A carrier task force of the Seventh Fleet, TF 74, made a U.S. incursion into the Bay of Bengal at the height of the Bangladesh Liberation War in December 1971.[5] TF 74 comprised the nuclear-powered aircraft carrier Enterprise; the amphibious assault carrier Tripoli; the destroyers Decatur, McKean, and Orleck; the guided-missile escorts Waddell, King, and Parsons; the nuclear-powered attack submarine Gurnard; and supply ship Wichita. On 15 December, a day before the surrender of Pakistan, the task force entered the Bay of Bengal, at a distance of some 1,760 km (950 nmi; 1,090 mi) from Dhaka.

172. Conversation Between President Nixon and his Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, December 10, 1971, 10:51â€“11:12 a.m.1

Washington, December 10, 1971, 10:51â€“11:12 a.m.

Kissinger : Today, I want to tell you what I have done, tentatively, subject to your approval.

Nixon : Let's go ahead.

Kissinger : They've got this East Pakistanâ€”they've got the offer of the commander of the Pakistan forces in East Pakistan to get a ceasefire and so forth. They were going to run to the Security Council and get that done. We don't want to be in a position where we push the Pakistanis over the cliff.

Nixon : No.

Kissinger : So I told them to link the ceasefire in the east with the ceasefire in the west.

[Omitted here is conversation unrelated to South Asia.]

Kissinger : The ceasefire in the west is down the drain.

Nixon : Yeah.

Kissinger : I mean the east is down the drain. The major problem now has to be to protect the west.

Nixon : Yeah.

Kissinger : So I've told them that they should link any discussion of ceasefire in the east with ceasefire in the west. And to use this to wrap the whole business up. I've got Vorontsov coming in at 11:30 and I'm going to tell him what the Pakistanis did in the eastâ€”

Nixon : was a result of ourâ€”

Kissinger : â€”was as a result of what we did. Which is true. I'm going to show him the Kennedy understanding. I'm going to hand him a very tough note to Brezhnev and say, "this is it now, let's settle theâ€”let's get a cease fire now.â€ That's the best that can be done now. They'll lose half of their country, but at least they preserve the other half. The east is gone.

Nixon : What is it the east in effect offered?

Kissinger : Well, the eastâ€”the commander in the east has offeredâ€”it's a little bit confused. He's asked the United Nations to arrange an immediate, honorable repatriation of his forces. In other words, turn over to civilian authority.

Nixon : Right. And?

Kissinger : And that's, in effect, all. And a promise that the Indians would eventually withdraw too. But that's going to happen anyway. I mean, to participate in that is a nice humanitarian effort, but it does not solve the overwhelming problem of the war in the west.

Nixon : Does State understand that?

Kissinger : No. Well they understand it now, believe me.

Nixon : Yeah. See the point is, our desire is to save West Pakistan. That's all.

Kissinger : That's right. That is exactly right.

Nixon : All right. Fine. What is State up to now? We're still getting, you're still getting thoseâ€”keep those carriers moving now.

Kissinger : The carriersâ€”everything is moving. Four Jordanian planes have already moved to Pakistan, 22 more are coming. We're talking to the Saudis, the Turks we've now found are willing to give five. So we're going to keep that moving until there's a settlement.

[Omitted here is conversation unrelated to South Asia.]

Nixon : When are you going to see the Chinese? This afternoon?

Kissinger : 5:30.

Nixon : What are you going to tell them?

Kissinger : I'm going to tell them everything we did, and I'm going to tell them that we, I'm going to tell them what forces we're moving.

Nixon : Could you say that it would be very helpful if they could move some forces or threaten to move some forces?

Kissinger : Absolutely.

Nixon : They've got to threaten or they've got to move, one of the two. You know what I mean?

Kissinger : Yeah.

Nixon : Threaten to move forces or move them, Henry, that's what they must do. Now goddamn it, we're playing our role and that will restrain India. And also tell them that this will help us get the ceasefire. We don't want to make a deal with the Russians [that] the Chinese will piss on.

Kissinger : Absolutely. Oh, God. That's whyâ€”

Nixon : The Chinese at the present time are kicking the hell out of the Russians about this, you know. The Russians are kicking the Chinese saying that the Chinese are playing with the Paks and the Paksâ€”you know what I mean? This is a Russian-Chinese conflict.

Kissinger : Mr. President, if we stay strong, even if it comes out badly, we'll have come out well with the Chinese, which is important.

Nixon : How about getting the French to sell some planes to the Paks?

Kissinger : Yeah. They're already doing it.

Nixon : All right, why not? I mean, if they need some supplies, why not the French?

Kissinger : Yeah.

Nixon : Now the French are justâ€”they'll sell to anybody.

Kissinger : Yeah, they are selling them now.

[Omitted here is conversation unrelated to Pakistan.]

Nixon : Let me say this on the French thing, can you talk with the French? And, is there any way we can get themâ€”I mean we talk about the United States helping, furnishing arms to Pakistan, how about getting the French to sell them in some instances?

Kissinger : Yeah.

Nixon : It's a question of sales, isn't it really?

Kissinger : Yeah.

Nixon : Yeah.

[Omitted here is conversation unrelated to South Asia.]

Nixon : Now coming back to this India-Pakistan thing, have we got anything else we can do?

Kissinger : No. I think we're going to crack it now.

Nixon : Then I hope that the Indians will be warned by the Chinese, right?

Kissinger : Well, I'll have to find out tonight.

Nixon : You do your best, Henry.

Kissinger : Yeah.

Nixon : This should have been done long ago. The Chinese have not warned the Indians.

Kissinger : Oh, yeah.

Nixon : They haven't warned them that they're going to come in. And that's the point. They've got to warn themâ€”it's justâ€”

Kissinger : Uh, huh.

Nixon : All they've got to do is move something . Move their, move a division. You know, move some trucks. Fly some planes. You know, some symbolic act. We're not doing a goddamn thing, Henry, you know that. We're just moving things around, aren't we?

Kissinger : Yeah.

Nixon : But these Indians are cowards. Right?

Kissinger : Right. But with Russian backing. You see, the Russians have sent notes to Iran, Turkey, to a lot of countries threatening them. The Russians have played a miserable game.

Nixon : So we'll do the same thing, right?

Kissinger : Exactly.

Nixon : Threatening them with what? If they come in and what?

Kissinger : They'll do something. They haven't said what they'll do. But they'll settle now. After your conversation with Matskevich yesterday, they're going to settle.

Nixon : What basis [unclear]?

Kissinger : The ceasefire in the west is all that's left.

Nixon : The ceasefire in the west. And what, though, on East Pakistan? What do we do about that? Are we going to just say thatâ€”

Kissinger : Yes, yes. The best not [unclear], but the best would be ifâ€”

Nixon : See, how are we, if we cannot tell those people how we want it to come out, we can't have a decent plan. That's what we haven't had at this point.

Kissinger : That's right. Well, we've hadâ€”after the Brezhnev letter came yesterday we sent a copy of it to Yahya.

Nixon : Yeah.

Kissinger : We've told him the pros and cons of accepting it.

Nixon : Right.

Kissinger : And now Yahya has come back with a proposal saying ceasefire, negotiations for mutual withdrawal, and negotiations to settle the political future ofâ€”

Nixon : [unclear]

Kissinger : And then what will happen on the Bangladesh, Mr. President, is that whatever West Pakistan and these people work out, we will accept. But we will not be in the foreâ€”in the front. If we can getâ€”

Nixon : Whatever West Pakistan works out with whom?

Kissinger : Withâ€”the negotiations on East Pakistan.

Nixon : India has not evenâ€”but India will not agree to negotiations on East Pakistan.

Kissinger : Yeah, but the Russians have already agreed to it. So what will happen, let's be realistic, what will happen is that the representatives of East Pakistan will demand independence. And in practice I think that is what West Pakistan will then agree to. But then it won't be us who've done it. This will solve the problem of do we recognize Bangladesh against the wishes of the Pakistan Government.

Nixon : That's right. We must never recognize Bangladesh. That's why no answer's the right thing, until West Pakistanâ€”

Kissinger : Well, that's the point.

Nixon : Gives us the go-ahead. Bhutto will do it. Now, I want a program of aid to West Pakistan formulated immediately. Have some sort of a program, you know, after they're there. We cannot let them hang out there by themselves. I don't think we can do much from a military standpoint, but let's find a way to let others do it. That's one suggestion. On the French thing, I want you to talk to the French cold turkey. We'd like to find a way to help to work with the French, can we? You got any arms in there?

Kissinger : I will do my best.

Nixon : Can you think of anything else?

Kissinger : No, I thinkâ€”

Nixon : I don't think we can getâ€”frankly Henry, I don't think we can get through the Congress arms sales to West Pakistan. That's what I mean. Do you?

Kissinger : No.

Nixon : All right. Then what was our answer? Give them a hell of a lot of economic assistance, correct?

Kissinger : I can let them convert it intoâ€”

Nixon : And let them convert intoâ€”well that's their, that's their, we don't ask the Indians, we've given the Indians all this economic assistance, and we didn't ask any questions when they made a treaty with the Russians and bought Russians arms. Did we raise any questions about that?

Kissinger : And the point you made yesterday, we have to continue to squeeze the Indians even when this thing is settled. They can't getâ€”these 84 million dollars are down the drain.

Nixon : That's right. That's gone. And incidentally we've already spent 25 million of it on the crap thatâ€”take another 25 million and give it to the Paks.

Kissinger : Yeah.

Nixon : We've got to for rehabilitation. I mean, Jesus Christ, they've bombedâ€”I want all the war damage; I want to help Pakistan on the war damage in Karachi and other areas, see?

Kissinger : I'm going to put before him, I'm going to show him that Kennedyâ€”

Nixon : Yeah. And say, "This is what the President's talking about.â€

Kissinger : Yeah.

Nixon : Now, and say now listen, we didn't [unclear] and we just want to say we're notâ€”don't get, just say the President is, as you know, you must never misjudge this man. He doesn't pound on the table, and he doesn't shout. But when he talks the way he doesâ€”I've walked with him for 3 years, this is the way he means it. It's just cold fact. I'd put it that way. I think you've got to be [unclearâ€”personable?]

Kissinger : Mr. President, I don't have, this was, if this thing comes up, between you and me we know that West Pakistan is lost. If you can save West Pakistan it will be an unbelievable achievement because West Pakistan has had all its oil supplies destroyed.

Nixon : Yeah.

Kissinger : They've had no spare parts from us for months. Their army is ground down. And 2 more weeks of war and they're finished in the west as much as they are in the east. So if we can save West Pakistan, it would still be a defeat, but we would have done it. And the Chinese will know that. And the Russians will know it. And the Indians will not be happy with it.

Nixon : I don't want the Indians to be happy. I want the Indiansâ€”I want also, put this down, and get Scali in. Use him more. I want a public relations program developed to piss on the Indians. I mean, that atrocity of the [unclear], for example.

Kissinger : Yeah.

Nixon : I want to piss on them for their responsibility. Get a white paper out. Put down, White paper. White paper. Understand that?

Kissinger : Oh, yeah.

Nixon : I don't mean for just your reading. But a white paper on thisâ€”

Kissinger : No, no. I know.

Nixon : I want the Indians blamed for this, you know what I mean? We can't let these goddamn, sanctimonious Indians get away with this. They've pissed on us on Vietnam for 5 years, Henry.

Kissinger : Yeah.

Nixon : And what do we do? Here they are raping and murdering, and they talk about West Pakistan, these Indians are pretty vicious in there, aren't they?

Kissinger : Absolutely.

Nixon : Aren't they killing a lot of these people?

Kissinger : Well, we don't know the facts yet. But I'm sure [unclear] that they're not as stupid as the West Pakistanisâ€”they don't let the press in. The idiot Paks have the press all over their place.

Nixon : Well, the Indians did, oh yes. They brought them in, had pictures of spare tanks and all the rest. Brilliant. Brilliant public relations.

Kissinger : Yeah, but they don't let them in where the civilians are.

Nixon : Oh, I know. But they let them in to take the good shots. The poor, damn Paks don't let them in at all.

Kissinger : Or into the wrong places.

Nixon : Yeah.

Kissinger : The Paks just don't have the subtlety of the Indians.

Nixon : Well, they don't lie. The Indians lie. Incidentally, did Irwin carry out my order to call in the Indian Ambassador?

Kissinger : Oh, yeah. Yeah.

Nixon : He did?

Kissinger : Within an hour.

Nixon : And he told him he would not accept aâ€”what they, well it came out fortuitously, didn't it? The right thing to say at this time.

Kissinger : It could not have worked better. It's all working together.

Nixon : Because we said to them that the acquisition of territory will not be accepted, correct?

Kissinger : Right.

Nixon : And that we had to have their assurance. What did the Ambassador say on [to] these instructions?

Kissinger : Well, he said, "How can you even suspect this?" and "What gave you this idea?"

NEW DELHI: A set of freshly declassified top secret papers on the 1971 war show that US hostility towards India during the war with Pakistan was far more intense than known until now.

The documents reveal that Indira Gandhi went ahead with her plan to liberate Bangladesh despite inputs that the Nixon Administration had kept three battalions of Marines on standby to deter India, and that the American aircraft carrier USS Enterprise had orders to target Indian Army facilities.

This article was first published in English in the Pakistan Navy News, but this version was in the original French and has been translated by the Editor. The article describes the sinking of the Blackwood class frigate Khurkri by the Daphne submarine Hangor.

THE INDIAN-PAKISTANI WAR OF 1971 resulted in the defeat of Pakistan and the transfer of the Pakistani province of Bangladesh to Indian authority. During the war, which lasted less than a month, a Pakistani submarine of the Daphne class, the Hangor, gave chase to two Indian frigates, sank the Khurkri and hit the Kirpan and then escaped from a hunt lasting several days.

Already devastated a year earlier by an exceptionally severe cyclone, Bangladesh was the scene of civil disturbances all through 1971. This agitation, conducted primarily by the Awami League, was very severely suppressed by the Pakistani Government, resulting in hundreds of thousands of victims, and six million refugees made for India.

India, which wished to create an independent state in Bengal, was very preoccupied by the problems arising from the exodus of Bengalis, in Calcutta in particular, and had concluded a treaty of friendship with the USSR on the 9th August 1917. On the signing of this treaty 5,000 tons of war supplies were delivered.

Pakistan on the other hand continued to obtain war supplies from the United States, but France and Britain had stopped all deliveries in July.

The conflict started in October, but the war really began on the 3rd December by an attack in the Israeli fashion with raids on Indian airfields by the Pakistani Air Force. But rapidly the Indians became mistress of the seas and sky. By the 17th December the eastern province was entirely in Indian hands when the Pakistani general Niazzi surrendered his troops on the race track at Dacca. From that time the official existence of Bangladesh began.

On the 9th December 1971, it was a fine evening at the entrance to the Gulf of Cambray, to the north-east of Bombay. At the time the sea was like oil and the night pitch black. On board the Indian frigate Khurkri, the sonar operator Kunwar Pal Singh was on watch. He had just started his watch and once more he tried to believe that he might locate one of these famous Pakistani submarines, the only valuable units in their whole Navy he thought. With such good conditions for operating the sonar he reckoned he could not fail.

While still concentrating his attention on the job, Singh went over the latest sequence of events in his mind. The war had only been going on for six days and the victories had all been on the Indian side. It had started on the first day with a submarine contact in the Bay of Bengal. This was Khurkriâ€™s bad luck as the contact had been on the other side of the sub continent where Indiaâ€™s only carrier, the Vikrant, had been sent to avoid any risk from submarines. In the end the Pakistani submarine Ghazi had been sunk. Although the submarine had been built in the United States during the 1939 war, it did prove that the Indian Navy with its old destroyers and frigates and its Russian instructors was fairly efficient.

After this incident, the Vikrantâ€™s Sea Hawks and Alizes had everything their own way; military and harbour installations in Bengal were bombed and practically destroyed - Chittagong, Coxâ€™s Bazaar, Chandur, Munola, Chalna and Khulna. One of the Alizes which had taken part in the attacks managed to land although badly damaged, and it was said that some escorts had steamed up the delta of the Ganges- Brahmaputra and bombarded Chandpur. Really the Pakistanis were non existent.

The Khurkriâ€™s captain announced to his shipâ€™s company that there had been a great victory near Karachi on the previous evening. The two cruisers Mysore and Delhi (ex HMS Achilles) had been engaged, as well as escorts and also six guided missile patrol boats. At Karachi they must have wondered how these small craft managed to reach the area. It was considered that these small craft had sunk four or five ships on their own. These craft were Soviet built and similar to the Egyptian one that sank the Israeli frigate Eilath.

Pal Singh realised that the frigatesâ€™ zone of surveillance was to protect the Indian forces against submarine attack. Leaving Bombay had not been without some difficulty as there was a big commotion at the entrance of the port in the middle of a minefield designed to attract enemy submarines. The passage through the swept channel had not been too easy. The Khurkri had then started her patrol with Kirpan following a track which seemed to be a rectangle based on the direction Bombay - Karachi. At the same time three trawlers in line ahead carried out a radar sweep in the adjoining sector. Singh tried to imagine what a Pakistani captain would see through his periscope after exhausting his batteries chasing them.

Khurkri sonar operator was thinking about this when a small echo attracted his attention. He was about to analyse the echo when there was a violent explosion followed by several others. Two minutes later all was over, Singh found himself swimming in the sea and oil. He was one of the 67 survivors.

For nearly 30 hours the Pakistani submarine Hangor of the French Daphne class had followed the two Indian frigates, 30 hours during which there had been little sleep for any of the crew, because they felt they were nearly at their goal and their dreams would at last be realised.

Soon the Torpedo Gunnerâ€™s Mate Gulham Ghous would be able to tell his six year old son how he fired the â€˜fishâ€™ which sank the enemy frigate. He would also be able to tell the boy how hard it had been to control the hydroplanes during the hunt as they were making 11 knots at a depth of 32 feet or snorkeling at 12 knots with the valve at the sea end locked open.

But all this was nothing compared with what they had experienced in home waters and in France.

But Commander Taznim ruled the shipâ€™s company with an iron hand and was detested for his harshness while the training progressed. Any mistake was punished severely, sometimes with loss of leave.

But now it was felt that his strictness in training would bear fruit. Ghulam Ghous was ready in the torpedo compartment with his hand on the firing trigger, ready to fire as many torpedoes as necessary to prove to the Indians that Allah alone is Great.

For the Captain as well, Lieutenant Commander Taznim Hamad, those thirty hours had proved very long. But he felt he would gloriously crown his efforts, which had begun by an endless period completing the submarine in France (wonderful people, the French, and they built remarkable submarines; but they lacked the ardour for war).

For nearly a year, since his return to Karachi, he had been forced to start again almost from nothing training his shipâ€™s company. The greater part had left, including his second in command and his torpedo officer. As there were no warships available, he had begun by dummy attacks on merchant ships for three consecutive weeks. Then he had started dummy attacks on the Indian Navy itself in front of Bombay. In this way he acquired an excellent knowledge of this area and of the traffic, tides and underwater currents. He deliberately tested the bearing and range of the Indianâ€™s sonar and their tactics when he deliberately allowed himself to get in contact. He exhausted his attack team, but the crew became so confident that they felt they would always win and their submarine was almost unsinkable.

Shortly before the outbreak of war, the captain found himself forced on account of lack of trained personnel to work up in five days instead of what normally would take a month.

Unfortunately, shortly after reaching the patrol area, the air conditioning system broke down; in the hot weather air conditioning played a vital role not only for the electronic gear. There could be no question of returning in view of the very serious tension between the two countries. So at night they had to come up to the surface showing the fishing lights of a trawler. An Indian warship had approached. What on earth could they do? If they submerged the submarine would be immediately spotted. So they had to stay on the surface ready to launch a torpedo. The warship came within 4,000 metres without using her searchlight and then left.

A little while later, just before the outbreak of war, Commander Taznim had to watch an Indian fleet pass by on a good bearing; these were practically all the ships available to the Indians on the west coast. The captainâ€™s officers and crew begged him to attack. Not having received his orders, he had to let the warships go although it broke his heart to do so.

But now this time the enemy was on a good bearing. At the beginning on the afternoon of the 8th, there had been only two radar echoes, detected twice in the same formation at an interval of one hour; this was enough to class them as warships on a southeasterly course. The hunt began.

continued to change course, which gave the hunter some problems. On the evening of the 8th the enemy was on a north-westerly course, then on the morning of the 9th they changed to a north-easterly course, then to a south-easterly course about noon.

Commander Taznim now realised that the enemy ships had been on a course that described a rectangle. Then at 1900 the ships set a course to the north west. At 1915 Commander Taznim estimated their mean course and dived to attack. He altered course on the frigate on the western side (Kirpan) at very slow speed in order to present the smallest silhouette to the enemyâ€™s sonar. He decided not to hurry the moment of firing, but to wait for the moment the enemy would be on target, judged to be at 2000.

At 2013 a sharp order broke the silence: â€˜Fireâ€˜. Everyone was tense. The torpedo left the tube and was heard moving towards the target, but then they heard it passing under without exploding.

There was no time to criticise this failure. The frigate on the eastern side (Khurkri) passed in her turn at high speed at a range of about 500 metres. There was just time to set the range and at 2017 a second torpedo was fired. At the sonar, Mohamed Miskeen, disappointed with the first firing, concentrated all his efforts on the hydrophones. Suddenly he heard a tremendous roaring - he snatched the hydrophones from his ears and in his joy prostrated himself on the deck shouting â€˜Allah is Great!â€˜

Kirpan returned to pick up survivors and her course brought her in line with the submarine, which promptly fired a third torpedo, but the frigate was prepared for the attack and left at high speed. After 8 or 10 minutes a very clear explosion was heard, followed by the stopping of the Kirpanâ€™s machinery. Commander Taznim considered that he had hit the frigate, but he decided to abandon the attack and made for deep water. Kirpan had a badly damaged stern and was unable to steam, she was finally towed into Bombay.

There followed three days of depth charge attacks by Shackletons, Alizes and escorts. The submarine suffered 156 depth charges, most of which were a long way off. Every time the submarine used the snorkel it was spotted by aircraft, but the escorts led to the position by the aircraft never made contact. Finally the Hangor managed to escape and carry on her mission.

On the morning of the 18th December, a long black silhouette glided into the port of Karachi.

All on board were exhausted but triumphant. The crew were seen lined up on the casing. Commander Taznim felt very strongly about the uncertainty which dominated the capability of his command until the first engagement. Two of his men had broken down during the encounter, one of whom was one of his most capable officers.

Also he thought that he had returned safely because he had taken risks, which would not have been acceptable in peacetime, and had not taken certain risks which his crew would not have been able to sustain.

But his thoughts were interrupted by the fanfare and ovations which came from the quay. The time for risks and loneliness were now finished for him, now came the time for honours.

Kirpan was never hit. Its a lie. Infact the CO of Kirpan was accused of cowardice for running away from battle rather than attack the sub whose position by than was well known. However he escaped as he stated that he did that as his own sonar had failed and he did to be able to return to pick up survivors from Khukhri.

On midnight, 2 December 1971, in an attempt to locate a number of possible enemy contacts, PNS Hangor continued her patrol in a northerly direction to investigate radio transmissions intercepted by on-board monitoring equipment. Two contacts were picked up on passive sonar and were identified as warships. The initial range was 6 to 8 miles. The submarine began to stalk the contacts, but an early attempt to gain an attack position on the identified ships failed when the PNS Hangor could not match the surface ships' speed. The submarine's crew however managed to predict the target ships' movements and succeeded in working its way into a tactically advantageous position along the path of the patrolling frigates by 19:00.

On the night of 2 and 3 December 1971, the PNS Hangor, while lying in wait off Bombay, detected a large formation of ships from Indian Navy's Western fleet which included cruiser INS Mysore. As the Indian Naval fleet passed by Hangor very closely, all transmissions were silenced to avoid detection by the Indian fleet. Upon reinstating communications, the PNS Hangor provided advance intelligence of a possible attack by the observed Indian armada near the Karachi coast and passed an alert to Pakistani forces stationed in Karachi. These transmissions were intercepted and identified by the Indian Navy. On 3 December, the Indian Navy dispatched two ASW frigates, INS Khukri and the INS Kirpan of 14 Squadron - Western Naval Command.

On 9 December 1971, 19:00 hours, PNS Hangor detected the possible signature of the two Indian frigates dispatched in response to the intercepted communications. Later, around midnight, Commander Tasnim ordered the PNS Hangor to dive deep to carry out a blind (Sonar only) approach and attack. The attack team concentrated on tracking the two targets as they gradually came within firing range. At 19:57 the submarine fired a down-the-throat shot with a Homing torpedo at the INS Kirpan from a depth of 40 meters. The torpedo was tracked but no explosion was heard.[3] It was then speculated that the torpedo has missed its target, and the moment INS Kirpan sensed the torpedo, the Captain of INS Kirpan realized that the ship was under attack turned away at maximum speed. Hangor had struck first, but had failed to hit hard.

As INS Kirpan fled the battle, INS Khukri, to its south, knowing the direction from which the torpedo had come, increased speed and came straight for an attack on Hangor. As INS Khukri came in for an attack, Hangorâ€™s attack team shifted targeting to Khukri, quickly obtaining a solution and fired a second torpedo. The second torpedo was fired on the approaching INS Khukri and was followed by a heavy and loud explosion as the torpedo impacted the INS Khukri. Shortly before the impact, Hangor detected the direct orders of INS Khukriâ€™s Commanding Officer Captain Mahendra Nath Mulla ordering evasive maneuvers, however, Khukri was unable to avoid the torpedo. Hangor moved into position to search for possible survivors, however, with the Khukri sinking in matter of two minutes, all hands were lost. The casualty roster listed 18 officers and 176 sailors aboard the INS Khukri. It remains as Indian Navy's most costly wartime casualty in terms of lives lost.

Witnessing the INS Khukri sinking as she did, aggravated the Commanding Officer of her sister ship, the INS Kirpan. The Kirpan engaged the PNS Hangor with a hasty emergency attack. Sinking a pattern of depth charges, the Kirpan hoped to drive the Hangor into retreat. However, Hangor continued the engagement, firing a third torpedo locked on to the INS Kirpan's tail. INS Kirpan quickly disengaged, and increased her speed and successfully evaded the torpedo.[4] Though it is reported that it got damaged in the attack.[5] Hangor disengaged by turning west towards deeper waters. Hangor continued to patrol for another 4 days till the night of 13 December 1971 when she returned safely to her berth. While celebrating her victory, the second half of the mission, with PNS Ghazi under the command of Commander Zafar Muhammad Khan patrolling in water near Vishakapatnam, Bay of Bengal, sank mysteriously when its own mine exploded on it. All hands aboard the PNS Ghazi died when the submarine sank on the night of 4 December 1971.[6]

Hangor had fired three torpedos, one missed and other two hit Khukhi resulting in its sinking. But there were about 60 survivors from Khukri. Kirpan was never hit. Pakistanies gave all the credit to Hangor only to salvage some pride for the massive humiliation they suffered. The IN COI had infact found Capt Mulla, a Kashmiri Pandit of not taking effective anti sub measures while entering sub infected areas and Hangor cud have been detected and sunk had he followed the proper tactics. He was in too much of a hurry to do his job of finishing the sub Hangor. These ships had reached that area after definite info about the presence of this sub in that area based on reports of Periscope sighting by local fishermen.
IN till date does not believe that Hangor sank Khukri as that sub did not have the ability to fire three torpedos within three minutes. We in IN suspect that it was a US sub which did the attack.

We had infact attacked a chinese sub also in bay of bengal in 1971 war which was trying to sneak thru the escorts of Vikrant. It was engaged, damaged so it surfaced and than engaged with guns and than it disappeared.

The Blood telegram (April 6, 1971) was seen as one of the most strongly worded Dissent Channel[4] messages ever written by Foreign Service Officers to the State Department.[5] It was signed by 29 Americans. The telegram stated:

Our government has failed to denounce the suppression of democracy. Our government has failed to denounce atrocities. Our government has failed to take forceful measures to protect its citizens while at the same time bending over backwards to placate the West Pak[istan] dominated government and to lessen any deservedly negative international public relations impact against them. Our government has evidenced what many will consider moral bankruptcy,(...) But we have chosen not to intervene, even morally, on the grounds that the Awami conflict, in which unfortunately the overworked term genocide is applicable, is purely an internal matter of a sovereign state. Private Americans have expressed disgust. We, as professional civil servants, express our dissent with current policy and fervently hope that our true and lasting interests here can be defined and our policies redirected.

In an earlier telegram (March 27, 1971), Blood wrote about American observations at Dhaka under the subject heading "Selective genocide":

1. Here in Decca we are mute and horrified witnesses to a reign of terror by the Pak[istani] Military. Evidence continues to mount that the MLA authorities have list of AWAMI League supporters whom they are systematically eliminating by seeking them out in their homes and shooting them down
2. Among those marked for extinction in addition to the A.L. hierarchy are student leaders and university faculty. In this second category we have reports that Fazlur Rahman head of the philosophy department and a Hindu, M. Abedin, head of the department of history, have been killed. Razzak of the political science department is rumored dead. Also on the list are the bulk of MNA's elect and number of MPA's.
3. Moreover, with the support of the Pak[istani] Military. non-Bengali Muslims are systematically attacking poor people's quarters and murdering Bengalis and Hindus.
(U.S. Consulate (Dacca) Cable, Selective genocide, March 27, 1971)[7]

Although Blood was scheduled for another 18 month tour in Dhaka, President Richard M. Nixon and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger recalled him from that position since his opposition went against their hopes of using the support of West Pakistan for diplomatic openings to China and to counter the power of the Soviet Union.

We had infact attacked a chinese sub also in bay of bengal in 1971 war which was trying to sneak thru the escorts of Vikrant. It was engaged, damaged so it surfaced and than engaged with guns and than it disappeared.

Hangor had targetted Kirpan initially but missed and it than quickly changed its position and targetted Khukri. Of the three torpedos fired, two had hit Khukri. This is what the account of survivors is. It is wrong to say that there were no survivors. It is a story spread by Pakistanies to claim undue bravery and to hide the fact that it was a US sub which attacked Khukri.
I amy have been a naval aviator but i also did my torpedo and anti submarine course and did my sea tenure on ships. I am well aware of the tactics & capabilities of PN and its ships/subs.Sinking of INS Khukri: Was it avoidable?

I can't give you exact details of official IN COI for obvious reasons.

Pakistan army officers got away without being tried for genocide in 1971:
Colonel Anil Athale (retd) identifies India's three blunders in that war.

The 1971 Indo-Pak war was one of those rarest of rare occasions in our history when India took the military initiative.

Politically, the war began in April 1971 when Pakistan pushed nearly nine million refugees into India through a campaign of rape, murder and terror that statistically comes close to Hitler's genocide of Jews in the Second World War, in scale and brutality.

Military force remained the only option when it became clear that the rest of the world had decided to ignore this crime. India bided its time till the winter snows closed the Himalayan passes, rendering Chinese intervention difficult.

Around November 26, 1971, India began to nibble at East Pakistani territory. Pakistan, instead of cutting its losses and calling quits, in a desperate gamble escalated the conflict by launching air/ground attacks in the West on December 3, 1971. By escalation, it hoped to rope in China and the US in widening the conflict and hoped for a UN intervention a la Kashmir.

The Indian Air Force achieved remarkable success when within the first 48 hours it achieved complete air superiority in the Eastern theatre of war. This enabled the advancing army columns to move without any fear of detection even in daytime.

With supply from the air assured, the army did not have to be dependent on opening of roads, which were heavily defended by the Pakistanis. The five division-strong Indian forces advanced from three directions and secured choke points well in the rear.

The bypassed Pak forces had no option but to up stick and attack the Indian troops in order to go back to Dhaka. This was a classic case of 'offensive strategy' and defensive tactics devised by the indomitable General J F R Jacob.

These tactics were reminiscent of the Israeli tactics of 1967 war when they bypassed the Egyptian forces in front and seized the passes in the rear (the Mitla and Giddi passes in the Sinai mountains).

The Indian Army in Bangladesh similarly bypassed the Pakistani forces on the border and headed for the river ferries/crossings/bridges in the rear. This war strategy took advantage of the fact of modern warfare that tactically 'defence' is always stronger than offence.

The Eastern prong led by Lieutenant General Sagat Singh found a chance opening and exploited it. In 24 hours, 12 small helicopters of the air force ferried brigade strength across a mile wide Meghan river.

The Pakistani defenders were totally taken aback and Indian troops reached Dhaka by December 13-14. The navy had blockaded the sea and All India Radio constantly drummed into the Pak soldiers that they had no choice but to surrender.

Surrender by the 93,000 strong garrison was only a matter of time.

It is interesting to note that the Indian troops had less than 1:2 superiority and were on the offensive. Normally that means more casualties. But it is tribute to Indian general-ship that the Indian loss was 2,000 men as against that of Pak at 6,000.

Credit for this goes to the dash and efficiency of the three services. The Bangladesh attack has been compared by many to the famous Blitzkrieg of the Germans. It must be never forgotten that the military success was a joint Indo-Bangladeshi effort.

Without the whole-hearted support from the Bangladeshis, this war could have never been won. The people of Bangladesh paid a very heavy price for their freedom.

In the West, both sides played a waiting game. In northern Kashmir, in the dead of winter, the Indian Army that was better trained and equipped, captured large amount of territory. There were minor losses in Chhamb and in Punjab.

India captured the Shakargarh tehsil in Punjab and many jump-off points on the western front. When the cease fire came on December 17, India had shifted many troops from the East to West and was in a military position to over-run West Pakistan as well.

The move of USS Enterprise and American threats of retaliation as well as Russian caution possibly saved Pakistan. An abortive Pakistani attempt to break through in Rajasthan at Longewala was foiled by a dogged infantry and the Indian Air Force that came to the army's rescue.

The navy in the course of the war sunk the Pakistani Ghazi submarine and also raided Karachi harbour. The air force carried out limited attacks only on military targets.

All in all, the 1971 war was a comprehensive victory for India and Bangladesh.

India's three strategic blunders:

In 1971 India lost a golden opportunity to sever the Sino-Pak communications by land and threaten the Karakoram highway.

In the 1971 war, all attention was focussed on the Eastern front. The Indian successes in Punjab, Shakargad, Chicken's Neck near Akhnoor, the thrust towards Naya Chor in the deserts were substantial. We also lost Chhamb in Jammu and Kashmir and small areas in the Fazilka sector.

The rest of the Cease Fire Line (as it was then called) was quiet with the exception of some 'local' initiatives in Ladakh, largely due to the valiant efforts of the great Colonel Rinchon and his Ladakh Scouts.

Kashmir was not an issue at all in that war.

Later at the Simla Peace Conference, India brought in the Kashmir issue. The conversion of the Cease Fire Line (agreed as per the Karachi agreement of 1949) was converted to the LOC or Line of Control, a sort of half-way house between the Cease Fire Line and the international border.

Though not marked on the ground, it is marked on the map in great detail after a ground survey. But at the conference in Simla, it was also agreed to let each side retain the territory captured by each other in Jammu and Kashmir.

In spite of extensive study of all the official documents connected with this war (including the minutes of the meeting of the Cabinet Committee on Political Affairs, the top decision-making body in the country at the time), there is no hint that this was a considered policy of the government of India before the war and that the armed forces were aware of it.

In the 1971 war in Kashmir, Pakistan gained some territory in Chhamb as the Indian Army poised for an offensive was caught off guard by the Pakistani attack. A determined Pakistani attack against the city of Poonch was thwarted by superior Indian strength.

India captured strategic outposts in the Kargil area, posts that dominated the Srinagar-Ladakh road link and was a constant irritant. In a war fought at the height of winter, the better-trained and equipped Indian mountain troops also captured vast areas north of Leh in the Partapur and Turtuk sector.

The recognition India gave the 'Kashmir dispute' in the Simla Agreement was a blunder

On the western front, much of the military effort was concentrated in the plains sector in Punjab, gains that had to be given up. On the other hand, an excellent opportunity to consolidate Kashmir or liberate Pak-occupied area was wasted.
If India had plans to retain the captured territory in Jammu and Kashmir a major thrust towards Skardu or Gilgit could have threatened the land access between Pakistan and China.

Unlike in 1965 when the Chinese served an ultimatum, in 1971 the Soviet build-up on the Sino-Soviet border on the Amur river border (of almost 44 divisions from the normal 3 or 4) kept China out of this conflict. An opportunity that is unlikely to present itself in the future.

As India faces a Sino-Pak joint military threat in the north, one can only wonder the effect this blunder has had. It is difficult to blame the military leadership for this as in retrospect it appears that the decision to retain gains in Kashmir was a 'spur of the moment after thought.'

It is amazing to note the cavalier manner in which issues of war and peace continue to be dealt in independent India.

The second blunder was the explicit recognition that India gave to the 'Kashmir dispute' in the Simla Agreement.

Zulfikar Ali Bhutto came to Simla as the head of a defeated nation with nothing to bargain. 93,000 Pakistani prisoners were in India and the tehsil of Shakargarh as well as large tracts of desert were under Indian occupation.

The Pakistani State itself was tottering and the only card Bhutto had was to play on the Indian need to have a viable Pakistan survive. Using his weakness dexterously, Bhutto made sure that India could never drive a hard bargain.

All that Pakistan conceded at Simla was that it would not use force to solve the Kashmir problem and it would deal with the issue bilaterally. It is indeed astonishing that a militarily weak and defeated nation promising 'non use of force' against another country ten times its size, being seen as a concession.
This naivete was to cause immense difficulties in the future. The acceptance of the disputed status of Kashmir was a major diplomatic blunder and India continues to pay a heavy price for it. In the words of a sports commentator, India snatched diplomatic defeat from the jaws of victory.

Pandit Nehru was the original Ashoka of modern times. Out of all the historical period great rulers of India, that include Chandragupta, Samudragupa or Vikramaditya, Ashoka seems to fascinate all.

From Nehru to Vajpayee and now Manmohan Singh, all want to emulate the great emperor and usher in peace. Even a supreme realist and tough leader like Indira Gandhi succumbed to this temptation at Simla in 1972.

Indians have forgotten that Ashoka embarked upon his 'peace offensive' only after the Kalinga victory. 1971 was a decisive victory only in the East, and the Pakistan army remained largely undefeated in the West.

Indians do not still realise that international agreements are honoured for either of the two reasons -- The agreement gives some tangible benefit to the countries involved or breaking of the agreement can mean loss for the violator.

The Simla Agreement was honoured by Pakistan till such time as the Indian troops did not vacate captured territory and the Pakistani prisoners did not return. Once these two short-term objectives were achieved, Pakistan found no reason to go on to implement the next step -- normalisation of relations.

Improvement in relations and people-to-people contacts were never permitted by Pakistan and the hoped for atmosphere to tackle the Kashmir issue never built up.

Today after violating all the other clauses of the Simla Agreement, Pakistan now harps on Article 6 that had provided for Indo-Pak talks at head of the government level to solve the Kashmir issue.

This is sheer sophistry, but effective diplomacy and the Indian diplomats have been stumped.

But the greatest blunder was to let the Pakistani army get away with its 'genocide' in Bangladesh.

There is massive evidence of Pakistani army brutality in Bangladesh. The evidence is from Pakistani sources itself, the Justice Hamidur Rehman Commission Report. Some of the testimony in that report makes very chilling reading, even 40 years after the event.

There is a mountain of evidence about Pakistani army atrocities. What did the Government of India do? We banned the short film made by S Sukhdeo, Nine Months to Freedom at Bhutto's request. The Pakistani army selectively targeted Hindus, members of the Awami League and Bangladesh intellectuals. It was a well known secret that the bulk of the refugees (close to 70 per cent) were Hindus.

Rumour has it that even the much maligned right wing organisation in India kept quiet on this issue so that communal peace in India should not be disturbed. The playing down of Pakistani genocide let a Rogue Army escape the consequences of its misbehaviour.

India only stored trouble for the future. The Nazis were tried for massacring the Jews, the Khmer Rouge, Saddam Hussein, Serbian militants, all faced international courts -- only the Pakistani army got away with murder, rape and loot.

While Bangladesh attempts to get justice for the victims, India is silent.

Colonel Dr Anil Athale (retd) is a former head of the War Studies Division, ministry of defence. He is currently the coordinator of Inpad, a Pune-based think-tank.

Veteran diplomat Henry Kissinger, the architect of the US' historic opening to China, has denied that that the US struck a secret pact with India to prevent an attack on West Pakistan in 1971.

Known in India for unflattering comments on former prime minister Indira Gandhi, he sought to correct the picture, saying he always thought she was "an extremely strong and far-sighted woman".

"India and the former Soviet Union had made a near-alliance around this time. It was in the national interest of the US to preserve West Pakistan," said Kissinger, a Nobel Peace laureate, while delivering the keynote address at the India Today Conclave Friday night.

He was reacting to the perception in strategic community that after the 1971 war, which led to the split of Pakistan and the creation of Bangladesh, the US asked India not to strike against West Pakistan.

With the Indian Army moving into East Pakistan Dec 4, 1971, Nixon resorted to gunboat diplomacy and sent the Seventh Fleet led by the nuclear powered aircraft carrier USS Enterprise into the Bay of Bengal.

"Each side did what it had to do. Each acted on its own national interest which clashed for a brief moment," he said.

Kissinger surprised many in India by revising his much-quoted opinion of Indira Gandhi which became public after White House tapes of the Nixon presidency were declassified in 2005.

"I was under pressure and made those comments in the heat of the moment. People took those remarks out of context," Kissinger said, adding that he had the "highest regard" for Indira Gandhi.

She was an extremely strong woman who acted in India's national interest and a far-sighted woman as a far as foreign policy is concerned, said the 89-year-old Kissinger.

The declassified tapes reveal Nixon calling then Indian prime minister Indira Gandhi an "old witch" and Kissinger agreeing with that assessment and reiterating that expression in their conversation.

Speaking on the Making of an Asian Century, Kissinger, the architect of President Nixon's historic visit to China in 1972 and the author of the bestselling "On China", advocated "a balance of power" in the Asian continent.

It would not be in India's national interests to allow a dominant power or a transnational power that would intrude into its sphere of influence, from Singapore to East Africa, he suggested.

When asked whether China would treat India as an equal, he said China would treat India respectfully, but suggested that India, China and the US would have to work together to balance China's internal forces that had the potential to destabilize it.

He said he believed in the long-term compatibility of the India-US interests and described India as "a key country" in the evolving global geopolitical landscape.

^^ I have always maintained - increasing economic progress and growth will solve all our problems. All these Kissinger-Pissinger fellows are speaking this way only because of the way India has developed economically in the last decade or two. If India had still been the strife-torn India of the 1980s with the NehruGandhi rate of growth, I can bet my arse that Kissinger wouldn't have said what he said here.