Because we are reviewing a directed verdict, we state the facts most
favorably to plaintiff, the losing party. Defendant operates Ray's Food Store in Harbor,
Oregon. Plaintiff lives near the store and shops at it five or six times a week. On
November 23, 1996, she went to the store with a friend, who intended to deliver a
videotape to a store employee. Plaintiff did not intend to purchase anything on this
particular visit. While plaintiff was entering the store, the automatic doors closed on her,
causing the injuries in question. There is evidence from which the jury could conclude
that defendant knew that the doors frequently malfunctioned, that defendant was
negligent in not permanently fixing the malfunction, and that plaintiff's injuries were the
result of that negligence.

Oregon adheres to the traditional rules governing the liability of an owner
or possessor of land, under which the duties that the occupier owes to a person who
comes on the land depend on whether the person is an invitee, licensee, or trespasser.
The occupier owes the greatest duties to an invitee, including both a duty to warn of latent
dangers and an affirmative duty to protect the invitee against dangers in the condition of
the premises about which the occupier knows or should reasonably have known. Rich v.
Tite-Knot Pine Mill, 245 Or 185, 192, 421 P2d 370 (1966). Oregon has adopted two tests
for determining whether a person is an invitee. Under the first, the "economic advantage"
test, anyone who comes on the premises for business that concerns the occupier, with the
occupier's express or implied invitation, is an invitee. Id. at 191-92; Reed v. Jackson
County, 105 Or App 24, 26-27, 803 P2d 1194 (1990), rev den 311 Or 261 (1991). Under
the second, the "invitation" test, a person is an invitee when the occupier, expressly or
impliedly, leads the person to believe that it intended visitors to use the premises for the
purpose that the person is pursuing and that the use was in accordance with the intention
or design for which the premises were adapted or prepared. Parker v. Hult Lumber &
Plywood Co., 260 Or 1, 8, 488 P2d 454 (1971); Reed, 105 Or App at 26-27.

Restatement (Second) of Torts § 332 (1974), describes both of these tests,
although it uses somewhat different terms. Both the Supreme Court and this court have
referred to the text of and the comments to section 332 in considering whether a person is
an invitee. Although the Supreme Court once refused to adopt a specific phrase in a
comment to section 332, the courts have generally found the section to be consistent with
Oregon law. SeeTaylor v. Baker, 279 Or 139, 146-47, 566 P2d 884 (1977) (generally
following section 332 but refusing to adopt one phrase in the comments); Bidiman v.
Gehrts, 133 Or App 145, 149, 890 P2d 436, rev den 321 Or 512 (1995) (relying on a
different comment); Baker v. Lane County, 28 Or App 53, 57 n 2, 558 P2d 1247 (1977)
(quoting the text of section 332).

We find section 332 and the comments to it helpful in resolving the issues
in this case. Section 332 provides:

"(1) An invitee is either a public invitee or a business visitor.

"(2) A public invitee is a person who is invited to enter or remain on land
as a member of the public for a purpose for which the land is held open to
the public.

"(3) A business visitor is a person who is invited to enter or remain on land
for a purpose directly or indirectly connected with business dealings with
the possessor of the land."

The issue in this case is whether plaintiff was an invitee when she went into
defendant's store, even though she did not intend to purchase anything during that specific
visit. We conclude that the jury could find that plaintiff was both a public invitee under
the definition in section 332(2), and thus an invitee under the invitation test, and that she
was a business visitor, and thus an invitee under the economic advantage test. Indeed, the
tests tend to merge in this situation, because a broad invitation may well be economically
advantageous to defendant's business.

We begin with the invitation test. The crucial issue under the invitation test
is the nature of the invitation that a store owner gives to the general public. In Baker, we
applied that test to hold that a boy who was present at a county fairground that was
generally open to the public, and who was injured when he wandered to a location away
from the function that he was attending, was an invitee under the invitation test. We
noted that cases hold that "when a public body maintains and occupies land or facilities
which are open to the public, then all members of the public who use the land or facility
for the purposes for which they are held open have invitee status." 28 Or App at 58.

As Baker suggests, invitee status will depend on both the purpose of the
occupier who makes the invitation to the public and the understanding of the public that
receives it. The invitation of the operator of a store selling groceries and general
merchandise to the public is likely to be quite broad, because the operator is likely to view
every person who enters as a potential customer. The invitation, thus, is not necessarily
limited to people who are interested in making a purchase during that specific visit. As
plaintiff argued to the trial court:

"Ray's opens their doors up to the public and says, 'Come to our
stores. Look at our prices.' When you park at the parking lot you get out of
your car; you see flyers, advertisements; you're subject to those on the
outside, on the doors, on the inside[.] [W]hen you walk into the front doors
you're subject to people standing right there trying to sell you things[.] * * *
That's exactly what Ray's wants.

"Why? Because if you're subject to those things, eventually those
enticements will lead you to buy something and incur [sic] * * * an
economic benefit upon Ray's. When you stand in line at the checker line,
what do they have there. Impulse items. Things that you do not plan on
buying but they want you to pick up."

The few relevant authorities generally agree with plaintiff in this respect.
Comment c to section 332 emphasizes that the proper inquiry is how a reasonable person,
examining the words or conduct of the occupier, would interpret the occupier's
willingness to receive a particular person.

"The nature of the use to which the possessor puts his land is often
sufficient to express to the reasonable understanding of the public, or
classes or members of it, a willingness or unwillingness to receive them.
Thus the fact that a building is used as a shop gives the public reason to
believe that the shopkeeper desires them to enter or is willing to permit
their entrance, not only for the purpose of buying, but also for the purpose
of looking at the goods displayed therein or even for the purpose of passing
through the shop. This is true because shopkeepers as a class regard the
presence of the public for any of these purposes as tending to increase their
business." (Emphasis added.)

Similarly, a leading hornbook states that a person is "an invitee in a store even if [the
person] enter[s] only to kill time between airplanes and intend[s] to buy nothing." Dan B.
Dobbs, Handbook of the Law of Torts § 234 at 601 (2000). We conclude that a store
owner's invitation ordinarily extends to the public at large, because store owners want to
encourage as many people as possible to view their goods and to become purchasers. The
jury, therefore, could find that plaintiff was an invitee under the invitation test on the
record before us.

The case that we have found that is factually closest to this one is Renfro
Drug Co. v. Lewis, 149 Tex 507, 235 SW2d 609 (1950). In that case, the plaintiff had an
appointment with a physician in a downtown office building. He parked in a parking
garage that was attached to that building and then went through a door from the garage
that led directly into the defendant's drug store. He fell and was injured due to alleged
defects in the entry. The plaintiff intended to pass through the store to the building lobby,
where he would take an elevator to the physician's office. Although the plaintiff had
previously purchased items at the drug store, he did not intend to do so on this occasion.
The Texas court, relying in large part on the predecessor to section 332, held that there
was sufficient evidence for the jury to find that the plaintiff was a business invitee of the
drugstore.

"Renfro had its sign on the door where the injury occurred
advertising its prescription department, and Renfro's manager testified that
the door was for the use of the general public. Thousands used the
passageway through the drugstore each month. Lewis had been a customer
of the store on a former occasion. The presence of members of the general
public in and passing through the drugstore tended to increase Renfro's
business." 235 SW2d at 617.

Thus, the very fact that the plaintiff was in the defendant's store, even though the
plaintiff's immediate purpose had nothing to do with the defendant's business, was held to
be to the defendant's economic advantage. There was, therefore, evidence to support the
trial court's implied finding that the plaintiff was an invitee.

What is common to all these discussions is the recognition that foot traffic
of any sort is potentially beneficial to the business of a store operator. As a result of that
potential advantage, a store is held to have extended a broad invitation to the public at
large, making all who enter public invitees. The expectation is that future economic
advantage will accrue from all who accept the invitation. These considerations certainly
apply in this case. Plaintiff frequently shopped at defendant's store both before and after
her injury. Although she did not intend to purchase anything at the time of her injury, she
could readily have done so if she had seen something that she wanted. A jury could find
on these facts that her presence was within the scope of defendant's invitation to potential
customers and that, both because of her possible purchase during that specific visit and
because the visit tended to reinforce her general habit of shopping at defendant's store, it
provided an economic advantage to defendant. Thus, there was evidence from which the
jury could find that plaintiff was an invitee at the time of her injury as she alleged. The
trial court erred in holding otherwise.

Reversed and remanded.

1. Plaintiff disputes whether she had fully rested before defendant made its
motion. Because of our disposition of the case, we do not need to resolve that question.

2. After the court orally granted the motion for a directed verdict, plaintiff
moved to amend her complaint to allege alternatively that she was a licensee. The court
denied the motion, in part because of its timing. Because we conclude that there was
evidence that plaintiff was an invitee, we do not need to reach plaintiff's assignment of
error concerning that motion. If plaintiff renews the motion on remand, the court will be
able to rule on it based on the situation that exists at the time of the renewed motion.