The not-so-final frontier

About the Author

Peter BrookesSenior Fellow, National Security AffairsDouglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign and National Security Policy

China destroyed one of its own aging, low-Earth-orbit
(LEO) weather satellites last winter while it was circling at 500
miles above the planet, using a ground-based, direct ascent
anti-satellite (ASAT) weapon.

This winter, the U.S., using its sea-based Aegis missile
defense system, shot down a disabled American intelligence
satellite at 100 or so miles altitude as it tumbled uncontrollably
toward the planet.

A little friendly military-to-military chest-beating,
perhaps? Maybe, but one thing is clear: America's long-standing
dominance of the final frontier is no longer a
given.

Beijing's January 2007 ASAT launch - the first test since
America and the Soviet Union conducted them in the 1980s - was a
surprise to many, especially considering China's promise to use
space for peaceful purposes only.

The international community also was taken aback by the
launch from the Xichang Space Center because it took place without
the prior notification normally given to other space-faring
countries, whose assets total about 3,000 scientific, commercial
and military satellites. Although China hoped to conduct the test
in secret, many believe U.S. intelligence was aware of the launch
in advance, but to collect data and protect intelligence sources
and methods, did not disclose its knowledge.

A White House National Security Council spokesman said in
the days after the test: "The U.S. believes China's development and
testing of such weapons is inconsistent with the spirit of
cooperation that both countries aspire to in the civil space
arena."

Adding to the consternation was China's initial silence
about the launch, followed by two weeks of denials. Even after
admitting the shot, Beijing claimed it was a peaceful scientific
experiment. Yet China's reticence is not surprising, considering
Beijing's general lack of transparency about its space programs,
which are run by the highly secretive military.

The satellite's destruction created a major debris field
in space, too. Of the estimated 100,000 pieces created by the
Chinese ASAT test - which account for nearly 40 percent of all
space junk in LEO - 2,600 pieces are trackable from Earth. Many of
these larger pieces are capable of damaging other space vehicles
that come into their paths. The U.S. already has maneuvered a
number of its spacecraft as a precaution against Chinese space
debris.

But more importantly, the successful ASAT test means
China can not only track, but also can destroy LEO satellites,
including weather, communications, surveillance and
global-positioning birds. Indeed, Chinese military writings,
according to the Pentagon, emphasize the need for the ability to
counter a foe's military-related satellites, especially in the
initial phases of a campaign, to "blind and deafen the enemy."

China's strategic intentions have the potential to take
on real-world significance, especially in consideration of a
possible Taiwan contingency, the most likely scenario for a
Sino-American military dust-up.

The Defense Department also believes the People's
Liberation Army is developing nonkinetic means of attacking
satellites, such as jamming and blinding, and using lasers,
microwave, particle beam and electromagnetic pulse weapons. Some
experts say they believe the future lies in the use of nonkinetic
kill capabilities, rather than using kinetic means such as the
direct-ascent ASAT. While adversaries are denied access to their
space assets, it would limit the potential damage to friendly
satellites from space debris. (Beijing allegedly "lased," or pulsed
with a high-intensity laser, one of our imagery satellites in
2006.)

Jamming in Space

Cyber-warfare, another key Chinese effort, also could be
used as an anti-satellite capability. Space assets rely on a range
of computers, including terrestrially based information technology
systems at operational or relay ground stations, making them
potentially vulnerable to cyber attacks. In congressional testimony
this year, the director of national intelligence (DNI) stated,
"Counter-command, control and sensor systems, to include
communications satellite jammers and ASAT weapons, are among
Beijing's highest military priorities."

In 2007, Beijing put to sea a Space Event Support Ship
(SESS) for space-tracking - a fundamental prerequisite for
improving space situational awareness, including monitoring
spacecraft and counterspace operations. As the Pentagon stated in
its annual report to Congress on Chinese military power, "China is
developing a multi-dimensional program to limit or prevent the use
of space by its potential adversaries during times of crisis or
conflict." As such, China could, in theory, eventually threaten the
entirety of the United States' military and civilian space
architecture, using its evolving asymmetric kinetic and nonkinetic
counterspace capabilities.

China also launched its first lunar orbiter in 2007,
demonstrating an ability to conduct sophisticated space operations.
Beijing plans to put a rover on the moon by 2012 and land a
taikonaut there by 2020, which will undoubtedly serve as a source
of scientific achievement - and national pride.

In addition to launching Chinese taikonauts into space,
China intends to put 100 civilian and military-use satellites into
orbit over the next decade, if not sooner, including 18 this year,
according to the Pentagon.

Beijing also is deploying advanced imagery,
reconnaissance, navigation and communications satellites. According
to the Defnse Department, China will deploy radar, ocean
surveillance and high-resolution photoreconnaissance satellites in
the next decade.

China's space prowess is boosted by Russian assistance,
especially for the manned space program. Although Moscow insists it
will not transfer sensitive space technology to Beijing, its record
of advanced conventional weapons sales to China is not
comforting.

In February, an Aegis-class Cruiser, the Lake Erie,
intercepted a crippled, U.S. military spy satellite with an SM-3
missile, designed for sea-based missile defense work. The
5,000-pound satellite, owned and operated by the National
Reconnaissance Office, failed to respond to commands shortly after
it was sent into orbit in December 2006.

Beijing immediately responded to the operation, saying
the destruction of the satellite was in response to China's ASAT
test a little more than a year earlier, and served as proof of the
hypocrisy of American criticism of their launch. Representatives
from China and Russia again cited the necessity for an outer-space
arms-control treaty to prevent what they claim is the unnecessary
"weaponization" of space. Others chimed in, accusing the U.S. of
starting a space arms race, attempting to portray China's ASAT test
as the moral equivalent of America's intercept of the defunct
satellite despite the vast discrepancies between these events.

The satellite's destruction also was criticized by those
who saw this operation as being an entirely staged event with the
intention of testing missile defense, or ASAT, technologies under
the guise of a humanitarian exercise. Washington denied these
accusations, insisting the satellite was uncontrollable,
unrecoverable and was going to re-enter Earth's atmosphere, posing
a potential threat to human life, property and the environment with
its tank of unused, highly toxic hydrazine fuel.

Proponents of the U.S. action argued that no matter how
small the chance that the satellite's hazardous materials would
reach the Earth's surface, Washington was fully justified, indeed
obligated, to pursue its chosen course of action. Others noted that
China's ASAT test was a military exercise of choice that in no way
compares to the transparent actions taken by the U.S. in the face
of pending danger to life and property on the ground.

Indeed, it could be suggested that if anyone opened the
door to an arms race in space, it was Beijing's ASAT test in 2007,
more than 20 years after the last U.S. test. But this argument by
some has not dissuaded China from pushing for a new space
treaty.

An Astro-Accord?

China, along with Russia, introduced a draft resolution
titled "Prevention of Placement of Weapons in Outer Space" in
February at the 65-member United Nations' Conference on Disarmament
in Geneva. Space-related concerns still are addressed by the 1967
Outer Space Treaty, which has 125 signatories. It includes a ban on
the deployment of weapons of mass destruction, but not conventional
weapons, in outer space. The treaty, modeled on another
non-armament accord, the 1959 Antarctic Treaty, does not forbid the
military use of space, but it does proscribe establishing bases,
installations, fortifications, testing of weapons or holding
military maneuvers on the moon.The Chinese-Russian draft treaty
would disallow the testing and deployment of weapons in space for
use against another nation's satellites or orbital craft.
Interestingly, the draft does not ban research and development or
production.

Although the concept of a new treaty has support among
some arms-control advocates, the Bush administration has
categorically rejected the idea, concerned about limitations on
U.S. access to, and use of, space. There are also worries about
treaty language such as the definition of the phrase "space
weapon"; a seemingly benign satellite could be used to attack
another satellite simply by ramming it - making it, in essence, a
weapon.

Other technologies or systems with real counterspace
abilities possibly could escape restriction, or even be included to
the detriment of other civilian programs, such as when the Soviets
tried to identify the space shuttle as a space weapon.

Another concern is verification of treaty compliance,
minimizing the possibility of a breakout. A high degree of
transparency would be required to inspect every payload to be put
into space, not to mention the national security risks from
espionage.

And even though they are not included in the draft
treaty, what about terrestrially based systems, which could include
direct-ascent ASAT and directed energy weapons, which appear to be
the future wave of counterspace capabilities?

The Chinese have admitted the challenges of implementing
such an agreement but are not interested in discussing their ASAT
test, which some states are insisting on as a prerequisite for
beginning discussions of the draft treaty. Some argue that
considering their great power ambitions, it is naïve to
believe that Beijing or Moscow would not deploy space weapons today
if they could; the treaty is merely a diplomatic gambit to buy time
to develop their own programs.

Detractors of a treaty point out that the U.S. has the
most to lose in any new agreement. As a leading space power, the
U.S. would be relinquishing much more in strategic advantage than
China or Russia - for the moment, at least. No nation relies more
on space than the U.S. It is the ultimate military high ground and
critical to maintaining the supremacy of American armed
forces.Potential enemies know this, seeing space as America's
Achilles' heel. As the DNI noted to Congress this year, "Over the
last decade, the rest of the world has made significant progress in
developing counterspace capabilities."

Moreover, the commander of the U.S. Strategic Command,
Air Force Gen. Kevin Chilton, told the House Armed Services
Committee in February, "The Chinese kinetic anti-satellite test ...
made it clear space is not a sanctuary."

China is on a trajectory to challenge Washington for
pre-eminence in space. Beijing believes that if it has the capacity
to target U.S. space assets, Washington will be more reluctant to,
and less capable of, challenging it on the battlefield.

Protecting American space assets - and freedom of action
on the high frontier - must be central to U.S. national security
strategy. Failure to maintain space superiority would only invite a
Pearl Harbor in space, leaving us deaf, dumb and blind - and at
war.

Peter Brookes is
Chung Ju Yung Fellow and Senior Fellow for National Security
Affairs in the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for
International Studies.

About the Author

Peter BrookesSenior Fellow, National Security AffairsDouglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign and National Security Policy