The Attack on Poland

Poland was attacked by Germany on
September 1st 1939. The German attack was
code-named Operation White (Fall Weiss). The attack on Poland started at 04.45
hours when blitzkrieg tore through the Polish
military and by the end of the month Poland had surrendered to the Germans and
the country was occupied.

German tanks cross into Poland

How did Germany achieve such an
overwhelming victory?

While the German Army had been
developing new tactics and building new fighting vehicles to implement these
tactics, the Polish Army, like many others in Europe, had stayed with a World
War One mentality.

A comparison of both armed forces
clearly indicates the problems faced by Poland.

Germany
had 11 tank divisions compared to Poland’s 1;

Germany
had 40 infantry divisions compared to Poland’s 30;

Germany
four motorised divisions compared to none in Poland;

Germany
had one cavalry brigade compared to Poland’s eleven,
some of who can be seen below.

In terms of air power, the Germans had
850 bombers and dive-bombers (the JU-87) and 400
fighters. The Polish Air Force numbered 210 bombers and 150 fighters – though
many of these were obsolete and clearly no match for the modern Luftwaffe that
destroyed the Polish Air Force within two days of the first attack.

The Polish Navy consisted of four
destroyers, five submarines, two gunboats, a mine-layer and six mine sweepers
– which meant that any German attack from the sea could not be repulsed.
Despite the terms of Versailles, Germany had built a modern navy that totally
outclassed the Polish Navy.

Such a massive superiority of modern
weaponry could only lead to one result – a swift and decisive victory for the
Germans. General von Brauchitsch, Commander-in-Chief of the German Army, made it
plain what he wanted in his first operational order for the campaign:

“The
object of the operation is the destruction of the Polish armed forces.
The idea of execution is by a surprise entry into Polish territory.”

An army group led by von Rundstedt
attacked from the south while another army group led by von Bock attacked from
the north. There had never been such a large mechanised attack before and
General Walter Nehring, who worked under Heinz
Guderian, claimed that many of the Wehrmacht’s senior officers were
apprehensive as they had nothing to turn to if the attack failed or was stalled.

One of the main concerns of those in
charge, other than whether a mechanised attack would work, was that the German
army was attacking in the north and south of Poland – but with very little in
the middle to oppose any Polish counter-attack. There was a 185 mile gap between
the German VIII Army based in the south in Silesia and the German IV Army in the
north based in Pomerania. Between the two was Poland’s Poznan Army and for a
while it posed a theoretical threat to the Wehrmacht with the potential to punch
a hole into the rear of either German army and disrupting its progress.

To ease this problem, the Germans put
all their faith in a lightening attack that would a) militarily hammer the Poles
and b) create such chaos in Poland that any form of a unified Polish attack
simply would not occur. For the Germans, speed and success went together. By
rolling back the Poles, the Germans assumed that they would always be advancing
and any Polish unit would simply fall back in disarray even if it was not
directly involved in a battle – such was the chaos and breakdown in command
the Germans hoped to achieve.

If the Poles were going to counter an
attack, this has to be done before either German army group had advanced far
into Poland. Both army groups had Warsaw as their target. As they both advanced,
the 185 mile gap between them got smaller and smaller; the nearer both army
groups got to each other, the more formidable they became. Also, the nearer both
army groups got to each other was symptomatic of how far they had pushed back
the Polish military, that by mid-September was in disarray. A Polish
counter-attack at Bzura simply could not be sustained.

The Poles had placed great value on the
River Vistula to act as a natural barrier to any form of military advance. The
Germans crossed the river on Day 5 of the attack. By this time, the Polish air
force had been defeated and this had stripped the Polish Army of any form of air
cover – it also meant that the Poles were easy targets for the Luftwaffe which
was free to operate in Poland after September 2nd.

When the Russians invaded eastern Poland
on September 17th, the defeat of Poland was sealed. On September 24th,
Warsaw was bombed by 1,150 German aircraft. On September 27th, Warsaw
surrendered. The last Polish troops to surrender did so on October 6th.

No-one doubts that the Polish military
put up a brave fight but they were the first army to feel the full might of blitzkrieg
– a tactic that was to push the British and French armies back to Dunkirk
in 1940. Tanks versus a primarily non-mechanised army
could only lead to one result.

Ironically, many point to the impact of
German tanks during the campaign. Yet it is known that many of the tanks used
during the attack were equipped only with machine guns or small calibre guns –
compared to later tank designs. What did the damage was the constant onslaught
of all parts of blitzkrieg, including large numbers of tanks, that never allowed
the Polish Army to gather its breath and re-group. Complete air superiority gave
the Germans every opportunity to attack the retreating Poles – and fleeing
civilians did a great deal to hinder a controlled withdrawal by the Polish
military.

According to the man credited with
developing Germany’s blitzkrieg, Heinz Guderian,
even Hitler was taken aback by its success.

“On
September 5th our corps had a surprise visit from Adolf
Hitler. I met him near Plevno on the Tuchel-Schwetz road, got into his
car, and drove with him along the line of our previous advance. We
passed the destroyed Polish artillery, went through the Schwetz, and
then, following closely behind our encircling troops, drove to Graudenz,
where he stopped and gazed for some time at the blown bridges over the
Vistula. At the sight of the smashed artillery regiment, Hitler had
asked me: “Our dive-bombers did that?” When I replied, “No, our
Panzers!”, he was clearly astonished.”
Heinz Guderian

According to the German,
the Polish campaign cost them 8,082 men killed, 27,279 wounded and 5,029 missing
in action. German tank losses included 217 destroyed and the Luftwaffe lost 285
planes destroyed and 279 damaged beyond repair - about 25% of all German planes
in September 1939. These figures do show that the
victory was not as easy as the very short time span and simple statistics might
indicate. In total, 90,000 Polish military personnel escaped to either Hungary
or Rumania and a number of Polish airman fought with distinction in the Battle
of Britain.