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As the Tribunal will shortly see, in the Norwegian Vidkun
Quisling the defendant Rosenberg found a very model of the
Fifth Column agent, the very personification of perfidy.
The evidence as to the early stages of the Nazi conspiracy
to invade Norway is found in a letter which the defendant
Raeder wrote on 10th January, 1944, to Admiral Assmann, the
official German Naval historian.
I put in this letter, the Document C-66, which will be
Exhibit GB 81, and which the Court will find further on in
this book of documents. I should explain that in this book
of documents the documents are inserted in the numerical
order of the series to which they belong and not in the
order of their submission to the Court. I trust that that
will be a more convenient form of bundling them together
than to set them down in the order of presentation.
THE PRESIDENT: 66?
MAJOR ELWYN JONES: C-66. It is headed "Memorandum for
Admiral Assmann, for his own information; not to be used for
publication."
The Court will observe that the first page deals with
"Barbarossa."
If the Tribunal turns to the next page, headed "(b) Weser-
Ubung," the Tribunal will find from documents which I shall
shortly be submitting to the Court, that "Weser-Ubung" was
the code name for the invasion of Norway and Denmark.
I will omit the first sentence. The document, which, as I
have said, is a communication from the defendant Raeder to
Assmann, reads as follows:
"During the weeks preceding the report on 10th October,
1939, I was in correspondence with Admiral Carls, who, in a
detailed letter to me, first pointed out the importance of
an occupation of the Norwegian coast by Germany. I passed
this letter on to C/SK1" - which is the Chief of Staff of
the Naval War Staff - "for their information and prepared
some notes based on this letter, for my report to the
Fuehrer,
[Page 180]
which I made on 10th October, 1939, since my opinion was
identical with that of Admiral Carls, while, at that
time, SK1 was more dubious about the matter. In these
notes, I stressed the disadvantages which an occupation
of Norway by the British would have for us - control of
the approaches to the Baltic, outflanking of our naval
operations and of our air attacks on Britain, pressure
on Sweden. I also stressed the advantages for us of the
occupation of the Norwegian coast - outlet to the North
Atlantic, no possibility of a British mine barrier, as
in the year 1917-1918. Naturally, at the time, only the
coast and bases were considered; I included Narvik,
though Admiral Carls, in the course of our
correspondence thought it could be excluded. The Fuehrer
saw at once the significance of the Norwegian problem;
he asked me to leave the notes and stated that he wished
to consider the question himself."
I will pause in the reading of that document at that point
and return to it later, so that the story may be revealed to
the Court in a chronological order.
That report of Raeder, in my submission, shows that the
whole evolution of this Nazi campaign against Norway affords
a good example of the participation of the German High
Command in the Nazi conspiracy to attack inoffensive
neighbours.
This letter, an extract from which I have just read, has
revealed that Raeder reported to Hitler on 10th October,
1939 -
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): When was that report?
MAJOR ELWYN JONES: The report C-66 was made in January,
1944, by the defendant Raeder to Assmann, who was the German
Naval historian, and so, presumably, was for the purposes of
history.
Before Raeder's report of 10th October, 1939 was made to the
Fuehrer, he got a second opinion on the Norwegian invasion.
On 3rd October, Raeder made out the questionnaire to which I
now invite the Court's attention. It is Document C-122, and
the Court will find it next but one to C-66 in the document
book. That will now be Exhibit GB 82.
That, as the Tribunal will observe, is headed "Gaining of
Bases in Norway (extract from War Diary)," and bears the
date of 3rd October, 1939. It reads:-
"The Chief of the Naval War Staff (who was the defendant
Raeder) considers it necessary that the Fuehrer be
informed as soon as possible of the opinions of the Naval
War Staff on the possibilities of extending the
operational base to the North. It must be ascertained
whether it is possible to gain bases in Norway under the
combined pressure of Russia and Germany, with the aim of
improving our strategic and operational position. The
following questions must be given consideration:-
(a) What places in Norway can be considered as bases?
(b) Can bases be gained by military force against
Norway's will, if it is impossible to carry this out
without fighting?
(c) What are the possibilities of defence after the
occupation?
(d) Will the harbours have to be developed completely
as bases, or have they already advantages suitable for
supply position?"
Then there follows in parentheses:
("F.O. U-boats" - which is a reference, of course, to the
defendant Donitz - "already considers such harbours
extremely useful as equipment and supply bases for
Atlantic U-boats to call at temporarily.")
[Page 181]
And then Question (e): "What decisive advantages would
exist, for the conduct of the war at sea, in gaining bases
in North Denmark, e.g., Skagen?"
There is, in our possession, a Document C-5, to find which
it will be necessary for the Court to go back in the
document book to the first of the C Exhibits. This will be
Exhibit GB 83.
This is a memorandum written by the defendant Donitz on
Norwegian bases. It presumably relates to the questionnaire
of the defendant Raeder, which, as I have indicated, was in
circulation at about that time. The document is headed "Flag
Officer Submarines, Operations Division," and is marked
"Most Secret." The subject is "Base in Norway."
Then there are set out "suppositions, advantages and
disadvantages," and, over the page, "conclusions." I am
proposing to read the last paragraph, III:-
"The following is therefore proposed:-
(1) Establishment of a base in Trondheim, including:
(a) Possibility of supplying fuel, compressed air,
oxygen, provisions.
(b) Repair opportunities for overhaul work after an
encounter.
(c) Good opportunities for accommodating U-boats
crews.
(d) Flak protection, L.A. anti-aircraft armament,
petrol and M/S units.
(2) Establishment of the possibility of supplying fuel in
Narvik as an alternative."
That is a Donitz memorandum.
Now, as the Tribunal saw in the report of Raeder to Assmann,
in October, 1939, Hitler was merely considering the
Norwegian aggression and had not yet committed himself to
it, although, as the Tribunal will see very shortly, he was
most susceptible to any suggestions of aggression against
the territory of another country.
The documents will show that the defendant Raeder persevered
in pressing his point of view with regard to Norway, and at
this stage he found a powerful ally in the defendant
Rosenberg.
The Nazi employment of traitors and the stimulation of
treachery as a political weapon are now unhappily proven
historical facts, but, should proof be required of that
statement, it is found in the remarkable document which I
now invite the Court to consider. I refer to Document 007-
PS, which is after the TC and D series in the document book.
That will be Exhibit GB 84.
That is headed on Page 1, "Brief Report on Activities of the
Foreign Affairs Bureau of the Party (Aussenpolitisches Amt
der N.S.D.A.P.) from 1933 to 1943." It reads: -
"When the Foreign Affairs Bureau (Aussenpolitsche Amt)
was established on 1st April, 1933, the Fuehrer directed
that it should not be expanded to a large bureaucratic
agency, but should rather develop its effectiveness
through initiative and suggestions.
Corresponding to the extraordinarily hostile attitude
adopted by the Soviet Government in Moscow from the
beginning, the newly-established Bureau devoted
particular attention to internal conditions in the
Soviet Union, as well as to the effects of World
Bolshevism, primarily in other European countries. It
entered into contact with the most variegated groups
inclining towards National Socialism in combating
Bolshevism, focussing its main attentions on nations and
States bordering on the
[Page 182]
Soviet Union. On the one hand, those nations and States
constituted an Insulating Ring encircling the Bolshevist
neighbour; on the other hand they were the laterals of
German living space and took up a flanking position
towards the Western Powers, especially Great Britain. In
order to wield the desired influence by one means or
another" - and the Court will shortly see the
significance of that phrase - "The Bureau was compelled
to use the most varying methods, taking into
consideration the completely different living
conditions, the ties of blood, intellect and history of
the movements observed by the Bureau in those countries.
In Scandinavia an outspokenly pro-Anglo-Saxon attitude,
based on economic considerations, had become
progressively more dominant after the World War Of 1914-
1918. There the Bureau put the entire emphasis on
influencing general cultural relations with the Nordic
peoples. For this purpose it took the Nordic Society in
Lubeck under its protection. The Reich conventions of
this society were attended by many outstanding
personalities, especially from Finland. While there were
no openings for purely political co-operation in Sweden
and Denmark, an association based on Greater Germanic
ideology was founded in Norway. Very close relations
were established with its founder, which led to further
consequences."
If the Court will turn to the end of the main part of the
statement, which is four pages forward - in the intervening
pages, I may say, there is an account of the activity of
Rosenberg's in various parts of Europe and indeed of the
world, to which I am not proposing to call the tribunal's
attention at this stage - but if the Tribunal will look at
the last paragraph of the main body of the report, the last
two sentences read:-
" With the outbreak of war, the Bureau was entitled to
consider its task as terminated."
THE PRESIDENT: I have not got the place.
MAJOR ELWYN JONES: I beg your Lordship's pardon; it is Page
4 of the report, which bears the signature of the defendant
Rosenberg.
"With the outbreak of war it was entitled to consider
its task as terminated. The exploitation of the many
personal connections in many lands can be resumed under
a different guise."
If the Tribunal will turn to the Annex to the document,
which is on the next page, the Tribunal will appreciate what
"exploitation of personal connections" involved.
Annex One to the document is entitled, "To Brief Report on
Activities of the Foreign Affairs Bureau of the Nazi Party
from 1933 to 1943." It is headed, "The Political Preparation
of the Military Occupation of Norway During the War Years
1939-1940", and it reads:-
"As previously mentioned, of all political groupings in
Scandinavia only 'Nasjonal Samling', led in Norway by
the Former Minister of War and Major of the Reserve,
Vidkun Quisling, deserved serious political attention.
This was a fighting political group, possessed by the
idea of a Greater Germanic Community. Naturally, all
ruling powers were hostile and attempted to prevent, by
any means, its success among the population. The Bureau
maintained constant liaison with Quisling and
attentively observed the attacks he conducted with
tenacious energy on the middle class, which had been
taken in tow by the English.
[Page 183]
From the beginning, it appeared probable that without
revolutionary events, which would stir the population
from their former attitude, no successful progress of
'Nasjonal Samling' was to be expected. During the winter
1938-1939, Quisling was privately visited by a member of
the Bureau.
When the political situation in Europe came to a head in
1939, Quisling made an appearance at the convention of
the Nordic Society, in Lubeck, in June. He expounded his
conception of the situation, and his apprehensions
concerning Norway. He emphatically drew attention to the
geopolitically decisive importance of Norway in the
Scandinavian area, and to the advantages that would
accrue to the power dominating the Norwegian coast, in
case of a conflict between the Greater German Reich and
Great Britain.
Assuming that his statement would be of special interest
to the Marshal of the Reich, Goering, for aero-
strategical reasons, Quisling was referred to State
Secretary Korner by the Bureau. The Staff Director of
the Bureau, handed the Chief of the Reich Chancellery a
memorandum for transmission to the Fuehrer."
In a later part of the document, which I shall read at a
later stage of my presentation of the evidence, if I may,
the Court will see how Quisling came into contact with
Raeder. The prosecution's submission with regard to this
document is that it is another illustration of the close
interweaving between the political and the military
leadership of the Nazi State, of the close link between the
professional soldiers and the professional thugs.
The defendant Raeder, in his report to Admiral Assmann,
admitted his collaboration with, Rosenberg, and I will
invite the Court's attention once more to Document C-66,
which is Exhibit GB 81. In the page headed "Weser-Ubung,"
the second paragraph of the Raeder report reads as follows:
"In the further, developments, I was supported by
Commander Schreiber, Naval Attache in Oslo, and the M-
Chief personally - in conjunction with the Rosenberg
Organisation. Thus, we got in touch with Quisling and
Hagelin, who came to Berlin in the beginning of December
and were taken to the Fuehrer by me-with the approval of
Reichsleiter Rosenberg."
I will later draw the attention of the Tribunal to the
developments in
December.
The details of the manner in which the defendant Raeder did
make contact personally with Quisling are not very clear.
But I would draw the Court's attention to the Document C-65,
which precedes -
THE PRESIDENT: Would you read the end of that paragraph?
MAJOR ELWYN JONES: With your Lordship's permission, I would
like to revert to that in a later stage of my unfolding of
the evidence.
In the Document C-65, which will be Exhibit GB 85, we have a
report of Rosenberg to Raeder, in which the full extent of
Quisling's preparedness for treachery and his potential
usefulness to the Nazi aggressors was reported and disclosed
to the latter.
Paragraph I of that report deals with matters which I have
already dealt
with, in reading Rosenberg's statement, 007-PS. But if the
Court will look at the second paragraph of Exhibit GB 85, C-
65, it reads as follows:
[Page 184]
"The reasons for a coup, on which Quisling made a
report, would be provided by the fact that the
Storthing" - that is to say the Norwegian Parliament -
"had, in defiance of the constitution, passed a
resolution, which is to become operative on January
12th, prolonging its own life. Quisling still retains in
his capacity as a long-standing officer and a former
Minister of War, the closest relations with the
Norwegian Army. He showed me the original of a letter
which he had received only a short time previously from
the Commanding Officer in Narvik, Colonel Sunlo. In this
letter, Colonel Sunlo frankly lays emphasis on the fact
that if things went on as they were going at present,
Norway was finished."
If the Court will turn to the next page of that document,
the last two paragraphs, the details of a treacherous plot
to overthrow the government of his own country, by the
traitor Quisling, in collaboration with the defendant
Rosenberg, will be indicated to the Court.
"A plan has been put forward which deals with the
possibility of a coup, and which provides for numbers of
selected Norwegians to be trained in Germany with all
possible speed for such a purpose, being allotted their
exact tasks, and provided with experienced and die-hard
National Socialists, who are practised in such
operations. These trained men should then proceed with
all speed to Norway, where details would then require to
be further discussed. Some important centres in Oslo
would have to be taken over immediately, and at the same
time, the German Fleet, together with suitable
contingents of the German Army, would go into operation,
when summoned specially by the new Norwegian Government,
in a specified bay, at the approaches to Oslo. Quisling
has no doubts that such a coup, having been carried out
with instantaneous success - would immediately bring him
the approval of those sections of the Army with which he
at present has connections; and thus it goes without
saying that he has never discussed a political fight
with them.
As far as the King is concerned, he believes that he would
respect it as an accomplished fact."
How wrong Quisling was in that anticipation was shown, of
course, by subsequent developments.
The last sentence reads:-
"Quisling gives figures of the number of German troops
required, which accord with German calculations."
The Tribunal may think that there are no words in the whole
vocabulary of abuse sufficiently strong to describe that
degree of treachery.
THE PRESIDENT: Is that document dated?
MAJOR ELWYN JONES: That document does not bear a date.
THE PRESIDENT: We will break off now.
(The Tribunal adjourned until 7th December, 1945, at 1000
hours.)

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