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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 SARAJEVO 000742
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR D (SMITH), P (BAME), EUR (DICARLO), EUR/SCE
(ENGLISH, SAINZ, FOOKS), NSC FOR BRAUN, USNIC FOR WEBER,
GREGORIAN
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/07/2016
TAGS: PRELPGOVBK
SUBJECT: BOSNIA: VOTES LACKING TO PASS CONSTITUTIONAL
REFORM
Classified By: AMBASSADOR DOUGLAS MCELHANEY. REASON: 1.4 (B) AND (D)
¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Constitutional reform measures agreed on
March 18 by Bosnia and Herzegovina's political party leaders
are now under consideration by relevant committees in the BiH
Parliament. Driven by Bosnia's electoral calendar,
amendments must be approved by the end of April in order for
the changes to the national government to be in place by the
October 2006 general elections. With 15 crucial days to go
before Parliament acts, our count indicates that we have not
-- yet -- nailed down all the votes we need. Some
parliamentarians continue to argue that the changes do not go
far enough; they reject the existing package in favor of a
non-existant but theoretically more sweeping package to be
negotiated in the future. As intensive Embassy lobbying
(bolstered by the international community) moves forward, we
are emphasizing a united message: these changes are an
important first step, essential for BiH's Euro-Atlantic
integration, and the best which can be agreed by all parties
now. For the first time, Bosnians are changing their
Dayton-era constitution themselves. As the parliamentary
vote nears, we will need a strong public message from
Washington to bolster our public diplomacy outreach. This
cable is the first in a series of updates on constitutional
reform legislation. END SUMMARY.
THE TIMELINE: DECISION BY APRIL 25
¶2. (C) After reaching political agreement March 18 on a
package of measures to strengethn Bosnia and Herzegovina's
national government, political leaders approved draft
amendments and legislation for parliamentary approval and
sent it forward on March 25. The measures provide for a
single President with limited competencies and two Vice
Presidents. The Council of Ministers becomes the key
institution of executive authority, and the Prime Minister
receives enhanced powers. In Bosnia's bicameral parliament,
the House of Representatives will double in size, and the
upper house -- the House of Peoples -- will find its role
limited to consideration of issues touching on the vital
national interest of Bosnia's three peoples.
¶3. (C) While political leaders agreed to forward the
legislation on March 25, Bosnian Croat HDZ leader Covic
insisted on having more time for review. This week, on April
5, the leaders met again at his request -- though Covic sent
a substitute. As the basis for the meeting, Covic reworked
some of the amendments, in clear violation of elements of the
earlier political agreement. These were rejected by the
party leaders (bolstered by the Ambassador's presence at the
meeting).
¶4. (C) Legislation is now under consideration by the House
of Representatives' Constitutional and Legal Affairs
Committee (CLAC). The CLAC will hold one public hearing
only, on April 12. We anticipate that it will get a large
turnout, including members of both houses of parliament, the
Council of Ministers, the Constitutional Court, entity-level
officials, law school faculty, etc. The Ambassador plans to
give extensive media interviews on April 11, so that April
12's news focuses on U.S. support for the package.
¶5. (C) The CLAC will vote on the legislation on April 18
and forward the legislation to the full House of
Representatives for consideration. The Constitutional
Committee of the House of Peoples will do the same on April
¶22. The House of Representatives will hold the required two
readings of the legislation and vote all in one day: April
¶24. The House of Peoples will do the same on April 25. The
Ambassador will attend the House session; we will ask all PIC
Steering Board Ambassadors to attend as well.
BUILDING POLITICAL SUPPORT IN THE HOUSE OF REPS . . .
¶6. (C) Both the Embassy and the BiH political party leaders
are engaged in a full court press to build support for the
legislation. Party leaders are counting on party discipline
to ensure passage (always an iffy assumption here), and are
briefing their representatives. Nevertheless, there are
pockets of opposition. Although the small multi-ethnic
government coalition partner "Party for BiH" (SBiH)
participated in the negotiation process, it withdrew and is
now formally opposed thanks to the Presidential ambitions of
its once and future leader, Haris Silajdzic. Also opposed:
the small Bosnian Serb Radical party and a couple of small
SARAJEVO 00000742 002 OF 003
parties without parliamentary representation. They are
joined, critically, by several members of the Bosnian Croat
HDZ who -- having been ousted from their party positions by
HDZ leader Covic -- are opposed to anything Covic has
negotiated.
¶7. (C) In the 42-seat House of Representatives, 28 votes
are needed to ensure passage. We estimate we have 23 solid
votes now. Our strategy is to focus on several potentially
persuadable representatives to get the five votes needed.
This includes key SBiH parliamentarians who are clearly
uncomfortable with Silajdzic's self-interested rejectionism.
The Ambassador met on April 6 with SBiH's Beriz Belkic;
Belkic, deeply uncomfortable with SBiH's stance (having
participated in negotiations through January), admitted that
it was difficult to explain. Belkic told the Ambassador that
SBiH planned to offer an amendment to the legislation which
would eliminate qualified majority voting in the House of
Representatives (QMV, also known as the "entity vote").
Unless QMV was eliminated, SBiH would vote against the
package (rather than abstaining). However, Belkic added that
he was still open for discussion.
¶8. (C) The Ambassador pressed Belkic to reconsider. Surely
Belkic realized, from his participation in the negotiations,
that the Bosnian Serbs could not agree to end QMV now?
Belkic admitted he did. Ambassador pointed out that Belkic
and SBiH had a clear choice to make: support constitutional
reform now, or be responsible for putting the brakes on
Bosnia's Euro-Atlantic integration. With his reputation for
responsible government, Belkic should not align himself with
those who wanted the first Bosnian-negotiated constitutional
reform to fail.
¶9. (C) SBiH's proposed amendment would put the Bosniaks and
Croats in a bind. President Tihic told the Ambassador on
April 4 that his party, SDA, could not be put in the position
of voting to maintain the practice. In the meeting of party
leaders with the Ambassador on April 5, Tihic proposed that
-- if the amendment was tabled by SBiH -- the Bosnian Serb
parties allow SDA, HDZ and the largely Bosniak SDP to side
with SBiH. The Bosnian Serbs could then veto the provision
in the full House. While the Bosnian Serbs rolled their eyes
(realizing that they would once again be portrayed negatively
in the press), SDP leader Lagumdzija argued persuasively that
all the party leaders must stand, together, against amendment
and for the compromises they had negotiated together. The
Ambassador will reinforce this point with Tihic in the coming
days.
¶10. (C) We are also putting the pressure on several Croat
HDZ MPs. Over the past few months, HDZ President Covic has
consolidated his hold over the party, while ousting his
internal opposition. That has made several key HDZ
parliamentarians rebel; they are strongly and publicly
against any plan negotiated and backed by Covic. The Embassy
has told key HDZ parliamentarian Martin Raguz not to make
constitutional reform a weapon in his fight against Covic.
Raguz is sweating under the pressure (which he is also
getting from European ambassadors). Several other anti-Covic
HDZ rebels we met with this week are waiting to see what
Raguz does before making up their own minds.
. . . IN THE HOUSE OF PEOPLES . . .
¶11. (C) By our reckoning, party solidarity in the House of
Peoples means that we already have sufficient support there.
Nine of 15 votes are required, including three from each
ethnic caucus. We estimate we have twelve solid votes; there
are no HDZ rebels among the House of Peoples delegates.
. . . WITH RELIGIOUS FIGURES . . .
¶12. (C) Public support will also be essential to getting
constitutional reform through parliament. Both party leaders
and the Embassy are reaching out to leading civil society
figures. The Islamic Community's governing body Rijaset
issued a supportive statement on March 28. However,
conservative Catholic Church leaders are proving a tougher
sell. President Tihic reportedly met with Vatican General
Secretary Angelo Soldano the week of March 25, explaining the
SIPDIS
benefits of constitutional reform and asking for support.
The Ambassador met with Cardinal Puljic in Sarajevo on April
¶6. Puljic initially claimed that the Church did not get
involved in politics, but when pressed by the Ambassador
SARAJEVO 00000742 003 OF 003
acknowledged that Peric's statements had blatantly already
crossed the line by putting out a statement strongly critical
of reform, and making clear Church criticism of the U.S.
Puljic argued that, as Bosnia's smallest constituent people,
the Croats needed more from constitutional reform -- i.e.,
more ways to block legislation with their minority votes.
However, he eventually agreed that the upcoming Easter
holidays were a good time to focus on religious, not
political, matters.
. . . AND WITH OPINION LEADERS
¶13. (SBU) Over the past ten days, Ambassador, in
conjunction with the German, Austrian and UK ambassadors,
have continued outreach to BiH's opinion leaders. (UK PM
Blair's comments on the issue here were greatly welcomed.)
In separate meetings with newspaper columnists, media editors
and owners, NGO representatives, academic and cultural
figures, he has stressed the importance of constitutional
reform for BiH's Euro-Atlantic future. The response has been
strongly supportive, though Croats remain the most skeptical.
The Ambassador will conduct targetted media outreach next
week, and host similar discussions in Herzegovina the week of
April 18 for those who have been unable to make the trek to
Sarajevo.
¶14. (C) Our outreach to the Bosnian Serb community has, of
necessity, been more low-key. Constitutional reform is not
viewed as positive by most Bosnian Serbs. They are ready to
accept the political leaders' agreement on this set of
reforms precisely because it focuses on national
institutions. Our challenge will be to get support for the
next -- post-election -- phase of the constitutional reform
process. That is the phase which, by examining
"sub-national" government structures, will most threaten
entity (read: Republika Srbska) prerogatives.
DEPLOYING EU, SBA AMBASSADORS -- AND CAPITALS
¶15. (C) At our request, the German and Austrian ambassadors
have been focusing pressure on Bosnian Croat politicians,
particularly HDZ rebels. Ambassador briefed the April 7
meeting of Steering Board Ambassadors on constitutional
reform. The High Rep and SBA agreed to work out a
coordinated lobbying strategy, to be deployed the week of
April 10. Included will be suggestions for using statements
from both Brussels and Washington to ratchet up pressure
closer to the April 24/25 votes. Further updates to follow.
¶16. (C) COMMENT: We are not there yet. If the majority
parties in favor of the package do not stick together,
Silajdzic and the Croats could bring the whole reform process
down. Interestingly, those who believe the reforms are not
enough and those who want more have formed an alliance of
convenience. Intense lobbying and media work will continue.
MCELHANEY