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Author: Suzanne Mulcahy Ph.D
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ISBN: 978-3-943497-80-9
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Crime Programme of the European Union

CONTENTS
Results overview

2

Highlights 4
Executive summary

6

Key findings

7

Key recommendations

10

Research framework and methodology

12

The lobbying landscape in Europe

14

Lobbying regulation in Europe

22

1. Transparency

24

2. Integrity

36

3. Equality of Access

46

4. Focus on Brussels

52

Recommendations

56

Endnotes

62

RESULTS OVERVIEW
How strong are safeguards against undue
influence and rules to promote ethical
lobbying in European political systems?

IRELAND

UK

39%
48%
38%
31%

44%
34%
51%
46%

GERMANY

NETHERLANDS

FRANCE

SPAIN

PORTUGAL

2

23%
13%
19%
37%

34%
25%
38%
39%

23%
13%
25%
30%

27%
24%
30%
27%

21%
10%
35%
17%

European Commission 53% 48% 49% 63%
European Parliament

37% 45% 46% 21%

Council of the EU

19% 17% 29% 13%

Transparency International

Legend
Total
Transparency
Integrity
Equality of Access

ESTONIA

29%
19%
38%
30%

CZECH REPUBLIC

LATVIA

SLOVAKIA

HUNGARY

40%
34%
42%
43%

55%
58%
58%
48%

ITALY

39%
28%
43%
48%

0%

50%

100%

50%
48%
40%
62%

POLAND

SLOVENIA

29%
24%
27%
35%

Score:

LITHUANIA

AUSTRIA

The overall score is an un-weighted average of
results in the three sub-categories. The overall
score represents the strength of the overall
system of regulatory safeguards against undue
influence in lobbying and efforts to promote
open and ethical lobbying.1

33%
29%
26%
43%

26%
21%
23%
34%

14%
8%
17%
18%

BULGARIA

25%
13%
25%
38%

20%
11%
27%
22%
CYPRUS

LOBBYING IN EUROPE – Hidden Influence, Privileged Access

14%
7%
21%
23%

3

HIGHLIGHTS

Quality of Lobbying Regulation

19
countries

and three EU institutions

Transparency

31%
average score

Average score %

26%
Integrity

Average score %

33%
Equality of Access

Average score %

33%
4

Transparency International

Key Statistics

7/19

58%

have a dedicated lobbying regulation
(Austria, France, Ireland, Lithuania, Poland,
Slovenia and the United Kingdom).

believe their countryâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s government is to a large
extent or entirely controlled by a few big interests
(Transparency International Global Barometer, 2013)

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Lobbying is any direct or indirect communication with
public officials, political decision-makers or representatives
for the purposes of influencing public decision-making,
and carried out by or on behalf of any organised group.

This report examines the practice of lobbying and the
attempts to regulate it in 19 European countries and
within the three core EU institutions.2 It comes at a time
when public trust in government is at an all-time low
and the practice of lobbying is widely associated with
secrecy and unfair advantage. It also comes at a moment
when an increasing number of governments in Europe
are promising to tackle the problem of undue influence in
politics, and the need for good government is particularly
pressing given the range of economic, social and political
challenges currently faced by European countries and
EU institutions.
Lobbying is an integral part of a healthy democracy,
closely related to universal values such as freedom of
speech and the right to petition of government. It allows
for various interest groups to present their views on
public decisions that may come to affect them. It also has
the potential to enhance the quality of decision-making
by providing channels for the input of expertise on
increasingly technical issues to legislators and decisionmakers. According to a 2013 survey of 600 European
parliamentarians and officials, 89 per cent agreed that,
“ethical and transparent lobbying helps policy
development”.3
Despite this, multiple scandals throughout Europe
demonstrate that without clear and enforceable rules,
a select number of voices with better resourcing and
contacts can come to dominate political decision-making.
At the very least, this can skew individual decisions, and
at the worst, it can lead to wide-scale institutional and
state capture. At present, unfair and opaque lobbying
practices constitute one of the key corruption risks facing
Europe, and six out of 10 European citizens consider
their government to be seriously influenced or entirely
co-opted by a few vested interests.4

6

This report compiles the results of national level studies
examining how lobbying manifests itself across Europe
and the quality of responses by both governments and
the EU institutions to the risks and realities of undue
influence in public decision-making. It is the first time that
such a holistic and comparable assessment has been
carried out.
A particular focus of the report is on reviewing the three
critical and inter-related elements of effective lobbying
regulation: firstly, whether interactions between lobbyists
and public officials are made transparent and open to
public scrutiny (transparency); secondly, whether there are
clear and enforceable rules on ethical conduct for both
lobbyists and public officials (integrity); and thirdly,
how open is public decision-making to a plurality of voices
representative of a wide range of interests (equality of
access). Any serious effort to combat undue influence in
politics must recognise that transparency measures must
be accompanied by broader measures to strengthen
public integrity and promote opportunities for access by
a wide range of citizens to the political system.
The overall results of the research give cause for concern
and suggest that attempts to date to promote open
and ethical lobbying standards by both governments and
lobbyists have been piecemeal and ineffective. Much
of the influence remains hidden and informal; there are
serious conflicts of interest at play; and certain groups
enjoy privileged access to decision-makers. The risks of
undue influence remain high and, on occasion, this has
resulted in drastic and far-reaching consequences for the
economy, the environment, social cohesion, public safety,
and human rights. Greater efforts by both the public
sector and all those seeking to influence public decisions
are urgently required to address the issue.

Transparency International

6 out of 10 European citizens
consider their government to be
seriously influenced or entirely
­co-opted by a few vested interests.

KEY FINDINGS
The lobbying landscape in Europe
is diverse, complex and becoming
more complicated

external observers. At the more extreme end, this
includes acting through front organisations or creating
the semblance of public support through manipulated
and/or purchased opinions (also known as “astroturfing”).

A broad range of interest groups and their representatives
are looking to inform and influence public decisionmaking, contributing to a generally dynamic democratic
environment. A number of actors attempting to influence
decisions, from the private, public, not-for-profit and legal
fields, do not consider themselves to be lobbying as
such, and the activity is frequently called by another name
– advocacy, public affairs or interest representation.

A notable portion of influencing efforts across the
examined countries occur outside of any formal partici­
patory or consultative channels, drawing on informal
relationships and a variety of social interactions. In
a number of states as diverse as Ireland, Portugal or
Hungary, this influence is deeply intertwined with familial,
class or business interest structures, creating oppor­
tunities for a culture of patronage and insular elites.

In most countries, lobbying as a stand-alone profession
and consultancy service is still in its nascent stages.
However, with the EU integration process increasingly
making Brussels a hub of European policy-making, there
is a growing professionalisation of the lobbying industry
there. At national level, the system of sectoral
representation and institutionalised partnerships with
government is still present. However, a new pattern is
emerging whereby the better resourced actors, in
particular the larger corporate actors, are increasingly
doing their own lobbying rather than relying on
representation from business associations.

The nexus between business and politics is growing
ever stronger, creating serious conflicts of interest, and
with it, the risk of regulatory and policy capture. Of
particular concern is the practice of carrying out lobbying
activities while holding office, as well as the postemployment “revolving door” between the public and the
private sectors. Disproportionate and hidden political
finance also plays a notable role.

Hidden and informal influence
persists in Europe
A diversity of lobbying techniques are being put to use,
from open participation in consultative processes to
direct communications with decision-makers and the
organisation of grassroots campaigns. Much of it is
legitimate – however, some of the activities are specifically
designed to confuse and conceal their true origins and
beneficiaries from public decision-makers and any

LOBBYING IN EUROPE – Hidden Influence, Privileged Access

Despite serious risk factors,
lobbying regulation in Europe is
woefully inadequate, allowing
undue influence to flourish
Measured against international standards and emerging
best practice, the 19 European countries and the three
EU institutions achieve an overall score of just 31 per cent
for the quality of their promotion of transparency, integrity
and equality of access in lobbying.
The vast majority of European countries reviewed have no
comprehensive regulation of lobbying and no system in

7

KEY FINDINGS

Slovenia is the only country
that managed a score
exceeding 50 per cent.

place to systematically record contacts between
lobbyists and policy-makers. Europe lags behind Canada
and the United States in this regard. Of the 19 countries
examined, only 7 have laws or regulations specifically
regulating lobbying activities (Austria, France, Ireland,
Lithuania, Poland, Slovenia and the United Kingdom).
Many of the lobbying related laws and regulations that
exist in Europe are, to varying degrees, flawed or unfit
for purpose. There are also problems with weak
implementation and lack of enforcement of existing rules.

Transparency

1/19
Only one country – Slovenia – and the European
Commission, manage a score exceeding 50 per cent.
However, they too are faced with a range of problems
including gaps in regulatory coverage, loopholes and
poor implementation of rules. It is notable that the
majority of countries at the centre of the financial crisis
(Cyprus, Spain, Italy and Portugal)5 sit at the bottom
of the table, together with Hungary. No less concerning is
the performance of the Council of the EU, one of the
most powerful institutions in Europe, which is third from
last with a score of just 19 per cent (and sitting at a polar
opposite from the European Commission in terms of
the ranking).

average score

26%

Citizens and interest groups have little opportunity to know who is influencing
public decisions, on what issues and how. Few countries have any requirements
on the public sector to record information about their contacts with lobbyists
and lobbying interest groups. The information that is documented is frequently
too narrow or sporadic, and often is not proactively released to the public.
Although all countries except for Cyprus have access to information laws, in
practice, citizens, media or other interest groups face practical hurdles in making
a successful information request.
The seven countries and the two EU institutions that have specific lobbying
regulations have all opted for a register as the cornerstone of their approach,
requiring lobbyist registration and, in most cases, a periodic reporting of
activities. Lobby registers can be useful in allowing citizens to track influence
in the political process if they are designed with comprehensive definitions
(including all who seek to influence public decisions), if they are mandatory, and
if they are coupled with meaningful oversight mechanisms. However, none of
the existing registers examined by this report fulfil these criteria. It is important to
note that even a comprehensive register of lobbyists is not a panacea to undue
influence. It is only one measure among many others that are required to open
decisions up to public scrutiny.

8

Transparency International

Only Austria has a mandatory code
of conduct for lobbyists in place.

Integrity

1/19
average score

33%

Neither lobbyists nor public officials are subject to clear and enforceable ethical
rules regarding lobbying activity, which is particularly troubling given the low
levels of transparency. Although most countries have introduced a public sector
code of conduct, a number of countries are still missing a similar one for
legislators. The codes of conduct that are in place are frequently incomplete and
do not provide sufficient behavioural guidance on how to deal with lobbying
third parties. Particular problems are present around conflicts of interest
management, including the periodic disclosure of interests. Although the majority
of states have some revolving door regulations requiring a ‘cooling-off’ period
before former public officials can lobby their former colleagues, only one country,
Slovenia, has instituted one for the legislators and even in this case it is not
properly applied in practice. None of the 19 countries assessed was found to
have effective monitoring and enforcement of the revolving door provisions.
In terms of core ethical guidance for lobbyists, only one country (Austria) has a
mandatory code of conduct and under Ireland’s recently adopted Regulation of
Lobbying Act (2015) a regulator is authorised to issue the same; a few others
have voluntary provisions. One positive finding is that in most countries there are
some voluntary initiatives and attempts to self-regulate lobbying activities,
including the promotion of codes of conduct. However, in most cases, these are
limited to particular professional associations, which constitute only a fraction
of those looking to influence public decision-making. The codes are also usually
voluntary and often with insufficient detail and weak complaint mechanisms.

Equality of Access

average score

33%

Public participation is inadequately protected, and certain groups are able
to enjoy privileged access to public decision-making. While a variety of public
consultation mechanisms do exist across most countries, implementation
is usually inconsistent across government, and in no cases are there
comprehensive requirements to provide detailed explanations on which views
were taken into account and why. A further significant concern is regarding
lobbying from the inside through expert and advisory groups convened by the
public sector. Only one country (Portugal) has a legal requirement to strive for a
balanced composition of these bodies, and in most countries their operations
remain opaque to the outside world.

LOBBYING IN EUROPE – Hidden Influence, Privileged Access

9

KEY FINDINGS

The status quo of a high risk of undue influence on public
decision-making, coupled with inadequate regulation
and oversight, has led to a serious impact on the public
good, as well as on the reputation of all parties. The
expert interviews and case studies outlined in this report
and the underlying national studies demonstrate the high
cost of the current approach, including its contribution
to instances of environmental degradation, financial
collapse, human rights abuse, and the endangerment of
public safety, amongst others. It has also tarnished the
reputation of all those lobbyists and lobbying groups as
well as public officials and public institutions that do wish
to conduct their operations in an open and ethical way.
Levels of public trust are low and given that much of the
lobbying activity remains below the radar, the true scale
of the problems is likely to be much higher.
Despite the serious shortcomings in the regulatory
frameworks across the EU, there are indications of
positive momentum for reform. An increasing number of
countries, including Estonia, France, Italy and Lithuania,
amongst others, are signalling a willingness to tackle the
issue, with proposals at various stages of development.
For all its shortcomings, the recently adopted Irish
lobbying law raises the bar in terms of the quality of
regulation in Europe. There are also a number of other
promising practices throughout Europe, with a few

included in this report. A growing number of professional
lobbyists and corporates are committing to higher ethical
standards in their interactions with government, and
are in fact supportive of reforms, recognising the moral
imperative but also the benefits to reputation and the
need for a level playing field. There have also been some
promising developments in Brussels, and ongoing
work on an international legal instrument on lobbying
under the auspices of the Council of Europe.
This overall trajectory is encouraging and to be
applauded. However, for these efforts to be truly effective,
a much more holistic approach to tackling the issue is
essential. Unfortunately, many of the efforts to date have
been too narrow in scope and do not take account of a
broader framework of transparency, integrity and equality
of access in lobbying (as well as the broader regulatory
framework).
Equally, a sense of urgency, leadership and political
commitment is required to ensure that such measures do
not stall at their deliberative stage (as so frequently was
the case in the past), but are adopted, and more critically,
enforced. Only then can public policy again serve the
public good, citizens can recover their trust in govern­
ment, and the term “lobbying” can be associated with
participatory democracy rather than corruption.

KEY RECOMMENDATIONS
The following are key recommendations for governments and
lobbyists to promote ethical lobbying and deter undue influence:6

Ensure information on lobbying activities is published
and made easily accessible to the public.
Ensure lobbying regulation is based on a set of broad definitions which capture
all who engage in lobbying activities (including consultant lobbyists, in-house
lobbyists, public affairs firms, NGOs, corporations, industry/professional
associations, trade unions, think tanks, law firms, faith-based organisations,
academics and pro-bono office holders of incorporated entities) and all key
lobbying targets.
Establish and strengthen existing registers of lobbyists by making them
mandatory, requiring timely registration by lobbyists, recording detailed infor­
mation on who lobbyists represent, who they target, with which resources,
with what purpose and using which supporting evidence.7
Ensure a “legislative footprint” is created for every legislative or policy proposal to
ensure full transparency of decision-making processes. This would include tracking
and publishing external input and contact between lobbyists and public officials.

10

Transparency International

Require that public officials and representatives publish information on
their meetings and interactions with lobbyists including calendars, agendas,
and documentation received from lobbyists.
All those seeking to influence public policy (including professional lobbyists,
businesses and civil society organisations) must ensure they are proactively
transparent about their advocacy and lobbying including the publication of:
Policies, expenditure and individuals lobbying on the organisation’s behalf
Political contributions and political involvement
Position papers and supporting documentation presented in support of
lobbying efforts

Create an ethical firewall between lobbyists and the public sector.
Establish minimum ‘cooling-off’ periods before former public and elected
officials can work in lobbying positions that may create conflicts of interest
and create a permissions process from a designated ethics office before
a lobbying-related appointment can be taken up by former public officials,
former members of parliament, and former members of the executive
(national and subnational levels).
Amend existing codes of conduct for public officials to guarantee they include
clear behavioural standards related to lobbying and how they should interact
with interest groups.
Introduce a statutory code of conduct for lobbyists laying out the core
principles of ethical lobbying.
Lobbyists must commit to carry out their work with integrity, in coherence with
their Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) policy, ensuring that information
conveyed is factually accurate and honest and that they do not misrepresent
their status or the nature of their communications.

Promote diverse participation in public decision-making from
individuals and groups with a range of perspectives.
Approve legal requirements that allow citizens, interest groups and corporate
bodies to equally input into legislative items under consideration.
Introduce a legal requirement on public bodies to publish the results of
consultation processes, including the views of participants in the consultation
process.
Make open all calls for applications to sit on advisory/expert groups and
introduce selection criteria to ensure a balance of different interests.

Ensure rules are enforced and that there are
meaningful sanctions for unethical behaviour.
Establish an adequately resourced independent oversight body to enforce
rules regarding the transparency of lobbying activities and ethical conduct
(post-employment, conflicts of interest, gifts and hospitality).

LOBBYING IN EUROPE – Hidden Influence, Privileged Access

11

RESEARCH FRAMEWORK AND METHODOLOGY
This report brings together the findings of 19 national
assessments carried out in 2014, examining the practice
of lobbying and attempts to regulate it across Europe.
The research framework was developed by Transparency
International with reference to internationally recognised
standards on the regulation of lobbying and prevention of
undue influence. These standards include, amongst
others, the OECD’s “10 Principles for Transparency and
Integrity in Lobbying”8 and their 2014 progress report on
the implementation of those principles,9 the Venice
Commission’s Report on the Role of Extra-Institutional
Actors in the Democratic System,10 Transparency
International’s Open Governance Scorecard Standards,11
the Sunlight Foundation’s International Lobbying
Disclosure Guidelines,12 and Access Info Europe’s
Standards of Lobbying Disclosure.13 Using these
standards as a starting point, a methodology consisting of
65 indicator questions was developed. The methodology
was refined in consultation with several of the abovementioned organisations.

The 65 indicators correspond to three core dimensions
and 10 sub-dimensions, which are considered to be
a comprehensive approach to lobbying regulation. The
three core dimensions are transparency, integrity
and equality of access.
The extent of transparency indicates how open
decision-making is and to what extent the public can
access information on who is lobbying public officials
and representatives, on what issues, when and
how they are being lobbied, how much is being spent
in the process, and what the results of these lobbying
efforts are.
The level of integrity demonstrates how effectively
countries ensure ethical conduct among public officials,
representatives and lobbyists.
The degree of equality of access shows how well a
system allows for a plurality of voices in public decisionmaking and the contribution of ideas and evidence by
a broad range of interests.

Assessment methodology
Each national assessment sought to assess existing
lobbying regulations, policies and practices, compile
evidence about corruption risks and incidences related to
lack of lobbying control, highlight promising practices
around lobbying found in the country, and provide
recommendations and solutions for decision-makers and
interest representatives in the public and private sector.
The research was conducted from March to August
2014. It involved an initial desk review of legal and policy
docu­­ments and existing secondary data. National
researchers then carried out in-depth interviews with
policy-makers, lobbyists and experts on lobbying in
the country. In total, 161 interviews were conducted
with a total of 180 interviewees across the 19 countries.
The research was primarily qualitative, but in order to
give a quantitative evaluation of lobbying regulations at
national and EU level, the researchers answered and

12

Transparency International

The 10 sub-dimensions of a comprehensive
lobbying regulation system
Transparency

Integrity

Equality of Access

1

5

9

Access to public information, via freedom of
information (FOI) regimes

2

Lobbyist registration systems

3

Oversight of registration system and sanctions for
non-compliance

4

Pro-active disclosure by public officials, including
legislative footprint

Pre and post-employment restrictions to reduce
risks associated with the revolving door between
the public and private sector

Consultation and public participation mechanisms

10

Expert/advisory group composition and policies

6

Codes of conduct for public sector employees

7

Codes of ethics for lobbyists

8

Self-regulation by lobbyist associations

scored the 65 indicator questions.14 In order to assess
the EU level rules and regulations, Transparency
International’s Brussels-based EU liaison office applied
the assessment element of the methodology to the
European Commission, the European Parliament and
the Council of the European Union.
A three-point scale was used to score the indicators,
with a minimum score of 0 and a maximum score of 2. In
order to calculate the overall scores for the country/EU
institution and for each of the three dimensions –
transparency, integrity and equality of access – a simple
aggregation was performed. Specifically, a total score
(as a percentage) was calculated for 10 sub-dimensions.
A simple un-weighted average was then calculated to
provide a score for each of the three dimensions.

LOBBYING IN EUROPE – Hidden Influence, Privileged Access

Similarly, the overall country/EU institution score is an
un-weighted average of these three dimensions. No
differential weighting was applied to individual indicators,
sub-dimensions or to the core dimensions. The scores
were reviewed and validated at international level by the
research team at the Transparency International
Secretariat in order to ensure cross-country comparability.
The resulting scores allow a comparison of attempts to
promote open and ethical lobbying and of the quality
of safeguards against undue influence at the national and
EU levels. The regional analysis in this report draws
mainly on the 19 national assessment findings and the
EU level assessment. Additional secondary sources
from Transparency International and other organisations
were also drawn upon where relevant.

13

THE LOBBYING LANDSCAPE
IN EUROPE
Many actors across Europe are engaged in lobbying activities,
looking to influence and inform public decision-making, and in
the process often competing or cooperating with each other.
This diversity includes, but is not limited to, those with economic
interests, professional interests and civil society interests.
This chapter maps out how influence is wielded in politics
across Europe, by whom, using which techniques and
with what impact. How influence is brought to bear in a
country’s political system varies across Europe and
depends on many factors, including, amongst others, the
degree of institutionalisation of lobbying within the system,
the size of the country, the political culture and the
maturity of the lobbying industry. With so many different
organisations and individuals lobbying, it is inevitable
that there is variation in the techniques used to influence,
including how openly and ethically individuals and
organisations behave.

A vibrant lobbying scene
A myriad of actors across Europe are engaged in lobbying
activities, looking to influence and inform public decisionmaking, and in the process often competing or
cooperating with each other. This diversity includes, but
is not limited to, those with economic interests (such as
companies and corporations), professional interests
(such as trade and labour unions or representatives of
professional societies) and civil society interests (such as
environmental or religious groups).15 The overall variety
of action and input by these groups is generally helpful to
public decision-making, and it contributes to a largely
dynamic democratic environment.

Desperately seeking influence:
A view from the frontline
In Hungary, interviewees spoke of companies desperately
hunting for opportunities to meet with members of the
government. Tactics included taking part in overseas
government business delegations and attending football
matches, even if they were known not to have an interest
in the sport.16
In Ireland, the houses of parliament are a major site for
lobbying. Several interest group interviewees said they
routinely positioned themselves in various places around
the Leinster House complex, including the coffee dock
and the Dáil bar, in order to “buttonhole” politicians.17
It Italy, the lounge of the exclusive fidelity club of Alitalia
(the Italian airline) at Linate airport in Milan, where there
is the flight connection with Rome, is known to be a
strategic location where lobbyists meet policy-makers on
a regular basis.18

Some actors who engage in lobbying activities do not
consider themselves lobbyists as such – lawyers often fall
into this category – and others use different names,
such as public affairs or public relations consultants. Civil
society groups and non-governmental organisations
sometimes prefer to label their activities as “advocacy”,
rather than “lobbying”. This is in part due to the negative
connotations linked with the term “lobbyist” in many
countries in Europe.

14

Transparency International

In the pharmaceutical sector alone,
conservative “official” estimates show
€40 million spent on lobbying, while other
more realistic estimates show €91 million.

The persistence of
informal influence
Much lobbying across Europe takes place outside the
formal channels and is invisible to the public eye. In
small and medium-sized countries, lobbying patterns are
tied in with familial, social and class networks. Elites in
such contexts are inevitably close-knit and this allows for
a culture of patronage and informal influence to flourish.
Connections between family, friends and old school
colleagues often determine who has the ear of
the decision-maker and which decision will be taken.
Several states demonstrate serious signs of crony
capitalism and, in the case of Hungary, state capture.19
Most informal lobbying takes the form of direct
communication and happens in social settings, such as
receptions, golf clubs, airport lounges, parliament bars,
corporate boxes at football stadiums and horseracing
tracks. These forums have been described as the
“anterooms of lobbying”,20 because while they may not
provide an immediate opportunity for a meaningful
dialogue, they are likely to trigger future and potentially
substantive communication, which often eventually
translates into influence. Regulation struggles to capture
this type of lobbying because these communications and
interactions are “by design” kept off the record.

Growing professionalisation
and diversification of
the lobbying landscape
Despite the persistence of informality, in most countries
there is a growing professionalisation of lobbying, with
lobbying and public affairs consultancies increasingly
contracted to represent business and other third-party
interests and to convince decision-makers on issues
of interest to their clients. The clients of these professional
lobbyists include companies, associations, public sector
agencies and non-governmental organisations.

LOBBYING IN EUROPE – Hidden Influence, Privileged Access

€91

million

There is also an increasingly wide array of actors providing
professional lobbying services, including for example,
lawyers and large accountancy firms. In countries such
as Portugal and Estonia, legal professions are the primary
channels of professional lobbying, and in a number
of others they are significant players. In recent years, the
presence in Brussels of large European and US-based
law firms – and their lobbying of the EU institutions on
behalf of corporate clients – has been noted.21 Lawyers
have been particularly reluctant to identify themselves as
lobbyists and have argued that transparency requirements
should not apply to them due to confidentiality concerns
associated with the lawyer-client privilege. It is telling
that, of the approximately 7,000 organisations registered
in the EU’s voluntary Transparency Register, only 88
are law firms.22 Recently, concerns have also been raised
about the influence of “The Big 4” accountancy firms –
PwC, Ernst & Young, Deloitte and KPMG – at the national
level23 and in influential European Commission expert
groups.24

Fragmentation of
business interests
Lobbying is often associated in the public mind with the
representation of business interests. However, the cluster
“business” encompasses many varied actors, with
a broad range of interests and huge variation in terms of
size, budget, scope of influence and lobbying behaviour.
Traditionally, businesses channelled their influence
through associations, which lobbied on their behalf.
In countries with a corporatist tradition, spanning much of
continental Europe, the participation of such associations
along with other interest groups has historically
been quasi-institutionalised within the decision-making
processes.

15

THE LOBBYING LANDSCAPE IN EUROPE

Associations continue to have importance in representing
business interests in Europe, particularly for small and
medium-sized enterprises, and, in some countries, they
remain a primary channel for business to articulate their
interests. In Lithuania, for example, it has been noted that
several business associations even have assigned offices
on public premises and are listed in the official contact
list as “representatives to the Government”.25
However, companies are not relying on associations
alone to represent their interests. Increasingly, lobbying is
carried out by in-house lobbyists and directly by the
senior management of companies. This is especially true
of large corporations, which are not surprisingly among
the most active lobbyists in Europe and often enjoy
disproportionate access to key decision-makers.

Increasing lobbying spending
by powerful sectors
Due to the lack of mandatory reporting mechanisms at
the EU level and in most countries in Europe, it is
impossible to know the true scale of lobbying activity and
the amounts of money spent on it. The few estimates
and indicators that do exist, however, point to increased
intensity of lobbying and rising levels of spending.26
Sectors such as pharmaceuticals, finance, telecommuni­
cations and energy dominate the lobbying landscape in
Europe. Conservative estimates based on entries into the
EU’s Transparency Register from 2012 suggest an annual
spend of €40 million to influence EU affairs by the
pharmaceutical sector alone. This figure is most likely a
gross underestimation due to imprecise, non-transparent
and absent declarations. A more realistic figure of
€91 million has been put forward.27 Equally remarkable
are estimates of lobbying spending by the finance
industry.28

Sophistication of lobbying
techniques
Much lobbying takes the form of direct communication,
either through public hearings during consultation
processes, formal meetings with decision-makers, or by
having a discrete word in the ear of a close contact.
However, more sophisticated indirect lobbying techniques
are also gaining traction in countries across Europe,
some of which are questionable and give cause
for concern. These include the mobilisation of the public
through advert­isements, public relations campaigns,
funding advocacy organisations or think-tanks, and the
use of grassroots campaigns.30
The use of grassroots lobbying is particularly prevalent.
Organisations instigate campaigns (online petitions, letters
to the government or parliamentarians, public debates,
leaflets, and demonstrations, amongst others) with the
aim of pressuring politicians to listen. In its benign form,
this type of citizen engagement can be empowering
for citizens. However, this technique can also involve
something more sinister when it takes the form of
“astroturfing”, the controversial practice of lobbyists hiding
behind front groups to give a semblance of grassroots
popular support for a cause, which is in fact funded by
private interests.
The drafting of legal texts by lobbyists has caused
controversy at the national level and at EU level.31 That
lobbyists suggest amendments is not a problem per se,
but when entire passages of lobbyists’ position papers
are copy-pasted into laws, there is an obvious concern of
disproportionate influence being brought to bear. This
has led to calls for the publication of all submissions and
supporting documentation by lobbyists on particular
pieces of legislation.

It is important to note that while corporations often have
large sums of money at their disposal, smaller companies
can struggle to bring influence to bear through lobbying
and often find it difficult to gain access to policy-makers.
Similarly, smaller NGOs and civil society organisations
operate with restricted resources, which can limit their
influence. Larger NGOs are strong players on the lobbying
landscape and increasingly devote significant budgets to
lobbying and advocacy activities, sometimes in the
hundreds of thousands of euros.29

16

Transparency International

Astroturfing: A lobbying technique that lends
legitimacy to concealed interests
In 2012, the Department of Health in the UK published
documentation revealing complaints that a lobby group
largely financed by the tobacco industry had tried to
fake signatures, thus overstating third-party support for
their campaign against plain packaging regulation in the
United Kingdom.32 The industry argued that some half
a million people were opposed to the measure, evidenced
by the signing of petitions, online forms and postcards/
letters delivered to the Department of Health.
However it was later revealed that some of the
expressions of support were faked. The “Hands Off
Our Packs” campaign, run by the tobacco front group
Forest and believed to be financed in large part by
the tobacco industry, contracted an agency to recruit
signature collectors, which then incentivised staff
based on the number of signatures garnered.33 Forest
subsequently admitted that a number of signatures had
been falsified, but denied that this was encouraged
or intentional and attributed blame to the individual
signature collector.34
The recently adopted Regulation of Lobbying Act in
Ireland has the potential to be the first national law in
Europe to address astroturfing and make it more difficult
for industries or others to conceal their interests behind
such organisations, requiring them to disclose their
indirect lobbying efforts.

LOBBYING IN EUROPE – Hidden Influence, Privileged Access

Private/public sector nexus
Most lobbying discourse assumes a separation of public
institutions and officials on the one hand, and lobbying
interests on the other. However, this is not necessarily the
case. The emergence of private-public partnerships,
the outsourcing of public services, secondments into the
public sector, and the use of advisory bodies all carry
the risk of lobbying from the “inside”, with private actors
having access to potentially privileged information and
performing dual functions.
Conversely a range of scandals throughout Europe also
demonstrate the potential of unaddressed conflicts of
interest on the part of public officials and representatives.
Various cases examined in the course of this research
include instances of public officials advising on or
conducting lobbying activities while in office; concealed
private interests in the course of public decision-making;
and the influence of disproportionate and hidden
political finance.
A particularly acute problem, and the threat to integrity
most commonly cited by lobbyists,35 is the revolving door
between the political world and the lobbying world.
Although the exchange of expertise between the public
and private sector can be positive, the situation can also
present serious post- and pre-employment conflicts of
interest, with the potential of regulatory and institutional
capture. Examples of risky revolving door practices
between business and politics abound in almost every
European country examined, revealing this to be a
widespread problem with ineffective oversight. The
absence of rules, or in some cases their poor
enforcement, allows risks of abuse of power and
misuse of office or former office.

17

THE LOBBYING LANDSCAPE IN EUROPE

The revolving door between business
and politics in Europe
In Portugal, of the past 19 finance ministers, 14 have
previously worked in banks or financial institutions.
Bankers have also been the most represented
professional group in cabinet, amounting to 54 per cent
of government positions since the establishment of the
democratic state. 230 members of parliament have taken
up 382 positions in financial institutions before or after
holding a government role. These close links between
business and politics also extend to the regulator’s office.
Since 1986, all heads of the Central Bank have gone
on to jobs in banking. The financial sector’s influence over
political decision-making is perceived as extensive and
commonplace.36
Similarly, in Spain, serious concern has been raised about
former members of the executive branch transitioning
to the business world and conversely, business executives
transitioning to regulatory agencies. This has been
characterised by the Council of Europe’s Group of States
against Corruption (GRECO) as “a serious threat to the
credibility of the nation’s institutions”.37 Some examples
of former politicians, with impressive networks of former
colleagues and unrivalled access to decision-makers,
are former presidents of Spain, Felipe González, who
became a Gas Natural Fenosa Board Member38 and José
María Aznar, whom Endesa (the largest utility company in
Spain) hired as an external consultant and who has
served as a board member in five other multinational
corporations, including as advisor to the global VicePresident of KPMG and President of KPMG in Spain.39

Social impact of opaque
lobbying and undue influence
When lobbying is unregulated and remains under the
radar of public scrutiny, the potential for undue influence
increases. Without a robust ethical firewall between the
public sector and lobbyists, decisions can be taken
that do not serve the public interest but rather a narrow
set of private interests. This can have very damaging
consequences for society and has been linked in Europe
to cases of environmental degradation, financial collapse,
human rights abuse, and the endangerment of public
health and safety, amongst others.
A pertinent example is the global financial crisis. While the
reasons for the financial crisis are many and varied,
opaque lobbying by powerful individuals and companies
in the banking sector (see Focus on Finance section),
who often enjoyed disproportionate access to key
decision-makers, has been linked to the failed economic
policies that led to the crisis. Recognising this, an
International Monetary Fund (IMF) working paper stated
that, “prevention of future crises might require weakening
political influence of the financial industry and closer
monitoring of lobbying activities to understand the
incentives better”.41

In the Netherlands, the revolving door also swings freely.
One example of many is the case of Jack de Vries,
former state-secretary of the Ministry of Defence. De
Vries was an advocate of the purchase of the Joint Strike
Fighter (JSF) airplane, which because of its increasing
costs has been severely disputed. De Vries resigned from
public service in 2010, but in 2011 he joined Hill and
Knowlton, a communication and advisory agency, which
also represented the Dutch airline industry and backed
the JSF purchase. When asked if he would be the contact
person with the Ministry of Defence, De Vries stated that
he did not know but he also did not see “any objections or
problems” in contacting the Ministry. A regulation specific
to this sector prohibits the Ministry from engaging with
ex-governmental officials until two years after their
employment, if they represent the business community.40

18

Transparency International

Post-crisis financial reform thwarted due to
intense lobbying by financial sector
As Europe emerges from the latest financial crisis, in an attempt to
prevent a recurrence, there have been several financial sector reform
efforts at the national and EU levels. But reform has been stalled,
thwarted and watered down, in large part due to intense lobbying
by the financial lobby in Europe. Post-crisis reforms have been
criticised as “rather tweaking than reforming the system”42 and many
fear the renewed capture of regulations by the financial industry.43
The complexity of the sector and related regulation has led to a
situation where the debate has mostly been left to experts – primarily
representatives of the financial sector itself – whereas the regulation
of financial services has a strong public interest dimension.44

Photo: iStockphoto/Nikada

FOCUS ON FINANCE

Financial lobbyists continue to be among the most powerful lobbies in
Europe. At the EU level, for example, spending by financial lobbyists
dwarfs that of many other sectors. A recent report by Corporate
Europe Observatory (CEO) estimated that the financial sector spends
€120 million per year on lobbying in Brussels and employs more
than 1,700 lobbyists. Their report involved investigative research,
uncovering and analysing data which is not easily accessible to the
average citizen, indicating the opacity of much lobbying activity in this
sector. CEO estimated that the financial industry lobbied the postcrisis EU regulation through over 700 organisations and outnumbered
civil society organisations and trade unions by a factor of more than
seven.45
At the national level too, the scale and effectiveness of the financial
lobby is evident. In France, in 2013, the law of separation and
regulation of banking activities was diluted significantly following
intense lobbying by the sector. The final text fell far short of the
original draft, which had been heralded as ambitious and would
have gone a long way to creating a stronger barrier between banks’
investment and trading activities, on the one hand, and commercial
banking activities, on the other, thus protecting ordinary consumers if
banks performed poorly on the financial markets. The law, as it was
eventually passed, has been criticised as “of minimal impact” and
“essentially cosmetic”.46 Close links between the financial sector and
the Treasury, including the pattern of many former Treasury officials
moving directly into lucrative jobs in the private banking sector, have
been seen as a major factor contributing to the weakening of the
law.47
Until recently, the vast majority of the large banks were not registered
in the voluntary EU Transparency Register, although they were lobbying
vigorously in Brussels. The announcement by the new Juncker
Commission in November 2014 that they would in the future only
meet registered lobbyists prompted a flurry of registrations, including
from the large banks.48
Perhaps even more important is the need for the public interest to be
more clearly reflected in financial sector decision-making. This can
only be achieved by requiring balance in advisory and expert groups
to ensure they are not dominated by industry and by broadening
consultation mechanisms on public policy to encourage participation
from non-financial industry stakeholders.

LOBBYING IN EUROPE – Hidden Influence, Privileged Access

19

Photo: Flickr/Greencolander

FOCUS ON PHARMACEUTICALS

Regulatory capture and the
pharmaceutical lobby in France49
Mediator was a drug marketed to overweight diabetics, but also often
prescribed to healthy women as an appetite suppressant when they
wanted to lose weight. It became the subject of a major scandal when
it was allowed to stay on the market in France until 2009, despite
increasing evidence of suspected public health risks with the drug and
despite the fact that it had been withdrawn from the market in Spain
and Italy in 2004. Conservative estimates suggest that the delay in
withdrawing the drug resulted in the deaths of 220–300 people, but
other studies have put the death toll at 1,300.50 Thousands more
complain of cardiovascular complications that have limited their daily
lives.51
The case sparked a furore about the lobbying power of pharmaceutical
companies in France. The official report cited “pressure” exerted by
the company behind the drug, Servier, which had reportedly lobbied
policy-makers and health experts to keep Mediator on the market
and have it recognised as an anti-diabetes drug.52 A trial to determine
whether the company misled patients and authorities about the
drug was postponed in 2013 and is expected to start in 2015. The
company has assured all those who suffered due to the drug will be
compensated, but denied the allegations of wrongdoing.53
There have been suggestions that conflicts of interest contributed
to the regulator acting too slowly, and favouring the interests of the
company over the public interest.54 After the scandal, according to
Le Figaro, Servier also reportedly tried to influence elected officials
to minimise its responsibility in the scandal by seeking to change
the conclusions of the Senate’s fact-finding report,55 and softening
the reform initiated in the wake of the scandal.56 The reform of the
regulator was passed, but with some loopholes including inadequate
regulation of gifts and hospitality.

20

Transparency International

Another sector of intense lobbying is the pharmaceutical
sector (see Focus on Pharmaceuticals section). In France,
aggressive lobbying of regulators by pharmaceutical
companies has been linked to a notorious case of a drug
with suspected health risks being allowed to stay on the
market allegedly resulting in hundreds, possibly
thousands, of avoidable deaths.
However, in this and other sectors, there were also
examples of lobbying by companies and organisations
with positive social impacts. In Italy, for example, a
group of small pharmaceutical manufacturing companies
carried out a lobbying campaign to have what are known
as “orphan drugs” excluded from a ruling regarding
hospital expenditures. Orphan drugs are used to treat rare
diseases and typically earn meagre profits for drug
companies. Their inclusion in the general ruling applying
to all drugs would have made them economically
unsustainable and therefore unavailable to patients who
needed them. Lobbying transparently and using a solid
evidence-base and the power of persuasion, this modest
group of small manufacturing industries succeeded in its
campaign to save the orphan drugs, showing the
potential of lobbying to have positive social impact.57
Such cases remind us that lobbying itself is not the
problem; instead it is opacity, unethical conduct and unfair
access to public decision-makers.

Necessity of comprehensive
regulation

and the lobbying community.59 At national, regional and
international levels, there is a growing recognition of
the need to promote “responsible”, “ethical” and “open”
lobbying.60 Perhaps surprisingly, lobbyists also tend to
welcome minimum standards for lobbying. According to a
survey carried out by Burson Marsteller in 2013, 55 per
cent of professional lobbyists agreed, and 24 per cent
strongly agreed, that greater transparency in lobbying
would help to reduce the actual or perceived problems of
influence peddling by lobbyists.61 Likewise, 70 per cent
of lobbyists surveyed by the OECD in 2014 agreed that
transparency should be mandatory for all in the
profession.62
Experience shows, however, that regulating lobbying
poses significant challenges and reformers face
reluctance from various quarters with opponents citing,
amongst other concerns, fears of administrative overload.
Achieving effective regulation requires striking a balance
without creating an onerous bureaucratic burden for
lobbyists and decision-makers. The process must
start with consensus building across all affected groups
including business people, politicians, public
administrations and civil society. In many countries reform
will necessitate a major shift of political culture.
Notwithstanding these challenges, adequate regulation
is without doubt a crucial element to tackling undue
influence in politics.

The lobbying landscape in Europe is complex. It involves
an increasingly diverse set of actors, bringing ever
more sophisticated influencing techniques to bear. The
status quo, where most lobbying remains unregulated
and opaque leads to disproportionate and unfair policy
influence by a subset of society representing select
interests.
There are signs of a growing momentum to address
the issue, however. Investigative journalists and
grassroots and international NGOs are doing important
work to detect and prevent undue influence,58 and there is
emerging leadership from some corners of the business

LOBBYING IN EUROPE – Hidden Influence, Privileged Access

21

LOBBYING REGULATION
IN EUROPE
The average score for the quality of lobbying
regulation in European countries and institutions
is just 31 per cent, indicating that most are
substantially ill-equipped to deal with the issue
of undue influence.
There is a growing awareness across Europe that
un­controlled lobbying has serious consequences,
ultimately allowing the distortion and co-option of public
power through undue influence. In this chapter, there is a
comparison of European countries’ attempts to tackle it,
mainly through different forms of regulation. The results
offer a sobering picture of lobbying control in Europe. The
response by both governments and organisations has
been wholly insufficient and not nearly far-reaching
enough to detect and prevent undue influence and
promote a culture of ethical lobbying.
Overall, European countries perform poorly when
measured against international standards and best
practice in lobbying regulation.63 Of the 19 countries and
the EU institutions assessed, the average score for
the quality of the regulatory system is just 31 per cent,
indicating that most are substantially ill-equipped to
deal with the issue of undue influence. This assessment
measured not only whether there was a lobbying
registration system in place, but comprised a
comprehensive assessment of broader public sector
transparency, the existence of integrity mechanisms to
prevent unethical behaviour and the degree to which
political systems are accessible to a plurality of voices.
Across all three categories of transparency, integrity and
equality of access the results were poor, with regional
averages for the categories ranging from 26 per cent for
transparency to 33 per cent for integrity and equality
of access.

22

Of the 19 countries studied, no country came close
to having the ideal safeguards to detect and deter undue
influence; nor did they have adequate measures in
place to promote open and ethical lobbying. Only one
country, Slovenia, and one EU institution, the European
Commission, achieved a score above 50 per cent, thanks
to their fairly robust transparency and integrity measures.
However, these too fall short in terms of their regulatory
coverage, the extent of implementation, and the quality of
monitoring and enforcement.64
The vast majority of countries have no regulation of
lobbying whatsoever and no process to systematically
register contacts between lobbyists and policy-makers.
Europe lags behind the United States and Canada in
this regard.65 Of the 19 countries examined, only seven
have laws or regulations specifically regulating lobbying
(Austria, France, Ireland, Lithuania, Poland, Slovenia and
the United Kingdom). The research also suggests that the
laws and regulations that do exist across Europe are, to
varying degrees, flawed or unfit for purpose and there are
also serious problems with implementation and
enforcement of rules.
Self-regulation by lobbyists themselves has not been
sufficiently developed either. Lobbyist associations have
an important role to play in promoting good practice
through awareness raising, training and providing ethical
guidance to those seeking to influence policy. The study
found some examples of companies’ own efforts to lobby
responsibly and transparently, but these remain very much
the exception rather than the rule.

Transparency International

0/19

No country came close to having
the ideal safeguards to detect and
deter undue influence.

It is striking that the average score for the EU institutions
– with their significant power and impact throughout
Europe – is only 36 per cent. Most concerning, is the
performance of the Council of the EU, which received less
than a fifth of the possible marks. Also of note is that
the larger EU member states – France, Germany, Italy and
Spain, and to a lesser extent, the United Kingdom – all
perform particularly badly when it comes to lobbying
regulation. These are powerful players at the European
level, and the decisions made in their capitals have the
potential to affect all EU citizens.
Occupying the bottom of the table are Cyprus and
Hungary. In Cyprus, a discussion on lobbying regulation is
virtually non-existent and citizens have one of the highest
rates of perception of state capture across the EU.66 In
Hungary, there was a poorly designed lobbying law in the
past, and the country has recently seen a systematic
dismantling of oversight institutions, threatening the
fundamentals of the democratic state.
The overall picture emerging from the research suggests
that even reforming countries have not taken a holistic
view of the issue of undue influence. This is exemplified
by the fact that the most popular regulatory tool is the
lobby register. Installing a registration system for lobbyists
in an effort to increase transparency will not promote
meaningful change unless it is accompanied by a broader
framework promoting integrity among lobbyists and
public sector employees, as well as concerted efforts to
equalise opportunities of access to political decisionmakers.

LOBBYING IN EUROPE – Hidden Influence, Privileged Access

Following the money: The link between lobbying
and political financing
Lobbying is but one of many forms of political activity
and attempts to regulate it without tackling the parallel
issue of political finance are likely to be unsuccessful.
The prime example is the United States, where corporate
money and political influence remain inextricably
linked despite concerted efforts to regulate lobbyists. If
corporate donations, for example, are not capped and/
or if the system is so opaque that citizens do not know
who is behind donations to parties and candidates, then
money can buy access and influence.
In some European countries, political financing is
considered relatively well regulated. In France, for
example, while legislation in this area is not perfect,
corporate donations are banned and the financing
of political activities by private economic interests is
not a major avenue for the exercise of undue influence.
Recent years have seen some notable improvements
in the legal framework regulating political finance,
including in Bulgaria (2011), Cyprus (2012), Estonia
(2014), France (2013), Ireland (2012), Italy (2014),
Lithuania (2012), Slovakia (2014) and Spain (2012).67
However, a number of countries still suffer from
substantial loopholes in their regulatory frameworks. In
the UK, for example, where there is no cap on donations
in place, there are serious concerns that a handful
of wealthy individuals and organisations may be able to
exert influence by making large donations: £250m of
the £432m donated to political parties between 2001
and mid-2010 was from single donations of more than
£100,000 made by individuals, companies or trade
unions.68 In a number of countries, indirect and in-kind
contributions also provide loopholes for exerting influence:
Sponsorships and donations (Cyprus), political fundraising
events (UK), debt forgiveness (Spain) and the use
of front organisations (Lithuania, Portugal, Slovenia)
are being used to bypass the safeguards set up against
undue influence, dependency and privilege in politics.
In addition, in a number of European countries, including
Bulgaria, Cyprus and Hungary, the regulatory framework
is undermined by a non-existent or ill-functioning
enforcement culture. Parties, politicians and contributors
break the rules without fear of consequences,
contributing to a culture of impunity around political
financing and influence.

23

1

TRANSPARENCY

100%

58%

Best performing country
Slovenia

26%
7%
Average score

including EU institutions

Worst performing country
Cyprus

Photo: iStockphoto/himbeertoni

1
TRANSPARENCY
A regional average score of 26 per cent
reveals a low level of transparency around
lobbying in particular, and public decisionmaking more broadly.

A regional average score of 26 per cent reveals a low
level of transparency around lobbying in particular, and
public decision-making more broadly. While general
access to information (understood as the existence and
functioning of a freedom of information regime) comes out
as the strongest aspect of the transparency landscape,
more specific issues, such as registration and disclosure
by lobbyists and oversight, as well as the existence of
legislative footprints which allow citizens to know who has
influenced the passage of a law, are revealed to be weak
or non-existent across the region.

Access to information: A
prerequisite for transparency
of decision-making
Lobbying transparency via freedom of information
When it comes to ensuring transparency, it should be
expected that all European countries at a minimum have
comprehensive and functioning access to information
laws. These laws should empower citizens to find out
what happens in their public institutions, including how
decisions are made. This is essential for citizen and media
oversight of decision-making, even if the data acquired
is post factum, and thus comes too late to alter decisions
that have already been made.

26

All countries studied have an access to information law,
with the notable exception of Cyprus, but across the
region there are significant weaknesses, both in terms
of the quality of laws and their implementation. In all but
two countries (Slovakia and the United Kingdom) access
is not always straightforward and citizens face obstacles
to accessing information on public sector activities
and government data. In the majority of countries, it is
not possible for information on lobbying to be accessed
through freedom of information requests, either because
contacts are not documented and thus the data does
not exist, or because exceptions keep such information
private (Bulgaria, Cyprus, Estonia, France, Hungary, Italy,
Lithuania, Portugal, Spain,69 the United Kingdom).70
Pro-active public sector transparency
It is increasingly recognised that access to information
in a reactive form is not enough to build a culture of
openness about public decision-making. Few dispute
that, while lobbyists bear responsibility for their actions,
the primary onus for transparency is on public officials
and representatives: those who are accountable to the
citizenry and have a duty to act, and be seen to act, in
the open and with integrity. Public officials and institutions
should, therefore, be required to pro-actively publish
information on how decisions are made, which meetings
they hold with various individuals and groups, what
documentation is submitted in attempts to influence
them, and who they invite to sit in an advisory capacity on
various expert groups. Clustering such information around
particular items under discussion, and adjoining it to
other relevant data, relating for example to programmatic,
procedural and decision-maker background, can make
for a powerful decision-making “footprint”, ensuring that
the overall work of the public sector is more open and
comprehensible to the public, and reducing the risk of
undue influence.
see p34/1

Transparency International

Thumb picto by Antar from the Noun Project

The public has a right to know who is in the room
contributing ideas and trying to convince decision-makers
on matters of public interest. In most European countries,
citizens face obstacles in exercising that right and
the public does not have sufficient knowledge of who is
trying to influence whom, when, where, how and on what
issues, how much is being spent in the process or the
results of these lobbying efforts.

How robust are lobbying transparency
mechanisms in European countries and
EU institutions?

Scale 0-100, where 0 is the weakest and 100 is strongest.
Overall score based on an un-weighted average of results in
four sub-categories. Results are presented in descending
order with highest scoring country/EU institution appearing first.

Only Latvia and Poland have a
variation of a legislative footprint
obligation written in law.

Several countries, most notably Slovakia, have various
proactive transparency measures written into law. The
recently adopted Catalan Transparency and Access
to Information act goes furthest of any instruments
examined, stipulating a general duty of proactive release
as well as listing a wide diversity of minimum types of
information for publication.71 However, in none of the
countries examined are lobbying targets required to proactively publish comprehensive information on meetings,
calendars, agendas, visitor logs or documentation
received from lobbyists. Slovenia comes closest, with the
anti-corruption agency releasing a weekly summary of
public sector contacts and a monthly excel sheet with all
information from lobbying contact reports, apart from the
name of the lobbyist. Some lobbying-related information
is also divulged in Latvia and Lithuania.
see p35/1

Only two countries of the 19 examined, Latvia and
Poland, have a variation of a legislative footprint obligation
written in law. In Latvia, any draft law that comes before
the Latvian parliament should enclose an explanatory
note, in which, among other things, all consultations that
have been held while preparing the draft law should be
specified.73 In principle, this explanatory note should also
indicate the lobbyists with whom the submitter of the draft
law has consulted, but the footprint does not function as
intended in practice, because institutions do not follow
the rules and there is no oversight or verification system
in place to compel them to do so or to penalise them for
non-compliance.74
In Poland, the act on lobbying compels ministries to
publish all documents related to the drafting of particular
legal acts. Those interested in a piece of legislation,
including professional lobbyists, must provide relevant
ministries with declarations describing the interest that
they are planning to defend or promote during their work.
Those declarations are also made public.
A number of countries have taken a more piecemeal
approach, requiring the publication of some level
of documentation, providing a mini-footprint related
to decision-making by public officials.75 In France, the
authors of parliamentary reports in the National Assembly
must annex a list of persons consulted. However,
this obligation does not apply to other institutions that
participate in the decision-making process. Therefore,
while there are requirements for tracking the consulted
interests groups at the Assembly level, the potential of
the measure is not used to the fullest since it fails to
provide an exhaustive list of all consulted interest groups
at the final stage of legislation.

Thumb picto by Antar from the Noun Project

Legislative footprints absent or poorly implemented
An important step to move closer to the ideal of proactive disclosure by default is to implement a legislative
footprint; a document that would detail the time,
person and subject of a decision-maker’s contact with
stakeholders, and include any supporting materials
provided by lobbyists in the course of legislative
development. Such a footprint would give a picture of
the interests mobilised by a decision-making process
and thus help the public, the media and anyone
interested to scrutinise legislative work.72 It would also
help address the issue of disproportionate influence by
providing an incentive for policy-makers to seek out a
balanced representation of views in their decision-making
processes. The legislative footprint should ideally be a
“live” document, updated in close to real time, but an
obligation to publish such a list as an annex to legislative
reports would be a good start.

2/19

LOBBYING IN EUROPE – Hidden Influence, Privileged Access

29

TRANSPARENCY

How comprehensive are definitions of
lobbyists, lobbying targets, lobbying activities
in national and EU lobbying regulations?

To what extent does the law clearly and
unambiguously define “lobbyists”?

Countries/institutions included in the table are those
with lobbying regulation in place. They are presented
in descending order from those with strongest
definitions to weakest.

To what extent does the law/regulation
define “lobbying targets”?

To what extent is the term
“lobbying”/“lobbying activities” clearly
and unambiguously defined?

Lobby registers: An effective
accountability tool or mere
window-dressing?
Lobby registers are fast becoming the most popular
transparency tool in the field of lobbying. Of the 19
countries studied, 10 have some form of lobby register
in place. These vary from mandatory registers at the
national level (Austria, Ireland, Lithuania, Poland, Slovenia,
the United Kingdom) to voluntary registers applying
to select institutions (National Assembly and Senate in
France, the Netherlands, EU Transparency Register)
or registers which target institutions at a sub-national level
(Tuscany, Molise and Abruzzo, Italy and Catalonia, Spain).

Thumb picto by Antar from the Noun Project

In theory, a mandatory register for lobbyists has the
potential to deter undue influence from two perspectives.
First, it provides an easy to access “go to” point for
politicians and public officials to vet those who approach
them with a view to influencing a decision-making
procedure. It also allows public scrutiny; giving citizens
and other interest groups the chance to evaluate, factcheck or counter the arguments put forward by lobbyists,
and track their influence.76 Perhaps most importantly, the
register can achieve what public sector disclosure cannot
– capturing information known only to the lobbyists,
information which is of public interest. This may include,
for example, the volume of lobbying expenditure, indirect
lobbying tactics or channels, and the ultimate clients
and beneficiaries of lobbying actions. The effectiveness
of a register, however, depends largely on how it is
constructed.
Existing registers across European countries and the
EU have yet to fulfil their potential as tools of meaningful
transparency and accountability. The registers are
criticised on a number of fronts including defective
definitions limiting the scope of the register, nonmandatory reporting and/or public disclosure, the use
of inaccessible or non-user-friendly data formats, and

LOBBYING IN EUROPE – Hidden Influence, Privileged Access

10/19
weak or absent oversight and sanctions. Some promising
examples also emerge, such as the recently adopted
Irish law, but it remains to be seen if that will deliver on its
promise.
see p34/2
Defective definitions: The devil’s in the detail
The definition of a lobbyist and what constitutes lobbying
are crucial to the effectiveness of any lobby register, and
indeed any form of lobbying regulation. The study found
that lobbyists, lobbying targets and lobbying activities are
often too narrowly defined in law, which results in weak
registers that fail to capture those seeking to influence
laws and policies. In some cases the result is that only a
small fraction of lobbyists fall within the net of the register.
None of the existing national laws were found to have
adequate definitions across the board.
An acute example is the recently adopted UK Lobbying
Act (2014), which has been described as “glaringly
inadequate” and “deliberately evasive”.77 The Association
of Professional Political Consultants in the United
Kingdom has estimated that the register will capture
only around 1 per cent of those who engage in lobbying
activity. Additionally, the Act is concerned only with
the lobbying of a very narrow group of possible targets –
ministers, permanent secretaries and special advisers. It
does not apply to the lobbying of members of parliament
or local councillors, the staff of regulatory bodies, private
companies providing public services, or any but the
most senior members of the civil service. The potential
exclusion of lawyers from the legal definition of lobbyists
has also been criticised.
Lithuania’s lobbying register has faced similar criticism
because most de facto lobbyists in the country,
including companies acting in their own interests,
business associations, trade unions, religious
organisations, various public institutions, and non-profits
do not have to officially register, meaning that the vast
majority of lobbying activities remain off the record.
The Chief Official Ethics Commission, the designated
oversight body for the register, has repeatedly called
on Parliament since 2005 to address the flaw, noting that
it leads to the overall “failure” of the regulation.78

31

TRANSPARENCY

How do existing national lobbying
registers in Europe measure up
against each other?
%

Registration and
disclosure by lobbyists

Oversight of register
and transparency rules

Overall score for
lobbying registers

Slovenia

60

56

58

Ireland

64

50

57

Lithuania

50

56

53

EU Transparency Register

50

38

44

Austria

57

19

38

France (National Assembly and Senate registers)

39

16

28

Poland

27

13

20

United Kingdom

33

25

19

Netherlands (House of Representatives Lobbyists Register)

10

0

5

In Slovenia, a country often held up as a good practice
example in this area, the definitions of both lobbying
and lobbied targets are fairly broad, although the latter
fails to include employees of state- and municipalowned companies and external advisors when legislation
is outsourced. The registration itself is confined only to
professional lobbyists, however a broader range of actors
are captured through public sector reporting on contacts,
including in-house employees and representatives
of organisations. A weakness of the law is the reported
abuse of exceptions, namely the rule that those who
lobby in the public interest to strengthen the rule of
law and protect human rights fall outside the ambit of
the act. The exclusion is made on the basis that the
public has the constitutional right to participate in public
affairs. However, some evidence shows that lobbyists
use this category as a legal loophole to influence public
officials on other matters, thus bypassing the obligation
to register and to report.79
Quality and usability of information varies
The scope and quality of the information that lobbyists
are required to disclose in a register will in large part
determine whether or not such a register is effective. The
information disclosure requirements vary across countries
– in general, when compared internationally to other

32

Scale 0-100, where 0 is the weakest and 100 is strongest.Overall
register score based on an un-weighted average of results of two
sub-categories, for countries that have a registration system in place.
Results are presented in descending order with highest scoring
country/EU institution appearing first.

lobbying registration systems, for example, in the United
States and Canada, the quality of information gathered by
European registers is much weaker and less detailed.
Lithuania and Slovenia have the broadest reporting
requirements in Europe. All registers record lobbyists’
names and the specific issue lobbied, with the notable
exception of the EU’s Transparency Register where
information on specific lobbying objectives is not easily
found. Poland and the United Kingdom do not require
any financial disclosure on the part of lobbyists, and
this is also the case for the new Irish law. No country
makes it mandatory for supporting documentation (for
example, lobbying position papers, amongst others) to be
published, which represents a major blind spot in the
lobbying transparency architecture.
In terms of the usability of the information produced
through registration systems, the study found that userfriendly formats are the exception rather than the rule
in Europe. In the United Kingdom and Austria, data is
available online in a searchable machine-readable opendata format, although in Austria an important range of
data on certain types of lobbyists remains undisclosed.
In Slovenia, a major impediment to public use of the data
is that, although an excel sheet with most information

Transparency International

Only in Lithuania is the oversight body required to publicly
disclose the names of all individuals or organisations found
to have violated lobbying rules or regulations.

on lobbying contacts is released on a monthly basis, the
underlying reports (which are the only way to obtain the
lobbyist’s name) must be requested and are only provided
in a pdf format, which is of little use for those who wish to
analyse the data and delve deeper into influencing
patterns.
Oversight and sanctions are missing or weak
Lobbying disclosure, reporting, registration and
publication of information should be overseen by an
independent government entity. Such an agency should
have strong investigative powers and be responsible
for spot-checking and auditing reported data. It should
also have sanctions at its disposal to deter and punish
individuals and organisations that fail to comply, as
well as being tasked with awareness raising and other
preventative activities.
Slovenia and Lithuania have an agency with close to

see
adequate enforcement powers on paper, but lack of
p35/2

capacity hampers the oversight agency in Slovenia as
well as lobbying not being a priority issue for the agency.
In Austria, Poland and the United Kingdom, capacity
problems extend beyond inadequate human and financial
resources to a lack of teeth in terms of investigative and
punitive powers.

Thumb picto by Antar from the Noun Project

Only in Lithuania is the oversight body required to publicly
disclose the names of all individuals or organisations
found to have violated lobbying rules or regulations. The
absence of this provision in other countries would appear
to be an under-usage of an important deterrent tool;
that of naming and shaming those who break the rules.
None one of the agencies have the sufficient means
to carry out effective preventative work, either in the
realm of awareness-raising, or in the promotion of good
practice and training on compliance. Most do not have a
single full-time staff working on the issue of lobbying. By
contrast, one of the better-resourced and most effective
oversight agencies worldwide, the Canadian Office of the
Commissioner of Lobbying (OCLA), has an annual budget
of close to €3 million and a pool of 28 employees.80

LOBBYING IN EUROPE – Hidden Influence, Privileged Access

The combination of inadequate regulation, oversight and
enforcement and lack of preventative measures explains
the high rate of non-compliance with rules. In each of the
countries examined, the number of registered lobbyists
and contacts are improbably low in comparison to the
actual scale of lobbying activities which the rules are
designed to capture (as limited as they are). For example,
in 2013, only 25 actors were registered to have lobbied
the Polish parliament (the Sejm) – 20 entrepreneurs, 4
individuals and 1 non-governmental organisation.81 While
in Slovenia, the Ministry of Health reported having only
8 lobbying contacts for the same year, despite having a
major health reform underway, and the relevant Minister
in charge noting the strong pressure from various interest
groups.82

The verdict on lobbying
transparency
Overall, the findings suggest that transparency around
lobbying is far too weak across Europe. Without the
means to know who is influencing public decisions, it
is little wonder that the public assumes that a cosy elite
take decisions without balanced input, decisions that
ultimately affect their health, their pensions, their social
services and their future.
Governments have gravitated towards the idea of a lobby
register as a quick-fix solution to regulating lobbying and
shining a light on the influence industry. However, lobby
registers are not a panacea to undue influence, and they
must be carefully designed and properly implemented
with meaningful oversight in order to make a difference.
In addition, a register of lobbyists somehow assumes that
it is lobbyists that are the problem. This is not necessarily
the case. Governments must put much more emphasis
on pro-active transparency by public institutions, placing
the primary onus for transparency on public officials and
representatives; those who exercise public power and are
ultimately accountable to the citizenry.

33

PROMISING PRACTICE

34/1
Individual MPs show the way
on proactive transparency
In the absence of a comprehensive national approach, a small
number of legislators and senior public officials are starting
to lead by example, harnessing the power of technology
and social media tools to be more transparent about their
contact with lobbyists. In Spain, for example, several deputies
use their Twitter and Facebook accounts to provide virtually
daily summaries of their meetings and activities; some have
published their calendars and agendas online;83 and at least
one deputy has linked his social media channels, biweekly
agenda and personal blog with a list of commitments, statement
of assets and interests, and documents signed in relation to
his political activity.84

34/2
Ireland’s Regulation of
Lobbying Act is a good start,
but just one piece of the
integrity puzzle
On March 11th 2015, the Irish legislature passed a new
Regulation of Lobbying law. The law aims to shine some light on
the links between lobbyists and key decision-makers in the
political and public service systems. When it enters into force
in September 2015, it will require those communicating
with senior civil and public servants in specific areas to supply
details in an online publicly accessible database.
The law defines lobbyists as employers or their staff (where the
employer has more than 10 employees), third-party lobbyists
(those who are paid by a client to lobby), and anyone lobbying
about the development of zoning of land. This definition appears
to be sufficiently broad to encompass lobbying by public affairs
professionals, as well as in-house lobbyists from businesses,
professional, representative or voluntary organisations, trade
unions, charitable, non-profit and faith based organisations.
Lobbying targets are termed “designated public officials”. These
are defined as: ministers and ministers of state, members of the
legislature (Dáil Éireann and Seanad Éireann), members of the
European Parliament for constituencies in the state, members of
local authorities and special advisers. Public servants as
pre­scribed are expected to include the top echelon of

34

SPAIN, BRUSSELS
In Brussels, a growing number of MEPs are leading the
charge on transparency by publishing regular diaries, meetings
agendas and/or “lobby lists” including Michèle Rivasi,85
Reinhard Buetikofer,86 Heidi Hautala87 and Richard Corbett.88
Also of note is the recent practice by current MEP Julia
Reda, who is rapporteur for reviewing the 2001 EU Copyright
Directive. Reda publishes an online accountability report
including a detailed list and analysis of all lobbying meetings
requested and taken by her in the course of conducting the
work.89
Although such initiatives are still rare, they demonstrate the
potential of proactive transparency and the practical channels
and tools to deliver on the promise of public accountability.

IRELAND
secretaries general and assistant secretaries in the civil service
and equivalent grades in local authorities. At central government
this means that only communications with the top tier of staff
– some 240 people in total – will have to be detailed in the
lobby register. However, the law allows the minister to include
other public servants or office holders in the definition of the
lobbied if this is in the public interest.
The specific matters on which lobbyists must file returns are
communications with lobbying targets in relation to: initiation,
development or modification of any public policy or programme,
preparation of legislation, or award of any grant, loan, contract,
etc. However, this definition excludes matters which relate
only to the implementation of any such policy, programme,
legislation, award, etc., or matters of a “technical nature”.
One significant aspect of the new law is its definition of
communications as including oral or written communications,
which are made personally either directly or indirectly,
thus giving it the potential to capture “astroturfing” by those
seeking to influence.
As for the register itself, it will contain basic information
including the name, business address and contact details of the
lobbyists; the names and organisations of the lobbying targets;
the subject of the lobbying communications and the results they
were intended to secure; and the extent and type of lobbying
activities. It falls short of requiring the publication of supporting
documentation submitted by lobbyists to policy-makers, a
measure which would strengthen the law significantly.

Transparency International

35/1
Obligation to document
lobbying contacts in Slovenia
The Slovenian Integrity and Prevention of Corruption Act adopts
a dual-track approach to capturing lobbying data, requiring
public officials to file a report on each meeting with a lobbyist
and an annual summary of activities from professional lobbyists.
The officials who are lobbied are required to log the date, place,
and subject matter of the lobbying contact; the lobbyist’s
name and who they represented; any documents submitted;
and an indication of whether the lobbyist identified themselves
in accordance with the Act. A signed copy of the report has
to be forwarded to the official’s superior and the national
anti-corruption agency within three days of lobbying contact. All
data is subject to the Slovenian access to information law
which is considered to be one of the strongest in the world.90

35/2
A strong oversight system in
need of better resourcing

Thumb picto by Antar from the Noun Project

The Slovenian registration, supervision and prosecution body
for lobbying is the Commission for the Prevention of Corruption
(CPC). The agency has powers of investigation and can mete
out sanctions for violations of legal provisions regarding
lobbying registration and reporting, for both lobbyists and
lobbying targets.
The lobbyist must not give any inaccurate, incomplete or
deceptive information to the lobbying target, nor must he or she
act against the regulations governing the conduct of lobbied
persons (including a ban on receiving gifts in relation to the
lobbyists’ function or public assignments). The sanctions that
the agency holds include a written warning; prohibition on
further lobbying on a certain matter, or for a certain period of
time (no shorter than 3 months or longer than 24 months); and
exclusion from the register. Lobbyists are excluded from and

LOBBYING IN EUROPE – Hidden Influence, Privileged Access

SLOVENIA
Although the framework itself is largely sound, the
implementation has been lacking. Most national-level officials
do not report their lobbying contacts, and virtually none do
so at municipal level. While the oversight agency has adequate
powers to issue sanctions and penalties for non-compliance
with the rules, in practice it rarely utilises them. An increased
emphasis on awareness-raising and enforcement by the
oversight agency has, however, helped to improve the
compliance rates year on year, but their efforts have been
hampered by limited resourcing and the deprioritisation of
lobbying as an issue for the agency.91 Training of public
officials to ensure their understanding of their obligations is
also insufficient. Prior field tests have also shown that the
implementation of the access to information law is
inconsistent.92

SLOVENIA
lose their lobbyist status if they report false data, or if they are
sentenced to more than 6 months in prison for an intentionally
committed criminal offence in the Republic of Slovenia.
The CPC can also fine those acting as professional lobbyists
without registering as such, to the tune of between €400 and
€1,200. The interested organisations, on behalf of whom the
lobbyist has unlawfully lobbied, can also be held responsible
for lobbyist violations and be fined by the CPC up to €100,000.
The same penalty is predicated for an interest organisation
that consciously employs a non-registered lobbyist.93
Formally, the measures of supervision, scrutiny and sanctioning
in the field of lobbying and other related influences are clear
and very well organised. The CPC has wide jurisdiction and
the ability to act proactively in its supervisory and punitive
roles. In practice, these measures and the possibilities the CPC
has are not fully exercised due to insufficient staff and other
resources, as well as lobbying being deprioritised as an issue,
indicating insufficient political will to tackle undue influence.
It is worth noting that the CPC does not have a dedicated
employee working on the issue of lobbying.

35

2

INTEGRITY

100%

58%

Best performing country
Slovenia

33%
Average score

including EU institutions

Worst performing country
Hungary

17%

Photo: iStockphoto/Alija

2
INTEGRITY
With a regional average score of 33 per cent for
integrity, it is clear that standards written in law
and ethical conduct in practice are falling far short
of what is needed to protect the system from being
captured by the interests of a few influential
individuals and organisations.

Transparency is a means to an end – it shines a light
on those in positions of responsibility, thus promoting
ethical behaviour and deterring undue influence in the
exercise of public power and in business conduct.
However, transparency measures must be embedded
within a broader integrity framework that provides clear
behavioural standards for politicians and public officials
and those seeking to influence them.
For public decision-makers, such an integrity framework
requires clear expectations of impartiality and fidelity
to public interest; practical guidance on how to deal
with gifts and hospitality, handling of official information,
and communication with third parties; as well as a
robust system of conflicts of interest management,
including periodic disclosure of interests, rules regarding
incompatibility of simultaneously acting as a lobbyist while
in office, and control of the revolving doors between the
public and the private sectors.

38

On the lobbying side too, ethical conduct is key.
This should entail being open about one’s identity and
interests pursued; providing honest, reliable and upto-date information; respecting institutional rules and
avoiding improper influence (particularly inducements);
preventing actual or perceived conflicts of interest; not
lobbying contrary to one’s institutional commitments,
including corporate social responsibility (CSR) policies;
and proactively publishing information about lobbying
positions and activities, particularly if there is no national
system of reporting.
Weaknesses in the integrity infrastructure can be
addressed through a combination of regulations, robust
and enforceable codes of conduct, and the promotion of
good practice from within the lobbying interest groups.
With a regional average score of 33 per cent for integrity,
it is clear that standards written in law and ethical conduct
in practice are falling far short of what is needed to
protect the system from being captured by the interests
of a few influential individuals and organisations.

Transparency International

How robust are integrity mechanisms
designed to promote ethical lobbying
among lobbyists and decision-makers in
European countries and EU institutions?

Scale 0-100, where 0 is the weakest and 100 is strongest.
Overall score based on an un-weighted average of results in
four sub-categories. Results are presented in descending
order with highest scoring country/EU institution appearing first.

%
Post-employment
and pre-employment
restrictions

Codes of conduct
for public sector
employees

Code of conduct for
lobbyists

Self-regulation of
lobbying by professional
bodies

Overall score

Slovenia

67

75

60

30

58

United Kingdom

40

40

33

92

51

European Commission

67

50

30

n/a

49

European Parliament

50

58

30

n/a

46

Latvia

33

67

20

50

43

Austria

8

67

60

33

42

Lithuania

50

58

50

0

40

Ireland

40

42

13

58

38

Netherlands

8

75

0

67

38

Czech Republic

25

50

20

58

38

Spain

58

58

0

25

35

France

22

42

7

50

30

Council of EU

42

25

20

n/a

29

Estonia

8

67

0

33

27

Italy

8

50

0

50

27

Poland

17

67

20

0

26

Germany

17

42

0

42

25

Bulgaria

33

42

0

25

25

Slovakia

42

42

10

0

23

Cyprus

58

25

0

0

21

Portugal

42

17

0

17

19

Hungary

8

50

0

8

17

Regional average

32

49

16

36

33

LOBBYING IN EUROPE – Hidden Influence, Privileged Access

39

INTEGRITY

In 4 out of the 19 European countries studied
there are no measures to regulate the revolving
door between the public sector and the
lobbying world.

Personal contacts, inside information and influence are
essential for lobbyists. It is well known that companies
and other organisations often use former public officials
for lobbying purposes because of their extended
networks and insider knowledge on how politics works.
Movement between the public sector and the lobbying
world poses particular risks of conflicts of interest, for
example:
Public officials might allow the agenda of a previous
private sector employer to influence their government
work, being overly sympathetic to a sector that they have
a responsibility to regulate.
Public officials may give undue consideration to the
interests of future or potential employers (this may take
the form of deliberate abuse of office, but this is not
always the case).
Former public officials who accept jobs in business
might influence their former government colleagues to
make decisions in a way that favours their new employer.
Former public officials might use confidential information
to benefit their new employers.
Such movement can also give rise to a perception of a
conflict of interest and undermine public and investor
confidence in decision-making.
Controlling the risk of the revolving door using postemployment restrictions is an internationally recognised
norm.94 While most countries have some form of post-

40

employment restrictions in place for limited categories
of officials, the scope, coverage and the length of time of
the “cooling-off period” varies widely. In 4 out of the 19
European countries studied (Austria, Hungary, Italy, Latvia)
there are no measures to regulate the revolving door
between the public sector and the lobbying world.
Where rules do exist, often they do not cover the range
of lobbying targets necessary to fulfil their risk mitigation
potential. A major gap is that members of parliament
are very rarely covered by post-employment restrictions,
despite them being among the primary targets of lobbying
activities and thus a high-risk category. In only 1 country
out of the 19, Slovenia, are MPs supposed to abide by
cooling-off periods before moving into positions that
may create conflicts of interest and our research found
that the rules are not applied in practice.95 While some
argue that parliamentarians should not be subject to
such constraints due to the sometimes short-lived nature
of electoral office, it is worth noting that legislators in
32 states in the United States are subject to cooling-off
periods running up to 2 years duration.96
In France, while robust rules have recently been put in
see
place for public officials, parliamentarians are exempt
p44/1
from these rules and they can even continue to carry out
consulting work and lobbying while in office. The situation
is similar in Portugal and Spain. In Germany, the limited
rules that do exist apply only to administrators in the
ministries and not to other significant lobbying targets
such as ministers and parliamentary state secretaries.
Apart from problems with the design of the laws them­
selves, primarily to do with their scope and the length
of moratoria, implementation has been problematic at
best. No country included in this study is found to have
Thumb picto by Antar from the Noun Project

The revolving door
between the political world
and the lobbying world

4/19

Transparency International

Only in Slovenia are MPs supposed to
abide by cooling-off periods before moving
into positions that may create conflicts of
interest.

adequate oversight of revolving door rules. The risks are
high when it comes to the revolving door and the research
shows that the importance of mitigating them has not
been sufficiently recognised by the political leadership in
European countries.

Codes of conduct: Regulating
behaviour of lobbying targets
and lobbyists
While public sector codes of conduct are fairly common
across Europe, a number of EU countries still lack codes
of conduct for parliamentarians. Those missing codes
for parliamentarians include Cyprus, the Czech Republic,
Hungary, Italy, the Netherlands, Slovakia, Slovenia and
Spain.97 Given that parliamentarians are a major lobbying
target, the lack of clear rules guiding their behaviour as
public representatives in general and how they deal with
lobbyists in particular is of major concern.
There are some relatively robust codes of conduct, for
example in Austria, the Netherlands and the European
Parliament. In Slovenia, officials’ conduct is fairly
adequately regulated by law, including the reporting of
lobbying contacts. Apart from the Slovenian case, none
of the public sector codes of conduct examined explicitly
and unambiguously specify standards on how public
officials should conduct their communication with interest
groups, nor do they specify a duty of documentation
of contacts or a duty to report unregistered or unlawful
lobbying to superiors.

LOBBYING IN EUROPE – Hidden Influence, Privileged Access

1/19

Overall public sector codes of conduct fail to provide
clear guidance on what constitutes good lobbying and
how public officials should conduct their communications
with external individuals and groups. This is further
compounded by inadequate training on and enforcement
of the existing codes in most jurisdictions, as well
as insufficient regulatory powers. In Cyprus and Ireland
for example, the oversight agencies cannot initiate
investigations without a complaint.
Concerning ethical guidance for lobbyists, only two
countries have statutory rules of conduct – Austria
and Slovenia. Both lay out core behavioural principles,
although Austria’s goes further and encourages lobbying
organisations to adopt and publish additional measures.
Non-legally binding codes exist in France, Lithuania,
Slovenia and the EU institutions. There is also the promise
of a statutory code of conduct in the UK Lobbying
Act. The recently adopted Irish lobbying law foresees a
by-law arrangement, empowering but not requiring the
regulator to issue a compulsory code, and to amend it as
necessary in consultation with the lobbying community.
Overall, however, most countries have no requirements or
guidance for organised interests to conduct their lobbying
with certain ethical standards, and no recourse or
sanction should inappropriate behaviour short of bribery
or trading in influence take place.

41

INTEGRITY

In the vast majority of countries (15 of the
19) self-regulatory codes of conduct have
been drawn up by the lobbying industry.

Building integrity from within:
Business and lobbyist
community reform efforts
While the primary responsibility for acting with integrity
rests with public officials and representatives, lobbyists
and lobbying organisations must play their part by taking
ethical lobbying seriously and showing themselves
to be pioneers of integrity. There are many reasons for
companies to lead the charge. Apart from any moral
considerations, acting with integrity can help build a
strong reputation, with both clients and investors,
particularly at a time of low public confidence in the
corporate sector. The Edelman Trust Barometer (2014),
for example, found that, globally, only 1 in five people
trust business leaders to make ethical and moral
decisions98 – presenting a unique opportunity to lead
by example. There is also strong evidence that ethical
lobbying can allow for more effective engagement
with public decision-makers,99 and in the long-run, it
can build the reputation of lobbying as a profession and
help to bring about a level playing field.

away from unethical situations (Austria, France, Italy,
the Netherlands and the United Kingdom), prohibit
simultaneous employment as a lobbyist and public official
(the Czech Republic, France, Ireland, Italy, the United
Kingdom), and have robust complaint mechanisms
(the United Kingdom). The challenge with these codes
see p45/1
is that they are invariably voluntary and apply only
to lobbyists who are members of the association.
Membership numbers vary widely across associations,
ranging from a rather meagre 120 members of Il
Chiostro, one of the Italian associations of lobbyists,
to 1000 individual members in the Public Relations
Institute of Ireland (PRII). The effectiveness of the codes
drawn up by such associations has been called into
question and in a number of cases enforcement of codes
appears piecemeal or absent. As an example, since
the introduction of the code of conduct by the PRII in
Ireland in 2003, not one complaint has been filed against
PRII members and the institute has not conducted any
investigations for violations of the code.100
Apart from these professional initiatives, the research
identified a slow but promising trend across Europe
whereby a number of pioneering companies are starting
to introduce and implement a culture of responsible
political engagement. At its best, this includes adopting
internal policies for transparent and ethical conduct,
streamlining these with corporate social responsibility
(CSR) commitments, establishing internal control
and training mechanisms, providing adequate channels see p44/2
for complaints, extending the measures to agents
and representatives, and being open about these
undertakings.101 However, unfortunately the adoption
of such practices is still at its nascent stages and
lags behind the developments in North America.102 This
has been attributed in part to a comparatively lower
level of shareholder activism in Europe.103

Thumb picto by Antar from the Noun Project

Self-regulation from within the lobbying community can
play an important role in starting a conversation about
ethics and fairness in lobbying and supporting lobbyists
through awareness-raising, training and providing ethical
guidance. In the vast majority of countries (15 of the
19) self-regulatory codes of conduct have been drawn
up by the industry, usually by professional associations
of lobbyists or PR associations. The stronger codes
include specific behavioural principles that steer lobbyists

15/19

42

Transparency International

Although international reporting frameworks
appear to be growing in traction, none of
them require a comprehensive account of the
full public policy engagement of a company.

A number of multinational firms operating in the EU are
also participating in international efforts for more
transparent and ethical business conduct. Important
initiatives such as the UN Global Compact and the
Global Reporting Initiative allow businesses to sign up
and to periodically report on their corporate gover­
nance and sustainability practices.
Although these international reporting frameworks
appear to be growing in traction, so far none of them
require a comprehensive account of the full public
policy engagement of a company, what policy issues
it engages in, how and with what resources. The ISO
26000 Standard on Social Responsibility goes furthest
of any of the frameworks, providing broad vision and
strong language on what constitutes responsible political
involvement. However, the standard does not include
detailed guidance or indicators for implementation and
reporting, and does not allow for certification unlike
some other ISO standards. This prevents its use as an
effective management tool and potentially discourages
adoption. The most thoroughly developed framework
in the area, the G4 from the Global Reporting Initiative,
covers only the matter of political contributions (financial
and in-kind), and even then calls for reporting only if

LOBBYING IN EUROPE – Hidden Influence, Privileged Access

0

political engagement is deemed “materially relevant”
to the operations of the business. This is an apparent
retrograde step104 on the earlier G3 framework which had
at least asked companies to report on their public policy
positions, even if not the resources or the methods used
in lobbying for such objectives.
The shortcomings in the current frameworks hamper
their potential to play a more central role in encouraging
ethical lobbying and allowing companies to showcase
their good behaviour on corporate political engagement
when they comply with such standards. The matter is
particularly acute given the move towards mandatory
non-financial reporting within a number of countries and
at the EU level. In 2014, the EU adopted a directive105
requiring companies and groups with more than 500 staff
to disclose their non-financial information, including on
social and anti-corruption measures, and are encouraging
the use of international reporting frameworks. The
directive will apply to some 6000 organisations across
the EU and is expected to be operational by 2017.106

43

PROMISING PRACTICE

44/1
France’s new post-employment
restrictions are a good start,
but MPs should be covered too
In France, the law requires a cooling-off period of three years
between the end of a public service mandate and the transition
to a company that the person was previously responsible
for in terms of surveillance or control activities. This prohibition
applies to all public officials, including cabinet ministers
and advisers of the president. Since the establishment of
the transparency law in 2013, this requirement also applies
to members of government and key local authorities. The
Public Service Ethics Commission and the High Authority for
Transparency in Public Life are responsible for monitoring
its implementation.

44/2
Civil society and business
lead the charge on ethical
conduct in France
Transparency France has been working to put this issue on the
public agenda since 2008, which has led the organisation to
engage in regular exchanges with businesses and to help them
adapt their lobbying practices to the highest standards. The
organisation has contributed to the development of lobbying
charters in several global companies, and has worked to ensure
that ethical lobbying is mainstreamed into corporate social
responsibility discourse.
The first cooperation was with the building materials company
Lafarge, which in April 2010 became the first French corporate
to develop and publish its charter on lobbying. The charter sets

44

FRANCE
However, monitoring is complex in practice. Although these
two institutions are independent, there is concern about the
resources available to them in relation to the scope of their
missions. For example, the Public Service Ethics Commission
is responsible for all public officials, who numbered 5.5 million
on 31 December 2012. In addition, the recommendations it
issues oblige the administration only if there are indications
of incompatibility. Further, the Committee has no control over
the implementation in the case of recommendation with
reservations – which represent, for example, nearly 42 per cent
of the recommendations submitted to the State Civil Service.107
It should be emphasised that the required cooling-off period
does not apply to MPs, who are a primary lobbying target, and
is not explicitly intended to cover lobbying activities.

FRANCE
out a general framework for lobbying activities at all levels of
the enterprise and applies to relationships with all types of
policy-makers (professional associations, parliamentarians,
civil servants, think-tanks, etc.). Transparency France also
worked with the non-financial rating agency Vigeo to include
the evaluation of lobbying practices in its CSR assessment.
Following on from this, in February 2014, seven French
companies signed a joint statement on promoting transparent
and honest lobbying practices and urged others to consider
the principles recommended by Transparency France regarding
their lobbying activities.
Since then, numerous other companies – the signatories have
a consolidated worldwide turnover of €266 billion – have
signed the document. The statement is open to all organisations
(members and non-members of Transparency France) that wish
to move forward on this issue and show their commitment to
social responsibility.108

Transparency International

45/1
The United Kingdom’s
professional lobbyist associations
provide clear ethical guidance
to lobbyists
Both the Chartered Institute of Public Relations (CIPR) and the
Association of Professional Political Consultants (APPC) have
codes of conduct with which members are expected to comply.
The CIPR has a membership of over 10,000 individual public
relations and public affairs practitioners. The APPC has 80
public affairs consultancies as members, roughly accounting
for over 85% by turnover of the UK’s public affairs industry.109
These codes include specific behavioural principles that steer
lobbyists away from unethical situations, for example, requiring
honesty and accuracy of information provided to public officials,
requiring early disclosure to public officials of the identity
of clients and interests being represented, urging members
to refrain from using information obtained in violation of the
law and to refrain from encouraging public officials to violate
the law, and banning gifts above a certain minimum value,
fees, employment or any other compensation from a lobbyist
to a public official.

own complaints mechanism: anyone can make a complaint,
which is then addressed first by an independent adjudicator and
then by a panel of three independent persons. The role of the
independent adjudicator and panel members is outsourced to
an external body, the Centre for Dispute Resolution (CEDR).
The complainant must specify which aspect of the APPC Code
of Conduct has been breached, provide evidence and agree
to abide by the APPC rules for dealing with complaints. The
APPC (through CEDR) convenes a panel as required responsible
for disciplining members who breach the Code. The panel is
empowered to warn or reprimand a member, or to require
remedial action to minimise the risk of further breaches of the
Code by the member. It can also suspend a member from the
APPC, recommend that the APPC Management Committee
expel the respondent from membership of the APPC, or require
the member to issue an apology or retraction in such terms
and to publish it in such a manner as the APPC Management
Committee may direct. Decisions may be published and will
always be published in the case of expulsion or suspension.
The panel consists of three persons from outside the profession
appointed by CEDR on the basis of their knowledge and
reputation.
However, ethics training is not a condition of membership.
Moreover, although the UKPAC Code requires members to
provide names of all clients, it does not distinguish between
clients and “those paying for lobbying activities”, and does
not require information on the specific subject matter
lobbied. The UKPAC Code does not “prohibit” simultaneous
employment as a lobbyist and a public official but regards
it as “inappropriate”.

Thumb picto by Antar from the Noun Project

The UK Public Affairs Council (UKPAC) is an umbrella body
bringing together the two main professional associations,
and whose main role is to host an online voluntary register of
lobbyists and set out some guiding principles on conduct. If
UKPAC receives a complaint that an organisation has violated
its guiding principles, it refers this to the body of which the
organisation is a member for investigation. The APPC has its

UK

LOBBYING IN EUROPE – Hidden Influence, Privileged Access

45

3
EQUALITY OF
ACCESS

100%

62%

Best performing country
Lithuania

33%
13%
Average score

including EU institutions

Worst performing country
Cyprus

Photo: iStockphoto/BarbarosKARAGULMEZ

3
EQUALITY OF ACCESS
With a regional average score of 33 per cent for equality
of opportunities to participate in public decision-making,
it is clear that consultation and public participation is not
being taken seriously enough in European countries.
Discussions about lobbying and how best to regulate it
must take account of a crucial point: gaining influence
requires access to decision-makers. If opportunities
of access are skewed in favour of a privileged few,
then all the transparency and integrity in the world will
not make for a fair and pluralist political system. With
a regional average score of 33 per cent for equality of
opportunities to participate in public decision-making,
it is clear that consultation and public participation is not
being taken seriously enough in European countries.
Democracy depends on the ability of all citizens to
make their preferences known, but public officials and
representatives “cannot consider voices they do not
hear, and it is more difficult to pay attention to voices
that speak softly”.110
Diverse participation and the contribution of ideas and
evidence by a broad range of interests are necessary
for the development of policies, laws, and decisions that
best serve society and broad democratic interests. Any
attempt to regulate lobbying must address this broader
issue of equality of opportunities of access. There are
various ways to promote the pluralism of voices, including
amongst others, public consultation and engagement
mechanisms and participation in expert or advisory
groups that provide input on policies and laws.

Inadequate consultation
mechanisms
Formal mechanisms exist to allow citizens to have their
voices heard during policy- and law-making processes in
most European countries. Of the 19 countries assessed,
17 place some requirements on public officials to engage
citizens through public consultation mechanisms with the
strongest protections existing in the newer EU member
states of Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Slovenia.
Notably in most cases, the provisions are rarely codified
in law, which can lead to a diverse and confused practice

48

17/19

17 countries place some
requirements on public officials
to engage citizens through public
consultation mechanisms.
among various government departments, as well as
limited redress for citizens or interest groups where the
consultation is omitted.
The wider democratic culture has a major impact on the
type of consultation processes used and the openness
or exclusivity of those processes. A number of EU
countries (Austria, Bulgaria, France, Germany, Hungary,
Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Slovakia and Slovenia) are
marked by corporatism or neo-corporatism, which implies
privileged access to “social partners” who represent
the interests of those seen to be primarily affected by
the policy under consideration. These usually include
associations of industry, trade unions, labour unions
and agricultural associations. While this type of social
partnership approach is not in itself problematic, a lack
of transparency around whose preferences are taken
into account is.
The research found that despite the existence of multiple
and varied avenues for citizens and groups to voice their
preferences, it is wholly unclear which voices decisionmakers actually listen to. None of the countries studied
have functioning mechanisms requiring policy-makers to
explain or justify why and how various submissions have
or have not been taken into account in final decisions.111

Transparency International

Do existing rules promote a plurality of voices
in the political system? How inclusive are
public consultation mechanisms and how
robust are advisory group composition rules?

Scale 0-100, where 0 is the weakest and 100 is strongest.
Overall score based on an un-weighted average of results in
two sub-categories.112 Results are presented in descending
orderÂ with highest scoring country/EU institution appearing first.

None of the countries studied have
functioning mechanisms requiring policymakers to justify why and how various
submissions have or have not been taken
into account in final decisions.

In a number of countries (Bulgaria, the Czech Republic,
Germany, Ireland, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Slovakia,
Slovenia, the United Kingdom) there are non-legally
binding guidelines or policy documents that make
reference to policymakersâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; obligations to justify their
decisions. However, in general they are rather weak and
overall found to be insufficient. Placing a stronger onus
on decision-makers to document and publish notÂ only
the results of public consultations, but also which
submissions have influenced the outcome of the decisionmaking process and how, would contribute to making
citizens more aware and give them greater ownership of
public decisions.
see p51

Advice as a form of influence:
Expert and advisory groups
Advisory and expert groups113 provide another significant
forum for participation and input from stakeholders,
particularly in areas where public administration lacks
internal expertise. They play a vital role in shaping thinking
around new policies and laws and in crafting the content
of decisions that affect the public. It is crucial that such
advisory groups are balanced and that representatives
of the interests of all those affected by a proposed law
or policy have a seat at the table. In particular, it is critical
that no single interest category dominates advisory
groups, in order to safeguard the broader public interest.
The research shows that the vast majority of European
countries do not pay enough attention to ensuring
a balanced composition of advisory groups. Such a

50

0/19

balanced composition is legally provided for in only 1 of
the 19 countries assessed (Portugal). Among the worst
offenders when it comes to not paying enough attention
to ensuring balance are Cyprus, the Czech Republic,
France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Slovakia and Spain; all
scoring just 10 per cent or less in an assessment of their
measures to ensure balanced advisory groups.
Furthermore, only in Lithuania and the United Kingdom
are lobbyists prohibited from sitting on advisory groups in
a personal capacity. In none of the countries studied are
corporate executives prohibited from sitting on advisory
groups in a personal capacity. This poses a major risk of
concealed interests having undue influence in the policy
process.
Apart from the composition of these influential groups,
it should also be possible for interested citizens to know
about their agendas, what is discussed at their meetings
and what are the positions of the various members.
InÂ a number of countries (the Czech Republic, France,
Germany, Italy, Latvia, Slovakia and Spain) none of
this information is made available and these advisory
groups are shrouded in a veil of secrecy. It may well be
the case that they have nothing to hide but the lack of
transparency inevitably breeds distrust.
Consultation mechanisms exist on paper, but in practice
they have too often become mere box-ticking exercises
rather than meaningful platforms for broad democratic
participation from a cross-section of society. Reforms
of existing structures, such as how public consultations
are run and how advisory groups are constituted, would
be a good start to achieving a better balance in the
representation of interests in public decision-making in
Europe and ultimately achieving greater equality of access
to public decision-making.

Transparency International

PROMISING PRACTICE

SLOVAKIA

e-consultation in Slovakia
The Slovak Interdepartmental Comments Procedure and its
accompanying Directive require that all official documents
designated for government sessions have to be first published
online for consultation. Any interested parties are allowed
to comment including government ministries, public bodies,
organised interests and the public at large. The standard period
for consultation is 10-15 days, and in exceptional situations this
may be shortened to five days.
The comments can be submitted by email or through a
dedicated online portal114 following compulsory registration. This
portal is open to view, and compiles a range of information per
item, as well as tracking the overall process of the initiative.

This system has made the creation of legislation more open
to the public, fostering participation and understanding
of government decision-making and creating some
safeguards against undue influence. It has also improved the
communication between the ministries and other involved
bodies. However, the comments portal is not very intuitive, the
notifications are sometimes not well communicated and the
submission periods are not always respected. Moreover, the
proposals and amendments by members of parliament do not
have to go through this process which creates a big window of
opportunity for opaque influence.

Thumb picto by Antar from the Noun Project

The comments themselves are divided into the following
categories: general, particular, material, legal, legislativetechnical and technical-linguistic. There is an opportunity to
designate certain parts of the feedback as “essential”, requiring
it to be considered by the proposer of the bill. There is also a
category of Collective Comment (CC) where a particular view is

expressed jointly by at least 500 natural and/or legal persons.
“Essential” comments that are subject of conflict and have
been submitted through CC or by a government entity are
subject to a special consultation/ dispute resolution process. All
comments are responded to by the proposer of the legislative
change, noting whether they are accepted, partially accepted,
or declined, and why. Following the consultation procedure, the
proposals are tabled for government discussion and from then
on, if applicable, move to parliament.

LOBBYING IN EUROPE – Hidden Influence, Privileged Access

51

4
FOCUS ON
BRUSSELS

100%

53%
37%
European Comission

European parliament

19%
Council of EU

Photo: iStockphoto/piccaya

4
FOCUS ON BRUSSELS: REGULATING LOBBYING
IN THE LOBBYING CAPITAL OF EUROPE
After Washington, D.C., Brussels has the highest density
of lobbyists in the world. The three core EU institutions
– the European Commission, European Parliament
(EP) and the Council of the EU – are all major targets of
lobbying. In recent years, numerous scandals regarding
undue influence have emerged from the centre of EU
decision-making. These include MEPs accepting cash
for amendments from journalists posing as lobbyists,115
industry lobbyists being seconded as experts to the
European Commission and shaping EU policy from the
inside,116 and perhaps most famously the “Dalligate”
scandal, which led to the resignation of a commissioner
after an associate allegedly solicited bribes from a
tobacco lobbyist in exchange for favours.117
In the assessment of the regulatory system to ensure
transparency, integrity and equality of access when it
comes to lobbying, the average score for the three
core EU institutions was just 36 percent. The European
Commission performed best of the three institutions at 53
per cent, while the European Parliament scored 37 per
cent and the Council of the EU a meagre 19 per cent.
This poor performance indicates that there is a long way
to go to safeguard the EU institutions against undue
influence.
The most pressing issues regarding lobbying at EU level
are the reform of the voluntary EU Transparency Register;
increasing decision-making transparency in all the core
institutions by, for example, creating effective legislative
footprints; strengthening the post-employment rules; and
ensuring that there are meaningful sanctions for breaches
of lobbying and transparency rules.118

Transparency: New Commission
strengthens transparency
but gaps remain
Since 2011, the European Transparency Register, a
voluntary register of those lobbying the European
Commission and European Parliament, has been in place.
There are many weaknesses to the system, as it currently
operates. Firstly, registration for those lobbying the
European Commission and the European Parliament
remains voluntary with the consequence that not

54

all lobbyists register. Secondly, monitoring of the register
is weak with no independent body tasked with oversight,
while sanctions for misuse should be more effective.
Thirdly, the Council of the EU, one of the most important
decision-making bodies in Brussels, does not participate
in the register.
On a more positive note, the definition of lobbying
in use at EU level is sound. Lobbyists are defined as
all organisations and self-employed individuals engaged
in “activities carried out with the objective of directly
or indirectly influencing the formulation or implementation
of policy and decision-making processes of the EU
institutions”.119 The new Juncker Commission has
indicated that it will propose in 2015 an inter-institutional
agreement with the European Parliament and the Council
of the EU to create a register for lobbyists covering all
three institutions. If this comes to pass, it will strengthen
the system, but still falls short of a mandatory register,
which would require a legislative proposal to be initiated.
The new Commission has also made positive changes
regarding pro-active transparency on the part of EU
officials. As of 1 December 2014, commissioners,
members of their cabinets and directors-general must
publish information about meetings held with lobbyists.
This information includes the dates, locations, names
of the organisations and self-employed individuals
met, and the topics of discussion. This is a welcome
development, as it may help to further a culture of
transparency within the Commission and it may also
shed light on lobbying by organisations that are not
registered in the voluntary system. However, its scope is
limited and it is not clear how the rules will be enforced,
given there is no independent body to oversee their
implementation. As noted by the European Ombudsman,
only the names of the commissioner or the director
general involved in the meeting must be published, but
not the lobbyists’ names (only the organisation
or company name).120 Furthermore, a rather broad
exceptions clause allowing the withholding of information
for “the protection of any other important public interest
recognised at Union level” is a potential loophole that

Transparency International

Average score for
the EU institutions
could hamper transparency in practice.121 Last but not
least, these rules do not apply to the European Parliament
or the Council of the EU.
As yet, the new Commission has not signalled its
intention to go further with transparency and push for a
mandatory legislative footprint, namely a requirement for
Commission officials to record and disclose all contacts
and input received from lobbyists for draft policies, laws
and amendments. A 2008 resolution of the European
Parliament recommended the use of legislative footprints
on a voluntary basis. According to the resolution,
“a rapporteur may, as he or she sees fit (on a voluntary
basis), use a ‘legislative footprint’, i.e. an indicative list,
attached to a Parliamentary report, of registered interest
representatives who were consulted and had significant
input during the preparation of reports”. A limited number
of parliamentarians have voluntarily provided legislative
footprints, though clearly the low level of uptake on
the “suggestion” put forward in the resolution indicates
that more robust measures are necessary at EU level
in order for the legislative footprint to take hold.122

Integrity rules insufficient
Transparency International’s EU Integrity Study (2014)123
found that the rules to detect, prevent and punish
unethical behaviour by MEPs and senior EU figures are
often inconsistent or contain gaps. Codes of conduct
and general ethics rules are inconsistent and lack proper
oversight. None of the ethics committees that exist to
advise MEPs and EU officials on compliance with ethics
rules is genuinely independent. These advisory bodies
and offices are generally reactive, dealing with issues as
they arise, rather than proactively monitoring compliance
(e.g. through conducting thorough spot-checks on
declarations). They are also powerless to issue binding
recommendations or administrative sanctions for
breaches of rules.
There are also deficiencies regarding the duration and
scope of obligations that former members and officials of
institutions have after leaving office: “cooling-off periods”
range from 18 months for former commissioners to none
at all for MEPs. When the first Barroso Commission left
office in 2010, no fewer than six commissioners went

LOBBYING IN EUROPE – Hidden Influence, Privileged Access

36 %
through the revolving door by promptly taking up private
sector positions. Outgoing commissioners receive a
generous three-year “transition allowance” and many have
argued that this allowance should come with a longer
and stricter ‘cooling-off’ period than the 18 months that
currently applies. The recent furore over the former chair
of the European Parliament Committee on Economic and
Monetary Affairs (ECON), Sharon Bowles, taking up a
position as a non-executive director at the London Stock
Exchange is yet another example of the revolving door
phenomenon at the EU level.124

European Commission expert
groups: Privileged access
for a select few?
When it comes to ensuring that a plurality of voices
is heard by EU policy-makers, a key issue raised is the
composition of European Commission expert groups.
Alter-EU has documented corporate dominance at the
expense of civil society and other interests’ involvement
in many powerful expert groups at EU level. They
found, for example, that in the Data Retention Experts
Group as of 2013 all seven non-governmental members
represented the interests of telecommunications
corporations. They also found numerous examples of
lobbyists sitting in a personal capacity in important
expert groups, including those dealing with tax,
intellectual property and finance issues. Calls for public
participation in expert groups at EU level are uncommon
and overall transparency in the selection process and
their functioning is lacking.125
Acknowledging that this is a major problem at EU level,
the European Ombudsman, Emily O’Reilly, recently
opened an investigation into the composition and
transparency of the European Commission’s expert
groups. This is a good sign and maybe a step
towards ensuring that those affected by decisions
have a say in EU policy-making.

55

RECOMMENDATIONS

to national decision-makers

126

GOAL 1: TRANSPARENCY

Guarantee the public has sufficient information on contact
between lobbyists and public officials to understand how decisions
are made and to hold their representatives to account.
Review immediately all laws, policies and practices on access to information
in countries where acute problems were found. Access to information
laws should adhere to fundamental principles127 and all information must be
considered “public by default”, including data on lobbying.
Bulgaria, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, France, Hungary, Ireland, Italy,
Latvia, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Poland, Slovenia, Spain
Require public institutions and representatives to capture and proactively
publish information on their interactions with lobbyists including meeting
summaries, calendars, agendas and documentation received.
All countries
Ensure a “legislative footprint” is created for every legislative proposal to
ensure full transparency of decision-making processes. All countries
Disclose publicly the membership of government and parliamentary expert
and advisory groups, as well their agendas, minutes and participants’
submissions. All countries
Establish and strengthen existing registers of lobbyists by making them
mandatory and requiring timely registration and periodic reporting on activities
by all professional lobbyists and organised interest groups.
STRENGTHEN: Austria, France, Ireland, Lithuania, Netherlands,
Poland, Slovenia, the United Kingdom
ESTABLISH: Bulgaria, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Germany,
Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Portugal, Slovakia, Spain
Ensure that the registers apply to both direct and indirect lobbying efforts
targeting the full range of institutions and individuals performing public
decision-making functions. All countries
Ensure that the registers capture a minimum set of lobbying-related
information including lobbyist details; client identity (if applicable); target
institutions and officials; the intent of lobbying activities; summary expenditure
incurred; and any political donations and in-kind contributions provided.
All countries
Ensure that the information complies with open data principles,128 including
being available online, free of charge, in an easily accessible machine-readable
format. Linking the various data sets, including through a single portal, and
allowing for bulk download is highly recommended. All countries

Establish minimum ‘cooling-off’ periods before former public and elected
officials can work in lobbying positions that may create conflicts of interest and
a permissions process from a designated ethics office before a lobbyingrelated appointment in the private sector can be taken up by former public
officials, former members of parliament, and former members of the executive
(national and subnational levels).
INTRODUCE: Austria, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, the Netherlands
AMEND: Bulgaria, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, France, Lithuania,
Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, the United Kingdom
Introduce a statutory code of conduct for lobbyists laying out the core
ethical principles including honesty and accuracy of information provided; early
disclosure of identity and interests; respect for institutional rules incumbent
on public officials; prohibition of undue influence, including inducements and
gifts and hospitality above a minimum value; and a speedy resolution of
conflicts of interests. All countries

LOBBYING IN EUROPE – Hidden Influence, Privileged Access

57

RECOMMENDATIONS

to national decision-makers

126

GOAL 3: EQUALITY OF ACCESS

Promote diverse participation in and contribution to
political decision-making processes to ensure they are
not captured by a select few interests.
Establish a legal right of citizens and interest groups to provide input into
legislative and policy items under consideration. Bulgaria, Cyprus,
theÂ Czech Republic, Estonia, France, Germany,Â Hungary, Ireland, Italy,
Latvia, the Netherlands, Portugal, Slovakia,Â Spain, the United Kingdom
Ensure the legal framework explicitly lays out the varied means for public
participation in legislative and policy processes, including timeframes,
mechanisms for dissemination of information, attendance and participation
rules, and channels to submit comments. Bulgaria, Cyprus,
the Czech Republic, Estonia, France, Hungary, Ireland, Italy,
the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Spain, the United Kingdom
Introduce a legal requirement on public bodies to publish the results of
consultation processes, including the views of participants in the consultation
process. Austria, Bulgaria, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia,
France, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, the Netherlands, Portugal,
Slovenia, Spain, the United Kingdom
Introduce a legal obligation on public authorities to strive for a balanced
composition of expert and advisory bodies, representing a diversity of interests
and views. All countries
Make open all calls for applications to sit on advisory/expert groups and
ensure common selection criteria are used to balance different interests.
All countries
Introduce a legal requirement that advisory and expert group members
disclose their interests and affiliations relevant to items under consideration.
All countries
Prohibit lobbyists and corporate executives from sitting on advisory/expert
groups in a personal capacity. Austria, Bulgaria, Cyprus,
the Czech Republic, Estonia, France, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Italy,
Latvia, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain

58

Transparency International

GOAL 4: OVERSIGHT

Ensure compliance and effective operation
of the rules
Ensure the operation of an adequately resourced independent oversight
body or mechanism to enforce rules regarding the transparency of lobbying
activities and ethical conduct (post-employment, conflicts of interest, gifts and
hospitality). The body should also focus on carrying out effective promotional
and educational measures. All countries

to all professional lobbyists,
companies and organisations,
including NGOs, who seek
to influence public policy.

GOAL

Foster a culture of integrity among companies and
organisations seeking to influence public policy.
Be aware of and comply with all the applicable laws, regulations, rules
and codes of conduct concerning lobbying activities
Register in all lobby registers in jurisdictions where lobbying is undertaken,
including those that are voluntary.
Establish internal policies and procedures for transparent and ethical
conduct, and ensure these are integrated with organisation’s anti-corruption
policies and corporate social responsibility commitments.
Be proactively transparent about the organisation’s lobbying and other
forms of political engagement, including:
• Policies, expenditure and individuals lobbying on the organisation’s behalf
• Political contributions and activities
• Positions papers and supplementary documents presented
in support of lobbying efforts
• Indirect political involvement including funding and support for
civil society organisations, scientific research and public relations
Ensure all lobbying efforts, political activities and spending are reported
as part of annual reporting and, specifically, as part of corporate social
responsibility reporting.
Ensure lobbying is carried out with integrity, that information conveyed
is factually accurate and honest and that lobbyists do not misrepresent their
status or the nature of their communications.
Avoid potential conflicts of interest, actual or perceived undue influence,
and respect the rules incumbent on public officials.
Train the organisation’s employees and representatives on the above
measures, and ensure they apply to any consultants and agents acting on
the organisation’s behalf.

60

Transparency International

RECOMMENDATIONS

to EU institutions

GOAL 1

Increase the transparency of lobbying and decision-making within core
EU institutions, and ensure meaningful sanctions for misconduct.
Make the Transparency Register mandatory for all interest representatives
and extend the register to cover the Council of the EU.
European Commission, European Parliament and Council of the EU
Publish legislative footprints to uniformly track contacts and input received
for draft policies, laws and amendments. European Commission,
European Parliament and Council of the EU

GOAL 2

Address conflicts of interest by strengthening ethics
rules for lobbyists, EU officials and MEPs.
Amend the European Parliament’s code of conduct and introduce a ‘coolingoff’ provision to prevent MEPs from moving straight into a job that might
create a conflict of interests. European Parliament
Strengthen oversight of the EU ethics infrastructure through independent
oversight bodies, who can proactively monitor and detect breaches of
the rules. European Commission, European Parliament and
Council of the EU
Make full use of the existing mechanisms for breaches of lobbying
transparency and integrity rules. European Commission,
European Parliament and Council of the EU

GOAL 3

Promote diverse participation in and contribution to
EU decision-making processes to ensure they are not captured
by a few select interests.
Make open all calls for applications to sit on European Commission
expert groups, ensure common selection criteria to balance different interests,
and make membership and group activities fully transparent.
European Commission
Ensure greater transparency regarding expert group membership and
activities by publishing information on the selection process for expert groups
as well as publishing detailed minutes of expert group meetings.
European Commission

LOBBYING IN EUROPE – Hidden Influence, Privileged Access

61

ENDNOTES
1 See Chapter 2 for a full explanation of the scoring methodology.
2 National assessments were conducted in 2014 in Austria, Bulgaria,
Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, France, Germany, Hungary, Ireland,
Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia,
Slovenia, Spain and the United Kingdom. The EU institutions reviewed
are the European Commission, the European Parliament, and the
Council of the EU.
3 Burson Marsteller, A Guide to Effective Lobbying in Europe:
The View of Policymakers (London: Burson Marsteller, 2013).
4 Transparency International, Global Corruption Barometer 2013
­(Berlin: Transparency International, 2013).
5 Greece was not in the cohort of countries reviewed for the
current report.
6 See our more detailed set of recommendations targeted at national
governments, EU institutions, lobbyists and civil society at the end
of this report.
7 While exemptions for some small operations could be justifiable
in certain cases, broadly speaking, registers should be inclusive of
all lobbyists, and, with this in mind, administrative burden should
be minimised.
8 The OECD Principles for Transparency and Integrity in Lobbying,
available at: www.oecd.org/gov/fightingcorruptioninthepublicsector/
oecdprinciplesfortransparencyandintegrityinlobbying.htm
9 OECD, 2014.
10 Council of Europe, Report on the Role of Extra-Institutional Actors in
the Democratic System (Lobbying) Adopted by the Venice Commission
at its 94th Plenary Session (Venice, 8-9 March 2013)
(Strasbourg: Council of Europe, 2013).
11 Transparency International, Open Governance Standards
(Berlin: Transparency International, forthcoming).
12 Sunlight Foundation, 2013.
13 Access Info Europe, Lobbying Transparency via Right to Information
Laws (Madrid: Access Info Europe, 2013).
14 The full methodology and research questionnaire online at
www.transparency.org
15 The breakdown is borrowed from John Hogan, Raj Chari and Gary
Murphy, “Lobbying Regulation Across Four Continents: Promoting
Transparency?” APSA 2009 Toronto Meeting Paper, 2009.
16 Interviews with a representative of a professional association in
Hungary, confirmed by an interview with a government public official.
17 See TI Ireland, Influence and Integrity: Lobbying and its Regulation
in Ireland (Dublin: TI Ireland, 2014).
18 F. Galietti, Alta pressione (Venice: Marsilio, 2011).
19 See also Transparency International Hungary National Integrity
System Assessment (Budapest: Transparency International Hungary,
2012), Bertelsmann Stiftung, Sustainable Governance Indicators: 2014
Hungary Report (Gütersloh: Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2014) and Mihály
Fazekas and István János Tóth, “From corruption to state capture: A
new analytical framework with empirical applications from Hungary”
Working Paper Series: CRCB-WP/2014:01 (Corruption Research
Center, Budapest, 2014).
20 TI Hungary, Lifting the Lid on Lobbying: National Report of Hungary
(Budapest: TI Hungary, 2014), p.20.
21 For detailed discussion of this phenomenon, see for example Eric
Lipton and Danny Hakim, “Lobbying Bonanza as Firms Try to Influence
the European Union”, New York Times (web), 18 October 2013.
22 See EU Transparency Register statistics:
http://ec.europa.eu/transparencyregister/public/consultation/statistics.
do?locale=en&action=prepareView (accessed November 2014).

44 Finance Watch, Finance Watch Response to the Public Consultation
on Stakeholder Consultation Guidelines, (Brussels: Finance Watch, 30
September 2014).
45 “The Fire Power of the Financial Lobby”, 2014.
46 Scheherazade Daneshkhu and Hugh Carneg, “France Unveils
Banking Reform”, Financial Times, 19 December 2012.
47 For further detail, see Transparency International France,
Transparency and Integrity in Lobbying: A Challenge for Democracy
(Paris: TI France, 2014) pp.22-26, and Adrien de Tricornot, Mathias
Thépot et Franck Dedieu, Mon amie c’est la finance ! Comment
François Hollande a plié devant les banquiers (Paris: Bayard, 2014).
48 James Panichi, “Banks Sign Up to Lobbying Register”, European
Voice, 4 December 2014.
49 For a detailed account of the case, see the official report issued by
the French General Inspectorate of Social Affairs (IGAS), “Enquête sur
le MEDIATOR”, 2011, http://www.ladocumentationfrancaise.fr/var/
storage/rapports-publics/114000028/0000.pdf
A summary report is available here: http://www.igas.gouv.fr/IMG/pdf/
Synthese_MEDIATOR.pdf
50 Agnès Fournier, A. and Mahmoud Zureik ‘Estimate of deaths due
to valvular insufficiency attributable to the use of benfluorex in France’.
2012, Pharmacoepidemiology and Drug Safety., 21: 343–351
51 Angelique Chrisafis, “France Shaken by Fresh Scandal over Weightloss Drug Linked to Deaths”, Guardian, 6 January 2013.
52 IGAS, 2011 p.97
53 “Servier indemnisera tous les patients qui ont souffert du Mediator”,
Le Monde, 14 May 2014
54 “Vaincre le conflit d’intérêts médical”, Le Monde, 05 August 2014.
55 “Mediator: Comment Servier a corrigé le rapport du Sénat”, Le
Figaro, 13 September 2013.
56 “Mediator: le lobbying de Servier pour minimiser ses responsabilités”,
Le Figaro, 26 September 2011.
57 Transparency International Italy, Lobbying and Democracy:
Representing Interests in Italy (Milan: TI Italy, 2014, pp 38-39).
58 Among many others, some prominent initiatives have emanated
from the Sunlight Foundation
http://sunlightfoundation.com/policy/lobbying/guidelines/; Alter-EU
www.alter-eu.org/ and LobbyPlag http://lobbyplag.eu/map
59 Vigeo, “Executive Summary: Transparency and Integrity of Lobbying:
A New Challenge for CSR”, www.vigeo.com/csr-rating-agency/images/
stories/SUMMARY_TABLE_OF_CONTENT_final.pdf
60 At the time of writing, there are strong indications of imminent
measures to strengthen lobbying rules at EU level (James Panichi,
“Commission sets Tough Disclosure Laws”, European Voice,
15 November 2014) and at the Council of Europe, the European
Committee on Legal Co-operation (CDCJ) has commissioned a
feasibility study on a Council of Europe legal instrument concerning
the regulation of lobbying activities, which is currently under
consideration.
61 Burson Marsteller, 2013.
62 OECD, 2014, p.51.
63 These standards are drawn from the increasing literature on lobbying
regulation and empirical examples. Among the most relevant sources
for standards are the OECD, 2014, Council of Europe Parliamentary
Assembly Recommendation 1908 (2010) on lobbying in a democratic
society and the Sunlight Foundation Lobbying Guidelines (2013),
http://sunlightfoundation.com/blog/2013/12/03/announcing-sunlightsinternational-lobbying-guidelines/, as well as the work by Chari et al.,
2010. In terms of empirical examples, the Canadian model is often held
up as a best practice of lobbying regulation.
64 The overall percentage per country is the un-weighted average of
the scores for the three dimensions. Each of those dimension scores is

LOBBYING IN EUROPE – Hidden Influence, Privileged Access

the un-weighted average of the corresponding sub-dimension scores.
In total, 65 indicators of transparency, integrity and equality of access
to decision-makers are included in the assessment. See Methodology
note for further details and the full methodology online at
www.transparency.org
65 It is important to note that both the U.S, and Canada continue to
face challenges in tackling undue influence. In Canada, there is a rather
robust lobbying registration system but a 20 percent activity threshold
for registering as an in-house lobbyist allows a significant portion of
lobbying activity to go unrecorded. In the U.S., attempts to regulate
lobbying have not been accompanied by concerted effort on the issue
of political financing and as a result, corporate money and political
influence remain inextricably linked.
66 Global Corruption Barometer, 2013.
67 See national research reports for more detail on these improvements.
68 Committee on Standards in Public Life, ‘Political Party Finance:
Ending the big donor culture, Thirteenth Report’, November 2011.
69 The Law in Spain entered into force in December 2014 for state
entities, and will enter into force in December 2015 for regional
entities. Although it is not possible to say to what extent institutions will
comply with the law, on paper the law has considerable weaknesses
and many exceptions.
70 See national reports for further details on country specific
weaknesses.
71 See Law 19/2014 on Transparency, Access to Public Information
and Good Governance, chapters II and III.
72 Draft Report on the Development of the Framework for the Activities
of Interest Representatives (Lobbyists) in the European Institutions
(2007/2115(INI)), Committee on Constitutional Affairs,
12 February 2008.
73 Latvian Saeima Rules of Procedure, Article 79.3 and 85.5.6.
74 TI Latvia Transparency of Lobbying in Latvia (Riga: TI Latvia, 2015)
75 These include Austria, Cyprus, Estonia, France, Lithuania, the
Netherlands, Poland and Slovenia.
76 Sunlight Foundation, 2013.
77 Cave and Rowell, 2014, p.269.
78 See for example Chief Official Ethics Commission, Activity Report
2010 (Vilnius: Chief Official Ethics Commission), p 31.
79 TI Slovenia, Lifting the Lid on Lobbying: Slovenia. Call for Transparent
and Ethical Lobbying (Ljubljana: TI Slovenia, 2014) p.17
80 The Office of the Commissioner of Lobbying of Canada,
www.ocl-cal.gc.ca/eic/site/012.nsf/eng/h_00007.html
Figures as of January 2014.
81 Stefan Batory Foundation Lifting the Lid on Lobbying: Call for
better regulation and practice (Warsaw: Stephan Batory Foundation,
forthcoming).
82 TI Slovenia, 2014, p16.
83 See for example, calendar of Deputy María González Veracruz:
www.mariagonzalezveracruz.com/mi-agenda-publica/ and agendas of
the deputies of the Iniciativa per Catalunya Verds (ICV) party
http://www.iniciativa.cat/icv/sections/agenda
84 Deputy Odón Elorza. See: www.odonelorza.com
85 See http://www.michele-rivasi.eu/agenda/agenda-%E2%80%93semaine-du-13-au-18-octobre-paris-lyon-bruxelles-douai-et-valence/
86 See http://reinhardbuetikofer.eu/meine-lobbyistenliste-von-april-bisende-juli-2014/
87 See http://heidihautala.com/en/parlamentti/lobbarilista/
88 See http://www.richardcorbett.org.uk/transparency/lobbying/
89 See https://juliareda.eu/2015/01/report-eu-copyright-rulesmaladapted-to-the-web

63

90 The Slovenian Public Access to Information Act (ZDIJZ) was ranked
second in the world on the Global Right to Information Rating 2014.
See: www.rti-rating.org

received in the consultations were refused. Though formally this law
is in force, in practice this provision is not enforced and has always
been totally disregarded.

91 For more in depth focus on the Slovenian enforcement framework,
see section Promising Practice: A strong oversight system in need
of better resourcing, p. 35

112 In France, there are no experts groups in Parliament. Therefore
the question of robustness of advisory groups applies only to other
public institutions. In this case, the overall score for equality of access
is calculated slightly differently from other countries. An average score
for equality of access is first calculated for the Senate, the Assemblé
Nationale and other public institutions and the overall score represents
an aggregate of these three scores.

92 See Transparency International Slovenia National Integrity System
Study (Ljubljana: Transparency International Slovenia, 2011).
93 Article 79, Integrity and Prevention of Corruption Act in English,
www.kpk-rs.si/upload/datoteke/ZintPK-ENG.pdf
94 Article 12 UN Convention against Corruption calls for “restrictions
[...], for a reasonable period of time, on the professional activities of
former public officials or on the employment of public officials by the
private sector after their resignation or retirement, where such activities
or employment relate directly to the functions held or supervised by
those public officials during their tenure”.
95 See Transparency International Slovenia, 2011.
96 For details see the National Congress of State Legislatures:
www.ncsl.org/research/ethics/50-state-table-revolving-doorprohibitions.aspx
97 Transparency International, 2012.
98 Edelman Trust Barometer, 2014, www.edelman.com/insights/
intellectual-property/2014-edelman-trust-barometer/trust-in-business/
99 Burson Marstellar, 2013.
100 TI Ireland, 2014
101 For more on best practice in organisational lobbying policy and
practice see the Transparency International France Guide for the
development of lobbying charters (Guide pour l’élaboration d’une charte
de lobbying) (TI France, Paris: 2014), and Transparency International
Germany Model declaration for responsible lobbying (Verhaltenskatalog
für verantwortliche Interessenvertretung) (Berlin: TI Germany, 2009).
102 See for example Vigeo, Transparency and integrity in reporting: A
new challenge for CSR (Vigeo, Paris: 2013). The study compared the
reported lobbying practices of 424 European and 321 North American
firms. About half (54%) of companies under review did not report on
their lobbying activities in Europe, while this percentage declined to
24% in the U.S. The average European score for compliance with best
practice in lobbying reporting and control was 33/100.
103 Vigeo, 2014, p5.
104 See Dieter Zinnbauer, Getting Serious About Corporate Citizenship
– The Essential, Yet Missing Building Blocks for Responsible Corporate
Behaviour (Berlin: Transparency International, 2013).
105 Directive 2014/95/EU.
106 See
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_STATEMENT-14-291_en.htm
107 Commission de Déontologie de la Fonction Publique, Accès des
Agents Publics au Secteur Privé. Rapport au Premier Ministre (Paris:
Direction Générale d’Administration de la Fonction Publique, 2014)
p.15.
108 For more on the statement and its signatories, see
http://www.transparency-france.org/ewb_pages/div/Lobbying_actions_
entreprises.php.
109 For further information on the respective associations,
see http://www.cipr.co.uk/ and http://www.appc.org.uk/
110 Kay Lehman Schlozman, Sidney Verba and Henry E. Brady, The
Unheavenly Chorus: Unequal Political Voice and the Broken Promise of
American Democracy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2012).
111 In Hungary such legal obligation exists in Article 11 Act CXXXI
(2010) on public participation in the preparation of legislation. This
article requires a summary that outlines the reasons why opinions

64

113 Following the OECD definition, here an advisory or expert group
refers to any committee, board, commission, council, conference,
panel, task force or any subcommittee set up by government
(executive, legislative or judicial branch) or any of its subgroups
to provide it with advice, expertise or recommendations. In some
countries, advisory groups will be regulated differently depending
on which sector/institution is concerned. If this is the case, we suggest
the focus should be on parliamentary advisory groups involved in
the process of legislating.
114 https://lt.justice.gov.sk/
115 “Ex-Austrian MEP Imprisoned in Lobbying Scandal”, EurActiv.com,
15 January 2013.
116 Alter-EU, Bursting the Brussels Bubble: The Battle to Expose
Corporate Lobbying at the Heart of the EU, (Brussels: Alter-EU, 2010)
pp.114-122.
117 Peter Spiegel, “Dalli and the Bribery Scandal that won’t go Away”,
Financial Times, 30 April 2013.
118 Transparency International EU, The European Union Integrity
System (Brussels: Transparency International EU, 2014).
119 See the EU Transparency Register, http://ec.europa.eu/
transparencyregister/info/your-organisation/whoRegister.do?locale=en
120 Panichi, 4 December 2014.
121 See Article 11 of European Commission, “Commission Decision
on the Publication of Information on Meetings held between DirectorsGeneral of the Commission and Organisations or Self-employed
Individuals”, C(2014) 9048, 25 November 2014,
http://ec.europa.eu/news/2014/docs/c_2014_9048_en.pdf
122 “Making the Case for a Legislative Footprint in the European
Parliament”, Association of Accredited Public Policy Advocates to
the European Union, 7 November 2014,
www.aalep.eu/making-case-legislative-footprint-ep
123 Transparency International EU, 2014.
124 “Seitenwechsel: Londoner Börse engagiert mächtige ­
EU-Politikerin”, Der Spiegel, 26 August 2014
125 Alter-EU (2013) A Year of Broken Promises: Big business still put in
charge of EU Expert Groups, despite commitments to reform
(Brussels: Alter-EU, 2013).
126 Note that the design of lobbying regulations necessitates a
thorough review and potential amendment of the broader regulatory
framework. This concerns in particular the laws and policies on
criminalisation of trading in influence, bribery and other corrupt conduct,
transparency and limits on political finance, public procurement,
media sponsorship, labour law (particularly on collective bargaining),
whistleblower protection, legislative procedure (including bringing
of items under urgency), judicial and administrative review rights to
freedom of speech, assembly and petition of government.
127 Article 19, The Public’s Right to Know: Principles on Freedom of
Information Legislation (London: Article 19, 1999).
128 See Sunlight Foundation Open Data Guidelines
http://sunlightfoundation.com/opendataguidelines/
Also, Annotated 8 principles for lobbying data, http://opengovdata.org/

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