Syria and Ukraine

Ross Douthat offers a quasi-defense of the importance of U.S. Syria policy for what has happened in Ukraine:

Is it really so ridiculous to believe that the Syria crisis confirmed certain impressions that Putin had already cultivated about America’s willingness to back up its threats [bold mine-DL] and see a given strategy through, and that this influenced his decision to push harder in Ukraine than this White House and its intelligence analysts expected? I think not: Of course this push isn’t “about us” in the sense that, say, Russia’s decision-making in the Cuban Missile Crisis was, but Putin surely took account of the steps that the United States and its allies were likely to undertake in response, and decided that they would be less effective, and less painful to his interests, than our own foreign policy team clearly expected him to think.

This is a much more qualified claim, and while it is not as ridiculous as the ordinary “credibility” and “resolve” arguments I’m not sure that there is any reason to believe it is true. As Russian leaders claim to see things, the U.S. is only too willing to back up threats with force, and has done so with some regularity over the last fifteen years. Moscow sees and fears the possibility of American intervention in other countries long before Washington is actively contemplating such a thing, it assumes that Western governments are always looking for a pretext to intervene against governments that they oppose, and it sees a major U.S. role in any and every major political disturbance in the former Soviet Union whether there is one or not. We could dismiss this as propaganda, but it appears that people in the Kremlin really do believe some or all of this. There is much more reason to think that Russia’s blundering overreaction in Crimea came from believing that the overthrow of Yanukovych was nothing more than a Western-backed coup, but that would mean that the U.S. is partly responsible for the current mess because it was being and was perceived as being too meddlesome in the affairs of another country. That is the last thing that the hawks pushing the connection between Syria and Crimea could or would admit, and so instead we hear endlessly about unenforced “red lines.”

While some Americans may have concluded from the abortive attack on Syria that American threats can’t be taken seriously, Russia was more likely to see this as an intervention that was halted only at the last minute. If Putin already had “certain impressions” about when the U.S. was and wasn’t prepared to use force, these had been formed by watching more than a decade of U.S.-led foreign wars and its (very sensible) unwillingness to back up its would-be Georgian client in 2008. He would have concluded from this that the U.S. is quite ready to go to war against much weaker governments to the point of destroying them, but that it isn’t going to risk a war for a minor client on the doorstep of a major power. In other words, he would have concluded that the U.S. is too willing to resort to force in some cases, but that it isn’t completely reckless in its readiness to go to war, and he could have easily reached that conclusion years before the Syrian civil war began. The fact that the U.S. didn’t attack Syria didn’t really tell Putin anything he wouldn’t have already known from watching U.S. behavior since 1999, and he could have dismissed it as a highly unusual instance of U.S. restraint that had no relevance in other places.

The idea behind linking the two episodes in this way is that U.S. “inaction” (i.e., not attacking other countries) supposedly invites international chaos, but a far more plausible and less tendentious argument is that encouraging political instability and supporting the overthrow of a government backed by a neighboring major power is likely to have dangerous and somewhat unexpected consequences. Not only did Western governments fail to anticipate what these consequences might be, but they proceeded as if there were no danger that things could go very wrong. This is the point Dmitri Simes made in a recent interview:

Now, I understand that we favored the rebels. And I also again have to say that looking at Yanukovych, he clearly was unsavory, and unpopular, and inept, and I can understand why we would not do anything to promote his questionable legitimacy. But we have to realize, that as we were applying this pressure on the Ukrainian political process to promote those we favor, we clearly were rocking the political boat in Ukraine, a country deeply divided, a country with different religions, different histories, different ethnicities. And it was that process of rocking the boat that led to the outcome [we] have seen. That is not to justify what Putin has done, that is not to say that the Russians are entitled to use their troops on the territory of another state. But let me say this: any Russian wrongdoings should not be used as an alibi for the incompetence of the Obama administration. European and American steps that contributed to this unfortunate outcome, and quite remarkably, nobody in this administration even seems to have been thinking about what the consequences of their previous actions could be.

The straightforward explanation is that Western support for destabilizing protests helped to create a degree of political upheaval and a kind of political change that Moscow wasn’t prepared to tolerate any longer. As Simes says, that doesn’t validate or justify the Russian response, but it does a better job of explaining it without having to come up with a roundabout way to lay blame for the situation on the U.S. “failure” to attack another country in the Near East.

Well, that’s a credibility issue. A failure to take responsibility for one’s views and apparently having none of your own.

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“Crimea came from believing that the overthrow of Yanukovych was nothing more than a Western-backed coup, but that would mean that the U.S. is partly responsible for the current mess because it was being and was perceived as being too meddlesome in the affairs of another country.”

I am not sure dancing around our complicity is going to improve our credibility.

Because the West, particularly the United States, can’t come clean about its substantial part in the overthrow of an elected government that dared to oppose its diktats, mobilizing opinion to follow along on a crusade to “free” “occupied” Ukraine is stymied. And of course we can’t come clean. And no one is going to be excited about the oligarchs being sent out by Kiev to re-claim the rebellious. There is no credible Ukrainian military threat. A partisan or guerilla war will lose the eastern Ukraine for good. Rattling the plastic sword of “Magnitsky” act punishment is about as far it goes. The Russian calculated the Crimea was crucial, they got it , the Crimeans are fine to be in(there will be no Tartar revolt from a new Kan descending from heaven) and we will all get used to Putin’s “blunder” in time. The world gets over border changes. Consult a thousand years of maps. It’s probably over because we decided to be aggressive, overthrow a government and then let these poor folks down because we never had the intention of going to a real war….which was obviously the result. Putin didn’t blunder anymore than FDR in 1941. He waited until his hand was forced and appears to be winning. Failure to act would have been his unforgivable blunder and downfall. He took the only option maniacs like Nuland and McCain left him. The results made still be unclear but the decision was not.

Yeah, I’m not getting the “blunder” part either. Putin knew what he was doing. He knew the West, particularly the USA, would make a lot of noise, and, perhaps, actually take some steps against it. But he saw securing Crimea as worth it. His actions may violate international law, but then the USA routinely does so, and it is not alone in doing so either, and, again, he may see the reward as worth the risk. Would any Russian leader simply do nothing in this circumstance? Would any Russian leader simply cede Crimea to a Ukrainian nationalist regime?

And, I agree with ECInc, it is BS to say the overthrow of Yanukovych was NOT “a Western backed coup,” as it was most certainly was a coup and most certainly was Western backed (as well as Western funded and otherwise assisted by the West in numerous ways). That it might not have been “only” that is not really important.

Re: Dimitri Simes “But let me say this: any Russian wrongdoings should not be used as an alibi for the incompetence of the Obama administration.”.

U.S. incompetence is not limited to the Obama administration. The Bush screw-ups are legion. And the United States has been engaged in global interventions of one sort or another since the start of the Cold War. Nitwit Victoria Nuland’s hare-brained cookies and f-bomb shenanigans to game the Ukrainian meltdown are merely a continuum of arrogant Power Elite subversion that extends back to the hackneyed plots to kill Castro.

All of the information that NSA collects only has value if someone does something with it. You give a covert hammer and a boatload of black money to the too-smart-by-half spy guys saturated with hubris and conceit and everything is a nail…

Unfortunately, the Congressional Intelligence committees meet in secret and are in bed with the Agencies that they are supposed to oversee. And Congress generally has abandoned its constitutional responsibilities which were happily arrogated by the metastasized Imperial Presidency.

So us hoi polloi can yammer all we want, but the fix is in for more business as usual crony stupidity by the National Security State, and the resulting wreckage which is of course billed to the taxpayers.

‘American Naiveté Abroad.’ How many times do we have to watch that show before we learn that it inevitably ends in blows, and worse?
Of course we were meddling it Kiev, openly, and if openly, assuredly covertly (cookie distribution on the square demonstrates openness I suppose and I don’t know what talking preferred succession on an unsecure phone demonstrates except incompetence); and of course we were being played by political players who were out, and wanted to be in, who were telling our diplomats and spies what they knew they wanted to hear.
I suspect that the Russians do not view us as weak at all; ill informed – yes; naïve – yes; credulous – yes; blundering – yes; over bearing – yes; and dangerous. After 20 years of careening all over the globe to make the world amenable to our aspirations for it, can we blame them?

I think the “credibility” argument about Syria has to be put in context. It’s not as if we reneged on a solemn promise to defend an ally; the president made an ill-conceived and poorly thought-out remark, and when it came time to decide whether he’d be goaded into following through or would find a way out, he backed out just about as gracefully as he could under the circumstances. That’s not exactly a great moment in statesmanship, but it’s not clear to me that our “credibility” would be bolstered if people assumed that every off-the-cuff remark was a binding statement of American foreign policy, to be followed through on no matter the cost.

Doing what you say you’ll do is one aspect of credibility, but so is reliability and good judgment. Does it make the US a more “credible” ally to, say, South Korea or NATO members when it diverts its resources into ill-considered adventures in areas of marginal strategic importance? Or does that make the US less credible, because it calls into question our ability to allocate our resources and attention in accordance with our interests and our promises to other states?

People who make these “credibility” arguments tend to assume we have clearer obligations than we actually do. It happened in Syria with people pretending that Obama was duty-bound to commence bombing, it happened in Georgia when people basically argued that we somehow had a NATO-style obligation to defend a state that is not in NATO. The same thing’s happening here. All of these credibility arguments would be trueif Ukraine were in NATO, but it’s not (fortunately, since whatever you think about this conflict it seems objectively true that Ukraine’s not united enough or stable enough to risk bringing into a mutual-defense treaty).

I wonder however about the credibility implications for the Iranian negotiations. After all, the USA, UK and Russia promised solemnly in 1994 “to refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of Ukraine, and that none of their weapons will ever be used against Ukraine except in self-defense”. It’s likely similar assurances would be promised as part of any deal for Iran to abandon potential nuclear weapon capabilities. It’s also very clear the Iranians would be foolish to place the slightest reliance on such empty promises.

I think the original destabilization was the offer by Putin for Ukraine to join the Eurasian Union, and Yanukovych’s plan to accept it, and then increase presidential power to make it irreversible.

It’s been pointed out accurately that any offer by the West to join the EU (let alone NATO) would be interpreted as forcing a choice on Ukraine, one that would be seen as threatening and illegitimate by the pro-Russian public in the east, Crimea, and south. Well, the Eurasian Union is seen exactly the same way by the pro-European public in the West, Center, and North of Ukraine.

Anyone who thinks that if only the EU and the US had ignored them, they would have quietly accepted their own vision for the Ukraine being completely rejected and then have their voice permanently smothered in the Putin-style managed democracy which Yanukovych was openly planned to install is awfully naive.

Of course if you agree with mainstream Russian opinion that all politically active western Ukrainians are “fascists” without exception, then I suppose provoking them to an uprising with a provocative decision and them using live ammo to kill them off would have been a great plan, one that would cement Ukraine as purely Russian and eastern for all time. Such a great plan, in fact, I find it hard to believe it wasn’t actually the plan. Good thing Putin knows how to improvise when his puppet Yanukovych turns out not to have enough guts to carry it out.

Don’t forget, the west already got the regime change it said it had wanted in the former Soviet Union. As is usual it isn’t pleased with the actual consequences of a foreign leadership becoming accountable to its own interests instead of being subservient. And so would like to have another go.

When you do foreign regime change for your own interests but in the name of supporting democracy that is in the interests of the foreign people involved, there is bound to be an eventual parting of the ways. In which case, still having your own interests, you will prefer a regime less accountable to its own people, just like the old one, but one which reports to you.

None of this has anything to do with democratic values, but with stock values.

“And here is Russian President Vladimir Putin, already last year, talking about how Russia and China decided to trade in roubles and yuan, and stressing how Russia needs to quit the “excessive monopoly” of the US dollar. He had to be aware the Empire would strike back.”

“I wonder however about the credibility implications for the Iranian negotiations. After all, the USA, UK and Russia promised solemnly in 1994 “to refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of Ukraine, and that none of their weapons will ever be used against Ukraine except in self-defense”. It’s likely similar assurances would be promised as part of any deal for Iran to abandon potential nuclear weapon capabilities. It’s also very clear the Iranians would be foolish to place the slightest reliance on such empty promises.”

We already blew that, so to speak, with the Libyan War. Gaddafi played nice after 9/11 (realizing that he was in a very vulnerable position), and we helped take him out.

Any government in Iran will be extremely aware that the USA is big, and quite willing to f*ck with Iran at any time, under any pretext. I would say ‘almost any’, because this shouldn’t apply to an Israel-friendly regime, but I think that Israel and our neocon lackeys would still try to weaken Iran, under the policy of not having any strong nations in the Middle East.

@Flavius: I suspect that the Russians do not view us as weak at all; ill informed – yes; naïve – yes; credulous – yes; blundering – yes; over bearing – yes; and dangerous.

This. Our folly is in acting as if we have to have a finger on one side of the scale in every geopolitical crisis in the world.

And while President Obama’s actions have been less disastrous for the US than those of his predecessor – he still has meddled far too much.

Some of Obama’s best geopolitical moves have actually come from ignoring American hawks and keeping our noses clean of some situations, as he did during the Green Revolution in Iran – since American support for the protesters would only given the Iranian hardliners more public justification for brutal repression, and may have spoiled our ability to move forward on nuclear talks.

“I think the original destabilization was the offer by Putin for Ukraine to join the Eurasian Union, and Yanukovych’s plan to accept it, and then increase presidential power to make it irreversible.”

LOL! The EU making a similar trade treaty offer is… what? Just fine? But Putin doing it is “destabilizing?” As for “irreversibility,” when was the last time a country managed to get out of the EU’s orbit, once inside?

“Anyone who thinks that if only the EU and the US had ignored them, they would have quietly accepted their own vision for the Ukraine being completely rejected and then have their voice permanently smothered in the Putin-style managed democracy which Yanukovych was openly planned to install is awfully naive.”

Leaving aside the dubiousness of the absolute accuracy of your knowledge of what was going to happen, who is actually claiming what you say is “naïve?” No one that I know of maintains that the Maidan protests were SOLELY the product of US and EU meddling, rather, the contention is that the EU and the US helped finance and train the protestors, supported them openly and behind the scenes, and encouraged them to refuse to make a deal or wait until next year’s elections.

“Of course if you agree with mainstream Russian opinion that all politically active western Ukrainians are ‘fascists’ without exception….”

No one that I know of here “agrees” with that “mainstream Russian opinion” (if that is what it is), certainly Mr Larison does not. But it is “naïve” to think that fascists were not a part of it, and it does not exactly reflect well on the USA and the EU that this did not seem to trouble them in the slightest.

“….then I suppose provoking them to an uprising with a provocative decision and them using live ammo to kill them off would have been a great plan, one that would cement Ukraine as purely Russian and eastern for all time.”

What tripe! Yeah, Putin and Yanukovich conspired to “provoke” the opposition with a “provocative decision,” and it is therefor their fault that the revolution occurred. Because, after all, it is not as if the President of a country can legitimately decide to seek a treaty with one trade group rather than another, even if it was understood when he took office that he leaned more towards one side than the other. Nope, it was all his fault, he “made” them come out and protest. How dare he not act according to the opposition party’s wishes! Why, one would think that he was elected or something!

“Such a great plan, in fact, I find it hard to believe it wasn’t actually the plan.”

Well, I doubt any one else has the same trouble. Really, you’ve convinced yourself of your own conspiracy theory/blame shifting argument, and that is supposed to be impressive?

“Good thing Putin knows how to improvise when his puppet Yanukovych turns out not to have enough guts to carry it out.”

How about an alternate theory? Putin and Yanukovich assumed the opposition would not like the treaty with Russia, but would stick to democratic practices and wait until next year’s election. Then, the majority of voters would probably side with Yanukovich, just as they did when he was elected in 2010. Neither one expected the opposition to “take it to the streets” over such an issue, one clearly within the government’s legitimate authority to make. Nor did they expect the EU and the USA to back so openly such an anti democratic appeal to mob rule. When they did, they had no answers. Actually NOT wanting to use “live ammo” and cause a bloodbath led to the revolutionaries gaining more and more confidence, and to the demoralization of the government forces. A real autocrat would have simply called in the army and had the square cleared, one way or another. Which neither he nor Putin wanted. Instead, Yanukovich diddled, and lost.

So, let’s lay off the criminal mastermind/conspiracy BS, and recognize that Putin has been “improvising” all along, to try and preserve some security for the Russian State against an ever encroaching NATO.