WASHINGTON — A small number of C.I.A. officers are operating secretly in southern Turkey, helping allies decide which Syrian opposition fighters across the border will receive arms to fight the Syrian government, according to American officials and Arab intelligence officers.

And the CIA, my friend, aren't interested in charity, so even if your Libyan rebels are the ones raising hell, they (or whoever ultimately makes up the core of the Syrian 'rebels') are very much related to deals cut with the CIA/NATO/US.

Quote:

The clandestine intelligence-gathering effort is the most detailed known instance of the limited American support for the military campaign against the Syrian government

Quote:

The weapons, including automatic rifles, rocket-propelled grenades, ammunition and some antitank weapons, are being funneled mostly across the Turkish border by way of a shadowy network of intermediaries including Syria’s Muslim Brotherhood and paid for by Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Qatar, the officials said.

Quote:

The C.I.A. officers have been in southern Turkey for several weeks, in part to help keep weapons out of the hands of fighters allied with Al Qaeda or other terrorist groups, one senior American official said. The Obama administration has said it is not providing arms to the rebels, but it has also acknowledged that Syria’s neighbors would do so.

I think the last 10 or so years has shown that the the US doesn't control Turkey or Saudi Arabia and both have their own reasons for being involved in Syria

I don't see how your post very much refutes what I said. That the main supporters of the Syrian rebels are Saudi Arabia , Turkey and the gulf states and that they are supporting the Syrian rebels for their own reasons.

We have entered the endgame in Syria. That doesn't mean that we have reached the end by any means, but it does mean that the precondition has been met for the fall of the regime of Syrian President Bashar al Assad. We have argued that so long as the military and security apparatus remain intact and effective, the regime could endure. Although they continue to function, neither appears intact any longer; their control of key areas such as Damascus and Aleppo is in doubt, and the reliability of their personnel, given defections, is no longer certain. We had thought that there was a reasonable chance of the al Assad regime surviving completely. That is no longer the case. At a certain point -- in our view, after the defection of a Syrian pilot June 21 and then the defection of the Tlass clan -- key members of the regime began to recalculate the probability of survival and their interests. The regime has not unraveled, but it is unraveling.

The speculation over al Assad's whereabouts and heavy fighting in Damascus is simply part of the regime's problems. Rumors, whether true or not, create uncertainty that the regime cannot afford right now. The outcome is unclear. On the one hand, a new regime might emerge that could exercise control. On the other hand, Syria could collapse into a Lebanon situation in which it disintegrates into regions held by various factions, with no effective central government.

The Russian and Chinese Strategy

The geopolitical picture is somewhat clearer than the internal political picture. Whatever else happens, it is unlikely that al Assad will be able to return to unchallenged rule. The United States, France and other European countries have opposed his regime. Russia, China and Iran have supported it, each for different reasons. The Russians opposed the West's calls to intervene, which were grounded on human rights concerns, fearing that the proposed intervention was simply a subterfuge to extend Western power and that it would be used against them. The Chinese also supported the Syrians, in part for these same reasons. Both Moscow and Beijing hoped to avoid legitimizing Western pressure based on human rights considerations -- something they had each faced at one time or another. In addition, Russia and China wanted the United States in particular focused on the Middle East rather than on them. They would not have minded a military intervention that would have bogged down the United States, but the United States declined to give that to them.

But the Russian and Chinese game was subtler than that. It focused on Iran. As we have argued, if the al Assad regime were to survive and were to be isolated from the West, it would be primarily dependent on Iran, its main patron. Iran had supplied trainers, special operations troops, supplies and money to sustain the regime. For Iran, the events in Syria represented a tremendous opportunity. Iran already held a powerful position in Iraq, not quite dominating it but heavily influencing it. If the al Assad regime survived and had Iranian support to thank for its survival, Syria would become even more dependent on Iran than was Iraq. This would shore up the Iranian position in Iraq, but more important, it would have created an Iranian sphere of influence stretching from western Afghanistan to Lebanon, where Hezbollah is an Iranian ally.

The Russians and Chinese clearly understood that if this had happened, the United States would have had an intense interest in undermining the Iranian sphere of influence -- and would have had to devote massive resources to doing so. Russia and China benefitted greatly in the post-9/11 world, when the United States was obsessed with the Islamic world and had little interest or resources to devote to China and Russia. With the end of the Afghanistan war looming, this respite seemed likely to end. Underwriting Iranian hegemony over a region that would inevitably draw the United States' attention was a low-cost, high-return strategy.

The Chinese primarily provided political cover, keeping the Russians from having to operate alone diplomatically. They devoted no resources to the Syrian conflict but did continue to oppose sanctions against Iran and provided trade opportunities for Iran. The Russians made a much larger commitment, providing material and political support to the al Assad regime.

It seems the Russians began calculating the end for the regime some time ago. Russia continued to deliver ammunition and other supplies to Syria but pulled back on a delivery of helicopters. Several attempts to deliver the helicopters "failed" when British insurers of the ship pulled coverage. That was the reason the Russians gave for not delivering the helicopters, but obviously the Russians could have insured the ship themselves. They were backing off from supporting al Assad, their intelligence indicating trouble in Damascus. In the last few days the Russians have moved to the point where they had their ambassador to France suggest that the time had come for al Assad to leave -- then, of course, he denied having made the statement.

A Strategic Blow to Iran

As the Russians withdraw support, Iran is now left extremely exposed. There had been a sense of inevitability in Iran's rise in the region, particularly in the Arabian Peninsula. The decline of al Assad's regime is a strategic blow to the Iranians in two ways. First, the wide-reaching sphere of influence they were creating clearly won't happen now. Second, Iran will rapidly move from being an ascendant power to a power on the defensive.

The place where this will become most apparent is in Iraq. For Iran, Iraq represents a fundamental national security interest. Having fought a bloody war with Iraq in the 1980s, the Iranians have an overriding interest in assuring that Iraq remains at least neutral and preferably pro-Iranian. While Iran was ascendant, Iraqi politicians felt that they had to be accommodating. However, in the same way that Syrian generals had to recalculate their positions, Iraqi politicians have to do the same. With sanctions -- whatever their effectiveness -- being imposed on Iran, and with Iran's position in Syria unraveling, the psychology in Iraq might change.

This is particularly the case because of intensifying Turkish interest in Iraq. In recent days the Turks have announced plans for pipelines in Iraq to oil fields in the south and in the north. Turkish economic activity is intensifying. Turkey is the only regional power that can challenge Iran militarily. It uses that power against the Kurds in Iraq. But more to the point, if a country builds a pipeline, it must ensure access to it, either politically or militarily. Turkey does not want to militarily involve itself in Iraq, but it does want political influence to guarantee its interests. Thus, just as the Iranians are in retreat, the Turks have an interest in, if not supplanting them, certainly supplementing them.

The pressure on Iran is now intense, and it will be interesting to see the political consequences. There was consensus on the Syrian strategy, but with failure of the strategy, that consensus dissolves. This will have an impact inside of Iran, possibly even more than the sanctions. Governments have trouble managing reversals.

Other Consequences

From the American point of view, al Assad's decline opens two opportunities. First, its policy of no direct military intervention but unremitting political and, to a lesser extent, economic pressure appears to be working in this instance. More precisely, even if it had no effect, it will appear that it did, which will enhance the ability of the United States to influence events in other countries without actually having to intervene.

Second, the current situation opens the door for a genuine balance of power in the region that does not require constant American intervention. One of the consequences of the events in Syria is that Turkey has had to reconsider its policy toward countries on its periphery. In the case of Iraq, Turkey has an interest in suppressing the Kurdistan Workers' Party militants who have taken refuge there and defending oil and other economic interests. Turkey's strategy is moving from avoiding all confrontations to avoiding major military commitments while pursuing its political interests. In the end, that means that Turkey will begin moving into a position of balancing Iran for its own interests in Iraq.

This relieves the United States of the burden of containing Iran. We continue to regard the Iranian sphere of influence as a greater threat to American and regional interests than Iran's nuclear program. The decline of al Assad solves the major problem. It also increases the sense of vulnerability in Iran. Depending on how close they are to creating a deliverable nuclear weapon -- and our view is that they are not close -- the Iranians may feel it necessary to moderate their position.

A major loser in this is Israel. Israel had maintained a clear understanding with the al Assad regime. If the al Assad regime restrained Hezbollah, Israel would have no objection to al Assad's dominating Lebanon. That agreement has frayed since the United States pushed al Assad's influence out of Lebanon in 2006. Nevertheless, the Israelis preferred al Assad to the Sunnis -- until it appeared that the Iranians would dominate Syria. But the possibility of either an Islamist regime in Damascus or, more likely, Lebanese-style instability cannot please the Israelis. They are already experiencing jihadist threats in Sinai. The idea of having similar problems in Syria, where the other side of the border is the Galilee rather than the Negev, must make them nervous.

But perhaps the most important losers will be Russia and China. Russia, like Iran, has suffered a significant setback in its foreign policy that will have psychological consequences. The situation in Syria has halted the foreign-policy momentum the Russians had built up. But more important, the Russian and Chinese hope has been that the United States would continue to treat them as secondary issues while it focused on the Middle East. The decline of al Assad and the resulting dynamic in the region increases the possibility that the United States can disengage from the region. This is not something the Russians or Chinese want, but in the end, they did not have the power to create the outcome in Syria that they had wanted.

The strategy of the dominant power is to encourage a balance of power that contains threats without requiring direct intervention. This was the British strategy, but it has not been one that the United States has managed well. After the jihadist wars, there is a maturation under way in U.S. strategy. That means allowing the intrinsic dynamic in the region to work, intervening only as the final recourse. The events in Syria appear to be simply about the survival of the al Assad regime. But they have far greater significance in terms of limiting Iranian power, creating a local balance of power and freeing the United States to focus on global issues, including Russia and China.

If this were happening in Jordan or Saudi the Free Syrian Army would be terrorists and Clinton would be flying around the world talking about the grave threat from terrorists to our friends. Truth is, as in Libya, the Syrian rebels are a hodge podge of religious nuts and useless pissed off young men. They're not looking for a constitutional convention where the rights of all are respected. They seek power. The process is useful if one were to want a war with Iran and a generally disorganized Middle East (less one).

There was an interesting and well-written letter to the editor in the Korea Herald on Wednesday.

Unfortunately, it had no point of view beyond 'what is happening is awful'.

Even the worst bigots on this thread don't gloat about the blood-shed happening in Syria.

It would be a more interesting thread if the pro-Assad people would just come out and say they support the West helping Assad reimpose his dictatorship. For those who support arming (or whatever) the rebels, it would help if they gave a direct statement of strategy and recommended policy initiatives.

It would be a more interesting thread if the pro-Assad people would just come out and say they support the West helping Assad reimpose his dictatorship. For those who support arming (or whatever) the rebels, it would help if they gave a direct statement of strategy and recommended policy initiatives.

I think you're kind of missing the point or being intentionally disingenous. The West has been funding, organizing, arming, and training the "rebels" from the very beginning, as well as flying in mercenaries from Libya, using state and "mainstream" media for black propaganda, and jamming Syrian communications so they cannot get their side out.

If the west stopped supporting the "rebels" and especially if their proxies from Saudi Arabia and Qatar stopped paying them eight times the average Syrian salary to fight, this so-called revolution would grind to a halt.

So maybe it would be more interesting if those who intentionally keep their heads in the sand would be more honest and present a case for why empowering islamist freaks, thugs for hire and Western stooges to destroy the Syrian state and enable a pogrom against Alawites and Christians- which is what we are doing now- is a good idea. That I would like to hear.

It would be a more interesting thread if the pro-Assad people would just come out and say they support the West helping Assad reimpose his dictatorship. For those who support arming (or whatever) the rebels, it would help if they gave a direct statement of strategy and recommended policy initiatives.

I think you're kind of missing the point or being intentionally disingenous. The West has been funding, organizing, arming, and training the "rebels" from the very beginning, as well as flying in mercenaries from Libya, using state and "mainstream" media for black propaganda, and jamming Syrian communications so they cannot get their side out.

If the west stopped supporting the "rebels" and especially if their proxies from Saudi Arabia and Qatar stopped paying them eight times the average Syrian salary to fight, this so-called revolution would grind to a halt.

So maybe it would be more interesting if those who intentionally keep their heads in the sand would be more honest and present a case for why empowering islamist freaks, thugs for hire and Western stooges to destroy the Syrian state and enable a pogrom against Alawites and Christians- which is what we are doing now- is a good idea. That I would like to hear.

(edited to replace "genocide" with pogrom- a bit more accurate)

Gotta go with the professor on this one - designed, packaged and now being delivered.

I've been following this guy ever since the "Deck of Cards" was released. Most of the guys looked like Corporals turned into Colonels. Then I saw this guy. "He might give us some trouble. Dude looks like a professional soldier." Turns out the ol instincts were right.

You know, it kinda seems like he might suddenly become useful to "us". Against Assad, against Iran. Probably why he's allegedly in Qatar and not dead. If that doesn't show how dirty our whole Mideast policy is, I don't know what does.

If the west stopped supporting the "rebels" and especially if their proxies from Saudi Arabia and Qatar stopped paying them eight times the average Syrian salary to fight, this so-called revolution would grind to a halt.

So maybe it would be more interesting if those who intentionally keep their heads in the sand would be more honest and present a case for why empowering islamist freaks, thugs for hire and Western stooges to destroy the Syrian state and enable a pogrom against Alawites and Christians- which is what we are doing now- is a good idea. That I would like to hear.

Nope. Nah. Hunh-uh.

You are arguing that for now and forever more, Syria must remain under the brutal control of a minority.

It is perfectly clear that Tunisia, Libya, and Egypt all have made moves toward (I'm not saying they have arrived)...toward a government that better represents the people.

Each is different, with different local conditions, but I don't see Syria as being fundamentally different from the others. The people are lunging toward a better system. They may succeed, or they may fail, but it is in our interest to promote the attempt for a more just system.

I suppose....only suppose...that during the Cold War we had little choice but to support dictators of various stripes (I would argue that we didn't have to), but now there is not that ideological divide. From Morocco to Iran, this part of the world has been struggling to find a better political arrangement.

My fear is that those who don't support democracy overseas won't continue to support it at home.

The prime minister has bailed out and maybe taken two or three generals with him. Obama has increased the amount of aid being allowed in. Turkey is still in a quandary because 40 of its 68 generals are in prison.

I don't know if Obama was right to send in more aid. I do know that I trust Obama more than Romney. He showed complete incompetence on his big international tour. No doubt all of you know the history of the '30's, the last time we had a major international economic crisis. The possibilities for this time around scare me.

The Syrian rebels would be immeasurably weaker today without al-Qaeda in their ranks. By and large, Free Syrian Army (FSA) battalions are tired, divided, chaotic, and ineffective. Feeling abandoned by the West, rebel forces are increasingly demoralized as they square off with the Assad regime's superior weaponry and professional army. Al-Qaeda fighters, however, may help improve morale. The influx of jihadis brings discipline, religious fervor, battle experience from Iraq, funding from Sunni sympathizers in the Gulf, and most importantly, deadly results. In short, the FSA needs al-Qaeda now.

CFR.

Kristof and Gerson want America to go to war with one of Israel's pesky neighbors.

Writing in Tablet, a daily online Jewish magazine, Foundation for Defense of Democracies fellow Lee Smith provocatively compares Syria’s increasingly imperiled Alawite minority to the most reviled group in modern history. In a piece revealingly entitled “Cause for Celebration in Syria,” the senior editor of the neoconservative Weekly Standard advises:

Many have noted the increasing presence of Islamists in the armed opposition and are warning that the United States might need to intervene to protect the Alawites and other minorities, like Christians, from being targeted. For instance, former CIA analyst Bruce Riedel has written that “one of the priorities of the international community after Assad falls will be to protect the Alawite community and its allies from vengeance.” Some in the Obama Administration have echoed Riedel, speaking of a “positive democratic transition that is inclusive, that is tolerant, that creates a place for all Syrians.” But that’s not going to happen right now—not after the Alawites have slaughtered thousands of Sunnis. The White House did not move a finger to save them, so why should step in to protect those who hunted them?

The idea that the Assad regime and its supporters warrant American protection simply because they are a minority group is not only strategically incoherent but immoral. During the course of four decades, the Assads have supported terrorist groups that targeted the United States and American allies in Israel, Lebanon, Iraq, Jordan, Turkey, and the Gulf Arab states. The Assads have allied with virtually every anti-American power for 40 years, from the Soviet Union to Iran. Does anyone believe that in the aftermath of World War II it was the role of the United States to save the Nazis and their allies from the Red Army? Of course not. Political wisdom begins with being able to distinguish enemies from friends, even if those allies are only temporary. (emphasis added)

In light of Smith’s invidious analogy, it’s worth recalling what Norman Finkelstein said to Yoav Shamir in Defamation, the Israeli filmmaker’s brilliant 2009 documentary on anti-Semitism: “The irony is that the Nazi Holocaust has now become the main ideological weapon for launching wars of aggression,” Finkelstein tells Shamir. “Every time you want to launch a war of aggression, drag in the Nazi Holocaust.”

With Tel Aviv having succeeded, in great part through the effective deployment of its American lobby, in inducing Washington and other lesser proxies — euphemistically known as the “international community” — to launch the latest war of aggression on its behalf against another Arab neighbour, Smith and his ilk will no doubt before long advocate a Nuremberg-style trial for the newest “Hitler” and his Nazi-like supporters.

Meanwhile, they will not cease to remind us of the “existential threat” posed to the ever besieged “Jewish state” as the secular regime it worked so hard to topple is replaced by supposedly Israel-threatening “Islamist elements.”

There is no end to this. The Israeli lobby in the United States is the single source of war propaganda on earth. Every other nation is fine with trade and sovereignty. Every single one. China is not attempting to start wars. Japan is not trying to start wars. The Irish Lobby is not trying to start wars. The Germanics are not trying to start wars. Argentina is not trying to start wars. Iran is not trying to start wars. Russia is not trying to start wars. It is Likud and the Israel lobby in the USA. Entirely. Any disaster visited on America and the world as a result of their war warmongering is 100% on their shoulders. We have got to talk sense into the Christian Zionists in America. Without them the Israeli lobby is isolated. How the hell to we argue with Christians who think god is a pro-Israeli warmonger?

I vote for 'c', on the basis that for months the anti-Assad forces were non-violent and clearly a continuation of the Arab Spring.

Bad news: Revolutions are messy multi-year affairs and many don't come out the way foreigners might hope. The best you can do is nudge things along in the direction you hope they take, and stand back, with fingers crossed. So far that is what we are doing.