Politics and Protection: Why the 2005 NPT Review Conference Failed

Though few were surprised when the seventh Review Conference of
the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) closed
in New York on May 27, 2005 without any substantive agreement on
the tough challenges facing the treaty, the magnitude, reasons and
manner of the failure convey important warnings for the future of
non-proliferation and security.

The conference, which was attended by 153 of the 188 NPT parties
in good standing, foundered on procedural wrangling, but its
failure was due to political manoeuvring and the self-protection
rackets run by a small number of states who wanted to keep their
own nuclear options as unfettered as possible. By the last day,
only the bare bones of a final document could be salvaged, which
did nothing more than list the participants, officials and
documents of this exercise in reality-avoidance.

The charade of this document's adoption has rather oddly been
cited by some diplomats as proof of success. Assessment, of course,
is comparative. Some had feared that the conference would explode
under the pressure of its contradictions and tear a great hole in
the non-proliferation regime; avoiding such a public meltdown may
be counted as a victory for the conference president, Ambassador
Sergio de Queiroz Duarte of Brazil. Others wanted to make sure that
nothing was adopted in 2005 that would supersede or roll back the
agreements and commitments made in 1995 and 2000. On this basis, no
agreement in 2005 constituted a success, underlining the primacy of
the previous undertakings, which remain to be carried forward and
implemented.

In providing an overview of the conduct and outcome of the
conference, this report examines the role and motivations of key
players and considers the implications for international security
and the future of the regime.

A Regime Under Pressure

NPT states were confronted with a very difficult task when they
assembled on May 2 in New York. All agreed that non-proliferation
faced some tough and unresolved challenges to its integrity and
effectiveness, but they differed in how they characterised the
major threats and what they wanted to be done. The major challenges
were[1] (and still are):

North Korea's nuclear brinkmanship and its apparent ease of
withdrawal from the treaty in order to demonstrate its development
of nuclear weapons.

The nuclear fuel cycle road to nuclear weapons, as pursued by
the P-5 permanent members of the Security Council (United States,
Russia, Britain, France and China) and the D-3 de-facto states with
nuclear weapons (India, Israel and Pakistan), by Iraq until 1991,
and by North Korea. Brought to a head by Iran's intentions to
enrich uranium, purportedly for peaceful purposes, this issue has
divided the NPT regime between those who want limits to be placed
on the nuclear fuel cycle and those who believe the curbs should be
placed on 'states of concern' rather than on the technologies. The
question lies at the heart of the NPT 'bargain' that provides
access to nuclear energy in return for renouncing nuclear weapons.
It is especially sensitive for countries with dependencies on
reprocessing and enrichment, including Britain, France, and Russia
and developed non-nuclear weapon state parties such as Japan,
Brazil, Australia and South Africa, as well as for the NPT's
safeguards overseer, the International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA).

Institutional weaknesses exposed not only by North Korean
noncompliance, but also by the compliance and enforcement problems
brought into the open in connection with the programmes of Iraq,
Iran, Libya, Dr Khan's nuclear blackmarket, and states with nuclear
weapons. Undoubtedly a valuable contribution to addressing the
weaknesses inherent in the pre-1990s trust-based 'comprehensive'
safeguards system, the IAEA's Additional Protocol suffers from slow
accession, with many pious expressions but inadequate
implementation. The major institutional deficit, as identified by
Ireland, Canada and others, is that the NPT has no implementing
mechanism or organisation, other than the IAEA, whose mandate
covers not the treaty per se, but bilateral safeguards arrangements
in conformity with article III. For strengthening
non-proliferation, dealing with cases of suspected or proved
noncompliance, and addressing the challenges of blackmarket trade
in nuclear-related technologies and non-state actors, the treaty
parties must rely on the Security Council or ad hoc arrangements
among states riven with regional and political rivalries.

Nuclear disarmament and doctrine may not have appeared as
prominently divisive in 2005, but they remain for most NPT parties
the key to sustainable non-proliferation. This was shown not only
in the opening statements, where practically every speech
emphasised the importance of early entry into force of the
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), and two-thirds underscored
the necessity for more effective progress in implementing the "13
Steps" plan of action on nuclear disarmament agreed by the 2000
Review Conference. Concern that the nuclear disarmament commitments
of 2000 should not be sidelined was an important factor in Egypt's
blocking of the President's draft agenda because it failed to make
reference to the outcome of the 2000 review conference.

Egypt, Iran and others also made use of the fact that Israel is
the only state in the Middle East not to have renounced its nuclear
weapon programme and joined the NPT. In a wider context, Israel is
one third of what is euphemistically called "the three-state
problem", i.e. the regime challenges arising from the D-3. Having
never been party to the NPT, these states cannot be accused of
violating it. Yet they are free-riders on the regime, deriving
security benefits from the fact that rivals and neighbours are kept
in check by the NPT and its associated instruments. Pressure on the
non-proliferation regime has been intensified by recent moves to
normalise the nuclear programme of India and require the D-3 to
behave "as if" they were responsible nuclear weapon states.

Finally, increased awareness of terrorist threats has doubled
the attention paid to the safety and security of nuclear weapons,
materials, technologies and facilities. While measures such as
cooperative threat reduction (CTR) initiatives, the Proliferation
Security Initiative (PSI) and UN Security Council Resolution 1540
go some way to address the gaps in the regime, issues of safety and
security have increased in salience since the end of the cold war
and many feel that more must be done.

Key Issues

Not all statements to the Conference identified all the
challenges noted above; some were ignored or given very different
emphasis and priority depending on a state's regional circumstances
or political grouping. Other familiar and less-familiar issues were
also highlighted. Many of these made their way into the bracketed
drafts of the committee and subsidiary body reports. Though it
should be stressed that only Main Committee I on disarmament
actually managed to transmit its report and text to the drafting
committee (albeit with many brackets denoting that little had been
agreed), the text generated by all three Main Committees (MC) and
Subsidiary Bodies (SB) are given in the documentary annex that
follows this article.

Much of the deliberation on these drafts was behind closed
doors, but the texts and their brackets provide a useful picture of
the major issues and areas of dispute and contention, obviating the
need for a detailed summary of the speeches in this report. Below,
however, I have selectively provided a thumbnail sketch of general
debate contributions on some of the most critical and interesting
issues.

CTBT

Almost every statement highlighted this multilaterally
negotiated treaty, viewed as a prime objective of the NPT since the
treaty took legal effect in 1970. By the time the NPT conference
opened, the CTBT had 175 signatories, of which 120 had ratified,
including 33 of the 44 states listed as necessary for entry into
force. Britain and France ratified together in April 1998, and
Russia had ratified just before the 2000 Conference.

It was made clear that everyone except the United States wanted
the Review Conference to give a strong endorsement to CTBT entry
into force. From all sides, the CTBT was very strongly supported,
and it was noted that a ban on all nuclear tests was promised in
the NPT's preamble and then underlined as of the highest priority
in 1995, when the treaty was indefinitely extended, and again as
the first item in the practical steps for nuclear disarmament
agreed in 2000. The EU gave a very strong affirmation of the
"utmost importance" it attaches to the entry into force of the CTBT
at the earliest possible date. Pending this achievement "the EU
urges all states to abide by a moratorium and to refrain from any
actions which are contrary to the obligations and provisions of the
CTBT".

China, which (like the US) has so far failed to ratify the CTBT,
lamented that the entry into force of the CTBT had been diluted and
declared, "China supports an early-entry-into-force of the CTBT and
is now working actively on its internal legal proceedings for
ratifying the treaty." This might have been more convincing if
China had not used a similar excuse five years ago, telling the
2000 Review Conference that it was awaiting the decision of the
People's National Congress.

It was politically and substantively important that the first
working paper from the G-10[2] group
of ten Vienna-based states was on the CTBT and clearly underlined
the centrality of entry into force of the CTBT to the NPT compact,
as well as the profound proliferation dangers attached to holding
open the option to resume nuclear testing. In their totality, the
general statements and working papers made it clear that the
overwhelming majority of NPT states are concerned about the fate of
the test ban regime if entry into force of the CTBT continues to be
so wantonly delayed. A stark warning was sent to those of the
nuclear weapon states that have failed to ratify the test ban
(China and the United States), thereby holding open the option to
test. It was also suggested that other states (North Korea for
example) may take advantage of a failure to lock down the CTBT and
conduct a nuclear test that would jeopardise the test ban norm and
therefore the NPT as well, because of the intextricable link
between the two treaties.

Fissile materials ban

A large number of states also mentioned the necessity to
negotiate a ban on the production of fissile material (highly
enriched uranium or plutonium) for weapons purposes. The chief
controversy over this is about the failure of the Conference on
Disarmament (CD) to get negotiations underway and whether (if they
ever take place) they should be on the basis of the 'Shannon
mandate' agreed by the CD in 1995, which called for negotiations on
"a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and
effectively verifiable treaty" or on a different basis, in view of
the US policy decision to support only negotiations on a treaty
without verification.

This unilateral decision, which followed a yearlong interagency
review in the United States, was announced at the CD by Ambassador
Jackie Sanders in July 2004, to the shock of many CD delegations
and the gratitude (whether expressed or not) of at least India,
Israel and Pakistan, who all had misgivings about the proposed
cut-off treaty, since they were its primary targets. Four of the
declared nuclear weapon states (Britain, France, Russia and the
United States) already abide by unilateral moratoria on production,
and France is in the process of dismantling its military fissile
material production facilities at Pierrelatte and Marcoule.

Most NAM statements continued to call for a "a
non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and
effectively verifiable treaty", while many west-leaning statements
fudged the question of verification, calling in shorthand just for
an (undifferentiated) treaty or FMCT. The EU, for example (from
which many others appear to have taken their cue) calls for
negotiations on "a non-discriminatory and universal treaty".
Nevertheless, verification or no-verification, the urgency of
halting fissile material production has appeared in almost all the
statements.

North Korea

A large number of statements raised concerns about North Korea,
which announced its withdrawal from the NPT in 2003 (after
previously declaring an intention to withdraw in 1993, which was
subsequently halted by the 1994 Framework Agreement with the United
States). In particular, South Korea's Deputy Minister, Chun
Yung-woo, castigated the NPT's "inherent limitations" and bluntly
argued that "the Korean peninsula suffers from diminished security
because of the miserable failure of the NPT to contain the nuclear
spectre".

In a very hard-hitting statement that condemned North Korea's
"complete disregard for and defiance of all nuclear
non-proliferation norms" and called for Pyongyang to take "the
strategic decision to abandon and dismantle once and for all its
entire nuclear weapons programmes", South Korea welcomed the
exposure of the A.Q. Khan network and the adoption of UNSC
resolution 1540 but warned that of themselves, these will not put
an end to trafficking: "One should never underestimate the
resourcefulness of black market peddlers and determined
proliferators to outsmart and outmanoeuvre governments."

South Korea favoured a much tougher approach to the fuel cycle,
safeguards and export controls and said it was open to various
options to make withdrawal from the treaty more difficult,
including requiring Security Council approval. Recognising the
importance also of addressing security concerns, South Korea argued
for the crisis to be resolved peacefully and for the incentive of
better security assurances for non-nuclear weapon states that are
in compliance with their NPT obligations.

While the majority of states devoted only a few sentences to the
problem of North Korea, Japan's Foreign Minister, Nobutaka
Machimura, committed several paragraphs to what he called "a direct
threat to the peace and stability of Northeast Asia". Japan called
on the Conference to deliver a clear message to the DPRK that it
must return to the Six Party Talks without preconditions,
"completely dismantle all of its nuclear programmes, including its
enrichment programmes, subject to credible international
verification".

NPT states and international lawyers may be in disagreement
about whether North Korea has legally accomplished its withdrawal
and is no longer a party to the NPT, or whether it is still bound
by its treaty obligations and needs to be brought back into
compliance; what is incontestable is that both the UN Security
Council and the NPT have proved incapable of addressing this issue
intelligently.

After intensive consultations, Ambassador Duarte received
agreement to follow the procedure first used by the Chair of the
2003 PrepCom, Ambassador László Molnár, in
which the DPRK nameplate was held by the Secretariat in the
Conference room "without prejudice to ongoing negotiations". This
was done early on the first day of the Review Conference. While not
opening a debate among states parties into the specific status of
the DPRK, Duarte acknowledged that many states wanted to have a
general discussion about the withdrawal provision (Article X) and
indicated that space would be found for this to take place.

Iran

Unlike North Korea, Iran was in the Conference chamber and
determined to prevent any formal criticisms from getting through.
Toning down some of the rhetoric in evidence at the 2003 and 2004
PrepComs, as well as from various Washington podia, the head of the
US delegation, Stephen Rademaker, noted, "Britain, France, and
Germany, with our support, are seeking to reach a diplomatic
solution to the Iranian nuclear problem, a solution that given the
history of clandestine nuclear weapons work in that country, must
include permanent cessation of Iran's enrichment and reprocessing
efforts, as well as dismantlement of equipment and facilities
related to such activity. Iran must provide such objective and
verifiable guarantees in order to demonstrate that it is not using
a purportedly peaceful nuclear program to hide a nuclear weapons
program or to conduct additional clandestine nuclear work elsewhere
in the country."

Varying in degree rather than kind, while trying to avoid
explicitly accusing or jumping to conclusions, a significant number
of other states called on Iran to suspend its uranium enrichment
and fully and transparently cooperate with the IAEA to reassure the
world that its programmes were indeed peaceful. On behalf of the
EU, Nicolas Schmit, Luxembourg's Minister-Delegate for Foreign
Affairs, said it was important "for Iran to re-establish trust",
making clear that the EU was "united in its determination not to
allow Iran to obtain military nuclear capabilities, and to see the
proliferation implications of its nuclear programme resolved." Iran
was enjoined to respect and implement the provisions of the Paris
Agreement of November 15, 2004 and the relevant resolutions of the
IAEA Board of Governors, especially regarding the suspension of its
enrichment related and reprocessing activities.

Iran responded with a combative speech from Dr Kamal Kharrazi,
Minister of Foreign Affairs, in which he declared that Iran "is
determined to pursue all legal areas of nuclear technology,
including enrichment, exclusively for peaceful purposes..." Stating
that "arbitrary and self-serving criteria and thresholds regarding
proliferation-proof and proliferation-prone technologies and
countries can and will only undermine the Treaty", Kharrazi argued
that Iran "has been eager to offer assurances and guarantees that
[its programme] remain[s] permanently peaceful." Moreover, he
warned, "Cessation of legal activity is no objective guarantee
against so-called break-out; it is indeed a historically tested
recipe for one."

Most of Iran's statement was devoted to trying to turn the
tables on the nuclear powers by first identifying issues of concern
such as the research and development of new nuclear weapons and
missile defences that could instigate a new arms race in outer
space, and then suggesting that the Conference take decisions on:
universality; a legally binding instrument codifying the commitment
not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons; ensuring and
promoting "the basic rights of states parties to unhindered access
to use nuclear technology for peaceful purposes without
discrimination"; and implementation of the 13 practical disarmament
steps. Though its expressed concerns about new nuclear weapons and
reducing the role of nuclear weapons in doctrines by codifying a
commitment not to use or threaten to use them are shared by many of
those who have castigated the inadequate progress on nuclear
disarmament since 2000, it is unlikely that such diplomatic devices
will distract the other NPT parties from the serious concerns many
of them harbour about Iran's programme and intentions.

Universality

Universality - accession to the Treaty by all UN-recognised
states - was accorded little more than lip service by many, but
raised strongly by a few, especially the Arab states. Unlike in
1995 or 2000, many states have come to accept that India and
Pakistan are unlikely to become non-nuclear weapon states except by
a process of disarmament that involved also the P-5 NPT nuclear
weapon states. Recognising that the Treaty could not be re-opened
to admit any additional nuclear weapon states as such, a growing
number of parties want India and Pakistan to behave as if the NPT
applied to them (as states with nuclear weapons) and abide by the
relevant responsibilities and obligations, something that both have
professed a desire to do (particularly as it would come with de
facto recognition, which India has long craved). Sweden, for
example, proposed that India and Pakistan should simultaneously
sign and then ratify the CTBT as a confidence-building measure and
first step.

Israel is in a different position, having neither tested nor
sought to declare itself or be accepted as having nuclear weapons.
Whether its policy of ambiguity and opacity is sustainable in the
long run is open to question, but the majority of Western parties
are less concerned with Israel's nuclear programme itself, than
with the political problems its existence poses for the regime - as
a central choke point in successive NPT PrepComs and review
conferences, and as an implicit (and sometimes explicit)
justification for some countries to stay outside other
non-proliferation agreements, and acquire or trade in missiles and
other WMD-related technologies.

Nuclear Weapon Free Zones

Nuclear weapon free zones (NWFZ) no longer play the political
role that they did during the 1960s-70s and again in the 1990s when
political changes strengthened the Treaties of Tlatelolco (covering
Latin America and the Caribbean) and Rarotonga (South Pacific), and
zones covering Africa and South-East Asia were negotiated and
institutionalised by means of the Treaties of Pelindaba and
Bangkok.

Just prior to the Review Conference, April 26-28, Mexico had
hosted in Tlatelolco a "Conference of States Parties and
Signatories to Treaties that Establish Nuclear Weapon Free Zones".
Mexico presented the main proceedings and declaration to the NPT
Review Conference. This underlined that the existence of nuclear
weapons constituted a threat to humanity's survival, supported the
implementation of the existing NWFZs and encouraged the development
of further zones "on the basis of agreements entered into freely
among the States of the zone concerned", specifically mentioning
South Asia and the Middle East. Expressing "deep concern with new
strategic security doctrines, which assign a broader role to
nuclear weapons, imply intentions to develop new types of nuclear
weapons or rationalisation for their use", the declaration
reaffirmed that "the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons
constitutes a breach of international law and the United Nations
Charter".

The declaration supported disarmament education and urged more
effective progress in implementing nuclear disarmament commitments
and respecting NWFZ agreements in full. It expressed support for
Mongolia's international nuclear weapon free status and welcomed
progress on establishing a NWFZ in Central Asia. Paragraphs also
expressed deep concern about the hazards of radioactive waste and
radiological warfare and expressed the conviction that "the most
effective way to prevent non-State actors from acquiring nuclear
weapons is through the total elimination of those weapons".[3]

Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons

Non-strategic nuclear weapons are being raised as an issue of
concern by a growing number of states, including Germany, although
Foreign Minister Joschka Fisher did not make any announcement about
the deployment of US non-strategic nuclear weapons in European
bases, including Germany, despite having been quoted on the subject
in the German newspapers just prior to the Review Conference. The
UN Secretary-General alluded to nuclear sharing when he noted in
his opening statements (reproduced below) that, "Many states still
live under a nuclear umbrella, whether of their own or an ally.
Ways must be found to lessen, and ultimately overcome, their
reliance on nuclear deterrence."

Terrorism, Plutonium and HEU

Far more statements than in 2000 referred to concerns about
non-state actors, a euphemism for armed groups and terrorists. This
emphasis reflected the changed security perceptions since 9/11 and
the war in Iraq. Though not everyone accepted the United States'
priority focus on terrorism above all other issues, there was
general support for strengthening measures to prevent terrorists
from gaining access to nuclear materials.

There were many expressions of endorsement for UNSC Resolution
1540 (2004) on Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) and the recently
agreed Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Terrorism, the G-8
Global Partnership, global and cooperative threat reduction (CTR)
approaches, physical safety and preventing access to nuclear
materials or weapons by terrorists, including useful proposals for
securing and reducing stockpiles of highly-enriched uranium
(HEU).

Civil society, particularly groups from Japan and Britain,
raised similar concerns about the proliferation and environmental
dangers of plutonium separation through reprocessing. Evoked by
Iran as its desired example, Japan was more defensive than at
previous review conferences, as pertinent questions were asked
about its intention to start reprocessing spent fuel at a new
facility at Rokkasho.

Japanese and international experts held packed meetings,
presented detailed papers and circulated an appeal signed by high
level scientists and senior figures in non-proliferation and
cooperative threat reduction, calling on Japan not to fly in the
face of non-proliferation and fuel-cycle trends by going ahead with
reprocessing at Rokkasho. In the NPT meeting rooms, however, the
British-French-Japanese alliance did its best to divert attention
from reprocessing. Where the fuel cycle was concerned, they seemed
to prefer there to be a focus on HEU. Professor William Potter,
acting as an advisor to Kyrgyzstan, was responsible for some useful
proposals on controlling and preventing access to HEU, which were
taken up by a number of delegations in a working paper.[4]

Though concerned about terrorism, some states warned against
over-legislating in ways that would erode other treaty commitments
or arrangements. South Africa's Ambassador Claudine Mtshali, for
example, raised a question concerning amendments to the 1988
Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety
of Maritime Navigation (SUA) and Protocol, which would "include a
substantial broadening of the range of offences included in Article
3 of the SUA Convention and the introduction of provisions for the
boarding of vessels suspected of, inter alia, transporting
material, equipment or technology intended to be used in a nuclear
weapons programme" similar to those of the Proliferation Security
Initiative".

South Africa was particularly concerned that a "savings clause"
and its related definitions of direct and dual-use nuclear
material, equipment and technology, undermined understandings in
the NPT, particularly relating to articles I, II and VI. "The text
of the so-called "savings clause" that was accepted by the IMO
Legal Committee, despite the concerns raised, essentially specifies
that It shall not be an offence within the meaning of this
convention to transport an item or material (direct and
dual-use)... if the item or material is intended for the
delivery system of a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive
device of a state party to the NPT, the holding of such weapon or
device is not contrary to that state party's obligations under the
NPT." Though such questions were raised during the debates,
they were seldom given satisfactory answers, and as the Review
Conference wore on, these and other concerns tended to get lost
amidst the wrangling.

Enhancing the NPT's decision-making powers

Significantly, given its position on the proliferation front
line, South Korea joined Ireland, Canada, Sweden and a growing
number who advocated giving the NPT more powers for enforcement,
including annual meetings and 'emergency' powers.

Building on the Irish initiative from 2000 and Canada's own
paper on addressing the NPT's "institutional deficit" that was
circulated at the 2004 PrepCom, Canada's Assistant Deputy Minister
Jim Wright gave the following argument, which due to its complexity
and importance is quoted in detail: "More sustained attention is
required, as well as greater opportunity for States Parties to
discuss and promote implementation, to express their views on
critical issues affecting the Treaty's health and authority and to
take decisions on pressing matters. It is no longer adequate to do
this only once every five years. The existing preparatory process,
with its inherent limitations, fails to provide for an annual forum
worthy of this Treaty and our collective interests in it. Hence,
our proposal to have the NPT membership adopt a new arrangement for
its meetings within the existing time envelope we currently devote
to the Treaty's gatherings. We propose an annual one week Meeting
of States Parties, to provide us with a regular policy forum, a
feature now standard in the operation of most other treaties in the
disarmament field. Our proposal would retain the necessary time for
preparing the Review Conferences. Recent experiences have
demonstrated that States Parties also require a rapid reaction
capacity, the ability to come together and take necessary action in
cases of extraordinary circumstances involving threats to the
Treaty, its norms and its authority, such as an announcement of
withdrawal. The outside world expects no less of us. The ability to
call such meetings would be vested in a standing bureau. This rapid
reaction capability would not detract from the mandate of the IAEA
nor the role of the UN Security Council, but rather be
complementary to any action by these bodies, conveying the
strongest possible messages on behalf of the Treaty's members."

The Review Conference Unravels

The Review Conference began to unravel from the first day, when
it opened without an agenda. This section summarises the procedural
tactics and politics that delayed adoption of the agenda until
midway through the second week, the controversies that prevented
the committees from starting work until well into the third week,
and the various ways in which the conference got tangled in
conflict, lost time, and then, under the benign auspices of the
president, gave up any pretence of trying to achieve a substantive
outcome.

Agenda Agreed on Day 9

Though Duarte had shuttled around the world holding
consultations on the agenda and other issues in the intervening
year, he failed to pin down agreement before the start of the
meeting. This was not his fault. In a strategic move that turns out
to have doomed the 2005 Review Conference, the United States
refused to acknowledge the consensus outcome of the last Review
Conference in 2000 as the basis for reviewing and evaluating
progress on the Treaty in 2005. The New Agenda Coalition (NAC) and
others refused to accept an agenda that ignored the 2000 outcome.
As a consequence, the 2004 preparatory committee (PrepCom) meeting
was unable to agree either the agenda or background documents for
the review conference, leaving Duarte to try and sort things out.[5] Even so, during meetings in the
run-up to the Review Conference, he appeared rather too sanguine,
seeming to assume that the agenda would fall into place in time. It
didn't.

During his consultations, Duarte tried out various formulae to
bridge the gap between those (principally the United States) who
continued to try and erase references to the important agreements
adopted by consensus by NPT States Parties in 2000, and those who
resisted such rewriting of history. The latter group had included
the NAM and the NAC in 2004, but their arguments were left largely
up to Egypt at the Review Conference.

When, shortly before the review conference opened, the United
States belatedly accepted the compromise option that it had
rejected in 2004, when it was proposed by the Chair of the PrepCom,
Ambassador Sudjadnan Parnohadinigrat of Indonesia, Egypt refused to
go along. Although this option listed by date all the review
conferences with agreed outcomes (1975, 1985, 1995 and 2000), Egypt
insisted that the focus should be on 1995 and 2000. Its stand came
at a high price, however, when Egypt was later confronted with an
agenda that failed to mention 2000 at all. Egypt's rejection of the
date-listing option also soured relations within the fragmenting
NAC even further, particularly with Sweden, whose ambassador,
Elisabet Borsiin-Bonnier, was Chair-designate of Main Committee
III, and so part of Duarte's management team.

At the end of the first week, Duarte thought he had obtained
acceptance for a US-leaning, pared down 'chapeau' (lead-in
sentence) to paragraph 16 of the agenda on "Review of the operation
of the Treaty" that mentioned none of the previous review
conferences by date. A 32-word statement from the Presidency was
meant to provide reassurance that the review would be conducted "in
the light of the decisions and the resolution of previous
conferences" and "allow for discussion of any issue raised by
States Parties". However, when it came to decision-time, Egypt
objected and offered an amendment making specific reference to
"taking into account" the "outcomes" as well as the decisions and
resolution of previous conferences.

Instead of putting Egypt's modest amendment to the conference
and requiring that any objectors (i.e. the United States) give
their reasons openly, Duarte suspended the meeting and entered into
several more days of shuttling back and forth between delegations
and groups. In the end, by means of a tactically placed asterisk,
the agenda was adopted in the second week. The asterisk was
understood by the NAM to connect the agenda with the President's
statement and a NAM understanding, putting both on the record.

The president's statement read: "It is understood that the
review will be conducted in the light of the decisions and the
resolution of previous Conferences, and allow for discussion of any
issue raised by States Parties."[6]

The statement from Malaysia on behalf of the NAM read: "The
Non-Aligned States Parties to the NPT welcome the adoption of the
agenda of the 2005 Review Conference of the Parties to the NPT. The
agenda establishes the framework for conducting the review of the
operation of the Treaty in accordance with article VIII, paragraph
3 of the Treaty, the decisions and the resolution of previous
Conferences, in particular the 1995 Review and Extension Conference
and the decision of the 2000 Review Conference to adopt by
consensus its Final Document."[7]

With these understandings linked to the agenda by the asterisk
(or so the NAM believed), the agenda was adopted. The meaning of
the asterisk, however, was to cause problems in the last week, when
the UK delegation persuaded the conference to accept a different
interpretation of the agenda agreement from the one that the
majority of states parties, including many Western allies, thought
had been agreed.

Work Programme Adopted on Day 17

The next procedural standoff concerned the work programme and
delayed the start of substantive debates until late in the third
week. The issue here was about which subsidiary bodies (essentially
a subcommittee or working group) would be convened and under what
terms. The subjects on the table were practical disarmament steps,
security assurances, regional issues (including the Middle East),
and withdrawal from the Treaty (Article X), but the main
disagreement was between the United States and the NAM over
negative security assurances (NSA), by which the nuclear powers
pledge not to attack the non-nuclear NPT states (since they have
renounced the option of developing nuclear weapons).

The NAM, which has a long-standing demand for a legally binding
agreement containing unconditional security assurances, originally
wanted two separate subsidiary bodies on practical disarmament
steps and on security assurances. Pressed by the president, the NAM
reluctantly agreed to just one subcommittee to cover both issues.
To the frustration of its Western allies, the US opposed the
mention of security assurances in the title or mandate, thereby
wasting more time.

Finally, at the very end of the sixteenth day on May 18,
agreement was reached on three main committees and three subsidiary
bodies, as follows:

Bracketed and Blocked: the Committees run out of time and
patience

Once the committees got going, the Conference had little more
than five days to discuss the many working papers and proposals on
issues as diverse as further practical steps on disarmament;
nuclear doctrines and nuclear sharing; the nuclear fuel cycle;
making the IAEA additional protocol the safeguards standard and a
condition of supply; universality; nuclear weapon free zones;
nuclear safety and security; and keeping weapons and materials out
of the hands of terrorists.

The six chairs of the committees and subsidiary bodies did a
valiant job of trying to pull very disparate ideas and political
perspectives together into some semblance of reflective assessments
and recommendations. As can be seen from the drafts, which are
reproduced below in as final a form as the Acronym Institute was
able to obtain, there were clichéd exhortations and
euphemistic generalisations mixed in with interesting proposals and
some real attempts to address the toughest issues. But the Chairs
had a near-impossible uphill struggle, deprived as they were of
both the time and the political will among States for serious
negotiations to take place.

The signals coming from the president were that he didn't expect
them to deliver much by way of agreed substance. The indications
from the P-5 were no better: though some would have liked the
Conference to have a constructive outcome, the weapon states were
themselves failing to agree a joint declaration, principally
because of the US refusal to endorse the CTBT. By this time, too,
key NAM states were letting it be known that in view of the US
refusal to acknowledge its obligations from 2000, no agreement on
substance would be better than a lowest common denominator
agreement that ignored or diluted previous commitments on
disarmament.

Not all the Chairs' efforts met the President's exhortation to
be "short and concise and yet balanced and comprehensive", but that
was far from the main problem. Self censorship and restricted
horizons prevailed, as the texts annexed to this article show.

MC.I on Disarmament

The report from MC.1 on disarmament and its subsidiary body on
practical disarmament turned out to be the only report transmitted
to the president, though it was so peppered with brackets that he
decided not to work on it further or send it to the drafting
committee. In annexing the two documents, Sudjadnan formally noted
that "they did not reflect fully the views of all states
parties".

As can be seen from the drafts reproduced below, MC.I's report
contained 8 principal paragraphs that focussed mainly on the
article I and II obligations, and included two paragraphs
supporting the recommendations of the Report of the UN Secretary
General on disarmament and nonproliferation education. Although
much was bland, the text notably exhorted the nuclear weapon states
to refrain "from nuclear sharing for military purposes under any
kind of security arrangements, among themselves, with
non-nuclear-weapon states and with states not party to the Treaty".
The non-nuclear-weapon States were called on "to refrain from any
activities designed to develop nuclear weapons capability". Passing
references were made to non-compliance, UNSC Resolution 1540 and
keeping weapons out of the hands of non-state actors.

The section on practical disarmament steps under article VI
tried to build on the decisions from 1995 and 2000. It reiterated
the basic principles of transparency, irreversibility and
verifiability and offered rather mild exhortations relating to
further reductions of strategic and non-strategy nuclear weapons;
despite its modest tone, the United States earmarked virtually the
whole of SB.I's text for deletion. A seven paragraph chair's draft
on security assurances was also discussed (see below), but the
United States made clear that it did not find this draft acceptable
in any way.

MC.II on Safeguards and Regional Issues

Main Committee II dealt with safeguards, and its subsidiary body
bore the same unwieldy title as in 2000: "regional issues,
including with respect to the Middle East and implementation of the
1995 Resolution on the Middle East". MC.II's report was blandly
crafted to minimise contention, but the report of SB.II was blocked
by Iran and Egypt. As a consequence, none of the report was
transmitted to the drafting committee.

The subsidiary body report contained sections about the 1995
Resolution and reporting on steps to fulfil it; a nuclear weapon
free zone in the Middle East; India and Pakistan; safeguards and
the Additional Protocol. It called on Israel to accede to the NPT
and welcomed Libya's deproliferation. The five NPT participants
involved in the six-party talks (China, Japan, Russia, South Korea
and the United States) met separately to try to get consensus on a
paragraph dealing with North Korea, which would no doubt have
materialised if the rest of the report had looked set for adoption;
in the event, the text on North Korea was never circulated.

The main issues of contention were a lengthy paragraph on Iran,
which Iran insisted should be deleted in its entirety, and a
paragraph that went further than the traditional exhortation to
Israel and called for NPT parties to take additional measures to
induce Israel to accede to the NPT. It also referred to convening a
standing committee and denial of transfers of technology and
cooperation in the nuclear and research fields. This paragraph was
opposed by the United States and some of the Western parties as
going beyond the 1995 Resolution and being impractical (or likely
to backfire).

The paragraph on Iran stated the current situation, including
the IAEA assessment and diplomatic initiatives of the EU-3
(Britain, France and Germany). It noted that Iran has signed the
Additional Protocol and called for its ratification and full
implementation. It also exhorted Iran to "respect the Paris
Agreement and the relevant resolutions of the IAEA Board of
Governors, in particular suspension of the enrichment-related and
reprocessing activities".

Iran's objections were not so much about the specific wording as
the fact that Tehran was determined to prevent any paragraph at all
that suggested non-compliance with the NPT or Iran's safeguards
agreements. Iran argued that it should not be singled out because
it was complying with IAEA inspections and had signed the
Additional Protocol. Even though this paragraph was in brackets,
Iran chose to block transmittal of the report.

MC.III on nuclear energy and withdrawal

Main Committee III had the task of dealing with nuclear energy
and institutional issues. Though the main report contained little
that any advocate of nuclear energy could object to, it came to be
blocked by the United States after Egypt refused to accept
annexation of the text of SB.III on Article X (withdrawal) and
other issues.

Only a couple of days earlier, it had appeared that MC.III's
rather conservatively-worded report, shorn of most of the
contentious safety and security questions raised during the debates
and in working papers, would get transmitted in a bracketed form.
Some had also hoped that by lowering its sights to finding language
that only clarified the interpretation and expectations of article
X on treaty withdrawal and pointed some ways forward (without
proposing decisions or commitments on strengthening the treaty's
institutional capacity or states parties' powers), agreement on the
text from the subsidiary body might also be achieved.

Late in the process, Egypt submitted an informal paper to MC.III
on universality of the NPT. When this did not get taken on board,
Egypt refused to allow SB.III's report to be annexed, reportedly on
the grounds that a revised text from the Chair of SB.I had not been
properly discussed. Despite holding an additional session to try to
resolve the problem, Ambassador Borsiin-Bonnier was forced by
Egypt's rejection to drop the text on withdrawal. Just as she was
about to bring the gavel down on the report of MC.III minus
anything from the subsidiary body, up popped the United States to
lodge an objection and block the report's adoption and
transmittal.

Brought to a Whimpering Close

Having rushed to finish their deliberations in barely a week,
the committees reports went nowhere but onto NGO websites. The
Drafting Committee, chaired by Ambassador Doru Romulus Costea of
Romania, had been given no authority to synthesise any of the
substance from the committees into the Conference report. Instead,
it just worked with the Secretariat to write up a 'technical
report' summarising the formal conduct of the conference.

Whether it might have been possible to get some agreement on
specific issues by other means, such as stand-alone decisions or
resolutions, used to such good effect in 1995, will never be known,
because Duarte made no attempt to convene further negotiations on
issues of substance. Reportedly, he wanted to close the Conference
on Thursday, but was persuaded that this would not look good; an
early finish with no substance would expose the charade too
obviously and give rise to suspicions that no real outcome had been
envisaged.

So the Conference was dragged out to Friday afternoon. Morale
had sunk so low that even the drafting committee had problems,
although it was just outlining the conference proceedings. Conflict
arose because the UK Ambassador, John Freeman, challenged the
Secretariat's understanding of the decision on adopting the agenda,
particularly what had been denoted and meant by the asterisk that
had made possible the agenda agreement. The Secretariat had
reflected its understanding by reproducing in adjacent paragraphs
the short text of the statements of understanding from the
President and from Malaysia on behalf of the NAM.

Freeman objected that this was not the understanding of the
Western Group and Others (WEOG). His intervention surprised and
angered a number of Western diplomats. Though they made clear in
the corridors that they were happy to accept the Secretariat's
characterisation of the agreement on the agenda, Freeman was
allowed to go ahead with its objection because the UK had
reportedly provided a different understanding to the Western group
in its role as WEOG coordinator. Though it was emphasised later
that the UK had not meant to make its objection on behalf of WEOG,
the UK continued to insist that the asterisk referred only to the
President's statement and not to the NAM's. After much wrangling
and recourse to contradictory precedents - and to the disgust of
the NAM and, it has to be said, several WEOG delegations - the text
of the NAM's statement of understanding was removed from the
report, while the one-sentence President's statement was
retained.

The Conference limped to its predicted end on May 27, when it
adopted a so-called 'final document' that did little more than list
participants and officials and how many meetings had been held. As
for the important issues states parties had identified before and
during the conference - such as entry into force of the CTBT,
nuclear disarmament, the nuclear fuel cycle and strengthening
safeguards and the institutional powers of states parties - they
had shown themselves devoid of the political will and
responsibility even to have an honest debate about these issues,
let alone adopt measures that would strengthen the world's capacity
to deal with nuclear dangers and proliferation.

The Conference closed with a series of public statements. Though
few stood out, Canada managed to say many of the things that - at
the very least - should have been expected from the President.
Sierra Leone acknowledged the "voice of the people", referring to
the actual and "potential victims of nuclear weapons" and the
contributions from civil society. From the NAM, Malaysia and South
Africa spoke well, but lacked real conviction; while Cuba, the most
recent party to the NPT, was impatiently determined in its calls
for nuclear disarmament. Iran, and of course the United States,
continued to abuse each other while refusing to take responsibility
for their own parts in this proliferation mess.

One of the few to have been satisfied by the debacle, Iran
managed to position itself to get practically the last word, which
it used to excoriate the United States for that superpower's crimes
against non-proliferation. Though few if any had wanted the NPT
Conference to give Iran such a dangerously easy ride, its closing
speech afforded some rare amusement, as a panicked US ambassador
was seen rushing around desperately trying to get Britain, France
or anyone to come to her aid - and being rebuffed, as Duarte began
his closing statement. Iran's speech had been so outrageous that
the ambassador knew she ought to object formally, but appeared
incapable of making the decision and intervention on her own.

Duarte's speech was a wasted opportunity. Short, charming and
innocuous, it summed up his presidency. Unfortunately, it did not
do what was needed. Instead, he gave a metaphorical shrug and then
a long list of thank-yous, managing (through intention or omission)
to leave out civil society, whose constructive representation had
included NGOs, mayors and parliamentarians from many countries
around the world.

Reasons for Failure

The conference did not fail simply because there was no final
document. For many states, this was a preferred outcome to a
document that would have cancelled out or weakened previous
commitments and agreements. It failed because no-one had a positive
strategy for addressing the major issues and moving forward despite
the political extremes. It is difficult to avoid the conclusion
that some states did not care enough and others desired this
impotent impasse.

Undoubtedly, the primary reason why the conference could not
adopt consensus agreements was the unpropitious political climate.
But the same could have been said about 2000, when there were
similarly serious problems, most notably US non-ratification of the
CTBT, the South Asian tests and concerns about the nuclear
programmes of several states. The difference is that in 2000, key
states responded to the political problems by trying harder to find
workable compromises.

The failure to get a consensus final document was long
predicted, but with different leadership and some constructive
strategies, it might have been possible for the 2005 Review
Conference to further the aims of non-proliferation with some other
kind of statements, agreements or even resolutions. Instead, it was
debilitated by a dismal lack of leadership and the entrenched
positions and proliferation-promoting policies of a small number of
influential states, including the United States and Iran, as they
pursued their narrowly defined self interests and sought to keep
open their different nuclear options.

In addition to the roles played by these countries, other
factors that contributed to a more abject Conference failure than
can be explained by the political situation included: lack of
leadership from the P-5, the European Union, or the NAM, as well as
the predicted disintegration of the New Agenda Coalition that had
played such a determining role in 2000; weak conference management
that went by the minimalist rule book rather than seeking out
innovative and regime-building initiatives that might have
identified ways to make progress; and the role of Egypt, which
caused concern and attracted criticism from many quarters.

The US Banana Skin

Despite President Bush having identified nuclear
non-proliferation as an urgent priority during his election
campaign, the US was determined to block any reference to CTBT
entry into force or a verifiable ban on fissile materials
production, which Washington now opposes. Its obsession to destroy
the CTBT even scuppered agreement on a joint NPT-related statement
by the P-5.

The US strategy involved undermining the NPT's disarmament
obligations, particularly the practical steps adopted at the 2000
Review Conference. Instead of arguing about these issues, which are
supported by the vast majority of non-nuclear weapon states and had
been agreed with all the nuclear powers, the US threw a pernicious
banana skin under the Review Conference when it refused to let the
agenda mention the consensus outcome from 2000 as the basis for
reviewing and evaluating progress on the Treaty in 2005. The
predictable consequence of this strategy was that the 2004 PrepCom
was unable to agree on an agenda, which then delayed the start of
substantive work at the Review Conference, causing great
frustration.

After placing its banana skin, the United States kept a
relatively low profile and watched from the corner as various
delegations and eventually the whole conference slipped up. Having
declared in advance to the media, if not the conference, that it
didn't matter whether there was an agreed outcome or not, the US
exercised no positive leadership to get one. The delegation
appeared inexperienced and disengaged. The architect of its NPT
strategy, John Bolton, undersecretary for arms control at the State
Department from 2001, was in limbo in May 2005, as his confirmation
as US ambassador to the United Nations was held up by revelations
of bullying and manipulation. Behind the scenes, however, the US
was being shielded by Western Group consensus, aided by its trusty
ally, the United Kingdom, which by a strange anomaly dating back to
1975 holds the position of WEOG coordinator for the NPT.

Aware of substantive opposition to its positions from many of
its allies, Washington sought to avoid both confrontation and
construction. It issued numerous statements, but refused to give
the NPT conference an accountable report of efforts to comply with
its disarmament commitments under Article VI. Instead, the US
displayed a big colourful exhibition about its nonproliferation
achievements in the UN hallway and issued glossy brochures with
chronologies of significant NPT-related events that managed to miss
out the CTBT and consensus agreements from the 2000 Review
Conference.

Iran Shrewdly Deflects Attention

Iran, determined to avoid criticism of its uranium enrichment
programme, played a clever game to prevent any practical discussion
of measures to control or limit nuclear fuel cycle options. When
its core interests with regard to the nuclear fuel cycle and
criticism of its uranium enrichment programme were not at stake,
Iran was publicly helpful, bent on deflecting attention and winning
friends. Its sizeable delegation briefed NGOs, worked the
conference floor, and explained how it only desired to model its
nuclear programme on Japan's, even to the extent of permitting
"24/7 inspections".

Adept at behind-the-scenes manipulations of conference procedure
and the consensus rule in the Non-Aligned group, Iran benefited
greatly from the reluctance of countries such as Brazil, Japan,
France and Britain to see the conference discuss - let alone adopt
- effective and non-discriminatory measures that would curb the
high enrichment of uranium or the separation of plutonium.

Egypt: Strategically Subtle or Tactically Inept?

While the US manipulated in the background and Iran exerted its
charm offensive, the Egyptian delegation was out front making its
objections visible, particularly in relation to the conference
agenda and the committee reports. Egypt explained its concerns in
terms of principle and practice, with particular reference to the
1995 Resolution on the Middle East and the agreed outcome of the
2000 review conference. However, as Egypt repeatedly exposed itself
to flak by objecting, some delegations began to speculate about its
underlying motivations.

According to one explanation, Egypt was under pressure for
domestic and regional reasons to uphold the agreements on the
Middle East and nuclear disarmament obtained in the two previous
review conferences. It is certainly true that Egypt had played a
prominent leadership role in persuading Arab states to support the
1995 extension decision, which was adopted with two decisions to
strengthen the treaty plus the Resolution on the Middle East. Egypt
also helped to persuade several Arab states to join the treaty
after 1995, and was a member of the New Agenda Coalition. Faced
with US determination that the regional and disarmament commitments
of 1995 and 2000 be sidelined, coupled with an absence of strategic
leadership from the NAM, NAC or anyone else, and a conference
president that appeared reluctant to offend the major powers, Egypt
may have considered that it had little option but to oppose
counter-productive or minimalist agreements. Egypt also had
regional concerns, needing to ensure that Iran was neither allowed
to develop nuclear weapons, nor isolated and rendered more
dangerous by short term US policies.

Whatever the reasons for Egypt's tactics, there were important
differences between the objectives, motivations and conduct of the
three countries identified as the main spoilers. The US and Iran
pursued narrow self-interest, whereas Egypt appeared to have a more
constructive regime-building motivation, even if its tactics at
times appeared inept. Though many hold all three responsible for
the conference failure, this blame assignment ignores the complicit
role of other delegations and the motivations and deficiencies of
other important players.

The P-5: Rhetoric without Much Substance

There were both contrasts and commonalities in how the P-5
characterised the challenges faced by the non-proliferation regime
in 2005. Yet despite efforts led by France, the five nuclear weapon
states foundered in their efforts to agree a P-5 statement. Though
some had tried hard, they were still a long way from agreement by
the time the Conference opened, and so failed to exert the positive
influence that the statements of 1995 (from Britain, France, Russia
and the United States) and 2000 (by all five) had achieved.

Intensive negotiations during the conference diminished the
brackets on the draft statement, and by the final week only a
handful remained, including the CTBT, Proliferation Security
Initiative (PSI) and North Korea. In the end, however, US hostility
to a paragraph endorsing CTBT entry into force scuppered the
effort, and there was no P-5 statement.

Considering how seriously they seemed to regard the plight of
the non-proliferation regime in their opening statements, the
failure of P-5 states, individually or collectively, to make a
constructive input to the Conference is all the more revealing.

The United States, for example, had proclaimed: "Today,
the Treaty is facing the most serious challenge in its history due
to instances of noncompliance" notably North Korea and Iran, and by
non-state actors. The US statement continued: "By secretly pursuing
reprocessing and enrichment capabilities in order to produce
nuclear weapons, North Korea violated both its safeguards
obligations and its non-proliferation obligations under the NPT
before announcing its intention to withdraw from the Treaty in
2003. In recent months, it has claimed to possess nuclear weapons.
For almost two decades Iran has conducted a clandestine nuclear
weapons program, aided by the illicit network of A. Q. Khan. After
two and a half years of investigation by the IAEA and adoption of
no fewer than seven decisions by the IAEA Board of Governors
calling on Iran to cooperate fully with the IAEA in resolving
outstanding issues with its nuclear program, many questions remain
unanswered. Even today, Iran persists in not cooperating fully.
Iran has made clear its determination to retain the nuclear
infrastructure it secretly built in violation of its NPT safeguards
obligations, and is continuing to develop its nuclear capabilities
around the margins of the suspension it agreed to last November,
for example, by continuing construction of the heavy water reactor
at Arak, along with supporting infrastructure." The US also
characterised two categories of "problematic non-state actors":
blackmarket traders like the A.Q. Khan network; and terrorist
organisations.

Russia emphasised the lack of entry into force of the
CTBT; slow uptake of the IAEA Additional Protocol; deadlock in the
CD impeding negotiations relating to disarmament;
proliferation-sensitive technologies and energy development
patterns; 'breaches', 'noncompliance' and 'technical failures'; and
nuclear blackmarket activities. With regard to North Korea's
announced withdrawal, Russia was "convinced that this situation can
be resolved through political and diplomatic means". On Iran,
Russia called "for current negotiations and consultations to
provide such decisions with regard to Iran's nuclear programme that
would meet the country's legitimate energy needs on the one hand
and dispel doubts as to the peaceful nature of its nuclear
activities on the other."

China raised concerns about "uncertain, unstable and
unpredictable factors affecting international security [which] are
increasing... [and] increasing non-traditional threats intertwined
with traditional threats [that] constitute new challenges for
international security. Terrorism and the proliferation of... WMD
become increasingly prominent. The emerging regional nuclear issues
as well as the exposure of [a] nuclear smuggling network have
overshadowed international nonproliferation efforts. It is no less
disturbing that the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty... regarded as a
'cornerstone of strategic stability' by the international
community, was discarded; outer space is facing the danger of
weaponisation; the prospect of entry-into-force of the CTBT is
diluted; international arms control and disarmament is at a
stalemate; the... CD has long been paralyzed, making it impossible
to start negotiations on issues such as the fissile material
cut-off treaty (FMCT) and the prevention of arms race in outer
space."

In an unmistakable dig at the Bush administration, China also
listed further "negative developments, including sticking to the
Cold War mentality, pursuing unilateralism, advocating pre-emptive
strategy, listing other countries as targets of nuclear strike and
lowering the threshold of using nuclear weapons, researching and
developing new types of nuclear weapons for specific purposes, and
new destabilizing factors to international security."

France and Britain endorsed the overall perspective and
objectives contained in the EU Strategy to combat WMD and the
43-paragraph EU Common Position on the 2005 NPT Review Conference.
Additionally, France alluded to "profound changes... in the
world" and built on the EU prioritisation of five threats:
"terrorism, weapons of mass destruction proliferation, regional
conflicts, state failure, and organised crime". France noted that
"In the face of these dangers our principal safeguard remains the
recourse by the community of States to determined action and
effective multilateralism while respecting the law".

France identified as its five key objectives for the conference:
an effective verification system; strengthening the multilateral
system to address cases of non-proliferation; greater State
accountability for transfers of nuclear items; facilitation of
access to non-sensitive nuclear items for States that respect their
commitments; and holding a debate on the issue of withdrawal from
the NPT. France concluded by quoting the UN Secretary-General's
opening statement to the Conference: "International regimes do not
fail because of one breach... They fail when many breaches pile one
on top of the other, to the point where the gap between promise and
performance becomes unbridgeable."

Britain referred to "changing threats, and challenges"
that "served only to underline [the NPT's] importance and therefore
our support". Noting that "non-proliferation and disarmament are
inter-linked in achieving the Treaty's goals", Britain said the
"the relationship between the two processes is neither simple nor
mechanistic... we believe that progress in non-proliferation is
important in its own right..." Saying that the "challenge is to
acknowledge and to underscore by our actions that all of us have
responsibilities as well as entitlements under the Treaty", the UK
indicated that it supported the suspension of nuclear fuel cycle
cooperation with states that violated their non-proliferation and
safeguards obligations, that it wanted the conference to decide on
action to resolve existing cases of such violation by states
parties, and that it should "address withdrawal... and work
together to prevent future abuses of the Treaty so as to ensure
that nuclear energy can continue..." Britain wanted "the Treaty's
objectives to be sustained and their implementation strengthened
for the security of all", and looked "forward to negotiation and
agreement of a strong Final Document at the conclusion of this
Conference."

Lack of Leadership

The P-5 were not the only ones to disappoint the conference and
the hopes of NPT supporters by failing to provide leadership. As
noted above, the European Union, had come prepared with a
43-point Common Action which contained some good positions, but the
EU had no convincing strategy for taking its ideas forward. Unlike
in 2000, this was not because Ireland and Sweden were involved in a
more radical and effective initiative than the EU majority. Far
from it, the NAC had collapsed in all but name before the review
conference started. The special interests of Britain and France, as
nuclear weapon possessors and plutonium reprocessors, certainly
contributed to the EU's inability to go beyond high sounding
platitudes, echoing 1995 and 2000, but does not fully explain the
EU's complete failure of leadership. There were internal divisions,
since many were critical of Britain, which used its influence as
WEOG coordinator to cover and front for the obstructionist
positions of the United States. The UK role weakened attempts by
others (Germany and the Netherlands, for example) to try to use EU
influence for more constructive ends, but though this undoubtedly
provoked additional frustration, it does not explain or justify the
lack of an effective strategy.

Headed by Luxembourg for the six months that included the review
conference, the EU should have done much more to promote the NPT's
objectives. Recalling the Treaty's preamble about the devastation
of nuclear war, its statement had called the NPT "an irreplaceable,
legally binding instrument for maintaining and reinforcing
international peace, security and stability... the cornerstone of
the global nuclear non-proliferation regime and the essential
foundation for the pursuit of nuclear disarmament under article VI,
as well as an important element in the further development of the
applications of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes."

The EU particularly highlighted challenges arising from: the
delay in CTBT entry into force, despite its impressive number of
signatories and ratifiers; that 106 NPT parties had not yet put
into force the Additional Protocol; the continuing urgency and
importance of "preventing terrorists from acquiring or developing
nuclear, biological or chemical weapons and their means of
delivery, as well as radiological dispersal devices".

With regard to the "illicit trade in highly sensitive nuclear
equipment and technology", the EU welcomed efforts to dismantle
"illicit" trafficking and procurement networks (leaving open the
question of what it might regard as a licit trafficking network).
Specific reference was made to "Pakistan, Malaysia, South Africa,
the United Arab Emirates" but no mention of Britain, Germany or
other European countries whose nationals and nationally-registered
companies have also been implicated in the A.Q. Khan network.

The EU expressed worries about increases in "conflict potential
at a regional level" and was "deeply concerned that some
non-nuclear weapon states parties to the treaty do not always
comply with their nonproliferation obligations". It deplored North
Korea's announced withdrawal from the NPT and mentioned its "firm
resolve to contribute to the search for a peaceful solution,
through negotiations". It also promised that the EU was "united in
determination not to allow Iran to obtain military nuclear
capabilities".

The Non-Aligned Movement also came with some
comprehensive positions on paper, some good and some rather
out-dated; but like the EU, it provided no kind of strategy or
leadership to promote their implementation. This was in part
because Indonesia had become co-opted by its management role as
Chair of Main Committee I, South Africa's unusual passivity
(relative to the role it undertook in 1995 and 2000), and the parts
played by Iran and Egypt, which prevented any coherent strategising
by the NAM. Moreover, while most NAM countries are in agreement
about disarmament (at least on the level of rhetoric), they are
divided about nuclear energy and the fuel cycle, and cannot be seen
to criticise their own members, including Iran, non-NPT members
India and Pakistan, and other participants who may be up to their
necks in proliferation networks and double-dealing.

The NAM statement, read by Malaysia, declared: "The NPT is at
[a] crossroads, with its future uncertain... The lack of balance in
the implementation of the NPT threatens to unravel the NPT regime,
a critical component of the global disarmament framework." It did
not mention by name North Korea, Iran, Libya or the Khan network
and said that the NAM would be guided in their approach to the NPT
conference by the Millennium Summit, and decisions taken at the
XIII Conference of NAM Heads of State or Government (Kuala Lumpur,
February 2003) and the XIV NAM Ministerial Conference (Durban,
August 2004). These "affirmed that multilateralism and
multilaterally agreed solutions, in accordance with the Charter of
the United Nations, provide the only sustainable method of dealing
with the multiplicity of disarmament and international security
issues. With regard to non-proliferation challenges, the NAM
asserted: "We all have concerns about nuclear non-proliferation,
both vertical and horizontal. We all have fears about nuclear
terrorism; we fear for the possibility of individuals or groups and
other non-State actors getting their hands on nuclear explosive
devices and using them for terrorist activities. We all continue to
have nightmares for so long as there is the continued existence of
nuclear weapons, and humanity has called for their total
elimination. At the same time, we want to preserve the inherent
right to peaceful uses of nuclear technology including energy. This
NPT Review Conference should rightly serve to take care of our
concerns, allay our fears and reduce our nightmares." Despite these
resounding sentiments, however, the NAM was as divided and
directionless as in previous review conferences.

Not much can be said about the New Agenda Coalition,
which began to fall apart soon after it brought about the
ground-breaking disarmament plan of action ("13-Steps") in 2000.
Attempts were made to cobble together some joint statements, the
best of which was the opening speech given by New Zealand on behalf
of the seven nations (Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand,
South Africa and Sweden).

This complained that "we have yet to realise the NPT's
preambular injunction on 'the cessation of the manufacture of
nuclear weapons, the liquidation of all existing stockpiles, and
the elimination from national arsenals of nuclear weapons and the
means of their delivery'" and continued: "according to the latest
estimates the number of existing nuclear warheads today amount to
upwards of 30,000... almost as high as the estimated number of
warheads that existed when the Treaty entered into force in 1970...
Even today's stocks of fissile material are enough to produce
thousands more nuclear warheads. We continue to be far from the
implementation of the 'programme of action' towards implementation
of Article VI contained in the Principles and Objectives for
Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament agreed in 1995 and the
'practical steps for... systematic and progressive efforts to
implement Article VI' agreed in the year 2000. The CTBT has not yet
entered into force, negotiations for a treaty banning the
production of fissile material have not begun, a subsidiary body on
nuclear disarmament has not been established, the majority of
weapons reductions are not irreversible, transparent, or
verifiable, and the role of nuclear weapons in security policies
has not been diminished - to give but a few examples of the lack of
implementation of the 1995 and 2000 agreements."

North Korea and Iran were both mentioned in relation to efforts
to resolve those challenges, and the NAC noted that "in spite of
recent positive efforts, tensions remain high in the Middle East
Region". Concern was also expressed about the "possibility that
terrorists could acquire nuclear weapons, and by activities such as
those of the A.Q. Khan network."

The existence of common statements did little to hide the fact
that the NAC members were pursuing individual interests and
agendas, and that Egypt and Sweden were barely on speaking terms.
The lesson to learn from the NAC's experience is that issue-based
coalitions, groups or alliances should form and stay together only
when they can constitute a whole that is greater than the sum of
its parts, and if they have coherent strategies and effective
leadership as well as good positions.

Since it is to be expected that political priorities and
personalities will change over time, care must be taken to monitor
whether the whole remains more positive, active and effective than
the individual members would be on their own or if they joined in
other ad hoc alliances.

If the whole does not remain more effective and progressive than
the alternatives, then it is time to recognise this, disband and
move on. A dysfunctional coalition constrains its members rather
than empowering them.

Finally, on the subject of poor leadership, questions need to be
asked about the role of the Brazilian presidency. Ambassador
Duarte was nominated to be conference president in large part
because of Brazil's role in 2000 as a NAC member and its
association with the NAM. No-one could have faulted Duarte's
dedication as he criss-crossed the world consulting assiduously
with states and civil society in the run-up to May 2005. Yet there
turned out to be remarkable little to show from all those travels
and meetings, at least not in the conduct and outcome of the review
conference. Rightly described by New Zealand in its closing remarks
as "dignified, consultative and patient", Duarte remained oddly
detached and unperturbed, regardless of the chaos and frustration
unfolding around him.

Despite the example of three of his more successful predecessors
(in 1985, 1995 and 2000), all of whom had likewise been faced with
tough issues and obstructionist states, and despite discussing with
many NGO experts and diplomats about ways in which the rules of
procedure and review conference precedents might be utilised to
broker innovative compromises and outcomes, the 2005 president
seemed content to let the meeting slide into oblivion, as quickly
and quietly as possible.

Perhaps he felt that if no final document was possible, nothing
else was worth attempting; or perhaps his over-riding objective was
to avoid a public knock-down fight and steer the conference into a
minimalist outcome (adoption of a technical report) on the
principle of "do no harm". If so, then he was successful. Two less
benign explanations need also to be considered, however. Could
Duarte's minimalist approach and unflappable calm have been meant
to show the P-5 (and especially the United States) that Brazil was
sufficiently conservative and pragmatic to be trusted with a seat
on the UN Security Council? Or was Brazil, one of the last states
to accede to the NPT, seeking to protect its own anomalous and
problematic positions with regard to uranium enrichment, the IAEA
Additional Protocol and even the CTBT? Uncomfortable though they
might be, such questions need to be asked, though it is unlikely
they will be answered.

Implications of Failure: a Nuclear Weapons
Resurgence without Deterrence

For some, the 2005 review conference will have provided quiet
satisfaction. The Bush administration had made it obvious that it
would prefer no agreement to one that reinforced the 2000
commitments or the CTBT. Iran succeeded in preventing any text that
would name, shame or criticise its nuclear programme. Absent from
the conference, India, Pakistan and Israel, together with North
Korea, might be happy that the conference failed to criticise them
or apply stronger measures to induce them to disarm. If such was
their aim, Egypt and several other non-nuclear weapon can be said
to have succeeded in preventing any agreement that might have
weakened or repudiated the 1995 and 2000 commitments. But all these
states - and particularly human security - will be losers if the
non-proliferation regime unravels further, a foreseeable (though
not inevitable) consequence of these failures.

At a time when the value of nuclear weapons is being reasserted
by states as diverse as North Korea, Russia and the United States,
governments will only reduce nuclear dangers if they face up to the
fact that such weapons are a security problem, not an asset. This
is recognised for biological and chemical weapons, the use of which
is banned, though more needs to be done to prevent terrorist use by
irresponsible governments or armed groups.

Balancing obligations, incentives and monitoring mechanisms, the
non-proliferation regime was constructed in the 1960s to prevent
the spread of nuclear weapons to the 20-plus aspirants that
President Kennedy had feared. Though proliferation was retarded,
the regime failed to stop a small number of states from acquiring
capabilities and weapons programmes outside the treaty, in part
because the P-5 undermined efforts to stigmatise such weapons by
continuing to assert the strategic importance and security value of
their own nuclear arsenals.

Now the credibility and effectiveness of the non-proliferation
regime are under intense pressure. The nuclear programmes of North
Korea and Iran have exposed areas of weakness relating to the lack
of adequate enforcement powers and the inherent technological link
between the nuclear fuel cycle and weapons materials. The review
conference had the opportunity to address these weaknesses, but
failed to act. The major danger we now face is not that there might
be one or two new states with nuclear weapons in the future, but
that weak or muddled policy responses allow such states to succeed
in being accepted, as India, Pakistan and Israel's nuclear
programmes are now, in effect, accepted as de facto by most if not
all - and that such acceptance will undermine the security value of
the treaty for all.

Nuclear deterrence for the weak against the
powerful

The NPT's historical discrimination between the rights and
obligations of nuclear haves and have-nots, which was bolstered by
cold war power relations, is proving to be unsustainable in the new
security environment. Both the 2004 High Level Panel on "Threats,
Challenges and Change" and the Secretary-General's 2005 Report "In
larger freedom" warned of a "cascade of proliferation" if the
nuclear non-proliferation regime were further eroded and
undermined. As discussed in these UN reports, the early 21st
century is characterised by deteriorating relations among major
powers, the unravelling of the treaty-based security regimes, an
increased sense of vulnerability to terrorist attack, and crises of
legitimacy and credibility in national and international
institutions of governance, including the United Nations. Such
developments are important factors in creating a fear-filled
security environment, and they are the avoidable consequence of
policy choices by major governments, not least the United
States.

Though the P-5 seem to be the last to realise this, the logic of
nuclear deterrence, such as it was in the cold war, is worse than
irrelevant when faced with extreme ideologues. Such aggressors will
not be deterred by nuclear or other weapons held by their target
countries or anyone else; on the contrary, they may have strategies
aimed at provoking a nuclear or similarly disproportionate
retaliation. Leaving aside the question of who could be justifiably
targeted in retaliation for a terrorist attack, any use of nuclear
weapons in response to terrorism - however bad - would be
counterproductive.

Mininukes do not solve the logical gap. Whatever the size and
yield of the warhead, crossing the nuclear threshold in retaliation
or preemption would destroy moral authority, fragment any
international anti-terrorist coalition, and likely redirect
international outrage from the original perpetrators to the nuclear
weapon user. Instead of there being one centre of destruction,
caused by the terrorists, a nuclear retaliation would create more
devastation, thereby dividing international response and practical
aid. Moreover, the consequences of a policy of retaliation are
indefensible in human terms and would be a recipe for signing many
new converts for the terrorists' cause; consequently, the threat to
do so lacks credibility.

In the 21st century, nuclear deterrence has no convincing role
and should be abandoned. The priority needs to be reducing the
incentives, opportunity and access to weapons capable of mass
destruction. Though they cannot be deterred, terrorists may be
prevented. The policy focus needs to be on strengthening the
regimes, combined with vigilance and better intelligence. Stronger
action will also be needed to prevent access to and supply of the
finances and necessary ingredients for nuclear terrorism.

Some states are attracted to nuclear weapons because they appear
to convey enhancements in status or security, or in political and
regional prestige. They are also coming to be perceived as a way to
hold off invasion or pressure from more powerful countries,
especially the United States, as North Korea sees itself as doing.
Such perceptions are already making it more difficult for some
governments to hold out against domestic and populist demands that
they should provide such "advantages" for their citizens as
well.

It is profoundly worrying to observe how nuclear weapons are
increasing in salience after a drop during the 1990s. Any new
nuclear entrants will likely cause their geostrategic rivals to
reconsider their positions. If the erosion of the non-proliferation
regime is not halted, the danger is not just that a few additional
countries will hedge their bets, but that global restraints will
crash, causing a proliferation surge.

Bizarrely, given what is at stake, a small number of states
still seek to maintain and even develop or replace their nuclear
arsenals while relying on collective commitments to
non-proliferation to deny other states the same weapons. In this
way, the P-5 and India, Israel and Pakistan are free-riders on the
non-proliferation regime, which is beginning to crumble under the
weight of their policies' contradictions. As their policies have
greatly added to the regime's vulnerability, they need to consider
that if non-proliferation collapses, their security will also be
severely compromised.

Regional problems increase the risks

While North Korea's nuclear gamesmanship appears to be chiefly
directed towards the United States, the inadequacy of Kim Jong Il's
regime, the shared border with South Korea and long and painful
history with Japan all contribute to a volatile security
environment, where misjudgment or miscalculation could potentially
result in the use of nuclear weapons. As noted by South Korea's
Deputy Minister, Chun Yung-woo, "the Korean peninsula suffers from
diminished security because of the miserable failure of the NPT to
contain the nuclear spectre".

The line of control in Kashmir is still a potential flashpoint
for war, including the use of nuclear weapons. Though India and
Pakistan appear to have backed down from the nuclear sabre-rattling
of 1998-2001 in favour of confidence-building measures and enhanced
lines of communication, both are building up their nuclear forces
and pursuing missile capabilities. Neither side has as much
stability as it would like, and it remains to be seen whether the
neighbours have sufficient stability to make a bilateral deterrent
relationship work. (The United States and Russia had several near
misses, and they did not share a highly contested border.)

The conflict in the Middle East pre-dates Israel's nuclear
programme, but Israel's policy of nuclear opacity and the
widespread assumption that it has a significant nuclear arsenal
serves as an excuse and impediment to efforts to persuade other
states in the region to adhere to and abide by non-proliferation
constraints and commitments.

Remove the genie's symbolic power and justifications for
use

Though their destructiveness derives from their physical
properties, nuclear weapons are pre-eminently political and carry
symbolic importance for state leaders as well as non-state
extremists. A great deal more can be done to limit access to the
physical components, but the real key to reducing dangers lies in
understanding how nuclear weapons are employed symbolically and
politically in domestic politics, strategic relations and
international security debates.

An important reason why biological and chemical weapons were
able to be prohibited and given up by the vast majority of states
is that they came to be stigmatised not only as inhumane, but as
unethical, even cowardly; that is, something that morally
responsible leaders would not use. What prevents the nuclear genie
from being put back into its bottle is not the technology or
know-how, but the value still accorded to nuclear weapons,
particularly by states that have them.

That nuclear weapons are presently valued as an important emblem
and currency of power is not a natural or military fact or
attribute connected with the weapons' utility, but a social and
political fact constructed and sustained by the major powers. By
its actions and policies, the United States has helped to create a
context in which nuclear weapons become the ultimate necessity for,
and symbol of, state prestige and security. Accordingly, when the
United States or other nuclear powers try to prevent other states
from obtaining nuclear weapons, they may be seen as coercively
denying sovereignty, power and self-determination to others. What
should be a collective endeavour for common security is thereby
turned into a counterproductive contest for control, feeding
nationalist and anti-imperialist passions.

Cuts in arsenals may reduce some nuclear dangers, but unless and
until they are accompanied by a disavowal of use (and therefore
value), they fail to have the desired political impact, both for
the non-nuclear weapon states and on the decision-making of
potential proliferators. Western allies have to stop running away
from the inescapable logic of what the NAM have argued for years:
non-proliferation is unsustainable without real and significant
progress in nuclear disarmament and the devaluation of nuclear
weapons.

Conclusions

On May 2, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan called on NPT parties
to imagine "a nuclear catastrophe in one of our great cities".
Depicting the impact - not just the obvious annihilation and pain
of those directly affected, but the less thought-about implications
for hard-won freedoms and human rights, development and trade - he
posed the question all would have to ask themselves, "Could I have
done more to reduce the risk by strengthening the regime designed
to do so?"

The answer to come out of the 2005 Review Conference was that
the majority knew what needed to be done but lacked the courage,
determination and strategies to stand up to or bypass the few who
want to carry on nuclear business as usual, regardless of the
future security risks for the world. The lesson to be learned is
that good ideas and proposals just remain on paper unless they are
combined with effective strategies and game plans for how to
achieve them - in 1995 and 2000 there were not only good ideas, but
innovative, pragmatic strategies and active presidents willing to
use the rules and procedural tools to their maximum possibilities
in order to achieve useful, regime-building outcomes.

Another lesson for the non-proliferation regime is that the
nuclear fuel cycle is a much bigger security problem than
recognised when the treaty entered into force in 1970, and will
have to be urgently addressed. But instead of sending a clear
message to would-be proliferators, the Conference allowed several
countries to protect their financial and nuclear interests above
international security imperatives.

A further conclusion concerns the group system based on the
Western Group and Others (WEOG), Eastern European leftovers, and
Non-Aligned Movement (NAM). This is outdated, severely
dysfunctional and provides a refuge for scoundrels and naysayers to
hide within. As well as requiring additional institutional powers,
NPT parties need to overhaul their traditions and rules, including
their lack of transparency and negative attitude towards civil
society participation.

In treaty terms, the failure in 2005 to adopt further
substantive recommendations means that agreements obtained in the
review conferences of 1995 and 2000 still stand as the benchmarks
for measuring progress and promoting compliance. It can even be
argued that the lack of consensus in 2005 underscores the fact that
the principles, measures and steps adopted by consensus in past
review conferences have not yet been implemented, and more work
must be done to ensure that they are. But in reality, the fact that
the majority of states lacked the will or backbone to stand up to
the few naysayers sends a dangerous message to would-be
proliferators and existing nuclear weapon possessors that the
regime is too weak to stop them.

It might be easy to dismiss this conference as representing the
triumph of procedure over substance, but that would be to miss a
crucial point about multilateral diplomacy. Egypt, the United
States, the NAM and others bandied around demands for inclusion or
exclusion of dates like "1995" and "2000" and words such as
"outcomes" and "negative security assurances" because in diplomacy,
language is code and the codes contain potential access, legitimacy
or denial for issues of substance.

Finally, To make real headway in reducing the threats and
dangers from nuclear weapons, attention must be paid to the
symbolic, strategic and political factors, as well as to the
physical materials and components. The fact that disarmament has
never been internalised as a genuine policy imperative by the
nuclear weapon possessors continues to complicate and thwart
efforts to prevent proliferation, rendering them less effective and
authoritative. The current US administration does not appear to
mind, as its ideologues are happier working outside multilateralism
and think they can contain nuclear threats by means of more
controllable groupings such as PSI and the London Club of nuclear
suppliers. But theirs is a dangerous illusion, doomed to
disappointment. Already a number of states are reasserting their
criticisms of the decision to extend the NPT indefinitely in 1995,
and more will begin to hedge their bets. If the military utility
and security value of nuclear weapons continue to be evoked at high
level by some states, the have-nots will lose confidence that the
non-proliferation regime can meet their security needs.

The 2005 review conference has further exposed how the US-driven
shift from norm-based non-proliferation to counter-proliferation,
involving self-selected coalitions of the willing, has weakened
some of the essential infrastructure and tools that the
international community needs for combating WMD and terrorism.

Whether the next decade is characterised by increased security
or proliferation will depend on the development of an integrated
approach based on disarmament, nonproliferation and human security,
to reinforce the norms and laws of the international regimes with
better practical controls tailored to deal with the specific
threats posed by nuclear weapons and technologies. This is
necessary to provide the rationale and international legitimacy for
integrating the norms, rules, institutions and practices built up
to constrain WMD during the 20th century with the policing powers
and tools developed more recently to deal with non-compliant states
and stop commercial or non-state actors whose activities threaten
national and international security.

[2] Comprising
Australia, Austria, Canada, Denmark, Hungary, Ireland, the
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway and Sweden, the G-10 has
coordinated on "Vienna-based" issues since 1980, more usually
relating to export controls, safeguards and issues of nuclear
safety.

[3] Note verbal
from Mexico and Declaration of the Conference of Nuclear Weapon
Free Zones (CZLAN/CONF/5), NPT/CONF.2005/WP.46, May 18, 2005.

[4] See "Combating
the Risk of Nuclear Terrorism by Reducing the Civilian Use of
Highly Enriched Uranium," Working Paper submitted by Iceland,
Lithuania, Norway, and Sweden, 2005 Review Conference on the
Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,
May 20, 2005 (NPT/CONF.2005/MC III/WP.5).