Abstract: Spinoza deals with humans and “human essence”
but it is not clear how consistent his use of these notions is. The problem
evoked by Spinoza’s anthropology concerns in turn the status of singular versus general essences and the
relationship between those essences and their concrete condition of existence.
In this paper, I propose to distinguish between these levels in order to argue
that humanity exists insofar as different
individuals can agree among themselves and become adapted to each other to live and operate together. Firstly, I
examine Spinoza’s use of the term “aptus”
in order to show that eternal singular essences can exist in different ways
according to the extent they can be “adapted” to their environment, that is, to
external causes. Secondly, I claim that “human essence” has to be understood as
a general essence which therefore
results from the “agreements” produced among certain singular essences. Thirdly,
I argue that, contrary to the remarkable interpretation provided by Valtteri
Viljanen, this ontological picture cannot be explained only by reference to formal causation but needs a genuine
kind of efficient causation.

Sangiacomo doet een nieuwe poging om Spinoza’s idee over wat
menselijk is te formuleren. Hij doet dat via het analyseren van hoe Spinoza de
term ‘geschiktheid’/’aangepastheid’ (aptus)
hanteert, waaruit hij afleidt dat, daar de externe oorzakelijke omstandigheden verschillen,
een actueel bestaand individu zal veranderen.” Changing the influences the body receives from
the outside also changes its greater or smaller aptitude to produce its effects.
In other words, at each moment the essence and the effects it can produce
remain the same. However, changing the environmental conditions, these effects
are more or less checked by external causes; thus, the aptitude of the thing to
produce these effects increases or decreases as well.” [p. 84]
Maar die verandering werkt naar wee kanten: “the concept of aptitude conveys
the extent to which a certain thing fits well in its environment, that is, the
degree of agreement between its effects and those of the external causes.” [p.85}

Nergens geeft Spinoza een specificatie van wat menselijk is.
Hem interesseert niet wat
mensen onderscheidt van de rest van de natuur: ”humanity might be better
understood not as a property that specific individuals independently
instantiate, but rather as the way in which different individuals can be
considered as parts of a certain whole.” [p. 87]