I have a question for any Calvinists or former Calvinists who post here.

My question is fairly simple: In the Calvinist teaching, if God inexorably decreed the fall of Adam (he decrees everything), how can Adam be held responsible or guilty for it? Likewise how can the reprobate, by nature incapable of doing anything but evil, be held culpable for their sin?

I have searched numerous Calvinist forums, tracts, catechisms, blogs, for a straightforward answer to this problem and I can't find one. I've seen lots of dodges, non-sequiturs, and bad analogies, but not an actual answer. Does a good answer simply not exist, or am I not looking in the right places?

« Last Edit: September 12, 2012, 11:34:55 PM by Iconodule »

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"A riddle or the cricket's cryIs to doubt a fit reply." - William Blake

My question is fairly simple: In the Calvinist teaching, if God inexorably decreed the fall of Adam (he decrees everything), how can Adam be held responsible or guilty for it? Likewise how can the reprobate, by nature incapable of doing anything but evil, be held culpable for their sin?

They just quote Romans 9 and misinterpret it to refer to God deciding the ultimate eternal salvation of individuals.

« Last Edit: September 13, 2012, 01:22:25 AM by NicholasMyra »

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Quote from: Orthonorm

if Christ does and says x. And someone else does and says not x and you are ever in doubt, follow Christ.

“But of eternal punishment, of cruelty, of pitilessness, and of inhumanity, we never, never say God is the author, who tells us that there is joy in heaven over one sinner that repents. Far be it from us, while we have our senses, to believe or to think this; and we do subject to an eternal anathema those who say and think such things, and esteem them to be worse than any infidels. . . . . But the novelties which the Calvinists have blasphemously introduced concerning God and divine things, perverting, mutilating, and abusing the Divine Scriptures, are sophistries and inventions of the devil” (Confession of Dositheus, Synod of Jerusalem, 1672)

“But of eternal punishment, of cruelty, of pitilessness, and of inhumanity, we never, never say God is the author, who tells us that there is joy in heaven over one sinner that repents. Far be it from us, while we have our senses, to believe or to think this; and we do subject to an eternal anathema those who say and think such things, and esteem them to be worse than any infidels. . . . . But the novelties which the Calvinists have blasphemously introduced concerning God and divine things, perverting, mutilating, and abusing the Divine Scriptures, are sophistries and inventions of the devil” (Confession of Dositheus, Synod of Jerusalem, 1672)

They might not say it, but it doesn't stop it from being true.

Strange how the Calvinists here get slapped with the sophistry card, when it seems to me the attempt at any reconciliation of the "problem of evil" with the Greek notion of the divine (read Classical Christian Theodicy) is at best overly sophistic, at worse sophistry.

I think like most interesting thinkers Calvin's primary problem wasn't the fact he developed the problematic that he did, it was that he didn't go far enough. And I am terribly unaware of anyone who has done anything interesting along his line of thought since his demise. But I haven't spent much time reading Calvinist theology, so like Iconodule, I would be interested if there has been any ground breaking work within Calvinism. Since Calvin, like all the Reformers, certainly had a profound honesty about the problems of Christian thought, even if his answers, like the rest of the Reformers', ended up less than satisfactory.

My question is fairly simple: In the Calvinist teaching, if God inexorably decreed the fall of Adam (he decrees everything), how can Adam be held responsible or guilty for it? Likewise how can the reprobate, by nature incapable of doing anything but evil, be held culpable for their sin?

They just quote Romans 9 and misinterpret it to refer to God deciding the ultimate eternal salvation of individuals.

No, I don't think Calvin is that simplistic. Even if the Orthodox are in their rejection of such a notion.

“But of eternal punishment, of cruelty, of pitilessness, and of inhumanity, we never, never say God is the author, who tells us that there is joy in heaven over one sinner that repents. Far be it from us, while we have our senses, to believe or to think this; and we do subject to an eternal anathema those who say and think such things, and esteem them to be worse than any infidels. . . . . But the novelties which the Calvinists have blasphemously introduced concerning God and divine things, perverting, mutilating, and abusing the Divine Scriptures, are sophistries and inventions of the devil” (Confession of Dositheus, Synod of Jerusalem, 1672)

They might not say it, but it doesn't stop it from being true.

Strange how the Calvinists here get slapped with the sophistry card, when it seems to me the attempt at any reconciliation of the "problem of evil" with the Greek notion of the divine (read Classical Christian Theodicy) is at best overly sophistic, at worse sophistry.

I think like most interesting thinkers Calvin's primary problem wasn't the fact he developed the problematic that he did, it was that he didn't go far enough. And I am terribly unaware of anyone who has done anything interesting along his line of thought since his demise. But I haven't spent much time reading Calvinist theology, so like Iconodule, I would be interested if there has been any ground breaking work within Calvinism. Since Calvin, like all the Reformers, certainly had a profound honesty about the problems of Christian thought, even if his answers, like the rest of the Reformers', ended up less than satisfactory.

Honestly, from what I've read of more modern Reformed theology (and I must confess that I am rather ignorant on the subject), it seems to me like a weird and rather disagreeable hodgepodge of Augustine, Aquinas, Luther, and Calvin mixed together. That being said, I think people do not give the Reformed enough serious thought, which is unfortunate.

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Be comforted, and have faith, O Israel, for your God is infinitely simple and one, composed of no parts.

Honestly, from what I've read of more modern Reformed theology (and I must confess that I am rather ignorant on the subject), it seems to me like a weird and rather disagreeable hodgepodge of Augustine, Aquinas, Luther, and Calvin mixed together. That being said, I think people do not give the Reformed enough serious thought, which is unfortunate.

Before I found Orthodoxy, I was rather impressed by the Reformed theologians who would debate with open theists. I could tell how difficult it was to argue with them, even harder were the Catholics.

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“There is your brother, naked, crying, and you stand there confused over the choice of an attractive floor covering.”

Honestly, from what I've read of more modern Reformed theology (and I must confess that I am rather ignorant on the subject), it seems to me like a weird and rather disagreeable hodgepodge of Augustine, Aquinas, Luther, and Calvin mixed together. That being said, I think people do not give the Reformed enough serious thought, which is unfortunate.

Before I found Orthodoxy, I was rather impressed by the Reformed theologians who would debate with open theists. I could tell how difficult it was to argue with them, even harder were the Catholics.

A well studied Roman Catholic is a strong debater. Unfortunately, as with Orthodox Christianity, RCism is racked with nominalism.

Honestly, from what I've read of more modern Reformed theology (and I must confess that I am rather ignorant on the subject), it seems to me like a weird and rather disagreeable hodgepodge of Augustine, Aquinas, Luther, and Calvin mixed together. That being said, I think people do not give the Reformed enough serious thought, which is unfortunate.

Before I found Orthodoxy, I was rather impressed by the Reformed theologians who would debate with open theists. I could tell how difficult it was to argue with them, even harder were the Catholics.

A well studied Roman Catholic is a strong debater. Unfortunately, as with Orthodox Christianity, RCism is racked with nominalism.

My friend who is/was a RC, who a few on this board know of from Facebook, definitely exhibited strong nominalism in getting into debates with us. Interestingly I think it planted the seed to start taking his faith a little more seriously.

But I agree with your first point, I saw plenty of atheists stumble when trying to debate with Catholics.

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“There is your brother, naked, crying, and you stand there confused over the choice of an attractive floor covering.”

This is my opinion, and a rather uninformed one when it comes to Calvin, but I think I see a quite reasonable false conclusion in his work simply from a finite being looking into a infinite being without have a clear vision on what that infinite being contains in it self and what it doesn't. If I'm way off here let me know so I don't say anything like this again.

Honestly, from what I've read of more modern Reformed theology (and I must confess that I am rather ignorant on the subject), it seems to me like a weird and rather disagreeable hodgepodge of Augustine, Aquinas, Luther, and Calvin mixed together. That being said, I think people do not give the Reformed enough serious thought, which is unfortunate.

Before I found Orthodoxy, I was rather impressed by the Reformed theologians who would debate with open theists. I could tell how difficult it was to argue with them, even harder were the Catholics.

A well studied Roman Catholic is a strong debater. Unfortunately, as with Orthodox Christianity, RCism is racked with nominalism.

Honestly, from what I've read of more modern Reformed theology (and I must confess that I am rather ignorant on the subject), it seems to me like a weird and rather disagreeable hodgepodge of Augustine, Aquinas, Luther, and Calvin mixed together. That being said, I think people do not give the Reformed enough serious thought, which is unfortunate.

Before I found Orthodoxy, I was rather impressed by the Reformed theologians who would debate with open theists. I could tell how difficult it was to argue with them, even harder were the Catholics.

A well studied Roman Catholic is a strong debater. Unfortunately, as with Orthodox Christianity, RCism is racked with nominalism.

So who is the Orthodox William of Ockham?

BISHOP KALLISTOS WARE

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“There is your brother, naked, crying, and you stand there confused over the choice of an attractive floor covering.”

Honestly, from what I've read of more modern Reformed theology (and I must confess that I am rather ignorant on the subject), it seems to me like a weird and rather disagreeable hodgepodge of Augustine, Aquinas, Luther, and Calvin mixed together. That being said, I think people do not give the Reformed enough serious thought, which is unfortunate.

Before I found Orthodoxy, I was rather impressed by the Reformed theologians who would debate with open theists. I could tell how difficult it was to argue with them, even harder were the Catholics.

A well studied Roman Catholic is a strong debater. Unfortunately, as with Orthodox Christianity, RCism is racked with nominalism.

Honestly, from what I've read of more modern Reformed theology (and I must confess that I am rather ignorant on the subject), it seems to me like a weird and rather disagreeable hodgepodge of Augustine, Aquinas, Luther, and Calvin mixed together. That being said, I think people do not give the Reformed enough serious thought, which is unfortunate.

Before I found Orthodoxy, I was rather impressed by the Reformed theologians who would debate with open theists. I could tell how difficult it was to argue with them, even harder were the Catholics.

A well studied Roman Catholic is a strong debater. Unfortunately, as with Orthodox Christianity, RCism is racked with nominalism.

So who is the Orthodox William of Ockham?

BISHOP KALLISTOS WARE

He always struck me of having a strong essentialist stance.

You know what book that is really apparent? "The Orthodox Way".

I've yet to come across an Orthodox theologian that has much nominalistic thought.

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“There is your brother, naked, crying, and you stand there confused over the choice of an attractive floor covering.”

I honestly never understood why nominalism is such a bogeyman amongst Christians.

Neither do I (really I do, in the end it threatens the existence of a certain understanding of God depending on the degree of the rejection of the existence of universals.). It is probably one of the more interesting developments in the history of medieval thought, although like everything it has it ancient roots.

But really all this stuff is out of my pay grade, which includes nearly everything. Including making change for an order off the dollar menu at a McDonald's.

I've yet to come across an Orthodox theologian that has much nominalistic thought.

I myself lean strongly toward nominalism, which makes it rather difficult for me to deal with, like, all of Orthodox theology.

Most modern people would have a hard time understanding essentialism, and I think we could benefit from learning to express our theology using different metaphysics.

Hey I was posting while you were. I agree with the bolded.

I don't hang around such sophisticates. So I never have really encountered a serious self-proclaimed nominalist like yourself.

Could you expound a little (I ain't looking for some argument) on how you reconcile your nominalist bent and belief in God and just some stuff in general. In short, could you talk a little about how you think?

(FWIW, if you don't hang on every word with issues forth from my mouth, I think nominalism and "essentialism" or belief in universals (which I find in the end to be the same although many would argue otherwise) stem from the same less than productive method.)

Again just curious, if you care to take a little to expand a bit on your thinking.

I honestly never understood why nominalism is such a bogeyman amongst Christians.

I think it depends on the context. And this is where I would actually agree with Fr. Hopko on that many of the Orthodox parishes have alot of nominalism, which we both feel is a negative.

But I would look forward to hearing your take on it.

Those of us who are sane, I think, should be willing to admit that if universals exist (either in some realm of universals, in the mind of God, or in the subjects), that language is not capable of accurately describing universals in a fashion which corresponds to what they are in themselves. For those of us who speak multiple languages, this is perhaps an easy problem to grasp. I think it was Gregory of Nyssa who once took a jab at Eunomius, saying that if we really could know the essence if God just by the term 'ingenerate', how terrible must it be for the Latins, Egyptians and Syriacs, who have no word which means exactly what 'agenneton' means in Greek. But this sort of thinking seems to be true of all things, and not just particularly true with God.

When I say 'grain', am I evoking some universal genus which is found in maize, wheat, oat, barley, rye, rice, and millet? But what about things which are also called grain in an equivocal sense? We have grains of sand, and the grain of a piece of wood. It would seem like grain, far from naming whatever universal might be find in millet, maize, wheat, etc., instead describes some quality which is shared by all things called 'grain', even of those which would traditionally be said to have the word predicated of them equivocally. If we admit then, that names don't truly correspond to universals but only what we observe of them, then that pushes universals into an awkward position of being spoken about but never spoken directly of, at which point, one has to wonder whether they are even necessary at all. I am by no means committed to nominalism, but I think that if we take an agnostic stance towards whether universals can be known, like some of the fathers did, then we should at least be open to the possibility that they don't exist at all.

« Last Edit: September 13, 2012, 11:37:37 PM by Cavaradossi »

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Be comforted, and have faith, O Israel, for your God is infinitely simple and one, composed of no parts.

I've yet to come across an Orthodox theologian that has much nominalistic thought.

I myself lean strongly toward nominalism, which makes it rather difficult for me to deal with, like, all of Orthodox theology.

Most modern people would have a hard time understanding essentialism, and I think we could benefit from learning to express our theology using different metaphysics.

Hey I was posting while you were. I agree with the bolded.

I don't hang around such sophisticates. So I never have really encountered a serious self-proclaimed nominalist like yourself.

Could you expound a little (I ain't looking for some argument) on how you reconcile your nominalist bent and belief in God and just some stuff in general. In short, could you talk a little about how you think?

(FWIW, if you don't hang on every word with issues forth from my mouth, I think nominalism and "essentialism" or belief in universals (which I find in the end to be the same although many would argue otherwise) stem from the same less than productive method.)

Again just curious, if you care to take a little to expand a bit on your thinking.

As fascinating as I find theology, I find philosophy equally dull, but I'll just try to set out how I think about stuff. I'm not interested in arguing for it. I'll just put it out there.

-We think about things in terms of labels based on patterns, which may be illusory.-Universals don't quite exist (at least not at our level of experience).-Individuals and discrete objects don't really exist either.

Unfortunately, it looks like there's not much left to exist.

Theologically, I struggle with the Greek concepts of essence and nature, which are typically treated by us Orthodox as having objective and borderline concrete existence. I would say that essence and nature are purely artificial constructs that we have invented in order to reduce the world to more manageable categories that we can think about easily. I don't think there's objectively any such thing as a nature or an essence.

Think about incarnational theology. I have trouble with this statement: Christ transformed the human nature through His redemptive acts. If nature is just a convenient abstraction, then how do Christ's redemptive acts affect us? They should only affect Him personally. Similarly, Western theories of atonemet stop making sense, because they presuppose an objective connection between Christ and the rest of humanity.

Now, I absolutely do not think that a nominalism undermines the doctrine of redemption. But it requires a completely different explanation--a less abstract one. I don't believe either explanation would contradict the other, or that we'd truly be inventing anything new, although I might call one explanation more precise.

This is just an example of a theological question that's affected by a nominalist theory, because the traditional Orthodox explanation supposes the existence of universal commonalities in a very strong sense.

I noticed you seemed to ask how I reconcile nominalism with belief in God. Unfortunately, I'm not sure what the contradiction would be, but I'd be glad to hear.

Those of us who are sane, I think, should be willing to admit that if universals exist (either in some realm of universals, in the mind of God, or in the subjects), that language is not capable of accurately describing universals in a fashion which corresponds to what they are in themselves.

I can admit to that, and will do so.

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For those of us who speak multiple languages, this is perhaps an easy problem to grasp. I think it was Gregory of Nyssa who once took a jab at Eunomius, saying that if we really could know the essence if God just by the term 'ingenerate', how terrible must it be for the Latins, Egyptians and Syriacs, who have no word which means exactly what 'agenneton' means in Greek. But this sort of thinking seems to be true of all things, and not just particularly true with God.

Ok I'm following you here, how language posits a problem with ontology.

Quote

When I say 'grain', am I evoking some universal genus which is found in maize, wheat, oat, barley, rye, rice, and millet? But what about things which are also called grain in an equivocal sense? We have grains of sand, and the grain of a piece of wood. It would seem like grain, far from naming whatever universal might be find in millet, maize, wheat, etc., instead describes some quality which is shared by all things called 'grain', even of those which would traditionally be said to have the word predicated of them equivocally. If we admit then, that names don't truly correspond to universals but only what we observe of them, then that pushes universals into an awkward position of being spoken about but never spoken directly of, at which point, one has to wonder whether they are even necessary at all. I am by no means committed to nominalism, but I think that if we take an agnostic stance towards whether universals can be known, like some of the fathers did, then we should at least be open to the possibility that they don't exist at all.

Are you saying that names do not have a place in the real world but only exist in the mind? And that names themselves are not beings? It seemed to me that Orthodoxy rejects this sort of dualism.

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“There is your brother, naked, crying, and you stand there confused over the choice of an attractive floor covering.”

When I say 'grain', am I evoking some universal genus which is found in maize, wheat, oat, barley, rye, rice, and millet? But what about things which are also called grain in an equivocal sense? We have grains of sand, and the grain of a piece of wood. It would seem like grain, far from naming whatever universal might be find in millet, maize, wheat, etc., instead describes some quality which is shared by all things called 'grain', even of those which would traditionally be said to have the word predicated of them equivocally. If we admit then, that names don't truly correspond to universals but only what we observe of them, then that pushes universals into an awkward position of being spoken about but never spoken directly of, at which point, one has to wonder whether they are even necessary at all. I am by no means committed to nominalism, but I think that if we take an agnostic stance towards whether universals can be known, like some of the fathers did, then we should at least be open to the possibility that they don't exist at all.

Are you saying that names do not have a place in the real world but only exist in the mind? And that names themselves are not beings? It seemed to me that Orthodoxy rejects this sort of dualism.

I agree with Cavaradossi's reasoning. I don't see how a name can be considered to exist outside of the human mind. I also don't see how this is dualistic.

When I say 'grain', am I evoking some universal genus which is found in maize, wheat, oat, barley, rye, rice, and millet? But what about things which are also called grain in an equivocal sense? We have grains of sand, and the grain of a piece of wood. It would seem like grain, far from naming whatever universal might be find in millet, maize, wheat, etc., instead describes some quality which is shared by all things called 'grain', even of those which would traditionally be said to have the word predicated of them equivocally. If we admit then, that names don't truly correspond to universals but only what we observe of them, then that pushes universals into an awkward position of being spoken about but never spoken directly of, at which point, one has to wonder whether they are even necessary at all. I am by no means committed to nominalism, but I think that if we take an agnostic stance towards whether universals can be known, like some of the fathers did, then we should at least be open to the possibility that they don't exist at all.

Are you saying that names do not have a place in the real world but only exist in the mind? And that names themselves are not beings? It seemed to me that Orthodoxy rejects this sort of dualism.

It depends on what you mean by exist in the real world. Do names have some sort of existence outside of the minds which comprehend them? If that is true, then how do names change meaning over time? When the English word 'corn' became synonymous with 'maize', and lost its older meaning of 'cereal grain', did we somehow change the being of 'corn'? In the theology of the Cappadocian Fathers (as well as later saints, like John of Damascus), names, precisely because of their inherent instability, were not thought of as being indicative of what something is, but only describing how something is, what something is not, or that something is. This perceived distance between names and the essences they describe seems to be why, for example, St. John of Damascus could comfortably write that the name 'Θεός' is only the second most proper name of God, the first being 'He that is' (ὁ ὤν). Because no name names the essence of God, he seems to argue that 'He that is', is most proper because God himself spoke it, and also because it is indicative (or manifests) of God's being and essence (τοῦ τὶ εἶναι, of the 'what it is'), while 'Θεός' is second most proper because it is indicative of His energy (he gives a list of supposed etymologies for Θεός earlier which supports this assertion).

None of this, of course, denies that names have true meaning, insofar as they can refer to things which are real (energies), but it denies the theory of language whereby a name can indicate what something is. And that leads back to, my whole: once we start dealing with these unknown essences, which seem to be little more than unknowable kernels of being, surrounded by 'energies' through which they are made manifest, one has to wonder why essences are necessary at all for understanding the world if we never can perceive them.

« Last Edit: September 14, 2012, 02:26:06 PM by Cavaradossi »

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Be comforted, and have faith, O Israel, for your God is infinitely simple and one, composed of no parts.

When I say 'grain', am I evoking some universal genus which is found in maize, wheat, oat, barley, rye, rice, and millet? But what about things which are also called grain in an equivocal sense? We have grains of sand, and the grain of a piece of wood. It would seem like grain, far from naming whatever universal might be find in millet, maize, wheat, etc., instead describes some quality which is shared by all things called 'grain', even of those which would traditionally be said to have the word predicated of them equivocally. If we admit then, that names don't truly correspond to universals but only what we observe of them, then that pushes universals into an awkward position of being spoken about but never spoken directly of, at which point, one has to wonder whether they are even necessary at all. I am by no means committed to nominalism, but I think that if we take an agnostic stance towards whether universals can be known, like some of the fathers did, then we should at least be open to the possibility that they don't exist at all.

Are you saying that names do not have a place in the real world but only exist in the mind? And that names themselves are not beings? It seemed to me that Orthodoxy rejects this sort of dualism.

I agree with Cavaradossi's reasoning. I don't see how a name can be considered to exist outside of the human mind. I also don't see how this is dualistic.

I would say that the Orthodox are more monistic than dualistic because all is in the nous. And that there is somewhat of an embrace of ideaslitic epistemology. We more or less do not use our logical faculties the way the Roman Catholics do with Aristotlian metaphysics, rather we come to God's knowledge by theoria in theosis. I guess you could say I like St. Gregory Palamas' hesychasm approach.

« Last Edit: September 14, 2012, 03:26:13 PM by Achronos »

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“There is your brother, naked, crying, and you stand there confused over the choice of an attractive floor covering.”

When I say 'grain', am I evoking some universal genus which is found in maize, wheat, oat, barley, rye, rice, and millet? But what about things which are also called grain in an equivocal sense? We have grains of sand, and the grain of a piece of wood. It would seem like grain, far from naming whatever universal might be find in millet, maize, wheat, etc., instead describes some quality which is shared by all things called 'grain', even of those which would traditionally be said to have the word predicated of them equivocally. If we admit then, that names don't truly correspond to universals but only what we observe of them, then that pushes universals into an awkward position of being spoken about but never spoken directly of, at which point, one has to wonder whether they are even necessary at all. I am by no means committed to nominalism, but I think that if we take an agnostic stance towards whether universals can be known, like some of the fathers did, then we should at least be open to the possibility that they don't exist at all.

Are you saying that names do not have a place in the real world but only exist in the mind? And that names themselves are not beings? It seemed to me that Orthodoxy rejects this sort of dualism.

I agree with Cavaradossi's reasoning. I don't see how a name can be considered to exist outside of the human mind. I also don't see how this is dualistic.

I would say that the Orthodox are more monistic than dualistic because all is in the nous. And that there is somewhat of an embrace of ideaslitic epistemology. We more or less do not use our logical faculties the way the Roman Catholics do with Aristotlian metaphysics, rather we come to God's knowledge by theoria in theosis. I guess you could say I like St. Gregory Palamas' hesychasm approach.

Well, I haven't read Palamas, so I'm afraid I can't give an educated response; but surely you've read St. Maximus, the Orthodox Prince of Aristotle?

When I say 'grain', am I evoking some universal genus which is found in maize, wheat, oat, barley, rye, rice, and millet? But what about things which are also called grain in an equivocal sense? We have grains of sand, and the grain of a piece of wood. It would seem like grain, far from naming whatever universal might be find in millet, maize, wheat, etc., instead describes some quality which is shared by all things called 'grain', even of those which would traditionally be said to have the word predicated of them equivocally. If we admit then, that names don't truly correspond to universals but only what we observe of them, then that pushes universals into an awkward position of being spoken about but never spoken directly of, at which point, one has to wonder whether they are even necessary at all. I am by no means committed to nominalism, but I think that if we take an agnostic stance towards whether universals can be known, like some of the fathers did, then we should at least be open to the possibility that they don't exist at all.

Are you saying that names do not have a place in the real world but only exist in the mind? And that names themselves are not beings? It seemed to me that Orthodoxy rejects this sort of dualism.

I agree with Cavaradossi's reasoning. I don't see how a name can be considered to exist outside of the human mind. I also don't see how this is dualistic.

I would say that the Orthodox are more monistic than dualistic because all is in the nous. And that there is somewhat of an embrace of ideaslitic epistemology. We more or less do not use our logical faculties the way the Roman Catholics do with Aristotlian metaphysics, rather we come to God's knowledge by theoria in theosis. I guess you could say I like St. Gregory Palamas' hesychasm approach.

What do you mean by an idealistic epistemology? Also, in the philosophy of the Cappodocians, names and words are all epinoetic processes. They are related, but distanced from the way we encounter things as they exist. I never really got the impression that Orthodox theology was monistic in its epistemology.

« Last Edit: September 14, 2012, 04:29:24 PM by Cavaradossi »

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Be comforted, and have faith, O Israel, for your God is infinitely simple and one, composed of no parts.

Well it's not entirely monistic because we still have a problem with neoplatonism. But I definitely see a rejection of dualism in Orthodoxy, because I ultimately do see a reconcilliation with both mind and matter, and a seperation of both seems to me at ends with Orthodox theology.

More later when I have the time from work and my hobbies.

« Last Edit: September 14, 2012, 06:01:51 PM by Achronos »

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“There is your brother, naked, crying, and you stand there confused over the choice of an attractive floor covering.”

When I say 'grain', am I evoking some universal genus which is found in maize, wheat, oat, barley, rye, rice, and millet? But what about things which are also called grain in an equivocal sense? We have grains of sand, and the grain of a piece of wood. It would seem like grain, far from naming whatever universal might be find in millet, maize, wheat, etc., instead describes some quality which is shared by all things called 'grain', even of those which would traditionally be said to have the word predicated of them equivocally. If we admit then, that names don't truly correspond to universals but only what we observe of them, then that pushes universals into an awkward position of being spoken about but never spoken directly of, at which point, one has to wonder whether they are even necessary at all. I am by no means committed to nominalism, but I think that if we take an agnostic stance towards whether universals can be known, like some of the fathers did, then we should at least be open to the possibility that they don't exist at all.

Are you saying that names do not have a place in the real world but only exist in the mind? And that names themselves are not beings? It seemed to me that Orthodoxy rejects this sort of dualism.

I agree with Cavaradossi's reasoning. I don't see how a name can be considered to exist outside of the human mind. I also don't see how this is dualistic.

I would say that the Orthodox are more monistic than dualistic because all is in the nous. And that there is somewhat of an embrace of ideaslitic epistemology. We more or less do not use our logical faculties the way the Roman Catholics do with Aristotlian metaphysics, rather we come to God's knowledge by theoria in theosis. I guess you could say I like St. Gregory Palamas' hesychasm approach.

Well, I haven't read Palamas, so I'm afraid I can't give an educated response; but surely you've read St. Maximus, the Orthodox Prince of Aristotle?

I defiantly agree with the best way to refer to God would be "He that is". So I this brings me to a question, I assume that "The Existing One" didn't get a choice about existing? And if your sole existence is to infinitly be I also would assume that He doesn't get a choice to at some point not be?

Also, in the philosophy of the Cappodocians, names and words are all epinoetic processes.

BTW isn't that the problem the West has on the experience of God? Let alone pagan philosophy.

No, because we still encounter things noetically. It is our thoughts and words about them which are epinoetic. This is why the saints unanimously agree that the noetic vision of the Uncreated Light is beyond description.

Logged

Be comforted, and have faith, O Israel, for your God is infinitely simple and one, composed of no parts.

When I say 'grain', am I evoking some universal genus which is found in maize, wheat, oat, barley, rye, rice, and millet? But what about things which are also called grain in an equivocal sense? We have grains of sand, and the grain of a piece of wood. It would seem like grain, far from naming whatever universal might be find in millet, maize, wheat, etc., instead describes some quality which is shared by all things called 'grain', even of those which would traditionally be said to have the word predicated of them equivocally. If we admit then, that names don't truly correspond to universals but only what we observe of them, then that pushes universals into an awkward position of being spoken about but never spoken directly of, at which point, one has to wonder whether they are even necessary at all. I am by no means committed to nominalism, but I think that if we take an agnostic stance towards whether universals can be known, like some of the fathers did, then we should at least be open to the possibility that they don't exist at all.

Are you saying that names do not have a place in the real world but only exist in the mind? And that names themselves are not beings? It seemed to me that Orthodoxy rejects this sort of dualism.

I agree with Cavaradossi's reasoning. I don't see how a name can be considered to exist outside of the human mind. I also don't see how this is dualistic.

I would say that the Orthodox are more monistic than dualistic because all is in the nous. And that there is somewhat of an embrace of ideaslitic epistemology. We more or less do not use our logical faculties the way the Roman Catholics do with Aristotlian metaphysics, rather we come to God's knowledge by theoria in theosis. I guess you could say I like St. Gregory Palamas' hesychasm approach.

Well, I haven't read Palamas, so I'm afraid I can't give an educated response; but surely you've read St. Maximus, the Orthodox Prince of Aristotle?

Plz poste moar?

St. Maximus is Aristotelian in the sense that he reasons extensively from Aristotelian syllogisms and terminology. I know a priest who did his theological studies on St. Maximus, translating many of his works. According to the priest, large swaths of some of St. Maximus' writings are copied verbatim from Aristotle.

Interestingly, it is reported that his professors weren't too happy with that.