To get this project in ONLINE or through TRAINING Sessions, Contact: JP INFOTECH, 45, KAMARAJ SALAI, THATTANCHAVADY, PUDUCHERRY-9
Landmark: Opposite to Thattanchavady Industrial Estate, Next to VVP Nagar Arch.
Mobile: (0) 9952649690 , Email: [email protected], web: www.jpinfotech.org
Blog: www.jpinfotech.blogspot.com
Combining Cryptographic Primitives to Prevent Jamming Attacks in Wireless Networks 2013 IEEE JAVA
The Open Nature of wireless medium leaves an intentional interference attack, typically referred to as jamming. This intentional interference with wireless transmission launch pad for mounting Denial-Of- Service attack on wireless networks. Typically, jamming has been addresses under an external threat model. However, adversaries with internal knowledge of protocol specification and network secrets can launch low-effort jamming attacks that are difficult to detect and counter. In this work we address the problem of jamming attacks and adversary is active for short period of time, selectively targeting the messages of high importance. We show that the selective jamming attacks can be launched by performing real-time packet classification at the physical layer. To mitigate these attacks, we develop three schemes that prevent real time packet classification by combining cryptographic primitives with physical-layer attributes. They are Strong Hiding Commitment Schemes (SHCS), Cryptographic Puzzles Hiding Schemes (CPHS), and All- Or-Nothing Transformation Hiding Schemes (AONTSHS). Random key distribution methods are done along with three schemes to give more secured packet transmission in wireless networks.

To get this project in ONLINE or through TRAINING Sessions, Contact: JP INFOTECH, 45, KAMARAJ SALAI, THATTANCHAVADY, PUDUCHERRY-9
Landmark: Opposite to Thattanchavady Industrial Estate, Next to VVP Nagar Arch.
Mobile: (0) 9952649690 , Email: [email protected], web: www.jpinfotech.org
Blog: www.jpinfotech.blogspot.com
Combining Cryptographic Primitives to Prevent Jamming Attacks in Wireless Networks | 2013 IEEE
The Open Nature of wireless medium leaves an intentional interference attack, typically referred to as jamming. This intentional interference with wireless transmission launch pad for mounting Denial-Of- Service attack on wireless networks. Typically, jamming has been addresses under an external threat model. However, adversaries with internal knowledge of protocol specification and network secrets can launch low-effort jamming attacks that are difficult to detect and counter. In this work we address the problem of jamming attacks and adversary is active for short period of time, selectively targeting the messages of high importance. We show that the selective jamming attacks can be launched by performing real-time packet classification at the physical layer. To mitigate these attacks, we develop three schemes that prevent real time packet classification by combining cryptographic primitives with physical-layer attributes. They are Strong Hiding Commitment Schemes (SHCS), Cryptographic Puzzles Hiding Schemes (CPHS), and All- Or-Nothing Transformation Hiding Schemes (AONTSHS). Random key distribution methods are done along with three schemes to give more secured packet transmission in wireless networks.

To get this project in ONLINE or through TRAINING Sessions, Contact: JP INFOTECH, 45, KAMARAJ SALAI, THATTANCHAVADY, PUDUCHERRY-9
Landmark: Opposite to Thattanchavady Industrial Estate, Next to VVP Nagar Arch.
Mobile: (0) 9952649690 , Email: [email protected], web: www.jpinfotech.org
Blog: www.jpinfotech.blogspot.com
Combining Cryptographic Primitives to Prevent Jamming Attacks in Wireless Networks
The Open Nature of wireless medium leaves an intentional interference attack, typically referred to as jamming. This intentional interference with wireless transmission launch pad for mounting Denial-Of- Service attack on wireless networks. Typically, jamming has been addresses under an external threat model. However, adversaries with internal knowledge of protocol specification and network secrets can launch low-effort jamming attacks that are difficult to detect and counter. In this work we address the problem of jamming attacks and adversary is active for short period of time, selectively targeting the messages of high importance. We show that the selective jamming attacks can be launched by performing real-time packet classification at the physical layer. To mitigate these attacks, we develop three schemes that prevent real time packet classification by combining cryptographic primitives with physical-layer attributes. They are Strong Hiding Commitment Schemes (SHCS), Cryptographic Puzzles Hiding Schemes (CPHS), and All- Or-Nothing Transformation Hiding Schemes (AONTSHS). Random key distribution methods are done along with three schemes to give more secured packet transmission in wireless networks.

To Get any Project for CSE,IT ECE,EEE Contact Me @9966032699,8519950799 or mail us - [email protected]­m-Visit Our WebSite www.liotechprojects.com,www.iotech.in
The open nature of the wireless medium leaves it vulnerable to intentional interference attacks, typically referred to as jamming. This intentional interference with wireless transmissions can be used as a launchpad for mounting Denial-of-Service attacks on wireless networks. Typically, jamming has been addressed under an external threat model. However, adversaries with internal knowledge of protocol specifications and network secrets can launch low-effort jamming attacks that are difficult to detect and counter. In this work, we address the problem of selective jamming attacks in wireless networks. In these attacks, the adversary is active only for a short period of time, selectively targeting messages of high importance. We illustrate the advantages of selective jamming in terms of network performance degradation and adversary effort by presenting two case studies; a selective attack on TCP and one on routing.We show that selective jamming attacks can be launched by performing real-time packet classification at the physical layer. To mitigate these attacks, we develop three schemes that prevent real-time packet classification by combining cryptographic primitives with physical-layer attributes. We analyze the security of our methods and evaluate their computational and communication overhead.

Objective of this project is to prevent jamming attacks in wireless network using cryptographic primitives. The Open Nature of wireless medium leaves an intentional interference attack, typically referred to as jamming. This intentional interference with wireless transmission launch pad for mounting Denial-Of-Service attack on wireless networks. Typically, jamming has been addresses under an external threat model. However, adversaries with internal knowledge of protocol specification and network secrets can launch low-effort jamming attacks that are difficult to detect and counter. In this work we address the problem of jamming attacks and adversary is active for short period of time, selectively targeting the messages of high importance. We show that the selective jamming attacks can be launched by performing real-time packet classification at the physical layer. To mitigate these attacks, we develop three schemes that prevent real-time packet classification by combining cryptographic primitives with physical-layer attributes. They are Strong Hiding Commitment Schemes (SHCS), Cryptographic Puzzles Hiding Schemes (CPHS), All-Or-Nothing Transformation Hiding Schemes (AONTS-HS). Random key distribution methods are done along with three schemes to give more secured packet transmission in wireless networks.BAVITHRA VM5446 IT BATCH.44

To Get any Project for CSE,IT ECE,EEE Contact Me @9966032699,8519950799 or mail us - [email protected]­m-Visit Our WebSite www.liotechprojects.com,www.iotech.in
Coordination of network functions in wireless networks requires frequent exchange of control messages among participating nodes. Typically, such messages are transmitted over a universally known communication channel referred to as the control channel. Due to its critical role, this channel can become a prime target of Denial-of-Service (DOS) attacks. In this paper, we address the problem of preventing control-channel DOS attacks manifested in the form of jamming. We consider a sophisticated adversary who has knowledge of the protocol specifics and of the cryptographic quantities used to secure network operations. This type of adversary cannot be prevented by anti jamming techniques that rely on shared secrets, such as spread spectrum. We propose new security metrics to quantify the ability of the adversary to deny access to the control channel, and introduce a randomized distributed scheme that allows nodes to establish and maintain the control channel in the presence of the jammer. Our method is
applicable to networks with static or dynamically allocated spectrum. Furthermore, we propose two algorithms for unique identification of the set of compromised nodes, one for independently acting nodes and one for colluding nodes. Detailed theoretical evaluation of the security metrics and extensive simulation results are provided to demonstrate the efficiency of our methods in mitigating jamming and identifying compromised nodes.

Charles Bouillaguet, Patrick Derbez, and Pierre-Alain Fouque
ENS, CNRS, INRIA, France
Abstract. In this paper, we describe versatile and powerful algorithms for searching guess-and-determine and meet-in-the-middle attacks on byte-oriented symmetric primitives. To demonstrate the strengh of these tool, we show that they allows to automatically discover new attacks on round-reduced AES with very low data complexity, and to find improved attacks on the AES-based MACs Alpha-MAC and Pelican-MAC, and also on the AES-based stream cipher LEX. Finally, the tools can be used in the context of fault attacks. These algorithms exploit the algebraically simple byte-oriented structure of the AES. When the attack found by the tool are practical, they have been implemented and validated.

To Get any Project for CSE,IT ECE,EEE Contact Me @9966032699,8519950799 or mail us - [email protected]­m-Visit Our WebSite www.liotechprojects.com,www.iotech.in
Digital signatures are an important mechanism for ensuring data trustworthiness via source authenticity, integrity, and source non-repudiation. However, their trustworthiness guarantee can be subverted in the real world by sophisticated attacks, which can obtain cryptographically legitimate digital signatures without actually compromising the private signing key. This problem cannot be adequately addressed by a purely cryptographic approach, by the revocation mechanism of Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) because it may take a long time to detect the compromise, or by using tamper-resistant hardware because the attacker does not need to compromise the hardware. This problem will become increasingly more important and evident because of stealthy malware (or Advanced Persistent Threats).
In this paper, we propose a novel solution, dubbed Assured Digital Signing (ADS), to enhancing the data trustworthiness vouched by digital signatures. In order to minimize the modifications to the Trusted Computing Base (TCB), ADS simultaneously takes advantage of trusted computing and virtualization technologies. Specifically, ADS allows a signature verifier to examine not only a signature's cryptographic validity but also its system security validity that the private signing key and the signing function are secure, despite the powerful attack that the signing application program and the general-purpose Operating System (OS) kernel are malicious. The modular design of ADS makes it application-transparent (i.e., no need to modify the application source code in order to deploy it) and almost hypervisor-independent (i.e., it can be implemented with any Type I hypervisor). To demonstrate the feasibility of ADS, we report the implementation and analysis of an Xen-based ADS system.

Recorded: 11/16/2011
CERIAS Security Seminar at Purdue University
Jam me if you can: Mitigating the Impact of Inside Jammers
Loukas Lazos, University of Arizona
The open nature of the wireless medium leaves wireless communications exposed to interference caused by the concurrent operation of co-located wireless devices over the same frequency bands. While unintentional signal interference is managed at the physical and mac layers using an array of techniques (advanced signal processing, channel coding and error correction, spread spectrum communications, multiple access protocols, etc.), in a hostile environment, wireless communications remain vulnerable to intentional interference attacks typically referred to as jamming. Jamming can take the form of an external attack launched by &quot;foreign&quot; devices that are unaware of the network secrets (e.g., cryptographic credentials) or its protocols. Such external attacks are relatively easy to neutralize through a combination of cryptography-based measures andspreading techniques. In contrast, when jamming attacks are launched from compromised nodes, they are much more sophisticated in nature.These attacks exploit knowledge of network secrets (e.g., cryptographic keys and pseudo-random spreading codes) and its protocol semantics to maximize their detrimental impact by selectively and adaptively targeting critical data transmissions. In this talk, wediscuss the feasibility and impact of selective jamming attacks in the presence of inside adversaries. The attacker's selectivity is considered at different granularities, namely on a per-channel basis and on a per-packet basis. We describe several mitigation methods thatdo not rely on the existence of shared secrets, but defeat selectivity via a combination of temporary packet hiding and uncoordinated frequency hopping.
Loukas Lazos is an Assistant Professor in the Electrical and Computer Engineering Department at the University of Arizona. He received his Ph.D. in Electrical Engineering from the University of Washington, Seattle, in 2006. He is a recipient of the NSF CAREER Award (2009), for his research in security of multi-channel wireless networks. His main research interests are in the areas of networking, security, and wireless communications, focusing on the identi&iuml;&not;�cation, modeling, and mitigation of security vulnerabilities, visualization of network threats, and analysis of network performance. (Visit: www.cerias.purude.edu)

This paper proposes a complete practical methodology for minimizing additive distortion in steganography with general (nonbinary) embedding operation. Let every possible value of every stego element be assigned a scalar expressing the distortion of an embedding change done by replacing the cover element by this value. The total distortion is assumed to be a sum of per-element distortions. Both the payload-limited sender (minimizing the total distortion while embedding a fixed payload) and the distortion-limited sender (maximizing the payload while introducing a fixed total distortion) are considered. Without any loss of performance, the nonbinary case is decomposed into several binary cases by replacing individual bits in cover elements. The binary case is approached using a novel syndrome-coding scheme based on dual convolutional codes equipped with the Viterbi algorithm. This fast and very versatile solution achieves state-of-the-art results in steganographic applications while having linear time and space complexity w.r.t. the number of cover elements. We report extensive experimental results for a large set of relative payloads and for different distortion profiles, including the wet paper channel. Practical merit of this approach is validated by constructing and testing adaptive embedding schemes for digital images in raster and transform domains. Most current coding schemes used in steganography (matrix embedding, wet paper codes, etc.) and many new ones can be implemented using this framework.

Avoid the selective jamming attack on transmission by using SHCS scheme. Three schemes that prevent real-time packet classification by combining cryptographic primitives
With physical-layer attributes.

Packet-Hiding Methods for Preventing Selective Jamming Attacks
Abstract:
The open nature of the wireless medium leaves it vulnerable to intentional interference attacks, typically referred to as jamming. This intentional interference with wireless transmissions can be used as a launchpad for mounting Denial-of-Service attacks on wireless networks. Typically, jamming has been addressed under an external threat model. However, adversaries with internal knowledge of protocol specifications and network secrets can launch low-effort jamming attacks that are difficult to detect and counter. In this work, we address the problem of selective jamming attacks in wireless networks. In these attacks, the adversary is active only for a short period of time, selectively targeting messages of high importance. We illustrate the advantages of selective jamming in terms of network performance degradation and adversary effort by presenting two case studies; a selective attack on TCP and one on routing. We show that selective jamming attacks can be launched by performing real-time packet classification at the physical layer. To mitigate these attacks, we develop three schemes that prevent real-time packet classification by combining cryptographic primitives with physical-layer attributes. We analyze the security of our methods and evaluate their computational and communication overhead.

Traditionally, as soon as confidentiality becomes a concern, data is encrypted before outsourcing to a service provider. Any software-based cryptographic constructs then deployed, for server-side query processing on the encrypted data, inherently limit query expressiveness. Here, we introduce TrustedDB, an outsourced database prototype that allows clients to execute SQL queries with privacy and under regulatory compliance constraints by leveraging server-hosted, tamper-proof trusted hardware in critical query processing stages, thereby removing any limitations on the type of supported queries. Despite the cost overhead and performance limitations of trusted hardware, we show that the costs per query are orders of magnitude lower than any (existing or) potential future software-only mechanisms. TrustedDB is built and runs on actual hardware and its performance and costs are evaluated here.

In this University of Waterloo Department of Combinatorics and Optimization Tutte Seminar, Daniel Younger presents a snapshot of the life of the late Bill Tutte. The seminar was held on Friday, November 21, 2014.

The IEEE Computer Society presented its 2014 Technical Achievement Award to Srinivas Devadas for pioneering work in secure hardware, including the invention of physical unclonable Functions and single-chip secure processor architectures. The Technical Achievement Award honors outstanding and innovative contributions to computer and information science and engineering, usually within the past 10 years. Dr. Devadas accepted his award at the Computer Society's 4 June 2014 awards ceremony in Seattle, Washington.
Devadas is the Webster Professor of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT). His research interests span Computer-Aided Design (CAD), computer security and computer architecture and he has received significant awards from each discipline.
For more information about Srinivas Devadas:
http://www.computer.org/portal/web/awards/srinivas-devadas
For more information about IEEE Computer Society Awards:
http://www.computer.org/awards

Packet-Hiding Methods for Preventing Selective Jamming Attacks
TO GET THIS PROJECT IN ONLINE OR THROUGH TRAINING SESSIONS CONTACT:
Chennai Office: JP INFOTECH, Old No.31, New No.86, 1st Floor, 1st Avenue, Ashok Pillar, Chennai – 83. Landmark: Next to Kotak Mahendra Bank / Bharath Scans.
Landline: (044) - 43012642 / Mobile: (0)9952649690
Pondicherry Office: JP INFOTECH, #45, Kamaraj Salai, Thattanchavady, Puducherry – 9. Landmark: Opp. To Thattanchavady Industrial Estate & Next to VVP Nagar Arch.
Landline: (0413) - 4300535 / Mobile: (0)8608600246 / (0)9952649690
Email: [email protected],
Website: http://www.jpinfotech.org,
Blog: http://www.jpinfotech.blogspot.com
The open nature of the wireless medium leaves it vulnerable to intentional interference attacks, typically referred to as jamming. This intentional interference with wireless transmissions can be used as a launch pad for mounting Denial-of-Service attacks on wireless networks. Typically, jamming has been addressed under an external threat model. However, adversaries with internal knowledge of protocol specifications and network secrets can launch low-effort jamming attacks that are difficult to detect and counter. In this work, we address the problem of selective jamming attacks in wireless networks. In these attacks, the adversary is active only for a short period of time, selectively targeting messages of high importance. We illustrate the advantages of selective jamming in terms of network performance degradation and adversary effort by presenting two case studies; a selective attack on TCP and one on routing. We show that selective jamming attacks can be launched by performing real-time packet classification at the physical layer. To mitigate these attacks, we develop three schemes that prevent real-time packet classification by combining cryptographic primitives with physical-layer attributes. We analyze the security of our methods and evaluate their computational and communication overhead.

As Presented at HOPE Number 9 (Hackers On Planet Earth) 2012 in New York, NY.
Description provided by conference:
Encryption makes information secret, steganography hides the information in plain sight. We fancy hiding it in a "pile" that most people would avoid. This talk explores hiding steganography in mediums such as archive exploders, file carving exploders, and virus files. There will be a release of the open source tools eZIPlode/asour, magicbomb/-asour and hivasour/hivsneeze.
Tools and presentation at:
https://github.com/XlogicX/Explosive-Steganography

Facilities.
Facilities for business continuity may include alternate workspace equipped for continuation of business operations. Alternate facilities may be owned or contracted including office space, data center, manufacturing and distribution.
Systems.
Systems for emergency response may include detection, alarm, warning, communications, suppression and pollution control systems. Protection of critical equipment within a data center may include sensors monitoring heat, humidity and attempts to penetrate computer firewalls.
Every building has exit routes so people can evacuate if there is a hazard within the building. These exit routes should be designed and maintained in accordance with applicable regulations.

Business continuity resources may include spare or redundant systems that serve as a backup in case primary systems fail. Systems for crisis communications may include existing voice and data technology for communicating with customers, employees and others.
Equipment.
Equipment includes the means for teams to communicate. Radios, smartphones, wired telephone and pagers may be required to alert team members to respond, to notify public agencies or contractors and to communicate with other team members to manage an incident.
Many tools may be required to prepare a facility for a forecast event such as a hurricane, flooding or severe winter storm.
Materials and Supplies.
Materials and supplies are needed to support members of emergency response, business continuity and crisis communications teams. Food and water are basic provisions.
Systems and equipment needed to support the preparedness program require fuel. Emergency generators and diesel engine driven fire pumps should have a fuel supply that meets national standards or local regulatory requirements. That means not allowing the fuel supply to run low because replenishment may not be possible during an emergency. Spare batteries for portable radios and chargers for smartphones and other communications devices should be available.
Funding.
Worksheets.