TBA

Propositions and Their Constituent Facts: An Essay in Pointillist Metaphysics

Speaker: Aviv Hoffmann From: The Hebrew University of Jerusalem URL:Abstract: Consider two fundamental questions in the metaphysics of propositions. (1) What in the nature of a proposition enables it to be true (or false)? (2) What in the nature of a proposition enables it to be about a given thing (especially, what enables necessarily equivalent propositions to be about distinct things)? To answer these questions, I offer the biregional theory of propositions. According to this theory, propositions inhabit what I call exemplification space, where each point is either a positive or a negative world-specific fact (such as the fact that Sophia is sad at w1 and the fact that it is not the case that Sophia is sad at w2, respectively). Propositions are (some) ordered pairs of disjoint regions of exemplification space: the first component of a pair corresponds to the truth of the proposition, and the second component corresponds to the falsity of the proposition. A proposition is true (false) at a possible world iff some fact in the truth (falsity) region of the proposition is specific to that world. A proposition is about a thing iff some fact in either the truth or the falsity region of the proposition is about the thing. The biregional theory is part of a novel doctrine I call metaphysical pointillism, which also includes a theory of facts and a concomitant theory of truth-making (I expound these theories elsewhere).