Thesis:
The 1973
Arab-Israeli War provides valuable insight into theater warfighting strategy
and operational art, matters of particular relevance in today's world of joint
and combined operations. This paper
examines that conflict, focusing on Arab policy objectives and the historical
circumstances framing them; the strategic setting which influenced Arab leaders
decision making as they translated policy into Arab grand strategy; and the
planning and execution of Arab military strategy as campaign plans at the
operational level of war.

Background: War, as preeminent military analyst Carl von
Clausewitz asserted, is an instrument of policy--a means by which nations may
achieve political ends. In October
1973, Arab nations led by Egypt and Syria chose war as their instrument of
policy--their primary policy objective in waging war: to recover Arab lands
occupied by Israel since the 1967 Six Days' War.

Arab leaders translated their policy
objective to recover the occupied territories into a grand strategy designed to
achieve that objective. The Arab grand
strategy contemplated limited military action followed by political pressure to
compel recovery of the occupied territories in total. Their return to Middle East hostilities, the Arab leadership
reasoned, would militarily compel partial Israeli withdrawal from the occupied
territories and create international and internal political pressure upon
Israel to concede the remaining Arab lands for the sake of regional peace.

Arab military strategy planned limited
Egyptian and Syrian offensive campaigns against Israel to secure lodgments
within the occupied territories, thereby achieving the military aspect of their
grand strategy, followed by immediate Arab reversion to the defensive to facilitate
the political aspect of the strategy.

The 1973 Arab-Israeli War is particularly
relevant to study of the relationship between the strategic and operational
levels of war. It clearly illustrates
how political objectives influence grand strategy designed to achieve those
strategic aims and how these policy objectives control the planning and
execution of military strategy as campaign plans at the operational level of
war.

THE 1973
ARAB-ISRAELI WAR:

ARAB POLICIES, STRATEGIES, AND
CAMPAIGNS

War is only a branch of political activity
.... [A] continuation of political intercourse, with the addition of other
means .... [P]olicy converts the overwhelmingly destructive element of war into
a mere instrument. It changes the
terrible battle-sword that a man needs both hands and his entire strength to
wield, and with which he strikes home once and no more, into a light, handy
rapier--sometimes just a foil for the exchange of thrusts, feints, and parries
.... The conduct of war ... is therefore policy itself, which takes up the
sword in place of the pen.[1]

War, as preeminent military analyst Carl von
Clausewitz asserted, is an instrument of policy--a means by which nations may
achieve political ends. In October
1973, Arab nations led by Egypt and Syria chose war as their instrument of
policy--their primary policy objective in waging war: to recover Arab lands
occupied by Israel since the 1967 Six Days' War.

Arab leaders translated their policy
objective to recover the occupied territories into a grand strategy[2]
designed to achieve that objective. The
Arab grand strategy contemplated limited military action followed by political
pressure to compel recovery of the occupied territories in total. Their return to Middle East hostilities, the
Arab leadership reasoned, would militarily compel partial Israeli withdrawal
from the occupied territories and create international and internal political
pressure upon Israel to concede the remaining Arab lands for the sake of
regional peace.

Arab military strategy [3] planned
limited Egyptian and Syrian offensive campaigns[4] against
Israel to secure lodgments within the occupied territories, thereby achieving
the military aspect of their grand strategy, followed by immediate Arab
reversion to the defensive to facilitate the political aspect of the strategy.

This paper will examine the 1973 Arab-Israeli
War, focusing on Arab[5]
policy objectives and the historical circumstances framing them; the strategic
setting which influenced Arab leaders decision making as they translated policy
into Arab grand strategy; and the planning and execution of Arab military
strategy as campaign plans at the operational level of war.

This pre-October
1973 Israeli saying illustrates the supremely confident, even arrogant view
Israelis held of their military prowess following their lightning-quick victory
over Arab forces in the 1967Six Days' War. Conversely, it also reflects the contempt Israelis held for the
military abilities of Arab neighbors Egypt and Syria. Their 1967 preemptive victory was so complete and won so cheaply,
Israelis viewed their military forces as invincible, their intelligence service
as unmatched, and their Arab foes as inferior and incapable.[7]

If the Six Days' War gave Israel reason for
jubilation, it cast a long shadow over the entire Arab Middle East,
particularly upon Egypt and Syria. Their militaries had been largely destroyed and their economies suffered
from staggering military expenditures necessary to replace their losses. Perhaps most importantly, the humiliating
defeat of 1967 and its aftermath--continued Israeli occupation of Arab lands,
deeply wounded Arab national psyche. The stigma to the Arabs was unbearable and Arab nations collectively
vowed to force resolution. Throughout
the Middle East, Arab nations adopted pan-Arab national political objectives,
including Israeli withdrawal from the occupied territories and resolution of
the Palestinian refugee issue.[8] Israel, buffered by the occupied territories
and buoyed by a sense of overall military superiority, was certain it could
crush any Arab military attempt to compel these political aims. The Israelis, convinced they could eventually
force the Arabs to peace on Israeli terms, were satisfied with the status quo.[9]

In 1973, the Middle East question no longer
held center-stage internationally. The
superpowers, focused on détente, sought to avoid Middle East tensions that
could disrupt Soviet-American diplomatic accords. American Middle East mediation efforts progressively declined,
finally ceasing entirely in mid-1973.[10] The environment in the Middle East, albeit
tense, was not war, and the superpowers, emersed in rapidly evolving global
politics,[11]
tolerated this no peace-no war situation.

Following three years of political efforts,
Arab leaders concluded that diplomatic resolution of their problems was at a
political impasse. The Arabs believed
Israel would never negotiate concessions so long as Israelis felt militarily
secure inside their borders and the United States was unwilling to apply
pressure to force a settlement. Arab
leaders determined that war was the only viable alternative to achieve their
political goals.

Arab leadership adopted a grand strategy
developed principally by Egypt that contemplated a combined military-political approach to achieve the
policy aim of Israeli withdrawal from the occupied territories.[12] The Arabs determined that they could compel
partial Israeli withdrawal by military force, the remaining Arab lands they
would recover as a result of political pressure. The renewal of hostilities, they believed, would refocus world attention upon the
Middle East question and disrupt Soviet-American détente, resulting in
American, as well as international political pressure, upon Israel to make
concessions on Arab political objectives. Simultaneously, military action would shatter Israeli feelings of
security, significantly disrupt their economy, and inflict casualties upon
their small population. These factors,
the Arabs reasoned, would force Israelis to reexamine and soften their
position, resulting in internal political pressure upon the Israeli government
to concede the remaining occupied Arab lands for the sake of peace. The return to war and combined international
and internal Israeli political pressure, the Arab leadership planned, would
break the political impasse, and compel Israeli withdrawal from occupied Arab
lands.

Arab military
strategy designed to force partial Israeli withdrawal from the occupied
territories envisioned a sophisticated and brilliant strategic deception
operation, followed by separate, but strategically linked Egyptian and Syrian
offensive campaigns. The Arab campaign
plans reflected critical lessons learned from previous wars, maximized Arab
capabilities, and minimized Israeli strengths. The central operational focus of both Arab campaigns was to quickly
seize limited military objectives before the Israelis could fully mobilize. Egypt planned to cross and seize a perimeter
along the eastern shore of the Suez Canal, defeating Israeli defensive
positions there, and then prepare to advance further to seize strategic passes,
if circumstances permitted. Syria
planned to defeat Israeli strongholds upon the Golan Heights and seize the
entire Golan Plateau. Their lodgments
secured, Arab forces would transition to the operational defensive,
anticipating superpower or United Nations' intervention and political pressure
for a cease-fire, solidifying their initial territorial gains. If a cease-fire was not forthcoming, Arab
forces would fight Israel in a prolonged conventional conflict, if
necessary. In either case, the Arabs
sought to facilitate the political aspect of their grand strategy,
international and internal political pressure upon Israel to withdraw from the
occupied territories. Their plans and
training complete, the Arab forces undertook to achieve their policies through
the instrument of war, shocking Israel and the world in the process.

Israeli illusions of complete superiority and
militarily negligible Arab foes were shattered at 1400 on 6 October 1973, as
Egyptian forces attacked across the Suez Canal into the Sinai and Syrian forces
attacked on to the Golan Heights in offensive campaigns against Israel. The Arab attacks caught the Israelis short,
achieved near complete strategic, as well as, tactical surprise and initially
appeared to threaten Israel's existence. The conflict raged at a murderous pace for almost three weeks, each
combatant inflicting and suffering rates of attrition and expending materiel at
rates of consumption unmatched in history over a comparable period.[13] The Arab forces won an initial advantage,
but the Israelis, fighting from interior lines in two separate theaters of
operation, managed to recover and gain the initiative before superpower and
United Nation's intervention imposed a cease-fire on 24 October 1973, prior to
any clear-cut military decision on the battlefield.[14] A complete understanding of Arab policies,
plans, and campaigns during the 1973 Arab-Israeli War requires an historical
review of the circumstances which gave rise to this conflict.

HISTORICAL SETTING

Arab policies, plans, decisions, and actions
prior to and during the 1973 war reflect the historical context from which they
arose: a recurring series of wars fought by various combinations of Arab states
and Israel since the latter's founding as a nation. Following its war for independence in 1948, Israel fought wars
with Arab states in 1956, 1967, and 1969, in addition to executing numerous
retaliatory raids, and counter-terrorist, and anti-guerilla operations. The 1973 Arab-Israeli War, referred to
variously as the Yom Kippur War, the War of Atonement, the War of Ramadan, and
the October War, was the fourth major conflict in this series.[15] Even before the nation of Israel was
founded, Arab inhabitants of Palestine and surrounding Arab nations warred with
Jewish settlers over the land that eventually formed the state of Israel.[16] Each of these prior conflicts helped set the
stage for the 1973 war, but it was the 1967 Six Days' War that most
significantly influenced the action.

On 5 June 1967,
following three weeks of tense international brinkmanship, Israel launched
preemptive airstrikes against Egypt, Jordan, Syria, and Iraq which
"effectively won the war in the first three hours, the time it took to
knock out the Arab air forces on the ground."[17] Though the Arab forces greatly outnumbered
the Israelis, left without air cover, Arab armor forces were defenseless against
the Israeli Air Force (IAF) and were disastrously defeated. The Israeli Defense Force (IDF), employing a
"classic tank-cum-aircraft blitzkrieg," [18]
routed the Arab forces, including a 90,000-strong Egyptian force, and raced for
the Arab frontiers.[19]By the end of the Six-Days' War,
Israel, a country of 20,000 square kilometers, had seized control of 65,000
square kilometers of Arab lands, including the Gaza Strip and the whole Sinai
Peninsula with the Suez Canal, from Egypt; the Golan Plateau from Syria; and
the West Bank of the Jordan River, from Jordan.

Israel 's preemptive attack in the 1967 war
and its offensive military strategy in general stemmed from its small size and
corresponding lack of defensible territory. Israeli leaders developed a doctrine which called for the attack as soon
as practicable in order to carry the battle away from Israeli soil. This strategy, successful in 1956, became
doctrine following the 1967 campaign.[20] The 1967 Six Days' War molded Israeli
thought about themselves, their Arab foes, and the next war. Flush with victory, the Israeli military
viewed itself as inherently superior, and the Arabs as militarily
negligible. Israelis developed an
almost mystical faith in the tank and tank commanders became national cult heroes.[21] Israeli military doctrine adopted the
frontal armored charge as the acme of tactics, to be immediately followed by a
campaign of strategic maneuver with a blitzkrieg deep into the enemy's rear.[22] Israel, quite simply, planned and trained to
fight the 1967 war again.

Following the Six Days' War, Israel felt
secure, believing it had achieved strategic depth and fully defensible borders
provided by the occupied territories seized from the Arabs.[23] The Israeli government ignored United
Nations Resolution 242, supported by the United States, which specified Israeli
withdrawal from the occupied territories in return for Arab recognition of
Israel.[24] This collective sense of security removed
any real impetus for Israel to negotiate with the Arab states. Under the leadership of Prime Minister Golda
Meir and Defense Minister Moshe Dayan, Israel distrusted the Arabs, and
preferred the status quo, believing that the country was strong enough to
eventually force the Arabs to make peace on Israeli terms. Further, Israel was confident in the United
States' support for its military requirements. In the absence of direct negotiations and the retention of some of the
occupied territory deemed necessary to Israel's security,[25] Israelis
believed that "no war was a plus, and no peace could be lived with. For the Arabs ... no war and no peace was
intolerable."[26]

The Arabs, for their part, were humiliated by
their losses to Israel. Since Israel
destroyed much of their military forces and occupied Arab lands, the Arab's
political bargaining position was weak. The Israelis demanded direct negotiations which implicitly required
official state recognition, the only terms on which they would negotiate a
peace; the Arabs required total Israeli
withdrawal from the occupied territories and resolution of the Palestinian
refugee issue. Neither side could agree
to the other's starting position and the situation settled into a stalemate
punctuated by minor military engagements over the next six years.

Syria, Jordan, and Egypt each faced
significant negative political, economic, and military impact from the Six
Days' War, exacerbated by the Israeli policy of settlement and annexation of
the occupied territories. The situation
was particularly problematic for Egypt whose economy suffered greatly from the
loss of tourism, Suez Canal revenues, and oil production due to the Israeli
occupation.[27] The Egyptian economy fell to below zero and
the treasury was empty; Egypt was unable to secure military arms sought from
the Soviet Union, and internal Egyptian unrest grew within the citizenry and
the army.[28] Egyptian President Anwar el-Sadat found the
situation intolerable, and in early 1971, declaring a "year of
decision,"[29]
embarked upon a two-pronged approach to resolve the long standing conflict:
diplomatic resolution or war.

STRATEGIC SETTING

Sadat believed the
key to all of Egypt's economic, political, and military problems lay in
redressing the situation ensuing from the 1967 defeat [30] The basic task in Sadat's view, was to
"wipe out the disgrace and humiliation [of 1967]" in order to restore
Egyptian self-confidence and the respect of the world community.[31] Sadat determined that Egypt could accomplish
this only by recovering the territories lost in the Six Days' War. Sadat then conceived and set in motion a
long-range strategy which would simultaneously develop political (i.e.,
diplomatic) and military courses of action to recover the occupied territories
from Israel.[32] The political side of Sadat's two-pronged
approach included his "peace initiative"[33] launched in
February 1971. In this Egyptian
diplomatic offensive, Sadat proposed that if Israel withdrew her forces east of
the Mitla and Gidi passes (about forty miles east of the Suez Canal in the
Sinai Peninsula), Egypt would reopen the Suez Canal; officially declare a
cease-fire; restore diplomatic relations with the United States; and sign a
peace agreement with Israel, contingent upon the latter's fulfillment of the
provisions of UN Resolution 242, which committed Israel to withdrawal from all
occupied territories and resolution of the Palestinian refugee problem.[34] Diplomatically, Israel was unwilling to
accept any proposal without direct negotiations and retention of territories
deemed essential to its security and political resolution was not forthcoming.

Concurrent with his diplomatic efforts, Sadat
in March 1971, began to develop his military options, making the first of four
trips to Moscow to secure ammunition and weapons from the Soviets.[35] The Egyptian military General Staff set
about assessing the military situation and planning possible military options
against Israel. In public speeches and
interviews throughout the Middle East, Sadat beat the drums of war, calling
1971 the year of decision.[36] Sadat elicited from the Soviets agreements
to provide ammunition sufficient to replace that expended by Egypt during the
War of Attrition, as well as surface-to-air missiles, and missile equipped
aircraft.[37] The Soviets, however, failed to deliver all
the promised weapons and Sadat determined that the military situation would not
permit him to resume the War of Attrition, let alone launch a decisive
offensive against Israel.[38] Thus 1971, the year of decision, passed
without any military action and many observers viewed Sadat's talk of war
merely as more Arab rhetoric, and the Egyptian threats as hollow.[39]

In 1972 the general consensus among Arab
political leaders was that diplomatic resolution of the Arab-Israeli problem
was at a hopeless impasse. U.S.
President Nixon and Soviet Premier Breznev met at a summit in Moscow in May
1972. President Sadat viewed this
growing détente between the United States and the Soviet Union as boding ill
for the Arabs, because it could mean a diplomatic status quo, and could
perpetuate Egypt's military disadvantage. Sadat's fears were confirmed, when in July 1972, the United States and
Soviet Union issued a joint communiqué hardly mentioning the Middle East and
failing to refer at all to UN Resolution 242.[40] The small portion devoted to the Arab-Israeli
problem "advocat[ed] military relaxation in the Middle East. It was a violent shock to ... [Egypt,
because the country] lagged at least twenty steps [militarily] behind Israel
and so 'military relaxation' in this context could mean nothing but giving in
to Israel."[41] Sadat's actions subsequent to the US-USSR
pronouncement suggest he determined that even more decisive, and remarkable,
actions were necessary in order to advance his strategy to resolve the Middle
East question.

In July 1972, Sadat dismissed the 15,000
Russian technicians and military personnel present in Egypt. The Soviet Ambassador to Egypt visited Sadat
to inform him that no progress was made on the Middle East question during the
Soviet-American talks. When the Russian
Ambassador failed to explain delays in the delivery of promised weapons, Sadat
ordered that all Russian personnel leave Egypt within a week.[42]

In addition to
serving as a rebuke to the Soviets for their perceived high-handed treatment of
Egypt generally, and Sadat and his weapons contracts specifically, the Soviet
dismissal directly furthered Sadat's two-pronged strategy. It served him militarily, enhancing
strategic deception and thereby advancing the prospect of a surprise attack, by
encouraging the belief that war was not an Egyptian option. Sadat, therefore played to advantage the
commonly held view that Egypt would not go to war without its Soviet
advisors. Further, it provided the
Egyptian military freedom to plan and train for war without direct Soviet observation
or knowledge. This lessened the
likelihood of Soviet attempts at dissuasion in the name of détente with the
United States or disclosure of Egyptian intentions. Finally, it served as
political posturing on Sadat's part to convince the Soviets their role in the
Middle East was potentially diminishing, thereby implicitly encouraging them to
deliver the needed weapons to buttress their position with the Egyptians.

Sadat's actions also served him diplomatically by creating an
impression in the international community, particularly in the West and in
Israel, that Sadat was making a conciliatory gesture toward the West. While Sadat needed the Soviets for weapons,
he needed the United States politically and diplomatically, for he believed
that only the United States could exert the political pressure upon Israel that
could force it to make concessions on the occupied territories. Coupled with his earlier peace initiative
offer to restore diplomatic relations, Sadat dangled an inticing diplomatic carrot
before the United States.[43] A United States, anxious to increase its
influence in the oil-rich Middle East, might be inclined to view the Arab
position more favorably, which could prove beneficial, whether for a diplomatic
solution, or if Egypt went to war.[44]

In July 1972, after expelling the Soviets,
Sadat instructed his National Security Adviser to be ready to conduct dialogue
with the United States, correctly predicting that his dismissal of the Soviets
would bring the Americans calling.[45] Secretary of State Henry Kissinger contacted
the Egyptians for a meeting at the highest possible level, initially scheduled
for September 1972, but subsequently postponed until February 1973.[46]

Additionally, Sadat ordered his Minister of
War General Mohammed Sadek to prepare the armed forces for launching an attack
against Israel sometime after November 15, 1972. Sadat chose this date because it fell after the United States'
presidential elections and he hoped the President-elect could find a peaceful
solution to the Middle East question.[47] He believed that as it was an election year,
the American government might be paralyzed at the time and incapable of taking
the bold action necessary to resolve these difficult issues.[48]

In August 1972,
Sadat, desiring to show the Soviets he did not intend to break with them
altogether, and needing to enhance his military option, reestablished contact
with the Soviets. His efforts were
rewarded later in the form of weapons essential to military action against
Israel as Egypt moved ever closer toward a decision to go to war.

In October 1972,
Sadat met with the Egyptian Supreme Council of the Armed Forces to determine
Egyptian readiness for war. He
discovered that Egyptian forces were not ready and that, in fact, a number of
critical Egyptian officers had not even been told of Sadat's instructions to be
prepared for war after November 15, 1972.[49] Sadat replaced his Minister of War,
promoting and appointing a long time supporter, General Ahmed Ismail Ali as the
new War Minister and Commander-in-Chief of the Egyptian Armed Forces. Sadat charged Ismail with improving Egyptian
defensive fortifications along the Suez Canal and devising an offensive plan
for an attack against Israel. Subsequently, Ismail approved plans previously prepared under the
direction of Lieutenant General Saad el-Shazly, appointed by Sadat in 1971 as
Egyptian Armed Forces Chief of Staff. Shazly began studying the military situation and planning possible
Egyptian operations in 1971 when Sadat first initiated his two-pronged
strategy. Ismail and Shazly's
conclusions regarding Egyptian military capabilities critically impacted
strategic decisions regarding possible military options. Their estimation of the situation was that
Egypt was militarily incapable of conducting a large-scale general offensive
through the Sinai to destroy Israeli positions or of militarily forcing
complete Israeli withdrawal from the occupied territories. Egyptian capabilities, they concluded, would
permit only a limited attack across the Suez Canal to destroy the Israeli
fortifications along the canal, push the perimeter out a short distance into
the Sinai, and establish a defensive posture.[50] Sadat and his planners faced the reality
that Egypt's strategic plan could not rely solely on military action if it was
to succeed in securing total Israeli withdrawal from the occupied
territories. Ismail and Sadat agreed
that an Arab political and military alliance was desirable. Such an alliance with Syria was particularly
critical, as it could enhance the military option, by forcing Israel into a
two-front war.

Sadat, Ismail, and Shazly continued on-going
discussions concerning military action against Israel with Arab political
leaders and rulers throughout the Middle East. Negotiations, conducted in very general terms and not disclosing any
detail of the military plans, included discussions of Arab political support
for war; materiel support, specifically, the need for oil and equipment; the
commitment of troops; and the possibility of an Arab oil embargo. Negotiations proved generally fruitful,
resulting in promises of oil supplies, and troops and equipment from various
Arab countries.[51] Most importantly, though, was Syria's
expressed interest in military operations against Israel. In January 1973, Syria's President Hafez
al-Assad indicated Syrian intentions of military action against the
Israelis. Following weeks of
negotiation concerning combined military operations against Israel, leaders of the
two nations agreed in principle, and Egypt's General Ismail was named to the
essentially honorific post of Commander-in-Chief of the armies of the
Federation of Arab Republics.[52] Ismail began negotiations with Syria's
Minister of War, General Mustafa Tlas, in an effort to forge a common military
strategy between the two countries.

In addition to his meetings with Arab
leaders, Sadat continued to court the Soviet Union in an effort to secure
weapons. Sadat curried Soviet favor in
December 1972 by ordering a five-year extension of a maritime facilities
agreement. This agreement, due to
expire in March 1973, allowed the Soviet Mediterranean Fleet to use Egyptian
port facilities, and was of central strategic importance to the Soviets.[53] A diplomatic trip to Moscow in February 1973
by General Ismail resulted in the largest arms deal ever concluded between the
two countries and deliveries began promptly. The Soviets delivered vital surface-to-air missiles (SAMs), that the
Egyptians could use to counter Israeli
air power, and SCUD, surface-to-surface missiles, which would enable the
Egyptians to strike Israeli cities. The
Soviets, however, enigmatically delivered only part of the equipment agreed to
before again stopping deliveries.

Meanwhile, Sadat's final and parallel
diplomatic initiative reached its peak.[54] As his military planned for war, Sadat
continued to pursue diplomatic resolution hoping the United States would exert
pressure on Israel to accept his original peace initiative.[55] Egyptian National Security Adviser Hafez
Ismail met with both President Nixon and Secretary of State Kissinger in
February 1973. The President spoke of
America's wish to get negotiations going; the Egyptians renewed their offer of
Sadat's 1971 peace initiative. Kissinger separately stated that the President was ready to cooperate in
the establishment of peace, but that while the United States could exert
pressure upon Israel, it could not force it to take any actions. Egypt would have to offer something in
exchange for Israeli withdrawal. Finally, he warned Egypt not to take military action as Israel would
score an even greater victory than it had in 1967.[56] Shortly after the meetings, the United
States announced that it would supply Israel with forty-eight additional
Phantom aircraft. This announcement caused
Sadat to abandon all hope of breaking the deadlock by diplomatic means.[57] Sadat's view was that diplomatic resolution
of the situation was impossible and that Egypt could not hope to achieve peace
through the Americans so long as Israel did not want peace and the United
States did not exert pressure upon it to sue for peace.[58] Sadat believed that as long as Israel felt
secure, it had no incentive to negotiate. In order to extract Israeli concessions, Sadat determined that direct
pressure on both Israel and the United States was necessary. The Arabs must shatter the Israeli sense of
security to make them more inclined to negotiate. Further, the Arabs must convince the United States of the need to
pressure the Israelis for concessions. This required that the Arab's demonstrate that failure to resolve the
Middle East question would disrupt the Soviet-American rapproachment. Sadat reasoned that only a Soviet-supplied,
Arab war against Israel could accomplish both of these aims. At the end of March 1973, Sadat gave an
interview to Newsweek magazine in which he warned:

If we don't take our case in our own hands,
there will be no movement .... Everything I've done leads to pressures for more
concessions .... Every door I have opened has been slammed in my face -- with
American blessings .... Everything [in Egypt] is now being mobilized in earnest
for the resumption of the battle -- which is now inevitable .... [T]his will be
the nightmare to end all nightmares -- and everybody will be losers ....
Everyone has fallen asleep over the Middle East crisis. But they will soon wake
up.[59]

Sadat, believing he had exhausted diplomatic
avenues for resolution of the Middle East question, announced to the world
Egypt's intention to go to war. The
decision made, Sadat turned to the task of formulating the details of the
strategic plan.

Sadat determined
that it would be advantageous to expand the Arab coalition to include Jordan,
thereby presenting the Israelis with the possibility of yet a third front. First, however, Sadat sought to build a
common political strategy with Syria. This required that the leaders and planners of Egypt and Syria agree on
the primary political objectives for the war. Syria had previously rejected UN Resolution 242, because to accept it
required at least implicit recognition of Israel as a nation, which Syria
vehemently opposed. The controversy
between the two Arab states concerned the central political objective of the
war, that is, "what the war was about -- the existence of Israel, or merely
the recovery of the occupied lands?"[60] Sadat's aim, based on the realities of the
military situation and his assessment of Egyptian needs, was only to recover
the occupied Arab territories. Assad,
however, contemplated a general Syrian military offensive into the heartland of
Israel to dismantle and destroy Israel as a nation.[61] Following a number of meetings between the
two countries' political and military leaders, Sadat finally persuaded Assad
that Syria could not fight Israel alone and that even combined, Egypt and Syria
were militarily incapable of a general offensive to destroy Israel. Assad, apparently convinced of the military
necessity to ally with Egypt, limited Syria's war aims and accepted Sadat's aim
of recovering the occupied territories and the grand strategy designed to
achieve it. Syria's alliance assured,
Sadat increased his efforts to bring Jordan into the Arab coalition. Sadat understood the strategic value,
militarily and politically, of threatening Israel with a third front. Though initially rebuffed by King Hussein,
Sadat persevered and his efforts eventually succeeded in bringing Jordan into
the Arab alliance. Sadat, Assad, and
Hussein ratified agreements already reached when they met at a Cairo summit on
September 10, 1973.

The political
leaders ratified the principal Arab policy objective of the war -- to recover
the Arab territories seized and occupied by Israel in the 1967 Six Days' War.[62] Coupled with this, was the aim of restoring
Arab pride, embarrassingly stripped away in the humiliating military defeat
suffered in 1967. Finally, Arab policy
objectives sought to punish and humiliate Israel internationally for what Arabs
believed was its policy of arrogance and brutality toward Arabs in the occupied
territories. The men ratified Sadat's
grand strategy, calling for a combination of military and political action in
order to achieve the basic war aim of total Israeli withdrawal from the
occupied territories. The Arab plan was
to militarily compel partial Israeli withdrawal and politically achieve total
withdrawal. The leaders agreed that
Syria could, through military action, recapture all of the relatively limited
territory it lost on the Golan Heights in the 1967 war. The Egyptians, however, could not recapture
the Suez Canal, an extraordinary feat in itself, and the vast lands of the
Sinai, lost to the Israelis in 1967, solely through military force. Rather, limited military action within
Egyptian capabilities, coupled with international political intervention and
pressure for Israeli concessions, was necessary. The international crisis "sparked"[63] by the
outbreak of renewed Middle East conflict would refocus the world's attention
upon the Middle East question and cause superpower and United Nations
intervention to stop the fighting. The
resulting cease-fire, the Arab leaders reasoned, would solidify their limited
territorial gains. The Arabs would
recover the remainder of the occupied territories in the Sinai and the west
bank of the Jordan as a result of international political pressure,
particularly by the United States, to compel Israeli concessions. Successful military action would also
destroy Israeli illusions of security, demonstrating the invalidity of the view
that holding the occupied territories provided total safety through strategic
depth and fully defensible borders. Even the planned limited military action, the Arab leaders believed,
would shatter Israeli notions of total military superiority and militarily negligible
Arab foes, while simultaneously restoring Arab confidence. Israel, faced with recognizing its
vulnerability, would be shaken out of its "status quo syndrome."[64] Israelis, confronted with the realities of
insecurity; mounting casualties in a small population; a significantly
disrupted economy; and subject to intense international political pressure,
would be much more likely to view favorably Arab peace initiatives calling for
total Israeli withdrawal from all occupied Arab territories.[65] Prior to adjourning the Cairo summit, the
Arab political leaders ratified the military strategy previously developed, and
left the final decision to go ahead with the war to Sadat.[66]

The overarching military strategy ratified by
the Arab political leaders was the outgrowth of the attack plan formulated by
Egyptian Chief of Staff Shazly and adopted by Egyptian and Syrian military
leaders, Generals Ismail and Tlas when they met in April 1973.[67] The plan sought to achieve limited military
objectives in order to facilitate the political aspects of the Arab grand
strategy. Ismail focused the Arab
military strategy on achieving strategic and tactical surprise, commenting that
"in war there are two plans, one an operations plan and the other a decoy
plan."[68]
Arab forces, on the strategic and operational offensive, would seize the
initiative by attacking and defeating the IDF at the frontiers, making limited
advances on two separate fronts. Egypt
would cross the Suez Canal, defeat the Israeli fortifications on the east bank
and seize a narrow strip along the entire length of the canal. If circumstances permitted, the Egyptians
would exploit the advantage by pushing their perimeter out between 30-40 miles
in order to seize the Mitla, Gidi, and Khatmia passes, strategic choke-points
to the Sinai. Simultaneously, Syria
would defeat the Israeli strongholds on the Golan Heights and seize the entire
Golan plateau. Jordan would merely pose
the threat of a third front, tying up Israeli forces and preventing Israel from
launching a flank attack through Jordan against southern Syria.[69] The sudden, violent surprise attacks would
force Israel to withdraw and enable Arab forces to seize the limited territory,
establish lodgments and consolidate their positions before Israel could
mobilize her reserves, reinforce, and counterattack in strength.[70] Arab forces, firmly entrenched, would revert
to the operational and tactical defensive and hold their positions until
superpower or United Nations intervention solidified their gains through a
cease-fire. The desired military end
state was to hold lodgments within the occupied territories at the time a
cease-fire was proclaimed and then achieve further territorial gains, the
strategic end state, through negotiations conducted from a position of Arab
strength. The limited military objectives
selected directly supported Arab policy aims by enhancing the possibility of
successful military action and creating the condition for international
intervention and political pressure, as well as internal Israeli pressure, for
negotiations and concessions. If the
military strategy failed to achieve the political objectives quickly, the Arabs
were prepared for a prolonged war of attrition with the Israelis, until Israel,
through exhaustion of money and lives, was compelled to negotiate concessions.[71]

Sadat and Assad and their military staffs
ultimately agreed to conduct the attack on

6 October 1973. The leaders chose this date because it
offered optimal conditions of illumination, maximum moonlight, necessary for
building the bridges across the canal, with darkness later when troops and
equipment would pass across; and favorable tide and current conditions within
the canal. The date also furthered the
deception plan since it fell during Ramadan, when Moslems fasted during the day
and the Israelis might well expect the Arab's energies to be failing. Further, the date fell on Yom Kippur, the
holiest day in the Hebrew calendar. The
operation was code named Badr in honor of Mohammed's victory at the Battle of
Badr on the same date in 626 A.D.

CAMPAIGN PLANNING

The Arab
strategic plan envisioned separate, but strategically linked Egyptian and
Syrian campaigns. The overall intent
was to neutralize Israeli advantages and enhance Arab capabilities through
technological improvements to Arab equipment and detailed, intensive planning
and preparation.[72] The plan called for deliberate,
step-by-step, set-piece action, denying to the Israelis the opportunity to
fight their combined-arms maneuver battles.[73] In order to neutralize the vast Israeli air
advantage, both the Egyptians and the Syrians would build formidable air
defense umbrellas with surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) and ZSU-23 cannon (AAA)
over their forces. The Arab infantry
would employ precision guided munitions, principally the Sagger anti-tank guided
missile (ATGM), to defeat Israeli armor counterattacks.

The plan called
for the Egyptians to bridge the Suez Canal and attack under a massive artillery
barrage in great strength all along the length of the canal, rather than at
only a few selected points. In this
manner, the Egyptian forces hoped to confuse the Israelis as to where to launch
their counterattacks, delaying them as they tried to determine the Egyptian's
main attack and forcing the Israelis to spread their forces all along the
frontier. Once across the canal, the
Egyptian forces would attack and isolate the Bar-Lev line, a series of Israeli
strongpoints defending the East Bank, then advance eastward six to nine miles
and dig-in to await Israeli counterattack.[74] Simultaneously, the Syrians would attack all
along the 1967 cease-fire line, to recapture the entire Golan Plateau and then
hold their positions and await counterattack. While the land campaign raged, Egypt's navy would impose a strategic
blockade of Israel, while tactically seeking to avoid direct confrontation with
Israeli vessels. At this point, the
Arabs hoped the superpowers or United Nations would intervene and force a
cease-fire. If no cease-fire was
forthcoming, the plan was to conduct a protracted war of attrition, inflicting
heavy casualties upon the Israelis. A
prolonged war would cripple Israel's service industries and severely disrupt
the country's economy, by requiring the continued mobilization of more than
one-fifth of its three million inhabitants in order to support the war effort.[75]

The Arab's
limited military end state translated directly into operational
objectives. The Egyptian's operational
objective was to seize bridgeheads and cross the Suez Canal, a decisive point,
penetrate a short distance into the Sinai, and seize and hold operational
lodgments along the length of the canal north to the Mediterranean Sea and
south to the Gulf of Suez. The Syrian's
operational objective was to seize and hold operational lodgments across the
entire Golan Plateau, particularly Mount Hermon massif, a decisive point, the
loss of which would deprive the Israelis of their vision over the battlefield,
and the Benot Yacov Bridge, a decisive point that served as the main military
supply route (MSR) to Israel.

None of the literature concerning the October
War written by its political or military leaders discusses military strategy or
planning in terms of the Clausewitzian concept of centers of gravity[76]
or the more recent constructs of critical capabilities, critical requirements,
or critical vulnerabilities.[77] Rather, the literature published by both
Arab and Israeli leaders associated with the October War simply discusses
strengths and weakness' and means of neutralizing or enhancing them.[78] From these discussions, though, taken in the
context of the military strategy to which they were relevant, one may
reasonably infer Arab intentions and apply them to the constructs by analogy.

Clausewitz wrote
that "a center of gravity is always found where the mass is concentrated
most densely."[79] This was clearly the case from the Arab
perspective during the October War. The
fully mobilized Israel Defense Force (IDF) once it took the field, comprised
one of two Israeli centers of gravity at the strategic level. Each of the two separate IDF commands,
Northern Command concentrated against Syria, and Southern Command massed to
face Egypt, constituted the single Israeli operational center of gravity in its
respective theater of war. The IDF was,
as Clausewitz described, the "hub of all power and movement."[80] It was essential to Egyptian and Syrian
forces' military success that each achieve its operational objectives prior to
the time the IDF could fully mobilize and deploy. Pursuant to their strategy of limited military action, once they had
defeated the Israeli strongholds in their respective theaters, the Egyptians
and Syrians planned to seize lodgments and revert to the operational and
tactical defensive and fight until the superpowers or United Nations
intervened. The Arab intent was to
engage the Israeli center of gravity, once mobilized, from a strong defensive
posture, employing a number of means to neutralize Israeli strengths and
enhance Arab capabilities. The Suez
bridgehead and crossing, and isolation and defeat of the Israeli static defense
positions on both fronts, would be at significant risk, if not impossible, if
Israel were able to fully mobilize and deploy to face the Arabs with the whole
of their combat power at these very vulnerable points in the Arab attacks.

The Arab's
intended to fight a prolonged war of attrition if intervention did not quickly
stop the war. Given this strategic
plan, it is possible that Arab leaders also considered the Israeli national
will and public support for continuing the war effort, a second strategic
center of gravity. The follow-on
political aspect of the Arab grand strategy, seeking Israeli concessions of the
remaining occupied territories, was premised upon pressure from within Israel,
as well as from external international pressure to force concessions. The Arabs, therefore, planned to attack the
Israeli national will and public support for war in order to compel them to
seek peace through concessions.

The vastly
superior Israeli air power and ability to fight lightning-quick combined-arms
maneuver campaigns constituted Israeli critical capabilities. The Arab's planned to fight a set-piece
defensive battle to take away the Israeli's maneuver advantage. Arab military planners knew that they could
not defeat Israeli air power head-to-head with their own air. Instead, they built an air defense system
with anti-aircraft artillery and various surface-to-air missile systems,
including the new Soviet SA-6, whose hardware and characteristics were unknown
to the Israelis. The air umbrella would
neutralize the Israeli air advantage and leave vulnerable Israeli armor which
Arab forces would engage with Sagger ATGMs.

Israel's critical
vulnerabilities at the strategic level included: an extended frontier, 500
miles in length and surrounded by Arab enemies, which could prove particularly
relevant during the crucial first hours of the war, as Israel mobilized forces
to defend on possible multiple fronts; a small population of under three
million, strongly adverse to casualties, as compared to Egypt's 36 million and
more than 82 million collectively for the Arab states hostile to it;[81]
and an overstrained economy already suffering from defense commitments.[82] Israel's manpower, let alone her national
will, could scarcely support a protracted war if significant casualties began
to mount. Additionally, prolonged
defense expenditures would be ruinously expensive, and coupled with the loss of
productivity resulting from mobilization of roughly one-fifth of Israel's population, could cripple the
country's economy if the war was protracted. This too, would severely degrade popular support for a prolonged war.

Israel's extended
lines of communication (LOCs) constituted an operational critical
vulnerability. These LOCs, supporting
operations at the frontiers in two separate theaters, though internal, were
nonetheless difficult to defend. The
Arab forces planned to attack the Israeli lines of communication with special
operations forces behind the lines to disrupt the flow of supplies, equipment,
and troops, particularly initial Israeli reinforcements. Israeli overconfidence, resulting in
extremely aggressive doctrine and tactics, also constituted an operational
critical vulnerability. Israeli
doctrine, calling for immediate combined-arms counterattack at the frontiers,
initially was a vulnerability because it played directly into the Arab plan and
their enhanced strengths. The Arab
forces knew the Israeli tactics and specifically planned to take advantage of
them. After seizing their lodgment, the
Egyptian forces would dig-in and wait with their Sagger anti-tank missiles,
their SAMs, and anti-air artillery for the coming Israeli counterattacks. Just as the Arab's expected, the Israelis,
who had trained to fight the 1967 war again, rushed headlong into the
counterattack, tactics which cost them dearly during the initial battles of the
October War.

Arab leaders
believed that obtaining at least partial strategic and tactical surprise was
essential to military success in order to offset significant Israeli military
superiority. Surprise was particularly
critical to initial success, as they crossed the Suez Canal and attacked the
Israeli strongholds on both fronts. Achieving even a partial measure of surprise would increase the chances
that Arab forces could seize their operational lodgments and prepare for the
coming counterattacks before Israel could fully mobilize her reserve forces and
build-up along the borders of the occupied territories. Equally important, surprise would prevent a
preemptive air attack like that Israel conducted in 1967, which effectively won
the war in a matter of mere hours. Finally, surprise would ensure the Israelis did not have a reason to
seek and obtain additional weapons from the United States based on their
assertions that an Arab war was imminent.

In an effort to
achieve surprise, the Arabs devised a sophisticated and brilliant strategic
deception plan, employing both political and military means of deception,
on-going as part of Sadat's two-pronged strategy since late 1972. The Arab military strategy and campaign
plans were in large measure built around this elaborate deception plan. The desired purpose was to disguise the
Arab's ultimate intentions by conditioning the Israelis to Arab troop build-ups
along the borders of the occupied territories. Additionally, the Arabs sought to force the Israelis to operate at a
high state of alert for long periods of time, fatiguing Israeli troops and
equipment and placing considerable financial burdens on the Israeli
economy. The plan involved movements of
various size units, progressively increasing in size up to divisions, toward
the borders where they conducted tactical exercises and then returned to the
rear. These actions, the Arabs
believed, would ultimately condition the Israelis to accept even mass movements
as routine, giving them a false sense of security, and ultimately disguising
the actual attack when it was executed as simply another exercise. Whether the Israelis fully mobilized each
time, expending millions of pounds in the process, or became conditioned to the
exercises, the result was to Arab advantage.[83]

OPERATIONAL SETTING

The 1973 Arab-Israeli theater of war involved
two primary theaters of operation, the Suez front and the Golan Heights, each
with its own strategically related campaign. The theater of war included the entire country of Israel; the occupied territories seized by Israel in
the 1967 war; the Gulfs of Suez and
Aqaba, and the Red Sea; and Israel's
and Egypt's coastlines on the Mediterranean Sea. The southern or Suez theater included the Sinai peninsula and
operations focused around the Suez Canal. The northern or Golan Heights theater included the Golan Plateau and
Israel's northern borders with Syria and Jordan.

Topographical
considerations in the Suez theater centered upon the Suez Canal, a strategic
decisive point, and its manmade 30 to 60 foot tall sand ramparts. The canal was the single most important
terrain feature, militarily and politically, in the theater of war. Moshe Dayan, Israel's Defense Minister,
believed and publicly stated that the canal presented an insurmountable
obstacle to Egyptian attack. In the
Golan theater, Mount Hermon was the most significant terrain feature on the Golan
Plateau, and constituted an operational decisive point.

Command
and Control:

Command and
control of the Egyptian forces ran from President Sadat, who assumed the office
of Premier, to General Ismail, the Egyptian Minister of War and
Commander-in-Chief of the Federated Armed Forces of Egypt and Syria. Ismail, the military commander of both
country's forces for Operation Badr, was the only individual common to the
otherwise separate chains of command. Lieutenant General Saad el-Shazly was the Egyptian chief of staff and
served as the top military officer at the Egyptian General Headquarters (GHQ)
located in Cairo. Egyptian forces were
divided into two armies under the command of the GHQ: the Second Army, commanded by Major General Saad el-Din Maamun;
and the Third Army, commanded by Major General Abdel Moneim Mwassil. On the Syrian side, command and control ran
from President Assad to his Minister of War Lieutenant General Mustafa Tlas --
directly to the five Syrian division commanders in the field.

Israeli command
and control ran from Prime Minister Golda Meir to Defense Minister Moshe Dayan
to Israeli military Chief of Staff Lieutenant General David Elazar and out to the Israeli theater
commanders: General Officer Commanding (GOC), Northern Command, Major General
Yitzhak Hofi; and GOC, Southern Command Major General Schmuel Gonen. The differences in styles of command and
control between the Arabs and Israelis could not have been more striking.

Command and control on the Arab side was
centralized and retained within General Ismail in Cairo on the Egyptian side
and General Tlas in Damascus for the Syrians. Field commanders were given little latitude in their decision
making. Centralized control was valuable
for the canal crossing, given the sheer magnitude of the operation. In general, however, centralized control
prevented the Egyptians and Syrians from capitalizing on their successes on
several occasions. Arab subordinate
commanders, trained to this strict regimented control and unaccustomed to
making decisions in a free flowing maneuver type environment, missed critical
opportunities to exploit situations to Arab advantage.

Israeli command style emphasized
decentralized operational control and leadership from the front. Israeli commanders throughout the chain of
command were accustomed to practicing decentralized command, a function of the
rapid maneuver tactics adopted from the 1967 war. This aggressive style proved costly, however, in early battles
when subordinate commanders, trained in the 1967 war tactics, rushed headlong
into the teeth of the Arab forces in the obligatory armor counterattack. The Israeli's practice of decentralized
command on the whole, though, with its emphasis on freedom of action and
independent decision making and initiative, was much more effective than the
Arab style of control.

Firepower
and Maneuver and Movement:

The
Arab campaign plan combined limited maneuver, that optimized their advantage as
they moved to secure operational objectives, with firepower that neutralized
Israeli strengths. Egypt's operational
maneuver to cross the canal and seize and establish a lodgment in the Sinai was
perfectly planned and executed to facilitate Arab strategic aims. Egypt executed its cross-canal attack across
a broad front, rather than mass its forces. This operational maneuver caused the Israelis to delay their
counterattack and prevented them from concentrating their forces, as they
sought to determine from where the Egyptian main attack was coming. In support of the maneuver, Egyptian
infantry with anti-tank weapons crossed first, setting-up their anti-armor
protective shield, while air defense forces simultaneously established a
formidable air defense umbrella, and Egyptian Rangers conducted deep operations
to harass and interdict Israeli counterattack forces. These tactical actions succeeded in neutralizing Israeli
strengths of combined-arms maneuver warfare and firepower, and in facilitating
Egyptian operational maneuver as the Arab forces flowed across the canal, moved
into the Sinai and established lodgments, securing their operational
objectives.

Israeli strength
centered upon air power, as the means for achieving air superiority and as half
of the Israeli preferred method of operation: rapid-paced, offensive, tank with
air, combined-arms maneuver warfare. Arab forces took advantage of the Israeli's extremely aggressive
doctrine and tactics and neutralized their firepower at the same time. Since the Arabs could not compete with
Israeli air, they saw their counter as air defense. The Arab forces devised and employed a plan that combined SA-2,
SA-3, SA-6, and SA-7 surface to air
missiles (SAMs), with ZSU-23 four-barrelled anti-air artillery (AAA), into an
air defense package that provided air neutrality. Once under their air umbrella, the Arab forces took advantage of
the Israeli propensity to conduct armor charges, tactics learned in the 1967
war. As the Israeli tanks
counterattacked, Arab infantry forces armed with Sagger and RPG-7 anti-tank
guided missiles (ATGM) launched salvos of tank-killing missiles. Egypt's combination of maneuver and
firepower enhanced their operations and enabled them to achieve their initial
strategic aims.

Syria also
employed operational maneuver that provided leverage when they attacked the
Israelis on the Golan Heights. The
Syrians massed their forces prior to attack, giving them a six-to-one numerical
advantage over the Israelis. Their
concept was essentially the opposite of the Egyptians, but also secured an
operational advantage, if only by sheer weight of numbers. The Syrians employed Soviet tactics,
advancing their massed forces in columns, in a classic four-pronged pincer
move. They overcame the vastly
outnumbered Israelis and pushed them back behind the 1967 cease-fire line. The Syrians attacked with strong momentum
that had the Israelis reeling. Syria
most likely would have achieved its operational objectives had Syrian forces
not stopped their attack overnight on the second day, permitting Israeli
reinforcements to arrive. The Israelis
seized the initiative during the Syrian operational pause and never lost it
again.

Israeli
operational maneuver on both fronts was impossible until mobilized reserves
arrived. On 8 October the Israeli high
command attempted operational maneuver, consistent

with their strategic defensive
aims of defeating an enemy at the frontier, by ordering a counterattack against
the Egyptians. As in the two previous
day's fighting, Egyptian strategy worked masterfully as Egyptian infantry with
ATGMs destroyed Israeli tanks conducting an armored cavalry charge in the
counterattack, without air support. The
IAF had suspended air operations in the Sinai theater because the Arab air
defense system had already shot down more than half of the attacking Israeli
aircraft. Egyptian firepower was able
to neutralize Israeli firepower and movement so long as the Arab forces
remained under the air defense umbrella. When the Egyptians left this protective overhead shield, as they did in
their attack to the Sinai passes to relieve pressure on the Syrians on 14
October, the IAF gained freedom of
action and Israeli tactical maneuver and firepower inflicted significant losses
on the Egyptians.

The Israeli's operational maneuver in the
Sinai began on 15 October with their counteroffensive against the
Egyptians. Capitalizing on the seam
between the Egyptian Second and Third armies, the Israelis maneuvered to
penetrate the Arab forces deep, entrap them, sever their LOCs, and threaten to
destroy them in detail. The Israelis
took advantage of the Egyptian's disorganized defense, not yet reconstituted,
following their unsuccessful attack the day prior. Once the corridor between the two Arab armies and the Israeli
bridgehead were secured, the Israelis
swept into Egypt employing a maneuver campaign. They benefited significantly from their destruction of Egyptian
SAM sites which punched a hole in the Arab air defense umbrella. This allowed the Israelis to bring the IAF
back into its close air support role, restoring their combined-arms firepower
and maneuver capabilities.

Sustainment:

The enormous rates of attrition suffered by
both sides and the rates of consumption of equipment and ammunition were
staggering. In a war lasting less than
three weeks, the forces suffered nearly 40,000 casualties between them. Both forces expended equipment at the cyclic
rate, including, for example: 3,394 tanks destroyed; 1,250+ armored personnel carriers (APCs) destroyed; 550+ artillery pieces destroyed (Israeli
losses unreported); 554 aircraft
destroyed; 15 ships destroyed, and the
list goes on.[84] These destruction and consumption rates
strained the logistics systems of the opposing forces mightily. Both sides had expended nearly all their
ammunition by the end of the first week of murderous, but indecisive fighting.[85] Each combatant required and received massive
strategic replenishment, the Arabs from the USSR and the Israelis from the
United States. The Soviets sent
supplies by sea and air. The United
States, because of sealift distances involved, immediately began an airlift to
Israel; American sealifted equipment
did not arrive until after the war's end. The U.S. was forced to deplete NATO war stocks in Europe and U.S. war
stocks from the continental U.S., in an effort to match the Soviet's resupply
of the Arab forces. Without the U.S.
resupply effort, the Israelis could not have sustained offensive operations in
the Sinai or sustained its Golan efforts in the face of further Syrian
offensive operations beyond 17 October 1973.[86]

Israel's extended land and sea LOCs were
operational critical vulnerabilities which the Arab forces sought to
exploit. Arab commandos interdicted the
land LOCs with some success and the sea LOCs were virtually closed by the
Egyptian naval blockade. [87]
Egyptian Rangers targeted Israeli logistics facilities and oil reserves behind
Israeli lines causing significant damage and disruption in the Israeli
rear. The lack of Egyptian air strikes
against their LOCs in the Sinai theater, allowed the IDF to push supplies
forward in relative security.[88] In spite of inadequate road networks for
strategic mobility, and land interdiction attempts, the Israelis did an
admirable job operating from internal lines, of providing logistical support in
a two-front war. At the operational
level, Israel's use of forward supply bases enhanced Israeli mobility and
mobile repair teams actually repaired tanks and other damaged vehicles on the
battlefield, returning a significant number to service, a significant
contribution to the war effort given the equipment shortage.[89] Egyptian LOCs were also vulnerable. The Israeli Navy was able to interdict
Egyptian efforts to resupply across the Red Sea and the Israeli Army cut the
Third Army's LOCs and encircled it prior to superpower intervention. Further, the Israelis destroyed a
significant amount of the Syrian war economy with a strategic bombing campaign
that destroyed Syria's only oil refinery, burned half of its oil storage
capacity, destroyed power generating stations, and incapacitated its port facilities.

Intelligence and Force Protection:

The Arab forces believed that by achieving
strategic and tactical surprise they could counter Israeli firepower and
maneuver by quickly seizing their operational objectives before the IDF could
fully mobilize. The Arab forces
employed an elaborate deception plan that convinced senior Israeli officers,
including Major General Eliyahu Zeira, the chief of Israeli Intelligence, that
Egypt and Syria would not attack and were only conducting routine defensive
training and saber rattling. Despite
Israel's sophisticated and renowned intelligence gathering apparatus, the Arabs
achieved total surprise on the Suez front and near complete surprise on the
Golan front, directly contributing to their initial successes.

The success of the Arab deception plan was due in large
measure to incorrect analysis and not failure in gathering intelligence. Israeli intelligence gathered many
indications in the spring of 1973 that in May convinced some junior
intelligence officers that war was probable. These included, for example, brigade size movements up to the canal and
extensive modification and improvements to defensive works and roads on the
west bank.[90] Major General Zeira, disagreed with the
analysis, but briefed Lieutenant General Elazar, nonetheless. Elazar concurred with the assessment of war
and recommended preparatory measures to the Meir government, which, in turn,
ordered mobilization. The judgment was
incorrect and the false alarm cost the Israelis millions of pounds, and with an
election upcoming, possibly political capital. The Arabs stepped-up their deception plan and the Israelis watched the
monthly movements of men, equipment, and supplies up to the borders, in combat
formations, in elements as large as divisions. In September alone, the Egyptian formations moved up to the canal six
times and then withdrew. The Egyptian
navy made open arrangements for two submarines to receive repairs in Pakistan,
to deceive the Israelis into believing they were operationally unready. Instead, these subs assumed posts in the
Egyptian blockade off the Israeli coast. Egypt made public announcements that naval forces had performed poorly
during exercises and would undergo further mine laying training. The mines laid during this subsequent
exercise were real and part of the blockade. The Arabs planted articles in newspapers quoting Sadat and Assad making
public pronouncements, alternating between strong condemnation and conciliatory
speeches, to keep the Israelis off balance. Both Arab nations actively engaged in many other deceptive measures
right up until the attack. In fact, the
morning of the attack, Egyptian forces lounged and sunned themselves along the
canal. The Arab deception plan was so
successful, that as late as the morning of 5 October 1973, Zeira advised Elazar
that the risk of attack was low.[91] Not until 0700 on 6 October 1973, the day of
the attack, did Israeli GHQ inform her reserve commanders that war was imminent
and give orders to begin mobilization.[92]

Additionally,
Israeli operational security apparently was poor following the 1967 war. The
Egyptians prepared their cross-canal attack based upon an accurate portrayal of
Israeli Sinai defenses, to include a detailed Israeli counterattack plan
prepared by Southern Command in May 1973. Further, the Egyptians captured a detailed Israeli map depicting the
Israeli plan for an assault crossing of the Suez that contained all the code
names referred to in Israeli radio traffic.[93]

The Arab's
clearly won the initial battle of intelligence services. Their deception plan,
a shrewd combination of political and military maneuvering, was a major aspect
of Arab force protection and directly contributed to the early Arab
successes. Arab deception, and perhaps
the Israeli belief that their military was invincible, lulled the Israelis into
complacency. Though Israeli troops were
belatedly placed at high alert, Prime Minister Meir made the political
decisions not to preemptively attack the Arab forces or to mobilize Israeli
reserves until the morning of the attack. These proved to be truly momentous decisions.[94]

CAMPAIGN EXECUTION

At 1400 on 6
October 1973, fire from 2,000 Egyptian guns signaled the Arab attack against
Israel along the Suez Canal, while a 100 plane Syrian airstrike followed
immediately by artillery and rocket attacks against targets on the Golan
Plateau, initiated the offensive in that theater. The October War was underway. Israel, having failed to preempt or mobilize early, was rocked out of
her complacency and forced to assume a strategic and operational defensive
posture.

As the Egyptian bombardment continued,
Egyptian infantry began its assault crossing of the Suez. Though the Israelis delivered heavy fire
from the Bar-Lev outposts, the Egyptian's canal crossing was completely
successful. The Egyptians, prepared to
accept 10,000 casualties in the crossing operation alone, suffered only 208
dead.[95] Infantry engaged in the piecemeal reduction
of the Israeli strongpoints and moved inland into the Sinai to establish
defensive positions on the east bank while anti-armor teams dug in and sighted
their anti-tank guided missiles toward the east. Egyptian engineers established vehicle bridgeheads all along the
canal; Egyptian armor began pouring across the canal by dark, and by midnight
more than 500 Egyptian tanks and a forward anti-air defense umbrella were
established on the east bank. After
twenty-four hours, the Egyptians had put 100,000 troops, 1,020 tanks, and 13,500
vehicles across the Suez Canal -- the largest water obstacle first day crossing
in world military history.[96] The Egyptian's multi-pronged attack had no
main effort against which Israeli Southern Command GOC Gonen could direct a
counterattack and he lost valuable hours trying to determine where to employ
his forces.[97] Offensively oriented, Israeli commanders
immediately reverted to old habits, and ordered a series of tactical
counterattacks while her reserve forces scrambled to mobilize. These counterattacks in the Sinai between
6-9 October were disastrous, as entire armor battalions employing their blitzkrieg
tactics were destroyed by Egyptian infantry fired ATGM, principally Sagger missiles. In the first three days of fighting, the
Israeli's lost over 400 tanks,[98]
and following their counterattack on 8 October, only 90 Israeli tanks remained
in the theater.[99] The Israeli Air Force (IAF) suffered severe
losses of aircraft and was rendered virtually ineffective by the Egyptian air
defense umbrella.[100] The conflict spread throughout the theater
of war when on 7 October the Israeli navy initiated offensive operations
against Syria and Egypt, defeating an attempted commando attack. The Egyptians continued attacks upon the
Bar-Lev forts that remained in Israeli hands and on 9 October, Gonen authorized
the Israeli garrisons to surrender or try to breakout. Following this, all but one strongpoint fell
to the Egyptians. The Egyptian Second
and Third Armies consolidated their positions on the east bank about eight
miles into the Sinai, their lodgments firmly established.[101] Their operational objectives secured,
Egyptian forces reverted to the operational and tactical defensive.

The Syrian's attack against the Golan front
was well synchronized with the Egyptian attack in the Sinai. The Syrians attacked with 800 tanks and
28,000 troops in three mechanized infantry divisions, the 5th, 7th, and 9th,
under the cover of close air support and artillery fire. The massed Syrian armor advanced against 176
Israeli tanks of the Barak and 7th Armored Brigades.[102] The Israelis, employing a mobile defense,
engaged in "stalking warfare, pouncing and retreating ... fir[ing] first,
quickly, and accurately."[103] The Syrians suffered heavy casualties, but
broke through by virtue of sheer weight of numbers. Syrian Rangers captured the decisive point Mt. Hermon and
combined Syrian mechanized and armor forces pushed eight kilometers beyond the
Purple Line--the 1967 cease-fire line. The Israelis also suffered heavy casualties, particularly the Barak
Brigade, which lost all but 15 tanks and had its brigade commander and every
company commander killed in action.[104] The IAF continued to attack despite
suffering significant losses to Syrian air defense. Moroccan and Druze units that had joined the Syrians refused to
advance and were removed from the battlefield. The Syrians continued their attack until the afternoon of 7 October when it apparently reached its
culminating point. The Syrians halted
their advance just short of their operational objective for reasons which
remain historically unclear. This
operational pause, lasting all night, ended their attack's momentum and allowed
mobilized Israeli reserve troops, tanks, and supplies to arrive in
reinforcement.[105] The Israeli government viewed the situation
on the Golan as extremely grave and determined that it must focus efforts upon
stopping the Syrian advance, which could threaten Israeli population
centers. Irrespective of peacetime
plans for employment of mobilized reserves, the Israeli military leadership
committed troops and tanks to the northern front without waiting for
battalions, or even companies to form.[106] The Syrians attempted to advance again on 8
October, but an Israeli counterattack seized and maintained the
initiative. Iraq entered the war,
supplying air support to Syria over the Golan, however, Syrian air defenses
shot down 12 Iraqi MIGs due to poor coordination between the forces. On 8 and 9 October, Syria fired 10 FROG
surface-to-surface missiles at an Israeli air base that missed, impacting
instead among Israeli kibbutzim. The Israelis retaliated by
engaging in a strategic bombing campaign against targets around Damascus,
including Syria's only oil refinery, a power installation, port facilities, and
the Defense Ministry.[107] IAF aircraft, attempting to defeat the
Syrian air defense umbrella, changed tactics. The new Israeli tactics, using terrain to mask their approach in the
attack and flying out of Jordanian airspace, were effective. This allowed IAF aircraft to attack and
destroy Syrian air defense sites and provide close air support to advancing
Israeli armor on the Golan. The
Israeli's armor counterattack reached the Purple Line and Syrian units
continued to withdraw. The Israeli
leadership made a decision to continue the attack into Syria, pursuing the strategic
aim of dissuading Jordanian and further Arab intervention. On 10 October, however, Jordan mobilized its
armed forces. Israel continued its
offensive, recapturing by nightfall all of its former positions on the Golan
Heights, except those on Mt. Hermon.[108] During these Israeli-Syrian battles on the
Golan, tactical maneuver was restricted; there were no quick and elegant victories, as in the Six Days War. The forces engaged in a brutal war of
attrition involving shooting matches at maximum range, which the Israelis,
considerably more proficient, were apt to win.[109] By the 11th, the Syrians were in trouble,
having lost more than 1,000 tanks.[110] Israeli armored units invaded Syria and the
IAF, having neutralized Syrian air defenses, attacked industrial, governmental,
and military targets in Syria.[111] Assad appealed to Sadat for assistance,
requesting that the Egyptians take the offensive and attack the Israelis in the
southern sector. Assad apparently hoped
this would relieve Israeli pressure, particularly by the IAF against Syria in
the north, by forcing the Israelis to divert resources to the south.[112] Only 35 miles from Damascus, the Syrian's
fighting withdrawal, lacked territory to trade for time. Egypt's Lieutenant General Shazly opposed
any Egyptian attack which would take it outside its air defense umbrella and
play to Israeli strength, open combined-arms maneuver warfare.[113] The Egyptians, having destroyed Israeli
counterattacks in the Sinai and inflicted significant casualties on the IDF,
delivered a psychological shock to the Israeli military, government, and
citizens. The vaunted IAF suspended
operations in the theater and the IDF launched no further counterattacks
following their disastrous attack on 8 October. Prior to Assad's request, the Egyptians were satisfied to hold
and fight a defensive war of attrition, consistent with their strategic
aims. Sadat, however, apparently felt
obliged to assist the Syrians and therefore rejected a cease-fire sponsored by
the United States and proposed to him by Henry Kissinger on 12 October. Had he accepted it, the war may well have
ended with a clear-cut, though limited, Egyptian military victory.[114] Sadat ordered the Egyptian military to
revert to the offensive and attack; it was a fateful decision and the attack
proved disastrous.

On 14 October,
despite his two-to-one force advantage, Egyptian General Ismail's plan sent
only six (of twenty-six available) armor brigades with armored personnel
carrier mounted infantry into the attack all along the front to confuse Israeli
counterattack efforts. Egyptian
objectives were three strategic mountain passes, Mitla, Giddi, and Khatmia,
that controlled access to the Sinai. The Egyptians advanced slowly and deliberately across the front, making
little use of speed or maneuver.[115] The largest tank battle since World War II
ensued. 1,000 Egyptian tanks and 5,000
mechanized infantry faced 800 Israeli tanks and their infantry. Israeli tanks, and infantry armed with
American provided TOW missiles, fired from prepared positions. Rather than fight individually, tanks fought
as companies with commander designated targets. Israeli tank and ATGM fire stopped and turned the attackers while
Israeli artillery prevented the mounted Egyptian Sagger ATGM teams from
employing their weapons. The Egyptian's
exposed armor, mostly outside their air defense umbrella, faced the wrath of
the IAF. By midday the Egyptians had
lost 264 tanks,[116]
compared with 40 lost for the Israelis.[117] Ismail recalled his forces, ordering a
withdrawal to original lines. This same
day, the Jordanian 40th Armored Brigade joined the Syrian lines and American
resupply planes began arriving in Israel.

Once the
situation on the Golan front was stabilized, the Israelis reverted from the
operational offense to the defensive in the Golan theater. The Israeli's decision to halt their
counter-offensive into Syria was probably due to two major factors. First, the logistics requirements were
greater than the Israelis could afford. The Israelis were losing troops and expending ammunition and equipment
at rates they could not sustain. Moreover, the Israeli approach toward Damascus simply was
internationally unacceptable. The
Soviets hinted at direct intervention with ground troops and the U.S.
threatened to cut-off its resupply effort if the Israelis did not stop the
advance.[118] The Israeli government and military
leadership realized that time worked against it, as Israeli losses in killed
and wounded, and cost to the state grew staggeringly high. The Israeli high command sought a strategy
to seize the initiative and bring about a quick decision, ending the war on
terms favorable to Israel.[119] The Israeli government decided to return to
the operational offensive in the Sinai theater after defeating the Egyptian
attack. The Israeli counteroffensive
would attack up a seam between the Egyptian Second and Third Armies, an
operational decisive point and critical vulnerability, assault across the canal
and attack the Egyptian air defense umbrella, creating a gap for IAF operations,
and then encircle and cut-off Egyptian forces.

On 15 October, the Iraqi Third Armor Division
counterattacked Israeli forces on the Golan, but was repulsed. The Israelis went on the operational
offensive, initiating their counteroffensive in the Sinai theater. Sharon's division was to open a corridor to
the canal, establish a bridgehead, and build bridges across the canal. Adan's division would pass through the
corridor, cross the canal to the west bank and launch an attack from the rear,
cutting-off the Third Army. Magen's
division would follow in trace and support Adan. Sharon launched two paratroop brigades. The first attacked west through the corridor driving toward the
canal to seize the bridgehead, cross and secure the western bank. Sharon's second brigade looped south, then
drove north in a diversionary attack to draw attention away from the Israeli
canal crossing. The paratroop brigade
encountered stiff Egyptian resistance
as it slammed into the southern flank of the Egyptian 21st Armor Division in an
area known as the Chinese Farm.[120] The diversionary attack became a major
engagement as Second Army forces drove down to close the corridor and one of
the toughest battles of the war ensued. Successive waves of tanks and paratroopers fought to keep the corridor
open and the battle around the Chinese Farm raged for two days. On 16 October Sharon sent one infantry
brigade and a company of 30 tanks across the canal on heavy rafts. Once across, despite his orders to secure
the bridgehead pending Adan's arrival, Sharon sent the armor force on a raiding
party to destroy Egyptian logistics facilities and SAM sites, leaving only a
token force to secure the west bank position.[121] Sharon's forces on the west bank destroyed a
number of SAM batteries and punched a hole in the Egyptian air defense
umbrella.[122] Sharon's superior, Gonen, however, ordered
Sharon to withdraw his forces until the corridor was secured and the paratroops
at the Chinese Farm were rescued.[123] The Egyptians, whose division and brigade
commanders remained in the rear, were slow to react and missed their
opportunity to crush the bridgehead. Once they realized Israelis were across the canal, the Egyptians
attempted to contain the penetration and belatedly sent aircraft in
unsuccessful attacks upon the bridgehead. On the Golan front, Syrian, Iraqi, and Jordanian forces attempted a
coordinated attack, however, elements failed to participate and the Israelis
easily stopped the attack.

On 17 October Sharon bridged the canal and
Adan successfully attacked to clear the corridor to the canal and rescue the
paratroop brigade at the Chinese Farm. Israeli Minister of Defense Dayan and Chief of Staff Elazar, who had considered canceling the
Israeli canal crossing, flew to the desert and met with Southern Command
generals. Upon learning of Israeli
successes that day, they agreed to allow the operation to continue. The Israeli's intercepted radio traffic that
the Egyptian 25th Tank Brigade would move south to close the corridor to the canal. Adan's division ambushed the Egyptian brigade, destroying 86 of
its 96 tanks[124]
and his forces then began pouring across the bridge over the canal at 1800.[125] On 18 October Adan's division completed its
canal crossing and Egypt withdrew SAM sites near the Israeli bridgehead,
further allowing the IAF to return to freedom of action. The Egyptians attempted to stem the Israeli
threat by activating the Egyptian Air Force, which had avoided confrontation
with the IAF. Numerous dogfights ensued
in which the Egyptians were invariably the loser.[126]

On 19 October Egyptian Chief of Staff Shazly
recommended withdrawing Egyptian forces from the east bank to counter the
Israeli west bank threat. Sadat and
Ismail relieved him and issued orders that no troops would withdraw. The Israelis, with elements of three
divisions across the canal on the west bank, began their attack with plentiful
close air support from the IAF. Adan's
division with his flank and rear protected by Magen, turned south and Sharon's
division pushed north. Sadat proposed a
cease-fire to Assad, while Syrian, Iraqi, and Jordanian forces attacked again
on the Golan, but were stopped by the Israelis.

On 20 October Assad rejected the cease-fire
proposal. Adan's division continued its
advance toward the rear of the Third Army, destroying SAM sites en route and
pushing the Israeli bridgehead 30 kilometers west of the canal and less than
100 kilometers from Cairo. Megan's
division cut the Third Army's main supply link to Cairo. On 21 October Israeli forces attempted
unsuccessfully to seize Mt. Hermon on the Golan Heights, but were prevented by
the Syrians. Anticipating a cease-fire,
Adan attacked the Egyptians on 22 October in an attempt to gain as much ground
as possible before the cease-fire was declared. The United Nations Security Council passed Resolution 338 calling
for a cease-fire at 1852 on 22 October. The cease-fire time arrived with the forces still fighting on the
battlefield. Israeli forces seized Mt.
Hermon on the Golan front 30 minutes after the cease-fire was to have taken
effect. The cease-fire failed and the Israelis continued their attack on both
fronts. On 23 October Israel continued
its push in Egypt in order to gain a stronger bargaining position at the
negotiating table after the imminent cease-fire. Megan's division reached the Gulf of Suez, trapping the Egyptian
Third Army. The UN Security Council
passed Resolution 339 calling for an immediate cease-fire in accordance with
Resolution 338. On 24 October Adan
continued his attack into Suez City where the Egyptians inflicted significant
casualties on his force in the last battle of the 1973 Arab-Israeli War. The United Nations patrols then separated
the forces and maintained the truce.

CONCLUSION

The 1973 Arab-Israeli War ended with no clear
decisive outcome on the battlefield. Militarily, the war was a stalemate, though on 24 October when the
cease-fire took effect, Israel had seized the initiative, crossed the Suez
Canal and maneuvered elements of three divisions on the west bank between the
Egyptian Third Army, located primarily on the east bank, and Cairo. The
Egyptians, however, clearly were not defeated, as was readily apparent by the
significant casualties their forces inflicted on Adan's division in Suez City
immediately prior to the cease-fire. Both sides suffered casualties and equipment destruction and supply
consumption at rates neither could support, even with resupply from the
superpowers. Time worked against the
Israelis much more so than against the Arab side. Thus, whether the Israelis could have destroyed the Third Army in
detail, as they claim, one may only speculate.

What seems clear, however, is that the Arab
grand strategy eventually proved successful in achieving most of thei Arab's
strategic policy objectives. While as
an immediate result of the war, Egypt recovered only a small portion of the
territory seized by the Israelis in 1967, and the Syrians lost some territory,
a clear shift in the political balance occurred in the Arab's, particularly Egypt's
favor.

Just as the Arab alliance planned, the return
to Middle East hostilities broke the political impasse, refocused world
attention on the Arab question, and forced international negotiations
concerning the occupied territories. These negotiations ultimately resulted in the return of the Suez Canal
and land in the western Sinai to Egypt and more Golan Heights territory to
Syria than it lost during the fighting.[127] Further, the war shocked and embarrassed
Israel internationally. The Arab's
military successes, particularly the deception campaign resulting in strategic
surprise, shattered the twin myths of Israeli invincibility and Arab
incompetence. This restored Arab
confidence and morale, a psychological victory for them, while conversely,
Israel was downcast and very paranoid about its future.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Adan, Avraham. On the Banks of the Suez. San
Rafael: Presidio Press, 1980.

Sadat, Anwar el. In Search of Identity: An Autobiography.
New York: Harper &

Row, 1978.

Shazly, Saad el. The Crossing of the Suez. San Francisco:
American Mideast Research, 1980.

Strange, Joe. Perspectives on Warfighting Number Four: Centers of
Gravity &Critical Vulnerabilities: Building on the Clusewitzian Foundation So
That We Can
All Speak the Same Language, Monograph, Marine Corps Command and Staff
College Foundation. Quantico: 1996.

[2]Department of Defense, Joint
Publication 3-0: Doctrine for Joint Operations (Washington,
D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1995),
GL-10. Grand strategy, derived from
policy, is the art and science of developing and employing instruments of
national power to secure national policy objectives. National strategy, or grand strategy, today is usually referred
to as national security strategy and concerns the development, application, and
coordination of diplomatic, economic, military, and informational instruments
of national power to achieve objectives that contribute to national security.

[3]Joint Publication 3-0: Doctrine for Joint Operations, GL-10. Military strategy is one aspect of grand strategy, involving the
application of military power to attain policy aims. "The
National Command Authority translates policy into national strategic military
objectives .... Strategy, derived from policy, is the basis for all operations."

[4]Joint Publication 3-0: Doctrine for Joint Operations, II-2. Military strategy is ultimately executed as operational art--the
employment of military forces to achieve strategic goals through the design and
conduct of strategies and campaigns. "The operational level links the tactical employment of forces to
strategic objectives."

[5]Israeli policies, strategies, and
campaign plans are addressed, as necessary, to present a clear assessment of
the action.

[8]Israeli withdrawal from the occupied
territories and the Palestinian refugee problem are hereinafter referred to
collectively as the Middle East question. It is important to note that these two matters, while obviously related,
substantively were separate issues. Egypt's and Syria's public pronouncements supported the Pan-Arab
position which linked diplomatic resolution of the matter with Israeli
withdrawal from all occupied territories and establishment of a Palestinian
state. While this may also have
represented Syria's internal position, indications are that had Israel been
amenable, Egypt under Sadat, might have accepted partial withdrawal in the
Sinai alone, without any resolution of the Palestinian refugee problem.

[9]Shlomo Aronson, Conflict & Bargaining in the
Middle East: An Israeli Perspective (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978), 136.The author states that Israelis developed a "status quo
syndrome, a psychological satisfaction with the situation."

[11]Aronson, 155. The author notes "four areas of international politics that
had an impact on one another and ... on the Arab-Israeli conflict." These included U.S. relations with the
Soviet Union, China, Western Europe, and Vietnam.

[15]The 1969 conflict was actually a renewal
of the sporadic fighting which had occurred along the Suez Canal since
September 1967, almost as soon as the Egyptian forces had regrouped following
the Six Days' War. This period between
1967 and August 1970 is referred to as the War of Attrition. This 'war' was actually a series of
engagements involving mortar and artillery battles and occasional air strikes
and special operations fought across the Suez Canal until the cease-fire in
August 1970. The March 1969 renewal of fighting was
referred to by Egyptian President Nasser as the 'liberation phase.'

[25]Bickerton and Klausner, 168-169. The Israelis considered retaining control of
Sharm el-Sheikh, a town at the southern tip of the Sinai Peninsula on the Red
Sea, of vital strategic importance because it controlled access to both the
Gulf of Suez and the Suez Canal, and more importantly, to the Gulf of Aqaba and
southern Israel.

[43]Sadat, 287. Note, however, that Sadat in his autobiography, dismisses the
notion that he expelled the Russians to please the United States and indicates
his decision was purely a "patriotic one." This reflects a consistent
theme of an independent and self-reliant Egypt that runs throughout his
autobiography. He certainly seems to
have had an agenda, but whatever his intentions, his actions had the effect of thawing
the diplomatic situation with the United States and encouraging the Soviets to
treat his requests for weapons more favorably.

[44]This is not to imply that Sadat believed
that he might somehow usurp Israel's unique relationship with the United
States, for he clearly did not. Sadat sought to entice the United States,
almost playing it and the Soviet Union against one another. In the event of
war, he did not expect the United States to side against Israel, but with the
prospect of improved relations with the Arab nations, it might exert pressure
on the Israelis to make concessions or sue for peace. In fact, as we shall see,
this proved most critical to the outcome of the 1973 October War.

[46]It is possible that the meeting was
postponed due to the perceived support by Arab leaders, including Sadat, for
the actions of the Black September organization whose terrorist attacks killed
eleven Israeli athletes at the 1972 Summer Olympics in Munich, Germany. It may also be possible, that Nixon was wary
of the Jewish lobby during the reelection campaign or that Washington was
sending a message of detached (cool) interest to signal Sadat that while his
actions were viewed favorably, he should modify his position and decrease the
level of demands upon Israel.

[51]Mohamar Gaddafi of Libya, and King Feisal
of Saudi Arabia agreed to provide oil supplies to support the mission. These Arab nations joined an Arab imposed
oil embargo which staggered many nations, including the United States. Though originally unplanned, Iraqi and Jordanian forces later joined the
Syrians in Golan operations against Israel. Other Arab nations that contributed small contingents of forces to the
Arab forces included Kuwait, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, as well as a commando unit
comprised by members of the Palestinian Liberation Organization.

[52]Insight Team of the London Sunday Times, Insight on
the Middle East War, (London: Andre Deutsch Limited, 1974), 34.

[62]Israel's central policy aims continued
unchanged since its founding as a nation in 1948--protection of the Jewish
people and preservation of the state of Israel. Israel viewed its survival interest as threatened by the hostile
Arab nations surrounding it. The
Israeli government believed that the Arab political and military goal during
the October War was the subjugation of Israel. During a 16 October 1973 speech to the Israeli Knesset, Prime Minister
Golda Meir emphasized the Israeli belief that it was not the limited objective
of a return to the pre-1967 borders that Arab leaders sought, but the
"total destruction of the state of Israel." (Golda Meir, My Life (New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons,
1975), 434.) The Israeli government
viewed continued occupation of portions of the lands seized in the 1967 Six
Days' War as a vital strategic interest central to Israel's defense of the
Jewish homeland. These lands, Israelis
believed, gave Israel fully defensible borders, strategic depth and more
maneuver space, and pushed their enemies away from the country's population
centers. Additionally, the Israeli
government believed that maintaining a close relationship with the United
States was a strategic interest directly linked to its survival. Sadat's political strategy sought to
exploit this relationship and Arab military plans rested on the precarious
assumption that the United States would persuade Israel to maintain a defensive
strategy unless attacked. Israel sought
to discourage any Arab war plans through deterrence, believing the outbreak of
war would constitute a political advantage for the Arabs. If war arose, Israeli policy aims included
destruction of as much of the Arab forces and their military infrastructure as
possible and the capture of additional territory to use for political
bargaining. (Herzog, 315-316).

[63]Sadat referred to the political aspect of
the strategy as Operation Spark. The
military action would spark an international crisis leading to political
intervention.

[67]Shazly, 29. The plan, as executed, was
named Operation Badr. The plan was
originally named "The High Minarets" and was based on Shazly's view
of limited Egyptian military capabilities. It called for a Suez Canal crossing and only a five or six-mile
penetration into the Sinai, reverting to the defensive and then fighting a
prolonged war of attrition. Shazly
originally presented the plan to then Minister of War and Egyptian Armed Forces
Commander-in-Chief Mohammed Ahmed Sadek in 1971. Sadek told Shazly the plan, "would be of no value
politically or militarily. Politically,
it would achieve nothing because Sinai would remain under enemy
occupation." Sadek told Shazly that the Egyptian offensive " had to
be forceful and unlimited: a clean,
swift sweep through Sinai and the Gaza Strip to destroy enemy
concentrations." Shazly convinced
Sadek that Egypt simply did not possess the military resources to execute such
a plan. In something of a compromise,
Sadek ordered Shazly to draft a plan for an offensive to seize the key Sinai
passes 30-40 miles east of the canal. This plan was named "Operation 41." Both plans were ready by September 1971, however, the Egyptian
leaders determined that Egypt lacked the military hardware to execute either plan. During 1972, Operation 41 was renamed
Operation "Granite Two." At
the end of 1972, Shazly's opinion remained unchanged, that the only executable
plan was The High Minarets, the limited Egyptian attack. Granite Two remained impossible because of
the inability of the Egyptian Air Force to provide ground support and the
Egyptian's shortage of mobile surface-to-air missiles in order to compensate
for the lack of air cover. In October
1972, General Ismail was appointed as Minister of War and Commander-in-Chief of
Egyptian forces. Ismail prepared a
political and strategic estimate of the situation and concluded that Egypt was
not ready for war. Shazly briefed him
on both plans, presenting his opinion that a limited attack, as planned in The
High Minarets, was possible, but that an attack further to the Sinai passes was
impossible because it would take Egyptian troops beyond the range of their SAM
umbrella. Ismail concurred in the
assessment and instructed Shazly to prepare for a limited attack based on The
High Minarets in the spring of 1973. Subsequently, in April 1973, Ismail ordered Shazly to revive planning
for an attack to the passes, stating that the Syrians would not join the Arab
coalition if they knew the plan was limited to an attack to capture Arab
territory less than ten miles east of
the canal. Shazly vigorously protested
that such an attack was completely beyond Egyptian capabilities. Ismail, in a curious compromise, instructed
Shazly to train to the original limited attack plan, but to plan an attack to
the passes that could be executed if the circumstances permitted. It is critical to note that the Egyptian
military commanders were all warned that the "two phases -- the crossing
and the drive to the passes -- were wholly independent." Shazly states that, "The truth was that
neither I nor any of my subordinates dreamed the second phase would be carried
out." The Egyptians did execute
this attack to the passes, apparently under orders by Sadat, and against
Shazly's and his two Army Commander's very strong contrary recommendations.
(Shazly 29-36). Sadat, in his
autobiography clearly tries to discredit Shazly and states that the Egyptians
conducted the attack to the passes in order to relieve Israeli pressure on the
Syrians on the northern front. At other
points in his discussion of the war, though, Sadat seems to contradict his
stated reason and speaks as if he intended the Egyptians to conduct the attack
to the passes from the outset, irrespective of circumstances. For example, Sadat, in discussing Henry
Kissinger's initial cease-fire proposal after early Egyptian successes states,
"We had already captured the Bar-Lev line, which meant that the first
stage of the war had been completed. We
now had to reach the Sinai passes, the second and last stage." (Sadat, 289). Shazly addresses at length the major controversy surrounding the
decision to conduct an attack to the passes in his autobiography. Following the war, Sadat and Ismail publicly
blamed Shazly for the attack's terrible failure. Ironically, albeit incorrectly, Shazly was hailed by the Arab
press as having desired to attack to the passes during Egypt's initial assault,
but, so the press said, was overruled by Ismail and Sadat. After the cease-fire agreement, Egypt held a
day of national celebration, broadcast nationwide on television, during which
the senior military commanders were awarded decorations. Shazly, however, was not invited to attend
and some months later received Egypt's highest military decoration
unceremoniously through the mail.

[70]Shazly, 33-36. Israel's strategic defense plan rested upon the assumption that
the Arab's could not prepare, position, and launch a major attack across the
frontiers, particularly the Suez, without giving sufficient warning (three to
five days) to allow the Israelis time to fully mobilize and deploy their
reserve forces. The defense plan
involved a combination of static and mobile defenses. Israel had a strategic need to conduct an area defense along the
entire frontier of the occupied territories, but a force that was simply too
small to do it. The need to defend all
along the border was most critical along the length of the Suez Canal, which
was of extremely high political value. Loss of the canal, even temporarily, with the attendant risk of an
internationally imposed cease-fire that could make the loss permanent, was
politically unacceptable. The IDF,
grossly outnumbered by the Arab forces, employed a mobile defense of maneuver
and surprise to offset its disparity in numbers. It was ill-suited and undersized to conduct a static area
defense. A compromise arose involving a
series of 33 strongpoints the Israelis built after the 1967 war along the west
bank of the Suez Canal, known as the Bar-Lev line. All but 16 of these strongpoints were later closed, but those
remaining served as early-warning posts and fixed positions to divide an
attacking force. The mobile force
staged behind these static positions. A
division-sized armor IDF counterattack force was arrayed behind these
strongpoints and prepared to move against an enemy's main attack across the
Suez Canal. The situation was similar
on the frontier with Syria, where Israel constructed 17 static defense positions
on volcanic hills. These fixed
strongpoints, manned by platoon sized forces were supported by an armor brigade
staged to its rear.

[73] Israel's military strategy developed
from previous experiences in war against the Arabs. Israel, concerned with self-preservation, was fundamentally on
the strategic defensive in all of its wars, including the 1973 October
War. At the operational and tactical
levels, however, Israeli military doctrine was inherently offensive. Israel believed it was critical that the
nation maintain military superiority relative to its Arab enemies, with a
capability to totally mobilize its reserve forces within 72 hours of an
emerging crisis. Israeli military
strategy sought to launch preemptive offensive operations, as it had in 1967,
when it appeared an attack against it was imminent. In this manner, Israel hoped to shorten any potential conflict
and carry the battle away from Israeli soil. Otherwise, Israel would immediately and viciously counter-attack to
seize the initiative in an effort to defeat the threat at its frontier. Israeli operational and tactical doctrine
sought to immediately achieve air superiority and attack or counterattack with
a combined-arms force of armor
supported by air. Israel's aggressive
strategy of preemptive attack, in an effort to win decisive battles quickly,
stemmed in large measure from the great disparity in the size of its population
and active armed forces vis-a-vis those of its Arab enemies.

[77]Dr. Joe Strange, Perspectives on Warfighting Number
Four: Centers of Gravity & Critical Vulnerabilities: Building on the
Clausewitzian Foundation So That We Can All Speak the Same Language,
Monograph, Marine Corps Command and Staff College Foundation (Quantico:
1996). Dr. Strange offers the following
definitions: Centers of Gravity:
"agents and/or sources of moral or physical strength, power and
resistance"; Critical
Capabilities: "inherent abilities enabling a center of gravity to function
as such"; Critical Requirements:
"essential condition, resources and means for a critical capability to be
fully operative"; Critical
Vulnerabilities: "critical requirements or components thereof which are deficient,
or vulnerable to neutralization, interdiction or attack (moral/physical harm)
in a manner achieving decisive or significant results, disproportional to the
military resources applied." (Strange, 3).

[78]Moshe Dayan, Moshe Dayan: Story of My Life (New York: William Morrow and Company, Inc.
1976), 523. There is one
exception. Israeli Minister of Defense
Moshe Dayan, in his autobiography, made one reference to centers of gravity
stating, "[a]fter the successful conclusion of our general counter-attack
on the northern front on October 13, the center of military gravity shifted to
the south. With Egyptian troops on the
east bank, it was essential to change the situation on the canal front. (O'Ballance, 34). During the meeting between Egyptian and Syrian military planners,
Egypt's General Ismail provided a military appraisal in which he enumerated
Israeli advantages as: air superiority,
technological skill, efficient training, and reliance on quick aid from the
United States. Ismail listed Israeli disadvantages
as: long lines of communication, on
multiple fronts which were difficult to defend; limited manpower that did not permit heavy loss of life; an economy that could not sustain extended
conflict; and the wanton evil of
conceit (i.e., overconfidence). (Shazly, 25-27). Egypt's Chief of Staff
Lieutenant General Shazly, when conducting the planning for the operation,
identified factors which led to the
conclusion that only a limited attack was advisable and that Egypt should fight
Israel in long sustained combat. These
included: the weakness of the Egyptian Air Force relative to the strong IAF (if the Egyptian planes challenged the
IAF head-to-head, they would lose, and thus Egyptian planes could not provide
air cover for advancing infantry and armor forces); the offensive limitations imposed by insufficient numbers of
mobile SAMs to provide air cover for advancing Egyptian infantry and armor
against the IAF (thus the advance had to be limited to a distance within the
range of the SAMs); the need to counter
the enemy's ability to fight quick blitzkrieg campaigns, and to capitalize on
the Israeli inability to accept casualties and economy incapable of sustaining
a prolonged conflict (by consolidating strong defensive positions and fighting
a protracted war of attrition).

[81]In 1973 Egypt's population was 36 million
and her armed forces consisted of 318,000 troops on active service and 500,000
trained reserves. Syria's population
was 6 million and her active military size was 110,000 regulars with 200,000
reservists. Israel's Jewish population
was 2,434,000. The IDF had a regular
military component of 25,000 with an additional 50,000 conscripts at some level
of training at any one time. When
reserves were fully mobilized , IDF strength numbered about 310,000.

[84]T.N. Dupuy, Historical Evaluation and
Research Organization. The Middle East War of October 1973 in Historical
Perspective, Prepared for Director Net Assessment, Office of the
Secretary of Defense, (February 1976).

[93]Chaim Herzog, The War of Atonement, (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1973), 275.

[94] Prime Minister Meir, consistent with the
advice of Moshe Dayan, but contrary that of General Elazar, rejected the idea
of a preemptive strike against the Arabs. The rationale for the decision against preemptive attack offered by both
Meir and Dayan in their memoirs was their fear that the United States would
abandon Israel if it attacked first, irrespective of the provocation and
imminent threat of war presented by the massed Arab forces on the borders of
the occupied territories. Describing
her feelings during the war as she watched US transport aircraft laden with
military supplies for Israel land, Meir wrote, "Thank God I was right to
reject the idea of a preemptive strike! It might have saved lives in the beginning, but I am sure that we would
not have had that airlift, which is now saving so many lives." (Meir,
431). Regarding her decision not to mobilize Israeli forces, though, Meir
wrote, "Today I know what I should have done. I should have overcome my
hesitations. I knew as well as anyone else [what] full-scale mobilization meant
and how much money it would cost, and I also knew that only a few months
before, in May, we had an alert and the reserves had been called up; but
nothing happened .... That Friday [5 October] I should have listened to the
warnings of my own heart and ordered a call-up .... I, who was so accustomed to
making decisions--and who did make them throughout the war--failed to make that
one decision." (Meir, 424-425).