I have received your letter of the 11th, with the Newspapers
containing your remarks on the present mode of
electing a President, and your proposed remedy for its defects.
I am glad to find you have not abandoned your attention
to great Constitutional topics.

The difficulty of finding an unexceptionable process for
appointing the Executive Organ of a Government such as
that of the U.S. was deeply felt by the Convention; and as
the final arrangement of it took place in the latter stage of
the Session, it was not exempt from a degree of the hurrying
influence produced by fatigue and impatience in all
such Bodies, tho' the degree was much less than usually
prevails in them.

The part of the arrangement which casts the eventual
appointment on the House of Reps. voting by States, was,
as you presume, an accommodation to the anxiety of the
smaller States for their sovereign equality, and to the jealousy
of the larger towards the cumulative functions of the
Senate. The agency of the H. of Reps. was thought safer
also than that of the Senate, on account of the greater
number of its members. It might indeed happen that the
event would turn on one or two States having one or two
Reps. only; but even in that case, the representations of
most of the States being numerous, the House would present
greater obstacles to corruption than the Senate with
its paucity of Members. It may be observed also, that altho'
for a certain period the evil of State votes given by one or
two individuals would be extended by the introduction of
new States, it would be rapidly diminished by growing
populations within extensive territories. At the present period,
the evil is at its maximum. Another Census will leave
none of the States existing or in Embryo, in the numerical
rank of R.I. & Del, nor is it impossible, that the progressive
assimilation of local Institutions, laws & manners, may [Volume 3, Page 557]
overcome the prejudices of those particular States against
an incorporation with their neighbours.

But with all possible abatements the present rule of voting
for President by the H. of Reps. is so great a departure
from the Republican principle of numerical equality, and
even from the federal rule which qualifies the numerical
by a State equality, and is so pregnant also with a mischievous
tendency in practice, that an amendment of the Constitution
on this point is justly called for by all its considerate
& best friends.

I agree entirely with you in thinking that the election of
Presidential Electors by districts, is an amendment very
proper to be brought forward at the same time with that
relating to the eventual choice of President by the H. of
Reps. The district mode was mostly, if not exclusively in
view when the Constitution was framed and adopted; &
was exchanged for the general ticket & the legislative election,
as the only expedient for baffling the policy of the
particular States which had set the example. A constitutional
establishment of that mode will doubtless aid in reconciling
the smaller States to the other change which they
will regard as a concession on their part. And it may not
be without a value in another important respect. The
States when voting for President by general tickets or by
their Legislatures, are a string of beads; when they make
their elections by districts, some of these differing in sentiment
from others, and sympathizing with that of districts
in other States, they are so knit together as to break the
force of those geographical and other noxious parties
which might render the repulsive too strong for the cohesive
tendencies within the Political System.

It may be worthy of consideration whether in requiring
elections by districts, a discretion might not be conveniently
left with the States to allot two members to a single
district. It would manifestly be an important proviso, that
no new arrangement of districts should be made within a
certain period previous to an ensuing election of President.

Of the different remedies you propose for the failure of
a majority of Electoral votes for any one Candidate, I like
best that which refers the final choice, to a joint vote of the
two Houses of Congress, restricted to the two highest
names on the Electoral lists. It might be a question,
whether the three instead of the two highest names might
not be put within the choice of Congress, inasmuch as it
not unfrequently happens, that the Candidate third on the
list of votes would in a question with either of the two first
outvote him, and, consequently be the real preference of
the voters. But this advantage of opening a wider door &
a better chance to merit, may be outweighed by an increased
difficulty in obtaining a prompt & quiet decision
by Congress with three candidates before them, supported
by three parties, no one of them making a majority of the
whole.

The mode which you seem to approve, of making a plurality
of Electoral votes a definitive appointment would
have the merit of avoiding the Legislative agency in appointing
the Executive; but might it not, by multiplying
hopes and chances, stimulate intrigue & exertion, as well
as incur too great a risk of success to a very inferior candidate?
Next to the propriety of having a President the
real choice of a majority of his Constituents, it is desirable
that he should inspire respect & acquiescence by qualifications
not suffering too much by comparison.

I cannot but think also that there is a strong objection to
undistinguishing votes for President & Vice President; the
highest number appointing the former the next the latter.
To say nothing of the different services (except in a rare
contingency) which are to be performed by them, occasional
transpositions would take place, violating equally the
mutual consciousness of the individuals, & the public estimate
of their comparative fitness.

Having thus made the remarks to which your communication
led, with a frankness which I am sure you will not
disapprove, whatever errors you may find in them, I will
sketch for your consideration a substitute which has occurred
to myself for the faulty part of the Constitution in
question

"The Electors to be chosen in districts, not more than
two in any one district, and the arrangement of the districts
not to be alterable within the period of ------ previous
to the election of President. Each Elector to give two
votes, one naming his first choice, the other his next
choice. If there be a majority of all the votes on the first
list for the same person, he of course to be President; if
not, and there be a majority, (which may well happen) on
the other list for the same person, he then to be the final
choice; if there be no such majority on either list, then a
choice to be made by joint ballot of the two Houses of
Congress, from the two names having the greatest number
of votes on the two lists taken together." Such a process
would avoid the inconvenience of a second resort to the
Electors; and furnish a double chance of avoiding an eventual
resort to Congress. The same process might be observed
in electing the Vice President.

Your letter found me under some engagements which
have retarded a compliance with its request, and may have
also rendered my view of the subject presented in it more
superficial than I have been aware. This consideration
alone would justify my wish not to be brought into the
public discussion. But there is another in the propensity of
the Moment, to view everything, however abstract from
the Presidential election in prospect, thro' a medium connecting
it with that question; a propensity the less to be
excused as no previous change of the Constitution can be
contemplated, and the more to be regretted, as opinions
and commitments formed under its influence, may become
settled obstacles at a practicable season.