Etienne Balibar and Antonio Negri on the constitution of Europe

Notes from a seminar in Rome, June 2004 *

*Translation and transcription by Arianna Bove. This text is in note form because it was
translated directly at the meeting with no recording device.

Etienne Balibar

Rather than as an
expert on EU politics I speak as a citizen because the EU is one of the
most fascinating and mysterious philosophical objects. I write in this
conjunction. As speak of constitution as a Politeia, not only formally
but also juridically important, as well as materially - with its equilibrium
and ridden with conflict - in the Aristotelian sense of constitution of
citizenship. It is about a pre-existing citizenship that is not State-centred
nor sovereign. It is not a citizenship 'of' the European Union, but one
'in' the EU. This designates the name of an aporia, in the positive and
negative sense. It is the name of the process and indefinite progress
but also the name of a permanent crisis and an impossibility. The question
is: what ae we doing in Europe? Building r destroying sovereignty?

Conjuncture:

The conjuncture is
a critical one and open to innovation of the EU project. Where is the
will and virtue(Machiavelli) to operate this renewal? In order for this
virtue to come to light we need a catastrophe. I wrote on the actual paradox
of progress and blockage, the latter identified by the actions of Spain
etc. Right now we could say that these difficulties are over, with the
Spanish elections and the promise ot go back to normal. But as we start
thinking the problems are over, there comes Blair's decision on the Referendum.
This constitutional project, however formal and liberal, is against some
national projects of power of Great Britain and its tradition. These are
not contingent effects of power struggles. They are symptoms of the contradiction
internal to the constitutional project. The impossibility of circumscribing
in a closed political space...

There are four aporias:

1) The nature of the
weak superstate, that is todays' Europe and the missing European people.

2) The problem of
borders

3) EU citizenship
as superior to national ones but lacking recognition of new rights

4) The blockage of
cosmopolitan citizenships that lack authority

1) Weak Statalism
without a State = bureaucratism, federal state, centralised and dislocated,
supernational institutions that contain whilst limiting their sovereignty
(subsidiaries). One aspect of the function of sovereignty is transferred
to the super national level whilst being subject to being divided for
instance on taxation. The power to tax belongs to States. Whilst there
is a monetary union, the practical side is that of neutralising centre
and periphery. There is a denial of the affirmation of EU independence.
Reconciling will to generality ad particularity, the latter being expressed
by th eneed to preserve the political class. The embodiment of this new
historic compromise is the bureaucracy. The latter cannot circumvent the
centres nor the multilevelled systems of government, nor can it impose
a strong line on public policy to the member states. This is what is at
stake in the new version of federalism: the relation between legitimacy
and people. We cannot avoid questioning the lack of the former wthout
asking who the European people is. Is it the European peace movement?
This is insufficient and we are still faced with the dilemma, when we
come across the Bismarkian position (with Nietzsche): the state is the
people. This solution would create a statist idol and repress social conflict,
what Gramsci called a passive revolution. That is not an active revolution,
i.e. a party of the movement of the multitude, because in Europe we fear
the masses, governments are terorised by the idea that the masses might
participaate. This leads to the melting of sovereignty down into the public,
and inaugurates the second deadly jump in the history of sovereignty since
the passage from price to people: the shift from people to peoples.

2) EU identity. whether
this is exclusive or inclusive is impossible to define (see the issue
of Turkey). There is a demagogic issue at play and nobody claims that
the integration of Turkey would be easy. Keynes helps us to understand
te arbitrary character of the EU borders in this case. In 1923 he wrote
as a European even though he was English. The Atlantism of the UK is irreducible
but this does not mean that we should expel the Uk and include Turkey
in Europe. Greek cypriots refuse the unification of the island despite
the EU monitoring that they should be included. If Turkey entered the
EU we could no longer refuse citizenship to Turkish people. We cannot
keep up the fiction of a qualitative difference between outsider and inside.
Jugoslavia, the unresolved question, demonstrated this. External politicisation
and internal depoliticisation of conflict. The positive side is the virtual
capacity for the EU to have a role as mediator in the fault lines of globalisation.
It might be a myth. This is impossible unless the EU becomes the protagonist
of a step forward in the progress of citizenship.

3) The vicious circle
of new citizenship without new rights. Progress as regress and revenge
of the proprietor class. The motto of French politicians is now Social
Europe, but why now if not yesterday? The Brits resist against the Social
charter but the latter is limited. There won't be legitimation for a constitution
unless it is more democratic than existing national ones. We deal wth
an option between more solidarity and less individuation. The halt comes
from the veto imposed on the constitutionalisation of basic rights, equal
opportunity and the equality of all citizens. The vicious circle is also
due to the fact that forms of counterpower are in crisis. The positive
side of this aporia may be the growth of political spontaneity and the
need of transnational communication.

4) A passive EU position
on the question of global citizenship. Can we talk of cosmopolitanism/internationalism?
The urgency to imlement a founding ground to oppose to the US an alternative
programme. It needs a double moveemnt, an aleatory convergence of constitutive
and constituent power. The former lies in the movement of movements and
also in global feminism, which has put into crisis national tribalism
and corrisponds to the minor power (Macchiavelli) of those who don't want
to oppress nor wish to be oppressed. There is always an antipolitical
residue. Today this is a combination of militarism and humanitarianism.
This combination is eating into the political space. In this frame the
need and lack of Europe is mostly felt. There are other possible mediators,
but the EU has a strategic place in relation to the Middle East. We feel
like at a threshold. There is a feeling of desperation. Contemporary politics
can lead anywhere, even to fascim or qualunquismo. But there is also a
strong sense of political responsibility.

Antonio Negri

Crisis of American
unilateralism. Bush's 18th Brumaire has failed. The awareness of this
failure is to be underlined. Bush never wanted Europe nor did America.
Since the 50's America has sabotaged any attempt at a European constitution.
This is exhalted in US unilateralism. The main moment was 1972-1973. It
was the year of Eurpe and Kissinger created the oil crisis, pushing on
the weak point of Europe: energy and Middle Eastern petroil. Michael Moore
is partial in his interpretation of the porblem. From this view, Europe
must be thought of as divided into two: the pro and the anti-war nations.
They were Europeanists. Zapatero breaks with America and opens the debate
on the EU. He breaks with Euroscepticism. The point insisted upon is the
European critical mass. But what is Europe today? No place for UK or Franco-German
hegemony. If we break with the US we must take the political risks. It
is not up to us to choose which EU citizenship we like. We must choose
whether or not we want Europe. On that basis EU citizenship will be formed.
philo-american and anti-russians were put together in a cohesion that
created critical moments in these countries (see Poland). We must first
decide whether or not we want Europe. Is it a terrain of peace? The big
problem is that unilateralism opens the question of global governance.
It makes it possible to have a policentric dispositif. It reveals the
proliferation of continental powers: Russia , China and Latin America.
Today we are faced with a strongly policentred world. Peace lies within
this proliferation. We must firstly accept Europe as it is if we want
to play this game and must be careful to help this continental power to
constitute itself. To not be in Europe equates to not doing politics.
The condition of US unilateralism is the point of departure of the new
EU constitution.

Secondly, Europe is
an ugly beast. If the imperial order is similar to what Polibius describes
then the failure of the monarchy of Empire makes the oligarchy the winner.
Corporations have won, not the multitude. We will find another alliance.
Our problem is not the EU yes or no, but this aristocratic constitution,
a constitution of multinational corporations. We cannot accept it nor
avoid it because the political conditions are these. It is like a Magna
Charta: the multitudes are excluded from this process. Peace is determined
not by the multitude in struggle, but by the corporations' blackmail.
How do we take back the initiative? The advantage of the movements is
that they are global. Will parties be capable of opening up to the movements
in this situation? Can they mediate without drawing the movements into
the mechanism of representation? [Tr. note: Fausto Bertinotti was the
third speaker at the event - these points were directed to him and his
party Rifondazione Comunista - no apology for absence of notes and transcript
on my part]. Institutions and classical representation expropriates the
multitude's capacity for expression. Our problem is to pose the new theme
of a political representation. See Latin America and the relation between
new governance and the movements? How can we launch in Europe such reflection?
The Left is just a representation but can no longer be. I think that today
the weak structure of the EU leaves us a lot of room for experimentation,
with all the risks, because this space can be filled by the movement as
much as by lobbies, but it is on this weakness that we could express the
peace and instances, moments of subversion of the given situation. Does
the present EU constitution reinforce or weaken power? Both. This ambiguity
must be played at two levels: interally on the power of multinationals,
externally on a push for peace. I agree on the top plus bottom push needed
by the EU.