By Tai Wei Lim

Korean Peninsula Peace: What Is the Roadmap Ahead?

The Trump-Kim summit in Hanoi ended up in a breakdown
of talks. Many factors were cited for its abrupt end. US President Donald J.
Trump gave a press conference and said that Pyongyang wanted the US to give up
all sanctions in exchange for the dismantling of the Yongbyon site. At that
point, he said he had to walk away because the US wanted North Korea to take
out additional uranium enrichment site/s that they had spotted through their
intelligence. However, the abrupt ending of the summit was apparently amicable,
according to the Trump administration as it left open a path for further talks.

The North Korea side had a different take. They denied
asking for all sanctions to be lifted and instead articulated the lifting of 5
out of 11 sanctions in return for their dismantlement of the Yongbyon
facilities. Before the breakdown, North Korea leader Kim Jong-un himself told
the press that he was there with some confidence of signing a deal. Many had
expected some form of peace deal to be inked at the end of the second Trump-Kim
summit, but were disappointed when both leaders left without having lunch,
sparking off worries that the breakdown was less than amicable.

The breakdown of the talks left South Korea President
Moon Jae-In vulnerable to critics, especially those from the conservative and
right leaning spectrums. Many saw him as the real victim/loser/detriment
receiver of the breakdown, given that he had staked his political career on a
successful outcome. He was pushing hard for the summit after the first one in
Singapore. He worked hard with Kim’s sister to bring about the second summit.

Some media reports also mentioned that Moon had even
prepared a speech to talk about inter-Korean ties in the aftermath of a
successful second Trump-Kim summit scenario. The mood leading up the Trump-Kim
talk was in fact very positive and Kim himself reiterated that he would not be
there if there was no intention to denuclearize, something confirming his New
Year address which also mentioned the desire to denuclearize.

Commentators, experts and journalists appeared to
indicate that the Chinese and the Japanese leaderships were relieved with the
outcome, as they were worried about a declaration of peace and/or other deals
hastily put together that may dent their national interests. Possible reasons
for the Chinese to feel relief included a nagging fear of seeing US troops near
their border and also loss of a North Korean buffer zone vis-à-vis a US
alliance network. For the Japanese, there were alleged fears of a hasty deal
that kept short and medium range ballistic missiles with possible
chemical/biological/nuclear warheads intact simultaneous with a withdrawal or
reduction of US troops in South Korea/Japan. This was of course speculation on
the part of the event watchers.

Overall, both countries did profess their full support
for peace on the Korean Peninsula and both countries were constantly briefed by
the South Korean Moon administration about the progress of the talks. In
addition, Washington D.C., Tokyo and Seoul constantly shared intelligence on
the latest developments in the Trump-Kim talks while Beijing no doubt had
constant updates from Pyongyang about the progress.

In other words, there is very little leeway for
surprises. Beijing lent its maximum support by apparently lending the Chinese
Premier’s plane for the first Trump-Kim summit while allowing Kim to travel
through 4000 km of Chinese territory from Dandong to Dong Dang to reach the
second Trump-Kim summit in Hanoi. Many observers were however surprised when
Kim made no stopovers in Beijing on the way back to Pyongyang.

Trump won accolades in his domestic political arena
for walking away. Democrats were relieved there were no hasty deals that
diminished US national interests. Conservatives, Republicans, right leaning
political elites were relieved that Trump proved to the American public that he
was not prepared to give up American interests lightly and won praise or/and
relief in a bipartisan manner. Trump won this rare appraisal from the liberals,
moderates, left and progressives in the midst of the ongoing trail of Michael
Cohen which was telecast “live” almost at the same time as the lead-up to the
Trump-Kim summit. Trump even suggested later that the Cohen proceedings may
have been a factor in the collapse of the Trump-Kim talks.

In the coming months,
there will probably be low-key behind-the-doors talks between official at
different levels in response to the no-deal outcome of the second Trump-Kim
summit in Hanoi.

The way forward has been made more complicated. On the
one hand, both leaders had kept the door open for further talks. Shortly after
Kim’s return to Pyongyang after the Trump-Kim summit, reports came out
regarding “manmade” explosions in North Korea, centered around Sohae. It caused
a magnitude 2.0 to 2.5 earthquake that was detected outside North Korea. This
triggered Trump to say that he would be “very, very disappointed” if it were
true. This was perhaps an early sign that the second Trump-Kim summit had given
rise to specific challenges. It would have been an unintended outcome of the
no-deal scenario because, in the aftermath of the summit, all stakeholders
tried their best to salvage the situation.

Trump stressed how amicable it was that they had
parted ways, opening the doors for further talks, although his detractors noted
how the lunch after the no-deal outcome was skipped as Trump headed home. This
was a negative point for many journalists and observers present at the summit site.
Kim also noted how the door was opened for further talks. He and his
administration further emphasized that they had asked for partial, not full,
lifting of sanctions. But one telling sign was perhaps when representative of
his administration mentioned to the effect that Kim “lost his will” for
sustained talks.

Combined this “loss of will” narrative with the “alternative
path” narrative, Kim is perhaps keeping his cards under his sleeves, in case he
needs to turn to an alternative major power for survival. Nevertheless, Moon’s
administration is continuing to work hard and has suggested novel formats like
a trilateral summit where South Korea may potentially and possibly play a more
intermediary role between Pyongyang and Washington D.C./Trump administration.
Moon may be conserving his resources to deal with any domestic responses from
the conservatives and other critics of his policy towards Pyongyang. It is
still premature to assume that his approach is dead in its tracks. Instead, it
has hit a plateau which can either be overcome or pose a permanent obstacle.

In the coming months, there will probably be low-key
behind-the-doors talks between official at different levels in response to the
no-deal outcome of the second Trump-Kim summit in Hanoi. One advantage of the
second Trump-Kim summit is that both sides are now more aware of each other’s
bottom-lines. The US has clarified its Complete Verifiable Irreversible
Denuclearization (CVID) position into the initial scenario of Pyongyang
dismantling Yongbyon as well as one or two other non-declared uranium
enrichment sites. Trump decided to share US intelligence on these sites as well
as their information on the Otto Warmbier case with Kim, who appeared surprised
and claimed he did not know about these cases.

Such frank sharing between the two top leaders appear
to lay the foundation for future talks, since the points of discussion are now
itemized. Such sharing can be a turning point for Washington-Pyongyang
relations since they have now frankly communicated at the topmost levels. Aside
from this gain, the Trump-Kim summit also has collateral benefits and spinoffs.
Trump managed to sign a USD 21 billion deal with Vietnam, among which Boeing
will supply planes to the country’s various airlines. Trump also sealed solid
Washington-Hanoi relations that were spearheaded by former President Barrack
Obama, repairing post-Vietnam War relations while facing common geopolitical
challenges.

Kim gained a major propaganda coup with domestic
audiences seeing him standing side by side with the leader of the most powerful
country on earth. He managed to replicate the 4000 km journey through China
that his grandfather made and enjoyed regal treatment from the Vietnamese. Kim also
observed the Doi Moi reforms that made Vietnam a fast-growing economy in East
Asia. Kim went back to Pyongyang a status-enhanced leader. Similarly, Trump
went back to the US vindicated, proving his critics wrong that he was out for a
quick deal.