MR. SNOW: Greetings. Welcome to Amman. First, I am joined by my
close personal friend, Senior Administration Official, for a background
briefing on the President's dinner with the King of Jordan. So let me
introduce to one and all, Senior Administration Official, to give you a
readout and then answer your questions.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Thank you. I should start with
who was there: The President; Secretary Rice; Mr. Hadley; Josh Bolten;
Elliott Abrams; the King; his brother, Prince Ali; the Prime Minister;
the Foreign Minister; and the head of the Intelligence Service.

The two main topics of discussion were the situation in Lebanon and
Syria's role in it, and the Israeli-Palestinian situation, starting with
Lebanon. There was a good deal of discussion about the very worrying
situation in Lebanon and the events of the last week or so, including
particularly the Gemayel assassination. And both the President and the
King agreed very much on the need to support Prime Minister Siniora and
his government.

There was a lot of concern expressed about the role that Syria is
playing in Lebanon, its failure to heed U.N. Security Council
Resolutions 1559 and 1701. The President made clear his view that this
is not the time for engagement with Syria because the Syrian government
always seems to see any such form of engagement as a gesture of
approval, or as a way of getting off the hook for actions that it is
taking.

On the Israeli-Palestinian situation, the President and the King
both thought this was a potential moment of opportunity. They both
commented on Prime Minister Olmert's speech of a couple days ago, very
positively. They agreed on the need to work with President Abbas and to
take concrete steps to strengthen the Palestinian Authority and
strengthen him.

The King said he thought that there was a real desire in the Arab
world to move forward, a change in the discourse about the
Israeli-Palestinian problem and about Israel, and that there was a real
opportunity here for Israel to create new relationships with Arab
countries if it was able to move forward in its relations with the
Palestinians -- forward, obviously, toward peace, toward negotiations.

The President was very grateful for the role that Jordan is
playing. It has a very positive relationship with all the key players
here -- the Palestinians, the Israelis, the other Arab countries
involved.

Secretary Rice noted that she is going to take the next step --
she's going to go across the river tomorrow and see the Israeli Prime
Minister and Foreign Minister and Palestinian President Abbas and get
their latest take on what the situation is and how they plan to work
together to move things forward, and what role the United States can
play and what role other countries can play.

I'm going to stop with that and take questions.

Q So they did not discuss the Iraq situation at all, and
Maliki's meeting with King Abdullah earlier today?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I can only tell you what happened
at the dinner. There was a one-on-one between the President and the
King before the dinner. I don't know whether that was discussed at it,
whether it was the main subject, whether it was not a subject at all, I
just don't know. I can tell you that at the dinner, that was not the
focus. The focus was the, what I would call, broader regional questions
under which, certainly, the Israeli-Palestinian and Syria-Lebanon
questions arise. There was some discussion of terrorism and of the role
in the region of al Qaeda, and of terrorism in the region. But this was
really a regional discussion.

Q I'm sorry, I'm a bit confused. You're saying you're not sure
what was discussed between President Bush and King Abdullah before the
dinner?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I don't know what happened in the
one-on-one. I only know that at the dinner, that was not the focus.

Q But did it come up at all?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It came up, but it was really not
the focus, because both the President -- the King had just had his
bilat, the President will have his, and I think they wanted to discuss
Iraq in those discussions with Maliki.

Q Have you gotten any clearer understanding of who made the
decision not to make it a trilateral? I mean, did King Abdullah suggest
it to Prime Minister Maliki, or did Prime Minister Maliki make the
decision unilaterally?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, the one word answer is, no. I
can tell you that when the President made the decision -- or actually,
it wasn't even a decision a few days ago when the idea arose -- of
coming here after Riga, it was always a bilateral dinner. I can tell
you that. It was always a bilateral dinner, and that was well
understood.

I don't know when the idea -- the trilateral idea came up, but it
was pretty clear from the dinner, I think, that both of them felt they
-- you know, there are three bilateral meetings here, which cover all
the bases -- President-King, King-Maliki, President-Maliki. So
everybody gets to have these bilateral conversations and go into all the
depth they want, and I guess they just concluded there was no need for a
trilat.

Q Did the King of Jordan --

Q -- who, that's my question.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, I can only --

Q Did the President land in Jordan believing that he was going
to a meeting this evening?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No.

Q Did he leave --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I don't believe so.

Q Did he leave Riga believing that he was going to be meeting --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I wasn't here, I can't answer
that.

Q When was the White House informed that Maliki would not be
attending the dinner tonight?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I can't answer. I can only tell
you that there was a good -- there was a broad feeling that a trilateral
was really not necessary.

Q Did the White House believe that a trilateral was not
necessary?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I can't tell you when precisely
decisions were made where I was not present. I can tell you that there
was -- this pattern of having three bilateral meetings, is one that the
President and the rest of us are very satisfied with, and the King was
clearly very satisfied with his meeting -- his bilateral meeting.

Q The subject was on the schedule, and even as of 11:30 a.m.
this morning it was still on the schedule. And we were trying to figure
out what the photo opportunities were going to be. Less than an hour
later, it's gone away. And there's a lot of confusion, and there's
going to be a lot more confusion unless we can get a sort of easy to
wrap our arms around answer on why this went away.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I know. I can't -- I was here,
and all I can tell you is it was a very clear understanding here that
there would be a bilateral dinner. I'm not sure where the trilateral
idea came from, but it was not what we decided in the end was really the
optimal way to spend the President's time. He wants to meet with
Maliki; he wants to meet with the King; the King wanted to meet with the
President; the King wanted to meet with Maliki. This is the best setup
for everybody.

Q Who is the "we"? When you say "we decided," who's the "we"?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I was not on the plane, so I can't
answer as to any decisions on the plane.

Q Can you clarify?

Q The decision occurred on the plane then?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We can't give you a process
answer. What we can tell you is that it was deemed superfluous and,
therefore, they didn't do it --

Q For who?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: For everybody.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: By all parties concerned.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Everybody.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: By everybody, because you ended up
having three trilats --

Q By the King, Maliki, and the President?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Maliki, the President and the
King, the three parties involved, it was going to be superfluous. I
cannot give you the whys and wherefores, but I can tell you -- also,
just to knock down because I know there's been speculation, was this
occasioned by the story in the Times? The answer is, it had no
relationship to that, period. That has been clearly transmitted and
that certainly is not --

Q But you didn't know when you were trying to figure out the
photo opportunity stuff that they canceled

--

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I understand. Exactly.

Q You were coming here thinking you were going to have this
meeting --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: And they decided it would be
superfluous. As my colleague was saying, you've got to figure out what
the most effective use of the President's time is going to be. And it's
--

Q "They" who?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The representatives of the three
governments, I'm presuming. I don't --

Q Decided it where? On the ground here?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: As I've told you before, I cannot
help you with the process questions because I don't know the exact
timing.

Q In the week ahead, the President's time -- that's what he's
doing here, to talk about Iraq.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: What he's doing here is he's
having meetings with the King of Jordan and also with the Prime Minister
of Iraq. And so you have your full discussion with the King and you
have your full discussion with the Prime Minister. The trilat, if
anything, was not something that was going to be as productive as the
bilats, and so what you end up doing is devoting more time to the
bilats.

Q Why wouldn't it be more productive? And there is the schedule
that was put out recently that said the dinner would include the King of
Jordan and the Prime Minister of Iraq. And also, you said the focus of
the meeting tonight was on regional issues. Is that exactly what the
focus was going to be? Is that what it was going --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I can only tell you what I knew.
I knew from day one this was a bilateral with the King of Jordan. And
if you look at the time, with the President's arrival, time to get over
-- had you had this trilat, the amount of time the President would have
had with the King would have been seriously compromised.

Q But why have it on the schedule --

Q -- Dan Bartlett thought there was a meeting. Why are you
making excuses for this --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We're not making excuses. We're
giving you an explanation, which is the King is going to be out of town
tomorrow, so you've got one shot of dealing with the King and having an
opportunity to be with the King. You also have serious ongoing
developments, which we're talking about, with regard to Lebanon, which
has been much in the news, and also with regard to what's going on in
Israel; it's important to share thoughts about that.

And so you end up going ahead and you maximize your time with the
King, who is your host, and then you also have your time tomorrow with
the Prime Minister. Look, you can keep asking -- this is all we can
give you on it.

Q Who called Maliki and told him he wasn't going to come?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Again, this is -- nobody -- there
was no somebody who said, Maliki, don't come. Again, this is something
that was a collaborative agreement, and all agreed it would be the best
way. I can't tell you further than that, because, honestly, I don't
know.

Q Why did the White House week-ahead say that the dinner is
going to include Maliki? Why didn't you correct that if that was wrong?
It seems like an oversight that one would not want to overlook.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Because we erred.

Q You erred. Why didn't you correct that earlier in the week?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I honestly don't know. I mean,
you know me, I, frankly, did not spend much time doing the week-ahead.

Q And how do you know that this is not related to the memo. Has
Maliki actually said it's not related to the memo?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Because it's been transmitted
through -- I believe through Ambassador Khalilzad that that was not a
factor.

Q What did you say you erred about? We couldn't hear back here.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The week ahead on the schedule on
who would be in the dinner -- because the understanding that I was given
was that it was always the President and the King.

Q Did the Ambassador suggest that Muqtada al-Sadr's boycott had
anything to do with cancelling --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No.

Q So Maliki thought it was a waste of time?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No one thought it would be a waste
of time. It was a question of, in a short period on the ground, what's
the best way for the three of them to spend their time. And they all
agreed that the best way is in a series of bilats.

Q You would think it would have sent a powerful message to the
region, though, as we got the impression this morning to see the three
leaders together discussing all the problems together in a sort of a
coordinated way. That is missing now, and we've got the impression that
it was happening --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, I don't. I mean, you could
say these three leaders -- why would -- there are a lot of leaders
missing; then you can say, oh, why those three leaders? Why not this
one and this one who aren't in the picture, who aren't at the meeting?
They agreed that this was the best way to spend a brief period of time
after the President's arrival in Jordan and before he and the King
actually departs tomorrow morning, too, for India.

Q About the Syrian discussions, you said that the President said
this is not a good time to engage with Syria. You didn't give us a
readout of the King's response. Did he agree that this was not a good
time to engage with Syria?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I don't -- I'm a little bit
worried, obviously, about putting words in his mouth. I think it's fair
to say that the Jordanians are very worried about the situation in
Lebanon, very worried about what Syria is doing in Lebanon, and
concerned about any action on the part of the Europeans or others --
Americans -- that give a mis-impression to the Syrians that their
behavior is not taken seriously and will not have repercussions. And
the problem is, depending on the nature of the visit and who the visitor
is, it can do that. So they are concerned about that pattern of visits.

Q With respect, that's not actually an answer to whether the
King --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I don't want to put words in the
King's mouth.

Q -- indication during the dinner that the Syrians were behind
the assassination last week --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It was not discussed, the question
of -- the only thing discussed was the need to continue with the --
investigating the Hariri assassination and the other 15 assassinations.

Q Did the King make any specific requests of the President in
terms of the Middle East peace process, in terms of ideas he had that he
wanted to --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The King wants the United States
to be as involved as possible. He was pleased to hear about Secretary
Rice's travel tomorrow to see the Palestinian and Israeli leaders. He
wants the United States involved and active and thinks that our activity
can help spur both parties to move forward. He did not make specific
suggestions as to what that activity should be.

Q Does the President agree with the point the King has made this
week that he believes the Israeli-Palestinian dispute is the core issue
in the Middle East, more so than Iraq or Lebanon?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The President did not answer the
question. I think from previous conversations with -- I mean, that
question wasn't asked of the President. I think what -- from previous
meetings, what he generally says is that the Israeli-Palestinian
conflict needs to be solved. And you don't need to look for extraneous
reasons to solve it. It means enough to Israelis and Palestinians and
friends and allies of theirs that that's enough reason to try to solve
it.

Q The King has, in the past, expressed a big concern about Iraq,
both -- Iraq for itself and also Iraq's impact, potentially, on Jordan
and on other neighboring countries. At any point tonight, did he
express doubts about Maliki, either similar to what Hadley expressed in
the memo, or just based on his observations of the situation in Iraq
right now?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Again, there was a -- I can't tell
you what was discussed in the one-on-one conversation, but the dinner
conversation was really not about Iraq.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Let me pick up. The way you've
summarized the memo, it's worth going back and reading the whole memo.
There are a series of questions raised -- and we worked through this
today -- but to depict it as something that "raises doubts about
Maliki" -- the focus of the memo, as we discussed earlier today, is on
building better capabilities within the Maliki government. Now, you do
ask, what are various explanations for the fact that we're not doing
well enough fast enough. But I would -- having talked to Steve and
having read the memo -- and many people have -- it's important to
recognize that the focus of that memo was not "to cast doubt," but
instead, to look for ways to strengthen.

Q I read the memo repeatedly. I also read the gaggle you guys
did about it. I think it's a stretch to say that a memo which questions
not simply his capabilities, but more importantly, his intention --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, you read it differently than
we did.

Q That's pretty much verbatim --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, it raises the question -- it
raises the question about intentions and capabilities in the rest of the
memo -- you're talking about that part at the very front end. Then if
you take a look at the back end, especially action items, it talks about
action items, and also supporting the Prime Minister. And if you also
take a look at what has happened subsequently, if you -- and I know you
did read the previous briefing transcript -- you take a look at action
items, and the Iraqis have been taking action on a number of those
fronts.

So once again, I think -- you know, I just want to caution against
leaping to that characterization. It makes a good headline, but it
doesn't make a whole and balanced view of the memo.

Q -- Mike's question, did the President make any specific
requests of the King?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: This in respect to the
Israeli-Palestinian --

Q Yes, or I'm thinking more -- I know you said that Iraq wasn't
really discussed, but we heard that the administration wants to reach
out to like-minded Arab nations, to ask them to bring, perhaps, some
pressure to bear on the Iraqi government --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I know that that subject was
discussed in previous conversations with the King when he's been in
Washington. That is Jordan's role with respect to Iraq. But the
President didn't make any specific requests to the King, because the
King actually laid out what Jordan was doing with the Palestinians,
which is a great deal, and in his contacts with the Israelis. So Jordan
is really being quite active in this. And the President was impressed
and grateful for the activity that Jordan is undertaking with the
Palestinians and Israelis.

Q To clarify, the collaborative decision to not have a
trilateral dinner tonight was made at some point today between the
President leaving Riga and --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It was our understanding -- and I
did not look at the week ahead -- it was always my understanding that it
was a bilateral dinner. There was talk of a trilat, and they decided
again that it was a more fruitful use of time to meet separately in
bilats. I cannot -- there had been discussion, as you know, earlier
today about doing a trilat. And I cannot give you the precise time in
which they decided not to go forward with that. But it was under
consideration today, not as part of a dinner, but as a separate meeting.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I left Washington a week ago, and
there was no --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes, the reason I'm a little
surprised by the week ahead, and I apologize for that, is that the
things we'd seen in advance all talked about a two-party dinner. So I
--

Q But it sounds like Dan Bartlett was confused until the
briefing he did to the pool over there, as well. It sounds like he was
under the impression it was going to be a trilateral.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, distinguish between a trilat
and the dinner. The trilat was to be a separate meeting. And there was
-- there was discussion, including today -- I mean, we were talking
about it coming off -- so there was discussion during the day about
doing a trilat. I can't tell you exactly when that came off, but that
came off during the course of the day. And my guess is it came out
someplace between Riga and here, because certainly I didn't know about
it until after we hit the ground. I'm sorry I can't give you any more
insight into process, but that --

Q Who first had the idea to cancel it, the trilat?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I don't know.

Q You have no idea whether it was Maliki --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I really don't, Martha. I can --
the characterization I've got, because I was not involved in any of
those conversations, is that they just came to the conclusion that
you're taking a look, are we going to be able to fit all this into this
small bag, and the answer is, no. And let's figure out how we're going
to be able to maximize our time, especially because the King's not here
tomorrow, let's go ahead and do our meetings with him tonight. We
already had scheduled the bilat with Maliki. Let's keep it clean and
let's keep it detailed. I think there was some concern that it just
wouldn't be that productive.

Q Can I just go back to the original statement by the White
House when you announced the joint statement -- "The President of the
United States and Prime Minister of the Republic of Iraq are pleased to
announce that we will meeting in Amman on November 29th and 30th." The
entire thing on the statement is about Iraq. It's not about the region,
it's about Iraq.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, that's the Prime Minister of
Iraq, and that's who he'd be having the conversation about Iraq with.

Q Just to press this a little bit, when the President arrived in
Jordan, did he think he was going to see Prime Minister Maliki tonight?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Bret, I don't know. Again, I
don't know the precise timing of this, so I cannot -- I know that --

Q And you're saying that it's not tied to the memo and it's not
tied to his political problems --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That is correct, that is
absolutely correct. That much -- those reassurances we did get in
conversations with our people who are on the ground.

Q Could you press to find out? I mean, this is a significant
question, and to say I don't know --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: A significant question of timing?
We told you the reasoning. That seems to me to be the significant
issue.

Q The appearance is the President was snubbed. That's the
appearance.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, no, no, no, no. This is
something that you can feel free to ask the Prime Minister about
tomorrow, and you will get an answer that there's no snub. That much we
do know. It's not a snub of the President, nor is it a snub of the
Prime Minister, period.

Q How do you know that?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Because we've had our
conversations with people on the ground who have had --

Q But you don't know who canceled it, you don't know --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I don't like the word
"cancellation."

Q -- I mean, maybe not just to the press, but when you don't see
those three people together, and that's what you thought was happening
and had advertised.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, the three people don't agree
with you, and that's what counts.

Q But the White House certainly knows what this looks like.
Again, there's a lot of anticipation about the fruitfulness of these
meetings and -- tonight, after you announced that it would, obviously it
raises the implication.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, and I'm telling you --
look, I'm telling you what I know, and I've also addressed directly,
because we asked the same questions you did about snubs and those sort
of thing. I cannot give you the process by which they came to this
conclusion, but I can give you the reasons.

Q -- that appearances mean a lot in this region. Every action
means something in this region.

Q Take this one question. Everybody in this room knows that
this is a White House -- the White House runs on a very meticulous
schedule. This President rarely has cancellations this abrupt. All
we're trying to find out is who did what and exactly when.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, as I said -- and if I can
get you any more detail, I will -- but this is -- A, it's not a snub; B,
in this region it is also important to know that people are paying due
care and attention, A, to your host, and B, to your invited guest. And
what you are having is very significant discussions with the President
and the King of Jordan, and with the President and the Prime Minister of
Iraq. And the publics in both of those countries are going to see the
President meeting with their head of state, and that also sends powerful
signals about the engagement of the President, and also the involvement
on a series of issues, not merely Iraq, but also Lebanon and the Middle
East peace process.

Q What is your view about how Muqtada al-Sadr reacted, and how
do you think that's going to affect Iraq?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Again, that's -- what has been
translated to me secondhand, and it's worth trying to find out tomorrow,
is that the Prime Minister really understands that he's still got a
meeting going on, and it's not clear that it's going to color it at all.

Q While you said that it was not the focus of the dinner, but it
did come up, you said, the question of Iraq -- did the President speak
with the King at all about the question of Maliki's competence, ability
to lead the government?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It was not that kind of detailed
discussion, and the President -- again, I can't tell you about the
one-on-one, but I think that's the kind of conversation the President
will have with the Prime Minister, if he wants to have it.

Q Was that the kind of subject that would have been more likely
to have been discussed in the private one-on-one meeting?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I wouldn't speculate. I don't
know what they talked about.

Q Can you just tell us how long the private one-on-one lasted,
if you know? And was it just private. or was Secretary Rice --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, no, on, it was one-on-one --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It was the translators.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, the was a one-on-one. This
was literally four eyes. I have to guess here, but roughly 30 minutes.
Prior to the dinner.

Q And the dinner was how long?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Roughly and hour and a quarter.

Q And can you give us just a small amount of detail on the
location of the dinner --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The menu? No --

Q Not the menu, but where was the dinner --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It's called the Raghadan Palace,
which is an official palace and home of the King that he uses for
official occasions like dinner with visiting heads of state.

Q Can you tell us a little bit about the setting tomorrow? Are
they going to be by themselves, are they going to have staff?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I'll give you the full readout,
but I believe that there's a -- we'll get it out in an email. I know
that I've said it, but I don't want to sort of fake it, unless -- does
anybody have a mini with them on tomorrow? Rather than have me fake it,
let me just get you a straight detailed answer. But there will be
others. I know there's an expanded meeting with -- I think there's a
smaller meeting the principals.

Q But is it in a hotel room --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It's over at the Four Seasons.

Q Will you commit to planning out the details of the
cancellation and communicating them to us?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I will commit to getting whatever
information I can, but I'm not going to commit to getting an answer,
because I'm not sure it's clear -- I mean we've given you what we know,
which is there is a decision. Whether I can get a tick-tock about who
talked to whom, and how the conference calls went and all that sort of
thing. But again, if you want to take the temperature of the President
and Prime Minister, you'll have an opportunity to see them tomorrow.

Q Was the President irritated by the leaking of the memo?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Let me put it this way, you're
never happy about having classified information show up anywhere.

Q Do you suspect there will be an investigation to try and --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Mark, the focus is not on figuring
out how a memo got into the paper. The focus is on having productive
meetings, first with the King and then with the Prime Minister. That is
not the sort of thing that's been discussed at all.

Q Word back in Washington is that the Iraq Study Group is going
to release its recommendations next week. Has the White House been
given notice of that?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No. We -- again, I have not heard
anything about it today. We can find out. The Iraq Study Group has
been operating on its own calendar. We certainly look forward to seeing
its recommendations, but they have got to get it wrapped up. So, Mark,
I don't know. I haven't heard anything about it. And it wasn't -- it
did not come up in any of my conversations with any of the principals.

Q And the only commitment from the President regarding those
recommendations is to read them?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The President, as I said before --
as his obligations as Commander-in-Chief. Furthermore, there are a
whole series of things going on. Not only do you have the consultations
with the King and the Prime Minister, a series of foreign leader calls
during the course of the week, you also have Pete Pace conducting a
review. You have the National Security Council conducting a review.

So there's a lot of stuff going on. And obviously, the insights of
the Baker-Hamilton commission are going to be a factor as we look
forward. But for one to say, ah-ha, there they go, there's our
blueprint, it doesn't work that way. The President still is responsible
for shaping and conducting foreign policy, and he'll make use of all the
input.

Q Did Mr. Bush and Maliki meet at all today?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No.

Q There's a report that's out citing a diplomatic source that
they met, but they wanted to keep it quiet.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, if they kept it quiet they
kept it real quiet.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No. The President went -- and his
motorcade went from the air field to the Raghadan Palace.

Q So they never met at all today?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No --

Q Have they spoken directly today by phone?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I don't think so and I doubt it.

Q Are they going to?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I don't think so. I would be
surprised.

Q You're on the record, right? Just he's not?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Anything regarding the memo is off
the record. Period. That's been -- this whole thing has been on
background. If you want to ping me about things that you want to put on
the record, I'll stay on email for a while. But this has all been
background.

Q But your comments on it's not related to the memo and it's not
related to --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes, that's fine, you can use
that.

Q How about it's not a snub of the President --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes, that's fine.

Q Changing of the schedule --

Q Are all your comments relating to the schedule change on the
record?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It means you're going to have to
-- you're going to pick your way through the transcript. That sort of
uglies it up. Beyond that, anything else let's just keep it on
background because it gets really sticky in trying to do it.

Q Are they going to make any announcement, do you know, of any
sort?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I don't think so. This is a
consultation. This is not a rollout.

Q And you're committed to getting us --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No --

Q No, a schedule for what's happening tomorrow.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We can double-check

-- let's just find out -- I'll tell you what, I'll leave it to Gordon.
Let's find out who's going to be in the meetings tomorrow. That's what
we promised to provide. Rather than having me do the email thing, I'll
throw it on Gordon's capable shoulders. It's going to be cleaner and
neater.

Q Does Mr. Hadley have any trepidation about seeing Mr. Maliki?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, Mr. Hadley's position is that
this is a memo that talks about ways to support the government of Iraq
in building capabilities for dealing with the numerous challenges, which
include security, economics, politics and diplomacy.