Saudi Arabia is leading a coalition force into Bahrain to help the government calm the unrest there. This move puts Iran in a difficult position, as Tehran had hoped to use the uprising in Bahrain to promote instability in the Persian Gulf region. Iran could refrain from acting and lose an opportunity to destabilize the region, or it could choose from several other options that do not seem particularly effective.

The Bahrain uprising consists of two parts, as all revolutions do. The first is genuine grievances by the majority Shiite population — the local issues and divisions. The second is the interests of foreign powers in Bahrain. It is not one or the other. It is both.

The Iranians clearly benefit from an uprising in Bahrain. It places the U.S. 5th Fleet’s basing in jeopardy, puts the United States in a difficult position and threatens the stability of other Persian Gulf Arab states. For the Iranians, the uprisings in North Africa and their spread to the Arabian Peninsula represent a golden opportunity for pursuing their long-standing interest (going back to the Shah and beyond) of dominating the Gulf.

The Iranians are accustomed to being able to use their covert capabilities to shape the political realities in countries. They did this effectively in Iraq and are doing it in Afghanistan. They regarded this as low risk and high reward. The Saudis, recognizing that this posed a fundamental risk to their regime and consulting with the Americans, have led a coalition force into Bahrain to halt the uprising and save the regime. Pressed by covert forces, they were forced into an overt action they were clearly reluctant to take.

We are now off the map, so to speak. The question is how the Iranians respond, and there is every reason to think that they do not know. They probably did not expect a direct military move by the Saudis, given that the Saudis prefer to act more quietly themselves. The Iranians wanted to destabilize without triggering a strong response, but they were sufficiently successful in using local issues that the Saudis felt they had no choice in the matter. It is Iran’s move.

If Iran simply does nothing, then the wave that has been moving in its favor might be stopped and reversed. They could lose a historic opportunity. At the same time, the door remains open in Iraq, and that is the main prize here. They might simply accept the reversal and pursue their main line. But even there things are murky. There are rumors in Washington that U.S. President Barack Obama has decided to slow down, halt or even reverse the withdrawal from Iraq. Rumors are merely rumors, but these make sense. Completing the withdrawal now would tilt the balance in Iraq to Iran, a strategic disaster.

Therefore, the Iranians are facing a counter-offensive that threatens the project they have been pursuing for years just when it appeared to be coming to fruition. Of course, it is just before a project succeeds that opposition mobilizes, so they should not be surprised that resistance has grown so strong. But surprised or not, they now have a strategic decision to make and not very long to make it.

They can up the ante by increasing resistance in Bahrain and forcing fighting on the ground. It is not clear that the Bahraini opposition is prepared to take that risk on behalf of Iran, but it is a potential option. They have the option of trying to increase unrest elsewhere in order to spread the Saudi and Gulf Cooperation Council forces, weakening their impact. It is not clear how much leverage the Iranians have in other countries. The Iranians could try to create problems in Saudi Arabia, but given the Saudis’ actions in Bahrain, this becomes more difficult.

Finally, they can attempt an overt intervention, either in Bahrain or elsewhere, such as Iraq or Afghanistan. A naval movement against Bahrain is not impossible, but if the U.S. Navy intervenes, which it likely would, it would be a disaster for the Iranians. Operations in Iraq or Afghanistan might be more fruitful. It is possible that Shiite insurgents will operate in Iraq, but that would guarantee a halt of the U.S. withdrawal without clearly increasing the Iranians’ advantage there. They want U.S. forces to leave, not give them a reason to stay.

There is then the indirect option, which is to trigger a war with Israel. The killings in the West Bank and Israeli concerns about Hezbollah might be some of Iran’s doing, with the emphasis on “might.” But it is not clear how a Hezbollah confrontation with Israel would help Iran’s position relative to Saudi Arabia in the Persian Gulf. It diverts attention, but the Saudis know the stakes and they will not be easily diverted.

The logic, therefore, is that Iran retreats and waits. But the Saudi move shifts the flow of events, and time is not on Iran’s side.

There is also the domestic Iranian political situation to consider. Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad has been strong in part because of his successful handling of foreign policy. The massive failure of a destabilization plan would give his political opponents the ammunition needed to weaken him domestically. We do not mean a democratic revolution in Iran, but his enemies among the clergy who see him as a threat to their position, and hard-liners in the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps who want an even more aggressive stand.

Ahmadinejad finds himself in a difficult position. The Saudis have moved decisively. If he does nothing, his position can unravel and with it his domestic political strength. Yet none of the counters he might use seem effective or workable. In the end, his best option is to create a crisis in Iraq, forcing the United States to consider how deeply it wants to be drawn back into Iraq. He might find weakness there that he can translate into some sort of political deal.

At the moment we suspect the Iranians do not know how they will respond. The first issue will have to be determining whether they can create violent resistance to the Saudis in Bahrain, to both tie them down and increase the cost of occupation. It is simply unclear whether the Bahrainis are prepared to pay the price. The opposition does seem to want fundamental change in Bahrain, but it is not clear that they have reached the point where they are prepared to resist and die en masse.

That is undoubtedly what the Iranians are exploring now. If they find that this is not an option, then none of their other options are particularly good. All of them involve risk and difficulty. It also requires that Iran commit itself to confrontations that it has tried to avoid. It prefers covert action that is deniable to overt action that is not.

As we move into the evening, we expect the Iranians are in intense discussions of their next move. Domestic politics are affecting regional strategy, as would be the case in any country. But the clear roadmap the Iranians were working from has now collapsed. The Saudis have called their hand, and they are trying to find out if they have a real or a busted flush. They will have to act quickly before the Saudi action simply becomes a solid reality. But it is not clear what they can do quickly. For the moment, the Saudis have the upper hand. But the Iranians are clever and tenacious. There are no predictions possible. We doubt even the Iranians know what they will do.

Lockheed Martin Corp., Marietta, Ga., is being awarded a $135,504,076 not-to-exceed undefinitized contract action to procure 14 outer wing assembly kits for the Navy P-3C aircraft, including engineering analysis support, integrated logistics support and associated technical data. Work will be performed in Marietta, Ga. and is expected to be completed in June 2014. Contract funds will not expire at the end of the current fiscal year. This contract was competitively procured via an electronic request for proposals, with one offer received. The Naval Air Systems Command, Patuxent River, Md., is the contracting activity (N00019-11-C-0037).

Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc., Fort Worth, Texas, is being awarded a $48,389,120 advance acquisition contract to provide long lead parts and components required for the manufacture of 26 Lot 9 UH-1Y and AH-1Z helicopters for the Marine Corps: 15 UH-1Y build new aircraft; four AH-1Z remanufactured aircraft; and seven AH-1Z build new aircraft. Work will be performed in Fort Worth, Texas (60 percent), and Amarillo, Texas (40 percent), and is expected to be completed in September 2012. Contract funds will not expire at the end of the current fiscal year. This contract was not competitively procured. The Naval Air Systems Command, Patuxent River, Md., is the contracting activity (N00019-11-C-0023).

ARMY

Hellfire Systems LLC, Orlando, Fla., was awarded on March 10 a $38,612,000 firm-fixed-price contract. The award will provide for an in-line configuration change of 2,600 Hellfire II AGM-114P2 missiles. Work will be performed in Orlando, Fla., with an estimated completion date of Sept. 30, 2013. One sole-source bid was solicited with one bid received. The U.S. Army Contracting Command, AMCOM Contracting Center, Redstone Arsenal, Ala., is the contracting activity (W31P4Q-08-C-0361).

Lockheed Martin Corp., Orlando, Fla., was awarded on March 10 a $31,994,994 firm-fixed-price contract. The award will provide for the acquisition of four Mobile Advanced Gunnery Training Systems and eight Deployable Advanced Gunnery Training Systems, with new-equipment training and logistics support, for the kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Work will be performed in Orlando, Fla., with an estimated completion date of Dec. 31, 2015. The Program Executive Office of Simulation, Training and Instrumentation, Orlando, Fla., is the contracting activity (W900KK-11-C-0005).

MD Helicopters, Inc., Mesa, Ariz., was awarded on March 10 a $19,932,188 firm-fixed-price contract. The award will provide for the acquisition for six new rotary wing primary training aircraft, and two corresponding flight training devices and critical spare parts for the Afghan Air Force. Work will be performed in Mesa, Ariz., with an estimated completion date of March 31, 2016. Nine bids were solicited with four bids received. The U.S. Army Contracting Command, Redstone Arsenal, Ala., is the contracting activity (W58RGZ-11-C-0070).

BAE Systems Information and Electronic Systems Integration, Austin, Texas, was awarded on March 9 a $19,205,745 firm-fixed-price contract. The award will provide for the acquisition of 390 L-rod aluminum bar armor kits and associated accessories, and field-service support for the RG-31 Mine Resistant Ambush Protected vehicle. Work will be performed in Austin, Texas, with an estimated completion date of Sept. 29, 2011. One bid was solicited with one bid received. The U.S. Army Contracting Command, Warren, Mich., is the contracting activity (W56HZV-10-C-0311).

Hagerstown Goodwill Industries, Hagerstown, Md., was awarded on March 10 a $16,337,288 firm-fixed-price contract. The award will provide for custodial support and services to Fort Detrick, Md. Work will be performed in Frederick, Md., with an estimated completion date of Feb. 28, 2016. One sole-source bid was solicited with one bid received. The U.S. Army Medical Research Acquisition Activity, Fort Detrick, Md., is the contracting activity (W81XWH-11-C-0068).

AAI Corp., Hunt Valley, Md., was awarded on March 9 a $12,609,386 firm-fixed-price contract. The award will provide for the retrofitting of two Shadow unmanned aircraft systems with tactical common data link. Work will be performed in Hunt Valley, Md., with an estimated completion date of April 30, 2011. One bid was solicited with one bid received. The U.S. Army Contracting Command, Redstone Arsenal, Ala., is the contracting activity (W58RGZ-08-C-0023).

Kidde Dual Spectrum, Goleta, Calif., was awarded on March 10 a $13,396,113 firm-fixed-price contract. The award will provide for the procurement of 1,290 crew and engine compartment automatic fire extinguishing system retrofit kits to improve protection against fire. Work will be performed in Goleta, Calif., with an estimated completion date of Oct. 31, 2011. One bid was solicited with one bid received. The U.S. Army Contracting Command, Warren, Mich., is the contracting activity (W56HZV-11-C-0225).

The Boeing Co., Mesa, Ariz., was awarded on March 8 an $11,123,219 firm-fixed-price contract. The award will provide for the upgrade of 29 Apache Longbow aircraft from Block I configuration to Block II configuration for the Netherlands. Work will be performed in Mesa, Ariz., with an estimated completion date of July 31, 2011. One bid was solicited with one bid received. The U.S. Army Contracting Command, Redstone Arsenal, Ala., is the contracting activity (W58RGZ-11-C-0045).

American Registry of Pathology, Washington, D.C., was awarded on March 8 a $10,413,259 cost-no-fee contract. The award will provide for the procurement of forensic pathology and associated services in support of the Armed Forces Medical Examiner System. Work will be performed in Rockville, Md., with an estimated completion date of Sept. 30, 2011. One bid was solicited with one bid received. The U.S. Army Medical Command, Health Care Acquisition Activity, Fort Sam Houston, Texas, is the contracting activity (W81K04-11-C-0006).

AAI Corp., Hunt Valley, Md., was awarded on March 8 a $7,420,446 firm-fixed-price contract. The award will provide for the acquisition of new receiver components into the one-system remote video terminal baseline. Work will be performed in Hunt Valley, Md., with an estimated completion date of Aug. 31, 2011. One bid was solicited with one bid received. The U.S. Army Contracting Command, Redstone Arsenal, Ala., is the contracting activity (W58RGZ-06-C-0190).

Hunter Manufacturing Co., Solon, Ohio, was awarded on March 8 a $6,436,229 firm-fixed-price contract. The award will provide for the procurement of 347 Type II large capacity field heaters. Work will be performed in Pennsauken, N.J., with an estimated completion date of Nov. 30, 2014. One bid was solicited with one bid received. The U.S. Army Contracting Command, Natick Contracting Division, Natick, Mass., is the contracting activity (DAAB15-02-C-0019).

AIR FORCE

Kaman Precision Products, Inc., Orlando, Fla., is being awarded a $23,834,070 firm-fixed-price contract modification which will provide the Air Force with a quantity of 6,000 of the Joint Programmable Fuze (JPF) systems to meet munitions requirements. The JPF is a state-of-the-art fuze system used with precision weapons systems such as the JDAM, and equipped with variable delay settings that may be programmed manually or from the cockpit through its in-flight reprogrammability feature. At this time, the full amount has been obligated, of which none expires on Sept. 30, 2011. AAC/EBDK, Eglin Air Force Base, Fla., is the contracting activity (F08626-98-C-0006; P00142).

FlightSafety Services Corp., Centennial, Colo., is being awarded a $21,776,904 firm-fixed-price contract which will provide C-5 Aircrew Training System operation, maintenance, and support. At this time, the full amount has been obligated. OO-ALC/GHMKA, Hill Air Force Base, Utah, is the contracting activity (FA8223-11-C-0003).

DEFENSE LOGISTICS AGENCY

Seven Bar Aviation Center, Inc., dba Atlantic Aviation, Albuquerque, N.M., is being awarded a maximum $7,280,330 fixed-price with economic price adjustment contract for fuel. Other location of performance is Albuquerque International Airport, Albuquerque, N.M. Using services are Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps and federal civilian agencies. There were originally 145 proposals solicited with 158 responses. The date of performance completion is March 31, 2015. The Defense Logistics Agency Energy, Fort Belvoir, Va., is the contracting activity (SP0600-11-D-0114).

Forces from Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries will enter Bahrain to help the Bahraini regime quell unrest, according to a number of media reports, including by Bahrain’s Alyam newspaper, known for its close links with the ruling al-Khalifa family. The reports come one day after clashes occurred between Shiite protesters and police in the capital, Manama. Meanwhile, Bahraini state media reported that the Independent Bloc (a parliamentary bloc of the Bahraini parliament) asked Bahraini King Hamad bin Isa al-Khalifa to enforce martial law to contain the unrest.

These reports suggest that foreign intervention in Bahrain, or at least the possibility that the Bahraini military is taking over the security reins, is imminent. Such a move would mean the regime is getting increasingly concerned with Shiite unrest, which does not appear to be subsiding despite calls for dialogue from Bahraini Crown Prince Sheikh Salman bin Hamad al-Khalifa.

Troops from the United Arab Emirates are reportedly expected to arrive March 14. Al Arabiya reported that Saudi forces have already entered Bahrain, but these claims have yet to be officially confirmed by the Bahraini regime. The only announcement thus far has come from Nabil al-Hamar, the former information minister and adviser to the royal family, who wrote on Twitter that the Arab forces arrived in Bahrain. An unnamed Saudi official also said March 14 that more than 1,000 Saudi troops from the GCC’s Peninsula Shield military force entered Bahrain late March 13, AFP reported.

The ongoing tensions are exacerbated by the split between Bahrain’s Shiite movement, which became clearer during protests on March 11. The more hard-line faction of the Shiite movement, led by the Wafa and Haq blocs, has been increasing the unrest on the streets in the hopes of stalling the talks between the Shiite Al Wefaq-led coalition’s negotiations with the regime. Military intervention by the GCC countries would mean the situation is increasingly untenable for the regime. The paradox the Bahraini regime faces is that it cannot contain the unrest while trying to kick off talks with Al Wefaq. Al Wefaq finds itself in a difficult position, since it risks losing ground against hard-liners if it appears too close to the regime while Shiite protesters are beaten by the police.

The Bahraini regime has used the military option before. On Feb. 17, the military deployed immediately after a police crackdown in Manama’s Pearl Square and was able to calm down the situation for a while by encircling the area with tanks. If Bahrain indeed has requested Saudi intervention this time, the implication is that the Bahraini military is not confident in its ability to contain the unrest now. Riyadh’s decision to send forces to Manama could be taken for this reason, since wider spread of Shiite unrest from Bahrain to Saudi Arabia would aggravate the already existing protests among Saudi Arabia’s own Shiite population. Saudi military intervention in Bahrain is also not unprecedented; Saudi Arabia sent troops to Bahrain in 1994 when Riyadh determined that Shiite unrest threatened the al-Khalifa regime.

The regional implications of the unrest in Bahrain were underscored when U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates visited Manama on March 12 and urged the Bahraini regime to implement bold reforms. Gates said Iranian interference would become a greater possibility if Bahrain fails to do so. While Bahrain and Saudi Arabia seem to be coordinating to avoid that possibility, it is not without risks. Leader of the hard-line Haq movement Hassan Mushaima, who is believed to be increasing the Shiite unrest in Bahrain with Iranian support, said Feb. 28 that Saudi intervention in Bahrain would give Iran the same right to intervene as well. A scenario of regional Sunni Arab forces cracking down on Shia would apply pressure on Iran to respond more overtly, but its military ability is limited and it is a very risky option given the U.S. 5th Fleet is stationed in Bahrain. As of this writing, there is no sign that the Iranian military is taking steps toward that end, however, the situation on the ground could escalate if Shia in Bahrain ramp-up demonstrations.