President: I am very grateful and honored that you
are able to be here today. There is a great deal of interest in our country
concerning these talks and there is a sense of anticipation. We have already
been able to develop a good personal friendship and I think that this will
help to minimize any differences we might have in the future and to maximize
the areas of agreement. We have a chance to discuss any matters that you
wish this morning, and this evening there will be a supper with about 45
other participants, the largest of these dinners we have had, and after
dinner I would like to meet privately with the Prime Minister. Then again
tomorrow we will talk. So we don’t need to rush and we can discuss issues in
detail. My Cabinet is also at your disposal and we are eager to make your
stay here profitable.

We would like to discuss with you how we can work together with you and with
your Arab neighbors in the search for peace in the Middle East. We have
assumed a position of responsibility as one of the co-chairmen of the Geneva
Conference, and, before you became Prime Minister, we met with all of the
other Middle East leaders. To begin, let me describe some of the principles
that we have evolved, not as a blueprint, but rather to give you an idea of
what we have discussed. Secretary Vance will go to the Middle East soon, but will leave Israel
for his last stop so that he will arrive as late as possible. You can work
this out with him.

Our only goal is a comprehensive peace settlement. We have no plan and we
have no preconditions for negotiations. We recognize that no outsider can
impose a settlement and that this would not be desirable in any case. We
want to be an intermediary who is trusted by both sides. It has been my
practice to tell Prime Minister Rabin, President Assad, President Sadat, and King Hussein the same thing. We recognize that our success can
only be based on eventual agreement among the parties, and not their
agreement with us, so we have no conceived plan. We are there to help as an
intermediary and as a chairman of the Geneva Conference, if it takes
place.

The basis for our hopes rests on two documents that have been accepted by
both parties: Resolutions 242 and 338. Although the parties interpret these
differently, the resolutions do give us a good foundation and represent a
major step. We have tried to understand the nuances of wording and the
interpretation of the words by each side.

I have tried to expand on Resolution 242 in one major area—to define what is
meant by a comprehensive peace. 242 only talks about the end of the state of
belligerency. But I believe that peace must also include open borders,
trade, friendship, student exchanges, transportation across borders, and
diplomatic recognition. In short, peace should involve normalization of
relations in their entirety. We have defined this in the same way with all
of the leaders. This is a difficult concept [Page 338]for the Arab leaders. King Hussein is most amenable. President Sadat sees some possibility of this, as he
told me privately, and he thinks that it could be achieved within a few
years. He has mentioned five years publicly. President Assad pointed out
that 18 months ago he would not have been able to make the kind of public
commitment that he has made to negotiations and to peace with Israel, but
now he is also able to say that. So none of the leaders have disavowed the
concept, but they have stressed how difficult it will be to bring about such
changes.

The territorial issue is also difficult. We do not have any maps or borders
in mind. The borders will have to be mutually agreed, and they should be
defensible and security should be assured. The borders should also be
recognized, and this is something that you will have to settle in
negotiations with your neighbors.

The last question involves the refugees. This is mentioned in the UN Resolutions. Whether the Palestinians should
have an area that they can control locally or whether they should have a
separate nation, as the Arabs propose, is a matter for negotiations. We have
not thought a separate Palestinian state would be advisable, and we prefer
that a homeland be tied to Jordan, but we have no plan to put forward. We
have discussed this in the same way with all of the leaders. Another
difficult question for the Arabs to solve is how to bring the Palestinians
into the discussions. If there is a meeting in Geneva, we understand the
Israeli position, and as you know, there are some differences among the
Arabs themselves. President Sadat,
and King Hussein to a lesser extent,
favor Palestinian representation as part of a Jordanian delegation.
President Assad prefers a single Arab delegation and thinks that it should
negotiate as a single body. Others feel that each state should have its own
delegation and should deal directly with you. We have not violated any
confidences and we will not reveal any positions that would embarrass any of
the leaders.

After our discussions and after Secretary Vance’s trip to the area, it might be a good idea for him to
visit Israel last in order to report to you on the Arab attitudes. We want
to accommodate your desires on this. I am eager to hear your views on how to
proceed and on our role. I would also like to hear your thoughts on how the
Arabs should perform to show their good faith. You might also want to
discuss how Israel can take steps to help convince the Arabs to negotiate.
Neither side now trusts the other and neither side fully trusts us. We want
to win that trust. I would like to hear your views and I would be glad to
answer any questions that you have. We will try to present your views to the
Arabs as clearly as possible. We are also eager to see you and your
neighbors negotiate directly. We have no desire to be an intermediary, and
as soon as they show a willingness to negotiate directly, that will be fine.
Let me repeat that you are very welcome here.

Prime Minister Begin: Mr. President, may I start with a word of
praise for Ambassador Lewis. He is
the most popular diplomat in Israel. My Foreign Minister and I have full
confidence in him. That confidence has been already of great importance as
was proved the night before I left Israel. We had information on movements
of Egyptian forces and we have to be very careful. We made a mistake in
October 1973. We had all the necessary information, but the intelligence was
evaluated poorly. We suffered a great deal in that war and we can’t let that
happen again. We did not mobilize this time, but we did strengthen our
position in the south. I called the US
Ambassador and I asked him to find out about Egyptian intentions. These were
clarified to our satisfaction and it proves that confidence can lead to good
results. On Lebanon we have also talked with Ambassador Lewis. I told him that we do not want any
Lebanese territory; that we do not want war; and that we will not let down
our Christian allies. We have been a minority in the past, but we are not
one now. Please show the President the map.2 (General Poran produces map of South Lebanon, with
Muslim, Christian, and Druze villages indicated.) As you can see, the
Christians are outnumbered. There are five thousand members of the PLO who live in their midst and who shell
their villages every night. We come to their rescue and we aim our artillery
at the sources of fire that threaten the Christian villages. Otherwise, they
would be wiped out. The fourth point I made to Ambassador Lewis about South Lebanon is that we will
not take you by surprise. We will consult you if any contingencies arise. It
is fair to say that we will not let the Christian minority be destroyed.
That is our main concern.

President: Do you feel that the central government is
the best protector of the Christians in the long run?

Prime Minister Begin: Yes, President Sarkis himself is a Christian, but he is helpless. The
PLO almost destroyed Lebanon.

President: Our inclination is to give him some
military assistance.

Prime Minister Begin: That’s a good idea, but then a complete
solution to the PLO in the south will still
be required. For now, the PLO only attacks
the Christians, but later they might aim at us. We want real quiet. We
basically agree to the idea of your helping the Lebanese army.

President: That would be preferable to a UN force.

Prime Minister Begin: Early this morning I received an appeal from
the ruler of Ethiopia.3 He wants direct help against the
Muslim Arab groups that are invading Eritrea and which threaten to dismember
[Page 340]Ethiopia. This makes a great
impression on us. Ethiopia has been hostile to the United States, but now he
wants to improve relations. We received this message from the head of
Ethiopian Intelligence. I promised that I would consult with my Foreign
Minister and my Defense Minister to see what we could do. We need to try to
save Ethiopia from being taken by the Soviets. This may be the propitious
time. Ethiopia has proclaimed itself to be a Marxist-Leninist state, but now
we have new developments. They have been disappointed by Soviet aid. This
may be the time to turn the tables.

President: We had an aid program to Ethiopia when we
were asked to leave. Mengistu turned his back on us and we have been quite
concerned about developments there. I am interested in the message that you
received.

Prime Minister Begin: We are still there.

Dr. Brzezinski: Does Mengistu know of this message?

Prime Minister Begin: Of course, It is from Mengistu to me through
Intelligence channels. He thinks it is a propitious time for change. If
things can be changed in Ethiopia, this would be very good. The Ambassador
can translate the message and give it to the Secretary of State.

Now, to our problem, Mr. President. We cannot allow our people to be
destroyed. In my book,4 I
used the word “tertiated” instead of “decimated” to describe what happened
to our people. One in three were killed. This is what happened to us in
Europe. No one came to our rescue. We could not do anything. Our country was
under British rule and in 1939 the British issued a White Paper calling for
the creation of a Palestinian state which would have an Arab majority of
two-thirds. They were prepared to carry this out with all the physical
pressure available to them. When the boats came to Israel filled with people
trying to save themselves from hell, the British turned them away and told
them that they would never see Palestine. So we began to fight to save our
people. If we had not, we would have gone under. Until then, with the
Balfour Declaration and the Mandate established at San Remo in 1922,5 we had begun the great return to
our home.

Already in 1920, the Arabs began to attack the Jews. There were terrible
atrocities. Jabotinsky,6
who was my master and teacher, led the fight of self defense. In 1921, the
Arabs again attacked in Jaffa. And this time civilians were killed. In 1929,
once again all over the country there were hundreds who were killed by the
Arabs. Then from 1936 to 1939, for three years there was permanent
bloodshed. The only real peace that we had was during the four and one-half
years when we were fighting against the British. None of the Arabs helped us
against the British. There was real peace then, but on November 30, 1947,
just twenty-four hours after the UN
resolution on partition, the Arabs attacked again. That war only ended in
January 1948. Then a civil war broke out up until May 1948. Their aim was to
destroy us. On May 15 and 16, 1948, just after Israel’s independence, the
military invasion began. We were invaded by the Jordanian Arab Legion, the
Egyptians and the Syrians. We had to fight. There were only 650,000 Jews in
those days, and we had to fight three armies, plus the Iraqis. All in all,
seven Arab countries went to war against us. I am not exaggerating when I
say that sometimes we had to fight with our bare hands and sometimes with
homemade arms that didn’t always work. We lost one percent of our population
in that war, 6000 people. That would now mean 30,000, and you can imagine
how many it would mean to the United States to lose one percent of its
population.

But we survived and we achieved our independence, and we began to bring in
our people, especially from the Arab countries. 800,000 came from the Arab
countries, and 400,000 Arabs left. We did not want them to leave. I myself
wrote a pamphlet which was translated into Arabic urging them not to leave.
But their leaders asked them to leave so that they could march on Tel Aviv
unimpeded. We faced the possibility of destruction in our own land, and the
bloodshed was permanent. Within the Armistice Demarcation Lines7 for 19 years we never had one day of
peace. The conflict now is not about territory. We did not occupy Sinai and
Golan and Judea and Samaria for nineteen years, and yet we had permanent
bloodshed. The PLO was organized in 1964,
and it adopted in its charter a statement saying that the foundation of
Israel is null and void. The bloodshed has gone on permanently. My
grandchild was bombed in Jerusalem. They were able to reach the outskirts of
Tel Aviv. There were attacks on Shafrir and students were killed. We lost
1500 people in these skirmishes, up until the Sinai campaign of 1956. In the
Sinai war, the British and the French knew in ad[Page 342]vance, but we were fighting for our national
self-defense. Most of the attacks against us were coming from the Gaza
Strip. We occupied Sinai and then we were forced to retreat by both the
Soviet Union and the United States working through the UN. I visited the United States in those days
and I met Mr. McCormack and Mr. Knowland, leaders in the Congress, and they told me that
President Eisenhower and Secretary
of State Dulles were considering
going to the Security Council for sanctions against Israel. But the leaders
of both of these parties said that there would be no sanctions against
Israel, because Israel had fought for its life. But Israel did submit
anyway. Golda Meir has told me that she was promised by Secretary Dulles that no Egyptian forces would enter
Gaza, but, within twenty-four hours after Israeli forces left, the Egyptians
came in and carried out terrible atrocities against those who had welcomed
us. Ben Gurion got very angry. He
felt that the pledge he had been given was not being carried out. He sent
Golda Meir to see Secretary Dulles,
and she was received and asked about the promise. His answer was “What can
be done? Are you going to start another war over this?” When the Six-Day war
came, we had very violent fighting in the Gaza area against both Egyptian
and Palestinian forces. We lost hundreds of men there.

In May of 1967, I remember being at the Independence Day parade when we got
news of Egypt’s mobilization in Sinai. For two weeks we were surrounded by a
ring of steel. There were more tanks facing us than those that Germany had
sent against the Soviet Union in 1941. All of the Arab capitals were calling
for our death, and wanting to throw us into the sea. There were
demonstrations in Cairo, in Baghdad, and elsewhere. They were using real
Nazi-like language. We were still within the “green line” in those days,
just eight miles between our border and the sea. The Egyptians were in Gaza
also, and we were threatened in the north from the Golan Heights. They also
threatened us from the east, where the Arab Legion confronted us with tanks,
even though they had promised not to send tanks to that area. We formed a
Government of National Unity. People were afraid for their lives. Mrs.
Dayan said that she had knives
ready to fight. We were outnumbered and outgunned. On Sunday we had an
all-day meeting in the Cabinet and we decided to take the initiative. The
Six-Day war was an act of legitimate self-defense to save ourselves from
total destruction.

President Kennedy during the second
Cuban confrontation said that the hour of maximum national peril does not
arise with the start of shooting, but rather before. Our hour of maximum
peril was before the war began. We acted in a spirit of legitimate
self-defense. Your predecessors gave us the same assessment. President
Johnson talked of this as a war
that was thrust upon us. We defended ourselves, had victory, and salvation.
We saved our children. This was ten years ago.

Now you can see that national security is not an excuse for expansion. We
have always believed in our right to Eretz Israel,8 but we will not make war to
achieve that right. We will do it by peaceful means. National security is
meant to protect the lives of our civilians. Let me show you a second
map.9 (The map shows Israel, with its concentrations of
population, and with the borders desired by the Arab countries.) Sadat wants
our complete withdrawal and the creation of a Palestinian state in Judea and
Samaria, plus a corridor to Gaza. This corridor would cut across our
country. What would the result be? Here is a point just nine miles from our
shore near Netanya. Here the country can be cut in two in a few minutes. The
Arab countries have over ten thousand tanks, and we have 3000 or more.
Fortunately, we also have good tankers, but it is only nine miles to the
sea. Here you see the bulk of our civilian population. Modern Soviet
artillery has a range of 43 kilometers, 800 meters. It can reach our
population centers.

Demilitarization may work in the desert, but it cannot work in a populated
area. Jerusalem was proclaimed a demilitarized area, but it never was on
either side before 1967. We had to militarize our side and the other side
did as well. We cannot play with the lives of our children. Two million
Israelis live in this area around Tel Aviv. Any home can be hit. Men would
not be able to defend their women and children. (The Prime Minister pauses.)
There was a time in our history when men could not defend their women and
children and we will never let this happen again. And that would be the
situation if we went back to the 1967 lines. The maximum width of our
country would only be twenty miles. We would lose the chance for peace
because the Arabs would look at the map and would conclude that they could
push us to the sea. Please excuse my emotions.

Our concept of national security is not based on aggrandizement or expansion.
But our fathers and mothers got killed only because they were Jews and we do
not want this for our children. Let me talk now about negotiations. I submit
that for too long Israel has been an exception to normal rules. Rules have
not applied to Jews. But now we have our own country, liberated by our own
efforts. Rules should apply to us as they do to anyone else. We ask for
direct, face-to-face negotiations. I have paid great attention to what I
heard yesterday10 and there are many
areas of agreement between the United States and Israel. We are for direct
negotiations, with no preconditions, and with no prior [Page 344]commitments. If President Sadat makes a proposal, he can do so. We
will discuss his ideas and we will react. He is entitled to do so. But we
will not agree in advance to that map before negotiations even begin.
Negotiations must be free of prior conditions.

We all stand in Israel for a united Jerusalem as our capital. Only the
Communists disagree and they only have five seats out of 120 in the Knesset.
All of the Knesset is united on this point and we shall express our opinion,
but the Arabs do not have to agree to this in advance before negotiations.
That would be a precondition. We do not ask or give prior commitments. As is
usual after a war, there should be peace treaties.

President: Do you consider Resolutions 242 and 338 as
preconditions?

Prime Minister Begin: We accept them.

President: As the basis for negotiations?

Prime Minister Begin: Yes, but we should be free of demands for
prior conditions.

President: When you say that, is that contrary to the
idea that 242 and 338 are the basis for negotiations? It would help if you
could say that they are the basis for negotiations.

Prime Minister Begin: I’ll say it publicly. Yes, sir. Now let me
turn to the framework of peace. I have a proposal which has been adopted by
the Cabinet. I had a hard time keeping it secret. Everyone wanted to know
about it, but I felt that you should be the first one to hear about it, so I
have brought it to you. Let me cover the main elements and I will leave a
copy with you.

Point One. Israel favors a reconvening of the Geneva
Peace Conference by the two co-chairmen. According to Article III of
Resolution 338, there should be negotiations between the parties concerned
under appropriate auspices. We acknowledge that Resolution 338 includes 242.
There is no doubt about our attitude on these two documents or about
Geneva.

Point Two. Who shall participate?

President: This is your chance to make real news.
(Laughter.)

Prime Minister Begin: I will be telling the press about our
proposal. The participants should be the accredited delegations of the
sovereign states of Israel, Egypt, Syria and Jordan. Syria did not attend
before, but probably this time it will. We can talk later about what we will
do if they refuse to come on this basis and insist on the PLO.

Point Three. The states should go to Geneva with no
prior conditions and no demands for prior commitments. Geneva should begin
with public sessions, and then three mixed commissions should be formed:
Egypt-Israel, Syria-Israel, Jordan-Israel. These should be [Page 345]mixed commissions such as existed at
Rhodes. This is not new for the Arabs. They sat with us before. We want to
negotiate peace treaties, so we suggest three mixed commissions. Their goal
would be negotiation of peace treaties.

Point Four. I was pleased to see recently that the
State Department recently said that peace treaties were an important
objective.11 If we can get agreement on
that, it would be very important. In the past, we have talked about the
essence of peace—diplomatic relations, trade, and so forth. We don’t need
that. In international law, when one says peace treaty, that includes the
termination of the state of war, and then a chapter on territories, which
will spell out the permanent boundaries, and then a chapter on diplomatic
relations and economic clauses. There were peace treaties signed after both
World Wars I and II. The U.S. also signed a treaty with Japan along these
lines. But first the state of war must end, and then good relations must be
defined. So let us try to negotiate peace treaties, article by article. The
chairmanship of the mixed commissions would rotate, and the negotiations
would be face-to-face. We will work on three separate peace treaties. This
may take some time, but when it is done, we will reconvene the Geneva
Conference to sign. This is our proposal.

Going back to the question of participation, in case Egypt says they will not
go to Geneva unless the PLO attends, then
they will make the Geneva Conference impossible. The PLO was not there four years ago. If they
insist, then they are responsible for Geneva not convening. Any change in
the participants must be accepted by all. We cannot accept the PLO being there. My friend, Shmuel Katz, will describe how we see the
PLO later. They have a charter which
declares our state null and void. They want to destroy us. Therefore, we
have no reason to negotiate with them. Our alternatives are:

1. Through the good offices of the United States, we would set up mixed
commissions somewhere without Geneva. This could be done through normal
diplomatic channels with U.S. good offices. We could start negotiations for
a peace treaty in this way. In the Rhodes agreements of 1949, three mixed
commissions met under Mr. Ralph
Bunche, who represented the UN, but who really used his good offices on behalf of the
United States. This led to the negotiation of armistice agreements which
were accepted and signed and were meant to be a step toward peace.
Twenty-nine years later and four wars later, we want that peace. We have an
obligation to work for it.

2. The second alternative would be to adopt the idea suggested in 1972 of
proximity talks12 that might take place in New York. We
accept [Page 346]this method as well. The
US can set up mixed commissions and
negotiate through proximity talks.

That is the end of my remarks. I wanted to tell you about my people, our
land, our suffering, and our care for the future as well. We do have to look
to the future. I have made a serious proposal and I have an open mind to
hear your ideas. We want to keep the momentum and to maintain direct
contact. With God’s help, we may eventually negotiate peace treaties.

President: Let me respond briefly. I think your major
points are very clear. In some ways, they are very encouraging. I am sure
your desire to go to the peace conference is genuine and I am grateful for
that attitude. There are some obstacles that we see based on our long
discussions with Arab leaders. First, let me say that we have no preference
on the details of an ultimate agreement, nor on procedures, nor on any
arrangements concerning the PLO. On the
basis of President Sadat’s public
comments on July 16, which he made at my request,13 he seems to accept Resolutions
242 and 338, as does King Hussein. I
think President Assad also does. Assad was very insistent that the Arabs
negotiate as a unified body, not as individual nations. Sadat does not
agree. Hussein also prefers individual delegations. My guess is that if
Sadat and Hussein show strong leadership, Assad will agree to go to Geneva
and to divide into national negotiating groups. This is my impression. There
will be a need for us to meet them again and for them to coordinate their
position on this.

A second problem we see has to do with territory. If Israel reserves the
question of borders until Geneva, that would be adequate. You don’t need to
make any promises on final borders. You can just adopt the language of the
UN Resolutions on withdrawal. Then the
depth and the other arrangements can be discussed at Geneva. That would be
an adequate degree of flexibility. But I want to speak frankly. On the
question of the West Bank, of Judea and Samaria, it is very important for
the Arabs. This has to be a subject of negotiations. For their people and
for your people, the question of the West Bank will be important to keep
open for discussions and not to be closed as a subject before negotiations
begin. The attitude of your government to encourage new settlements could
prevent a peace conference itself and I recognize how important this is to
you. One of the concerns that was very acute here is the attitude of you and
your government on settlements on the West Bank. It almost seems to close
off any chance for negotiations.

The third question has to do with the PLO.
Your predecessors’ view, as I understood it, is that the PLO might attend Geneva as part of an Arab
delegation or as part of the Jordanian delegation—at least as Palestinians,
if not as the PLO. We also agreed in Sinai
II that if the PLO were to recognize
Israel’s right to exist, then it might be possible for us to negotiate with
them. We know that there is a question of whether you would then participate
or not. We have refrained from contacts with representatives of the
Palestinian organizations and we respect the agreement that we made with
you. However, we have told the PLO through
others that if they would endorse 242 publicly and if they were to
acknowledge the right of Israel to exist in peace, then we would talk to
them and listen to their position. This is difficult for us. My
understanding, and perhaps I am wrong, is that Israel would meet with the
PLO if the PLO or Palestinian leaders would acknowledge Israel’s right to
exist permanently as a free nation. So these are the three different
questions that Arab leaders have raised with us: the framework of
negotiations at Geneva, and for after the conference begins; the settlements
on the West Bank of the Jordan which prejudge the outcome of negotiations;
and some way for the PLO or Palestinians to
be represented at Geneva. These are the most difficult and they might
prevent further progress. Secretary Vance has met with the Arab leaders more than I have and he
may want to add something or to correct me.

Secretary Vance: You have given an accurate summary of the Arab
views. The issues as indicated are the question of borders, of the
Palestinian entity, and the procedural question of Palestinian
representation at Geneva. These are the critical issues, along with the
definition of the nature of peace.

President: One possibility has been that the
Palestinians might not be included at Geneva at the beginning, but when the
question of the refugees is put on the agenda, they might come in then.

Prime Minister Begin: Arab refugees and Jewish refugees.

President: We have no objection to that. We have no
preference on this. My motive is to keep the discussions open and flexible.
There are some things on which each side feels very deeply, but we have no
preconceived ideas.

Prime Minister Begin: Prime Minister Rabin did not agree to the PLO participating in a Jordanian delegation. His view was that
Palestinian Arabs could be accepted within a Jordanian delegation. We too
are Palestinians. Mr. Katz will
describe our views on this later. To convene the Geneva Conference, we are
agreeable to Palestinian Arabs being in the Jordanian delegation and we will
not look at their credentials, but they cannot be PLO.

Dr. Brzezinski: I have a question. When you speak of three
commissions, are these three bilateral commissions? Or are they mixed?

Dr. Brzezinski: Does that mean Israel plus three others, or
Israel-Egypt, Israel-Jordan, Israel-Syria?

Prime Minister Begin: The latter. We see three simultaneous,
separate procedures. They can talk day and night to reach agreement.

President: If before Geneva, or during Geneva, it is
advisable for Lebanon to participate, would this be all right?

Prime Minister Begin: We would agree. I left them out because of
the precedent. We don’t want to change the composition of Geneva, but it
would be all right.

President: I understand.

Prime Minister Begin: So we might have four mixed commissions.

President: There is no way to avoid the larger
question of the refugees, both Palestinians and the Jews from Arab
countries. On that issue, the two nations negotiating together might not be
enough. Refugees have come from many countries, and on that subject, perhaps
all four nations would have to meet?

Prime Minister Begin: I want to understand your question. Do you
mean one Arab delegation?

President: I don’t know. But on borders, it is
obvious that Israel and Syria would have to agree, and Israel and Egypt, and
so forth, but on the question of refugees, and the Palestinian question,
Syria, Jordan, Egypt, and maybe Lebanon, might also participate. This could
not be settled in separate bilateral negotiations.

Prime Minister Begin: We have no objection. That would be my first
reaction.

Shmuel Katz: Let me show you
another map.14 The Prime Minister referred to the Yom Kippur
War. There were errors made then. We were fearful for our existence. When we
speak of the PLO, we have in the back of
our mind, whenever we consider the Palestinian problem, the threat posed by
the entire Arab world. This map shows the problem as we see it. (Large map
showing all Arab countries in red, with Israel in blue.) As of now, in all
of the Arab states children in schools are taught that this is a single Arab
world which must be unified and this unity must be restored by closing this
little gap of Israel. There are 21 sovereign Arab countries. They occupy 12
million square kilometers. All of us understand why an Arab who grows up
with that kind of indoctrination believes that it is his patriotic duty and
his moral imperative to destroy Israel. The purposes of the Arab nation are
those referred to in the PLO charter. They
want to expel Israel from the great [Page 349]Arab homeland and then to purge Zionism from Palestine. It is important to
the Arab nation as a whole. The fact that this is their purpose is expressed
in various ways. I can quote from an Arab journal, al-Mussawar, of December 1968. “The expulsion of our Palestinian
brethren from their homes is no cause for anxiety, because they are now in
Arab countries, but for the world to accept our struggle against Israel, it
must be portrayed as the uprooted Palestinians against Israel.” This shows
that the Palestinian state is a recent idea to replace the idea of homeless
refugees. This puts Israel in a position of a predator which has driven
refugees out. Their scenario, based on a mythological history which has
little relationship to fact, is reflected in Arafat’s statement at the UN15 when he said that the Arab people have
been engaged in cultivating Palestine for thousands of years and they have
been the guardians of the holy places. This is in total contrast to the
facts. In the American context, I would suggest that one read Mark Twain, in
his book, Innocents Abroad, where he describes a trip
to Palestine one hundred and ten years ago. He describes it as a desert
country of weeds, mournful expanse, and desolation. Only the Jewish people
ever claimed Palestine as a homeland or ever tried to build it up. They have
been the only ones to develop it. Those who are described as Palestinian
Arabs are in fact new immigrants. Some came in during the nineteenth
century, but the largest Arab immigration to Palestine came after the
Zionist revival of the country. We believe that those Arabs who did not flee
in 1948 were probably the only ones who had deep roots in the country.
Peasants after all do not flee, even in the midst of war. The Palestinian
Arabs were told by their leaders to leave, but it was not natural that they
would do so. Those who stayed are probably the only real local Arabs.

The term Palestinian until recently was applied to us. There were many
organizations in the United States that included the name Palestine. For
example, there was the League for Labor Palestine.16 (Mr. Katz proceeds to read a long list of such names.) All of
these referred to the Zionist effort. Palestine was thought of as a Jewish
country and was not claimed as an Arab center until modern times.

Prime Minister Begin: I would like to remind you that when the
British Mandate was set up in 1922, in the preamble it stated that the
League of Nations recognized the historical connection between the Jewish
people and Palestine. Educated men knew that Palestine meant the land of
Israel. The name Palestine originated after the Bar Kochba revolt in Roman
times, when the area was renamed Syrie et Palestina. [Page 350]This goes back 18 centuries. Since then, the word
Palestine has existed. There has always been a historical connection between
the Jews and Palestine.

Mr. Katz: In 1919, Faisal agreed with
President Weizmann in a document that
was signed between the Arab state and the “representative of Palestine,”
which meant “of the Jews.” After the Mandate, the Arabs objected to the word
Palestine, preferring the word South Syria. President Assad referred to
Palestine just recently as southern Syria, and I can leave to your
imagination the political implications of that usage. The Arabs did, after
all, get three-quarters of the country, since both sides of the Jordan River
are considered Palestine. By 1922, the British created Trans-Jordan and
removed it from the Balfour Declaration’s terms. The Arabs built their state
on the other side of the Jordan. The British were able to do this because
the French gave up some of their claims to the West of Jordan. In 1919, the
French took the position that a Jewish state should be established on both
sides of the Jordan, since the western sector alone did not provide for
adequate defense. The PLO claims both sides
of the Jordan, and the Palestinians therefore already have a homeland on the
east bank of Jordan.

On another point, although the PLO is
organized and armed and trained by the Arab states, today it is also getting
Soviet support. Arms reach the PLO through
Iraq and Syria. There are some 30 to 36 training courses in the Soviet Union
for the PLO.

Prime Minister Begin: I want to discuss the question you raised
about settlements. This is a very serious matter for us. I want to speak
with candor. No settlements will be allowed to become obstacles to
negotiations. Jews and Arabs live together in Jaffa, in Haifa. There are
many towns named Hebron in the United States, and many named Bethel and
Shiloh.

President: Just 20 miles from my home town there is a
Bethel and a Shiloh, each of which has a Baptist Church!

Prime Minister Begin: Imagine the Governor of a state declaring
that all American citizens except Jews could go to live in those towns. Can
we be expected, as the government of Israel, to prevent a Jew from
establishing his home in the original Bethel? In the original Shiloh? These
will not be an obstacle to negotiation. The word “non-negotiable” is not in
our vocabulary. But this is a great moral issue. We cannot tell Jews in
their own land that they cannot settle in Shiloh. We cannot do that. This is
a serious issue to us. One day I hope you will come to visit Shiloh.

President: I have already been to Bethel.

Prime Minister Begin: You will find it interesting to see Shiloh.
There are many Biblical stories about it.

President: I can tell you that this might prevent a
Geneva Conference from even being convened. Even though you see this as no
[Page 351]problem for negotiations, my
impression of the attitudes of the other leaders is that they would view
this as a sign of bad faith on Israel’s part. The previous government
discouraged settlements, and I have no reason to draw conclusions, but I
would not be responsible if I did not point this out to you. If you could
say that there would be no new settlements until after you had met with the
Arab leaders in Geneva, that would be a very constructive step.

Prime Minister Begin: Thank you, Mr. President.

President: We should adjourn now and our discussions
can continue later. We can also talk tonight. I have one other question. We
have frequent requests from Saudi Arabia concerning Israeli overflights. We
have found Saudi Arabia helpful to us in bringing about a better attitude in
Egypt, Jordan and Syria. They want peace because they sit on great wealth
and they do not want war. I don’t know how important these overflights are
to you, but it would help if you could refrain from invading their air
space. We have asked this before. If there is information that you need, we
might be able to provide it for you in some form. It would help if you could
refrain from these flights. This is a problem for us. If Israel wants peace,
they wonder why you have to overfly their territory. It creates a feeling
among the Arabs that Israel is not sincere about wanting to reduce tensions.
I wanted you to know about this problem.

Prime Minister Begin: Yes, Mr. President. I am hearing about this
for the first time. General Poran
tells me that the Saudis have a base at Tabuk, which is a huge base aimed at
us. So we need to overfly their territory. But I will consider your request
when I get back home. If there is no risk to us, I will do what is possible.
We want an atmosphere of goodwill. General Siilavasuo helped recently with
the Egyptians and we exchanged some compliments with General Gamasy. So we
want goodwill.

President: Gestures can help. If there is information
that you need about Tabuk, we could ask the Saudis for a description of
their plans and give you a reply. It would help if you could refrain from
the flights.

Prime Minister Begin: The week after I return I will tell you. We
will do our best.

President: I asked President Sadat recently to decrease his propaganda
against Israel and to withdraw the excess troops in Sinai. He is also
returning 19 bodies of Israeli war dead.

Prime Minister Begin: We appreciate that.

President: He also said in the last week that he
supports the UN Resolutions and he did all
of these things as a gesture of good faith. In the few weeks ahead, let’s
all try to lessen tensions. I have learned a lot from our talks and I
appreciate your sharing with me your views. You [Page 352]can continue your talks this afternoon with members of
my Cabinet, and then we will review prospects tomorrow and summarize our
positions.

Prime Minister Begin: With Secretary Brown, I would like to bring up the question of our defense
requirements.

THE FRAMEWORK FOR THE PEACE-MAKING PROCESS BETWEEN ISRAEL
AND ITS NEIGHBORS

1. The Government of Israel will be prepared to participate, beginning
October 10, 1977, in a new additional session of the Geneva Peace
Conference to be convened by the two co-chairmen on the basis of
Paragraph 3 of Security Council Resolution 338 of 21 October 1973 which
states: (The Security Council) “decides that, immediately and
concurrently with the cease-fire, negotiations start between parties
concerned under appropriate auspices aimed at establishing a just and
durable peace in the Middle East.”

2. Resolution 338 includes and makes reference to Security Council
Resolution 242 of November 22, 1967.

3. Accredited delegations of sovereign states will participate in the
reconvened session of the Geneva Peace Conference, namely: the
representatives of Israel, Egypt, Syria and Jordan.

4. The participating states in the Geneva Peace Conference will present
no prior conditions for their taking part in the Conference.

5. At the public session of the reconvened Geneva Peace Conference the
representatives of the parties will make opening statements.

6. At the conclusion of the public session three mixed commissions will
be established, namely: Egyptian-Israeli; Syrian-Israeli;
Jordanian-Israeli.

7. In the framework of these mixed commissions, peace treaties between
the parties concerned will be negotiated and concluded.

8. The chairmanship of each mixed commission will be fixed by the rule of
rotation between an Israeli representative and a representative of the
neighboring state.

9. Having reached agreement on the substance of the peace treaties—i.e.
the termination of the state of war; the determination of permanent
boundaries; diplomatic relations; the economic clauses, etc.—a public
session of the Conference will again be convened for the purpose of
signing the peace treaties.

THE ALTERNATIVE

(Two Possibilities)

In the event that the states bordering on Israel refuse to participate in
the Geneva Peace Conference in accordance with the established framework
determined by the precedent of the first session of the Conference on
grounds of insistence that the organization called PLO be added to the sovereign state
delegations, it is proposed:

To establish through the good offices of the United States the
aforementioned three mixed commissions in keeping with the method used
during the Rhodes negotiations of 1949.

Or: In accordance with the principle of “proximity talks,” with a view to
conducting in the framework of such mixed commissions the negotiations
on the conclusion of peace treaties.

Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material,
Middle East File, Subject File, Box 66, Middle East: Peace Negotiations
1977 Volume I [II]. Top Secret; Sensitive. The meeting took place in the
White House Cabinet Room. Begin
visited the United States for his first international visit since taking
office in June. After 2 days of talks in Washington, Begin visited New York for a
day.↩

Apparently a reference to
Begin’s 1951 book entitled
The Revolt: The Story of the Irgun.↩

Regarding the Balfour Declaration, see footnote 2, Document 14. Held from April 19
to 26, 1920, in San Remo, Italy, the San Remo Conference, attended by
the United Kingdom, France, Italy, and Japan, determined Class “A”
mandates in the Middle East carved from the former Ottoman Empire. The
United Kingdom received the mandate for Palestine and Iraq. On April 25,
the San Remo Resolution incorporated the Balfour Declaration into
Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations, which had
established the mandate system.↩

Ze’ev Jabotinsky played a
major role in the establishment of Revisionist Zionism, a
right-of-center political movement within Zionism. He also helped found
and lead the Irgun, a militant underground Zionist organization.↩

A reference to the lines negotiated between Israel and
its Arab neighbors at Rhodes in 1949. See footnote
5, Document 18.↩

Eretz Israel refers to the Hebrew term “Eretz Yisrael,”
which means the Land of Israel.↩

Possibly a reference to
comments made when Secretary Vance and other U.S. officials met Begin when he arrived at Andrews Air
Force Base on July 18. (“Begin,
in Washington, Voices Hope for a ‘Real Peace’,” New
York Times, July 19, 1977, p. 3)↩

Proximity talks would place
Israelis and Egyptians in the same location, such as a hotel, and
American officials would act as intermediaries passing proposals and
information back and forth.↩

See Document 44. On July 16,
Sadat addressed a meeting of the Arab Socialist Union and stated Egypt’s
readiness to “end the state of war politically and legally with Israel
and noted that for “the first time in its history, Israel’s legal
existence within its borders will be recognized.” (Don Oberdorfer,
“Sadat Bares New Saudi Arms Aid,” Washington
Post, July 17, 1977, p. 1)↩