Mexico in 1996

Originally published in the Britannica Book of the Year. Presented as archival content. Learn more.

This article was originally published in the Britannica Book of the Year, an annual print publication that
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The year 1996 began in the shadow of the previous year’s financial crisis. Although that crisis had been largely overcome as the result of the government’s implementation of an International Monetary Fund (IMF) austerity program, difficulties remained to be tackled on both the political and economic fronts. At the end of December 1995, there had been a partial Cabinet reshuffle. Energy Minister Ignacio Pichardo Pagaza, a former head of the ruling Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) and widely viewed as belonging to the party’s "old guard," was replaced by Jesús Reyes Heroles. Arsenio Farell Cubillas was appointed comptroller general in place of Norma Samaniengo, and Carlos Almeida López became head of the president’s press office, a post formerly occupied by Carlos Salomon. These changes, though relatively minor, were seen as a prelude in the new year to further political reform, to which Pres. Ernesto Zedillo Ponce de León had pledged a firm commitment.

As the year began, Zedillo resumed this reform drive, seeking the cooperation of the two main opposition parties, the National Action Party (PAN) and the Party of the Democratic Revolution (PRD). Although both parties intermittently withdrew from the negotiations, Zedillo at the end of July managed to achieve an accord that, among other attributes, ended the ruling party’s role at the head of the Federal Electoral Institute (IFE). Accordingly, Interior Minister Emilio Chuayffet resigned as president of the IFE in mid-October along with other PRI members who had served on the board since it was established in 1990; the question of replacement and selection of new nominees remained to be clarified.

On other political matters Zedillo’s endeavours were less positive. Finalizing terms of a peace accord with the Zapatista National Liberation Army, which had surfaced in the southern state of Chiapas at the beginning of January 1994, continued to be problematic, with negotiations repeatedly breaking down. Developments were complicated at the end of June by the appearance of another armed guerrilla group, known as the Popular Revolutionary Army (EPR), in the village of Aguas Blancas, Guerrero state, on the first anniversary of a massacre of 17 peasants by state police.

The group consisted of some 70 people, masked and carrying AK-47 and R-15 rifles. Their brief appearance at a commemoration for those killed the previous year, being held by members of the left-leaning PRD and peasant groups, was nonconfrontational but called for the overthrow of the Zedillo government, which it alleged to be antidemocratic and illegitimate. The incident was initially played down by the authorities, but during the next few weeks and months, there were more incidents involving the EPR in a number of different states, which prompted a major counterinsurgency effort by the government.

The conflict appeared to simmer down to some degree when the EPR declared a cease-fire in the days preceding (and during) municipal and local legislative elections in the state of Guerrero on October 6. Just before the elections, tension was high as a result of some 15,000 government troops who had been posted to the state to flush out the EPR. On October 5 troops were ordered to temporarily suspend their counterinsurgency operations and remain confined to barracks until the elections had been held. This fostered an atmosphere of relative peace as the voting took place. There were, nevertheless, reports of irregularities perpetrated by the PRI in regard to voting lists, vote buying, and intimidation, compiled by the independent Civic Alliance (Alianza Cívica). Recriminations by the PRI and the PAN, however, were limited, given that both parties won significant numbers of seats. Also, in the weeks immediately after the elections, EPR hostilities did not resume.

At its convention in late September, the rank and file of the ruling PRI adopted a number of resolutions that unleashed additional controversy and threatened the prospects for internal party reform, which Zedillo was seeking. Two major resolutions were approved. One concerned rules covering the party’s choice of presidential candidate in 2000, when Zedillo’s term ended. Government technocrats with no experience of elected office (such as Zedillo) and fewer than 10 years of PRI membership would not be allowed to be candidates. A unanimous resolution of the party was to defend state ownership of the petrochemical industry (a part of the state oil concern, Pemex) and resist the privatization moves the government had been seeking to impose. This, in fact, led to the deferral in October of the planned government sell-off.

Throughout 1996 Zedillo continued to be dogged by the backlog of unfinished business from the administration of Pres. Carlos Salinas de Gortari. Not the least of these were the investigations into the murder of former PRI presidential candidate Luis Donaldo Colosio and the case against Salinas’s brother, Raúl, concerning his alleged involvement in the assassination of the PRI secretary-general, José Francisco Ruiz Massieu, in September 1994. During October the discovery of a body believed to be that of a member of the legislature suspected in the Ruiz Massieu case, on the grounds of property owned by Raúl Salinas, appeared to provide more evidence of foul play.

In regard to the economy, the picture was significantly brighter than in 1995, as a modest recovery began after the almost 7% decline in gross domestic product (GDP) registered in 1995. Growth in the first quarter of 1996 was measured at 2.2%, and in the second quarter there was significant expansion year-on-year of 7.2%. By mid-1996 recovery was evident in both manufacturing and construction, which had declined sharply (by 6.4% and 22%, respectively) in 1995. Indeed, in June, when industrial output rose by 12% overall, manufacturing was up from the previous year by 12.6% and construction by 13.2%. The increases resulted largely from exports rather than domestic demand. Overall, GDP growth of about 3% in 1996 was officially expected.

Inflation, which surged to an annual rate of almost 52% in 1995 as a result of the devaluation of the peso and the impact of adjustment measures, was reduced significantly in 1996. The monthly consumer price index rose by 1.3-1.6% from June through September, compared with a 2.4% increase per month in the first half of the year.

Concerning the exchange rate, which had been altered to a floating regime in the wake of the 1995 financial crisis, the peso showed remarkable stability during the first nine months of 1996, tending to appreciate from its end-of-1995 level of about 7.7 to the U.S. dollar. Indeed, by the end of September, the rate--which then stood at 7.54 per $1--was comfortably within the target average of 7.7 envisioned for the year. During the second week of October, however, the rate declined to around 7.8 new pesos per $1, and the rate at the year’s end was expected to be about 8 per $1.

The relative strength of the peso did not hamper the achievement of monthly trade surpluses during the first nine months of 1996. In fact, the accumulated surplus stood at approximately $5.5 billion by the end of September, and it appeared probable that the total at the end of the year would be at the upper end of the $6.5 billion to $7 billion range. The buoyant trade results led to further improvements in the current-account position.