I wonder if it would even be as effective as PAC-3 in that role simply because PAC-3 has the thrusters up front that are probably faster reacting than SM-6s purely aerodynamic controls. Against a ballistic target that would be less of an issue.

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True, and that's great while the motor is burning, but PAC-3 can activate those thrusters right up to impact. PAC-3 MSE even has a dual-pulse motor who's 2nd pulse can be activated when near the target (time wise). You can see where it fired up the 2nd pulse here:

I don't think anybody is suggesting it shouldn't. I'm just pointing out, it would be interesting to know the details, limitations, and how it compares to THAAD (and while I'm at it I'll wish for a Ferrari to be parked in my driveway on Christmas morning).

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But the real question is how the overall system-of-systems (SoS) compare. SM-3 is limited compared to THAAD, since it is exoatmospheric only, while THAAD covers some endo-atmospheric range as well. But SM-6 may have a larger endo-atmospheric capability than PAC-3, since it is a much bigger missile. If so, the naval SM-3 plus SM-6 may provide basically the same net coverage as land-based THAAD plus PAC-3, just divided differently between the two missiles in each SoS.

CLEARANCE: Above Top Secret

But the real question is how the overall system-of-systems (SoS) compare. SM-3 is limited compared to THAAD, since it is exoatmospheric only, while THAAD covers some endo-atmospheric range as well. But SM-6 may have a larger endo-atmospheric capability than PAC-3, since it is a much bigger missile. If so, the naval SM-3 plus SM-6 may provide basically the same net coverage as land-based THAAD plus PAC-3, just divided differently between the two missiles in each SoS.

I really should change my personal text

That's a trade I guess. The PAC-3 is obviously a much shorter ranged weapon whereas the SM6 is an over the horizon weapon that can also double up as an ABM weapon covering SR and MRBM's. Lockheed has already demonstrated PAC-3 integration with the Navy's cells so that is something they can also look towards for shorter ranged terminal defense if these anti ship ballistic missile threats proliferate beyond their current levels.

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That's a trade I guess. The PAC-3 is obviously a much shorter ranged weapon whereas the SM6 is an over the horizon weapon that can also double up as an ABM weapon covering SR and MRBM's. Lockheed has already demonstrated PAC-3 integration with the Navy's cells so that is something they can also look towards for shorter ranged terminal defense if these anti ship ballistic missile threats proliferate beyond their current levels.

"I should really just relax"

But the real question is how the overall system-of-systems (SoS) compare. SM-3 is limited compared to THAAD, since it is exoatmospheric only, while THAAD covers some endo-atmospheric range as well. But SM-6 may have a larger endo-atmospheric capability than PAC-3, since it is a much bigger missile. If so, the naval SM-3 plus SM-6 may provide basically the same net coverage as land-based THAAD plus PAC-3, just divided differently between the two missiles in each SoS.

SM-6's seeker is probably better suited (for the present as Solid State MMW continues to advance) for the overall target set in the rainy, foggy, misty, hazy maritime environment.
Also, SM-6's warhead is useful for SBT because an RV deflection is probably enough to render it ineffective against the task force.

I really should change my personal text

The Missile Defense Agency -- as soon as Dec. 14 -- plans a major flight test off the coast of Hawaii in an event that features an attempt to detect, track and intercept a medium-range ballistic missile target flying a trajectory that stays within the Earth's atmosphere with the first-ever salvo engagement of two Standard Missile-6 interceptors.

"The test will involve the attempted intercept of a medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM) target, launched from the Pacific Missile Range Facility located on Kauai, HI," MDA spokesman Chris Szkrybalo said. "An Aegis Baseline 9.C1 (BMD 5.0 Capability Upgrade) configured ship positioned west of Hawaii will detect, track and conduct an endoatmospheric engagement and intercept of an MRBM target with a salvo of two SM-6 (BMD) guided missiles.”

The test will feature two M-6 Dual I guided missiles. The "Dual 1" SM-6 variant contains both the BMD and anti-air warfare software in the same round. When paired with the Aegis system, the missile can be directed to intercept cruise missiles, aircraft or anti-ship ballistic missiles.

In May, the guided missile destroyer John Paul Jones (DDG-53) conducted a test in preparation for FTM-27, demonstrating for the first time the ability of the Aegis system to detect and track a medium-range ballistic missile target flying an endoatmospheric flight path.

The test was conducted off the coast of Hawaii just after midnight on Dec. 14.

"This test demonstrated the capabilities MDA and the Navy are delivering to our fleet commanders," said MDA Director Vice Adm. Jim Syring. "The SM-6 missile and the Aegis Weapon System continue to prove that they are critical components of our nation's multilayered, robust ballistic missile defense system."

The SM-6 missile uses an explosive warhead to defeat ballistic missile threats, differing from other missile defense interceptors, such as the Standard Missile-3, which use non-explosive hit-to-kill technology.

Program officials will continue evaluating system performance based upon telemetry and other data obtained during the test.

"I should really just relax"

A tactical datalink controller, in charge of maintaining encrypted data exchanges between ships and aircraft,
accidentally identified the incoming ballistic missile target as a friendly in the system, causing the SM-3 missile to
self-destruct in flight, according to a source familiar with the test.

A tactical datalink controller, in charge of maintaining encrypted data exchanges between ships and aircraft,
accidentally identified the incoming ballistic missile target as a friendly in the system, causing the SM-3 missile to
self-destruct in flight, according to a source familiar with the test.

“As unfortunate as this might be, it’s a good thing that this wasn’t a technology issue or some deeper failure that needs to be investigated at great length and time,” Karako said. “There is no reason to believe the basic capability that has already been demonstrated has any new problems.”

No, it's not a technology problem with the interceptor. It's probably a more fundamental technology problem with the AEGIS user interface, which makes it hard to tell which track you're looking at. If this sort of mistake is possible in a test environment, what's going to happen in a live environment where there might be actual friendly ballistic missiles flying around? They really need to spend a lot more effort on human factors analysis and interface design, because this sort of mistake happens a lot more often than anyone wants to admit, and it can have major consequences. I can think of one incident where bad AEGIS user interface design contributed to hundreds of deaths.

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It's probably a more fundamental technology problem with the AEGIS user interface, which makes it hard to tell which track you're looking at. If this sort of mistake is possible in a test environment, what's going to happen in a live environment where there might be actual friendly ballistic missiles flying around? They really need to spend a lot more effort on human factors analysis and interface design, because this sort of mistake happens a lot more often than anyone wants to admit, and it can have major consequences. I can think of one incident where bad AEGIS user interface design contributed to hundreds of deaths.

After 30 years in service I find it difficult to believe they wouldn't have encountered this issue (if it is one) before now and fixed it. I'd be more worried about Joe Sailor just not being up to the task.

Or having poor vision, or being overworked, or a plethora of other possibilities.

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In combat, there will be sailors who are tired, have blurry vision, or are plain not up to the task. The user interface has to be designed to make user tasks as close to idiot-poof as possible. If it is possible to screw it up this badly in a test environment, which is almost certainly less stressful than actual combat, then it will be screwed up in real life as well.

I don't know the specific issue here but AEGIS has a history or giving users data in non-intuitive ways (see Vincennes) and I'll bet the interface contributed here. And there's never enough time or effort put into user interface design, because it's unsexy compared to other measures of system performance.

"I should really just relax"

They really need to spend a lot more effort on human factors analysis and interface design, because this sort of mistake happens a lot more often than anyone wants to admit, and it can have major consequences. I can think of one incident where bad AEGIS user interface design contributed to hundreds of deaths.

Perhaps they biased it in the other direction as a result of Iran Air i.e. made relabeling a hostile target with missile-in-flight to a friendly very easy
and tying it to an immediate command destruct.

CLEARANCE: Top Secret

In combat, there will be sailors who are tired, have blurry vision, or are plain not up to the task. The user interface has to be designed to make user tasks as close to idiot-poof as possible. If it is possible to screw it up this badly in a test environment, which is almost certainly less stressful than actual combat, then it will be screwed up in real life as well.

I don't know the specific issue here but AEGIS has a history or giving users data in non-intervention ways (see Vincennes) and I'll bet the interface contributed here. And there's never enough time or effort put into user interface design, because it's unsexy compared to other measures of system performance.

CLEARANCE: Above Top Secret

In combat, there will be sailors who are tired, have blurry vision, or are plain not up to the task. The user interface has to be designed to make user tasks as close to idiot-poof as possible. If it is possible to screw it up this badly in a test environment, which is almost certainly less stressful than actual combat, then it will be screwed up in real life as well.

I don't know the specific issue here but AEGIS has a history or giving users data in non-intervention ways (see Vincennes) and I'll bet the interface contributed here. And there's never enough time or effort put into user interface design, because it's unsexy compared to other measures of system performance.

Without knowing the specifics it's impossible to know. (Right there with you on interface design. As someone who's worked with many graphical programs over the years, I can appreciate a good interface versus a horrid one.)

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As long as you have humans-in-the-loop, you will have potential for error. Sometimes people have really bad days and do inexplicable things that engineers never consider. Releasing the feather mechanism on Spaceship 2 right as it starts powered flight for example. I think they now inhibit that control until the flight enters descent phase.

It would have been useful to have a spare missile available. A lot of the test cost is coordinating and assembling all the various personnel and hardware involved plus scheduling range time.

"I should really just relax"

FTM-21 which featured a salvo of two SM-3 Block IBs against one ARAV-C++ was stated to cost $31 million in total (range, target, interceptors, sensors)
The per unit cost for SM-3 Block IB for that period was ~ $12 million. Couldn't find a unit cost for ARAV-C++ but the SM-3s alone constitute
at least three quarters of the total test cost.

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What makes me scratch my head is how they were able to test Spartan at least 24 times and Sprint nearly 50 (with 42 of the latter being over a period of only 3 years). Imagine how "proven" and reliable GBI and the rest would be with that kind of attention devoted to them.

I really should change my personal text

I could be wrong but my belief was that MDA was an agency that would be tasked with executing research and development and test activities for the ballistic missile defense program and not being the primary agency buying the said systems and their associated interceptors which their budgets have also been doing of late. I think THAAD now transitions to the Army (which may not be the best thing given their lengthy acquisition cycles) but in general the less procurement MDA has to do the more money they would have in its budget for other tasks.

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FTM-21 which featured a salvo of two SM-3 Block IBs against one ARAV-C++ was stated to cost $31 million in total (range, target, interceptors, sensors)
The per unit cost for SM-3 Block IB for that period was ~ $12 million. Couldn't find a unit cost for ARAV-C++ but the SM-3s alone constitute
at least three quarters of the total test cost.

Looking at the 2018 MDA budget, there are multiple lines for testing which sum up to about $750Million/year for GMD, $100Million/year for AEGIS and roughly $50Million/year for THAAD.

I can’t find any specific cost breakout detailing hardware, operations, and support for a specific test. However, a simplistic approach would be to just divide the annual cost by the number of tests/year.

For AEGIS, that would be around $50Million/test. This cost would include such things as test planning, coordination of all involved personnel and facilities, development and procurement of special hardware and sensors to observe and record data, plus the interceptor and target. I would not be surprised if the interceptor/target costs amounted to no more than 50% of the total test cost.

"I should really just relax"

Looking at the 2018 MDA budget, there are multiple lines for testing which sum up to about $750Million/year for GMD, $100Million/year for AEGIS and roughly $50Million/year for THAAD.

I can’t find any specific cost breakout detailing hardware, operations, and support for a specific test. However, a simplistic approach would be to just divide the annual cost by the number of tests/year.

For AEGIS, that would be around $50Million/test. This cost would include such things as test planning, coordination of all involved personnel and facilities, development and procurement of special hardware and sensors to observe and record data, plus the interceptor and target. I would not be surprised if the interceptor/target costs amounted to no more than 50% of the total test cost.

But I think all tests (ground, test target only, interceptor only, and intercept) get lumped into that sum so it's very tricky to tease out.
And the number of intercept tests does fluctuate: there are three US tests planned for FY18 vs. five planned for FY17.
An even more extreme example: five intercept tests accomplished in FY13 vs. one in FY14. So perhaps three is a better average
which would bring you more in line to the quoted (by MDA) cost for FTM-21.

Given that SM-3 Block IIA in LRIP is estimated to be about 2x the unit cost of SM-3 Block IB and that they are testing
against more expensive MRBM targets the budget numbers sort of make sense to me.

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What makes me scratch my head is how they were able to test Spartan at least 24 times and Sprint nearly 50 (with 42 of the latter being over a period of only 3 years). Imagine how "proven" and reliable GBI and the rest would be with that kind of attention devoted to them.

OTOH we now collect much more data and do more ground-based analysis as part of contemporary flight-testing than was historically done. Those few missile-defence flight tests may be telling their project management much more than the more numerous Spartan/Sprint tests told their management back then.

Which is not to say that multiple flight testing doesn't have a value for shaking out component reliability issues that won't otherwise show up in analysis. Literally shaking out if I'm correctly remembering the cause of the couple of cabin-depressurization incidents we had during 777 flight testing as being vibration at a joint.

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An interesting tidbit (if true):
"It was apparently at an altitude of 550 kilometers when it passed over Hokkaido, which is at the very limit of the intercept range for the SM-3, and any Aegis destroyer would have needed to be in just the right position to intercept," Gatling said. "All in all, it was a pretty low percentage shot if they had gone ahead and ordered it."

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"Tokyo plans to build two Aegis Ashore batteries, costing around $700 million each without missiles, the sources said. That would mean its southwestern Okinawa island chain would likely be protected by one of Japan’s existing BMD warships.

The Aegis system’s new SM-3 Block IIA defensive missiles, designed to hit warheads Pyongyang may try to fire over its missile shield, can fly more than 2,000 km - about twice the distance of the current SM-3 missiles.

The interceptor missiles will cost around $30 million each, the sources added. "

Can't decide if they've REALLY been understating the capability of SM-3 or what. I recall reading years ago about an early SM-3, where the upper stage landed some 500 miles downrange but that's not its RANGE. ???

CLEARANCE: Above Top Secret

"Tokyo plans to build two Aegis Ashore batteries, costing around $700 million each without missiles, the sources said. That would mean its southwestern Okinawa island chain would likely be protected by one of Japan’s existing BMD warships.

The Aegis system’s new SM-3 Block IIA defensive missiles, designed to hit warheads Pyongyang may try to fire over its missile shield, can fly more than 2,000 km - about twice the distance of the current SM-3 missiles.

The interceptor missiles will cost around $30 million each, the sources added. "

Can't decide if they've REALLY been understating the capability of SM-3 or what. I recall reading years ago about an early SM-3, where the upper stage landed some 500 miles downrange but that's not its RANGE. ???