Towards a theory of adaptive rationality?

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Abstract

The idea that humans are prone to widespread and systematic biases has dominated
the psychological study of thinking and decision-making. The conclusion that has
often been drawn is that people are irrational. In recent decades, however, a number
of psychologists have started to call into question key claims and findings in research
on human biases. In particular, a body of research has come together under the
heading of adaptive rationality (henceforth AR). AR theorists argue that people
should not be assessed against formal principles of rationality but rather against the
goals they entertain. Moreover, AR theorists maintain that the conclusion that people
are irrational is unsupported: people are often remarkably successful once assessed
against their goals and given the cognitive and external constraints imposed by the
environment. The growth of literature around AR is what motivates the present
investigation, and assessing the plausibility of the AR challenge to research on
human biases is the goal of this thesis. My enquiry analyses several aspects of this
suggested turn in the empirical study of rationality and provides one of the first
philosophically-informed appraisals of the prospects of AR. First and foremost, my
thesis seeks to provide a qualified defence of the AR project. On the one hand, I
agree with AR theorists that there is room for a conceptual revolution in the study of
thinking and decision-making: while it is commonly argued that behaviour and
cognition should be assessed against formal principles of rationality, I stress the
importance of assessing behaviour against the goals that people entertain. However, I
also contend that AR theorists have hitherto failed to provide compelling evidence in
support of their most ambitious and optimistic theses about people’s rationality. In
particular, I present a great deal of evidence suggesting that people are often
unsuccessful at achieving prudential and epistemic goals and I argue that AR
theorists have not made clear how, in light of this evidence, optimistic claims about
human rationality could be defended.