Степанян Դավիթ Stepanyan Ստեփանյան David Давид

Vladimir Yevseyev: Weakening of Saudi Arabia and Iran to make it easier for U.S. to manage Near East and Middle East

The conflict between Russia and
Turkey has once again proved the strategic relations of Moscow and Yerevan and
cast doubt on the alliance with Baku. What conclusion will Moscow draw from the
situation? How all this will affect the future of these relations?

Moscow has never considered its relations with Baku as
allied ties. The matter has always concerned strategic partnership.

The ties have either been strengthening or
deteriorating to the level of partner relations. In particular, the closure of
the Gabala radar station and the large-scale supply of Israeli military
hardware to Azerbaijan have not only resulted in deterioration of the relations
but have also made Moscow consider creation of an alternative organization for
the Azerbaijani community in Russia.

Meantime, the Russia-Armenia relations, in turn, have
always been considered as allied relations.
The creation of a joint air defense system and protection of state
borders is direct evidence of that. Russia has not got even a military facility
in Azerbaijan, whereas in Gyumri it has a full-fledged military base, whose
potential is constantly growing. Amid
the serious deterioration of the Russian-Turkish relations, I anticipate a
Moscow-Yerevan rapprochement, first of all, in the military and political
field.

Eight more logistic support helicopters have been
deployed at the Russian military base in Armenia. Russia considers supplying Iskander
short-range ballistic missile systems and up-to-date air defense systems to Armenia,
for instance, S-300 PMU-2.

Certainly, Moscow will not excessively aggravate the
relations with Baku. But even its aspiration to partially replace the
Azerbaijani natural gas in Georgia demonstrates that Russia's patience is not
unlimited, especially given the artificial escalation by Azerbaijan in the
Karabakh conflict zone.

2015 was a year of stalemate in the
Karabakh peace process. In addition, the sides suffered new human losses. Will
the current heavy social and economic situation in Armenia and, first of all,
in Azerbaijan, lead to any breakthrough in the peace process in 2016 or
everything depends on geopolitical factors?

The year 2015 was rather troublesome for the Karabakh
conflict settlement. In the conflict zone, Azerbaijan used not only cannon
artillery, but also Turkish-made 107mm multiple launch rocket systems, which
killed three women from the near-border Armenian villages. Moreover, the
Azerbaijani armed forces have used battle tanks for the first time since the
truce in 1994. All this demonstrates that the situation in the Karabakh
conflict zone is increasingly deteriorating. It is possible to stop that
process by means of certain measures only. In particular, it is necessary to
change the OSCE mission format in the armed conflict zone. The mission should
work full time and have technical control devices, for instance, drones, which
would provide high-resolution images.
Secondly, it is necessary to create an international mechanism to
investigate the military incidents in the conflict zone. Thirdly, both heavy
and light weapons should be withdrawn from the frontline. Otherwise, we may experience a local armed
conflict in Karabakh in the short-term outlook.

Last December, China with the support of
Georgia, Azerbaijan, Turkey, Kazakhstan, and EU launched the project of cargo
shipments from Asia to Europe passing by Russia as part of the Silk Road
infrastructure project. This demonstrated that the Silk Road project and the
Russian-led Eurasian integration could hardly become complementary despite the
assurances of Moscow and Beijing. The Silk Road extends via the territory of
the post-Soviet space, which Moscow still considers as a zone of its vital
interests. What are the prospects of these two projects?

China is launching a global project "One Belt -
One Road" and the Silk Road Economic Belt is part of the project in the
territory of Central Asia. Creation of various transport corridors under this
project is not the major goal of the Chinese economy. China's shrinking export
makes its focus on transfer of its industrial productions, mainly the hazardous
ones, to the territory of other countries. This process was launched in
Kazakhstan. Then goes Kyrgyzstan. The
second important task of China is to make long-term - for at least 20-years - investments. Well, the pilot shipment of Chinese
containers via the Caspian Sea to Azerbaijan and further to Georgia and Turkey
will not impede the Eurasian integration, as the volume of these shipments is
not large. Another matter how the Russian and Chinese integration projects will
be linked in practice. I think there will be certain barriers that will not be
formidable, however.

There is an impression that failing
to press Iran in the issue of its nuclear program and actually abandoning the
policy towards its isolation, the West, and U.S. particularly, decided to
isolate the Islamic Republic from the East through Saudi Arabia and other Sunni
partner-states. What do you think of such assumptions? Maybe things are no that
simple?

I suppose Saudi Arabia undertook deliberate
provocation against Iran. The goal is to try to isolate Tehran even in case of
mitigation of anti-Iranian financial and economic sanctions. It is suspicious
that this is necessary for the Obama Administration, for which the myth about
the settlement of the Iranian nuclear crisis is one of the few foreign
political achievements. Not everyone in the U.S. society supports Obama in
mitigation of the anti-Iranian sanctions. In particular, the U.S. Congress has
prepared several bills envisaging introduction of new sanctions against Iran
for violations in the missile program, terrorism or human rights violations.
The incumbent U.S. Administration will be delaying this process, but it has no
serious political capital. President Barack Obama is thinking about how to
leave a mark in history. Under such circumstances, it is getting obvious that
the real process of mitigation of the anti-Iranian sanctions related to the
nuclear program will be delayed and will not be stable while the incumbent
Administration is in the office. On the other hand, the United States is
interested in mutual weakening of Saudi Arabia and Iran as two regional
leaders, because in that case it will be easier for the U.S. to manage the Near
and Middle East.

It's another matter that there are also extra-regional
leaders: China, Russia, India, which
have their own interests there. Turkey
is also trying to conduct its own policy in the region.

Ankara hurried to
blame the “Islamic State” terrorist group for the latest terror attack in
Istanbul. Does Erdogan try to avoid further blames for supporting terrorists in
Syria or Turkey is a temporary partner of ISIL leadership who seeks to
overthrow Erdogan’s government?

There are many reasons
to slam the National Intelligence Organization of Turkey (MIT - Millî
İstihbarat Teşkilatı) for close cooperation with the “Islamic State.” In particular, its
establishment in June 2014 was mostly connected with the cooperation of the
security services of Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Qatar, which helped radical
Islamists seize Mosul in Iraq. Radicals captured the Turkish consulate
representatives and set them free very promptly and without a reward. Now, Turkey’s leadership tries to blame the
“Islamic State” for any terror attack to show that the Islamists are allegedly
taking revenge on Turkey for joining anti-terrorist coalition. In fact, Ankara
has helped and will further help radical Islamists, as it is using them for its
own national interests in Syria and Iraq. What will Ankara do with the radical
Islamists when the national army of Syria gradually ousts them to the territory
of Turkey? The only way out of such situation is to send them to Europe as
refugees. Yet, even this will not help
Turkey avoid terror attacks inside its territory.

The
December visit of Secretary of State John Kerry to Russia and his meetings with
Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov and President Vladimir Putin gave experts a
reason for moderate optimism and hope for a second "reset" in the
strain Russian-American relations. What do you think of the future of the two
countries relations?

The Russian-American relations are too uncertain at
present. It is noteworthy that Washington has understood that it needs to agree
with Russia over Syria, but the incumbent administration no longer can adopt
any serious decision for a second 'reset.' The confrontation, including over
Ukraine, may decrease certainly. This became evident, for instance, after the
recent meeting of the president's aide Vladislav Surkov and U.S. Assistant
Secretary Victoria Nuland in Kaliningrad region. In this light, the anti-Russia
sanctions over both Crimea and the east of Ukraine will not be rescinded within
2016. Yet, the anti-Russian rhetoric of
the West will reduce for a while. In
addition, Washington will try to deal with Moscow in the issues related to
Syria.