Increasingly scholars of international relations are rallying around the idea that 'domestic politics matters'. Few, however, have articulated precisely how or why it matters. In this significant book, Helen Milner lays out the first fully developed theory of domestic politics, showing exactly how domestic politics affects international outcomes. In developing this rational-choice theory, Milner argues that any explanation that treats states as unitary actors is ultimately misleading. She describes all states as polyarchic, where decision-making power is shared between two or more actors (such as a legislature and an executive). Milner constructs a new model based on two-level game theory, reflecting the political activity at both the domestic and international levels. She illustrates this model by taking up the critical question of cooperation among nations.Milner examines the central factors that influence the strategic game of domestic politics. She shows that it is the outcome of this internal game - not fears of other countries' relative gains or the likelihood of cheating - that ultimately shapes how the international game is played out and therefore the extent of cooperative endeavours. The interaction of the domestic actors' preferences, given their political institutions and levels of information, defines when international cooperation is possible and what its terms will be. Several test cases examine how this argument and explain the phases of a cooperative attempt: the initiation, the negotiations at the international level, and the eventual domestic ratification. This book reaches the surprising conclusion that theorists - neo-Institutionalists and Realists alike - have overestimated the likelihood of cooperation among states.

"[This book] brings us back to the politics of domestic-level analyses to balance the emphasis on economics. It also provides important insights into questions concerning the foreign policy behavior of different regime-types. . . This is a powerful work that . . . gives us a new lens through which we may examine issues central to the field." --Political Science Quarterly

Contenuti:

List of Tables and Figures

Acknowledgments

1

Introduction

3

2

Actors' Interests, Policy Preferences, and the Demand for International Cooperation

33

3

A Model of the Two-Level Game

67

4

Political Institutions and International Cooperation

99

5

The Bretton Woods Monetary Agreement and the International Trade Organization, 1943-1950

135

6

The Anglo-American Oil Agreement and the International Civil Aviation Agreement, 1943-1947

158

7

The European Coal and Steel Community and the European Defense Community, 1950-1954

179

8

The North American Free Trade Agreement and the Maastricht Treaty on European Monetary Union, 1989-1993

Descrizione libro Princeton University Press, United States, 1997. Paperback. Condizione libro: New. New.. 228 x 154 mm. Language: English . Brand New Book. Increasingly scholars of international relations are rallying around the idea that domestic politics matters. Few, however, have articulated precisely how or why it matters. In this significant book, Helen Milner lays out the first fully developed theory of domestic politics, showing exactly how domestic politics affects international outcomes. In developing this rational-choice theory, Milner argues that any explanation that treats states as unitary actors is ultimately misleading. She describes all states as polyarchic, where decision-making power is shared between two or more actors (such as a legislature and an executive). Milner constructs a new model based on two-level game theory, reflecting the political activity at both the domestic and international levels. She illustrates this model by taking up the critical question of cooperation among nations. Milner examines the central factors that influence the strategic game of domestic politics. She shows that it is the outcome of this internal game--not fears of other countries relative gains or the likelihood of cheating--that ultimately shapes how the international game is played out and therefore the extent of cooperative endeavors. The interaction of the domestic actors preferences, given their political institutions and levels of information, defines when international cooperation is possible and what its terms will be. Several test cases examine how this argument explains the phases of a cooperative attempt: the initiation, the negotiations at the international level, and the eventual domestic ratification. The book reaches the surprising conclusion that theorists--neo-Institutionalists and Realists alike--have overestimated the likelihood of cooperation among states. Codice libro della libreria AAH9780691011769

Descrizione libro Princeton University Press, United States, 1997. Paperback. Condizione libro: New. New.. 228 x 154 mm. Language: English . Brand New Book. Increasingly scholars of international relations are rallying around the idea that domestic politics matters. Few, however, have articulated precisely how or why it matters. In this significant book, Helen Milner lays out the first fully developed theory of domestic politics, showing exactly how domestic politics affects international outcomes. In developing this rational-choice theory, Milner argues that any explanation that treats states as unitary actors is ultimately misleading. She describes all states as polyarchic, where decision-making power is shared between two or more actors (such as a legislature and an executive). Milner constructs a new model based on two-level game theory, reflecting the political activity at both the domestic and international levels. She illustrates this model by taking up the critical question of cooperation among nations. Milner examines the central factors that influence the strategic game of domestic politics. She shows that it is the outcome of this internal game--not fears of other countries relative gains or the likelihood of cheating--that ultimately shapes how the international game is played out and therefore the extent of cooperative endeavors. The interaction of the domestic actors preferences, given their political institutions and levels of information, defines when international cooperation is possible and what its terms will be. Several test cases examine how this argument explains the phases of a cooperative attempt: the initiation, the negotiations at the international level, and the eventual domestic ratification. The book reaches the surprising conclusion that theorists--neo-Institutionalists and Realists alike--have overestimated the likelihood of cooperation among states. Codice libro della libreria AAH9780691011769

Descrizione libro Princeton University Press, 1997. PAP. Condizione libro: New. New Book.Shipped from US within 10 to 14 business days.THIS BOOK IS PRINTED ON DEMAND. Established seller since 2000. Codice libro della libreria IP-9780691011769