20/06/08 "ICH
" -- -
Washington D.C.,
June 13, 2008
- Recently
declassified
documents show
that the U.S.
military has
long sought an
agreement with
Baghdad that
gives American
forces virtually
unfettered
freedom of
action, casting
into doubt the
Bush
administration's
current claims
that their
demands are more
limited in
scope. News
reports have
indicated that
the Bush
administration
is exerting
pressure on the
government of
Prime Minister
Nuri al-Maliki
to accept a
U.S.-Iraq
security plan by
the end of July
2008. According
to these
accounts, the
plan would give
the U.S. more
than 50 military
bases in Iraq,
provide complete
freedom of
action to
conduct military
operations,
allow complete
freedom to
arrest and
detain Iraqis,
and grant U.S.
forces and
contractors
total immunity
from Iraqi law.
Growing
awareness of the
implications of
the pact have
fueled
opposition by
the Iraqi public
– to the extent
that Prime
Minister al-Maliki
announced today
that discussions
had deadlocked.

Documents
obtained by the
National
Security Archive
under the
Freedom of
Information Act
indicate that
the U.S. started
drafting the
agreement in
November 2003.
While
information
available in the
heavily redacted
copies that were
provided does
not specifically
address such
hot-button,
present-day
issues as the
number and
location of
bases, or
control of
airspace, these
preliminary
planning
documents show
that from the
outset U.S.
aspirations for
conducting
military
operations based
in Iraq were
essentially
without limit.

The Bush
administration
had initially
hoped to see the
security pact
accepted by an
interim Iraqi
Governing
Council that it
itself had
appointed. The
documents
outline a number
of "red lines"
that the Defense
Department and
the Central
Command
considered
crucial during
the early
planning,
including
unlimited
authority to
conduct military
operations; the
"absolute"
prerogative to
detain,
interrogate and
intern Iraqis;
the right to
establish its
own rules of
engagement;
complete freedom
of movement
entering,
departing, and
within Iraq;
full immunity
for U.S. forces
and contractors;
immunity from
international
tribunals; and
exemption from
inspections,
taxes, and
duties.

"When it
developed its
initial plans
for a security
pact, the U.S.
wanted virtually
unlimited
freedom of
action for its
forces –
including
private
contractors,"
said Archive
analyst Joyce
Battle. "In
addition to
freedom to wage
military
operations as it
saw fit – and to
arrest, detain,
and interrogate
Iraqis at will –
U.S. demands
even extended to
priority use of
public
utilities. This
was after the
invasion had led
to the collapse
of Iraq's
already fragile
infrastructure
and Iraqi
civilians – old
and young,
healthy, sick,
and disabled –
were getting by
with a few hours
of electricity a
day – if they
were lucky."

Looks Like San
Remo All Over
Again - The U.S.
Status of Force
Agreement for
Iraq, 2008

Recently
declassified
documents show
that the U.S.
military has
long sought an
agreement with
Baghdad that
gives American
forces virtually
unfettered
freedom of
action in – and
possibly around
– Iraq. This new
information
appears to run
counter to Bush
administration
claims that U.S.
intentions have
been more
limited in
scope.

According to
recent news
accounts, the
Bush
administration
is exerting
pressure on Iraq
to accede to a
military
agreement –
before a U.N.
resolution
authorizing the
U.S. occupation
lapses, and
before the end
of President
Bush's tenure –
on terms highly
favorable to the
United States.
Information
reported by
Patrick Cockburn
of the
Independent
indicates that
the deal under
discussion calls
for:

Indefinite
perpetuation
of the U.S.
military
occupation
of Iraq,
whether a
Republican
or a
Democrat is
in the White
House

More than 50
permanent
U.S. bases
in Iraq

U.S.
carte
blanche
to conduct
military
operations
and to
arrest
Iraqis and
anyone else
in Iraq
without
consulting
the Iraqi
government

Immunity
from Iraqi
law for U.S.
forces and
private
contractors

Control of
Iraq's
airspace
below 29,000
feet

Unlimited
freedom to
pursue the
"war on
terror"
through
operations
in Iraq. (Note
1)

Drafting a
Status-of-Forces
Agreement, 2003

Documents
recently
obtained by the
National
Security Archive
through the
Freedom of
Information Act
indicate that
the Bush
administration
began codifying
its demands for
a long-term
U.S.-Iraq
Security
Agreement in
late 2003.
Popular protest
at the time and
an increasingly
violent armed
resistance had
forced the
administration
to seek both an
"Iraqi face" for
the occupation,
and a mechanism
intended to
legitimate a
long-term
military
presence.
Perhaps
reflecting
sensitivity to
Iraqi and U.S.
public
opposition, the
heavily redacted
documents do not
reveal much of
the detail of
what U.S.
military and
government
entities hoped
to obtain in
terms of Iraqi
acquiescence.
At the same
time, there is
little in the
available text
to indicate U.S.
forces were
initially
willing to grant
any significant
limits to their
ability to
conduct
operations in
and around Iraq.

It is unlikely,
of course, that
all details of
the 2003
planning have
carried over to
the 2008
discussions, and
news accounts
indicate that
the U.S.
continues to
revise its
demands in
response to
exploding Iraqi
opposition as
knowledge of the
plan grows.
However, the
available
evidence
indicates that
U.S.
expectations
then and now are
similar in
intent and
ambition. The
U.S. sought in
2003 and seeks
in 2008 the
prerogative to
use Iraqi land
and facilities,
unconditional
immunity for
Coalition
military forces
and contractors,
and virtually
unlimited
freedom of
action. The
administration
wanted the
Security
Agreement to be
approved by the
U.S.-appointed
Iraqi Governing
Council by March
31, 2004, before
establishment of
an interim Iraqi
government in
late June 2004
and the election
of a
Transitional
National
Assembly in
January 2005.

The
2003 Documents

The Pentagon

PowerPoint
briefing slides
(heavily
redacted), dated
November 27,
2003, probably
created by the
Office of the
Under Secretary
of Defense for
Policy,
introduce the
discussion. The
purpose of a
Security
Agreement, from
the Pentagon's
perspective, was
to establish a
legal framework
for U.S.
military
operations,
allow a role for
Iraq's
transitional
administration,
and "maintain
coalition
operational
flexibility and
ability to
pursue GWOT
[U.S. "Global
War on
Terrorism"]
objectives.
(The Office of
the Under
Secretary of
Defense for
Policy (OUSDP)
was headed by
Douglas Feith,
one of the
principal
instigators of
the U.S.
invasion of
Iraq.)

According to the
slides, U.S.
requirements for
Iraq included:

Use of Iraqi
facilities

Pre-positioning
of supplies

Contracting

Respect for
Law

Entry and
Exit of
forces

Vehicle
licensing
and
registration

Bearing of
Arms

Taxation

Import and
Export

Claims

Movement of
Aircraft and
Vehicles

Use of land
and
facilities

Security
requirements
and support

Internal
discussions over
the next month
expanded on
these points.

The CPA,
the State
Department, and
the NSC

According to a
November 28,
2003 email
from U.S.
Central
Command-Iraq
headquarters (in
Qatar), the
CentCom
commander,
General John
Abizaid, wanted
further
clarification of
plans for
"CENTCOM
equities." What
was being
contemplated,
the email's
writer asked: a
U.S.-Iraq Status
of Forces
Agreement, a
Military
Technical
Agreement as
part of a
Security
Framework, or
"All of the
above and more"?

The general
counsel for the
Coalition
Provisional
Authority (CPA),
Edwin S.
("Scott")
Castle, replied
that he had
prepared a draft
agreement, under
the direction of
the OUSDP. With
further guidance
from the office
of Defense
Secretary Donald
Rumsfeld, the
CPA would set up
a working group
to develop the
plans. Members
of the group
would include
CentCom and
Coalition Joint
Task Force Seven
(CJTF-7), the
unit of CentCom
in control of
Coalition forces
in Iraq.

Emails dated
November 30
from Frederick
Smith, a CPA
senior security
advisor, and
Castle confirm
that the CPA,
CentCom, and
CJTF-7 were to
work on the
agreement, with
guidance from
Washington.
Smith advised
keeping other
Coalition
members
involved. The
emails indicate
that Paul
Bremer,
proconsul of
Iraq at the time
as head of the
CPA, expected a
briefing from
staff on the
matter on
December 4. In
early December
Rumsfeld's
office, the
Joint Staff, and
CentCom were to
send a team from
the U.S. to join
the
discussions.
Castle was to
travel to
Washington for
additional
consultations on
December 15.

A note of
caution was
raised in the
correspondence:
the U.S. did not
know "how much
we should expect
from the Iraqi
side. The GC
members will be
running for
elections and
will not want to
appear to be
appeasing the
Coalition on
tough issues
such as
jurisdiction."
(The
U.S.-appointed
Governing
Council (GC) had
been set up in
July 2003 to
create the
impression that
sovereignty
would soon be
restored to
Iraq.)

On December 3
State Department
lawyers
disseminated
an information
memo on the
agreement,
to be used the
next day for
Bremer's
briefing. It
outlined "CPA's
own current
strategic vision
for Iraq's
transition to
full
sovereignty,"
utilizing three
"basic
documents": the
"Fundamental
Law," "Treaty
Restoring
Sovereignty",
and "Security
Agreement", the
last comprising
a military
technical
assistance
agreement, an
acquisition and
cross-servicing
agreement, and a
status of forces
agreement
(SOFA).

Bremer, on
December 5,
wrote in a
cable to the
State Department
and the National
Security Council
(NSC) that
since "Coalition
forces will need
to remain in
Iraq after the
CPA dissolves,
the Coalition
must negotiate
international
agreements to
provide for its
role in the
security of Iraq
after the
transitional
Iraqi
administration
assumes full
sovereignty, as
planned for June
30, 2004." He
wrote that the
agreement of
November 15,
2003, a timeline
supposedly
leading to
restoration of
Iraq's
sovereignty,
called for
arrangements
concerning the
status of
coalition forces
"giving wide
latitude to
provide for the
safety and
security of the
Iraqi people."
The cable then
outlines points
requiring
additional
attention. Text
concerning one
issue, "use of
facilities" is
redacted in its
entirety. A
section on
"military/security
operations,"
though partially
redacted,
includes several
points, e.g.:

"U.S. must
be
authorized
to detain,
intern, and
interrogate
anti-coalition
and security
risk
personnel"

"U.S. must
be
authorized
to retain
custody of
current
POWs/detainees/internees…"

"U.S. must
be
authorized
to seize and
retain
intelligence-related
documents"

"Coalition
forces must
have
unlimited
authority to
conduct
military
operations
they deem
necessary
and proper
under the
circumstances."

On the "bearing
of arms,
uniforms, flags
& markings," the
cable says:

"U.S. forces
must be
authorized
to bear arms
and wear
uniforms"

"Designated
U.S.
contractor
personnel
must be
authorized
to bear
arms."

On "utilities
and
communications":

"U.S.
forces must
have access
to utilities
and enjoy
priority in
use" (Note
2)

"U.S. forces
must be
authorized
to use all
necessary
radio
spectrums
without
charge."

Information in
the cable on
"postal and
recreational
facilities" was
redacted in its
entirety.

As to
"privileges and
immunities,"
according to
Bremer's cable,

"U.S.
personnel
must be
accorded
status
equivalent
to that
accorded to
administrative
and
technical
(A&T)
personnel
(full
criminal
immunity and
immunity
from civil
process for
official
acts)"

"Contractors
and Iraqis
employed by
the
coalition
must be
immune from
legal
process for
acts
performed in
official
capacity"

"U.S.
personnel
and
contractor
employees
must not be
surrendered
to
international
tribunals or
any other
states or
entities
without
approval of
U.S.
government."

On "entry and
exit" into and
from Iraq:

"U.S.
personnel
must be
allowed to
enter Iraq
with ID
cards and
orders"

"Iraq must
not use visa
issuance as
a way of
imposing
limits on
contractor
personnel."

Regarding
"movement of
vehicles,
vessels, and
aircraft":

"U.S.
vehicles,
vessels, and
aircraft
must be able
to freely
enter, exit,
and transit
Iraq"

"U.S. must
be able to
import and
export
equipment,
supplies,
and
materials
without
inspection,
restrictions,
taxes,
customs,
duties,
etc."

In regard to
"contracting",
CPA headquarters
wrote:

"U.S. must
be free to
contract for
goods,
services,
and
construction
without
restriction"

"U.S. must
be able to
contract
using its
own rules"

On taxation:

"U.S. forces
must be
exempt from
all Iraqi
taxes"

"Iraq may
not tax
income of
U.S.
personnel
and certain
contractors
received
from U.S.
government
or sources
outside
Iraq."

All discussion
of "claims" was
withheld from
disclosure.

CPA headquarters
sent
a cable on
December 10
to the Defense
Department,
State
Department, and
NSC indicating
that the
drafting and
approval of
Iraq's
"fundamental
law," by the CPA
and the
Governing
Council, were to
be completed by
February 28,
2004. Security
agreements were
to be approved
by March 31,
2004. (Note
3) A highly
redacted section
of the cable
touches on
elements of the
security plan --
those not
withheld from
disclosure are
references to
acquisition and
servicing
arrangements,
nonproliferation,
and "Protection
of U.S. forces
from the
International
Criminal Court."

The CPA,
CJTF-7, and
CentCom

On December 11,
2003, prior to
CPA lawyer
Castle's planned
visit to
Washington, he
received
a memo from
CJTF-7,
conveying its
"requirements
for what we
would like to
see reflected in
the final
agreement."
Attached were
PowerPoint
slides from
CentCom listing
its objectives,
key provisions,
and "redlines"
(elements that
in its opinion
had to be, or
could not be, in
the agreement.)

The first of the
CJTF-7
requirements was
"authority for
the Coalition
Force, without
interference or
permission", to,
in order: "fight
the GWOT, fight
anti-coalition
forces" and
"ensure a safe
and secure
environment in
Iraq."

Other
requirements in
CJTF-7's list
included a
defined status
for Coalition
forces under
international
and Iraqi law;
command
authority;
detention and
interrogation
rights; their
own definition
of the rules of
engagement;
complete freedom
of movement;
exemption from
passport and
visa
requirements;
exclusive
criminal
jurisdiction;
use of public
utilities;
exemption from
taxes and
duties, and full
diplomatic
immunity for
both Coalition
personnel and
contractors.

According to its
PowerPoint
slides,the
Central
Command's
objectives and
"Key Provisions"
were similar to
those of CJTF-7,
including
unlimited
authority to
conduct military
operations;
exclusive use of
facilities at no
cost; freedom of
movement over
land and through
air, space, and
territorial
waters; immunity
for contractors
from legal
process; and
exemption for
contractors from
visa
requirements,
vehicle and
aircraft
registration,
and income
taxes.

Central
Command's "red
lines"
included
immunity for
both U.S.
personnel and
contractors from
international
tribunals and
foreign courts;
priority use of
public
utilities; and
exemption of
U.S. contracts
for goods,
services, and
construction
from Iraqi
jurisdiction.

CPA head Bremer
met weekly with
the Governing
Council. At the
end of December
he was
advised to raise
the issue of the
Security
Agreement at
the next
meeting, since
"the GC has not
yet focused on
this issue and
will likely take
some time to
organize itself
for these
negotiations."
In
a subsequent
memo to the
Council he
indicated that
he would provide
a briefing on
his recent trip
to Washington –
which was to
have included
discussion of
the Agreement –
but he did not
mention it
specifically as
part of the
agenda.The
Governing
Council's
then-president,
Adnan Pachachi,
said in late
January 2004that
the GC was
"still waiting
for a draft." (Note
4)

The
Current Plan

It is not yet
known whether
the government
of Iraq will
sign on to this
agreement.
Cockburn's
reporting has
indicated that
this is likely.
(Note
5)
Resistance to
the pact in Iraq
is growing,
though
opposition from
some politicians
could be a
fašade intended
to defuse public
anger. (Note
6) On June
13, 2008, Prime
Minister
al-Maliki
announced that
negotiations had
been suspended
because of
concerns about
the plan's
implications for
Iraq's
sovereignty, (Note
7) but this
is unlikely to
be the end of
the story. If
Iraq does
acquiesce, one
probable reason
would be its
weakness – the
government of a
divided society
with limited
popular support
may rely on a
foreign patron
for its
survival, rather
than aim for
accommodations
with political
rivals that
could ultimately
improve chances
for peace and
national
reconciliation.
The Bush
administration
intends to
bypass the U.S.
Congress in
striking this
deal, (Note
8) and, if
news reports are
correct, is
using strong-arm
tactics –
including
opening Iraqi
assets on
deposit in New
York to judicial
seizure – to
coerce the
Iraqis to
comply. (Note
9) If the
SOFA is adopted
on terms that
appear
non-responsive
to public
opinion, there
can be little
doubt that many
will give
credence to
charges by Iran
-- which opposes
the pact -- that
U.S. strategy
included bribery
on a grand
scale. (Note
10)

Likely Fallout

When modern Iraq
was created
after World War
I and the
breakup of the
Ottoman empire,
there was
widespread
expectation
among its people
that
independence and
self-government
would follow.
Instead the
League of
Nations
(predecessor to
the United
Nations) granted
administrative
control to the
British, who
imposed a client
monarchy and,
for the next
four decades,
attempted to
retain military
bases in Iraq,
exercise the
unrestricted
right to
transport their
troops across
the country, and
control Iraq's
oil. (Note
11) It took
a revolution in
1958 to
overthrow the
British-installed
monarchy, though
political
reconciliation
in Iraq did not
follow. For
Iraqis of all
persuasions and
most political
inclinations,
acquiescence to
a SOFA imposed
by a foreign
power would seem
like a throwback
to the colonial
era. (Note
12)

According to
Cockburn's
reporting,
"President Bush
wants to push
[the security
pact] through by
the end of next
month [July
2008] so he can
declare a
military victory
and claim his
2003 invasion
has been
vindicated." (Note
13) A prime
beneficiary of
the acceptance
of a military
agreement that
the Iraqi people
do not believe
respects their
rights or serves
their interests
would probably
be the vast,
privatized U.S.
military/intelligence
complex,
positioned to
profit from
repressing the
resistance sure
to follow. If
the Bush
administration's
goal is achieved
through secret
deals and
pressure tactics
it would only
confirm the
widespread view
that its
commitment to
democracy is
primarily
self-serving.
In Iraq as
elsewhere there
are many who
would welcome a
genuine American
commitment to
liberty and
human rights but
believe that
U.S. actions
contradict its
rhetoric.

Read the
Documents
Note: The
following
documents are in
PDF format.
You will need to
download and
install the free
Adobe Acrobat
Reader to
view.

These PowerPoint
slides outline
the purpose of a
proposed
U.S.-Iraq
security
framework, key
features of a
political
agreement, the
purpose of a
military
technical
agreement,
requirements for
a status of
forces
agreement,
organization of
a joint planning
structure, and a
security
agreement
timeline.

This message
exchange
indicates that
the Coalition
Provisional
Authority has
prepared a
Security
Agreement draft
based on
information from
the Office of
the Under
Secretary of
Defense for
Policy and will
include
Coalition Joint
Task Force Seven
and Central
Command
representatives
in a working
group formed to
revise the
draft.

This message
exchange
indicates that
those attending
a November 29
meeting on the
security
agreement had
agreed on the
entities that
would draft the
agreement: CPA
offices for
governance and
national
security affairs
and the CPA
general counsel,
Coalition Joint
Task Force
Seven, and the
Central Command;
and on plans for
participation by
L. Paul Bremer
and officials in
Washington. The
planners would,
by December 5,
prepare "red
lines": that is,
items that had
to be, and items
that could not
be, in the
agreement. A
participant
introduced a
"dose of
reality": Iraqi
Governing
Council members
would have to
face voters and
would not wish
to appear to
have appeased
the Coalition on
issues like
jurisdiction.

This email
provides U.S.
State Department
legal staff with
the CPA's
"concept paper"
to be used to
brief Paul
Bremer on the
Security
Agreement. The
paper
incorporates
input from
CJTF-7 and
CentCom. The
paper lays out a
timeline for
implementation
of a
"Fundamental
Law" and a
Security
Agreement by
March 31, 2004 –
that is, before
the election of
an Iraqi
Transitional
National
Assembly on May
31, 2004, and a
Transitional
National
Administration
in June 2004.

Paul Bremer
states that
"Coalition
forces will need
to remain in
Iraq after the
CPA dissolves,"
and has to
"negotiate
international
agreements to
provide for its
role in the
security of Iraq
after the
transitional
Iraqi
administration
assumes full
sovereignty, as
planned for June
30, 2004." The
CPA was
consulting
CentCom,
developing a
draft agreement,
and "formulating
a negotiating
strategy." The
cable addresses
milestones,
structure, use
of facilities,
logistics
support,
military and
security
operations,
bearing of arms,
uniforms, flags
and markings,
utilities and
communications,
privileges and
immunities,
entry and exit,
movement of
vehicles,
vessels, and
aircraft,
importation and
exportation,
contracting,
taxation, and
claims.

Paul Bremer
outlines
"considerations
that should be
taken into
account" during
negotiation of a
"fundamental
law" and a
Security
Agreement to
remain in effect
in Iraq after
dissolution of
the CPA and
establishment of
an interim Iraqi
government. He
outlines a
timeline,
indicating that
"the fundamental
law and Security
Agreement(s) are
to be prepared
and executed at
the outset of
the transition
process." The
final Security
Agreement was to
be approved by
March 31, 2004.

Headquarters for
CJTF-7 sends the
CPA general
counsel its
Security
Agreement
requirements and
those of CentCom,
before his trip
to Washington
for
consultations.
The CJTF-7 and
CentCom briefing
materials
address status
issues; arrest,
detention, and
interrogation;
WMD; rules of
engagement;
entry and exit;
uniforms;
criminal
jurisdiction;
use of radio
spectrums and
public
utilities; taxes
and duties;
contractors;
diplomatic
immunity;
seizure of
documents; the
"war on
terrorism;"
facilities use;
uniforms;
bearing of arms;
freedom of
movement;
drivers'
licenses; visas;
passports, car
registration;
tolls; and legal
immunity.

A CPA aide
suggests that
Paul Bremer
raise the
Security
Agreement during
his next weekly
meeting with
Iraq's Governing
Council. It is
not clear from
the attached
proposed agenda
whether he did
so.

Notes

1.
Patrick
Cockburn,
"US
Issues
Threat
to
Iraq's
$50bn
Foreign
Reserves
in
Military
Deal,"
Independent,
June 6,
2008.
Coburn's
account
is
noteworthy
because
he seems
clearly
to have
gained
access
to a
recent
draft of
the
SOFA.

2.
Emphasis
added.
Iraqis
were
getting
by with
a few
hours of
electricity
a day,
sharply
reduced
from
levels
maintained
by the
Iraq
government
even
during
the
sanctions
regime
of the
1990s.

3. The
U.S.-appointed
Governing
Council
later
demurred
from
approving
a plan,
indicating
that
they
wanted
"to wait
for a
transitional
government
to
negotiate
such an
agreement."
(Sewell
Chan,
Rumsfeld
Praises
New
Iraqi
Forces;
Car Bomb
Kills
Seven At
Police
Station
in
North,"
Washington
Post,
February
24,
2004.)

Comment GuidelinesBe succinct, constructive and
relevant to the story. We encourage engaging, diverse
and meaningful commentary. Do not include
personal information such as names, addresses,
phone numbers and emails. Comments falling
outside our guidelines – those including
personal attacks and profanity – are not
permitted.
See our complete Comment Policy
and use this link to notify usif you have concerns
about a comment.
We’ll promptly review and remove any
inappropriate postings.

In accordance
with Title 17 U.S.C. Section 107, this material
is distributed without profit to those who have
expressed a prior interest in receiving the
included information for research and educational
purposes. Information Clearing House has no
affiliation whatsoever with the originator of
this article nor is Information ClearingHouse
endorsed or sponsored by the originator.)