07ASTANA3368, SCHOOL OF HARD KNOCKS: BECOMING A LIBERAL

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ASTANA 003368
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR SCA/CEN - O'MARA
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/26/2017
TAGS: ECONKDEMKZOSCEPGOVPHUM
SUBJECT: SCHOOL OF HARD KNOCKS: BECOMING A LIBERAL
POLITICIAN IN NORTHERN KAZAKHSTAN
REF: A. ASTANA 2222
¶B. ASTANA 3025
Classified By: Ambassador John Ordway, Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
¶1. (C) Summary. Young, U.S.-educated and fed up with local
corruption, Viktor Frolov wants to enter politics and change
the way things are done in his native Petropavlovsk (capital
of Northern Kazakhstan oblast). Frolov told Econoff that,
despite being defeated in his first campaign for the
Petropavlovsk City Maslikhat (city council), he aspires to
run again. Although he most closely identifies himself with
the opposition Ak Zhol, Frolov has chosen to direct his
pursuits through the ruling Nur Otan. He sees his region as
one with an increasingly disaffected population and no
functioning political opposition. Frolov's travails present
an interesting microcosm of the political realities in
Northern Kazakhstan oblast. End summary.
Pick Your Party
---------------
¶2. (C) In a December 15 conversation with Econoff, Viktor
Frolov, an ethnic Russian native of Petropavlovsk, made it
clear that his political perspective was largely defined by
the year he spent studying in the United States as an
undergraduate on a U.S.-funded program. By the time of the
August elections, Frolov had been preparing for a run for the
Petropavlovsk City Maslikhat for some time. Ideologically,
he most closely identifies himself with Ak Zhol (Econoff
first met Frolov when visiting the Petropavlovsk Ak Zhol
campaign headquarters in early August in the run-up to the
Parliamentary elections, ref A). However, Frolov never
officially joined Ak Zhol due to his conviction that an
affiliation with the opposition would prevent him from
getting elected. Instead, in early 2008, with the
encouragement from the city akim, Frolov joined Nur Otan,
hoping to build his political career from within the ruling
party.
¶3. (C) Upon joining Nur Otan, the twenty-something Frolov was
immediately made a member of the 12-member "politburo" of Nur
Otan's Petropavlovsk branch. Nevertheless, Frolov's
ambitions to run in the August election on the Nur Otan
ticket for the city maslikhat were dashed. Frolov told
Econoff that, although his candidacy was supported by the
city akim, the oblast akim struck it down. The reason,
Frolov explained, was that he "had nothing to lose" and was
therefore difficult to control. Without a substantial stake
in the "system" (such as owning his own business), Frolov was
deemed by the oblast akim as not subject to leverage and
potentially too independent.
Run on Your Own
---------------
¶4. (C) Undeterred (and without leaving Nur Otan), Frolov
proceeded to run for the city maslikhat as an independent.
He and his supporters canvassed the neighborhoods of his city
district, talking to residents and handing out campaign
materials. The issues were local: repairing buildings,
constructing a playground, etc. Frolov told Econoff that he
came under some pressure from the local authorities to pull
out. His supervisor at the bank was asked to coerce Frolov
to abandon his pursuit. To this, Frolov said, his boss had a
"clever" response: he (falsely) claimed that he was powerless
to act against Frolov, because the latter had strong links to
the bank's leadership in Almaty.
¶5. (C) Frolov echoed the claim made to Econoff by the
Petropavlovsk Ak Zhol leader in August that all the local
election results were drawn up in the oblast maslikhat a
month or two before the election (ref A). Other local
opposition-minded candidates (all running as independents)
were, Frolov said, pressured to withdraw or even stricken
from the ballot. The oblast akim, Frolov claimed, violated
the law by openly campaigning for Nur Otan. Many businesses,
including Frolov's own bank, called their employees and
pressured them to show up at the polls. Frolov was told by
the authorities not to bother fielding observers at two of
his district's four polling stations. At the end of the day,
he garnered 29% of the vote, with the Nur Otan candidate
winning over 60%, and the rest going to a "stand-in,
sacrificial lamb" candidate. Of the 19 seats in the city
Maslikhat, Frolov said, 18 went to Nur Otan, with the
remaining seat going to a "token" independent with no ties to
the opposition.
Savor the Frustration
ASTANA 00003368 002 OF 002
---------------------
¶6. (C) Frolov stated to Econoff that he is happy with his
career in banking but remains determined to enter politics.
Many people in the largely ethnic-Russian Northern Kazakhstan
oblast are, according to Frolov, increasingly unhappy with
the current state of affairs. Endemic corruption and
preferences for ethnic Kazakhs in hiring are, he said,
fueling public unease. Emigration to Russia from the oblast
is continuing. Frolov stated that t
he removal of Tair
Mansurov, the oblast akim, in October drew a sign of relief
from the local business community, which resented Mansurov's
penchant for extracting money from businesses. (Note:
Mansurov has since been appointed the General Secretary of
the Eurasian Economic Community, "EurAsEc," which includes
Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and
Uzbekistan. End note.) On the other hand, Frolov added,
Mansurov's replacement, his former deputy Serik Bilyalov, is
a "nobody" and does not inspire confidence. At the same
time, the political situation in the oblast is becoming
"harsher": every single local newspaper issue is read and
pre-approved by oblast authorities prior to publication; Nur
Otan is increasingly acting as the sole party in power and
calling the shots by itself. The oblast authorities,
according to Frolov, routinely compel local businesses,
particularly banks, to provide money for various public
projects, though the recent financial turmoil (ref B) has
abated these pressures. Government jobs, he added, are
routinely "purchased." Frolov stated that young people who
come back to Petropavlovsk after studying in the U.S. are
"incensed" by the corruption they see.
...And Run, Run Again
---------------------
¶7. (C) With the next Petropavlovsk city maslikhat election
nearly five years away, Frolov's main hope is that one of the
maslikhat's seats becomes vacated early. (Note: Candidates
for the Petropavlovsk city maslikhat must be residents of the
city but not necessarily of the district they are vying to
represent. End note.) In the meantime, Frolov said, he
remains in the Nur Otan politburo, which "hypocritically"
approves any proposal that comes before it. Frolov stated
that he is presently laying the groundwork for a political
career by building connections. For now, he believes that
Nur Otan is his best bet for getting elected as a member of
the city maslikhat. He noted that the law allows a maslikhat
deputy (though not a Mazhilis deputy) to leave his party
after being elected and still retain his seat.
Comment
-------
¶8. (C) Frolov's travails present a good cross-section of the
political realities in the Northern Kazakhstan oblast, which
-- under the thumb of the recently departed akim Tair
Mansurov -- earned the reputation of being a tightly
controlled one (ref A). The increasingly close marriage of
the ruling Nur Otan with the government, the virtually
unbridled powers enjoyed by the oblast akim, the rampant
corruption, and the nearly complete impotence of the local
opposition are the common threads running through Frolov's
story and that of his oblast.
ORDWAY

The information recorded on this site has been extracted from http://Wikileaks.org (Kazakhstan) database..

We wish to express our gratitude to Julian Assange and his team for making this data available as it is an important public record.

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