By Wei Luo

Chinese and Vietnamese Nationalism and the South China Sea

On
July 12, 2016, the Permanent Court of Arbitration at The Hague repudiated much
of China’s claims to the South China Sea, rejecting China’s historical claims
based on the “Nine-Dash Line.” Beijing boycotted the proceedings and stated
that it would not abide by the ruling.1 Many online nationalistic
commentators quickly called for tough responses to what amounted to a legal
humiliation to Beijing. Territorial sovereignty is a very sensitive issue in
China, as the country lost many territorial possessions — including Hong Kong,
Taiwan, parts of Xinjiang and Manchuria — during the Qing and Republican eras
to European and Japanese invaders. Therefore, because of this “Century of
Humiliation,” Chinese nationalists and policy makers see themselves as
defending the historical territorial possessions of China against foreign
powers, especially China’s geopolitical rivals.2

While
the Philippines appear to be the most vocal opponent of Chinese territorial
claims in the South China Sea, it has not engaged in armed conflict with China.
On the other hand, a much quieter but more assertive claimant in the South
China Sea had fought two naval battles with China in 1974 and 1988 over their
disputed maritime territories. In contrast to China, contemporary Vietnam
prides itself on having repelled, over the centuries, numerous hostile foreign
invaders, especially China. For example, Vietnamese today still pay their
respects to the Truong sisters, who held back Han Chinese invaders for three
years from 40 to 43 AD. The Truong sisters represented the first line of
national heroes and heroines who repelled foreign invaders. Subsequently China
ruled Northern Vietnam during the Sui and Tang Dynasties, and for another
twenty years during the Ming Dynasty. In 1979, after spending about 30 years
repelling French colonizers and American invaders, Vietnam and China fought a
brief but brutal war that devastated much of northern Vietnam. Hence, the
geopolitical threat of China looms large in contemporary Vietnamese
nationalism.3

Sino-Vietnamese Conflict over the
South China Sea

China
in the minds of the Vietnamese is seen mainly as a hostile “other.” Although
there was a short honeymoon period when they briefly cooperated under the
Communist ideology to resist the French colonizers and American invaders, it is
insignificant when compared to the longer period of Chinese hostility lasting
from the Han Dynasty to the 1988 shootout over the Spratly Islands. Thus, the
perception of China as an enemy among the Vietnamese could be much stronger
than their negative perceptions of France, Japan, and the US. For example,
following Japan’s surrender in 1945, when Chinese leader Chiang Kai-shek was
given the task of disarming Japanese troops in northern Vietnam, Ho Chi Minh —
the founding father of modern Vietnam — replaced Chiang’s troops with French
ones and stated that he “would rather smell French excrement for a few years
more than Chinese excrement for another millennium.”4

In
addition, although both the Chinese and Vietnamese Communist Parties are
supposed to share the same ideology, this ideological connection enjoys little
support among the Vietnamese public today. For example, during the 2014 riot
against China’s deployment of the Haiyang Shiyou 981 oil rig near the Paracel
Islands, much of the public anger in Vietnam was actually directed against
their government, especially its perceived weakness and lack of strong will in
dealing with China.5 With their ideological connection no longer
having a significant role in the Sino-Vietnamese relationship, the Vietnamese
public’s perception of their country’s relationship with China mainly consists
of a sense of collective security against the Chinese threat. The very
existence of neighboring China as a malicious “enemy” enhances the Vietnamese
people’s self-imagined national community. Therefore, in order to legitimate
itself in the eyes of the public, the Communist Party of Vietnam’s (CPV’s)
policy choices regarding the South China Sea dispute would likely be very
limited, as making even small concessions to China would be perceived as a
betrayal to the Vietnamese people, but firmly confronting the Chinese “enemy”
could strengthen domestic support for the CPV. As a result, the Sino-Vietnamese
relations are likely to continue to be overshadowed by hostility.

Armed conflict is very
unlikely to occur, as it will cause considerable economic, humanitarian, and
political disasters to both countries.

On
the other side of the border, while the Chinese people’s perception of Vietnam
is less hostile, the CPV’s likely choice of confronting China over the South
China Sea and allying itself with China’s geopolitical rivals like the US and
Japan could cause the Chinese public and policymakers to reciprocally see
Vietnam as an enemy. During the early years of the People’s Republic of China,
Beijing saw Hanoi as an ally based on their socialist brotherhood against the
French and the US, who were seeking to preserve the Western colonial hegemonic
order in Asia. However, after the Soviet Union became Beijing’s largest
geopolitical and ideological threat following the Sino-Soviet split, Vietnam
chose to side with the Soviet Union against Beijing, eventually leading to the
1979 Sino-Vietnamese war. Recently, Vietnam has openly sought US and Japanese
assistance in the South China Sea dispute. Hence, after seeing Vietnam
repeatedly siding with China’s geopolitical rivals, Chinese policymakers and
the Chinese public would most likely see Vietnam as a rival in line with the US
and Japan.

As
mentioned earlier, given the fact that safeguarding territorial sovereignty
after the “Century of Humiliation” is arguably the Chinese Communist Party’s
(CCP’s) promise to the Chinese people,6 Beijing is unlikely to back
down from confronting Hanoi as the latter embarks on an increasingly assertive
position against China over the South China Sea. As a result, China and Vietnam
could witness an increasing number of confrontations in the near future over
their disputed maritime territories in the South China Sea.

War Remains Unlikely

While
armed conflict may seem likely, there is no evidence suggesting that this is
inevitable. On the contrary, this is very unlikely to occur, as it will cause
considerable economic, humanitarian, and political disasters to both countries.
In terms of economics, as of 2012, China is Vietnam’s largest trading partner
with their bilateral trade reaching USD 36 billion, while trade between Vietnam
and the US reached only USD 22 billion. Vietnam’s manufacturing sector is also
heavily dependent on Chinese industrial inputs.7 Hence, despite the
Vietnamese public seeing China as their enemy, Vietnam remains highly dependent
on China for trade and investment. Thus, should the ongoing tensions over the
South China Sea escalate, economic sanctions from China could hurt the
Vietnamese economy, not to mention that the Chinese Navy could potentially
blockade Vietnamese ports if an armed conflict breaks out.

In
terms of military capabilities, although Vietnam has recently bought six
improved Kilo-class conventional attack submarines, long-range supersonic and
subsonic anti-ship cruise missiles, S-300 series long-range surface-to-air
missiles, and Sukhoi-30 fighter jets from Russia,8 China arguably
still possesses an absolute military advantage over Vietnam. Even if the
Vietnamese navy and air force were to successfully sink dozens of Chinese naval
vessels and shoot down Chinese fighter planes, the sheer size of the Chinese
military — especially its short and medium-range ballistic missiles based in
southern China — could cause the Vietnamese navy and air force to lose most of
their best assets, airfields, and naval bases. Finally, if one draws historical
parallels with their 1979 War, Hanoi simply cannot rule out the possibility
that Beijing might launch another land invasion into northern Vietnam, which
could result in an economic and humanitarian disaster. Thus, Vietnam clearly
does not have much to gain from confronting Beijing militarily.

On
the other hand, China also would have much to lose over a potential military
conflict in the South China Sea. Although Vietnam is not a US treaty ally, an
armed confrontation between China and Vietnam would most likely pit China
against the US, Japan, and other important trading partners. As the West’s
response to Russia’s annexation of Crimea and incursions into Ukraine
demonstrate, countries that militarily challenge the post-Cold War US-led
international order will not go unpunished. In this sense, should China take
large-scale military actions against Vietnam, it could face multilateral
sanctions from countries and regions — such as the US, Japan, and the EU — that
have the most interest in upholding the current international order. However,
given that the Chinese economy is much more diversified than that of Russia,
sanctions are unlikely to have decisive effects on changing Beijing’s foreign
policy. Nevertheless, given that China’s economy is still highly dependent on
exports, foreign technology transfers, and international trade, economic
isolation resulting from sanctions would likely slow down China’s economic
growth and technological progress.

Additionally,
should China confront Vietnam with military force, Vietnam could invite the US
to return to the naval base at Cam Ranh Bay, just like how Vietnam offered the
same to the Soviet Union following the 1979 Sino-Vietnamese War. Cam Ranh Naval
Base offers three advantages: geographical proximity to the disputed Paracel
Islands and the Straits of Malacca; easily strengthened defenses with the help
of hardening measures; and proximity to Ho Chi Minh City.9 Hence,
similar to the presence of the Soviet Navy in the South China Sea and Cam Ranh
Bay in the 1980s, the permanent presence of the US Navy at Cam Ranh would
certainly limit China’s freedom of action in the South China Sea. Thus, in the
long run, a war with Vietnam today could impose significant strategic costs on
China, with Vietnam potentially joining and strengthening the US-led alliance
in Asia. The Obama Administration’s recent lifting of the Cold War-era arms
embargo on Vietnam — despite Vietnam’s poor human rights record10 —
should serve as a reminder to Beijing that a US-Vietnam military alliance is
not impossible.

As
a result, although history and nationalism continue to fan the flames of
conflict between Vietnam and China, a large-scale armed conflict remains
unlikely. This is due to the fact that while Vietnam’s hard power is likely to remain
inferior to that of China, China could also face incalculable economic,
political, and geopolitical costs should it initiate such a conflict. Thus, due
to their economic and strategic interests, neither Beijing nor Hanoi has any
realistic interest in an armed confrontation over the South China Sea, unless
the leaders of both countries decide that the resulting costs described above
are endurable.

Conclusion

Both
Vietnam and China have histories of victimhood at the hands of more powerful
imperial and colonial powers. China is one of Vietnam’s most important “enemies”
as a result of their history of conflict, while Vietnam is increasingly siding
with the geopolitical rivals of China, including the US and Japan, due to their
territorial disputes over the South China Sea. Therefore, conflict seems likely
to occur again between Vietnam and China. However, given that Vietnam is likely
to suffer both militarily and economically from an armed confrontation with
China, it has little realistic interest in any conflict with China. For Hanoi,
unilaterally challenging Beijing by military means over their disputed maritime
territories could be an act of geopolitical and military suicide.

On
the other hand, should China initiate such conflicts, it could face an international
backlash including economic and political isolation, and strategic encirclement
if Vietnam decides to allow other great powers — especially superpower like the
US — to permanently station naval units at Cam Ranh Bay. The US’ and the EU’s
reactions to Russia’s annexation of Crimea could also serve as a reminder to
policymakers in Beijing that great powers resolving disputes with small and
medium powers by means of war and conquest could face significantly more
negative consequences in the 21st century than in the 19th and 20th centuries. As
a result, unless Beijing and Hanoi are willing to take significant economic,
political, and military risks, policymakers on neither side should have any
incentive to allow nationalism to lead to war.

6. Davis, M. (2016, July 21). China won’t back down in
the South China Sea. The National
Interest. Retrieved from http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/china-wont-back-down-the-south-china-sea-17057

10. Harris, G. (2016, May 24). Vietnam arms embargo to
be fully lifted, Obama says in Hanoi. The
New York Times. Retrieved from
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/24/world/asia/vietnam-us-arms-embargo-obama.html?_r=0