This book explores a particular way of justifying the rational principles that govern credences (or degrees of belief). The main principles that the book justifies are the central tenets of Bayesian ...
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This book explores a particular way of justifying the rational principles that govern credences (or degrees of belief). The main principles that the book justifies are the central tenets of Bayesian epistemology, though many other related principles are met along the way. These are: Probabilism, the claims that credences should obey the laws of probability; the Principal Principle, which says how credences in hypotheses about the objective chances should relate to credences in other propositions; the Principle of Indifference, which says that, in the absence of evidence, credences should be distributed equally over all possibilities that are entertained; and Conditionalization, the Bayesian account of how responses are planned when new evidence is received. Ultimately, then, the book is a study in the foundations of Bayesianism. To justify these principles, the book looks to decision theory. An agent’s credences are treated as if they were a choice she makes. The book appeals to the principles of decision theory to show that, when epistemic utility is measured in this way, the credences that violate the principles listed above are ruled out as irrational. The account of epistemic utility given is the veritist’s: the sole fundamental source of epistemic utility for credences is their accuracy. Thus, this is an investigation of the version of epistemic utility theory known as accuracy-first epistemology.Less

Accuracy and the Laws of Credence

Richard Pettigrew

Published in print: 2016-04-01

This book explores a particular way of justifying the rational principles that govern credences (or degrees of belief). The main principles that the book justifies are the central tenets of Bayesian epistemology, though many other related principles are met along the way. These are: Probabilism, the claims that credences should obey the laws of probability; the Principal Principle, which says how credences in hypotheses about the objective chances should relate to credences in other propositions; the Principle of Indifference, which says that, in the absence of evidence, credences should be distributed equally over all possibilities that are entertained; and Conditionalization, the Bayesian account of how responses are planned when new evidence is received. Ultimately, then, the book is a study in the foundations of Bayesianism. To justify these principles, the book looks to decision theory. An agent’s credences are treated as if they were a choice she makes. The book appeals to the principles of decision theory to show that, when epistemic utility is measured in this way, the credences that violate the principles listed above are ruled out as irrational. The account of epistemic utility given is the veritist’s: the sole fundamental source of epistemic utility for credences is their accuracy. Thus, this is an investigation of the version of epistemic utility theory known as accuracy-first epistemology.

The biological and social sciences often generalize causal conclusions from one context to others that may differ in some relevant respects, as is illustrated by inferences from animal models to ...
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The biological and social sciences often generalize causal conclusions from one context to others that may differ in some relevant respects, as is illustrated by inferences from animal models to humans or from a pilot study to a broader population. Inferences like these are known as extrapolations. How and when extrapolation can be legitimate is a fundamental question for the biological and social sciences that has not received the attention it deserves. This book argues that previous accounts of extrapolation are inadequate and proposes a better approach that is able to answer methodological critiques of extrapolation from animal models to humans.Less

Across the Boundaries : Extrapolation in Biology and Social Science

Daniel Steel

Published in print: 2007-10-01

The biological and social sciences often generalize causal conclusions from one context to others that may differ in some relevant respects, as is illustrated by inferences from animal models to humans or from a pilot study to a broader population. Inferences like these are known as extrapolations. How and when extrapolation can be legitimate is a fundamental question for the biological and social sciences that has not received the attention it deserves. This book argues that previous accounts of extrapolation are inadequate and proposes a better approach that is able to answer methodological critiques of extrapolation from animal models to humans.

Addiction seems to involve a significant degree of loss of control over behaviour, yet it remains mysterious how such a loss of control occurs and how it can be compatible with the retention of ...
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Addiction seems to involve a significant degree of loss of control over behaviour, yet it remains mysterious how such a loss of control occurs and how it can be compatible with the retention of agency. This collection, which arose out of a conference held at the University of Oxford, brings together philosophers, neuroscientists and psychologists with the aim of understanding this loss of control from a perspective informed by cutting-edge science and philosophical reflection. Individual chapters, by well-established names in philosophy of action, moral philosophy, neuroscience and psychology, illuminate the mechanisms involved in the loss of control and link these mechanisms to our understanding of agency and the moral responsibility of addicts.Less

Addiction and Self-Control : Perspectives from Philosophy, Psychology, and Neuroscience

Published in print: 2013-11-29

Addiction seems to involve a significant degree of loss of control over behaviour, yet it remains mysterious how such a loss of control occurs and how it can be compatible with the retention of agency. This collection, which arose out of a conference held at the University of Oxford, brings together philosophers, neuroscientists and psychologists with the aim of understanding this loss of control from a perspective informed by cutting-edge science and philosophical reflection. Individual chapters, by well-established names in philosophy of action, moral philosophy, neuroscience and psychology, illuminate the mechanisms involved in the loss of control and link these mechanisms to our understanding of agency and the moral responsibility of addicts.

The Advancement of Science attempts to understand the notions of scientific progress, scientific objectivity, and the growth of knowledge by taking up the challenges that have been ...
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The Advancement of Science attempts to understand the notions of scientific progress, scientific objectivity, and the growth of knowledge by taking up the challenges that have been issued by scholars in the history and sociology of science. Begins from an outline of classical views in philosophy of science and explains how those views were confronted with apparently problematic examples from scientific practice past and present. Then builds an account of science that emphasizes the ways in which socially situated scientists can gain objective understanding of the world.Less

The Advancement of Science : Science Without Legend, Objectivity Without Illusions

Philip Kitcher

Published in print: 1995-08-17

The Advancement of Science attempts to understand the notions of scientific progress, scientific objectivity, and the growth of knowledge by taking up the challenges that have been issued by scholars in the history and sociology of science. Begins from an outline of classical views in philosophy of science and explains how those views were confronted with apparently problematic examples from scientific practice past and present. Then builds an account of science that emphasizes the ways in which socially situated scientists can gain objective understanding of the world.

In evolutionary biology, there is a mode of thinking which is quite common, and philosophically significant. This is ‘agential thinking’. In its paradigm case, agential thinking involves treating an ...
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In evolutionary biology, there is a mode of thinking which is quite common, and philosophically significant. This is ‘agential thinking’. In its paradigm case, agential thinking involves treating an evolved organism as if it were an agent pursuing a goal, such as survival and reproduction, and treating its phenotypic traits, including its behaviours, as strategies for achieving this goal. Less commonly, the entities that are treated as agent-like are genes or groups, rather than individual organisms. Agential thinking is related to the familiar Darwinian point that organisms’ evolved traits are often adaptive, but it goes beyond this. For it involves deliberately transposing a set of concepts—goals, interests, strategies—whose original application is to rational human agents, to the biological world at large. There are two possible attitudes towards agential thinking in biology. The first sees it as mere anthropomorphism, an instance of the psychological bias which leads humans to see intention and purpose in places where they do not exist. The second sees agential thinking as a natural and justifiable way of describing or reasoning about Darwinian evolution and its products. The truth turns out to lie in between these extremes, for agential thinking is not a monolithic whole. Some forms of agential thinking are problematic, but others admit of a solid justification, and when used carefully, can be a source of insight.Less

Agents and Goals in Evolution

Samir Okasha

Published in print: 2018-06-21

In evolutionary biology, there is a mode of thinking which is quite common, and philosophically significant. This is ‘agential thinking’. In its paradigm case, agential thinking involves treating an evolved organism as if it were an agent pursuing a goal, such as survival and reproduction, and treating its phenotypic traits, including its behaviours, as strategies for achieving this goal. Less commonly, the entities that are treated as agent-like are genes or groups, rather than individual organisms. Agential thinking is related to the familiar Darwinian point that organisms’ evolved traits are often adaptive, but it goes beyond this. For it involves deliberately transposing a set of concepts—goals, interests, strategies—whose original application is to rational human agents, to the biological world at large. There are two possible attitudes towards agential thinking in biology. The first sees it as mere anthropomorphism, an instance of the psychological bias which leads humans to see intention and purpose in places where they do not exist. The second sees agential thinking as a natural and justifiable way of describing or reasoning about Darwinian evolution and its products. The truth turns out to lie in between these extremes, for agential thinking is not a monolithic whole. Some forms of agential thinking are problematic, but others admit of a solid justification, and when used carefully, can be a source of insight.

We live in a world of crowds and corporations, legislatures and languages, money and markets. These are all social objects—they are made, at least in part, by people and communities. But what exactly ...
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We live in a world of crowds and corporations, legislatures and languages, money and markets. These are all social objects—they are made, at least in part, by people and communities. But what exactly are these things? How are they made, and what is the role of people in making them? This book aims to rewrite our understanding of the nature of the social world and the foundations of the social sciences. The book challenges the three prevailing traditions about how the social world is made. One tradition takes the social world to be built out of people, much as traffic is built out of cars. A second tradition also takes people to be the building blocks of the social world, but focuses on the attitudes we have toward one another. The third tradition takes the social world to be a collective projection onto the physical world. The book shows that these share critical flaws. Most fundamentally, all three traditions overestimate the role of people in building the social world: they are overly anthropocentric. In the place of traditional theories, the book introduces a model based on a new distinction between the grounding and the anchoring of social facts, and illustrates the model with a study of the nature of law. It studies social groups and their constitution, and what it means for groups to take an action or have an intention. Contrary to the overwhelming consensus, these often depend on more than the actions and intentions of group members.Less

The Ant Trap : Rebuilding the Foundations of the Social Sciences

Brian Epstein

Published in print: 2015-04-01

We live in a world of crowds and corporations, legislatures and languages, money and markets. These are all social objects—they are made, at least in part, by people and communities. But what exactly are these things? How are they made, and what is the role of people in making them? This book aims to rewrite our understanding of the nature of the social world and the foundations of the social sciences. The book challenges the three prevailing traditions about how the social world is made. One tradition takes the social world to be built out of people, much as traffic is built out of cars. A second tradition also takes people to be the building blocks of the social world, but focuses on the attitudes we have toward one another. The third tradition takes the social world to be a collective projection onto the physical world. The book shows that these share critical flaws. Most fundamentally, all three traditions overestimate the role of people in building the social world: they are overly anthropocentric. In the place of traditional theories, the book introduces a model based on a new distinction between the grounding and the anchoring of social facts, and illustrates the model with a study of the nature of law. It studies social groups and their constitution, and what it means for groups to take an action or have an intention. Contrary to the overwhelming consensus, these often depend on more than the actions and intentions of group members.

This book explores the idea that our aesthetic responses and art behaviors are connected to our evolved human nature. Our humanoid forerunners displayed aesthetic sensibilities hundreds of thousands ...
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This book explores the idea that our aesthetic responses and art behaviors are connected to our evolved human nature. Our humanoid forerunners displayed aesthetic sensibilities hundreds of thousands of years ago and the art standing of prehistoric cave paintings is virtually uncontested. After introducing the topic, Part I analyzes the key concepts of the aesthetic, art, evolution, and how they might be related. Among other issues, there is consideration of whether animals have aesthetic tastes and whether art is not only universal but cross-culturally comprehensible. Part II is on aesthetics. The many aesthetic interests that humans take in animals and how these reflect our biological interests are examined, as is the idea that our environmental and landscape preferences are rooted in the experiences of our distant ancestors. In considering the controversial subject of human beauty, evolutionary psychologists focus on female physical attractiveness in the context of mate selection, but here a broader view decouples human beauty from mate choice and explains why it goes more with social performance and self-presentation. Part III asks if the arts, together or singly, are biological adaptations, incidental by-products of nonart adaptations, or so removed from biology that they rate as purely cultural technologies. None of the many positions examined is conclusively supported, but there are grounds, nevertheless, for seeing art as part of human nature. It serves as a powerful and complex signal of human fitness, and so cannot be incidental to biology. Indeed, such behaviors are the touchstones of our humanity.Less

The Artful Species : Aesthetics, Art, and Evolution

Stephen Davies

Published in print: 2012-12-06

This book explores the idea that our aesthetic responses and art behaviors are connected to our evolved human nature. Our humanoid forerunners displayed aesthetic sensibilities hundreds of thousands of years ago and the art standing of prehistoric cave paintings is virtually uncontested. After introducing the topic, Part I analyzes the key concepts of the aesthetic, art, evolution, and how they might be related. Among other issues, there is consideration of whether animals have aesthetic tastes and whether art is not only universal but cross-culturally comprehensible. Part II is on aesthetics. The many aesthetic interests that humans take in animals and how these reflect our biological interests are examined, as is the idea that our environmental and landscape preferences are rooted in the experiences of our distant ancestors. In considering the controversial subject of human beauty, evolutionary psychologists focus on female physical attractiveness in the context of mate selection, but here a broader view decouples human beauty from mate choice and explains why it goes more with social performance and self-presentation. Part III asks if the arts, together or singly, are biological adaptations, incidental by-products of nonart adaptations, or so removed from biology that they rate as purely cultural technologies. None of the many positions examined is conclusively supported, but there are grounds, nevertheless, for seeing art as part of human nature. It serves as a powerful and complex signal of human fitness, and so cannot be incidental to biology. Indeed, such behaviors are the touchstones of our humanity.

This book deals with questions of metaphysics, epistemology, and philosophy of mind from the vantage point of physics. Combining general philosophy with physics, it covers such topics as the ...
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This book deals with questions of metaphysics, epistemology, and philosophy of mind from the vantage point of physics. Combining general philosophy with physics, it covers such topics as the definition of matter, the nature of space, motion, gravity, electromagnetic fields, the character of physical knowledge, and consciousness and meaning. Throughout, the book maintains an historical perspective and seeks to determine how much we really know of the world described by physics. It defends a version of “structuralism”: the thesis that our knowledge is partial and merely abstract, leaving a large epistemological gap at the center of physics. The book then connects this element of mystery to parallel mysteries in relation to the mind. Consciousness emerges as just one more mystery of physics. A theory of matter and space is developed, according to which the impenetrability of matter is explained as the deletion of volumes of space. The book proposes a philosophy of science that distinguishes physics from both psychology and biology, explores the ontology of energy, and considers the relevance of physics to seemingly remote fields such as the theory of meaning. In the form of a series of aphorisms, this book presents a metaphysical system that takes laws of nature as fundamental.Less

Basic Structures of Reality : Essays in Meta-Physics

Colin McGinn

Published in print: 2012-01-01

This book deals with questions of metaphysics, epistemology, and philosophy of mind from the vantage point of physics. Combining general philosophy with physics, it covers such topics as the definition of matter, the nature of space, motion, gravity, electromagnetic fields, the character of physical knowledge, and consciousness and meaning. Throughout, the book maintains an historical perspective and seeks to determine how much we really know of the world described by physics. It defends a version of “structuralism”: the thesis that our knowledge is partial and merely abstract, leaving a large epistemological gap at the center of physics. The book then connects this element of mystery to parallel mysteries in relation to the mind. Consciousness emerges as just one more mystery of physics. A theory of matter and space is developed, according to which the impenetrability of matter is explained as the deletion of volumes of space. The book proposes a philosophy of science that distinguishes physics from both psychology and biology, explores the ontology of energy, and considers the relevance of physics to seemingly remote fields such as the theory of meaning. In the form of a series of aphorisms, this book presents a metaphysical system that takes laws of nature as fundamental.

The way some scientific explanations work is not by describing causal connections between events or by describing the world’s overall causal structure. Furthermore, mathematicians regard some proofs ...
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The way some scientific explanations work is not by describing causal connections between events or by describing the world’s overall causal structure. Furthermore, mathematicians regard some proofs as not merely proving some theorems but also explaining why those theorems hold—and these explanations do not work by supplying information about causes. This book proposes philosophical accounts of many kinds of non-causal explanations in science and mathematics. One important kind of non-causal scientific explanation is termed “explanation by constraint.” These explanations work by providing information about what makes certain facts especially inevitable—that is, what makes them possess greater necessity than ordinary laws of nature (connecting causes to their effects) do. This book presents an original account of explanations by constraint, offering many examples from classical physics and special relativity. This book also offers original accounts of several other varieties of non-causal scientific explanation. “Dimensional explanations” work by showing how some law of nature arises merely from the dimensions of the quantities involved. “Really statistical explanations” include explanations that appeal to regression toward the mean and other canonical manifestations of chance. This book also provides an original account of what makes certain mathematical proofs but not others explanatory, thereby connecting mathematical explanation to a host of other important but underexplored mathematical ideas, including coincidences in mathematics, the importance of giving multiple proofs of the same result, impure proofs that explain, and natural properties in mathematics.Less

Because Without Cause : Non-Causal Explanations in Science and Mathematics

Marc Lange

Published in print: 2016-11-24

The way some scientific explanations work is not by describing causal connections between events or by describing the world’s overall causal structure. Furthermore, mathematicians regard some proofs as not merely proving some theorems but also explaining why those theorems hold—and these explanations do not work by supplying information about causes. This book proposes philosophical accounts of many kinds of non-causal explanations in science and mathematics. One important kind of non-causal scientific explanation is termed “explanation by constraint.” These explanations work by providing information about what makes certain facts especially inevitable—that is, what makes them possess greater necessity than ordinary laws of nature (connecting causes to their effects) do. This book presents an original account of explanations by constraint, offering many examples from classical physics and special relativity. This book also offers original accounts of several other varieties of non-causal scientific explanation. “Dimensional explanations” work by showing how some law of nature arises merely from the dimensions of the quantities involved. “Really statistical explanations” include explanations that appeal to regression toward the mean and other canonical manifestations of chance. This book also provides an original account of what makes certain mathematical proofs but not others explanatory, thereby connecting mathematical explanation to a host of other important but underexplored mathematical ideas, including coincidences in mathematics, the importance of giving multiple proofs of the same result, impure proofs that explain, and natural properties in mathematics.

This book provides an overview of the recent history and methodology of behavioral genetics and psychiatric genetics. The perspective is primarily philosophical and addresses a wide range of issues, ...
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This book provides an overview of the recent history and methodology of behavioral genetics and psychiatric genetics. The perspective is primarily philosophical and addresses a wide range of issues, including genetic reductionism and determinism, "free will," and quantitative and molecular genetics. The latter covers newer genome-wide association studies (GWAS) that have produced a "paradigm shift" in the subject and generated the problem of "missing heritability." Cases involving genetic testing for IQ and for attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) are presented. This text examines the nature-nurture controversy and developmental systems theory using C. elegans or "worm" studies as a test case, concluding that genes are special and provide powerful tools, including "deep homology," for investigating behavior. A novel account of biological knowledge emphasizing the importance of models, mechanisms, pathways, and networks is offered that clarifies how partial reductions provide explanations of traits and disorders. The book examines personality genetics and schizophrenia and its etiology, including quotes from a number of prominent researchers interviewed in recent years. Caspi and Moffitt's research and critiques of their "candidate gene" approach are discussed. It is noted that thousands of genes are likely to influence human personality. The book concludes with additional philosophical implications of the genetic analyses raised in the earlier text, some major worries about "free will," and arguments pro and con about why genes and DNA are so special. A pessimistic view of the current state of the field, but optimism for the future of the subject, is proposed.Less

Behaving : What's Genetic, What's Not, and Why Should We Care?

Kenneth F. Schaffner

Published in print: 2016-06-01

This book provides an overview of the recent history and methodology of behavioral genetics and psychiatric genetics. The perspective is primarily philosophical and addresses a wide range of issues, including genetic reductionism and determinism, "free will," and quantitative and molecular genetics. The latter covers newer genome-wide association studies (GWAS) that have produced a "paradigm shift" in the subject and generated the problem of "missing heritability." Cases involving genetic testing for IQ and for attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) are presented. This text examines the nature-nurture controversy and developmental systems theory using C. elegans or "worm" studies as a test case, concluding that genes are special and provide powerful tools, including "deep homology," for investigating behavior. A novel account of biological knowledge emphasizing the importance of models, mechanisms, pathways, and networks is offered that clarifies how partial reductions provide explanations of traits and disorders. The book examines personality genetics and schizophrenia and its etiology, including quotes from a number of prominent researchers interviewed in recent years. Caspi and Moffitt's research and critiques of their "candidate gene" approach are discussed. It is noted that thousands of genes are likely to influence human personality. The book concludes with additional philosophical implications of the genetic analyses raised in the earlier text, some major worries about "free will," and arguments pro and con about why genes and DNA are so special. A pessimistic view of the current state of the field, but optimism for the future of the subject, is proposed.

There are few more unsettling philosophical questions than this: ‘what happens in attempts to reduce some properties to some other more fundamental properties?’ Reflection on this question inevitably ...
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There are few more unsettling philosophical questions than this: ‘what happens in attempts to reduce some properties to some other more fundamental properties?’ Reflection on this question inevitably touches on very deep issues about ourselves, our own interactions with the world and each other, and our very understanding of what there is and what goes on around us. If we cannot command a clear view of these deep issues, then very many other debates in contemporary philosophy seem to lose traction — think of causation, laws of nature, explanation, consciousness, personal identity, intentionality, normativity, freedom, responsibility, justice, and so on. Reduction can easily seem to unravel our world. This book aims to answer this question. Its chapters span a number of current debates in philosophy and cognitive science: what is the nature of reduction, of reductive explanation, of mental causation? The chapters range from approaches in analytical metaphysics, over philosophy of the special sciences and physics, to interdisciplinary studies in psychiatry and neurobiology. The chapters connect strands in contemporary philosophy that are often treated separately, and in combination they show how issues of reduction, explanation, and causation mutually constrain each other.Less

Being Reduced : New Essays on Reduction, Explanation, and Causation

Published in print: 2008-09-04

There are few more unsettling philosophical questions than this: ‘what happens in attempts to reduce some properties to some other more fundamental properties?’ Reflection on this question inevitably touches on very deep issues about ourselves, our own interactions with the world and each other, and our very understanding of what there is and what goes on around us. If we cannot command a clear view of these deep issues, then very many other debates in contemporary philosophy seem to lose traction — think of causation, laws of nature, explanation, consciousness, personal identity, intentionality, normativity, freedom, responsibility, justice, and so on. Reduction can easily seem to unravel our world. This book aims to answer this question. Its chapters span a number of current debates in philosophy and cognitive science: what is the nature of reduction, of reductive explanation, of mental causation? The chapters range from approaches in analytical metaphysics, over philosophy of the special sciences and physics, to interdisciplinary studies in psychiatry and neurobiology. The chapters connect strands in contemporary philosophy that are often treated separately, and in combination they show how issues of reduction, explanation, and causation mutually constrain each other.

Explanatory reasoning is quite common. Not only are rigorous inferences to the best explanation used pervasively in the sciences, explanatory reasoning is virtually ubiquitous in everyday life. ...
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Explanatory reasoning is quite common. Not only are rigorous inferences to the best explanation used pervasively in the sciences, explanatory reasoning is virtually ubiquitous in everyday life. Despite its widespread use, inference to the best explanation is still in need of precise formulation, and it remains controversial. On the one hand, supporters of explanationism take inference to the best explanation to be a justifying form of inference—some even take all justification to be a matter of explanatory reasoning. On the other hand, critics object that inference to the best explanation is not a fundamental form of inference, and some argue that we should be skeptical of inference to the best explanation in general. This volume brings together top epistemologists and philosophers of science to explore various aspects of inference to the best explanation and the debates surrounding it. The newly commissioned chapters in this volume constitute the cutting edge of research on the role explanatory considerations play in epistemology and philosophy of science.Less

Best Explanations : New Essays on Inference to the Best Explanation

Published in print: 2017-12-07

Explanatory reasoning is quite common. Not only are rigorous inferences to the best explanation used pervasively in the sciences, explanatory reasoning is virtually ubiquitous in everyday life. Despite its widespread use, inference to the best explanation is still in need of precise formulation, and it remains controversial. On the one hand, supporters of explanationism take inference to the best explanation to be a justifying form of inference—some even take all justification to be a matter of explanatory reasoning. On the other hand, critics object that inference to the best explanation is not a fundamental form of inference, and some argue that we should be skeptical of inference to the best explanation in general. This volume brings together top epistemologists and philosophers of science to explore various aspects of inference to the best explanation and the debates surrounding it. The newly commissioned chapters in this volume constitute the cutting edge of research on the role explanatory considerations play in epistemology and philosophy of science.

According to a widespread view, whether one has justification for believing a proposition is determined by how probable that proposition is, given one’s evidence. In the present book this view is ...
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According to a widespread view, whether one has justification for believing a proposition is determined by how probable that proposition is, given one’s evidence. In the present book this view is rejected and replaced with another: in order for one to have justification for believing a proposition, one’s evidence must normically support it–roughly, one’s evidence must make the falsity of that proposition abnormal in the sense of calling for special, independent explanation. This conception of justification bears upon a range of topics in epistemology and beyond, including the relation between justification and knowledge, the force of statistical evidence, the problem of scepticism, the lottery and preface paradoxes, the viability of multiple premise closure, the internalist/externalist debate, the psychology of human reasoning, and the relation between belief and degrees of belief. Ultimately, this way of looking at justification guides us to a new, unfamiliar picture of how we should respond to our evidence and manage our own fallibility. This picture is developed here.Less

Between Probability and Certainty : What Justifies Belief

Martin Smith

Published in print: 2016-01-01

According to a widespread view, whether one has justification for believing a proposition is determined by how probable that proposition is, given one’s evidence. In the present book this view is rejected and replaced with another: in order for one to have justification for believing a proposition, one’s evidence must normically support it–roughly, one’s evidence must make the falsity of that proposition abnormal in the sense of calling for special, independent explanation. This conception of justification bears upon a range of topics in epistemology and beyond, including the relation between justification and knowledge, the force of statistical evidence, the problem of scepticism, the lottery and preface paradoxes, the viability of multiple premise closure, the internalist/externalist debate, the psychology of human reasoning, and the relation between belief and degrees of belief. Ultimately, this way of looking at justification guides us to a new, unfamiliar picture of how we should respond to our evidence and manage our own fallibility. This picture is developed here.

The theory of evolution may be successful in explaining natural history, but it is of limited value when applied to the human world. Because of our reflectiveness and rationality, as embodied in ...
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The theory of evolution may be successful in explaining natural history, but it is of limited value when applied to the human world. Because of our reflectiveness and rationality, as embodied in language, we give ourselves ideals that cannot be justified in terms of survival‐promotion or reproductive advantage. Evolutionary theory is unable to give satisfactory accounts of such distinctive features of human life as the quest for knowledge, our moral sense, and the appreciation of beauty. At most, it can account for their prefiguration at some earlier stage of development than the human. In all these areas we transcend our biological origins, and such mechanisms as genetic survival, kin selection, reciprocal altruism, and sexual selection. But because of our rationality we can also transcend our cultural inheritance explanation of which in terms of memes is both hollow and misleading. We are rooted both in our biology and in our cultural inheritance; but, sociobiology and sociology notwithstanding, we are prisoners neither of our genes nor of the ideas we encounter as we each make our personal journey through life.Less

Anthony O'Hear

Published in print: 1999-07-22

The theory of evolution may be successful in explaining natural history, but it is of limited value when applied to the human world. Because of our reflectiveness and rationality, as embodied in language, we give ourselves ideals that cannot be justified in terms of survival‐promotion or reproductive advantage. Evolutionary theory is unable to give satisfactory accounts of such distinctive features of human life as the quest for knowledge, our moral sense, and the appreciation of beauty. At most, it can account for their prefiguration at some earlier stage of development than the human. In all these areas we transcend our biological origins, and such mechanisms as genetic survival, kin selection, reciprocal altruism, and sexual selection. But because of our rationality we can also transcend our cultural inheritance explanation of which in terms of memes is both hollow and misleading. We are rooted both in our biology and in our cultural inheritance; but, sociobiology and sociology notwithstanding, we are prisoners neither of our genes nor of the ideas we encounter as we each make our personal journey through life.

Much work in bioethics, and also work in mainstream ethics and in political philosophy, is committed to substantive positions regarding the interpretation of biology. Sometimes these commitments are ...
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Much work in bioethics, and also work in mainstream ethics and in political philosophy, is committed to substantive positions regarding the interpretation of biology. Sometimes these commitments are quite obvious, as when ethicists rely on robust notions of species natures to ground their views of enhancement. At other times ethicists espouse more covert positions regarding (for example) proper biological development, ‘species design’, the alleged distinction between the natural and the social, the nature of evolutionary processes, or the causal pre-eminence of genes. This book examines a series of bioethical debates concerning human enhancement, synthetic biology, the ethical significance of species natures, the moral import of evolutionary history, genes and justice, and reproductive ethics, and offer a critical assessment of their biological foundations. It shows how the philosophy of science, and more specifically the philosophy of biology, can illuminate bioethics, political philosophy and ethics more generally.Less

The Biological Foundations of Bioethics

Tim Lewens

Published in print: 2015-01-01

Much work in bioethics, and also work in mainstream ethics and in political philosophy, is committed to substantive positions regarding the interpretation of biology. Sometimes these commitments are quite obvious, as when ethicists rely on robust notions of species natures to ground their views of enhancement. At other times ethicists espouse more covert positions regarding (for example) proper biological development, ‘species design’, the alleged distinction between the natural and the social, the nature of evolutionary processes, or the causal pre-eminence of genes. This book examines a series of bioethical debates concerning human enhancement, synthetic biology, the ethical significance of species natures, the moral import of evolutionary history, genes and justice, and reproductive ethics, and offer a critical assessment of their biological foundations. It shows how the philosophy of science, and more specifically the philosophy of biology, can illuminate bioethics, political philosophy and ethics more generally.

What is required for a fact to be evidence for a hypothesis? In this book Achinstein introduces four concepts of evidence, which he calls potential, veridical, epistemic‐situation, and subjective. He ...
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What is required for a fact to be evidence for a hypothesis? In this book Achinstein introduces four concepts of evidence, which he calls potential, veridical, epistemic‐situation, and subjective. He defines the last three by reference to the first, and then characterizes potential evidence using a new objective epistemic interpretation of probability. The resulting theory is used to provide solutions to four ”paradoxes of evidence” (grue, ravens, lottery, and old evidence) and to a series of questions, including whether explanations or predictions furnish more evidential weight; whether individual hypotheses or only entire theoretical systems can receive evidential support (the Duhem‐Quine problem); and what counts as a scientific discovery and what evidence it requires. Two historical scientific cases are examined using the theory of evidence developed: Jean Perrin's argument for molecules (did he have noncircular evidence for their existence?), and J.J. Thomson's argument for electrons (what sort of evidence did this argument provide?).Less

The Book of Evidence

Peter Achinstein

Published in print: 2001-10-18

What is required for a fact to be evidence for a hypothesis? In this book Achinstein introduces four concepts of evidence, which he calls potential, veridical, epistemic‐situation, and subjective. He defines the last three by reference to the first, and then characterizes potential evidence using a new objective epistemic interpretation of probability. The resulting theory is used to provide solutions to four ”paradoxes of evidence” (grue, ravens, lottery, and old evidence) and to a series of questions, including whether explanations or predictions furnish more evidential weight; whether individual hypotheses or only entire theoretical systems can receive evidential support (the Duhem‐Quine problem); and what counts as a scientific discovery and what evidence it requires. Two historical scientific cases are examined using the theory of evidence developed: Jean Perrin's argument for molecules (did he have noncircular evidence for their existence?), and J.J. Thomson's argument for electrons (what sort of evidence did this argument provide?).

A Brief History of the Philosophy of Time is a concise introduction to the the history, philosophy, and science of the study of time, from the pre-Socratic philosophers through Einstein ...
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A Brief History of the Philosophy of Time is a concise introduction to the the history, philosophy, and science of the study of time, from the pre-Socratic philosophers through Einstein and beyond. Its treatment is roughly chronological, starting with the classical philosophers Heraclitus and Parmenides, and proceeding, in the first four chapters, through the history of Western philosophy and science up through the twentieth century. The remaining four chapters draw on both historical and contemporary sources in examining key puzzles about time. Using illustrations and a minimum of technical language, A Brief History of the Philosophy of Time efficiently covers subjects such as time and change, the experience of time, physical and metaphysical approaches to the nature of time, the direction of time, time-travel, time and freedom of the will, and scientific and philosophical approaches to eternity and the beginning of time. The author argues that the history of the philosophy of time is a history of substantive progress in understanding time.Less

A Brief History of the Philosophy of Time

Adrian Bardon

Published in print: 2013-07-01

A Brief History of the Philosophy of Time is a concise introduction to the the history, philosophy, and science of the study of time, from the pre-Socratic philosophers through Einstein and beyond. Its treatment is roughly chronological, starting with the classical philosophers Heraclitus and Parmenides, and proceeding, in the first four chapters, through the history of Western philosophy and science up through the twentieth century. The remaining four chapters draw on both historical and contemporary sources in examining key puzzles about time. Using illustrations and a minimum of technical language, A Brief History of the Philosophy of Time efficiently covers subjects such as time and change, the experience of time, physical and metaphysical approaches to the nature of time, the direction of time, time-travel, time and freedom of the will, and scientific and philosophical approaches to eternity and the beginning of time. The author argues that the history of the philosophy of time is a history of substantive progress in understanding time.

This is a book about facts that don’t have explanations, or what philosophers call brute facts. Such facts appear in our explanations, they inform many people’s views about the structure of the ...
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This is a book about facts that don’t have explanations, or what philosophers call brute facts. Such facts appear in our explanations, they inform many people’s views about the structure of the world, and are part of philosophical views in metaphysics and the philosophy of science. Yet, despite the very large literature on explanation, the question of bruteness has been left largely unexamined. The chapters in this collection aim to address this gap in the literature by exploring questions related to brute facts such as the following: How can we draw a distinction between facts that can reasonably be thought of as brute and facts for which further explanation is possible? Can we explain something and gain understanding by appealing to brute facts? Is naturalism inconsistent with the existence of (non-physical) brute facts? Can modal facts be brute facts? Are emergent facts brute? Thinking about these matters systematically directs one to related considerations that are at the heart of major debates in contemporary philosophy concerning modality, naturalism, consciousness, reduction, and explanation. With contributors who include senior and junior faculty members from different backgrounds and holding a number of different views, this book aims to begin a debate and to further engage the reader in these questions.Less

Brute Facts

Published in print: 2018-10-18

This is a book about facts that don’t have explanations, or what philosophers call brute facts. Such facts appear in our explanations, they inform many people’s views about the structure of the world, and are part of philosophical views in metaphysics and the philosophy of science. Yet, despite the very large literature on explanation, the question of bruteness has been left largely unexamined. The chapters in this collection aim to address this gap in the literature by exploring questions related to brute facts such as the following: How can we draw a distinction between facts that can reasonably be thought of as brute and facts for which further explanation is possible? Can we explain something and gain understanding by appealing to brute facts? Is naturalism inconsistent with the existence of (non-physical) brute facts? Can modal facts be brute facts? Are emergent facts brute? Thinking about these matters systematically directs one to related considerations that are at the heart of major debates in contemporary philosophy concerning modality, naturalism, consciousness, reduction, and explanation. With contributors who include senior and junior faculty members from different backgrounds and holding a number of different views, this book aims to begin a debate and to further engage the reader in these questions.

In this book, Lenhard concentrates on the ways in which computers and simulation are transforming the established conception of mathematical modeling. His core thesis is that simulation modeling ...
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In this book, Lenhard concentrates on the ways in which computers and simulation are transforming the established conception of mathematical modeling. His core thesis is that simulation modeling constitutes a new mode of mathematical modeling that is rearranging and inverting key features of the established conception. Although most of these new key features—such as experimentation, exploration, and epistemic opacity—have their precursors, the new ways in which they are being combined is generating a distinctive style of scientific reasoning. Lenhard also documents how simulation is affecting fundamental concepts of solution, understanding, and validation. He feeds these transformations back into the philosophy of science, thereby opening up new perspectives on longstanding oppositions. By combining historical investigations with practical aspects, the book is accessible for a broad audience of readers. Numerous case studies covering a wide range of simulation techniques are balanced with broad reflections on science and technology. Initially, what computers are good at is calculating—with a speed and accuracy far beyond human capabilities. Lenhard goes further and investigates the emerging characteristics of computer-based modeling, showing how this initially simple observation is creating a number of surprising challenges for the methodology and epistemology of science. These calculated surprises will attract both philosophers and scientific practitioners who are interested in reflecting on recent developments in science and technology.Less

Calculated Surprises : A Philosophy of Computer Simulation

Johannes Lenhard

Published in print: 2019-03-11

In this book, Lenhard concentrates on the ways in which computers and simulation are transforming the established conception of mathematical modeling. His core thesis is that simulation modeling constitutes a new mode of mathematical modeling that is rearranging and inverting key features of the established conception. Although most of these new key features—such as experimentation, exploration, and epistemic opacity—have their precursors, the new ways in which they are being combined is generating a distinctive style of scientific reasoning. Lenhard also documents how simulation is affecting fundamental concepts of solution, understanding, and validation. He feeds these transformations back into the philosophy of science, thereby opening up new perspectives on longstanding oppositions. By combining historical investigations with practical aspects, the book is accessible for a broad audience of readers. Numerous case studies covering a wide range of simulation techniques are balanced with broad reflections on science and technology. Initially, what computers are good at is calculating—with a speed and accuracy far beyond human capabilities. Lenhard goes further and investigates the emerging characteristics of computer-based modeling, showing how this initially simple observation is creating a number of surprising challenges for the methodology and epistemology of science. These calculated surprises will attract both philosophers and scientific practitioners who are interested in reflecting on recent developments in science and technology.

Brings together 26 of Salmon's essays, including 7 that have never before been published and others that are difficult to find. Part I (Introductory Essays: Causality, Determinism, and Explanation) ...
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Brings together 26 of Salmon's essays, including 7 that have never before been published and others that are difficult to find. Part I (Introductory Essays: Causality, Determinism, and Explanation) comprises five essays that presuppose no formal training in philosophy of science and form a background for subsequent essays. Parts II (Scientific Explanation) and III (Causality) contain Salmon's seminal work on these topics. The essays in Part II present aspects of the evolution of the author's thought about scientific explanation, and include critical examination of the claim that explanations are arguments and a carefully reasoned defense of explanatory asymmetry. Those in Part III develop the details of the theory sketched in Ch. 1. This theory identifies causal connections with physical processes that transmit causal influence from one space‐time location to another, and it incorporates probabilistic features of causality, keeping open the possibility that causality operates in indeterministic contexts. Part IV (Concise Overviews) offers survey articles that discuss advanced material but remain accessible to those outside philosophy of science. Essays in Part V (Applications to Other Disciplines: Archaeology and Anthropology, Astrophysics and Cosmology, and Physics) address specific issues, in particular, scientific disciplines, including the applicability of various models of explanation.Less

Causality and Explanation

Wesley C. Salmon

Published in print: 1998-05-07

Brings together 26 of Salmon's essays, including 7 that have never before been published and others that are difficult to find. Part I (Introductory Essays: Causality, Determinism, and Explanation) comprises five essays that presuppose no formal training in philosophy of science and form a background for subsequent essays. Parts II (Scientific Explanation) and III (Causality) contain Salmon's seminal work on these topics. The essays in Part II present aspects of the evolution of the author's thought about scientific explanation, and include critical examination of the claim that explanations are arguments and a carefully reasoned defense of explanatory asymmetry. Those in Part III develop the details of the theory sketched in Ch. 1. This theory identifies causal connections with physical processes that transmit causal influence from one space‐time location to another, and it incorporates probabilistic features of causality, keeping open the possibility that causality operates in indeterministic contexts. Part IV (Concise Overviews) offers survey articles that discuss advanced material but remain accessible to those outside philosophy of science. Essays in Part V (Applications to Other Disciplines: Archaeology and Anthropology, Astrophysics and Cosmology, and Physics) address specific issues, in particular, scientific disciplines, including the applicability of various models of explanation.

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