In his article "Encryption and the NSA Role in International Standards," Dr. Wertheimer works hard to leave the impression that the NSA did not place a backdoor in the DUAL_EC_DRBG algorithm. He never issues a direct denial, because of overwhelming evidence of the backdoor. Instead, he misleads through selective omission of evidence, including evidence that the NSA considered it a "challenge in finesse" to get the standard accepted, that the NSA paid a leading industry player a large sum to make this standard (with NSA's curve points) the default option, that it suppressed discussion of how the curve points should be generated, and that the standard makes no mathematical sense unless you were designing it for the backdoor.
The NSA needs to address the actual question of the backdoor, or provide an explanation of why it will not.

Dr. Wertheimer writes that he feels "a connection to the mathematics community that goes beyond scholarship." If so, his attempt to mislead this community--the community that "encouraged and supported his studies"--is even more shameful.