Accident Comparisons For Equal Time Periods
With And Without Whistle Bans

31

2.

Study Period Crossing Accidents--With And
Without Whistle Bans

36

3.

Accident History 1989 Through 1993

37

4.

Additional Accidents--Whistle Ban Versus
Non-Ban

38

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

On July 26, 1991, the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA)
issued Emergency Order No. 15 requiring the Florida East Coast
Railway Company (FEC) to follow rules requiring train horns to be
sounded at highway-rail crossings. This action was taken in
response to a dramatic increase in the number of crossing
accidents after seven counties and twelve cities in Florida
issued ordinances prohibiting the sounding of train whistles at
511 crossings during nighttime hours.

Following the imposition of Emergency Order No. 15, the
nighttime accident rate declined 68.6 percent to pre-whistle ban
levels. It was clear that prohibiting train horns had
significantly increased the risk of accidents.

FRA is very concerned that other locations throughout the
country might be experiencing a similar increased risk of
crossing accidents as a result of whistle bans. In consideration
of a possible future rulemaking, FRA announced it would conduct a
national study of whistle bans to determine how many crossings
were affected and examine the accident histories of those
crossings.

The study was performed using data from a survey conducted
in 1992 by the Association of American Railroads (AAR) which
identified crossings with whistle bans. Twenty-five railroads
surveyed their systems. Seventeen reported operating over
highway crossings subject to whistle bans. After screening,
2,122 public, at-grade crossings on 17 railroads and located in
27 states were considered in this study.

FRA believes the AAR survey accounted for a major portion of
all crossings subject to whistle bans. The responding railroads
operate over 61 percent of the nation's public, at-grade
crossings and operate 91 percent of the annual train miles. Of
the total number of interactions between highway users and train
traffic that occur at crossings subject to whistle bans, FRA
believes only a small share take place at crossings not included
in this survey.

A breakdown of the types of motorist warning devices
installed at crossings with whistle bans showed 40 percent with
gates, 22 percent with flashing lights, 26 percent with
crossbucks, and 12 percent with other types of signs or train
crew flagging. Overall, crossings subject to whistle bans have a
higher level of warning device than the general population of
crossings, wherein, 17 percent have gates, 18 percent have
flashing lights, and 51 percent have crossbucks.

Ninety-four percent of the whistle bans were effective 24
hours a day. Fewer than six percent of the bans (at 118
crossings) were nighttime-only, typically from 6:30 PM to 6:30 AM.
The "Study Group" of 2,122 crossings were located in 227
cities in 27 states. The states with the greatest number
included Illinois with 286, Wisconsin with 183, Kentucky with
158, New York with 157, and Minnesota with 153.
Among the seventeen railroads that reported crossings with
whistle bans, CSX, Conrail, and Soo Line accounted for about 56
percent of the total crossings. Amtrak reported operating over
77 crossings.

As of the 1992 survey, the number of crossings with whistle
bans had reportedly decreased by 721. Whistle bans at crossings
in 65 cities had either been cancelled by public officials or
were being ignored by the railroads in a conscious decision to
not abide by ordinances that appeared to compromise safety. As
of 1992, there were 1,401 remaining bans in 164 cities and 24
states. Of these remaining bans, 84 were nighttime-only bans in
18 cities and 8 states.

The cancellations of whistle bans enabled FRA to make direct
comparisons of the number of accidents during the bans and during
equal time intervals when the bans were not in effect. Twelve
"before and after" case studies resulted, involving eight
railroads and 831 crossings. Overall, this comparison showed the
accident rate declined 38 percent when whistle bans were
cancelled. However, for 288 Conrail crossings, the accident rate
declined 53 percent, and for 293 CSX crossings, it declined 59
percent.

In addition, an analytical comparison of 1,222 crossings
subject to whistle bans from 1989 through 1993 against all other
167,000 public grade crossings in the national inventory was
made. The comparison showed crossings with whistle bans had a
significantly higher average accident frequency than the non-ban
crossings. In performing this analysis, 1,222 whistle ban
crossings were divided into ten groups of nearly equal size based
on similar estimated accident frequencies, as calculated by an
established accident prediction formula. Within each risk level,
which ranged from low to high, the accident histories of the
crossings were tabulated. A similar procedure was followed for
all other 167,000 public crossings in the national inventory. In
nine of the ten risk levels, the group of crossings with whistle
bans had accident frequencies significantly higher than the
national population in the corresponding risk level group.
Overall, whistle ban crossings experienced an average of 84
percent more accidents than crossings without bans.

For the 118 crossings reported to have nighttime-only
whistle bans, FRA found a notably higher frequency of accidents
during the hours bans were in effect, especially between 6:30 PM
and midnight. There were 15 accidents during that 5 1/2 hour
period, compared to 24 accidents during the 12 daytime (non-ban)
hours.

From January 1988 through June 1994, there were a total of
948 accidents at crossings with whistle bans in effect, resulting
in 62 fatalities and 308 injuries. Accidents occurred on all 17
of the railroads reporting whistle bans. Railroads with the
highest number of accidents included Soo Line with 157, Wisconsin
Central with 142, CSX with 113, Union Pacific with 101, Norfolk
and Western with 89, and Burlington Northern with 80.
During this period, Amtrak experienced 54 accidents with 5
fatalities and 19 injuries. The Northeastern Illinois Regional
Commuter Railroad (METRA) reported 36 accidents with 2 fatalities
and 7 injuries.

Accidents during whistle bans occurred in 24 states. The
greatest number were in Wisconsin with 162 accidents, followed by
Illinois with 144, Minnesota with 92, Indiana with 93, Kentucky
with 47, and Michigan with 41.

A comparison of the circumstances of accidents indicated
that sounding train horns reduced the frequency of accidents
during the hours of darkness and also reduced the frequency of
motorists driving around lowered gates. This review served to
identify the conditions where whistle sounding reduced accidents.
Overall, the results of this study indicate that the safety
risks associated with the whistle bans in Florida are not unique
to that area. Twelve case studies, involving 831 crossings in
eight states other than Florida, showed an overall 38 percent
decline in the accident rate when whistle bans were cancelled,
There were 53 percent and 59 percent reductions on 288 Conrail
and 293 CSX crossings.

Unlike the crossings in Florida, which were located along
the same right of way with relatively uniform rail traffic, the
crossings in this study reflect a very diverse population with
respect to physical configurations, motorist warning devices, and
highway and rail traffic mixes. Their geographical dispersion
contributes to a more credible indication of the national safety
implication of train whistle bans.

However, in spite of the differences between the groups of
crossings involved in this study and the Florida study, the
results are similar and significant. The national group showed a
38 percent reduction in the crossing accident rate when whistle
bans were cancelled, and the Florida group, a 68.6 percent
reduction. These trends add credence to both studies and
indicate that whistle bans, whether 24 hour or nighttime-only,
increase the risk of accidents at crossings.

Railroad transportation fostered early economic and
population expansion in the United States. Long before the
invention of motor vehicles and aircraft, which prompted the need
for the interstate highway system and airports, a new generation
of cities such as Atlanta appeared. The location of these cities
was due solely to the presence of railroad lines that crossed or
ended at that particular point.

During the 1830s, when commercial rail service began, the
population of the United States averaged about fifteen million.
By 1870, just after the Central Pacific (now part of Southern
Pacific) and the Union Pacific completed the first trans-continental
railroad in 1869, the U.S. population was
approximately forty million. Today, the U.S. population exceeds
250 million. The railroad right-of-way, once the only sign of
civilization in most parts of the United States, now finds itself
surrounded by residential populations and industrial facilities
never envisioned by early railroad pioneers. To fulfill the
needs of commerce and private travel, public highways cross
railroad rights-of-way at more than 168,000 locations.

Highway-Rail Grade Crossing Accidents

The railroad industry's steel wheel on steel rail technology
makes the economic transportation of bulk commodities possible.
However, the laws of physics do not allow rapid deceleration of
trains to avoid accidents. As a result, there are many tragic
accidents involving motor vehicles at highway-rail grade
crossings as well as railroad trespasser fatalities. It takes a
100-car train traveling 30 miles per hour approximately half a
mile (2,640 feet) to stop, compared to about 40 feet for the
average passenger vehicle. At 50 miles per hour, a 100-car
train's stopping distance increases to one and a third miles
(7,040 feet), compared to less than 150 feet for the average
passenger vehicle.

Accident data indicates that the train speed in 87 percent
of crossing accidents is less than 50 miles per hour, and evenly
distributed between 10 and 50 miles per hour. When an accident
occurs, train speed is a factor in its severity. Collisions
between trains and motor vehicles are eleven times more likely to
result in fatalities than collisions between two motor vehicles
on highways. Each year, highway-rail grade crossing accidents
claim about 600 lives and injure 2,400.

Motor vehicles, even large trucks, are severely crushed when
struck by the mass of a moving train. The average freight
locomotive weighs between 140 and 200 tons, and a 100 car train
1 49 CFR 229.129. The minimum sound level for train
locomotives is specified at 96 decibels (dB) ± 4 dB--at 100 feet
forward of the locomotive in its direction of travel. (A decibel
is a unit for measuring the relative loudness of sounds which for
humans range from zero, for the average least perceptible sound,
to about 130 for the average pain level.)
can weigh 10,000 tons. In comparison, the average automobile
weighs approximately one to two tons.

Highway-rail crossing accidents can cause death and injury
to train crews and passengers, particularly in collisions with
large trucks, buses, or other heavy equipment. Moreover, the
release of hazardous materials by trucks or trains following
grade crossing collisions can endanger anyone near the right-of-way
or downwind of the collision point.

More than fifty percent of highway-rail collisions occur at
crossings equipped with active warning devices. Perhaps the
motor vehicle operators in these accidents do not cross railroad
tracks often enough to be familiar with the warning devices
designed for their safety. Or perhaps they become careless about
heeding the warning indications. Statistics show that very few
accidents are due to the infrequent failures of crossing warning
lights or gates.

Train whistles, horns, and bells are warning devices which
enhance railroad safety by giving motorists an audible indication
of a train's proximity. The Federal Railroad Administration
(FRA) requires that each lead locomotive in a train have an
audible warning device.1 However, FRA's regulations do not
specify when train audible warning devices should be sounded.2
Individual railroads and state laws mandate those requirements.
Typically, railroad operating procedures require engineers to
sound train horns at most highway-rail grade crossings. The
audible train horn provides the only indication of an approaching
train at crossings with only passive warning devices.3

Florida Whistle Ban

Railroads are powerless to restrain the growth of
residential populations along their rights-of-way. Train whistle
use is an important deterrent to highway-rail crossing accidents
in densely populated areas. However, special interest groups
formed in the late 1970s, sought ways to silence train whistles,
and concentrated their attention on nighttime bans, which gained
much support from nearby residents. One Florida-based group,
Project Whistle Stop, Inc., approached Federal agencies and the
State of Florida's Federal legislators to sponsor a national
whistle ban. When the national ban could not be obtained, the
Florida State Legislature was persuaded to enact state whistle
ban legislation. Local jurisdictions, cities, and counties were
allowed to establish nighttime (10:00 P.M. to 6:00 A.M.) train
whistle bans. However, the bans could be imposed only at
crossings with active warning devices4 and only on railroads that
operate totally within the State of Florida.

Effective July 1, 1984, the Florida legislation applied only
to the Florida East Coast Railway Company (FEC), an intrastate
carrier.5 Not affected were highway-rail crossings of a
competing carrier, CSX Transportation, Inc. (CSX), an interstate
rail carrier with lines parallel to those of FEC. However,
response to the permissive legislation was widespread. By
December 31, 1989, seven counties and a dozen additional cities
had established whistle bans for 511 of FEC's 600 public grade
crossings equipped with active warning devices. Unfortunately,
the nighttime accident rate soared at the whistle ban grade
crossings.

During House Appropriations Hearings on March 21, 1990, FRA
received a congressional request to study FEC's nighttime train
accident rate. Representative William Lehman (Florida's 17th
District) asked FRA to determine if there was any correlation
between those areas that had whistle bans and the number of
highway-rail crossing accidents. Using a 1984-89 study period,
the agency found that FEC's nighttime accident rate at the 511
affected crossings increased 195 percent following the imposition
of whistle bans. FEC's daytime accident experience at the same
511 crossings remained virtually unchanged.6 The study clearly
showed the only identifiable difference between the number of
accidents occurring at the crossings was the existence of the
nighttime whistle bans themselves.

FRA provided copies of its 1990 study to officials of each
Florida county and municipality with whistle bans in effect.
Copies were also sent to the Florida Department of
Transportation, and to fifteen members of the Florida state
legislature. In the year following release of the study, no
county or municipality acted to repeal or modify its whistle ban
ordinance. The Florida state legislature also did not act in
response to FRA's findings. Unfortunately, the number of FEC
highway-rail crossings subject to the ban increased to 537.
Furthermore, neither state or local authorities took action to
compensate for the hazard introduced by whistle bans.

Appropriate measures could have included increased law
enforcement, installation of immovable highway dividers, grade
separation at high-traffic crossings, or temporary nighttime or
permanent closure of low-use crossings.

While waiting for state and local responses to its study,
FRA continued to monitor accidents at FEC crossings. In some
accidents, the highway vehicle went around or through grade
crossing gates. In other accidents, the highway user failed to
clear the crossing before the train's arrival.7 These events
suggested that without the train whistle warning, motorists were
unaware of the proximity of the train, or the direction of the
train's travel.

FRA Emergency Order No. 15

Based on its investigation, FRA issued Emergency Order
No. 15 on July 26, 1991. This decision requires the FEC to sound
train horns when approaching public highway-rail grade crossings.
Specifically, FEC was ordered to follow the operating rules
governing horn use that were in effect before the state-permissive
train whistle ban. While the FRA recognized that
nighttime train whistles can be an inconvenience to residents
near the railroad right-of-way, whistles can also save lives.

The effects of FRA's emergency order were dramatic and
immediate. During the two years following the emergency order,
"Day Accidents" (6:01 A.M. - 9:59 P.M.) declined 8.8 percent and
"Night Accidents" (10:00 P.M. - 6:00 A.M.) declined 68.6 percent.
Reported accidents returned to pre-whistle ban levels. This data
is summarized in the table that follows.

FEC ACCIDENT REPORTS
7/27/89-7/25/93

DAY ACCIDENTS6:01 AM - 9:59 PM

NIGHT ACCIDENTS10:00 P.M. - 6:00 P.M.

Two Years Prior to E.O. #15

34

51

Two Years After E.O. #15

31

16

Percent Change

-8.8

-68.6

The graph in Figure A shows a summation of FEC's pre- and
post-whistle ban crossing accidents from 1980 through 1993.

In the Florida legislative session of 1992, the whistle ban
statute was revised. Whistle bans on all railroads operating in
Florida are now permitted. However, to be in compliance with
FRA's Emergency Order No. 15, affected crossings must meet one of
five FRA criteria. The five criteria are described in Appendix 1
and are intended to preclude unsafe actions by motorists.

Nationwide Whistle Ban Study

As a result of FRA's study and subsequent actions, the
whistle bans in Florida received widespread publicity. However,
many other counties, cities, and towns around the nation also
have ordinances prohibiting whistles. Over time, some have been
repealed and some new ones enacted. Generally, safety
considerations have prevailed in decisions regarding whistle
bans. Since 1975, reports show that 30 new municipal bans have
been enacted while 72 have been cancelled. However, FRA has not
been monitoring ordinances against train whistle use.

During administrative appeals to FRA's Emergency Order
No. 15, the agency began an informal conference process with
affected Florida parties on September 13, 1991. On December 5,
1991, FRA issued Conference Notice No. 3. This notice announced
FRA's intention to issue an Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking
regarding a nationwide rule for train whistles at highway-rail
grade crossings.8 In consideration of the rulemaking, FRA agreed
to conduct a national survey of train whistle bans in cooperation
with the Association of American Railroads (AAR). The AAR, a
railroad industry trade association, requested its member
railroads to submit information on state and local whistle bans
of any type. Seventeen of twenty-five railroads responding to
the AAR survey reported being affected by whistle bans at various
crossing locations and that 94 percent of the reported bans were
in effect 24 hours a day. An examination of the accident
histories at these crossings provided the basis for FRA's
Nationwide Study of Train Whistle Bans.

This study had two primary objectives. The first was to
determine how many crossings (other than those on the FEC) were
subject to whistle bans. The second was to evaluate whether
those crossings were subject to the same elevated safety risk
shown by the FEC whistle ban crossings in Florida.

Need for Study

Experiences in the states of Florida and Oregon 9 have
provided compelling evidence about the safety benefits of
sounding train horns at highway-rail grade crossings. FRA is
very concerned that other locations throughout the country, where
whistle bans are being observed, could be experiencing an
increased risk of crossing accidents. However, FRA recognizes
that the sounding of train horns is often regarded as an
unnecessary disturbance of the peace and quiet of residential and
commercial areas. Consequently, FRA was not prepared to initiate
a national rulemaking without first examining the safety records
of affected crossings.

The findings from this study will be considered by FRA in
its decision with respect to possible regulatory actions. These
findings will also provide citizens, local government officials,
railroads, and other concerned parties with information that will
clarify the safety implications of train whistle bans.

Before this study, no information about whistle bans in
states other than Florida and Oregon had been compiled. In 1992,
the AAR asked member railroads to prepare lists of all crossings
on their respective systems subject to whistle bans. Carriers
were asked to include information about the types of bans, and
the dates of origins and cancellations, if applicable. Copies of
the lists were provided to the FRA. Crossings were identified by
their U.S. DOT/AAR National Rail-Highway Crossing Inventory
Number.10 The survey identified 2,705 crossings that were
subject to whistle bans which included 24 hour and nighttime-only
bans.

Twenty-five railroads responded to the AAR survey, seventeen
of which reported operating over crossings subject to whistle
bans. The respondent railroads operate over a total of 102,737
public, at-grade, crossings. These represent about 61 percent of
the national total of 168,223. Crossings not included in the
survey are on the properties of approximately 603 other
railroads, all of which are smaller railroads.

FRA believes that nearly all crossings of the Class I
railroads were covered by the survey. Because the Class I
railroads, as a group, accounted for about 91 percent of the
total annual train miles operated in 1993, the crossings listed
in the AAR survey experience a very large share of the total
interactions between highway-users and trains that occur at
crossings subject to whistle bans.

Initial Summary

An initial tabulation of the survey information showed that
the crossings subject to whistle bans were located in 27
states.11 The state with the greatest number was Illinois, with
306 crossings. Arizona had the fewest, with one. The
distribution is shown in the following table and on the map in
Figure B.

STATES WITH WHISTLE BAN CROSSINGS
(Initial Count)12

AR

43

MN

159

AZ

1

MO

122

CA

81

NC

5

FL

213

NY

260

GA

54

OH

106

IA

23

OR

53

IL

306

PA

104

IN

143

SC

24

KY

209

TX

78

LA

86

VA

167

MA

105

WA

69

MD

10

WI

251

ME

13

WV

5

MI

226

Initial Count: 27 States with 2,705 Crossings

Of the 17 railroads reporting crossings subject to whistle
bans, CSX, Conrail, and Soo Line had the greatest number,
accounting for about 56 percent of the total between them. The
initial survey results are shown below:

Using information in the DOT/AAR Inventory, the list of
2,705 crossings was screened to identify and delete private
crossings, pedestrian-only crossings, non at-grade crossings
(railroad over or under roadway), closed crossings, crossings
where the ban had been canceled before January 1, 1988, 14 and
garbled crossing inventory identification numbers. The result
was a final list of 2,122 public at-grade crossings where 24 hour
or nighttime-only bans were in effect.

Locations and Types of Bans

Crossings which passed the screening process comprised the
"Study Group" and were used in the subsequent compilations and
analyses performed by FRA.

The locations of the crossings are shown in the following
table and on the map in Figure C.

STATES WITH WHISTLE BAN CROSSINGS

(Post Screening Count)

AR

41

MN

153

AZ

1

MO

118

CA

69

NC

1

FL

213

NY

157

GA

52

OH

74

IA

19

OR

49

IL

286

PA

73

IN

118

SC

24

KY

158

TX

65

LA

70

VA

93

MA

88

WA

62

MD

8

WI

183

ME

12

WV

5

MI

141

27 States with 2,122 Crossings

Railroads operating over the crossings are shown in the table below:

RAILROADS WITH WHISTLE BAN CROSSINGS
(Post Screening Count)

ATK

77

GTW

9

ATSF

41

KCS

82

BAR

12

NS

59

BN

128

NW

101

CNW

74

SOO

335

CR

350

SP

28

CSX

436

SR

11

DH

16

UP

198

WC

165

17 Railroads and 2,122 Crossings

The types of highway-user warning devices installed at the
crossings are shown in the following table and in Figure D, which
also provides a comparison with the general population of
crossings in the U.S. As a group, crossings with whistle bans
have a higher level of motorist warning device.

TYPES OF WARNING DEVICES AT WHISTLE BAN CROSSINGS15

Gates

852

Cantilevered Flashing Lights

99

Flashing Lights

373

Crossbucks

551

Other or None

247

The post-screening count identified 227 cities with whistle
bans. Their state locations are shown in Figure E. Of the 2,122
crossings with whistle bans, 94 percent of the bans (at 1,993
crossings) were effective 24 hours a day.

Fewer than six percent of the bans (at 118 crossings) were
effective only during nighttime hours, usually between the hours
of 6:30 p.m. and 6:30 a.m. Figure F shows the locations of the
crossings with nighttime-only bans. They were located in 9
states and 20 cities. The types of warning devices installed at
these crossings include 49 with gates, 36 with flashing lights,
and 33 with passive signs. Some of the nighttime-only whistle
bans were reported to have been rescinded prior to the date of
the AAR survey, but subsequent to January 1, 1988 (the beginning
date of the study's time frame). Figure G shows the locations of
84 crossings that are believed to continue to have nighttime-only
whistle bans in effect. They are located in 18 cities in 8
states.

Eleven crossings had restrictions that permitted train
whistles, but restricted them to "one sounding at 500 feet" or
required the horn to be sounded, but only at "minimum intensity".

In reviewing the reports from the AAR survey, many indicated
that a substantial number of whistle bans had been terminated by
the municipalities or were being ignored by the railroads in a
conscious decision to not abide by ordinances that appeared to
compromise safety. In a few cases, new whistle bans had been
implemented by communities. (These terminations and
implementations provided the opportunity to compare accident
frequencies during ban and non-ban periods). From the initial
study group of 2,122 whistle bans, the number of crossings
subject to bans decreased by 721. The observance of whistle bans
in 63 cities has been discontinued.

The locations of the remaining 1,401 bans are shown in
Figure H. They are located in 164 cities in 24 states. This
total includes both 24 hour and nighttime-only bans.

Legal Basis and History

Ordinances prohibiting train whistles have been passed by
many municipalities. At least one dates back to 1910. Many
ordinances specifically mention train whistles or bells, while
others are general ordinances against objectionably loud sounds
of any type and have been interpreted as applicable to train
whistles. Nominal fines have been established in some cases.

However, most of the ordinances originated between 1950 and
1970. The precise dates and municipal code sections for many of
them were beyond the immediate recall of city and county
personnel presently responsible for maintaining code records.
Some localities believe they simply have informal agreements with
the railroads.

Of greater interest to the FRA was the documentation of any
recent implementations or cancellations of whistle bans. Such
changes would provide opportunities to compare accident
frequencies both with and without whistle bans. This technique
provided significant results in the earlier Florida whistle ban
study. For the nationwide study, twelve such cases were
documented involving Conrail, CSX, GTW, KCS, NS/SR, BAR, Soo
Line, WC and UP railroad operations.

Formulated to derive as much insight as possible from the
survey information, FRA's methodology used two types of
analytical procedures. The first was a direct comparison of
empirical data using a case study approach. The second was also
a comparative approach, but employed an established analytical
model for predicting the likelihood of accidents at highway-rail
crossings based on certain physical and operational parameters.
The predicted accident frequencies were compared with the actual
accident histories for crossings with whistle bans. As an
independent control group, accident predictions for all other
crossings in the 168,223 DOT/AAR national crossing inventory were
computed and compared to their actual accident histories. The
amount of variance between the predicted and actual accidents for
whistle ban and non-whistle ban groups was then examined. Of
interest was any difference in how well each group conformed (or
did not conform) to its predicted frequency of accidents.

Before and After Case Studies

Using information about whistle ban cancellations and
implementations from the AAR survey, in conjunction with accident
data from FRA's crossing accident/incident file,16 direct
comparisons of accident occurrences for twelve groups of
crossings were made. As shown in Table 1, each case study
covered equal periods of time when the crossings were and were
not subject to whistle bans. This type of "before and after"
comparison is similar to the technique used to study the impact
of whistle bans in Florida.

In conducting this analysis, equivalent time periods were
established by counting an equal number of months and weeks
before and after the date a whistle ban was terminated (or in a
few cases, implemented). Limited by the end dates of January 1,
1988 or June 30, 1994, the equal time intervals were maximized.
They ranged from as long as 38 months and 2 weeks to as short as
19 months and 1 week. Accident records for the crossings during
each of the two time intervals were then compared. Because, in
all cases the time periods were equal, no normalizing procedure
was required.

For the twelve case studies, there were a total of 130
accidents during whistle bans and 80 accidents when whistles were
sounded, indicating a 38 percent reduction in the overall rate of
accidents after whistle bans were cancelled. Eleven fatalities
occurred during the whistle bans compared to 4 in the non-ban
periods. Forty-one people were injured during the whistle bans
compared to 28 when whistles were sounded.

At the 288 Conrail crossings included in Case Study 1,
accidents declined 53 percent when whistle bans were cancelled,
and for the 293 CSX crossings in Michigan and Kentucky of Case
Studies 3 and 4, there was a 59 percent reduction in accidents.
However, not all whistle ban periods proved to have more
frequent accidents. Four of the case studies showed fewer
accidents during the whistle ban periods. For example, in Case
Study 5, the KCS had 11 accidents reported for the whistle ban
period compared to 18 during the non-ban period. A
representative of the KCS commented that rail traffic had doubled
in some areas during the post ban period. Such a change could
explain the increased frequency of accidents.

In conducting these case studies, a number of repeat
accidents at particular crossings were noted. One crossing had
five accidents during the 33 months and 2 weeks of the non-ban
period reviewed. Three crossings had 4 accidents, 5 crossings
had 3 accidents, and 13 crossings had 2 accidents during the
periods whistles were not sounded.

The case studies reflect a very diverse group of crossing
configurations, warning devices, traffic mixes, and locations.
Unlike the Florida crossings, where there was a high order of
similarity from one crossing to the next, especially with regard
to the number of trains, the crossings in these case studies
embody such a variety of situations that the results should be
free from significant bias. FRA also believes the eight state
geographical distribution represented in the case studies
contributes to a more credible portrayal of the national safety
implication of train whistle bans.

National Comparison

For a more generalized indication of the impact of train
whistle bans, FRA collated crossing information for the entire
nation for the five year period from January 1989 through
December 1993. Without regard to state borders or railroad
identities, national information and information about the
crossings with whistle bans were compared as two large groups.
An analytical model was used to predict the expected frequency of
accidents within the two groups and the results were compared
with actual accident information.

This procedure applied FRA's crossing accident prediction
model developed in the early 1980's. This model, referred to as
the "Accident Prediction Formula" (APF) is routinely used to
decide which crossings should be given priority for upgrading
motorist warning devices.

It uses information about the physical characteristics of a
crossing, such as the number of tracks, the number of highway
lanes, types of existing warning devices (gates, flashing lights,
and signs), whether its location is urban or rural, and whether
the roadway is paved. Operational information about the number
of highway vehicles using the crossing per day and the number,
type, time of day, and maximum speed of trains is also used in
the formula to predict the frequency of accidents at a particular
crossing.

The formula was developed using data from thousands of
accidents and incidents spanning many years. It does not
consider whether a crossing has a whistle ban.
For this comparison, the formula was used without a
supplemental factor normally used to adjust its output for
recent accident occurrences at a specific crossing. As a result,
the analysis considered only the essential crossing
characteristics, and was not skewed by local, accident-causing
anomalies.

For this comparison, the "Study Group" of 2,122 crossings
was purged of 900 crossings that either had a change in the
status of its whistle ban or had a change to the type of motorist
warning device installed during the five years of 1989 through
1993. Either change would have invalidated the results of the
APF for the crossings. The resulting accident estimates were
based solely on each crossing's physical and operational
parameters. FRA applied the accident prediction formula to
estimate the five-year accident rates for the remaining 1,222
crossings reported to be subject to whistle bans.

The 1,222 crossings with whistle bans were sorted in order
of increasing risk according to their APF ratings, divided into
ten groups of nearly equal size, and labeled A through J. Based
on the APF ratings, Group "A" had the least risk and Group "J"
had the highest risk.

A similar procedure was followed for 167,000 crossings in
the U.S. DOT/AAR national crossing inventory, wherein FRA used
the APF to estimate the five-year accident rates for crossings
that did not have whistle bans in effect throughout the period
1989 through 1993.17 As with the whistle ban crossings, the
inventory crossings were sorted and divided into corresponding
risk groups A through J according to their APF ratings.18

For each group, "with" and "without" whistle bans, the
number of accidents for the five-year period for the group was
divided by the number of crossings. This calculation produced an
accident rate per crossing group independent of group size. This
data is shown in Tables 2 and 3. Finally, the percentage
difference in the rates between whistle ban and non-ban crossings
was determined by subtracting the non-ban rate from the whistle
ban rate, and then dividing by the non-ban rate. This produced
the percentage by which the whistle ban rate exceeded the non-ban
rate. The results of this calculation are shown in Table 2 and
Table 4.

The results of this analysis were dramatic. For nine out of
ten theoretically similar risk groups, the whistle ban crossings
had significantly higher accident rates over the five year period
than did the non-ban crossings. While one group showed whistle
ban crossings had fewer accidents per crossing (by 17.5 percent),
the other nine groups clearly showed that crossings with five
year whistle bans were less safe than similarly grouped non-ban
crossings. The average difference for all ten groups, including
the group with the 17.5 percent reduction, was an increase of 84
percent.

A review of the accidents at crossings when whistle bans
were in effect indicated a total of 948 accidents between
January 1, 1988 and June 30, 1994. These accidents resulted in
62 fatalities and 308 injuries.

All seventeen railroads that reported operating over
crossings with whistle bans experienced at least one accident at
a crossing subject to a ban during the time period. The numbers
of accidents, and the resulting fatalities and injuries are shown
in the following table:

ACCIDENTS EXPERIENCED BY RAILROADS AT CROSSINGS
DURING WHISTLE BANS

January 1, 1988 through June 30, 1994

RAILROAD

NUMBER OF ACCIDENTS

NUMBER OF FATALITIES

NUMBER OF INJURIES

ATK

54

5

19

ATSF

20

2

6

BA

1

0

0

BN

80

13

20

CNW

49

8

19

CR

81

11

26

CSX

113

4

31

DH

4

0

5

GTW

3

0

1

KCS

11

1

9

NS

10

0

4

NW

89

5

31

SOO

157

2

33

WP

28

2

7

SR

5

0

0

UP

101

7

36

WC

142

2

61

TOTALS

948

62

308

The 948 accidents included 54 reported by Amtrak, with 5
fatalities and 19 injuries. Thirty-six accidents with 2
fatalities and 7 injuries were reported to involve Metra commuter
trains (Northeastern Illinois Regional Commuter Railroad)
operating on SOO Line trackage. Eleven of the METRA accidents
occurred at the same crossing.

Geographically, 24 of the 27 states with crossings subject
to whistle bans experienced accidents at one or more of their
crossings during the study time period. A tabulation of the
locations of the accidents is provided in the following table and
on the maps of Figure I and Figure J:

ACCIDENTS IN STATES AT CROSSINGS
DURING WHISTLE BANS

January 1, 1988 through June 30, 1994

STATE

NUMBER OF ACCIDENTS

NUMBER OF FATALITIES

NUMBER OF INJURIES

AR

15

1

4

CA

40

5

17

GA

21

0

5

IA

6

0

1

IL

144

25

41

IN

93

11

34

KY

47

2

15

LA

33

1

12

MA

34

1

15

ME

1

0

0

MI

41

1

10

MN

92

0

15

MO

41

1

13

NC

6

0

1

NY

20

2

10

OH

11

0

2

OR

15

3

8

PA

17

0

2

SC

3

0

0

TX

30

1

10

VA

38

5

16

WA

37

1

5

WI

162

2

72

WV

1

0

0

TOTALS

948

62

308

Accident Circumstances

The circumstances of accidents occurring during whistle bans
were compared with those of accidents during non-ban periods to
determine whether the sounding of train horns reduced or
prevented accidents under certain conditions. Accidents at the
crossings where whistle bans were cancelled or enacted were
grouped according to whether they occurred during the ban or non-ban
periods. The circumstances for the two groups are shown
below:

ACCIDENT CIRCUMSTANCES

WHISTLES BANNED

WHISTLES SOUNDED

CIRCUMSTANCES

NUMBER

%19

NUMBER

%19

Clear Weather

617

65%

62

62%

Cloudy

195

21

25

25

Rain

98

10

6

6

Fog

8

1

0

0

Sleet

2

0

1

1

Snow

28

3

6

6

Daylight

421

44

52

52

Dusk or Dawn

69

7

5

5

Night

458

48

43

43

View Obstructed

56

6

6

6

Signal Failure

1

0

0

0

Hit by 2nd Train

17

2

2

2

Struck Side of Train

206

22

21

21

Drove Around Gates

270

28

15

15

Total Accidents

948

100

Almost two thirds of the accidents occurred in clear weather
(65 and 62 percent). Accidents during bad weather, including
rain, fog, sleet, and snow, showed a negligible difference when
whistles were sounded (14 percent compared to 13 percent). Night
accidents accounted for 48 percent of the total during the ban
period, compared to 43 percent when whistles were permitted.
Accidents at dawn and dusk were about the same during the ban and
non-ban periods (7 percent compared to 5 percent).

However, accidents that occurred when motorists drove around
lowered gates accounted for 28 percent of the cases when whistles
were banned and only 15 percent when whistles were sounded.

Motorists were struck by a second train with the same
frequency during both ban and non-ban periods (about 2 percent of
the cases).

Similarly, accidents where motorists struck the side of the
train occurred with about equal frequency during both ban and
non-ban periods (22 percent compared to 21 percent).

In the combined total of 1,048 accidents, there was only one
instance where the crossing warning device had failed to operate.
That one accident was at a crossing with a whistle ban in effect.

While these samples are admittedly small and of unequal
size, they do show some differences that could logically be
attributed to the use of train horns. Accidents at night or
involving motorists who drove around lowered gates, showed a
reduced frequency when train horns were sounded and suggest a
conclusion that train horns reduce accidents in instances of
darkness and motorist impatience.

Nighttime-Only Accidents

When FRA examined the accident histories of the 118
crossings subject to nighttime-only whistle bans, the data was
found to be insufficient to support statistically meaningful
conclusions.

There were a total of 41 accidents at the 118 crossings. Of
these, 24 accidents occurred during daytime or non-ban periods
and 17 occurred during the hours the whistle bans were in effect.
Of the 17 accidents, 15 of them (88 percent) occurred during the
5 1/2 hour period between 6:30 PM and midnight. When compared to
the 24 accidents that occurred during the non-ban hours of the
day, a period more than twice as long (e.g. the 12 hour period
generally between 6:30 AM to 6:30 PM), the frequency of accidents
during the early nighttime ban hours is notably higher. However,
without information about the relative volumes of train and
highway traffic at the crossings during the ban and non-ban time
periods, the higher accident frequency cannot be attributed
entirely to the whistle bans. But, if it were determined that
the exposure to accidents was lower during the evening hours,
because of reduced highway and/or train traffic, then the higher
frequency of accidents would become more significant.

Low highway and/or train traffic volumes after midnight are
probably responsible for the relatively small number of accidents
that occurred during the nighttime whistle ban hours between
midnight and 6:30 AM. Only 2 of the 17 accidents (approximately
12 percent) occurred during those hours.

A total of 2,122 public grade crossings subject to whistle
bans were identified in a 1992 survey conducted by the AAR. Of
these, 94 percent of the whistle bans were in effect 24 hours a
day. Fewer than 6 percent (at 118 crossings) were effective only
during nighttime-hours, typically from 6:30 PM to 6:30 AM.

The crossings were located in 227 cities in 27 states and on
17 different railroad properties. Whistle bans at many of the
2,122 crossings were reported to have been cancelled or were
being ignored. As of the 1992 survey, there remained 1,401
crossings subject to whistle bans located in 164 cities in 24
states. Of these, 84 were reported to be nighttime-only bans and
were located in 18 cities in 8 states.

The accident histories of the crossings with whistle bans
were examined and indicated that the safety risks associated with
the whistle bans in Florida are not unique to that area.
Overall, in twelve "before and after" case studies involving 831
crossings in eight states other than Florida, a 38 percent
reduction in accidents occurred when whistle bans were cancelled.
However, for 288 Conrail crossings, the accident rate fell 53
percent, and for 293 CSX crossings, it dropped 59 percent when
whistle bans were ignored or canceled.

An analytical comparison of 1,222 crossings subject to
whistle bans from 1989 through 1993, against the other 167,000
public grade crossings in the national inventory was made. The
comparison disclosed that the crossings with whistle bans had a
significantly higher average accident frequency than the non-ban
crossings. In performing this analysis, 1,222 whistle ban
crossings were divided into ten groups of nearly equal size,
based on similar estimated accident frequencies, as calculated by
an established accident prediction formula. Within each risk
level, which ranged from low to high, the accident histories of
the crossings were tabulated. A similar procedure was followed
for the other 167,000 crossings in the national inventory. In
nine of the ten risk levels, the group of crossings with whistle
bans had accident frequencies significantly higher than the
national population. Overall, this analysis indicated the
whistle ban crossings experienced an average 84 percent greater
frequency of accidents than the crossings without bans.

Unlike the crossings in Florida, which were located along
the same right of way with relatively uniform rail traffic, the
crossings in this study reflect a very diverse population with
respect to physical configurations, motorist warning devices, and
highway and rail traffic mixes. Their geographical dispersion
contributes to a more credible indication of the national safety
implication of train whistle bans.

However, in spite of the differences between the groups of
crossings involved in this study and the Florida study, the
results are similar and significant. The national group showed a
38 percent reduction in the crossing accident rate when whistle
bans were canceled, and the Florida group, a 68.6 percent
reduction. These trends give credence to both studies and
indicate that whistle bans, whether they are effective 24 hours
or nighttime-only, increase the risk of accidents at crossings.

PERMANENT CLOSURE OF THE HIGHWAY-RAIL CROSSING:
Eliminate the at-grade crossing through permanent closure of the
street or highway or through grade separation (overpass or
underpass).

NIGHTTIME CLOSURE OF THE HIGHWAY-RAIL CROSSING:
Close crossings to highway traffic during nighttime hours subject
to the following conditions:

The closure system must completely block highway traffic
from entering the crossing.

Activation and deactivation of the system will be the
responsibility of the county or municipality responsible for
the street or highway. The crossing should be closed
continuously during the hours of 10:00 P.M. to 6:00 A.M.

The crossing must be part of a quiet zone, as defined in
these specifications.

The system must be vandal proof.

The Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices (MUTCD)
standards must be met for any barricades and signing used in
the nighttime closure of the facility. Signing for
alternate routes must also be included.

FOUR-QUADRANT GATE SYSTEM:
Install gates at crossings designed to block all highway traffic
from entering a crossing when the gates are lowered, subject to
the following conditions:

Approaches on both sides of the highway-rail crossing will
be separated with medians with non-mountable curbs or
traffic separators. Such median construction will include
energy dissipaters and median striping as required by MUTCD.

Any median construction will extend at least 200 feet or to
a major intersection, which ever is less. All major
intersections must be a minimum of 100 feet from the
highway-rail crossing. Any minor intersections within 200
feet of the crossing will be closed to crossing traffic.

At low traffic volume streets, median curbs with vertical
delineators (rubber pipes and low curbing) between opposing
lanes may be used for non-mountable curbs or traffic
separator.

The maximum length of a gate arm will not exceed 40 feet.

Gate timing for full closure systems should be based on
these suggested times:

Step

Inc. Time

Lights start flashing

0 sec.

Entrance gates start down

3-5

Entrance gates fully lowered

9-15

Exit gates start down

4-6

Exit gates fully lowered

9-15

Exit gates will be equipped with a presence detection loop
located between the outside track and the exit gate arm. This
loop will raise or prevent the lowering of the exit gate arm if
an automobile is detected within the loop. The loop or loops
will be of sufficient size and number to detect an automobile in
all exit lanes.

The gap between the end of a lowered gate and the median
will be less than one foot.

Four-quadrant gates will not be an option where traffic
signal preemption exists.

The crossing must be part of a quiet zone, as defined in
these specifications.

The system must be vandal proof.

General principles of the AASHTO Roadside Design Guide
regarding median barrier construction will be adopted where
applicable.

GATES WITH MEDIAN BARRIERS:
Install median barriers at crossings that prevent highway traffic
from driving around lowered gates subject to the following
conditions:

Approaches on both sides of the highway-rail crossing will
be separated with median barriers. Any barrier so
constructed will include markers as required by the MUTCD,
and energy dissipaters.

Median barriers will extend at least 200 feet or to a
major intersection, whichever is less. All major
intersections must be a minimum of 100 feet from the
highway-rail crossing. Any minor intersections within 200
feet of the crossing will be closed to crossing traffic.

The maximum length of a gate arm will not exceed 40 feet.

The gap between the end of a lowered gate and the median
barrier will be less than one foot.

The crossing must be part of a quiet zone, as defined in
these specifications.

The system must be vandal proof.

General principles of the American Association of State
Highway and Transportation Officials (AASHTO) Roadside
Design Guide regarding median barrier construction will be
adopted where applicable.

ONE-WAY PAIRING OF ADJACENT STREETS:
Adjacent streets would be made into one-way pairs and gates
modified or relocated to block the approaching lanes of traffic,
subject to the following conditions:

Streets to be made into one-way pairs should ideally be no
more than one city block (300'-500') apart. Cross streets
connecting the one-way pairs should be no more than one city
block from each side of the crossings in Central Business
Districts, nor more than one-quarter mile from each side of
the crossings in suburban areas.

Lane capacities of both streets should be approximately the
same.

Preferably, the gate arms on the approach side of the
crossings should be extended to within one foot of the left
edge of pavement. The left edge of the pavement on the
approach side in this pattern will include a non-mountable
curb extending at least 200 feet or to a major intersection,
which ever is less. Alternatively, the gate mechanisms on
the far side of the crossings may be relocated to the left
side of the approach lanes. This choice requires the gate
arms size to provide a maximum of one foot between the tips
of the gate arms when in the lowered position.

The maximum length of a gate arm will not exceed 40 feet.

Two two-lane roadways one-way in the same direction may be
paired with a single intervening multi-lane undivided
roadway in the opposite direction provided all other
conditions are met.

Both crossings of a one-way pair must be part of a quiet
zone, as defined in these specifications.

Signing for one-way streets shall be in conformance with the
MUTCD.

Footnotes

1 49 CFR 229.129. The minimum sound level for train
locomotives is specified at 96 decibels (dB) ± 4 dB--at 100 feet
forward of the locomotive in its direction of travel. (A decibel
is a unit for measuring the relative loudness of sounds which for
humans range from zero, for the average least perceptible sound,
to about 130 for the average pain level.)

2 49 CFR 218. FRA's railroad operating practice regulations
require that safety devices be operational; they do not specify
when audible warning devices should be sounded.

7 FRA also believes that the train whistle can prevent
accidents involving a second train on an adjacent track. If the
view of adjacent tracks is blocked by the first train, a highway
user who decides to go around a "down" highway crossing gate
after the first train passes, is totally dependent on hearing the
warning of the second train's whistle.

9 The Public Utility Commission of Oregon rescinded whistle
bans in two cities after a 200 percent increase in the accident
rate. See U.S. Federal Railroad Administration, Florida's Train
Whistle Ban, 2nd ed., September 1992, Appendices L and M.

10 FRA is custodian of this computer-based file of all
highway-rail crossings in the United States. This data base,
initiated by States, railroads, and the US DOT, circa 1973-75, is
kept current by States and railroads who voluntarily provide
information for newly established crossings and updates for
existing crossings to FRA on a " U.S. DOT - AAR Crossing
Inventory Form", Form FRA F 6180.71. See Appendix 2. (In the
year ended March 31, 1993, FRA processed more than 103,255
inventory updates.) Each crossing in the country is assigned a
unique number which facilitates precise identification. Among
other uses, this number is included in all crossing accident
reports.

11 The 537 crossings of the FEC, which had whistle bans
prior to Emergency Order No. 15, have not been included in this
tabulation or elsewhere in this study.

12 This initial count was subsequently adjusted downward as
the result of screening procedures.

13 Excluding 537 crossings on Florida East Coast Railway
Company.

14 For this study, FRA established a time frame of January 1,
1988 through June 30, 1994. This was based on the availability
of the most recent accident data, which was through June of 1994,
and a need to minimize potential changes in highway and rail
traffic volumes as well in the physical characteristics of the
crossings, while ensuring there would be sufficient accident data
to enable meaningful analysis. The resulting study time frame
spanned 6.5 years.
An exception to this time frame was made for those analyses
involving an FRA accident prediction model, for which five years
of accident data was used. The model's computer program was
developed using this time span. The five year time frame used by
the accident prediction model was from January 1, 1989 through
December 31, 1993. (See page 32).

15 For this study, crossings were classified according to the
highest level of highway-user warning device installed at the
crossing. For example, if a crossing is equipped with gates, it
will also have flashing lights and passive warning signs such as
crossbucks. In this study, the crossing would be classified and
counted as a "gate" crossing and not counted in any other group.

16 Pursuant to the Federal Railroad Safety Act of 1970 (P.L.
91-458) and the Accident Reports Act (45 U.S.C. 38-34), railroads
are required to file accident/incident reports with the FRA. Any
impact which occurs between railroad on-track equipment and an
automobile, bus, truck, motorcycle, bicycle, farm vehicle,
pedestrian, or other highway user at a highway rail crossing must
be reported to the FRA on the "Rail-Highway Grade Crossing
Accident/Incident Report," Form FRA F 6180.57. See Appendix 3.
The FRA has maintained a computer-based file of these reports
since 1975.

17 Crossings which had a ban for part of the period were
included in the "non-ban" group. This inclusion caused the
differences between the two groups to be understated.

18 The ten groups, "A" (least risk) through "J" (highest
risk) vary in size. Since the subsequent analysis is based on
accident rate per crossing, the variance in group size did not
affect the validity of the analysis. The technique of
stratification is normally used to prevent a preponderance of a
certain characteristic, or a large number of low or high risk
values from masking differences or skewing a comparison based on
fully aggregated groups.