To produce the Scorecard, we poll Brookings scholars and other experts on the present state of U.S. relations with Europe—overall and in the political, security, and economic dimensions—as well as on the state of U.S. relations with five key countries and the European Union itself. We also ask about several major issues in the news. The poll for this edition of the survey was conducted January 7-10, 2019.

The experts’ analysis is complemented by a Snapshot of the relationship over the previous four calendar months, including a timeline of significant moments, a tracker of President Trump’s telephone conversations with European leaders, figures presenting data relevant to the relationship, and CUSE Director Thomas Wright’s take on what to watch in the coming months.

Snapshot

Timeline

September 5

Prime Minister May identified 2 GRU agents as suspects in the poisoning of Sergei and Yulia Skripal in Salisbury and said the operation was “almost certainly” approved at a “senior level of the Russian state.”

September 6

Leaders of France, Germany, the United States, Canada, and the United Kingdom backed the British assessment in the Skripal case with “full confidence” in a joint statement.

September 9

Sweden’s general elections prove inconclusive, with the Social Democrat-led governing coalition losing support but winning one seat more than the Moderate-led Alliance coalition, and the far-right Sweden Democrats winning 17.5 percent of the vote. No new government has formed by the end of 2018, with Stefan Löfven staying on as prime minister in an acting capacity.

September 12

The European Parliament voted to censure Hungary for threats to democracy and rule of law and begin the Article 7 sanctions procedure, which could ultimately strip Budapest of EU voting rights. 448 MEPs voted in favor (including a majority from the European People’s Party, of which Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán’s Fidesz is a member), with 197 against and 48 abstaining.

September 12

President Trump signed an executive order establishing a framework for imposing sanctions on foreign individuals over interference in U.S. elections.

September 18

President Trump met with Polish President Andrzej Duda, who stated in their joint press conference that “I would very much like for us to set up permanent American bases in Poland, which we would call ‘Fort Trump.’”

September 20

Prime Minister May’s Chequers proposal for Brexit was largely rejected by EU leaders in a summit in Salzburg. May warned that the United Kingdom has also been preparing for a “no deal” Brexit after European Council President Donald Tusk flatly told her that her Brexit plan “will not work.”

September 20

U.S. Vice President Mike Pence met with Macedonian Prime Minister Zoran Zaev in Washington to express support for the Prespa Agreement between Macedonia and Greece, which will change Zaev’s country’s name to North Macedonia, and discuss the next steps in its implementation.

September 24

Presidents Macron and Trump hold bilateral meeting in New York.

September 25

President Trump delivered an address to the 73rd Session of the UN General Assembly in which the dominant theme was a defense of sovereignty coupled with sharp criticism of “global governance.” Trump reaffirmed the Monroe Doctrine, called for equitable trade, and announced that the United States will revise its foreign aid policy to only give “to those who respect us and, frankly, are our friends.”

September 25

President Macron delivered an address to the UN General Assembly which sharply contrasted with Trump’s, in which he argued the “path of unilateralism leads us directly to withdrawal and conflict, to widespread confrontation between everyone, to the detriment of all – even, eventually, of those who believe they are the strongest.”

September 26

President Trump and Prime Minister May hold bilateral meeting in New York.

September 27

The Italian coalition government unveiled its first budget, which set a deficit target of 2.4 percent of GDP for 2019, three times the 0.8 percent forecast of the previous government and higher than many analysts expected the European Commission would accept given Italy’s debt burden, the second highest in the eurozone at 131 percent of GDP.

September 30

Macedonian voters approved the controversial change of the country’s name in a referendum. With opponents boycotting the vote, the measure saw 91 percent in favor on a turnout of just 37 percent, and both supporters and opponents claimed victory.

September 30

The United States and Canada reached agreement on a renegotiation of NAFTA, the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA), several weeks after the United States and Mexico came to a deal and just before the Trump administration’s deadline.

October 2

Jamal Khashoggi, a journalist critical of Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, was killed by Saudi government operatives in the Saudi consulate in Istanbul.

October 3

President Putin signed into law an unpopular bill which will raise the retirement age in Russia by five years.

October 4

The United States indicted seven Russian military intelligence officers for allegedly hacking into a number of international organizations, including FIFA, anti-doping agencies, and the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons.

October 7

Bulgarian TV journalist Viktoria Marinova was found raped and murdered in Ruse, a week after hosting a broadcast on alleged fraud related to EU funds. Marinova was the third journalist killed in the EU in less than a year.

October 9

U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Nikki Haley announced she will step down at the end of the year.

October 10

President Macron and Dutch Prime Minister Mark Rutte announced an agreement to unite Macron’s La République En Marche! with the liberal-centrist Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe group for the May 2019 European Parliament elections. The new coalition will reportedly campaign around a common platform and seek to challenge the dominance of the conservative European People’s Party.

October 12

Andrew Brunson, an American pastor, was freed from house arrest in Turkey and left the country. Imprisoned since October 2016 on allegations that he was linked to groups involved in the July 2016 failed coup, Brunson’s detention had been a major source of tension between Washington and Ankara, with Washington imposing Global Magnitsky sanctions on two Turkish government ministers in August.

October 14

Elections in the German state of Bavaria saw the Christian Social Union, sister party to Chancellor Merkel’s Christian Democratic Union, lose the absolute majority it has held almost continuously since the 1960s. The big winners were the Greens, who finished second with 17.6 percent of the vote, and the Alternative for Germany, which entered the state parliament for the first time with 10.2 percent.

October 17

U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo met President Erdoğan in Ankara to discuss the Khashoggi killing after meeting with senior Saudi officials in Riyadh. Pompeo stated that the Saudis had promised accountability and stressed that the U.S. government has to be mindful of the importance of U.S.-Saudi relations as it responds to Khashoggi’s killing.

October 17

A European Council summit in Brussels which had been expected to be the “moment of truth” for the Brexit deal made little progress with the Irish border remaining the sticking point.

October 20

President Trump announced his intention to withdraw the United States from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty with Russia, arguing that Russia had violated the agreement for years (a U.S. government assessment since 2014). Signed in 1987, the treaty was a Cold War success story that resulted in the destruction of 1,846 missiles by the Soviet Union and 846 missiles by the United States.

October 23

After meeting with President Putin in Moscow, U.S. National Security Adviser John Bolton confirmed that the United States will withdraw from the INF Treaty. In addition to arguing that Russia had long been violating the treaty, Bolton said INF was a “bilateral treaty in a multipolar ballistic missile world” as powers like China had created a “new strategic reality.”

October 23

The European Commission rejected Italy’s budget proposal, citing “particularly serious non-compliance” with its recommendations. The Italian government defended its position, with Deputy Prime Minister Luigi De Maio claiming “No surprise: This is the first Italian budget written in Rome and not in Brussels!”

October 25

The largest NATO military exercise since the Cold War, Trident Juncture 2018, began in Norway. Involving 65 ships, 250 aircraft, 10,000 vehicles, and 50,000 troops, the exercise served to test NATO’s ability to provide reinforcements both on sea and on land in response to a hypothetical invasion of Norway and the invocation of Article 5.

October 27

In a quadrilateral summit on Syria held in Istanbul, Chancellor Merkel and Presidents Erdoğan, Macron, and Putin produced a joint statement calling for a political solution with constitutional reform “paving the way for free and fair elections.”

October 28

Germany’s governing Christian Democratic Union and Social Democratic Party both lose ground in regional elections in Hesse.

October 29

Following previous day’s losses in Hesse, Chancellor Merkel announced she would step down in December as head of her party and not seek a fifth term as chancellor in 2021.

October 31

Austrian Chancellor Sebastian Kurz announced that Vienna will not sign the United Nations’ Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration, already opposed by Hungary and the United States. Kurz argued the pact mixes up asylum seekers and economic migrants and could lead to “a human right to migration.” Following Austria’s move, some other European countries including Italy, Poland, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia also decided against signing the pact.

November 6

In U.S. midterm elections, the Democrats captured 40 Republican-held seats to take control of the U.S. House of Representatives after eight years in opposition and captured several governorships, while the Republicans slightly increased their Senate majority. The 116th Congress is expected to pass little legislation, with the Democratic House acting as a check on President Trump via its oversight power and reasserting Congressional power on U.S. foreign policy.

November 6

In an interview with Europe 1 radio, President Macron called for “a true European army” to reinforce Europe’s capacity to defend itself “without relying only upon the United States.”

November 8

The European People’s Party announced that its leader in the European Parliament for the past five years, Manfred Weber of the Bavarian Christian Social Union, will be its Spitzenkandidat to lead the European Commission after the May 2019 European elections. Weber defeated former Finnish Prime Minister Alexander Stubb for the nomination.

November 9

President Trump flies to France for celebrations of the centenary of the World War I armistice.

November 11

In a speech on the Armistice centenary, President Macron called on assembled leaders not to forget the lessons learned from four bloody years of conflict and painted nationalism as a “betrayal of patriotism.”

November 13

In a speech to the European Parliament, Chancellor Merkel said that “Europe is our best chance for lasting peace, lasting prosperity, and a safe future” and called on Europeans to take their fate into their own hands. Among other points, she advocated the streamlining of European defense and security policy through a European Security Council and echoed President Macron’s call from the prior week for the creation of a European army to “complement NATO.”

November 13

Responding to President Macron’s calls for a more sovereign European defense capacity, President Trump tweeted: “Emmanuel Macron suggests building its own army to protect Europe against the U.S., China and Russia. But it was Germany in World Wars One & Two – How did that work out for France? They were starting to learn German in Paris before the U.S. came along. Pay for NATO or not!”

November 14

Prime Minister May won the support of her divided cabinet for her Brexit deal with the EU after negotiations concluded.

November 15

Four ministers resigned from Prime Minister May’s government in protest over her Brexit deal, including Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union Dominic Raab, whose predecessor David Davis had also resigned over May’s approach.

November 25

The Russian coast guard, part of the FSB, fired upon and seized three Ukrainian naval vessels as they attempted to transit the Kerch Strait from the Black Sea to the Sea of Azov en route to the Ukrainian port of Mariopol. Six sailors were injured and 24 were detained by Russia. The following day, the Ukrainian parliament voted to introduce martial law in the areas bordering Russia for a period of 30 days.

November 25

At a special European Council summit, European leaders endorsed the negotiated Brexit deal. With the real battle over Brexit looming in the House of Commons, the unity showed by members of the EU27 was noteworthy compared to the clear division within Britain and its government.

November 30

Former U.S. President George H. W. Bush, who managed the end of the Cold War, died in Houston. Chancellor Merkel expressed her country’s gratitude for Bush’s support for German unification, stating at the G20 that as an East German, “without the results of his policies” she “would hardly be standing here,” and traveling to Washington for the funeral.

December 1

The G20 summit in Argentina ended with a final communiqué that reflected the sharp divide between the United States and its European allies on global trade, migration, and climate change. Among other developments, all participants agreed to pursue WTO reform, with the goal of discussing the issue at next G20 in Osaka, Japan in June 2019.

December 1

Thousands of demonstrators from the “Gilets Jaunes” movement gathered in Paris to protest President Macron’s proposed gas tax increase. The protests became violent as French police used tear gas and protestors responded by throwing rocks and setting cars on fire. In total, 260 people were detained and at least 95 injured.

December 3

Central European University (CEU) announced that it will leave Budapest and move to Vienna, after Hungary passed a law requiring foreign-accredited institutions to have a campus in their home country and its government refused to sign an agreement with the State of New York. Prime Minister Viktor Orbán has long attacked CEU and its founder George Soros as political opponents.

December 3

Far-right anti-immigrant party Vox won 11 percent of the vote and 12 seats in elections for Spain’s largest region, Andalusia. Spain had been one of the last countries in Europe where far-right parties have not had a national or regional parliamentary presence.

December 4

Prime Minister May launched five days of parliamentary debate on her Brexit deal. MPs passed an unprecedented resolution holding the government in contempt for refusing to publish the attorney general’s legal advice to the Cabinet on the agreement.

December 4

In a speech in Brussels, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo pushed back sharply against European criticism of President Trump’s foreign policy, claiming that President Trump was “returning the United States to its traditional, central leadership role in the world.” In separate remarks at NATO headquarters, Pompeo gave Russia 60 days to correct its alleged violations of the INF Treaty or the United States would leave the agreement.

December 5

President Putin said Russia would “respond appropriately” to a U.S. withdrawal from the INF Treaty and match Washington if it produces short- and medium-range missiles.

December 5

The European Commission announced a plan to increase the role of the euro in global transactions generally and in the energy sector in particular. The Commission presented the use of the dollar by European businesses as exposing businesses to “currency risks and political risks, such as unilateral decisions that directly affect dollar-denominated transactions.”

December 7

At the CDU party conference, Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer (widely referred to as AKK and perceived as Chancellor Merkel’s preferred successor), the secretary-general of the CDU and former Minister President of Saarland, was elected as the new leader of the party.

December 10

Prime Minister May postponed a House of Commons vote on her Brexit deal which was scheduled for the next day as it was apparent she lacked the votes for approval, increasing the potential for a “no deal” Brexit on March 29, 2019. The European Court of Justice ruled the same day that Britain has the legal power to unilaterally stop Brexit by revoking its invocation of Article 50, the exit clause of the Treaty on European Union.

December 11

In a televised address in response to the “Gilets Jaunes” protests, President Macron apologized to the French people for not having reacted quickly enough to “malaise” in French society and announced an increase in the minimum wage.

December 12

Prime Minister May survived a vote of confidence mounted by members of her own Conservative Party over her Brexit deal in a 200-117 vote, after promising not to stand for reelection. While May became immune from a leadership challenge for the next year, the chances that she can win parliamentary approval for her Brexit deal appeared increasingly slim.

December 19

The Italian government lowered its planned 2019 budget deficit to 2.04 percent of GDP in a deal with the EU.

December 19

President Trump announced the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Syria, claiming that ISIS had been defeated. French Defense Minister Florence Parly disputed that claim. “Daesh has not been struck from the map,” she tweeted, “nor for that matter has its roots, it is essential to militarily and decisively defeat the remaining pockets of this terrorist organization.”

December 20

U.S. Secretary of Defense Jim Mattis resigned effective at the end of February, stating in a letter to President Trump, “My views on treating allies with respect and also being clear-eyed about both malign actors and strategic competitors are strongly held and informed by over four decades of immersion in these issues. We must do everything possible to advance an international order that is most conducive to our security, prosperity and values, and we are strengthened in this effort by the solidarity of our alliances. Because you have the right to a Secretary of Defense whose views are better aligned with yours on these and other subjects, I believe it is right for me to step down from my position.”

December 23

President Trump announced that Deputy Secretary of Defense Patrick Shanahan would become Acting Secretary of Defense on January 1.

Europe on the line

Tracking President Trump’s reported phone conversations with European leaders.

Between September 1 and December 31, 2018, President Trump spoke on the phone with Turkish President Erdoğan six times (October 21, November 1, November 16, November 28, December 14, December 23), French President Macron once (October 21), and U.K. Prime Minister May once (November 9). He last spoke on the phone with German Chancellor Merkel on August 27 and with Russian President Putin on March 20.

We track Trump’s phone calls with the leaders of France, Germany, Russia, Turkey, and the United Kingdom, whether they have spoken or not, as well as other calls with European leaders of which we are aware. The White House stopped releasing readouts of the president’s calls with foreign leaders in July 2018. If we’ve missed a conversation, please give us a ring. Source: whitehouse.gov, elysee.fr, bundeskanzlerin.de, gov.uk, en.kremlin.ru, tccb.gov.tr/en, press reports.

Figures

U.S. Exports of LNG to Europe

The Trump administration has made increasing U.S. energy exports – in particular of liquefied natural gas (LNG) – a cornerstone of its trade policy. In a speech in 2017, President Trump announced that a goal of his administration would be not only “American energy independence,” but also “American energy dominance.”

Thirteen of the 28 EU member states import LNG. In 2017, European imports of LNG amounted to 5.1 billion cubic feet per day and accounted for 13 percent of the global total. The United States provided a small (4 percent), but rapidly growing, portion of the total LNG imported by the EU. The goal of U.S. LNG exports is not to replace other providers, but to allow for more competition in a sector currently dominated by Russia. The Trump administration’s criticism of the Nord Stream 2 pipeline between Russia and Germany, which Chancellor Merkel has defended as “purely economic,” stems from the potential that Russian imports bring Russian political influence to Berlin and harm the interests of Ukraine and other U.S. partners and allies.

Diversification of European energy sources away from a heavy reliance on Russia has been a U.S. foreign policy objective since the George W. Bush administration at least, and President Trump’s efforts to promote LNG exports to Europe represent a continuation of this strategy. With the loosening of restrictions on U.S. energy exports in 2015-2016, U.S. exports of LNG rapidly increased, and the first shipment of U.S. LNG to Europe arrived in Poland in June 2017. A year later, the summit between President Trump and European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker saw further agreements made by the EU to increase imports of U.S. LNG. After more than quadrupling from 2016 to 2017, U.S. exports of LNG to Europe look set to grow further as more capacity is constructed on both sides of the Atlantic.

U.S. and EU Trade in Goods with Iran

A principle carrot used to conclude negotiations on the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) aimed at restraining Iran’s nuclear program was the end of many restrictions on trade and investment with Iran. The subsequent thaw brought about by the JCPOA sparked hope among European businesses that trade relations with one of the Middle East’s largest economies, called by some observers “the last, large, untapped emerging market,” would improve after several years of intense multilateral sanctions. Some hoped that this economic opening would incentivize Iran to alter its other destabilizing behavior in the Middle East.

Europe has long had stronger trade ties with Iran than the United States does. The European Union is Iran’s third-largest trading partner, behind China and the United Arab Emirates. A fraction of this trade volume exists between the United States and Iran due to the comprehensive embargo on Iran that has been in place for more than 20 years – what trade does exist consists of exempted goods, such as food, pharmaceuticals, and medical devices. Yet because of the long divergence between the U.S. and Europe over how to approach Iran, the imposition of such a strenuous sanctions regime in response to the nuclear crisis stood as a testament to the potential of multilateral cooperation.

That cooperation is now history. The Trump administration’s decision to withdraw from the JCPOA and re-impose the sanctions it waived or suspended by or before November 4, 2018 leaves the United States and the EU on opposite sides of the issue. The EU is seeking to preserve the JCPOA by maintaining at least some of the economic benefits promised by the agreement, through special banking channels among other steps, while the United States seeks to ratchet up pressure on Iran to deter its nuclear ambitions and contain its influence in the wider Middle East. The U.S. sanctions have broad reach and their reimposition has already had a significant chilling effect on European trade and investment in Iran. Overall, the disparity in trade relations highlights the different approaches taken by the United States and Europe on Iran. U.S. policy towards Iran has largely sought to address security concerns through punitive measures, while Europeans have sought to address their security concerns through economic engagement.

What to watch

Center on the United States and Europe Director Thomas Wright lays out events, issues, and potential developments to watch for in the months ahead.

2018 was the year in which President Trump replaced the so called “axis of adults” with people who would be more deferential to his wishes. This began with the replacement of Rex Tillerson with Mike Pompeo in March of 2018 and it ended in December with Jim Mattis’s resignation as Secretary of Defense on a matter of principle.

2019 is shaping up to be the year when we find out what Trump unbound is really like. Will he renew his threat to pull out of NATO? Will he reignite a trade war with the European Union? There is much to be anxious about and we can find this anxiety in abundance in the new edition of the scorecard. Scholars felt that the relationship had marginally deteriorated from September and they worried that Mattis’s departure would weaken NATO.

Looking ahead to the next quarter, NATO foreign ministers will gather in Washington, DC on April 4 to mark the alliance’s 70th anniversary. Normally, NATO would mark a significant anniversary with a leaders summit but European governments worried that such a meeting may have led Trump to create a new crisis about NATO’s future—better to work around him. If NATO is to have a 75th anniversary, it needs to give up the 70th. There is still some potential for Trump to intrude on the festivities and we’ll be watching that closely.

We’ll also be watching trade. Will the president impose new tariffs on the EU and is such a step made more or less likely by a U.S. – China trade deal? And, we’ll also be looking at Secretary Pompeo’s international conference on Iran which will be held in Warsaw in mid-February—how many European governments will participate and at what level?

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https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/ArmisticeMacronMerkelPutin_0011.jpg?w=270
Welcome to the second edition of the Trans-Atlantic Scorecard, a quarterly evaluation of U.S.-European relations produced by Brookings’s Center on the United States and Europe (CUSE), as part of the Brookings – Robert Bosch Foundation Transatlantic Initiative.
To produce the Scorecard, we poll Brookings scholars and other experts on the present state of U.S. relations with Europe—overall and in the political, security, and economic dimensions—as well as on the state of U.S. relations with five key countries and the European Union itself. We also ask about several major issues in the news. The poll for this edition of the survey was conducted January 7-10, 2019.
The experts’ analysis is complemented by a Snapshot of the relationship over the previous four calendar months, including a timeline of significant moments, a tracker of President Trump’s telephone conversations with European leaders, figures presenting data relevant to the relationship, and CUSE Director Thomas Wright’s take on what to watch in the coming months.
Snapshot
Timeline September 5 Prime Minister May identified 2 GRU agents as suspects in the poisoning of Sergei and Yulia Skripal in Salisbury and said the operation was “almost certainly” approved at a “senior level of the Russian state.” September 6 Leaders of France, Germany, the United States, Canada, and the United Kingdom backed the British assessment in the Skripal case with “full confidence” in a joint statement. September 9 Sweden’s general elections prove inconclusive, with the Social Democrat-led governing coalition losing support but winning one seat more than the Moderate-led Alliance coalition, and the far-right Sweden Democrats winning 17.5 percent of the vote. No new government has formed by the end of 2018, with Stefan Löfven staying on as prime minister in an acting capacity. September 12 The European Parliament voted to censure Hungary for threats to democracy and rule of law and begin the Article 7 sanctions procedure, which could ultimately strip Budapest of EU voting rights. 448 MEPs voted in favor (including a majority from the European People’s Party, of which Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán's Fidesz is a member), with 197 against and 48 abstaining. September 12 President Trump signed an executive order establishing a framework for imposing sanctions on foreign individuals over interference in U.S. elections. September 18 President Trump met with Polish President Andrzej Duda, who stated in their joint press conference that “I would very much like for us to set up permanent American bases in Poland, which we would call ‘Fort Trump.’” September 20 Prime Minister May’s Chequers proposal for Brexit was largely rejected by EU leaders in a summit in Salzburg. May warned that the United Kingdom has also been preparing for a “no deal” Brexit after European Council President Donald Tusk flatly told her that her Brexit plan “will not work.” September 20 U.S. Vice President Mike Pence met with Macedonian Prime Minister Zoran Zaev in Washington to express support for the Prespa Agreement between Macedonia and Greece, which will change Zaev’s country’s name to North Macedonia, and discuss the next steps in its implementation. September 24 Presidents Macron and Trump hold bilateral meeting in New York. September 25 President Trump delivered an address to the 73rd Session of the UN General Assembly in which the dominant theme was a defense of sovereignty coupled with sharp criticism of “global governance.” Trump reaffirmed the Monroe Doctrine, called for equitable trade, and announced that the United States will revise its foreign aid policy to only give “to those who respect us and, frankly, are our friends.” September 25 President Macron delivered an address to the UN General ... Welcome to the second edition of the Trans-Atlantic Scorecard, a quarterly evaluation of U.S.-European relations produced by Brookings’s Center on the United States and Europe (CUSE), as part of the Brookings –https://www.brookings.edu/articles/what-international-law-tells-us-about-the-khashoggi-investigation/What International Law Tells Us About the Khashoggi Investigationhttp://webfeeds.brookings.edu/~/592660726/0/brookingsrss/topics/turkey~What-International-Law-Tells-Us-About-the-Khashoggi-Investigation/
Thu, 17 Jan 2019 21:27:24 +0000https://www.brookings.edu/?post_type=article&p=558693

Although there is little worth salvaging in the United States’ flawed approach to the conflict in Syria, the Trump administration should stop making the situation worse. Inadequate policy coordination, incoherent presidential tweets, and discordant remarks by senior advisors have created confusion across the Middle East. And the disorderly withdrawal of U.S. troops, which President Donald Trump has already put in motion, will only serve to exacerbate tensions between Turkey—a NATO ally with legitimate security concerns—and Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG) fighters who spilled blood for the United States and deserve fair treatment.

This tension has long been at the heart of U.S. military activity in Syria. Former President Barack Obama long resisted calls to directly intervene in the Syrian civil war but sought an expeditious way to defeat the Islamic State. When the United States launched an air campaign against the Islamic State in Syria in September 2014, it deployed special operators to assist local forces on the ground. They found a faction of Syrian Kurds—the YPG—to be effective fighters and began developing their capabilities. The problem: They are affiliated with Turkey’s Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), which Turkey and the United States designate as a terrorist group. Although the United States argues that the YPG has not received the same designation, government officials and congressional leaders acknowledge the ties. Gen. Raymond Thomas, the head of U.S. Special Operations Command, said he told the YPG to rebrand given Turkish concerns—which led to the creation of the Syrian Democratic Forces: an umbrella group composed of YPG and a small number of Syrian Arab fighters. The Trump administration continued this approach.

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan objected all along to U.S. cooperation with the YPG. He said fighters moved freely between the YPG and PKK, worried supplies provided to the YPG by the United States could reach the PKK, and described a YPG-controlled region along the Turkish border as an existential threat. Although the YPG itself has not threatened Turkey, it has refused to sever operational ties to the PKK. This gives cause for concern, as the PKK’s armed struggle against the Turkish state for Kurdish rights has resulted in some 40,000 deaths in recent decades. Tensions in Syria also spilled into Turkey’s domestic politics, contributing to the breakdown in July 2015 of peace talks that Erdogan had initiated with the PKK, as well as a 30-month cease-fire.

The United States made several promises to assuage Turkish concerns. The military vowed to collect weapons from the YPG at the end of the Islamic State campaign. Former Vice President Joe Biden publicly promised that YPG fighters would leave the predominantly Arab city of Manbij after clearing out the Islamic State. And State Department officials said U.S. cooperation with the YPG was “temporary, transactional, and tactical.”

In addition, the Turkish government has long sought to create a buffer zone. This would serve the dual purposes of pushing back YPG forces and providing a safe haven for some of the 3.5 million Syrian refugees flooding the country. The United States negotiated with Turkey throughout 2015 on a joint military operation, whereby U.S. air support to Turkish and Syrian opposition fighters would create a de facto buffer zone. These plans floundered over divergent opinions on whether certain Syrian fighters were sufficiently “moderate” for the United States to support, suspicion of Turkey’s desire to defeat Bashar al-Assad’s regime in Syria rather than the Islamic State, and Erdogan’s insistence on a no-fly zone; they became moot after the Russian military entered Syria in September 2015. So Turkey launched its own missions in northwestern Syria: Operation Euphrates Shield in summer 2016 and Operation Olive Branch in spring 2018 succeeded in pushing the Islamic State off the Turkish border and blocking further YPG expansion.

When Trump spoke to Erdogan in December, staffers prepared him to caution the Turkish leader against a new military operation targeting U.S.-backed YPG fighters (and intermingled U.S. forces) in northeastern Syria. Instead, Trump seized the opportunity to fulfill a campaign pledge to bring home U.S. troops and task Turkey with defeating the remaining remnants of the Islamic State. The details quickly became garbled, with U.S. National Security Advisor John Bolton outraging Erdogan by conditioning U.S. withdrawal on Turkish assurances of the security of the Kurds. Trump upped the ante with tweets threatening to “devastate Turkey economically if they hit Kurds,” warning “the Kurds [not] to provoke Turkey,” and obliquely referencing the creation of a “20 mile safe zone.”

Although a subsequent phone call smoothed relations, the United States needs to articulate and implement a single Syria policy. As Trump has repeatedly stressed his desire to leave Syria, his advisors have done him a disservice by setting out longer-term objectives (for instance, to counter Iranian influence) that he clearly does not share.

The best solution would be to develop a holistic approach that addresses the root of the problem. In particular, the administration should encourage the PKK and Turkish government to resume a peace process: If the PKK is no longer a threat at home, its YPG affiliates will not be a threat next door. As Asli Aydintasbas wrote in an op-ed for the Washington Post, “Americans would need to do what they have been avoiding—that is, rolling out maps and engaging in geostrategic engineering, to develop a comprehensive peace plan between Turks and Kurds across Turkey, Syria and Iraq.” Yet the Trump administration likely lacks the required time, patience, and diplomatic heft (with no U.S. ambassador in Ankara since October 2017).

At minimum, the Trump administration should conclude diplomatic and military negotiations with Turkey that ensure an orderly withdrawal of U.S. troops and prevent a leadership vacuum that Russia and Iran will readily fill. The United States must honor past promises to Ankara, which include collecting all heavy weapons given to the YPG and finishing a “Manbij roadmap” that addresses security and governance arrangements.

The United States must also help Turkey feel secure along its border. The administration is rightly concerned that sustained Turkish attacks on YPG forces could harm civilians in a burgeoning part of a war-torn country, spark conflict with Russia, distract attention from the Islamic State’s efforts to regroup, and exhaust the Turkish military. Yet as Turkey and the United States discuss the creation of a buffer zone along the border, many significant details remain to be clarified—including its size, its scope, and the composition of forces policing it. Any Turkish-created zone must respect diversity on the ground: Given the large number of Kurds living there, it should enable local governance and not provoke a mass exodus. It should also be a temporary solution, tied to the goal of a broader political settlement in Syria.

Although the Trump administration did not create this Syria conundrum, it must help resolve it responsibly. The deaths of U.S. soldiers and civilians in Manbij following an Islamic State suicide bombing on Wednesday show how dangerous and volatile the situation remains.

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By Amanda Sloat
Although there is little worth salvaging in the United States’ flawed approach to the conflict in Syria, the Trump administration should stop making the situation worse. Inadequate policy coordination, incoherent presidential tweets, and discordant remarks by senior advisors have created confusion across the Middle East. And the disorderly withdrawal of U.S. troops, which President Donald Trump has already put in motion, will only serve to exacerbate tensions between Turkey—a NATO ally with legitimate security concerns—and Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG) fighters who spilled blood for the United States and deserve fair treatment.
This tension has long been at the heart of U.S. military activity in Syria. Former President Barack Obama long resisted calls to directly intervene in the Syrian civil war but sought an expeditious way to defeat the Islamic State. When the United States launched an air campaign against the Islamic State in Syria in September 2014, it deployed special operators to assist local forces on the ground. They found a faction of Syrian Kurds—the YPG—to be effective fighters and began developing their capabilities. The problem: They are affiliated with Turkey’s Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), which Turkey and the United States designate as a terrorist group. Although the United States argues that the YPG has not received the same designation, government officials and congressional leaders acknowledge the ties. Gen. Raymond Thomas, the head of U.S. Special Operations Command, said he told the YPG to rebrand given Turkish concerns—which led to the creation of the Syrian Democratic Forces: an umbrella group composed of YPG and a small number of Syrian Arab fighters. The Trump administration continued this approach.
Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan objected all along to U.S. cooperation with the YPG. He said fighters moved freely between the YPG and PKK, worried supplies provided to the YPG by the United States could reach the PKK, and described a YPG-controlled region along the Turkish border as an existential threat. Although the YPG itself has not threatened Turkey, it has refused to sever operational ties to the PKK. This gives cause for concern, as the PKK’s armed struggle against the Turkish state for Kurdish rights has resulted in some 40,000 deaths in recent decades. Tensions in Syria also spilled into Turkey’s domestic politics, contributing to the breakdown in July 2015 of peace talks that Erdogan had initiated with the PKK, as well as a 30-month cease-fire.
The United States made several promises to assuage Turkish concerns. The military vowed to collect weapons from the YPG at the end of the Islamic State campaign. Former Vice President Joe Biden publicly promised that YPG fighters would leave the predominantly Arab city of Manbij after clearing out the Islamic State. And State Department officials said U.S. cooperation with the YPG was “temporary, transactional, and tactical.”
In addition, the Turkish government has long sought to create a buffer zone. This would serve the dual purposes of pushing back YPG forces and providing a safe haven for some of the 3.5 million Syrian refugees flooding the country. The United States negotiated with Turkey throughout 2015 on a joint military operation, whereby U.S. air support to Turkish and Syrian opposition fighters would create a de facto buffer zone. These plans floundered over divergent opinions on whether certain Syrian fighters were sufficiently “moderate” for the United States to support, suspicion of Turkey’s desire to defeat Bashar al-Assad’s regime in Syria rather than the Islamic State, and Erdogan’s insistence on a no-fly zone; they became moot after the Russian military entered Syria in ... By Amanda Sloat
Although there is little worth salvaging in the United States’ flawed approach to the conflict in Syria, the Trump administration should stop making the situation worse. Inadequate policy coordination, incoherent presidential ... https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/its-not-too-late-for-trump-and-turkey-to-reach-a-compromise-over-syria/It’s not too late for Trump and Turkey to reach a compromise over Syriahttp://webfeeds.brookings.edu/~/592334743/0/brookingsrss/topics/turkey~It%e2%80%99s-not-too-late-for-Trump-and-Turkey-to-reach-a-compromise-over-Syria/
Wed, 16 Jan 2019 07:51:54 +0000https://www.brookings.edu/?post_type=opinion&p=558188

Executive Summary

In July 2018, having triumphed in the presidential elections the previous month, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan began to formally transform Turkey’s long-standing parliamentary system into a heavily centralized presidential one. The new system entrenched his one-man authoritarian rule at home and is having profound implications for the making and substance of Turkish foreign policy as well as Turkey’s relations with the West. This transition has taken place amid an international environment that is undergoing a significant transformation. Today, the West is far from a shining “city on the hill,” attracting Turkey and other countries toward the liberal values it is meant to represent. Populism and nationalism are on the rise on both sides of the Atlantic. President Donald Trump’s “America First” policies are eroding the world order characterized by multilateralism, free trade, and advocacy of liberal values. The European Union is weakened internally by the challenge of Brexit and by diminishing public support for a liberal Europe comfortable with diversity. Complicating this picture are emerging powers such as China, Iran, and Russia that are playing a much more assertive role on the global stage.

This paper argues that the confluence of a “new” Turkey and an evolving international order is likely to continue to strain Turkey’s relations with its Western allies. Although many of the challenges that crowd the Turkish-Western agenda predate Ankara’s formal introduction of its presidential system, these issues are likely to become more visible and harder to overcome. Yet, it is possible that the amount of authority and power the Turkish president has amassed for himself may also create new opportunities for transactional relationships. Furthermore, structural factors and geopolitical realities are likely to dampen Erdoğan’s temptation to break away from the trans-Atlantic alliance. This in turn may create some room for pragmatism and the possibility to improve cooperation between Turkey and the West in addressing common challenges. Against this background, anchoring Turkey to the West within a values-based framework no longer looks realistic. So how should the West approach Turkey? Which is better: engagement not based on rules, or rules-based non-engagement?

This paper recommends that moving forward, Turkey’s Western allies should bear in mind that:

• Geopolitical realities bind Turkey to the West. Trans-Atlantic allies should play the long game and try to find a functioning framework tied to credible conditionality. In the short term, the focus should be on realistic and pragmatic engagement with Turkey while insisting on rules-based cooperation.

• One common challenge to Turkey’s relations with its historical allies stems from pervasive negative discourse against the West in Turkey, as well as against Islam and Turkey in the West. To revive mutual trust between the two, leaders and policymakers on both sides should make a concerted effort to refrain from employing negative rhetoric toward each other.

• For U.S.-Turkish relations, given Trump’s disinterest in prioritizing the rule of law and basic rights and freedoms, it will be important that all branches of the government, business, and civil society keep these principles on their agenda.

• Urgently appointing a U.S. ambassador to Turkey and reconsidering U.S. tariff increases on Turkish aluminum and steel imports could be another confidence-building avenue to explore, especially given that the United States enjoys a persistent trade surplus over Turkey.

• Finding a pragmatic solution to the issue of Turkey’s purchase of Russian S-400 missiles will be an important step forward. A resolution that stops short of an outright cancellation of the purchase but limits the operationalization of the missiles in a manner that does not jeopardize NATO member countries’ immediate security should be considered.

• Once Turkey meets the relevant criteria, the EU should fulfill its pledge of visafree travel for Turkish nationals, as part of a broader public diplomacy effort to reconstitute reciprocal trust.

• Areas of EU-Turkish cooperation, such as counterterrorism, transportation, migration, and energy, should be further deepened in the spirit of win-win cooperation.

• Efforts to modernize the EU-Turkey customs union should be boosted and framed in the spirit of “rules-based cooperation” that benefits both sides.

• Last but not least, there is urgent need to make progress on the Cyprus issue, starting with a concerted effort to resolve the irony that Turkey and Turkish Cypriots are currently being punished for having supported the reunification of the island.

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By Kemal Kirişci, Ilke Toygür
Executive Summary
In July 2018, having triumphed in the presidential elections the previous month, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan began to formally transform Turkey’s long-standing parliamentary system into a heavily centralized presidential one. The new system entrenched his one-man authoritarian rule at home and is having profound implications for the making and substance of Turkish foreign policy as well as Turkey’s relations with the West. This transition has taken place amid an international environment that is undergoing a significant transformation. Today, the West is far from a shining “city on the hill,” attracting Turkey and other countries toward the liberal values it is meant to represent. Populism and nationalism are on the rise on both sides of the Atlantic. President Donald Trump’s “America First” policies are eroding the world order characterized by multilateralism, free trade, and advocacy of liberal values. The European Union is weakened internally by the challenge of Brexit and by diminishing public support for a liberal Europe comfortable with diversity. Complicating this picture are emerging powers such as China, Iran, and Russia that are playing a much more assertive role on the global stage.
This paper argues that the confluence of a “new” Turkey and an evolving international order is likely to continue to strain Turkey’s relations with its Western allies. Although many of the challenges that crowd the Turkish-Western agenda predate Ankara’s formal introduction of its presidential system, these issues are likely to become more visible and harder to overcome. Yet, it is possible that the amount of authority and power the Turkish president has amassed for himself may also create new opportunities for transactional relationships. Furthermore, structural factors and geopolitical realities are likely to dampen Erdoğan’s temptation to break away from the trans-Atlantic alliance. This in turn may create some room for pragmatism and the possibility to improve cooperation between Turkey and the West in addressing common challenges. Against this background, anchoring Turkey to the West within a values-based framework no longer looks realistic. So how should the West approach Turkey? Which is better: engagement not based on rules, or rules-based non-engagement?
This paper recommends that moving forward, Turkey’s Western allies should bear in mind that:
• Geopolitical realities bind Turkey to the West. Trans-Atlantic allies should play the long game and try to find a functioning framework tied to credible conditionality. In the short term, the focus should be on realistic and pragmatic engagement with Turkey while insisting on rules-based cooperation.
• One common challenge to Turkey’s relations with its historical allies stems from pervasive negative discourse against the West in Turkey, as well as against Islam and Turkey in the West. To revive mutual trust between the two, leaders and policymakers on both sides should make a concerted effort to refrain from employing negative rhetoric toward each other.
• For U.S.-Turkish relations, given Trump’s disinterest in prioritizing the rule of law and basic rights and freedoms, it will be important that all branches of the government, business, and civil society keep these principles on their agenda.
• Urgently appointing a U.S. ambassador to Turkey and reconsidering U.S. tariff increases on Turkish aluminum and steel imports could be another confidence-building avenue to explore, especially given that the United States enjoys a persistent trade surplus over Turkey.
• Finding a pragmatic solution to the issue of Turkey’s purchase of Russian S-400 missiles will be an important step forward. A resolution that stops short of an outright cancellation of ... By Kemal Kirişci, Ilke Toygür
Executive Summary
In July 2018, having triumphed in the presidential elections the previous month, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan began to formally transform Turkey’https://www.brookings.edu/media-mentions/20190108-financial-times-amanda-sloat/20190108 Financial Times Amanda Sloathttp://webfeeds.brookings.edu/~/591171298/0/brookingsrss/topics/turkey~Financial-Times-Amanda-Sloat/
Tue, 08 Jan 2019 21:26:42 +0000https://www.brookings.edu/?post_type=media-mention&p=556530

For about 20 years since the end of the Cold War, the regional power dynamics of the Middle East were relatively stable, and United States was the uncontested and dominant external power. Today, a combination of the upheavals, revolutions, and civil wars in the region, U.S. war fatigue, the shale energy revolution, and the return of great power competition have dramatically transformed the geopolitics of the Middle East. In September 2018, Bruce Jones, director of the Brookings Foreign Policy Program, convened 10 Brookings experts—Jeffrey Feltman, Samantha Gross, Martin Indyk, Kemal Kirişci, Suzanne Maloney, Bruce Riedel, Natan Sachs, Amanda Sloat, Angela Stent, and Tamara Cofman Wittes—to discuss new geopolitical alignments in the Middle East and the future of U.S. policy in the region. The edited transcript below reflects their assessments of the landscape of the new geopolitics of the Middle East; the reality and perception of U.S. withdrawal from the region; the strategic interests and goals of major regional actors; the interactions between these regional actors, including in proxy wars; and policy recommendations for U.S. strategy going forward.

Director’s summary

The perception of U.S. withdrawal from the Middle East overstates reality, but American influence in the region is certainly on the decline. The United States retains a significant troop presence in the region, but the American public has limited support for military engagement in Middle Eastern conflicts. The perception that the United States is no longer dependent on the region’s oil supplies is not borne out by the realities of the global oil market, but does shape contemporary American decisionmaking. The United States has stepped back from diplomatic leadership on the Middle East peace process and conflict management across the region. Only on issues related to Iran has the United States had a sustained—but not consistent—focus.

Other actors have been inserting themselves into regional decisionmaking. As these two dynamics converge, a new geopolitical structure is evolving. It has six primary countries—Saudi Arabia, Iran, Turkey, Israel, the United States, and Russia. Others, like Egypt, maintain some of their past influence, although at significantly diminished levels. China does not currently play a central role in directing regional affairs, but is building its economic and diplomatic ties across the region and is poised to be more influential in the future.

The primary actors have distinct strategic objectives. Iran and Saudi Arabia seek to balance each other. Israel seeks to counter both Iran’s nuclear and regional ambitions, and engages in a conflict management, rather than conflict resolution, approach toward the Palestinians. It shares with Saudi Arabia the strategic objective of containing Iran, but Saudi Arabia and Arab public opinion place limits on the depth of Saudi-Israeli cooperation. Turkey has a dual Islamic-nationalist strategy, and is increasingly involved in regional affairs. Russia seeks to protect state sovereignty and gain influence at the expense of the United States.

The split in the Gulf Cooperation Council has resulted in a strengthening of ties between Turkey and Qatar, two powers aligned with or sympathetic to the Muslim Brotherhood, versus Saudi Arabia and the UAE, who oppose the Brotherhood. The split has pushed Qatar into closer ties with Iran, probably temporarily. American diplomatic efforts to smooth the rift have not succeeded. President Trump’s interest in forging a new Middle East Security Alliance has been delayed as a consequence of this and other developments.

American strategy in the region is confused, at best. U.S. diplomatic engagement to push for a regional economic and military framework that would support stability and limit Iran’s reach might still deliver results, but it would require the United States to convince its putative partners in the region that it has staying power.

]]>
By Jeffrey Feltman, Samantha Gross, Martin Indyk, Kemal Kirişci, Suzanne Maloney, Bruce Riedel, Natan Sachs, Amanda Sloat, Angela Stent, Tamara Cofman Wittes, Bruce Jones
For about 20 years since the end of the Cold War, the regional power dynamics of the Middle East were relatively stable, and United States was the uncontested and dominant external power. Today, a combination of the upheavals, revolutions, and civil wars in the region, U.S. war fatigue, the shale energy revolution, and the return of great power competition have dramatically transformed the geopolitics of the Middle East. In September 2018, Bruce Jones, director of the Brookings Foreign Policy Program, convened 10 Brookings experts—Jeffrey Feltman, Samantha Gross, Martin Indyk, Kemal Kirişci, Suzanne Maloney, Bruce Riedel, Natan Sachs, Amanda Sloat, Angela Stent, and Tamara Cofman Wittes—to discuss new geopolitical alignments in the Middle East and the future of U.S. policy in the region. The edited transcript below reflects their assessments of the landscape of the new geopolitics of the Middle East; the reality and perception of U.S. withdrawal from the region; the strategic interests and goals of major regional actors; the interactions between these regional actors, including in proxy wars; and policy recommendations for U.S. strategy going forward.
Director's summary
The perception of U.S. withdrawal from the Middle East overstates reality, but American influence in the region is certainly on the decline. The United States retains a significant troop presence in the region, but the American public has limited support for military engagement in Middle Eastern conflicts. The perception that the United States is no longer dependent on the region’s oil supplies is not borne out by the realities of the global oil market, but does shape contemporary American decisionmaking. The United States has stepped back from diplomatic leadership on the Middle East peace process and conflict management across the region. Only on issues related to Iran has the United States had a sustained—but not consistent—focus.
Other actors have been inserting themselves into regional decisionmaking. As these two dynamics converge, a new geopolitical structure is evolving. It has six primary countries—Saudi Arabia, Iran, Turkey, Israel, the United States, and Russia. Others, like Egypt, maintain some of their past influence, although at significantly diminished levels. China does not currently play a central role in directing regional affairs, but is building its economic and diplomatic ties across the region and is poised to be more influential in the future.
The primary actors have distinct strategic objectives. Iran and Saudi Arabia seek to balance each other. Israel seeks to counter both Iran’s nuclear and regional ambitions, and engages in a conflict management, rather than conflict resolution, approach toward the Palestinians. It shares with Saudi Arabia the strategic objective of containing Iran, but Saudi Arabia and Arab public opinion place limits on the depth of Saudi-Israeli cooperation. Turkey has a dual Islamic-nationalist strategy, and is increasingly involved in regional affairs. Russia seeks to protect state sovereignty and gain influence at the expense of the United States.
The split in the Gulf Cooperation Council has resulted in a strengthening of ties between Turkey and Qatar, two powers aligned with or sympathetic to the Muslim Brotherhood, versus Saudi Arabia and the UAE, who oppose the Brotherhood. The split has pushed Qatar into closer ties with Iran, probably temporarily. American diplomatic efforts to smooth the rift have not succeeded. President Trump’s interest in forging a new Middle East Security Alliance has been delayed as a consequence of this ... By Jeffrey Feltman, Samantha Gross, Martin Indyk, Kemal Kirişci, Suzanne Maloney, Bruce Riedel, Natan Sachs, Amanda Sloat, Angela Stent, Tamara Cofman Wittes, Bruce Jones
For about 20 years since the end of the Cold War, the regional power ... https://www.brookings.edu/media-mentions/20181229-politico-amanda-sloat/20181229 Politico Amanda Sloathttp://webfeeds.brookings.edu/~/591142906/0/brookingsrss/topics/turkey~Politico-Amanda-Sloat/
Sat, 29 Dec 2018 17:52:42 +0000https://www.brookings.edu/?post_type=media-mention&p=556170