Thursday 19 July 2012 10.05 EDT
First published on Thursday 19 July 2012 10.05 EDT

The targeted killing of several key Syrian military and security figures including members of President Assad's inner circle signals a turning point in the 17-month uprising. It is uncertain who the authors of the operation against the National Security headquarters are. According to some accounts, it was carried out by the Free Syrian Army (FSA) in co-ordination with supporters inside the military forces. Others suggest it was the playing out of an internal power struggle among regime forces. In either case, the immediate implication is that the regime's foundations – namely the military and security forces – have been shaken severely and are showing signs of fracture and vulnerability. It can no longer be taken for granted that core elite groups are solidly loyal to the Assad regime.

The scenario of internal struggle opens up the possibility that contenders aspiring for power may emerge from within the regime to oust the president. More likely, however, actors within the government and military have been working with the uprising. The FSA and other opposition spokespeople frequently affirm in media interviews that they have supporters within key institutions, in particular, the army.

The regime appears to be unravelling at a faster pace with the reported acceleration of military defections across the country (in Idlib, Aleppo, Homs and Damascus). More defections in diplomatic and political circles are expected to follow in the coming days.

How the battle in Damascus will unfold remains unclear. The FSA and associated militias do not have military capabilities to match the regular army, and without massive defections the battle will grind on in the form of guerrilla warfare between the rebel militias and the loyalist troops in various city neighbourhoods and suburbs (Midan, Barzeh, Qadam, Kafr Sousa, Qaboun and Joubar, for example) with the risk of descending into sectarian strife.

With the apparent disintegration of the regime, the question becomes what forces will emerge in its place. The Syrian uprising has many facets: a popular uprising consisting of peaceful protests and acts of civil disobedience exists side by side with an armed struggle carried out by militia groups composed of army defectors and civilians who took up arms in self-defence, all nominally grouped under the FSA but not necessarily operating within a single structure or under a unified leadership. The civilian wing of the uprising is led by local co-ordination committees which, though effective in mobilising popular protests, have yet to put forward a political programme and do not yet have clearly identifiable leaders. Meanwhile, the traditional political opposition has shown itself to be divided, with the Syrian National Council comprising divergent factions and being contested by other groups such as the Syrian Democratic Forum. In this context, Syrians face two problems: political leadership and working out the terms of a political transition.

The Syrian conflict is further complicated by regional and global geopolitical power plays. Rival global and regional actors with competing agendas and interests have undermined the possibility of devising means to protect civilians from regime violence and from being caught in the crossfire once the militarisation of the uprising had begun. As the balance of power tips away from the Asad regime, these regional and global players appear to be jostling for influence through the UN to dictate the terms of conflict settlement. Western powers pressing for a UN security council resolution against the Syrian regime that includes provision for military intervention under chapter seven of the UN charter appear primarily motivated by a desire to bring under their control the course of the eventual transition. In turn, Russia insists that the UN monitors' mandate, up for renewal, must be tailored to keep the Assad regime in place.

If foreign military intervention was dangerous when the regime kept a united front and held a firm grip over the apparatuses of power, it is more so today as Assad's hold on power becomes tenuous. Any such intervention would only contribute to the escalation of violence, lead to further splintering among the different factions, and threaten the territorial integrity and independence of the country.

Despite the weakening of the regime evidenced by the recent events, the Syrian conflict remains at an impasse. On one hand, the regime continues to pursue the military-security approach aiming to crush the popular uprising at all costs. On the other hand, some rebel groups on the ground and the organised opposition in exile have come predominantely to uphold the military option as the means of bringing down the regime. To break out of this impasse, Syrians from all sectors of society will have to come to agree that a solution cannot be achieved through military means, but that they have to negotiate a political settlement for a post-Assad government and a programme of national reconciliation.