Result of U.P. Higher Judicial Service (Main Written) Examination, 2014
Direct Recruitment to U.P. Higher Judicial Service held on 14th, 15th and 16th November, 2014 has been
declared.
High Court of Madhya Pradesh, Jabalpur notified Advertisement for recruitment additional district judges through M.P. Higher Judicial Service (Entry Level) Direct Recruitment for BAR, Exam 2015
Haryana Judicial Services Examination 2014-Pre is conducted on 10th of Jan 2015. The result is awaited.
THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI will hold examination for direct recruitment against 14 vacancies to Delhi Higher Judicial Service on Sunday, the 06th April,2014-Last Date 06.02.2014
13/11/2013: While renewing the term of the appointment of the existing incumbents the State Government is required to consider their past performance and conduct in the light of the recommendations made by the District Judges and the District Magistrates. Therefore, the High Court could not have issued a Mandamus for renewal of the term of respondent Nos. 1 and 2 and other similarly situated persons and thereby frustrated the provisions of LR Manual and Section 24 Cr.P.C .- SUPREME COURT.

Head Note: Held " I. Absence of appellant from duty as Guard Commander for 25
minutes was bona fide and permissible under the statutory rules.
II. Imposition of punishment of punishment drill for 10 days for
the said absence was unwarranted.
III. Protest by the appellant against the imposition of the said
punishment could not warrant enhancement of punishment of the
appellant for confinement in cell for ten days.
IV. Disobedience of the enhanced punishment could not, in this
case, warrant initiation of disciplinary proceedings by the
Commandant concerned against the appellant.
V. The Commandant could not himself become the Judge of his
own cause.
VI. The Commandant could not appoint his own subordinate as the
inquiry officer.
VII. The Commandant could have referred the matter to his superior
officer for appropriate action in terms of Rules 1991.
VIII. Once the Commandant concerned appeared as a witness
himself in the enquiry, he could not pass the order of punishment.
IX. The Authority who initiated the disciplinary proceedings
against the appellant became a witness before the inquiry officer
appointed by him, who is subordinate to him in his office and also
accepted the enquiry report and passed the order of punishment.
Thus, the order of punishment stood vitiated.
X. The Appellate Authority could not consider the past conduct of
the appellant to justify the order of punishment passed by the
disciplinary authority without bringing it to the notice of the appellant.
XI. As the punishment order had been passed in violation of the
statutory rules and the principles of natural justice as well, it is
rendered null and void. Thus, it remained inexecutable.
XII. Past conduct of an employee should not generally be taken into
account to substantiate the quantum of punishment without bringing it
to the notice of the delinquent employee.
XIII. The error of violating the principles of natural justice by the
Disciplinary Authority has been of such a grave nature that under no
circumstance can the past conduct of the appellant, even if not
satisfactory, be taken into consideration.- Supreme Court.

Judgement:

Dr. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.
1. Leave granted.
The facts of the present case reveal that a person who initiated
the disciplinary proceedings against the appellant for disobeying his
own orders; appointed his subordinate as an inquiry officer; appeared
as a witness in the proceedings to prove the charges of disobedience
of his orders; accepted the enquiry report; and further passed the order
of punishment - i.e. dismissal of the appellant from service. The
1
question does arise as to whether such a course is permissible in law.
2. This appeal has been preferred against the judgment and order
dated 12th July, 2007 passed by the High Court of Allahabad
(Lucknow Bench), dismissing the Writ Petition No. 782 of 2007 filed
by the appellant against the judgment and order of the U.P. State
Public Services Tribunal, (hereinafter referred to as the `Tribunal)
Lucknow dated 25th May, 2007, by which the Tribunal dismissed the
Claim Petition No. 837 of 2003 filed by the appellant and upheld the
order of dismissal of the appellant from service by the Statutory
Authorities.
3. Facts and circumstances giving rise to this case are that the
appellant was appointed as a Constable in the Provincial Armed
Constabulary (hereinafter referred to as `PAC) on 10th February, 1969
and promoted to the post of Head Constable vide order dated 5th May,
1983. The appellant was posted with 30th Battalion PAC in G-
Company in the year 2002. On 29th September, 2002, the appellant
was on duty as Guard Commander along with another Head Constable
named Rama Nand. At around 6.20 A.M., the appellant left his post
and came back after 25 minutes after having tea and medicine in the
2
canteen. His departure from his post was duly recorded in the register
maintained for the purpose by the other guard, Head Constable Rama
Nand. The Dal Nayak endorsed his comments in respect of the
appellants absence for the period of 25 minutes and placed it before
the Commandant on 3rd October, 2002. The Commandant vide order
dated 4th October, 2002 imposed the punishment of 10 days
punishment drill. Upon protest by the appellant, the Commandant
enhanced the punishment to 10 days confinement in a cell. The
appellant refused to serve the punishment being not acceptable to him.
4. Refusal to serve the punishment so imposed by the appellant
was considered to be a serious act of indiscipline and he was placed
under suspension. The appellant was served with a chargesheet dated
2nd December, 2002 indicating that an enquiry was to be held against
him under Rule 14(1) of the Uttar Pradesh Police Officers of the
Subordinate Ranks (Punishment and Appeal) Rules, 1991 (hereinafter
referred to as `the Rules 1991). The appellant submitted his reply to
the said chargesheet on 11th December, 2002. The inquiry officer
concluded the enquiry and submitted the report on 28th March, 2003
with the finding that the appellant was guilty of negligence and
disobedience and recommended his removal from service.
3
5. The Disciplinary Authority issued a notice dated 31st March,
2003 to the appellant to show cause as to why his services should not
be terminated in view of the enquiry report. The appellant submitted
his reply to the said show cause on 7th April, 2003. After considering
the same, the Commandant passed the order dated 8th April, 2003
imposing the punishment of termination from service.
6. Being aggrieved, the appellant preferred an appeal against the
order of termination. However, the said appeal was dismissed by the
Appellate Authority vide order dated 25th August, 2003. The
appellant challenged the said order of termination before the Tribunal
by filing Claim Petition No. 837 of 2003. The Tribunal dismissed the
said Claim Petition vide judgment and order dated 25th May, 2007
recording the finding that the absence from duty for 25 minutes on
29th September, 2002 was bona fide and permissible under Rule 21 of
the Guard and Escort Rules, however, not obeying the order of
punishment was a case of gross indiscipline and thus, order of
termination of his services was justified.
7. Being aggrieved of the said judgment and order of the Tribunal,
4
the appellant preferred a Writ Petition before the High Court which
was dismissed vide impugned judgment and order dated 12th July,
2007 in a cursory manner without considering the issues raised by the
appellant, merely on the ground that charge of disobedience of the
orders of the higher authority stood proved and the enquiry had been
conducted in accordance with law. Hence, this appeal.
8. Shri Tripurari Ray, learned counsel appearing for the appellant
has raised large number of submissions, inter-alia, the absence from
duty for a short - specified period, when other guard is present on
duty, is permissible under the Guard and Escort Rules. The appellant
had left his duty for only 25 minutes and it was so recorded in the
register at the spot. If such an absence is permissible in law, imposing
the punishment of 10 days punishment drill was unwarranted. More
so, it had been awarded without giving a proper opportunity of
hearing to the appellant. The appellants protest against such an
arbitrary imposition of punishment could not be the ground for
enhancing the punishment to 10 days confinement in a cell; depriving
him of his personal liberty was totally unwarranted and uncalled for,
particularly, in view of the fact that the imposition of the very first
5
punishment was in contravention of the statutory rules. The
disciplinary authority did not consider the reply submitted by the
appellant against the show cause notice wherein it had specifically
been submitted that in case the Commandant was of the view that his
orders had been violated, he should have referred the matter to his
superior officer to transfer the disciplinary proceedings to another
coordinate officer and that officer should have conducted the enquiry.
The Disciplinary Authority himself appeared as a witness in the
enquiry. Thus, the enquiry itself stood vitiated. The punishment of
dismissal remained disproportionate to the proved delinquency; the
Appellate Authority considered while passing the order, the past
conduct of the appellant for the purpose of confirming the order of
punishment passed by the Disciplinary Authority. The appellants past
conduct had never been the part of the chargesheet or the show cause
notice; nor had the appellant ever been informed that his past conduct
was likely to be considered at the time of passing the order of
punishment. The High Court failed to consider that, in a case where
there had been a violation of the statutory provisions, or principles of
natural justice, power of judicial review required to be exercised. The
appeal deserves to be allowed.
6
9. Per contra, Shri Ameet Singh, learned counsel appearing for the
State of U.P., has opposed the appeal contending that the appellant
had been the member of a disciplined force. Indiscipline therein,
amounts to a very serious misconduct. Therefore, it is intolerable.
Once the charge of absence and further charge of disobedience stood
proved, the matter does not deserve to be considered by this Court.
The appeal lacks merit and is liable to be dismissed.
10. We have considered the rival submissions made by learned
counsel for the parties and perused the record.
11. An enquiry was initiated against the appellant by the
Commandant, for disobedience of the order of punishment by the
Commandant himself. The charge-sheet contained two basic charges
which read as under:-
"1. Your duty was as a Guard Commander in the
Vahini Quarter Guard from 22.9.2002 to 29.9.2002. On
29.9.2002 in the morning at 06.30 a.m., inspection of the
Vahini Quarter Guard was made by the Platoon Officer
of "G" Platoon, when you were found absent. With
regard to this absence the Second Guard Commander
H.C.39074 Rama Nand told that you have gone to take
tea and medicine. This was mentioned by the Platoon
Officer "G" Platoon in the Inspection Book. With
regard to this absence your explanation was sought by
the Platoon Officer "G" Platoon, when you did not give
7
satisfactory explanation and you sought that your
explanation be placed before the Senanayak, in your
explanation you alleged violation of rules and standing
orders by the Platoon Officer "G" Platoon, which was
submitted by the Platoon Officer "G" Platoon on
3.10.2002 with his comments before the Senanayak to
produce you in his chamber.
2. On 4.10.2002 when you appeared before the
Senanayak in the Orderly Chamber, after the hearing 10
days P.D. was awarded to you which you declined. On
this you were punished by the Senanayak for violation of
his order passed in the Orderly Chamber with 10 days
cell punishment, which you the H.C. did not accept and
after saluting the Commandant you voluntarily went out
of the chamber."
12. The inquiry officer conducted the enquiry and on its conclusion
held that the appellant was guilty on both counts. The Disciplinary
Authority accepted the report and held that:
"Mohd. Yunus Khan has been found to be violating
orders and bleak chances of improvement, not fit to be
retained in a disciplined force like PAC as his
continuance in the force will have adverse effect on other
personnel. He is guilty of negligence in duty,
indiscipline and disobedience of orders."
The Commandant awarded the punishment - dismissal from
service.
13. The Appellate Authority, while affirming the said order of
8
punishment, considered the past conduct of the appellant wherein it
had been mentioned that the appellant had been given 8 petty
punishments; 3 censure entries; and a penalty of reversion for six
months from the post of Head Constable to the post of Constable. He
was also reduced to the lowest pay scale of Rs.975/- for one year after
he had been found guilty in a departmental enquiry.
14. The Tribunal dismissed the Claim Petition filed by the
appellant, however, it recorded the finding that the absence of the
appellant for 25 minutes was bona fide and legally permissible in
view of the provisions of Rule 21 of the Guard and Escort Rules.
However, his subsequent misconduct, i.e., disobedience in carrying
out the punishment was a serious matter. The Tribunal also took note
of the order of the Appellate Authority wherein the past conduct of the
appellant had been taken into consideration. The High Court
dismissed the Writ Petition without realising the gravity of the legal
issues involved in the case.
15. We have to proceed, keeping in mind the trite law that holding
disciplinary proceedings against a government employee and
9
imposing a punishment on his being found guilty of misconduct under
the statutory rules is in the nature of quasi-judicial proceedings.
Though, the technical rules of procedure contained in the Code of
Civil Procedure, 1908 and the provisions of the Indian Evidence Act,
1872 do not apply in a domestic enquiry, however, the principles of
natural justice require to be observed strictly. Therefore, the enquiry
is to be conducted fairly and reasonably and the enquiry report must
contain reasons for reaching the conclusion that the charge framed
against the delinquent stood proved against him. It cannot be an ipse
dixit of the inquiry officer. Punishment for misconduct can be
imposed in consonance with the statutory rules and principles of
natural justice. (See Bachhittar Singh v. State of Punjab & Anr.,
AIR 1963 SC 395; Union of India v. H.C. Goel, AIR 1964 SC 364;
Anil Kumar v. Presiding Officer & Ors., AIR 1985 SC 1121;
Moni Shankar v. Union of India & Anr. (2008) 3 SCC 484; and
Union of India & Ors. v. Prakash Kumar Tandon, (2009) 2 SCC
541).
16. The Tribunal has categorically held that absence of the
appellant from duty for such a short span of time was permissible in
10
view of the statutory rules and was bona fide. That finding was not
challenged by the respondents any further and attained finality. This
finding of the Tribunal leads us to the questions that in case the first
punishment of 10 days punishment drill was unwarranted and illegal;
whether any protest against such punishment, authorised the
Commandant to enhance the punishment to 10 days confinement in a
cell; and whether further disobedience thereof, ought to have enabled
the Commandant to initiate the disciplinary proceedings against the
appellant. These questions have to be considered keeping in mind that
the appellant was a member of disciplined force and the Appellate
Authority as well as the Tribunal had very heavily relied on the past
conduct of the appellant for considering the proportionality of the
punishment, though it had not been a part of the charge-sheet nor was
the appellant informed of the same while issuing the second show
cause notice, giving him the opportunity to make his representation
against the enquiry report.
17. In Union of India & Ors. v. L.D. Balam Singh, (2002) 9 SCC
73, this Court observed as under:
11
"....the extent of restrictions necessary to be imposed on
any of the fundamental rights in their application to the
armed forces and the forces charged with the mainte-
nance of public order for the purpose of ensuring proper
discharge of their duties and maintenance of discipline
among them would necessarily depend upon the prevail-
ing situation at a given point of time and it would be in-
advisable to encase it in a rigid statutory formula. The
Constitution-makers were obviously anxious that no
more restrictions should be placed than are absolutely
necessary for ensuring proper discharge of duties and
the maintenance of discipline amongst the armed force
personnel". (Emphasis added)
18. In Lt. Col. Prithpal Singh Bedi v. Union of India & Ors.,
AIR 1982 SC 1413, this Court observed:
"It is one of the cardinal features of our Constitu-
tion that a person by enlisting in or entering armed
forces does not cease to be a citizen so as to wholly de-
prive him of his rights under the Constitution....
Persons subject to Army Act are citizens of this an-
cient land having a feeling of belonging to the civilised
community governed by the liberty-oriented constitution.
Personal liberty makes for the worth of human being and
is a cherished and prized right. Deprivation thereof must
be preceded by an enquiry ensuring fair, just and rea-
sonable procedure and trial".
19. In R. Viswan & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors., AIR 1983 SC
658, Constitution Bench of this Court observed:
12
"Morale and discipline are indeed the very soul of an
army and no other consideration, howsoever important,
can outweigh the need to strengthen the morale of the
Armed Forces and to maintain discipline amongst them.
Any relaxation in the matter of morale and discipline
may prove disastrous and ultimately lead to chaos and
ruination affecting the well being and imperilling the hu-
man rights of the entire people of the country".
20. Thus, the requirements of morale, discipline and justice have to
be reconciled. There is no scarcity of examples in history, and we see
it in day-to-day life also, that even in disciplined forces, forced morale
and discipline without assured justice breeds defiance and
belligerency. Our Constitution protects not only the life and liberty
but also the dignity of every person. Life convicts and hardcore
criminals deprived of personal liberty are also not wholly denuded of
their Constitutional rights. Arbitrariness is an anathema to the
principles of reasonableness and fairness enshrined in our
constitutional provisions. The rule of law prohibits the exercise of
power in an arbitrary manner and/or in a manner that travels beyond
the boundaries of reasonableness. Thus, a statutory authority is not
permitted to act whimsically/arbitrarily. Its actions should be guided
by the principles of reasonableness and fairness. The authority cannot
be permitted to abuse the law or to use it unfairly.
13
21. Rule 13 of the Rules 1991 reads as under:
"Officer not competent to conduct disciplinary
proceedings- A gazetted officer of the Police Force who
is either a prosecution witness in the case or has either
conducted a preliminary enquiry in that case shall not
conduct inquiry in that case under these rules. In case
the said gazetted officer is the Superintendent of Police
himself, the Deputy Inspector-General concerned shall
be moved to transfer the case to some other district or
unit as the case may be." (Emphasis added)
It is evident from the aforesaid rule that a person who is a
witness in a case can neither initiate the disciplinary proceedings nor
pass an order of punishment.
22. A Constitution Bench of this Court in State of U.P. v. Mohd.
Noor, AIR 1958 SC 86, rejected a submission made on behalf of the
State that there was nothing wrong with the Presiding Officer of a
Tribunal appearing as a witness and deciding the same case, observing
as under:
"The two roles could not obviously be played by one and
the same person.......the act of Shri B. N. Bhalla in
having his own testimony recorded in the case
indubitably evidences a state of mind which clearly
discloses considerable bias against the respondent. If it
shocks our notions of judicial propriety and fair play, as
14
indeed it does, it was bound to make a deeper impression
on the mind of the respondent as to the unreality and
futility of the proceedings conducted in this fashion. We
find ourselves in agreement with the High Court that the
rules of natural justice were completely discarded and
all canons of fair play were grievously violated by Shri.
B.N. Bhalla continuing to preside over the trial. Decision
arrived at by such process and order founded on such
decision cannot possibly be regarded as valid or
binding."
23. A similar view was taken by this Court in Rattan Lal Sharma
v. Managing Committee, Dr. Hari Ram (Co-education) Higher
Secondary School & Ors., AIR 1993 SC 2155, observing that a
person cannot be a witness in the enquiry as well as the inquiry
officer.
24. The legal maxim "nemo debet esse judex in propria causa" (no
man shall be a judge in his own cause) is required to be observed by
all judicial and quasi-judicial authorities as non-observance thereof is
treated as a violation of the principles of natural justice. (Vide
Secretary to Government, Transport Department v. Munuswamy
Mudaliar & Anr., AIR 1988 SC 2232; Meenglas Tea Estate v.
The Workmen, AIR 1963 SC 1719; and Mineral Development Ltd.
v. The State of Bihar & Anr., AIR 1960 SC 468).
15
25. This Court in A.U. Kureshi v. High Court of Gujarat &
Anr., (2009) 11 SCC 84, placed reliance upon the judgment in Ashok
Kumar Yadav & Ors. v. State of Haryana & Ors., (1985) 4 SCC
417, and held that no person should adjudicate a dispute which he or
she has dealt with in any capacity. The failure to observe this
principle creates an apprehension of bias on the part of the said
person. Therefore, law requires that a person should not decide a case
wherein he is interested. The question is not whether the person is
actually biased but whether the circumstances are such as to create a
reasonable apprehension in the minds of others that there is a
likelihood of bias affecting the decision.
26. The existence of an element of bias renders the entire
disciplinary proceedings void. Such a defect cannot be cured at the
appellate stage even if the fairness of the appellate authority is beyond
dispute. (Vide: S. Parthasarthy v. State of Andhra Pradesh, AIR
1973 SC 2701; and Tilak Chand Magatram Obhan v. Kamla
Prasad Shukla & Ors., 1995 Supp. (1) SCC 21).
27. In Arjun Chaubey v. Union of India & Ors., AIR 1984 SC
1356, a Constitution Bench of this Court dealt with an identical case
16
wherein an employee serving in the Northern Railway had been
dismissed by the Deputy Chief Commercial Superintendent on a
charge of misconduct which concerned himself, after considering by
himself, the explanation given by the employee against the charge and
after thinking that the employee was not fit to be retained in service.
It was also considered whether in such a case, the court should deny
the relief to the employee, even if the court comes to the conclusion
that order of punishment stood vitiated on the ground that the
employee had been guilty of habitual acts of indiscipline/ misconduct.
This Court held that the order of dismissal passed against the
employee stood vitiated as it was in utter disregard of the principles of
natural justice. The main thrust of the charges against the employee
related to his conduct qua the disciplinary authority itself, therefore, it
was not open to the disciplinary authority to sit in judgment over the
explanation furnished by the employee and decide against the
delinquent. No person could be a judge in his own cause and no
witness could certify that his own testimony was true. Any one who
had a personal stake in an enquiry must have kept himself aloof from
the enquiry. The court further held that in such a case it could not be
considered that the employee did not deserve any relief from the court
17
since he was habitually guilty of acts subversive of discipline. The
illegality from which the order of dismissal passed by the Authority
concerned suffered was of a character so grave and fundamental that
the alleged habitual misbehaviour of the delinquent employee could
not cure or condone it.
28. Thus, the legal position emerges that if a person appears as a
witness in disciplinary proceedings, he cannot be an inquiry officer
nor can he pass the order of punishment as a disciplinary authority.
This rule has been held to be sacred. An apprehension of bias
operates as a disqualification for a person to act as adjudicator. No
person can be a Judge in his own cause and no witness can certify that
his own testimony is true. Any one who has personal interest in the
disciplinary proceedings must keep himself away from such
proceedings. The violation of the principles of natural justice renders
the order null and void.
29. In the instant case, Shri Arvind Kumar Upadhyaya, IPS,
Commandant, 30th PAC Battalion, Gonda, appeared as a witness and
proved the disobedience of his orders of imposition of punishment,
18
first as of punishment drill and subsequently of confinement to a cell.
However, after appearing as a witness in the enquiry, he also passed
the order of punishment, i.e., dismissal of the appellant from service
on 8.4.2003. This issue has been agitated by the appellant throughout
but none of the authorities or the courts below had taken it into
consideration. Appellant has made crystal clear pleadings before this
Court also in this regard and the same have not been denied in the
counter affidavit by the respondents, rather a very vague and evasive
reply has been filed stating that the disciplinary proceedings had been
concluded strictly in accordance with law.
30. An order in violation of the principles of natural justice may be
void depending on the facts and circumstances of the case. (Vide Raja
Jagdambika Pratap Narain Singh v. Central Board of Direct
Taxes & Ors., AIR 1975 SC 1816; Smt. Maneka Gandhi v. Union
of India & Anr., AIR 1978 SC 597; Krishan Lal v. State of J & K,
(1994) 4 SCC 422; State Bank of Patiala & Ors. v. S.K. Sharma,
AIR 1996 SC 1669; Union of India & Anr. v. M/s. Mustafa &
Najibai Trading Co. & Ors., AIR 1998 SC 2526; and Vishnu Dutt
& Ors. v. State of Rajasthan & Ors., (2005) 13 SCC 592).
19
31. In case the very first order of imposition of punishment for
remaining absent from duty for 25 minutes was bad in law, the
appellants protest against the said punishment could not be said to be
unjustified. In Nawabkhan v. State of Gujarat, AIR 1974 SC 1471,
this Court dealt with the issue and held as under:
"In the present case, a fundamental right of the
petitioner has been encroached upon by the police
commissioner without due hearing so the Court quashed
it - not killed it then but performed the formal obsequies
of the order which had died at birth. The legal result is
that the accused was never guilty of flouting an order
which never legally existed." (Emphasis added)
32. We are of the considered opinion that the initiation of
disciplinary proceedings against the appellant and the conclusion
thereof by the imposition of the punishment by the Commandant, who
had himself been a witness, was in flagrant violation of the principles
of natural justice and thus, stood vitiated. "Principles of natural
justice are to some minds burdensome but this price-a small price
indeed-has to be paid if we desire a society governed by the rule of
law." All other consequential orders passed in appeal etc. remained
inconsequential. More so, a protest/disobedience against an illegal
order may not be termed as misconduct in every case. In an
appropriate case, it may be termed as revolting to ones sense of
20
justice. In view of the above, we are of the considered opinion that
the protest raised by the appellant against the punishment imposed for
his absence could not give rise to a cause of action for initiating the
disciplinary proceedings.
33. The courts below and the statutory authorities failed to
appreciate that if the disciplinary authority wants to consider the past
conduct of the employee in imposing a punishment, the delinquent is
entitled to notice thereof and generally the charge-sheet should
contain such an article or at least he should be informed of the same at
the stage of the show cause notice, before imposing the punishment.
34. This Court in Union of India & Ors. v. Bishamber Das
Dogra, (2009) 13 SCC 102, considered the earlier judgments of this
Court in State of Assam v. Bimal Kumar Pandit, AIR 1963 SC
1612; India Marine Service (P) Ltd. v. Their Workmen, AIR 1963
SC 528; State of Mysore v. K. Manche Gowda, AIR 1964 SC 506;
Colour-Chem Ltd. v. A.L. Alaspurkar & Ors., AIR 1998 SC 948;
Director General, RPF v. Ch. Sai Babu, (2003) 4 SCC 331, Bharat
Forge Co. Ltd. v. Uttam Manohar Nakate, (2005) 2 SCC 489; and
21
Govt. of A.P. & Ors. v. Mohd. Taher Ali, (2007) 8 SCC 656 and
came to the conclusion that it is desirable that the delinquent
employee be informed by the disciplinary authority that his past
conduct could be taken into consideration while imposing the
punishment. However, in case of misconduct of a grave nature, even
in the absence of statutory rules, the Authority may take into
consideration the indisputable past conduct/service record of the
delinquent for "adding the weight to the decision of imposing the
punishment if the fact of the case so required."
35. The appellant joined the service on 10.2.1969 and his services
stood terminated vide order dated 8.4.2003. Therefore, the benefit of
service rendered by the appellant for more than 34 years stood
forfeited. At the time of his removal from service, the appellant was
54 years of age. Thus, he had been visited with serious punishment
on the verge of retirement.
36. In view of the above, we reach the following inescapable
conclusions:-
I. Absence of appellant from duty as Guard Commander for 25
22
minutes was bona fide and permissible under the statutory rules.
II. Imposition of punishment of punishment drill for 10 days for
the said absence was unwarranted.
III. Protest by the appellant against the imposition of the said
punishment could not warrant enhancement of punishment of the
appellant for confinement in cell for ten days.
IV. Disobedience of the enhanced punishment could not, in this
case, warrant initiation of disciplinary proceedings by the
Commandant concerned against the appellant.
V. The Commandant could not himself become the Judge of his
own cause.
VI. The Commandant could not appoint his own subordinate as the
inquiry officer.
VII. The Commandant could have referred the matter to his superior
officer for appropriate action in terms of Rules 1991.
VIII. Once the Commandant concerned appeared as a witness
himself in the enquiry, he could not pass the order of punishment.
IX. The Authority who initiated the disciplinary proceedings
against the appellant became a witness before the inquiry officer
appointed by him, who is subordinate to him in his office and also
23
accepted the enquiry report and passed the order of punishment.
Thus, the order of punishment stood vitiated.
X. The Appellate Authority could not consider the past conduct of
the appellant to justify the order of punishment passed by the
disciplinary authority without bringing it to the notice of the appellant.
XI. As the punishment order had been passed in violation of the
statutory rules and the principles of natural justice as well, it is
rendered null and void. Thus, it remained inexecutable.
XII. Past conduct of an employee should not generally be taken into
account to substantiate the quantum of punishment without bringing it
to the notice of the delinquent employee.
XIII. The error of violating the principles of natural justice by the
Disciplinary Authority has been of such a grave nature that under no
circumstance can the past conduct of the appellant, even if not
satisfactory, be taken into consideration.
37. In view of the above, we are of the considered opinion that the
present case is squarely covered by the decision of the Constitution
Bench in Arjun Chaubey (supra). The order of punishment is null
and void and therefore, cannot be given effect to. The appeal deserves
to be allowed. The appellant had already reached the age of
24
superannuation and no fresh enquiry can be initiated in the matter if
the earlier proceedings are rendered null and void for the violation of
the statutory provisions and principles of natural justice. In the facts
and circumstances of the case and in order to meet the ends of justice,
it is desirable that the appellant be paid 50% of the wages from the
date of removal from service till the date of reaching the age of
superannuation and he be granted retiral benefits in accordance with
law from the date of his retirement.
In view of the above, appeal stands disposed of. No order as to
costs.

6/12/2013:"The analysis of the materials placed before us clearly brings the
case within the principles laid down by the Constitution Bench of this
Court in Committee for Protection of Democratic Rights (supra). We hereby
direct the respondents to hand over all the documents to the CBI within a
period of two weeks from the date of receipt of copy of this order."-Supreme Court.

21/11/2013: "Magistrate has to exercise judicial discretion and apply his mind to
the contents of the petition. The refer report as well as the statement
of the complainant would indicate that no offence has been made out so far
as the second accused is concerned since, admittedly, no money was
entrusted to her and that second accused is the divorced wife of the first
accused"- Supreme Court

"While renewing the term of the appointment of the existing incumbents
the State Government is required to consider their past performance and
conduct in the light of the recommendations made by the District Judges and
the District Magistrates...."- Supreme Court - 13/11/2013.

Conclusion/Directions:
111) In view of the aforesaid discussion, we hold:
i) Registration of FIR is mandatory under Section 154 of the Code, if
the information discloses commission of a cognizable offence and no
preliminary inquiry is permissible in such a situation.

11/11/2013-" What is a little disturbing about this case is that it is illustrative of the slow movement of the wheels of criminal justice delivery. The dowry death took place on 6th September, 1989. The Trial..."-Supreme Court.

"Life Imprisionment"-Meaning of- Discussed.
"Para 66. Off and on, the issue has been the interpretation of “life sentence”
– does it mean imprisonment for only 14 years or 20 years or does it mean
for the life of the convict. This doubt has been laid to rest in several
cases, more recently in Sangeet where it has been unequivocally laid down
that a sentence of imprisonment for life means imprisonment for the rest of
the normal life of the convict. The convict is not entitled to any
remission in a case of sentence of life imprisonment, as is commonly
believed. However, if the convict is sought to be released before the
expiry of his life, it can only be by following the procedure laid down in
Section 432 of the Code of Criminal Procedure or by the Governor exercising
power under Article 161 of the Constitution or by the President exercising
power under Article 72 of the Constitution. There is no other method or
procedure. Whether the statutory procedure under Section 432 of the Code
of Criminal Procedure can be stultified for a period of 20 years or 30
years needs further discussion as observed in Sangeet..."- Supreme Court - Dated 25.4.2013

Meaning of Life Imprisionment - Supreme Court:
Yakub Abdul Razak Memon vs. The State of Maharashtra,
through CBI , Bombay - See Para524 –
"As rightly observed by this Court in Sangeet and Anr. vs. State of
Haryana, 2012 (11) Scale 140, there is misconception that a prisoner
serving life sentence has an indefeasible right to release on completion of
either 14 years or 20 years imprisonment. A convict undergoing life
imprisonment is expected to remain in custody till the end of his life,
subject to any remission granted by the appropriate Government under
Section 432 of the Code, which in turn is subject to the procedural checks
mentioned in the said provision and to further substantive check in Section
433-A of the Code" - Supreme Court of India, Dated 21st. March 2013.

UTTAR PRADESH L.R.MANUAL: ""....The order dated 3rd April, 2008, which we have reproduced above, clearly shows non-application of mind and non-recording of reasons, which leads only to one conclusion, that the said order was an arbitrary exercise of power by the State. We cannot find any fault with the reasoning of the High Court in that behalf. But we do find some merit in the contention
raised on behalf of the appellant State that the High Court should not have
directed appointments while regulating the age, as has been done by the
High Court in operative part of its judgment. There is right of
consideration, but none can claim right to appointment. Para 7.06 states
that renewal beyond 60 years shall depend upon continuous good work, sound
integrity and physical fitness of the counsel. These are the
considerations which have been weighed by the competent authority in the
State Government to examine whether renewal/extension beyond 60 years
should be granted or not. That does not ipso facto means that there is a
right to appointment upto the age of 60 years irrespective of work, conduct
and integrity of the counsel. The rule provides due safeguards as it
calls for the report of the District Judge and the District Officer
granting renewal""- DISMISSED- SUPREME COURT OF INDIA- DATED-13-12-2012

HELD--The mere undertaking of a further investigation
either by the Investigating Officer on his own or upon the directions of
the superior police officer or pursuant to a direction by the concerned
Magistrate to whom the report is forwarded does not mean that the report
submitted under Section 173(2) is abandoned or rejected. It is only
that either the Investigating Agency or the concerned Court is not
completely satisfied with the material collected by the investigating
agency and is of the opinion that possibly some more material is
required to be collected in order to sustain the allegations of the
commission of the offence indicated in the report.--SUPREME COURT OF INDIA- DATED:6-11-2012

Issue-Whether the said offence is suicide or murder-Medical Evidence-However, what is clinching in the present case is the medicalevidence which clearly indicates that Remani was forcibly administeredFuradan; she had resisted this forcible administration; as a result of herresistance, she received several minor injuries on her body. Eventually,with a view to overcome her resistance, she was smothered and ultimatelyshe died as a result of the forcible administration of Furadan and smothering. No person other than her husband could have possibly causedRemani’s death, especially considering the motive or grudge that heharboured against her.-Held guilty of murder-SUPREME COURT OF INDIA- DATED: 30.10.2012

It is the duty of an Appellate Court to look into the
evidence adduced in the case arrive at an independent conclusion as to
whether the said evidence can be relied upon or not and even it can be
relied upon then whether the prosecution can be said to have proved
beyond reasonable doubt on the said evidence. The credibility of a
witness has to be adjudged by Appellate Court in drawing inference from
proved and admitted facts-SUPREME COURT OF INDIA-DATED: 1ST OCT 2012

It is the bounden duty of the Division Bench to
carry out such exercise in the manner set out above and we feel it
appropriate, therefore, to set aside the judgment impugned in this
appeal for that reason and remit the matter back to the High Court for
deciding the Reference under Section 366 Cr.P.C. in the manner it ought
to have been decided. Inasmuch as the conviction and sentence imposed
on the appellant was by the judgment dated 09.03.2007 of the trial
Court and the offence alleged was dated 16.01.2006, while remitting the
matter back to the High Court, we direct the High Court to dispose of
the Reference along with the Appeals expeditiously and in any case
within three months from the date of receipt of the records sent back
to the High Court. The appeal stands disposed of with the above
directions to the High Court

CBI is not justified in proceeding with the FIR No.
R.C. 0062003A0019 dated 05.10.2003. In view of the above discussion, we
are satisfied that the CBI exceeded its jurisdiction in lodging FIR No.
R.C. 0062003A0019 dated 05.10.2003 in the absence of any direction from
this Court in the order dated 18.09.2003 or in any subsequent orders - Supreme Court - Dated 6.7.2012

"As has been held
by this Court in Randhir Singh Rana v. State (Delhi Administration)
[(1997) 1 SCC 361], once a Magistrate takes cognizance of an offence
under Section 190 Cr.P.C., he cannot order of his own further
investigation in the case under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. but if
subsequently the Sessions Court passes an order discharging the accused
persons, further investigation by the police on its own would be
permissible, which may also result in submission of fresh charge-sheet." - Supreme Court - Dated 7/6/2012.

Civil Laws-Section 64A(1)(a)-Goods Act, 1930-Receipt given to the petitioner for payment of the amount in the proforma invoice, it had been indicated that the prices prevailing on the date of billing would apply.
--The billing was done on 5th of April, 1989. In the absence of any evidence of any deliberate intention on the part of the respondents to delay delivery of the vehicle, we are unable to agree with the petitioner that the increase in price has to be borne by the respondents
-- It is the liability of the petitioner to pay the extra price when the excise duty had been enhanced prior to the delivery of the vehicle—
-The Special Leave Petition fails and is dismissed-Supreme Court of India :Order Dated Feb 10, 2011

Confession a very weak type of evidence-Confession in TADA Case-The alleged confession was subsequently retracted by the appellant. The alleged confession was not corroborated by any other material. We have held in Arup Bhuyan”“s case (supra) that confession is a very weak type of evidence, particularly when alleged to have been made to the police, and it is not safe to convict on its basis unless there is adequate corroborative material. In the present case there is no corroborative material:SUPREME COURT OF INDIA-10-02-2011.

Civil Laws-Rule 4-Haryana State Agricultural Marketing Board (Sale of
Immovable Property) Rules 1997-It is clear that the allottees cannot postpone the payment of instalments merely on the ground that some of the amenities were not ready. If they were not entitled for postponement of the instalments, it follows that they will be liable to pay the normal interest on the delayed instalments up to date of payment. However, having regard to the fact that the Rules did not contemplate compound interest and penal interest and the Market Committee was yet to complete certain infrastructural work like water, sewerage disposal, as held in Shantikunj (supra), the Market Committee will not be entitled to claim any compound interest or penal interest.-Supreme Court of India -Order Dated: FEBRUARY 10, 2011

The Registrar General
High Court of Judicature at Madras
Vs.
R. Perachi and others

APPEAL

Civil Appeal , AppealNo: 7936 OF 2011

ACT

Constitution of India, Section:

HEAD NOTE

Under Constitution administrative powers vests in Chief Justice and not in Judges - "As pointed out above, under the constitutional
scheme, Chief Justice is the supreme authority and the other
Judges, so far as officers and servants of the High Court are
concerned, have no role to play on the administrative side. Some
Judges, undoubtedly, will become Chief Justices in their own turn
one day, but it is imperative under the constitutional discipline that
they work in tranquillity. Judges have been described as "hermits".
They have to live and behave like "hermits" who have no desire or
aspiration, having shed it through penance. Their mission is to
supply light and not heat. This is necessary so that their latent
desire to run the High Court administration may not sprout before
time, at least, in some cases."-Verdict of Apex Court followed in CIVIL APPEAL NO. 7936 OF 2011
The Registrar General
High Court of Judicature at Madras
Vs.
R. Perachi and others - Dated 19/09/2011.

Indian Penal Code, Section: 302 read with Section 120B as also under Section 193 read with Sections 114, 186 & 153A, 186, 187 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860.

HEAD NOTE

"The above decisions make it clear that though
this Court is competent to entrust the investigation
to any independent agency, once the investigating
agency complete their function of investigating
into the offences, it is the court in which the
charge-sheet is filed which is to deal with all
matters relating to the trial of the accused
including matters falling within the scope of
Section 173(8) of the Code. Thus, generally, this
Court may not require further monitoring of the
case/investigation. However, we make it clear that
if any of the parties including CBI require any
further direction, they are free to approach this
Court by way of an application."- Supreme Court.

Advocates Act, Section: 15 & Rules 121 and 122-A of the State Bar Council of Madhya Pradesh Rules

HEAD NOTE

Advocates Act and State Bar Council of Madhya Pradesh Rules - The provisions of Rules 121 and 122-A (in
particular) of the M.P. Rules are not ultra vires of the provisions,
including the provisions of Section 15, of the Advocates Act.
These rules also do not suffer from the vice of excessive
delegation.

In view of the language of Section 15(3) of the Advocates
Act and the factual matrix afore-noticed by us, it is clear that the
amended rules of the M.P. Rules had received the approval of the
Bar Council of India, particularly Rule 122-A. The Rules would
not be invalidated for want of issuance of any notification, as it
is not the requirement in terms of Section 15(3) of the Advocates
Act and in any case would be a curable irregularity at best : Supreme Court.

Held "(a) Section 110 of the Land Reforms Act and the notification dated 8.3.94 are valid, and there is no excessive delegation of legislative power on the State Government.

(b) Non-laying of the notification dt.8.3.94 under Section 140 of the Land Reforms Act before the State Legislature is a curable defect and it will not affect the validity of the notification or action taken thereunder.

(c) The Acquisition Act is protected by Article 31A of the Constitution after having obtained the assent of the President and hence immune from challenge under Article 14 or 19 of the Constitution.
(d) There is no repugnancy between the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 and the Karnataka Land Reforms Act, 1961, and hence no assent of the President is warranted under Article 254(2) of the Constitution.

(e) Public purpose is a pre-condition for deprivation of a person from his property under Article 300A and the right to claim compensation is also inbuilt in that Article and when a person is deprived of his property the State has to justify both the grounds which may depend on scheme of the statute, legislative policy, object and purpose of the legislature and other related factors.

Seniority in Services : For the reasons aforesaid this Court holds that
for determination of seniority of the officers
who were recommended on the same date, age is the
only valid and fair basis as such their seniority
should be decided on the basis of age of the
candidates who have been recommended.-Supreme Court.

Determination of Age under Juvenile Act : "We are satisfied that the entry relating to date of birth entered in the mark sheet is one of the valid proof of evidence for determination of age of an accused person.

The School Leaving Certificate is also a valid proof in determining the age of the accused person.

Further, the date of birth mentioned in the High School mark sheet produced by the appellant has duly been corroborated by the School Leaving Certificate of the appellant of Class X and has also been proved by the statement of the clerk of Nehru High School, Dadheru, Khurd- O-Kalan and recorded by the Board.

.... Accordingly, the appellant was a juvenile on the date of occurrence that is 04.06.2007 as alleged in the FIR dated 04.06.2007.

We are also satisfied that Rule 12 of the Rules which was brought in pursuance of the Act describes four categories of evidence which have been provided in which preference has been given to school certificate over the medical report"- Supreme Court.

Article 136 of the
Constitution - "...this Court will be
extremely loath to upset the judgment of
conviction which is confirmed in appeal.
However, if it is found that the
appreciation of evidence in a case,
which is entirely based on
circumstantial evidence, is vitiated by
serious errors and on that account
miscarriage of justice has been
occasioned, then the Court will
certainly interfere even with the
concurrent findings recorded by the
Trial court and the High Court., [Bharat
Vs. State of M.P. 2003 (3) SCC 106] - Followed.-Supreme Court - Dated 13/07/2011.

Excercising jurisdiction under Article 136 Constitution of India : "However, if this Court is of the opinion that the
acquittal is not based on a reasonable view, then it may review
the entire material and there will be no limitation on this
Cour`s jurisdiction under Article 136 to come to a just
decision quashing the acquittal"- 1985(4) SCC 476 para 45;
1996(7) SCC 471 para 4 - Followed.-Supreme Court- Dated 24/05/2011.

Evidence of interested witness - Appreciation thereof - can be relied upon :"in the case of
Namdeo v. State of Maharashtra [(2007) 14 SCC 150] and in
the case of State of Maharashtra v. Ahmed Shaikh Babajan
and Others [(2009) 14 SCC 267] which dealt with the
question of appreciation of evidence of interested
witnesses. Both those decisions follow the well-settled
principle that just because evidence is given by the
interested persons that is no ground for discarding the
same. We have already held that in the instant case, the
evidence given by PWs 5, 6, 7 and 8 is quite cogent and
clearly established the prosecution case."- Supreme Court - Dated 16/05/2011.

"We warn policemen that they will not be excused for committing
murder in the name of `encounter' on the pretext that they were carrying out
the orders of their superior officers or politicians, however high. In the
Nuremburg trials the Nazi war criminals took the plea that `orders are
orders', nevertheless they were hanged. If a policeman is given an illegal
order by any superior to do a fake `encounter', it is his duty to refuse to carry
out such illegal order, otherwise he will be charged for murder, and if found
guilty sentenced to death. The `encounter' philosophy is a criminal
philosophy, and all policemen must know this. Trigger happy policemen
who think they can kill people in the name of `encounter' and get away with
it should know that the gallows await them."-SUPREME COURT - Dated 13th.May,2011.

POLICE ENCOUNTERS: "We warn policemen that they will not be excused for committing murder in the name of `encounter' on the pretext that they were carrying out the orders of their superior officers or politicians, however high. In the Nuremburg trials the Nazi war criminals took the plea that `orders are orders', nevertheless they were hanged. If a policeman is given an illegal order by any superior to do a fake `encounter', it is his duty to refuse to carry out such illegal order, otherwise he will be charged for murder, and if found guilty sentenced to death. The `encounter' philosophy is a criminal philosophy, and all policemen must know this. Trigger happy policemen who think they can kill people in the name of `encounter' and get away with it should know that the gallows await them."-SUPREME COURT - Dated 13/05/2011.

The plaintiff in a suit for specific performance, cannot obviously succeed unless he proved that he was ready and willing to perform the contract. The exhaustive correspondence between the parties clearly discloses the respective stands of the parties. Even the
prayer in the plaint shows that the appellant was not ready to pay the entire balance of Rs.34,00,000/- as agreed under
the agreement of sale but that the plaintiff insisted upon
the appellant to pay the municipal taxes before the sale, as a condition for sale. If appellant was not willing to pay Rs.34 lakhs at the time of sale, as specifically agreed under
the agreement of sale, the appellant could not claim that it was ready and willing to perform its obligations. As noticed above, after appreciating the entire evidence, learned Single Judge and Division Bench of the High Court have recorded a finding that the appellant was not ready and willing and consequently dismissed the suit. Supreme Court of India- Dated: 04:09:2011

Petitioner submits matter be
considered by a larger Bench as the petition raises the following
issues of Constitutional importance:
(1) Whether the aforesaid two verdicts, viz. the 7-Judge Bench
and 9-Judge Bench decisions of this Court referred to above
really amount to amending Article 124(2) of the
Constitution?
(2) Whether there is any `Collegium' system for appointing
Supreme Court or High Court Judges in the Constitution?
3
(3) Whether the Constitution can be amended by a judicial
verdict or it can only be amended by Parliament in
accordance with Article 368?
(4) Whether the Constitutional scheme was that the Supreme
Court and High Court Judges can be appointed by mutual
discussions and mutual consensus between the judiciary and
the executive; or whether the judiciary can alone appoint
Judges of the Supreme Court and High Courts?
(5) Whether the word `consultation' in Article 224 means
`concurrence'?
(6) Whether by judicial interpretation words in the Constitution
can be made redundant, as appears to have been done in the
aforesaid two decisions which have made consultation with
High Court Judges redundant while appointing a Supreme
Court Judge despite the fact that it is permissible on the clear
language of Article 124(2)?
(7) Whether the clear language of Article 124(2) can be altered
by judicial verdicts and instead of allowing the President of
India to consult such Judges of the Supreme Court as he
deems necessary (including even junior Judges) only the
Chief Justice of India and four seniormost Judges of the
Supreme Court can alone be consulted while appointing a
Supreme Court Judge?
(8) Whether there was any convention that the President is
bound by the advice of the Chief Justice of India, and
whether any such convention (assuming there was one) can
prevail over the clear language of Article 124(2)?
(9) Whether the opinion of the Chief Justice of India has any
primacy in the aforesaid appointments?
(10) Whether the aforesaid two decisions should be overruled by
a larger Bench?-Supreme Court-Dated 4/4/2011
4

POLICE CUSTODY DEATHS & RAPES-"In spite of the constitutional and statutory
provisions aimed at safeguarding the personal liberty and
life of a citizen, growing incidence of torture and deaths
in police custody has been a disturbing factor. Experience
shows that worst violations of human rights take place
during the course of investigation, when the police with a
view to secure evidence or confession often resorts to
third-degree methods including torture and adopts
techniques of screening arrest by either not recording the
arrest or describing the deprivation of liberty merely as a
prolonged interrogation. A reading of the morning
newspapers almost everyday carrying reports of
dehumanising torture, assault, rape and death in custody
of police or other governmental agencies is indeed
depressing. The increasing incidence of torture and death
in custody has assumed such alarming proportions that it
is affecting the credibility of the rule of law and the
administration of criminal justice system. The
community rightly feels perturbed. Societys cry for
justice becomes louder.
Custodial death is perhaps one of the worst crimes:SUPREME COURT OF INDIA-Dated 29/03/2011.

Applicability of section 34 I.P.C. read with 302 - which accused actually caused the murder not certain
But It is clear that all the three accused persons had taken part in
the beating of deceased Deepak and all the accused persons dragged him
in the room and closed the door. Therefore, it was up to the accused
persons to explain as to how Deepak died. It is very clear that all the three
accused persons had acted with common intention of causing the death
and, therefore, all the three accused persons would be guilty with the aid of
Section 34, IPC. The High Court has rightly held them guilty: Supreme Court.

On the basis of the materials on record, the enquiry officer held the writ petitioner guilty with which the disciplinary authority as also the appellate authority agreed. It is well settled that High Court while exercising the power of judicial review from the order of the disciplinary authority do not act as a Court of appeal and appraise evidence. It interferes with the finding of enquiry officer only when the finding is found to be perverse. We are of the opinion that the Division Bench of the High Court erred in setting aside the order of learned Single Judge and quashing the order of compulsory retirement. The finding recorded by the enquiry officer is based on the materials on record and on proper appreciation of evidence which cannot be said to be perverse calling for interference by the High Court in exercise of its power of judicial review. SUPREME COURT OF INDIA-ORDER DATED 28 FEB 2011

The appellant filed a revision before the High Court which was dismissed, affirming the conviction and sentence of the appellant under Sections 420 and 471 of the I.P.C.
Admittedly, the entire amount of Rs.60,000/- involved in the case, has been deposited by the appellant.
The Chief Executive Officer of the Zila Parishad, Beed, has filed an application before this Court in which it is mentioned that since the entire amount has been deposited by the appellant, they have no objection if the sentence under Section 420 of the I.P.C. is compounded. The alleged incident took place 23 years ago and the appellant has already undergone a part of the sentence.
We have heard the learned counsel for the appellant, learned counsel for the State and learned counsel for the complainant. In our considered view, ends of justice would meet if, while upholding the conviction of the appellant, the sentence is reduced to the period already undergone by him. We direct accordingly.
This order is subject to the appellant”“s paying additionally a fine of Rupees One Lakh within six weeks from today. This appeal is disposed of with these observations and directions.
In case the amount of fine, as directed above is not deposited by the appellant, then this order would be of no avail to the appellant and he would have to serve out the remaining period of sentence.

The Chief Executive Officer of the Zila Parishad, Beed, has filed an application before this Court in which it is mentioned that since the entire amount has been deposited by the appellant, they have no objection if the sentence under Section 420 of the I.P.C. is compounded. The alleged incident took place 23 years ago and the appellant has already undergone a part of the sentence.-Supreme Court Allowed the request.

Civil Appeal , AppealNo: 2153 OF 2011 with 2154-2167 of 2011 and 2168-2170 of 2011

ACT

The National Council for Teacher Education, Section: Section 12

HEAD NOTE

the decision of the High Court, permitting the State Govern- ment to continue with the recruitment process, initiated on the basis of the Amendment Rules, 2005 which have been declared by it to be illegal is clearly indefensible. Having clearly held that ““the requirement of ad- herence to the Statutory Regulations framed by the NCTE cannot be left to be determined at the discretion of the authorities of the State Govern- ment and that there was no compelling reason with the State to justify a departure from the Statutory Regulations, any action under illegal rules would be null and void”“, the High Court could not have permitted the State Government to perpetuate an illegality. To say the least, we are equally amazed by the stand of the State Government. Having failed to sustain the Amendment Rules, 2005 before the High Court, it would be improper for the State to go ahead with the recruitments under the said amended Rules which have been declared null and void, particularly when the decision of the High Court on that issue has not been ques- tioned by it. We are of the view that the impugned observation by the High Court would be clearly inimical to the rule of law. While it is trite that Courts can exercise judicial discretion in moulding the relief, however, such discretion cannot be exercised to perpetuate and encour- age an illegality.

The High Court overlooked that what section 31(5) contemplates is not merely the delivery of any kind of a copy of the award but a copy of the award that is duly signed by the members of the arbitral tribunal. ---In the facts of the case the appellants would appear to be deriving undue advantage due to the omission of the arbitrator to give them a signed copy of the award coupled with the supply of a copy of the award to them by the claimant-respondent but that would not change the legal position and it would be wrong to tailor the law according to the facts of a particular case. ---In the light of the discussion made above this appeal must succeed.

Having bestowed our anxious consideration, we are constrained to hold that the impugned judgment deserves to be set aside on the short ground that while deciding the case, the Tribunal has ignored the specific directions issued by this Court, vide order dated 30th August, 2001. It is evident from the impugned order, in particular from paras 15 and 16 that the Tribunal has not appreciated the facts obtaining in the present case in their correct perspective, which has resulted in vitiating its decision on the question of leviability of import duty. Although, from para 14 of the impugned order it is evident that the Tribunal was conscious of the direction of this Court that it was required to first record the correct facts and then in the factual perspective locate and apply the relevant law, yet in the very next paragraph it proceeds to hold that when it is accepted that Notification No. 118/59-Cus. did not exist at the time of clearance of the vessel from the ship yard, the persistent plea that the ship was manufactured in a warehouse located in India and therefore, it attracted 8 1994 Supp (3) SCC 606 9 (2009) 14 SCC 342 excise duty alone need not be considered at all. In our opinion, in light of the decision and directions of this Court in C.A. 1998 of 2000, judicial discipline obliged the Tribunal to examine the entire legal issue after ascertaining the foundational facts, regardless of its earlier view in the matter. Therefore, the decision of the Tribunal cannot be sustained

Learned Solicitor General submits that if the Bank is allowed to appropriate this amount, then he has no objection to the appeal of the appellant being heard on merit by the DRAT. We direct that the Indian Bank would be at liberty to appropriate the amount which is already with the Bank, however, this would be subject to the final decision of the appeal by the DRAT.--
In the facts and circumstances of this case, we direct the DRAT to hear and dispose of the appeal on all questions of law, as expeditiously as possible, in any event, within two months from the date of the communication of this order.--Supreme Court of India- Dated:February 25, 2011.

where the appeal is against a conviction and sentence of death or of imprisonment, and the appellant dies during the pendency of the appeal, any of his near relatives may, within thirty days of the death of the appellant, apply to the Appellate Court for leave to continue the appeal; and if leave is granted, the appeal shall not abate; (b) the power to grant leave to continue the appeal is conferred on the court and not on the Registrar under Order VI of the Supreme Court Rules, 1966.--Supreme Court Of India- Order Dated:February 25, 2011

On a consideration of the matter it cannot be said that there is no disproportion or even a sizeable disproportion.....There are also other possible errors in the calculations in regard to point (c). The finding becomes inescapable that the assets were in excess of the known sources of income. But on the question whether the extent of the disproportion is such as to justify a conviction for criminal misconduct...., a somewhat liberal view requires to be taken of what proportion of assets in excess of the known sources of income constitutes ““disproportion”“ for purposes of Section 5(1)(e) of the Act

The pressures on state executive and judicial officers charged with the administration of the criminal law are great. But it is precisely the predictability of those pressures that makes imperative a resolute loyalty to the guarantees that the Constitution extends to us all. Order Dated-24-2-2011

It is by now a settled law that the exemption notification has to be construed strictly and there has to be strict interpretation of the same by reading the same literally. In this connection reference can be made to the decision of this Court in Collector of Customs (Preventive), Amritsar vs. Malwa Industries Limited reported at (2009) 12 SCC 735 as also to the decision in Kartar Rolling Mills vs. Commissioner of Central Excise, New Delhi reported at (2006) 4 SCC 772 wherein also it was held by this Court that finding recorded by the Tribunal and the two authorities below are findings of fact and such findings in absence of evidence on record to the contrary is not subject to interference. In order to get benefit of such notification granting exemption the claimant has to show that he satisfies the eligibility criteria. Since the Tribunal and the authorities below have categorically held that the appellant does not satisfy the eligibility criteria on the basis of the evidence on record, therefore, we hold that the said exemption Notification is not applicable to the case of the appellants.

An order passed by the Settlement Commission
could be interfered with only if the said
order is found to be contrary to any
provisions of the Act. So far findings of the
fact recorded by Commission or question
of facts are concerned, the same is not
open for examination either by the High
Court or by the Supreme Court. In the
present case the order of the Settlement
Commission clearly indicates that the said
order, particularly, with regard to the
imposition of simple interest @ 10 per cent
per annum was passed in accordance with
the provisions of Rule 14 but the High
Court wrongly interpreted the said Rule
and thereby arrived at an erroneous
finding.

So far as the second issue with respect to interest
on Rs. 50 lacs is concerned, the same
being a factual issue should not have been
gone into by the High Court exercising the
writ jurisdiction and the High Court
should not have substituted its own
opinion against the opinion of the
Settlement Commission when the same
was not challenged on merits.

In that view of the matter, we set aside the order passed by the
Punjab & Haryana High Court by the impugned judgment and
order and restore the order of the Settlement Commission
leaving the parties to bear their own costs.
ORDER DATED-February 21, 2011.

HELD--We have heard learned counsel for the parties and we are of the considered opinion that the Division Bench of the High Court should not have passed the impugned order for deposit of Rs.20,00,000/- for each of the appeals when the Appellate Authority had directed the appellant to make pre- deposit for Rs.5,00,000/- for both the appeals. The second proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 15 of the Act states that in the case of an appeal against a decision or order imposing a penalty or redemption charges, no such appeal shall be entertained unless the amount of the penalty or redemption charges has been deposited by the appellant. The third proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 15 of the Act, however, states ““where the Appellate Authority is of opinion that the deposit to be made will cause undue hardship to the appellant, it may, at its discretion, dispense with such deposit either unconditionally or subject to such conditions as it may impose.”“ Hence, under the Act discretion is vested in the Appellate Authority to dispense with a pre-deposit of penalty either unconditionally or subject to such condition as the Appellate Authority may impose. If in exercise of such discretion, the Appellate Authority in the present case dispensed with the pre-deposit penalty of Rs.1,30,00,000/- in each of the two appeals subject to the appellant depositing a sum of Rs.5,00,000/-, the Division Bench of the Delhi High Court ought not to have enhanced the amount of pre-deposit to Rs.20,00,000/- for each of the two appeals.

As the two appeals of the appellant have not been heard on merits, we set aside the impugned order of the Division Bench of the High Court of Delhi and the order of the learned Single Judge and direct that in case the appellant deposits the sum of Rs.5,00,000/- as directed by the Appellate Authority within two months from today, the two appellate orders of the Appellate Authority will stand quashed and the appeal will be heard on merits afresh by the Appellate Authority.

With the aforesaid directions, the appeals are allowed. No costs- ORDER DATED- February 21, 2011.

HELD--The High Court has gone on the premise that once the Appellant have themselves extended the benefit to the Respondent they cannot further classify the benefit of investment up to the date of amendment, putting the unit in the negative list. It appears that the High Court while arriving at the said finding has failed to appreciate the fact that the case of the Respondent was considered for exemption in the light of the judgment passed by this Court in the Mahabir Vegetable case (supra) reported at (2006) 3 SCC 620 wherein it was held that the Respondent is entitled to exemption. However, the issue of quantum was kept open. The High Court while giving the said finding has altogether closed itself in considering the said issue and on the contrary has held that only because the Respondent has been considered for grant of exemption, there is no issue of quantum and the Respondent is entitled to entire exemption. In our opinion the said finding is not in line with the observations made by this Court in the Mahabir Vegetable case (supra) reported at (2006) 3 SCC 620. The quantification made by the LLSC is in accord with the ratio laid by this Court.
Accordingly, we allow the appeal and set aside the impugned judgment passed by the High Court leaving the parties to bear their own costs.- ORDER DATED February 21, 2011.

HELD- Counsel appearing for the appellant also submitted that the punishment awarded to the appellant was too severe and harsh considering the nature and the degree of the offences established. The appellant belongs to Air Force, which is a disciplined service. The allegations made against the appellant were serious. The charge number (2) against him stood proved. The said charge is also serious and we are of the considered opinion that for an offence of the aforesaid nature the authority was justified in awarding him the punishment of dismissal from service.
-- The scale of punishment provided in Section 73 of the Act clearly confirms the position that dismissal from service is a lesser punishment than that of detention in prison. By commuting the punishment of three months detention and imposing the punishment of dismissal, the Confirming Authority has strictly followed the scale of punishment provided for in Section 73 of the Act and, therefore, there is no justification for any interference with the nature of punishment awarded to the appellant-APPEAL DISMISSED- ORDER DATED- FEB 21, 2011

Held- The only ground on which Article 14 has been put forward by the learned counsel for the respondent is that the fixation of the cut-off date for payment of the revised benefits under the two notifications concerned was arbitrary and it resulted in denying arrears of payments to certain Sections of the employees. This argument is no longer res integra. It has been held in a catena of judgments that fixing of a cut-off date for granting of benefits is well within the powers of the Government as long as the reasons therefor are not arbitrary and are based on some rational consideration.”“
-- We have sympathies for the appellant but, in a society governed by Rule of law, sympathies cannot override the Rules and Regulations. We may recall the observations made by this Court while considering the issue of compassionate appointment in public service. In Life Insurance Corporation of India v. Asha Ramachhandra Ambekar and Anr. (1994) 2 SCC 718, wherein the Court observed: ““The High Courts and the Administrative Tribunals cannot confer benediction impelled by sympathetic consideration.... Yielding to instinct will tend to ignore the cold logic of law. It should be remembered that ““law is the embodiment of all wisdom”“. Justice according to law is a principle as old as the hills. The Courts are to administer law as they find it, however, inconvenient it may be.- Order Dated Feb 21 ,2011

HELD--The proliferating unaided private colleges, may need a full complement of students for their comfortable sustenance (meeting the cost of running the college and paying the staff etc.). But that cannot be at the risk of quality of education. To give an example, if 35% is the minimum passing marks in a qualifying examination, can it be argued by colleges that the minimum passing marks in the qualifying examination should be reduced to only 25 or 20 instead of 35 on the ground that the number of students/candidates who pass the examination are not sufficient to fill their seats? Reducing the standards to `fill the seats”“ will be a dangerous trend which will destroy the quality of education. If there are large number of vacancies, the remedy lies in (a) not permitting new colleges; (b) reducing the intake in existing colleges; (c) improving the infrastructure and quality of the institution to attract more students. Be that as it may. The need to fill the seats cannot be permitted to override the need to maintain quality of education. Creeping commercialization of education in the last few years should be a matter of concern for the central bodies, states and universities.
13. No student or college, in the teeth of the existing and prevalent rules of the State and the University can say that such rules should be ignored, whenever there are unfilled vacancies in colleges. In fact the State/University, may, in spite of vacancies, continue with the higher eligibility criteria to maintain better standards of higher education in the State or in the colleges affiliated to the University. Determination of such standards, being part of the academic policy of the University, are beyond the purview of judicial review, unless it is established that such standards are arbitrary or `adversely affect”“ the standards if any fixed by the Central Body under a Central enactment. The order of the Division Bench is therefore unsustainable. ORDER DATED:FEB 18, 2011

HELD-- a permanent disability certificate by the said Medical Board. Therefore, the said certificate clearly establishes that Appellant had sustained permanent disability to his own body to the extent of 50% and even after several surgeries; he was not able to control his urination. We can well appreciate and imagine the problems and difficulties of a young boy aged 16 years, who is not able to control his urination and spoils his clothes even while attending school. We have been given to understand that he is required to go with additional sets of clothings so that he could change the same, in case they are spoiled. This is the state of affairs even as on date. We do not doubt the genuineness and correctness of the aforesaid certificate. Even otherwise, Respondents have also not contended that this certificate is forged or fabricated and has been obtained with an intention to get compensation-APPEAL ALLOWED- ORDER DATED- FEB 18, 2011

HELD--the Tribunal should have considered the prospect of future income while computing compensation but the Tribunal has not done that. In the appeal, which was filed by the appellants before the High Court, the High Court instead of maintaining the amount of compensation, granted by the Tribunal, reduced the same. In doing so, the High Court had not given any reason. The High Court introduced the concept of split multiplier and departed from the multiplier used by the Tribunal without disclosing any reason therefore. The High Court has also not considered the clear and corroborative evidence about the prospect of future increment of the deceased. When the age of the deceased is between 51 and 55 years the multiplier is 11, which is specified in the II Column in the II Schedule in the Motor Vehicles Act, and the Tribunal has not committed any error by accepting the said multiplier. This Court also fails to appreciate why the High Court chose to apply the multiplier of 6.-SUPREME COURT OF INDIA -ORDER DATED : FEB 18 2011

This is, however, a clear case where the admissions of the seven appellants took place due to the fault of the rule-making authority in not making the State Rules, 2008 in conformity of the MCI Regulations. For this fault of the rule-making authority if the appellants are discharged from the MBBS course, they will suffer grave injustice. On the peculiar facts of the case, we are thus of the view that this is a fit case where this Court should exercise its power under Article 142 of the Constitution to do complete justice between parties. In Delhi Judicial Service Association, Tis Hazari Court, Delhi v. State of Gujarat and Others. [(1991) 4 SCC 406] after examining the width of this power under Article 142 of the Constitution, this Court held: ““No enactment made by Central or State legislature can limit or restrict the power of this Court under Article 142 of the Constitution, though while exercising power under Article 142 of the Constitution, the court must take into consideration the statutory provisions regulating the matter in dispute. What would be the need of ““complete justice”“ in a cause or matter would depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case and while exercising that power the Court would take into consideration the express provisions of a substantive statute. Once this Court has taken seisin of a case, cause or matter, it has power to pass any order or issue direction as may be necessary to do complete justice in the matter. --In the facts of the present case, we have found that the
appellants were not to be blamed for having secured
admission in the MBBS course and the fault was entirely of
the rule-making authority in making the 2008 Rules and the
appellants have gone through the pains of appearing in the
common entrance test and have been selected on the basis of
their merit and admitted into the MBBS course in the college
in accordance with the State Rules, 2008 and have pursued
their studies for a year. Hence, even though under the MCI
Regulations the appellants were not eligible for admission to
the MBBS course in the academic year 2008-2009, for the
purpose of doing complete justice in the matter before us, we
direct that the admissions of the appellants to the MBBS
course in the college during the academic year 2008-2009 will
not be disturbed. This direction shall not, however, be treated
as a precedent- SUPREME COURT OF INDIA - ORDER DATED- FEB 18,2011

The liability of the Insurance Company to pay compensation was limited to six persons travelling inside the vehicle only and that the liability to pay the others was that of the owner, we, in this case, are faced with the same problem as had surfaced in Anjana Shyam's case (supra). The number of persons to be compensated being in excess of the number of persons who could validly be carried in the vehicle, the question which arises is one of apportionment of the amounts to be paid. Since there can be no pick and choose method to identify the five passengers, excluding the driver, in respect of whom compensation would be payable by the Insurance Company, to meet the ends of justice we may apply the procedure adopted in Baljit Kaur”“s case (supra) and direct that the Insurance Company should deposit the total amount of compensation awarded to all the claimants and the amounts so deposited be disbursed to the claimants in respect to their claims, with liberty to the Insurance Company to recover the amounts paid by it over and above the compensation amounts payable in respect of the persons covered by the Insurance Policy from the owner of the vehicle, as was directed in Baljit Kaur”“s case- SUPREME COURT OF INDIA-ORDER DATED: FEB 18,2011

The Dean of King Edward Memorial Hospital as well as Ms. Pinky Virani (who claims to be the next friend of the petitioner) are directed to intimate the brother(s)/sister(s) or other close relatives of the petitioner that the case will be listed on 2nd March, 2011 in the Supreme Court and they can put forward their views before the Court, if they so desire. Learned counsel for the petitioner and the Registry of this Court shall communicate a copy of this Order forthwith to the Dean, KEM Hospital. The Dean, KEM Hospital is requested to file an affidavit stating his views regarding the prayer in this writ petition, and also the condition of the petitioner- SUPREME COURT OF INDIA- ORDER DATED: FEB 18,2011

The import manifest and the bill of entry having been filed before the Collectorate of Customs (Imports) Mumbai, the same having been assessed and clearance for home consumption having been allowed by the proper officer on importers executing bond, undertaking the obligation of export, in our opinion, the Collector of Customs (Preventive), not being a ““proper officer”“ within the meaning of Section 2(34) of the Act, was not competent to issue show cause notice for re- assessment under Section 28 of the Act. Nothing has been brought on record to show that the Collector of Customs (Preventive), who had issued the show cause notices was assigned the functions under Section 28 of the Act as ““proper officer”“ either by the Board or the Collector/Commissioner of Customs. We are convinced that Notifications No. 250-Cus and 251-Cus., both dated 27th August, 1983, issued by the Central Government in exercise of the powers conferred by sub-section (1) of the Section 4 of the Act, appointing Collector of Customs (Preventive) etc. to be the Collector of Customs for Bombay, Thane and Kolaba Districts in the State of Maharashtra did not ipso facto confer jurisdiction on him to exercise power entrusted to the ““proper officers”“ for the purpose of Section 28 of the Act. In that view of the matter, we do not find any substance in the contention of Mr. V. Shekhar, learned Senior Counsel, appearing for the revenue in the second set of appeals, that the source of power to act as a ““proper officer”“ is Sections 4 and 5 of the Act and not sub-section 34 of Section 2 of the Act. The said sections merely authorize the Board to appoint officers of Customs and confer on them the powers and duties to be exercised/discharged by them, but for the purpose of Section 28 of the Act, an officer of customs has to be designated as ““proper officer”“ by assigning the function of levy and collection of duty, by the Board or the Commissioner of Customs. The argument is rejected accordingly. Similarly, revenue’‘‘‘s reliance on the decision of this court in Ram Narain Bishwanath & Ors. (supra) is clearly misplaced. In that case the issue for determination was that when goods imported and cleared at Paradip Port (Orissa State) were seized by the Customs authorities in West Bengal on the allegation that these had been imported on the strength of fictitious licences, whether the customs authorities at Paradip or West Bengal will have the jurisdiction to initiate adjudication proceedings. By a short order it was held that it was for the customs authorities at Paradip to initiate proceedings against the importer. Apart from the fact that none of the statutory provisions were considered in that case, the issue arising for consideration in the present appeals was not the subject matter therein. Thus, the said decision is of no avail to the revenue.- SUPREME COURT OF INDIA- ORDER DATED: FEBRUARY 18, 2011

HELD--With regard to recovery of the pistol, the learned counsel is right that the pistol was recovered from a public place but it was recovered from the place which could not have been easily located by anyone and, therefore, the accused cannot get benefit which the learned counsel wanted him to get. From the memo of recovery, it is clear that the pistol had been hidden by digging earth under a plant of Sarkanda about half a kilometer away from bridge of Ladhuwala Uttar. Thus, it is very clear that the pistol had been hidden by digging earth under the plant of Sarkanda about half a kilometer away on the eastern katcha path from bridge of Ladhuwala Uttar and, therefore, in our opinion, the recovery cannot be said to be from a place which could have been easily accessible to anyone.
--With regard to recovery memo, the mistake committed in writing the word "witness"
or "witnesses" can not be said to be so material so as to adversely affect the case of the prosecution. – SUPREME COURT OF INDIA- ORDER DATED:FEB 18,2011

If the order has re-determined the valuable rights of the parties to the proceeding, whether without issuing any notice or after issuing notice, it is a judgment as per the tests laid down in Khimji's case.

CRIMINAL LAWS-The letter which forms the basis of conviction by the Appellate Court was never produced during the investigation and for the first time produced by the witness during the course of trial, when she appeared as a witness. It is submitted that authenticity of the letter in question has not been proved and hence the appellate Court ought not to have reversed the judgment of acquittal and convicted the appellant. --Moreover, this letter had not been produced before the police during the course of the initial investigation and had been handed over to the police after several months. This fact, as also a reading of the letter, indicates that this was a concocted piece of evidence and the work of a legal mind, as no person would write such a letter meeting all legal requirements for implicating himself and his near relatives, in a claim for dowry. It has also been pointed out that view taken by the Trial Court was one of the possible views which the High Court in appeal ought not to have reversed.-SUPREME COURT OF INDIA- ORDER DATED: FEB 17,2011

STATE OF UTTARAKHAND AND OTHERS...Appellant(s)
VERSUS
HARPAL SINGH RAWAT...Respondent(s)

APPEAL

Civil Appeal , AppealNo: 1894 OF 2011

ACT

, Section:

HEAD NOTE

CIVIL LAWS--An agreement signed by the parties in the matter of collection of toll. While rejecting the argument of the writ petitioner that he was not liable to pay stamp duty under Article 35(b) read with Section 2(16) of the Act, the Division Bench observed: ““On bare reading of the section it becomes clear that all leases with respect to immovable property would be leases in terms of Section 2(16) but in addition to leases of immovable property in other three categories there would also be lease under category (c) in which any instrument by which tolls of any description are let would be a lease for the purpose of Section 2(16). The instrument by which right to collect toll is conveyed has to be treated as lease for the purposes of Stamp Act. Right to collect toll will never in any circumstances involve immovable property. Basically toll is collected for using a road or bridge and as such neither the road nor the bridge is leased out, only the right to collection is leased out and this right of leasing out the collection is ““lease”“ for the purposes of Stamp Act- APPEAL ALLOWED- SUPREME COURT OF INDIA- ORDER DATED FEB 17, 2011

Civil Laws-There is concurrent finding that a pond exists and the area covered by it varies in the rainy season. In such a case no part of it could have been allotted to anybody for construction of house building or any allied purposes. It is important to notice that the material resources of the community like forests, tanks, ponds, hillock, mountain etc. are nature”“s bounty. They maintain delicate ecological balance. They need to be protected for a proper and healthy environment which enables people to enjoy a quality life which is the essence of the guaranteed right under Article 21 of the Constitution. The Government, including the Revenue Authorities i.e. Respondents 11 to 13, having noticed that a pond is falling in disuse, should have bestowed their attention to develop the same which would, on one hand, have prevented ecological disaster and on the other provided better environment for the benefit of the public at large. Such vigil is the best protection against knavish attempts to seek allotment in non-abadi sites- Appeal Dismissed- SUPREME COURT OF INDIA- ORDER DATED FEB 17, 2011

HELD--In the present case the acquisition proceeding commenced with the notification under Section 4 issued on 06.03.1965 and it culminated in passing of the award by the Collector on 09.07.1980, i.e., before 30.04.1982, the date from which the amending Act 68 of 1984 was made applicable to the pending and subsequent proceedings. Therefore, in terms of the law laid down by the Constitution Bench decision of this Court in the case of K.S. Paripoornan (supra) the respondents are not entitled to the benefit of Section 23(1A).

All the appeals, therefore, are partly allowed to the aforesaid extent and disposed of leaving the parties to bear their own costs. -SUPREME COURT OF INDIA-ORDER DATED FEB 17,2011

HELD--The High Court unfortunately took a very technical view in the matter of applying the multiplier. The High Court cannot keep out of its consideration the claim of the daughter of the first claimant, since the daughter was impleaded, and was 49 years of age. Admittedly, the deceased was looking after the entire family. In determining the age of the mother, the High Court should have accepted the age of the mother at 65, as given in the claim petition, since there is no controversy on that. By accepting the age of mother at 67, the High Court further reduced the multiplier from 6 to 5, even if we accept the reasoning of the High Court to be correct. The reasoning of the High Court is not correct in view of the ratio in Sarla Verma (supra). Following the same the High Court should have proceeded to compute the compensation on the age of the deceased.

Thus, the finding of the High Court is contrary to the ratio in Sarla Verma (supra), which is the leading decision on this question and which we follow.

This Court, therefore, cannot sustain the High Court judgment and is constrained to set aside the same. The award of MACT is restored.

HELD--The language of the circular dated 13.12.1995 makes it crystal clear that the Government took a fresh decision in supersession of earlier instructions that promotion to Grade-IV may be given from amongst officials in Grade-III on the basis of their seniority in the basic grade. Hence, the decision of the Government to make promotions to Grade-IV on the basis of their seniority in the basic grade could take effect only from 13.12.1995 and not from a prior date and the respondents, who had filed O.A. No.2484 of 1997 and O.A. No.2099 of 1997 in the Central Administrative Tribunal could not claim any promotion to Grade-IV on the basis of their seniority in the basic cadre with effect from any date prior to 13.12.1995. The Central Administrative Tribunal was, therefore, not right in allowing O.A. No.2484 of 1997 and O.A. No.2099 of 1997 by order dated 11.08.2000, directing the Government to consider promoting the applicants to Grade-IV with effect from the dates their immediate juniors in the basic grade seniority were so promoted subject to their being found fit with consequential benefits of seniority as well as arrears of pay and allowance and of retiral benefits in the case of those of the applicants in the O.As. who had retired on superannuation. In our considered opinion, the High Court ought to have interfered with the decision of the Tribunal.
18. We accordingly allow these appeals and set aside the impugned orders dated 22.05.2003 of the High Court and the common order dated 11.08.2000 of the Central Administrative Tribunal in O.A. No. 2484 of 1997 and O.A. No.2099 of 1997. The two O.As. stand rejected. There will be no order as to costs.- SUPREME COURT OF INDIA- ORDER DATED: FEB 17, 2011

Held- The appellant has preferred this appeal against the final judgment dated 10.09.2007 before this Court. This appeal is also barred by limitation of 114 days. There is no satisfactory explanation for condonation of delay before this Court also. -Supreme Court of India -Order Dated: Feb 17,2011
The Union of India ought to have been careful particularly in filing this Civil Appeal because the Division Bench, by the impugned order, has dismissed the appeal before it on the ground of delay. It is a matter of deep anguish and distress that majority of the matters filed by the Union of India are hopelessly barred by limitation and no satisfactory explanations exist for condoning inordinate delay in filing those cases.
On consideration of the totality of the facts and circumstances, we are constrained to dismiss this appeal on the ground of delay. However, in the larger interest, we are keeping the question of law open

Held- It is, therefore, difficult for us to uphold the impugned judgment and order of the Division Bench of the High Court and hence we quash and set aside the same. If, however, the writ petitioner, respondents herein, has/have any other alternative remedy or forum to claim allotment of the land, they obviously will have to first of all get the letter of the State Government quashed and set aside which has ordered stopping the allotment of rehabilitation land forthwith. Unless the respondents succeed in doing so, no allotment of the land could have been made specially without any enquiry as to whether the predecessor-in-interest had left any land at all in Pakistan when he migrated to India. Besides this, learned counsel for the appellants-State further informed that the writ petitioner, predecessor-in- interest of the respondents herein had already been allotted land under the rehabilitation scheme way back in the year 1952 and, therefore, claim for allotment for the second time should not have been allowed by the High Court contrary to the government instructions. We find force in this submission also, and, therefore, this aspect was required to be examined and enquired before any order was passed in favour of the respondents-claimants- Supreme Court of India- Order Dated Feb 15, 2011

Held- Supreme Court of India-Order Dated Feb 15, 2011- The DNA test of Rimpa by CDFD, a pioneer institute in Hyderabad matched with that of blood of her parents and brother. The Doctors at AIIMS have put the parts of the deceased girls which have been recovered by the Doctors of AIIMS together. These bodies have been recovered in the presence of the Doctors of AIIMS at the pointing out by the accused Surendra Koli. Thus, recovery is admissible under Section 27 of the Evidence Act.
On the facts of the case we see no reason to interfere with the findings of the trial court and the High Court that the appellant Surendra Koli is guilty of murdering Rimpa Haldar. Both Courts have gone into the evidence in great detail and we have perused the same. The appellant appears to be a serial killer, and these cases in our opinion fall within the category of rarest of the rare cases as laid down in Bachan singh Vs State of Punjab, 1982 SCC 689 which has been subsequently followed in Atbir Vs Government of NCT of Delhi, 2010 SCC (9) 1.
The killings by the appellant Surendra Koli are horrifying and barbaric. He used a definite methodology in committing these murders. He would see small girls passing by the house, and taking advantage of their weakness lure them inside the house no. D-5, Sector 31, Nithari Village, Noida and there he would strangulate them and after killing them he tried to have sex with the body and would then cut off their body parts and eat them. Some parts of the body were disposed off by throwing them in the passage gallery and drain (nala) beside the house. House no. D-5, Sector 31 had become a virtual slaughter house, where innocent children were regularly butchered.
In our opinion, this case clearly falls within the category of rarest of rare case and no mercy can be shown to the appellant Surendra Koli.
The appeal is, therefore, dismissed.

Held-Supreme Court of India- Order Dated: Feb 15, 2011-Coming to the case at hand we are of the opinion that the High Court was not justified in imposing the extreme penalty of death upon the appellants. We say so for reasons more than one. Firstly, because the appellants are not professional killers. Even according to the prosecution they were only a part of the coal mafia active in the region indulging in theft of coal from the collieries. The deceased being opposed to such activities appears to have incurred their wrath and got killed. Secondly, because even when the deceased was a politician there was no political angle to his killing. Thirdly, because while all culpable homicides amounting to murder are inhuman, hence legally and ethically unacceptable yet there was nothing particularly brutal, grotesque, diabolical, revolting or dastardly in the manner of its execution so as to arouse intense and extreme indignation of the community or exhaust depravity and meanness on the part of the assailants to call for the extreme penalty. Fourthly, because there was difference of opinion on the question of sentence to be awarded to the convicts. The Trial Court did not find it to be a rarest of rare case and remained content with the award of life sentence only which sentence the High Court enhanced to death. Considering all these circumstances, the death sentence awarded to the appellants in our opinion deserves to be commuted to life imprisonment.-Appeal Allowed

HELD- In view of the fact that the inspection and verification in regard to renewal of permission for the second, third, fourth and fifth years will be restricted only to the consideration of the additional faculty and additional infrastructure, it may not be necessary to apply the lengthy time schedule prescribed for initial permission, to renewal of permissions during the next four years. The DCI Regulations presently contemplate almost similar time schedules in regard to applications for establishment of new dental colleges, for opening of higher courses of study, for increase of admission capacity, and for renewal of permissions, with 15th July being the last date both for grant of permission or renewal of permission. DCI and Central Government may consider amendment to the DCI Regulations suitably to provide for a shorter and distinct time schedule for renewal of permissions, so that the dental colleges could file applications till end of February and the process of grant or refusal of renewal is completed by 15th of June. Conclusion
22. In view of the above, these writ petitions are allowed as follows : (a) The condition imposed by the Central Government (requiring the dental colleges to secure appropriate orders from this court approving the renewals of permission) in the letters of renewal of permission issued to the petitioners in July/August/September, 2010, is quashed; (b) It is however declared that the renewal of permissions issued by Central Government to the petitioners for the academic year 2010-2011, are valid.- SUPREME COURT OF INDIA- ORDER DATED: FEB 15,2011

Held- Learned senior counsel appearing for the respondents submits that the suit is pending before the Small Causes Court, Pune.
We direct the proceedings in the suit to continue, however, no final order in the suit be passed until the disposal of the writ petition to be filed by the appellants before the Bombay High Court.
In the facts and circumstances of the case, we request the Bombay High Court to dispose of the writ petition, if filed (by the appellants within four weeks from today) as expeditiously as possible, in any event, within a period of one year from the date of filing of the writ petition.
In case, the writ petition is not filed within a period of four weeks, this order would be of no avail to the appellants- Supreme Court of India -Order Dated: Feb 15 2011

The learned counsel for the appellant submitted that there was no justification for the High Court, in exercise of power of judicial review, to interfere with the findings of the revisional authority and the punishment imposed, which had been accepted by the Administrative Tribunal It is impermissible in law.
--The revisional authority did not interfere with the findings recorded by the appellate authority that respondent was not guilty of charges 2,3,4 and 5. The appellate authority found that as only charges 1,6 and 7 were proved and the other charges relating mis- appropriation of additional fare were not proved, the punishment of dismissal was excessive and consequently set aside the same and imposed a lesser punishment of reduction in rank.
-On the facts and circumstances, the said order of the appellate authority did not call for interference and that too in exercise of power of revision.
Therefore we are of the view that the High Court was justified in restoring the decision of the appellate authority imposing a lesser punishment.
However while the High Court was justified in restoring the order of reinstatement with imposition of lesser punishment of reduction in service with continuity of service, the High Court was not justified in granting the reliefs of seniority and 25% back wages. When the High Court has upheld the finding that the respondent was guilty of charges 1,6 and 7, any direction for back wages would amount to rewarding the guilty, which is not permissible. Nor will he be entitled to restoration of his seniority as ordered by the High Court.
we allow this appeal in part and set aside the order of the High Court awarding backwages of 25% and restoring the seniority.- Supreme Court of India –Order Dated :Feb 14, 2011

Appeal-Civil Laws-The appellant has pointed out that apart from being a Member of the Bar, he is a former President of the Student Union of the AMU, former elected Member of AMU Court, Life Member of AMU Old Boys Association and Donor Life Member of the AMU-- He had produced documents in support of the said averments. The said averments are not shown to be false. The appellant claims that his only interest in filing the writ petition was to ensure that AMU continues to be an Institution of academic excellence and that no action of the University should dilute its academic excellence. On the other hand, the respondents contend that the writ petition was filed with the oblique motive of maligning the Vice Chancellor of the University. It is not necessary to examine that aspect now-Held- he has sufficient interest to file the writ petition in public interest. The High Court ought not to have dismissed the public interest litigation only on the ground of locus standi of appellant to file the writ petition. Appeal Allowed-Supreme Court of India-Order Dated: Feb 14 2011

Budhadev Karmaskar ..Appellant
versus
State of West Bengal ..Respondents

APPEAL

Criminal Appeal , AppealNo: 135 OF 2010

ACT

Indian Penal Code, Section: Sec 302 IPC

HEAD NOTE

Appeal- Sec 302-Indian Penal Code-Medical Officer of Mauza Burdwan Medical College, opined that the death was due to the effect of the injuries as noted anti-mortem in nature; that all the injuries as noted in the post mortem examination report might be caused if a person pushed against the wall and it may be homicidal in nature- Appeal Dismised- Supreme Court of India- Order Dated Feb 14, 2011

Appeal- Civil Laws- Post of Ticket Collector is categorised in Annexure IV in Class B-2 but while doing so the underlying object of division of staff into three broad groups A, B and C for vision tests of candidates and of serving Railway employees in non-Gazetted Railway services seems to have been overlooked. Broadly, Class B-2 covers a certain staff in workshops and engine rooms engaged on duties. It has been so done because failing eyesight may endanger themselves or other employees from moving parts of the machinery and crane drivers on open line. This is in consonance with the objective of group B viz; `in the interest of the employee himself or his fellow workers or both”“. Insofar as Ticket Collectors are concerned, vision tests for them are not required `in the interest of employee himself or his fellow workers or both”“ as contemplated in group B but it is required in the interest of administration only - the objective contemplated in group C. In this view of the matter, there seems to be no rational basis, in relation to the object set out in Para 510 of IRMM, of categorizing the post of Ticket Collectors under Class B-2 in Annexure IV. However, it is for the respondents to have a fresh look insofar as categorisation of posts pertaining to non-Gazetted Railway services in Annexure IV is concerned. Suffice it to say that categorization of posts for the purpose of vision tests must have nexus with the object set out in Para 510. Having regard to the objective of division of groups/ classes for the purpose of vision tests under Para 510 of IRMM, the post of Ticket Collectors can not be held to be covered by Class B-2 but rather will be covered by Class C-2. Any inconsistency in categorization of Railway posts in Annexure IV, in our view, must not operate against the appellant in getting promotion to the post of Ticket Collector.
--the appellant could not have been denied promotion to the post of Ticket Collector as he had passed written test and viva voce and was provisionally selected for the post of Ticket Collector and had been declared medically fit in Class C-2. --Appeal is allowed- Supreme Court of India- Order Dated: Feb 14, 2011

Writ- Transfer Petition- Transfer Petition pending at the District Judge (MACT Court, Gautam Budh Nagar, U.P.) to the competent Court at Pune, Maharashtra. The petitioners allege in the petition that the MACT Court, Gautam Budh Nagar, U.P. has no jurisdiction in the matter. - An order of transfer of a case can be passed where both the courts, namely, the transferor court as well as the transferee court, have jurisdiction to hear the case and the party seeking transfer of the case alleges that the transferee court would be more convenient because the witnesses are available there or for some other reason it will be convenient for the parties to have the case heard by the transferee court. There is no question of transfer of a case which has been filed in a court which has no jurisdiction at all to hear it.-With these observations, the transfer petition is dismissed-Supreme Court of India- Order Dated Feb 14, 2011

In the facts of this case, we deem it appropriate
to direct that the appeal, which was dismissed in default
for not depositing the amount in time, shall be restored
to its original number and be heard expeditiously by the
Tribunal.-Supreme Court of India-Order Dated February 11, 2011.

Criminal Laws--Handed over the sample parcel, duly sealed and sample impression of seal to Constable for depositing the same in the office of Chemical Examiner. --None had tampered with the aforesaid case property and the seal which remained in his custody. --Deposited the case property in the office of Chemical Examiner on the same day and tendered receipt. --Report of the Chemical Examiner (Ex. PJ) which indicates that the seals were intact when the sample was received and tallied with the sample impression of the seal. --It is note worthy that such a report of the Chemical Examiner would be admissible under Section 293 of the Cr.P.C. Considering the aforesaid clear evidence, it cannot be said that there is any infirmity in the link evidence merely because there was a delay of few days in sending the sample to the office of the Chemical Examiner.-Appeal Dismissed- Supreme Court of India –Order Dated-February 11, 2011.

Civil Laws-Assigning of lesser marks to Sardar Mahinder Singh not only denied him the first place in the panel, but also unjustly and undeservedly gave the first respondent, the first place in the panel. The manner of assigning marks showed a clear intention to favour the first respondent at the cost of the other applicants. It is this finding that persuaded the General Manager of IOC to scrap the selection. The High Court having recorded a finding that the appellant was satisfied about the illegality committed by the selection committee, ought to have rejected the writ petition, as the decision of the appellants to scrap the selection was reasonable and not arbitrary.-Appeal Allowed- Supreme Court of India-Order dated:Feb 14, 2011

Criminal Laws-Appeal-Sections 120-B and 409- IPC, Sections 5(1)(c) and 5(2) -PC Act-- The prosecution has established - a) By awarding both the works of Idamalayar at a very high and exorbitant rate with special conditions having heavy financial implications. b) By reducing the retention and security amount. c) By allowing the contractor to return only fifty per cent of the empty cement bags. Having arrived at such conclusion,
- High Court failed to appreciate in its proper sense the materials placed by the prosecution and brushed aside several important items of evidence adduced by the prosecution.- Unable to accept the conclusion of the High Court, namely, ““the proved circumstances are not sufficient to hold that there was conspiracy as alleged by the prosecution”“.
- Satisfied that the Special Court after framing various points for consideration and after thorough discussion has accepted the case of the prosecution insofar as the work of driving the surge shaft, lining the surge shaft, balance driving the power tunnel and other allied works of Idamalayar Hydro Electric Power Project at a higher or exorbitant rates to the contractor K.P. Poulose and the accused persons have abused their official positions.
-The Special Court has also accepted the prosecution case founding that A1 along with K.P. Poulose, Paul Mundakkal and other accused persons entered into criminal conspiracy and rightly convicted them.
-The High Court committed a grave error in acquitting the accused without adverting to the reliable and acceptable evidence adduced by the prosecution.- Appeal Allowed- Supreme Court of India –Order Dated: FEBRUARY 10, 2011

Civil Laws- Appeal- A bare perusal of the said order would also indicate that he has
given deductions for the items held as immovable. -The Commissioner having considered the aforesaid issue carefully and after proper scrutiny, the Tribunal
was not justified in rejecting the said findings by mere conclusion and without trying to meet the findings recorded by the Commissioner–Appeal Allowed , Set aside order passed by Tribunal and restore the order of Commissioner- Supreme Court of India. –Order Dated:FEBRUARY 10, 2011.

Even assuming, however, that the bus crew ought to have been examined as that would have greatly enhanced the value of the prosecution evidence, but their non-examination case would not mean that the entire prosecution story would fall through as there were several other credible witnesses including an injured one-- The appeal is accordingly dismissed.-Supreme Court of India -Order Dated- 4 Feb 2011.

SUICIDE NOTE- DEFENCE TOOK BY ACCUSED THAT SUICIDE NOTE WRITTEN BY DECEASED-FAILURE TO REBUT THE PRESUMTION THAT HE HAD CAUSED DOWRY DEATH-APPEAL DISMISSED- In the instant case, evidently, the suicide note, Ext.P-2
purported to have been written by Sarla (deceased) had been taken by appellant as his defence while making his statement under section 313 Cr.P.C. Therefore, the onus was on him to establish his defence by leading sufficient evidence to rebut the presumption that he has caused the dowry death. The appellant miserably failed to discharge that onus.--SUPREME COURT OF INDIA, DATED- 14/01/2011

TRANSFER PETITION ALLOWED-CR.P.C-The petitioner has been able to show the
circumstances from which it can be reasonably inferred
that it has become difficult for the witnesses to safely
depose truth because of fear of being haunted by those
against whom they have to depose. The reluctance of the
witnesses to go to the court at Haridwar in spite of
receipt of repeated summons is bound to hamper the
course of justice.

If such a situation is permitted to
continue, it will pave way for anarchy, oppression, etc.,
resulting in breakdown of criminal justice system. In
order to see that the incapacitation of the eye-witnesses
is removed and justice triumphs, it has become
necessary to grant the relief claimed in the instant
petition. On the facts and in the circumstances of the
case this Court is of the opinion that interest of justice
would be served if transfer of the case from Haridwar to
Delhi is ordered.

BAIL- GRANTED-DELAY IN CONCLUDING THE TRAIL-SUPREME COURT OF INDIA -dated--03/01/2011-In deciding bail applications an important factor which should certainly be taken into consideration by the Court is the delay in concluding the trial. Often this takes several years, and if the accused is denied bail is ultimately acquitted, who will restore so many years of his life spent in custody? Is Article 21 of the constitution, which is the most basic of all the fundamental rights in our Constitution, not violated in such a case? Of course this is not the only factor, but it is certainly one of the important factors in deciding whether to grant bail.

No Intention - as mentioned U/s 300 IPC- considering the nature of the injuries sustained by the deceased as opined by Medical Expert- the conviction from Section 302 to Section 323 is altered.- SUPREME COURT OF INDIA- dated--03/01/2011

Evidence on record - The deceased was subjected to crueltyand harassment by her husband, the appellant herein and the harassment was in connection with the demand of dowry- victim (deceased) died within oneyear and two months of the marriage- to set aside the
conviction of the appellant under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code but in the facts and circumstances of this case we proceed to convict the appellant under Section 304B of the Indian Penal Code and sentence him to 9 years rigorous imprisonment and fine of Rs.10,000/-

Question of revival of the repealed clauses of L.R.
Manual in case the substituted clauses are struck down by the court,
would not arise. In view of this, the interim order would amount to
substituting the legal policy by the judicial order, and thus not
sustainable:Supreme Court

the first respondent
set up the case in the plaint that the appellant was a trespasser in the
subject room. The first appellate court has also recorded a
categorical finding, which has not been disturbed by the High Court,
that the appellant was occupying the subject room as trespasser. In
the circumstances, the suit was clearly not maintainable for want of
written permission from the Competent Authority and was rightly
dismissed by the trial court- Appeal Dismissed- Supreme Court of India- Order Dated- 01 Dec 2010

The recovery of blood
stained loan form application bearing name and address of
appellant Rameshbhai Mohanbhai Koli from the scene of
offence and the serological report which opines the blood to be
of group -O- which is the blood group of the deceased
conclusively establishes the presence of accu sedat the scene of
offence. Even though the panch-witness Vijaybhai has
turned hostile to the prosecution but the spot panchnama has
been cogently and convincingly proved through the testimony
of the Investigating Officer.-conviction maintained
:Supreme Court.

Held " I. Absence of appellant from duty as Guard Commander for 25
minutes was bona fide and permissible under the statutory rules.
II. Imposition of punishment of punishment drill for 10 days for
the said absence was unwarranted.
III. Protest by the appellant against the imposition of the said
punishment could not warrant enhancement of punishment of the
appellant for confinement in cell for ten days.
IV. Disobedience of the enhanced punishment could not, in this
case, warrant initiation of disciplinary proceedings by the
Commandant concerned against the appellant.
V. The Commandant could not himself become the Judge of his
own cause.
VI. The Commandant could not appoint his own subordinate as the
inquiry officer.
VII. The Commandant could have referred the matter to his superior
officer for appropriate action in terms of Rules 1991.
VIII. Once the Commandant concerned appeared as a witness
himself in the enquiry, he could not pass the order of punishment.
IX. The Authority who initiated the disciplinary proceedings
against the appellant became a witness before the inquiry officer
appointed by him, who is subordinate to him in his office and also
accepted the enquiry report and passed the order of punishment.
Thus, the order of punishment stood vitiated.
X. The Appellate Authority could not consider the past conduct of
the appellant to justify the order of punishment passed by the
disciplinary authority without bringing it to the notice of the appellant.
XI. As the punishment order had been passed in violation of the
statutory rules and the principles of natural justice as well, it is
rendered null and void. Thus, it remained inexecutable.
XII. Past conduct of an employee should not generally be taken into
account to substantiate the quantum of punishment without bringing it
to the notice of the delinquent employee.
XIII. The error of violating the principles of natural justice by the
Disciplinary Authority has been of such a grave nature that under no
circumstance can the past conduct of the appellant, even if not
satisfactory, be taken into consideration.- Supreme Court.

ALL WITNESSES TURNED HOSTILE - WHEATHER CONVICTION CAN BE BASED ON FIR AND STATEMENTS U/S 161 CR.P.C.? YES.

"The FIR had been lodged promptly, naming the appellant as
the person who committed the offence. All the eye-witnesses,
including the injured witnesses, attributed the commission of the
offence only to the appellant in their statements under Section 161
Cr.P.C. It is difficult to imagine that the complainant and the eye-
witnesses had all falsely named the appellant as being the person
responsible for the offence at the initial stage itself - SUPREME COURT"

Standard of Proof:

• Kashmira Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1952 SC 159; • State of Punjab v. Jagir Singh Baljit Singh & Anr., AIR 1973 SC 2407; • Shankarlal Gyarasilal Dixit v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1981 SC 765; • Mousam Singha Roy & Ors. v. State of West Bengal, (2003)12 SCC 377; and • Aloke Nath Dutta & Ors. v. State of West Bengal,(2007) 12 SCC 230). • In Sarwan Singh Rattan Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1957 SC 637, Supreme Court observed : "Considered as a whole the prosecution story may be true; but between `may be true` and `must be true` there is inevitably a long distance to travel and the whole of this distance must be covered by legal, reliable and unimpeachable evidence [before an accused can be convicted]."

Circumstantial Evidence:

• In Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1984 SC 1622, Supreme Court observed that it is well settled that the prosecutions case must stand or fall on its own legs and cannot derive any strength from the weakness of the defence put up by the accused. However, a false defence may be called into aid only to lend assurance to the court where various links in the chain of circumstantial evidence are in themselves complete. The Court also discussed the nature, character and essential proof required in a criminal case which rests on circumstantial evidence alone and held as under: (1) The circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should be fully established; (2) The facts so established should be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused, that is to say, they should not be explainable on any other hypothesis except that the accused is guilty; (3) The circumstances should be of a conclusive nature and tendency; (4) They should exclude every possible hypothesis except the one to be proved; and (5) There must be a chain of evidence so complete as not to leave any reasonable ground for the conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused and must show that in all human probability the act must have been done by the accused. A similar view has been reiterated by Supreme Court in - • State of Uttar Pradesh v. Satish, (2005) 3 SCC 114; • Krishnan v. State represented by Inspector of Police, (2008) 15 SCC 430; • Ramesh Bhai & Anr. v. State of Rajasthan, (2009) 12 SCC 603; • Subramaniam v. State of Tamil Nadu & Anr., (2009) 14 SCC 415; • Babu v. State of Kerala, JT 2010 (8) SC 560, observing that the evidence produced by the prosecution should be of such a nature that it makes the conviction of the accused sustainable.

Hostile Witness:

State of Gujarat v. Anirudhsing, (1997) 6 SCC 514, State of Rajasthan v. Bhawani & Anr., (2003) 7 SCC 291) Radha Mohan Singh @ Lal Saheb & Ors. v. State of U.P., (2006) 2 SCC 450, observed as under:".....It is well settled that the evidence of a prosecution witness cannot be rejected in toto merely because the prosecution chose to treat him as hostile and cross-examined him. The evidence of such witness cannot be treated as effaced or washed off the record altogether but the same can be accepted to the extent his version is found to be dependable on a careful scrutiny thereof... In Mahesh v. State of Maharashtra, (2008) 13 SCC 271, Supreme Court considered the value of the deposition of a hostile witness and held as under: ".....If PW 1, the maker of the complaint has chosen not to corroborate his earlier statement made in the complaint and recorded during investigation, the conduct of such a witness for no plausible and tenable reasons pointed out on record, will give rise to doubt the testimony of the investigating officer who had sincerely and honestly conducted the entire investigation of the case. In these circumstances, we are of the view that PW.1 has tried to conceal the material truth from the Court with the sole purpose of shielding and protecting the appellant for reasons best known to the witness and therefore, no benefit could be given to the appellant for unfavourable conduct of this witness to the prosecution". In Rajendra & Anr. v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2009) 13SCC 480, Supreme Court observed that merely because a witness deviates from his statement made in the FIR, his evidence cannot be held to be totally unreliable. Supreme Court reiterated a similar view in Govindappa & Ors. v. State of Karnataka, (2010) 6 SCC 533, observing that the deposition of a hostile witness can be relied upon at least upto the extent he supported the case of the prosecution. So, In view of the above, it is evident that the evidence of a person does not become effaced from the record merely because he has turned hostile and his deposition must be examined more cautiously to find out as to what extent he has supported the case of the prosecution.

Abscondance of Accused :

In Matru @ Girish Chandra v. The State of U.P., AIR 1971 SC 1050, Supreme Court repelled the submissions made by the State that as after commission of the offence the accused had been absconding,therefore, the inference can be drawn that he was a guilty person, observing as under: "The appellants conduct in absconding was also relied upon. Now, mere absconding by itself does not necessarily lead to a firm conclusion of guilty mind. Even an innocent man may feel panicky and try to evade arrest when wrongly suspected of a grave crime such is the instinct of self- preservation. The act of absconding is no doubt relevant piece of evidence to be considered along with other evidence but its value would alwaysdepend on the circumstances of each case Normally the courts are disinclined to attach much importance to the act of absconding, treating it as a very small item in the evidence for sustaining conviction. It can scarcely be held as a determining link in completing the chain of circumstantial evidence which must admit of no other reasonable hypothesis than that of the guilt of the accused. In the present case the appellant was with Ram Chandra till the FIR was lodged. If thereafter he felt that he was being wrongly suspected and he tried to keep out of the way we do not think this circumstance can be considered to be necessarily evidence of a guilty mind attempting to evade justice. It is not inconsistent with his innocence." A similar view has been reiterated in Rahman v.State of U.P., AIR 1972 SC 110; State of M.P. v. Paltan Mallah & Ors., AIR 2005 SC 733; Bipin Kumar Mondal v. State of West Bengal, JT 2010 (7) SC 379. So, Abscondance by a person against whom FIR has been lodged, having an apprehension of being apprehended by the police, cannot be said to be unnatural. Thus, mere abscondance by the appellant after commission of the crime and remaining untraceable for a period of six days itself cannot establish his guilt. Absconding by itself is not a conclusive proof of either of guilt or of a guilty conscience.

Statement u/s 313 Cr.P.C.

An accused can be questioned under Section 313 Cr.P.C. only for the purpose of enabling him personally to explain any circumstance appearing in the evidence against him. No matter how weak or scanty the prosecution evidence is in regard to certain incriminating material, it is the duty of the Court to examine the accused and seek his explanation on incriminating material which has surfaced against him. Section 313 Cr.P.C. is based on the fundamental principle of fairness. The attention of the accused must specifically be brought to inculpatory pieces of evidence to give him an opportunity to offer an explanation if he chooses to do so.
Therefore, the court is under a legal obligation to put the incriminating circumstances before the accused and solicit his response. This provision is mandatory in nature and casts an imperative duty on the court and confers a corresponding right on the accused to have an opportunity to offer an explanation for such incriminatory material appearing against him.
Circumstances which were not put to the accused in his examination under Section 313 Cr.P.C. cannot be used against him and have to be excluded from consideration. ( Sharad Birdhichand ; and State of Maharashtra v. Sukhdev Singh & Anr., AIR 1992 SC 2100).
In S. Harnam Singh v. State (Delhi Admn.),
AIR 1976 SC 2140, Supreme Court held that non-indication of inculpatory material and its relevant facts by the trial court to the accused adds to the vulnerability of the prosecution case. The recording of the statement of the accused under Section 313 Cr.P.C. is not a purposeless exercise.
If any appellate Court or revisional court comes across the fact that the trial Court had not put any question to an accused, even if it is of a vital nature, such an omission alone should not result in the setting aside of the conviction and sentence as an inevitable consequence. An inadequate examination cannot be presumed to have caused prejudice. Every error or omission in compliance of the provisions of Section 313 Cr.P.C., does not necessarily vitiate trial. Such errors fall within category of curable irregularities and the question as to whether the trial is vitiated, in each case depends upon the degree of error and upon whether prejudice has been or is likely to have been caused to accused. Efforts should be made to undo or correct the lapse.
Wasim Khan v. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1956 SC 400;
Bhoor Singh & Anr. v. State of Punjab, AIR 1974 SC 1256;
Labhchand Dhanpat Singh Jain v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1975 SC 182;
State of Punjab v. Naib Din, AIR 2001 SC 3955;
Parsuram Pandey & Ors. v. State of Bihar, (2004) 13 SCC 189).
In Asraf Ali v. State of Assam, (2008) 16 SCC 328, Supreme Court
observed: "Section 313 of the Code casts a duty on the court to put in an enquiry or trial questions to the accused for the purpose of enabling him to explain any of the circumstances appearing in the evidence against him. It follows as a necessary corollary therefrom that each material circumstance appearing in the evidence against the accused is required to be put to him specifically, distinctly and separately and failure to do so amounts to a serious irregularity vitiating trial, if it is shown that the accused was prejudiced."
In Shivaji Sahebrao Bobade & Anr. v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1973 SC 2622, Supreme Court observed as under :"It is trite law, nevertheless fundamental, that the prisoner's attention should be drawn to every inculpatory material so as to enable him to explain it. This is the basic fairness of a criminal trial and failures in this area may gravely imperil the validity of the trial itself, if consequential miscarriage of justice has flowed. However where such an omission has occurred it does not ipso facto vitiate the proceedings and prejudice occasioned by such defect must be established by the accused. In the event of evidentiary material not being put to the accused, the court must ordinarily eschew such material from consideration. It is also open to the appellate court to call upon the counsel for the accused to show what explanation the accused has as regards the circumstances established against him but not put to him and if the accused is unable to offer the appellate court any plausible or reasonable explanation of such circumstances, the court may assume that no acceptable answer exists and that even if the accused had been questioned at the proper time in the trial court he would not have been able to furnish any good ground to get out of the circumstances on which the trial court has relied for its conviction." (Emphasis added).
In Ganesh Gogoi v. State of Assam, (2009) 7 SCC 404, Supreme Court relying upon its earlier decision in Basavaraj R. Patil & Ors.v. State of Karnataka, (2000) 8 SCC 740, held that the provisions of Section 313 Cr.P.C. are not meant to nail the accused to his disadvantage but are meant for his benefit. The provisions are based on the salutary principles of natural justice and the maxim "audi alteram partem" has been enshrined in them. Therefore, an examination under Section 313 Cr.P.C. has to be of utmost fairness.
In Shaikh Maqsood v. State of Maharashtra, (2009) 6 SCC 583; and Ranvir Yadav v. State of Bihar (2009) 6 SCC 595, Supreme Court held that it is the duty of the trial court to indicate incriminating material to the accused. Section 313 Cr.P.C. is not an empty formality. An improper examination/inadequate questioning underSection 313 Cr.P.C. amounts to a serious lapse on the part of the trial Court and is a ground for interference with the conviction.
In Suresh Chandra Bahri v. State of Bihar, AIR 1994 SC 2420, Supreme Court rejected the submission that as no question had been put to the accused on motive, no motive for the commission of the crime could be attributed to the accused, nor the same could be reckoned as circumstance against him observing that it could not be pointed out as to what in fact was the real prejudice caused to the accused by omission to question the accused on the motive for the crime. No material was placed before the court to show as to what and in what manner the prejudice, if any, was caused to the accused. More so, the accused/appellant was aware of accusation and charge against him.
Thus, it is evident from the above that the provisions of Section 313 Cr.P.C make it obligatory for the court to question the accused on the evidence and circumstances against him so as to offer the accused an opportunity to explain the same. But, it would not be enough for the accused to show that he has not been questioned or examined on a particular circumstance, instead he must show that such non- examination has actually and materially prejudiced him and has resulted in the failure of justice. In other words, in the event of an inadvertent omission on the part of the court to question the accused on any incriminating circumstance cannot ipso facto vitiate the trial unless it is shown that some material prejudice was caused to the accused by the omission of the court.

Remmission of Sentence : Part A and Part B of Punjab Government`s order for remission of sentences discussed- earlier order reviewed - the special
remission of one year under the Government Order dated 14.8.2002 was
available to persons convicted for a term of seven years for the offence
under section 304-B of IPC - Supreme Court.

Electricity arrears do not constitute a charge over the property.
Therefore in general law, a transferee of a premises cannot be made liable for
the dues of the previous owner/occupier - Supreme Court.

Abatement to suicide : Abetment involves a mental process of instigating a
person or intentionally aiding a person in doing of a thing.
Without a positive act on the part of the accused to instigate
or aid in committing suicide, conviction cannot be sustained.
The intention of the legislature and the ratio of the cases
decided by this Court is clear that in order to convict a person
under Section 306 IPC there has to be a clear mens rea to
commit the offence. It also requires an active act or direct act
which led the deceased to commit suicide seeing no option and
that act must have been intended to push the deceased into
such a position that he committed suicide - defination of suicide ? - Supreme Court.

Belated apology cannot be
accepted because it has not been given in good faith--Even if it is not belated where apology is without real
contrition and remorse and was merely tendered as a
weapon of defence, the Court may refuse to accept it.

The reserved category candidates "belonging to OBC,
SC/ ST categories" who are selected on merit and placed in
the list of General/Unreserved category candidates can
choose to migrate to the respective reserved category at the
time of allocation of services

The National Human Rights Commission had published
`Guidelines for the Administration of Polygraph Test (Lie
Detector Test) on an Accused` in 2000. These guidelines should
be strictly adhered to and similar safeguards should be
adopted for conducting the `Narcoanalysis technique` and the
`Brain Electrical Activation Profile` test. The text of these
guidelines has been reproduced below:
(i) No Lie Detector Tests should be administered except
on the basis of consent of the accused. An option
should be given to the accused whether he wishes
to avail such test.
(ii) If the accused volunteers for a Lie Detector Test, he
should be given access to a lawyer and the physical,
emotional and legal implication of such a test
should be explained to him by the police and his
lawyer.
(iii) The consent should be recorded before a Judicial
Magistrate.
(iv) During the hearing before the Magistrate, the
person alleged to have agreed should be duly
represented by a lawyer.
(v) At the hearing, the person in question should also
be told in clear terms that the statement that is
made shall not be a `confessional` statement to the
Magistrate but will have the status of a statement
made to the police.
(vi) The Magistrate shall consider all factors relating to
the detention including the length of detention and
the nature of the interrogation.
(vii) The actual recording of the Lie Detector Test shall
be done by an independent agency (such as a
hospital) and conducted in the presence of a lawyer.
(viii) A full medical and factual narration of the manner
of the information received must be taken on
record.

Police Custody Remand : Police remand can only be
made during the first period of remand after arrest
and production before the Magistrate, but not after
the expiry of the said period.- Anupam J. Kulkarni
case [sc] followed : Supreme Court.

It is not only desirable but imperative that
electronic and news media should also play positive role in
presenting to general public as to what actually transpires during
the course of the hearing and it should not be published in such a
manner so as to get unnecessary publicity for its own paper or news
channel. Such a tendency, which is indeed growing fast, should be
stopped. We are saying so as without knowing the reference in
context of which the questions were put forth by us, were completely
ignored and the same were misquoted which raised unnecessary hue and
cry.

1) The appellate Court has all the necessary powers to re-
evaluate the evidence let in before the trial Court as well
as the conclusions reached. It has a duty to specify the
compelling and substantial reasons in case it reverses
the order of acquittal passed by the trial Court. In the
case on hand, the High Court by adhering to all the
ingredients and by giving cogent and adequate reasons
reversed the order of acquittal.
2) The presence of the accused at the scene of crime is
proved through the ocular testimonies of PWs 1, 2, 6, 20,
23, 24 and 70, corroborated by Ex PW 12/D-I as well as
3 PCR calls Ex PW 11/A, B and C.
3) Phone calls made immediately after an incident to the
police constitutes an FIR only when they are not vague
and cryptic. Calls purely for the reason of getting the
police to the scene of crime do not necessarily constitute
the FIR. In the present case, the phone calls were vague
and therefore could not be registered as the FIR. The FIR
was properly lodged as per the statement of Shyan
Munshi PW-2.
4) Delay in recording the statement of the witnesses do not
necessarily discredit their testimonies. The court may
rely on such testimonies if they are cogent and credible.
5) The laboratory reports in the present case are vague and
ambiguous and, therefore, they cannot be relied upon to
reach any specific conclusion regarding the incident.
6) The evidence regarding the actual incident, the
testimonies of witnesses, the evidence connecting the
vehicles and cartridges to the accused - Manu Sharma,
as well as his conduct after the incident prove his guilt
beyond reasonable doubt. The High Court has analyzed
all the evidence and arrived at the correct conclusion.
7) The public prosecutor is under a duty of disclosure under
the Cr.P.C., Bar Council Rules and relevant principles of
common law. Nevertheless, a violation of this duty does
not necessarily vitiate the entire trial. A trial would only
be vitiated if non-disclosure amounts to a material
irregularity and causes irreversible prejudice to the
accused. In the present case, no such prejudice was
caused to the accused, and therefore the trial is not
vitiated.
8) No prejudice had been caused to the right of the accused
to fair trial and non-furnishing of the copy of one of the
ballistic reports had not hampered the ends of justice.
The right of the accused to disclosure has not received
any set back in the facts and circumstances of the case.
9) The High Court has rightly convicted the other two
accused, namely, Amardeep Singh Gill @ Tony Gill and
Vikas Yadav after appreciation of the evidence of PWs 30
and 101.
10) Normally, the judgment/order should be set aside or
affirmed as the case may be but preferably without
offering any undesirable comments, disparaging remarks
or indications which would impinge upon the dignity and
respect of judicial system.
11) Every effort should be made by the print and electronic
media to ensure that the distinction between trial by
media and informative media should always be
maintained. Trial by media should be avoided
particularly, at a stage when the suspect is entitled to the
constitutional protections. Invasion of his rights is
bound to be held as impermissible : Supreme Court.

it is now a settled law that a
confessional statement duly recorded by a police officer in a
case related to TADA Act and the rules framed thereunder
would continue to remain admissible for the offences under
any other law which were tried along with TADA offences
under Sections 12 read with Section 15 of the Act
notwithstanding that the accused was acquitted of offences
under the TADA Act in the same trial. But, here is a case
where the allegation was mainly for the offences under the IPC
and some offences under the TADA Act were also incorporated
initially but later on the same were dropped. Consequently,
charges in the said case were framed only for offences under
14
the IPC and not under the TADA Act and the trial is also only
for offences under the IPC and not under the TADA Act.
Therefore, such confessional statement as made by the
respondent no. 4 under the TADA Act, in a different case,
cannot be used or utilised by the prosecution in the present case as the charges were framed only for the offences under
the Indian Penal Code.

The priciple reteriated that whenever a person complains and claims that there is a violation of any provision of law or a Constitutional provision,it does not automatically involve breach of fundamental right for the enforcement of which alone Article 32 of the Constitution is attracted.

This court cannot sit in judgment over
whether investigations should be launched against politicians
for alleged acts of corruption. The Supreme Court of India
functions as a Constitutional Court as well as the highest
appellate court in the country. If the Supreme Court gives
direction for prosecution, it would cause serious prejudice to
the accused, as the direction of this Court may have far
reaching persuasive effect on the Court which may ultimately
try the accused. It is always open to the petitioners to
approach the investigative agencies directly with the
incriminating materials and it is for the investigative agencies
to decide on the further course of action: Supreme Court

The Appellate Tribunal for Electricity-- has no jurisdiction to decide --the validity of the Regulations framed by the Central
Electricity Regulatory Commission-- under Section 178 of the
Electricity Act, 2003. The validity of the Regulations may,
however, be challenged by seeking judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

Indian Penal Code,1860 -Section 304 Part II-Bail Bond cancelled- It is well settled that in a case where the Trial
Court has recorded acquittal, the Appellate Court should be
slow in interfering with the judgment of acquittal. On
evaluation of the evidence, if the two views are possible,
the Appellate Court should not substitute its own view and
discard the judgment of the Trial Court. But, in the instant
case, the High Court clearly came to the conclusion that the
entire approach of the Trial Court cannot be sustained both
on the law and the facts.

State of West Bengal & others
Vs.
Committee for Protection of Democratic
Rights, West Bengal & others.

APPEAL

Civil Appeal , AppealNo: 6249-6250 of 2001

ACT

Constitution of India, Section: 226 , 32.

HEAD NOTE

Whether the High Court, in
exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India, can direct the Central Bureau of
Investigation established under
the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, 1946 , to investigate a
cognizable offence, which is alleged to have taken place
within the territorial jurisdiction of a State, without
the consent of the State Government ? -Yes. : Constitution Bench Supreme Court.

"Section 304-B merely
raises a presumption of dowry death and lays
down that the minimum sentence should be 7
years, but it may extend to imprisonment for
life. Therefore, awarding the extreme punishment
of imprisonment for life should be used in rare
cases and not in every case." -Three Judge Bench verdict
of SC in the case of Hemchand v. State of
Haryana followed : Supreme Court