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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 NEW DELHI 003969
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/26/2015
TAGS: PRELPTERMOPSINPKINDOPAK
SUBJECT: INDIAN FOCUS ON FROZEN, WET, AND SOFT PAK BORDERS
REF: NEW DELHI 3745
Classified By: PolCouns Geoff Pyatt, for Reasons 1.4 (B, D)
¶1. (C) Summary: New Delhi is currently focused on three
Indo-Pak territorial disputes, with senior officials in
Islamabad discussing two of them, demilitarizing Siachen
Glacier (May 26-27) and demarcating the international border
at Sir Creek (May 28-29). Conventional thinking in Delhi is
that, absent one side climbing down significantly or
proposing a creative compromise, progress on these
territorial disputes will be incremental, despite these
issues having been fast-tracked by PM Manmohan Singh and
Pakistan President Pervez Musharraf in their April 18 Joint
Statement. If the PM has given the Indian delegations a
sufficiently strong directive to reach closure, however, a
deal is possible, and the atmospherics appear positive.
Meanwhile, Delhi-based Pakistan-watchers see little new in
Musharraf's latest proposals for Kashmir, and some are
annoyed at his recent calls for a speedy solution, a role for
the "international community," and an end to "human rights
excesses." End Summary.
Politics, Emotions Govern Demilitarizing Siachen
--------------------------------------------- ---
¶2. (C) Although the absence of an indigenous population
makes demilitarizing the Siachen Glacier in theory an easier
nut to crack than the inhabited areas of Kashmir, the MEA and
the Indian military appear firm in wanting Islamabad to agree
to delineate the Actual Ground Position Line (AGPL) -- both
sides' current troop locations -- to seal a deal. Defense
Secretary Ajai Vikram Singh is leading the Indian delegation
SIPDIS
for the ninth set of bilateral talks on the issue; media
reports say the meetings started on a positive note because
"both sides mean business this time."
¶3. (C) A small but growing cadre of influential Indian
strategists -- including C Raja Mohan, AG Noorani, and the
officer who was responsible for India seizing the upper ridge
in 1984, Lt. Gen. (ret) ML Chibber -- discount Siachen's
strategic worth. Nevertheless, as NDTV Defense Correspondent
Col. (ret) Ajai Shukla told Poloff recently, Siachen retains
a large symbolic value, especially with the Indian military
which echoes MEA's concern that vacating positions on the
high ground would be an invitation for the Pakistan Army to
launch a second Kargil-like operation (Reftel). Mohan
recently reflected that "the Indian Army has shed so much
blood and treasure over Siachen, and now pours good money
after bad," rather than withdraw without an agreed AGPL. He
advocated using national technical means to "reasonably
satisfy" the military's concerns without forcing Islamabad
into a political corner on the AGPL. An Army spokesman
earlier this year told reporters that over 100 soldiers die
annually on Siachen.
¶4. (C) Indian Army Chief JJ Singh reiterated the importance
the military places on an AGPL to reporters in Delhi on the
first day of the May 26-27 talks. Mapping the currently held
positions would give India future justification for punitive
action, should Pakistan reneg on an agreement to de-induct
its forces. It will also prove that the Indian Army is in
possession of the main glacier and ridgeline, versus Pakistan
holding the Lower Saltoro Ridge. Mapping positions could
also affect a future agreement on alignment of the LoC (and
perhaps a soft border) north of marker NJ9842, which is the
last codified point on the LoC per the 1972 Simla Agreement.
¶5. (C) NDTV's Shukla told Poloff that the Army is concerned
that Musharraf is using the "peace euphoria" to leverage the
Indian political leadership into conceding on "the emotional
and political issues surrounding Siachen." An Indian
concession on Siachen would have to be matched by related
Pakistani concessions, either troop withdrawals along the LoC
or visible action against Pakistan-based terrorist groups
that operate in Kashmir, he continued. Shukla also reported
recently that, while the Indian team was preparing for the
talks, Defense Minister Pranab Mukherjee authorized "a sharp
increase" in extreme cold weather combat gear, of the type
used by troops stationed at Siachen. "Leaving is easy,
returning is well-nigh impossible," Shukla concluded.
¶6. (C) Officials who attended a May 24 Cabinet Committee on
Security briefing preparatory to the Siachen talks have
remained tight-lipped about the delegation's marching orders.
For example, when asked by reporters if New Delhi expected
positive movement at the talks, Defense Minister Pranab
Mukherjee replied, "We'll see." The "Indian Express" on May
25 claimed the GOI would propose the following CBMs as a
modus vivendi until a demilitarization plan is concluded:
-- Freezing troop levels and positions;
-- No attempts to seize additional territory;
-- Continuing the cease-fire, with respect both to artillery
and small arms; and
-- No airspace violations.
Sir Creek: More Economics Than Emotions
--------------------------------------
¶7. (C) The eventual demarcation of the land border in the
Sir Creek area between Gujarat and Sindh is important because
the extension of the border into the Arabian Sea will mark
the Indo-Pak maritime boundary and exclusive economic zone
(EEZ). The periodic arrests of fishermen that cross from one
EEZ to the other in search of better catches has been a
long-standing irritant, with hundreds of fishermen from both
countries arrested each year; when they are released, it is
often in groups of over 100. The communications link agreed
to by the Indian Coast Guard and the Pakistani Maritime
Security Agency on May 11 was designed, in part, to
repatriate these fishermen more quickly.
¶8. (C) Interpretation of crude British-era maps ambiguously
delineating the channel boundary and constantly shifting sand
bars complicate resolution of this dispute. The Indian and
Pakistani Surveyors-General will discuss the Sir Creek border
on May 28-29. This will be the first meeting on Sir Creek
following the January joint survey of the pillars in the
horizontal segment of the International Boundary.
Kashmir "Soft Borders" Proposal: "Iftar Musings" Redux
--------------------------------------------- ---------
¶9. (C) Veteran strategic analyst and National Security
Advisory Board Convenor K Subrahmanyam summarized the
widely-held Indian perception that Musharraf's remarks to the
recent summit of South Asian parliamentarians -- of finding a
"regional" vice "religious" or "territorial" solution for
Kashmir -- are largely an updated version of Musharraf's
October 2004 "Iftar musings" on dividing Kashmir into
regions, demilitarizing them, and "changing their status."
New here are Musharraf's references to "soft" and
"irrelevant" borders, terms that have figured prominently in
the Indo-Pak dialogue since the April 16-18 "Cricket Summit."
¶10. (C) That said, New Delhi-based Pakistan watchers now
accept that off-the-cuff variations of Musharraf's "Iftar
musings" have become part of the Indo-Pak landscape. In
contrast to earlier behavior, the GOI has not leapt to
register public rejection of Musharraf's remarks.
Subrahmanyam also noted that, as Musharraf has also said,
soft borders are not a final solution; the GOI and GOP will
need to flesh out the construct further, to determine whether
soft borders will extend to residency and local governance as
well as trade and travel.
¶11. (C) J&K Chief Minister Mufti Mohammad Saeed and moderate
Hurriyat Chairman Mirwaiz Umar Farooq were both upbeat on
hearing of Musharraf's proposal, while leader of the
pro-Pakistan Hurriyat SAS Geelani, who can always be counted
on to act the spoiler, dismissed the proposal out of hand.
"Hindustan Times" Associate Editor Vinod Sharma, who attended
Musharraf's speech at the parliamentarians' summit, assessed
that the Pakistani President's call for greater
self-governance was a way to reach out to Kashmiris who seek
independence from both India and Pakistan. An assessment of
what autonomy in Kashmir might mean will follow septel.
¶12. (C) The BJP and our Pakistan-watching contacts have
reacted sharply to Musharraf's call for the "international
community" to play a role in Kashmir, referencing the GOP's
well-known opposition to any Indo-Pak proposal that includes
third-party involvement. Musharraf's connecting cross-border
terrorism to India's "human rights excesses" -- a subject
that had not been broached recently at senior levels --
similarly rankled observers in New Delhi, although some
ignored the comment as a sop to his domestic audience.
¶13. (C) Indians are also less sanguine about Musharraf's
renewed call for speeding up the peace process with respect
to Kashmir, ostensibly to strike a deal while the Pakistani
and Indian leaders have a positive rapport. Observer
Research Foundation Senior Fellow Wilson John told Poloff
that the trust-building process between New Delhi and
Islamabad is still in its infancy, and that Kashmir "should
not be touched for at least five years," well beyond
Musharraf's suggested timeline. "We should not confuse
liking Musharraf with trusting him," John cautioned. He was
also concerned that Musharraf's statement suggested that the
peace process was resting exclusively on the rapport between
the two leaders, and not on its own logic.
Comment
-------
¶14. (C) Unlike the cross-LoC bus and other people-to-people
CBMs which Delhi views as low-cost success stories, coming to
closure on territorial disputes -- with their inherent
zero-sum constructs -- comes with a potentially higher
political (and for Sir Creek, economic) cost. Agreement on
either Siachen or Sir Creek may require a significant
trade-off or a creative compromise that either combines these
issues or brings in another high-profile dispute such as
Baglihar Dam, which -- given the importance the PM gives to
the peace process -- cannot be ruled out.
¶15. (C) The major factor in these talks will likely be how
much energy and direction the PM imparted to the Indian
delegations. On Kashmir, Musharraf's recent pronouncements
have garnered less public attention than in the past because
his language tracks closely with the PM's on soft borders and
Musharraf's formulation is being treated by the GOI as
another trial balloon, and not a formal proposal requiring an
Indian response.
BLAKE