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Consciousness of the kind we value often takes narrative forms. This chapter adopts the psychological stance of Bruner who writes that narrative deals in human or human-like intention and action and the vicissitudes and consequences that mark their course. It discusses the interaction-type elements and story-type elements of narrative, and explores whether consciousness has causal properties. The chapter explains the evolution and development of consciousness, and the developmental psychology of narrative consciousness. The chapter presents a debate of a protagonist and an antagonist. It proposes that we accept not only Dennett's metaphor of self-as-novelist but also that, different conclusions may be drawn than those offered by Dennett. The chapter explores the idea of a conscious unitary self, based on functional properties of narrative. It discusses four aspects of consciousness: the Helmholtzian consciousness, Woolfian consciousness, Vygotskyan consciousness, and Meadean consciousness.

Objective: Our aim was to assess the impact of six recommendations
regarding drug prescription on the clinical practices of French psychiatrists.
The recommendations were part of the conclusions of a consensus conference
entitled “Long-term therapy of schizophrenia” (Paris, January
1994).

Methods: The impact of the conference was assessed on the basis of
awareness of the existence of the conference, knowledge of its conclusions,
and actual changes in clinical practice. We performed: a) a survey of a
representative sample of 396 psychiatrists 2 years after the conference; and
b) an analysis of changes in drug prescriptions in a cohort of 2,407 patients
with schizophrenia under treatment at the time of the conference.

Results: Overall, 78% of interviewed psychiatrists were aware of
the existence of the conference and 70% of its conclusions. Declared
prescription practices conformed with conference conclusions about 60%
(10%–95%) of the time. No difference in practices was noted between
psychiatrists who were aware of the recommendations and those who were not.
Single neuroleptic prescriptions increased in the cohort study in line with
the main conference recommendation. The increase was small, but significant
from 51.1% to 56.4%, and mainly concerned patients recently put on treatment.
Contrary to recommendations, prescriptions of anticholinergics plus
neuroleptics inexplicably rose from 48.2% to 54.3%.

Conclusion: Small changes in prescription habits occurred in the
wake of the consensus conference, but we cannot really ascribe them to a
direct impact of the conference. Despite the great pains we took in
disseminating the conclusions of the conference as widely as possible, it is
clear that a more forceful action plan (e.g., including continuous medical
education) is required.

In a recent paper, Pritchard, Krieble, and Duke
(Psychophysiology, 33, 362–368,
1996) studied the validity of spatial embedding of electroencephalographic
(EEG) data and rejected this method in favor of time-delay
embedding. The present paper describes the nonlinear characterization
of brain dynamics using either spatial or time-delay embedding.
We discuss the arguments published in Pritchard et al.
(1996) and demonstrate that the spatial embedding cannot
be rejected on this basis. We also point out the limitations
of both spatial and time-delay embeddings related to the
spatial extension and the high-dimensional dynamics of
brain activity.

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