Aguilera v. Baca
510 F.3d 1161 (9th Cir. 2007) aff’g 394F. Supp. 2d 1203 (C.D. Cal. 2005) cert. denied 555U.S., 129 S.Ct.487, 172 L.Ed2d 355 (2008)
During an internal investigation by the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department into allegations of a police assault, several Deputies were ordered to remain at work for questioning after their shifts ended. The Deputies were thereafter taken off patrol duty and reassigned, even though no criminal charges were filed. The Deputies subsequently filed a lawsuit against the County of Los Angeles claiming civil rights violations. In a published opinion, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals granted summary judgment in favor of the County, finding that the Deputies were not “seized” within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment because they were given access to their weapons, allowed to converse freely, and only intermittently supervised. Further, the Deputies were not compelled to testify in any proceedings and, in fact, refused to do so. Distinguishing the questioning of employees in an employment context from situations involving police custodial interrogation of criminal suspects, the Court of Appeals concluded that even if the Deputies’ civil rights may have been implicated, qualified immunity protected the County’s conduct. Back to A

Alexander v. County of Los Angeles
64 F.3d 1315 (9th Cir. 1995)
Police officers entitled to qualified immunity from liability for temporary detention of robbery suspects where suspects generally matched description of robbers and suspects were held at gunpoint and handcuffed for 45 to 60 minutes while witnesses were brought to the scene. Back to A

Avalos v. Baca
596 F.3d 583 (9th Cir. 2009), aff’g 517 F. Supp. 2d 1156 (C.D. Cal 2007)
Plaintiff was arrested on an Orange County warrant; however, Orange County was not notified that Plaintiff was available to be picked up. Over two months later the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department (LASD) realized that Plaintiff had been over-detained and should be released. At the time of his release, LASD risk management personnel negotiated a $500 settlement. Plaintiff was later given the settlement check at which time he signed full release and settlement agreement. Plaintiff sued claiming violation of his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights as a result of his over-detention and his alleged involuntary waiver. He also claimed that defendants conspired and engaged in a pattern of racketeering activity in violation of RICO. Summary judgment was upheld in favor of the individual defendants on the over-detention claim since plaintiff failed to present evidence from which a jury could find defendants had a policy, practice or custom of over-detaining inmates. Plaintiff also failed to show an independent violation of the Constitution as a result of the alleged improper efforts to preclude his access to the courts. Even if such a right exists, defendants were entitled to qualified immunity since the right was not clearly established. Finally, summary judgment in favor of defendants on plaintiff’s RICO claim were also proper since a predicate act that might support a finding of a pattern of racketeering activity was absent and since plaintiff offered no evidence of a specific injury to a business. Back to A

Bautista v. County of Los Angeles
190 Cal. App. 4th 869 (Ct. App. 2010)
Summary judgment in favor of the County of Los Angeles affirmed on appeal on grounds that the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department’s prohibited-association policy did not violate the plaintiff’s intimate associational rights, and the challenged termination was not excessive in light of the plaintiff’s violation of this policy. Back to B

Beets v. County of Los Angeles
200 Cal. App. 4th 916 (Ct. App. 2011)
Decedent’s parents sued for the wrongful death of their son (“Rose”) who was shot and killed while he and his girlfriend (“Morales”) fled from Deputy Sheriffs. Rose was eventually cornered and drove directly at a Sheriff’s Deputy. Rose was shot and killed by the deputy in self defense. Morales was eventually convicted of assault with a deadly weapon upon a police officer based upon an aiding and abetting theory. In so finding, the jury necessarily found that the deputy acted lawfully. The civil complaint was dismissed in the trial court pursuant to Heck v. Humphrey (1994) 512 U.S. 477 analysis, i.e., that a finding for the plaintiffs would necessarily call into question the conviction of Morales which had not been invalidated or set aside. The Court of Appeal reversed, finding that the success of appellants’ lawsuit would not necessarily invalidate the Morales’s conviction. The Court speculated that if Rose had survived, he might have been acquitted while Morales in a separate trial might be convicted. The Court noted that “[i]t is an occasional reality that ‘inconsistent jury verdicts are inevitable in our criminal justice system.” The Court of Appeal also found that the parents’ suit was not barred by collateral estoppel since Rose was not in privity with Morales. Back to B

Beets v. County of Los Angeles
669 F.3d 1038 (9th Cir. 2012)
In a federal wrongful death action, the plaintiffs’ 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims were barred as a matter of law under Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), where the validity of the decedent’s criminal accomplice’s state law convictions would be brought into question, if the plaintiffs prevail on their § 1983 claims against the County and the defendant sheriff’s deputies. Back to B

Berry v. Baca
379 F.3d 764 (9th Cir. 2004)
A plaintiff alleging over-detention need not prove that an individual policy is unconstitutional. He may base his claim against the entity on the basis that lawful policies are implemented in a fashion that rises to the level of deliberate indifference. Back to B

Bingham v. City of Manhattan Beach
329 F.3d 723 (9th Cir. 2003), amended by 341 F.3d 939
When addressing qualified immunity in the context of an arrest, the arrest will be upheld if probable cause exists to support the arrest for an offense that is not denominated as the reason for the arrest by the arresting officer. This is because the qualified immunity inquiry focuses on the objective question of whether a reasonable officer could have concluded probable cause existed. Back to B

Blair v. City of Pomona
206 F.3d 938 (9th Cir. 2000), amended by 223 F.3d 1074
Plaintiff police officer who allegedly encouraged fellow officer to report misconduct in the Department claimed retaliation by fellow officers in violation of his First Amendment rights. Ninth Circuit reversed summary judgment in favor of City, holding that plaintiff had presented sufficient evidence to justify a jury trial on the issue of whether the City was deliberately indifferent to plaintiff’s right to inform his supervisors of misconduct and that a custom or policy of the Department caused a violation of his First Amendment rights. Back to B

Bradbury v. Superior Court. (Spencer)
49 Cal. App. 4th 1108 (Ct. App. 1996)
Governmental units and their employees, when speaking on matters of public concern, are entitled to the same free speech protections as are private citizens. Back to B

Ceballos v. Garcetti
361 F.3d 1168 (9th Cir. 2004), reversed, Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (2006).
A public employee’s purely job-related speech, expressed strictly pursuant to the duties of employment, is protected under the First Amendment and can be the basis for a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 if the speech touches on a matter of public concern. Reversed in Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (2006). Back to C

Choate v. County of Orange
86 Cal. App. 4th 312 (Ct. App. 2001), as modified on denial of rehearing (Jan. 17, 2001), review denied (Mar. 28, 2001)
Civil rights plaintiff who recovered only $3,380 in compensatory damages and $1,000 in punitive damages was not entitled to an award of attorney fees due to his “extremely limited success.” Plaintiff also not entitled to a Monell trial against the public entity since plaintiff was fully compensated in first phase of trial and entity had agreed to pay the judgment. Back to C

City of West Covina v. Perkins
525 U.S. 234, 119 S. Ct. 678 (1999), reversing 113 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 1997) see below
When the police seize property for a criminal investigation, pursuant to a search warrant, due process does not require them to provide the owner with notice of available state law remedies. Back to C

Cooley v. Superior Court (Greenstein)
140 Cal. App. 4th 1039 (Ct. App. 2006)
LBAC represented the District Attorney of Los Angeles County in the civil suit arising from the tragic death of ten individuals who were run down at the Santa Monica Farmer’s Market by an elderly motorist. Counsel for plaintiffs subpoenaed documents in the District Attorney’s possession that had not been prepared by the District Attorney. The District Attorney objected to production but was ordered by the Superior Court to produce the documents. The Court of Appeal reversed, holding that the District Attorney was not the “custodian” of the records since the documents had been generated elsewhere and, consequently, the District Attorney could not execute an affidavit stating that the documents had been generated in the ordinary course of business as required by California Evidence Code § 1561. Back to C

County of Los Angeles v. Superior Court (Anderson-Barker)
242 Cal.App.4th 475 (2015)
The Court of Appeal vacated a Los Angeles County Superior Court Order to disclose, in accordance with the California Public Records Act, approximately 215,000 unredacted, electronically stored CHP 180 Reports. The Court of Appeal held that the CHP 180 Reports containing residence and mailing addresses were exempt from disclosure under Government Code § 6254(k), which exempts disclosure of “[r]ecords, the disclosure of which is exempted or prohibited pursuant to federal or state law.” The Court of Appeal determined that residence and mailing addresses in DMV records fall under this exemption because both Government Code § 6254.1 and Vehicle Code § 1808.21 “prohibit disclosure of a vehicle owner’s address retrieved from DMV records.” The Court of Appeal further held that residential and mailing addresses, and personal information (including names) were exempt from disclosure because of the Federal Drivers’ Privacy Protection Act of 1994 which prohibits “the disclosure of any personal information obtained from DMV records, without express consent from the vehicle owner.” Back to C

County of Los Angeles v. Superior Court (Axelrad)
82 Cal. App. 4th 819 (Ct. App. 2000), review denined (Nov. 21, 2000)
A court hearing a request for public records under the California Public Records Act should be made aware of any pertinent prior discovery rulings and is bound by such rulings if the elements of collateral estoppel are present. Back to C

County of Los Angeles v. Superior Court (Peters)
68 Cal. App. 4th 1166 (Ct. App. 1998), rehearing denied (Jan. 26, 1999), review denied (Mar. 17 1999)
The Sheriff, when determining whether to release a person from the County Jail, is performing a state law enforcement function as a state officer; consequently, the County cannot be liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for the Sheriff’s acts or omissions. Back to C

County of Los Angeles v. Superior Court (Valentin)
78 Cal. App. 4th 212 (Ct. App. 2000), review denied (May 10, 2000)
A plaintiff claiming false arrest against a public entity or employee is entitled to post-arraignment damages only if injury is caused by pre-arraignment conduct. Back to C

County of Orange v. Superior Court (Wu)
79 Cal. App. 4th 759 (Ct. App. 2000)
The Fourth Appellate District granted the County’s Petition for Writ of Mandate directing the trial court to vacate its order compelling the production of the contents of the Sheriff Department’s investigative file pertaining to an ongoing homicide investigation of the murder of plaintiffs’ child. Plaintiffs were suspects in the investigation and brought suit against the County for defamation. The Court concluded that the public interest in solving the murder and bringing the perpetrator(s) to justice outweighed plaintiffs’ interest in obtaining the discovery sought. Back to C

County of Orange v. Superior Court Superior Court for the County of San Francisco(Barrie)
(1999) 73 Cal.App.4th 1189
Plaintiff who was arrested in San Francisco on a recalled Orange County bench warrant and transported to Orange County brought suit in San Francisco alleging negligence and false imprisonment. Court held that CCP §394 required San Francisco Superior Court to transfer venue to Orange County. Back to C

Fowler v. Block
2 F. Supp. 2d 1268 (C.D. Cal. 1998)
Delay of 24 to 48 hours to process acquitted inmate out of large urban jail not unreasonable as a matter of law. Back to F

Fukuda v. City of Angels Camp (1999)
20 Cal. 4th 805 (1999), reversing 63 Cal. App. 4th 1426 (Ct. App. 1998) see below
When a trial court reviews a final administrative decision that substantially affects a fundamental vested right, the trial court exercises its independent judgment upon the evidence, however, the trial court must afford a strong presumption of correctness concerning the administrative findings, and the party challenging the administrative decision bears the burden of convincing the court that the administrative findings are contrary to the weight of the evidence. Back to F

Fukuda v. City of Angels Camp (1998)
63 Cal. App. 4th 1426 (Ct. App. 1998), reversed on other grounds, 20 Cal. 4th 805 (1999) see above
In cases involving fundamental, vested rights in which the trial court exercises its independent judgment on the evidence (administrative mandamus), the burden of proving grounds for termination is on the administrative entity. Back to F

Gabbert v. Conn
131 F.3d 793 (9th Cir. 1997), reversed in part, on other grounds, Conn v. Gabbert, 526 U.S. 286, 119 S.Ct. 1292, 143 L.Ed.2d 399 (1999)
In suit brought by an attorney who was searched while his client was testifying nearby before a grand jury, court held that detective who served search warrant entitled to qualified immunity and special master entitled to absolute quasi-judicial immunity. Back to G

Garcetti v. Ceballos
547 U.S. 410, 126 S. Ct. 1951 (2006), reversing Ceballos v. Garcetti, 361 F.3d 1168 (9th Cir. 2004)
While public employees enjoy First Amendment protection when they speak “as citizens” regarding matters of public concern, the First Amendment does not protect public employee speech expressed pursuant to official job duties, and therefore, such job-related speech does not give rise to an actionable First Amendment claim. Back to G

Garcia v. Whitehead
961 F. Supp. 230 (C.D. Cal. 1997)
California’s survivorship statute is inconsistent with the purposes of § 1983 because it excludes damages for pain and suffering of the decedent. Back to G

Greenstreet v. County of San Bernardino
41 F.3d 1306 (9th Cir. 1994)
Search warrant invalid where the supporting affidavit does not establish connection between the suspect’s criminal activities and the home in question. Back to G

Harris v. Marhoefer
24 F.3d 16 (9th Cir. 1994)
A plaintiff’s award of attorney’s fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 is reduced to reflect limited success where he prevails on only selected theories of civil rights complaint against certain defendants. Back to H

Henriksen v. City of Rialto
20 Cal. App. 4th 1612 (Ct. App. 1993), as modified (Dec. 22,1993)
Off-duty police officer who accidentally shoots another while socializing not within course and scope of employment notwithstanding fact that employer requires officer to have loaded weapon on person at all times. Back to H

Hernandez v. City of Pomona
49 Cal. App. 4th 1492 (Ct. App. 1996)
The parents of young man with gang affiliations sued the county, city, and police detectives for the wrongful death of their son, alleging that the detectives had a duty to protect him from gang retaliation after he provided incriminating evidence against them. Court held detectives owed no duty. Back to H

Jaramillo v. County of Orange
200 Cal. App. 4th 811 (Ct. App. 2011)
Plaintiff was required to sign an agreement that his position was “at will” as a condition of his appointment to Assistant Sheriff. Plaintiff was terminated by the Sheriff and not given any reason for the termination. At trial, Plaintiff claimed that the termination was retaliation for advising the Sheriff that Plaintiff would no longer cover for the Sheriff’s illegal activities. The Court of Appeal upheld the verdict finding that the waiver was invalid because it violated the Public Safety Officers Procedural Bill of Rights Act (POBRA) by denying Plaintiff notice and an opportunity to be heard. The Court of Appeal also held that Plaintiff’s alleged complaints to the Sheriff about the Sheriff’s own wrongdoing were sufficient to invoke the whistleblower statute (California Labor Code section 1102.5). Back to J

Khatib v. County of Orange
639 F.3d 898 (9th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, County of Orange v. Khatib, 132 S. Ct. 115
Plaintiff brought suit under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) claiming she was unlawfully denied the right to wear her religious head garb [hijab] when the Superior Court ordered her held in the courthouse lockup for the day. A three judge panel of the Ninth Circuit upheld order granting summary judgment for defendants holding that a courthouse lockup is not an “institution” as envisioned under RLUIPA. Decision was reversed by an en banc panel of the Ninth Circuit, holding that a courthouse holding cell is an “institution” as envisioned under the RLUIPA. Back to K

Liston v. County of Riverside
120 F.3d 965 (9th Cir. 1997)
Suit brought by recent purchasers of a home which was searched pursuant to investigation of previous owner. Presence of “For Sale” sign was a material fact which should have been included in the warrant application. Back to L

MacEachern v. City of Manhattan Beach
623 F. Supp. 2d 1092 (C.D. Cal. 2009)
Following a fatal officer-involved shooting, decedent’s mother pursued a Section 1983 claim against the involved officer and his employer, alleging that her Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated by the shooting. The District Court granted summary judgment on all claims finding that there was no evidence to support the plaintiff’s claim that the officer had a “purpose to harm” the decedent, because the officer shot the decedent after the officer issued multiple commands for the decedent to drop the knife he was holding and the decedent moved towards the officer while thrusting the knife in an attacking fashion. Back to M

Mortimer v. Baca
594 F.3d 714 (9th Cir. 2010), affirming 478 F. Supp. 2d 1171 (C.D. Cal. 2007)
Evidence did not support a finding that plaintiff’s over-detention was the result of a set of policies or lack of policies that amounted to a policy of deliberate indifference, consequently Sheriff Baca could not be held liable in his official capacity. The “law of the case” doctrine did not preclude the District Court from entertaining Baca’s motion for summary judgment since a Ninth Circuit ruling in a related case did not directly address the issue of deliberate indifference and since substantially different evidence was adduced in the subsequent motion, a recognized exception to the “law of the case” doctrine. Back to M

Newman v. County of Orange
457 F.3d 991 (9th Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1253, 127 S.Ct. 1383m 167 L.Ed.2d 161 (2007)
Plaintiff was charged with violation of Penal Code §148 after he sprayed a motorcycle officer with rocks and dirt while leaving the scene where he had been ticketed for speeding. Plaintiff went to trial, was acquitted and sued the officer under 42 U.S.C. §1983 for malicious prosecution, among other things. Under federal law, there is a rebuttable presumption that the prosecutor exercises independent judgment when criminal charges are filed. The Ninth Circuit held that a plaintiff’s account of the incident in question, by itself, does not overcome the presumption of independent judgment. The presumption “protects the officers unless such evidence shows that officers interfered with the prosecutor’s judgment in some way, by omitting relevant information, by including false information, or by pressuring the prosecutor to file charges. A suspect’s account of the incident, by itself, is unlikely to influence a prosecutor’s decision, and thus, it cannot, by itself, serve as evidence that officers interfered with the prosecutor’s decision.” The ruling precludes the plaintiff from offering at trial evidence of the prosecution and from recovering as damages attorneys fees incurred in defending himself in the criminal proceeding. Back to N

Perkins v. City of West Covina
113 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 1997), reversed on other grounds, City of West Covina v. Perkins, 525 U.S. 234, 119 S. Ct. 678 (1999). see above
Police officers entitled to qualified immunity with regard to seizure of large amount of cash in light of evidence that suspect had been involved in drug-related activities. Back to P

Quintanilla v. City of Downey
84 F.3d 353 (9th Cir. 1996), cert denied, 519 U.S. 1122, 117 S.Ct. 972, 136 L.Fd.2d 856 (1997)
Use of police dog to apprehend suspect by biting does not violate Fourth Amendment. Without an unconstitutional use of excessive force, plaintiff could not challenge the City’s policy of using police dogs. Deadly force jury instruction unwarranted based upon the plaintiff’s injuries and the dog’s training. Back to Q

Real v. City of Compton
73 Cal. App. 4th 1407 (Ct. App. 1999), review denied (Nov. 10, 1999)
Police officer who suffered a work-related knee injury and received a 42% permanent disability rating after filing a worker’s compensation claim was involuntarily retired from the Compton Police Department based upon his inability to perform the essential functions of a patrol officer. Retired officer sued the City under the Americans with Disabilities Act claiming that he was regarded or perceived as having a disability when, in fact, he had been satisfactorily performing as a police officer. The Court of Appeal held that plaintiff failed to satisfy the threshold requirement that he was a disabled individual entitled to the protections of the ADA in that the evidence did not sufficiently show that “he was regarded as precluded from a broad class of jobs, such as the law enforcement field in general.” The fact that the City perceived that plaintiff was unable to perform the functions of a patrol officer for the Compton Police Department did not establish that plaintiff was regarded as being precluded from a broad class of jobs. Back to R

Rivera v. County of Los Angeles
745 F.3d 384 (9th Cir. 2014)
Plaintiff was arrested twice (1989 and 2009) on a felony warrant seeking the arrest of another person. After being detained at the Los Angeles County jail on both occasions, he was ultimately exonerated. The only discrepancies between his description and the warrant were a one-inch height difference, a ten-pound weight difference, and a different address. The warrant did not include any numeric or biometric identifiers, nor was it updated after his 1989 arrest to indicate that he had previously been cleared on the warrant. During his 2009 detention, Plaintiff was in custody 33 days. He testified that he complained repeatedly to Sheriff’s Department personnel that he was not the subject of the warrant, but he was not released nor was his identity investigated. Plaintiff brought suit against the County for violation of his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights, claiming the Sheriff’s Department should have (1) updated the warrant information following his 1989 detention; and (2) investigated his identity in response to his claims of mistaken identity during his 2009 detention. The District Court granted summary judgment for the County, and the Ninth Circuit affirmed the judgment in a published opinion, holding that the Fourth Amendment particularity clause does not require an arrest warrant to include numeric or biometric identifiers, so long as it includes sufficient information to identify the warrant subject to the reasonable exclusion of others. The Ninth Circuit further held that Sheriff’s Department personnel were not obligated to investigate Plaintiff’s identity because he reasonably matched the warrant description, and Plaintiff’s due process rights were protected because he was brought to court the day after his arrest and thereafter remained in custody pursuant to the Superior Court’s remanding order. Back to R

Shively v. Bozanich
31 Cal. 4th 1230 (2003), reversing 85 Cal. App 4th 363 (Ct. App. 2000)
In a unanimous decision, the California Supreme Court held that the accrual of a cause of action for defamation was not delayed or otherwise tolled by the so-called discovery rule, where the alleged defamatory statements were republished in a mass media forum. Reversing the Los Angeles-based 2nd District Court of Appeal, the justices refused to give the plaintiff the benefit of the discovery rule, which tolls the statute of limitations in cases in which plaintiffs do not immediately learn that they have been wronged. Plaintiff was a witness in the O.J. Simpson murder case who sued her former boyfriend and a Los Angeles Deputy District Attorney for making alleged false statements that she was a “felony probationer,” and also brought libel and slander claims against the author and publisher of a book that repeated those statements. Her lawsuit, filed in October 1997, however, was not filed until one year and one day after the book containing the alleged defamatory statements were first made available for sale in California. The trial court dismissed the suit pursuant to the defendants’ motion for summary judgment on the ground that plaintiff missed the one-year deadline, notwithstanding plaintiff’s declaration that she had not read the book and discovered the alleged defamatory statements until December 1996. Chief Justice Ronald M. George, writing for the high court, reversed the appellate court, concluding that the one-year deadline for filing a suit began to run on “the date the book was first generally distributed to the public, regardless of the date on which plaintiff actually learned of the existence of the book and read its contents.” Back to S

Sorchini v. City of Covina
250 F.3d 706 (9th Cir. 2001)
Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3(b) does not permit citation to an unpublished disposition for the purpose of providing “notice” to the court of the existence or absence of legal precedent. Unpublished dispositions are neither persuasive nor controlling authority, and the limited exceptions to the non-citation rule contained in section (b) are not intended to change that. Back to S

Streit v. County of Los Angeles
236 F.3d 552 (9th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, County of Los Angeles v. Streit, 534 U.S. 823, 122 S.CT 59, 151 L.Ed.2d 27
Sheriff acts on behalf of the County, not the State, when processing inmates for release from the county jail. Back to S

Susag v. City of Lake Forest
94 Cal. App. 4th 1401 (Ct. App. 2002), rehearing denied (Feb. 5, 2002) review denied (Apr. 10, 2002)
A person convicted of resisting or obstructing a peace officer under California Penal Code §148 may not maintain an action for state law battery, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and false arrest unless the conviction has been set aside through appeal or other post-conviction proceeding. Back to S

Thompson v. County of Los Angeles
142 Cal. App. 4th 154 (Ct. App. 2006), rehearing denied (Sept. 13, 2006) review denied (Nov. 15, 2006)
A court properly denies a deadly force jury instruction and correctly instructs the jury that the use of a trained police dog to find and bite a hiding criminal suspect is to be analyzed under the Fourth Amendment reasonableness standard. Special counsel Judge Kolts who reviewed allegations of excessive force against the Sheriff’s Department for the County Board of Supervisors was not authorized to make party admissions on behalf of the Sheriff’s Department and his report was properly excluded from trial. The probative value of evidence relating to bites inflicted by dog of a handler who was not a defendant in this case, was outweighed by its potential for prejudice; and absent violation of suspect’s Fourth Amendment rights, there was no basis for state civil rights claim. Back to T

Trafficschoolonline Inc. v. Superior Court (Ohlrich)
89 Cal. App. 4th 222 (Ct. App. 2001)
Article VI, section 10 of the state Constitution and Code of Civil Procedure section 1085, subdivision (a), vest power in the superior court to order an executive officer of the court to comply with a legal obligation or to direct the performance of an act which the law requires. Since the court has subject matter jurisdiction, the court cannot order transfer to the Court of Appeal pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 396. Back to T

Truong v. Orange County Sheriff’s Department
129 Cal. App. 4th 1423 (Ct. App. 2005)
Plaintiff’s federal and state claims for excessive force arising from fight with jail deputies dismissed under Heck doctrine in light of plaintiff’s plea of guilty to one count of resisting the exercise of the lawful duty of a peace officer under California Penal Code section 148. Back to T

Venegas v. County of Los Angeles
32 Cal. 4th 820 (2004)
A California sheriff acts as a state agent when performing law enforcement functions. Consequently, a sheriff and the County in which he serves are absolutely immune from liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Claims brought under California Code of Civil Procedure section 52.1 for unreasonable search and seizure do not require a showing that the defendant acted with discriminatory intent. Back to V

Walker v. Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority
116 Cal. App. 4th 43 (Ct. App. 2004), reversed 135 Cal 4th 15 (2005)
Following a jury trial defense verdict in a wrongful termination/whistleblower case, plaintiff appealed the order denying a motion for new trial. The Court held that an order denying a new trial is not appealable and the appeal could not be saved through the fiction of deeming it to be an appeal from the judgment. Plaintiff’s notice of appeal was so specific in its reference to the order denying a motion for a new trial, that it could not be given any effect as an appeal from the judgment. Back to W

Washington v. Lambert
98 F.3d 1181 (9th Cir. 1996)
Officers’ detention of individuals was sufficiently intrusive to constitute an arrest. Absent probable cause, the use of three other officers, a police dog, a spotlight, and drawn weapons was a violation of the Fourth Amendment. Back to W

Yousefian v. City of Glendale et al.
(9th Cir. 2015) 779 F.3d 1010
Plaintiff brought suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for false arrest and malicious prosecution, based on his arrest for assaulting his elderly father-in-law and subsequent charges for drug possession. The arresting officer developed an intimate relationship with Plaintiff’s wife which was disclosed shortly before commencement of the criminal trial which resulted in an acquittal. A three judge panel of the Ninth Circuit affirmed the District Court’s granting summary judgment for defendants, holding that the existence of probable cause at the time of the arrest barred the false arrest and malicious prosecution claims notwithstanding the subsequent relationship with the Plaintiff’s wife. The Ninth Circuit also held that the drug charges did not result in an arrest, and that, to the extent that Plaintiff was subject to own-recognizance release conditions amounting to a Fourth Amendment seizure, the conditions were identical to those imposed as a result of the assault-related charges for which there was probable cause. Back to Y