The
court granted the defendants' motions to dismiss on March
23, 2017, and judgment was entered the next day. The
plaintiffs move for reconsideration of the order granting the
motions to dismiss, arguing that the court erred in
concluding that no private right of action exists under
Subchapter II of the Uniform Relocation Assistance and Real
Property Acquisition Policies Act of 1970
(“URA”), 42 U.S.C. §§
4621-4638.[1] The defendants object.

Standard
of Review

The
plaintiffs move for reconsideration under Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure 59 and 60. Because the plaintiffs do not cite
a particular part of Rule 60, they appear to seek
reconsideration under Rule 59(e).

“[R]evising
a final judgment is an extraordinary remedy and should be
employed sparingly.” Ira Green, Inc. v. Military Sales
& Serv. Co., 775 F.3d 12, 27 (1st Cir. 2014). Relief
under Rule 59(e) is available “only when the original
judgment evidenced a manifest error of law, if there is newly
discovered evidence, or in certain other narrow
situations.” Biltcliffe v. CitiMortgage, Inc., 772 F.3d
925, 930 (1st Cir. 2014). A party cannot succeed on a motion
for reconsideration by “advanc[ing] arguments it should
have developed prior to judgment” or by
“regurgitat[ing] old arguments previously considered
and rejected.” Id. (internal quotation marks
omitted).

Discussion

The
plaintiffs contend that, contrary to the court's order
granting the defendants' motions to dismiss, a private
right of action exists under Subhapter II of the URA,
specifically § 4622. They argue that the court
erroneously relied on reasoning from cases that considered
whether a private right of action exists under Subchapter I
and III of the URA, rather than Subchapter II; that the court
did not consider whether a private right of action existed
under § 4622; and that the provisions of § 4622
provide such a right. In support, they distinguish some of
the cases the court cited in the analysis of whether a
private right of action exists.

A.
Gonzaga Standard

In the
prior order granting the defendants' motions to dismiss,
the court first examined the standard for determining whether
a private right of action exists:

It is undisputed that the URA does not expressly provide a
private right of action. The plaintiffs argue, nevertheless,
that they are entitled to assistance and benefits under
§ 4622 and § 4630 as “displaced
persons.” They urge the court to find that § 4622
and § 4630, when read together, imply a private right of
action.

In Gonzaga v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 282-84 (2002), the Supreme
Court clarified and tightened the test used to determine
whether federal legislation conferred individual rights that
could be enforced through an implied cause of action and
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The Court explained that in
determining both whether a statutory violation could be
enforced through § 1983 and whether a private right of
action could be implied from a statute the court “must
first determine whether Congress intended to create a federal
right.” Id. at 283. To meet that requirement,
the statute must grant rights that are “‘phrased
in terms of the persons benefitted'” and, for
purposes of an implied right of action, the statute must
“manifest[] an intent ‘to create not just a
private right but also a private remedy.'”
Id. at 284 (quoting Cannon v. Univ. of Chicago, 441
U.S. 677, 692, n.13 (1979), and Alexander v. Sandoval, 532
U.S. 275, 286 (2001)). The Court acknowledged that some
language in prior opinions, including Blessing v. Freestone,
520 U.S. 329, 340-41 (1997) and Wilder v. Va. Hosp.
Ass'n, 496 U.S. 498, 509 (1990), might have suggested a
less stringent standard.

Therefore, to determine whether a federal statute confers an
implied right of action, “the key inquiry is whether
the statute is ‘phrased in terms of the persons
benefitted' ‘with an unmistakable focus on the
benefited class.'” City of Portsmouth, R.I. v.
Lewis, 813 F.3d 54, 62 (1st Cir. 2016) (quoting Gonzaga, 536
U.S. at 284). In addition, courts must consider
“whether the statute is worded in terms of government
policy and practice or individual entitlements, and whether
Congress provided alternate mechanisms for enforcing the
statute.” City of Portsmouth, 813 F.3d at 62.

Order,
doc. no. 36, at *16-*18. For purposes of the motion for
reconsideration, the plaintiffs do not dispute that ...

Our website includes the first part of the main text of the court's opinion.
To read the entire case, you must purchase the decision for download. With purchase,
you also receive any available docket numbers, case citations or footnotes, dissents
and concurrences that accompany the decision.
Docket numbers and/or citations allow you to research a case further or to use a case in a
legal proceeding. Footnotes (if any) include details of the court's decision. If the document contains a simple affirmation or denial without discussion,
there may not be additional text.

Buy This Entire Record For
$7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.