Sonntag, 31. Mai 2015 - 11:20 Uhr

MAGNETIC FILAMENTS ON THE SUN: With no sunspots actively flaring this weekend, solar activity is low. Or is it? There's more to solar activity than sunspots and flares. "I can't recall ever seeing as many magnetic filaments on the sun as I have this month," points out amateur astronomer John W. O'Neal of Amherst, Ohio. "This composite image is my tribute to the filament-ridden sun of May 2015."

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Indeed, the sun has been unusually filamentary. Vast strands of plasma held together by magnetic fields have crept across the face of the sun all month long. Occasionally, these dark filaments become unstable and erupt, hurling parts of themselves into space. Fragments falling back to the stellar surface can explode, producing a type of flare called a Hyder flare--no sunspot required.

There is an extra-large filament on the solar disk today. It stretches more than 700,000 km from end to end--about twice the distance from Earth to the moon. These dimensions make it an easy target for backyard solar telescopes.

Samstag, 30. Mai 2015 - 23:30 Uhr

This image gallery features the best images taken by ESA astronaut Alexander Gerst during his Blue Dot mission as chosen by his followers on Facebook.

Alexander spent six months on the International Space Station in 2014 to run experiments for scientists on Earth and maintain the weightless research station. His tasks included a spacewalk to upgrade a power supply, overseeing the arrival of ATV Georges Lemaître and installing a new furnace to research metal alloys.

Together with crewmates NASA astronaut Reid Wiseman and Russian commander Maxim Suraev, Alexander took thousands of images of Earth from the Cupola observatory in his free time.

Samstag, 30. Mai 2015 - 17:55 Uhr

MOSCOW. The cause of the failed launch of the Progress M-27M ship was a loss of pressure in the engines of the launch vehicle's third stage, Federal Space Agency (Roscosmos) chief Igor Komarov said.

"As a result of the work by the State Commission, telemetric data has been gathered which confirmed the out-of-control release that included two subsequent releases due to a loss of pressure, i.e. an opening first of an oxidizer tank and then the rocket third stage's fuel tank after the rocket's third stage propulsion units were switched off," Komarov said at a briefing commenting on the results of the state commission which probed the situation around the Progress M-27M transport cargo spacecraft.

Quelle: Interfax

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The crew of the International Space Station (ISS) will have to stay in orbit for one more month, the Russian Federal Space Agency (Roscosmos) said on Tuesday.

"We plan make this landing in early June by the decision of the state commission," Vladimir Solovyov, the flight director of the ISS Russian segment, told a news conference.

He said a Progress cargo spaceship would be launched after the landing of the ISS crew and only after that another manned mission would be put in orbit.

It was planned earlier that three members of the ISS crew would return to the Earth on May 14.

The next docking with the International Space Station will be performed in July, Solovyov said. In his words, a cargo spaceship launch would be followed by a manned spacecraft due to safety consideration.

"Under our laws, we cannot make a manned launch next, so we suggested, and Roscosmos supported us, that it would be expedient to launch a Progress cargo ship. A different carrier rocket with a different third stage will be used," he said.

"Preliminarily, we plan to launch a Soyuz with another expedition in late July," Solovyov noted. "We will try to continue the programme, to keep a year’s flight and everything linked with it."

Initially, it was planned to launch another Progress M-28M cargo spaceship on August 6 and a Soyuz - on May 26.

On May 8, a source in the rocket and space industry source told TASS that Roscosmos planned to adjust the program of flights to the International Space Station due to the recent accident involving the Progress M-27M spacecraft. "It is suggested that the return from orbit of the expedition which is currently there be postponed from May 14 to June, then, in late June - early July, a Progress cargo spacecraft be blasted off to the ISS, and then, in the last ten days of July, a manned Soyuz launch be made," the source said, adding the proposal had forwarded by a Roscosmos working group but had not yet been approved.

The Progress M-27M cargo spacecraft was launched on April 28 from the Baikonur space center on a Soyuz carrier rocket. The rocket took the spacecraft to a higher orbit than required to dock with the International Space Station. After a few unsuccessful attempts to get control of the spacecraft, experts gave up the idea. The Progress was to take food, oxygen and other cargos to the ISS crew.

The probe, originally scheduled to be over May 14, has been prolonged till May 22 and may continue after that

The Russian space agency’s panel of inquiry probing into the loss of the Progress M-27M cargo vehicle late last month lacks data to say exactly what caused the emergency, a senior source in the space rocket industry familiar with investigation has told TASS.

"The telemetry data are not enough to name the cause of the incident with certainty. The commission’s members have been dispatched to various manufacturers involved in order to scrutinize space rocket technologies from the same batch and to simulate the emergency. This is essential, as there still is no clarity regarding the real cause of the mishap," the source said.

According to the official the probe, originally scheduled to be over May 14, has been prolonged till May 22 and may continue after that.

"True, some findings may be presented by May 22. In the meantime specialists will keep working at individual enterprises after that date," the source said.

A member of the Tsiolkovsky Russian Cosmonautics Academy, editor-in-chief of the Novosti Kosmonavtiki (Cosmonautics News), Igor Marinin, has told TASS that the real cause of the incident may never be established.

"When such accidents occur, the real cause can be accurately established very rarely. As a rule, all conclusions are probabilistic to a large extent. For instance, there is a 90% certainty that this or that factor was to blame, but there still remains a 10%-chance the cause was different. The probability only one cause will be identified is very low. Such cases are very rare," the expert said.

Another specialist, associate member of the Tsiolkovsky Cosmonautics Academy, Andrei Ionin disagrees. "I believe that the telemetry data available are quite enough. Inquiries at sub-contractor enterprises are the normal second phase of any technical probe, when specialists have clearer suspicions of what happened. Now they will be inspecting the manufacturers," he told TASS.

The Soyuz-2.1a rocket carrying a Progress cargo vehicle blasted off from the Baikonur space site in Kazakhstan on April 28. It soon turned out that the cargo craft had entered a wrong orbit and communication with it was lost. On May 8 the abortive delivery vehicle burned up in the atmosphere. Roscosmos said the accident was due to decompression of the rocket’s propellant and oxidizer tanks, which upset the normal separation of the third stage and the vehicle. Inquiries are now focused on factors that might have been behind decompression.

Quelle: TASS

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Update: 30.05.2015

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Ursache für Proton-M" Trägerrakete-Crash gefunden

Roscosmos blames an old-time design flaw of the Proton rocket crash

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According to Russian space agency, the third stage engine’s pump failed exactly as it did decades ago to cause a Proton crash back in 1988

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Russia’s space agency Roscosmos says it has found out why a Proton-M rocket, launched on May 16, failed to put in space Mexico’s communication Satellite MexSat-1. According to the probe’s findings the shaft in the third stage engine’s pump failed, just as it did decades ago to cause a Proton crash back in 1988.

Eliminating the flaw will not require great costs, Roscosmos said. However, the agency’s chief Igor Komarov promised to take disciplinary and administrative measures following the inquiry and to present a plan for reforming the system of quality management in the space rocket industry.

JUST AS IT HAPPENED IN 1988

"The abortive launch of the Proton-M rocket was due to the failure of the third stage’s engine, caused by excessive vibration," Komarov told the media.

he first deputy chief of Roscosmos, Aleksandr Ivanov, explained the cause was rooted in the design, and not workmanship. A series of experiments identified with certainty there had been problems with the rotor of the turbo pump, specifically, with its shaft. The general designer of Proton’s manufacturer - the KIhrunichev Centre - Aleksandr Medvedev said that the flaw had caused a similar accident back in 1988. Both crashes looked very much alike.

"As we understand, the unit had been ‘unwell’ for quite a while, since 1988," Medvedev said.

In the meantime, just three days after the crash Russia’s Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Rogozin, who oversees the space rocket industry, made a similar statement in the State Duma. He told the lawmakers Proton’s loss was due to an old-time design flaw.

THE ROCKET TO BE IMPROVED

"In the near future the shafts will be replaced in all turbo pumps," Roscosmos first deputy chief Aleksandr Ivanov told the media, adding he was certain that the proposed measures would "cure the disease."

"We will be replacing the most vulnerable components," the Khrunichev Centre’s chief designer said. "Both elements of the turbo pump and the mounting structure are to be improved and replaced." Komarov promised that correcting the designers’ mistake would not push up Proton rockets’ manufacturing costs.

"The money question is not a very big one, because it will be enough to alter the shaft’s design and material," he explained. "The material has been identified and some fundamental work carried out already."

Roscosmos has refrained from disclosing the date of Proton’s next launch so far. "The date of Proton-M’s next launch is to be announced in June 2015," Komarov said.

MEASURES WILL BE TAKEN

Komarov promised to take "disciplinary and administrative measures" in connection with Proton’s loss but avoided disclosing any details. "When the decisions are made, you will know them," he told the media.

At the same time he disclosed a plan for eliminating errors in quality management at the space rocket industry. The plan is likely to be systemic.

"The inquiry identified quality management and manufacturing process inconsistencies. They are very clear. Instructions have been issued. A plan for eliminating the mistakes will be finalized within two weeks. Possibly, it will be systemic," Komarov said.

REASONS BEHIND THE LOSS OF PROGRESS CARGO CRAFT

Shortly before Proton’s loss the space industry saw another emergency. A Soyuz-2.1a rocket that blasted off from the Baikonur space site in Kazakhstan failed to put in orbit the ProgressM-27M cargo spacecraft that was carrying supplies to the International Space Station. Roscosmos has already announced its preliminary findings - the incident was due to improper separation of the rocket’s third stage and the space vehicle following decompression of the rocket’s fuel tanks.

The exact causes have not been announced yet. According to Roscosmos First Deputy Chief Aleksandr Ivanov, the working group will be through with the probe soon. "In the near future," he said, when asked by TASS when the investigation of the failed launch of the Progress cargo spacecraft might be completed.

Samstag, 30. Mai 2015 - 17:15 Uhr

The Outer Space Treaty keeps weapons of mass destruction out of orbit. That's not the same as prohibiting warfare in space. Some nations have successfully tested destructive antisatellite weapons in space and many more are presumed to possess antisatellite capabilities. Meanwhile, important strategic capabilities such as early warning, secure communications, intelligence gathering, and command and control increasingly run through space. This raises the troubling possibility that the use of antisatellite weapons amid a crisis between nuclear-armed nations might lead to a nuclear exchange—indeed, US war games have repeatedly demonstrated that antisatellite weapons can cause crises to escalate in unpredictable ways. Below, experts debate this question: To what extent do antisatellite weapons increase the risk of nuclear war—and what can be done to moderate the risk?

Much ado about nothing

China's 2007 antisatellite test sparked considerable debate among policy planners in the United States regarding the potential vulnerability of US space assets. Many scholars and analysts believe that, over the last decade, China has slowly but steadily invested in a wide range of counterspace capabilities that are in fact capable of posing threats to the United States and its allies. Concern focuses on two issues.

First, Chinese counterspace abilities might someday challenge US command of the commons, particularly in the area of space. This is a crucial consideration vis-à-vis Washington's conventional military operations because space assets provide the United States enormous advantages in military surveillance and other areas. Second, certain counterspace capabilities could endanger assets that are critical to Washington's launch-on-warning nuclear posture. An attack on such assets could lead to an inadvertent nuclear war. Relatedly, some worry that Beijing’s investments in counterspace technologies might trigger a regional arms race—in particular, Delhi might invest in such capabilities as well, heightening the risk of an inadvertent nuclear exchange between India and China.

Postures and motivations. The US military enjoys significant qualitative advantages over potential rivals because of support provided by space platforms. A vast array of imaging satellites, for example, significantly improves US surveillance capabilities. Global positioning satellites help US forces guide their weapons with unparalleled accuracy. Communication satellites help control flows of information. As a result, US military forces are able to project power in an expeditionary manner. They can operate in distant theaters, employing both doctrines and sophisticated equipment that rely on satellites for advanced surveillance, reconnaissance, communication, navigation, and timing data.

But US space assets also represent potential vulnerabilities—mainly to Chinese counterspace capabilities. Several assessments based on publicly available information suggest that, despite China’s increased investments in counterspace technologies, Washington still enjoys a huge advantage in conventional operations conducted with the support of space assets. Still, China is reluctant to engage fully in the rules-based world order that Washington built after World War II, and this is a key concern to US policy makers. They worry that China might exhibit unpredictable behavior—and indeed, unpredictability was manifested in the antisatellite weapon test that China carried out in 2007, and in its other tests in outer space since then.

A second key concern for US policy makers is that counterspace capabilities might inadvertently trigger a nuclear exchange—say, between the United States and China, or between China and India. Several US policy planners worry that China could employ counterspace capabilities to destroy Washington's critical space assets, such as early warning satellites. In some scenarios, this could lead to incorrect conclusions that China had engaged in a preemptive nuclear strike. Similarly, Chinese or Indian investments in these capabilities might lead to miscalculations in Beijing or Delhi, escalating a conflict into a nuclear exchange. But to understand the probability of such a situation, it is important to understand China and India's motivations for acquiring counterspace capabilities—and also to understand the two countries' nuclear postures.

Unfortunately, China's motivations regarding its counterspace capabilities remain unclear. Does China contemplate degrading US command of the commons in order to hinder the operational capability of US forces in the Western Pacific? Does Beijing envision eliminating US nuclear surveillance capabilities? These critical questions remain unanswered. Even more confusing to policy makers is whether China will approach these issues in the same way that Moscow did during the Cold War—in that era, the Soviet Union and the United States diminished pressure and reassured themselves by establishing treaties such as the Outer Space Treaty. One thing is certain: China’s current counterspace capabilities are sufficient to deny the United States access to space—but only temporarily.

When it comes to nuclear posture, the situation is clearer: China does not believe in conducting a nuclear first strike. From 1964, when China conducted its first nuclear test, until the mid-1990s, when negotiations for the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty began, the modernization of the Chinese arsenal moved at a snail’s pace. In the late 1970s, China developed long-range ballistic missiles capable of targeting the continental United States, but Beijing possessed barely a dozen such missiles. For the Chinese, even a warhead ratio such as 125:1 in Washington's favor seemed sufficient to provide nuclear deterrence. And unlike the United States, which developed an arsenal that included several thousand warheads and delivery systems, diverse nuclear warfighting capabilities, and baroque redundancies, China kept its arsenal simple. Beijing forsook the technical for the political.

Today, all available evidence suggests that China, though its nuclear arsenal has grown, has not fundamentally rethought its posture. Hence it is very unlikely that China conceives of antisatellite weapons as a means for disabling nuclear surveillance satellites. And even if China did not espouse a no-first-use policy, Beijing's nuclear delivery systems are not particularly accurate. They are incapable of executing the sort of "splendid first strike" that might eliminate US land-based nuclear forces.

Despite tensions between China and India, Delhi's nuclear posture vis-à-vis Beijing is rather relaxed—it is based on minimum deterrence and a strict no-first-use policy. Indian national security managers, like their Chinese counterparts, see nuclear weapons as political tools, and they have resisted efforts by military planners to jettison no-first-use. India possesses approximately 100 nuclear warheads, but none are mated with missiles under normal conditions. Indian policy planners, because of their country's strong commitment to no-first-use, have little incentive to develop an operational antisatellite weapon to help execute a first strike against China. Such ideas hardly figure in any Indian public forum about space security. Rather, most debates center around defending India’s growing space assets in low Earth orbit.

To be sure, China’s successful demonstration of an antisatellite weapon galvanized a debate in India, and prompted the Defense Research and Development Organisation to begin exploratory efforts toward developing retaliatory capabilities and an Indian antisatellite weapon. But India’s antisatellite research efforts, unlike China's, have emerged from a national missile defense program, which suggests it is largely an offshoot of that program. Many kinetic energy antisatellite technologies overlap with the ballistic missile defense system currently under development in India, especially in the areas of radar tracking and target acquisition. The little publicly available evidence suggests that the Indian authorities have not instituted an antisatellite program. Even if Delhi did so, India’s antisatellite weapon technology is largely unproven; not a single test has been conducted. In contrast, the United States conducted almost three dozen tests, and the former Soviet Union about two dozen, before declaring their antisatellite weapons operational.

If the United States is worried that Chinese advances will erode its primacy in space, evidence suggests that Chinese systems are at least capable of challenging US primacy. But concerns that Chinese or Indian advances in counterspace technologies will trigger an inadvertent nuclear exchange are overstated. Chinese and Indian counterspace capabilities have not advanced far enough to destroy US early warning satellites—and, on a more fundamental level, India and China's nuclear postures remain oriented toward deterrence.

Samstag, 30. Mai 2015 - 14:45 Uhr

NASA’s Commercial Crew Program will deliver U.S. astronauts into low-Earth orbit, from U.S. soil, and aboard a U.S. spacecraft, for the first time since the end of the Space Shuttle era. Image Credit: NASA

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Eight months after it was shortlisted as one of two finalists in the $6.8 billion Commercial Crew transportation Capability (CCtCap) phase of the effort to return U.S. astronauts to orbit, aboard a U.S. spacecraft, and from U.S. soil, for the first time since the twilight of the Space Shuttle era, Boeing has received the first of to six orders to execute a crew-rotation mission of its CST-100 spacecraft to the International Space Station (ISS). The announcement was made yesterday (Wednesday, 27 May) by NASA and Boeing and it was noted that this and future orders will typically be made 2-3 years before flight, in order to provide sufficient time for the fabrication and integration of both the spacecraft and its launch vehicle. It was also stressed that yesterday’s decision does not necessarily imply that a Boeing vehicle will fly ahead of its fellow CCtCap finalist, SpaceX, and that “determination of which company will fly its mission to the station first will be made at a later time”. Also in May, veteran astronaut Mike Fincke—previously the Astronaut Office’s representative to the Commercial Crew Program—has been assigned as Chief of the newly formed Commercial Crew Branch.

Samstag, 30. Mai 2015 - 08:55 Uhr

The launch will be carried out only after the investigation of the Progress cargo spacecraft accident is competed, a rocket and space industry source said

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The launch of the Soyuz-2.1b rocket with a military satellite, planned for June 5, has been indefinitely postponed - it will be carried out only after the investigation of the Progress cargo spacecraft accident is competed, a rocket and space industry source told TASS on Friday.

Russia’s Progress M-27M cargo spacecraft was launched to the International Space Station (ISS) by the Soyuz-2.1a rocket, but failed to reach the target orbit and burned up in the atmosphere in the morning of May 8. According to the Russian Federal Space Agency (Roscosmos), the accident was due to decompression of the rocket’s propellant and oxidizer tanks, which upset the normal separation of the third stage and the vehicle. Inquiries are now focused on factors that might have been behind decompression.

"Preparations for the launch will be started only after the investigation of the contingency with the Soyuz-2.1a carrier rocket is over," the source said.

According to him, the launch so far is delayed for several days, but may be longer.

The investigation of the Soyuz-2.1a rocket and Progress spaceship accident continues so far. The probe results were to be announced on May 22, however, the Federal Space Agency said then that Roscosmos would make public the probe commission’s final conclusions later. A source familiar with the investigation progress told TASS previously that the investigation might be continued after May 22 because the commission had insufficient data for establishing the exact cause of the accident. It became known later that the versions of the equipment defect and the rocket’s overload during flight were also considered.

The difference between the Soyuz-2.1b rocket and the Soyuz-2.1a version is the use of the RD-0124 engine instead of the RD-0110.