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Friday, January 13, 2012

THE ARAB SPRING, IRAN AND TURKEY: A NEW POLITICAL LANDSCAPE

While the nation is focused on the
Republican presidential nomination process and enters the 2012
election year, the world continues to turn and important events and
changes will impose a steep learning curve on whoever the next
president, including the incumbent, turns out to be. The new “Dear
Leader” in North Korea still remains a virtual unknown, Russia's
Vladimir Putin's new presidential ambitions are starting to show some
cracks, and tensions between the civilian government and the military
establishment in Pakistan could adversely effect the continuing war
in Afghanistan.

However, it is in the Middle East where
the “Arab Spring” revolutions have precipitated fundamental
changes that are still in an evolutionary process, that the future is
most unclear and the stakes the highest. In Tunisia, Egypt, Libya,
Yemen and in all probability, Syria, the downfall of authoritarian
regimes has, or will soon, produce representative institutions and
elected leaders. The process will be difficult and is unlikely to
produce Western style liberal democracies. Tribal loyalties,
religious identification and intolerance, the continued presence of
privileged militaries, and the absence of any cultural experience
with fundamental democratic concepts such as the role of the “loyal
opposition”, an independent judiciary and the rule of law,
protection of minorities, a free press, equality for women, and the
creation of viable broad based political parties, will all present
substantial challenges to transitional leaders. Thus the prospects
for stable governance in these nations in the near future is
problematic. The implications for regional stability and foreign
relations among both regional states, and the major outside nations
with important interests in the area are profound.

Three issues are currently of most
concern and are likely to be affected by the uncertainty of the
domestic political outcomes in the newly evolving goveRnments. These
are the security of Israel which the U.S. has pledged to protect, and
the stalemated Palestinian statehood issue; the on-going Iranian
nuclear weapons program; and the stability dependent access to a
significant portion of the world's oil supplies.

Prior to the “Arab Spring”, the
Israeli-Palestinian problem was going nowhere but despite sporadic
terrorism attacks, Israel was secure from large scale conflicts with
Arab states because of peace treaties with Egypt and Jordan. The
looming security threat to Israel has become the nuclear weapons
program and the related regional dominance ambitions of Iran. Syria,
which shares a border with Israel has remained an intransigent foe
and Iranian ally but by itself represented no direct threat. However,
Iran has been determined to continue it's nuclear program in spite of
a long term, slowly escalating process of economic sanctions led by
the United States and Western Europe. The former authoritarian
regimes in the region actually provided some stability as dictators
pursued policies of self interest, which in the all important case of
the then dominant power, Egypt, was supported by good relations with
the U.S. and and an average over the last decade of $1.8 billion in
annual aid, mostly military, under the terms of the 1979 Camp David
Accords and subsequent peace treaty.

Now everything has changed. The new
government in Egypt is going to be dominated by the two Islamist
parties, the Freedom and Justice Party of the Muslim Brotherhood and
the Salifi Nour Party representing the fundamentalist Salafi sect.
In early public opinion polls, a majority of Egyptians were in favor
of abrogating the peace treaty with Israel. A political struggle
with the Egyptian military which is already underway, will no doubt
continue as these parties are charged with drawing up a new
constitution which will delineate the respective powers of the
legislature, the military and the new president whose election is
coming up. The constitution will also determine the extent that
Islamic sharia law is part of the legal and cultural reality for
Egyptian citizens. It is worthy of note that the more secular,
liberal parties who played a significant role in the Tahir Square
uprisings will be left out of this process by virtue of their poor
showing in the legislative election. The settling of these issues
will be a long term process and impose a significant level of
uncertainty onto both domestic and regional politics.

Thus a regional power vacuum of sorts
has developed with the new government in Iraq facing a difficult and
violent sectarian divide, Iran finding itself under international
pressure and increasing isolation, Syria in the throes of its own
domestic uprising, Libya descending into tribal conflict, Yemen on
the verge of its own internal struggle for political control, and
Egypt distracted from regional affairs by its domestic divisions and
power struggles.

There is much evidence that Turkey,
under the guidance of its popular president Recep Tayyip Erdogan will
attempt to step into the regional leadership void. Turkey in
relative terms, is well positioned to seek such a leadership role.
Although smaller than both Egypt and Iran geographically, its
population is roughly the same as both (78-81 million) and the
Turkish economy (GDP) is over three times the size of Egypt's which
is currently struggling in the aftermath of the revolution. Turkey's
economy is also more than one and a half the size of Iran's oil based
economy and experiencing remarkable growth in the 8.5-9% range.

Such an initiative however contains
several contradictions with respect to the interests of the West as
well as the regional states. On the positive side, Turkey has long
been regarded as a “Eurasian state” with borders on several
southeastern European nations as well Syria, Iran, and Iraq. Thus,
although it is an Islamic nation, it has a constitutional mandate
that requires a secular government and an identity that does not fall
completely into either the Middle East or Western categories. From
the Western point of view, Turkey's membership in NATO and its
expressed desire to join the European Union also draw a clear
distinction with the more tribal and/or Islamic fundamentalist states
in the region.

However, Turkey under Erdogan's Justice
and Development Party (AKP) has adopted a more Islamic character
while at the same time cracking down on political dissent, notably
arresting numerous members of the press and recently, the former
Chief of Staff of the military. This trend is part of an effort to
achieve more credibility among the Islamic states in terms of foreign
policy. The Erdogan government also supported the attempt by a
Turkish ship with pro-Palestinian activists on board to break the
Israeli blockade of Gaza. This attempt resulted in a battle between
the activists and Israeli commandos who boarded the vessel and led to
several deaths among the activists. Turkey demanded an apology from
the Netanyahu government in Israel which was rejected and which has
resulted in a break of diplomatic relations between the two nations.

On the new issue of the anti-government
uprising in Syria, Turkey has changed its position of backing the
Assad regime and now supports the Arab League's demand for observers
in Syria and an end of the government's harsh repressive measures
against the protestors. This change of position is no doubt part of
an assessment that the Assad regime will eventually fall, and also
part of the effort to identify with the pro-democracy dynamic of the
region while at the same time supporting the positions of the
remaining autocratic regimes in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states who
are members of the Arab League.

Perhaps the most difficult relationship
for a regional leadership seeking Turkey will be the one with Iran.
Turkey and Iran have a long history of cooperation, especially in
trade. And until recently Turkey appeared to distance itself from
the West in this respect. In the early stages of Iran's nuclear
development efforts, while the U.S. and Europe started an escalating
policy of economic sanctions over Iran's refusal to allow UN (IAEA)
inspection of it's nuclear facilities, Turkey sided with Iran. As
tensions grew, Turkey and Brazil negotiated a nuclear fuel swap
program with Iran intended to keep high grade fissionable material
out of Iran's control but provide them with the type of fuel
necessary for electrical production. When this deal fell through,
the West pushed enhanced economic sanctions.

Turkey is now essentially a competitor
with Iran for regional influence. By turning against the Assad
regime in Syria, which is Iran's main Arab ally and a conduit for
Iranian arms shipments to its client, the anti-Israeli Hezbollah
militia in Lebanon, Erdogan has taken an important step in changing
the perception by the U.S. and European governments that he had
focused his foreign policy away from the West and towards the Islamic
nations of the Middle East. He has further alienated Iran by
agreeing to the construction in Turkey of early-warning systems which
are intended to defend Europe from Iranian medium range missiles.
Iran claims that these sites are intended to warn Israel of a
retaliatory strike should Israel bomb Iran's nuclear facilities and
has threatened to attack them if Israel launches such an attack.

Thus, Turkey is engaged in a delicate
balancing act in its pursuit of a more aggressive leadership position
in the Middle East. To do this it seeks to reemphasize its Islamic
identity while protecting its secular image with the West and its
institutional ties with NATO and the European Union. The result has
been a calculation based on strategic and economic reasoning to tilt
away from its rival for influence, Iran, which is experiencing
virtual political and economic isolation, and fill the political void
left by the changes in “Arab Spring” governments. Turkey may well
become one of the most important players on the Middle East stage
with which the U.S. should seek to develop a closer diplomatic and
strategic relationship.