Jan F. Drewnowski, Neoscholasticism
and the Demands of Modern Science (1937)
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The History of the Circle

The Cracow Circle represents
the most significant expression of Catholic thought between the
two World Wars. Founded by a group of theologians and philosophers,
it distinguished itself from traditional neo-Thomist circles by
its acceptance of the modern formal logic developed in Warsaw,
which it applied to both traditional Thomist issues and theological
topics. Although its adherents were few and it did not last long
(ending with the War, the Nazi invasion of Poland and the consequent
suppression of any form of intellectual activity), the Cracow
Circle counted a number of prestigious philosophers among its
members, above all the Dominican Józef Maria Bochenski (1902-1995) who, after studying law and economics
at Lvov and Poznan, devoted himself to philosophy, going to study in
Freiburg and then completing his studies in logic at the Angelicum
in Rome. Returning to Poland, he studied the history of logic,
following the example of Jan Lukasiewicz, and then emigrated to Freiburg after the Second World
War. Another distinguished member was Father Jan Salamucha (1903-1944) who studied theology in Warsaw, where
he also attended the lectures of Lukasiewicz and Stanislaw
Lesniewski and specialised
in the history of logic. Salamucha lost his life during the Warsaw
Uprising. Finally there was Jan
F. Drewnowski (1896-1978)
who, after studying physics, mathematics and technical sciences
and then philosophy and mathematical logic under the guidance
of Lesniewski, Lukasiewicz and Tadeusz
Kotarbinski, collaborated
with Salamucha in the field of metaphilosophy and Bochenski in
the modernisation of traditional philosophy, elaborating a personal
logico-symbolic system which was lost during the War. Minor roles
in the Circle were played by Boleslaw
Sobocinski (1906-1980) and the historian of logic Father Antoni
Korcik.
The problem of the relation between the new logic and the traditional
way of cultivating philosophy, especially by Catholics, was nothing
new. As early as 1927 there had been a controversy following an
article by Lukasiewicz proposing a radical reform of philosophy
by applying mathematical logic; a number of Thomist philosophers
had taken part in the debate (H. Jakubanis, J. Kopacz, H. Elzenberg and in particular P. Chojnacki), generally adopting
a critical attitude towards the theses of this representative
of the Lvov-Warsaw School.
Both Salamucha and Bochenski had taken part in the discussion.
The School can, however, be said to have started with the publication
of a book by Drewnowski (Zarys programu filosoficznego
[Lineaments of a Philosophical Programme], "Przeglad Filozoficzny",
XXVII, 1934, pp. 3-38, 150-181, 262-292), which can be seen as
a sort of manifesto. The book traced the fundamental outlines
of a philosophical programme which drew on Lukasiewicz's standpoint
and proposed to introduce a range of semiotic problems into gnoseological
and ontological thought by reflecting on human knowledge as a
system of signs. It also clearly expressed the non-philosophical
role of contemporary logic, a thesis which was to be one of the
most typical of the School, in opposition to those who wished
to bind logic to the specific expressions of Neopositivism. Drewnowski
thus set himself at a distance from both the criticism of traditionalists
(who saw logic as an impoverishment of philosophy) and the purposes
to which the neopositivists intended to put logic, i.e. to clear
philosophy of any metaphysical issues, which they considered to
be senseless: thanks to the application of logic, in fact, metaphysics
and theology would achieve a specific scientific nature that was
by no means inferior to that of the natural sciences. To demonstrate
this assertion he quoted the formalisation of the proof
of the existence of God "ex motu", from Thomas Aquinas' Summa
contra Gentiles.
In the meanwhile Bochenski had also published an article in 1935
and two more in 1936. The first (Dowód przyczynowy na
istnienie Boga w swietle wiary katolickiej [Causal Proof of
the Existence of God in the Light of the Catholic Faith], "Woclawek",
1935) is a history of the causal proof in the light of the Catholic
faith to demonstrate that it was a constant element of theology,
and thus prove its rationalistic vocation. In the first of the
1936 articles (O racjonalizmie i irracjonalizmie katolickim
[Catholic Rationalism and Irrationalism], "Verbum",
1936) Bochenski defended the rational nature of the Catholic faith,
maintaining that theology is not a collection of sentiments but
of statements which have to be logically organised; in the second
(W sprawie logistyki [About Logistics], "Verbum",
1936) he supported the programme of Drewnowski and emphasised
the continuity between modern logistics and traditional logic,
which lies in their common insistence on accuracy. In the same
period Salamucha had also put forward his ideas, first of all
in his works on the history of logic, then with a series of articles
in which he maintained the importance of logic and semantics in
the education of young seminarians, and finally with an article
(Zza kulis filozofii chrzescijanskiej [Behind the Scenes of
Christian Philosophy], "Verbum", 1936) in which he explained
the relationship between traditional and contemporary logic, stating
that the only alternative to its application in philosophical
debate was either to trust in traditional logic at the expense
of accuracy or to slip into irrationalism.
When, at the 3rd National Philosophical Conference held at the
Catholic Scientific Institute in Cracow on 24-27 September 1936,
the innovators - with the spiritual backing of Lukasiewicz, whose
pupils they had all been, except for Bochenski - presented their
theses in three contributions made by Bochenski, Salamucha and
Drewnowski, the clash with Catholic and Thomist traditionalism
was inevitable. The subject of the dispute was quite simple: was
the new logic really a completion of Aristotelian and Medieval
logic? And, more importantly, was the new logic a neutral instrument,
lacking in a world view and therefore suitable for a continuation
of traditional Thomist themes?
Bochenski's reply to these objections (O
"relatywizmie" logistycznym, in Mysl katolicka
wobec logiki wspolczesnej [Catholic Thought Versus Contemporary
Logic], ed. by K. Michalski, "Studia Gnesnesia", 15,
1937; Engl. transl. in "Axiomathes",
2, 1993) expressed the basic assumptions of the Cracow Circle.
Above all, the viewpoint of its members was not merely a reproposal
of the theses of contemporary logicians, but provided a personal
interpretation in distinguishing between the theses of the philosophy
of logic and the contents of logic as such; that is, the principles
of modern formal logic are separate from the philosophical opinions
expressed by logicians.
Bochenski particularly wished to emphasise the instrumental nature
of logic and its philosophically neutral character, in order to
separate the destiny of positivistic philosophy from that of the
new logic, which was seen as a continuation of the real heritage
of Medieval Scholastic philosophy, in contrast with the many contemporary
manuals on formal Scholastic logic, which were hostile to logistics.
In this context it was therefore of fundamental importance to
deny the accusation that logistics was the theoretical nucleus
of anti-metaphysical positivism, as propounded by Carnap and the
Vienna Circle.
This was associated with an extremely negative view of the state
of contemporary Catholic philosophy, which was far from being
as avant-garde as Scholasticism had been in its day. Contemporary
logic was considered to be the lawful heir of ancient and Medieval
logic and it was therefore quite legitimate to apply it to Thomistic
philosophy and analysis of the concepts of traditional metaphysics,
in the attempt to formalise them. For this purpose it was necessary
to replace Scholastic notions with more advanced ones in the field
of semiotics, logic and methodology. In short, "the Circle
wished to persuade Catholic thinkers and philosophers to adopt
the philosophical 'style' cultivated by the Polish school of logic".
However, the Circle's attempts to influence and re-orientate Catholic
thought ended "in almost complete failure". According
to Bochenski, the reason did not lie "in particular Polish
circumstances. It seems to be the result of a reluctance, widespread
amongst theologians and philosophers with a different way of thinking,
to recognise the significance and importance of mathematical logic
and analytical philosophy in all intellectual spheres. The case
of the Cracow Circle is a particularly bitter one. Poland is,
in fact, one of the few countries in which a school of logic flourished,
with an efficient group of Catholic scholars who maintained a
rationalistic position. In such a country it was to be expected
that a new Catholic philosophy, and above all a new Catholic theology,
would develop. Alas, it was not to be".
The School's programme was not devoid of significant results:
Bochenski tried to analyse and formalise Thomas Aquinas' proof
of the immortality of the soul; Salamucha tried to formalise the
proof "ex motu" of existence of God (see a reconstruction); Salamucha,
Drewnowski and Bochenski conducted interesting analyses of the
concept of analogy; and lastly research was carried out into the
history of logic, especially Medieval logic, the result of which
was Bochenski's well-known history of logic and the great amount
of research conducted by Korcik.
Finally, it should recalled that both Bochenski and Drewnowski
continued their activity after World War II in the same spirit
as in the 30s, albeit no longer in the context of an organised
school, and that other philosophers of a Thomist orientation resumed
the Circle's programme, trying to develop some of its themes and
improve them from a logical and methodological point of view;
these themes included the demonstration of the existence of God
"ex motu" and "ex contingentia" (J. Bendiek,
E. Nieznanski, K. Blachowicz, K. Policki), and new additions such
as the formalisation of the argument supporting the immortality
of the soul as proposed by Bochenski, or the logical analysis
of the traditional doctrine of analogy, predestination, etc. (Bochenski,
Nieznanski, C. Oleksy).