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Report to Congressional Requesters:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
March 2010:
Homeland Defense:
DOD Can Enhance Efforts to Identify Capabilities to Support Civil
Authorities during Disasters:
GAO-10-386:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-10-386, a report to congressional requesters.
Why GAO Did This Study:
In addition to its primary mission of warfighting, the Department of
Defense (DOD) plays an important role in civil support. Four years
after the poorly coordinated national response to Hurricane Katrina,
issues remain about DOD’s progress in identifying its capability
requirements for supporting a coordinated civilian-military response
to a catastrophic domestic event. This report addresses the extent to
which DOD (1) has identified and addressed its capability gaps for its
civil support mission; (2) has clearly defined roles,
responsibilities, and relationships and identified appropriate levels
and types of personnel to assign to the FEMA regions; and (3) shares
and tracks information concerning its civil support requirements
response process with civil authorities. To do this, GAO analyzed DOD
civil support guidance and plans and met with DOD and FEMA officials
regarding the support that civilian authorities may request during a
catastrophic incident.
What GAO Found:
DOD has identified capability gaps for its civil support mission by
completing a capabilities-based assessment, but key DOD policies and
guidance for the civil support mission are outdated, limiting DOD’s
ability to fully address capability gaps. DOD’s strategic guidance
requires that it anticipate requests for civil support by identifying
capability gaps. However, inconsistency and misalignment across DOD’s
policies, strategy, and doctrine for civil support make it difficult
for DOD to address capability gaps and pre-position equipment and
supplies. GAO found this was due to outdated key DOD policies and
guidance that do not reflect DOD’s current organizational framework
for providing assistance to civil authorities. If DOD updates key
policies for civil support, it will be better able to address
capability gaps and provide timely and appropriate support to civil
authorities.
DOD has increased its personnel dedicated to coordinate civilian
requests for assistance, but it has not clearly defined their roles,
responsibilities, and relationships, and its staffing is not based
upon a staffing assessment by FEMA region. DOD guidance calls for
coordination with federal and state authorities on military
capabilities for civil support. However, while the Defense
Coordinating Officer program has improved civil authorities’ overall
awareness of DOD’s capabilities, roles, and responsibilities, command
and control and coordination among the Defense Coordinating Officers
and the military services’ liaison officers have been confusing and
sometimes problematic because DOD’s civil support guidance is
outdated. Further, DOD officials noted that staffing of the Defense
Coordinating Officer program should reflect its multiservice
environment and the unique challenges of each FEMA region. Different
FEMA regions are prone to different disasters and have varying needs
for DOD support, but the size and composition of the Defense
Coordinating Officers’ staff—nearly all from the Army—were not based
on a staffing needs assessment. Therefore, they do not necessarily
reflect variations in the support needs of the regions. As a result,
DOD may be missing an opportunity to optimize its ability to provide a
coordinated response to civil authorities with appropriate
multiservice capabilities.
While DOD follows established processes in responding to requests for
assistance from civil authorities, it has not established a system to
track civilian requests that is accessible to DOD’s interagency
partners. The National Response Framework broadly identifies how DOD
responds to requests for assistance, and DOD guidance further
specifies DOD’s processes. However, civil authorities are not fully
aware of the length of this process. While DOD has several different
tracking systems in use by different DOD components for the civil
support mission, it lacks a formal, interoperable, and unclassified
system for tracking all requests for assistance across DOD. Without
such a system, gaps will remain in gaining real-time situational
awareness and maintaining a common operational picture of DOD support
for all federal partners in disaster-response missions including DOD.
What GAO Recommends:
GAO recommends that DOD update its civil support guidance to reflect
current doctrine; clearly define roles, responsibilities, and
relationships for personnel assigned to manage civilian requests for
assistance; conduct a staffing needs assessment for Defense
Coordinating Officers; and establish an official system to track
requests for assistance across DOD that is accessible to DOD’s inter-
agency partners. DOD concurred with our recommendations.
View [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-386] or key
components. For more information, contact Davi M. D'Agostino at (202)
512-5431 or dagostinod@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Contents:
Letter:
Results in Brief:
Background:
DOD Has Taken Actions to Identify Capability Gaps, but Key Policies
and Guidance Are Outdated:
DOD Has Personnel to Coordinate DOD Capabilities for Civil Support,
but Roles, Responsibilities, and Command Relationships Are Not Clearly
Defined, and DOD Has Not Assessed Its Staff Needs:
DOD Has Established Processes to Respond to Civil Authorities, but It
Has Not Established a Comprehensive System to Track Requests-for-
Assistance:
Conclusions:
Recommendations for Executive Action:
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense:
Appendix III: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments:
Tables:
Table 1: Examples of Commands Supporting NORTHCOM and PACOM for
Homeland Defense and Civil Support:
Table 2: Defense Installations and Offices Where GAO Obtained
Documentary Evidence and Officials' Views Pertaining to the Defense
Support of Civil Authorities Mission:
Table 3: Federal Civilian Departments and Agencies Where GAO Obtained
Documentary Evidence and Officials' Views Pertaining to the Defense
Support of Civil Authorities Mission:
Figures:
Figure 1: National Response Framework:
Figure 2: FEMA Regions:
Figure 3: Defense Coordinating Officer and Emergency Preparedness
Liaison Officer Team:
Figure 4: Catastrophic Risk in the United States: Earthquakes and
Hurricanes:
Figure 5: FEMA Regions:
Figure 6: DOD's Internal Process for Responding to Requests-for-
Assistance and FEMA Mission Assignments:
Abbreviations:
CBRNE: chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-yield
explosive:
DCO: Defense Coordinating Officer:
DHS: Department of Homeland Security:
DOD: Department of Defense:
FEMA: Federal Emergency Management Agency:
MA: mission assignment:
NORTHCOM: U.S. Northern Command:
PACOM: U.S. Pacific Command:
RFA: request for assistance:
RFF: request for forces:
Stafford Act: The Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency
Assistance Act:
[End of section]
United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
March 30, 2010:
Congressional Requesters:
The United States continues to face an uncertain, complex security
environment with the potential for natural disasters and terrorist
attacks. After the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, the
Department of Defense (DOD) established the U.S. Northern Command
(NORTHCOM)[Footnote 1] in October 2002 to provide for and manage DOD's
homeland defense and civil support missions in the continental United
States and Alaska.[Footnote 2] The poorly coordinated national
response to Hurricane Katrina in 2005 further highlighted the need for
a more coordinated and integrated civilian and military response to a
major domestic incident. Eight years after the September 11 attacks,
nearly 4 years after Hurricane Katrina, and while engaging in two
major overseas operations, issues remain about DOD's ability to
provide defense support to civil authorities.[Footnote 3]
Specifically, two issues are whether DOD has made progress in
understanding the requirements for DOD capabilities needed to support
civil authorities in the event of catastrophic incidents, as well as
recognizing the capabilities of local, tribal, state, territorial, and
federal civilian authorities--a key component in identifying any DOD
shortfalls or capability gaps.
While DOD is the primary federal agency for homeland defense, it is
not the primary federal agency for civil support; rather, it serves as
a supporting federal agency to the Federal Emergency Management Agency
(FEMA) and other federal civilian agencies in domestic disaster
situations in which local, tribal, state, territorial, and other
federal resources are overwhelmed. As the combatant commands charged
with carrying out DOD's domestic civil support mission, NORTHCOM and
U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM) face a unique challenge in planning for
and coordinating civil support missions, because they must work with
and respond to the needs of 56 separate and often unique state and
territorial governments. Additionally, NORTHCOM and PACOM have to
coordinate with numerous federal agencies that also have roles in
planning for and responding to a wide variety of incidents in the
homeland, as reflected in the National Response Framework.[Footnote 4]
However, DOD operates in support of civil authorities only when
directed to do so by the President or the Secretary of Defense. In
such instances, NORTHCOM (or PACOM) would command only the federal
military[Footnote 5] portion of such operations in direct support of
another federal agency, such as FEMA or the U.S. Secret Service.
[Footnote 6]
Since the establishment of NORTHCOM in 2002, we have periodically
evaluated and reported on issues related to its ability to carry out
its missions.[Footnote 7] Most recently, we evaluated NORTHCOM's
exercise program, identifying the program's strengths as well as gaps
in areas such as planning, coordination with states and interagency
partners, and ways to improve NORTHCOM's participation in the National
Exercise Program.[Footnote 8] We also recently reported on planning,
resourcing, and training challenges for DOD's response to domestic
chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-yield explosive
incidents (CBRNE).[Footnote 9]
While DOD plays an important role in civil support, warfighting
remains its primary mission. Therefore, with the exception of key
specialized capabilities for its CBRNE consequence-management mission,
DOD relies on its "dual-mission forces" to provide all other civil
support capabilities in addition to existing overseas missions.
Additionally, unlike some combatant commands such as European Command,
NORTHCOM has few forces permanently assigned to it; therefore, like
all commands that have few forces assigned to them, NORTHCOM must
request forces from Joint Forces Command, through the Joint Staff, in
order to perform its civil support mission. To plan, prepare for, and
carry out their civil support mission, NORTHCOM and PACOM may rely on
other DOD organizations and commands for assistance.
Both NORTHCOM and PACOM have established, primarily under their
respective Army component commands, Defense Coordinating Officers with
staff known as Defense Coordinating Elements, to serve as DOD
representatives to civilian authorities in the 10 FEMA regions.
[Footnote 10] The Defense Coordinating Officers and Elements are
colocated with the FEMA regional staff and they attend meetings,
planning conferences, exercises, and other activities within their
assigned regions and states. In that way they can develop
relationships with civilian authorities and gain an understanding, or
situational awareness, of civilian capabilities so that DOD will know
what, if anything, it may be called upon to provide in the event of a
disaster or other incident.
You asked us to examine a broad range of planning and operational
considerations related to DOD's and NORTHCOM's homeland defense and
civil support missions. This report addresses the extent to which DOD
(1) has identified and addressed its capability gaps for its civil
support mission; (2) has clearly defined roles, responsibilities, and
relationships and identified appropriate levels and types of personnel
to assign to the FEMA regions; and (3) shares and tracks information
concerning its civil support requirements response process with civil
authorities. As agreed with your offices, this report focuses on DOD's
support of civil authorities for natural disasters. We did not address
issues pertaining to civil support for CBRNE consequence management,
as these issues are addressed in other GAO work.[Footnote 11] We are
reporting separately to you on DOD's interagency coordination efforts
with U.S. federal agencies for its homeland defense and civil support
missions.[Footnote 12]
To address our objectives, we reviewed and analyzed DOD, NORTHCOM, and
PACOM civil support guidance and plans, as well as DOD's March 2009
Homeland Defense and Civil Support Capabilities-Based Assessment. We
met with officials in the Joint Staff, NORTHCOM, PACOM, U.S.
Transportation Command, and their component and supporting commands to
discuss the work and analysis that DOD has conducted in order to
understand what support civilian authorities may ask the department to
provide during a catastrophic incident. Additionally, we met with FEMA
officials at both the national and regional levels to understand how
they work with DOD both in identifying capability gaps during planning
stages and in channeling state and federal requests-for-assistance to
DOD during an actual incident. During our visits to 4 of the 10 FEMA
regions, we met with the Defense Coordinating Officers and Defense
Coordinating Elements in those regions to discuss their roles as DOD's
representatives to FEMA, other civilian authorities, and the National
Guard in their assigned states and regions. We conducted telephone
interviews with all 10 NORTHCOM Defense Coordinating Officers and a
survey with the 2 PACOM Defense Coordinating Officers, which allowed
us to gain a broad picture of DOD's civil support activities across
the country. We used the results of these interviews and surveys, our
meetings with DOD and FEMA officials, and our review of documents and
guidance to identify areas for improvement in DOD's ability to provide
support to and respond to requests-for-assistance from civil
authorities. Additional information on our scope and methodology
appears in appendix I.
We conducted this performance audit from January 2009 to March 2010 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe
that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
Results in Brief:
DOD has identified some capability gaps for its civil support mission
by completing a capabilities-based assessment, but key DOD policies
and guidance for the civil support mission are outdated, inconsistent,
and unclear, which limits DOD's ability to fully identify and address
its capability gaps. A strategic goal for NORTHCOM is to anticipate
requests for civil support and identify capability gaps. NORTHCOM, at
the direction of the Deputy Secretary of Defense, conducted a
capabilities-based assessment for DOD's homeland defense and civil
support missions that led to the identification of 31 DOD capability
gaps for those missions; 10 of these were for civil support missions
related to natural disasters. However, the capabilities-based
assessment also noted inconsistencies and a lack of alignment across
policies, strategy, and doctrinal actions for DOD's civil support
mission, making it difficult to determine DOD's capability
requirements. We found this lack of alignment attributable to the fact
that key DOD policies and guidance for civil support--specifically,
DOD Directives 3025.1, "Military Support to Civil Authorities" (1993);
3025.15, "Military Assistance to Civil Authorities" (1997); and Manual
3025.1-M, "Manual for Civil Emergencies" (1994)--are outdated and do
not reflect the current organizational framework that DOD has created
for providing assistance to civil authorities. For example, the 2008
Unified Command Plan assigns NORTHCOM and PACOM the responsibility for
support to civil authorities within their areas of responsibility,
while DOD directives for civil support, which pre-date the
establishment of NORTHCOM, designate executive agent responsibility
for support to civil authorities to the Department of the Army.
According to the DOD homeland defense and civil support capabilities-
based assessment, DOD strategy and doctrine recognize the department's
civil support mission, but DOD policy prohibits its components from
procuring or maintaining any supplies, materiel, or equipment
exclusively for the civil support mission, unless otherwise authorized
by the Secretary of Defense. According to U.S. Transportation Command
officials, this policy may limit DOD's ability to pre-position forces
and equipment for lifesaving missions, such as aeromedical evacuations
prior to a hurricane making landfall along the coastal United States.
Incomplete DOD policy guidance for its civil support mission may lead
to confusion and misunderstanding among the military services and
other DOD components regarding the proper employment of defense
capabilities in support of civil authorities. We are recommending that
DOD update its guidance for civil support missions to reflect current
doctrine, terminology, funding policy, practices, and DOD's
organizational framework for providing support to civil authorities.
DOD agreed with our recommendation and discussed the steps it was
taking to update its guidance for civil support missions and
identified time frames for completion of the guidance.
While DOD has identified and assigned personnel to coordinate civilian
requests-for-assistance, an important DOD capability for civil
support, DOD has not clearly defined roles, responsibilities, and
command and control relationships for these personnel, nor has it
conducted a formal staffing needs assessment that accounts for
differences across the FEMA regions to which these personnel are
assigned. DOD guidance states that the Defense Coordinating Officer
serves as DOD's single point of contact for coordinating with federal
and state authorities on the use of military capabilities for civil
support. Other DOD guidance, specifically DOD Directive 3025.16,
"Military Emergency Preparedness Liaison Officer (EPLO) Program"
(2000), creates additional military service points of contact, such as
Emergency Preparedness Liaison Officers, for federal and state
coordination with the military services. DOD officials have indicated
that the staffing of the Defense Coordinating Officer program should
reflect the multiservice environment in which the program operates.
Further, FEMA officials told us that DOD's Defense Coordinating
Officer program has improved overall awareness of DOD capabilities for
civil support. However, the ability of the Defense Coordinating
Officers and Emergency Preparedness Liaison Officers to coordinate and
provide DOD capabilities to civil authorities may be limited, because
DOD has not delineated the roles, responsibilities, and command and
control relationships between the Defense Coordinating Officers and
the Emergency Preparedness Liaison Officers. In part, this is due to
the fact that DOD places the multiservice Emergency Preparedness
Liaison Officers under the operational command and control of their
respective services, while the Defense Coordinating Officers are under
the operational command and control of the combatant commands,
NORTHCOM and PACOM. Further, the guidance does not specify how these
command structures are to plan and function together. For example,
these different command structures can lead to inconsistencies between
the Defense Coordinating Officers and Emergency Preparedness Liaison
Officers in their training and equipping requirements, which could
hinder their ability to provide optimal support to civil authorities
during a real-life disaster or event. Further, DOD officials told us
that there is friction and confusion between the military services and
the Defense Coordinating Officers regarding the proper employment of
Emergency Preparedness Liaison Officers for civil support missions.
Moreover, while different FEMA regions are prone to different
disasters and have varying needs for DOD support, the composition of
the Defense Coordinating Officers' staff is not based upon a staffing
needs assessment; they do not reflect variations in the geographic
size and catastrophic disaster profile of the different FEMA regions.
Based upon our interviews, some Defense Coordinating Officers may not
have the appropriate mix of staff to meet the varying needs of the
FEMA regions, potentially limiting DOD's ability to provide an
optimally coordinated response to civil authorities with appropriate
multiservice capabilities. Therefore, we are recommending that, as DOD
updates its key policies and guidance for civil support--such as DOD
Directive 3025.1, "Military Support to Civil Authorities" (1993)--it
should define roles and responsibilities for the personnel involved in
coordinating civilian requests-for-assistance and ensure that the
program's staffing reflects service representation and regional
differences as appropriate. DOD concurred with the recommendation and
discussed the steps it is planning to take in response.
Although DOD uses an established process to respond to requests-for-
assistance from civil authorities, it has not established a system
that both comprehensively tracks civilian requests-for-assistance and
is accessible to DOD's interagency partners. The National Response
Framework broadly calls for DOD and other federal agencies to respond
to requests-for-assistance from state and local civilian authorities,
while DOD's doctrine and guidance specify how the department will
review and respond to these requests. However, as DOD and FEMA
officials told us, civil authorities have misconceptions about time
frames for DOD's process for approving and resourcing civilian
requests-for-assistance. For example, DOD's capabilities-based
assessment for homeland defense and civil support identified the
response timeliness of DOD transportation support--including
aeromedical evacuation--as a capability shortfall. The assessment
noted that although civil authorities have identified a need for DOD
transportation support within 24 hours of a catastrophic incident, DOD
has limited capability to respond sooner than 72 hours. DOD could help
to mitigate this issue by incorporating its internal processes for
responding to requests-for-assistance in the partner guide that we
recommended in a recent report.[Footnote 13] Further, DOD's
information sharing implementation plan recommends the development of
an unclassified information sharing system providing a common
operating picture for all the appropriate authorities in civil support
operations. However, DOD currently lacks a single, comprehensive
system that would accomplish this goal. For instance, NORTHCOM and
PACOM use a Web-based system to track incoming requests-for-
assistance, but only those coming from FEMA and the National
Interagency Fire Center appear in the system, even though other
federal agencies such as the U.S. Secret Service also request
assistance from DOD for disasters or National Special Security Events.
Further, not all DOD entities involved in civil support missions--such
as Joint Forces Command--use the Web-based system because this system
is voluntary and not an official DOD program. Joint Forces Command
uses a classified system that does not interact with the system used
by NORTHCOM and PACOM. Additionally, FEMA and the other lead federal
agencies, such as the U.S. Secret Service, do not have a common
operating picture with DOD because DOD does not share this tracking
system with them. Without the development of a comprehensive,
unclassified system for tracking requests-for-assistance, gaps will
remain in enabling real-time situational awareness and a common
operational picture for all participants involved in disaster-response
missions. We are recommending that DOD establish a formal DOD tracking
system for requests-for-assistance from civil authorities that is
accessible to all of DOD's interagency partners. DOD concurred with
the recommendation and added that it needs access to FEMA's system for
tracking mission assignments to provide the best potential for
insuring accurate situational awareness of requests for DOD assistance.
Background:
Framework for Disaster Response:
To assist in integrating state and federal responses to domestic
emergencies, the Homeland Security Council developed 15 national
planning scenarios in 2004 whose purpose was to form the basis for
identifying the capabilities needed to respond to a wide range of
emergencies. The scenarios focus on the consequences that federal,
state, and local first responders may have to address, and they are
intended to illustrate the scope and magnitude of large-scale,
catastrophic emergencies for which the nation needs to be prepared.
These include a wide range of terrorist attacks involving nuclear,
biological, and chemical agents, as well as catastrophic natural
disasters, such as an earthquake or hurricane. The Department of
Homeland Security (DHS), which was established in 2002[Footnote 14]
to, among other purposes, reduce America's vulnerability to terrorism,
is the lead federal agency responsible for preventing, preparing for,
and responding to a wide range of major domestic disasters and other
emergencies. Then-President George W. Bush designated DHS and its
Secretary as the lead federal representative responsible for domestic
incident management and coordination of all-hazards preparedness. In
2008, DHS issued its National Response Framework, which provides a
framework for federal, state, and local agencies to use in planning
for emergencies and establishes standardized doctrine, terminology,
processes, and an integrated system for federal response activities.
Overall coordination of federal incident-management activities, other
than those conducted for homeland defense, is generally the
responsibility of DHS. Within DHS and as the executive agent for the
National Preparedness System,[Footnote 15] FEMA is responsible for
coordinating and integrating the preparedness of federal, state,
local, tribal, and nongovernmental entities.
Response to disasters or other catastrophic events in the United
States is guided by the National Response Framework and is based on a
tiered response to an incident; that is, incidents must be managed at
the lowest jurisdictional levels and supported by additional response
capabilities as needed (see figure 1). Local and county governments
respond to emergencies daily using their own resources and rely on
mutual aid agreements and other types of assistance agreements with
neighboring governments when they need additional resources. For
example, county and local authorities are likely to have the resources
needed to adequately respond to a small-scale incident, such as a
local flood, and therefore will not request additional resources. For
larger-scale incidents, when resources are overwhelmed, local and
county governments will request assistance from the state. States have
capabilities, such as the National Guard,[Footnote 16] that can help
communities respond and recover. If additional resources are required,
the state may request assistance from other states through interstate
mutual aid agreements, such as the Emergency Management Assistance
Compact.[Footnote 17] If an incident surpasses community and state
capabilities, the governor can seek federal assistance. The federal
government has a wide array of capabilities and resources that can be
made available to assist state and local agencies to respond to
incidents.
Figure 1: National Response Framework:
[Refer to PDF for image: illustration]
Incident:
First level responders:
Local resources are exhausted.
Second level responders:
State resources are exhausted (including the National Guard);
Governor requests assistance and a Presidential Declaration is issued.
Third level responders:
FEMA.
Fourth level responders:
Emergency Support Function/Primary federal agency resources are
exhausted.
Fifth level responders:
FEMA requests DOD assistance. First mission assignment is generally to
activate the Defense Coordinating Officer & staff.
Source: DOD.
[End of figure]
In accordance with the National Response Framework and applicable laws
including the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency
Assistance Act (Stafford Act)[Footnote 18] various federal departments
or agencies may play primary, coordinating, or supporting roles, based
on their authorities and resources and the nature of the threat or
incident. In some instances, national defense assets may be needed to
assist FEMA or another agency in the national response to an incident.
Defense resources are committed following approval by the Secretary of
Defense or at the direction of the President.
Military Mission and Organization:
One of DOD's missions is civil support, which includes domestic
disaster relief operations for incidents such as fires, hurricanes,
floods, earthquakes, National Special Security Events (for example,
the opening of the United Nations General Assembly, or the Democratic
and Republican National Conventions), counterdrug operations, and
consequence management for CBRNE events.[Footnote 19] As noted
earlier, DOD is not the primary federal agency for such missions
(unless so designated by the President) and thus it provides defense
support of civil authorities only when (1) state, local, and other
federal resources are overwhelmed or unique military capabilities are
required; (2) assistance is requested by the primary federal agency;
and (3) either NORTHCOM or PACOM, the two combatant commands with
responsibility for civil support missions, is directed to do so by the
President or the Secretary of Defense.[Footnote 20] When deciding to
commit defense resources, among other factors, defense officials
consider military readiness, appropriateness of the circumstances, and
whether the response is in accordance with the law.[Footnote 21] For
example, the Posse Comitatus Act[Footnote 22] allows military forces
to provide civil support, but these forces generally cannot become
directly involved in law enforcement. When they are called upon to
support civil authorities, NORTHCOM and PACOM generally operate
through established joint task forces that are subordinate to the
command. In most cases, support will be localized, limited, and
specific. When the scope of the disaster is reduced to the point where
the primary federal agency can again assume full control and
management without military assistance, NORTHCOM and PACOM will exit.
DOD established the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Homeland Defense and Americas' Security Affairs to oversee homeland
defense and civil support activities for DOD, under the authority of
the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, and, as appropriate, in
coordination with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. This
office develops policies, conducts analysis, provides advice, and
makes recommendations on homeland defense, defense support of civil
authorities, emergency preparedness, and domestic crisis-management
matters within the department. The Assistant Secretary assists the
Secretary of Defense in providing policy directions to NORTHCOM and
other applicable combatant commands to guide the development and
execution of homeland defense plans and activities. This direction is
provided through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. This
office is also responsible for coordinating with DHS. While most of
the National Guard's roles and responsibilities in the disaster-
response area are not federal ones, the Chief of the National Guard
Bureau is a principal advisor to the Secretary of Defense on matters
involving nonfederalized National Guard forces.[Footnote 23] In this
role, the National Guard Bureau provides NORTHCOM, PACOM, and other
DOD organizations with information on National Guard capabilities
available in the states for disaster response so that DOD can better
anticipate what, if any, additional capabilities it may be asked to
provide.
The process whereby DOD provides capabilities to assist civil
authorities has changed over the past 5 years. In 2004, a series of
four hurricanes struck Florida, and DOD received a large number of
civil requests-for-assistance that all had to be approved by the
Secretary of Defense. DOD and others concluded that the process was
time-consuming and complicated. To streamline the process, the Joint
Staff developed operational guidance for DOD commands--referred to as
an Execute Order[Footnote 24]--modeled after the Execute Order for
Operation Noble Eagle, the North American Aerospace Defense Command's
activities to defend American skies begun in response to the September
11, 2001, terrorist attacks. A standing Defense Support of Civil
Authorities Execute Order has been several times, but an important
purpose has been to pre-identify forces that NORTHCOM and PACOM can
request from the Secretary of Defense in the event of a disaster. The
Execute Order places DOD capabilities into four categories. Category 1
comprises capabilities assigned to the combatant command (that is, the
Defense Coordinating Officer and staff, service component command
staff, command and control personnel, and communication capabilities).
Category 2 comprises pre-identified capabilities, such as helicopters
for rapid area assessments, C-130 aircraft that can refuel
helicopters, and capabilities for search and rescue, that NORTHCOM and
PACOM can place on 24-hour prepare-to-deploy status after notifying
the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretary of Defense. Category 3
comprises capabilities for DOD use (for example, combat camera, or
public affairs). Category 4 comprises large-scale response forces
(rarely used except for large-scale disasters such as Hurricane
Katrina).
Finally, local installation and unit commanders have the authority to
respond to localized events as requested by local civilian
authorities. These responses, conducted under immediate response
authority, do not normally exceed 72 hours and require notification of
the relevant service commands as well as the Secretary of Defense.
Additionally, local installations may establish mutual aid agreements
for things such as fire and ambulance support with the communities
surrounding their installations. NORTHCOM and PACOM are not involved
in either of these responses. However, depending on the nature of the
local incident, including possibility of media involvement, NORTHCOM
and PACOM may receive a spot report[Footnote 25] regarding the local
incident as part of the process of informing DOD senior leadership.
Combatant Commands:
NORTHCOM is the unified military command responsible for planning,
organizing, and executing DOD's homeland defense and federal military
support to civil authorities' missions within the continental United
States, Alaska, and U.S. territorial waters. PACOM has these
responsibilities for the Hawaiian Islands and U.S. territories in the
Pacific. Both combatant commands receive support from a variety of
commands and organizations in their direct chain of command and
throughout DOD. Table 1 shows examples of these commands.
Table 1: Examples of Commands Supporting NORTHCOM and PACOM for
Homeland Defense and Civil Support:
Subordinate commands:
NORTHCOM:
Joint Task Force, Alaska;
Joint Force Headquarters National Capital Region;
PACOM:
Joint Task Force, Homeland Defense.
Component commands:
NORTHCOM:
U.S. Army North;
Air Forces North;
U.S. Marine Forces North;
PACOM:
U.S. Army Pacific;
U.S. Pacific Fleet;
U.S. Marine Forces Pacific;
U.S. Pacific Air Forces.
Supporting commands:
U.S. Fleet Forces Command;
U.S. Joint Forces Command;
U.S. Transportation Command.
Source: DOD.
[End of table]
DOD Civil Support Personnel:
As part of the lessons learned from Hurricane Katrina, NORTHCOM has
placed a Defense Coordinating Officer with associated support staff,
known as the Defense Coordinating Element, in each of FEMA's 10
regional offices, placing greater emphasis on the Defense Coordinating
Officers' mission. Figure 2 shows the 10 FEMA regions. Prior to
October 1, 2006, the Defense Coordinating Officers had full-time jobs
commanding training units for the First and Fifth Continental U.S.
Armies. The Defense Coordinating Officers, along with their 40-person
training staff, served part-time as Defense Coordinating Officers and
only did so when requested by FEMA or another federal agency. Upon
establishment of Fifth U.S. Army as the Army component to NORTHCOM, 10
full-time regional Defense Coordinating Officers were established and
located in the FEMA regional offices. Defense Coordinating Officers
are senior-level military officers (typically Army colonels) with
joint experience and training on the National Response Framework,
defense support of civil authorities, and DHS's National Incident
Management System. They are responsible for assisting the primary
federal agency when requested by FEMA; they provide liaison support
and requirements validation; and they serve as single points of
contact for state, local, and other federal authorities that need DOD
support. Defense Coordinating Officers work closely with federal,
state, and local officials to determine what unique DOD capabilities
can be used to assist in mitigating the effects of a natural or man-
made disaster. Since FEMA region IX is split between NORTHCOM and
PACOM, NORTHCOM has a Defense Coordinating Officer assigned to the
FEMA regional office in California and PACOM has established two
Defense Coordinating Officers within its area of operations.
Currently, there is a Navy civilian Defense Coordinating Officer for
Guam and the Northern Mariana Islands and a part-time, Army Reserve
Defense Coordinating Officer for Hawaii and American Samoa.[Footnote
26]
Figure 2: FEMA Regions:
[Refer to PDF for image: map of the U.S.]
Depicted on the map are the geographical boundaries of the ten FEMA
regions, as well as the following regional headquarters:
Region 1: Boston, Massachusetts;
Region 2: New York, New York;
Region 3: Philadelphia, Pennsylvania;
Region 4: Atlanta, Georgia;
Region 5: Chicago, Illinois;
Region 6: Denton, Texas;
Region 7: Kanas City, Kansas;
Region 8: Denver, Colorado;
Region 9: Oakland, California;
Region 10: Seattle, Washington.
National Office: Washington, DC.
Sources: FEMA; Map Resources (maps).
[End of figure]
Additionally, the military services have Emergency Preparedness
Liaison Officers. These are senior Reserve officers (typically
colonels or Navy captains) from the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine
Corps who represent the federal military in each of the 10 FEMA
regional offices and in the states and territories.[Footnote 27] While
they have some service-specific responsibilities, Emergency
Preparedness Liaison Officers' civil support responsibilities include
assisting the Defense Coordinating Officers with service subject-
matter expertise and coordinating the provision of military personnel,
equipment, and supplies to support the emergency relief and cleanup
efforts of civil authorities.
DOD Has Taken Actions to Identify Capability Gaps, but Key Policies
and Guidance Are Outdated:
NORTHCOM Led a Capabilities-Based Assessment That Identified DOD
Capability Gaps for the Homeland Defense and Civil Support Missions:
DOD planning documents for its civil support mission require that DOD
maintain continuous situational awareness of its civil support
operating environment by identifying shortfalls in capabilities,
planning, exercising, and coordinating DOD efforts with its
interagency partners. Further, in its Vision 2020 statement, NORTHCOM
identifies a strategic goal of providing timely and effective civil
support by anticipating requests for support and providing military
capabilities at the right place and the right time.[Footnote 28]
Accordingly, at the direction of the Deputy Secretary of Defense and
in response to a request from the Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Homeland Defense and Americas' Security Affairs, NORTHCOM agreed to
lead a department-wide, capabilities-based assessment for DOD's
homeland defense and civil support missions. The strategic goals of
the effort were to enable improvement in DOD homeland defense and
civil support policy, evaluate existing DOD capabilities and identify
DOD capability gaps, improve DOD's integration with interagency
mission partners, and recommend further action to promote future
capability development for the homeland defense and civil support
missions. The Deputy Secretary of Defense identified the capabilities-
based assessment as one of DOD's top 25 transformational priorities to
be completed or advanced to a major milestone by December 2008. DOD
conducted the assessment between September 2007 and October 2008 in
accordance with DOD processes.[Footnote 29] DOD agencies, the
combatant commands, the military services, the National Guard Bureau,
DHS, and other key federal interagency partners participated in the
assessment. The assessment did not include participants from state and
local governments.
The recently completed capabilities-based assessment identified 31
capability gaps for DOD's homeland defense and civil support missions.
The 31 capability gaps were derived from an initial identification of
2,192 capabilities, tasks, and statements of required activity that
define and describe the homeland defense and civil support missions.
According to our analysis, the assessment identified 14 capability
gaps related to the civil support mission, 4 of which are CBRNE or law
enforcement related, and 17 gaps related to the homeland defense
mission or mission assurance function.[Footnote 30] The 10 civil
support gaps related to natural disasters[Footnote 31] were:
* Common Operational Picture,
* Operational Intelligence Analysis and Dissemination,
* Information Management and Sharing,
* DOD Interagency Planning,
* DOD Interagency Operations,
* DOD Transportation Support,
* Mass Care Support,
* Assured Access to Electromagnetic Spectrum,
* Logistical Health Medical Support, and:
* Isolation and Quarantine Support.
The capabilities-based assessment was limited in that (1) the nature
of its assumptions may have hidden other capability gaps and (2) DOD
has not received precise information from civil authorities on the
capabilities it will be asked to provide. First, one of the strategic
assumptions guiding the capabilities-based assessment is that DOD will
provide a total force (combined active and reserve component) response
to support civil authorities for domestic emergencies and other
activities as directed. However, as we have reported in prior work and
raised as a matter for congressional consideration,[Footnote 32] DOD
has no legal authority to order Reserve personnel to involuntary
active duty service for the purpose of providing civil support in the
response to a natural disaster,[Footnote 33] which may limit DOD's
ability to provide the capabilities requested by civil authorities in
a timely manner. For example, according to U.S. Transportation Command
officials, this lack of authority has made it difficult to access the
personnel it needs to perform its civil support operations, especially
since about 88 percent of DOD's capabilities for aeromedical
evacuation operations are assigned to the reserve component. U.S.
Transportation Command officials said they have been able to rely on
volunteers from the service Reserves to meet their civil support
requirements thus far, but they noted that, in the event of multiple
disaster requirements that overwhelm state capabilities, U.S.
Transportation Command might not be able to provide the capabilities
requested due to the lack of authority to order service Reservists to
active duty service to respond to disasters. DOD officials we
interviewed told us that the department has advocated a change to this
legislative status, but that the states have opposed the change due to
issues involving state sovereignty.
Second, while the assessment provided a general discussion of the
civil support capability shortfalls it identified, it concluded that a
precise scope of many of these shortfalls could not be determined
because several strategic policy questions remained unanswered. There
is a lack of interagency understanding and agreement on the extent of
capabilities requested by civil authorities that DOD is expected to
provide, and on how quickly DOD is expected to provide them. For
example, Emergency Support Function #8: Public Health and Medical
Services Annex to the National Response Framework, requests that DOD
provide support for evacuating seriously ill or injured patients, but
it does not provide specifics on the amount of capabilities that DOD
should provide, or the timeliness of DOD's response for providing
these capabilities. We previously reported that NORTHCOM has
difficulty identifying requirements for capabilities it may need in
part because NORTHCOM does not have more detailed information from DHS
and the states on the specific requirements needed from the military
in the event of a disaster.[Footnote 34] For DOD's civil support
mission, the requirements are established by the needs of the federal,
state, and local agencies and organizations that DOD would be
supporting in an actual event. In January 2008, the Commission on the
National Guard and Reserves noted that DHS had not defined the
requirements that DOD must meet to adequately perform its civil
support mission.[Footnote 35] Several DOD officials we spoke with said
that one of the biggest challenges in providing defense support of
civil authorities is that civil authorities have not yet defined the
capability requirements that DOD might be requested to provide in the
event of a disaster. FEMA is responsible for establishing a
comprehensive system to assess the nation's prevention capabilities
and overall preparedness. However, our prior work has shown that FEMA
faces methodological and coordination challenges in completing the
system and issuing required reports on national preparedness.[Footnote
36]
DOD and DHS have undertaken some recent initiatives to address gaps in
strategic planning that should assist DOD in identifying its
capability requirements for the civil support mission. For example,
during the course of our work, DOD and DHS were implementing the
Integrated Planning System,[Footnote 37] which includes a process for
fostering integration of federal, state, local, and tribal plans that
allows for state, local, and tribal capability assessments to feed
into federal plans. In conjunction with officials from federal, state,
and local government as well as the private sector, DOD and DHS
recently issued catastrophic plans for responding to and recovering
from a category 4 hurricane in Hawaii. These plans were developed in
accordance with the Integrated Planning System. DOD and FEMA officials
in Hawaii with whom we spoke said that this was an important milestone
because it represented the first time that DOD's capability
requirements had been identified and formally agreed to by interagency
stakeholders. As another example, DHS has also established a Task
Force for Emergency Readiness pilot initiative that seeks to integrate
federal and state planning efforts for catastrophic events. Five
states are currently participating in the initiative, and officials
from the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland
Defense and Americas' Security Affairs told us that the initiative
should assist the states in identifying their capability requirements
for catastrophic events, which in turn should assist DOD in
determining the capabilities it may be asked to provide. As a third
example, the National Guard Bureau recently completed an assessment of
National Guard capabilities for domestic missions by conducting a
series of regional war games. A major goal of the effort was to
identify National Guard capability gaps and provide recommendations on
how to address these gaps.
Key Policies and Guidance for DOD's Civil Support Mission Are
Outdated, Inconsistent, and Unclear:
DOD Policies Are Outdated:
DOD's capabilities-based assessment highlighted a lack of alignment
across DOD's policies, strategy, and doctrine for its civil support
mission, making it difficult to determine DOD's capability
requirements. We determined that this is due, in part, to outdated key
policy directives. In many cases, DOD's policy guidance does not
reflect widely accepted terminology or the organizational structure
that DOD has developed for providing assistance to civil authorities.
For example, DOD Directive 3025.1, "Military Support to Civil
Authorities," which defines disaster response and outlines the
responsibilities of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Unified Commands, and
other DOD components and military services that respond to a civil
emergency, was issued in January 1993--almost 10 years prior to the
establishment of NORTHCOM. DOD's implementing guidance for this
directive, 3025.1-M, "Manual for Civil Emergencies," was issued in
1994 and DOD Directive 3025.15, "Military Assistance to Civil
Authorities," which establishes DOD policy for evaluating requests for
disaster assistance, was issued in February 1997. This guidance
further states that the Department of the Army is the DOD executive
agent for military support to civil authorities, and is responsible
for developing planning guidance, plans, and procedures on behalf of
the Secretary of Defense. Since NORTHCOM's creation, the 2008 Unified
Command Plan and the Forces for Unified Command Memorandum state that
both NORTHCOM and PACOM, through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, are responsible for providing support to civil authorities
within their areas of responsibility.
Moreover, a 2009 DOD directive, DOD Directive 5111.13, established the
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Americas'
Security Affairs as the principal advisor to the Secretary of Defense
for DOD's civil support mission. The DOD policy directives are not
aligned with DOD and national-level guidance in that they use outdated
terminology. For example, the 1993 and 1997 DOD directives use the
terms "military support" and "military assistance" to describe the
types of support DOD provides to civil authorities, but DOD currently
uses the term "defense support of civil authorities." The latter term
has been widely accepted by the defense community and is part of
current strategy, doctrine, and plans, including the Strategy for
Homeland Defense and Civil Support, as well as interagency documents,
such as the National Response Framework. DOD is considering a new
draft directive for defense support of civil authorities that will
supersede the old policy directives and provide overarching policy
guidance for its civil support mission. However, the draft directive
has been under review for about 4 years and has yet to be finalized.
According to officials from the Office of the Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Homeland Defense and Americas' Security Affairs, the draft
directive has taken longer to finalize than expected because of the
evolving nature of DOD's civil support mission. These officials noted
that defense support of civil authorities has been difficult to define
because DOD's civil support mission has shifted from a military
service-centric to a more unified, joint effort, as exemplified by the
establishment of NORTHCOM.
DOD Policies Are Inconsistent and Unclear:
The military services' implementing guidance for DOD's civil support
mission, DOD 3025.1-M, is based on the DOD directives that were issued
in 1993 and 1997, but DOD joint doctrine and planning documents
reference the draft DOD directive. While DOD recognizes that there are
circumstances in which new doctrine would influence policy, the normal
progression is for policy to drive doctrine and thereby influence
training and the conduct of operations. Thus, we note that incomplete
DOD policy guidance for its civil support mission may lead to
confusion and misunderstanding among the military services and other
DOD components regarding the proper employment of defense capabilities
in support of civil authorities.
One of the chief examples of the confusion caused by DOD's outdated
policies and their lack of alignment with other published documents is
the disparate perceptions of the components as to the importance of
the civil support mission. According to the DOD homeland defense and
civil support capabilities-based assessment, DOD strategy and joint
doctrine recognize the department's civil support mission, but DOD
policy prohibits the DOD components from procuring or maintaining any
supplies, materiel, or equipment exclusively for their civil support
mission, unless otherwise directed by the Secretary of Defense.
[Footnote 38] The capabilities-based assessment noted that some DOD
components have interpreted this policy statement to signify that DOD
does not program or budget for civil support capabilities. We found
this view was prevalent among DOD officials we interviewed, even
though DOD policy does not preclude DOD agencies from programming and
budgeting for civil support capabilities--rather, it requires that
they obtain direction from the Secretary of Defense to do so.[Footnote
39] Further, strategy and joint guidance also do not provide clarity
about funding and priority of the civil support mission. The DOD
Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support states that DOD will
maintain capabilities to assist civil authorities in responding to
catastrophic incidents. However, while the strategy implies that DOD
will program and budget for capabilities for responding to
catastrophic incidents, it does not directly state this for the civil
support mission. Additionally, Joint Publication 3-28, Civil Support,
recognizes civil support as a DOD mission but states that civil
support capabilities are derived from DOD warfighting capabilities
that could be applied to domestic assistance and law enforcement
support.
The capabilities-based assessment concluded that lack of alignment
across a range of policy, strategy, and doctrinal actions have made it
difficult to develop and implement coherent recommendations regarding
capabilities for DOD's civil support mission.[Footnote 40] According
to NORTHCOM and U.S. Transportation Command officials, these
inconsistencies in policy, strategy, and doctrine and in DOD
officials' interpretation of them may limit DOD's ability to pre-
position forces and equipment for life-saving missions, such as
aeromedical evacuations prior to a hurricane making landfall along the
coastal United States. These officials cited the importance of pre-
positioning forces, because aeromedical and patient evacuation
operations are to be concluded no later than 18 hours before a major
hurricane's landfall. They said that it is difficult for DOD to spend
money to alert the personnel who are needed to perform these missions.
According to U.S. Transportation Command officials, DOD and FEMA have
agreed on a prescripted mission assignment that would provide DOD with
an estimated $986,388 in "surge" funding for these operations.
However, U.S. Transportation Command officials said that additional
funds are still needed to alert personnel and pre-position forces, and
thereby ensure that they can perform the life-saving mission
successfully.
We also found that DOD has not fully exercised available funding
authorities to support its civil support operations. Congress has
established a Defense Emergency Response Fund to reimburse DOD for
providing disaster or emergency assistance to other federal agencies
and to state and local governments in anticipation of reimbursable
requests. However, a June 2008 report from the DOD Inspector General
found that DOD had not used any funds from this account for domestic
disaster or emergency relief assistance since it was established in
November 1989.[Footnote 41] An official from DOD's Office of the
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Americas'
Security Affairs acknowledged that the Defense Emergency Response Fund
could be a source of funding but did not know why the fund has not
been used for civil support operations.
DOD Has Personnel to Coordinate DOD Capabilities for Civil Support,
but Roles, Responsibilities, and Command Relationships Are Not Clearly
Defined, and DOD Has Not Assessed Its Staff Needs:
Defense Coordinating Officers and Emergency Preparedness Liaison
Officers Constitute Important DOD Capabilities for Civil Support:
DOD guidance and the National Response Framework state that the
Defense Coordinating Officer, when requested by civil authorities and
approved by DOD, serves as the single point of contact for DOD at the
FEMA regions, and is responsible for coordinating with federal and
state authorities on the use of military capabilities for defense
support of civil authorities. DOD Directive 3025.1 (1993), and the
implementing guidance for this directive, 3025.1-M, "Manual for Civil
Emergencies" (1994), define the roles and responsibilities of the
Defense Coordinating Officers. According to this guidance, Defense
Coordinating Officer responsibilities require knowledge of military
capabilities and of how to access military assets to support validated
requirements.
As of 2006, DOD permanently assigned 10 full-time Defense Coordinating
Officers, along with a full-time supporting staff known as the Defense
Coordinating Element, to each FEMA region,[Footnote 42] and colocated
all of them with the FEMA regional headquarters. FEMA officials we
interviewed said that these actions have greatly improved coordination
among DOD, FEMA, and other civil authorities; previously, they said,
their understanding of DOD capabilities was limited because they had
only infrequent contact with the Defense Coordinating Officers. These
FEMA officials said that the Defense Coordinating Officers and Defense
Coordinating Elements, especially the Defense Coordinating Element's
planners, have improved civilian authorities' awareness of DOD's
capabilities by providing disaster planning expertise to civil
authorities and by routinely participating in disaster exercises,
planning conferences, and workshops throughout the FEMA regions. For
example, they said, Defense Coordinating Officers have especially
improved FEMA's awareness of DOD's logistical capabilities by
informing FEMA about DOD installations and bases, located throughout
the FEMA regions, that could be used as staging areas to pre-position
commodities and supplies. Defense Coordinating Officers and Defense
Coordinating Elements told us that having a full-time presence in the
FEMA regions has allowed them to build effective relationships and
establish trust with civil authorities. According to NORTHCOM
officials, the Defense Coordinating Officers are a key means of
gaining insight into civil authorities' capabilities, thus assisting
NORTHCOM in better anticipating civil support requirements.
The military services' Emergency Preparedness Liaison Officers assist
the Defense Coordinating Officers in executing their civil support
responsibilities. DOD Directive 3025.16, "Military Emergency
Preparedness Liaison Officer (EPLO) Program" (2000), establishes DOD
policy for the management of the Emergency Preparedness Liaison
Officer program and creates additional points of contact within the
military services for federal and state coordination of resources for
emergency response. This policy directive states that the military
services are responsible for ensuring that Emergency Preparedness
Liaison Officers are trained and equipped to meet the requirements of
DOD's civil support mission. Additionally, DOD's 3025.1-M, "Manual for
Civil Emergencies," establishes doctrinal procedures necessary for
implementation of the Emergency Preparedness Liaison Officer program
to provide civil support under DOD Directive 3025.1. It provides for
the establishment of Emergency Preparedness Liaison Officer teams at
the FEMA regions and states, and it defines the roles and
responsibilities of the Emergency Preparedness Liaison Officers.
Defense Coordinating Officers told us that the Emergency Preparedness
Liaison Officers play a critical role in assisting them in day-to-day
operations; in exercises that are designed to simulate a real-life
disaster; and in disasters. For example, the Emergency Preparedness
Liaison Officers routinely provide situational awareness at both the
state and FEMA regional levels by participating in meetings, planning
workshops, and conferences; by establishing relationships with federal
and state disaster-management officials, including the National Guard;
and by reviewing state and federal agency disaster plans. Several of
the Defense Coordinating Officers told us that the Emergency
Preparedness Liaison Officers are their key source of information on
state capabilities. During exercises and actual disasters, the
Emergency Preparedness Liaison Officers will deploy to the State Joint
Force Headquarters,[Footnote 43] state emergency operation centers,
Joint Field Offices,[Footnote 44] or FEMA's Regional Response
Coordination Centers and assist the Defense Coordinating Officer in
validating requests-for-assistance. They provide the Defense
Coordinating Officer with expertise on the capabilities that are
available from their respective military services, and they serve as
liaisons between the Defense Coordinating Officer and their military
services, the federal agencies responsible for the Emergency Support
Function activities,[Footnote 45] state emergency management
officials, and National Guard officials. Almost all of the Defense
Coordinating Officers indicated to us that the Emergency Preparedness
Liaison Officers were important to a great or moderate extent for
gaining knowledge of gaps in state disaster capabilities.
DOD Has Not Clearly Defined Roles, Responsibilities, or Command and
Control Relationships for DOD's Civil Support Coordination Personnel:
DOD has not updated or clearly defined the roles and responsibilities
of the Defense Coordinating Officers and Emergency Preparedness
Liaison Officers that it has assigned to the FEMA regions, due to gaps
in policy and guidance for its civil support mission. As we have
previously stated, DOD has not updated its key policies and guidance
for the civil support mission, namely DOD Directive 3025.1 (1993), or
the implementing guidance for this directive, 3025.1-M, "Manual for
Civil Emergencies." This guidance continues to define the roles and
responsibilities of the Defense Coordinating Officers and Emergency
Preparedness Liaison Officers, even though significant changes have
occurred in DOD's command responsibilities and organizational
structure for executing its civil support mission. Most notably,
NORTHCOM and PACOM now have the responsibility for executing the civil
support mission within their areas of responsibility, something not
accounted for in the earlier guidance. Furthermore, DOD Directive
3025.16, DOD's guidance for the Emergency Preparedness Liaison Officer
program, has not been updated since 2000--about 2 years prior to the
establishment of NORTHCOM.
Since DOD has permanently assigned the Defense Coordinating Officers
to the FEMA regions, their roles and responsibilities for the civil
support mission have expanded, yet the existing guidance does not
reflect their additional responsibilities. For example, DOD guidance
defines the roles and responsibilities of the Defense Coordinating
Officers only after they have been activated--even though Defense
Coordinating Officers perform many activities prior to being
activated, in an effort to assist NORTHCOM in anticipating civil
support requirements. These activities may include establishing
liaison among military, state, and other federal agencies;
coordinating with service officials regarding the potential use of
military service installations and bases for civil support operations;
participating in federal, regional, state, and local disaster
exercises, planning workshops, and conferences; and providing disaster
planning expertise to civil authorities. In addition, according to a
Defense Coordinating Officer we interviewed, the Defense Coordinating
Officers will routinely provide assistance to civil authorities prior
to being officially activated when it appears that a disaster
declaration may be imminent.
Command and Control Challenges:
Further, DOD lacks guidance on how the Defense Coordinating Officers
are to work with the Emergency Preparedness Liaison Officers for the
civil support mission. DOD's Joint Staff Defense Support of Civil
Authorities Standing Execute Order identifies the Emergency
Preparedness Liaison Officers as military service assets that may be
activated by the military service Secretaries in response to a
disaster. It also states that the Defense Coordinating Officer has
tactical control of the Emergency Preparedness Liaison Officers
requested by NORTHCOM. According to a NORTHCOM official, this
operational framework is improvised as needed, and has not been
included in any other DOD guidance. The command relationship between
Defense Coordinating Officers and Emergency Preparedness Liaison
Officers is therefore not clearly understood throughout the DOD
organizations responsible for planning and executing civil support
missions.
These gaps in guidance that we have identified may limit the ability
of the Defense Coordinating Officers and Emergency Preparedness
Liaison Officers to fully and effectively coordinate and provide DOD
capabilities to civil authorities. For example, according to several
Defense Coordinating Officers we interviewed, service officials, and a
DOD Inspector General September 2008 report,[Footnote 46] in some
instances the military services have not been willing to activate
their Emergency Preparedness Liaison Officers to participate in
training and exercises with the Defense Coordinating Officers.
Further, some military service officials told us that their Emergency
Preparedness Liaison Officers are required to meet training and
exercise requirements established by their military services, and
these requirements can sometimes conflict with the training and
exercise requirements identified by the Defense Coordinating Officers.
DOD officials also told us that there has been friction and confusion
between the military services and the Defense Coordinating Officers
regarding the proper employment of the Emergency Preparedness Liaison
Officers. For example, military service officials told us that Defense
Coordinating Officers have attempted to exert command and control over
their military service Emergency Preparedness Liaison Officers before
they were officially activated. Although Defense Coordinating Officers
and NORTHCOM officials said that the Defense Coordinating Officer and
Emergency Preparedness Liaison Officer relationship has been generally
cooperative, they noted that Emergency Preparedness Liaison Officers
on occasion have not provided assistance when requested by the Defense
Coordinating Officers. DOD officials told us that the command and
control relationship between the Defense Coordinating Officers--who
are nearly all Army personnel[Footnote 47]--and the Army's Emergency
Preparedness Liaison Officers is clearer, resulting in less friction.
This is because the Army has delegated operational control over the
Army Emergency Preparedness Liaison Officers to the Defense
Coordinating Officers on a day-to-day basis. However, the other
military services have not done so; prior to activation for an event
or exercise, the Defense Coordinating Officers have only coordinating
relationships with the Emergency Preparedness Liaison Officers from
the other services. Figure 3 shows an organizational chart of the
Defense Coordinating Officer and Emergency Preparedness Liaison
Officer team.
Figure 3: Defense Coordinating Officer and Emergency Preparedness
Liaison Officer Team:
[Refer to PDF for image: Organization chart]
Top level: Defense Coordinating Officer (Army colonel).
Second level, reporting to Defense Coordinating Officer: Deputy
Defense Coordinating Officer (Army lieutenant colonel).
Third level, reporting to Deputy Defense Coordinating Officer:
* Operations and planning staff[A] (4) (Army major, Army sergeant
first class, Department of Army civilians);
* Communications staff (2) (Army sergeant first class, Army sergeant);
* Supply and logistics officer (Army staff sergeant).
Defense Coordinating Officer has operational control over the
following:
* Army Regional Emergency Preparedness Liaison Officers[B] (Army
colonel);
* Army State Emergency Preparedness Liaison Officers[B] (Army colonel).
Defense Coordinating Officer works in coordination with:
* Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps Regional Emergency Preparedness
Liaison Officers[B] (Air Force colonel, Navy captain, Marine Corps
colonel);
* Air Force and Navy State Emergency Preparedness Liaison Officers[B]
(Air Force colonel, Navy captain).
Source: DOD.
[A] In May 2009, Army North allocated additional planning staff to
four Defense Coordinating Elements. Regions III and IV each received
one military planner, Region II received a military planner for Puerto
Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands, and Region X received two military
planners--one for Alaska and one for the National Interagency Fire
Center, which is located in its region. In fiscal year 2010, the PACOM
Defense Coordinating Officer for Hawaii became permanently assigned
and currently has six full-time staff positions in its Defense
Coordinating Element. A PACOM official told us that the command plans
to increase this number to eight to accommodate the workload and to
reflect the staffing changes NORTHCOM made.
[B] Regional Emergency Preparedness Liaison Officers represent their
service at the FEMA regional headquarters, where they serve as a
liaison with the Defense Coordinating Officer and Element, FEMA
regional staff, and other federal regional organizations and agencies.
According to NORTHCOM, there are at least two Regional Emergency
Preparedness Liaison Officers from each service in each of the 10 FEMA
regions. State Emergency Preparedness Liaison Officers represent their
service at the state level, usually at the state National Guard's
Joint Force Headquarters, where they serve as a liaison with state
organizations and agencies as well as the Defense Coordinating Officer
and Element. According to military service officials we interviewed,
the Air Force, Army, and Navy generally have at least one State
Emergency Preparedness Liaison Officer in each state, while the Marine
Corps does not have State Emergency Preparedness Liaison Officers.
[End of figure]
The command and control and coordination challenges we have described
exist because the Emergency Preparedness Liaison Officers are under
the operational command and control of their respective military
services, while the Defense Coordinating Officers remain under the
operational command and control of the combatant commands--NORTHCOM
and PACOM. A 2008 report by the DOD Inspector General highlighted
inefficiencies regarding coordination in DOD disaster training and
exercises due, in part, to a lack of Emergency Preparedness Liaison
Officer participation, and recommended that NORTHCOM determine whether
the DOD 3025 series of directives provides adequate authority to
Defense Coordinating Officers to ensure that DOD maintains an
adequately trained and exercised Emergency Preparedness Liaison
Officer program.[Footnote 48] In recognition of their critical role in
planning, coordinating, and executing DOD's civil support mission,
NORTHCOM has attempted to establish standard requirements for the
Emergency Preparedness Liaison Officers in the following seven general
areas: organization and structure; roles and responsibilities;
qualification, selection, and administration; equipping and
resourcing; training and professional development; operations and
command and control; and reporting. However, the military services
have opposed this NORTHCOM initiative, on the grounds that their
Emergency Preparedness Liaison Officers have additional duties to
their respective services aside from assisting the Defense
Coordinating Officers. NORTHCOM officials maintain their view that,
because of the lack of consistency in the military services' training
and equipment requirements for their Emergency Preparedness Liaison
Officers, it cannot be determined whether these personnel are
adequately trained and equipped to perform the civil support mission.
Without updated and clear guidance on the roles and responsibilities
of the Defense Coordinating Officers and the Emergency Preparedness
Liaison Officers, friction and confusion between DOD commands and the
services is likely to continue and potentially hamper the
effectiveness of DOD's civil support mission planning and preparedness.
Staff Composition of the Defense Coordinating Officer Program Is Not
Based on a Staffing Needs Assessment:
The size and composition of the Defense Coordinating Officer program
is not based on a staffing needs assessment and therefore does not
necessarily reflect the unique characteristics or disaster needs of
the several FEMA regions. Disasters such as hurricanes, wildfires, and
flooding occur in some regions more often than others. For instance,
in 3 fiscal years of 2007 through 2009 there were only five disaster
declarations throughout FEMA Region III, while there were 97 disaster
declarations in Region VI. These events in Region VI represented
nearly 25 percent of all disaster declarations nationwide for those 3
years. Figures 4 and 5 illustrate the combined relative risk of
earthquakes and hurricanes across the United States. As figures 4 and
5 show, different FEMA regions are prone to different disasters, with
some regions facing greater risk of catastrophic disasters than
others; therefore they may require different levels of personnel and
types of expertise from DOD both in preparing for and responding to
natural disasters. For example, one of the Defense Coordinating
Officers told us that he could use more specialists, particularly in
logistics and aviation.
Figure 4: Catastrophic Risk in the United States: Earthquakes and
Hurricanes:
[Refer to PDF for image: U.S. map]
Map indicates ares of catastrophic risk in six gradients, from high to
low.
Source: Risk Management Solutions.
[End of figure]
Figure 5: FEMA Regions:
[Refer to PDF for image: map of the U.S.]
Depicted on the map are the geographical boundaries of the ten FEMA
regions, as well as the following regional headquarters:
Region 1: Boston, Massachusetts;
Region 2: New York, New York;
Region 3: Philadelphia, Pennsylvania;
Region 4: Atlanta, Georgia;
Region 5: Chicago, Illinois;
Region 6: Denton, Texas;
Region 7: Kanas City, Kansas;
Region 8: Denver, Colorado;
Region 9: Oakland, California;
Region 10: Seattle, Washington.
National Office: Washington, DC.
Sources: FEMA; Map Resources (maps).
[End of figure]
Although DOD recognizes that its civil support mission requires a
joint effort from all the military services, its Defense Coordinating
Officer program continues to be staffed only by Army personnel, except
for PACOM's Navy Defense Coordinating Officer in Guam. Several DOD
officials told us that the Defense Coordinating Officer program should
be more reflective of the multiservice environment in which it
operates. However, as we have noted above, there is a lack of DOD
guidance that delineates the roles and responsibilities of the Defense
Coordinating Officers prior to their activation, including how they
are to coordinate with the military services' Emergency Preparedness
Liaison Officers with emergency preparedness activities. A September
2008 DOD Inspector General report found that NORTHCOM has not obtained
an equal and adequate level of effort from all the military services
to jointly establish the Defense Coordinating Officer program, and
recommended that the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff develop an
implementation plan to migrate the staffing of Defense Coordinating
Officer positions from the Army to all the military services and other
DOD components, as appropriate. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff concurred with the recommendation, and the Joint Chiefs plan to
implement actions to address the recommendation by fiscal year 2010.
[Footnote 49] A NORTHCOM official acknowledged to us that a jointly
staffed Defense Coordinating Officer program would be a good idea, and
said that NORTHCOM has discussed the proposal with the military
services. The DOD Homeland Defense and Civil Support Joint Operating
Concept states that civil support operations are inherently joint
endeavors, and that changes in DOD concepts, policies, authorities,
and organizations may be required to ensure an effective and
integrated DOD response.
Although DOD has improved its support of civil authorities through
improvements in the Defense Coordinating Officer program, its
outdated, inconsistent, and unclear guidance on roles,
responsibilities, and command and control relationships; and lack of a
staffing needs assessment increase the risk that DOD may not be
appropriately staffed to meet the varying needs of the FEMA regions,
thus potentially limiting its ability to provide an optimally
coordinated response to civil authorities with appropriate
multiservice capabilities.
DOD Has Established Processes to Respond to Civil Authorities, but It
Has Not Established a Comprehensive System to Track Requests-for-
Assistance:
DOD Has Established Processes to Respond to Civil Authorities:
The National Response Framework broadly calls for DOD and other
federal agencies to respond to requests-for-assistance from state and
local civilian authorities, and DOD follows an internal process to
respond to these requests-for-assistance when both state and other
federal civilian resources have been exhausted or are unavailable. How
DOD handles these requests-for-assistance depends on various factors,
such as whether the request is a Stafford Act or non-Stafford Act
request; how much time has elapsed since the incident occurred; and
the identity of the originator of the request. DOD's Joint Publication
3-28, Civil Support, lays out the department's internal process for
reviewing and sourcing--that is, providing military resources--for
requests-for-assistance from other federal agencies.
The process by which the requests-for-assistance are conducted is
complex. The primary federal agency--usually FEMA, working in
conjunction with the Defense Coordinating Officer and Defense
Coordinating Element--will initiate the request-for-assistance. To
validate the request, according to Joint Publication 3-28, the Defense
Coordinating Officer should ensure that it is readily understandable
and clearly describes the requirement or capability that is needed. If
the Defense Coordinating Officer finds that the request-for-assistance
calls for a specific asset rather than a capability, the response
process will be lengthened as the officer and staff coordinate with
the requesting agency to revise the request language. Further, the
Defense Coordinating Officer/Element must evaluate all requests based
on the six criteria established in DOD's Joint Publication 3-28, which
are applied at all levels of DOD review. These criteria are as follows:
* Cost: Who pays, and what is the effect on the DOD budget?
* Appropriateness: Is the requested mission in the interest of DOD to
conduct? Who normally performs this mission, and who may be better
suited to fill the request?
* Readiness: How does the request affect DOD's primary warfighting
mission?
* Risk: Does it place DOD's forces in harm's way?
* Legality: Is the request in compliance with laws and Presidential
directives?
* Lethality: Is the potential use of force by or against DOD forces
expected?
The internal DOD request-for-assistance review and sourcing process is
presented below in figure 6. This process takes place after local,
state, and federal capabilities are exhausted or otherwise unavailable
as shown in the National Response Framework in figure 1.
Figure 6: DOD's Internal Process for Responding to Requests-for-
Assistance and FEMA Mission Assignments:
[Refer to PDF for image: illustration]
Incident:
The National Response Framework: Local response; State response
(National Guard) Federal response (FEMA).
Request process to FEMA.
Mission assignment/request for assistance to Defense Coordinating
Officer.
Request process to NORTHCOM.
Lead federal agency (DHS, Department of Transportation, Secret
Service, etc.) makes request for assistance to Secretary of Defense.
NORTHCOM makes request for assistance and request for forces to Joint
Chiefs of Staff, Joint Director of Military Support.
NORTHCOM works in coordination with:
* Support Force provider (Joint Forces Command, PACOM, and/or U.S.
Transportation Command);
* Supporting services;
* Supporting agencies;
* Supporting components (e.g. Army North, Fleet Forces Command);
all of which are staffed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Director
of Military Support.
Source: DOD.
[End of figure]
After the Defense Coordinating Officer validates the request-for-
assistance, it is simultaneously forwarded, along with the Defense
Coordinating Officer's recommendation for action, to NORTHCOM's
Operations Center. The Joint Directors of Military Support at the
Joint Staff is copied on the request so it can initiate parallel
coordination and planning efforts. At this point, NORTHCOM then
coordinates with the appropriate supporting service commands, force
provider, the National Guard Bureau, or any other federal or DOD
stakeholder, depending on the nature of the incident and the requested
capability. Once NORTHCOM reviews and approves the request, it goes to
the Joint Directors for Military Support for approval before being
sent up to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Americas' Security
Affairs for policy review. Finally, the request-for-assistance is
forwarded to the Secretary of Defense for his approval. Upon approval
by the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Directors of Military Support
will issue an Execute Order to designate a command structure and to
task the appropriate commands, services, and DOD agencies to provide
support.
NORTHCOM and DOD have developed two methods to expedite the request-
for-assistance review and sourcing process.
* First, NORTHCOM has worked with FEMA and DOD officials to develop
prescripted mission assignments, which are descriptions of a set of
the capabilities civil authorities might need from DOD. The
prescripted mission assignments are developed so as to provide a
common understanding of a capability, and they also serve as a
template for drafting mission assignments. Most of the Defense
Coordinating Officers told us that they use the prescripted mission
assignments to a great extent to execute their civil support mission.
For example, several of the Defense Coordinating Officers found the
prescripted mission assignments useful for outlining cost information
or language as they prepared to write mission assignments. However,
one Defense Coordinating Officer said their usefulness for expediting
requests-for-assistance is limited, because the requests still have to
go through the regular process.
* Second, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have developed the Defense Support
of Civil Authorities Standing Execute Order, which pre-identifies
forces that a supported combatant commander may use based upon
historical requests for DOD assistance. Many of the Defense
Coordinating Officers said this order is an important piece of
guidance, because it identifies the DOD capabilities that are most
readily available to assist civil authorities during an event.
However, if the requested item is not listed in the Execute Order, the
request must be channeled through the standard internal DOD request-
for-assistance process, so it will take longer. According to DOD
officials, in some emergency cases, DOD allows for the immediate
activation of certain assets on vocal orders from the Secretary of
Defense, with the regular process to be performed later.
Civil Authorities Are Not Fully Aware of DOD's Processes for
Responding to Requests-for-Assistance:
While DOD has developed a process to respond to requests-for-
assistance and has published portions of a description of its internal
process as part of an annex to the National Response Framework, the
lead civilian authorities may not be fully aware of the details or
length of this process. For example, service and Defense Coordinating
Element officials told us that their biggest challenge is responding
to incidents when civil authorities request assistance too late for
DOD to respond due to unrealistic expectations about DOD response
times. An official at NORTHCOM concurred, saying that the only
situations in which NORTHCOM cannot respond are those for which the
request comes too late. Further, FEMA's Liaison Officer to NORTHCOM
acknowledged that FEMA officials do not recognize how lengthy the DOD
review and sourcing process is. According to several service and
Defense Coordinating Element officials, civil authorities have the
perception that DOD can respond immediately to a request; they do not
realize that it takes time to identify, activate, and deploy military
units in response to a request-for-assistance. This perception can be
especially dangerous when aeromedical evacuation[Footnote 50] of
patients is needed in advance of a hurricane's landfall. These
patients have special medical needs, and a crew of specially trained
nurses and physicians must be assembled to care for them. A U.S.
Transportation Command official told us that requests for aeromedical
evacuation assistance must be made early, as it takes at least 72
hours to activate the personnel with the skills needed to execute this
mission. Further, this official stated that these crews can safely
operate no later than 18 hours before a hurricane makes landfall.
DOD's capabilities-based assessment for homeland defense and civil
support identified the response timeliness of DOD transportation
support--including aeromedical evacuation--as a capability shortfall.
The assessment noted that although civil authorities have identified a
need for DOD transportation support within 24 hours of a catastrophic
incident, DOD has limited capability to respond sooner than 72 hours
after the incident. A NORTHCOM official suggested that educating state
decision makers (i.e. governors and state emergency management
officials) about DOD's response times and processes may help expedite
their disaster declaration process so that NORTHCOM can respond before
it is too late to do so. Without shared, comprehensive guidance
outlining DOD's internal review and sourcing process, state and
federal decision makers may overestimate the speed of DOD's response
and therefore not request assistance in a timely manner. DOD could
help to mitigate this issue by incorporating its internal processes
for responding to requests-for-assistance in the partner guide that we
recommended in a recent report.[Footnote 51] Doing so would provide
DOD's interagency partners with information on the complexity of its
internal review and sourcing process for civilian requests-for-
assistance.
DOD Lacks a Comprehensive and Formal System That Tracks All Civilian
Requests-for-Assistance:
While DOD has developed a Web-based system to track incoming requests-
for-assistance from civilian authorities, this system is not
comprehensive and is not accessible to all of DOD's interagency
partners. During Hurricane Katrina, DOD was unable to efficiently
manage or track a large number of requests-for-assistance. Following
Hurricane Katrina, U.S. Army North developed the DOD Defense Support
of Civil Authorities Automated Support System (the tracking system) to
monitor the approval, sourcing, cost, and progress of requests-for-
assistance from FEMA. NORTHCOM approved the tracking system in March
2007.
According to a 2008 DOD Inspector General Report, the tracking system
should enable DOD users to monitor the approval, sourcing, and
progress of civilian requests-for-assistance. Some Defense
Coordinating Officers, Defense Coordinating Elements, and service
officials agree about the need for a tracking system, and others
recognize benefits provided by the current system. However, we have
identified gaps in the tracking system's ability to maintain a common
operational picture and provide real-time situational awareness.
Furthermore, the current system is not an official DOD program to
track civilian requests-for-assistance. Its use is voluntary; there
are no requirements mandating that requests-for-assistance and
associated information be entered into the system. DOD officials
indicated to us that the system is available to all DOD components and
interagency partners who request and are granted access.
While PACOM and NORTHCOM have agreed to use the system and they
require their components to use it, the DOD force providers--Joint
Forces Command and its components (such as Air Combat Command and
Marine Forces Command)--are not utilizing the sourcing section of the
system. Instead, Joint Forces Command and its components use
classified systems, like Global Force Management and the Joint
Capability Requirements Manager, to resource their civil support
requirements. Those systems are not compatible with the unclassified
tracking system. When asked about the DOD Defense Support of Civil
Authorities Automated Support System, officials at Air Combat Command
told us that they were unaware of its existence. Additionally, service
and Defense Coordinating Element officials noted that information is
not always entered into the system accurately, thus limiting the
system's utility. Further, a Defense Coordinating Officer told us that
the architects of the current system did not ask civil support
stakeholders what they thought should be included in a request-for-
assistance tracking system.
During the course of our audit work, we found that other DOD
information technology systems have the potential to enhance
situational awareness and provide a common operating picture for both
DOD and the civilian authorities it is assisting. For example, Air
Force North has developed the unclassified Defense Support for Civil
Authorities Collaboration Suite for its Emergency Preparedness Liaison
Officers. While this Air Force system can perform all of the same
functions as the current unclassified tracking system, it ties in
additional features to provide a single information collaboration
system, such as a section noting available capabilities at each Base
Support Installation; all state emergency management points of
contact; anticipated requests-for-assistance based upon lessons
learned and historical requests; a Google Earth section that maps
weather and the locations of Air Force bases; and a section showing
"shared situational awareness," including threat assessments and
continuous updates of current operations. Similarly, PACOM's Joint
Task Force-Homeland Defense has leveraged the All Hazards Decision
Support System, an unclassified system developed by the Pacific
Disaster Center. This system uses geospatial mapping and modeling
capabilities to identify locations and critical areas of vulnerability
for potential disasters. In addition, the Pacific Disaster Center's
system provides a common operating picture by allowing
interoperability among agencies, and it is accessible to all
stakeholders in the disaster-management community.
Further, despite recommendations in the April 2009 DOD Information
Sharing Implementation Plan regarding the establishment of
authentication and access standards across unclassified systems to
allow DOD and its external mission partners to achieve an appropriate
level of access to information concerning civil support operations,
the DOD Defense Support of Civil Authorities Automated Support System
does not provide a common operating picture for DOD and the lead
civilian agencies. That is because the system is an internal NORTHCOM
system and not a DOD-wide program, and attempts to link the system
with those in other agencies, such as FEMA, have been unsuccessful in
terms of interoperability. Therefore, FEMA and the other lead federal
agencies, such as the U.S. Secret Service, do not necessarily have
visibility into the system. According to FEMA officials, that lack of
visibility constitutes a major shortfall in FEMA's ability to see the
status of its requests.
Finally, although there should be situational awareness among DOD and
its interagency partners, DOD has acknowledged in its homeland defense
and civil support capabilities-based assessment that such situational
awareness is lacking. DOD's Defense Support of Civil Authorities
Automated Support System is not comprehensive; it includes only those
requests-for-assistance issued to DOD by FEMA and the National
Interagency Fire Center.[Footnote 52] The system does not include all
requests issued by the other federal agencies that have lead roles in
specific cases. For example, the DOD Defense Support of Civil
Authorities Automated Support System did not include requests-for-
assistance from the U.S. Secret Service--the lead agency for pre-
planned National Special Security Events[Footnote 53]--for the annual
United Nations General Assembly, the 2008 Presidential Nominating
Conventions, or the 2009 G-20 Summit. In September 2009, DOD was
tasked to provide air support, bomb detection, search and rescue, and
medical assistance to support the Secret Service for the G-20 Summit
held in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. However, the current tracking system
contained no record of this request.
Without a comprehensive, unclassified system that tracks requests-for-
assistance from, and is shared with, all of DOD's interagency
partners, gaps will remain in gaining real-time situational awareness
and in maintaining a common operational picture of DOD's assistance
for all participants involved in disaster-response missions.
Conclusions:
DOD, through both NORTHCOM and PACOM, has taken concrete steps to
develop and enhance its defense support of civil authorities mission
in such ways as conducting an assessment of the DOD capabilities
needed to assist civil authorities and designating full-time personnel
to coordinate with federal, state, territorial, tribal, and local
civil authorities. These efforts improve DOD's overall ability to
assist federal, state, and local authorities in the shared
responsibility of responding to natural disasters in the United
States. But this improvement has been limited by outdated and
inconsistent DOD policies, guidance, and doctrine pertaining to the
civil support mission. Unless and until these issues are addressed,
challenges will remain in the ability of DOD commands and personnel,
specifically the Defense Coordinating Officers and their staffs, to
provide the support requested by civil authorities during disasters.
Without clear roles, responsibilities, effective command and control
structures, shared guidance, and an assessment of DOD staffing needs
in the FEMA regions, DOD will be missing an opportunity to further
enhance its ability to support civil authorities with the kind of
coordinated and integrated civilian and military response to disasters
that is intended by the National Response Framework. While DOD can
address policy and guidance issues, there are obstacles over which it
has no control, such as a statutory restriction on DOD's authority to
order Reserve personnel to involuntary active duty service for
catastrophic disaster relief, which we raised as matter for
congressional consideration in 1993 and again in 2006.[Footnote 54] We
continue to believe that this statutory restriction impedes DOD's
ability to respond to and assist civilians during catastrophic natural
disasters. To some degree, DOD will always face challenges and risks
in this mission area because it has to be prepared for a wide variety
of incidents that can range from a regional flood to a catastrophic
tsunami or hurricane, while maintaining focus on its warfighting
mission. However, DOD can make further improvements to mitigate these
challenges and facilitate and strengthen its relationships with
federal, state, territorial, tribal, and local civil authorities.
Recommendations for Executive Action:
To improve DOD's ability to conduct its civil support missions, we
recommend that the Secretary of Defense take the following five
actions:
* Direct the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and
Americas' Security Affairs to update DOD policy and guidance for civil
support (i.e., DOD directive and instruction 3025 series) to reflect
current doctrine, terminology, funding policy, practices, and DOD's
organizational framework for providing civil support, to include
clarifying NORTHCOM and PACOM roles and responsibilities for civil
support missions; and establish time frames for completion.
* Direct the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and
Americas' Security Affairs, in coordination with the Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, to:
- clarify roles and responsibilities, including command and control
relationships for the Defense Coordinating Officers, Defense
Coordinating Elements, and Emergency Preparedness Liaison Officers;
- identify the extent to which NORTHCOM and PACOM should set training
and equipping requirements for the Defense Coordinating Officers,
Defense Coordinating Elements, and Emergency Preparedness Liaison
Officers; and:
- conduct a review of staffing requirements for the Defense
Coordinating Officers, Defense Coordinating Elements, and Emergency
Preparedness Liaison Officers in both the NORTHCOM and PACOM areas of
responsibility that includes but is not limited to an assessment of
staff size, subject-matter expertise, and military service composition
by FEMA region.
* Direct the Joint Staff in coordination with the Assistant Secretary
of Defense for Networks and Information Integration/Chief Information
Officer to identify and establish an official, DOD-wide, unclassified
tracking system for all incoming requests-for-assistance from federal
agencies regarding civil support missions. This system should at a
minimum include:
- requirements and guidance to ensure that the system is comprehensive
and captures request-for-assistance data that can be used to
anticipate civil support requirements;
- access for FEMA and other lead federal agencies, to provide them
with real-time situational awareness; and:
- time frames for the system's development and implementation.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
In comments on a draft of this report, DOD agreed with our
recommendations and discussed some of the steps it is taking and
planning to take to address these recommendations. DOD also provided
technical comments, which we have incorporated into the report where
appropriate. DHS and FEMA did not provide comments on this report.
In response to our recommendation that DOD clarify roles and
responsibilities, including command and control relationships, and
identify the extent to which NORTHCOM and PACOM should set training
and equipping requirements for the Defense Coordinating Officers,
Defense Coordinating Elements, and Emergency Preparedness Liaison
Officers, DOD said that new guidance is in coordination to describe
roles and responsibilities for DOD entities for homeland defense and
civil support. Further, DOD said that NORTHCOM is reviewing the
staffing, training, and equipment requirements for the Defense
Coordinating Elements in each FEMA region. However, it was unclear
from DOD's comments whether and how the Emergency Preparedness Liaison
Officers' roles, responsibilities, training and equipment requirements
will be addressed in the new issuance or in the NORTHCOM review. We
continue to believe the inclusion of the Emergency Preparedness
Liaison Officers in these efforts is important to enhance DOD's
ability to support civil authorities with the kind of coordinated and
integrated civilian and military response to disasters that is
intended by the National Response Framework.
As arranged with your offices, unless you publicly announce its
contents earlier, we plan no further distribution of this report until
30 days after its date. At that time, we will send copies to the
appropriate congressional committees, the Secretary of Defense, the
Secretary of Homeland Security, and other interested parties. In
addition, the report will be available at no charge on GAO's Web site
at [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov].
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please
contact me at (202) 512-5431 or dagostinod@gao.gov. Contacts points
for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be
found on the last page of this report. Key contributors to this report
are listed in appendix III.
Signed by:
Davi M. D'Agostino:
Director, Defense Capabilities and Management:
List of Requesters:
The Honorable Joseph I. Lieberman:
Chairman:
The Honorable Susan M. Collins:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson:
Chairman:
Committee on Homeland Security:
House of Representatives:
The Honorable Loretta Sanchez:
Chairwoman:
The Honorable Jeff Miller:
Ranking Member:
Subcommittee on Terrorism, Unconventional Threats and Capabilities:
Committee on Armed Services:
House of Representatives:
The Honorable Christopher S. Bond:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Patrick J. Leahy:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Adam Smith:
House of Representatives:
[End of section]
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
To address the extent to which the Department of Defense (DOD) (1) has
identified and addressed its capability gaps for its civil support
mission, (2) has clearly defined roles, responsibilities, and
relationships and identified appropriate levels and types of personnel
to assign to the FEMA regions, and (3) shares and tracks information
concerning its civil support requirements response process with civil
authorities, we reviewed and analyzed available DOD, U.S. Northern
Command (NORTHCOM), and U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM) civil support
guidance and 4 of the 20 civil support operational plans, as well as
DOD's March 2009 Homeland Defense and Civil Support Capabilities-Based
Assessment.
To address all of our objectives, we compared the DOD civil support
guidance and policies currently in place to the relevant DOD doctrine,
which, when compared with anecdotal evidence provided by DOD and
civilian officials, allowed us to identify the various policy and
guidance issues raised in the report and their associated operational
effects. To examine the extent to which DOD has identified and
addressed its civil support capability gaps, we reviewed DOD's March
2009 Homeland Defense and Civil Support Capabilities-Based Assessment
and held discussions with NORTHCOM and other DOD officials about how
the assessment was conducted, how NORTHCOM identified relevant
capabilities, and how NORTHCOM and DOD plan to use the assessment in
the future.
We met with knowledgeable officials across a range of DOD offices and
commands, as illustrated in table 2. At these meetings, we held
discussions about the work and analysis that DOD has conducted in
order to understand what forms of support civilian authorities may ask
the department to provide during a catastrophic incident. We also held
discussions with these officials about the policies and guidance that
exist to provide structure to DOD's civil support mission set.
Further, officials in these offices provided us with information on
the day-to-day roles and responsibilities that are a part of the civil
support mission as they work to prepare to support civil authorities
with a wide range of potential disasters.
Table 2: Defense Installations and Offices Where GAO Obtained
Documentary Evidence and Officials' Views Pertaining to the Defense
Support of Civil Authorities Mission:
Organization: DOD Headquarters:
Installation or office: Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland
Defense and Americas' Security Affairs, Arlington, Virginia.
Installation or office: Office of Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Reserve Affairs, Arlington, Virginia.
Installation or office: Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of
Defense for Readiness, Arlington, Virginia.
Installation or office: Office of the Director, Cost Assessment and
Program Evaluation (CAPE), Arlington, Virginia.
Installation or office: Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Director of
Military Support, Arlington, Virginia.
Installation or office: Joint Chiefs of Staff, Strategic Plans and
Policy Directorate, Arlington, Virginia.
Installation or office: Joint Chiefs of Staff, Force Structure,
Resources, and Assessment Directorate, Arlington, Virginia.
Installation or office: Office of the Inspector General, Arlington,
Virginia.
Organization: U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM):
Installation or office: Headquarters, Petersen Air Force Base,
Colorado Springs, Colorado.
Installation or office: U.S. Army North, Fort Sam Houston, San
Antonio, Texas.
Installation or office: Marine Forces Northern Command, New Orleans,
Louisiana.
Installation or office: Air Force North, Tyndall Air Force Base,
Panama City, Florida.
Installation or office: Defense Coordinating Officer, FEMA Region III,
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.
Installation or office: Defense Coordinating Officer, FEMA Region IV,
Atlanta, Georgia.
Installation or office: Defense Coordinating Officer, FEMA Region VII,
Kansas City, Missouri.
Installation or office: Defense Coordinating Officer, FEMA Region IX,
Oakland, California.
Organization: U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM):
Installation or office: Headquarters, Camp H.M. Smith, Hawaii.
Installation or office: U.S. Army Pacific, Fort Shafter, Hawaii.
Installation or office: Joint Task Force-Homeland Defense, Fort
Shafter, Hawaii.
Installation or office: U.S. Navy Pacific Fleet, Pearl Harbor, Hawaii.
Installation or office: Marine Forces Pacific, Camp H.M. Smith, Hawaii.
Installation or office: Pacific Air Forces, Hickam Air Force Base,
Hawaii.
Installation or office: Defense Coordinating Officer, Hawaii and
American Samoa, Fort Shafter, Hawaii.
Installation or office: Defense Coordinating Officer, Andersen Air
Force Base, Guam.
Organization: U.S. Joint Forces Command:
Installation or office: Headquarters, Norfolk Naval Station, Virginia.
Organization: U.S. Transportation Command:
Installation or office: Headquarters, Scott Air Force Base, Illinois.
Installation or office: Air Mobility Command, Scott Air Force Base,
Illinois.
Installation or office: Military Sealift Command, U.S. Navy Yard,
Washington, District of Columbia.
Organization: National Guard Bureau:
Installation or office: Headquarters, Arlington, Virginia.
Organization: U.S. Army:
Installation or office: Office of Assistant Secretary of the Army for
Manpower and Reserve Affairs, Arlington, Virginia.
Installation or office: Headquarters, Department of the Army, Deputy
Chief of Staff G-3/5/7, Arlington, Virginia.
Installation or office: Army Medical Command, Office of the U.S. Army
Surgeon General, Falls Church, Virginia.
Installation or office: Army Forces Command, Fort McPherson, Georgia.
Organization: U.S. Navy:
Installation or office: Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy,
Infrastructure, Strategy and Analysis, Arlington, Virginia.
Installation or office: Naval Fleet Forces Command, Norfolk Naval
Station, Virginia.
Organization: U.S. Marine Corps:
Installation or office: Headquarters Marine Corps, Homeland Defense
Branch, Security Division--Plans, Policies and Operations, Arlington,
Virginia.
Installation or office: Marine Forces Command, Norfolk Naval Station,
Virginia.
Organization: U.S. Air Force:
Installation or office: Headquarters Air Force Operational Plans and
Requirements, Director of Operational Planning, Policy and Strategy,
Rosslyn, Virginia.
Installation or office: Air Combat Command, Langley Air Force Base,
Virginia.
Source: GAO.
[End of table]
We met with FEMA officials at both the national and regional levels to
understand how they work with DOD both in identifying capability gaps
during planning stages and how they channel state and federal requests-
for-assistance to DOD during an actual incident. They discussed with
us the evolution of the FEMA-DOD relationship, as well as
relationships between DOD officials and state and local civil
authorities. Table 3 shows the federal civilian offices and agencies
with whom we met.
Table 3: Federal Civilian Departments and Agencies Where GAO Obtained
Documentary Evidence and Officials' Views Pertaining to the Defense
Support of Civil Authorities Mission:
Department or agency: Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA):
Office: Headquarters, Disaster Operations Directorate, Washington,
District of Columbia.
Office: Headquarters, National Preparedness Directorate, Washington,
District of Columbia.
Office: FEMA Region III, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.
Office: FEMA Region IV, Atlanta, Georgia.
Office: FEMA Region VII, Kansas City, Missouri.
Office: FEMA Region IX, Oakland, California.
Office: FEMA Liaison Officer to NORTHCOM, Petersen Air Force Base,
Colorado Springs, Colorado.
Office: FEMA Pacific Area Office, Fort Shafter, Hawaii.
Department or agency: Department of Health and Human Services:
Office: Office of the Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and
Response, Washington, District of Columbia.
Department or agency: Centers for Disease Control and Prevention:
Office: Headquarters, Atlanta, Georgia.
Source: GAO.
[End of table]
In the course of our audit work we visited four FEMA regions (FEMA
regions III, IV, VII, and IX) that were selected because they deal
with a range of National Special Security Events such as the Olympics,
political conventions, and the Super Bowl, as well as a variety of
natural disasters including hurricanes, earthquakes, wildland fires,
and floods. During our visits to these FEMA regions we not only met
with FEMA officials, but with the Defense Coordinating Officers and
their staff in those regions to discuss their role as DOD's
representatives to FEMA, other civilian authorities, and other
military officials (including the National Guard) in their assigned
states and regions. They provided us with anecdotal and documentary
evidence on their roles, responsibilities, and relationships in their
respective regions. When they were available, we also met with some of
the Emergency Preparedness Liaison Officers, who are military service
representatives. Specifically, we met with an Army Emergency
Preparedness Liaison Officer in Region III, one Emergency Preparedness
Liaison Officer from the Army, one from the Air Force, and one from
the Navy in Region IV, and one Emergency Preparedness Liaison Officer
from each of the four services in Region IX.
Subsequent to our meetings with DOD, FEMA, and other federal civilian
officials, we reviewed the guidance, policies, and other documentation
we obtained from them and compared it with the anecdotal information
that those officials shared with us during our meetings in support of
all of our objectives. We noted discrepancies and areas of concern,
then followed up with military and civilian officials as appropriate.
Additionally, we reviewed previous GAO and DOD Inspector General
reports to identify what, if any, progress and changes had occurred in
the area of defense support of civil authorities over the last several
years, specifically since Hurricane Katrina in 2005.
Following our visits to Defense Coordinating Officers in four of the
FEMA regions, we decided to contact the Defense Coordinating Officers
in all 10 FEMA regions to obtain a nationwide perspective of our
objectives. In order to obtain detailed information about the extent
to which DOD has identified and addressed its capability gaps for its
civil support mission; identified and defined roles, responsibilities,
and relationships of personnel assigned to the FEMA regions; and
shares and tracks information concerning its civil support
requirements response process with civil authorities, we developed a
structured questionnaire and sent it to all 12 Defense Coordinating
Officers assigned to the PACOM and NORTHCOM areas of responsibility.
The questionnaire included a variety of questions, covering issues
ranging from the guidance the Defense Coordinating Officers use to
execute their civil support mission to the methods and mediums (such
as regional exercises or planning conferences) they use to identify
capability gaps in their region. The questionnaire also asked what
challenges, if any, the Defense Coordinating Officers face when
anticipating and responding to requests-for-assistance and in
identifying capability gaps at both the federal and state levels.
Since we intended to survey the universe of Defense Coordinating
Officers at PACOM and NORTHCOM, our survey was not a sample survey and
therefore had no sampling errors. However, the practical difficulties
of conducting any survey may introduce other types of errors, commonly
referred to as nonsampling errors. For example, difficulties in
interpreting a particular question, sources of information available
to respondents, or entering data into a database or analyzing them can
introduce unwanted variability into the survey results. We took steps
in developing the questionnaire, collecting the data, and analyzing
them to minimize such nonsampling errors. For example, a social
science survey methodologist helped design the questionnaire in
collaboration with GAO staff that had subject-matter expertise. The
questionnaire was also reviewed by an independent GAO survey
specialist. The survey asked a combination of questions that allowed
for open-ended and close-ended responses. We pretested the content and
format of the questionnaire with two Defense Coordinating Officers to
ensure that the questions were relevant, clearly stated, and easy to
understand. During the pretests, we asked questions to determine
whether (1) the survey questions were clear, (2) the terms we used
were precise, (3) the questionnaire did not place an undue burden on
the respondents, and (4) the questions were unbiased. We received
input on the survey and made changes to the content and format of the
final questionnaire based on our pretest results. Since there were
relatively few changes based on the pretests and we were conducting
surveys with the universe of respondents--all PACOM and NORTHCOM
Defense Coordinating Officers--we did not find it necessary to conduct
additional pretests.
Data analysis was conducted by a GAO data analyst working directly
with GAO staff with subject-matter expertise. A second independent
analyst checked all of the computer programs for accuracy.
Following this extensive work on developing a questionnaire to collect
data in a standardized and structured manner, we sent the
questionnaire by e-mail on October 8, 2009, in an attached Microsoft
Word form that respondents could return electronically after marking
checkboxes or entering narrative responses into open-answer boxes.
Alternatively, respondents could return the survey by mail after
printing the form and completing it by hand. Both PACOM Defense
Coordinating Officers returned the completed surveys to GAO
electronically. However, NORTHCOM Defense Coordinating Officers were
told by their command leadership not to send the completed surveys to
GAO, but instead route them through the NORTHCOM headquarters
Inspector General. Since this position posed both considerable
methodological problems for the integrity of the data we wanted to
analyze and would not allow for anonymity and transparency in
responses, we instead elected to conduct structured interviews with
all 10 NORTHCOM Defense Coordinating Officers individually over the
phone using the same questionnaire to promote candid discussions that
may not have been obtained through a NORTHCOM screening process.
We combined the information gathered from the telephonic interviews
and analyzed the frequency and distribution of marked checkbox
responses. We also analyzed the open-ended narrative responses for
trends and recurring themes. For instance, although we did not
directly ask about the extent to which personnel coordinating DOD's
civil support mission are joint, several Defense Coordinating Officers
said that the Defense Coordinating Officer and Emergency Preparedness
Liaison Officer programs were not joint and that this made their work
more challenging than it needed to be. When the Defense Coordinating
Officers were not in agreement or had different perspectives on
issues, we summarized conflicting responses to illustrate the
complexity of the Defense Coordinating Officers' mission and the
unique challenges found in each region. For example, some Defense
Coordinating Officers told us they were sufficiently staffed with
their current personnel, when others said they badly need more staff
to assist them with their mission and to engage with the states within
their regions. We compiled this information and used it in conjunction
with the interviews from the four FEMA region visits, our meetings
with DOD and FEMA officials, and our review of documents and guidance
to identify areas for improvement in DOD's ability to provide support
to civil authorities and respond to requests-for-assistance.
We conducted this performance audit from January 2009 to March 2010 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe
that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
[End of section]
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense:
Assistant Secretary Of Defense:
Homeland Defense & Americas' Security Affairs:
2600 Defense Pentagon:
Washington, D.C. 20301-2600:
March 10, 2010:
Ms. Davi M. D'Agostino:
Director, Defense Capabilities and Management:
U.S Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20548:
Dear Ms. D'Agostino:
This is the Department of Defense (DoD) response to the GAO draft
report, GAO 10-386, "Homeland Defense: DoD Can Enhance Efforts to
Identify Capabilities to Support Civil Authorities During Disasters"
dated February 3, 2010 (Job Code 351317). DoD concurs with all three
recommendations. Responses to the recommendations are enclosed.
Our point of contact for this action is Mr. Andrew Kuepper, Office of
the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Americas'
Security Affairs (OASD (HD&ASA)), (703) 614-8618 or
andrew.kuepper@osd.mil.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
Christine E. Wormuth:
Principal Deputy:
Enclosure: As stated:
Enclosure:
GAO Draft Report — Dated February 3, 2010:
GAO Code 351317/GA0-10-386:
"Homeland Defense: DoD Can Enhance Efforts to Identify Capabilities to
Support Civil Authorities During Disasters"
Department Of Defense Comments To The Recommendations:
Recommendation 1: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense
direct the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and
Americas' Security Affairs (ASD(HD&ASA)) to update DoD policy and
guidance for civil support (i.e., DoD directive and instruction 3025
series) to reflect current doctrine, terminology, funding, policy,
practices, and DoD's organizational framework for providing civil
support, to include clarifying U.S. Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) and
U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM) roles and responsibilities for civil
support missions; and establish timeframes for completion.
DoD Response: Concur. Several draft issuances are in coordination; DoD
Directive 3025.dd, Defense Support of Civil Authorities with estimated
completion date (ECD) June 2010; DoD Instruction (DoDI) 3025.ff,
Defense Support of Civilian Law Enforcement Agencies, ECD August 2010;
DoDI 3025.gg, Defense Support of Special Events, ECD September 2010.
Corresponding Joint Publications will be updated by September 2011.
Recommendation 2: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense
direct the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and
Americas' Security Affairs (ASD(HD&ASA)) in coordination with the
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, to:
* Clarify roles and responsibilities, including command and control
relationships for the Defense Coordinating Officers, Defense
Coordinating Elements, and Emergency Preparedness Liaison Officers;
* Identify the extent to Which U.S. Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) and
U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM) should set training and equipping
requirements for the Defense Coordinating Officers, Defense
Coordinating Elements, and Emergency Preparedness Liaison Officers;
and;
* Conduct a review of staffing requirements for the Defense
Coordinating Officers, Defense Coordinating Elements, and Emergency
Preparedness Liaison Officers in both the OSNORTHCOM and USPACOM areas
of responsibility that includes, but is not limited to, an assessment
of staff size, subject matter expertise, and military service
composition by Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) region.
DoD Response: Concur. A new issuance is in coordination to describe
Office of the Secretary of Defense, Joint Staff, combatant command,
Service, and Defense Agency roles and responsibilities to include
coordination and control for homeland defense and civil support. The
Defense Coordinating Officers and Elements are combatant command
representatives in the FEMA regions. USNORTHCOM is reviewing the
staffing, training, and equipment requirements for the Defense
Coordinating Elements in each FEMA region.
Recommendation 3: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense
direct the Joint Staff, in coordination with the Assistant Secretary
of Defense for Networks and Information Integration/Chief Information
Officer (ASD(NII)), to identify and establish an official, DoD-wide,
unclassified tracking system for all incoming requests for
assistance from Federal agencies regarding civil support missions.
This system should at minimum include:
* Requirements and guidance to ensure that the system is comprehensive
and captures request-for-assistance data that can be used to
anticipate civil support requirements;
* Access for Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and other lead
Federal agencies, to provide them with real-time situational
awareness; and;
* Timeframes for the system's development and implementation.
DoD Response: Concur. DoD also needs access to the FEMA mission
tracking system in order to maintain visibility of the Mission
Assignments FEMA has asked DoD to support. Allowing DoD and FEMA to
have access to each other's tracking system will provide the best
potential for insuring accurate situational awareness on mission
assignments between DoD and the Primary Agency in accordance with the
National Response Framework.
[End of section]
Appendix III: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contacts:
Davi M. D'Agostino, (202) 512-5431 or dagostinod@gao.gov:
Acknowledgments:
In addition to the contact named above, William O. Jenkins, Jr.,
Director, Homeland Security and Justice; Lorelei St. James, Acting
Director; Joseph W. Kirschbaum, Assistant Director; Nicholas Benne;
Grace Coleman; Michael Hanson; David Lysy; Lonnie J. McAllister; Eric
E. Petersen; Terry Richardson; Bethann E. Ritter; Wesley Sholtes;
Cheryl Weissman; and Jena Whitley made key contributions to this
report.
[End of section]
Footnotes:
[1] NORTHCOM was created in April 2002 as part of a revised Unified
Command Plan, which outlines the areas of responsibility for the
combatant commands. It became officially operational on October 1,
2002.
[2] NORTHCOM differs from other combatant commands in that, in
addition to Canada and Mexico, its area of responsibility includes the
49 North American U.S. states and the District of Columbia, as well as
Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands. U.S. Pacific Command has
homeland defense and civil support responsibilities for the state of
Hawaii and the U.S.'s Pacific territories of Guam, American Samoa, and
the Northern Mariana Islands. These responsibilities are outlined in
DOD's Unified Command Plan, most recently in 2008.
[3] For the purposes of this report, we will refer to defense support
of civil authorities, known in most of DOD as "DSCA," as "civil
support." We are not including DOD support of civilian law enforcement
or for chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-yield
explosives (CBRNE) incidents in the scope of this report.
[4] The National Response Framework--formerly called the National
Response Plan--is a national-level guide to how local, state, and
federal governments respond to incidents resulting from all kinds of
hazards. The framework is based on the principal of tiered response,
starting from local communities and working up to include support from
the other levels of government and the private sector. Department of
Homeland Security, National Response Framework (Washington, D.C.:
January 2008).
[5] This does not include U.S. Coast Guard forces, which are under the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS), or the National Guard, which,
unless federalized by the President, would remain under the authority
of the respective state and territory governors.
[6] See Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Pub. 3-28, Civil Support, vii
(Washington, D.C.: Sept. 14, 2007).
[7] GAO, Homeland Defense: U.S. Northern Command Has Made Progress but
Needs to Address Force Allocation, Readiness, Tracking Gaps, and Other
Issues, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-251]
(Washington, D.C.: Apr. 16, 2008); Homeland Defense: Steps Have Been
Taken to Improve U.S. Northern Command's Coordination with the States
and the National Guard Bureau, but Gaps Remain, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-252] (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 16,
2008); Influenza Pandemic: DOD Combatant Commands' Preparedness
Efforts Could Benefit from More Clearly Defined Roles, Resources, and
Risk Mitigation, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-696]
(Washington, D.C.: June 20, 2007); Reserve Forces: Actions Needed to
Identify National Guard Domestic Equipment Requirements and Readiness,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-60] (Washington, D.C.:
Jan. 26, 2007); Chemical and Biological Defense: Management Actions
Are Needed to Close the Gap between Army Chemical Unit Preparedness
and Stated National Priorities, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-143] (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 19,
2007); Catastrophic Disasters: Enhanced Leadership, Capabilities, and
Accountability Controls Will Improve the Effectiveness of the Nation's
Preparedness, Response, and Recovery System, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-618] (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 6,
2006); Hurricane Katrina: Better Plans and Exercises Needed to Guide
the Military's Response to Catastrophic Natural Disasters, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-643] (Washington, D.C.: May 15,
2006); and Homeland Defense: DOD Needs to Assess the Structure of U.S.
Forces for Domestic Military Missions, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-03-670] (Washington, D.C.: July 11,
2003).
[8] GAO, Homeland Defense: U.S. Northern Command Has a Strong Exercise
Program, but Involvement of Interagency Partners and States Can Be
Improved, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-849]
(Washington, D.C.: Sept. 9, 2009).
[9] GAO, Homeland Defense: Planning, Resourcing, and Training Issues
Challenge DOD's Response to Domestic Chemical, Biological,
Radiological, Nuclear, and High-Yield Explosive Incidents, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-123] (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 7,
2009).
[10] NORTHCOM has designated 10 Defense Coordinating Officers and
Defense Coordinating Elements, one in each of the 10 FEMA regions.
However, since FEMA Region IX is located in both NORTHCOM and PACOM,
PACOM has established two Defense Coordinating Officers of its own,
one under the Army for the state of Hawaii and the territory of
American Samoa, and one under the Navy for the territories of Guam and
the Northern Marianas. Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands are
part of FEMA Region II and are covered by the NORTHCOM Defense
Coordinating Officer and Element for Region II.
[11] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-123].
[12] GAO, Homeland Defense: DOD Needs to Take Actions to Enhance
Interagency Coordination for Its Homeland Defense and Civil Support
Missions, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-364]
(Washington, D.C.: Mar. 30, 2010).
[13] In GAO-10-364, we state that "to facilitate and institutionalize
a unified approach between DOD and its federal partners for
interagency coordination for homeland defense and civil support
missions, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Under
Secretary of Defense for Policy, in coordination with the Joint Chiefs
of Staff, to establish a time line to develop and issue a partner
guide that identifies the roles and responsibilities of DOD entities,
processes, and agreed-upon approaches for interagency coordination for
homeland defense and civil support efforts."
[14] The Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, §101
(2002).
[15] The National Preparedness System is intended to provide a tool to
assist jurisdictions, agencies, and organizations at all levels to
plan for, assess, and track capabilities in a shared environment.
[16] The National Guard holds a unique dual status in that it performs
federal missions under the command of the President and state missions
under the command of the state's Governor. Currently, DOD funding for
the National Guard's federal warfighting mission provides for the vast
majority of the National Guard's personnel, training, and equipment.
The National Guard can use the capabilities provided by DOD--such as
transportation, engineering, medical, and communications units and
equipment--when available to respond to domestic emergencies while
operating under the command of the Governors and generally paid for
with state funding. However, under certain circumstances such as large-
scale, multistate events, homeland security-related activities, or
federally declared disasters, federal funding has been provided for
missions carried out by the states' National Guard.
[17] The Emergency Management Assistance Compact is a mutual aid
agreement among member states and is administered by the National
Emergency Management Association. States affected by disasters have
increasingly relied on the Emergency Management Assistance Compact as
a means to access resources from other states, including emergency
managers, National Guard assets, and first responders. GAO, Emergency
Management Assistance Compact: Enhancing EMAC's Collaborative and
Administrative Capacity Should Improve National Disaster Response,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-854] (Washington, D.C.:
June 29, 2007).
[18] The Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance
Act, Pub. L. No. 100-707 (1988), amended the Disaster Relief Act of
1974, Pub. L. No. 93-288 (1974). The Stafford Act constitutes the
statutory authority for most federal disaster response activities,
especially as they pertain to FEMA and FEMA programs.
[19] As we noted earlier, for the purposes of this report, we have
scoped out other civil support activities such as counterdrug
operations and management of the consequences of a terrorist incident
employing a weapon of mass destruction.
[20] Department of Homeland Security, National Response Framework
(Washington, D.C.: January 2008), and Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint
Pub. 3-28, Civil Support.
[21] Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Pub. 3-28, Civil Support, II-4.
[22] 18 U.S.C. § 1385 (2007).
[23] A recent change due to the 2008 National Defense Authorization
Act, Pub. L. No. 110-181, §§1811, 1812, and 1813 (2008).
[24] An Execute Order is a directive to implement an approved military
course of action.
[25] A spot report is a concise narrative report of essential
information covering events or conditions that may have an immediate
and significant effect on current planning and operations.
[26] At the time of our review, PACOM was in the process of converting
the part-time Army Reserve Defense Coordinating Officer for Hawaii and
American Samoa to a full-time, active duty position like the NORTHCOM
Defense Coordinating Officers.
[27] At the time of our review, the Marine Corps only provided
Emergency Preparedness Liaison Officers to the 10 FEMA regions and did
not have any in individual states. The other three military services
informed us that they generally have at least one Emergency
Preparedness Liaison Officer in each of the states and territories.
[28] North American Aerospace Defense Command and United States
Northern Command, Vision 2020, (Oct. 1, 2007).
[29] The assessment was in accordance with DOD's Joint Capabilities
Integration and Development System, which sets forth an integrated,
collaborative process to identify and guide the development of new
capability requirements that address the current and emerging security
environment.
[30] According to the Homeland Defense and Civil Support Capabilities-
Based Assessment, mission assurance is defined as a process to ensure
that assigned tasks or duties can be performed in accordance with the
intended purpose or plan. It is a summation of the activities and
measures taken to ensure that required capabilities and all supporting
infrastructures are available to DOD to carry out the National
Military Strategy.
[31] Under the civil support heading, NORTHCOM included CBRNE
Decontamination Support, CBRNE Urban Search and Rescue, and Biological
Incident Support. We have not included them because they are outside
the focus of this review. Additionally, DOD included Riverine Presence
and U.S. Coast Guard Maritime Security Levels as a capability gap
relevant to the civil support mission. However, this capability
primarily involves DOD maritime support to civil authorities for
activities such as combating terrorism, counterdrug operations, and
law enforcement activities.
[32] GAO, Disaster Management: Improving the Nation's Response to
Catastrophic Disasters, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/RCED-93-186] (Washington, D.C.: July
23, 1993) and GAO-06-643.
[33] 10 U.S.C. § 12304 (c) (1) (2010).
[34] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-251].
[35] The Commission on National Guard and the Reserves, Transforming
the National Guard and Reserves into a 21st-Century Operational Force,
Final Report (Arlington, VA: Jan. 31, 2008).
[36] GAO, National Preparedness: FEMA Has Made Progress, but Needs to
Complete and Integrate Planning, Exercise, and Assessment Efforts,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-369] (Washington, D.C.:
Apr. 30, 2009).
[37] In January 2010, DOD officials stated that the Integrated
Planning System is currently under reconsideration by the National
Security Council.
[38] DOD Directive 3025.1, Military Support to Civil Authorities,
para. 4.4.8.2 (Jan. 15, 1993).
[39] DOD Directive 3025.1, para. 4.4.8.2 (1993).
[40] The capabilities-based assessment also noted that DOD is in the
process of implementing Section 1815 of the National Defense
Authorization Act of 2008 (Pub. L. No. 110-181, §1815 (2008)), which
requires DOD to work with DHS to determine the military-unique
capabilities DOD needs to provide for civil support operations and to
prepare a plan to provide funds and resources to maintain existing
military-unique civil support capabilities or any additional
capabilities required for homeland defense and civil support missions.
According to the capabilities-based assessment, these efforts will
ultimately inform the fiscal year 2012 programming and budget cycles
with military-unique or other civil support capabilities required for
DOD to respond to catastrophic or other incidents of national
significance.
[41] DOD, Office of the Inspector General, Defense Emergency Response
Fund. Report Number D-2008-105, (Arlington, VA: June 20, 2008).
[42] Prior to this time, the Defense Coordinating Officers provided
disaster assistance to civil authorities on a part-time basis because
they also served as Army training brigade commanders. In this role,
they were primarily responsible for training Army reserve component
personnel for warfighting missions.
[43] State Joint Force Headquarters provides command and control of
all National Guard forces in a state or territory for the governor.
[44] Joint Field Offices are temporary federal multi-agency
coordination centers established locally to facilitate field-level
domestic incident management activities.
[45] The Emergency Support Function structure of the National Response
Framework provides the mechanism for coordinating federal interagency
support for a federal response to an incident, and groups functions
most frequently used to provide federal support to states and federal-
to-federal support during a disaster. The National Response Framework
includes 15 Emergency Support Functions ranging from transportation to
external affairs issues, with federal agencies designated as a
coordinator, primary agency, or supporting agency (e.g., Department of
Transportation is the coordinator and primary agency for Emergency
Support Function #1 Transportation).
[46] DOD, Office of the Inspector General, Approval Process, Tracking,
and Financial Management of DOD Disaster Relief Efforts. Report Number
D-2008-130, (Arlington, VA: Sept. 17, 2008).
[47] NORTHCOM's 10 Defense Coordinating Officers and Defense
Coordinating Elements are all staffed by Army personnel. However, in
PACOM, the Defense Coordinating Officer for the state of Hawaii and
the territory of American Samoa is under the Army, and the one for the
territories of Guam and the Northern Marianas is under the Navy.
[48] DOD Office of the Inspector General, Report Number D-2008-130.
Because the recommendation had been redirected to NORTHCOM from the
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Americas'
Security Affairs, NORTHCOM had not provided an official comment on
this recommendation at the time the DOD Inspector General report was
published.
[49] According to the DOD Inspector General's office as of February
2010, the Joint Staff has coordinated a follow-up inquiry with
NORTHCOM, the military services, and the National Guard Bureau. There
is general support for the concept of developing an implementation
plan to migrate the staffing of Defense Coordinating Officer positions
from the Army to all of the services and other DOD components, as
appropriate. NORTHCOM will establish a working group to determine
whether to pursue the idea of sourcing the Defense Coordinating
Officers from the other services, to include developing a migration
plan, if applicable.
[50] Aeromedical evacuation involves the movement of patients to and
between medical facilities by air transportation.
[51] In GAO-10-364, we state that "to facilitate and institutionalize
a unified approach between DOD and its federal partners for
interagency coordination for homeland defense and civil support
missions, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Under
Secretary of Defense for Policy, in coordination with the Joint Chiefs
of Staff, to establish a time line to develop and issue a partner
guide that identifies the roles and responsibilities of DOD entities,
processes, and agreed-upon approaches for interagency coordination for
homeland defense and civil support efforts."
[52] As we were drafting our report in December 2009, three requests-
for-assistance from the Department of Transportation for the August
2007 Minnesota bridge collapse were added to the DOD Defense Support
of Civil Authorities Automated Support System. Since they were added
to the system over 2 years after the event, we are not including the
Department of Transportation as a federal agency with information in
the system.
[53] National Special Security Events are events of national
significance, by virtue of their profile or status, that represent a
significant target and, therefore, warrant additional preparation,
planning, and mitigation efforts.
[54] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/RCED-93-186] and
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-643].
[End of section]
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