The paradox of legal unification

In the games used to study legal standardization, the outcome of the usual cooperative solution is never legal unification. We call this property the paradox of legal unification. To solve this paradox, we resort to alternative notions of cooperation. We show that introducing other-regarding preferences or Kantian rules of behavior do not resolve the paradox. By contrast, we show that legal uniformity prevails at any Berge equilibrium of our legal standardization game (a Berge equilibrium is a strategy profile such that a unilateral change of strategy by any one player cannot increase another player’s payoff). This, we argue, is a first step towards a solution to the paradox of legal unification.

Research theme

GERAD

GERAD is a multi university research center founded in 1979, financed by FRQNT.
It involves some seventy experts from a mix of disciplines: quantitative methods for management, operations researchers, computer scientists, mathematicians and mathematical engineers, from HEC Montréal, Polytechnique Montréal, McGill University and Université du Québec à Montréal.