Ok,
Let me make sure I understand you correctly.
Obviously /etc/ldap.conf needs to be readable by all ldap clients.
You want to make sure that sudo(which runs as root) has access to
query the ldap tree,
but you don't want the user running sudo to be able to query the sudo
entities in the ldap tree.
Is that correct?
If that is the case, then as long as you don't tell your users what
the bind name and password are you should be ok,
sudo (because you gave it the bind name/password when you compiled
it) may access the ldap entities in the tree.
However, because the user does not know (presumably) they would not
have access to said entities unless they were able to coerce sudo
into giving them access which means there is probably a bigger
problem with the sudo code.
Don't be insulted by this next statement, and it is probably a big
"Duh!", but since I don't know your background or experience...
The ldap entries are not kept in /etc/ldap.conf so the readability
of this file is irrelevant to this conversation.
If I didn't get what you were meaning correct, then some
clarification would be in order.
On Jun 14, 2005, at 8:24 AM, Andrea Barisani wrote:
> On Tue, Jun 14, 2005 at 08:01:02AM -0500, Michael Grubb wrote:
>>> No,
>> A different ldap.conf is not needed. To protect the sudoers entries
>> in the ldap directory, you need to use ACLs.
>>>> I'm sorry but I'm afraid that you are not seeing the problem. How am I
> supposed to protect the sudo entries with an ACL? I'm talking about
> preventing
> sudo ldap entries lookup to the user that's actually using sudo,
> not external
> entities (which can be of course protected with an acl).
>> On a system where pam_ldap/nss_ldap are used the user must be able
> to read
> ldap.conf (otherwise getent+ldap won't work for instance) and if
> sudo is able
> to read the entries then the user can do that as well. There is no
> ACL that
> allows me to say "prevent attribute lookup if the sudo process is
> doing
> this". The only thing that could be done is tieing a separate
> binddn bindpw
> to the sudo process, but that requires a different ldap.conf.
>>>>>> On Jun 14, 2005, at 3:56 AM, Andrea Barisani wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>> Hi,
>>>>>> quoting README.LDAP: "The /etc/ldap.conf file is meant to be shared
>>> between
>>> sudo, pam_ldap, nss_ldap", that's fine in theory but it also means
>>> that every
>>> local user is able to see the ldap'ized /etc/sudoers settings while
>>> normally
>>> /etc/sudoers is not readable by the user.
>>>>>> Having ldap.conf not readable is not an option when it's used with
>>> pam_ldap
>>> and especially nss_ldap. So probably the only way to make sudo ldap
>>> settings
>>> not readable by users is pointing it to a different ldap.conf
>>> (ldap.conf-sudo
>>> with a specific binddn and bindpw) changing -DLDAP_CONFIG.
>>>>>> Do you agree that this actually decreases security and that it
>>> should be
>>> handled differently or at least specified in the docs (maybe
>>> pointing the
>>> ldap.conf-sudo hack) ?
>>>>>> Of course feel free to slap me on the face if I'm totally missing
>>> something
>>> and there is a way to do what I'm seeking ;).
>>>>>> Cheers
>>>>>> P.S.
>>> thx for adding ldap to sudo! it was the last missing bit for
>>> having a
>>> complete ldap'ized system.
>>>>>> --
>>> Andrea Barisani <lcars at gentoo.org> .*.
>>> Gentoo Linux Infrastructure Developer V
>>> ( )
>>> GPG-Key 0x864C9B9E http://dev.gentoo.org/~lcars/pubkey.asc ( )
>>> 0A76 074A 02CD E989 CE7F AC3F DA47 578E 864C 9B9E ^^_^^
>>> "Pluralitas non est ponenda sine necessitate"
>>> ____________________________________________________________
>>> sudo-workers mailing list <sudo-workers at sudo.ws>
>>> For list information, options, or to unsubscribe, visit:
>>>http://www.sudo.ws/mailman/listinfo/sudo-workers>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> --
> Andrea Barisani <lcars at gentoo.org> .*.
> Gentoo Linux Infrastructure Developer V
> ( )
> GPG-Key 0x864C9B9E http://dev.gentoo.org/~lcars/pubkey.asc ( )
> 0A76 074A 02CD E989 CE7F AC3F DA47 578E 864C 9B9E ^^_^^
> "Pluralitas non est ponenda sine necessitate"
>>>