Thursday, March 3, 2011

Academically Adrift Part 2: The Moral Function of the University

One of my initial responses to Academically Adrift (AA) was a form of despair. It is the feeling I’ve had at times in the classroom as 30 faces stare back at me (or at the ground, or at the cell phone they’re trying to hide under their desk) when I ask a question about the assigned reading, and it appears that at best a handful of students have even attempted to do that reading. It is tempting to become cynical, or bitter, or to simply throw up our hands in resignation. But if we desire to pursue excellence as philosophy teachers, we need to overcome these temptations. And one way to do that is to take on what seems like an even more monumental task than encouraging students to work—we may need to attempt to help our students become better human beings.

If Aristotle was right that one’s childhood is very important with respect to the task of embodying virtue as an adult, then some of the points raised in AA paint a bleak picture. Students who come to college primarily for a social experience and career credential may not see the value in grappling with difficult ideas and concepts, reading at least 40 pages a week and writing longer papers. Why undergo the sometimes painful and often difficult process of developing intellectual virtue when the point of college is to obtain a credential and have some fun? If all of the involved parties are supporting this approach, to varying extents, it will be that much more difficult to change the mind of the student to the extent that he or she engages in the necessary behavior for growth in intellectual virtue and critical thinking skills.

There are other issues in play here, as the authors of AA point out. Many PhD’s see themselves as independent professionals and are not concerned with advancing any particular institution, i.e. there is a lack of institutional loyalty which can be problematic. Related to this, according to Arum and Roksa a primary incentive driving faculty research “is a quasi-religious commitment to embracing research as a ‘vocational calling’" (Kindle location 289). The motive is not financial reward, at least for many and perhaps for most faculty. Clearly this is the case for philosophers, as our work very rarely populates any best-seller list. Perhaps we ought to take teaching to be a part of this calling as well. I won’t pursue this more here, given a previous discussion at ISW.

I’m interested in a repeated point in AA having to do with the institutional function of not only academic education, but (at least potentially and clearly historically) the function of moral education as well. There is a tradition in the U.S.A. in which colleges and universities have taken the moral education of students to be a central function and rationale for their own existence. Many institutions, historically speaking, were created for the achievement of moral ends via moral education. Moral education here is taken to include moral guidance, lest we think it is merely educating students about different moral theories or principles. Some worry that if the only moral values we support are diversity and tolerance, then we shouldn’t be surprised at the state of morality at institutions of higher education (Kindle location 368). As AA states, “in most secular colleges there has been little institutional responsibility taken for the moral development or social regulation of students. It is thus not particularly surprising that behaviors at odds with academic values, such as cheating on exams, have been demonstrated to have increased significantly in recent decades” (Kindle location 381).

A mark of colleges that change lives is that professors are not only mentors in class, but companions at dinner and on hiking trails, intramural teammates, and even friends. I’m not sure what to make of this as far as its possibility or even desirability for colleges and universities across the nation, but I do think that if we want to offer moral guidance to students it will have to happen in contexts beyond the classroom and office hours. Again, as Aristotle tells us, we grow in moral virtue in the school of life, not in the classroom. And I have a hunch that we need to offer such guidance, because of the ways in which moral and intellectual virtue are connected to one another and required for achieving the goals set out at the end of AA.

At the end of AA, the authors state that deep changes are needed if we are going to instill “in the next generation of young adults a lifelong love of learning, an ability to think critically and communicate effectively, and a willingness to embrace and assume adult responsibilities.” Again, I don't see how we can do this unless we take on the task of moral guidance.

I am interested in what people think about all of this. Do we need to focus more on a set of what might be called democratic values, beyond diversity and tolerance, to include such values and virtues as justice, equality, liberty, community, honesty, wisdom, and compassion? I think we do, though I’m unsure how this might work, apart from attending to them in the classroom, seeking to live them out ourselves, and forming deeper relationships with at least some of our students as described above. The last element would demand more of something that many of us have little to give, our time. But perhaps it is a price worth paying, at least for some of us.

18 comments:

I agree with you Mike that the small set of "neutral" virtues (diversity and tolerance) is an impoverished set. I also agree that we do a terrible disservice by not taking the moral features of our profession seriously. I take it that there is an assumption that these are the only virtues about which we can agree. But this shows how uneducated we are about the virtues (we can't agree about friendship, equality, humor, etc.?) Even worse, this exacerbates the unreflective adoption by so many students of a kind of incoherent relativism.

But perhaps you and I depart with respect to how these virtues ought to be cultivated in education. I don't think that we ought to do it by teaching the virtues. I don't think we should do it by trying to teach people to be empathetic, kind, judicious, fair, etc. Rather, I am a traditionalist in the sense that I think that learning biology, economics, philosophy, literature, political theory, chemistry, etc. etc. tends to make people better people. I believe that a truly rigorous liberal education tends to make people more virtuous.

I know. I'm going to get a million counterexamples (we went through this when we read Nussbaum's Not for Profit). So let me be clear: I am not making a claim about necessary or sufficient conditions here. I am making a broad empirical claim about probabilities. Do I have proof? No. I have anecdote.

Yes, educated people can do the most horrible things - this is part of the problem of modernity. I know all of this. Nevertheless, I cling to both parts of the Enlightenment ideal. On the one hand, reason can expand our spheres of concern beyond our narrow subjectivities in order to put us in contact with the world, other persons and the past. On the other hand, from the crooked timber of humanity, nothing straight may be fashioned.

I know that many have taken the 20th century as a clear indictment against the notion that education can improve humans, morally speaking. I think that from the 20th century, the most we can conclude is that an education is consistent with evil. This does not entail that education is wholly ineffective with respect to the entirety of humanity, morally speaking.

So, insofar as our courses lack rigor, insofar as we are complicit in a scheme of limited learning (according to Arum and Roksa) then our courses also do not edify and we are complicit in a scheme of limited moral development.

"And one way to do that is to take on what seems like an even more monumental task than encouraging students to work—we may need to attempt to help our students become better human beings."

I didn't train to be anyone's counselor, role model, confessor, or guru. It's not in my job description either. I learned philosophy and that's what I want to teach. Is the lady down the hall struggling to teach algebra expected to inculcate virtue as well? Obviously not. Why would anyone think that that's a philosophy teacher's job either? We're not Socrates talking with his friends. The students, we are constantly reminded, are our "customers." The whole thing is supposed to be impersonal: fee for service. I am not averse to spending time after class talking philosophy or other academic subjects with those students having a genuine interest in learning. But any attempt to fashion their characters would be asking for trouble. For one thing, it makes it harder to be objective in grading. I can also imagine complaints growing out of such interaction should that grading not turn out as expected by the subject of one's extra-curricular efforts.

I can appreciate your vision here. I'm not entirely convinced either way at this point by what you say; I'd say I'm somewhere between sympathetic with you and also with Robert (comment above this one).

I'll leave my concerns about the general nature of the project behind for a second, though, and focus on something else.

When you say that the kind of relationship professors should have with students is one in which they "...are not only mentors in class, but companions at dinner and on hiking trails, intramural teammates, and even friends" I wonder, honestly, whether virtue can be acquired in the context of such a pedagogical relationship.

Basically, I wonder whether there's too much familiarity as it is within the student-teacher relationship, so much so that it may actually be _harmful_ to virtue. It may be that what is needed is more distance (that doesn't mean ignoring them), not more structured close relationships and familiarity.

In a way, I wonder whether our desire to become more like guiding peers to students has deconstructed the very ground required for teachers to serve as exemplars.

Basically, the more I am friends with my students, the more I think it is unlikely that they will look up to me, and it seems to me that this 'looking up' psychological component is required for virtue to take root.

I think I'm with Becko, but in slightly different key: We live in a society with too much diversity in values for me to be comfortable with the notion of faculty as moral exemplars in a very deep or substantive sense. I gather that faculty at religious institutions do this, but I'd find myself extremely anxious being thought of as a moral role model in the usual sense. Furthermore, I fear this would undermine an important part of the teaching persona, namely, the instructor as an objective 'tour guide' through the terrain rather than an advocate. (Yes, I think we can be objective as teachers even if we have philosophical commitments, but I doubt that students will always appreciate that subtlety.) Perhaps I'm echoing Chris here; informal relationships with students directed at "moral guidance" are not obviously compatible with what I think teachers should be doing.

So here's where I'm with Becko in a way: Perhaps exposure to academic content instills values in students, along the lines of what Becko called the "Enlightenment ideal." But we also model certain virtues of inquiry and belief that I hope our students pick up on: doggedness, modesty, skepticism, integrity, sympathy, etc. And my suspicion is that these 'values' are the main mode of moral guidance we give our students. (And it's not a coincidence these are 'liberal' values, I'd say.) I'd be very happy if students practice and internalize these values, even if they are in a sense 'thinner' or more procedural than other values. And if we succeed in internalizing these values, our students will probably learn a great deal to boot!

I distinctly remember hearing my first mentor in graduate school, a woman I looked up to, indignantly telling one of her undergraduate students, who had indicated that she and other students wanted to get to know her personally, 'I am not your buddy!'.

Picking up on Michael Cholbi's point, one way to teach "virtue" in our classes--and I think this applies more broadly than just to philosophers--is to pay attention in our teaching, and to make explicit to our students, the intellectual virtues we are trying to cultivate in them. This is because many of them have either moral equivalents or applications beyond academe. For example, intellectual humility, charitable (sympathetic) reading, but also things like intellectual courage (connected with asking hard questions, pursuing lines of thought that might challenge our own preconceptions, etc.). One would think that there would be some connection--despite Becko's worries above--between the cultivation of these virtues as relevant to study and their more general application in other areas of life.

A different virtue that seems relevant to raising student performance by raising expectations is something like the virtue of doing a job well. Cultivating this involves breaking down the conceptual barrier between the classroom and the "real world." I have many students fail to turn in smaller, weekly assignments, and while they can often slide through because of the way I structure the grades, this kind of patchy performance would just get one fired in the "real world." (Recall John Alexander's recent frustrations on this blog.) It doesn't matter if it's just a minor assignment; if you don't do the work, you're fired. Of course, fixing this is part of fixing the larger problem of motivating students to take life in the classroom more seriously--when they don't, and perhaps this is related to Mike's occasional frustration, it's hard to take ourselves, and what we do, seriously. And the downward spiral continues.

In the post Robert removed (unless it is to appear again later), he asks how we can manage to hold students more accountable re: my example about minor assignments without getting ourselves fired (or chastised, etc.).

I had a conversation with my intro class today about this--at least, the ones who come to class the day before spring break begins. I asked them to what extent they see the classroom as separate from the "real world" and several of them agreed that the distinction is there, though at least one resisted that. And there are differences: in the real world (work--which many of them do), they get paid. For college, they pay. But obviously the ones in class today care enough about getting what they paid for to show up. I pointed out that if they have scholarships or grants, then they are being paid to go to school, and could think about the responsibilities entailed by receiving such support.

Some of them recognized the concerns on our end--e.g. about slackers--and actually had ideas, e.g. about structuring grading so that while assignments are worth a certain number of points, failure to do them results in penalties greater than a zero (like a reduction in the possible final grade they can earn).

And we had a nice class, with lots of discussion afterwards. Maybe talking (not whining) about these kinds of meta-concerns with them is part of making what goes on in the classroom more "real"--to get them, too, to think about why it matters. It might be worth thinking about the ways in which some students--the motivated ones, the ones who are willing to work hard--might be allies in thinking through these issues, because I certainly don't think those students appreciate seeing the ease with which others skate by (in some classes). (I've heard that there's a similar phenomenon related to academic integrity--student juries seem willing to propose much harsher penalties for violations than "teachable moment" types of administrators.)

"It doesn't matter if it's just a minor assignment; if you don't do the work, you're fired. Of course, fixing this is part of fixing the larger problem of motivating students to take life in the classroom more seriously."

Somebody please tell me how to hold students accountable in this way without getting ONESELF fired. I hear horror stories all the time about instructors called on the carpet for handing out too many low grades or how counselors will steer students away from instructors who insist on maintaining high standards. I myself was once told by an administrator "your problem is you want to be teaching graduate students." Another cited the anonymous complaints posted on Rate Your Professor. I have been trying since I began posting here to get people to see that our hands are tied until there is a sea change in administrators' attitudes towards the purpose of higher education. As long as they see it as a commodity, instead of something with intrinsic worth, we will be unable to get our "students" to take seriously either our subject or us.

I agree that a rigorous liberal education tends to make people more virtuous. I also think that the highly involved model I discussed in the post in reference to the book's points about professors spending time with at least some students outside of class is not for everyone. I do some of this, but not too much, because I have responsibilities that I take seriously to my wife and children, and I want to have a life outside of work.

However, I would like to make one additional point. Some philosophers (e.g. Kierkegaard and Aristotle, to name 2) believe that our ability to perceive at least some moral truths depends upon not just our intellectual but also our moral character. As one commenter on Kierkegaard puts it, "People with healthy moral...concerns are able to see truths that people who lack such concerns cannot see" (Kierkegaard's Ethic of Love, S. Evans, p. 58). I think this is probably the case. If it is, then it underscores the need for moral guidance as I described in the post.

"Some of them recognized the concerns on our end--e.g. about slackers--and actually had ideas, e.g. about structuring grading so that while assignments are worth a certain number of points, failure to do them results in penalties greater than a zero (like a reduction in the possible final grade they can earn)."

Mike,

I have a policy of never talking to students about other students. It is supposed to be a class, a group having some level of cohesiveness. Also, such a conversation places them on the same level as you, removing the distance required for authority and objectivity. Unburdening yourself in front of them can come back to haunt you when it's time to exercise the former and practice the latter. Students are not our helpers and they certainly should have no say in setting standards.

Robert, do you think that students are unaware that there are slackers in their midst? unaware that professors struggle to find effective ways to deal with slackers? As long as they weren't naming names, I'm with Matthew.

There _are_ thoughtful students who are or want to be your allies on issues like academic integrity, engagement, and ensuring that students who receive high grades actually have earned them. And I can see how engaging such students in conversation could be beneficial to both sides: maybe a student will come up with a good idea that you can use (later, of course, so that you don't risk students influencing their own policies, which could get messy fast), and the conversation gives the students a chance to think through these issues--with feedback from a professor!--in ways that don't happen through regular coursework.

I had professors of both kinds--the kind who will happily meet a student in the campus coffee shop to discuss issues outside of class, who serves as a kind of mentor; and the kind Michael described, who maintain distance while modeling intellectual virtues, serving more as a role model. I think that both were of great value.

I am, however, wary of any attempt to explicitly moralize in the classroom. I suspect that's partly a result of attending a religious college for two years; the administration there had a tendency to sacrifice academic rigor in favor of promulgating their own brand of morality.

As a virtue ethicist myself. I tend to agree that perception is altered by virtues (whether they be intellectual or moral), or even that moral facts are created by virtues (doesn't matter which for this). So my concern is not outside the virtue project.

My concern is simply this: in the current institutional structure that academia happens to be, students are encouraged to think of teachers as a type of peer, or a 'guide' or 'store worker' -- everything but 'the sage on the stage'. Students do not see (because they are not taught the virtues required for it) teachers are people to mirror or copy. They are taught to think of themselves as consumers, and of teachers as people peddling products that they may or may not have any use for - people to be navigated if anything. All of this is highly destructive to the creations of the kinds of conditions required for even minimal virtue training to succeed.

That said, it's not that I am opposed to the things you say - I think that in the right environment, they *might* actually work (not the friend part). However, in the current climate, my fear is that such behaviors simply add to the destructive environment for virtue, as they will invariably be processed as more of the "teacher as tour guide" or "teacher as cruise director" view of the teacher/student relationship.

What we need, first and foremost (if we want to build virtue) is get rid of the "club med" view of college. From a very rigid and rigorous academic base, we can then, and with care, add these further behaviors. Without that core, we're just making things worse.

Dammit, comment just got eaten. Here's the short version.These comments are astounding. Seriously, I can't imagine how you can believe/write these things.

1) I teach philosophy only.Robert says: "I didn't train to be anyone's counselor, role model, confessor, or guru. It's not in my job description either."I haven't seen your contract, but here, most contracts make reference to being a member of the university community. That's pretty vague, but it clearly goes beyond delivering your content in the designated location at the designated times. Instructors should have human relationships with students - though they may not be close.Robert says: "Students are not our helpers and they certainly should have no say in setting standards."Same applies.

2) Familiarity breeds contempt.Chris says: " there's too much familiarity as it is within the student-teacher relationship, so much so that it may actually be _harmful_ to virtue...this 'looking up' psychological component is required for virtue to take root."You've confused (1) possession of the virtue of respect and (2) acquisition of virtues. I don't know the literature on this, but think of your own experience. My moral values and virtues, such as they are, were formed by those closest to me: my family. I cannot think of a single case where I've developed a moral value/virtue from someone distant from me - because I can't perceive them at a distance. To recognize and appreciate moral virtues, you have to see them close up. And familiarity does not breed contempt, if that's what you're worried about. There is research on this stuff.

3) Virtue is the opposite of fun.Chris says: "What we need, first and foremost (if we want to build virtue) is get rid of the "club med" view of college."Only if you're a puritan! Where I come from, the hardest working and hardest partying students are the med students. High academic standards does not mean you have to be negative about student social activities.

4) Morality means religion.Michael says: "We live in a society with too much diversity in values for me to be comfortable with the notion of faculty as moral exemplars in a very deep or substantive sense. I gather that faculty at religious institutions do this, but I'd find myself extremely anxious being thought of as a moral role model in the usual sense."Anonymous says: "I am, however, wary of any attempt to explicitly moralize in the classroom. I suspect that's partly a result of attending a religious college for two years; the administration there had a tendency to sacrifice academic rigor in favor of promulgating their own brand of morality."I think Becko's given my answer to this. You can be a moral exemplar in a *limited area*. There's no need to try to inculcate students with your views on sexuality, euthanasia or colonialism. But you should be an exemplar in the area of academic rigour.

5) Instructors are not invested in their subject.Michael says: "an important part of the teaching persona, namely, the instructor as an objective 'tour guide' through the terrain rather than an advocate."I can't even understand this. By the action of teaching philosophy, rather than cookery, you are advocating for philosophy. You set the syllabus, you decide what knowledge/skills it is key for students to possess. This is advocating. And rightly so: you possess the knowledge, and no-one else can make the decisions you make.

Here are some quick replies, as I think you've misunderstood what I'm saying, or my post/comments were not clear, or some combination of both.

1. "You say that I've confused (1) possession of the virtue of respect and (2) acquisition of virtues....I cannot think of a single case where I've developed a moral value/virtue from someone distant from me - because I can't perceive them at a distance."

I don't deny that. Virtues require a level of foundational familiarity of course - you need to have an actual relationship with the person in question. However, if you don't look UP to the person in question, there's little chance you'll acquire much of anything in terms of virtues.

Think of family relationships -- they are familiar, yet hierarchical. I'm not arguing for a removal of the familarity aspect - I'm suggesting that (a) we should not seek to remove the hierarchical aspect, and that (b) in current (American) institutions, that hierarchical aspect is under serious attack, and has been for some time. I'm pretty sure that I specifically said that I was not against any of the actual activities that were mentioned in the main post - I was more concerned with the fact that given the current educational climate, they would be harmful to virtue, not helpful

2) You said: "Virtue is the opposite of fun. Chris says: "What we need, first and foremost (if we want to build virtue) is get rid of the "club med" view of college." Only if you're a puritan! Where I come from, the hardest working and hardest partying students are the med students. High academic standards does not mean you have to be negative about student social activities."

I'm never said that virtue and fun can't go together. What I'm said was that (and Academically Adrift seems to support this with data) in educational institutions there is a serious shift towards making fun the guiding purpose of being at college, NOT work. Hardly virtue enforcing. I think fun is just fine, when it is present in the right overall context.

Chinaphil, you seem to have misunderstood me as well. I emphatically disagree with the statement "morality means religion," so if it sounded like I was saying otherwise, something went wrong. Religion informed the particular set of morals that my first college tried to inculcate, but my point was that the school was more concerned with making good little X's of their students than with providing a solid (academic) education. I do think that religious institutions are more prone to this, but that's a tangential issue.

I quite agree that professors ought to model intellectual virtue; that was one of my points. I don't know whether Becko is right about a rigorous liberal education tending to make people better, but hers (and Michael's) is the approach I would favor.

I'm an adjunct, chinaphil, so I'm not expected to do anything but teach my classes, which is part of the problem here: we are not made to feel a part of the institutions at which we teach. But let's suppose my contract did say something about being a member of the university community. I would take that clause to mean participate in colloquia, conferences, faculty meetings, and the like. Such activities mostly involve interacting with colleagues, not students. And to the extent that they do involve students, the purpose would still be academic, not social.

Nobody said anything about not developing relationships. My point is, the focus of those relationships should be philosophy. Kids know I love to talk sports, e.g., and do so outside class. But I always try to bring the conversation back to what we're there for: learning philosophy.

Also, CP, I gave a couple reasons why students should not have anything to do with the setting of standards or solving of classroom management problems. You did not address those concerns. Learning requires maintaining a clear line between the roles of students and faculty.

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