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entitled 'Space Shuttle: Status of NASA's Efforts to Address Workforce
Issues Related to the Space Shuttle's Retirement' which was released on
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Testimony:
Before the Subcommittee on Science and Space, Committee on Commerce,
Science, and Transportation, United States Senate:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
For Release on Delivery Expected at 10:30 a.m. EDT:
Wednesday, May 18, 2005:
Space Shuttle:
Status of NASA's Efforts to Address Workforce Issues Related to the
Space Shuttle's Retirement:
Statement of Allen Li, Director, Acquisition and Sourcing Management:
GAO-05-718T:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-05-718T, a testimony before the Senate Subcommittee
on Science and Space, Committee on Commerce, Science, and
Transportation, U.S. Senate
Why GAO Did This Study:
The National Aeronautics and Space Administration’s (NASA) space
shuttle program is key to implementing the President’s vision for space
exploration, which calls for completing the assembly of the
International Space Station (ISS) by the end of the decade. Currently,
the space shuttle, which is to be retired after ISS assembly is
completed, is the only launch system capable of transporting ISS
components. To meet the goals of the President’s vision and satisfy
ISS’s international partners, NASA is examining alternative launch
vehicles and ISS configurations.
Retiring the space shuttle and, in the larger context, implementing the
President’s vision, will require NASA to rely on its most important
asset—its workforce. Because maintaining a skilled workforce through
retirement will be challenging, GAO was asked to discuss the actions
NASA has taken to sustain a skilled space shuttle workforce and the
challenges it faces in doing so—findings reported on in March 2005 (see
GAO, Space Shuttle: Actions Needed to Better Position NASA to Sustain
Its Workforce through Retirement, GAO-05-230).
What GAO Found:
While NASA recognizes the importance of sustaining a critically skilled
workforce to support space shuttle operations, it has made limited
progress toward developing a detailed long-term strategy to do so. At
the time of our March 2005 review, the Space Shuttle Program had
identified lessons learned from the retirement of comparable programs,
and United Space Alliance—NASA’s prime contractor for space shuttle
operations—had begun to prepare for the impact of the space shuttle’s
retirement on its workforce. However, timely action to address
workforce issues is critical given their potential impact on NASA-wide
goals. Significant delays in implementing a strategy to sustain the
space shuttle workforce would likely lead to larger problems, such as
overstretched funding and failure to meet NASA program schedules. NASA
and United Space Alliance acknowledge that sustaining their workforces
will be difficult, particularly if a career path beyond the space
shuttle’s retirement is not apparent. Fiscal challenges facing the
federal government also make it unclear whether funding for retention
tools, such as bonuses, will be available.
Our March 2005 report identified several factors that have hampered the
Space Shuttle Program’s workforce planning efforts. For example, the
program’s near-term focus on returning the space shuttle safely to
flight has delayed other efforts that will help the program determine
its workforce requirements, such as assessing hardware and facility
needs. Program officials also noted that due to uncertainties in
implementing the President’s vision for space exploration, requirements
on which to base workforce planning efforts have yet to be defined.
Despite these factors, our work on strategic workforce planning has
shown that even when faced with uncertainty, successful organizations
take steps, such as scenario planning, to better position themselves to
meet future workforce requirements.
Since we issued our report and made our recommendation, NASA has
publicly recognized, at its Integrated Space Operations Summit, that
human capital management and critical skills retention will be a major
challenge for the agency as it progresses toward retirement of the
space shuttle.
Estimated Timeline for the Process of Retiring NASA’s Space Shuttle:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
What GAO Recommends:
In its March 2005 report, GAO recommended that NASA take steps aimed at
sustaining a critically skilled space shuttle workforce through
retirement. NASA concurred with the recommendation.
www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-718T.
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
the link above. For more information, contact Allen Li at (202) 512-
4841 or lia@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Madam Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:
I am pleased to be here today to discuss how the National Aeronautics
and Space Administration (NASA) is positioning itself to sustain the
critically skilled space shuttle workforce through the retirement of
the Space Shuttle Program. NASA is in the midst of one of the most
challenging periods in its history. It must demonstrate that the space
shuttle can safely fly again, begin the process of retiring its largest
program, and at the same time prepare for the uncertain future of space
exploration. These challenges are further exacerbated by the complex
task of maintaining the right workforce to support the space shuttle
program while ensuring that the skills needed for future programs are
not lost. Over the next several years, thousands of NASA civil service
and contractor employees who support the Space Shuttle Program will be
impacted by decisions made about the remaining life of the program and
implementation of exploration goals. These include decisions about the
final number of space shuttle flights and about future programs, such
as the Crew Exploration Vehicle (CEV). As requested, my testimony today
will discuss the actions that NASA is taking to position itself to
sustain its critically skilled space shuttle workforce and the
challenges that the agency faces in doing so--issues we reported on to
Senators Inouye and McCain in March 2005.[Footnote 1]
In summary, we found that NASA had made limited progress in its
planning efforts for sustaining the space shuttle workforce through the
program's retirement. At the time of our March 2005 report, the Space
Shuttle Program had taken preliminary steps, including identifying the
lessons learned from the retirement of comparable programs, such as the
Air Force Titan IV Rocket Program. Further NASA's prime contractor for
space shuttle operations--United Space Alliance (USA)--had taken some
initial steps to prepare for the impact of the space shuttle's
retirement on its own workforce. However, its progress depends on NASA
making decisions that impact contractor requirements through the
remainder of the program. Timely action to address workforce issues,
however, is critical given the potential impact that they could have on
NASA-wide goals. Unaddressed, such issues would likely lead to schedule
delays and overstretched funding for both the Space Shuttle Program and
the agency. Both NASA and USA have acknowledged that sustaining their
workforces will be difficult as the space shuttle nears retirement,
particularly if a career path beyond the space shuttle's retirement is
not apparent to their employees. In addition, the federal government is
facing fiscal challenges. Such challenges call into question whether
funding for tools, such as retention bonuses, will be available for the
agency to use to aid in retaining the space shuttle workforce.
In our report we identified several factors that have hampered the
Space Shuttle Program's planning efforts. For example, because of the
program's near-term focus on returning the space shuttle to flight,
other efforts that will ultimately aid in determining workforce
requirements, such as assessing hardware and facility needs, are being
delayed. In addition, program officials indicated that they face
uncertainties regarding the implementation of future aspects of the
President's vision for space exploration (Vision) and have yet to
define requirements on which workforce planning efforts would be based.
Despite these factors, our prior work on strategic workforce planning
has shown that, even when faced with uncertainty, successful
organizations take steps, such as scenario planning, to better position
themselves to meet future workforce requirements.
In our March 2005 report, we recommended that the agency begin
identifying the Space Shuttle Program's future workforce needs based
upon various future scenarios the program could face. The program can
use the information provided by scenario planning to develop strategies
for meeting the needs of its potential future scenarios. NASA concurred
with our recommendation, and NASA's Assistant Associate Administrator
for the Space Shuttle program is leading an effort to address the
recommendation. Since we issued our report and made our recommendation,
NASA has taken action and publicly recognized, through its Integrated
Space Operations Summit, that human capital management and critical
skills retention will be a major challenge for the agency as it
progresses toward retirement of the space shuttle.
Background:
On January 14, 2004, the President articulated a new vision for space
exploration for NASA. Part of the Vision includes the goal of retiring
the space shuttle following completion of the International Space
Station (ISS), planned for the end of the decade. In addition, NASA
plans to begin developing a new manned exploration vehicle, or CEV, to
replace the space shuttle and return humans to the moon as early as
2015, but no later than 2020, in preparation for more ambitious future
missions. As this Subcommittee is aware, NASA's Administrator has
recently expressed his desire to accelerate the CEV development to
eliminate the gap between the end of the Space Shuttle Program,
currently scheduled for 2010, and the first manned operational flight
of the CEV, currently scheduled for 2014. If the CEV development cannot
be accelerated, NASA will not be able to launch astronauts into space
for several years and will likely have to rely on Russia for
transportation to and from the ISS. A 1996 "Balance Agreement" between
NASA and the Russian space agency, obligated Russia to provide 11 Soyuz
spacecraft for crew rotation of U.S. and Russia crews. After April
2006, this agreement will be fulfilled and Russia no longer must
allocate any of the seats on its Soyuzes for U.S. astronauts. Russian
officials have indicated that they will no longer provide crew return
services to NASA at no cost at that time. However, NASA may face
challenges to compensating Russia for seats on its Soyuzes after the
agreement is fulfilled due to restrictions in the Iran Nonproliferation
Act.[Footnote 2]
The space shuttle, NASA's largest individual program,[Footnote 3] is an
essential element of NASA's ability to implement the Vision because it
is the only launch system presently capable of transporting the
remaining components necessary to complete assembly of the ISS. NASA
projects that it will need to conduct an estimated 28 flights over the
next 5 to 6 years to complete assembly of and provide logistical
support to the ISS. However, NASA is currently examining alternative
ISS configurations to meet the goals of the Vision and satisfy NASA's
international partners, while requiring as few space shuttle flights as
possible to complete assembly.
Prior to retiring the space shuttle, NASA will need to first return the
space shuttle safely to flight[Footnote 4] and execute whatever number
of remaining missions are needed to complete assembly of and provide
support for the ISS. At the same time, NASA will begin the process of
closing out or transitioning its space shuttle assets that are no
longer needed to support the program --such as its workforce, hardware,
and facilities--to other NASA programs. The process of closing out or
transitioning the program's assets will extend well beyond the space
shuttle's final flight (see fig. 1).
Figure 1: Estimated Timeline for the Process of Retiring NASA's Space
Shuttle:
[See PDF for image]
[A] The planning window for the first flight is July 13 through July
31, 2005.
[End of figure]
Retiring the space shuttle and, in the larger context, implementing the
Vision, will require that the Space Shuttle Program rely on its most
important asset--its workforce. The space shuttle workforce consists of
about 2,000 civil service[Footnote 5] and 15,600 contractor[Footnote 6]
personnel, including a large number of engineers and scientists. While
each of the NASA centers support the Space Shuttle Program to some
degree, the vast majority of this workforce is located at three of
NASA's Space Operations Centers: Johnson Space Center, Kennedy Space
Center, and Marshall Space Flight Center. Data provided by NASA shows
that approximately one quarter of the workforce at its Space Operations
centers is 51 years or older and about 33 percent will be eligible for
retirement by fiscal year 2012.[Footnote 7]
The space shuttle workforce and NASA's human capital management have
been the subject of many GAO[Footnote 8] and other reviews[Footnote 9]
in the past that have highlighted various challenges to maintaining
NASA's science and engineering workforce. In addition, over the past
few years, GAO and others in the federal government have underscored
the importance of human capital management and strategic workforce
planning.[Footnote 10] In response to an increased governmentwide focus
on strategic human capital management, NASA has taken several steps to
improve its human capital management. These include steps such as
devising an agencywide strategic human capital plan, developing
workforce analysis tools to assist in identifying critical skills
needs, and requesting and receiving additional human capital
flexibilities.[Footnote 11]
Progress toward Developing a Strategy to Sustain the Space Shuttle
Workforce Is Limited:
NASA has made only limited progress toward developing a detailed long-
term strategy for sustaining its workforce through the space shuttle's
retirement. While NASA recognizes the importance of having in place a
strategy for sustaining a critically skilled workforce to support space
shuttle operations, it has only taken preliminary steps to do so. For
example, the program identified lessons-learned from the retirement of
programs comparable to the space shuttle, such as the Air Force Titan
IV Rocket Program. Among other things, the lessons learned reports
highlight the practices used by other programs when making personnel
decisions, such as the importance of developing transition strategies
and early retention planning.
Other efforts have been initiated or are planned; examples include the
following:
* contracted with the National Academy of Public Administration to
assist it in planning for the space shuttle's retirement and
transitioning to future programs and:
* began devising an acquisition strategy for updating propulsion system
prime contracts at MSFC to take into account the Vision's goal of
retiring the space shuttle following completion of the ISS.
NASA's prime contractor for space shuttle operations, USA, has also
taken some preliminary steps, but its progress with these efforts
depends on NASA making decisions that impact contractor requirements
through the remainder of the program. For example, USA has begun to
define its critical skills needs to continue supporting the Space
Shuttle Program, devised a communication plan, contracted with a human
capital consulting firm to conduct a comprehensive study of its
workforce; and continued to monitor indicators of employee morale and
workforce stability. Contractor officials said that further efforts to
prepare for the space shuttle's retirement and its impact on their
workforce are on hold until NASA first makes decisions that impact the
space shuttle's remaining number of flights and thus the time frames
for retiring the program and transitioning its assets.
The Potential Impact of Workforce Problems and Other Challenges the
Space Shuttle Program Faces Highlight the Need for Workforce Planning:
Making progress toward developing a detailed strategy for sustaining a
critically skilled space shuttle workforce through the program's
retirement is important given the impact that workforce problems could
have on NASA-wide goals. According to NASA officials, if the Space
Shuttle Program faces difficulties in sustaining the necessary
workforce, NASA-wide goals, such as implementing the Vision and
proceeding with space exploration activities, could be impacted. For
example, workforce problems could lead to a delay in flight
certification for the space shuttle, which could result in a delay to
the program's overall flight schedule, thus compromising the goal of
completing assembly of the ISS by 2010. In addition, officials said
that space exploration activities could slip as much as 1 year for each
year that the space shuttle's operations are extended because NASA's
progress with these activities relies on funding and assets that are
expected to be transferred from the Space Shuttle Program to other NASA
programs.
NASA officials told us they expect to face various challenges in
sustaining the critically skilled space shuttle workforce. These
challenges include the following:
* Retaining the current workforce. Because many in the current
workforce will want to participate in or will be needed to support
future phases of implementing the Vision, it may be difficult to retain
them in the Space Shuttle Program. In addition, it may be difficult to
provide certain employees with a transition path from the Space Shuttle
Program to future programs following retirement.
* Impact on the prime contractor for space shuttle operations. Because
USA was established specifically to perform ground and flight
operations for the Space Shuttle Program, its future following the
space shuttle's retirement is uncertain. Contractor officials stated
that a lack of long-term job security would cause difficulties in
recruiting and retaining employees to continue supporting the space
shuttle as it nears retirement. In addition, steps that the contractor
may have to take to retain its workforce, such as paying retention
bonuses, are likely to require funding above normal levels.
* Governmentwide budgetary constraints. Throughout the process of
retiring the space shuttle, NASA, like other federal agencies, will
have to contend with urgent challenges facing the federal budget that
will put pressure on discretionary spending--such as investments in
space programs--and require NASA to do more with fewer resources.
Several Factors Have Impeded Workforce Planning Efforts:
While the Space Shuttle Program is still in the early stages of
planning for the program's retirement, its development of a detailed
long-term strategy to sustain its future workforce is being hampered by
several factors:
* Near-term focus on returning the space shuttle to flight. Since the
Space Shuttle Columbia accident, the program has been focused on its
near-term goal of returning the space shuttle safely to flight. While
this focus is understandable given the importance of the space
shuttle's role in completing assembly of the ISS, it has led to the
delay of efforts to determine future workforce needs.
* Uncertainties with respect to implementing the Vision. While the
Vision has provided the Space Shuttle Program with the goal of retiring
the program by 2010 upon completion of the ISS, the program lacks well-
defined objectives or goals on which to base its workforce planning
efforts. For example, NASA has not yet determined the final
configuration of the ISS, the final number of flights for the space
shuttle, how ISS operations will be supported after the space shuttle
is retired, or the type of vehicle that will be used for space
exploration. These determinations are important because they impact
decisions about the transition of space shuttle assets. Lacking this
information, NASA officials have said that their ability to progress
with detailed long-term workforce planning is limited.
Despite Uncertainties, NASA Could Follow a Strategic Human Capital
Management Approach:
Despite these uncertainties, the Space Shuttle Program could follow a
strategic human capital management approach to plan for sustaining its
critically skilled workforce. Studies by several organizations,
including GAO, have shown that successful organizations in both the
public and private sectors follow a strategic human capital management
approach, even when faced with an uncertain future environment.
In our March 2005 report, we made recommendations aimed at better
positioning NASA to sustain a critically skilled space shuttle
workforce through retirement. In particular, we recommended that the
agency begin identifying the Space Shuttle Program's future workforce
needs based upon various future scenarios the program could face.
Scenario planning can allow the agency to progress with workforce
planning, even when faced with uncertainties such as those surrounding
the final number of space shuttle flights, the final configuration of
the ISS and the vehicle that will be developed for exploration. The
program can use the information provided by scenario planning to
develop strategies for meeting the needs of its potential future
scenarios. NASA concurred with our recommendation, and NASA's Assistant
Associate Administrator for the Space Shuttle program is leading an
effort to address the recommendation.
Since we issued our report and made our recommendation, NASA has taken
action and publicly recognized that human capital management and
critical skills retention will be a major challenge for the agency as
it moves toward retiring the space shuttle. This recognition was most
apparent at NASA's Integrated Space Operations Summit held in March
2005. As part of the Summit process, NASA instituted panel teams to
examine the Space Shuttle Program's mission execution and transition
needs from various perspectives and make recommendations aimed at
ensuring that the program will execute its remaining missions safely as
it transitions to supporting emerging exploration mission needs. The
reports that resulted from these examinations are closely linked by a
common theme--the importance of human capital management and critical
skills retention to ensure success. In their reports, the panel teams
highlighted similar challenges to those that we highlighted in our
report. The panels made various recommendations to the Space Flight
Leadership Council on steps that the program should take now to address
human capital concerns. These recommendations included developing and
implementing a critical skills retention plan, developing a
communication plan to ensure the workforce is informed, and developing
a detailed budget that includes funding for human capital retention and
reductions, as well as establishing an agencywide team to integrate
human capital planning efforts.
Conclusions:
There is no question that NASA faces a challenging time ahead. Key
decisions have to be made regarding final configuration and support of
the ISS, the number of shuttle flights needed for those tasks, and the
timing for development of future programs, such as the CEV--all in a
constrained funding environment. In addition, any schedule slip in the
completion of the construction of the ISS or in the CEV falling short
of its accelerated initial availability (as soon as possible after
space shuttle retirement) may extend the time the space shuttle is
needed. But whatever decisions are made and courses of action taken,
the need for sustaining a critically skilled workforce is paramount to
the success of these programs. Despite a limited focus on human capital
management in the past, NASA now acknowledges that it faces significant
challenges in sustaining a critically skilled workforce and has taken
steps to address these issues. We are encouraged by these actions and
the fact that human capital management and critical skills retention
was given such prominent attention throughout the recent Integrated
Space Operations Summit process. The fact that our findings and
conclusions were echoed by the panel teams established to support the
Integrated Space Operations Summit is a persuasive reason for NASA
leadership to begin addressing these human capital issues early and
aggressively.
Madam Chairman, this concludes my prepared statement. I would be
pleased to respond to any questions that you or other Members of the
Subcommittee may have.
Contacts and Acknowledgments:
For further information regarding this testimony, please contact Allen
Li at (202) 512-4841 or lia@gao.gov. Individuals making key
contributions to this testimony included Alison Heafitz, Jim Morrison,
Shelby S. Oakley, Karen Sloan, and T.J Thomson.
FOOTNOTES
[1] GAO, Space Shuttle: Actions Needed to Better Position NASA to
Sustain Its Workforce through Retirement, GAO-05-230 (Washington, D.C.:
Mar. 9, 2005).
[2] The Iran Nonproliferation Act (P.L. 106-178). The Iran
Nonproliferation Act bans the United States from making extraordinary
payments to Russia in connection with the International Space Station,
unless the President determines, among other things, that Russia
demonstrated a commitment to prevent the transfer to Iran of goods,
services, and technology that could materially contribute to developing
nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons, or of ballistic or cruise
missile systems.
[3] The Space Shuttle Program accounted for 27 percent of NASA's fiscal
year 2005 budget request.
[4] To return the space shuttle to flight, NASA will conduct two
flights, which are intended to test and evaluate new procedures for
flight safety implemented as a result of the Space Shuttle Columbia
accident. The planning window for the first flight is July 13 through
July 31, 2005.
[5] Number is based on a full-time equivalent calculation. Full-time
equivalent is a measure of staff hours equal to those of an employee
who works 40 hours per week in 1 year; therefore, the actual number of
employees who work part-time or full-time on the Shuttle Program is
greater than 2,000. The number was calculated by averaging the number
of civil service employees over fiscal year 2004.
[6] The number was calculated by averaging the number of contractor
employees over fiscal year 2004. This number includes data from NASA's
prime contractor for space shuttle operations, United Space Alliance,
and other NASA contractors. United Space Alliance, established in 1996
as a joint venture between Lockheed Martin and Boeing to consolidate
NASA's various Space Shuttle Program contracts under a single entity,
and its approximately 10,400 employees are responsible for conducting
the space shuttle's ground and flight operations under the Space Flight
Operations Contract. The remaining contractor personnel are associated
with other space shuttle components, such as its propulsion systems.
[7] Data provided by NASA is as of September 30, 2004. GAO did not
perform a reliability assessment of the data.
[8] GAO, Space Shuttle: Human Capital Challenges Require Management
Attention, GAO/T-NSIAD-00-133 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 22, 2000) and
GAO, Space Shuttle: Human Capital and Safety Upgrade Challenges Require
Continued Attention, GAO/NSIAD/GGD-00-186 (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 15,
2000).
[9] Columbia Accident Investigation Board, Report Volume I (Washington,
D.C.: August 2003); Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel, Annual Report for
2001 (Washington, D.C.: March 2002); Behavioral Sciences Technology,
Inc., Assessment and Plan for Organizational Culture Change at NASA
(Ojai, Calif.: March 15, 2004).
[10] GAO, High-Risk Series: An Update, GAO-01-263 (Washington, D.C.:
January 2001); GAO, High-Risk Series: An Update, GAO-03-119
(Washington, D.C.: January 2003); GAO, High-Risk Series: An Update, GAO-
05-207 (Washington, D.C.: January 2005); GAO, Performance
Accountability Series--Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: A
Governmentwide Perspective, GAO-01-241 (Washington, D.C.: January
2001); GAO, Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: A
Governmentwide Perspective, GAO-03-95 (Washington, D.C.: January 2003);
GAO, Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: National
Aeronautics and Space Administration, GAO-01-258 (Washington, D.C.:
January 2001); and GAO, Major Management Challenges and Program Risks:
National Aeronautics and Space Administration, GAO-03-114 (Washington,
D.C.: January 2003); GAO, Human Capital: Key Principles for Effective
Strategic Workforce Planning, GAO-04-39 (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 11,
2003); GAO, A Model of Strategic Human Capital Management, GAO-02-373SP
(Washington, D.C.: Mar. 15, 2002); and GAO, Human Capital: A Self-
Assessment Checklist for Agency Leaders, GAO/OCG-00-14G (Washington,
D.C.: Sept. 1, 2000). See also www.gao.gov/pas/2005.
[11] Enacted in February 2004, the NASA Flexibility Act of 2004 (P.L.
108-201) amends title 5, United States Code, by inserting a new chapter
98 in that title, which provides new authorities to NASA. On March 26,
2004, NASA submitted a written workforce plan for using its new
authorities to Congress.