On remand from the Supreme Court for consideration as on leave
granted, defendant appeals from an order issued by the circuit
court affirming a judgment against defendant’s appeal bond issued
by the district court. We affirm.

I

In 1988, plaintiffs and defendant entered into a land contract
by which defendant purchased some undeveloped land in Kentwood
for $800,000. After several defaults and defendant’s failure
to make a balloon payment pursuant to the land contract, plaintiffs
filed suit in district court seeking a land contract forfeiture
under the summary proceedings act. In October 1992, the district
court entered a judgment of forfeiture against defendant, who
then claimed an appeal. In order to stay the execution of the
district court judgment, defendant moved for a stay of execution
and posted an appeal bond.

After a series of hearings, and based on the uncontroverted evidence
as to the amount of damages, the district court ordered defendant
to post $50,000 in either cash, or a corporate surety bond, with
the court by March 1993. The district court provided in a subsequent
order that the appeal bond would only be effective during the
pendency of defendant’s appeal to the circuit court.

In April 1993, the circuit court issued its opinion affirming
the district court’s judgment in the underlying matter. Plaintiffs
then moved under MCR 3.604(I) for a judgment against defendant’s
appeal bond to satisfy their damages attributable to defendant’s
appeal. After a hearing on the issue, the district court determined
that plaintiffs were entitled to a $50,000 judgment against defendant’s
appeal bond.

In June 1993, defendant filed an appeal from this order with
the circuit court. The circuit court affirmed the district court’s
judgment, and this appeal followed.

II

Defendant first argues on appeal that because the judgment against
the bond was for more than $10,000, the district court lacked
subject matter jurisdiction to enter it. We find that the district
court had subject matter jurisdiction to enter such a judgment
under the circumstances of the case at hand.

A

Subject-matter jurisdiction is a question of law that this Court
reviews de novo. W A Foote Memorial Hospital v Dep’t of Public
Health, 210 Mich App 516, 522; 534 NW2d 208 (1995). In Michigan,
district courts have subject-matter jurisdiction over all civil
matters when the amount in controversy does not exceed $10,000.
MCL 600.8301(1); MSA 27A.8301(1). In addition, district courts
also have equitable jurisdiction over cases, such as this one,
arising under Chapter 57 of the Revised Judicature Act, regardless
of the amount in question. MCL 600.8302(3); MSA 27A.8302(3).
Thus, there appears to be a conflict between the two jurisdictional
statutes regarding whether district courts have the jurisdiction
to issue a judgment in excess of $10,000 when the case arises
under Chapter 57 of the RJA.

Michigan law is clear that a more specific grant of jurisdictional
power is supreme over a general grant of jurisdictional power.Driver v Hanley, 207 Mich App 13, 17; 523 NW2d 815 (1994).
This Court has found that § 8301(1) is a general grant of
jurisdictional power, and as such, it must give way to a more
specific statute. Driver, supra. We find § 8302(3)
to be specific because it grants the district court jurisdiction
over a specific subject matter, namely actions arising under Chapter
57 of the RJA. Because § 8302(3) is specific, it takes precedence
over § 8301(1). Driver, supra at 17-18.

B

Plaintiffs’ underlying action for the forfeiture of a land contract
arose pursuant to the provisions of Chapter 57 of the RJA. See
MCL 600.5726; MSA 27A.5726. Because the district court’s action
flowed from its powers arising under Chapter 57 of the RJA, its
actions are within the scope of § 8302(3), and § 8301(1)
is inapplicable. Therefore, the district court had jurisdiction
to issue the judgment in question, and defendant’s argument fails.

III

Next, defendant argues that even if the district court had subject
matter jurisdiction to issue the judgment in question, the district
court did not have the authority to issue the judgment against
his appeal bond absent a jury trial. We agree with the circuit
court that MCR 3.604 affords the district court the discretion
to issue the type of judgment in question.

A

Construction of a court rule is a question of law that this Court
reviews de novo for error. St George Greek Orthodox Church
v Laupmanis Ass’n, PC, 204 Mich App 278, 282; 514 NW2d
516 (1994). Court rules are construed in the same manner as statutes.Id. If the language of the court rule is clear, this
Court should apply it as written. Skene v Fileccia, 213
Mich App 1, 4; 539 NW2d 531 (1995).

B

The court rule in question provides:

In an action in which a bond or other security has been posted,
judgment may be entered directly against the surety or the security
on motion without the necessity of an independent action on a
showing that the condition has occurred giving rise to the liability
on the bond or to the forfeiture of the security. [MCR 3.604(I).]

We find the language of the court rule to be clear. It provides
that, without the necessity of a separate action, a judgment may
be entered against a bond or security if the moving party demonstrates
that the conditions of the bond or security have been triggered.

C

Defendant’s bond stated that he would "pay any damages from
the time of forcible entry, the detainer, the notice to quit,
or demand for possession." This promise is conditioned on
defendant’s failure to prevail on appeal to the circuit court.
MCR 4.201(N)(4)(b). In addition, a subsequent bond order provided
that the bond would only remain in effect until such time that
the circuit court made a decision on defendant’s appeal in the
underlying action. The circuit court’s affirmance of the district
court’s judgment in the underlying proceeding triggered both these
conditions.

In accordance with MCR 3.604(I), plaintiffs then moved for a
judgment against the bond. At the hearing on plaintiffs’ motion,
the district court reaffirmed its previous findings with regard
to plaintiffs’ damages, and ordered a judgment against the bond.
Because this procedure fulfilled the requirements of MCR 3.604(I),
we conclude that the district court did not err in issuing the
judgment against defendant’s bond.

D

We also conclude that the district court did not err in the costs
it assessed against the bond. MCR 3.604(I)(1) provides that the
judgment may be had against the surety for the liability stated
in the bond. As noted, the bond here provided that defendant
would be liable for "any damages from the time of forcible
entry, the detainer, the notice to quit, or demand for possession."

The judgment against the bond included taxes owed on the property
as well as fair rental value as of the date of its initial judgment.
We find these amounts to be well within the liability as stated
in the bond.

IV

Accordingly, we conclude that the circuit court committed no
error when it affirmed the district court’s judgment against defendant’s
appeal bond.