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MAC_SEEOTHERUIDS(4) FreeBSD Kernel Interfaces Manual MAC_SEEOTHERUIDS(4)
NAMEmac_seeotheruids -- simple policy controlling whether users see other
users
SYNOPSIS
To compile the policy into your kernel, place the following lines in your
kernel configuration file:
optionsMACoptionsMAC_SEEOTHERUIDS
Alternately, to load the module at boot time, place the following line in
your kernel configuration file:
optionsMAC
and in loader.conf(5):
mac_seeotheruids_load="YES"
DESCRIPTION
The mac_seeotheruids policy module, when enabled, denies users to see
processes or sockets owned by other users.
To enable mac_seeotheruids, set the sysctl OID
security.mac.seeotheruids.enabled to 1. To permit superuser awareness of
other credentials by virtue of privilege, set the sysctl OID
security.mac.seeotheruids.suser_privileged to 1.
To allow users to see processes and sockets owned by the same primary
group, set the sysctl OID security.mac.seeotheruids.primarygroup_enabled
to 1.
To allow processes with a specific group ID to be exempt from the policy,
set the sysctl OID security.mac.seeotheruids.specificgid_enabled to 1,
and security.mac.seeotheruids.specificgid to the group ID to be exempted.
LabelFormat
No labels are defined for mac_seeotheruids.
SEE ALSOmac(4), mac_biba(4), mac_bsdextended(4), mac_ifoff(4), mac_lomac(4),
mac_mls(4), mac_none(4), mac_partition(4), mac_portacl(4), mac_test(4),
mac(9)HISTORY
The mac_seeotheruids policy module first appeared in FreeBSD 5.0 and was
developed by the TrustedBSD Project.
AUTHORS
This software was contributed to the FreeBSD Project by Network Asso-
ciates Labs, the Security Research Division of Network Associates Inc.
under DARPA/SPAWAR contract N66001-01-C-8035 (``CBOSS''), as part of the
DARPA CHATS research program.
BUGS
See mac(9) concerning appropriateness for production use. The TrustedBSD
MAC Framework is considered experimental in FreeBSD.
While the MAC Framework design is intended to support the containment of
the root user, not all attack channels are currently protected by entry
point checks. As such, MAC Framework policies should not be relied on,
in isolation, to protect against a malicious privileged user.
FreeBSD 10.2 October 6, 2005 FreeBSD 10.2