Translation of abstract (English)

The present dissertation discusses share buybacks against the background of conflicting information and incentives in the relationships between shareholders, creditors and company management. Economic conditions and control mechanisms within the German financial system are addressed explicitly in order to assess the signal and incentive effects of buybacks. The study of share buybacks before and during the 1931 banking crisis shows that the primary goal in this period tended to be the transfer of corporate assets to the assets of a few shareholders. An analysis of the current legislation on share buybacks demonstrates that this type of misuse is no longer possible. However, financial analysis and descriptive statistics indicate that in the present German financial system – which is characterized by a concentration of private equity in the hands of only a few equity holders – share buybacks are used within the existing insider system because companies primarily purchase their own shares for subsequent use as an acquisition currency. In the U.S. financial system, the key motives for share buybacks are seen in the distribution of liquid funds to a wide range of shareholders and the associated signals to the markets, but these are of subordinate importance in Germany. Insofar, the results of the present study can be taken as an indication that the introduction of a single element taken from a market-dominated outsider system to the German insider system does not necessarily lead to stronger market orientation. The approach taken by German legislators must therefore be challenged. The study is rounded out by an examination of a buyback of own shares in a GmbH (limited liability company). In this situation, the potential for harm appears to be greater.