Chapter IVBreaking the Blockade of China

Of the three moves by NCAC, only one was aimed toward China. The
drives down the Railway Corridor and toward the Shweli would keep the
Japanese away from the trace of the projected line of communications, but
only the easternmost drive--down the Myitkyina-Bhamo road--could clear
the way for vehicles and gasoline to enter China on the ground. As the
Chinese New First Army (30th and 38th Divisions) completed preparations
for the 15 October 1944 offensive, a reconnaissance east from Myitkyina toward
China revealed that the Japanese grip had already been pried from the
northeast corner of Burma. (See Map 6)

Maj. Benjamin F. Thrailkill, who as a lieutenant colonel later commanded
the 2d Battalion of the 475th at Tonkwa, left Myitkyina on 27 August with
a company of Chinese and a platoon of U.S. infantry, plus engineers, signal,
medical, and OSS personnel, with orders to establish contact with the Chinese
from Yunnan. Moving east via Fort Harrison (Sadon), Thrailkill and
his force met the Yunnan Chinese on 6 September in the Kambaiti Pass
(Kauliang Hkyet). Eight days later Thrailkill and his men were back at
Myitkyina.

The Thrailkill expedition, as it came to be called, established that the
trail to China was passable, with numerous dropping ground and camp sites.
The local inhabitants were thought to be friendly toward the Americans, but
not to the Chinese. No Japanese were met.1

NCAC Drives Toward China

The initial NCAC orders to General Sun Li-jen's New First Army called
for it "to advance rapidly on Bhamo, destroy or contain enemy forces there;
seize and secure the Bhamo-Mansi area, and be prepared to continue the advance."2
The key point was Bhamo, the second largest town in north
Burma and the end of navigation on the Irrawaddy. Before the war the

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town had been a thriving river port; the great 400-foot river steamers had
brought cargoes and passengers from Rangoon to Bhamo for the short overland
trip to China. When in May 1944 the Chinese and Americans had
struck Myitkyina that town had had only the defensive capabilities inherent
in any inhabited locality. Nevertheless it had held out till August. Now,
in the fall of 1944, the Chinese in north Burma faced a town that not only
possessed natural defenses but had been strongly fortified in addition.
Bhamo's military importance lay in that it dominated the ten-mile gap between
the Irrawaddy River and the plateau that is the eastern side of the
Irrawaddy valley. Through that space the Ledo Road would have to be
built.

A force moving from Myitkyina to Bhamo in October 1944 would find
a good prewar road connecting the two towns. The road did not parallel
the Irrawaddy closely, but had been placed on higher ground to the east, in
the foothills, to lift it above the monsoon floods. The wooded hills and the
tributaries of the Irrawaddy that cut across the road offered obvious opportunities
to a defending force. Of these tributaries the Taping is the most
considerable.

Entering the Irrawaddy just above Bhamo, the Taping is a large river in
its own right. Its sources extend so far into the plateau that marks the Sino-Burmese border that one of its own tributaries flows past the city of Tengchung
where there had been some of the heaviest fighting of late summer
1944 between Chinese troops seeking to break into Burma from that side and
the Japanese 56th Division trying to keep a block on the Burma Road.

Japanese documents dated early September 1944 and captured a few weeks
later showed that the Japanese planned to delay around Bhamo in three
stages. In the first, the Japanese outpost line would be defended from Sinbo
on the Irrawaddy to Na-long on the Myitkyina-Bhamo road, about halfway
down to Bhamo, and thence to the upper reaches of the Taping River. The
second Japanese line was the Taping River, whose crossings were to be fortified.
The third stage was Bhamo itself.

These lines were manned by the 2d Battalion, 16th Regiment, and the
Reconnaissance Regiment of the 2d Division. The division was ordered to hold
the outpost line until 20 September, the line of the Taping to mid-November,
and Bhamo itself to late December.3
These time limits seem not to
have been known to the individual Japanese, who were exhorted:

As it was with the heroes of Myitkyina, so it must be with the Bhamo garrison. . . .
Do not expect additional aid. . . . Each man will endeavor to defend his post to the

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utmost--to the death . . . If, for the success in the large sense, units in dire straits are
overlooked in the interests of larger units do not expect to be relieved, but be cognizant
of the sacrifice you as an entity will make to insure the success of the whole.4

The 38th Division led the advance of the New First Army and was
charged with taking Bhamo. Possibly because D Day was 15 October, more
than three weeks after the date to which the Japanese had planned to defend
their outpost line, the Sinbo-Na-long line was crossed without incident.
With the 113th Regiment in the lead the Chinese moved right down the
road to Bhamo without a significant contact until 28 October when Japanese
patrols were met two miles north of the Taping River, the next Japanese defense
line. These were brushed aside, and the 113th was on the river bank,
occupying Myothit.

Here was the Japanese outpost line of resistance; the Chinese patrols
speedily found that the Japanese meant to defend it. Strong Japanese positions
were seen on the south bank, and the commander of the 38th Division,
General Li Huang, saw that he would have to force a defended river line
unless he could turn the Japanese position. General Li decided to use the
112th and 114th Regiments, which had been the main body of the 38th, as
an enveloping force. Since they were some seven miles to the north the
112th and 114th were out of contact with the Japanese and well placed to
make a wide swing to the east. The two regiments began their march
through the hills, while the 113th made a show of activity around Myothit
to keep the Japanese attention focused there.

Once again envelopment proved its worth. The Japanese were too few
to defend a long line, and the enveloping force was able to cross the Taping
at an unguarded bridge upstream, go around the right end of the Japanese
outpost line of resistance, and emerge on the Bhamo plain on 10 November.
Pressing on west toward Bhamo, the enveloping force met a strong entrenched
Japanese force at Momauk, which is eight miles east of Bhamo and
is the point at which the Myitkyina-Bhamo road swings to the west for the
last stretch into Bhamo. Here there was savage fighting between the 114th
Regiment and the Japanese defenders. Heavily outnumbered, the Japanese
outpost at Momauk was driven into the main defenses at Bhamo. The appearance
of its survivors, some without rifles, others without shoes, depressed
the Bhamo garrison.5

Meanwhile, the 113th Regiment at Myothit on the Taping River profited
by these diversions to force a crossing. Then, instead of coming down the
main road, the 113th went west along the Taping's south bank, where there

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GENERAL SULTAN AND GENERAL SUN LI-JEN, commanding the Chinese New First
Army, examine enemy equipment left behind at Momauk, Burma, by fleeing Japanese
troops.

was a fair road, and came at Bhamo from due north. The Japanese sought
to delay along the road and at one point, Subbawng, three miles north of
Bhamo, appeared ready to make a fight of it. Here the 113th's commander
elected to rely on the unexpected. Leaving a small force to contain the garrison
of Subbawng, he moved south directly across the face of the defenses,
at close proximity, and only ended his march when he was south and southeast
of Bhamo in the suburbs of U-ni-ya and Kuntha. As a result of these
several and rather intricate maneuvers--with the 114th Regiment attacking
west from Momauk, the 113th cutting between the Momauk outpost and the
Bhamo garrison, and the 112th bypassing the fighting completely to move
on down the Bhamo road toward Namhkam--a loose arc was drawn around
the Japanese outposts in the Bhamo suburbs, with the 113th holding the
south portion of the arc and the 114th the north.6

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Finally facing Bhamo, the Chinese saw a town that was deceptively pleasant
in appearance. Bhamo, lying between the Irrawaddy River to the west
and a ring of lagoons to the east, seemed like a city in a park. Unlike the
close huddle of buildings and shops that is the usual settlement in Asia,
Bhamo reflected the years of peace under British rule in Burma, for its homes
and warehouses were spread out among grassy and wooded spaces. The
Burmans, Shans, and Kachins who worked in Bhamo tended to cluster together
in suburban communities. Over all were the pagoda spires. But
each of these features, so attractive in peace, held a menace to the Chinese.
The almost complete ring of lagoons channeled the attack. The spaces between
buildings gave fields of fire to the defense. The pagodas were natural
observation posts. And the thick brick and concrete walls that had been
meant to give coolness now gave protection against Chinese shells and bullets.
The Japanese were known from aerial photography to have been fortifying
Bhamo; how well, the infantry would soon find out.7

Attack on Bhamo

The first Chinese attack on Bhamo itself was given the mission of driving
right into the city. Made on the south by the Chinese 113th Regiment, the
attack received heavy air support from the Tenth Air Force. It succeeded in
moving up to the main Japanese defenses in its sector, but no farther.
American liaison officers with the 113th reported that the regimental commander
was not accepting their advice to co-ordinate the different elements
of the Allied force under his command or supporting him into an artillery-infantry-air team, and that he was halting the several portions of his attack
as soon as the Japanese made their presence known.8

However, the 113th's commander might well have argued that he and his
men faced the most formidable Japanese position yet encountered in Burma.
Aerial photography, prisoner of war interrogation, and patrolling revealed
that the Japanese had been working on Bhamo since the spring of 1944.
They had divided the town into three self-contained fortress areas and a headquarters
area. Each fortress area was placed on higher ground that commanded
good fields of fire. Japanese automatic weapons well emplaced in
strong bunkers covered fields of sharpened bamboo stakes which in turn were
stiffened with barbed wire. Antitank ditches closed the gaps between the
lagoons that covered so much of the Japanese front. Within the Japanese
positions deep dugouts protected aid stations, headquarters, and communications

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centers. The hastily improvised defenses of Myitkyina were nothing
like this elaborate and scientific fortification. Manned by some 1,200 Japanese
under Col. Kozo Hara and provisioned to hold out until mid-January
1945, Bhamo was not something to be overrun by infantry assault.9

Meanwhile, north of Bhamo, where the Chinese had not moved closer
to the city than the containing detachment the 113th had left opposite the
Japanese outpost at Subbawng, the 114th was making more progress. That
regiment bypassed the Subbawng position on 21 November and moved two
miles west along the south bank of the Taping River into Shwekyina. Outflanked,
the Japanese quickly abandoned Subbawng and the rest of the 114th
came up to mop up the Shwekyina area, freeing advance elements of the
114th to move directly south through the outlying villages on Bhamo.

On 28 November the 114th was pressing on the main northern defenses
of Bhamo. In this period of 21-28 November the division commander, General
Li, did not alter the mission he had given the 113th of entering Bhamo,
but by his attention to the 114th he seemed to give tacit recognition to the
altered state of affairs.10

The Chinese lines around Bhamo were strengthened by putting the 3d
Battalion of the 112th into place on the southern side between the Irrawaddy
River and the road to Namhkam. This permitted a heavier concentration of
the 113th east of Bhamo, and that unit was given another chance at a major
attack. Such an effort would be supported by twelve 75-mm., eight 105-mm.,
and four 155-mm. howitzers and a company of 4.2-inch mortars.11
Supported
by air and medium artillery, the 113th on the east again showed itself willing
to move up to the Japanese defenses but no further. Moreover, it did not
appear able to take advantage of the artillery concentrations laid down for it.
At this point, an American division commander would have relieved the
113th's commander, but the Chinese response was to shift air and artillery
support to the 114th.

The 114th's aggressive commander had been most successful in the early
days of December. With less than half the air support given the 113th and
with no help from the 155-mm. howitzers, he had broken into the northern
defenses and held his gains. The decision to give the 114th first call on artillery
support posed a problem in human relations as well as tactics. This
was the first time the 38th Division had ever engaged in the attack of a fortified
town. All its experience had been in jungle war. Faced with this new
situation, the 113th Regiment's commander seemed to have been at a loss to
know what to do. The 114th, on the contrary, had gone ahead with conspicuous
success on its own, and now was being asked to attempt close co-ordination

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with artillery and air support. Its commander hesitated for a day,
then agreed to try an attack along the lines suggested by the Americans.12

The tactics developed by the 114th Regiment by 9 December took full
advantage of the capabilities of air and artillery support. Since the blast of
aerial bombardment had stripped the Japanese northern defenses of camouflage
and tree cover it was possible for aerial observers to adjust on individual
bunkers. So it became practice to attempt the occupation of one small area
at a time. First, there would be an artillery preparation. Two 155-mm.
howitzers firing from positions at right angles to the direction of attack
would attempt to neutralize bunkers in an area roughly 100 by 300 yards.
Thanks to the small margin of error in deflection, the Chinese infantry could
approach very close to await the lifting of fire. The 105's would lay down
smoke and high explosive on the flanks and rear of the selected enemy positions.
Aerial observers would adjust the 155's on individual positions.
When it was believed that all Japanese positions had been silenced the Chinese
infantry would assault across the last thirty-five yards with bayonet and
grenade.13

Meanwhile, the Japanese 33d Army sent a strong task force under a
Colonel Yamazaki to attack toward Bhamo in the hopes of creating a diversion
that would cover the breakout of the Bhamo garrison. Comprising
about 3,000 men with nine guns, the Yamazaki Detachment moved north from
Namhkam the evening of 5 December to move on Bhamo via Namyu.14
Operating south of Bhamo was the Chinese 30th Division, which had been
ordered to move on down the general line of the Bhamo road to take Namhkam.
Twenty-two miles south of Bhamo the leading regiment, the 90th,
encountered rough country, with hills up to 6,000 feet, and six miles farther
on the first Japanese patrols and outposts were encountered. The 2d Battalion,
on the far right, pulled up along a ridge about 1 December. The dominant
height in the area, Hill 5338, was the object for the next ten days of
operations that to American liaison officers appeared prolonged beyond all
reason. When it was finally occupied, the Japanese immediately began attacking
in strength, and the battalion soon showed itself as stubborn in defense
as it had been lethargic in attack.15
These Japanese attacks, regarded
as a reaction to the loss of Hill 5338, were actually the Yamazaki Detachment
making its arrival known.

To the left of the 2d Battalion, across the road, was the 1st Battalion,
with the mission of keeping contact between the 90th Regiment and the rest
of the division and of protecting a battery of the division artillery. In attempting

to execute this mission the battalion spread itself over a two-mile
front. On the night of 9 December the battalion received a heavy bombardment
followed by a Japanese attack which penetrated its lines and isolated its
1st and 2d Companies. This was bad enough, but worse followed the next
morning. Colonel Yamazaki massed three battalions in column to the east
of the road, and, attacking on a narrow front, broke clean through by leap-frogging
one battalion over another as soon as the attack lost momentum.
The third Japanese battalion overran the 2d Artillery Battery, 30th Division,
and captured four cannon and 100 animals. The battery commander died at
his post.16

The Chinese were not dismayed by the setback but fought with a spirit
novel to the Japanese. The 88th Regiment swung its forces toward the
Japanese penetration, which was on a narrow front, and since the terrain was

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hilly in the extreme the Japanese could see Chinese reinforcements converging
on the battle site. So vigorously did the Chinese counterattack that one
lone Chinese soldier fought his way almost into the trench that held Colonel
Yamazaki and the 33d Army liaison officer, Colonel Tsuji. Writing in
his diary, Tsuji remarked: "This was the first experience in my long military
life that a Chinese soldier charged Japanese forces all alone."17

The Chinese, comprising as they did three regiments of a good division,
could not be indefinitely withstood by the four Japanese battalions. Destroying
the four pack howitzers they had captured, the Japanese sought only to
hold their positions until the Bhamo garrison could escape.18

Meanwhile, within Bhamo, the Japanese garrison was making preparations
to break out. Its mission of delay was well-nigh accomplished, and a further
reason for its departure was provided by the increasing successes of the 114th
Regiment in the northern part of Bhamo. By 13 December this unit had
penetrated the northern defenses and was cutting its way into the central part
of Bhamo.19

At this point, Chinese techniques of war intervened to change what might
have been the inevitable end of the story, a heroic suicidal dash by the Bhamo
garrison on the machine guns of the besiegers, the so-called banzai charge that
had been the final episode for so many Japanese garrisons before. American
liaison officers with the Chinese formed the impression that a co-ordinated
attack by the Chinese had been planned and ordered for 15 December.20

On the night of the 14th the Japanese in the garrison tried to fire off all
their ammunition. Then they moved out into the river bed of the Irrawaddy
and charged the Chinese lines along the river at daybreak. Taking advantage
of the early morning mists, they moved through the Chinese lines to safety.
As soon as the garrison was clear, the Japanese word for "success" was broadcast
to the waiting Yamazaki Detachment, which promptly began to disengage.
The Japanese claim that 950 of the garrison's 1,200 men made their
way safely to Namhkam. American records support the claim of a successful
withdrawal. After the war, the Chinese chronicler, Dr. Ho Yung-chi,
former vice-commander of the 38th, stated that the Bhamo garrison was
allowed by General Sun Li-jen to escape, only to be annihilated later. However,
the agreement between the Japanese and American accounts, plus the
fact that the American liaison officers with the 38th Division were told

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nothing either of Sun's order to let the Japanese garrison through his lines
or of any later annihilation of 950 Japanese, suggests that there are some
flaws in the Chinese account.21

If to Western minds the reasoning which permitted the Japanese garrison
of Bhamo to live to fight another day was difficult to follow, a Western
observer had to admit that the performance of the Chinese 38th Division at
Bhamo compared most favorably with that of the combined Chinese and
American forces at Myitkyina six months before. That within thirty days
the Chinese 114th Regiment should have hacked a way through defenses
the Japanese had been six months preparing and have accomplished the feat
with artillery and air support that was slight in comparison with that at the
disposal of Allied forces elsewhere reflected the greatest credit on the unit
and its commander.

Last Days of the Burma Blockade

After the fall of Bhamo, the Chinese Army in India and the Chinese
Yunnan divisions, or Y-Force, were within fifty air miles of each other.
This narrow strip of rugged, highly defensible terrain was the last Japanese
block across the road to China. (Map 7)

The Chinese Army in India had before it a march of twenty miles south-southeast
over fairly level country; then it met the escarpment that was the
western edge of the great plateau through which the Shweli and Salween
Rivers had cut their valleys, the great plateau on which, far to the east, was
China's Yunnan Province, Kunming, and the Hump terminals. The road
the Chinese took was an extension of the Myitkyina-Bhamo road, one-way
and fair-weather but leading directly to the old Burma Road. All the road
needed was metaling and widening and it would be ready for heavy traffic
as the easternmost end of the Ledo Road. The road met the hills about
twenty miles south of Bhamo. Crossing a series of ridges it entered the
Shweli valley. It then swung northeast for about thirty miles and linked
with the old Burma Road at Mong Yu. East of the Shweli valley, over
fifteen miles of 5,000-foot hills, was the Burma Road.

Therefore, after the fall of Bhamo, the task facing the Allies in north
Burma was to clear the 33d Army with its approximately 19,500 Japanese
from the remaining fifty-mile stretch that lay between the two Chinese
armies.

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Map 7
Opening the Road to China

--124--

The positions the Japanese held in the Shweli valley from Namhkam to
Wanting could have been most formidable. Namhkam, for example, had
originally been fortified with the expectation that the whole of the 18th Division
would hold it. However, the 33d Army's mission was only to delay the
Chinese while the decisive battle was fought out around Mandalay; there was
no thought of fighting to a finish and the 33d organized itself for combat
accordingly. The Japanese positions in the vicinity of the valley covered the
Burma Road, the main avenue of approach to Mandalay from the northeast.
The bulk of the Japanese forces was deployed in the Wanting-Mong Yu
area facing the Y-Force. The strongly fortified Wanting was held by the
56th Division, and ten miles to the rear along the Burma Road at Mong Yu
was the 168th Infantry Regiment of the 49th Division, Colonel Yoshida.
Thirty miles to the southwest of Wanting the Yamazaki Detachment, 3,000
strong, manned the Namhkam defenses astride the route of advance of the
Chinese New First Army, thus protecting the left and the rear of the main
body of Japanese troops in the Wanting-Mong Yu area. The 4th Infantry
Regiment, 2d Division, Colonel Ichikari, located at Namhpakka on the Burma
Road near its intersection with the road leading to Namhkam, was in a good
position to be used as a tactical reserve along either of the roads. Thirty-third
Army had expected that the Ichikari and Yoshida regiments would be
transferred to the Mandalay area and the Japanese intended to keep them in
reserve, but the Chinese pressure forced their commitment.22

As of 17 December NCAC headquarters believed, and correctly, that in
the Tonkwa-Mongmit area, the center of the Japanese position in north
Burma, they faced a strong force of the 18th Division. At Namhkam, NCAC
estimated there were 2,500 Japanese, and from Namhpakka to the north edge
of the Shweli valley, 2,500 more. In the north end of the valley, around
Wanting, NCAC placed the 56th itself. A week later NCAC's G-2, Col.
Joseph W. Stilwell, Jr., estimated that only delaying action and minor
counterattacks were to be expected from the Japanese.23

When the Chinese 22d Division was recalled to China, in mid-December,
General Sultan changed his plans and regrouped his forces. His original
thought had been to send the 22d Division wide to the south and then east
to place it across the old Burma Road in the Namhpakka area. This would
cut off almost the whole of the 33d Army to the north and make inevitable
its withdrawal, which in turn would clear the way for the Ledo Road to be
linked with the Burma Road. In so planning, he was aware of the possibility
that some Chinese divisions might be recalled to China and arranged
his dispositions accordingly. He hoped that his forces might swing east like
a giant gate whose southernmost edge would hit Lashio, but if he lost some

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of his Chinese troops then he planned to compensate by shortening his gate
and making a shallower swing to the east. Across the Allied line from west
to east Sultan's new orders directed the following moves: (See Map 7.)

The British 36th Division would move east of the Irrawaddy, then
southeast via Mongmit to cut the old Burma Road in the Kyaukme-Hsipaw
area, well south of Lashio.

The 5332d Brigade (MARS Task Force) would make a most difficult
march across hill country to the Mong Wi area, then cut the Burma Road
near Hosi. Essentially, this was the mission once contemplated for the 22d
Division.

The Chinese 50th Division, which had been following the British
36th Division down the Railway Corridor, would move just to the east of
that unit, cross the Shweli River near Molo, and then move southeast to take
Lashio. It thus moved into the area formerly occupied by elements of MARS
Task Force.

The Chinese New First Army would occupy the upper Shweli valley
from Namhkam to Wanting and reopen the road to China.24

The earliest action in the drive south from Bhamo to link up with the
Y-Force and clear the road fell to the Chinese 30th Division. While the
38th had been besieging Bhamo, the 30th had been sent past it; the 30th was
the division that had fought the Yamazaki Detachment at Namyu when the
latter sought to relieve Bhamo. General Sun Li-jen, army commander, now
ordered the 90th Regiment, 30th Division, to move straight down the road
toward Namhkam. The 88th and 89th Regiments were sent on a shallow
envelopment south of the road, to come up on Namhkam from that direction.
The 38th Division was used for wide envelopments to either side of
the 30th Division, and one of its regiments was kept in army reserve.25

After the heavy fighting of mid-December, the 30th Division did not find
the Japanese to its front intent on anything more than light delaying action.
The stage was set for a swift advance into the Shweli valley, but the commander
of the 90th Regiment was not so inclined and, as he had the center
of the Chinese line, the flanks delayed accordingly. His repeated failures to
advance, and his practice of abandoning supplies and then requesting more
by airdrop, were regarded by the American liaison officers as having wasted
two weeks after the action at Namyu; his relief was arranged in early January.
The new regimental commander, Colonel Wang, was energetic and a
sound tactician; the regiment's performance improved at once.26

The 90th Regiment now moved with more speed, and soon reached the

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hill dominating the southwestern entrance to Shweli valley. The term valley
as applied here refers to a stretch of flat ground about 25 miles long and
from 4 to 6 miles wide carved from the mountains by the Shweli River and
its tributaries between Mu-se and Namhkam. The floor of the valley, 2,400
feet above sea level, is dotted with villages. The existing road, whose trace
the engineers planned to follow, closely hugged the hills forming the southeastern
edge of the valley. Namhkam was built along the road near the
southwestern end of the valley and its immediate approaches were dominated
by a hill mass abutting the Bhamo road between the river and its small
tributary to the north.

Facing this terrain, the Chinese chose to circle around the southwestern
end of the valley with the 90th Regiment, while the 112th Regiment was
ordered to move directly across the valley on Namhkam. Units of the regiment
began crossing the Shweli on 5 January 1945; the whole regiment was
across in fifty hours. The regiment now came swinging around the southeast
corner of the valley and up the eastern side of Namhkam. Meanwhile,
the 88th Regiment had entered the valley along the road and cut across the
little plain directly toward Namhkam.

Namhkam itself was occupied on 16 January by the 2d Battalion of the
90th. Only a few shots marked the change in ownership, and two Japanese
were killed. Inspecting the settlement, the Chinese realized that the Japanese
had not planned to stand there. So there was no dramatic battle. The significance
lay in that the Japanese had been pushed away from the lower end
of the Shweli valley. Once the valley was in Allied hands, the road to China
was open, and on 15 January the Japanese 33d Army, which attached little
significance now to blockading China, was slowly pulling back off the trace
of the road to China.27

Since the 38th Division had been engaged at Bhamo while the 30th
Division had bypassed the fighting there and gone on toward the Shweli
valley, its regiments were behind the 30th and, in effect, had to follow it in
column before they could swing wide to envelop the Shweli valley. The
112th Regiment had been pulled out of the lines at Bhamo just before the
city fell and sent toward the Shweli valley along trails running through the
hills north of the Bhamo road. There was little contact with the Japanese,
and as the 112th moved along it stopped on Chinese soil, so close is the
Bhamo area to China. This made the 38th the first Chinese unit to fight its
way back to Chinese soil. Moving steadily on, the regiment was in the
Loiwing area on 6 January 1945. In 1941 Loiwing had been the site of the
Central Aircraft Manufacturing Company plant. In 1942 Chennault and the
American Volunteer Group had operated from the Loiwing field for several

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BURMESE IDOL IN NAMHKAM. American and Chinese soldiers are from the Northern
Combat Area Command.

months. Now, it was back in Allied hands. Patrolling from the Loiwing
area across the Shweli to Namhkam, the 112th concluded that the road to
Namhkam was open. It requested permission to take the town, but was
held back until the 30th Division occupied it.28

The 114th Regiment, which had so distinguished itself at Bhamo, was
given the mission of swinging wide around the southern end of the Shweli
valley. Because of the casualties the 114th had taken at Bhamo it had to be
reinforced with the 1st Battalion of the 113th. The mission it received was
to be a severe test of its marching powers, for on reaching the south end of
the Shweli valley it was to ford the Shweli, move south and east through
the hills on the right flank of the 89th Regiment as the latter moved on
Namhkam, then continue its march to cut the Namhkam-Namhpakka trail
about midway. At the mid-point, the village of Loi-lawn, it would be about

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TWO SOLDIERS. An American-trained and -equipped soldier of the Chinese Army in
India (left), compares lots with a Chinese Expeditionary Force soldier at Mu-se, Burma.

seven miles from the old Burma Road, which was the line of communications
to the Japanese 56th Division in the Wanting area. Crossing the
Shweli on 10 January, it reached Ta-kawn on the 16th. Making this the
regimental base with a garrison and air supply facilities, Col. Peng Ko-li sent
two battalions off to cut the Namhkam-Namhpakka trail. The Japanese
resisted stubbornly, and not until the 19th were the Chinese across the trail.29

With the southern end of the Shweli valley firmly in Chinese hands by
17 January, General Sun issued his next orders, which called for the 112th
and 113th Regiments to move up the Shweli valley toward Wanting and
secure the trace of the Ledo Road. At this point the conceptions of the
battle held by NCAC and 33d Army were very much at odds. NCAC saw
its men as fighting their way up the valley in a northeasterly direction. The

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Japanese saw themselves as falling slowly back from the Shweli under pressure
from the northwest. Actually, the only pressure from the northwest was
that of the 30th Division and the MARS Task Force, which after rounding
the Namhkam corner were moving southward toward the Burma Road. In
the northern two thirds of the Shweli valley, the 38th Division's flank guards,
as they drove northeast, were brushing across the Japanese rear guards,
which were falling back to the southeast and attempting to cover the Burma
Road, their line of communications and avenue of retreat.

Such being the case, the 38th not surprisingly met little resistance as it
drove up the Shweli valley. The 56th Division was holding strongly only at
Wanting, where the road up the valley met the Burma Road, and not until
the 38th Division approached Wanting did Japanese resistance stiffen.

First contact with the Japanese came at Panghkam, a village near the
northern exit of the valley. The 113th stayed in the valley, and the 112th
was sent wide into the hills to the right of the road near Se-lan. Japanese
resistance was of the rear-guard variety; the 113th was only slowed, not
stopped. As it approached Mu-se, the exit of the valley, its leading
elements on 20 January joined with Chinese troops of the Yunnan divisions.30
These men had entered the Shweli valley by enveloping its northern
end, much as Sun Li-jen's troops had enveloped the southern, then driving
directly across to the southern side. The trace of the road was not yet open,
but the presence of the Yunnan troops meant formal opening was only a
matter of days.

The End of the Salween Campaign

While the Chinese Army in India had been moving on and then encircling
Bhamo, the battered divisions of General Wei Li-huang's Chinese
Expeditionary Force had been trying to recover from the blows inflicted on
them by the September Japanese counteroffensive, which the Chinese had
manfully stemmed.31
At the end of the battle, both sides were exhausted,
but the Chinese could claim the advantage. They had kept the Japanese from
reoccupying the terrain about Teng-chung and Ping-ka, which controlled
passes into Burma north and south of the Burma Road, and they had held
on to Sung Shan, from which Japanese artillery had once controlled the
ascent of the Burma Road from the Salween gorge. On the Burma Road
itself, the Chinese, with the survivors of seven divisions, were in a semicircle
to the east of Lung-ling.

As October began, American liaison officers with the Chinese saw traffic
movements and demolitions within the Japanese lines that convinced them,

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and correctly, that the Japanese were thinning their lines, that only rear-guard
action was contemplated.32

The Chinese of XI Group Army completed their preparations for the next
attack, and on 29 October it began. Thirty-seven P-40's from the Fourteenth
Air Force flew close support for the Chinese 200th Division, a veteran
of the 1942 campaign, which led the assault. South and west of Lung-ling,
elements of the Chinese 200th swung around to attack positions along the
Burma Road behind Lung-ling. Meanwhile, two divisions of the 71st Army
put heavy pressure on the Japanese garrison, with artillery support up to
1,700 rounds and 30-40 air sorties per day. Late on 3 November the last
Japanese left Lung-ling and at 2300 the Honorable 1st Division moved
through the gutted center of the town.33(Map 8)

A pause followed which thoroughly disturbed General Dorn, the chief
of the Y-Force Operations Staff advising General Wei. Dorn saw no reason
why the Chinese should not follow closely on the Japanese rear guards,
feared that the Chinese were delaying, and asked Wedemeyer to intervene
with the Generalissimo. Wedemeyer agreed, and pointed out to the Generalissimo
that it was important to finish the campaign and free the Y-Force
for service in China. On 9 November the Generalissimo agreed to give the
necessary orders.

In addition to advising on strategy and tactics and furnishing air support,
the American forces gave medical aid. From the opening of the campaign
in May 1944 to November they treated 9,428 Chinese, of whom only 492
died. Many wounded never reached an American hospital because of the
rough terrain, but even so this was the best medical aid Chinese forces in
China had yet enjoyed.

Receiving the Generalissimo's orders to advance, General Wei sent his
XI Group Army (53d, 2d, 71st, 6th Armies) against Mang-shih, the 56th
Division's former headquarters. One army moved through the hills on the
north side of the Burma Road, and two on the south, while the 71st came
down the road itself. Having strict orders to avoid any decisive battle, the
56th Division contended itself with demolitions, burning the rice harvest, and
delaying the Chinese with rear-guard actions. Casualties were light among
the Chinese as they advanced through Mang-shih on 20 November. At this
point the Chinese were about seventy miles away from Namhkam in the
Shweli valley. Mang-shih was a valuable prize because of its airstrip.
Speedily repaired, it permitted the C-46's of the 27th Troop Carrier Squadron
to land supplies, a much more economical and satisfactory means than air-dropping.34

--131--

Map 8
End of the Salween Campaign
3 November 1944-27 January 1945

--132--

Meanwhile, the Fourteenth Air Force continued to harass the
retreating Japanese, bombing all bridges and likely Japanese billets. The
Japanese were careful to stay clear of the Burma Road in daylight, but contacts
with their rear guards gave the P-40's opportunity to demonstrate close
air support.

By this time Wei had a solution to his tactical problems. One army
moved along each of the ridges that paralleled the road, and the rest of his
forces came straight down the road. If the Japanese, as at the divide between
Mang-shih and the next town twenty-four miles away, Che-fang, attempted a
delaying action with a small force, the wings of Wei's force simply outflanked
them and forced them back. If the Japanese, as seemed likely to be
the case at Wanting, attempted a stronger stand, then Wei was advancing in
a formation well adapted to rapid deployment and encirclement. Che-fang
fell on 1 December, and Wanting was the next target.

Lying as it does at the northeastern exit of the Shweli valley, on the
Burma Road, Wanting had to be taken. Moreover, pressure on Wanting
would make it difficult for the Japanese to transfer units from that front to
meet the NCAC troops at the southwestern end of the Shweli valley.

Not for another thirty days did the Chinese resume their offensive down
the Burma Road. Asked by Y-Force Operations Staff to send out strong
patrols at least, the Chinese were willing, but ordered their patrols to stay
out of Wanting. The Chinese unwillingness to advance down the Burma
Road and end the blockade of China as quickly as possible, at a time when
Wedemeyer was making every effort to bring aid to China, moved the latter
to make very strong representations to the Generalissimo. After describing
the situation around Wanting, Wedemeyer wrote:

It is a policy of the China Theater not to give aid to those who will not advance;
therefore, no air support has been given to these divisions nor to the others in that section
who, apparently having similar instructions, cannot advance. The Chief of Staff
[General Ho] has been promised renewed efforts when he puts into effect plans which
are now being developed to take Wanting. His earlier plans to send two regiments as
patrols into Wanting did not materialize.

I feel certain that if you will issue orders to these C.E.F. [Chinese Expeditionary
Force] forces to take Wanting, they have the ability to do so in a short time. I certainly
will provide all the air support possible which should greatly facilitate the capture of the
objective.35

Then, on 15 December, Bhamo was evacuated by the Japanese. General
Wei may have wanted to delay his attack until he could be sure that the
NCAC forces would not be delayed by another siege like that of Myitkyina.

--133--

Wei's divisions were now far understrength, since replacements had not been
supplied, and lacked 170,000 men of their prescribed strength.36

As part of his swing around China Theater, Wedemeyer visited Wei on
20 December. The American commander urged Wei to resume the offensive,
to link his forces with Sultan's because the east China situation demanded
everyone's aid. Apparently, Wei's circumstances were changing,
because in late December the Y-Force began its last battle.

The first Chinese attack was made by the 2d Army on the Japanese right
flank, in the area of Wanting. Initially, it went very well. The Chinese
9th Division on 3 January broke through to the village streets, finally reaching
the Japanese artillery positions. The Japanese rallied, and there was
bitter hand-to-hand fighting--"pistols, clubs, and bayonets"--according to
the Japanese account. That night the Japanese counterattacked successfully
and drove out the Chinese.

Wei then shifted his attack to the Japanese left flank, which lay along the
Shweli River. The Chinese succeeded in establishing a bridgehead but could
not hold it against Japanese counterattacks by two regiments, and the attempt
failed. A pause of a week or so followed.

The Japanese defense of Wanting had been successful, but while the 56th
Division had been fighting in that area, Sultan's NCAC forces in the
Namhkam area, including the MARS Task Force, had begun moving eastward
toward the Burma Road. If they succeeded in blocking the Burma
Road, the 56th Division's position obviously would be compromised. So the
problem the Japanese faced was to know how long they could afford to fight
at Wanting before the exit slammed shut. As noted above, the MARS Task
Force had been dispatched by Sultan to block the Burma Road, and by 17
January it was clashing with Japanese outposts adjacent to it. Weighing all
these factors, the 56th Division in mid-January estimated it could hold its
present positions about one week more. The 33d Army could not afford to
cut things too fine, and so the 56th began to shorten its perimeter as it prepared
to withdraw south down the Burma Road while time remained.

Since attempts at enveloping the Japanese position had been successfully
countered by the alert defenders, the American liaison section with XI Group
Army, Col. John H. Stodter commanding, suggested that Wei try a surprise
attack on the center, which seemed to be lightly held. American liaison
officers took an active part in the planning. After the war, as he looked
back with satisfaction on the careful co-ordination of air, artillery, and infantry
weapons that distinguished this attack from many of its unsuccessful
predecessors along the Salween, Stodter thought it the "best coordinated" he

--134--

had seen to that time in the Y-Force. From his observation post, Stodter
watched the Chinese infantry attack on 19 January and climb up the dominant
local peak, the Hwei Lung Shan. Chinese artillery, mortar, and machine
gun fire pounded the Japanese trenches until the last moment, then
the Chinese infantry attacked with grenade and bayonet. The attack succeeded,
Japanese counterattacks failed, and the Japanese hold on Wanting
was no longer firm.37

On 20 January elements of the Chinese 9th Division found Wanting
empty. Later in that day patrols from Wei's army met other patrols from
Sultan's Chinese divisions. The long Salween campaign was drawing to a
victorious close; the road to China was almost open.

The final work in opening the Burma Road would have to be done by
the Chinese Army in India. On 22 January the Generalissimo ordered the
Chinese Expeditionary Force to concentrate north of the Sino-Burmese border.
He informed his commanders that remaining Japanese resistance would be
cleared away by the Chinese Army in India. Two days later General Wei
ended his offensive, and ordered his units to stay in place until relieved by
one of Sultan's. The Salween campaign was thus formally ended 24 January
1945.

On the vast panorama of the world conflict the Salween campaign did
not loom very large to the Western world. But the Chinese had succeeded
in reoccupying 24,000 square miles of Chinese territory. It was the first time
in the history of Sino-Japanese relations that the Chinese forces had driven
Japanese troops from an area the Japanese wanted to hold. To this effort
China had contributed initially perhaps 72,000 troops and in the fall of 1944
some 8,000 to 10,000 replacements, plus the elite 200th Division. The
United States had given 244 75-mm. pack howitzers, 189 37-mm. antitank
guns, and infantry weapons, plus sufficient ammunition. American instructors
and liaison officers had sought to assist the Chinese in their conduct
of operations. The Fourteenth Air Force had been ordered to draw
heavily on its small resources to support the operation. The Japanese had
initially faced Wei's men with 11,000 soldiers and thirty-six cannon. For
their fall offensive they had reinforced the much-reduced original garrison
with 9,000 more soldiers from the 2d and 49th Divisions.

The military significance of Wei's victory lay in the trucks and artillery
which now would move into China, and in the three elite divisions released
for service there. For the future, the Salween campaign demonstrated that,
given artillery and heavy weapons plus technical advice, Chinese troops, if
enjoying numerical superiority of five to one or better, could defeat the forces

--135--

of the Great Powers. Observing the campaign, the American liaison officers
had concluded that technical errors by the Chinese reduced the combat efficiency
of the Chinese forces. Failure to bypass isolated Japanese units; inability
to co-ordinate infantry and artillery; faulty maintenance of equipment
and poor ammunition discipline--all tended to offset the valor and hardihood
of the Chinese soldier. None of the practices was beyond correction. As
the Chinese improved, they would require less in the way of numbers.38

Opening the Ledo Road

In the period between the split of the CBI Theater in October 1944 and
the fall of Bhamo on 15 December, the Ledo Road engineers under General
Pick brought the survey of the Ledo Road from a point just below and east
of Kamaing, 211 miles from Ledo, to a juncture with the Myitkyina-Bhamo
road. The Ledo Road was to bypass Myitkyina, for there was no point to
running heavy traffic through an inhabited place, and Myitkyina's supply
needs could be served by an access road. Metaling and grading were complete
almost to Mogaung. The Mogaung River had been bridged near
Kamaing, and a temporary bridge placed across the Irrawaddy. Tonnage carried
on the road for use within Burma was steadily rising. In early October
it had carried 275 tons a day; by the latter part of the month the rate was
twice that.39
Immediately after Bhamo's capture, the advance headquarters
of the road engineers was moved to that town. A combat supply road was
made from Mogaung, below Myitkyina, to a point just ten miles west of
Namhkam.

Progress during December was steady, swift, and uneventful because once
the roadbuilders reached the Myitkyina area of north Burma only routine
engineering remained. In mid-January the Ledo Road was linked with the
Myitkyina-Bhamo road, at a point 271 miles from Ledo. The Myitkyina-Bhamo road was being metaled, and, significant of the state of the link to
China, the first truck convoy was poised at Ledo ready to drive to Kunming.
The road to China was complete, as far as the engineers were concerned.
Beginning the traffic flow now depended on driving away the Japanese. A
four-inch pipeline paralleled the road as far as Bhamo, where the intent was
to send the line cross country to China, rather than along the next stretch of
road. The mission of clearing the Japanese rear guards from the last stretch
of the road trace was given to the 112th and 113th Regiments of the Chinese
38th Division, with the 113th moving up the valley along the existing road

--136--

PONTON BRIDGE OVER THE IRRAWADDY RIVER was an important link in the Ledo
Road.

from Panghkam and the 112th going through the hills. By 23 January the
112th had reached a point in the hills south of the valley road from which it
could, through a gap in the hills, see the Shweli valley road behind the
Japanese lines but at a range too great to bring fire to bear. The regiment
halted that afternoon and formed its defenses for the night. The precaution
was wise, for that afternoon and evening several Japanese detachments withdrawing
from the valley area found the 112th across their projected routes
and at once tried to fight their way through. There was brisk fighting, and
sixty-seven dead Japanese were later buried around the regiment's positions.

Meanwhile, the first convoy had closed on the Namhkam area and was
waiting for the all-clear signal. The road stretch from Namhkam to the
northeast was being efficiently interdicted by fire from a Japanese 150-mm.
howitzer. The convoy was heavily laden with representatives of the press;
there would be a great to-do if a 150-mm. shell burst among them on a section
of road that the Army had designated as clear, and so the convoy was

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held up several days at Namhkam while NCAC pressed the Chinese to open
the road and also tried to silence the 150-mm. howitzer by counterbattery.

An artillery observation craft was sent aloft and after some time managed
to locate the Japanese howitzer. Several rounds were fired; the Japanese
finally displaced the howitzer to a safer spot.40

To expedite the clearing of the road, the NCAC chief of staff, Brig. Gen.
Robert M. Cannon, conferred with the Chinese commander, General Sun
Li-jen, on 24 January and received General Sun's promise that the road
would be open on 27 January. Unknown to the two Allied officers, the
Japanese began withdrawing the 56th Division from the Wanting area on 23
January, beginning with their casualties and ammunition.41
Reflecting the
decisions of the conference, the 113th Regiment moved forward on the 25th,
and by the night of the 26th there were only five miles of Japanese-held
territory between the two Chinese armies.

On the night of the 26th plans were made for an attack by armor and
infantry, supported by artillery, to clear the last five miles. Careful co-ordination
was needed lest the attack carry on into the Y-Force, beyond, and conferences
between U.S. liaison officers from Y-Force and NCAC sought to
arrange it. The attack moved off the morning of the 27th, with the tanks
overrunning the little village of Pinghai, the last known enemy position. It
fell without opposition. Meanwhile, an air observer reported that he saw
troops in blue uniforms, undoubtedly Y-Force soldiers, in the area where
the Shweli valley road joined with the Burma Road. A message was sent
out canceling all artillery fire. Unfortunately, soldiers of the 38th opened
small arms fire on the Y-Force troops.

At this point, Brig. Gen. George W. Sliney, who had been an artillery
officer in the First Burma Campaign, intervened to halt what might have
become an ugly incident. Fearlessly exposing himself to the Chinese bullets,
he walked across the line of fire and forced it to stop. Sliney then walked
over to the Y-Force lines. So ended the blockade of China.

Soon after, some tanks with the 38th mistakenly fired on Y-Force men.
Their artillery retaliated. Only prompt action by General Sun Li-jen and
the liaison officers with the 112th straightened out the affair. With this misunderstanding
ended, the road to China was open, and the first convoy was
ready to roll. The Ledo Road, built at an estimated cost of $148,000,000,
was open.42

The confusion that attended the meeting between Y-Force and the

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CHINESE COOLIES LEVELING A ROADBED for the Teng-chung cutoff route to Kunming.

--139--

Chinese Army in India was only a reflection of the greater confusion that
surrounded the actual declaration that the road to China was open and the
blockade broken. The several headquarters involved in the operation were
aware of the public relations aspect of the feat; there were sixty-five press
and public relations people in the first convoy as one indication of it--more
reporters than there were guards.

The inaugural convoy had departed from Ledo on 12 January. Its trucks
and towed artillery, with Negro and Chinese drivers, the latter added for
ceremonial reasons, reached Myitkyina on the 15th, and then had to wait
there until the 23d because the Japanese still interfered with traffic past
Namhkam. On the night of the 22d, Lt. Gen. Daniel I. Sultan, India-Burma Theater commander, made some rough calculations of space and time,
and announced that the road was open. Probably he expected the Japanese
to be gone by the time the convoy reached the combat area. Next morning
the caravan got under way again. It reached Namhkam without incident,
and then confusion began.

The newsmen and public relations officers were surprised to learn on the
24th that the British Broadcasting Corporation had just announced the arrival
of the first truck convoy at Kunming, China, via Teng-chung, on 20
January. India-Burma and China Theater authorities had long known that
a rough trail, capable of improvement, linked Myitkyina and Kunming via
Teng-chung. There had been considerable discussion of the respective merits
of the Bhamo and Teng-chung routes, with General Pick firm for the Bhamo
trace. The Chinese liked the idea of a Teng-chung route, and had advocated
the Teng-chung cutoff as an alternative to and a supplement of the Bhamo
route. Their laborers to the number of 20,000 were put to work on the
stretch beyond Teng-chung, beginning 29 September 1944 and were supported
by the small force of American engineers under Colonel Seedlock who
had been assisting in reconstructing the Chinese portion of the Burma Road.
In less than sixty days, 145 miles were cleared.43

On 20 January 1945, two trucks and an 11-ton wrecker commanded by
Lt. Hugh A. Pock of Stillwater, Oklahoma, arrived at Kunming after a sixteen-day trip from Myitkyina. At one point, at a precipitous pass, the back
wheels of the lead truck had slid out over empty space; the vehicle had to
be winched back. At another point Lieutenant Pock had to halt his little
convoy while one of Seedlock's bulldozers cleared a path. But this was
minor compared to the fact that a truck convoy had reached China.44
No
more than sixty-five vehicles crossed into China via Teng-chung, for the
route was a rough one, and not paralleled by a pipeline as was the route via

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Bhamo. The impact of the news was immediate. As a result of some of
the announcements that followed, General Merrill radioed Sultan:

A Reuter's report has been published and broadcast to the effect that convoys from
India have been reported by Chinese sources to have crossed overland from India to China
via Teng-chung. The Supreme Allied Commander is quoted as radioing Churchill and
Roosevelt: "In accordance with orders you gave me at Quebec, the road to China is
opened."

Wheeler's PRO [Public Relations Officer] has sent to Washington a blurb saying
that the "plan drawn up by Lt. Gen. Raymond A. Wheeler two years ago is now about
to pay off."

The Chinese censors have scooped your correspondents, but events in Europe and the
Pacific are dwarfing the story. I recommend you take no action except to get your convoy
across the border fast.45

On the morning of the 28th, the official inaugural convoy from India-Burma Theater resumed the often-interrupted journey. There was a two-hour
ceremony at Mu-se, and then, a few miles beyond, a road junction with
a macadam road. As the trucks swung out onto it realization flashed down
the line that they were at last on the Burma Road and in China. Two days
later, as the convoy crossed the Salween, an air raid alarm brought a flurry
of excitement. Then came the long drive through Yunnan Province to
Kunming, through dry, hilly, brown land, a contrast to the green and blue
of the Burmese hills. The night of 3 February the convoy bivouacked at
the lake Tien Chih, and next morning Chinese drivers took over for the
ceremonial entry.

On 4 February the line of 6 x 6 trucks and jeeps, some of the prime
movers towing 105-mm. and 75-mm. howitzers, entered Kunming. General
Pick led the parade, standing erect in his jeep. Firecrackers crackled and children
screamed; American missionary nuns waved greetings, and Chinese
bands added their din. That night Governor Lung Yun of Yunnan gave a
banquet which was graced by the presence of an American operatic star,
Lily Pons, and her husband, a widely known conductor, Andre Kostelanetz.
The occasion had its ironic side, unknown to the Americans as they rejoiced
in the completion of the engineering feat; for, if General Okamura's memory
is to be trusted, Lung Yun corresponded with him throughout the war.46

Shortly after the road was opened, the Generalissimo suggested that it be
renamed the Stilwell Road. The idea received general approval, and so the
man who was primarily a tactician and troop trainer, whose mission and
greatest interest was the reshaping of the Chinese Army into an efficient
force, had his name applied to one of the great engineering feats of history,
and was indelibly associated with it in the public mind. The soldiers called
it either the Ledo Road or "Pick's Pike."47

4. (1) IBT Combat History, p. 8. (2) Under interrogation, one enemy prisoner stated that at
first the Japanese were told they must fight to the death, but later that if they fought well they
would be allowed to evacuate. Superior Pvt Rokuro Wada, 12 Dec 44. Folder 62J, 411-420,
NCAC files, KCRC.

20. The American combat narratives, prepared in 1945 from sources at the disposal of NCAC,
such as liaison officers' reports, Daily Operational and Intelligence Summaries, and the like, refer
to the proposed attack of 15 December. There is no hint that the American liaison officers knew
Sun had ordered that the Japanese were to be allowed to escape.

21. (1) Japanese Study 91 states the Bhamo garrison made good its escape and rejoined the 2d
Division. (2) Japanese prisoners of war taken later in December 1944 state that 400 to 600
Japanese evacuated Bhamo. Folder 62J, 411-420, Japanese Documents, NCAC files, KCRC. (3)
NCAC History, II, 205, says that an attempt was made to intercept the Japanese but failed because
reserves were too far away. (4) Dr. Ho Yung-chi, The Big Circle (New York: The Exposition
Press, 1948.) p. 130.

36. Memo 304, McClure for Generalissimo, 20 Dec 44. Bk 16, ACW Corresp with Chinese.
This memorandum describes Wedemeyer as being disturbed over the replacement problem in the
Y-Force.

37. Stodter comments on draft MS. Elsewhere in his comments, Stodter remarks that Chinese
noncommissioned officers and junior officers, though inexperienced, appeared brave and intelligent,
while the Chinese private won the affectionate regard of those Americans who served with him.