A review has to answer one simple question: is it
advisable to buy
this book? This time, the answer is an unqualified yes. Heckel and
Yardley (H&Y) have collected many sources on the reign of Alexander
and offer admirable translations and fine explanations. Among
the texts are long fragments from well-known authors like Arrian,
Curtius
Rufus, and Plutarch,
but the reader will also find interesting,
lesser-known sources, like the Itinerary
of Alexander,
the Metz Epitome,
and several important
inscriptions.

However, the first pages of the book appear to be
carelessly edited,[1]
and there are several minor mistakes,[2]
which can easily be corrected when the book is reprinted. Personally, I
would not have devoted an entire chapter to 'Alexander and the Romans';
instead, 'Alexander and the Barbarians' would have received more
attention, because in my view, Alexander's reign is extremely relevant
to the current debate on transcultural leadership. But this is merely a
matter of emphasis and personal opinion. I have learned a lot from this
book.

Consequently, I have only one single point of serious
criticism: the
book is incomplete. It wants to offer 'the raw material of ancient
history' (page ii), but contains, as is indicated in the title, only
written sources. Archaeological discoveries are virtually ignored, even
though they have greatly improved our understanding of, for example,
the sack of Persepolis.
We now know that the Macedonians
placed seats
on the eastern platform wall to watch the destruction of the palaces.[3]
It is also to be regretted that H&Y barely use numismatic
evidence (although their book contains three pictures of ancient coins).

Even accepting H&Y's decision to restrict the
raw material of
ancient history to written sources, the book is incomplete, as it
contains only Greek and Latin texts. Egyptian sources are absent.
Somtutefnakht is not mentioned, although his autobiography, the Naples
stela, illustrates the panic after the battle
of Issus. But the real
weakness of the book is the fact that not a single Babylonian
text has
been included, even though the Astronomical Diaries,
the Dynastic
Prophecy and the Babylonian
chronicles are contemporary sources that
offer useful information.

Many scholars have already studied the Babylonian
texts.[4]
In the remainder of this review I will try to show that H&Y
should have included these sources in their book. They certainly could
have done this, because all relevant Babylonian sources have been
accessible in fine translations for at least a decade and a half. I
will also offer some new interpretations. Some of them have, to the
best of my knowledge, not been published before.

I will start with the dynastic crisis in the Persian
empire in
338-336, which led to the accession of Darius III. On
page 54, H&Y state that Artaxerxes
III Ochus was murdered by his chamberlain Bagoas,
who placed Arses
on the throne. This is the story as given by Diodorus
Siculus, and H&Y continue with a translation of 17.5.3-6.2,
where we can read that Bagoas was also responsible for the
assassination of Arses, and was in turn killed by Darius.

We know more about these events. The history of
Babylonian and
Persian kings known as the Dynastic Prophecy (first published in 1975)
suggests that Arses was killed after an open revolt, not by a palace
coup. It confirms that Bagoas murdered the king but also allows the
interpretation that he acted as an agent of Darius. This suggests that,
when the Macedonians invaded Asia, the Persian empire was involved in
nothing less than a civil war. Even when H&Y disagree with
this
suggestion, they could have pointed out that our sources contradict
each other.

The most interesting parts of the Astronomical Diaries
were already
known before their first edition in 1988. These cuneiform texts offer
two kinds of information: astronomical observations during a certain
month, and contemporary events in Babylonia. They are the data that the
astrologers of Babylonia, the famous Chaldaeans,
included in the
handbooks they used to predict future events. According to these
handbooks, the lunar eclipse of 20 September 331 BC (eleven nights
before the battle of Gaugamela) indicated the death of a king. The
section of the moon that was first darkened proved that Babylonia and
Persia would suffer and the visibility of Saturn meant that the effects
were intensified. If Jupiter had been visible, the omen might have been
neutralized, but this planet had set at the beginning of the eclipse.

Several people at Gaugamela must have felt that Darius
was bound to be defeated, because Chaldaean science was no secret.[5]
The Diaries also describe what happened during the battle: 'The army
abandoned Darius and returned to the cities' (AD -330; obv.17). After
an evil omen, leaving a doomed king was a sensible thing to do.

There is a problem here. The Babylonian text contradicts
the Greek
source that is often accepted as the best, Arrian. He says that Darius
was the first to turn and run, after which the other Persians followed
suit (Anabasis
3.14.3). One way to harmonize these
conflicting
pieces of information is to render 'The army abandoned Darius' as
'Darius abandoned his army'.[6]
Suspending the rules of grammar, however, will not solve the problem.
We must accept that either Arrian or the Diary is wrong, and in this
case we must prefer the Babylonian source, which was written two weeks
after the battle. In my opinion, H&Y should have included the
text of the Diary in their book and could have ignored Arrian, who
misrepresented the crucial stage of the battle.

The same cuneiform tablet offers an interesting account
of
Alexander's diplomatic moves before entering Babylon.
We read about his
offer to rebuild the temple
of Marduk and learn how he announced that
the houses of the Babylonians would not be looted. These negotiations
are not mentioned by Curtius Rufus and Arrian, who state that the
Macedonians prepared for battle when they approached Babylon (History
of Alexander 5.1.19 and Anabasis
3.16.3). More intriguingly, the Diary makes it clear that Alexander did
not send Macedonian envoys, but Greeks. Did he consider it unsafe to
send the very soldiers who had recently fought against the Babylonian
cavalry?

The Astronomical Diaries offer further useful
information. They may
help us find the hitherto unknown date of the battle
near Issus. Diary
-332 B rev.10 mentions a solar eclipse that was 'omitted', which means
that a predicted evil omen did not occur, so that there was no reason
to fear the future. In this case, the omitted dangerous period would
have started with the eclipse of 27 October 333 and the portended
disaster would have befallen Darius within 100 days. According to the
astronomical advisers in the Persian army, the great king could safely
set out from Sochi and attack the Macedonians in Cilicia.
Assuming that
Darius left immediately after he had received his astronomer' s green
light, and accepting normal marching distances for the next days,
Darius must have reached Issus between 3 and 6 November. The battle
took place on the next day.[7]

The Diaries also offer information about Babylonian food
prices, and
we are lucky to have tablets for two occasions when an army was staying
in Babylon. In the summer of 333, when Darius assembled the army that
was to be defeated near Issus, the prices were normal. On the other
hand, in 323, when Alexander's army was in Babylon, the prices were
higher than after an ordinary crop failure. In my view, there are two
possible explanations: (1) Darius assembled his army not in Babylon,
but somewhere else; (2) the king of Asia was less interested in the
well-being of the populace of Babylon than of the king of kings.

[...]

I am not claiming that the Babylonian sources are better
than the
classical texts, but I hope to have shown that they can offer useful
information. Van der Spek's edition of Chronicle
8 has probably shown
the name of a hitherto unknown satrap, a possible reference to Bessus,
and something that looks like the execution of the famous astronomer Kidinnu.
There is a lot more to be expected from Babylonia and I hope
to have convinced the readers of this review that a scholar studying
Alexander can no longer ignore the cuneiform texts.

As I already pointed out, these sources have been
accessible for
more than a decade and a half, and I assume that H&Y, both
excellent scholars, are aware of the importance of the sources they
have left undiscussed. Yet, although I think H&Y's selection
of
sources is old-fashioned, their book is to be recommended to anyone
studying the reign of Alexander.

[1]
The first stemma calls Adea-Eurydice 'Philip III' (instead of her
husband Arrhidaeus).
On the map on page xii-xiii, Tyre has moved to
Haifa; Pella, Issus, Maracanda,
and the Jaxartes
are called Bella,
Issis, Marcanda, and Laxartes; ultrazionists may appreciate that the
word 'Palestine' is placed in Jordan.

[2]
Alexander's date of birth, 6 Loos, is identified with 20 July (although
we cannot, to the best of my knowledge, convert dates from the
Macedonian to the Gregorian calendar), whereas the day of Alexander's
death, which we know beyond reasonable doubt (11 June 323) is ignored.
Cf. Leo Depuydt, 'The Time of Death of Alexander the Great' in Welt
des Orients 28 (1997) 117-135, an article not mentioned in
H&Y's otherwise complete bibliography.

[4]
Recently,
these sources have been collected, re-edited, re-translated,
and commented upon by R.J. van der Spek in a useful article -
'Darius
III, Alexander the Great and Babylonian scholarship' in Achaemenid
History 13 (2003) 289-346 - that appeared too late for H
& Y to take into account.

[5]
At least one Jew was educated as a Chaldaean: Talmud Babli, Baba
Metziah 85b, mentions a rabbi Samuel, educated as 'astrologer and
physician' - an exact translation of one of the Chaldaean titles. To
be fair, this happened several centuries after Alexander.

[6]
Michael Wood, In the
Footsteps of Alexander the Great
(1997 Berkeley), p.90.

[7]
This date can also be deduced from the lunar phase. The battle started
late in the afternoon and must have lasted until after sunset. If it
took place after 7 November, the moon rose too late to illuminate the
battlefield. On the other hand, before 4 November, the moon's disk was
too small.