France is an ally that exercises its responsibility as a founding member
and is committed to promoting common values but does not hesitate, if
necessary, to air its differences honestly. This position is in line
with the one the Socialist Party took in particular during the debate in
2009 on France’s return to the integrated command: allied yes, aligned no.

… In 2009, we [French Socialist Party members] did not support a return to the integrated command, but
there is no question of organizing a permanent to-ing and fro-ing, and
there would be little point in leaving it again today. However, we must
ensure that our return, now officially endorsed, does not result in a
trivialization of our foreign policy or a deterioration of our ability
to make decisions and act, but on the contrary, in the growth of our
influence and capabilities.

In this way, France will play its full role in an organization whose
chief mission is to enable democracies with shared values and interests
to organize effectively their armed forces’ interoperability while
guaranteeing their collective defense.

The report [pdf]
that the former foreign minister Hubert Védrine has just presented to
the French president on our country’s role in NATO is a highly useful
contribution to the work of the White Paper Commission tasked with
considering our defense and security policy agenda.

The report shares the same agenda. In particular, it emphasizes a
twofold need: to strengthen our influence within the alliance by showing
ourselves to be vigilant there, and to be more proactive in building a
European defense.

These recommendations are pertinent. In order to implement them and
optimize NATO’s role in the new world around us, our policy must set
itself at least three goals.

1) For France, NATO must remain a special instrument of the
trans-Atlantic relationship for the sake of values and interests we
share — Europeans on the one hand and Americans and Canadians on the
other. NATO is the natural framework for our forces’ joint engagement
with the Americans.

In this context, France will act to pursue the reform of the alliance in
order to make it more effective. It will continue to shoulder its
responsibilities, while preserving autonomy in its fundamental choices:
to implement its nuclear deterrent; to withdraw its combat troops from
Afghanistan, as it has now done; to develop a NATO anti-missile defense
mechanism — for which, at the alliance’s latest summit, President
Hollande set out his conditions, endorsed by the other 27 heads of state
and government; and more generally, to retain freedom in the use of its
forces and develop Defense Europe, which is an integral part of the
project of political union.

France will also continue working to strengthen all areas of cooperation
between NATO and Russia, which in our eyes is a vital partner in
different fields, such as Afghanistan and the fight against piracy and
terrorism.

2) There must be calm discussion — facilitated by President Obama’s
re-election — of a new sharing of security and defense responsibilities
between Europeans and Americans. The United States needs a reliable
European ally capable of shouldering all its responsibilities.

The Libya crisis showed that Europeans could play their part in dealing
successfully with a conflict. We took on the bulk of the risks,
responsibilities and military contributions. But the crisis also showed
that we still need the support provided by the United States. Insofar as
it has the necessary capabilities — as is not sufficiently the case
today — it should be the European Union that acts when Europeans’
security interests are primarily at stake.

In a few months’ time, for example, the E.U. will have to play its full
role supporting the United Nations in helping Mali regain its
sovereignty and fight terrorism. For the same reason, it would be good
to start thinking about the responsibilities it will have to take on
alongside the future Syrian authorities.

3) The efforts initiated for Defense Europe must be pursued. NATO can
make its contribution, but it is up to the Europeans first of all to
work on it among themselves.

This project is consistent with what we are doing to ensure that the
European Union has a coordinated foreign policy with the means to make
and implement decisions. We must act now toward this end, whereas our
country, mobilized these past few years by its return to NATO’s
integrated command, has been rather sparing when it comes to the
resources devoted to Defense Europe.

We are going to continue working to build support for this project among
European institutions and all our European partners, including the
British. Defense Minister Jean-Yves Le Drian and I recently hosted a
meeting with our German, Italian, Spanish and Polish colleagues in order
to make progress, calling on all the member states to join us in
developing this project in cooperation with our main partners, who
obviously include NATO.

All these approaches must allow France to guarantee its independence and
its capacity for action in a new world and at a time when we are facing
strong budget constraints. We shall thus be able to remain an
“influential power” that is expected to speak out and is listened to and
respected.