In
both Egypt and Jordan, the Muslim Brotherhood’s participation in electoral
politics has not occasioned any changes in its basic ideology or objectives.
The MB remains committed to the creation of an Islamic state. It should
come as no surprise, therefore, that the Egyptian MB's draft party program
calls for a state ruled by sharia. The novelty of the draft program lies
in the way the MB seeks to institutionalize that rule, namely through the
assembly of jurists That may help explain, incidentally, the Egyptian
Brotherhood's professed solidarity with Iran, which first implemented the
concept of rule of the jurists during its revolution in 1979, in addition
to the Brotherhood's identifying with Iran’s anti-American and anti-Israeli
positions. From the MB’s point of view, Islamic parties like Turkey’s
AKP represent an adjustment to new global realities and a desire to integrate
into the global system whereas by contrast, the Iranian regime, like the
MB, rejects the current world order, and seeks to construct an alternative,
Islamic one..

The crisis in
which the MB organizations in both Egypt and Jordan find themselves is
very much a product of the MB being both a dawa movement, committed to
the creation of an Islamic order, and a political actor that is forced
to work within the existing framework of nation states and popular politics.
Despite the ideological incongruities and incoherence that these dual approaches
and roles produce, the MB has shown itself to be unwilling to alter its
basic ideological agenda or to modify its organizational structure. Some
point to a generation gap inside the Brotherhood and presume that a younger
generation is more pragmatic and political and less ideological than the
old guard. They argue that this younger generation will ultimately transform
the MB into a political organization, which will, in turn, moderate the
Brotherhood’s radical ideology. In fact, however, the generation gap
does not correspond to an ideological one. Although they may differ in
their choice of tactics, the “second generation” leaders in Egypt share
the ideological commitments of their elders regarding the Brotherhood's
objectives.

Muhammad Abu
Rumman, the Jordanian journalist and expert on the Islamist movements,
has suggested that Arab Islamists have tolerated and even justified the
ideological stagnation within their movements by the fact that their adherents
are too preoccupied with state repression to be able to develop and change.
But the Turkish Islamist movement, he remarks, was also besieged and persecuted
for decades, but its leaders nonetheless managed to develop, innovate and
thus lead the movement out of the constraints imposed on it by the regime.[44]
Neither can regime repression explain the modest electoral gains of the
Moroccan Brotherhood’s Justice and Development Party. According to the
Egyptian analyst Khalil Anani, those electoral gains may indicate that
Arab societies as a whole are not deeply convinced of the effectiveness
or desirability of "the Islamic solution” offered by the Islamists.

The Muslim Brotherhood’s
generation-old project is being blocked, and the movement is being called
on to reexamine its objectives and strategies. So far the Brotherhood has
not opted to make any fundamental change. It survived major crises in the
past by being able to exploit opportunities and turn adversities to its
advantage.

The influence
of conservative Islam in Egyptian public life was greatly abetted by the
changing orientation of state elites that began in the 1970's. By using
Islam as a basis of nationalist legitimacy, both Sadat and curent Egyptian
President Mubarak, abandoned the earlier eommitments to seeular modernity
that marked the Nasser era. It also ereated an opportunity for conservative
activists to promote their vision of Islam in public life.

Following the
murder of President Anwar Sadat by Islamists, and in the early 1990's,
the Egyptian government launched a major offensive against Islamist opposition
groups. By 1997, thousands of Islamic activists had been killed, imprisoned
or driven underground. Many had also escaped to join forces with AI-Qaeda
in Afghanistan. The government's tactics during this period were brutal.
It made extensive use of the security services to detain and kill suspected
militants, and relied upon the military court system to prosecute
cases. Since then, President Hosni Mubarak has taken a more moderate line,
but Islamic groups have continued their campaigns sporadically, being responsible
for deadly attacks that have often targeted tourists and resort areas.

The Mubaraf
regime also took advantage ofthe state's control of the mass media and
the official religious establishment to discredit the Islamist opposition
and to counter their religious critique. The extreme measures that the
regime employed reflected their belief that the Islamists were an existential
threat to their continued role. Western govemments similarly feared the
repercussions that would attend a 'fundamentalist' takeover, and tumed
a blind eye to the human rights abuses and other 'emergency' tactics which
the govemment used to win its war against Islamic extremism.Although the
govemment' s offensive succeeded in removing the militants as an immanent
threat, it did little to lessen the significance of religion in Egyptian
public life.On the contrary, a conservative interpretation of Islam became
further entrenched in Egypt's religious and political institutions during
this period. This was evident in a series of high profile assaults on minority
populations and upon intellectual and artisticfreedoms throughout the 1990's.
Apostasy cases were brougt against secular intellectuals, and books were
banned even as the militant threat receced. The government's complicity
in these attacks, moreover, raised questions about the regime's commitment
to a pluralist and tolerant conception of social order. It also generated
concern about Egypt's future. While one would assume that the political
victors would be able to define the new "rules of the game, "in this instance,
the Islamist challenge-even in defeat-was able to reshape the vernacular
of political discourse.( Se Joel Migdal, Strong Societies and Weak
States: State-Society Relations and State Capabilities in the Third W orld,
Princeton University Press, 1988).

Why had this
occurred?

The explanation
of this anomalous dynamic can be found in the centrality of the state in
Egyptian politics, and its reliance upon Islam as a source of ideological
legitimacy. A legacy of the Nasser era, Egypt's centralized state dominates
the political and economic life of the country.

While the current
regime has sought to libera1ize the economy, politically it continues to
dominate all facets of public life. Political opposition is tightly controlled,
and the use of extra-legal means to limit dissent is not uncommon.

Similarly, elections
are regularly manipulated, and elements of civil society that engage in
political activism run the risk of arrest and government harassments State
elites have also sought to control ideological dis course through censorship
and. control of the mass media. To this end, the Egyptian government has
used its control over religious institutions at all levels of society to
promote Islam as a means of cultivating political quiescence and obedience
to authority.

State actors
in Egypt appeal to Islam in order to situate their rule within a broader
framework of moral order, and to tie the Egyptian public to its political
leaders in a web of rights and duties defmed by religious obligation. The
significance, and viability, of this approach is based upon the majority
population's continuing identification with, and belief in, Islam. Despite
the perceived 'secular' quality of the Egyptian state and its leaders,
it has never, in fact, broken with its religious moorings, preferring instead
a time honored use of 'official Islam' to sanction political authority.
Even during Gamal Abd' al-Nasser's rule (case study above), the modernizing
state never sought to eradicate religious belief. Rather, the regime appealed
to a more modernist interpretation of Islam in order to challenge traditional
elites and to sanctify its socialist program of development.

The use of Islam
for political ends was even more important for Nasser's successors-Anwar
Sadat and Hosni Mubarek-who lacked bis charisma and the early optimism
of the post-independence era. The policies of the Sadat regime, however,
represented a significant break with his predecessor. Sadat embraced a
more conservative Islam in an effort to redefine the direction of Egyptian
politics. As part of this transformation, Sadat allied with the Muslim
Brotherhood, the Saudi Royal family and other traditional elites in opposition
to bis Communist and Nasserist rivals on the left.

For their part,
during the cold war the Muslim Brotherhood followed the general guidelines
of the Wahabis, but since it was not in control of a government (like it
is now to some degree in Egypt), it developed a different strategy. While
the Saudis had the luxury to use the powers of others, mainly the United
States, the Ikhwan preferred to use the powers of the community they wanted
to mobilize. The group's dense and complex writings over half a century
focused on infiltrating the group's home countries, starting with the Arab
and Muslim societies, so that they could be in full control of their destinies.
The Brotherhood was extremely careful so as not to engage the regimes before
reaching full capability. Their military and subversive doctrine was amazingly
fluid and adaptable to circumstances. Their ideal shortcut was to infiltrate
the ranks of the military and proceed with a coup d'etat against the government.
Their next choice was to "advise" the ruler and influence him instead.
This approach would start from the bottom-up and then reverse into a top-down
mechanism. Hence, the Brotherhood would be interested in spreading through
the elites, converting them patiently into the Salafi doctrine, and only
then enlisting them in the organization. The Muslim Brotherhood often created
front groups, both inside the Arab world and within emigre communities.
Known to be very patient, the members distinguished themselves in smart
deception.

In contrast
to recent more radical organizations such as al Qaeda and its allies, the
Brotherhood has made sure to camouflage its literature.The group seldom
called for a direct confrontation with the ruler (al haakem), which was
a recourse of last resort if he stopped abiding by the rule of Sharia or
if he became obstructionist. The Brotherhood wanted full legitimacy on
its side and projected an image of being the "aggressed," not the aggressors.
Members acted as hardworking militants transforming the society in which
they live into a gruyere. Their ideal plan is to make ideological reversal
impossible. Educational and media institutions are the ideal tools for
their campaigns. Their impact will be felt across the school system and
in many cases within the media web. This trait was omnipresent in the audiotapes
I examined as the government's expert in one particular terror case. The
speaker, a Salafi cleric from Egypt whose words reached as far as Detroit,
said clearly: "We need to preachjihad in schools; the culture of jihad
must become the first nature of our youth."

Indeed, the
Brotherhood's ideology is clear and self-explanatory. The path to power
resembles a pyramid, from the community up to the governing bodies. The
Ikhwan's jihad is more flexible politically than that of the Wahabis, although
they are equivalent ideologically. The Brotherhood has accepted, for example,
the need to participate in the political process, including legislative
elections. Although inconsistent with their Islamic fundamentalist vision,
which does not accept the concepts of republic, democracy, secularism,
nonreligious courts, and so on, the Brotherhood and related organizations
practiced the "political path." In Jordan, the group has an official presence
in parliament. It has accommodated to the political structure in the hope
of achieving further inroads. Will elections eliminate the struggle for
the caliphate? Many westerners thought they would, but they have not understood
the very long-term strategy of the Muslim Brotherhood. In 1991 the Front
de Salut Islamique (FSI), an offshoot of the Ikhwan, ran for election in
Algeria and won more than 51 percent of the seats. Many citizens frustrated
with the previous totalitarian government voted for the FSI, despite the
fact that it signaled openly that it would transform the republic into
an "Islamist state" with all that entails: elimination of political parties
that disagree with a new constitution and ultimately elimination of pluralism
and the basic institutions of the republic.9 The Muslim Brotherhood invented
"political jihad," which means using democracy to come to power so that
one can destroy democracy. Most western analyses, particularly academic
research, overlooked this dimension of jihadism. American and European
scholars imagined that any step toward some democratic practices was a
slow concession toward liberalization. The western apologists could not
comprehend the overarching global goals of the modern jihadists; and they
made the same analytical mistake with regard to jihadi violence.

A general tactic
in their speeches are to make a distinction between the violent and
the nonviolent Islamists. But the ten years in Algeria were a hell waged
by the Muslim Brotherhood Salafis against seculars; more than 150,000 were
killed for example. Many scholars in the United States and western Europe
seriously misunderstood the Muslim Brotherhood jihadists. In fact there
were and are distinctions, but these are drawn by the fundamentalists themselves.
They can chose to be violent or nonviolent at their discretion-not at the
discretion of western experts.

Sadat used the
mechanisms of the state-particularly its control over education, media,
and the official religious institutions--to actively promote religion in
the public sphere, also supported Islamic student groups on Egypt's campuses,
many of whom would later form the basis of Egypt's militant groups.

While the current
regime has sought to libera1ize the economy, politically it continues to
dominate all facets of public life. Political opposition is tightly controlled,
and the use of extra-legal means to limit dissent is not uncommon.

Similarly, elections
are regularly manipulated, and elements of civil society that engage in
political activism run the risk of arrest and government harassments. State
elites have also sought to control ideological dis course through censorship
and. control of the mass media. To this end, the Egyptian government has
used its control over religious institutions at all levels of society to
promote Islam as a means of cultivating political quiescence and obedience
to authority.

Thus State actors
in Egypt often appeal to Islam in order to situate their rule within a
broader framework, and to tie the Egyptian public to its political leaders
in a web of rights and duties defined by religious obligation. The significance,
and viability, of this approach is based upon the majority population's
continuing identification with, and belief in, Islam. Despite the perceived
'secular' quality of the Egyptian state and its leaders, it has never,
in fact, broken with its religious moorings, preferring instead a time
honored use of 'official Islam' to sanction political authority. Even during
Gamal Abd' al-Nasser's rule (case study above), the modernizing state never
sought to eradicate religious belief. Rather, the regime appealed to a
more modernist interpretation of Islam in order to challenge traditional
elites and to sanctify its socialist program of development.The use of
Islam for political ends was even more important for Nasser's successors-Anwar
Sadat and Hosni Mubarek-who lacked bis charisma and the early optimism
of the post-independence era.

The policies
of the Sadat regime, however, represented a significant break with his
predecessor. Sadat embraced a more conservative Islam in an effort to redefine
the direction of Egyptian politics. As part of this transformation, Sadat
allied with the Muslim Brotherhood, the Saudi Royal family and other traditional
elites in opposition to bis Communist and Nasserist rivals on the left.
He also used the mechanisms of the state-particularly its control over
education, media, and the official religious institutions—to actively
promote religion in the public sphere. Sadat also supported Islamic student
groups on Egypt's campuses, many of whom wou1d later form the basis of
Egypt's militant groups. Sadat' s inability to rein in the more extreme
members of the Islamist movement, however, and bis ultimate assassination,
demonstrated the failure of the regime to control either the forces or
ideas that it bad set in motion. (Nabil Abdel-Fattah. Veiled Violence:
Islamic Fundamentalism in Egyptian Polities in the 1990’s, Cario, 1994,
p. 19).

In fact the
relationship between religion and polities in Egypt has a long history,
though one that is neither as unified nor as unproblematie as many would
argue. Religious and political authorities developed quite distinetly from
one another within Sunni Islam, and generated a system of dual authority
replicated throughout the Islamic world. The two elements of this system
tended to cooperate because they needed each other: political rulers required
legitimacy, while religious leaders needed temporal authorities to uphold
Islamic law. The relationship between these two forms of authority, however,
was not an easy one.

Political leaders
actively sought to control the religious authorities-as well as the actual
doctrine of Sunni Islam-to more ably pursue their temporal ends. They were
also not above using force to attain such compliance.The ulema, on the
other band, struggled to maintain their independence, with many recognizing
the corrupting influence of political power both on themselves and upon
Islamic doctrine. Imam Abu Hamid al-Ghazali summed up his suspicion of
political rulers as such: "Three kinds of relations are possible with princes,
govemors, and oppressors. The tirst and worst is that you visit them. Somewhat
better is the second whereby they visit you; but best of all is the third
in which you keep your distance so that you neither see thein, nor they
see you." (See Abu Hamid Al-Ghazali, Ihya' 'Ulam al-Din, Book 14: Kitab
al-Halala wa al-Haram).

If the pre-modern
era was characterized by a system of dual authority-with each attempting
to gain the upper hand over the other-the early modem era is best characterized
by the emerging dominance of the political. With the French occupation
in 1798, Egypt was opened to the modernizing influences of European political,
economic and ideological thought. Tbe subsequent transformation of Egypt's
social and political life was undertaken in the 19th century by Muhamad
Ali (1805-1863) and, later, by his successor the Khedive Ismail (1863-79).
A key element of their program was the elimination of the previously dominant
Mamluk leadership, as well as the curtailment of the other major center
ofpower: the traditional religious elite. Reining in the ulema entailed,
above all, separating them from their source of economic livelihood [tax
farms and 'religiously endowed properties' (awaqaj)], as weIl as minimizing
their control over education and the law. The first of these two steps
were designed to make the ulema dePendent upon the ruler, and paved the
way for subsequent step, the introduction of western-style education and
legal codes. (See Nabil Abdel Fatah, Quran and Sword: Stole-Religion Conflict
in Egypt, Cairo, 1998).

In 1882, when
Egypt was on the verge of defaulting on its debt held largely by British
investors, the British took over the country and set up a mechanism for
repayment. The precipitating crisis was the Urabi revolt.

Egypt gained
formal independence from England in 1922, though was effectively controlled
by British influence until 1952. The British rote in Egypt, bowever, dates
back to the end ofthe Napoteonic era, when they sunk mucb ofthe Frencb
fleet in Alexandria barbor. Their infIuence was also feit throughout the
1911. But the corresponding social revolution helped to establish the dominance
of a secular elite in areas traditionally controlled by religious scholars,
and left to the latter only a very limited (and re-conceived) realm of
religion.

The era of Mnhammad
Ali, then, was a defining moment in the modernization of Egypt, and was
characterized by the diminished influence of the ecclesiastic caste within
Egyptian politica1 life. This program of secular modernization was an integral
part of the process of state formation, and was driven by adesire to emulate
European development.

The political
and social transformation of this era also set the stage for early nationalist
period, and the liberal experiment of 1922-52. The nationalist revolution
of 1919-which led to the formal withdrawal ofBritish colonial rule in 1922
- and the idea of a state based upon national, not necessarily religious,
loyalties defined the first half of the 20th century. The constitution
adopted in 1923 reflected the intellectuaI ferment of this time, and embraced
liberal secular principles that provided a basis of common citizenship
not premised upon religion. It also placed control of education, law and
justice in the bands of the secular and modernizing state, a sharp departure
from earlier practice.

This period
also marked the emergence of an Islamic reform movement led by Jamal al-Din
al-Afghani (1838-1897), and his disciples, Moh’ad Abduh (18491905) and
Rasbid Rida (1865-1935). A Persian and thus not Sunni by birth Jamal al-Din
sought to respond to European dominance by reinterpreting Islam for the
modem era.

His student
Abduh later served as Mufti of Egypt (Chief Judge of the Sharia Courts),
and was a leading reformer within al-Azhar, the pre-eminent university
and mosque complex in Egypt.

The reformers'
approach was both political as weIl as religious. Theologically, they sought
to reinterpret Islam within a modem context, and to demonstrate that Islam
could viably challenge Western modes of modemization. Underlying this was
a recognition of the importance of science and reason for material progress,
and the corresponding dangers of a religious tradition defmed by 'unquestioning
imitation' (taqlid), yet would become a model for Islamic activists
in years to come.

Rashid Rida,
Abduh's disciple, took a more conservative interyretation of Islamic tradition,
despite his embrace of Abduh's general approach. He led what was known
as the Salafiyya movement, which represented the primary opposition to
the secularism of the 1920's and 30's. Hasan al-Banna, who founded the
Muslim Brotherhood in 1928, was deeply influenced by Rida and the Salafiyya
movement. While they both differed with Abduh on some issues, they shared
with the reformist movement an emphasis on religious reinterpretation and
political activism. They also shared a common animosity to Western dominance
and continued influence in Egypt. To this end, the early Islamists believed,
as did the ruling liberal parties, that Egypt was a unique nation-state,
and deserved independence. While all of these groups were committed to
an amorphous Egyptian nationalism, they differed greatly over what this
entailed.

While the Muslim
Brotherhood and the Salafiyyas interpreted Egyptian nationalism in Islamic
terms, the liberal parties advocated a more secular and cosmopolitan conception
of the nation. This divide marked the contemporary origins ofthe debate
over Egypt's social order, as well as the beginnings ofthe 're-traditionalization
of Islam.' (See Denis Sullivan and Sana Abed-Kotob, Islam in Contemporary
Egypt: CMI Society, 1999).

The early success
ofliberal nationalism in Egypt, however, was short-lived due to an absence
of consensus about the basis of political life. Though the liberal nationalists
had emerged as politically dominant in the aftermath ofthe 1919 revolt-benefiting
from the deep animosity to Britisb rule, and the fear that tbe Western
powers were undermining Islam-their ideas of liberal secularism remained
somewhat alien to the deeply religious population. Moreover, the inability
of the constitutional government to deal with such core issues as socio-economic
development, corruption and continuing British influence, discredited what
little faith there was in the idea of democratic constitutionalism. Not
surprisingly, alternative movements expanded to fiIl the ideological vacuum.
These included the right wing nationalist Misr al-Fatat (Young Egypt) -
modeled on the fascist parties of Italy and Germany - as weIl as the Muslim
Brotherhood, and severalleft wing parties including the Communists and
socialists. The communalist orientation of all these groups reflected the
resurgence of such tendencies in Europe during the same time period (1930's
and 40's).

Although the
left-wing communalism of Nasser's Arab socialism and the right wing Islamic
communalism of the Muslim Brotherhood differed over the basis of society,
they shared a common rejection of the individualism inherent within the
liberal democratic idea.

In the post-1952
Egypt context then Gamal Abd al-Nasser and the ‚Free Officers’ then
sought to overthrow was dominated by a landed aristocracy, a corrupt monarch,
and continuing British influence.

The nationalist
movement that had grown up in the inter-war period-and which opposed both
the British and the Monarchy-reflected the diversity of Egyptian society
at the time: the Muslim Brotherhood on the right, the Communists on the
left, and the liberal party in the middle. All of these parties agreed
on the twin goals of economic development and independence from foreign
rule, but differed over the means of achieving them. Many in the military-the
only stable institution in Egyptian society-saw the politicians as unable
to accomplish either of these goals, and, in 1952, a small group of them
overthrew the government of King Farouk and sent him into exile.

The 1952 revolution,
was little more than a coup. (For details see).
Nasser and the Free Officers did not lead a mass movement, nor did they
espouse a clear ideology. What did separate them from their rival claimants
was their control of the armed forces. This provided them the ability to
take power, and to institute some degree of order. The failings of the
ancien regime, moreover, and its inability to improve life for ordinary
Egyptians, disposed the population favorably toward the young officers
of modest origins. While there remained skepticism that the new rulers
would be any different from the old, there was some reason for hope. The
dissolution of the monarchy and the departure of British troops in 1954
marked the end of Ottoman and European control of Egyptian politics. As
such, it was "the fust time in over two thousand years . . . [that] Egypt
was ruled by Egyptians." (AI-Sayyid Marsot, A Short History of Egypt, Cambridge
University Press, 1998 )

Egypt's first
President, General Muhammed Naguib, was a leading advocate of the return
to parliamentary mle, but was deposed by Nasser and placed under hause
arrest in 1954. It was only after the coup, then, that the struggle to
define the revolution began in earnest. lnitially, this entailed a concerted
effort to expand state control of Egyptian society, and to restrncture
economic and social relations along socialist and secular lines.It also
entailed a concerted effort to build a populist-and nationalist-basis of
support.

These two features
of the Nasser period would come to define the post-1952 era: the emphasis
on a strong, centra1ized state, and the continuing struggle to cultivate
popular acceptance and support for military rule. We early on when this
website started already mentioned that, many German military officers and
Nazi party officials were granted sanctuary in Middle Eastern countries,
most notably Egypt and Syria, where they helped develop the militaries
and intelligences agencies of those countries.

Nasser and the
Free Officers saw the state as the vehicle for modernizing and transforming
Egyptian society. Basing its policies upon both the Nazi and the Soviet
model, the regime created a one-party state whose influence spread into
all areas of Egyptian life. While there was a split within the ruling elite
over whether or not to return to constitutional rule, this ended with the
marginalization of its advocates and the emerging dominance of Nasser.
The core institutions of the new state, then, remained the armed forces,
the newly expanded security services (the mukhabarat), and the single party.
These were initially directed by the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC),
though later came under control ofthe office oftbe president. The Nasser
regime also sought to eliminate its potential rivals by banning tbe political
parties that bad been controlled by tbe landed elite and which had dominated
Egyptian politics in the inter-war years. While the Muslim Brotberhood
was allowed to continue its activities in return for its support of the
revolution, this ended in 1954.

Economica1ly,
tbe regime promoted major initiatives on land reform and state-led development.
This reflected a commitment to socio-economic reform and a more equitable
distribution of wealth. It was also indicative of Nasser's political strategy.
The land reform, in particular, was intended to dis-empower traditional
elites-both the landowners and religious leaders-who opposed the regime's
policies. It was also designed to generate support among the peasantry.
who were the major beneficiaries of the policy. State-promoted industrialization
was also intended 10 provide jobs 10 urban workers, a major constituency
of the new regime. Moreover. Nasser mobilized these "subordinate classes
against landed elites and private business elites." (Maye Kassem, Egyptian
Politics: The Dynamics of Authoritarian Rufe, 2004, p. 13).

By emphasizing
the class divisions of society. Nasser was able to cultivate popular support
for his policies. and to stigmatize the 'feudal elements' and 'reactionaries'
who opposed the regime. The rapid expansion of the public sector . and
the nationalization of various industries, also created a new class whose
interests were tied closely to those of the state.

These efforts
to centralize political and economic control of the country went hand in
hand with the effort to construct a new basis of state authority. In order
to mobilize popular support, the regime undertook a number of public speaking
toms and used the mass media to communicate directly to the masses, bypassing
traditional political channels. The dissolution of political parties and
the subsequent development of a single mass party was a central part ofthis
strategy. By removing the mechanisms by which alternative political interests
could be organized, the regime was better able to control opposition groups.

It also helped
to exclude supportive interests, such as students and unions, from real
power. Aseries" of political organizations were subsequently created, which
included the Liberation Rally (1953), the National Union (1956), and, finally,
the Arab Socialist Union (1962). While the first two parties floundered,
either for organizational reasons or for lack of an agenda, the Arab Socialist
Union proved more effective.

Like we suggested
in the above Case Study P.2, it cannot be said that Islamists promoted
a fascist concept of state. However, especially after the visit by Baldur
von Schirach (as leader of German youth) to the Midlle-East in 1937, paramili­tary
youth organizations became a popular phenomenon. These authoritarian
structure, fascist slogans, and contacts with Germans and Italians, and
their presence in NSDAP rallies (together with politicians) in Nuremberg
were in fact a source of anxiety for the British and the French. British
government also sent a special commission headed by Earl Peel to investigate
the matter. In its report of 1937, the commission proposed termination
of the mandate and partition of Palestine (one-fifth of the land to go
as a Jewish state, an Arab state in the rest of the country, and minor
areas remaining under British mandate, in addition to Transjordan .

But as Jeffry
Bale recently formulated it for the Encyclopedia of World Fascism, “Nasir's
Harakat al-Dubbat al-Ahrar (Free Officers' Movement] in Egypt ), is arguably
more akin to the pan-European ("Nation Europa") notions promoted by many
post­war neofascist movements. Indeed, neofascist activists in Europe
have periodically offered support, and not only rhetorically, to their
comrades." (World Fascism Vol.1, ed.Blamires/Jackson, 2006, p. 84).

In fact Nasser's
approach to dealing with the Egyptian left also reflected that of the Islamists,
and fluctuated between repression and limited cooperation. After an initial
suppression of the communist party and the labor movement in the early
1950's, aperiod of rehabilition and collaboration was begun in 1961, reflecting
the regime's closer ties to the Soviet Union. (Hamried Ansari, Egypt, The
Stalled Society, University of New York , 1986, p. 92).

What Nasser
sought from these various mass parties was not a vehicle for participation,
but, rather, a mechanism for building consent. In developing these new
political organizations, Nasser was able to expand the social base of the
regime to the lower classes who bad previously been excluded from politicallife.
This marked a new era of politics, defined by populist appeals and mass
mobilization. It also reflected a new social contract. The peasantry and
the working c1asses accepted the authoritarianism of a new 'military-bureaucratic
elite' in exchange for the promise of higher living standards and economic
opportunity. Thus, "by destroying the party system and replacing parliamentary
democracy with the referendum, [Nasser] brought the Egyptian (and Arab)
masses into play [ushering in a new era ofEgyptian politics]." (Ibrahim
Ibrahim, "Religion and Polities under Nasser and Sadat," in Freyer Barbara
Stowasser, ed., The Islamic Impulse,Washington: Center for Contemporary
Studies, 1987, p. 125).

Arab socialism
one should mention, was not intended to replicate the Soviet system-particularly
its hostility to religion-but, rather, to adapt it to an Arab context.
The more defming feature of Nasser era, though, was Arab Nationalism, the
basis of which was a belief that the Arab peopIes-defined by language,
history and culture-were a 'nation' and ought therefore to be politically
unified. This was an important element in developing an inclusive Arab
identity not based on religious affiliation.

Rather, it was
a secular ideology that embraced Arab Christians as well as Muslims, and
placed each on an equal footing. Plus there was a strong anti-imperialist
sentiment to Arab nationalism, which saw the European powers as a primary
obstac1e to Arab development. Despite a failed political union with Syria
(1958-61), and animosity from the Gulf monarchies, Nasser's continued advocacy
of this ideal emphasized the international focus of the regime and made
him a hero among the Arab masses.

The Suez crisis
of 1956, the appeal of third world nationalism, and a failed attempt on
Nassser's life all heightened the charismatic quality of the new leader.
The capacity of the state to monitor and control its perceived enemies
also grew in these early years with the expansion of the state security
forces. The adoption of a series of constitutions between 1956 and 1964
continued this trend.

These provided
for a greater concentration of power within the office of the presidency,
and, at least in the 1964 constitution, a new system of security courts
to try political cases. What ultimately emerged was a strong centralized
state that was able to mobilize popular sentiment behind the ideology of
Arab nationalism. As one commentator phrased it, "identification with the
people in a ritualized cult of symbolic relationships went hand in hand
with the development of the control funetion of the nation-sta1e, the formation
of an elite of army officers, and the use of rubber stamp organizations
and assemblies." (Michael Gilsenan, ''Popular Islam and the State in Contemporary
Egypt," in Fred Halliday and Hamza Alavi, eds., State and ldeology in the
Middle East and Pakistan, p. 171).

The primary
ideological challenge to the Nasser regime throughout its tenure however,
remained three residual elements ofthe old order: (1) the loyalties ofthe
establishment ulema (religious scholars) to the landowning c1ass, (2) the
popularity of the Muslim Brotherhood, and (3) the grip of traditional Islam
on the population.

Thus Nasser,
undertook a well-publicized pilgrimage (Haj) to Mecca in 1954, fulfilling
one of the primary commandments of Islam. Similarly, the government sought
to gain greater control over the mosques throughout the country (both public
and private) by placing them under the direct supervision of the Ministry
of Religious Endowments. Thus between 1952 and 1962, the govemment built
or helped fund upwards of 1500 mosques, and virtually doubled the personnellevels
in government mosques. (Anwar Alam, Religion and State: Egypt, Iran and
Saudi Arabia, Delhi, 1998, p. 87).

But while the
previously mentioned ‚Muslim Brotherhood’ was initially supportive
of the Free Officers, their relationship was a complicated one. It had
long standing ties with many of the Free Officers, including relations
with both Nasser and Sadat who some believe had previously been members.(
Hamid Ansari, Egypt, The Stalled Society, American University in Cairo
Press, 1986, p. 82).

Moreover, its
initial support of the revolution was important for the Free Officers in
both challenging the secular Wafd party and in providing a religious sanction
for the mili.tarY takeover (what the Brotherhood referred to originally
as the "Blessed Movement''). The Brotherhood had been a major force in
Egyptian politics throughout the 1930's and 40's, and, despite repression
under the old regime, it retained an extensive grass roots network as well
as a militant wing and long-standing opposition to the Monarchy and
the British also gave the organization a great deal of legitimacy, which
the Free Officers initially sought to co-opt.(See Barry Rubin, Islamic
Fundamentalism in Egyptian Politics, 1990).

Relations between
the two groups, however, broke down fairly quickly. This was due, to the
fact that the Brotherhood had hoped that their support for the new
government would translate into a genuine power sharing arrangement. This,
however, did not materialize, and instead a competition between both the
Brotherhood and the Free Officers over the same constituency (urban laborers,
rural peasaIits and the lower middle classes) ensuid.

The question
of power sharing was complicated by the fact that there were sharp divisions
between the Free Officers and the Brotherhood over Egypt's future. While
the Free Officers, and Nasser in particular, sought to modernize Egypt
along secular and socialist lines, the Brotherhood advocated a more central
role of religion in public life-defmed as areturn to tradition-as apre-requisite
for aresurgent Egypt. In essence, the divide hinged upon the compatibility
of Islam with the secular mission of the modemizing state. While members
of the Muslim Brotherhood argued for a religious state as apre-requisite
for an Islamic community, many of the Free Officers did not believe that
such an alternative was either necessary or beneficial.

The debate over
these competing visions was reflected in two books that were published
during this,period. The first of these was Khalid Muhammad Khalid's Min
Huna Nabda (From Here We Start, published in 1950). It echoed that true
Islam has little to say about the nature of political or social order,
and thus the type of State structure to be adopted was entirely open.
According to this interpretation, there was nothing inconsistent between.
Islam and a secular state, as long as certain minimal prohibitions were
upheld. Moreover, secularism would in fact be preferable given the danger
of linking religious and politica1 power too closely. As Khalid argued
in the book, a religious state would binder Egypt's development since the
unification of religious and politica1 authority would be corrupting on
both sides, and would more likely undermine the development of liberty
and justice than create it. What was truly needed, he argued, was a social
revolution, an alternative that would be hindered by a ''priesthood" that
"colluded with tyrants," and-in their pursuit of power-used religion to
"keep the people poor and ignorant."(Albert Hourani, Arabie Thoughl in
the Liberal Age: 1798-1938, Cambridge University Press, 1991, p. 353).
The above debate is also discussed in Nadav Saftan, Egypt in Seareh of
Politieal Community: An Analysis of The intelleetual anti Politieal Evolution
ofEgypt 1804-1952 (Boston: Harvard University Press, 1961). See also Mullaney,
The Role of Islam in the Hegemonie Strateg)' of Egypt's Military Ru/ers,
p. 160-1. For more background on both Kalid and Abd al-Raziq see also Leonard
Binder, Islamic Liberalism: A Critique ofDevelopment ldeologies (Chicago:
University ofChicago Press, 1988).

Shaykh Muhammad
al-Ghazzali represented the Muslim Brotherhood's position in this debate,
and articulated it in a text written to rebut Khalid's book entitled Min
Huna Na'lam (Dur Beginning in Wisdom), though more literally From Here
We Learn, published in 1950. It argued that Islam is a "comprehensive program"
meant to regulate all facets ofhuman existence, not least ofwbich the politica1
and social. To preclude Islam from a central role in goveming the state
would, therefore, be a violation ofGod's revelation. In terms of the structure
of an Islamic state he was somewhat vague; al-Ghazali simply argued
that ''the duties of the state are clearly and precisely outlined in the
Qur'an and the Sunna (tradition)...'' (Saftan, Egypt in Search ofPolitical
Community, p. 235).

The need for
an Islamic state, he argued, nonetheless remained c1ear. The retum to Islam
was a pre-requisite for a revived Muslim community, and this was all the
more important given the imminent threat to Islam posed by a 'hostile,
Christian West.'

In making his
arguments, al-Ghazzali appealed to the communal sentiments of a religious
population and called upon them to defend their tradition. Not only was
Islam ''threatened with extermination ''-- but those such as Khalid who
argued for a secular political authority were betraying their faith and
were, in bis words, "puppets of the enemies of Islam." And those such as
Khalid who argued for a secular political authority were betraying their
faith and were, in bis words, "puppets of the enemies of Islam." (Cited
in Saftan, Egypt in Search of Political Community, pp. 236-37).

This conflict
between the Brotherhood and the Free Officers came to a head in 1954. The
Brotherhood bad been deeply divided over how to deal with Nasser' s intransigence
on their core issues of creating an Islamic state and sharing power. One
faction, which included Hasan al-Banna's successor, Hasan al-Hodeibi, sought
to work with Nasser and "persuade [him] to turn toward Islam." Another
faction, led by Sayyid Qutb, pressed for a more forceful confrontatiOIi
that would entail Nasser's overthrow. Hodeibi was arrested in the Fall
of 1954, and shortly afterwards an assassination attempt was made on Nasser's
life, reputedly by a member of the Muslim Brotherhood. Seven thousand members
of the Brotherhood were subsequently arrested in a concerted effort to
eradicate their influence within the military, the police and other areas
of Egyptian society. A military tribunal subsequently convicted 800 members
of the Brotherhood on charges of conspiring to overthrow the state, and
six of its leaders were executed.

The above situations
are discussed in Nadav Saftan, Egypt in Seareh of Politieal Community:
An Analysis of The intelleetual anti Politieal Evolution of Egypt 1804-1952
(Boston: Harvard University Press, 1961); Mullaney, The Role of Islam in
the Hegemonie Strateg)' of Egypt's Military Rulers, p. 160-1. For more
background on both Kalid and Abd al-Raziq see also Leonard Binder, Islamic
Liberalism: A Critique of Development ldeologies (University of Chicago
Press, 1988).

The detining
issue was whether or not Islam is compatible with secular principles, and
whether the Egyptian state ought to be more explicitly Islamic. But as
in other places, these debates also have been influenced by the struggle
for political power.

But as the political
violence of the 1990' s escaIated-and the structuraI crises that facilitated
this violence worsened-the now, Mubarek regime became more dependent upon
a discourse of conservative Islam to sanction its continued rule. This
increased the government's reliance upon the official ulema (religious
scholars) of Al-Azhar (a mosque university complex headed by the Sheikh
of Al-Azhar).' the Dar al-Ifta (House of Fatwas, headed by the Grand Mufti)
and other elements of the official religious establishment.

While the official
ulema may have opposed the militants' use of violence, they generally shared
the vision of society advocated by the Islamist movement. What subsequently
emerged in the earIy to mid-1990's, then, was adynamie whereby the struggle
for political power between the Islamist opposition groups and the ruling
government was not defmed by competing visions of social order, but, rather,
by competing claims of religious authenticity. As a result, the regime
ceded much of the cultural and religious ground to the Islamist tendencies
in an effort to depict itself as the authentie defender of Islam.

It also helped
to ereate an environment where the persecution of religious minorities
(particularly Coptic Christians) and attacks upon secular intellectuals
occurred without official opposition, and often with its complicity. Thus,
even though the state was able to defeat the militants in the field, its
embrace of conservative Islam validated the Islamist critique and helped
to transform Egyptian publie life. The end result was that the government's
own efforts to co-opt conservative Islam greatly undermined the development
of an inclusive basis of national identity, and the corresponding "rights
[to] participation and equal eitizenship. (See Tamir Moustafa, "Conflict
and Cooperation between the State and Religious Institutions in Contemporary
Egypt," International Journal of Middle East Studies, 32, Feb. 2000).

Nasser earlier
however had already abolished the sharia courts which had operated as a
parallel court system since the 19th century, and merged them into the
national judiciary. While the stated goal was to unify a fragmented judiciary,
it had the effect ofbringing this alternate court system under the direct
control of the state. In 1961 also, Nasser passed a law that re-organized
AI-Azhar university, and placed it under the jurisdiction of the Ministry
of Religious Endowments.This entailed the introduction or the first time,
of modem courses of learning into the university's curriculum, including
medicine and engineering. (Malika Zeghal, "Religion and Politics in Egypt:
The Ulama of aI-Azhar, Radical Islam, and the State 1952-54," International
Journal ofMiddle East Studies. 31, No. 3,August 1999, p. 314).

Previously,
the court and educational systems in Egypt had been divided between the
private, Islamic and national systems. Both the reform of the sharia courts
and of AI-Azhar were designed to end this separation, and unify both systems
under the control of the state. (For more on this, see Jakob Skovgaaard-­Peterson,
Defining lslam for the Egyptian State: Muftis and Fatwas ofthe Dar al-Ifta,
1991, p. 184).

Nevertheless,
while the Nasserist state was defined by a program of modernization-and
derived much of its authority from the idea of Arab nationalism-it found
ample justification for its mission in the fatwas (religious rulings) of
the religious establishment. The regime also established the Supreme Council
on Islamic affairs whose primary purpose was to demonstrate a connection
between the state and Islam. (Moustafa, Conflict and Cooperation between
the State and Religions Institutions in Contmporary Egypt, p. 7).

Not surprising,
Saudi Arabia innitially was deeply troubled by, the populist rhetoric and
policies of the Egyptian regime. Nasser, on the other hand, perceived Saudi
Arabia as a bastion of conservative reaction actively working against his
interests. Both the Saudis and the Egyptians subsequently sought to offset
the other's influence in the region by setting up competing Islamic institutions
to promote their respective agendas. The culmination of this, was the outbreak
of war with Yemen in 1962. (See Malcolm Kerr, The Arab Cold War: Gamal
Abd Al-Nosir and His Rivals. 1958-1970, Oxford University Press, 1971).

Not unlike the
Nazi’s before (or at least in contrast to the the Soviet system), Nasser
believed that creating a state-controlled monopoly on religion would be
useful in supporting his regime against both internal and external enemies.
Moreover, the strength and popularity of Islam throughout Egypt precluded
the Nasserists from attempting to suppress it in the way that Ataturk had
done in Turkey thirty years before.

Cultivating
a modernist Islam, while suppressing the more radical interpretations,
was thus an essential element of Nasser's mass politics. Far from being
hostile to religion, Islam became integrated into the state apparatus in
order to provide it with ideological support."Islam became, in effect,
a creature of the regime. "(Katerina Dalacoura, Islam, liberalism and human
rights, 1998, p. 119).Thus although channeled and controlled by the
state, the use of religion within a nationalist discourse remained a key
link between the modemizing state and its traditional population.

This however
came to an end with Egypt's defeat by Israel in the six day war of
June 1967. As Fouad Ajami notes, among those who wanted to get to the deep
structure behind the defeat there was a consensus that the heroes of yesterday
had made too many compromises, "The Arabs had tumed away from God, and
God bad turned away from them." (Ajami, The Arab Predicament: Arab Political
Thought and Practice Since 1967, Cambridge University Press 1992, p. 74).

Then Nasser
died in September, 1970, and was succeeded by his vice­ President Anwar
Sadat. Sadat's efforts were encouraged by members of the military and by
influential people within the state ministries, all of whom shared a common
distrust and antipathy for the Socialist party. The conflict between the
two came to a head in May of 1971, when Socialist supporters were accused
of conspiring to overthrow the govemment. This led to the arrest of ninety
members of the Socialist party, and their removal from positions in the
govemment. In the aftermath, Sadat undertook a major restructuring of the
state that eliminated the 'alternate power centers.' This series of events
came to be known as the 'Corrective Revolution.'

While the basic
contours of the system remained the same-in terms of the centrality of
a strong state, and the cultivation of a populist nationalism a socialist
but also the secular vision of development, were abandoned.

Sadat's new
direction also included a new set of alliances with economic and religious
elites as a bulwark against the left, and a rapprochement with Saudi Arabia.
And although also Nasser had used religion to provide legitimacy to his
rule, Sadat embraced Islam with much greater fervor. His main concern was
to provide a counterweight to the socialist ideas that continued to dominate
Egyptian public life. In his speeches, Sadat emphasized (and often conflated)
the ideas of religious morality and Egyptian nationalism in order to reinforce
traditional patterns of authority and social order. For example he told
the National Assembly; '' I want us to return to the village source, to
our origin. .. I want tbe constitution to take this into account, not only
for the sake orthe villages. but so that the whole of Egypt should take
shape in the way and become a single village. " Aulas, "State and Ideology
in Republican Egypt: 1952, p. 82).

Sadat's
alliance with the Muslim Brotherhood thus was part of an effort to provide
a grass roots basis to his rule, and to help him contain the left. According
to several reports, the Brotherhood agreed to renounce the use of violence
and promised not to engage in anti-regime activities in exchange for their
fteedom and the right to continue their peaceful advocacy of Islam. (See
AIi Eshmawy, The Secret History ofthe Muslim Brotherhood Movement, Cairo,
1993).

Leaders of the
Brotherhood were also involved in drafting sections of the 1971 constitution,
and were allowed to participate in parliamentary elections, although not
as a registered party. During the period of Sadat's rule, the number of
government controlled mosques more than doubled from 3000 to 7,000,
while the total number of mosques grew from roughly 15,000 mosques in the
mid-1960's to 27,000 mosques in 1980. (See Carrie Rosefsky Wickharn, Mobilizing
Islam: Religion, Activism and Politica/ Change in Egypt, Columbia University
Press, 2003).

Mohamed Heikal
in addition reported that ,"Knowing they had the support of higher [government]
authority, Islamic students began to behave as if it was they who
were running the universities. They decided what subjects were suitable
to be taught, [Moreover] it was clear that the religious students were
not simply tolerated by the authorities but actively encouraged by them."
(Heika, Autumn of Fury: The Assassination of Sadat , London, 1983, pp.
133-4).

The extent of
the government's support however, remains a point of dispute. Muslim Brothers
deny any overt support from the government, and leftist activists, recall
that the security services actively supported the election of Islamic candidates
to student union offices. There were also claims that security forces used
to arm Islamists, and that the number of [Islamist] groups mushroomed runder
the umbrella of state security (see Heikal, Atumn of Fury, on these issues).

Save is to say
that historicly during periods of good relations with Soviets, the Leftists
were treated better, while during periods of Saudi influence, the Islamists
were treated better. The repression which each leader visited on these
groups was often a signal that their external relations were in trouble.
Also, the liberalization of economic policies certainly allowed for a greater
flow of funds from abroad, many of which benefited from the oil boom, and
helped finance the Muslim Brotherhood during the earIy 1970's.The
adoption of a new Constitution in 1971 was similarly meant to reflect a
greater role of Islam in Egyptian politics. It designated Islam the
official state religion, and the Sharia as "a principle source of legislation."

But while the
Muslim Brotherhood and the Islamic student groups were initially supportive
of Sadat, these organizations proved to be unreliable allies. Particularly
the Brotherhood was rebuilding its network and relied upon the goodwill
of the regime to continue its work. (See also Patrick Gaffuey, The Prophet's
Pulpit: lslamic Preaching in Contemporary Egypt, 1994).

The deference
to the government ended with Sadat's trip to Israel, and Sadat's
relations with the United States. The regime's reluctance to completely
implement Islamic law remained another point of contention. The subsequent
re-emergence of Islamic violence indicated that the state had set in motion
something that it was not able to control.

While the ruling
party-the National Democratie Party-advocates a modernist ideology of development,
both the Mubarak and Sadat regimes consistently sought to situate their
authority within a framework linked to Islamie tradition. More importantly,
the active promotion of Islam through state-run media and the official
religious establishment has been a key factor in explaining the resurgence
of eonservative Islamic polities. Not only did this contribute to the re-emergence
of the long-standing debates over the nature of Egypt's social order, but
it helps to explain the partieular outcome. By attempting to appear more
culturally authentie than its religious opposition, state actors contributed
greatly to the construetion of an Islamie social order defined by exclusive
eonceptions of national identity and conservative interpretations of religion.
(See also Fouad Ajami, "The Sorrows of Egypt," Foreign Affairs, September/October,
1995).

This role of
state actors in promoting eonservative Islam helps to explain, then, two
key anomalies in contemporary Egyptian polities. The first was the emerging
dominance of Islamist polities in the aftermath of the government's victory
over its militant opposition in the 1990's. While the militants failed
to dislodge the regime, the Islamist critique had nonetheless taken hold
and the vernacular of political discourse was fundamentally transformed.
This raised the inevitable question: ''why had this occurred?" Why weren't
the victors able to defme the new 'rules of the game'?

Related to this
was a second anomaly: why did the regime tolerate a religious establishment
that was, outspoken and moving "closer to the Islamists ideas and further
away from the official line?" (Dalacoura, Islam, Liberalism anti Human
Rights, p. 126-7).

While conventional
wisdom tends to attribute the resurgence of Islam to popular unrest or
an inherent religiosity among the population, the approach defined here
emphasizes the important role of the state in creating an environment where
Islamist politics tlourished. The state politicized not just the ulema,
but the discourse of conservative Islam. It even went so far as to support
some of the groups that would later emerge as its prlmary opponents. In
this way, the government' s politicization of religion helped to validate
the ideas and organizations associated with the Islamist movement, and
ushered in a new era of religious politics.

The implications
of this instrumental manipulation of religion have been significant.Not only has
it contributed to greater communalization of the polity, but it has helped
to create an environment where the persecution of Coptic Christians, secular
intellectuals and those with dissenting religious opinions has occurred
with regularity (and often with state complicity). The most significant
victim ofthe ideological battles of the last thirty years, then, has been
the conception of Egypt as a plural society. The right to differ, either
intellectually or politically, has been stigmatized and often equated with
either heresy or treason. But by relying upon coercive state structures
to constrain dissent, and by using Islam to promote political quiescence,
the state continues to exclude large segments of the population from public
life, and undercuts the possibility of developing a truly open society.
Minority rights, political development, civil society and regional stability
will all remain problematic issues for the near future.

The Islamic
discourse that now dominates in Egypt has demonstrated intolerant and exclusive
tendencies, and as such does not provide the kind of pluralist basis for
a what is in fact a diverse society. How this affects Egypt's future remains
to be seen, though it is likely that the two opposing elements of Egyptian
culture-the secular intellectual and conservative Islamic-will continue
to clash. If the state is able to improve economic well-being, increase
political participation or otherwise generate alternative sources of legitimacy,
its dependency upon religious politics may diminish, and the influence
of conservative Islam may lessen. The irony, of course, is that any effort
to genuinely open the political arena will seriously threaten the existence
of the regime, since free elections would likely benefit the Islamist opposition.
In other words, the state has limited its options by embracing conservative
Islam as a source of legitimacy.

Increased radicalism
of the Islamic networks, led Sadat to give a speech in 1979 where he denounced
the student groups by name, and argued that „those who wish to
practice Islam can go to the mosques, and those who wish to engage in politics
may do so through legal institutions." (Hopwood, Egypt: State and Society,
p. 117).

Sadat next,
reversed his steps toward political liberalization in order to reign in
the Islamic movement which he had helped create. (David Sagiv, Fundamentalism
and Intellectuals in Egypt, 1973-1993, London, 1994, p. 60).

But by then,
religious politics had taken on a life of their own. Islamist groups had
emerged as the dominant opposition to the state, a movement ironically
facilitated by Sadat's own policies and Saudi money. And with his assassination
in 1981 by members of al-Jihad, "the genie bad struck him down." (Fouad
Ajami, The Dream Palaces of the Arabs: A Generation's Odyssey, 1998, p.
206).

Interresting,
the message of both establishment Islam and the Islamist opposition was
becoming increasingly similar throughout this period. Moreover, they all
sought a common goal of "bring[ing] Egyptian society back to Islam." (Zeghal,
"AI-Azhar and Radical Islam," p. 382).

Unlike Ataturk's
Turkey by then (1970), Sadat's Egypt now had become firmly rooted in its
Islamic heritage. In fact the assassination of Anwar Sadat, was meant to
spark a popular rebellion coordinated by the militant group al-Jihad, but
a breakdown in communication prevented many ofthe cells around the eountry
from being activated. Members of al-Jihad planned to eapture the radio
and television building in eentral Cairo, and begin broadcasting news of
the uprising. This would give other members of the organization a signal
that the plan was in effect. The failure, however, to capture the building
kept many of the cell leaders in the dark, and out of the fight. The government
responded by rounding up thousands of suspeeted militants and supporters,
300 of whom were eharged with murder and conspiracy to overthrow the government.

Sentences ranged
from 3 years to life (plus more than eighty were excecuted), but those
that were acquitted left the courthouse chanting "the Islamic Revolution
is coming," a clear indication of conflict to come (SulIivan and Abed-Kotob,
Islam in Contemporary Egypt, p. 81.).

The Mubarak
regime's policies reflected those ofthe Sadat era: tolerating (though constraining)
the Muslim Brotherhood, while using the official religious establishment
to promote a more obedient Islam. Unlike Sadat, however, Mubarak would
rely to a much greater degree upon the security services to deal with the
militants, which, in the 1980's and 90's, mounted a significant challenge
to the regime.

Influenced by
both the Iranian revolution in 1979, and the Afghan war against the Soviets,
political Islam emerged as an ideology capable of challenging existing
patterns of domination. Political tracts by writers such as al-Banna, Qutb,
and Mawlana Mawdudi found a new generation receptive to their message.
The subsequent resurgence of a politicized Islam combined the rejectionist
ideas of these early writers with the anti Western sentiments that bad
informed Nasser's Arab Nationalism. Along with their political and economic
critique of the status quo, the Islamists offered a positive message that
drew from the cultural and religious tradition of the people. This alternative
was detined by a fear that Islam was under attack from the West (and Westemized
elites), and that the vulnerability of the umma (community) to such an
assault was due to its having strayed from the true path of Islam.

The prescription,
then, to such ills was a "return to Islam," an amorphous slogan that entailed
a reordering social and political life in accordance with the religious
teachings of the Prophet, the Qur'an and the Sunna. (The example of the
Prophet Mohamed as it is relayed through Islamic tradition).

Although the
specifies remained vague, the Islamists believed it promised a more authentic
society, and, as such, represented an indigenous alternative to Western
models of development. It also resonated strongly with a dispossessed population,
the majority of which were preeluded from any real opportunity for advaneement.
As such, Islam became a "potent ideology of popular dissent." (Muhammad
Faour, The Arab World After Desert Storm (Washington: U.S. Institute of
Peace Press, 1993, p. 55).

The initial
goal was not to destroy Islamie activism, but to temper the extremists
and co-opt the moderates, at least long enough for economic reforms to
improve living standards. There was never any intention of allowing the
Islamist groups into the political arena, or to otherwise share power with
them; rather, the state tolerated their existence as long as they did not
challenge the regime's right to rule. While Mubarak created space in the
religious and cultural spheres for those willing to cooperate with the
state-and allowed groups like the Muslim Brothers to continue providing
social services-the regime retained full control over what it perceived
to be the core issues of economic and foreign poliey.

The official
ulema subsequently worked with the regime by offering theological responses
and critiques of the militants, and, in particular, their use of violence
against fellow Muslims. The ulema continued these efforts throughout the
1990's in part to preserve their institutional interests, and, in part,
to continue their propagation of Islam. In return for its cooperation,
the Mubarak government provided significant resourees and a degree of independence
to AI-Azhar and the Ministry of Religious Endowments. (Skovgaaard-Peterson.
Defining Islam tor the Egyptian Stole, p. 220).

The Muslim Brotherhood
also worked with the Mubarek government in the 1980's, serving as
an intermediary between the state and the Islamic militants. By accepting
state authority, the Brotherhood thus was allowed to operate and published
a newspaper, al-Da 'wa (tbe Call), for a short period, and continued to
provide social seryices throughout Egypt. In tbe 1980's, young activists
were able to bring their experience in university politics to the realm
of the professional syndicates. (Gehad Auda, "Tbe Nonnalization of the
Islamic Movement in Egypt from the 1970's to the Early 1990's", in Marty
and Appleby, Fundamentalisms and the State, University of Chicago Press,
1994, p. 390).

They made early
gains in the Engineering Syndicate in the mid-1980's, and by 1987 had won
amajority of seats on that board. They made similar imoads into the doctor's
and pharmacists associations, and in 1992 they gained control of the board
of the lawyer's syndicate. Thus poliey of "mutual accommodation" benefited
the Brotherhood in its effort to re-establish itself as the leading Islamic
organization in Egyptian society. (See Geneive Abdo. No God but God: Egypt
and the Triumph of Islam, Oxford University Press, 2000).

While the early
1980' s were relatively quiet in Egypt, sporadic violence began in the
mid to late-1980's. The violence began with a senes of attacks on Coptic
Christians in upper Egypt. Militant groups targeted Copts for the money
that could be raised by robbing their shops, and also to strike at the
historically cosmopolitan fabric of Egyptiansociety. The state was slow
to respond to these attacks, even as they contributed to the communal tensions
that had been increasing since the Sadat era. In the late 1980's, the tactics
of the militants shifted, as al-Jihad began targeting government officials,
particularly, those involved in the security services. In 1987, there were
four assassination attempts on government officials, ostensibly undertaken
by Islamic Jihad.

In 1989, the
Minister oflnterior, Zaki Bar, was targeted by al-Gama'a AI-Islamiyya (the
Islamic group), Egypt's second major militant organization. Several months
later, in 1990, the speaker of the Egyptian Parliament, Refaat EI Mahgoub,
was assassinated. In 1992, Farag Foda, a leading secular critic ofthe Islamists
was shot to death outside his home in Cairo. In that same year, other militant
groups struck at foreign tourists, a leading source of foreign exchange
for the government. When bombs exploded in Cairo, it was dear that the
violence of upper Egypt had penetrated the urban life of the capital.

The Soviet invasion
of Afghanistan in 1979, and the subsequent war, had an enormous impact
upon the capability and direction of these groups. The United States and
Saudi Arabia provided significant funding and training for the Mujahadeen
forces fighting the Soviet occupation. Working with the Inter-Service Intelligence
(ISI) agency ofPakistan, the U.S. Cen1ral Intelligence Agency provided
upwards of$6 billion in arms, equipment and training over the course of
ten years. Moreover this was matched "dollar for dollar" by the Saudi government.
(George Crile, "Charlie Did It," Financial Times, June 7-8, 2003).

For its part,
the Egyptian government-like other Arab governments-actively encouraged
its young men to join the Jihad against the godless communism. Many who
bad been jailed for their role in the events of 1981, left for Afghanistan
immediately upon their release. This included among others, Ayman al-Zawahiri,
the leader of Islamic Jihad and future advisor to Osama Bin Laden. Omar
Abdel Rahman, spiritual head of al-Gamaa commonly known as the 'Blind Sheikh'
was another participant in the broader effort. The Afghan war was also
an important moment in the development of an international financial network
for "Jihadi" groups. Fundraising organizations were created with branches
in Western capitals as weIl as in the Middle East to funnel money into
Islamic militancy. When the war ended, these networks and groups continued
to operate, and began redirecting their focus to other venues including
Kashmir, Chechnya, Algeria and Egypt. (Robert Oakley, former-Ambassador
to Pakistan, referenced in Hibbard and Litte, Islamic Activism and US.
Foreign Policy, p. 76).

Estimates regarding
the number of Egyptians who joined the fight range from several hundred
to several thousand, although a11 agree that they were coordinated largely
by Islamist organizations. A number of the militant groups, particu1arly
al-Jihad, saw this as an opportunity to rebuild their organizations after
the repression stemming from Sadat's assassination.The Afghan war subsequently
contributed to a new level of conflict between the Egyptian militants and
the state. The capacity of both Islamic Jihad and al-Gama 'a, as weIl as
the regularity ofviolence, increased dramatically with the return ofthe
mujahedin (holy warriors). These returnees had been trained in explosives
and guerriIla tactics and many of them had honed their skills in combat.
Their expertise was now being turned on the regime in a manner similar
to that occurrlng in neighboring countries such as Algeria.

Moreover, the
Egyptian military was largely unprepared to deal with this new level of
expertise and commitment. Unlike those who bad never left Egypt, these
men knew what they were doing. The attempted assassination of Interior
Minister Zaki Badr in 1989, for example, demonstrated what the security
services now faced. Although the attack failed, the use of explosives detonated
by remote control demonstrated a level of sophistication that had not existed
earlier in the decade. Of equal concern was the international funders and
operatives which gave these groups significant support, a situation created
ironically by U.S., Saudi and Pakistani intelligence agencies.

The events leading
up to new confrontations between the state and the militants began in early
1990, with a senes of provocations by Islamic activists. While some actions
were non-violent-including a peaceful march by the Gama'a al-Islamiyya
through one of Cairo' s slums-others were more aggressive, including a
number of anti-Christian riots and attacks on churches in upper Egypt.
The government responded by going on the offensive; it assassinated the
spokesman of tbe Gama'a on the streets of Cairo, and sent its spiritual
leader, Sheikh Mubammad Abdel Rahman, into exile. The Gama ' a retaliated
by assassinating Rifaat Mahgoub, the Speaker of the National Assembly.
Abdel Rahman eventually received a visa to the United States and set up
operations in Jersey City, NI. He was also the 'blind Sheikh' who was later
convicted in a U .S. court for bis involvement in the first attack on the
World Trade Towers in the early 1990s.

And after a
year and a half of relative quiet-during which time the Gulf War occurred,
the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS), was about win-Islamic violence once
again escalated. There was a slaughter of 13 Christians in tbe Spring of
1992 by a small faction in upper Egypt, followed by Farag Foda's assassination
in June of that year. (This was reflected in a leaked U.S. National Intelligence
Estimate reported in tbe London Sunday Times in February 1994 wbicb stated
that the Egyptian government was in danger ofbeing overthrown. The report
is referenced in Jon Alterman, "Egypt: Stable, but for How Long?" The Washington
Quarterly, Autumn 2000, p. 108).

While these
events did little to provoke the government, it was the subsequent attack
on foreign tourists the following Fall-and the Gama'a's announcement of
a concerted campaign against Western tourism-that prompted the government
to strike back. (It is estimated that the tourist industry brought into
Egypt $3.3 Billion annually at this time).

Thousands of
people were arrested or detained without charge during these sweeps, with
many being tortured and killed in police custody. Despite govemment gains.
however, both the Gama 'a and Islamic Jihad continued their operations.
These included several assassination attempts on leading state figures,
as well as on local police and security officers. Coptic Christians were
also targeted for attack. Some of the more high profile attacks included
a failed attempt on the life of Interior Minister Hassan al Alfi, and a
similar attempt on the Prime Minster Atef Sedky. The latter attempt proved
somewhat disastrous for the militants, since the attack claimed only the
life of a local schoolgirl, which state media covered extensively. Nonetheless,
the violence was escalating, and a government victory was far from assured.(Lawyers
Committee on Human Rights, Escalating Attactics on Human Rights Protection
in Egypt, Washington: Lawyers Committee, 1995).

Many were held
without trial for several years, while those who did face charges were
tried in military courts. The govemment also passed a law barring political
activity of groups that were not registered political parties, and actively
cracked down on the activities of the Muslim Brotherhood.

As long as the
militants limited their attacks to govemment officials and police-who bad
little if any popular support-the population was behind them. When the
Gama'a shifted tacticst and started targeting foreign tourists and Egyptian
civilians (even Copts), popu1ar support rapidly fell.

This occurred
for two reasons. On the one band, the decline in tourism seriously impacted
the livelihood of ordinary Egyptians, particu1arly in upper Egypt, and
created economic hardship for those whom the militants were ostensibly
meant to support. On the other band, popu1ar opinion just did not perceive
as legitimate the kilIing of fellow Muslims.

By late 1994
the govemment's beavy handed tactics were beginning to pay off. By 1995,
the fighting bad been effectively isolated to the remote areas of central
and upper Egypt, where the conflict "degenerated into the timeless politics
of vengeance and vendettas, an endless cycle of killings and reprisals."
(Ajami, The Dream Palaces ofthe Arabs, p. 202).

Militant activity
continued, though, with two attacks in September and November 1997, the
latter of which was a gruesome attack on tourists in Luxor that left 60
dead. Far from demonstrating a resurgence of militancy, however, this attacked
marked the end of the conflict. Imprisoned members of the Gama'a subsequently
ca1led for a ceasefire.

But while the
state proved able to deal with the security threat posed by the militants,
the ideological challenge proved more difficult to address. When
the ulema defended government policies in the 1960's and 70's, they were
pereeived as puppets of thecregime. Many of members of the ulema, refused
to sanction this role, which ereated a split within AI-Azhar between the
leadership and those sympathetie to the Islamist cause. WhiIe the Iatter
may have opposed the militant's use of violence, they agreed with the Islamist
eritique of the regime, and shared the Islamist vision of social order.
These internal divisions also prodded the leadership into a more antagonistie
relationship with the regime. Consequently, when the Mubarek govemment
enlisted the ulema in its battIe with the militants in the earIy 1990's,
it had the unintended consequenee of empowering (and emboldening) both
the centrist leadership and the conservative ulema alike. (See Julie Taylor,
"State-Clerical Relations in Egypt: A Case of Strategie Interaction," presented
at the American Political Seience Association Annual Meeting in Washington,
DC, September 2000).

The government
also provided a forum for these religious leaders to comment on political
events, yet they used it in a way that did not always benefit the regime.
In April 1993, for example, a group of ulema alled upon the government
to "release the Islamist prisoners and to negotiate with the members of
radical Islam." (See Steven Baraclough, "Al-Azhar: Between the Govemment
and the Islamists," Middle East Journal, Vol. 52, No. 2, Spring 1998).

Similarly, in
1994, Gad al-Haq attributed the rise of Islamic extremism to the state's
manipulation and control of religious affairs, and implicitly argued for
a fteer hand in religious interpretation. He also became less willing to
issue blanket condemnations of attacks upon tourists and Copts, and focused
instead on issues of public morality. In taking these steps, the ulema
were presenting themselves as an alternative to both Islamic extremists
and the state. This allowed the ulema to develop an agenda of its own,
and were calling for " a retum to religion." (Zeghal, "Religion and Politics
in Egypt," p. 382).

While there
were limits, AI-Azhar's leverage over the regime grew more significant
as the violence became more intense. The tactics of the regime undermined
its legitimacy, and made it increasingly reliant upon whatever allies it
could get. As a result, a wide-spectrum of conservative ulema were
promoted a moderate Islamist worldview through radio, television. (See
Judith Miller, God has Ninety-Nine Names: Reporting from a Militant Middle
East, 1996).

Thus, although
the Mubarak regime bad previously supported many of the secular intellectua1s
who were subsequently targeted-and provided space for them to challenge
the Islamists-the regime did little to defend them when such support became
a liability. The state's compromise with conservative religion, then, privileged
a communalist interpretation of the Egyptian nation and national identity,
and demonstrated that the tirst victim in the struggle to maintain power
was Egypt' s historical commitment to secular and cosmopolitan norms.

At the heart
of the Islamist challenge in Egypt has been the continuing debate over
how to defme the nation. At issue, is a conflict between those who advocate
a society based upon a salafiyya (or Islamist) vision of social order-detined
by the establishment of an Islamic state and the full application of Sharia-and
those who embrace some notion of secular modernity. While the former argue
that the answer to Egypt's social ills is areturn to tradition, the latter
holds that it is the continuing influence of a stagnant tradition that
has been the source of Egypt's economic and political decline.

In the 19th
century, this debate was dominated by the reform movement of alAfghani,
Abdhuh and others. Challenged by European imperialism, members of this
movement advocated the embrace of science and reason as a means of social
revitalization. Among the more liberal elements of this movement, religion
was to be relegated to the private sphere, while the institutions of state
and society were reformed along western lines. The premise behind this
emulation of Europe was two-fold. First, developments in science and technology
were perceived to be an important element in transforming the material
conditions of Western societies, and Islamic societies, it was believed,
ought to follow suit. Second, many believed !hat the unquestioning obedience
to religious authority, and the lack of critical thinking associated with
it, had severely hindered the development of Arab society. Only by embracing
science and reason, then, could Arab societies compete economically and
politically with the West.

The more culturally
conservative elements in Egyptian society, however, rejected this reasoning,
and saw the European influence as an intrusion in traditional Egyptian
life. Such conservative elites perceived European values and ideas-particularly
those that emphasize individual self-interest over the interests of the
community-as largely inconsistent with those of Islam. The basic dichotomy
between Egypt's Islamists and secular intellectua1s has changed little
since this era.

This was evident
in the 1990's when-in the midst of the militant violence-the debate re-emerged
over whether Egypt ought to have an Islamic or secular state. The secular
argument generally took one of two approaches. On the one.

A debate on
this issue between Islamist and secular intellectuals occurred during a
meeting ofthe Cairo Book Fair in 1992, the proeeedings of whieh ean be
found in Misr Bayn a/ Daw/a a/ Diniya wa a/Madaniya (Egypt: A Religious
or CM/ State?)(Cairo, 1992). Representing the Islamists were Muhammad Imara,
Mamoun al-Hodeiby, the spokesman for the Muslim Brotherhood, and Shekh
Muhammad alGhazzali of AI-Azhar. On the other side were two renowned secular
intellectuals, Farag Foda, the founder of a/-Tanwir, and Muhammad Ahrned
Khanafa. The debate was significant for a nurnber of reasons, including
the fact that it was the first and last debate on such a sensitive topic
to be hosted by a govemment institution in such a public forum. Moreover,
it was shortly after this debate that Farag Foda was gunned down by Islamie
militants outside his horne in Cairo. He argued that nowhere in the Qur'
an does it specify a particular form of government, and thus a secular
government is consistent with Islam. (Fauzi M. Naiiar, "Tbe Debate on Islam
and Secularism in Egypt," Arab Studies Quarterly, Spring 1996, Vol. 18,
No. 2, p. 21).

It was not that
the early Wafdists were necessarily hostile to religion. Rather, they were
concemed about the politicization of ecclesiastic authorities, and the
manipulation of religion by political actors (particularly by the monarchy).
If this first approach is wary of religion's influence upon politics, the
second approach is concemed with the effect of politics upon religion.
Authors such as Mohammad Said al-Ashmawy are deeply disturbed over the
politicization of Islam. Though he explicitly eschews the label of secularist,
Ashmawy's position is premised upon the belief that religion (and specifIcally
Islam) deals fundamentally with human spirituality, not with politics.
(See Muhammad Said al-Ashmawy, Islam and the Political Order, Washington,
DC: The Council for Research in Values and Philosophy, 1994).

Other concerns
raised by secular and liberal intellectua1s deal with the ambiguity of
what an Islamic state would entail. For example, the demand for the application
of shari'a, despite its apparent simplicity, is rather misleading because
there is no single interpretation of Islamic law. Rather, there are several
schools of Islarnic jurisprudence-the Hanafi, Malaki, Hanbali, and Shafi'i-which,
while similar in most matters, do differ on various issues. Second, the
secularists fear the abuse that would be inherent in an Islamic state.
139 Once shari 'a was established, any opposition could be equated with
heresy, and dissent would "become an insolence in the face of God' s law
..that has to be punished by applying the appropriate hadd (Quranic punishment)."The
proponents of an Islamic state-a group often referred to as 'integralists
' -reject these arguments, and believe that a elose affiliation between
religion and politics is not just preferable, but essential. The core of
their argument lies in the assertion that Islam has never known a distinction
between public and private realms, and that all aspects ofhuman existence
are meant to be regulated by God's will as defined in the Qur'an, the Sunna
(example of the Prophet) and the Shari'a. The basic assumption within this
claim is that without religion, there can be no normative basis to political
life and, hence, no morality. Moreover, secularism is understood from this
perspective as either a matter of unbelief (kufr) or of active hostility
to religion. The alternative to an Islamic state, then, "is not a civil
state, but rather an irreligious [one]." (Farid Zakariyya, quoted in Alexander
Flores, "Secularism, Integralism, and Political Islam: The Egyptian Debate,"
in Joel Beinin and Joe Stork, Political Islam: Essays from Middle East
Report, Berkeley, 1997, p. 91).

By promoting
conservative Islam for its own ends, state elites have helped to validate
the integralist (and Islamist) vision of social order, and moved the salaflya
interpretation of Islam into the ideological mainstream. This also contributed
greatly to the communalization of Egyptian politics, with dire results
for the Christian minority.

Discrimination
against the Coptic Christians-which comprise the largest minority in the
country-is evident in a variety of issues ranging from the official count
of the population,l to biring procedures that exclude Christians from holding
positions of authority. There are no Christian govemors or mayors in Egypt,
for example, or Cabinet level officials. Members of the Coptic community
are also unrepresented in the upper ranks of the security services. Similarly,
Cbristians are largely absent in the realm of academia. Of Egypt' s 15
state universities, none have a Coptic Christian in a key administrative
post-either Dean or President-and only a very few Christians hold teaching
positions. Similarly, Christian students are not allowed to attend AI-Azhar
University despite its public funding. As one of Egypt's pre-eminent universities,
this type of discrimination has long-term implications for future job prospects
in such fields as medicine, law and engineering. There is some dispute
as to the actual nwnbers of the Coptic population as weIl. Govemment figures
place the number at 6 million, or roughly 5 percent ofthe population. Coptic
activists claim a much higher figure, around 10 million. while external
sources place it at 7 to 8 million.

Other forms
of discrimination can be found in the treatment of minorities on matters
of religious freedom and marriage. While a Christian may convert to Islam,
Muslims who convert to Christianity have been subject to harassment by
local law enforcement. While such conversions are not specifically prohibited
by law, neither are hey recognized. Similarly, a Muslim woman is legally
prohibited from marrying a Christian man, though a Muslim man may marry
a Christian woman. There have also been numerous reports of Coptic girls
being abducted and forcibly converted to Islam (meaning included in a harem)
by Muslim men. While there are no reports of government involvement in
such abductions, the local police and government officials have harassed
Christian families seeking redress, and the government has clearly failed
"to uphold the law in such instances." Plus there is a law prohibiting
Churching construction (and repair) absent a presidential decree remains
in force, even while the government uses public funds for mosque construction
and support. (International Religious Freedom Report 2001, Egypt, U.S.
Department of State).

On New Years
Eve 1999, violenee in the southem city of AI-Kosheh led to two days of
rioting. During this period, Muslims burned and looted Coptic stores, and
killed 20 Christians. The violenee reflected long simmering tensions between
wealthy Christians and less weIl-off Muslims, though was very much intertwined
with the communalization of polities. When two Christians had been killed
in the previous year, the government rounded up 1,000 Copts-torturing many-convinced
that Christians were behind the killings. (Alberto Femandez. "In the Year
ofthe Martyrs" Anti-Coptic Violence in Egypt, 1988-1993," Paper Presented
at the Middle East Studies Association Annual Meeting, San Francisco, November
18-20,2001).

The government's
response to the 1999-2000 violence reflected a similar unwillingness to
address the real issues. The initial trial indicted 96 defendants-58
Muslims and 38 Copts-but acquitted 92 of them. The remaining four were
convieted of only minor crimes. According to one analyst at the time, "the
verdiets were intentionally light in order to avoid fanning the flames
of sectarian strife."( cited in Nadia About EI-Magd, "The Meanings of AI-Kosheh,"
AI-Ahram Weeldy, 3-9 February 2000).

While the Egyptian
government refuses to recognize the Coptic community as a minority-and
argues that the Egyptian nation is entirely of one 'ethnic' fabric-the
government has nonetheless refused to allow for equal treatment of the
Christian population. This is refleeted in the common pereeption among
members of the Coptic eommunity that they are second class eitizens, and,
thus, not 'fully Egyptian.'(See "International Religions Freedom Report,
2004" U.S. Department of State).

Moreover, the
large amounts of daily television and radio time dedicated to Islamic programming
has in the past either demeaned Christianity or emphasized the benefits
of conversion to Islam. Similarly, Islamist newspapers, commonly denigrate
Christianity and the Coptic community, as do the sermons at Friday prayers
in mosques around the country. Each of these trends contributes to the
further communalization of public life, and has increased Coptic alienation.

These issues
were also resurrected in 2001 when an Arabic language weekly, al Nabaa,
published a lengthy story-with numerous pictures-of a defrocked priest
having sex with women at a revered monastery. A major protest erupted among
the Coptic community that included several days of demonstrations in Cairo.
While the immediate cause of the protest was the publication of the article,
these unprecedented street protests were driven largely by the community'
s sense of continued persecution. The protestor' s grievances reflected
long-standing frustration with the Mubarak regime's unwillingness to protect
minority rights, and ineluded a variety of critieisms of both the Government
and the Church leadership.

While the Mubarak
regime has sought to promote interfaith dialogue and other means to ease
tensions between the communities, the state' s promotion of communalism
has had a lasting impact upon Coptic as weIl as Muslim identity. This has
not been helped by the tendency of state actors to take community issues
up with the Coptic Church, and not with secular representatives. And while
there remain numerous Muslims and Christians willing to reach out to one
another, they frequently face opposition within their own communities over
such issues as inter-communal dialogue and the advocacy of reform. This
is especially evident in the internal divisions that exist within the Coptic
community over how to respond to both the state and the sectarian tensions.
Expatriate Coptic groups often differ with local groups over how to approach
many of the issues raised by their minority status. Similarly, the communalism
fostered by the state has constrained those in both groups who try to promote
religious tolerance and mutual understanding.

Elsewhere Farag
Foda, a leading secular writer, was assassinated in 1992. He had participated
in the 1992 Cairo Book Fair forum, during which he bad he had insulted
Muhammad al-Ghazali, a leading member of Al-Azhar. The Front subsequently
issued afatwa designating Foda a kafir (beretic), the punishment for which
is death. During the murder trial, Sheikh al-Ghazali testified to the fact
that "anyone opposing the full implementation of the sharia, as Foda did,
was guilty of apostasy, and that anyone killing such a person was not liable
for punishment under Islamic law." (Abdo, No God but God, p. 68).

The assassination
of Foda was a galvanizing event, as was the attack two years later on writer
Naguib Mahfouz, Egypt's famed Nobel Laureate. In both cases, the efforts
by establishment clerics to ban their books or otherwise identify them
as apostates provided a warrant for their subsequent attacks by the more
radical militant groups. And although wi1ling to support secular thinkers
in their criticisms of Islamic militancy, the Egyptian regime was less
willing to aid such intellectuals when challenged by members of the religious
establishment.

For example,
Nasr Hamid Abu Zeid in 1993, a former professor at the University of Cairo,
was a scholar of Islamic studies and Arabic literature. By attempting the
application of hermeneutics to the interpretation of the Qur'an, several
of his colleagues with whom he had long differed considered his analysis
heresy, and coordinated with a group of Islamist lawyers to bring formal
charges against him. While Abu Zeid argued his case on the grounds of freedom
of thought and _expression (a constitutional matter), those bringing the
case invoked the rules of sharia (lslamic law), and focused on whether
or not Abu Zeid's writings were a threat to the community of Muslims. The
court then ordered Abu Zeid divorced from his wife, since "being married
to an apostate from Islam was a violation of the rights of God." (George
N. Sfeir, "Basic Freedoms in a Fractured Legal Culture: Egypt and the Case
of Nasr Hamid Abu Zayid," Middle East JoumaJ, Summer 1998, p. 406).

Muhammad Said
al-Ashmawy, the former Chief Justice of the Cairo High Court however ,
has found himself in a similar predicament to that of Abu Zeid. In 1992,
the Islamic Research Academy recommended that a number of bis books be
banned, and ordered the confiscation of five specific texts. In 1996, a
similar order was given for a book he published concerning women and the
veil in Islam. In this book he argued that there is nothing in the Quran
or the Sunna that require woman to wear a veil, and that this is solely
a matter of custom.The Islamic Research Academy subsequently ordered the
confiscation of this book.

Other leading
scholars in Egypt were similarly targeted for attack, including author
Said Mahmud al-Qumny, whose book The God of Time, was banned. The attack
on The God of Time was part of a broader campaign against 196 books that
al-Azhar deemed blasphemous. The case was submitted to the State Security
court upon the request of Al-Azhar, where al-Qumny was subsequently charged
with ''propagating ideas that denigrate Islam [under Artiele 198 of the
Criminal Code]." (Egyptian Organization for Human Rights, Press Release,
May 1, 1997).

The underlying
debate in each of these cases-the limits of free expression and the acceptability
of questioning revealed religion-is not new. As noted above, there has
long been a debate over the degree to which Islam is open to interpretation.

What is perhaps
most significant, though, is the government's complicity in these attacks.
The intolerance of dissenting opinions on religious matters has been legitimated
by state policies which have been designed to encourage religious piety
and political quiescence, while stigmatizing both extremism and Westernization
as twin evils to be avoided. In doing so, however, it also helped redefine
the moral order of Egyptian public life. As one writer recently commented,
the emergence of "~ influential middle c1ass with a [traditional] mentality
as weIl as the politicization of Islam" has created a new social
environment, where the idea that society should be organized around religious
principles is largely accepted and where assaults on 'deviance' by state
institutions is now commonplace.

While rhetorically
committed to a secular modernity, the regime has ceded the basic debate
over religion and public life to conservative clerics. As such, the regime
sought to appropriate the message of conservative Islam, not oppose it.
Since the vast majority of the population are sympathetic to the concems
raised by the Islamists, neither the regime nor the state-controlled media
wished to defend secular principles or ideas. Moreover, the assaults on
intellectual freedoms were perceived by the regime to be peripheral to
their core economic and political concerns. (See Judith Miller "The Challenge
of Radical Islam," Foreign Affairs 72, no. 2,1993).

Furthermore,
aimed at constraining moderate Islamists was the reform of the Hisba laws
in 1997, which had allow Islamists lawyers to bring cases of Islamic morality
to court. The regime has also continued to ignore the complaints of Coptic
Christians, secular intellectua1s and Shi'a Muslims.

At the same
time, the Mubarak government claims to support avision of modemity that
promotes tolerance, pluralism and economic development. In short, the Mubarak
regime is trying to serve as both an advocate of secular modemity and Islamic
tradition at the same time.The inconsistency of these two trends has generated
a 'superficial hybrid,' where the successful promotion of economic modemity
would appear to entail the promotion of critical reasoning.

Successful modernization
also requires at least some degree of independence for the realm of civil
society, and a greater emphasis upon the rule of law and accountable government.
Moreover, the success of the state in promoting a communalist vision of
society-and of depicting conservative religious belief as culturally more
authentic-has greatly affected the middle classes which have become increasingly
conservative and overtly Islamic in the last twenty years.

Despite the
government's success in replacing. top officials of the religious establishment,
moreover, the Mubarak regime has been largely unable to eradicate the deeply
entrenched conservatism that exists within these institutions. And it is
here that the state's politicization of Islam over the last thirty years
is most evident. By inviting Saudi influence and financing to eradicate
the left-and, later, to counter the Islamists-both the Sadat and Mubarak
regime helped to destroy the intellectual basis for a liberal modernist
(or humanist) Islam and discredited the idea that religion was open to
interpretation. These policies subsequently contributed to the demise of
modernist Islam within Egypt. In its stead has been placed a conservative
interpretation of Islamic tradition.

Moreover, by
using the security services (and courts) to prosecute heterodox views,
the Mubarak government has "repeatedly sent a clear message that religion
is not a private matter and that any 'deviation ftom the true religion'
will not be tolerated." (Hossam Bahgat, "AI-Azhar is wrong, but the state
is the real culprit," The Dally Star, September 23, 2004).

The influenee
of eonservative Islam in Egyptian public life was greatly abetted by the
changing orientation ofstate elites that began in the 1970's. By using
Islam as a basis of nationalist legitimacy, bot,h Sadat and Mubarak abandoned
the earlier eommitments to seeular modernity that marked the Nasser era.
It also ereated an opportunity for conservative activists to promote their
vision of Islam in public life. While the ruling party-the National Democratie
Party-advocates a modernist ideology of development, both the Mubarak and
Sadat regimes consistently sought to situate their authority within a moral
framework linked to Islamie tradition. More importantly, the active promotion
of Islam through state-run media and the official religious establishment
has been a key factor in explaining the resurgence of eonservative Islamic
polities. Not only did this contribute to the re-emergenee ofthe long-standing
debates over the nature of Egypt's social order, but it helps to explain
the partieular outcome. By attempting to appear more culturally authentie
than its religious opposition, state actors contributed greatly to the
construetion of an Islamie social order defined by exclusive eonceptions
of national identity and conservative interpretations of religion.

This role of
state actors in promoting eonservative Islam helps to explain, then, two
key anomalies in contemporary Egyptian polities. The first was the emerging
dominance of Islamist polities in the aftermath of the government's victory
over its militant opposition in the 1990's. While the militants failed
to dislodge the Mubarek as the noted political commentator and fonner-Ambassdor
Tahseen Basbir remarked, even though the Islamists were "checked in [their]
bid for power, ... the Islamization of society gained ground."referenced
in Fouad Ajami, "The Sorrows ofEgypt," Foreign Affairs (September/October.
1995)

The Islamist
critique bad nonetheless taken hold and the vernacular of political discourse
was fundamentally transformed. This raised the inevitable question: ''why
had this occurred?" Why weren't the victors able to defme the new 'rules
of the game'? Related to this was a second anomaly: why did the regime
tolerate a religious establishment that was, at least from the early 1990's,
extremely outspoken and moving "closer to the Islamists ideas and further
away from the officialline?"207 This was particularly perplexing given
the state's complicity in high profile assaults upon intellectual freedom,
and the regime's apparent absence in the debate over social order.

The answers
to these questions are best found by moving away from a dichotomous understanding
of Egyptian politics that emphasizes a secular state vying with an
Islamist opposition-and recognizing instead the central role of official
institutions in promoting conservative Islam. The focus of this research,
then, is on the interaction of three sets of actors-the state elite, the
religious establishment and the Islamist opposition-and the manner in which
this dynamic facilitated an ideological transformation of Egyptian politics.
While conventional wisdom tends to attribute the resurgence of Islam to
popular unrest or an inherent religiosity among the population, the approach
defined here emphasizes the important role of the state in creating an
environment where Islamist politics tlourished. The state politicized not
just the ulema,but the discourse of conservative Islam. It even went so
far as to support some of the groups that would later emerge as its prlmary
opponents. In this way, the government' (Dalacoura, Islam, Liberalism anti
Human Rights, p. 126-7).

Politicization
of religion helped to validate the ideas and organizations associated with
the Islamist movement, and ushered in a new era of religious politics.The
implications of this instrumental manipulation of religion have been significant.
Not only has it contributed to greater communalization of the polity, but
it has helped to create an environment where the persecution of Coptic
Christians, secular intellectua1s and those with dissenting religious
opinions has occurred with regul~ty (and often with state complicity).
The most significant victim ofthe ideological battles ofthe last thirty
years, then, has been the conception of Egypt as a plural society. The
right to differ, either intellectua1ly or politically, has been stigmatized
and often equated with either heresy or treason. The takfir cases, for
example, demonstrate the weakness of the,government in the face of a religious
communalism of its own making; by failing to stand,up to chauvinistic tendencies
within official institutions, the ruling regime has become complicit in
their actions. Moreover, the failure to cultivate an inclusive basis of
national identity-and a political culture of tolerance and compromise-has
contributed to major divisions in society and continuing social tensions.
In short, by relying upon coercive state structures to constrain dissent,
and by using Islam to promote political quiescence, the state continues
to exclude large segments of the population from public life, and undercuts
the possibility of developing a truly open society.

These findings
do not, however, imply the imminent downfall ofthe regime or an imminent
Islamist takeover. What it does signify is that minority rights, political
development, civil society and regional stability will all remain problematic
issues for the near future. The Islamic discourse that now dominates in
Egypt has demonstrated intolerant and exclusive tendencies, and as such
does not provide the kind of pluralist basis for a what is in fact a diverse
soci~ty. How this affects Egypt's future remains to be seen, though it
is likely that the two opposing elements of Egyptian culture-the secular
intellectual and conservative Islamic-will continue to clash. If the state
is able to improve economic well-being, increase political participation
or otherwise generate alternative sources of legitimacy, its dependency
upon religious politics may diminish, and the influence of conservative
Islam may lessen. The irony, of course, is that any effort to genuinely
open the political arena will seriously threaten the existence of the regime,
since free elections would likely benefit the Islamist opposition. In other
words, the state has limited its options by embracing conservative Islam
as a source of legitimacy.

As pointed out,
the goal of the Muslim Brotherhood has always remained the same: to reestablish
Sharia rule in Egypt and elsewhere, whether by peaceful or violent means.
And now, despite the best efforts of the Mubarak regime (which, like the
Nasser and Sadat regimes before it, has tried to keep the Ikhwan at bay
with a combination of force and concessions) to limit its influence, it
is gaining strength in Egypt. However the Islamist group has now won 76
seats -- more than five times the number it held in the outgoing chamber.

One of
the most important developments in the recent history of the Muslim Brotherhood
movement has been its adoption of participatory politics as a major strategy.
The Brotherhood’s engagement in the political process has been accompanied
by the embrace of a new, pro-democracy narrative in which the movement
claims to seek the creation not of a religious state, but of a "civil state
with an Islamic source of authority.” In some countries, the Brotherhood’s
embrace of electoral politics has also led to the formation of political
parties.In light of these developments, it has been argued that the Brotherhood
will become moderated as it integrates more fully into the political process,
and conversely, more radicalized, should it be excluded. But has the MB's
own track record provided any evidence to support this hypothesis? Has
the Brotherhood’s participation in politics brought about a fundamental
ideological change in the movement, and led it to alter its radical nature
and objectives?Two cases, both of which will be examined in this paper,
shed some light on these questions: that of Egypt, where the Brotherhood
is officially outlawed, and that of Jordan, where the Brotherhood is legal
and has formed its own political party. In both cases, the Brotherhood’s
embrace of politics has rewarded it with some considerable electoral successes
in the recent past. At the same time, those achievements have also compelled
the Egyptian and Jordanian regimes to move firmly to deny the Brotherhood
new electoral gains and to try and reduce its political role. The Jordanian
Brotherhood has complained that the government rigged recent elections,
causing the Brotherhood’s party to perform poorly. And yet, despite
these claims, Jordanian experts say the Brotherhood’s electoral setbacks
can not be ascribed entirely to governmental manipulation alone. Instead,
it seems that the Brotherhood has not been able to persuade the masses
of its ideological agenda.Meanwhile, Hamas's victory in the January 2006
legislative elections didn’t help the group accomplish its own professed
goals of liberating and Islamizing Palestine. Instead, Hamas ended up politically
isolated in Gaza. Moreover, in Morocco, the Brotherhood-inspired
Justice and Development Party did not perform as well as expected in the
legislative elections of September 2007, which were relatively free and
fair compared to elections in other Arab countries.

All of this
suggests that the Brotherhood’s political strategy has recently come
up against some genuine limits—including limits imposed not only by states
to curb the MB’s political ascendancy, but also limits to the Brotherhood’s
own ability to mobilize voters on the basis of its slogan "Islam is the
solution.” The more the MB has advanced in the polls, and the more the
possibility of its assuming power loomed on the horizon, the more the movement
was expected, at home and abroad, to offer pragmatic solutions to people’s
problems and to make the sort of compromises required of political parties
in a pluralistic political order. But the Brotherhood has not met those
expectations, and as a result, has suffered in the political arena in recent
times.

It appears,
then, as the Egyptian analyst Khalil al-Anani has recently put it,[1] that
"the Islamist Spring" may well be coming to a close. But if the MB's political
strategy has reached a dead end, what will its various branches choose
to do now and in the future? Hamas provided one response to this dilemma
when it took over Gaza by force. That response may well be a model that
other Brotherhood branches will follow in the future. On the other end
of the spectrum, however, is the example offered by the Islamic AKP (Justice
and Development Party) in Turkey, which won victories in the 2002
and 2007 legislative elections—but only after distancing itself from
traditional Brotherhood ideology. This achievement suggests that an Islamic
political party can assume power and keep it in a civil state, so long
as it is willing to accept the sovereignty of that political order and
reject the ideological objectives of establishing an Islamic state.
But is the MB at large willing to take this step? On this question, the
views of the Brotherhood regarding the AKP’s model and success are especially
revealing, and will also be examined in this paper.

But while the
Brotherhood was founded with the expressed purpose of establishing the
sovereignty of sharia (Islamic law), uniting Muslim lands, liberating them
from all foreign presence, and eventually spreading Islam worldwide. And
while these objectives have also been pursued through jihad, especially
since the period of repression it experienced during Nasser’s reign in,
through dawa, or missionary and social activities.

It thus is important
to understand the relationship between dawa and politics (siyasah) in Brotherhood
organizations. In politics, the Brotherhood may claim to seek the creation
of a civil state. But at the level of dawa, the MB doesn’t make
compromises with its basic ideological objectives, because divine truth,
as it see it, cannot be subject to political negotiation. The Brotherhood’s
political activities are meant to advance the Islamizing objectives of
the Brotherhood as a dawa movement.

MB political
parties in Arab countries are, organizationally speaking, not separate
from the dawa organization. This is so even in Morocco, where the Brotherhood’s
political party—the Justice and Development Party (Hizb al-Adalah wal-Tanmiyah)—is
widely regarded as having gone further than other MB parties in distancing
itself from the dawa organization and the revivalist movement from which
it sprang, the "Monotheism and Reform Movement" (Harakat al-Tawhid
wal-Islah).[2]

In many ways,
the two strategies of dawa and siyasah are contradictory and inevitably
produce deep ambiguities in the Brotherhood’s ideological message. For
example, as a dawa movement, the Brotherhood calls for the implementation
of sharia and the establishment of an Islamic state, and cannot accept
non-Muslims as citizens fully equal to Muslims, which should be a sine
qua non for a civil political party. Moreover, engagement in political
activity and elections requires dialogue and partnership with other political
forces, including with ideological rivals. As such, the Brotherhood’s
political activities have sometimes found themselves in conflict with the
message of the dawa. These tensions have given rise to the famous “grey
zones”—the ambiguous positions on ideological and political issues
that provide key benchmarks for gauging an organization’s commitment
to democratic and pluralistic values.

A Civil
or Sharia State?

Since the beginning
of the Egyptian Brotherhood's involvement in electoral politics in the
1980s, its public statements have emphasized its commitment to promoting
democracy, freedom, justice, human rights, and common citizenship for members
of religious minorities. The Brotherhood’s participation in politics
has also created a felt need within the movement’s ranks to form a political
party.

The Egyptian
Brothers most in favor of establishing a political party belong to the
“second generation” or "middle generation" (jil al-wasat). These men,
many of whom were activists in Islamist student organizations in the 1970s,
are skilled and politically savvy, and more interested in political work
than in dawa. Some of these activists have advocated setting up a party
alongside the Brotherhood's dawa structure, while others have suggested
that the Brotherhood transform itself entirely into a political party.
Today, the Egyptian Brotherhood's discourse is abuzz with discussion about
the future Brotherhood party, which is often described as “a civil party
with a religious source of authority” (marja’iyyah.)

Contemporary
Islamist writers ordinarily describe this concept of a “civil state with
an Islamic source of authority” as an alternative to the traditional
Brotherhood concept of a state operating on the principle of divine rule
(hakimiyyah), which requires the full implementation of sharia. But while
the Egyptian Brotherhood gives lip service to the creation of a civil party
and a civil state, it continues to adhere as an organization to the principle
of hakimiyyah. It regards itself as a comprehensive movement that combines
religion and the state and seeks to implement sharia in all aspects of
human activity.

The Brotherhood’s
mission statement, which is permanently posted on its official Arabic-language
website,[3] defines the Brotherhood as a Muslim community (jama’ah) that
preaches for and demands the rule of Allah’s law (tahkim shar’ allah).
It recapitulates the Brotherhood creed first formulated at its fifth conference
(January 1939) that declares that Islam is a complete and total system
and is the final arbiter of life in all its aspects, in all nations and
in all times.[4] The “Reform Initiative,” which the Brotherhood launched
in March 2004, states clearly that the ultimate goal of Islamic reform
is the implementation of sharia. It also says:

We have a clear
mission—to implement Allah’s law, on the basis of our belief that that
it is the real, effective way out of all our problems—domestic or external,
political, economic, social or cultural. That is to be achieved by forming
the Muslim individual, the Muslim home, the Muslim government, and the
state which will lead the Islamic states, reunite the scattered Muslims,
restore their glory, retrieve for them their lost lands and stolen homelands,
and carry the banner of the call to Allah in order to bless the world with
Islam’s teachings.[5]

In the Egyptian
context, even the most ardent advocates of the siyasah strategy have neither
accepted the separation of religion and state, nor abandoned the principle
that Islam is both religion and state (din wa-dawlah). These advocates
also uphold the Brotherhood’s identity as a religious dawa movement that
is committed to Islam’s total and universal nature. Thus, according to
Abd al-Mun’im Abu al-Futuh, one of the most outspoken “second generation”
advocates of the political strategy, the most important achievement of
the Brotherhood has been its success in spreading the concept of a universal
and comprehensive Islam and of the inseparability of state and religion.[6]
Issam al-Aryan, another prominent second generation leader and promoter
of the siyasah strategy, defined the Brotherhood's objective as:

The construction
of a total revival on the foundations and principles of Islam, which begins
with reforming the Muslim individual, the Muslim home and the Muslim society,
continues with reforming government and restoring the international entity
[al-kiyan al-duwali] of the Islamic nation, and ends with being the masters
of the world [ustadhiyat al-‘alam] through guidance and preaching [bil-hidayah
wal-irshad wal-dawa].[7]

This concept,
that the Brotherhood is a guide to society, obviously does not conform
to the idea of a civil party, one among many that compete with one another
without claiming possession of the absolute truth or pretending to guide
the others. Neither is the Islamic concept of the “Guide” as the title
of the Brotherhood's leader indicative of a democratic organization. The
Brotherhood has, therefore, made it a point to refer to its leader as the
“Chairman of the MB group" on its English-language website, to his deputy
as the “Deputy Chairman” and so forth. On the Brotherhood’s Arabic-language
sites and in its publications, however, the leader is still the “General
Guide” (al-Murshid al-‘Aamm), the organization's highest institution
is the “Guidance Bureau” (Maktab al-Irshad), etc. Far from regarding
itself as one political actor among many, the Brotherhood views itself
as speaking for Islam. The Brotherhood's claim to be the true representative
of Islam is reflected in its electoral slogan, “Islam is the Solution”
(al-Islam huwa al-hal). The slogan has been sharply criticized, but the
Brotherhood has refused to give it up. The MB believes their movement represents
the real and true Islamic community. That is why the Brotherhood would
not transform itself into a political party: If Islam is comprehensive,
and the MB is Islam, then it cannot be reduced to a political party.

The Egyptian
MB Party’s Program

In 2006 the
Egyptian Brotherhood made several public relations mistakes—including
the display of force by MB students performing martial arts in al-Azhar
University (10 December 2006)—that hurt its efforts to project itself
as a nonviolent, civil movement. These mistakes, in turn, helped the regime
paint the Brotherhood as a violent movement that poses a threat to Egypt's
national security. Facing the regime's pressure and wanting to improve
its image and acquire legitimacy as a civil movement seeking democratic
reform, the MB started in early 2007 to focus public attention on its future
political party and its program. The Brotherhood announced that it had
decided to establish a party and was on the verge of publishing the party's
program. Although this party has not been established and its official
program has not been published, unofficial draft texts of its platform—not
formally endorsed by the Brotherhood—have been circulated and have aroused
public debate.

The unofficial
texts not only support the supremacy of sharia in the Brotherhood's future
state, but also institutionalize it. Thus, the future party seeks to implement
“the authority of Islamic Sharia” (marja'iyyat al-shari'ah al-Islamiyyah)
in the following manner:[8]

o
The legislative branch should consult an assembly of religious scholars.
The president of the state must also consult this assembly of religious
scholars whenever he issues decisions that have legal power.

o
Whenever there is a definitive sharia ruling, backed by a definite holy
text (nass), the legislative branch has no authority to legislate differently.
When a clear holy text is not available, the position of the assembly of
scholars can be put to vote in the legislative branch. Rejecting that position
requires an absolute majority of the members of the legislative branch.

o
The assembly of religious scholars should be elected by religious scholars,
and enjoy total freedom from the executive branch.The Brotherhood
thus seeks to institutionalize sharia rule by establishing its own version
of the radical Shia concept of "rule of the jurist."

The draft program
further says that the state has fundamental religious functions, as it
is responsible for protecting and defending Islam. Those religious functions
are represented by the head of state, and consequently the head of state
must be a Muslim. That is also so because decisions on matters of war are
sharia decisions, requiring that whoever makes them will be a Muslim. (Other
drafts have specifically stated that the president must be a Muslim male.)[9]
The draft declared as well, however, that the state will be based on the
principle of citizenship (muwatanah), that all citizens will have equal
rights and obligations, and that "the woman will enjoy all her rights,
to be practiced in conformity with the fundamental values of society."

How does the
MB square the equality of all citizens with the exclusion of non-Muslims
and women from the top state position? What are "the fundamental values
of society" that govern women rights, and who defines them? Those and similar
questions emerged following the appearance of the drafts. First Deputy
General Guide Muhammad Habib clarified what he described as the Brotherhood's
"red lines" on these issues: Copts and women, he stressed, cannot be the
head of state.[10] Moreover, the Brotherhood’s leadership rejected a
proposal to insert wording into the draft that presented the authority
of sharia as reflecting the people's, rather than the divine, will. The
rejected formulation stated: "The authority of the Islamic sharia is a
constitutional principle chosen by the nation by its free will…. That
authority is not imposed on the nation, and becomes an authority only due
to the nation's choice."[11]

On all of these
issues, the draft program met with harsh criticism, including from within
the MB itself. In defense of the draft, Abd al-Futuh argued that any misunderstanding
resulted simply from "mistaken phrasing," and that the assembly of religious
scholars would be a consultative body only and that a woman could be the
head of state. He did not say, however, that a non-Muslim could be head
of state.[12]

Since the November
2005 legislative elections, the Egyptian government has undertaken a series
of measures that have aimed to deny the Brotherhood any political role.
Those measures have included large-scale and ongoing arrests that have
targeted, among others, top MB leaders; the use of military courts; a crackdown
on the Brotherhood’s financial infrastructure; and constitutional amendments,
adopted in March 2007, designed to undercut the Brotherhood's electoral
activity. As a consequence of these actions, not one Brotherhood-supported
candidate was elected in the Majlis al-Shura (Consultative Council) elections
of June 2007.

As the government
has imposed these constraints, the Brotherhood's political strategies have
come under increasing criticism from within both the Islamist movement
and the Brotherhood itself. In early 2007, Ali Abd al-Hafiz of Asyut University
led a group of Brotherhood members out of the organization, and formed
what he called “the Alternative Trend” (al-Tayar al-Badil). He called
on the Brotherhood to separate itself entirely from the political realm,
arguing that one cannot claim to be a religious and moral guide to society
while, at the same time, competing in elections against those one pretends
to guide.[13]

In January 2007,
Abdullah al-Nafisi, a former Brotherhood member and renowned Islamist scholar,
went even further. He argued that the Brotherhood’s political strategy
had exhausted the movement by involving it in endless skirmishes with the
regime, and had few valuable achievements to show for it. By being so immersed
in daily political struggles, the Brotherhood had lost strategic direction
and long-term systematic thinking, and had become a burden on the Islamist
movement itself. It was better for the Brotherhood to dissolve itself,
he concluded, and transform itself into a school of thought.[14]

In a similar
argument, Muhammad Salim al-Awa—a well-known Islamist thinker, former
Brotherhood member and close associate of Shaykh Yusuf al-Qaradawi—urged
the Brotherhood in June 2007 to leave politics altogether for ten years.
He pleaded that the movement should focus instead on educational, cultural
and social work. The Brotherhood's political action had given nothing to
the Muslim people of Egypt, he argued, adding that the right way to fight
injustice and tyranny is not by running for parliament, but by educating
the people and caring for them.[15]

So far, the
Brotherhood's leadership has reacted both to the regime's new constraints
and to criticism from Islamists by staying its course. It did not resort
to public protests and demonstrations in response to the regime's crackdown,
nor has it shown signs of changing its strategy. In response to its critics,
the leadership has told its followers that the movement had seen worse
repression in its long history, and that it has survived in the past through
patience and perseverance.

Moreover, the
MB leadership has rejected ideological and organizational change, asserting
that the movement has a course, a set of “constants” or “fixed principles”
(thawabit), and a historical heritage that must be adhered to. Whoever
chooses to follow a different path that is not in harmony with the movement’s
course is free to do so—but only outside the movement. As such, the fixed
and constant principles of the MB must always be respected and followed,
lest the movement disintegrate into factions and parties. It is “our
belief that Islam is total, comprehensive, and an integrated whole …
it is unimaginable therefore that someone from the ranks should show up,
calling for the breaking up of Islam, trying to push the movement into
the unknown,” wrote Muhammad Habib.[16] (Those “calling for the breaking
up of Islam” are either the advocates of separating siyasah from dawa,
or those that favor abandoning the political strategy altogether).

The Brotherhood's
rejection of separating the religious and political realms derives from
its view of itself as a comprehensive movement that is committed to the
application of sharia in all realms of human life. But why has the Egyptian
Brotherhood chosen to refrain from violent reaction? This is apparently
explained by the Brotherhood's doctrine of pursuing power.

That doctrine
is based on the Brotherhood’s long-term dawa strategy of Islamizing society
from the bottom up. According to this plan, the Brotherhood will be able
to take power only at the stage of tamkin, when the movement will have
won the hearts and minds of a significant majority, if not all, of the
people. At this stage, all the necessary steps to prepare society as whole
for the embrace of a fully Islamic order will have been taken. These steps
entail, among other things, the penetration and ideological indoctrination
of such "influential institutions" as the military, the police, the media,
educational institutions like al-Azhar, legal institutions and the parliament.
Moreover, the external, international environment also needs to be prepared
for the Brotherhood’s ascension to power.[17]

The Brotherhood’s
reaction to the Mubarak regime’s imposition of constraints on its activities
seems to reflect its assessment that the ground is not yet sufficiently
prepared for it to attain power. The Brotherhood’s leaders have in fact
publicly stated that the organization is not yet ready to assume complete
power. The MB’s General Guide Muhammad Mahdi Akif has even characterized
all the recent cases in which Islamists have assumed power—in Sudan,
Iran, Afghanistan and Somalia—as failures, because those regimes were
not raised to power by the people’s will. He added that the Brotherhood
will be ready and able to assume power only when the people accept its
message and desire its rule.[18] In light of these statements, it appears
the Brotherhood leadership has chosen to avoid making any provocative moves,
as it does not want to provide the regime with a legitimate reason for
taking measures that could put the movement at risk.

Hamas’s election
victory in Gaza in 2006 and its subsequent formation of a government did
not conform to the Egyptian Brotherhood’s concept of reaching power either.
Both the domestic and external environments were unprepared for it. Indeed,
in August 2007 Deputy General Guide Muhammad Habib stated that Hamas's
election victory had "negatively affected the political reality in Egypt
and in the Arab world"[19] (that is to say, Hamas’s victory has damaged
the prospects of the Brotherhood in the region).

It should be
clear that the Brotherhood has not ruled out the use of violence in principle.
Although Akif did indeed say in March 2007 that violence would not be one
of the Brotherhood’s means for reacting to its exclusion from the political
system,[20] he later qualified that remark in August 2007. At that time,
he did not abjure violence, but argued that violence should not be undertaken
when the regime is favored in the balance of power and thus, likely to
win in a conflict. As Akif said, "It is not in everyone's interest that
violence or a clash take place now, and it is not in [our] interest now
to conduct resistance against the government, because it has millions who
have been prepared to confront protests, to repress demonstrators, and
to beat and arrest them (emphasis added.)"[21]

In light of
this, it seems that the Brotherhood's leadership likely believes that there
is little advantage in risking further trouble now. Rather, it apparently
opts to prepare for the day after President Hosni Mubarak departs, when
the Brotherhood will have a chance to play a key role in shaping the new
order. Patiently waiting for that time seems to be the Egyptian Brotherhood’s
chosen option—at least for now.

The Jordanian
MB

The Jordanian
branch of the Brotherhood was established in 1945 to pursue the Islamization
of society, the creation of an Islamic state that would implement sharia,
the conduct of jihad to liberate occupied Muslim lands, the unification
of the Muslim nation, and the liberation of the globe from idols (tawaghit).[22]
In the 1950s and 60s, the Jordanian Brotherhood formed an alliance with
the Jordanian state to oppose their common enemy, Nasser’s pan-Arabism
and socialism. That alliance ended in the 1980s, however, when Islamism
became the main ideological rival to the monarchy.

Since then,
the Jordanian MB has come under the influence of the radical, takfiri ideology
of Said Qutb, Abdullah Azzam and others. It has also become increasingly
influenced by Hamas. This has led to the Jordanian MB’s increasingly
confrontational posture toward the state and, in turn, the regime’s efforts
to contain and reduce the Brotherhood's power. [22]

In 1992, the
Jordanian MB formed a political party—the Islamic Action Front (IAF).
One reason for the creation of this party was to protect the Jordanian
MB’s dawa activities from any measures the government might adopt against
its political activities. The IAF’s declared objectives include fostering
a return to Islamic life and applying sharia in all fields, preparing the
Muslim Nation for jihad against Zionist and imperialist enemies, helping
the Palestinian cause and seeking to liberate Palestine achieving
national unity and liberty, confronting imperialist and foreign influences,
and establishing a system of government based on democratic principles
and shura, or consultation.[23]

The party’s
blueprint for a new Jordan, entitled “The Islamist Movement’s Vision
of Reform in Jordan,” demands the implementation of Islamic law, and
states that “sharia is the source of the laws and of legislation” (al-Shari’ah
al-Islamiyyah hiya masdar al-qawanin wal-tashri’at). The document further
states that the "Islamic Movement" seeks to establish Allah's sharia on
earth and to construct life on the basis of justice and liberty, in a civil
society whose source of authority is Islamic.[24] Far from abandoning the
idea of creating an Islamic state that will implement sharia, the MB has
established a political party committed to advancing that goal.

The MB and IAF
oppose the Jordanian government on the most critical strategic issues.
Several fatwas issued by the IAF's committee of sharia scholars denounced
Jordan's alliance with the United States and its assistance to American
and allied forces in Iraq. They also attacked the Jordanian king directly,
stating that a ruler who allies himself with the enemies of his religion
and his nation becomes one of them.[25] Another IAF fatwa proclaimed that
Jordan’s relations with Israel contradicted the sharia and must be severed.
It said that maintaining those relations amounted to a betrayal of Allah,
the Prophet and the Muslim Nation.[26] The IAF has additionally supported
the Iran-Hezbollah-Syria-Hamas axis and maintained close contacts with
the Syrian regime, despite that regime’s persecution of the Syrian branch
of the MB.

The Jordanian
Brotherhood's strong ties to Hamas raise the question of whether it still
is a truly Jordanian organization. Unlike their Egyptian counterparts,
the Jordanian Brothers have stated clearly that their aim is to reach power
without delay. Following Hamas’s 2006 victory in Gaza, IAF leaders expressed
confidence that they, too, would soon win an electoral victory, boasting
that the Islamic movement was ready to assume political power.[27]

As the Jordanian
MB has become more radical, however, the government has moved to limit
its power and influence. It passed legislation limiting the Brotherhood’s
dawa activities and implemented new measures to control the movement’s
financial arm and thus reduce its ability to sustain its country-wide network
of social, educational and religious institutions. In July 2007 the MB
escalated the standoff with the government by withdrawing from municipal
elections while they were in progress, accusing the government of fraud,
and threatening to boycott the November 2007 legislative elections. The
government responded by signaling that it might ban the Brotherhood from
politics.

This confrontation
led to an internal dispute within the Brotherhood. Ultimately, more pragmatic
voices overcame the opposition of hardliners, and the Brotherhood participated
in the legislative elections. But it won only 7 out of the 22 seats that
it contested, compared to the 17 it had won in the previous elections.

The Jordanian
Brotherhood subsequently claimed that the elections were rigged by the
government. But according to reliable observers, the Brotherhood’s electoral
setbacks can not be ascribed wholly to the government’s interference.
Observers believe that some voters may not have supported the Brotherhood
because of its close association with Hamas, whose popular appeal has been
waning somewhat especially since its violent takeover of Gaza. In any case,
the disaffection of voters with the Brotherhood is cited as a major factor
in that electoral defeat. As Muhammad Abu Rumman, the Jordanian expert
on the MB, has explained:

The organization
has totally failed to offer the public a convincing political discourse
which would transcend resounding slogans. The people are fed up with those
slogans and know for certain that they are unrealistic and incongruous
with the citizen's concerns and grave economic conditions. The Brotherhood's
electoral campaign was characterized by old, used-up phrases which exposed
its candidates as being devoid of any realistic political vision.[28]

This political
failure was only one more demonstration of the Jordanian Brotherhood's
crisis. That crisis has produced criticism of the MB leadership and calls
for a dramatic change of direction. Even before the elections, Ibrahim
Gharaibah, a former senior MB member, proposed sweeping organizational
and ideological changes, arguing that the Brotherhood had outlived its
original mission and that it had lost its direction. He further said
that the Brotherhood must choose between three different courses of action—namely,
dawa, politics or social work—because it was impossible to combine them.
He urged the Brotherhood to become a social movement that would focus on
organizing and leading the middle classes in the face of new challenges
posed by globalization and privatization. Alternatively, he suggested that
the Brotherhood movement could either transform itself completely into
a political party or turn its political arm into a party that was truly
independent of the wider movement.[29]

An article on
the Jordanian MB’s official website offered yet another strategy, urging
the Brotherhood to think "creatively" about new ways to confront repressive
regimes. It proposed changing the rules of the political game—for example,
by organizing large-scale civil disobedience. It called for an end
to the "Meccan period" in the Brotherhood’s thinking—an allusion to
the time when the Prophet Mohammed and his followers were persecuted by
the tribes of Mecca, which Mohammed ended abruptly by immigrating to Yathrib.
The article further suggested that the MB should react more aggressively
to regime repression and follow Hamas’s example. "If the Brotherhood's
bones are to be broken, why not break the enemy's bones too?" asked the
writer.[30]

MB Views
of the “Turkish Model”

The AKP’s
July 2007 victory in the Turkish elections generated mixed reactions amongst
MB branches throughout the Arab world. Some saw the AKP’s success as
a vindication of the Brotherhood’s strategic decision to participate
in electoral politics. Others expressed strong reservations to the very
idea of considering the AKP an Islamist party, and voiced doubts about
whether the AKP’s victory should rightly be considered a victory for
the Islamic movement.

Among the AKP’s
supporters, Shaykh Faisal Mawlawi, the head of Al-Jama’ah al-Islamiyya,
the Lebanese Brotherhood branch, had no problem with the AKP’s professed
commitment to secularism. The AKP did not abandon its Islamic principles,
he said, but only tried to achieve what was possible in difficult conditions.
Moreover, he argued that the AKP had succeeded in moving a step closer
to an original Islamic solution that could be developed and implemented
in the age of materialistic globalization.[31] Abdelilah Benkirane, a leader
of the Moroccan Justice and Development Party, was more skeptical. As he
said, the AKP “are far more advanced in politics than us: We are still
in the dawa phase. And they may be a role model, but they make too many
concessions on Islam: They even serve alcohol at their official receptions,
it’s shameful.”[32]

For their part,
the leaders of the Egyptian Brotherhood rejected any suggestion that their
organization was analogous to the AKP. That was probably in reaction to
calls for the Egyptian MB to emulate the AKP by shedding the traditional
Ikhwani ideology, which some have described as unpopular and hence, useless
in the political arena. Additionally, the Egyptian Brotherhood's leadership
argued forcefully that the AKP was not the right role model for the Islamic
movement.[33] Among other things, they claimed that the AKP's goal was
merely to wield political power without generating a tangible, substantive
Islamic change in society. The Brotherhood, by contrast, seeks political
power for the purpose of creating a fully Islamic society. Furthermore,
the Egyptian MB leaders pointed out that Turkey’s Prime Minister Erdogan
adheres to the rules of the Turkish political system, to Turkey’s constitution,
and to the country’s secular identity. This adherence to secularism—or
the “AKP’s choice,” as the Egyptian leaders described it—cannot
be the Brotherhood’s position in any form. They said that Brotherhood
seeks to revive the unified Islamic nation, restore its leading global
role, and reestablish the Islamic Caliphate, whereas the AKP has no universal
Islamic agenda—and even worse, seeks integration into Europe.

The MB and the
United States

Neutralizing
American opposition to the Muslim Brotherhood is a key objective in the
Egyptian MB’s plan to prepare the way for its future assumption of political
power. The Brotherhood’s “Reform Initiative,” which was launched
in March 2004, aimed to persuade outsiders that the Brotherhood was in
fact a “moderate Islamist” movement. The MB remains unwilling, however,
to pay for dialogue with the United States by making any substantial ideological
or political concessions. And as the self-appointed leader of the Arab
Islamic struggle, the Egyptian MB continues to hold firm to the idea that
its overall project is in total conflict with that of the United States.

In the view
of General Guide Akif, the policies of the United States are particularly
hostile toward the Arab and Muslim world.[34] He stated in a recent
missive that Islam is the only way to save the international community
from American tyranny, which is bound to spread a "destructive chaos" (a
swipe aimed at what the MB perceives to be the American notion of spreading
“constructive chaos” in order to reform the Middle East) and destroy
the whole world.In another
recent missive Akif called on young jihadis, like those who committed the
suicide attacks in Morocco and Algeria, to direct their efforts, using
all possible means, “against the real enemy of the Nation (Umma), the
enemy which occupies, kills, desecrates and plunders . . . in al-Quds,
in Baghdad and in Kabul.”[35] Akif’s deputy, Muhammad Habib, said that
the role of the Brotherhood was to resist “the American project, which
seeks to bring the Nation down to its knees, to weaken its faith, to corrupt
its morality, to plunder its resources, and to eradicate its cultural particularity.”[36]

Second generation
MB leaders like Issam al-Aryan have expressed interest in dialogue
with the United States. But al-Aryan, too, has held firmly to the position
that the Brotherhood's project is fundamentally opposed to the American
one. He welcomed dialogue “as a cultural and human value,” but
at the same time pointed to a basic conflict between, on the one hand,
“the growing American project of empire and hegemony,” and on the other,
the Brotherhood's project of constructing an Islamic revival, liberating
Muslim lands from any foreign influence, unifying the Arabs, and creating
an international Islamic order (kiyan dawli islami).[37]

In July 2007
al-Aryan called for opening relations with the West, but he warned that
the Muslim Brothers should not submit to Western dictates and unfair preconditions.
The purpose of any dialogue with the West, as he saw it, was to demand
that the West respect the right of Muslims to choose their way of life
and to be ruled by the sharia (wa-shari’atihim allati tahkumuhum). The
West should not impose another system on Muslim countries.[3

The Shia Question

While Egyptian
Brotherhood leaders have voiced criticisms about Iran's role in Iraq and
the Shi'a resurgence, they also see Iran and Hezbollah as major partners
in the struggle against Israel and the U.S. In the past, this has meant
that the Egyptian MB has routinely rejected the view that Iran constitutes
a strategic threat to Arabs. Moreover, it has generally welcomed Iran’s
nuclear program by reiterating the Iranian regime’s claim that the program
was for peaceful purposes, while at the same time adding that any possible
military purpose would “create a sort of a balance” between the Arab
and Islamic world, on the one hand, and Israel and its allies on the other.[39]

The Egyptian
MB has also tended not to show much concern over Iran’s efforts to spread
Shi’a Islam in Arab countries. Akif has repeatedly dismissed the phenomenon
of Sunni conversions to Shi’a Islam in Egypt as insignificant, and has
rejected the idea of a rising, increasingly powerful “Shi’a crescent”
as neither logical nor realistic.[40] His position has been that the rivalry
between Sunnis and Shi’a should be postponed until the day when the Muslim
Nation has won its battles with the West and the Muslims have recovered
all their rights.

In May 2007,
however, the Egyptian Brotherhood’s public pronouncements about Iran
and the Shi’a as a whole seemed to change somewhat after meetings between
the United States and Iran were announced. Akif, for instance, warned that
such negotiations were likely to make Iran the dominant regional actor
and thus would threaten the power of Arab Sunni states.[41] More recently,
the Deputy General Guide Habib said that Iran’s role in the Middle East
was “raising concerns,” and that Iran was seeking to enlarge its sphere
of influence into Arab societies. He added, however, that Iran’s strategy
was a legitimate response to American policies in the region, and roundly
criticized what he called the "Arab moderate axis" for serving American
interests. He further urged Arab countries to stand up to the United States
and support Islamic "resistance projects" (mashru'at al-muqawamah) worldwide.[42]

Generally speaking,
the Jordanian MB’s attitude toward Iran and toward Shiism as a whole
appears to be much less coherent than that of the Egyptian branch. In fact,
the MB’s Jordanian branch appears to be internally deeply divided on
the Shia question. The takfiri, anti-Shi’a sentiment within its ranks
conflicts with its professed solidarity with Hamas, Iran's ally. Therefore,
while the Jordanian MB highly values Iran's support of the Palestinian
cause, it has also been deeply critical of Iran's role in the destruction,
sectarianism, and violence against Sunnis in Iraq, going so far as to allege
that Iran actually facilitated the American invasion of that country. It
has also been claimed that Iran helped the United States topple the Sunni
Taliban regime in Afghanistan.[43]

Jan. 3, 2007
As an example see, Egyptian
court: "Islam is the final and most complete
religion and therefore Muslims already practice full freedom of religion
and cannot convert"