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Abstract

This honors thesis focuses on the “etiological challenge” in epistemology. Roughly, that
challenge says: “A person cannot justifiably hold ideological beliefs given the contingency of these
beliefs on irrelevant or biasing influences.” This is an abstract generalization of the very intuitive
challenge against ideological beliefs: “you only believe that p (where p is some proposition about
religion, politics, philosophy) because you were educated or raised to believe it.” I examine and raise
several epistemic principles that could underwrite the challenge, and I conclude that at least one such
principle does support the challenge. This principle appeals to problems with our beliefs that directly
result from issues raised by the etiological challenge, so the challenge doesn’t simply reduce to more
general epistemic worries. Briefly, the most promising principle to underwrite the challenge is that all
ideological beliefs are produced by a unique belief forming mechanism, which is unreliable. Since
reliability of the belief forming mechanism is a necessary condition for holding justified beliefs, it
emerges that we do not justifiably hold ideological beliefs. I further conclude that there’s no good reason
to think that any subclass of ideological beliefs deserves special exemption from the challenge. So, if the
epistemic principle succeeds, the etiological challenge demonstrates that no one ever justifiably holds
ideological beliefs. Despite this bleak conclusion for epistemic justification, I explain why ideological
dogmatism is rational, and perhaps even becomes more attractive once we come to realize that no one
justifiably holds ideological beliefs to begin with. The upshot of the etiological challenge is faith, not
skepticism, although it does generate some surprising results.