This is the old United Nations University website. Visit the new site at http://unu.edu

The Latin American experience reveals two fundamental
strategies for controlling such social movements. The first
consists of "establishing or reinforcing a social and
political pact [uniting] labour organizations, governments,
political parties, the military and the bourgeoisie". Such a
policy can be seen in countries such as Venezuela, Mexico and
Colombia, "where more or less democratic governments exist
and where Social Democratic or Christian Democratic parties have
great influence both in government and in labour
organizations". On the other hand, the second strategy for
controlling social movements consists of "establishing
authoritarian regimes such as [those] in Chile, Argentina,
Uruguay and Brazil".

When viewed within the general dynamics of world politics
today, neither of these strategies is "intrinsically
stable". As stated above, the world is at present undergoing
not only an economic transformation, but "also a political
transformation... which is perhaps as important as or even more
important than the economic transformation". In line with
his general views on the dynamics of the historical process, Dr
Silva Michelena explained the nature of this political
transformation as follows. "Since the mid-1950s (and the
emergence of the nuclear stalemate or 'mutual superiority'
between the United States and the USSR, the locus of
confrontation between the great powers shifted from the
equilibrium zones (especially Europe) to the periphery. From then
on, any war of liberation or revolutionary war emerging in the
underdeveloped countries of the world was likely to be
transformed into an indirect confrontation between the
above-mentioned Great Powers, provided that massive logistic
support could be given by both of them. Since the US could do so
around the world since 1945, the matter was reduced to the
increasing capacity of the other Great Power to give logistic
support to popular movements. Apparently, the Soviet Union today
is able to give logistic support to revolutionary movements in
Asia, the Middle East and Africa. These are the 'hot zones' of
the world today... Simultaneously, multipolarisation of the world
has increased both economically and politically, thus making it
possible to establish new alliances and pacts in order to take
better advantage of the new social division of labour on a world
scale."

It is within the context of these general tendencies that one
can explain recent events such as "the increasing inability
of the United States to enforce the applicability of post-war
pacts such as CENTO, SEATO, etc." and "the emergence of
an organization such as OPEC" ("... a phenomenon made
possible by the strategic nature of oil, by the will of OPEC
nations to back the organization and, last but not least, by the
increase in the profits of the transnational oil
corporations"). Furthermore, apparently overlooking the
example of alignments before and during World War II, Dr Silva
Michelena cited "the rift between China and the Soviet
Union" as the factor which "made possible the formation
of cross-ideological alliances" such as those which emerged
into view during the Indo-Pakistani war and the Angolan
revolution. Moreover, the case of the "intervention" of
Vietnam in Cambodia "revealed that conflicts between
underdeveloped socialist countries can also happen. Along these
lines, it is not surprising that closer links... are growing
between the US and China. One cannot even rule out new and
perhaps more formerly unthinkable ententes"; and "even
a new entente between the Soviet Union and West Germany... may be
guise possible within this rearrangement of the world".

At present "the most significant" element in world
politics is "the expanding capability of the USSR to give
massive logistic support. In the last 30 years, the Soviet Union
has gone from supporting Korea to backing Angola and Eritrea with
the help of Cubans. Whether it will continue to expand towards
Latin America is yet to be seen, so far, the compromise reached
during the missile crisis in Cuba still seems to be operative.
However, one can hypothesise that it may not be so by the end of
the century." In short, from these general trends Dr Silva
Michelena drew the conclusions "that underdeveloped
countries will continue to suffer political instability and that
the probability of revolutionary successes in the 'hot zones' is
increasing".

"It is obvious that, in the face of such trends, dominant
capitalist countries need to foster new means of legitimising the
present situation in order to reinforce the more orthodox ways of
economic, military and political domination. We [would] like to
advance the hypothesis that one such means is the creation of a
new myth which could both revive and make more credible the idea
that under developed countries can, in effect, develop within the
capitalist system. It seems that science and technology are to
play a key role within this new developmentalist ideology."
As noted by Dr H. Vessuri at the ACAST international colloquium
in Vienna, such a myth could usefully fulfil three functions:
"(a) the process of qualitative intensification of
technological dependence, which predominates in most of the
developing countries, could be conveniently disguised; (b)
neutralisation and progressive obstruction of the few attempts of
underdeveloped countries to control technology imports and direct
investments, such as... the Andean pact regulations, could be
hidden; (c) the strategies of 'global planned obsolescence' and
technological domination developed by a few multinational
corporations of some of the main OECD countries could be
efficiently legitimized".

Likewise, "concepts such as 'appropriate technology',
'increasing capacity to negotiate', 'technology transfer', etc.,
which appear profusely in the jargon of developmentalist
ideologists, are but good ways of obscuring the basic facts that:
(1) the true obstacle to satisfying the basic needs of the masses
lies in the present system of domination; (2) local bourgeoisies,
allied with the transnational corporations, are using technology
to increase control and domination of their populations rather
than to better their standards of living; (3) the industrialized
countries are, in fact, less inclined to share on an equal basis
the fruits of scientific and technological development; [and] (4)
experience shows that industrialized countries treat science and
technology as commodities to be exchanged in the market of
underdeveloped countries on an unequal basis".

What, then, can the underdeveloped countries do to change this
situation? According to Dr Silva Michelena, as long as problems
of science and technology "continue to be negotiated only at
inter-State forums,... we can only expect millimetrical progress
or no progress at all" - if only because such discussions
leave out "the most important factor... the transnational
corporations". Therefore, "it seems to us that the time
is ripe either to create a [new] specific organisation or [to
designate] an existing organization [such as the Group of 77 or
the non-aligned movement] to adopt as a priority the objectives
of dealing directly with the transnational corporations in a
global way. Then and only then can a more substantive context be
given to common efforts to increase capacities to negotiate, to
create an information bank, to foster managerial capabilities, to
create multinationals of the developed countries, etc. One reason
why we think such an operation may work is that transnational
corporations, as in the case of OPEC, may also derive benefits
from it. Among other things, uncertainty could be reduced; and
therefore they could plan future ventures and profits in a more
reliable way."

Undoubtedly one of the most stimulating papers prepared for
the conference was that by Dr Zoran Vidakocic, entitled The
technology of repression and repressive technology: the social
bearers and the cultural consequences. Unfortunately, Dr
Vidakovic was quite ill when the conference took place, and he
was thus unable to address any of its working sessions.

Dr Vidakovic began his paper by observing that one of the
great cultural phenomena of our time is perception of the fact
that "the social functions of science and technology have
been mystified, refracted through the prism of the
[dominant] ideologies and stated in the fetishised frameworks of
productivism, economic 'growth', 'promotion of civilization',
'technological solutions' to social contradictions", etc.
This basic perception is the result of continuing socio-economic
crises and of social struggles both in the Third World and in the
industrialized societies. Dr Vidakovic's paper is an attempt to
elaborate on this perception in regard specifically to "the technology
of repression, i.e. (1) armaments and their scientific,
research and technological potentials, (2) the para-military
sectors (nuclear energy, outer space research, etc.) and (3) the
'reserve potentials' of totalitarian control over man and society
(biogenetic, psychological, meteorological, nutritional,
etc.)".

By way of introduction, the basic points of this elaboration
can be summarised as follows, in a series of seven theses. First
of all, "together with militarized science and technology in
the service of force and violence, science and technology geared
towards greater exploitation of natural resources and towards
economic, socio-political and cultural hegemony in international
relations [all] comprise a unified organically linked
structure of repressive function". Secondly, "the
main machinery of exploitation and rule within individual
societies in international relations is decisively moving towards
combining the monopoly of the technology of repression in the
narrow sense with other forms of scientific and technological
monopoly geared towards repressive functions". At the
socio-political level, the ruling classes are tending to regroup
themselves in a hegemonistic nucleus which expresses and makes
possible the combination of both forms of repressive technology
and which tends to consist of the military hierarchy, the
military-industrial technocracy, the managerial nucleus of the
transnational corporations, and the corresponding political and
banking oligarchies. Thirdly, the bearers of hegemony continue to
guide scientific and technological development "towards the
expanded reproduction of the total conditions and factors of such
hegemony". They are thus exerting "an ever more
intensive effect... on the social character of the productive
forces of labour", while absorbing a predominant part of the
total potential of the scientific-technological institutions and
leaving "a decisive socio-economic, political and cultural
mark on the majority of scientific work and the technological
application of its results". Fourthly, socio-political
restructuring "globally conditions decision-making", in
such a way that "the effectiveness of repression becomes a
top priority"; and "the scientific-technological
complexes in industry, agriculture, communications, medicine,
urbanism, etc.... [actually] thwart the investigation and
realisation of alternatives urgently needed for the material
progress of human life.... Grandiose, diabolical scientific
and technological selection is carried out systematically at
the expense of the primary needs and historically formed
progressive values of humanity." Fifthly, a monopoly of
political power alone is not enough to legitimate such a
selection: also necessary is "a specific socio-cultural
articulation", according to which the interests, values and
motives of "organised knowledge" are established and
structured as functions of the scientific and technological
advancement of effective repression. Concomitantly, in order
"to legitimise scientific and technological monopolies and
their repressive aims", ideological and theoretical forms
have been developed in the social sciences (e.g. "the
functional systems theory of society..., neo-Malthusian crises
theories, 'socio-biology' as defined by Wilson and Trivers,
etc."). Sixthly, "in 'developing countries', inasmuch
as the process of their emancipation has not prevailed,
technology placed under the guidance of metropolitan monopolies
takes on multiple and potent repressive functions; [it]
becomes an essential and may become the decisive factor
in conditioning their structural dependence. 'The transfer of
technology' is transformed into the implantation of
military-technical, techno-economic, socio-political and cultural
instruments for extending and continuing dependency and
underdevelopment. With the help of these instruments, a
fundamental technological inhibition is established in the
development of these countries: a fundamental and radical
frustration of scientific research and technological advancements
that would be oriented towards primary needs and development
possibilities. The repressive scientific-technological monopoly
is constructed in a dependent society as an armature of
international and, consequently, internal relations of
exploitation; [it is] an armature geared to overcoming strivings
and efforts towards economic and political emancipation. As a
lever for ensuring the continuance of dependency, [it] is built
not only into the material-technical structure of production, but
also into the class-structure of dependent societies.
Local oligarchies and 'Úlites' regroup... in function of
military-political and techno-economic transmission; [and they
tend] to impregnate the 'cultural assimilation' of the authorised
parts of the dependent society with the mystification of the
scientific monopoly and repressive technology." Seventhly,
exposure and abolition of the repressive functions of science and
technology is undisputably a "common denominator" linking
efforts for "progressive transformation in otherwise
differing societies and in regions with materially unequal and
culturally specific possibilities, priorities and choices. This
common denominator is the global, international premise
for the emancipated and autonomous, progressive and creative,
contribution of all parts of the world" not only to their
own scientific-technological progress, but also to the
realization of such progress on a world scale.

Analytically based, socially motivated and culturally
articulated criticism of the repressive functions of science and
technology can serve as the basis for deriving a profound
long-term strategy for progressive transformation and
development, a strategy that will aim at giving "the
totality of scientific and technological development a
significantly different quality". But one should harbour no
illusions that such a multifaceted transformation can be realised
without protracted efforts, both creative and preventive; its
realization will undoubtedly require "an entire historical
epic". Our strategy today, however, "must begin with
criticism and removal of those negative characteristics of
scientific and technological development in which are condensed
the most extreme... defects of [those] antagonistic structures
that are, at the same time, the constitutive obstacles to
the investigation and realisation of socio-cultural
alternatives". Although it might be argued that repressive
characteristics are interwoven into every aspect of the fabric of
modern science and technology, the approach here adopted will be
justified if it can single out the essential bearers and
expressions of repressive functions, thereby putting the struggle
into a historical relation by focusing on that which it is both
"possible and necessary to subject to criticism and
change" in our times.

Within this focus, three key tendencies towards
scientific-technological repression can be distinguished: (1) the
growing tendency for scientific-technological development to be
oriented primarily towards goals of military force and
totalitarian control of society, and the inclusion of such
development into the international system of accumulation and
distribution of surplus value; (2) the growth of 'a
scientific-technological monopoly' in the hands of metropolitan
centres which dictates not only the direction of basic research,
but also the application of results to industry, agriculture,
etc. - specifically for the purpose of consolidating their
"economic and social hegemony in international and
interregional relations"; (3) the determination of
scientific priorities and technological selection in production
according to the aims of increasing "forced exploitation and
repressive control of the behaviour of the labour-force".
The mutual interaction of these three phenomena constitutes
"the dynamic of the expansion of the repressive,
exploitative and destructive effects of science and
technology".

One can in turn enumerate five main aspects of this dynamic:

(1) "The military-repressive orientation of science
is transformed into an essential economic factor of
hegemonistic expansion and exploitation in international
relations", since "the linkage of military and
scientific resources creates an exceptional economic
advantage: the metropolitan centres that gain this advantage
will continue to expand resources and to control an
ever-greater part of world accumulation."

(2) "The economic mechanism of international hegemony
and exploitation... is established and functions in the
presence of the international machinery of non-economic
compulsion that in part ensures the reproduction of the
social conditions for monopolistic accumulation...."

(3) In the face of social movements for the emancipation
of subordinated countries, "a specific
scientific-technological control apparatus becomes
increasingly important" as a means for protecting the
threatened international order of hegemonistic expansion and
exploitation; and this apparatus likewise "leads to
profound inversion and distortion of science and technology
with regard to the primary needs and developmental
possibilities of societies".

(4) There consequently ensues a division of the economy
into sectors with essentially different priorities for
reproduction. Those sectors that do not enjoy the advantages
of militarization their structurally limited possibilities
for research and innovation "directed primarily towards
the development of means of labour, of the technical
organization of the labour process, and of technological
approaches that enable intensive exploitation",
especially of unskilled labour. "In this way, the
orientation of technology as an instrument of increased
exploitation of labour is strengthened", while
"backward and repressive technology in the production of
goods is the other side of a system of production and
accumulation that favours rising technological and scientific
development in the production of arms and other means of
repression".

(5) Together with other factors, monopolistic
technological control of the dependent countries determines a
situation in which "the development and use of science
and technology are carried out within the framework" and
for the explicit purpose of "the super-exploitation of
the labour force of the dependent countries".

Taken all together, these five aspects form a vicious circle
in which "the economic function of the production of arms
stimulates the scientific-technological revolution in the
military-industrial sectors, reduces the accumulative capability
and the possibility of essential technical innovations in other
sectors and orients [the existing] technology [in these sectors]
towards forced exploitation of the labour force".

One of the most important manifestations of this dynamic is to
be found in its effects on the structure of the international
division of labour. "If the possibility for... exploitation
of labour in metropolitan societies is limited, sectors of
production whose capacity for accumulation is in danger move to
countries in which they can create the conditions for more
intensive exploitation." This exportation of sectors is
effected from the developed countries towards the developing
countries; but it also occurs from the more powerful to less
powerful industrialized countries. Worsening conditions, in turn,
lead to opposition and resistance both in the Third World and in
the second-class industrialized in both cases, "the bearers
of international hegemony react by strengthening the repressive
apparatus" (in ways 'appropriate' to the conditions of each
country).

Frequently "mystified as a scientific and technological 'gap'
between developed and developing countries", the
international scientific-technological monopoly is in
reality "an essential part of the system of international
monopolistic accumulation and control of the conditions of
production, exchange, distribution and consumption"; and
"the repressive functions of science and technology are directly
based on the monopoly of scientific research, the
monopolistic private ownership of scientific knowledge and the
exclusive control of its technological applications".

But all this is only part of the story. "For more
complete knowledge it is necessary to shed some light on the
totality of class, socio-political and cultural phenomena"
both in the hegemonistic centres and in dominated social
environments. In this respect, "the international
scientific-technological monopoly is formed and carries out its
repressive action especially by means of two basic social figures
which represent a condensation of the international totality of
antagonistic social reproduction: the metropolitan monopolistic
technocracy, and its subordinate [satellite] local 'oligarchies'
and 'Úlites' in dependent societies". The monopolistic
technocracy "synthesizes interests, motives, values and
goals, forms of social organization and a hierarchy of functions
and positions that inspire intellectual production...; at the
same time, [it] directs this production towards investigation and
selection of the optimal possibilities for exploitation and
repressive action". It likewise "interiorises the
repressive functions of science and technology and these
functions determine its 'maximum consciousness"'. The other
social component of the international scientific-technological
monopoly consists (in the subordinated countries) of dependent
groups in symbiotic relationships with the metropoles and
characterized by a "socio-cultural lobotomy", i.e. by a
"subordination of interests and motives, an incapacity for
research and knowledge beyond the framework of the hegemonistic
interests and the models that are the incarnation of these
interests...., [by] a caricature-like imitation of metropolitan
status and cultural patterns, a basic insensitivity to the
interests of the working masses in their countries and a scorn
for the native culture of these masses, for their creative and
productive potentials... ".

The metropolitan technocracy was called into being by the
militarization of the economy and of science; and one can even
say that the corporations in the technologically leading branches
of production (aeronautics, electronics, nuclear technology,
industrial computers and information systems, chemical industry,
etc.) served as the birthplace of this technocracy.
"Galbraith's image of the concentric circles of the
'technostructure' [in fact] most closely corresponds to the
leading corporations in the militarized economy." Such
corporations are characterized by the high organic content of
their capital, by a high concentration of scientific potential
and educated technical personnel - and thus by "profits that
devour a lion's share of the surplus value". In these
corporations were found the greatest possibilities for the social
integration of a relatively broad circle of participants under
the hegemony of technocratically reorganised leading groups which
mediate between financial centres, State military programmes and
the resulting subsidised development of science and universities.
In order to constantly exploit new scientific-technological
resources and thus to permanently maintain military orders, these
corporations "introduce the appropriate technology of power
and management, bring their managerial groups into conformity
with these demands, and... construct a new symbiosis of class
interests and status between ownership and technocratic
management". Furthermore, "the consequences of the
symbiosis of the military repressive system and the authorised
monopoly [e.g. of science and technology] are well known with
respect to the personal union and rotation of leading managerial
groups on both sides, with respect to their combined influence on
fiscal and economic policy in the interests of a militarized
economy and a global military-political strategy, [as well as]
with respect to the entire political process in the
metropolis".

Although the technology of violence and death actually becomes
the main concern of the leading metropolitan corporations, these
militarized corporations nevertheless extend their domination
over the totality of social production. Power over death and
power over life are concentrated in the same hands; they are made
to serve an identical purpose, and they are judged by identical
criteria. The only difference between the two is that the use of
their power for destruction and death is "significantly more
effective" than its use for furthering survival and the
relief of those human problems that are, in fact, consequences of
this whole system of production itself. Within this context, it
can also be pointed out that the militarized apparatus of
production was the original laboratory for perfecting the
so-called "scientific-systematic" and technocratic
forms of rationality; and from it also was inherited "the
basic irresponsibility and superficial 'political neutrality' of
researchers and technical operators".

Within subordinated societies, on the other hand, there are
two main generators for the formation of 'technocratic Úlites'.
The first is "the local repressive apparatus (primarily
military...)". This apparatus maintains itself "under
the influence and control of metropolitan systems, thus carrying
out perhaps the most important transfer of [military] technology
and contributing to the formation of a specifically
authoritarian-technocratic ideology", which "postulates
total repression as the sine qua non for the survival and
development of [any given] 'backward' society...". The
second generator of local 'technocratic Úlites' is "a
complex of 'technical aid' projects" which are "carried
out within the global strategy of the metropolitan monopolistic
centres". The selection, education and indoctrination of the
cadres for such projects is performed either by
"metropolitan educational and research factories" (and
their local branches in the Third World) under the auspices of
"superficially independent foundations" or by the
transnational corporations themselves within their own
personnel-training programmer.

These two types of local Úlites typically remain on their own
separate lines of development until a crisis hits. Thereafter,
unless such a crisis results in liberation from the metropolitan
system, the two tend to merge into a single restructured
class-fraction: "these two components - the military group
and the social arm of the transnational corporations - produce
the local force that becomes the interested, politically and
culturally conforming recipient of (scientific-technological and)
total hegemony. Between these two components there develops a
symbiosis of power and interests, an osmosis of ideas, values and
orientations. The ideology of total repression unites with the
ideology of technological and cultural dependence and
assimilation; and in this union, repression gains strength as the
condition for all (dependent) economic growth, technological
progress and 'modernization of the society', as a circle of
insurmountable dependency based on the importation of
prefabricated knowledge (together with technical and consumerist
models) is closed up by the ambitions of the protagonists of
authoritarian rule."

In presenting his paper entitled Nuclear energy in Latin
America: the Brazilian case, Dr Luiz Pinguelli Rosa first of
all made clear his general ideas about what constitutes the most
suitable sort of general energy policy for developing countries.
Dr Pinguelli Rosa observed that "an effective energy policy
cannot be limited [merely] to meeting demand, nor can it be
guided solely by the search for a minimum price. [It] must also orient
energy demand so as to make it consistent with the global
objectives of the country." In the case of a country with an
inadequately articulated industrial base, but with an energy
sector controlled by the Government, a correct energy policy can
be a key factor in reducing the importance of foreign-dominated
sectors and of balancing the general structure of production.
Since energy enterprises are responsible for a substantial share
of all purchases of equipment and since they likewise influence
industrial costs by means of pricing, a correct energy policy can
be an important driving mechanism both in national and in
regional industrialization. Such a policy in a developing country
must as much as possible shift energy consumption towards
indigenous energy resources, in terms both of technology and of
supply. By this means, foreign currency can be consented and
security of energy supply safeguarded.

On the other hand, "energy consumption is nowadays large
enough and concentrated enough to produce serious effects on the
ecological equilibrium of certain regions. This entails a social
cost which can be large, but which has in most cases been
overlooked." Any adequate policy, however, must take this
social cost into account: "otherwise the country will sooner
or later have to pay for it".

Even apart from its ecological implications, it is clear that
"energy policy is closely linked to social and economic
policy. There is no way to separate it from the national planning
we have in mind for the future. Either we will maintain a high
concentration of revenue, socially and regionally, or we will try
to reach a more reasonable distribution of the national revenue.
This is not a rhetorical or an idealistic point. [On the
contrary,] it would be unrealistic to separate the technical and
political discussion about energy from its economic and social
context." Institutional changes in the direction of
democratization and decentralisation are necessary here as
elsewhere, and working people must make their voices heard in
discussions about energy policy. In this regard, it should be
noted that at present the domestic consumption of energy for
different social classes is highly unequal ("sophisticated
goods incorporated typically into the middle-class standard of
living have a high energy content"), while means of public
transportation are insufficient and their services poor
("the private car has all the privileges"). Social
discrimination is also to be witnessed in the consumption of
energy within the industrial sector, "which produces goods
for a relatively small part of the population or for export,
while neglecting the needs of the majority of the people almost
completely". For these reasons, "the reorientation of
energy demand is the basic condition for an effective
energy policy in Brazil", as well as in many other Third
World countries.

It is within the context of these general considerations that
specific energy policies of given developing countries can be
evaluated and guidelines for the formation of policy drawn up.

As a practical example, Dr Pinguelli Rosa analysed the case of
the Brazilian nuclear energy programme, for which a certain
amount of background information should be kept in mind. For
example, "Brazil has a hydroelectric potential of 200 GW, of
which only 25 GW is at present utilised; and it is expected that
150 GW will be used by the year 2000. In spite of the great
distances between many of the waterfalls and the big cities, it
is possible to transmit electrical energy with final cost of a
hydroelectric kW at less than half of the nuclear kW cost.
Besides this, there is coal in the south of the country.
Therefore, nuclear energy is not an economic necessity to Brazil
yet."

Nevertheless, "the Brazilian nuclear programme foresees
the construction of eight light-water PWR-KWU reactors of 1300 MW
each" by 1990, in addition to the 627 MW Westinghouse
reactor now in the final stage of construction. Furthermore,
according to a treaty signed with West Germany in 1975, Brazil
has undertaken the establishment of an industrial base for the
production of heavy equipment for reactors and for enriching and
reprocessing nuclear fuel. Why does a developing country
implement such an 'ambitious' programme? There are, in fact, a
number of reasons. Some of them are "related to the
long-term security of the country's energy supply, after the
exhaustion of the hydroelectric potential and of other
sources"; but there are also other reasons "related to
the myth of nuclear power as a magic key for the progress of the
nation...".

According to Dr Pinguelli Rosa, "nuclear energy may be
necessary to the economy of the less developed countries in the
future"; and within thirty years it will probably have to
play an important role in supplying Brazil's energy. "No
matter how great the Brazilian hydroelectric potential may be,
the day will inevitably come when this consumption will exceed
that potential. Thus, Brazil cannot ignore nuclear technology,
because it may need it in the future." This becomes all the
more clear when one considers that an economical utilization
solar energy for generating electricity on a large scale is
"improbable at medium term". Likewise, "the myth
that the developing countries have to concentrate on intermediate
technologies" would here imply "the absolute priority
of renewable resources and of rustic ways of energy
generation", whose development still requires much time and
investment. Such a choice would, naturally, be quite dangerous,
for, among other things, it would mean abandoning native
petrochemical and nuclear resources to exploitation by the rich
countries alone.

On the other hand, however, usage of nuclear energy is a
subject that demands a careful assessment of prospective risks
and benefits and "a political evaluation that transcends the
technical aspects". For such an evaluation, "the
[proper] instrument is democratic discussion; and for this
political discussion to be well-founded, the participation of the
technical-scientific community is essential". Moreover, the
Three Mile Island accident has highlighted the risks of accidents
on reactors and the question of nuclear safety, while the problem
of "the storage of radioactive wastes... stands without a
final solution". Such problems "tend to be worst in
less developed countries, for three basic reasons: (1) the
necessity of adopting nuclear standards and requirements from
other countries and sometimes from more than one country...; (2)
the weakness of the national licensing authorities, which not
only have small budgets, but also do not have the necessary
independence and authority to fulfil some of their intended
functions; and (3) the lack of well-established public opinion
groups which could force the government into giving more
attention to safety-related matters".

It should be stressed that "nowadays the acquisition of
sophisticated equipment from the developed countries may not
[always] be the most appropriate way to assure control of nuclear
technology for the future". In this regard, the acquisition
by the Brazilian Government of the German nuclear technology
deserves to be severely criticized. Not only was this technology
purchased at a very high price at a time when the country was by
no means in urgent need of it, but also the project was badly
adapted to Brazilian conditions and internal resources; in
particular, it ignored the Brazilian scientific community
"almost completely". In addition, the treaty governing
the establishment of the nuclear-energy industry "fatally
requires the importation of the equipment" from Germany; and
even if eventually such equipment is partially made in Brazil, it
"will be made by foreign companies or in joint ventures with
them". Thus, despite the fact that the technology has been
well-known for decades, the industrial production of equipment
for the generation of electricity will see its already grave
dependence on multinational companies intensified; and the
foreign debt will be aggravated.

On the other hand, the nuclear power industry within the
country will be under national control only when Brazil possesses
all elements of the nuclear fuel cycle: "from this point of
view the country must have both enrichment and reprocessing
plants". Here arises the snag, however, for the plutonium
produced by such plants is the essential material for making a
nuclear weapon; and, on the grounds of restricting the
proliferation of nuclear weapons, the USA is "trying to
avoid the sale of a reprocessing plant to Brazil". Brazil
now finds herself threatened with the abrogation, under US
pressure, of the final stages of the Brazilian-German treaty. If
these stages are not carried out, she "may find herself in
the position of having bought the reactors and afterwards of not
having any guarantee of fuel supply", while "relying
upon an imported fuel (namely, enriched uranium, which may become
more critical than oil) for a substantial part of [her]
electrical energy".

Raising once again the question of collective self-reliance
and advancing the proposals of the 1978 Interciencia Symposium,
Dr Pinguelli Rosa suggested that in the face of such
circumstances "countries at a comparable industrial and
economic stage (such as Brazil, Argentina, Venezuela and Mexico)
[should] unite themselves to develop a nuclear programme,
eventually including other countries as soon as the latter need
this kind of energy.... Continental co-operation would bring the
enormous advantage of eliminating the possibility of a senseless
nuclear race, with military implications. However, this
co-operation would permit a rational internationalisation, at the
South American level, of certain processes proper to nuclear
industry, particularly the fuel cycle." "The USA, on
the other hand, has proposed [another form oft
internationalisation of the nuclear fuel cycle, in order to avoid
the proliferation of such technology and the dissemination of
plutonium." This internationalisation "under the
hegemony of the countries already possessing nuclear
technology", fails to inspire confidence, because of the
"historical tradition of political and economic domination
implicit in technological and industrial dependence. However,
internationalisation at a Latin American level could be feasible
and would overcome the objections currently made by the North
Americans in relation to the fuel cycle. It would also make joint
efforts possible, giving an adequate position to nuclear
enterprises and strengthening the Latin American bloc in
negotiations with the proprietors of nuclear technology." In
fact (and at least partially in response to the attempts at
obstruction by the USA), the development of a Latin American
consortium to develop nuclear power "appears to be in the
making". The USA has already been "virtually excluded
from some South American nuclear markets" and is "still
not considered a reliable supplier of fuel enrichment services
and reactors". On the positive side, the consortium aims at
linking the uranium resources of Latin America, the technical
experience and expertise of Spain and Argentina, and the
technologies available from Europe and Canada.

The question of the proliferation of nuclear weapons is, of
course, an extremely important one, but it is imperative to place
it within a proper context. It is true that the non-proliferation
treaty has not been signed by many countries (including Brazil),
who allege that it will only legitimate an unacceptable
distribution of power, "by restricting the control of the
pacific uses" of nuclear energy "without imposing any
obstacle on the growth of the nuclear weapons of the military
world powers." On the other hand, Brazil has signed
the treaty of Tlatelolco, which "forbids the production or
possession of nuclear weapons and forbids the storage in the
territory of a signatory country of nuclear weapons"
belonging to other countries. It should be understood that in
scientific circles many domestic critics of the Brazilian nuclear
programme have, in fact, supported the Government's position in
regard to the non-proliferation treaty. Why? Because "the
objective of the scientists is for the country to follow an
energy policy which is suitable to its real means and which leads
to greater autonomy". On the other hand, the purpose of much
international pressure (such as that exerted by the Club of London)
is "to limit the autonomy of the less developed
countries"; international pressure groups for
non-proliferation base their position on the hypothesis that if
developing countries manage to master nuclear technology, their
"political irresponsibility... will lead to a nuclear
war". The underlying assumption here, of course, is that
"the responsibility of the world's military nuclear powers
is enough to guarantee that a nuclear war will not occur. The
historical tradition of some of these world powers, responsible
for the worst wars and devastation the world has suffered,
provides examples which refute this assertion." The point
here is "not to defend the nuclear militarization of Latin
America, but to put the international question into its real
context: the question of the nuclear disarmament of the world
powers. From our point of view, the correct position is to
repudiate the military use of nuclear technology in all countries
of the world, while making clear that the great threat to the
security of mankind lies in the nuclear weapons arsenal of the
military world powers."