[124] Wright Air
Development Center took no action on the directive during the
remainder of 1954, but there were other developments. The Fuels and
Propulsion Panel of the Air Force Scientific Advisory Board
considered the Rex I engine at its 29 [125] September 1954
meeting.* The panel saw Rex I as an interesting cycle of
potential importance and recommended that the development of
non-air-breathing chemical engines should be actively pursued. Rex I
was viewed as only one of several possibilities. The panel also
recommended that a broad general study be made before development of
the Rex I engine.25

According to Rae, the staff of the scientific
Advisory Board asked him to go to the NACA Lewis Flight Propulsion
Laboratory in Cleveland and give a briefing on Rex
I.26 He did so in November 1954, presenting the Rex
concepts and various cycles to Abe Silverstein.**

The situation in late 1954 was tense for Rae.
He had distributed fifteen copies of his brochure and backup
technical data, given several briefings, and was aware that the Air
Force was very interested. He had to defend his idea against a number
of criticisms. He had conducted enough analysis to believe in the
soundness of his approach and wanted support to develop it, but this
appeared slow in coming. On the Air Force side, there was great
interest in Rae's concepts-probably more than he suspected-for it
touched on a critical need. The power plant laboratory, however, had
reservations about the practicality of Rae's engine and how far to go
with Summers Gyroscope as a contractor, and these points were clearly
made in the WADC evaluation. The new development office of the weapon
systems directorate, where Seaberg was pushing other high-altitude
concepts, was negative about the Rex concept. Storm signals were
flying for those perceptive enough to observe them.

Late in 1954, when Kelly Johnson was
developing the U-2, Randy Rae was still seeking a way to get the Air
Force to move on his proposal. It became clear to him that he needed
to associate with a company having experience with turbines, the
major component of his propulsion system. He knew Bertram N. Snow
(1901-1966), dynamic vice president of the Garrett Corporation,
makers of small turbines and many other components for the aviation
industry. He approached Snow and later J.C. (Cliff) Garrett, founder
and president of the company.27 Garrett and Snow were very interested in Rae's ideas,
but being shrewd and perceptive businessmen, they wanted to sound out
Air Force interest in Rae's ideas and Garrett as a suitable
contractor before they committed themselves. After assuring
themselves on these questions, they began negotiations to acquire the
Rex engine from Rae and Summers.28

** An
interesting speculation is whether Rothrock, who heard the Rex-I
presentation at the 29 Sept. 1954 SAB meeting, transmitted
information about it to Lewis earlier than November 1954, or asked
the laboratory to investigate hydrogen, or asked the SAB staff to
send Rae to Lewis. The last appears to be the most probable
(p.97). Raeís presentation intensified Silversteinís
interest in hydrogen for aircraft, but was not the origin of his
interest.