In early December
1944, shortages of infantry rifle replacements in the European theater
began to mount sharply. The theater had been experiencing rifleman shortages
since July 1944, and its Ground Force Replacement Command (GFRC) had been
engaged in a training program to convert basic privates from other arms
and services to infantry.1
In December the forecast of shortages increased rapidly as the supply
of replacements available from the United States declined. As of 8 December,
a week before the beginning of the German counterattack in the Ardennes
caused further depletions, the theater estimated that there would be an
overall deficiency of more than 29,000 riflemen by the end of the month.2
Such a deficiency would effectively curtail plans for pressing the attack
against Germany. By the beginning of the Ardennes counterattack, the theater
had already planned to convert to infantry as many physically fit men
from service units as possible. These men would be replaced in service
units by limited assignment men. Basics from new divisions were already
being used to fill the infantry battalions of veteran divisions and a
theater G-1 delegation was preparing to leave for Washington to present
the case for more and prompter deliveries of infantry replacements. Lt.
Gen. John C. H. Lee planned to release and train 20,000 additional infantry
riflemen from his Communications Zone units.3

General Lee, after consulting with
General Eisenhower and with army commanders, proposed adding to this number
physically qualified men from the Communications Zone's Negro units.4
General Eisenhower, General Bradley, and the army commanders agreed. General
Lee then consulted with Brig. Gen. Henry J. Matchett, commanding the Ground
Force Reinforcement Command, and Brig. Gen. Benjamin O. Davis, then Special
Advisor and Coordinator to the Theater Commander on Negro Troops. General
Davis responded enthusiastically and, on Christmas Day, 1944, General Davis,
General Matchett, and the GFRC G-1 drew up a plan to train Negro volunteers

[688]

as individual infantry replacements.5
General Lee had already prepared a call to troops, which went out to his
base and section commanders on 26 December with instructions that it be
reproduced and disseminated to troops within twenty-four hours. It read:

1. The Supreme Commander desires
to destroy the enemy forces and end hostilities in this theater without
delay. Every available weapon at our disposal must be brought to bear upon
the enemy. To this end the Commanding General, Com Z, is happy to offer
to a limited number of colored troops who have had infantry training, the
privilege of joining our veteran units at the front to deliver the knockout
blow. The men selected are to be in the grades of Private First Class and
Private. Non-commissioned officers may accept reduction in order to take
advantage of this opportunity. The men selected are to be given a refresher
course with emphasis on weapon training.

2. The Commanding General makes
a special appeal to you. It is planned to assign you without regard to color
or race to the units where assistance is most needed, and give you the opportunity
of fighting shoulder to shoulder to bring about victory. Your comrades at
the front are anxious to share the glory of victory with you. Your relatives
and friends everywhere have been urging that you be granted this privilege.
The Supreme Commander, your Commanding General, and other veteran officers
who have served with you are confident that many of you will take advantage
of this opportunity and carry on in keeping with the glorious record of
our colored troops in our former wars.

3. This letter is to be read confidentially
to the troops immediately upon its receipt and made available in Orderly
Rooms.Every assistance must
be promptly given qualified men to volunteer for this service.6

Two days later the formal plan,
based on General Davis' conference with the GFRC staff, went out to commanders.
It provided that the initial quota of volunteers be kept to 2,000, the largest
number the GFRC could handle at once and a number which would not reduce
any service unit by more than 3.5 percent at the most. Personnel with the
highest qualifications would get first priority and no man with an Army
General Classification Test score lower than Grade IV would be taken. The
number of volunteers would be reported by 9 January 1945 so that quotas
could be allocated to units. The men selected were to report to the 16th
Reinforcement Depot at Compiegne not later than 10 January 1945. They would
be relieved from their present units and attached unassigned to the Ground
Force Reinforcement Command. The retrained personnel would then be assigned
to combat units as infantry reinforcements without regard to race.7

Before the plan could be carried
out, a number of changes, some resulting from misunderstanding and others
from apprehension, occurred. The plan itself represented a major break with
traditional Army policy, for it proposed mixing Negro soldiers into otherwise
white units neither on a quota nor a smaller unit basis but as individuals
fitted in where needed. When the cir-

[689]

cular letter to troops reached Supreme
Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF), Lt. Gen. Walter B. Smith,
chief of staff, held that its promise to assign Negro troops "without
regard to color or race to the units where assistance is most needed, and
give you the opportunity of fighting shoulder to shoulder to bring about
victory" was a clear invitation to embarrassment to the War Department.
Failing to convince General Lee that he should change his letter, he put
the matter to General Eisenhower:

Although I am now somewhat out of
touch with the War Department's negro policy, I did, as you know, handle
this during the time I was with General Marshall. Unless there has been
a radical change, the sentence which I have marked in the attached circular
letter will place the War Department in very grave difficulties. It is inevitable
that this statement will get out, and equally inevitable that the result
will be that every negro organization, pressure group and newspaper will
take the attitude that, while the War Department segregates colored troops
into organizations of their own against the desires and pleas of all the
negro race, the Army is perfectly willing to put them in the front lines
mixed in units with white soldiers, and have them do battle when an emergency
arises. Two years ago I would have considered the marked statement the most
dangerous thing that I had ever seen in regard to negro relations.

I have talked with Lee about it,
and he can't see this at all. He believes that it is right that colored
and white soldiers should be mixed in the same company. With this belief
I do not argue, but the War Department policy is different. Since I am convinced
that this circular letter will have the most serious repercussions in the
United States, I believe that it is our duty to draw the War Department's
attention to the fact that this statement has been made, to give them warning
as to what may happen andany
facts which they may use to counter the pressure which will undoubtedly
be placed on them.

Further, I recommend most strongly
that Communications Zone not be permitted to issue any general circulars
relating to negro policy until I have had a chance to see them. This is
because I know more about the War Department's and General Marshall's difficulties
with the negro question than any other man in this theater, including General
B. O. Davis whom Lee consulted in the matter-and I say this with all due
modesty. I am writing this as I may not see you tomorrow morning. Will talk
to you about it when I return.8

General Eisenhower personally rewrote
the directive, changing all but the first two sentences and making dissemination
permissive instead of mandatory. "This is replacing the original &
is something that can not possibly run counter to regs in a time like this,"
he told General Smith.9
The new directive, officially approved by both General Eisenhower and General
Lee, appeared over General Lee's signature with the same date, file number,
and subject as the earlier directive, under a cover letter ordering return
and destruction of all copies of the original version. The substitute letter
read:

1. The Supreme Commander desires
to destroy the enemy forces and end hostilities in this theater without
delay. Every available weapon at our disposal must be brought to bear upon
the enemy. To this end the Theater Commander has directed the Communications
Zone Commander to make the greatest possible use of limited service men
within service units and to

[690]

survey our entire organization in
an effort to produce able bodied men for the front lines. This process of
selection has been going on for some time but it is entirely possible that
many men themselves, desiring to volunteer for front line service, may be
able to point out methods in which they can be replaced in their present
jobs. Consequently, Commanders of all grades will receive voluntary applications
for transfer to the Infantry and forward them to higher authority with recommendations
for appropriate type of replacement. This opportunity to volunteer will
be extended to all soldiers without regard to color or race, but preference
will normally be given to individuals who have had some basic training in
Infantry. Normally, also, transfers will be limited to the grade of Private
and Private First Class unless a noncommissioned officer requests a reduction.

2. In the event that the number
of suitable negro volunteers exceeds the replacement needs of negro combat
units, these men will be suitably incorporated in other organizations so
that their service and their fighting spirit may be efficiently utilized.

3. This letter may be read confidentially
to the troops and made available in Orderly Rooms. Every assistance must
be promptly given qualified men who volunteer for this service.10

The new letter allowed for further
changes in the initial plan for individual replacements but the revision
appeared too late to halt the distribution of the first version completely.
The Normandy Base Section, for example, had already distributed the earlier
letter to the commanders of all Negro units on 28 December and had sent
copies to both of its districts.11

The revised letter could be interpreted
in a number of ways. There were no Negro infantry units in the theater.
The theater had long been concerned with replacements for its Negro artillery,
tank, and tank destroyer units, for it had already been told that none would
be available from the United States. If Negro volunteers from service units
were to be retrained for combat use, the greatest immediate need was in
units like the 761st Tank and 3334 Field Artillery Battalions whose losses
without replacements threatened their combat efficiency and, in the case
of the 333d threatened their existence. The revised letter seemed to direct
that Negro volunteers would first be used for these units. But the GFRS
was not equipped to convert individuals to any service other than infantry
and the smaller Negro combat support units were already operating under
a system, admittedly not the happiest solution, of retraining their own
replacements from volunteers and replacements trained in other branches.
Since the revised letter could still be interpreted to mean that any excess
Negro volunteers would be placed in white units in the same manner as white
reinforcements, SHAEF G-1 pressed for a further clarification. After determining
that General Eisenhower did not desire to place Negro trainees in white
organizations as individuals and that he preferred to form the Negro trainees
into "units which could be substituted for white units in order that
white units could be drawn out of line and rested," SHAEF G-1 prepared
a new letter directing that the Negro volunteers be trained as reinforcements
for existing Negro combat units in the theater and that any excess

[691]

VOLUNTEERS FOR COMBAT INFANTRY
REPLACEMENT

learning how to assemble a BAR.

be formed into separate infantry
units for assignment to an army group. Initially, the goal would be one
battalion; subsequently, if numbers warranted, this battalion would be expanded
to a regiment. All other instructions were rescinded.12

Originally, "in fairness to
all concerned," this new directive was to be sent to all Negro units
to interpret paragraph 2 of the revised letter of 26 December. After further
discussions, distribution was confined to the theater G-3 and G-4, to the
Commanding General, GFRC, and to General Davis. It went out under a covering
letter indicating that it was an interpretation of the words "other
organizations" in the revised December letter.13
The change

[692]

in plan did not, therefore, reach
Negro troops during the period of volunteering.

By February, 4,562 Negro troops
had volunteered, many of the noncommissioned officers among them taking
reductions in rank to do so.14
The first 2,800 reported to the Ground Force Reinforcement Command in January
and early February, after which the flow of volunteers was stopped. The
service units from which these men came parallelled closely the distribution
of Negroes by branch: 38 percent came from engineer units, 29 percent from
quartermaster, 26 percent from transportation, 9 percent from signal, 2
percent from ordnance, and the remaining 2 percent from units of other branches.
Sixty-three percent had formerly had one of the six following military occupational
specialties, in order of frequency: truck driver, duty soldier, longshoreman,
basic, construction foreman, and cargo checker. Like other volunteers, they
were somewhat younger than average-10 percent of the Negro riflemen were
thirty years old or older as compared with 20 percent of white riflemen.
They had somewhat better educational backgrounds and test scores than the
average for Negro soldiers in the European theater but the differences between
them and other Negro troops in these respects were not so great as the differences
between them and the average white troops. Of the white riflemen in the
ETO, 41 percent were high school graduates and 71 percent were in AGCT classes
I, II, and III; of the Negro infantry reinforcements, 22 percent werehigh school graduates and 29 percent
were in classes I, II, and III; of all Negroes in ETO, 18 percent were high
school graduates and 17 percent were in Classes I, II, and III.15
The important difference between these soldiers and other Negro troops was,
therefore, that they had volunteered on the basis of a call to duty under
circumstances unusual to their former Army experience. Only their motivation
and their method of employment set them off sharply from other Negro troops.

Retraining was conducted at the
16th Reinforcement Depot at Compiegne, which had been retraining individuals
as riflemen since November. The Negro trainees were organized into the 47th
Reinforcement Battalion, 5th Retraining Regiment, under the command of Col.
Alexander George. According to the depot staff, the Negro volunteers approached
their work with a will. There were proportionately fewer absentees and fewer
disciplinary problems among the Negro trainees than among the white soldiers
being retrained as infantrymen.16

The question of how to carry out
the latest directive on the completion of the training of these infantrymen
arose toward the end of January 1945. The Ground Force Reinforcement System
was equipped to train individual replacements only; the newer provision
that Negro trainees in excess of those needed in combat support units be
trained as a battalion could not be met

[693]

47TH REINFORCEMENT BATTALION

trainees march out for a day
of intensive training, Noyon, France, February 1945.

by the system. In the meantime,
command of the system changed and responsibility for it shifted from General
Lee's Communications Zone to Lt. Gen. Ben Lear, newly arrived in the theater
as deputy theater commander. General Lee now obtained a new interpretation
of General Eisenhower's wishes and passed them on to General Lear. General
Lee reminded General Lear that the army commanders and General Eisenhower
had personally approved the original plan with the understanding that the
men so trained would be used in infantry units. He informed General Lear
that General Eisenhower "now desires that these colored riflemen reinforcements
have their training completed as members of Infantry rifle platoons familiar
with the Infantry rifle platoon weapons." These platoons would be made
available to army commanders who would then provide platoon leaders, platoon
sergeants, and, if necessary, squad leaders. "It is my feeling,"
General Lee said, "that we should afford the volunteers the full opportunity
for Infantry riflemen service. Therefore we should not assign: them as Tank
or Artillery reinforcements unless they express such preference. To do otherwise
would be breaking faith, in my opinion."17

The Reinforcement Command had enough
volunteers to form 45 to 47 platoons, including overstrength provided to
compensate for the expected lack of further reinforcements for these units.

[694]

The first 2,253 men were ready by
I March. They were organized into 37 platoons: 25 went to 12th Army Group
and 12 to 6th Army Group, joining about to March. A second group was distributed
later, 12 platoons going to 12th Army Group and 4 to 6th Army Group. The
divisions sent one platoon leader and one sergeant to meet each platoon
at the 16th Depot. The possibility of receiving needed replacements, especially
in early March when the spring offensive and the crossing of the Rhine were
in the offing, was readily accepted by most divisions. Army group and army
commanders were given discretion in the use of the platoons. They could
be assigned to divisions as platoons or they could be assigned in larger
groupings. They could later be grouped into units as large as a battalion
if so desired.18

In 12th Army Group the platoons
were assigned to divisions in groups of three and the divisions, retaining
them as platoons, usually assigned one to each regiment. The regiments,
in turn, selected a company to which the units went as a fourth rifle platoon.19

In most divisions, the platoons
were given additional training periods of varying lengths before commitment.
In others, such as the divisions headed across the Remagen Bridge, the platoons
arrived just in time for immediate employment. Where arrival of the Negro
platoons coincided with a period of heavy fighting, their welcome as fresh
replacements was warmer than in units that were then engaged in training
only.20
But divisional training periods were valuable both to the platoons and to
the divisions' attitude toward accepting them. "They had had some sort
of training before they joined us," one assistant division commander
explained, "but we wanted to make sure they knew all the tricks of
infantry fighting. We assigned our best combat leaders as instructors. I
watched those lads train and if ever men were in dead earnest, they were."21
In some cases the platoons were given the division patch and a brief indoctrination
in the division's history and accomplishments, plus personal welcomes by
the division or assistant division commander.22

In most instances, the platoons
quickly identified themselves with the more than three dozen battalions
and companies to which they were distributed. They were employed just as
any other platoon within their companies, a point frequently noted by their
regiments. Some went to veteran regiments which, like those of the 1st and
9th Divisions, had fought in Europe and Africa. Others went to newer units
like the 12th and 14th Armored Divisions, and the 69th, 78th, 99th, and
104th In-

[695]

fantry Divisions. These divisions
played varying roles in the concluding months of the war. Some still met
hard fighting in their marches across the Rhine and across central Germany;
others found resistance collapsing all around them and spent the last weeks
of the war rounding up the enemy and establishing provisional military governments.

Army and theater headquarters were
considerably more interested in the careers of the platoons than were the
units which, having accepted them, proceeded to employ them as they -would
have any other platoons. Selected divisions were required to report weekly
on the strength and casualties of the platoons-their casualties were usually
proportionate and in some instances relatively higher than those of comparable
platoons in the same unit. Division G-1's were initially concerned about
grades and promotions for the members of the platoons, many of which had
arrived with all of their members rated as privates and privates first class.
Strenuous efforts to determine whether the platoons had their own tables
of organization with authorized ratings or whether the Negro riflemen were
eligible for promotion within the tables of organization of their units
and whether their members were eligible for officer candidate quotas was
a question of concern both to the Reinforcement System and to the divisions.
Army headquarters determined that the platoons would be assigned noncommissioned
grades, a procedure considered only fair now that the Negro riflemen were
not to be integrated individually, but in most instances authority for these
promotions did not arrive in time to affect the organization of the platoons.
Most of the platoons, including those organized as provisional companies
with the armored divisions, finished the war without ratings.

At the close of the first calendar
month after the platoons joined their units, divisions had already formed
their impressions of the Negro replacements. The 104th Division, whose platoons
had joined while the division was defending the west banks of the Rhine
at Cologne, commented: "Their combat record has been outstanding. They
have without exception proven themselves to be good soldiers. Some are being
recommended for the Bronze Star Medal."23
When General Davis stopped at 12th Army Group headquarters on his way to
observe the platoons a month after they had joined their units, he found
that General Bradley was well satisfied with the reports of the performance
and conduct of the Negro reinforcements. General Hodges stated that First
Army's divisions had given excellent reports on their Negro platoons. As
General Davis went down through corps and division to regiment and battalion
and finally to a company-Company E of the Goth Regiment, 9th Infantry Division-he
found similar reports of satisfaction. At Company E, the company and platoon
commanders and several enlisted men, including the white platoon sergeant,
recounted their experiences with enthusiasm. All officers and men, from
the regimental commander down, reported high morale and confirmed that the
platoon was functioning as planned.24

The 60th Infantry's Negro platoon
had

[696]

had its first heavy going less than
a fortnight before, on 5 April, when it and the other platoons of its company
took Lengenbach. "This was the colored troops' first taste of combat,"
the regiment's combat historian recorded, "and they took a big bite."25
Four days later one of these men, Pfc. Jack Thomas, won the Distinguished
Service Cross for leading his squad on a mission to knock out an enemy tank
that was providing heavy caliber support for a hostile roadblock. Thomas
deployed his squad and advanced upon the enemy position. He hurled two hand
grenades, wounding several of the enemy. When two of his men at a rocket
launcher were wounded, Thomas took up the weapon and launched a rocket at
the Germans, preventing them from manning their tank. He then picked up
one seriously wounded member of the rocket launching team and, through small
arms and automatic weapons fire, carried him to safety.26

Officers and men in other divisions
gave General Davis similar reports of their satisfaction with the Negro
reinforcements. One division commander, Maj. Gen. Edwin F. Parker of the
78th Division, whose Negro platoons, joining at the Remagen bridgehead,
were the first Negro combat troops east of the Rhine, expressed the wish
that he could obtain more of the Negro riflemen.27
The 104th Division's G-1 noted that hegave
General Davis a very satisfactory report.28
He told the visiting general:

Morale: Excellent. Manner of performance:
Superior. Men are very eager to close with the enemy and to destroy him.
Strict attention to duty, aggressiveness, common sense and judgment under
fire has won the admiration of all the men in the company. The colored platoon
after initial success continued to do excellent work. Observation discloses
that these people observe all the rules of the book. When given a mission
they accept it with enthusiasm, and even when losses to their platoon were
inflicted the colored boys accepted these losses as part of war, and continued
on their mission. The Company Commander, officers, and men of Company "F"
all agree that the colored platoon has a calibre of men equal to any veteran
platoon. Several decorations for bravery are in the process of being awarded
to the members of colored platoons.29

The three platoons attached to the
three regiments of the 1st Infantry Division illustrate the range and circumstances
of employment of Negro reinforcements within a single division. The 26th
Infantry's platoon, continuously engaged from 12 March to 8 May, varied
in strength from 36 to 31 men. They took their turn at every assignment
within their company: patrolling, outposting, assault platoon, support platoon
in attacks, and platoon in defense. While little time was available for
training-the platoon upon arrival had had individual training only-the regiment
estimated that combat efficiency went up

[697]

from 30 percent to an estimated
8o percent by the end of the second week, a development which the regiment
ascribed to an "increase in confidence and training brought about by
joint integrated action in combat." 30
Efficiency increased further in the next weeks and the platoon took its
"full share of this almost continuous fighting and maneuvering."31
Replacements kept this platoon operating as an entity, but the platoon assigned
to Company B, 16th Infantry, had thirty men wounded and nine killed in action,
with the result that on V-E Day it had only fifteen men present for duty.
When its platoon strength fell too low to operate as a platoon the Negro
riflemen were used as a squad or squads in a white platoon. Company B's
Negro reinforcements participated in every battle from 12 March to 8 May.
In their first action, they were "over-eager and aggressive" and
consequently suffered severe casualties. Despite their casualties, their
success in battle was good and they took their assigned objectives in an
aggressive manner. White platoons "like[d] to fight beside them because
they laid a large volume of fire on the enemy positions." Their discipline
was good. They had only "three or four" minor company punishments
under the 104th Article of War and no courts-martial offenses.32
The platoon with Company B, 18th Infantry, had a strength varying from 20
to 43 men. It, too, was employed "in an identicalmanner
to any other rifle platoon in the regiment," and, from its first contact
with the enemy on 18 March near Eudenbach in the Remagen bridgehead, it
participated in all company combat engagements until hostilities ceased.
The aggressiveness of this platoon was both an asset and a drawback, for
at times it overran objectives and became overextended. Despite a "slightly
more pronounced" nervousness when subjected to shell fire when in defense
at night, the record of its men "as a whole in combat was very satisfactory
and the platoon can most certainly be considered a battle success."33
When this platoon's white sergeant was wounded, he was replaced by a Negro
who performed "all the duties of a platoon sergeant, in and out of
combat, in a superior manner." 34
From another division came similar reports. The Negro platoons of the 99th
Division, characterized as employed "just as any other platoon,"

. . . performed in an excellent
manner at all times while in combat. These men were courageous fighters
and never once did they fail to accomplish their assigned mission. They
were particularly good in town fighting and [were often used as the assault
platoon with good results. The platoon assigned to the 3934 Infantry is
credited with killing approximately too Germans and capturing 900. During
this action only three of their own men were killed and fifteen wounded.35

Units, in their own unofficial accounts,
were more laconic. For example, the 393d's platoon, in the regiment's photographic
history for its men, was described

[698]

as "The Colored Platoon of
Easy Company-one of the best platoons in the regiment." 36

There was less satisfaction with
the Negro riflemen assigned to the Seventh Army. The 6th Army Group and
Seventh Army had not been included in the original discussions of the use
of Negro riflemen. On the decision of General Patch, the twelve platoons
assigned to Seventh Army were organized into provisional companies and sent
to the 12th Armored Division, whose armored infantry battalions had relatively
greater shortages than infantry division regiments. The platoons, barely
trained as squads and platoons, had had no training as companies at all;
the division felt that too little time was available to equip and train
them before their first battle. 37
The 12th Armored Division, after its experience with the 827th Tank Destroyer
Battalion a month before-it received notification to send officers to these
platoons on the day that the 827th departed-"objected violently"
to these platoons from the beginning. But when the reinforcements arrived
they made a "good" impression.38
The 12th Armored Division's companies were known variously as Seventh Army
Provisional Infantry Companies 1, 2, and 3, or as Company D in each of the
armored infantry battalions to which they were attached.39
All of these companies were used as armored infantry in support of tanks
or with tank support, but theirorganization
varied. One was composed of four platoons, each organized into one machine
gun and three rifle squads. The other two had three platoons, each with
two 60-mm. mortars and several light machine guns. The companies attacked
dismounted or mounted on tanks; all engaged in several actions. They were
generally considered very satisfactory, improving as experience made up
for their lack of training as companies and as machine gun and mortar crews.40
When 6th Army Group's four supplementary platoons arrived on 26 March, they
were similarly assigned to the 14th Armored Division, which took them with
it when it moved to Third Army on 23 April.41
In the 14th Armored Division, they were known as Seventh Army Provisional
Infantry Company No. 4 or, since they were attached to the Combat Command
Reserve, as CCR Rifle Company.42

When General Davis visited the 12th
Armored Division on 1 9 April 1945, he found battalion and company commanders
acutely conscious of the lack of company training in the Negro platoons.
Even so, they felt that the units had done good work.43
Seventh Army Provisional Infantry Company No. 1, attached to the 56th Armored
Infantry Battalion, had not been committed as a unit but detachments had
been used. One of these, riding on a tank near Speyer, Germany, on 23 March
1945,

[699]

ran into heavy bazooka and small
arms fire. Sgt. Edward A. Carter, Jr., voluntarily dismounted and attempted
to lead a three-man group across an open field. Within a short time, two
of his men were killed and the third was seriously wounded. Carter continued
toward the enemy emplacement alone. He was wounded five times and was finally
forced to take cover. When eight enemy riflemen attempted to capture him,
Carter killed six of them and captured the remaining two. He then returned
across the field, using his two prisoners as a shield, obtaining from them
valuable information on the disposition of enemy troops.44

Similarly, the 240-man company attached
to the 14th Armored Division, in combat from 5 April to 3 May 1945, failed
to receive the same approving response from the division as the platoons
attached to infantry regiments.45
The 14th Armored Division, moving south through Bavaria along the Bayreuth
Nurnberg autobahn when everyone knew that the war was over, that is everyone
"except the men who could hear the high-pitched, irritable whine of
a sniper's bullet, the blast of a mortar shell,"46
met sporadic and spotty resistance, but resistance that was still strong
enough to produce sharp, and sometimes prolonged, fire fights. The Combat
Command Reserve rifle company wasmainly
employed in attachment to the 25th Tank Battalion. The company's first real
engagement was at Lichtenfels, where two platoons crossed the Main and,
after a bitter fight, took the town.47
But it was at Creussen, near Bayreuth that the Negro reinforcements got
the accolade of approval from the men of the 14th Armored Division. The
94th Reconnaissance Squadron had entered Creussen, site of a weapons factory,
on 15 April when enemy tanks and infantry all but surrounded the town. A
call for reinforcements started two platoons of tanks from the 25th Tank
Battalion and one of the Negro infantry platoons toward the town. At about
1145, near Gottsfeld, the tanks were fired on by antitank guns. Four were
hit and two were destroyed. The remaining tanks pulled back. The Negro infantrymen
dismounted, entered the town, and, while considerable enemy artillery fire
fell, cleared Gottsfeld by 1500. Tanks then moved in and before dark knocked
out five enemy Mark IV's which had come out into the open just east of the
town. The tank-infantry force then continued to Creussen, already relieved
of much pressure as a result of the action at Gottsfeld, and moved in from
the west at 1700. For the next two days, platoons of Combat Command Reserve
rifle company patrolled in and around Gottsfeld and Creussen, taking prisoners.
One platoon of the 94th's D Troop, observing the Negro riflemen for the
first time, commented in its journal: "And were those guys good! "48
In later fighting, when the company (less one platoon) was used as a unit,
results were

[700]

less satisfactory. Poor control
and discipline within the companies, especially after taking towns, was
the principal fault that Seventh Army found with its Negro units.

When General Patch informed General
Davis that the provisional companies were not trained to function as companies
and were not performing too well as armored infantry, General Davis explained
that they were never intended to be used as other than riflemen, and that,
except for a week before assignment, they had had no group training. He
described the use being made of them in First Army. He himself had noted
that the men in the Seventh Army's companies, though they stated that they
were getting along fine, lacked the enthusiasm and high morale of the Negro
reinforcements in the First Army.

When General Davis' report of his
visit reached General Devers, with an informal recommendation from General
Lear that it should receive any action thought suitable, General Devers
sent it on to General Patch with a note for his consideration to the effect
that "a better solution would have been to use them as rifle platoons
in an Infantry Division." Maj. Gen. Roderick Allen, commanding the
12th Armored Division, was scheduled to visit General Patch on 12 May to
discuss the matter, but by then the war was over. General Patch informed
his chief of staff on 11 May: "Nothing more need be done. Already Allen
will be giving them Co. Tng."'49

Thus, among men similarly trained
and similarly motivated, two forms ofemployment
produced different results -at least in the eyes of higher headquarters
if not in the eyes of the men and their immediate associates, who had no
means of comparison. All the men were volunteers, and had identical training.
But the men in the larger units, organized as companies with their own company
administration, adding to the duties of riflemen in which they were trained
those of machine gunners and mortar men in which they were not trained,
operating as separate and provisional units obviously attached and not a
part of the units with which they fought, lost a portion of their original
enthusiasm and motivation in the process of commitment to battle. The smaller
groups-operating as platoons and at times as squads-as parts of the companies
to which they were attached, gained in their commitment. This was not achieved
without skepticism on the part of both the Negro replacements and their
associates within their companies. An officer who, as rifle platoon and
company commander, led one of these platoons for nearly two months, explained
that his platoon, advancing at mid-day through heavy woods, in its very
first contact with the enemy

. . . discovered a German force
digging in upon a hill-top. Without being discovered, it maneuvered into
a position to deliver maximum fire from a distance of a scant 20 yards,
and struck so powerfully and suddenly that the Germans were shot-up and
dispersed before they could pick up their weapons-2 machine guns, 4 machine
pistol "burp guns," several rifles and dozens of grenades.

A lucky break, we all agreed ....

But the soldiers of this platoon
showed thereafter that this was not simply "a lucky break" since
in "frequent instances

[701]

after that baptismal triumph"
their fellow white soldiers saw them "prove their stuff at the cost
of lives and blood by advancing doggedly under fire, by aggressive noncommissioned
officer leadership in house-to-house fights and in the forbidding wilderness
of No-Man's Land."50
As the men of this platoon took their places in their company, not a single
incident of friction occurred between them and the white infantrymen who
fought for the same towns, ate in the same chow line, sometimes gambled
in the same clandestine games. The Negro troops of this platoon gradually
came to be accepted not as unusual, or special, but as normal soldiers,
neither better nor worse than usual. "The premise that no soldier,"
their commander decided, "will hold black skin against a man if he
can shoot his rifle and does not run away proved to be substantially true.
Most of the white men of the company soon became highly appreciative of
the Negroes' help and warmly applauded their more colorful individual and
combat exploits."51

One Negro platoon, when faced with
heavy automatic weapons fire from outlying buildings in a town which another
platoon was already supposed to have taken, made a hasty estimate of the
situation and, realizing that its only safety was in the buildings from
which its men were receiving fire, broke into a run with all weapons firing,
raced three hundred yards under "a hail of enemy fire," took the
buildings and, in a matter of minutes, the entire town. The battalion commander
concluded:

I know I did not receive a superior
representation of the colored race as the average AGCT was Class IV. I do
know, however, that in courage, coolness, dependability and pride, they
are on a par with any white troops I have ever had occasion to work with.
In addition, they were, during combat, possessed with a fierce desire to
meet with and kill the enemy, the equal of which I have never witnessed
in white troops.

In a number of units whose praise
of the willing efforts of the Negro volunteers during combat was high there
arose an undercurrent of misgivings about retaining these troops within
units once the war was over and battalions and regiments settled into occupation
and garrison duties. But in this battalion two months of garrison life had
brought no deterioration of relations between Negro and white soldiers:

To date, there has never appeared
the slightest sign of race prejudice, or discrimination in this organization.
White men and colored men are welded together with a deep friendship and
respect born of combat and matured by a realization that such an association
is not the impossibility that many of us have been led to believe. Segregation
has never been attempted in this unit, and is, in my mind, the deciding
factor as to the success or failure of the experiment. When men undergo
the same privations, face the same dangers before an impartial enemy, there
can be no segregation. My men eat, play, work, and sleep as a company of
men, with no regard to color. An interesting sidelight is the fact that
the company orientation NCO is colored, the pitcher on the softball team,
composed of both races, is colored, and the bugler is colored.

The sole morale problem facing these
troops two months after the conclusion of hostilities was the growing suspicion,
now that a group of Negro troops had

[702]

been transferred to this unit from
another division, that they too would "soon be removing their Division
patch, and the thought of this impending separation has materially affected
their morale and performance thereby."52

This was a morale problem to many
of the Negro reinforcements, for as redeployment regulations went into effect,
the Negro infantrymen, having fewer points than the white troops in their
units, began to be transferred to other units, including a large group that
went to a combat engineer battalion constructing redeployment camps. The
suspicion arose that all would eventually be returned to service units.
Actually a compromise was worked out by the European theater, which declared
that it could not make exceptions to redeployment regulations. A thousand
or more of the reinforcements with relatively higher points were sent to
the 69th Infantry Division for redeployment to the United States and the
remainder, except for some who, having been transferred already, could not
be readily located, went to the 350th Field Artillery Battalion, a Negro
unit of low redeployment status, thus preserving their combat status and
at the same time remaining with the occupation forces in Europe. The compromise
was not wholly satisfactory to the troops concerned, for most of them had
hoped to remain with the units with which they had fought and with whose
men they had got along well. Many had hoped that their service would be
"the beginning of the end of differences and discriminations onaccount of race and color."53
As one of their commanders explained their and his dilemma: "These
colored men cannot understand why they are not being allowed to share the
honor of returning to their homeland with the Division with which they fought,
proving to the world that Negro soldiers can do something besides drive
a truck or work in a laundry. I am unqualified to give them a satisfactory
answer."54

In the Negro infantry rifle platoons,
the employment of Negro troops moved farthest from traditional Army patterns.
Despite the multitude of problems with which the Army was faced in the use
of Negro troops in World War II, at the war's end a greater variety of experience
existed than had ever before been available within the American Military
Establishment. For Negro troops had been used in larger numbers over a longer
period of time than in any previous war. They had been used by more branches
and in a greater variety of units, ranging from divisions to platoons in
size and from fighter units to quartermaster service companies in the complexity
of their duties. They had been used in a wider range of geographical, cultural,
and climatic conditions than was believed possible in 1942. All of this
was true of white troops as well, but in its manpower deliberations and
in its attempts to wrest maximum efficiency and production from the manpower
allotted it, the Army found that it was the

[703]

10 percent of American manpower
which was Negro that spelled a large part of the difference between the
full and wasteful employment of available American manpower of military
age.

As World War II drew to a close
the Army, as a part of its continuing inventory of its operations, turned
fuller attention to the problems of Negro manpower. These had already received
disproportionate administrative attention hardly justified by the results.
The Army was now interested in the experience of the theaters, both to conclude
the war in the Pacific and to plan for the postwar Army. Reports and more
reports already existed, but the Army was now interested in the judgment
of the theaters themselves. For whatever had occurred in the training and
deployment phases, the crucial questions could be answered best by the experience
of the theaters-the experience with Negro troops at the point of operational
use. Before the war was over, stock-taking on the employment of Negro troops
in World War II had already begun. Upon the basis of the direct experience
of the war, the McCloy Committee began to look toward the establishment
of a clearer postwar policy than there had ever been. Shortly after the
war was over, on 4 October 1945" the War Department appointed a board
of officers, headed by Lt. Gen. Alvan C. Gillem, Jr., to prepare a new and
broad policy for the future employment of Negro troops. From the investigations
and conclusions of this committee many of the changes in the employment
of Negro troops after World War II would come. These deliberations and developments
belong properly to a study of the postwar period, although the genesis

of the change may be found in the
vastly varied experiences of the Army and the War Department in the employment
of Negro troops in World War II.

Writing in the early summer of 1945,
before the fighting with Japan ended, the Chief Historian of the Army, the
late Dr. Walter L. Wright, Jr., provided a perceptive commentary on the
Army's experience with the employment of Negro troops in segregated units
during World War II: 55

With your general conclusion regarding
the performance of Negro troops, I tend to agree: They cannot be expected
to do as well in any Army function as white troops unless they have absolutely
first-class leadership from their officers. Such leadership may be provided,
in my opinion, either by white or by Negro officers, but white officers
would have to be men who have some understanding of the attitude of mind
which Negroes possess and some sympathy with them as human beings. What
troubles me is that anybody of real intelligence should be astonished to
discover that Negro troops require especially good leadership if their performance
is to match that of white troops. This same state of affairs exists, I think,
with any group of men who belong to a subject nationality or national minority
consisting of under-privileged individuals from depressed social strata
.... American Negro troops are, as you know, ill-educated on the average
and often illiterate; they lack self-respect, self-confidence, and initiative;
they tend to be very conscious of their low standing in the eyes of the
white population and consequently feel very little motive for aggressive
fighting. In fact, their survival as individuals and as a people has often
depended on their ability to subdue completely even the appearance of aggressiveness.
After all, when a man knows that the color of his skin will automatically
disqualify him for reaping the fruits of attainment it is no wonder that
he sees

[704]

little point in trying very hard
to excel anybody else. To me, the most extraordinary thing is that such
people continue trying at all.

The conclusion which I reach is
obvious: We cannot expect to make first-class soldiers out of second or
third or fourth class citizens. The man who is lowest down in civilian life
is practically certain to be lowest down as a soldier. Accordingly, we must
expect depressed minorities to perform much less effectively than the average
of other groups in the population .... So far as the war in progress is
concerned, the War Department must deal with an existing state of affairs
and its employment of Negroes must parallel the employment of the same group
in civilian American society. Yet, it is important to remember that the
civilian status of Negroes in this country is changing with a rapidity which
I believe to be unique in history; the level of literacy is rising steadily
and

quickly and privileges other than
educational are being gained every year ....

As to the segregation of Negroes
to special units in the Army, this is simply a reflection of a state of
affairs well-known in civilian America today. Yet, civilian practice in
this connection differs very widely from Massachusetts to Mississippi. Since
the less favorable treatment characteristic of southern states is less likely
to lead to violent protest from powerful white groups, the Army has tended
to follow southern rather than northern practices in dealing with the problem
of segregation. Also, it is most unfortunate for the Negroes that considerations
of year round climate led to the placing of most of the training camps in
the southern states where conditions in the nearby towns were none too acceptable
to northern white men and the unfamiliar Jim Crowism was exceedingly unacceptable
to northern Negroes. My ultimate hope is that in the long run it will be
possible to assign individual Negro soldiers and officers to any unit in
the Army where they are qualified as individuals to serve efficiently.