I'm a bit confused regarding the arguments that absolve the 2nd SS of any criminal activity at Oradour. As far as I can understand, there seem to be 2 theories that are used alone or in combination with regards to why the 2nd SS isn't at fault:

1) The "war is hell" theory

2) The "oops" theory

The "oops" theory specifically concerns the destruction of the Oradour church and the subsequent deaths of all but one of the women and children the W-SS troops herded inside. Hans Schmidt in his book "SS-Panzergrenadier" has a nice summary of this train of thought:

"...While the reprisals were being carried out, the women and children of the village had been ordered into the village church for their own safekeeping. Then the unthinkable happened. The church caught fire and 'somehow' an inferno developed that would cost most of the women and children their lives. Young SS soldiers tried desperately to help the people trapped in the church but not too many could be saved."

Schmidt goes on to mention that the maquis had hidden explosives in the church "underneath the roof," which exploded, killing everyone save one.

This theory seems to have been first postulated by Otto Weidinger's 1978 book "Comrades to the End," a history of the "Der Führer" regiment:

"The women and children had been locked in the church during this time. Then the town had been set on fire; in nearly all the houses hidden ammunition had exploded. The fire had suddenly spread to the church, which also had ammunition hidden in its steeple. The church burnt down very quickly, and the women and children died."

In essence, the "oops" theory describes the church incident as a tragedy due to an accident of spreading flames combined with the perfidy of the Resistance storing weapons in the church. The oops theory also places the W-SS soldiers as either unwitting bystanders to the tragedy or as shocked spectators willing but unable to help the civilians trapped inside.

The "war is hell" theory concerns the messy reality of guerrilla warfare and seems to branch into 2 tangents - the semi-legalistic justifications regarding the Hague/Geneva conventions (e.g. French partisans fought dirty, didn't wear uniforms, committed atrocities, Germans were within convention regulations to take hostages etc.). The second tangent is that because partisan war is hell - terrorism can only be stopped by counterterror on a greater scale and a much greater ferocity. In essence, Oradour was a hotbed of partisan activity, and to stop the terrorists the SS looted the town, it, and killed most of the inhabitants as a massive and fitting reprisal to squash further Resistance activity.

There are very, very few instances in military history where an occupying power successfully developed effective strategies to stop terrorist/partisan/franc-tireur/Resistance/guerrilla/insurgent activity. (Whatever you want to call it, since each term has different positive or pejorative connotations) This type of "asymmetrical warfare" has confounded armies of all nations at different periods. The methods for dealing with irregular forces have spanned the spectrum from persuasion to pogroms. (Neatly summed up by the Vietnam-era phrase "Let me win your hearts and minds or I’ll burn your damn huts down").

The Third Reich relied heavily on a strategy of massive counterterror, which, however morally odious, usually did have some sort of twisted logic to it – e.g. shooting X number of hostages for each German killed and wounded, for example. It’s also important to point out that a massive counterterror strategy was not limited to the Wehrmacht & SS 1939-45 but has deep roots in multiple conflicts going back centuries – the Franco-Prussian war, the Napoleonic wars, etc.

Back to the "oops" and "war is hell" theories. To me they seem to have a lot of flaws, which I’ll outline in a series of questions below. Combined, these flaws, seem to postulate the existence of a third theory – that Oradour was a war crime, and importantly, was considered a war crime by the Germans in 1944.

I disagree with the idea that "we won’t know the true story until the trial records are released." There are enough testimonials, trial documents, unit records, books, etc. available today to reconstruct the events in question.

Take for example Oradour being a hotbed of resistance activity – (the SD thought it might be, at least according to Weidinger). Sarah Farmer writes, "The precise reason this town was chosen is still unclear. There had been no resistance in Oradour itself. The nearest maquis was in the hills at Monts de Blond, approximately 12km away." Max Hastings writes, "The evidence is overwhelming that there was no maquis presence in or around Oradour-sur-Glane. The nearest maquis camp was some seven miles southwards." We now have FTP, FFI, and SOE documentation to help us determine where Resistance camps were. So where is the proof that Oradour contained, aided, abetted or promoted Resistance activity?

Otto Weidinger writes that "hidden ammunition" exploded in all the houses and the church at Oradour. How did the SS know it was ammunition, or even it was ammunition, if it was hidden?

Why did the SS men gather all the men into various barns, announce that there was arms and ammunition in the town before conducting a search, then killing the village menfolk and only then firing the town?

How much "hidden ammunition" would it take to explode to kill all but one of the 400-odd women and children forced into the church? 5 pounds? 50 pounds? 100 pounds? It would take a massive amount of ammunition to destroy a stone church, wouldn’t it?

Where is the documentation regarding how much, if any, ammunition was seized by the "Der Führer" regiment? Why do accounts of the ammunition not mention quantities – e.g. "50 kg explosive, 25 grenades,, 5,000 rounds 7.62mm, etc? This is standard procedure for counterinsurgency operations.

The SS accounts mention ammunition but no weapons. Why no weapons? Did the maquis at Monts de Blond have to walk 12km to Oradour each time they wanted to fit a clip into a rifle? Why would the maquis "at Oradour" have ammo but not a single rifle or Sten gun?

Why couldn’t the SS men, who presumably had just forced the civilians into the church, possibly save a single one? Why did only one survive?

If W-SS men attempted to help civilians out of the burning church, why don’t published accounts from Marguerite Rouffanche, the sole survivor of the church incident, mention it? Why does she mention jumping out of the church, followed by a Mme Joyeux and her baby, and then being shot at by the Germans? (woman and baby were killed, Rouffanche was wounded 5 times by bullets as she fled the church and hid herself in a garden) Why does not mention any hidden ammunition exploding, but does mention SS men placing some sort of incendiary device on the altar, and mentions them shooting and tossing grenades into the terrified crowd?

"Der Führer’s" war diary for June 10th mentions "the town of Oradour-sur-Glane was surrounded, and ammunition found stored in almost every house. Results: 548 enemy dead. Our casualties: 1 dead, 1 wounded." Even the most casual student of guerrilla warfare would notice the striking difference in casualties. So we have a 500:1 ratio of French/German casualties, and no documentation of specific amounts of seized ammunition or weapons. Sounds like something’s fishy with the body count – a la "If it’s dead and French it’s Maquis"

Say for example, that for the purposes of argument we will accept reprisal activities as practiced by the "Der Führer" regiment as legal under the Hague/Geneva conventions existing in 1944 and that these practices would most likely be considered acceptable "standard operating procedures" for counterinsurgency warfare by the armed forces of most nations.

On June 9th, 1944, the "Das Reich" commander wrote down specific directives regarding how the divisional units were to proceed with their anti-partisan activities en route to Normandy. Section (I) offers specific instructions as to reprisal policies:

"Executions are to be carried out on the order of regimental or other commanders by hanging, only in such places where guerilla units fight or hold up our troops or commit atrocities…As a rule, the proportion to be applied is as follows: for every wounded soldier: 3 guerillas. For every dead soldier: 10 guerillas.

Given the Hague/Geneva, common practices, and specific divisional order above:

Didn’t Diekmann exceed his quota for reprisal killings? "Das Reich" lost something like 17 men total KIA (Max Hastings estimate) by Resistance fighters by June 10th – thus it would be "acceptable" for Diekmann to kill 170 "partisans" – but he killed over 600. Isn’t this over his limit? And why didn’t he follow the written directive from his divisional commander to hang the civilians? (as the division did at Tulle) Please also note that the division continued on to kill 337 additional "terrorists" as it proceeded from Limoges to Rochechouart, not to mention the hundreds of others deported to KZs. So at what number does a reprisal ration tip from being acceptable to being an "excess of zeal?"

According to Weidinger’s account, Diekmann, the commander of the 1st Battalion of the DF regiment, had heard from 2 French civilians in St. Junien that a fellow battalion commander, (Kampfe of the 3rd Bat) was captured and being held by the maquis at Oradour-sur-Glane and that Kampfe "was to be executed and publicly burnt amid celebrations." Weidinger describes Diekmann and Kampfe as "close personal friends." Did that friendship affect Diekmann’s military professionalism and his decision as to how to "pacify" Oradour? Is it acceptable for a commander to exceed the bounds of his written orders because of the loss of a comrade?

Does the Hague/Geneva Conventions in effect in 1944 permit the hostage taking or the execution of children under 5?

Most accounts of the raid at Oradour include mention of the W-SS men looting goods and livestock from the town prior to destroying it and killing the inhabitants. Isn’t looting specifically prohibited under the SS code, as mentioned by Hans Schmidt? If so, is this looting the action of denying aid and comfort to the enemy or just the time-honored right to pillage as practiced by soldiers since time immemorial?

DF commander, Staf. Stadler specifically order Diekmann to search for Kampfe at Oradour, and if unable to find him, to bring back maquis prisoners for interrogation. Diekmann fails to bring back a single prisoner, disobeying Stadler’s direct order. Is this the action of a commander attempting to achieve his objectives or just was Diekmann’s action at Oradour just getting his revenge?

Stadler, given Diekmann’s report of the events at Oradour, is angry, and threatens Diekmann with a court-martial and even recommends to the divisional commander that a military hearing be held. If the events at Oradour were within the bounds of war conventions and common methods of warfare then why did Stadler recommend a court martial – one of the few, if not only, investigations ever instigated by the W-SS into the actions of a commander regarding his activities during a pacification program?

Why are the accounts of the court-martial proceeding scant and contradictory? Some say the trial happened and Diekmann was acquitted, some say he died before proceedings could get underway. Why wasn’t Diekmann relieved of command? (a standard operating procedure in all armies when a commander is under investigation) It seems like the Waffen-SS did not realize what other sectors of the German Wehrmacht and occupied forces did – that Oradour was no ordinary pacification campaign but a public relations disaster and a war crime:

Why did German troops enter Oradour on the 11th and hastily bury all the bodies they could find in shallow graves?

Why did the Gestapo make an (fortunately unsuccessful) attempt to "locate" all the survivors of the massacre? Why did they want to "locate" them?

Why did German authorities prohibit Marc-Paul Freund-Valade, the Vichy prefect for the Limousin region, access to Oradour until June 13th?

Why did Freund-Valade, (remember this is guy who works for the collaborationist Vichy government) write his superiors about Oradour "such measures of repression, which are against all laws of war and whose atrocity raises indignation and horror throughout the whole region"?

Why did the Wehrmacht commander of the Limousin region, General Gleininger, personally apologize to the Bishop of Limoges for the events at Oradour?

Why did the German occupation authorities prohibit the Limoges newspapers from writing about the event, and even prevented the advertising agency Agence Havas from publishing the funeral notices of the victims?

Why did Army Group B specifically inquire as to the status of Diekmann’s inquiry?

Why is Weidinger’s account considered more "truthful" in some quarters? Was he there at Oradour? Would he not be capable, as a senior commander in the 2nd SS division, of writing a biased account of the incident? Wouldn’t it be humanly understandable that he would want to clear the name of his unit and his men? Would you accept as unadulterated truth anything Lt. Calley wrote about Mai Lai? Or is Weidinger’s account gospel because he’s a "Waffen-SS Hero?"

BTW Meyer also wrote:

"In the interests of historical truth nothing must be glossed over. Things happened during the war that are unworthy of the German nation. The former soldiers of the Waffen-SS are men enough to recognize and deplore actual cases of inhuman behavior. It would be foolish to label all charges laid at our doorstep as the propaganda of our former enemies. Of course they made propaganda of it…but crimes were committed. It is useless to argue about the toll of victims – the facts are burdensome enough."

The Waffen-SS, was particularly good at being particularly brutal – both in front line combat and rear area security. The problem seems to be that the W-SS never recognized that for whatever gains they made in pacifying a region by terror they incurred a greater proportional loss in political, social and moral credibility. You can’t be honorable "soldiers like the others" and pull a stunt like shooting a man condemned as a reprisal victim as he hugs his fifteen year old son for the last time – as Hauptsturmfuhrer Kahn did at Fraysinnat-le-Gelat in a counterterror action long before his participation at Oradour. That’s not the method of a professional soldier – just the stunt of a sadist getting his kicks. But Oradour was just an example of the self-defeating nature of Third Reich security policies – as Caleb Carr say in his book "The Origins of Terror" – "Warfare against civilians, whether inspired by hatred, revenge, greed or political or psychological insecurity, has been one of the most ultimately self-defeating tactics in all of military history."