Saturday, September 23, 2017

The KRG Independence Referendum: A Path to Self-Determination or Greater Authoritarian Rule and Regional Instability?

Iraqi Kurds celebrate the coming referendum for an independent Kurdish state

This coming September 25th, the Kurdish
Regional Government (KRG) will hold a referendum asking Iraq’s Kurds whether
they want to leave the Republic of Iraq and form an independent nation-state. If
successful, and the KRG secedes from Iraq, will the referendum serve Kurdish desires
for national self-determination? Will it give Iraq’s Kurds greater control over
their political, cultural and economic destiny?

Or would secession from Iraq instead solidify
authoritarian rule in the KRG and harm the Kurds' economic and strategic
interests? These questions require careful analysis given the referendum’s implications,
not only for Iraq’s Kurds, but for the stability of Iraq and the eastern MENA region.

Distribution of Kurdish populations in Turkey, Syria, Iraq and Iran.

As they rightly argue, the Kurds are the largest ethnic
group in the world which lacks its own nation-state. Beginning with Declaration of Independence by
the United States in 1776, and further elaborated as the 19th
century progressed, the concept of national self-determination became a
cardinal principle of international law, to be later embodied in the 1945 United
Nations Charter.

Ballot urging a "Yes" vote on the
the September 25 referendum

Kurds argue that having a nation-state does not reflect
an abstract desire, but represents a question of self-preservation. The historical
record clearly demonstrates that the Kurds have been treated in a despicable
manner in all 4 countries of the MENA region in which they live.

Saddam Husayn’s notorious ANFAL campaign, including
the dropping of chemical weapons on Kurdish residents of the city of Halabja in
March 1988, led to the destruction of hundreds of Kurdish towns and villages,
the elimination of Kurdish agriculture, and the deaths of thousands of men,
between the ages of 15 and 55, not to speak of the inhabitants of Halabja.

Image from the town of Halabja after it was bombed at Saddam Husayn's
orders with chemical weapons in March 1988

The Turkish government has also suppressed Kurdish
rights, including prohibiting the use of the Kurdish language, referring to Kurds
as “mountain Turks,” and refusing to invest in Kurdish populated areas in
eastern Turkey. The refusal to invest state funds in Kurdish areas has deprived
Turkey’s Kurdish minority of economic development, schools and employment
opportunities.

Syrian dictator Bashar al-Asad

Syria’s frequent seizure of Kurdish lands in the
country’s northeast was often accompanied by the withdrawal of Syrian
citizenship, and the arrest and torture of Kurds who protested the policies of
the Bacthist regime in Damascus. Syria’s Kurds were deprived of
government services and, like Kurds in neighboring Turkey, prevented from
engaging in cultural expression. In effect, they were not recognized as Syrian
citizens. (See my earlier post: "The Rojava Kurds: A Model for the Contemporary Middle East? https://new-middle-east.blogspot.com/2017/06/the-rojava-kurds-model-for-contemporary.html).

Iran’s suppression of Kurdish rights began with the
destruction of the only Kurdish nation-state, the short-lived Mahabad Republic
(Kurdish: کۆماری
مەھاباد‎ Komara Mehabadê; Persian: جمهوری مهاباد‎‎) of May-June 1947. The leader of the fledgling state, Gazi
Muhammad, a respected member of a local clerical family, was arrested, tried
and hung.

The continued jailing and killing of Kurdish
activists, both under the Shah’s regime and the Islamic Republic, and the refusal
to invest state funds in Kurdish areas of the north-west, constitute a record
of Iranian state’s authoritarianism, economic and cultural marginalization, and
physical elimination towards its Kurdish citizens. Given this history, why wouldn’t Kurds want their
own nation-state?

However, will the September 25 referendum give Kurds
the right to self-determination? Will it
offer them a better life? The answer is
most likely not. First and foremost,
Kurds and the international community should be asking, why is the referendum
being held at this point in time? Did
the KRG leadership schedule it to help Iraq’s Kurds or are there other
motivations at work? Unfortunately, if
the referendum is successful and the KRG withdraws from Iraq, we can expect political
and economic conditions to worsen in the new Kurdish nation-state.

Democracy and political development
Would an independent Kurdish state create a more democratic political system
for Iraq’s Kurds? Unfortunately, the
answer is no. KRG President Masoud Barzani fits the all too prevalent model of
political rule in the MENA region: authoritarianism
mixed with rampant corruption and nepotism.

KRG President Masoud Barzani
standing next to Iraq & KRG flags

An independent Kurdish state in Iraq would only
strengthen Barzani’s rule in the KRG Parliament and he has already flouted KRG
laws by remaining as president, despite his term having expired 2 years ago. The
Referendum will do nothing to address the demands of young Kurds, expressed for
example in the formation of the Gorran (Change) Party, which demand that the
KRG become more transparent in its political and economic decision-making.

Relations between the KDP and PUK
As is already clear, the declaration of an independent Kurdish state will not
solve the ongoing tension between the two dominant political parties in the
KRG, the Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP), controlled by the Barzani family and its
extended clan, and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) controlled by the
Talabani family. Both parties still have
separate militias (Pesh Merga units) and control their own economic and legal
institutions.

Because an independent Kurdistan would create new
power vacuums, there is a high probability that a successful referendum would
foster internal Kurdish divisions, as well as conflict with ethnic groups
living under Kurdish rule. As an example, the governor of Kirkuk, Najmaldin
Karim, who is nominally a member of the PUK, is supporting the referendum which
will be of greater benefit to Masoud Barzani and the KDP than the PDK. After having initially promoted reconciliation
between Kirkuk’s multiple ethnic groups – Kurds, Arabs, Turkmen and Christians,
Karim has ruling in an increasingly sectarian, asserting the rights of the
city’s Kurdish population over other ethnic groups.

Domestic political and economic impact
One of the most important consequences of the KRG referendum if it leads to an
independent state has received little attention. The current president of the Republic of Iraq
is a Kurd, Fuad Masum, who was overwhelming elected by the Chamber of Deputies
(national parliament) in 2014 to succeed Iraq’s previous president, Jalal
Talabani, also a Kurd.

Former Iraqi Foreign Minister
Hoshyar Zebari

Kurds have consistently occupied positions of power
in the Federal Government in Baghdad since the overthrow of Saddam Husayn and
the Bacth Party regime in 2003.
Other Kurds, such as Hoshayr Zebari, who was Minister of Foreign Affairs,
and Barham Salih who served as a Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Planning,
have wielded significant influence in the Federal Government in Baghdad.

Former Iraq Deputy Prime Minister &
KRG Prime Minister Barham Salih

A Kurd, General Babakir Shawkat Zebari, was appointed
Chief of Staff of Iraq’s Armed Forces, serving in that position from 2003-2015.
Many Kurdish delegates serve in the
Chamber of Deputies (national parliament) and Federal Government Ministries.

Iraq's Chief-of-Staff, Babakir Zebari ,meets General Maritn Dempsey

Declaring independence will rupture these positions
of influence in Baghdad and weaken lines of communications between the central
government and Arbil. The new Kurdish
state would be unable to benefit from oil revenues generated throughout Iraq,
only in the more limited areas under its control. Because it is highly doubtful that it could forcibly
integrate the oil-rich city of Kirkuk into the new state, it would lose those
oil revenues as well. Further, it would
face problems transporting oil through pipelines which crossed the territory of
Iraq.

With the serious economic problems which continue to
face the KRG, most importantly the decline in global oil prices and extensive
political corruption, the new Kurdish state would have less access to
international; lenders and credit markets than if it remained within the
Federal Republic of Iraq. With no
appreciable agrarian sector, a result of Saddam’s genocidal ANFAL campaign, the
new Kurdish state will be very much dependent on food imports.

Human resources
With Arab Iraq, Turkey and Iran having made clear their strong opposition to
the upcoming independence referendum, the new Kurdish state will not only be
landlocked, but it’s likely that its neighbors would prevent their citizens
from accepting employment there. This would present a special problem in light
of the KRG’s need for a wide variety professional expertise, ranging from civil
engineers, and computer scientists, to economists and management specialists,
to oil industry professionals.

The KRG’s universities, which all too frequently
give preference to applicants with ties to the KDP and PUK rather than students
with strong academic records, are not producing the level of professional and
technical expertise which is needed to develop the Kurdish economy,
infrastructure, government institutions, and generate meaningful economic
growth. While Western personnel might fill (at a much higher cost) this
deficiency, the new Kurdish state would be cutting itself off from access to
critically needed human resources.

Regional opposition
The strident rhetoric emanating from Turkey and Iran do not bode well for the
Iraqi Kurds declaring an independent state.
Both Turkey and Iran fear the “halo effect” of the Kurds in Iraq declaring
an independent state. Kurds in both Turkey and Iran are restive in the face of
central governments who have done nothing to offer them a place in Turkish or
Iranian political life and society.

Tanks of the Turkish Army on manuevers along Iraq-KRG border this past week

Indeed, this past week, Turkey has been conducting
extensive military maneuvers along the Turkish-KRG (Iraq) border. Meanwhile, clashes between PKK militants
along the Turkish KRG border, and those between PJAK forces and the Iranian
Army along the KRG-Iran border, could escalate if the declaration of
independence moves forward.

International opposition Certainly, the KRG should be concerned that
its main allies, the United States and the European Union, have both come out
against the referendum. Long time US diplomat
in Iraq and Trump administration point man on
Iraq, Brett McGurk, called the referendum, “a very risky process,” with,
“no prospect for international legitimacy,” https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/21/world/middleeast/iraqi-kurds-independence-vote.html?_r=0
. United Nations Secretary-General, António Guterres, likewise
opposes the referendum, saying that it will undermine the joint effort to
defeat the so-called Islamic State.

Out-migration of the Kurdish educated
classes While supportive of the idea of a Kurdish
nation-state, large numbers of educated Kurds argue that the KRG has yet to
develop the democratic infrastructure which would allow the referendum to be a
meaningful exercise.

This point assumes greater salience if we consider
the expectations which the referendum has raised among many Kurds, especially
those who are educated. If corruption is not addressed and the economy doesn’t
improve (and I know university faculty who haven’t received their salaries for
going on 2 years), highly educated and skilled Kurdish youth will leave the new
state for other parts of the MENA region, Europe, North America, Australia and
East Asia. As of now, there is no reason
to believe that an independent Kurdish state in Iraq would become truly
democratic or offer meaningful economic opportunities.

Fighting the Dacish There is every reason to believe that the
referendum will undermine the struggle against terrorism, particularly the Dacish
or so-called Islamic State. The
suspicion which already exists between KRG Pesh Merga and the Iraqi Army will
be amplified and cooperation in the struggle to defeat the Dacish will be
compromised.

Possible solutions I have no doubt that there will be a Kurdish
state in the future. And it is highly probable that it will stretch across an
area larger than the current KRG. If
establishing a Kurdish state in Iraq is not a wise idea at the moment, are
there alternative solutions to the current situation, even if temporary?

I would suggest that Kurds might begin by looking at
the reconciliation which was achieved between French and English speaking
Canadians. Ever since the defeat of the
French in North America during the French and Indian War (1754-63), tensions have
existed between the two communities. Concentrated in the east-central province
of Quebec, the Quebecois have bristled at what they consider English speaking
Canada’s cultural condescension and failure to assist them in benefiting from
the country’s economic progress.

The Parti Québécois has advocated for an independent
Quebec for many years and referenda were held in 1980 and 1985. Each was defeated, although the 1985
referendum only by a narrow margin. In
2006, the Canadian parliament - 265 to 16 - declared that the Québécois were “a nation within
a united Canada.” Today, the province’s official language is French.

"Made in Quybec"

Unlike the Kurdish economy, Quebec’s economy is highly diversified.
Economic reasons were one reason the Québécois chose not to secede from Canada
as many saw secession as delivering a serious blow to the province’s economy. Quebec’s
economy has thrived through remaining part of the Canadian Federation.

At the same time, the Federal Government in Ottawa has taken Quebec’s
culture seriously. Considerable funds are spent protecting and preserving its
French heritage. All official signs
throughout Canada, and not just in French speaking areas, are in English and
French. French speaking university students, who study outside Quebec, can submit
examinations and research papers to be evaluated in French.

If the Federal Government in Iraq would demonstrate the same type of
respect for Kurdish culture, would that be sufficient to begin a dialogue, one
which, after 2003, has yet to begin? Could
a cultural dialogue which would involve a serious effort at national reconciliation?
As an example, most Kurds speak Arabic and many can read and write the
language. However, few Arab Iraqis have studied
and learned Kurdish, even though both are designated as official languages in
the Republic of Iraq.

There are many other examples of efforts by conflicting
groups finding solutions to the problems divide them. Should the Iraqi Kurds “bet the farm” on
Masoud Barzani and the corrupt political elite which continues to exploit the
KRG’s oil wealth? Does the Barzani clan deserve their support?

Or should they attempt to work with progressive
Iraqis in the Federal Government in Baghdad like Prime Minister Hayder al-Abadi
(a Ph.D. in economics from the University of Manchester in the UK), highly respected Iraqi technocrats, and the members of Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani’s office in al-Najaf to
find economic, political and cultural paths to national reconciliation? I would suggest the latter course which would create more synergy and bring greater benefits to all concerned parties than the forthcoming referendum.

About Me

Eric Davis is Executive Director, MA Program in Political Science - Concentration in United Nations and Global Policy Studies, Professor of Political Science and the former director of the Center for Middle Eastern Studies at Rutgers University, New Brunswick, NJ, USA. He is author of CHALLENGING COLONIALISM: BANK MISR AND EGYPTIAN INDUSTRIALIZATION, 1920-1941 (Princeton University Press, 1983; Institute for Arab Development, Beirut, 1986, and Dar al-Sharook, Cairo, 2009); STATECRAFT IN THE MIDDLE EAST: OIL, HISTORICAL MEMORY AND POPULAR CULTURE (University Presses of Florida, 1993); MEMORIES OF STATE: POLITICS, HISTORY AND COLLECTIVE IDENTITY IN MODERN IRAQ (University of California Press, 2005; Arab Institute for Research and Publishing, 2008; and the forthcoming, TAKING DEMOCRACY SERIOUSLY IN IRAQ (Cambridge University Press). Currently, he is writing a book on the Islamic State and the changing modalities of terrorism in the Middle East. He can be contacted at davis@polisci.rutgers.edu and @NewMidEast