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The history of jubbaland,short story about the cawlyahan(ogadeen) and their war of freedom against the british empire.

Mentioned in despatches for Jubaland 1917-18.By Keith Steward FRGSArmy Order 95 of 1919 states that His Majesty the King has been graciously pleased toapprove the award of the Africa General Service Medal for operations in Jubaland 1917-18.The award is granted to all officers and men who served under the command of Lieut.Colonel WEH Barrett, King’s African Rifles; Major EGM Porcelli, Duke of Cornwall’sLight Infantry; Captain JF Wolseley-Bourne or Captain O Martin, King’s African Rifles. Theoperations were against the Northern Aulihan tribe in the area west of the Juba River andnorth east of a line Waregta-Lak Abaleni-Lorian Swamp-Eil Wak-Dolo, between the 23rdJuly, 1917 and the 24th March 1918.Many military historians will respond in the ‘Who, Where? Why? What When?’ Manner tothis statement; the Juba River is in East Africa, Kismayu, a coastal town some 400 milesnorth east of Mombasa is the best local reference. It is in what was then called ItalianSomaliland. ‘On the withdrawal of most of the regular troops from Jubaland in 1914, anArmed Constabulary was formed, mainly mounted on camels. Considering the recenthistory of the tribes in the northern part of Jubaland1 it was hardly to be expected that thesituation created by the war (the withdrawal of regular troops) would not result in furtherdisturbance’2.A British officer, Lieutenant Elliott commanding the local Constabulary at Serenli wasbrutally attacked and killed along with 35 African police, 7 others were wounded, 3 desertedand some 50 villagers were also murdered. The local warlord Abdurraham Mursaal, hadtricked Lieutenant Elloitt into disarming his constables when they were ‘off duty.’ On night of2nd/3rd February 1916, an unexpected and carefully planned attack caught the small Policeforce unawares. The unarmed off duty askaris were not able retrieve their rifles which werelocked in the guardroom. Finally, to make matters worse, ‘a great quantity of loot, including amachine gun, 50 rifles and 300 hundred boxes of ammunition’. 3As no troops were availablethe raids and reprisals continued throughout the year. ‘It was in these circumstances that thedecision taken, as part of the general policy for expansion of the KAR to include a newbattalion for the defence of Jubaland and the NFD (Northern Frontier District). 5. KARtherefore came into being under the command of Lieut. Colonel WEH Barrett (Reserve ofOfficers).’4The interesting aspect of this incident to military historians is the awarding of the AfricaGeneral Service Medal as a separate medal issue while the First World War was still inprogress. Only six clasps to the medal were awarded during the period 1914-19, (Shimber-Berris 1914-15, East Africa 1915, Nyasaland 1915, Jubaland 1917-18, East Africa 1918 andNigeria 1918). The reason for the separate medal issue was that the campaign fell within theremit for the award of the Africa General Service Medal and was not concerned in any waywith the war against the Germans. It was on each occasion given to African troops under thecommand of British Officers & a few civilians who responded to the violence and civildisturbance of a number disaffected Africans. The grievances were concerned with theuninvited occupation of tribal land by the foreign colonising power. It was felt that the timewas right for opposition to British rule while the armed forces (Kings African Rifles in EastAfrica & the West Africa Frontier Force in West Africa) available were diverted fightingagainst the Germans.The prime source for the details of the part of the campaign, on which this paper is based, is aten-page report written by Major Porcelli (DCLI) OC Troops, Jubaland to the AssistantCommandant, the King’s African Rifles, and dated March 19185. For an overall coverage ofthe Jubaland 1917-18 campaign, the reader is referred to Lieut.Colonel Moyse-Bartlett’sbook. As his book does not include much detail that follows, it is probable that ColonelMoyse-Bartlett did not have access to Major Porcellis report. The copy in the Public RecordOffice was only made available in xxxx. However, the Colonel was clearly able to use othermaterial not yet discovered by the present author.This paper is principally concerned with three things; the details of a patrol commanded byCaptain O Martin (Special List) between 20th December 1917 and 20th February 1918.Second the process that subsequently led to awarding a mention in despatches to four of theofficers involved in the patrol and third listing the names of those Europeans who receivedthe clasp to the AGS Jubaland 1917-18. Three African NCOs from the KAR received theDistinguished Conduct Medal for this campaign. 1 These were very well deserved asoutstanding soldering was a characteristic of this patrol. In several cases this was while underthe command of a senior African NCO, without a British Officer being present.As a result of the affirmative action taken by Lieut. Colonel WEH Barrett to re-occupySerenli in September 1917, the rebel leader Geydu Aulihan had been defeated. Spieshowever reported that the Auhilan were divided about whether to submit to British authorityor continue with their rebellion. The difficulty arose from the fact that submission involved aheavy fine of cattle that had to be paid. A large party of the disaffected Aulihan led by RerAfgab and Rer Wafatu decided to break out of Serenli via Damassa. This they did inNovember 1917 and headed in the direction the Juba River, camping in the area around Jabirand Sereneli. Captain O Martin was ordered to obtain scouts, reliable guides, baggage camelsand local Marehan Levies in readiness for pursuit of the rebels.When it was reported that the rebel Aulihan were in a position to cross the Juba River southof Sereneli, Captain Martin was ordered to intercept them. Leaving a small garrison at GarbaHarre under the command of Lieutenant Gutsell, he proceeded to make contact. A furthertwo British officers, a BNCO and 100 rank and file from 1/6th KAR were sent to Jabir tocover the southern approach of the Aulihan. A further detachment of 1/6th KAR had left theirstation on December 20th, but high floodwater prevented their crossing the River Juba andthey were forced to return to Yonti.In order to cut-off the Aulihan from escaping north-eastwards, Major Porcelli contacted theItalian authorities across the border in Somaliland. Italian co-operation was requested andimmediately forthcoming. Three hundred troops under Major Chiampo and LieutenantsSpeggioni, Piazza, Gotti and Costa were detached. The Italians were asked to prevent theAulihan from seeking refuge in their territory. The Italian troops were posted on the oppositebank of the Juba at Awaila, Anola and near Salugli, with patrols covering the area from Afiato Dujima from December 15th 1917. Captain Osborn and Lieutenant Erskine then crossedthe Juba to Bardera and devised a scheme for co-ordinating the two forces.Major Porcelli then gave Captain Martin the following broad instructions.1. Captain Martin was instructed not to delay his attack of the Auhilan as their means ofescape was now blocked with the disposition of the Italian forces.2. Captain Martin was also advised that secrecy, surprise and rapidity of movement wereimportant, as the Auhilan was a highly mobile force.3. Once defeated in battle, the enemy was to be continually harassed and their stockprevented from watering.4. A two-column approach was to be adopted one operating inland patrolling the areaHafanli, Fafadun, Bosha and Merjissa. The other was patrol close to the riverbank.5. Karao, Afia and the Garba Harre road were to be kept under surveillance to preventescape by the dissidents’ northwards.6. The El Wak garrison was to be kept informed of the Auhilans movements in case theywere required to blockade them.7. Every endeavour was to be made to capture the ringleaders, Abdurhaman Mursal andGabodi Abdi in particular.8. Only unconditional surrender was to be accepted, and this only after the capture of mostof the enemy cattle and the killing of the rebel fighting troops.9. At least 14 days rations were to taken to the advanced base at qqqq …and arrangementsmade to obtain fresh supplies from Sereneli.6The inland column under Colour Sergeant Farah Rageh of G Company was sent out on thenight of December 20th/21st for Karap. There were 30 rank & file (15 from G Company & 15mounted infantry), with 230 Marehan riflemen and 45 spearmen. Their instructions were tomove parallel with the river Juba. No 2 column left the following morning. The followingofficers were in the group under Captain Martin, Captain J Osborn, Lieutenants EN Erskine,EM Ritchie, CF Henry, Captain Welch (Medical Officer) and Native Officer Abdi SheriffAhmed. There were 60 Somali rank & file from G and the mounted infantry company, 120Swahili’s from C & E companies, 24 Government Somali Scouts (Illaloes), 18 rank and filefrom F company, 300 Marehan Levies and two Lewis guns.Number 2 column proceeded down the Juba River as far as Malkaadi, halting on the 22nd toawait the arrival of the inland party. Later news reached the camp that No 1 column hadcaptured a large quantity of enemy camels, but was being attacked by Auhilan in force. TheMarehan Levies had bolted, but the KAR troops were holding firm. Immediately, CaptainMartin despatched 30 Somali Riflemen under Colour Sergeant Mohamed Amiashi and afurther 150 Marehan Levies to Hafalani, six hours march away. The inland column (ColourSergeant Fareh Rageh) having driven off the tribesmen succeeded in reaching Hafalani thefollowing morning. Shortly afterwards some 2000 camels were captured as they came towater. Colour Sergeant Farah Rageh decided to drive them on to Serenli, but was waylaid bya strong force (estimated at several hundred) of Aulihan. A running fight lasting several hoursensued. Once again the Marehan Levies proved to be absolutely useless and bolted. Heavilyoutnumbered (Colour Sergeant Mohamed Ainashi’s force had not yet caught up), the smallKAR force adopted the tactic of laying prone on the sand & volley firing as the tribesmenapproached. Over fifty of the Aulihan were killed and many wounded. Again the levies didnot perform at all well, and almost without exception ran away. They lost 17 killed and manywounded. In many cases they had been stabbed in the back as they fled. It was of coursequite impossible to keep hold of 2000 camels in those circumstances and only 160 actuallyreached Serenli. No 1 column after handing over the camels re-joined No2 column atMalkaadi.On December 24th 1917, scouts working for the KAR discovered the main body of theenemy force at Hagagabli. Enemy snipers also became something of a nuisance, seriouslywounding KAR picquets on several occasions. To counter this and prevent the Aulihancollecting camels straying in the direction of the river, an ambush was laid on the 25thDecember. It was successful, four tribesmen were killed and several wounded. No 4534Corporal Jama Mohamed of G Company had a narrow escape, severely wounded he wasstabbed by an Aulihan with his own bayonet. A Government scout Samanter Aden bravelyrushed forward and wounded the tribesman before he could kill the corporal.On the night of December 25th/26th, Captain Martin, Lieutenant EM Ritchie, LieutenantErskine and 90 rank and file (G Company & Mounted Infantry Company) with one Lewisgun left Malkaadi and set out for Hagagabli. The rest, a 120 Somalis (C and E Companies)under Captain Osborn, Lieutenant Henry, Captain Welch (Medical Officer) and NativeOfficer Abdi Sheriff Admed and the transport camels followed at dawn on the 26th. At 2-30am the enemy picquet fired on Captain Martins column and shortly afterwards attacked onboth flanks. Unencumbered by baggage camels, the small force was able to deploy withgreat flexibility. Lieutenant Erskine had devised a fitting, which when attached to a mulesaddle, meant that the Lewis gun could be brought into action in seconds rather than minutes.A steady fire was maintained until dawn. Seeing that the Government Boma at Hagagabliwas in the hands of the enemy, Captain Martin ordered a bayonet charge. The tribesmen fled.The small KAR force had been lucky, though heavily out numbered the Aulihan rifle fire hadbeen wild and high. It was another example that casualties can be avoided when troops liedown and fire from the forward prone position. The second party under Captain Osbornarrived a few hours later unmolested.Scouts later reported that water was to be found at Fafadun, west of Hagagabli. Anticipatingthat the Aulihan would want to take advantage of this, it was decided to leave CaptainOsborn with C and E companies at Hagagabli, while Captain Martin with the rest of theforce went to intercept the recalcitrant tribesmen. Two Lewis guns mounted on mules andfive days rations were taken. After a forced march of 11 hours, two Aulihan prisoners weretaken. They were persuaded to guide the Captain Martins force to the village of Sheik HajjiAbdurhaman Mursal, the Aulihan leader. The village was approached unobserved, but firediscipline was not maintained by the Marehan Levies and before the village could beeffectively surrounded, the enemy fled and there leader escaped into the bush. AllAbderhaman’s personal property including his flag, documents and ammunition was leftbehind in the panic. Also, many of Lieutenant Elliott’s personal effects were recoveredincluding his field glasses, thermos flask and some clothing. The village was burnt, 3000goats killed, (as it was impossible to herd them) and 1233 camels were taken away.Anticipating that the enemy would not expect the troops to return to Hafanli, Captain Martinwith his Somalis did exactly that. The Aulihan were caught unprepared in the process ofwatering the herds. A short action followed which culminated with the KAR charging theenemy with fixed bayonets. A further 600 camels were taken. Lieutenant EM Ritchie wasthen sent with 50 Mounted Infantry and the captured stock on to Sereneli. Captain Martin,Lieutenants Erskine and Henry with the remaining 47 KAR and two Lewis guns continuedto track the main enemy force. Further small actions followed over the next few weeks,which resulted in the capture of more camels and various minor chiefs. Colonel Barrett’sorders to punish the Aulihan very severely and to take Abdurhaman Mursal prisoner beforeaccepting any surrender were strictly followed.At this stage in the campaign, the weather became a factor, the heavy rains were expected inMarch: once these started finding the Auhilan would become much more difficult (due to thewider availability of water for the cattle). It was thought that their escape would be madenorthwards. The Italian Resident, at Margarita sent word that Abdurhaman Mursal hadcrossed the Juba River with a small group of followers proceeding towards Lugh.Meanwhile Lieutenant Erskine after arresting a further 16 chiefs had also captured 3000camels and returned to Sagugli with his patrol. Some Auhilan were however still hiding inthe bush. It was thought that others who were supposed to have surrendered were supplyingthem with water and ammunition. A patrol lead by Captain Martin and Lieutenant Ritchiewith 40 men attacked the Rer Afgab (3 hours from Salugli) on the night of 24th/25th January.During this action, twenty villages were burnt, water holes destroyed and some 1400 camelscaptured.The final statistics for the campaign were: Auhilan dead counted on the field 92 (although thetribe estimated a figure of well over 300); largebore rifles taken 402; Government riflesrecaptured (from Lieutenant Elliott’s disaster) 32; ammunition taken 16, 000 rounds; Maximgun recaptured in good condition (Lieut. Elliott’s). In addition, over 5000 camels were takento Sereneli (this is excluding those claimed by the Government fine). Captain Martin hadachieved this result with only five British Officers and 96 Somali troops (G and the MICompany) supported by just over 100 Swahali troops and the rather useless Marehan Levies.The latter had continuously proven their unreliablability under fire.

At 7 p.m., while the askaris, or African soldiers, were settling down to evening meals, the Aulihan burst upon the British post. The Somalis set the surprised soldiers' huts on fire, and killed many of them as they fled the flames. By one account, 'Abdurrahman Mursaal himself is said to have shot Elliot beneath the ear with a revolver, and by another, to have donned Elliot's sun helmet after the raid. Dozens of Elliot's men were killed in the attack, while the survivors escaped across the Juba River to the nearby Italian post at Baardheere.The Somalis captured the company's maxim gun along with large quantities of arms and ammunition. 24 For the next 18 months, 'Abdurrahman Mursaal's northern Aulihan, strengthened by the acquisition of British weapons, held free reign over much of Jubaland and threatened British rule in the NFD as well. Indeed, a British officer with service in the region would later describe the Ogaden, of whom the Aulihan were a part, as "one of the most formidable fighting tribes in Africa" because of their mobility with their ponies, remarkable endurance, and the skill with which they wielded their spears.

Who remembers the countless Askaris that died for the British, where's there due respect.To the British they were merely Askari's guns for hire, whereas in hindsight they extend respect and admiration for the resistance given by Sheekh Abdirahman Mursal and his men.