Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman and members of the standing committee, for inviting the Canadian Shooting Sports Association to participate and express the views of our members and other active Canadian firearm owners and users.

My name is Steve Torino. I'm the president of the Canadian Shooting Sports Association. I also co-chair the firearms advisory committee, reporting to Public Safety Minister Vic Toews. I have occupied this position for the last six years. Previously, I served as chair of the user advisory group on firearms for Justice Ministers Allan Rock, Anne McLellan, and Martin Cauchon from 1996 to 2003, and then I was part of Firearm Commissioner William Baker's program advisory committee for three years, wherein I chaired the firearms subcommittee.

The Canadian Shooting Sports Association represents active target shooters and collectors in Canada. From the volume of communication we've received concerning the upcoming July UN conference on the arms trade treaty, apparently the issue of sporting and hunting firearms being a part of the arms trade treaty has taken on some significance. CSSA has been asked to represent our members' position to the government.

While my colleague Mr. Bernardo will submit the views of CSSA members and of the firearms community in general, I will present some facts that may be pertinent in any discussions and deliberations this committee's members may hold in regard to the arms trade treaty.

Our members' main concern in the past has been and remains the fact that there does not seem to be an agreed upon definition of small arms and light weapons, and each country has either different interpretations or different applications regarding these items. The United Nations small arms survey and others seem to use various definitions, ranging from those found in a 1997 study to those in a 2005 UN version.

In regard to civilian small arms and ammunition, Canada is primarily a nation of importers, not manufacturers. Current import costs of these specific items total some $250 million, as part of an industry generating some $6 billion annually in revenue, including costs related to and in support of these activities. Related imported equipment represents about 35% of this amount.

It must also be noted that these importers also import many related outdoor products, such as those for fishing, camping, and other outdoor activities. There are items such as telescopes for firearms and products by camera manufacturers, such as Nikon, Swarovski, etc. Specific clothing and shelter products for such activities are imported by many of Canada's firearms importers.

It must also be said at this point that Canada has probably the strongest import and export controls in the world, and is regarded as having such. Canada's major trading partner in this regard is the United States, accounting for some 65% to 75% of these products as a whole.

The number of small arms in civilian hands worldwide is really unknown at this point. The small arms survey's latest estimate is that there are some 650 million small arms in private hands. This amount increases or changes depending on the type of study done and the timing of such a study.

Canada's homicide rate with firearms is 0.5%, about 175 persons per year out of some 600 total homicides per year. The number of homicides with firearms registered to accused in Canada totals under 3% of that total. The small arms survey claims there are about 245,000 firearms deaths worldwide annually. Canada does not rank among the top 10 countries for possession of legal civilian firearms, according to the small arms survey's latest estimate. This study goes on to state that “...it is inherently impossible to be sure of the total number of all guns”.

At this point, the small arms survey also says that with regard to violent deaths listed among the 58 countries that were studied, the rate of violent death for Canada was some 10 times lower than that for the country lowest on the list in their survey.

In summary, the Canadian Shooting Sports' members and Canada's recreational firearms community are greatly encouraged by the government's attention to this issue and respectfully request that this government stay the course, as outlined to date, by any means deemed most effective. National discretion is an excellent criterion for all involved.

Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen. Thank you for this opportunity to speak to you on a matter of such great concern for over two million Canadians.

My name is Tony Bernardo. I'm the acting executive director of the Canadian Shooting Sports Association. I've been an executive member of the World Forum on the Future of Sport Shooting Activities since 1997 and have been attending and working at the United Nations since 1998 regarding civilian firearms issues. I've addressed the United Nations assembly four times.

As an association, the CSSA has no objection to the concept of a treaty on conventional weapons. Our concerns relate to the firearms that ordinary Canadians use every day. It's no secret that Canada has one of the most stringent sets of controls in the world on the ownership and use of firearms. Bluntly put, we don't need any more. Neither does the United Nations, not if they're actually trying to accomplish something.

The civilian firearms issue is a very important topic to many nations. Moreover, some nations have constitutional protection regarding civilian firearms ownership, protections that prohibit their involvement in any initiative that might undermine those constitutional protections. The issue of civilian firearms is, truthfully, a no-win situation that should be avoided at all costs if there's to be any hope of a functional treaty.

However, in my conversations with members of delegations from countries less developed than Canada, I'm told repeatedly that civilian firearms are almost never a problem. Most people understand that the real issue is the proliferation of exclusively military weapons being illegally sold by countries with less than scrupulous motives.

Have there been any deaths? Well, yes, of course—but not as you might think: 56 million people have died in genocides in the last 100 years, almost all of them murdered by their own governments.

The inclusion of civilian firearms, also called “small arms” at the United Nations, in the former firearms protocol virtually caused the collapse of the entire UN process and left that project in a state of utter failure. In fact, one of the few things that ever came from the firearms protocol was the Canadian firearms-marking regulation—an unmitigated disaster, at best.

For those who are unfamiliar with the marking regulation, permit me a brief explanation.

The UN marking regulations were passed into Canadian law in 2004. As is typical of those days, firearms importers were never consulted prior to the regulations being introduced. The Chrétien, Martin, and Harper governments have successively delayed the implementation since then. The obvious question is “Why?”

Members of the Canadian firearms industry conducted an exhaustive study and concluded the marking requirement was impossible to comply with. An international study reached the same conclusion. Participants in this represented Browning, Remington, Beretta, Sako, Savage, Tikka, Uberti, NORINCO, Ruger, Glock, Smith & Wesson, Heckler & Koch, and several others. These respectable and reputable companies flatly stated that if this were implemented in Canada, they would simply close their Canadian operations, devastating a legitimate billion-dollar industry and putting thousands of Canadians on the unemployment rolls.

These are the consequences of domestic legislation being developed by international forums with little or no understanding of the ramifications of their undertakings. An initiative, started to theoretically ease violence in the world's desperate regions, instead causes unemployment and financial hardship to peace-loving Canada.

We've been assured that the position of the Canadian government is that civilian firearms must not be included within the scope of an arms trade treaty. Indeed, the language of the preamble makes clear the Government of Canada's intention to have civilian firearms regulated domestically, not internationally.

Our support for the treaty process and the Government of Canada's participation in this process remains contingent upon the stated intention being upheld at all levels.

Civilian firearms must be regulated domestically, taking into consideration political, constitutional, and social factors inherent in each nation's makeup. In this instance, the one-size approach does not fit all.

In other words, members of the Canadian Shooting Sports Association are saying there is no good use for overriding one nation's rules based on the demands and needs of another UN state's requirements being applied to all other states without regard for each party's national jurisdiction and legislation. Again, national discretion and jurisdiction should and must prevail. The rules for civilian possession of small arms in one country do not necessarily make sense, nor are they useful, in another country.

It must also be said that we have seen no evidence that this position has changed in any way. We strongly encourage the government to stay the course and protect the rights of Canadian citizens first, before attempting to agree with having an international body regulate what is completely within the purview of Canadian national discretion and jurisdiction.

Article 2 of the UN charter specifically states that there is nothing in the charter authorizing:

...the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state....

Having one set of rules for the use of such items in all countries would be, at most, counterproductive and presumably unacceptable to the UN principle of national discretion and jurisdiction.

Lastly, to conclude, I'd like to say to Mr. LeBlanc that I wrote that, and I am not a member of the Canadian delegation, nor did I violate any confidentiality agreement.

I thank you very much for your time and attention to this, and I appreciate it. Thanks.

Good afternoon, honourable members. Thank you very much for inviting me to address you today.

My name is Solomon Friedman. I am a criminal defence lawyer in private practice in Ottawa. Although I maintain a comprehensive defence practice, a significant portion of my work is focused on firearms law, representing law-abiding hunters, target shooters, sportsmen and women, and firearms businesses in Criminal Code and related Firearms Act matters.

As the Government of Canada considers its position on the arms trade treaty, it is important that Parliament be aware of the potential domestic implications of the treaty in general, and in particular of certain more problematic provisions. I preface my remarks by simply noting that there is, as of yet, no official final draft of the treaty before this committee for consideration. Accordingly, issues highlighted today may become moot and new ones may arise. I base my comments, therefore, on the chair's text and on suggested model texts, which have been circulated by the United Nations and various NGOs, and by Canada's official policy statements concerning the proposed treaty.

In my view, there are three distinct areas of concern with regard to the proposed treaty. First, does the treaty signify a step backwards in firearms regulation and a change of direction for this government? Second, will the treaty adversely affect law-abiding gun owners and businesses by influencing domestic criminal and regulatory law and by unduly hampering law reform in Canada? Third, are certain key treaty provisions overly broad in their scope and reach?

With your kind permission, I will address each in turn.

First, the government should be careful that this treaty not signify a regression, a step backwards, in how firearms and gun owners are treated in Canada and abroad. Since 2006, the Canadian government has demonstrated a shift, exemplified in policy, regulation, and most recently legislation, in how Canadian gun owners are regulated under our law. Instead of punishing the law-abiding for the acts of the lawless, the government has consistently signalled that the regulation of firearms should target those who wilfully and unlawfully misuse firearms in a criminal manner.

It is imperative that Canada's involvement with the arms trade treaty not signify either a condemnation of responsible civilian firearms ownership or a step backwards to a time when it was thought—based on ideological speculation, not empirical evidence—that somehow the criminal misuse of guns could be addressed by more onerous and stringent regulation of law-abiding civilian gun owners, be they farmers, hunters, or target shooters.

Aside from the potential for symbolic repercussions, Parliament should be aware that international law, despite being conceived of and legislated thousands of miles away, can potentially have very real implications here at home. Of course, in Canada, unless a treaty is implemented by domestic legislation, it is not, strictly speaking, a part of Canadian law. However, courts are increasingly turning to international law, be it in the form of binding treaties or normative principles, when interpreting domestic law.

For example, a court may consider the arms trade treaty when wrestling with an unclear provision in the Firearms Act or the Criminal Code. Of course, despite Parliament's best intentions, legislators do not always say what they mean and mean what they say. For that reason, Parliament should be particularly concerned with broad, overreaching purposive clauses and preamble-like statements. If these are in conflict with our own domestic approach to regulating firearms, we do not want to put a court in the position of having to square domestic statutory interpretation with Canada's statements on the international stage.

Of course, such a discussion is, by its very nature, entirely speculative. We do not know which provisions of the Firearms Act or the Criminal Code will be litigated and require interpretation by our courts. Similarly, we do not know how a court may choose to use the arms trade treaty as the basis of statutory interpretation. Accordingly, when crafting any treaty provisions, Canada should proceed with caution.

Aside from the courtrooms of this country, the effects of the arms trade treaty may be felt in the chambers of Parliament as well. To illustrate this point, let me turn to the long-gun registry for a moment.

I had the opportunity to testify before the parliamentary committees that reviewed and ultimately passed Bill C-19, both in the House and the Senate. At both these sessions, proponents of the long-gun registry repeatedly cited Canada's international commitments in the UN and other global forums as a purported reason for maintaining the wasteful and ineffective registry.

It is important that the government assess this treaty with an eye to not just the current state of firearms regulation in Canada but also to how the law may develop in the future. Make no mistake about it, the Firearms Act is desperately in need of rewrite, revision, and reform. Parliament should not bind itself through treaty commitments or other international instruments and thereby prevent the meaningful reform that is required to restore equity and fairness to the treatment of two million law-abiding Canadian gun owners.

Finally, I would like to point out two particularly problematic provisions that appear in numerous draft texts and proposals for the arms trade treaty.

First, it is essential that any final treaty protect Canada's sovereignty and national discretion in the regulation of civilian-owned firearms. I would therefore commend the government for the approach it has taken to propose the introduction of a paragraph acknowledging and respecting “responsible and accountable trans-national use of firearms for recreational purposes, such as sport shooting, hunting and other forms of similar lawful activities”. This is a good first step.

Also, many states have argued for a ban on firearms transfers to “non-state actors”. The use of this term is overbroad and inconsistent with Canadian domestic law. I would agree, therefore, with Canada's recent proposal that the phrase “illegal armed groups” be used instead. While no one would argue that armed guerrilla groups and insurrectionist insurgents should be denied firearms, the term “non-state actors” on its face connotes any non-government entity or individual, including, it would seem, responsible and law-abiding civilian gun owners.

In closing, I think the most important issue for this committee in considering the arms trade treaty is one of focus. It is clear that Canada should support measures that keep firearms out of the hands of those who seek to do ill, whether it is to terrorize their own people or to topple democratically elected governments.

At the same time, however, Canada must expressly recognize on the international stage, as it has done at home, that the lawful use and ownership of firearms is consistent with both international and domestic peace and security. For that reason, the arms trade treaty should not focus on compliant and law-abiding civilian gun owners. As I have seen time and time again in my firearms law practice, such an approach is ineffective, unworkable, and fundamentally unjust.

Thank you, Mr. Chair. I will share my seven minutes with my two colleagues, the one on my left and the one on my right.

I would have liked to ask our witnesses a number of questions, and I thank them for being here today. My question is for the Oxfam-Québec representative, Ms. Holguin.

She said in her presentation that it was unfortunate that socio-economic development is no longer included in Canada's criteria. I think you were all here earlier when we mentioned the six criteria used for that negotiation. I would like Ms. Holguin to give us more detail about this, to clarify the connection she is establishing between these negotiations and socio-economic development, and that she describes to us how these issues could be addressed as part of the negotiations on the United Nations arms trade treaty.

We think that the treaty needs to take these criteria into consideration. Before a country decides to transfer weapons, it must determine whether doing so will contribute to violating human rights or international humanitarian law and hinder development, in which case, those resources should perhaps instead be put toward fighting poverty.

In an Oxfam report that will be published this week, we indicate that, in 2009-2010, fragile states have increased their military spending by 15%. Of course, they could have used those resources to send children to school, improve their health care system or feed people. The treaty's introduction indicates that there is a connection between development and armed violence, and that in the case of a transfer, the country should consider what their responsibilities are.

The effectiveness of aid is also an issue for us. It is something that is extremely important for this government. If we give aid to fragile countries and others, but they use that money to buy weapons, it doesn't make sense. In our report, we give the example of Eritrea, which used 35% of its budget to buy weapons. But 35% of that country's total budget comes from development aid. In other words, the money comes in on one side and goes out the other.

As I mentioned, I'm from Colombia. I've been in Canada for 15 years now, but I grew up there. Colombia has been in a state of conflict for 50 years. None of the children have access to education. Inequality is growing. Why? Because the Colombian government has spent a lot of money in the course of the conflict. Colombia is of enormous economic interest to Canada. So there is not only the question of how effective the aid is; there is also an economic interest. If we want companies to engage in development in Colombia, but Colombia doesn't apply any control of weapons and everyone plays by different rules, it won't work.

You gave the example of Syria, which is fairly recent. Could you please give us more detail about how this treaty will mitigate international armed conflicts? Are there any other examples you could give us in this regard?

I'm not sure I caught the end of that, but I think I understand generally what you're saying.

The other example I would give, as a contemporary example that hasn't been in the headlines in the same way Syria has, is Sudan. With the conflict in Darfur, there was a Security Council arms embargo, but it was only on the region. It wasn't on the whole of Sudan. Without going into a lot of detail, arms still were sold to Sudan and they got into Darfur, for all sorts of reasons, and to both sides in that situation. It shows the political will around the rigorousness of an arms embargo and the breadth you need to have to truly deal with an armed conflict. We just don't have enough of that to rely on it.

The other thing is that there is an increasing conflict now between Sudan and the newly independent South Sudan. Again, the international community has really struggled to deal with that through things like Security Council resolutions. There's a lot of attention on what's happening in South Sudan with the refugee flows, but not so much within Sudan. You have the government bombing two southern states, causing hundreds of thousands of people to flee, but they're bombing their own citizens.

I'm picking on the Security Council, but there is a reason for that. You would think that a state bombing its own citizens would result in some sort of Security Council condemnation, and it hasn't. And because that's where.... When I say there are few regulations, we're looking for something where there is a common standard, where people know where that bar is, and we don't have that for the arms trade. Everyone is sort of looking to a different set of rules. We're looking to establish that common set of rules so that even if not everyone has yet signed on to a treaty, the common standard exists, that norm exists, and you can use that as pressure to say, “You are falling short as a state”.

It's primarily Russia and China that have been selling to Sudan, but also Belarus. There are a number of states arming South Sudan, which is a new county being seen as a new market.

So it's to be able to bring that norm to these contexts and say, “Don't help fuel a conflict. Look at the abuses that are taking place. Look at how these weapons are being used.”

I have just a comment on what Ms. Homes has been saying, and I think what Mr. Bernardo was saying something very similar to—that a treaty like this probably would have very little effect on a government turning on its own citizens. I think that could be a huge problem, and I don't know that it's going to really be solved by this; I'm skeptical.

To the Canadian Shooting Sports Association, you talked about a consensus being reached in regard to this treaty that I think the U.S. asked for. That could be a real challenge. Maybe you could talk about that a little bit more. What is the American position on this ATT, and what are the positions of other countries that might be a party to it?

Both of you are familiar with the United Nations. Could you maybe talk a little bit about that?

The U.S. position in regard to the arms trade treaty has not been fully declared. In looking back at previous references, Ambassador Bolton testified to the United Nations last time that the United States would entertain absolutely no measures whatsoever that would impinge upon their second amendment, which is the right of citizens of the United States to keep and bear arms. So it seems that constitutionally any U.S. involvement in something where the firearms of their citizens might be regulated by an international agreement is completely a non-starter. Now, while the U.S. has not declared itself yet with regard to this particular item in the current ATT talks, the U.S. Senate has. After the last conference last summer, the U.S. Senate sent a strongly worded letter to Barack Obama signed by a majority of the senators, which stated that if civilian firearms were going to be included in the arms trade treaty, then the U.S. Senate would refuse to ratify it.

If any member would like a copy of that letter, I have a copy of it.

As for other countries around the world, I think you see countries that perhaps would be quite agreeable to the exclusion of civilian firearms, particularly with regard to their domestic regulation. In previous negotiations that have happened within the UN framework, this has been a constant bugaboo. It's been an irritant going right back to 1995 when this stuff all started. It's always been a roadblock. If there's a legitimate need or legitimate interest in going forward with a real arms trade treaty that deals with the export of military weapons into the underdeveloped areas of the world, then you have to do what you can to make that happen. In doing so, if you include the domestically regulated firearms of civilians in that mix, you're already trying to do a dance with one foot in a concrete block, and it's not going to happen.

Mr. Friedman, I was interested in your testimony. I understand we could sign on to an international treaty at the United Nations without ratifying it here in Canada, and it would be binding upon us. I think I heard you say that. I would like to know how such an international treaty might affect criminal proceedings here in Canada. How would it affect law-abiding citizens here? I wasn't clear. You touched on this, yet I'm not clear as to how that works.

In Canada, international law is formally received into domestic law through implementation by statute. That, however, is really not the end of the conversation, particularly when we look at statutory interpretation. Statutory interpretation is probably the most boring class in law school, and it has to do with how we divine the meaning of words and phrases in our legislation. Increasingly—and this is what I refer to—courts are turning to Canada's international commitments to decipher words or phrases that may appear in our own domestic legislation and that, for whatever reason, are unclear. As I said, this is a speculative process, but it's one that has happened again and again, and it has certainly gained favour in Canadian legal circles. The Supreme Court itself is engaged in this. There's nothing new or unusual about it.

I think what should be of concern to the Canadian government when considering the arms trade treaty is ensuring that, for example, when we have overarching statements of principle—let's say, for example, about how Canada ought to view the regulation of firearms, be they civilian or not—those phrases not be inadvertently transmitted and received into our domestic legislation. I pointed to the example of a judge who is trying to weigh a particular phrase in the Criminal Code—and in this case it would be something about firearms transfer, whether it be ownership, registration, or use—who would then look to the international law and say, “Well, if Canada has made this profound and overarching statement on”—let's say—“firearms control, including civilian use, then I should take a harsh or stricter interpretation.” That is precisely how it could affect law-abiding gun owners in Canada.

Ordinarily, for example, when we have an ambiguity in a Criminal Code statute, we say it's resolved in favour of the accused. If, however, there are other interpretive sources, such as international law, that give a different interpretation, that rule may not be followed.

I'll use this time just to clarify a matter that was brought up earlier by Madame Laverdière. She referred to Minister Baird's responses to one of her questions to the committee on December 1, 2011.

I'll just read the question, because it's pretty clear. She seemed to believe that he said he didn't know who appointed the members of the negotiating team. In fact the question from Madame Laverdière was as follows:

With regard to the next round of negotiations, as you know, there are a lot of civil society organizations who have been working on that issue, either globally or in the hemisphere. I was a party to some of those negotiations at one point, and I can tell you that these people brought a lot of expertise and knowledge to the Canadian team as a whole.

In the next negotiations, do you intend to bring all sides of civil society, existing expertise and groups that have participated in previous negotiations?

The minister replied:

As I responded,

—he'd responded earlier to one of her questions about a previous round of negotiations—

I don't know who was part of that delegation. If you have anyone you think could contribute, I'd be very pleased to receive any suggestions you might have.