I research, write about innovation, privacy and reputation via my books and articles, and work on it with clients as president of Arcadia, a communications research, design & delivery lab focused on today's most important, cutting-edge issues. I have 30+ years of professional experience working at big ad/PR agencies and at major brands, and I'm a Senior Fellow Emeritus at the Smithsonian's National Museum of American History.

The author is a Forbes contributor. The opinions expressed are those of the writer.

Boeing Has An Airplane Problem, Not a PR Problem

Brake problems, a fuel leak, and an electrical fire kept three Boeing 787s from flying earlier this week, eliciting reassurances from the company that its problems were similar to those of all new planes, and that they’re not changing any manufacturing procedures or sales plans.

Downplaying the events might be standard PR practice — and they may well be minor bumps in the ongoing shakedown of the new plane — but I think Boeing needs to reevaluate its strategy in light of the fact that it has an airplane problem.

The 787 Dreamliner has been vexed since its inception.

The company was convinced by one or more management consulting firms to outsource design and production of the 787’s components. While this idea might make sense for sourcing coffeemakers, it was a nonsense approach to assembling perhaps the most complicated and potentially dangerous machines shy of nuclear reactors. I’m sure blather from the HBR supported the idea that distances between factories in Seattle and Outer Mongolia were no farther than a VOIP chat, but the reality was a mess. Parts didn’t fit together with others. Some suppliers subcontracted work to their suppliers and then shrugged at problems with assembly. When one part wasn’t available, the next one that depended on it couldn’t be attached and the global supply chain all but seized up. Boeing had to spend $1 billion in 2009 to buy one of the worst offenders and bring the work back in-house.

It didn’t help that the outsourcing plan included skipping the detailed blueprints the company would have normally prepared, and allowing vendors to come up with their own. Delivered components arrived with instructions and notes written in Chinese, Italian, and other languages. Oh, and they decided to build the airplane out of plastic along with other novel materials and technologies, so it would have been a big experiment even if Boeing approached manufacturing like it always had.

The project went billions over budget, the delivery schedule was pushed back at least 7 times before the first planes were delivered 3+ years late, and so far the company has delivered only 49 of the 848 it has sold.

So are you looking forward to flying on an airplane adopting novel technology with no single blueprint built out of plastic and assembled from pieces that don’t necessarily fit together?

Fair or not, this narrative is all but established fact because it’s searchable online, so it’s just waiting for the next technical mishap to get revisited. Worse, it may well have yielded major issues, which is why the company’s declarations of “business as usual” have no credibility because nothing has been usual about the 787 since day one.

Boeing runs many risks following its PR strategy. More mishaps are likely, if not inevitable. The world’s media are on the outlook and will report them. Boeing’s stock price will continue to be particularly sensitive to these reports (it fell 2% on this week’s news). Its airline customers will get a little itchier with every glimpse of a problem. The flying public will take note. Regulators might feel compelled to take another look at the planes. God forbid something truly “not minor” happens; the I told you so meme will run rampant, and at that point all bets are off on stock price, flying confidence, and even ultimate delivery of those remaining 800 planes.

It’s time now for Boeing to stop telling us that everything is fine and start proving it. Get third-parties to affirm its design integrity. Go back and check the quality and tolerances of the parts it received from all over the world. Test the planes even more, and make a big public stink about it. Create and then announce an even deeper, more intensive quality regime for those models still on the assembly line. Do something big, like Rolls Royce did when its new engine flamed out in 2010 (they grounded every plane using it until they were satisfied the problem was solved).

It needs to narrate operational truths, using social media and TV advertising filled with documented, factual evidence that the 787 is the best, safest plane ever built. Get ahead of the narrative by changing it, not talking as if it doesn’t exist. Don’t declare. Prove.

Oh, and if there’s such a thing as malpractice suits against management consultants, the brainiacs who pitched the outsourcing deal in the first place deserve to be drawn and quartered. Ultimately, there’s no way anybody is going to believe that Boeing has got things right unless it demonstrates the ability to acknowledge what it got wrong.

Until then, it doesn’t have a PR problem. It has an airplane problem.

UPDATE 01.11.13: A day after I wrote this essay, the FAA announced a ”comprehensive safety review of Boeing 787 critical systems.” Unfortunately, this just plays into the ongoing narrative, whether it’s deserved suspicion or not. I had hoped Boeing had more time to proactively change the story. It’s never too late.

UPDATE 01.14.13: More news of 787 problems. Many comments pointed out that the plane was getting unfair scrutiny, and that its problems were no different that those of any other new plane. While this may well be the case, the fact of the attention — which the program has enduring for many years now — should have encouraged Boeing to approach its communications in a different way, in my opinion.

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My point is that Boeing’s communications on the 787 need to go far beyond the standard PR treatment they’re giving it. Its problem is that the complicated and sometimes scary history of the plane is the underlying problem for its image.

Nobody I know is worried about the reliability of the Dreamliners, and Airlines look beyond traditional media for their purchases. Plus, Boeing are doing some really cool stuff (like pressurising their planes higher).

They ALREADY test their parts thoroughly, and their fleet hasn’t been grounded either. Clearly, you’ve been selling PR companies so long, that you are no longer concerned with researching facts.

Andrew, I’m not questioning Boeing’s regulatory compliance or its own internal commitment to doing what’s right (or what’s cool). The narrative of the 787′s development, expressed publicly, makes for a horrible context for the marketing of the plane. I think it’s a mistake to ignore that context.

I had to create an account to respond to this poorly researched article.

The problem is that you don’t understand what you’re speaking about.

Are you insinuating that Boeing shouldn’t have used international partners to manufacture the aircraft? Are you not aware that Boeing has teamed up with some of the better aircraft part manufacturers in the world like Alenia in Italy?

Do you actually believe that an OEM can make an aircraft of this complexity without having major issues with certain suppliers? The purchasing of certain processes from various suppliers is done on a daily basis by Ford, GM, Chrysler and so on. This is not an unusual practice. It’s the nature of the game when you’re dealing with this degree of suppliers.

Whether the OEM is making aircraft or cars, there isn’t a single complex product that hasn’t had issues similar to what the 787 is enduring currently. The 767-400 series had teething issues along with early versions of the 777. The only difference between those issues and now is that those issues were not sensationalized by the media.

None of the reported failures have any relation to tolerances as you elude to in your article. Final part tolerance has never been an issue on any Boeing aircraft. Not once.

If this article is representative of the research and writing quality of this publication, I would say that Forbes has much more to be concerned about than Boeing.

The fact that your ideas are “searchable” online underscores my belief that you’re regurgitating inaccurate information. This is a slanted and horribly researched article.

Wendell, thanks for your spirited defense of outsourcing! I am also a fan in many cases. You’re right, it is standard operating practice in the car industry (among others). And you’re also right about many new or first-ever products evidencing growing pains.

But I think you’re woefully underestimating how radically new or different almost every aspect of the 787 story has been. The information I’m “regurgitating” has come from a host of reputable news sources and, in many instances, from Boeing itself, and much of it isn’t particularly positive. My point is that this development narrative doesn’t suggest confidence (to the vast majority of us non-aerospace experts) and that it lurks just beneath every news item, small or otherwise. It magnifies every tidbit and, if something truly bad happened, it would most certainly get center stage as a/the cause.

Yet Boeing’s approach to the lastest spate of “minor” problems has been to say, effectively, “don’t worry, trust us,” and I think that such a dismissive stance has no credibility. The plane deserves a more robust, operationally-based communications plan that substantiates its safety and efficacy claims. This is core to defining and then sustaining its corporate reputation, not just defending the plane.

PS: As for your issue with my use of the word “tolerances,” I was referencing the broad issues of “things fitting together,” which was a problem for the 787 during its development…perhaps more than it would have been had it not been pursuing the novel, experimental and, in many ways unproven approaches of outsourced design and manufacture (at least for its industry). But you’re right, I’m a marketer, not an ISO 900-certified engineer, so maybe tolerances was the wrong word? Here’s just one example of what I meant (you can easily search for others): http://seattletimes.com/html/businesstechnology/2017434319_boeing06.html

Jonathan, I understand your point. What I don’t agree with is how you are evaluating these issues. I consider these issues minor yet it would seem that you believe that these issues are much more than this.

All Nippon Airlines (the launch customer for the 787) also consider these issues to be minor and they haven’t modified their orders. ANA is easily considered one of the safest airlines in the world and they have never compromised on passenger safety.

What I consider serious issues are one of the issues you mention in your article. The A380 2010 incidents. To be clear, Rolls Royce did not “ground every plane.” Quantas was the only carrier to ground the aircraft. Emirates, Air France, Singapore and Lufthansa all continued normal flight operations with the aircraft during this incident.

I assure you that Rolls Royce very much wanted the A380 to continue flight operations during this ordeal because they knew they would be held accountable for any flight disruptions. Ultimately they were held accountable to the tune of just over 100 million dollars that was paid directly to Quantas Airlines.

This is an interesting point you mention:

The plane deserves a more robust, operationally-based communications plan that substantiates its safety and efficacy claims.

Based upon what I’m reading from overjoyed Boeing’s 787 customers, hasn’t that point been addressed by the operators of the aircraft? Am I misunderstanding your comment?

You make some very strong points in your article but in my opinion I feel it should have been more balanced and far more accurate with regards to the facts you reference.

Wendell, you’re welcome, and thank you for your thoughtful review in the first place (and this addendum). I still stand by every one of my facts, however, and my conclusion that Boeing cannot claim that the 787 project has ‘the same’ minor issues as any other plane when every aspect of its creation and delivery was “different.”

Also, regarding my specific reference to Rolls Royce engines, a couple of facts: Qantas, Singapore, and Lufthansa were the only airlines flying the Trent 900; both Qantas and Singapore grounded them, and Lufthansa continued its use only with extraordinary engine checks before every flight; and Rolls Royce did take engines out of service, whether happily or willingly (http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/newsbysector/industry/engineering/8522268/Blowout-led-Rolls-Royce-to-remove-53-engines.html).

Re my call for better communications on the plane, I don’t think that “overjoyed customers” tells consumers and then, by indirect reference, financiers or regulators, much of anything about safety and efficacy. The ongoing narrative of the project is just too chocked full of problems, delays, tests, shortcomings, and a host of other points that may not mean anything to an expert but suggest trouble to the rest of us. We need third-parties and activities to substantiate their joy.

I hate to say it, but just watch what happens regarding PR on this plane over the next few years. Every little shortcoming will dredge up the ugly big backstory, and the narrative is/will be an ongoing weight on Boeing’s reputation. God forbid something really bad happens; then it’ll be ID’d as the cause.

The drift I am catching from the comments of individuals who appear to be sector experts is that aircraft design and assembly is a complex process that depends on globally sourced expertise and is invariably punctuated by problems. I take their comments to be the truth.

The drift I am catching from Baskin’s original article and spirited defense is that it would do Boeing well to tell that truth…with all the hairy details…rather than offering what appears to me, a lay person, as a dismissive comment that on any given day, the world’s most sophisticated aircraft can be reasonably expected to have “brake problems, fuel leaks, and electrical fires.”

Yes, with one addition: I think now Boeing doesn’t have the credibility to “come clean” (the 787 was particularly complex in novel ways, at least according to mainstream media reports), and doing so would probably carry with it the wrong tonality anyway. It should figure out how to strategically reassert its authority with new program/programs that would provide the substance to turn those dismissive comments into contributors to reputational value.

A single fact proves that the development of the 787 has not been like any previous Boeing commercial airplane. The delay from roll-out to first flight was 29+ months. The previous high for a Boeing plane that actually entered service was 4 months. The 787 was rolled out for PR on 7-8-7. It was not a viable airplane on that day and Boeing has been playing catch-up ever since.