Thursday, September 29, 2011

When I was in junior high school, I had a horse that could count to three. I would say, "Count the three," and she would scrape the ground three times. She could do it for one and two as well. She also nodded her head when she was told to say "Yes," and shook her head for "No." For me it was a chance to impress visitors. For her it involved a carrot.

But Lady Anne was not as smart as Trigger, Roy Rogers horse. Look here Trigger dances, and here he actually acts!

But was Lady Anne really "counting"? And could Trigger really dance? And act? All Lady Anne knew is that if she performed a certain action in response to a certain command, it would result in a carrot. She didn't understand what she was doing. She could clearly distinguish between commands, and which one was calling for which action, but she didn't know anything about the concept "one," or "two" or "three." What Trigger's reward was, I don't know, although it apparently largely involved the emotional reward she got from the relationship with Roy Rogers, who, I heard Dale Evans say once, was an amazing one.

These animals can't reflect on what do, which would involve mentally stepping outside of themselves and viewing as a third person, they just do it.

When Lady Anne scraped the ground with her hoof, she couldn't think about the idea of "scraping the ground with your hoof." She could eat a carrot, but she couldn't think about the idea of "eating a carrot". This involves some kind of abstract conceptual realization that animals do not possess, but that humans, as rational animals, do.

One of the questions that has come up in the comments section of the post on the controversy over Adam and Eve is the nature of the difference between humans and non-humans, and whether animals can conceptualize like humans. The Aristotelian distinction separating man from animal is rationality, and that rationality has been said to consist in some inherent metaphysical ability to conceptualize.

Our beloved Singring, the chief rabble rouser in the Peanut Gallery, claims that primates have the ability to apprehend abstract concepts, but he keeps pointing to instances which do not demonstrate what he claims. He keeps posting links to websites that show or describe apes engaging in certain technical procedures that are clearly clever, but don't give any indication of an ability conceptualize in an abstract way.

So what exactly is the difference between humans and animals in regard to conceptualization? I would submit that man's "rationality" consists in his ability to apprehend universal concepts through process of abstraction (the process by which one intellectually moves from a particular instance of a thing to the concept or idea of the thing), to make judgments about those concepts which are expressed in statements, and to make deductive inferences using those judgments. And animals cannot apprehend universal concepts because they are incapable of abstraction, and they cannot therefore make judgments, because judgments are made up of those concepts which they cannot apprehend, and they cannot make deductive inferences because they are made up of judgments, which they are incapable of making.

For example, a dog might be able to apprehend that his master is feeding him, but he cannot articulate, even his his own mind, "The man (the physical thing in front of me now) is feeding me," since that involves the predication of one concept of another, and he can't apprehend concepts. And he can't think "Man is a rational animal" or "Dogs are mammals." And he can't reflect back on any of these thoughts, viewing them as grammatical procedures, nor can he reflect on the fact that he had these thoughts in the first place.

In other words, animals cannot conceptualize, predicate, judge, or deductively infer. And nothing Singring has said shows he can do any of these things that rational animals are capable of. And this, by the way, is why animals don't have language of the kind humans use.

40 comments:

I was really hoping you would engage with the evidence from primate studies in this post, Martin. Instead, we get a few straw man paragraphs on horses (which I agree show no evidence of abstract conception), and then the only effort you make (if one can even call it that) to respond to the small glimpse of the large amount of experimental data on apes is that they are 'instances which do not demonstrate what [I] claim' and that they 'don't give any indication of an ability conceptualize in an abstract way'.

You then say this:

'And nothing Singring has said shows he can do any of these things that rational animals are capable of.'

The obvious response is of course:Why not?

Your performance here reminds me very much of John Cleese's performance in the Monty Python sketch 'The Argument'.

Just saying 'it isn't so' to every piece of data your opposition presents is simply pathetic, symptomatic of willful ignorance and does not even constitute a rudimentary defense of your position.

I gave specific explanations for why the ape behaviour indicates abstract concpetion on their part and the scientists that present this data agree with me.

Its takes a little more than an childish 'NOPE' to engage with this kind of evidence and I'm very disppointed to see you didn't even try.

Like you said, just saying so doesn't make it so. Give me the precise behavior displayed by an ape and tell me which of the precise procedures I mentioned here as being unique to humans that you think it demonstrated and we'll talk.

I have made these points extensively in my posts on your essay on the Coyne/Feser dispute, as you must know since you were reading my posts. But to save you the time of finding them again, here are the key points, simply copied and pasted, with some slight elaborations so you know exactly the point I am making:

'http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yrPb41hzYdw

In the video, the chimpanzee sees and examines the tube and the peanut and realizes he cannot reach the peanut directly. He then *leaves* the tube and the peanut to get some water. This means he must have come up with the idea (or concept) of using the water to make the peanut float up while he was examining tube and peanut. In other words, he had the abstract concept of water going into the tube and raising the peanut in his mind before he even went to get the water.'

But don't take my word for it - listen to what the scientists say and watch many of the other amazing example of how apes can form abstract concepts, can learn by observing others and can identify the intentions of others, can co-operate and can make simple tools via multiple, intended steps - all behaviours that they share with us. It's really fascinating:

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4-JlnIBYapM

But on to my second example - again, I simply copy and paste with an addition in italics:

'For example, a recent much published example is that of a chimpanzee in a Swedish zoo who collected stones in the evening so he had them ready the next morning to throw at visitors. Simply said, he was making plans, which means that not only did he have an abstract concept of future events in his mind, he had an abstract concept of himself performing these events, which is, of course, evidence for reflective thinking or some form of self-awareness and a concept of the self in apes.'

the chimpanzee sees and examines the tube and the peanut and realizes he cannot reach the peanut directly. He then *leaves* the tube and the peanut to get some water. This means he must have come up with the idea (or concept) of using the water to make the peanut float up while he was examining tube and peanut.

How does this "mean he must come up with the idea or (or concept) of using the water to make the peanut float up"? Nothing in that procedure requires abstracting from a particular to a universal. If you think so, you ought to say how. Just saying it, as you point out, doesn't make it so.

Is it the complexity of the procedure performed? Animals are capable of all kinds of very complex procedures, but none of them amount to or require abstracting from a particular to a universal. Have you ever watched a spider spin a web? Or a school of fish swim in complicated patterns? Or bees construct a honeycomb? The complexity of animal behavior has absolutely no bearing on the ability to form abstract concepts.

Is it the planning involved? That won't get you there either. Animals commonly perform behavior that involves future planning with the expectation of some future result. Any animal begging for food does this for a short term result, but this expectation doesn't require abstract conceptualization. Just because the result is farther off doesn't make it any more necessary. Birds go south for the winter; monarch butterflies fly off to Mexico to mate; bears dig wholes and fatten themselves up for hibernation; birds build nests for laying eggs. Just because a squirrel gathers nuts for the winter does that mean he's forming abstract concepts about nuts and winter?

Is it cooperation with other animals that establishes this link? Have you ever seen a school of fish swim or a flock birds fly? Or how about lions on the hunt?

No single aspect of the examples you give here is sufficient to prove the formation of abstract concepts in animals--and adding several insufficient examples together doesn't amount to a sufficient example.

In fact, you can find all of these actions performed at a much more advanced level in computers, but no one thinks that computers conceptualize.

'Nothing in that procedure requires abstracting from a particular to a universal. If you think so, you ought to say how. Just saying it, as you point out, doesn't make it so.'

So now instead of any old abstraction you require 'abstraction to a universal'? The goalposts have moved again.

But you do apparently accept the ape is forming an abstract concept of the water and how to use it in his mind? It just isn't a 'universal' abstraction?

Then maybe explain to me what makes a 'universal' abstraction qualitatively (not just quantitatively) different from a simple abstraction like 'water in tube'?

'Is it the complexity of the procedure performed?'

No. I clearly explained what it was. It was the idea (or concept) of water being used.

'Is it the planning involved? Animals commonly perform behavior that involves future planning with the expectation of some future result.'

No they don't - at least not in the sense we are discussing here. Animals usually perform instinctive behaviours that show no evidence of intent and are determined by the environment, for example the egg rolling instinct in ducks. Remove the egg - and the duck still performs the exact same behaviour - it doesn't realize the egg is gone. This shows that it has no concept of the egg or any abstract concept of what it is trying to achieve.

The ape and the tube is an entirely different situation - it is not instinctual (the ape has not been presented with this problem before) and it has a very clear concept of what it is trying to achieve and can form in its mind the mental image of what it needs to do and how to do it. The same goes for the ape in the zoo - this was completely novel behaviour and therefore not at all similar to what other animals 'plan'.

'Any animal begging for food does this for a short term result, but this expectation doesn't require abstract conceptualization.'

This is instinctive/learned behaviour and has nothing to do with apes solving a novel problem. An animal 'begging' for food has no need to abstract - whoever it is begging from is right there in front of it - all the required components are immediately present, and the gratification of receiving the food will simply reinforce the begging response inthe presence of the stimulus (i.e. a humanoid shaped object, for example). The ape in the video *walks away* from the peanut, specifically to get the water. It doesn't splash the water around haphazardly - it intently squirts it into the tube. How did it do that if it didn't already have a concept of this not immediately available object (the water) in its mind?

'Birds go south for the winter; monarch butterflies fly off to Mexico to mate; bears dig wholes and fatten themselves up for hibernation; birds build nests for laying eggs. Just because a squirrel gathers nuts for the winter does that mean he's forming abstract concepts about nuts and winter?'

These are all genetically determined instinctive behaviours common to (almost) all members of the respective species. We also have instinctive behaviours, like the blinking reflex.

The examples for the apes I have given are unique situations. Apes don't routinely fish peanuts out of tubes using water. If you think a behaviour as novel as this is analogous to migration behaviour in birds, then why is driving a car not analogous to the migration of birds? No, these apes are solving novel problems or performing novel behaviour.

If you ran the tube/peanut experiment with a squirrel, do you think it would get at the nut?

Many of the experiments performed on apes have also been performed on humans, often children - sometimes the children do better, sometimes the apes do better - but the behaviours are often remerkably similar. Simply referring to other animals (which we all agree do not conceptualize) ignores the main point here: Apes frequently show the same kind of behaviour young humans do. So if young humans do not conceptualize - are they not human?

'Is it cooperation with other animals that establishes this link?'

Again, you are using 'cooperation' for two different scenarios - one in which cooperation is purely instinctual, one where it is acquired or emergent behaviour.

'In fact, you can find all of these actions performed at a much more advanced level in computers, but no one thinks that computers conceptualize.'

Why should we think that they do? They are designed (which in and of itself dooms the analogy) to solve the problems we program them to solve - similar to instinctual behaviour in animals.

But computers are getting closer to at least simulating the output of humans - maybe you watched the recent Jeopardy match between humans and 'Watson', a computer. If you haven't, you should - it is remarkable.

So now instead of any old abstraction you require 'abstraction to a universal'? The goalposts have moved again.

"Any old abstraction"? Maybe you could give me an example of an abstraction that is not an abstraction from a particular to a universal. That's what an abstraction is.

And in regard to "moving the goalposts," I think you need to read my post again. I referred to "abstract concepts" or "abstract conceptualization" twice and "universal concepts" the same number of times, just to make clear what I was saying.

You have now added conscious intent and dealing with a novel problem your growing list of activities that supposedly demonstrate abstract conceptualization. We can add these to complexity of procedure, prior planning, and cooperation, all of which you say somehow demonstrate this but don't.

You keep just saying that they do but never say exactly why. Just repeating that they do does not constitute an explanation.

There is nothing in any of these activities that requires anything more than particulars, and instances can be given of animals performing any one of these procedures without having to leave the world of particulars.

Nor does having a mental image constitute the apprehension of a concept. The possession of a mental image occurs before abstraction.

I suggest you read Chapter 1 of my Traditional Logic, Book I, which deals with this entire issue, and discussion the concept in relation to sense perception and mental image.

I think the confusion here is between calculation and formalization. In the first case, the creature looks at the particulars (all of which can be perceived with the senses) and calculates what will happen if other particular activities are performed.

This sort of planning and activity is all bound to the senses and is not, therefore, what Aristotle and others would have considered rational.

Humans, on the other hand, can form a conception in the mind of a universal (an abstraction). This is different because it is distinct from utility and is ultimately separate from what can be perceived with the senses (even if it is discovered by building on what the senses were able to discover).

Aristotle's different kinds of knowledge are very helpful on this distinction and I think Thomas Aquinas and Dr James Taylor might be the best explainers of this idea. I also recommend Polanyi.

When the form of the object outside the mind enters our mind and becomes a part of the mind, we have knowledge. It is rational and distinct from calculation.

The empiricist refusal to acknowledge this sort of knowledge because it doesn't fit their theories only undercuts their own ability to perceive reality, a problem we can see most clearly in their impact on education, where their methods consistently stultify their students.

An ape that gathers stones at night to throw at humans the next day clearly has an abstract notion of human that includes "will be back" and "to throw stones at". Denying that is no different than denying the age oftf the earth.

Andrew said...The empiricist refusal to acknowledge this sort of knowledge because it doesn't fit their theories only undercuts their own ability to perceive reality, a problem we can see most clearly in their impact on education, where their methods consistently stultify their students.

since when do empiricist run any part of the school curriculum besides the science department?

An ape that gathers stones at night to throw at humans the next day clearly has an abstract notion of human that includes "will be back" and "to throw stones at". Denying that is no different than denying the age oftf the earth.

That's a very nice assertion there, but explain to me why this requires an "abstract" (i.e. universal) notion and not a particular one.

'That's a very nice assertion there, but explain to me why this requires an "abstract" (i.e. universal) notion and not a particular one.'

First, I am very pleased that we finally seem to agree that apes are performing *some* kind of abstraction in their minds.

However, it is you Martin who has to justify your (in my view) arbitrary distinction between 'particular' (yet a new definition enters the fray) and a 'universal' abstraction if this is the entire basis you rest your radical distinction between apes and humans.

What is it a bout a 'particular abstraction' (e.g. the concept of the wheel on my car) that makes it a qualitatively (and not just quantitatively) different process form 'particular abstraction' in the mind?

For example, I can abstract from the 'particular' concpet of the wheel on my car to the concept of car wheels in general. Then I could further abstract to the wheels on any vehicle. Then to cylindrical things in general and finally perhaps to the concept of an ideal cylinder in the geometric sense. This process is a continuum - I am gradually increasing the number of elements in my conceptual set. Where in that sequence is there a qualitative shift in abstraction, rather than just a quantitative shift in the number of concepts I am packing under on roof, so to speak?

Finally, you again spend a lot of time insisting that animals don't do waht you consider 'abstraction to universals' - which is fair enough (though I'd still like to know why that is a good criterion, see above). However, you neglect to address the problem that most human children up to the age of 4 or 5 (at least) cannot abstract any better than apes can and in some cases, apes even appear to out-perform them when it comes to tasks that we would consider as involving abstraction or even rational thought.

Children don't pop put of the womb spouting Aristotle or Aquinas - then come out as drooling babies. So how do you explain that if they are 'ensouled' with this capacity for immediate 'universal abstraction'? Are you honestly going to suggest that babies drool, but in reality they are already solving algebra problems in the delivery room?

I doubt it...

On my view, where abstraction is an emergent capacity of a large and growing brain, all of this data is explained fairly well.

But according to your criteria - are we to believe that children (and fetuses, for that matter) are not humans? Then why do you oppose abortion? Are mentally handicapped people who have lost their ability to form abstract concepts not human? Then why do you oppose euthanasia?

Martin Cothran said...That's a very nice assertion there, but explain to me why this requires an "abstract" (i.e. universal) notion and not a particular one.

There is no individual human present, and the humans that will be present tomorrow are different than the ones that were present today. Treating all humans the same, and planning to do so, requires an abstract notion of human. What's your justification that this reaction is particular?

First, I am very pleased that we finally seem to agree that apes are performing *some* kind of abstraction in their minds.

Thank you for sharing your feelings with us, but I am afraid you have once again taken what I have said and interpreted it as saying the exact opposite of what I actually said. If there is one thing you can't mistake from my post, it is that animals cannot abstract, since abstraction is the process of going from the particular to the universal, and animals cannot apprehend a universal.

However, it is you Martin who has to justify your (in my view) arbitrary distinction between 'particular' (yet a new definition enters the fray) and a 'universal' abstraction if this is the entire basis you rest your radical distinction between apes and humans.

No. Sorry. If you're going to simply deny the existence of abstract universals when you employ them all the time, including in your own posts, then I suggest you go and get an education on this issue and then come back and we can talk about it.

What is it a bout a 'particular abstraction' (e.g. the concept of the wheel on my car) that makes it a qualitatively (and not just quantitatively) different process form 'particular abstraction' in the mind?

It's statements like this that make it clear that the problem is a basic command of the simple terms needed to be able even to have an intelligent discussion of this issue. There is no such thing as a "particular abstraction." Abstraction is the process of going from a particular to a universal. That's what it is. To talk about a "particular abstraction" is like talking about a "square circle."

For example, I can abstract from the 'particular' concpet of the wheel on my car to the concept of car wheels in general. Then I could further abstract to the wheels on any vehicle. Then to cylindrical things in general and finally perhaps to the concept of an ideal cylinder in the geometric sense. This process is a continuum - I am gradually increasing the number of elements in my conceptual set. Where in that sequence is there a qualitative shift in abstraction, rather than just a quantitative shift in the number of concepts I am packing under on roof, so to speak?

You cannot "abstract" from "particular concept" because there is no such thing as a "particular concept," since a "concept" is a universal that has already been abstracted from a particular.

The number of "elements in your conceptual set" is irrelevant and "a qualitative shift in abstraction" is meaningless. You either perform an abstraction or you don't, there's nothing qualitative about it. If you observe particular wheels and you derive from it the universal concept 'wheel', you have performed an abstraction. If you say "All wheels are cylinders," then you are predicating cylindricalness of wheels by employing the already abstracted concept of "cylinder." You don't derive one universal from another universal, and if you could, it would not be abstraction.

There is no continuum. You are either abstracting from a particular to a universal or you are not. You continue to be confused about what abstraction is.

However, you neglect to address the problem that most human children up to the age of 4 or 5 (at least) cannot abstract any better than apes can and in some cases, apes even appear to out-perform them when it comes to tasks that we would consider as involving abstraction or even rational thought.

Again, this is irrelevant. And again, you are unfamiliar with basic Aristotelian distinctions, in this case, that between potentiality and rationality.

The nature of a human being is to be a rational animal. That means he intrinsically possesses this characteristic potentially or actually. A child has it more potentially than actually, and an adult has more of that potential actualized.

An ape doesn't even have rationality potentially, which is why we say he is not a rational animal.

And apes cannot "out-perform" children "when it comes to tasks that we would consider as involving abstraction or even rational thought" since they don't do tasks involving abstraction and do not engage in rational thought.

Children don't pop put of the womb spouting Aristotle or Aquinas - then come out as drooling babies. So how do you explain that if they are 'ensouled' with this capacity for immediate 'universal abstraction'? Are you honestly going to suggest that babies drool, but in reality they are already solving algebra problems in the delivery room?

Again, you do not distinguish between potentiality and actuality. You argue that a child does not have the capacity for universal abstraction because that capacity is not actualized. That is irrelevant. You can have a capacity either actually or potentially and a child clearly has it potentially even though it has not yet been actualized.

People don't don't solve algegraic equations when they are asleep either. That doesn't mean their not rational when they sleep.

There is no individual human present, and the humans that will be present tomorrow are different than the ones that were present today. Treating all humans the same, and planning to do so, requires an abstract notion of human. What's your justification that this reaction is particular?

Why does treating something the same and planning to do so involve an abstract notion? There are particular things coming by your cage tomorrow and you want to throw rocks at them so you pile up rocks. Where is the need for an abstract concept of "human"?

If a beaver builds a dam (and doing a lot of preparation for it by felling trees etc.) does he therefore have an abstract notion of dams and water and wood? Some people would say that he doesn't even do this intentionally, but by instinct, which just makes my point all the better: that you can not only plan to do something to some particular thing without having a concept of it, but you don't even need intention to do it.

'No. Sorry. If you're going to simply deny the existence of abstract universals when you employ them all the time...'

I don't deny the existence of abstract universals at all (though I' m not sure of what you woudl define as such), I simply asked you to explain what makes them qualitatively different from a 'particular' in the mind.

What makes the 'universal' idea or concept of water qualitatively different from the idea or concept that the chimp with the tube obviously had - namely the water he thought of as a tool to get at his peanut? What is this huge difference? If you could articulate it, maybe we could have a more productive discussion.

However, you don't address this issue at all and instead chose to simply repeat your assertions that whatever it is humans can do, apes just can't do it and that's that.

'There is no such thing as a "particular abstraction."'

Then we are simply debating semantics and if that is all you want to do, feel free to do so. I mean, who actually wants to engage in argument and debate the evidence when you can just resort to semantics and repeat assertions? Way more productive.

But since you insist we stick to your particular idea of language here, how about you give of an nice, clear example of what constitutes an 'abstract universal', so we know what exactly we are talking about?

'You either perform an abstraction or you don't, there's nothing qualitative about it.'

Well isn't that just convenient? In other words, your position is unfalsifiable. If we show you clear evidence that an ape is thinking of 'water', then you can always claim: 'Well, he wasn't thinking of water as a *universal*, he was thinking of some *particular* water.' If we show you evidence of an ape planning ahead on specific future events, then 'He wasn't really thinking of the *universal* of humans, he was thinking of some *particular* humans.'

You are welcome to define your set of premises (e.g. what constitutes a 'universal abstraction' and what makes us human) just so the conclusion will be what you want it to be - but don't expect others to take that kind of shell-game seriously.

'That is irrelevant.'

What about mentally handicapped people? They don't have rationality actually or potentially. So they are not human?

'You argue that a child does not have the capacity for universal abstraction because that capacity is not actualized. That is irrelevant.'

So this is your excuse to explain away the empirical evidence, namely that children gradually develop language and other rational skills and behave much like apes at an early age?

Am I to assume then that the soul is on 'sleep' mode for the first few years of life? So when does God flick the switch? On your fifth birthday? One day later? A day after that? The list of absurd metaphysical assertions you need to build in to your model to make it even ruidmentarily line up with the evidence is growing fast.

'There are particular things coming by your cage tomorrow and you want to throw rocks at them so you pile up rocks.'

So the chimp had a premonition and knew exactly who or what *in particular* was coming by the zoo in the morning?

Martin, the very fact that he was planning for the future means that he couldn't have been thinking of particulars and that he must have been thinking in what you would call 'abstract universals'.

'If a beaver builds a dam ...'

We have discussed this red herring before, Martin: all beavers build dams, it is an instinctive bhaviour. We are talking about novel, unique behaviours. Not all apes gather rocks for throwing and not all humans type into comment boxes on blogs. Therefore, these phenomona require a bit more explanation than 'it's instinctive'.

Martin Cothran said...Why does treating something the same and planning to do so involve an abstract notion? There are particular things coming by your cage tomorrow and you want to throw rocks at them so you pile up rocks. Where is the need for an abstract concept of "human"?

Is this chimp psychic, that he can predict particular things will be coming by his island? If not, on what basis does this chimp know of this particular?

Of course, there were different particular things that had been experienced the previous day. However, to identify the particular things of yesterday as being in a common class with the particular things of today is an abstraction.

If a beaver builds a dam (and doing a lot of preparation for it by felling trees etc.) does he therefore have an abstract notion of dams and water and wood?

I don't know. If the beaver has no such abstraction, does that mean the chimp in question does not?

Some people would say that he doesn't even do this intentionally, but by instinct, which just makes my point all the better: that you can not only plan to do something to some particular thing without having a concept of it, but you don't even need intention to do it.

There is an instinct in this chimpanzee to gather rocks to throw rocks at humans, even though this behavior didn't start until he was 19? Do wild chimps gather rocks? Why doesn't this chimp gather the rocks during the six months of the year when the zoo is closed, if the behavior is instinctual?

Instinct seems adequate to explain the behavior of the beaver. It does not seem adequate for the chimp.

An ape doesn't even have rationality potentially, which is why we say he is not a rational animal.

Belief suppressing knowledge. You have decided a priori that the chimpanzee can not be rational, therefore commit yourself to explaining it's behavior without rely on abstractions. This is pure denailism.

I don't deny the existence of abstract universals at all ..., I simply asked you to explain what makes them qualitatively different from a 'particular' in the mind.

There is no qualitative difference (speaking in logical terms), there is only a quantitative difference. But if you mean why does the difference matter it is because only by a universal concept can you apprehend the natures of things.

In classical ontology, there is first the thing, which, from sense impression and mental image (which animals do have) is abstracted into a universal concept, which signifies the nature of the thing.

This is why humans can abstract language and apprehend the natures of things and animals (and computers) can't.

What makes the 'universal' idea or concept of water qualitatively different from the idea or concept that the chimp with the tube obviously had - namely the water he thought of as a tool to get at his peanut? What is this huge difference?

Animals manipulate objects all the time and it does not require an apprehension of a universal to do it, only an understanding of particulars. This chimp is manipulating objects on a very advanced level, but there is nothing he is doing qualitatively different from what other animals do, he just does it better.

Abstraction is not just a more advanced kind of apprehension, it's a different kind of apprehension altogether.

'But if you mean why does the difference matter it is because only by a universal concept can you apprehend the natures of things.'

I'm sorry, Martin, but this just strikes me again as a completely arbitrary claim. You entire response is just a restatement of your original assertions and nowhere do you attempt to explain or illustrate what an example of an 'abstract universal' would actually be and how we would be able to identify that someone or some animal is conceiving of it empirically. You are treading water.

'This chimp is manipulating objects on a very advanced level, but there is nothing he is doing qualitatively different from what other animals do, he just does it better.'

But Martin, I could say exactly the same thing looking at human behaviour! I could look at my brother typing into his laptop and say 'Gee, he is manipulating that object at a really advanced level - but no evidence of rationality there, I'm afraid.' I could say the same thing about pretty much every other behaviour.

But of course that would be absurd, just as it is absurd of you to insist that an ape who intentionally walks away from the objects he is trying to manipulate to get a third object that is not only out of reach and that he therefore must have conceived of as as an abstract in his mind, but that is also completely amorphous and therefore doesn't even have its own particular shape apart from the container, it is in is showing no signs of rationality.

The same goes for the chimp collecting rocks. If he is simply 'manipulating things in an advanced way', then I could say the same thing of humans constructing a suspension bridge. Which is obvious nonsense.

All you are doing at this point is repeating arbitrarily derived protestations that one kind of behaviour that clearly bespeaks mental abstraction is a completely and utterly qualitatively different from another behaviour that clearly does so. This is special pleading.

Finally, you do not address the problem of why the soul lies 'dormant' in early childhood if it is the seat of rationality and we are all endowed with it and you do not deal with the problem of a mentally handicapped person and why you consider him or her a human, Of course, these are very important questions that you really ought to be able to sort out if you are going to maintain your definition of what makes us human.

Oh, and apes can use language in an abstract way as I have already mentioned in the posts on Coyne/Feser. Koko the gorilla and other chimps that have been taught symbolic or sign language, when presented with a new, unfamiliar object or situation will sometimes use words in a 'universal' way to describe these things.

'Studies using classical training approaches as well as methods that tap spontaneous abilities reveal that animals acquire and use awide range of abstract concepts, including tool, color, geometric relationships, food, andnumber (66, 76–82).'

and

'Similarly, in the same way that human infants appear capable of computing algebraic rules that operate over particular [consonant-vowel] sequences (115), so too can cotton-top tamarins (116), again demonstrating that the capacity to discover abstract rules at a local level is not unique to humans, andalmost certainly did not evolve specifically for language.'

It is a very interesting review that also highlights some of the differences between apes and humans:

Is there a difference between reacting to all zoo visitors in the same way (such as by throwing rokcks) and having an abstraction of "zoo visitor"?

If a human brain were transplanted into an ape body, what behaviors would you recognize as consisting of recognizing universals. If it was next to a second ape, what would you use to tell the difference?

'The use of language which displays a clear command of predication and signification.'

So now suddenly the only criterion for 'universal abstraction' is the use of language - but not just any old language, no, it has to be language 'which displays a clear command of predication and signification.'

If there's anything around here that exceeds the speed of light, its those goalposts zipping about.

Now, the problem is of course, that paes have no voice box, so once again, your are firmly planting your metaphysical flag in the land of unfalsifiability. If we look at the actual evidence from experiments, for example using sign language etc., then - and let me quote that science review again, just in case you missed it:

'Studies using classical training approaches as well as methods that tap spontaneous abilities reveal that animals acquire and use awide range of abstract concepts, including tool, color, geometric relationships, food, andnumber.'

So now suddenly the only criterion for 'universal abstraction' is the use of language - but not just any old language, no, it has to be language 'which displays a clear command of predication and signification.'

If there's anything around here that exceeds the speed of light, its those goalposts zipping about.

When you are asked, as I was by One Brow, how you would tell whether a creature was rational, you give them a way to verify it. Aren't you the one always asking for verification of my statements? I just provided one and you don't like it.

If there's anything around here that exceeds the speed of light, its those goalposts zipping about.

One Brow: Is there a difference between reacting to all zoo visitors in the same way (such as by throwing rocks) and having an abstraction of "zoo visitor"?

Martin Cothran: Yes.

Which is? Do you agree that the chimpanzee in question is treat different particulars in the same way? What is required for an abstraction that is missing here?

One Brow: If a human brain were transplanted into an ape body, what behaviors would you recognize as consisting of recognizing universals.

Martin Cothran: The use of language which displays a clear command of predication and signification.

So, it you feel that any given action signifies only a murky command of predication (I presume you mean the ability to categorize; there are other definitions that seem less relevant) and signification (similarly, I presume you mean the use of abstract symbols), then it does not qualify? How do you distinguish between a clear command and a murky command?

Looking at the anecdotes for Kanzi, he makes a sound for yogurt, and his adopted sister Panbanisha point to the specific lexagram for yogurt even though she can't see the yogurt. Assuming this is repeatable and reversible, does that qualify as clear signification (the symbol to the yogurt)? Does the ability to know the difference between a dance and an aggressive display show clear predication?

Or, are you going to deman a full Turing test and claim it is a bright line?