Tending Events - Issue 19 - Jan-Feb 2017

US – Russia relations have been
following the same identical cyclical pattern for over quarter of a century.
When a new US President takes over at the White House, Russia tries to use an
opportunity to reproach the relations and quickly resolve multiple issues
accumulated during the past presidency. This high point in the relations then
leads to a gradual deterioration often exacerbated by international crises.
Although currently the bilateral relations are at their lowest point in the
post-Cold War era, there is a clear limit to what both sides consider possible
in their relations.

Although currently the US-Russia
bilateral relations are at their lowest point, some are talking about the
possibility of a third world war breaking out. However, there is a clear limit
to what both sides consider possible in their relations. Russia is certainly
not starting a war with the only superpower unless there is a vital threat to
the country.

1. Determinants of Post-Cold War US-Russia
Relationship

The US – Russia relations are one of
the most important bilateral relationships on the planet and certainly the most
important relations for Moscow. In the second half of the 20th century that
relationship defined the whole international system. What is currently
perceived in the relation between the two countries currently is to a large
extent an outcome of the Cold War past. If we were to use Kenneth Waltz’s
Man-State-System approach, there would be a clear pattern explaining the systemic
nature of the relationship.

First, on a personal emotional level: All the leaders in
charge of both countries in the last 25 years were raised in the Cold War
world. Russian leaders always expected a respectful equal dialogue with the
other side and every time they had a feeling there is a certain level of under-appreciation,
they felt offended and even betrayed.

Second, on a national level: There is a strong
organizational inertia on both sides. Senior officers of armed forces,
intelligence and diplomatic agencies as well as think tanks have extensive
experience in analyzing the other side and developing counter measures. Both
countries’ multibillion defense industries with millions of workers depend on
the military strategy that sees the other side a strategic rival and requires
extensive spending.

Third, on the international system
level: Russia is the only country that
still maintains strategic parity with the US due to its vast nuclear arsenal.
Therefore, the system creates a specific set of incentives. On one hand, it
prevents the two sides from establishing a trustful relationship, while on the
other hand, it also stops them from getting into a full-blown conflict.

2. US – Russia relations 1990 - 2000:
The Big Disappointment

Russia’s relations with the West
have to a large extent been a function of the US – Russia relations since the
end of the Soviet Union. After the Soviet Union dissolved in the end of 1991,
the US supported Russia financially and also joined forces with Moscow in
reclaiming the post-Soviet nuclear arsenal from Belarus, Ukraine and
Kazakhstan. Both countries then got new leaders starting their terms almost
simultaneously; the US got its first post-Cold War President Bill Clinton and
Russia’s President Boris Yeltsin became the country’s first leader after the
dissolution of the Soviet Union. As the US openly supported democratic
candidates there was a strong belief in the Russian elite that Washington’s
objective was to ensure a lasting mutually beneficial relationship that would
make NATO redundant and create an inclusive security mechanism preventing the
arms race. Although the Warsaw Pact[1]
was dissolved in 1989, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) remained
after the end of the Cold War. Moscow saw it as remnant of history till mid-1990s.
However, NATO’s enlargement that was initiated early in the second half of the
1990-s starting an entirely new era of ongoing mistrust. In a somewhat symbolic
measure, President Yeltsin replaced the then Minister of Foreign Affairs Andrei
Kozyrev with the head of the Foreign Intelligence Yevgeny Primakov. While
Kozyrev was a strong proponent of having a trusted relationship with the US and
authorized multiple significant concessions on matters of national security,
Primakov took a tougher stand in relations with Brussels and, most importantly,
Washington.

Overall, the second part of the
1990s turned out a lasting confrontation between Russia and the US-led NATO
that culminated in 1999 when NATO launched an air campaign in the former
Yugoslavia. After long-lasting negotiations and Russia preventing a UN Security
Council resolution that would authorize the use of force from being adopted,
NATO unilaterally started a series of air strikes against official Belgrade.
Yevgeny Primakov, the then Russia’s Prime Minister, was in mid-air traveling
from Moscow to start his official visit in the US and turned the airplane
around in the air once he learned about the news. The move - which was
afterwards dubbed “Primakov’s loop” – was a symbolic gesture of a strong
protest and eagerness to cut almost any ties between the two sides if that is
what it required.

3. Russia – US in 2000 – 2008: From
Marriage to Divorce

The 1999 relations breakup took over
two years to recover as the first time Washington and Moscow started handling a
problem jointly as partners was in September 2001 when the new President Putin
was one of the first people to offer his help George W. Bush (also less than
year in the office). Russia’s leadership reacted to the situation as a historic
opportunity that would allow the two nations to jointly react to international
security threats. The “honeymoon”, however, did not last long. Despite
coinciding interests in Afghanistan, the two countries took a radically
different stand on the situation in Iraq and Russia used every chance to
prevent the US from getting any legal grounds to start a military operation in
the country in the UN Security Council. Russia sided with France and Germany
opposing an international invasion in Iraq and strongly contributed to creating
an alternative coalition that objected to the US-led use of force in the
region. The Iraq-related crisis spoiled the relations for next several years
and, most importantly, undermined trust between the two nation leaders.

However, it was not this Middle
Eastern crisis that became the most challenging pressure point in the bilateral
relations. As a great power with global interests, Russia has been constantly
involved with multiple international situations all over the world to expand
and protect its influence in various regions

What angered Moscow, therefore, is
that the US attempted to expand its influence in the former soviet republics
and in Moscow’s immediate neighbors in particular. Therefore, NATO’s continued
enlargement in 2000s became another pressure point in the bilateral relations
and then, most notably, it was Ukraine. In 2004-2005, the country went through
a political crisis that was nicknamed “Orange Revolution” and brought to power
a pro-Western candidate that indicated his willingness to get Ukraine a NATO
membership.[2] As
the largest post-Soviet state after Russia and the closest to Russia
history-wise, Ukraine has always been a very special partner for Moscow. With
the Cold War mindset in place, having Ukraine joining NATO was seen in Moscow
as losing it forever

Vladimir Putin was then reported
saying to George W. Bush, privately, that Ukraine joining NATO would be
crossing the red line and the country might even lose its statehood if it were
to choose that path.[3]

During Moscow and Washington
remained generally cautious, as the two sides were already bitterly
disappointed with each other. Yet the end of President George W. Bush’s second
term once again brought the US-Russia relations to a new low with the start of
the conflict in the Republic of Georgia in August 2008. After Georgian troops
openly attacked an internationally recognized peacekeeping force of Russian
nationals guarding the separation line with light weapons and used artillery and
tanks, Russia responded with its full military might. For the first time in
recent history, Russia used its military against a foreign country as it was
used against Georgian forces in Georgian breakaway regions of South Ossetia and
Abkhazia. As the US had been providing training and limited material supply
support to the Georgian army, Russia saw the conflict as inspired by the US.
Similarly, the US had to start considering Russia as an immediate military
threat to all neighboring countries. Once again, the trust was lost for years
and the 2008 US Presidential campaign was focused on resurgent Russia as a potential
threat.

4. 2008 – 2016: Resetting Relations

After President Obama won the 2008
election, his administration focused on rebuilding relations with Russia and
had a window of opportunity to restructure the relationship and put all the
blame for past misunderstandings on the previous Republican administration.

As Russia was led by a new President
Dmitry Medvedev, who pioneered innovation and entrepreneurship agenda, there
was an obvious quick win for both parties. Medvedev would rebuild connections
with the West and attract international investments, while Obama would be credited
with successfully handling one of the toughest international players that his
predecessor failed to handle. The new trend was officially nicknamed “Reset”,
which failed shortly after Foreign Minister Lavrov and State Secretary Clinton
pressed a symbolic button that was meant to reboot the actual bilateral
relations.

The new honeymoon period came to an
end after President Medvedev personally authorized Russia’s not vetoing a UN
Security Council resolution establishing a no-fly zone in Libya in March 2011.
Russia’s abstention essentially authorized an international military operation
in the country that resulted, among other things, in the death of Muammar
Gaddafi. The decision sparked a public exchange of criticism between Putin and
Medvedev and few months later Medvedev admitted making a mistake authorizing
the resolution.[4]
The episode caused yet another deep disappointment in Moscow and led to another
cold in the US – Russia relations.

However, once again it was not Libya
that brought Moscow and Washington to the lowest point in their relations since
the end of the Cold War. It was Ukraine, again. In 2014, Ukraine entered a
domestic political crisis over a decision to halt its joining the European
integration process under Russia’s pressure. After long-lasting street
protests, there was violence and over hundred people died. As the US was
supporting the protesters despite what Russia considered an agreement on
settling the crisis, Putin seemed to have lost patience and started acting.
Russian troops entered the Crimean peninsula and within weeks there was a
referendum to join Russia instead of Ukraine. After that Russia started
supporting rebels in Donetsk and Lugansk breakaway regions that have been
fighting with Ukrainian government troops for over two years and caused deaths
of thousands of people. The US responded with economic and individual
sanctions.

5. 2016 - New Opportunity for Rapprochement

Once again, with Donald Trump
elected US President, there is a chance for Russia to start yet another cycle
in the relations with a positive restart.. Sanctions imposed by the US and its
allies put significant pressure on the economy and Moscow is tired of
sanctions. The terms of a potential unofficial agreement seem obvious and not
exaggerated. That is, Russia needs sanctions lifted, Crimea recognized as
Russian (officially or semiofficially) and Russia would of course prefer Bashar
Assad to remain in power in Syria.

Donetsk and Lugansk breakaway
regions can be given up if other conditions are met. Meanwhile Syria is not a
policy priority by itself – it is another bargaining chip that is becoming
increasingly expensive. Supporting Assad’s army results in a growing number of
civilian casualties as well as casualties on the Russian side. This position is
supported by a change in Moscow’s political rhetoric. After September 2016
Parliamentary elections, Russian government officials stopped using foreign
policy topics to mobilize their supporters and started using every opportunity
to communicate their willingness to negotiate with the US.

Although Trump’s victory is
generally a preferred outcome for Russia, there are no extraordinary
expectations. Previous eight-year cycles taught the Russian leadership that
long-term changes are highly unlikely. Reasonable expectations include a new
personal relationship with the elected leader and Russia went to a great length
to make this possible. Early in December 2016 President Putin almost
simultaneously presented his annual address to the Federal Assembly and signed
a new Foreign Policy Concept. . The Concept did demonstrate a certain
willingness to reproach the relations with the US but the Address sent a far
stronger message once again reiterating that the Kremlin is looking for an
opportunity to establish a new dialogue.[5]

Conclusion

Russia’s leadership Cold War mindset
created obstacles for its integration in international cooperation and became a
foundation for the lack of trust towards the US and its partners. It was also
one of the reasons why Moscow repeatedly overreacted to any US intentions to
enlarge NATO as Russia continues seeing NATO a strategic threat. Yet, there are
benefits to this worldview too as Russian diplomats and military personnel have
a long history of relations with NATO, and they have extensive experience of
teasing the adversary without starting a full-scale conflict.

Unless what Russia sees as its vital
interest is at stake, it will be limiting its engagements with the US to
teasing but will not open fire and expect the other side to do the same. If
anything, Moscow will be relying on the same Cold War legacy framework to
prevent the global war as it did successfully in the past. That approach will
be the main foundation of keeping the peace between Russia and the US although
there is hardly a chance for a long-term improvement.

[1] A military bloc consisting of Eastern European
nations and the Soviet Union that was established in 1956 to balance NATO in
Europe.