Classical (Bayesian) probability (CP) theory has led to an influential research tradition for modeling cognitive processes. Cognitive scientists have been trained to work with CP principles for so long that it is hard even to imagine alternative ways to formalize probabilities. However, in physics, quantum probability (QP) theory has been the dominant probabilistic approach for nearly 100 years. Could QP theory provide us with any advantages in cognitive modeling as well? Note first that both CP and QP theory share the (...) fundamental assumption that it is possible to model cognition on the basis of formal, probabilistic principles. But why consider a QP approach? The answers are that (1) there are many well-established empirical findings (e.g., from the influential Tversky, Kahneman research tradition) that are hard to reconcile with CP principles; and (2) these same findings have natural and straightforward explanations with quantum principles. In QP theory, probabilistic assessment is often strongly context- and order-dependent, individual states can be superposition states (that are impossible to associate with specific values), and composite systems can be entangled (they cannot be decomposed into their subsystems). All these characteristics appear perplexing from a classical perspective. However, our thesis is that they provide a more accurate and powerful account of certain cognitive processes. We first introduce QP theory and illustrate its application with psychological examples. We then review empirical findings that motivate the use of quantum theory in cognitive theory, but also discuss ways in which QP and CP theories converge. Finally, we consider the implications of a QP theory approach to cognition for human rationality. (shrink)

ABSTRACTIn this research, we investigated whether appraisals of faces follow distinct rules of information integration under arousing versus non-arousing conditions. Support for this prediction was found in four experiments in which participants observed angry faces that were presented with a direct versus an averted gaze, on a red versus a grey background, and after performing a motor exercise versus no exercise. Under arousing conditions, participants’ appraisals of faces reflected summation whereas, under non-arousing conditions, appraisals did not reflect summation and could (...) instead be accounted for by three alternative rules of information integration based on averaging, mere exposure, or the number of strong stimuli. (shrink)

ABSTRACTDynamic changes in emotional expressions are a valuable source of information in social interactions. As the expressive behaviour of a person changes, the inferences drawn from the behaviour may also change. Here, we test the possibility that dynamic changes in emotional expressions affect person perception in terms of stable trait attributions. Across three experiments, we examined perceivers’ inferences about others’ personality traits from changing emotional expressions. Expressions changed from one emotion to another emotion, allowing us to disentangle potential primacy, recency, (...) and averaging effects. Drawing on three influential models of person perception, we examined perceptions of dominance and affiliation, competence and warmth, and dominance and trustworthiness. A strong recency effect was consistently found across all trait judgments, that is, the end emotion of dynamic expressions had a strong impact on t... (shrink)

Prior research has found attributions to mediate the relationship between the elements of corporate social responsibility activities and consumer responses to firms; however, the question of what variables determine consumer attributions of CSR remains partially unaddressed. This article analyzes why consumers make attributions of CSR that are either positive, or negative. The results obtained from two empirical studies indicate that company–cause fit, corporate ability, and interpersonal trust have a positive influence on the motives that consumers attribute to CSR, whereas corporate (...) hypocrisy has a negative effect. This research contributes to our understanding of the psychological mechanisms underlying impactful consumer judgments and provides guidance for organizations in responding to such evaluations. (shrink)

One widely-endorsed argument in the experimental philosophy literature maintains that intuitive judgments are unreliable because they are influenced by the order in which thought experiments prompting those judgments are presented. Here, we explicitly state this argument from ordering effects and show that any plausible understanding of the argument leads to an untenable conclusion. First, we show that the normative principle is ambiguous. On one reading of the principle, the empirical observation is well-supported, but the normative principle is false. On the (...) other reading, the empirical observation has only weak support, and the normative principle, if correct, would impugn the reliability of deliberative reasoning, testimony, memory, and perception, since judgments in all these areas are sensitive to ordering in the relevant sense. We then reflect on what goes wrong with the argument. (shrink)

In this article, I further analyze the notion of the effectiveness of argumentative strategies, introduced in Jovičić, 2001. The most relevant achievements of the theories of reasonable discussion and the theories of persuasion are called to mind with the aim of explaining the mechanism of the argumentative effectiveness. As a result, a procedure for evaluating the effectiveness of argumentative strategies is suggested.