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How can capital assets, not to mention hundreds of lives, be sent in harms way on the basis of a mere virtual test? It has to be tested against an actual maneuvering missile before its declared to be capable of intercepting moskit/yakhont type threats.

Because synthetic testing and M&S are important parts of any system design and testing and is extensively employed by each and every systems developer and operator the world over. You can never simulate 100% of each and every potential threat type so must test for some, and develop and validate models that help you gain confidence in the ability of your system against the threats you cannot affordably simulate. Besides the USN, not many operators (if any) operate a known SSST program with terminal maneuvering and dive/attack mode requirements at speeds approaching or exceeding Mach 3. Some model that performance while others loan out these SSST's and do limited testing in order to further enhance their models. How do you know a radar is difficult to jam, or LPI against a given threat type? Do you have to test it out against each and every threat ESM system or Jammer before you put it out into service?

Yes, there are benefits to actually running hard testing and maintaining a program to constantly develop targets that mimic certain characteristics of threat systems but there are always limits both technical and financial. But there are other ways to develop an understanding on the abilities and limitations of these systems. Unless you have a very significant threat and have a very large number of missiles that you test over a fixed period of time (USN put out roughly 4 dozen GQM-163A shots in about a decade of it being declared operational), dedicated target programs that cover the entire spectrum of your potential threat would be so expensive so as to actually eat into the capability of the system you are designing (finite resources so development funding will have to give way for test and evaluation). There is a good reason why the path taken by Israel is different from that taken by the USN which has always obsessed about anti-ship missiles and has traditionally maintained at least one SST program along with multiple subsonic targets. There is also a cultural and bureaucratic difference in these approaches. In the US, the Director, Operational Test and Evaluation cannot certify a system as being Operationally Suitable or Effective against a specific threat based solely on simulation - one reason why there exist so many targets and QF-4/16s programs. While this may not be needed for every threat type but when it comes to the missile, systems are often required to be subjected to supersonic missile threats, or TBM threats depending on threat profiles (SRBM, MRBM, IRBM, ICBMs etc) hence a need to test systems against specific threat types.

Radar jamming etc. is run on a system that is very easily 'characterized' and you do know the specific types of threats that can be jammed etc. By an easily characterized system, I mean its easy to predict the behavior of the system given a stimulus. A given rf freq is fed into the front end, run throgh the dsp and generates a jamming signal..

IMO, an anti missile missile is a much more complex system because of the interaction of aerodynamics, rocketry, sensors etc. A 'virtual' test will never stress these interaction issues. It will verify a part of the system, and has its place in the development cycle, but is no replacement for an actual test.

Fortunately, we have not one, but two missiles that can be used for as maneuvering super sonic targets - Aakash and the Brahmos.

IMO, an anti missile missile is a much more complex system because of the interaction of aerodynamics, rocketry, sensors etc. A 'virtual' test will never stress these interaction issues. It will verify a part of the system, and has its place in the development cycle, but is no replacement for an actual test.

The Israelis would disagree. They know a thing or two about Missile design and engineering.

IMO, an anti missile missile is a much more complex system because of the interaction of aerodynamics, rocketry, sensors etc. A 'virtual' test will never stress these interaction issues. It will verify a part of the system, and has its place in the development cycle, but is no replacement for an actual test.

The Israelis would disagree. They know a thing or two about Missile design and engineering.

With due respect to 'the Israelis', I know a thing or thing and a half also. Whether these virtually tested missiles will actually work when faced with the real threat is anybodies guess.

Weapons are the Combat Differentiators: The BrahMos Air Launched Cruise MissileBY DEFENCEUPDATE · NOVEMBER 28, 2017

“Weapons differentiate between Air Forces and Flying Clubs” is an often heard adage. Weapons capability is an integral part of an Air Power matrix. In the last three months, a number of successful indigenous weapons trials in India indicate a positive move in the right direction even if a little late in certain cases and after multiple failures in others.

India’s dependence on foreign vendors for weapons and weapon platforms is well known and it is the largest importer of weaponry. Importing weapons acts as a stimulant for defence capability but it is short lived owing to severe limitations in terms of quantum (cost factor), quality (technology) and sustenance (maintenance support). Indigenous weapons development is therefore the key to efficient and effective security.

In July 2017, the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) developed Quick Reaction Surface to Air Missile (QRSAM) was successfully flight tested.1 This was followed by the successful final Development Flight Trials of Astra –the Beyond Visual Range Air to Air Missile (BVRAAM) – against a Pilotless Target Aircraft (PTA) in September 2017.2 On November 3, the indigenously developed light weight Glide Bomb, SAAW (Smart Anti Airfield Weapon), with an effective range of 70 km was tested.3 Then came, after multiple failures, the successful test flight of ‘NIRBHAY’, the Long Range Sub-Sonic Cruise Missile with an indigenously designed Ring Laser Gyroscope (RLG) and a range of over 700 km.4 And finally, on November 22, the most significant development in this class took place when the Indian Air Force (IAF) successfully fired the BrahMos, the world’s fastest supersonic cruise missile, from a Su-30 MKI fighter aircraft. With a warhead weighing 300 kg, this 2.5 tonne missile has an engagement envelope of 400 km. The operationalisation of the BrahMos Air Launched Cruise Missile (ALCM) will significantly bolster the IAF’s combat capability. BrahMos, with a multi-platform and multi-mission role, is now capable of being launched from land, sea and air, completing the tactical cruise missile triad for India.5

Test firing is one of the initial yet significant steps towards the operationalisation of a system. It will take a while before all the above mentioned weapons systems are declared fully operational and inducted for operational deployment. But the die is cast. Once operational, for the first time in India’s history, the armed forces will have a significant share of cutting edge weapons of indigenous origin.

Although already deployed as a ground based and sea based weapons system, the BrahMos ALCM adds a different dimension to combat capability. It converges the advantages of a missile system with the flexibility of air power. A standoff range of 300 to 400 km keeps the mother aircraft outside the lethal zone of all known terminal defence weapons. If need be, the mother aircraft can go deep inside the adversary’s territory with requisite combat support and carry out the attack on target systems hitherto not reachable. In practical terms, with this weapon, the effective range for engaging targets (radius of action) increases by 25 to 30 per cent and the size of engagement zone doubles.6

READ Ignored dimensions of India’s MTCR membershipCarrying out attacks against targets defended by multi-layered air defence weapons systems has attendant risks. Non-stealth aircraft in a ground attack configuration have a large Radar Cross Section (RCS) given the imperative of carrying multiple external weapons. This leads to early detection by adversary surveillance and tracking systems. Besides early detection by the terminal weapon radars, the aircraft configuration imposes a severe limitation both in terms of its speed and manoeuvrability. Unless protected by multiple high powered Electronic Warfare (EW) warning and counter measure systems, there is a high probability that terminal weapons would be able to engage strike aircraft. This leads to either aborted attacks or loss of aircraft. All this can be avoided by carrying out an attack from outside the lethal engagement zone of the terminal weapon systems. For that, an air launched weapon with a range greater than the lethal zone of terminal weapons is required. The BrahMos ALCM is just that. Although BrahMos itself can be intercepted, owing to its relatively smaller RCS and high speed in the range of 2.8 to 3 Mach, interception is much more difficult than intercepting a fully loaded aircraft. This leads to a high assurance level of success of an attack.

Interaction between the primary damage mechanisms of a weapon (like blast, fragmentation or penetration) with the vulnerability of a target system defines the weapon’s effect on target. The amount of explosive in the warhead, the nature and type of casing along with the explosion initiation mechanism and timing determine the nature and extent of damage. The damage caused by each weapon assists in calculating the number of weapons required to achieve the requisite degree of damage on the target system. Owing to its high kinetic energy at the terminal stage, BrahMos has a high penetration potential but subject to the warhead retaining its shape during impact and penetration. The weight of its warhead, which indicates the quantum of explosive carried, indicates that the damage caused by BrahMos would be akin to one 1000-pound bomb. This is a limiting factor. In addition, the weight of attack is relatively low as only one such missile can be carried per aircraft. The low quantity of explosives carried coupled with the fact that one aircraft would be able to carry only one weapon necessitate a high force level. In other words, a very large number of aircraft loaded with BrahMos will be required to neutralise a large target. This can be offset by high weapon delivery accuracy, with a Circular Error of Probability (CEP) comparable to the dimensions of the vulnerable portion of the target around the aiming point or Desired Mean Point of Impact (DMPI).7 Therefore, terminal accuracy attains great significance. An accurate attack can result in damaging the critical sub system to make the target system non-functional and achieve the desired effect. With this size of warhead, sub 10 metre accuracy is ideal for most target systems.8

READ Tibet is China's Right Hand and Ladakh, Nepal, Sikkim, Bhutan and Arunachal are its Fingers - Mao ZedongThree aspects of BrahMos that are still a work in progress are: extending its range, increasing its speed to hypersonic level, and shrinking its size so that three missiles can be carried by a single aircraft. While all three are steps in the right direction, the most significant change that is required is in terms of further enhancing the missile’s accuracy by fine-tuning its terminal guidance. Greater accuracy will actually reduce the number of weapons required to achieve the desired effect on a given target system.

Originally scheduled to be operational by 2012, the BrahMos ALCM is heading to become a reality after a delay of five years. Now is the time to step on the accelerator. Work needs to be carried out on finalising the modification of the aircraft in terms of structure, electrical and avionics, the manufacture of suitable pylons and changes in the weapon to ensure seamless compatibility and communication between the three. Necessary ground handling and support equipment and infrastructure will also have to be defined for storing, servicing, testing, conveying and loading of the weapon. Thereafter, work needs to be initiated with respect to the parallel processing on aircraft fleet modification, pylon manufacture, support equipment and infrastructure and weapon production. This will enable the availability of this unprecedented and game changing weapon delivery capability for operational deployment in adequate strength at the earliest. A similar approach also needs to be followed in the case of the other indigenous weapon systems that have been tested in recent months. These indigenous long range and accurate weapons in the air-to-surface, surface-to-surface, surface-to-air, and air-to-air categories in adequate quantity will partially offset the capability deficiency resulting from the IAF’s dwindling force structure.

brar_w, USN, after the USS Stark incident, has proven that they can take down missiles fired in anger. And they do have regular confirmed tests for the supersonic targets. As did RN during the falkland skirmish with the Sea Dart.

Not so with the Israelis. The issue with Israelis competence for CIWS is that their weapon (which is carried in many IN ships) did not prevent a major mission kill of a largish warship, from a rudimentary AShM on INS Hanit. Basic questions like "did they slap the person who created an "energy saving mode" for a CIWS ?" etc remains.

However, as Karan M pointed out, I doubt if we will ever hear of any intercept of a supersonic target from Indian sources.

yes.... the system apparently had a "screen-saver mode" enabled in a war zone, wherein it saves energy <face palm>

The issue was squarely put on the chap who slept at the wheel and not on a system that did not have an alerting backup mechanism to wake up Lootenent Pop-eye, when inside a geo-fence that says "Hizb territory".

sudeepj wrote:Radar jamming etc. is run on a system that is very easily 'characterized' and you do know the specific types of threats that can be jammed etc. By an easily characterized system, I mean its easy to predict the behavior of the system given a stimulus. A given rf freq is fed into the front end, run throgh the dsp and generates a jamming signal..

IMO, an anti missile missile is a much more complex system because of the interaction of aerodynamics, rocketry, sensors etc. A 'virtual' test will never stress these interaction issues. It will verify a part of the system, and has its place in the development cycle, but is no replacement for an actual test.

Fortunately, we have not one, but two missiles that can be used for maneuvering super sonic targets - Aakash and the Brahmos.

BrahMos..?

Karan M wrote:India would have tested against physical targets as well. Due to sensitivity of the issue, the public notification would be dropped.

HNair boss, that story was so amazing at so many levels, basically the system was in manual mode and the duty officer wasn't too bothered because the famed Mossad didn't tell the Navy the Hezbollah had C-802 missiles.

Philip wrote:Karan, Ramana, the point is that if Trishul did make the grade, why was it not adopted, at least by one service? The goalposts will keep shifting, IN wanting greater range, others fire and forget capability, etc.End result of that programme, we learnt a lot, but as a system that the services wanted a big zero.We're now repeating the effort with the QR SAM trying to go if alone again(?), hoping past mistakes are not being repeated.

Please read the information that is posted in response to your repetitive statements on the forum. The other day itself, it was posted that the QRSAM will form the basis of a specific Naval & IAF version as well. So what exactly is the problem?Next, the services did not adopt the Trishul, because they wanted the latest and bestest, and that IS their prerogative in the Indian system, which is led by services QR leading the procurement. The Navy version was not ready by the time, the Akash program progressed ahead for several other criteria. But the AF and Army wanted active seeker equipped systems, and hence the SpyDer and now the Akash 1S.As regards a big zero, clearly, you neither intend to understand context or nuance. India developed the equivalent of the Barak-1 system in service on IN ships. That capability now exists , and has become the basis of creating something like the QRSAM.

Now QRSAM draws on ALL the above to come up with a brand new system with AESA radars, active seeker, two way datalink, and a host of other improvements.

Variants can then be developed for each service in turn.

The point I'm repeatedly making is that where we do not have all the answers, to provide the services with a system in time, JVs are essential.Saves time and money.Have we not done that with B-8 as well as BMos? It is now being fitted to principal warships.But B-8 is extremely expensive and too few rounds fitted aboard our DDGs meant to also provide cover for the fleet, CBG,etc.Akash has been rejected by the IN, reasons given in an above post.Warships do require compact systems, lightweight and long life canisterisation, but was there no attempt to develop a med. range Akash silo launched?Anyway, B-8's arrival with greater range has taken over that req.

Here you go in circles over and over and over again.JV's are taken when the local capability does not exist.Barak-8 was a JV done entirely because the services wanted a quick answer for the MR requirement & local effort was focused on the Akash & BMD efforts. Now the capability exists to develop follow ons to Akash, which is exactly the point of the SRSAM/QRSAM/Akash follow on programs!Why should DRDO form a JV when it is not getting anything from the JV?Also, by producing Barak-8 in numbers, and indigenizing key systems (namely the radar) cost for the entire system can be brought down (economies of scale) which is an alternative to launching a program to supplanting the Barak-8.

There have been many critical articles about the IN in particular fielding warships without SAM's, ASW TAS sonars, ASW helos, etc.Including the VikA.We are fortunate that we've not had a conflict in recent times.The 20km range for BPDMS systems that the IN want can easily be resolved with the newer lightweight gun/ missile systems replacing Kashtan.In any case the 30mm galting has already become std. last ditch gun anti-missile system aboard most of the combat vessels.This would solve the problem that John has mentioned, better than using individual MANPADS.

Those critical articles also mention the fact that while import clearances are given, they are stuck because of corruption allegations, price glitches and vendor non compliance!

What does that have to do with indigenous programs!

I don't know if a smaller missile based upon B-8 ,using the same seeker, etc. could be developed, just as we're developing a smaller BMos-NG. This could replace the older Barak-1 systems and offer a cheaper standardised QR SAM which has the same missile intercept capability as a B-8.It would save time and money developing yet another missile.

Which is what the SRSAM program is.

PS: Parl. Standing Cmmttee on Defence "deeply anguished " ,that with each yr., "the revenue to capital outlay is deeply skewed as capital acquisitions for the services is declining in comparison to revenue allocations, adversely affecting the modernisation process of the forces."

The same Committee makes the same statements every darn year and no Govt thanks to our skewed subsidy heavy expenditures has the financial wherewithal to change things! If anything under the UPA, the addiction has become huge & which means the current Govt is not going to yank it while heading into an election year!

Philip wrote:The Bulava failures ,which I've regularly quoted as an example,were becos the distinguished BM scientist was not familiar with naval missiles,esp. sub-lunched ones,only land-based ones,not due to alcoholism,etc., which is in v.poor taste (pun intended-no idea what brand of vodka is being consumed!) but makes for hilarious thoughts! A vodka-fuelled Bulava.Great name for a cocktail what?! What will people ascribe Indian missile failures to then? Too much nimbu paani ,Hercules XXX rum and butter chicken? Putin replaced the gent with someone else who delivered.

So do you think one scientist develops all these complex systems? You must surely be kidding. Fact, all the PR of tough guy Putin solving all of Russia's problems, is just PR.

The stop-gap ,"split-procurement" solutions,acquiring only a small batch for immediate reqs. and then developing a desi one later-with uncertainty as to when it will finally arrive, is only going to add to the inventory confusion,support and maintenance,let alone integration with the overall AD system.It would be far better to go the whole hog locally ,or evaluate and select a firang system that meets our reqs,as the IN did, seal the deal with a JV/TOT -as in BMos/B-8. A mere small-batch purchase will still keep us bound to the OEM for any problems and continued support. Unless substantial progress has been made with the desi system,which is around the corner,waiting for years for ships,etc. to be equipped with it is taking a huge risk. We already have a menagerie of anti-ship missiles,the most varied of any navy in the world,so there's little need to emulate that with the anti-air/missile types.

You are again mistaken in terms of what you are speaking, as our procurements are hardly small-batch & take care of substantial requirements, while it is the Indian system which is usually given a limited token order to ensure the technology is at least developed.As the Indian capabilities mature, then the orders proportionately increase!The first of any class of system, taken ab-initio will have the highest degree of systemic risk because of the complexity of effort, but it reduces thereafter!As regards logistics complexity, it is anyday better to have two lines of support of which at least one is local & flexible as versus tied to an imported system wherein the OEM holds us at their beck and call.The Navy of the three services has driven split procurements with optimal efficiency & the much maligned AF/Army procurement teams have also delivered! It is worthwhile to note that by following this approach, the IAF for instance may end up sourcing almost 80% of its radar requirements locally, and in a few years time, a similar proportion of its munitions programs will follow suit, given the number of local munitions programs in advanced trials and makin steady progress!If the services were to follow your plan, there would be no capability, local or imported and there would be severe gaps in our warfighting capability!

One option,if the split-procurement is inevitable due to prolonged delays,is to increase the number of systems acquired from abroad and use it throughout a particular class/batch of warship/warships. This would be more cost-effective.Future warships on the drawing board and some under construction which could accommodate the desi SAM without too much of difficulty.Those which are in n early stage in the builders yard, can wait for the desi missile which hopefully arrives on time for integration at fitting out time.[/b] There is also no guarantee that the desi missile will cost less.As a general yardstick this should happen,but look at HAL built MKIs,more expensive than those built in Russia.

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HAL built MKIs are on paper more expense because the per unit cost includes the cost of the entire infra build up for the sake of only 200 odd Flankers of which only some 70 odd are truly Phase 4, whereas the Russian ones are amortized over a build of thousands!

How does that compare to our missiles which are anyhow customized to our requirements and which come with significant cost incurred for TOT if imported.

As a mental exercise it should not be to difficult to do at least a rudimentary analysis of what specs of missile would be needed to intercept a Brahmos. Intuitively my mind tells me that it would be difficult except in some situations.

As a wild guesstimate I doubt if any missile would catch the Brahmos in tail chase or if launched from 90 deg off to one side. The only hope of actually hitting one would come from a cone in front where the two missiles would close into each other at an insane pace. Not that that is not possible - but here's the rub, if the Brahmos is doing terminal manoeuvring it would make things difficult if not impossible to intercept.

If an anti-Brahmos missile was launched from say 30 degrees off boresight from an approaching Brahmos, what would have to be the detection distance for a direct hit to kill assuming there is no manoeuvring?

hnair wrote:yes.... the system apparently had a "screen-saver mode" enabled in a war zone, wherein it saves energy <face palm>

The issue was squarely put on the chap who slept at the wheel and not on a system that did not have an alerting backup mechanism to wake up Lootenent Pop-eye, when inside a geo-fence that says "Hizb territory".

The system was shut down to avoid targeting Israeli warplanes in the region. IFF is a pain in combat. The Patriot has shot down more US aircraft than enemy.

DRDO's techfocus has some info on K4 SLBM, whose aluminium nose cap dome is " now made by Hindalco, proved in a K4 slbm test in 2014, and validated in other tests." Specifically Mentions a 2017 flight trail of K4.

Deliberately put by DRDO to send a message that K4 production started ?

I didnt get you.. China has access to a Brahmos type missile (C-302). Can the Barak-8 intercept it? If its a virtual target, suuuuure.. You have 'the Israelis' word for it.

Even if a SAM gets tested against a target of similar type and is a success it does not really mean they would succeed against real missile , Most SAM are tested against real target in simulated exercises and vice verse thats the nature of the same and in such exercises we have reports of SAM outsmarting an aircraft missile or vice verse.

In real war you have multiple system employed EW , ECM , Decoys , Jammers etc and it also involves careful mission planning and intelligence from both the sides and there is also an intense pressure of war where Humans behaviour and reaction would also play a significant role something you cant really simulate in any real combat exercises the climate/environment where such weapons are deployed also matters too.

So to answer the question if Barak-8 or some other missile can intercept Brahmos or Harpoon or Exocet in a simulated exercises perhaps may be and can Brahmos/Harpoon defeat such SAM perhaps may be but do we know really how such system will behave in real combat environment that is some thing we will come to know in actual war.

There are cases of IN Barak SAM intercept Styx SSM and even failing to do so in combat exercise held by IN.

tsarkar wrote:The system was shut down to avoid targeting Israeli warplanes in the region. IFF is a pain in combat. The Patriot has shot down more US aircraft than enemy.

The last part cannot be emphasized enough. IFF and the fog of war can play havoc on how you actually perform with a system under a real world threat. While you can automate many ballistic missile attack responses and much of this has been automated on AEGIS and Patriot for years now, but when it comes to live aircraft it is still largely a subjective call which gets a lot tougher under the fog of war especially when operating with coalition aircraft. This has been one of the reason cited by the USAF for example on why it prefers to do long range AAW as opposed to the US Army as far as over land air-superiority sweeps are concerned.

tsarkar wrote:

sudeepj wrote:China has access to a Brahmos type missile (C-302). Can the Barak-8 intercept it?

There are supersonic targets against which naval SAM's are tested.

Check the flight profile and timelines of the below target. It flies faster than BrahMos. And missiles like Standard and Barak-8 have intercepted such targets.

The Coyote SSST and other SST's have been successfully intercepted by SM2/6, Aster, ESSM-1, and now even the RIM-116 - Blk. 2. I had asked this earlier, does Israel have a dedicated SSST that it uses to test the Barak and other systems? Australia, Japan and France have borrowed range infrastructure (France actually brought it to their shore) and tested their systems against the GQM-163A but so far, I have not read anything on Israel using it or the jayhawk or having an indigenous SSST program that is publicly known. They are going to be using US range infrastructure and targets for their BMD progam, with testing shifting to Alaska but so far this has been limited to the BMD side. Indranil was able to point to synthetic tests so either live testing has happened in secret using undisclosed SSSTs or they used extensive M&S to develop the envelope for such a potential target set.

kit wrote:The israelis has mounted the iron dome on ships ..They are thinking on the lines of defence against missile swarms

It is a low cost solution against the saturated threat from cheap rockets and other lower end missile systems and the UAV's that can be potentially used to make some of the weapons more accurate. The Tamir isn't an optimal weapon against the medium-high end subsonic or supersonic missile threat, or a TBM threat which is real in the region since Iran now, I believe, has short range TBMs capable of anti surface roles.. The system has limitations which was one of the ways they were able to keep costs low enough to address the CRAM mission. For better coverage they really need to put Stunners onto ships.

Austin wrote:In real war you have multiple system employed EW , ECM , Decoys , Jammers etc and it also involves careful mission planning and intelligence from both the sides and there is also an intense pressure of war where Humans behaviour and reaction would also play a significant role something you cant really simulate in any real combat exercises the climate/environment where such weapons are deployed also matters too.

Testing is supposed to give you a good baseline of how your system is expected to perform against a given threat under a given scenario being tested. Higher fidelity operational testing can further introduce elements outside of the system performance such as the human factors (use of operational crews) and you can inject other scenarios as well including decoying, jamming, etc etc. But yes, the testers who do this professionally know the limits of testing vs the real thing but the point of extensive testing , and taking efforts to add more and more complex tests (like introducing unmanned supersonic aircraft that can carry 100s of kg's of electronic warfare equipment while pulling 9Gs) is to develop a baseline capability and understanding of the limits of your weapons system and to further refine models. Here you are looking to Model - Test - Verify - Refine Model .

At the end of the day, nothing will replicate real combat but answer to that isn't less testing since through testing you learn the limits of your capability hoping that this better understanding will help you make a better product which will give you some confidence when you take it to war. It is the same for offensive systems as well, they too are tested or should be extensively tested and stressed in order to better understand their advantages and limitations knowing that even they may work differently when used in combat under the fog of war where many factors come into play that cannot always be perfectly replicated in a test environment. The answer there too is to constantly seek to develop better operational test scenarios and to constantly refine models and improve system performance over time. The same applies to training. Nothing will put you in a real world combat scenario but either through live, or simulated training professionals look to gain confidence in both their system and in their ability to operate it.

There have been many critical articles about the IN in particular fielding warships without SAM's, ASW TAS sonars, ASW helos, etc.Including the VikA.We are fortunate that we've not had a conflict in recent times.The 20km range for BPDMS systems that the IN want can easily be resolved with the newer lightweight gun/ missile systems replacing Kashtan.In any case the 30mm galting has already become std. last ditch gun anti-missile system aboard most of the combat vessels.This would solve the problem that John has mentioned, better than using individual MANPADS.

Those critical articles also mention the fact that while import clearances are given, they are stuck because of corruption allegations, price glitches and vendor non compliance!

What does that have to do with indigenous programs!

I don't know if a smaller missile based upon B-8 ,using the same seeker, etc. could be developed, just as we're developing a smaller BMos-NG. This could replace the older Barak-1 systems and offer a cheaper standardised QR SAM which has the same missile intercept capability as a B-8.It would save time and money developing yet another missile.

Which is what the SRSAM program is.

I am all for SRSAM program but what frustrates me about it is we seem to be earmarking for vessels that are already completed which only puts more pressure on overall program. Right know we have $350 million vessels fitted with no SAM and likely same is going to happen with next gen missile corvette. This is repeat of Trishul and brahmaputra class debacle at least back then we didn't have many fall back options but know we do.

Later, the aerodynamic loads on the complete configuration was determined in the 4-ft wind tunnel simulating flight Mach number range of 0.55 to 1.2 conditions at various angles of attack and sideslip to ascertain installation effects, store load in carriage position and in aircraft interference flow-field.