Syrians in Toronto gather at the Eaton Centre for a rally for Syrian freedom, May 21,
2011.

By Donna Robinson Divine/ Published
June 6, 2011

Bashar al-Assad's credibility as a legitimate ruler has eroded because every reform he announces
is delivered to his people with bullets and arrests. But the credibility of America's
Secretary of State and the British Prime Minister, both of whom continue to make the “Orwellian” claim that Bashar al-Assad can end the violence and initiate political reforms, is also much
diminished. Much like other Middle East dictators, Bashar al-Assad sustains his regime by
controlling access to economic opportunity and political office. Without these repressive
mechanisms of control, he has no power. And without the resources to sustain these
mechanisms, he would lack the means to kill off or sweep away the people demanding freedom. By
some estimates, 1,000 protestors have already been killed, and many more are imprisoned.
Yet this brutality has triggered only the mildest criticism from the very same leaders who
rushed to call for Egyptian leader Hosni Mubarak's departure from office and who are now
sending war planes to bomb Libya's dictator into submission or surrender. Thus Iran
and the Gulf States can extend financial and material support to a regime savagely wiping
out its opponents and risk not even the mildest rebuke from the international community. One
suspects the silence of American and European political leaders comes from some calculation
of national self-interest activated by a collective fear of what comes next.

But are these calculations correct
and is this fear of Syria's post-Assad future rational? One might reasonably wonder why the Gulf
States, so obsessed with the spread of Iranian/Shia influence, are propping up Syria—the very regime
that brings what they deem a highly problematic influence into the Arab heartland. Perhaps a shared
interest among these kingdoms in undermining the spread of democracy is far stronger than their suspicions
of Iran. Still, the more troubling question relates to the reactions of American and European policy
makers who have long focused their concerns on the possibility, even likelihood, of Iran gaining access
to nuclear weapons. Efforts to stop the development of Iran's nuclear capacity have led to a cumbersome
set of sanctions, widely acknowledged to be ineffective, and a series of rumored undercover cyber warfare
tactics whose impact is very difficult to assess. Surely, if the fall of Syria, Iran's longstanding ally
in the region, would cut Syria's ties to its proxies in Lebanon and in the Gaza Strip, the consequences
for regional stability and a Middle East peace process are far more promising than they are with a Syrian
leader more beholden to Iran for saving his regime. It is also conceivable that the end of Syria's
dictatorship will energize the Iranian opposition to take to the streets once again. So, it must be asked:
why are American and European policy makers hesitating to call for the end of the Assad regime? At
the very least, Americans and Europeans are owed an explanation that accords with fact and not with the
fantasy that President Bashar al-Assad can bring democratic reforms to Syria.

Donna Robinson Divine is the Morningstar Family Professor of Jewish Studies and Professor of Government
at Smith College.

A Smith College professor who has a strong and longstanding interest in all
aspects of Middle East history and politics asks why American and European policy makers
are hesitating to call for the end of President Bashar al-Assad’s Baathist regime.