28.(MEDIEVAL INDIA)CLIMAX AND CRISIS OF THE MUGHAL EMPIRE

The rise of Marathas, like that of the Rajputs, was a medieval (8th century onwards) phenomenon. Both

had mixed origins which have been discussed at length. It is clear that there was a definite process of

both Brahmanization and Kshtriasation in medieval India. Thus, those enrolled in service, particularly

military service, and in receipt of grants of land tended to become a separate group, marrying within

itself, following a certain code of conduct (such as giving up widow remarriage, certain foods, etc.) an d

claiming a higher status. However, unlike the Rajputs, the Marathas had not been able to set up well –

established independent states of their own. They were, hence, seen as powerful local chiefs and

potential allies with a following of loose auxiliaries termed bargirs, rather than autonomous rulers.

From the time of the Bahmani kingdom, as also under its successor states, Maratha chiefs or sardars

were employed in the service of the state, and many of them, such as the Mores, the Ghatges, the

Nimalkars etc. exercised local authority in many areas. The position of the Maratha chiefs improved

further as first Malik Ambar, and then the Mughals competed for their support.

The rise of the Marathas during the 17th century, and the establishment of an independent Maratha

state is closely associated with the family of Shivaji. Shivaji’s ancestor, Babaji, was the patel (headman)

of villages Hingani Beradi and Devalgaon in the Poona district. His sons, Maloji and Vithoji, settled in the

Daultabad district and served as petty horsemen under the Jadhavs of Sindkhed. However, another

branch of the family, the Ghorpades, were well established in the kingdom of Bijapur. Subsequently,

Maloji rose in the service of Malik Ambar. An important step in

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the rise of the family was the grant by Malik Ambar of the parganas of Sholapur and Poona to Shahji,

son of Maloji, in 1622. These parganas were held at that time by Murari Pandit on behalf of Bijapur, and

Shahji earned his spurs by ousting Murari Jagdev from the area. In 1630, when Lukhaji Jadhav, father-inlaw of Shahji, was treacherously murdered at the Ahmadnagar court, Shahji defected to the side of the

Mughals, and was given the mansab of 5000 zat, 5000 sawar, and Poona as jagir by Shah Jahan. His

brother Minaji and elder son, Sambhaji, were also given mansabs. However, Shahji’s alliance with the

Mughals was short lived and he defected to Bijapur in 1632 when Fath Khan, the son of Malik Ambar,

agreed to surrender Daultabad, joined the Mughal service, and was awarded Poona in jagir.

Following the agreement with Fath Khan, the Nizam Shah was sent to prison at Gwaliyar. Shahji, with

the backing of Bijapur, now emerged as the champion of the Nizam Shahi dynasty. Following the

example of Malik Ambar, Shahji found a Nizam Shahi prince, and raised him up as a ruler at Shahgarh.

The Adil Shah sent a force of 7 – 8000 horsemen to aid Shahji. He also induced many Nizam Shahi nobles

who had assumed independent charge of their forts and territories following the end of the Nizam Shahi

rule to join Shahji. Many disbanded Nizam Shahi soldiers also joined Shahji whose forces swelled to

20,000 horse. With these he harassed the Mughals and took control of a large portion of the

Ahmadnagar state. We are told that out of a yield of 84 lakh huns, at this time Shahji held territory

asserts that Aurangzeb was prepared to grant chauth to Shahu. However, he does not cite any source in

support. G.T. Kulkarni has been followed by J F. Richards in his The Mughal Empire (The New Cambridge

History of India, (O.V.9. 1993).

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in which all the various internal problems of the empire were coming to a head.

Assessment of Aurangzeb and the Jagirdari Crisis

There has been a great deal of debate about the responsibility of Aurangzeb in the downfall of the

Mughal empire which virtually collapsed and began to disintegrate in less than two decades after his

death. According to some, Aurangzeb strove manfully to stem the forces of disintegration represented

by the Hindus, and tried to rally the Muslims for the defence of the empire, but was stymied by the

combine of the Hindus and the shias i.e. the Marathas and the Deccani kingdoms. On the other hand, Sir

Jadunath Sarkar compares Aurangzeb to the boa constrictor, who kept on swolling everything so that

the empire “collapsed under its own weight.”

There can be little doubt that Aurangzeb’s policy of puritanism, of attempting to force Muslims to

strictly abide by the life style prescribed by the sharia, his discriminatory policies against the nonMuslims, and his attempt to make the ulama a pillar of support (by giving them large concessions) was

bound to fail. India was too large and varied a country to abide by a narrow, religiously prescribed code

which went against long-established conventions and practices. Thus, many of the social reform

measures of Aurangzeb, such as banning of wine and intoxicants, and cultivation of bhang were

honoured more in the breach. Thus, even Qazi Abdul Wahab, a favourite of Aurangzeb, drank in private.

Nor were the nobles and princes willing to follow the grim, dutiful ascetical life-style favoured by

Aurangzeb. Thus, Asad Khan, his wazir and the most highly paid official in the empire, maintained such a

high life style that according to the Maasir-ul-Umara, a highly reliable biographical account of the nobles

written during the 18th Century, says that “the expenses of his haram and for the purveyors of music

and song were so great that his revenues did not meet them.”

Unlike some of his predecessors, such as Babur, Akbar, Jahangir, etc., Aurangzeb did not believe in

holding convivial parties in which wine and music flowed and to which the nobles were invited, or of

holding discussions with them. In consequence,

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Aurangzeb remained an austere, aloof and remote figure. This may have suited the life style of a saint,

but did not suit one who had to make political decisions for which both consultations and a sense of

participation was necessary. Thus, at the height of the Marwar crisis, even the Imperial Bakhshi, Khan-iJahan, had to force his way into the ghusal-khana or private audience hall to give his opinion, and was

punished for his audacity. Likewise, even Prince Shah Alam, then his father’s favourite, could not give to

Aurangzeb his views regarding Bijapur and Golconda, and was imprisoned for daring to differ from him.

Aurangzeb’s attempt to utilise the ulama and through them to rally the Muslims in support behind him

was even less successful. The ulama proved to be corrupt and grasping, as was shown in the case of

many qazis who were appointed amils of jizyah. Even the respected Qazi Abdul Wahab at his death left

behind a sum of two lakhs of ashrafis and five lakhs of rupees in cash apart from an immense quantity of

other valuables.

According to Khafi Khan, Aurangzeb had established the qazis so firmly in the affairs of state, with

reference to the general principles as well as details of the administration, that “the leading and

responsible officers of the empire began to look upon them with envy and jealousy.” Thus, Qazi Abdul

Wahab Gujrati, the Qazi-ul-Quzzat, had become so strong and powerful that all the well known amirs

were afraid of him. It was in this context that in the seventies, when Aurangzeb wanted to send

Mahabat Khan with a force to uproot Shivaji, Mahabat Khan retorted that there was no need for an

army being sent against Shiva as a fatwa (decree) of the Qazi would suffice! Later on, in a letter written

to Aurangzeb in 1676, Mahabat Khan expressed shock that “experienced and able officers of the state

are deprived of all trust and confidence while full reliance is placed on the hypocritical mystics and

empty-headed ulama” Mahabat Khan went to say “Since these men are selling knowledge and manners

for the company of kings, to rely upon them was neither in accordance with the sharia, nor suited to the

ways of the world.”

Oddly enough, while departing from Akbar’s policy of sulh-i-kul, Aurangzeb, like Akbar, wanted to

combine worldly power with spiritual powers. Thus, to counter the Satnamis who were supposed to be

endowed with magical powers so that no arms prevailed against them, Aurangzeb ordered prayer

formulae and

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symbols written by his own hand to be sewn on the imperial banners and standards in facing them.

Again, in 1695-96, when the river Bhima suddenly rose in flood, and caused great destruction in the

royal camp, Aurangzeb wrote prayers on papers, and ordered them to be thrown into the water.

Bhimsen says: “Immediately the water began to subside. The prayer of the God-devoted Emperor was

accepted by God, and the world became composed again.” No wonder, Shaikh Kalimullah, the well

known sufi saint of Delhi, accused Aurangzeb of hypocrisy and presumptiousness in trying to combine

sultanat or worldly rule with faqiri or sainthood.

Like Akbar and the other rulers of the time, Aurangzeb claimed the right to supersede ruling of the

sharia by secular decrees, called zawabit, and also to choose between rulings of different schools of

sharia. Thus, during the siege of Satara, out of a group which made a sortie from the fort, four Muslims

and nine non-Muslims soldiers were captured. The Qazi of the camp proposed that if the Hindus

accepted Islam they should be released and the Muslim kept in prison for three years. Aurangzeb turned

down the proposal and wrote on the petition that the Qazi should take recourse to some other school of

law than the Hanafi school “so that control over the kingdom was not lost”. This was done and the Qazi

recommended that “the Hindu and Muslims prisoners of war should be executed as a deterrent.” This

was acted upon.

While upholding the sharia, Aurangzeb was not prepared to repudiate his Timurid legacy. Thus, in his

letters to his sons written towards the end of his reign, he refers approvingly to some of the actions of

Akbar and Shah Jahan, and, almost echoing Abul Fazl, says… “You should consider the protection of the

subjects as the source of happiness in this world and the next.” No special emphasis is placed in these

letters of advice on defending the faith and punishing the irreligious and waging war on the infidel, but

uphold the discharge of “truly necessary worldly tasks” as being truly religious tasks.

Thus, Aurangzeb’s character was a complex one, with his orthodox bent of mind and his emphasis on

sharia competing with or being in conflict with his equally strong emphasis on the tasks of rulership in a

multi-religious country.

Aurangzeb has been called an indefatigable and stern administrator who neither spared himself nor

those close to him. Nevertheless, Aurangzeb’s very industriousness reflected, like

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Philippe II in Europe, the mind of a clerk or a junior functionary rather than that a politician with insight

and an understanding of larger forces. Thus, his handling of the Marwar-Mewar issue was clumsy and

inapt, and brought no advantage to him or to the government. He failed to understand the nature of the

Maratha movement, or to befriend Shivaji or his successors although there were a number of

opportunities for doing so. His hope of utilizing the Muslim kingdoms of the Deccan against the “infidel”

Marathas was a will-o-the wisp. When, finally, he was disillusioned, he decided upon the outright

annexation of the two Deccani kingdoms, against the advice and wishes of many of his nobles and prince

Shah Alam. The unending war in the Deccan brought to the surface all the inherent weaknesses of the

Mughal administrative system. The chief of these was the jagirdari system on whose successful working

depended the nobility, the army and the administration.

Jagirdari Crisis

The crisis of the jagirdari system had both an administrative and a social basis. The success of the

jagirdari system depended on the ability of the holder of the jagir getting sufficient resources for living in

the style he was accustomed to or expected, and maintaining a sufficient quota of troops for the service

of the state. The jagirdari system implied giving the jagirdars or nobles a vested interest in collecting

land-revenue from the zamindars in the tract of land assigned to them as jagir. Thus, the co-relation

between the jama (assessed income) and the hasil (income) depended not only upon the realistic nature

of revenue assignment and its income but also on the ability of the jagirdar with the help of the faujdar,

to overawe and compel the zamindars who were armed, and often associated closely with the ownercultivators on a caste and kinship basis, to pay the assessed land-revenue.

Thus, the jagir system was based on the specific social system prevailing in the country. Due to a variety

of factors, the Mughals were, by and large, able to “persuade” the zamindars of north India, except

those living in remote and inaccessible areas, to cooperate in paying the assessed land-revenue. In fact,

more and more of them were converted from peshkash paying zamindars to kharaj (land-revenue)

collecting agents, receiving, in turn a definite share in the proceeds as nankar. Even then, due to the

rapid expansion of the number of mansabdars, there was an apparent

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mismatch between the available resources, and the demands of salaries by the mansabdars and their

contingents. This was met by reducing salaries and the number of troops and horses a mansabdar was

required to maintain. This also implied that a mansabdar became even more dependent on the support

of the local faujdar for over-awing the local zamindar when necessary.

The attempt to import this system into the Deccan where conditions were vastly different, and where

there was an endemic warfare which local zamindars were fully prepared to utilize for their own

purposes, was the real basis of the crisis of the jagirdari system. As Bhimsen, who was posted in the

Deccan, says:

“The provinces given to the mansabdars in tankhwah (salary) cannot be governed because of the

smallness of their force (jamiat). The zamindars, too, have assumed strength, joined the Marathas,

enlisted armies (jamiat) and laid the hands of oppression on the country.” He concludes, “When such is

the condition of zamindars it has become difficult for a dam or dirham to reach the jagirdars”.

Regarding the lack of military force at the disposal of the jagirdars and faujdars, 3himsen says that

during the last years of Aurangzeb’s reign, except Ram Singh Hada, Dalpat Bundela and Jai Singh

Kachhwaha(grandson of Mirza Raja Jai Singh), who had their watans, no mansabdar maintained more

than 1000 sawars. Bhimsen goes on to say: “The lawless men of every district, disregarding the petty

faujdars, have acquired strength. The faujdars, despiring of being able to bear the trouble and cost of

campaigning, consider it a gain to sit at one place, and to enter into an agreement with the enemy i.e.

the Marathas.” The Amber wakil wrote back home that even mansabdars of 7000 maintained

contingents of only 700, and that due to the ineffectiveness of the faujdars, royal princes and their sons

were roaming the country side like faujdars.

The working of the administrative system worsened the situation. The most paying (sair hasil) jagirs

were reserved for the khalisa to meet the cost of the war. In consequence, the jagirdars were given

jagirs in the areas called zor-talab, i.e. where it was difficult to realize land-revenue on account of the

entrenched power of the zamindars and the land-owning community. This was generally in the areas

outside the old Golconda and Bijapuri kingdoms. When the jagirdars were unable to produce for dagh

the requisite number of sawars and horses of the requisite quality,

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their jagirs were confiscated, and included in the pai-baqi (land meant for assignment).

The struggle for sair-hasil jagirs thus became a matter of life and death for mansabdars, and allowed the

royal mutasaddis (lower officials) the opportunity of indulging in all kinds of corrupt practices, including

frequent transfers of which Bhimsen complains bitterly. In this situation, the smaller mansabdars were

the worst hit.

The growing disfunctionality of the jagirdari system was aggravated by the problem of be-jagiri or lack of

sufficient jagirs for assignment. Khafi Khan, says that on account of the inadequacy of pai baqi, or lands

meant for assignment in jagirs, and the appointment of innumerable mansabdars especially large

numbers of Deccanis and Marathas, sons of old nobles or khanazads were not able to get jagirs for four

or five years. This was in the year 1691-92. The situation seems to have worsened because, anxious not

to allow the number of mansabdars to exceed the resources after the conquest of Bijapur and Golconda,

Aurangzeb put a virtual ban on the recruitment of new nobles. He repeatedly declared that he did not

need any new servants, and desired that no papers (misls) for new entrants be put up to him. For some

time the Imperial Bakhshi, Ruhullah Khan, under the pressure of nobles, continued to put fresh cases

before the Emperor, on the plea that the Empire consisted of seven Sultanats (presumably the five

Deccani Sultanats and Malwa and Gujarat), i.e. it was vast, and the Emperor alone could say yes or no to

the large number of needy khanazads. After the death of Ruhullah Khan (1692), Aurangzeb angrily

turned down all the requests of the new Bakhshi, Mukhlis Khan. Khafi Khan says that this led to great

lamentation in the camp among those who had waited for an appointment for years. Thus, imperial

signature i.e. grant of a jagir became like one pomegranate among a hundred sick!

It is hardly necessary to bring together more information on the subject. The question of frequent

transfers, especially of smaller mansabdars, asking a lump sum of payment (qabz) before the jagir was

handed over to the agent of the new jagirdar, demanding money for the up keep of the royal animals

even before possession of the jagirs etc. were abuses in the working of the system. Failure to meet the

expectations of the khanazads, i.e. those who had served the Empire for generations, and whose loyalty

and support were important for the Empire, was something completely

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different. It undermined the loyalty of the old nobles, and as the system deteriorated, made them look

to opportunities for carving out their own spheres of domination. Both Asad Khan the wazir, and hi s son,

Zulfiqar Ali Khan, and the leading noble, Ghaziuddin Firuz Jung were suspected of harbouring such

ambitions. It has been argued that there was no jagirdari crisis because after the annexation of the two

Decanni kingdoms, the jama of the empire rose by 23 per cent or Rs. 5.3 crores annually, whereas the

numbers of mansabdars was kept within that limit. It has also been argued that there was no shortage

of pai baqi, according to a Mughal revenue document of 1689. However, two aspects need to be kept in

mind. The jama in the Deccan had been grossly inflated from the time of Akbar. Hence, what the nobles

received for meeting their claims (talab) was a fraction of the real income (hasil), leading to an acute

struggle for more paying sair hasil jagirs. Also, later documents suggest that large areas were kept in pai

baqi on extraneous grounds, but in reality to meet the spiralling cost of a war the end of which seemed

nowhere in sight, and for which most of the nobles had no heart.

There has been a great deal of misunderstanding regarding the precise extent of the growth of the

number of mansabdars under Aurangzeb. We are told by Lahori that during the twentieth year of Shah

Jahan’s reign, there were 8000 mansabdars and 7000 ahadis and mounted artillery men. A document

under Aurangzeb which, it seems, was prepared before the annexation of Bijapur and Golconda, gives a

figure of 14,449 of whom 7,457 received cash salaries and 6992 were jagirdars. These figures show that

there was no addition to the number of jagirdars during this period.

Unlike Shah Jahan, there is no official history of Aurangzeb after the tenth year, so that it is difficult to

know the precise number of mansabdars. However, on the basis of a careful study, Athar Ali has shown

that the total number of mansabdars holding zat ranks of 1000 zat and above increased as follows:

Shah Jahan Aurangzeb

1628-58 1658-78 1679-1707

437 486 575

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Thus, there was only 31 per cent increase during the entire reign of Aurangzeb. Athar Ali points out that:

“… the increase in the number of ranks was not anywhere near the scale witnessed between 1595 and

1656-57, an increase of 4.2 times (ranks of 500 zat and above), and totally out of proportion with the

actual increase of territory within that period”. He concludes: “One can only hold that Aurangzeb did his

best to hold back the pressures for higher mansabs with greater vigour than his predecessors were able

to do.” That Aurangzeb worked with reasonable efficiency the system of administration he had inherited

may be readily conceded. But he brought the system under tremendous pressure by his religious and

political policies. Also, he took no new initiatives to cope with the emerging administrative and military

problems.

We had hinted in the section dealing with the reigns of Jahangir and Shah Jahan, that with the

introduction of the rule of one-fourth and the month scale, the Mughal mansabdari system was no more

the efficient machine for fighting and collection of land-revenue it once was. As it was, development of

military technology elsewhere showed the need of a stronger, more efficient and mobile force of fieldgunners, and the growing importance of infantrymen armed with flint guns. These, in turn, necessitated

a larger standing army, paid for centrally. The need to capture and hold large numbers of Maratha forts

also needed larger infantry forces, whereas the forces led by the nobles remained predominantly cavalry

forces. The hardships faced by these forces, and the growing disgruntlement of the nobles is described

graphically by the contemporary, Bhimsen.

Thus, the jagirdari crisis was part of a growing social, administrative and military crisis compounded by

the long drawn-out and unprofitable war in the Deccan which was the result of Aurangzeb’s lack of

political flexibility, his arrogant and suspicious nature and his over-dependence on military force as the

arbiter of difficult political problems.

However, this should not lead us to the conclusion that there was a total breakdown of the system

under Aurangzeb. The Mughal empire was still a powerful and vigorous military and administrative

machinery. The Mughal army might fail against

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the elusive and highly mobile bands of Marathas in the mountainous region of the Deccan, especially in

the western part. Maratha forts might be difficult to capture and still more difficult to retain. But in the

plains of northern India and the vast plateau extending up to the Karnataka, the Mughal artillery and

cavalry were still master of the field. Thirty or forty years after Aurangzeb’s death, when the Mughal

artillery had declined considerably in strength and efficiency, the Marathas could still not face it in the

field of battle. Continuous anarchy, wars and the depredations of the Marathas may have depleted the

population of the Deccan and brought industry and agriculture in large areas to a virtual standstill. But in

northern India which was the heart of the empire and was of decisive economic and political importance

in the country, the Mughal administration still retained much of its vigour, and continued to collect a

large magnitude as land-revenue. Trade and industry not only continued to flourish but expanded. The

administration at the district level proved amazingly tenacious and a good deal of its survived and found

its way indirectly into the British administration.

Despite the military reverses and the mistakes of Aurangzeb, the Mughal dynasty still retained a

powerful hold on the mind and imagination of the people.

As far as the Rajputs are concerned, we have seen that the breach with Marwar was not due to an

attempt on Aurangzeb’s part to undermine the Hindus by depriving them of a recognised head, but to a

miscalculation on his part: he wanted to divide the Marwar state between the two principal claimants,

and in the process alienated both, as also the ruler of Mewar who considered Mughal interference in

such matters to be a dangerous precedent. The breach with Marwar and the long drawn-out war which

followed damaged the moral standing of the Mughal state. However, the fighting was not of much

consequence militarily after 1681. It may be doubted whether the presence of Rathor Rajputs in larger

numbers in the Deccan between 1681 and 1706 would have made much difference in the outcome of

the conflict with the Marathas. In any case, the demands of the Rajputs related to grant of high mansabs

as before and restoration of their home lands. These demands having been accepted within half a dozen

years of Aurangzeb’s death, the Rajputs ceased to be a

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problem for the Mughals. They played no active role in the subsequent disintegration of the empire, nor

were they of much help in arresting the process of its decline.

Aurangzeb’s religious policy should be seen in a wider context. Aurangzeb was orthodox in his outlook

and tried to remain within the framework of the Islamic law. But this law was developed outside India in

a vastly dissimilar situation, and could hardly be applied rigidly to India. His failure to respect the

susceptibilities of his non-Muslim subjects on many occasions; his willingness till the fall of Bijapur and

Golconda in 1687 to destroy many old standing Hindu temples while formally adhering to the sharai

position of respecting old temples belonging to the zimmis (protected people), and his re-imposition of

jizyah did not help him to rally the Muslims to his side or generate a greater sense of loyalty towards a

state based on Islamic law. On the other hand, it alienated segments of the Hindus and strengthened

the hands of those section which were opposed to the Mughal empire for political or other reasons.

However, undue emphasis should not be given to religion as the cause of the decline of the Mughal

empire. Jizyah was scrapped within half a dozen years of Aurangzeb’s death and restrictions on building

new temples eased. But these had no effect on the rapidly accelerating decline and disintegration of the

empire in the 18th century.

In the ultimate resort, the decline and downfall of the empire was due to economic, social as well as