Improving Intelligence Analysis

The raison d'etre of the Intelligence Community is to provide accurate and meaningful information and insights to consumers in a form they can use at the time they need them. If intelligence fails to do that, it fails altogether. The expense and effort invested in collecting and processing the information have gone for naught.

Assessing how well the Intelligence Community accomplishes this
fundamental task is a complicated matter. A great deal of analysis
is published; much of it is timely and of excellent quality. The
Intelligence Community has many analysts who are recognized experts
in their respective fields and whose professional judgments are
valued and relied upon. Clearly, intelligence analysis has substantial
value to many consumers.

The Commission found especially close ties between the producers
and users of military intelligence. Within the military there
is a long history of respect for, and reliance upon, intelligence.
Intelligence is factored into strategic and tactical planning,
is exercised in war gaming, and is integral to operations. As
a result, military requirements are better defined, in large part,
because of the close and continuing dialogue between intelligence
analysts and the military commands they support.

Where policy agencies are concerned, however, consumers more often
take a jaundiced view of the analytical support they receive.
The President and senior cabinet officials appear to be relatively
well served, but many decisionmakers at lower levels find that
intelligence analysis comes up short. Often what they receive
fails to meet their needs by being too late or too unfocused,
or by adding little to what they already know.

In fact, only a small percentage of the resources allocated to
intelligence goes to "all- source" analysis. Relatively
few resources are devoted to developing and maintaining expertise
among the analytical pool. Intelligence lags behind in terms of
assimilating open source information into the analytical process,
and it continues to struggle with how to avail itself of expertise
in the private sector. Analysis that is not responsive to consumer
needs continues to be produced.

The Intelligence Communityis not entirely to blame. Consumers
have a responsibility not only to engage in the process but, more
important, to drive it. Often, they are uncooperative or too busy
to engage at all. Since most are political appointees, many enter
and leave government never appreciating what intelligence might
have done for them. Clearly, consumers need to be better educated
about the value of intelligence.

The Commission did find numerous instances where there was a close
working relationship with policymakers. Intelligence producers
were able to focus on issues of significance and to make information
available when needed. Analysts understood the consumer's level
of knowledge and the issues he or she wanted help on. Their analysis
was read and relied upon. The consumer, for his part, developed
an understanding of what intelligence could do for him and-equally
important-what intelligence could not do. Many considered the
support vital to meeting their responsibilities and actively engaged
in a dialogue with analysts to refine the support they received.
But these instances appear to be the exception rather than the
rule.

For the Commission, the lesson from all this is clear: there must
be a concerted effort to make intelligence analysis more useful
to the policymakers it serves. Just as elements of the private
sector have re-engineered themselves to improve the quality of
their products and their responsiveness to customers, so, too,
must intelligence agencies. In the sections that follow, the Commission
explains how we believe this might be accomplished.

Building Relationships

Policymakers receive their support from a variety of sources.
CIA's Directorate of Intelligence (DI) as well as the National
Intelligence Officers who comprise the National Intelligence Council
are responsible for providing all-source intelligence analysis
to the Government as a whole, with the President, the National
Security Advisor, and the Secretaries of Defense and State being
the foremost customers to be served. The CIA continues to be viewed
by most policymakers as the preeminent all-source analytical element
within the Government for providing independent judgments free
of policy or departmental bias.

Departments and agencies that have substantial requirements for
intelligence also have internal elements that provide tailored
all-source analysis to the agency head and his or her staff, using
what is provided by CIA and other sources available to the agency.
In the Department of Defense, this function is performed by the
Defense Intelligence Agency; in the Department of State, by the
Bureau of Intelligence and Research; and in the Departments of
Energy, Commerce, and Treasury, by small dedicated components.
These departmental organizations also participate in the production
of National Intelligence Estimates (discussed later in this chapter)
and other analyses produced under Community auspices. (See Chapter
10 for a description of the agencies that provide analytical support
to military users.)

In addition, consumers receive "single-source" reports
based on data obtained by NSA, CIA, DoD and diplomatic reporting
from the Department of State. Such reports are valued by consumers,
although they may not provide the context of all-source analysis.

Intelligence producers interact with their customers in various
ways. At one end of the spectrum, intelligence analysts may be
assigned to the staffs of certain consumers and integrated into
their work force, taking part in the substantive work of the office,
participating in foreign travel, discussions with foreign representatives,
etc. This type of support was universally acclaimed by the consumers
who had it, but because theassigned analyst is then unavailable
to meet the demands of other consumers, such in-house support
is at present limited to a small number of senior officials.

Some consumers are supported by detailing intelligence analysts
to help with a particular issue or process, for example, to support
a treaty negotiation. In other cases, intelligence producers station
"liaisons" with their customers, not to provide substantive
support, but to serve as a focal point for requests for such support.
The CIA, which has a government-wide responsibility, now has over
100 officers in policy agencies or military commands, either providing
direct support or in a liaison capacity. DIA and NSA similarly
have specialists providing direct support to consumers or in a
liaison capacity. In addition to providing benefits to the customer,
assignments to policy agencies also benefit the analysts involved
by improving their understanding of the policymaking process and
customer needs.

Other consumers receive regular briefings, or are briefed when
there are developments in their area of interest. Others may simply
be introduced to the analystswho cover their subject area
and invited to call them as needed. Many other consumers, particularly
those down the bureaucratic chain, may receive no special analytical
support beyond what is available in the daily publications and
intelligence reports. Obviously, the more intensive the support,
the more strained the personnel resources of intelligence agencies
are to provide it.

The Commission found that those consumers who have intelligence
aides on their staffs, or who receive daily intelligence briefings,
tend to express greater satisfaction with the quality of the intelligence.
In our view, such arrangements, while costly in terms of manpower,
should be encouraged. Nevertheless, no single relationship will
"fit all." It is up to intelligence producers, working
directly with particular consumers in policy agencies, to determine
the preferred kind of analytical support and to make every effort
to provide it.

A more systematic approach to building these relationships is
also needed. At present the support arrangements for officials
below cabinet-level appear largely ad hoc rather than the
result of a deliberate strategy. Further, where particular consumers
(for example, an assistant secretary at the Department of State)
receive analytical support both from an internal organization
(in this case, the Bureau of Intelligence and Research) and from
the CIA, it is sometimes unclear where the division of responsibility
lies between the two organizations, and opportunities to contribute
are missed.

8-1. The Commission recommends that each intelligence producer
develop a strategic plan for better serving consumers. Relevant
customers should be identified by position and consulted with
respect to the type of intelligence support they prefer. Senior-level
consumers should be strongly encouraged to have intelligence aides
assigned to their staffs or to have daily intelligence briefings.
As new incumbents are appointed to these senior positions, additional
consultations should be arranged to ascertain whether the existing
relationship should be changed. Once the customer has indicated
a preference, the producer should make every reasonable effort
to provide the support requested. Where the consumer receives
support from the CIA and also from a departmental organization,
representatives of both should participate in these consultations
in order to establish clear areas of responsibility.

Many observers have cautioned that in promoting closer relationships
with consumers, the chances are increased that intelligence analysis
will lose its objectivity. As analysts became aware of their customers'
assumptions and policy preferences, they would, consciously or
not, produce analysis that conformed to those preferences.

The Commission believes this problem is real, but manageable.
The need to present the "unvarnished truth" to policymakers
is at the core of every analyst's training and ethos. It is, in
a real sense, why intelligence exists. Further, there are checks
and balances within the system. Virtually all analysis is reviewed
by multiple experts, not all of whom are familiar with the biases
of a particular consumer. Some analyses, such as national estimates,
are reviewed by interagency boards.

The role of intelligence analysts is to inform the policy process.
One witness before the Commission expressed the view that "if
an intelligence analyst is not in some danger of being politicized,
he is probably not doing his job." The Commission agrees.
The greater danger lies not in becoming "politicized"
but in becoming irrelevant to the process of government.

Improving the Quality of the Product

However desirable it may be to build relationships between producers
and consumers, such relationships cannot be sustained unless the
intelligence side is able to demonstrate over time that it brings
something of value to the table.

The Commission attempted to assess, as a general proposition,
what intelligence, in fact, does bring to the table. Put another
way, what value, if any, is added by intelligence over information
available from open sources or the media? The Commission reviewed
prior studies of this issue and conducted its own analysis of
two separate international incidents, comparing the information
reported by the news media with the information reported by the
Intelligence Community. The conclusion reached in each case was
that both sources of information had their strengths. The media
were faster and did a better job conveying information on an immediate
event. But the media lacked staying power, missed essential details,
and often did not report what was of interest to policymakers
or report in a way that was comprehensible to policymakers. In
some cases, the intelligence analysis provided critical information
that was not reported by the news media at all. The verdict arising
from this sampling was that while the media contributed importantly,
there was clear value added by intelligence analysis.

Whatever its past contributions, the quality of intelligence analysis
can always be improved. The Intelligence Community has, in fact,
made substantial progress in this regard over the last four years.
But the Commission believes more could be done.

Promoting Greater Expertise Among Intelligence Analysts

An intelligence analyst sent to brief a senior policymaker on
"country x" faces a daunting situation. The policymaker
often issomeone who has lived in, or frequently travels
to "country x," has daily contacts with his or her counterparts
there and with substantive experts in the United States, and reads
the current literature on "country x." The intelligence
analyst, on the other hand, may have neither lived in, nor even
traveled to, "country x," and his or her contacts with
experts in the U.S. and within "country x" itself may
be limited. Yet he or she is expected to provide fresh insight
to the policymaker.

While there are senior analysts in the Intelligence Community
who are nationally known experts in their respective fields, they
are the exception rather than the rule. Recognizing this, most
analytical elements within the Intelligence Community have programs
designed to give their analysts the skills and knowledge base
they need to perform credibly. These programs are promising and
deserve support, but their scope remains limited. Exacerbating
the problem has been an unfortunate decline in the number of government
and foundation programs that once served as training grounds for
area, functional, and languagespecialists in the intelligence
area.

8-2. The Commission recommends several actions to improve the
quality of analysis:

More intelligence analysts should be given the opportunity
to serve in, and travel to, the country or countries they are
expected to cover. An extended visit to the country or countries
involved should be a minimal pre-requisite for any intelligence
officer prior to undertaking analytical duties.

Educational opportunities should be expanded. Analysts
should be encouraged to take university or graduate courses here
and abroad within their areas of expertise and to establish contacts
with experts in the private sector. They should be rewarded for
learning and maintaining proficiency in relevant foreign languages.
Participation in pertinent conferences and seminars, both in this
country and abroad, should become a routine part of their duties.

Analysts should be encouraged to remain within their
substantive areas of expertise rather than having to rotate to
other areas or serve in management positions in order to be promoted.
Substantive expertise should be rewarded.

Analysts should be encouraged to serve rotational assignments
in the policy agencies they principally serve.

The Commission recognizes that similar recommendations have been
made in the past but have not been followed up with a sufficient
commitment of resources. Considering the importance of this aspect
of the intelligence function, however, they must receive a high
priority for funding. Personnel shortages and budgetary constraints
should not be used to justify a lower level of effort in these
areas.

Making Greater Use of Expertise Outside the Intelligence
Community

Analysis on topics of significant national interest should be
informed by the best expertise this country has to offer, whether
that expertise resides within the Intelligence Community or outside
it. Intelligence agencies should more often take the initiative
to sponsor open conferences on international topics, make direct
and regular use of outside consultants, establish regular "peer
review" by outside experts for major assessments and estimates,
and contract out research on unclassified aspects of analytical
problems or the maintenance of reference data bases. Analysts
should systematically be able to consult outside experts on particular
issues without undue bureaucratic hindrance.

The failure to make greater use of outside expertise at the CIA
appears to result in part from a lack of financial resources and
in part from onerous security requirements-particularly the polygraph
examination and the requirement to submit subsequent publications
for review-that discourage some outside experts from participating
in intelligence work. The Commission believes that less intrusive
measures should be instituted in order for outside experts who
will have limited access to intelligence information to obtain
a security clearance.

Making Better Use of Open Sources

While the use of secret information distinguishes finished intelligence
from other analysis, no analyst can base his or her conclusions
solely on secret information without considering what is on the
public record. Indeed, analysts must have command of all relevant
information about their subjects, not simply command of secret
information.

As the volume and availability of information from "open
sources" has multiplied as a result of the revolution in
information technology, ascertaining what relevant information
may be on the public record has become more difficult. In CIA
alone, the amount of open source information has grown by a factor
of ten over the past four years.

To cope with this situation, the DCI established a Community Open
Source Program Office in 1992 to coordinate the collection, processing,
and dissemination of openly available information to CIA and other
elements of the Intelligence Community. Two new computer networks
have been established: one provides CIA analysts on-line access
to over 1200 open source publications; the other provides consumers
access not only to the CIA open source data base but also to other
unclassified and classified data bases maintained within the Intelligence
Community.

While the development of open source data bases is growing, intelligence
analysts have only limited access to them. Given the amount of
open source information that is readily available to the public
over computer networks, the effort of the Intelligence Community
to structure and make available to analysts pertinent open source
data bases seems inexplicably slow.

During the course of its inquiry, the Commission conducted an
impromptu test to see how readily information could be obtained
exclusively from open sources on a subject of current national
security interest and how that information compared to what could
be obtained from the Intelligence Community. The information obtained
from open sources was substantial and on some points more detailed
than that provided by the Intelligence Community. On the other
hand, the information that came from open sources took longer
to produce, required validation, and failed to cover many key
aspects of the situation important to policymakers.

In any event, it is clear that open sources do provide a substantial
share of the information used in intelligence analysis. In some
areas, such as economic analysis,it is estimated that
as much as 95 percent of the information utilized now comes from
open sources. With more and more information becoming available
by electronic means, its use in intelligence analysis can only
grow. Indeed, knowing what is publicly available enables producers
and collectors of intelligence to better focus their efforts on
that which is not. So crucial is this determination to the overall
intelligence process that the Commission finds it surprising that
more emphasis has not been given this aspect of the Intelligence
Community's operations. An adequate computer infrastructure to
tie intelligence analysts into open source information does not
appear to exist. In the view of the Commission, the creation of
such an infrastructure should be a top priority of the DCI and
a top priority for funding.

Making Analysis Available to Consumers

Until recently, intelligence was made available daily to consumers
in the form of large stacks of intelligence reports and daily
printed summaries of reports and analyses on specific issues.
Typically, staff would sort through this material and select or
summarize what the consumer should read. Once read, the materials
would be returned or destroyed. If a consumer had a question about
something he or she read, or wanted to be reminded of something
in a previous report, he or she could attempt to reach the analyst
who had prepared the report.

This situation has begun to change. The military, in particular,
has made significant strides in applying new information technology
to facilitate the dissemination and use of intelligence. Through
the Joint Deployable Intelligence Support System (JDISS), military
commands around the world have access not only to open source
information and current intelligence reporting over their computer
terminals, but are able to search electronically the archives
of intelligence agencies for pertinent data. Sorting is done by
keyword selection rather than the tedious process of going manually
through stacks of messages and printed publications. A user with
a question can query the analyst who prepared the report electronically.
The user also has an ability to evaluate instantly what is being
provided and request additional data as needed. In addition, intelligence
briefings are now provided daily through secure videoconferencing,
and fast-breaking intelligence is relayed instantaneously over
secure communications to affected consumers.

A similar capability known as INTELINK has been developed by the
Intelligence Community and is being installed in policy agencies
and with military users. While commercial technology has been
available for some time to allow the electronic storage, dissemination,
and manipulation of intelligence, agencies have faced a considerable
problem in doing this securely. Not only do they have to worry
about "hackers" gaining access to the system, but also
about controlling access. Not all users are necessarily cleared
for all levels of intelligence. While these problems are gradually
being overcome, they have slowed progress on the civilian side
beyond what one might expect, given the rapid development and
availability of commercial information systems. When INTELINK
is fully deployed to users, some policymakers will in all likelihood
continue to rely upon their staffs to utilize the system on their
behalf. Nonetheless, their ability to obtain specific intelligence
on demand should be greatly improved.

The Commission believes it essential that the development and
deployment of INTELINK be completed as soon as possible. The project
should be given the highest funding priority within the Intelligence
Community.

Improving the National Estimates Process

National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs) treat issues of major importance
and long-term interest to the United States and are considered
by the Intelligence Community to be its most comprehensive and
authoritative products. NIEs are produced by the National Intelligence
Council (NIC), an organization composed of twelve senior officers
called National Intelligence Officers (NIOs), who report directly
to the DCI. Each NIE undergoes thorough review and coordination
by representatives of the various intelligence agencies and is
ultimately approved by a board chaired by the DCI and composed
of the heads of these agencies.

NIEs are intended to help policymakers and warfighters think through
key issues by presenting forward-leaning judgments about the likely
course of events in foreign countries and their implications for
the United States. The Commission, however, found consumer reaction
to NIEs mixed at best. Some senior policymakers professed to be
unaware of them altogether. Some dismissed them as neither timely
nor relevant. Others criticized them for notable predictive failures
or for watering down the analysis through an interagency coordination
process that led to "lowest common denominator" results.
NIEs did receive the plaudits of a few policymakers, but, on balance,
the reaction was negative.

Regardless of how NIEs are appreciated by senior policymakers,
they do appear to serve several useful purposes. They are authoritative
statements of the views of the Intelligence Community about important
topics. The development of NIEs forces analysts to consider and
test all the evidence brought to bear upon the issue. Without
such a process, the assessment of important issues probably would
not be as rigorous or comprehensive. It also appears that while
senior policymakers may not read them, their staffs do, incorporating
information and judgments from NIEs into what is being provided
to more senior levels.

To improve the usefulness of NIEs, the Commission believes policymakers
should be involved more directly and systematically in the estimates
process. NIEs should only be prepared at the request of a senior
policymaker or where there is senior policymaker interest. These
policymakers should be consulted routinely on the terms of reference
and timing of estimates affecting their areas of responsibility.
Moreover, analysts developing national estimates should routinely
solicit the views of pertinent policy officials, to include U.S.
Ambassadors, on the subjects concerned, without distorting their
analyses to reflect policy preferences.

Establishing a More Broadly Focused Analytical Entity

During the Cold War, the focus of intelligence analysis was on
the Soviet Union and other Communist states. Most of the information
relating to these countries was secret and could best be obtained,
analyzed, and reported by the Intelligence Community. When it
came to assessing the significance of the information, it made
sense to do that within the Intelligence Community as well.

Today, while there remain subjects that can be addressed adequately
only by intelligence means, such as terrorism or weapons proliferation,
much of the information on the vast majority of issues of concern
to policymakers is openly available. Most of the expert knowledge
on these subjects lies outside the Intelligence Community: in
the policy agencies, in academia, in "think tanks,"
in the Library of Congress, in foreign countries, and in the media.
While the Intelligence Community may still have an important contribution
to make in these areas by providing the "secret piece,"
the Community will rarely provide the "recognized expert"
in the field.

In recognition of these realities, the Commission believes that
the NIC should be restructured to become a more open and broadly
focused analytic entity. Important as it is to improve the expertise
of intelligence analysts, the Commission is persuaded that, with
the end of the Cold War, the Government must take better advantage
both of openly available information and of the wide range of
expertise in the academic and business communities. The wisdom
that exists outside the Intelligence Community must be incorporated
into the assessment of today's foreign policy issues. An open
environment needs to be created where knowledgeable experts on
issues of concern to policymakers can be brought together from
policy departments, "think tanks," and academia, as
well as from the Intelligence Community, to analyze, debate, and
assess these new world issues. Although the NIC has increasingly
drawn on outside experts in recent years, the Commission believes
a more radical approach is required.

8-3. The Commission recommends that the National Intelligence
Council be restructured as a "National Assessments Center."
The new entity should continue to produce NIEs requested by policymakers
that draw largely or partially on information collected by intelligence
agencies. Equally or more important, it should also prepare classified
and unclassified "assessments" of issues of concern
to policymakers where the intelligence contribution is relatively
small. These assessments should include analyses of long-term
problems policymakers are unable to address effectively because
of their demanding schedules and need to focus on current events.
The Commission anticipates that assessments would increasingly
be directed by experts-in or out of government-who would manage
integrated teams of substantive specialists on rotational assignment
from policy departments, academia, think-tanks, and the Intelligence
Community. The Center should remain under the purview of the DCI
but should be moved out of CIA headquarters to a suitable location
in downtown Washington to make it more acceptable and accessible
to policymakers and outside experts.