Washington Should Not Defend Ukraine or Expand NATO: U.S. Should Shift Responsibility For Europe’s Defense to Europe

Russia’s brazen annexation of Crimea has generated a flood
of proposals to reinvigorate and expand NATO. Doing so would make
America less secure.

Until World War II the U.S. avoided what George Washington
termed “entangling alliances.” America generally
defended itself by avoiding old world conflicts. The U.S. changed
course in World War II and the Cold War, fearing that hostile
powers would dominate Eurasia. Protecting important embattled
states preserved international space for America.

The collapse of communism eliminated the prospect of another
country controlling large swaths of Europe and Asia. The threat to
“Old Europe” dissipated and Washington’s allies
were capable of dealing with whatever dangers remained. The
liberation of “New Europe” was welcome, but the former
Soviet allies were not important to U.S. security.

However, American policymakers turned the nation’s
alliances into ends rather than means, seeking new purposes for old
organizations. NATO joined the European Union in linking former
communist states to the West. Militarily the alliance focused on
“out-of-area” activities, entering conflicts which
did not seriously threaten any members.

Washington should not
today court war with Russia—a defensive, paranoid nuclear
power.

Admitting former Warsaw Pact states also dramatically
transformed the alliance, expanding it into a region highly
sensitive to Russia. During the Cold War the U.S. and Western
Europeans sought to prevent Soviet expansion but made no attempt to
roll back Moscow’s control over Central and Eastern Europe.
The fall of the Berlin Wall and collapse of the Soviet Union made
these nations even less important militarily. There was no security
reason for the U.S. to risk war to protect countries long dominated
by Moscow.

Worse, the seeds of future conflict germinated in many of these
nations. With the end of the Cold War’s ideological contest,
Moscow had no obvious conflicts with its traditional western
adversaries. In contrast, its former allies shared borders, hosted
ethnic Russian minorities, interpreted historical experiences
differently, and directly impacted Russian security.

When European nations demobilized after the disappearance of
their one serious threat, the principal burden of integrating and
defending the new members fell on America. Yet Washington waved a
dozen new applicants through, treating alliance memberships as
candies to be put on guest pillows by hotel staff at night.

NATO even committed to include Georgia and Ukraine. However,
America’s European partners proved wary of inducting these
two countries, which had significant political problems at home and
more serious potential conflicts with Moscow. Hence, NATO was saved
from the legal obligation to intervene during Tbilisi’s 2008
war with Russia.

Yet the invasion of Crimea has triggered a cascade of demands
that the alliance, mostly meaning America, do something. In March
the administration undertook what Secretary of State John Kerry
termed “concrete steps to reassure our NATO allies.”
President Barack Obama detailed: “Today NATO planes patrol
the skies over the Baltics, and we’ve reinforced our presence
in Poland, and we’re prepared to do more.” The U.S.
added six F-15Cs to Lithuania and a dozen F-16s and 300 troops to
Poland, made plans to involve more forces in exercises and training
in Poland and the Baltic States, and increased intelligence flights
over Poland and Romania.

At its March meeting NATO ordered the study of measures to
bolster the alliance’s Eastern European members, including
adding troops and equipment on station, holding additional military
exercises, improving the rapid-deployment force, and reviewing
military plans. Alliance commander Gen. Philip Breedlove said
options for this “reassurance package” included
augmenting airpower, increasing ships in the Baltic Sea,
establishing a naval force in the Black Sea, and deploying a 4,500
member combat brigade from Texas to Europe. In early April the
Pentagon said it would send an American warship to the Black Sea in
“direct response to the circumstances in Ukraine.”

The Eastern Europeans desire even more. Polish Defense Minister
Tomasz Siemoniak insisted: “The U.S. must increase its
presence in [Central and Eastern] Europe, also in Poland.”
Romania’s President Traian Basescu cited “the need to
reposition NATO’s military resources,” meaning into
Romania. Estonia’s NATO ambassador, Lauri Lepik, said
“What the Baltic States want is an allied presence in the
form of boots on the ground.” An unnamed former Latvian
minister told the Economist: “We would like to see a
few American squadrons here, boots on the round, maybe even an
aircraft carrier.”

A gaggle of American policy advocates joined this Greek Chorus.
For instance, defense analyst Steven Metz wanted the U.S. to
“reverse its withdrawal from Europe and redeploy some forces,
particularly in NATO’s eastern areas. An increased ground and
air presence in the Baltic republics, Poland, Bulgaria and Romania
could help steel the resolve of nations facing Russian
intimidation. Greater naval activity in the Black and Baltic Seas
would help as well.” The Washington Post urged
“more forward deployments in front-line states such as
Poland, Estonia and Latvia.”

Andrew Michta of Rhodes College argued that “The U.S.
needs to expand its presence on the ground in Central
Europe.” In particular, “The Obama administration
should move ground assets to Poland—preferably a brigade-size
force to strengthen near-term deterrence.” John Deni of the
U.S. Army War College suggested refashioning temporary facilities
in Bulgaria and Romania used for exercises and training “into
a permanent one with U.S. forces deployed from Italy, Germany, or
even the United States.” Kurt Volker of the McCain Institute
would issue “an iron-clad statement articulating the absolute
commitment of the alliance to defend the territory of all NATO
member states,” update defense plans for all alliance
members, and “strengthen air defense assets deployed to the
Baltic States.”

At least the foregoing countries are all NATO members.
Secretary-General Anders Fogh Rasmussen said the alliance would
“intensify our military cooperation with Ukraine,”
including assisting in modernizing its military. Washington
announced that it would be heading annual military exercises in
July in Ukraine, which would “promote regional stability and
security, strengthen partnership capacity and foster trust while
improving interoperability between the land forces of Ukraine, and
NATO and partner nations.” Ukraine’s ambassador to
NATO, Ihor Dolhov, said “Very active consultations are going
on,” with an experts delegation due in Kiev to assess
Ukraine’s military needs.

Rep. Mike Rogers (R-Mich.) proposed providing Ukraine with small
arms. Zbigniew Brzezinski advocated “immediate and direct aid
so as to enhance” the Ukrainian military’s
“defensive capabilities.” Ian Brzezinski of the
Atlantic Council urged NATO or the U.S. alone to arm Kiev with
“anti-tank and anti-aircraft weapons.” Moreover,
“the alliance or a U.S.-led coalition should back that
assistance with the deployment of intelligence and surveillance
capabilities and military trainers to Ukraine.”

Similarly, Volker suggested selling military equipment to
Ukraine financed by loan guarantees, providing military advisors
and trainers, and expanding intelligence sharing. Leslie Gelb
proposed helping “prepare Ukraine for guerrilla war against
an invading Russian force.” Steven Metz proposed doing the
same for other non-NATO members as well.

A number of analysts would make Ukraine an ally in everything
but name. For instance, Volker advocated conducting ground military
exercises in “territory bordering Ukraine.” Moreover,
he wrote, the alliance should “Determine that any further
assaults on Ukraine’s territorial integrity beyond Crimea
represent a direct threat to NATO security and, accordingly, issue
a statement saying that any such efforts to break off more
territory will be met with a NATO response.” Charles
Krauthammer suggested creating “a thin tripwire of NATO
trainer/advisers” to “establish a ring of protection at
least around the core of western Ukraine.”

AEI’s Thomas Donnelly proposed “putting one brigade
astride each of the two main roads—and there are only
two—that connect Crimea to the Ukrainian mainland,”
with the forces “backed by U.S. aircraft and partnered with
NATO and Ukrainian units.” Robert Spalding of the Council on
Foreign Relations advocated deploying F-22 fighters along
“with an American promise to defend Ukrainian skies from
attack.” Leslie Gelb similarly urged sending “50 or 60
of the incredibly potent F-22s to Poland plus Patriot batteries and
appropriate ground support and protection” which could be
used to “smash the far inferior Russian air force and then
punish Russian armies invading eastern Ukraine or elsewhere in the
region.”

Finally, there were ubiquitous proposals to expand the alliance.
Senators John McCain and Lindsey Graham advocated increasing
“cooperation with, and support for, Ukraine, Georgia,
Moldova, and other non-NATO partners.” Former Defense
Secretary Robert Gates called for making association agreements
with Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine. John Bolton suggested putting
“both Georgia and Ukraine on a clear path to NATO
membership.” McCain and Graham urged expanding NATO to
Georgia and Moldova. The Foreign Policy Initiative put together a
neoconservative all-star list of 56 advocating a Membership Action
Plan for Georgia and membership for Finland, Sweden, Ukraine,
“and other European security partners.” A group of 40
congressmen called for admitting Macedonia and Montenegro,
eventually including Kosovo, advancing “the membership
prospects of Georgia and Bosnia-Herzegovina,” and continuing
“close partnerships … with other countries in Central and
Eastern Europe which seek closer relations with the U.S. and
NATO.”

Finally, more must be spent on the military. For example,
Estonian president Toomas Hendrik Ilves argued: “Maintaining
2 percent of GDP for defense must become a major benchmark of
allies’ commitment. U.S. officials long have said the same.
Last month President Obama declared: “every NATO member state
must step up and carry its share of the burden.”

In practice, however, NATO always has stood for North America
and The Others. The Europeans continue to enjoy a cheap if not
quite free ride on the U.S., and have no reason to change so long
as Washington showers them with reassurances while guaranteeing
their security.

Although Ilan Berman of the American Foreign Policy Council
complained that “The past half-decade has seen the U.S.
defense budget fall victim to the budgetary axe,”
America’s military spending is up 37 percent over the last
two decades while collective expenditures by NATO’s other 27
members are down by 3.4 percent. Overall the Europeans spend 1.6
percent of GDP on the military and all but four of NATO’s 27
other members spend less than official guideline of two percent of
GDP. None match America’s 4.4 percent.

Today even the bigger European states don’t spend much and
most NATO members continue to cut outlays. Noted the Wall
Street Journal: “European powers in recent years have
shelved entire divisions and weapons systems. The British Royal
Navy doesn’t operate a proper aircraft carrier. The
Netherlands in 2012 disbanded its heavy-armor division, and France
and the U.K. each now field a mere 200 main battle tanks. France
has cut its order of Rafale combat jets to six a year from
11.”

The Eastern Europeans, with the exception of Poland, have been
reducing their defense outlays as well. The only European nation
which spends less on its military than Latvia and Lithuania is
Luxembourg. After the annexation of Crimea, the former two, which
respectively devote .9 and .8 percent of GDP to defense, announced
plans to increase outlays. Latvia hopes to meet the two percent
target by 2020. Lithuania’s plans would do so in 2025 or
2026.

Still, despite Europe’s anemic military efforts, its
capabilities far outrange Russia’s reach. In 2012 the other
27 NATO members spent $319 billion on their militaries, compared to
$91 billion by Moscow. With a collective GDP more than eight times
that of Russia, the Europeans could do far more if they desired.
Moscow can beat up on its weak neighbors, not conquer the
continent.

The bizarre status quo persists because many Americans simply
stopped viewing alliances as serious commitments. In expanding
NATO, noted Stephen Walt, people didn’t “ask whether
they were really willing to send their sons and daughters to die to
protect these new but distant partners. Instead, president after
president simply assumed the pledges they were making would never
have to be honored.”

An American threat to go to war is supposed to deter. But
history is replete with alliances that failed to prevent conflict.
And when deterrence failed, the military pacts became transmission
belts of war. In World War II Germany attacked Poland even though
both France and Great Britain guaranteed the latter’s
security. The opposing Triple Entente and Triple Alliance failed to
prevent World War I from occurring.

The Peloponnesian War featured contending Greek blocs. Various
opposing confederations did not constrain Rome. The First Punic War
between Rome and Carthage grew out of conflict among allies. The
Thirty Years’ War featured competing groups. Alliances did
not prevent the Anglo-Dutch wars or curb French King Louis
XIV’s aggressive empire-building. A kaleidoscope of
constantly changing coalitions fought during the 18th
century and in the Napoleonic wars.

In fact, alliances can encourage confrontation by emboldening
weaker, sometimes irresponsible partners. In 2008 Georgia appeared
to believe that Washington would back it against Russia. Offering
military support to Ukraine could have a similar effect. That would
prove especially dangerous in a region that will always remain more
important to Russia than to America.

In the end, the U.S. could find itself practically alone
fighting a war with a nuclear power over minimal geopolitical
stakes. Washington should bar further NATO expansion, whether de
jure or de facto. Over the longer term America should turn
responsibility for Europe’s defense back to Europe. Irish
journalist Constantin Gurdgiev complained that “Europeans
can’t afford” to take over NATO and their own defense:
“Imagine the public debt levels [the] EU would have to
run.” But that spending is even less affordable for the U.S.,
which possesses a smaller GDP, is committed militarily around the
globe, and has less at stake in Europe’s freedom than does
Europe.

Americans should sympathize with the Ukrainian people, who have
been ill-served by their own government as well as victimized by
Moscow. But that does not warrant extending military support or
security guarantees to Kiev. Doing so would defeat the original
purpose of NATO: enhancing U.S. security.

America went through the entire Cold War without the conflict
with Moscow turning hot. Washington should not today court war with
Russia—a defensive, paranoid nuclear power. Even a small risk
of trading Washington for Kiev is too much. Today Washington can
most effectively maintain the peace outside of the transatlantic
alliance.