5 1. Introduction This is version 2.04 of the Security Target for IBM RACF for z/os V1R Security Target (ST) identification Title: Security Target for IBM RACF for z/os V1R13 Version: 2.04 Status: Final Date: Sponsor: IBM Corporation Developer: IBM Corporation Certification ID: BSI-DSZ-CC-0816 Keywords: access control, discretionary access control, security labels, mandatory access control, security This document is the Security Target for the Common Criteria (CC) evaluation of the IBM RACF for z/os V1R13 access control component. It is conformant to the Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Version 3.1 R3 [CC]. 1.2 TOE Identification The TOE is RACF for z/os Version 1 Release 13 (provided as part of the Common Criteria Evaluated Base Package for z/os V1R13, program number 5694-A01). 1.3 TOE overview This Security Target (ST) documents the security characteristics of the IBM RACF for z/os V1R13 access control component of z/os V1R13. RACF is the central component within z/os responsible for user authentication, access control, management of user security attributes, and management of access rights. RACF provides the interfaces for identification and authentication of users using different authentication mechanisms, interfaces that resource managers can use for both discretionary and mandatory access control to objects they define, interfaces for sophisticated security management functions, and the ability to generate audit records for security critical events. 1.4 TOE description The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is the RACF component of the z/os operating system. RACF is the component that is called within z/os from any component that wants to perform user authentication, Copyright IBM Corp Page 5 of 170

6 access control to protected resources and the management of user security attributes and access rights. RACF is designed as an authentication and access manager component that manages both user security attributes and access management attributes in its own database. Users are represented within RACF by user profiles and protected resources are represented by resource profiles. Users can be members of groups where each group is represented by a group profile. Resource profiles are structured into classes, which represent the different types of resources. Within such a class a individual profile is represented by the name of the resource, which is unique within its class. Resource manager will then query RACF whenever they need to check a user's access rights to a resource. In this query they will specify the resource class, the name of the resource within the class, the type of access requested and the internal representation of the user that requests access. RACF is also called when a component within z/os needs to authenticate a user. In this case the z/os component will call RACF and will pass the identity of the user, the authentication credentials presented, the name of the component requesting user authentication and several other parameters to RACF. Based on this information RACF will authenticate the user and, if successful, create a control block representing the user with the security attributes assigned. This control block is later used when a component of z/os calls RACF for checking access rights. RACF also provides interfaces that allow the management of user profiles, digital certificates assigned to users, group profiles, resource profiles, access rights, security labels and general RACF attributes. RACF also provides an interface that z/os components can call to generate a security related audit record. Note: The RACF Remote Sharing Facility (RRSF) is not considered as a part of this evaluation and therefore must not be used in an evaluated system configuration Intended method of use RACF is designed to be used by z/os components to perform user authentication, validate a user's access to a resource, audit security critical events, and manage RACF profiles, access rights to resources and RACF security parameter. It also provides interfaces to extract RACF status information. This interface is a programming interface implemented by the RACROUTE macro. RACF will check if the calling application has the right to use the function called. In addition RACF exports a command interface that can be used by appropriately authorized users directly to perform management operations. This Security Target specifies two modes of operation: a "normal" mode where labeled security features are not configured as required in this Security Target and a "Labeled Security Mode" where labeled security is configured as described in this Security Target. In "Labeled Security Mode" additional security functionality is active, which is marked with "Labeled Security Mode" in this document. Note that when functions of labeled security are configured differently than specified in this Security Target, the security functionality defined for the "normal" mode still works but additional restrictions may be imposed due to the way the functions for labeled security are configured Summary of security features The primary security features of RACF are: identification and authentication of users discretionary access control mandatory access control and support for security labels (Labeled Security Mode) auditing security management Page 6 of 170 z/os RACF Security Target

7 TSF protection These primary security features are supported by the domain separation and reference mediation properties of the other parts of the z/os operating system, which ensure that the RACF functions are invoked when required and cannot be bypassed. RACF itself is protected by the architecture of the z/os operating system from unauthorized tampering with the RACF functions and the RACF database Identification and authentication RACF provides support for the identification and authentication of users by the means of an alphanumeric RACF user ID and a system-encrypted password or password phrase. an alphanumeric RACF user ID and a PassTicket, which is a cryptographically-generated password substitute encompassing the user ID, the requested application name, and the current date/time. an x.509v3 digital certificate presented to a server application in the TOE environment that uses System SSL or TCP/IP Application Transparent TLS (AT-TLS) to provide TLS- or SSLv3- based client authentication, and then mapped (using TOE functions) by that server application or by AT-TLS to a RACF user ID. a Kerberos TM v5 ticket presented to a server application in the TOE environment that supports the Kerberos mechanism, and then mapped by that application through the GSS-API programming services. The TOE also provides functions (specifically the R_ticketServ, and R_GenSec services) that enable the application server to validate the Kerberos ticket, and thus the authentication of the principal. The application server then translates (or maps) the Kerberos principal (using the TOE provided function of R_userMap) to a RACF user ID. The TOE security functions authenticate the claimed identity of the user by verifying the password/phrase (or other mechanism, as listed above) and returning the result to the trusted program that used the RACF functions for user identification and authentication. It is up to the trusted program to determine what to do when the user identification and authentication process fails. When a user is successfully identified and authenticated RACF creates control blocks containing the user's security attributes as managed by RACF. Those control blocks are used later when a resource manager calls RACF to determine the user's right to access resources or when the user calls RACF functions that require the user to hold specific RACF managed privileges. The required password quality can be tailored to the installation s policies using various parameters. When creating users, administrators are required to choose an initial password and optionally a password phrase, that must usually be changed by the user during the initial logon that uses the password/phrase Discretionary access control RACF implements the functions allowing resource managers within z/os to control access to the resources they want to protect. Resources protected by RACF fall into two categories, based on the mechanisms used within RACF to describe them: Standard (e.g., MVS data sets, or general resources in classes defined by RACF or the system administrator), and UNIX (e.g., UNIX files, directories, and IPC objects instantiated by a UNIX file system). Discretionary access control (DAC) rules allow resource managers to differentiate access of users to resources based on different access types. RACF standard DAC mechanism Access types implemented in RACF for standard resources are hierarchical (i. e. a higher level of access implies all lower levels of access). The access types are in hierarchical order: ALTER CONTROL Copyright IBM Corp Page 7 of 170

8 UPDATE READ EXECUTE NONE RACF makes access control decisions based on the user s identity, security attributes, group authorities, and the access authority specified with respect to the resource profile. RACF leaves the interpretation of the semantics of the different access types to the resource manager. This allows for example a resource manager to manage privileges for users with RACF by defining a resource class for the privileges it wants to manage and individual resources within the class to represent individual privileges. A resource manager can then interpret a specific access type to such a resource as a specific privilege and allow a user to use functions it has bound to that privilege based on the access type the user has to the resource representing the privilege. Access authorities to resources are stored in profiles. Discrete profiles are valid for a single, named resource and generic profiles are applicable to a group of resources, typically with similar names. For access permission checks, RACF always chooses the most specific profile for a resource. Profiles can have an access control list associated with them that contains a potentially large number of entries for different groups and users, thus allowing the modeling of complex, fine-grained access controls. Access rights of users to resources can be set by the profile owner and by a user with the appropriate administrative privileges. The TOE supports access decisions local applications want to enforce for the resources they control. Local applications can use the RACROUTE programming interface or the related programming interfaces from the RACF callable services to perform the access check. The request specifies the resource to be checked and the RACF user ID or group name whose access should be checked. Most RACF interfaces require either the calling program to execute with privileges (e. g. supervisor state or APF authorized) or require the user that started the program to have specific RACF managed privileges. The system or RACF privileges required are documented with each RACF interface. RACF UNIX DAC mechanism RACF implements POSIX-conformant access control that can be used for such named objects in the UNIX realm as UNIX file system objects and UNIX inter-process communication (IPC) objects. Access types for UNIX file system objects are read, write, and execute/search, and read and write for UNIX IPC objects. z/os UNIX uses a dedicated interface to RACF to perform access control to file system objects which is based on the permission bits associated with a file, or based on access control lists, which are upward-compatible with the permission bits algorithm and implement the recommendations from Portable Operating System Interface for UNIX (POSIX) e draft 17. Unlike the access rights to resources protected by RACF resource profiles, the permission bits and access control lists for those objects are not stored in the RACF database but are stored outside of RACF with the objects they protect and passed to RACF together with the request to check for access permissions. The RACF callable services contain the interfaces to perform those access checks and manage the related access permissions. The use of many of those interfaces is restricted to programs executing with system privileges and some of those interfaces are explicitly reserved for IBM's implementation of the UNIX System Services component or other z/os components. RACF supports resource managers in the decision when to prepare a resource for re-use Mandatory access control and support for security labels In addition to DAC, RACF provides mandatory access control (MAC) functions that are required for Labeled Security Mode, which impose additional access restrictions on information flow on security classification. Users and resources can have a security label specified in their profile. Security labels contain a hierarchical classification (security level), which specify the sensitivity (for example: public, internal use, or secret), and zero or more non-hierarchical security categories (for example: PROJECTA or PROJECTB). Page 8 of 170 z/os RACF Security Target

9 The access control enforced by the TOE ensures that users can only read labeled information if their security labels dominate the information s label, and that they can only write to labeled information containers if the container s label dominates the subject s, thus implementing the Bell-LaPadula model of information flow control. The system can also be configured to allow write-down for certain authorized users. Copyright IBM Corp Page 9 of 170

10 Auditing RACF provides an auditing capability that allows generating audit records for security-critical events. RACF provides a number of logging and reporting functions that allow resource owners and auditors to identify users who attempt to access resources. Audit records are generated by RACF and submitted to another component of z/os (System Management Facilities (SMF)), which collects them into an audit trail. RACF always generates audit records for such events as unauthorized attempts to access the system or changes to the status of the RACF database. The security administrator, auditors, and other users with appropriate authorization can configure which additional optional security events are to be logged. In addition to writing records to the audit trail, messages can be sent to the security console to immediately alert operators of detected policy violations. RACF provides SMF records for all RACF-protected resources (either traditional or z/os UNIX-based). For reporting, auditors can unload all or selected parts of the SMF data for further analysis in a human-readable formats and can then upload the data to a query or reporting package, such as DFSORT if desired Security management RACF provides a set of commands and options to adequately manage the TOE s security functions. Additionally, RACF provides the capability of managing users, groups of users, general resource profiles, and RACF SETROPTS options. RACF recognizes several authorities that are able to perform the different management tasks related to the TOE s security: General security options are managed by security administrators. In Labeled Security Mode: management of MAC attributes is performed by security administrators. Management of users and their security attributes is performed by security administrators. Management of groups (and to some extent users) can be delegated to group security administrators. Users can change their own passwords or password phrases, their default groups, and their user names (but not their user IDs). In Labeled Security Mode: users can choose their security labels at login, for some login methods. (Note: this also applies in normal mode if the administrator chooses to activate security label processing.) Auditors manage the parameters of the audit system (a list of audited events, for example) and can analyze the audit trail. Security administrators can define what audit records are captured by the system. Discretionary access rights to protected resources are managed by the owners of the applicable profiles (or UNIX objects) or by security administrators TSF protection TSF protection is based on several protection mechanisms that are provided by the underlying abstract machine and z/os operating system: Privileged processor instructions are only available to programs running in the processor s supervisor state Semi-privileged instructions are only available to programs running in an execution environment that is established and authorized by the TSF Page 10 of 170 z/os RACF Security Target

11 While in operation, all address spaces, as well as the data and tasks contained therein, are protected by the memory protection mechanisms of the underlying abstract machine z/os protects the RACF address space and RACF functions from unauthorized access and either z/os or RACF itself ensures that a caller of RACF services has the hardware or z/os privileges (e. g. supervisor state, PSW key, APF authorization) required to invoke the service z/os address space management ensures that programs running in problem state cannot access protected memory or resources that belong to other address spaces. Access to system services through supervisor call (SVC) or program call (PC) instructions, for example is controlled by z/os, which requires that subjects who want to perform security-relevant tasks be authorized appropriately. The hardware and firmware components that provide the abstract machine for the TOE are required to be physically protected from unauthorized access. Tools are provided in the TOE environment to allow authorized administrators to check the correct operation of the underlying abstract machine. In addition to the protection mechanism of the underlying abstract machine, z/os also uses software mechanisms like the authorized program facility (APF) or specific privileges for programs in the UNIX system services environment to protect the TSF. RACF uses the protection mechanisms provided by z/os in the following way: the main functions of RACF are implemented as separate address spaces, which protects their code and data from direct interference by unprivileged programs executing in other address spaces RACF defines a limited set of SVCs and PCs that programs in all address spaces can invoke. Some PCs are defined such that the hardware prohibits their use unless the caller has appropriate hardware privileges. For other PCs as well as for SVCs, callable services and commands RACF performs its own check if the caller has the appropriate authorization to invoke the interface with the parameter specified. The specification of the individual interfaces also define the authorizations required to use the interface and specific parameter of the interface. many interfaces to RACF require the calling program to execute with system privileges like supervisor state, key 0, or APF authorization. When called without proper authorizations, those programs will fail to perform the requested action and either return with an appropriate return code, cause an exception, or cause an "abnormal end" (ABEND) with an ABEND code indicating the cause of the problem. RACF uses the z/os mechanisms for establishing error recovery routines which allows RACF to handle errors or exceptions detected by z/os or the hardware and either recover from the error, perform any necessary clean-up operation and signal the error to the calling program, or (in the extreme case when RACF is not able to maintain its integrity e. g. when the RACF database is full or compromised) terminate RACF itself Configurations Software configuration The Target of Evaluation, RACF for z/os V1R13, consists of: RACF for z/os V1R13 (RACF) provided as part of the Common Criteria Evaluated Base Package for z/os V1R13, program number 5694-A01 APAR OA35973 (PTF UA62097) Note: This APAR will also be installed as part of the evaluated configuration for z/os V1R13. Copyright IBM Corp Page 11 of 170

12 The z/os Common Criteria Evaluated Base package must be installed according to the directions delivered with the media and configured according to the instructions in Chapter 7, The evaluated configuration for the Common Criteria in z/os Planning for Multilevel Security and the Common Criteria ([PMLS]). Although RACF allows the installation of system exits to tailor RACF processing, no such exits are allowed in the evaluated configuration with the exception of the sample ICHPWX11 exit and its associated IRRPHREX routine (which may be modified to suit the security administrator's needs). Additionally, the RACF Authorized Caller Table (ICHAUTAB) is not allowed in the evaluated configuration. 1.5 Structure The structure of this document is as follows : Section 1 is the ST Introduction. Section 2 is the CC Conformance Claims Section 3 provides the Security Problem Definition Section 4 provides the Security Objectives Section 5 provides the Extended Components Definition Section 6 provides a statement on supporting functionality implemented by the operational environment of RACF Section 7 provides the statement of Security requirements Section 8 provides the TOE summary specification, which includes the detailed specification of the IT security functions 1.6 Terminology This section contains a glossary of technical terms with definitions that are specific to this document. Terms defined in the [CC] are not reiterated here, unless stated otherwise. Some of these terms are used differently in other z/os publications. This glossary includes the differences in usage where appropriate. abstract machine A processor design that is not intended to be implemented as hardware, but which is the notional executor of a particular intermediate language (abstract machine language) used in a compiler or interpreter. An abstract machine has an instruction set, a register set, and a model of memory. It may provide instructions that are closer to the language being compiled than any physical computer or it may be used to make the language implementation easier to port to other platforms. access If an authorized user is granted a request to operate on an object, the user is said to have access to that object. There are numerous types of access. Examples include read access, which allows the reading of objects, and write access, which allows the writing of objects. access control policy Page 12 of 170 z/os RACF Security Target

13 A set of rules used to mediate user access to TOE-protected objects. Access control policies consist of two types of rules: access rules, which apply to the behavior of authorized users, and authorization rules, which apply to the behavior of authorized administrators. Accessor Environment Element A RACF control block that describes the current user s security environment. authorization If an authorized user is granted a requested service, the user is said to have authorization to the requested service or object. There are numerous possible authorizations. Typical authorizations include auditor authorization, which allows an administrator to view audit records and execute audit tools, and DAC override authorization, which allows an administrator to override object access controls to administer the system. authorized administrator An authorized user who has been granted the authority to manage all or a defined subset of the functions of the TOE. Authorized administrators are expected to use this authority only in the manner prescribed by the guidance that is given to them. authorized user A user who has been properly identified and authenticated. Authorized users are considered to be legitimate users of the TOE. (Note: this is different from the z/os concept of an authorized program which is a program running in supervisor state, or system key, or with APF authority.) category See security category. classification (MLS) A hierarchical designation for data that represents the sensitivity of the information. The equivalent IBM term is security level. discretionary access control (DAC) An access control policy that allows authorized users and authorized administrators to control access to objects based on individual user identity or membership in a group (PROJECTA, for example). Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP) A client/server protocol for accessing a directory service. mandatory access control (MAC) An access control policy that determines access based on the sensitivity (SECRET, for example) and category (PERSONNEL or MEDICAL, for example) of the information that is being accessed and the clearance of the user who is trying to gain access to that information. mediation When DAC and MAC policy rules are invoked, the TOE is said to be mediating access to TOEprotected objects. password For the purposes of this evaluation, a 6 to 8 character secret value used during some forms of user authentication, and allowing upper- and lower-case alphabetic, numeric, or national ($, characters. Passwords are initially assigned by administrators, but may be changed by the user to whom they are assigned. password phrase Copyright IBM Corp Page 13 of 170

14 A 14 to 100 character secret value used in a manner similar to a password, except for its length and an expanded set of valid characters (upper- and lower-case alphabetic, special (including blanks), or numeric). In addition to assigning a password, administrators may assign a password phrase to a user. Note: Phrase may be shorter (down to 9 characters) if enabled by an administrator-installed exit (ICHPWX11) that RACF supplies. password/phrase A shorthand term for password or password phrase sometimes used in this security target when statements apply equally to passwords or to password phrases. SECLABEL Synonym for security label. SECLEVEL Synonym for security level (IBM). security category A special designation for data at a certain level, which indicates that only people who have been properly briefed and cleared for access to data with this category can receive permission for access to the information. security label A name that represents the combination of a hierarchical level of classification (IBM security level) and a set of non-hierarchical categories (security category). Security labels are used as the base for mandatory access control decisions. Security labels are sometimes referred to as SECLABELs. security level (IBM) A hierarchical designation for data that represents the sensitivity of the information. Security levels are sometimes referred to as SECLEVELs. The equivalent MLS term is classification. security level (MLS policy in the Bell-LaPadula model) The combination of a hierarchical classification (called security level in z/os) and a set of nonhierarchical categories that represents the sensitivity of information is known as the security level. sensitivity label user A specific marking attached to subjects or objects that indicates the security level. The equivalent to this MLS term in other IBM documentation is security label. A person who is trying to invoke a service that is offered by the TOE. user ID In z/os, a string of up to eight characters defined as a RACF USER profile that uniquely identifies a user. Users who may use UNIX services will additionally have a numerical user identifier (UID) that is used by the UNIX subsystem for access decisions. The user name is an additional attribute that usually holds the user s full name. While users can modify their user names, only administrators can change user IDs. Page 14 of 170 z/os RACF Security Target

16 Corporation in the United States, other countries, or both: DFSORT IBM MVS PR/SM Print Services Facility Processor Resource/Systems Manager RACF System z VTAM z/architecture z/os z/vm zseries z9 z10 Java and all Java-based trademarks and logos are trademarks or registered trademarks of Sun Microsystems, Inc. in the United States, other countries, or both. UNIX is a registered trademark of The Open Group in the United States, other countries, or both. Other company, product, and service names may be trademarks or service marks of others. Page 16 of 170 z/os RACF Security Target

17 2. CC Conformance Claims 2.1 Common Criteria conformance This Security Target is conformant to the Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Version 3.1 R3 [CC]. It is CC Part 2 extended and Part 3 conformant, with a claimed Evaluation Assurance Level of EAL5, augmented by ALC_FLR.3. Copyright IBM Corp Page 17 of 170

18 3. Security Problem Definition 3.1 Introduction The statement of the TOE security problem definition describes the security aspects of the environment in which the TOE is intended to be used and the manner in which it is expected to be deployed. To this end, the statement of the TOE security environment identifies the list of assumptions made on the operational environment (including physical and procedural measures) and the intended method of use of the product, defines the threats that the product is designed to counter, and the organizational security policies with which the product is designed to comply. 3.2 Threat Environment Threats to be countered by the TOE are characterized by the combination of an asset being subject to a threat, a threat agent and an adverse action Assets Assets to be protected are: 1. RACF internal data used to control the operation of RACF (TSF data), including user and group profiles and profiles in other classes that RACF uses for its internal operations 2. RACF profiles managed by RACF on behalf of resource managers (user data) 3. RACF functions 4. The resources managed by the TSF that are used to store the above-mentioned objects, including the metadata needed to manage these objects Threat Agents Threat agents are external entities that potentially may attack the TOE. They satisfy one or more of the following criteria: External entities not authorized to access assets may attempt to access them either by masquerading as an authorized entity or by attempting to use TSF services without proper authorization. External entities authorized to access certain assets may attempt to access other assets they are not authorized to either by misusing services they are allowed to use or by masquerading as a different external entity. Untrusted subjects may attempt to access assets they are not authorized to either by misusing services they are allowed to use or by masquerading as a different subject. Threat agents are typically characterized by a number of factors, such as expertise, available resources, and motivation, with motivation being linked directly to the value of the assets at stake. The TOE protects against intentional and unintentional breach of TOE security by attackers possessing a moderate attack potential. Page 18 of 170 z/os RACF Security Target

19 The threat agents can be categorized as one of the following: unauthorized users of the TOE (that is, individuals who have not been granted the right to access the system) authorized users of the TOE (that is, individuals who have been granted the right to access the system) but not given administrative authority. Those users may have programming capabilities and/or are allowed to install programs on the underlying z/os operating system. Note: Security breaches in the operational environment that are not caused by security problems within the TOE itself are not subject of this evaluation. The threat agents are assumed to originate from a well-managed user community in a moderately hostile working environment, and hence the product protects against threats of attempts to breach the system security by users with a moderate attack potential. The TOE is not intended to be applicable to circumstances in which protection is required against determined attempts by hostile and wellfunded attackers with a high level of expertise to breach system security. The TOE relies on the z/os operating system within its operational environment to ensure that users can not bypass the z/os separation mechanisms and get operating system privileges (getting one of their programs to operate in supervisor state, with a storage key of 0 to 7, or as an APF authorized program). The TOE also relies on z/os to enforce the decisions made by RACF for access to the data sets used by RACF. The TOE also relies on z/os to enforce the protection of system memory and prohibit any untrusted program from modifying system memory used by RACF or accessing such memory other than the allowed access modes. The TOE also uses services from some z/os components and relies upon those services to be implemented correctly Threats countered by the TOE T.ACCESS.TSFDATA A threat agent may read or modify TSF data using functions of the TOE without the necessary authorization T.ACCESS.USERDATA A threat agent may gain access to user data stored, processed or transmitted by the TOE without being appropriately authorized according to the TOE security policy by using functions provided by the TOE. T.ACCESS.TSFFUNC A threat agent may use or manage functionality of the TSF bypassing protection mechanisms of the TSF. T.IA.MASQUERADE A threat agent might masquerade as an authorized entity including the TOE itself or a part of the TOE in order to gain unauthorized access to user data, TSF data, or TOE resources. T.IA.USER A threat agent might gain access to user data, TSF data or TOE resources with the exception of public objects without being identified and authenticated by the TSF. T.SENSITIVITY (Labeled Security Mode only) The TOE may not adequately separate data on the basis of its sensitivity label, thereby allowing access to RACFinternal data, RACF user data or resources protected by external resource managers in violation of the label-based access control policy. Copyright IBM Corp Page 19 of 170

20 3.3 Assumptions This section describes the security aspects of the environment in which the TOE is intended to be used. It includes information about the physical, personnel, procedural, and connectivity aspects of the environment. The TOE is assured to provide effective security measures in its intended environment only if it is installed, managed, and used correctly. The operational environment must be managed in accordance with user/administrator guidance documentation. The following specific conditions are assumed to exist in an environment where the TOE is employed Environment of use of the TOE Physical Personnel Procedural The TOE is intended for application in user areas that have physical control and monitoring. It is assumed that the following physical conditions will exist: A.PHYSICAL It is assumed that the IT environment provides the TOE with appropriate physical security, commensurate with the value of the IT assets protected by the TOE. A.MANAGE The TOE security functionality is managed by one or more competent individuals. The system administrative personnel are not careless, willfully negligent, or hostile, and will follow and abide by the instructions provided by the guidance documentation. A.AUTHUSER Authorized users possess the necessary authorization to access at least some of the information managed by the TOE and are expected to act in a cooperating manner in a benign environment. A.TRAINEDUSER Users are sufficiently trained and trusted to accomplish some task or group of tasks within a secure IT environment by exercising complete control over their user data. A.DETECT Any modification or corruption of security-enforcing or security-relevant files of the TOE, user or the underlying platform caused either intentionally or accidentally will be detected by an administrative user. Operating system A.OPERATING_SYSTEM The z/os operating system the TOE is integrated in protects the TOE from modification and access of the TOE's TSF data and user data other than through the interfaces provided by the TOE. The operating system also ensures that no unauthorized user program can escalate its privileges such that it can bypass the separation and memory protection functions of the operating system. RACF also relies on the functional support of the following components of z/os: SMF for the collection, protection and analysis of the audit records. DFSMS for access to data sets RACF uses for its TSF data and user data. Page 20 of 170 z/os RACF Security Target

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