B. Senior NSC Staff Project,
“Conditions for a Peaceful Settlement With the USSR”, listed in the
current NSC Status of Projects3

The enclosed memorandum by the Secretaries of State and Defense and its
attached report on the subject, prepared pursuant to Reference B by a
State-Defense working group as part of the NSC 79 project, are submitted herewith at their request for
consideration by the National Security Council and will be scheduled on the
agenda of an early Council meeting.

Attention is invited to the fact that the enclosure recommends that:

a.

The basic principles contained in paragraph 6, Part V and the
“Conclusions” contained in paragraph 7, Part VI of the attached
report, be approved as the basis for the development of detailed
United States positions for use in any negotiations which may be
undertaken in connection with a proposal for a system of regulation,
limitation and balanced reduction of armaments and armed forces;
and

b.

In the event of the approval of the enclosure as recommended
above, an interdepartmental group, representing appropriate
departments and agencies, be established to develop such detailed
United States positions.

Accordingly, it is recommended that, if the above recommendations are
adopted, the enclosed report be submitted to the President for consideration
with the recommendation that he approve the above [Page 478]recommendations and direct their
implementation by all appropriate executive departments and agencies of the
U.S. Government under the coordination of the Secretary of State.4

James S. Lay, Jr.

[Enclosure]

Memorandum by the Secretaries of State and Defense to
the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council (Lay)

top secret

[Washington,] July 6, 1951.

Subject: Report to the National Security Council on the
Formulation of a United States Position with Respect to the Regulation,
Limitation and Balanced Reduction of Armed Forces and Armaments.

There is forwarded herewith a report on the “Formulation of a United
States Position with Respect to the Regulation, Limitation and Balanced
Reduction of Armed Forces and Armaments”. This report was prepared by a
State-Defense working group, and has received the approval of the
Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, and the Joint Chiefs of
Staff.

It is requested that this report be submitted for early consideration by
the National Security Council. It is essential that the United States
Government come to a formulation of its policy for the regulation,
limitation and balanced reduction of armed forces and armaments,
including disclosure and verification of such armed forces and
armaments, for two reasons:

(1)

As a result of the President’s address to the United Nations
on October 24, 1950, the United Nations is at work putting
together its Commission on Conventional Armaments and its
Commission on Atomic Energy. At the next session of the General
Assembly this subject will inevitably be an active one and it is
important that the United States should maintain its leadership
and initiative. In this connection we must also expect either
that the U.S.S.R. may put forward some disarmament proposals for
which we should be prepared, or that groups in Congress, now
active, may advance proposals.

(2)

It may well be desirable, possibly before the next session of
the General Assembly of the United Nations, and possibly in
connection with other proposals for the solution of East-West
problems in Europe and Asia, as contemplated in that part of the
NSC 79 project dealing with
the development of conditions for a peaceful settlement with the
USSR, for the United States publicly to put forward proposals
relating to the regulation, limitation and balanced reduction of
armed forces and armaments.

Therefore it is deemed important that the National Security Council give
this matter urgent study. The attached report is submitted as a basis on
which the United States can formulate its policy and prepare
proposals.

In the event of approval by the National Security Council of this report
as a basis for such proposals, it is recommended that an
interdepartmental group, representing appropriate departments and
agencies of the Government, be established to develop detailed United
States positions for use in any negotiations which may be undertaken
pursuant to the proposals.

Dean Acheson

G. C. Marshall

[Subenclosure]

Report of the State-Joint Chiefs of Staff Working
Group on the Formulation of a Basis for U.S. Positions To Be Taken
Vis-a-Vis U.S.S.R.

i. the problem

1. Under its terms of reference, the State-Joint Chiefs of Staff Working
Group was directed to study two problems: (1) a basis for the U.S.
position on the matter of disclosure and verification of armed forces
and armaments, including the criteria for verification which the U.S.
would require and permit; (2) the manner in which the existing level of
armed forces and armaments can best be presented in its relation to the
causes of international tensions in Europe.

ii. purpose

2. The purpose of this study is the establishment of a foundation upon
which positions may be built which would, if accepted by the Soviet
Union, be acceptable to the U.S. or, if rejected by the Soviet Union, be
advantageous to the U.S. and the Western Powers for their propaganda
value. The urgency of establishing such a foundation arises in large
measure as a result of the meetings now being held in Paris preliminary
to a possible Council of Foreign Ministers meeting of the U.S., USSR,
U.K. and France.

iii. nature of the report

3. The study of the Working Group is contained in two papers attached
hereto as Annexes “A” and “B”. Annex “A” deals with the problem of
disclosure and verification of armed forces and armaments and Annex “B”
deals with the presentation of material relating to the existing level
of armed forces and armaments in relation to the causes of international
tensions in Europe.

4. At the State–Joint Chiefs of Staff meeting of 15 March 1951, it was
agreed that a Working Group from the Department of State and from the
Joint Chiefs of Staff Organization would be directed to study the
problems described above and to report to the State-Joint Chiefs of
Staff conferees on these matters. In addition to the four members
originally designated, the Working Group invited Mr. Frank Nash of the
Office of the Secretary of Defense to participate in the study, and he
has attended most of the meetings. Mr. Nash is also the U.S.
Representative on the U.N. Commission on Conventional Armaments, and has
a broad knowledge of the field under study.

5. As authorized by its terms of reference, the Working Group has
consulted with the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and through the latter with the
intelligence branches of the various departments and agencies which
participate in the work of the CIA.
Consultation with the AEC was arranged
through Mr. LeBaron5 and the Military Liaison Committee and the
Working Group had assistance from Brigadier General Herbert B.
Loper6 and Brigadier General Alvin R. Luedecke7 in this matter. Consultation with the CIA was arranged through Mr. Paul H. Nitze
and the Working Group was able to discuss the problem at length with
various CIA officials. Material secured
as a result of such consultations is on file in the Department of State
and in the Joint Chiefs of Staff Secretariat.

v. basic principles with respect to the regulation
of armaments and armed forces

6. In their approach to the problem, the Working Group recognized that a
system of disclosure and verification is but one facet of the larger
problem of the regulation of armaments and armed forces. The Working
Group agreed to the following principles as essential to the
establishment of a basis for the development of United States positions
on the matter:

a.

In the light of the present world situation the security
interests of the United States demand that the first step in the
field of regulation of armaments and armed forces be achievement
of international agreement on at least the general principles
involved;

b.

International control of atomic energy is inseparably related
to international regulation of armed forces and all other forms
of armaments; and

c.

The international control of atomic energy must be based on
the United Nations Plan8 or some no
less effective plan.

vi. conclusions

7. Subject to the acceptance of the basic principles outlined in Section
V, above, the Working Group has concluded that:

a.

A system of disclosure and verification of armed forces and
armaments logically would be the first step in the
implementation of an agreed international program for the
regulation, limitation, and balanced reduction of armed forces
and armaments;

b.

The system of disclosure and verification must be on a
continuing basis;

c.

Disclosure and verification should be applicable to all
armaments, including atomic, and all types of armed forces
including paramilitary, security, and police forces;

d.

To protect the security interests of the U.S., disclosure and
verification should be carried out stage by stage, with
appropriate provisions for proceeding to the next stage only
when previous stages have been satisfactorily concluded;

e.

To protect the security interests of the U.S., disclosure and
verification should begin with the relatively less sensitive
information and proceed to the information which is more
sensitive:

(1)

With respect to atomic energy, the phasing might start
first with raw materials, proceed to processing plants
and facilities for producing fissionable materials and
finally include weapons and weapon fabrication
facilities;

(2)

With respect to armed forces and other weapons, the
phasing should probably begin with a count of police,
security, and paramilitary forces (including their
reserve components) together with the types and amounts
of their materiel in service and in reserve, and proceed
to inspection of regular army, navy, and air forces
together with the types and amounts of their materiel in
service and reserve;

f.

A program for the regulation, limitation and balanced
reduction of armed forces and armaments (including international
control of atomic energy), of which disclosure and verification
would be a step, could not depend in the foreseeable future on
the existence of an international force separate and apart from
national armed forces, and therefore should not involve the
balanced reduction of existing armed forces and armaments to the
level which the mere maintenance of internal security would
require;

g.

Under a program for the regulation, limitation and balanced
reduction of armed forces and armaments (including international
control of atomic energy), the United States must under present
world conditions rely on the willingness of the participating
nations to continue [Page 482]the
plan or on the capability and willingness of the United States
and states cooperating with it to deal with violations if any
occur;

h.

Because of the complexity of the matter and since no empirical
formula has yet been devised for the determination of national
armed forces to which nations will agree, it probably will be
necessary, prior to the implementation of any part of the
program which has to do with the actual regulation, limitation
or reduction of armed forces or armaments, to develop the
precise nature of the program and to reach agreement regarding
the program by detailed negotiations;

i.

A program should call for the regulation, limitation and
balanced reduction of armed forces and armaments to a level
which would decrease substantially the possibility of a
successful initial aggression and thereby increase the chances
that armed aggression would not be resorted to in furtherance of
national objectives;

j.

If armed force can be so limited that resort to its use as an
instrument of national policy would be much less likely, the
conflict between the intentions of the West and the Soviet orbit
might be resolved through other means;

k.

A program for the regulation, limitation and balanced
reduction of armed forces and armaments should be open for
adherence to all states and initially it must include those
states whose military resources are so substantial that their
absence from the program would endanger it. In any event, the
Soviet European satellites and Communist China must be
included;

l.

A program for the regulation, limitation and balanced
reduction of armed forces and armaments would have to provide
for the administration of adequate safeguards by competent
international authority with appropriate status, rights and
powers;

m.

A proposal for an international system of phased disclosure
and verification of all armed forces and armaments, including
atomic, as the first step in implementation of a program for the
regulation, limitation and balanced reduction of armed forces
and armaments (including international control of atomic
energy), with adequate safeguards, would be advantageous to the
United States if accepted by the USSR and would be advantageous
to the United States for its propaganda value even if rejected
by the USSR;

n.

Data on existing levels of armed forces and armaments can be
presented to indicate the relation of such levels of armed
forces and armaments to the causes of international tensions in
Europe.

vii. recommendations

8. It is the recommendation of the Working Group that:

a.

This study be forwarded by the Department of State–Joint
Chiefs of Staff Conferees, through appropriate channels, to the
National Security Council for consideration as the basis for the
development of a United States position on regulation,
limitation and balanced reduction [Page 483]of armed forces and armaments, including
disclosure and verification of military forces; and for the
manner of presentation of the level of armaments in its relation
to causes of existing international tensions in Europe;
and

b.

The Department of State-Joint Chiefs of Staff Conferees
recommend to the Secretary of State and the Secretary of
Defense, respectively, that in the event of approval of this
study an interdepartmental group, representing appropriate
departments and agencies of the Government, be established to
develop detailed United States positions for use in any
negotiations which may be undertaken in connection with a
proposal for a system of regulation, limitation and balanced
reduction of armaments and armed forces.

Annex “A”

The Question of Disclosure and Verification of
Armed Forces and Armaments and the Formulation of a Basis for U.S.
Positions To Be Taken Vis-a-Vis U.S.S.R.

i. introduction

1. The discussions at the preliminary conference of deputies in Paris
convened to arrive at an agreed agenda for a Four Power Foreign
Ministers Conference point up the need for a development of U.S.
positions on a number of outstanding issues. These issues include such
specific political questions as Germany and Austria as well as the
general causes of tension in Europe. The excessive size of the armed
forces of the Soviet Union and its satellites is symptomatic of these
tensions. The wide range of these issues indicates that the U.S. will be
confronted with the necessity of developing broad proposals with respect
to armed forces and armaments in order to assist in the possible
settlement of specific political issues.

ii. object

2. The object of this Annex is to establish a basis for the U.S. position
on the matter of disclosure and verification of armed forces and
armaments, including the criteria for verification which the U.S. would
require and permit.

iii. purpose

3. The purpose of this Annex is the establishment of a foundation upon
which positions may be built which would, if accepted by the Soviets, be
acceptable to the U.S., or if rejected by the Soviets, be advantageous
to the U.S. and the Western Powers for their propaganda value.

iv. facts bearing on the problem

4. This Government has formally supported proposals for a “onetime”
census and verification of armed forces and conventional armaments. [Page 484]The U.N. resolution embodying
such proposals treated census and verification as necessary first steps
toward regulation, limitation and reduction of armed forces and
conventional armaments. This resolution, however, was vetoed in the
Security Council by the U.S.S.R.9

5. While the U.S. has not advanced specific proposals for the regulation,
limitation and balanced reduction of armed forces and conventional
armaments, the President reaffirmed this Government’s support of this
general principle in his address to the General Assembly of the U.N. on
24 October 1950.

6. This Government has advanced and supported in the U.N. specific
proposals for the international control and regulation of atomic energy
which, when fully implemented, would make effective the elimination of
atomic weapons from national armaments. These proposals were embodied in
what has come to be known as the U.N. Plan. This Plan, though vetoed by
the U.S.S.R. in the Security Council, was approved by an overwhelming
majority of the members of the United Nations.10

v. aspects of the problem of inspection and
verification

7. The proposals formulated by the U.S. and introduced in the U.N.
relating to census and verification of conventional armaments and armed
forces contemplated reports by each participating nation as of an agreed
date. Such reports were to cover (a) the regular armed forces, military
and para-military forces subject to national control, such as border
guards, internal security forces, militia and gendarmerie, as well as reserve components of those forces in
organized groups; and (b) categories of matériel,
in service and in reserve, necessary to provide adequate knowledge of
the existing level of conventional armaments. Materiel in the research
or development stage was specifically excluded. Such proposals indicated
that the problem was essentially one of disclosure and inspection to
verify the disclosure. The Working Group believes that the term “census”
is misleading unless it is understood to mean disclosure and a system of
inspection to verify such disclosure.

8. It is the view of the Working Group that disclosure of the size and
nature of armed forces and armaments as of a particular date on [Page 485]a “one-time” basis and the
subsequent verification of such disclosure would, in the light of the
present world situation, no longer be meaningful unless it were
undertaken as a step in a program of international regulation of armed
forces and armaments. Such a program, if approved, would provide
substantive measures to reduce tensions and increase stability in the
world. The relationship between disclosure and regulation was recognized
in the U.N. resolution in which disclosure and verification were linked
with the regulation of armaments.

9. If the question of inspection to verify disclosure is considered as
the first step in the implementation of a program for the regulation,
limitation and balanced reduction of armed forces and armaments, it
becomes apparent that the mere disclosure of the level and nature of
armed strength on a particular date is inadequate. The system of
disclosure and verification by a competent international authority must
be on a continuing basis. In fact, a continuing system of disclosure and
verification will be necessary in order to provide a body of information
for use in the prolonged negotiations that will be required to complete
the details of a plan after agreement on the principles for regulation,
limitation and balanced reduction of armed forces and armaments has been
reached. The Working Group feels strongly that, in present
circumstances, such a system of disclosure and verification should not
be undertaken except in this context.

vi. the relevance of inspection and verification to
broad proposals for the reduction of tensions

10. The U.S. is handicapped in negotiating with the U.S.S.R. by the
disparity of armed forces and armaments in Europe. If the U.S. is in a
position to make proposals with respect to regulation, limitation, and
balanced reduction of armed forces and armaments, in which the
initiation of a continuing system of inspection to verify disclosure is
the necessary first step, then the U.S. could make concurrent proposals
for acceptable solutions to such outstanding political problems as
Germany and Austria. The proposals for specific political settlements
would be conditioned upon agreement to such a plan for the regulation,
limitation, and balanced reduction of armed forces and armaments.

vii. the nature of a system of disclosure,
inspection and verification which would be acceptable to the
u.s.

11. Extent of the Disclosure. The proposals
already formulated in the U.N. provide for the extent of the disclosure
of armed forces, including para-military and security forces, and the
conventional armaments of such forces. There remain the questions of
including police in the forces to be disclosed and of extending the
disclosure to include atomic and [Page 486]other weapons which have not been previously included under the
existing U.N. proposals.

12. It is the view of the Working Group that police forces should be
included in the disclosure and verification. The existing proposals
supported by the U.S. in the United Nations already cover para-military
forces subject to national control, such as border guards, internal
security forces, militia and gendarmerie as well
as reserve components of those forces in organized groups. Because of
the nature of the Soviet system, police forces of all kinds must be
regarded as part of its military forces and will have to be included in
a system of disclosure and inspection, since it will be almost
impossible to distinguish between police and the categories already
covered in the U.N. proposals. The U.S. will suffer no disadvantage from
the disclosure of its police forces even down to the municipal level,
while the information which would be gained and disclosed about the
police system in the U.S.S.R. would be of great value in exposing the
forces required to perpetuate the Soviet system. Such a disclosure would
in itself be a major alteration in the Soviet system.

13. With respect to atomic energy, the Working Group has consulted with
the Atomic Energy Commission* and the intelligence agencies
represented on the Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee.*

14. The AEC has advised the Working Group
that the U.N. Plan is the best plan yet developed for the regulation and
control of atomic energy. Apart from a plan for regulation and control,
however, the AEC believes that a system
of disclosure and verification, “if it included rights of inspection
comparable with those of the United Nations plan for control of atomic
energy and if it were carried out in stages, could work to the advantage
of the U.S.” The Commission has also advised the Working Group that “if
the census and verification were to be the first steps toward eventual
control of atomic energy, it would be in our interest to have a system
of inspection provide as high a degree of accuracy as possible with
respect to atomic facilities, present production rates and capacity, and
existing stocks of fissionable material”, although there would be some
advantage “to the U.S. from even incomplete information on important
Russian production facilities.” With respect to research and development
activities, the Commission advised that it would appear to be neither
desirable nor feasible to include them.

15. The Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee . . . concluded that
the U.S. should gain considerably from the inspection of mines,
fissionable material production facilities and current weapon stockpile,
but that as inspection becomes detailed, the U.S. would have [Page 487]little to gain and the U.S.S.R. would
gain important information from the technical point of view. The
Committee also concluded, as did the Commission, that it would be
neither desirable nor feasible to include research and development
activities in a system of disclosure and verification.

16. The Phasing of Disclosure and Verification. As
indicated above, it would be dangerous to the security of the U.S. to
undertake the disclosure of information concerning its armed forces and
armaments, including atomic, and to engage in a system of inspection to
verify such disclosure unless the disclosure and the verification were
phased in such a way that the U.S. would be protected in the event of a
serious violation or a collapse of the system. The Working Group
believes that one of the important advantages from a phased and
continuing system of disclosure and verification is the opportunity over
a period of time to test the good faith of the parties. The mere
agreement to enter into such a system would give no assurance that the
Soviet Union would actually carry it out in full or at all; thus the
insistence upon completing each step of a phase before proceeding to the
next would provide the U.S. with a safeguard on the exchange of
information. At the same time, it would provide a continuing check on
Soviet intentions. The U.S. cannot afford to assume that the Soviet
Union would continue to live up to the agreement through all of its
stages, but as the various stages were reached and passed the U.S. would
have reason to increase its confidence in continued good faith. If the
Soviet Union agreed to such a system of disclosure and verification and
began to carry it out, a fundamental alteration would have been achieved
which might eventually lead to profound changes within the Soviet
Union.

17. With specific reference to atomic energy, the Working Group was
advised by the Atomic Energy Commission that an orderly procedure for
staging the disclosure and verification would “start first with raw
materials, proceed to processing plants and facilities for producing
fissionable materials and finally, if everything had worked out
satisfactorily up to that point, include weapons and weapon fabrication
facilities.”

18. The Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee recommended that, from
an intelligence point of view, disclosure and verification be carried
out in a somewhat different sequence because of the assumed
technological superiority of the U.S. program.

19. The variance in staging suggested by the AEC and the Joint Committee was based largely on the
realization by the Joint Committee that bad faith might halt the system
at any stage and it would therefore be desirable to avoid the disclosure
of any information not now thought to be known by the Soviet Union while
at the same time acquiring as much information as possible not now known
to the U.S. [Page 488]The Working Group
is not in a position to strike a balance between the advantages and
disadvantages in the somewhat different staging suggested by the Atomic
Energy Commission and the Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee,
but it does believe that the material submitted to the Working Group
supports the view that a phased system of inspection of atomic energy
programs is feasible.

20. Apart from the specific advice sought by the Working Group with
respect to the inclusion of atomic energy, a number of general questions
were submitted to the Central Intelligence Agency with respect to a
system of disclosure and verification of armed forces and armaments,
including atomic, to determine the accuracy that could be achieved and
the protection which could be secured against bad faith in the course of
implementing the system.

21. It was the view of the Central Intelligence Agency that the relative
superiority of Soviet intelligence with respect to the armed forces and
armaments of the U.S. is such that the U.S., in a phased system, would
secure more valuable information than the U.S.S.R. in the initial
phases, provided the U.S.S.R. were prevented from acquiring prematurely
information intended to be withheld initially or not to be disclosed at
all. It was the advice of the CIA that a
system of disclosure and verification should include the Soviet
satellites as well as the U.S.S.R. It was recommended that the system be
so phased that in the initial phases the information disclosed by the
U.S. should provide the U.S.S.R. with data which is largely known
already or at least believed to be available to the U.S.S.R. The CIA has pointed out that the information
already in the hands of the Soviet Union will permit them to pinpoint
their inspection with far greater ease than will be possible for the
U.S. Even where the U.S. has information which would assist it in an
inspection, the source of the information may have to be protected and
may present us with problems of utilizing the information in our
possession. In general, the Central Intelligence Agency recommended that
the phased disclosure should progress from generalized and less
sensitive information to the detailed examination of processes and
weapons, in short from quantitative to qualitative data, and that
sensitive aspects of research and development in all fields,
manufacturing processes and details of new weapons should be excluded
entirely. Recognizing the difficulty of achieving in practice the
desired results, the CIA pointed out
that the difficulties, as well as the possibilities of surmounting them,
will require extensive further study by the operating and intelligence
agencies of the U.S. Government.

22. As a matter of tactics, and as evidence of U.S. good faith, together
with its attendant value as propaganda, the Working Group feels that the
U.S. should take the position that research and development [Page 489]should be included in the very last
stage of an agreed system or systems of control and inspection
undertaken to implement a program for the regulation, limitation and
balanced reduction of armaments and armed forces. In any event, the
United States must be convinced, on the basis of performance in all of
the earlier stages, of the good faith and complete cooperation of the
other signatories before any implementation of this stage is
undertaken.

23. The Working Group suggests on the basis of present data that such a
system should probably begin with a count of police, security and
para-military forces (including their reserve components) together with
the type and amounts of their materiel in service and in reserve, and
proceed to inspection of regular army, navy and air forces together with
the types and amounts of their materiel in service and reserve. The
subsequent stages would involve the disclosure and verification of other
more sensitive fields (such as research and development) covered by the
agreement.

24. The Working Group did not secure detailed information concerning the
disclosure and verification of biological and chemical warfare
activities. It was advised, however, that it would be practically
impossible to detect biological warfare activities by an inspection
scheme. The Working Group therefore wishes to call attention to this
preliminary judgment as indicating a problem that would require detailed
study in the event any plan for disclosure and verification were to be
actually negotiated.

25. The conclusions and recommendations of the Central Intelligence
Agency confirm the view of the Working Group that prolonged negotiations
will be required in order to arrive at the precise provisions for a
system of disclosure and verification in order to assure the U.S. that
disclosure and inspection in any one stage will not involve the
disclosure of data intended to be held out until a later stage. These
conclusions and recommendations also seem to support the view of the
Working Group that a public proposal for disclosure and verification,
including atomic energy, can be made, provided it includes a requirement
for carefully phased implementation of the plan. The details do not need
to be advanced when the proposal is made.

26. The Working Group agrees that further study will be required before
the details of a phased system of disclosure and verification can be
determined, and believes that additional working groups should be
established, composed of technically competent representatives of the
intelligence and operating agencies of the U.S. Government, to conduct
the careful and extensive studies which will be required for the
development of detailed positions for use in any negotiations which may
be undertaken in connection with the proposal for a system of disclosure
and verification.

vii, [viii.] net advantage
to the u.s. in a system of inspection to verify disclosure

27. The Working Group concludes on the basis of its detailed analysis of
the problem and the advice it has secured from the Atomic Energy
Commission and the Central Intelligence Agency that, on balance, a
system of disclosure and verification of armed forces and all armaments
within the framework of a program for regulation, limitation and
balanced reduction would work to the advantage of the U.S. provided:
(a) agreement could be secured with respect
to the rights of inspection and the authority and privilege of the
inspectors adequate to insureaccuracy, and (b)
agreement could be secured on a phased disclosure and verification which
would withhold in the initial stages the most sensitive information
intended to be disclosed only in the later stages and which, therefore,
would be so devised that in the event of bad faith at any stage no
serious harm would result to the U.S. upon the termination of the
system. The Working Group concludes that, so long as these safeguards
are explicitly stated in the principles included in any proposal for a
system of disclosure and verification, the U.S. would be protected in
the complex negotiations that would be required and in the application
of the system itself. The Working Group does not believe that the
difficulties of negotiation which will be encountered should prevent the
U.S. from advancing a proposal for a continuing disclosure and
verification of armed forces and armaments, including atomic energy,
within the framework of a program for the regulation, limitation and
balanced reduction of armed forces and armaments. In the unlikely event
that the U.S.S.R. should agree to negotiate such a system of disclosure
and verification, the Working Group concludes that the U.S. could
develop a detailed system acceptable to the U.S.

ix. the practical scope of a plan for regulation,
limitation and balanced reduction

28. The Working Group does not believe that any plan for the regulation,
limitation and balanced reduction of armaments or the enforcement of
such a plan should be developed on the assumption that there would be in
existence an international force separate and apart from the national
forces of the parties. The group believes it must be recognized that the
existing system of sovereign states will continue for the foreseeable
future and that in any plan devised the U.S. must rely, in the final
analysis, on the willingness of the participating nations to continue
the plan or on the capability and willingness of the U.S. and states
cooperating with it to deal with violations if any occur.

x. the principles and elements of a plan for the
regulation, limitation and balanced reduction of armed forces and
armaments

29. The Development of a Plan. The Working Group
believes that it will be impossible to complete the details of a plan
for regulation, [Page 491]limitation and
balanced reduction of armed forces and armaments in advance of
initiating the inspection and verification of the armed strength of the
participants. Any eventual complete plan will have to be negotiated over
a long period of time. It is possible, however, to suggest the
principles on which such negotiations could be conducted and to define a
variety of elements and factors which would affect the provisions for
regulation and limitation and balanced reduction.

30. The Soviet Union has advanced a proposal for a flat percentage
reduction of existing armed forces. This proposal is wholly unacceptable
because it would merely perpetuate the existing disparity in level of
armaments and armed forces, and consequently would not bring about a
reduction of the tensions which arise therefrom. In order to deal with
the Soviet proposal, it will be necessary to secure public understanding
of the complexity of the problem and to make clear that the Soviet
proposal avoids the vital question of imbalance. The nature of the
Soviet proposal makes it essential for the U.S. to speak in terms of a
balanced reduction. In short, before any
general limitation or reduction can be carried out by the West, the
Soviet Union and its satellites will have to reduce their total armed
strength until the level of armaments between East and West is more
nearly equal or the West will have to bring the effectiveness of its
armed strength up to the level of the East.

31. General Principles. The U.N. Commission for
Conventional Armaments has developed a number of principles applicable
to a system of regulation and limitation of armed forces and armaments,
but inherent in these principles is the idea of utilizing an
international force to assure compliance with the program of regulation
and limitation. As the Working Group has indicated, it believes that, as
a practical matter, the existence of sovereign states makes it necessary
to devise a program which does not depend upon the use of an
international force but which recognizes that the only response to a
violation by one of the parties will be the action taken by one or more
of the other parties.

32. The Working Group is firmly of the opinion that a plan for
regulation, limitation and balanced reduction must be such as to give
prompt warning of an actual violation or even a serious threat of
violation so as to permit other nations to take adequate measures for
their self-protection. The safeguards provided must enable nations to
recognize the danger inherent in an actual or threatened violation so
that they will have an opportunity to take appropriate measures,
including an increase of their military strength to offset a similar
increase on the part of the violator. No system for regulation and
limitation of armaments can be wholly fool-proof. Accordingly, the U.S.
must not be lulled into a false sense of security, and the national [Page 492]leadership must be determined
and vigorous in order to meet the dangers which will exist if a
violation occurs.

33. The foregoing analysis leads to the conclusion that we cannot expect
an international force capable of assuring compliance with a program for
regulation, limitation and balanced reduction to be available.
Accordingly, the plan developed must not involve for the foreseeable
future the balanced reduction of existing armaments to that level which
the mere maintenance of internal security would require.

34. The following are the principles which the Working Group believes to
be essential as the basis for the program of regulation, limitation and
balanced reduction which it proposes:

a.

The program must be open for adherence to all states and
initially it must include at least those states whose military
resources are so substantial that their absence from the program
would endanger it. In any case, participation could not be
limited to the U.S., U.S.S.R., U.K. and France and still provide
an adequate degree of national security;

b.

With respect to the control and regulation of atomic energy it
would be necessary to secure agreement on the U.N. plan, or some
no less effective plan;

c.

The limitation of armed forces and armaments must be carried
out under an agreed system of regulation and inspection, and the
implementation must be phased in such a manner that will protect
the security of the participating states at each stage;

d.

It would be essential to secure agreement on necessary
safeguards which would technically be feasible and practical.
Such safeguards would have to provide for the prompt detection
of the occurrence of violations, while at the same time causing
only the necessary degree of interference with the various
aspects of the life of individual nations;

e.

In the case of armed forces and non-atomic weapons, the
inspection and other mechanisms required as safeguards should be
conducted under an international authority vested with the
necessary status, rights and powers; and

f.

With respect to atomic energy, the control and inspection
required as safeguards would be conducted in accordance with the
U.N. plan or a plan no less effective.

35. Under the foregoing principles the plan developed would not be
directed to the end of total national disarmament and would not envisage
reliance on an international force to prevent aggression. Instead, the
plan would be directed toward a reduction in the existing level of
national armed forces and armaments, and thereby a reduction in tensions
and an improvement in relations between nations. The plan would call for
the limitation and balanced reduction of armed forces and armaments to a
level which would decrease substantially the possibility of a successful
initial aggression and thereby increase the chances that armed
aggression would not be resorted to in furtherance of national
objectives. If armed force can be so limited that resort to its use as
an instrument of national policy would be much less likely, the [Page 493]conflict between the intentions
of the West and the Soviet Orbit might be resolved through other
means.

36. In its analysis of the problem, the Working Group considered those
elements of national strength which in some degree or other contribute
to the expression of national power in the form of armed forces.
Initially, it was thought that a study of these elements, such as
Position, Area, Geography, Length of Seacoasts, Length of Borders,
Frontiers Protected by Natural Barriers, Agricultural Base, Population,
Natural Resources, Internal Communications, Industrial Plant,
Technological Skills, University System, and many others, might lead to
an acceptable formula for negotiating the limitation of armed forces and
armaments. However, since nations differ radically in population, size,
geographical situation, national wealth, national character, and in
numerous other ways, consideration of these elements led to such a maze
of complexities that an effort to work out a definite formula had to be
abandoned. Such elements may, however, be appropriate subjects of
discussion in any negotiations toward an acceptable plan. The Working
Group concluded that the exact manner of regulation or the exact nature
of the limitation which the eventual plan would contain could only be
developed through extensive negotiations. Nevertheless, there could be
suggested as examples certain specific criteria which might be found to
be acceptable in the course of detailed negotiation of the program. Some
of the criteria appear to be:

a.

Over-all Size of Armed Forces. The size
of the armed forces to be permitted each country under the plan
will have to be agreed on, and size should bear a relationship
to population. This factor alone, however, cannot be controlling
and if a percentage of population is adopted, it would also be
necessary to set a ceiling so that no nation could have a great
preponderance. If, for example, the percentage adopted were 1%
of the population but the ceiling for any country were one
million, the Soviet Union and Communist China would together
have two million men in their armed forces and the U.S., U.K.
and France would have approximately the same number.

b.

Use of Natural Resources and Industrial
Potential. It may be undesirable to permit the
unlimited use of resources and industrial potential for military
purposes under a plan for limitation and balanced reduction.
Therefore, it might be advisable to restrict the portion of
national production which can be so used. The production of
armaments should bear a direct relation to the amount needed for
the armed forces permitted under the plan, and it may be that
there should also be a ceiling which it might be possible to
express in terms of percentage of the national product; for
example, 5% as contrasted with the much higher percentages
today. Such a criterion based upon a percentage would require
extensive verification because of the difficulty of securing
comparable data.

c.

Mutually Agreed Programs within the Over-all
Limitations. It would not be enough to agree merely on
over-all criteria, since the composition of permitted national
armed forces and armaments would also have a direct bearing on
the effectiveness of the plan. For example, no [Page 494]nation could reasonably propose
to concentrate its total permitted force in heavily armored
ground divisions or entirely in the form of a strategic air
force. The requirement of mutually agreed programs within the
over-all limitation would provide a means of securing a balanced
reduction.

Annex “B”

The Existing Level of Armed Forces and Armaments in
Relation to the Causes of International Tensions in Europe

At VE Day, in 1945, the U.S. had ground forces of over six million men,
four million of whom were in the European and Mediterranean Theaters.
The French and British ground forces in Europe, the Middle East and
Africa on VE Day totaled nearly 3½ million. When the war in Europe
ended, the U.S.S.R. had five million men in its ground armies.

These massive forces, together with air and naval power, had accomplished
the defeat of the Axis Powers in Europe, and a few months later Japan
surrendered. The world looked forward to peace, and in the West the
nations rapidly demobilized and sought to turn again to peaceful
occupations. In the Soviet Union, however, enormous forces were
maintained, and in the first years after World War II these forces, many
of them stationed outside the Soviet borders in Europe, were used by the
U.S.S.R. to threaten and dominate the Eastern European nations.

Repeated efforts were made by the West, both in the United Nations, in
meetings of the Council of Foreign Ministers and in other ways, to
secure the adherence of the U.S.S.R. to the provisions of the U.N.
Charter and to the principles which normally govern relations between
friendly countries.

It became increasingly apparent that the Soviet Union intended to use the
threat of overwhelming force to further its political and ideological
objectives of controlling and subjugating the remaining free members of
the European community, and eventually the world.

When in April 1949, the United States, Canada and nine other nations
signed the North Atlantic Pact,11 the danger to
the North Atlantic Treaty nations from the Soviet’s pursuit of its
objectives by the threat of its armed strength in being was clear and
present. The U.S.S.R. had armies of half a million men stationed outside
the Soviet borders in Europe. It had armies of two million more within
its borders and another half million of security troops for the
maintenance of its system over its own people and those of its
satellites. And, in addition to its own armies, it had available in its
Eastern European satellites, armies of another million men to do its
bidding. [Page 495]The peace treaties
with Hungary, Rumania and Bulgaria had been violated to provide these
forces, and a marshal of the Soviet army commanded the Polish
troops.

In 1949 there were 600,000 men in the Soviet Air Force, 60,000 of them
stationed at air bases in East Germany and the Eastern European
satellites.

Against these massive forces, in 1949, the United Kingdom and France had
ground forces in Europe of only half a million men and the total ground
forces of the United States, both at home and abroad, consisted of only
a little more than another half million. In air forces, the U.S., U.K.
and France had 300,000 men (or half as many men as the U.S.S.R.)
stationed in Europe and the Mediterranean, and the rest of the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) countries had air forces totalling
only 50,000 men. Under these circumstances, it is absurd to argue that
the great, vast Soviet Union was under any changer as a result of the
level of armaments in the West. In fact, the disparity was so great the
other way, and this only a short time after the common victory in
Europe, that self-defense required the nations of Europe and the United
States and Canada to look to their immediate safety. They have tried to
do so under the North Atlantic Treaty.

When the ruthless aggression occurred in Korea in the summer of 195012 the efforts of the West to repair the balance had
only begun. Hut the very boldness of this action demonstrated to the
non-Soviet world that it could not afford to delay an increase in its
own strength. In the past year, the people of the free nations have
turned to the task of redressing the balance with vigor and
determination. They will continue to do so until their security is
protected against the Soviet and European satellite armed forces, which
now total nearly six million men. Of these the U.S.S.R. has ground
forces of 1½ million stationed in the Soviet Union west of the Urals
and, together with its satellites, another 1½ million in Eastern Europe.
The Soviet Air Forces in Western Russia and Eastern Europe comprise
600,000 more.

The members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization have less than a
million men in their armies on the European continent and in the United
Kingdom, and, in their air forces in the area, half as many men as the
U.S.S.R.

If the Soviet Union would look at the world as it is, rather than as it
appears through the distorted lenses with which they view it, they would
cast aside the groundless pretense that they are threatened with
aggression from the West. At any time since the end of World War II the
Soviet Union has had it in its power to demobilize its huge forces and
spare its own people and the rest of the world the burden of huge
armaments and armies. No one outside the Kremlin provoked the [Page 496]U.S.S.R. into its present
posture of excessive military strength. Its posture is of its own
making, and until it decides to forego its desire for world domination
and the use of massed, armed might as an instrument of that policy, the
free world has no alternative but to meet the challenge by its own
defense efforts.

Master set of National Security Council
documentation, 1947–1961, retired by the Executive Secretariat of the
Department of State (S/S).↩

At its 97th Meeting, July 18, the National Security
Council agreed to the recommendations contained in points a and b above (NSC Action No. 511: S/S–NSC Files, Lot 66 D 95). By memorandum of
July 19, Executive Secretary Lay notified the Council that President
Truman had that day approved the recommendations and directed that they
be implemented (PPS Files, Lot 64 D 563).↩

Robert LeBaron, Chairman
of the Military Liaison Committee to the United States Atomic Energy
Commission.↩

Deputy Chief of the Armed Forces Special Weapons
Project; Executive Secretary of the Military Liaison Committee,
1949–1951.↩

For an
explanation of the “United Nations Plan,” see footnote 7,
p. 446.↩

On August
1, 1949, the Commission for Conventional Armaments adopted a working
paper which provided for a census of conventional armaments and
armed forces and verification of reported facts (U.N. doc. S/1372).
The CCA transmitted this document to the Security Council on August
4, 1949. At its 452d Meeting, October 18, 1949, the Security Council
failed to endorse the proposals contained in the working paper due
to a Soviet veto. For text of the working paper approved by the CCA,
see Foreign Relations, 1949, vol. i, p. 106.↩

For information on General Assembly approval of
proposals for international control of atomic energy, November 4,
1948, see footnote 7, p. 446. Endorsement of these proposals by the
Security Council was prevented by a Soviet veto on June 22, 1948.
For documentation on this subject, see Foreign Relations, 1948, vol. i, Part 1, pp. 311 ff.↩

Those
represented are the Departments of State, Army, Navy and Air Force,
the Atomic Energy Commission and the Central Intelligence Agency.
[Footnote in the source text.]↩

Those represented are the Departments of
State, Army, Navy and Air Force, the Atomic Energy Commission and
the Central Intelligence Agency. [Footnote in the source
text.]↩