The respondent was employed by the appellant. On
the basis that the respondent had indulged in various
activities of misconduct,
he was placed under suspension
pending disciplinary enquiry. The respondent was served
with a charge-sheet which was issued by the
Managing
Director of the appellant. An Enquiry Officer was
appointed. After holding the enquiry, a report was
submitted by the Enquiry
Officer. According to the
report, of the eight charges, four were proved, one partly
proved and three not proved. The Managing Director
concurred with the Enquiry Officer's findings and issued
a show cause notice to the appellant why the punishment
of dismissal of
service should not be imposed upon him.

No reply appears to have been given to this notice and
the respondent was dismissed from service on 25th
January, 1991. The order
of dismissal was also passed
by the Managing Director. Challenging the order of
dismissal, the respondent filed a writ petition before
the
Nagpur Bench of the Bombay High Court.

While the writ petition was pending, the Board of
Directors of the appellant Corporation passed a
resolution ratifying the action
taken by the Managing
Director in respect of the disciplinary action against the
respondent and also empowering the Managing Director
to take decisions in respect of the officers and staff in the
grade of pay the maximum of which did not exceed Rs.

4,700/-p.m. Prior to this resolution the Managing
Director had powers only in respect of those posts where
the maximum pay did not
exceed Rs. 1,800/- p.m.

Admittedly, the respondent at the relevant time was
drawing more than Rs. 1,800/- p.m. Therefore when the
Managing Director issued
the order dismissing the
respondent, he was incompetent to do so.

In the writ petition the respondent had taken
several grounds for challenging the dismissal order for
example, that the relevant
documents were not supplied,
that he was not allowed to cross-examine the witnesses,
that he was not allowed to engage a lawyer etc.
However,
a perusal of paragraph 6 of the impugned judgment of
the High Court shows that the writ petitioner did not
press any of
the grounds. The only ground which was
pressed was that the order of dismissal was passed by
the Managing Director of the appellant,
who had no
authority or power to do so, as the same was vested in
the Board of Directors of the appellant. In view of the
fact that
the respondent had not pressed these grounds
before the High Court, we cannot allow him to urge these
points before us. The only
issue which the High Court
was called upon to decide was whether the removal of the
respondent from service was by a competent authority.

The High Court allowed the writ petition holding
that the Managing Director was not competent to
terminate the respondent's services
as on the date of the
passing of the order of termination and therefore the
order of dismissal was invalid. The High Court was also
of the view that this defect could not be rectified
subsequently by the resolution of the Board of Directors.

The High Court accordingly set aside the order of
termination. Since the respondent had already retired
from service, the appellant
was directed to reinstate the
respondent notionally with effect from the date of
termination in the same post and pay salaries up
to the
date of superannuation and to pay all retrial benefits
after the date of superannuation.

Before us learned counsel appearing on behalf of
the appellant has submitted that the High Court's
decision was contrary to the
decisions of this Court in
Parmeshwari Prasad Gupta V. The Union of India
(1973) 2 SCC 543 and High Court of Judicature for
Rajasthan
V. P.P. Singh and Anr. (2003) 4 SCC 239.

The respondent on the other hand submitted that the
resolution of the Board was subsequent to the order of
dismissal and, therefore,
could not operate
retrospectively. The respondent relied upon the decision
in Krishna Kumar V. Divisional Assistant Electrical
Engineer
(1979) 4 SCC 289 in support of this
contention.

The High Court was right when it held that an act
by a legally incompetent authority is invalid. But it was
entirely wrong in holding
that such an invalid act cannot
be subsequently 'rectified' by ratification of the competent
authority. Ratification by definition
means the making
valid of an act already done. The principle is derived
from the Latin maxim 'Ratihabitio priori mandato
aequiparatur'
namely ' a subsequent ratification of an act
is equivalent to a prior authority to perform such act'.

Therefore ratification assumes an invalid act which is
retrospectively validated.

In Parmeshwari Prasad Gupta, the services of the
General Manager of a company had been terminated by
the Chairman of the Board of
Directors pursuant to a
resolution taken by the Board at a meeting. It was not
disputed that that meeting had been improperly held
and
consequently the resolution passed terminating the
services of the General Manager was invalid. However, a
subsequent meeting
had been held by the Board of
Directors affirming the earlier resolution. The
subsequent meeting had been properly convened. The
Court held:

"Even if it be assumed that the
telegram and the letter terminating
the services of the appellant by the
Chairman was in pursuance
to the
invalid resolution of the Board of
Directors passed on December 16,
1953 to terminate his services, it
would not follow that
the action of
the Chairman could not be ratified
in a regularly convened meeting of
the Board of Directors. The point is
that even
assuming that the
Chairman was not legally authorized
to terminate the services of the
appellant, he was acting on behalf of
the
Company in doing so, because,
he purported to act in pursuance of
the invalid resolution. Therefore, it
was open to a regularly constituted
meeting of the Board of Directors to
ratify that action which, though
unauthorized, was done on behalf of
the Company. Ratification
would
always relate back to the date of the
act ratified and so it must be held
that the services of the appellant
were validly terminated
on
December 17, 1953".

The view expressed has been recently approved in
the case of High Court of Judicature for Rajasthan V.

P.P. Singh (supra) .

The same view has been expressed in several cases
in other jurisdictions. Thus in Hartman vs. Hornsby
(142 Mo 368, 44 SW 242, 244)
it was said "Ratification'"
in the approval by act, word, or conduct, of that which
was attempted (of accomplishment), but which
was
improperly or unauthorizedly performed in the first
instance".

In the present case, the Managing Director's order
dismissing the respondent from the service was
admittedly ratified by the Board
of Directors on 20th
February 1991, and the Board of Directors
unquestionably had the power to terminate the services
of the respondent.
On the basis of the authorities noted,
it must follow that since the order of the Managing
Director had been ratified by the Board
of Directors such
ratification related back to the date of the order and
validated it.

Reliance on the decision in Krishna Kumar V.

Divisional Assistant Electrical Engineer (1979) 4 SCC
289 by the respondent is misplaced. In that case, the
appellant had been
appointed by the Chief Electrical
Engineer, the departmental head. He was removed from
service by the Divisional Assistant Engineer.
The
question for determination was whether the appellant
had been removed from the service by an authority
subordinate to that which
had appointed him in violation
of Article 311(1) of the Constitution. Having considered
the affidavits filed, the Court came to
the conclusion that
the appellant had been removed from the service by an
officer who was subordinate in rank to the officer by
whom
he was appointed. The Divisional Assistant
Engineer was, subsequent to the appellant's
appointment, given the power to make an appointment
to
the post which the appellant held. It was urged by the
respondent State that he, therefore, had the power to
remove all persons
holding that post. The submission
was rejected on the grounds first that the right under
Article 311(1) is vested in an employee
on the date of his
appointment and that subsequent authorization of any
subordinate officer would not confer the power on such
subordinate
officer to remove the employee. Secondly,
merely because the subordinate officer was vested with
the power to appoint would not
make him equal in rank
with the officer making the appointment. In other words,
the Divisional Engineer did not cease to be subordinate
to the Chief Electrical Engineer merely because the
latter's power to make appointment to the post had been
delegated to him.

That was not a case of ratification but of
empowerment subsequent to the operative date. The
case is, therefore, distinguishable
not only on facts but
also on the law applicable.

In view of the above, this appeal is allowed, the
impugned judgment and order of the High Court is
quashed, and the dismissal order
dated 25.1.1991 is
upheld. There shall be no order as to costs.

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