The Shuttle-Mir Program: Testimony
Before The U.S. House Of Representatives Committee On Scienceby Marcia S. Smith
Science Policy Research Division, NASA

September 18, 1997

Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee, thank
you for inviting me here to testify about the Shuttle-Mir program. You asked that
I focus my testimony on the original goals of the program, what has been accomplished
(including accomplishments that may not have been anticipated), and policy options
regarding the future of the program.

Original Goals

The Shuttle-Mir program was initiated by President
Bush in 1992. Although joint human spaceflight missions to follow the successful
1975 Apollo-Soyuz Test Project had been discussed for many years, Cold War issues
prevented the two countries from finalizing any such arrangement. Once the Cold
War ended, Presidents Bush and Yeltsin chose space cooperation as one of the areas
in which to demonstrate the new relationship between former adversaries.

The agreement called for a Russian cosmonaut
to fly on the U.S. space shuttle, an American astronaut to visit Russia's Mir
space station for three months, and a docking between the shuttle and Mir that
would include the exchange of Mir crew members. When the agreement was announced,
the primary reason identified for the visit of an American astronaut to Mir was
science, particularly life science. Engineering and operational objectives also
were mentioned. As a symbol of the end of the Cold War, the Shuttle-Mir program
also has had important political significance from the beginning.

In 1993, Vice President Gore and Russian Prime
Minister Chernomyrdin expanded the Shuttle-Mir program, making it Phase I of space
station cooperation between the United States and Russia. Phases II and III involve
adding Russia to the partnership of countries (United States, Japan, Canada, and
10 European countries) building the new International Space Station (ISS).

The Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission agreed to
add "as many as" nine more shuttle flights (for a total of up to 10) and an additional
21 months of U.S. astronaut time on Mir (for a total of 24 months). Another cosmonaut
flight on the space shuttle and a rendezvous (but not docking) between the shuttle
and Mir were also added. NASA signed an interim contract with the Russian Space
Agency in 1994 implementing this agreement. At that time, NASA stated that the
additional 21 months on Mir would give a "new generation of American astronauts
and scientists their first experience with long-duration space flight." Primarily
for budgetary reasons, NASA decided to conduct seven, rather than 10, Shuttle-Mir
docking missions. Objectives for the docking missions were to give fundamental
experience in joint operations: risk reduction, command and control, docking the
shuttle with large structures in space, performing technology experiments, and
executing a joint research program. Overall, the Shuttle-Mir program's purpose
was identified as reducing risk in the ISS program by gaining experience in conducting
joint operations and programs; demonstrating technologies to be used for ISS;
studying and developing interoperability where possible; and conducting research
in space earlier than otherwise would be possible.

In 1996, the Shuttle-Mir program was expanded
again. In return for Russia promising to deliver two modules for ISS (the FGB
module and the Service Module) on time and to build a cargo version of the FGB
(called the Logistics Transfer Vehicle), NASA agreed inter alia to add two more
Shuttle-Mir docking missions to help Russia keep Mir operational longer than Russia
originally had planned. The two sides also agreed to increase the number of months
U.S. crews would spend on Mir.

Accomplishments

NASA seems already to have achieved most of
the objectives set out for the Shuttle-Mir program. Five NASA astronauts (Thagard,
Lucid, Blaha, Linenger, and Foale) have accumulated 22 months of experience on
Mir. Scientific experiments have been conducted, relationships between Russian
and American space personnel have grown, the Shuttle has docked with Mir six times
(a seventh is scheduled for later this month), and operational knowledge of living
and working on a space station has been gained that could be important for the
ISS program.

While there are several rationales for the
Shuttle-Mir program overall, science is mentioned prominently as the reason for
long duration stays on Mir. NASA developed a number of life sciences and materials
processing experiments that were incorporated into Spektr and Priroda, the final
two modules that became part of the Mir complex in 1995 and 1996 respectively.
Generally, the life sciences experiments are in Spektr and materials processing
experiments are in Priroda.

Spektr arrived at Mir several months later
than expected. Since it contained the experiments that Dr. Norman Thagard, the
first American on Mir, had intended to conduct, his research program was sharply
limited. Spektr docked with Mir in June 1995, only a month before the end of Dr.
Thagard's visit. Dr. Shannon Lucid, the second American on Mir, was to work both
with the experiments on Spektr and with those on Priroda. Like Spektr, however,
Priroda arrived late, delaying initiation of those experiments. Perhaps because
the modules were late, both Lucid and Thagard commented at the end of their visits
that they could have done more science. Thagard pointed to the importance of keeping
busy for maintaining morale. Both modules were fully operational to support the
missions of the next three NASA astronauts -- John Blaha, Jerry Linenger, and
Mike Foale -- who conducted a variety of experiments as planned.

The June 25, 1997 collision between the Progress
M-34 cargo craft and Mir, which punctured Spektr and required that Priroda and
other Mir modules be powered down, severely limited the amount of science that
could be performed. While the reconnection of power cables from Spektr to the
rest of the station at the end of August has restored some capabilities, others
appear permanently lost. Though the Russians have not ruled out the future repair
of Spektr, NASA is skeptical that any such repair could be certified to ensure
that another depressurization would not occur. Thus, it appears that the scientific
equipment in Spektr is lost. Several major pieces of equipment for life sciences
experiments are located there, including a centrifuge, a large freezer (two smaller
freezers are in Priroda), a bicycle ergometer, a cardiovascular monitor, and a
gas analyzer. NASA hopes to replace some of this equipment on future Progress
or shuttle missions, but for the moment, U.S. scientific research will be limited
to a greenhouse and the experiments in Priroda. Priroda was powered down after
the June 25 collision, but the equipment and experiments located there are not
thought to have been affected by the collision. Power disruptions caused by the
repeated computer outages that temporarily cause the solar arrays to lose their
orientation to the Sun could complicate conduct of some of those experiments,
however. Life science experiments that require only pre- and post-flight measurements
(such as bone density) are unaffected by the situation on Mir.

NASA asserts that its next astronaut to visit
Mir, David Wolf, will be able to complete 80-90 percent of his science program.
Apparently that means that 80-90 percent of the time he was to have spent performing
science still will be devoted to that task. NASA says that approximately 50 percent
of its experimental equipment was in Spektr, so clearly the exact experiments
he will conduct will change since those are not accessible.

One of the perhaps unanticipated accomplishments
of the science experiments on Mir has been NASA learning that the training it
needs to give its crews is different for working on a space station than on a
shuttle. NASA has said it needs to focus more on building generic skills rather
than focusing on performance of specific tasks, for example.

Closer working relationships have developed
between NASA personnel and their Russian counterparts. Though improvements clearly
need to be made in terms of communications between the two sides, the two countries
are much further along in coping with technical and cultural differences that
could be important in the ISS era than if there had been no Shuttle-Mir program.

The Shuttle-Mir dockings should be valuable
experience for ISS since the Shuttle previously had never docked with any such
massive object in orbit. The two sides also have conducted joint spacewalks, or
EVAs (extravehicular activity). Two have involved Americans joining in Russian
EVAs from Mir. A Russian will participate in a U.S. EVA on the upcoming Shuttle-Mir
flight later this month. Cross-training in each other's EVA suits and learning
to work together on EVA is expected to be important for the ISS, which requires
a large number of spacewalks for assembly and maintenance (approximately 1520
hours during the assembly period). NASA also has gained experience in the day-to-day
issues of life aboard a space station such as storage and the need to keep an
inventory of what equipment is located where.

Though the circumstances certainly were less
than ideal, NASA obtained the "bonus" of having two crew members, Linenger and
Foale, experience near catastrophic accidents aboard Mir -- a fire in February
(described below) and the collision in June. Those emergencies, as undesirable
as they were, may have had a positive aspect in terms of demonstrating how the
space crews work together in an emergency, how the space and ground crews interact
under tense circumstances, and intensified interaction between Russian and American
personnel.

Issues

To a large extent, NASA has met the objectives
set out for the Shuttle-Mir program already. Since approximately half of NASA's
experiments are no longer accessible because they are in Spektr, the question
arises as to the value of having additional astronauts remain on Mir. Other witnesses
today will discuss the specific issue of Mir safety, which is of great interest
to this committee. Another factor is the overall risks involved in any human spaceflight
mission compared with the value of what is being accomplished.

There are two types of risk involved in visits
to Mir -- the risks inherent in any human spaceflight mission, and special risks
associated with Mir. The latter involve the age of some of the Mir's components,
and the strain under which the Russian space industry is operating due to Russia's
economic situation.

The 10 Americans and 4 Russians who have died
as a result of spaceflights indelibly underscore the risks experienced whenever
humans venture into space. Despite these risks, the United States and Russia have
conducted human spaceflight programs since 1961. Twenty three other countries
have accepted invitations to send representatives into space on American or Russian
missions. Clearly many governments and their citizens are willing to accept certain
levels of risk in order to achieve a particular end, whether it is a desire to
explore, a quest for scientific knowledge, or national prestige, for example.
The astronauts and cosmonauts who fly into space accept those risks as well.

Mir also presents special risks because portions
of it are aging. The original core module has been in orbit since 1986. Kvant
(often called Kvant-1 in the West) was added in 1987, Kvant-2 in 1989, and Kristall
in 1990. As noted, Spektr and Priroda are more recent additions (1995 and 1996
respectively). Most of the life support and control equipment is in the older
modules, including the main computer, oxygen generation and carbon dioxide removal
systems, and gyrodynes for controlling the space station's correct orientation
("attitude") in space. In a very real sense, Mir has become a technological experiment
itself. How its systems and materials deteriorate over time can provide important
information for ISS and future spacecraft that will be exposed to the space environment
for many years. The question is how much risk that adds for crews living on Mir.

Further risks in the Mir program may arise
because of Russia's economic situation and the loss of skilled space workers to
more profitable professions. The effect of lower government funding for the Mir
program has been apparent for several years, exemplified by the reduction in frequency
of Progress resupply flights to the space station and the repeated need to extend
the duration of Mir crews because launch vehicles are not available to launch
their replacements. The commander of the Mir crew that returned in August, Vasily
Tsiblyev, blamed the Russian economy for many of the problems during his trouble-plagued
visit to Mir: "The cause lies with problems on Earth. It's connected with the
economy, with our affairs in general. Even the equipment needed to live aboard
the station and that we requested to be sent . . . they just don't exist." (Washington
Post, August 17, 1997, A 21.)

These risks are all important to consider when
deciding whether to leave Americans on Mir. It should also be borne in mind, however,
that the picture may not be as bleak as what is being portrayed in the media.
While Mir is experiencing more anomalies than in the past, as would be expected
with an aging system, the cosmonauts have extensive experience in space station
repairs. Mir is Russia's seventh successful space station since 1971. Earlier
models also have encountered major problems that cosmonauts have repaired. The
reports CRS has prepared for Congress over the years about the Soviet (and now
Russian) space program are full of examples. I have studied the Russian space
station program for 22 years. After seeing them salvage situations that appeared
unsalvageable time and time again, it is difficult not to be impressed by the
versatility, ingenuity, resourcefulness, and determination of cosmonaut crews.

So the "routine" anomalies they experience,
set against a backdrop of 26 years of space station experience, seem less daunting.
That is not to diminish the reality that the risks probably are higher today than
11 years ago when the Mir core module was new. So it is not a matter of rejecting
concerns about Mir's safety, but more a matter of keeping the newspaper headlines
in perspective. As long as a Soyuz spacecraft is available for emergency return,
aging systems alone would not seem to pose immediately life-threatening risks.

Life-threatening risks, such as those from
fire or depressurization, seem more related to the risks inherent in any human
spaceflight. Mir has experienced both in 1997. The fundamental cause of the February
23 fire, created when the crew activated a lithium percolate device (an "oxygen
candle") to generate more oxygen, appears elusive. The Russians apparently have
been unable to repeat the failure on the ground. Perhaps the most sobering (and
instructive) aspect of the fire was the fact that it blocked the escape route
to one of the two Soyuz spacecraft. Six people were aboard Mir at the time. Each
Soyuz can accommodate three. Three crew members could have escaped using the Soyuz
docked at the forward end of the station, but access to the second Soyuz, docked
at the aft end, was blocked by the fire itself. Another important issue raised
by the fire is communications problems between NASA and its Russian counterparts.
NASA was not notified about the fire until several hours after it occurred, and
there have been different accounts of exactly what happened. For instance, based
on information from the Russians, NASA reported that the fire lasted 90 seconds
and fire extinguishers were used to douse the flame. Later, NASA astronaut Linenger,
who was aboard at the time, disclosed that it lasted 14 minutes and the fire extinguishers
were ineffective. They were used instead to cool the walls of the station to prevent
burn-through while the fire burned itself out. No one was injured.

As for the collision that caused the depressurization
of the Spektr module (mentioned above), the formal investigation of its cause
is not complete. President Yeltsin recently instructed the commission investigating
the incident to report by October 1.

Apart from these unique accidents, other problems
have been encountered this year. Perhaps the most important, for Mir operations
and in some cases for ISS, include:

Repeated Computer Failures. The main computer
on Mir has failed several times this year. Each time, the station loses its proper
orientation to the Sun and hence loses electrical power until the solar arrays
again can be correctly pointed. This requires systems to be powered down, disrupting
the crew's work and living routines and potentially ruining scientific experiments
that must be operated without interruption for long periods.

Carbon Dioxide Removal Problems. The August
29, 1997 report by the NASA Inspector General notes that one of the NASA astronauts
described how it was possible to tell when carbon dioxide concentrations were
too high because "it was a little harder to think. It was easier to make mistakes." (page 6) Clearly this situation is not desirable under any circumstances, but
could be particularly dangerous if an emergency occurred while the crew was affected
in this manner.

Soyuz Landing Engine Failure. The failure of
the usually reliable Soyuz landing engines during the return of the Tsiblyev-Lazutkin
crew in August is troubling both for Mir operations and for ISS. Commander Tsiblyev
said that if someone had been sitting in the third seat in the Soyuz (which was
vacant during this particular landing because of a change of plans just weeks
before), he could have been seriously injured. Since Soyuz not only is the emergency
return vehicle for American astronauts on Mir, but also the lifeboat for ISS,
identifying and rectifying the cause of this failure is quite important. (Clearly
it is important for the Russians, too, since their crews and other visiting astronauts
use Soyuz for their trips to and from Mir.) Whether this is an isolated failure,
or the result of lower quality control by the manufacturer, is an important issue.

Docking Problems. Problems have been experienced
over the past several years with both the manual and automatic systems for docking
Soyuz and Progress with Mir. Not only do these problems need to be rectified for
Mir operations, but both spacecraft also will be used for ISS. A reliable system
is needed.

These problems do present risks. Added to the
risks inherently associated with human spaceflight, questions arise about whether
the goals to be accomplished by NASA astronauts remaining on Mir are worth the
risks. Since NASA already has met most of the objectives of the Shuttle-Mir program
and the science that can be conducted is limited by the loss of the equipment
in Spektr, justifying two more flights of NASA astronauts on Mir may be difficult.

NASA argues that the last two long duration
visits to Mir will add to their knowledge base about living and working aboard
space stations, allow them to conduct more science with the equipment they can
still access, and train more astronauts in participating in Russian EVAs. Others
question whether the added value of yet another joint EVA, or another few months
of observing system malfunctions on Mir, or conducting experiments with the remaining
functional NASA equipment aboard Mir, is worthwhile.

NASA also argues that the United States needs
to fulfill its obligations to its partners and not be a "fair weather friend." In that context, it is important to remember that the last two Shuttle-Mir dockings
(scheduled for January and May) and most of the time accounted for by the last
two astronaut visits to Mir were agreed to in 1996. In exchange, Russia made three
promises -- to keep the FGB module and the Service Module on schedule, and to
build a new cargo version of the FGB. Only one of these has been kept (the Russians
could have delivered the FGB on its original schedule, though the schedule slipped
because they could not meet the Service Module's schedule). This demonstrates
that there is flexibility in meeting partner obligations.

Policy Options

The following policy options are available
as Congress debates the merits of leaving additional astronauts on Mir:

Continue with the program as planned. NASA's
current choice, this option would see David Wolf remain on Mir following the next
Shuttle-Mir mission scheduled for launch on September 25. Another astronaut would
replace him in January for the final U.S. flight to Mir. This option would reflect
a desire to be a "good partner" and to gain additional experience that could be
relevant to the ISS. Additional science also would be conducted, though less than
originally planned because of the loss of the equipment in Spektr. This option
could help to solidify relationships between the two countries in joint spaceflight.
It also poses the greatest risk to two NASA astronauts, both because of the inherent
risk of human spaceflight and the special risks associated with Mir.

Complete the planned Shuttle-Mir dockings,
but do not leave astronauts on Mir. This option could be chosen if a decision
was made that Mir is not sufficiently safe, or that while it may be safe, the
added value of having two more long duration missions on Mir is not worth the
other risks inherent in human spaceflight missions. The United States could argue
that the more important aspect of the Shuttle-Mir program for the Russians is
the shuttle docking missions, since the shuttle takes cargo to and from Mir. The
United States would be fulfilling that part of its pledge. In terms of the number
of months that U.S. astronauts are to spend on Mir, half of Wolf's flight and
all of the final flight are part of what the expanded program adopted in 1996.
Since the Russians have not fulfilled their end of the deal, there should be minimal
repercussions if the United States similarly did not complete all that it promised,
especially since it was the shuttle dockings that were of prime importance.

Terminate the program entirely. In addition
to the reasons stated above as to why the United States might choose not to leave
two more astronauts on Mir, it could argue that this next Shuttle-Mir mission
completes the agreement as signed in 1994. This will be the 7th and last of those
missions. Apart from safety issues, since the Russians have not fulfilled their
commitments under the 1996 extension, it could be argued that the United States
has no obligation to fly the two additional shuttle missions. This option likely
would cool relationships considerably between the two countries since Mir is so
dependent on the shuttle for cargo transport. Russia could be faced with a choice
between ending Mir operations or redirecting money from the ISS program to provide
the Progress spacecraft and associated launch vehicles that would be needed to
replace the Shuttle flights. The overall relationship between NASA and its Russian
counterparts in the context of the ISS program could be damaged.

While others add the possibility of having
a hiatus in flights while the United States monitors the situation on Mir, it
is unclear as to whether the Russians would be motivated to accept such a condition.
It seems unlikely that Mir's condition will improve with time in any case.

Conclusion

Despite the many media reports of Mir's imminent
demise, the space station continues to function in the hands of its patient, competent
crew. Other witnesses here today are addressing the explicit question of whether
Mir is safe from a systematic safety and reliability analysis standpoint. Apart
from that type of analysis is the more subjective judgment of whether the science
and operational tasks to be conducted by two more astronauts justifies exposing
them to the risks associated with long duration stays on Mir. The original primary
justification for the long duration visits of U.S. astronauts to Mir was to conduct
science, particularly life science. Many of NASA's science experiments (especially
those for life sciences) are inside the unusable Spektr module.

Astronaut Jerry Linenger, who recently returned
from Mir, was quoted last week as commenting that the purpose of occupying Mir
has become "survival for survival's sake" (Washington Post, September 9, 1997,
A15). The question becomes whether that is sufficient cause for astronauts to
remain on Mir.

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