This is
a pro se prisoner's petition for a writ of habeas corpus
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 [Doc. 1]. Respondents filed
a response in opposition thereto, as well as a copy of the
state record [Docs. 18 and 19]. For the reasons set forth
below, Petitioner's § 2254 petition [Doc. 1] will be
DENIED and this action will be
DISMISSED.

The
following factual background is taken from the TCCA's
opinion on direct appeal of Petitioner's conviction:

At the defendant's May 22-25, 2007, trial, Officer
Matthew Talley of the East Ridge Police Department testified
that on June 15, 2005, . . . at 12:07 a.m., he received a
call that there was an apparent gunshot victim lying in the
middle of the street in the 600 block of North Holly. He
stated that when he and his fellow officers responded to that
location, they saw a large crowd in the middle of the street
and the victim lying in the street partially on his side with
his face down. He testified that, according to the report he
had prepared, witnesses at the scene reported that an unknown
suspect had fled the area in a blue Blazer. On
cross-examination, he acknowledged that his report indicated
that witnesses also stated that the victim and the defendant
had been arguing before the shooting.

Detective Gregory Mardis of the Chattanooga Police Department
testified that he was an investigator with the crime scene
unit and responded to the scene of the shooting at 1:19 a.m.
on June 15, 2005. He stated that when he arrived, another
investigator related that the defendant and the victim had
gotten into an argument, that a fight had ensued, and that
the defendant had retrieved a gun from his vehicle, shot the
victim, and fled the scene. Detective Mardis identified a
number of items that were subsequently admitted into
evidence, including crime scene photographs that showed where
the victim's blood had “puddled up on the
street[.]” He stated that he searched the area but was
unable to locate any weapon.

Lottie Stamper, who said she lived at 609 North Holly Street
and had known the defendant for years, testified that on the
night of the shooting, the defendant and a number of other
individuals were “hanging out” in the vicinity of
Larry Harper's duplex located at 618 North Holly. She
said that another neighborhood resident known as Greg or
“Fat Boy” spoke to the defendant's girlfriend
and that the defendant became angry, telling him that he
could not be “hollering at [his] bitch like
that.” She stated that the two men exchanged words and
then began fighting. She testified that two other men,
Ladarius and Cornelius, became involved and that the victim,
who was visiting his aunt at 614 North Holly, walked down the
street to attempt to break up the fight. She said the victim
was unsuccessful, walked back to his aunt's house, and
went inside. She testified that the victim then came out of
his aunt's house and walked to his car, talking about his
“Game Boy.” She stated that the defendant and the
other men were no longer fighting at that time but were still
down the street at Harper's house arguing.

Stamper described the shooting:

[The victim] went in the car, he was bent over in the car. As
he came out [of] the car, we was sitting on the corner. By
that time, [the defendant] came out of [Harper's] house
and somebody said “Gun!” Everybody . . . left the
street so fast, and . . . me and one of my neighbors . . .
said at the same time, “Somebody going to get
shot.” By that time, [the victim] had, you know, one
knee in the car . . . . And he's coming out. As he
turned, [the defendant] was coming up the street with the
gun, fired the shot, [the victim] fell, everybody had
scattered.

Stamper further testified as follows. She went to the victim
and began applying pressure to his wound. As she did so, he
kept asking what he had done and why had he been shot. She
was still with the victim when the defendant drove down the
street toward them in a sports utility vehicle, and she
overheard him say, “I'm going to run over that
motherf-----.” She put herself in front of the victim
and told the defendant not to do it. He paused a minute,
said, “I should have ran over that motherf-----,
” and then drove off.

Stamper testified that she did not tell the police that the
victim was involved in the argument or the fight and
suggested that either the police officer who took her
statement misunderstood her or that she misspoke and said the
victim's name when she meant to say Greg. She stated that
she saw the defendant go to his vehicle at some point between
the fight and the shooting but that she did not see him
retrieve a gun from the vehicle. She said the defendant was
the only one she saw with a gun that night. Finally, she
testified that although the defendant had grown up with her
children and been “just like a son, ” she felt
obligated to testify against him because she had witnessed
him kill the victim.

On cross-examination, defense counsel played a portion of
Stamper's tape-recorded statement to police, made within
a few hours of the shooting. Stamper acknowledged that she
said in the statement that the victim and the defendant were
arguing over a girl and got into a fight and that the
victim's cousins attempted to break up the fight. She
further acknowledged that she never said anything in her
statement about the victim's having gone to retrieve
something from his car, instead telling the police officer
that the victim was walking away from the fight when he was
shot. She explained the discrepancies by stating that she
might have said anything in the immediate hours after the
shooting and insisted that the account she provided on direct
examination was accurate. She testified, “Like I said,
when the boy got shot, I could have said anything. I
don't know. I hear what's on there and I understand
what's on there, but I'm telling you what happened,
the way it happened.”

The victim's cousin, Antoin Edwards, testified that he
was twelve years old at the time of the shooting and that he
had been playing video games that night with the victim at
his aunt's house, where two other cousins, Ladarius and
Cornelius, were present. He said that he heard voices outside
and that the victim and Cornelius left the house. He stated
that the voices got louder and that he looked out the window
and saw the defendant shoot the victim in the back. He
estimated that the men were within a foot of each other when
the shot was fired and said that he did not see anything that
preceded the shooting.

Homicide Detective James Tate of the Chattanooga Police
Department testified that the defendant was arrested at
approximately 11:00 a.m. on June 16, 2005, and brought to the
“service center” where he and Detective Miller
questioned him about the crime. He identified the
defendant's waiver of rights form and his tape-recorded
statement, which were subsequently admitted into evidence. In
the statement, played for the jury, the defendant said that
he and Gregory Scott got into a fight after Scott
“disrespected” the defendant's girlfriend. He
said that after three or four minutes of one-on-one fighting,
two to four other men jumped in, ganged up on him, and tore
off his shirt. The defendant stated that he told the men the
fight was over and that they broke loose, letting him go. He
said that he was walking away when he noticed a second group
of people headed down the street toward him. He stated that
he “made up [his] mind, ” went to the porch of a
duplex, retrieved a hidden gun, turned around, and fired at
the victim, who had been following him and who turned and
began to run away when he saw that the defendant had a gun.
The defendant stated that he had to “rack” the
gun in order to fire the shot. He said that he intended to
commit an aggravated assault on the victim and did not mean
to kill him.

Detective Tate testified that the gun came from the porch of
618 North Holly Street, which was more than twenty yards from
where the victim's body was found. He said the defendant
had no visible cuts or abrasions on his face or hands during
the interview and did not appear to have been in a recent
fight. He testified that the defendant never identified the
victim as one of the major participants in the altercation.
On cross-examination, he acknowledged that the shirt
identified as the one the defendant had been wearing on the
night of the altercation was torn.

Frank King, Jr., M.D., the Hamilton County medical examiner
who performed the autopsy of the victim's body, testified
that the cause of death was a gunshot wound in which the
bullet entered the victim's body at the left lower back,
grazed against the spine, tore the aorta, went through the
bowel, and exited at the right anterior abdomen. He
classified it as a distant gunshot wound, fired from a
distance of two feet or greater, and he said that it entered
the body at 45.5 inches above the heel and exited at 44.5
inches above the heel, which meant that it descended one inch
from point of entry to point of exit with the body in
“anatomic position.” He stated that he observed
no fresh injuries to the victim's head, hands, or legs
other than those caused by the emergency medical care he
received after the gunshot. He testified that he found two
fresh abrasions on the back right shoulder, which could be
consistent with the victim's having fallen to the
pavement after being shot. During his testimony, Dr. King
identified several autopsy photographs, which were admitted
into evidence and published to the jury. On
cross-examination, he acknowledged that the victim's
hands had been washed in the emergency room and that he had
no way of knowing the exact position of the victim's
body, head, or limbs at the time he was shot other than that
his lower left back was facing the direction of fire.

The defendant elected not to testify and presented no
witnesses in his defense.

State v. Tarvin, 2009 WL at *1-4.

The
following factual background is taken from the TCCA's
opinion on appeal of Petitioner's petition for
post-conviction relief:

At the post-conviction hearing, counsel testified that he did
not subpoena witnesses for the trial, although the Petitioner
provided a list of four or five names the Petitioner thought
had beneficial information. He said he asked the Petitioner
for contact information, but the Petitioner was unable to
provide addresses and working telephone numbers. He said he
attempted to find the people on the list by going to Holly
Street where the killing occurred. He said he and his
paralegal tried to find the people on the list by canvassing
the neighborhood and talking to people. He denied talking to
anyone on the Petitioner's list and said nobody admitted
knowing any of them. He said that they were unsuccessful in
obtaining contact information for the people on the list and
that he did not subpoena them because he could not find them.
He said that he asked the Petitioner to identify other people
who might provide information about how to find the people on
the list but that counsel was still unable to find them.

Counsel testified that he did not have an investigator or
request the court to provide funds for an investigator. He
said the Petitioner's case was pending at a time when he
was responsible for the investigation. He denied that an
investigator would have located the people on the list.

Counsel testified that recordings of the Defendant's and
the witnesses' statements to the police were provided in
the discovery package, and he agreed a recording of Amanda
Wynn's statement was included. When asked if he went to
the address provided by Ms. Wynn in her statement to the
police, he said he pursued any information that might have
helped locate the witnesses. He said that in the neighborhood
where the shooting occurred, it was common for people to hide
because they did not want to participate as witnesses or
discuss the case. He said that the difficulty in locating
witnesses did not mean he did not look for them and that he
was not shocked when he did not find them.

Counsel testified that he did not know if he went to 2305
Barley Street. When he was told Ms. Wynn lived there, counsel
said, he would have tried to locate the address. He said that
he would have gone to where the address should have been but
that he was unsure if it was a “specific
address.” He said it was common to be unable to find a
house at the address provided by a witness. He said that
although he was unsure if a house was located at 2305 Barley
Street, he went to the area looking for the address.

Counsel testified that he twice discussed with the Petitioner
his inability to locate the people on the list and that they
discussed his inability to find the people “within a
reasonable proximity of the time.” He said that his
inability to locate them was not the reason he chose not to
present a self-defense theory. He said he discussed with the
Petitioner his decision not to argue self-defense at the
trial. He said he explained to the Petitioner that he could
be convicted of first degree murder, second degree murder, or
manslaughter. He explained the elements of each offense and
the likelihood of conviction and told the Petitioner that he
believed the Petitioner was most likely to be convicted of
second degree murder, although the jury convicted the
Petitioner of first degree murder. Counsel stated that the
Petitioner did not want to accept any plea offer that would
result in a nineteen-year prison sentence. He said the
Petitioner stated, “If I'm going to get that time,
they're going to have to give it to me. I'm not going
to take it.” He believed the Petitioner thought the
worst possible outcome was a voluntary manslaughter
conviction and a nineteen-year sentence and said he attempted
to explain to the Petitioner that “he had a lot of
exposure.” He said the Petitioner disagreed.

Counsel testified that he discussed with the Petitioner
whether the Petitioner should testify at the trial. He denied
the theory of the case was self-defense and said the
Petitioner told him that he was involved in a fight with a
group of people but left the scene, returned with a weapon,
and shot the victim. He said this was consistent with the
Petitioner's statement to the police, which was played
for the jury. He said the Petitioner's leaving the scene
after the fight prevented a self-defense theory. He said that
in his opinion, it was unwise for the Petitioner to testify.
He agreed the Petitioner referred to multiple fights in his
statement to the police but said the Petitioner discussed
“breaking away” from a fight and obtaining a
weapon, preventing a self-defense theory. He agreed that the
Petitioner's baseball jersey was torn during the fight
and said that the tear was significant because the material
was strong and durable. He said he used this evidence, in
part, to show the Petitioner's state of mind at the time
of the shooting and that the Petitioner was not operating
with a “clear head” or premeditation. He said
that he did not request a self-defense jury instruction
because the facts did not support it and because self-defense
was not the trial strategy.

Counsel testified that he did not recall if the box cutter
found at the scene was introduced at the trial. He said it
was difficult to link the box cutter to someone involved in
the fight who used it against the Petitioner. He did not
recall questioning before the trial the police officer who
testified about the box cutter. He denied that the box cutter
was analyzed for fingerprints and said he did not address the
failure to have it analyzed at the trial because he could not
“place the box cutter in any particular person's
hands.”

Counsel testified that they discussed the Petitioner's
testifying at the trial on “a number of
occasions” before the trial and after the State's
case-in-chief. He advised the Petitioner not to testify and
said he always discussed with his clients that counsel made
certain decisions during the trial and that the defendant
made certain decisions. He said he explained that the trial
strategy of focusing on the Petitioner's state of mind
rather than arguing self-defense was counsel's decision
and that the decision to accept a plea offer and whether to
testify at the trial belonged to the Petitioner. He said the
Petitioner understood that he thought the Petitioner should
accept a plea offer and that he did not recommend the
Petitioner testify at the trial. He said the Petitioner
understood that it was his decision to testify and that he
could testify if he disagreed with counsel's
recommendation. Counsel believed the Petitioner's
testimony would have harmed the case because the Petitioner
risked having his criminal history introduced at the trial.
He said that the Petitioner knew the defense was not calling
any witnesses when he made his decision not to testify.

Counsel testified that aspects of the Petitioner's
statement to the police were not “fleshed out as
perhaps they could have been if he testified.” He said,
though, that having a witness testify about one favorable
topic did not justify presenting the witness at the risk of
having numerous unfavorable topics addressed on
cross-examination. He said that the Petitioner could have
“fleshed out some things” had he testified but
that his testimony would not have been materially different
from his statement to the police. He said, too, that
cross-examination regarding the Petitioner's criminal
history would have “overshadowed” any favorable
testimony regarding the events leading to the shooting. He
denied the Petitioner told him that after he obtained the
gun, the victim stood behind him and two other people stood
in front of him. He did not recall whether Ms. Wynn testified
similarly at the trial. He recalled that the victim stood
behind the Petitioner and that the Petitioner turned and shot
the victim in the back, but he did not recall two men
standing behind the Petitioner.

Counsel testified that he knew about the Petitioner's eye
condition, macular degeneration, and that evidence of the
condition was not introduced at the trial. He agreed his
trial strategy was to obtain a conviction for voluntary
manslaughter but denied that the condition would have been
helpful. He said the testimony showed that the Petitioner
thought someone was coming toward him, that the Petitioner
fired the gun, and that the victim was shot in the back. He
said that there “were issues” about the distance
between the victim and the Petitioner and that testimony
showed the Petitioner was not able to identify clearly whom
he shot. Counsel did not think it mattered that the
Petitioner had macular degeneration because the testimony
showed that the Petitioner “was just shooting at a
form, an object that he saw[.]” He denied that the
Petitioner's eye condition might explain why the
Petitioner did not know if he shot someone who was facing him
or had their back to him.

Counsel testified that he recalled cross-examining Lottie
Stamper but did not recall asking about her two misdemeanor
theft convictions that occurred within ten years of the
trial. He recalled that Ms. Stamper lived on the street where
the shooting occurred and that she held the victim in her
arms after he was shot. He said that although he did not
recall if he asked Ms. Stamper about the convictions, he did
not think the convictions would have changed the jurors'
view of her testimony given the emotional nature of her
testimony. He agreed Ms. Stamper provided a statement to the
police that differed from her testimony. He said he
highlighted the discrepancies during cross-examination by
playing the relevant portions of her recorded statement to
the police. He denied playing her entire statement. He agreed
Ms. Stamper testified that the Petitioner stated twice he was
going to “run this MFer over.” He did not know
why he did not object but said that his usual practice was
not to draw attention to statements of that nature because
the judge might overrule an objection. He recalled thinking
Ms. Stamper's testimony was highly emotional and
dishonest.

Counsel testified that Ms. Stamper stated at the trial that
the victim only attempted to stop the fight and that she
found the victim's gunshot wound by pulling up the
victim's shirt. He agreed Ms. Stamper said in her
statement to the police that the victim “took off his
shirt before he . . . began to fight.” He agreed he did
not address the inconsistency at the trial and said he did
not think highlighting the inconsistent statement would have
changed the jury's verdict because the victim was shot
regardless of whether he wore his shirt at the time. He said
he highlighted the consistencies that were most relevant to
the theory of the case. He recalled that Ms. Stamper was an
uncontrollable witness who said what she wanted to say and
that he attempted to craft his questions carefully to prevent
her from “going off the tracks.” He did not want
to object and hear the trial judge say, “You asked the
question.”

Counsel testified that he did not request special jury
instructions regarding witness credibility and said the
standard instruction was given. He said he reviewed the
pattern jury instructions before the trial and determined
which instructions he needed to request. He did not recall
asking for a special instruction regarding witnesses
convicted of crimes of dishonesty but said even if the jury
discredited Ms. Stamper's testimony in its entirety, the
outcome of the trial would have been the same because of the
Petitioner's statement to the police. He agreed, though,
that Ms. Stamper was the only witness who testified that the
Petitioner said, “I should run that Mfer over.”
He agreed that Ms. Stamper testified that she either got in
front of the car or protected the victim with her body and
that the Petitioner said he should run over the victim. He
agreed the implication was that the Petitioner was driving
the car. He agreed he did not question her about the
Petitioner's eye condition and said he knew she did not
know about the Petitioner's macular degeneration because
he spoke with her before the trial. He said that Ms. Stamper
had known the ...

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