Considered and decided by Hudson,
Presiding Judge, Randall, Judge, and Peterson, Judge.

U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O
N

RANDALL, Judge

On appeal from a conviction of fourth-degree DWI,
appellant challenges the legality of the initial stop of his vehicle. Because the information reported to police
dispatch by an identified citizen tipster contained sufficient indicia of
reliability to justify an investigatory stop, we affirm.

FACTS

On September 20, 2002, at
approximately 11:44 p.m., Officer Dacian Bienek of the Crookston Police
Department received a report from dispatch that a vehicle was “driving all over
the road” and “coming into Crookston on Hwy 2 from East Grand Forks.” The vehicle was described as a “white over
gray colored car” reportedly moving at a “high rate of speed.” The citizen informant also stated that the
vehicle had North Dakota license plates.
The informant followed the vehicle in question and continued to talk to
dispatch by cellular phone. The
informant identified herself as a driver observing the conduct described.

A few minutes after receiving the
call from dispatch, Officer Bienek was traveling on Highway 2 when he observed
a white and gray vehicle that appeared to be traveling at a “high rate of
speed” in a 55 mph zone. While driving
by, he shined his spotlight on the car from across the highway in an effort to
get the driver to slow down. Officer
Bienek then turned around, and activated his emergency lights to get the
vehicle to stop. He reported that the
driver was traveling at such a high rate of speed that the vehicle “began to pull
away from [his] squad car.”
Subsequently, Officer Bienek advised all responding units that the
vehicle was not stopping. He then
observed the vehicle turn right onto County Road 61, and Deputy Hanson follow
right behind it. Deputy Hanson advised
Officer Bienek that he stopped the vehicle in the AmericInn parking lot in
Crookston.

When Officer Bienek approached the
vehicle, he observed appellant standing in front of the vehicle. He also observed that all seats were
occupied except the driver’s seat.
While speaking with appellant, Officer Bienek smelled a strong odor of
alcohol emanating from appellant.
Appellant stated that he was the owner of the vehicle, that he had had
only one drink, and that he was coming from downtown Grand Forks. Officer Bienek observed that appellant’s
eyes were red and watery. Officer
Bienek reported that he administered three field sobriety tests, which
appellant either failed or refused to take.[1]

Based on this information, Officer
Bienek arrested appellant for Driving While Impaired (DWI). Appellant moved to suppress the evidence
obtained as a result of his DWI arrest, asserting that Officer Bienek stopped
his vehicle without a reasonable articulable suspicion of criminal activity. The district court denied appellant’s motion
to suppress. On February 13, 2002, the
district court found appellant guilty of fourth-degree DWI in violation of
Minn. Stat. § 169A.27, subd. 1(1) (2002).
This appeal followed.

In accordance with the Fourth
Amendment, a police officer may not stop a vehicle without a specific and
articulable suspicion of a violation. Marben v. State, Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 294
N.W.2d 697, 699 (Minn. 1980); Terry v.
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1880 (1968). An officer may rely on the observations of
another person when forming specific and articulable suspicion. Marben,
294 N.W.2d at 699. A private citizen
who provides information relevant to a stop is presumed reliable. Id. But the informant’s tip must contain sufficient “indicia of reliability”
to justify a traffic stop. Olson v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 371
N.W.2d 552, 556 (Minn. 1985).

The reliability of the informant’s
information is judged on “identifying information given by the informant” and
“the facts that support the informant’s assertion” that a traffic stop is
warranted. Jobe v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 609 N.W.2d 919, 921 (Minn. App.
2000). Neither factor is separately
dispositive, and the determination of whether the officer had a reasonable
suspicion of a criminal activity at the time of the stop is based on the
totality of the circumstances. Id.
The informant’s personal observation of the suspected conduct is also
deemed relevant to the reliability of a tip.
See Payle v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety,
439 N.W.2d 747, 749 (Minn. App. 1989) (upholding stop where circumstances
indicated that caller, who identified himself as a Burger King employee,
personally made reported observations).

Identifying
Information

Appellant argues
that the citizen informant is unreliable because the informant was anonymous,
and the informant’s information was not corroborated. We disagree. This court
has distinguished between anonymous and identifiable informants. Rose
v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 637 N.W.2d 326, 329-30 (Minn. App. 2001). An informant who provides sufficient
identifying information is not “anonymous,” even if the informant does not
provide a name. Sheperd, 420 N.W.2d at 890-91 (holding that caller who identified
himself as an attendant at particular gas station and reported a drunk driver
was sufficient identifying information to find the tip reliable); Playle, 439 N.W.2d at 748 (holding that
caller who identified himself as a Burger King employee was enough information
to make his tip about a drunk driver reliable). Even if the informant is unnamed, an officer is justified in
presuming the informant is truthful in identifying himself if the informant
provides sufficient information to locate him and hold him accountable for
providing false information. Sheperd, 420 N.W.2d at 890-91; Playle, 439 N.W.2d at 748.

In Marben, a truck driver radioed a state
trooper while driving on the freeway. Marben, 294 N.W.2d at 698. The truck driver told the trooper that he could see
the trooper’s squad car parked alongside the freeway andasked the trooper to
check out a vehicle that was tailgating him.
Id. He also told the trooper that the vehicle in question was exiting
from the freeway onto a nearby highway.
Id. Subsequently, the trooper followed the vehicle, noticed no
improper driving violations, and pulled over the suspect. Id. The court found that the truck driver was
reliable and the stop was valid. Id.
The court reasoned that, although he did not state his name, the truck
driver was reliable because the truck driver was able to describe his location
in relation to the trooper’s car and the suspect’s vehicle. Id.
at 699. The court also found the truck
driver reliable because the trooper was able to verify that the trucker driver
was in the area and in close proximity to the suspect’s car. Id.

Here, like the truck
driver in Marben, the informant
followed the suspect while talking to dispatch by cellular phone. Also, like the truck driver in Marben, the informant was able to
describe her location and the location of the vehicle in question. The informant stated that she was following
a vehicle heading into Crookston on Highway 2.
A few minutes later, Officer Bienek drove onto Highway 2 and located the
suspect. Therefore, like the truck
driver in Marben, the informant
adequately described her location and proximity so that Officer Bienek could
verify her location and information.
The standard requires a presumption of citizen-informant reliability
based on the totality of the circumstances.
Thus, like the truck driver in Marben,
the informant here can be deemed reliable.

Facts Offered to Support Informant’s
Assertion

The facts offered by the informant
were sufficient to support informant’s conclusion that appellant was “driving
all over the road” and at a “high rate of speed.” The factual basis required to support a stop for a routine
traffic check is minimal. State v. McKinley, 305 Minn. 297, 300,
232 N.W.2d 906, 909 (1975). Simply put,
the stop must not be “the product of mere whim, caprice, or idle
curiosity.” State v. Munson, 594 N.W.2d 128, 136 (Minn. 1999) (quotation
omitted.). Further, a court may
conclude that any information given by an informant to a dispatcher is imputed
to the officer effecting the stop under the collective-knowledge doctrine. See State v. Riley, 568 N.W.2d 518,
523 (Minn. 1997); Olson, 371 N.W.2d at 555 (applying collective-knowledge
doctrine to information relayed through dispatcher).

Here,
the informant followed behind appellant’s vehicle and personally observed the
vehicle “driving all over the road” and traveling at a “high rate of speed”
into the city of Crookston on Highway 2.
The informant gave this information to the dispatcher along with a
description of the car. She stated that
the vehicle was a “white over gray colored car” with North Dakota license
plates. After receiving this
information, Officer Bienek, confirmed the informant’s observations when he
personally observed the white and gray vehicle driving by him on Highway 2 “at
a high rate of speed” in a 55 mph zone.
Officer Bienek had additional suspicion when appellant’s car did not
stop after he activated his spotlight and emergency lights. The facts relayed by the informant,
including the description of the vehicle, its location and conduct, along with
Officer Bienek’s confirmation that the vehicle was traveling at a high rate of
speed was sufficient to support an investigatory stop.

Officer’s Reasonable Articulable Suspicion

Appellant contends that the officer was too vague about the speed of
appellant’s car and that the evidence was insufficient to find that appellant
was attempting to evade the law. We
disagree.

A police
officer’s assessment of the need for a traffic stop is based on all the
circumstances, including the officer’s general knowledge and experience, the
officer’s personal observations, the nature of the offense suspected, the time,
the location, and anything else that is relevant, and the officer draws
inferences and makes deductions that might well elude an untrained person. State
v. Dalos, 635 N.W.2d 94, 95-96 (Minn. App. 2001). An officer’s observation of a traffic violation presents an
objective basis to support a traffic stop.
State v. Shellito,
594 N.W.2d 182, 185 (Minn. App. 1999) (stop justified where it was based on
defendants’ driving at an excessive speed); State v. Richardson, 622
N.W.2d 823, 825-26 (Minn. 2001) (officer’s independent observation of erratic
driving, which included crossing of fog and center lines, after receiving
report from another driver that vehicle was “all over the road” was sufficient
to support stop). Furthermore, an
officer’s credibility as a witness is a matter for the fact finder. State
v. Pieschke, 295 N.W.2d 580 (Minn. 1980).

Here,
Officer Bienek observed appellant’s driving at a “high rate of speed” in a 55 mph
zone and attempted to get him to stop.
These facts alone, justify the stop.
Even though Officer Bienek did not specify the exact rate of speed at
which appellant was driving, the speed was excessive enough that he made
several attempts to slow appellant’s vehicle down. First, Officer Bienek shined his spotlight on appellant’s car in
an effort to get him to slow down.
Next, Officer Bienek turned around, and activated his emergency lights
to try to get the vehicle to stop.
Officer Bienek then states in his report that the driver was traveling
at such a high rate of speed that the vehicle “began to pull away from [his]
squad car.” At that point, he contacted
all responding units and stated that the vehicle was not stopping. The court found Officer Bienek credible when
Bienek reasoned that appellant was speeding and attempting to evade the law.

Officer Bienek had a reasonable
articulable suspicion, on his own observations, to stop appellant; that,
coupled with the informant’s personal observations, easily met the threshold
for a good stop.

The district court did not err in
denying appellant’s motion to suppress.

Affirmed.

[1] Officer Bienek gave appellant instructions on how to perform the
horizontal gaze nystagmus test. He
stated that appellant did not pass this test.
Officer Bienek then asked appellant to perform a walk and turn test, but
appellant refused, stating that he recently had surgery on his legs and had
very bad arthritis. Officer Bienek also
asked appellant to take a preliminary breath test (PBT). Appellant stated that he had asthma, but he
tried to perform the test. Officer
Bienek reported that appellant would not close his lips around the mouthpiece. Officer Bienek stated that when he placed a
new mouthpiece on the PBT, appellant “huffed” into the mouthpiece and the
screen read .082. Officer Bienek
determined that the sample was extremely poor and considered this to be a
refusal.