sang pujangga cinta

Selasa, 24 Mei 2011

STATE AND POLITICS:MAJELIS ULAMA INDONESIA AFTER SUHARTOMOCH. NUR ICHWAN*AbstractThis essay examines the Majelis Ulama Indonesia (MUI) and the legal decisionsthat it issued after the fall of President Suharto, whose regime played a rolein its establishment. In light of MUI’s changing relationship with the stateunder Suharto’s successors B.J. Habibie and Abdurrahman Wahid, I call fora more nuanced reading of MUI’s decisions.I also discuss the relative weight accorded to MUI decisions—variouslycalled “opinions,” pieces of “advice,” and “fatw§s”—arguing that these“discursive products” reflect a conscious attempt by MUI to break free fromthe circumstances of its birth and to guide the reformation process in post-Suharto Indonesia.Religious authority and political power have long beenbound together in Islamic history and tradition, in which theProphet is seen as both a religious and political leader, while the#ulam§" are considered “the heirs of the Prophets” (Ar. warathatal-anbiy§").Certainly the #ulam§" played an important role in politicalprocesses in the states that constituted pre-colonial and colonialIndonesia. In the pre-colonial era, #ulam§" participated in decisionmaking in the sultanates of Aceh, Palembang, Mataram andSambas. In the colonial era, some #ulam§" served the government(Hisyam 2001), while others devoted themselves to educationand reform (Azra 2004). Still others were actively involved inrebel movements or, later, in the struggle for national independence(Noer 1963; Kartodirdjo 1966; Hayat 1995). The #ulam§" haveCorrespondence: Moch. Nur Ichwan, International Institute for Asian Studies,Leiden, M.N.Ichwan@let. leidenuniv.nl* I wish to thank Herman Beck, Michael Laffan, Johan Meuleman, andthe anonymous reviewers for providing valuable comments on the draft. Anyremaining errors are solely my own.46 moch. nur ichwanbeen actively involved in political affairs in post-colonial Indonesia,whether in government, in political parties, in Islamic organizationsor in rebellions against central authority (Abdullah 1987; VanDijk 1981, 1996; Cahyono 1992).The role of the #ulam§" in the Indonesian political sphere hasbecome even more significant since the establishment of the MajelisUlama Indonesia (MUI, the Council of Indonesian #Ulam§") on26 July 1975.1 Unlike other Islamic political parties and organisations,MUI’s political activities are limited mostly to the issuance(and non-issuance) of fatw§s and non-legal recommendations knownas tausiyahs (Ar. tawßiya). During the “New Order” of PresidentSuharto (1966-98), MUI’s position vis-à-vis the government wasuneasy, as reflected in its fatw§s and tausiyahs. However, the collapseof the regime on 21 May 1998 signalled major changes andheralded the period of “Reformasi” that opened up a space forthe free articulation of public opinion. It also gave MUI a chanceto reflect on its role during the New Order and to redefine itsrole for the future.2 As I will argue below, however, MUI did notshift ground overnight. During the presidency of Suharto’simmediate successor B.J. Habibie (21 May 1998-20 October 1999),MUI was also concerned with legitimising the position of thepresident. It was not until the term of Abdurrahman Wahid (20October 1999-July 2001) that MUI distanced itself from the state,especially after Wahid suggested that communism might belegalised and that formal trade relations might be establishedwith Israel.I will examine the general reaction of MUI to political change,as reflected in its production of fatw§s and tausiyahs, which containsigns of its changing position as a mediator between state andsociety. My central thesis is that fatw§s and tausiyahs are themechanisms by which MUI attempts to bring Indonesians closerto its understanding of “orthodoxy.” I will suggest that the contextin which the fatw§s and tausiyahs are issued, on the one hand,and the responses to them by government and society, on the1 For the official explanation of the establishment of MUI and an outlineof its first year of development, see Majelis Ulama Indonesia (1976).2 The position of MUI was much discussed at its twenty-third anniversarycelebrations, at which the seminar on “Reformasi in the perspective of the#ulam§" ” was convened on 26 July 1998. See “Milad ke-23 MUI, antara Harapandan Tantangan,” Mimbar Ulama, no. 240, xx, August 1998, 12-3.#ulam§", state and politics 47other, are manifestations of how the authority of a fatw§ or tausiyahis negotiated and the position of MUI as an #ulam§" institution isredefined.3MUI and PoliticsDespite the fact that Muslims and Muslim leaders played animportant role in eliminating the Indonesian Communist Party(PKI) and in establishing the New Order government, Suhartodid not rehabilitate Masyumi, the major Islamic party, whichhad been dissolved by Sukarno in 1962. Instead the governmentforced all of the Islamic parties to consolidate into a new unwieldyparty, the United Development Party (Partai Persatuan Pembangunan,PPP). However, the Islamic parties failed to gainsignificant support in the general election of 1972, and it wasreported in the media that the newly established governmentparty, Golkar, intimidated Muslim leaders, especially in ruralareas, to vote for it. These developments created the impressionthat Suharto had defeated Islam politically. Ironically, it wasSuharto who was partially responsible for the creation of MUI.The idea to establish a national council of #ulam§" was first proposedat a conference held from 30 September to 4 October 1970 bythe Centre for Indonesian Islamic Propagation (Pusat DakwahIslam Indonesia), an institution established by the Ministry ofReligious Affairs in 1969 (Mudzhar 1993: 46). At that time,many Muslim leaders reacted to the proposal with suspicion,seeing it as yet another stratagem to eliminate Islamic politicalpower. Suharto, who was certainly aware of the important placeof the #ulam§" in Indonesian society, had become increasinglyinterested in bringing them into line with his own political agenda.Nonetheless it was the Ministry of Religious Affairs that took theinitiative to bring the idea to fruition.3 During the final revision of this essay, an important article on MUIappeared covering the period from its inception to the collapse of the Suhartogovernment. See Hosen (2004). Another valuable discussion of the relationshipbetween fatw§s issued by the MUI, other Muslim organizations, and politicsin Indonesia can be found in Hosen (2003). Otherwise the main study ofMUI for the period 1975-88 remains that of Mudzhar (1993), which wasupdated for the period 1989-2000 in Mudzhar (2001).48 moch. nur ichwanThe idea to establish a national council of #ulam§" was againput forward in the National Workshop for Islamic Preachers,organised, once again, by the Centre for Indonesian IslamicPropagation, on 26-29 November 1974. In May 1975 Suhartoexpressed his support for the proposal in a meeting with theboards of the Council for Indonesian Mosques (Dewan MasjidIndonesia, DMI), another institution established by the Ministryof Religious Affairs. Following this, the Ministry of Home Affairs(not the Ministry of Religious Affairs) instructed local governmentsto establish their own councils of #ulam§". Matters moved swiftlyand, by the end of May, councils had been established in allprovinces (propinsi) and a number of regencies (kabupaten).4The Ministry of Religious Affairs then established a preparatorycommittee for a national congress of #ulam§" on 1 July 1975,headed by Lieutenant General H. Soedirman. At this congress(later called the first National Congress of MUI), held on 21-27July, Prof. Hamka was appointed as the first general head. Thestated aims of the congress were political. At its opening, Suhartodelivered a speech in which he stated that MUI should play fourroles: it should (1) serve as the “translator of the concepts andactivities of national or local development for the people”; (2) bea form of advisory council that “gives advice and opinions to thegovernment concerning religious life”; (3) be the “mediator betweenthe government and #ulam§"”; and (4) function as a place wherethe #ulam§" discuss “the problems related to the duties of #ulam§".”5Although its foundation was engineered by Suharto, and itcontinues to be funded by the government, MUI is not a statutorybody anchored in law, but an independent non-governmentalinstitution. The general chairperson of MUI is not appointed bythe government but elected periodically by its members.6 These4 A number of local #ulam§" councils predated MUI, such as those in WestJava (established in 1958), Aceh (1965), West Sumatra (1966), and SouthSulawesi (ca. 1970). See Noer (1978: 65); and “Majelis Ulama Indonesia,” inEnsiklopedi Islam: III, 122.5 Majelis Ulama Indonesia (1995: 18-20). “National development” (pembangunannasional) was also the key concept articulated in speeches delivered byofficials, such as the ministers of Religious Affairs, Home Affairs, Defenceand Security, and Information.6 The general chairpersons have been: Haji Abdul Karim Malik Amrullah(Hamka, 1975-1981); K.H. Syukri Ghozali (1981-1984); K.H. Hasan Basri(1984-1990); K.H. Ali Yafie (1990-1999); and M.A. Sahal Mahfudh (1999-present).#ulam§", state and politics 49consist of #ulam§" and other Muslim scholars from various Muslimorganizations, including the two largest, Nahdlatul Ulama (NU)and Muhammadiyah. However, MUI is not a supervisory bodyoverseeing these organisations, and its decisions, fatw§s and tausiyahsare not binding upon them.Most of the #ulam§" members of MUI have graduated fromIslamic boarding schools (pesantren), both “traditional” and “modern,”7 and some have received university training as well. Mostof the non-#ulam§" members are graduates of secular universitieswho joined the council following the establishment, in 1989,of its Institute of Food, Medication and Cosmetics Research(LPPOM),8 and, in 1991, the Islamic bank, Bank MuamalatIndonesia (BMI). Since 1998 membership has been widened toinclude activists from newly established movements, some of whichhave a radical orientation.9Beginning in the 1990s, MUI has offered courses for youngscholars sent by its regional branches for a couple of months oftraining under senior members of MUI. Although most of thesubjects deal with the Islamic sciences, especially Islamic law,other, non-religious subjects are taught, such as national developmentorientation and socio-political affairs.At its 1995 National Conference, MUI outlined two sets ofgeneral programs, one functional, the other institutional (Mudzhar2001: 320-1). The functional programs deal with the originalmandate of MUI as a provider of religious advice to both thegovernment and Muslim communities. These programs include7 The traditionality or modernity of a pesantren depends on the curriculum:traditional pesantrens focus on Arabic works of fiqh and its associated disciplines,while modern ones incorporate secular subjects and use Indonesian as theprimary language of instruction.8 LPPOM was established to protect Muslim consumer rights relating tothe legal status of food. The institution issues Èal§l certificates after inspectingfood production and processing facilities. By 2000 the institute had issued500 certificates to both domestic and international producers (Mudzhar 2001:320)9 These new Islamic movements and organisations which were critical ofMUI position—such as the Forum Komunikasi Ahlus Sunnah Wal Jama’ah,Hizbut Tahrir, and Front Pembela Islam—were included in the ForumUkhuwah Islamiyah. Sometimes they participated in issuing tausiyahs. Prof.Din Syamsuddin has played an important role in fostering such cooperation,which aims to bridge the gap between radical and moderate Muslims. Interviewwith Din Syamsuddin, Leiden, 5 August 2001.50 moch. nur ichwanthe fields of Islamic brotherhood, Islamic education, missionaryactivity, Islamic economics, and Islamic identity. The institutionalprograms cover the practical activities of MUI, such as plans todevelop pilot projects on practical da#wa, including communitydevelopment, the creation of an Islamic fund, and the extensionof its #ulam§" training centre.MUI has its central office in Jakarta and other branches at theprovince, regency and district levels. To manage its programsMUI maintains ten commissions concerned with: (1) Islamicbrotherhood; (2) da#wa; (3) education and culture; (4) economyand finance; (5) development of Islamic community organisationsand institutions; (6) research and development; (7) fatw§ and law;(8) foreign affairs; (9) inter-religious harmony; and (10) women,youth and the family.10According to its 2000 vision statement, MUI plays five majorroles (MUI 2000: 12-50). It is: (1) the heir to the Prophets inspreading Islamic teachings and striving for the construction ofan Islamic life; (2) a fatw§-giver for the Muslim community (Ar.umma),11 “whether requested or not”; (3) a guide and servant tothat community; 4) an agent for “reform and renewal” (Ar. alißl§È wa’l-tajdÊd); and (5) an upholder of the Qur"§nic dictate toenjoin good and avert evil. Further, MUI declares itself to be “amoral force … for social rehabilitation” (MUI 2000: 14-5).This vision, formulated in the Reformasi era, indicates twothings. First, MUI is now distancing itself from the governmentand seeking to align itself with Muslim aspirations. Second, it isusing an Islamic reformist strategy to bring MUI and IndonesianMuslim communities closer to its definition of orthodoxy. Bothorientations are evident in its fatw§s and tausiyahs.MUI’s Discursive Products: Fatw§ and TausiyahMUI (2000: 13) maintains that it is important that a fatw§ be ananswer to a “question” and related to a point of Islamic law.10 “Surat Keputusan Dewan Pimpinan Majelis Ulama Indonesia tentangPembentukan Komisi-komisi,” issued 1 April 1996.11 As in most MUI documents, reference to the Umma or, in many cases,“the Islamic Umma” (Umat Islam), specifically means Indonesian Muslims,and not the global totality of believers.#ulam§", state and politics 51However, the “question” here is understood broadly to includesocial problems that require Islamic legal answers. The fatw§sissued by MUI cover topics ranging from purely legal matters toquestions of belief, the economy and politics, all of which areviewed from a legal perspective.The role played by the government in the establishment anddevelopment of MUI did not necessarily entail that MUI wasalways supportive of the government. Mudzhar (1993: 122) hasshown that “although a large proportion of the fatw§s demonstratea strong government influence, the majority of the fatw§s areneutral; in a few cases they are even in opposition to governmentpolicies.” Of twenty-two fatw§s issued from 1975 to 1988, elevenwere “neutral,” eight were supportive and three were opposedto government policies. One oppositional fatw§ dealt with attendingChristmas celebrations. Whereas the government encouraged thecommon celebration of Christmas by Christians and Muslims,MUI issued a fatw§ declaring that Muslims are not allowed toattend such a celebration (Mudzhar 1996).Moreover, it is important to note that MUI’s relationship withthe government was articulated not only through the fatw§s itissued, but also by its silence on certain state policies and programmes.Such silence often reflected the powerlessness felt bymany Muslims in relation to the state, as with the question of agovernment-supported sport lottery and the Tanjung Priokmassacre of 1984, in which dozens, if not hundreds, of Muslimswere killed by the armed forces.12As noted, in its capacity as a guide to the Indonesian communityof Muslims (umat), MUI also produces several non-fatw§ discourses:Recommendation (Tausiyah), Admonition (Tadzkirah), Instruction/Mandate (Amanah), Position Statement (Pernyataan Sikap), Appeal(Himbauan), or Thought Contribution (Sumbangan Pemikiran). It isnoteworthy, however, that MUI’s official magazine Mimbar Ulamaincludes all of these non-fatw§ discourses under the rubric oftausiyah.Although MUI does not formally distinguish between a fatw§and a tausiyah, I propose the following distinctions.13 First, a12 Although official figures claim that only eighteen people were killed,survivors of the crowd of some 1500 demonstrators claim that as many as600 lost their lives (Awanohara 1984: 16; Tapol 1987: 20).13 In Hans Wehr’s Dictionary, taußiya connotes “[a] recommendation,52 moch. nur ichwanfatw§ is produced by a special commission (Komisi Fatwa danHukum), whereas a tausiyah is issued by the Leadership Board(Dewan Pimpinan), member meetings, conferences, or the IslamicBrotherhood Forum (Forum Ukhuwwah Islamiyah)—the latteran institution established by MUI to facilitate coordination withleaders of Islamic organisations at the national level. Second, afatw§ is, in theory, much stronger than a tausiyah.14 Third, fatw§sdeal with legal and dogmatic issues, whereas most tausiyahs areconcerned with social, economic and political ones. Fourth, theofficial textual format of an MUI fatw§ suggests that its authorityis much greater than that of a tausiyah as it duplicates the formatof a governmental decision or law, and uses formal phrases suchas “referring to,” “considering,” and “it is decided that.” Somefatw§s also end with the following note: “the fatw§ is valid fromthe date of its issuance.” By contrast, the format of a tausiyah isless formal and official, more closely resembling a press releaseor general letter.Unlike most classical fatw§s, those of MUI are collective, andare issued by its Fatw§ and Law Commission, which draws onthe expertise of some twenty-five persons. The fatw§ should bein line with MUI’s guidelines for fatw§ decisions,15 according towhich it should be based on the Qur"§n and \adÊth and maynot contradict “the interests of the community” (kemaslahatan umat).If the subject is not found in either source, the fatw§ should notcontradict consensus, sound reasoning by analogy, and otherlegal principles. Moreover, before a fatw§ is issued, the Commissionshould consider the views of the Islamic legal schools and theopinions of experts on the subject.On occasion MUI uses fatw§s rather than tausiyahs to deal withadmonition, exhortation, advice, counsel; proposal, suggestion; order, instruction,direction, commission, [or] mandate.” See Wehr (1976: 1075). MUI definestausiyah as a piece of advice, a call (seruan), and an appeal (himbauan). “TausiyahMUI tentang Memperingati Kegagalan Pemberontakan G.30.S/PKI,” MimbarUlama, no. 265, xxii, September 2000, 32. However, there is no official explanationof the difference between a tausiyah and a fatw§. Mudzhar (1993,2001) categorises tausiyahs as fatw§s, although he recognises the difference(Mudzhar 2001: 322).14 Interview with Din Syamsuddin, who was then general secretary ofMUI, Leiden, 5 August 2002.15 “Pedoman Penetapan Fatwa Majelis Ulama Indonesia,” issued on 2October 1997.#ulam§", state and politics 53social and political matters. For example, some MUI fatw§s treatbribery and corruption or were produced in a specific politicalsituation and had a political impact, as we shall see below.MUI under B.J. HabibieIn the 1990s Suharto signalled his shift to patronising Islamizationby backing the establishment of the Indonesian Muslim IntellectualsAssociation (Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim se-Indonesia,ICMI), which advocates partial Islamization of the state andpublic life (Hefner 1993: 1-35). Suharto allowed then vice-presidentHabibie to head ICMI, and most Muslim cabinet ministers andmembers of parliament soon joined. With Suharto’s forcedresignation in May 1998 and the elevation of Habibie to thepresidency, MUI felt confident about playing a role in thecontinuing process of state-aided Islamization.161. Tausiyahs in Defence of Habibie1. a. Mandate for HabibieThe appointment of Habibie was based on Article 8 of the 1945Constitution, which states that “[s]hould the president die orcease executing his duties or become unable to execute themduring his term of office he shall be replaced by the vice-presidentuntil the expiry of that term.”Habibie’s appointment was controversial, however, because ittook place in the presidential palace and not before the Parliament.Some critics therefore regarded it as unconstitutional. Respondingto this criticism, MUI supported Habibie by gathering the nationalboards of Islamic organisations on 27 May 1998 with the aim ofproducing a political statement. This statement, called “A Mandate(Amanah) for the President of the Republic of Indonesia, Mr.Prof. Dr. Ing. B.J. Habibie” was issued as a tausiyah for both thePresident and the entire Indonesian people.17 But while thestatement is called an Amanah—which is supposed to be issuedby a higher institution—it is actually a piece of moral advice for16 On Habibie’s transitional government, see Bourchier (1999: 15-38).17 “Amanah kepada Presiden Republik Indonesia Bapak Prof. Dr.Ing. B.J.Habibie,” Mimbar Ulama, no. 238/xx, June 1998, 29-31.54 moch. nur ichwanHabibie concerning the mandate of leadership granted to himby God and the people.18On behalf of a number of Islamic organisations involved inthe Forum Ukhuwwah Islamiyah, MUI also congratulated Habibieon his inauguration, wishing him and his family the blessings of“physical and spiritual strength in leading the nation and stateof our beloved Republic of Indonesia in line with the statephilosophy of Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution, so that theideals of all Indonesian people and the nation may be attainedwith His protection, blessings and permission.”19The mandate tausiyah quotes four Suras: 3: 104 on enjoininggood and averting evil; 4: 59 on loyalty to God, His prophet,and those in authority; 4: 135 on justice and just witness; and 8:46 on the prohibition of unproductive debate. It then encouragesthe President and the “pro-Reformasi factions” to carry out thefollowing:1) To return to religious teachings, morals and ethics—in line withour national character and constitution as basic written law—in solvingthe problems of the nation and state. Avoid polemics on the controversyconcerning the position of the President and Cabinet. Create peaceand a harmonious national life so that the government can concentrateon enacting total reformation in line with societal demand.2) To prioritise the availability of the nine basic material needs,[and] to open up job opportunities for the millions of people underthe poverty line due to current economic, political and legal crises.3) Political reform should be conducted in a constitutional mannerby the government together with the legislative body, and with thesupport of all Indonesian people on the basis of national unity andintegrity.18 The statement says that leadership is “the mandate of Allah and of allIndonesian people … to implement the mandate of development, and reformasiin particular, in a constitutional way.” See “Amanah kepada Presiden,” 29.19 MUI had also organised the Forum Ukhuwah Islamiyah (IslamicBrotherhood Forum) in response to various national problems. The forumincluded representatives from a wide range of Islamic organizations. Suchpolitical support was also gathered prior to the Extraordinary Session of thePeoples Consultative Council (MPR), when MUI organised the Congress ofIndonesian Islamic Umma (KUII) in Jakarta, on 3-7 November. AlthoughMUI stressed its purely religious nature, the event easily may be interpretedas an effort to gain support from the Muslim community. AbdurrahmanWahid has described this tendency in his article, “Mencari Format HubunganAgama dengan Negara,” Kompas, 4 December 1998. On the congress itself,see MUI (1999).#ulam§", state and politics 554) [MUI] fully supports the statement of the Ministry of Defence andthe Armed Forces Commander expressing support for the leadershipof the President of the Republic of Indonesia. It hopes that the solidaritybetween the Armed Forces and the people will be strengthened inrelation to security and prosperity in the [context of national] unityand integrity.20The statement was signed by forty-four leaders of various Islamicorganisations, including Muhammadiyah, NU, al-Irsyad, al-Wasliyah, Persis, and Pergerakan Tarbiyah Islamiyah. Nonetheless,the involvement of these leaders created a misleading impressionthat the statement represented the formal position of theirorganisations, despite the fact that many of the leaders had attendedthe forum as private individuals. In some cases their own organisationshad very different views.1. b. Three Tausiyahs on the General ElectionOne of the most important items on the political agenda underHabibie was the general election, held on 7 June 1999. Althoughmore than ninety political parties were established during thesecond half of 1998, the General Election Commission (KPU)decided that only forty-eight were eligible to participate. Of these,fourteen were “Islam-based” parties, but only seven declaredIslam as their sole ideological basis; two adopted both Pancasilaand Islam; and five adopted Pancasila alone.21 Anticipating this,MUI issued three tausiyahs on 29 April, 20 May and 1 June,respectively.For MUI to issue more than one tausiyah on the same topic,and within a short period of time was in itself unusual, reflectinga growing nervousness on its part and the general tension beforethe election. The first tausiyah, entitled “MUI’s Appeal for theSuccess of the 1999 General Election,” urges people, and especiallyMuslims, to realise that: (1) the 1999 election is important forrescuing Indonesia from the crisis, especially the political crisis;(2) by participating in the election, voters play a role in determiningthe future of the nation and the struggle of the Umma; (3) thepeople, especially the Umma, should vote for the party they20 “Amanah kepada Presiden,” 30.21 “Nomor Urut Partai Politik Peserta Pemilu 1999,” Kompas, 6 March1999.56 moch. nur ichwanbelieve capable of leading the nation towards a harmonious,united, peaceful and prosperous life; (4) the Umma should abstainfrom the negative aspects of the election and should not engagein matters contrary to the interests of the Umma or of the nationin general; (5) the Umma should pray for a peaceful and successfulgeneral election, and success in choosing a national leader capableof bringing honour to the Umma.22The second tausiyah, entitled “Advice of the MUI ExecutiveLeading up to the 1999 Election,” made the following points: (1)all elements of the nation should advocate a democratic, faithful,just and peaceful election, and prevent chaos and disorder; (2)the entire nation, especially the Umma, should use their right tovote in a responsible manner and vote for the party that it isbelieved can struggle for the aspiration and betterment of all(Ar. al-maßlaÈa al-#§mma); (3) the Umma should prioritise Islamicbrotherhood and abstain from involvement in conflict and friction;(4) the leaders of Islamic parties and Muslim-based parties shouldprioritise the spirit of competition for the good (Ar. fa’stabiqå alkhayr§t) and prevent sectarian egotism (Ar. an§niyya Èizbiyya); (5)the entire nation, especially the Umma, should be cautious ofthe latent danger of communism and the PKI; and (6) the Ummashould pray that Indonesia will be saved from any disaster andcalamity.23The third tausiyah, entitled “An Instruction to the Umma Leadingup to the Election of 7 June 1999,” was issued just six daysbefore the election. The issuance of this tausiyah was motivatedby the impending threat of a victory by the Indonesian DemocraticParty of Struggle (PDIP), led by Megawati Soekarnopoetri, whichwas allegedly dominated by non-Muslim politicians. The tausiyah,produced by the leadership board of MUI and the national levelleaders of (some) Islamic organisations, mentions Q. 3: 28: “Letnot the believers take for friends or helpers unbelievers ratherthan believers: if any do that, in nothing will there be help fromAllah: except by way of precaution, that ye may guard yourselvesfrom them. But Allah cautions you (to remember) Himself; forthe final goal is Allah.”22 “Himbauan Majelis Ulama Indonesia untuk Suksesnya Pemilihan Umum1999,” Mimbar Ulama, no. 248, xxi, May 1999, 30.23 “Tausiyah Dewan Pimpinan Majelis Ulama Indonesia MenyongsongPemilu 1999,” Mimbar Ulama, no. 250, xxi, June 1999, 26.#ulam§", state and politics 57The tausiyah then delivers the following instructions:1) The Indonesian nation, especially the Umma, should use theirvoting rights in a correct and responsible manner according to theirinnermost heart by voting for the political party that is believed willbe able to struggle for the aspiration and interests of the Umma,nation and state;2) The Umma should vote in a sincere manner, and with the intentionof obeying God, for one of the political parties that puts forwardserious Muslim candidates, and those who possess good moral character;3) The Umma should be on guard against the return of communism,authoritarian and secularist government by means of political partiesthat have an incipient hatred of Islam and the glory of the Republicof Indonesia;4) The Umma should surrender to Allah and pray that the electionwill be conducted in a peaceful, democratic, just and honest manner,so that the Indonesian nation can rid itself of various crises and placethe new Indonesian society in the shelter of Allah’s blessing.24As can be seen, the first tausiyah gives general advice to Muslimsto participate in the elections in a peaceful manner. It does notsuggest that Muslims vote for one of the Islamic parties, butsimply says that Muslims should vote for “the party they believecapable of leading the nation to a harmonious, united, peacefuland prosperous life.” The second tausiyah was seemingly issuedin response to (potential) conflict between the members of variousIslamic parties. It does not suggest, however, that Muslims mustchoose Islamic parties, but rather should “vote for the party thatis believed can struggle for the aspiration and betterment of all.”The third tausiyah gives the clearest instruction to Muslims tovote for parties that “struggle for the aspiration and interests ofthe Umma, nation and state” and not to vote for non-Muslimpolitical leaders and parties dominated by non-Muslims. Nevertheless,the absence of any explicit mention in the tausiyahs ofIslamic parties benefited Muslim dominated parties, such asHabibie’s Golkar party.Due to general ignorance, most people regarded these tausiyahsas MUI fatw§s. They understood that MUI had instructed themthat Islam and Muslim interests would be threatened if theyvoted for non-Muslim leaders (Husein 1999: 62-3). At this point,Abdurrahman Wahid, the then leader of NU, charged that MUI24 “Tausiyah Amanat Ummat Islam Menyongsong Pemilu 7 Juni 1999,”Mimbar Ulama, no. 250, xxi, June 1999, 27.58 moch. nur ichwanwas interfering in political affairs. Be that as it may, the MUItausiyahs were ineffective and it was the parties with little explicitconnection to Islam, such as the National Awakening Party (PKB)and the National Mandate Party (PAN), and the avowedly secularparties, Golkar and PDIP, that won the greater share of thevote.251. c. Admonition on the Bank Bali Scandal, Ambon and East TimorA tausiyah of admonition (tadzkirah) regarding key issues affectingthe Habibie presidency was issued by MUI only five days beforethe parliamentary session in which the new president was elected.26The issuance of this tausiyah was very much related to Habibie’sefforts to defend himself against allegations that he was involvedwith, or the cause of, the so-called Bank Bali scandal, the crisisin Ambon, and the East Timor referendum, respectively (cf.Singh 2000: 147). In its introduction, the admonition mentionsall three issues, but then says nothing more about the Bank Baliscandal. The first part of the admonition, entitled “General,”urges all political and community leaders to prioritise nationalinterest over individual and parochial aims, and, further, to fostera positive atmosphere for the next general assembly of the People’sRepresentative Council (Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat, MPR).It also suggests that the media should avoid tendentious and“insinuating” reportage and should take national interest intoconsideration. MUI’s position in this case was clear: it sought todefend Habibie as its preferred representative of the Umma(Yurnaedi 1999) and to spare him from the personal taint of acorruption scandal that might cost him the election.The second section, “The Treatment of the Ambon Case,”25 Of the entirely Islamic parties, PK achieved only 1.3%, PBB 1.8%, andPPP 10.7%, whereas PKB achieved 17.4%, PAN 7.3%, Golkar 20.9% andPDIP 37.4%. See Riddell 2002. On the ineffectiveness of MUI’s tausiyahs, see“Pemilu 1999: Muslimin itu Kini Memerah,” in Mimbar Ulama, no. 251, xxi,July 1999, 33-4. Even here, the Mimbar Ulama editor called the tausiyahsfatw§s. According to Din Syamsuddin, MUI apparently is aware of this confusionalthough it has never officially explained the difference. Interview, Leiden, 5August 2001.26 The tadzkirah was issued on 25 September 1999. “Tadzkirah UmatIslam Indonesia,” Mimbar Ulama, no. 253, xxi, September 1999, 26-7.#ulam§", state and politics 59condemns the soldiers who killed ten unarmed civilians in frontof Al-Fatah mosque in Ambon. It also asserts that both thegovernment and the armed forces have a responsibility to keepthe peace and provide security for the two conflicting communities(here Muslims and Christians).The third section, “The East Timor Problem,” deals with thereferendum on independence for the province (which had beenannexed in 1975) conducted on 30 August 1999, one monthbefore the parliamentary session. The overwhelming vote forindependence led to intense debate among Indonesians at largeand in the parliament, where most blamed Habibie for the lossof Indonesian sovereignty. Unlike most, however, MUI blamedthe United Nations Mission in East Timor for conducting thereferendum unfairly and for tolerating “anti-integration cheatingand manipulation” that brought about physical conflicts between“pro-integration” and “anti-integration” factions. Nonetheless,the tausiyah concedes that the choice of the majority of the EastTimorese people should be respected, and expresses the hopethat the new state will coexist peacefully with Indonesia. Finally,MUI expresses its support for the efforts undertaken by thegovernment and the Indonesian Armed Forces to foster peace inEast Timor after the referendum.2. Fatw§ on a Government-run Sport LotteryThe only fatw§ produced by MUI during the Habibie era dealtwith a government-run sport lottery, the Tiket Peduli Olahraga(TPO). As in most of MUI’s fatw§s, the mustaftÊ is not explicitlyidentified. However, other sources indicate that the fatw§ wassolicited by the very foundation responsible for running the lottery,namely the Yayasan KONI (once part of the Ministry of Youthand Sport).The TPO was supposed to raise money for public services andsports. Tickets were priced at around Rp. 5000, and the holdercould, over the course of a year, watch a match of any sportplayed at the local level, with the exception of semi-final andfinal games. KONI planned to manage the scheme with thecooperation of foreign investors, especially from the United States.After meeting the Minister of Social Affairs on 22 July 1998,the chair of KONI, Wismoyo Arismunandar, and a board-member,60 moch. nur ichwanDali Tahir, stated that the TPO had been legitimised by MUI.This was strongly denied by the General Secretary of MUI,Prof. K.H. Ali Yafie, who suggested that the TPO would “poison”society with gambling practices and should not be conducted. Inresponse to Yafie’s rejection, Tahir claimed that the media hadmisquoted him. He now said that what he had meant was thathe had asked MUI about the legal status of the TPO.To end the controversy, MUI’s Fatw§ and Law Commissionheld a special meeting in Jakarta on 1 August 1998, chaired byProf. K.H. Ibrahim Hosen, the head of the Commission, andattended by thirteen members. The resulting fatw§ was based onfive considerations: (1) Q. 4: 29 on the prohibition of wastingproperty and the possibility of traffic and trade by mutual goodwill; (2) the legal principle that averting causes of corruptiontakes precedence over bringing about benefit; (3) the previousdecision of MUI of 23 November 1991 on SDSB (see below); (4)the statutes and by-laws of MUI of 1995-2000; and (5) theguidelines for deciding MUI’s fatw§ with the agreement of allmembers of the meeting.The fatw§ decreed the following:1) The TPO is contradictory to Islamic law, and, therefore, is illegitimateand forbidden.2) MUI suggests that the TPO operator, that is the KONI foundation,abort its plan to operate the TPO and look for other ways [to raisefunds] that neither contradict Islamic law nor inflict a loss on society.27As may be gathered from MUI’s third consideration, the issueof a sports lottery was in fact not new. Under Suharto there hadbeen the so-called Porkas (from the English “forecast”), and laterthe SDSB (Sumbangan Dana Sosial Berhadiah, “Prizes for SocialContributions”), managed by the Ministry of Social Affairs. Atthat time, the Ministry had requested an opinion on Porkas/SDSB, putting pressure on MUI to issue a positive fatw§. Howeverthe majority of MUI members regarded the Porkas/SDSB asgambling and decided not to issue any fatw§, although IbrahimHosen did publish a book in which he argued that Porkas/SDSB was not gambling and was thus permissible.28 MUI’s real27 “Fatwa tentang Tiket Peduli Olahraga (TPO),” 27-8.28 Hosen 1987. It is interesting that in the TPO case, Hosen, who chairedthe Fatwa Commission, affirmed that the TPO is religiously forbidden (Ar.#ulam§", state and politics 61opinion on the matter, however, was finally articulated on 23November 1991, when the relationship between the state andIslam had become more harmonious, and the Fatw§ and LawCommission, chaired by Hosen, declared SDSB to be forbidden.The above tausiyahs and fatw§ are nonetheless supportive ofHabibie. The tausiyahs on his mandate, general elections, BankBali, Ambon, and East Timor were highly political and placedMUI fully at Habibie’s side. As for the contents of the tausiyahs,they clearly are critical of groups opposed to Habibie. And whileMUI’s immediate rejection of the TPO may at first indicate thatit was acting independently of the government, this rejectionwas not surprising, not only because the TPO programme wasunpopular, but also because of the Habibie government’s increasingsupport for Islamization. This fatw§, far from harming the Habibiegovernment, actually helped Habibie to Islamise particular “secular”programmes inherited by his administration.MUI under Abdurrahman WahidAbdurrahman Wahid was elected through a democratic processin the parliamentary session on 20 October 1999. He was supportednot only by his own party (PKB), but also by a coalition of rivalIslamic parties led by M. Amien Rais. The primary reason forthis coalition was that most of the Islamic parties did not wantMegawati Soekarnopoetri, chairperson of the PDIP, to be thenew president. And while these parties disliked Wahid for hisoften controversial statements on Islam and Muslim communities,it was hoped that he would desist from such pronouncementsand fall into line with them in return for their support for himas president. Instead Wahid continued as usual, and ultimatelyclashed with MUI.Wahid’s opposition to MUI was apparent well before hispresidency, as evidenced by his earlier criticism of the Congressof the Indonesian Islamic Umma, convened by MUI in 1998,and of MUI’s tausiyahs on the general election of 1999. Suchcriticism continued after he became president on 20 OctoberÈar§m). It is not clear whether or not he revised his previous opinion, as thereis no substantive difference between Porkas/SDSB and TPO.62 moch. nur ichwan1999, and he soon suggested that MUI should be financiallyindependent of the Ministry of Religious Affairs and should finditself an office outside the Istiqlal mosque, also funded by thegovernment. As his presidency progressed, many of Wahid’sstatements and policies were interpreted as inimical to Islamicinterests. The most controversial of these were his stated willingnessto open official trade with Israel, to overturn the TemporaryPeople’s Consultative Assembly decision no. 15 of 1966 banningcommunism, and his support for the Japanese manufacturer ofmonosodium glutamate, Ajinomoto.Since the sixth National Congress of 2000, MUI has describeditself as the “servant of the Islamic Umma,” asserting its desireto defend both its religious and political interests (MUI 2000: 13).Although MUI had supported Habibie, it emerged as one of themain opponents of Wahid, as is apparent in its tausiyahs on communismand fatw§s on corruption, human rights and Ajinomoto.1. Two Tausiyahs on CommunismSoon after assuming office, Wahid suggested that the 1966 decisionto dissolve the PKI and prohibit the dissemination of Marxist-Leninist teachings should be abrogated because it contravenedHuman Rights, and the state had victimised communists, excommunists,and their families for over thirty years.Along with most other Islamic organisations, MUI severelycriticised this statement, issuing two tausiyahs but no fatw§.29The first tausiyah lists ten reasons why Communism or Marxism-Leninism should not be allowed on Indonesian territory:1) Based on MPRS decision no. 15 of 1966, the PKI and Communism/Marxism-Leninism is forbidden in all Indonesian territory;2) Communism/Marxism-Leninism is against Pancasila and religion;3) The adherents of Communism/Marxism-Leninism have beencreating a dangerous situation and trying to change Pancasila ideology;29 “Sikap Majelis Ulama Indonesia tentang Keberadaan Ajaran Komunisme/Marxisme-Leninisme di Wilayah Negara Republik Indonesia,” Mimbar Ulama,no. 260, xxii, April 2000, 28-9; and “Tausiah MUI tentang MemperingatiKegagalan Pemberontakan G.30.S./PKI,” Mimbar Ulama, no. 265, xxii,September 2000, 32. G.30.S/PKI, or Gerakan 30 September Partai KomunisIndonesia, denotes the attempted communist coup of 30 September 1965that was subsequently suppressed by Suharto.#ulam§", state and politics 634) The PKI terrorised Muslims, insulted the Qur"§n, and disseminatedpropaganda against Islamic organisations, such as NU, Muhammadiyah,Ansor, Pemuda Muhammadiyah/Kokam, HMI, HSBI and Lesbumi;5) The PKI’s hostility towards Islam predates Indonesian independencein 1945;6) Throughout Indonesian history, the PKI has carried out a numberof terrorist acts and rebellions, such as the upheavals of 1926-1927;30[an uprising] in West Java in December 1945; the rebellion in Madiunin September 1948; the “direct actions,” terrorism, sabotage, agitationand propaganda during 1965, which culminated in the PKI rebellionof 30 September 1965;7) The failure of the PKI rebellion of 30 September 1965 was followedby a number of armed rebellions in East Java (Blitar) and CentralJava between 1967 and 1968 and in the 1980s;8) The members of the PKI abroad aligned themselves against theIndonesian government;9) The teachings of Communism/Marxism-Leninism never die. Thiswas demonstrated by Sudisman, Rewang, Oloan Hutapea and Sukatno,who in September 1986 set up the new tripartite strategy in theKOK (Kritik Oto-Kritik) document. This urged that: (a) a Marxist/Leninist party should be revived free from subjectivism, revisionismand opportunism; (b) the PKI should concentrate its struggle on armedresistance; and (c) the PKI should organise a united revolutionaryfront that includes labourers, peasants, the petty bourgeoisie, and thenational bourgeoisie;10) With the above new strategy, Communism/Marxism-Leninismhas always tried to conduct illegal activities within so-called “formlessorganisations.”31Based on these ten reasons MUI, at its meeting of 21 March2000, determined the following:First, [we] remind Muslim people and the national community ingeneral, and especially the younger generation, that Communist/Marxist-Leninist teaching is an anti-God and anti-religion ideologythat never dies, and always endeavours to break down the honoured,ethical and religious principles of life based on Pancasila.Second, responding to the question as to whether or not it is necessaryto ban Communist/Marxist-Leninist teachings in Indonesia, MUIfirmly rejects any effort to revoke the decision of the TemporaryPeople’s Consultative Assembly no. 15 of 1966. MUI warns the membersof the People’s Representative Council (DPR) and People’sConsultative Body (MPR) of the Indonesian Republic—as the representativesof the people and the manifestations of their aspirations—tobe wise and consistent and not to disregard the past injuries and pain30 Mention of this rebellion is ironic, given that the fight was against theDutch colonial government.31 “Sikap Majelis, 28-9.64 moch. nur ichwanexperienced by Muslims and the Indonesian nation as victims of thelibel, propaganda, and ill-mannered actions of the Communists/PKI.Third, MUI hopes that God Almighty will spare the Indonesiannation from the ongoing economic crisis and will help them to overcomeit; for poverty is fertile soil for the revival of the Communist/Marxist-Leninist teaching.32To further endorse the fight against Communism, MUI issuedits second tausiyah on the thirty-fifth anniversary of the attemptedcoup of 1965. This tausiyah states:1) The Indonesian people should praise God Almighty for His aid inaverting the barbaric calamity of the G.30.S/PKI in 1965. It is believedthat if the rebellion had succeeded, atheistic communism would haveoverwhelmed national life. The religious community, especially Muslims,would have been in danger.2) The Indonesian people should always be aware of the potentialrevival of communism in all of its forms.3) All Indonesian people should be united in overcoming any effort,phenomenon or indication of the revival of communism and itsmanifestations.4) Muslims should pray that Indonesia will be rescued from multiplecrises and protected from any calamity and catastrophe.33Both of these tausiyahs were intended to pre-empt Wahid’sproposal to decriminalize communism. Further, all the argumentsposed in these tausiyahs, with their reference to Pancasila ideology,are typical of New Order official discourse. And, despite theopenness afforded by Reformasi, communism remained a sensitiveissue, to be attacked in the New Order language as opposed toboth God and the state doctrine of Pancasila. In such a context,MUI’s firm rejection of Wahid’s suggestion is understandable. Italso marked the withdrawal of support for the Wahid governmentby many Islamic organisations and parties.2. Fatw§s on Corruption, Human Rights, and \al§l FoodReformasi created great changes in political life, giving Indonesiansopportunities to influence government policy and express positionsin relation to their rights and practices. This is also expressed inMUI’s fatw§s. At its sixth national congress, held in July 2000,the Fatw§ Commission formed three sub-commissions. One32 Ibid., 29.33 “Tausiah MUI tentang Memperingati …,” 32.#ulam§", state and politics 65discussed abortion, organ transplants, healing with human urine,and cloning; a second dealt with bribery and corruption; simultaneousperformance of the Friday prayers, and human rights;the third discussed the problem of female workers abroad andgender bias. Most of the fatw§s issued during the Wahid erawere formulated at this congress, except for the fatw§ on Ajinomoto.Of these, the fatw§s on corruption, human rights and Ajinomotowill be discussed below.2. a. Fatw§ on Bribery, Corruption and Presents for Government OfficialsMUI never issued any tausiyah or fatw§ on corruption underSuharto or Habibie. MUI’s silence on this important, yet politicallysensitive, matter reflects its subordination to the government ofthe day, widely regarded as corrupt. With Reformasi, howeverthere was a strong demand for a statement on such issues, andMUI knew that if it failed to take a stand, it would be stigmatisedas a mere regime supporter, and should therefore represent itselfas part of the movement for change. The issuance of a fatw§ onbribery, corruption and presents for government officials was aresponse to this political demand.The identity of the mustaftÊ is not clear. It is simply stated thatthe legal status of such practices was being “questioned anew bysociety.” The fatw§ quotes two verses on the prohibition of takingthe property of others (Q. 2: 188; and 4: 29), and one on betrayal(Q. 3: 161). It also quotes five ÈadÊths dealing with presents andbribes, one saying of a Companion, and the juridical principlethat “what is forbidden to take is forbidden to give.”34Quoting Majd al-DÊn ibn AthÊr (544-606/1149-1210), the fatw§defines a “bribe” (Ar. rishwa) as a present given by one personto another in order to do evil or to pervert a true act; a “present”to an official as something given by an individual and/or communityto an official, due to the latter’s position; and “corruption”as the act of taking something under one’s authority in a waycontradictory to the SharÊ#a.3534 Ar. m§ Èurrima akhdhuhu Èurrima i#ã§"uhu. “Fatwa tentang Risywah (Suap),Ghulul (Korupsi) dan Hadiah kepada Pejabat,” Mimbar Ulama, no. 281, xxiv,January 2002, 32.35 Ibn AthÊr, al-Nih§ya fÊ gharÊb al-ÈadÊth wa’l-§th§r, vol. II, 226, quoted in“Fatwa tentang Risywah,” 32.66 moch. nur ichwanThe fatw§ then declares:1) Giving and receiving a risywah is forbidden under Islamic law.2) Corruption is forbidden under Islamic law.3) Regarding the giving of a present to an official:a) If the act was performed prior to the official being in office, thisis permissible, as is receipt of such;b) If the act was not performed before the official was in office,there are three possibilities: i) If there is, or will be, no businessbetween the giver and the official, then giving and receiving thatpresent is not forbidden; ii) If there is a matter between the giverand the official, then the latter is prohibited from receiving it;while it is prohibited for the giver to give a present if it is meantto initiate a wrong thing; and iii) If there is a matter between thegiver and the official, either before or after the giving act, and thegiving is not meant to initiate a wrong thing, then it is permittedfor the giver to give the present, but forbidden for the official toreceive it.36Such a fatw§ is by no means strong enough to combat corruptionin Indonesia, which remains endemic. It is common knowledgethat bribery, corruption and illegal presents for government officialsare forbidden, and the statement about the status of presents forofficials is vague. In any case, this fatw§ has attracted little publicnotice and is seldom referred to by the media or anti-corruptionmovements.2. b. Fatw§ on Human RightsWhen human rights abuses occurred during the New Order andHabibie eras—such as the Tanjung Priok massacre or duringmilitary operations in Aceh—MUI remained silent. No tausiyahor fatw§ was ever issued condemning such abuses. However at itssixth national congress of 2000, MUI wished to define its positionon human rights.The sub-commission examining the issue included Prof. K.H.Ali Mustafa Yaqub (chairman), Drs. K.H. Nahrawi (assistant),Drs. Afwan Faizin (secretary), Dr. H. Ahmad Thibraya and K.H.Ahmad Dimyati Rasyid. Significantly, all are classically-trained#ulam§"; none is a human rights activist.MUI’s position on the Universal Declaration of Human Rights(UDHR) is vague, although it aligns with the Declaration at36 “Fatwa tentang Risywah,” 32.#ulam§", state and politics 67certain points. This vagueness seems to be influenced by theCairo Declaration on Human Rights in Islam.37 Such influenceis clear in the following remarks formulated by MUI with referenceto the UDHR:381) Generally and substantially, the International Convention on theUDHR is in line with the aims and values of Islamic teachings, thatis: the protection and preservation of the rights of every single memberof humanity to defend his or her life and dignity.2) Human Rights do not operate in vacuum, and up to now there isno consensus regarding their interpretation and application. Henceit is possible that every country interprets and understands themdifferently based on its distinct cultural, ethical and legal values.3) Chapters of the UDHR seem to prioritise individual rights andfreedom and neglect the equality of rights and obligations, the equalityof individual and social interests, and the equality of freedom andresponsibility.4) There are some chapters of the UDHR that are not in line with,or are contradictory to, Islam, to wit: (a) Chapter 16, sections 1 and2, on free choice of a marriage partner, marriage and divorce; (b)Chapter 18 on freedom of religious conversion; and (c) Chapter 23on freedom of employment.Based on these remarks, MUI decided to issue a fatw§ on the“limitations” of the application of Human Rights by comparingthem with the Cairo Declaration, a document also signed by theIndonesian government.The fatw§ mentions that Islam recognizes five basic humanneeds, namely the preservation of religion, life, property, reason,and dignity, quoting several verses in this regard: Q. 17: 70 onhumankind as honoured creatures; Q. 21: 107 on Islam as amercy for all creatures; Q. 10: 99 on the prohibition of compellingothers to accept Islam; Q. 5: 32 on the universalist basis ofIslamic teachings; Q. 55: 7-9 on equality and truthfulness inIslam; Q. 4: 37 on the prohibition of apostasy from Islam;39 Q.2: 221 and 4: 22 on persons and groups who are forbidden as37 For a copy of the Cairo Declaration, see Appendix II in Abdillah (1997:269-73).38 “Fatwa tentang Hak-hak Azasi Manusia (HAM),” Mimbar Ulama, no.271, xxiii, March 2001, 26.39 Q. 4: 37 discusses niggardliness: “(Nor) those who are niggardly, orenjoin niggardliness on others, or hide the bounties which Allah hath bestowedon them; for We have prepared, for those who resist God’s grace (Ar. k§firån)a punishment that steeps them in contempt.” MUI seems to have chosen thelast phrase only, and understands k§firån as including apostates.68 moch. nur ichwanmarriage partners; and Q. 2: 228 on the equality of rights andobligations between husband and wife. Once again the principleis mentioned that “averting causes of corruption takes precedenceover bringing about benefit.”Based on all of these considerations, the MUI fatw§ makesthree points on Human Rights:1) It is obligatory to accept, respect, and hold in high esteem HumanRights, which are universal in nature, albeit with some conditions:a) One should honour and respect the different understandings,interpretations and applications of Human Rights, based on thediffering cultures, ethics and laws prevailing in each country;b) Any understanding and application of Human Rights mustconsider: (i) the equivalence of individual rights and individualduties; (ii) the equivalence of individual and social rights; (iii) theequivalence of rights, freedom and duties.2) Concerning the UDHR chapter 16 sections 1 and 2 [on freechoice of a marriage partner, marriage and divorce], and chapter 18[on freedom of religious conversion], Muslims are obliged to firmlyadhere to Islamic teachings, because freedom to live out religiousteachings is a part of Human Rights;3) It is obligatory for the government and for Muslims, especiallytheir leaders, to promote Human Rights that are in line with religious,cultural and ethical values of the society and with the laws prevailingin Indonesia.40Although the preamble to the fatw§ states that chapter 23 of theUDHR on freedom of employment is not in line with, indeed iscontradictory to, Islam, the fatw§ itself does not say anythingabout this freedom. No reason is given for the absence of thispoint from the fatw§, but it is probably related to the question ofwomen in the work place. In another fatw§, concerning femaleworkers abroad, issued on 29 July 2000, MUI stated:In principle, it is allowed for women to leave the household to workin another town or country, so long as they are accompanied by theirclose relations, family or a group of trustworthy women. If not … itis forbidden unless there is an emergency situation—at which time itis tolerated by the legal Islamic, national legal, and customary reasons—and that the women’s security and dignity are guaranteed.41Like the fatw§ on corruption, the fatw§ on human rights shouldnot be separated from the euphoria of Reformasi. Neither should40 “Fatwa tentang Hak-hak,” 26-7.41 “Fatwa tentang Pengiriman Tenaga Kerja Wanita (TKW) ke Luar Negeri,”Mimbar Ulama, no. 265, xxii, September 2000, 30-1.#ulam§", state and politics 69it be disassociated from international politics, given that thequestion of human rights is often used to pressure developingcountries, including Indonesia. This fatw§ challenges the hegemonyof the Western interpretation of human rights, which tends toneglect the local context; and it is imbued with the spirit of theCairo Declaration, which emphasises not only individual rightsbut also individual duties, social rights, and the relative weightingof rights, freedom and duties.2. c. Fatw§ on \al§l FoodOne of the most polemical fatw§s issued under Wahid dealt withwidely-consumed monosodium glutamate (MSG) products producedby the Japanese company Ajinomoto.Ajinomoto was already in receipt of a \al§l Certificate fromLPPOM, which had established rules prohibiting the use of porkproducts in any part of its production or preparation process.The certificate aims to assure Muslim consumers that Ajinomoto’sMSG products are permissible. As the receiver of the certificate,Ajinomoto Indonesia Inc. was required to maintain the Èal§lquality of its products. However, LPPOM discovered that, betweenJune 1999 and November 2000, Ajinomoto Indonesia Inc. hadsubstituted bacto soytone, which contains a pig enzyme, for theusual poly peptone, a soy-bean based enzyme. Therefore, on 16December 2000, MUI issued a fatw§ stating that Ajinomoto’sproducts are forbidden. To strengthen the argument, the fatw§cited five verses on the prohibition of consuming pork (Q. 2:168, 173; 5: 3; 6: 145; and 7: 157); three ÈadÊths; consensus, andtwo juridical principles. The fatw§ itself declared:1) It is Èar§m to consume the MSG products of Ajinomoto IndonesiaInc. which use bacto soytone in their production process;2) Muslims who, due to their ignorance, have consumed the aboveMSG products may regard themselves as innocent;3) MUI calls on Muslims to be careful in consuming anything thatis in doubt or forbidden by religion;4) This decision is valid from the date of its issuance, with the provisothat should the decision be found to be mistaken, it shall becorrected. 4242 “Fatwa tentang Produk Monosodium Glutamate (MSG) PT. AjinomotoIndonesia yang Menggunakan Bacto Soytone,” Mimbar Ulama, no. 269, xxiii,January 2001, 18-20.70 moch. nur ichwanThis fatw§ was challenged by President Wahid, an Islamicscholar himself, who said that, based on scientific evidence,Ajinomoto’s MSG products were safe for consumption by Muslims.Wahid insisted that there had been a mistake in the process ofproducing the fatw§. The most important points, he argued, arethat the final product should be free of any pork element andthat the fatw§ should consider the general principle that “avertingcauses of corruption takes precedence over bringing about benefit”(Ar. dar" al-maf§sid muqaddam #al§ jalb al-maß§liÈ). According to hisspokesman, Wimar Witoelar, Wahid was concerned about “theproper administration of religious law” and suspected that MUIhad issued an “imperfect” fatw§ (Roderick 2001). Wahid thereforesuggested that people should not overreact.43Wahid’s critics suggested that his use of the aforementionedjuridical principle is misleading, since the president was concernedonly with the economic impact of the fatw§ rather than withreligious teachings. This charge may have some basis since Wahid’sargument was based mainly on an economic consideration: thejobs of more than 4,000 workers at the Ajinomoto factory wereat stake, and any ban would affect Indonesia’s relationship withforeign, and especially Japanese, investors. However, the majorityof Indonesians supported MUI in this instance.The strong public support for MUI’s fatw§ reflected the generalclimate against Wahid, who had already lost support amongmost Islamic and Islam-based parties, except his own PKB.Furthermore, the gulf between the President and the DPR wasby now unbridgeable. DPR chairman Akbar Tanjung suggestedthat Wahid’s statement had caused confusion, while Laode DjeniHasmar, a Golkar legislator, stated that it would only triggerMuslim anger, and that it is MUI, and not the President, thathas the authority to issue a fatw§. Similar reactions came fromIslamic parties, such as the United Development Party (PPP),the Crescent and Star Party (PBB), and Justice Party (PK).Zainuddin MZ, a PPP board member, stated that Muslims shouldfollow MUI’s fatw§, because Wahid’s opinion is more politicalthan religious.44 Even the police force failed to support Wahid,43 “Produk Ajinomoto Halal,” Tempo Interaktif, 9 January 2001.44 “Fatwa MUI Jelas Lebih Kuat,” Tempo Interaktif, 10 January 2001.#ulam§", state and politics 71and its chief, General S. Bimantoro, stated that his officers wouldfollow MUI rather than the President.45The Justice Party produced its own fatw§ on the issue, releasedby its SharÊ#a Council on 10 January 2001. The Justice Partydeclared that it was issuing the fatw§ to support MUI, but hadbroadened its scope to include the general matter of Èal§l foodand the respective positions of MUI and the government. Thefatw§ states, for instance, that in establishing the Èal§l and Èar§mstatus of food, “the government should not use a political andeconomic approach, but rather an Islamic legal one.”46Meanwhile NU, of which Wahid was former chairman, wasnaturally cautious in dealing with the issue. Rather than suggestingthat MUI’s fatw§ was invalid, it suggested that it needed carefulreevaluation. It is worth noting that NU’s own representatives inMUI, including Ma’ruf Amin, the chairperson of MUI’s Fatw§and Law Commission, did not support Wahid’s opinion. Indeed,Amin wrote an article supporting the MUI fatw§.47ConclusionThe transitional period following the fall of Suharto was markedby government weakness and a strengthening of civil society.During this time, MUI shifted from being state-oriented to beingUmma-oriented, as reflected in its slogan, used since the Wahidera, that it is “the servant of the Umma.” However, the word“Umma” remains vague, since Islam is expressed in a variety ofways in Indonesia and it is hard to define a single Islamiccommunity in matters of doctrine and practice. Some of MUI’sfatw§s and tausiyahs have garnered a negative reaction in certainMuslim circles, especially those with liberal, progressive, andnationalist inclinations. MUI’s previous support for the Habibiegovernment was clear not only from its practical political attitudesbut also from its discursive products, fatw§s and tausiyahs in which45 “Polri Tetap Berpegang pada Fatwa MUI,” Tempo Interaktif, 10 January2001; “Fatwa MUI Jadi Pegangan Polisi,” Tempo Interaktif, 11 January 2001.46 Dewan Syariah Partai Keadilan, “Fatwa: Seruan Dewan Syariah PartaiKeadilan kepada Umat Islam Indonesia tentang Masalah Makanan Halal,”in http://www.keadilan.or.id/templates/produk.cfm?ID=3. Site now deactivated.47 Mimbar Ulama, no. 269, xxiii, January 2001, 22-8.72 moch. nur ichwanHabibie is characterised as a Muslim representative and Wahidis cast as a secularist (or even a leftist).MUI’s political role is best reflected in its tausiyahs rather thanin its fatw§s. This is because MUI frequently has been forced toreact to political situations. For this purpose, the process of issuingtausiyahs—which is much easier and less complicated than issuingfatw§s—has been the preferred mode of communication.MUI continues to use its fatw§s and tausiyahs to affirm its claimto be the national institution with authority in Islamic affairs. Itcalls upon both the state and the people to heed its legal opinionsand advice. Nevertheless, MUI’s fatw§s and tausiyahs are not legallybinding on the government and society. Rather, the actual influenceof each utterance is very much related to the prevailing socialand political context. Some fatw§s, such as that on Ajinomoto,have been quite popular, but many people are only dimly aware,if at all, of others, such as that on human rights. In this respect,it seems that the relative success or effectiveness of MUI fatw§sand tausiyahs is not a function of their direct and short-term influenceon society, but rather of their indirect and long-term influence.Some statements may have to wait until they find their relevantsocial and political space. The tausiyahs on elections, for instance,will most likely be reiterated in most future plebiscites, much asan earlier fatw§ on Muslim attendance at Christmas celebrationshas been reiterated every year in December. Other tausiyahseventually may be elevated to the formal status of a fatw§.The increased independence of MUI has enabled it to participateactively in debates about the place of Islam in Indonesia’s future.Although the organization is somewhat tainted by its links toprevious regimes of Suharto and Habibie, this heritage still grantsit important influence on draft legislation. For example, MUI isauthorised to give advice concerning national laws that mayhave an affect on Muslims. However, since such advice is notbinding, the government may accept or reject it, much asIndonesians in general remain free to accept or reject MUI’sfatw§s and tausiyahs.

FATW$, PURIFICATION AND DYNAMIZATION:A STUDY OF TARJ^\ IN MUHAMMADIYAHSYAMSUL ANWAR*AbstractI examine here contemporary ift§" practices in Muhammadiyah, Indonesia’sleading organisation for modernist Muslims, with special attention to MajelisTarjih, the body charged with issuing its fatw§s since 1927. After explainingMuhammadiyah’s ideology, and the working method of Majelis Tarjih andthe authority of its decisions, I examine and discuss several fatw§s relating tosyncretic practices in Indonesia and one fatw§ about whether a woman mayserve in a position of authority over men. I argue that the fatw§s issued byMajelis Tarjih demonstrate how Muhammadiyah promotes a more dynamicunderstanding of religion among its members and within Indonesian societyat large, an understanding that often differs from traditionalist views espousedin classical fiqh books.Fatw§ giving in the Islamic context is an effort to interpretreligio-legal norms in response to issues faced by communitymembers in their daily life. As such, fatw§s represent “the meetingpoints of law and fact” (Masud et al. 1996: 3). At the same time,they reflect the creative tension between the normative ideals ofIslam and social reality or “the tension between official religionand the practice of religion … in daily life” (Kaptein 1997: xi).They also disseminate criticism and correction as well asdemonstrating mechanisms of adaptation and adjustment to existingsocial conditions. Finally, they form “an institutional means ofsocial and religious improvement” ( Jainuri 1997: 57).The formulation of modern fatw§s differs from the pre-modernand classical process in some respects. Whereas most fatw§straditionally were issued by an individual muftÊ, fatw§ giving inCorrespondence: Syamsul Anwar, Faculty of Islamic Law, Sunan Kalijaga StateIslamic University, Yogyakarta, Indonesia. syamsanw@yahoo.com* I wish to thank Nico Kaptein for his valuable comments on the first draftof this paper and Michael Laffan for editing the English.28 syamsul anwarmodern times often involves a group of muftÊs and indeed institutionsas well (Mudzhar 1996: 230). Modern fatw§s are communicatedto their petitioners (mustaftÊs) not only in an immediate way andin person, as was the case with classical fatw§s, but also by utilizingthe available media, with the result that fatw§s now reach awider spectrum of community members.1One Indonesian institution that involves muftÊs collectively informulating its fatw§s is the semi-official Majelis Ulama Indonesia(MUI) or Council of Indonesian Ulama. Since its foundation in1975, MUI has issued many fatw§s on various aspects of sociallife.2 In addition, it has an institutional body called the NationalSharÊ#a Committee (NSC), which is specifically responsible forthe issuance of fatw§s regarding Islamic banking in Indonesia.3A number of socio-religious associations have special divisions inwhich their experts formulate fatw§s collectively. One suchassociation is Muhammadiyah, the subject of the present article,which has within its organizational structure a division chargedwith the task of examining religious matters in general. Thisdivision, Majelis Tarjih dan Pengembangan Pemikiran Islam,usually called Majelis Tarjih, issues fatw§s each fortnight on variousproblems and publishes these fatw§s in its mouthpiece, SuaraMuhammadiyah. In addition, this body also issues Islamic legaldecisions representing the formal position of the organization,which are considered binding by its members.This essay discusses the process of formulating fatw§s in Muhammadiyahthrough Majelis Tarjih and shows how its fatw§s functionas an instrument of purifying faith and dynamizing social life.1 Such means also include radio, see Messick (1996: 310-20).2 The fatw§s of MUI as compiled by Prodjodikoro et al. (1995) are studiedby Mudzhar (1993). See also the discussion of Nur Ichwan in this volume.3 See its published fatw§s in Himpunan Fatwa (2001). It should be notedthat as far as Indonesian Islamic banks are concerned, fatw§s regarding theirproducts and operations are not under the responsibility of a Sharia SupervisoryBoard established by the individual institution, as is usually the case in otherMuslim countries. For example, according to Article 20 of the Decree of theBoard of Directors of Bank Indonesia, its Sharia Supervisory Board servesonly to oversee the activities of the bank in order to keep them in line withthe principles of the SharÊ#a. In performing this function, Bank Indonesiafollows the fatw§s of MUI’s NSC, founded in 1999 with the primary task offormulating SharÊ#a values and principles regarding Islamic banking transactionsand operations. Its membership includes Islamic legal scholars and expertsfrom the financial sector.fatw§, purification and dynamization 29First, however, it is necessary to give a short account of Muhammadiyahand its genesis.An Overview of MuhammadiyahFounded by Ahmad Dahlan in Yogyakarta in 1912,4 Muhammadiyahconstitutes a movement for Islamic propagation (Ar. da#wa)that has Islam as its basis and the Qur"§n and Sunna as itssources.5 It is also, according to Deliar Noer, a modernist movementthat approaches these sources by means of independent rationalinvestigation (Ar. ijtih§d ) in order to spread Islam among thepopulation and to carry out social and religious reforms amongIndonesian Muslims (Noer 1973: 73; Sejarah Muhammadiyah1993: 28; Mulkhan 1990: 3, 27). As such, this movement representsa link in the chain of what Nakamura calls Indonesia’s “ongoingIslamization.”6Muhammadiyah was born in a context in which many Muslimswere questioning the prevailing socio-religious conditions andarguing that their coreligionists had deviated from the ideals ofIslam and were imbued with elements of superstition and innovation.Even though Islam had been present in the Indonesianarchipelago for centuries prior to the emergence of new reformmovements, it had yet to penetrate deeply into Indonesian society.The social structure of Southeast Asian societies often compelledIslam to coexist alongside popular customs and to sanction manylocal traditions that are not fully in line with its teachings (Federspiel2001: 12-3). While observers debate the actual extent to whichnon-Islamic influences persist, it cannot be denied that Indonesiansstill practice many popular customs that contain elements ofpre-Islamic traditions that are thus a target of reformist missionaryactivity.74 For biographical information on Ahmad Dahlan (1869-1923), see Asrafie1983; Kutoyo and Safwan n.d.; Anis 1962; and Peacock 1978: 29-42.5 See Article 1, paragraph 2 of Muhammadiyah’s Statutes (Anggaran DasarMuhammadiyah 2000).6 By “ongoing Islamization”, Nakamura (1983: 2) means “a process inwhich a substantial number of Muslims regard prevailing religious situations(including themselves) as unsatisfactory and, as a corrective measure, strive tolive up to what they conceive of as the standard of the orthodox teaching ofIslam.”7 Fauzan Saleh (2001: 40) contends that Islam in Indonesia, especially in30 syamsul anwarIslam played a key role in the formation of an Indonesianconsciousness which opposed the values and interests of the Dutch.The presence of foreigners, who, over time, became dominantover Indonesia’s diverse array of indigenous peoples, caused manyto seize on religion in their search for a common identity. IndeedDutch colonial power accelerated the process of conversion toIslam and provided additional impetus for a shift from nominalIslam to a more substantial commitment to the faith.By the late nineteenth century, Dutch domination in theeconomic, political and, increasingly, educational spheres createdan elite class steeped in Dutch culture and often indifferent toreligion. The final crystallization of Dutch power in the form ofthe Netherlands Indies and the rise of this new Dutch-allied elitewas also accompanied by a rise in the activities of Christianmissions. As Saleh observes, Muhammadiyah was primarilyconcerned with issues such as “the impurity of religious life, theinefficiency of religious education, the activities of Christianmissionaries, and indifference and even an anti-religious attitudeon the part of the Indonesian intelligentsia” (Saleh 2001: 3).Muhammadiyah’s approach to reform and its concern withijtih§d is linked to the teachings of the Egyptian modernistMuÈammad #Abduh, whose writings were communicated throughthe centuries-old channel linking the Indonesian archipelago andthe Middle East. As a result of this relationship, many peoplefrom the Middle East had come to Southeast Asia as traders andpreachers. Meanwhile, increasing numbers of Southeast Asiansmade the journey to the Holy Sanctuaries for the Èajj and tostudy.Ahmad Dahlan was a participant in this exchange. He visitedMecca twice, first in 1890—staying for several years as a student—and again in 1903, living in the Holy City for about eighteenmonths. One of his mentors in Mecca was the MinangkabaubornAhmad Khatib,8 famous for his criticism of local customsJava, historically has been unable to efface traditions that pre-date Islam. Onthe question of the pre-Islamic substratum in Indonesia, see also MarkWoodward’s criticism of Clifford Geertz for accepting the earlier Dutch viewthat Islam in Indonesia, especially in Java, was, at least prior to the rise ofmodernism, a thin veneer of symbols attached to a solid core of animistic orHindu-Buddhist meaning (Woodward 1989: 82).8 On Ahmad Khatib and his network of students in Mecca, see Nazwar(1983).fatw§, purification and dynamization 31in his homeland of West Sumatra. And although Khatib was notenamoured of #Abduh’s modern approach, it was he who gaveDahlan the opportunity to read and appreciate #Abduh’s writings,such as his Ris§lat al-tawÈÊd, al-Isl§m wa’l-naßr§niyya, and TafsÊr juz"#§mma. It is also reported that Dahlan later took a great interestin #Abduh’s exegesis, completed by Ri•§, the TafsÊr al-Man§r( Jainuri 1997: 33-4).Much like the program of #Abduh, the religious views ofMuhammadiyah are based on the principle of “return to theQur"§n and the Sunna of the Prophet.” This means that it isnecessary to reshape religious understandings to bring them intoline with their original purity, as expounded in the Qur"§n andSunna. The slogan is always emphasised by Muhammadiyahleaders. For example, at the forty-first Muhammadiyah Conference,Ahmad Azhar Basyir (later chairman of Majelis Tarjih [1985-1990] and of Muhammadiyah [1990-1995]) asserted that fromthe outset this movement has been keen to summon Muslims toreturn to, and live in accordance with, the Qur"§n and Sunna.This, he continued, is accomplished by purifying faith fromassociationism (Ar. shirk, i.e. associating other gods with All§h)and superstitions (Ar. khur§f§t),9 as well as by cleansing ritualobservances (Ar. #ib§d§t) of innovations (Ar. bida#) widely practicedby Muslims (Basyir 1985: 1).The implication of such a view is that the spirit of ijtih§d mustbe revived and that, by the same token, taqlÊd, the uncriticalfollowing of an authority, regarded as a source of conservatismand stagnation, must be abandoned (Nakamura 1979: 13). It isalso the aim of this movement not to be tied to any one schoolof Islamic law (Ar. madhhab). Every Muslim, when practicing hisor her religion, should take religious teachings directly from theQur"§n and Sunna. Those who cannot do this, for lack ofeducation, should practice ittib§#, i.e. following an opinion whilefully understanding its underlying grounds in the Qur"§n andSunna. The difference between ittib§# and taqlÊd is that taqlÊdmeans “following an opinion in religious matters without knowingits source or basis” (Pasha and Darban 2000: 202), whereas ittib§#involves active acceptance of an opinion by understanding its9 According to the Ensiklopedi Islam (III: 58-9), khur§f§t generally meansfabulous stories or something that does not stand up to reason.32 syamsul anwararguments from the primary sources. For this reason, membersof Muhammadiyah often claim that they have no madhhab affiliation.However, this does not mean that Muhammadiyah ignoresthe opinions of the different schools of Islamic law. Such opinionsare indeed important and very useful, but they function ascomparative materials to be taken into consideration in comprehendingthe Qur"§n and Sunna (Rahman 1985: 5-54). In thisconnection, A.R. Fakhruddin, a former chairman of Muhammadiyah(1968-90), emphasized that the only source of truthand righteousness is the Qur"§n and \adÊth. If the doctrines ofthe madhhabs do not comply with these two sources, they must beavoided, but if they do comply with them, they must be followed(Fakhruddin 1984: 17-8).As an Islamic da#wa movement with a modernist outlook,Muhammadiyah has an ongoing mission to carry out social andreligious reforms among the Muslim community in Indonesia.This mission is nicely encapsulated in two key-words, “purification”and “dynamization,” as in the title of a book recently publishedby Majelis Tarjih, Pengembangan Pemikiran Keislaman Muhammadiyah:Purifikasi dan Dinamisasi (Muhammadiyah’s Development of Islamic Thought:Purification and Dynamization).10 The focus on purification is evidentin the attention given to aspects of belief and ritual observances.In these fields, Muhammadiyah stresses the pristine character ofIslamic belief and holds the opinion that Muslims should becompletely free from superstitions and unwarranted innovation.Sociologically, Muhammadiyah interprets Islamic teachings in adynamic manner so as to advocate social reforms and, at thesame time, facilitate adaptation to modern life. This forms thespirit of the Muhammadiyah movement and yields dynamization,as seen through the social programs of this organization connectedto education, health care and community development (Nakamura1979: 13). Muhammadiyah contends that involvement in socialprojects is an expression of genuine religious commitment asemphasized in the Qur"§n (107:1-7). It should also be notedthat, since its establishment, Muhammadiyah has not involveditself directly in political activities.Muhammadiyah developed rapidly. Within the lifetime of itsfounder, it had branches throughout Java, and by 1930 it had10 See Azhar and Ilyas 2000. This book includes a number of paperspresented at a seminar held by Majelis Tarjih on 22-23 June 1996.fatw§, purification and dynamization 33spread to the larger islands of Indonesia, including Sumatra,Kalimantan and Sulawesi (Sejarah Muhammadiyah 1993: 68;Kutoyo and Safwan n.d.: 60). At present, it is represented in allcorners of Indonesia and it has founded 34 general hospitals, 77clinics and polyclinics, 95 maternity hospitals, four dispensaries,137 maternal and paediatric health centres, 166 orphanages, 34family planning units, 102 community development centres, and3,126 family-care centres (Muhammadiyah 2000: 17). It alsoruns 117 institutions of higher learning (including universities,academies, and polytechnics) and thousands of elementary andsecondary schools (Muhammadiyah 2000: 15). In this respect,Muhammadiyah is the largest socio-religious movement in Indonesia.Majelis Tarjih and its Fatw§sMuhammadiyah’s use of the word tarjÊÈ has changed over thecourse of its development. In its early period, and in accordancewith its usage in the principles of law (Ar. ußål al-fiqh), tarjÊÈconveyed the meaning of examining the various opinions of Muslimjurists on a certain question and evaluating them in order todetermine which is most faithful to the original SharÊ#a sources.Over the course of time this usage gradually came to includeany intellectual endeavour used to study new cases that had notbeen addressed by earlier jurists. In short, tarjÊÈ is identical, oralmost identical, to ijtih§d.The success of Muhammadiyah in its missionary activities andin the development of its programs in the social and religiousspheres spurred its leaders to undertake more difficult tasks. Inthe first decades of its development, the tasks of studying religiousmatters, issuing fatw§s, and implementing social and educationalprograms, were all carried out directly by the leadership. However,as a result of the growth of its activities and the broadening ofits organizational network, the leadership was less able to controland synchronize the implementation of its programs in accordancewith the underlying principles of the movement. This conditionrequired a division of labor. Hence in response to a recommendationmade by K.H. Mas Mansur,11 it was decided at11 Mas Mansur (1898-1946) was born in Surabaya, East Java. He went to34 syamsul anwarMuhammadiyah’s sixteenth congress in 1927 to establish a tarjÊÈcouncil to deal with religious matters and to provide directionfor its movement. The name of the council was changed slightlyafter its inception, as a reflection of the emphasis on the tasks itbore in a given period.12 Since 1995, this body has been calledthe Council of Tarjih and the Development of Islamic Thought.13Majelis Tarjih maintains a centralized and hierarchical branchstructure and undertakes tasks in line with Muhammadiyah’sorientation as a reformist movement. It is therefore directed tothe examination of Islamic teachings; providing guidance in mattersof belief, ethics, ritual observances and social relations; issuingfatw§s either on request or on its own initiative; constructivelydirecting controversies on religious matters; improving the generalquality of religious scholarship; and handling other mattersdetermined by the board of Muhammadiyah.14One of the responsibilities of Majelis Tarjih is to formulate theideological bases of the Muhammadiyah movement. Acting asan interpreter of alternative ideological frames of reference, theCouncil may announce that its dictums can serve as a philosophicaljustification for the programs and goals of the movement. Muhammadiyah’sreligious views are flexible and its ideological elementscan be modified in accordance with the dynamics of progressand change. This is the basic framework within which MajelisTarjih deals with the reevaluation and reformulation of its outlookto ensure a continuous evolution (Jainuri 1997: 100).Majelis Tarjih has central, regional, and district boards. However,each board has only a structural relationship with the board ofMuhammadiyah at its commensurate level. Thus Majelis Tarjihof the Central Board (Pimpinan Pusat) is responsible to the CentralBoard of Muhammadiyah, while a regional tarjÊÈ council answersMecca in 1912 and later studied at al-Azhar, Cairo. In 1928 he was appointedthe first chairman of MajelisTarjih. He also served as chairman of Muhammadiyahfrom 1937 to 1943. See Ensiklopedi Islam (1993: 157-60); EnsiklopediNasional Indonesia (1990: X, 148); and Kutoyo (1977). His writings are reprintedand edited in Hamzah (1986).12 See Boeah Congres 23 (1938: 11). Majelis Tarjih was officially founded in1928, based on a decision of 1927.13 The organization was called Majelis Tarjih upon its establishment, butMuhammadiyah altered the name to “Tarjih Commission” (Lajnah Tarjih) inits 1971 Constitution, and it was subsequently redesignated as Majelis Tarjih.14 See Article 4 of the Statutes of Majelis Tarjih; and Rahman (1985: 23).fatw§, purification and dynamization 35to the regional board to which it belongs. There is no structuralchain of command linking Majelis Tarjih at the central level toa regional or district council. The relationship between them issolely one of functionality and coordination. This structure affectsthe level of authority of Islamic legal decisions; decisions thatemanate from a lower tarjÊÈ have less authority and cannotcontradict a decision issued by a higher one. FurthermoreMuhammadiyah, through the Majelis Tarjih of the Central Board,produces two kinds of Islamic legal pronouncements of differingvalue. Resolutions adopted at a Tarjih Conference held by MajelisTarjih are called keputusan tarjih (tarjÊÈ decisions).15A conference held by the Majelis Tarjih of the Central Boardis called a National Tarjih Conference. This is attended by maleand female #ulam§" and intellectuals (including staff of MajelisTarjih) who have the proven capacity to excercise tarjÊÈ in thesense that their knowledge of the sources enables them to carryout ijtih§d. It is also attended by invited #ulam§" and scholars fromoutside Muhammadiyah.16 The decisions of such a nationalconference become the formal stand of the organization as awhole. It is important to note that the decisions are not broughtdirectly to the public; rather they first must be submitted to theCentral Board in order to be officially promulgated (ditanfidz).Formally speaking, these decisions are binding on Muhammadiyahas an institution as well as on its individual members. In practice,however, members exercise their right not to be bound absolutelyto a certain decision if they have reached a different opinion asa result of ijtih§d on the same issue.1715 Some of these decisions are compiled in the Himpunan Putusan TarjihMuhammadiyah (n.d.), while others are still in draft form. Note that tarjÊÈ decisionsmade in a “regional” or a “district” tarjÊÈ conference are called regional ordistrict decisions, respectively, and can be enforced only in the province ordistrict that issued them.16 The Majelis Tarjih staff includes women and there is a female sectionwithin the Central Board devoted to issues affecting women and family affairs.Women are actively involved in every Majelis Tarjih Conference, and thecouncil also invites female #ulam§" from other organizations to participate inits conferences. For example in the twenty-sixth National Conference of 2003,Prof. Chuzaimah Y. Tahido, a graduate of al-Azhar and member of MUI,was invited as a keynote speaker.17 In recent years, and as a result of the widening of the Majelis Tarjih’smission, Tarjih decisions not only cover traditional fiqh matters, but alsotouch upon aspects of current issues, including political and economic ethics,36 syamsul anwarMajelis Tarjih also issues fatw§s.18 Unlike the keputusan, a fatw§is not produced by a formal mechanism of the organization suchas a Tarjih Conference. Rather, it is issued by Majelis Tarjih inresponse to questions posed by members of the community. Suchquestions may have been sent to the editors of Suara Muhammadiyahor directly to the Council. Council staff then make copies of thequestions, file the originals in its records and pass on one ormore questions to members entrusted with the task of preparingdraft fatw§s to be discussed at a scheduled time. Usually informalmeetings for discussing the draft fatw§s are held in rotation atthe homes of members or at a restaurant. At the scheduled timethe participants discuss the relevant fatw§, making any necessarychanges before sending the final fatw§ to the editors of SuaraMuhammadiyah for publication. The fatw§ may also be delivereddirectly to the questioner if need be. Unlike the keputusan, thefatw§ is binding neither on Muhammadiyah as an organizationnor on the questioner or other members of Muhammadiyah.However, in practice it serves as a guide for members of Muhammadiyah,as evinced by the fact that fatw§ collections are oftenreprinted.19The authoritative value of decisions produced by the TarjihConference and of fatw§s issued by Majelis Tarjih is determinedby the quality of the arguments and SharÊ#a evidence on whichthey are based and by the faithfulness to Islamic law of themethodological procedures followed (cf. Arkoun 1988: 63). Themore tarjÊÈ decisions and fatw§s are based on the Qur"§n and\adÊth, the stronger their authoritative value. Conversely, a legaldecision or a fatw§ for which there is no basis in these twosources, and which is based merely on a saying of a religiousscholar, will be considered as lacking authority. This reflects thebasic principle of Muhammadiyah, i.e., “a return to the Qur"§npornography, corporate and professional alms tax, HIV, combating drugabuse, human rights in an Islamic perspective, the strategy of the reformmovement, the development of Islamic thought, and labour relations.18 These are compiled in the collection Tanya-Jawab Agama (1992-1997).There are still many fatw§s in press. Note that the task of fatw§ giving isassigned officially only to the Majelis Tarjih of the Central Board of Muhammadiyah.19 Nadirsyah Hosen (2002: 237), who has recently written on Muhammadiyah’smethod of issuing fatw§s, appears to be unaware of the differencebetween tarjÊÈ decisions and fatw§s.fatw§, purification and dynamization 37and the Sunna of the Prophet.” Scholars and muftÊs have onlyderivative authority, which means that their ijtih§d and fatw§s areauthoritative only if predicated upon the Qur"§n and \adÊth.They must therefore fulfill the prerequisites of ijtih§d stipulatedin ußål al-fiqh, which includes a mastery of Arabic, the Qur"§n,\adÊth and other branches of Islamic knowledge, in addition to“secular” science. Fulfilment of these conditions guarantees theauthoritative value of the resulting interpretation.But the authority of the instrument itself is also decisive. Thusa Majelis Tarjih decision binds individual members and theorganization at large, and becomes the formal position of Muhammadiyah,while a fatw§ issued by the Council does not. Thereason for this is that the former is a product of a process thatinvolves competent scholars and people in a formal conferenceforum, while the latter does not. Furthermore, a Majelis Tarjihdecision does not automatically lose its authoritative value whennew arguments contrary to it are discovered, unless a decisionabrogating the earlier decision is taken in an equally formalprocedure through a Tarjih resolution.The emergence of institutional authority is connected to thecumulative process through which the authority of Majelis Tarjihcame to be accepted. However, in the course of its history, someMuhammadiyah members came to believe that only Tarjih legaldecisions were valid or represented sound religious interpretation;as a result, they were sceptical towards any interpretations thathad not been assessed by the Council.In 1936, fearing that this situation might lead to too doctrinairean attitude among Muhammadiyah members, the Central Boardissued its “explanation of tarjÊÈ.” According to this explanation,tarjÊÈ is employed to avoid conflicts in Muhammadiyah that mightbe caused by differences of opinion in understanding religion. AMajelis Tarjih decision, the explanation adds, is not made inorder to contest other opinions, that is, it does not seek to challengeor denounce opinions that Majelis Tarjih does not accept. Rather,Majelis Tarjih was created to strengthen unity by identifying theopinion that is closest to Qur"§n and Sunna. Therefore, prevailingopinions are accepted, on the condition that support for themcan be found in the Qur"§n and \adÊth and regardless of whetheror not they have been evaluated by the Council. The functionof Majelis Tarjih, then, is simply to explicate matters of controversy38 syamsul anwarand to seek a solution (Penerangan 1936: 145; Boeah Congres26 n.d.: 31; Anwar 2000: 34). Furthermore, Majelis Tarjih doesnot want to establish itself as the sole bearer of the right tointerpret religion and it is fully aware of the possibility of formingerroneous conclusions. Therefore, it “eagerly invites all #ulam§"to be willing to evaluate Majelis Tarjih decisions to find out theweakness of its arguments …, for the evaluation is made only onthe basis of our understanding and ability at that time” (Penerangan1936: 145).Because the authority of the Tarjih Council’s fatw§s is determinedby the quality of their arguments and the evidence supportingthem, readers of Suara Muhammadiyah often adopt critical attitudesto them. Frequently a fatw§ issued by Majelis Tarjih in responseto a reader’s question is debated by other readers of SuaraMuhammadiyah or is called into question. The Council thenreevaluates the fatw§ and issues a more comprehensive elucidation.Indeed, the Council appreciates feedback and acknowledges whenthe argument of one of its fatw§s is weaker than that of its readers.There is yet another kind of tarjÊÈ product called wacana tarjih(tarjÊÈ discourse). Although this discourse is not mentioned explicitlyin the statutes of Majelis Tarjih, it is carried out by the Councilinformally, based on paragraph a of Article 4 of those statutes,which states that the main tasks of the Council include “intensifyingthe study and investigation of the Islamic teachings in theframework of realizing tajdÊd (renewal) and anticipating socialdevelopment.” In contrast to a keputusan and a fatw§, both ofwhich constitute a formal opinion, the former binding and thelatter persuasive, wacana tarjih represents ideas, thought, or opinionsconcerning contemporary issues adduced and brought to thefore by the Council. This third kind of tarjÊÈ resolution is aimedat making Majelis Tarjih more dynamic and developing Islamicthought in Muhammadiyah circles in order to be able to anticipateand deal with various contemporary issues. The existence of thediscourse is a logical consequence of the addition in 1995 of thewords “the Development of Islamic Thought” to the name ofMajlis Tarjih, which reflects the broadening of the Council’smission.In this connection, in 2000 the Council produced a controversialbook entitled A Thematic Exegesis of the Qur"§n on Inter-religious SocialRelations (Majelis Tarjih dan Pengembangan Pemikiran Islam PPfatw§, purification and dynamization 39Muhammadiyah 2000). This work—prepared by the board ofMajelis Tarjih and then discussed at the twenty-fourth NationalTarjih Conference of early 2000—interprets thematically a numberof Qur"§nic verses closely connected to central issues in interfaithrelations, including pluralism, cooperation among adherents ofdifferent religions, and the Qur"§nic view of ahl al-kit§b. As anon-binding resolution, wacana tarjih is open to discussion andmay even be rejected. In any case, however, the Council hopesthat by producing such a discourse it will broaden the horizonsof its readers and elicit valuable ideas from them to be used insolving problems faced by the community.Some Fatw§s of Majelis TarjihI shall now discuss some examples of Majelis Tarjih fatw§s inorder to show how they play a role within the framework ofMuhammadiyah’s endeavours to dynamize the socio-religiouslife of Indonesian Muslims. The fatw§s presented here are chosenfrom a four-volume collection entitled Tanya-Jawab Agama (Questionsand Answers on Religious Matters). This collection treatsa wide range of problems faced by questioners, from aspects ofbelief and morality to commercial transactions and social relations,although the vast majority are devoted to ritual matters. Thespheres of social relations and commercial matters include marriage,the family, women’s issues, inheritance, trade and theeconomy, endowments, health, art and customs, and inter-religiousrelationships.Although the fatw§s were issued in Yogyakarta, the questionersrepresent Indonesian society at large, including the westernmostprovince of Aceh and West Papua in the East. Several questionsemanated from East Timor before its secession in 1999, as wellas from isolated islands like Bawean, situated in the Java Seabetween Java and Kalimantan. The questioners are either individuals,groups, institutions (such as a regional tarjÊÈ councils),Muhammadiyah branches, or its “autonomous organizations.”20Although the editors did not always disclose the background ofthe questioners, there can be no doubt that they come from20 The Muhammadiyah movement oversees many so-called ‘autonomousorganizations’ such as Aisyiyah, Nasyiatul Aisyiyah, Ikatan Remaja Muhammadiyah,and Ikatan Mahasiswa Muhammadiyah.40 syamsul anwardifferent social strata, including university graduates, scholars,teachers, public figures, youth leaders, students and ordinarypeople.The function of a fatw§ as a tool for religious purification anddynamization can be discerned from some fatw§s included inQuestions and Answers on Religious Matters. For instance, one fatw§was issued in response to the question of a woman from Kalimantanwho asked whether (1) giving offerings to big trees (any tall treecan become an object of veneration), (2) making a vow to go toa grave after recovery from illness, or (3) asking for treatmentfrom a traditional healer (dukun) constitutes associationism (Tanya-Jawab Agama: IV, 285).This question reflects practices that are typical of certain partsof Indonesian society. The resultant fatw§ issued by Majelis Tarjihrefers to economic and religious considerations. It declares thatgiving offerings to big trees is economically vain and therefore a“wasteful act” (Ar. tabdhÊr) that is religiously prohibited. Thusgiving offerings to big trees is unlawful. If the act of giving offeringsto big trees is based on the belief that the trees have certainpowers, then it is indeed considered shirk. As for vowing to go toa tomb after recovery from illness, the fatw§ states that this practiceconstitutes shirk if the maker of the vow believes that a grave (orthe saint buried in it) has the magical power to heal. Qur"§n and\adÊth provide sufficient precedent to show that Muslims mayvisit a grave in order to remember death, but not to ask for ablessing (Tanya-Jawab Agama: IV, 285).On the subject of seeking a cure from a dukun, the fatw§ declaresthat traditional dukuns treat a patient by massaging his or hermuscles and nerves, while asking God to cure the patient. Suchpractices alone do not lead to shirk. The same holds for a healerwho uses the efficacious ingredients of medicinal herbs withoutbelieving that these substances have inherent magical powers;this too does not lead to associationism. However if the dukunuses such ingredients as offerings to an unseen magical power,then this constitutes an act leading to shirk and it is thereforereligiously prohibited (Tanya-Jawab Agama: IV, 286).This fatw§ manifests a desire to purify religion from superstition.At the same time it tries to inculcate rational thinking, as can beseen in the economic consideration of prohibiting votive offeringsto trees. It also develops a rational understanding of the practiceof massage and traditional medicine.fatw§, purification and dynamization 41The linking of purification, rationalism and public benefit mayalso be seen in a fatw§ regarding the practice of burying a buffalo’shead in the foundation of a new building. The fatw§ admonishesthis action as a vain deed and squandering of wealth. This fatw§also reflects Muhammadiyah ideology, which orients adherenceto Islam and genuine religious commitment to involvement insocial responsibility and concrete works for the community. Thisidea is confirmed in a Muhammadiyah publication which emphasizesthat in the teachings of Islam, “wealth, rather thanbeing wasted for useless extravagance and redundant vanity,should be spent for what has more concrete social benefits, suchas constructing a school, a mosque, a hospital, an orphanage,and the like” (Pasha and Yusuf 1975: 10).Another fatw§ found in the collection discusses both the mitoniritual, a thanksgiving ceremony for the seventh month of pregnancy,and the tahlilan, a commemorative celebration held three,seven and forty days after the death of a person (Tanya-JawabAgama: II, 196-7). The fatw§ declares that there is no basis forthese practices in \adÊth. On the contrary, one finds a traditionreported on the authority of #$"isha, that the Prophet said,“Whoever performs a practice (Ar. #amal) that does not accordwith our decree will be refused” (Ar. man #amila #amalan laysa#alayhi amrun§ fa-huwa raddun).21 Therefore, the fatw§ continues,Muhammadiyah does not practice these celebrations. Other fatw§sdiscuss delivering gifts to a dead person in order to gain favourand protection (Tanya-Jawab Agama: II, 197-201). Such acts arealso rejected on that grounds that they have no foundation inQur"§n and \adÊth.A very different fatw§ itself played a role as a tool for socialdynamization (Tanya-Jawab Agama: IV: 240). The question arosewhen the government forbade a private hospital to appoint as itsdirector a physician who was also a government official. For thisreason, the Muhammadiyah hospital in Surakarta had to find anew director. Among the candidates, only one, a woman, wasqualified. When the hospital management informed her that theywanted to appoint her, she refused, arguing that there is a ÈadÊth21 The text is in al-Bukh§rÊ (1345/1926 IX: 132), Kit§b al-i#tiß§m bi’l-kit§bwa’l-sunna, B§b 20; and Muslim 1955: III, 1343-4.22 The ÈadÊth in question is reported by al-Bukh§rÊ on the authority of Abå42 syamsul anwarbanning women from positions of leadership.22 The hospitalforwarded this case to the Tarjih Council of the Surakarta RegionalBoard, asking for a fatw§. The Surakarta Council found it difficultto answer, because the above-mentioned ÈadÊth is indeed “authentic”(Ar. ßaÈÊÈ). The Council chairman therefore passed thematter along to the Council of Tarjih of the Central Board inYogyakarta. As usual, one of the Council members was asked toprepare a draft fatw§. Then, at a later meeting, the draft wasdiscussed by staff members and the proposed arguments werescrutinized. Shortly after reaching an agreement, the membersformulated the final fatw§, and the draft was sent to SuaraMuhammadiyah, as well as to the Council of Tarjih of the SurakartaRegional Board.The essence of the fatw§ issued by Majelis Tarjih is that awoman may be appointed as a director of hospital. The fatw§refers specifically to a Majelis Tarjih decision in the Muhammadiyahpublication Adabul Marah fil Islam (1982: 52) which declaresthat religion does not bar a woman from serving as a judge,23school headmistress, director of a firm, sub-district head, villagechief, minister, mayor, and so forth. The fatw§ then cites anddiscusses three texts commonly used as arguments against theleadership of a woman. These include the Qur"§nic passage (4:34),“Men are the managers of the affairs of women,” the abovementionedÈadÊth, and another stating that “men will be unluckywhen they obey women.”24 According to the fatw§, this latterÈadÊth is “weak” (Ar. •a#Êf ) because its chain of transmission (Ar.isn§d) includes an unreliable transmitter (Ar. r§wÊ) named Bakk§rb. #Abd al-#AzÊz.As for the Qur"§nic text, the fatw§ attempts to limit the scopeof the passage to include only marital relationships, not socialBakra, who said, “When a report came to the Prophet that the people ofPersia made Kisr§’s daughter queen over them, he [viz., the Prophet] said,“People shall not be victorious if they put a woman in charge of their affairs”(Ar. lan yufliÈa qawmun wallaw amrahum imra"atan). Al-Bukh§rÊ 1345/1926: VI:10, B§b kit§b al-nabÊ il§ Kisr§ wa Qaysar. For commentary on this ÈadÊth see al-#Asqall§nÊ 1954: IX, 192.23In Indonesia it is not considered strange or counter to the SharÊ#a for awoman to serve as a judge (or q§•Ê). At present many female judges serve onvarious Indonesian courts, including the Religious Courts, which are responsiblefor the settlement of Muslim family disputes.24 The last ÈadÊth is cited in AÈmad ibn \anbal 1993: V, 61, no. 20403.fatw§, purification and dynamization 43relations in general. The passage therefore does not bar a womanfrom serving as a leader. The basis for this restrictive interpretationis “the occasion for the revelation” (Ar. sabab al-nuzål) of theverse, which indicates that it was revealed to the Prophet inconnection with a marital dispute between Sa#d b. al-RabÊ# andhis wife. As for Abå Bakra’s ÈadÊth, the fatw§ urges that it shouldbe understood from the perspective of its spirit, not its letter, byinvestigating its underlying ratio legis (Ar. #illa). Relying on historicalinformation, the fatw§ argues that the reason behind this Propheticmaxim is that the condition of women at the time of the Prophetmade it impossible for them to assume social responsibilities dueto their lack of knowledge and experience in public affairs. Mostof them were sequestered in their houses. At present, however,women have the same access to education as men do, and theyshare the same experience and knowledge with men in social lifeand public affairs. It is therefore lawful for them to be involvedoutside the home and to be a leader of a community. This, thefatw§ continues, is in line with a passage in the Qur"§n whichreads, “And whoever does a righteous deed, be it male or female,believing, We shall assuredly give him to live a goodly life; andWe shall recompense them their wage, according to the best ofwhat they did” (Q. 16:97).25 Here the fatw§ suggests that undertakinga social responsibility is an opportunity to do righteousnessfrom which, according to the verse, neither a male nor a femaleshould be dissuaded. To the contrary, a man or woman has thesame right to perform it. Here the fatw§ argues that this is alsoin compliance with the Islamic legal maxim that “the effectivenessof a legal rule depends on the existence or non-existence of itsratio legis” (Ar. al-Èukm yadåru ma#a #illatihi wujådan wa #adaman).This fatw§ reflects Muhammadiyah’s attempt to promote amore dynamic understanding of religion and to distance itselffrom the view held by the classical #ulam§" and by a substantialnumber of contemporary Muslim religious scholars that a womancannot be put in charge of public affairs.25 The translation of the two verses is quoted from A. J. Arberry ‘s TheKoran Interpreted: Arberry (1964: 77 and 269).44 syamsul anwarConcluding RemarksFatw§ giving in Muhammadiyah forms but a part of the activitiesof Majelis Tarjih. At present tarjÊÈ not only entails the activity ofevaluating the prevailing opinions of Muslim jurists, but alsoencompasses all intellectual endeavours to struggle with newproblems whose Islamic legal status has not yet been determinedin works of fiqh. Muhammadiyah fatw§s formulated by MajelisTarjih thus promote the reformist ideology of the movementwhich aims to purify faith and dynamize social life. This is achievedby issuing fatw§s that promote a more rational worldview andattitude toward human life, thereby inculcating a spirit of rationalismin the questioners and readers, and in Indonesian societyat large.