4 About CSIS For over 50 years, the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) has worked to develop solutions to the world s greatest policy challenges. Today, CSIS scholars are providing strategic insights and bipartisan policy solutions to help decisionmakers chart a course toward a better world. CSIS is a nonprofit organization headquartered in Washington, D.C. The Center s 220 fulltime staff and large network of affiliated scholars conduct research and analysis and develop policy initiatives that look into the future and anticipate change. Founded at the height of the Cold War by David M. Abshire and Admiral Arleigh Burke, CSIS was dedicated to finding ways to sustain American prominence and prosperity as a force for good in the world. Since 1962, CSIS has become one of the world s preeminent international institutions focused on defense and security; regional stability; and transnational challenges ranging from energy and climate to global health and economic integration. Former U.S. senator Sam Nunn has chaired the CSIS Board of Trustees since Former deputy secretary of defense John J. Hamre became the Center s president and chief executive officer in CSIS does not take specific policy positions; accordingly, all views expressed herein should be understood to be solely those of the author(s) by the Center for Strategic and International Studies. All rights reserved. ISBN: (pb); (ebook) Center for Strategic & International Studies Rowman & Littlefield 1616 Rhode Island Avenue, NW 4501 Forbes Boulevard Washington, DC Lanham, MD

7 Executive Summary Asia stands out as the world s most vibrant region, where rivalries and confrontation coincide with increased economic cooperation and community building. How should we interpret these two dynamics, and what are the implications for U.S. policy? With the support of the MacArthur Foundation, Asahi Shimbun, Joongang Ilbo, and China Times, the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) collaborated with Opinion Dynamics Corporation on a survey of strategic elites 1 in 11 Asia Pacific economies. 2 Key findings are as follows: Finding One: Power Will Shift to China An average of 53 percent of respondents 3 believed China will exert the greatest power in East Asia in 10 years, followed by the United States with 43 percent. Similarly, 56 percent of respondents expected China to be their country s most important economic partner in 10 years, followed by the United States at 28 percent. Most respondents, 79 percent, considered China s impact on regional economic development either very or slightly positive, but 61 percent felt China is having a very or somewhat negative impact on regional security. Finding Two: U.S. Leadership Will Nevertheless Remain Strong Despite expectations that China will be the most powerful country in the region in 10 years, experts continue to see continued U.S. leadership even with declining U.S. relative power. When asked about the future dynamics of international relations in East Asia over the next decade, 57 percent of respondents on average predicted continued U.S. leadership while only 7 percent predicted Chinese primacy. South Korean and Japanese respondents were most certain of continued U.S. leadership, but a majority of Chinese experts also agreed. A plurality of respondents on average also felt that continued U.S. leadership would be in the best interests of their country, although only 11 percent of Chinese respondents agreed. Thailand, despite its status as a U.S. treaty ally, was least enthusiastic about U.S. leadership. 1 Members of the strategic elite were identified as nongovernmental experts who are influential in the debate on international and/or Asian regional affairs. Excluded from the list were serving members of the legislative, judicial, or administrative branches of government or those with expertise outside of international relations and/or Asia. 2 CSIS identified 150 candidates each in the United States, Japan, South Korea, China, Thailand, Indonesia, India, Australia, Singapore, Burma/Myanmar, and Taiwan. The survey was conducted online between March 24 and April 22, 2014, and the total number of participants was To allow comparisons among the 11 economies (across which the number of responses varied from 23 to 81), we used average values that weight each country equally. Burma/Myanmar was excluded due to a low response rate and is therefore analyzed separately. V

8 Finding Three: Broad Support for the U.S. Rebalance, but Concern about Implementation An average of 79 percent of respondents expressed support for the Obama administration s strategic rebalance to Asia. China was the only country where a majority of respondents disapproved of the rebalance, by a margin of 77 to 23 percent. When asked to evaluate the rebalance, most respondents, 51 percent on average, suggested it is the right policy but is neither resourced nor implemented sufficiently, followed by 24 percent who felt it is reinforcing regional stability and prosperity. China was the only country where a majority of respondents believed the rebalance is too confrontational toward China (74 percent compared with a regional average of 18 percent). Finding Four: Territorial Confrontations Are the Greatest Obstacle to Regional Community Building A failure to resolve territorial issues was deemed the greatest obstacle to community building in East Asia on average. 4 South Korea, Singapore, and China were most concerned about the failure to resolve historical issues as an obstacle, which came in second on average. The third greatest obstacle was uncertainty about a rising China, led by respondents from Japan and Taiwan. When asked whether their country should resort to military force to reverse a hostile takeover of territory by the other side should diplomacy fail, over 80 percent of Chinese and Japanese respondents said yes. Finding Five: Northeast Asia Struggling with History Respondents in South Korea and China were even more concerned about historical issues than territorial issues. In addition, 88 percent of respondents in China, 62 percent in Taiwan, and 60 percent in South Korea said Japan s impact on regional security was very or slightly negative. Most respondents, 42 percent on average, said that these historical issues would remain diplomatic and not military problems, but 43 percent of Chinese said the historical differences could lead to military confrontation. Finding Six: Regional Economic Crises Seen as the Greatest Challenge to National Security Most respondents on average considered regional economic and financial crises to be the greatest challenge to their nation s security, led by Indonesia. 5 Territorial and historical disputes came in second on average, with South Korea, China, Taiwan, India, and Japan expressing the most concern, in that order. Climate change emerged as the third-greatest challenge on average, led by India and Singapore, with Northeast Asia relatively less concerned. 4 Participants were asked to rate nine potential obstacles to community building in East Asia on a scale of 1 to 10, with 1 meaning not a major obstacle at all and 10 meaning a very significant obstacle. 5 Participants were asked to rate their level of concern about 12 potential challenges to their nation s security on a scale of 1 to 10, with 1 meaning not concerned at all and 10 meaning extremely concerned. VI MICHAEL J. GREEN AND NICHOLAS SZECHENYI

9 Finding Seven: Support for Trans-Pacific Regional Economic Framework Strong When asked about the importance of various economic frameworks to their country s economic future, 6 respondents on average ranked the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum and the Group of 20 (G-20) highest, with 82 percent considering them either very or somewhat important, followed by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations Economic Community (81 percent) and the Trans-Pacific Partnership (75 percent). Finding Eight: Robust Regional Support for Democratic Values, but now Americans More Doubtful In the CSIS Survey, 7 respondents listed democratic norms as a high priority for regional community building, with Americans near the top and Chinese respondents most uncertain about these priorities. In a surprising change, Americans now ranked at the bottom of the surveyed countries in the priority they placed on these norms for regional community building. On human rights and women s empowerment, American experts ranked last, below Chinese counterparts. On promoting free and fair elections, Americans were second from the bottom. Finding Nine: Peace in the Taiwan Strait Matters to the Entire Region Seventy percent of respondents on average felt that if Taiwan were reunified with mainland China through coercive means that would have a slightly or very negative impact on their country s interests. The United States and Japan expressed the most concern (99 and 98 percent either slightly or very negative, respectively) followed by Taiwan (89 percent), Australia (85 percent), and South Korea (80 percent). Respondents in China were more negative than positive by a margin of 43 to 40 percent. 6 Participants were asked to rate the importance of seven economic frameworks on a scale of 1 to 4, with 1 meaning very important and 4 meaning not at all important. 7 Bates Gill et al., Strategic Views on Asian Realism: Survey Results and Analysis (Washington, DC: CSIS, February 2009), POWER AND ORDER IN ASIA VII

10

11 1 Introduction Project Background In , the MacArthur Foundation supported a CSIS survey of strategic elites in nine Asia-Pacific countries on the future of regional architecture. 1 The survey, which was conducted in cooperation with Opinion Dynamics Corporation (ODC), Asahi Shimbun (Japan), and Joongang Ilbo (South Korea), was designed to map aspirations and expectations across the region with respect to Asia s emerging power relations, institutions, and norms. The survey demonstrated that despite notional support for creation of an East Asia Community, there continues to be deep skepticism across Asia about the ability of regional institutions to handle security, economic, or transnational crises. The survey also revealed a strong degree of support in the region for the idea that a future East Asia Community should be based on democratic norms such as human rights, free and fair elections, and good governance, though there were divisions about whether states should cede national sovereignty to advance those norms. In response to questions about regional dynamics there was a clear assessment that power was shifting toward China, but trust was highest toward the United States and quite high toward Japan. The one surprising exception to this result was in Thailand, where expressions of mistrust toward the United States were significant, perhaps reflecting stresses in the U.S.-Thai relationship in the wake of the 2006 coup and a more benign Thai view of China. The juxtaposition of power competition and increased economic cooperation and community building has become even more pronounced in the years since the initial CSIS survey was completed. In 2010, North Korea sank the South Korean corvette Cheonan and shelled the island of Yeonpyeong; China and Japan entered a cycle of crisis and confrontation over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands in the East China Sea; and in the South China Sea the Philippines and Vietnam began squaring off against an expanding and assertive Chinese maritime presence. These confrontations moved from incidents at sea to multilateral diplomatic settings. When the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) of foreign ministers failed for the first time in decades to issue a joint communiqué because of the South China Sea confrontations, the weakness of the region s institutions detected in the prior CSIS survey was exposed. Emerging Chinese strategies such as the Near Sea Doctrine and American concepts such as AirSea Battle also suggested that the localized tests of will in the East and South China Seas were increasingly being connected to a larger strategic competition between Washington and Beijing. Also underlying these growing confrontations over territorial issues were clashing interpretations of history and identity among the claimants. The CSIS survey results shed light on the strategic landscape in Asia with respect to questions of regional institutions, norms, and power. Since then, intervening crises on the Korean peninsula and in the East and South China Seas as well as in the 1 Bates Gill et al., Strategic Views on Asian Realism: Survey Results and Analysis (Washington, DC: CSIS, February 2009), 1

12 governance of ARF and other forums suggested a need to reassess regional trend lines. CSIS approached Opinion Dynamics Corporation to design a second survey of strategic elites and, with the support of the MacArthur Foundation, Asahi Shimbun, Joongang Ilbo, and China Times, was able to further explore issues related to power and order in Asia. Methodology The 2014 survey targeted strategic elites in 11 Asia Pacific economies. The CSIS team of Asia scholars identified candidates in Australia, Burma/Myanmar, China, India, Indonesia, Japan, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan, Thailand, and the United States. 2 Members of the strategic elite were identified as nongovernmental experts who are influential in the debate on international and/or Asian regional affairs. Excluded from the list were serving members of the legislative, judicial, or administrative branches of government or those whose expertise lies outside of international relations or Asia. The Opinion Dynamics Corporation worked with CSIS to design an online survey template and fielded the survey electronically between March 24 and April 22, Participants in China, Japan, and South Korea were given the option of filling out the survey in their native languages. The survey required a significant level of expertise on a range of policy issues, but the use of an online template allowed for completion in 10 minutes or less. The final number of participants in each country was as follows: Australia 26 Burma/Myanmar 8 China 35 India 33 Indonesia 23 Japan 52 Singapore 28 South Korea 59 Taiwan 29 Thailand 28 United States 81 Total 402 To allow comparisons among the 11 economies (across which the number of respondents varied from 23 to 81), we used average values that weight each country equally. Burma/Myanmar was excluded due to a low response rate but is analyzed separately in the section on key assessments. As noted in the previous survey report, there are advantages and limitations to this kind of elite survey sample. The respondents are influential individuals who have studied and written on the subjects of the survey, and many have held senior positions in their respective governments with responsibility for policy. The 402 responses therefore allow for a well-informed comparison of strategic thinking across Asia on questions associated with power and order. However, the selection of strategic elites is necessarily subjective, and the number of responses varied from country to country. In addition, this 2 The authors wish to thank Ernie Paicopolos of Opinion Dynamics Corporation for his expert advice as well as the following CSIS scholars and staff for their assistance with the design, implementation, and analysis of the survey: William Colson, Zack Cooper, Rick Inderfurth, Persis Khambatta, Nicole White, Jacqueline Vitello, Ying Sun, Ellen Kim, Sang Jun Lee, Eunchong Jeon, Marie Dumond, Greg Poling, Kathleen Rustici, Phuong Nguyen, Elke Larsen, Grace Hearty, David Parker, Samir Nair, Vineeth Murthy, Deep Pal, Yuko Nakano, Benjamin Self, Eri Hirano, Ayumi Teraoka, James Dunton, Alison Bours, and Ryan Sickles. 2 MICHAEL J. GREEN AND NICHOLAS SZECHENYI

13 sample does not necessarily reflect the full range of elite views. While derived from a carefully constructed survey and methodological approach, these elite-oriented surveys cannot be compared with large public opinion surveys in terms of precision or margin of error. Despite these limitations, the project team is confident the results will enhance understanding of the strategic landscape in Asia with respect to questions of power, norms, and regional institutions. In our view, the survey reveals nine key findings, which are analyzed below and depicted graphically in the pages that follow. POWER AND ORDER IN ASIA 3

14 2 Key Assessments Finding One: Power Will Shift to China As in the previous CSIS survey, regional experts expected that power will continue shifting to China within Asia, with generally positive impact on economic development but a negative impact on regional security. Fifty-three percent of respondents on average believed China will exert the greatest power in East Asia in 10 years, followed by the United States with 43 percent. The percentage of national responses for China and the United States is depicted in Figure 1. Figure 1. Which of the following countries will exert the greatest power in East Asia in 10 years? 100% 90% 89% 80% 70% 60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 10% 26% 71% 32% 68% 37% 61% 42% 52% 50% 50% 54% 55% 43% 45% 70% 22% 79% 12% 7% 0% China U.S. Korea Japan Australia Singapore Taiwan Indonesia India Thailand Answer: China The U.S. The divergence between views of China s economic and security impact is demonstrated in Figure 2. Seventy-nine percent considered China s impact on regional economic development to be either very or slightly positive but 61 percent felt China is having a very or somewhat negative impact on regional security. 4

15 100% 90% 80% 70% 60% 98% 83% Figure 2. Is China's impact on regional economic development... Is China's impact on regional security... (Percentage responding "Very Positive"or "Somewhat Positive") 93% 90% 88% 84% 79% 78% 70% 60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 10% 0% 44% 22% 24% 26% 20% 18% 12% 9% 1% 2% China Thailand Singapore Australia U.S. Taiwan Korea Indonesia India Japan Regional economic development Regional security The reason that a majority of respondents across the region expect China to exert the greatest power in 10 years is evident in Figure 3, in which 56 percent of respondents expected China to be their country s most important economic partner in 10 years, followed by the United States at 28 percent. Among American allies, Australia and South Korea stood out for their expectations that China will be their major economic partner (77 percent for Australians and 86 percent for South Koreans). However, both Australian and South Korean experts expressed strong support for and expectations of a continued U.S.-led regional order as seen in Figure 4. Japanese respondents predicted that the United States will be their country s closest economic partner in 10 years, which also stands out and likely reflects not only growing anxiety about political and economic risk within China, but also anticipation of increased investment in American energy and infrastructure over the coming decade. It is worth highlighting that Chinese respondents overwhelmingly saw the United States as their major economic partner in 10 years (83 percent of respondents), while only 46 percent of Americans saw China as being their nation s most important future economic partner. This picture of asymmetrical dependence, though based on impressions rather than market predictions per se, might suggest one reason that Beijing will seek to avoid a dangerous confrontation with the United States for the foreseeable future. POWER AND ORDER IN ASIA 5

16 100% 90% 80% 70% 90% Figure 3. Which of the following countries do you expect will be your country s most important economic partner ten years from now? 86% 77% 75% 71% 71% 83% 60% 50% 57% 46% 49% 40% 30% 20% 10% 0% 30% 19% 22% 23% 12% 14% 3% 4% 4% 3% Taiwan Korea Australia Singapore Thailand Indonesia U.S. India Japan China China The U.S. Finding Two: U.S. Leadership Will Nevertheless Remain Strong Despite expectations that China will be the most powerful country in the region in 10 years, experts continue to see continued U.S. leadership even with declining U.S. relative power. As Figure 4 indicates, when asked about the future dynamics of international relations in East Asia over the next decade, 57 percent of respondents predicted continued U.S. leadership. South Korean and Japanese respondents were most certain of continued U.S. leadership, but a majority of Chinese experts also agreed. Although this result may seem to contradict the earlier data indicating that regional experts expect China to surpass the United States in terms of power, the question asked respondents to describe the dynamics of international relations in the region (not which country would have the most power). Very few respondents could picture anything other than continued U.S. leadership, with only 7 percent predicting a Sino-centric system and 5 percent predicting a Sino-U.S. condominium. The sources of U.S. leadership, in other words, depend on more than perceptions of relative or absolute U.S. power alone. 6 MICHAEL J. GREEN AND NICHOLAS SZECHENYI

17 Figure 4. What is your expectation for the dynamics of international relations in East Asia over the next decade? 100% 90% 80% 70% 60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 10% 0% Korea Japan Singapore U.S. Australia Taiwan China India Thailand Indonesia Continued U.S. leadership even if relative U.S. power declines An uneasy balance of power among major regional states with no one state dominant A new community of nations based on strengthened multilateral institutions and cooperation Chinese primacy A U.S.-China condominium The expectation that Asia will continue to see a U.S.-led regional order almost certainly reflects the desire of most regional actors to sustain that U.S.-led order. As Figure 5 indicates, a plurality of respondents felt that continued U.S. leadership is not only likely, but would be in the best interests of their country. Respondents in India, Indonesia, and Thailand all expressed a preference for a regional community based on multilateral institutions, but as Figure 4 indicated, few of those experts expect such a community in the coming decade (with the exception of Indonesians). Meanwhile, U.S. allies and partners such as Japan, Australia, Korea, and Taiwan and of course Americans themselves had a strong preference for a U.S.-led regional order, regardless of the expectations they had for economic relations with China. American influence in the region rests on the combination of those who want that leadership and POWER AND ORDER IN ASIA 7

18 100% Figure 5. Which of these descriptions would be in the best interest of your country? 90% 80% 70% 60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 10% 0% Japan U.S. Korea Australia Taiwan Singapore India China Indonesia Thailand Continued U.S. leadership even if relative U.S. power declines An uneasy balance of power among major regional states with no one state dominant A new community of nations based on strengthened multilateral institutions and cooperation Chinese primacy A U.S.-China condominium those who desire a regional community but do not yet think such a community is likely. Only 11 percent of Chinese respondents preferred a U.S.-led regional order, though this still was higher than the number of Indonesians and Thais. In contrast to the Indonesian and Thai respondents, however, Chinese experts were more divided on what regional order they wanted to replace a U.S.-led order. The clarity of American respondents preference for a U.S.-led order (80 percent) stands in contrast to the Chinese respondents ambivalence about a Sino-centric order (17 percent). 8 MICHAEL J. GREEN AND NICHOLAS SZECHENYI

19 Finding Three: Broad Support for the U.S. Rebalance, but Concern about Implementation Given the broad expectation of and desire for continued U.S. leadership, it follows that an average of 79 percent of respondents expressed support for the Obama administration s strategic rebalance to Asia, as seen in Figure 6. The broad backing among American experts (96 percent) indicates that support for the rebalance to Asia has strong bipartisan support at least among experts and is therefore likely to be sustained by future administrations. China was the only country where a majority of respondents disapproved of the rebalance, by a margin of 77 to 23 percent. By presenting the responses geographically, Figure 6 suggests: (1) how out of sync Chinese views of the rebalance are with the rest of the region; (2) the demand pull for the rebalance from states within the region concerned about China; and (3) the reason Chinese observers might see the policy resembling containment. It is worth noting here that not all regional states could be surveyed and these results do not include the Philippines and Vietnam, which are now in stand-offs with China in the South China Sea and would likely demonstrate strong support for the rebalance if surveyed. On the other hand, the survey also does not include the Russian Federation, where support for the rebalance could be low in light of recent events in Ukraine. Despite broad support for the rebalance outside of China, there are mixed views about its effectiveness to date particularly among Americans and close U.S. allies and partners. When asked to evaluate the rebalance, 51 percent of respondents suggested it is the right policy but is not being resourced or implemented sufficiently, followed by 24 percent who felt it is reinforcing regional stability and prosperity. The consensus among CSIS experts observing this result was that allies and partners continue to have questions about: (1) the influence of extra-regional crises such as Syria and Ukraine; (2) the lack of presidential engagement with the Congress on Trade Promotion Authority and the Trans- Pacific Partnership; (3) the future of the U.S. defense budget; and (4) the commitment of the second-term Obama foreign policy team to the rebalance. However, other observers may draw different conclusions. Notably, China was the only country where a majority of respondents believed the rebalance is too confrontational toward China (74 percent compared with a regional average of 18 percent). Chinese impressions of the rebalance remain a problem for the United States, but experts in Beijing should take note of the strong support for the rebalance elsewhere in the region. POWER AND ORDER IN ASIA 9

20 Figure 6. Do you support the Obama administration s goal of a strategic U.S. rebalance to Asia? 10 MICHAEL J. GREEN AND NICHOLAS SZECHENYI

21 Figure 7. Which of the following statements best represents how you would evaluate the U.S. rebalance to Asia? Too Too confrontational toward toward China China Reinforcing regional stability and prosperity China Indonesia Thailand Australia Singapore U.S. Taiwan S. Korea Japan India No impact on regional dynamics Right policy but insufficient resources and implementation Finding Four: Territorial Confrontations Are the Greatest Obstacle to Regional Community Building The survey found strong support for the goal of establishing an East Asia Community, with 89 percent of respondents in favor a marked increase from the survey result of 81 percent (although strong support held relatively steady at 36 and 37 percent, respectively). 3 However, the 2014 survey once again showed skepticism about actually building a regional order around multilateral institutions. Most respondents (54 percent) in 2014 did express the view that there had been limited progress towards the goal of an East Asia Community in recent years. However, when asked to characterize the dynamics of international relations they expect in the region in 10 years (see Figure 4), only 11 percent expected a community of nations based on strengthened multilateral institutions and regional cooperation. 3 The survey targeted strategic elites in nine Asia Pacific countries: Australia, China, India, Indonesia, Singapore, Thailand, Japan, South Korea, and the United States. POWER AND ORDER IN ASIA 11

22 Figure 8. Rate the following as obstacles to community building in East Asia Average response on a scale of 1 to 10, with 1 shown in green meaning Not an obstacle at all and 10 in red meaning A very significant obstacle. Average of all countries Australia China India Indonesia Japan Korea Singapore Taiwan Thailand U.S. Failure to resolve territorial issues Failure to resolve historical issues Uncertainty about a rising China Lack of common values Uncertainty about continued American preeminence Uncertainty about North Korea Uneven levels of economic development Uncertainty about Japan Uncertainty about India Japanese respondents are now most skeptical of the East Asia Community concept, but this could reflect former prime minister Yukio Hatoyama s use of the phrase in 2009 as an implicit attack on the U.S.-Japan alliance. As Figure 8 indicates, experts identify the most significant obstacle to community-building as territorial and historical disputes, followed closely by uncertainty about China. 4 In other words, Asia s past is increasingly obstructing its future. Uncertainty about Japan is not seen as a major obstacle, except in China and Korea. However, concern about territorial disputes across the region is not misplaced. When asked whether their country should resort to military force to reverse a hostile takeover of territory by the other side should diplomacy fail, over 80 percent of Chinese and Japanese respondents said yes. 4 Participants were asked to rate nine potential obstacles to community building in East Asia on a scale of 1 to 10, with 1 meaning not a major obstacle at all and 10 meaning a very significant obstacle. 12 MICHAEL J. GREEN AND NICHOLAS SZECHENYI

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