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A Time to Act: The Beginning
of the Fritz Kolbe Story, 1900 - 1943, Part 2

By Greg Bradsher

Kolbe Takes Action
to Contact the Allies

Kolbe knew that his access
to many of the documents
and some of the information
that the top Nazis saw or
knew put him in a unique
position to help the Allies.
"From the first day
I found myself in touch with
Nazi secrets, I knew,"
Kolbe said, "I would
have to find a way, somehow,
to get them out." This
meant treason. He thought
about it and concluded that
"nobody was obligated
to be faithful and obedient
toward Hitler's regime"
and therefore, to benefit
Germany, he needed to mentally
transcend the issue of treason.
He did and decided to make
contact with the Allies.
In late 1941, before Pearl
Harbor, he made attempts
to contact American officials
in Berlin through Catholic
Church intermediaries. These
efforts failed, and the American
embassy was soon closed once
Germany declared war against
the United States. Kolbe,
perhaps discouraged, tried
unsuccessfully at this point
to get out of his position
with Ritter and be sent abroad.39

During the winter of 1941 - 1942, Kolbe watched the war from the safety of Berlin as the military fortunes of Germany ebbed and flowed in North Africa and Russia. Millions were being killed, and undoubtedly Kolbe knew of the atrocities being committed by the Germans on the eastern front. Starting in March 1942, German cities were subjected to devastating air attacks. The German people gradually began to realize that the war might be lost.

Kolbe wanted to take action
and get information
to the Allies, but
he knew that he had
to be cautious. "Months
went by without my
being able to do a
thing," he recalled.
So during the winter
and following spring,
Kolbe tried to live
a simple, normal life,
perhaps not wanting
to bring attention
to himself. Increasingly,
Germany was becoming
a dangerous place,
and not just because
of the war. Under German
law there had been
only three capital
offenses in 1939. By
1942 the number had
risen to forty-six.
In the Reich the number
of people put to death
rose from 926 in 1940
to 3,002 in 1942.40

During the spring of 1942,
it became obvious to
Kolbe that the only
way to make a satisfactory
contact with the Allies
would be on neutral
territory. Switzerland
seemed to him the best
place. He knew the
country and had friends
there, but to get to
Switzerland, he would
have to furnish a valid
reason for an exit
permit. That spring
Kolbe asked his superiors
if he could take a
brief vacation, skiing
in the Swiss Alps,
or Italy, telling them
it did not matter which
country. They turned
down his request.41

Kolbe's Contacts with
the Opposition

Although unable to leave
Germany, Kolbe continued
his association with members
of the opposition. Besides
his anti-Nazi contacts within
the Foreign Office, Kolbe
also had ties to the opposition
movement through Dr. Ferdinand
Sauerbruch. One center of
anti-Nazi sentiment in Berlin
was the university hospital
directed by Sauerbruch, the
most famous surgeon in Germany
during the Third Reich. Kolbe
was engaged, pending his
divorce, to Sauerbruch's
secretary. Sauerbruch had
initially supported Hitler
and the Nazi Party and was
often called upon to operate
on important Nazi leaders,
including Propaganda Minister
Goebbels, and he even performed
a throat operation on Hitler
in 1940.42

At some point, probably
during 1940 - 1942,
Sauerbruch became an
anti-Nazi and was involved
in the resistance movement.
He traveled frequently
to Zurich, Switzerland,
for medical meetings
and talked freely to
people with whom he
came in contact. He
was known among his
medical colleagues,
as well as others,
in Switzerland as an
outspoken critic of
Hitler's regime.43

Kolbe was able to get some
information out of
Germany to help the
Allied cause. Among
the cables he read,
he saw many relating
to pending arrests
of leaders of the French
Resistance movement.
For example, he read
in a cable from Otto
Abetz, the Nazi ambassador
to Vichy, that Cardinal
Gerlier of Lyon, who
had saved many Jewish
children, was about
to be arrested. To
warn him, Kolbe met
an Alsatian leader
of the Resistance,
who, according to Kolbe,
was startled when he
opened the conversation
with the questions,
"Do you have courage?
Are you daring?"
After receiving satisfactory
answers, Kolbe gave
the Alsatian the information
to warn the French.44

In the fall of 1942, a young
Alsatian doctor whom
the Germans had drafted,
Adolphe Jung, was requisitioned
by Dr. Sauerbruch to
work with him. Kolbe
sounded him out and
found him eager to
do something for Free
France. Kolbe was soon
using Dr. Jung's office
for temporary storage
of documents filched
from the Foreign Office.
As Dr. Jung had reason
to make occasional
trips to Strasbourg,
where his brother or
a friend could get
information to the
French Resistance and
on to London, Kolbe
was soon using this
channel, particularly
for warnings that certain
Frenchmen were about
to be arrested.45

The War Turns

During the fall of 1942 the
course of the war was turning
in favor of the Allies, as
Rommel's Afrika Korps was
defeated at El Alamein, Anglo-American
forces landed in Morocco
and Algeria, and the Russians
mounted attacks north and
south of Stalingrad. At the
end of January 1943, the
German Sixth Army surrendered
to the Russians. These defeats,
the increasing aerial bombardments,
and the terror and shortages
at home increased hatred
of Hitler and the Nazis.
This hatred would deepen
with the beginning of the
massive bombing campaign
in the spring. Many Nazis,
even die-hard ones, were
changing their views about
Hitler and the Nazi Party.
One such person was Karl
Ritter, Kolbe's boss. Increasingly
during 1943, he became more
interested in his own well-being
than that of the Nazi Party,
Foreign Office, and Hitler.
Ritter, according to Kolbe,
had now become thoroughly
corrupt. When Ritter was
questioned about his views,
he evaded answer by saying,
"Anyhow, we get wonderful
trips out of this."
Ritter began becoming more
openly critical of the Nazi
Party.46

In mid-February there
were student-led anti-Nazi
demonstrations on the
streets of Munich.
During February and
March the military
and civilian opposition
contemplated the overthrow
of Hitler and the party.47
Other anti-Nazis did
not take action, for
various reasons. After
the disaster of Stalingrad,
Gen. George Thomas
began to "feel
that nothing could
be achieved any longer
from the overthrow
of Hitler. The war
now obviously lost
and could only result
in a harsh peace for
Germany no matter what
government were in
power; it seemed best
to let the odium for
this fall on the Nazi
regime." He was
especially fearful
that a successful attempt
to assassinate Hitler
would lead to a new
legend "in which
he would be canonized
as a martyr and the
generals blamed for
the collapse."48
The Allies' demand
at the Casablanca Conference
for unconditional surrender
led many Germans to
believe that the Allies
would take revenge
on them.49
In early April a Swiss
businessman just back
from Berlin informed
American officials
"that, if the
German people could
be shown that their
existence would not
be threatened after
the war, they would
overthrow the present
Government without
much delay."50

Another reason for lack
of action was fear
of reprisals from the
Gestapo. Fearful of
an internal overthrow,
the forces of Himmler
and the Gestapo were
unleashed on the opposition.
The first five months
of 1943 witnessed thousands
of arrests and executions
as the Gestapo exercised
a severity hitherto
not seen by the German
public. Student leaders
were executed in late
February, and a major
opposition organization,
the Oster Circle, was
destroyed in April
1943.51

The German people were caught
between a rock and
a hard place in the
late spring and early
summer of 1943. On
one hand it was next
to impossible to overthrow
Hitler and the party.
On the other hand,
because of the Allied
demand of unconditional
surrender, and therefore
no opportunity for
a compromise peace,
there seemed to be
no other alternative
but to continue the
military struggle.52

As Kolbe witnessed events
in Germany during the
spring, he decided
once again to attempt
to get to Switzerland.
In his request for
leave, he explained
it had become necessary
for him to divorce
his second wife, who
was Swiss, and he needed
to travel to Zurich
to engage an attorney
for the proceedings.
That could wait, he
was informed. When
he then volunteered
as a special diplomatic
courier, he was informed
that there were others
available.53

Nevertheless, Kolbe tried
his best to assist
the Allies. He learned
that a spy was active
in England who provided
Berlin, by way of the
German embassy in Stockholm,
Sweden, with weather
forecasts and inside
information about aircraft
production. Determine
to stop the flow through
these channels, he
made contact with the
British through his
confidants in Alsace.
They in turn got in
touch with a go-between
in Paris, who then
dealt with British
representatives. The
British, according
to Kolbe, were at first
inclined to scoff at
him but finally took
him seriously when
the information he
gave them led at once
to arresting the spy
and stopping the leak.54

By the end of May 1943, the German forces had been driven out of North Africa, and the beginning of the end was in sight on the eastern front. Additionally, Germany was losing the war in the air and on the sea. In August the Allies occupied Sicily. The German navy was also suffering reversals of fortune. During the last week of July, ten U-boats were sunk in four days in the Bay of Biscay, and the Allies were effectively blocking the U-boat exit routes.

During the period July 24 - August 3, 1943, the British Royal Air Force, briefly assisted by the U.S. Eighth Air Force, launched a major air offensive against Hamburg, Germany's second-largest city. Forty thousand people were killed, and tens of thousands of homes and buildings were destroyed.

On July 24 the Italian Fascist
Grand Council arraigned
Mussolini for mismanaging
the war and exercising
an arbitrary dictatorship,
and the next day King
Emmanuel III relieved
Mussolini of his office
and asked Marshal Badoglio
to form a new government.
The news of Mussolini's
downfall affected the
German public more
than did the bad tidings
from Stalingrad. For
many in Germany, the
fall of Mussolini had
broken the spell of
National Socialism.55
Although the morale
of the German army
remained relatively
high during the early
summer, civilian morale
was in marked decline
as a result of the
aerial bombardments
and the news from the
various fronts. Most
Germans realized, as
the events of July
and early August took
place, that the war
was lost and there
was not a chance for
a compromise peace
settlement.

The Opposition, Summer
1943

Despite fear of the Gestapo,
some German people, however,
did speak out and show signs
of protest during the summer
of 1943.56
Despite the mass arrests
and executions of the spring,
the opposition still plotted
and planned. Some Germans
were "convinced that
it is their duty to apply
all possible expedients to
end the war as quickly as
possible, that is, to further
the German defeat with all
available means."57
Kolbe certainly shared this
point of view.

During the summer
of 1943 he expanded
his contacts with opposition
members outside of
the Foreign Office,
particularly with those
associated with Col.
Claus Schenk Graf von
Stauffenberg.58
Stauffenberg had become
disillusioned about
the Nazis during the
Russian campaign and
by 1942 was involved
in the opposition movement.
In early 1943 he was
posted to Tunisia and
on April 7 was gravely
wounded. He was returned
to a Munich hospital,
where he recovered
under Dr. Sauerbruch's
supervision. While
recuperating, he decided
to devote all of his
energies to removing
Hitler at all costs.
He was convinced the
war was lost and was
determined not to allow
Hitler to destroy the
army and Germany itself.
During the year he
would move into the
inner circle of the
resistance to Hitler.59

The fall of Mussolini
gave the opposition
plotters more hope
to be able to achieve
similar results in
Germany and seemed
to provide a propitious
moment to assassinate
Hitler and overthrow
the Nazi regime.60
But this did not happen
for a variety of reasons.
First and foremost
was the fear of Himmler
and the Gestapo. During
June, July, and August,
Himmler's forces continued
to move swiftly against
the opposition, rendering
any organized opposition
impossible. Arrests
and executions were
common. Terror against
the people had become
a way of life.61
A second major reason
was that the opposition's
peace feelers to the
western Allies did
not meet with success.62

A Time to Act

Kolbe lacked confidence in
the opposition methods and
did not believe that their
plans to kill Hitler and
topple the Nazi Party would
succeed. He saw only one
means to bring about the
downfall of the Nazis— the
military defeat of Nazi Germany.63
Being well informed about
international affairs, Kolbe
knew it was hopeless to separate
the Western Allies from Russia.
During 1943 he became ever
"more convinced that
in order to liberate the
German people from Nazi terror
and corruption, some Germans
had to risk their lives in
combining the fight against
the common enemy with the
Allies."64
For Kolbe this meant getting
information to the Allies— information
that would hasten Germany's
defeat.

Early in August Kolbe decided
that it was now time
for him to act— time
to go Switzerland with
information for the
Allies. He did not
believe that at this
point he was under
any suspicion by the
Gestapo. If he were,
he would not have been
working in the sensitive
position he held. And
he believed that a
friend in the Foreign
Office could help him.
This was Fraulein Maria
von Heimerdinger, assistant
chief of the courier
section and one of
Kolbe's old Wandervogel
comrades. Kolbe told
her that he must go
to Switzerland to check
on certain business
interests of some friends
and asked if it would
be possible to take
the next special courier's
assignment. She told
him a pouch would be
ready for Bern in about
a week's time. Kolbe
received permission
to go and received
his exit visa.65

Kolbe Arrives in Switzerland

Kolbe went to a Berlin train
station late on Sunday, August
15, to catch a train to Switzerland.
The documents he intended
to give the Allies were strapped
to his leg. He must have
been nervous; at this time,
all train passengers were
checked several times by
Gestapo agents in the trains,
in waiting rooms, and on
platforms. As a diplomat,
described as "Secretary
of Consulates, Berlin, traveling
to Bern as courier,"
he was not searched. The
trip was uneventful, and
Kolbe's train crossed over
the Rhine River and entered
Switzerland via Basel on
August 16.66

Bern, Switzerland, ca.
1930s. (NARA, 306-NT-89390)

Although Switzerland was
a neutral country,
in many respects it
was in a war for survival,
surrounded by Nazi-controlled
territory. Fearful
of being invaded by
Germany, Switzerland
had mobilized all or
part of its armed forces
since September 2,
1939.67

The Swiss population
in 1943 was about four
million people, most
of who identified with
the Allied cause.68
The small nation also
held tens of thousands
of refugees from the
Nazis, internees, escaped
prisoners of war, deserters,
hospital cases, civilian
refugees, political
refugees, and emigrants.
A large number of diplomats
and intelligence agents
resided in Switzerland
as did foreign businessmen.
Germany had many diplomats
and businessmen in
Switzerland as well
as supporters among
the Swiss. German intelligence
and counterintelligence
activities also had
a presence in Switzerland.
The German military
intelligence organization
(Abwehr) in
Switzerland was headquartered
at the German embassy
at Bern, with substations
in seven cities. Thirty
members of the Gestapo
also operated in Switzerland.69

Once in Bern, Kolbe
remained cautious.
Not only was he concerned
about Abwehr
and Gestapo agents,
he also had to worry
about the Swiss secret
police. The Swiss counterespionage
agents were most effective.
A German officer stated
that "after a
certain point the Swiss
counterespionage organization
was considered as by
far the most dangerous.
It is in Switzerland
that the proportion
of agents put out of
action was highest.
Our painstakingly built
networks were constantly
disorganized by timely
intervention of Swiss
counterespionage."70
In early summer 1943,
more than one hundred
Germans, Swiss, and
Italians were under
arrest for espionage
in Switzerland.71

Kolbe checked into the Terminus
Hotel on the Bahnhofplatz,
right in the center
of town, intending
to stay two or three
days. He then left
the hotel, found a
public telephone, and
dialed the number of
Dr. Ernest (also Ernesto)
Kocherthaler.72

Kolbe had met Kocherthaler
in the mid-1930s while
serving in the German
embassy in Madrid and
sought his assistance
in making contact with
the British. Kocherthaler,
a German-born Jew and
businessman, left Germany
in the middle 1920s
and went to Madrid,
where he took over
some of his father's
business interests
there and also engaged
in importing Russian
oil into Spain. At
the beginning of the
Spanish Civil War he
was jailed by the Franco
forces, presumably
because of his Russian
affiliations. He was
released and in 1936
went to Switzerland,
settling in Adelboden
and marrying a Swiss
woman. Either while
in Spain or subsequently
in Switzerland, Kocherthaler
converted to Christianity
and became quite active
in religious circles.
His anti-Nazi position
was well known.73

Kocherthaler Meets
the British

Kocherthaler came to Bern
on the evening of August
16 or very early on the seventeenth.
He and Kolbe talked about
what could and could not
be done with respect to ending
the war. Kocherthaler believed
Kolbe's "way of action
the only reasonable one for
a better German future,"
and he "appreciated
the valiant attitude of a
man, who had always been
an opponent to Hitler by
conviction." Kolbe gave
him a document (maybe more)
that he could show the British
so they would be interested
in meeting him and receiving
more documents. Kolbe undoubtedly
felt it safer to send Kocherthaler
to the British embassy rather
than risking going himself.74

During the day of August
17, Kocherthaler went
to the British embassy
and tried to meet with
a diplomat named MacKillop,
who was too busy to
see him. He then met
with a Captain Reid
and informed him he
had a German friend
who was willing to
work with the British.
Being unable to present
any satisfactory introduction
and declining to disclose
the name of his German
friend, Reid dismissed
him without carrying
the matter further.
Not giving up, Kocherthaler
met with Col. Henry
Cartwright, the British
military attaché.
Cartwright also represented
MI9, the organization
that helped and debriefed
escapees from Germany.
Cartwright's cover
role was well known
in Switzerland, and
German intelligence
had several times tried
to plant an agent on
him. These attempts
had made Cartwright
very suspicious of
"walk-ins."75

Kocherthaler told Cartwright
that that he could
put him in touch with
a German from Berlin
who could provide valuable
information. As evidence,
he showed Cartwright
one paper in German
that purported to be
the text of a deciphered
German telegram. Cartwright
did not even look at
it. Kocherthaler made
some vague remarks
about knowing the British
minister and MacKillop,
but when Cartwright
pressed for specifics,
Kocherthaler admitted
that his acquaintanceship
with the minister was
apparently limited
to having met him at
a reception. When asked
why did not he try
to see MacKillop, Kocherthaler
said that he had tried
but that MacKillop
had said he was busy.76
Cartwright thanked
Kocherthaler and showed
him the door.

Cartwright cannot be completely
faulted for thinking
Kocherthaler was a
plant or agent
provocateur. The
Venlo incident of 1939,
when Gestapo agents
posing as anti-Nazis
in the Netherlands
kidnapped two British
Secret Intelligence
Service (MI6) officers
lured to a meeting
to discuss peace terms,
prompted Churchill
to ban any further
contact with the German
opposition. The British
did not want to deal
with anti-Nazis primarily
because they were fearful
that the Russians would
believe they were attempting
to make deals behind
their backs. Thus Cartwright
was simply following
his country's policy
with regards to possible
traps and contacts
with anyone representing
the German opposition.77

Kocherthaler believed
they needed a better
introduction to either
the Americans or even
the British again.
To obtain this, he
wrote a letter, sent
by express mail, to
an "old established
and reputable Basel
banker," Paul
Dreyfus, requesting
either an introduction
to Mr. Norton [the
British minister] or
a contact with the
American legation.78
Dreyfus, head of a
private bank in Basel,
was an interesting
choice for such an
introduction. During
the previous winter,
this well-known banker
had been in trouble
with the British and
American authorities
for having been involved
in buying, from Germans,
exit permits to allow
Dutch Jews to depart
from Nazi-occupied
Holland. When confronted
with the possibility
of being placed on
the British Black List
or the American Proclaimed
List (thereby not being
able to conduct business
with an Allied individuals
or companies), he signed
a statement for the
British diplomatic
authorities in Basel
indicating he would
refrain from the Jewish
ransom traffic.79
To follow up on this
statement, he provided
reports on conditions
in Germany to British
diplomatic officials,
who supplied them to
the Americans.80
Most probably, Kocherthaler
knew of Dreyfus's contacts
with the British and
Americans and thought
him a good choice to
make contact with them.

Dreyfus responded to Kocherthaler
and told him that he
was going to arrange
an introduction with
Gerald Mayer, an American
working for the Office
of War Information
(OWI) the next morning
at 9 A.M. Dreyfus had
known Mayer for about
a year and undoubtedly
knew his connections
with the American legation
and the Office of Strategic
Services (OSS).81

Meanwhile, around
6 P.M. on August 17,
the head of the Bern
OSS office, Allen W.
Dulles, ran into Cartwright
in front of the OSS
office at 24 Duforstrasse.
Cartwright cryptically
remarked (someone was
with him at the time)
that he had had been
contacted by a person
whose name had "tal"
in it (he did not remember
the exact spelling)
and that undoubtedly
the fellow would turn
up at his shop in due
course.82
Dulles probably envisioned
another person trying
to provide information
at a price and also
probably recalled the
warning he had received
soon after his arrival
in Bern from the MI6
not to trust people
claiming to be anti-Nazis.83

Holocaust-Era AssetsGreg Bradsher, an archivist at the National Archives and Records Administration, is working
on a book about Fritz Kolbe, Allen Dulles, and World War II intelligence. His previous contributions to
Prologue have been "Taking America's Heritage to the People: The Freedom Train Story"
(Winter 1985) and "Nazi
Gold: The Merkers Mine Treasure" (Spring
1999).