General Merrill A. "Tony" McPeak headed the US Air Force during Operation Desert Storm, widely regarded as a “coming of age” for airpower. On the 25th anniversary of that historic conflict, in DESERT STORM the Air Force's 14th chief of staff gives a rare, first-hand account of pivotal events and lessons learned.

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The Eagle's Last FlightThe philosopher Thomas Hobbes once said, ‘life is nasty, brutish, and short”. Saddam Hussein must surely have thought the same thing during Operation Desert Storm. Nasty and brutish? Yes, probably. Remember “shock and awe?” But, as William Tecumseh Sherman once said, “war is hell.” And short? Mercifully so. The combat phase lasted just 43 days from January 17 to February 28, 1991.Few of us glued to the TV watching the first nights of Desert Storm realized we were watching the coming of age of air power as a major player in the doctrine of warfare. General Merrill (“Tony”) McPeak’s latest book, “Desert Storm”, published some twenty five years after the conflict ended, provides what could only be described as our own personal briefing on both the players and the events that occurred during the “birthing” process.As usual, General McPeak’s narrative is well written and the facts he describes ring true. This is to be expected, given that he was the Chief of Staff of the United States Air Force during that time. Thus, he was present at several meetings and discussions conducted by President Bush and General Colin Powell who was Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff at the time. Also, while it is fair to say that the other service chiefs, particularly the Chief of Staff of the Army, were less than enthusiastic about the emergence of air power as a major player, General Mcpeak, to his credit, described their position in a fair and balanced way, without backbiting or rancor.If you are not an airpower doctrine wonk, or someone who enjoys slogging through the quagmire of defense and security issues, you might be tempted to skim through the last chapter. This would be a big mistake, because this is the best part of the book. In it, General Mcpeak carefully and analytically lists the lessons learned about air power during Desert Storm, along with changes needed to be made to benefit from these lessons. In other words, it is the chapter that needs to be read by students in the service academies, as well as by young officers destined for leadership in today’s Air Force.Getting back to Hobbes, “Desert Storm” is neither nasty, nor brutish. But it is short---some 59 pages. But don’t be fooled by its size. I suspect it is destined for inclusion in the third volume of the author’s autobiography which is currently being reviewed prior to publication. Meanwhile, it is a must read for everyone interested in military aircraft or aviation history.

Profound assessment of the forces that impede success in a Pentagon that's too big and bound by interservice rivalry. General McPeak was kind to Colin Powell who tried to orchestrate this event into an Army victory, and downplay Airpower. Telling was the Navy's insistence in doubling the requested Naval strength in the from three to six Carrier Battle Groups. McPeak understands the Army still has too many tanks and heavy vehicles and is entrenched in defensive doctrinal issues to defend it's turf protected by the Military Industrial Congressional Complex.