The Anti-Terrorism Coalition:Don't Pay an Excessive Price

by Charles V. Peña

Charles V. Peña is a senior defense policy analyst at the Cato Institute.

Executive Summary

To prosecute the war on terrorism,
President Bush has assembled a diverse
coalition of countries for political, diplomatic,
and military support. Some of those
countries are long-standing friends and
allies of the United States. Others have new
or changing relationships with the United
States. Although there may be a price for
their support, America should not pay an
excessive price—one that could be detrimental
to longer-term U.S. national security
interests. And though it may be necessary
to provide a certain amount of immediate
aid (directly or indirectly) as a quid pro quo
for the support of other nations in our war
on terrorism, the United States needs to
avoid longer-term entanglements, open-ended commitments, and the potential for
an extreme anti-American backlash.

If the United States has the same kind of
tunnel vision about terrorism that it had
about the fight against communism during
the Cold War, it could be blindsided by disastrous
unintended consequences. In its zeal to
go after the terrorists responsible for the
attacks on the World Trade Center and the
Pentagon, the U.S. government must understand
that alliances of convenience (especially
with countries of which it was legitimately
critical before September 11) may be necessary,
but they come with the potential for
great risk. Ultimately—and paradoxically—the
United States could end up doing more to
breed terrorism than to prevent it.