The base has a very serious security force. But the first line of defense is in the surrounding villages, where insurgents can stash rockets or bomb-making materials. Forces stationed here need to know what's going on in their backyard – but that information comes at a price. It's the promise of jobs – and reconstruction dollars – that can yield valuable intelligence. That's where the "Bagram outreach" comes in.

I recently spent a day with soldiers of the 82nd Division Special Troops Battalion in the village of Qaleh Dewana, an ethnic Pashtun village not far from Bagram. Capt. Derek Henson, the commander of Headquarters Company, set up a "key leader engagement" to break the ice with village elders. As Henson explained, Qaleh Dewana has been overlooked in the past by coalition patrols; his unit was hoping to build some rapport in an community that is key to base security.

"Usually if we give them a little help, they’re more willing to help," Henson said. "In this village, the issue is that they don’t have a lot of work; they have to go to Pakistan for work, and we are concerned that people may be infiltrating back to the village with them – or may be recruited while in Pakistan."

It was a friendly visit; Henson first sat down for tea with Sayed Mohammad, the village elder (pictured, center). But in the course of the meeting, it quickly became clear that Commander Bashir (seated at right), a former mujahid, was the one calling the shots. And he was not happy with the assistance the coalition had offered his village so far.

"Our people need jobs," he said. "And you’re supposed to help everyone. You guys help the Dari [ethnic Tajik] people working inside the base. But you don’t help the Pashtun people."

Henson responded that he could help get passes for some of the men to work as day laborers on base – but added that he could not guarantee any jobs. "I can’t hire them, and I can’t make anyone hire them," he said. "I’ll do my best to assist. ... You know there are hundreds of villages around here and we’ll try to assist everyone as best we can."

The captain then tried to sweeten the offer. What can we do for you? He asks. A clinic? A well? A paved road?

Laying down asphalt seems the most attractive idea. But Bashir has another idea he wants to discuss: He wants his own militia. "If the American want to make a local guard force, I can set up local guards and checkpoints to guard the area," he said. "I told the ANA [the Afghan National Army] I have a bunch of people. I heard something about this – if you want me to make local guards, I will."

Bashir may have been alluding to the Afghan Public Protection Force, a "Sons of Iraq"-style tribal militia that has been tried on an experimental basis in Wardak Province. That idea is controversial, not least because of Afghanistan's history of predatory militia leaders.

Henson, for his part, offered a diplomatic reply. "We want security in the villages, but we want to get the ANA and the ANP [Afghan National Police] guys involved, so that nobody gets hurt," he said. "But we want them to alert us if there are any unknown personnel or vehicles, so you can get the ANP out here and they can investigate."

Don't worry, replied Bashir: "If we see any bad guy, we’ll take care of them."