Max Boot Examines the History of Guerrilla Warfare

1/22/2014 6:50PM

Historian Max Boot, author of "Invisible Armies," explores the history of guerrilla warfare which he calls the "dominant form of warfare throughout history." "Uncommon Knowledge with Peter Robinson" is a production of the Hoover Institution.

This transcript has been automatically generated and may not be 100% accurate.

... the warfare of ... an invention ... of the Vietnamese ... think again ... think back for a thousand years ago ... with this today Max pooped ... author of ... invisible ... army ... uncommon Knowledge ... now ... the the the the ... I ... welcome to uncommon knowledge on Peter Robinson ... the gene J Kirkpatrick senior fellow and National Security studies at the Council on Foreign Relations Max boot is a journalist ... and military historian whose books include ... the savage wars of peace small wars on the rise of American power ... and war made new ... technology warfare in the course of history ... fifteen hundred to today ... Max whose newest book ... the invisible Army's an epic history of Carrillo warfare ... from ancient times to the present ... Max boot welcome ... thanks for coming on Peter ... my pleasure ... define ... who were low warfare ... well it's a little but like pornography you know when you see it but it's a little hard to ... nail it down and current essentially it's ... using hit and run tactics by forces that typically don't wear uniforms ... and don't have ... all the paraphernalia of conventional military ... forces and US Census everything except ... conventional war spitting one regular uniformed army against another ... which in fact everything else ... is the vast majority of human conflict ... when you you anticipating what get me out in Spanish means little more to ... come in the term was actually calling ... during the Peninsular War oh one the Spanish resisted the French ... legions of Napoleon from eighteen oh wait ... to eighteen fourteen but the practice of describes ... his is a Ciena's mankind has gone by many different names ... both in the old listened to the next question then can be a little war ... with the notes and bibliography ... invisible armies comes over seven hundred pages ... why is the rule of warfare so important ... that you devoted several years of your life too ... while six years and over seven hundred pages and I believe a lot out because the more you walk ... the more grown warfare and five ... this is that I'm on a form of warfare through August computer I mean it's amazing ... how important ... and how pervasive it is ... we have a tendency to say ... all Walter Raleigh how many of the war since World War two the Korean War ... the typical four ... and we forget that all the wars going on on the world right now ... are on conventional wars in regular wars ... the rulers in places like ... Syria Afghanistan Iraq ... and elsewhere ... and that's not on common ... you talk about uncommon Knowledge Wall this is a common form of warfare ... this is the way it's always been this is not an anomaly ... it's always been this way ... so why runaway describing is the dominant form of warfare through August Reagan so naturally to some the top ... it takes a few pages already ... um ... beautifully written pages ... invisible armies begins in Mesopotamia ... it's more than two thousand years BC runs to the present ... so we go across some more than four thousand years of history Mesopotamia roamed the British Empire ... French Indochina contemporary Afghanistan in Iraq ... and I'm struck by two characteristics of the book one is ... the new business and particulary good with which to write about ... these widely differing times and places to get every ... there's relatively little abstraction ... each each ... moment or conflict which are writing about and get its due as its own entity ... and yet you close the book ... with twelve lessons ... highly analytical ... so how can it be ... that such disparate events ... across ... more than four millennia ... can have enough uncommon to represent in fact I think that the implicit argument of the book is ... that studying guerrilla warfare represents a branch of military history into it the verb represent the discipline ... how can that be ... well obviously there's a lot of ... differences between growers and grow low warfare is really ... the most ... distinctive in particular form of warfare and someone is because it's rooted ... in very individual conditions and to really understand ... why girls fight and how to defeat them ... you really have to understand the society ... and its grievances ... Natal ... but the same time ... are also commonalities and Grillo's ... or dislike conventional military forces ... they study the text which offered a realist ... effect this has been one of the big changes ... in warfare in the last hundred years is that ... prior to but say the nineteen Sentry guerrillas were isolated from one another ... the Su who were fighting on North Americans ... claims against American settlers ... didn't know what the Zillow's were going in southern Africa ... even though they were facing very similar adversaries ... but in the last hundred years there's been a commonality of knowledge ... which has brought along not only ... countered surge in forces ... but also long insurgent forces ... and they've really both sides of the land in an attempt to ... learn lessons from history ... Heidi you fight ... as an insurgent or Heidi you counterinsurgency ... then there are some general commonalities that have emerged ... a which I think are very relevant for me think about the course of ... conflicts the day in so that so I try to bring out ... at the end of the book ... after trying to give each particular story is do ... as an applique ... hand as I saw that deserves its own ... telling us Don't ... of place in the historical handles ... with the computer lessons ... as a way of getting into the book ... well ... in every case have simply quoting the lesson you present an invisible armies quote ... cool warfare has been ubiquitous ... you've already mentioned that ... and important ... throughout history ... you going to say for example that the United States again according to the United States reached its present borders ... only by waging ... green centuries of unremitting warfare ... against Indian ... your regulars ... the United States is more like from its very ... inception we can think of of of of peaceful columnists ... few troubles with the Indians here and there on skirmishes and then comes the American Revolution ... and then the war of eighteen twelve on them fundamentally ... calm until the civil war but ... the background here's three centuries of colonial ... fighting against ... absolutely we don't like to think of ourselves as Ben Marshall but ... of course up so we've been from day one because as soon as the first settlers were landing ... on the eastern shore of North America they were fighting the people already here ... the American Indian tribes in the Warford and then ... until eighteen ninety ... and those Indians were superb fighters per borrowers' ... but they did not March on maths information to cannot stand ... in irregular battle line like the ... infantry of the day did in the Western world ... they fought and using skirmishes ambushes rates ... using the elements of style surprise there were basically guerrilla fighters and that was fighting them ... was the dominant mission ... of the U S Army one was in in case another complex but every other conflict also had ... a major ... irregular warfare face when it was the revolutionary War ... of the Sobel Wharton will work to have a lot of the regular operations ... this kind of warfare ... we have to do was look you find ... the ... next soup ... the the ... the cavalry rates ... in the civil war ... I tend to think of them is the kind of ... exception to the rule of ... Li Xin control his strategist he's got is forcing maneuver Force Reserve and ... Grant is doing the same thing and then you've got these fellows doing odd ... leading ... essentially irritation rates but that's not quite ... right then that those cavalry raids were operating within a tradition ... that was already pretty deeply rooted in American military history ... absolutely the Bush lockers for example the southern growers to operate in the Surrey ... were major that was the major part of the war and and and a lot of the Western States ... it certainly did not decide the outcome of this of Warwick was primarily conventional ... one of the interesting points about how the civil war and it was ... the fact that the Confederate army choose to accept surrender in mathematics ... or as they in fact could've continued fighting ... Bigger Role warfare for years and Robert E Lee ... decided not to do that because he understands ... health fighting guerrilla war ... destroys the very fabric of society ... and destroys ... the ability of both men of wealth and land like them ... to control ... costs society in the way they wanted to ... were saying that today for example in Syria were grown warfare is the strongest of the fabric of Syrian society ... that's what probably the one told what he wanted to fight ... and a primarily conventional mode ... as by the way did towards Washington ... in the Revolutionary War for very similar reasons because they understood ... while grow a war for can be an effective tactic ... that also carries a heavy cost ... coup will or warfare has been both ... underestimated ... and over ... it ... well I think ... I would say you know prior two months in nineteen forty five or so there was a tendency for military ... men in the last Roman world ... to kind of look down their noses at the role is to say they're not ... there ... are savages they don't fight the way that all my are supposed to fly ... there you know beneath contempt and yet even in the pre twenty ascension career ... there been instances of Korea was defeated conventional armies ... for example look at the way that anyone it's ... very sellers and bloody ... war of independence ... in the seventeen nineties when they defeated tens of thousands ... of Napoleon's troops ... using hit and run tactics ... but now since nineteen forty five there's been a tendency to go on the opposite direction ... and to hold off Corliss Aziz ... ten foot tall super humans ... who could not possibly be defeated ... by military force ... Morsi because of the success of a handful ... of high-profile insurgents like ... malice late on coaching men Fidel Castro ... Baker willingness to develop ... in the nineteen sixties ... which is exaggerated because if you look ... at the fate of most insurgencies even ... in the post nineteen forty five period ... most of them still lose ... invisible armies ... although often able to fight for years and has put great losses on their enemies guerrillas have seldom achieve their objectives carriers have been even less successful calls go ... alike come in a moment ... more fully to consider the implications of your findings ... for ... America to present moment ... bought ... this question of overestimating ... guerrillas and terrorists is the second World War ... the kind of ... film a ... preliminary finding is that we should get in some way be and duly under ... by nine eleven even nine eleven ... they are still ... terrorists or grill is unconventional forces fighting within a pattern ... write will nine eleven certainly ... takes terrorism to a new bubble we haven't seen before but ... and there are certainly differences between al Cato and previous ... terrorist or a grower groups but there's also a lot of commonalities ... and one of those commonalities says that ... even in the years he's gonna love this graphic terrible attack ... okay that has not really been able to achieve its objectives ... when the Khona makes my point ... they were seeking to drive America out of the Middle East and in many ways I actually ... made us become more involved in the Middle East ... and they certainly have not succeeded in taking no for a lot of countries ... as they'd hoped to do ... so even this were productive while once so far ... has been banned from the ... perspective of a cat ... invisible arms once again the most important development in global warfare in the last two hundred years ... has been the rise of public ... that's really been a game changer and you know ... we really saw that became first began to change ... he was on our very own war of independence ... because ... you know we tend to think that the battle ended in your town in seventeen eighty one that was the last major battle of the ... American Revolution ... the second half to be the last major bubble ... because even after your town ... the British Empire still has ... tens of thousands of troops ... because of going into the fray ... and I can guarantee you that far for founding fathers ... had been fighting off the British Empire ... but the Roman Empire ... the result would not including ... Washington Adams Jefferson the rest ... what Obama being crucified quite literally literally ... the reason why didn't happen in the present is this was not because the British Empire ... was truly defeated ... on the battlefield they still have ample resources to fight ... that the reason I chose not to do so ... was because Parliament turned against the war ... in seventeen eighty two ... there was a pivotal vote in the House of Commons ... to discontinue often sub operations there was a very close vote ... but it was a ... wondrous repudiation award more than the Tories who wanted to fight ... and it led to the rise of war propaganda swings ... who are committed to a policy of conciliation ... with their American broker ... collapse revolutionary truly revolutionary ... the fact that this great power has the capacity to keep fighting but chooses not to do so ... because it's public turns against the conflict ... that's not something that happened very often ... if ever ... prior to the eighteenth century but of course it's happened ... quite a few times since the ... Vietnam ... I was one of the biggest examples on in the last couple hundred years ... of the same pattern repeating itself ... um ... on the same point of public opinion Max invisible armies of pudding will to Get Today insurgency and counterinsurgency up the which not only in the ground in cyberspace ... and on satellite TV season rolls were innovative Islam is groups that is ok to and Hezbollah ... have excelled and more hidebound conventional militaries have black clothes quo ... how would you grade the United States ... for waging the war of public opinion ... model click we've done a very good job and I think are ... our military and political leaders to be the first to admit it that it's very hard for us ... to to counter ... the claims that these ... propagandists make and in cyberspace another Rome's ... now the good news from our perspective this the fall but were not for a good way to the stubble of ideas ... many of the things that are enemies to ... discredit themselves with public opinion ... because they are so for Roche's insulin utility from fellow Muslims ... that ... their reputation in the Moslem world has gone down dramatically over the course of the past ten years ... so in many ways they are their own worst enemies we have not been on a scuffle with say ... the calendar propaganda you draw a distinction between the Bush administration and the Obama administration ... in the effort to wage the war ... of public opinion ... Brock Obama went to K were Cairo gave a speech ... just earlier this autumn he met with the president of Iran in ... the United Nations both of these obviously calculated at least in part ... to have an effect on Islamist opinion right or ... opinion in the Middle East generally ... I don't think you can say that President Obama spent a lot of success ... in selling the United States the Moslem world ... yes you got good press for his Cairo speech but ... if you actually look of American public approval ratings ... in countries across the Middle East in many cases are lower than the war ... under the under the Bush presidency ... and with present Obama style reached ... two wrong ... and his handling of Syria and whatever you may think of those individuals than says ... the result of that has been a declining confidence ... in many countries in the Arab world ... better up close to the rain regime that are opposed to the Assad regime in Syria ... they want to see a tougher American line ... until they happen ... you know the reputation of ... the US on a present Obama are are not high and most of that region ... conventional tactics don't work against them on conventional threat ... well this is the hardest thing for ... for a normal soldier to wrap his or her mind around because ... there's a tendency for soldiers to think ok we've got an enemy ... let's go down on what's uses much firepower is renewed let's ... with them not destroy them annihilate them ... boy yes now works at the enemy is wearing uniforms in Osaka where they are ... you can go on an island from the problem ... when you're fighting picker will follow as ... they're not wearing a uniform ... if you go out there he just kill a bunch of people you round up a bunch of people ... you may wind up ... creating more enemies ... the new laminate ... that's one of the most ... basic lessons ... of counterinsurgency warfare and yet it's a lesson ... that we ignored for many years in Vietnam and its allies have ignored again ... in the early years of Iraq ... and was all when we start a figure that out in Iraq and the surge ... in two thousandseven two thousandeight ... but our military fortunes began to rivers ... population centric and quoting once again from invisible and ... population centric ... counterinsurgency ... is often successful ... but it's not as touchy feely ... as commonly supposed ... population centric counterinsurgency ... is another term for what's more often called hearts and minds ... a lot of people of this idea ... of hearts and minds of the need to go out and spend a lot of money by the when the love and support ... of the popular No schools build grow write all that with all the touchy feely kind of stuff in fact we did that ... in both Iraq and Afghanistan for years ... and we wasted billions of dollars in the process ... because the whole art lesson of history is ... ok people may like having a new hospital ... and they like having a new school ... but they're not going to support you if it's going to result in them getting killed ... fundamental matters of security ... are what matter most ... and if you can establish the basic security that can ... protect the populace from the insurgents ... all the money you're spending on ... public works projects ... it's all gonna go down the drain or may actually support the insurgents that ... city got it ... the hearts and mind population centric counterinsurgency is really ... it's not about winning the love and affection of the population ... it's about controlling the population it's about ... putting our troops out among the people ... twenty four seven ... so late in the same way that the police patrol a major city all the time ... to keep crime a band and to ... reassure the people they are safe ... what you're eating of the Pentagon as an entity ... Hezekiah this lets them down now ... this the Iraq withdrawal it was in some ways that just it in the sense at least that was a two phase war Phase one we get everything wrong face two things start to come around because we change their tactics ... in that sense the least it was a parallel experience to Vietnam to be learned ... I'm not so certain I am I see a lot of the same ... process that we saw after Vietnam was trying to consign this experience to honor ... the memory hole ... although there's a lot of tremendous experience in the millet re now I mean are our military as result of Iraq and Afghanistan ... has really become the finest counterinsurgency force in the world ... but right now they're not focused on ... keeping that knowledge and the capability and bandwidth are focused on right now ... is on cutting the budget ... in a lot of people watch on our side order from the fight another ground war again ... so we can just of this with your mean let's put all of our money ... into the Navy and Air Force which have very little interest of course ... in counterinsurgency and so I'm afraid ... the insurgencies the ground and it's all was going to give ground in obvious ways that you know obviously there are a hassle or supporting role but fundamentally it is common ground and ... until you know insurgents are not to have the capability ... to top line with our fighter aircraft ... all they have the capability to attack ... our troops are others on the ground and that's what they're going to ... invisible music and ... establishing legitimacy is vital for any successful insurgency or counterinsurgency in in modern times that is hard ... to achieve for foreign group ... government ... and you made the point ... that ... when we radiation counterinsurgency in the Philippines ... we're supporting ... the legitimate democratically established ... government ... bought ... Wells scored two was more of a challenge to achieve legitimacy was more of a shell of itself in on Afghanistan and Iraq where the United States was trying to create legitimate governments from scratch ... can we create legitimate governments from scratch ... I think it is possible but it's very hard to do I mean we sort of that in the case of South Korea which is big ... business amazing success story points have been devastated ... in the nineteen fifties to think ... more of a top top top ten economies in the world today ... but there are many more failures and setbacks particular success we have an awful lot of luck obviously ... in ... the tourney and selfie announcer me and ... I would say in Iraq I don't think the Fed the much luck in Afghanistan ... next the Korean War and was in nineteen fifty ... three three fifty three ... when the South Korea become a democracy ... the nineteen eighties ... so it's three decades it's a long process ... I ... the new definitions that's one of the other big losses of the draw as ... you can expect overnight victories we all of this idea ... that the ... that the military ID or something like the six day war we caught him annihilate the enemy ... in six days ... you can do that against the conventional adversary ... you really can't do that against an entrenched insurgency ... that can take years decades even to defeat the kind of threat ... in his old alarmist technology has been less important to reward than in conventional war but that may be changing ... the role of weapons could grow if insurgents get their hands on chemical biological or especially ... nuclear ... weapons ... to the school to be some likelihood and ... will were ready saying ... you know insurgents have ... more destructive power to fingertips ... then they have a sentry ako or even that many conventional armies I mean just compare ... the attack of Pearl Harbor carried out by the parole Japanese ... Navy ... in the attack of nine eleven carried out ... by fewer than two dozen ... terrorist fanatics and terrorists fanatics killed more people than the entire ... Imperial Japanese Navy did in ... nineteen forty one ... shots unfortunately ... a microcosm of the trend which is that ... gross can cause more more destruction and damage ... were saying that with the with the IED some the other kinds of attacks that carried out ... in Iraq and ... Afghanistan ... unfortunately those are all to the low Tucker it was ... the real nightmare scenario is that you'll have more sophisticated enemies in the future ... who will in fact of nuclear ... chemical or biological weapons ... in which case our casualties maybe not in the thousands in the millions ... that's truly an existential threat and why we have to focus on ... we don't have the luxury of singers region in the past ... as the millet re often has in the past ... so some ankle biter nuisance but the prep ... were talkin a focus our energy on and ... we have to focus our energy on it because ... it's not a threat on to some battlefield today it's a red ... light here ... on the home front ... Rome's ... Afghanistan Pakistan Yemen ... we fused ... groans ... but forgot the count but it's a hike underscores ... to kill Islamists from the year ... is that the correct policy does that get to the question of legitimacy of ... public opinion of ... of ... violence without putting people on the grounds that what what what you make of that ... I would worry too that groans ... are necessary ... but not sufficient to achieve ... something approximated victory ... the we tend to get ... to focus on drones may become kind of flavor the month in Washington ... but in fact ... drones are just another way of doing leadership are getting which has been going on since the dawn of time ... is just another way to try to kill or arrest the leaders of an insurgency ... and what history generally teaches you is that ... you can do that and you could try to keep the insurgency off balance by going that ... the typical large ... well entrenched insurgency ... could Hakan defeated by throwing a few people to top ... their goods can be replaced ... by somebody off and some even more noxious ... and I mean look at Israel which is in the past the skill the leaders ... of Hamas and Hezbollah and Hamas and Hezbollah are still around the strongest effort ... you really have to be able to ... have a some kind of ground presents a dozen FBR presents ... its not gonna be our presence in most cases but it was going to the Pakistani army or the Yemeni army of the Libyan army ... somebody stocks become physically police ... this the physical space ... where these terrorists topweight ... and to prevent them from encroaching themselves ... if you don't do that ... drones are just a band aid solutions are not a cure for the problem ... Syria ... president Obama took to settle the conflict ... as a killed about a hundred thousand people in Syria ... then the regime uses chemical weapons ... till something like fifteen hundred more people the president ... threatens military action ... calls on Congress ... to hold a vote ... and then the Soviets move in with the diplomatic initiative under which the Syrians are ... voluntarily ... to ... permit outsiders to destroy their chemical ... weapons ... in the military threat is called well that's the that's the narrative arc ... when they can ... well I think the obvious point one one which the entire world has now digested this makes us look weak ... makes us look like when the present United States is there's a rub on ... he doesn't really mean it ... which is gonna be trouble down the road ... when we're ... trough offering redlines other ... ropes but it's the president says the editorial page of the New York Times says Thomas Friedman writing in the New York Times says weakness fall ... the president ... right thing for us and got a very desirable diplomatic out ... last week about that we got what we wanted what was an incredible ... force because ... everybody saw the Congress was not vote for ... that resolution so wide ... that there was a real threat either ... but the larger issue to my mind in Syria this ... I think were paralyzed by this notion that there are bad guys on both sides of the Sargen riotous people are bad but then on the other side the myth is that it's there all ... al Cato Tide Terrace and so aren't a lot of people seem to think the best in the canoes is to let them fight Senator Rand Paul I think this is a quotation to close paraphrase if not there were no good guys in Syria right ... and so theres upshot of that is a lot of people say just let them fight about ... what the problem is even if you accept that analysis which is not really true because ... the bus intelligence estimates are that the al Cato type fighters ... are only about twenty percent of the rubble ranks ... but even if you say that they're the dominant force my are very strong force ... what is the result ... of our staying on the sidelines the sounds they which are saying is ... has a long the rain Aeon's on one slide ... in the al Cato attacks on the other ... or carving up the country between them ... the al Cato folks ... are in control of a lot of northern Syria ... has bull on the cards for sent ... me a snob loyalists are controlled Damascus and other parts ... that's from our standpoint ... that's the worst possible outcome live with the American interest ... when you have extremist Mambo signs very anti-American gazebo lot which has been ... targeting American interests since ... the dark days of the of ... of of Beirut nineteen eighty three when the ball for Marine barracks ... on the other side you have ... these al Cato fanatics ... who are fighting American troops in Iraq and in ... many cases a move across the border ... this is becoming ... a magnet for jihad is from around the world ... we've seen in previous conflicts like this ... in places like Iraq are especially in Afghanistan is ... that once they come to a place like this and get trained ... they often migrate outward ... and wind up attacking targets in Europe or even in the United States so ... for us I think this is a very dangerous scenario that would allow it on full next poster for moment Israel ... Israel faces a classic insurgency in Hezbollah ... in Lebanon based in Lebanon ... they're receiving outside support again a classic pattern ... from ... both Syria and Iran ... then go ... Syria possesses chemical weapons and Iran is working hard to achieve ... nuclear weapons again something that you mourn against an invisible armies ... you are now a member of the Israeli security cabinet ... would you do ... we do about the Iranian nuke story dual Papa larger issue of the insurgencies that Israel freeze well what I had in mind was what you do about the insurgencies but ... the next question was going to be with you to the ring ... why do I don't have a solution on the reunion nukes because a lot of that really has to be based on a very classified intelligence assessment ... on that the Israelis have to conduct in terms of ... how much damage can actually do to the rainy Nuclear facilities ... if all they can do is to shut them down for six months ... and in return the can face ... terrorist retaliation mess fall off ... the may not be worthwhile but if they can to greater damage ... that may make sense I'd I don't have that one of those facts and figures ... but I will set up a larger issue that Israel faces ... goes back to exactly what I was signed ... the only way you can truly defeat ... an entrenched insurgency ... is by offering better governance by offering long order to the people ... so that ... the insurgents the terrorists are gross cannot operate ... but Israel ... is unwilling or unable to do that because it has no desire ... to administer her plans so Sharon's withdrawal from Gaza was a mistake ... no I'm not saying that because the Israelis don't wanna be of ministering Gaza just like they don't wanna be of ministering ... Levanon ... they don't wanna be in perilous they don't wanna roll over Palestinians or Lebanese ... or anybody else but they have to understand the cost of adopting or less ... the cost of their nodded ministering these areas as ... they have no way to eradicate ... Hamas and has a lot ... all they can do is attack them every once in awhile ... and tried to determine from attacking Israel ... but fundamentally ... the only way you can upload comes with butter government ... and unfortunately ... the Lebanese government isn't going to ... the Palestinian Authority gets going in ... and Israel isn't doing it ... unsold that's why you have ... some awesome ... fall off ... in a position of relative strength ... last question ... Vinokourov to ... invisible and is one more time ... if armed with nuclear weapons the small carousel the size of a platoon ... might have more killing capacity to the entire army of a non nuclear state like Brazil for each ... that is a sobering fall ... it suggests that in the future ... low intensity conflict could pose even greater problems ... for the world's leading powers than it has in the past ... how well prepared ... does the United States ... I'm not sure that we are well prepared for any ... attack with weapons of mass destruction I mean we've we've done certain things to try to defend ourselves and we have ... civilian response plans in effect but ... this is such a cataclysmic effect it's hard even wrap your mind around ... what it would mean what the implications would be ... its over effect that we don't wanna think about it ... as a result of that if ... if heaven forbid or ever to happen I typically be well prepared ... but the larger issue that I wanna call attention to is ... just how incredibly important is to understand this Moto warfare because it's not an aberration ... it's not something that ... ended with the Vietnam War of the Iraq war ... it's something that's always been with us ... always will be and is actually ... the the final point that I wanna make a mature bring on this ... it's actually getting more porn on average becoming a matter of life and death right here at home ... to understand ... that history and in the operations ... of insurgent forces next to it ... author of invisible armies and Epic History of guerrilla warfare from ancient times to the present ... thank you ... thank you ... for the Hoover institution Wall Street Journal ... on Peter Robinson ... the the the