basis for the further development of broad and
mutually beneficial cooperation in various fields of
mutual interest to the peoples of both countries and
in the interests of all mankind. They noted their
'Signed at San Clemente, Calif., on June 24; re-
leased at Moscow, Washington, and San Clemente
on June 25.
satisfaction with the mutual effort to implement
strictly and fully the treaties and agreements con-
cluded between the USA and the USSR, and to
expand areas of cooperation.
They agreed that the process of reshaping rela-
tions between the USA and the USSR on the basis
of peaceful coexistence and equal security as set
forth in the Basic Principles of Relations Between
the USA and the USSR signed in Moscow on May
29, 1972 is progressing in an encouraging manner.
They emphasized the great importance that each
Side attaches to these Basic Principles. They re-
affirmed their commitment to the continued scrupu-
lous implementation and to the enhancement of the
effectiveness of each of the provisions of that docu-
ment.
Both Sides noted with satisfaction that the out-
come of the US-Soviet meeting in Moscow in May
1972 was welcomed by other States and by world
opinion as an important contribution to strengthen-
ing peace and international security, to curbing the
arms race and to developing businesslike cooperation
among States with different social systems.
Both Sides viewed the return visit to the USA
of the General Secretary of the Central Committee
of the CPSU, L. I. Brezhnev, and the talks held
during the visit as an expression of their mutual
determination to continue the course toward a major
improvement in US-Soviet relations.
Both Sides are convinced that the discussions' they
have just held represent a further milestone in the
constructive development of their relations.
Convinced that such a development of American-
Soviet relations serves the interests of both of their
peoples and all of mankind, it was decided to take
further major steps to give these relations maximum
stability and to turn the development of friendship
and cooperation between their peoples into a perma-
nent factor for worldwide peace.
II. The Prevention of Nuclear War and the
Limitation of Strategic Armaments
Issues related to the maintenance and strengthen-
ing of international peace were a central point of
the talks between President Nixon and General
Secretary Brezhnev.
Conscious of the exceptional importance for all
mankind of taking effective measures to that end,
they discussed ways in which both Sides could work
toward removing the danger of war, and especially
nuclear war, between the USA and the USSR and
between either party and other countries. Conse-
quently, in accordance with the Charter of the
United Nations and the Basic Principles of Rela-
tions of May 29, 1972, it was decided to conclude
an Agreement Between the USA and the USSR on
the Prevention of Nuclear War. That Agreement
was signed by the President and the General Secre-
tary on June 22, 1973. The text has been published
separately.
130
Department of State Bulletin
The President and tlie General Secretary, in ap-
praising this Agreement, believe that it constitutes
a historical landmark in Soviet-American relations
and substantially strengthens the foundations of
international security as a whole. The United States
and the Soviet Union state their readiness to con-
sider additional ways of strengthening peace and
removing forever the danger of war, and particu-
larly nuclear war.
In the course of the meetings, intensive discussions
were held on questions of strategic arms limitation.
In this connection both Sides emphasized the funda-
mental importance of the Treaty on the Limitation
of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems and the Interim
Agreement on Certain Measures with Respect to
the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms signed
between the USA and the USSR in May 1972 which,
for the first time in history, place actual limits on
the most modern and most formidable types of
armaments.
Having exchanged views on the progress in the
implementation of these agreements, both Sides re-
affirmed their intention to carry them out and their
readiness to move ahead jointly toward an agree-
ment on the further limitation of strategic arms.
Both Sides noted that progress has been made in
the negotiations that resumed in November 1972,
and that the prospects for reaching a permanent
agreement on more complete measures limiting
strategic offensive armaments are favorable.
Both Sides agreed that the progress made in the
limitation of strategic armaments is an exceedingly
important contribution to the strengthening of US-
Soviet relations and to world peace.
On the basis of their discussions, the President
and the General Secretary signed on June 21, 1973,
Basic Principles of Negotiations on the Further
Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms. The text has
been published separately.
The USA and the USSR attach great importance
to joining with all States in the cause of strengthen-
ing peace, reducing the burden of armaments, and
reaching agreements on arms limitation and dis-
armament measures.
Considering the important role which an effective
international agreement with respect to chemical
weapons would play, the two Sides agreed to con-
tinue their efforts to conclude such an agreement in
cooperation with other countries.
The two Sides agree to make every effort to fa-
cilitate the work of the Committee on Disarmament
which has been meeting in Geneva. They will ac-
tively participate in negotiations aimed at working
out new measures to curb and end the arms race.
They reaffirm that the ultimate objective is general
and complete disarmament, including nuclear dis-
armament, under strict international control. A
world disarmament conference could play a role in
this process at an appropriate time.
III. International Questions: The Reduction of
Tensions and Strengthening of Interna-
tional Security
President Nixon and General Secretary Brezhnev
reviewed major questions of the current interna-
tional situation. They gave special attention to the
developments which have occurred since the time
of the US-Soviet summit meeting in Moscow. It was
noted with satisfaction that positive trends are de-
veloping in international relations toward the fur-
ther relaxation of tensions and the strengthening of
cooperative relations in the interests of peace. In
the opinion of both Sides, the current process of
improvement in the international situation creates
new and favorable opportunities for reducing ten-
sions, settling outstanding international issues, and
creating a permanent structure of peace.
Indochbm
The two Sides expressed their deep satisfaction
at the conclusion of the Agreement on Ending the
War and Restoring Peace in Vietnam, and also at
the results of the International Conference on Viet-
nam which approved and supported that Agreement.
The two Sides are convinced that the conclusion
of the Agi-eement on Ending the War and Restoring
Peace in Vietnam, and the subsequent signing of the
Agreement en Restoring Peace and Achieving Na-
tional Concord in Laos, meet the fundamental inter-
ests and aspirations of the people of Vietnam and
Laos and open up a possibility for establishing a last-
ing peace in Indochina, based on respect for the inde-
pendence, sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity
of the countries of that area. Both Sides emphasized
that these agreements must be strictly implemented.
They further stressed the need to bring an early
end to the military conflict in Cambodia in order
to bring peace to the entire area of Indochina. They
also reaffirmed their stand that the political futures
of Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia should be left to
the respective peoples to determine, free from out-
side interference.
Europe
In the course of the talks both Sides noted with
satisfaction that in Europe the process of relaxing
tensions and developing cooperation is actively con-
tinuing and thereby contributing to international
stability.
The two Sides expressed satisfaction with the
further normalization of relations among European
countries resulting from treaties and agreements
signed in recent years, particularly between the
USSR and the FRG [Federal Republic of Germany].
They also welcome the coming into force of the
Quadripartite Agreement of September 3, 1971.
They share the conviction that strict observance of
the treaties and agreements that have been con-
cluded will contribute to the security and well-being
of all parties concerned.
They also welcome the prospect of United Na-
July 23, 1973
131
tions membership this year for the FRG and the
GDR [German Democratic Republic] and recall, in
this connection, that the USA, USSR, UK and
France have signed the Quadripartite Declaration of
November 9, 1972, on this subject.
The USA and the USSR reaffirm their desire,
guided by the appropriate provisions of the Joint
US-USSR Communique adopted in Moscow in May
1972, to continue their separate and joint contri-
butions to strengthening peaceful relations in
Europe. Both Sides affirm that ensuring a lasting
peace in Europe is a paramount goal of their
policies.
In this connection satisfaction was expressed with
the fact that as a result of common efforts by many
States, including the USA and the USSR, the pre-
paratory work has been successfully completed for
the Conference on Security and Cooperation in
Europe, which will be convened on July 3, 1973. The
USA and the USSR hold the view that the Con-
ference will enhance the possibilities for strengthen-
ing European security and developing cooperation
among the participating States. The USA and the
USSR will conduct their policies so as to realize
the goals of the Conference and bring about a new
era of good relations in this part of the world.
Reflecting their continued positive attitude toward
the Conference, both Sides will make efl'orts to bring
the Conference to a successful conclusion at the
earliest possible time. Both Sides proceed from the
assumption that progress in the work of the Con-
ference will produce possibilities for completing it
at the highest level.
The USA and the USSR believe that the goal of
strengthening stability and security in Europe
would be further advanced if the relaxation of
political tensions were accompanied by a reduction
of military tensions in Central Europe. In this re-
spect they attach great importance to the negotia-
tions on the mutual reduction of forces and arma-
ments and associated measures in Central Europe
which will begin on October 30, 1973. Both Sides
state their readiness to make, along with other
States, their contribution to the achievement of mu-
tually acceptable decisions on the substance of this
problem, based on the strict observance of the prin-
ciple of the undiminished security of any of the
parties.
Middle East
The parties expressed their deep concern with the
situation in the Middle East and exchanged opinions
regarding ways of reaching a Middle East settle-
ment.
Each of the parties set forth its position on this
problem.
Both parties agreed to continue to exert their ef-
forts to promote the quickest possible settlement in
the Middle East. This settlement should be in ac-
cordance with the interests of all states in the area,
be consistent with their independence and sover-
eignty and should take into due account the legiti-
mate interests of the Palestinian people.
IV. Commercial and Economic Relations
The President and the General Secretary thor-
oughly reviewed the status of and prospects for
commercial and economic ties between the USA
and the USSR. Both Sides noted with satisfaction
the progress achieved in the past year in the nor-
malization and development of commercial and ec-
onomic relations between them.
They agrreed that mutually advantageous cooper-
ation and peaceful relations would be strengrthened
by the creation of a permanent foundation of eco-
nomic relationships.
They recall with satisfaction the various agree-
ments on trade and commercial relations signed in
the past year. Both Sides note that American-Soviet
trade has shown a substantial increase, and that
there are favorable prospects for a continued rise
in the exchange of goods over the coming years.
They believe that the two countries should aim at
a total of 2-3 billion dollars of trade over the next
three years. The Joint US-USSR Commercial Com-
mission continues to provide a valuable mechanism
to promote the broad-scale growth of economic rela-
tions. The two Sides noted with satisfaction that
contacts between American firms and their Soviet
counterparts are continuing to expand.
Both Sides confirmed their firm intention to
proceed from their earlier understanding on meas-
ures directed at creating more favorable conditions
for expanding commercial and other economic ties
between the USA and the USSR.
It was noted that as a result of the Agreement
Regarding Certain Maritime Matters signed in Octo-
ber 1972, Soviet and American commercial ships
have been calling more frequently at ports of the
United States and the USSR, respectively, and since
late May of this year a new regular passenger line
has started operating between New York and
Leningrad.
In the course of the current meeting, the two
Sides signed a Protocol augmenting existing civil
air relations between the USA and the USSR pro-
viding for direct air services between Washington
and Moscow and New York and Leningrad, in-
creasing the frequency of flights and resolving other
questions in the field of civil aviation.
In the context of reviewing prospects for further
and more permanent economic cooperation, both
Sides expressed themselves in favor of mutually
advantageous long term projects. They discussed a
number of specific projects involving the participa-
tion of American companies, including the delivery
of Siberian natural gas to the United States. The
President indicated that the USA encourages Amer-
ican firms to work out concrete proposals on these
projects and will give serious and sympathetic con-
sideration to proposals that are in the interest of
both Sides.
132
Department of State Bulletin
To contribute to expanded commercial, cultural
and technical relations between the USA and the
USSR, the two Sides signed a tax convention to
avoid double taxation on income and eliminate, as
much as possible, the need for citizens of one coun-
try to become involved in the tax system of the
other.
A Protocol was also signed on the opening by the
end of October 1973 of a Trade Representation of
the USSR in Washington and a Commercial Of-
fice of the United States in Moscow. In addition a
Protocol was signed on questions related to es-
tablishing a US-Soviet Chamber of Commerce. These
agreements will facilitate the further development
of commercial and economic ties between the USA
and the USSR.
V. Further Progress in Other Fields of Bilat-
eral Cooperation
The two Sides reviewed the areas of bilateral co-
operation in such fields as environmental protection,
public health and medicine, exploration of outer
space, and science and technology, established by
the agreements signed in May 1972 and subse-
quently. They noted that those agreements are
being satisfactorily carried out in practice in accord-
ance with the programs as adopted.
In particular, a joint effort is under way to de-
velop effective means to combat those diseases which
are most widespread and dangerous for mankind:
cancer, cardiovascular or infectious diseases and
arthritis. The medical aspects of the environmental
problems are also subjects of cooperative research.
Preparations for the joint space flight of the
Apollo and Soyuz spacecraft are proceeding accord-
ing to an agreed timetable. The joint flight of these
spaceships for a rendezvous and docking mission,
and mutual visits of American and Soviet astronauts
in each other's spacecraft, are scheduled for July
1975.
Building on the foundation created in previous
agreements, and recognizing the potential of both
the USA and the USSR to undertake cooperative
measures in current scientific and technological ar-
eas, new projects for fruitful joint efforts were iden-
tified and appropriate agreements were concluded.
Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy
Bearing in mind the great importance of satisfy-
ing the growing energy demands in both countries
and throughout the world, and recognizing that the
development of highly efficient energy sources could
contribute to the solution of this problem, the
President and General Secretary signed an agree-
ment to expand and strengthen cooperation in the
fields of controlled nuclear fusion, fast breeder re-
actors, and research on the fundamental properties
of matter. A Joint Committee on Cooperation in
the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy will be estab-
lished to implement this agreement, which has a
duration of ten years.
Agriculture
Recognizing the importance of agriculture in
meeting mankind's requirement for food products
and the role of science in modern agricultural pro-
duction, the two Sides concluded an agreement pro-
viding for a broad exchange of scientific experience
in agricultural research and development, and of
information on agricultural economics. A US-USSR
Joint Committee on Agricultural Cooperation will
be established to oversee joint programs to be car-
ried out under the Agreement.
World Ocean Studies
Considering the unique capabilities and the major
interest of both nations in the field of world ocean
studies, and noting the extensive experience of US-
USSR oceanographic cooperation, the two Sides have
agreed to broaden their cooperation and have signed
an agreement to this effect. In so doing, they are
convinced that the benefits from further develop-
ment of cooperation in the field of oceanography
will accrue not only bilaterally but also to all peo-
ples of the world. A US-USSR Joint Committee on
Cooperation in World Ocean Studies will be estab-
lished to coordinate the implementation of coopera-
tive programs.
Transportation
The two Sides agreed that there are opportu-
nities for cooperation between the USA and the
USSR in the solution of problems in the field of
transportation. To permit expanded, mutually bene-
ficial cooperation in this field, the two Sides con-
cluded an agreement on this subject. The USA and
the USSR further agreed that a Joint Committee
on Cooperation in Transportation would be es-
tablished.
Contacts, Exchanges and Cooperation
Recognizing the general expansion of US-USSR
bilateral relations and, in particular, the growing
number of exchanges in the fields of science, tech-
nology, education and culture, and in other fields of
mutual interest, the two Sides agreed to broaden
the scope of these activities under a new General
Agreement on Contacts, Exchanges, and Coopera-
tion, with a duration of six years. The two Sides
agreed to this in the mutual belief that it will fur-
ther promote better understanding between the peo-
ples of the United States and the Soviet Union and
will help to improve the general state of relations
between the two countries.
Both Sides believe that the talks at the highest
level, which were held in a frank and constructive
spirit, were very valuable and made an important
contribution to developing mutually advantageous
relations between the USA and the USSR. In the
view of both Sides, these talks will have a favorable
impact on international relations.
They noted that the success of the discussions in
July 23, 1973
133
the United States was facilitated by the continuing
consultation and contacts as agreed in May 1972.
They reaffirmed that the practice of consultation
should continue. They agreed that further meetings
at the highest level should be held regularly.
Having expressed his appreciation to President
Nixon for the hospitality extended during the visit
to the United States, General Secretary Brezhnev
invited the President to visit the USSR in 1974.
The invitation was accepted.
June 24, 1973
Leonid I. Brezhnev
Richard Nixon
President of the United
States of America
General Secretary of the
Central Committee,
CPSU
Presidential Assistant Kissinger Discusses Agreements Signed
During General Secretary Brezhnev's Visit
Folloiving are traiiscripts of news confer-
ences held on June 21, June 22, and June
25 bij Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the
President for National Security Affairs.
DR. KISSINGER'S NEWS CONFERENCE,
WASHINGTON, JUNE 21
Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated June 25
Mr. Ziegler [Ronald L. Ziegler, Press Sec-
retary to President Nixon]: As we mentioned
to you this morning, President Nixon and
General Secretary Brezhnev have reached
agreement on the basic principles of negotia-
tion of further limitation for strategic of-
fensive arms. The final agreement of those
principles was reached in the meeting yester-
day evening.
Also, an agreement will be signed today be-
tween the United States and the Soviet
Union on scientific and technical coopera-
tion in the field of peaceful uses of atomic
energy. The signing of both of these matters
will take place at 3:30 in the East Room,
which we have already announced.
Before Dr. Kissinger briefs you on the
matters I have just referred to, together with
Ambassador Johnson [U. Alexis Johnson,
U.S. Representative and chief of the U.S.
delegation to the Strategic Arms Limitation
Talks (SALT)l, I should tell you that the
morning meeting between the President and
General Secretary lasted for slightly over an
hour. It began at 11 :30 and ended at 12:30.
Dr. Kissinger participated in most of that
meeting. The President and General Secre-
tary then took a brief break and resumed
their meetings at 1:20 and are still meeting
at this time and plan to return to Washing-
ton for the signing ceremony at 3:30. With
that, I will present to you Dr. Kissinger.
Dr. Kissinger: Ladies and gentlemen, I will
go over the agreement on SALT principles
with you. Due to some misunderstanding
between Camp David and my oflfice here,
the actual text hasn't been distributed to you,
but it vdll be at the end of the meeting. I
thought that in order to explain it adequately
I would read to you each of the principles
and then explain what they mean.
There is no need for you to take down the
text itself, because we are going to distribute
it right after the meeting, together with a
factsheet, and my apologies for not having
gotten it to you before this briefing.
Let me first give you some background on
the principles that have been agreed upon
and what they are intended to achieve.
As you know, the second round of SALT
started last November, and as you know also,
our representative is Ambassador Johnson,
who is here to help with the briefing.
The objective of these talks has been to
consider a permanent agreement limiting of-
134
Department of State Bulletin
fensive weapons to replace the interim agree-
ment that was signed in Moscow last May
and which came into effect last October to
run for five years.
Now, in negotiating a permanent agree-
ment, one faces problems that are more com-
plex than those in an interim agreement. The
essence of the interim agreement was that
both sides froze their offensive weapons at
the levels they had achieved last May and,
frankly, at the levels that were foreseeable
over the terms of the interim agreement, for
a period of five years.
And as you know, we have always rejected
the argument that we had agreed to a numer-
ical inferiority in the interim agreement pre-
cisely because there was no possibility of
overcoming that numerical inferiority in the
five years for which the interim agreement
was designed.
On the other hand, when you are dealing
with a permanent agreement you are affect-
ing the long-term strategic interests of both
countries, and therefore numbers that are ac-
ceptable in an interim agreement will have a
different connotation in a permanent agree-
ment and safeguards will have to be looked
at in a different context.
Secondly, with respect to a permanent
agreement, we now face the situation that the
numerical arms race, quantitative arms race,
has been, in some respects, eclipsed in sig-
nificance by the qualitative arms race.
Throughout the 1960's, it was considered
that the buildup was the greatest threat to
the stability of the arms race and hence to
international peace. In this period we have
to consider as well that the improvement —
refinement — of arms in terms of accuracy, in
terms of throw-weight, in terms of multiple
warheads, can be profoundly unsettling to
this strategic equation even when the num-
bers on both sides are kept fairly constant.
And thirdly, when one is talking about a
permanent agreement, one has to consider the
question not only of limiting arms but the
objective of reducing arms. It was in this
context that the negotiations started last No-
vember and have been conducted for the last
six months.
The negotiations went through the usual
phase of some exploratory discussions, fol-
lowed by some more concrete proposals by
both sides. However, we faced the situation
in April where it became clear that a com-
prehensive agreement of a permanent nature
would require more time than the interval
before the summit allowed; and therefore the
President, General Secretary Brezhnev, in
their communications with each other de-
cided that perhaps the approach of agreeing
on some principles that could guide the nego-
tiators, coupled with some full discussions
while they were meeting in the United States,
could give a new impetus to the talks on stra-
tegic arms limitation. This is what was done.
In the closest consultation with Ambassa-
dor Johnson and with the allies most con-
cerned, we developed a set of principles on
a preliminary basis, which we have further
discussed since the General Secretary has
arrived in the United States and which led to
the agreement which we are releasing today.
Now, since you don't have the text, I think
the best thing I can do is read it, and then
attempt to explain its significance — what we
understand by it. It isn't very long. I see
somebody is looking at his watch. [Laugh-
ter.]
The preamble says: The President of the
United States and the General Secretary of
the Central Committee of the CPSU, having
thoroughly considered the question of the
further limitation of strategic arms and the
progress already achieved at the current ne-
gotiations, reaffirming their conviction that
the earliest adoption of further limitation of
strategic arms would be a major contribution
in reducing the danger of an outbreak of
nuclear war and in strengthening interna-
tional peace and security, have agreed as
follows.
The primary significance of the preamble
is the emphasis that both leaders give to their
conviction of the importance of the earliest
adoption of further limitation of strategic
arms, not only with respect to reducing the
danger of the outbreak of nuclear war but
with respect to the strengthening of inter-
national peace in general, and therefore the
July 23, 1973
135
personal backing that they are giving to a
sense of urgency in the conduct of these
negotiations.
The first principle is as follows: The two
sides will continue active negotiations in or-
der to work out a permanent agreement on
more complete measures on the limitation of
strategic offensive arms, as well as their sub-
sequent reduction, proceeding from the Basic
Principles of Relations between the United
States of America and the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics signed in Moscow, May
29, 1972, and from the interim agreement
between the United States and the U.S.S.R.
of May 26, 1972. Over the course of the next
year, the two sides will make serious effort
to work out the provisions of the permanent
agreement on more complete measures on the
limitation of strategic offensive arms with
the objective of signing in 1974.
The first principle substantially speaks for
itself. It commits both sides to accelerate
their efforts, and it commits both sides to
make a major effort to achieve an agreement
in 1974, or during the course of 1974. The
two leaders would not have made this formal
statement if they did not believe that this
goal was within reach and was attainable.
Therefore it represents a commitment by
both sides to bring about — to do their utmost
to bring about a permanent agreement on the
limitation of strategic arms during the course
of next year. This agreement is to be based
on the basic principles of international rela-
tions that were established last year in Mos-
cow and on the interim agreement. However,
the U.S. position has been clear that the
agreement has to be more comprehensive and
that the numbers that last governed the in-
terim agreement would not be the numbers
of a permanent agreement.
The second ])rinciple is: New agreements
on the limitation of strategic offensive arma-
ments will be based on the principles of the
American-Soviet documents adopted in Mos-
cow in May 1972 and the agreements reached
in Washington in June 1973; and in particu-
lar, both sides will be guided by the recogni-
tion of each other's equal security interests
and by the recognition that efforts to obtain
unilateral advantage, directly or indirectly,
136
would be inconsistent with the strengthening
of peaceful relations between the United
States of America and the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics.
This article attempts to set out the basic
guidelines in which the two sides will ap- 1
proach the negotiations. It makes it clear
that neither side can attempt to achieve
through these negotiations a unilateral ad-
vantage and, secondly, that we have always
maintained the position that we did not
separate our security interests from those of
our allies.
I must mention one other point with re-
spect to the first principle, which is to say
that both sides have agreed that the negotia-
tions should include not only limitations on
strategic arms but measures for the reduc-
tion of strategic arms.
The third principle states: The limitations
placed on strategic offensive weapons can
apply both to their quantitative aspects as
well as to their qualitative improvement.
This is one of the essential differences be-
tween SALT One and SALT Two. SALT One
concerned primarily exclusively the question
of numerical limitation. SALT Two will in-
clude, as well, qualitative restraint. That will
involve discussions on MIRV's [multiple in-
dejiendently targetable reentry vehicles], on
throw-weight, and issues introduced by the
other side with respect to specific types of
armaments; for example, on airplanes.
The fourth principle states: Limitations on
strategic offensive arms must be subject to
adequate verification by national technical
means — which is a familiar principle from
the previous SALT discussions and which
the negotiating record makes it clear that we
include also the imperative that both sides
will maintain practices which facilitate mon-
itoring the agreement.
The fifth principle applies to the moderni-
zation of arms and states: The modernization
and replacement of strategic offensive arms
would be permitted under conditions which
will be formulated in the agreements to be
concluded.
The essence here is that on the one hand
there will be some provision for moderniza-
Department of State Bulletin
tion and replacement. On the other hand, it
also makes clear that the modernization and
replacement cannot take place except under
agreed conditions that do not threaten the
purposes of the agreement.
The. sixth principle is: Pending the com-
pletion of a permanent agreement on more
complete measures of strategic offensive
arms limitation, both sides are prepared to
reach agreements on separate measures to
supplement the existing interim agreement
of May 26, 1972.
The significance of this principle is that
with respect to some issues that are time-
urgent, in which the interval between now
and the time in 1974 when we expect the per-
manent agreement to be concluded, that this
interval might have a major impact on the
existing strategic situations, both sides have
agreed that they would be prepared to nego-
tiate supplementary or separate measures to
the interim agreement which would probably
be of shorter duration and which would of
course be absorbed by the permanent agree-
ment.
The seventh principle is a reaffirmation of
the accidental war agreement, which is to say
that each side will continue to take necessary
organizational and technical measures for
preventing accidental or unauthorized use of
nuclear weapons under its control in accord-
ance with the agreement of September 30,
1971, between the United States of America
and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.
To sum up, the statement of principles
which will be signed today, first, formally
commits the two principal leaders to the
urgency of completing a permanent agree-
ment and the relationship between interna-
tional peace and security and the completion
of such an agreement. Secondly, it states a
deadline for the completion of the agreement,
in 1974. Thirdly, it includes reductions as one
of the objectives of the agreement and not
simply limitation. Fourth, it defines a per-
manent agreement as one that will limit the
number of weapons systems as well as to
limit their qualitative improvement and
therefore opens a dimension to the negotia-
tions that was not covered by SALT One.
And it defines some general principles as
July 23, 1973
yardsticks against which the negotiators
can measure progress.
Now, these principles have to be seen also
in terms of the negotiating record at Geneva,
where both sides are now discussing concrete
proposals and where it is therefore perfectly
clear what both sides mean by such phrases
as "qualitative changes" and other phrases.
It must also be seen in the light of the
extensive discussions that took place yester-
day between the President and the General
Secretary which dealt with how to give effect
to these principles and how to move forward
to these negotiations so that the timetable
that has been set out in these principles can
be realistically met.
These, then, are the principles which will
guide our actions over the next year. We
expect that they will be seen as a major
step in developing a permanent agreement
on the limitation of offensive weapons — the
ultimate reduction — as a move toward bring-
ing under control not only the pace of the
arms race but its nature and therefore will
contribute to long-term prospects of peace.
Now I will be glad to answer any ques-
tions.
Q. Dr. Kissinger, why do you find the
need to provide for further interim agree-
ments if you think you are going to have
a permanent agreement within 18 months?
Dr. Kissinger: This issue will of course be
left in detail to the negotiators. The need
could arise, for example, in the case of
certain technological developments, where
restraints on the pace of testing could affect
the situation in the space over the next 12
to 18 months. It would be applied to those
issues which are sensitive to the time
interval that has been outlined in this agree-
ment. It would not, obviously, apply to such
issues as the numbers of weapons to be
deployed because that would not arise in the
12- to 18-month period.
Q. Does the United States seek parity in
numbers in the permanent agreement?
Dr. Kissinger: The issue of how you define
equal security and no unilateral advantage
is one of the most complex. As you know,
137
with respect to the interim agreement, we
believe that the larger number of our war-
heads compensated for the somewhat larger
number of their missiles, and also the larger
number of our airplanes. And we also con-
cluded that in the five-year period of this
agreement we were not going to increase
the number of these weapons anyway.
With respect to a permanent ban, the
limitations must be equitable; that is, they
must take into account the numbers of
weapons and the numbers of warheads. And
we will certainly seek, and we will obtain,
what we consider strategic parity.
Q. So you don't have to have exactly the
same numbers in terms —
Dr. Kissinger: It depends what other limi-
tations exist, and therefore it is very difficult
to answer it in the abstract. In general, our
objectives will be equality, but how you
calculate this equality, we have to leave open
to the negotiators. In effect though, the total
compositions of the forces should be sub-
stantially equal.
Q. Dr. Kissinger, you said in reading this
over, I don't know if you meant it, that in
principle 3 —
Dr. Kissinger: If I said it, there is a
chance I meant it. [Laughter.]
Q. You said this is qualitative as well as
quantitative, and later on you said the agree-
ment will deal with qualitative. In relation
to that, if you mean that it will deal with
qualitative matters, can you relate principle
4 on the use of national technical means of
inspection to the control of MIRV's? Are
you announcing that the United States is
prepared to use national technical means
of inspection to verify any kind of MIRV
agreement that might be forthcoming?
Q. Can we have the question, please?
Dr. Kissinger: I will repeat the question,
but not the introduction to the question. The
question is that the third principle says that
the agreement can apply both to qualitative
and to quantitative aspects and then the
fourth principle says that the limitation
must be subject to adequate verification by
national technical means.
Miss Berger's question was how these
two principles could be reconciled and
specifically whether we were saying that we
were prepared to accept national verification
for any kind of MIRV agreement.
I think I would put it another way. I
would say any kind of MIRV agreement that
may be reached will have to be one that can
be verified by national technical means, and
therefore that those MIRV agreements that
are not verifiable by national technical means
would be difficult to reconcile with these
provisions and therefore the question de-
pends on the nature of MIRV limitations
that we are talking about. But as I have
made clear, we consider the development of
multiple independent warheads one of the
major factors of concern in the arms race.
And that is clearly understood by the other
side.
Q. You are aware that there are stories
circulating that the President and Mr.
Brezhnev are working on a so-called surprise
agreement also in the nuclear field. Can you
tell us whether in fact this is the only agree-
ment going to be reached at the summit that
has anything to do with nuclear weapons or,
in a more general way, whether they are
working on some more major surprise agree-
ment — to be announced here, I mean ?
Dr. Kissinger: I don't want to comment
on everything that they may be working on.
I would not characterize anything as a
surprise agreement, and I would say that
there is nothing that they are working on
that is directly relevant to the Strategic
Arms Limitation Talks.
Q. Dr. Kissinger, is there any understand-
ing about whether forward-based systems
will be considered in these negotiations?
Dr. Kissinger: The basic position of the
two sides has been elaborated in previous
negotiations. We have left no doubt that we
consider our security interests and those of
our allies inseparable and that we believe
that the central strategic systems should be
the principal concern of this phase of the
negotiations ; that is to say, the ICBM's [in-
tercontinental ballistic missiles], bombers,
and submarine-launched ballistic missiles.
The Soviet Union has taken a different
138
Department of State Bulletin
view in the past. It is a view that we
managed to avoid having to address in the
first phase of SALT, and it is something
which we believe can be negotiated in the
second phase of SALT.
But we can state now that with respect
to forward-based systems, we will make no
agreement that separates our security
interests from those of our allies and that
we believe that in this phase the central
strategic systems should be the principal
focus of negotiation.
Q. What can you tell us of the changes the
Soviets have made in the last year in their
missile programs and whether they have
been completely in accordance with the
agreements reached in Moscow?
Dr. Kissiriffer: The Soviet Union, to the
best of my information, has pursued an
active program within the terms of the
agreement. If we should receive any infor-
mation that is contrary to that, we will
actively pursue it in the standing committee
and in other channels. Up to now, they have
pursued an active program, which is, how-
ever, to the best of our current information,
within the terms of the agreement.
Q. Could you give just a general outline
of what that active program constitutes?
Dr. Kissinger: I reveal Soviet strategic
deployments only in bars in the Soviet
Union. [Laughter.]
Q. Henry, I am having a little trouble
here with the qualitative principle. What is
new about the qualitative principle? I
thought it was understood right along that
SALT Two would be qualitative as well as
numerical. Are you saying here there is
something in this that now permits the
Soviet Union to place a freeze on MIRV's?
Is that what is new here? If not, what is the
change ?
Dr. Kissinger: I am saying this is the first
time that there is a formal statement to this
effect by both sides. Our position on it has
been made clear, and I have enunciated it to
this group. This is the first time that an
agreed guideline signed by the two leaders,
or an agreed guideline by the two sides, to
this effect has been enunciated.
Q. So it is that the Soviet Union has
agreed to negotiate on MIRV?
Dr. Kissinger: I don't want to speak to
the Soviet position because qualitative can
include many things in addition to MIRV.
Q. Dr. Ki.ssinger, is the final agreement on
SALT contingent on any agreement or
understanding of any kind, and if not, what
is all this talk about SALT not being reach-
able if the Soviet Union does not get most-
favored-nation treatment?
Dr. Kissinger: The SALT agreement is
independent of other agreements, but it is
of course dependent on the general climate
of U.S.-Soviet relations. We have always
held the view that the relationship between
the general political climate and progress in
SALT was close. It is not, however, linked
as a condition to progress in any other
negotiation ; it has not been stated as such
by us.
Q. Dr. Kissinger, may I follow that up?
In the event the Jackson amendment is
adopted, will SALT go down the drain?
Dr. Kissinger: I would not speculate on
any particular agreement. We have said that
in the event that the Jackson amendment is
adopted in its present form that it would
have a serious impact on Soviet-American
relations. What the particular impact will be
on any specific negotiation, I would not want
to go into.
Q. Dr. Kissinger, what can we say to our
readers in the area of the prospects for re-
ductions? Aren't you kind of dangling out
the proposition here that the world can look
forward to a reduction in the spending for
nuclear armaments? What can we tell them
the real prospects might be? When would it
come, the lower number of missiles? Would
it involve large amounts of savings on either
side?
Dr. Kissinger: I don't want to go into
specific proposals that are being negotiated.
I will only say that our proposals will be
consistent with these principles and they will
include proposals for initial limitations to be
followed by ultimate reductions.
Q. Dr. Kissinger, the linkage was not
stated by us, with any other agreements.
July 23, 1973
139
Have the Soviets raised the question of a
linkage?
Dr. Kissinger: The Soviet Union also has
not raised any particular linkage.
Q. Dr. Kissinger, you said the numbers in
the temporary agreement would not be the
numbers in the permanent agreement —
Dr. Kissinger: Not necessarily.
Q. — is it our side's position that the
Soviet Union's numbers will have to be
decreased more than our numbers have to, to
reduce or eliminate the apparent disparity
between the numbers agreed upon in the
temporary agreement, and if so, do they
accept that as a general proposition?
Dr. Kissinger: How you set these limits,
and what weapons you include in these limits
is of course one of the key issues in the
negotiations. For example, if you include
bombers in the limits, the inequality in total
numbers is different than if you are only
talking about missiles.
Therefore, at what figure you set the limit,
whether you set it at one below both sides'
current strength, at the strength of one side,
or somewhere in between, that remains to be
determined through the negotiations, and I
don't want to speculate on that.
Q. Dr. Kissinger, can you tell us, sir, if an
attempt was made to reach an agreement in
principle here on a MIRV freeze but that
was found to perhaps be too complex to
achieve at this stage of the negotiations?
Dr. Kissinger: I don't want to go into the
details of any particular negotiation. I don't
think that would be appropriate for me to
do.
Q. Dr. Kissinger, is there any news about
a ban on underground testing?
Dr. Kissinger: We have stated this is a
subject under very active review in our
government now and one on which we will
make a decision as soon as the studies are
completed, but not during the summit.
Q. I have a double question. The first is:
The implication of your earlier comment
about national means and MIRV's — does that
mean you will have to have a limitation on
flight tests, a test ban on MIRV's, and you
cannot get into a production ban; and the
second question is, if the two leaders are
confident enough to set a deadline for the
negotiations, why couldn't the other princi-
ples be more specific on such questions as
MIRV and the numbers than you have been
able to be today?
Dr. Kissinger: Because, first, with respect
to the question of what sort of limitations
are verifiable by national means, it is obvious
that flight testing is more easily verifiable
than production, and this has been an issue
we have covered in previous discussions on
MIRV.
With respect to the principles, our objec-
tive is to have the permanent agreement, and
not have a spectacular announcement. Many
issues that can be agreed to in principle
nevertheless leave a margin — a narrow
margin, but nevertheless a margin — for sub-
sequent discussion, such as numbers, such
as the type of qualitative limitations, and
such as the procedures to be followed in
eliminating the remaining margins. And for
that reason, it was thought to be best if we
went no further, then, now. But there have
been discussions on how to proceed from
here to meet this objective with some con-
fidence.
Q. Dr. Kissinger, when you talk of quality,
are you including limitations on technical
improvements of accuracy of warheads ?
Dr. Kissinger: When I speak of quality,
these are all permissible issues to be raised.
They have to be seen, however, in the context
of verifiability. And the more esoteric the
problem the more complex the problem of
verification becomes. And it is not in the
interests of either side to have agreements,
particularly of a permanent nature, in which
both sides feel they are at the mercy of
developments that they cannot control.
So I would say, in principle, this is some-
thing that can be included in these dis-
cussions probably by means of restrictions
on testing. In practice, however, it is getting
into the more esoteric areas.
Q. Can you express confidence that we
will have some kind of limitation, particu-
larly on land-based MIRV's, within the next
18 months?
140
Department of State Bulletin
Dr. Kissinger: I have confidence that we
will achieve an agreement consistent with
the principles enunciated.
DR. KISSINGER'S NEWS CONFERENCE,
WASHINGTON, JUNE 22 '
Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated June 25
Dr. Kissinger: Ladies and gentlemen, let
me put this agreement [on the prevention
of nuclear war] first in its context, describe
what it is seeking to achieve, and then go
through its specific provisions, a little bit
of its history, and then I will take your
questions.
The principal goal of the foreign policy of
this administration ever since 1969 has been
to set up what the President has called a
structure of peace, by which we mean an
international system less geared to the man-
agement of crises, less conscious of constant
eruptions of conflict, in which the principal
participants operate with a consciousness of
stability and permanence.
This requires that all of the nations
operate with a sense of responsibility, and
it puts a particular obligation on the two
great nuclear powers that have the capacity
to destroy mankind and whose conflicts have
produced so many of the crises of the post-
war period.
In achieving this objective, the United
States has operated on many levels. We have
always believed that it required adequate
strength to deter aggression. But we also
have believed that we have to move from the
period of military confrontation to a period
which is characterized more by restraints
and, eventually, cooperation. In our dealings
with the other great nuclear superpower, the
President, from the day of his first inaugura-
tion, has emphasized that we wanted to move
from confrontation to negotiation.
In those negotiations we have operated on
many levels. We have attempted to remove
specific causes of tension. We have attempted
to forge specific instruments of cooperation.
" Introductory remarks by Press Secretary Ziegler
are not printed here.
And finally, we have attempted to develop
certain principles of conduct by which the
two great nuclear countries could guide their
expectations and by which both in relations
to each other and in their relations to third
countries, they could calm the atmosphere
and replace purely military measures by a
new attitude of a cooperative international
system.
It is in this spirit that last year in Moscow
the United States and the Soviet Union
signed certain principles of conduct which
were described then as a roadmap on a road
that no one was forced to travel but that if
we wanted to travel it, it was there for the
two major countries.
I believe we have traveled on this road in
the last year and therefore it was decided
to formalize some of these principles in an
agreement, to extend them in some respects,
particularly concerning consultation. The
origin of the negotiation, as it turned out,
was at the last session of the Moscow summit
meeting when there were some general ex-
changes with respect to how to control
nuclear weapons in a political and diplomatic
sense, beyond the negotiations going on in
strategic arms limitations.
These discussions were continued between
the President and Foreign Minister Gromyko
on the occasion of Gromyko's visit to the
United States last October. They were con-
tinued in exchanges between the two leaders.
There was some discussion when I visited
the Soviet Union in September of last year,
and the discussions continued this spring
and were extensively pursued in Zavidovo
and finally concluded here.
Throughout, the United States has held
the view that any obligations with respect
to international conduct that applied to the
great nuclear powers also had to apply to
their relations to other countries, and we
have held the view, which was shared by
the Soviet leaders, that the principal problem
was how to prevent a war and not how to
conduct a war.
Therefore this is an agreement which is
designed to regulate the relations of the two
nuclear powers to each other and to other
July 23, 1973
141
countries in time of peace. It is an attempt
to prevent the outbreak of nuclear war. And
to the extent that it contributes to this task,
it can be a significant landmark in the rela-
tionships of the United States to the Soviet
Union and in the relationships of the two
great nuclear countries toward all other
countries of the world.
Now let me run through the articles,
which are largely self-explanatory.
Article I states that it is an objective of
both the policy of the United States and the
policy of the Soviet Union to remove the
danger of nuclear war and the use of nuclear
weapons. This has been a consistent goal of
American foreign policy and is a goal shared
by all of mankind.
Article II applies this objective to the
general conduct of both sides ; that is to say,
the prevention of nuclear war presupposes
the avoidance of situations capable of an
exacerbation of relations, avoidance of mili-
tary confrontation, and it is in that context
that the outbreak of nuclear war can be
excluded. The second article states this more
concretely by elaborating that the prevention
of nuclear war presupposes the avoidance of
force or the use or threat of force by the
two nuclear countries toward each other and
toward other countries.
Article III is a general article that simply
states that the two nuclear countries have
to develop their relations with each other
and with third countries in a way consistent
with the pur])oses of this agreement, and it
makes it clear that while it is a bilateral
agreement the obligations are multilateral.
Article IV states that in any situation in
which the two great nuclear countries might
find themselves in a nuclear confrontation,
or in which either as a result of their policies
toward each other or as the result of de-
velopments elsewhere in the world there is
a danger of a nuclear confrontation between
them or between them or any other country,
they are obligated to consult with each other
in order to avoid this risk.
Article V permits tlie consultation — that
these consultations he communicated to the
United Nations and to other countries, a
clause which we would of course apply to
our allies.
Article VI makes clear that this agreement
deals with the prevention of war and that
if it fails, the existing obligations in existing
documents, treaties, and alliances will be
maintained.
So, we see the basic significance of this
agreement as a step, a significant step
toward the prevention of nuclear war and
the prevention of military conflict. It is a
formal obligation that the two nuclear super-
powers have taken toward each other and,
equally importantly, toward all other coun-
tries to practice restraint in their diplomacy,
to build a peace that is permanent, to pursue
a policy whose dedication to stability and
peace will become, as General Secretary
Brezhnev said last night at the banquet,
irreversible.
Of course anyone who has studied the
history of the last 30 years must recognize
that agreements are not always maintained
and that there is nothing self-enforcing
about this document. However, if the two
great nuclear countries continue to be ani-
mated by the spirit in which they have con-
ducted their policy of the last two years,
then this document could mark a landmark
on the road toward the structure of peace
of which the President has been speaking
and can be seen as a step toward a new era
of cooperation in the relations of all nations
and of lifting from them increasingly the
fear of nuclear war and of war in general.
Now I will be glad to answer your
questions.
Q. Dr. Kissinger, please, does article II
have any relation to our bombing of Cam-
bodia, and does article II have any relation
to the supply of the belligerents by both the
Soviet Union, the United States, and other
countries, of military support?
Dr. Kissinc/er: What is the question?
Q. Does article II have any bearing or any
relation to our bombing in Cambodia or to
the military supply of the Indochina bel-
ligerents l)y both the United States and the
Soviet Union?
Dr. Kissinger: Obviously, in interpreting
142
Department of State Bulletin
this agreement we could go around the world
and see how it specifically applies to each
individual country and to each conceivable
situation.
Let me answer first as to Cambodia. The
military operations now going on in Cam-
bodia were in progress when this agreement
was being negotiated, and it was not raised
as applying to that particular situation.
Now, I don't want to go into the relation-
ship of particular articles to particular
events. I don't think it would be appropriate
at this point to do it.
Let me say as a general proposition this :
It is not possible under this agreement for
either side — and I was specifically exempting
Cambodia for the reason that this is an
operation that was in progress at the time —
but it is not possible for either side to use
force in circumstances that can threaten
international peace and stability, as is said
in article II, without breaching the letter
and the spirit of this agreement.
Now, one then has to decide to what extent
the clauses of article VI apply and to what
extent particular operations threaten inter-
national peace and stability, and I don't
think this is the appropriate time to discuss
it.
The purpose of this agreement is to
legalize, to symbolize, and to bring about
restraint on the part of the two nuclear
superpowers in their international relation-
ship so as to produce — at least contribute to
the preservation of peace, and it cannot be
approached from the point of view of a
sharp lawyer pushing against the limits of
every clause because if that is going to be
the attitude, the agreement will not have
any significance.
Q. I would like to ask a naive question,
if I could. It seems to me that we agreed on
the desirability of motherhood here. I don't
see why it took so long to reach this agree-
ment and what the disputes were. I wonder
if you could outline some of the negotiations
that went on, and what were the issues in
this discussion?
Dr. Kissinger: Well, I don't agree, first of
all, with your premise, because this agree-
ment was made by two countries whose con-
flicts and confrontations have characterized
the entire postwar period. For them to
formalize these series of restraints, the will-
ingness to consult, was a very major step.
Secondly, I don't think it is useful at the
conclusion of the negotiation to go through
all of the debates and provide a scorecard. I
have indicated the general approach that we
took, which was to extend the applications
to the international system in general and
not just have them apply to the United
States and to the Soviet Union and to put
the emphasis on the prevention of war
rather than on how wars might be con-
ducted. But I don't think any useful purpose
is served by going through all of the com-
plexities.
Q. I have a two-part question. According
to article II, would China be regarded as an
ally of the Soviet Union? And secondly, to
what degree would this document be con-
ceived as an effort to forestall any kind of
military action against China?
Dr. Ki.ssinger: What article II says is that
force and the threat of force cannot be used
against the ally of another country; it
doesn't say anything about one's own allies.
But it also says force and the threat of force
cannot be used against any other country,
so clearly under this agreement the use of
force against any country under circum-
stances that would have wide international
repercussions would be precluded.
It was not conceived as a protection for
any particular country, but I think its
practical consequence is that if it were
observed — as we of course expect it will be —
it will have the practical consequence of ap-
plying both to the situation you described
as well as to many other conceivable situa-
tions.
Q. May I follow that up. Dr. Kissinger,
please? Did you have prior consultations
when you met with the Chinese representa-
tives several days ago about any form of this
document? And would you at some point
this year or next like to broaden the docu-
ment to include China as a signatory?
Dr. Kissinger: The United States con-
July 23, 1973
143
suited several countries prior to the com-
pletion of this document, but I don't want
to go into an enumeration of which countries
were consulted. I do not discuss my conversa-
tions with the head of the Chinese Liaison
Office, but I have no particular reason to
suppose that they will necessarily approve a
bilateral agreement between the United
States and the Soviet Union, whatever its
consequences. I will let them speak for them-
selves.
Q. Dr. Kissinger, there is one qualifier in
article II, where it says that both parties will
refrain from the use or threat of force in
circumstances which may endanger interna-
tional security. When the Soviets went into
Czechoslovakia, they obviously thought it
didn't endanger international peace, and
when the United States went into North
Viet-Nam, they felt it didn't endanger inter-
national peace. Isn't that a large hole for
a truck to go through?
Dr. Kissinger: If either of the two signa-
tories wants to find an excuse to go to war,
it will find an excuse to go to war. This has
been the history of the postwar period. We
are talking here of restraint on significant
military actions ; and what endangers inter-
national peace and security is not determined
by the unilateral declaration of the country
going to war but also by the reactions of
other members of the international system,
because this is what pi'oduces the threat to
international peace and security.
Therefore, again, I can only repeat, if any
of the signatories deal with this like sharp
lawyers pushing against the edges of the
agreement, they will of course then find ways
of doing so.
On the other hand the movement into
sovereign countries of large forces would
not be in our view consistent with the spirit
of this agreement, but I really do not want
to go into a detailed analysis of every con-
ceivable situation that could arise.
Q. Dr. Kissinger, while realizing you can-
not go into specific circumstances, could you
discuss in a general way what your expecta-
tions are for applying this principle, for
example, to the Middle East area or Asia to
reduce the dangers of nuclear war in either
of those areas?
Dr. Kissinger: I really do not want to go
into specific areas. Obviously, if we did not
believe that this agreement could make a
contribution to bringing about international
restraint in areas which have been demon-
strable sources of international tension, if
we did not believe it could make a major
contribution to this, we would not have
agreed to proceed with it.
So, as a general answer to your question,
I would say that it is our intention to proceed
on the basis that the restraint foreseen by
this agreement will become an increasingly
vital factor in international aff"airs. But I
think that you can understand why one can-
not at this moment give a precise descrip-
tion of every situation which might arise.
Q. Dr. Kissinger, I have two questions.
You have said it would be impossible to
indicate in every situation what this might
tend to prohibit or inhibit. Could you give
us an example looking back over the past 20
or 25 years of any situation in which force
has been applied which you think it would
be inhibited in the future? That is the first
question.
The second question is: This is the kind
of agreement which the Russians have been
inclined to sign with a number of countries,
and I wonder whether or not it was they
who were the ones who originally raised the
idea back in Moscow last May?
Dr. Kissinger: As to the agreement as it
has now emerged, it would be difficult to say
who raised the particular nature of this
agreement. When the discussions were first
raised in Moscow last year, it was indeed
by the Soviet Union, but in a different con-
text.
The original discussion that gave the im-
petus to this has been transformed into an
agreement in which, I think, the contril)ution
of both sides can be said to be equal —
Q. You are particularly talking about the
broadening aspect to other countries?
Dr. Kissinger: — and the emphasis on the
prevention of war in general. But again, on
the approach, I think at this point it can
144
Department of State Bulletin
be said that both parties made a substan-
tially equal contribution to this agreement.
Now, secondly, with respect to situations
that might be prevented, I can think of
several crises in this administration, and I
would have thought in previous periods —
the Cuban missile crisis would be one
example. Several Berlin ci'ises that we have
had would be othei- examples that would
have been avoided. I can think of some in
this administration, but again, when we are
talking about restraint we are talking about
things that do not happen.
It is never very easy to demonstrate why
something has not happened. I think it
reflects the changes that have occurred in
the international environment that such an
agreement which would have been incon-
ceivable, say on the visit 15 years ago of
Khrushchev, can now be described in one
question as simply affirming motherhood — it
is not the virtues of motherhood or desir-
ability of motherhood.
Q. Dr. Kissinger, this agreement obvi-
ously will have a long-term effect within
the United States and other countries. I
wonder why this was not written in a treaty
form so that the Senate could get a chance
to discuss it in its entirety and question you
about it. And two, has there really been
discussion with the NATO allies? I know
you didn't want to discuss that, but obviously
in Europe there will be concern about the
American credibility in case of large-scale
conventional attacks in central Europe.
D)\ Kissinger: There can be no concern,
because article VI fully covers existing
NATO obligations and because if war is not
prevented there is no particular restraint
then about how it is conducted. Secondly,
several NATO allies were closely consulted
over an extended period of time, but I don't
want to go into details.
Q. As to the first part of the question, on
the treaty?
Dr. Kissinger: Excuse me. With respect to
why it was not made in treaty form, it does
not involve any particular positive actions
that the United States has to take and it is a
general statement of policy. The President,
however, is meeting with the congressional
leaders at 11 :30, and he will discuss with
them ways in which the Congress can regis-
ter its support if it wishes to do so.
Q. You have now signed a new document
of detente, and yesterday you pledged to go
for new strategic arms agreements by 1974.
Can you explain how the administration will
then be able to ask Congress for more arms
in the strategic arms field, and will you dis-
cuss some insight into how you will argue
your case?
Dr. Kissinger: We have believed that the
limitation of strategic arms should be
achieved by agreement, and of course we will
scrupulously observe the limitations that the
agreement we hope to sign in 1974 will be
carried out.
However, it would be destructive of the
negotiations if we now unilaterally imposed
on ourselves the limitations that we are at-
tempting to negotiate. We believe that one
of the elements that has brought about the
present situation is the military balance that
exists between us and the Soviet Union.
However, we believe that this document
can contribute to an atmosphere that will ac-
celerate the discussions on strategic arms
limitations, and as I said yesterday, we con-
sider the reduction of arms an important
element of the Strategic Arms Limitation
Talks. And it has been so expressed in the
principles that were signed yesterday.
But we cannot anticipate what may be
negotiated by unilateral actions on our part.
Q. Dr. Kissinger —
Dr. Kissinger: Haven't you asked a ques-
tion already?
Q. I reminded you of part of Bernie's
question.
Dr. Kissinger: You are only entitled to a
short question then.
Q. My question. Your explanation of not
putting it in treaty form is based in part on
it not involving any positive obligations on
the United States part. How is it different
from a limited nuclear test ban treaty in that
respect? Could you expand on why it didn't
need to be a treaty or shouldn't be one?
Dr. Kissinger: The limited nuclear test
July 23, 1973
145
ban reflected a significant change in our arms
policy that had been carried out until that
time. This is really a statement of policies
that we intend to pursue and have to be
applied in individual cases.
It is therefore more in the nature of a for-
malization of a declaration of principles
rather than of a specific set of obligations
that can be applied automatically to concrete
specific circumstances.
Q. In your expose today, you used the
word "superpower." Ambassador Zamyatin
[L. I. Zamyatin, General Director of TASS],
when I spoke to him about this "super-
power," he said the Soviet Union is not a
superpower, neither a great power, only a
big power. Then he said this word is in-
vented by the Chinese. [Laughter.]
My other question is about Israel. We in
the Arab world welcome this agreement; we
are concerned that Israel has so far not
signed a partial nuclear treaty. There was an
article by Flora Lewis, which referred to
you, saying that you had taken a study by
the Rand Corporation on how Israel can at-
tack Egypt with an atomic bomb. Within
articles IV and VI, do you think America,
as an ally of Israel, will try to bring her to
sign this partial treaty?
Dr. Kissinger: First of all, with respect to
the comments of Ambassador Zamyatin, I
welcome the humility that he has expressed,
and it was not adequately reflected due to
certain personality problems in my own
comment.
With respect to the Rand study, I have
never seen such a study, and I know it has
been written about, although this is a big
government and there are many studies
floating around in it. They don't necessarily
mean, however, that they have any connec-
tion with American foreign policy.
Thirdly, the implications of the agreement
on the actions of other countries with respect
to existing multilateral agreements, I do not
want to speculate about. We could not as-
sume that this agreement imposes on the
United States a particular additional obliga-
tion with respect to treaties whose obliga-
tions are already clear.
Q. Dr. Kissinger, do you interpret this
document as one that supercedes the so-
called Brezhnev doctrine?
Dr. Kissinger: This document makes no
distinction in its application between the
domestic structure of various forms of
countries.
Q. Dr. Kissinger, is this document a re-
nunciation of atomic war, and if not, why
not?
Dr. Kissinger: Well, I will take you along
on future negotiations to fill in gaps that we
leave. But this document is designed to pre-
vent the outbreak of nuclear war by impos-
ing restraints on the major countries with
respect to nuclear war and with respect to
the use of force in general.
Therefore it does not address the question
of what happens if war cannot be prevented,
because that is not its purpose. Its purpose is
to prevent wars. It is not a renunciation of a
particular form of war if war cannot be
prevented, but we hope that it will make a
major contribution to the prevention of war
and therefore your question will not have to
be addressed.
Q. Did you discuss the concept of not us-
ing nuclear force first against each other,
and why wasn't that included?
Dr. Kissinger: We can now discuss many
things that individual members of the press
corps would like to have as part of other
agreements.
Q. That is a recognized international con-
cept of how to prevent nuclear war, isn't it,
Dr. Kissinger?
Dr. Kissinger: There are two ways you
can look at how to prevent nuclear war. One
is by preventing war, and the second is by
imposing on yourselves specific restraints
with respect to particular categories of
weapons if war cannot be avoided.
We choose to go the road of attempting to
prevent war, and thereby nuclear war, be-
cause many other countries depend upon
what actions will be taken in case an ag-
gression occurs. Therefore, we did not be-
lieve it would contribute to peace if we made
particular distinctions as to categories of
weapons in case of war.
The overriding problem is to preserve the
peace and to prevent war.
146
Department of State Bulletin
Q. Dr. Kissing-er, does article IV oblige
the United States to act as sort of an arbiter
or mediator of the Sino-Soviet conflict if it
should get worse?
Dr. Kissinger: No. What article IV pro-
vides is that if either of the countries con-
templates nuclear war with any other
country, or of course with the other nuclear
country, it has an obligation to consult the
other signatory with the purpose of avoiding
the situation that would produce such a war.
We have no intention of being an arbiter
between the Soviet Union and the People's
Republic of China, and we look at this con-
sultation as a mutual restraint rather than
as one that creates a right of intervention
all over the world.
DR. KISSINGER'S NEWS CONFERENCE,
SAN CLEMENTE, CALIF., JUNE 25
White House press release (San Clemente) dated June 25
Mr. Ziegler: You have the communique,
which is embargoed until 1 o'clock eastern
time and 10 o'clock Pacific time. Dr. Kis-
singer is here to discuss that with you and
take your questions on the communique and
also on the summit between the President
and General Secretary.
For the statistics buffs in the press corps,
the President and General Secretary spent
a total of 47 hours together. They met in
formal sessions with advisers or alone for
I814. hours. In addition, the President and
General Secretary were together 28% hours
at informal gatherings, social functions and
signing ceremonies, and events of that sort.
Q. How much alone, face to face?
Mr. Ziegler: Almost 10 hours — 91/0 hours.
Dr. Kissinger: Ladies and gentlemen, I
will not go through the communique, be-
cause I understand you have already had a
chance to read it. Let me make a few gen-
eral observations about the summit and how
it fits into the general development of our
foreign policy, and then I will take questions
about the communique or any other part of
the summit which you may wish to raise.
One good way of assessing the results of
the summit is to compare last year's com-
munique with this year's communique. Last
year's communique spoke about the desira-
bility of peaceful coexistence. I said : -
Having considered various areas of bilateral
US-Soviet relations, the two Sides agreed that an
improvement in relations is possible and desirable.
This year we say that:
Both Sides are convinced that the discussions
they have just held represent a further milestone
in the constructive development of their relations.
Convinced that such a development of American-
Soviet relations serves the interests of both of their
peoples and all of mankind, it was decided to take
further major steps to give these relations maxi-
mum stability and to turn the development of
friendship and cooperation between their peoples
into a permanent factor for worldwide peace.
In other words, what marks the turning
point last year, in which the fact of peaceful
coexistence required special affirmation and
the possibility of improving relations be-
tween the United States and the Soviet
Union was thought deserving of special
note, and this year we are speaking of a
continuing relationship.
As a result, as relations between the So-
viet Union and the United States proceed
along the course that was charted last May
and accelerated this June, we cannot expect
that these meetings, which we have affirmed
should become a regular part of U.S. -Soviet
relationships, will produce a dramatic new
departure. It is the strength of this relation-
ship as it develops that the road is charted
and that what we expect to see is a further
evolution along a path which will be increas-
ingly free of confrontations and which will
become increasingly a part of a .stable inter-
national system. This is the context in which
we see the U.S. -Soviet relationship.
If you look back over previous summit
meetings between Soviet and American
leaders, they almost invariably occurred in
the shadow of some crisis, and they were in-
evitably directed to removing some source
of tension and some cause of confrontation.
In May 1972 we still met in this shadow
of the Vietnamese war and the recent deci-
sions that had led to an expansion of military
July 23, 1973
■ For text, see BULLETIN of June 26, 1972, p. 899.
147
operations in Indochina but even then, be-
fore the first talk, enunciated some common
principles of conduct and affirmed the de-
sirability of a long-term evolution toward a
peaceful and ultimately cooperative relation-
ship between the two states and the two
peoples. These expectations were fulfilled
over the course of the year, and therefore
what this summit intended to do was to
strengthen the cooperative bonds that had
developed in particular areas, to give a new
impetus to the key areas of negotiations,
especially strategic arms limitations and
mutual force reductions, and thirdly, to take
the joint principles one step further by em-
bodying them in a formal agreement de-
signed to prevent war, and especially nuclear
war.
There is nothing I can add to the partic-
ular agreements that are enumerated in the
communique that deal with the cooperative
relationships in various fields and that rep-
resent a continuation of a process that
started last year.
I can only say from my personal experi-
ence in participating in many of these ne-
gotiations that what I told you ladies and
gentlemen before the summit has been re-
inforced by the experience of the summit.
Many of these agreements do not themselves
take the attention and time of the top lead-
ers, and it would be absurd to pretend to
you that the General Secretary and the Pres-
ident sit down and discu.ss the details of the
civil aviation agreements ; but it is also true
that the imminence of their meetings, and
the fact that they have determined to give a
symbolic expression to this relationship,
gives an impetus to negotiations that other-
wise would drag on for months and permits
the quick resolution of particular issues
which, if left to the expert level, could pro-
duce extended stalemate and there is some
significance in having the relationship de-
velop on such a broad front, developing on
both sides a commitment that is becoming
increasingly difficult to reverse.
With respect to the other areas, I have
talked to you at some length about the de-
cisions with respect to Strategic Arms Lim-
itation Talks. I think you can assume that
in addition to what has been stated formally
in the agreement on principles that the two
leaders had extensive discussions as to how
the process can be accelerated so that a
meaningful agreement can be achieved con-
sistent with the deadline that they have set
themselves. Therefore we believe, with con-
siderable hope, that a permanent agreement
limiting strategic offensive arms, which
would be one of historic achievements in the
field of arms control, can and will be nego-
tiated during the course of 1974.
With respect to the mutual balanced force
reductions (MBFR), we told you before this
summit conference that this was not the
forum in which to negotiate the specifics.
This is a matter of the profoundest concern
to our allies, and it had never been intended
to discuss the specifics, the specific schemes,
at this meeting.
However, as those who have followed the
discussions realize, there had been some un-
certainty about when these discussions would
begin. Prior to the meeting, in the prepara-
tory conference in Vienna, the Soviet posi-
tion had tied the opening of the MBFR con-
ference to the ending of the European
Security Conference. At this meeting, it was
decided that the MBFR conference would
begin unconditionally on October 30th, and
of course both leaders agreed that they would
make a serious effort to deal with the ques-
tion of armaments in central "Europe.
The Indochina problem, which last year
was a source of contention, has received a
common expression in this document.
And finally, there has been the agreement
on the prevention of nuclear war. Now, I
have seen several comments to the effect that
it is nonbinding, that it is not self-enforcing,
and no doubt I have contributed to this by
comments that reflect my former profes-
sorial profession, so let me state our posi-
tion : that no agreement in history has ever
enforced itself; every agreement in history
that has been observed has depended either
on the willingness of the parties to observe
it or on the willingness of one or the other
parties to enforce it or on the rewards for
148
Department of State Bulletin
compliance and the risks of noncompliance.
This agreement is no different from any
other agreement in that respect. When great
powers make an agreement with each other,
they of course have the capability of not
observing it unless the other side is prepared
to draw extreme consequences. But the vio-
lation of this agreement would have serious
consequences for the whole context of U.S.-
Soviet relations, and conversely the observ-
ance of this agreement can mark, as I said
on Friday, a milestone in the achievement
of self-restraint by the major countries, a
self-restraint which is by definition the es-
sence of peace and which we intend to ob-
serve, which we expect the Soviet Union to
observe, and which can therefore provide
the foundation for a new international rela-
tionship.
Of course history is replete with changes
of course and we must be vigilant and pre-
pared for such an occurrence; but it is the
belief of the President that this period has a
unique opportunity to create a new and more
peaceful system. It is an opportunity that
has come about partly as a result of the
enormity of the weapons that would be used
in case of a conflict, partly by the depth of
human aspiration toward peace, partly as a
result of the complexities of a world in which
the ideological expectations of any side have
not been fully met.
But whatever the reasons, we consider the
summit as a further advance along that
road, that as these meetings become a regu-
lar feature of international life and as we
come to take them more and more for
granted, the results will follow paths that
will come to seem more and more natural,
and we would consider that one of the best
signs that a peaceful world is coming into
being.
So this is our assessment of the summit,
and I will be glad to answer any questions
on this or on what I have said or on the com-
munique or anything else related to the sum-
mit.
Q. Dr. Kissinger, the communique says
positive trends are developing in interna-
tional relations toward the relaxation of
tension and the strengthening of cooperative
relations in the interest of peace. I wonder if
you would apply that sentence specifically to
the Middle East situation and what tran-
spired on it in the summit?
Dr. Kissinger: As you can see from the
communique, the Middle East is one of the
most complex areas and it is one in which one
has to separate two problems, one, the local
tensions — that is, the tensions between the
Arab states and Israel — from the so-called
great-power rivalry in that area. When this
administration came into oflfice, they were
inextricably linked. In 1970 the world came
close to the brink of war, closer than perhaps
was realized generally at the time, over the
invasion of Jordan by Syrian tanks, and at
that time every conflict in the Middle East
became immediately and inextricably a part
of the great rivalry. Even the selection of
words by White House briefers was picked
up by local newspapers and became a matter
of attention in the context of East-West re-
lationships.
Now, I think it is safe to say not that the
Soviet Union and we agree on the evolution
of the Middle East and how it should be
resolved, as the communique makes clear,
but I think both sides will make an effort
not to become inextricably involved in its
conflict with respect to the Arab-Israeli
conflict.
The communique states that both sides
recognize the importance of the solution and
that both sides will make efforts to help
pi'omote it, and therefore we hope that some
progress will be made over the course of the
year.
Q. Is there any significance in the drop-
ping of the word "balanced" from mutual
balanced force reduction in the communique,
and I notice that you used it once and didn't
use it another time?
Dr. Kissinger: That is because I usually
speak extemporaneously. No, there is no sig-
nificance in the dropping of the word "bal-
anced."
In the preparatory discussions in Vienna,
there was some di.scussion about it, but since
it concerned entirely procedural matters it
July 23, 1973
149
has no substantive significance. The U.S.
position with respect to the mutual l)alanced
force reduction negotiations has been sub-
mitted to our allies. We think that it has re-
ceived substantial support from our allies.
We will enter the negotiations, we are con-
vinced, with a reasonable and united position.
What particular adjective one gives to de-
scribe it is really less important, but the sub-
stance of it will be that it must be balanced
and that it must reflect the principles of this
communique and of May 29 last year — that
no negotiation can succeed that attempts to
give a unilateral advantage to one side or
another.
Q. Is there any significance in the brief
material on the Middle East to the omission
of the word "security" in the phrase "be
consistent with their independence and sov-
ereignty"?
Dr. Kissinger: No, I think it is safe to say
that both sides recognize that no solution is
possible that does not assure the security of
the countries concerned. And there is no
dispute about this.
Q. Why didn't the communique then say
so?
Dr. Kissinger: The truth is that I don't
remember any discussion about the word
"security." If somebody there thought of it,
it almost certainly would have said so.
Q. Dr. Kissinger, do you plan soon to go
to China or do you plan to invite a Chinese
leader to visit the United States in order to
assure them that what they witnessed this
past week was not the beginning of some kind
of superpower condominium?
Dr. Kissinger: We are of course ahvays in
touch with all interested countries, and it
is a fixed element of our policy not to partic-
ipate in any condominium directed either at
our allies or at other interested parties.
We believe that we have a common in-
terest with the Soviet Union in promoting a
peaceful order. We believe also that to the
extent that a more peaceful conduct emerges
by all parties — emerges from our discus-
sions — that all nations benefit.
We have not agreed, and we shall not agree
nor were we asked to agree, to anything that
smacks of superpower condominium, and
our views on this are well known to all
interested countries.
We have no specific plans at this moment
for any of the visits that you have described,
and if any should develop, we will of course
announce them immediately. But we don't
have to have such a visit to make that par-
ticular point clear.
Q. Dr. Kissinger, there has been a con-
siderable amount of confusion in connection
with the SALT agreement about MIRV's. In
the agreement it states that national means
of inspection will be the only possible means.
Is it possible to control MIRV through only
national means of inspection, or should we
read into the wording there that in effect,
you have abandoned the notion of being able
to control MIRV's?
Dr. Kissinger: First, the agreement does
not say national means are the only possible
means. It says that both sides agree that
they must be verifiable by national means.
If both sides should decide to have other
than national means, that wouldn't be pre-
cluded ; but I think that is extremely unlikely.
So, the realistic assumption has to be that
any agreement that will be made is one that
will be monitored by national means. Now
then, the question is: Does that principle
really exclude any control of MIRV's?
First, let me say that we believe that
MIRV's are an important part of this nego-
tiation and therefore we believe that it is
possible to have some restraints on MIRV's
that can be monitored by national means and
therefore a great deal depends on what re-
straints we are talking about.
If you are talking about bans on produc-
tion, those would be next to impossible to
monitor by national means. If you are talk-
ing about deployment, then they are possible
to monitor within a margin of error which is
larger than is the case in mere quantities —
than if you are monitoring quantities, but
that is finite. If you are talking about a com-
bination of deployment and improvements in
accuracy and so forth, so that you could add
certain testing restraints, then you have ever
greater possibilities of inspection.
150
Department of State Bulletin
I am not saying that these are our specific
proposals. I am saying that you cannot just
look at this in terms of one category of re-
straints and assess the relationship of na-
tional means to that one category. You have
to do it in the whole complex of MIRV tech-
nology and of the kinds of restraints you
want to employ, and we think it is possible
to put together a package by combining sev-
eral restraints verifiable by national means.
Q. Dr. Kissinger, on page 12 of the com-
munique, it says they set the goal for trade
over the next three years $2-$3 billion. This
is the figure for the entire three-year period,
as I understand it. Is that right?
Dr. Kissinger: That is right.
Q. Since the current trade is running at,
I think $1.3 billion annually now, '73, would
not this be —
Dr. Kissinger: The $1.3 billion includes
agricultural. This is excluding agricultural
commodities.
Q. Do you have any figure including agri-
cultural commodities ?
Dr. Kissinger: I do not have it including
agricultural. I think, excluding agricultural,
it runs at about $600 million now, and I
think this envisages an increase of about
50 percent.
Q. Dr. Kissinger, does the communique
hint, or more than hint, at an East-West
summit at the end of the European Security
Conference?
Dr. Kissinger: Well, it obviously mentions
it.
The position of the communique with re-
spect to the East- West summit is one that
we have taken before; that is to say, that
the level of the concluding phase of the Euro-
pean Security Conference will be determined
by progress that is made in the first two
phases, the first of which begins on July 3
at the Foreign Minister level. Then there will
be commission meetings, and upon the con-
clusion of the commission meetings, one can
determine, first, the final phase of the con-
ference and, secondly, the appropriate level
of participation. We are, in principle, pre-
pared to consider a summit if the results of
the first two phases warrant it.
Q. May I ask you to enumerate as briefly
as possible the total package of benefits that
will accrue to the United States as a result
of the past few days' activities?
Dr. Kissinger: I can see this is not some-
body who has attended previous briefings or
he wouldn't have made a demand for brevity.
[Laughter.]
The benefits that accrue to the United
States are the benefits that accrue to all par-
ticipants in the international system from an
improvement in the prospects of peace. To
the extent that we live in an atmosphere of
confrontation, the United States, as the
strongest country in the non-Communist
world and as the one on which the security of
most others depends, is immediately drawn
closer to the brink of war than almost any
other participant.
Secondly, we expect that as a result of
many of these cooperative efforts, both peo-
ples will benefit in a concrete way.
With respect to the economic relationships,
about which this question is often asked, they
have to be seen in the whole context of the
web of relations that is developing between
the two countries. Most of the large deals
that are being talked about will have to be
made by private American industry, and
they would presumably not be made unless
they were thought to be of mutual benefit.
We have taken the view from the begin-
ning of this administration, first, that nego-
tiations with the Soviet Union should not
be conducted on the basis of atmospherics,
but on the basis of very concrete negotia-
tion and, secondly, that the economic and
political matters should be linked together
so that the progress would take place on a
broad front. And I must say it is a little
ironic that early in the administration we
were all accused of delaying the progress of
negotiations and now many of the same peo-
ple who accused us then of being too slow
are discovering that the benefits may be too
one-sided. But the benefits of peace in this
period cannot be one-sided.
Q. Dr. Kissinger, what is the reason for
including a proposal for a world disarma-
ment conference to be held at an appro-
priate time? What is your definition of an
appropriate time? Does it mean after the
July 23, 1973
151
treaties on the strategic arms, or what?
Dr. Kissinger: Well, you know that the
proposal for a world disarmament confer-
ence is one that the Soviet Union has re-
peatedly made. It was included in last year's
communique, and it was repeated in this
year's communique, and I think it is safe to
say that if our Soviet colleagues and we were
pressed to the wall, our definition of the ap-
propriate time might differ. [Laughter.]
Q. Dr. Kissinger, what we have been lis-
tening to is an anthology of the positive
results of the summit. Were not there some
things that you had hoped to achieve at this
particular summit that you have not?
Dr. Kissinger: Either due to lack of imag-
ination or megalomania, I can't really tell
you anything that we were hoping to achieve
that we didn't. These summits are prepared
over a long period of time. This particular
summit is the result of many exchanges with
the Soviet Union : Secretary Peterson's
[Peter G. Peterson, then Secretary of Com-
merce] trip in July, my trip in September,
Foreign Minister Gromyko's trip to the
United States in October, Secretary [of the
Treasury George P.] Shultz's trip in March,
my trip in May, many exchanges between
the two leaders.
So it really is organically almost impos-
sible for those summits to occur with a long
agenda in which you will say we will try this
and see what happens. It is impossible, and
also undesirable, because when you have the
two leaders of the most powerful nations in
the world confronting each other you do not
want to have a situation in which a totally
unpredictable clash can occur.
So in this meeting the range of what was
attainable was clearly understood by April
or May, and the results were within the
I'ange that had been previously agreed to.
Now, at the end of each summit there is
always a very extensive meeting between
the two leaders in which they decide the sort
of problems they can be working on over the
next year. We had such a meeting in the
Kremlin on the day of the President's de-
parture in 1972, and that was the third time
that this agreement on the prevention of
nuclear war in a slightly different context
was raised.
As j-ou all know, the President and the
General Secretary met for three hours on
Saturday night, and there was a discussion
of the sort of problems that could be worked
on in preparation for next year's summit,
and of course there is an unfinished agenda.
Obviously the Middle East is part of the un-
finished agenda, but we didn't expect to
settle it at this meeting. SALT is part of it.
MBFR is part of it. This is where we stand
now in relation to next year's summit.
Q. General Secretary Brezhnev said, as he
was departing, that he believed that Presi-
dent Nixon could be returning to the Soviet
Union as early as six to eight months. He
also said that he expects that there will be
more important agreements, or equally im-
portant agreements, signed there, indicating
to some that he was possibly projecting per-
haps an interim agreement on SALT. On
those two points, could you give us the U.S.
view on the timing of a visit and also on
possibilities of an interim agi'eement on
SALT, which was referred to in an earlier
statement by the principals?
Dr. Kissinger: Well, as you saw, the Gen-
eral Secretary was speaking without notes
and in the exuberance of the moment.
[Laughter.]
We don't foreclose a meeting earlier than
12 months that has been customary between
the two recent summits, but if we had been
asked on that occasion to give our estimate,
we would have been somewhat more cautious.
So if it is more rapid, then this would indi-
cate a more rapid pace of negotiation than
we have foreseen, which we do not exclude
but which we think is unlikely.
Now, it is not at all excluded, as the prin-
cipals made clear, that there would be an
interim agreement on SALT in a period less
than the 12 to 14 months that I would have
given you as an estimate, and this is one of
the matters to which we will now turn.
Q. A followup on Mr. Kalb's question.
Was chemical weapons control one of the
things that had been dropped by April or
152
Department of State Bulletin
May, or was that actively under considera-
tion at this summit?
Dr. Kissinger: No.
Q. You suggested that most things had
been decided on the agenda by April or May.
I wondered if this matter had been excluded
at that point for possible agreement or was
under active consideration for agi'eement
here?
Dr. Kissinger: When I say "had been de-
cided by April or May," let me make clear
what I mean. By the end of my visit to Za-
vidovo, it was not that everything had been
decided, but that the range within which the
negotiations between the two leaders would
take place had been essentially determined
and therefore the shape of probable agree-
ments had become fairly clear. By that time
it was clear that there would be no agree-
ment on chemical warfare.
Q. It used to be a theory that it would be
a good idea for the top Soviet leaders to
come to this country to get an idea of our
strength; that is, the size of the country,
what the people are like, the size and scope
of our production, that kind of thing. This
summit conference could have been held on
a rock in the Atlantic Ocean for as much or
as little that Mr. Brezhnev saw of America
and Americans. Did he have at any time any
desire to see anything of us and our country
outside of the Presidential compound?
Dr. Kissinger: The nature of the travel of
the General Secretary was left to him. We
made it clear that he could go anywhere he
chose and for as long as he wished, so the
General Secretary's itinerary was not deter-
mined by us. However, it seemed logical to
us as well that the General Secretary wanted
to follow the summit in Moscow that had
been devoted entirely to work with just two
very brief side trips with another summit
in the United States of a more or less similar
nature, in which the two leaders would spend
most of their time in accelerating the mo-
mentum of their previous conversations.
I think, however, it is safe to say that now
that the basic course has been established
and many of the major agreements have
been achieved, that the purpose to which
you referred will be realized in future sum-
mits. For example, the General Secretary
has pointed out to the President that when
he returns to the Soviet Union in 1974, the
Soviet Union would like it very much if we
would agree to a greater exposure to various
aspects of Soviet life and also to see more of
the Soviet Union than proved to be the case
last year. We have agreed to this.
If these summits become annual events
and the General Secretary returns here in
1975, it can be taken for granted that much
more extensive travel would be included in
his program.
Q. Dr. Kissinger, concerning Indochina,
on page 8, the last sentence on page 8 says
that the leaders may also reaffirm their stand
that the political futures of Viet-Nam, Laos,
and Cambodia should be left to the respective
peoples to determine, free of outside inter-
ference. Have you detected any change, per-
haps, in the Soviet attitude concerning the
current fighting in Cambodia, and particu-
larly, do the Soviets disapprove at all of any
activities that Hanoi may be undertaking in
Cambodia, either supply or military?
Dr. Kissinger: First, let us get the Cam-
bodian problem into perspective. We are talk-
ing here of the very last phase of a very
prolonged war. We are not talking here of
the beginning of another Indochina conflict.
I don't want to characterize the Soviet atti-
tude toward Cambodia. I think the Soviet
Union should speak for itself.
I think that this sentence here states our
view exactly : that w^e agreed that the future
of Cambodia should be left to the Cambodian
people and that peace should come consistent
with the sovereignty and the rights of self-
determination of the Cambodians. We are
actively engaged in attempting to bring this
about at this moment, and we believe, as I
said previously, that as the relationships
among the great powers fall into clearer
focus, as one looks at these areas less from
their symbolic aspect of either being the
spearhead of wars of national liberation or
of being a conspiracy directed, it was thought
once, from Peking, I think that all countries
can adopt a more responsible attitude to-
July 23, 1973
153
ward the conflict in Indochina and a more
disassociated attitude than was the case in
the 1960's.
Q. My impression is that the granting of
most-favored-nation status to the Soviet
Union, whether or not it is granted, is no
longer a serious obstacle to the development
of long-term trade. Is that the case ?
Dr. Kissinger: No, we believe that the
granting of most-favored-nation status to the
Soviet Union is important for the develop-
ment of large-scale trade, and it is extremely
important to the development of Soviet-
American relations. This was part of the
series of understandings in a whole complex
of relationships between us and the Soviet
Union last year, and it would cast serious
doubt on our ability to perform our side of
understandings and agreements if in each
case that part of an agreement that is car-
ried out later by one side or the other is then
made the subject of additional conditions that
were not part of the original negotiation.
And therefore I would say that for both sym-
bolic and substantive reasons, and substan-
tively both economic and political, it would
be very unfortunate if the request to grant
most-favored-nation status to the Soviet
Union, which means nondiscriminatoiy
status vis-a-vis the Soviet Union, were not
granted.
Q. Can you address yourself to two im-
pressions?
Dr. Kissinger: Impressions or questions?
Q. However you like, impressions and a
question. First, is there here a signal to the
Russians that they have a free hand where
China is concerned, as a followup to an ear-
lier question? And the second impression.
Dr. Kissinger, in the 89 words devoted to the
Middle East, one gets the impression that the
Soviet Union and the United States are as
far apart as before.
Dr. Kissinger: With respect to the first
question, as I said on Friday, I do not want
to go into hypothetical cases addressed to
particular countries. However, since you
raised the question, lot me say this: I don't
know what a free hand vis-a-vis China
means. The Soviet Union has declared offi-
cially that it has no military intentions vis-
a-vis the People's Republic of China.
On the other hand it is difficult to conceive
a military attack by anybody on the People's
Republic of China that would not endanger
international peace and security, and there-
fore it would be thought to be, from what-
ever direction it came, not consistent with
our view of this treaty, but I repeat: This
does not imply that we have any reason to
believe that any such attack is contemplated
or that any of this subject was discussed at
all between them.
With respect to the Middle East, the com-
munique makes clear that there is no una-
nimity of views. Whether that is as wide as
before or narrower, I think we should let
the future decide, but obviously the subject
was discussed at some length.
Q. The glowing manner in which the two
leaders have described their past weeks —
Dr. Kissinger: What manner?
Q. Glowing manner, the euphoric manner.
Dr. Kissinger: Don't top yourself. [Laugh-
ter.]
Q. — carries with it the impression that
we can now expect an acceleration of de-
mands or requests or proposals, at least
within our own country, for the reduction
of armaments. A moment ago you talked
about the necessity of maintaining vigilance.
Would you discuss that in context with the
summit meeting?
Dr. Kissinger: This period requires great
sophistication on the part of the American
people. We have reached this point because
we have proceeded from the basis of ade-
quate strength and because we have consist-
ently taken the position that we would
reduce our strength only by agreement with
the other side in some agreed relation to the
reductions by the other side.
This must remain an essential part of our
policy, and we cannot do, as a result of this
agreement, unilaterally those things that the
Soviet Union will not do. We have made it
clear in the communique and we have made
it clear in the conduct of our policy that the
principal goal of this administration in the
field of foreign policy is to leave behind it a
154
Department of State Bulletin
world that can be said to be safer, more
peaceful, and more permanently free of crisis
than the one we found.
But we, in our view, cannot achieve this
by unilateral reductions of American
strength, and we believe that the course on
which we are — which has made, in our judg-
ment, significant progress — can be main-
tained only if we were to continue to pursue
it on the basis of strict reciprocity.
Q. If I may, I would like to come back to
this not so important adjective "balanced."
Isn't it true that the Soviets have quite a
different interpretation of balance than you
have, and is this one of the reasons why not
even the formal title of MBFR talks was
spelled out in the communique?
Dr. Kissinger: What was spelled out in
the communique is, I believe, consistent with
what was agreed to in Vienna. The future of
force reductions in Europe will not be deter-
mined by adjectives. It will be determined
by concrete programs. It will not be deter-
mined by constant insinuations of some dark
American design.
The United States has taken the view and
has stated publicly that our security is inte-
grally linked to the security of our European
allies. Therefore we are prepared to work
with our European allies on working out a
concrete program that reflects the common
conception of security. We have invited our
European allies to participate with us in
developing this program, and we think the
time has come to discuss the program, rather
than the adjectives of a title of a conference.
Q. Dr. Kissinger, did they give us to un-
derstand that they would play a useful role
in seeking a cease-fire in Cambodia, and did
we give them to understand that we will be
winding down our bombing there in the
meantime ?
Dr. Kissinger: I don't think any useful
purpose is served if I go into the details of
these discussions with respect to Cambodia.
The primary problem with respect to Cam-
bodia now is whether it is possible in a finite
period of time to bring about a negotiation
that leads toward a political settlement and
produces a rapid cease-fire. The particular
tactics of particular operations are subsid-
iary to that overriding issue which was the
subject of discussions.
Q. Dr. Kissinger, does the agreement to
])revent nuclear war mean that we would
have to enter into consultations with the
Russians before we would come to the de-
fense of an ally under attack?
Dr. Kissinger: The agreement for the pre-
vention of nuclear war, in article VI, makes
clear that allied obligations are unaffected.
Secondly, the significance of article IV is that
in case of situations that might produce the
danger of nuclear war in general, consulta-
tions have to be undertaken. It .should there-
fore be seen as a restraint on the diplomacy
of both sides and, as I pointed out on Friday,
not a guide to action in case those restraints
break down and war occurs.
Q. Dr. Kissinger, on the economic front,
here you talk about that serious and sympa-
thetic consideration should be given by the
U.S. Government. Earlier you stressed in
your discussion —
Dr. Kissinger: Consideration to what?
Q. To proposals that are in the interests
of both sides. These are business proposals,
presumably. Earlier you stressed the impor-
tance of the private corporations in the ne-
gotiations. What happens when they conflict
and a corporation says this is in our mutual
best interest, but perhaps you do not? A case
in point right now is the natural gas deals.
There are two of them that were discussed
before. One corporation went out and made
a deal. How do you resolve this question?
Dr. Kissinger: To the extent that corpora-
tions can implement their deals without the
aid of the government, we can do no more
than express our views to their directors. To
the extent that the corporations require the
assistance of the government or the guaran-
tee of the government of their investment,
we have the possibility of gearing the deci-
sions to our national policy.
Now, with respect to the natural gas deal,
we are not under the impression that these
companies have the resources to do them
entirely on their own, and therefore we can
relate them to national policy; but as the
July 23, 1973
155
communique says, we are looking on them
favorably. But it is hard to discuss in the
abstract.
Q. There is a reference in the communi-
que to a meeting at the highest level to com-
plete the European Security Conference.
What sort of time frame do you have in
mind?
Dr. Kissinger: As you notice, the com-
munique makes no particular reference to a
specific time frame, and therefore this ques-
tion will be easier to answer after the For-
eign Ministers have met and particularly
after the commissions have started their
work. It will depend to some extent on
whether the European participants will de-
cide to take a summer vacation and the
commissions will decide to take a summer
vacation in August or not. The time frame is,
as the communique says, the quickest possi-
ble time, but there is no particular time limit.
Q. We are talking about some period with-
in less than a year, aren't we?
Dr. Kissinger: That would be a reasonable
assumption, but it depends on the progress
of the conference. But that is a good working
hypothesis.
Q. On the Watergate, the inevitable ques-
tion as to whether Watergate in any way
was discussed between the President and the
General Secretary, and would you, Dr. Kis-
singer, be prepared to comment on published
speculation that the pressures of Watergate
applied a more modest negotiating technique
on the part of the President in his expecta-
tions on the summit?
Dr. Kissinger: With respect to the first
question, Watergate was not discussed. And
I don't think the point has yet been reached
where our domestic travails are discussed
with foreign leaders. Second, the negotiating
frame for the summit was established last
year and was in no way affected by Water-
gate.
Q. Dr. Kissinger, did the Soviet side, com-
ing back to the natural gas deals, ask for a
more specific, more categorical American
endorsement of these, particularly the latest
Occidental Petroleum deal, and a promise of
guarantees on the credits than is in the
communique?
Dr. Kissinger: No, the specific status of
the gas deals is now that they have to be
moved from these abstract declarations of
intent to some concrete propositions. These
concrete propositions have to be developed,
in the first instance, by the companies con-
cerned that have to make a judgment of the
degree of investment that is required and
also on whether it is an economic proposition.
At that point, one will have to determine
whether this can be done entirely by private
capital or if it requires, at least in some of its
aspects, some U.S. governmental guarantees.
That point has not yet been reached, because
the projects have not yet been formulated
into precise economic propositions.
Q. Dr. Kissinger, in what way are the doc-
uments and agreements signed by the Gen-
eral Secretary of the Soviet Communist
Party binding in any respect on the Soviet
Government, and another rather petty ques-
tion, is there any connection between the
timing of this week's events or at least the
communique, this press conference this
morning and your press conference Wednes-
day, if you have one — is there any connec-
tion between that timing and the Watergate
events going on in Washington?
Dr. Kissinger: With respect to the first
question, whenever the General Secretary of
the Communist Party signs a document, we
are given — it is actually legally a very good
question — we are given a document by the
Soviet Foreign Ministry pointing out that he
has full powers to sign that document, be-
cause, as you know, Mr. Brezhnev has no
ofl^cial governmental position. So that legally
the documents which he signed this year and
the documents which he signed last year are
fully within Soviet constitutional processes,
and we have also an ofl^cial Soviet statement
that he has full governmental powers to sign
the document.
Secondly, with respect to my briefings, our
view here has always been that the necessi-
ties that produce foreign policies are of a
permanent nature and that our objective is
what I described at the beginning, to bring
156
Department of State Bulletin
about a more peaceful world. They are not
geared in any respect to any of the domestic
situations.
This schedule was determined at a time
when it was believed that [John W.] Dean
would testify last week, and it was agreed
then that in view of the fact that the Gen-
eral Secretary's speech was on television
yesterday, that his departure statement
would be on television yesterday, and in view
of the fact that it is more appropriate to re-
lease communiques at a time he is leaving
the country, that the release of the commu-
nique would be on Monday and therefore
the briefing of the communique would be on
Monday. That is a schedule that was deter-
mined, I repeat, at a time when we did not
know that the hearings would be postponed.
If I have another briefing on Wednesday,
it is in response to the repeated request of
many of you ladies and gentlemen that we
have a more informal session, less geared to
the words of the communique, to set this in
better perspective.
But, since you have raised the issue, I will
say now, I will move you to Thursday, to
remove any question about it. The thought
had never crossed our mind, and we will now,
if there is one, have it on Thursday.
Q. Could I suggest that the day is less
important than it be sometime later in the
afternoon, California time.
Dr. Kissinger: Work it out with Ron. If
there is another briefing, the purpose is to
permit a somewhat more philosophical dis-
cussion of where we are going. The timing
should be left to what produces the best
philosophical discussion.
Q. Dr. Kissinger, the proposal for a world
disarmament conference has been mentioned
many times over the years and ha.s not been
a subject necessarily of agreement between
the Soviet Union and the United States as to
its usefulness. I wonder whether the mention
of it here in the communique, whether you
would characterize it as one of the accom-
plishments of the summit?
Dr. Kissinyer: The world disarmament
conference was mentioned in last year's
communique, and therefore to have it men-
tioned again cannot be considered a radical
departure and one of the principal accom-
plishments of the conference.
We have said that we would be prepared
to discuss it at an appropriate time, and I
suspect that this will lead to several ex-
changes on that subject.
July 23, 1973
157
Agreements Signed During General Secretary Brezhnev's Visit
to the United States
FoUotving are texts of agreements signed
during the tveek of June 18 by President
Nixon and General Secretary Brezhnev, by
Secretary of Agricnltxire Earl L. Butz and
Foreign Minister A. A. Gromyko, by Secre-
tary of the Treasury George P. Shultz and
Minister of Foreign Trade N. S. Patolichev,
and by Secretary of Transportation Claude
S. Brinegar and Minister of Civil Aviation
B. P. Buyagev.
BASIC PRINCIPLES OF NEGOTIATIONS
ON STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION
Basic Principles of Nkgotiations on the Firtiier
LliMITATION OK STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS
The President of the United States of America,
Richard Nixon, and the General Secretary of the
Central Committee of the CPSU, L.I. Brezhnev,
Having thoroughly considered the question of the
further limitation of strategic arms, and the prog-
ress already achieved in the current negotiations,
Reaffirming their conviction that the earliest adop-
tion of further limitations of strategic arms would
be a major contribution in reducing the danger of
an outbreak of nuclear war and in strengthening
international peace and security,
Have agreed as follows:
First. The two Sides will continue active negotia-
tions in order to work out a permanent agreement
on more complete measures on the limitation of
strategic offensive arms, as well as their subsequent
reduction, proceeding from the Basic Principles of
Relations between the United States of America and
the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics signed in
Moscow on May 29, 1972, and from the Interim
Agreement between the United States of America
and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics of
May 26, 1972 on Certain Measures with Respect to
the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms.
Over the course of the ne.xt year the two Sides
will make serious efforts to work out the provisions
of the permanent agreement on more complete meas-
ures on the limitation of strategic offensive arms
with the objective of signing it in 1974.
Second. New agreements on the limitation of stra-
tegic offensive armaments will be based on the prin-
ciples of the American-Soviet documents adopted in
Moscow in May 1972 and the agreements reached
in Washington in June 1973; and in particular, both
Sides will be guided by the recognition of each
other's equal security interests and by the recogni-
tion that efforts to obtain unilateral advantage, di-
rectly or indirectly, would be inconsi.'itent with the
strengthening of peaceful relations between the
United States of America and the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics.
Third. The limitations placed on strategic offen-
sive weapons can apply both to their quantitative
aspects as well as to their qualitative improvement.
Fourth. Limitations on strategic offensive arms
must be subject to adequate verification by national
technical means.
Fifth. The modernization and replacement of stra-
tegic offensive arms would be permitted under con-
ditions which will be formulated in the agreements
to be concluded.
Sixth. Pending the completion of a permanent
agreement on more complete measures of strategic
offensive arms limitation, both Sides are prepared to
reach agreements on separate measures to supple-
ment the existing Interim Agreement of Mav 26
1972.
Seventh. Each Side will continue to take neces-
sary organizational and technical measures for pre-
venting accidental or unauthorized use of nuclear
weapons under its control in accordance with the
Agreement of September 30, 1971 between the United
States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics.
Washington, June 21, 1973
For the United
of America:
Richard Nixon
President of the United
States of A^nerica
States For the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics:
L. I. Brezhnev
General Secretary of the
Central Committee,
CPSU
158
Department of State Bulletin
AGREEMENT ON SCIENTIFIC COOPERATION
IN PEACEFUL USES OF ATOMIC ENERGY
AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA AND THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST
REPUBLICS ON Scientific and Technical Co-
operation IN THE Field of Peaceful Uses of
Atomic Energy
The United States of America and the Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics;
Attaching great importance to the problem of
satisfying the rapidly growing energy demands in
both countries as well as in other countries of the
world ;
Desiring to combine the efforts of both countries
toward the solution of this problem through the de-
velopment of highly efficient energy sources ;
Recognizing that solutions to this problem may be
found in more rapid development of certain nuclear
technologies already under study, such as controlled
thermonuclear fusion and fast breeder reactors, as
well as in additional basic research on the funda-
mental properties of matter;
Noting with satisfaction the successful results of
previous cooperation between the Parties in the field
of peaceful uses of atomic energy;
Wishing to establish a more stable and long-term
basis for cooperation in this field for the benefit of
both their peoples and of all mankind;
In accordance with and in further development of
the Agreement between the Government of the
United States of America and the Government of
the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Coopera-
tion in the Fields of Science and Technology of
May 24, 1972; the Memorandum on Cooperation in
the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy of Septem-
ber 28, 1972 between the U.S. Atomic Energy Com-
mission and the USSR State Committee for the
Utilization of Atomic Energy; and the General
Agreement between the United States of America
and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Con-
tacts, Exchanges and Cooperation of June 19, 1973;
Have agreed as follows:
Article 1
The Parties will expand and strengthen their co-
operation in research, development and utilization
of nuclear energy, having as a primary objective the
development of new energj' sources. This coopera-
tion will be carried out on the basis of mutual bene-
fit, equality and reciprocity.
Article 2
1. Cooperation will be concentrated in the follow-
ing three areas:
a. Controlled thermonuclear fusion.
The aim of cooperation in this area is the even-
tual development of prototype and demonstration-
scale thermonuclear reactors. Cooperation may in-
clude theoretical, calculational, experimental and
design-construction studies at all stages up to in-
dustrial-scale operations.
b. Fast breeder reactors.
Cooperation in this area will be directed toward
finding solutions to mutually agi-eed basic and ap-
plied problems connected with the design, develop-
ment, construction and operation of nuclear power
plants utilizing fast breeder reactors.
c. Research on the fundamental properties of
matter.
Cooperation in this area will include joint theo-
retical and experimental studies on mutually agreed
subjects, and particularly in high, medium and low
energy physics, through utilization of accelerators,
data processing equipment and other facilities of the
two countries. Cooperation may also be undertaken
on the design, planning and construction of joint
facilities to be used in this area of research.
2. Further details of cooperation in each of these
three areas will be arranged through individual im-
plementing protocols.
3. Other areas of cooperation may be added by
mutual agreement.
4. Cooperation under this Agreement shall be m
accordance with the laws of the respective countries.
Article 3
1. Cooperation provided for in the preceding Ar-
ticles may take the following forms:
a. Establishment of working groups of scientists
and engineers for design and execution of joint
projects;
b. Joint development and construction of experi-
ments, pilot installations and equipment;
c. Joint work by theoretical and experimental sci-
entists in appropriate research centers of the two
countries ;
d. Organization of joint consultations, seminars
and panels;
e. Exchanges of appropriate instrumentation,
equipment and construction materials;
f. Exchanges of scientists and specialists; and
g. Exchanges of scientific and technical informa-
tion, documentation and results of research.
2. Other forms of cooperation may be added by
mutual agreement.
Article 4
In furtherance of the aims of this Agreement, the
Parties will, as appropriate, encourage, facilitate
and monitor the development of cooperation and
direct contacts between organizations and institutions
of the two countries, including the conclusion, as ap-
propriate, of implementing protocols and contracts
for carrying out cooperative activities under this
Agreement.
Article 5
1. For the implementation of this Agreement,
July 23, 1973
159
there shall be established a US-USSR Joint Commit-
tee on Cooperation in the Peaceful Uses of Atomic
Energi.-. Meetings will be convened once a year in the
United States and the Soviet Union alternately,
unless otherwise mutually agrreed.
2. The Joint Committee shall take such action as
is necessary for effective implementation of this
Agreement including, but not limited to, approval of
specific projects and programs of cooperation; desig.
nation of appropriate participating organizations
and institutions responsible for carrying out cooper-
ative activities; and making recommendations, as
appropriate, to the two Governments.
3. The Executive Agents of this Agreement shall
be, for the United States of America, the U.S. Atomic
Energy Commission, and for the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics, the USSR State Committee for
the Utilization of Atomic Energy. The Executive
Agents, on their respective sides, shall be responsi-
ble for the operation of the Joint Committee and
shall coordinate and supervise the development and
implementation of cooperative activities conducted
under this Agreement.
Article 6
Nothing in this Agreement shall be interpreted to
prejudice other agreements concluded between the
Parties.
Article 7
1. This Agreement shall enter into force upon
signature and shall remain in force for ten years.
It may be modified or extended by mutual agreement
of the Parties.
2. The termination of this Agreement shall not
affect the validity of implementing protocols and
contracts concluded under this Agreement between
interested organizations and institutions of the two
countries.
Done at Washington, this 21st day of June, 1973,
in duplicate, in the English and Russian languages,
both texts being equally authentic.
For the United States For the Union of Soviet
of America: Socialist Republics:
Richard Nixon l. I. Brezhnev
President of the United General Secretary of
States of America the Central Committee,
CPSU
AGREEMENT ON PREVENTION OF NUCLEAR
WAR
Agreement Between the United States of
America and the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics on the Prevention of Nuclear War
The United States of America and the Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics, hereinafter referred to as
the Parties,
Guided by the objectives of strengthening world
peace and international security.
Conscious that nuclear war would have devas-
tating consequences for mankind.
Proceeding from the desire to bring about condi-
tions in which the danger of an outbreak of nuclear
war anj^vhere in the world would be reduced and
ultimately eliminated.
Proceeding from their obligations under the Char-
ter of the United Nations regarding the mainte-
nance of peace, refraining from the threat or use
of force, and the avoidance of war, and in conformity
with the agreements to which either Party has
subscribed,
Proceeding from the Basic Principles of Relations
between the United States of .\merica and the Union
of Soviet Socialist Republics signed in Moscow on
May 29, 1972,
Reaffirming that the development of relations be-
tween the United States of America and the Union
of Soviet Socialist Republics is not directed against
other countries and their interests,
Have agreed as follows:
Article I
The United States and the Soviet Union agree
that an objective of their policies is to remove the
danger of nuclear war and of the use of nuclear
weapons.
-Accordingly, the Parties agree that they will act in
such a manner as to prevent the development of situ-
ations capable of causing a dangerous exacerbation
of their relations, as to avoid military confronta-
tions, and as to exclude the outbreak of nuclear
war between them and between either of the Parties
and other countries.
Article II
The Parties agree, in accordance with Article I
and to realize the objective stated in that Article, to
proceed from the premise that each Party will re-
frain from the threat or use of force against the
other Party, against the allies of the other Party
and against other countries, in circumstances which
may endanger international peace and security. The
Parties agree that they will be guided by these con-
siderations in the formulation of their foreign
policies and in their actions in the field of interna-
tional relations.
Article III
The Parties undertake to develop their relations
with each other and with other countries in a way
consistent with the purposes of this Agreement.
Article IV
If at any time relations between the Parties or
between either Party and other countries appear to
involve the ri.sk of a nuclear conflict, or if relations
between countries not parties to this Agreement ap-
pear to involve the risk of nuclear war between the
United States of America and the Union of Soviet
160
Department of State Bulletin
Socialist Republics or between either Party and other
countries, the United States and the Soviet Union,
acting in accordance with the provisions of this
Agreement, shall immediately enter into urgent con-
sultations with each other and make every effort to
avert this risk.
Article V
Each Party shall be free to inform the Security
Council of the United Nations, the Secretary General
of the United Nations and the Governments of allied
or other countries of the progress and outcome of
consultations initiated in accordance with Article IV
of this Agreement.
Article VI
Nothing in this Agreement shall affect or impair:
(a) the inherent right of individual or collective
self-defense as envisaged by Article 51 of the Char-
ter of the United Nations,
(b) the provisions of the Charter of the United
Nations, including those relating to the maintenance
or restoration of international peace and security,
and
(c) the obligations undertaken by either Party
towards its allies or other countries in treaties,
agreements, and other appropriate documents.
Article VII
This Agreement shall be of unlimited duration.
Article VIII
This Agi-eement shall enter into force upon sig-
nature.
Done at Washington on June 22, 197.3, in two
copies, each in the English and Russian languages,
both texts being equally authentic.
For the United States For the Union of Soviet
of America: Socialist Republics:
Richard Nixon
L. I. Brezhnev
President of the United General Secretary of the
States of America Central Committee,
CPSU
AGREEMENT ON COOPERATION IN
AGRICULTURE
Agreement Between the Government of the
United States of America and the Go\-ernment
OF the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on
Cooperation in the Field of Agriculture
The Government of the United States of America
and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics;
Taking into account the importance which the pro-
duction of food has for the peoples of both countries
and for all of mankind;
Desiring to expand existing cooperation between
the two countries in the field of agricultural research
and development;
Wishing to apply new knowledge and technology in
agricultural production and processing;
Recognizing the desirability of expanding relation-
ships in agricultural trade and the exchange of in-
formation necessary for such trade;
Convinced that cooperation in the field of agricul-
ture will contribute to overall improvement of rela-
tions between the two countries;
In pursuance and further development of the
Agreement between the Government of the United
States of America and the Government of the Union
of Soviet Socialist Republics on Cooperation in the
Fields of Science and Technology of May 24, 1972,
and in accordance with the Agreement on Exchanges
and Cooperation in Scientific, Technical, Educa-
tional, Cultural and Other Fields of April 11, 1972,
and in accordance with the Agreement on Coopera-
tion in the Field of Environmental Protection of
May 23, 1972;
Have agi-eed as follows:
Article I
The Parties will develop and carry out coopera-
tion in the field of agriculture on the basis of mutual
benefit, equality and reciprocity.
Article II
The Parties will promote the development of mu-
tually beneficial cooperation in the following main
areas :
1. Regular exchange of relevant information, in-
cluding forward estimates, on production, consump-
tion, demand and trade of major agricultural com-
modities.
2. Methods of forecasting the production, demand
and consumption of major agricultural products, in-
cluding econometric methods.
3. Plant science, including genetics, breeding,
plant protection and crop production, including pro-
duction under semi-arid conditions.
4. Livestock and poultry science, including gen-
etics, breeding, physiology, nutrition, disease pro-
tection and large-scale operations.
5. Soil science, including the theory of movement
of water, gases, salts, and heat in soils.
6. Mechanization of agriculture, including devel-
opment and testing of new machinery, equipment and
technology, as well as repair and technical service.
7. Application, storage and transportation of min-
eral fertilizers and other agricultural chemicals.
8. Processing, storage and preservation of agri-
cultural commodities, including formula feed tech-
nology.
9. Land reclamation and reclamation engineering,
including development of new equipment, designs
and materials.
10. Use of mathematical methods and electronic
July 23, 1973
161
computers in agriculture, including mathematical
modeling of large-scale agricultural enterprises.
Other areas of cooperation may be added by mu-
tual agreement.
Article III
Cooperation between the Parties may take the fol-
lowing forms:
1. Exchange of scientists, specialists and trainees.
2. Organization of bilateral symposia and con-
ferences.
3. Exchange of scientific, technical and relevant
economic information, and methods of research.
4. Planning, development and implementation of
joint projects and programs.
5. Exchange of plant germ plasm, seeds and living
material.
6. Exchange of animals, biological materials, agri-
cultural chemicals, and models of new machines,
equipment and scientific instruments.
7. Direct contacts and exchanges between botani-
cal gardens.
8. Exchange of agricultural exhibitions.
Other forms of cooperation may be added by mu-
tual agreement.
Article IV
1. In furtherance of the aims of this Agreement,
the Parties will, as appropriate, encourage, promote
and monitor the development of cooperation and
direct contacts between governmental and non-
governmental institutions, research and other or-
ganizations, trade associations, and firms of the two
countries, including the conclusion, as appropriate,
of implementing agreements for carrying out spe-
cific projects and programs under this .Agreement.
2. To assure fruitful development of cooperation,
the Parties will render every assistance for the
travel of scientists and specialists to areas of the
two countries appropriate for the conduct of activi-
ties under this Agreement.
3. Projects and exchanges under this Agreement
will be carried out in accordance with the laws and
regulations of the two countries.
Article V
1. For implementation of this Agreement, there
shall be established a US-USSR Joint Committee on
Agricultural Cooperation which shall meet, as a rule,
once a year, alternately in the United States and the
Soviet Union, unless otherwise mutually agreed.
2. The Joint Committee will review and approve
specific projects and programs of cooperation; estab-
lish the procedures for their implementation; desig-
nate, as appropriate, institutions and organizations
responsible for carrying out cooperative activities;
and make recommendations, as appropriate, to the
Parties.
3. Within the framework of the Joint Committee
there shall be established a Joint Working Group on
Agricultural Economic Research and Information
and a Joint Working Group on Agricultural Re-
search and Technological Development. Unless other-
wise mutually agreed, each Joint Working Group
will meet alternately in the United States and the
Soviet Union at least two times a year. The Joint
Committee may establish other working groups as
it deems necessary.
4. The Executive Agents for coordinating and
carrying out this Agreement shall be, for the Gov-
ernment of the United States of America, the United
States Department of Agriculture, and for the Gov-
ernment of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics,
the Ministry of Agriculture of the USSR. The Exec-
utive Agents will, as appropriate, assure the cooper-
ation in their respective countries of other institu-
tions and organizations as required for carrying out
joint activities under this .Agreement. During the
period between meetings of the Joint Committee, the
Executive Agents will maintain contact with each
other and coordinate and supervise the development
and implementation of cooperative activities con-
ducted under this Agreement.
Article VI
Unless an implementing agreement contains other
provisions, each Party or participating institution,
organization or firm, shall bear the costs of its par-
ticipation and that of its personnel in cooperative
activities engaged in under this Agreement.
Article VII
1. Nothing in this Agreement shall be interpreted
to prejudice or modify any existing Agreements be-
tween the Parties.
2. Projects developed by the US-USSR Joint
Working Group on Agricultural Research which
were approved at the first session of the US-USSR
Joint Commission on Scientific and Technical Coop-
eration on March 21, 1973, will continue without
interruption and will become the responsibility of
the US-USSR Joint Committee on Agricultural Co-
operation upon its formal establishment.
Article VIII
1. This Agreement shall enter into force upon
signature and remain in force for five years. It will
be automatically extended for successive five-year
periods unless either Party notifies the other of
its intent to terminate this Agreement not later than
six months prior to the expiration of this Agreement.
2. This Agreement may be modified at any time by
mutual agreement of the Parties.
3. The termination of this Agreement will not
affect the validity of implementing agreements con-
cluded under this Agreement between institutions,
organizations and firms of the two countries.
Done at Washington, this 19th day of June, 1973,
in duplicate, in the English and Russian languages,
both texts being equally authentic.
For the Government of For the Government of
the United States of the Union of Soviet So-
America: cialist Republics:
Earl L. Butz A. Gromyko
162
Department of State Bulletin
AGREEMENT ON COOPERATION IN STUDIES
OF THE WORLD OCEAN
Agrrement Between the Government of the
United States of America and the Government
OK the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on
Cooperation in Studies of the World Ocean
I'he Government of the United States of America
an.l the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics;
Recognizing the importance of comprehensive
studies of the World Ocean for peaceful purposes and
for the well-being of mankind;
Striving for more complete knowledge and ra-
tional utilization of the World Ocean by all nations
through broad international cooperation in oceano-
gvaphic investigation and research;
Aware of the capabilities and resources of both
countries for studies of the World Ocean and the
extensive history and successful results of previous
cooperation between them;
Desiring to combine their efforts in the further
investigation of the World Ocean and to use the re-
sults for the benefit of the peoples of both countries
and of all mankind; and
In pursuance and further development of the
Agreement between the Government of the United
States of America and the Government of the Union
of Soviet Socialist Republics on Cooperation in the
Fields of Science and Technology of May 24, 1972,
and in accordance with the Agreement on Exchanges
and Cooperation in Scientific, Technical, Educational,
Cultural and Other Fields of April 11, 1972, and in
accordance with the Agreement on Cooperation in
the Field of Environmental Protection of May 23,
1972;
Have agreed as follow-s:
Article 1
The Parties will develop and carry out coopera-
tion in studies of the World Ocean on the basis of
equality, reciprocity and mutual benefit.
Article 2
In their studies of the World Ocean, the Parties
will direct cooperative efforts to the investigation
and solution of important basic and applied research
problems. Initially, cooperation will be implemented
in the following areas:
a. Large-scale ocean-atmosphere interaction, in-
cluding laboratory studies, oceanic experiments, and
mathematical modeling of the ocean-atmosphere
system.
b. Ocean currents of planetary scale and other
questions of ocean dynamics.
c. Geochemistry and marine chemistry of the
World Ocean.
d. Geological and geophysical investigations of the
World Ocean, including deep sea drilling for scien-
tific purposes.
July 23, 1973
e. Biological productivity of the World Ocean and
the biochemistry of the functioning of individual or-
ganisms and whole biological communities in the
World Ocean.
f. Intercalibration and standardization of oceano-
graphic instrumentation and methods.
Other areas of cooperation may be added by mu-
tual agreement.
Article 3
Cooperation provided for in the preceding Articles
may take the following forms:
a. Joint planning, development, and implementa-
tion of research projects and programs;
b. Exchange of scientists, specialists, and ad-
vanced students;
c. Exchange of scientific and technical informa-
tion, documentation, and experience, including the
results of national oceanographic studies;
d. Convening of joint conferences, meetings, and
seminars of specialists;
e. Appropriate participation by both countries in
multilateral cooperative activities sponsored by in-
ternational scientific organizations;
f. Facilitation by both Parties, in accordance with
laws, rules and regulations of each country and rele-
vant bilateral agi-eements, of use of appropriate port
facilities of the two countries for ships' services and
supplies, including provision for rest and changes of
ships' personnel, in connection with carrying out co-
operative activities.
Other forms of cooperation may be added by mu-
tual agreement.
.Article 4
In furtherance of the aims of this .\greement, the
Parties will, as appropriate, encourage, facilitate
and monitor the development of cooperation and di-
rect contacts between agencies, organizations and
firms of the two countries, including the conclusion,
as appropriate, of implementing agreements for
carrying out specific projects and programs under
this Agreement.
Article 5
1. For implementation of this Agreement, there
shall be established a US-USSR Joint Committee on
Cooperation in World Ocean Studies. This Joint
Committee shall meet, as a rule, once a year, alter-
nately in the United States and the Soviet Union,
unless otherwise mutually agreed.
2. The Joint Committee shall take such action as is
necessary for effective implementation of this Agree-
ment including, but not limited to, approval of spe-
cific projects and programs of cooperation; designa-
tion of appropriate agencies and organizations to be
responsible for carrying out cooperative activities;
and making recommendations, as appropriate, to the
Parties.
3. Each Party shall designate its Executive Agent
163
which will be responsible for carrying out this
Agreement. During the period between meetings of
the Joint Committee, the Executive Agents shall
maintain contact with each other and coordinate
and supervise the development and implementation
of cooperative activities conducted under this
Agreement.
Article 6
Nothing in this Agreement shall be interpreted to
prejudice other agreements between the Parties or
commitments of either Party to other international
oceanographic programs.
Article 7
Each Party, with the consent of the other Party,
may invite third countries to participate in coopera-
tive activities engaged in under this Agreement.
Article 8
1. This Agreement shall enter into force upon sig-
nature and remain in force for five years. It may be
modified or extended by mutual agreement of the
Parties.
2. The termination of the Agreement shall not
affect the validity of implementing agreements con-
cluded under this Agreement between interested
agencies, organizations and firms of the two coun-
tries.
Done at Washington, this 19th day of June, 1973,
in duplicate, in the English and Russian languages,
both texts being equally authentic.
For the Government of For the Government of
the United States of the Union of Soviet So-
America: cialist Republics:
WiLUAM P. Rogers A. Gromyko
AGREEMENT ON COOPERATION IN
TRANSPORTATION
Agreement Between the Government of the
United States of America and the Government
OF THE Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on
Cooperation in the Field of Transportation
The Government of the United States of America
and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics;
Recognizing the important role played by safe and
efficient transportation systems in the development
of all countries;
Considering that the improvement of existing
transportation systems and techniques can benefit
both of their peoples;
Believing that the combined efforts of the two
countries in this field can contribute to more rapid
and efficient solutions of transportation problems
than would be possible through separate, parallel
national efforts;
Desiring to promote the establishment of long.
term and productive relationships between transpor-
tation specialists and institutions of both countries;
In pursuance and further development of the
Agreement between the Government of the United
States of America and the Government of the Union
of Soviet Socialist Republics on Cooperation in the
Fields of Science and Technology of May 24, 1972,
and in accordance with the Agreement on Exchanges
and Cooperation in Scientific, Technical, Educational.
Cultural and Other Fields of April 11, 1972, and in
accordance with the Agreement on Cooperation in
the Field of Environmental Protection of May 23,
1972;
Have agreed as follows:
Article l
The Parties will develop and carry out coopera-
tion in the field of transportation on the basis of
mutual benefit, equality and reciprocity.
Article 2
This cooperation will be directed to the investiga-
tion and solution of specific problems of mutual in-
terest in the field of transportation. Initially, cooper-
ation will be implemented in the following areas:
a. Construction of bridges and tunnels, including
problems of control of structure stress and fracture,
and special construction procedures under cold cli-
matic conditions.
b. Railway transport, including problems of roll-
ing stock, track and roadbed, high speed traffic,
automation, and cold weather operation.
c. Civil aviation, including problems of increasing
efficiency and safety.
d. Marine transport, including technology of mari-
time shipping and cargo handling in seaports.
e. Automobile transport, including problems of
traffic safety.
Other areas of cooperation may be added by mu-
tual agreement.
Article 3
Cooperation provided for in the preceding Articles
may take the following forms:
a. Exchange of scientists and specialists;
b. Exchange of scientific and technical information
and documentation;
c. Convening of joint conferences, meetings and
seminars; and
d. Joint planning, development and implementa-
tion of research programs and projects.
Other forms of cooperation may be added by mu-
tual agreement.
Article 4
In furtherance of the aims of this .Agreement, the
164
Department of State Bulletin
Parties will, as appropriate, encourage, facilitate
and monitor the development of cooperation and
direct contacts between agencies, organizations and
firms of the two countries, including the conclusion,
as appropriate, of implementing agreements for car-
rying out specific projects and programs under this
Agreement.
Article 5
1 For the implementation of this Agreement,
there shall be established a US-USSR Joint Commit-
tee on Cooperation in Transportation. This Com-
mittee shall meet, as a rule, once a year, alternately
in the United States and the Soviet Union, unless
otherwise mutually agreed.
2. The Joint Committee shall take such action as is
necessary for efTective implementation of this Agree-
ment including, but not limited to, approval of spe-
cific projects and programs of cooperation; designa-
tion of appropriate agencies and organizations to be
responsible for carrying out cooperative activities;
and making recommendations, as appropriate, to the
Parties.
H. Each Party shall designate its Executive Agent
which will be responsible for carrying out this Agree-
ment. During the period between meetings of the
Joint Committee, the Executive Agents shall main-
tain contact with each other, keep each other in-
formed of activities and progress in implementing
this Agreement, and coordinate and supervise the
development and implementation of cooperative ac-
tivities conducted under this Agi-eement.
Article 6
Nothing in this Agreement shall be interpreted to
prejudice other agreements between the Parties or
their respective rights and obligations under such
other agreements.
Article 7
1. This Agreement shall enter into force upon
signature and shall remain in force for five years. It
may be modified or extended by mutual agreement
of the Parties.
2. The termination of this Agreement shall not
affect the validity of implementing agreements con-
cluded under this Agreement between interested
agencies, organizations and firms of the two coun-
tries.
Done at Washington, this 19th day of June, 1973,
in duplicate, in the English and Russian languages,
both texts being equally authentic.
For the Government of For the Government of
the United States of the Union of Soviet So-
America: cialist Republics:
William P. Rogers
A. Gromyko
GENERAL AGREEMENT ON CONTACTS,
EXCHANGES AND COOPERATION
General Agreement Between the United States
OF America and the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics on Contacts, Exchanges and Coop-
eration
The Government of the United States of America
and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics;
Consistent with the Basic Principles of Relations
Between the United States of America and the Union
of Soviet Socialist Republics, signed at Moscow on
May 29, 1972;
Desiring to promote better understanding between
the peoples of the United States and the Soviet
Union and to help improve the general state of rela-
tions between the two countries;
Believing that the further expansion of mutually
beneficial contacts, exchanges and cooperation will
facilitate the achievement of these aims;
Taking into account the positive experience
achieved through previous agreements on exchanges
in the scientific, technical, educational, cultural and
other fields;
Have agreed as follows:
Article I
1. The Parties will encourage and develop con-
tacts, exchanges and cooperation in the fields of sci-
ence, technology, education and culture, and in other
fields of mutual interest on the basis of equality,
mutual benefit and reciprocity.
2. Such contacts, exchanges and cooperation shall
be subject to the Constitution and applicable laws
and regulations of the respective countries. Within
this framework, the Parties will make every effort to
promote favorable conditions for the fulfillment of
these contacts, exchanges and cooperation.
Article II
1. The Parties take note of the following special-
ized agreements on cooperation in various fields and
reaffirm their commitments to achieve the fulfillment
of them:
a. The Agreement on Cooperation in the Field of
Environmental Protection Between the United States
of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Re-
publics, signed at Moscow on May 23, 1972;
b. The Agreement Between the Government of the
United States of America and the Government of the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Coopera-
tion in the Field of Medical Science and Public
Health, signed at Moscow on May 23, 1972;
c. The Agreement Between the United States of
America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
Concerning Cooperation in the Exploration and Use
July 23, 1973
165
of Outer Space for Peaceful Purposes, signed at
Moscow on May 24, 1972;
d. The Agrreement Between the Government of the
United States of America and the Government of the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Cooperation
in the Fields of Science and Technology, signed at
Moscow on May 24, 1972;
e. The Agreement Between the Government of the
United States of America and the Government of
the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Coopera-
tion in the Field of Agriculture, signed at Washing-
ton on June 19, 1973;
f. The Agreement Between the Government of the
United States of America and the Government of the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Cooperation
in Studies of the World Ocean, signed at Washing-
ton on June 19, 1973; and
g. The Agreement Between the Government of the
United States of America and the Government of the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Cooperation
in the Field of Transportation, signed at Washing-
ton on June 19, 1973.
2. The Parties will support the renewal of spe-
cialized agreements, including mutually agreed upon
amendments, between :
a. The National Academy of Sciences of the
United States of America and the Academy of Sci-
ences of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics; and
b. The American Council of Learned Societies and
the Academy of Sciences of the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics.
3. The Parties will encourage the conclusion, when
it is considered mutually beneficial, of additional
agreements in other specific fields within the frame-
work of this Agreement.
Article III
The Parties will encourage and facilitate, as ap-
propriate, contacts, exchanges and cooperation be-
tween organizations of the two countries in the field
of .science and technology and in other related fields
of mutual interest which are not being carried out
under specialized agreements concluded between the
Parties. These activities may include:
a. the exchange of specialists, delegations, and
scientific and technical information; and the organi-
zation of lectures, seminars and symposia for such
specialists;
b. the participation of scientists and other spe-
cialists in scientific congresses, conferences and sim-
ilar meetings being held in the two countries, and the
conducting of specialized exhibits and of joint re-
search work; and
c. other forms of contacts, exchanges and coop-
eration which may be mutually agreed upon.
Article IV
1. The Parties will encourage and facilitate the
expansion of contacts, exchanges and cooperation in
various fields of education. To this end, the Parties
will:
a. provide for the exchange of students, research-
ers and faculty members for study and research;
professors and teachers to lecture, offer instruction,
and conduct research ; as well as specialists and dele-
gations in various fields of education; and
b. facilitate the exchange, by appropriate organi-
zations, of educational and teaching materials, in-
cluding textbooks, syllabi and curricula, materials on
methodologj-, samples of teaching instruments and
visual aids.
2. The Parties will also encourage the study of
each other's language through the development of
the exchanges and cooperation listed above and
through other mutually agreed measures.
Article V
In order to promote better mutual acquaintance
with the cultural achievements of each country, the
Parties will encourage the development of contacts
and exchanges in the field of the performing arts.
To this end, the Parties will facilitate exchanges of
theatrical, musical and choreographic ensembles, or-
chestras, other artistic and entertainment groups,
and individual performers.
Article VI
1. The Parties will encourage the organizations of
the film industries of both countries, as appropriate,
to consider means of further expanding the purchase
and distribution on a commercial basis of films pro-
duced in each country.
2. The Parties will also encourage, as appropri-
ate, the exchange and exhibition of documentary
films in the fields of science, technology, culture,
education and other fields, as well as facilitate the
exchange of delegations of creative and technical
specialists.
3. The Parties further agree, when requested by
organizations and individuals of their respective
countries, to consider other proposals directed toward
the expansion of exchanges in this field, including the
holding of film premieres and film weeks in each
country and the joint production of feature films
and short and full-length educational and scientific
films.
Article VII
1. The Parties will facilitate contacts and encour-
age exchanges between organizations of the two
countries in the fields of radio and television, in-
cluding the exchange of radio programs and tele-
vision films and exchanges of delegations and spe-
cialists in these fields.
2. The Parties further agree, when requested by
organizations and individuals of their respective
countries, to consider other proposals in the fields of
radio and television, including joint production of
television films and the providing of assistance in the
production of radio and television programs.
166
Department of State Bulletin
Article VIII
The Parties will encourage:
a. the exchange of books, magazines, newspapers
and other publications devoted to scientific, technical,
cultural, and general educational subjects between
libraries, universities and other organizations of
each country, as well as the reciprocal distribution
of the magazines Amerika and Soviet Life; and
b. exchaJiges and visits of journalists, editors, pub-
lishers, and translators of literary works, as well as
their participation in appropriate professional meet-
ings and conferences.
Article IX
The Parties will encourage and facilitate the ex-
change of exhibitions on various topics of mutual
interest, as well as appropriate participation by one
Party in exhibitions which may take place in the
other's country. The Parties will also render assist-
ance for the exchange of exhibitions between the
museums of the two countries.
Article X
The Parties will provide for reciprocal exchanges
and visits of architects, art historians, artists, com-
posers, musicologists, museum specialists, play-
wrights, theater directors, writers, specialists in var-
ious fields of law and those in other cultural and
professional fields, to familiarize themselves with
matters of interost to them in their respective fields
and to participate in meetings, conferences and
symposia.
Article XI
1. The Parties will render assistance to members
of the Congress of the United States of America and
deputies of the Supreme Soviet of the Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics, as well as to officials of
the national governments of both countries, making
visits to the Soviet Union and the United States re-
spectively. .Arrangements for such assistance will be
agreed upon in advance through diplomatic channels.
2. The Parties will encourage exchanges of repre-
sentatives of municipal, local and state governments
of the United States and the Soviet Union to study
various functions of government at these levels.
Article XII
The Parties will encourage joint undertakings and
exchanges between appropriate organizations active
in civic and social life, including youth and women's
organizations, recognizing that the decision to im-
plement such joint undertakings and exchanges re-
mains a concern of the organizations themselves.
Article XIII
The Parties will encourage exchanges of athletes
and athletic teams as well as visits of specialists in
the fields of physical education and sports under ar-
rangements made between the appropriate sports or-
ganizations of the two countries.
Article XIV
The Parties will encourage the expansion of tour-
ist travel between the two countries and the adoption
of measures to satisfy the requests of tourists to
acquaint themselves with the life, work and culture
of the people of each country.
Article XV
The Parties note that commemorative activities
may take place in their countries in connection with
the celebration of anniversaries recognized by major
international bodies.
Article XVI
The Parties agree to hold a meeting each year of
their representatives for a general review of the
implementation of contacts, exchanges and coopera-
tion in various fields and to consider exchanges which
are not being carried out under specialized agree-
ments concluded between the Parties.
Article XVII
1. In implementation of various provisions of this
Agreement, the Parties have established a Program
of Exchanges for 1974-1976, which is annexed to and
constitutes an integral part of this Agreement. The
terms of this Program shall be in force from Janu-
ary 1, 1974 to December 31, 1976, and thereafter,
unless and until amended by agreement of the Par-
ties, will provide the basic guidelines for the Pro-
gram of Exchanges in 1977-1979.
2. The Parties agree that their representatives
will meet prior to the end of 1976 and will develop
the Program of Exchanges for the succeeding three
years.
Article XVIII
The Parties agree that:
a. The programs and itineraries, lengths of stay,
dates of arrival, size of delegations, financial and
transportation arrangements and other details of
exchanges and visits, except as otherwise determined,
shall be agreed upon, as a rule, not less than thirty
days in advance, through diplomatic channels or be-
tween appropriate organizations requested by the
Parties to carry out these exchanges;
b. Applications for visas for visitors participating
in exchanges and cooperative activities shall be sub-
mitted, as a rule, at least fourteen days before the
estimated time of departure;
c. Unless otherwise provided for in specialized
agreements between the Parties, and except where
other specific arrangements have been agreed upon,
participants in exchanges and cooperative activities
will pay their own expenses, including international
travel, internal travel and costs of maintenance in
the receiving country.
Article XIX
1. This Agreement shall enter into force on signa-
ture and shall remain in force until December 31,
July 23, 1973
167
1979. It may be modified or extended by mutual
agreement of the Parties.
2. Nothing in this Agreement shall be construed
to prejudice other agreements concluded between the
two Parties.
Done at Washington, this 19th day of June, 1973,
in duplicate, in the English and Russian languages,
both texts being equally authentic.
For the Government of For the Government of
the United States of the Union of Soviet So-
America: cialist Republics:
William P. Rogers a. Gromyko
ANNEX
Program of Exchanges for 1974-197(!
In implementation of various provisions of the
General Agi-eement between the United States of
America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
on Contacts, Exchanges and Cooperation signed at
Washington on June 19, 1973, the Parties have
agreed on the following Program of Exchanges for
the period January 1, 1974 to December 31, 1976:
Section I
Education
1. The Parties agree to provide for the exchange
annually from each side of:
a. At least 40 graduate students, young research-
ers and instructors for study and postgraduate re-
search in the natural sciences, technical sciences, hu-
manities and social sciences, for periods of stay from
one semester up to one academic year, including
five-week courses before the beginning of the aca-
demic year to improve the participant's competence
in the Russian or English language;
b. At least 30 language teachers to participate in
summer courses of ten weeks to improve their com-
petence in the Russian or English language ;
c. At least 10 professors and instructors of uni-
versities and other institutions of higher learning to
conduct scholarly research for periods of stay be-
tween three and six months, the total volume of these
exchanges not to exceed 50 man-months for each
side ; and
d. At least two graduate-level students or young
specialists in the fields of dance, music, theater, film
and the graphic and plastic arts for the purpose of
study, research and training for periods of from four
to ten months in specialized schools, institutes, con-
servatories, theaters, museums, studios, or other
institutions.
2. The Parties agree to provide for exchanges of
professors and specialists from universities and
other institutions of higher learning, in accordance
with the desires of the receiving side, for periods of
from one semester up to one academic year, to offer
instruction and to lecture at universities and other
institutions of higher learning in the fields of:
a. The natural sciences, technical sciences, human-
ities and social sciences; and
b. Language, literature and linguistics.
3. The Parties agree to provide for the exchange
of at least two specialists in vocational rehabilita-
tion or education of the handicapped from each side
during the period of this Program for a period of
from three to six months. The specialists will con-
duct research on topics to be agreed upon between
the appropriate organizations of both countries.
4. The Parties agi-ee to facilitate the conducting
of bilateral seminars of United States and Soviet
specialists in education: twelve participants from
each side for a period of two to four weeks on sub-
jects to be agreed upon subsequently. During the pe-
riod of this Program, four seminars will be con-
ducted in each country, two in subjects bearing on
higher education, and two in subjects bearing on
primary and secondary education.
5. The Parties agree to exchange during the period
of this Program four delegations from each side com-
posed of three to five specialists for a period of up
to three weeks on topics to be agreed upon subse-
quently; two of these delegations shall be in the
field of higher education, and two in primary and/or
secondary education.
6. The Parties agree to explore the possibility of
an exchange of primary or secondary school teachers
between appropriate organizations of the two coun-
tries.
7. The United States will take measures to encour-
age the study of the Russian language in the United
States in accordance with the Joint United States-
Soviet Communique of May 29, 1972.
8. The Parties agree to explore the possibility of
an exchange of information and appropriate con-
sultation concerning equivalency of degrees.
9. The exchanges specified in this Section will be
implemented in accordance with the terms of a sup-
plemental agreement to be effected through an ex-
change of notes.
Sex^tion II
Performing Arts
1. The Parties agree to facilitate the tours of at
least ten major performing arts groups from each
side during the period of this Program. The detailed
arrangements for tours of these groups will be pro-
vided for in contracts to be concluded between the
following entities: for tours of American groups,
between the Embassy of the United States of Amer-
ica in Moscow or authorized representatives of the
groups themselves and the appropriate concert or-
ganizations of the Soviet Union ; for tours of Soviet
groups, between appropriate organizations or im-
presarios of the United States and concert organiza-
tions of the Soviet Union. The receiving Party will
seek to satisfy the wishes of the sending Party con-
cerning the timing and duration of the tours as well
as the number of cities to be visited.
2. The Parties agree to facilitate the tours of at
168
Department of State Bulletin
least 35 individual performers from each side during
the period of this Program. Arrangements for tours
of individual performers will be made directly be-
tween appropriate organizations or impresarios of
the United States and concert organizations of the
Soviet Union.
Section III
Publications
1. The Parties agree to render practical assistance
for the successful distribution of the magazines
Amcrika in the Soviet Union and Soviet Life in the
United States on the basis of reciprocity and to con-
sult as necessary in order to find ways to increase the
distribution of these magazines. Upon reaching full
distribution of the 62,000 copies of each magazme as
currently provided for, the Parties will examine the
possibility of expanding the reciprocal distribution
of the magazines to 82,000 copies per month by De-
cember 1976. The Parties will distribute free of
charge unsold copies of the magazine among visitors
to mutually-arranged exhibitions.
2. The Parties agree to encourage the exchange of
specialized publications and microfilms between the
National Archives of the United States of America
and the Main Archival Administration of the Coun-
cil of Ministers of the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics.
Section IV
Exhibitions
1. The Parties agree to exchange exhibitions dur-
ing the period of this Program, as follows:
a. From the Soviet side, either a major industrial/
trade exhibition or one or two circulating exhibitions.
The decision of the Soviet side on this matter will
be conveyed through diplomatic channels; and
b. From the US side, one or two circulating
exhibitions.
The subjects of the exhibitions will be agreed upon
through diplomatic channels.
The circulating exhibitions will be shown in nine
cities in each country for a period of up to 28 actual
showing days in each city. The Parties will discuss in
a preliminary fashion the nature and general content
of each exhibition and will acquaint each other with
the exhibitions before their official opening, in par-
ticular through the exchange of catalogues, pro-
spectuses and other information pertinent to the
exhibitions. Other conditions for conducting the ex-
hibitions (dates, size and character of premises,
number of personnel, financial terms, etc.) shall be
subject to agreement by the Parties. Arrangements
for conducting the exhibitions will be concluded no
later than five months before their opening.
2. The Parties agree to render assistance for the
exchange of exhibitions, including art exhibitions,
between the museums of the two countries, and to
encourage these museums to establish and develop di-
rect contacts with the aim of exchanging informa-
tive materials, albums, art monographs and other
publications of mutual interest. In the case of art
exhibitions, their content and the conditions for con-
ducting them would be the subject of discussion and
special agreement in each case between the relevant
American museums and the Ministry of Culture of
the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.
3 The Parties will agree through diplomatic chan-
nels on the arrangements for other exhibitions and
on participation in national exhibitions which may
take place in either country.
Section V
General
Each of the Parties shall have the right to include
in delegations interpreters or members of its Em-
bassy, who shall be considered as within the agreed
total membership of such delegations.
CONVENTION ON MATTERS OF TAXATION
Convention Between the United States of
America and the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics on Matters of Taxation
The President of the United States of America
and the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, desiring to
avoid double taxation and to promote the develop-
ment of economic, scientific, technical and cultural
cooperation between both States, have appointed for
this purpose as their respective plenipotentiaries:
The President of the United States of America:
George P. Shultz, Secretary of the Treasury of
the USA; and
The Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:
Nikolai Semenovich Patolichev, Minister of For-
eign Trade of the USSR;
Who have agreed as follows :
Article I
1. The taxes which are the subject of this Con-
vention are:
(a) In the case of the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics, taxes and dues provided for by the All-
Union legislation;
(b) In the case of the United States of America,
taxes and dues provided for by the Internal Rev-
enue Code.
2. This Convention shall also apply to taxes and
dues substantially similar to those covered by para-
graph 1. which are imposed in addition to, or in
place of, existing taxes and dues after the signature
of this Convention.
Article II
In this Convention, the terms listed below shall
have the following meaning:
July 23, 1973
169
1. "Soviet Union" or "USSR" means the Union
of Soviet Socialist Republics and, when used in a
geographical sense, means the territories of all the
Union Republics. Such term also includes:
(a) The territorial sea thereof, and
(b) The seabed and subsoil of the submarine
areas adjacent to the coast thereof, but beyond the
territorial sea, over which the Soviet Union ex-
ercises sovereign rights, in accordance with inter-
national law, for the purpose of exploration for
and exploitation of the natural resources of such
areas. However, it is understood that such term in-
cludes such areas only to the extent that the per-
son, property or activity with respect to which
questions of taxation arise is connected with such
exploration or exploitation.
2. "United States" or "USA" means the United
States of America and, when used in a geographical
sense, means the territories of all the states and
of the District of Columbia. Such term also includes:
(a) The territorial sea thereof, and
(b) The seabed and subsoil of the submarine areas
adjacent to the coast thereof, but beyond the terri-
torial sea, over which the United States exercises
sovereign rights, in accordance with international
law, for the purpose of exploration for and exploi-
tation of the natural resources of such areas. How-
ever, it is understood that such term includes such
areas only to the extent that the person, property
or activity with respect to which questions of taxa-
tion arise is connected with such exploration or
exploitation.
3. "Resident of the Soviet Union" means:
(a) a legal entity or any other organization
treated in the USSR as a legal entity for tax pur-
poses which is created under the laws of the Soviet
Union or any Union Republic and
(b) an individual resident in the Soviet Union for
purposes of its tax.
4. "Resident of the United States" means:
(a) a corporation or any other organization
treated in the United States as a corporation for
tax purposes which is created or organized under
the laws of the United States or any state thereof
or of the District of Columbia and
(b) an individual resident in the United States
for purposes of its tax.
5. "Contracting State" means the United States
or the Soviet Union, as the context requires.
6. The term "competent authorities" means;
(a) in the case of the Soviet Union, the Ministry
of Finance
(b) in the case of the United States, the Secre-
tary of the Treasury or his delegate.
Article III
1. The following categories of income derived
from sources within one Contracting State by a
170
resident of the other Contracting State shall be sub-
ject to tax only in that other Contracting State:
(a) rentals, royalties, or other amounts paid as
consideration for the use of or right to use literary,
artistic, and scientific works, or for the use of copy-
rights of such works, as well as the rights to in-
ventions (patents, author's certificates), industrial
designs, processes or formulae, computer programs,
trademarks, service marks, and other similar prop-
erty or rights, or for industrial, commercial, or
scientific equipment, or for knowledge, experience,
or skill (know-how) ;
(b) gains derived from the sale or exchange of
any such rights or property, whether or not the
amounts realized on sale or exchange are contingent
in whole or in part, on the extent and nature of use
or disposition of such rights or property;
(c) gains from the sale or other disposition of
property received as a result of inheritance or gift;
(d) income from the furnishing of engineering,
architectural, designing, and other technical serv-
ices in connection with an installation contract with
a resident of the first Contracting State which are
carried out in a period not exceeding 36 months at
one location;
(e) income from the sale of goods or the supply-
ing of services through a broker, general commis-
sion agent or other agent of independent status,
where such broker, general commission agent or
other agent is acting in the ordinary course of his
business;
(f) reinsurance premiums; and
(g) interest on credits, loans and other forms
of indebtedness connected with the financing of
trade between the USA and the USSR except where
received by a resident of the other Contracting
State from the conduct of a general banking busi-
ness in the first Contracting State.
2. A Contracting State shall not attribute taxable
income to the following activities conducted within
that Contracting State by a resident of the other
Contracting State:
(a) the purchase of goods or merchandise;
(b) the use of facilities for the purpose of stor-
age or delivery of goods or merchandise belonging
to the resident of the other Contracting State;
(c) the display of goods or merchandise belonging
to the resident of the other Contracting State, and
also the sale of such items on termination of their
display;
(d) advertising by a resident of the other Con-
tracting State, the collection or dissemination of in-
formation, or the conducting of scientific research,
or similar activities, which have a preparatory or
auxiliary character for the resident.
Article IV
1. Income from commercial activity derived in one
Contracting State by a resident of the other Con-
tracting State, shall be taxable in the first Contract-
Department of State Bulletin
ing State only if it is derived by a representation.
j 2. The term "representation" means:
(a) with regard to income derived within the
USSR, an office or representative bureau estab-
lished in the USSR by a resident of the United
States in accordance with the laws and regulations
in force in the Soviet Union;
(b) with regard to income derived within the
USA, an office or other place of business established
in the USA by a resident of the Soviet Union in ac-
cordance with the laws and regulations in force in
the United States.
3. In the determination of the profits of a repre-
sentation, there shall be allowed as deductions from
total income the expenses that are connected with
the performance of its activity, including executive
and general administrative expenses.
4. This article applies to income, other than in-
come of an individual dealt with in Article VI, from
the furnishing of tour performances and other pub-
lic appearances.
5. The provisions of this article shall not affect
the exemptions from taxes provided for by Articles
III and V.
Article V
1. Income which a resident of the Soviet Union
derives from the operation in international traffic
of ships or aircraft registered in the USSR and
gains which a resident of the USSR derives from
the sale, exchange, or other disposition of ships or
aircraft operated in international traffic by such
resident and registered in the USSR shall be exempt
from tax in the United States.
2. Income which a resident of the United States
derives from operation in international traffic of
ships or aircraft registered in the USA and gains
which a resident of the USA derives from the sale,
exchange, or other disposition of ships or aircraft
operated in international traffic by such resident and
registered in the USA shall be exempt from tax in
the Soviet Union.
3. Remuneration derived by an individual from
the performance of labor or personal services as an
employee aboard ships or aircraft operated by one
of the Contracting States or a resident thereof in
international traffic shall be exempt from tax in the
other Contracting State if such individual is a mem-
ber of the regular complement of the ship or air
craft.
Article VI
1. Special exemptions.
Income derived by an individual who is a resident
of one of the Contracting States shall be exempt
from tax in the other Contracting State as provided
in subparagraphs (a) through (f).
(a) Governmental employees.
(1) An individual receiving remuneration from
government funds of the Contracting State of which
the individual is a citizen for labor or personal
July 23, 1973
services performed as an employee of governmental
agencies or institutions of that Contracting State
in the discharge of governmental functions shall not
be subject to tax on such remuneration in that other
Contracting State.
(2) Labor or personal services performed by a
citizen of one of the Contracting States shall be
treated by the other Contracting State as performed
in the discharge of governmental functions if such
labor or personal services would be treated under
the internal laws of the first Contracting State as
so performed. However, it is understood that persons
engaged in commercial activity, such as employees
or representatives of commercial organizations of
the USA and employees or representatives of the
foreign trade organizations of the USSR, shall not
be considered in the USSR and USA respectively
as engaged in the discharge of governmental func-
tions. . , 1, 4.
(3) The provisions of this Convention shall not
affect the fiscal privileges of diplomatic and consular
officials under the general rules of international law
or under special agreements.
(b) Participants in programs of intergovernmen-
tal cooperation.
An individual who is a resident of one of the
Contracting States and who is temporarily present
in the other Contracting State under an exchange
program provided for by agreements between the
governments of the Contracting States on coopera-
tion in various fields of science and technology shall
not be subject to tax in that other Contracting State
on remuneration received from sources within either
Contracting State.
(c) Teachers and researchers.
(1) An individual who is a resident of one of the
Contracting States and who is temporarily present
in the other Contracting State at the invitation of
a governmental agency or institution or an educa-
tional or scientific research institution in that other
Contracting State for the primary purpose of teach-
ing, engaging in research, or participating in scien-
tific, technical or professional conferences shall not
be subject to tax in that other Contracting State on
his income from teaching or research or participat-
ing in such conferences.
(2) Subparagraph (1) shall not apply to in-
come from research if such research is undertaken
primarily for the benefit of a private person or
commercial enterprise of the USA or a foreign
trade organization of the USSR. However, sub-
paragraph (1) shall apply in all cases where re-
search is conducted on the basis of intergovern-
mental agreements on cooperation.
(d) Students.
An individual who is a resident of one of the
Contracting States and who is temporarily present
in the other Contracting State for the primary pur-
pose of studying at an educational or scientific re-
search institution or for the purpose of acquiring a
profession or a specialty shall be exempt from taxes
in the other Contracting State on a stipend, schol-
arship, or other substitute type of allowance, nec-
essary to provide for ordinary living expenses.
171
(e) Trainees and specialists.
An individual who is a resident of one of the
Contracting States, who is temporarily present in
the other Contracting State for the primary pur-
pose of acquiring technical, professional, or com-
mercial experience or performing technical serv-
ices, and who is an employee of, or under contract
with, a resident of the first mentioned Contracting
State, shall not be subject to tax in that other
Contracting State on remuneration received from
abroad. Also, such individual shall not be subject
to tax in that other Contracting State on amounts
received from sources within that other Contracting
State which are necessary to provide for ordinary
living expenses.
(f) Duration of exemptions.
The exemptions provided for under subpara-
graphs (b), (c), (d), and (e) of this article shall
extend only for such period of time as is required
to effectuate the purpose of the visit, but in no
case shall such period of time exceed:
(1) One year in the case of subparagraphs (b)
(Participants in programs of intergovernmental
cooperation) and (e) (Trainees and specialists);
(2) Two years in the case of subparagraph (c)
(Teachers and researchers) ; and
(3) Five years in the case of subparagraph (d)
(Students).
If an individual qualifies for exemption under more
than one of subparagraphs (b), (c), (d), and (e),
the provisions of that subparagraph which is most
favorable to him shall apply. However, in no case
shall an individual have the cumulative benefits of
subparagraphs (b), (c), (d), and (e) for more
than five taxable years from the date of his arrival
in the other Contracting State.
2. General exemptions.
Income derived by an individual who is a resident
of one of the Contracting States from the perform-
ance of personal services in the other Contracting
State, which is not exempt from tax in accordance
with paragraph 1. of this article, may be taxed in
that other Contracting State, but only if the indi-
vidual is present in that other Contracting State
for a period aggregating more than 183 days in the
taxable year.
Article VII
This Convention shall not restrict the right of a
Contracting State to tax a citizen of that Contract-
ing State.
Article VIII
This Convention shall apply only to the taxation
of income from activity conducted in a Contracting
State in accordance with the laws and regulations
in force in such Contracting State.
Article IX
If the income of a resident of one of the Con-
tracting States is exempt from tax in the other
172
Contracting State, in accordance with this Conven-I
tion, such resident shall also be exempt from any
tax which is at present imposed or which may be
imposed subsequently in that Contracting State on
the transaction giving rise to such income.
Article X
1. A citizen of one of the Contracting States who
is a resident of the other Contracting State shall
not be subjected in that other Contracting State to
more burdensome taxes than a citizen of that other
Contracting State who is a resident thereof carry-
ing on the same activities.
2. A citizen of one of the Contracting States who
is a resident of the other Contracting State or a
representation established by a resident of the first
Contracting State in the other Contracting State
shall not be subjected in that other Contracting
State to more burdensome taxes than are generally
imposed in that State on citizens or representations
of residents of third States carrying on the same
activities. However, this provision shall not require
a Contracting State to grant to citizens or represen-
tations of residents of the other Contracting State
tax benefits granted by special agreements to citi-
zens or representations of a third State.
3. The provisions of paragraphs 1. and 2. of this:
article shall apply to taxes of any kind imposed on
the Federal or All-Union level, the state or Republic
level, and on the local level.
Article XI
1. If a resident of one of the Contracting States
considers that the action of one or both of the
Contracting States results or will result for him in
taxation not in accordance with this Convention, he
may, notwithstanding the remedies provided by the
laws of the Contracting States, present his case to
the competent authorities of the Contracting State
of which he is a resident or citizen. Should the
claim be considered to have merit by the competent
authorities of the Contracting State to which the
claim is made, they shall endeavor to come to an
agreement with the competent authorities of the
other Contracting State with a view to the avoid-
ance of taxation not in accordance with the pro-
visions of this Convention.
2. In the event that such an agreement is reached
the competent authorities of the Contracting States
shall, as necessary, refund the excess amounts paid,
allow tax exemptions, or levy taxes.
Article XII
The competent authorities of the Contracting
States shall notify each other annually of amend-
ments of the tax legislation referred to in para-
graph 1. of Article I and of the adoption of taxes
referred to in paragraph 2. of Article I by trans-
mitting the texts of amendments or new statutes
and notify each other of any material concerning
the application of this Convention.
Department of State Bulletin
Article XIII
This Convention shall be subject to ratification
and shall enter into force on the thirtieth day after
the exchange of instruments of ratification. The
instruments of ratification shall be exchanged at
Moscow as soon as possible.
The provisions of this Convention shall, however,
have effect for income derived on or after January 1
of the year following the year in which the instru-
ments of ratification are exchanged.
Article XIV
1. This Convention shall remain in force for a
period of three years after it takes effect and shall
remain in force thereafter for an indefinite period.
Either of the Contracting States may terminate this
Convention at any time after three years from the
date on which the Convention enters into force by
giving notice of termination through diplomatic
channels at least six months before the end of any
calendar year. In such event, the Convention shall
cease to have effect beginning on January 1 of the
year following the year in which notice is given.
2. Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph 1.
of this article, upon prior notice to be given through
diplomatic channels, the provisions of subparagraphs
(e), (f). or (g) of paragraph 1. of Article III and
the provisions of Article IX may be terminated sep-
arately by either Contracting State at any time
after three years from the date on which this Con-
vention enters into force. In such event such pro-
visions shall cease to have effect beginning on
January 1 of the year following the year in which
notice is given.
In Witness Whereof, the plenipotentiaries of the
two Contracting States have signed the present Con-
vention and have affixed their seals thereto.
Done at Washington, this 20th day of June, 1973,
in duplicate, in the English and Russian languages,
both texts being equally authentic.
For the President of
the United States of
America
George P. Shultz
For the Presidium of the
Supreme Soviet of the
Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics
N. S. Patolichev
PROTOCOL ON U.S.-U.S.S.R. CHAMBER OF
COMMERCE
Pkotocol
Considering the interest expressed by United
States companies and Soviet foreign trade organiza-
tions in the development of organizational arrange-
ments for increased cooperation, and
Recognizing that such increased cooperation
would contribute to the promotion of contacts be-
tween businessmen of the USA and the USSR,
which in turn would assist in the development of
July 23, 1973
mutually beneficial trade between the two countries,
The Secretary of Commerce of the USA will meet
at an early date with members of the United States
business and financial community to discuss the
desirability of establishing in the United States
private sector a US-USSR Chamber of Commerce.
The Minister of Foreign Trade of the USSR will
continue similar consultations with Soviet foreign
trade and other organizations.
The results of these consultations shall be re-
ported promptly to the Joint US-USSR Commer-
cial Commission.
Done at Washington, this 22nd day of June, 1973,
in duplicate, in the English and Russian languages,
both texts being equally authentic.
For the Government For the Government of the
of the United States Union of Soviet Socialist
of America: Republics:
George P. Shultz N. S. Patolichev
Secretary of the Minister of Foreign Trade
Treasury
PROTOCOL ON COMMERCIAL FACILITIES
Protocol
In the interests of strengthening their commercial
and economic ties, the Government of the USA and
the Government of the USSR undertook in the
Agreement between the Government of the USA and
the Government of the USSR Regarding Trade
signed in October 1972, to cooperate in the expan-
sion and improvement of their commercial facilities
in Moscow and Washington.
In accordance with that undertaking representa-
tives of the Soviet Government and the US Embassy
in Moscow have this week contracted for new facili-
ties at a convenient location which will enable the
Office of the Commercial Counselor of the USA to
provide more effective services to US businessmen
seeking assistance in their commercial pursuits with
appropriate USSR organizations.
The US Government facilitated the acquisition by
the USSR earlier this year of a building at a con-
venient location in Washington for use as the Office
of the Commercial Counselor of the USSR.
The Government of the USSR has also informed
the Government of the USA that, in connection with
the Agreement Regarding Trade, it has issued ac-
creditation to establish representations in Moscow
to the following US business and financial organiza-
tions:
Pullman Incorporated
Occidental Petroleum Corporation
The Chase Manhattan Bank, N. A.
General Electric Company
International Harvester Company
Caterpillar Tractor Company
173
Hewlett-Packard Company
Engelhard Minerals & Chemicals Corporation
Bank of America
First National City Bank
Requests by additional US firms for accreditation
in Moscow are now under consideration by Soviet
authorities.
Consistent with Article 5 of the Agreement Re-
garding Trade, the Government of the USA and
the Government of the USSR have also agreed to-
day to undertake immediate preparations for mu-
tually satisfactory arrangements to enlarge their
commercial staffs in each other's country. A Trade
Representation of the USSR in Washington and a
Commercial Office of the USA in Moscow will simul-
taneously be opened as soon as possible and in any
event not later than October 31st of this year.
Done at Washington, this 22nd day of June, 1973,
in duplicate, in the English and Russian languages,
both texts being equally authentic.
For the Government For the Government of the
of the United States Union of Soviet Socialist
of America: Republics:
George P. Shultz
Secretary of the
Treasury
N. S. Patolichev
Minister of Foreign Trade
PROTOCOL ON EXPANSION OF AIR SERVICES
Protocol Between the United States of America
AND the Union of Soviet .Socialist Republics
on Questions Relating to the Expansion of
Air Services
The Government of the United States of America
and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics,
In keeping with paragraph 7 of the Basic Prin-
ciples of Relations Between the United States of
America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
signed at Moscow on May 29, 1972,
Desiring to foster expanded communications be-
tween the two countries on a mutual basis.
Recognizing the role which air transportation can
play in this connection, and
Pursuant to Article 16 of the Civil Air Transport
Agreement between the two Governments of No-
vember 4, 1966,
Have agreed as follows:
Article 1
The existing agreed services under the Civil Air
Transport Agreement between New York and Mos-
cow are to be expanded to include services for the
designated airline of the United States from New
York to Leningrad and for the designated airline of
the USSR from Moscow to Washington.
Article 2
In view of the increasing traffic between the two
countries, the existing arrangements under the Civil
Air Transport Agreement relating to flight frequen-
cies are to be amended to allow increases in fre-
quency of service.
Article 3
The foregoing and other related amendments of
the Civil Air Transport Agreement are incorporated
in the attached Annex which supersedes the existing
Annex to that Agreement.
This Protocol shall enter into force upon signature.
Done at Washington, this 23rd day of June, 1973,
in duplicate, in the English and Russian languages,
both texts being equally authentic.
For the Government For the Government of the
of the United States Union of Soviet Socialist
of America: Republics:
Claude S. Brinegar b. P. Bugayev
ANNEX
1. The Government of the Union of Soviet So-
cialist Republics entrusts the Ministry of Civil
Aviation of the USSR with responsibility for the
operation of the agreed services on the routes speci-
fied in Table I of this Annex, which in turn desig-
nates for this purpose the General Department of
International Air Services f Aeroflot Soviet Airlines).
2. The Government of the United States of Amer-
ica designates Pan American World Airways, Inc.,
to operate the agreed services on the routes specified
in Tabic II of this Annex.
3. Each designated airline shall have the follow-
ing rights in the operation of the agreed services on
the respective routes specified in Tables I and II of
this Annex:
(1) The right to land for technical and commer-
cial purposes at the terminal point of the agreed
route in the territory of the other Contracting
Party, as well as to use alternative airports and
flight facilities in that territory for these purposes;
(2) The right to discharge passengers, baggage,
cargo and mail in the territory of the other Con-
tracting Party, but without the right to discharge
passengers, baggage, cargo and mail coming from
any intermediate point in a third country on the
given route, except for passengers and their ac-
companied baggage which have been disembarked at
that intermediate point by the designated airline and
subsequently reembarked during the validity of the
ticket (but in no event later than one year from the
date of disembarkation) and which are moving un-
der a passenger ticket and baggage check providing
for transportation on scheduled flights on each seg-
ment of the route between the two Contracting
Parties; and
(3) The right to pick up passengers, baggage,
cargo and mail in the territory of the other Con-
tracting Party, but without the right to pick up
passengers, baggage, cargo and mail destined for
174
Department of State Bulletin
any intermediate point in a third country on the
given route, except for passengers and their ac-
companied baggage which are to be disembarked at
that intermediate point and subsequently re-
embarked by the designated airline during the
validity of the ticket (but in no event later than one
year from the date of disembarkation) and which
are moving under a passenger ticket and baggage
check providing for transportation on scheduled
flights on each segment of the route between the
two Contracting Parties.
4. In addition to the rights specified in paragraph
3 above, each designated airline shall have the right,
subject to paragraph 5 below, to pick up and dis-
charge passengers, baggage, cargo and mail in the
territory of the other Contracting Party which are
to be discharged or have been picked up at any
intermediate point in a third country on the given
route.
5. Each designated airline may operate up to two
roundtrip flights per week through March 31, 1974,
up to three roundtrip flights per week during the
1974 summer traffic season (April 1, 1974-October
31, 1974), up to two roundtrip flights per week dur-
ing the 1974/75 winter trafl^c season (November 1,
1974-March 31, 1975), and thereafter such number
of flights as is subsequently agreed between the
Contracting Parties. The designated airline of the
United States may exercise the right specified in
paragraph 4 above on all its flights. The designated
airline of the Soviet Union may exercise the right
specified in paragraph 4 above on one of its flights.
6. The intermediate points referred to in Table I
of this Annex shall be any two of the following:
Amsterdam, Copenhagen, Paris, London, Frankfurt,
and Brussels; and the intermediate points referre-1
to in Table II shall be any two of the following:
London, Amsterdam, Frankfurt, Copenhagen, Brus-
sels and Paris. At the beginning of each summer
and winter traffic season, each designated airline
may change from one combination of two interme-
diate points to another combination of two inter-
mediate points for that season. No more than one
intermediate point may be served on each flight. The
intermediate point or points may, at the option of
each designated airline, be omitted on any or all
flights.
7. Each designated airline may make a change of
gauge at any intermediate point in Europe listed in
paragraph 6 above provided that:
(1) carriage beyond the point of change of gauge
will be performed by a single aircraft of capacity
equal to or less (in the case of services outbound from
the homeland) or equal to or more (in the case of
services inbound to the homeland) than that of the
arriving aircraft, and
(2) aircraft for such beyond carriage will be
scheduled only in coincidence with the incoming
aircraft (with the same flight number) to insure
true and genuine continuing service.
AGREED SERVICES
Table I
For the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:
Moscow to New York or Washington (Dulles)
and return, via the intermediate points listed in
paragraph 6 of the Annex. New York and Washing-
ton will be served on separate flights. Technical
stops will be limited to those listed in Article II of
the Supplementary Agreement, as amended.
Table II
For the United States of America:
New York to Leningrad or Moscow, and return,
via the intermediate points listed in paragraph 6
of the Annex. Leningrad and Moscow will be served
on separate flights. Technical stops will be limited
to those listed in Article II of the Supplementary
Agreement, as amended.
Current Treaty Actions
MULTILATERAL
Atomic Energy
Protocol suspending the agreement of March 4, 1969
(TIAS 6741), between the International Atomic
Energy Agency, Iran, and the United States for
the application of safeguards and providing for
the application of safeguards pursuant to the
nonproliferation treaty of July 1, 1968 (TIAS
6839). Done at Vienna June 19, 1973. Enters into
force on the date on which the Agency receives
from Iran written notification that it has com-
pleted its constitutional requirements for entry
into force of the treaty safeguards agreement and
of this protocol.
Signatures: International Atomic Energy Agency,
Iran, United States.
Aviation
Convention for the suppression of unlawful acts
against the safety of civil aviation. Done at
Montreal September 23, 1971. Entered into force
January 26, 1973. TIAS 7570.
Accession deposited: Nigeria, July 3, 1973.
Convention for the suppression of unlawful seizure
of aircraft. Done at The Hague December 16,
1970. Entered into force October 14, 1971. TIAS
7192.
Accession deposited: Nigeria, July 3, 1973.
Biological Weapons
Convention on the prohibition of the development,
production and stockpiling of bacteriological (bio-
logical) and toxin weapons and on their destruc-
tion. Done at Washington, London, and Moscow
April 10, 1972.'
Ratification deposited: Nigeria, July 3, 1973.
Not in force.
July 23, 1973
175
Satellite Communications System
Agreement relating to the International Telecom-
munications Satellite Organization (Intelsat),
with annexes. Done at Washington August 20,
1971. Entered into force February 12, 1973 TIAS
7532.
Ratification deposited: Federal Republic of Ger-
many, including West Berlin, July 2, 1973.
BILATERAL
Ireland
Agreement relating to travel group charter flights
and advance booking charter flights, with memo-
randum of understanding. Efl'ected by exchange of
notes at Washington June 28 and 29, 1973. En-
tered into force June 29, 1973.
Morocco
Agreement amending the agreement for sales of
agricultural commodities of April 19, 1973. Ef-
fected by exchange of notes at Rabat May 11,
1973. Entered into force May 11, 1973.
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
Protocol to the agreement of February 21, 1973
(TIAS 7575), relating to the consideration of
claims resulting from damage to fishing vessels
or gear and measures to prevent fishing conflicts,
with annex. Signed at Copenhagen June 21, 1973.
Entered into force June 21, 1973.
Agreement on certain fishery problems on the high
seas in the western areas of the middle Atlantic
Ocean. Signed at Copenhagen June 21, 1973 En-
tered into force July 1, 1973.
PUBLICATIONS
Recent Releases
For sale by the Government Bookstore, Department
of State, Washington, D.C. 20520. A 25-percent dis-
count is made on orders for 100 or more cojnes of
any one publication mailed to the same address.
Remittances, payable to the Superintendent of Docu-
ments, must accompany orders.
Discussion Guide— Issues : No. 4— People's Republic
of Chma. A teaching tool to facilitate classroom
and adult discussion groups use of the recently pub-
lished "Issues" pamphlet on the People's Republic
of China. Pub. 8503. East Asian and Pacific Se-
ries 185. 4 pp. 20^ postpaid.
Social Security. Agreement with Liechtenstein.
TIAS 7476. 3 pp. 15^
Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with Uruguay
TIAS 7477. 11 pp. 15<.
Passenger Charter Air Services. Memorandum of
Understanding with Belgium. TIAS 7479. 3 pp
15(!.
Naval Communications Facility on Diego Garcia.
Agreement with the United Kingdom of Great
Britain and Northern Ireland supplementing the
agreement of December 30, 1966. TIAS 7481. 21
pp. 25^
Prevention of Foot-and-Mouth Disease and Kinder,
pest. Agreement with Panama. TIAS 7482. 7 nn
IS*-. ^^'
Education— Educational Foundation and Financing
of Exchange Programs. Agreement with Pakistan
TIAS 7483. 6 pp. 15f.
Air Transport Services. Agreement with Spain ex-
tending the provisional agreement of June 28 and
30, 1972. TIAS 7484. 3 pp. 15^
Technical Cooperation. Agreement with Afghanistan
extending the agreement of June 30, 1953, as ex-
tended. TIAS 7485. 3 pp. 15^.
Surplus Property— Off-Shore Sales Facility. Agree-
ment with Singapore amending the agreement of
May 5, 1972. TIAS 7486. 1 p. 15c.
Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with the
Khmer Republic amending the agreement of Janu-
ary 13, 1972, as amended. TIAS 7487. 5 pp. 15o.
Loan of Vessels. Agreement with Spain. TIAS 7488
5 pp. 15('.
Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with the Re-
public of Korea amending the agreement of Febru-
ary 14, 1972, as amended. TIAS 7489. 4 pp. 15('.
Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with Pakistan
amending the agreement of September 21, 1972
TIAS 7490. 2 pp. ISf".
Improvement of Airfield Facilities. Memorandum of
understanding with the Khmer Republic. TIAS
7491. 5 pp. 15('.
Military Assistance— Deposits Under Foreign Assist-
ance Act of 1971. Agreement with Colombia. TIAS
7492. 5 pp. 15(<.
Trade in Wool and Man-Made Fiber Textile Products.
Agreement with the Republic of China, the Republic
of Korea, and Hong Kong. TIAS 7493. 4 pp.
15('.
Trade in Wool and Man-Made Fiber Textile Products.
Agreement with Hong Kong. TIAS 7494. 8 pp.
15^
Fiber Textiles. Ar-
7495. 23 pp. 30('.
Trade in Wool and .Man-Made
rangement with Japan. TIAS
Trade in Cotton Textiles. Agreement with the Re-
public of Korea amending the agreement of Decem-
ber 30, 1971. TIAS 7496. 2 pp. ISt*.
Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with Bolivia
amending the agreement of March 7, 1969. TIAS
7497. 5 pp. 15(*.
176
Department of State Bulletin
INDEX July 23, 197 J Vol. LXIX, No. 1778
liculture. Agreements Signed During Gen-
ial Secretary Brezhnev's Visit to the United
tates (basic principles for strategic arms
i.gotiations, agreements on peaceful uses of
itoniic energy, prevention of nuclear war,
agriculture, studies of the world ocean, trans-
portation, and exchanges, convention on
taxation, protocols on Chamber of Commerce,
immercial facilities, and air services) . . . 158
omic Energy. Agreements Signed During
leneral Secretary Brezhnev's Visit to the
nited States (basic principles for strategic
arms negotiations, agreements on peaceful
uses of atomic energ>-, prevention of nuclear
var, agriculture, studies of the world ocean,
1 ansportation, and exchanges, convention on
taxation, protocols on Chamber of Commerce,
commercial facilities, and air services) . . 158
Disarmament
Agreements Signed During General Secretary
Brezhnev's Visit to the United States (basic
irinciples for strategic arms negotiations,
agreements on peaceful uses of atomic
energy, prevention of nuclear war, agricul-
ture, studies of the world ocean, transporta-
tion, and exchanges, convention on taxation,
protocols on Chamber of Commerce, com-
mercial facilities, and air services) .... 158
Tresidential Assistant Kissinger Discusses
Agreements Signed During General Secre-
tary Brezhnev's Visit (news conferences) . . 134
Economic Affairs. .Agreements Signed During
General Secretary Brezhnev's Visit to the
United States (basic principles for strategic
arms negotiations, agreements on peaceful
uses of atomic energy, prevention of nuclear
war, agriculture, studies of the world ocean,
transportation, and exchanges, convention on
taxation, protocols on Chamber of Commerce,
commercial facilities, and air services) . . . 158
Educational and Cultural .\8fairs. Agreements
Signed During General Secretary Brezhnev's
\'isit to the United States (basic principles
for strategic arms negotiations, agreements
on peaceful uses of atomic energy, prevention
of nuclear war, agriculture, studies of the
world ocean, transpoi-tation, and exchanges,
convention on taxation, protocols on Chamber
of Commerce, commercial facilities, and air
services) ^58
I'lesidentia! Documents. General Secretary
Brezhnev Visits the United States (Nixon,
Brezhnev, joint communique) 113
Publications. Recent Releases 1''6
Treaty Information
^irreements Signed During General Secretary
Brezhnev's Visit to the United States (basic
principles for strategic arms negotiations,
agreements on peaceful uses of atomic
energy, prevention of nuclear war, agricul-
ture, studies of the world ocean, transporta-
tion, and exchanges, convention on taxation,
protocols on Chamber of Commerce, com-
mercial facilities, and air services) .... 1-58
Current Treaty Actions 1"5
U.S.S.R.
Agreements Signed During General Secretary
Brezhnev's Visit to the United States (basic
principles for strategic anns negotiations,
agreements on peaceful uses of atomic
energy, prevention of nuclear war, agricul-
ture, studies of the world ocean, transporta-
tion, and exchanges, convention on taxation,
protocols on Chamber of Commerce, com-
mercial facilities, and air services) .... 158
General Secretary Brezhnev Visits the United
States (Nixon,'Brezhnev, joint communique) 113
Presidential Assistant Kissinger Discusses
Agreements Signed During General Secre-
tary Brezhnev's Visit (news conferences) . . 134
Name Index
Bi'ezhnev, Leonid I 113
Kissinger, Henry A 134
Nixon, President 113
Check List of Department of Stafe
Press Releases: July 2-8
Press releases may be obtained from the
Office of Press Relations, Department of State,
Washington, D.C. 20520.
No. Date
Subject
t233 7/2 U.S. and Ireland reach under-
standing on operation of ad-
vance air charters, June 29
(rewrite).
*234 7/3 Study group 8 of the U.S. Na-
tional Committee for CCIR,
July 31.
t235 7/5 U.S.-Japan Committee on Scien-
tific Cooperation, July 10-12.
t236 7/6 U.S. opens consulate general in
Leningrad.
t237 7/6 Rogers: Conference on Security
and Cooperation in Europe,
July 5.
* Not printed.
t Held for a later issue of the Bulletin.
Superintendent of Documents
u.s. government printing okfice
washington. o.c. 2040z
official business
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mediate attention if you write to: Director, Office
of Media Services (PA/MS), Department of State,
Washington, D.C. 20520.
I
s
(3:
\l//77f
THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BULLETIN
Volume LXIX
No. 1779
July 30, 1973
CONFERENCE ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE
MEETS AT HELSINKI AT FOREIGN MINISTER LEVEL
Statement by Secretary Rogers, Conference Communique,
and Final Recommendations of the Helsinki Consultations 177
DEPARTMENT DISCUSSES RECENT NEGOTIATIONS
IN THE INTERNATIONAL OIL INDUSTRY
Statement by Under Secretary Casey 190
U.S. CALLS FOR IMMEDIATE ACTION ON PRIORITY PROPOSALS
FOR U.N. ENVIRONMENT PROGRAM
Statement by Christian A. Herter, Jr. 201
THE OFFICIAL WEEKLY RECORD OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY
For index see inside back cover
THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BULLETI
Vol. LXIX, No. 1779
July 30, 1973
For sale by the Superintendent of Documents
U.S. Government Printing Office
Washington, D.C. 20402
PRICE:
62 issues plus semiannual indexes,
domestic $29, foreign $36.26
Single copy 65 cents
Use of funds for printing this publication ap-
proved by the Director of the Office of Man-
agement and Budget (January 29, 1971).
Note: Contents of this publication are not
copyrighted and items contained herein may be
reprinted. Citation of the DEPARTMENT OF
STATE BULLETIN as the source will be
appreciated. The BULLETIN is indexed in
the Readers' Guide to Periodical Literature.
The Department of State BULLETI,
a weekly publication issued by t,
Office of Media Services, Bureau
Public Affairs, provides tfie public at
interested agencies of the governmei
with information on developments i,
the field of V.S. foreign relations
on the work of the Department
the Foreign Service.
The BULLETIN includes aelecta
press releases on foreign policy, issued
by the White House and the Depart-
ment, and statements, addresses
and news conferences of the President
and the Secretary of State and othei
officers of the Department, as well at
special articles on various phases ol
international affairs and the function
of the Department. Information is iiu
eluded concerning treaties and inter-
national agreements to which /Aas
United States is or may become
party and on treaties of general inter
national interest.
Publications of the Department
State, United Nations documents, ant
legislative material in the field oi
international relations are also listed
Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe
Meets at Helsinki at Foreign Minister Level
The first stage of the Conference on Secu-
rity and Cooperation in Europe met at Hel-
sinki Jnly 3-7, at the Foreign Ministers level.
Following is a statement by Secretary Rogers
made before the conference on July 5, to-
gether ivith the texts of a covimtinique is-
sued at the conclusion of the meeting on
July 7 and of the Final Recommendations of
the Helsinki Considtxitions, agreed to on June
8 by participants in the preparatory talks
and adopted by the conference on July 3.
STATEMENT BY SECRETARY ROGERS, JULY 5
Press release 237 dated July 6
I would like to join my colleagues in ex-
pressing the gratitude of the U.S. Govern-
ment to the Government of Finland for its
many and substantial contributions to bring-
ing this conference into being. This confer-
ence provides the nations represented here
a historic opportunity. But whether the con-
ference itself achieves historic importance
depends on how we — the Foreign Ministers
here present and the 35 governments we rep-
resent — avail ourselves of the opportunity.
I think it can be said that so far the meet-
ing has met our expectations. We have gath-
ered together in a friendly and constructive
manner and have engaged in what we refer
to as a general debate — but a debate with
very few differences. I am the 21st speaker,
and unless I missed something, each speaker
who preceded me spoke thoughtfully, respect-
fully of the viewpoints of others, and with-
out using contentious rhetoric. Maybe we
should not list this as an accomplishment,
but we can say it's a i-elief.
But beyond the friendly climate which has
prevailed throughout, we made a decision of
major dimensions at the outset — almost
routinely. After careful consideration by our
governments, we unanimously adopted the
Final Recommendations of the Helsinski
Consultations. This, in fact, is a remarkable
document. It is not merely a conference
agenda. It contains a long list of agreed prin-
ciples and includes a detailed and carefully
drafted work program designed to promote
peaceful evolution in Europe for the years
ahead. This document is a commitment to
find new and more civilized ways of dealing
with one another. I wish to underline the
point that the commitments we have made
here are solemn obligations to develop com-
prehensive and specific measures to advance
our relationships in that spirit.
I think President Kekkonen captured the
essence of our decision when he said, "Secu-
rity is not gained by erecting fences; security
is gained by opening gates."
For a quarter century, division has been
the dominant feature of Europe. We all
recognize that this conference must not con-
firm the barriers that still divide Europe.
Rather, by our support of the final recom-
mendations we have expressly undertaken to
lower these barriers. We have said coexist-
ence is not enough. Indeed, the document to
which we have agreed requires constructive
change on a broad front in order that with
the passage of time we can engage in many
truly cooperative and mutually beneficial and
peaceful relationships.
The decisive challenge of the conference,
then, is: Can we follow through?
We have had some discussion here about
the time frame for meeting the challenge. It
seems to me that that decision can be reached
later on. If we are successful — and I believe
July 30, 1973
177
we can succeed — then scheduling will come
easily. If we fail, the schedule will be of little
importance.
Cynics have suggested that the objective
of an international conference is to complete
it. I am sure that does not represent the views
of any nation here. This conference, I be-
lieve, should proceed as expeditiously as pos-
sible, but without undue haste. What we seek
is progress. Progress results from practical
steps. Practical steps are not easy to take,
but they are essential because we do not want
to complete our work merely restating fa-
miliar principles.
As previous speakers have noted, the con-
ference comes at a propitious time. Many na-
tions represented here have dramatically con-
tributed to creating the conditions which
have made this conference possible. Four and
one-half years ago President Nixon pledged
that the policy of the United States would be
to move from confrontation to negotiation in
all areas of the world. He acted promptly to
carry out his policy, and as a result it is gen-
erally acknowledged that today we live in a
much more peaceful world. This new climate
for peace benefits all of mankind. But much
more remains to be done.
The universal hope for a durable peace
can be significantly strengthened by the na-
tions participating in this conference; that
is the hope that permeates this hall. We rep-
resent most of the world's developed nations.
Our economies produce about 75 percent of
the world's wealth, and together we account
for approximately 85 percent of the world's
military expenditures. Our long-range goal
must be an act of common will to bring our
enormous resources to bear on the common
problems we face and on assisting others less
fortunate. Moreover, it is now within our
grasp to contribute to an improved world
climate so that a reduction in the world's
armaments is a definite possibility.
We are all conscious, as so many have said,
that the two World Wars began in Europe.
We have all learned lessons from those con-
flicts. The United States has learned from
our experience that Europe's security is in-
divisible from our own. The presence of my
delegation today symbolizes that fundamen-
tal fact — ^the fact, if you will, of our engage-
ment in Europe.
Americans believe that during the last
generation we have made a constructive and
successful commitment to peace and stability
in Europe. And today, on behalf of the Gov-
ernment of the United States, I want to un-
derscore the firmness of our resolve both to
continue that commitment and to strengthen
our relationship with all of the states repre-
sented here.
Let me turn briefly to some of the specific
issues with which the conference has agreed
to deal.
Nothing is more important than the prin-
ciple that states refrain from the use or
threat of force. It is the keystone in the arch
of a durable peace, and we have accepted it
as a fundamental principle in relations be-
tween states.
This means, of course, that frontiers
should not be violated by force or threats of
force. At the same time, this does not rule
out — and I emphasize, does not rule out —
peaceful changes in frontiers if such changes
are based on popular will and mutual agree-
ment between states. Certainly no one could
validly contend otherwise, for such conten-
tion would violate the twin principles of sov-
ereignty and the right of self-determination.
Another principle which this conference
has already endorsed is the principle of uni-
versal respect for the right of every country
to independence and to its own internal de-
velopment free of outside interference, ir-
respective of its political, economic, or social
system. We have said in effect that a country
must not be denied these rights for any
reason. That is why we Foreign Ministers
have mandated the committee that it must
"express the determination of the participat-
ing States to respect and apply the principles
equally and unreservedly in all aspects to
their mutual relations and co-operation, in
order to ensure to all participating States
the benefits resulting from the application of
these principles by all." There is nothing
equivocal about that decision which we have
made. And in international aff'airs strict ob-
servance of that mandate is of utmost im-
portance.
178
Department of State Bulletin
Another important mandate in the docu-
ment states that we should study ways in
which problems arising between states can
be resolved on a peaceful basis early on to
avoid later conflict. The committee could
achieve meaningful results in this area by
carefully developing plans for early consulta-
tion and possibly mediation to avoid confron-
tation.
The committee is also enjoined to give
specific meaning to the concept of reduction
of tensions in the military sphere as set forth
in paragraph 23 of the final recommenda-
tions. Thus we support :
1. Advance notification of major military
maneuvers ;
2. Exchanges of observers by invitation at
military maneuvers under mutually accept-
able conditions ; and
3. The study of prior notification of major
military movements.
We have given support to these measures
because we believe greater confidence can re-
sult from sharing such military information
so that the margin for surprise can be sub-
stantially reduced.
A fundamental aspect of our commitment
is outlined in section III. I refer of course to
the lowering of barriers to the freer flow of
people, information, and ideas among the
participating states. This aspect of our work
stems from the importance we attach to
human rights and fundamental freedoms.
There are few words which are so filled with
meaning, so venerated by people everywhere.
But section III could turn out to be a sad foot-
note in future history books unless the com-
mittee finds concrete ways to embody the
concepts contained therein so that the every-
day lives of people are favorably aflfected. I
have in mind here, for example, proposals for
arrangements that will permit the reunifica-
tion of families, more regular visits between
the members of divided families, new ways of
sharing experiences in various fields of pro-
fessional and intellectual endeavor, and pro-
moting closer links between our young
people. Our youth should learn more about
one another and about other states and sys-
tems. The future development of our rela-
lations can only profit from their mutual
understanding.
We have agreed here also to facilitate
travel for personal or professional reasons.
In several countries, as in our country, citi-
zens are free to travel anywhere in the world
without any restriction or interference. I
recognize of course that each state has its
own regulations. But the thrust of the man-
date is to encourage — indeed, to exhort —
states to lower barriers to travel and en-
courage human contacts that are so essential
to understanding and mutual respect in to-
day's world.
It will also be important to give specific
content to our agreement to improve the
circulation of and access to information
transmitted by the various media and to im-
prove the conditions under which journalists
may exercise their profession in our coun-
tries. The right of people to know fully what
is happening in the world is a basic human
right and a basic requirement for under-
standing and knowledge.
We have also agreed to reduce the obsta-
cles in the development of trade by examin-
ing specific measures, among other things,
to facilitate business contacts and the ex-
change of information on commercial op-
portunities.
In addition to our work in this conference,
we have recognized that the process of rec-
onciliation must move forward on a broader
front. In this connection it should be noted
that the increasingly united European Com-
munity has a special contribution to make as
it forges an economic and political union
among member states whose past disputes
were a frequent cause of war in Europe. And
by building closer ties with individual East
European nations, members of the Commu-
nity and other West European nations are
lowering the barriers that have too long
divided Europe.
The United States will continue to work
closely with its allies in the Atlantic alliance,
which contributes not only to the security
and independence of its members but is also
seeking new ways to improve relations in
Europe.
With the nations of eastern Europe the
July 30, 1973
179
United States has opened a new era of im-
proved relations. We are dealing with each
country in eastern Europe separately — de-
termining our policy in accordance with the
specific policies and actions of each and look-
ing forward to a wider and more construc-
tive association with all the nations of the
area.
The United States and the Soviet Union
have a major contribution to make to a
secure and cooperative Europe. Just as the
confrontation between our two nations con-
tributed to the division of postwar Europe, so
the recent improvement in our relations is
helping to bring Europe together again.
At the conclusion of their meeting in
Washington last month President Nixon and
General Secretary Brezhnev affirmed that
"ensuring a lasting peace in Europe is a
paramount goal of their policies." ' The
agreement they signed on prevention of nu-
clear war is a landmark in Soviet-American
relations and should have a favorable impact
upon European security as well. And by set-
ting forth basic principles for further limita-
tion of strategic arms and by entering into
several other agreements involving mutual
endeavors, the Soviet Union and the United
States further contributed to the goal, held
by all of us at this conference, of strengthen-
ing stability and security in Europe.
The United States is also gratified by the
progress being made in discussions in various
forums on the limitation of arms and arma-
ments. We are particularly pleased that
many of us here have reached agreement that
negotiations on the mutual reduction of
armed forces and armaments and associated
measures in central Europe will begin on
October 30. These talks will be proceeding in
Vienna at the same time as the second stage
of this conference is going forward in Ge-
neva. The Vienna talks should complement
our efforts in this conference to strengthen
stability and security in Europe.
As the first phase of the conference draws
to a close, it might be well briefly to outline
' For text of a communique issued June 25 upon
General Secretary Brezhnev's departure from the
United States, see Bulletin of July 23, 1973, p.
130.
what we hope can be achieved during the
second phase. The conference should :
1. Elaborate, with precision, upon the
agreed general principles in ways that re-
late directly and specifically to the problems
of states participating in the conference;
2. Reach agreements on specific military
matters including exchange of certain signi-
ficant military information and appropriate
exchange of observers in order to increase
confidence and dispel suspicion ;
3. Develop methods for early and peaceful
settlement of disputes which might have the
potential for confrontation between any of
the participating states ;
4. Advance proposals for reducing bar-
riers to the growth of trade, increasing com-
mercial exchanges, industrial cooperation,
cooperation in the field of science and tech-
nology; and
5. Of paramount importance, work out
specific and meaningful ways to facilitate
human contacts, the freer dissemination of
information, and the broadening of cultural
and educational cooperation.
In the second phase we have to translate
the results of our work into dynamic pro-
grams which would give specific meaning to
the relationships that we seek, and the United
States will submit concrete proposals for this
purpose. Finally, during the process we must
adhere in all of our dealings to the spirit of
reconciliation. For it is this spirit which has
raised all of our hopes for a new era of peace
in Europe and throughout the world.
Our goal should be a continent in which no
nation feels threatened, a continent open to
the free flow of people and ideas, and a con-
tinent enriched rather than divided by po-
litical and cultural diversity. Such a Europe
will not come about merely by wishing for
it or by making declarations about it. Only
time will tell whether we have accomplished
anything or not, but one thing is certain:
We must proceed with great industry and
diligence in the days ahead and must pursue
our goal with patience, understanding, and
determination through the years to come. If
there is a consensus among us in that spirit,
then we may be proud of the few days we
180
Department of State Bulletin
spent together in this friendly city of Hel-
sinki.
TEXT OF CONFERENCE COMMUNIQUE, JULY 7
Press release 238 dated July 9
The first stage of the Conference on Security and
Cooperation in Europe took place in Helsinki from 3
to 7 July 1973. In accordance with the agreement
reached earlier, this stage of the Conference was held
at Foreign Minister level.
The following states are participating in the con-
ference: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Cy-
prus, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Finland, France,
German Democratic Republic, Federal Republic of
Germany, Greece, Holy See, Hungary, Iceland, Ire-
land, Italy, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Malta, Mon-
aco, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Ro-
mania, San Marino, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland,
Turkey, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United
Kingdom, United States of America, Yugoslavia.
At the Inaugural Session of the Conference Dr.
Urho Kekkonen, President of the Republic of Fin-
land, made a speech of welcome. Dr. Kurt Waldheim,
Secretary-General of the United Nations, also ad-
dressed the Conference.
The Ministers adopted the Final Recommendations
of the Helsinki Consultations which comprise the
agenda and instructions of the working bodies of the
Conference together with the rules of procedure and
the other arrangements relating to the conduct of
the Conference. The text of these final recommenda-
tions is available to the public.
The Ministers stated the views of their govem-
ments on essential problems relating to security and
cooperation in Europe, and on the further work of
the Conference.
The Foreign Ministers of several states submitted
proposals on various questions relating to the
agenda. Others announced the intention to submit
proposals during the second stage of the Conference.
The Ministers examined the manner in which the
Conference would acquaint itself with points of view
expressed by non-participating states on the subject
of various agenda items. This matter was in particu-
lar considered in connection with the request of
Malta and Spain in favor of Algeria and Tunisia.
This matter was also considered in relation to other
non-participating states bordering the Mediterra-
nean. No consensus was reached for the time being.
The Ministers decided that the second stage of the
Conference will meet in Geneva on September 18,
1973, in order to pursue the study of the questions on
the agenda and in order to prepare drafts of decla-
rations, recommendations, resolutions or any other
final documents on the basis of the proposals sub-
mitted during the first stage as well as those to be
submitted.
The coordinating committee made up of represen-
tatives of participating states will assemble for its
first meeting in Geneva on August 29, 1973, in order
to prepare the organization of the second stage.
The Ministers expressed the determination of their
governments to contribute to the success of the
further work of the Conference.
The participants in the Conference expressed their
profound gratitude to the Government of Finland for
its hospitality and for the important contribution
made by Finland to the preparation of the Confer-
ence on Security and Cooperation in Europe and to
the conduct of the first stage.
TEXT OF FINAL RECOMMENDATIONS
OF THE HELSINKI CONSULTATIONS
(1) The participants in the Helsinki Consultations
on the question of the Conference on Security and
Cooperation in Europe, representing the Govern-
ments of States listed in the annex, recommend to
their Governments that this Conference should be
convened under the conditions specified below, con-
cerning its organization, agenda and the related in-
structions, participation, date, place, rules of
procedure and financial arrangements.
(2) The participants expressed their collective
agreement to these Recommendations on 8 June, 1973.
(3) Each State entitled to participate in the Con-
ference will infoi-m the Government of Finland,
within the time limits laid down in Chapter 3, of its
decision to take part in this Conference, thereby
indicating its intention to do so on the basis of the
Final Recommendations of the Helsinki Consulta-
tions. The Government of Finland will inform all
States entitled to participate of the communications
received in this respect.
(4) The Government of Finland will take the nec-
essary measures, in accordance with the arrange-
ments provided for in the Final Recommendations,
to organize the first stage of the Conference.
(5) Index of Recommendations
1. Organization of the Conference
2. Agenda and the Related Instructions
3. Participation, Contributions, Guests
4. Date
5. Place
6. Rules of Procedure
7. Financial Arrangements
Annex : Li-st of Participating Countries '
1 . Organization of the Conference on Security
ancJ Cooperation in Europe
(6) The Conference on Security and Co-operation
in Europe will take place in three stages:
(a) Stage I
(7) The first stage will consist of a meeting of the
= Not printed here.
July 30, 1973
181
Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the participating
States. In accordance with the recommendations of
the Helsinki Consultations, the Ministers will adopt
the rules of procedure, the agenda and the instruc-
tions of the working bodies of the Conference, to-
gether with the other arrangements relating to the
conduct of the Conference. The Ministers will state
the views of their Governments on the problems re-
lating to security and co-operation in Europe. Should
they so wish they will put forward, for consideration
in the course of the second stage, proposals relating
to the various topics on the agenda.
(b) Stage II
(8) The second stage will comprise the work of the
specialized committees and sub-committees whose in-
structions are defined in Chapter 2 of these recom-
mendations (points I, II and III of the agenda).
Within this framework and on the basis of the pro-
posals submitted either by the Ministers for Foreign
Affairs, or subsequently by the delegations of the
participating States, the committees and sub-com-
mittees will prepare drafts of declarations, recom-
mendations, resolutions or any other final documents.
The participating States will be represented in these
bodies by such delegates and experts as they shall
designate for the purpose.
(9) A co-ordinating committee, composed of rep-
resentatives appointed by the Ministers for Foreign
Affairs, will meet periodically during the second
stage of the Conference. It will co-ordinate the activ-
ities of the committees and assemble the results of
their work with a view to the final stage of the
Conference. The Co-ordinating Committee shall also
be entrusted with the execution of the tasks defined
in point IV of the agenda, as stated in Chapter 2 of
the present recommendations. It will, furthermore,
submit to the participating Governments such rec-
ommendations as it may consider useful regarding
the conduct of the Conference, especially the organi-
zation of its third stage.
(c) Stage III
(10) In the light of the recommendations drawn
up by the Co-ordinating Committee, the Conference
will meet for its third stage.
(11) The level of representation at the third stage
will be decided by the participating States during
the Conference, before the end of the second stage.
(12) The Conference will adopt its final docu-
ments, in formal session, at the close of this third
stage.
2. Agenda and the Related Instructions
I. Questions Relating to Security in Europe
(13) In carrying out the instructions set out be-
low, the Committee will bear in mind the wider
objective of promoting better relations among par-
ticipating States and ensuring conditions in which
their people can live in peace free from any threat
to or attempt against their security.
(14) In its work the Committee will proceed from
the premise that the strengthening of security in
Europe is not directed against any State or continent
and should constitute an important contribution to
world peace and security.
(15) In considering questions relating to security
in Europe, the Committee will bear in mind the
broader context of world security and in particular
the relationship which exists between security in
Europe and in the Mediterranean area.
(16) The Committee will be assisted in its tasks
by the appropriate Sub-Committees.
1.
(17) (a) The Committee/Sub-Committee is charg-
ed with the task of considering and stating in
conformity with the purposes and principles of the
United Nations those basic principles which each
participating State is to respect and apply in its re-
lations with all other participating States, irrespec-
tive of their political, economic or social systems,
in order to ensure the peace and security of all par-
ticipating States.
(18) The principles to be stated shall be included
in a document of appropriate form to be submitted
by the Committee for adoption by the Conference.
It shall express the determination of the participat-
ing States to respect and apply the principles equally
and unreservedly in all aspects to their mutual rela-
tions and co-operation, in order to ensure to all par-
ticipating States the benefits resulting from the
application of these principles by all.
(19) The reaffirmation, with such clarifications
and additions as may be deemed desirable, and the
precise statement, in conformity with the purposes
and principles of the United Nations, of the follow-
ing principles of primary significance guiding the
mutual relations of the participating States, are
deemed to be of particular importance:
— sovereign equality, respect for the rights inher-
ent in sovereignty;
— refraining from the threat or use of force;
— inviolability of frontiers;
— territorial integrity of States;
— peaceful settlement of disputes;
— non-intervention in internal affairs;
— respect for human rights and fundamental free-
doms, including the freedom of thought, conscience,
religion or belief;
— equal rights and self-determination of peoples;
— co-operation among States;
— fulfilment in good faith of obligations under in-
ternational law.
(20) In discharging itself of these tasks, the Com-
mittee/Sub-Committee shall take into account in par-
ticular the Declaration on Principles of International
Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation
182
Department of State Bulletin
among States in accordance with the Charter of the
United Nations.
(21) (b) The Committee/Sub-Committee shall
give expression to the idea that respect for the above-
listed principles will encourage the development of
normal and friendly relations among the participat-
ing States as well as of their political contacts which
in turn would contribute to the furthering of their
co-operation. It shall also consider proposals de-
signed to give effect to refraining from the threat or
use of force. In this context, it shall study proposals
for and undertake the elaboration of a method for
the peaceful settlement of disputes among partici-
pating States.
2.
(22) The Committee/Sub-Committee shall have
regard to the fact that the participating States are
desirous of eliminating any causes of tension that
may exist among them and of contributing to the
strengthening of peace and security in the world,
bearing in mind the fact that efforts aimed at dis-
armament complement political detente and are
essential elements in a process in which all partici-
pating States have a vital interest.
(23) In order to strengthen confidence and to
increase stability and security, the Committee/Sub-
Committee shall submit to the Conference appropri-
ate proposals on confidence-building measures such
as the prior notification of major military manoeu-
vres on a basis to be specified by the Conference, and
the exchange of observers by invitation at military
manoeuvres under mutually acceptable conditions.
The Committee/Sub-Committee will also study the
question of prior notification of major military move-
ments and submit its conclusions.
(24) The Committee/Sub-Committee shall pay due
attention to the view-s expressed by participating
States on the various subjects mentioned in the pre-
ceding paragraphs, on the particular interest they
attach thereto, especially from the point of view of
their own security and of their desire to be informed
about the relevant developments.
II. Co-operation in the Fields of Economics, of
Science and Technology and of the Environ-
ment
(25) The Committee shall be responsible for
drawing up a draft final document/documents con-
taining guidelines and concrete recommendations
which could stimulate common efforts for increased
co-operation in the fields of economics, science and
technology and environment, which might guide the
participating States in their mutual relations in
these areas and which they might utilize in the
conclusion of bilateral or multilateral agreements,
as well as recommendations on specific measures for
the development of co-operation which could be
agreed by participating States.
(26) The Committee will bear in mind the
contribution which such co-operation could make to
the reinforcement of peace and security in Europe.
It will also bear in mind the interests of developing
countries and regions and the positive effects which
the broadening of co-operation among participating
States could have on world economic relations.
(27) The Committee, having in mind the fore-
going, shall study ways and means that would make
it possible, by mutual agreement among participat-
ing States, to facilitate, with due regard for the
diversity of economic and social systems and under
conditions of reciprocity of advantages and obliga-
tions, the development of trade and co-operation in
the various fields of economic activity, science, tech-
nology and in the field of the environment. In this
regard, it will in particular take account of the
work of the United Nations Economic Commission
for Europe.
(28) In considering questions relating to co-
operation in Europe covered by this mandate, the
Committee will bear in mind the relationship which
exists between such co-operation in Europe and in
the Mediterranean area.
(29) The Committee in its final draft/drafts will
formulate relevant proposals, based on full respect
for the principles guiding relations among the par-
ticipating States enumerated in the terms of refer-
ence for the Committee on item I of the agenda.
(30) The Committee, assisted by the appropriate
Sub-Committees, will examine the following ques-
tions:
1. Commercial Exchanges
(31) The Committee/Sub-Committee will examine
general provisions designed to promote trade and
the exchange of services between participating
States. It could discuss general problems relating
to most favoured nation treatment. It could also
examine measures aiming at the reduction or pro-
gressive elimination of all kinds of obstacles to the
development of trade.
(32) The Committee/Sub-Committee will examine
specific measures designed to facilitate commercial
transactions and the exchange of services, such as
measures aiming at the improvement of
— business contacts and facilities
— the exchange of information on commercial op-
portunities and specific trading conditions
— provisions for the settlement of commercial dis-
putes including various forms of arbitration.
2. Industrial Co-operation
and Projects of Common Interest
(33) The Committee/Sub-Committee will study
the forms and modalities of industrial co-operation
and will examine the various measures by which
participating States could encourage the develop-
ment of this co-operation using, as appropriate, the
framework of bilateral or multilateral intergovern-
mental agreements.
(34) The Committee/Sub-Committee will ex-
July 30, 1973
183
amine, in particular, the measures which govern-
ments could take to create conditions favourable to
this co-operation between competent organizations,
firms and enterprises of participating States. It will
bear in mind that the specific forms of such
co-operation should be settled bilaterally unless
otherwise agreed upon by the participants. This
examination could bear on the various forms of
co-operation, such as co-operation in production and
sales, on the exchange of information concerning
the possibilities of industrial co-operation, on the
improvement of conditions for setting up projects,
and on other measures which could develop and
facilitate various forms of industrial co-operation.
(35) The Committee/Sub-Committee will also ex-
amine the possibilities of encouraging projects of
common interest and of working out, where rele-
vant, recommendations in this respect.
(36) This examination could bear on the possi-
bilities of implementing projects of common interest
in the fields of energy resources, exploitation of
raw materials and, when appropriate, of transport
and communications.
3. Science and Technology
(37) The Committee/Sub-Committee shall con-
sider proposals for the development of co-operation
in the field of science and technology, taking into
account already existing or planned co-operation in
this field, with a view to facilitating, through such
means as the improvement of contacts and infor-
mation, access to new developments in science and
technology, and to contributing to the most effec-
tive solution of problems of common interest and
to the betterment of the conditions of human life.
(38) These proposals, in particular, shall be
concerned with the areas where there are the most
favourable prerequisites for such co-operation, the
forms and methods for its implementation, as well
as with the obstacles that hinder such co-operation
and measures for their removal. In the consideration
of these questions, the Committee/Sub-Committee
will seek to build on existing practices and take into
account the possibilities and capabilities of relevant
existing international organizations.
4. Environment
(39) The Committee/Sub-Committee shall be re-
sponsible for discussing questions of environmental
protection and improvement and in particular for
determining the fields that are important for the
participating States and can best lend themselves
to the development of co-operation between them,
such as: protection of the seas surrounding Europe,
of the waters and of the atmosphere; improvement
of environmental and living conditions, especially
in towns; protection of nature and of its resources.
(40) The Committee/ Sub-Committee shall ex-
amine and put forward the most appropriate bi-
lateral and multilateral forms and methods of
co-operation, including co-operation on a regional
and subregional basis, for the various fields that
have been determined. In the consideration of these
questions, the Committee/Sub-Committee will seek
to build on existing practices and take into account
the possibilities and capabilities of the relevant
existing international organizations.
5. Co-operation in Other Areas
(41) The Committee/Sub-Committee could ex-
amine the following questions:
— problems relating to the development of trans-
port and communications between participating
States;
— promotion of tourism by the exchange of infor-
mation, techniques and the results of practical ex-
perience and by the study of appropriate measures;
— economic and social aspects of migrant labour;
— training of personnel in various fields of eco-
nomic activity;
— such other questions as may be decided by
common agreement.
III. Co-operation in Humanitarian and Other
Fields
(42) With the aim of contributing to the
strengthening of peace and understanding among
the peoples of the participating States and to the
spiritual enrichment of the human personality, with-
out distinction as to race, sex, language or religion
and irrespective of their political, economic and social
systems, the Committee, assisted by the appropriate
Sub-Committees, shall be charged with examining
all possibilities of co-operation conducive to creating
better conditions for increased cultural and educa-
tional exchanges, for broader dissemination of in-
formation, for contacts between people, and for the
solution of humanitarian problems. In this connec-
tion, it shall not only draw upon existing forms of
co-operation, but shall also work out new ways and
means appropriate to these aims.
(43) The Committee in its final document will
formulate relevant proposals, based on full respect
for the principles guiding relations among the par-
ticipating States enumerated in the terms of refer-
ence for the Committee on item I of the agenda.
(44) The Committee shall also consider to what
extent existing institutions could be used to achieve
these aims.
1. Human Contacts
(45) The Committee/ Sub-Committee shall pre-
pare proposals to facilitate freer movement and
contacts, individually or collectively, privately or
officially, among persons, institutions and organi-
sations of the participating States.
(46) With a view to contributing to the favour-
able examination and settlement of relevant matters
by the States concerned under mutually acceptable
conditions, it shall pay particular attention to:
(a) contacts and regular meetings on a basis of
184
Department of State Bulletin
family ties; reunification of families; marriage be-
[ tween nationals of different States;
(b) travel for personal or professional reasons;
improvement of conditions for tourism, on an in-
dividual or collective basis;
(c) meetings among young people; expansion of
contacts and competitions, particularly in the field
of sport.
2. Information
(47) The Committee/Sub-Committee shall pre-
pare proposals to facilitate the freer and wider
dissemination of information of all kinds. In doing
so it shall pay particular attention to:
(a) improving the circulation of, and access to,
oral, printed, filmed and broadcast information and
extending the exchange of information;
(b) encouraging co-operation in these fields of
information on a basis of short or long term agree-
ments ;
(c) improving conditions under which journalists
from one participating State exercise their profes-
sion in another participating State.
3. Co-operation and exchanges in the field of culture
(48) The Committee/Sub-Committee shall pre-
pare proposals aimed at extending and improving
co-operation and exchanges in the various fields of
culture and shall indicate the components and ob-
jectives of a consistent long-term development of
such exchanges. In its work, it shall bear in mind
the results of the Intergovernmental Conference
on Cultural Policies in Europe, Helsinki, June 1972
including the broader concept of culture outlined by
that Conference.
(49) The Committee/Sub-Committee shall con-
sider in particular:
(a) Extension of relations among competent gov-
ernment agencies and non-governmental bodies deal-
ing with matters of culture;
(b) Promotion of fuller mutual knowledge of
and access to achievements in literature, art and
other fields of cultural activity;
(c) Improvement of facilities for contacts and
exchanges in the above-mentioned spheres;
(d) Extension of contacts and co-operation among
creative artists and people engaged in cultural
activities;
(e) Common search for new fields and forms of
co-operation; co-operation in the investigation of
the social aspects of culture;
(f) Encouragement of such forms of cultural
co-operation as: international events in the fields
of art, film, theatre, music, folklore, etc.; book
fairs and exhibitions; joint projects in the field of
protection of monuments and sites; co-production
and exchange of films and of radio and television
programmes.
(50) The Committee/Sub-Committee while con-
sidering the role of States in co-operation in the
field of culture will bear in mind the contribution
that national minorities or regional cultures could
make to it within the framework of respect for
principles referred to above.
4. Co-operation and exchanges
in the field of education
(51) The Committee/Sub-Committee shall prepare
proposals aimed at broadening co-operation and ex-
changes in the fields of education and science on a
short or long-term basis. These proposals shall be
carried out bilaterally and multilaterally as appro-
priate, between participating States and non-govern-
mental bodies. The Committee/Sub-Committee shall
consider in particular:
(a) Expansion of links between State institutions
and non-governmental bodies whose activities are
concerned with questions of education and science.
(b) Improved access, under mutually acceptable
conditions, for students, teachers and scholars from
the participating States to each other's educational,
cultural and scientific institutions, and a more exact
assessment of the problems of comparison and equiv-
alence between academic degrees and diplomas.
(c) Encouragement of the study of the languages
and civilizations of other peoples for the purpose of
creating favourable conditions for promoting wider
acquaintance with the culture of each country.
(d) Exchange of experience in teaching methods
in various fields including those used in adult educa-
tion and exchanges in the field of teaching materials.
(52) The Committee/Sub-Committee while consid-
ering the role of States in co-operation in the field
of education will bear in mind the contribution that
national minorities or regional cultures could make
to it within the framework of respect for principles
referred to above.
IV. Follow-up to the Conference
(5.3) The Co-ordinating Committee shall consider,
on the basis of the progress made at the Conference
such measures as may be required to give effect to
the decisions of the Conference and to further the
process of improving security and developing co-
operation in Europe. Having considered proposals
to this effect, including proposals of an organiza-
tional nature, it shall make any recommendations
which it deems necessary. In examining the follow-up
of the Conference, the Committee shall also consider
the contributions which it believes could be asked
from existing international organizations.
3. Participation, Contributions, Guests
(a) Participation
(54) All European States, the United States and
Canada shall be entitled to take part in the Confer-
ence on Security and Co-operation in Europe. If any
of these States wishes to attend as an observer it
July 30, 1973
185
may do so. In that case, its representatives may at-
tend all stages of the Conference and of its working
bodies, hut shall not participate in the taking of
decisions. Such a State may decide later to accept
these decisions or some of them under the conditions
defined by the Conference.
(55) States referred to in the first sentence of the
paragraph above wishing to participate in the Con-
ference or to attend as observers must so inform the
Finnish Government at the latest on 25 June 1973.
(b) Contributions
(56) The Conference and its working bodies will
acquaint themselves, in such manner as they may
determine, with the points of view held by non-
participating States on the subject of the various
agenda items.
(57) States situated in regions adjacent to Europe
and to whom reference is made in the provisions of
Chapter 2, and in particular those of the Mediter-
ranean States which have already expressed their
interest in stating their views to the Conference, are
especially envisaged by this Chapter.
(58) The Co-ordinating Committee may decide, by
consensus, the means by which the working bodies of
the Conference may consult appropriate interna-
tional organizations, on the subject of the various
agenda items.
(c) Guests
(59) The Secretary-General of the United Nations
will be invited as guest of honour to the inaugural
session of the Conference.
4. Date
(60) 1. The Conference on Security and Co-oper-
ation in Europe shall be opened on 3 July 1973 at
11:30 a.m.
(61) 2. The date of the opening of the second
stage shall be determined by the Ministers during the
first stage.
(62) 3. The date of the opening of the third
stage shall be decided during the second stage by
agreement among the participating States on the
basis of the recommendations of the Co-ordinating
Committee.
5. Place of the Conference
(63) Taking into account with appreciation the
invitation by the Government of Finland, having in
view practical considerations and rotation, the first
stage of the Conference on Security and Co-operation
in Europe will be held in Helsinki; the second stage
will be held in Geneva; the third stage will be held in
Helsinki.
6. Rules of ProcecJure
(64) The States participating in the Conference
on Security and Co-operation in Europe shall con-
duct their work as follows:
(65) 1. All States participating in the Confer-
ence shall do so as sovereign and independent States
and in conditions of full equality. The Conference
shall take place outside military alliances.
(66) 2. The representation of the participating
States at each stage of the Conference shall be de-
termined in accordance with the provisions laid down
in Chapter 1 of these Final Recommendations.
(67) 3. The working bodies of the Conference
shall be the Co-ordinating Committee, the Commit-
tees and the Sub-Committees. These working bodies
will function during the second stage of the Confer-
ence. However, the Co-ordinating Committee will
meet at the site of the second stage before the open-
ing of the second stage in order to settle questions
relating to the organization of that stage.
(68) The working bodies of the Conference may,
if they so wish, set up such working groups as they
may consider useful. The working bodies and work-
ing groups of the Conference shall be open to all
participating States.
(69) 4. Decisions of the Conference shall be
taken by consensus. Consensus shall be understood
to mean the absence of any objection expressed by a
Representative and submitted by him as constituting
an obstacle to the taking of the decision in question.
5. Chairmanship
(70) A. The Chair at the inaugural and closing
meetings of the first stage of the Conference shall
be taken by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the
host country. The Chair at other meetings shall be
taken on a basis of rotation, as follows:
(a) The Chair at each meeting shall be taken
by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of a different
participating State, in an order established in ac-
cordance with a list selected by lot country by
country before the end of the Helsinki Consulta-
tions;
(b) If the Conference should meet both in the
morning and in the afternoon of the same day, the
two meetings shall be regarded as constituting two
distinct meetings;
(c) In the interval between meetings of the Con-
ference, the functions of the Chair shall be exercised
by that Minister for Foreign Affairs who presided
over the immediately preceding meeting of the
Conference;
(d) Should a Minister for Foreign Affairs be
prevented from taking the Chair, it shall be taken
by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the country
next in the order established.
(71) B. The Chair at the inaugural meeting of
the working bodies of the Conference shall be taken
by the Representative of the host country. There-
after, the office of Chairman shall be filled as
follows:
186
Department of State Bulletin
(a) The Chairman of the Co-ordinating Commit-
tee and the Chairmen of the Committees shall be
designated on a basis of daily rotation, in French
alphabetical order, starting from a letter drawn by
lot;
(b) The Chairmen of Sub-Committees and of
other subsidiary bodies of the Conference shall be
designated on a basis of rotation in accordance with
practical arrangements to be established at the
^appropriate time by the bodies in question.
(72) Where necessary, a rapporteur shall be
designated by consensus.
(73) C. The provisions laid down for the meet-
ings of the first stage shall be applicable inutatis
mutandis to the meetings of the third stage of the
Conference. They may be further defined by the
Co-ordinating Committee.
(74) 6. The Executive Secretary for technical
matters at each stage of the Conference shall be
a national of the corresponding host country. He is
designated by the host country subject to agreement
by the participating States.
(75) In organizing the services, the Executive
Secretary of each stage will be responsible for the
recruitment of his staff and assured of the collabo-
ration of the Secretariats of the other stages.
(76) The Executive Secretaries will work under
the authority of the Conference and report on their
activities to the appropriate body of each stage of
: the Conference, especially on financial matters.
(77) 7. Official verbatim records shall be taken
at the meetings of the first and third stages of the
Conference.
(78) Proposals on matters of substance and
amendments thereto shall be submitted in writing
to the Chairman and circulated to all participants.
The proposals adopted shall be registered by the
Executive Secretary and circulated among the par-
ticipants.
(79) Representatives of States participating in
the Conference may ask for their formal reserva-
tions or interpretative statements concerning given
decisions to be duly registered by the Executive
Secretary and circulated to the participating States.
Such statements must be submitted in writing to the
Executive Secretary.
(80) 8. The inaugural and closing sessions of
the first stage of the Conference will be open. Other
sessions of the first stage may be open if the Min-
isters so decide. The Co-ordinating Committee, the
Committee and the Sub-Committee shall not, as a
rule, meet in open sessions, unless the participants
decide otherwise. Arrangements for the third stage
will be similar to those for the first stage and may
be further defined by the Co-ordinating Committee.
(81) 9. The working languages of the Confer-
ence and of its working bodies shall be: English,
French, German, Italian, Russian and Spanish.
(82) Speeches made in any of the working Ian-
July 30, 1973
guages shall be interpreted into the other working
languages.
(83) 10. Any Representative may make a state-
ment in a language other than the working lan-
guages. In this case, he shall himself provide for
interpretation into one of the working languages.
(84) 11. Records and decisions of the Conference
shall be issued and circulated to participants in the
working languages.
(85) The participants shall decide by consensus
whether it is desirable to make public, through the
appropriate services of the Conference, certain
documents or communiques on the work of the Con-
ference and, if they decide in the affirmative shall
specify the contents.
(86) 12. During the discussion of any matter, a
Representative may raise a point of order and the
Chairman shall give him the floor immediately. A
Representative raising a point of order may not
speak on the substance of the matter under
discussion.
(87) 13. During the meeting the Chairman shall
keep a list of speakers and may declare it closed
with the consent of the meeting. He shall, however,
accord the right of reply to any Representative if
a speech after he has declared the list closed makes
this desirable.
(88) 14. These procedural arrangements shall
be adopted by consensus. Once adopted, they can
only be altered by consensus.
7. Financial Arrangements
A. Distribution of Expenses
(89) The following scale of distribution has been
agreed for the expenses of the Conference, subject
to the reservation that the distribution in question
concerns the Conference only and shall not be
considered as a precedent which could be relied
on in other circumstances:
(90)
France 8.80 per cent
Federal Republic
of Germany 8.80
Italy 8.80
Union of
Soviet Socialist
Republics 8.80
United Kingdom 8.80
United States of
America 8.80 52.80 per cent
Canada 5.52 5.52
Belgium 3.48
German Democratic
Republic 3.48
Netherlands 3.48
Poland 3.48
Spain 3.48
Sweden 3.48 20.88
187
Austria 2.00
Czechoslovakia 2.00
Denmark 2.00
Finland 2.00
Hungary 2.00
Norway 2.00
Switzerland 2.00
Greece 0.80
Romania 0.80
Turkey 0.80
Yugoslavia 0.80
Bulgaria 0.60
Ireland 0.60
Luxembourg 0.60
Portugal 0.60
Cyprus 0.20
Holy See 0.20
Iceland 0.20
Liechtenstein 0.20
Malta 0.20
San Marino 0.20
14.00
3.20
2.40
1.20
100 per cent 100 per cent
(91) Necessary alterations of the cost sharing
scale due to any possible modification in the list of
participating States above will be decided upon by
consensus.
B. System, of Financing
(92) 1. The monies needed to finance the Con-
ference will be advanced by the host country of
each stage subject to reimbursement out of the con-
tributions of the participating States according to
the agreed cost sharing scale.
(93) 2, Payment of contributions by participat-
ing States shall be made to a special account of the
Conference.
(94) 3. Payment shall be made in the currency
of the host country.
(95) 4. Accounts will be rendered in respect of
each stage or at intervals of three (3) months, as
appropriate.
(96) 5. Accounts shall be expressed in the cur-
rency of the host country and shall be rendered as
soon as technically possible after the termination of
a billing period. They shall be payable [within]
sixty (60) days of presentation.
Senate Confirms Gerald F, Tape
OS U.S. Representative to IAEA
The Senate on June 6 confirmed the nomi-
nation of Gerald F. Tape to be the Repre-
sentative of the United States to the
International Atomic Energy Agency, with
the rank of Ambassador.
Secretary Signs Consular Convention
With Czechoslovakia
Secretary Rogers visited Czechoslovakia
July 8-9. Following is a statement made by
Secretary Rogers upon his arrival in Pmgue.
Press release 240 dated July 9
It is a pleasure to be in Prague for this
official visit to Czechoslovakia. It is, I be-
lieve, the first such visit by an American
Secretary of State since the founding of this
nation. The United States is proud of the
part it played in the foundation of Czecho-
slovakia in 1918 and proud, too, of our par-
ticipation in your liberation in 1945.
As you are well aware, the United States
has made a major efl'ort under President
Nixon's leadership to improve its relation-
ships with all countries, including those of
eastern Europe, on the basis of reciprocity
and mutual respect. I am prepared tonight
to say that we wish to improve our relation-
ship with Czechoslovakia in that spirit. Thus
I hope that this visit, and the Consular Con-
vention we will be signing tomorrow, will
help to open a new chapter in our relations.
Mr. Minister [Bohuslav Chnoupek, Minis-
ter of Foreign Affairs], you and I have just
returned from a conference in Helsinki in
which we and 33 other states committed
ourselves to an important set of principles
governing future relations. That conference
made a fundamental and unanimous decision
to lower the barriers that have too long
divided our peoples. The meetings we will
have tomorrow therefore are particularly
timely.
First, the Consular Convention should open
the way to a considerably greater flow of
people between our two countries.
Second, our discussions of outstanding
economic and commercial problems could
pave the way to better relations in the field
of trade and commerce.
Third, our discussions could lead to better
understanding on both sides of our respec-
tive views and could result in negotiations
leading to an exchange agreement.
Finally, while of course we will continue to
188
Department of State Bulletin
have fundamental diflferences of ideology and
viewpoints, it is my hope that we can make
progress on a number of problems and thus
begin to improve relations between Czecho-
slovakia and the United States.
U.S. Opens Consulate General
in Leningrad
Press release 236 dated July 6
DEPARTMENT ANNOUNCEMENT
At a ceremony in Leningrad July 6,
Assistant Secretary of State for European
Affairs Walter J. Stoessel, Jr., presided over
the raising of the American flag at the office
building which will house the U.S. consulate
general in that city. In addition to repre-
sentatives of the city of Leningrad and the
Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Adolph
Dubs, U.S. Charge d' Affaires ad interim in
the U.S.S.R., and Culver Gleysteen, U.S.
consul general in Leningrad, were present.
The building, which is the second U.S.
Foreign Service post in the Soviet Union,
will house the consulate general's offices and
the American Print, Film, and Music Li-
brary in addition to providing apartments
for a large part of the American staff.
REMARKS BY ASSISTANT SECRETARY STOESSEL
Mr. Mayor, Mr. Popov [Georgiy I. Popov,
Diplomatic Representative, Leningrad Dip-
lomatic Agency, Ministry of Foreign Af-
fairs] , distinguished guests: We are gathered
here today to open the American consulate
general in Leningrad. The Soviet consulate
general in San Francisco was opened two
weeks ago. These two events are symbolic
of a long and often difficult effort to improve
U.S.-Soviet relations. The first effort to open
a consulate was almost 40 years ago. Another
effort was made in 1948. It is perhaps inter-
esting to note that at that time I was to be
assigned to Leningrad as a vice consul, but
the office never opened. This makes it even
more of a personal pleasure for me to be
here today.
The current project for a consular office
here was initiated by Mr. Nixon when he
was Vice President. When Mr. Nixon became
President, he was determined to improve
relations between the United States and the
Soviet Union, and I am sure it is a source
of great satisfaction to him that after so
many years we are now opening the Ameri-
can consulate general in Leningrad.
As you know, the Conference on European
Security and Cooperation is now taking
place in Helsinki. I can say from my personal
experience there that it is working very
well and the atmosphere is good. We are
drawing away from confrontation and have
moved toward negotiation. It is pai-ticularly
fitting that the opening of this office in Len-
ingrad is taking place at this time. Cxeneral
Secretary Brezhnev has just completed his
visit to the United States, one year after
President Nixon's visit to the U.S.S.R. These
two visits have made an enormous contri-
bution toward improving bilateral relations
between our two countries and to prospects
for peace everywhere. We believe that in
their day-to-day operations the new con-
sulates general in Leningrad and San Fran-
cisco will play a significant role in under-
standing and contacts between our two
countries.
I wish on this occasion to say a special
word about Leningrad. This is a city with
a great history which is world famous for
its culture, its beauty, and its industrial
achievements. It is a hero city which has a
deep meaning for all who remember the
past and who are dedicated to preserving
peace now and in the future. You who repre-
sent Leningrad have reason to be proud of
your city, and the United States is proud
to be present here.
Mr. Mayor, Mr. Popov, and other distin-
guished guests, let me raise a toast to your
health, to the city of Leningrad, to the suc-
cess of our consul general and his colleagues
in their important tasks, and to the constant
improvement of relations between the Soviet
Union and the United States.
July 30, 1973
189
Department Discusses Recent Negotiations
in the International Oil Industry
Statement by William J. Casey
Under Secretary for Economic Affairs^
I thank you for the opportunity to testify
today and to discuss recent negotiations con-
cerning the international oil industry. I know
this committee is already familiar with the
basic nature of our oil relationships with the
producers and with other consuming nations.
Nonetheless, before specifically addressing
the negotiations of the past year, I would
like to make a few general comments about
the international oil market with which we
find ourselves so intimately involved as a re-
sult of our own growing oil imports. This
will explain a great deal about the OPEC
[Organization of Petroleum Exporting Coun-
tries] and other negotiating situations.
The first feature of the international oil
market is its size: The quantities involved
are huge, and the rate at which they are
increasing is dramatic. The world at present
consumes approximately 50 million barrels
of oil per day and, at present rates of growth,
will double that figure early in the 1980's.
Unless this rate of growth can be moderated
through conservation or development of
large-scale alternatives, new oil production
in quantities equivalent to the production of
Kuwait, or the North Sea, must be developed
each year simply to keep up with demand.
This is not an impossible task, but it is one
which will require huge amounts of capital.
' Made before the Subcommittees on Foreign Eco-
nomic Policy and on the Near East and South .Asia
of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs on July
11 (press release 244). The complete transcript of
the hearings will be published by the committee and
will be available from the Superintendent of Docu-
ments, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washing-
ton, D.C. 20402.
effort, and good will if it is to be achieved
in a stable and secure manner. We unfor-
tunately cannot assume that conditions will
be uniformly favorable, and it seems entirely
possible that serious problems may develop
in bringing forth the desired quantities of
production.
The second major feature of the interna-
tional oil picture is the increasing concentra-
tion of key supplies under the effective con-
trol of a small number of governments,
which as a result have a tremendous poten-
tial to influence the terms of trade in their
favor jointly or individually. Over the past
few years they have, moreover, shown a con-
siderable degree of solidarity in pursuing
their joint goals of achieving ever-increasing
revenues from their oil production as well as
control over the production of the oil itself.
The growth in their revenues has been sub-
stantial in the past few years and will con-
tinue to increase with expected increases in
oil production and price. Their increasing
affluence will give these governments new
strength and new responsibilities as well in
terms of the management of their fiscal re-
serves and investment funds. For a small
number of them — principally the Arab states
of the gulf — increased affluence may bring
serious problems in addition to its benefits.
They are concerned that they may not find
sufficiently attractive investment outlets for
their growing revenues and that their grow-
ing wealth could become a source of instabil-
ity. They will want to structure expenditure
and investment programs which will make
possible the most balanced and mutually bene-
190
Department of State Bulletin
ficial development of oil production and
capital utilization. We and other consuming
governments should help them in this to the
extent we can.
The third feature of the international oil
picture is the reverse of the second. Con-
trasted to relative cohesion of the OPEC
governments, the oil companies and govern-
ments of the consuming nations tend to act
independently and sometimes even at cross-
purposes. Faced v/ith an increasing possibil-
ity that oil will continue to be in short supply
in the future, individual companies as well
as governments have understandably acted
to protect their own interests by seeking
special access to sources of supply. The end
result of this policy can add to the general
insecurity, bid up prices further, and
strengthen the negotiating hand of the OPEC
governments. As a result, it seems desirable
to us that consumer governments consult to
develop more coordinated energy policies
which do not. We have taken a number of
specific steps toward this goal, which I will
return to later.
Major Transition in the Oil Industry
Against this background, it is not unex-
pected that the negotiators from OPEC gov-
ernments have been able over the past several
years to gain many of the major objectives
for which they have reached. They have
achieved not only a major improvement in the
terms on w^hich they export their oil but also
the acceleration of a major transition in the
oil industry itself. The producer governments
have been assuming a greater role in the
international oil industry for some time
through joint ventures, service contracts, or
other new forms of association with oil com-
panies. Up until the recent negotiations, how-
ever, these have largely been on the fringes ;
the major oil concessions were still tradi-
tional in form and under the effective con-
trol of the concessionary companies. That
has now changed, and entirely new relation-
ships between producer governments, oil com-
panies, and consumer nations are developing.
The central fact of the new arrangements
is the increasing degree of control which will
be exercised by the OPEC governments over
oil production. By the early 1980's they will
control directly over half of the oil sold in
world trade. This transition need not neces-
sarily be harmful to our interest, however, if
the loss of influence over production and in-
vestment decisions formerly enjoyed by our
oil companies can be compensated for by
development of common interests in filling
the needs of the oil consumers.
The companies have not embarked on
their course toward new arrangements wath
the producer governments entirely voluntar-
ily. The negotiations of the past months have
been difficult and at times strained, and there
has inevitably been occasional bad feeling
on both sides. The companies, who have
formed a common front for the purpose of
these negotiations, have been able as a result
to coordinate their negotiating strategies,
and this has had some effect in reducing the
danger that OPEC negotiators could play
them off one against the other. In the final
analysis, however, they have found it diffi-
cult to negotiate with sovereign governments
which have the ability to invoke legislation
if their negotiating goals are not reached.
We have kept closely in touch with these
negotiations, both through our diplomatic
contacts with the OPEC governments and
through our companies; other oil company
parent governments have done likewise and
have kept closely in touch with us. We have
also made every eflfort to share information
with other consumer governments, some of
which are concerned at the fact that decisions
affecting their vital oil supplies are being
made in negotiations at which the only par-
ties are OPEC governments and largely
American-British oil companies.
Implications of Recent Settlements
Without going into the specific terms of the
agreements reached, most of which have been
published in the newspapers, I w^ould like to
make general comments on the implications
which we see in the settlements recently
reached.
First is the participation settlement with
Saudi Arabia, which is important not only
July 30, 1973
191
because of the tremendous importance of
Saudi oil reserves and production potential,
but also because it has set a pattern for other
countries and because it appears to present
an opportunity for a gradual, stable, and mu-
tually beneficial transition period to new ar-
rangements in the international oil industry.
By providing for a phased increase in the
government's control over oil production and
marketing, it will allow the companies to
continue to plan an important and stabilizing
role as major suppliers of market require-
ments, while at the same time allowing the
OPEC governments to build up their own
market outlets at a pace which will maintain
their interest in permitting production in-
creases. Through the government's share of
participation oil, previously oil-short govern-
mental or private companies (including many
American ones) should also be able to se-
cure access to needed supplies. This should
in the long run have a reassuring effect on
the market, although in the recent past these
new customers have only driven up the price
of oil in their anxiety to secure supplies.
Another benefit from participation is the fact
that the producer government will have to
put up its equity share for capital expansion
programs ; this will both ease the capital re-
quirements in the consuming countries and
put to constructive use some of the large
revenues of the producer governments. It is
also probable that, under participation, the
producer governments will find it advanta-
geous to develop their own markets through
investment in downstream facilities. We
should welcome such a development, which
would give the producers a real interest in
maintaining stable oil supplies as well as
])rovide another productive outlet for pro-
ducer government revenues.
The participation agreements negotiated
with Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Abu Dhabi
are in the process of being implemented,
while that with Kuwait remains to be ratified
and may involve some modifications of the
previous agreements. A variant form of par-
ticipation, giving the government a higher
initial equity in the company but a compara-
ble financial settlement, has been negotiated
with Nigeria We believe that the basic pat-
tern these agreements have established for]
transition to a period of much greater oil
producer government control links the in-
terest of the producing state with the in-
terest of the companies and the oil consum-
ers, who wish to see a steady expansion of
the necessaiy oil flow. At the same time it
provides a real role for producer govern-
ments in the management of their major
resource and offers new opportunities for
constructive use of their gi-owing revenues.
Settlements remain to be negotiated in Libya
and the Basra concession in Iraq. While these
negotiations may be long and diflficult, we
hope that they will result in settlements
which will not undercut the basic principles
of the gulf participation agreements.
Settlement of the long dispute between the
Government of Iraq and the oil companies
was reached last spring at the end of another
major negotiation. Because the 11-year-old
dispute between the companies and the Iraqis
had resulted in a low rate of development of
Iraq's very considerable oil-producing po-
tential, the settlement will finally make pos-
sible increased Iraqi oil production during
the coming decades. The final agreement set-
tled both last June's nationalization of the
Iraq Petroleum Company's Kirkuk fields and
the original 1961 dispute as well. The com-
panies are presently receiving compensation
which, although not as great as they had
hoped for, is many times the depreciated
book value figure which the Iraqis had origi-
nally oflfered. The principle set in the partici-
pation settlements that compensation must
bear some relationship to the actual value of
the property was thus also upheld in the Iraq
negotiations.
In Iran, negotiations are underway to work
out final arrangements for a new working
relationship between the oil consortium and
the government. The Iranians, who national-
ized their oil industry in 1951, have as a
result not found the concept of participation
to be attractive, as it would consist essen-
tially of buying an enterprise which was al-
ready theirs. They have therefore asked the
consortium to transform its relationship to
that of long-term contract purchaser, which
192
Department of State Bulletin
is in fact the legal form of the arrangements
which have existed since 1954. The companies
have agreed to assume the role of purchase
contractors. As contractors, the consortium
companies will continue to enjoy exclusive
access to the bulk of Iran's oil production
with the exception of certain quantities (ap-
proximately 20 percent of production in
1980) reserved for the government to market
on its own. The companies will retain some
management role and initiative as service
contractors to run the oil fields and facilities.
This arrangement will, like participation,
provide common incentives to both company
and government to make available a stable
and expanding supply of oil to help meet
world needs. As in the participation agree-
ments this will be done at some loss to the
companies' present degree of control over
production and investment decisions.
As we look to the future, a major ques-
tion is the degree to which this assumption
of control over production by the producer
governments will affect the stability and nec-
essary expansion of supplies. We believe that
the participation agreements and the agree-
ment with Iran provide some degree of as-
surance that the necessary stability can be
maintained. They link the interest of the
producer government with the enterprise,
and with the supply of its markets, while at
the same time giving additional incentive
to those governments to supply other mar-
kets. They retain a significant role for the
oil companies in providing the production,
development, transport, and marketing ca-
pabilities necessary to bring to market the
huge quantities of oil which the world will
need in the future. They provide, most im-
portantly, a framework within which a stable
and gradual transition can be accomplished
and avoid the sterility of confrontation and
nationalization which would seriously dam-
age the steady development of new produc-
tion capacity. The agreements cannot m
themselves, of course, guarantee the stability
of the new arrangements or the flow of oil.
These will depend on the good faith of the
parties as well as other developments in the
world, including perhaps political ones.
The evolution of new relationships between
producer governments and oil companies is
only one part of the rapidly changing world
petroleum situation. Major oil-consuming.
governments have also felt the need to review
their policies in an effort to find answers to
their growing energy problems. On April 18
President Nixon sent to the Congress the
administration's assessment of our domestic
requirements and resources and proposed a
series of domestic measures to meet our
needs for clean and reliable energy sources
in the decades ahead. This concentration on
domestic policies was based on the realiza-
tion that our primary response to the energy
challenge must lie in the pursuit of national
policies and measures to develop more fully
and most rapidly the existing energy re-
sources within the United States and its off-
shore areas, as well as new energy technol-
ogies, while utilizing energy resources in a
more frugal and efficient manner.
Cooperation To Manage Energy Problem
At the same time, the President directed a
comprehensive effort to develop cooperation
with other nations in sharing the impact ot
energy shortages in the short run and m
working to develop new sources of energy.
He also directed us to develop cooperative
relations with the oil-exporting countries. In
early June, I met in Paris with representa-
tives of other governments which belong to
the Organization for Economic Cooperation
and Development-OECD. At that meeting
we began a new phase in the continuing dia-
logue with other members of the OECD on
how to effectively cooperate to manage the
now well-publicized world energy problem.
Among other things, the United States
proposed, and the OECD Oil Committee ac-
cepted, a suggestion that an informal work-
ing group be established to develop and
evaluate various issues and options of an
OECD-wide agreement to share oil in times
of emergency. We also proposed expanded
international cooperation in research and de-
velopment to increase energy supplies and
to diversify resources. We believe particular
attention should be paid to international co-
operation at the industrial level, especially in
the development of those technologies that
July 30, 1973
193
might provide nearer term solutions to
energy needs. We are hopeful that these ini-
tiatives will result in improved communica-
tion and actions of mutual benefit to all con-
sumers of energy.
The more difficult and pressing question of
worldwide competition for shrinking supplies
of oil does not lend itself to the same confi-
dence that cooperative action by consumers
can result in successful solution to the prob-
lem. Within recent months there has been a
substantial increase in prices paid for oil in
world markets by buyers to whom avail-
ability of crude oil is today more important
than its price. It is clear that we must design
measures of international cooperation to in-
clude producing as well as consuming na-
tions which will bring about and sustain the
willingness of the oil-producing countries to
produce the oil the consumers will require
over the next several decades.
This will not be easy to achieve. It is the
administration's view, and one we have
urged, that the industrialized nations stand
ready to assist the producing nations in their
desire to marry their vital oil with the equally
valuable technology, engineering, manage-
ment, and markets of consuming countries in
order to reap lasting benefits for their peo-
ples during this one brief generation when
they will be in a highly favored market po-
sition. We know their common desires for
the location of high-energy-using export in-
dustries in their countries. We must help
here, not only in providing the plants, but
also in marketing the product of those plants.
It is critical, however, that in our eflTorts we
not let our requirements to sell plant, equip-
ment, and services cloud the judgments and
advice we offer these developing nations. It is
also important that we do not undermine the
role of the international oil companies, which
have found so much oil and still have the best
capability to find more oil and bring it effi-
ciently from the ground to consumption
points throughout the world.
It seems to us that producer, as well as
consumer nations, have a clear and vital
stake in cooperating to find additional sources
of hydrocarbons, bring them to market in a
prudent and orderly manner, minimize waste
I
m their use, and bring on supplementary
sources of energy at a rate and in a way
which will maintain the prosperity of the
oil-rich nations as their petroleum assets
diminish. The administration is fully com-
mitted to this task. We do not believe that
drama is called for in this delicate stage of
international oil relations. Instead we all
need to proceed with care and deliberation
to build a foundation for international coop-
eration designed to meet the world's require-
ments for energy in the months as well as
the decades ahead.
U.S.-U.S.S.R. Fisheries Agreement
Signed at Copenhagen
Press release 224 dated June 25
Representatives of the United States and
the Soviet Union signed at Copenhagen on
June 21 a bilateral fisheries agreement
broadening and extending through Decem-
ber 31, 1974, an agreement concluded Decem-
ber 11, 1970, concerning fishing and fishing
operations in ocean areas off the Atlantic
coast of the United States. Ambassador
Donald L. McKernan, Special Assistant to the
Secretary of State for Fisheries and Wild-
life and Coordinator for Ocean AflTairs in the
Department of State, signed for the United
States." Vladimir M. Kamentsev, Deputy Min-
ister of Fisheries, signed for the Soviet
Union. The presence of fisheries experts of
both countries in Copenhagen for the 23d an-
nual meeting of the International Commis-
sion for the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries
June 5-15 facilitated final arrangements con-
cerning the agreement.
The new agreement contains provisions to
further conserve stocks of fish of mutual con-
cern, to enhance the exchange of scientific
information with respect to these stocks, to
minimize fishing-gear conflicts between ves-
sels of the two countries and to facilitate the
settlement of claims arising from such con-
flicts, and to provide opportunities for pe-
riodic discussions of problems of mutual
194
Department of State Bulletin
concern between representatives of the ap-
propriate fisheries authorities of the two gov-
ernments and fishermen's organizations.
Ambassador McKernan said the new agree-
ment has been expanded to afford new pro-
tection for biuefish, lobster, and yellowtail
flounder. Protective measures are broadened
for menhaden and continued for scup,
• flounder, hake, and river herring. The agree-
ment also continues the seasonal closure
January 1 to April 15 to fishing bv all Soviet
vessels in waters roughly between 50 and
100 fathoms from Rhode Island to Virginia
where bottom-dwelling species concentrate
I early in the year.
New assurances are added to the agree-
ment indicating that Soviet vessels shall not
intentionally catch lobster north of Cape
Hatteras. shall take appropriate measures to
minimize incidental catches of lobster in spe-
cialized fisheries for other species, and shall
return to the sea in a viable condition all
lobster taken incidentally, insofar as possible.
To facilitate conservation of bottom-
dwelling inshore stocks of yellowtail floun-
der, Soviet vessels of more than 145 feet in
length will limit fishing operations to mid-
water trawling during the period from July
1 through December 31 in the area adjacent
to the U.S. southern New England coast
north of 40° 20' N and south of 43° 17' N
and west of a line drawn between the points
68° 15' W, 40° 20' N, and 70° 00' W, and
43 17' N.
In return, the United States agreed to cer-
tain relaxation of port privileges for Soviet
fisheries vessels in Baltimore, Philadelphia,
New York, and Boston. In addition, Soviet
fishing vessels will continue to be allowed to
transfer fish and supplies in two areas within
the contiguous fishing zone and to fish within
a small area of the contiguous fishing zone
off the United States middle Atlantic coast.
The agreement also establishes a volun-
tary scheme of joint inspection between the
United States and the Soviet Union to help
insure the enforcement of its provisions.
Both countries agreed to seek to minimize
the possibility of conflicts between Soviet
fisheries using mobile fishing gear and U.S.
fisheries using fixed fishing gear. To facilitate
settlement of claims that might arise from
any such conflicts, a protocol to the agree-
ment makes available fisheries claims boards
to consider claims voluntarily submitted by
either side and to attempt to conciliate the
parties on the basis of factfinding.
Ambassador McKernan said, "The new
agreement represents important progress in
facilitating conservation of stocks of fish of
importance to the United States and in pro-
viding further protection for our coastal
fisheries."
U.S.-ltaly Extradition Treaty
Transmitted to the Senate
Message From President Nixon ^
To the Senate of the United States:
With a view to receiving the advice and
consent of the Senate to ratification, I trans-
mit herewith the Treaty on Extradition be-
tween the United States of America and
Italy, signed at Rome on January 18, 1973.
I transmit also, for the information of the
Senate, the report of the Department of
State with respect to the Treaty.
The Treaty significantly updates the extra-
dition relations between the United States
and Italy and adds to the list of extraditable
offenses both narcotic offenses, including
those involving psychotropic drugs, and air-
craft hijacking.
The Treaty will make a significant contri-
bution to the international effort to control
narcotics traflflc and to cope with other of-
fenses. I recommend that the Senate give
early and favorable consideration to the
Treaty and give its advice and consent to
ratification.
Richard Nixon.
The White House, June 26, 1973.
• Transmitted on June 26 (White House press re-
lease, San Clemente, Calif.) ; also printed as S. Ex.
M, 93d Cong., 1st sess., which includes the text of
the treaty and the report of the Department of State.
July 30, 1973
195
Fund Committed for Assistance
to Migrants to Israel
Press release 226 dated June 27
The Department of State on June 27 com-
pleted commitment of $50 million appropri-
ated by the Congress to assist migrants from
the Soviet Union, particularly Jews moving
to Israel.
Initial expenditures from the appropria-
tion, amounting to $33.5 million, were an-
nounced by the Department on April 6.^ The
new commitments, totaling $16.5 million,
are:
— A $13 million contract signed June 27
with United Israel Appeal, Inc. (UIA), an
accredited American voluntary agency. Sig-
natories were, for the Department, Frank L.
Kellogg, Special Assistant to the Secretary
for Refugee and Migration Affairs, and for
UIA, Executive Vice Chairman Gottlieb
Hammer of New York. The new contract
brings to $44 million the funds UIA will ex-
pend for en route care of migrants to Israel,
construction of absorption centers and hous-
ing, a hospital facility, and training or re-
training of artisans, professionals, and
scientists.
— An additional $3 million to the Inter-
governmental Committee for European Mi-
gration for air travel of migrants from
' For background, see Bulletin of Apr. 30, 1973,
p. 532.
Austria to Israel, bringing the total to $S
million.
— An additional $500,000 to other volun-
tary agencies for assistance to migrants from
the Soviet Union to countries other than
Israel, bringing the total to $1 million.
Congressional Documents
Relating to Foreign Policy
93d Congress, 1st Session
Section-By-Section Analysis of the Proposed For-
eign Military Sales and Assistance Act. S. 1443,
To Authorize the Furnishing of Defense Articles
and Services to Foreign Countries and Interna-
tional Organizations. April 24, 1973. 19 pp.
Executive Branch GATT Study No. 1. Tax Adjust-
ments in International Trade: GATT Provisions
and EEC Practices. Senate Committee on Fi-
nance. Study prepared by the executive branch
at the request of Senator Abraham Ribicoff,
Chairman, Subcommittee on International Trade.
April 26, 1973. 15 pp.
Text of International Labor Organization Conven-
tion No. 132, Concerning Annual Holidays With
Pay. Communication from Acting Assistant Secre-
tary of State for Congressional Relations trans-
mitting the convention. H. Doc. 93-97. May 7,
1973. 12 pp.
Report of the Subcommittee To Investigate the Ad-
ministration of the Internal Security Act and
Other Internal Security Laws of the Senate Com-
mittee on the Judiciary for the fiscal year ending
February- 28, 1973. S. Rept. 93-137. May 8,
1973. 42 pp.
Six Amendments to the Convention for the Safety
of Life at Sea, 1960. Message from the President
of the United States transmitting the amendments
adopted at London October 12, 1971. S. Ex. I.
May 9, 1973. 11 pp.
196
Department of State Bulletin
THE UNITED NATIONS
U.S. Cautions Against Premature International Regulation
of Developing Direct Broadcast Satellite Technology
The Woi'king Group on Direct Broad<;ast
Satellites of the U.N. Committee on the
Peaceful Uses of Outer Space met at U.N.
Headquarters June 11-22. Following are ex-
cerpts from a statement made in the working
group on June 15 by U.S. Representative
Sttoart H. Mclntyre, ivho is Deputy Director
for Oceans, Outer Space, and Disarmament
of the DepaHment's Office of United Nations
Political Affairs.'
The use of satellites in communication,
particularly broadcasting, is a fascinating:
subject which is engaging the attention of
more and more of the world. At the same
time it is very difficult at this early stage
to estimate what the benefits and liabilities
of this new means of communication may
be. But all of us have a common interest
in maximizing the potential benefits and
minimizing the potential problems.
The working group has been assigned an
important responsibility by the General
Assembly and its parent committee in rela-
tion to this new and as yet untried tech-
nology. U.N. General Assembly Resolution
2453 B (XXIII) requires the working group
"to study and report on the technical feasi-
bility of communication by direct broadcast
from satellites and the current and foresee-
able developments in this field, including
comparative user costs and other economic
considerations, as well as the implications
of such developments in the social, cultural,
legal and other areas." Specifically, this
session of the working group is to consider
new developments in the satellite broad-
' For the complete text, see USUN press release
59 dated June 15.
casting field since the group's last meeting
in 1970.
To assist the working group in carrying
out this mandate, we considered that it would
be important that the group have a clear
perspective of the current state and
prospects of the technology. The June 12
presentation by Mr. Leonard Jaffe, Deputy
Associate Administrator for Applications of
NASA [National Aeronautics and Space
Administration], represented an effort to
provide such a perspective covering both
technical and economic aspects.
In this connection let me express the U.S.
delegation's appreciation for the thorough
and well-prepared background and status
report on broadcast satellite technology con-
tained in the working paper submitted
jointly by Canada and Sweden. While we
will suggest a few minor modifications, we
believe this report provides a balanced,
accurate, and informative resume of devel-
opments to date which should be useful to
the entire U.N. community.
The Canadian-Swedish working paper
points out that all current activity in the
satellite broadcast field relates to broadcasts
to community receivers. This also accords
with Mr. Jaffe's appraisal that we know of
no work in progress or planned on other
than community systems. Broadcasts to com-
munity systems, of course, should arouse
none of the concerns apparently perceived
by some countries in relation to systems
utilizing a signal transmitted from a satel-
lite directly to unaugmented individual home
receivers without utilizing a ground station
or other intermediary for retransmission.
So far as we are aware, virtually all current
work with community systems is associated
July 30, 1973
197
with U.S. experimental programs. These are
open to arrangements for international co-
operation, in keeping with the approach
we have taken previously in contributing to
improved space communication capabilities
in the world community.
As Mr. Jaffe noted, two community
broadcast projects now being developed in-
volve such cooperative arrangements. Can-
ada and the United States are collaborating
on the Communications Technology Satellite
(CTS) system for community broadcasts
to Canadian viewers, and we look forward
to the Indian Satellite Instructional Tele-
vision Experiment (SITE) making use of
the U.S. applications technology satellite
ATS-F, scheduled for launch in 1974.
Broadcast Satellites and Development
Mr. Chairman, we are at the very begin-
ning of learning how to use broadcast satel-
lites for particular economic and social
development purposes. Indeed, we do not
yet fully understand what they can do and
what they cannot do. Satellites are only
delivery mechanisms; their effectiveness will
depend on what is delivered and how it is
used. We can only be certain that they pro-
vide us some important new possibilities
for improving the quality of life: through
making education available where there are
no schools or teachers; through providing
isolated rural populations with access to
information on agricultural practices, nutri-
tion, and health; through making worldwide
expertise and information rapidly available
to every nation.
The major task of this decade must be to
learn how to achieve these potentials. We
have made a start. We do have a growing
knowledge of how to use communications
technology for particular development prob-
lems. This has been notably true in educa-
tion, thanks to the creative and bold efforts
of developing nations which are using tele-
vision and radio for broad national develop-
ment and expansion of forma] education,
nations like Brazil, El Salvador, the Ivory
Coast, Mexico, and many othens. Satellite
technology now provides the opportunity to
build on these efforts, to attack other kinds
of problems, and to reach larger populations.
Our most direct opportunitj' to learn about
these new kinds of problems will be through
the planned experimental projects with com-
munity broadcast satellites, including those
in India, Canada, and the United States. We
believe that contact among the professionals
involved in these programs and with those
from other nations is essential. We would
be happy to facilitate such professional con-
tacts with the U.S. experimental projects.
We also specifically would like to invite ex-
pressions of interest in participation of ex-
perts from other nations to work in the
ATS-F projects within the United States
in the Rocky Mountain area, Alaska, and
Appalachia. We are working out mechanisms
to fund the work of a number of experts
from developing countries in these programs.
For the participants it should be a valuable
and unique experience. For the projects it
would provide the United States with valu-
able technical assistance. We invite others
to share our problems, possible failures, and
— we hope — successes.
Finally, we would point to the need for
many other kinds of cooperative activities
in making such systems useful instruments
of social development:
— Research on more effective ways to
program for diverse populations.
— Studies of sy.stem cost, building on the
fine work of UNESCO [United Nations Edu-
cational, Scientific and Cultural Organiza-
tion] and related work sponsored by the
United States.
— Studies of alternative and complemen-
tary transmission systems.
— Studies of ways to use satellites to
extend existing networks of professional
knowledge, e.g., in medicine and engineering,
across country boundaries.
— Development of an effective information
network on the social development uses of
satellites.
— Additional work in training, project de-
sign, and evaluation.
Mr. Chairman, we stand ready to coop-
198
Department of State Bulletin
erate actively in learning how to use this
technology as an instrument for social de-
velopment. We believe that a serious and
substantial effort of this sort w\\\ have two
yields: First, it will solve many important
educational and technical problems; second,
it will teach us about means of cooperation
at the substantive and professional level
that may eliminate many of the problems
that can arise at the political level.
Problems in Setting Global Principles
However, let me turn now to a matter
with immediate consequences for the work-
ing group: the proposition, supported by
a number of delegations in their general
debate statements, that the working group
should embark at this session on the actual
elaboration of principles to govern direct
television broadcasting by satellites. We hold
the view that some other delegations have
already expressed — that such action is
wholly inadvisable. Our position is based
on both substantive and procedural grounds.
As to the substantive issues involved, we
think it would be wrong to attempt to es-
tablish globally applicable principles con-
cerning a technology which is still far in
the future and may be regionally organized
if it does come into being.
I might note that as far as the United
States is concerned, our broadcasters have
shown no interest in developing a domestic
direct broadcast satellite television system.
The existing infrastructure of the present
U.S. television system is simply too broad,
and represents too great an investment, to
be replaced economically by telecasting in a
different mode, even if this were technically
feasible. As far as we know, the idea of
reaching unaugmented home receivers — un-
altered TV sets of the type which people
have in their homes today — is simply un-
realistic within the foreseeable future.
On the other hand, certain American firms
engaged in the manufacture of communi-
cations satellite equipment have studied
systems for transmitting to augmented indi-
vidual receivers. Augmented receivers would
utilize a larger antenna than is required to
receive conventional broadcasts as well as
a relatively sophisticated adapter unit. Gov-
ernments could of course control the manu-
facture or import of such equipment.
However, to our knowledge no satellite ex-
periments utilizing augmented home re-
ceivers are presently scheduled.
We would be interested in learning
whether assessments and plans of other
countries in this area differ from our own.
If such differences exist, it obviously would
be useful if the working group were in-
formed of them.
But even if more rapid progress than we
now estimate toward satellite direct broad-
casting to augmented individual receivers
should subsequently develop, how unwise
it would seem to run the risk of inhibiting
that progress by freezing international be-
havior in connection with satellite broad-
casts at an unduly early stage. We believe
that we must have a clearer picture of what
it is we are dealing with — and, indeed, what
concrete and specific problems are foreseen
in the use of the technology — before we es-
tablish principles designed to govern it.
Basic Human Right To Exchange Ideas
The United States, however — and I want
to stress this — is keenly interested in hearing
and discussing in depth, in this forum and
later in others, the concerns and problems
which others may perceive in connection
with satellite direct broadcasting. Even
though we may not agree that all such con-
cerns are warranted, we understand the
basis for many of them. And as we explore
various views regarding the possible social,
cultural, legal, and other implications of
direct broadcast satellites, we ask that our
colleagues take our concerns into account
as well.
Foremost among these concerns is our
constitutional commitment to the principle
of freedom of speech. Justice Oliver Wendell
Holmes, one of the most distinguished legal
philosophers to sit on the American Su-
preme Court, expressed this fundamental
value in these memorable words:
July 30, 1973
199
. . . the ultimate good desired is better reached
by free trade in ideas . . . the best test of truth is
the power of the thought to get itself accepted in
the competition of the market. . . .
We believe that in the competition of the
market of thought and ideas, the freedom
to receive information is just as impoi-tant
as the freedom to impart it. We would ask-
that all members of the working group weigh
most carefully the possible consequences to
this basic human right, as set out in the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, in
considering possible constraints on the use
of satellite broadcasting.
We share another concern, articulated
yesterday by the distinguished Representa-
tive of Japan, that a technology whose prac-
tical applications offer high prospective
benefit to all should not be stunted and
thwarted by an unduly restrictive abstract
approach. It is important to think through
the practical consequences of various prin-
ciples which may be discussed — in particular,
could they inhibit the use of satellite broad-
casting in ways which might not be suspected
by their proponents?
We see, for example, in the blanket prin-
ciple of prior consent an inherent danger
of sanctioning not only total censorship but
such arbitrary and diverse application of
the principle as to nullify the basic human
right to exchange ideas and information.
Let me address one concern of others
which a number of countries already have
aired quite explicitly: the fear that the
free flow of information and ideas, at least
as conveyed by a future direct broadcast
satellite, might be a one-way flow controlled
by the few powers technically capable of
launching, and financially able to operate,
a satellite service. The United States is pre-
pared to study possible arrangements for
sharing broadcast time and channels on
any future direct broadcast system among
countries within a given region. We think
that discussion of these possible arrange-!
ments could be one of the most fruitful
exchanges of views that the working group
could take up. Access to the use of direct
broadcast satellites seems to us to represent
a central problem, and solving this problem
could well eliminate a large number of other
potential difl^culties. |
Also in this regard, I would like to re-
iterate that my government is willing to
provide other countries launch assistance
on a nondiscriminatory, reimbursable basis,
for any space program designed for peaceful
purposes. This offer is applicable to com-
munications satellite programs; and as is
known, we already have made available
launch capability and space segments for
both domestic and international experimental
and operational programs in this field.
In general my delegation believes that
further study is indicated regarding possible
regional approaches to arrangements facili-
tating the use of direct broadcast satellites.
These arrangements might be among broad-
casting and receiving states, or perhaps
among broadcasting agencies or broadcasters
unions. Another possibility warranting fur-
ther exploration is the adoption of voluntary
codes of conduct by those entities. Whether
on an ofliicial or nonoflficial basis, a regionally
oriented approach sensitive to the needs,
tastes, attitudes, and practices of a particular
region may be preferable to attempting to
impose universal standards or principles.
I would only add this final thought for
the group's consideration : The basic question
underlying our work is how to encourage
responsible conduct in international direct
broadcasting by satellites, when and if such
broadcasting may become an actuality.
Success in this effort is most likely to emerge
from the encouragement of international
cooperation based on the fullest understand-
ing of both benefits and concerns.
200
Department of State Bulletin
U.S. Calls for Immediate Action on Priority Proposals
for U.N. Environment Program
Statement by Christian A. Herter, Jr. *
Over the next two weeks we shall be en-
gaged in the important and precedent-setting
task of getting the new U.N. Environment
Program underway. We have already made
remarkable progress, not only in receiving
the endorsement of the General Assembly
as to the action plan, the declaration, and the
institutional arrangements propounded by
Stockholm but in positioning ourselves to
move ahead. It is important also to note that
with the impetus of Stockholm the in-
ternational community has in the last year
negotiated three new environmental con-
ventions — one on ocean dumping, one on a
world heritage trust, and a third on inter-
national trade in endangered species.
We believe that there is a fundamental
reason for this progress. Whatever other
matters may divide us, we do share a com-
mon concern for the future of human life
on this planet. This principle, which underlay
all our actions at Stockholm, is one we must
not forget — one that we hope will carry over
in all our actions in this Governing Council.
Whatever particular steps we take should
be in the context of man's relationship to
an incredibly complex and fragile series of
ecosystems and a finite resource base.
I can assure you, Mr. Chairman, that the
United States plans to approach its responsi-
bilities in this body in the spirit of Stockholm
' Made in the Governing Council of the United Na-
tions Environment Program (UNEP) at Geneva on
June 13. Mr. Herter, who was U.S. Representative
to the Governing Council, is Director of the Office
of Environmental Affairs and Special Assistant to
the Secretary of State for Environmental Affairs.
and we shall strive to work cooperatively
with all the members of this Council to help
assure that the new program gets off to a
sound start.
Having made these preliminary remarks,
it would be appropriate to comment on some
of the more specific aspects of the matters
before us.
Mr. Chairman, my government wishes to
express its satisfaction with the progress
made since the Stockholm Conference in the
development of the U.N. Environment Pro-
gram. With a very large number of tasks to
be performed, the Executive Director and his
small but competent staff have devoted a
good deal of attention to policy and admin-
istrative matters and to the preparation of
essential documents — activities vital to get-
ting the UNEP machinery in place. Now our
energies must be directed toward the devel-
opment of substantive programs for action —
the heart of the UNEP effort.
In this connection we have given a good
deal of study in the United States to the doc-
ument UNEP/GC/5, the Report of the Exec-
utive Director on an Action Plan for the
Human Environment. In general we believe
it constitutes a constructive basis for initiat-
ing action. There are a few general comments
with respect to this document that we would
like to make at the outset:
First, we do not think it a productive ex-
ercise for the Governing Council to try to
establish priorities among the objectives sug-
gested in chapter I. All of these objectives set
out in this chapter are ones toward which we
should strive and which we believe should
July 30, 1973
201
provide guidelines, to the greatest possible
extent, for the program of UNEP. We would
be hard put to list them in some order of
priority. Far more useful, in our judgment,
would be an indication of what programs
should be developed for Council approval and
which should be given priority. Here we feel
the criteria for selection of programs should
reflect the urgency of the environmental
problem, the capacity of the institutional
structure inside and outside the U.N. to ini-
tiate action, and the cost of implementation
relative to available funds.
Second, and based at least in part on the
criteria I have just outlined, we think it ex-
tremely important that the Governing Coun-
cil authorize the Executive Director at this
meeting to proceed with the implementation
of two or three key programs. In our judg-
ment it is vital that the momentum of Stock-
holm not be lost— that the world understand
we mean business and that we are in fact
underway. We have in mind, for example,
that portion of "Earthwatch" which deals
with the monitoring of pollutants of inter-
national significance; the Information Re-
ferral Service, which we understand is close
to being ready for implementation ; and per-
haps a program concerned with desertifica-
tion, taking into account national and
international efforts in this area that have
already begun.
In sum, Mr. Chairman, UNEP must begin
immediately to establish its credibility as an
effective environmental force.
Major Areas of Concern
If I may, I would like now to mention in
somewhat more specific terms two broad cat-
egories of concern which should receive pri-
ority attention : problems of natural resource
management and problems of pollution where
there is urgency because damage to the en-
vironment may be irreversible. With respect
to both categories, the involvement of the
developing countries is essential.
First, with regard to resources, emphasis
should be placed on programs leading to
improved management of ecosystems, par-
ticularly arid lands and tropical forests.
Desertification and shifting cultivations are
examples of the harmful side effects of man's
activities, and action must be taken to im-
prove management of irreplaceable re-
sources. While we are on this topic I note
that research on ecosystems does not figure
importantly in the subject document. We
would like to see additional emphasis placed
on this matter in accordance with the con-
sensus at Stockholm.
Emphasis should also be placed on:
— Initiation of a genetic resources conser-
vation program.
— Regional programs in water resources
management.
— Guidelines for use by countries and the
U.N. family for assessing the potential en-
vironmental impacts of development projects.
Second, efforts concerned with pollution
should, in the U.S. view, be focused on :
— Identification of pollutants which are of
international significance and selection of
actions which should have highest priority
for their control.
—Global monitoring of pollutants consid-
ered to have international significance. A bal-
anced program should be developed concerned
with monitoring the oceans, atmosphere,
food, terrestrial ecosystems, and human
health.
— Consideration of exposure-eflPect rela-
tionships. This should include criteria for
pollutant exposures and risks and identifica-
tion of pathways and sources.
—Development of primary protection
standards. First priority should be given to
human health and well-being.
— Derivation of working limits (ambient
standards) for pollutants in air, water, and
food to provide a basis for international co-
operation in the development of effective and
economically feasible methods for the pre-
vention and control of pollutants from spe-
cific sources.
— International agreement on the control
of pollutants in specific environments.
Recognizing that actions also should begin
in other areas of environmental concern, the
202
Department of State Bulletin
following topics, which will increase environ-
mental competence and understanding in all
countries, merit attention :
— Training in the environmental aspects of
development project planning and analysis.
— Regional training programs in human
settlements planning and management, re-
source management, and pollution control.
— Technical assistance on practical pro-
grams to deal with serious and specific en-
vironmental problems.
— Review of means to help countries bring
their exports within the tolerances estab-
lished by other countries for the protection
of the environment.
— Consultation to identify priority items
for action in the human settlements area and
cooperative national research programs.
I mentioned in the course of describing
U.S. priorities that one area of emphasis
should be international agreements on the
control of pollutants in specific environments.
We have made major progress in the devel-
opment of an ocean dumping convention
which will help curtail the degradation of a
vital international resource. We note that
IMCO [Intergovernmental Maritime Consul-
tative Organization] is preparing to negoti-
ate a convention this fall to regulate pollution
of the oceans from vessels. We believe it is
time to take yet another step to regenerate
the productivity of the oceans. Accordingly,
we propose that the Governing Council au-
thorize the Executive Director to devote
substantial effort during the coming year to
arranging for consultations among inter-
ested states on possible means of achieving
an internationally accepted system of con-
trols over toxic land-based discharges into
rivers and estuarial areas, based perhaps on
similar initiatives at the regional level.
We also propose that the Governing Coun-
cil request the Executive Director to urge
the International Whaling Commission, be-
fore its annual meeting in London starting
June 25, to give renewed consideration to a
10-year moratorium on commercial whaling
in accordance with recommendation 86 that
was approved at Stockholm.
Coordination of U.N. Environmenf Programs
Turning now to the role of coordination
of environmental programs within the U.N.
system given to the Environmental Secre-
tariat by the relevant provisions of General
Assembly Resolution 2997, we note that the
Executive Director has met with the Envi-
ronment Coordination Board. = The report
of that meeting, which is part of the docu-
mentation for this Council meeting, indicates
that excellent progress was made in estab-
lishing a basis for cooperation. As this is
a major element in the entire program, it
is essential that relationships between UNEP
and the specialized agencies are clearly estab-
lished. If UNEP is to provide direction and
coordination of environmental programs
within the U.N. system, it must draw upon
all existing competencies to do so. It must
develop means to identify and fill gaps in
current programs and propose reorienta-
tions and expansions of existing efforts when
that appears desirable. It must try to prevent
overlapping and duplications. This implies
an organizational responsibility going beyond
simple responses to requests for financial
support from the specialized agencies.
In a somewhat similar vein, we believe it
is essential that the Council be kept informed
of all work in the United Nations family
which bears upon the human environment.
It is obvious that there are already extensive
programs within the U.N. system which have
important environmental implications but
are oriented principally toward other objec-
tives. Examples include efforts to increase
forest or crop productivity or to provide
medical assistance. Although these programs
are not the direct concern of UNEP, we will
be looking to the Executive Director in his
coordinating role for regular information on
the status and need for improvements in
collateral programs relating to the environ-
ment.
To return to document UNEP/GC/5, it is
the U.S. view that chapter III, dealing with
the relationship of future activities to the
' For text of the resolution, see Bulletin of Jan.
15, 1973, p. 57.
July 30, 1973
203
functional components of the action plan,
contains a useful exposition of plans for
UNEP in the years ahead. We will look for-
ward to seeing these plans develop and reach
fruition at future meetings of the Council.
In the course of this activity, it is critical
that the broadest range of talent be brought
to bear and not be restricted to that avail-
able through governments and intergovern-
mental organizations. There is an immense
reserve of capability and expertise available
in the nongovernmental scientific community,
in industry, and in conservation and other
organizations which must be utilized if a
global environmental effort is to be success-
ful. We look forward to working with the
Executive Director, as I am sure all countries
do, to develop means for drawing upon this
valuable resource.
As a final point concerning the action plan,
I would like to provide U.S. views on the
recommendations contained in chapter IV of
UNEP/GC/5. With regard to recommenda-
tion (a), we have already expressed our
approval of the objectives in toto, while
recognizing that they do not provide, in our
view, a useful basis for establishing priori-
ties. We have separately indicated priorities
for programs which we believe should be
pursued.
As to recommendation (b), it is the U.S.
view that the Executive Director should be
given the authority to draw upon resources
available to him so that he can develop com-
prehensive programs for submission to the
Council.
So far as recommendation (c) is con-
cerned, we hope that the Council will agree
that the Executive Director should assume
the Secretariat responsibilities which are
set forth within the terms of the convention
on international trade in endangered species
of wildlife. We view this as an extremely
important area of concern and would propose
that the assignment be carried out by the
Executive Director through contractual ar-
rangements with appropriate organizations.
As other similar conventions ai-e concluded
relevant to the Stockholm Conference, we
believe that the responsibilities and capa-
bilities of UNEP should be kept in mind,
and its possible role considered on a case-by-
case basis.
Recommendation (d) deals with the In-
formation Referral Service. We support the
establishment of the IRS, although we have
no indications about the staffing and funding
of such an eflfort, as no limits have been de-
termined as to the number and type of users
and the size and content of the referral data
base.
We believe that the Executive Director
should continue to receive advice on an ad
hoc basis during the design and initial im-
plementation stages of the IRS. Further, it
is essential that a survey be made of exist-
ing and planned information and data serv-
ices within the U.N., and particularly within
the context of Earthwatch, so that IRS, dur-
ing its organizational phase, can benefit from
and interrelate with these efforts.
With regard to recommendation (e), we
have already indicated our strong support
of the concept of Earthwatch and specifically
the early initiation of a monitoring effort.
We believe that the convening of a meeting
as early as possible at the intergovernmental
level is an essential first step to filling the
gaps in an important program of global
significance.
Administration of the Environment Fund
So far, Mr. Chairman, I have spent most
of my time discussing some of our thoughts
on substantive matters. I would like to turn
now to a different but related aspect of our
work and reflect for a few minutes on the
proposed rules and procedures which should
govern the administration of the Environ-
ment Fund.
When it adopted Resolution 2997 last fall,
the General Assembly created a new U.N.
program which in many respects is unique.
The principal task of the new program is
one of coordination : the development of a
cooperative, coordinated U.N. program for
the preservation and enhancement of the hu-
man environment. The overriding nature of
this assignment is apparent in the resolution
204
Department of State Bulletin
itself, where the word "coordination" is all
pervasive.
What this implies, we believe, is that the
UNEP must have a considerable degree of
autonomy and operating flexibility.
On the other hand, the UNEP was estab-
lished with one foot firmly in the U.N. itself
and derives part of its lifeblood from the
U.N. The costs of the core staff and the costs
of servicing this Council are borne by the
U.N. regular budget. Furthermore, the Fund
was to be established, and I quote from the
resolution, "in accordance with existing
United Nations financial procedures," al-
though the resolution also charges the Gov-
erning Council with the task of formulating
"such general procedures as are necessary
to govern the operations of the Environment
Fund."
We will address ourselves to the particu-
lars of the arrangements and procedures
which are now proposed to govern the Fund —
and I refer not only to GC/4 but also to the
Secretary General's report to the General
Assembly on the financial and personnel ar-
rangements—at the appropriate point in our
deliberations. In this connection we believe
that a sessional group on this subject should
be established at the earliest possible time.
For the moment, we would simply like to
record some general comments.
First, we support the basic concept that
the Governing Council must provide policy
and program guidance to the Secretariat.
This places a particular obligation, in our
view, on the Executive Director to present
his program recommendations to the Gov-
erning Council in sufficient detail that the
Council may make considered and realistic
program decisions. On the other hand, we
believe the Executive Director should have
authority for the initiation and implemen-
tation of projects which fall within the
Council's guidance.
Second, we strongly urge that contribu-
tions to the Environment Fund be un-
restricted as to use. Otherwise, we shall
severely handicap the ability of the Executive
Director to develop and implement programs
July 30, 1973
to which we as a total Governing Council
have assigned priority attention.
Third, we reiterate our conviction that the
Fund not be used for development assistance.
Fourth, we would like to reemphasize our
view that UNEP will not be an operating
agency but will rely on other agencies and
organizations to carry out environment
programs.
Fifth, we suspect that one part or another
of the arrangements now recommended to
the Council, resulting as they do from many
days of sensitive negotiations between U.N.
headquarters and the UNEP Secretariat, are
not entirely satisfactory to either party.
Frankly, we are not entirely happy either.
We do think, however, that the procedures
and arrangements recommended, subject to
some clarifications and perhaps some modifi-
cations which we will suggest in due course,
appear to be generally satisfactory.
Finally, I should like to express my gov-
ernment's great pleasure at the excellent ar-
rangements which are being made by the
Government of Kenya for locating the United
Nations Environment Program at Nairobi.
The support which is being accorded to this
undertaking is evidence of the deep concern
nations everywhere feel for improving the
condition of the global environment. We look
forward to continued and rewarding cooper-
ation with the Government of Kenya and
other governments within the United Nations
system in this effort to improve the quality
of human life throughout the world.
United Nations Documents:
A Selected Bibliography
Mimeographed or processed documents (such as
those listed below) may be consulted at depository
libraries in the United States. U.N. printed publi-
cations may be purchased from the Sales Section of
the United Nations, United Nations Plaza, N.Y.
10017.
Economic and Social Council
Commission for Social Development:
Report of the Board of the United Nations Re-
search Institute for Social Development on its
205
activities during 1971 and 1972. E/CN.5/489.
December 19, 1972. 13 pp.
Report on Youth. Report of the Secretary Gen-
eral. Summary and Proposals for Action. E/
CN.5/486/Summary. December 22, 1972. 13 pp.
Commission on Human Rights:
Study of Equality in the Administration of Jus-
tice. Report of the Secretaiy General. E/CN.4/
1112. January 12, 1973. 31 "pp.
Report of the Committee on Crime Prevention and
Control on its first session. Note by the Secre-
tary General. E/CN.4/111.3. January 30, 1973.
5 pp.
The Widening Gap. A study of the realization of
economic, social, and cultural rights, by Man-
ouchehr Ganji, special rapporteur of the Com-
mission on Human Rights. E/CN.4/1108, Feb-
ruary 5, 1973, and Add. 1-9.
TREATY INFORMATION
U.S. and Ireland Sign Agreement
on "Advance Charter" Flights
The Department of State announced on
July 2 (press release 233) that the United
States and Ireland had concluded on June 29
a memorandum of understanding on travel
group charters (TGC's) and advance booking
charters (ABC's) under which each party
will accept as charterworthy transatlantic
traffic originated in the territory of the
other party and organized and operated
pursuant to the "advance charter" (TGC or
ABC) rules of that party. Other provisions
deal with enforcement and arrangements
to minimize administrative burdens on car-
riers and organizers of "advance charters."
The understanding was brought into force
by an exchange of notes at Washington.
While the understanding is not an exchange
of economic rights, it is expected to facilitate
the operation of "advance charter" flights
between the United States and Ireland by
carriers of both countries. The understand-
ing with Ireland is the fourth of a series of
such agreements the United States hopes
to conclude soon with other countries to
facilitate the operation of "advance char-
ters." (For text of the memorandum of
understanding, see press release 233.)
Current Actions
MULTILATERAL
Agriculture
Convention on the Inter-American Institute of Ag-
ricultural Sciences. Done at Washington January
15, 1944. Entered into force November 30, 1944
58 Stat. 1169.
Adherence deposited: Guyana, June 6, 1973.
Atomic Energy
Amendment of article VI of the statute of the In-
ternational Atomic Energy Agency of October
26, 1956, as amended (TIAS 3873, 5284). Done at
Vienna September 28, 1970. Entered into force I
June 1, 1973. |
Acceptances deposited: Byelorussian Soviet So-
cialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Re-
publics, July 12, 1973.
Aviation
Convention for the suppression of unlawful seizure
of aircraft. Done at The Hague December 16,
1970. Entered into force October 14, 1971 TIAS
7192.
Ratification deposited: Colombia, July 3, 1973.
Convention for the suppression of unlawful acta
against the safety of civil aviation. Done at Mon-
treal September 23, 1971. Entered into force Jan-
uary 26, 1973. TIAS 7570.
Accessions deposited: Cameroon, July 11, 1973;
Finland, July 13, 1973; Iran, Sweden, July 10.
1973.
Ratification deposited: Australia, July 12, 1973.
Bills of Lading
Protocol to amend the international convention for
the unification of certain rules of law relating
to bills of lading signed at Brussels August 25,
1924 (51 Stat. 233). Done at Brussels February
23, 1968.'
Signature: Egypt, June 4, 1973.
Load Unes
Amendments to the international convention on load
lines, 1966 (TIAS 6331, 6629, 6720). Adopted at
London October 12, 1971.'
Acceptance deposited: Netherlands, May 30, 1973.
Safety at Sea
Convention on the international regulations for pre-
venting collisions at sea, 1972. Done at London
October 20, 1972.'
Signatures: Greece, May 17, 1973; India, Ireland,
Not in force.
206
Department of State Bulletin
May 30, 1973; New Zealand, June 1, 1973 (all
subject to ratification, acceptance, or approval).
Amendments to the international convention for the
safety of life at sea, 1960 (TIAS 5780). Adopted
at London October 12, 1971.'
Acceptance deposited: Norway, May 29, 1973.
Telecommunications
International telecommunication convention, with
annexes. Done at Montreux November 12, 1965.
Entered into force January 1, 1967; for the
United States May 29, 1967. TIAS 6267.
Ratification deposited: Liberia, April 27, 1973.
BILATERAL
Barbados
Agreement continuing in force between the United
States and Barbados the consular convention of
June 6, 1951, between the United States and the
United Kingdom (TIAS 2494). Effected by ex-
change of notes at Bridgetown September 14,
1972, and May 10, 1973. Entered into force May
10, 1973.
Belgium
Agreement amending annex B of the mutual defense
assistance agreement of January 27, 1950 (TIAS
2010). Effected by exchange of notes at Brussels
June 25 and 28, 1973. Entered into force June 28,
1973.
Brazil
Agreement relating to the establishment of a Peace
Corps program in Brazil. Effected by exchange of
notes at Rio de Janeiro November 11, 1961. En-
tered into force November 11, 1961. TIAS 4909.
Terminated: March 7, 1973.
Agreement relating to the establishment of a Peace
Corps program in Brazil. Effected by exchange
of notes at Brasilia June 18, 1973. Entered into
force June 18, 1973.
Mexico
Agreement extending the air transport agreement
of August 15, 1960, as amended and extended
(TIAS 4675, 7167). Effected by exchange of
notes at Mexico and Tlatelolco June 29, 1973.
Entered into force June 29, 1973.
Pakistan
Agreement amending the agreement for sales of
agricultural commodities of September 21, 1972
(TIAS 7466). Effected by exchange of notes at
Islamabad June 20, 1973. Entered into force June
20, 1973.
Sudan
Agreement relating to the deposit by Sudan of 10
percent of the value of grant military assistance
furnished by the United States. Effected by ex-
change of notes at Khartoum April 27 and May
24, 1973. Entered into force May 24, 1973.
PUBLICATIONS
' Not in force.
Recent Releases
For sale by the Government Bookstore, Department
of State, Washington, D.C. 20520. A 25-percent dis-
count is made on orders for 100 or more copies of
any one publication, mailed to the same address.
Remittances, payable to the Superintendent of Docu-
m.ents, must accompany orders.
Background Notes: Short, factual summaries which
describe the people, history, government, economy,
and foreign relations of each country. Each contains
a map, a list of principal government officials and
U.S. diplomatic and consular officers, and a reading
list. (A complete set of all Background Notes cur-
rently in stock— at least 140— $16.35; 1-year sub-
scription service for approximately 77 updated or
nev Notes— $14.50; plastic binder— $1.50.) Single
copies of those listed below are available at 20<' each.
Bangladesh Cat. No. S1.123:B22
Pub. 8698 8 pp.
Equatorial Guinea Cat. No. S1.123:EQ2
Pub. 8025 4 pp.
Pakistan Cat. No. S1.123:P17
Pub. 7748 8 pp.
Panama Cat. No. S1.123:P19
Pub. 7903 4 pp.
Swaziland Cat. No. S1.123:SW2
Pub. 8174 5 pp.
Thailand Cat. No. S1.123:T32
Pub. 7961 8 pp.
United Kingdom Cat. No. S1.123:UN34K
Pub. 8099 8 pp.
Vatican City Cat. No. S1.123:V45
Pub. 8258 3 pp.
International Exchange: People's Diplomacy in Ac-
tion. This illustrated report describes major aspects
of the Department's exchange program and some of
the support from private citizens, organizations, and
institutions which enriches and multiplies govern-
ment efforts in this age of people's diplomacy. Pub.
8682. International Information and Cultural Series
103. 19 pp. 45((.
Trade in Wool and Man.Made Fiber Textile Products.
Agreement with the Republic of China. TIAS 7498.
13 pp. ISf*.
Trade in Wool and Man-Made Fiber Textile Products.
Agreement with the Republic of Korea. TIAS 7499.
11 pp. 15('.
Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with Bolivia
amending the agreement of April 29, 1971, as
amended. TIAS 7500. 4 pp. IS**.
Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with Indonesia
amending the agreement of May 26, 1972, as
amended. TIAS 7501. 2 pp. IS?*.
July 30, 1973
207
Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations and Op-
tional Protocol on Disputes. TIAS 7502. 208 pp.
$2.
Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems. Treaty
with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. TIAS
7503. 27 pp. 30<'.
Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms. Interim
ajerreement and protocol with the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics. TIAS 7504. 21 pp. 25<'.
Agricultural Commodities. Agreement w-ith Sri
Lanka amending the agi-eement of December 20
1971. TIAS 7505. 4 pp. 15('.
Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with the Phil-
ippines amending the agreement of May 4 1972 as
amended. TIAS 7506. 2 pp. 15(^.
Education— Financing of Exchange Programs. Agree-
ment with the Federal Republic of Germany supple-
menting the agreement of November 20, 1962 as
supplemented. TIAS 7507. 3 pp. ISt".
Radio Communications Between Amateur Stations on
Behalf of Third Parties. Agreement with Jordan.
TIAS 7508. 3 pp. 15«'.
Taxation— Withholding of Contributions for Educa-
tional Insurance. Agreement with Panama. TIAS
7509. 5 pp. ISC'.
Extradition. Treaty with Argentina. TIAS 7510
39 pp.
Loan of Vessel— U.S.S. Camp. Agreement with Viet-
Nam. TIAS 7511. 4 pp. IS^*.
Embassy Sites— Conditions of Construction. Agree-
ment with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
TIAS 7512. 29 pp. 20('.
Use by Bahamian Organizations of Certain Lands at
the United States Navy Base, Great Exuma Island,
Bahamas. Agreement with the United Kingdom of
Great Britain and Northern Ireland. TIAS 7514 5
pp. 20('.
Agricultural Commodities. Agreement vrith the
Khmer Republic amending the agreement of Jan-
uary 13, 1972, as amended. TIAS 7515. 3 pp.
Shellfish Sanitation. Agreement with the Republic of
Korea. TIAS 7516. 6 pp. 20(».
Fisheries. Agreement with the Republic of Korea
TIAS 7517. 14 pp. 20('.
Television System and Radio Facility. Agreement
with Saudi Arabia extending the agreement of De-
cember 9, 1963, and January 6, 1964, as amended
and extended. TIAS 7518. 5 pp. 20^.
Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with Viet-
Nam amending the agreement of October 2, 1972.
TIAS 7519. 3 pp. 20^
Agricultural Commodities. Agreements with Indo-
nesia amending the agreement of May 26, 1972 as
amended. TL4S 7520. 6 pp. 20^
Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with Pakistan
amending the agreement of September 21, 1972 as
amended. TIAS 7521. 3 pp. 20i*.
Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with Iceland
TIAS 7522. 3 pp. 20('.
Status, Privileges and Immunities of Strategic Arms
Limitation (SALT) Delegations. Agreement with
Switzerland. TIAS 7523. 5 pp. 20('.
Cultural Relations. Agreement with the Socialist
Republic of Romania. TIAS 7524. 29 pp.
Consular Officers— Continued Application to Fiji of
the United States-United Kingdom Convention of
June 6, 1951. Agreement with Fiji. TIAS 7525
2 pp. 20<*.
Scientific Cooperation. Agreement with Italy extend-
ing the agreement of June 19, 1967. TIAS 7526
3 pp. 20('.
Fisheries— King and Tanner Crab. Agreement with
Japan. TIAS 7527. 6 pp. 20('.
Fisheries— Certain Fisheries Off the United States
Coast Salmon Fisheries. Agreements with Japan
TIAS 7528. 13 pp. 20C.
Defense— Acquisition and Production of Additional
F-4EJ Aircraft and Acquisition of RF-4E Aircraft.
Agreement with Japan. TIAS 7529. 8 pp. 20('.
Investment Guaranties. Agreement with St Vincent.
TIAS 7530. 4 pp. 20('.
Agricultural Commodities. Agreements with the Re-
public of Korea amending the agreement of Feb-
ruary 14, 1972, as amended. TIAS 7531. 7 pp.
20«(.
Transfer of Military Scrap. Agreement with the Re-
public of Viet-Nam. TIAS 7534. 5 pp. 20^.
DEPARTMENT AND FOREIGN SERVICE
Confirmations
The Senate on June 6 confirmed the nomination
of David H. Popper to be an Assistant Secretary of
State [for International Organization Affairs].
The Senate on June 14 confirmed the nomination
of Graham A. Martin to be Ambassador to the Re-
public of Viet-Nam.
The Senate on June 15 confirmed the nomination
of Kenneth B. Keating to be Ambassador to Israel.
The Senate on June 30 confirmed the nomination
of John Hugh Crimmins to be Ambassador to
Brazil.
208
Department of State Bulletin
INDEX July 30, 1973 Vol. LXIX, No. 1779
Atomic Energy. Senate Confirms Gerald F.
& Tape as U.S. Representative to IAEA . . 188
^viation. U.S. and Ireland Sign Agreement on
"Advance Charter" Flights 206
Hrazil. Crimmins confirmed as Ambassador . 208
( ommunications. U.S. Cautions Against Pre-
mature International Regulation of Develop-
ing Direct Broadcast Satellite Technology
(Mclntyre) l^**
.iigress ,, ^.
mfirmations (Crimmins, Keating, Martin,
Popper) _,••.• 2"^
ngressional Documents Relating to Foreign
Policy • • . • 19^
partment Discusses Recent Negotiations m
the International Oil Industry (Casey) . . 190
. nate Confirms Gerald F. Tape as U.S. Repre-
sentative to IAEA 188
Czechoslovakia. Secretary Signs Consular Con-
vention With Czechoslovakia (Rogers) . . 188
Department and Foreign Service
Confirmations (Crimmins, Keating, Martin,
Popper) . . . . . . ....... • ■ 208
U.S. Opens Consulate General in Leningrad
(Department announcement, Stoessel) . . 189
Economic AfTairs. U.S.-U.S.S.R. Fisheries
Agreement Signed at Copenhagen .... 194
Energy. Department Discusses Recent Negotia-
tions in the Industrial Oil Industry (Casey) 190
Environment. U.S. Calls for Immediate Action
ton Priority Proposals for U.N. Environment
, Program (Herter) 201
Europe. Conference on Security and Coopera-
tion in Europe Meets at Helsinki at Foreign
Minister Level ( Rogers, texts of communique
and Final Recommendations of Helsinki
Consultations) 1'^''
Extradition. U.S.-Italy Extradition Treaty
Transmitted to the Senate (Nixon) ... 195
International Organizations and Conferences
Conference on Security and Cooperation in
Europe Meets at Helsinki at Foreign Min-
ister Level (Rogers, texts of communique
and Final Recommendations of Helsinki
Consultations) • • 1'^''
Popper confirmed as Assistant Secretary for
International Organization Affairs . . . 208
Senate Confirms Gerald F. Tape as U.S. Repre-
sentative to IAEA 188
Ireland. U.S. and Ireland Sign Agreement on
".Advance Charter" Flights 206
Israel
Fund Committed for Assistance to Migrants
to Israel 19°
Keating confirmed as Ambassador .... 208
Italy. U.S.-Italy Extradition Treaty Trans-
mitted to the Senate (Nixon) 195
Middle East. Department Discusses Recent Ne-
gotiations in the International Oil Indus-
try (Casey) 190
Presidential Documents. U.S.-Italy Extradition
Treaty Transmitted to the Senate .... 19.)
Publications. Recent Releases 207
Space. U.S. Cautions Against Premature Inter-
national Regulation of Developing Direct
Broadcast Satellite Technology (Mclntyre) . 19/
Treaty Information
Current Actions ^'^^
Secretary Signs Consular Convention With
Czechoslovakia (Rogers) ....... 188
U.S. and Ireland Sign Agreement on "Advance
Charter" Flights 206
U.S.-Italy Extradition Treaty Transmitted to
the Senate (Nixon) . 195
U.S.-U.S.S.R. Fisheries Agreement Signed at
Copenhagen 1^*
U.S.S.R. . . , .
U.S. Opens Consulate General in Leningrad
(Department anouncement, Stoessel) . . 189
U.S.-U.S.S.R. Fisheries Agreement Signed at
Copenhagen 1^4
United Nations
United Nations Documents ■'05
U.S. Calls for Immediate Action on Priority
Proposals for U.N. Environment Program
(Herter) • ; ^01
U.S. Cautions Against Premature International
Regulation of Developing Direct Broadcast
Satellite Technology (Mclntyre) 197
Viet-Nam. Martin confirmed as Ambassador . 208
Name Index
Casey, William J 190
Crimmins, John Hugh ^0°
Herter, Christian A., Jr 201
Keating, Kenneth B 208
Martin, Graham A ^08
Mclntyre, Stuart 11 19;
Nixon, President 19^
Popper, David H 1^7 TrI
Rogers, Secretary ^ ' ' , on
Stoessel, Walter J., Jr 189
Tape, Gerald F 1b»
Check List of Department of State
Press Releases: July 9-1 5
Press releases may be obtained from the
Office of Press Relations, Department of State,
Washington, D.C. 20520.
Releases issued prior to July 9 which ap-
pear in this issue of the Bulletin are Nos.
233 of July 3 and 236 and 237 of July 6.
No. Date Subject
238 7/9 Communique on first stage of
CSCE, July 8.
*239 7/9 Rogers: departure statement,
Helsinki, July 8.
240 7/9 Rogers: arrival statement,
Prague, July 8.
*241 7/10 Subcommittee on Code of Con-
duct for Liner Conferences,
Shipping Coordinating Com-
mittee, July 19.
t242 7/10 Rush: House Committee on For-
eign Affairs.
*243 7/10 U.S. announces pledge of funds
for drug control at U.N.
ECOSOC meeting July 9.
244 7/11 Casey: House Subcommittee on
Near East.
t245 7/12 Casey: House Committee on For-
eign Affairs.
t246 7/12 Rumsfeld: House Committee on
Foreign Affairs.
*Not printed.
fHeld for a later issued of the Bulletin.
Superintendent of Documents
U.S. government printing office
WASHINGTON. O.C 20402
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s
/. 3 ;
9//7go
THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BULLETIN
Volume LXIX
No. 1780
August 6, 1973
DEPARTMENT OPPOSES PROPOSALS FOR UNILATERAL REDUCTION
OF U.S. TROOP LEVELS IN EUROPE
Statements by Deputy Secretary Rush,
Under Secretary Casey, and Ambassador Rumsfeld 209
U.S. REVIEWS YEAR'S ACTIVITIES OF THE UNITED NATIONS
IN THE FIELD OF OUTER SPACE
Statement by Herbert Reis 231
THE OFFICIAL WEEKLY RECORD OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY
For index see inside back cover
.•>iiO(V^-
THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BULLETI
Vol. LXIX, No. 1780
August 6, 1973
For sale by the Superintendent of Documents
U.S. Government Printing Office
Washington, D.C. 20402
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Note: Contents of this publication are not
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STATE BULLETIN as the source will be
appreciated. The BULLETIN is indexed in
the Readers" Guide to Periodical Literature.
The Department of State BULLETI.
a weekly publication issued by t
Office of Media Services, Bureau
Public Affairs, provides the public an
interested agencies of the government
with information on developments /i
the field of U.S. foreign relations am
on the work of the Department am
the Foreign Service.
The BULLETIN includes selectei
press releases on foreign policy, issuet
by the White House and the Depart
ment, and statements, addresses,
and news conferences of the President^
and the Secretary of State and other
officers of the Department, as well as
special articles on various phases of
international affairs and the functions^
of the Department. Information is in4
eluded concerning treaties and inters
national agreements to which the.
United States is or may become a
party and on treaties of general inter-
national interest.
Publications of the Department of
State, United Nations documents, and
legislative material in the field of
international relations are also listed.
Department Opposes Proposals for Unilateral Reduction
of U.S. Troop Levels in Europe
Following are texts of a statement made
before the House Committee on Foreign
Affairs and its Subcommittee on Europe on
Juhj 10 by Deputy Secretary Kenneth Rush,
a statement submitted on July 12 by Under
Secretary for Economic Affairs William. J.
Casey, and a statement made that day by
Donald Rumsfeld, U.S. Permanent Repre-
sentative to the North Atlantic Council.''
STATEMENT BY DEPUTY SECRETARY RUSH, JULY 10
Press release 242 dated July 10
I welcome this opportunity to testify be-
fore the House Foreign Affairs Committee
and its European Subcommittee on proposals
made by Members of the Congress and dis-
tinguished Members of this committee for a
reduction in the level of American forces in
western Europe. I very much appreciate
Chairman [Thomas E.] Morgan's readiness
to hear us before your full committee and
Congressman [Benjamin S.] Rosenthal's co-
operation in making that possible.
In order to remove any possible doubt that
may exist, I want to assure you that we are
unequivocally opposed to any unilateral re-
duction of American forces in western Eu-
rope and therefore to those proposals that
now lie before your committee that would
commit the Congress or bind the adminis-
tration to such an act.
Our policy is most authoritatively stated
by the President himself. It was most re-
cently reaffirmed in his annual foreign pol-
icy report to the Congress; there he re-
peated the pledge made to the NATO Coun-
cil last December : -
In the light of the present strategic balance and of
similar efforts by our allies, we will not only main-
tain but improve our forces in Europe and will not
reduce them unless there is reciprocal action by our
adversaries.
My colleagues and I of the executive
branch appear before your committee this
week to explain why we believe that this pol-
icy should remain that of the United States
and to ask your continued support for it.
Let me begin by assuring you that we are
keenly aware of the changed circumstances
that affect NATO, our defenses, and our re-
lationship to Europe.
First, we are embarked on a period
of active negotiations— SALT, CSCE, and
MBFR [Strategic Arms Limitation Talks;
Conference on Security and Cooperation in
Europe; mutual and balanced force reduc-
tions] — each of which has a direct bearing
on the security of our allies and ourselves.
Together with the summit meetings, they
form part of our general effort to create a
more normal relationship between East and
West. While we feel there has been progress,
this process is only beginning and in the next
phase we will be dealing with the more diffi-
cult issues of reducing military tensions.
— Second, this process is occurring at a
time when in each allied country, not just in
the United States, there are growing pres-
sures to divert resources to domestic needs.
' The complete transcript of the hearings will be
published by the committee and will be available
from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Gov-
ernment Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.
-"The complete text of President Nixon's foreign
policy report to the Congress on May .3 appears in
the Bulletin of June 4, 1973; the section entitled
"Europe and the Atlantic Alliance" begins on p. 754.
August 6, 1973
209
— Third, our allies are now stronger than
ever economically and are making significant
strides toward greater political and economic
unity. At the same time a considerable num-
ber of common trade and monetary problems
characterize our economic relationships.
— Finally, we face a strategic nuclear situ-
ation in which the predominance of the
United States vis-a-vis the U.S.S.R. has
given way to rough balance, placing a
greater premium on conventional deterrence.
I think it essential that the Congress be
fully aware of what is being done to adapt
NATO and our presence in Europe to these
realities. We are dealing with them in a
threefold manner:
1. We are seeking in this year of Europe
to reinvigorate our relationship with our
allies and to establish a framework within
which we can deal productively with the
issues of trade, finance, and security.
2. As a result of the recent meetings of
NATO's Foreign and Defense Ministers, we
are working on programs aimed at:
— Improving NATO's defense posture.
— Developing a multilateral mechanism
for more equitable burden sharing and for
helping with our military balance of pay-
ments problems.
— Revising some basic defense concepts
affecting specialization and more efllicient
use of scarce defense resources.
3. We have reached agreement that full-
scale negotiations on mutual and balanced
force reductions will begin in slightly more
than 90 days, on October 30. We are cur-
rently developing an allied position that
could lead to U.S. and Soviet reductions.
In sum, we are involved with our allies to
improve the postwar trade and monetary sys-
tem ; we are at work in NATO to build a
more equitable and effective security pos-
ture; and we are engaged with the Soviet
Union in finding ways to ease the burdens
of defense on our peoples at no loss in our
fundamental security. This is an undertak-
ing of unprecedented scope and importance
for America's future welfare. It should be
obvious that we risk failure in all these en-
deavors if:
— First, we tell our allies that irrespective
of their desires to accommodate our mutui
needs, we will unilaterally cut back our con'
tribution to the common defense.
— And second, we tell our adversaries that
we will unilaterally cut our forces even
though we want mutual reductions.
In effect, we would be telling our allies
that we want them to do more for America
in trade, finance, and security and in return
we will do less. And we would be telling the
eastern nations that they can expect some-
thing for nothing.
These are the important and compelling
considerations that convince us that unilat-
eral reductions in our NATO defense effort
would be unwise. In addition, there are three
specific reasons that I believe are of funda-
mental and determining importance. They
are that:
— The independence and security of wesi
ern Europe is vital to every American be-
cause of its decisive influence upon his
security, his economic well-being, and the
survival of his democratic way of life.
— The independence of western Europe isi
dependent upon the maintenance of a credi-
ble deterrent and defense against an attack,
and in such a defense posture U.S. forces
play a vital role.
— The process of maintaining a reliable
defense posture while negotiating an orderly
and balanced reduction in the size of the
forces facing each other in Europe would
be disastrously undercut by a unilateral re-
duction of our forces.
America's Vital Stake in Western Europe
Your committee has many times told us
and has repeatedly sustained the view that
the survival of a prosperous and independ-
ent western Europe is essential to the well-
being of the United States and of its citizens.
That primacy has in no respect diminished
during the last quarter of a century since the
conclusion of the Second World War. West-
ern Europe is, and has been, the foremost
concern in the defense of the United States
against the only other superpower. It is
there, more than anywhere else in the world,
210
Department of State Bulletin
that the future of the United States could
be threatened. It is that conviction that has
led the Congress and the President to take
tlie United States into two World Wars and
to sustain a major effort for the rebuilding of
western Europe after the Second World War
to prevent Europe's falling into hostile
hands.
Those sacrifices were made in the interests
of the United States and of its people. They
were a reflection of policies championed by
both parties and by a succession of Con-
gresses and of Presidents. They have proved
themselves to have been among the wisest
and the most sensible policies adopted by our
government in this century.
Nor is our vital interest in western Europe
by any means only a matter of history or
habit. Our very prosperity is buttressed upon
it. It has, in fact, become an ever more pow-
erful center of the world economy. It is our
most important market and our most im-
portant supplier. American firms have more
than $28 billion invested in western Europe,
which earns American investors almost $3
billion a year. Make no mistake: Our pros-
perity and the prosperity of the entire world
is deeply affected by western Europe. That
means American jobs, American dividends,
and the American standard of living.
It is because we and our western European
allies are so totally aware of our inter-
dependence that we are now engaged in com-
mon efl'orts to strengthen our common
economy through global trade negotiations
and through a reform of the world monetary
system. Neither expanded world trade nor
monetary reform can succeed without a full
measure of western European cooperation.
It is in the light of that reality that we
urge the Congress and the American people
not to discard or to turn away from the most
successful of our postwar policies or to for-
get the reasons for the sacrifice that we and
our allies have made in two great wars. This
is the moment in history when our postwar
policies are about to bear the long-desired
fruits of relaxed tension, greater stability,
reduced costs, and a more secure world peace.
It would be folly to abandon the very policies
that have brought us to the threshold of our
long-term objective.
The Need for Conventional Forces
The defense of western Europe depends
upon three conditions. First, it depends upon
the will of the Europeans to be independent
and to defend themselves. Second, it depends
upon the commitment of the United States to
its European allies that, in the face of the
imposing military resources of their neigh-
bors to the east, it will stand with them to
deter aggression and to defend our common
interests should deterrence fail. Third, it de-
pends upon the existence of a defense system
the capability of which is convincing not only
to the eastern European states but to our
NATO allies and to ourselves as well.
Fulfilling these conditions requires a con-
tinuing effort on the part of the United
States and its allies.
Our European allies do have the will to
maintain their independence and their free-
dom. They have been steadfast during the
postwar period in resisting threats to their
independence both from within and from
without. They continue to give solid, tangible
proof that they are ready, able, and deter-
mined to stand with us in our common de-
fense. They are today spending almost $35
billion a year for their own defense. They
have over 3 million men in active service in
western Europe today.
While the U.S. contribution is highly sig-
nificant, particularly because of the quality
of our forces, our allies do contribute to
NATO nearly 90 percent of the ground
forces, 80 percent of the seapower, and 75
percent of the airpower. In central Europe,
the allies, including France, supply 25 of the
291/:? combat-ready divisions.
Moreover, the allies, in the form of the
European Defense Improvement Program,
have undertaken to procure major new items
of military equipment and construction
which we have jointly agreed are most sig-
nificant in improving NATO's nonnuclear
defense capabilities. In December 1970 they
undertook a $1 billion five-year program. In
December 1971 they announced increases in
August 6, 1973
211
their planned defense budgets for the next
year of well over $1 billion. In December
1972 they announced a similar increase for
the next year of about $1.5 billion. Overall,
the defense expenditure of the European
NATO countries increased from $19.5 billion
in 1965 to $35 billion in 1973.
At the same time, the United States has
repeatedly stated its commitment to the de-
fense of its interests in Europe. Our record
of support for European reconstruction, for
the integration of western Europe, for the
creation and strengthening of NATO, and
the presence of more than 300,000 American
troops in western Europe are reciprocal
proof that we are fully and unequivocally
committed to help defend western Europe
as our own first line of defense.
This fabric of political commitment, eco-
nomic cooperation, and common defense is
convincing both to our allies and to the
Warsaw Pact nations.
It is that certainty that has guaranteed
peace with the Warsaw Pact for a quarter
century. It has allowed the economy of the
Atlantic world to prosper beyond our great-
est expectations. And today that fabric is
being strengthened by a broad range of pro-
grams for improved forces, for more equita-
ble burden sharing, for balance of payments
relief, and for development of a more ra-
tional, efficient, and cost-conscious defense
posture.
Historically, NATO's first function, and
still its most important, has been to safe-
guard its members from external attack and
pressure. I know that Soviet relations with
its neighbors in Europe, as well as with us,
have improved significantly in recent years.
We welcome that improvement. But I also
know that the Soviet Union is still far more
powerful than any other state or group of
states in Europe. I know that there is no
certainty, nor can there ever be any, that its
power will never be used to threaten the in-
terests of the members of NATO. Such
power would be a constant political pressure
on the western European states to accommo-
date to Soviet policies unless it continues to
be counterbalanced by NATO.
The Warsaw Pact nations see no inconsis-
tency between negotiations to reduce tension
in Europe and maintaining and strengthen-
ing their military power. Nor is there any
necessary inconsistency. Soviet negotiating
from strength has not impeded our search
for better relations with the East. In fact,
it has probably provided the only basis for
Soviet policy to evolve as it has. The eastern
countries no doubt will continue to negotiate j
on this basis. It is important that they never
have reason to expect that we would do
otherwise.
Even in a period of relative detente in
Europe, occasions may arise when the
U.S.S.R. would want to exert military pres-
sure on a neutral neighbor or one of the
adjacent NATO members or to back up some
diplomatic position with a show of force. No
one can exclude the possibility that in these
or other kinds of situations the Soviet Union
might wish to probe allied positions, either
as a means of diplomatic pressure or as a
possible prelude to some form of aggression.
Nor can anyone exclude the possibility of
frontier violence arising from accident
rather than design, but with unforeseeable
consequences.
The power of the Warsaw Pact has grown
appreciably in recent years. Its manpower
in eastern Europe has remained roughly con-
stant, but these forces are increasingly
armed with the most modern equipment
available. They are trained and deployed,
should war come, for a short decisive thrust
through western Europe. In keeping with
the emphasis of Soviet military doctrine on
offensive operations against NATO forces in
the event of war, the Warsaw Pact forces
have developed a superiority over the NATO
forces in tanks and artillery.
In the face of this Warsaw Pact capability,
and the diversity of the options it gives to
the Soviet Union, prudence and common
sense dictate that we be prepared for a wide
range of eventualities. Makeshift responses
imposed by inadequate advance preparation
are likely to prove not only insufficient but
downright dangerous. This is the more true
in that the purpose of the United States, as
of its allies, is to deter war. And war can be
deterred at every level only if it is cer-
212
Department of State Bulletin
tain that attack will be met at every level.
At this point I want to deal with what we
believe to be a specious argument advanced
to justify unilateral U.S. withdrawals. It is
that NATO has only a tripwire defense and
that in case of attack it would have to resort
to nuclear weapons in a few short days, if
not hours. Therefore it is argued that the
United States does not need to keep 300.000
men in Europe to serve as a tripwire.
The premise of a tripwire defense is false,
and so is the conclusion. However, major
U.S. reductions and their effect on the morale
and preparedness of our allies could well
bring about a tripwire situation in which
violence in Europe could automatically bring
the threat of nuclear war to every American.
The doctrine of "massive retaliation" be-
came inadequate when the Soviet Union be-
came a real nuclear power able to retaliate
in kind. That is why it is astonishing to hear
proposals to defend western Europe by de-
pendence upon nuclear weapons alone. This
backdoor revival of the doctrine of massive
retaliation coincides with the emergence of
something like parity in strategic weapons
systems between the United States and the
Soviet Union. But nuclear parity makes mas-
sive retaliation less believable as a means of
deterring all forms of aggression in Europe.
The proposed return to this concept, whether
it is called "massive retaliation" or "trip-
wire," as a substitute for NATO's agreed
flexible response capability reflects one of
two things : either a misunderstanding of the
implications of strategic parity or a cavalier
dismissal of the possibility of less than all-
out war in Europe.
There can never be absolute security. But
I am struck by this simple judgment: War
can probably continue to be deterred in Eu-
rope at all levels by the same means by
which it has been deterred for more than a
decade. NATO planned ahead in the 1960's
to deal with eventual strategic parity be-
tween East and West. It decided to acquire
the conventional arms needed to counter a
Warsaw Pact conventional capability to use
force in many ways short of strategic war.
Now, in the 1970's we are facing precisely
the circumstances for which these plans were
made. It seems absurd to abandon the prep-
arations so successfully made to deal with
the predicted threat that now exists.
I will not review the NATO force struc-
ture and the U.S. role in it. Other witnesses
will do so in detail. But I want to emphasize
very strongly that with continued appropri-
ate support by all its members NATO will
continue to have a solid conventional option
against Soviet-Warsaw Pact attack.
The allies have much to do to place them-
selves in the best posture to meet conven-
tional threats.
But NATO's military deficiencies are not
of a sort to require a wholesale turning away
from a rational strategy for lack of means
to put it into effect. On the contrary, it is the
expert judgment of U.S. and NATO military
planners that the flexible response strategy is
the right one for the world of the seventies
and that with vigorous political and military
leadership in the alliance, the resources
needed for this strategy can be equitably
provided.
In short, the need for a convincing con-
ventional capability to defend western Eu-
rope and to deter war is greater than ever,
and today our allies and ourselves have un-
derway the programs and actions which we
believe can continue to provide that capabil-
ity into the future.
I will leave to Ambassador Rumsfeld and
to General Goodpaster [Gen. A. J. Good-
paster, USA, Supreme Allied Commander,
Europe] a detailed explanation of the rea-
sons why our men in western Europe cannot
be replaced by our Eui-opean allies. But the
fact is that the presence of militarily signifi-
cant numbers of our troops is essential to
convince the public and the parliaments of
both our allies and the Warsaw Pact that
western Europe can and will be defended.
Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions
The third reason that unilateral reductions
would be unwise is that such an act would
cripple our careful effort to negotiate recip-
rocal force reductions. In May 1972 at the
Moscow summit, we and the Soviet Union
agreed in principle to seek reciprocal reduc-
August 6, 1973
213
tions. In November of that year, the NATO
allies invited the Warsaw Pact states to ex-
ploratory talks that opened shortly there-
after in January 1973. These resulted in an
important agreement on a negotiating forum
and upon the negotiating procedures. Finally,
the President and General Secretary Brezh-
nev agreed during their Washington meet-
ings that the substantive phase of the nego-
tiations will begin on October 30 of this year.
We are now poised to begin a series of
negotiations that could be among the most
portentous of the postwar era. It would be
unthinkable to jeopardize these negotiations
by unilateral action. Such a step would make
almost inconceivable the conduct of recip-
rocal negotiations. The very likelihood of
such a decision would remove the incentive
of the Warsaw Pact states to negotiate at all.
Moreover, a unilateral American troop re-
duction would seriously divide the NATO
alliance. Since the United States would have
reduced without regard to the military con-
sequences, our allies would be under political
pressure from their parliaments to make
comparable unilateral reductions. The entire
fabric of our common decisionmaking could
be torn apart. And while the governments
would probably oppose any further reduc-
tions — reciprocal or not — the process of un-
raveling the peacetime defense of the West
would be underway and would have been be-
gun by the United States itself.
Under such circumstances, our every effort
would be needed to hold NATO together and
to restore some degree of its effectiveness.
Our unilateral reductions would unsettle
the entire military situation in Europe to
our detriment. Who among us can be confi-
dent that the discovery of a weakened and
divided West would not reawaken the appe-
tite of those in the East whose hope for the
control of all Europe must still sui-vive?
Who would feel America's interests would be
safeguarded once accommodation rather than
independence became the guiding rule of
Europe's foreign policy?
We do not yet know precisely where the
effort to achieve mutual reductions will even-
tually lead. Like SALT, it promises to be a
process that will yield not only substantial
military results but a continuing political
discourse that could well be valuable to us.
In SALT, our candid discussions with the
Soviet Union did much to dispel common
misconceptions. That same possibility lies
before us in MBFR. I urge that none of us
underestimate the contribution that it could
make to our security and to reduced inter-
national tensions.
But the promising prospects of these mo-
mentous negotiations would be destroyed by
a unilateral decision of the United States to
reduce its NATO forces. Such a pullout
would disrupt NATO, unsettle the existing
East- West equilibrium, and abruptly halt the
process of reciprocal force reduction.
Economic Aspects
I have stated the three decisive reasons
against a unilateral troop withdrawal. Let
me conclude by explaining why, in our judg-
ment, we need not feel forced by economics
to do that which political and military reason
tells us would be profoundly wrong.
There is much confusion about the costs
of our military deployments in the European
theater. Let's begin with the facts about cost.
First, the budgetary costs. Our budgetary
outlays for keeping our 300,000 men in the
European theater, and that includes the
Mediterranean Sea, is $4 billion for fiscal
year 1974. That is the cost of pay and main-
tenance of these men and their dependents
in Europe.
However, if we consider the cost of the
support facilities in the United States for
these forces and the cost of their arms and
equipment, the cost rises to $7.7 billion for
fiscal year 1974. That includes the $4 billion
figure.
Within these costs there is an incremental
cost to the stationing of our forces in Europe
additional to the costs of similar forces in the
United States. It runs to about $400 million
per year and is composed largely of such ex-
penses as transportation.
Now, that is the budgetary cost of keep-
ing 300,000 men and their dependents in
Europe. If you bring these men home and
maintain our NATO commitment, you will
214
Department of State Bulletin
have to keep them in uniform and provide
the added transport and duplicate heavy
ai-ms in Europe so that they can be rapidly
returned to fight there. In that case, the an-
nual budget cost will be more than at
present.
The main point is that while there is a
modest incremental cost to stationing our
forces in Europe, these costs cannot be saved
by bringing the troops home if at the same
time we are serious about providing the
wherewithal to continue meeting our com-
mitments.
Second, there is the balance of payments
effect. In this calculation we are trying to
measure the net outflow (or inflow) of all
goods, services, and capital between the
United States and the rest of the world.
The result of our having 300,000 men and
their dependents in Europe was a deficit in
our military balance of payments of $1.5 bil-
lion in fiscal year 1972. That is, after sub-
tracting the value of our military exports
and services to western Europe from the
value of our military expenditures in west-
ern Europe, there was a difference of $1.5
billion. In this particular part of our overall
balance of payments, we had spent more
than we had earned.
This excess of military purchases over mil-
itary sales has to be looked at in the context
of our overall balance of payments. It is
comparable, for example, to the excess of
expenditures by American tourists visiting
western Europe over the expenditures of
western European tourists visiting the
United States. There our deficit for 1972 was
$1.2 billion.
But our $1.5 billion deficit on military ac-
count is a relatively small part of our balance
of payments deficit. In 1972 our total basic
payments deficit was $9.2 billion. And of
this, only a sixth (that is, $1.5 billion) was
attributable to our military spending in Eu-
rope, of which the deployment of our troops
is a major part. However, such comparisons
are overly simplistic in that they fail to take
into account the interdependency of different
accounts that make up the balance of pay-
ments. Thus, even total withdrawal of all
troops could not be expected to "improve"
our balance of payments by $1.5 billion, be-
cause of indirect or secondary effects that
withdrawal would have on other activities
affecting the payments situation — such as
European imports of nonmilitary goods and
services from the United States.
Obviously, the United States cannot man-
age a $9 billion basic deficit indefinitely. But
neither can we eliminate it simply by attack-
ing individual items such as the military
account. The causes of the deficit are funda-
mental, and fundamental changes are re-
quired to respond to them. That is why we
have moved so energetically to correct the
problem by the devaluation of the dollar and
by insisting upon constructive reform of the
international monetary system.
It is because these fundamental economic
changes are being made that we need not feel
that our national defense must be hobbled
by balance of payments problems. The re-
alignment of currencies will strengthen our
competitive position over the whole range of
our exports and imports of goods and serv-
ices, which are running in excess of $80 bil-
lion each way. It will also influence the out-
flow and inflow of long-term investments.
As Secretary Casey will tell you, the
results of our monetary actions are be-
ginning to take effect. Our overall balance
of payments has begun to improve as the
turnaround has started to take hold. The
Department of Commerce data for the first
quarter of this calendar year shows a drop
in the deficit in our basic balance of pay-
ments from $3.8 billion for the first quarter
of 1972 to $1.2 billion this year. That is a
very impressive improvement. Our econo-
mists believe that, despite some initial spotti-
ness, the trend back to equilibrium will
continue and that it will do so at an increas-
ing pace.
This turnaround in our balance of pay-
ments does mean that the very real concern
that we have had about the balance of pay-
ments costs of stationing troops in western
Europe is much relieved. We can see the
restoration of equilibrium in the reasonable
future. We must, however, continue to exact
every possible economy in the maintenance
of our forces there. And we must continue to
August 6, 1973
215
press our allies to shoulder a larger and
more equitable portion of the costs of the de-
fense of Europe. Relief is now being felt,
not only because of these moves but because
of the effects of the Smithsonian agreement
and the other currency adjustments that
have been made.
In calling on our allies to share a larger
part of the defense burden, I would not want
you to assume that they are not already do-
ing a great deal to reduce our military bal-
ance of payments deficit. A significant share
of their defense outlays goes to capital im-
provements, and much of this is spent on
purchases of U.S. military equipment.
The German Government, in addition to
substantial arms purchases in the United
States, has also purchased $621 million in
U.S. Government medium-term securities on
which it pays the interest and has put $186
million into the rehabilitation of U.S. bar-
racks in Germany, benefiting both our bal-
ance of payments and our budget costs. The
total value of this oflfset agreement to the
United States has been approximately $2,065
billion over a two-year period. We are now
negotiating another ofi'set agreement with
the Federal Republic. In addition, and im-
portant for the long run, NATO's Defense
Ministers last month agreed to examine the
problem of finding additional multilateral
means to reduce the adverse economic conse-
quences borne by the United States as a re-
sult of its stationing forces in Europe. We
consider this a major step that can reduce
the incremental budgetary burden and bal-
ance of payments impact of stationing forces
abroad rather than at home.
It is the turnaround in our balance of pay-
ments outlook, the stringent balance of pay-
ments economies being practiced by the De-
partment of Defense, and the continued sup-
port of our allies in reducing the balance of
payments effects of our troops in Europe
that leads to the conclusion that I have al-
ready stated; that is, that our balance of
payments situation does not oblige us to
make decisions about the deployment of
troops in Europe that are politically and
militarily wrong.
It is for these reasons, Mr. Chairman,
that we believe that a decision to make uni-
lateral reductions in the number of American
troops in western Europe would be gravely
contrary to the vital interests of the United
States and its citizens.
The friendship and cooperation of western
Europe is essential to the security, economic
well-being, and peace of mind of every
American. Our defense is its defense, and its
security is essential to our own.
That security today depends upon a con-
vincing conventional and nuclear capability
to resist pressure, to deter aggression, and
to defend western Europe if deterrence fails.
Today that dual capability exists, but it
hinges upon the presence of substantial U.S.
forces in Europe.
Our goal is to maintain our present secu-
rity, but to do so at lower levels of tension
and armament. The process of making the
transition from security at the present level
to security at a lower level will be diflicult.
But the negotiations to do so are already
agreed between the Warsaw Pact and NATO.
The substantive phase of the mutual and bal-
anced force reduction negotiations opens on
October 30.
These extraordinarily important negotia-
tions cannot succeed, nor can they proceed,
if the United States undercuts them with
unilateral troop reductions.
Equally important, our efforts with our
allies for more equitable burden sharing,
trade, and monetary arrangements are also
underway. Programs to improve NATO's de-
fense and to provide a more cost-conscious
and eflicient posture are also in train.
Nor need we feel compelled by our budget
or balance of payments to withdraw our
troops from the area where they are most
valuable to a distant base in the United
States. The improvement in our overall bal-
ance of payments that is already beginning
to show can be expected greatly to diminish
this pressure in the months ahead.
It is for these essential reasons that my
colleagues and I believe that unilateral troop
reductions in western Europe would be con-
trary to the interests of the American peo-
ple and that we ask your continued support
for our Atlantic defense policy.
216
Department of State Bulletin
STATEMENT BY UNDER SECRETARY CASEY, JULY 12
Press release 245 dated July 12
Mr. Chairman : I am pleased to have this
opportunity to discuss with you and the dis-
tinguished Members of this committee ques-
tions concerning the maintenance of U.S.
military forces in Europe, with particular
emphasis on the balance of payments aspect
of our European troop commitment. For the
reasons given in my testimony today, I trust
the committee and the Congress will reject
proposals for unilateral reductions in our
force levels.
We maintain these forces in Europe be-
cause security interests of the highest im-
portance to the United States demand it.
What happens in western Europe is a matter
of utmost gravity to the United States. West-
ern Europe is the second greatest economic
power in the world, linked to the United
States by innumerable strategic, political,
cultural, and economic ties. It is American
security which dictates the necessity to deter
not only a full-scale Soviet attack on western
Europe but also the application of Soviet
political pressure on that area that could give
it a veto power over western European co-
operation with the United States. U.S. forces
in Europe together with those of our NATO
allies provide an effective shield for our com-
mon interests there. This shield has made
possible not only the recovery of Europe but
the development of detente with the Soviet
Union and the Warsaw Pact. It is the pres-
ence of these forces which has been in large
measure responsible for the agreement by
the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact to
agree to talks on the mutual reduction of
forces, through which we hope forces on both
sides may be reduced in this region, thereby
contributing to increased stability at less
cost to us all. It is against these fundamental
national security considerations that I wish
to cast my remarks on the balance of pay-
ments costs of our troops in Europe.
At the outset, Mr. Chairman, let me under-
score the distinction between the budget
cost of our forces deployed in the European
area and our military balance of payments
with NATO Europe.
The budget cost of our maintaining some
300,000 troops and their dependents in the
European area is about $4 billion for their
pay and maintenance. If we add to that the
cost of the support facilities in the United
States for these forces, the cost of their
arms and equipment, and a proportionate
share of the U.S.-based training and logistics
support, the cost rises to $7.7 billion for fiscal
year 1974. These are the total dollars spent
to pay for our forces in the European area.
You will also have heard the figure of $17
billion. That is the cost of all the U.S. armed
forces, wherever located in the world, that
are committed to NATO and would be de-
ployed in the event of hostilities. It is not the
cost of our troops now in Europe, nor would
this amount be saved even if we withdrew all
of our forces from Europe.
In FY 1972, foreign currency expenditures
for these troops was about $2.1 billion in
NATO European countries. This supported
our troop deployments and the 6th Fleet.
European countries spent about $600 million
in the United States (mainly for military
goods and services) , leaving a net deficit of
about $1.5 billion in the U.S. military pay-
ments balance with NATO countries. This
deficit with NATO Europe comprised about
one-sixth of the overall worldwide basic bal-
ance of payments deficit of about $9.2 billion.
While the continued decline in value of the
dollar increases our foreign costs, it increases
the competitiveness of our services and mer-
chandise exports. It therefore contributes
to the improvement of our balance of pay-
ments and speeds the return to equilibrium.
At the same time, of course, it does increase
the cost of our troop deployments in western
Europe to the extent that these expenditures
apply to local costs. This increase is small,
however, compared to the favorable impact
which the new exchange rates are having on
our $80 billion annual exports of goods and
services.
It is obvious, therefore, that the deteriora-
tion in the military balance of payments has
not been the primary cause of our deterio-
rating balance of payments situation with
NATO Europe. The major problem has been
an increasingly adverse balance in nonmili-
August 6, 1973
217
tary goods and services. The balance of this
account deterioi-ated from a surplus of $1
billion in 1970 to a deficit of about $2.7 bil-
lion in 1972. The very significant fact that I
want to underline to you is that this adverse
trend has apparently begun to turn around.
Since April 1971, the value of the dollar
has declined sharply with respect to many of
our trading partners; for example, by 26
percent with Japan, 34 percent with Ger-
many, 33 percent with Switzerland, and 26
percent with France. This factor, coupled
with the continuing effects of the 1971 de-
valuation and the still-evolving impact of
the February dollar devaluation, has im-
proved our competitive position in interna-
tional trade. A turnaround has, in fact,
already started to take effect. The statistics
indicate a steady export growth between
January and May, up 35 percent over the
same five-month period in 1972. Imports, on
the other hand, have shown only a 23 percent
rise during the past five months over the
same 1972 period. Thus, the January to May
1972 trade deficit of $2,414,300,000 has re-
duced during the same 1973 period to $454.5
million. Since March, with the European
countries and Japan functioning under a
"managed floating" exchange rate system,
there has been a net reduction in official dol-
lar holdings of about $1.6 billion — mainly by
Japan. This compares with increases in hold-
ings, from January 1 to mid-March, of $11.5
billion.
Predictions of future performance aie
hazardous because of rising demand and the
fact that the U.S. economy is running close
to capacity, coupled with export controls on
various commodities. These factors are likely
to reduce the extent of the improvement in
the trade account in 1973 and may mask the
real improvement in longrun competitiveness
of U.S. exports.
The current decline of the dollar is not
justified by fundamental trade and balance
of payments factors but seems to arise from
confidence and related psychological factors.
We continue to believe that the general
structure of exchange rates established by
the February realignment is broadly correct
in the sense that it provides a valid basis for
elimination of the longstanding U.S. deficit
and restoration of international payments
equilibrium. Indeed, developments in recent
months with respect to our trade position
reinforce the view that our competitive posi-
tion has benefited in a major way from the
two realignments of December 1971 and Feb-
ruary 1973, and further important gains in
our balance of payments can be expected.
Plainly, the speed and extent of our success
will, as always, be dependent upon our ability
to restrain inflation at home and to maintain
a sound domestic economy.
As Deputy Secretary Rush testified on
Tuesday, the approach to eliminating our
balance of payments deficit should not be to
forgo programs which are essential to our
security. We want to be satisfied that they
are necessary and carried out in an efficient
and economical manner. But then, we should
recognize that the causes of our balance of
payments deficit are fundamental, and fun-
damental changes are required to respond to
them. That is why we have moved so ener-
getically to correct the problem by the de-
valuation of the dollar and by insisting upon
constructive reform of the international
monetary system.
It is because these fundamental economic
changes are being made that we need not
feel that our national defense must be hob-
bled by balance of payments problems. The
realignment of currencies will strengthen
our competitive position over the whole
range of our exports and imports of goods
and services and also influence the outflow
and inflow of long-term investments.
At the same time, we are firmly committed
to the maximum possible alleviation of the
balance of payments costs attributed to our
troop presence. Let me spell out how we are
pursuing this. There are now two strands
to this effort.
The first strand is to continue our bilateral
offset arrangements with the Federal Re-
public of Germany. These have a history of
successive improvements in quality. These
oflfset arrangements will continue to be nec-
essary as long as the overall balance of pay-
ments adjustment is not accomplished.
The second element will be the eflfort, com-
218
Department of State Bulletin
bined with the bilateral offset program with
the Federal Republic of Germany, to develop
offset arrangements with all of NATO Eu-
rope in a multilateral framework. We expect
that a formal report will be made to the De-
fense Planning Committee ministerial meet-
ing in December and that we shall have even
before then clear indications of the direction
in which our allies wish to move.
When we discuss troop costs, there are
three aspects which tend to become confused.
First, there is offset, which refers to meas-
ures w'hich give goods or securities to an ally
but give us dollars to erase the balance of
liayments costs of stationing our troops in
Europe. Secondly, there is burden sharing
or cost absorption, which avoids balance of
payments costs of stationing our troops in
of the extra budgetary cost involved in sta-
tioning our troops in Europe. Some meas-
ures, for example, for the Germans or other
Europeans to pay up the cost of local labor
or of providing or making improvements in
necessary facilities, would accomplish both
burden sharing and offset. Finally, there is
force improvement, which involves improve-
ment in the quality and quantity of forces
of the allies as a whole, such as the European
Defense Improvement Program in Europe.
What w-e hope to avoid is that, to the extent
the Europeans share some part of our budge-
tary burden, they not simultaneously reduce
the effectiveness of their own troops.
Multilateral Offset Measures
The alliance itself has long recognized, as
stated in the communique of the North At-
lantic Council in November 1968, that the
solidarity of the alliance can be strengthened
by cooperation between members to alleviate
balance of payments deficits resulting spe-
cifically from military expenditures for the
common defense.
In his May 3, 1973, report. President
Nixon stated:
Our position is unique in that our deployments in
Europe add significantly to our general balance of
payments deficit.
... the Alliance as a whole should examine this
problem. As a general principle, we should move
toward a lasting solution under which balance of
payments consequences from stationing U.S. forces
in Europe will not be substantially different from
those of maintaining the same forces in the United
States. It is reasonable to expect the Alliance to ex-
amine this problem this year.
On June 7 at the meeting of the Defense
Planning Committee in ministerial session,
Defense Secretary [James R.] Schlesinger
asked the Ministers to work on the develop-
ment of a multilateral program to compen-
sate the United States for the additional
burden it assumes by stationing its troops in
Europe. In the communique following this
meeting, the Ministers directed the Perma-
nent Representatives to develop appropriate
recommendations.
At this time it is too early to say just what
kind of program and of what amount will be
developed. Suffice it to say that our goal is
that this, combined with the bilateral offset
program with the Federal Republic of Ger-
many, will move significantly toward elimi-
nating our military balance of payments
deficit with NATO Europe. We expect that
a formal report will be made to the Defense
Planning Committee ministerial meeting in
December and that we shall have even before
then clear indications of the direction in
which we can move on multilateral burden
sharing.
We believe that this program should be
developed and implemented by our allies. In
this connection the allies could undertake
actions which would cover both budgetary
and balance of payments costs of U.S. troops
stationed in Europe. These could, for exam-
ple, include such things as assuming recur-
ring costs for the operation and maintenance
of bases and other real property or such non-
recurring costs connected with construction
or rehabilitation of facilities used by our
troops. They might also undertake certain
actions which would reduce the U.S. military
balance of payments deficit such as increased
purchases of military goods and services in
the United States or by the funding of cer-
tain research and development projects in
this country.
We shall, of course, be working closely
with our allies on this problem and shall
August 6, 1973
219
keep this committee and the Congress in-
formed on the progress we have made.
Bilateral Offset Measures
Of our forces in Europe the bulk —
210,000 — is stationed in the Federal Repub-
lic of Germany.
A key member of the NATO alliance,
Germany has been consistently one of
NATO's strongest supporters. Its total force
contribution of 485,000 men is the largest
of the European forces committed to NATO,
and its financial support of NATO is the
highest of the European members. Germany
has provided effective leadership in NATO to-
ward securing a greater West European con-
tribution to Western defense. It promoted the
European Defense Improvement Program,
under which the European NATO states in
1970 agreed to contribute $1 billion over a
five-year period for force improvements
above and beyond their normal military bud-
gets, and it has assumed about half of the
total costs of that program. In line with
NATO force goals recommendations, Ger-
many also has placed a high priority on im-
proving its military capabilities with special
emphasis on improvements in armor, anti-
tank weapons, maritime forces, and air and
air defense weapons. So the presence of a
substantial number of U.S. troops in Ger-
many, together with the over 140,000 British,
French, Belgian, Canadian, and Dutch sol-
diers stationed on German soil, is an impor-
tant but not dominant element in defense of
the central front in Europe. The FRG is the
dominant element.
Under a series of offset agreements dating
back to the early 1960's, the German Govern-
ment has substantially increased the trans-
fers of funds to the United States to finance
military purchases in the United States and
to invest in certain special securities and
other assets in order to offset the costs of
stationing of U.S. troops in Germany. Our
current offset agreement expired June 30,
and we now are in the process of negotiating
a new bilateral offset agreement. For this
purpose I have met with the German chief
negotiator, Assistant Secretary [Peter]
Hermes of the German Foreign Oflice, to
discuss aspects of a new agreement. The
German negotiator has undertaken to assess
German procurement possibilities, and we
have provided a number of proposals for
study. These negotiations are continuing in
an orderly fashion, and it is expected that,
as in the past, the new offset agreement will
be retroactive; that is, to July 1, 1973.
Through fiscal year 1967, German military
procurement in the United States repre-
sented the major component in a mix of pur-
chases and transactions designed to balance
as much as possible U.S. military spending
in Germany. The first three offset agreements
provided for German military procurement
from the United States close to $4 billion for
fiscal years 1962-67.
By the midsixties, however, basic equip-
ping of German military forces was accom-
plished, and the level of German military
procurement dropped off sharply. As a re-
sult, new forms of offset were developed.
The Germans agreed to purchase medium-
term U.S. Treasury notes in the amount of
$500 million and $625 million respectively,
at market rates of interest.
While the transactions during the fiscal
years 1968 and 1969 had an immediate fa-
vorable impact on the U.S. balance of pay-
ments, they were not entirely satisfactory
as a sole means of offset, and an improved
agreement was negotiated for fiscal year
1970-71. Military procurement again became
a major offset component. The agreement
provided also for additional civilian offset
procurement, a long-term loan at below-
market rates of interest subsidized by the
Bonn government, and various other finan-
cial transactions. A detailing of the elements
of this agreement is being submitted sepa-
rately for the record. The components of the
1970-71 offset came to $1.52 billion, at the
then prevailing exchange rate.
The latest agreement, covering fiscal years
1972 and 1973, reflected further improve-
ments in ofi'setting our troop costs, with total
benefits amounting to over $2 billion. At
$1,207 billion, military procurement in the
United States again represented the largest
220
Department of State Bulletin
single component. Secondly, the German
Bundesbank (central bank) agreed to lend
the United States the amount of $621 million
(repayable after 4i/o years at 2.5 percent
interest) . Other elements include a cash pay-
ment of $100 million equivalent to interest
and, for the first time in the history of our
offset agreements, a commitment by the Ger-
man Government to provide $186 million for
the rehal)ilitation of U.S. troop barracks and
other facilities. This component represents
the fir.SL time that German funds have been
made available for the direct support of U.S.
activities in the Federal Republic. The bar-
racks rehabilitation program has proceeded
exi^editiously. The program involves the re-
habilitation and renovation of eight airbases,
56 barracks, and 35 remote sites. The Ger-
man Government to date has committed 97
percent of the promised funds under this
provision of the offset agreement. Just
this week, in Ludwigsburg, Germany, the
first completely renovated barracks vi^ere
dedicated by our top diplomatic and military
representatives in Germany in the presence
of German Defense Minister [Georg] Leber.
Since the inception of the offset agree-
ments, the German Government has com-
mitted itself to military procurement in the
United States exceeding $5.5 billion. Here
again the German record of fulfilling its off-
set commitments has been exemplary. While
the data on military procurement for the
last four quarters of the current agreement
is not yet complete, the record of the Ger-
man Government from the inception of the
offset agreements has been one of faithful
fulfillment of their obligations under the
agreement.
I am making available for the record more
detailed breakdowns concerning U.S. securi-
ties purchased by the Federal Republic of
Germany under terms of the various offset
agreements and on German military pro-
curement.
Troop Reductions, Trade, and Monetary Reform
While I have concentrated my attention
upon the balance of payments aspects of the
troop level problem, I cannot leave the sub-
ject at that. As Under Secretary of State for
Economic Affairs, I am working daily with
our European allies on the whole range of
our economic relations.
These are enormously important to our
prosperity as well as to our security. The
future of the world monetary system, of
world trade, of our private investments
abroad, and of our income from services,
patents, and royalties dei)ends squarely upon
our ability to work closely and constructively
with the West Europeans.
We need western Europe and its good will
for our well-being just as western Europe
needs us and our good will for its well-being.
We are deeply interdependent, not only in
the abstract but in the practical day-to-day
lives of our workers, our farmers, our in-
vestors, and our managers.
We and our NATO allies have been able
to forge a prosperous and dynamic world
economy from the ruin of war because we
worked together, not only to rebuild the
world economy, but also because we worked
together to provide for our common security.
There can be no prosperity without security,
just as there can be no security without a
sound economy.
We cannot abandon that cooperation in
one sector without gravely damaging the
other. It is that knowledge that has always
provided the commonsense bounds to our
differences on any matter.
That is a reality that I urge the committee
not to forget as it considers proposals to act
unilaterally to reduce our contribution to
our common defense. It would not be prudent
to assume that the good will and constructive
effort that our allies have brought to the
solution of our common trade and monetary
problems could be quite the same if our co-
operation in our common defense had been
eroded by substantial unilateral troop re-
ductions.
I do not wish to say that our economic
cooperation would be ended. But I do believe
that it would be permeated by a new and
corrosive atmosphere that would make the
resolution of our common basic economic
problems much more difficult. That is a cost
August 6, 1973
221
which every prudent man should give due
weight as he considers the wider implica-
tions of the troop level proposals lying be-
fore your committee.
Mr. Chairman, Mr. Rosenthal, my state-
ment has been a short one, but I hope that I
have conveyed several basic points :
— First, that our balance of payments is
not a factor obliging the United States to
reduce its deployment of troops in western
Europe;
— Second, that the deficit in our balance
of payments caused by military costs in
Europe is a small component of the total ;
— Third, that the fundamental change in
our worldwide competitive position as a re-
sult of the devaluation of the dollar promises
to wipe out our military deficit within the
foreseeable future;
— Fourth, that the turnaround in our basic
balance of payments is already evident and
may be expected to continue;
— Fifth, that we are at the same time
woi'king energetically with our NATO allies
to improve the valuable balance of payments
and budgetary help that they are already
providing for our European costs; and
— Finally, that there will be an inevitable
and disadvantageous spillover into our eco-
nomic relations with our major trading part-
ners if we ignore their deep security concerns
and make major unilateral troop reductions.
It is with these very weighty considera-
tions in mind that I urge the committee and
the Congress to reject proposals for uni-
lateral reduction of our European troop
deployment.
STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR RUMSFELD, JULY 12
Piesa release 24G dated July 12
I welcome the opportunity to appear be-
fore this committee to discuss the question
of American forces in Europe. This issue
has been a central topic of foreign policy
debate for many years; and it is a subject
on which I have had countless discussions,
not only at NATO but in many allied capi-
tals, with European leaders. It is especially
appropriate that in this year of examination
of Atlantic relations — a reexamination which
has certainly stirred Europe — you have fo-
cused on the question of this alliance, which
is the keystone of our foreign policj'.
Because of the several negotiations with
the East and because of the President's call
for a fresh look at our Atlantic relations,
the shape of the future U.S. presence in
Europe is a most important topic.
I would particularly like to discuss with
you today what I believe are the fundamental
questions of what policy purposes are served
by our troops in Europe. We sometimes get
so preoccupied with some of the detailed
questions related to the management and
maintenance of these armed forces that we
fail to reflect upon the basic reasons why
they are there at all.
Let us review briefly, then, the principal
reasons why five successive American Pres-
idents have determined that it is in the na-
tional interest to station American forces on
the continent of Europe. I would summarize
these as follows:
1. To assist in preventing the domination
of western Europe by the Soviet Union.
2. To provide a contribution to the defen-
sive strength of the alliance, which is the
essential underpinning of allied efforts to
lessen tensions in Europe.
3. To contribute to the achievement of
stable conditions for the development of
mutual prosperity in our relationships with
western Europe.
4. Finally, to help enable a reinvigorated
western Europe to assume a greater share
of the common defense.
What I would like to do today is evaluate
the success we have had to date in achieving
those aims and to give my views on what
further needs to be done.
1. It is worth recalling the familiar point
that the NATO alliance has succeeded for
nearly 25 years in preserving the independ-
ence, integrity, and stability of the West. I
have not received the least indication from
any ally that responsible Europeans are in-
difi"erent to this achievement or think that
NATO's usefulness is now over.
222
Department of State Bulletin
This may seem an impolitic point to make,
in view of the improving relations between
the Soviet Union and the United States ; but
we must continue to bear in mind the power-
ful Soviet position across the Eurasian land-
mass. Soviet political and economic long-term
interests would be served by a stronger role
in western Europe, and there is no reason to
believe that, given the opportunity, the So-
viet Union would fail to take advantage of
opportunities to satisfy those interests. As
others have discussed in greater detail, we
are still faced with an impressive array of
Soviet military power.
In the absence of an effective alliance
defense posture credibly linked to the U.S.
nuclear deterrent, I fail to see how we could
prevent the Soviets from enjoying a
strengthened position. I also see little likeli-
hood at present of a unified European de-
fense grouping which could substitute in
great part for the U.S. commitment to Euro-
pean defense.
2. In terms of the second interest, assur-
ing the stability necessary to lessen tensions
in Europe, we can take satisfaction from the
impressive progress in recent years. The
achievements of the Federal Republic of
Germany in reconciling some of the deep
conflicts with its eastern neighbors have
contributed to the reduction of tension in
Europe. The Four-Power agreement on Ber-
lin and the recent treaty between East and
West Germany are part of this encouraging
picture.
Other important negotiations are contin-
uing or are just getting underway: SALT
Two, the Conference on Security and Co-
operation in Europe, and the conference on
mutual and balanced force reductions. Our
bilateral relations with the Soviet Union
have improved markedly in recent years,
culminating in the President's two meetings
with the Soviet leadership, resulting in nu-
merous new agreements. We might also draw
some hope from at least some indications
that the leadership of the Soviet Union is
underlining the importance of technological
improvement and the level of consumer
goods, as reported in the recent study by the
Joint Economic Committee.
What we must also bear in mind, however,
is that this process is by no means complete.
Nor do we know what the future will hold.
The Soviet Union continues to enjoy a dom-
inant position in eastern Europe and remains
dedicated to a system irreconcilable with our
own in many ways. Massive armies still con-
front each other across the center of Europe.
There remain points of potential conflict —
the Middle East, the Balkans — and Europe
is still a divided continent.
3. With respect to the third interest, the
creation of conditions of stability and well-
being, the achievements of the Atlantic com-
munity have been impressive. The countries
of western Europe have been free of signifi-
cant conflict among themselves, and I do
not think that even today we should under-
estimate the influence of a visible U.S. pres-
ence on this unprecedented harmony. In the
postwar years, the United States has en-
joyed the fruits of a highly productive and
mutually beneficial relationship with Eu-
rope in the economic and commercial spheres.
It would be a grave error, however, to
take the indefinite continuation of these rela-
tions for granted. A growing conviction in
Europe that the United States was deter-
mined to unilaterally withdraw out of pique
over some specific commercial issues w^ould
be widely seen as a lessening of the U.S. com-
mitment to preserve its interest in Europe.
This could start a regressive trend in our
mutual relations which could result in a de-
structive upswing of protectionism on both
sides of the Atlantic. I believe that a sharp
unilateral reduction of our forces would only
worsen the difficult problems in the commer-
cial field which we are experiencing today.
4. Let me turn to the final item on my list
of U.S. interests, the assumption by western
Europe of its share of the common defense.
I know the committee is familiar with the
figures on the division of burden within the
NATO defense structure.
We are all aware that the Europeans do
make a substantial contribution to their own
defense. We are also all aware that they
could do more, particularly to improve
NATO's conventional defense posture, and
could be more helpful in assisting us in a
August 6, 1973
223
portion of our balance of payments problem.
Active efforts are continuing in NATO to
insure that the United States does not have
to face a disproportionate share of the com-
mon defense. In May we proposed to the
allies a new multilateral approach to burden
sharing to supplement our bilateral arrange-
ments.
However, a unilateral reduction of U.S.
forces could make it much more difficult to
convince the allies that they should contrib-
ute more resources to the alliance. Such a
move could convince them of the unreliability
of the U.S. commitment and thus of the
NATO defense system concept. The principal
effect would be to create a dangerous situa-
tion of American retreat and European con-
fusion at a time of critical negotiations with
the Soviet Union on fundamental security
questions.
Prevention of War in Europe
But there is one more reason why it has
been thought wise and in the national inter-
est to station American forces in western
Europe — the prevention of war in Europe.
If someone who was trying to forecast
the future in 1953, or even 1963, had told us
that not only would there be no war in Eu-
rope by 1973 but that the perception of the
danger of war in 1973 would be less and that
people generally would be relaxed and not
fearful, we probably would have thought him
excessively optimistic, somewhat unrealistic,
and not very prudent.
I offer this comment to emphasize the re-
markable fact that there has been no war
in Europe for 28 years. We don't have to
dwell on historical examples of Europe 100
years ago, or before World War I, or before
World War II, to remind ourselves that long
periods without war have not been the ordi-
nary state of affairs in European history.
This different and improved situation has
resulted from decades of wise leadership and
steadiness of purpose, expressed through the
North Atlantic partnership in its political
and economic and military aspects.
Among our chief policy objectives must
be the continuation of peace in Europe. We
cannot take peace for granted; it will not
just happen; if we achieve it, it will be be-
cause of wise and strenuous efforts. What-
ever the other problems — diplomatic, politi-
cal, economic, monetaiy — they are subordi-
nate in importance to the task of preventing
another war.
The trouble with what I am saying is that,
once said, it is too obvious. But if it is not
said, there is a danger that we will take peace
for granted as if it were the normal state of
things in international affairs, as it is in do-
mestic politics ; and taking peace for granted
can lead to grave errors with severe conse-
quences. I take the risk of saying the obvious
and telling you what you know well, to make
sure that we consider these questions in
the right context; namely, preventing war.
How can the United States in cooperation
with our European allies pursue these aims?
Europe is not yet one. It is still a collection
of very distinct nations ; this sometimes
makes Europe a difficult negotiating partner,
as we have seen. But Europe is fully united
on one question — and I know of no signifi-
cant departure from this consensus — the con-
viction that it is of the highest importance
for the period ahead that the United States
and NATO maintain their military force
levels in Europe until the time when compa-
rable reductions can be obtained, through
negotiations, with the other side.
In past decades the United States had an
overwhelming strategic nuclear capability,
which deterred both conventional and nu-
clear attacks against us or our European
allies.
Now a situation of rough strategic nuclear
parity exists. Both sides are thought to be
capable of sustaining a first nuclear attack
and striking back with their own nuclear
weapons. Now both sides theoretically deter
nuclear attack.
When in 1967 we decided, with our NATO
allies, to abandon the policy of massive re-
taliation, we knew that the alternative would
be a burden. But we accepted the demands
on our money and our manpower, and we
welcomed the new situation. We were right
224
Department of State Bulletin
to welcome it, because we had reached the
stage in which resort to nuclear weapons
seemed less likely than it had a decade
before.
A marked imbalance of conventional
forces, tempting one side to strike at the
other because the "pickin's" looked easy, pre-
sents a situation which might be provocative
because the weakness was enticing. If the
victim of aggression is weak in conventional
forces but has a substantial nuclear capabil-
ity, the possibility of nuclear war seems
greater.
The alternative to a dangerously low nu-
clear threshold is the maintenance of an ade-
quate conventional force in Europe and,
perhaps more important, the maintenance of
the belief by all parties that we can be
counted upon to maintain that collective de-
fense force until negotiations have permitted
a reduction on both sides. Such a negotiated
reduction is the only kind of reduction that
does not lower the threshold and increase
the risks of nuclear war.
Preventing war, preserving the independ-
ence of western Europe, reducing tensions,
creating stability, and helping Europe in-
creasingly to provide its own defense — those
are the common goals. They are what the
French political commentator Raymond Aron
meant when he applauded the President's
initiative for a reexamination of Atlantic
relations and said, "At this time when eco-
nomics appears to divide us, let us remember
that politics unites us."
Contributions of the Allies
Mr. Chairman, I am often asked: Why
does so much of the burden for the defense
of Europe fall on the United States? Why
can't the Europeans do more for their own
defense? Are the allies doing their fair
share?
The answer is that they do make a sub-
stantial effort and carry a large share of the
burden. You know that by rough aggregate
calculations they provide something approxi-
mating 90 percent of the men, 80 percent of
the ships, and 75 percent of the aircraft in
western Europe. As for defense spending,
NATO Europe, including France, devoted
something in the range of $35 bilhon to de-
fense in 1972. Their defense expenditure
collectively has increased by an average of
10 percent per year in current terms since
1970. In constant terms, the increase has
been on the order of 3 or 4 percent per year.
During the 10 years of significant American
manpower reductions in Europe, five NATO
nations have increased their manpower con-
tribution. For example, since 1960 German
forces have increased by more than 70 per-
cent, from 270,000 to 467,000.
Of the 61 divisions or division equivalents
available to SACEUR [Supreme Allied Com-
mander, Europe] in Europe, the United
States furnishes five division equivalents.
These units are not all equal in size, the
U.S. units being among the largest in NATO ;
nevertheless, the proportion is not mislead-
ing. In the central region, however, the U.S.
divisions constitute about one-quarter of the
available NATO forces and are key to the
effective defense of that area.
Even so, it has been the position of this
government that the allies should do more
and that we should not be asked to carry
what we feel is a disproportionate share of
the burden. We have told them, and we con-
tinue to tell them ; and they have responded
with positive action. Our repeated pledge
that we will not reduce our effort unilaterally
has always been coupled with the condition
that they must make a similar effort.
Further, as you know, we are urging them
to examine with us the principles and ob-
jectives of our alliance, as Dr. Kissinger's
speech proposed, and to find, in the light of
the new circumstances, shared goals for our
allied effort in the coming period. ' These
new grounds for a continuing alliance should
take into account the greatly increased eco-
nomic prosperity of western Europe and the
budget and balance of payments problems
that the United States faces.
" For an address made on .A.pr. 23 by Henry A.
Kissinger, Assistant to the President for National Se-
curity Affairs, see Bulletin of May 14, 1973, p. 593.
August 6, 1973
225
As to the economic side, in my view we
shouldn't make a major decision on a secu-
rity matter, such as reducing troops in Eu-
rope, affecting a successful alliance and
partnership involving 15 nations, because
the troops contribute to a balance of pay-
ments deficit. The corrections must be made,
and they are being made, and as with the
other deficits, we should make them up by
increasing our sales of products to other
countries and other offset arrangements.
From the political viewpoint, there are
some who say, in my judginent wrongly, that
there seems to be no compelling need for
U.S. troops in Europe and thus conclude that
if they are not necessary, we should bring
them home for military reasons. But if one
concludes, as do I, that they are necessary
to our security arrangements and to the
stability which has fostered detente, let's not
reduce them unilaterally because of confu-
sion over the balance of payments issue.
An unstable Europe or a Europe unfa-
vorably disposed to the United States — or a
so-called "neutral" Europe — could lead to
monetary, balance of payments, and trade
consequences that would cost us far more
than the military deficit we now sustain in
Europe. This should be clear when one con-
siders the tens of bilHons of dollars of U.S.
investments in Europe.
For all of these reasons, it seems unwise
and even dangerous to advance the balance
of payments deficit in the military account
in Europe as the reason for reducing the
number of U.S. troops in western Europe.
But let us remember that it is the position
of the U.S. Government, and one that I ad-
vance in the North Atlantic Council, that we
believe greater assistance should be provided
with respect to the balance of payments for
contributing to our collective security. We
think that no nation should suffer a balance
of payments disadvantage, and we continue
to urge that a remedy be designed. I believe
we will continue to make progress on it.
We have pledged, firmly and repeatedly,
that we would not reduce our troops uni-
laterally and would maintain and improve
our force capabilities if the allies made a
similar effort. What would the allied reaction
be to a substantial unilateral cut in our
forces now?
One possibility is that the allies would act
quickly and effectively to fill the void left by
our troops. But in my judgment that would
be playing Russian roulette. The nations of
western Europe are making some progress
toward greater cooperation, but they do not
now have the political base for a unified
military buildup. The troop increases, if
they occurred in any instances, would be in
separate national armies. One immediate re-
sult might be an emergence of rivalry and
mistrust among the allies and a spirit of
going it alone or seeking bilateral ties with
the East. Or worse, it could mean a return to
the national conflicts which marred past
European history and even escalated into
broader conflicts.
Another possibility, if we reduce our
troops unilaterally, is that our allies would
begin to think that they could not or should
not rely on the United States for nuclear de-
fense. They might — and all of this is, of
course, speculation, for no one knows pre-
cisely what the cumulative allied reaction
would be — they might decide to try to build
up their own nuclear capabilities. Some think
we should be pleased to be relieved of such a
grave responsibility; but others ask if we
really want nuclear weaponry to begin to
spread again, just when the prospects of
limitation of nuclear strategic arms are
more hopeful.
The most likely reaction, in my opinion, to
a U.S. unilateral troop reduction would be a
loss of confidence among the allies — loss of
confidence in the United States and our
pledges, loss of confidence in the alliance and
its ability to provide the integrated security
they need, and loss of confidence in their
ability to defend themselves.
One possible result of a serious instability
could be a tilt toward the East in ways that
could be harmful for the people of all of
226
Deportment of State Bulletin
Europe, harmful to international stability,
and harmful to American interests and
security.
I said before that I cannot be sure just
what would happen if we unilaterally cut
our troop presence — and that in itself is an
important point. Such an action would un-
doubtedly lead to a period of uncertainty,
during which all sorts of new political forces
might be released among our European al-
lies, with unpredictable results. Is this the
time when we want to introduce new and
potentially unsettling elements in what has
become a rather stable and certainly more
reliable situation? It seems to me that the
answer should be no.
Effect on Negotiations
But arguments against substantial uni-
lateral troop reductions should not be under-
stood as insistence that our present troop
levels must be maintained in Europe forever.
MBFR is one answer to that contention.
In my opinion, alliance strength and the
U.S. presence in Europe were among the pri-
mary moving forces in the change in the ad-
versary relationship with the Soviet Union.
The alliance's weakness and our absence as
a counterpoise would have been (and could
still be) a great enticement. Instead of en-
ticement to aggressive adventure, we have
offered to the East only the path of serious
negotiations to accomplish a mutual force
reduction. The result of these negotiations,
scheduled to begin October 30, can be a lower
level of political and military confrontation.
We seek undiminished security for both sides
at a lower level of forces. Our assumption is
that balanced reductions would enhance sta-
bility and security while unilateral changes
in the balance would damage stability and
security.
Beginning in 1972, NATO began to grap-
ple with the concrete issues involved — for
example, what kinds of forces should be re-
duced, whose forces, in what part of Europe ;
what sort of measures should be sought to
insure against (or detect) violations of any
agreement ; and what timetable should be en-
visaged. The fact that NATO members were
moving into questions involving their basic
military security, both collective and individ-
ual, required careful discussion of the issues.
With our allies we are now fully engaged
in the process. They have become increas-
ingly sensitive to the painful choices facing
the U.S. Government and Congress in the
allocation of budgetary and manpower re-
sources. Obviously, a multilateral negotiation
of this kind takes more time than a bilateral
negotiation, but in the end will minimize the
damage to American credibility and to the
strength of the alliance, which is as impor-
tant for us as it is for the Europeans.
The Vienna talks illustrate the point. Some
six months of intense effort by allied negoti-
ators were required, but we succeeded in
settling on a specific date and geographic
focus for the negotiations and a satisfactory
description of what the negotiations would
be about.
Unilateral American military reductions
would spell the end of meaningful negotia-
tions on conventional forces and would seri-
ously undercut the U.S. bargaining position
with the Soviet Union in the SALT negotia-
tions. SALT is an opportunity to partially
limit the danger to world peace posed by the
nuclear arms race. MBFR is the one reason-
able and safe way to reduce the military con-
frontation in central Europe.
Some people seem to think or hope that if
we reduced unilaterally, the other side would
match the reductions. Past withdrawals have
not drawn this reaction. In 1968 we dual-
based two-thirds of a division and four tac-
tical fighter squadrons, withdrawing these
from permanent stationing in Europe.
There was no parallel response from the
Soviets. The military capability of the Soviet
Union increased during this period. Indeed,
1968 saw a movement of Soviet troops into
Czechoslovakia. You are fully aware of the
expanded Soviet naval might in the Mediter-
ranean and in the northern waters, of the
modernization projects which have been car-
ried through to improve the capability of
August 6, 1973
227
their ground forces in Europe. When such a
unilateral American or Western reduction is
suggested, we must recall this history and
take note of the fact that never once in all our
recent talks with the Soviet Union have they
suggested the possibility of their reducing
unilaterally. Our search for a mutual reduc-
tion is genuine and reasonable, but there is
no basis for hope that a unilateral step would
work a revolution in the behavior of the
East.
U.S. forces in Europe have served well
the American interests and basic foreign pol-
icy objectives for which they were intended.
We may be on the threshold of a new era
between East and West Europe, marked for
the first time in history by :
— A reasonably reliable security structure
consciously agreed to by both sides to serve
us for a time.
— A period of reduction in the level of
confrontation matched by a period of an in-
crease in levels of confidence and trust.
— A deceleration of the arms race for a
period and increasing allocation of resources
for nonmilitary purposes.
— The development of better and more co-
operative relations in the political, economic,
and cultural fields.
The emergence of such an era would hold
the promise of a brighter future for our citi-
zens than many would have considered possi-
ble only a few years ago. U.S. representa-
tives are working intently on East-West
negotiations to help make such an era possi-
ble.
On the other hand, events may lead in an
entirely different direction :
— Efforts in the Conference on Security and
Cooperation to bridge differences and build
understanding with the Communist world
could fail.
—We may find in MBFR talks that the
Soviets are not seriously interested in reduc-
ing their forces, and as yet w-e do not know
what the answer will be.
— Soviet leaders could decide to rapidly
reverse their present policy and give higher
priority to ideological and political-military
conflict than to practical cooperation.
— Present Soviet interest in detente could
eventually prove to have been merely a tactic
for a period of years, to exploit differences
within the alliance and weaken Western de-
fenses, while they continue to increase their
military capabilities. J
Developments of this kind would forecast
a very different future for coming genera-
tions.
At this moment, all we can say with cer-
tainty is that we are in a period of probing,
of exploration, to see what the dimensions
of the future may be.
At this juncture, I find it difficult to imag-
ine anything more unwise than a unilateral
decision by the United States to discontinue
the approach that has been working so well
in favor of a unilateral and undoubtedly de-
stabilizing withdrawal. Our allies could in-
terpret this as meaning that the United
States was no longer willing to protect its
security interests. The Soviets could see this
as an irresistible invitation to explore the new
limits of the possible with a provocatively
weakened and exposed western Europe.
The process of negotiations on curbing the
arms race and developing cooperation with
the Soviet Union and the other countries of
eastern Europe is in swing. Great Britain
has become a member of the European Com-
munity, and the dialogue on strengthening
European integration, including in the mili-
tary field, is again underway. My hope is
that the negotiations now in process between
East and West, among the West Europeans
themselves, and between the United States
and its allies will enable the United States to
reduce its forces in Europe safely in the
years ahead.
But until the results of these efforts be-
come clearer, I believe we should strongly
oppose unilateral reductions and that we
must keep the country's commitment not to
reduce our forces in Europe except in the
framework of mutual force reductions. To do
otherwise might be appealing for a time, but
it would endanger those very interests for
which the American people have made so
many sacrifices in this century.
228
Department of State Bulletin
President Urges Support in Search
for Cambodian Settlement
Following are texts of President Nixon's
message to the House of Representatives on
June 27 upon his veto of H.R. 7Uh.7 and a
statement by President Nixon issued at San
Clemente, Calif., on July 1 upon his signing
H.R. 9055 (Public Law 93-50) and H.J. Res.
636 (Public Latv 93-52).
MESSAGE TO THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
JUNE 27
White House press release (San Clemente, Calif.) dated June 27
To the House of Representatives:
I am returning today without my approval
H.R. 7447, the Second Supplemental Ap-
propriation Act of 1973.
I am doing so because of my grave con-
cern that the enactment into law of the
"Cambodia rider" to this bill would cripple
or destroy the chances for an effective ne-
gotiated settlement in Cambodia and the
withdrawal of all North Vietnamese troops,
as required by Article 20 of the January 27
Vietnam agreement.
After more than ten arduous years of
suffering and sacrifice in Indochina, an equi-
table framework for peace was finally agreed
to in Paris last January. We are now in-
volved in concluding the last element of that
settlement, a Cambodian settlement. It
would be nothing short of tragic if this great
accomplishment, bought with the blood of so
many Asians and Americans, were to be un-
done now by Congressional action.
The decision to veto is never easy, but in
this case there is no other responsible course
open to me. To understand this decision, we
should all recognize what the full impact
would be if we call a total halt to U.S. air
operations in Cambodia, as now sought by
the Congress:
A total halt would virtually remove
Communist incentive to negotiate and would
thus seriously undercut ongoing diplomatic
efforts to achieve a ceasefire in Cambodia.
It would effectively reverse the momentum
towards lasting peace in Indochina set in
motion last January and renewed in the
four-party communique signed in Paris on
June 13.
— The proposed halt would also gravely
jeopardize the ability of the Cambodian
armed forces to prevent a Communist mili-
tary victory achieved with the assistance of
outside forces and the installation of a
Hanoi-controlled government in Phnom
Penh.
— A Communist victory in Cambodia, in
turn, would threaten the fragile balance of
negotiated agreements, political alignments
and military capabilities upon which the
overall peace in Southeast Asia depends and
on which my assessment of the acceptability
of the Vietnam agreements was based.
— Finally, and with even more serious
global implications, the legislatively imposed
acceptance of the United States to Commu-
nist violations of the Paris agreements and
the conquest of Cambodia by Communist
forces would call into question our national
commitment not only to the Vietnam settle-
ment but to many other settlements or agree-
ments we have reached or seek to reach with
other nations. A serious blow to America's
international credibility would have been
struck — a blow that would be felt far beyond
Indochina.
I cannot permit the initiation of a process
which could demolish so substantially the
progress which has been made, and the fu-
ture relationships of the United States with
other nations.
However, I must emphasize that the pro-
visions of H.R. 7447, other than the "Cam-
bodia rider," contain a number of appropria-
tions that are essential to the continuity of
governmental operations. It is critical that
these appropriations be enacted immediately.
By June 28, nine Government agencies
will have exhausted their authority to pay
the salaries and expenses of their employees.
The disruptions that would be caused by a
break in the continuity of government are
serious and must be prevented. For example,
it will be impossible to meet the payroll of
the employees at the Social Security Admin-
August 6, 1973
229
istration, which will threaten to disrupt the
flow of benefits to 25 million persons.
But an even greater disservice to the
American people — and to all other peace lov-
ing people — would be the enactment of a
measui-e which would seriously undermine
the chances for a lasting peace in Indochina
and jeopardize our efforts to create a stable,
enduring structure of peace around the
world. It is to prevent such a destructive
development that I am returning H.R. 7447
without my approval.
Richard Nixon.
The White House, June 27, 1973.
STATEMENT BY PRESIDENT NIXON, JULY 1
white House press release (San Clemente. Calif. t dated July 1
I have today signed H.R. 9055, the second
supplemental appropriation for fiscal year
1973, and H..J. Res. 636, the continuing joint
resolution.
Last week I was compelled to veto the
original supplemental bill because of my
grave concern that enactment of the rider
then attached to it, calling for an immediate
halt to all air activity over Cambodia, would
have led to a destructive series of events. As
I indicated then, such a precipitous step
would have crippled or destroyed the chances
for achieving a negotiated settlement in
Cambodia. The stability of Southeast Asia
would have been threatened, and we would
have suffered a tragic setback in our efforts
to create a lasting structure of peace.
The conclusion of a responsible settlement
in Indochina has been and remains a matter
of the greatest urgency. All but one of the
major elements of that peace are now in
place, forged against the will of a determined
enemy by the sacrifice and courage of count-
less men and women, by our perseverance
in protracted negotiations, and by the effec-
tiveness and the deterrent of American mili-
tary power. The last remaining element of
the peace in Southeast Asia is a stable Cam-
bodian settlement. I believe that settlement
can be secured so long as we maintain rea-
sonable flexibility in our policies and essen-
tial air support is not withdrawn unilaterally
while delicate negotiations are still under-
way.
A sudden bombing halt, however, would
not have brought us the lasting peace that
we all desire. As President, charged by our
Constitution with responsibility for conduct-
ing our foreign policy and negotiating an end
to our conflicts, I will continue to take the
responsible actions necessary to win that
peace. Should further actions be required to
that end later this year, I shall request the
Congress to help us achieve our objectives.
Senate Confirms William B. Dale
as U.S. Executive Director, IMF
The Senate on June 6 confirmed the nomi-
nation of William B. Dale to be U.S. Execu-
tive Director of the International Monetary
Fund for a term of two years.
230
Department of State Bulletin
THE UNITED NATIONS
U.S. Reviews Year's Activities of the United Nations
in the Field of Outer Space
The U.N. Committee on the Peaceful Uses
of Outer Space met at U.N. Headquarters
June 25-July 6. Follovnng is a statement
made in the committee ov July 2 by U.S.
Represeiitative Herbert Reis.
USUN press release 62 dated July 2
Let me begin, Mr. Chairman, by saying
how much my delegation appreciates the
very kind and generous remarks of other
delegations on the successful completion of
the first visit by our astronauts to Skylab.
We were of course concerned over the me-
chanical difficulties which were initially en-
countered in the Skylab mission but were
impressed by the ingenuity and resourceful-
ness of those, both on the ground and in
space, who analyzed the problems, developed
remedies, and put them into effect. Skylab is
another demonstration, if one were needed,
that man will play an essential role in the
space systems of the future. And in this
sense the Skylab crew acted not only on be-
half of the United States but of mankind.
Skylab marks a continuation of inter-
national cooperation in the U.S. space pro-
gram. The Earth Resources Experiment
Package (EREP) aboard the orbiting lab-
oratory will provide data for scientists in
more than 20 countries who are investigat-
ing possible research applications in agri-
culture, forestry, ecology, geography, me-
teorology, hydrology, hydrography, and
oceanography.
Mr. Chairman, we are proud to have been
a pioneer in the international cooperation in
space of which Skylab is an important cur-
rent embodiment and are delighted at the
expansion of cooperative relationships, not
just those in which we play a part but also
those among other nations throughout the
world. Many of these have already been men-
tioned during general debate in this com-
mittee.
We are also proud that cooperation has
become so integral a part of the U.S. space
program that in 1972 each and every NASA
[National Aeronautics and Space Adminis-
tration] launching had a distinct interna-
tional aspect.
Ten of these missions involved interna-
tional cooperation on a basis in which both
sides assumed full financial responsibility
for their contributions to joint projects. An
example is the AEROS satellite, proposed,
designed, built, instrumented, and funded by
the Federal Republic of Germany; NASA
contributed the launch vehicle in considera-
tion of our program interest in the satellite's
scientific objectives. Another example is the
Orbiting Astronomical Observatory 3, which
carried an experiment proposed and funded
by the United Kingdom. This satellite, named
Copernicus, has already honored the .500th
anniversary of the great Polish astronomer
by making some 2,000 observations of 92
ultraviolet and X-ray sources in the sky.
Still another example is the significant
international involvement in the last two
Apollo missions. Apollo 16 carried a Swiss
experiment for measuring solar winds, and
both Apollo 16 and 17 carried biological
experiments contributed by Germany and
France. Both missions returned quantities
of lunar surface material for analysis in
340 experiments from 20 other countries.
In addition, NASA launched six satellites
for international organizations and other
governments on a nonprofit cost basis. In a
seventh international launching, an Italian
August 6, 1973
231
team used Italy's unique San Marco sea plat-
form off the coast of Kenya to launch a U.S.
satellite on our behalf.
Nineteen seventy-two will also be remem-
bered for the Earth Resources Technology
Satellite. Some 150 experiments propo.sed by
scientists in nearly 40 countries (13 of them
members of this committee) are now being
pursued on the basis of ERTS data. These
programs of analysis are enlarging man's
understanding of the potential applications
of earth sensing from space. As I have noted,
this work is being carried forward with the
Earth Resources Experiment Package on
Skylab.
Meanwhile, we have been building for the
future. During the past year, work has con-
tinued on additional joint satellite projects —
with Canada, the Federal Republic of Ger-
many, the Netherlands, Spain, and the
United Kingdom. We have signed new agree-
ments for joint sounding rocket projects
with France, the Federal Republic of Ger-
many, India, Norway, Spain, and Sweden.
There has been major progress on the joint
U.S.-U.S.S.R. experimental flight which will
test compatible rendezvous and docking pro-
cedures in 1975. And in the area of space
science and applications, joint U.S.-U.S.S.R.
working groups can point to the exchange of
lunar samples and of detailed physiological
data derived from manned space flight, to a
joint program of measurements of surface
phenomena in the Bering Sea, and to con-
tinuing consideration of common problems
encountered in exploring the planets.
Of major significance for the future has
been the action early this year by the Coun-
cil of the European Space Research Organi-
zation to establish an ESRO special project
for the development of a Sortie Laboratory
(called Space Lab in Europe) to operate in
conjunction with the NASA Space Shuttle.
Seven European countries have so far
listed themselves for participation. Agency-
to-agency and intergovernmental agreements
are currently being negotiated. When this
project comes to fruition, it is certain to
constitute a very major cooperative ven-
ture in the development of advanced space
technology.
232
Mr. Chairman, this brief review of U.S.
cooperative activities leads me to the report!
of the Scientific and Technical Subcommit-
tee.' The U.S. delegation would like to draw
attention as meriting particular study to
the sections of the report which deal with the
status of the United Nations program on
space applications and with the progress and
future eff^orts of the Working Group on
Remote Sensing of the Earth by Satellites.
The presence of Dr. [H. G. S.] Murthy,
the new United Nations Expert on Space
Applications, afforded the subcommittee an
opportunity to take a fresh look at the pro-
gram for which he is responsible. After con-
sidering his report and proposals, the sub-
committee recommended the experimental
appointment of two part-time regional con-
sultants and the preparation of audiovisual
presentations, for the purpose both of facil-
itating the work of the expert in disseminat-
ing information on space applications and
creating an awareness of their economic and
social potential. Looking ahead to 1974, the j
subcommittee approved a program devoted
primarily to panel meetings and training
workshops. These recommendations seem a
reasonable approach to the utilization of
limited resources. We believe they should be
commended to the General Assembly. May
I take this occasion also to renew my gov-
ernment's overall support for Dr. Murthy
and his program.
Probably the most important section of
the report of the Scientific and Technical
Subcommittee is that which addresses the
activities of the Working Group on Remote
Sensing of the Earth by Satellites. At the
heart of this section is its recommendation
that the Outer Space Committee approve the
establishment of a task force to undertake
the specialized work of identifying and
reporting on alternatives for the dissem-
ination and optimum utilization of en-
vironmental and resources data, keeping
in mind the data requirements of the devel-
oping countries. The principal objective of
the task force would be to identify, study,
and analyze for the benefit of the working
^U.N. doc. A/AC.105/116.
Department of State Bulletin
group the best means of disseminating re-
mote sensing data acquired from space in
the interest of promoting the optimum
utilization of this space application for
the benefit of states and the international
community.
In this connection, we recall that durmg
the deliberations of the working group early
this year the U.S. Representative stated that
if, after examining the cost and other factors
involved, the need for an international dis-
tribution center or centers of some kind
should become apparent, its character de-
fined, and at a later date, its establishment
agreed, the United States would undertake
to make available on a timely basis a master
copy of the data we receive from our experi-
mental satellite program.
With this in mind, my delegation believes
that the Outer Space Committee should ap-
prove the Scientific and Technical Subcom-
mittee's recommendation that a task force
be established for the purposes mentioned.
The task force study seems to us the most
sensible way to proceed at this stage in as-
certaining how benefits from remote sensing
technology can be given the widest possible
international availability.
We appreciate the significant progress
made by the Working Group on Remote
Sensing under the leadership of its able
chairman and suggest that this committee's
report to the General Assembly should in-
clude reference to the advances that have
been recorded in this important space
application.
Mr. Chairman, we consider that the report
of the other working group of this commit-
tee, the Working Group on Direct Broadcast
Satellites, on its 1973 session contains some
useful results.- Although consideration of
new developments in the satellite broadcast-
ing field was somewhat curtailed owing to
extensive general debate, viewpoints were
clarified through a broad exchange of views,
aided, we hope, by the technical briefing on
the state of the art of satellite communica-
tions presented by the United States. A
precis of that briefing is contained in work-
ing paper A/AC.105/L.71, which was pre-
pared for circulation to this committee in
the hope that it will provide members with
a perspective on the status of this promising
new technology.
We think that, whenever consideration
may be given to the question of principles
concerning satellite broadcasting, it will be
essential to take account of relevant tech-
nical and economic factors. We were able to
accept the recommendation to reconvene the
working group on that basis, as reflected in
the statement of the group's terms of refer-
ence in paragraphs 77-79 of its report.
Mr. Chairman, turning now to the report
of the Legal Subcommittee,' we have noted
that many delegations expressed disappoint-
ment that the subcommittee was unable to
complete its work either on the Treaty on the
Moon or the Convention on the Registration
of Objects Launched into Outer Space. We
have shared their disappointment. Indeed,
we came to the current session of this com-
mittee prepared to participate in making
further progress toward agreement on both
treaties. The new readiness of the United
States to accept a suitable review provision
in the Registration Convention bears witness
to the reality of our commitment.
It seems apparent, Mr. Chairman, that our
informal consultations during the week just
passed have brought us closer to agreement.
On the other hand, it has become more evi-
dent than before that in both treaties dif-
ferences still persist on issues of importance.
Agreement has so far escaped us concerning
how the Moon Treaty will deal with the ques-
tion of possible future exploitation of natural
resources of the moon and other celestial
bodies in the period before an appropriate
international regime is established. The U.S.
delegation would like to subscribe to what
the distinguished Representative of France.
M. [Jean-Felix] Charvet, suggested the othei-
day: that it would be unwise to let differ-
ences over a very hypothetical future pos-
sibility block conclusion of a treaty contain-
ing many provisions affording new benefits
to all countries. Once agreement is reached
'U.N. doc. A/AC.105/117.
U.N. doc. A/AC.105/115.
August 6, 1973
233
on the natural resources question, my dele-
gation would not anticipate undue difficulty
in resolving the other outstanding issues.
With respect to registration, we find the
short-term outlook for agreement a bit more
promising. In fact, we seem close to success
in our efforts to bridge the one real gap
which remains, diflferences as to the need for
a provision on the marking of space objects.
My delegation has repeatedly stated its views
as to the lack of utility such a provision
would have in identification assistance, and
I shall not repeat those views now.
If agreement does not prove possible in
the remaining informal consultations, we
should leave both treaties as priority items
for consideration in the agenda of the 1974
session of the Legal Subcommittee, expect-
ing that governments will use the time be-
tween now and that next session of the Legal
Subcommittee to deliberate further on the
remaining issues. We sincerely hope that
agreement would then be within reach.
TREATY INFORMATION
U.S. and the Netherlands Agree
on "Advance Charter" Flights
The Department of State announced on
July 18 (press release 255) that the United
States and the Netherlands had concluded
on July 11a memorandum of understanding
on travel group charters (TGC's) and
advance booking charters (ABC's) under
which each party will accept as charter-
worthy transatlantic traffic originated in the
territory of the other party and organized
and operated pursuant to the "advance
charter" (TGC or ABC) rules of that party.
Other provisions deal with enforcement and
ari'angements to minimize administrative
burdens on carriers and organizers of "ad-
vance charters." The understanding was
brought into force by an exchange of notes
in The Hague. While the understanding is
not an exchange of economic rights, it is
expected to facilitate the operation of "ad-
vance charter" flights between the United
States and the Netherlands by carriers of
both countries. The understanding with the
Netherlands is the fifth of a series of such
agreements the United States has concluded
with other countries to facilitate the opera-
tion of "advance charters." (For text of the
memorandum of understanding, see press
release 255.)
Current Actions
MULTILATERAL
Oil Pollution
International convention for the prevention of pollu-
tion of the sea by oil, as amended. Done at London
May 12, 1954. Entered into force July 26, 1958; for
the United States December 8, 1961. TIA.S 4900
6109.
Acceptance deposited: Tunisia, June 11, 1973 (with
a reservation).
International convention on civil liability for oil pol-
lution damage. Done at Brussels November 29
1969.'
Ratification deposited: Ivory Coast, June 21, 197,3.
Patents
Strasbourg agreement concerning the international
patent classification. Done at Strasbourg March
24, 1971.'
Ratification deposited: Sweden, May 17, 1973.
Postal Matters
Constitution of the Universal Postal Union with final
protocol signed at Vienna July 10, 1964 (TI.\S
5881), as amended by additional protocol, general
regulations with final protocol and annex, and the
universal postal convention with final protocol and
detailed regulations. Signed at Tokyo November
14, 1969. Entered into force July 1, 1971, except
for article V of the additional protocol, which en-
tered into force January 1, 1971. TIAS 7150.
Ratification deposited: Philippines, April 27, 1973.
.Additional protocol to the constitution of the Uni-
versal Postal Union with final protocol signed at
Vienna July 10, 1964 (TIAS 5881), general regu-
lations with final protocol and annex, and the
universal postal convention with final protocol and
detailed regulations. Signed at Tokyo November
14, 1969. Entered in