UNITED NATIONS
DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME
Emergencies Unit for Ethiopia

REPORT ON MISSION TO HAUD AREA, REGION 5

02 - 15 NOVEMBER 1994, Matt Bryden

Executive Summary

From 02-15 November 1994, a mission from the UN Emergencies Unit for
Ethiopia (UN-EUE) visited the north-eastern sector of Region 5, approximately
the arid plateau known as the Haud, or former Somali "Reserved Area." The
purpose of the mission was to offer an overall evaluation of conditions
in the area, with special reference to security, food security, trade,
and administration. Unfortunately, the hijacking of the project vehicle
at an early point in the mission did not permit all objectives to be fulfilled.
The findings of the abbreviated trip are described below.

Security: Security, a direct function of political and social stability
among Somali clans, is generally good throughout the area. There is remarkably
little inter-clan tension in comparison with the situation across the border
where the same clans also inter-mingle. This is almost entirely due to
the power and influence of traditional clan leadership, since the presence
of official security forces (EPRDF, police) is minimal, and restricted
to a handful of locations. The absence of a government presence means that
events in Somalia may easily spill over onto Ethiopian soil, and that there
is relatively free movement across the border of people, vehicles and arms.

The area is free of the kinds of guerilla. Casual banditry (such as
the looting of the mission vehicle) poses the only danger to Haud travellers
for the moment.

Politics and Administration

Subsequent to its relocation from Gode to Jigjiga, the Region 5 Administration
is still absorbed by its own need for re-organisation and reform, and is
not yet prepared to discharge its all of its normal functions. Some key
posts in the administration remain unfilled, and although its plans have
been approved, the government will not be in a position to implement its
capital budget for the 1995 fiscal year for another month or two. With
only 7 months remaining, Bureaux will be under considerable pressure to
meet all of their committments under the accelerated timetable.

East of Gaashamo, where there is a small military garrison and a few
public buildings, there is virtually no sign of administration, and communities
rely upon traditional authority structures for management of their affairs.
The area can therefore only be understood in terms of the clans who live
there, all of whom are "transnational" and thus simultaneously involved
in the Somali political and military arena.

Economy

Somaliland and the Haud compose a single economic area, in which the
presence of an international boundary is practically irrelevant. There
are no formal border controls, so livestock and goods may pass freely in
both directions. In general, livestock from the Haud is sold for export
through Somali ports, principally Berbera and (to a lesser extent) Bosaaso.
Terms of trade have improved over the past two years since the end of the
war in north-west Somalia and the easing of a long period of drought.

Pastoralism: The population of the area visited is entirely composed
of pastoralists, who migrate seasonally in search of water and pasture.
Over the past few decades this movement has been reduced, to the point
where many families move no more than 20-30 km a year. The widespread introduction
of cisterns and artificial ponds, and the use of tankers to truck water
during the dry season, are mainly reponsible for this changing way of life.
Nevertheless, the lack of permanent water sources, and the scarcity of
veterinary care, remain of primary concern to the inhabitants of the region.

From 02-15 November 1994, a mission undertaken on behalf of the UN
Emergencies Unit for Ethiopia visited the north-eastern corner of Region
5, otherwise known as the 'Haud' or former "Reserve Area." The mission's
terms of reference were to report on the general situation in the area,
with special reference to security, economic activity, and humanitarian
considerations or needs.

Although expected to last between two and three weeks, the mission was
cut short when the team's vehicle was hijacked on 10 November 1994. A second
visit was made to Jigjiga from 22-25 November 1994.

Note: Unfortunately, all mission notes and source materials were also
lost with the vehicle. Precise information such as market prices and rates
of exchange are lost, thus references to this data in the report are unfortunately
imprecise.

With certain notable exceptions of banditry, security in the Haud area
is contingent upon reigning socio-political circumstances on both sides
of the international boundary. Tension between clans in one area will almost
assuredly produce tension elsewhere between the concerned clans. Such tension
may result in anything from constraints upon safe travel and commerce,
to controlled blood-feuds, and even to full-scale inter-clan war.

Although heavy weapons remain for the most part on the far side of the
international boundary, small arms are commonplace in the Haud. Only in
Gaashamo were we told of any restrictions concerning fire-arms, i.e. that
magazines must be removed from rifles within the town. Since we saw no
other weapons, we assumed that this applied mainly to members of the EPRDF
garrison. Elsewhere, weapons are carried freely by adult men (we did not
observe any children bearing arms, unlike Somalia) for protection and as
a symbol of status. Although President Abdirahman Ugaas described the formation
of EPRDF-sponsored community militias as a new means of providing security
throughout the Region (and particularly as a technique for combating Al-Ittihad),
this process has clearly not yet begun in the Haud area, where such militia
- or even the idea of such militia - do not yet exist.

In the absence of any consequential EPRDF/government presence, maintenance
of security remains the province of traditional clan leadership. Only in
the case of a major disturbance might the potential for an EPRDF intervention
be considered to be a determinant of law and order in the area. Security
is therefore a function of political and social stability, and thus directly
linked to events on the other side of the border. Clan conflicts may be
transmitted from one side of the frontier to the other, or take place on
both sides of the border simultaneously.

A cross-border conflict was reportedly in progress in and around Bokh
at the time of the mission, where two sub-clans of the Mijerteen clan (Reer
Mahamud and 'Omar Mahamud / Mahamud Sesman) were said to be involved in
serious clashes. The killing of a district official in Garowe, north-east
Somalia was said to have triggered the battle - a consequence of political
tension generated by the current political schism within the SSDF. Due
to insecurity (over 20 people killed and 40+ technical vehicles circulating
in and around Bokh), it was not possible confirm the reports with a visit
to the area. It was reported to us that the EPRDF garrison at Bokh had
withdrawn from the conflict zone to Wardheer.

Al-Ittihad Al-Islam

There is much confusion and contradictory information concerning the
nature of Al-Ittihad Al-Islam and the threat posed by the organisation
to security and stability in Region 5. The mystique surrounding the organisation
no doubt serves to enhance its dubious prestige, and may well even be encouraged
by the movement's leadership. Security-related incidents in the area are
frequently reported to be the work of Al-Ittihad whether or not this is
really the case; since the movement typically refrains from claiming responsibility,
it is possible that actions of other groups are mistakenly attributed to
the Islamists. Al-Ittihad rarely explains its actions, and it is rare to
find someone with first-hand knowledge of the movement. Observations and
analysis about Al-Ittihad, such as that which follows below, can be little
more than speculative.

There can be little doubt that the movement's activities are of real
concern to the new leadership of the Kilil. In meetings with both Abdirahman
Ugaas and 'Iid Dahir, both men devoted a substantial portion of the meeting
to the Islamist group, without any questioning (Abdirahman Ugaas is apparently
a committed enemy of Al-Ittihad, having worked closely with the EPRDF during
their early operations against the movement). Elsewhere, any mention of
security issues while in Jigjiga automatically elicited some response concerning
Al-Ittihad, from members of both the local and international communities.
Only the EPRDF commander did not directly mention Al-Ittihad as posing
a threat to security in the region.

By most accounts, Al-Ittihad have recently been most active in the area
between Qabri Dehaar, Denaan, Qalafo and Dhagax Buur. Some loose elements
were reported to be active near Danood, Nusdariiq and 'Adow, having been
recently dispersed by the EPRDF from their usual theatre of operations.
In the Haud area, however, clan leaders (Isaaq and Dhulbahante) were unequivocal
that Al-Ittihad would not be permitted to operate within their territory.
The categorical rejection and contempt for Al-Ittihad articulated by the
Isaaq and Dhulbahante we encountered would obviously inhibit Al-Ittihad
recruitment among their members for the time being. It remains to be seen
whether renewed civil strife across the border in Somaliland would favour
Al-Ittihad's expansion among these communities.

This local 'ban' on Al-Ittihad operations may not amount to a total
embargo: there are indications that the Islamists' lines of support must
cross the territory of the Haud clans, and that these same clans permit
the existence of Al-Ittihad camps among them across the border in Somaliland.
Booraame (Gadabursi), Bur'o (Habar Yonis & Habar Je'elo), Las 'Anood
(Dhulbahante) and Luuq (Mareexaan) are variously identified as major cross-border
bases for the organisation, while it also reportedly maintains a presence
in many other communities including Hargeysa, Badhan, Muqdisho and Bosaaso.
Since their battle against Al-Ittihad in 1992, the SSDF have been among
the most virulent opponents of the Islamists, and have circulated a dossier
containing precise information about the movement. Among their assertions
are the description of Bur'o as the retreat of Al-Ittihad's leadership,
headed by Sheikh 'Ali Warsame, and a detailed description of linkages between
these Somali-based groups and their brethren abroad - including Kenya,
Djibouti and Ethiopia.

In addition to obscurity surrounding Al-Ittihad's international organisational
structure, some confusion exists concerning the relationship between Al-Ittihad
and other militant groups within Ethiopia, whose areas and methods of operation
often overlap. Some observers have suggested that the Islamists are little
more than an armed appendage of the ONLF, while others equate Al-Ittihad
with the Ogaadeen Islamic Unity Party. This narrow definition of the Islamists
as a clan-based political entity like the ONLF, essentially pursuing Ogadeni
nationalist aims, stands in direct contradiction to Al-Ittihad's profile
across the border in Somalia and Somaliland: a pan-Islamic organisation
whose creed of Islamic unity (hence the name) transcends parochial clan
or ethnic interests. Nor has Al-Ittihad's alleged leader in Region 5, a
man named Abdiselam, expressed admiration for the ONLF or any other group
with limited, political horizons. More probably, Al-Ittihad simply finds
it easy to capitalise on present Ogadeni discontent, redirecting the disaffection
of clan members into support for the Islamist front, and exploiting ONLF/Ittihad
common interests as a kind of "force multiplier" in their campaign against
the government.

Whatever the reason, Al-Ittihad activity within Region 5 remains concentrated
within the Ogaadeen clan. At no time during our mission did we encounter
any sign of Al-Ittihad operations that would contradict the universal assurance
we received that the movement was not tolerated among the Isaaq and Dhulbahante
clans we visited.

Information about the actual source of donor funds remains vague. Some
administration officials (and one member of the Somali Embassy in Teheran)
cite Iran and Sudan as principal donors. Private contributions are also
said to come from Saudi Arabian, American, and European Islamists. Only
in one instance did any of our contacts actually describe having seen foreign
members of Al-Ittihad: two Arabs, describing themselves as Egyptians, who
visited the Al-Ittihad base near Gode in mid-1992, at a time when the front
had made territorial gains in the south-eastern Ogaden. The visitors apparently
discouraged the capture of territory, arguing that it could dilute the
militancy of the movement and detract from its contribution to the global
Islamist cause.

Since then, the Ethiopian branch of Al-Ittihad seems to have abandoned
any territorial ambitions. Although the message of the Arab visitors described
above might be one reason for the movement's change of heart, other contacts
in Jigjiga have argued that the organisation is simply too weak to face
the prospect of a direct confrontation with EPRDF: the certain outcome
of any attempt to take and hold ground. Indeed, Al-Ittihad seems to shun
virtually any contact at all with outsiders, including the Regional administration.

During talks with the movement's leadership reported to have taken place
early this year, members of the regional government managed to make some
progress in persuading Al-Ittihad of certain common objectives, including
the promotion of Islam. Negotiations broke down, however, over the issue
of disarmament, a constitutional requirement for any political party seeking
official recognition from the TGE. Fighting again erupted, and all contact
between the administration and Al-Ittihad seems to have been broken. The
new regional government now claims to pursue an aggressive campaign against
Al-Ittihad employing local militia, equipped and reinforced by the EPRDF,
a technique also advocated by moderate Ogadeni leaders opposed to the Islamists.
It is too early to evaluate the success of this new strategy, though there
are hints that Al-Ittihad have asked to attend the upcoming Ogaadeeni meeting
in Qabri Dehaar, perhaps opening up new paths for dialogue.

Political and Social Organisation

Region 5 Administration(N.B. As of 05/12/94 the President of Region 5, Mr Abdirahman Ugaas,
has been relieved of his responsibilities and title.)

In May/June 1994, the TGE dissolved for a second time the administration
of Region 5, citing maladministration and inefficacy. The re-appointment
coincided with the designation of Jigjiga rather than Gode as the new capital
of the Kilil. The implications of this transition, both practical and symbolic,
have yet to be fully felt, though some early inferences may be drawn.

Of prime symbolic importance is the relocation of the capital from Gode,
which strikes a blow at the traditional hegemony enjoyed by the Ogaadeen
clan in regional politics. Unlike Gode, Jigjiga is a cosmopolitan centre
frequented by Somalis of all clans, Oromo, and highland Ethiopians. No
single major group dominates the area, allowing representatives from all
communities to interact on the basis of relative equality. Although the
shift is perceived by many members of the Ogaadeen group to reflect an
anti-Ogaadeen bias, the appointment of Ogaadeenis to major posts in the
administration (including the Presidency), would suggest that such fears
are exaggerated. Nonetheless, several key posts remain unfilled, perhaps
reflecting the delicacy of clan sensitivities to such appointments more
than the availability of qualified candidates for these posts.

In practice, the installation of the government in its new home is far
from complete. Staff from Gode are still arriving and facilities to accommodate
them are scarce. Office and housing space in Jigjiga are limited, and fundamental
requisites such as office equipment, communications, transport, and support
staff are not yet adequate. Senior figures share pooled vehicles and answer
their own telephones (sometimes two or more, which ring ceaselessly); appointments
are first-come first serve, with unruly lines forming outside officers'
doors. The additional, unnecessary pressures created by such working conditions
on an administration on now struggling to its feet are evidently cumbersome.

Staffing of the various Bureaux (there are to be 23) also poses a challenge.
The Executive Committee's Secretary is especially critical of the widespread
appointment of personnel to post's beyond their qualifications - a practice
he attributes to the former Gode regime. The Executive Committee has thus
requested the dispatch of a task force from the central Council for Public
Administration in order to review standards and staff qualifications. He
expressed a strong commitment to the rapid replacement or, where necessary
re-training, of unqualified personnel, while recognising that this process
may further inhibit the implementation of this year's capital budget.

The budget is one of the administration's major preoccupations. A full
Amharic text has been prepared and approved by the central government,
and a Somali text is presently in translation. A comprehensive breakdown
of the budget by project and district (in any language) is not yet available,
though certain

Bureaux seem to have formulated comprehensive plans for expenditure,
and are awaiting only the disbursement of funds from the central Treasury.
Several practical constraints to implementation of the budget remain unresolved.

Foremost is the compressed time frame for implementation of the budget:
the fifth month of the Ethiopian fiscal year is now in progress, leaving
only seven months remaining. President Abdirahman estimates that another
month or two must elapse before the administration will be prepared to
disburse funds, sharply pressurising the various bureaux. Exercising control
over accelerated expenditure in the five or six remaining months of the
fiscal year will certainly challenge the government's capacities. Funds
remaining at the end of the fiscal year will be re-absorbed by the central
government: a blunder of previous years that the administration is anxious
not to repeat.

Even when money becomes available, simply spending it may not always
be possible for the Bureaux concerned, since local capacities to absorb
cash are very restricted. For example, costs per unit for construction
of public buildings are standardised under the budget, meaning that the
government will pay the same price for an office in Jigjiga as in Geladi.
Private contractors are unwilling to assume the additional costs associated
with work in more remote areas of the Ogaden, and claim that such contracts
are unprofitable. Thus tenders for the building of schools, clinics and
other planned government infrastructure may simply not attract any bids
- a problem that has already frustrated the plans of the South-East Rangelands
Project (SERP) in Negob zone, relatively close to Jigjiga.

Despite the problems, members of the administration seem to feel that
the situation today represents an improvement over past years. Credit for
much of the progress being made may largely be due to the intervention
of the TGE. Many of the new senior appointees are Amharic-speakers, at
least partly raised or educated in highland Ethiopia, and thus better equipped
for dialogue with the central government. They are also generally receptive
to the TGE's political formula of regional autonomy, which demands accountability
and transparency at the regional level (whether the administration is better
described as "pliant" or "pragmatic" in its dealings with the central government
remains a moot point). Furthermore, in recognition of the Kilil's present
weaknesses, the TGE has provided a technical team to strengthen the region's
administrative capacity. The need for this support seems undisputed by
the regional authorities, who readily admit the flagrant corruption and
mismanagement which tainted previous administrations. They also seem to
acknowledge that past failures have stemmed in part from political immaturity
and in part from lack of professional and technical human resources necessary
to bear the burden of regional self-government. This self-criticism seems
to be complemented by - and indeed prerequisite to - a vigorous and sincere
drive for reform. Whether or not this reformist spirit, reinforced by impartial
central government intervention (e.g. the CPA, technical team etc.) can
shield the mechanism of governance from the corrosive effects of clan particularism
remains to be seen.

Rural Areas

Beyond Jigjiga, government authority recedes rapidly into haze, becoming
either illusory or in some areas totally non-existent. Cartographic definitions
of international borders, and internal regional or district boundaries
are either intrusive or irrelevant to the inhabitants of this area, who
profess little (if any) first-hand knowledge of any kind of administration.
The Haud itself comprises a number of administrative zones and districts
(or parts of them) whose demarcation is principally arbitrary and whose
names serve as little more than geographic labels: Dhagaxbuur, Danood,
Bokh, Geladin etc (all of which may be accurately described as towns, but
not as administrative districts). We heard numerous complaints from residents
of the area that these boundaries, though effectively notional, were neither
appropriate nor appreciated, especially where a single clan may be divided
between two (or more districts), or where two clans may be lumped together
in a single administrative principality. Since these boundaries are little
more than abstract concepts for the time being, disapproval was also somewhat
hypothetical.

Evidence of government in the area visited is limited to isolated EPRDF
garrisons at Gaashamo, Wardheer, Geladi and Bokh (reportedly abandoned
due to recent insecurity) and to sparse, dilapidated infrastructure. We
were informed everywhere by village elders (with the single exception of
Marqaan Weyne, where the census was in progress) that they had never seen
any sign of an Ethiopian government (implying, improbably, that the area
had even been spared the ravages of the Ogaden War). In general we heard
that a government presence would be welcomed, especially if it implied
benefit to the community in terms of public services.

Public Services: Health

Gaashamo was the only community visited with a "public" health facility:
a clinic comprising a consultation room, examination room and store-room/pharmacy.
The clinic functions basically as an OPD, managed by a senior nurse (and
acting District Medical Officer) Mahamed Mahdi Hassan, since no doctor
is in attendance. The nurse and his auxiliaries, 16 in total, are not paid,
though they are theoretically to receive remuneration from the regional
government.

Diagnosis and treatment of complaints is of unknown reliability, however
discussions with the head nurse and extracts from the register suggest
that the most common diseases are:

With the exception of Hepatitis among the top five, this report appears
largely consistent with health profiles of communities throughout Somalia.
The appearance of measles so high on the list may reflect the near-total
lack of vaccination reported to us among children under 5 years.

Resources for the clinic come from a variety of sources: most of the
medicines in the pharmacy were said to have come from Bur'o, suggesting
that they come from MSF and UNICEF stores there (confirmed by a glimpse
at the labels). The head nurse told us he also purchases medicines occasionally
in Dhagaxbuur for resale through the clinic in Gaashamo; the proceeds go
to the purchase of more drugs. One cold box, empty, was said to date from
Mengistu's regime. A variety of surgical instruments and an examination
table were also in evidence.

Gaashamo is also the only community in the area to benefit from a public
school building - supposedly constructed during Haile Selassie's reign.
Like the health workers, the teachers are supposed to receive a government
salary which arrives rarely, if ever at all. Furniture and educational
materials are a matter of pure improvisation: children bring tin cans and
rocks to sit on in class, while teachers search for textbooks wherever
they can find them: most seem to come from UNICEF contributions in Somaliland.
The principal (and acting District Education Officer), 'Ali Ibrahim Yusuf,
draws up the curriculum himself without any guidance from either central
or regional government.

Parents apparently contribute to the expenses of their children's' education,
and the disproportionate presence of children from the local religious
community or tariiqa, Al Wahda, which we observed during our visit
suggests that the group may also underwrite some of the school's costs.
Al Wahda, a pacific, traditionalist Islamic movement, has long been
active in the Bur'o area and has some support among both the Habar Yonis
and Habar Je'elo. There is no other form of support.

Education in smaller communities is limited to private Quranic schools,
whose curriculum sometimes includes subjects like Somali language and maths.
In all other respects, formal education is non-existent throughout the
area.

Clan Relations

Apart from Gaashamo where there is a small EPRDF outpost and some buildings
for a school, a clinic, and a district administrative office we saw practically
no evidence of government administration. Some members of the Gaashamo
local council receive an irregular stipend. Virtually no other support
is received, and the functioning of these structures depends entirely on
community and private initiative. Beyond Gaashamo, community elders were
emphatic that they represent the only effective authority in their territories
- an assertion supported by objective observation, since we encountered
no other formal power structures during our visit to the area. Since security,
political and economic activity are all profoundly clan-related, conditions
in the area can only be understood in terms of clans: clan territories
visited included the those of Isaaq (Habar Awal, Arab, 'Iidagale, Habar
Yonis, Habar Je'elo) and Dhulbahante (insecurity around Bokh, and the hijacking
of our vehicle in Qararo forced us to abandon plans to visit areas controlled
by the Mijerteen and Ogaadeen). Because of the presence of UNHCR in between
Jigjiga and Aware (comprising Habar Awal, Arab and 'Iidagale territories
- all Isaaq), this study focused on the relatively little-known area from
Gaashamo east, a zone predominantly settled by Isaaq Habar Yonis and Habar
Je'elo, Dhulbahante and Mijerteen. Within each territory, dominant sub-clans
or lineages may differ from village to village. An annotated sketch map
and list of contacts is included for clarification.

Habar Yonis (Isaaq): the Habar Yonis, a large clan of the Isaaq / Garxajis
family (which also includes 'Idagale) straddle the Somaliland border, and
branches of the family also live in the area of Berbera and 'Eerigaabo
in Somaliland. Gaashamo serves as the clan's Ethiopian "capital", in a
territory that spreads north to Hargeysa, Oodweyne, and Bur'o. It is a
source of aggravation for the community that Gaashamo is administratively
labelled as a dependency of Dhagaxbuur - a town dominated by a clan (the
Ogaadeen) with whom they have strained relations and little common interest.
Relations with their Garxajis cousins, the 'Idagale, are generally good
and they share a common political orientation on most matters. In Somaliland,
sections of the Habar Yonis, are presently allied with the dissident 'Iidagale
militia in their opposition to Mohamed Ibrahim Egal's administration. Their
relations with their eastern neighbours, the Habar Je'elo, traditionally
involve some friction, and the two often find themselves on opposite sides
of divisive political issues (also the case in Somaliland at the moment).
. In the south-east corner of their territory, the Habar Yonis share a
border with the Dhulbahante with whom they have cordial relations, despite
a more general Isaaq-Dhulbahante hostility. Even during the SNM's struggle
against Siyaad Barre, trade and travel between Isaaq and Dhulbahante could
continue through this peculiar juncture.

Habar Je'elo (Isaaq): the Habar Je'elo are not strongly represented
in Ethiopia, occupying a wedge of territory between the Habar Yonis and
the Dhulbahante. Their relations with the Dhulbahante are characterised
by feuds and disputes over grazing, and they have little in common politically,
having fought on different sides during the SNM's war against the Siyaad
Barre regime. Their only major 'urban' centre is Bur'o, a town they share
roughly equally with the Habar Yonis. Within Ethiopia, the Habar Je'elo
find themselves generally lumped together with the Habar Yonis, and resent
the pre-eminence of Gaashamo as a local centre of Isaaq activity (the Habar
Je'elo have no comparable Ethiopian base). They therefore seek separate
representation from Gaashamo vis-à-vis the regional government and
the constituent assembly.

Dhulbahante (Daarod / Harti): Within Ethiopia the Dhulbahante share
borders with the Isaaq (Habar Yonis and Habar Je'elo) to the west, their
Harti cousins the Mijerteen to the east, and the Ogaadeen to the south.
Relations with the Ogaadeen are generally good, perhaps better than the
Mijerteen whose history with the Dhulbahante is complicated by infrequent
skirmishes and blood feuds. The Dhulbahante 'capital' is at Las 'Anood,
across the border in Somaliland. Following several years of dependence
upon Bosaaso as an outlet for trade, the Dhulbahante are turning increasingly
to Berbera, both for its proximity and in consequence of a general warming
of Dhulbahante-Isaaq relations under the Somaliland administration.

New Trends

Despite the traditional character of local authority throughout the
Haud, some new linkages between these far-flung communities and the administrative
hubs of Jigjiga, Dire Dawa and Addis Ababa seem to be emerging. Among these
phenomena are the new mechanism of direct representation to the constituent
assembly, the formation of new political parties (in particular the Ethiopian
Somali Democratic League or ESDL), and the first exploratory efforts of
the TGE to extend its influence directly into rural areas (initially through
the population and housing census).

The mission encountered two communities with direct representation to
the constituent assembly: Gaashamo (Abdikarim 'Ali Guleed: Isaaq / Habar
Yonis) and Marqaan Weyne (Jamaa' Diibleh: Dhulbahante). Community elders
are aware of these delegates' participation in the assembly and apparently
consider them to be representatives of their kinsmen throughout the area,
rather than as conventional "platform" politicians or as the spokesmen
for one or another village. A direct linkage between the traditional dynamic
of inter-clan relations and the modern "democratic" model exemplified by
the constituent assembly may therefore be inferred.

Uncertainty, and a certain degree of scepticism, surrounding the role
and purpose of the constituent assembly was common, though we were able
to observe efforts underway to raise popular awareness about this new mechanism.
For part of the journey the mission travelled together with Mr Huseen Ali
Guleed, an official from the regional administration. Mr Guleed met with
the elders of various villages, informing them of the need for collaboration
and consensus at the regional level, and the imperative of subordinating
clan interests to Somali "national" interests where regional affairs were
concerned, and the need to offer a united Somali front vis-à-vis
other nationalities in the Ethiopian political arena.

The "unity" message is also the message, perhaps not coincidentally,
of the Ethiopian Somali Democratic League (ESDL) and of the League's architect,
Mr Abudlmejid Huseen (current Minister of External Economic Co-operation).
Many villages through which we passed had new League offices and nascent
party structure. In view of Mr Abdulmejid's virtually single-handed management
of Somali affairs on behalf of the TGE, it is not surprising that the "unity"
theme is also pervasive within the new Regional Administration. Moreover,
it has caught on among some of the League's adversaries among the Ogaadeen
clan, who are now trying to effect a rapprochement between radical Ogaadeen
tendencies (disillusioned by their perceived fall from grace) and those
more predisposed to share power with the (generally) non-Ogaadeeni membership
of the League. A meeting intended to encourage this process is scheduled
to take place from December 5th in Qabri Dehaar.

Economy

Trade patterns are primarily a function of the geography of each clan
and its relationships with its neighbours. The population of the Haud is
therefore more closely linked economically to its kinsmen across the border
in Somaliland and Somalia that to neighbouring, but unrelated, communities
in Ethiopia. Consequently, the Haud and Somaliland (which includes part
of the Haud plateau) comprise what Dr. Ahmed Yusuf Farah, anthropologist
and UNHCR consultant, rightly describes as "a single economic zone." Livestock
flow north for export through various ports along the Red Sea coast, while
commodities and manufactured goods follow the same routes inland.

Terms of trade in the eastern Haud seem to reflect natural trading patterns,
free of the kind of market distortions encountered further west, where
the local economy is largely fuelled by food aid inputs. Apparently, clan-specific
demographics favour this north-south continuum, while posing invisible
barriers to east-west trade. East of Gaashamo for example, there is no
sign in markets of the grain and maize distributed through refugee/returnee
programmes that is so abundant in the area of Jigjiga and Aware (questions
about the availability of these items met with derision in many villages,
where elders told us that even were they available nobody would eat them).
By several accounts, fortified by our own observations, nothing of value
moves along the east-west road from Jigjiga but qaad.

Prices for livestock throughout the area remained constant, with animals
(sheep or goat) of first quality for slaughter or export selling between
100-120,000 shillings (approx. E.Birr 160-190). Second quality sold between
85-100,000/- (approx. E.Birr 130 - 160. Prices were quoted to us without
exception in Somali Shillings). Most livestock traders said they would
accept full or part payment in kind (barter) since cash of all denominations
is in short supply. None of the herders encountered brought their own livestock
to port for export. They preferred instead to sell their stock to large-scale
exporters who purchased either through major markets (Gaashamo, Bur'o,
Las 'Anood) or sometimes directly from the herders.

In return for livestock, merchants purchase commodities and manufactured
goods imported from Djibouti and the Gulf states. Again, prices remained
constant throughout the area visited, though Dhulbahante merchants consistently
added 20,000/- shillings to these prices which they attributed to additional
transport costs from Berbera (see map). As with livestock prices, all quotes
we received were in Somali shillings.

The merchants were generally satisfied with these terms of trade, describing
them as far better than the 1988-91 period of Somalia's civil war. During
those years, fighting strangulated cross-border trade and forced sharp
price rises for imports. A sustained drought over roughly the same period
(but extending into 1992) concurrently encouraged widespread distress-selling
of livestock throughout the Ogaden, placing pastoralists at a critical
economic disadvantage. In response to questioning, we were told universally
that the situation had much improved.

One "unknown quantity" at the time of our visit was the recent introduction
of the new Somaliland shilling. In Isaaq areas the value of the new shilling
remained pegged at 1:100 (1 S/L Shilling = 100 SoSh). This rate seems to
have been fixed by Habar Awal traders (who sponsored the introduction of
the new currency), while the value of the Somali Shilling was calculated
against the Saudi Riyal, rather than the US Dollar. We encountered Somaliland
Shillings throughout the Isaaq territories, and found that the currency
met with widespread acceptance. Among the Dhulbahante however, we were
shown only some specimen notes whose appearance was greeted with derision.
Dhulbahante we interviewed were categorical that they did not recognise
this new currency and did not wish to accept it, presumably mirroring sentiment
among certain Dhulbahante living across the border in Somaliland.

Pastoralism

The population of the Haud, specifically in the sector north and east
of Wardheer is almost exclusively pastoralist. An SCF socio-economic survey
of the Ogaadeen conducted in 1991 found no communities which could be described
as either agro-pastoralists or cultivators in the area (0%). Although the
geographic reach of the SCF survey was limited, observations from this
mission would tend to support the assumption that only pastoralists live
in this zone.

Water

Water, or the absence of it, is perhaps the single most important determinant
of life in the Haud. Permanent water sources are scarce, and even temporary
sources are unreliable. Pastoralists and their livestock are therefore
dependent upon a vast system of ponds or cisterns (balli), used
to trap rainfall and groundwater runoff. Probably thousands of these balli
exist throughout the area. The balance between exploitation of available
water sources and the need to claim fresh pasture in order to sustain livestock
is still the main preoccupation of communities of the area.

Permanent water sources typically fall under the jurisdiction of a single
clan, and can only be used by others with the proprietor's consent. Clans
may therefore show a preference for watering at one of their "own," distant
wells, rather than to negotiate access to closer water within the territory
of a different clan. Habar Yonis (Isaaq) communities described Bur'o and
Oodweyne as the nearest permanent water sources, while Habar Je'elo mentioned
Bur'o (shared with Habar Yonis) and 'Aynabo. Dhulbahante communities referred
to 'Aynabo (shared with Habar Je'elo) and Las 'Anood (surprisingly, the
former was mentioned more than the latter).

Virtually every group of elders expressed a desire for permanent water
sources (e.g. boreholes) to be established within their locality. No consideration
was made of the effects this might have on grazing, nor of the fact that
in some parts of the Haud, exploratory drilling has shown the water table
to be lower than 250-300m (e.g. beyond borehole depth).

In the absence of permanent water sources, most communities depend on
cisterns or balli for their water supply. Since balli are
usually private property, a single village and its environs may have dozens
of them, each serving an extended family and their relatives. In times
of relative abundance, owners may elect to sell water to other residents
of the area; when scarce, water may remain family property, not for sale.

Both humans and livestock share these rain-fed artificial ponds, raising
concerns about water quality for human consumption. Contamination is not
the only threat to water quality, however. Since balli also tend
to become breeding grounds for mosquitoes and thus malaria, it is common
practice for owners to add a slick of diesel to the water's surface. The
relative advantages and disadvantages of this practice clearly merit some
investigation.

Tanker trucks fulfil a kind of intermediate function between boreholes
and balli, since they allow seasonal water-sources to function perennially.
It is common practice for balli owners to hire water tankers (at
no small expense) in order to keep the ponds full even during the dry season
(i.e. Jilaal, between November/December and March/April). Pastoralist
are therefore no longer obliged to migrate in search of water during the
dry months, and often choose to remain static. Nomads and elders consistently
described their annual migration as covering only 20-30 km, noting that
this is a steep reduction from several decades ago, when families might
wander more than 150 km in search of water and grazing.

This evolution of the transhumant migratory pattern towards a more settled,
stable model must undoubtedly have a tremendous impact upon social, economic
and political arrangements within pastoral communities, possibility inducing
new and intolerable pressures upon the local ecosystem and the populations
- human and animal - which depend on it.

Livestock

Animal welfare is of at least equal importance to pastoralists, if not
more so, than human welfare. Elders in most villages in which we stopped
preferred to devote the bulk of our discussions to matters of livestock
health (including the availability of water) than to issues like human
health and education. Their prime concerns in this domain were the availability
of veterinary drugs, and protection of livestock from predators.

There is no effective government veterinary programme in the region
visited. The South-East Rangelands Project (SERP), recently galvanized
by a change of management, is in the process of completing a "development
centre" in Gaashamo which will include veterinary services amongst other
activities, but the timetable is uncertain and the effectiveness of the
programme remains to be tested. In the meantime, herders are entirely dependent
upon the irregular commercial supply of drugs from businessmen returning
from abroad. The pertinence of these products and the correct use of drug
protocols are therefore questionable, and the effectiveness of this system
clearly inadequate: livestock merchants and herders were unanimous in their
desire for better access to veterinary medicine, even through commercial
channels.

Predators, specifically hyena and fox, were also commonly identified
as a scourge. We were repeatedly apprised of the need for poisons to deal
with these animals, whose predations were reported to be increasingly troublesome
to the pastoralists.

The comments and observations
in this document represent the views of the author and do not necessarily
reflect those of the United Nations. Nor do the designations and presentation
of material imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever of the UN concerning
the legal status of any country, territory, city or area, of its authorities,
or concerning the delimitations of its frontiers or boundaries.