Fuel Recycling

Somewhere in Russia, 34 tons of surplus weapons-grade plutonium—enough material to make about 10,000 weapons—are awaiting disposal. Moscow was supposed to start destroying this stockpile, but has yet to start, leaving a huge threat lurking in an unknown location. If even a tiny fraction of this material fell into terrorists’ hands, they could threaten nuclear terrorism around the world.

In 1998, Russia and the United States agreed to each dispose of 34 tons of surplus plutonium, a major step towards nuclear nonproliferation. But in the years since, due to mistaken policy decisions, the U.S. hasn’t begun destroying its own stockpile—and that process isn’t going to start anytime soon. In turn, Russia hasn’t complied either while they wait for us, leading to the current stalemate.

The good news is that Russia still intends to uphold the deal—but only if the U.S. finds a credible way to dispose of its plutonium. On the current path, that may never happen. Both the Obama and Trump administrations have adopted a technique to dispose of our plutonium stockpile that Russia has already rejected, deeming it not credible.

Luckily, there is a third path, one that would provide significant economic benefits to the U.S. economy and one that Russia has already approved, ensuring that Moscow would finally dispose of its 34 tons of weapons-grade plutonium. It’s time for the Trump administration to abandon the failed Obama-era approach and chart a new course, one that can comply with the deal signed 20 years ago.

I have decades of experience with this issue: I was science adviser to the late Sen. Pete Domenici, who authored the original legislation codifying the 1998 U.S.-Russia agreement, and then served as a commissioner on the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Under Barack Obama, I served as the Energy Department’s top nuclear energy official.

Under the original agreement, the United States agreed to dispose of its plutonium by building a facility to make mixed plutonium-uranium reactor fuel—known as MOX fuel—to use in our commercial reactors. At the time, this path made sense since we anticipated a “nuclear energy renaissance,” which promised a growing need for reactor fuel.

But in the past two decades, the MOX proposal has become much less likely to work. First, that “nuclear energy renaissance” never happened. In fact, reactors are closing in many countries and there is so much cheap uranium that some of the world’s most productive mines have closed. Second, the facility to convert the plutonium into MOX fuel—originally scheduled to start operating in 2016—is years behind schedule and well over-budget; its current completion date is at least a decade away. And even if the fuel facility is completed, domestic utilities are not interested in burning MOX fuel in their reactors because uranium is so cheap—unless the government pays them. In other words, for the MOX proposal to work, the government would have to pay to build and maintain the facility—and then pay utilities to actually burn the MOX fuel. Not a great business model!

Hoping to break this political and financial logjam, the Obama administration devised a new approach to get rid of its plutonium called “dilute and dispose.” Under this approach, the plutonium is blended with other waste and sent to a radioactive waste disposal facility, the Waste Isolation Pilot Project (WIPP) in New Mexico. “Dilute and dispose” renders a valuable resource totally worthless, but the Obama administration supported this option because it was cheaper than the MOX approach.

However, like the MOX proposal, this approach is unlikely to work. The biggest problem is that the WIPP doesn’t even have the capacity to complete its present mission and also dispose of the 34 tons of plutonium. Any new use of WIPP could crowd out other uses, potentially delaying the disposal of waste generated in the clean-up of former defense facilities. In addition, even if there was enough room, WIPP is not currently licensed to accept this additional material. Even worse, Russia already rejected this idea, both in the original negotiations and again last year, because it does not destroy the plutonium. In other words, even if the Trump administration successfully implemented the “dilute and dispose” option, Moscow likely wouldn’t dispose of its own 34 tons of plutonium.

Luckily, there’s another option. During the Obama administration, I argued vehemently that the “dilute and dispose” proposal was a poor choice and instead recommended to dispose of the plutonium as fuel in fast reactors, which effectively destroy the plutonium. I was overruled, but this idea remains the best chance to eliminate Russia’s dangerous stockpile of plutonium and realize other important national benefits.

Fast reactors are not new in the United States. Back in the 1950s, we built several fast reactors and demonstrated their impressive safety attributes, including proving that they could not melt down even with a complete loss of coolant. But through a combination of early safety issues and political decisions, the last fast reactor in the country shut down in 1993.

However, several U.S. companies—including Terrapower, which is funded by Bill Gates, General Atomics and General Electric—are exploring fast reactors because of their versatility and melt-down proof operation; among other abilities, they can destroy nuclear waste, burn plutonium, and generate electricity with higher efficiency than existing reactors. But the exploration process can take years, especially since any testing requires the use of existing Russian fast reactors. But if Washington financed a fast reactor to dispose of its plutonium stockpile, it would jumpstart the development process by providing a fast reactor testing platform in this country, a real benefit to many U.S. companies. Congress has recognized this opportunity as well, earmarking money in fiscal 2016 to develop a plan for an advanced reactor, such as a fast reactor.

Such a plan would also prevent the U.S. from falling behind on modern technologies as other nations, including France, Japan, China, and India consider building their own fast reactors. At the very least, this proposal would ensure that the U.S. has enough operational experience with fast reactors to participate in global discussions on their safety and nonproliferation characteristics.

This plan has one downside: It would be more expensive than the “dilute and dispose” option since we’d have to build a new reactor. But unlike Obama’s plan, the fast reactor proposal would ensure that Russia disposes of its plutonium stockpile. In fact, Moscow intends to use its own fast reactors to destroy its plutonium. If we adopt a similar proposal, we would satisfy the original agreement, taking an important step towards nuclear nonproliferation and a safer world.

Peter Lyons worked at Los Alamos National Laboratory from 1969 until he became science advisor to Sen. Pete Domenici from 1997 to 2005. He was a Commissioner on the Nuclear Regulatory Commission from 2005 to 2009 and Assistant Secretary for Nuclear Energy from 2011 to 2015. He now consults on nuclear energy and safety issues.

Jake DeWitte and Caroline Cochran, the cofounders of Oklo, a start up company that is developing a 1-2 MWe nuclear reactor-based power system for remote areas, have been credited with drawing attention to a problem that can be solved by a government policy decision.

“Nearly all advanced reactors have a need for low enriched fuel greater than 5%,” Cochran recently wrote in an email.

Oklo is the chair of the Fast Reactor Working Group (FRWG), an industry-led effort focused specifically on future nuclear technology.

Current U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission licenses in the fuel supply chain specify a limit of 5% enrichment. Since there is currently no commercial demand for material with higher levels of enrichment, there is no commercially significant supply available.

The U.S. is party to an international agreement to keep enrichment less than 20% for all commercial uses. Material with fissile isotope content greater than 5% and less than 20% is known as high assay low enriched uranium (HALEU), the material that advanced reactors have been designed to use.

There is a small quantity of HALEU produced each year from down blended HEU. The quantity is just large enough to fuel research reactors in the U.S. and in countries where the U.S. has agreed to supply fuel.

What’s Being Done to Address Gap?

NEI and the Nuclear Innovation Alliance have formed a working group to explore ways to address the need for HALEU.

A potential domestic source for a starter quantity of HALEU fuel to prime the demand pump is the U.S. Department of Energy’s stock of surplus HEU.

For more than two decades, DOE has been selling LEU to the commercial market. It removes HEU from either Russia or its own inventory, contracts with private companies to blend the HEU with either natural or depleted uranium and produces a material that competes with freshly enriched LEU used for commercial nuclear fuel.

Due to criticality prevention considerations, the process begins with a relatively large tank of natural uranium in solution. HEU in the same chemical solution is carefully added from small diameter containers to bring the isotopic mix to just under 5% U-235 with the remainder being U-238.

The system as configured is designed and licensed for a maximum of 5% enrichment; an investment of several tens of millions of dollars plus several years of design, licensing and installation would be required for a different enrichment level.

During a recent hearing held by the Senate Energy and Natural Resources Committee, Sen. Deb Fischer (R-NE) addressed the HALEU issue with Dr. Ashley Finan, the Nuclear Innovation Alliance policy director. Here is an excerpt from the conversation:

Fischer: Dr. Finan, I understand that there are several advanced reactor technologies that need uranium enriched to 20% and this is higher than the standard 5% enrichment currently used in operating reactors. Can you tell me more about the situation?

Finan: Sure. Thank you for the question. There are many of the advanced reactor companies who will need to use enriched uranium that is low enriched, but is between 5 and 20%. We currently do not have a supply chain for that fuel because there hasn’t been a demand. That’s essentially the situation. It’s possible that they could obtain the material internationally, but that is not the preferred option.

Can Commercial Suppliers Meet Needs?

Though there is wide experience in the world’s nuclear enterprise with fuel enrichments that vary from 3% to < 90%, knowledge isn’t sufficient.

Specifics are way beyond the scope of this piece, but HALEU licensees will require different machinery capacities, different piping systems, different storage containers and special shipping containers. Each stage in the fuel supply chain could be affected.

Procedures and control systems need revisions to accommodate the new material’s characteristics. Safety regulators have to review and approve all of these components to overall system of handling.

None of that comes cheaply. Fortunately, none of the changes require any inventions or material discoveries.

During the hearing mentioned above, Sen. Fischer asked NEI CEO Maria Korsnick how long it would take to develop a commercial supply of HALEU.

Korsnick replied that the supply chain for the material could be established within 7-10 years after customers place firm orders for a sufficient quantity of material to justify the necessary investments.

Before advanced reactor developers can place firm orders, they must be able to develop a solid order book from credible customers.

It is unlikely that any will succeed in that sales effort unless they build and operate demonstration power plants.

Improving Performance Vectors

Advanced reactor technology developers are aiming to improve nuclear energy performance along many vectors. An area of intense interest is waste reduction.

One part of the answer to the inevitable question, “What do you do with the waste?” is to make less of it.

Another is to create ways to reuse the materials that have traditionally been called waste.

The material removed from current reactors often contains 95% or more of the initial potential energy; if some of that can be consumed in a second or third pass through operating reactors, a smaller volume of material will ultimately need to be permanently protected.

Being able to start reactors with fuels that have higher enrichment levels and being able to add new fuel with higher enrichment during various stages of operation is roughly analogous to using high quality dry wood, or even lighter fluid to keep a fire burning hot enough and long enough to consume large, possibly damp logs.

Urenco Might Be Initial Source

During the recently completed 7th Annual International SMR and Advanced Reactor Summit hosted by Nuclear Energy Insider in Atlanta, there was a spontaneous discussion about supply sources for HALEU.

NEI’s Marcus Nichol, who attended the session where the topic came up, reported that a representative from Urenco said his company would be able to supply the material needed.

Urenco can enrich uranium to needed levels in its European facilities. Its U-Battery is one of the reactor designs under development that will need HALEU, so it will need to develop a complete fuel supply chain to meet its own needs.

Apparently, scaling the capacity of that supply chain to meet the needs of other developers fits within Urenco’s business model for future growth.

Of course, this is not the domestic source that some might prefer, but it would be sufficient to enable advanced reactors to prove their worth and market acceptability.

A version of the above was first published in the April 7, 2017 edition of Fuel Cycle Week. It is republished here with permission.

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