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Japan's main opposition Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) president Shinzo Abe (R) and secretary general Shigeru Ishiba attach rosettes next to successful general electoral candidate names on a board at the party headquarters in Tokyo on December 16, 2012. Japan's conservative opposition swept to victory in polls on December 16, broadcasters said, in an apparent shift to the right as tensions rise with China and the economy continues to stumble. (Image credit: AFP/Getty Images via @daylife)

This week another photo op (NYSE closing bell ringing) and speech (NYSE, the U.N. General Assembly) filled visit to the U.S. by Japanese prime minster Abe Shinzo during which a meeting with President Obama was not on the schedule.

That Obama seems to go out of his way to avoid—and thereby to humiliate— Abe, and that Obama cannot be unmindful that by doing so, the U.S. is insulting and, in a sense, injuring, its supposedly most important ally in East Asia, is both puzzling and ironic. The irony is that Obama and Abe seem to share a variety of messianic personality, which we might think would draw them together, at least to the extent of enlivened conversation, but also potentially for devising a common “vision” for their two countries.

Why is this not happening? It is a question of “same bed, different dreams?” Or are both these messianic personalities living in cognitive bubbles that so distort reality neither is capable acting rationally? I would say it is bit of both.

Take Abe’s speech to the conservative Hudson Institute on September 25.

“Japan should not be a weak link in the regional and global security framework where the U.S. plays a leading role….Japan is one of the world's most mature democracies. Thus, we must be a net contributor to the provision of the world's welfare and security. And we will. Japan will contribute to the peace and stability of the region and the world even more proactively than before.”

Does a statement like this not warrant five minutes face time with the U.S. commander-in-chief? Apparently not. We may wonder why.

Abe was talking about his “mission” to reinterpret the Japanese constitution to allow the “exercise” (not the “right” which is taken for granted) of collective self-defense. Such “exercise” would specifically include sanctioning counterattacks by Japanese forces against attackers not of Japan or its own forces, but of “allied” (read: U.S.) forces.

The exercise of “collective self-defense” so defined and mandated, would be a fundamental deviation from current Japanese defense policy and post-WWII domestic political consensus. Abe left no doubt why and against which potential adversary this change is warranted: it is China’s rise, and its concomitant expansion of military power. “Our immediate neighbor,” said Abe, has a military budget twice the size of Japan’s.

The September 14 Asahi Shimbun carried a commentary by the respected Japanese military affairs journalist Taoka Shunji. In it, Taoka used the analogy of a slow swimmer to describe Prime Minister Abe push on collective self-defense. In a swimming race in a pool, a slow swimmer will fall so far behind the pack that he finds himself swimming in the opposite direction. This is how Taoka sees Abe’s initiative, both in relation to Japan’s neighbors, and to its presumed collective security ally, the United States.

I would suggest also, Abe’s vision is not only dangerous and gratuitous in terms of Japan’s own security, it is also a conceptual and psychological bridge too far (or to nowhere) for most Japanese. This being the case, whatever the reception at such forums as the Hudson Institute, a much cooler reception surely awaits Abe and his main supporters—we note in particular Deputy Prime Minister Aso Taro and LDP Secretary General Ishiba Shigeru—in the Diet.

In the end, I hope, and expect, Abe’s initiative will fail.

No doubt Abe’s collective security vision is welcomed in the “China threat” precincts of the Pentagon, the region from which emanated the militarized “Asian pivot”—or “rebalance”—strategy and offensive strike plans like the Air-Sea Battle. But new and distinctly different voices and views are beginning to be heeded in the Pentagon, as we saw at the conclusion of the August 19 meeting between Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel and Chinese Minister of National Defense Chang Wanquan.

The Hagel-Chang meeting followed the June 7 Obama-Xi Jinping “Sunnylands Summit” in California, at which military power “balance” was a major topic.