Tensions between the OCR and UNC

Holmes discusses his correspondence with the University of North Carolina in 1973, regarding the OCR's notification to southern universities and colleges that they needed to develop new plans for desegregation that met federal requirements. In discussing this, Holmes addresses UNC's concern, by the late 1970s, that the OCR kept changing those requirements, making it difficult for UNC to comply. Additionally, Holmes addresses the role of the federal courts in this process, asserting that he felt Pratt's decision was "unfortunate" but that he felt no pressure from the federal court in determining desegregation policies.

Citing this Excerpt

Oral History Interview with Peter Holmes, April 18, 1991. Interview L-0168. Southern Oral History Program Collection (#4007) in the Southern Oral History Program Collection, Southern Historical Collection, Wilson Library, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.

Full Text of the Excerpt

WILLIAM LINK:

I was going to ask you about theߞa couple of specific things.
And just let me know if it's too fuzzy to answer, or do your
best, I'd appreciate it. In early 1973 you wrote to the
University of North Carolina an official letter that requested the
development of the state plan. I wonder if you could recall, or what you
recall, about the kind of response. And I don't mean the
official response but the kind of contact that you might have had prior
to the University of North Carolina's official response. You
must have been in regular communication or had a series of ߞ

PETER HOLMES:

I can't remember specifically, Bill, but I do know a number
of occasions that Mr. Friday and some of the other people with the
system came to Washington. Now, it would not surprise me, and I just
don't recall specifically, that after that letter had gone
outߞand you tell me that letter went out on that date, I
accept thatߞthat after receiving that they may have come to
Washington to sat down with us and talk. What was their response? Again,
I can't be very specific but, other than to say that it was
one of wanting to cooperate but, also them recognizing that this is an
area where the law was not very clearly developed, and perhaps some of
our suggestions of some of the things we were asking, some of the
proposals we were making were not as reasonable as they felt, or as
attainable, as we thought they might be.

WILLIAM LINK:

Well, in talking with people at the UNC side which, of course,
I've heard more from them than I have from what was going on
here. Their position was that the messages they were getting from OCR
was mixed, not so much, I think, in this period of OCR as later,
'77, '78, '79, particularly. And I
suppose what you're saying is that reflected the nature of
the whole case, the standards were so ill defined really?

PETER HOLMES:

What were the nature of the messagesߞwhat were the nature of
messages later as opposed to earlier?

WILLIAM LINK:

The late '70s?

PETER HOLMES:

Yeah.

WILLIAM LINK:

Well, they hadߞthere are several incidents in which they
actually changed the rules. At least according to UNC that OCR actually
changed the rules.

PETER HOLMES:

Right.

WILLIAM LINK:

Saying they wanted one thing at one point and when UNC attempted to meet
those positions, and felt they did, OCR would come in later and
completely change the rules. I think the duplicationߞwell, the
duplication issue is really oneߞwas true, particularly.

PETER HOLMES:

The earlier position being eliminate duplication, the later position
being that duplication was all right, or the earlier position being that
some duplication was all right, and the later one is eliminate all
duplication?

WILLIAM LINK:

Yes, exactly. Or define what duplication was. That's the key.

PETER HOLMES:

Right. It wouldn't surprise me in the least that that would
be the case.

WILLIAM LINK:

Yeah. What a core curriculum was. And what outside the core would be
duplicated. In 1973 UNC developed this plan and itߞduring that
year, and I may beߞI'm probably too specific here,
I realize this has been twenty years ago.

PETER HOLMES:

Go ahead, Bill.

WILLIAM LINK:

Your office responded to North Carolina that the plan is inadequate.
Would the primary reasons for reaching that decision, from the point of
view of you as a director, were the primary reasons the fact that you
were facing pressure from the court? Feeling that the plan would not
make it pass the court? In other words, what was guiding you in the
negotiations?

PETER HOLMES:

Oh, I don't think it was the court. I don't feel
it was the court at all. As a matter of fact I feltߞI felt, I
mean, as director of the office, I felt no compulsion or pressure
whatsoever to negotiate aߞor enter into an agreement on a
resolution of an issue that would be acceptable or unacceptable to
court. If I can explain myself.

WILLIAM LINK:

Sure.

PETER HOLMES:

The court wanted to seeߞit became mechanical with the court.
Letters were sent out and no actions were followed up, therefore
we're going to give you certain time
frames in which you've got to do things, do them. My view was
fine, that was a mechanical timetable as to how you do things, but we
had the complete policy authority. Because the court
definedߞthe court did not attempt to define any particular
standards of what higher education desegregation was. We had the total
policy flexibility to make the determination ourselves as to whether
this plan was acceptable or not. And we would advise the court that we
viewed it as acceptable. And if somebody wanted to differ with our
conclusion as to whether it was acceptable or unacceptable then they
could challenge us and take the issue to court. And then we'd
defend our position. So, to answer your specific question, if the plan
was rejected, and as I recall it was, it was because we, as a policy
matter, felt that their response was insufficient. Not that the court
had some higher or different expectation.

WILLIAM LINK:

Yeah. So, you weren't feeling a kind of daily pressure or
direct pressure from the court? You felt kind of ߞ

PETER HOLMES:

No, I was feeling no pressure at all from the court, in terms of the
substance of a plan of desegregation for higher education systems. There
was pressure from the court in terms of the timetables of getting
certainߞachieving certain milestones and reacting to the
things, as I recall. And that is the way I viewed the court decision.

WILLIAM LINK:

Yeah. How did you find Pratt as a justice, in terms of ߞ

PETER HOLMES:

I have no opinion. I mean, I've never met him.
I've never presented in court. I was constantly deposed on,
you know, why we did this, why we did that, what have you. And they were
filed by the plaintiffs with the court. But, I've never met
Pratt. I mean, I go back to my original reaction, I felt that this was
an unfortunate decision. It was an unnecessary decision. There
wasn't foot dragging on these issues of elementary and
secondary desegregation, or even higher education desegregation. The
office was very effectively prosecuting cases involving elementary and
secondary education, where the law was clearer, where the standards were
clearer, and where we were comfortable with the policies to implement
thoseߞimplement the law. In those areas where it was not
clear, like in higher education desegregation. It was going to be a long
process, we knew, from the beginning. But the court was imposing on us
certain deadlines, and timetables, by which certain actions that had to
be taken. Which was unfortunate and was wrong.

WILLIAM LINK:

And that was much of the problem?

PETER HOLMES:

Well, it was a large part of the problem. It was a large part of the
problem.