Why the Israelis Are Being Difficult

TimesMachine is an exclusive benefit for home delivery and digital subscribers.

About the Archive

This is a digitized version of an article from The Times’s print archive, before the start of online publication in 1996. To preserve these articles as they originally appeared, The Times does not alter, edit or update them.

Occasionally the digitization process introduces transcription errors or other problems; we are continuing to work to improve these archived versions.

TEL AVIV.

SUDDENLY, it seems — almost unnoticeably — the moment of truth has arrived. At first, after the 1967 war, there was an unequiv ocal policy: Israel would not content herself with anything less than real peace, the sort of peace which would entail diplomatic relationd, open bor ders, trade relations and, above all, a change of heart—the relations de fined by Abba Eban as “Benelux peace.” Anything else — anything which smacked of armistice agree ments—would not do. The Arabs, Israelis explained, would have to make up their minds once and for all and would either have to come to terms with the Jewish state or would have to stare helplessly at the Israelis digging in along the cease fire lines. The Arabs, led by President Nasser, retorted with a defiant three fold No: No recognition. No negotia tions. No peace with Israel. It seemed that only a miracle or another cata clysmic eruption of war could end the impasse. And yet, gradually, under external pressures and under fire of internal criticism, the parties inched their way forward and obstacles, ostensibly insurmountable, were un obtrusively removed.

Looking back at this process, the objective observer is impressed by the ground thus gained. The Israeli Government has had to go back on many of its emphatic statements: It has waived its insistence on direct negotiations and has agreed to enter the U.N.‐sponsored arena run by Am bassador Gunnar Jarring. The hated word “withdrawal” was eventually uttered by the reluctant Mrs. Meir, falteringly at first, then more clearly. The requirement that Egypt roll back her missiles and thus rectify her violation of the cease‐fire and stand still agreement of August, 1970, was abandoned with a sudden dovish fer vor. Then came the most surprising concession of all: in her reply to Jarring's queries Israel indicated her readiness to reconsider her former demands for diplomatic relations with Egypt.

This erosion of Israel's declared policy occurred without much op position from within. Gahal, the liberal‐right bloc, walked out of the National Coalition Government be cause of its “appeasement” policy. Menahem Begin, the Gahal leader, railed against the Government's capitulatioh and cited previous state ments by Mrs. Meir—there was no shortage of such quotations — in which Israel's refusals to compromise had been firmly stated. Charges of defeatism, loss of credibility, and even downright cowardice were hurled against the Government from critics on the right. But, on the whole, the change of policy took place with amazing tranquillity, without the tremors and quakes one has come to expect from the volatile Israelis.

THE main reason for this tran quillity was the widespread belief, shared by most Israelis, that the Egyptians would not budge from their triple No, and that even far‐reaching concessions on Israel's part would be met with the same old blank wall of Arab intransigence. The Govern ment's increasing flexibility was a sorely needed boost to Israel's dam aged image abroad, without compro mising Israel's security needs — so journalists reassured their readers. The Arab refusal to make any sort of peace with Israel—or even to mention her by name—became the rock upon which Israel built her for eign policy.

When President Anwar el‐Sadat, Nasser's successor, announced re cently, both in his interview with Newsweek and in his reply to Jar ring's questionnaire, his readiness to recognize Israel and her boundaries and to conclude a peace agreement with her, the rock began to crumble, and the carefully built house seemed to be on the verge of collapse. The immediate reaction in Israel was expressed by Ephraim Kishon, Is rael's leading humorist:

“During the last few years, when the whole civilized world was mono lithic in its categoric demand for an Israeli withdrawal to unsafe and un recognized borders, in exchange for the Arabs' willingness to call the old armistice agreement a ‘peace treaty,’ in those fateful days our harassed glances turned toward the Valley of the Nile and our parched lips mum bled a mute supplication: ‘Gamal, where are you?’

“And he came. Gamal was always in the right place at the right time. … ‘No peace, no negotiations, no recognition! …

“Now the great man has gone and left us orphaned… Anwar, that nin compoop, needed only a few months to discover the basic gimmick: The world expects deeds from Israel but only words from Egypt, and in ex change for the old borders he is willing to supply an unlimited quanti ty of new words. We have lost our last and most faithful ally. One can no longer rely on the Arabs.”

The political arena, dormant for the past year, came back to life with a howl from the “I‐told‐you‐so” platoon, a groan from the traditional “the‐whole‐world‐is‐against‐us” bat talion, a thunder of criticism from the “if‐you'd‐only‐heeded‐my‐advice” brigade and an occasional aria by Foreign Minister Eban reassuring all and sundry that there was no cause for concern.

But obviously, there was some cause for concern. Israel had whittled down her definition of peace and, by excluding insistence on diplomatic exchanges and the other paraphernal ia of real peace, had made it easy for Sadat to accept peace verbally, with out bringing about the volte ‐ face which Israel has in mind. Sadat pushed Israel into a corner, forcing her to state her territorial claims. Israel's refusal to relinquish the whole of Sinai—the Gaza Strip has, legally, never been Egyptian territory —was seen as a confirmation of what the Arabs had alleged all along, that Israel was set upon an expansionist course. The wave of reprobation which followed in the international press was an ominous prediction of things to come. The Arabs' policy was considered flexible: they agreed to peace and guarantees. Israel wanted peace and territory. The eventual showdown with Washing ton, with the Security Council—in fact, with the whole world—lurked theateningly around the corner.

It was in order to lessen these stresses and ease the pressures, that Mrs. Meir produced her trump card and, in an interview with The Times of London, verbally sketched a map of the territorial settlement that Is rael could accept: In addition to Jerusalem, the Gaza Strip and the Golan Heights, Israel would insist on holding Sharm el Sheik and having access to it, and on some measure of military control along the Jordan River. She said quite clearly that Israel does not, and will not, claim the West Bank or the greater part of Sinai.

Thus the circle was complete: all the elements of the initial Israeli foreign policy were washed away by the tide of events. Israel had to define her territorial claims, without direct negotiations, without a peace conference, without the definition of peace so often expounded by Eban and Ambassador Itzhak Rabin.

OUT of the ruins emerged one significant fact: the discrepancy be tween public opinion in Israel and public opinion abroad. In Israel, Mrs. Meir's plan was enthusiastically re ceived by outspoken doves. Ha'aretz, the Tel Aviv daily, a perennial voice of reason and moderation and a harsh critic of any sign of rigidity on the part of the Government, praised Mrs. Meir for her “sensible and reasonable proposal.” Dr. Walter Gross, senior editor of that paper, wrote that “Mrs. Meir's plan, though not spelled out in detail, will assist us in our at tempts to rebut hostile propaganda which seeks to stigmatize us as an nexationists and to cast upon us the suspicion that we really want to sabotage any initiative which at tempts to remove us from the cease fire lines.”

The Movement for Peace and Security, headed by professors of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and other intellectuals, staged a number of demonstrations for “Peace Now” but failed to utter one word of criti cism of the Meir “map.” Hayim Hef er, a poet‐columnist often associated with dissident peace movements, who has infuriated Mrs. Meir by lashing out against her alleged hawk ish attitudes, wrote in his weekly column in Yedioth Ahronot, a Tel Aviv evening paper:

Not long ago, our friends abroad were angrily inclined — and so, I must admit, was yours truly undersigned— to rage against the Government and Premier without cease for wanting all those territories instead of wanting peace.

And now it happens that we read with definite relief the briefing in The Times in which the Premier turned a leaf.

And — we must confess — her words, if by intent or in effect, reflect those very principles we think must be correct While all those warriors for peace who had their glorious hour have suddenly received a sort of glorious cold shower.

For now it's clear — those ter ritories over which we tought are not in fact as “conquered” or as “annexed” as we thought …

But when you hear Egypt so solemnly announce she will not give up her homeland by a grain or by an ounce it must occur to you to ash, if but for logic's sake how many Egyptian fellahin have land in Sharm el Sheik, And why should Egypt contest so limited a lease or not relinquish Sharm el Sheik if this could lead to peace?

Unless they're really interested in having a replay of the exercise of ‘67 in the month of May?

And so, slowly there are questions that will raise their ugly heads, and disturb us with their weighti ness and haunt us in our beds like the question which is strange and yet so simple in the end such as ‘Why not have such fron tiers as we can best defend?’ …

And anyway why should the left consider it so right that Israel be defended by the powers' concerted might?

Odd that with all the protest and petitions they've arrayed when left‐wing splinters always join the antipowers debate they want the Gaullist, C.I.A. and Russian secret police to be our keepers, and our broth ers' keepers, in the Middle East.

No, Sirs, I think we can predict with every certainty, that the “instant peace” our friends propose is of our eternity.

Harsh criticism of Mrs. Meir came from the liberal‐right opposition. A vote of censure and no‐confidence, submitted by Gahal, ended up in furor of bickering and recriminations reminiscent of the good old pre‐1967 days, while, outside the Knesset, demonstrators railed against Munich and “sell‐out” tactics. Six members of the National Religious party asked for permission to abstain from vot ing: all were refused but three ignored party discipline and ab stained nevertheless. The Govern ment, afraid of deserters even from its own Labor ranks, refused to agree to a secret ballot and insisted on a roll call so that none should escape the party whip. The Government scraped through with 62 votes — the total number of Members of Knesset is 120 — which included the two de spised votes of Haolam Hazeh, a tiny radical party.

The two evening papers criticized the Government for its poor tactical moves and its readiness to state minimalist terms even before negotia tions had begun in earnest. Shmuel Shnitzer, the leading columnist in Ma'ariv, Israel's largest‐circulation paper, referring to Mrs. Meir's readi ness to hand the West Bank of the Jordan to King Hussein, wrote: “These concessions are not explicable in terms of justice, or security risks or any Israeli interests whatsoever, but only in terms of American inter ests which seek to compensate the Hashamite king for his loyalty to the West.” He rebuked the Prime Minis ter for neglecting Israel's basic security needs and giving in to American pressure. Herzl Rosenblum, editor of Yedioth Aharonot, the other evening paper, delivers daily homilies against the Government for yielding so easily to American pressure. Thus, what is seen abroad as rigidity on Israel's part is regarded in Israel as dovish flexibility. What Le Monde and other newspapers in the West regard as maximalist demands which preclude any peace is seen by moder ates inside Israel as an expression of Israeli moderation and her rejection of expansionist ideas.

WHENCE this discrepancy? And why do the Israelis seem obsessed with an obduracy which outsiders find hard to comprehend? Why do they pooh‐pooh international guaran tees which their friends abroad re gard as sufficient? Why, in short, are they being so difficult?

Any attempt to answer these ques tions must reach beyond the sphere of current events and penetrate the Israeli psyche. As individuals and as a society, Israelis are characterized by a deeply rooted suspicious atti tude toward others. Distrust of the apparent and speculation as to real motives are the characteristics of the emerging Israeli character. This inherent suspicion has become part of the daily fabric of life. When one Israeli asks another the otherwise innocuous question “What are you doing here?” he means more than meets the uninitiated ear. Implied are a series of inquisitory questions: “Why are you not elsewhere [at school, at work, with your family]?” “Does your wife know of your being here and if not, why didn't you tell her?” “How can you afford to be here on the salary you earn?”

Over this suspicion, which para doxically coexists with the straight forward frankness of the Sabra, over this distrust of appearances, looms a much more significant attitude—dis trust of the whole outside world. Three distinct layers of conscious and often even unconscious associa tions are expressed in this distrust and rejection: the first is directed against the non‐Jewish world; the second against the Arab neighbors; the third against international ma chineries.

The deepest layer is the endemic distrust of the non‐Jewish world. Over the years, Jews have developed this suspicion — nay, certainty — that the world of the goyim is at best neutral, at worst actively hostile to the Jew. The “good” goy was the ex ception to the rule and in Jewish literature was termed as “one of the righteous few among the world's na tions” he was regarded with respect, almost with awe, as one of nature's unnatural phenomena.

Zionism sought to free the Jews of their predicament by normalizing them through the nation‐state channel and eradicating the Jew‐Gentile com plex. Jews were to be a nation like all other nations — significantly the word goy in Hebrew denotes both “gentile” and “nation.” But the na tion reborn was nevertheless Jewish and carries in its soul the scars and traumas of an age‐old quota of suf fering unparalleled in human history. The systematic murder of European Jews confirmed in the most brutal way conceivable, the myth of the hostile goy. While one million Jewish children died, the Western powers procrastinated—to use a mild term— and refused to lift a finger to save those who could be saved. Israelis will not forget that which cannot consciously be remembered. Hence the ambivalence toward the outside world; hence the national schizo phrenia concerning the goyim.

Israel's relationship with France was symptomatic of this schizophre nia. The alliance itself was proof of Israel's independent status: some of its stanchest advocates in France were not renowned for their philo Semitic sentiments. But when the al liance was broken and when de Gaul le accused Israel as the paradigm of Jewish negative traits, the Israeli reaction was an ambivalent one. Alongside the disappointment and anger, there was a palpable sense of relief: we knew it all along; the goyim cannot be trusted; inside the best of them lives the anti‐Semitic bug. With a perverse sense of glee, some journalists sought to prove that France should never have been trusted in the first place. The expec tation of imminent betrayal by friends, especially when in need, is apparent in the Israeli press. Writes Amos Elon, author and journalist, in “The Israelis: Founders and Sons” (to be published by Holt, Rinehart & Winston next month):

“An irrepressible penchant for pessimistic prophesying can be noticed daily in the Israeli press. The United States is constantly on the ‘verge of selling Israel out.’…It is the Israeli way of screaming ‘Gevalt!’ or ‘Help — burglars!’ at the slightest noise. Gevalt is a key Yiddish word — both an expletive and a noun … There are times when such Gevalts are backed up by facts or realistic estimates. In at least as many instances, there are no substantiating facts whatsoever. The headlines are just as black and the editorials just as angry.”

A popular song expresses this tra ditionally Jewish attitude. It is en titled “The Whole World is Against Us,” and the lyrics are by a young Israel Sabra, Yoram Tehar‐Lev:

The whole world is against us.

This is an ancient tale Taught by our forefathers to sing and dance to.

Having thus established the link between the persecution of the Jews and Israel's isolated stand, the song goes on to establish the difference between the forefathers and the Sabra sons:

If the whole world is against us, We don't give a damn.

If the whole world is against us, Let the whole world go to hell.

The same mood has invaded even the usually detached atmosphere of the Supreme Court. In the recent cause celebre pertaining to registra tion of sons of non‐Jewish mothers, Justice Silberg wrote: “We are a solitary nation — fighting alone. And when our young men stood alone in battle against a belligerent, hostile world.— at best indifferent — they clearly saw that there is no friend to Israel but Israel.”

It should be noted that Justice Sil berg's minority view is not character istic of the Israeli bench's cool and detached atmosphere, but it does re flect Israel's trauma.

ABOVE this layer of the Jew‐vs. goy syndrome lies a more recent but equally strong suspicion of the Arab world. That you cannot trust the Arab is a truism which the Israeli re gards as a fact of life, to be accepted without animosity and without re sentment. To protesting outsiders, Is raelis will point out the Arabs' own admission of their weakness, of the use of words for their own sake, of the gap between reality and its ver bal expression. No sane Israeli would take the words of an Arab Govern ment at their face value. To remove any doubts, he will point to solemn undertakings repeatedly broken by Arab Governments: to Jordan, which refused access to the Wailing Wall and Mount Scopus and broke every conceivable provision in the armistice agreement; or to Egypt, which barred Israeli shipping from the Suez Canal, started the 1967 crisis, and twice broke the postwar cease‐fire agree ments. Although Israel's record is not entirely spotless, either, the fact is that the Arab Governments have used the armistice agreements, which directed the parties to the path of peace, as a shield be hind which they could strike at Israel with growing inter tional immunity.

Israelis dismiss reports from Cairo, indicating that the Sadat regime is ready, in earnest, to make up with Is rael. They tend to believe that Nasser's death has brought about a certain change in tone but insist that the tune is the same. In answer to reports by visiting American journal ists and diplomats who tell reassuring stories of tete‐à tete conversations with peace seeking Egyptians in the bar of the Nile Hilton, Israelis point to the fact that Egypt. has not budged from its total boycott of everything Israeli and has even refused to ac cept, through Jarring, a docu ment which bore the offend ing headline “From the Gov ernment of Israel to the Gov ernment of the United Arab Republic.”

WHEN they hear of Salah Gohar, Deputy Foreign Min ister, privately telling foreign visitors of his life‐long am bition to be Egypt's first Am bassador to Israel, they smile knowingly at the naiveté of the gullible Westerner and point out that there has been no relaxation of the anti Israeli propaganda inside Egypt, that Sadat's News week interview was censored by the official Egyptian news agency and that the words “Peace Agreement” were omit ted from the Egyptian version for local consumption. When told that Egypt is tired of the Arab‐Jewish dispute and wants to concentrate on put ting her own house in order, Israelis retort that they heard the same tales prior to 1967. The cunning Arab statesman and the credulous Western observer have become two stock characters in Israeli folklore. Against hearsay evi dence adduced by well‐mean ing friends, Israelis produce evidence coming straight from Cairo, which is heard and seen in their own living rooms: Radio Cairo emitting its usual harangues about the stolen land and its return by force to the Palestinians, and Egypt ian television showing the “real” Israel. (One recent film purported to show an Israeli teacher killing an Arab girl by smashing her head against a blackboard as a punishment for shouting “Free Palestine!” and Israeli soldiers butchering women and children, break ing coffins and torturing tod dlers.)

“Is this the prologue to peace?” asks the furious. Is raeli, and when answered that this is merely part of Arab play‐acting, he points to explicit statements in the Egyptian press which assure their reader that the peace offensive is mere camou flage. Such statements have recently become more rare but have not dis appeared. Al Goumhouria, the official newspaper of the Arab Socialist Union, wrote on Feb. 4, 1971:

“The liberation of Palestine will not be achieved by waving empty slogans but by using realistic slogans adapted to a given situation. Such a realistic slogan is ‘the elimination of the consequences of Israeli agres sion,’ which should lead to the fur ther slogan of ‘returning Israel to the original partition borders,’ which will eventually give birth to another slogan — ‘restoring the ties of each Jewish community to the mother country from which they came.’”

And the newspaper goes‐on to ad monish the impatient by telling them that “just as an officer who does not know how to camouflage his tank with leaves is guilty of dereliction of his duty, so is the politician who uses an explicit and uncamouflaged slogan.”

THE third layer of suspicion relates to international guarantees. The United Nations is despised and dis trusted, international guarantees are regarded as synonymous with hot air, observers and peace‐keeping forces are regarded as futile instruments. Israelis, invoking their own experi ence, refuse to believe that interna tional action, which did not prevent the 1948 Arab invasion of Palestine, and vanished into thin air when Nas ser closed the Straits of Tiran in 1967, will ever protect their country.

At this point, all three layers of suspicion unite into a vehement re jection of what is seen as a Jewish dependence on the goodwill of the goyim being fooled by the cunning Arabs” into concocting an inoperable machine. Listen to Haim Goury, one of Israel's most famous poets, veter an of the 1948 war and a keen ob server of the Israeli scene, writing in Lamerkhav, a small Tel Aviv daily:

“Don't mock our experience. We remember too much. We are very careful. We have witnessed illusion wrecking the hearts of the innocent. We have seen what befell those who trusted promises, guarantees and honorable words. We have heard tranquilizing words. We have heard words of false promise, words of deceit, words which seduce the tired and bribe the weak. Whore words.

“That's why we are somewhat sus picious.

“My generation has seen Ethiopia attacked by the legions of Mussolini while the League of Nations looked on in silence. We have seen Repub lican Spain vanquished by the Fas cists and Nazis and the embargo and nonintervention of the Western Powers. We have seen Czechoslova kia deceived and forsaken by her al lies, who succumbed to Hitler's ulti matum. We have seen what they did to the Jews of Europe while the en lightened world stood by, dead silent.

“We have seen Israel invaded by seven Arab states, seeking to turn her first day into her last. We have seen too much.

“We are suspicious. Don't con demn us … because of this. We are afraid of being robbed of the victory of our last war and of being taken back to 1948, to 1947.”

GIVEN the present Israeli mood on the one hand and the Egyptian insistence on total withdrawal on the other, are there still any prospects of a peaceful solution? Is another eruption of war inevitable?

Prophesying is a notoriously dan gerous occupation in the Middle East, where the irrational and imponder able often reign supreme.

At worst, the gap between Egypt and Israel could lead to a resumption of hostilities by the Egyptians, fol lowed by an Israeli attempt to knock out the Soviet antiaircraft system. Senior Israeli officers talk with glow ing self‐confidence about their ability to smash the SAM 2 and 3 missiles. Some Israelis believe that such a showdown is inevitable, since only another Egyptian defeat would en able — as it were — Egypt's rulers to agree to that which Israel regards as a sine qua non—an Israeli pres ence in Sharm el Sheik.

Yet, such an Israeli victory could also lead to further Soviet involve ment in the war, most probably by throwing more planes and pilots into actual combat.

In order to succeed, Egypt would have to cross the canal and attempt to push the Israelis out of Sinai. With Israeli forces dug in deeper and better, all experts agree, an Egyptian attempt to establish a bridgehead across the canal would be doomed from the start. The Egyptian High Command must be aware of the facts.

At best, the present deadlock could, under pressure of fear of war and external persuasion, give way to a redefinition of policy on both sides. Such a redefinition might seek to evolve an interim arrangement de signed to open up the canal, as well as a new approach to the security and territorial questions.

The opening of the canal, provided it gave no side an undue strategic advantage, would give both countries an opportunity to evolve their de mands without the pressure of im pending war. A permanent solution would need concessions on both sides.

Such a feasible compromise would be an Israeli recognition of Egyptian sovereignty over Sinai, and the long term lease of Sharm el Sheik and the roads leading to it. Anything less than physical control over the straits would not dispel the heavy cloud of distrust which hangs over Israel.

TAKING into account this mood, can the Israeli Government go be yond the principles of the Meir plan, even if it may eventually want to? Can it, in the foreseeable future agree to the Rogers plan for Sinai and do without military control along the Jordan River?

These are hypothetical questions and depend to a large extent upon the nature and degree of pressures which might be exerted on Israel by foe and friend. Given the present circumstances, the sense of military confidence in Israel and the rejection of international guarantees as a sub stitute for secure borders, it seems that the Meir plan has become a political minimum from which retreat is not only unlikely but politically unfeasible. Mrs. Meir, even now, has difficulty in retaining the support of the National Religious party. Six of its 12 representatives in the Knesset belong to the Greater Israel move ment. The party's whip, Yitzhak Rafael, has said that the party will not make up its mind on the question of the West Bank without consulting the Chief Rabbinate, whose views or the religious sanctity of the whole of the West Bank are well‐known. Last year, the party's conference, under the prodding of its young extremist groups, adopted a resolution which proclaims Israel's historical and religious claim to Judea and Samaria. The National Religous party, split inside and driven toward extremity by its constant competition with more orthodox parties, is an unrelia ble partner even if Mrs. Meir does not budge another inch.

Without the National Religious party, Labor, plus its two other coali tion partners, Mapam and Independ ent Liberals, can muster 60 votes out of the 120 Knesset seats, but, even among these, defections would be more than likely in a showdown in which withdrawal from the whole of Sinai was at stake. The Government could rely, in case of such a show down, on the votes of four Arab members aligned to Labor, the two Communist parties and Haolam Hazeh. But such reliance in such an issue would be politically suicidal and, as the Prime Minister has al ready indicated, she does not want these votes.

The Government could, and per haps would, turn to the nation for a new mandate at the polls. But the outcome of such elections is far from certain. For the last year, Israelis have been told by Mrs. Meir, Moshe Dayan, Abba Eban, Israel Galili and practically every other minister, that clinging to Sharm el Sheik and the Jordan River is the only means of ensuring Israel's security. This barrage of statements has virtually chained Labor to these two minimal demands. Even the leftist Mapam, which originally wanted total with drawal from Sinai, seems to have changed its mind. Natan Peled, the Mapam Minister of Absorption, came out for an Israeli hold over Sharm el Sheik. The arguments enlisted to support these demands are cogently made through all the mass media. International guarantees are shown to be demonstrably futile: Israelis are being assured that no peace‐keep ing force could resist the sovereign host state for any length of time — or, for that matter, stand up to regu lar or irregular forces; that no peace keeping force could prevent the Egyptians from laying mines in the Straits of Tiran, or from sending through the straits an expeditionary force to Aqaba from which to attack the vulnerable Israeli port of Elath. Similarly, Red Army units along Is rael's frontiers are a remedy far worse than the illness they seek to cure. All these arguments easily take root in a soil nourished by the very components of the Israeli psyche.