October 15, 2010Sharia-Sanctioned Marital Rape in Britain -- And North AmericaAndrew G. BostomAs reported in the UK Independent, president of the Islamic Sharia Council in Britain, Sheikh Maulana Abu Sayeed, has reiterated alarming comments made during a March, 2010 interview, sanctioning marital rape.

Sheikh Sayeed was in fact responding to an inchoate effort at modernizing the contracts which govern Muslim marriages in Britain. The good Sheikh, representing Britain's main Islamic Sharia court, the Islamic Sharia Council, promptly published a rebuttal of the contract, which included a statement on sexual abuse (page 6 here). He opined in the March interview:

Clearly there cannot be any "rape" within the marriage. Maybe "aggression", maybe "indecent activity."

He further rejected both the characterization of non-consensual marital sex as rape, and the prosecution of such offenders as "not Islamic." Sheikh Sayeed, who came to Britain from Bangladesh in 1977, also brazenly expressed his Sharia-supremacism and accompanying disdain for Western, i.e., British Law, stating,

...to make it exactly as the Western culture demands is as if we are compromising Islamic religion with secular non-Islamic values.

Sayeed re-affirmed these sentiments to The UK Independent:

In Islamic sharia, rape is adultery by force. So long as the woman is his wife, it cannot be termed as rape.

Crowing with pride during his March 2010 interview, Sheikh Sayeed maintained,

No other sharia council can claim they are so diverse as ours because other sharia councils, they are following one school of fiqh [Islamic jurisprudence]. Ours is diverse -we are hanafi, shafi'i, hanbali.we have Bangladeshi...we have Pakistani, we have Indian, we have Palestinian, we have Somali scholars on our board.

At present there are 16 main sharia courts around Britain, located in Birmingham, Bradford, and Ealing in West London. These institutions are "complemented" by more informal sharia-based tribunals-the think tank Civitas asserting that up to 85 tribunals currently exist in Britain.

But for those who naively-and smugly-proclaim such phenomena are absent within the Muslim communities of North America, consider AMJA, the Assembly of Muslim Jurists of America. AMJA's mission statement claims the organization was, "...founded to provide guidance for Muslims living in North America...AMJA is a religious organization that does not exploit religion to achieve any political ends, but instead provides practical solutions within the guidelines of Islam and the nation's laws to the various challenges experienced by Muslim communities."In response to the specific query, “Is there a such thing as Marital Rape?,” the AMJA issued fatwa #2982:

In the name of Allah, all praise is for Allah, and may peace and blessing be upon the Messenger of Allah and his family. To proceed:

For a wife to abandon the bed of her husband without excuse is haram [forbidden]. It is one of the major sins and the angels curse her until the morning as we have been informed by the Prophet (may Allah bless him and grant him peace). She is considered nashiz (rebellious) under these circumstances. As for the issue of forcing a wife to have sex, if she refuses, this would not be called rape, even though it goes against natural instincts and destroys love and mercy, and there is a great sin upon the wife who refuses; and Allah Almighty is more exalted and more knowledgeable.

An ocean apart from Britain—now a recognized Western hotbed for “Islamic fundamentalism”—the same Sharia-sanctioned misogynistic bigotry prevails in a North American clerical organization openly advising US and Canadian Muslims.

It looks like the first step to this law/state constitutional amendment being rejected by the Court....

OKLAHOMA CITY -- A hearing began at 10 a.m. set on a request for a temporary injunction against a state constitutional amendment that prohibits Oklahoma courts from considering Islamic law. Judge Vicki Miles-LaGrange approved the injunction in federal court Monday morning. "This court will issue a detailed order as soon as possible," she said.

The lawsuit stated the amendment singles out Islam for special restrictions by prohibiting use of the law that is also known as Islamic Sharia law.

The temporary restraining order will be in effect for 14 days. The next hearing to hear arguments on both sides of the controversial State Question 755 is expected to take place on Nov. 22.

According to AP, federal district judge Vicki Miles-LaGrange today issued a temporary restraining order blocking implementation of Oklahoma’s recently adopted constitutional amendment barring Oklahoma state courts from considering or using international law or shariah law in deciding cases. Specifically, the judge’s TRO prevents the state election board from certifying that the amendment was approved by the voters (with support of 70%).

The judge’s reported order—I haven’t seen the text or any supporting opinion—strikes me as highly dubious. The plaintiff, the executive director of the Council on American-Islamic Relations in Oklahoma, evidently claims that the amendment stigmatizes Islam. It’s true that, among the different existing bodies of religious law, the amendment identifies only shariah law as impermissible. But that, I gather, is because advocates of shariah law make comprehensive claims to supplant civil law that no other body of religious law is seen to threaten.

Among other things, issuance of a TRO would generally require some determination that the plaintiff faces irreparable injury and is likely to succeed on the merits. I don’t see how either prong would likely be satisfied. Further, considerations of federalism ought to make a federal court very hesitant to interfere with a state’s election-certification process.

As I’ve previously indicated, I’m open to the possibility that a categorical bar on the use of international law or shariah law for any purpose might have some improper applications. It’s possible that a particular application of the state constitutional amendment might be preempted by federal law (statute or treaty) or even violate the federal Constitution. But any such claim is best pursued by a party in the context of an independently existing case.

"It clearly appears from the specific facts shown that immediate and irreparableinjury, loss, or damage will result to Plaintiff if Defendant’s are not enjoined fromcertifying the election results for State Question 755."

You can "reason" yourself or "logic" yourself into any end goal you want, that is the way the lawyers have wrote the law- that still does not make it right. Bottom line is that the law of the land in the main body of the constitution, much less bill of rights, is being violated. The decision amounts to granting extraterritoriality to Moslems. That law was to ensure it did not start to happen in Oklahoma. People wonder why some of the foil hats call judges Nazgul.............

The way the "lawyers" wrote the law/amendment is wrong. The Federal Judge agreed. She granted a TRO and I think she will soon rule in favor of the Plaintiff because this law/amendment does violate the U.S. Constitution.

Our Constitution, our Bill of Rights protects everyone, treats everyone as equal, not just groups in favor and out of favor at the moment.

I skimmed the first 2-3 of the 27 pages. Regardless of the ultimate determination on the merits, it is not clear to me that the standard for a TRO has been met (immediate and irreparable); the logic with regard to this point seems a bit circular to me.

Also, why not limit the TRO to the part about Islam and leave in place the part about international law?

Concerning the part about Islam, as best as I can tell this is a matter of first impression and both sides have yet to make their arguments and have them tested.

11/09/2010 13:06PAKISTANPunjab: Christian woman sentenced to death for blasphemy

For the first time, a woman is sentenced to death in Pakistan for this kind of “offence”. The blasphemy law was introduced in 1986 by then Pakistani dictator Zia-ul Haq and since then it has become a tool for discrimination and violence. Part of the Pakistan Penal Code, the law imposes life in prison for defiling the Qur’an and death for insulting Muhammad.

Islamabad (AsiaNews/Agencies) – Pakistan has “crossed a line” in sentencing a Christian woman to death for blasphemy. Asia Bibi, a 37-year-old farm worker mother of two, was convicted of committing blasphemy before her fellow workers during a heated discussion about religion in the village of Ittanwali in June last year.

Some of the women workers had reportedly been pressuring Bibi to renounce her Christian faith and accept Islam. During one discussion, Bibi responded by speaking of how Jesus had died on the cross for the sins of humanity and asking the Muslim women what Muhammad had done for them.

The Muslim women took offence and began beating Bibi. Afterwards she was locked in a room. According to Release International, a mob reportedly formed and “violently abused” her and her children.

The charity, which supports persecuted Christians, said that blasphemy charges were brought against Bibi because of pressure from local Muslim leaders.

“Pakistan has crossed a line in passing the death sentence on a woman for blasphemy,” he said.

In addition to the death sentence, Bibi was also fined the equivalent for an unskilled worker of two and a half years’ wages.

Another Christian woman, Martha Bibi (no relation to Asia), is also on trial in Lahore for blasphemy.

According to the National Commission on Justice and Peace (NCJP) of the Catholic Church, between 1986 and August 2009, at least 974 people have been charged for defiling the Qur’an or insulting the Prophet Muhammad. They include 479 Muslims, 340 Ahmadis, 119 Christians, 14 Hindus and 10 from other religions.

The blasphemy law has often been used as a pretext for personal attacks or vendettas as well as extra-judicial murders. Overall, 33 people have died this way at the hands of individuals or crazed mobs.

The decision was announced yesterday, but the opinion was apparently just released today. This is just a temporary restraining order, entered without even any written argument from the state; there’ll be a hearing on the request for the longer-lasting preliminary injunction on Nov. 22.

You can also see the plaintiff’s Complaint and Memorandum in Support. Thanks to Josh Gerstein (Politico) for the pointer.

UPDATE [3:06 pm]: I’m no fan of the amendment, which would also apparently ban the use of foreign law in Oklahoma courts, even in situations — such as disputes about whether two people were validly married in a foreign country, enforcement of contracts that provide for the use of (say) British law, and tort litigation over conduct that happened in a foreign country — where foreign law has long been used under standard choice-of-law principles. And it’s also possible that the specific ban on the use of Sharia law might be unconstitutional, though that depends on exactly how the amendment is interpreted. But my tentative sense is that the plaintiff doesn’t have standing to challenge the ban on the use of Sharia.

1. The plaintiff argues that the amendment is unconstitutional because it impermissibly expresses governmental hostility to Islam, and provides for discrimination against Muslims. But the mere existence of the law does not, I think, amount to a constitutionally sufficient injury on which a lawsuit can be founded. (That’s the legal requirement of “standing.”)

It’s true that the Supreme Court has sometimes allowed standing in Establishment Clause cases based on symbolic injuries. But the Court has never allowed standing simply based on the existence of a law that allegedly conveys an impermissible message of endorsement, and lower courts have not accepted such claims. See Newdow v. Lefevre (9th Cir. 2010):

Newdow lacks standing to challenge 36 U.S.C. § 302, which merely recognizes “In God We Trust” is the national motto. Unlike §§ 5112(d)(1) and 5114(b) [which provide for the placement of the motto on currency], § 302 does not authorize or require the inscription of the motto on any object. Without §§ 5112 and 5114, the motto would not appear on coins and currency, and Newdow would lack the “unwelcome direct contact” with the motto that gives rise to his injury-in-fact. Although Newdow alleges the national motto turns Atheists into political outsiders and inflicts a stigmatic injury upon them, an “abstract stigmatic injury” resulting from such outsider status is insufficient to confer standing.

People can have standing to object to the placement of religious symbols in particular places, when the objectors have “frequent regular contact” with the symbols (in the sense of often being around where the symbols are visible). But the presence of words in a law — even words that express endorsement or disapproval of religion — does not yield standing.

2. The plaintiff also argues that he suffers a more tangible injury, because his will directs the executor of the estate to follow Islamic law in arranging the funeral, and directs his wife to contribute to charity in accordance with Islamic law. The constitutional amendment, the plaintiff argues, bars courts from effectively probating the will in accordance to the plaintiff’s wishes, and thus unconstitutionally discriminates against plaintiff.

It’s not clear to me whether plaintiff might lack standing on the grounds that the harm will only happen some time in the future, or whether he could in principle have standing in such a case because the prospect of the courts’ inability to apply Sharia law in the future might cause sufficient harm to plaintiff now. (All this would involve the legal requirement of “ripeness.”)

But in any case, I think plaintiff has a deeper problem here: Even without the constitutional amendment, the First Amendment would bar American courts from “consider[ing] Sharia law” in interpreting the will. I blogged about this general point here, but the short version is this: Under the Court’s precedents (e.g., Presbyterian Church in the United States v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Memorial Presbyterian Church (1969)), secular courts may not resolve questions that require interpretation of religious doctrine.

This would include, I think, decisions about what Sharia law — or kosher law or the proper understanding of Presbyterian doctrine — requires, even when a contract or will calls for such interpretation. Thus, lower courts have held that, for instance, “a court [deciding a church property dispute] can invoke a secular interpretation of church deeds, by-laws and canons, thereby avoiding judicial entanglement in issues of religious doctrine, polity and practice. When the application of this standard requires judicial involvement in a [religious] doctrinal question, however, it may not be relied upon.” “[P]rovisions in deeds or in denomination’s constitution for the reversion of local church property to the general church, if conditioned upon a finding of departure from doctrine, could not be civilly enforced [quoting and endorsing a concurring opinion in a different Supreme Court case].” Likewisee, see this case, which refused to decide whether a church “cease[d] to be a Southern Baptist Church,” language that appeared in the church’s bylaws and that would be judicially interpretable if it hadn’t required resolution of questions of religious doctrine.

So the amendment would thus have no tangible effect on the probate of plaintiff’s will. The will’s references to Sharia would be unenforceable in secular courts even without the amendments, just as terms in a will that require compliance with Orthodox Jewish doctrine or with Southern Baptist doctrine could not be enforced. (Terms in a will that expressly set forth certain secularly determinable requirements would be enforceable, even if the requirements were religiously motivated; but that remains true under the Oklahoma constitutional amendment as well.)

3. More broadly, it’s hard to tell what exactly the Oklahoma amendment would do. It might or might not bar the consideration of Sharia Law in cases that call for the application of foreign law, whether, say, Saudi contract law or Israeli family law applicable to Muslims. But given the amendment’s broader ban on the use of foreign law, I don’t think the amendment would in fact discriminate against Sharia law in this respect.

If the amendment banned religious exemption claims brought by Muslims under existing religious accommodation rules that would otherwise apply to a wide range of religions, then it would be unconstitutionally discriminatory. But it’s not clear that considering such accommodation requests would be seen as “considering ... Sharia Law”; it might well just be seen as considering the particular claimant’s sincere religious beliefs, with no requirement for the courts to consider their relationship with Sharia.

This is further reason, I think, for federal courts to abstain from deciding whether the amendment is unconstitutional until they actually have someone before them to whom the amendment will be applied (that’s the “standing” requirement), and until they can tell — likely based on state court decisions — just what the amendment means (that’s often labeled the Pullman abstention doctrine. And while that still leaves the general objection that the very existence of the law unconstitutionally expresses disapproval of Islam, I doubt that under current law an objector has standing to bring such a challenge, for the reasons I mentioned in item 1.

"2. The plaintiff also argues that he suffers a more tangible injury, because his will directs the executor of the estate to follow Islamic law in arranging the funeral, and directs his wife to contribute to charity in accordance with Islamic law. The constitutional amendment, the plaintiff argues, bars courts from effectively probating the will in accordance to the plaintiff’s wishes, and thus unconstitutionally discriminates against plaintiff."

IMHO this clearly is a justiciable claim with sufficient standing.

"It’s not clear to me whether plaintiff might lack standing on the grounds that the harm will only happen some time in the future, or whether he could in principle have standing in such a case because the prospect of the courts’ inability to apply Sharia law in the future might cause sufficient harm to plaintiff now. (All this would involve the legal requirement of “ripeness.”)"

IMHO this simply is profoundly stupid. The harm as the author defines it is such that when the harm it occurs, by definition the injured party, the plaintiff here, will already be dead! Cf. Roe v. Wade wherein the issue presented was one of mootness. By the time the case got heard, the woman would already be a mother and no case could ever be heard.

As long as the burial was not done in violation of health codes/statutes in Oklahoma, how is the religious nature applicable? There is nothing that would stop the decedent from being buried facing Mecca or having an imam conduct islamic funeral services or probating a will in compliance with OK. law just as the wills of christians, jews or atheists are probated.

Would a Mexican national who legally or illegally resided in Oklahoma have the right to have Mexican civil code considered in probating his/her will by the OK. courts?

On Tuesday I discussed the Supreme Court’s decision to strike down laws that allow juveniles to be sentenced to life without parole (LWOP) for non-homicide crimes. What concerns me here isn’t so much the morality or policy wisdom in applying such sentences — though Chief Justice Roberts makes some good policy points in his concurrence — or even the interpretation of what constitutes a “cruel and unusual punishment” — which I think Justice Kennedy mishandles in a confusing discussion of national consensuses.

No, the most troubling part of that case was the unfortunate reference to foreign authorities to support the Court’s interpretation of the Eighth Amendment. Justice Kennedy notes that juvenile LWOP has been “rejected the world over.” “The judgment of the world’s nations that a particular sentencing practice is inconsistent with basic principles of decency,” he writes, “demonstrates that the court’s rationale has respected reasoning to support it.”

Justice Thomas, in his dissent, disputes Justice Kennedy’s math, noting that 11 countries allow the punishment. More importantly, “foreign laws and sentencing practices” are “irrelevant to the meaning of our Constitution.” He adds that most democracies around the world remain free to adopt the punishment should they wish to. “Starting today,” Thomas concludes, “ours can count itself among the few in which judicial decree prevents voters from making that choice.”

And that’s the crux of the matter: citing foreign law, using it to support a given reading of domestic law undermines democratic self-governance. The interpretation of the U.S. Constitution should depend on that document’s text, structure, and history, what it means in the context of the American polity. Even if a judge cares about ”evolving standards of decency” or invokes the “living Constitution,” it should be the updated standards in America that matter, or the opinions and values of modern Americans.

That is, federal judges derive their powers from the Constitution, which is a wholly American document. To the extent they use foreign extrinsic evidence to interpret this document, they are engaging in something — comparative law? social science? — that is not judging. It’s not a matter of being closed-minded or provincial — I actually enjoy reading comparative political research, and think our legislators and constitutional draftsmen engage in malpractice if they don’t use it — but, as Justice Thomas describes in Graham, the judicial role is different than the legislative or academic one.

Now, in practice U.S. courts actually rarely cite foreign law, and most of the time when they do it’s not controversial. For example, it’s relevant to see how all the contracting parties interpret a treaty, because you want a treaty (a contract among nations) to be understood the same way everywhere. Similarly, foreign court pronouncements are relevant to interpreting customary international law – the law of nations as the Framers understood it — to the limited extent it applies to a given case (crime on the high seas and the like). Next we have the coordination of litigation, with international companies suing each other based on contracts that specify that “X” provision is subject to British law whereas “Y” deals with Hong Kong law, and that the arbitration forum is supposed to be Switzerland: here the citation of foreign law is absolutely appropriate. Another appropriate use is in conflict of laws analysis: figuring out which law applies and sometimes even applying foreign law as binding in a dispute.

But using foreign law to interpret domestic law, and especially the Constitution, is problematic — but the Supreme Court does it more than lower courts, particularly in high profile cases: those involving the culture wars, moral issues like the death penalty and abortion, and other charged cases like affirmative action and sex discrimination. Libertarians should not welcome this trend because it signals judging based on something other than the principled reading of our own laws — in short, judicial usurpation of the policy-making function.

Hans Bader of CEI provides a longer write-up of Graham, and here again is Cato’s brief. For a pithy critique of the improper use of foreign law by U.S. courts, see Richard Posner’s now-famous article in Legal Affairs. And for an in-depth and entertaining exploration of these issues, read or watch a debate Justices Scalia and Breyer had in 2005.

Coincidentally, the same day the Court issued both Graham and Comstock (which I discuss here), it also decided an important case, Abbott v. Abbott, that uses foreign law to interpret an international treaty on child abduction. (While I haven’t yet gone through the Abbott decision, both the majority and dissent are correct to use foreign law to help them reach their conclusions.)

"And that’s the crux of the matter: citing foreign law, using it to support a given reading of domestic law undermines democratic self-governance. The interpretation of the U.S. Constitution should depend on that document’s text, structure, and history, what it means in the context of the American polity."

I was reading this and it caused me some thought. The Republic where my wife and I have a home in Russia, is 70% Muslim. Having said that, the Russian approach to having her laws tampered with, is not what it is here, and the Muslim influence upon Russian law is kept to a minimum.

Here, IMO, outside influences are granted the power to supercede the beliefs and views of the whole i.e., negating the basic principles of the constitution and I'm not sure that it is a wise path to follow.

I understand that personal freedom is a value that is paramount to the system that we use here, but when we allow another system to gain purchase here, especially when it is an idea that is wholly contrary to that of personal freedom, is it wise to allow it under the guise of "religious freedom?"

November 09, 2010De Facto Shariah Law in AmericaBy Janet LevyIs the United States today a de facto shariah state? A close look at recent events points to some alarming conclusions about the tenets of shariah law taking hold in our once-proud constitutional republic and the unwitting, unequal application of existing U.S. laws. The result is that when it comes to religious expression, Muslims now enjoy more freedom of religion and speech under our Bill of Rights than non-Muslims. Equal protection under the laws of our country holds for Muslims far better than for non-Muslims. Several recent examples illustrate this point.

Christianity Suppressed

In October, students at a Chattanooga, Tennessee high school were told that their longtime tradition of praying at practice and before games would no longer be allowed. The school superintendent had called an end to prayer at all school functions following a complaint from the Freedom From Religion Foundation.

In July, students visiting the Supreme Court from an Arizona Christian school were stopped by police as they bowed their heads and quietly prayed for the justices. The students were standing outside the court building to the side at the bottom of the building steps. They weren't blocking traffic, but an officer abruptly approached them and ordered them to stop praying immediately.

Four Christians were arrested in June for disorderly conduct at the Dearborn Arab International Festival after handing out copies of the Gospel of John. The four had stationed themselves five blocks from the festival and did not actively approach anyone, but instead waited for others to approach them. Still, police officers confiscated their video cameras and led the four Christians away in handcuffs to shouts of "Allah hu Akbar" from Muslim bystanders.

In June of 2006, an instrumental rendition of "Ave Maria" was banned at the Henry Jackson High School graduation in Everett, Washington. Despite Justice Samuel Alito's protests, the U.S. Supreme Court declined to consider whether the case was an example of censorship of student speech.

In direct contrast to the above incidents, which limit Christian prayer and expression, numerous examples exist of special accommodations for Muslim activities and religious practices. These indicate an adherence to a separate and distinct policy for Muslims that mirrors the supremacist requirements of shariah law.

Islam Accepted

In the State of California, 7th-grade students at Excelsior Middle School in Discovery Bay, California adopted Muslim names, prayed on prayer rugs, and celebrated Ramadan under a state-mandated curriculum that requires instruction about various religions. In 2006, the U.S. Supreme Court again declined to hear legal challenges by concerned Excelsior parents, who complained that the instruction was actually religious indoctrination and that Christianity and Judaism were not given equal time and exposure. The curriculum has been upheld as appropriate multicultural material.

After Carver Elementary School in San Diego absorbed Muslim students from a defunct charter school in September 2006, a special recess was provided for the students to pray, classes were segregated by gender, and pork was removed from the school menu. A teacher's aide at the school led children in prayer and was provided with a lesson plan allotting an hour of class time for Islamic prayer. In essence, Muslim students alone were privileged with public school time to practice their religion at an additional cost of $450,000 in public funds and a loss of instruction time. (Note: Looked this up also and revised it a bit as well.)

In May, students at a Wellesley, Massachusetts middle school visited a local radical mosque and participated in a prayer session. Parents, who gave signed permission for students to visit the mosque, were not informed in advance that students would also be bowing to Allah and listening to lectures on Islam. Surprisingly, teachers did nothing to intervene as students participated and a mosque spokesperson denigrated Western civilization while glorifying and misrepresenting Islam, even falsely referring to the greater rights of women under Islam. Astonishingly, this occurred in a state that has prohibited the sale of Christmas items, including red and green tissue paper, at a school store and forced firefighters to remove a "Merry Christmas" sign from their station.

Over the last few years, the University of Michigan, a taxpayer-funded school, has provided separate prayer rooms and ritual foot baths, requiring bathroom modifications costing over $100,000, for Muslim observances.

At Minneapolis Community and Technical College, where religious displays, including those for Christmas, have been strictly prohibited, foot-washing facilities are being installed using taxpayer dollars after one student slipped and injured herself washing her feet in a sink. Director of Legal Affairs and President Phil Davis justified the disparate treatment of Muslims, explaining, "The foot-washing facilities are not about religion; they are about public safety."

Muslims periodically block the streets of New York City, prostrating themselves in the middle of roadways and sidewalks undisturbed by police and other authorities. The resulting traffic jams are ignored, the double- and illegally parked vehicles are free of citations, and law enforcement officers are nowhere to be seen. Surely, practitioners of other religions or groups planning similar gatherings would be required to obtain permits for such an activity. Reportedly, the police have been ordered not to interfere with the Muslim prayer spectacle.

These special accommodations for Muslims effectively elevate the Islamic faith above that of Christians and Jews, reinforcing the message of the Koran -- "Allah proclaims Islam over all other religions" (48:28), "Islam will dominate other religions" (9:33), and "Islam does not coexist with other faiths" (5:51). Muslims are required by the teachings of their faith to conquer and subjugate non-Muslims and Ensure worldwide submission to Islam -- "The believers must make war on infidels around them and let the infidels find firmness in them" (9:123).

Under Islamic shariah law, Christians may not even speak to Muslims about Christianity nor provide them with any literature about Christianity. With the recent arrests of Christians in Dearborn juxtaposed with prostrate Muslim worshipers in Manhattan (where a mosque is planned at Ground Zero at the same location where a church will not be rebuilt), it appears that the principles of Islamic supremacy and prohibitions against Christian proselytizing have begun to gain traction in America.

Meanwhile, Christianity in America is withering as Bible study is eradicated in public schools, crosses are removed from the public square, and "winter holidays" replace Christmas celebrations. Remarkably, as Christianity is being dethroned and denied public expression, Islam is being unabashedly and openly promoted in what has been a Christian country for over two hundred years. It is truly remarkable that as American students chant prayers in Arabic in California's classrooms, Christmas music and graphics that refer to both Christmas and Chanukah are prohibited in New Jersey.

Censure of Non-Muslims

Further, the First Amendment, free-speech rights of non-Muslims are being curtailed amidst the demands of Muslims who operate under few constraints. While non-Muslims are self-censoring out of fear and being shut down by authorities, Muslims enjoy almost unfettered rights to speak out.

For example, leading up to the 9th anniversary of the Muslim attack on 9/11, Pastor Terry Jones of Florida announced that he would burn the Koran in protest of the proposed Ground Zero mosque. Not only was Jones's life threatened by Muslims, but an Obama administration official asked him to cancel his plans. New York Governor David A. Paterson commented in response to Jones' threat: "More and more, particularly this year, I feel that the memory of those who were lost is being disrespected." However, Paterson did not criticize the Muslim threat on Jones' life, nor the plan itself to build a mosque over the remains of the victims of Islamic terrorism killed on 9/11.

While Pastor Jones was punished by the loss of his mortgage and insurance and was presented with a bill for $180,000 for security by the City of Gainesville, Muslims avoided any public opprobrium even though twenty innocent people around the world died during Muslim protests against Jones. Like the response to the Danish Mohammed cartoons years earlier, the Koran-burning activity was suppressed and censured as disrespectful to Muslims. It was even compared to the burning of churches and synagogues. Yet Muslims who threatened violent reprisals against Jones were not warned that attempts to curtail First Amendment rights and even mayhem, assaults, or murder would not be tolerated and would be punished to the full extent of the law.

In another instance of free speech rights violations, when New Jersey Transit Authority (NJTA) worker Derek Fenton burned a Koran near Ground Zero on 9-11, he was promptly removed by authorities as much for the perceived insult to Islam as for his own safety. The very next day, he was fired from his job of eleven years.

In October, NPR reporter,Juan Williams was fired for expressing on Fox News a fear shared by the majority of Americans in a post-9/11 world -- his discomfort about being on a plane with people who dress as conservative Muslims. Thanks to pressure from CAIR, a Hamas-supporting, extremist-linked organization, Williams was punished for this thoughtcrime and, without first talking to Williams, an NPR spokesperson broke the news on Twitter. Ironically, CAIR spokespersons are regular guests on NPR programs.

Cartoonist Molly Norris was forced to disappear after declaring April 20 "Everybody Draw Mohammed Day." Norris ignited a religious firestorm with radical Islamic cleric Imam Anwar al-Awlaki publicly ordering her execution. Under FBI recommendations and at her own expense, Norris went underground, changing her name and identity. She is no longer publishing cartoons at the publication where she has been a regular contributor.

Freedom of Speech for Muslims

Whereas Norris was forced to enter a witness-protection program in response to a fatwa against her, Islamic leaders enjoy unlimited freedom to spread their messages of hate within the United States. Some even receive protection at taxpayer expense, as did Feisal Abdul Rauf, an Egyptian-American Sufi imam who plans to build a mosque at Ground Zero. Rauf is closely associated with the Muslim Brotherhood and Muslim Brotherhood organizations, endeavors to supplant U.S. law with shariah, and refuses to condemn jihadist groups and terrorism. In addition, he refused to sign a pledge revoking the mandatory death sentence for Muslim apostasy, has encouraged U.S. government officials to negotiate with the terrorist group Hamas, and blames the United States for 9/11. Imam Rauf, who created the Shariah Index Project, which rates countries around the world on shariah compliance, has said that he believes in shariah supremacy.

Tariq Ramadan, a highly controversial leader in the fundamentalist Muslim world and the grandson of the founder of the Muslim Brotherhood, Hassan Al-Banna, visited the United States in April. As a keynote speaker at the Hamas-supporting Council on American Islam Relations and as a speaker before another Muslim Brotherhood organization, the Muslim American Society, Ramadan refused to condemn the shariah law provision that calls for stoning women for alleged improprieties or to denounce suicide bombing. Ramadan is suspected by U.S. intelligence of having ties to al-Qaeda. He espouses amicable messages of peace and respect when speaking with Western audiences, while endorsing Wahhabism and spreading hatred of the West to Arabic-speaking audiences.

Even Muslims targeted by our own government for their crimes receive protection. Anwar al-Awlaki, dubbed the "bin Laden of the internet" and suspected of having prior knowledge of 9/11 by having met privately with two of the 9/11 hijackers, has been defended by the American Civil Liberties Union. After President Obama approved placing Awlaki on a government assassination list, the ACLU initiated a lawsuit against the U.S. government challenging the order to kill him. This despite Awlaki being on the FBI's Most Wanted List and his having met and corresponded with Major Nidal Hasan, the Fort Hood assassin. He trained the Christmas underwear bomber, Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, and was the inspiration for Faisal Shahzad, the attempted Times Square car bomber. In a recent video delivered to CNN, Awlaki stated that Muslims are obligated to wage jihad against the United States.

Nine years after 9/11, in contrast to protections enjoyed by Muslims, individuals perceived by Muslims to have damaged Islam in some way have been threatened, fired, and publicly censured. This development indicates how far we have come down the road to dhimmitude, a subservient status in relation to Muslims. Clearly, if Norris had organized a Draw Jesus or Draw Moses Day, her life would be very much intact. If Juan Williams had talked about his fear of fundamentalist Christians, he would still be an NPR host in good standing. Had Jones burned the Old Testament, twenty people murdered by Muslims jihadists would still be alive, his reputation would be untarnished, and his financial situation would be undamaged. Had Derek Fenton burned a copy of the Old or New Testament, it is unlikely that the NJTA would have taken any action against him.

Islamization of America

We are witnessing a transformation of American society in which Islam enjoys a privileged place among the country's religions. The sensitivities of the country's 3 to 5 million Muslims are considered above those of non-Muslims. Non-Muslims even assist sensitive Muslims in the weeding out of potentially offensive statements or actions that could be remotely critical of Islam or Muslims. Since 9/11, Americans have been well-trained not to talk about Islam and terrorism or to use the word "jihad." Publicly criticizing, voicing concern about, or even expressing fear about Muslim behavior or activities is forbidden. While other religions may be freely criticized, lampooned in cartoons, and denigrated by artwork, Islam is sacred, supreme, and beyond reproach.

Every effort is made in the United States to accommodate Muslims and engage them in interfaith dialogue and community affairs. Muslims may pray openly in public -- on city streets and in airport terminals. Many U.S. government departments hold Iftar dinners to celebrate the end of Ramadan. The Ground Zero mosque will be built over the ashes of 9/11 victims, but the St. Nicholas Greek Orthodox Church that was destroyed by Muslims will not. Non-Muslims enjoy no such privileges or special treatment in Muslim countries. They may not visit Mecca nor build churches or synagogues. U.S. forces stationed in Saudi Arabia are prohibited from wearing visible religious symbols.

The foregoing examples, not exhaustive by any means, point to the fact that we are living under a de facto shariah law system in the United States today that has compromised the freedoms we have enjoyed under our Constitution -- freedom of religion, freedom of speech, and freedom of the press. Now, we no longer enjoy equal protection under the law. Our uniquely American virtues of tolerance and freedom have worked against us to produce intolerance and oppression. This has led to the stealthy introduction of shariah law and a climate in which criticisms of Mohammed and Islam are no longer possible without serious repercussions.

Instead, claims of Islamophobia and anti-Muslim bias are rampant. Yet consider the following: the Muslim atrocity of 9/11, the attempt by the Nigerian Muslim Abdulmutallab to detonate plastic explosive in his underwear on a Northwest Airlines flight in 2009, the massacre of thirteen soldiers at Fort Hood by jihadist psychiatrist Nidal Hassan in 2009, the failed bombing of Times Square by Faisal Shahzad last May, the violent jihad plot in North Carolina planned by Daniel Patrick Boyd, the recent storming of a Baghdad church and murder of 58 Christians, the UPS plot to bomb synagogues in the Chicago area uncovered this past weekend, and countless other incidents over the past several years.

It is not irrational and biased to fear practitioners of a religion who are trying to kill non-Muslims based on teachings from their religion's doctrine. Apologists for Islam whitewash these events, but Islamic teachings (Reliance of the Traveller, o4.9, p. 590) specifically state that a Muslim's life is worth three times that of a Christian or Jew and fifteen times more than that of a Zoroastrian. (The Consulate General of India, Jeddah lists indemnities for Hindus and Buddhists at 1/15 that of Muslims). When non-Muslims so much as express any discomfort with Muslims and Islamic ideology, they risk public censure, financial ruin, loss of livelihood, and even death. he United States is truly under shariah law when it is forbidden and a punishable offense to call out Islamic doctrine for what it is.

Pupils at Islamic schools across the country are being taught to chop off a criminal's hand and that Jews are conspiring to take over the world, a BBC investigation claimed on Monday.

Up to 5,000 pupils aged between six and 18 are being taught Sharia law punishments using "weekend-school" text-books which claim those who do not believe in Islam will be subjected to "hellfire" in death, the Panorama programme said.

A text book for 15-year-olds advises: "For thieves their hands will be cut off for a first offence, and their foot for a subsequent offence."

"The specified punishment of the thief is cutting off his right hand at the wrist. Then it is cauterised to prevent him from bleeding to death," it added.

Young pupils are warned that the punishment for engaging in homosexual acts is death by stoning, burning with fire or throwing off a cliff and that the "main goal" of the Jews is to "have control over the world and its resources."

The schools are part of the "Saudi Students Clubs and Schools in the UK and Ireland" organisation. The BBC investigation claimed that one school in London is owned by the Saudi government.

Education Minister Michael Gove told the BBC programme: "I have no desire or wish to intervene in the decisions that the Saudi government makes in its own education system.

"But I?m clear that we cannot have anti-Semitic material of any kind being used in English schools. Ofsted (Britain's education watchdog) will be reporting to me shortly."

“While the public has an interest in the will of the voters being carried out … the Court finds that the public has a more profound and long-term interest in upholding an individual’s constitutional rights,” the judge wrote.

In Monday’s order, the judge wrote that Awad “has made a strong showing that State Question 755’s amendment’s primary effect inhibits religion and that the amendment fosters an excessive government entanglement with religion.”

The judge rejected the state’s argument that the amendment is a broad ban on state courts applying the law of other nations and cultures regardless of what faith they may be based on.She wrote, “The actual language of the amendment reasonably … may be viewed as specifically singling out Sharia law, conveying a message of disapproval of plaintiff’s faith.”

The judge wrote: “This order addresses issues that go to the very foundation of our country, our (U.S.) Constitution, and particularly, the Bill of Rights. Throughout the course of our country’s history, the will of the ’majority’ has on occasion conflicted with the constitutional rights of individuals, an occurrence which our founders foresaw and provided for through the Bill of Rights.”

Quoting from a 1943 U.S. Supreme Court decision, she wrote, “One’s right to life, liberty, and property, to free speech, a free press, freedom of worship and assembly, and other fundamental rights may not be submitted to vote; they depend on the outcome of no elections.”

Something you and this leftist judge seem incapable of grasping is that OKhoma's law does not in any way stop a muslim from attending a mosque, praying towards Mecca 5 times a day, following halal dietary rules or making a haj to Mecca. It tells the courts they can't apply sharia law to Oklahoma law.

Yesterday’s feature, “Monitoring America,” by Dana Priest and William Arkin, intentionally distorts the role of outside experts training local law enforcement in matters related to terrorism.

In an effort to smear the Center for Security Policy, Arkin and Preist erroneously describe the Center’s book, Shariah: The Threat to America, as “expanding on what [Walid] Shoebat and [Ramon] Montijo believe.”

This is false. In fact, Shariah: The Threat to America is an independent work of nineteen national security experts, including the former Director of Central Intelligence, former directors of military intelligence agencies, a former counterterrorism agent in the FBI, experts in Shariah law, and many others. Each of the authors is an expert in his own right on a diverse array of national security issues; in that capacity, they can authoritatively address the nexus between America’s national security and Islamic law, called Shariah.The study of Shariah is important to the nation’s national security because America’s Islamist enemies—from the inhabitants of al Qaeda-linked training camps in Yemen and Pakistan to homegrown American “lone-wolf” bombers—declare, above all other concerns, that they fight to install Islamic law and in furtherance of its explicit dictates.

Shariah: The Threat to America demonstrates that the mainstream legal code understood by many of the world’s Muslims to be divinely sanctioned law (Shariah) is a knowable system of law, making the practice of Islam possible in an organized way. Its foundational rulings—on issues like jihad, relations with non-Muslims, mandatory punishments for adultery and apostasy, and more—are objectively knowable. The book takes great pains to present the most mainstream Islamic sources, like the classic of Shafi’i law, Umdat Al-Salik (or Reliance of the Traveller: The Classic Manual of Islamic Sacred Law) and, in describing the tenants of Shariah, use texts written by Muslims for an Islamic audience.

In writing on the Center for Security Policy’s book, Shariah: The Threat to America, “Monitoring America” gives no more accurate or deep a description of the nearly 400-page work than dismissive posts on far-left blogs and missives from organizations linked by the US Government to the Muslim Brotherhood and Hamas.

Arkin and Preist write, “government terrorism experts call the views expressed in the center’s book [Shariah: The Threat to America] inaccurate and counterproductive. They say the DHS should increase its training of local police, using teachers who have evidence-based viewpoints.”

Predictably, the un-named “government terrorism experts” who, according to Preist and Arkin, critiqued the book, could not point to a single assertion or fact that is “inaccurate and counterproductive.” Shariah: The Threat to America may indeed be “counterproductive”—but only to politically correct fictions these un-named experts cling to at the expense of national security.The premise of Shariah: The Threat to America is that America’s law enforcement and national security professionals must orient on the terrorist threat itself, using an unconstrained analysis that should begin with what the nation’s enemies themselves declare as war aims. It is unreasonable and counterproductive for national security professionals to substitute Western rationalizations—like poverty, localized political aspirations, the effect of globalization, or territorial claims—for terrorist groups’ motivations; this analysis will inevitably fail, at the detriment of both America’s foreign policy goals and its own security.In addition, while lamenting the viewpoints of terrorism experts currently training local police around the country, no article has appeared in The Washington Post describing the other groups involved with training and advising national security professionals, from local police forces to consulting at the National Counterrerrorism Center and the White House: the Council on American Islamic Relations (CAIR), the Muslim Public Affairs Council (MPAC), the Islamic Society of North America (ISNA) and many other groups previously named by the U.S. Government as unindicted co-conspirators in US vs. Holy Land Foundation, the largest and most sweeping terrorism-financing case in America’s history. As recently as this year, a Federal Judge Jorge Solis reiterated the close links between these groups and the recognized terrorist entity Hamas, writing of, “at least a prima facie case as to CAIR’s involvement in a conspiracy to support Hamas.” Indeed, according to the United States government, the seed for the most vocal group, CAIR, was created at a Hamas meeting in Philadelphia taped by the FBI as an explicit branch of the Muslim Brotherhood’s Palestine Committee.

Evidently, Arkin and Priest are not concerned about the security implications of or, indeed, the scandal of, relying on associates of a known terrorist entity to provide national security professionals with advice or guidance in combating terror. This pernicious influence is felt less in mandatory sensitivity training than in the ability of groups like CAIR, ISNA, MPAC and others to define what’s known as the “war on terror” for us. Allowing our national security epistemology to be ‘outsourced’ to any group prior to an understanding of what motivates jihadist terrorism is a recipe for both continued potentially disastrous attacks, as well as the confusion and demoralization of watching those with the responsibility to protect us prove to be ineffective and clueless.

The bulk of “Monitoring America” takes a critical look at the gathering of raw intelligence by law enforcement nationally and locally; the effort, made clear by previous reporting from Preist and Arkin, is to enflame civil libertarians about possible violations of privacy at the expense of security. There is, however, no “false choice between liberty and security”—it is difficult, but it is a reality any free society must necessarily negotiate.

The authors, however, do not see the contradiction in their concerns: by maintaining a stubborn refusal to look at the motivating doctrine of terror on its own terms, the nation’s security establishment has no choice but to fiddle with data points and “See Something, Say Something” campaigns at Wal-Mart. Our intelligence bureaucracy decided it was more beneficial to its politically correct shibboleths to ignore the most important determining factor, a legal system that demands jihad.

Haunting video: Assassinated Pakistani Christian cabinet minister on why he defied threats on his life

posted at 4:16 pm on March 2, 2011 by Allahpundit

This makes two Pakistani officials murdered in two months for the “crime” of opposing the country’s blasphemy laws. The first, Punjabi governor Salman Taseer, was gunned down in January by one of his own security people. Who, naturally, was then treated as a hero by Pakistan’s many, many jihadi sympathizers.

Taseer was a liberal Muslim; Shahbaz Bhatti was a Catholic, which made him both a blasphemer and an apostate. He was a marked man and he knew it only too well, as Nina Shea vividly recounts at The Corner:

He had waged a strong campaign — inside the government as a minister and outside it in cooperation with human-rights groups — for the repeal of the country’s draconian blasphemy law, which mandates the death penalty for insulting Islam. The 42-year-old was a Roman Catholic, the government’s only Christian minister, and the longtime head of the All Pakistan Minorities Alliance, a non-governmental organization promoting national unity, interfaith harmony, social justice, and human equality…

Death threats were a constant in Bhatti’s life for many years. He once told me that he had never married because he did not think it would be fair to a wife and children to subject them to this concern. His work was his life: At the end of each day, he left his government Cabinet office and headed over to his office at the All Pakistan Minorities Alliance, where he continued to help Pakistan’s persecuted minorities until late into the night.

“I personally stand for religious freedom, even if I will pay the price of my life,” he had said when he received the USCIRF award. “I live for this principle and I want to die for this principle.”

A pamphlet left at the scene named Bhatti in connection with the blasphemy laws and claimed responsibility for Al Qaeda and the Taliban in Punjab. The second video below shows what they did to his car; this graphic photo from Getty will give you an idea of what they did to him. It’s the first video, though, that’s unforgettable — recorded four months ago, even before Taseer’s assassination, a weary Bhatti contemplates his fate. So sure was he of being murdered, in fact, that he left instructions with friends to send this clip to broadcasters when the inevitable deed was done. He reminds me of Franz Jagerstatter, another devout Catholic who resisted monsters knowing full well what the consequences would be. Jagerstatter is already on his way to sainthood; I assume the process will begin for Bhatti sooner rather than later.

The fact that he spent years working for human rights but only recently felt compelled to record a postmortem testimonial tells you everything you need to know about where Pakistan is these days. Hitchens marveled just yesterday at how “sick” our relationship with this sickening country is; the only silver lining in withdrawing from Afghanistan will be that we can stop pretending that we’re impartial as between India and this cancer on the region. Which won’t be much of a comfort to India: The weaker and more insane Pakistan gets, the more fissile material they pile up, and the more a horrendous outcome — a suicide bombing on a global scale — seems all but assured. I’m not sure there’s any way out.

Darbesh Khan and his wife, Aklima Begum, had to watch their youngest daughter being whipped until she dropped.STORY HIGHLIGHTSHena Akhter, in her last words to her mother, said she was innocentAt first, an autopsy said she committed suicideBut later, the ugly details of her case surfacedHer family says she was punished twice -- raped and then lashedShariatpur, Bangladesh (CNN) -- Hena Akhter's last words to her mother proclaimed her innocence. But it was too late to save the 14-year-old girl.

Her fellow villagers in Bangladesh's Shariatpur district had already passed harsh judgment on her. Guilty, they said, of having an affair with a married man. The imam from the local mosque ordered the fatwa, or religious ruling, and the punishment: 101 lashes delivered swiftly, deliberately in public.

Hena dropped after 70.

Bloodied and bruised, she was taken to hospital, where she died a week later.

Amazingly, an initial autopsy report cited no injuries and deemed her death a suicide. Hena's family insisted her body be exhumed. They wanted the world to know what really happened to their daughter.

Dearborn, Michigan has become a Sharia enclave, much like those populating many European countries. The city of Dearborn, Michigan denied a permit Wednesday for Qur’an-burning Pastor Terry Jones’ planned protest outside the Islamic Center of America on Good Friday.

Islamic supremacists were handed a victory for their violent intimidation and threats. City spokeswoman Mary Laundroche said that Jones’ permit had been denied for “public safety reasons.” In other words, they’re afraid Muslims will riot. And so the rights of free Americans have to be curtailed.

Terry Jones burned a Qur’an. So what? What happened to the freedom of assembly, the freedom of speech, and the freedom of expression? Terry Jones is prohibited from rallying in Michigan for fear of Islamic violence. Is that how far down the Sharia rabbit hole we have gone? Why is it that any time American law comes into conflict with Islamic law, it is American law that has to give way?

How dare they prohibit this march? Nazis marched in Skokie. Americans better stand up to this enforced Sharia. The idea that Muslims in America would get violent because of Jones speaks volumes about Muslims in America, does it not? Why don’t we don’t see Muslims taking to the streets every time there is an honor killing, or a church bombing, or an act of jihad, jihad piracy, forced marriage, or child slavery? Where are they?

Dearborn is trying to charge Jones for the extra police protection that his rally will require. But he is not the one responsible for that; the Muslims who might get violent are. If Jones had burned a Bible, no one would be threatening violence against him. Dearborn should charge the Muslims for the extra police, not Jones.

Once again Dearborn shows itself to be a pro-Sharia city that oppresses Christians. Who can forget the Christians who were arrested for passing out leaflets at a Muslim festival last July? Or the lawsuit that challenges the official cooperation by the city of Dearborn, Michigan with Islamic interests, and makes a stunning allegation: that under the recognized “Shariah” law in the city, there have been “honor killing” murders that have been “covered up”?

Wednesday’s court filing against Constitutional freedoms “equates the actions of zealots in Afghanistan with Muslim Americans in Dearborn.” I pulled that quote from Muslim Brotherhood-tied CAIR. Indeed.

As for Jones, I don’t like book burning, but so what? I have repeatedly stated my position on this. Jones does a grave disservice to the cause of spreading awareness about Islamic teachings and the threat that Sharia poses to our way of life. The burning of books is wrong in principle: the antidote to bad speech is not censorship or book-burning, but more speech. Open discussion. Give-and-take. And the truth will out. There is no justification for burning books.

Nonetheless, if Americans are free and not under Sharia, then Jones can burn any book he wants, and his church and people of like mind can hold any demonstration they want. His freedom and rights should be protected. Islamic supremacists should not be allowed a victory for their violent intimidation — if these people want to stage a protest, they’re free to do so.

This is another challenge to the U.S. to stand up for free speech and free expression. Popular speech needs no protection. As such all Americans should support the right of the church to have done this, even if they dislike what they’re doing.

Many people have said that Jones’s actions will endanger American troops in Afghanistan. This warning is just another terror tactic. It is based on the assumption that the Taliban and others in Afghanistan are fighting us because we are doing things they don’t like, and so if we stop doing those things, they will stop fighting us. But actually they are fighting us because of imperatives within the Islamic faith. They will never like us unless we convert to Islam or submit to Islamic rule. If we stop doing things they dislike, where will we draw the line? How far will Sharia advance in the U.S., with Americans afraid to stop its advance for fear of offending Muslims and stirring them up to violence? The Muslim Students Association is already pushing for halal cafeterias, segregated dorms, segregated gym facilities on campus. This is incompatible with American freedom. We have to draw the line.

I will tell you this: Islamic law (Sharia) cannot, must not, and will not have its way over our free speech. That is worth fighting for, worth dying for.

That would be better in the Free Speech vs. Islam thread. Also not exactly related to the subject of this thread but I don't know where else to put it is this which comes to me from a source I believe to be reliable, but without citation:

Excerpt from a Wash Post article:

It was an unusual complaint for someone who was so committed to al-Qaeda. According to documents, to avoid the distraction of women, he “reportedly received injections to promote impotence and recommended the injections to others so more time could be spent on the jihad.”

Well, I think it's relevant here, as the voters in Michigan were not as insightful as the good people of Oklahoma. Islamic blasphemy laws are being enforced in the US now. Being moderates, they aren't executing people, yet.

That's ridiculous. No where does it say Islamic Law is coming to Dearborn.

No one is challenging free speech or free expression. Or Qur'an burning however ill advised it might be.

But like yelling "fire" in a crowded room, there are safety concerns. And financial concerns.

"Dearborn is trying to charge Jones for the extra police protection that his rally will require."

I bet GM your city too would consider the same thing; why should tax payers pay? Like a KKK rally (they too have freedom of expression)or a Civil Right's March, the cost to the local community is high. It's high time that these fringe groups pay or at least acknowledge the burdenplaced upon the local community.

However, I concede the Supreme Court decided in the Forsyth case that few if any restrictions could be placed upon the group.

Supreme Court: 'hurtful speech' of Westboro Baptist Church is protected

Supreme Court Justice Alito is the lone dissenter in the 8-to-1 ruling on free-speech principles, saying the conduct of the Westboro Baptist Church 'caused petitioner great injury.'

By Warren Richey, Staff writer / March 2, 2011

WashingtonIn an important reaffirmation of free speech principles, the US Supreme Court on Wednesday ruled that noxious, highly offensive protests conducted outside solemn military funerals are protected by the First Amendment when the protests take place in public and address matters of public concern.

. The high court ruled 8 to 1 that members of the Topeka, Kansas-based Westboro Baptist Church are entitled to stage their controversial antigay protests even when they cause substantial injury to family members and others attending the funeral of a loved one.

“Speech is powerful. It can stir people to action, move them to tears of both joy and sorrow, and – as it did here – inflict great pain,” Chief Justice John Roberts wrote in the majority opinion. “On the facts before us, we cannot react to that pain by punishing the speaker,” he said.

Under Sharia law, it is forbidden to proselytize to Muslims, and no Muslim can leave the faith. Dearborn, Michigan, is home to a substantial Muslim population, and there is strong evidence that local authorities now enforce sharia in preference to the Constitution of the United States. Thus this Associated Press story about the arrest of four Christian missionaries that took place on Friday:

Police in the heavily Arab Detroit suburb of Dearborn say they arrested four Christian missionaries for disorderly conduct at an Arab cultural festival.

Police Chief Ron Haddad says his department made the arrests Friday. The four are free on bond.

Here is video of the arrest. The "disorderly conduct" consisted of handing out copies of the Gospel of John outside the festival. Note the police demand that one of the group stop filming the arrest:

Many people seem to believe that concerns about creeping sharia are exaggerated or misplaced. This incident demonstrates, I think, the contrary.

Disorderly conduct, known under Michigan law as a disorderly persons offense (MCL 750.168) is a catch all for several offenses in Michigan. What might be considered under a heading all its own in other states (public intoxication for instance) can be grouped in the disorderly persons statute. Because this offense is so common, and subjectively applied having a skilled defense attorney can be extremely helpful. If is often possible to get these charges completely dropped, preserving you for getting a permanent criminal record. Call and talk to us about the specifics of your case.

What is a Disorderly Persons Charge?

You can be considered disorderly and subsequently charged with this offense if you: • Refuse to support your family • Are a prostitute, window peeper, or vagrant • Engage in illegal business • Beg in public • Loiter where illegal activities are taking place • Cause a public disturbance in public while intoxicated • Crowd or jostle people unnecessarily in public

The penalty for this misdemeanor charge is up to 90 days in prison and a fine of not more than $500.00.

Molesting and Disturbing Persons in Pursuit of Occupation MDL 750.352

If you hinder or interfere with someone while they are in commission of their occupation or on their way to their occupation, you can be charged with a misdemeanor. Misdemeanors typically bring less than one year in prison and a fine.

False Report of Crime MDL 750.411a

If you report to law enforcement that a crime took place when you know that to be untrue, you can be charged with this offense.

The severity of the sentence depends on the crime you falsely reported. If the crime you reported was a misdemeanor, you can be charge with a misdemeanor. If you falsely reported a felony, you may be charged with a felony.

Misdemeanor false reporting carries a potential sentence of up to 93 days in jail and a fine of up to $500.

Felony false reporting, however, carries a possible sentence of up to 4 years in prison and a fine of up to $2,000.

In this offense, you can be charged if your report to the police or dispatch.

Hazing MDL 750.411t

Once quite common, hazing has become a crime in most states. In Michigan, you may be charged with hazing if you (while attending or being employed by an educational institution), commit an intentional act against someone knowing it will endanger their physical health or safety for the purpose of pledging, initiation, or maintaining office in any organization.

There are a range of activities that can be considered hazing, including: • Physical brutality • Physical activities involving sleep deprivation, exposure to elements, confinement, or excessive exercise • Activities involving the consumption of food, alcohol, drugs, or other drinks • Forcing or coercing someone into criminal activity

As important as this theme is, it is an example of Islam vs. Free Speech and there is a thread for exactly that. As I understand it, this thread is for what Sharia says or does not say e.g. can women drive cars, must they cover themselves, that sort of thing.

If a woman believes Allah does not want her to drive (e.g. as Sharia is interpreted in Saudi Arabia) that for her to decide and a subject for this thread so that we may become more educated about Sharia. OTOH if Christian missionaries are being denied their First Amendment rights because of PC pre-emptive dhimmitude or because of intimations of intimidation on the part of certain Muslim groups, that is a matter of Islam vs. Free Speech.

Will Calls for Distribution “According to Islamic Laws and Sharia”; Pennsylvania Court Gives Twice as Much to Each Son as to Each Daughterfrom The Volokh Conspiracy by Eugene Volokh

That seems to be what happened in Alkhafaji v. TIAA-CREF Individual and Instit. Services LLC, 2010 WL 1435056 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pl. Jan. 14, 2010), which is now on appeal. I’m posting about this now because the briefs were just posted on Westlaw, and confirm the details of the will, as well as giving some extra perspective on the disputes related to what Sharia law provides in such situations.

Prof. Abbass Alkhafaji died, and left a will that apparently said, in relevant part,

(4) About my pension, the beneficiaries are all my biological kids and my current wife, ... after reducing all costs associated with the house.... [The] rest of the pension, if any left, should be divided according to Islamic Laws and Sharia....

(9) In case I have additional monetary benefits from my job, such as life insurance, 401K, 403B or any other retirement funds that I am not aware of, Allah as my witness, They should be divided, after costs associated with the payment of those funds according to Islamic Laws and “Sharia.”

The trial court entered an order that concluded with, “(1) TIAA-CREF Individual and Institutional Services LLC, shall make distribution of the pension accounts of the TIAA-CREF certificates ... to the decedent’s surviving spouse, ... in accordance with decedent’s last will and testament dated July 17, 2007, and to his biological children, ... in accordance of the law of Sharia, mainly [sic], one-eighth share to the surviving spouse, ... and thereafter, the remaining balance to be divided, two shares each to the six male children, and one share each to the [two] female children.”

Now if Prof. Alkhafaji had specified in his will that he was leaving a 1/8 share to his wife, and then 1/8 to each of his sons and 1/16 to each of his daughters, that would be fine, regardless of whether his motivation was religious or secular. (This is subject to any state law that might give his wife the power to get some minimum prescribed share, but apparently this was not argued in this case, perhaps because part of the argument — which I won’t get into here — was that Prof. Alkhafaji had left his wife certain assets for the duration of her life, with only the remainder after her death to be split between the children.) People are free to discriminate based on sex, religion, race, and so on in their wills, including in their gifts to their children.

But apparently the will had no such specific provision; rather, it called for distribution under religious law. This raises two questions:

(1) May a court interpret a will — or a contract, deed, trust instrument, or what have you — that calls for the application of religious law (whether Islamic law, Jewish law, canon law, or any other religious law)? Or does the Establishment Clause preclude courts from deciding what, say, Islamic law actually requires, at least if there’s a controversy between the parties about what the “true” interpretation of the religious law should be? Here, one side argues that under Islamic law, the contested provisions of the will are invalid, and that the court erred in relying on the widow’s interpretation of Sharia law; to quote the appellee’s brief, 2011 WL 1573386:

The Court’s determination that the pension should be distributed by giving the widow one eighth of the estate, with the remainder going to the children with two parts for each male and one part for each female, was not only a violation of the terms of the MDA, but also an incorrect interpretation of Shariah law. Had the trial court consulted an expert or referenced judicial texts rather than an interested non-expert, it would have noted that the will offered by a person who is in the illness of death is invalid under Shariah law. The illness of death is defined as the illness which would most likely lead to death. In other words, had the court correctly interpreted Shariah law, it would have found paragraph four of Decedent’s most recent will to be invalid. Because Shariah law is codified in judicial texts which were referenced at the trial court level, and the trial court failed to consult those texts, it committed an error of law when it incorrectly interpreted Shariah law.

(2) May a court apply a foreign or religious legal rule that requires discrimination based on sex, religion, race, and the like, when it is doing so in the course of interpreting a will, contract, etc., on the theory that the court is simply effectuating the author’s discriminatory preferences rather than itself engaging in constitutionally suspect discrimination?

Here’s my tentative answer to question (1), based on an earlier post: I think courts must refuse to interpret religious terms of wills and other such documents, because of what I call the No Religious Decisions strand of Establishment Clause caselaw. Here’s a very brief summary of that strand: In a long line of cases (such as Presbyterian Church in the United States v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Memorial Presbyterian Church (1969)), the Supreme Court held that secular courts may not resolve religious questions, such as which rival church group most closely follows orthodox church teachings. Some states had rules, borrowed from English law, under which the more orthodox group would get to keep the church property, presumably on the theory that this would be more in keeping with what was intended by past donors to the church. But the Court held that such rules may not constitutionally be applied by civil courts (paragraph break added):

First Amendment values are plainly jeopardized when church property litigation is made to turn on the resolution by civil courts of controversies over religious doctrine and practice. If civil courts undertake to resolve such controversies in order to adjudicate the property dispute, the hazards are ever present of inhibiting the free development of religious doctrine and of implicating secular interests in matters of purely ecclesiastical concern. Because of these hazards, the First Amendment enjoins the employment of organs of government for essentially religious purposes; the Amendment therefore commands civil courts to decide church property disputes without resolving underlying controversies over religious doctrine. Hence, States, religious organizations, and individuals must structure relationships involving church property so as not to require the civil courts to resolve ecclesiastical questions.

The Georgia courts have violated the command of the First Amendment. The departure-from-doctrine element of the implied trust theory which they applied requires the civil judiciary to determine whether actions of the general church constitute such a “substantial departure” from the tenets of faith and practice existing at the time of the local churches’ affiliation that the trust in favor of the general church must be declared to have terminated. This determination has two parts. The civil court must first decide whether the challenged actions of the general church depart substantially from prior doctrine. In reaching such a decision, the court must of necessity make its own interpretation of the meaning of church doctrines. If the court should decide that a substantial departure has occurred, it must then go on to determine whether the issue on which the general church has departed holds a place of such importance in the traditional theology as to require that the trust be terminated. A civil court can make this determination only after assessing the relative significance to the religion of the tenets from which departure was found.

Thus, the departure-from-doctrine element of the Georgia implied trust theory requires the civil court to determine matters at the very core of a religion — the interpretation of particular church doctrines and the importance of those doctrines to the religion. Plainly, the First Amendment forbids civil courts from playing such a role.

Now one could argue that this only applies to “resolving underlying controversies over religious doctrine” when called on to do so by a special state-created legal rule, such as the preference for the more orthodox group, and that such resolution of doctrinal controversies could take place when interpreting voluntarily entered into contracts, wills, deeds, trusts, and the like. But I think the logic of the Court’s decision encompasses all civil court decisions about what is the right interpretation of legal doctrine (as opposed to questions, which arise in religious exemption schemes, about whether a claimant sincerely believes in a particular interpretation), especially given the later decision in Jones v. Wolf (1979). And that’s the view lower courts have taken: “[A] court can invoke a secular interpretation of church deeds, by-laws and canons, thereby avoiding judicial entanglement in issues of religious doctrine, polity and practice. When the application of this standard requires judicial involvement in a [religious] doctrinal question, however, it may not be relied upon.” “[P]rovisions in deeds or in denomination’s constitution for the reversion of local church property to the general church, if conditioned upon a finding of departure from doctrine, could not be civilly enforced [quoting and endorsing a concurring opinion in a different Supreme Court case].” See also this decision.

And I think this rule is right, even though it does make things difficult for religious people who want the religious terms of their wills and contracts enforced. The alternative, after all, is for courts to take sides in deciding which rival religious view — say, which understanding of Islamic law — is right and which is wrong, which would itself involve discrimination in favor of one religious subgroup (the one whose view is adopted by the civil courts as the true view of Islamic law, Jewish law, etc.) and against another religious subgroup. That strikes me as worse than civil court abstention from all attempts to decide how to interpret religious concepts.

Fortunately, religious observers who want their disputes settled according to religious law generally have a simple solution: They can provide for arbitration by some religious tribunal that they choose, and courts will generally then enforce the result of that arbitration. Civil courts will no longer be called to decide what Islamic/Jewish/etc. law “really” requires, yet religious believers can have their disputes adjudicated under religious principles. And in fact there are such arbitral bodies around, in a wide range of religions, and they are often used. And if people want their property distributed under religious law after their death, they can just set forth in secular terms their instructions (e.g., “1/8 to my wife, 1/8 to each of my sons, 1/16 to each of my daughters”) rather than incorporating the religious law by reference.

For more on related questions in the context of kosher enforcement laws — and proposed halal enforcement laws — see here and here. For the backstory on who is challenging the will and why, see this later opinion.

Interesting case and interesting legal question presented. My first read is that the facts in the case law can be distinguished from the question presented; I'd certainly be interested to see what is decided on appeal.

You think things would change if race were substituted for gender? Say a gent had kids by 3 women, one a full MOYCH (minority of your choice), one a half blood, and one 1/4 with funds distributed according to whoever had the least MOYCH in 'em.

The man had every right to leave the money to whomever he wants; nothing wrong with his decision. If he left, "a 1/8 share to his wife, and then 1/8 to each of his sons and 1/16 to each of his daughters" that is entirely his prerogative.

Also as the article points out, "people are free to discriminate based on sex, religion, race, and so on in their wills, including in their gifts to their children."

He can name his dog if he wants and exclude his sons and daughters.

It's unfortunate; this decedent should have had his wishes granted. But it was his own fault there are problems (or sue his attorney if he had one); he was not specific in the distribution. The problem then was for the Judge; trying to fulfill the wishes of the decedent, tried to interpret religious law, but whether it is Islam, Judaism, Christianity, or whatever; that is a daunting task. Also, probably the Judge erred in relying on the widow's interpretation of religious law. Probate Court is full of cases where a decedent wasn't specific enough and therefore left to interpretation.

I see, and the courts should thus be forced to participate in discrimination by gender which it otherwise finds abhorrent, and should be forced to interject its interpretations into matters of church, which it is constitutionally prohibited from doing.

JDN, With that kind of thinking you will never be part of the leftist movement that believes all money really belongs to the state. I agree with you, but in estate law as I know it - you have to spell it out.

To write: "divided according to Islamic Law" is a blank, unrecognized note on a page in a U.S. court with no authority to discern the meaning.

His money should be divided exactly as it would have been without a will.

Like Crafty said, the appeal decision will be interesting.

Amazing that the same people who accept this BS accuse the right of trying to bring religion into politics and public affairs.

His right to learn all about Islam and practice and honor his religion is matched by my right to learn none of it if I am the judge or opposing attorney.

Doug said, "I agree with you, but in estate law as I know it - you have to spell it out."

That is true and that is the problem here. Anything vague, i.e. I leave all my money to my favorite children for examplerarely wil stand up. Nor could I leave my money according to Christian Law, Hindu Law, or whatever that is too vague.

And yes, you definitely can discriminate based upon gender. For example, I love my daughter so I leave everything to her and nothing to my worthless son who is in prison is perfectly permissible. For example my first born son can inherit my business; everybodyelse can get the scraps. In England, the first born son becomes King and inherits nearly everything. Etc.

The real threat in a Tennessee case is to our nation's Bill of Rights.

Doyle McManus

May 19, 2011

Last year, a Muslim congregation in Murfreesboro, Tenn., a pleasant college town of about 110,000 people southeast of Nashville, decided that the time had come to build a proper mosque.

For 20 years or more, the town's roughly 250 Muslim families had met for prayers in makeshift quarters, and the congregation's prosperous leaders — doctors, professors, auto dealers — thought they could do better. They bought a 15-acre plot of land next to a Baptist church south of the city limits, and won approval from the Rutherford County Planning Commission for a 53,000-square-foot community center.

Then, as has happened in several places around the country lately, bedlam broke out.

Conservative activists protested that they didn't want a big, visible mosque in their quiet Southern town. A candidate for the Republican congressional nomination decried the construction. Vandals torched one of the (non-Muslim) contractor's bulldozers. And a group of residents filed suit, charging that the building permit had been issued improperly and that they would suffer "emotional distress" if they had to live near a mosque.

What happened next was unexpected, but it was what should happen in a country where freedom of religion is enshrined in the Constitution: Most of Murfreesboro rallied around the Muslims. Christian clergymen and a rabbi formed a support committee; there were marches and teach-ins. The fiery congressional candidate lost her primary race.

Among the Islamic Center of Murfreesboro's most important supporters was the elected mayor of Rutherford County, a Republican farmer and retired healthcare executive named Ernest G. Burgess. He's also an elder at North Boulevard Church of Christ.

"This is going to sound a little philosophical, but this is a matter of principle," Burgess told me this week. "When I took this office, I promised to uphold the constitutions of the United States and the state of Tennessee.... As far as I'm concerned, that's the end of the story."

Only it wasn't.

In a move that could portend a shift away from mosque battles as strictly local fights, the anti-mosque forces consulted with national conservative groups to marshal arguments against the project. And they imported a Washington-based activist, former Reagan administration official Frank Gaffney Jr., to testify in court that American Muslims — including those in Murfreesboro — want to impose Sharia, or Islamic law, on the United States, and that the proposed mosque, gymnasium and swimming pool were part of a "stealth jihad."

"I'm willing to take this case all the way to the Supreme Court if I have to," said Joe Brandon Jr., the plaintiffs' lawyer. "And I'm getting a lot of help. I didn't know anything about Islam or Sharia when this started — I'm just a criminal lawyer — but I've learned a lot."

In short, what began as a strictly local zoning case that looked open and shut — under federal law, religious congregations can build houses of worship almost anywhere — has become the focus of a battle that opponents would like to take national.

"I can't help thinking that if this were just a local controversy, it would have been settled by now," Mayor Burgess said last week.

Brandon, the plaintiffs' lawyer, dismisses the idea of outside agitation, noting that national donations to pursue the case haven't been pouring in. But he acknowledges that national groups such as Gaffney's Center for Security Policy have helped him make his case.

Gaffney's argument boils down to this: Devout Muslims want to live under Sharia, the religious legal code that governs in Saudi Arabia and other traditional Islamic societies. But Sharia, which treats women as unequal, is incompatible with U.S. law. So organized Islam, Gaffney charges, is conspiring to supplant American law with Muslim law — and that, he says, is sedition.

"What is going on in Murfreesboro … fits into the profile of the stealth jihad that is being waged by the Muslim Brotherhood," he told me. "It's a mega-mosque that's clearly disproportionate to the community that it's intended to serve. It has the purpose of demonstrating a kind of triumphalist agenda."

Murfreesboro's Muslims haven't actually done anything explicitly seditious, he acknowledges, but "you want to err on the side of caution."

It's hard to see how the lawsuit against the Murfreesboro mosque can prevail. Even if Brandon wins his case, the most he can ask for is a rehearing on the building permit. Meanwhile, the Muslim congregation has actually sped up construction on the advice of its lawyers, who say that once the building is up, it will be harder to undo.

But it's unlikely that even a resounding defeat in court will end attempts to stop mosque construction. In Gaffney's view, the protests across the country are crucially important, "analogous to the Cold War and the struggle against communism."

Newt Gingrich probably wouldn't disagree; last year he called Sharia "a mortal threat to the survival of freedom in the United States."

Gaffney has a point: Not since the communist scares of the Cold War have we heard that kind of rhetoric. Back then, plenty of politicians found it useful to run against sedition, both real and imagined. The Bill of Rights survived, but it certainly came under attack. Looks as if it's in for another battle.

"Gaffney's argument boils down to this: Devout Muslims want to live under Sharia, the religious legal code that governs in Saudi Arabia and other traditional Islamic societies. But Sharia, which treats women as unequal, is incompatible with U.S. law. So organized Islam, Gaffney charges, is conspiring to supplant American law with Muslim law — and that, he says, is sedition."