HELSINKI FOR MPT DEL; VIENNA FOR MBFR DEL
1. SUMMARY. AT NATO QUADRIPARTITE AND COUNSELORS MEETINGS
MARCH 7, UK CHARGE AND COUNSELOR RESPECTIVELY BRIEFED
COLLEAGUES ON HIGHLIGHTS OF RECENT VISIT TO ENGLAND OF
DISARMAMENT SPECIALISTS KULISH AND KOSTKO FROM INSTITUTE
OF WORLD ECONOMICS AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS ( IMEMO).
WHAT THEY HAD TO SAY ESSENTIALLY REPEATED VIEWS EXPRESSED
ON EARLIER OCCASIONS TO THIS AND OTHER EMBASSIES. AMONG
MORE STRIKING REMARKS WAS BELIEF THAT U. S. WOULD RETAIN
FORCES ON EUROPEAN CONTINENT THROUGH THIS CENTURY-- WHICH
IMPLIED CONVERSE, THAT SOVIET FORCES WOULD ALSO REMAIN IN
CONFIDENTIAL
PAGE 02 MOSCOW 02561 100416 Z
EASTERN EUROPE. UK SHARES OUR VIEW THAT ANALYSIS OF THESE
ACADEMIC SPECIALISTS, WHILE SIGNIFICANT, MUST BE TREATED
WITH CAUTION AS ACCURATE INDICATOR OF SOVIET POLICY. END
SUMMARY.
2. DISARMAMENT.
A. KOSTKO APPARENTLY DID MOST OF TALKING. ON GENERAL
DISCUSSION OF DISARMAMENT, HE ARGUED THAT IT CANNOT BE AP-
PROACHED FROM MILITARY ANGLE. ECHOING LINE USED IN CONNEC-
TION WITH MBFR, HE SAID THAT DISARMAMENT MUST FOLLOW PRIOR
POLITICAL DECISION AND WILLINGNESS TO DISARM, CREATING
APPROPRIATE ATMOSPHERE.
ASKED ABOUT VERIFICATION WHICH HAS SO OFTEN PROVEN
STUMBLING BLOCK IN DISARMAMENT TALKS, SOVIETS ARGUED ALONG
FAMILIAR LINES THAT NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS OF VERIFICATION
ARE NOW SO GOOD AS TO RENDER ON- SITE INSPECTION SUPER-
FLUOUS. NUCLEAR INDUSTRIAL ESTABLISHMENTS HAVE BECOME SO
COMPLEX THAT INSPECTION OF THEM IS VIRTUALLY MEANINGLESS.
C. SOVIETS WERE VERY FRANK IN SAYING THAT SOVIET PHOBIA
ABOUT SECRECY AND ESPIONAGE MAKE EVEN DISCUSSION OF VERI-
FICATION VERY DIFFICULT. THE MOST THEY WERE PREPARED TO
CONCEDE WAS THE POSSIBILITY OF " SOME MEASURE OF ON- SITE
INSPECTION IN VERY EXCEPTIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES."
3. MBFR. SOVIETS ANALYZED MBFR BY ITS COMPONENT ELEMENTS:
A. MUTUAL: THERE MUST BE SIMULTANEOUS REDUCTIONS
BY ALL EUROPEAN COUNTRIES ( PRESUMABLY THOSE INVOLVED IN
FORCE REDUCTIONS). REDUCTIONS BY US AND USSR ONLY WOULD BE IN-
SUFFICIENT.
B. BALANCED: DIFFICULTY OF THIS CONCEPT BECOMES CLEAR
WHEN ONE CONSIDERS QUESTION OF WHAT FORCES MAY BE INVOLVED.
C. FORCES: SOVIETS KNOW THAT NATO STRATEGY IS BASED
ON ESCALATING DETERRENCE. IF TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS ARE
USED, IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO CONCEIVE THIS TAKING PLACE WITH-
OUT ESCALATION OF CONFLICT TO POINT WHERE FORCES OUTSIDE
EUROPE WOULD BE USED ( E. G. POLARIS SUBMARINES IN PACIFIC,
CONFIDENTIAL
PAGE 03 MOSCOW 02561 100416 Z
MEDITERRANEAN, U. S.- BASED FORCES, ETC.). ANY REDUCTION MUST
TAKE INTO ACCOUNT ALL FORCES WHICH COULD BE INVOLVED ANY-
WHERE. BY NOTING THAT SOVIETS WOULD NEED TO KEEP FORCES
ON CHINESE BORDER REGARDLESS OF ANY CONFLICT WITH WEST,
SOVIETS IMPLIED THAT REDUCTIONS WOULD NOT BE EXTENDED TO
THESE FORCES. THEY CONCLUDED IT WAS UNREALISTIC TO LIMIT
MBFR TALKS TO CENTRAL EUROPE.
D. REDUCTIONS: CLIMATE OF OPINION IN WEST IS NOT YET
RECEPTIVE TO REDUCING FORCES. ATMOSPHERE REMAINS ONE OF
DISTRUST. SOVIET AIM IS TO REMOVE ALL FORCES IN EUROPE IN
ORDER TO SAVE MONEY, RESOURCES AND MANPOWER. USSR ANTIC-
IPATES, HOWEVER, THAT U. S. FORCES WILL REMAIN IN EUROPE IN
VIABLE STRENGTH FOR FORESEEABLE FUTURE. AT LUNCHEON GIVEN
BY SOVIET EMBASSY FOR KULISH AND KOSTKO AFTER THEIR RETURN,
THEY COMMENTED THEY SAY AMERICAN FORCES REMAINING IN EUROPE
UNTIL END OF CENTURY. THEY ALSO REMARKED THAT PRESENT
BALANCE OF FORCES SEEMED AFTER ALL, SATISFACTORY TO ALL
SIDES SO WHY TAMPER WITH IT.
E. CONFIDENCE- BUILDING MEASURES WERE DISCUSSED IN
ENGLAND IN EQUALLY NEGATIVE TERMS. ONLY USEFUL MEASURE
THEY COULD CITE WAS BAN ON MILITARISTIC PROPAGANDA. SOVIETS
ASKED HOW IT WOULD PROMOTE SOVIET CONFIEENCE FOR THEM TO
SEND OBSERVERS TO NATO MANEUVERS AND FIND THAT USSR IS THE
HYPOTHETICAL ENEMY.
4. COMMENT: UK COUNSELOR VOICED CONCERN, WHICH WE SHARE,
ABOUT READING TOO MUCH INTO VIEWS OF SOVIET ACADEMICIANS
WHICH ARE NOT ALWAYS CONSISTENT WITH OFFICIAL SOVIET NEGOTIATIONG
POSITION. WHEN ASKED EARLIER THIS YEAR ABOUT VIEWS
OF KOSTKO, MFA OFFICIALS REACTED VERY MUCH AS DEPARTMENT OFFICERS
MIGHT TO VIEWS OF AMERICAN ACADEMICIANS WITHOUT POLICY-
MAKING RESPONSIBILITY, NOTING LIMITATIONS ON THEIR SOURCES.
5. ON QUESTION OF VERIFICATION, WE NOTE THAT ACADEMICIANS
EVEN FROM SAME INSTITUTE TAKE RATHER DIFFERENT POSITION.
IN ARTICLE PRINTED FOR USSR' S FRG MAGAZINE " SOVIET UNION HEUTE"
( BONN 1807) IMEMO SECTION CHIEF PROEKTOR REITERATED LINE HE USED IN
HIS ARTICLE IN JUNE 1972 ISSUE OF INSTITUTE' S PUBLICATION IN
WHICH HE SPOKE OF CREATION OF " FUTURE SYSTEM OF CONTROL OF
DISARMAMENT" AND PICTURED ACTUAL FORCE REDUCTIONS TAKING
CONFIDENTIAL
PAGE 04 MOSCOW 02561 100416 Z
PLACE " AFTER HAVING CREATED OPERATING SYSTEM OF GUARANTEE
AND CONTROL." WHEN ASKED LAST SUMMER ABOUT DISCREPANCY
BETWEEN HIS VIEWS ON VERIFICATION ISSUE AND THAT OF
PROEKTOR, KOSTKO WAS OBVIOUSLY THROWN OFF STRIDE.
6. WE WOULD NOT SUGGEST ACADEMIC VIEWS ARE TO BE IGNORED,
SIMPLY READ AGAINST BACKGROUND OF OTHER INFORMATION. THUS,
KOSTKO SIGNALED POSITION TAKEN BY SOVIETS AT VIENNA ON STRA-
TEGIC RATHER THAN GEOGRAPHIC INTERPRETATION OF WHAT IS
CENTRAL EUROPE. SINCE MANY DISARMAMENT ANALYSTS
HAVE MILITARY BACKGROUND, IT IS ALSO POSSIBLE VIEWS REFLECT
CONSERVATIVE MILITARY BIAS.
7. NATO COUNSELORS, NOTABLY FRG AND UK, FELT THAT VIEWS
ABOUT U. S. FORCES REMAINING IN EUROPE MAY REFLECT TWO
CONSIDERATIONS; ( A) SOVIET RELUCTANCE TO CONSIDER WITHDRAWAL
FROM EASTERN EUROPE, WHICH U. S. WITHDRAWL WOULD ENCOURAGE, AND
( B) PREFERENCE TO SEE U. S. WITHDRAWAL FROM WESTERN EUROPE
SPREAD OUT OVER TIME LEST SUDDEN UNILATERAL ACTION TRAUMATIZE
WEST EUROPEANS INTO MAKING MAJOR COMPENSATING DEFENSE EFFORT.
DUBS
CONFIDENTIAL
<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

Raw content

PAGE 01 MOSCOW 02561 100416 Z
11
ACTION PM-09
INFO OCT-01 EUR-25 ADP-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 H-02 INR-09 L-03
NSAE-00 NSC-10 PA-03 RSC-01 PRS-01 SS-14 USIA-12
NEA-10 GAC-01 MBFR-03 SAJ-01 IO-13 OIC-04 T-03 AEC-11
ACDA-19 OMB-01 RSR-01 /157 W
--------------------- 017465
R 091302 Z MAR 73
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7052
INFO USMISSION BERLIN
AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST
AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST
AMEMBASY HELSINKI
USMISSION NATO
AMEMBASSY PRAGUE
AMEMBASSY SOFIA
AMEMBASSY VIENNA 1945
AMEMBASSY WARSAW
C O N F I D E N T I A L MOSCOW 2561
E. O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PARM, NATO
SUBJ: MBFR: FURTHER VIEWS OF SOVIET ACADEMICS.
HELSINKI FOR MPT DEL; VIENNA FOR MBFR DEL
1. SUMMARY. AT NATO QUADRIPARTITE AND COUNSELORS MEETINGS
MARCH 7, UK CHARGE AND COUNSELOR RESPECTIVELY BRIEFED
COLLEAGUES ON HIGHLIGHTS OF RECENT VISIT TO ENGLAND OF
DISARMAMENT SPECIALISTS KULISH AND KOSTKO FROM INSTITUTE
OF WORLD ECONOMICS AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS ( IMEMO).
WHAT THEY HAD TO SAY ESSENTIALLY REPEATED VIEWS EXPRESSED
ON EARLIER OCCASIONS TO THIS AND OTHER EMBASSIES. AMONG
MORE STRIKING REMARKS WAS BELIEF THAT U. S. WOULD RETAIN
FORCES ON EUROPEAN CONTINENT THROUGH THIS CENTURY-- WHICH
IMPLIED CONVERSE, THAT SOVIET FORCES WOULD ALSO REMAIN IN
CONFIDENTIAL
PAGE 02 MOSCOW 02561 100416 Z
EASTERN EUROPE. UK SHARES OUR VIEW THAT ANALYSIS OF THESE
ACADEMIC SPECIALISTS, WHILE SIGNIFICANT, MUST BE TREATED
WITH CAUTION AS ACCURATE INDICATOR OF SOVIET POLICY. END
SUMMARY.
2. DISARMAMENT.
A. KOSTKO APPARENTLY DID MOST OF TALKING. ON GENERAL
DISCUSSION OF DISARMAMENT, HE ARGUED THAT IT CANNOT BE AP-
PROACHED FROM MILITARY ANGLE. ECHOING LINE USED IN CONNEC-
TION WITH MBFR, HE SAID THAT DISARMAMENT MUST FOLLOW PRIOR
POLITICAL DECISION AND WILLINGNESS TO DISARM, CREATING
APPROPRIATE ATMOSPHERE.
ASKED ABOUT VERIFICATION WHICH HAS SO OFTEN PROVEN
STUMBLING BLOCK IN DISARMAMENT TALKS, SOVIETS ARGUED ALONG
FAMILIAR LINES THAT NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS OF VERIFICATION
ARE NOW SO GOOD AS TO RENDER ON- SITE INSPECTION SUPER-
FLUOUS. NUCLEAR INDUSTRIAL ESTABLISHMENTS HAVE BECOME SO
COMPLEX THAT INSPECTION OF THEM IS VIRTUALLY MEANINGLESS.
C. SOVIETS WERE VERY FRANK IN SAYING THAT SOVIET PHOBIA
ABOUT SECRECY AND ESPIONAGE MAKE EVEN DISCUSSION OF VERI-
FICATION VERY DIFFICULT. THE MOST THEY WERE PREPARED TO
CONCEDE WAS THE POSSIBILITY OF " SOME MEASURE OF ON- SITE
INSPECTION IN VERY EXCEPTIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES."
3. MBFR. SOVIETS ANALYZED MBFR BY ITS COMPONENT ELEMENTS:
A. MUTUAL: THERE MUST BE SIMULTANEOUS REDUCTIONS
BY ALL EUROPEAN COUNTRIES ( PRESUMABLY THOSE INVOLVED IN
FORCE REDUCTIONS). REDUCTIONS BY US AND USSR ONLY WOULD BE IN-
SUFFICIENT.
B. BALANCED: DIFFICULTY OF THIS CONCEPT BECOMES CLEAR
WHEN ONE CONSIDERS QUESTION OF WHAT FORCES MAY BE INVOLVED.
C. FORCES: SOVIETS KNOW THAT NATO STRATEGY IS BASED
ON ESCALATING DETERRENCE. IF TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS ARE
USED, IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO CONCEIVE THIS TAKING PLACE WITH-
OUT ESCALATION OF CONFLICT TO POINT WHERE FORCES OUTSIDE
EUROPE WOULD BE USED ( E. G. POLARIS SUBMARINES IN PACIFIC,
CONFIDENTIAL
PAGE 03 MOSCOW 02561 100416 Z
MEDITERRANEAN, U. S.- BASED FORCES, ETC.). ANY REDUCTION MUST
TAKE INTO ACCOUNT ALL FORCES WHICH COULD BE INVOLVED ANY-
WHERE. BY NOTING THAT SOVIETS WOULD NEED TO KEEP FORCES
ON CHINESE BORDER REGARDLESS OF ANY CONFLICT WITH WEST,
SOVIETS IMPLIED THAT REDUCTIONS WOULD NOT BE EXTENDED TO
THESE FORCES. THEY CONCLUDED IT WAS UNREALISTIC TO LIMIT
MBFR TALKS TO CENTRAL EUROPE.
D. REDUCTIONS: CLIMATE OF OPINION IN WEST IS NOT YET
RECEPTIVE TO REDUCING FORCES. ATMOSPHERE REMAINS ONE OF
DISTRUST. SOVIET AIM IS TO REMOVE ALL FORCES IN EUROPE IN
ORDER TO SAVE MONEY, RESOURCES AND MANPOWER. USSR ANTIC-
IPATES, HOWEVER, THAT U. S. FORCES WILL REMAIN IN EUROPE IN
VIABLE STRENGTH FOR FORESEEABLE FUTURE. AT LUNCHEON GIVEN
BY SOVIET EMBASSY FOR KULISH AND KOSTKO AFTER THEIR RETURN,
THEY COMMENTED THEY SAY AMERICAN FORCES REMAINING IN EUROPE
UNTIL END OF CENTURY. THEY ALSO REMARKED THAT PRESENT
BALANCE OF FORCES SEEMED AFTER ALL, SATISFACTORY TO ALL
SIDES SO WHY TAMPER WITH IT.
E. CONFIDENCE- BUILDING MEASURES WERE DISCUSSED IN
ENGLAND IN EQUALLY NEGATIVE TERMS. ONLY USEFUL MEASURE
THEY COULD CITE WAS BAN ON MILITARISTIC PROPAGANDA. SOVIETS
ASKED HOW IT WOULD PROMOTE SOVIET CONFIEENCE FOR THEM TO
SEND OBSERVERS TO NATO MANEUVERS AND FIND THAT USSR IS THE
HYPOTHETICAL ENEMY.
4. COMMENT: UK COUNSELOR VOICED CONCERN, WHICH WE SHARE,
ABOUT READING TOO MUCH INTO VIEWS OF SOVIET ACADEMICIANS
WHICH ARE NOT ALWAYS CONSISTENT WITH OFFICIAL SOVIET NEGOTIATIONG
POSITION. WHEN ASKED EARLIER THIS YEAR ABOUT VIEWS
OF KOSTKO, MFA OFFICIALS REACTED VERY MUCH AS DEPARTMENT OFFICERS
MIGHT TO VIEWS OF AMERICAN ACADEMICIANS WITHOUT POLICY-
MAKING RESPONSIBILITY, NOTING LIMITATIONS ON THEIR SOURCES.
5. ON QUESTION OF VERIFICATION, WE NOTE THAT ACADEMICIANS
EVEN FROM SAME INSTITUTE TAKE RATHER DIFFERENT POSITION.
IN ARTICLE PRINTED FOR USSR' S FRG MAGAZINE " SOVIET UNION HEUTE"
( BONN 1807) IMEMO SECTION CHIEF PROEKTOR REITERATED LINE HE USED IN
HIS ARTICLE IN JUNE 1972 ISSUE OF INSTITUTE' S PUBLICATION IN
WHICH HE SPOKE OF CREATION OF " FUTURE SYSTEM OF CONTROL OF
DISARMAMENT" AND PICTURED ACTUAL FORCE REDUCTIONS TAKING
CONFIDENTIAL
PAGE 04 MOSCOW 02561 100416 Z
PLACE " AFTER HAVING CREATED OPERATING SYSTEM OF GUARANTEE
AND CONTROL." WHEN ASKED LAST SUMMER ABOUT DISCREPANCY
BETWEEN HIS VIEWS ON VERIFICATION ISSUE AND THAT OF
PROEKTOR, KOSTKO WAS OBVIOUSLY THROWN OFF STRIDE.
6. WE WOULD NOT SUGGEST ACADEMIC VIEWS ARE TO BE IGNORED,
SIMPLY READ AGAINST BACKGROUND OF OTHER INFORMATION. THUS,
KOSTKO SIGNALED POSITION TAKEN BY SOVIETS AT VIENNA ON STRA-
TEGIC RATHER THAN GEOGRAPHIC INTERPRETATION OF WHAT IS
CENTRAL EUROPE. SINCE MANY DISARMAMENT ANALYSTS
HAVE MILITARY BACKGROUND, IT IS ALSO POSSIBLE VIEWS REFLECT
CONSERVATIVE MILITARY BIAS.
7. NATO COUNSELORS, NOTABLY FRG AND UK, FELT THAT VIEWS
ABOUT U. S. FORCES REMAINING IN EUROPE MAY REFLECT TWO
CONSIDERATIONS; ( A) SOVIET RELUCTANCE TO CONSIDER WITHDRAWAL
FROM EASTERN EUROPE, WHICH U. S. WITHDRAWL WOULD ENCOURAGE, AND
( B) PREFERENCE TO SEE U. S. WITHDRAWAL FROM WESTERN EUROPE
SPREAD OUT OVER TIME LEST SUDDEN UNILATERAL ACTION TRAUMATIZE
WEST EUROPEANS INTO MAKING MAJOR COMPENSATING DEFENSE EFFORT.
DUBS
CONFIDENTIAL
<< END OF DOCUMENT >>