Monday, March 25, 2013

Syria's Meltdown Requires a U.S.-Led Response

As Syria heads toward a meltdown spilling over its borders
-- with loss of control over strategic weapons, accelerated refugee
flows, spreading extremism, and Sunni-Shiite clashes -- only engaging
with those doing the fighting will give Washington much influence over
events.

Two years after it began as a protest movement, the Syrian uprising has
long since turned into a full-blown armed insurrection, with Sunni Arab
rebel battalions fighting the Alawite regime while Kurdish factions
show mixed hostility to both. Given the lack of a visible political
solution, the reported use of chemical agents, the increasing spillover
to and from neighboring countries, and the growing belief that Syria may
already be a failed state, Washington must take a leading role in
decisively dealing with the disease -- namely, the Assad regime's brutal
assault on its citizens -- not just the humanitarian symptoms.

SYRIA'S MELTDOWN

The news from Syria is grimmer than ever, with over 70,000 people
killed and over 130,000 either missing or held prisoner. The core of the
conflict remains internal: Bashar al-Assad's attempt to shoot, bomb,
missile, and perhaps even gas the population into submission. Unlike the
1979-1982 uprising, however, Syria's demographics are now much more
skewed against the regime: in the ten years following the February 1982
Hama massacre, Syrians largely stayed home and procreated, making them
one of the twenty fastest-growing populations on earth. Those born
during that period constitute the majority of the forces currently
fighting the regime.
Moreover, in the absence of major Western support, Salafist and other
Islamist extremists from the Persian Gulf, North Africa, and neighboring
countries have come to the opposition's aid, causing more Syrians to
side with their cause. As a result, the rebels have only been able to
grind down the regime, not eliminate it, in a war that is increasingly
eating down into the sectarian nature of Syrian society, destroying the
country, and creating a haven for Sunni and Shiite terrorist groups,
perhaps for years to come. No political solution is in sight, especially
given U.S. and Russian differences over what "transition" means. Even
if Moscow and Washington did agree on how to pursue such a solution,
Russia could not deliver the regime, nor could the United States deliver
the entire opposition. In short, there seems nothing to prevent Syria's
complete meltdown in the coming months.

SPILLING OUT, SPILLING IN

One of the reasons why containing the conflict may no longer be
possible is because its effects are increasingly spilling over Syria's
borders in both directions. The most worrisome effects include the
following:Strategic weapons transfer and loss of control. The
Assad regime holds arguably the region's largest stockpile of chemical
weapons, some of which it may have used this week. These and other
strategic weapons (e.g., Scuds and other surface-to-surface missiles)
are scattered around scores of sites, and the regime is desperate to
keep them out of the hands of its adversaries. This has raised concerns
that Assad may be tempted to transfer advanced weapons to his Hezbollah
allies in Lebanon; in fact, Israel attacked a regime convoy near
Damascus last month for reportedly attempting just such a transfer.
Given recent territorial losses, however, the regime might lose control
of its stockpiles before it is able to move or destroy them. In that
scenario, extremists could obtain untold numbers of chemical or other
strategic weapons, whether for use against regime forces, transfer to
militants in the Golan Heights, or transfer to neighboring states for
use in global jihad operations.Refugee crisis. The UN has registered over 1.1 million
refugees in the countries bordering Syria, but that figure only begins
to tell the story. Individual estimates from each country are much
higher, and the millions of displaced persons languishing without aid
inside Syria may soon cross the border if more regime forces pull back
to defend Damascus. In the Houran region, for example, the average rate
of refugees crossing the border is already around 3,000 per day, and the
only thing keeping that number from increasing is the presence of
regular and irregular regime patrols that fire on those attempting to
pass.
Meanwhile, Jordanian border forces have returned fire on occasion,
leading to a few deaths. If Assad's forces pull back further, aid
agencies estimate that some 15,000-20,000 refugees per day could flow
into the kingdom. Even at the current rate, Jordan will have some
770,000 Syrian refugees by June.Spreading extremism. In addition to humanitarian
issues, the refugees are bringing with them the various political
problems currently enflaming Syrian communities, most notably the rise
of extremist ideologies from the Gulf and North Africa. This could
destabilize areas with large numbers of refugees, particularly northern
Jordan, Turkey's Hatay and Kilis provinces, and portions of Lebanon. To
endanger the region's security architecture, especially around Israel,
extremist groups only need certain areas of a state to fail, not the
entire country. Such areas could then be used as staging grounds for
attacks against Israel, and as havens for operations inside Syria,
whether before or after Assad falls.Cross-border Sunni-Shiite fighting. In Lebanon's north
Beqa region, Shiite Hezbollah militants are openly operating across the
border against Syrian Sunni groups fighting the Assad regime south of
al-Qusayr. This includes targeting rebel positions with rocket fire from
Lebanon. Yet residents of the nearby Lebanese Sunni village of Arsal
are helping the Syrian rebels repel these Hezbollah operations, causing
considerable tension at home; for example, at least two Lebanese army
soldiers were recently murdered after fellow troops killed Free Syrian
Army supporter Khaled Hmayed.
At stake in such clashes is control of the mixed Sunni-Shiite area
lying west and south of the Syrian city of Homs, which a rump Assad
statelet would need to be contiguous with Lebanon's Hezbollah-controlled
Beqa Valley. The fighting has exacerbated existing tensions caused by
daily Syrian regime shelling of Lebanese border areas along the Nahr
al-Kibar river valley, resulting in considerable sectarian strife from
Wadi Khaled westward toward the Akkar district and Tripoli. Such
activities could set off full-scale Sunni-Shiite conflict in Lebanon and
draw in each side's regional patrons.

WORKING FROM THE GROUND UP

This week's reports of possible chemical weapons use in Syria imply
that direct military intervention against the Assad regime is now in the
mix. Yet even that measure alone will not change the country's overall
trajectory toward disintegration. The best way for the United States to
avert a meltdown and, ultimately, contain the crisis is to lead a
coalition to end the Assad regime from the ground up, not simply deal
with the symptoms of the conflict. Assad has not "stepped aside," and a
"peaceful, democratic, and secular" Syria is not going to evolve anytime
soon. Syria is now more violent than Iraq, where the United States had
thousand of troops and assets to help shape the outcome. Simply engaging
the opposition coalition in exile and relying on Qatar or Saudi Arabia
to arm the rebels via the Supreme Military Council is insufficient.
Syrians, like all people, cannot follow what they do not understand;
therefore, it will take a lot more than U.S. intelligence vetting of
armed groups to shape a post-Assad outcome that aligns with U.S.
interests. The best way for Washington to influence the composition and
mindset of the armed rebels is to directly engage with vetted units
fighting on the ground. This includes encouraging their integration into
either the National Coalition of Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition
Forces (SOC) or a successor organization that can boast greater
representation of groups inside the country.Andrew J. Tabler is a senior fellow at The Washington Institute and author ofIn the Lion's Den: An Eyewitness Account of Washington's Battle with Syria.