Share 13. Pamil vs Teleron

All materials on our website are shared by users. If you have any questions about copyright issues, please report us to resolve them. We are always happy to assist you.

Related Documents

Share

Transcript

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila EN BANC
G.R. No. L-34854 November 20, 1978 FORTUNATO R. PAMIL,
petitioner-appellant, vs.
HONORABLE VICTORINO C. TELERON, as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Bohol, Branch III, and REV. FR. MARGARITO R. GONZAGA,
respondents-appellees.
Urbano H. Lagunay for petitioner. Cristeto O. Cimagala for respondents.
FERNANDO,
J.:
The novel question raised in this
certiorari
proceeding concerns the eligibility of an ecclesiastic to an elective municipal position. Private respondent, Father Margarito R. Gonzaga, was, in 1971, elected to the position of municipal mayor of Alburquerque, Bohol.
1
Therefore, he was duly proclaimed. A suit for
quo warranto
was then filed by petitioner, himself an aspirant for the office, for his disqualification
2
based on this Administrative Code provision: In no case shall there be elected or appointed to a municipal office ecclesiastics, soldiers in active service, persons receiving salaries or compensation from provincial or national funds, or contractors for public works of the municipality.
3
The suit did not prosper, respondent Judge sustaining the right of Father Gonzaga to the office of municipal mayor. He ruled that such statutory ineligibility was impliedly repealed by the Election Code of 1971. The matter was then elevated to this Tribunal by petitioner. It is his contention that there was no such implied repeal, that it is still in full force and effect. Thus was the specific question raised.
There is no clear-cut answer from this Tribunal. After a lengthy and protracted deliberation, the Court is divided on the issue. Seven members of the Court are of the view that the judgment should be affirmed as the challenged provision is no longer operative either because it was superseded by the 1935 Constitution or repealed. Outside of the writer of this opinion, six other Justices are of this mind They are Justices Teehankee, Muñoz Palma Concepcion Jr., Santos, Fernandez, and Guerrero. For them, the overriding principle of the supremacy of the Constitution or, at the very least, the repeal of such provision bars a reversal.
4
The remaining five members of this Court, Chief Justice Castro, Justices Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio, and Aquino, on the other hand, hold the position that such a prohibition against an ecclesiastic running for elective office is not tainted with any constitutional infirmity.
The vote is thus indecisive. While five members of the Court constitute a minority, the vote of the remaining seven does not suffice to render the challenged provision ineffective. Section 2175 of the Revised Administrative Code, as far as ecclesiastics are concerned, must be accorded respect. The presumption of validity calls for its application. Under the circumstances, certiorari lies. That is the conclusion arrived at by the writer of this opinion, joined by Justice Concepcion Jr., Santos, Fernandez, and Guerrero. They have no choice then but to vote for the reversal of the lower court decision and declare ineligible respondent Father Margarito R. Gonzaga for the office of municipal mayor. With the aforesaid five other members, led by the Chief Justice, entertaining no doubt as to his lack of eligibility, this petition for certiorari must be granted. Except for the dispositive part announcing the judgment of the Court, the remainder of this opinion sets forth the reasons why there are constitutional objections to the continuing force and effectivity of Section 2175 as far as ecclesiastics are concerned. 1. The Revised Administrative Code was enacted in 1917. In the 1935 Constitution, as it is now under the present Charter, it is explicitly declared: No religious test shall be required for the exercise of civil or political rights.
5
The principle of the paramount character of the fundamental law 6 thus comes into play. There are previous rulings to that effect.
6
The ban imposed by the Administrative Code cannot survive. So the writer of this opinion would hold.
2. This is to conform to this provision of the 1935 Charter: All laws of the Philippine Islands shall continue in force until the inauguration of the Commonwealth of the Philippines; thereafter, such laws shall remain operative, unless inconsistent with this Constitution, until amended, altered, modified, or repealed by the Congress of the Philippines, and all references in such laws to the government or officials of the Philippines shall be construed, in so far as applicable, to refer to the Government and corresponding officials under this Constitution.
7
It was first applied in
People v. Linsangan
,
8
decided in December, 1935, barely a month after that Constitution took effect. This Court held that Section 2718 of the Revised Administrative Code that would allow the prosecution of a person who remains delinquent in the payment of cedula tax,
9
was no longer in force. As stated by the then Justice, later Chief Justice, Abad Santos, after setting forth that the Constitution prohibits the imprisonment for debt or non-payment of poll tax:
10
It seems too clear to require demonstration that section 2718 of the Revised Administrative Code is inconsistent with section 1, clause 12, of Article Ill of the Constitution in that, while the former authorizes imprisonment for non-payment of the poll or cedula tax, the latter forbids it. It follows that upon the inauguration of the Government of the Commonwealth, said section 2718 of the Revised Administrative Code became inoperative, and no judgment of conviction can be based thereon.
11
De los Santos v. Mallare
12
came next. The President, under the Revised Administrative Code, could remove at pleasure any of the appointive officials under the Charter of the City of Baguio.
13
Relying on such a provision, the then President Quirino removed petitioner De los Santos, who was appointed City Engineer of Baguio on July 16, 1946, and chose in his place respondent Gil R. Mallare. Why such a power could not pass the test of validity under the 1935 Constitution was pointed out by Justice Tuason thus: So, unlike legislation that is passed in defiance of the Constitution, assertive and menacing, the questioned part of section 2545 of the Revised Administrative Code does not need a positive declaration of nullity by the court to put it out of the way. To all intents and purposes, it is non-existent, outlawed and eliminated from the statute book by the Constitution itself by express mandate before the petitioner was appointed.
14
Martinez v. Morfe
,
15
a 1972 decision, is likewise in point. In the light of the cited provision of the 1935 Constitution, as authoritatively construed, Article 145 of the Revised Penal Code was found to be inoperative. As therein provided, the penalty of
prision correccional
is imposed on any public officer or employee who, while the Congress was in regular or special session, would arrest or search a member thereof, except in case he had committed a crime punishable by a penalty higher than
prision mayor
. This Court ruled that the Revised Penal Code extended unduly the legislative privilege of freedom from arrest as ordained in the Constitution.
16
Such a provision then was contrary to and in defiance of the clear expression of the will of the Constitutional Convention of 1934 that such immunity was never intended to exempt members of a legislative body from an arrest for a criminal offense, the phrase treason, felony and breach of the peace being all-inclusive. Reference was likewise made to the prevailing American doctrine to that effect as enunciated by
Williamson v. United States
.
17
3. It would be an unjustified departure from a settled principle of the applicable construction of the provision on what laws remain operative after 1935 if the plea of petitioner in this case were to be heeded. The challenged Administrative Code provision, certainly insofar as it declares ineligible ecclesiastics to any elective or appointive office, is, on its face, inconsistent with the religious freedom guaranteed by the Constitution. To so exclude them is to impose a religious test.
Torcaso v. Watkins
18
an American Supreme Court decision, has persuasive weight. What was there involved was the validity of a provision in the Maryland Constitution prescribing that no religious test ought ever to be required as a disqualification for any office or profit or trust in this State, other than a declaration of belief in the existence of God ... Such a constitutional requirement was assailed as contrary to the First Amendment of the United States Constitution by an appointee to the office of notary public in Maryland, who was refused a commission as he would not declare a belief in God. He failed in the Maryland Court of Appeals but prevailed in the United States Supreme Court, which reversed the state court decision. It could not have been otherwise. As emphatically declared by Justice Black: this Maryland religious test for public office unconstitutionally invades the appellant's freedom of belief and religion and therefore cannot be enforced against him.
19
The analogy appears to be obvious. In that case, it was lack of belief in God that was a disqualification. Here being an ecclesiastic and therefore professing a religious faith suffices to disqualify for a public office. There is thus an incompatibility between the Administrative Code provision relied upon by petitioner and an express constitutional mandate. It is not a valid argument against this conclusion to assert that under the Philippine Autonomy Act of 1916, there was such a prohibition against a religious test, and yet such a ban on holding a municipal position had not been nullified. It suffices to answer that no question was raised as to its validity. In
Vilar v. Paraiso
,
20
decided under the 1935 Constitution, it was assumed that there was no conflict with the fundamental law.
4. This is the first case then where this Court has to face squarely such an issue. This excerpt from the opinion of Justice Moreland in the leading case of
McGirr v. Hamilton
,
21
a 1915 decision, has a force unimpaired by the passage of time: Relative to the theory that Act No. 1627 has stood so long and been silently acquiesced in for so great a length of time that it should not be disturbed, it may be said that the fact that certain individuals have, by ignorance or neglect,
failed to claim their fundamental rights, furnishes no reason why another individual, alert to his rights and their proper enforcement, should be prevented from asserting and sustaining those rights. The fact that Smith and Jones have failed to demand their constitutional rights furnishes no basis for the refusal to consider and uphold the constitutional rights of Richard Roe In the case of
Sadler v. Langham
(34 Ala. 311), this same question was under consideration and the court in resolving it said: 'It may be urged, that these statutes have stood, and been silently acquiesced in for so great a length of time, they should not now be disturbed. We are sensible of the force of this argument. It will be observed, however, that in Tennessee, the decision which declared the private road law unconstitutional was pronounced forty years after the enact. judgment of the statute; and in New York, after seventy years had elapsed. It is, perhaps, never too late to re- establish constitutional rights, the observance of which had been silently neglected.
22
To support such a conclusion, no less than the great Chief Justice Marshall, speaking for this Court in
United States v. More
, in disposing of a contention by one of the parties as to appellate jurisdiction having been previously exercised and therefore beyond dispute was likewise relied upon. Thus: No question was made in that case as to the jurisdiction petition. It passed
sub silentio
, and the court does not consider itself bound by that case.
23
So it should be in this litigation. As set forth at the outset, it is not even necessary to annul the challenged Administrative Code provision. It is merely declared inoperative by virtue of the mandate of the 1935 Constitution, similarly found in the present Charter.
5. Nonetheless, tie above view failed to obtain the necessary eight votes needed to give it binding force. The attack on the continuing effectivity of Section 2175 having failed, it must be, as noted at the outset, given full force and application. WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is granted. The judgment
a quo
is reversed and set aside. Respondent Gonzaga is hereby ordered immediately to vacate the mayoralty of the municipality of Albuquerque, Bohol, there being a failure to elect. No pronouncement as to costs.
Concepcion, Jr., Santos, Fernandez and Guerrero, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions CASTRO,
C.J.,
concurring: While I concur in the result, certain overriding considerations, set forth below, constrain me to dissent from the opinion penned by Justice Fernando as well as the written concurrence of Justice Teehankee and Muñoz Palma.
1.
I reject Justice Teehankee's argument that section 2175 of the Administrative Code
1
has been repealed by section 23 of the Election Code of 1971.
2
Nor can I accept the conclusion reached by Justice Fernando that the said provision of the Administrative Code has been superseded or rendered inoperative by the specific provisions of the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions that forbid the requirement of a religious test for the exercise of civil or political rights.
The thrust of section 23 of the Election Code of 1971 is simple: what is the effect of the filing of certificates of candidacy by appointive, elective and other officials of the government? The said section is therefore of no relevance (except to the extent that it allows members of the Armed Forces to run for elective positions). Upon the other hand, section 2175 of the Administrative Code treats of a disparate matter, which is the absolute disqualification of the classes of persons enumerated therein. Nor does the proscription contained in the said section 2175 prescribe a religious
test
for tile exercise of civil or political rights. I have searchingly analyzed this provision, and I am unable to infer from it any requirement of a religious
test
.
On the complementary question of implied repeal, it is a time-honored cardinal rule of legal hermeneutics that for a later provision of law to be considered as having repealed a prior provision, there must be such absolute repugnance between the two that the prior provision
must
give way. I do not discern any such repugnance.
2.
Since section 2175 of the Administrative Code has not been superseded, and has been neither expressly nor impliedly repealed in so far as the absolute disqualification of ecclesiastics is concerned, it is perforce the controlling law in the case at bar. Careful note must be taken that the absolute disqualification is couched in the most compelling of negative terms. The law reads:
In no case
shall there be
elected
or
appointed
to a municipal office ecclesiastics (emphasis supplied) Should an ecclesiastic be erroneously allowed by this Court to hold a municipal office, through the happenstance of a procedural technicality or by the mischief of circumlocution or otherwise, then the Court would be
particeps criminis
in the negation of the unequivocal and imperious mandate of the law. The law admits of no exception; there can therefore be none. And the Court has no constitutional warrant to legislate thru any manner of exercise in semantics.
3.
I wish to make of record some grave misgiving about allowing ecclesiastics to be elected to governmental offices. Our Lord Jesus Christ preached love, charity, compassion and mercy throughout His earthly existence
—
and these four virtues, to my mind, make up His timeless gospel. Unhappily, however, history has not infrequently been an anguished witness to religious intolerance and persecution by ecclesiastics, whether they were Catholics or Protestants. Adverting to my own personal experience as a practicing Catholic, I still hear, once in a great while, sermons or homilies by Catholic priests, delivered from the pulpit or from the altar, declaring that the Catholic way of life is the way to salvation, thereby inescapably implying (without explicitly stating) that the adherents of other Christian sects and other religious faiths may be damned from birth. It is thus entirely possible that the election of ecclesiastics to municipal offices may spawn small religious wars instead of promote the general community welfare and peace - and these religious wars could conceivably burgeon into internecine dimensions. Where then would we consign Pope John XXIII's ecumenism? Should the majority of the mayoralties of the Philippines be someday occupied by militant Catholic ecclesiastics, is it improbable that the next development will be a determined nationwide campaign by the Catholic Church for the election of ecclesiastics to our national legislative body? And if this eventuality should come, what then of our cherished tradition of separation of Church and State? For my part, with history in perspective, the obvious logical and inevitable consequence is too frightful to contemplate. In my view, all ecclesiastics
—
whoever they are, whatever their faiths, wherever they may be
—
should essentially be pastors, immersing themselves around the clock in the problems of the disadvantaged and the poor. But they cannot be effective pastors if they do not dissociate themselves completely from every and all bane of politics.
TEEHANKEE,
J.,
dissenting: I dissent from the judgment reversing and setting aside respondent judge's appealed resolution of March 4, 1972 which dismissed herein petitioner's petition below of
quo warranto
for disqualification of respondent as the duly elected and qualified mayor of Alburquerque, Bohol in the 1971 elections due to his being allegedly ineligible therefor as an ecclesiastic and instead entering a new judgment ordering him to vacate the said office on the ground of there being a failure to elect.

Thank you for visiting our website and your interest in our free products and services. We are nonprofit website to share and download documents. To the running of this website, we need your help to support us.