Plaintiff and defendants are neighbors. Defendants have a single family
dwelling on their property. They applied to the city for a building permit to construct a
"garage w/guest house" on their property. The application stated that the proposed
building would involve new residential construction and would contain, in addition to the
garage, one bedroom and one bathroom. The area for the garage was listed as 912 square
feet, as was the area for the guest house. A space on the application form for "kitchen"
was left unchecked.

The description of the project as a "garage w/ guest house" appeared in the
"remarks" portion of the application form. After reviewing defendants' proposal, the city
building official, Tim Lindsey, crossed out the word "house" in the description and
substituted the word "room." The city approved the application, as amended, on July 9,
1996.

Following the city's approval, defendants built a two-story structure
consisting of a garage below and a living space above the garage. The living space
includes a bedroom, bathroom, and what plaintiff describes as a kitchen area because it
includes a sink, cupboards, microwave, and a refrigerator. The structure has electrical,
plumbing, telephone, and cable services. It has been used by family and non-paying
guests and is occupied, on average, two weekends a month.

On October 21, 1996, plaintiff sought a hearing before the Cannon Beach
City Council concerning the city's approval of the building permit. The city manager
wrote plaintiff that the council would not grant her request for a hearing. He added,
however, that plaintiff's request had been considered at the city council meeting on
November 12, 1996. He said that the council

"determined that there was no action to be taken by that body. A garage or
accessory dwelling is a permitted use within an R-2 zone. The application
meets the criteria of the City's zoning ordinance, and there is no basis for
requiring a hearing in this matter."

After more correspondence, the city modified its position and told plaintiff that the use
was approved as an "accessory structure," not as an accessory dwelling or guest house.

More specifically, plaintiff argues that defendants' building should be
classified as either a "guest house" or an "accessory dwelling." Cannon Beach Zoning
Ordinance (CBZO) 17.04.285 defines a "guest house" as "a structure of no more than four
hundred fifty square feet of site area used in conjunction with the main building for
temporary housing of non-paying visitors and guests and containing no cooking
facilities." An "accessory dwelling" is defined as "an attached or detached dwelling unit
which is located on the same lot on which a single-family dwelling * * * is located * * *
and which is rented only for periods of thirty calendar days or more." CBZO 17.04.008.
Accessory dwellings may not exceed 600 square feet. CBZO 17.54.080(B). Plaintiff
asserts that, whichever of these two provisions applies, each clearly and objectively
prohibited the city from approving defendants' proposed structure, which was 912 square
feet. It follows, plaintiff reasons, that the trial court had jurisdiction to review the city's
decision.

In analyzing the parties' arguments, we start from the proposition that the
hybrid structure that defendants proposed--a garage with a guest room--does not fit within
either of the two subcategories of accessory uses--guest houses and accessory dwellings--that, in plaintiff's view, apply. At a minimum, neither category includes structures such as
garages, with or without guest rooms. The issue accordingly reduces to the question
whether the general category for accessory uses on which defendants rely is broad enough
to include defendants' hybrid structure. More specifically, the question is whether the
city's zoning ordinance is ambiguous on that point. If it is, then any challenge to the city's
decision to approve defendants' application under that classification should have been
filed with LUBA rather than with the trial court. St. John, 138 Or App at 47.

A garage with a guest room located on defendants' lot next to their main
residence is, or at least arguably could be considered, "a structure or use incidental and
subordinate to the main use of property and located on the same lot as the main use."
See CBZO 17.04.010 (defining accessory use); Tirumali, 169 Or App at 247. At a
minimum, the question whether one use is incidental and subordinate to another requires
interpretation. Plaintiff, however, argues that another provision in the city's zoning
ordinance unequivocally demonstrates that, in considering whether to approve defendants'
application for a building permit, the city was precluded from relying on the classification
for accessory uses and was limited to deciding whether defendants' structure was either a
"guest house" or an "accessory dwelling." Specifically, plaintiff relies on a general
interpretative rule, which provides:

"Where the conditions imposed by any provisions of this title are less
restrictive than comparable conditions imposed by any other provisions of
this title, resolution or comprehensive plan, the provisions which are more
restrictive shall govern."

CBZO 17.02.030.

Although plaintiff argues that this interpretative rule unambiguously
required that defendants' proposed structure be classified as either a guest house or an
accessory dwelling, the rule raises as many questions as it answers. In this case, for
example, is the condition that accessory uses be "incidental and subordinate to the main
use of property" more or less restrictive than the condition that accessory dwellings be
rented only for 30 days and be no larger than 600 square feet? Because the restrictions
each condition imposes differ, deciding which condition is more or less restrictive is not
as obvious as plaintiff's argument assumes. Beyond that, the interpretative rule assumes
that two zoning provisions apply to an application and provides a rule for deciding which
of those two provisions governs--the one with the more restrictive conditions. In this
case, however, neither the provision for guest houses nor the one for accessory dwellings
applies to a garage with a guest room attached. It is thus far from clear that the
interpretative rule on which plaintiff relies applies to defendants' application for a
building permit, or at least that is one plausible interpretation of the rule. Having
considered the parties' arguments and the various provisions of the city's code, we cannot
say that they unambiguously required the city to reach the conclusion that plaintiff urges.
If plaintiff believed that the city erred in approving defendants' application, her only
remedy was to challenge the city's decision before LUBA.

Plaintiff's second assignment of error is directed at the trial court's ruling
dismissing the second count of her first claim for relief. In that count, she alleged:

"In the alternative, if Defendant Property Owners' structure actually
contains a kitchen or cooking facility or violates yard or set back
requirements, such structure was approved, constructed and maintained in
violation of the Code because the structure approved by Defendant City and
built by Defendant Twietmeyer exceeds the maximum allowed area of 600
square feet under Section 17.54.080 (standards for 'accessory dwelling')
and/or was not subjected to design review as required under Chapter 17.44
of the Code."

Plaintiff argued below that, even if the trial court lacked jurisdiction to review the city's
decision to approve defendants' building permit, it retained jurisdiction to grant injunctive
relief in "proceedings brought to enforce the provisions of an adopted comprehensive
plan or land use regulations[.]" See ORS 197.825(3)(a). The trial court granted summary
judgment on this count without discussion.

We affirm the trial court's ruling for two related but separate reasons. For
all that appeared from plaintiff's pleadings and her arguments below, the second count of
her first claim for relief was simply a collateral attack on the city's decision to approve
defendants' building. That count alleges, for example, that defendants' structure "was
approved, constructed and maintained" in violation of the city's zoning ordinance because
it exceeded the 600 square foot limit imposed on accessory dwellings. To the extent that
plaintiff intended to make a separate claim to enforce the permit the city issued, as
opposed to challenging its decision to approve the permit, she never made that separate
claim clear to the trial court. Rather, the claim in plaintiff's second count is bound up in,
and part of, her claim that the city should never have approved defendants' application in
the first place.

Moreover, plaintiff's allegations assume that the city could have approved
defendants' application, if at all, only under the classification for accessory dwellings. As
explained above, however, the question whether defendants' application should have been
characterized as an accessory dwelling, a guest house, or an accessory use was an issue
initially for the city and then for LUBA. In order to resolve the second count of plaintiff's
first claim for relief, the trial court would have had to decide the issue that the statutes
entrust to LUBA. See Mar-Dene Corp. v. City of Woodburn, 149 Or App 509, 515, 944
P2d 976 (1997). Because plaintiff's second count is inextricably intertwined with the
issues properly before LUBA, the trial court correctly declined to reach it.

Affirmed.

1. We use the term defendants to refer to the persons who own the land on
which the structure was built. Although the City of Cannon Beach is also a defendant, we
refer to it separately as the city.

2. ORS 197.015(10)(a)(A) defines "land use decision" to include a "final
decision or determination made by a local government or special district that concerns the
adoption, amendment or application of," among other things, a land use regulation. A
land use regulation is an ordinance establishing standards for implementing a
comprehensive plan. ORS 197.015(11). The trial court ruled that the city's decision to
issue a building permit represented the application of a land use regulation, the city's
zoning ordinance. See ORS 197.015(10)(a)(iii). With certain exceptions, LUBA has
exclusive jurisdiction to review land use decisions. See ORS 197.825.

4. The trial court's jurisdiction is governed by ORS 197.825(3)(a), which
provides that the circuit courts of Oregon retain jurisdiction "[t]o grant declaratory,
injunctive or mandatory relief in proceedings arising from decisions described in ORS
197.015(10)(b)[.]" ORS 197.015(10)(b), in turn, provides that certain local government
decisions are subject to circuit court jurisdiction, including "a decision of a local
government * * * which approves or denies a building permit issued under clear and
objective land use standards[.]" ORS 197.015(10)(b)(B).

6. Defendants correctly note that the only potentially applicable land use
standard, the general definition of "accessory use," is itself not clear and objective.
Rather, the definition of accessory uses sets out a general standard that is subject to
differing interpretations.