Daubert Report MEALEY S

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1 MEALEY S Daubert Report September 2009 Volume 13, Issue #9 Child Murder Conviction Overturned For Expert Exclusion, Confrontation Error DALLAS A Texas Fifth District Court of Appeals panel on Aug. 28 reversed a nanny s conviction for the murder of one of her charges, finding that the trial court s exclusion of a cabinet-maker s testimony was error and that admission of DNA test results violated her rights under the confrontation clause. SEE PAGE 4. D.C. Judge Failed To Consider Eyewitness I.D. Expert Before Exclusion WASHINGTON, D.C. A trial court applied incorrect legal principles and nearly adopted a per se rule of exclusion when it barred an eyewitness identification expert from testifying for the defense in a murder-kidnapping trial in which the sole evidence was witnesses identification, a District of Columbia Court of Appeals panel held Sept. 3. SEE PAGE 5. Suit Against Law Firm, Experts Resurrected For Improper Expert Exclusion BOSTON A man suing his law firm and his expert over their performance in underlying litigation should not have been barred because of a low response rate from presenting expert survey testimony that supported his original claim, a Massachusetts Appeals Court panel held July 14. SEE PAGE 6. 11th Circuit OKs Exclusion Of Damages Opinion On Hospital Group s Turbocharging ATLANTA Expert testimony on the damages caused to a hospital by another hospital chain s overcharging for Medicare reimbursements was overly broad because it went beyond the liability theory, the 11th Circuit U.S. Court of Appeals held Sept. 4 in affirming its exclusion. SEE PAGE 8. Economist Needed To Verify Source Of Business Loss Data, Federal Judge Says WILMINGTON, Del. An expert who used a strategic business plan for the basis for his antitrust damages estimate must be excluded because he did not verify the data underlying the plan, a federal judge in Delaware held Aug. 20. SEE PAGE 9. 1st Circuit: Land Value Expert Lacked Support For Development Potential BOSTON A trial judge correctly excluded an expert s valuation of land being taken by the federal government because he lacked support for his conclusion that the protected coastal property would be rezoned for residential development or that sand could be extracted and sold, a First Circuit U.S. Court of Appeals panel held Sept. 11. SEE PAGE 11. 3rd Circuit Resurrects Employer s Claim Of Proprietary Secrets Theft PHILADELPHIA A New Jersey federal judge wrongly limited an engineer s testimony regarding proprietary information and reverse engineering in the rubber molding industry on grounds that he lacked experience in the specific subindustry at issue in the proprietary secrets case, a Third Circuit U.S. Court of Appeals panel held July 30. SEE PAGE 12. Federal Judge In Kansas: Aircraft Safety Can t Be Predicted With Graph KANSAS CITY, Kan. A forensic weather analyst s attempt to predict a plane s relative safety by plotting aircraft data on a graph is untested and not generally accepted, a federal judge in Kansas held Sept. 9 in barring his testimony in the Cessna products liability multidistrict litigation. SEE PAGE 13. Michigan Panel Affirms $2.5M Verdict For PIP Insurance Benefits LANSING, Mich. An anesthesiologist was qualified to testify about the necessity of pain management injections to a woman s face, and his treatment protocol was generally accepted and reliable, a Michigan Court of Appeals panel held Aug. 25. SEE PAGE 15. Alcohol-Detection Bracelet Meets Admissibility Standard, S.D. High Court Concludes PIERRE, S.D. The methodology underlying an alcohol-monitoring ankle bracelet and the expert opinion on its results are sufficiently reliable to pass muster under Daubert, the South Dakota Supreme Court held Sept. 16 in affirming its admission in a probation revocation proceeding. SEE PAGE 17.

4 Vol. 13, #9 September 2009 MEALEY S Daubert Report News Child Murder Conviction Overturned For Expert Exclusion, Confrontation Error DALLAS A Texas Fifth District Court of Appeals panel on Aug. 28 reversed a nanny s conviction for the murder of one of her charges, finding that the trial court s exclusion of a cabinet-maker s testimony was error and that admission of DNA test results violated her rights under the confrontation clause (Ada Betty Cuadros-Fernandez v. State of Texas, No CR, Texas App., 5th Dist.; 2009 Tex. App. LEXIS 6896). (Opinion available. Document # Z.) Ada Betty Cuadros-Fernandez was convicted in the 380th District Court for Collin County for capital murder of 14-month-old Kyle Lazarchik. Cuadros- Fernandez was the live-in nanny for Kyle and his twin, Ryan. Fatal Head Injuries In October 2005, Cuadros-Fernandez called 911 and reported that Kyle had vomited and was choking. At the hospital, several head injuries were discovered. Kyle was placed on life support, but eventually he was determined to be brain dead. Cuadros-Fernandez told investigators that she may have struck Kyle s head on a door jamb as she raced from the room with him on her hip but that she did not harm him in any other way. The prosecution theorized that Cuadros-Fernandez struck Kyle s head on a kitchen cabinet door so severely that it broke the door. She then taped the crack with masking tape. To support its theory, prosecutors presented evidence that Cuadros-Fernandez s DNA was on the masking tape on the cabinet door and that the pattern of small nail holes on the inside of the door matched a wound on Kyle s head. Expert Exclusion The trial court found Cuadros-Fernandez s cabinetry expert, David Gardner, inadmissible under Daubert v. Merrill Dow Pharm., Inc. (509 U.S. 579 [1993]). He was allowed to testify as a fact witness about cabinet manufacturing. Gardner, who was production manager at the company that built and installed the Lazarchiks cabinets, opined that the damage to the cabinet door was not consistent with something hitting against the back of it with great force. He said the most likely causes were widening of a hairline crack caused by hardware installation or someone standing on or leaning on the door. He based his opinion on his years of experience analyzing damage to cabinet doors to determine if the manufacturer or the customer was responsible for the damage and his experience testing new cabinet doors to see how different forces in different places caused damage. Cuadros-Fernandez made several arguments on appeal, including that the evidence was legally and factually insufficient to support the jury s verdict, that the admission of the DNA test results without testimony from the analyst violated her Sixth Amendment right to confrontation and that exclusion of Gardner was improper. The appeals panel found that the evidence was legally and factually sufficient. However, it found that admission of the DNA analyst s report and notes without her being available for cross-examination at trial violated Cuadros-Fernandez s rights. The trial judge erred in denying Cuadros-Fernandez s confrontation clause objection, and the error was not harmless, the panel held. Regarding Gardner, the panel said he had sufficient familiarity with the subject of the causes of cabinet damage, so his opinion fit the facts of the case. The 4

5 MEALEY S Daubert Report Vol. 13, #9 September 2009 panel also held that Gardner s testimony would have assisted the jury in determining whether the cabinet door was the murder weapon. Legitimate, Reliable The panel said the field of determining the cause of damage to cabinetry is legitimate because that determination is necessary to apportion liability for the cost of repair or replacement. Gardner s testimony was within the scope of that field, and he relied on and used principles involved in that field, the panel said. Gardner s years of experience in this field, his knowledge of the damage to cabinets and his testing of the stresses placed on cabinets establish the reliability of his testimony. Therefore, it was error to exclude his opinion, and the error was not harmless, the panel held. Justice Kerry P. Fitzgerald wrote the opinion for the panel, which also included Justices Joseph B. Morris and Douglas S. Lang. Pamela J. Lakatos of Plano, Texas, represents Cuadros- Fernandez. Jeffrey S. Garon of the Collin County District Attorney s Office in McKinney, Texas, represents the state. n D.C. Judge Failed To Consider Eyewitness I.D. Expert Before Exclusion WASHINGTON, D.C. A trial court applied incorrect legal principles and nearly adopted a per se rule of exclusion when it barred an eyewitness identification expert from testifying for the defense in a murder-kidnapping trial in which the sole evidence was witnesses identification, a District of Columbia Court of Appeals panel held Sept. 3 (Raymond L. Benn v. United States of America, No. 03-CF-946, D.C. App.; 2009 D.C. App. LEXIS 384). (Opinion available. Document # Z.) The panel did not reverse Raymond Benn s conviction but remanded the case to the District of Columbia Superior Court for examination of the expert s proffer and his admissibility under Dyas v. United States (376 A.2d 827 [D.C.], cert. denied, 434 U.S. 973 [1977]), which established a three-part test for determining eyewitness identification expert admissibility. Witnesses Benn was convicted of the 1992 armed kidnapping of Charles Sean Williams after a second jury trial. He was found not guilty of murder. Benn s first conviction was overturned by the appeals court because the trial court erred in not allowing Benn to present testimony from his mother to back up his alibi defense. At his second trial, Benn abandoned the alibi defense and focused on the reliability of the five witnesses who identified him as one of the men who took Williams from their apartment at gunpoint. Williams was later found murdered. All of the witnesses, including teenagers, were members of the Mahoney family, who lived in the apartment from which Williams was taken. None of the witnesses knew Benn. In their initial conversations with police, the witnesses said a photo of Benn in a photo spread looked like one of the suspects. By the time of trial, three of the five said they were 95 percent sure the abductor was Benn, based on their initial identification and identification in court. Benn was never placed in a line-up. Penrod Benn sought to introduce testimony from Steven Penrod regarding the unreliability of stranger-to-stranger identifications and other factors that can affect an eyewitness s identification and recollection, including confidence level as it relates to accuracy, the impact of time delay, influences during the identification process, stress, the presence of weapons and the duration of the exposure. The trial judge did not review the studies Penrod presented or his numerous writings on the subject, and he did not question Penrod to determine admissibility. Under Dyas, expert testimony on eyewitness identification is admissible if the testimony is beyond the ken of the average layman, the expert has sufficient skill or knowledge and the opinion is generally accepted. The appeals panel said the trial court did not explicitly consider any of the three Dyas factors in light of the specific and detailed proffer. 5

6 Vol. 13, #9 September 2009 MEALEY S Daubert Report Rather, the court appears to have excluded the expert evidence at least in part based on a prior belief that the untrustworthiness of eyewitness identification is one of those revealed truths in the law that somebody said about 100 years ago.... And we don t know that that s so. Helpfulness Additionally, the judge seemed to be swayed by prosecutor arguments that the expert would usurp the jury s role. The appeals panel said both statements were categorical and reflect a lack of attention to the proffer and its potential relevance in this case. The panel said the trial court missed its critical role in evaluating the testimony s admissibility. To the extent that the trial court excluded the proffered expert testimony based on what most other judges do, or because, as the government urged, that expert testimony questioning eyewitness identification is never helpful to the jury, it was error to fail to exercise discretion, the panel said. But even if the trial court did not apply an automatic rule of exclusion, the ruling was nonetheless defective because it did not address the correct legal factors set out in Dyas or apply them to the expert testimony that the defense proffered. The panel noted that, given the abundance of scientific studies that have been conducted since its Dyas holding, a more careful review under the first Dyas factor may be in order. Case Strength In Benn I, the appeals panel questioned the strength of the prosecution s case, given that there was no other evidence, physical or otherwise, linking Benn to the crime. The panel noted that it was not even clear what led investigators to name Benn a suspect. The panel said the trial court was bound by its holding. The panel said Penrod would have addressed the accuracy of each individual witness s identification and the circumstances that may have influenced the initial identifications and that made possible their mutual reinforcement as a group. In a case grounded on eyewitness identifications of a stranger, without other corroborating evidence, and in which the defense depends entirely upon demonstrating that the identifying witnesses are not as reliable as they believe themselves to be, to preclude the defendant from presenting the scientific testimony of a qualified expert on research that is generally accepted and not known to lay jurors to prove this point is not harmless, the panel held in ordering the remand. Judge Vanessa Ruiz wrote the opinion for the panel and was joined by Chief Judge Eric T. Washington. Concurring Opinion In a concurring opinion, Senior Judge Frank E. Schwelb said the trial court erred in three ways: It considered only whether expert testimony on eyewitness identification is admissible in general; it rejected as misinformed holdings from other appellate courts that stranger-stranger identification is often untrustworthy and presents the danger of misidentification; and it questioned the reliability of the Benn I holding regarding the strength of the prosecution s case. Judge Schwelb said remand is required solely because the judge based his exercise of discretion on incorrect legal principles. Counsel to Benn are Lee Richard Goebes, James W. Klein, Sandra K. Levick and Erin Murphy of the Public Defender Service in Washington, D.C. Assistant U.S. Attorney Ann K. H. Simon, U.S. Attorney Kenneth L. Wainstein and Assistant U.S. Attorneys John R. Fisher, Roy W. McLeese III and Colleen Covell in Washington, D.C., represent the government. n Suit Against Law Firm, Experts Resurrected For Improper Expert Exclusion BOSTON A man suing his law firm and his expert over their performance in underlying litigation should not have been barred because of a low response rate from presenting expert survey testimony that supported his original claim, a Massachusetts Appeals Court panel held July 14 (Harvey Albert v. Albert P. Zabin, et al., No. 08-P-889, Mass. App.; 2009 Mass. App. Unpub. LEXIS 572). 6

7 MEALEY S Daubert Report Vol. 13, #9 September 2009 (Unpublished opinion available. Document # Z.) However, because the defendants assert other deficiencies in the survey, the panel remanded the case to the trial court to address whether those alleged deficiencies warrant exclusion of the testimony under Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (509 U.S. 579 [1993]). Legal Malpractice Alleged Harvey Albert filed claims of negligent representation and breach of contract against his attorneys, Albert P. Zabin and Robert C. Zaffrann, and their firm, Schneider Reilly, and negligence and breach of contract claims against Robert Brandwein and his company, Policy and Management Associates Inc. Albert alleges that the defendants were negligent in failing to establish his damages in the underlying litigation. Albert has a patent for a daily disposable denture container with a built-in cleansing agent. He negotiated for three years with Warner-Lambert Co. to develop and market his product. However, Warner-Lambert terminated negotiations and informed him that its Efferdent denture cleanser could not be used in Albert s product. Albert hired Zabin and Zaffrann to file a claim for willful misrepresentation against Warner-Lambert. He said he was coerced into ending discussions with other interested investors, and he sought lost profits he would have earned from developing his product. Survey Brandwein conducted a concept survey of hospitals and nursing homes. The trial judge in that matter granted Warner-Lambert s motion to exclude Brandwein s testimony, finding his survey unreliable under Daubert because Brandwein failed to follow accepted standards for concept surveys. The judge said Brandwein failed to mention the price of the product, even though it was the most influential factor in the consumer s decision to purchase the product; he did not ask respondents if they would be likely to buy the product; respondents were not screened to ensure that they were qualified; none of the respondents worked at hospitals or assisted living facilities, even though the survey purported to predict lost profits on sales to those institutions; the respondents were not randomly selected; and the sample only 20 respondents was too small. The trial judge then granted summary judgment to Warner-Lambert. For the current litigation, Albert retained Opinion Dynamics Corp. to conduct a new, reliable concept survey of nursing homes and hospitals. The defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing that the new opinion was unreliable and that Albert could not establish a causal connection between their conduct and his financial loss. The trial judge granted the motion, finding that the new survey was not reliable under Daubert because the response rate was below 50 percent. The appeals panel noted that because the legal malpractice claim involved an opinion survey that did not comply with Daubert, Albert must produce one that does. If he is unable to, he cannot establish causation and damages. Admissible Daubert, the panel said, was not meant to disqualify testimony of an expert who adopts a recognized methodology, even though it is not the methodology on which the adverse party prefers to rely and even though the adverse party makes a case that the methodology may have been incorrectly applied. While industry standards urge caution when accepting survey results with a response rate under 50 percent, a low response rate does not require exclusion, the panel said. Albert presented uncontested data that the nonresponder population did not significantly differ from the responder population and that no significant bias was found among the nonresponders in the nursing home and hospital groups, the panel noted. [W]e consider that the exclusion of the survey on that ground alone was improper, the panel said, reversing summary judgment. On remand, the trial judge must address the defendants remaining Daubert questions, the panel held. 7

8 Vol. 13, #9 September 2009 MEALEY S Daubert Report The panel comprised Justices R. Malcolm Graham, Raya S. Dreben and Mitchell J. Sikora Jr. Robert William Walker of the Law Offices of Robert D Auria in Bedford, Mass., represents Albert. Michael J. Stone and Allen M. David of Peabody & Arnold in Boston represent the defendant attorneys. Ronald M. Jacobs and Thomas E. Peisch of Conn, Kavanaugh, Rosenthal, Peisch & Ford in Boston represent Brandwein. n 11th Circuit OKs Exclusion Of Damages Opinion On Hospital Group s Turbocharging ATLANTA Expert testimony on the damages caused to a hospital by another hospital chain s overcharging for Medicare reimbursements was overly broad because it went beyond the liability theory, the 11th Circuit U.S. Court of Appeals held Sept. 4 in affirming its exclusion (Boca Raton Community Hospital v. Tenet Health Care Corp., No , 11th Cir.; 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 19952). (Opinion available. Document # Z.) The 11th Circuit also affirmed summary judgment to defendant Tenet Health Care Corp. granted by the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida. Plaintiff Boca Raton Community Hospital filed a class action against Tenet alleging Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act violations. It asserted that Tenet s turbocharging resulted in excessive payments from Medicare for outlier cases extraordinary cost cases. Tenet s conduct caused Boca and other hospitals to receive less money for its legitimate outlier cases, Boca alleged. Outlier Payments The government filed its own suit against Tenet and obtained a $900 million settlement, including $800 million in outlier payments. Under the outlier program, Medicare supplements payment for treatments that cost a specified amount more than its fixed-rate payment. This amount is called the fixed-loss threshold. Medicare pays the amount above the fixed-loss threshold. Boca alleged that Tenet increased its outlier reimbursements by dramatically raising its charges without reference to actual cost increases, making averagecost cases look like outlier cases. The hospital said Tenet s excessive outlier payments forced Medicare to increase the loss threshold to keep total outlier payments at a target percentage. The increase in the loss threshold caused Boca to receive less outlier money for its legitimate extraordinary cases, it said. Boca presented expert testimony to show that the overcharging caused the loss threshold to increase and that Boca would have received additional outlier payments but for Tenet s conduct. The experts recalculated what the loss threshold would have been without Tenet s alleged turbocharging and calculated the amount of outlier payments Boca would have received; this was the estimate of damages to Boca. No Fit The trial court excluded the expert testimony because the methodology did not fit Boca s liability theory. The experts made no attempt to figure out what Tenet could have lawfully charged, so that they could know how much Tenet overcharged, the trial court said. The expert could not know how Tenet s overcharging had impacted the loss threshold. The experts decision to manipulate costs instead of charges made their method unhelpful and inadmissible, the trial court said. The appeals panel agreed. The expert opinion covered too much. Under Boca s liability theory, it is not unlawful for hospitals to overcharge as long as their audited ratios do not fall below the low national threshold. Boca s expert opinion uses unaudited ratios to approximate Tenet s actual costs. The damage assessment includes the outlier payments Tenet got from lawful overcharging, as well as unlawful overcharging, the panel said. In that way Boca s expert opinion holds Tenet to a stricter standard for injury and damages than its liability theory does for culpability by including charges that were excessive but not so much so that they forced a hospital s audited ratio below the low National Threshold, the panel held. 8

9 MEALEY S Daubert Report Vol. 13, #9 September 2009 What Boca s expert opinion fails to recognize (which, by contrast, its liability theory does) is the range of behavior between clearly unlawful and perfectly lawful. Too Broad Because Boca s injury and damages expert opinion was not confined to charges that its liability theory considered unlawful, it was too broad, the panel said. Therefore, the trial court did not err in excluding the testimony or in granting summary judgment, the panel said. Judge Ed Carnes wrote the opinion for the panel, which also comprised Chief Judge Joel F. Dubina and Chief Judge Jane A. Restani of the U.S. Court of International Trade, sitting by designation. Counsel to Boca are Bruce Rogow and Cynthia E. Gunther of Bruce S. Rogow, P.A., in Fort Lauderdale, Fla. Susan Elisabeth Engel and Karen N. Walker of Kirkland & Ellis in Washington, D.C., Jay Philip Lefkowitz of the firm s New York office and Peter Prieto of Holland & Knight in Miami represent Tenet. n (Memorandum opinion available. Document # Z.) U.S. Judge Sue L. Robinson of the District of Delaware said Dr. David DeRamus conclusions flowed from the slenderest of analytical threads one page of estimates from a business plan prepared for a business formed within the year whose source is both unknown to, and untested by, DeRamus. Antitrust Alleged ZF Meritor LLC and Meritor Transmission Corp. sued Eaton Corp., alleging that its monopoly power in the heavy duty transmissions through exclusive dealing contracts with distributors foreclosed competition and caused them injury. Eaton s long-term agreements with distributors included incentives such as price reductions, up-front payments, on-site engineering resources and other efforts to lower distributors costs. The plaintiffs filed claims under Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act and Section 3 of the Clayton Act. Economist Needed To Verify Source Of Business Loss Data, Federal Judge Says WILMINGTON, Del. An expert who used a strategic business plan for the basis for his antitrust damages estimate must be excluded because he did not verify the data underlying the plan, a federal judge in Delaware held Aug. 20 (ZF Meritor, et al. v. Eaton Corp., No SLR, D. Del.; 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 74180). Mealey's Copyright Policy DeRamus calculated Meritor s damages to be between $606 million and $824 million. The judge said De- Ramus reliance on Meritor s revised strategic business plan for without support for the factual basis of the plan rendered his opinion unreliable. The judge said that it appeared that DeRamus used reliable economic methods in calculating his damages but that there was no evidence the business plan estimates were reliable. Unsupported Data He did not use actual financial data in order to proj- Subscribers are encouraged to copy sections of this report for use in court submissions. You also are welcome to copy a single article to send to a client or colleague, and to copy and route our table of contents. If you wish to copy and distribute sections of the report, simply contact the Editorial Director at (610) or MEALEYS ( ). It is a violation of our copyright to copy substantial portions of this report for any other reasons without permission. Illegal copying can seriously undermine subscription-based publications like ours; moreover, the Copyright Act of 1976 provides for damages for illegal copying. 9

10 Vol. 13, #9 September 2009 MEALEY S Daubert Report ect the 2000 estimates. He did not apply his own assumptions, based upon his expertise, to any financial data in order to project the 2000 estimates. In short, Dr. DeRamus relied on the 2000 estimates without knowing either the qualifications of those who actually prepared them or the validity of the underlying data and assumptions upon which the 2000 estimates were based, the judge said. Counsel to Meritor are Karen V. Sullivan of Drinker Biddle & Reath in Wilmington, R. Bruce Holcomb of Adams Holcomb in Washington, D.C., and Jay N. Fastow of Dickstein Shapiro in New York. Donald E. Reid of Morris, Nichols, Arsht & Tunnell in Wilmington and Robert R. Ruyak, Joseph A. Ostoyich, Andrew D. Lazerow and Melissa R. Handrigan of Howrey in Washington represent Eaton. n New York Federal Judge Nixes Damages Expert From Pepsi Contract Suit NEW YORK A former bottling company manager s assessment of damages to a Peruvian Pepsi distributor from unauthorized sales in its territory lacks any reliable basis and is built upon one baseless flawed assumption after another, a federal judge in New York held Sept. 9 in excluding his testimony (Compania Embotelladora del Pacifico v. Pepsi Cola Co., No. 00 Civ [JSR], S.D. N.Y.; 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 81376). (Opinion and order available. Document # Z.) U.S. Judge Jed S. Rakoff of the Southern District of New York also excluded marketing testimony for similar reasons and granted summary judgment to defendant Pepsi Cola Co. Contract Breach Alleged Compania Embotelladora Del Pacifico S.A. (CEPSA) sued Pepsi for damages caused by an alleged breach of an exclusive bottler appointment agreement. CEPSA contends that Pepsi s failure to prevent transshipping, or unauthorized sale of its products in CEPSA s territory by other distributors and third parties, caused it damages. Pepsi filed several counterclaims, including one for liability for unpaid invoices for concentrate. Graham Searles, an accountant and former general manager of a Peruvian Coca-Cola bottler, estimated that CEPSA s damages total $236 million. Searles used data from the market research firm Consumer Communications Research (CCR) to estimate the total volume of Pepsi products sold in Lima, which is in CEPSA s exclusive territory. He adjusted this data upward by 22.5 percent because everyone in the industry believes that CCR understates market volume to this degree. Searles then subtracted the amount of CEPSA s own reported sales of Pepsi products to determine the amount of non-cepsa products sold in Lima. He then extrapolated that data to the rest of CEPSA s territory, even though no specific data was available for that area. Searles assumed that had all of that transshipping been prevented, CEPSA would have made those sales instead. He calculated CEPSA s lost profits on these lost sales by applying CEPSA s historical marginal profit rate. Unreliable The judge found that Searles estimate was based on unreliable and inaccurate data, along with a series of assumptions that have no basis in fact or reality. Searles conceded that he was aware of no one who ever relied on CCR data as a measure of market volume and that he knew of no scientific studies validating or confirming its accuracy for that purpose. He also did not support his decision to correct CCR s figures or to extend them to areas beyond Lima, the judge said. Similarly, the judge excluded the testimony of Julio Luque, a marketing consultant who opined regarding the sales volume data used to calculated CEPSA s alleged damages. He offered no support for his opinion that CCR sales volume data is reasonably accurate, the judge said. In the absence of any admissible expert testimony on damages, the judge said summary judgment on CEPSA s sole remaining breach of contract claim is appropriate. Even with experts, CEPSA s claim would fail as a matter of law because strict interpretation of the unambiguous contract shows that Pepsi had no 10

11 MEALEY S Daubert Report Vol. 13, #9 September 2009 obligation to prevent other bottlers and third parties from selling its products in CEPSA s territory, the judge held. Counterclaim The judge also granted CEPSA s motion for partial summary judgment regarding the concentrate claim, finding that the claim is being handled through bankruptcy proceedings in Peruvian courts. Counsel to CEPSA are Daniel J. Fetterman and Trevor J. Welch of Kasowitz, Benson, Torres & Friedman in New York; Kenneth J. Vianale of Vianale & Vianale in Boca Raton, Fla.; Olga Lucia Fuentes of Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher in New York; and Robert Yancy Lewis, Alexander Todd Linzer and Jennifer Freeman of Freeman Lewis in New York. Louis M. Solomon and Michael Lazaroff of Proskauer Rose in New York represent Pepsi. n 1st Circuit: Land Value Expert Lacked Support For Development Potential BOSTON A trial judge correctly excluded an expert s valuation of land being taken by the federal government because he lacked support for his conclusion that the protected coastal property would be rezoned for residential development or that sand could be extracted and sold, a First Circuit U.S. Court of Appeals panel held Sept. 11 (United States of America v Acres of land, et al., No , 1st Cir.; 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 20291). (Opinion available. Document # Z.) The panel affirmed the U.S. District Court for the District of Puerto Rico s award of $375,300 in compensation to Juan Piza-Blondet for his acres of land to be used by the Federal Aviation Administration for a radio beacon. Eminent Domain The government leased the property from Piza- Blondet for nearly 20 years. Following a lease dispute, Piza-Blondet segregated the land from his surrounding 400 acres and the government initiated condemnation proceedings. It estimated the property s value at the $375,300, based on its highest and best use applying the before and after valuation method. The land is zoned B-2, and its use is restricted to coastal protection, scientific investigation, passive recreation and fishing activities that do not impact the surrounding mangroves. Piza-Blondet s expert, Carlos Gaztambide, opined that the highest and best use for the parcel was residences and sand extraction. He estimated the value of the land to be $1.12 million, with an additional $3 million to $6 million for sand extraction. A magistrate judge found that Gaztambide s opinion was unsupported, speculative and amounted to double counting because he valued the land for development and again for its mineral deposits. The trial judge excluded his testimony, holding that it failed to meet Federal Rule of Evidence 702 s relevance and reliability standards. The trial judge refused to allow Piza-Blondet to introduce any other valuation testimony, including his own, that was not based on conservation and/or mitigation. Because of the expert order, the parties filed a stipulation for consent judgment. Speculation The appeals panel found that Gaztambide had not spoken to anyone on the Puerto Rico Planning Board and offered no other support for his opinion that the board would approve rezoning, a variance or permits for residential development or sand extraction on the land. He also offered no evidence that such variances had been permitted on similarly zoned parcels in the past, the panel said. The panel found no evidence that any of the parcels Gaztambide relied on were or had been zoned B-2 or that sand extraction had ever been permitted on a B-2 property. Ten-year-old applications for residential development permits on other parts of Piza-Blondet s 400 acres had never been granted. The panel held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that Gaztambide s testimony did not meet admissibility requirements. 11

12 Vol. 13, #9 September 2009 MEALEY S Daubert Report Finally, the panel said the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the before and after method to be used to value the property. Judge Timothy B. Dyk of the Federal Circuit wrote the opinion for the panel, which also comprised Judges Michael Boudin and Senior Judge Bruce M. Selya. Counsel to Piza-Blondet are Paul E. Harrison in Mandeville, La., and J. Wayne Mumphrey in Chalmette, La. Aaron P. Avila and Jeffrey M. Tapick of the U.S. Department o Justice and Acting Assistant Attorney General John C. Cruden in Washington, D.C., represent the government. n 3rd Circuit Resurrects Employer s Claim Of Proprietary Secrets Theft PHILADELPHIA A New Jersey federal judge wrongly limited an engineer s testimony regarding proprietary information and reverse engineering in the rubber molding industry on grounds that he lacked experience in the specific sub-industry at issue in the proprietary secrets case, a Third Circuit U.S. Court of Appeals panel held July 30 (Thomas & Betts Corp. v. Richards Manufacturing Co., et al., Nos , , 3rd Cir.; 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 16837). (Unpublished opinion available. Document # Z.) The panel reversed the expert admissibility ruling and found that the U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey created an improper standard for determining the protectibility of company information. The panel reversed summary judgment on plaintiff Thomas & Betts Corp. s (T&B s) misappropriation claim and dismissal of its related claims for breach of contract, breach of the duty of loyalty, fraud, tortious interference with prospective advantage and unjust enrichment. Competitor T&B employed defendant Glenn Luzzi as director of engineering in its Elastimold division, which manufactured 600-amp underground oil-resistant electrical connectors, primarily for Consolidated Edison (Con Ed). T&B had been the exclusive supplier of connector products to Con Ed for 20 years. In 1999, Luzzi left and went to work for a T&B competitor, defendant Richards Manufacturing Co. T&B released Luzzi from any previous employment restrictions, except that he still was not permitted to share or release proprietary information. Eighteen months later, Richards developed a compatible product line and in 2001 obtained a sole-source contract from Con Ed at a lower price than T&B. The trial court, believing that New Jersey case law provided no clearly defined protectibility standard, fashioned its own from two holdings Ingersoll- Rand Co. v. Ciavatta (110 N.J. 609, 542 A.2d 879 [1988]) and Lamorte Burns & Co. v. Walters (167 N.J. 285, 770 A.2d 1158 [2001]). The trial court created a four-part test for determining if information could be protected the degree to which the information is generally known in the industry; the level of specificity and specialized nature of the information; the employer/employee relationship and the circumstances under which the employee was exposed to the information; and whether the information is current. Expert Limited The trial court also significantly limited T&B s primary expert, Van T. Walworth, finding that he lacked experience in underground electrical connectors and that his methodology was unreliable. The trial court limited Walworth s testimony to general concepts within the rubber molding industry; his personal observations of T&B s and Richards processes; and his observations of the materials in the case, such as design drawings, that demonstrate similarities between the processes. The trial court barred Walworth from testifying about what is commonly known in the rubber molding industry; what is generally done in the rubber molding industry with respect to maintaining secrecy in manufacturing operations and whether T&B s efforts were consistent with such practices; whether Richards reverse-engineered T&B s products and what it would take to do so; the transferability of processes regarding injection molding plastics to manufacturing the products at issue; 12

13 MEALEY S Daubert Report Vol. 13, #9 September 2009 and whether the information at issue is protectible information. The trial court found that T&B failed to provide sufficient evidence to demonstrate that any of its 10 claimed trade secrets were secrets or that it had a protectible interest in any of the discrete items of confidential information. The trial court then granted Richards summary judgment. Appeal T&G did not appeal the trial court s holding regarding its claimed trade secrets, only its formation of the protectibility standard, its expert exclusion and its grant of summary judgment on the misappropriation of confidential, non-trade-secret information. The Third Circuit panel held that while the trial court correctly barred Walworth from testifying about the ultimate issue of protectibility, it erred in excluding the remainder of his testimony. Walworth has extensive experience in manufacturing and engineering of products using rubber injection molding. He should not have been deemed unqualified just because he was not the best qualified expert in the specialization at issue, the panel held. Walworth has participated in developing systems to maintain the secrecy of manufacturing and engineering process for rubber molding products at various companies. The trial court erred in rejecting his testimony regarding security and secrecy because what is done in the rubber molding industry is not necessarily what is done in the underground connectors market, the panel said. It is difficult to see... how Walworth s expertise in the larger industry of rubber injection molding would be irrelevant and unhelpful to a finder of fact charged with analyzing a subset of the industry, particularly given the relatively low standard for admissibility under Rule 702, the panel said. Standard Reversed Regarding the protectibility standard, the appeals panel held that the New Jersey Supreme Court cases relied on by the trial court involved a reasonableness review of noncompete clauses that is not relevant to this case, where Luzzi had a common-law obligation to maintain the secrecy of his employer s proprietary information. On remand, the panel said, the trial court should consider whether the allegedly misappropriated information was provided to Luzzi by T&B in the course of his employment for the sole purpose of furthering T&B s business interests. The court should consider whether the information was generally available to the public; whether Luzzi would have been aware of the information if not for his employment with T&B; whether the information gave Luzzi and Richards a competitive advantage; and whether Luzzi knew that T&B had an interest in protecting the information to preserve its own competitive advantage. These four factors are not to be treated as essential elements of a cause of action for the misappropriation of confidential information, the panel concluded. The panel advised the trial court to consider that the items of confidential information cited by T&B may serve as the basis for a tort action despite the fact that many of them, examined in isolation, constitute manufacturing techniques that are generally known in the industry. It also should consider that the competitive value an employer ascribes to certain information may derive solely from its relation to other information, even when, taken in isolation, that information is neither novel nor unknown, the panel said. And finally, it should consider that, at this juncture, it is asked only to determine whether there are genuine issues of material fact in dispute as to whether the information at issue is confidential and proprietary. Judge Maryanne Trump Barry wrote the opinion for the panel, which also included Judge D. Brooks Smith and Senior U.S. District Judge Jan E. DuBois of the District Court of Eastern Pennsylvania, sitting by designation. Counsel to T&B is Kevin McNulty of Gibbons in Newark, N.J. Steven B. Pokotilow of Stroock, Stroock & Lavan in New York, represents Richards and Luzzi. n Federal Judge In Kansas: Aircraft Safety Can t Be Predicted With Graph KANSAS CITY, Kan. A forensic weather analyst s attempt to predict a plane s relative safety by plotting 13

14 Vol. 13, #9 September 2009 MEALEY S Daubert Report aircraft data on a graph is untested and not generally accepted, a federal judge in Kansas held Sept. 9 in barring his testimony in the Cessna products liability multidistrict litigation (In re: Cessna 208 Series Aircraft Products Liability Litigation, MDL No. 1721, Case No. 05-md-1721-KHV, D. Kan.; 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 81932). (Memorandum and order available. Document # Z.) Plaintiffs sued Cessna Aircraft Co. and Goodrich Corp. for personal injuries and wrongful death, alleging that the Cessna 2008 Series is defectively designed or manufactured because ice accumulation caused several crashes. NAD Theory Plaintiff expert Peter H. Hildebrand is a research meteorologist and forensic weather consultant for weather conditions relating to aircraft accidents. He developed the norm for aircraft design (NAD) hypothesis. The NAD uses data for thrust, weight, lift and drag of all safely designed aircraft to plot points on a graph. Hildebrand then draws a straight NAD line where the average data points fall. Aircraft that fall significantly outside that norm line Hildebrand considers to be potentially unsafe. Specifically, Hildebrand found the Cessna 208B to have significantly lower horsepower than aircraft of similar maximum weight or payload and similar wing length. The longer wings and lower horsepower could cause problems if the drag increases because of in-flight icing, Hildebrand said. The 208B also has a low sea level maximum climb rate compared to other aircraft of similar maximum takeoff weight and similar engine power, suggesting high drag and/ or low lift. This suggests that the 208B is relatively underpowered and has high drag compared with the NAD, which can be severe issues during icing conditions, Hildebrand said. Hildebrand conceded that his analysis only raised questions; it does not draw any conclusions regarding a design defect or the plane s safety. Daubert Failings U.S. Judge Kathryn H. Vratil of the District of Kansas agreed with Cessna that Hildebrand s methodology fails to meet admissibility requirements under Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals (509 U.S. 579, 592 [1993]). Hildebrand did not test the NAD hypothesis to determine whether basic physical characteristics of an aircraft can be used to measure aerodynamic properties or whether aircraft that are at or close to the norm are safer than those that are not. Hildebrand admitted that an aircraft with a novel and unique aerodynamic design might be safe but not adhere to the norm. The judge also found that the NAD hypothesis has not been subject to peer review and publication, and it has no known error rate. Finally, the hypothesis is not generally accepted by the scientific community, the judge said. She noted that contrary to Hildebrand s methodology, aircraft designers do not use engine horsepower as a proxy for thrust because several other factors such as accessory operation, aerodynamic efficiency of the propeller and airspeed also contribute significantly to aircraft thrust. Similarly, designers do not use maximum seal level rate of climb as a measure of aerodynamic efficiency, the judge said. The judge held that Hildebrand s methodology was unreliable. Further, his opinions would not assist a jury, the judge held. Finally, the judge said Hildebrand did not adequately explain the scientific background for his hypothesis or what conclusions one can draw from it. He simply presented a chart of data based on the physical characteristics of various aircraft without applying that data to accident histories to determine the safety of the Cessna s design. His testimony has a substantial potential to mislead and misinform the jury, she said. Attorneys Representing the plaintiffs are Donald J. Nolan and Paul R. Borth of Nolan Law Group in Chicago; J. Walter Sinclair and Mark S. Geston of Stoel Rives in Boise, Idaho; Jerome L. Skinner of Nolan Law Group in Cincinnati; Robert R. Bodoin and Thomas A. Fuller of Bodoin & Agnew in Fort Worth, Texas; Colin P. King of Dewsnup King & Olsen in Salt Lake City; Martha Knudson of Richards Brandt Miller & Nelson in Salt Lake City; David E. Keltner of the Keltner Law Firm in Fort Worth; and Donna J. Bowen and Michael L. Slack of Slack & Davis in Austin, Texas. 14

15 MEALEY S Daubert Report Vol. 13, #9 September 2009 Also representing the plaintiffs are Stuart W. Smith, Patrick J. Kurkoski and Timothy E. Miller of Miller & Associates in Lake Oswego, Ore.; William A. Fuhrman and Christopher P. Graham of Trout, Jones, Gledhill and Fuhrman in Boise; Eugene O Neill Jr. of Goldfinger & Lassar in New York; Scott J. Gunderson of Nelson, Gunderson & Lacey in Wichita, Kan.; Dean R. Brett, Rand F. Jack and William R. Coats of Brett & Coats in Bellingham, Wash.; Bradley Bowles of Bowles & Verna in Walnut Creek, Calif.; Arthur A. Wolk and Bradley J. Stoll of Wolk Law Firm in Philadelphia; David S. Houghton, William G. Garbina and Robert W. Mullin of Lieben, Whitted Law Firm in Omaha, Neb.; Matthew K. Clarke of Wolk Law Firm in Philadelphia; and Morton A. Rudberg in Dallas. Representing Cessna are Caryn Geraghty Jorgensen, David M. Schoeggl and Janna J. Annest of Mills Meyers Swartling in Seattle; Dale W. Storer of Holden Kidwell Hahn & Crapo in Idaho Falls, Idaho; Don G. Rushing and Erin M. Bosman of Morrison & Foerster in San Diego; Fred J. Meier Jr. of Carstens & Cahoon in Dallas; Heather S. Woodson and John C. Nettels Jr. of Stinson Morrison Hecker in Overland Park; John J. Reenan of Winstead in Dallas; Kamie F. Brown and Tracy H. Fowler of Snell & Wilmer in Salt Lake City; Laurie A. Hand of Morrison & Foerster in Washington, D.C.; and Patrick Matthew Graber and Stephen Donald Koslow of McCullough, Campbell & Lane in Chicago. n Michigan Panel Affirms $2.5M Verdict For PIP Insurance Benefits LANSING, Mich. An anesthesiologist was qualified to testify about the necessity of pain management injections to a woman s face, and his treatment protocol was generally accepted and reliable, a Michigan Court of Appeals panel held Aug. 25 (Sheri M. Anderson v. State Farm Mutual Auto Insurance Co., No , Mich. App.; 2009 Mich. App. LEXIS 1763). (Unpublished per curiam opinion available. Document # Z.) The panel also affirmed a $2.5 million jury verdict from Wayne County Circuit Court for plaintiff Sheri M. Anderson against State Farm Mutual Auto Insurance Co. Anderson sued the insurer for personal injury protection (PIP) benefits under Michigan s No-Fault Law after it cut off payments for injections for her facial pain that resulted from a 1999 car accident. Converse State Farm appealed, alleging a number of errors. The issues at trial included whether Anderson s pain was caused by the car accident or by her multiple sclerosis and whether the facial injections were reasonable and necessary. Dr. Maurice H. Converse testified that he designed a pain management regimen that included Anderson receiving 22 facial injections twice weekly, including steroids, anesthetic and Sarapin. State Farm argued that Converse was not qualified to testify and that his methodology was unreliable. The appeals panel found Converse qualified to testify by his more than 50 years as an anesthesiologist. Further, the panel said Converse s specialized knowledge would help the trier of fact. The panel rejected defense arguments that though Converse may have been qualified as an anesthesiology expert, he was not qualified as an expert on the specific facts of Anderson s treatment pain management injection therapy. The panel said it was not the role of the trial court to determine whether Sarapin was effective in pain management, only that its use had achieved general scientific acceptance. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in so finding or in concluding that Converse s use of the drug represented an accepted method of pain treatment, the panel said. Additional Appeal Points The appeals panel also ruled that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it excluded evidence of Anderson s receipt of collateral source benefits. The THE EDITOR editor kristin casler at 15

16 Vol. 13, #9 September 2009 MEALEY S Daubert Report panel affirmed the trial court s exclusion or limitation of State Farm s experts testimony due to discovery delays or an admitted lack of expertise. The panel also concluded that the trial court improperly prohibited State Farm from identifying an adjuster as working in the fraud division. This information might have been helpful to a jury in determining what triggered the investigation into Anderson s claim, the panel said. However, any error was harmless, the panel concluded. The panel comprised Judges Deborah A. Servitto, Pat M. Donofrio and Karen M. Fort Hood. Counsel to Anderson are Jackson Garth of Plymouth, Mich., and Mark Granzotto of Royal Oak, Mich. James G. Gross of Detroit, and Lincoln G. Herweyer of New Baltimore, Mich., represent State Farm. n New Jersey Court Finds Nurse Expert May Offer Opinion On Causation TRENTON, N.J. The New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division on Aug. 4 reversed a trial court ruling that a nurse may not offer expert testimony in a nursing home negligence cause of action. The appeals court found that the nursing expert may testify as to causation and standard of care in a nursing home but affirmed the trial court order regarding the medical diagnosis for a wrongful death claim (Louise Detloff, et al., v. Absecon Manor Nursing Center and Rehabilitation Center, No. A T2, N.J. Super., App. Div.; 2009 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 2088). (Per curiam opinion available. Document # Z.) Louise Detloff, as executrix of the estate of Mary Mazzei, appealed an Atlantic County Superior Court order granting summary judgment dismissing her claims alleging negligence, carelessness and violations of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act (OBRA) in the care of Mazzei at the Absecon Manor Nursing Center and Rehabilitation Center. Detloff filed a merit of affidavit by Adrienne Abner, a licensed registered nurse who specializes in wound care nursing and nursing administration. N.J.S.A. 45:11-23(b) However, the trial court held that as a matter of law, a nurse is not qualified to render a medical opinion with respect to causation under New Jersey Statutes Annotated (N.J.S.A.) 45:11-23(b). On appeal, Detloff argued that Absecon Manor never challenged the adequacy of Abner s opinion. The appellate court reversed the trial court order, finding that the lower court s overly broad interpretation of 45:11-23(b) was in error. The motion judge in the instant action concluded earlier in the proceedings that Abner was clearly qualified to render an expert opinion on the standard of care to which Mazzei was entitled as a home nursing patient and to also render an opinion that defendant deviated form that standard of care, the appeals court said, adding that her two reports focused on specific deviations of care directly related to the provision of care supportive to or restorative of life and well-being. That Mazzei suffered a fractured hip following a fall and then developed pressure sores are not disputed facts, the court said. The opinions reached by Nurse Abner do not require a medical diagnosis, the court said. Indeed, it is of common knowledge that the day-to-day care of nursing home residents is generally undertaken not by physicians but by nursing staff such as licensed practical nurses and nursing aides under the supervision of a registered nurse. The appeals court noted that given the scope of nursing care under the direction of a nursing administrator, 45:11-23(b) does not prohibit Abner s testimony on the issue of causation. Wrongful Death Claims However, the appeals court said Abner s testimony regarding medical causation as to the Wrongful Death Act cause of action reaches beyond the scope of her expertise and is prohibited under 45:11-23(b). Detloff is represented by Robert Aaron Greenberg and Elizabeth Kronisch of Aronberg & Kouser in Cherry 16

17 MEALEY S Daubert Report Vol. 13, #9 September 2009 Hill, N.J. Absecon Manor is represented by William L. Doerler, Kevin C. Cottone and Deborah E. Ballantyne of White and Williams in Philadelphia. n Investigation Based On National Fire Standards Reliable, Federal Judge Holds LEXINGTON, Ky. A fire causation expert relied on reliable national fire investigation standards in ruling out all other possible causes of a house fire and in determining that a Hitachi television caused the blaze, a federal judge in Kentucky held Aug. 20 (Kentucky Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Co. v. Hitachi Home Electronics [America], Inc., No. 3: DCR, E.D. Ky., Central Div.; 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 73998). (Memorandum available. Document # Z.) U.S. Judge Danny C. Reeves of the Eastern District of Kentucky denied defendant Hitachi s motion to exclude Eric Evans testimony. Possibilities Eliminated Fire destroyed the home of Kentucky Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Co. (KFB) insureds in November After paying the homeowners claim, KFB filed a products liability action against Hitachi, asserting claims for negligence, strict liability and breach of warranty and seeking to recover the $164,490 it paid on the claim. Evans, who worked for the Forensic Fire Investigation Bureau, opined that the fire originated in the projection television. He eliminated other items in the area. The DVD player and satellite receiver, for example, were burned from the outside in. However, Evans conceded that he could not identify the specific malfunction that caused the fire because the TV suffered extensive damage. As an initial matter, the judge found Evans qualified by his nearly 30 years of experience in fire investigation and as a fire investigation instructor. The judge found his opinions reliable because he followed National Fire Protection Agency (NFPA) 921 guidelines, which have been recognized as the generally accepted standard in the fire investigation community. Hitachi argued, however, that Evans failed to follow the NFPA 921 standards for eliminating other possible ignition sources because he was unable to examine power cords and extension cords near the television and rule them out as possible causes. Standards Followed [T]he fact that Evans was unable to eliminate possible ignition sources he did not locate during the course of his investigation does not necessarily make his investigation, or his subsequent causation conclusion, inherently unreliable, the judge said. Evans investigation followed the NFPA 921 standards. His report demonstrates that he systematically analyzed and eliminated all other possible ignition sources observed in the room, the judge said. Thus, his conclusion that the television caused the fire is sufficiently reliable, the judge said. The judge rejected Hitachi s argument that Evans theory is unreliable because it was not testable or tested. The judge said the theory underlying the fire investigation standards must be testable, which they are and have been. Finally, the judge held that Evans testimony was highly relevant to the ultimate issue of whether a manufacturing or design defect in the television caused the fire. Counsel to KFB are John C. Miller and Joseph A. Bott of Bertram, Cox & Miller in Campbellsville, Ky. David T. Schaefer and Patrick Shane O Bryan of Woodward, Hobson & Fulton in Louisville, Ky., represent Hitachi. n Alcohol-Detection Bracelet Meets Admissibility Standard, S.D. High Court Concludes PIERRE, S.D. The methodology underlying an alcohol-monitoring ankle bracelet and the expert opinion on its results are sufficiently reliable to pass 17

18 Vol. 13, #9 September 2009 MEALEY S Daubert Report muster under Daubert, the South Dakota Supreme Court held Sept. 16 in affirming its admission in a probation revocation proceeding (State of South Dakota v. Neal J. Lemler, No , S.D. Sup.; 2009 S.D. LEXIS 156). (Opinion available. Document # Z.) Neal J. Lemler was on probation for third-offense drunken driving. His probation was conditioned on him not consuming any alcohol. He was being monitored by a Secure Continuous Remote Alcohol Monitoring (SCRAM) bracelet, which uses transdermal alcohol detection. Lemler s bracelet registered three drinking events and uploaded the results to Alcohol Monitoring Systems (AMS), the SCRAM manufacturer. The state petitioned for probation revocation in the Sixth Judicial District Court for Hughes County. Drinking Events Lemler contended that his exposure on the dates at issue to alcohol in fermenting grain on his farm, lighter fluid and graphite lubricant caused his bracelet to erroneously record a drinking event. At the hearing, the state presented expert testimony from Jeff Hawthorne, chief technology officer at AMS and co-developer of the SCRAM. He explained that the SCRAM flags all transdermal alcohol readings of.02 percent alcohol by weight or higher. A drinking event is confirmed after three consecutive measurements over that percentage. This requires at least two drinks per hour on average. The data is used to create a curve, and it is compared with a blood-alcohol curve, which has known alcohol levels. Hawthorne testified that the curve for alcohol consumption is different from that for an interfering topical chemical such as those Lemler claims he was exposed to. Sudden exposure to a chemical produces a spike in the readings and is disregarded. Hawthorne specifically tested the exact chemicals to which Lemler said he was exposed, and they did not create the same readings as Lemler s bracelet submitted on the days in question. Hawthorne opined that based on his education and experience, Lemler consumed alcohol on those dates. The judge found Hawthorne s testimony reliable under Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (509 US 579, 113 SCt 2786, 125 LEd2d 469 [1993]). Dueling Experts Lemler s expert, Dr. Michael Hlastala, an alcohol physiology expert, did not dispute the validity of the science underlying the SCRAM, only its reliability given its limitations in identifying other possible sources of alcohol. The Supreme Court rejected Lemler s argument that Hawthorne was not a qualified expert because he is not a scientist. His experience developing the SCRAM, publishing an article and his testimony in 48 prior cases qualifies him to testify, the high court said. Regarding reliability, the high court said Hawthorne identified an analytical basis to interpret the data and account for variables that might be caused by interfering chemicals. He relied on internal testing, experience and peer-reviewed literature documenting differences in absorption rates, elimination rates and total elimination time for consumed alcohol and interferants, the high court said. The District Court was required only to be reasonably satisfied that a probation violation occurred, the panel noted. Lemler s own expert confirmed the requisite level of reliability of the bracelet in this case, the high court said. Daubert Met Although Lemler s expert opined that variables could affect the outcome or conclusion, there was evidence that the underlying scientific process was widely accepted, the theories and techniques in question either had been or could be tested, the process has been subjected to some review and publication, and potential error rates (under the evidence presented) are lower than some other accepted methods of measuring alcohol consumption, Justice Steven L. Zintner wrote for the court. The issues concerning possible interferants, as well as the possibility of inhaled ethanol from fermented grain, were factual variables argued to the factfinder. Under the circumstances, both this Court and the Supreme Court have recognized that a trial court 18

19 MEALEY S Daubert Report Vol. 13, #9 September 2009 does not abuse its discretion in admitting the scientific evidence and then letting the fact finder resolve the factual dispute. Counsel to the state are Attorney General Marty J. Jackley and Assistant Attorney General Max A. Gors. Rose Ann Wendell represents Lemler. All are in Pierre. n New York Judge Allows Zoloft Causation Opinion In Defense Of Assault Charges HEMPSTEAD, N.Y. A New York trial judge on Aug. 21 stood by her earlier decision to allow defense expert testimony in an assault trial that the antidepressant Zoloft can cause excessive aggression in some people (State of New York v. Brandon W. Hampson, No. 2006NA021294, N.Y. Dist., 1st Dist., Nassau Co.; 2009 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 2182). (Opinion available. Document # Z.) First District Nassau County Judge Rhonda E. Fischer held that the general acceptance requirement under Frye v. United States (293 F 1013 [DC Cir 1923]) does not require unanimous acceptance of a scientific theory before it can be admitted. Therefore, even though the state s expert cited numerous studies showing no link between Zoloft and aggressive behavior, the judge said expert testimony citing other studies that support the theory is admissible. Side Effects The judge said Dr. Stefan Kruszewski can testify on behalf of defendant Brandon W. Hampson, who is charged with third-degree assault, attempted assault, menacing, unlawful imprisonment, harassment and criminal contempt. Kruszewski opined that impulsivity, agitation, excessive aggression, grandiosity and hypomania can appear in a small group of people who take antidepressants. The behaviors can be seen as a side effect or as a withdrawal symptom, he said. He relied on psychiatric and neuro-psychiatric literature and a Yale University medical letter. After a hearing in April, the judge found Kruszewski s opinion admissible. After a rehearing, she again admitted his testimony. The judge found that the literature Kruszewski relied on is generally accepted within the medical field. She rejected the state s arguments that she misapplied the Frye standard, overlooked evidence that discredited Kruszewski s testimony and that Hampson did not meet his Frye burden. Adhering to the New York Court of Appeals holding that Frye does not require a method or position to have unanimous support, only general acceptance, the judge found Kruszewski s opinion generally accepted. Competing Experts The defendant and the People have presented distinguished experts who possess differing opinions on the effect SSRIs [selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors] may have on the population for which they are prescribed, the judge said. Thus, the Court should not look to see which expert is correct, but whether each expert s testimony is based on reliable methods. Both experts meet that standard and the triers of fact should have an opportunity to weigh the credibility of the expert s testimony under the crucible of crossexamination. Counsel to the state is Nassau County District Attorney Kathleen M. Rice in Hempstead. Eric R. Bernstein in New York represents Hampson. n Special Master Chided; Compensation Ordered For Hepatitis B Petitioners WASHINGTON, D.C. Saying the special master cloaked a causation finding as an assessment of an expert s credibility not subject to review, the U.S. Court of Federal Claims ordered compensation for three of five previously rejected petitioners who claimed that the hepatitis B vaccine caused autoimmune hepatitis (AIH), in an opinion released Sept. 8 (Claudia Rotoli v. Secretary, No V; David Myers v. Secretary, No V; Colleen Torbett v. Secretary, No V; Mona Porter v. Secretary, No. 19

20 Vol. 13, #9 September 2009 MEALEY S Daubert Report V; Allison Hager v. Secretary, No V, Fed. Clms.; 2009 U.S. Claims LEXIS 299). (Opinion available. Document # Z.) Judge Nancy B. Firestone said Special Master Christian J. Moran s decisions Allison Hager s petition was rejected Oct. 15; the other four were denied in a single decision Oct. 11 flew directly in the face of the recently decided Andreu v. Sec y HHS (569 F.3d 1367, 1379 [Fed. Cir. 2009]). Judge Firestone said the petitioners expert immunologist, Dr. Joseph A. Bellanti, was a highly qualified expert whose extensive credentials are not in dispute. In these cases, however, the special master erroneously founded his rejection of the petitioners theory of causation on his assessment of Dr. Bellanti s poor credibility, Judge Firestone said. The special master s discussion of Dr. Bellanti s credibility permeated his analysis of the petitioners claims. Most egregiously, the special master included a nine-page section a substantial portion of the total length of each decision entitled Additional Comments Regarding Dr. Bellanti, in which he questioned not only Dr. Bellanti s persuasiveness but also his truthfulness as a result of various weaknesses in the evidence underlying Dr. Bellanti s claims and Dr. Bellanti s demeanor. Damages Given the special master s errors, Judge Firestone said, she would issue her own causation findings and remand only for damages determinations. Regarding generic causation, the judge said Bellanti s testimony and references to the literature were sufficient to show that the vaccine could cause autoimmune hepatitis through dysfunction of the CD4+ regulatory T cells in genetically predisposed individuals. Among Bellanti s sources were Autoimmune Diseases: The Liver, by Michael P. Manns, et al., in The Autoimmune Diseases, third edition, edited by Noel Rose and Ian Mackay. Dr. Bellanti then described various mechanisms by which infections and vaccines can cause autoimmune disease molecular mimicry, bystander activation, polyclonal activation, and dysfunction of CD4+ regulatory T cells (or T-reg cell dysfunction ), the judge said. Over the course of the hearings in these cases, the last theory, CD4+ regulatory T cell dysfunction, rose to the forefront as a promising theory by which AIH might be triggered by a vaccine such as hepatitis B. The respondent s attack of the petitioners evidence of a medical theory was largely focused on the quantum of evidence in the scientific literature underlying Dr. Bellanti s assertions, Judge Firestone said. They did not present any medical literature that negated Dr. Bellanti s medical theory. Instead, they emphasized the fact that no link between the hepatitis B vaccine and AIH has been directly proven in the literature. Specific Causation Judge Firestone affirmed the special master s rejection of benefits for David Myers and Colleen Torbett. Myers, she said, did not have AIH but had non-alcoholic steatohepatitis (NASH) and had presented no theory of causation for that condition. The judge said NASH is a metabolic disease, not an autoimmune condition that might be traced to vaccines. Torbett, the judge said, did not present an appropriate time frame between vaccination and the development of her condition, as required by Althen v. Secretary of HHS (418 F.3d 1274, 1278 [Fed. Cir. 2005]). Moreover, the judge said, Torbett had been taking minocycline, an antibiotic used to treat acne and known to cause autoimmune hepatitis, for approximately 13 months before having an abnormal liver test in August 1997, when she was 40 years old. The petitioners are represented by Ronald C. Homer of Conway, Homer & Chin-Caplan in Boston. The respondent is represented by Althea Davis, Tony West and Timothy P. Garren of the U.S. Department of Justice in Washington. n U.S. Judge Says Heart Doctor s Opinion On Surgery Length Lacked Reliable Methods PHILADELPHIA A pediatric heart surgeon did not rely on appropriate studies or scientific data in forming his opinion that a defendant surgeon s devia- 20

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