The answer is “Yes” if there are no restrictions on a
married woman travelling alone internationally.

The answer is “No” if

permission or additional documentation is required
for a married woman to leave the country; however,
this permission must be different from that
required to get a passport, which is covered in a
separate question, or

the law requires a married woman to accompany
her husband out of the country if he so wishes.

The answer is “Yes” if there are no restrictions on an unmarried woman travelling alone internationally.

The answer is “No” if an unmarried woman has to have permission or additional documentation to leave the country; however, this permission must be different from what is required to get a passport, which is covered in a separate question.

This question compares the ability of an adult married woman to legally convey her citizenship to her non-national husband with the ability of an adult married man to do the same for his non-national wife.

The answer is “Yes” if

marriage to a national male or female equally confers some preference in naturalization to the non-national spouse, or

neither spouse may convey citizenship to the other; citizenship must be obtained through the general naturalization procedures with no preference of any sort given to the spouse of a national.

The answer is “No” if

a national husband can convey citizenship to his non-national wife, but a national wife may not do so for her non-national husband, or

the ability to convey citizenship to a spouse is procedurally differentiated by gender, e.g., a woman married to a national receives automatic citizenship rights upon her marriage, but a man married to a national must wait a specific number of years to become a citizen.

the constitution explicitly recognizes customary law or customary law courts, or

the constitution refers to methods by which customary law will be aligned with constitutional principles, or by which customary law is to be determined, or the constitution refers to requirements that customary chiefs be consulted before enactment of legislation, or

the constitution allows laws that applied before the constitution comes into force to continue to have the force of law, if the country had a robust system of customary law in place at the time.

The answer is “No” if

there is no explicit constitutional recognition of customary sources or systems of law, or

the constitution recognizes customary law to be applied only in certain limited territorial areas.

This question does not include customary contractual terms or other forms of implied usage.

the constitution makes reference to methods by which personal law will be aligned with constitutional principles or by which personal law is to be determined, or provides for a religious council or other body to advise on the passage of personal laws, or recognizes religious systems of law or religious sources of law, or

the constitution allows laws that applied before the constitution came into force to remain valid, if the country had a robust system of personal law in place at the time.

The answer is No if there is no explicit constitutional recognition of religious sources or systems of law.

The answer is “Yes” if there is an equal protection or a general equality provision in the constitution, and the provision applies generally to “all citizens” and does not specify women as a protected category.

The answer is “No” if there is no equal protection or general equality provision in the constitution.

If there is a nondiscrimination clause in the constitution, does it mention gender?
• The answer is “Yes”
o if the constitution explicitly states that gender or sex is a protected category for nondiscrimination
o even if there is a clawback provision granting exceptions to the nondiscrimination clause for certain areas of the law, such as inheritance, family and customary law
o if the nondiscrimination clause does not explicitly mention gender or sex but specifies that male and female citizens are equal without discrimination.
• The answer is “N/A” if there is no nondiscrimination provision.
• The answer is “No” if
o there is no nondiscrimination provision, or
o there is a nondiscrimination provision that does not specify gender or sex as protected categories, or
o the nondiscrimination language that includes sex is present in the preamble but not in an article of the constitution, or
o there is merely a provision stipulating that the sexes are equal or the sexes have equal rights and obligations—this is considered to be an equality clause, or
o there is merely a stipulation that the sexes are equal before the law but there is no provision dedicated to nondiscrimination, or
o there is merely language negating privileges based on sex, or
o there is merely a provision entitling both sexes to fundamental rights without use of the word discrimination, although a phrase such as “without regard to sex” or “whatever his sex” is used.
×

The answer is “Yes” if the definition of head of household is codified, and there are no explicit restrictions on a married woman becoming “head of household” or “head of family.”

The answer is “No” if

there is an explicit restriction on a married woman becoming “head of household” or “head of family,” e.g., a provision stating that only husbands can be so designated or that husbands “lead the family” or “represent the family,” or

a male is designated as the default family member who receives the family book or equivalent document that is necessary for access to services.

The answer is “N/A” if the definition of head of household is not codified.

The answer is “Yes” if the definition of head of household is codified, and there are no explicit restrictions on an unmarried woman becoming “head of household” or “head of family.”

The answer is “No” if there is an explicit restriction on an unmarried woman becoming “head of household” or “head of family;” e.g., a provision stating that only men can be designated “head of household” or “head of family” or that men “lead the family.”

The answer is “N/A” if the definition of head of household is not codified.

both the married mother and father may convey citizenship to their children in the same manner, wherever the children are born, or

there are additional procedures that must be completed by men but not by women (e.g., proof of paternity).

The answer is “No” if only the married father can convey citizenship to the child, wherever that child may have been born, or if additional requirements exist when citizenship is conveyed by the mother.

Where a citizenship law and the constitution conflict on the passage of citizenship, the answer is coded according to whichever came later in time.

The answer is “Yes” if there are no inequalities in the process for obtaining a national identity card. If married men must provide a marriage certificate or birth certificate as proof of name, whereas married women must provide a marriage certificate, the answer is still “Yes.”

The answer is “No” if

a married woman must provide a marriage certificate, but a married man need not, or

a married woman, but not a married man, must provide additional signatures, such as those of the husband, father or guardian, or

a married woman must indicate the name of her spouse, but a married man is not so required, or

identity cards are optional for women, but required for men, or

the identity card of a married woman displays the name of her spouse, but the identity card of a married man does not.

there are no restrictions on a married woman opening a bank account—only provisions from the body of family law are systematically reviewed, or

the law explicitly states that a married woman may open a bank account, or that both spouses may open bank accounts in their own names.

The answer is “No” if

specific legal provisions limit the ability of a married woman to open a bank account, such as those stating that a married woman who is separately employed from her husband may open a bank account in her own name, because that implies that a woman without a separate income stream may not do so, or

specific provisions limit the capacity of a married woman and prevent her from opening a bank account in her own name, such as required permissions or additional documentation.

The answer is “Yes” if full legal capacity is obtained upon the age of majority and there are no restrictions on a married woman registering a business. Only provisions from the body of family law are systematically reviewed.

The answer is “No” if a married woman

has limited legal capacity to register a business, as when she may not legally bind herself to a contract, or

needs her husband’s permission, signature or consent to register a business, or

must provide information or documentation at any stage of the registration process, and the requirement does not apply to a married man.

The answer is also “No” for member states of regional bodies, such as the Organisation pour l’Harmonisation en Afrique du Droit des Affaires (OHADA) for which supranational law applies (e.g., OHADA Acte Uniforme Révisé sur le Droit Commercial Général) when domestic law contravenes these supranational rules and limits the legal capacity of women.

The answer is “Yes” if full legal capacity is obtained upon the age of majority and there are no restrictions on a married woman signing legally binding contracts.

The answer is “No” if a married woman has limited legal capacity to enter into contracts or needs the signature, consent or permission of her husband to legally bind herself.

This question does not concern restrictions on married women signing contracts specifically related to marital property governed by the default marital property regime; these are covered under the using property indicator.

Where the main business city is both a municipal and a federal entity, it is treated as a municipality.

If there is a quota for candidate lists, the percentage will be indicated.

If the quota refers not to a percentage but to where women must be placed on the list (e.g., every third candidate must be a woman), this information is converted to a percentage format (in this example, 33%).

If the quota varies depending on the length of the candidate list or the number of seats contested, the highest quota is recorded. If the quota is an absolute number, the answer is > 0.

If there is a quota for candidate lists, the percentage will be indicated.

If the quota refers not to a percentage but to where women must be placed on the list (e.g., every third candidate must be a woman), this information is converted to a percentage format (in this example, 33%).

If the quota is an absolute number, the answer is > 0.

If the quota varies depending on the length of the candidate list or the number of seats contested, the highest quota is recorded.

“No quota” means there is no quota for candidate lists. The question does not apply to quotas for internal party elections.

If the parliament has two chambers, and the law specifies a quota for one but not the other, the answer reflects the quota only for the chamber that has the quota.

If both parliamentary chambers have quotas, only the quota for the lower chamber, e.g., the national or people’s assembly, is counted.

The question does not cover voluntary or recommended quotas. If the parliament has two chambers and the law specifies a quota for one but not the other, the answer reflects the quota only for the chamber that has a quota.

If both parliamentary chambers have quotas, only the quota for the lower chamber, e.g., the national or people’s assembly, is counted.

The answer is “Yes” if there are no restrictions on an unmarried woman opening a bank account. Only provisions from the body of family law are systematically reviewed; any that exist in other types of law, such as banking regulations, are not included here.

The answer is “No” if specific provisions limit the ability of an unmarried woman to open a bank account, such as required permissions or additional documentation.

The answer is “Yes” if a woman obtains full legal capacity upon reaching the age of majority and there are no restrictions on an unmarried woman registering a business.

The answer is “No” if

an unmarried woman has limited legal capacity to register a business; this would include situations in which a woman may not bind herself to a legal document, or

the registration process requires additional information or documentation for unmarried women not required of unmarried men.

The answer is also “No” for member states of regional bodies, such as the Organisation pour l’Harmonisation en Afrique du Droit des Affaires (OHADA) for which supranational law applies (e.g., OHADA Acte Uniforme Révisé sur le Droit Commercial Général) when domestic law contravenes these supranational rules and limits the legal capacity of women.

Is the Chief Justice a woman?
• This question reflects if the Chief Justice of the constitutional court or the court-like body mandated with the determination of constitutionality of laws and regulations is a woman.
×

The answer is "Yes" if the constitution or another law establishes or recognizes the authority of a judicial body (e.g., a court or tribunal) that is competent to exclusively hear cases and apply customary law, codified or not.

The answer is "No" if the constitution or another law establishes or recognizes the authority of a judicial body that applies customary law, codified or not, in addition to laws other than customary law.

Does the law recognize customary courts?
• The answer is “Yes” if the constitution or another law establishes or recognizes the authority of a judicial body (e.g., a court or tribunal) that is competent to exclusively hear cases and apply customary law, codified or not.
• The answer is “No” if the constitution or another law establishes or recognizes the authority of a judicial body that applies customary law, codified or not, in addition to laws other than customary law.
×

The answer is "Yes" if the constitution or another law establishes or recognizes the authority of a judicial body (e.g., court or tribunal) that is competent to exclusively hear cases and apply personal law, codified or not.

The answer is "No" if the constitution or another law establishes or recognizes the authority of a judicial body that is competent to hear cases and apply personal law, codified or not, in addition to laws other than personal law.

Does the law recognize personal law courts?
• The answer is “Yes” if the constitution or another law establishes or recognizes the authority of a judicial body (e.g., court or tribunal) that is competent to exclusively hear cases and apply personal law, codified or not.
• The answer is “No” if the constitution or another law establishes or recognizes the authority of a judicial body that is competent to hear cases and apply personal law, codified or not, in addition to laws other than personal law.
×

This indicates the highest amount for claims that can be heard in a small claims court; when different amounts apply to civil and commercial cases, the amount that applies to civil cases is used.

The answer is “N/A” if the economy in question has no small claims courts or fast-track procedures for civil claims of small value.

How many justices are on the constitutional court?
• For the purposes of this question, constitutional courts and court-like institutions mandated with the determination of constitutionality of laws and regulations are examined.
• When a specific number of justices is set by law, the data reflect that number of justices.
• When the number of justices set by law is a minimum, a maximum or a range, the data reflect the actual number of justices.
• When a separate chamber of the highest court carries out constitutional review, the question reflects the composition of that chamber.
×

This question reflects how many members of constitutional courts or court-like institutions mandated with the determination of constitutionality of laws and regulations are women.

Of those, how many are women?
• This question reflects how many members of constitutional courts or court-like institutions mandated with the determination of constitutionality of laws and regulations are women.
×

The answer is "Yes” if

there is either a small claims court or a fast-track procedure for civil claims of small value, and there is a maximum value of cases that may be heard in a small claims court or fast-track procedure, or

the small claims court or fast-track procedure has jurisdiction to hear at least general civil cases.

The answer is "No” if

there is a small claims court or fast-track procedure but it is competent only to hear commercial claims, not all civil claims, or

only a few types of civil disputes are within the jurisdiction of the small-claims court (e.g., rent disputes only).

Is there a small claims court/fast-track procedure?
• Small claims courts hear only civil cases between private litigants involving relatively small amounts of money; though the names of such courts vary by jurisdiction, common features generally include relaxed rules of civil procedure, the appearance of adversaries without legal representation, the use of plain language and relaxed evidentiary rules. Fast-track and simplified procedural rules for small claims operate similarly but the cases are tried in courts of more general jurisdiction.
• The answer is “Yes” if
o there is either a small claims court or a fast-track procedure for civil claims of small value, and there is a maximum value of cases that may be heard in a small claims court or fast-track procedure, or
o the small claims court or fast-track procedure has jurisdiction to hear at least general civil cases.
• The answer is “No” if
o there is a small claims court or fast-track procedure but it is competent only to hear commercial claims, not all civil claims, or
o only a few types of civil disputes are within the jurisdiction of the small-claims court (e.g., rent disputes only).
×

This question covers all types of court cases.

The answer is "No" if the law explicitly differentiates between the evidentiary value of a woman's testimony and that of a man.

The answer is "Yes" if the law does not differentiate between the evidentiary value of a woman's testimony and that of a man.

Is a woman’s testimony afforded equal weight to that of a man?
• This question covers all types of court cases.
• The answer is “No” if the law explicitly differentiates between the evidentiary value of a woman’s testimony and that of a man.
• The answer is “Yes” if the law does not differentiate between the evidentiary value of a woman’s testimony and that of a man.
×

This question covers financial support granted by the government to parents for children not yet old enough for primary school. Support may take such forms as vouchers or preschool fee waivers and transfers. Payments are granted while mothers work. The payments are not tax benefits and do not require attendance at preschool.

The answer is Yes"

if allowance is granted up to a certain age and is not associated with maternity, paternity, or parental leave, or

even if the allowance is granted to only one of the parents.

The answer is "No" if the allowance is granted to a specific class of people (e.g., parents of children with disabilities).

For purposes of this question, childcare for children too young for primary education may take such forms as kindergartens or creches, preschools, daycare centers, after-school centers, in-home care and child-minding arrangements.

The answer is "Yes" if

public authorities fund childcare facilities and services (public or private), or

public authorities subsidize the use of private childcare facilities and services, as well as the hiring of child-minders.

The answer is "Yes" if childcare expenses are listed as deductible items in the personal income tax code; for this purpose, childcare expenses cover, e.g., fees for kindergartens or creches, daycare centers, after-school centers, in-home care and child-minding arrangements.

The answer is "No" if the childcare allowance granted by the government is not taxable.

This question is designed to determine whether the tax code differentiates between men and women on deductions and credits and covers instances where tax-specific deductions and credits can only be claimed by male heads of household.

The answer is "Yes" if

the personal income tax code specifies that a tax deduction or credit applies only to male taxpayers, or

the code provides for a tax deduction or credit that can only go to the head of household, and only men can legally be the head of household.

the law prohibits discrimination on the basis of gender or sex, or provides for equal access for both sexes when conducting financial transactions, such as applying for credit or loans, or

the law prohibits discrimination on the basis of gender or sex when conducting entrepreneurial activities or receiving financial assistance, or

the law prohibits discrimination on the basis of gender or sex when accessing goods and services, and the definition of services in law, regulation or government-published explanations/promotional material covers financial services, or

banking and financial services are not listed as services exempt from nondiscrimination laws.

the law specifically prohibits discrimination on the basis of marital status or provides for equal access irrespective of marital status when conducting financial transactions, such as applying for credit or loans, or

the law prohibits discrimination on the basis of marital status when conducting entrepreneurial activities or receiving financial assistance, or

the law prohibits discrimination on the basis of marital status when accessing goods and services, and the definition of services in law, regulation or government-published explanations/promotional material covers financial services, or

banking and financial services are not listed as services exempt from nondiscrimination law.

High-income economies are not included in this sample because microfinance institutions are far more prevalent in developing economies. Also, because traditional bank financing is generally widely available to women in high-income economies, microfinance is less critical to women’s quest for capital.

For purposes of this question, it is sufficient that any private credit bureau or public credit registry in the economy in question collects information from microfinance institutions.

This number reflects the lowest minimum loan amount of any credit bureau or registry in the economy in question.

If a credit bureau or registry collects data on loans worth less than 1% of income per capita, it is treated as if it collects data on loans of any value; thus an answer of zero here means either that there is no minimum loan amount in at least one credit bureau or registry, or that at least one credit bureau or registry collects data on loans worth less than 1% of income per capita.

The answer is “N/A” if there is no credit bureau or registry in the economy.

This question is designed to determine whether an employer is allowed to inquire about the family status of a prospective employee during a job interview; the law may prohibit discrimination based on this information but be silent about whether employers are allowed to ask for it in the first place.

Family status refers to both whether the applicant is married and has children.

The answer is “Yes” if the employer may not ask whether the applicant is married or has children.

If the law prohibits employers from asking prospective employees personal information, it is assumed that family status constitutes personal information.

This question is designed to determine if there are specific jobs that women explicitly or implicitly cannot perform except in limited circumstances.

Both partial and full restrictions on women's work are counted as restrictions. For example, if women are only allowed to work in certain jobs within the mining industry, e.g., as health care professionals within mines but not as miners, this is a restriction.

Explicit restrictions on women doing certain jobs, such as mining, are examined, as are implicit restrictions stating that women cannot work in "hazardous" or "arduous" conditions, or in jobs deemed morally or socially inappropriate.

Where the law indicates that a given ministry or minister may promulgate regulations restricting women's work in particular industries, this is considered a restriction.

The answer is “Yes” if there are no laws that prohibit women, but not men, from working in a broad and subjective category of jobs deemed “hazardous.”

The answer is “No” if the employer can determine whether particular jobs are too hazardous for women but not for men. In such cases, the law explicitly uses the term “hazardous” or its synonyms to describe a broad category of jobs that women—but not men— are prohibited from doing. Work of a hazardous nature includes, for example, jobs that could have a harmful effect on or increased risk to women’s lives or health, given women’s psycho-physical qualities, or jobs not deemed to have a harmful effect on or increased risk to men’s life or health given men’s psycho-physical qualities.

Where the law indicates that a given minister or ministry may promulgate regulations restricting women’s work in hazardous jobs, the answer is “No.”

The answer is “Yes” if there are no laws that prohibit women, but not men, from working in a broad and subjective category of jobs deemed arduous.

The answer is “No” if the employer can determine whether particular jobs are too arduous for women but not for men. In such cases, the law explicitly uses the term “arduous” or its synonyms to describe a broad category of jobs that women—but not men— are prohibited from doing. Work of an arduous nature includes jobs that involve particularly hard manual labor or jobs that are considered to exceed women’s capabilities.

Where the law indicates that a given minister or ministry may promulgate regulations restricting women’s work in arduous jobs, the answer is “No.”

This question is designed to determine whether non-pregnant and non-nursing women—but not men—are prohibited from working at night. Night-hour restrictions on women in specified industries are captured in later questions.

The answer is “Yes” if there are no restrictions on women working at night. If the law conditions women’s ability to work at night on employer compliance with safety measures (such as providing transportation to and from work), the answer is also “Yes.”

The answer is “No” if the law

broadly prohibits women from working at night, or

broadly prohibits women from working at night but provides for exceptions, such as in cases of force majeure.

Where the law indicates that a given ministry or minister may promulgate regulations restricting women’s work at night, this is considered a restriction.

The answer is “Yes” if there are no laws that prohibit women, but not men, from working in a broad and subjective category of jobs deemed morally or socially inappropriate.

The answer is “No” if the employer can determine whether particular jobs are morally inappropriate or socially harmful for women but not for men. In such cases, the law explicitly uses the term “morally inappropriate” or its synonyms to describe a broad category of jobs that women—but not men—are prohibited from doing. Work that is morally inappropriate includes, for example, employment that is considered not in accordance with the “moral development” only of women.

Where the law indicates that a given minister or ministry may promulgate regulations restricting women’s work in morally or socially inappropriate jobs, the answer is “No.”

Job-related tasks refers to specified actions women are prohibited from doing, materials or substances women are prohibited from working with, or particular settings women are prohibited from working in. For purposes of this question, metalwork and lifting weights above a set threshold are not included because they are captured separately in previous questions.

The answer is “Yes” if there are no restrictions on women doing the same job-related tasks as men.

The answer is “No” if there are restrictions on women doing particular job-related tasks but not on men doing them.

This question captures whether employers are legally obliged to pay equal remuneration to male and female employees who do work of equal value.

"Remuneration" refers to the ordinary, basic or minimum wage or salary and any additional emoluments payable directly or indirectly, whether in cash or in kind, by the employer to the worker and arising out of the worker's employment.

"Work of equal value" refers not only to the same or similar jobs but also to different jobs of the same value.

The question takes into account paid and unpaid leave and captures whether the employer has a legal obligation to reinstate the returning employee in an equivalent or better position and salary than the employee had pre-leave.

Where the maternity leave regime explicitly states that the employee may not be indefinitely replaced, the answer is assumed to be “Yes.”

Where the maternity leave regime explicitly establishes a suspension of the employee’s contract, the answer is assumed to be “Yes.”

In economies that also have parental leave and the law guarantees return after the leave to the same or an equivalent position paid at the same rate but is silent on guaranteeing the same position after maternity leave, the answer is “Yes.”

The answer is “N/A” if no paid or unpaid maternity leave is available.

The answer is “Yes” if the law specifically requires firms and employers to provide break time for nursing mothers who breastfeed at work; such a requirement may depend on the size of the firm or the proportion of women it employs.

This question is designed to determine whether the law specifically prevents or penalizes gender-based discrimination in the hiring process; the law may prohibit discrimination in employment on the basis of gender but be silent about whether job applicants are protected from discrimination.

Hiring refers to the process of employing a person for wages and making a selection by presenting a candidate with a job offer.

Job advertisements, selection criteria and recruitment, although equally important, are not considered “hiring” for purposes of this question.

Is it prohibited for prospective employers to ask about family status?
• This question is designed to determine whether an employer is allowed to inquire about the family status of a prospective employee during a job interview; the law may prohibit discrimination based on this information but be silent about whether employers are allowed to ask for it in the first place.
• Family status refers to both whether the applicant is married and has children.
• The answer is “Yes” if the employer may not ask whether the applicant is married or has children.
• If the law prohibits employers from asking prospective employees personal information, it is assumed that family status constitutes personal information.
×

This is the age at which a man must cease employment or loses the right to continue working for his employer. Even if the law allows employers and employees to contract for work beyond that age, retirement is still considered mandatory because the employer can legally oblige the employee to retire.

This is the age at which a woman must cease employment or loses the right to continue working for her employer. Even if the law allows employers and employees to contract for work beyond that age, retirement is still considered mandatory because the employer can legally oblige the employee to retire.

Maternity leave may be paid or unpaid, as long as the government explicitly mandates the right to some form of maternity leave.

Maternity leave is defined as leave available only to the mother; it does not cover parental leave that is available to both parents.

Provisions for circumstantial leave by which an employee is entitled to a certain number of days of paid leave (usually fewer than five days) upon the birth of a child are considered paternity leave; even if the law is gender-neutral, such leave is not considered maternity leave if the law covers maternity leave elsewhere.

This is the total percentage of wages covered by all sources during paid maternity leave; when different percentages of wages are covered at different stages of maternity leave, a weighted average is calculated; weights are proportional to the duration of each stage.

If the law sets a maximum amount of maternity benefits that can be paid or does not stipulate an exact percentage, it is assumed that the woman earns the equivalent of the average value-added per worker. Average value-added per worker is the ratio of an economy's GNI per capita to the working-age population as a percentage of the total population.

This question covers whether maternity leave benefits are funded by the government, the employer or both; if only the employer funds the benefits, the employer bears the entire cost and pays the employee directly.

Employer contributions to government funds (such as social security) that pay maternity benefits are not considered employer payment of maternity benefits.

If the law provides that the government must reimburse the employer for all maternity leave benefits paid to employees, the answer is “government 100%.” If the government only reimburses a portion of the benefits, the answer is “government and employer.”

This is the mandatory minimum number of calendar days of parental leave which by law must be paid by the government, the employer or both.

If parental leave is an individual rather than a family entitlement, the assumption is that only one parent takes the full entitlement.

If the law mandates that the length of parental leave is not a specified amount of time but is rather worded “until the child reaches a [certain] age,” postnatal maternity leave days are subtracted from the number of parental leave days.

Parental leave is counted only if it is contiguous with maternity and paternity leave.

It is assumed that the mother and the father both take the full maternity and paternity leave available to them before taking parental leave.

If there are several parental leave schemes that the parents or family can choose from, it is assumed that parents select the scheme that pays the most.

This question covers whether parental leave benefits are funded by the government, the employer or both; if the employer alone funds parental leave benefits, the employer bears the entire cost and pays the employee directly.

Employer contributions to government funds, such as social security, that pay parental benefits are not considered employer payments of parental benefits.

If the law provides that the government must reimburse the employer for parental leave benefits paid to employees, the government is considered to be paying the portion reimbursed.

This is the total percentage of wages covered by all sources during paid paternity leave; when different percentages of wages are covered at different stages of paternity leave, a weighted average is calculated; weights are proportional to the duration of each stage.

If the law caps the maximum amount of paternity benefits that can be paid or does not stipulate an exact percentage, it is assumed that the man earns the equivalent of the average value-added per worker. Average value-added per worker is the ratio of an economy's GNI per capita to the working-age population as a percentage of the total population.

This question covers whether paternity leave benefits are funded by the government, the employer or both; if only the employer funds paternity leave benefits, the employer bears the entire cost and pays the employee directly.

Employer contributions to government funds (such as social security) that pay paternity benefits are not considered employer payments of paternity benefits.

If the law provides that the government must reimburse the employer for paternity leave benefits paid to employees, it is considered a government payment of the portion reimbursed.

Parental leave may be paid or unpaid as long as the government explicitly mandates the right to some form of parental leave shared between mother and father; parental leave may also be an individual entitlement.

Allowances for a fixed number of days per year applied to family emergencies or child-related responsibilities are not considered parental leave; the leave must be contiguous with the birth of the child and with maternity or paternity leave.

Paternity leave may be paid or unpaid as long as the government explicitly mandates the right to some form of paternity leave.

Paternity leave is defined as leave available only to the father; it does not include leave available to both parents.

Provisions for circumstantial leave in which an employee is entitled to a certain number of days of paid or unpaid leave (usually fewer than five days) upon the birth of a child are considered paternity leave; even if the law is gender-neutral, such leave is not considered maternity leave as long as maternity leave is covered elsewhere by the law. For example, if the labor code provides that a worker may take a “one-day leave for the birth of a child” as an unpaid justified absence, the term “worker” is gender-neutral, and maternity leave is covered in another article of the code, the one-day unpaid justified absence is considered paternity leave.

This is the age at which a man can retire but not with full pension benefits, either because he did not accumulate enough work experience or contributions, or because he has not reached the age that would qualify him for a full pension.

If there is no specified age to qualify for an early pension, retire early, or retire and receive partial benefits, the answer is the same as the age at which a man can retire and receive full benefits (see 64a).

This is the age at which a woman can retire but not with full pension benefits, either because she did not accumulate enough work experience or contributions, or because she did not reach the age that would qualify her for full pension.

If there is no specific age at which a woman can retire and receive partial benefits, the answer is the same as the age at which she can retire and receive full benefits (see 64b).

If there is no national law regarding retirement, the answer is “N/A.”

This is the mandatory minimum number of calendar days of unpaid maternity leave that an employer must allow an employee to take, whether or not she elects to take it. Parental leave that is optional for both parents is not covered here.

If leave is provided but is not contiguous with the birth, the leave is not considered unpaid maternity leave because it can be taken at any point after the child is born.

Unpaid maternity leave is in addition to any paid maternity leave available.

The answer is "Yes" if there are provisions that prevent the marriage of girls, boys, or both before they reach the legal age of marriage or the age of marriage with consent, including, for example, a prohibition on registering the marriage or provisions stating that such a marriage is null and void.

The answer is "No" if

there are no provisions invalidating the marriage or prohibiting the registration under a minimum age, or

the marriage is invalid based on lack of consent of the parent or guardian when the law does not set a minimum age.

there is legislation addressing domestic violence: violence between spouses, within the family or members of the same household, or in interpersonal relationships, including intimate partner violence that is subject to criminal sanctions or provides for protection orders for domestic violence, or

the legislation addresses "cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment" or "harassment" that clearly affects physical and mental health, and it is implied that such behavior is considered domestic violence.

The answer is "No" if

there is no legislation addressing domestic violence, or what does so refers to or prohibits domestic violence but does not provide for sanctions or orders of protection, or

the provision enables a woman to obtain a protection order only if the husband has been convicted of the offense or the wife has ceased to reside in the common home, or

the provision protects only a specific category of women (e.g., pregnant) or defines the offense in terms of specific motives (e.g., violence against a person in connection with performing a professional or civil duty), or

there is only a provision that heightens penalties for general crimes covered in the criminal code if committed between spouses or within the family.

The answer is "Yes" if the legislation clearly protects women in unmarried, intimate relationships, including cohabiting and noncohabiting partners.

The answer is "No" if the legislation only covers married couples or spouses and does not protect women in unmarried, intimate relationships.

The answer is also "No" if the legislation covers de facto spouses, defined as persons who have gone through a form of ceremony recognized as a marriage but that has not been registered or is not capable of being registered.

The answer is "Yes" if there are enforcement measures or sanctions in the law against anyone who allows, registers or celebrates the marriage of girls or boys violating the legal age requirements, including for any party who is over the legal age of marriage and knowingly married someone not of legal age.

The question is meant to capture whether there is a law or specific provisions on sexual harassment; provisions may be general or apply only to employment.

The answer is "Yes" if

legislation specifically addresses and protects against sexual harassment, including unwelcome sexual advances; requests for sexual favors; verbal or physical conduct or gestures of a sexual nature; annoyance, if understood to include harassment with sexual content; or any other behavior of a sexual nature that might reasonably be expected or be perceived to cause offense or humiliation to another, or

sexual harassment is considered "discrimination," and legislation protects against discrimination, or

there is a provision protecting against sexual harassment in employment, including provisions on inducing indecent or lewd behavior coupled with financial or official dependence on authority, or language that can be clearly interpreted to mean such dependence or abuse.

The answer is "No" if

the law does not specifically address sexual harassment, or

the behavior or gesture of sexual nature is performed using force or violence or the threat of force of violence, which is understood to constitute a crime, e.g., sexual assault or abuse, or

the conduct covered in the legislation is not directed at a specific individual, or

the legislation allows an employee to terminate employed based on sexual harassment but provides for no other protection (however, a provision allowing the employer to terminate an employee's contract for committing sexual harassment will be considered), or

the legislation protects only a specific category of women or those in a specific area or sector of employment, e.g., protection from sexual harassment in political functions, or applies only to government or state-owned enterprises, or

the legislation accounts only for sexual acts, including intercourse or copulation, as clearly involving contact of or with genital organs, or

the legislation states only that the employer has a duty to prevent sexual harassment, but there are no provisions to prohibit or provide sanctions for sexual harassment, or

the legislation addresses harassment in general but makes no reference to acts of a sexual nature or contact.

The question covers provisions addressing sexual harassment in education, educational facilities, schools or where the offender is in the role of educator, professor or in charge of the education of the victim, whether or not there are sanctions associated with the provision.

The answer is "Yes" if the legislation specifically covers sexual harassment in education or contains language that can clearly be interpreted as sexual harassment in education.

The answer is "No" if

the legislation does not specifically cover sexual harassment in education, or

it covers sexual harassment only in public or only in private education, but not in both.

The question covers provisions on sexual harassment in the workplace or in employment, whether or not sanctions apply.

The answer is "Yes" if

there is legislation that specifically protects against sexual harassment in employment, including unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, verbal or physical conduct or gestures of a sexual nature, annoyance if understood to include harassment with sexual content, or any other behavior of a sexual nature that might reasonably be expected or be perceived to cause offense or humiliation to another in connection with employment, including provisions on inducing indecent or lewd behavior coupled with financial or official dependence or authority, abuse of position or authority, or language that can be clearly interpreted to mean such dependence or abuse, or

sexual harassment is deemed discrimination in employment, and the law protects against discrimination.

The answer is "No" if

there is no legislation specifically addressing sexual harassment in employment, or

a behavior or gesture of sexual nature uses force or violence or the threat of force or violence, which is understood to constitute a crime, e.g., sexual assault or abuse, or

the conduct covered by legislation is not directed at a specific individual, or

the legislation allows an employee to terminate an employment contract based on sexual harassment but provides for no other protection, although a provision allowing the employer to terminate an employee's contract for committing sexual harassment will be taken into account, or

the legislation covers only public or only private sector employees, but not both, or

the legislation protects only a specific category of women or only a specific area of employment, e.g., protection from sexual harassment in political functions, or applies only to government or state-owned enterprises, or

the legislation refers only to sexual acts, including intercourse or copulation, as clearly involving contact of or with genital organs, or

the legislation states only that the employer has a duty to take measures to prevent sexual harassment, but there are no provisions prohibiting or providing sanctions for sexual harassment, or

the legislation addresses harassment in general but makes no reference to acts of a sexual nature or contact.

the term "financial" or "economic" violence or abuse is clearly defined or stated in the law as a form of domestic violence, or

the law contains language that can clearly be interpreted as financial or economic violence or abuse, or

a provision covers the use of violence that causes or results in consequences affecting the livelihood of the victim.

The answer is "No" if the domestic violence provision does not use the term "financial" or "economic" violence or abuse, or other language that can clearly be interpreted as financial or economic violence or abuse.

the term "physical" violence or abuse is clearly defined or stated in the law or provision as a form of domestic violence, or

the language in the provision can clearly be interpreted as treating physical violence or abuse as a form of domestic violence, including cruel or inhuman treatment, or harassment if stated as affecting physical health.

The answer is "No" if the domestic violence law does not use the term "physical" violence or abuse or other language that can clearly be interpreted as physical violence or abuse.

the term "psychological" or "emotional" violence or abuse is clearly defined or stated in the law as a form of domestic violence, or

the law contains language that can clearly be interpreted as psychological or emotional violence or abuse being a form of domestic violence, such as outrages upon personal dignity, humiliating and degrading treatment and harassment, if affecting mental health, and harm, if interpreted as emotional harm.

The answer is "No" if the domestic violence law does not contain the term "psychological" or "emotional" violence or abuse or other language that can clearly be interpreted as psychological or emotional violence or abuse.

the domestic violence law does not prescribe criminal sanctions but states that domestic violence offenses will be sanctioned in accordance with the criminal code, or

domestic violence is addressed in the criminal code, which criminalizes violence by or against a spouse, a family member or an intimate partner, or

the criminal code provides for aggravated penalties if an offense is committed by or against a spouse, a family member or an intimate partner

The answer is "No" if

the domestic violence law does not provide for criminal sanctions or the provision on sanctions does not protect individuals from violence by or against a spouse, a family member or an intimate partner, or

the provision addressing domestic violence prohibits only the conduct or establishes only noncriminal penalties or penalties for violating a protection order.

there is legislation that explicitly criminalizes the act of marital rape by providing that rape or sexual assault provisions apply "irrespective of the nature of the relationship" between the perpetrator and complainant or by stating that "no marriage or other relationship shall constitute a defense to a charge of rape or sexual assault under the legislation," or

there is legislation that explicitly criminalizes the act of rape between (i) persons in marital relationships; (ii) relatives, when the law explicitly considers spouses relatives (but not for relatives in general); or (iii) persons in situations of abuse or dependency of family position (but not of dependency in general), when the law clearly includes spouses within the definition of family; or when legislation that explicitly criminalizes the act of rape states that the spouse is a potential offender or is not exempt from charges, or

marital relationships are an aggravating factor for the crimes of rape and sexual assault that includes elements of rape, or if the law sets out conditions in which the penalty for marital rape or rape by the husband is mitigated so that the criminalization of marital rape can be inferred.

The answer is "No" if

there are no criminal sanctions for the offense (i.e., the law only "prohibits the act, provides for the application of protection orders, or "allows a judge to order a husband not to rape his wife"), or

the provision on marital rape applies only if the spouses are separated or in the process of getting separated, or

the provision covers only relationships of dependency in general, or financial or official dependence, or

the provision on rape applies only in certain circumstances, such as sickness, or

the provision applies only to family members, and spouses are not clearly included in the definition of family.

the legislation on rape or sexual assault, or general criminal law, exempts husbands or spouses from being charged with the offense or clearly states that there is no crime of rape between husband and wife or within marriage, or

the provision on rape between spouses is conditioned on the act being committed with violence.

The answer is "Yes" if legislation entitles a woman to file a complaint for rape against her husband or partner, and does not exclude spouses from its application.

The answer is "No" if

the legislation on rape or sexual assault contains exemptions that prevent spouses from being charged with the offense or states that there is no crime of rape between husband and wife or within marriage, or

The answer is "Yes" if the protection order obtained in cases of domestic violence provides for prohibiting contact with the survivor and/or requiring the perpetrator to maintain a geographic distance from the survivor or contains similar language.