As if the Bush administration didn't have enough to fret about already, it is now faced with a queue of corporate supplicants, begging bowls to the fore. To ladle, or not to ladle, that is the question. This is indeed a crisis for the capitalist cause.

One hesitates to use the word "unique" to describe the economic conditions engendered by the terrorist attacks on America, for that might encourage an injudicious policy response. If at all possible, emotion must yield to analysis if the policymakers are to frame their actions effectively.

No one would disagree, however, that the economic circumstances are highly exceptional. These might be seen to justify an exceptional set of responses. Corporate America has been swift to explore, if not yet exploit, the opportunities that might arise should the government temporarily lay capitalism to one side.

President Bush's team is caught on the horns of a dilemma. It is keen to act, swiftly and decisively. But it must also do so effectively. This imperative must have an eye to both the long term as well as the intermediate requirements of a wounded nation.

In these early, critical days, decisions have been made and markers put down. The airline industry wanted $24bn of financial aid. It looks as if it may receive about two thirds of what it asked for. At the same time, one of Bush's advisers wagged a finger in the direction of all those seeking help: "You don't want to subsidise bad business practices."

Last week in this column I argued that "everything has changed, but it must be business as usual".

How true that is of the airlines. Their financial position was parlous before September 11 - a grossly over-supplied, com modity industry, perched atop a mountain of debt, with demand cooling.

The investment cycle in the air industry is very long. Aircraft are delivered years after the carriers' business planners first moot their purchase.

Once operational, they must be kept flying almost continuously if their cost is to be justified. Sell a ticket at any price, just don't leave a jumbo idle. Hence the curiosity of wildly differing fares within a single flight.

Now, of course, there has been a slump in demand for air travel - but the aircraft still sit at the departure gates, or circle the skies waiting for a parking stand to become available. If the carriers choose to mothball them, the financing bills will not disappear. If their reduced income streams won't meet them, they can either put them back on the financing houses - if the contracts allow - file for bankruptcy or beg.

In Seattle, home of Boeing, the local labour force is said to be used to the cycle of hiring and firing that accompanies the ups and downs of the air industry.

This time, however, could be very different. Will Boeing's Sonic Cruiser, star of billboards worldwide, ever roll out of the hanger?

None of this is the fault of governments, but it is now their problem. And not only in the US. British Airways would love a little assistance from 10 Downing Street. Across the globe, carriers will be making similar requests of their politicians. BA's self-help includes a 10% cut in flight numbers, a 12.5% workforce reduction, 20 aircraft withdrawals, and a suspension of investment projects. When, eventually, the world emerges from this tunnel of terror, its people will want to fly once more. Maybe not as often, but certainly with a greater sense of security. This may reflect in a willingness to pay higher prices, although I wouldn't bet on it.

The airline industry will have to scale itself to meet whatever level of demand emerges, and to do so profitably. Capacity will have to be cut. This can only be avoided if governments choose to support structurally unprofitable airlines indefinitely. This makes no sense.

So, bankruptcies and mergers are inevitable as a route to capacity reduction. What you can be sure of, is that sufficient aircraft already exist to meet likely levels of demand. What is uncertain is simply their ownership.

How, then, to respond to the requests for assistance? A brutal free market response would be to do nothing.

The fittest airlines will survive, the weakest fail. The trigger for their failure will not be of their own making, but they cannot hide from the consequences of their past investment decisions.

Brutality, however, is not in fashion right now. The trick for a caring capitalist government must be to provide sufficient short-term aid for an orderly market in airline assets to be established. This is unlikely to alter the eventual outcome, but might ensure that it is achieved with a vestige of dignity.

Whatever approach the Bush administration adopts - across all industries - it must ensure that it is clearly articulated. If the rules of the game have been changed, they should be available for the benefit of all players. This goes to the heart of free market principles, which are, after all, what the government is now so publicly committed to defending.