The topic of this paper is the relation between logic, language, and reasoning. I begin by arguing that logical thinking is a type of thinking that is only available to language-using creatures. This conclusion is a corollary of a more general argument for the language-dependence of a more general class of thoughts. In the second part of the paper I discuss the implications of the language-dependence of logic for how we think about the actions of non-linguistic creatures, on the assumption that non-linguistic creatures behave (at least sometimes) in ways that need to be explained in psychological terms. On one popular model, psychological explanations depend upon assumptions of rationality that in turn depend upon the agent whose behavior is being explained being capable of certain forms of reasoning. How should we understand non-linguistic reasoning, if logical thinking requires language? The paper develops a model of proto-logic that satisfies the
requirements of psychological explanation without contravening the language-dependence of logical thinking.

“Human beings are rational animals, in other words, they have logic. The word ‘logic’ has a double meaning, as it describes both a way of thinking and one of the most ancient intellectual disciplines, with its beginnings going back to the 4th century b.c. According to the second meaning, logic is the science of reasoning. Not only because of its long history, but also mainly because of its strong inﬂuence on society, it can be viewed as the backbone of Western civilization […]” (Watanabe 2006:235) [Leer texto completo]