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The Court temporarily allowed debtor’s principal’s claim pursuant to Fed.R.Bankr.P. 3018(a) for voting purposes. The Court has some discretion to determine the amount of a creditor’s claim for voting purposes. The claimant must present sufficient evidence that it has a colorable claim capable of temporary evaluation. Claimant was not entitled to a claim for arising from anticipated lease-rejection damages.

After obtaining a nondischargeable judgment under section 523(a)(4), Plaintiffs sought to recover litigation costs under Fed.R.Bankr.P. 7054, Local Rule 7054-1, and 28 U.S.C. 1920. Defendants argued the award should be limited to only those costs which can be tied to a successful claim. The Court rejected this argument and instead analyzed whether the costs appeared necessary at the time they were incurred for preparation of the case. The Court then analyzed whether individual costs for transcription fees, copying charges, and witness fees were reasonable and/or allowable.

Creditors objected to debtor’s claims of exemption, asserting that debtor could not claim exemptions under the New Mexico exemption statute applicable to married persons or heads of household, nor could the debtor claim exemptions under the New Mexico exemption statute applicable to persons who support only themselves. Debtor was not married and depended upon his live-in girlfriend for support. The Court overruled the creditor’s objection, interpreting the New Mexico statute to allow the debtor to claim an exemption under 42-10-2 notwithstanding the fact that his income was insufficient to fully support himself. The Court overruled the Creditors’ objection to debtor’s claimed exemption in the cash surrender value of a life insurance policy and debtor’s homestead exemption. The Court also overruled the Creditors’ objection to Debtor’s claimed exemption in televisions, stereo, speakers, Blue Ray Players, wall art, beaver fur, and twenty-seven pieces of silver jewelry. The Court sustained the creditors’ objection to the debtor’s claimed exemption in a camera, bicycles, skis, boots, and ski gear, because those items did fall within the category of “furniture” or “clothing” under the New Mexico exemption statutes.

The facts not subject to genuine dispute established that the residential lease underlying Plaintiffs’ claims for violation of the automatic stay and the discharge injunction was entered into after Plaintiffs filed their voluntary Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition. Defendants’ actions to enforce the post-petition lease did not violate the automatic stay or the discharge injunction. The Court granted Defendants’ motion for summary judgment.

The Court denied the debtor’s oral motion for sanctions under FRBP 2019(e) based on alleged failure to comply with the requirements of FRBP 2019. Imposing sanctions under FRBP 2019 within the Court’s sound discretion. The Court found that counsel’s Rule 2019 notice complied with the requirements of the rule and disclosed its representation of two creditors in the bankruptcy case.

The Court temporarily allowed creditor’s claims pursuant to Fed.R.Bankr.P. 3018(a) for voting purposes. Creditor purchased two claims. The objecting creditor failed to establish that the claims were not purchased in good faith or that the purchaser was an insider of the debtor. Creditor was entitled to vote each claim separately.

The Court denied creditors’ request for temporary allowance of claim under Fed.R.Bankr.P. 3018(a) for voting purposes. The evidence showed that the creditor did not hold a pre-petition claim. Only creditors with an allowable pre-petition claim against the debtor are eligible to vote to accept or reject a chapter 11 plan.

Chief Judge Robert H. Jacobvitz

Assumption and Rejection, Classification of Claims, Equitable Remedies, Good Faith

Debtor sought to reject a state court settlement agreement with a homeowner's association under section 365(a). The HOA objected, arguing that rejection would be futile because the HOA would be entitled to specific performance in the event of a breach, and that rejection was proposed in bad faith. The Court analyzed the definition of "claim" and concluded that because specific performance is an alternative to the legal remedy of money damages, the HOA could be forced to accept money damages if Debtor confirmed a plan. The Court also found that filing a bankruptcy petition to reject a lease or executory contract did not constitute bad faith.

The Trustee objected to chapter 13 Debtors' counsel's fee application. Counsel submitted his fee application after the last plan payment was made, and the Trustee asserted laches. The Trustee further argued that the fees should be discharged. The Court concluded that the fee application should be allowed and granted an administrative expense, but that the fees are subject to discharge.

The Court denied the debtor’s request to set aside a default order granting stay relief, finding that the anti-modification provision under § 1123(b)(5) prevented the debtor from seeking to restructure the loan through a Chapter 11 plan. There was no other evidence before the Court that the debtor would be able to sell the property to a third party to pay off the loan.