Prior to your post atticus I had been on the trail of proprietary estopple.I had looked at the cases such as Lothian v Webb / Gillet v Holt.My problem remained that I couldn't quite put my finger on reliance/ to the detriment i.e. I had not given up something tangible, as in Lothian v webb.

However, found Suggitt v Suggitt and this fills in the gap; in the way that my life had been to some extent wasted because of dads assurances. He has wanted to keep me dependant and close by.I never got a career started, but stayed at home with dad, elder sister at college, younger sister with mum after recent divorce.Every time I proposed doing something he put me down. Considered joining the police force, he said I would just cry in the face of a villain. Thought about becoming a solicitor but he reminded me that I was no good at public speaking. Wanted to become a florist or hairdresser but that wasn't a good enough.Stayed local lived with partner, got pregnant, relationship breakdown - single mum thus dependant on dads largess, which wasn't much, lived on benefits doing odd jobs for dad and others, but was never worried about the future as in pension because my father assured me that he was my pension.Was generally groomed to take over when he wanted to retire. Was available as required to look after business/house/dog when he went to his Spanish house twice a year. My telephone number was posted at the properties in case at any time he could not be reached in an emergency.Property (2) 2001 and property (3) 2012 put in his and my names as joint tenants. This only confirming the assurance and reliance to me of things to come.Was single up until 7 years ago. He tried to put a spanner in the works then, but I had prepared my future husband, and the marriage went ahead. Dad hated it because in doing so I was less reliant on him in his eyes.4 years ago dad got in a mess with the business and was in ill health, so I was call over and began sorting out. Did this for 18 months but eventually we fell out - I wanted to do things properly e.g. separating the business accounts from his personal accounts. Solicitors wanted him to give me PoA, ( it is difficult to run a business when you have to sit in your fathers house making the required telephone calls on his behalf, when companys etc will not speak with you about the business in hand until dad has said in each individual situation I can talk with them.)I must also add that he is a vile man, difficult, cruel, rude, nasty, not really someone you would choose to spend you time with unless you were being 'bought'

I think dad felt under pressure was in ill health knew he should give up and sort out his affairs, instead it came to ahead and one day he told me to ****off and not come back.I waited for him to cool down, but he didn't, and then without my knowledge started removing me from his properties.

As an aside, after finding out I was not on the title deeds of the promised property, that my sister in the USA had been given PoA, feeling used, abused, angry, and stupid for trusting him, I overdosed and found myself in hospital 3 days later after trying to get my head around my fathers lies and deeds. Does that count to detriment?

Thorner -v- Major and others; HL 25 Mar 2009References: [2009] UKHL 18, [2009] 13 EG 142, [2009] WTLR 71, [2009] Fam Law 583, [2009] 2 FLR 405, [2009] 1 WLR 776 Links: Bailii, Times, HLCoram: Lord Hoffmann, Lord Scott of Foscote, Lord Rodger of Earlsferry, Lord Walker of Gestingthorpe, Lord Neuberger Ratio:The deceased had made a will including a gift to the claimant, but had then revoked the will. The claimant asserted that an estoppel had been created in his favour over a farm, and that the defendant administrators of the promisor's estate held it under bare trust for him. Held: The claimant's appeal succeeded. A proprietary estoppel might be established by acts falling short of an explicit promise, provided that they were otherwise sufficiently clear. A small change in the property need not necessarily destroy such a trust provided the property remained essentially identifiable. In summary: 'a. An assurance may be sufficient to found an estoppel even if it is not made expressly; it can be made in oblique and allusive terms; it may be subject to unspoken and ill defined qualifications; b. Of importance is whether the encouragement given was 'clear enough' for the person to whom the assurance was made to form a reasonable view that he was being given an assurance that he would inherit the relevant property ; c. This is an issue of fact heavily dependent upon the context in which the assurance or assurances was or were made (including the characteristics of the protagonists, the relationship between them and whether assurances were repeated and formed part of a pattern) on which evidence to the parties' subjective understanding of what they were agreeing is admissible; d. It is unnecessary for the person giving the assurance to know the Claimant was thinking of alternative courses of action at the time the assurances were given; it is also unnecessary for there to have been a dramatic announcement in front of assembled witnesses or a 'signature event'.'Lord Neuberger said: 'It should be emphasised that I am not seeking to cast doubt on the proposition, heavily relied upon by the Court of Appeal, that there must be some sort of an assurance which is 'clear and unequivocal before it can be relied upon to find an estoppel. However, that proposition must be read as subject to three qualifications. First, it does not detract from the normal principle so well articulated in this case by Lord Walker that the effect of words or actions must be assessed in their context. Just as a sentence can have one meaning in one context and a very different meaning in another context so can a sentence, which will be ambiguous and unclear in one context, be a clear and unambiguous assurance in another context . . Secondly, it would be quite wrong to be unrealistically rigorous when applying the 'clear and unambiguous' test. The Court should not search for ambiguity or uncertainty, but should assess the question of clarity and certainty practically and sensibly, as well as contextually . . Thirdly -- there may be cases where the statement relied on to find an estoppel could amount to an assurance which could reasonably be understood as having more than one possible meaning. In such a case, if the facts otherwise satisfy all the requirements of an estoppel, it seems to me that, at least normally, the ambiguity should not deprive a person who reasonably relied on the assurance of all relief; it may well be right, however, that he should be accorded relief on the basis of the interpretation least beneficial to him'.Lord Walker discussed the clarity necessary to found an estoppel: 'I would prefer to say (while conscious that it is a thoroughly question-begging formulation) that to establish a proprietary estoppel the relevant assurance must be clear enough. What amounts to sufficient clarity, in a case of this sort, is hugely dependent on context.' This case cites:

- At First Instance - Thorner -v- Curtis and others ChD (Bailii, [2007] EWHC 2422 (Ch)) The claimant said that the deceased, his father and a farmer, had made representations to him over many years that if the claimant continued to work on the farm, he would leave the farm to him in his will. He died intestate. He claimed a proprietary . .- Appeal from - Thorner -v- Major and others CA ((2008-09) 11 ITELR 344, [2008] 2 FCR 435, Bailii, [2008] EWCA Civ 732, [2008] WTLR 1289, [2009] 3 All ER 945) The deceased had written a will, revoked it but then not made another. The claimant had worked for the deceased understanding that property would be left to him, and now claimed that the estate property was held under a trust for him. Held: . .- Cited - Ramsden -v- Dyson HL ([1866] LR 1 HL 129, [1866] 12 Jur NS 506) The Vice-Chancellor had held that two tenants of Sir John Ramsden, the owner of a large estate near Huddersfield, were entitled to long leases of plots on the estate. They ostensibly held the plots as tenants at will only, but they had spent their . .- Cited - Clarke -v- Edinburgh and District Tramways Co HL (1919 SC (HL) 35) The House considered the ability of an appellate court to reconsider the facts. Held: The privileges enjoyed by a trial judge extend not only to questions of credibility. Lord Shaw said that the judge enjoys 'those advantages, sometimes . .- Cited - Yeoman's Row Management Ltd and Another -v- Cobbe HL (Bailii, [2008] UKHL 55, Times, [2008] 35 EG 142, [2008] 31 EG 88, [2008] WTLR 1461, [2008] 1 WLR 1752, HL) The parties agreed in principle for the sale of land with potential development value. Considerable sums were spent, and permission achieved, but the owner then sought to renegotiate the deal. Held: The appeal succeeded in part. The finding . .- Cited - Uglow -v- Uglow and others CA (Bailii, [2004] EWCA Civ 987, [2004] WTLR 1183.) The deceased had in 1976 made a promise to the claimant. The promise was not honoured in the will, and the claimant asserted a proprietary estoppel. Held: The judge was right to have found that the promise was bound up with the claimant being . .- Cited - Gissing -v- Gissing HL ([1970] 3 WLR 255, [1971] AC 886, [1970] 2 All ER 780, Bailii, [1970] UKHL 3) The family home had been purchased during the marriage in the name of the husband only. The wife asserted that she had a beneficial interest in it. Held: The principles apply to any case where a beneficial interest in land is claimed by a . .- Cited - Dann -v- Spurrier ((1802) 7 Ves Jun 231, Commonlii, [1789] EngR 482, (1789-1817) 2 Ves Jun Supp 26, (1789) 34 ER 982 (A)) The tenant had carried out improvements to the property. It was uncertain whether the length of the term (7, 14 or 21 years) was at the option of the lessee alone. Held: The case was decided on construction of the lease. Lord Eldon made it . .- Cited - Gillett -v- Holt and Another CA (Times 17-Mar-00, Gazette 23-Mar-00, Bailii, [2000] EWCA Civ 66, [2001] Ch 210, [2000] 2 All ER 289, [2000] 2 WTLR 195, [2000] Fam Law 714, [2000] 1 FCR 705, [2000] 3 WLR 815, [2000] 2 FLR 266) Repeated assurances, given over years, that the claimant would acquire an interest in property on the death of the person giving the re-assurance, and upon which the claimant relied to his detriment, could found a claim of equitable estoppel. The . .- Cited - In re Basham dec'd; Basham -v- Basham ([1986] 1 WLR 1498, [1987] 1 All ER 405) The claimant and her husband had helped her mother and her stepfather throughout the claimant's adult life. She received no remuneration but understood that she would inherit her stepfather's property when he died. After her mother's death and until . .- Cited - JT Developments -v- Quinn & Another CA ([1991] 2 EGLR 257, (1990) 62 P & CR 33) The plaintiff told the defendant it was willing to grant a lease on the same terms as those contained in a new tenancy that the plaintiff had recently granted to the tenant of a nearby shop, also owned by the plaintiff. The defendant carried out . .- Cited - Walton -v- Walton CA (Unreported, 14 April 1994) The mother had repeatedly promised to her son that he would inherit her farm in return for which he left school early and had worked for low wages. Her stock phrase to him had been: 'You can't have more money and a farm one day'. Held: . .- Cited - Layton -v- Martin ([1986] 2 FLR 227) The deceased had written to the Plaintiff offering her 'what emotional security I can give, plus financial security during my life, and financial security on my death.' Held: The statement could was insufficient to establish either a . .- Cited - Carmichael and Another -v- National Power Plc HL (Times 23-Nov-99, Gazette 01-Dec-99, Gazette 17-Dec-99, House of Lords, Bailii, [1999] 4 All ER 897, [1999] UKHL 47, [1999] 1 WLR 2042, [2000] IRLR 43, [1999] ICR 1226) Staff who worked only as and when required, and who then had the right to turn down work offered were not employees and were not therefore entitled to written particulars of employment. The absence of mutuality and the discontinuity of any . .

(This list may be incomplete) This case is cited by:

- Cited - Gill -v- Woodall and Others ChD (Bailii, [2009] EWHC B34 (Ch), [2009] EWHC 834 (Ch)) The claimant challenged her late mother's will which had left the entire estate to a charity. She asserted lack of knowledge and approval and coercion, and also an estoppel. The will included a note explaining that no gift had been made because she . .- Cited - Nugent -v- Nugent ChD ([2014] 3 WLR 59, [2014] 2 All ER 313, Bailii, [2013] EWHC 4095 (Ch), [2013] WLR (D) 516, WLRD) The court was asked whether the court has, following the the 2002 Act, an inherent power to order the cancellation of a unilateral notice registered against a title registered under the 2002 Act and, if so, in what circumstances, and how, such a . .- Cited - Bradley and Another -v- Heslin and Another ChD (Bailii, [2014] EWHC 3267 (Ch)) The parties were neighbours. One had a right of way over the other's land. A gate existed over it. B wished to close the gate for security, but H wished it open in order to be able to drive through it without having to get out of his car, and so he . .- Cited - Wright -v- Waters and Another ChD (Bailii, [2014] EWHC 3614 (Ch)) The claimant sought provision from her late mother's estate under the 1975 Act, and asserting a proprietary estoppel. The mother had transferred &pound;10,000 to the daughter several years before. The mother had said it was to be invested on her . .- Cited - Rawlings -v- Chapman and Others ChD (Bailii, [2015] EWHC 3160 (Ch)) In 1992 the claimant paid substantial amounts of money towards the cost of building and fitting out a new house on farmland owned by the deceased, Mr. Hopkins, at Aggs Hill, Cheltenham. She alleged that she did so in reliance on promises, frequently . .