North Korea and its relations with the South have dominated the news this fall, with the elevation of Kim Jong-un as Kim Jong Il‘s successor, North Korea’s announcement that it had built a vast facility to produce low enrichment uranium, and the bombardment last month of Yeonpyeong Island by the North following the commencement of military exercises by South Korea. To sort out fact from fiction and get an inside look at politics on the Korean Peninsula, Britannica Blog went to one of the leading experts on Korean politics, Professor Chung-in Moon. Moon, a Britannica contributor, is a professor of political science at Yonsei University and editor-in-chief of Global Asia. The author of more than 40 books and several hundred articles, he was a special delegate to the summits between North and South Korea in 2000 and 2007. He also served as chairman of the Presidential Committee on Northeast Asian Cooperation Initiative, a cabinet-level post, and was ambassador for international security at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade during the Roh Moo Hyun government. He kindly agreed to answer a few questions from Britannica Executive Editor Michael Levy. (Editor’s Note: Professor Moon also served on Michael Levy’s dissertation committee while serving as a professor of political science at the University of Kentucky.)

Moon: On both occasions, the overall atmosphere was congenial. Two South Korean leaders’ meetings with Kim Young Nam, Chairman of the Standing Committee of the Supreme People Congress and formal head of the state, before their encounter with North Korean leader Kim Jong Il, were tense. Kim Young Nam took an usually hard stance. But when they met Kim Jong Il, the real leader, he was candid, friendly, and forthcoming. He was extremely well-informed of what is going on in South Korea and around the world, and he clearly demonstrated his will to improve inter-Korean relations. [Editor's Note: For an excerpt of Professor Moon's commentary on the details of the summit, click here. A full version of the article, “Reflections on a Summit, is available on the Web site of Global Asia, an English-language quarterly magazine Professor Moon is currently editing.]

Britannica: North Korea’s nuclear weapons program represents one of the most potentially destabilizing forces on the Korean Peninsula (and the world for that matter). Kim Jong Il has been a master of agreeing to halt the program or subject it to international checks while extracting aid concessions through the Six-Party Talks (North Korea, South Korea, China, Japan, Russia, and the United States). Invariably, the perception in the West is that he always goes back on the agreement eventually, forcing the talks to start from scratch. How accurate is that perception, and if you could look into Kim Jong Il’s mind, what is it that he wants from the talks?

Moon: I do not agree with your observation. This is a typical Western perception that is grossly misguided and distorted. A careful analysis of North Korea’s behavior shows an unusual consistence. North Korea has been rather reactive than proactive or provocative. Whenever the six-party talks failed to deliver what was promised during the negotiations, the North is said to show what we call ‘rogue behavior.’ Extracting aid concession from six-party talk members is not its goal. To my knowledge, North Korea is seeking the nuclear path in order to secure a minimal nuclear deterrence against the United States. When I interviewed North Korean leaders, they truly believed that the United States would attack North Korea with its tactical nuclear weapons. Another rationale behind its pursuit of nuclear weapons is closely related to a growing gap in the conventional arms race with South Korea, whose national defense budget is nearly equal to North Korea’s gross domestic product. North Korea’s obsession with asymmetric forces (e.g., nuclear, biochemical, special commando forces) reflects its concern with the inferiority of its conventional arms. The nuclear weapons card is also being used as an instrument to enhance Chairman Kim Jong Il’s domestic legitimacy because North Korea’s possession of nuclear weapons not only enhances its international status but also facilitates the realization of ‘a strong and prosperous great nation.’ And Kim Jong Il is also pursuing ‘military first politics,’ in which the nuclear weapons can be used as an effective tool for co-opting the military. Extracting concession or export earnings are not principal goals. And, I do not agree with the Western characterization of North Korea as an extorting or ruthless concession-seeking nation. North Korea argues that it is its sovereign right to develop nuclear energy for peaceful purposes and that if the United States, Japan, and South Korea want the cancellation of its nuclear programs, they should compensate its energy losses. That is why the six-party talks have agreed to provide the North with heavy oil. I am not taking North Korea’s side, but it is very important to analyze claims from both sides in an objective manner. But so far, the West, especially the Unite States, has been demonizing North Korea and has blamed only the North for all the setbacks and stalemates. Addressing North Korea’s authentic concerns, not contrived ones through Western biases, stereotype, and mirror image, should be the first step toward resolving the North Korean nuclear quagmire. What Kim Jong Il wants from the talks is the assurance of peace and security, especially from the United States, through the termination of hostile relations and diplomatic normalization. Thus, turning North Korea into a normal state as well as creating a peace regime on the Korean peninsula would constitute essential steps toward realization of the verifiable dismantling of North Korea’s nuclear programs and weapons. He would also want foreign direct investment and development assistance from the outside for economic revitalization.

Britannica: The perception of the DMZ in the West is that it is powder keg, possibly erupting into war between North and South Korea at any time—and drawing in China and the United States in a deadly regional conflagration. Is this feeling shared by South Koreans, particularly those living in Seoul, which is so close to the line?

Moon: South Koreans used to be panic when even a minor military skirmish occurred. For example, in the aftermath of North Korea’s commando attack to the Blue House, the office of the president, on January 21, 1968, many South Koreans were truly terrorized and made a massive exodus to the United States in fear of the outbreak of war. But inter-Korean rapprochement during the progressive decade (i.e., the Kim Dae Jung and the Roh Moo Hyun government) freed South Koreans from fear and insecurity–particularly because of rapidly increased inter-Korean exchanges and cooperation and political and military confidence-building measures. Nevertheless, an increasing frequency of military clashes (e.g., a shooting death of a South Korean tourist in the Mount Geumgang area, naval clash in the West Sea, torpedoing of a South Korean frigate, and a recent artillery attack on the Yeonpyong island) has heightened fear and insecurity among South Koreans. However, probably owing to the presence of American forces in South Korea, they do not believe that there would be a major escalation on the Korean peninsula, lessening their anxiety.

Britannica: Until recently, North Koreans presumably knew very little about Kim Jong-un, Kim Jong Il’s youngest son and hand-picked successor, until he was appointed a general as part of the succession process. What support do you perceive for Kim Jong-un among both the military and the North Korean people and how smooth do you think the succession process will be?

Moon: North Korean citizens might not be happy with his succession, but they are powerless. North Korea does not have any civil society from which any organized civil opposition could emerge. Meanwhile, Kim Jong-un is currently being patronized and protected by three layers of supporting forces. The first layer of patronage is his family, which is composed of his father Kim Jong Il, his aunt Kim Kyoung-hee, and his uncle Chang Sung-taik. They are all powerful. The Korea Workers’ Party, which was institutionally strengthened after the party representatives meeting on September 28, 2010, now offers him the second layer of protection and support. Finally, the military lend undisputed support and protection to him. Thus, I do not see any problem in the succession process. As a matter of fact, the designation of Kim Jong-un as his successor has reduced the uncertainty associated with the succession. However, if Chairman Kim Jong Il passes away or becomes incapacitated within one or two years, the succession process could be troublesome. Nevertheless, such a development would not lead to a regime collapse, needless to say the collapse of a sovereign state, because of vested interests and unity among Kim family members, party officials, and the military.

Britannica: Recently, the United States and South Korea marked the 60th anniversary of their alliance, which began in 1950 with the Korean Augmentation to the U.S. Army, and there are more than 25,000 U.S. troops stationed in South Korea. In 2007 the U.S. and South Korea agreed to an operational control (OPCON) transfer in 2012, which would consolidate U.S. based on the peninsula and transfer primary capabilities of defense to South Korean forces. That was delayed, through Strategic Alliance 2015, by three years. Can you briefly describe why OPCON came about and its importance, as well as the effect that it will have on the number of U.S. troops stationed on the peninsula?

Moon: As to the details of transfer of wartime operational control, please refer to to my article “Misunderstandings on the Transfer of Wartime Operational Control” from 2006, which was prepared for the Korea Policy review. I personally believe that it is wrong to delay the transfer to 2015. The delay was politically motivated. When the transfer is made, the ROK-U.S. Combined Forces Command will be dissolved, and a new parallel command structure will be created. I do not see any immediate effect on the number of U.S. troops stationed on the peninsula. The size of U.S. troops in South Korea will be influenced by the level of American security commitment, budget constraints, and South Korea’s defense burden sharing.

Britannica: North Korea recently unveiled a new, quickly built and vast facility for enriching uranium. What kind of threat is this and what does it portend for challenge does this represent to the six-party talks? And, how much should South Koreans worry about this development?

Moon: What North Korea unveiled to Dr. Siegfried Hecker [who once directed the Los Alamos National Laboratory] was the low uranium enrichment program for peaceful use. It would take more time and effort to transform it into a high uranium enrichment program and to produce uranium-based nuclear bombs. Thus, it would not pose any immediate threats, whereas its existing nuclear bombs made of plutonium pose a pressing threat. Some argue that the revelation is an outright violation of six-party talks agreements and that North Korea should be punished for its wrongdoings through additional sanctions. But I do not buy this argument. Its very possession of the uranium enrichment program demonstrates that sanctions are not working. As the Chinese government has been arguing, addressing concerns over the enrichment program through the immediate resumption of the six-party talks seems a much wiser policy posture than the outright boycott of the talks–which would allow North Korea to take a more risky path regarding the weaponization of enrichment program. Time is not on our side. And South Koreans are worried about the development because the chance for denuclearization of North Korea is getting dimmer.

Britannica: In the aftermath of North Korea’s recent attack that killed four people, including two civilians, how likely is the situation to escalate and what do you see as the likeliest scenario, and why do you think North Korea unleashed such an aggressive attack?

Moon: The South Korean government, including its newly appointed defense minister, pledged to make a tough retaliation on North Korea’s military provocation. Kim Gwan-jin, the new defense minister, stated during his national assembly appointment hearing that he would even use air power (i.e., F-15s, and F-16s) in retaliating and destroying North Korea’s artillery bases. This being the case, we cannot rule out the possibility of escalation since North Korea has more than 1,200 long-range artillery pieces aiming at the Seoul metropolitan area in which more than 20 million people live. However, wartime operation control rests with the American commander of the ROK-U.S. Combined Forces Command (CFC). Thus, it seems highly unlikely, except in the case of immediate self-defense, that South Korea would strike back with massive force including air power against North Korean targets without the permission of the CFC Commander. It seems ironic to note that the escalation into a full-blown war depends on an American decision, not a South Korean one. Why did the North do it? The South Korean explanation is that the attack was a premeditated act to provoke the South, to nullify the Northern limit line, and to smooth out the succession process by contriving an external tension. By contrast, North Korea says that the attack was a righteous act of self-defense to South Korea’s aggressive move of shelling its territorial waterway. I am inclined to support the South Korean position. Yet, the North Korean claim also deserves a prudent attention.