The Central Intelligence Agency offered some remarkably straightforward
answers to some rather blunt questions from the Senate Intelligence
Committee earlier this year.

What is the most likely delivery system of weapons of mass destruction
to be used by terrorists or states against the U.S.? How stable is
the Jordanian regime of King Abdullah? In the event of a nuclear war
between India and Pakistan, which nation would likely prevail? Does
the Intelligence Community believe that the resumption of U.S. trade
with Cuba could hasten economic and political reform in Cuba?

CIA responses to these and many other pointed questions, plus Agency
comments on intelligence-related "leaks" and the hazards of aggregate
budget disclosure, were appended to the hearing record from the
February 6, 2002, Senate hearing on "The Worldwide Threat in 2002,"
which was published two weeks ago without fanfare or notice.

Other agency responses to many of the same questions for the record
will be posted later in the week.

DOD EXAMINES "PREEMPTIVE" INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS

One way to invigorate U.S. intelligence would be to "Develop an
entirely new capability to proactively, preemptively evoke responses
from adversary/terrorist groups," according to the Defense Science
Board, a Pentagon advisory group.

Such an approach would "improve [intelligence] information collection
by stimulating reactions" from the target.

One hundred "highly specialized people with unique technical and
intelligence skills such as information operations, PSYOP, network
attack, covert activities, SIGINT, HUMINT, SOF, influence
warfare/deception operations" could constitute a new, elite "Proactive
Preemptive Operations Group (P2OG)," reporting to the National
Security Council with an annual budget of $100 million.

The proposal is the latest sign of a new assertiveness by the Defense
Department in intelligence matters, and an indication that the cutting
edge of intelligence reform is not to be found in Congress but behind
closed doors in the Pentagon.

The Defense Science Board recommended creation of the preemptive
operations group in its "DSB Summer Study on Special Operations and
Joint Forces in Support of Countering Terrorism."

The findings and recommendations of the DSB Summer Study were set forth
in an August 16, 2002, PowerPoint briefing.
The first thirty pages of the unclassified 78 page PointPoint
presentation are posted here:

The DSB briefing was first reported by Dan Dupont in Inside the
Pentagon on September 26. It was also discussed by William M. Arkin
in the Los Angeles Times on October 27.

THOMAS B. ROSS, 73

Writer Thomas B. Ross, who died last week, was practically the creator,
along with his co-author David Wise, of investigative reporting on
U.S. intelligence.

The three books that Ross and Wise wrote together, especially the 1964
work entitled "The Invisible Government," were the kind of thing that
had not been seen before and they prompted some alarm in official
circles.

Director of Central Intelligence John A. McCone felt the need to warn
President Johnson in 1964 that "inquisitive writers such as Ross and
Wise" were sniffing around certain U.S. intelligence activities "and I
thought the consequences would be very serious." See Document 49 on
this page of a recent volume of Foreign Relations of the United States:

"I think it is reasonable to say, in retrospect, that we were among the
first to recognize and point out the dangers to American democracy of
official lies told to protect covert operations," Wise wrote in his
own 1973 book "The Politics of Lying."

David Wise's new book, published this month to favorable reviews, is
"Spy: How the FBI's Robert Hanssen Betrayed America" (Random House,
2002).

PSYCHOLOGICAL EFFECTS OF SECRECY

With unusual self-awareness, a CIA author noted in a newly declassified
study that the Agency's secrecy system for handling highly classified
intelligence information could have unintended psychological effects.

The March 1977 study, entitled "Critique of the Codeword Compartment in
the CIA," was formally declassified (with redactions) and accessioned
at the National Archives on October 21. The 67 page document was
obtained by Jeffrey Richelson of the National Security Archive, who
kindly shared a copy.

"We know that secrecy by its very nature may affect the personality of
its practioners," the unnamed author wrote.

"This is true of all forms of secrecy from the primitive secret society
to the codeword compartment. The latter is a heightened form of
secrecy that resembles the former in many ways. It has the aura of a
secret society. It has its initiation, its oaths, its esoteric
phrases, its sequestered areas, and its secrets within secrets. And
in place of passwords and hand signs, there are letter designations on
badges. There are in-groups and out-groups. No wonder, then, if the
codeword compartment has unintended psychological effects."

Among other effects identified, cleared personnel tend to assign
undue accuracy and weight to highly classified information, and to
equate access levels with professional status.

"On balance, the psychological side effects of the codeword compartment
seem to diminish rather than enhance security," the author concludes.

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Secrecy News is written by Steven Aftergood and published by the Federation of American Scientists.

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