Sunday, June 28, 2015

The world changed in a lot of ways last Friday. Some changes were easily grasped; some will take longer to fully comprehend. The world changed for some people who are serving 15 years or more in prison. The statute that drove the no-less-than 15 year penalty was held unconstitutional, at least in part. Some of these people were, and are, actually innocent of the penalty. They may go home soon. This is retroactive. How much more reach will it have? Carl writes about this below. Here’s the case:Johnson v. US, reversing the Eighth Circuit in an 8-to-1 decision, with Justice Scalia writing for the majority and Justice Alito as the lone dissent.Here’s the issue: The Armed Career Criminal Act, or ACCA, requires a mandatory fifteen-year sentence for a felon-in-possession if that person has three or more previous convictions of a violent felony or a serious drug felony. A violent felony includes any felony that “involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another.” This is known as the residual clause. The Court held that this definition is too vague to be constitutionalHere’s the standard: A criminal law so vague that it fails to give ordinary people fair notice of the conduct it punishes, or so standardless that it invites arbitrary enforcement, is unconstitutional. It violates the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. And the holding: “We are convinced that the indeterminacy of the wide-ranging inquiry required by the residual clause both denies fair notice to the defendant’s and invites arbitrary enforcement by judges. Increasing a defendant’s sentence under the clause denies due process of law.” Justice Scalia deemed the nine-year effort to salvage the residual clause “a failed enterprise.” Next: This is a 50-plus page decision, with concurrences and a dissent. Some of the issues are easy to grasp; some will take longer to absorb. But Johnson is important, and immediately so. More in-depth posts in the coming days, but for the short-term reactions, distinctions, and musings, read on. Tom:The Court identified two vagueness concerns. First, a court must determine not whether the defendant's real-world conduct created a substantial risk, but rather whether an idealized "ordinary case" of the crime involved such a risk. But it's unclear how to define such an ordinary case and whether such a crime creates the requisite degree of risk -- should this be done through statistics, surveys, expert testimony, or judicial intuition? So this type of indeterminancy relates to the specific type of crime at issue. Second, a broader problem relates to the indeterminancy of the ACCA's "serious potential risk" standard. The four enumerated crimes vary widely in the degree of risk each poses, so it's impossible to distill a clear standard from them. This indeterminancy goes to both the degree of risk and the type of risk required to qualify a crime as a violent felony. Some crimes happen to be close enough to an enumerated crime (e.g., in James attempted burglary qualified because it was sufficiently analogous to the enumerated crime of completed burglary) and other crimes happen to be of a kind for which statistics are maintained (e.g., escape as in Chambers or eluding as in Sykes) but these may be outliers. Lower courts have also disagreed widely not only on their categorization of priors but also in their analysis -- the nature of the inquiry, the relevant factors, and the probability of harm required, and this supports the notion that the statute is indeterminate. Melody: On a more basic note, Johnson is limited to the residual clause definition. The four enumerated crimes that Tom refers to are in the text of the statute -- arson, burglary, extortion, and crimes involving the use of explosives. Those definitions remain in force (although still problematic, in some instances). Carl: This case will obviously lead to a lot of ACCA defendants getting new sentences. But it could also have dramatic impacts for many other defendants. For example, the definition of ACCA “violent felony”is virtually identical to the guideline definition of "crime of violence." And the Tenth Circuit has treated the analysis the same. So Johnson’s holding that the residual clause of the ACCA is unconstitutionally vague (as to what constitutes a "violent felony") could impact many cases where a “residual clause”-type analysis was used to enhance the sentence based on a prior conviction for a crime of violence (as defined in USSG 4B1.2(a)). Melody: Those will be good arguments going forward. Johnson will be retroactive for the true ACCA/actual innocence cases. But is there a way back into the guideline "residual-clause"-type cases that are already sentenced? Probably not.Kirk: Shucks, I don't know. I am trying to figure out a way to rodeo up the PSRs that will let us find the clients who are affected by Johnson. I'm just the accountant who provides the raw material to the smart folks.Dan: Persist. Endure. Survive. This is the message. This is the heart of it all. Because twice in the last ten years, a majority of the Supreme Court opined that the residual clause was not, in fact, unconstitutionally vague. Lower courts turned this dicta into law. We had lost. This battle was done. Until it wasn't. Put aside the future for a moment. Think about the past. And understand that what once was may no longer be. We learned this on a grand scale this June 26. We learned that, when right is on our side, we have a fighting chance. Keep up the fight. [Preach it, brother].Kirk: Sure. This is the decision that emboldens the “exception proves the rule” crowd. Alamendarez-Torres, anyone? Keep filing those cert petitions. And keep telling clients that you will fix things at the Supreme Court. Even though you won’t.Johnson is an extreme outlier. It happens. I know it does. But it happens once in forever. Dan has limited faith in appellate courts, because he negotiates them better than I ever could. But we have to recognize the odds. Which are bad. I vote for maximizing gain in district court. Melody: Or perhaps both. When you win at the appellate level, you can win big. Like Johnson. Or Brooks. Or Booker. I say this as I am neck-deep in an Almendarez-Torres challenge. Because that case WILL fall. Back to Johnson . . . .Tom: The opinion may help in other vagueness challenges. For example, the majority rejects the notion that a statute cannot be void for vagueness unless it is vague in all applications -- that is, it rejects the notion that because there may be cases unquestionably within the scope of a statute, the statute is not vague. The Court recognizes that the relevant question is whether the statute is vague, and this one is. The Court distinguished other cases rejecting vagueness challenges because this statute, unlike statutes using phrases such as "substantial risk," requires a court to look not at what occurred on an actual occasion but at an abstract idealized case. This might open the door to vagueness challenges of some other recidivism statutes (or maybe even USSG provisions) to the extent that they require categorizing a prior conviction based on some attribute of an idealized version of the crime rather than, for example, its elements. Are there other statutes or USSG provisions similar to the residual clause in this regard?

Carl: The existence of a prior “crime of violence” determines whether a defendant qualifies as a career offender. It also impacts the offense level for basic felon-in-possession cases under USSG 2K2.1. Similarly, illegal reentry defendants see increases in their offense level under USSG 2L1.2 for prior crimes of violence. See, e.g., U.S. v. Ventura-Perez, 666 F.3d 670, 673 (10th Cir. 2012). And I'm sure there are even more enhancements for prior crimes of violence that are not immediately apparent. In short, Johnson was huge for defendants who received the mandatory minimum sentences under the ACCA. But it could have a much greater impact than just in ACCA cases.

Thursday, June 25, 2015

A new legal podcast has been launched by Paige Nichols. Just in Case will review US Supreme Court, Tenth Circuit, and Kansas appellate decisions in criminal cases. You know, cases just in.In case you needed to know. Expect a new podcast about every two weeks. Two are already posted and ready for listening. Original music accompaniment. The podcasts will run about a half hour to 45 minutes, and will host different guests to talk about cases that are just in. Sponsored by Monnat and Spurrier, the podcast link is on their website, or here.

As always, Paige is educational, erudite, and entertaining. Tune in to Just in Case.

Tuesday, June 16, 2015

With all of the talk about over-incarceration and pending legislation designed to reduce prison overcrowding, probationary sentences are gaining momentum. In advocating for a non-custodial sentence, the courts should be reminded that probation is not a free pass. This passage fromGall v. US catalogs the penalties,

Probationers may not leave the judicial district, move, or change jobs without notifying, and in some cases receiving permission from, their probation officer or the court. They must report regularly to their probation officer, permit unannounced visits to their homes, refrain from associating with any person convicted of a felony, and refrain from excessive drinking. USSG § 5B1.3. Most probationers are also subject to individual ‘special conditions’ imposed by the court. Gall, for instance, may not patronize any establishment that derives more than 50% of its revenue from the sale of alcohol, and must submit to random drug tests as directed by his probation officer.

In Gall, the Court approved of a variance from 30 to 37 month guideline range to probation (and rejected a presumption of reasonableness at the district court level). The Court also said,

[T]he probation or parole conditions imposed on an individual can have a significant impact on both that person and society .... Often these conditions comprehensively regulate significant facets of their day-to-day lives .... They may become subject to frequent searches by government officials, as well as to mandatory counseling sessions with a caseworker or psychotherapist.

Just the stigma of a felony carries with it a devaluation in our society, in employment, housing, and reputation. All, of course, in addition to losing the right to vote or carry a firearm. Other "invisible punishments" and collateral consequences bear down on our clients and should not be ignored in measuring the appropriate sentence.

Congress recognized the value of a probation sentence, distinct from a prison sentence, and not just a matter of judicial grace in extraordinary cases. In fact, through the Sentencing Reform Act, Congress told the Commission to design guidelines that preserved probation as a ‘generally appropriate’ sentence in certain cases, such as nonviolent crimes or first offenders. The initial provision of 28 USC §994(a)(1) directs that the first sentencing decision under the guidelines should be whether probation or prison is appropriate.

That didn’t happen. Instead the Commission devised guidelines that made probation a rarity in federal court, all but ignoring the great significance of nonviolent offenders or first-time offenders. This Guideline defect from flawed empirical data – in averaging sentences from past practice, the Commission excluded non-prison sentences, thus eliminating 48% of all sentences imposed during the relevant time frame.

Now, with the move toward alternative sentences and the overarching concern about prison overcrowding and over-incarceration,there is more reason than ever to advocate for a non-custodial sentence. According to the United States Sentencing Commission, about 7.1% of 2014 cases received probation,and this should climb. The USSC website and resources offer much information about the rates of probation for each category of offense. Good fodder for our sentencing memos.

Friday, June 12, 2015

Note: if you read this entire post, please note in the comments section. We have statistical comparison (betting pool) on this factor. -- MelodyPrologue: So we are working on a statistical instrument to measure
different plea bargaining strategies. The following is an email thread
discussing our approach. Dan Hansmeier, Carl Folsom, Melody Evans, and myself
(Kirk Redmond) are quoted. The names of Judges are redacted to protect the innocent.

Spoiler (from Kirk) - Dan is wrong, but funnier and more profane than
anyone else.

Kirk

We are getting close to having enough data to analyze. The
question is what to do with it. One of the ideas was that we would normalize
between judges by adding a coefficient. The idea was to compare the SD (sentence
differential: sentence expected minus sentence imposed) for each judge against
the low end, and add a multiplier. If Judge XXXX sentences illegal re-entry
defendants at 1.21 times the low end of the guideline range, we should multiply
the sentence expected by 1.21 to account for how s/he actually sentences
defendants. This is a recognition that a low end sentence is not the
expectation in front of Judge XXXX in a 1326 case.

But it occurred to me just now, because I'm dense, that this
approach should not extend across all plea options. Binding pleas don't affect
what the judge can do to the client, unless it is rejected, which we keep track
of separately. 5K motions don't affect what the judge does, because they are [almost]
always followed. Charge bargains are a more difficult question. They usually
leave the ultimate sentence up to the judge.I think we should only apply the multiplier in open plea and no plea
agreement cases. The other plea (or acquittal) options don't measure judicial
performance. We need to get this straight before we set up the database.

Dan

Doesn't this coefficient obliterate the known comparator (the
low end of the Guidelines range)?

I don't follow the coefficient. I don't understand why we
need to fudge the numbers to recognize that some judges vary downward in
certain cases. The actual numbers, compared to the Guidelines range, will tell
us that, right?

And how does the coefficient affect our ability to compare
judges? I'm lost when I try to imagine that scenario.

Kirk

And I'm not following. How is the low end of the guideline
range the baseline if a particular judge doesn't sentence at the low end in a
particular case type? Assuming that the low end is a stable result seems dumb
if the data doesn't agree. It's not fudging the data, it's adjusting for the
results.

Dan

You lost me. The low end is the low end because, by
definition, it is the low end. It is the one constant that allows a
cross-comparison. It is why that brilliantly odd KU professor [edit: Not who
you might be thinking of if you know what we are doing] got a boner when we
talked with him that day. Maybe I'm wrong, but it seems to me that as soon as
the low end is something other than the low end, it is impossible to compare
between judges. Well, at least impossible to make a meaningful comparison
between judges. And it makes it more difficult to advise clients.

Wouldn't this be like adjusting ERA based on the strength of
the opposing team? Or maybe awarding less than or more than one steal based on
the arm strength of the opposing catcher? Is that similar to what the
coefficient does? Does Billy Beane do this shit?

Kirk

We don't throw out the low end. We see whether judges
actually adhere to it.

This is like baseball guys adjusting for the park in which
the team plays. Say a guy hits 38 home runs. It matters whether he plays 81
games at Coors Field or 81 games at Petco (before they moved the fences in this
year). If you are considering signing that guy as a free agent, you have to
know whether those home runs were a product of his skill or a product of the
park he played in.

Or with your ERA example, you have to consider the defense
behind the pitcher. A pitcher’s ERA may be low because he is awesome, or it may
be low because he puts the ball in play a lot and the defense goes and catches
it.

For the same reason, it matters what court you are in when
determining what approach to take to a given case. Returning to the example of
Judge XXXX sentencing a 1326 case, it will be useful for the client to know
whether s/he generally sentences defendants to the low end of the guideline
range. I suspect that is not true. But we will be able to find out soon enough.
If s/he does not, we can see how far away from the low end s/he generally
imposes sentence. That is a critical piece of advice for clients- is a low-end
recommendation worth bargaining for? Because if it’s not, we should try to lock
in a binding plea, even if it's just to the low end.

The inverse is Judge XXXX on a drug case. If s/he is
statistically likely to vary downward, then why would you ever enter a low-end
plea agreement? More specifically, if Judge XXXX sentences drug cases at .89 of
the low end, shouldn't you always plead open and argue for a variance? You
can't find that out if you use low end as an unaltered constant.

Carl is enjoying this from afar.

Dan

Redmond's Coefficient. My children will study this one day.
Well, the younger one. The older one might not make it out of preschool.

Suspiciously, your hyperlinks did not work.

I'm still missing the value in it. We are not scouting
judges. We are comparing them. Right? And, for a valid comparison, one that is
statistically significant, the key is a stable comparator. We have that. The
guidelines range is the equivalent of the universal ball park, or the universal
defense. Or the entire universe. It allows us to compare judge behavior in all
types of cases. And our numbers will answer your proposed questions without the
application of Redmond's Coefficient. If XXXX comes in below the range in drug
cases, our numbers tell us that, and we know not to enter into a low-end plea
agreement.

What if we created two sets of numbers: one based on
Redmond's Coefficient, and the other based on a straight statistical comparison
with the Guidelines range? Or are we doing that? Is Redmond's Coefficient like
a bonus? Is it like a Lorenzo Cain bobblehead? Because if so, I'm not going to
argue against it. I love bobbleheads.

So, should Clayton Kershaw's ERA depend upon the team he
faces? Should he be allowed 2 earned runs per inning when he faces the Cards
because the Cards own him? Should he not be allowed any earned runs when he
faces the Cubs because the Cubs are, well, the Cubs?

Have you written Rob Manfred a letter about this yet? Can you
set up a fantasy baseball league where the stats are based on Redmond's
Coefficient?

Carl (at
least the response he was writing before I got in first)

Hilariously enough, this is the unfinished response I started
for Dan:

I think it's more like adjusting the ERA based on the park
the team is playing in (park factor) or the defense they pitch in front of. The
same fly ball out in Kauffman might be a home run in Yankee Stadium. Just like
a low end sentence might be a poor result with a really favorable judge, but it
might be a good result with a tough judge.

The league ERA in Kauffman is lower than it is in Yankee
Stadium. This is true even when other factors are accounted for. So a pitcher
with a 4.50 ERA who plays for the Royals is a worse pitcher than one with a
4.50 ERA who plays for the Yankees.

So if the league average ERA is 4.50, this is like the SE.
Getting the average ERA or the low end is an average result. But if a certain
judge always gives high end of the range on child porn cases, or another judge
always gives downward variances - because he/she thinks the use of computer
enhancement is bullshit, that should be accounted for.

Just like the SD will be worse for certain judges than other
judges. Getting a 20-month variance (below the Low end (SE)) from XXXX will
probably be a hell of a lot harder than in front of XXXX.

What Carl actually
wrote

I think we're scouting judges against the guidelines. And
we're scouting our own performance against what the judges usually do (Redmond
Coefficient?).

Like a Rockies pitcher with a 4.50 ERA is probably better
than a Royals pitcher with a 4.50 ERA (adjusting for home park and defense).

Dan

I cannot believe that Carl just conceded that a Rockies
pitcher is "probably better" than a Royals pitcher.

What the fuck is going on around here?

I'd also note the phrase "against the guidelines"
Carl used in the first sentence. I think that is exactly right. The Guidelines
do not adjust based on the courtroom or the judge (like ERAs and ballparks).

I feel like a member of the Sentencing Commission.

What the fuck is going on around here?

Kirk

Let's continue this email until the end of time.

The guidelines comparator stays in the equation, always. But
our current assumption of a low-end default is just a starting point. And it
will probably be the ending point with some Judges, like XXXX. But that's not
universally true. Judge XXXX says that he starts in the middle of the guideline
range, and after looking at all of his drug sentences, I believe him.
Evaluating whether a government recommendation influences his sentencing
decision seems important. Anecdotally, I don't think it influences XXXX.

Dan, I will set up the database so that if you prefer to
ignore the judge deciding the sentence, you can.

Melody

I want a XXXX bobblehead.

Carl

I can probably make this happen. Karen and I had personalized
bobble heads on our wedding cake. Ordered from England.

Dan

I have my own bobblehead as well. I thought everyone did. I
think some kid in Asia made mine. It is like the bobblehead equivalent
to a blood diamond.

I don't want to ignore the judge. I think I want the option
to ignore your coefficient. Can we have it both ways? Will the numbers tell me
where the judge falls with respect to the guidelines range? Or will the numbers
tell me where the judge falls with respect to some point created by Redmond's
Coefficient? Do I get to know both of those things?

And yes, Hansmeier's Coefficient is in its development stage.
I'm researching Ricky Henderson's stolen-base record as we speak . . . .

Thursday, June 11, 2015

The new Computer and Internet Monitoring Program (or “CIMP”
-- not to be confused with the amusing abbreviation for “simpleton” so often
hurdled at the author as a child) is off to a rocky start. The Tenth Circuit, in this week's opinion inUS v. Ullman, just stated that the CIMP language authorizing USPO to impose “restrictions
and/or prohibitions related to: computer and Internet use,”

standing alone, would impermissibly
impose a greater deprivation of liberty than reasonably necessary because it
suggests that the Probation Office may completely ban a means of communication
that has become a necessary component of modern life.

The court also remarked that such a condition, “standing
alone, is unnecessarily ambiguous,” and it “caution[ed] that adjudicating
further appeals because of the ‘restrictions and /or prohibitions’ language is
not a valuable use of our limited judicial resources.” So the defendant wins,
right?

Not so fast. The Tenth Circuit upheld the condition because
the district court, in the course of
denying the defense objection to the USPO petition to add this condition,
had remarked that the defendant “has not been prohibited from using his
computer, cell phone, or any other electronic appliance with internet access.”
Characterizing this remark as “unambiguous” and “the controlling version of the
modified condition,” the Tenth Circuit upheld the modified condition. Does this
now mean that the defendant is authorized to use his “computer, cell phone, or
any other” Internet device? And should we now be arguing in appropriate cases
that district court findings about what has or has not been done in the past
may actually be authoritative limiting constructions of orders being
challenged?

The Ullmann Court
rejected a nondelegation challenge to the condition as well, again relying on
the district court’s efforts to reshape the CIMP language, in particular, the
district court’s statement confirming that it

retains control over decisions
affecting the scope of Ullmann’s punishment, such as whether he can access the
Internet, and delegates to the Probation Office only ministerial issues, such
as the choice of monitoring software.

Ullmann makes
clear that the unadorned CIMP condition is invalid, but it fails to answer many
questions. For example, if the CIMP condition is challenged, should the
district court replace it with an unambiguous condition or just refer to Ullmann and say this has already been
resolved by the Tenth Circuit? Remember that 18 U.S.C. § 3583(f) requires
district courts to direct USPO to

provide the defendant with a written
statement that sets forth all the conditions to which the term of supervised
release subject, and that is sufficiently clear and specific to serve as a
guide for the defendant’s conduct and for such supervision as is required.

The CIMP language certainly doesn’t meet this standard, but
it’s hard to see how any language in the Ullmann
opinion does, either. It will be interesting to see whether USPO comes up with
a new policy that actually provides such guidance.

Wednesday, June 10, 2015

It is common knowledge that the courts allow Congress to regulate noncommercial activity via its Commerce Clause authority. And this is so despite two Supreme Courtdecisions reigning in that power with respect to gun-free school zones and violence against women. On the heels of these decisions, failed attacks were made on a number of statutes rooted in commerce-clause authority (think child pornography and other sex-offender-related statutes as examples). But we continue to press the arguments, knowing that there are Supreme Court Justices displeased with the breadth of Congress's commerce-clause powers.

In
a recent dissent, Justice Thomas, joined by Justice Scalia, was explicit: “Congress
may not regulate noneconomic activity, such as sex crimes, based on the effect
it might have on interstate commerce."Enter the Sixth Circuit's even more recent decision in United States v. al-Maliki.The case involved a prosecution based on foreign travel followed by sex with a minor in a foreign country. The defendant challenged the prosecution as outside the scope of Congress's foreign commerce clause powers. The Sixth Circuit rejected the argument under plain error review, but, for all intents and purposes, found the argument persuasive. The Court found it doubtful that it is enough to establish that a defendant at one point traveled in foreign commerce, with no unlawful intent whatsoever, in order to convict under the statute at issue (18 U.S.C. 2423(c)). That type of noneconomic activity is beyond commerce-clause authority. The Court noted: "There isn't -- and can't be -- a generalized federal crime for traveling in interstate commerce with no illicit purpose and then, after a few months, committing illicit sexual conduct with a minor."Let's stop there and insert: "failing to register as a sex offender" for "committing illicit sexual conduct with a minor." Because the logic is identical: why do we allow Congress to prohibit the intrastate activity of failing to register simply because the defendant had earlier traveled in interstate commerce, with no illicit purpose not to register. Because the courts do not require such an illicit purpose.As difficult as it is to raise bound-to-fail commerce-clause challenges, this case gives some hope that, at some point, perhaps we can turn the tide and reign in the farce that is noncommercial regulation justified via a clause about commerce.

Monday, June 8, 2015

We know that prison can be much more punishing to our older clients. And we know that BOP does not provide adequate care for or attention to elderly inmates. Now, the Office of the Inspector General, a division of DOJ, has issued a report saying just that. The Impact of an Aging Inmate Population on the Federal Bureau of Prisons reviews the financial and structural burdens on BOP and how this translates into less-than-optimal care for older inmates. Bottom line: it costs more to take care of older inmates because of physical and medical needs, and BOP cannot afford to incarcerate elderly inmates in a safe and humane manner. Not a shocking conclusion, but the numbers are compelling.

34%: By the end of 2013, BOP was 34% over capacity and elderly inmates are the fastest growing segment of that population.36/ 39,000: One of the sentencing factors listed in section 3553(a) is whether the sentence will provide "the defendant with needed educational or vocational training, medical care, or other correctional treatment in the most effective manner. . . " This Report is evidence that a custody sentence for an aging client may not be appropriate because BOP fails to "provide programming opportunities designed specifically to meet the needs of aging inmates." Staffing is simply inadequate. Social workers are "uniquely qualified" to prepare an aging inmate for release. Of 39,000 BOP employees, only 36 serve as social workers. This impedes placement on home confinement.

114, 262, and 1,000: Likewise, a client who is both aging and has serious medical problems will not, according to DOJ, receive adequate medical care while in BOP custody. Inadequate medical staffing often requires medical care outside of the institution, but insufficient transport staff then limits this option. Need a cardiologist or neurosurgeon? The average wait time was 114 days. Follow up appointment? Another 262 days. One institution estimated that it was "one thousand inmates behind" in providing chronic care clinics.

15%: Recidivism is also a primary concern for sentencing courts. Aging inmates have fewer violations while in prison, and are much less likely to recidivate. The Report compared the general re-arrest rate for released inmates at 41% (which is questionable) to only 15% of elderly inmates re-arrested within three years.

There are other reasons for the sentencing court to consider a non-custody sentence for an elderly client, or a shorter sentence for an older client who may develop medical and physical needs that BOP cannot accommodate. For example, the Report finds that BOP's physical infrastructure limits the availability of appropriate housing. Lower bunks, handicap access, elevators, or level terrain are simply unavailable in some institutions, in part due to overcrowding and under-funding. (Same coin, different sides). Institutions often lack enough trained staff to assist with daily activities, such as hygiene and ambulation, which can be compromised by age. Lacking trained staff, BOP resorts to inmate companion programs, in which an inmate is assigned to care for an elderly inmate. These arrangements are usually unregulated.

Another example: staff untrained to recognize some problems of aging, such as forgetfulness and lost track of time, will read this behavior as misconduct. Cognitive impairment can be unjustly penalized because the correction officer was not educated on aging issues. This can result in lost good time or other sanctions.

The Report's conclusion: "[A] growing aging inmate population has an adverse impact on the BOP’s ability to provide a safe, humane, cost-efficient, and appropriately secure environment for aging inmates and to assist aging inmates reentering the community."Compassionate Release Program

One other point. For a while, we heard about the compassionate release program, and it sounded hopeful. Then we heard that almost no one got relief, and, as currently administered, it is meaningless to both our clients and BOP. In fact, in 2013, DOJ issued a similar report that was a wholesale take-down of the alleged program. "[T]he existing BOP compassionate release program has been poorly managed and implemented inconsistently, likely resulting in eligible inmates not being considered for release and in terminally ill inmates dying before their requests were decided." In response, BOP revised the criteria for compassionate release, but the statute still requires BOP to initiate any request to the courts for compassionate release, 18 USC 3582(c)(1)(A) and USSG 1B1.13. And BOP simply does not make those requests.

Not much has changed. Between August of 2013, when the OIG's critical report came out, and September of 2014, a total of two "elderly inmates" were released under the new eligibility provisions. That is, two out of 248 inmate requests. The OIG has, again, recommended changes and clarifications to the compassionate release program for elderly inmates.

Wednesday, June 3, 2015

The Central Park Five, for those of us who live in the law, represent the most egregious of injustices, young men subjected to interrogation that produced false confessions, guilty pleas, then years in prison despite their actual innocence.

The Central Park Five – a film by Ken Burns & David McMahon and Sarah Burns 2012) – In 1989, five black and Latino teenagers were arrested and charged with brutally attacking and raping a white female jogger in Central Park. News media swarmed the case, calling them a "wolfpack." The five would spend years in prison for a crime they didn’t commit before the truth about what really happened became clear. With THE CENTRAL PARK FIVE, this story of injustice finally gets the attention it deserves. Based on Sarah Burns’ riveting book and codirected by her husband David McMahon and father, the acclaimed docfilmmaker Ken Burns, this incendiary film tells the riveting tale of innocent young men scapegoated for a heinous crime, and serves as a mirror for our times.

UMKC Film and the Law Series will screen this film June 10, 2015, at Screenland Armour Theatres during a day-long CLE: "This film and the law seminar will present a discussion on statements and interrogations made in wrongful conviction cases and interrogation methods that have no bearing on the truth, but are intended to mousetrap detainees into making incriminating statements. A solid, non-suggestive investigative interview will be demonstrated with an explanation of what a good interview should look like. Screening for innocence in non-DNA cases and racially biased policing will also be addressed."