Economic Affairs: Year In Review 1994

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World economic output recovered strongly during 1994 and headed for the fastest growth since 1989. According to estimates by the International Monetary Fund (IMF), global economic growth averaged 3.1%, compared with 2.3% in 1993. The pace of recovery was faster than had been expected. This bounce back was largely attributable to faster growth in the U.S., a well-established recovery in the U.K., an upturn in continental Europe, and the bottoming out of the recession in Japan. (For Real Gross Domestic Products of Selected OECD Countries, see Table.)

Economic recovery in the developed countries as a group accelerated to 2.7%, twice as fast as the year before. Higher interest rates in the U.S.--and to a lesser extent in the U.K. and other European countries--which had been raised in a preemptive move to prevent inflationary forces from getting stronger, did not affect the outcome in 1994. Large budget deficits, a legacy of the recession and high social spending, and high unemployment (except in the U.S.) remained concerns of economic policy makers. These factors also explained why the "feel good" factor, which accompanied previous upswings, was missing this time around.

For the third year running, the less developed countries’ (LDCs’) economies (see Table) continued to grow much faster than those of the industrialized countries. Economic output growth (close to 5.6%) was as great as the year before and exceeded population growth, leading to a slight increase in personal living standards. As in recent years, the main engine of growth remained Asia, especially China. Growth in Africa was slightly higher, but in Latin America and the Mediterranean region, output stagnated or fell.

Among the developed countries, growth in the U.S. accelerated to nearly 4% from 3.1% in 1993, despite higher interest rates, as improvement in consumer and corporate confidence led to higher consumption and investment. Canada, as a result of its close ties with the U.S., expanded by a similar rate. Australia and New Zealand also marked another year of good progress thanks to rapid growth in export markets in Asia and North America. The British economy enjoyed an investment- and export-led acceleration in recovery and grew by 4%. The speed of upturn in continental Europe was much faster than expected. Western Germany, the powerhouse of Europe, surprised forecasters as gross domestic product (GDP) growth bounced back to above 2% and reversed the 1.3% decline in 1993. In eastern Germany a 10% growth rate was achieved. The rest of Europe experienced average growth rates of between 1.7% and 2.5% during 1994. Most of the growth came from exports to rapidly growing North America and Asia, but a recovery in consumer spending and business confidence also contributed to the overall recovery.

Relaxation of the German Bundesbank’s tough anti-inflationary policy in 1993, which allowed interest rates to fall, continued early in 1994. Lower interest rates were encouraged by low inflation and, more important, by stable exchange rates in Europe. (For Effective Exchange Rates of selected currencies, seeGraph V.) By mid-1994 many of the currencies within the European exchange-rate mechanism (ERM) were back inside, or close to, their old narrow 2.25% divergence bands against the Deutsche Mark. Fears that the widening of the currency bands from 2.5% to 15% in August 1993 would create greater instability, keep interest rates high, and prolong the recession in Europe proved unfounded. The long recession came to an end in Japan thanks to the cumulative effect of four stimulatory economic packages of tax cuts and higher public spending introduced in 1993 and 1994. Despite the strength of the yen, a gradual pickup in exports also helped Japan’s GDP grow by nearly 1%.

Among LDCs, economic growth in China remained very strong. Measures introduced in 1993 to control a very rapid economic boom were partly successful. In the rest of Asia, economic growth continued to be rapid, with many countries registering 8-9% growth. Economic growth in Latin America remained steady at 3-4%, but in Africa drought and civil war held back growth in many countries.

Most Central and Eastern European countries continued to make progress, and economic growth accelerated. Growth climbed to 4% in Poland, 2.5% in the Czech Republic, and more than 1% in Hungary. In the countries of the former Soviet Union, where economic reforms were still progressing slowly, economic decline held at around 10%, a slightly slower pace than in 1993.

Many components of demand strengthened as world economic growth gathered pace. In a number of countries, external demand, led by exports, grew more strongly than domestic demand (which depends on spending by households and businesses). Private consumption (which accounts for a large proportion of total private demand) expanded by nearly 2% in the developed world. There were wide regional differences, however, depending on each country’s relative position in the recovery cycle. In the U.S. and Canada, where the recovery was well established, private consumption expanded by 3.6% and 5%, respectively. Retail sales were strong through most of the year, and investment outlays, both business and residential, surged ahead. In Western Europe, where households were still worried about job security and business confidence remained low, consumer spending was sluggish and business investment flat. Even in the U.K., where the recovery started earlier than in continental Europe, growth in retail sales and business investment was shallower than in previous upswings. At the same time, higher government spending or lower taxes contributed little to growth. Governments in North America and Europe were concerned with reducing their large budget deficits and either froze or scaled back public spending. Japan, unburdened by such constraints, continued to spend heavily on new public-works projects and cut income taxes. Thus, private consumption grew faster (2%, compared with 1% in 1993), while export growth slowed to below 3%. By contrast, Europe and North America enjoyed a boom in exports--7% in the U.S., 10% in the U.K., 5% in Germany, and 4% in France.

As new employment usually lags behind economic recovery, unemployment in the developed countries remained at historically high levels. (For Standardized Unemployment Rates in Selected Developed Countries, see Table.) In the 25 countries belonging to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)--which included the U.S., Canada, Japan, all Western European countries, Australia, and New Zealand--official unemployment rates averaged around 8%, compared with 7.8% in 1993. Some 35 million people were registered as unemployed in the OECD at the end of 1994. This figure excluded countless millions of workers who had withdrawn from the job market because they faced poor prospects, believed they were too old, or lacked necessary skills. The fastest job creation was in the U.S., where the unemployment rate fell to 5.4% from nearly 7% in 1993. In Japan the rate rose to 3% from 2.5%, but it was still low by most standards. The real problems were in Europe, where average unemployment within the European Union (EU) rose from 10.6% in 1993 to 11.5% in 1994. The highest unemployment was in Spain, Belgium, France, and Denmark (24%, 14%, 13%, and 12%, respectively). Those individuals with jobs also faced unsettling change and job insecurity as companies continually restructured and streamlined operations to become more efficient.

In Central and Eastern Europe, unemployment averaged around 20%. In Russia and other former Soviet bloc countries where output had fallen sharply, unemployment remained understated in the published statistics.

The long downward trend in interest rates came to an end in 1994, and in some countries the trend turned up, reflecting the strength of economic activity. (For short-term interest rates in selected countries, seeGraph III.) In many industrialized countries real interest rates were regarded as historically high in relation to the comparatively low inflation rates. Despite inflation’s being under control, the outlook for interest rates in 1995 was for continuing small increases in line with faster economic recovery. In the U.S. the Federal Reserve Board (Fed) raised short-term interest rates for the first time in five years. The first move came in February (earlier than anticipated) and, together with subsequent rises, led to instability in the financial markets and an upward movement in long-term interest rates across the world. (For long-term interest rates in Selected Countries, seeGraph IV.) By year’s end, after six successive rate increases, the Fed funds rate (the rate the banks pay when they borrow from each other’s reserves held at the Fed) stood at 5.5%, compared with 3% at the beginning of the year. British rates went up by 0.5% in September, mimicking the preemptive moves in the U.S. Elsewhere in Europe interest rates followed Germany’s lead. A series of small cuts in the spring reduced the discount rate in Germany from 5.75% to 4.5%. In France the intervention rate came down to 5% from 6.2%. In Denmark, Italy, Spain, and Portugal, similar small reductions occurred in the spring. In late summer, however, interest rates went up slightly in Italy, Sweden, and Spain. In Japan interest rates had been reduced to historically low levels by a 0.75% cut in September 1993, and no further reductions took place in 1994.

The decline in inflation rates in most countries continued in 1994. (For information inflation rates in selected countries, seeGraph I.) A few notable exceptions were found in Latin America and Eastern Europe. In the developed countries the outturn was better than expected, and inflation was ceasing to be a major issue. In OECD countries inflation dipped to around 2.5%, the lowest in more than two decades, but central banks remained vigilant and prepared to raise interest rates to prevent an upsurge in inflationary rates as economic recovery gathered pace. In the LDCs the median inflation rate rose slightly to 9%. Inflation remained relatively high in Latin America and Eastern Europe. Brazil’s inflation accelerated to over 2,300% early in the year, but the introduction of a new, stronger currency, the real, brought monthly rates down to single digits, and at year’s end annual inflation was under 1,100%. By contrast, it was only 3-8% in Argentina, Chile, and Mexico (despite the devaluation of the peso in December). In Central and Eastern Europe, ongoing economic reforms kept inflation relatively high. There was a dramatic slowdown in Russia from almost 1,000% in 1993 to around 300% in 1994. Inflation accelerated in Turkey, but in South Asia it was generally stable. In China inflation had doubled to 27%, despite measures taken to slow the pace of activity in the economy.

Economic policy makers remained concerned with reducing their budget deficits during 1994. In the developed world this meant tight control of government spending and few tax concessions. Fortunately, the faster-than-expected recovery had begun shrinking deficits by boosting tax revenue and reducing payouts to the unemployed. In the U.S. the budget deficit fell to $202 billion from $255 billion the year before and was heading for $168 billion in 1995. In the U.K. it came in at £ 34 billion. In 1993 it had been £ 45 billion, and it was forecast to fall to £ 21 billion in 1995. In other EU countries, except Italy, and in Sweden, budget deficits as a proportion of GDP were expected to fall within a few years from the 1994 average of 6.5% to the less than 3% stipulated in the Maastricht Treaty as a convergence criterion for economic and monetary union. Japan was the only large economy where fiscal policy was stimulatory; significant tax cuts were accompanied by long-term plans to further boost government spending.

The IMF expected the external debt of the LDCs to rise by around 8% in 1994. This was similar to the increase seen the year before. Although in absolute terms the LDCs’ debt continued to increase, as a proportion of exports of goods and services it was expected to be slightly down from the year before, with a further decline possible in 1995.

NATIONAL ECONOMIC POLICIES

United States

The pace of U.S. economic activity accelerated during 1994, and GDP grew by nearly 4%--the best performance in five years. At this level the economy was running close to full capacity, and the Fed repeatedly raised interest rates in an effort to keep inflationary pressures at bay and to prevent the economy from overheating. Despite charting an uneven course, economic growth during most of the year was at a rapid and unsustainable level. A blistering 6.3% rise in the final quarter of 1993 was followed by an abnormally slow 3.3% in the opening quarter of 1994, largely because of severe weather and an earthquake in California. Unsurprisingly, economic growth accelerated to 4.1% in the second quarter, but the pace eased a little to 3.9% in the third quarter, only to pick up again in the final quarter.

The economic expansion during 1994 was driven by fixed investment (including housing investment), export sales, and stronger consumer demand. Despite the increasing cost of borrowing, business investment rose by over 10%. Residential investment surged by a similar amount earlier in the year. Faced with a high capacity utilization and improved corporate profits, companies invested heavily, especially in information technology.

Responding to higher demand, production (Graph II) and capacity use rose further in 1994, and output reached record levels. Although the pace moderated somewhat after the summer, manufacturing output for the year grew by more than 6%, leading to tightness in manufacturing industries. The industrial-capacity utilization rate of 84.9% in October was a touch higher than the previous cyclical peak of 84.8%.

Consumers, encouraged by modest income growth and higher employment, increased their retail spending by 6% in real terms during the year, at a slightly faster pace than the year before. Spending on interest-rate-sensitive durable goods, including automobiles, furniture, and household goods, was strong during most of the year. Overall, retail sales were up 7.6%, but retailers reported a falling off in November and December.

In contrast to private spending, government spending fell by nearly 6% as a result of budget-reduction measures introduced in 1993 and earlier. Most of the decline was attributable to lower defense outlays. Nondefense spending also fell slightly, while expenditure at state and local levels picked up as a result of federal infrastructure projects. The U.S. economy showed robust growth, despite the faster-than-expected fall in government spending and a rapid contraction in the budget deficit. The budget deficit for fiscal year 1994, ended in September, was $202 billion, down from the previous year’s $255 billion.

The robust economic recovery created new jobs at an average rate of 300,000 a month and reduced the unemployment rate to its lowest level since 1990. As in the previous 10 years, most of the new jobs occurred in low-paid, part-time service sectors. Nevertheless, this strong job creation cut the unemployment rate to 5.4% in December from 6.7% in January.

A striking feature of the sustained economic growth in 1994 was the lack of inflationary pressures. Consumer prices (see Table) rose 2.7%, less than generally expected, and the core inflation rate (Graph I) declined to 2.6% from 1993’s average of 3%. Wages and salaries grew at a similar rate during the year, squeezing real (inflation-adjusted) take-home pay.

Exports performed better in 1994, stimulated by the decline in the external value of the dollar and by the worldwide economic recovery. Exports of goods and services rose by more than 7%, but export growth was once again outstripped by that of imports, reflecting the strength of domestic demand. Imports grew by around 12% but in the closing months slowed considerably. This was due to the weakness of the dollar (Graph V), which made imports more expensive. Nevertheless, the U.S. was heading for a larger trade deficit of $150 billion, much higher than in 1993, which, at $116 billion, had been the worst since 1988. Likewise, the current-account deficit (including trade balances on invisibles and capital movements) widened.

Economic policy making during 1994 was characterized by the active use of monetary policy. The Fed reversed the five-year trend of falling or stable interest rates (Graph III and Graph IV) with six successive rate increases. The first move, in February, was seen as a preemptive strike to stop the economy from overheating. In August, when it raised the Fed funds rate for the fifth time, from 4.5% to 4.75%, the Fed indicated that it had almost attained its goal of neutral monetary policy. In November, however, the Fed raised interest rates by another 0.75%, higher than generally expected. Significantly, the Fed left the door open for further rises in 1995 to check inflation before it became a problem. In line with the upturn in the Fed funds rate, commercial banks raised their prime rates from 6% in January to 8.5% in August. As the year drew to a close, a lively debate continued among economists about whether the successive interest-rate increases had tightened policy sufficiently to cool the economy. The financial markets did not think so and were betting on another rise in the new year.

Japan

The stagnation in the world’s second largest economy ended during the last quarter of 1993, but the recovery in 1994 was less robust than previous ones. After uneven progress in the first half of the year, the pace of economic activity picked up in the summer, giving a GDP growth of nearly 1% for the year as a whole. A pickup in consumer spending was largely responsible for this recovery. The sluggish upswing was explained by the fact that previous recoveries had been led by strong growth in capital investment and exports. In 1994 both of these factors were weak because of three structural weaknesses in the economy: surplus industrial capacity, deflation, and the weakness of the financial system.

Faced with a stagnant economy despite four spending packages totaling 45 trillion yen over the previous two years, the government introduced further measures in February to boost demand. These included tax cuts of 5,850,000,000,000 yen, with reductions in income, residential, and car sales taxes. These benefits were passed on as a tax rebate in the summer. Helped by a hot summer, lower-priced imports, and heavy retail discounting, consumer spending improved. In the three months to August, sales in department stores and supermarkets were 3.4% higher than a year earlier, compared with a 1.5% annual decrease in the previous three months. On the basis of partial data, total private consumption (a wider measure of spending) was estimated to have risen by 2%.

There was little contribution to demand from employment and rises in wages. The jobless total rose to more than two million, or about 3% of the workforce, in the final quarter of the year. At this level 20% more people were out of work than a year before. This was a large rise in an economy where layoffs were still taboo and employers accomplished reductions in workforce by curbing recruitment and encouraging early retirement. The immediate outlook was not too encouraging, as employment traditionally lags behind the economy. In an effort to safeguard jobs, employees were agreeing to lower increases, smaller bonuses, and reduced overtime. In the autumn industrial wages were down more than 1% from a year earlier.

Despite the hesitant recovery, industry made good progress in reducing its vast inventories of unsold goods. As private consumption growth boosted imported goods, industrial production (Graph II) was a late beneficiary. Industrial production picked up late in the year and in the third quarter was 1.6% higher than a year before. Because of a 2% decline in the first half, however, it was virtually flat for the year as a whole. Although there had been some improvement, Japanese industry still suffered from a large overhang of surplus capacity--a legacy of large capital investment during the halcyon days in the 1980s. During 1994 a decline in industrial capital investment eased to 4% from 8% the year before, giving rise to hopes that it might start rising in 1995.

The disinflationary effect of the yen’s strength on the prices of imported goods, coupled with heavy price discounting by large retailers, pushed down the annual inflation rate (Graph I) of 0.2%. Earlier in the year the rate had been negative, but higher prices for seasonal foodstuffs in the summer pushed up inflation a little. This return to the previous low levels was good news for consumers, but there was a risk that it could squeeze the profits of manufacturers. It was feared this could further undermine manufacturers’ confidence and cause them to delay or cancel investment decisions. A related problem was the continuing decline in the prices of land and commercial property. (Since the bubble burst in 1990, commercial property prices had fallen by nearly 50%.) This had increased the amount of nonperforming or bad debts, making the banks even more cautious about extending new loans. Thus, money-supply growth was sluggish and in the third quarter edged up by 1-2% year-on-year, well below the 5% annual growth considered necessary to fund a strong revival. Against this backdrop, the Bank of Japan’s monetary policy remained accommodating. Short-term interest rates were unchanged during the year. (For short-term and long-term interest rates, seeGraph III and Graph IV.)

As a result of a surge in imports and a slowdown in exports (partly a reflection of the yen’s appreciation), the trade surplus fell back to an estimated $130 billion from the previous year’s record $142 billion. There was no corresponding reduction in the huge current-account surplus, estimated at $135 billion ($130 billion in 1993). Because only a part of this surplus was recycled, it maintained an upward pressure on the yen (Graph V), but it was not enough to deflect from Japan’s long-standing trade friction with the U.S. and the EU.

United Kingdom

During 1994 the U.K. economy enjoyed a favourable combination of rapid expansion, subdued inflation, relatively stable interest rates, booming exports, and falling unemployment. Nevertheless, this rosy economic picture had not translated into a "feel-good" factor or government popularity. A late upward revision to economic statistics indicated that GDP grew by nearly 4%. This better-than-expected performance was largely due to higher consumer spending, stronger export demand, and a recovery in investment, albeit from a low level.

Concerned that the rapid pace of economic growth might lead to faster inflation in the future and blow the economy off course, Chancellor of the Exchequer Norman Lamont and the governor of the Bank of England raised interest rates (for short-term and long-term interest rates, seeGraph III and Graph IV) sooner than expected. A surprise 0.5% rise in the banks’ base rates to 5.75% in early September mirrored similar preemptive moves by the Fed. The move marked the beginning of a shift toward neutral monetary policy, and higher interest rates were widely anticipated in 1995.

Despite better-than-expected progress in reducing the public-sector deficit, fiscal policy remained restrictive. For the second consecutive year, overall government spending was cut substantially and, as a result of phased tax increases introduced in 1993, the tax burden further increased. Arguing that "sound economics is good politics," Lamont opted to apply the revenue windfall arising from faster-than-expected economic growth and lower-than-projected inflation to reducing the public-sector deficit. Thus, voter-friendly tax cuts were deferred to a future date closer to the next general elections, which were not due before April 1997.

The engine that fueled growth until mid-1994 was the rise in consumer spending. The delayed impact of April tax increases, continuing fears about job security, and unease about the future direction of interest rates, however, caused the pace of consumer spending to slow. In the final quarter of the year, retail-sales volumes were barely 3% higher than those of 1993, compared with more than 4% earlier in the year. Car sales also lost momentum, particularly private (nonfleet) purchases.

As consumer spending faltered, export growth sustained the pace of economic activity. During 1994 export volumes were up by 10%, reflecting the global economic recovery. Improved competitiveness of British exports, thanks to low inflation and the relatively weak pound sterling (Graph V), also contributed to export growth. Imports grew more strongly than in 1993, but the annual growth rate lagged well behind that of exports. As a result, both trade and current-account deficits were smaller than in 1993.

Investment in manufacturing, having fallen steeply since 1989, picked up in 1994, but its contribution to economic recovery was small. Total investment grew by more than 3% in 1994; it was mostly aimed at improving productivity and efficiency with only a small increase in capacity. Construction activity, including home building, also showed some recovery, again from a low base.

On the supply side, the pace of industrial production (Graph II) quickened, reflecting growth in demand. By late summer, however, a slowdown was evident. Manufacturing output in the third quarter stood 3.7% higher than a year earlier, having been 5.8% higher in the second quarter.

Historically, inflationary pressures had revived early when the British economy was coming out of a recession. During 1994, after more than two years of recovery, the various inflation (Graph I) indicators all remained at a low level. The headline rate of inflation in November was 2.4%, which was below the Bank of England’s forecasts. Strong price competition between retailers and continuing productivity gains were the main reasons for slack inflationary pressures. Average earnings growth in the closing quarter was below 4% and steady, but because of efficiency gains, wage costs per unit of output fell slightly.

The modest increase in wage settlements reflected the general improvement in the labour market. Unemployment, having reached a peak of 2,960,000 in January 1993, dipped to under 2.5 million, or 8.9% of the workforce, in October. In addition to economic expansion, this better-than-expected reduction in joblessness was largely due to an increase in self-employment and a decrease in the number of people registering as available for work.

Germany

Economic activity in Germany exceeded expectations in 1994, and GDP in Germany as a whole expanded by almost 3% for the year. Growth in the western part of the country was around 2.5%, while in eastern Germany it was 10%. Although the eastern German economy was still heavily dependent on western Germany for transfer payments, it made progress toward self-sustained growth.

The economic upswing in western Germany was mainly supported by strong growth in exports, a rise in construction, and increased business investment activity. Boosted by stronger foreign demand, manufacturing output (Graph II) and capacity utilization both rose. Export volume grew by nearly 5% during 1994, reversing 1993’s 10% decline. Apart from the faster pace of economic growth being enjoyed by Germany’s main trading partners, this rise in exports was due to an increase in the competitiveness of German products. Moderate wage settlements, corporate restructuring, and substantial staff reductions were cited as the main elements behind this.

Gross capital investment rose by an estimated 2.5% in the west and 14% in the east, giving a pan-German increase of 4%. Investment in machinery and equipment was comparatively sluggish despite improved capacity utilization, suggesting that industrialists were in no hurry to expand capacity. Construction activity remained strong in eastern Germany, where housing construction complemented infrastructure improvements. Construction also expanded rapidly in western Germany, where demand for housing was stronger in response to lower interest rates and government incentives to ease housing bottlenecks caused by the high levels of immigration in recent years.

By contrast, consumer expenditure remained flat. A modest decline in the west was offset by a 1.3% gain in the east. Spending was depressed in the west by the introduction of higher taxes in January 1994 and by the virtual freeze on wages. Although inflation moderated, real disposable incomes in western Germany declined slightly.

Unemployment stabilized rather than improved, which was to be expected in the early stages of a recovery. Total unemployment stood at 3.6 million at year’s end, nearly half a million above 1993 but below the spring peak. In western Germany the unemployment rate averaged 8%, compared with 15% in the east. The latter figures excluded disguised unemployment (early retirement, job creation, and training schemes), which stood at close to one million. Considerable progress was made in reducing the inflation rate (Graph I); after three years of relatively high inflation in the east, prices moved broadly in line with those in western Germany. Consumer prices in October were 2.8% higher than a year before in western Germany and 3.2% in the east.

Against the backdrop of economic recovery, the government’s fiscal policy remained one of tackling the deficits that had resulted from unification. Thus, the budget approved in July planned a nominal increase in federal government spending while holding the borrowing requirement broadly unchanged at DM 69 billion. The total deficit, however, including deficits of the Treuhandanstalt (privatization agency) and those of the states and municipalities, was much higher. Despite measures introduced in 1993 but not due to come into force until 1995 (such as reduced unemployment benefits and reintroduced solidarity surcharge), no early reduction in the deficit was projected. Monetary policy, on the other hand, was geared toward maintaining stable interest rates (Graph III) following a series of stepped reductions in the spring. These reduced the discount rate from 5.75% to 4.5% and the Lombard rate (the rate at which the Bundesbank offered emergency funding) from 6.75% to 6%. Despite the growth of the money stock outside the target range and weakness in the bond markets, which increased long-term interest rates (Graph IV), the Bundesbank opted for a policy of consistency and did not reverse the spring cuts in interest rates.

France

The modest economic recovery, which started in the summer of 1993, gathered pace during 1994. Compared with expectations of around 1% growth, GDP expanded by 2.7%. This strong upturn effectively negated the claims of those who argued during the 1993 currency crises that France’s tough anti-inflationary stance and its policy of keeping interest rates tied to German rates would prolong the stagnation of the economy.

The recovery in 1994 was based on a mixture of stronger external demand, higher consumer spending at home, and a rise in investment. Consumer spending was stimulated early in the year by a F 5,000 government incentive to new-car buyers. Although the effect of this incentive tailed off by the autumn, consumer spending held up and rose by 1.5%. Improved external demand, however, came from economic recovery in Germany, France’s most important trade partner, and from the U.S. and the Far East. As domestic demand picked up during the year, the contribution of foreign trade to economic growth declined. Nevertheless, the trade balance was heading for a surplus of F 80 billion, only slightly down from F 83 billion in 1993 and well in excess of 1992’s F 32 billion.

Business investment recovered in 1994 in response to a marked increase in capacity utilization, particularly in automobile and capital-goods sectors. The upturn in production (Graph II), investment, and consumption had a marginal effect on the labour market. Thus, the total number of unemployed, at 3.3 million, was higher at year’s end than at the beginning of 1994. At this level, the rate of unemployment stood at 12.6%, just below the post-World War II record level of 12.7% reached in May 1994. Not surprisingly, unemployment remained a major concern for the government, and several measures to fight unemployment were included in the September 1994 budget. These were aimed at reducing the cost of training less-qualified people and encouraging firms to hire young people.

Partly as a result of the gloomy employment market, wages and salaries grew at a subdued rate of 2.5% (2.8% in 1993). The downward drift in consumer prices also dampened the rise in earnings. Average inflation (Graph II) edged down to 1.7% from 2.1% in 1993. This outcome was in line with the Bank of France’s objective of price stability. Despite greater freedom allowed by the 15% bands within the ERM, the value of the franc remained stable against the Deutsche Mark. This was achieved by keeping the French interest rates (for short-term and long-term interest rates, seeGraph III and Graph IV) closely tied to German rates. The intervention rate, the floor for money market rates, was gradually reduced to 5% from 6.2% in the spring.

Fiscal policy in France remained focused on curbing the public-sector deficit in line with a five-year plan. With the aid of higher revenues from privatization and a freeze on real expenditure, the government aimed to cut the deficit in 1994 to F 330 billion--a reduction of F 16.5 billion. The target was to reduce the deficit by a further F 25 billion in 1995. With the approach of presidential elections in the spring of 1995, fiscal rigour would have been increasingly difficult to maintain had it not been for the economic recovery.

The Former Centrally Planned Economies

The economic decline in the former centrally planned economies continued for the fourth consecutive year, but the rate slowed from the peak decline of 15.5% in 1992 to 9% in 1993 and 8.3% in 1994. The outlook was improving, with many countries beginning to expand, and output was expected to fall by only 1% in 1995.

The best-performing countries were those in Central Europe, where the reforms necessary to create a market economy had been put in place soon after the fall of communism, five years earlier. The overall output of Central and Eastern Europe (excluding Belarus and Ukraine) grew by 1.4% in 1994, compared with a decrease of 2.3% in 1993. Several countries were growing rapidly, with, for example, Hungary’s output expected to increase by more than 4% because of strong investment and export performances.

Russia was still lagging behind, with output falling by 12% in 1994, as it had in 1993. Most of the former Soviet republics were also continuing to experience declines in output. Many had high rates of inflation that were causing social problems as well as acting as a deterrent to investment. Worst affected was Georgia, where prices in 1994 were expected to rise by 10,000%, followed by Azerbaijan with an increase of more than 5,000%.

Exceptional among the former Soviet states were the three small Baltic countries, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, which all registered increases in output and had sharply falling inflation rates. All of them were asserting their economic independence from Russia and were anxious to become part of the EU, with which they were expected to negotiate association agreements in the near future.

Problems associated with restructuring continued. One of the most refractory was unemployment, of which the countries had had little experience under the old regimes. In many countries, as in Western Europe, early retirement was being used as a means of reducing labour forces. Welfare systems were able to offer little assistance, financial or otherwise. The numbers of unemployed were estimated to have risen in most countries in 1994. The situation was compounded by the lack of training or retraining facilities. There was a general lack of entrepreneurial skills and little knowledge or willingness to encourage them. People often needed more than one job to meet basic needs.

Open unemployment was greatest in the countries most advanced with economic reform, including Hungary, Poland, Albania, and the Baltic states, where the number of registered unemployed was equivalent to between 10% and 20% of the workforce. In some countries the rates exaggerated the true situation. The Czech Republic was exceptional among the more advanced countries because of its low unemployment rate of 4%. Although strict eligibility conditions applied to unemployment benefits, which may have influenced registrations, the many training programs under way, as well as the prospect of job opportunities in nearby Germany, contributed to the improved employment figures.

In the Transcaucasian and Central Asian countries, registered unemployment levels remained low, partly because of the stigma attached to being without a job but also because of the low or negligible benefits that were available. In Russia official unemployment stood at 1.5% of the labour force, but by international measuring standards the figure would be at least 6%, with as many again working short hours.

The privatization process was continuing in 1994 but was far from complete. In 9 of the 25 countries in the region, the private sector contributed over half of national GDP. The Czech Republic led in this respect, with private enterprise contributing 65% of GDP. Little headway was made in privatization of the agricultural sector, and land reforms were needed. The Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, and the Baltic states were beginning to make progress on large-scale privatizations and the reforms needed in the financial sector to support them. The other former Soviet republics, including Kyrgyzstan and Russia--where political difficulties hampered the reform effort--carried out large programs of privatization in 1994, but their financial sectors needed reforms and restructuring.

Privatization was a vital part of the restructuring process in the region, not least because of the foreign direct investment (FDI) it attracted. Central and Eastern Europe privatizations attracted 67% of all FDI flows into the region in the four years to 1992, a much greater share than any other of the world’s regions attracted. The share of FDI in privatizations in all LDCs averaged 5%, led by Latin America and the Caribbean, where privatizations took a 14% share.

The cumulative inflows of FDI registrations in the transitional countries reached nearly $20 billion in the period 1991-93. The U.S. and Western European countries were most active, while Japan, which was one of the world’s leading investors, showed little interest. More than half of the investment was in manufacturing. Often single projects--such as in the automobile industry in Poland and the Czech Republic--accounted for much of the investment. Certain sectors, too, attracted the interest of single countries. For example, more than two-thirds of all medium or large hotel investments were being promoted, developed, financed, or managed by Austrian companies.

Although foreign investment into Central and Eastern Europe was increasing at a fast rate, it was from a very low base. In absolute terms, the amount was not so significant. Between 1990 and 1993 total FDI into the region was less than the $15 billion received by Singapore alone. Investment was also heavily concentrated in the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, and Poland.

There were a number of reasons why the region failed to attract a larger share of world FDI flows. Output was still declining and was not providing the strong consumer demand investors liked. Inflation rates were high, and currencies in some countries were unstable. These factors often combined with inadequate physical and financial infrastructures and with a lack of the regulatory mechanisms associated with free markets. This made the region less attractive for foreign investors than other destinations, such as countries in Asia that were competitive and politically stable.

Nevertheless, foreign investment was playing a more significant role in the region than its size might have suggested. Foreign capital was revitalizing industries, and transnational companies from Western Europe were forging new trade links with the East. Most important were the transfer of technology and the development of human resources that were taking place. Franchising, which was becoming more acceptable, was already popular in Hungary and was growing in Poland, Slovakia, and the Czech Republic. McDonald’s had been established in the region for several years, and other fast-food restaurants were making headway, as were print shops, hair salons, hotels, and computer centres.

Restructuring was having an adverse impact on tax revenues in the short term. High inflation eroded the value of tax collected, and the private sector, which was producing most of the economic output, was harder to tax. Taxation systems were being modified to be more compatible with a market system. Value-added taxes were replacing turnover taxes, and corporation taxes had become necessary. Tax administration needed to be improved and accounting skills learned. With falling revenues, governments were finding it difficult to meet the growing demand for social services, such as housing, education, and health care, which had often been provided by state enterprises in the past. The need to protect the most vulnerable members of society and provide for future pensioners was a growing concern.

Less Developed Countries

Economic growth in the LDCs, at 5.6%, remained largely unchanged from 1993. The main factors driving growth for the second year running were continuing benefits of economic reforms, low interest rates, and export growth. The latter was of strong benefit to countries in South Asia. Regionally, growth was strongest among the Asian countries, led by China. As a result of measures introduced in 1993 to control an unsustainable economic boom, GDP growth in China moderated to around 10% from over 13% in 1993. In many other Asian countries, economic growth remained strong. Singapore, Malaysia, South Korea, Thailand, and Vietnam all experienced economic growth rates of 8-9%. The economies of Hong Kong and Indonesia expanded relatively less strongly. The manufacture of electronic and consumer goods was an important element of economic activity in this region, and faster U.S. economic growth and an upturn in global economic activity stimulated their exports. The recovery in India accelerated a little to 4.5% as the economy continued to respond to liberalization. In Latin America, with the exception of Venezuela, economic growth remained largely unchanged at 3-4%. In Africa, despite a recovery in South Africa, drought, internal strife, and civil war induced stagnation or decline in other countries. In the Mediterranean region a financial crisis in Turkey and the effects of civil war in former Yugoslavia led to lower growth rates.

Although median inflation in LDCs moderated somewhat, it remained at a high level in many countries. (For Changes in Consumer Prices in Less Developed Countries, see Table.) Brazil had an annual inflation rate of close to 1,100%, but there were signs of easing. Venezuela’s inflation increased to around 70%. Elsewhere in the region, however, inflation was below 10%. Economic reforms in Central and Eastern Europe kept inflation at 10-30%. In Russia there was a dramatic slowdown from almost 1,000% in 1993 to around 300% in 1994. Most of South Asia held steady at 3-9%, while China (27%), to the east, and Turkey (over 100%), to the west, rose rapidly. Across Africa inflation was generally stable at around 35%, but in South Africa it remained unchanged at around 9%.

There was no improvement in the external balances of the LDCs during 1994. IMF projections pointed to an expected current-account deficit of $106 billion. This was true despite the fact that exports from the LDCs increased slightly faster than imports. In Asia export volumes increased by 10%, two to three times as fast as in other regions of the world. Although the financing of the deficit was not problematic, the IMF expected the total external debt of the LDCs to rise by 8% to $1,675,000,000,000. Total debt as a proportion of exports and services continued to decline, however, and was expected to drop to 121% in 1994.