The development and test flight of China’s J-20 is not
insignificant, but it is also by no means a game changer in the U.S.-China
defense balance. More intriguingly, the test highlights how China’s military
increasingly is making its interests heard.

The J-20 Test Flight and China’s Strategic Concerns

The J-20 test flight shone a light on China’s strategic
concerns and reflected some of the developing capability that addresses those
concerns. The Chinese fear a potential U.S. blockade of their coast. While this
may not seem a likely scenario, the Chinese look at their strategic
vulnerability, at their rising power and at the U.S. history of thwarting
regional powers, and they see themselves as clearly at risk.

China’s increased activity and rhetoric in and around the South and East China
seas also clearly reflect this concern. For Beijing, it is critical to keep
the U.S. Navy as far from Chinese waters as possible and delay its approach by
maximizing the threat environment in the event of a conflict. Though the J-20 is
still a work in progress, a more advanced combat fighter — particularly one with
stealth capabilities — could serve a number of relevant roles toward this end.

The Chinese are still in the early stages of development,
however. They are experimenting with stealth shaping, characteristics and
materials, meaning the degree to which the J-20 can achieve low observability
against modern radar remains an open question. Significant changes to the design
based on handling characteristics and radar signature can be expected. And true
“stealth” is the product of more than just shaping. Special coatings and
radar-absorbing materials only top a lengthy list of areas in which Chinese
engineers must gain practical experience, even allowing for considerable insight
gained through espionage or foreign assistance. China still is thought to be
struggling with indigenously designed and manufactured high-end jet engines, not
to mention the integration of advanced sensors, avionics and the complex systems
that characterize fifth-generation aircraft. It is too early to infer much from
the single flight-tested prototype, something the United States learned during
the Cold War when initial U.S. estimates of the Soviet MiG-25 attributed far
more sophistication and capability to the design than proved to be the case
after a Soviet pilot defected with his aircraft years later.

The Chinese role for the J-20 is based on a different set of
realities than those the Soviets and Americans faced during the Cold War,
meaning the J-20 prototype should not be judged solely by the American standards
for fifth-generation aircraft. More than having the most advanced aircraft in
the sky, the Chinese value the ability to maintain high sortie rates from many
bases along the country’s coast to overwhelm with numbers the superior U.S.
combat aircraft, which would be expected to be operated from aircraft carriers
or from more distant land bases.

The J-20 Test’s Timing

Perhaps more interesting than the test was its timing, with
its associated political implications. For weeks before the test flight, Chinese
message boards and blogs were filled with photographs of the new prototype on
the tarmac, conducting taxi tests in preparation for its first test flight.
Foreign military and defense observers closely monitor such sites, and their
“leaked” images renewed attention to China’s fifth-generation development
program, about which there has been plenty of speculation but little hard
detail. Chinese defense and security officials also closely monitor such boards,
but the officials chose not to shut them down — clearly indicating Beijing’s
intent to draw attention to the test.

Gates asked Hu about the test when the two met in Beijing.
According to some media reports citing American officials present at the
meeting, Hu appeared surprised by the question and somewhat perplexed by the
details of the test — the implication being that Hu was unaware of the test and
that the Chinese military may have acted out of turn. Gates told reporters that
Hu had assured him the timing was coincidental. After being asked for his own
thoughts regarding the relationship between the military and the political
leadership in China after his meetings with Chinese civilian and defense
leaders, Gates noted that he had become concerned about that relationship over
time. He added that ensuring civilian and military dialogue between the two
countries was important.

Although Gates did not say the Chinese military tested the
J-20 without political clearance from Hu, the idea was certainly suggested by
the media coverage and Gates’ response. On the surface, this seems rather hard
to believe. Hu, as president of China and general secretary of the Central
Committee of the Communist Party of China, also serves as chairman of China’s
parallel Central Military Commissions (one is under the government, the other
under the Party, though both have exactly the same makeup).

That the head of China’s military would not know about a
major new hardware test coming a week before his trip to meet with the president
of the United States and coinciding with a visit of the U.S. defense secretary
seems a reach. Furthermore, given the amount of attention just beneath the
surface in China to the imminent test, and the subsequent attention in the
foreign media, it would be startling that the Chinese president was so poorly
briefed prior to meeting the U.S. defense secretary. If indeed the test
surprised Hu, then there is serious trouble in China’s leadership structure. But
perhaps the issue isn’t one of knowledge but one of capability: Could Hu have
stopped the test given the timing, and if so, would he have wanted to stop it?

The Rising Influence of China’s Military

Rumors and signs of the rising influence of the military
establishment in China have emerged over the past few years. Since the 1980s,
China has focused on and invested in a major reorientation of its military from
a massive land army focused on territorial defense to one that emphasizes naval
and air capabilities to protect
China’s interests in the East and South China seas and beyond into the
western Pacific. This has included expanding China’s reach and a focus on
anti-access and area-denial capabilities, with accelerated development in this
arena in recent years.

Some systems, like the
DF-21D anti-ship ballistic missile, are uniquely tailored to countering the
U.S. Navy. Others, like an expanding and more aggressive Ocean and Fisheries
Administration, is directed more at China’s neighbors in the South and East
China seas, and at asserting China’s claims to these waters.

This change in focus is driven by three factors. First,
China sees its land
borders as being fairly well locked down, with its buffer territories
largely under control, but the maritime border is a vulnerability — a particular
concern for a trade-based economy. Second, as China’s economy has rapidly
expanded, so has
Beijing’s dependence on far-flung sources of natural resources and emerging
markets. This drives the government and military to look at protection of
sea-lanes, often far from China’s shores. Third, the military leadership is
using these concerns to increase its own role in internal decision-making. The
more dependent China is on places far from its borders, the more the military
can make the case that it is the only entity with both the intelligence and the
understanding to provide the necessary strategic advice and perspective to
China’s civilian leadership.

There is also the issue of a modernizing military looking out
for itself, battling for its share of China’s budget and economic pie. A key
part of former Chinese President Jiang Zemin’s fundamental military reforms was
stripping the military of much of its business empire. At the time, the state —
while funding the military — assumed that military-run industry would supplement
the defense budget. In short, the military ran industries, and the profits were
used to support local and regional defense needs. That kept the official state
military budget down and encouraged enterprising commanders to contribute to
China’s economic growth.

But over time, it also led to corruption and a military where
regional and local military commanders were at risk of becoming more intent on
their business empires than on the country’s national defense. Money that
largely had gone to support the living of the troops was sidelined and funneled
to the military officials. And the faster the Chinese economy grew, the more
profit there was for the taking. Regional military leaders and local governments
teamed up to operate, promote and protect their own business interests
regardless of the state’s broader national economic or social priorities.
China’s central leadership saw troubling parallels to older Chinese history,
when regional warlords emerged.

In response, Jiang ordered the military largely out of
business. Military leaders grudgingly complied for the most part, though there
were plenty of cases of military-run industries being stripped of all their
machinery, equipment and supplies, which were then sold on the black market and
then unloaded at bargain prices to the cronies of military officials. Other
companies were simply stripped and foisted on the government to deal with, debts
and all. Jiang placated the military by increasing its budget, increasing the
living standard of the average soldier and launching a ramped-up program to
rapidly increase the education of its soldiers and technical sophistication of
China’s military. This appeased the military officials and bought their loyalty
— returning the military to financial dependence on the government and Communist
Party.

But the success of military reform, which also involved
seeking greater sophistication in doctrine, training, communications and
technology, has also given the military greater influence. Over time, the
military has come to expect more technologically, and China has begun
experimenting with technology-sharing between military and civilian industry to
spur development. The drive for dual-use technology, from the evolving aerospace
industry to nanotechnology, creates new opportunities for military officials to
promote new weapons-system development while at the same time profiting from the
development. As China’s global economic power has grown, the military has
demanded more funding and greater capabilities to protect national interests and
its own prerogatives.

But China’s military officials are also growing more vocal in
their opinions beyond the issue of military procurement. Over the past year,
Chinese military officers have made their opinions known, quite openly in
Chinese and sometimes even foreign media. They have addressed not only military
issues but also Chinese foreign policy and international relations. This step
outside the norm has left the Chinese diplomatic community uncomfortable (or at
least left it expressing its unease with the rising influence of the military to
their foreign counterparts). This may be an elaborate disinformation campaign or
a slightly higher level of the griping typical of bureaucrats, or it may in fact
reflect a military that sees its own role and significance rising and is
stepping forward to try to grab the influence and power it feels it deserves.

One example of the ostensible struggle between the military
and the civilian bureaucrats over Chinese foreign policy played out over the
past year. Through nearly the first three-quarters of the year, when the United
States carried out defense exercises in the Asia-Pacific region — whether annual
or in response to regional events like the
sinking of the ChonAn in South Korea — the Chinese would respond by holding
their own series of exercises, sometimes on a larger scale. It was a game of
one-upmanship. But the foreign ministry and bureaucracy purportedly argued
against this policy as counterproductive, and by the fourth quarter, China had
shifted away from military exercises as a response. Instead, it once again
pushed a friendlier and more diplomatic line even as U.S. exercises continued.
By the November 2010 crisis over North Korea’s shelling of Yeonpyeong Island,
China had returned to its standard call for moderation and dialogue.

If this narrative is accepted, the military response to being
sidelined again was to leak plans to launch an aircraft carrier in 2011, to
reinvigorate international attention to Chinese anti-ship ballistic missiles,
and to test the new Chinese fifth-generation aircraft while Gates was in Beijing
and just before Hu headed to Washington. A Chinese military motivated by
nationalism — and perhaps an even stronger interest in preserving its power and
influence within China — would find it better to be in contention with the
United States than in calm. This is because U.S. pressure, whether real or
rhetorical, drives China’s defense development.

But the case could as easily be made that the Chinese
political leadership has an equal interest in ensuring a mixed relationship with
Washington, that the government benefits from seemingly endless U.S. criticism
of Chinese defense development. This is because such criticism increases Chinese
nationalism, distracting the people from the
economic troubles Beijing is trying to manage. And this is the heart of the
issue: Just how well-coordinated are the military and civilian leadership of
China, and how stable is their relationship?

An End to the Chinese Miracle

The Chinese miracle is nearing its natural conclusion, as Beijing begins to
face a reality like that seen by Japan, South Korea and the other Asian Tigers
that all followed the same growth pattern. How that crisis plays out is
fundamentally different depending upon the country: Japan has accepted the
shared long-term pain of two decades of malaise; South Korea saw short, sharp,
wrenching reforms; Indonesia saw its government collapse. The reliability of the
military, the capability of the civilian leadership and the level of acceptance
of the population all combine to shape the outcome.

A divide between the military and civilian leadership would
mean that China, already facing the social consequences of its economic
policies, is facing another significant issue at the same time: the balance of
civilian-military relations. However, a carefully coordinated drive to give the
appearance of a split may help China convince the United States to ease economic
pressure to avoid exacerbating this “split” while also appealing to
nationalistic unity at home.

But even small signs of a split now are critical because of
the stresses on the system that China will experience when its economic miracle
expires in the not-so-distant future. Mao and Deng were both soldiers. Their
successors were not. Neither Jiang Zemin nor Hu Jintao has military experience,
and incoming President Xi Jinping similarly lacks such training. The rumors from
China suggest that the military plans to take advantage of Xi’s lack of
experience and use its influence to shape his policies. The leadership
transition may provide a chance for the military to gain more influence in an
institutional way, allowing it to drive a hard bargain and buy a bigger share of
the pie in the fifth generation set-up.

For most of modern China’s history, the military has been an
internal force without much appetite for more worldly affairs. That is now
changing, appropriately, due to China’s growing global prominence and reliance
on the global economy. But that means that a new balance must be found, and
China’s senior leadership must both accommodate and balance the military’s
perspective and what the military advocates for.

As Chinese leaders deal with a generational transition,
expanding international involvement and an increasingly difficult economic
balance, the military is coming into its own and making its interests heard more
clearly. How this balance plays out will be tremendously significant. †