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PAGE'S mind, from the day of his arrival in England, had been
filled with that portent which was the most outstanding fact in
European life. Could nothing be done to prevent the dangers threatened
by European militarism? Was there no way of forestalling the war
which seemed every day to be approaching nearer? The dates of
the following letters, August, 1913, show that this was one of
the first ideas which Page presented to the new Administration.

.

To Edward M. House

Aug. 28, 1913.

MY DEAR HOUSE:

. . . Everything is lovely and the goose hangs high. We're
having a fine time. Only, only, only---I do wish to do something
constructive and lasting. Here are great navies and armies and
great withdrawals of men from industry---an enormous waste. Here
are kings and courts and gold lace and ceremonies which, without
producing anything, require great cost to keep them going. Here
are all the privileges and taxes that this state of things implies---every
one a hindrance to human progress. We are free from most of these.
We have more people and more capable people and many times more
territory than both England and Germany; and we have more potential
wealth than all Europe. They know that.

They'd like to find a way to escape. The Hague programmes,
for the most part, just lead them around a circle in the dark
back to the place where they started. Somebody needs to do something.
If we could find some friendly use for these navies and armies
and kings and things---in the service of humanity---they'd follow
us. We ought to find a way to use them in cleaning up the tropics
under our leadership and under our code of ethics---that everything
must be done for the good of the tropical peoples and that nobody
may annex a foot of land. They want a job. Then they'd quit sitting
on their haunches, growling at one another.

I wonder if we couldn't serve notice that the land-stealing
game is forever ended and that the cleaning up of backward lands
is now in order---for the people that live there; and then invite
Europe's help to make the tropics as healthful as the Panama
Zone?

There's no future in Europe's vision---no long look ahead.
They give all their thought to the immediate danger. Consider
this Balkan War; all European energy was spent merely to keep
the Great Powers at peace. The two wars in the Balkans have simply
impoverished the people---left the world that much worse than
it was before. Nobody has considered the well-being or the future
of those peoples nor of their land. The Great Powers are mere
threats to one another, content to check, one the other! There
can come no help to the progress of the world from this sort
of action---no step forward.

Work on a world-plan. Nothing but blue chips, you know. Is
it not possible that Mexico may give an entering wedge for this

kind of thing?

Heartily yours,

WALTER H. PAGE.

In a memorandum, written about the same time, Mr. Page explains
his idea in more detail:

Was there ever greater need than there is now of a first-class
mind unselfishly, working on world problems? The ablest ruling
minds are engaged on domestic tasks. There is no world-girdling
intelligence at work in government. On the continent of Europe,
the Kaiser is probably the foremost man. Yet he cannot think
far beyond the provincial views of the Germans. In England, Sir
Edward Grey is the largest-visioned statesman. All the Europeans
are spending their thought and money in watching and checkmating
one another and in maintaining their armed and balanced status
quo.

A way must be found out of this stagnant watching. Else a
way will have to be fought out of it; and a great European war
would set the Old World, perhaps the whole world, back a long
way; and thereafter, the present armed watching would recur;
we should have gained nothing. It seems impossible to talk the
Great Powers out of their fear of one another or to "Hague"
them out of it. They'll never be persuaded to disarm. The only
way left seems to be to find some common and useful work for
these great armies to do. Then, perhaps, they'll work themselves
out of their jealous position. Isn't this sound psychology?

To produce a new situation, the vast energy that now spends
itself in maintaining armies and navies must find a new outlet.
Something new must be found for them to do, some great unselfish
task that they can do together.

Nobody can lead in such a new era but the United States.

May there not come such a chance in Mexico---to clean out
bandits, yellow fever, malaria, hookworm---all to make the country
healthful, safe for life and investment, and for orderly self-government
at last? What we did in Cuba might thus be made the beginning
of a new epoch in history----conquest for the sole benefit of
the conquered, worked out by a sanitary reformation. The new
sanitation will reclaim all tropical lands; but the work must
be first done by military power---probably from the outside.

May not the existing military power of Europe conceivably
be diverted, gradually, to this use? One step at a time, as political
and financial occasions arise? As presently in Mexico?

This present order must change. It holds the Old World still.
It keeps all parts of the world apart, in spite of the friendly
cohesive forces of trade and travel. It keeps back self-government
and the progress of man.

And the tropics cry out for sanitation, which is at first
an essentially military task.

A strange idea this may have seemed in August, 1913, a year
before the outbreak of the European war; yet the scheme is not
dissimilar to the "mandatory" principle, adopted by
the Versailles Peace Conference as the only practical method of
dealing with backward peoples. In this work, as in everything
that would help mankind on its weary way to a more efficient and
more democratic civilization, Page regarded the United States,
Great Britain, and the British Dominions as inevitable partners.

Anything that would bring these two nations into a closer cooperation
he looked upon as a step making for human advancement. He believed
that any opportunity of sweeping away misconceptions and prejudices
and of impressing upon the two peoples their common mission should
be eagerly seized by the statesmen of the two countries. And circumstances
at this particular moment, Page believed, presented a large opportunity
of this kind. It is one of the minor ironies of modern history
that the United States and Great Britain should have selected
1914 as a year for a great peace celebration. That year marked
the one hundredth anniversary of the signing of the Treaty of
Ghent, which ended the War of 1812, and in 1913 comprehensive
plans had already been formed for observing this impressive centennial.
The plan was to make it more than the mere observance of a hundred
years of peaceful intercourse; it was the intention to use the
occasion to emphasize the fundamental identity of American and
British ideals and to lay the foundation of a permanent understanding
and friendship. The erection of a monument to Abraham Lincoln
at Westminster---a plan that has since been realized---was one
detail of this programme. Another was the restoration of Sulgrave
Manor, the English country seat of the Washingtons, and its preservation
as a place where the peoples of both countries could share their
common traditions. Page now dared to hope that President Wilson
might associate himself with this great purpose to the extent
of coming to England and accepting this gift in the name of the
American nation. Such a Presidential visit, he believed, would
exercise a mighty influence in forestalling a threatening European
war. The ultimate purpose, that is, was world peace---precisely
the same motive that led President Wilson, in 1919, to make a
European pilgrimage.

This idea was no passing fancy with Page: it was with him a
favourite topic of conversation. Such a presidential visit, he
believed, would accomplish more than any other influences in dissipating
the clouds that were darkening the European landscape. He would
elaborate the idea at length in discussions with his intimates.

"What I want," he would say, "is to have the
President of the United States and the King of England stand up
side by side and let the world take a good look at them!"

.

<CENTER>To Edward M. House

August 25, 1913.

I wrote him (President Wilson) my plan---a mere outline. He'll
only smile now. But when the tariff and the currency and Mexico
are off his hands, and when he can be invited to come and deliver
an oration on George Washington next year at the presentation
of the old Washington homestead here, he may be "pushed
over." You do the pushing. Mrs. Page has invited the young
White House couple to visit us on their honeymoon.(<A NAME="n54"></A><A
HREF="Pagenotes.htm#54">54</A>) Encourage that and that may encourage
the larger plan later. Nothing else would give such a friendly
turn to the whole world as the President's coming here. The old
Earth would sit up and rub its eyes and take notice to whom it
belongs. This visit might prevent an English-German war and an
American-Japanese war, by this mere show of friendliness. It
would be one of the greatest occasions of our time. Even at my
little speeches, they "whoop it up!" What would they

do over the President's!

.

But at that time Washington was too busy with its domestic
programme to consider such a proposal seriously. "Your two
letters," wrote Colonel House in reply, "have come to
me and lifted me out of the rut of things and given me a glimpse
of a fair land. What you are thinking of and what you want this
Administration to do is beyond the power of accomplishment for
the moment. My desk is covered with matters of no lasting importance,
but which come to me as a part of the day's work, and which must
be done if I am to help lift the load that is pressing upon the
President. It tells me better than anything else what he has to
bear, and how utterly futile it is for him to attempt such problems
as you present."

.

From the President

MY DEAR PAGE:

. . . As for your suggestion that I should myself visit England
during my term of office, I must say that I agree with all your
arguments for it, and yet the case against the President's leaving
the country, particularly now that he is expected to exercise
a constant leadership in all parts of the business of the government,
is very strong and I am afraid overwhelming. It might be the
beginning of a practice of visiting foreign countries which would
lead Presidents rather far afield.

It is a most attractive idea, I can assure you, and I turn
away from it with the greatest reluctance.

We hear golden opinions of the impression you are making in
England, and I have only to say that it is just what I had expected.

Cordially and faithfully yours,

WOODROW WILSON.

HON. WALTER H. PAGE,
American Embassy,
London, England.

.

In December, however, evidently Colonel House's mind had turned
to the general subject that had so engaged that of the Ambassador.

.

<CENTER>From Edward M. House

145 East 35th Street,

New York City.
December 13th, 1913.

DEAR PAGE:

In my budget of yesterday I did not tell you of the suggestion
which I made to Sir William Tyrrell when he was here, and which
I also made to the President.

It occurred to me that between us all we might bring about
the naval holiday which Winston Churchill has proposed. My plan
is that I should go to Germany in the spring and see the Kaiser,
and try to win him over to the thought that is uppermost in our
mind and that of the British Government.

Sir William thought there was a good sporting chance of success.
He offered to let me have all the correspondence that had passed
between the British and German governments upon this question
so that I might be thoroughly informed as to the position of
them both. He thought I should go directly to Germany without
stopping in England, and that Gerard should prepare the Kaiser
for my coming, telling him of my relations with the President.
He thought this would be sufficient without any further credentials.

In other words, he would do with the Kaiser what you did with
Sir Edward Grey last summer.

I spoke to the President about the matter and he seemed pleased
with the suggestion; in fact, I might say, he was enthusiastic.
He said, just as Sir William did, that it would be too late for
this year's budget; but he made a suggestion that he get the
Appropriations Committee to incorporate a clause, permitting
him to eliminate certain parts of the battleship budget in the
event that other nations declared for a naval holiday. So this
will be done and will further the plan.

Now I want to get you into the game. If you think it advisable,
take the matter up with Sir William Tyrrell and then with Sir
Edward Grey, or directly with Sir Edward, if you prefer, and
give me the benefit of your advice and conclusions.

Please tell Sir William. that I lunched at the Embassy with
the Spring Rices yesterday, and had a satisfactory talk with

both Lady Spring Rice and Sir Cecil.

Faithfully yours,

E. M. HOUSE.

.

It is apparent from Page's letters that the suggestion now
contained in Colonel House's communication would receive a friendly
hearing. The idea that Colonel House suggested was merely the
initial stage of a plan which soon took on more ambitious proportions.
At the time of Sir William. Tyrrell's American visit, the Winston
Churchill proposal for a naval holiday was being actively discussed
by the British and the American press. In one form or another
it had been figuring in the news for nearly two years. Viscount
Haldane, in the course of his famous visit to Berlin in February,
1912, had attempted to reach some understanding with the German
Government on the limitation of the German and the British fleets.
The Agadir crisis of the year before had left Europe with a bad
state of nerves, and there was a general belief that only some
agreement on shipbuilding could prevent a European war. Lord Haldane
and von Tirpitz spent many hours discussing the relative sizes
of the two navies, but the discussions led to no definite understanding.
In March, 1913, Mr. Churchill, then First Lord of the Admiralty,
took up the same subject in a different form. In this speech he
first used the words "naval holiday," and proposed that
Germany and Great Britain should cease building first-class battleships
for one year, thus giving the two nations a breathing space, during
which time they might discuss their future plans in the hope of
reaching a permanent agreement. The matter lagged again until
October 18, 1913, when, in a speech at Manchester, Mr. Churchill
placed his proposal in this form: "Now, we say to our great
neighbour, Germany, 'If you will put off beginning your two ships
for twelve months from the ordinary date when you would have begun
them, we will put off beginning our four ships, in absolute good
faith, for exactly the same period.'" About the same time
Premier Asquith made it clear that the Ministry was back of the
suggested programme. In Germany, however, the "naval holiday
" soon became an object of derision. The official answer
was that Germany had a definite naval law and that the Government
could not entertain any suggestion of departing from it. Great
Britain then answered that, for every keel Germany laid down,
the Admiralty would lay down two. The outcome, therefore, of this
attempt at friendship was that the two nations had been placed
farther apart than ever.

The dates of this discussion, it will be observed, almost corresponded
with the period covered by the Tyrrell visit to America. This
fact, and Page's letters of this period, had apparently implanted
in Colonel House's mind an ambition for definite action. He now
proposed that President Wilson should take up the broken threads
of the rapprochement and attempt to bring them together again.
From this, as will be made plain, the plan developed into something
more comprehensive. Page's ideas on the treatment of backward
nations had strongly impressed both the President and Colonel
House. The discussion on Mexico which had just taken place between
the American and the British Governments seemed to have developed
ideas that could have a much wider application. The fundamental
difficulties in Mexico were not peculiar to that country nor indeed
to Latin-America. Perhaps the most prolific cause of war among
the more enlightened countries was that produced by the jealousies
and antagonisms which were developed by their contacts with unprogressive
peoples---in the Balkans, the Ottoman Empire, Asia, and the Far
East. The method of dealing with such peoples, which the United
States had found so successful in Cuba and the Philippines, had
proved that there was just one honourable way of dealing with
the less fortunate and more primitive races in all parts of the
world. Was it not possible to bring the greatest nations, especially
the United States, Great Britain, and Germany, to some agreement
on this question, as well as on the question of disarmament? This
once accomplished, the way could be prepared for joint action
on the numerous other problems which were then threatening the
peace of the world. The League of Nations was then not even a
phrase, but the plan that was forming in Colonel House's mind
was at least some scheme for permanent international cooperation.
For several years Germany had been the nation which had proved
the greatest obstacle to such international friendliness and arbitration.
The Kaiser had destroyed both Hague Conferences as influential
forces in the remaking of the world; and in the autumn of 1913
he had taken on a more belligerent attitude than ever. If this
attempt to establish a better condition of things was to succeed,
Germany's cooperation would be indispensable. This is the reason
why Colonel House proposed first of all to visit Berlin.

.

From Edward M. House

145 East 35th Street,

New York City.
January 4th, 1914.

DEAR PAGE:

. . . Benj. Ide Wheeler(<A NAME="n55"></A><A HREF="Pagenotes.htm#55">55</A>)
took lunch with me the other day. He is just back from Germany
and he is on the most intimate terms with the Kaiser. He tells
me he often takes dinner with the family alone, and spends the
evening with them.

I know, now, the different Cabinet officials who have the
Kaiser's confidence and I know his attitude toward England, naval
armaments, war, and world politics in general.

Wheeler spoke to me very frankly and the information he gave
me will be invaluable in the event that my plans carry. The general
idea is to bring about a sympathetic understanding between England,
Germany, and America, not only upon the question of disarmament,
but upon other matters of equal importance to themselves, and
to the world at large.

It seems to me that Japan should come into this pact, but
Wheeler tells me that the Kaiser feels very strongly upon the
question of Asiatics. He thinks the contest of the future will

be between the Eastern and Western civilizations. . . .

Your friend always,

E. M. HOUSE.

.

By January 4, 1914, the House-Wilson plan had thus grown into
an Anglo-American-German "pact," to deal, not only with
"disarmament, but other matters of equal importance to themselves
and to the world at large." Page's response to this idea
was consistent and characteristic. He had no faith in Germany
and believed that the existence of Kaiserism was incompatible
with the extension of the democratic ideal. Even at this early
time eight months before the outbreak of the World War---he had
no enthusiasm for anything in the nature of an alliance, or a
"pact," that included Germany as an equal partner. He
did, however, have great faith in the cooperation of the English-speaking
peoples as a force that would make for permanent peace and international
justice. In his reply to Colonel House, therefore, Page fell back
at once upon his favourite plan for an understanding between the
United States, Great Britain, and the British colonies. That he
would completely sympathize with the Washington aspiration for
disarmament was to be expected.

.

To Edward M. House

January 2, 1914.

MY DEAR HOUSE:

You have set my imagination going. I've been thinking of this
thing for months, and now you've given me a fresh start. It can
be worked out somehow---doubtless, not in the form that anybody
may at first see; but experiment and frank discussion will find
a way.

As I think of it, turning it this way and that, there always
comes to me just as I am falling to sleep this reflection: the
English-speaking peoples now rule the world in all essential
facts. They alone and Switzerland have permanent free government.
In France there's freedom---but for how long? In Germany and
Austria ---hardly. In the Scandinavian States---yes, but they
are small and exposed as are Belgium and Holland. In the big
secure South American States---yes, it's coming. In Japan---?
Only the British lands and the United States have secure liberty.
They also have the most treasure, the best fighters, the most
land, the most ships---the future in fact.

Now, because George Washington warned us against alliances,
we've gone on as if an alliance were a kind of smallpox. Suppose
there were---let us say for argument's sake---the tightest sort
of an alliance, offensive and defensive, between all Britain,
colonies and all, and the United States---what would happen?
Anything we'd say would go, whether we should say, "Come
in out of the wet," or, "Disarm." That might be
the beginning of a real world-alliance and union to accomplish
certain large results---disarmament, for instance, or arbitration
---dozens of good things.

Of course, we'd have to draw and quarter the O'Gormans.(<A
NAME="n56"></A><A HREF="Pagenotes.htm#56">56</A>) But that ought
to be done anyhow in the general interest of good sense in the
world. We could force any nation into this "trust"
that we wanted in it.

Isn't it time we tackled such a job frankly, fighting out
the Irish problem once for all, and having done with it?

I'm not proposing a programme. I'm only thinking out loud.
I see little hope of doing anything so long as we choose to be

ruled by an obsolete remark made by George Washington.

W. H. P.

.

January 11, 1914.

. . . But this armament flurry is worth serious thought. Lloyd
George gave out an interview, seeming to imply the necessity
of reducing the navy programme.,

The French allies of the British went up in the air! They
raised a great howl. Churchill went to see them, to soothe them.
They would not be soothed. Now the Prime Minister is going to
Paris--ostensibly to see his daughter off to the Riviera. Nobody
believes that reason. They say he's going to smooth out the French.
Meantime the Germans are gleeful.

And the British Navy League is receiving money and encouraging
letters from British subjects, praying greater activity to keep
the navy up. You touch the navy and you touch the quick---that's
the lesson. It's an enormous excitement that this small incident
has caused.

W. H. P.

.

To Edward M. House

London, February 24, 1914.

MY DEAR HOUSE:

You'll be interested in these pamphlets by Sir Max Waechter,
who has opened an office here and is spending much money to "federate"
Europe, and to bring a lessening of armaments. I enclose also
an article about him from the Daily Telegraph, which tells
how he has interviewed most of the Old World monarchs. Get also,
immediately, the new two-volume life of Lord Lyons, Minister
to the United States during the Civil War, and subsequently Ambassador
to France. You will find an interesting account of the campaign
of about 1870 to reduce armaments, when old Bismarck dumped the
whole basket of apples by marching against France. You know I
sometimes fear some sort of repetition of that experience. Some
government (probably Germany) will see bankruptcy staring it
in the face and the easiest way out will seem a great war. Bankruptcy
before a war would be ignominious; after a war, it could be charged
to "Glory." It'll take a long time to bankrupt England.
It's unspeakably rich; they pay enormous taxes, but they pay
them out of their incomes, not out of their principal, except
their inheritance tax. That looks to me as if it came out of
the principal. . . .

I hope you had a good time in Texas and escaped some cold
weather. This deceptive sort of winter here is grippe-laden.
I've had the thing, but I'm now getting over it. . . .

P. S. There's nothing like the President. By George! the passage
of the arbitration treaty (renewal) almost right off the bat,
and apparently the tolls discrimination coming presently to its
repeal! Sir Edward Grey remarked to me ---yesterday: "Things
are clearing up! " I came near saying to him: "Have
you any miracles in mind that you'd like to see worked?"
Wilson stock is at a high premium on this side of the water in

spite of the momentary impatience caused by Benton's death.

W. H. P.

.

From Edward M. House

145 East 35th Street,
New York City.
April 19th, 1914.

DEAR PAGE:

I have had a long talk with Mr. Laughlin.(<A NAME="n58"></A><A
HREF="Pagenotes.htm#58">58</A>) At first he thought I would not
have more than one chance in a million to do anything with the
Kaiser, but after talking with him further, he concluded that
I would have a fairly good sporting chance. I have about concluded
to take it.

If I can do anything, I can do it in a few days. I was with
the President most of last week. . . .

He spoke of your letters to him and to me as being classics,
and said they were the best letters, as far as he knew, that
any one had ever written. Of course you know how heartily I concur
in this. He said that sometime they should be published.

The President is now crystallizing his mind in regard to the
Federal Reserve Board, and if you are not to remain in London,
then he would probably put Houston on the Board and ask you to
take the Secretaryship of Agriculture.

You have no idea the feeling that is being aroused by the
tolls question. The Hearst papers are screaming at all of us
every day. They have at last honoured me with their abuse. .
. .

With love and best wishes, I am,

Faithfully yours,

E. M. HOUSE.

.

From Edward M. House

145 East 35th Street,

New York City.
April 20th, 1914.

DEAR PAGE:

. . . It is our purpose to sail on the Imperator, May
16th, and go directly to Germany. I expect to be there a week
or more, but Mrs. House will reach London by the 1st or 2nd of
June. . . .

Our friend(<A NAME="n59"></A><A HREF="Pagenotes.htm#59">59</A>)
in Washington thinks it is worth while for me to go to Germany,
and that determines the matter. The press is shrieking to-day
over the Mexican situation, but I hope they will be disappointed.
It is not the intention to do anything further for the moment
than to blockade the ports, and unless some overt act is made

from the North, our troops will not cross the border.

Your friend always,

E. M. HOUSE.

.

To Edward M. House

London, April 27, 1914.

MY DEAR HOUSE:

Of course you decided wisely to carry out your original Berlin
plan, and you ought never to have had a moment's hesitation,
if you did have any hesitation. I do not expect you to produce
any visible or immediate results. I hope I am mistaken in this.
But you know that the German Government has a well-laid progressive
plan for shipbuilding for a certain number of years. I believe
that the work has, in fact, already been arranged for. But that
has nothing to do with the case. You are going to see what effect
you can produce on the mind of a man. Perhaps you will never
know just what effect you will produce. Yet the fact that you
are who you are, that you make this journey for this especial
purpose, that you are everlastingly right---these are enough.

Moreover, you can't ever tell results, nor can you afford
to make your plans in this sort of high work with the slightest
reference to probable results. That's the bigness and the glory
of it. Any ordinary man can, on any ordinary day, go and do a
task, the favourable results of which may be foreseen. That's
easy. The big thing is to go confidently to work on a task,
the results of which nobody can possibly foresee---a task so
vague and improbable of definite results that small men hesitate.
It is in this spirit that very many of the biggest things in
history have been done. Wasn't the purchase of Louisiana such
a thing? Who'd ever have supposed that that could have been brought
about? I applaud your errand and I am eagerly impatient to hear
the results. When will you get here? I assume that Mrs. House
will not go with you to Berlin. No matter so you both turn up
here for a good long stay.

I've taken me a little bit of a house about twenty miles out
of town whither we are going in July as soon as we can get away
from London. I hope to stay down there till far into October,
coming up to London about thrice a week. That's the dull season
of the year. It's a charming little country place---big enough

for you to visit us. . . .

.

From Edward M. House

An Bord des Dampfers Imperator

den May 21, 1914.

Hamburg-Amerika Linie

DEAR PAGE:

Here we are again. The Wallaces(<A NAME="n60"></A><A HREF="Pagenotes.htm#60">60</A>)
land at Cherbourg, Friday morning, and we of course go on to
Berlin. I wish I might have the benefit of your advice just now,
for the chances for success in this great adventure are slender
enough at best. The President has done his part in the letter

I have with me, and it is clearly up to me to do mine. . . .

Faithfully yours,

E. M. HOUSE.

.

It will be observed that Colonel House had taken the advice
of Sir William. Tyrrell, and had sailed directly to Germany on
a German ship---the Imperator. Ambassador Gerard had made
preparations for his reception in Berlin, and the American soon
had long talks with Admiral von Tirpitz, Falkenhayn, Von Jagow,
Solf, and others. Von Bethmann-Hollweg's wife died almost on the
day of his arrival in Berlin, so it was impossible for him to
see the Chancellor---the man who would have probably been the
most receptive to these peace ideas. All the leaders of the government,
except Von Tirpitz, gave Colonel House's proposals a respectful
if somewhat cynical hearing. Von Tirpitz was openly and demonstratively
hostile. The leader of the German Navy simply bristled with antagonism
at any suggestion for peace or disarmament or world cooperation.
He consumed a large part of the time which Colonel House spent
with him denouncing England and all its works. Hatred of the "Island
Kingdom" was apparently the consuming passion of his existence.
On the whole, Von Tirpitz thus made no attempt to conceal his
feeling that the purpose of the House mission was extremely distasteful
to him. The other members of the Government, while not so tactlessly
hostile, were not particularly encouraging. The usual objections
to disarmament were urged---the fear of other Powers, the walled-in
state of Germany, the vigilant enemies against which it was necessary
constantly to be prepared and watchful. Even more than the unsympathetic
politeness of the German Cabinet the general atmosphere of Berlin
was depressing to Colonel House. The militaristic oligarchy was
absolutely in control. Militarism possessed not only the army,
the navy, and the chief officers of state, but the populace as
well. One almost trivial circumstance has left a lasting impression
on Colonel House's mind. Ambassador Gerard took him out one evening
for a little relaxation. Both Mr. Gerard and Colonel House were
fond of target shooting and the two men sought one of the numerous
rifle galleries of Berlin. They visited gallery after gallery,
but could not get into one. Great crowds lined up at every place,
waiting their turns at the target; it seemed as though every able-bodied
man in Berlin was spending all his time improving his marksmanship.
But this was merely a small indication of the atmosphere of militarism
which prevailed in the larger aspects of life. Colonel House found
himself in a strange place to preach international accord for
the ending of war.

He had come to Berlin not merely to talk with the Cabinet heads;
his goal was the Kaiser himself. But he perceived at once a persistent
opposition to his plan. As he was the President's personal representative,
and carried a letter from the President to the Kaiser, an audience
could not be refused---indeed, it had already been duly arranged;
but there was a quiet opposition to his consorting with the "All
Highest" alone. It was not usual, Colonel House was informed,
for His Imperial Majesty to discuss such matters except in the
presence of a representative of the Foreign Office. Germany had
not yet recovered from the shock which the Emperor's conversation
with certain foreign correspondents had given the nation. The
effects were still felt of the famous interviews of October 28,
1908, which, when published in the London Telegraph, had
caused the bitterest resentment in Great Britain. The Kaiser had
given his solemn word that he would indulge in no more indiscretions
of this sort, and a private interview with Colonel House was regarded
by his advisers as a possible infraction of that promise. But
the American would not be denied. He knew that an interview with
a third person present would be simply time thrown away since
his message was intended for the Kaiser's own ears; and ultimately
his persistence succeeded. The next Monday would be June 1st---a
great day in Germany. It was the occasion of the Schrippenfest,
a day which for many years had been set aside for the glorification
of the German Army. On that festival, the Kaiser entertained with
great pomp representative army officers and representative privates,
as well as the diplomatic corps and other distinguished foreigners.
Colonel House was invited to attend the Kaiser's luncheon on that
occasion, and was informed that, after this function was over,
he would have an opportunity of having a private conversation
with His Majesty.

The affair took place in the palace at Potsdam. The militarism
which Colonel House had felt so oppressively in Berlin society
was especially manifest on this occasion. There were two luncheon
parties---that of the Kaiser and his officers and guests in the
state dining room, and that of the selected private soldiers outside.
The Kaiser and the Kaiserin spent a few moments with their humbler
subjects, drinking beer with them and passing a few comradely
remarks; they then proceeded to the large dining hall and took
their places with the gorgeously caparisoned and bemedalled chieftains
of the German Army. The whole proceeding has an historic interest,
in that it was the last Schrippenfest held. Whether another will
ever be held is problematical, for the occasion was an inevitable
part of the trappings of Hohenzollernism. Despite the gravity
of the occasion, Colonel House's chief memory of this function
is slightly tinged with the ludicrous. He had spent the better
part of a lifetime attempting to rid himself of his military title,
but uselessly. He was now embarrassed because these solemn German
officers persisted in regarding him as an important part of the
American Army, and in discussing technical and strategical problems.
The visitor made several attempts to explain that he was merely
a "geographical colonel"---that the title was constantly
conferred in an informal sense on Americans, especially Southerners,
and that the handle to his name had, therefore, no military significance.
But the round-faced Teutons stared at his explanation in blank
amazement; they couldn't grasp the point at all, and continued
to ask his opinion of matters purely military.

When the lunch was finished, the Kaiser took Colonel House
aside, and the two men withdrew to the terrace, out of earshot
of the rest of the gathering. However, they were not out of sight.
For nearly half an hour the Kaiser and the American stood side
by side upon the terrace, the German generals, at a respectful
distance, watching the proceeding, resentful, puzzled, curious
as to what it was all about. The quiet demeanour of the American
"Colonel," his plain citizen's clothes, and his almost
impassive face, formed a striking contrast to the Kaiser's dazzling
uniform and the general scene of military display. Two or three
of the generals and admirals present were in the secret, but only
two or three; the mass of officers watching this meeting little
guessed that the purpose of House's visit was to persuade the
Kaiser to abandon everything for which the Schrippenfest stood;
to enter an international compact with the United States and Great
Britain for reducing armaments, to reach an agreement about trade
and the treatment of backward peoples, and to form something of
a permanent association for the preservation of peace. The one
thing which was apparent to the watchers was that the American
was only now and then saying a brief word, but that the Kaiser
was, as usual, doing a vast amount of talking. His speech rattled
on with the utmost animation, his arms were constantly gesticulating,
he would bring one fist down into his palm to register an emphatic
point, and enforce certain ideas with a menacing forefinger. At
times Colonel House would show slight signs of impatience and
interrupt the flow of talk. But the Kaiser was clearly absorbed
in the subject under discussion. His entourage several times attempted
to break up the interview. The Court Chamberlain twice gingerly
approached and informed His Majesty that the Imperial train was
waiting to take the party back to Berlin. Each time the Kaiser,
with an angry gesture, waved the interrupter away. Despairing
of the usual resources, the Kaiserin was sent with the same message.
The Kaiser did not treat her so summarily, but he paid no attention
to the request, and continued to discuss the European situation
with the American.

Fig. 10. Walter. H. Page, from a photograph taken a few
years before he became American Ambassador to Great Britain</TD>
<TD WIDTH="52%">
<P ALIGN=CENTER>Fig. 11. The British Foreign Office, Downing Street</TD>

The subject that had mainly aroused the Imperial warmth was
the "Yellow Peril." For years this had been an obsession
with the Kaiser, and he launched into the subject as soon as Colonel
House broached the purpose of his visit. There could be no question
of disarmament, the Kaiser vehemently declared, as long as this
danger to civilization existed. "We white nations should
join hands," he said, "to oppose Japan and the other
yellow nations, or some day they will destroy us."

It was with difficulty that Colonel House could get His Majesty
away from this subject. Whatever topic he touched upon, the Kaiser
would immediately start declaiming on the dangers that faced Europe
from the East. His insistence on this accounted partly for the
slight signs of impatience which the American showed. He feared
that all the time allotted for the interview would be devoted
to discussing the Japanese. About another nation, the Kaiser showed
almost as much alarm as he did about Japan, and that was Russia.
He spoke contemptuously of France and Great Britain as possible
enemies, for he apparently had no fear of them. But the size of
Russia and the exposed eastern frontier of Germany seemed to appal
him. How could Germany join a peace pact, and reduce its army,
so long as 175,000,000 Slavs threatened them from this direction?

Another matter that the Kaiser discussed with derision was
Mr. Bryan's arbitration treaty. Practically all the great nations
had already ratified this treaty except Germany. The Kaiser now
laughed at the treaties and pooh-poohed Bryan. Germany, he declared,
would never accept such an arbitration plan. Colonel House had
particular cause to remember this part of the conversation three
years afterward, when the United States declared war on Germany.
The outstanding feature of the Bryan treaty was the clause which
pledged the high contracting parties not to go to war without
taking a breathing spell of one year in which to think the matter
over. Had Germany adopted this treaty, the United States, in April,
1917, after Germany had presented a casus belli by resuming
unrestricted submarine warfare, could not have gone to war. We
should have been obliged to wait a year, or until April, 1918,
before engaging in hostilities. That is, an honourable observance
of this Bryan treaty by the United States would have meant that
Germany would have starved Great Britain into surrender, and crushed
Europe with her army. Had the Kaiser, on this June afternoon,
not notified Colonel House that Germany would not accept this
treaty, but, instead, had notified him that he would accept it,
William II might now be sitting on the throne of a victorious
Germany, with Europe for a footstool.

Despite the Kaiser's hostile attitude toward these details,
his general reception of the President's proposals was not outwardly
unfriendly. Perhaps he was sincere, perhaps not; yet the fact
is that he manifested more cordiality to this somewhat vague "get-together"
proposal than had any of his official advisers. He encouraged
Colonel House to visit London, talk the matter over with British
statesmen, and then return to Berlin.

"The last thing," he said, "that Germany wants
is war. We are getting to be a great commercial country. In a
few years Germany will be a rich country, like England and the
United States. We don't want a war to interfere with our progress."

Any peace suggestion that was compatible with German safety,
he said, would be entertained. Yet his parting words were not
reassuring.

"Every nation in Europe," he said, "has its
bayonets pointed at Germany. But--- "---and with this he
gave a proud and smiling glance at the glistening representatives
of his army gathered on this brilliant occasion "we are ready!"

Colonel House left Berlin, not particularly hopeful; the Kaiser
impressed him as a man of unstable nervous organization---as one
who was just hovering on the borderland of insanity. Certainly,
this was no man to be entrusted with such powers as the American
had witnessed that day at Potsdam. Dangerous as the Kaiser was,
however, he did not seem to Colonel House to be as great a menace
to mankind as were his military advisers. The American came away
from Berlin with the conviction that the most powerful force in
Germany was the militaristic clique, and second, the Hohenzollern
dynasty. He has always insisted that this represented the real
precedence in power. So long as the Kaiser was obedient to the
will of militarism, so long could he maintain his standing. He
was confident, however, that the militaristic oligarchy was determined
to have its will, and would dethrone the Kaiser the moment he
showed indications of taking a course that would lead to peace.
Colonel House was also convinced that this militaristic oligarchy
was determined on war. The coolness with which it listened to
his proposals, the attempts it made to keep him from seeing the
Kaiser alone, its repeated efforts to break up the conversation
after it had begun, all pointed to the inevitable tragedy. The
fact that the Kaiser expressed a wish to discuss the matter again,
after Colonel House had sounded London, was the one hopeful feature
of an otherwise discouraging experience, and accounts for the
tone of faint optimism in his letters describing the visit.

.

From Edward M. House

Embassy of the United States of America,

Berlin,
May 28, 1914.

DEAR PAGE:

I have done something here already---not much, but enough
to open negotiations with London. I lunch with the Kaiser on
Monday. I was advised to avoid Admiral von Tirpitz as being very
unsympathetic. However, I went directly at him and had a most
interesting talk. He is a forceful fellow. Von Jagow is pleasant
but not forceful. I have had a long talk with him. The Chancellor's
wife died last week so I have not got in touch with him. I will
write you more fully from Paris. My address there will be Hotel

Ritz.

Hastily,

E. M. H.

.

From Edward M. House

Hotel Ritz, 15, Place Vendôme, Paris.

June 3, 1914.

DEAR PAGE:

I had a satisfactory talk with the Kaiser on Monday. I have
now seen everyone worthwhile in Germany except the Chancellor.
I am ready now for London. Perhaps you had better prepare the
way. The Kaiser knows I am to see them, and I have arranged to
keep him in touch with results---if there are any. We must work
quickly after I arrive, for it may be advisable for me to return
to Germany, and I am counting on sailing for home July 15th or

28th. . . . I am eager to see you and tell you what I know.

Yours,

E. M. H.

.

Colonel House left that night for Paris, but there the situation
was a hopeless one. France was not thinking of a foreign war;
it was engrossed with its domestic troubles. There had been three
French ministries in two weeks; and the trial of Madame Caillaux
for the murder of Gaston Calmette, editor of the Paris Figaro,
was monopolizing all the nation's capacity for emotion. Colonel
House saw that it would be a waste of energy to take up his mission
at Paris---there was no government stable enough to make a discussion
worth while. He therefore immediately left for London.

The political situation in Great Britain was almost as confused
as that in Paris. The country was in a state approaching civil
war on the question of Home Rule for Ireland; the suffragettes
were threatening to dynamite the Houses of Parliament; and the
eternal struggle between the Liberal and the Conservative elements
was raging with unprecedented virulence. A European war was far
from everybody's mind. It was this utter inability to grasp the
realities of the European situation which proved the main impediment
to Colonel House's work in England. He met all the important people---Mr.
Asquith, Mr. Lloyd George, Sir Edward Grey, and others. With them
he discussed his "pact" proposal in great detail.

Naturally, ideas of this sort were listened to sympathetically
by statesmen of the stamp of Asquith, Grey, and Lloyd George.
The difficulty, however, was that none of these men apprehended
an immediate war. They saw no necessity of hurrying about the
matter. They had the utmost confidence in Prince Lichnowsky, the
German Ambassador in London, and Von Bethmann-Hollweg, the German
Chancellor. Both these men were regarded by the Foreign Office
as guarantees against a German attack; their continuance in their
office was looked upon as an assurance that Germany entertained
no immediately aggressive plans. Though the British statesmen
did not say so definitely, the impression was conveyed that the
mission on which Colonel House was engaged was an unnecessary
one---a preparation against a danger that did not exist. Colonel
House attempted to persuade Sir Edward Grey to visit the Kiel
regatta, which was to take place in a few days, see the Kaiser,
and discuss the plan with him. But the Government feared that
such a visit would be very disturbing to France and Russia. Already
Mr. Churchill's proposal for a "naval holiday" had so
wrought up the French that a hurried trip to France by Mr. Asquith
had been necessary to quiet them; the consternation that would
have been caused in Paris by the presence of Sir Edward Grey at
Kiel can only be imagined. The fact that the British statesmen
entertained so little apprehension of a German attack may possibly
be a reflection on their judgment; yet Colonel House's visit has
great historical value, for the experience afterward convinced
him that Great Britain had had no part in bringing on the European
war, and that Germany was solely responsible. It certainly should
have put the Wilson Administration right on this all-important
point, when the great storm broke.

The most vivid recollection which the British statesmen whom
Colonel House met retain of his visit, was his consternation at
the spirit that had confronted him everywhere in Germany. The
four men most interested---Sir Edward Grey, Sir William Tyrrell,
Mr. Page, and Colonel House---met at luncheon in the American
Embassy a few days after President Wilson's emissary had returned
from Berlin. Colonel House could talk of little except the preparations
for war which were manifest on every hand.

"I feel as though I had been living near a mighty electric
dynamo," Colonel House told his friends. "The whole
of Germany is charged with electricity. Everybody's nerves are
tense. It needs only a spark to set the whole thing off."

The "spark" came two weeks afterward with the assassination
of the Archduke Ferdinand.

"It is all a bad business," Colonel House wrote to
Page when war broke out, "and just think how near we came
to making such a catastrophe impossible! If England had moved
a little faster and had let me go back to Germany, the thing,
perhaps, could have been done."

To which Page at once replied:

"No, no, no---no power on earth could have prevented it.
The German militarism, which is the crime of the last fifty
years, has been working for this for twenty-five years. It is
the logical result of their spirit and enterprise and doctrine.
It had to come. But, of course, they chose the wrong time
and the wrong issue. Militarism has no judgment. Don't let your
conscience be worried. You did all that any mortal man could do.
But nobody could have done anything effective.

"We've got to see to it that this system doesn't grow
up again. That's all."