Dawn Brancati

Abstract

Why does political decentralization reduce intrastate conflict more in some countries than in others? Can political institutions be designed to engender peace? If so, how? Addressing these questions, this book advances the current debate on decentralization beyond a discussion of whether or not decentralization is effective in reducing conflict, to when and under what conditions it is successful. The book bridges opposing views while offering an original one, arguing that decentralization's ability to reduce conflict hinges on the electoral strength of regional parties, which, in turn, varies ... More

Why does political decentralization reduce intrastate conflict more in some countries than in others? Can political institutions be designed to engender peace? If so, how? Addressing these questions, this book advances the current debate on decentralization beyond a discussion of whether or not decentralization is effective in reducing conflict, to when and under what conditions it is successful. The book bridges opposing views while offering an original one, arguing that decentralization's ability to reduce conflict hinges on the electoral strength of regional parties, which, in turn, varies according to different institutional features of decentralization. Various aspects of political systems likewise affect the extent to which regional parties stimulate conflict and conversely, the degree to which statewide parties mitigate it. This book illuminates the exigent issue of how to design political institutions in order to promote peace.

Part III Quantitative Analysis

End Matter

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