The President and Prime Minister Wilson joined the group at about 1:10 p.m. The President
said that he had had a very enjoyable meeting with the Prime Minister,
that both of them had discussed how to get reelected. Mr. Wilson said that he had very much
enjoyed their talk which had related to principles, objectives and
political background. They had not tried to get into any arguments for
or against any particular solutions. The President said that he and the
Prime Minister had whole-heartedly agreed that our objectives and hopes
stand upon having a proper understanding of each other. It was better to
talk across the table than in the columns of newspapers. He had told
Wilson that “a burned child
dreads fire,” and that he didn't intend to pressure Mr. Wilson, and he felt sure that Mr.
Wilson did not intend to
pressure him. The President went on to say that he thought it would be
useful for our two governments to continue to “reason together,” as
recommended in Isaiah. He felt that this meeting was a continuance of
previous meetings which would permit both sides to explore their common
problems and discuss them. Nothing would emerge from this meeting that
was black on white or of a nature to make other countries feel that a
blueprint of action had been developed by our two governments. We were
not undertaking to provide answers to our problems at this meeting. The
President said that he had to be very careful because of what the press
tended to write.

[Omitted here is discussion of Vietnam and defense matters not related to
British Guiana.]

1Source: National Archives and Records Administration,
RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL UK–US. Secret. Drafted by Tyler and approved in the White House on December
16. The meeting was held in the Cabinet Room at the White
House.

2A December 7
memorandum of conversation reported Rusk's discussion with Foreign Secretary Walker that morning concerning
British Guiana. Walker said
that HMG would not “go toward independence in the foreseeable
future. Perhaps some steps toward increasing self-government could
be devised.” The Foreign Minister added that he thought that the
U.S. Government “had an excessively favorable estimate of Burnham.” (Ibid., POL 16 BR
GU)

3In a December 6
memorandum to the President, Ball urged Johnson “to
demonstrate your personal interest” in British Guiana to Wilson by emphasizing that the
United States attached great importance to a satisfactory outcome,
that independence should not be granted prematurely, that the United
States could not provide assistance to any government which included
Jagan, and that it was
hoped that close cooperation and aid would contribute to a racially
peaceful, democratic, and non-Communist British Guiana. (Ibid., POL
BR GU)