Friday, October 05, 2012

Wrongful Termination, Extortion and Using a Computer to Commit a Crime

After he was convicted of extortion and using a computer to
commit a crime in violation of Michigan law and sentenced to “60 to 240 months
for each offense”, Patrick Joseph Morrissey appealed.People
v. Morrissey, N.W.2d, 2012 WL 4039682 (Michigan Court of Appeals
2012).

The Court of Appeals began its opinion by explaining how
Morrissey came to be charged with and convicted of these crimes:

[His] convictions arose from his
efforts to extort money from his former employer, Steelcase, by sending
numerous threatening e-mails under the pseudonym `Crazy Chrissy’ to members of
Steelcase's board of directors. Chrissy threatened to release materials related
to [his] termination from Steelcase, which `she’ claimed would be harmful to
Steelcase.

To stop the release of information,
Chrissy demanded money and insisted that Steelcase rectify [Morrissey’s]
allegedly wrongful termination by putting him through the severance process.

People v. Morrissey,
supra.

The opinion quotes some of Crazy Chrissy’s emails, like this
one: “`[m]ake no mistake, this video will go out all over the internet on
Thursday should Steelcase not come through.’” People v. Morrissey, supra.Here’s another:

`Don't be dumb, Steelcase. We had a
policeman contact us. This was not very wise. If you do that again, we will
raise our price. Do not have any authorities bother Pat or us in any way.’

`Even
if you would find out who we are, a friend of ours would release the video. You
would lose much worse. We would spread this story much more than what we are
saying already. It would go straight to the major newspapers. Do not be dumb.
We have copies with other people we know. Just do what we ask and this will be
over soon.’

People v. Morrissey,
supra.

Morrissey’s first argument on appeal was that Steelcase, as
a corporation, was not a “person” who could be extorted under the Michigan
statute, which provides as follows:

Any person who shall, either orally or
by a written or printed communication, maliciously threaten to accuse another of
any crime or offense, or shall orally or by any written or printed
communication maliciously threaten any injury to the person or property or
mother, father, husband, wife or child of another with intent
thereby to extort money or any pecuniary advantage whatever, or with intent to
compel the person so threatened to do or refrain from doing
any act against his will, shall be guilty of a felony, punishable by
imprisonment in the state prison not more than 20 years or by a fine of not
more than 10,000 dollars.

Michigan Compiled Laws § 750.213 (emphasis in the original).

The Court of Appeals did not buy his argument. It noted,
first, that § 750.213 does not

provide a definition of `person’ or `of
another’. . . . However, under the general provisions of the penal code, `[t]he
words ‘person,’ ‘accused,’ and similar words include, unless a contrary
intention appears, public and private corporations, copartnerships, and
unincorporated or voluntary associations.” Michigan Complied Laws § 750.10. Similarly, the Legislature has enacted general
rules of construction to govern `construction of the statutes of this state.’
Michigan Complied Laws § 8.3.

Under these general rules of
construction, `[t]he word “person’” may extend and be applied to bodies politic
and corporate, as well as to individuals.’ Michigan Complied Laws § 8.3.`When the Legislature has provided a
definition, it is binding and the courts cannot ‘look afield’ for their meaning
elsewhere.’ People v. Washpun, 175 Mich.App 420, 438 NW2d 305
(Michigan Court of Apepals1989). In keeping with the Legislature's definition,
we have repeatedly held that “person” extends beyond human persons to include
corporations. . . .

We
are not persuaded by [Morrissey’s] argument that the Legislature's definition
of `person’ should be used only in regards to those accused of a crime.
Instead, `identical language in various provisions of the same act should be
construed identically.’ People v. Wiggins, 289 Mich.App 126, 795
N.W. 2d 232 (Michigan Court of Appeals 2010).

Given the Legislature's express
definitions of `person’ and `similar words,’ we conclude that § 750.213 includes
corporations as a `person’ who may be the victim of extortion.

People v. Morrissey,
supra.

Morrissey also argued that the trial judge “should have
instructed the jury that the action defendant sought to extort from Steelcase
had to be `serious.’” People v.
Morrissey, supra.In analyzing this argument, the court noted
that he

However, because [Morrissey] failed to
request an instruction relating to this theory that his demand was not `serious,' the trial court was not required to present such an instruction to
the jury and failure to give such an instruction is not grounds for
reversal. People v. Mills, 450 Mich. 61, 537 N.W. 2d 909
(Michigan Supreme Court 1995); Michigan Compiled Laws § 768.29.

Moreover, the trial court instructed
the jury that [Morrissey] must intend to make Steelcase `do something against
its will` and `against its will’ was defined as to be forced `to make a choice
and it has to choose the lesser of two evils.’ The phrase `lesser of two evils’
imparts the severity of the demand required to commit extortion, and as such,
the instructions as given were a correct statement of the law. . . .

To the extent [his] argument suggests
the prosecutor misstated the law, his claim is also without merit. Any
potential error in the prosecution's legal argument was cured by the trial
court's explanation of the law and instructions that the jury should follow the
court's explanation of the law. People v. Grayer, 252 Mich.
App 349, 651 N.W. 2d 818 (Michigan Court of Appeals 2002).

People v. Morrissey,
supra.

Morrissey also argued that the trial judge erred in not
letting the jury see a Power Point presentation he created and that “depicted
his understanding of why and how he was fired from Steelcase" because the presentation was hearsay. People
v. Morrissey, supra.Hearsay is a statement made by someone who does not testify at the trial but is
repeated by a witness who does testify.Morrissey claimed the presentation was not hearsay, which is excluded
unless hearsay falls into one of a number of exceptions to the default rule
excluding it, and the Court of Appeals agreed.People v. Morrissey, supra. If
you’d like to read more about what hearsay is and why it is presumptively
excluded from evidence, check out this blog post.

The court found that the

Power Point presentation was not
hearsay because [Morrissey] did not seek to prove the truth of the matter
asserted therein. The presentation consisted of [his] version of events
relating to his termination from Steelcase. However, [he] did not seek to
introduce the presentation to prove he was wrongfully terminated as described
in the presentation.

Instead, he sought to establish that
the information was not threatening and could not pose a risk ofinjury’ to Steelcase within the meaning
of § 750.213. Because Morrissey was not seeking to establish the truth of
the contents contained in the Power Point presentation, it did not constitute
hearsay.

People v. Morrissey,
supra.

Notwithstanding that, the Court of Appeals found that the
trial judge did not err in excluding the presentation, for either or both of
two reasons. People v. Morrissey, supra.

The first was that it was

irrelevant and its probative value was
substantially outweighed by the risk of confusion and the needless presentation
of cumulative evidence. ‘Relevant
evidence’ means evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact
that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less
probable than it would be without the evidence. Michigan Rule of Evidence 401.

[Morrissey] was charged with extortion
on the theory that he threatened injury to Steelcase's property with the intent
to extort money or compel action from Steelcase. . . . The crime of extortion is complete at the time
the threat is made. . . . An overt act is not required, nor is the victim
required to feel intimidated. . . .

Likewise, there is no requirement in
the plain language of § 750.213 that [Morrissey] possess the means to
accomplish his threat. In this case, the Power Point presentation was not the
threat; the e-mails were the threat. The e-mails contained an express threat to
make information regarding [Morrissey's] termination public, specifically
information that Chrissy claimed would make Steelcase look like `morons,’ `anger
[Steelcase's] current employees,’ `start up a scandal at Steelcase,’ and impede
Steelcase's efforts at recruiting new employees.

The e-mails were the threat and it was
the e-mails that were relevant to determining whether [Morrissey] threatened
`injury’ to Steelcase's property. At most, the Power Point presentation
contained the means by which [he] intended to bring ruination upon Steelcase.
Whether the release of the information in the Power Point may or may not have
accomplished the injury [Morrissey] threatened is irrelevant to whether he, in
fact, threatened injury. Accordingly, the Power Point presentation was
irrelevant and properly excluded.

People v. Morrissey,
supra.

As noted above, the Court of Appeals also found that even if
the Power Point was

relevant, it was properly excluded under
Michigan Rule of Evidence 403, which provides that `[a]lthough relevant,
evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by
the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the
members, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation
of cumulative evidence.’

`Rule 403 determinations are best
left to a contemporaneous assessment of the presentation, credibility, and
effect of testimony by the trial judge.” People v. Bahoda, 448
Mich. 261, 531 NW2d 659 (Michigan Supreme Court 1995). In this case, the
trial court determined that the Power Point presentation could confuse the
issues, pose difficulty in presenting the material to the jury, and was already
incorporated in [Morrissey’s] own testimony.

Because the Power Point presentation
had no bearing on whether the e-mails expressed a threat, the probative value
of the presentation was minimal. Additionally, the information in the Power
Point consisted of [Morrissey’s] version of events surrounding his termination,
facts to which he testified during trial. As such, introduction of the Power
Point was the needless presentation of cumulative evidence. It also posed a
risk of diverting the jury's attention from the criminal matters at issue by
confusing them with irrelevant contentions from [Morrissey’s] civil litigation.

2 comments:

Anonymous
said...

With sentences like this it is no wonder that the crimianl justice system has so little credibility. I didn't see anything in this story or in any of the other news articles I read on this case that says he had a gun or was going to kill people or blow stuff up, etc.

So him sending some angry emails gets him twenty years?!? He would have been better off just killing his bosses instead. Its not like he would not have gotten much more time.

by the way, your blog is all messed up and i can't read any of your posts. under this post you have a pic of some CDs and a mention of marijuana, but no story. nor can i see any of your past stories, either.