Title

Author

Date of Award

1998

Availability

Article

Degree Name

Doctor of Philosophy (Ph.D.)

Department

Philosophy

First Committee Member

Susan Haack, Committee Chair

Abstract

In 1909, Charles Sanders Peirce defined the first-operators for three-valued logic, thus rejecting the Principle of Bivalence. Commentators have consistently misunderstood Peirce's reasons for doing so. I argue that Peirce did not intend for the third value of his logic to be taken by: object-indeterminate propositions; indeterminate predications; modal propositions; or lawful generalizations or future-directed subjunctive conditionals. Further, I argue that Peirce intended for his third value to be taken by boundary-propositions, propositions which predicate of a continuity-breach one of the properties which is a boundary-property relative to that breach. I conclude by considering how Peirce's rejection of the Principle of Bivalence interacts with his pragmatic account of truth.