Dangerous Weeks Ahead

Sudan is in a state of high tension at the moment, and we face a dangerous month ahead. Darfur is witnessing its worst fighting for a year.

The immediate cause of the tension is the expected arrest warrant to be issued by the ICC, the immediate cause of the fighting is JEM’s offensive.

The Sudan Government sees the ICC as the gravest threat to its survival it has ever faced and a matter of life and death. It is a national issue, not one confined to Darfur. Up to now, the Sudan Government has responded coolly to the threat, but it is clear that no option is off the table should an arrest warrant be issued.

Key to how the Khartoum leadership responds will be the reactions of others, international and domestic. If the reaction all round were to be that the arrest warrant changes nothing and business as usual should continue, then the NCP and security leadership is likely to remain cool. But if the reactions are otherwise, then the response could be very adverse.

President Omar al Bashir has made it clear that he considers the UN responsible for allowing the ICC Prosecutor to proceed with his application for an arrest warrant, and he will hold the Secretary General and the Security Council responsible should the warrant be issued. Should this happen, all relations with the UN will be up for reconsideration. In Darfur, UNAMID is relatively protected because it is a joint mission with the African Union, which is opposed to the arrest warrant. UNMIS may be more exposed. Possibly the test for the UN will be if its senior officials, including the Special Representatives, are ready to meet with President Bashir, who is their host. If they refuse to meet with him, the government may conclude that they have no business being in Sudan. A similar test may be applied to ambassadors accredited to Sudan: will they meet with the President?

More sensitive still is the question of how the national parties respond. Just recently, Hassan al Turabi was arrested for demanding that Bashir be handed over to the ICC. This, we can be confident, will be the fate of any national political figures who take this line. The government expects that many Darfurians will openly support the ICC and has already discounted this, as far as the IDP camps and rural areas are concerned. But it is unlikely to tolerate open opposition in Khartoum.

The SPLM’s reaction will be pivotal. There seems to be a range of views within the SPLM, with some seeing the indictment as a threat to the CPA and others seeing it as leverage against the NCP. First Vice President Salva Kiir has emphasized the strategic interest of the south in seeing a stable and legitimate Government of National Unity. But it is not difficult to foresee a ratchet of escalation in which the NCP suspends or stalls on certain CPA provisions, leading to a crisis which in turn pushes some SPLM figures to argue that this is the opportunity to short-circuit the CPA and push for unilateral independence. Relations between the NCP and the SPLM will be absolutely crucial in the coming weeks and could determine the country’s fate.

The ICC issue is so preoccupying the NCP leadership that all other political business in Sudan is grinding to a halt. This in itself portends crisis as it means that key CPA implementation deadlines will slip.

Meanwhile, parts of Darfur are again in flames, with the worst fighting in the region since the beginning of 2008. This began with the military takeover of Muhajiriya, formerly controlled by SLA-Minawi, by JEM. Other Minawi strongholds have also fallen and JEM is now threatening Gereida. Minni Minawi tried to fight off the attackers without the Sudanese army, but having lost, the government is responding at scale with its most readily available military asset, the airforce. Reports indicate high-technology bombardment and considerable casualties, in Muhajiriya and other places including Gereida and north Darfur.

The operation was carried out by former SLA-Minawi commanders who had defected, and JEM is now claiming their loyalty. There are some indications that JEM had intended to mount an offensive in South Kordofan, which is already a tinderbox, which would have been a very dangerous escalation of the war, but instead seized Muhajiriya because the opportunity arose.

For some time, JEM has been saying that it is the only armed opposition movement worthy of the name and should be the sole group represented at the planned peace talks in Doha. JEM’s offensive can be seen as an attempt to turn that claim into a reality on the ground. It is common for the run-up to peace talks to see this kind of military action. Taking Muhajiriya also allows JEM to recruit more fighters and to make new appeals to the Arabs.

The timing may also be connected to the ICC. JEM’s leaders do not want any ICC announcement to be solely an international affair, and want to position themselves as the Sudanese champions of the ICC. The government suspects a link between JEM and Turabi on this issue.

The immediate loser in this fighting has been Minni Minawi. He refused Sudan Armed Forces assistance in defending Muhajiriya. Only after losing the battle did the army and airforce intervene. The Sudan Government has been quite open about bombing JEM positions in Muhajiriya. Having lost his main territorial base in Darfur, Minawi is now losing the little independence he possessed. He has called upon SAF to defend Gereida, knowing that as soon as Sudanese troops take up positions there, they will not leave unless by force of arms.

Meanwhile the Arab tribes are agitating for arms from the government, while also watching this contest to see who emerges on top. In this context, the ICC is a mixed blessing for JEM, as an arrest warrant would probably push the Arabs into siding with the government.

Ironically, the Khartoum leadership is less unhappy about JEM taking over Muhajiriya. Their argument is that it is easier to deal politically with JEM once it has a base inside Sudan. It will not be hostage to Chadian agendas and now, for the first time, JEM has an incentive to negotiate a ceasefire because it has something to defend. Bombing Muhajiriya and other areas of JEM activity would therefore not just be a military tactic but a signal that it is time to negotiate a truce.

But the current fighting might also portend something altogether more dangerous: a true showdown. There is no question that some of Khartoum’s leaders see the conjunction of JEM attacks, Turabi’s hardline stand, and the imminent ICC arrest warrant, as the first round of a new war for regime survival. This weekend’s air raids signal that the government has the capacity and readiness to strike as hard as it considers necessary.

What should be done? My proposal is that the UN Security Council should invoke Article 16 without condition. I think that there is sufficient threat to peace and security arising in the current situation for the Security Council to have reason to be seized of the matter. Most unusually, there is an immediate step the Council can take. I do not support putting conditions on the Article 16 deferral. Using every opportunity for leverage on the Sudan Government is not a strategy but a habit, and in my view the absolute priority is to focus on the CPA and Sudan’s progress towards democracy and stability, and only when that objective is agreed does it make any sense to apply additional leverage. The 12-month deferral is the time period in which the strategy for that objective needs to be in place and seen to be working.

Equally importantly, making justice conditional on specific political actions would, in my view, be in violation of basic values of human rights and the independence of the Court. From the viewpoint of The Hague or New York, it may not be evident how much damage is being done to the standing of the ICC by the ongoing escalation of reciprocal machismo.

In this context, there can be both incentive and pressure for a reduction in violence in Darfur, reining in JEM’s adventurism and halting the terror unleashed by the Sudanese airforce.

11 comments

You are missing one very important point. A deferral is not even something acceptable to Khartoum. It will be a hanging sword thing and that is even worst for them than a non-deferral. They want the UN Security Council to completely nullify resolution 1593 that authorizes the ICC to investigate in Darfur. Please refer to statements made by their envoy in New York.

On the other hand I think your analysis carries a great deal of exaggeration and requires a reality check. If Khartoum was indeed to take drastic measures with regards to Darfur, CPA or both they will simply isolate themselves. What leverage do they reamins for them to convince the international community? Even the Chinese will not like that and I think that the message made by their envoy as suggested by his statements afterwards.

Internally if they were to crack down on political parties they will also isolate themselves at a time when they need those political powers to back them.

I think Sudanese officials are well aware that they there is little they can do once an arrest warrant is issued which is why they sent envoys all over the world asking them to stand on their side which yielded moral support more than anything else.

If you notice the steps taken since ICC announcement. Khartoum first condemned it- dismissed it – made threats (tsunami as they called it) – Bashir visited Darfur promising a solution-People of Sudan initiative (which failed miserabally according to one of its participants Sadiq Al-Mahdi)- Lifted roadblocks for UNAMID- pleaded US, UK, France for deferral- After that failed they started making threats again – finally they indirectly pushed two groups to file a motion before the ICC.

You should also read what Ali Osman Taha said in the NCP meetings last week. He said that demonstrations and legal arguments are ok but not enough and said that an arrest warrant “is not the end of the world”. He made no threats.

I personally think a deferral as you propose is simply a bad example of UN Security Council falling hostage to blackmailing and its a terrible idea. It will also deepen biterness among Darfuris in the camps who will feel that the world is conspiring against them. You will end up with more extreme views.

The majority of people in Sudan are really indifferent to Bashir’s fate. Of course there are those who support Bashir but others are really more concerned with their day to day lives. The average Sudanese is going through severe economic difficulties that will only be realized by someone who lives there and see it for himself. At the same time they are seeing NCP figures leading a very lavish lifestyle. In the minds of most Sudanese NCP is associated with corruption and they may have little sympathy for Bashir.

While it is true that the Sudan Government would like Resolution 1593 nullified, that is a political impossibility. An Article 16 deferral at least lies within the bounds of possibility.

As you imply, we should not underestimate the ability of the Sudan Government to continue as usual, managing the unmanageable. That indeed is the most probable outcome of an ICC arrest warrant. And I expect most people in the government would like things to work out like this. But every now and then there is a game-changer in Sudan, usually for the worse. The arrest warrant introduces an element of uncertainty that could easily lead to an escalation of political confrontation or violence.

A no preconditions deferral would certainly be touted as giving in to blackmail. But there are more important things at stake than posturing in this way.

Lastly, whatever happens, I fear that the people of Darfur, and Sudan as a whole, are going to feel betrayed. Few people have any sympathy for the NCP leaders, and after almost twenty years in power, they have no-one to blame for their plight but themselves. Would an arrest warrant for Bashir, or even his handover to the ICC, change the reality of their lives? I suspect not. The best way to improve the lives of Sudanese citizens is, I argue, to see the steady implementation of the CPA and its measures for democratization and reform.

I dont think any Sudanese would want anything different than a democratic transofrmation & democratization of Sudan.

However I again stress the reality check. No one in Sudan has any faith in the upcoming elections or that it will be conducted fairly. Elections are not just the polls; it is a free society, free press, freedom of expression, no fear of reprisal etc.. That it is non-existent now. As it stands now any elections held may actually complicate matters particularly when no one thinks they are fair.

A good example is the census results? WHere are they? They kept postponing and postponing which opens the door for a great deal of speculations. This is almost a year! Why is it taking so long?

Lets took a look at the DPA. I think you will agree with me that the government has reneged on what it signed. This is what Minnawi says day and night. How can Darfuris have faith that this government will honor anything it signs afterwards? If DPA was impelemented and peopel saw the fruits of it things would have been very different now but they arent.

There is a fundamental problem with the NCP Alex. They want to give little concessions and want to stay in power forever. You cant really achieve anything with such a mentality.

The ICC is not a solution to Sudan’s problems and I dont think any sane person would argue that. However it is a positive factor that made the NCP rethink what they are doing even if not tangible outcome ensued. They moved to court the political parties and cooperate with UNAMID and launch an initiative. This is all post-ICC. Before that it was their way or the highway.

Deferral on the other hand is not the solution Alex. What would it achieve? Make the NCP act in more good faith? I highly doubt it. They had plenty of opportunity to come right and they didnt seize it so I think its time they reap what they sow.

I will finish up with one story

Al-Sadiq Al-Mahdi met recently with senior Sudanese officials lately who told him that they are willing to revive their bilateral agreement they signed in May with him. He told them “Its too late now. There has to be a national agreement and broad based coalition government”. Of course we know that the NCP rejected that.

I appreciate your contributions as always, but I do fail to see from it how is that you prove your post thesis that the “the immediate cause of the tension is the expected arrest warrant to be issued by the ICC.”

As you know well, tensions highly increase before a truce is to be implemented, as parties to a conflict give everything they can to destroy as much as possible the enemy. This is a fact, and yet is by no means a good argument against peace or truces, is it? Of course not, because the cause of the violence is not the truce, but the goals of the warring parties.

So in all honesty, while I see how the expectancy on the arrest warrant may explain the violent behaviour of those who feel threatened by it, I do not see how advocating for a deferral may ever be a solution to the real causes of the conflict.

there is a difference between an arrest warrant and a truce, one being a negotiated agreement and the other being an enforced surrender. But I do agree that a deferral is an unsatisfactory solution which will satisfy nobody. It is is just, i think, the least bad of all the alternatives.

To Khalid, I would add that the ICC has been extremely salutary to the NCP. It has put the issue of accountability on the table and has made the perpetrators of feel a shudder of fear, though not comparable to the terror endured by their victims. The problem is, there is no compromise with the ICC: either one side wins, or the other.

The ICC issue has become the only matter in Sudan, and sideline all other major issues facing the country and its citizens. But the main question is, will deferring the case resolve the current deadlock and allow things to move forward again? Or not?

I do agree with you that the ICC is biggest threat which is facing the National Congress Party in its 18 years in power and an indictment to President Al Bashir means indictment to the regime as whole. That why it is so serious to them. But a one year deferral will not eliminate the threat which is facing the NCP, and accordingly they will cooperate by honouring their commitments to the CPA and the other agreements which they signed.

As far as the threat of the ICC exist nothing will change and NCP will do anything to stay in power as losing power means the risk of them being handed over to the ICC. Also we donâ€™t know whether Al Bashir is the last person on the prosecutor’s list or whether he is going to ask for indictment of other senior officials.

I do understand the ramifications of indicting a sitting president for the country. He will not be able to carry its duties, and that will paralyse the whole government system, and that will add to the suffering of Sudanese people.

Why are we in this situation, it is because of the NCP policies, and now they are making the Sudanese people to pay for their mistakes.

The NCP might react by suspension all the agreement which they have signed including the CPA and cracking down more on individual freedoms and freedom of expression as they have already started doing. That will not going to resolve the issues. The Sudanese people have nothing to do with the ICC and its decisions. Punishing them for the action of the ICC persecutor will just show how isolated the regime is.

I think the way out should be by genuinely engaging Sudanese people in a proper transition which will lead to true democracy and handling the issue of justice in Darfur through truth and reconciliation process such like South Africa. But the NCP must first allow a true and genuine process, that will not only resolve the issue of the ICC but also address the other problems facing the country and save it from collapsing. If it possesses sovereignty it also holds responsibility and should exercise that properly in the interests of the people.

Dears,
I appreciate your opinions.
Deferral of the case is not a good solution. NCP will declare itself victorious and huge rallies will be mobilized across the country. The deferral will encourage the regime to go on with its past crimes if not escalating violence against its “enemies” who include the majority of Sudanese people.
The ICC indictment was a catalyist that improved the opposition stance. The Communist Party held its 5th convention, which was considered an impossible dream under the NCP rule .
An ICC arrest warrant for Al Bashir will force the regime to make further concessions. NCP will be compelled to do whatever it could internally to reduce international pressure. NCP internal power struggle will be accelerated and more concessions will be made to gratify the Sudanese. The “internal front” will benefit from such pressure. We will have a regime wobbling on the verge for a longer time. the thing that will result in strengthening the political opposition and thus give the Sudanese more options.
If given another year unconditionally, the regime will go on celebrating its victory. It will not remember to take necessary measures to solve internal crises untill the year passed, then it will return to the first square once again.

Broadly I agree with much of Khalid Omer’s rebuttal of Alex’s position but wish instead to ask what good is achieved by offering an opinion, in public, at this very late hour, that an unconditional deferral is urgently required?

We know that most Capitals on the Security Council have set upon a course of action decided last year that is unlikely to be hurriedly changed, we know that the key veto holders who might table such a resolution – China and Russia – are loathe to, we know that the only precedent we have was that when the same alarm bells were rung by outside analysts last July they were indeed cited by authorities in Khartoum in their threats to the outside world of calamities to come, but did not in fact prove correct.

One outcome of advocating the position, now, that ‘all hell will break loose and so we should do X quickly’, is that for those desiring X, hell breaking loose has now become a more legitimate and powerful lever. It makes the bar of what is a sufficient ‘threat to international peace and security’ for Article 16 an issue where, in recent months, it has been less part of the equation. I am concerned that the argument Alex makes will only detrimentally impact upon the gunboat and brinkmanship politics that we are no doubt in for.

History might prove the argument right, but the argument may be shaping the story.

it is never too late in the day. And my arguments today are no different to six or eight months ago.

I would not be so foolish as to predict any particular outcome. But the risks of something going wrong are significant, and if things go wrong they could go terribly wrong.

A lot of hard political work, from a number of quarters, went into creating the cool response of the Sudan Government in July. But none of the strategies for handling the issue, so as to translate it into substantive outcomes in favour of peace, democracy and justice for Sudan, has worked up to now. The NCP’s cynicism and bad faith has been a big part of the problem but not the only part. The options are now much diminished. And, even an outcome that is “only” a slowdown of CPA implementation puts us on a track towards a crisis within two years.

Dear Mr. de Waal,
The Sudanese media made a hero out of you today. All the headlines are about your blog. Alahdath Daily main and only headline reads “Alex de Waal: Ocampo’s case is weak”. Alsahafa Daily reads “International Expert:”The Hague is a matter of (life or Death) for the NCP” (your photo is the only one on the front page). You really deserve it, but it refelcts that the NCP (as the media is NCP controled) will consider the unconditional deferral a victory as I have mentioned yesterday. The NCP does not listen to any voice except those supporting its stances.

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