Plaintiff alleges infringement of his 1977 song in the 1989 NWA rap song "Striaght Outta Compton." Defendants made two motions for partial summary judgment. First, the defendants argued that plaintiff is precluded from recovering any damages for infringements that occurred more than three years prior to his filing of the law suit, as barred by the statute of limitations. Second, defendants argued that plaintiff did not own the sound recording for his song (only the musical composition) and thus could not recover for any infringement of the sound recording. The former motion was denied, and the latter was granted.

As to the statute of limitations defense, the Court held that notwithstanding the Supreme Court's Petrella decision, Sixth Circuit precedent "defines accrual of a copyright claim as occurring when the plaintiff “knew of the potential violation or is chargeable with such knowledge.” Continuing, "When the [Petrella] opinion is read in conjunction with footnote 4, which acknowledges that most circuits will modify this rule so as to focus on the date of 'discovery' as opposed to the date of 'occurrence,' then Petrella reiterates what the Sixth Circuit already requires: that damages be limited to those claims for infringement that accrued within three years of the initiation of the suit, with accrual being determined by the rules of the 8 circuit (until the Supreme Court “passe[s] on the question')." Because Plaintiff had presented evidence that his claim did not accrue until 2014 (when it was allegedly discovered), his claim was not time-barred.

As to the sound recording, the Court held that defendant had provided proof that plaintiff did not own the sound recording. The plaintiff's evidence (e.g., a mechanical license agreement) at best established his ownership of the musical work/composition.

The 11th Circuit held that, in a case brought by hip-hop artists over the use of their song "Hustlin'" in the dance song "Party Rock Anthem," the lower Court erred in invalidating the plaintiffs' copyright registrations. The District Court had sua sponte raised the issue of invalid copyright registrations and failure to demonstrate ownership in dismissing the case at summary judgment.

First, the Appellate Court held that invalidity was not raised as an affirmative defense, and therefore should not have been the basis for dismissal, as it was waived by the defendants. Second, the Appellate Court held that the lower court applied the wrong standard -- specifically on the element of scienter -- in finding that there had been a fraud on the copyright office in obtaining the registrations.

Rappers are skilled in poetry and rhythm—not necessarily in proper copyright registration procedures. While error is not generally a strong legal argument, it is a sufficient counter to a claim of Fraud on the Copyright Office. This is not a case where Rapper A attended a Rapper B concert, heard a delightful song, stole the composition, and fraudulently registered it with the Copyright Office—far from it. There is no dispute by any party that Appellants authored and created Hustlin’, and there is no dispute that they continue to receive the writers’ share of royalties from their musical composition. Furthermore, Appellees never proffered any argument or theory as to why Appellants would attempt to deceive the Copyright Office, when they are, in fact, the undisputed authors. As indicated by the absence of any sort of motive for deception, the errors made in each of the registrations were done in good faith. As portions of the ownership interest were acquired by record companies, those companies— incorrectly, but in good faith—filed for a new registration to protect their newly acquired interests presumably under the assumption that no previous registration had been filed.

Accordingly, the case was remanded. "The Appellants were erroneously 'hustled' out of court, and now deserve to be heard on the merits."

The Second Circuit affirmed the District Court's judgment interpreting the consent decree between the Department of Justice and Broadcast Music, Inc. (“BMI”), in which the court ruled that the consent decree neither requires full-work licensing nor prohibits fractional licensing of BMI’s affiliates' compositions. The DOJ had concluded that the consent decrees require ASCAP and BMI to offer full-work licenses to the exclusion of fractional licenses, which led to the lower court's decision subject to the appeal.

The Second Circuit focused on the plain language of the consent decree. "This appeal begins and ends with the language of the consent decree."

In the long-running dispute between Flo & Eddie (the Turtles) and Sirius, the Florida Supreme Court held that Florida common law does not recognize an exclusive right of public performance in pre-1972 sound recordings.

The dispute in this case concerns rights in sound recordings of performances of musical works as distinct from rights in the composition of such works. The crucial question presented is whether Florida common law recognizes an exclusive right of public performance in pre-1972 sound recordings. We conclude that Florida law does not recognize any such right and that Flo & Eddie’s various state law claims fail.

Thus, Florida joined in New York, leaving it to the legislature rather than the Courts.

In a copyright infringement action concerning the guitar riff in the classic rock song Gimme Some Lovin' performed by the Spencer Davis Group, the Court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment. Plaintiff's song was governed by the 1909 Act, under which the general rule was that the publication of a work with proper notice was necessary to obtain statutory copyright protection. The Court found that "Although Defendants proffer evidence that the work was distributed as a phonorecord prior to 1978, the Copyright Act specifically states that the distribution of phonorecords prior to 1978 is not considered a publication under copyright law. See 17 U.S.C. § 303. Even if the work-at-issue had been published, however, Plaintiffs would not be foreclosed from bringing an infringement suit so long as they made the requisite deposit. The right to sue is not destroyed for failure to make a prompt deposit after publication." Accordingly, the motion to dismiss was denied.

Nonetheless, there were other basis to dismiss. One defendant's motion to dismiss was granted for lack of personal jurisdiction -- he was not properly served, and had no minimum contacts with Tennessee. As to the record label owner, after rejecting the argument that the plaintiff's lacked standing, the Court nonetheless found that the claim should be dismissed because the record label's sister company owned the rights to plaintiff's song!

Turning to the meat of the claim, the Court granted the defendant musicians summary judgment:

The Court finds no dispute of material fact still exists regarding whether Defendants had a “reasonable possibility” of access to Plaintiffs’ song before they created “Gimme Some Lovin’.” Specifically, the Court finds Plaintiffs have failed to meet their burden to show that there is a dispute regarding whether Defendants infringed Plaintiffs’ song between its release date on October 7, 1966 in the United Kingdom (ECF No. 64 ¶ 25) and the release date of “Gimme Some Lovin’” on October 28, 1966 (ECF No. 64 ¶ 25), or at any time before that date. Defendants presented evidence in the form of affidavits that the members of The Spenser Davis Group had not heard Plaintiffs’ song prior to creating "Gimme Some Lovin’.” (Mervyn Winwood Decl., ECF No. 57 ¶ 5; Stephen Winwood Dec., ECF No. 58 ¶ 4; Spenser Davis Decl., ECF No. 59 ¶¶ 3, 5.) The burden then shifted to Plaintiffs to set forth specific facts showing a triable issue of material fact. Plaintiffs only proffered inadmissible evidence to refute these facts Defendants set out in affidavit form. Plaintiffs also proffer no admissible evidence that Defendants infringed Plaintiffs’ song between its release and Defendants’ release, but rather contend it would have been possible. (ECF No. 64-6 at PageIDs 547-48.) Because Plaintiffs have failed to proffer any admissible evidence that establishes a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Defendants heard Plaintiffs’ song prior to creating or releasing “Gimme Some Lovin’,” the Court GRANTS summary judgment in favor of Defendants Steve Winwood and Kobalt (ECF No. 54)

In a putative class action challenging the validity of the defendants' copyright in the folk-song "We Shall Overcome," the Court granted plaintiffs partial summary judgment finding that the lyrics and melody of the first verse (repeated as the 5th verse) of the song are not sufficiently original to qualify for copyright registration as a derivative work. After going through the history of various publications and registrations of the song, the Court held that the defendants could not rely upon their copyright registration's presumption of validity because the defendants had submitted sufficient evidence to rebut the presumption: "They have shown that the Defendants’ 1960 and 1963 applications for a copyright in the Song were significantly flawed."

The next questions was whether the changes to the most well-known verse of the Song, Verse 1/5, embody the originality required for protection by the Copyright Act. A version of the song was in the public domain, so the issue was whether the changes claimed by the defendants were sufficient to qualify as a a protectable derivative work. The Court held that "the Plaintiffs have shown that the melody and lyrics of Verse 1/5 of the Song are not sufficiently original to qualify as a derivative work entitled to a copyright. As a matter of law, the alterations from the PSI Version are too trivial. A person listening to Verse 1/5 of the Song would be hearing the same old song reflected in the published PSI Version with only minor, trivial changes of the kind that any skilled musician would feel free to make. ... More specifically, the changes of “will” to “shall” and “down” to “deep” and the melodic differences in the opening measures and the seventh measure, do not create a distinguishable variation. These differences represent “variations of the piece that are standard fare in the music trade by any competent musician.” In other words, changing "will" to "shall" was not sufficiently original to warrant copyright protection.

The Court did, however, deny the motion for summary judgment on the issues of the authorship and divestment (by publication), and fraud on the copyright office; and partially granted a Daubert motion precluding expert testimony.

A songwriter who claimed that his song "Remember Me" was infringed by country music star Alan Jackson's song "Remember When" had his copyright infringement claim dismissed under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) for failure to plausibly allege the defendant's access to the plaintiff's song. The Plaintiff argued that Jackson had access to Remember Me because it was widely disseminated and sent to third-party intermediaries who knew Jackson. But, the Court found that the fact that the plaintiff's song was available on the internet and that plaintiff had sold the song (without an allegation of commercial success) did not create an inference of access. Further, the connections between the alleged third-party intermediaries was not close enough, and the plaintiff did not sufficiently allege how the songs were sufficiently similar in order to assume access.

Judge Preska refused to certify as a class action a case alleging price fixing in the digital music industry. Several individual plaintiffs sought to represent a nationwide class of Digital Music purchasers against defendants Sony BMG Music Entertainment, UMG Recordings, Inc., Warner Music Group Capitol Records, Inc., Capitol-EMI Music, Inc., EMI Group North America, Inc., and Virgin Records America, Inc. The Court found that the Plaintiffs failed to satisfy the typicality requirement and that widespread pirating would raise “unclean hand” defenses that could not be determined on a class-wide basis.

The decision arises out of an ongoing litigation where defendants allegedly control eighty percent of the market for Digital Music in the United States through production, licensing, and distribution of music online and on CDs. The plaintiffs allege that defendants have conspired to restrain trade in and fix prices of Digital Music in order to sell CDs at supra-competitive prices.

A California Federal Judge determined that the band ‘Jefferson Starship’ lost the right to use their name when co-founder Paul Katner died in 2016. The band name had been contractually retired in 1985 under an agreement, after Katner and various other founders left the band. In 1993, Craig Chaquico, whom brought the suit, agreed to allow Katner to use the name for a new band under a new agreement. The Judge determined that Katner’s death terminated the ’93 agreement and the band’s new members as well as older founders were barred from using the name as they were not parties to the agreement. While the Judge dismissed Chaquico’s Lanham Act claims that the former band members’ imagines in marketing creates confusion, she is allowing the breach of contract claim to proceed.

A California Court of Appeals sided with Facebook, granting an anti-SLAPP motion and striking the complaint by Mikel Knight, a Country Rap/Urban Country artist. Knight filed a complaint against Facebook alleging six causes of action arising from a Facebook page inciting violence and death threats against Knight and his team.

As a part of Knight’s label’s marketing efforts, independent contractors were hired to drive vans throughout the country, promoting Knight’s music and merchandise. In 2014, two separate incidents occurred where drivers fell asleep at the wheel and were involved in car accidents, resulting in two deaths and one serious injury. Shortly after the incidents, a Facebook page called “Families Against Mikel Knight” was created by people related to the victims. Numerous individuals posted comments to the page inciting death threats and violence, and members of Knight’s promotion team were verbally threatened and physically assaulted. Knight requested Facebook remove the page after various business deals fell through due to its existence. Facebook refused.

The Court agreed with a special motion filed by Facebook to dismiss all six causes of action as they arose from protected activity and that plaintiffs could not show a probability of prevailing on any of them. The Court of Appeals instructed the trial court to enter an order granting the anti-SLAPP motion and strike the complaint.

Webster v. Dean Guitars et al., No. 17-cv-03027 (U.S. District Court for the Central District of California July 26, 2017).

A copyright suit against a guitar production company and the estate of Pantera frontman “Dimebag” Darrell Abbott was transferred to the Middle District of Florida after a California Federal Judge determined that Florida is the more convenient venue. In granting the motion, the judge determined that Florida would be more accessible to most of the parties and witnesses. While two additional defendants were added to the amended complaint, the judge was not convinced that these two defendants, located in California, were significant enough to keep the case in the state.

The case was brought by Buddy “Blaze” Webster claiming that he wasn’t paid for the modifications he made to a Dean-branded guitar that ultimately became synonymous with “Dimebag” Darrell.

Estate of Barré et al. v. Carter et al., No. 2:17-cv-01057 (U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana July 26, 2017)

A Louisiana federal judge refused to dismiss a copyright lawsuit against Beyoncé claiming she illegally sampled YouTube clips in her music video for “Formation.” The judge determined that Beyoncé’s use of the deceased YouTube star, Anthony Barré’s audio, would likely fail the four-factor fair use test. The Judge stated that Beyoncé’s use of Barré’s work was “highly commercial” and copied “the heart” of the original work, both weighing against a finding of fair use. Barré’s estate had presented “sufficient facts at this stage of litigation to show that the four-factor fair use test could ultimately weigh against a finding of fair use.”

The Court dismissed a copyright suit against the Beatles' Apple Corp. company, determining that Sid Bernstein Presents LLC – the company that currently owns intellectual property rights of a promoter who is credited with bringing The Beatles to the U.S. – did not have rights over footage from the band’s 1965 concert at Shea Stadium. The complaint alleged that Sid Bernstein Presents LLC retained copyrights to the footage and that The Beatles Company had infringed their copyright by allowing it to be used in Ron Howard’s “Eight Days a Week.” After reading through the contracts, the Judge determined that the language makes an admission that Sid Bernstein was not involved in the filming of the concert and was not the “author” of the footage for the purposes of copyright law.

Jones v. MJJ Productions Inc. et al., No. BC525803 (Superior Court of the State of Cal. For the Cty. Of L.A.)

Michael Jackson’s production company was ordered to pay producer Quincy Jones more than $9.4 million in royalty damages for his work on “Thriller,” “Bad,” and “Off the Wall.” The jury determined that Jones was shorted after Jackson’s estate had breached contracts but declined to award Jones the full $30 million sought

The parties resolved their litigation involving Paul McCartney's termination notices by entering into a confidential settlement agreement and jointly requested that the Court enter a proposed order dismissing the action without prejudice.

BBC Films is a British Corporation responsible for providing broadcast television, radio news and entertainment content in the United Kingdom. Hit Bound Music Ltd., a Canadian music publisher, sued BBC, among others, alleging that the company infringed on three of Hit Bound’s copyrights for the soundtrack in the film “My Old Lady.”

The court ultimately dismissed the claims against BBC Films for lack of personal jurisdiction, determining that the company’s principal place of business is in the United Kingdom. Hit Bound argued that BBC should be subject to general jurisdiction because one of their subsidiaries maintains an office in Los Angeles. The court held that BBC Films had no business operations or property in California and the company is not incorporated in California so it is not subject to general jurisdiction and the parent-subsidiary relationship is insufficient to establish personal jurisdiction after the Supreme Court’s decision in Daimler AG v. Bauman.

In re: The Estate of Prince Rogers Nelson, Deceased, No. 10-PR-16 in the Carver County District Court June 2017.

A Minnesota judge voided a portion of Universal Music Group’s $31 million deal with Prince’s estate, ordering the estate to refund Universal Music Group’s advanced payment.

After determining that the exclusive licensing agreement made back in January included rights that were already guaranteed to Warner Bros. through previous agreements, Prince’s estate asked the court to rescind the agreement so they could ensure no overlapping occurred. The court determined that rescinding the agreement was in everyone’s best interest as opposed to long and expensive litigation.

California District Judge, Dale Fischer granted partial summary judgment in favor of “The SteveHarvey Show” , in regard to all copyrights except those filed prior to We 3 Kings Inc.’sfirst amended complaint. In 2014, We 3 Kings Inc., brought suit against the Steve Harvey Show, its production company, and 27 satellite broadcasting and cable companies for using its music for its second season after their license for the first season had expired. We 3 Kings Inc. is seeking $700 for each time the music was used in the show’s second season, multiplied by each of the television stations that distributed it. The damages amount to $42.3 million.

Judge Fischer stated that a copyright suit cannot be maintained if a copyright application had not been submitted to the Copyright Office prior to the filing of the complaint. Only one of the copyrights at issue were submitted prior to the filing of the first amended complaint.

The Steve Harvey Show argued that the company had an express license from We 3 Kings, Inc.for season one of the show, and an implied license for any episodes thereafter. We 3 Kings, Inc.refuted The Steve Harvey Show’s argument, stating that the contract was approved by We 3Kings Inc.’s ousted president and is unenforceable. Judge Fischer stated that there are stillsignificant questions of material fact remaining in regards to both parties’ arguments. However,Judge Fischer did agree with The Steve Harvey Show’s argument that the broadcastingcompanies are protected from copyright liability by a statute that grants them a blanket license to air the episodes at issue because they had no input in the content of the work.

The legal entities and estates for founding late Lynyrd Skynyrd band members are seeking a permanent injunction blocking the production of a film about a plane crash that killed some of the band’s original members.

Following the plane crash, members of Lynyrd Skynyrd went on a 10-year hiatus, which ended once the surviving members reunited for a tribute tour. Judith Van Zant Jenness, widow of Van Zent, brought suit amid the reunion tour, which ended in a consent order laying out the details of all future Lynyrd Skynyrd events and their post-breakup image.

U.S. District Judge Robert Sweet ordered that the legal entities for the late band members must produce any available tour lists and information regarding Lynyrd Skynyrd shows that followed the 1988 agreement. The film company is arguing that the band has been violating the agreement for years. Judge Sweet ordered the information to determine whether ex-drummer Artimus Pyle and Cleopatra Films are in compliance with the agreement.

The plaintiffs are currently in the process of developing their own film about the band.

The United States Supreme Court ruled that the disparagement clause of the Lanham Act was unconstitutional under the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment. The disparagement clause of the Lanham Act, Section 2(a), prohibited the registration of trademarks that my, “disparage ... or bring ... into contemp[t] or disrepute” any “persons, living or dead.” 15 U.S.C. §1051(a).

An Asian-American rock band, “The Slants,” were refused registration of their band name based on a 2(a) rejection that “the slants” is a derogatory term for Asians. The Supreme Court held that the disparagement clause was not narrowly drawn enough to prevent trademarks that support discrimination. The court stated that the clause, “reaches any trademark that disparages any person, group, or institution. It applies to trademarks like the following: ‘Down with racists,’ ‘Down with sexists,’ ‘Down with homophobes.’ It is not an anti-discrimination clause; it is a happy-talk clause. In this way, it goes much further than is necessary to serve the interest asserted.”