Tuesday, March 10, 2009

NOTE: This post has been moved back to the top because of the ongoing discussion in the comments section.

John Derbyshire once again admits of a subject he knows nothing about that he knows nothing about it--and then goes on to talk about it authoritatively. This is the man who reviewed Ben Stein's movie on Intelligent Design without actually seeing it--a feat that he apparently felt comfortable performing on the movie made by someone he claimed to know despite the fact that he had never met him.

This is an approach he also used on John Milton's birthday to discuss Paradise Lost, which he admitted he didn't actually read.

This time Derbyshire directs his lack of knowledge toward the abortion issue. "The whole 'right to life' business is over my head," he says today on his blog Secular Right. "I don't even know what it means," a judgment he then goes on to demonstrate in the rest of his post.

If I fall down the basement steps and break my neck tomorrow, what happened to my “right to life”? I do of course have the legal right to expect that, if somebody wilfully kills me, he will be punished (by the death penalty, if it’s up to me — no inconsistency here!) I’d extend the same privilege to a new-born baby. Back beyond that — five minutes, or five months before the baby is born — the mother is rather intimately involved (and the father somewhat less so), and you are in a different situation.

The assumption, of course, is that the mother is not "rather intimately involved" after the baby is born--the point at which Derbyshire thinks it should be protected with the full force of the law, as opposed to "five minutes" before, at which point it's fair game. Exactly what is the difference other than geographical location? And why should that matter?

I have no patience with the angels-on-pin-heads logic-chopping about “when life begins.”

Well, that's pretty obvious. In fact, Derbyshire seems not to understand the difference between the chopping of logic and the simple application of it--something else that seems to be over his head.

Without a moral metaphysic and a belief in ensoulment, neither of which I have, it’s all hot air.

As one of the commenters on the post observed, if he doesn't believe in ensoulment, then why should he care about the life of a baby after it's born any more than he does before it is born?

The killing of embryos and fetuses is intrinsically disturbing and disgusting to normal people, including me. As with other such acts — the eating of corpses, for example — an organized society needs some consensus, embodied in law, about what may and may not be done; though also (I’d argue) an understanding that that consensus is founded on nothing but those widespread common emotions — disturbance and disgust. I’d guess that most people in today’s U.S.A. would settle for unconditional abortion up to 12 weeks, conditional abortion up to 20, severely conditional thereafter. Whatever the consensus is, let’s settle on it and enforce the laws.

How can you view the killing of embryos and fetuses "intrinically" disturbing and disgusting to people, unless you have a "moral metaphysic"? And why, outside of some moral metaphysic, can you rationally prefer public consensus as the manner in which this issue should be resolved over any other resolution to the problem? Maybe if you have abandoned the application of reason to something, that's the only thing left.

Worthy and admirable civilizations can co-exist with all sorts of attitudes to fetuses, and even to newborns. The ancient Athenians exposed unwanted babies on the Acropolis. Were they not civilized? Abortion has been a human universal everywhere, among civilizations high and low, and also among primitives.

So has slavery.

And what do the right-to-lifers want? A total nationwide ban on all abortions, at any time? Yes, that seems to be what they want. Do they really imagine that’s going to happen? What a waste of political energy!

Yes, I'm sure the abolitionists could have been accused at some points of being in the same position.

...as an intellectual construct, [the right to life argument] loses most of its point once you drop ensoulment.

Yup. And so does any acknowledgment of human rights.

I wish, though, that some of the time and energy that conservatives give to thinking about fetuses could be diverted to real problems of governance.

And why are these "real problems of governance" any more amenable to rational treatment than the issue of abortion?

Yes, I know the arguments to the contrary. I never heard a non-believer make them, though.

It's fairly evident that he doesn't know the arguments to the contrary, and what difference would it make if no non-believers make such arguments? And anyway, non-believers have made these arguments. Has he really never heard of Nat Hentoff?

Of course not--one of the many pieces of evidence that this issue is over Derbyshire's head.

25 comments:

Sorry, I can never resist throwing a rock at Derbyshire. To me, he is the symbol of everything that has gone wrong at National Review since Buckley gave up the editor-in-chied position. I mourn what that magazine once was. No one has stepped up to the plate yet.

I think I'm the commenter you referred to in this post. I should state that you (slightly) misquoted me. I said, "if you don't believe in ensoulment or a moral metaphysics." As it happens, I'm an atheist and I don't believe in ensoulment, but I'm also a moral realist and I do believe in a moral metaphysic.

1. Yes. If by "transcends man," you mean that the same things are right and wrong for all similarly-situated people regardless of anyone's opinions.

2. The properties of the universe are complex. The problem that you have to deal with, as a believer in God, is the Euthyphro dilemma. Is what is moral commanded by God because it is moral or is it moral because it is commanded by God? If the latter, then the commands of God are wholly arbitrary and why should we obey them (other than fear of punishment, I suppose, which makes God nothing more than a celestial dictator)? If the former, then is there any role for God other than as a transmitter of moral knowledge? I grab the first horn of the Euthyphro dilemma - that there is an objective morality prior to God and, by grabbing this horn, I have no need of the God hypothesis. As to how it came about, I believe I have far fewer problems explaining that than you do explaining how God came about, which is a much more complex phenomenon. (And if you try to duck out of the Euthyphro dilemma in the way Aquinas did, by arguing that morality is part of God's nature, then you still solve my problem more easily than your own, since all I need is that part of God's nature and none of the rest.) But basically I believe that moral values are a part of the universe just as much as atoms and energy and forces and the laws of physics and the laws of mathematics and other abstract objects (numbers, colors, mass, etc). I have seen no good argument for why any of this requires a god.

3) I don't think I'd go so far as to suggest that it has any "authority" over him. If a man wishes to disobey moral standards and the fact that "what you are doing is wrong" isn't good enough for him, then I don't really have any other argument to make. I don't think this puts me in any worse position than a believer. People who do believe in God disobey his commandments all the time and it's crystal clear that God does nothing about this as long as the person is still on this Earth at least. However, in general, I believe vice is usually its own punishment. If you disobey the moral law "you ought to eat when you are hungry," the punishment you will suffer is rather obvious. Other punishments are more subtle. Evil men can buy sex from prostitutes or trophy wives, but they rarely know love. They might have sycophants, but they rarely have friends. And then, of course, there is the matter of one's own conscience. I guess what I'm trying to say is that obeying moral standards is the key to a happy life, not in some celestial Heaven, but right here on Earth. However, quite frankly, I don't think one should need anything more than "what you're doing is wrong." (It is a simple tautology, after all. You ought to do what you ought to do.) It is unfortunate that many people are irrational and don't see that.

Sorry, I was referring to this part of the post, which was not making a direct quote:

As one of the commenters on the post observed, if he doesn't believe in ensoulment, then why should he care about the life of a baby after it's born any more than he does before it is born?

I assumed this was referring to my comment when I said "Without a moral metaphysic or a belief in ensoulment, I too can’t see why one would argue for the illegalization of abortion. (I’m actually not sure why one would argue for the illegalization of murder either, but that’s another matter.)" It was a long thread, though, and perhaps you were referring to someone else's comment.

In either event, what is required is not a belief in ensoulment, but in a moral metaphysic. (As a different commenter pointed out, if we believe in souls, then abortion is a lesser tragedy than if we don't, since God is there to welcome the souls into Heaven.)

I'd certainly be willing to read and engage with your comments, but I hope that I'm not coming across as a proselytizing atheist here, since that is not my intent; I was just defending my metaphysics. I'm much more concerned with convincing my fellow atheists of moral realism than I am with convincing Christians of atheism. Lack of belief in moral realism does real damage, in my opinion, while Christianity has probably done more good than harm.

> 1. Yes. If by "transcends man," you mean that the same things are right and wrong for all similarly-situated people regardless of anyone's opinions.

I meant: "to be above and independent of (the universe, time, etc.)."

> I grab the first horn of the Euthyphro dilemma - that there is an objective morality prior to God and, by grabbing this horn, I have no need of the God hypothesis.

You take this... what? On faith?

> Euthyphro dilemma

I'm not sure there are only two possibilities. Here's a third: What if, e.g., "in the beginning," there was God, and that goodness is an aspect of God's character, and that He and the goodness have been together from the start?

In any event, if you want to get into logical dilemmas, let's explore this one:

> the same things are right and wrong for all similarly-situated people regardless of anyone's opinions.

Those are your words; I don't wish to put words in your mouth. But this means that if something is "right" regardless of anyone's opinion, the "right" must be something higher than man. Something greater than man, and not a creation of man's.

And how can that be, if God does not exist? Let's assume for the sake of argument that there is no God. What's the alternative? Well, the materialists say that there is nothing but physics. Matter and energy is all there is. If that is true, then nothing exists that is not matter or energy. And that means that a transcendent morality does not exist, since it is not material. Its existence is relegated to that of mere thought or conceit. And we are now back to consensus: it's what most people believe. But we have assumed that moral truth exists regardless of anyone's opinion, ref. your proposition.

So therefore, yours is not a materialist viewpoint. So we now have to look for a non-materialist viewpoint which a) allows for something greater than man to exist, and b) can explain the existence of some form of abstract goodness that must have existed always, before any "god" that came along.

So you are accepting quite a bit, it seems, on the basis of faith. You are accepting on faith that goodness exists, that it is greater than man, and that somehow it could not have arisen from God's very character, but must have been here first in case of a tie -- it could not possibly be an aspect of His character (we ruled that out when you accepted the Euthyphro dilemma as authoritative).

Is this an accurate portrayal of your beliefs?

> As to how it came about, I believe I have far fewer problems explaining that than you do explaining how God came about, which is a much more complex phenomenon.

I'm not sure either one of us can explain how God or morality came to be. But as I said, you ignored the third possibility, that goodness is an aspect of God's and that it is nonetheless still good. In your view, God came after, or God came before, but somehow God and goodness came together didn't register even as a possibility.

For, according to the Bible, God was there from the very beginning. Why is it impossible that goodness is simply an aspect of His character?

> And if you try to duck out of the Euthyphro dilemma in the way Aquinas did, by arguing that morality is part of God's nature, then you still solve my problem more easily than your own, since all I need is that part of God's nature and none of the rest.

Nice! (But I don't see it as "ducking".) But actually, not true. If goodness is part of God's nature, and God says you need Him, then you need Him. He's God because He's the authority, and (to quote Chevy Chase) you're not.

> But basically I believe that moral values are a part of the universe just as much as atoms and energy and forces and the laws of physics and the laws of mathematics and other abstract objects (numbers, colors, mass, etc). I have seen no good argument for why any of this requires a god.

So you *are* a materialist! So it's all just forces and matter. Why does any of this require a god, you ask? Well, I have ideas, but I can't prove any of them. But then, why do you believe that morality exists apart from anyone's opinion? Whose opinion does matter? If you are correct, then we have no evidence at all of morality's separate existence, apart from anyone's opinion. We have to go the other way: if everything is the result of matter and energy, then morality is simply a behavior pattern that has helped man to survive. However, in that form, it cannot transcend man, as it is an outgrowth of man, and not the other way around. Its source is man. Its an invention of man. And why then should it hold any authority over man?

It would seem to me that if you're saying that we cannot accept God's existence without proof, but only faith, I would say, fine -- but let's also not accept anything *else's* existence based on faith. You don't need God to explain morality? Fine! But take it a step further: why accept morality's existence? Why assert authoritatively that it exists, is true regardless of man's opinions, but then take away any reason for believing this is so? If it crawled out of the mud along with man, why do what it suggests? Who died and made it God?

> I don't think I'd go so far as to suggest that it has any "authority" over him. If a man wishes to disobey moral standards and the fact that "what you are doing is wrong" isn't good enough for him, then I don't really have any other argument to make.

Morality, by its very definition, *ought* to be heeded, *ought* to compel a man of good conscience to observe its rules. What you're suggesting here, that it has no real authority, means that, if true, what you're talking about isn't really morality. And, since as you stated, morality exists regardless of anyone's opinion, then it doesn't matter whether they heed or not, what they're doing is still wrong if they fail to heed. The only arguments that make sense are this: either morality exists and we ought to heed it (whether we do or not), or it does not exist and that means you may do what you want -- at the very least, unencumbered by superstitions of "right and wrong." (There may other encumbrances, such as making other people mad at you, but that's merely a practical concern if morality does not exist.)

> I don't think this puts me in any worse position than a believer. People who do believe in God disobey his commandments all the time and it's crystal clear that God does nothing about this as long as the person is still on this Earth at least.

It's perfectly consistent with the Christian viewpoint that someone may indeed disobey God's commandments, but it does not mean that the Christian does not believe in God's commandments. That's pretty much the entire theme of Christianity: there is a right and wrong, but we are a fallen race and *cannot* do His will without His divine intervention to help us along. And it's also the essence of Christianity that God controls all things, before, during, and after this life, and that justice will be done some day. Justice, but also mercy for those who have bent their knees and repented of their evil-doing.

> However, in general, I believe vice is usually its own punishment. If you disobey the moral law "you ought to eat when you are hungry," the punishment you will suffer is rather obvious.

If Christianity is false, in the end, we are all "punished" with death. Josef Stalin murdered millions and died in his sleep. Jesus, on the other hand, even in a secular sense, did nothing but teach others about moral truth, and died a horrifying death. Some good people never have a good time, and some bad people have all the fun. I don't think morality by karma works.

> Other punishments are more subtle. Evil men can buy sex from prostitutes or trophy wives, but they rarely know love.

Maybe they don't want love. Who are we to say they need it?

> They might have sycophants, but they rarely have friends.

Maybe they don't want friends. Who are we to say having friends is good?

> And then, of course, there is the matter of one's own conscience.

Maybe all one's conscience is, is a hyperactive subconscious that is telling us things we don't need to pay attention to?

> I guess what I'm trying to say is that obeying moral standards is the key to a happy life, not in some celestial Heaven, but right here on Earth.

I would suggest that if moral standards are not transcendent and all there is, is physics, "moral standards" are a conceit, and don't really exist, and if it makes you happy to believe it, do so... But then, in that case, they aren't exactly immune to our opinion, are they?

> However, quite frankly, I don't think one should need anything more than "what you're doing is wrong." (It is a simple tautology, after all. You ought to do what you ought to do.) It is unfortunate that many people are irrational and don't see that.

I'm not sure there are only two possibilities. Here's a third: What if, e.g., "in the beginning," there was God, and that goodness is an aspect of God's character, and that He and the goodness have been together from the start?

The question is not which came first temporally, but which is the cause of the other.

Those are your words; I don't wish to put words in your mouth. But this means that if something is "right" regardless of anyone's opinion, the "right" must be something higher than man. Something greater than man, and not a creation of man's.

I might be broadly in agreement with this, but I don't actually know what "greater than man" means. I also think there are serious problems with your claim that it can't be a creation of man's. E.g. a man creates a green car. Even though this is a creation of man's, it is still green, regardless of anyone's opinion. However, since I am not in fact arguing that morality is a creation of man's, I wouldn't want to waste time arguing this.

So therefore, yours is not a materialist viewpoint. So we now have to look for a non-materialist viewpoint which a) allows for something greater than man to exist, and b) can explain the existence of some form of abstract goodness that must have existed always, before any "god" that came along.

So you are accepting quite a bit, it seems, on the basis of faith. You are accepting on faith that goodness exists, that it is greater than man, and that somehow it could not have arisen from God's very character, but must have been here first in case of a tie -- it could not possibly be an aspect of His character (we ruled that out when you accepted the Euthyphro dilemma as authoritative).

Is this an accurate portrayal of your beliefs?

I think most materialists would agree that mine is not a materialist viewpoint and generally I don't describe myself as a materialist. Again, I don't know what you mean by "greater than man." Are the laws of physics "greater than man"? And I reject the characterization that any of this has to do with faith. I am persuaded to my opinions by logical arguments. Otherwise, you've roughly got it.

So you *are* a materialist! So it's all just forces and matter.

You didn't read me carefully enough. The laws of physics and abstract objects are material entities? This is a very strange interpretation of what I said.

But then, why do you believe that morality exists apart from anyone's opinion? Whose opinion does matter?

For a logical argument to work, the conclusion must be less certain than the premises and the denial of the conclusion must be less certain than the premises. Any argument which ends with the conclusion "there are no such things as moral values" relies on a number of premises. One of these, often, is simply a materialist premise as you're assuming. However, if we conclude that there are no such things as moral values, then all "ought" statements are false. But surely it is true that "I ought to believe only what is true." Indeed, this seems to be a precursor to rational thought so I reject whatever the least plausible premise is that led to the repugnant conclusion. One of the easiest to dispose of is the assumption of materialism since there is no evidence for it.

If you are correct, then we have no evidence at all of morality's separate existence, apart from anyone's opinion. We have to go the other way: if everything is the result of matter and energy, then morality is simply a behavior pattern that has helped man to survive. However, in that form, it cannot transcend man, as it is an outgrowth of man, and not the other way around. Its source is man. Its an invention of man. And why then should it hold any authority over man?

All of these arguments seem to disappear since I am not a materialist (certainly not in the way you define it).

It would seem to me that if you're saying that we cannot accept God's existence without proof, but only faith, I would say, fine -- but let's also not accept anything *else's* existence based on faith. You don't need God to explain morality? Fine! But take it a step further: why accept morality's existence? Why assert authoritatively that it exists, is true regardless of man's opinions, but then take away any reason for believing this is so? If it crawled out of the mud along with man, why do what it suggests? Who died and made it God?

A world without moral values leads me to insoluble contradictions. A world without God leads me to no problems whatsoever.

Morality, by its very definition, *ought* to be heeded, *ought* to compel a man of good conscience to observe its rules.

Certainly, as I said earlier, one ought to do what one ought to do. Simply tautological.

What you're suggesting here, that it has no real authority, means that, if true, what you're talking about isn't really morality.

What I meant by the above, as should have been clear from the context, is that it has no power. It cannot compel people to do the right thing as should be obvious to everyone.

And, since as you stated, morality exists regardless of anyone's opinion, then it doesn't matter whether they heed or not, what they're doing is still wrong if they fail to heed.

Yes.

The only arguments that make sense are this: either morality exists and we ought to heed it (whether we do or not), or it does not exist and that means you may do what you want -- at the very least, unencumbered by superstitions of "right and wrong." (There may other encumbrances, such as making other people mad at you, but that's merely a practical concern if morality does not exist.)

Sure. And obviously I believe the first option, that we ought to heed it.

If Christianity is false, in the end, we are all "punished" with death.

Yes, we all die.

Josef Stalin murdered millions and died in his sleep. Jesus, on the other hand, even in a secular sense, did nothing but teach others about moral truth, and died a horrifying death. Some good people never have a good time, and some bad people have all the fun. I don't think morality by karma works.

I don't actually believe in karma. I was simply illustrating why what one ought to do is often in one's own self-interest. But I certainly agree that sometimes morality requires one to act against one's self-interest and I wasn't actually arguing that one ought not to do what one ought to do, just because it might not be in your own best interests.

I would suggest that if moral standards are not transcendent and all there is, is physics, "moral standards" are a conceit, and don't really exist, and if it makes you happy to believe it, do so... But then, in that case, they aren't exactly immune to our opinion, are they?

I have no idea what you mean here other than that you are making some assertions without argument or evidence. Is God not immune to our opinion because we can either believe in him or not? I suppose that's true in some sense of the word "immune," but then you're going beyond what I have argued about moral values.

First, is your moral metaphysic applicable only to humans? If so, why?

Second, how do you determine the substantive content of your moral metaphysic? Upon what specific basis do you make a moral judgment that one action is right and another wrong?

Finally, when you say that your position is based on logic, are you saying that there is something inherent in logic itself from which you infer your position, or are you simply saying that your position has a better logical foundation than other views of morality?

First, is your moral metaphysic applicable only to humans? If so, why?

This is an excellent question. No, it is not simply applicable to humans. Animals with brains have evaluative beliefs as well. Survival is good, "I ought to eat this," and so forth. Because their capacity for reason is limited (see answer to your second question), they probably have access only to very basic intuitions.

My theory is that the moral sense evolved because to be able to recognize and do what one ought to do is good for the survival of intelligent social animals (although "good for survival" is only the explanation for their existence and not their normative force). The mathematical sense evolved for similar reasons. Originally, it was just to help survival, but it is far more high-powered than that. (Biographically, it was trying to explain mathematics, not morality, which first lured me away from a materialist worldview.)

Second, how do you determine the substantive content of your moral metaphysic? Upon what specific basis do you make a moral judgment that one action is right and another wrong?

My moral objectivism is fairly minimalist. I couldn't give an exhaustive list of the basic moral intuitions, but there are certainly only a fairly small number. Most morality must be derived from these basic premises. So most morality is arrived at through a process of reasoning based on a small number of basic moral intuitions, combined with factual premises. This, of course, is why there is often so much disagreement. (Although partly this is simply because facts are hard.) Indeed, I think my view is the best explanation for this disagreement. The evolutionary account of morality would surely predict that most of us would agree, at least, on what was best for the survival of our genes.

Finally, when you say that your position is based on logic, are you saying that there is something inherent in logic itself from which you infer your position, or are you simply saying that your position has a better logical foundation than other views of morality?

The latter, certainly. I concede the possibility that I am mistaken. However, it seems to me that error theory, the only other good alternative, doesn't have sufficient force in its premises to overturn very basic moral intuitions. For example, even if error theory is correct, it is no longer at all clear why I should believe it, since I can no longer truly state that I ought to believe what is true. Non-cognitivist ethics have similar problems.

It sounds more like an assumption to me. You stated two possibilities out of three, and then assume that one of them must be true. You didn't arrive at the position that an objective morality must have existed before God by arguing your way there -- you simply "grabbed" it.

> The question is not which came first temporally, but which is the cause of the other.

Fine.

> I might be broadly in agreement with this, but I don't actually know what "greater than man" means.

In this case, I think it may suffice to define it as holding more moral authority.

>I also think there are serious problems with your claim that it can't be a creation of man's.

It can't be a creation of man's *and* at the same time be greater than man.

> Are the laws of physics "greater than man"?

Do the laws of physics serve as the source of moral truth? I would say, no.

> And I reject the characterization that any of this has to do with faith. I am persuaded to my opinions by logical arguments. Otherwise, you've roughly got it.

You cannot prove that there is a moral metaphysic. If you believe in one, welcome to the world of faith.

> You didn't read me carefully enough. The laws of physics and abstract objects are material entities? This is a very strange interpretation of what I said.

Fine, perhaps I didn't. Here's what you said:

> But basically I believe that moral values are a part of the universe just as much as atoms and energy and forces and the laws of physics and the laws of mathematics and other abstract objects (numbers, colors, mass, etc). I have seen no good argument for why any of this requires a god.

But now you are facing another dilemma. You *believe* that moral values are part of the universe, yet you *deny* that this is due to faith. If it is not faith, then show me evidence that such moral laws exist, in the same sense that the laws of physics exist. You see no argument why it ought to be attributed to God? I'll go one further: I see no argument to show that moral values exists on their own, as part of the universe, at all.

If faith doesn't work as a justification for my arguments, it shouldn't work for anyone's. If I have to prove God is the source of morality, I'm not going to spot you the existence of a morality (apart from man's existence, as somehow part of the universe). You say, what's with this God hypothesis? I say, then, what's with this morality hypothesis?

It sounds more like an assumption to me. You stated two possibilities out of three, and then assume that one of them must be true.

Those are the only possibilities. They are logically exhaustive. Either A) moral statements are propositions about reality or B) they aren't. If B, then non-cognitivist ethics (since that's what non-cognitivist ethics is). If A, then either 1) moral statements actually refer to reality (moral realism) or 2) they don't (error theory). There are no other options. All moral theories can be subsumed under these three categories - moral realism (which includes religious belief as well as mine), error theory, or non-cognitivist ethics. There are many different kinds of moral realism just as there are many different kinds of non-cognitivist ethics. (Error theory, however, has only one form.) The argument I have advanced on this thread is for moral realism simpliciter, not (yet) a particular kind of moral realism. It is perfectly consistent with religious morality, ethical naturalism, ethical non-naturalism, utilitarianism, Kant's categorical imperative, or any other form of moral realism.

You didn't arrive at the position that an objective morality must have existed before God by arguing your way there -- you simply "grabbed" it.

My argument hasn't dealt with God at all. One can accept my argument for moral realism and still believe in God. (Indeed, a very large number of Christians do.) I don't happen to do so, but the two aren't logically inconsistent. We both believe in abstract entities. I just believe in fewer of them.

Do the laws of physics serve as the source of moral truth? I would say, no.

My argument is that moral law is equivalent to the laws of physics or the laws of mathematics. So if the laws of physics aren't "greater than man" (and since I don't know what you mean by that, I don't know whether they are or aren't), then I would assume that neither are the laws of morality.

You cannot prove that there is a moral metaphysic. If you believe in one, welcome to the world of faith.

This is a very odd argument for a Christian to make; I would expect this argument from an atheist, but it's very strange coming from a Christian. The atheist would argue that since moral metaphysics don't exist, obviously I won't be able to prove their existence. But, supposedly, you do believe they exist so I find it very odd that you think their existence can't be demonstrated or proved.

In any event, you are falling into the "infallibilist fallacy." If you're arguing that I can't infallibly prove the existence of moral metaphysics, then I agree with you that you're probably (though not infallibly) correct. There is precious little that I can infallibly prove. If you are arguing that anything we believe due to the weight of the evidence, but can't infallibly prove is an article of faith, then your definition of faith is mistaken. For example, I believe that I ate a bowl of cereal this morning. I can't infallibly prove this. It is possible that I hallucinated it. Nevertheless I believe it for a very good reason. It is simply not the case that it's an article of faith. I have reasons for my belief.

But there is no good reason for calling belief in anything we can't infallibly prove an article of faith. (You certainly can't infallibly prove that, can you?) You seem to be saying that either A) we should believe in almost nothing or B) we should believe in absolutely anything we like. I reject this epistemology.

But now you are facing another dilemma. You *believe* that moral values are part of the universe, yet you *deny* that this is due to faith. If it is not faith, then show me evidence that such moral laws exist, in the same sense that the laws of physics exist. You see no argument why it ought to be attributed to God? I'll go one further: I see no argument to show that moral values exists on their own, as part of the universe, at all.

Our moral intuitions are sufficient evidence, given the weakness of the arguments against. Again, I find it very curious that you can't possibly find an argument for moral values sufficient, given that you believe in them. This must be some sort of evangelical Protestant theology you are using, which I am not terribly familiar with. You appear to be saying that God exists, but he purposely hides any evidence of his existence from human beings so it's not at all possible, in any way, to infer his existence except through faith. I've actually never met anyone with this belief before. Most Christians, far from trying to argue me out of moral realism, instead agree that my arguments for moral realism are correct and then try to argue that they can demonstrate from the existence of moral values the existence of God (the so-called "moral argument" or "argument from morality"). This seems to me to be a much stronger argument than the one you seem to be making.

If faith doesn't work as a justification for my arguments, it shouldn't work for anyone's. If I have to prove God is the source of morality, I'm not going to spot you the existence of a morality (apart from man's existence, as somehow part of the universe). You say, what's with this God hypothesis? I say, then, what's with this morality hypothesis?

My arguments are analagous to St. Thomas Aquinas's five rational proofs for the existence of God - what Aquinas called "natural revelation" available to everyone through reason. They are not analogous to the articles of faith ("supernatural revelation" in Aquinas's schema).

If faith doesn't work as a justification for my arguments, it shouldn't work for anyone's. If I have to prove God is the source of morality, I'm not going to spot you the existence of a morality (apart from man's existence, as somehow part of the universe). You say, what's with this God hypothesis? I say, then, what's with this morality hypothesis?

It would take a long lecture on epistemology to untangle this one. There are a great many excellent Christian philosophers out there. I would recommend reading more of them.

Fine. I picked one of the possibilities that you didn't offer at first, but dismissed it as unnecessary. I don't recall that you responded, though, to my observation that if morality is simply part of God's very nature, *and* part of that morality is that you need Him, then He is therefore necessary.

> The argument I have advanced on this thread is for moral realism simpliciter, not (yet) a particular kind of moral realism. It is perfectly consistent with religious morality, ethical naturalism, ethical non-naturalism, utilitarianism, Kant's categorical imperative, or any other form of moral realism.

And I'm fine with that. What it seems to me to inconsistent with is unbelief, just so we're clear on that.

> We both believe in abstract entities. I just believe in fewer of them.

Is the goal to believe in as few abstract entities as possible? If so, then you could save yourself a couple of steps. Why believe in morality as something distinct and real at all, if you don't believe in God?

> My argument is that moral law is equivalent to the laws of physics or the laws of mathematics. So if the laws of physics aren't "greater than man" (and since I don't know what you mean by that, I don't know whether they are or aren't) > then I would assume that neither are the laws of morality.

I would posit that if morals are not greater than man, then they can hold no authority over him. The whole concept of morality is centered on things that one ought to be obliged to do, whether one does them or not. The power to instruct man implies a greatness that exceeds man, however greatness is measured. We'll start with defining greatness in this sense as possessing moral wisdom. To me, that implies consciousness and self-awareness, but maybe that isn't necessary.

>> You cannot prove that there is a moral metaphysic. If you believe in one, welcome to the world of faith.

> This is a very odd argument for a Christian to make; I would expect this argument from an atheist, but it's very strange coming from a Christian.

Surely, even a Christian can argue a from hypothetical proposition?

> The atheist would argue that since moral metaphysics don't exist, obviously I won't be able to prove their existence. But, supposedly, you do believe they exist so I find it very odd that you think their existence can't be demonstrated or proved.

Then let me clarify: I think a belief in an objective, absolute morality is consistent with my Christianity, and I think a disbelief in it is consistent with atheism. I sense an inconsistency with your beliefs, however: There is no god, but somehow there exists some sort of objective morality, sitting out there in the universe. It didn't make us, it may not even be aware of us, and we certainly can't measure it. But nevertheless, it holds some sort of authority over the actions of man. How does belief in that not constitute some sort of faith?

> In any event, you are falling into the "infallibilist fallacy." If you're arguing that I can't infallibly prove the existence of moral metaphysics, then I agree with you that you're probably (though not infallibly) correct.

I would settle for seeing some evidence.

> There is precious little that I can infallibly prove. If you are arguing that anything we believe due to the weight of the evidence, but can't infallibly prove is an article of faith, then your definition of faith is mistaken.

Not in this case, I don't think. What you are proposing is that there is something that holds authority over the behavior of man, something that is not god, and I don't think it's too much to ask that you provide some evidence for it. Prove it exists? How about starting with some reason to believe it exists?

> For example, I believe that I ate a bowl of cereal this morning. I can't infallibly prove this

People eat breakfast all the time. We see people eating breakfast all the time. I don't need a lot of faith to believe you're a person who eats breakfast. I just don't think that the sort of thing you're talking about with morality is something we can observe, or have ever observed, and we have no idea how to measure it, or even where it is.

> It is possible that I hallucinated it. Nevertheless I believe it for a very good reason.

Fine. I'd like to know what it is.

> It is simply not the case that it's an article of faith. I have reasons for my belief.

And those reasons are...?

> But there is no good reason for calling belief in anything we can't infallibly prove an article of faith.

How about a fallible proof? A case? Your notions on the subject? By your standards, I don't need to prove God exists, either, to say I believe in Him, nor do I need to call it faith. I have good reasons. That's all I need, right?

> (You certainly can't infallibly prove that, can you?)

I'm the guy who admits to having a faith.

> You seem to be saying that either A) we should believe in almost nothing or B) we should believe in absolutely anything we like. I reject this epistemology.

That's not what I'm intending to say. I'm saying that an atheist should not borrow from the Christian's worldview in order to defend his own. I believe in an absolute, objective morality because I believe, by faith, that our Creator is the author of morality, and it's an attribute that permeates Him and His creation, and that we do horrible damage to ourselves and others in a very real sense when we disobey it. I think it's perfectly consistent, though wrong, for an atheist to challenge my beliefs as mere notions, as (in his view) there is no creator and no ultimate order to things, and everything is just an accident of matter and energy, and that's it. (Not that this stops most such atheists from moralizing with the very best of Baptist preachers.)

But what doesn't make sense to me is this halfway house in between Christianity and atheism: rejection of the concept of God, but acceptance of an absolute standard of morality that somehow has authority over us, cannot be measured or seen, or explained, it just is.

To me, it just seems too convenient. The consistent materialist will acknowledge that, since everything is an accident of matter and energy, there must therefore be no transcendent morality. But then he loses the ability to pass moral judgment, as what we refer to as "morality" (in his view) is nothing more than notions in the brain -- and ultimately, no more than chemicals in the brain. What you're proposing sort of gives you the best of both worlds, doesn't it? You can moralize and instruct others on morality, or at least your view of it, and at the same time deny that there is anything to whom you are beholden to, anyone to whom you should bend your knee and acknowledge as the King.

Even I can't do that, as a Christian. If I step out of line, a bunch of elders will show up at my door, and they'll insist that the Bible says one thing while I keep doing another, and that one of them is going to have to give.

> But now you are facing another dilemma. You *believe* that moral values are part of the universe, yet you *deny* that this is due to faith. If it is not faith, then show me evidence that such moral laws exist, in the same sense that the laws of physics exist. You see no argument why it ought to be attributed to God? I'll go one further: I see no argument to show that moral values exists on their own, as part of the universe, at all.

> Our moral intuitions are sufficient evidence, given the weakness of the arguments against.

So if enough people intuit it, it must be so? Is that our authority? People's intuition? Why can't that be a simple instinct towards self-preservation as a species that evolved with us through the eons? That would certainly demote our notions of morality as something no more objective than brain chemicals.

> Again, I find it very curious that you can't possibly find an argument for moral values sufficient, given that you believe in them.

I think an objective moral standard follows from my premises, but not from yours.

> This must be some sort of evangelical Protestant theology you are using, which I am not terribly familiar with.

If it's relevant, I consider myself a Calvinist.

> You appear to be saying that God exists, but he purposely hides any evidence of his existence from human beings so it's not at all possible, in any way, to infer his existence except through faith.

I didn't intend to say that, no. Quite the contrary. I think there is evidence for God in all things. But that's what I believe. I'm trying to figure out what you believe, and why.

> I've actually never met anyone with this belief before. Most Christians, far from trying to argue me out of moral realism, instead agree that my arguments for moral realism are correct and then try to argue that they can demonstrate from the existence of moral values the existence of God (the so-called "moral argument" or "argument from morality").

Perhaps these other Christians are just nicer than I am. If you don't share my beliefs, then you are not entitled to use my premises as a springboard.

> This seems to me to be a much stronger argument than the one you seem to be making.

It is, or it isn't, regardless of what it seems to you. We'll know whether it is, perhaps, if you can explain why you invest belief -- faith -- in this thing unseen called an objective morality, that can't be seen, heard, smelled, tasted, felt, measured, photographed, or inferred based on other things that can be. If it isn't faith, as you insist, show me why.

> My arguments are analagous to St. Thomas Aquinas's five rational proofs for the existence of God - what Aquinas called "natural revelation" available to everyone through reason.

Do you accept all of Aquinas' arguments?

> They are not analogous to the articles of faith ("supernatural revelation" in Aquinas's schema).

> It would take a long lecture on epistemology to untangle this one. There are a great many excellent Christian philosophers out there. I would recommend reading more of them.

Suit yourself. I'm sure there's a great number of things I ought to read, or read more of.

Fine. I picked one of the possibilities that you didn't offer at first, but dismissed it as unnecessary. I don't recall that you responded, though, to my observation that if morality is simply part of God's very nature, *and* part of that morality is that you need Him, then He is therefore necessary.

I don't think I see a problem with this argument. Let me make sure I'm getting it right. If morality is part of God's nature and part of that morality is that you need him, then you therefore need him. I'd be inclined to agree with this, sure. If both of your premises are true, I'd grant you the conclusion.

And I'm fine with that. What it seems to me to inconsistent with is unbelief, just so we're clear on that.

It's certainly the case that not many atheists who are also moral realists exist nowadays. While there are atheists who are moral realists (such as Michael Martin), I do freely grant that they appear to be very rare. Historically, this hasn't always been true. G.E. Moore in the early 20th century was an atheist who was a moral realist. Stoic philosophy in ancient Greek times was atheist (or, at best, pantheist, but they didn't believe nature had a mind) and moral realist. The early Christians, while rejecting Stoic philosophy, borrowed many terms from it - logos, virtue, spirit, conscience, etc. (In fact, I am, in my first order philosophy, something of a modern Stoic.) Aristotle made no reference to a god or gods in his Ethics and established moral norms on an entirely secular basis. Historically, atheists who were also moral realists were very common (in terms of the percentage of atheists who were moral realists - atheists have not historically been very common as a whole, of course).

In modern times, however, most atheists are thorough-going materialists, if not logical positivists. This may be due to the theory of evolution (although see G.E. Moore) or for other reasons. Personally, I think it's because of the rise of scientism - the view that natural science has authority over all other interpretations of life and other fields of inquiry, including philosophy. Since science must use methodological materialism, there is often a belief that science has proven materialism, which it plainly hasn't. This leaves less space for moral realism, since the very foundation requires an assumption that it must be false. I reject scientism, of course, since there is no reason to believe in science without philosophy. The truths of philosophy are, and must be, prior to science.

Is the goal to believe in as few abstract entities as possible? If so, then you could save yourself a couple of steps. Why believe in morality as something distinct and real at all, if you don't believe in God?

I wouldn't say that's the goal, no. However, Occam's Razor and all that. If it's unnecessary to postulate entities, I don't do so. I am forced to postulate one particular kind of abstract entity - that being universals. These universals have many different kinds, however - colors, mass, length, numbers, the laws of physics, the laws of mathematics, and moral values. (I am not a Platonist, by the way, though that may make me sound like one. I am, in fact, an immanent realist as Aristotle was. Universals exist in particulars not in a free-floating way. Moral values, for example, inhere in states of affairs.)

I would posit that if morals are not greater than man, then they can hold no authority over him.

Again, I don't know what this whole "authority" concept is all about. Moral values do not have the ability to punish or reward. They just have the ability to motivate.

The whole concept of morality is centered on things that one ought to be obliged to do, whether one does them or not. The power to instruct man implies a greatness that exceeds man, however greatness is measured. We'll start with defining greatness in this sense as possessing moral wisdom. To me, that implies consciousness and self-awareness, but maybe that isn't necessary.

Again, moral values do not "instruct" man. They just exist, again like the laws of mathematics.

Surely, even a Christian can argue a from hypothetical proposition?

By all means. It just seems an odd thing to argue that it could not be possible to apprehend morals, when in fact you think they exist (whether the nature of God or what have you).

Then let me clarify: I think a belief in an objective, absolute morality is consistent with my Christianity, and I think a disbelief in it is consistent with atheism. I sense an inconsistency with your beliefs, however: There is no god, but somehow there exists some sort of objective morality, sitting out there in the universe. It didn't make us, it may not even be aware of us, and we certainly can't measure it. But nevertheless, it holds some sort of authority over the actions of man. How does belief in that not constitute some sort of faith?

Is Platonism a faith? I'm not actually a Platonist, but I think it's clear that one can be a Platonist and believe in Forms, having been convinced by Plato's arguments. It doesn't seem to me that this is a faith in any meaningful sense.

[Insert several requests for me to restate my argument here.]

Okay, here's the argument again. This time, I'll do it as a formal argument.

1) There are moral propositions. (Premise - this rejects non-cognitivism, which I reject due to the Frege-Geach problem)2) They are either true or false. (Law of the Excluded Middle)3) They're not all false. Surely it is true that "on the subject of the existence of moral values, we ought to believe only what is true." (Premise - if we don't believe that moral proposition, what's this argument all about?)4) So some moral judgments correspond to reality. (From 2, 3, and the correspondence theory of truth)5) So moral values are part of reality. (Which is moral realism.)

The controversial premise here is, obviously, 3. Atheists can (and often do) deny 3. But their arguments are never anywhere near as strong as the initial plausibility of "on the subject of the existence of moral values, we ought to believe only what is true." Perhaps that particular moral statement is too abstract, so substitute what you like. "It is wrong to torture a child just for the fun of it" or "we ought to eat when we're hungry" or whatever you find most plausible. In the end, their argument can't succeed unless the premises of the opposing argument are more certain than the premises of my argument.

Let us take the view you think I should be adopting, error theory. The best arguments for error theory came from the brilliant philosopher J.L. Mackie. Mackie's first argument against moral realism is:

What do I object to? Premise 3, of course. Hard to find things weirder than quarks and scientists assure me that they exist. Nobody, I hope, is going to argue that premise 3 is more plausible than "pleasure is better than pain."

Again, I straightforwardly deny premise 3. As far as I can tell, you haven't offered me arguments any better than Mackie's. If you want to defeat my argument, you simply have to construct one where all of the premises are at least as certain as the most certain moral intuition - say, "All else being equal, a life of joy and satisfaction is better than a life of excruciating agony."

That's not what I'm intending to say. I'm saying that an atheist should not borrow from the Christian's worldview in order to defend his own.

Now this I very much object to. Moral realism predates Christianity by a good long way. Atheist moral realism (the Stoics) predates Christianity. You don't get to claim it as some sort of discovery of your own which nobody would have come up with without a concept of God. Moral realism is the common sense position. (Indeed, my full-fledged moral philosophy is known as "common sense moral intuitionism.") The fact that some silly atheists like Richard Dawkins are currently trying to overthrow it isn't my fault.

I believe in an absolute, objective morality because I believe, by faith, that our Creator is the author of morality, and it's an attribute that permeates Him and His creation, and that we do horrible damage to ourselves and others in a very real sense when we disobey it.

This is a perfectly consistent ontology. I am happy to let you believe it. I don't happen to agree, but, as you've probably figured out, virtually nobody agrees with me on everything and I'm fine with that.

But what doesn't make sense to me is this halfway house in between Christianity and atheism: rejection of the concept of God, but acceptance of an absolute standard of morality that somehow has authority over us, cannot be measured or seen, or explained, it just is.

I see where your problem is. Because you believe moral values are inextricably tied up with God, you cannot imagine how somebody can believe in one without the other. I sympathize with your dilemma, but I don't think the concept requires too much imagination.

To me, it just seems too convenient. The consistent materialist will acknowledge that, since everything is an accident of matter and energy, there must therefore be no transcendent morality.

As I've said before, I'm not a materialist.

What you're proposing sort of gives you the best of both worlds, doesn't it? You can moralize and instruct others on morality, or at least your view of it, and at the same time deny that there is anything to whom you are beholden to, anyone to whom you should bend your knee and acknowledge as the King.

Really? Isn't it easier simply to say that there are no moral values? That way I don't actually have to obey them. I can assure you that only a very few people pay attention to me when I try to instruct them in first order moral philosophy and I suspect those people would listen to me no matter what my second order moral philosophy was. As you pointed out, atheists who deny moral values, like Richard Dawkins, go about lecturing like Baptist preachers and other atheists rarely seem to point out the contradiction in his philosophy (except me, of course). Believe me - he has a far bigger following and influence than I have.

And, of course, I don't deny that I am beholden. I am beholden to the best understanding I have of morality. The people you are thinking of who have the best of both worlds are those who deny the existence of moral values. They get to do whatever they like. I don't get to cheat on my wife, no matter how much I might be tempted and no matter how certain I might be that I wouldn't get caught, because that would be wrong. One ought to keep one's promises. If I denied moral values, maybe I wouldn't cheat on my wife anyway, but I'd at least have the option. Why on earth do you think so many people are so anxious to deny moral values? So that they can ease their conscience when they don't do what they know they ought to do, that's why.

But, yes, you're right on that very last point. I don't have to bow the knee to anyone and acknowledge him as king.

Even I can't do that, as a Christian. If I step out of line, a bunch of elders will show up at my door, and they'll insist that the Bible says one thing while I keep doing another, and that one of them is going to have to give.

I don't say one thing and do another, of course. That would be inconsistent with my philosophy. The atheists who don't believe in moral realism are the ones who get to do that (with a clear conscience anyway - I don't deny that I could do that if I could bring myself to do it). It is true, however, that I have no Church elders to keep me in line. Just my family and friends.

So if enough people intuit it, it must be so? Is that our authority? People's intuition?

Actually, it is sufficient for me that I intuit it. However, I seem to have fewer intuitions than most people so it's a safe bet that if I intuit it, just about everybody else does as well. And, yes, intuition is the source of the premises on which my argument for moral realism rests. When you think about it, though, you'll see that that's all we ever have for any argument if you drill down far enough. Even the authority of science rests on an argument from intuitive premises. All of logic and mathematics rests on intuitive premises. Etc.

Why can't that be a simple instinct towards self-preservation as a species that evolved with us through the eons? That would certainly demote our notions of morality as something no more objective than brain chemicals.

Ah, now this is a serious argument. The argument here is that perhaps it is the case that evolution, purely for its own purposes (the survival of my genes), planted the moral intuitions which I have in order to "fool" me into doing what it wants me to do. I.e. perhaps evolution makes a stronger case for the existence of these intuitions than an actual intuition of reality. I respond in a number of different ways, but none of them are conclusive. 1) Like most people, I find the entire idea of evolution morally repugnant. Nature red in tooth and claw, might makes right, and survival of the strong by eliminating the weak, etc. It is very strange that evolution should have selected a morality which is antithetical to evolution itself. This is not a deadly objection, though, since evolution has no "goal" in mind (or any mind, for that matter). Perhaps we are simply a maladaptive error who will foolishly stop evolving because of this morality, and it just hasn't happened yet. 2) Kin altruism cannot explain stranger altruism - the man who risks his own life to save the life of a child he does not know. The usual explanation given by evolutionists, Dawkins for example, is "misfirings." (He also calls them "blessed, precious mistakes" of evolution, though I have no idea what possible standard he could be using to judge them in this way.) Again, this isn't conclusive. "Misfirings" is a weak explanation, but it is a possible explanation. (But, boy, evolution has sure screwed up with us, hasn't it?) 3) Evolution also gave us logical and mathematical intuitions. I am sufficiently convinced of the truth of logic and mathematics regardless. Clearly, we could have evolved so that our intuitions are intuitions of reality. My view, that evolution gave us a moral sense which actually senses moral values in reality is, I think, a better explanation for the "mistakes" of morality. Evolution is a sufficient explanation for most immorality, of course.

I assume you're aware that this exact same argument has been used to cut against religious faith. The claim is that evolution implanted this desire for faith in people for survival reasons (social cohesion probably). And, no, I don't really buy that either.

It is a good argument, but I don't think it's nearly as strong as my own.

If it's relevant, I consider myself a Calvinist.

It is relevant in that Calvin was notoriously hostile to philosophy; I don't reciprocate the hostility. Calvin was a remarkable thinker and a great theologian. I am the descendant of Puritans myself and was originally raised Congregationalist. I have a huge respect for the entire Calvinist tradition in this country and others.

Perhaps these other Christians are just nicer than I am. If you don't share my beliefs, then you are not entitled to use my premises as a springboard.

Again, they are not your premises. Christianity was the melding of Judaism with pagan Greek philosophy. The Greeks got there first. And the Greeks were at best pagan and most of their philosophers, like Epicurus, Aristotle, Plato, the Stoics, etc. had abandoned the gods (which is why they killed Socrates). Aristotle, who would be used extensively in medieval Christian theology, believed in an Uncaused Cause, but that was a metaphysical principle, the causal source of our world, impersonal, and caring nothing for us or our worship. Nevertheless, Aristotle's Ethics is a moral realist philosophy.

Do you accept all of Aquinas' arguments?

Of course not. But I regard Aquinas as the greatest Christian philosopher and a great commentator on Aristotle and I read what he has to say on any philosophical subject.

> I don't think I see a problem with this argument. Let me make sure I'm getting it right. If morality is part of God's nature and part of that morality is that you need him, then you therefore need him. I'd be inclined to agree with this, sure. If both of your premises are true, I'd grant you the conclusion.

And (to distinguish this argument from others in the thread that I have occasionally posited) this one represents my beliefs. It's certainly consistent with the Bible. There must be something about the way we are made that makes not only us, but everyone and everything around us, suffer when we fall into sin (which may or may not correspond to your idea about an objective moral standard that we are free to heed, or not). It sure seems that way. It sure seems like sin in people's lives cause all sort of grief for those who indulge in it, and those who have to live around those who indulge in it.

> In modern times, however, most atheists are thorough-going materialists, if not logical positivists.

This describes what I see.

> This may be due to the theory of evolution (although see G.E. Moore) or for other reasons.

Dawkins has stated, in various articles one could entitle "Three Cheers for Evolution!", that the beauty of evolution is that it makes atheism intellectually respectable. Which makes it sound less like he appreciates evolution for what it tells us about science than for what it tells us about God... or would if we let it.

> Personally, I think it's because of the rise of scientism - the view that natural science has authority over all other interpretations of life and other fields of inquiry, including philosophy.

This has been true particularly since WWII and C.P. Snow.

> Since science must use methodological materialism, there is often a belief that science has proven materialism, which it plainly hasn't.

Bless you. I have tried so many times to explain to materialists that they haven't proven materialism, but only assumed it.

> This leaves less space for moral realism, since the very foundation requires an assumption that it must be false. I reject scientism, of course, since there is no reason to believe in science without philosophy. The truths of philosophy are, and must be, prior to science.

Again, let me say a good hearty amen. I believe there is another assumption prior to that one, but at least that relationship is properly categorized.

>> Is the goal to believe in as few abstract entities as possible? If so, then you could save yourself a couple of steps. Why believe in morality as something distinct and real at all, if you don't believe in God?

> I wouldn't say that's the goal, no. However, Occam's Razor and all that. If it's unnecessary to postulate entities, I don't do so. I am forced to postulate one particular kind of abstract entity - that being universals. These universals have many different kinds, however - colors, mass, length, numbers, the laws of physics, the laws of mathematics, and moral values. (I am not a Platonist, by the way, though that may make me sound like one. I am, in fact, an immanent realist as Aristotle was. Universals exist in particulars not in a free-floating way. Moral values, for example, inhere in states of affairs.)

Well, then as I stated, you could postulate fewer assumptions. You could assume, for example, that you cannot trust what you call your instincts that a higher morality exists. Since it can be explained as an outgrowth of materialism (via evolution), then you should assume that morality, rather than being an absolute, is a mere conceit, that must have arisen because of the tautological but nevertheless worshiped "survival of the fittest" mantra.

>> I would posit that if morals are not greater than man, then they can hold no authority over him.

Again, I don't know what this whole "authority" concept is all about.

Well, I don't know how something can be called "morality" without implying some sort of authority over our actions. I don't have an Oxford's, but here's Random House's attempt to define morality:

1. conformity to the rules of right conduct; moral or virtuous conduct.2. moral quality or character.3. virtue in sexual matters; chastity.4. a doctrine or system of morals.5. moral instruction; a moral lesson, precept, discourse, or utterance.

"Rules". "Virtue". "Doctrine". "Instruction". "Lesson". All of these words suggest some degree of authority. Without that authority, a "rule" becomes a mere preference.

> Moral values do not have the ability to punish or reward. They just have the ability to motivate.

We don't know that, do we? For all we know, there will be plenty of punishment and reward some day. I believe it will. To be fair, you have to at least grant the possibility.

> Again, moral values do not "instruct" man. They just exist, again like the laws of mathematics.

And again, if they don't instruct, then they aren't morals. Maybe they're recommendations. Maybe they're non-judgmental propositions that don't work depending on how much we respect other cultures. Maybe they're complete and utter figments of our imaginations, conceits that we tend to agree with so long as they help us accomplish our immediate goal.

>> Surely, even a Christian can argue a from hypothetical proposition?

> By all means. It just seems an odd thing to argue that it could not be possible to apprehend morals, when in fact you think they exist (whether the nature of God or what have you).

As I've said, I think morals follow from my premises, but I see no reason to grant you access to them unless you share my premises.

> Is Platonism a faith? I'm not actually a Platonist, but I think it's clear that one can be a Platonist and believe in Forms, having been convinced by Plato's arguments. It doesn't seem to me that this is a faith in any meaningful sense.

Checking the dictionary again:

faith: belief that is not based on proof; belief in anything, as a code of ethics, standards of merit, etc.

There are other definitions, but these are the ones I mean. And then let's let the Book of Hebrews have a say in all this:

> "Now faith is the substance of things hoped for, the evidence of things not seen."

Since your concept of morality cannot be "seen" (measured or inferred), I would say it qualifies as faith.

> Okay, here's the argument again. This time, I'll do it as a formal argument.

> So moral values are part of reality. (Which is moral realism.)

Well, I believe that, and I believe it follows from the premises of my faith. I don't see how it follows from a position of non-faith.

> 1) There are moral propositions. (Premise - this rejects non-cognitivism, which I reject due to the Frege-Geach problem)> 2) They are either true or false. (Law of the Excluded Middle)

I can't even grant you the first proposition, let alone the second, if you do not believe the universe itself is a creation. There are moral propositions? Where did meaning itself come from? Who invented it? How did the whole universe come about without a creator, and therefore through blind happenstance, and yet there be something called "meaning"?

I believe in meaning because I believe 'In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God.' Meaning follows from my assumptions, but you have rejected God, and therefore you reject my assumptions. I question whether meaning can be accepted with confidence as a true concept, in a godless universe.

> Let us take the view you think I should be adopting, error theory.

I would be more interested in your response to the arguments put forth by presuppositional apologetics.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Presuppositional_apologetics

There is an interesting (to me) link to a debate between Doug Wilson and Theodore Drange. Wilson calls his argument "the argument from transcendence", but I think it's probably fairly close to what I'm talking about.

> If you want to defeat my argument, you simply have to construct one where all of the premises are at least as certain as the most certain moral intuition - say, "All else being equal, a life of joy and satisfaction is better than a life of excruciating agony."

I'm not sure the burden of proof is on me at all. You're the one who accepts a set of moral principles without God -- I have already admitted to having a faith, have I not? But you believe in something that cannot be observed or tested, that you believe because of "instinct", apparently. Abstract concepts that you think are real.

>> That's not what I'm intending to say. I'm saying that an atheist should not borrow from the Christian's worldview in order to defend his own.

> Now this I very much object to. Moral realism predates Christianity by a good long way.

If God exists, He predates moral realism by a good long way. Even by worldly measure, moral realism does not predate Judeo-Christianity, and we Calvinists don't throw away the Old Testament as if it tells us nothing.

> Atheist moral realism (the Stoics) predates Christianity.

But does not predate Yahweh in any sense.

> You don't get to claim it as some sort of discovery of your own which nobody would have come up with without a concept of God.

I don't. It's a tenet of Calvinism that everyone can perceive what is right, they just cannot choose to accept it unless the Lord chooses them. I only claim that there are many things that depend on a God in order to exist.

> Moral realism is the common sense position. (Indeed, my full-fledged moral philosophy is known as "common sense moral intuitionism.") The fact that some silly atheists like Richard Dawkins are currently trying to overthrow it isn't my fault.

I stand educated on this issue, and grant you that with pleasure.

> I see where your problem is. Because you believe moral values are inextricably tied up with God, you cannot imagine how somebody can believe in one without the other.

Close enough. I cannot imagine, nor can I construct logically, how something that is a part of our universe along with us somehow has more moral wisdom, and that this something has moral authority over us without being above us.

> I sympathize with your dilemma, but I don't think the concept requires too much imagination.

It's not just imagination that is failing me. It doesn't make logical sense.

> As I've said before, I'm not a materialist.

Fine, but you haven't provided any reason to believe that a non-materialist universe is possible. You certainly can't get there logically. Nothing was created; it just happened. There is no higher intelligence, whether cognitive, moral, or any other way. It just happened. Your instincts lead you to believe in moral absolutes, when all it really is, is a set of delusions of significance. What you call 'morals' is in fact a set of notions that enough human beings believe in so that the species survives. All of this follows from an atheistic premise. From atheism, follows materialism, unless you can demonstrate why a separate morality can just be out there.

> Really? Isn't it easier simply to say that there are no moral values?

Easier, perhaps, but it just doesn't seem to work that way. Most atheists, like most Christians, like to prescribe behavior for other people. You can't do that without moral authority. Atheists -- okay, materialists, for sure -- throw away any basis for moral authority, but that doesn't stop them. A materialist-atheist can't even argue against Christianity effectively, even if his argument is objectively true: for example, if morals were necessary for human evolution and survival, then Christianity evolved as the best of the religious systems, and must have done so because it helped humanity to survive, and therefore it fits the needs of both atheists and Christians.

> But, yes, you're right on that very last point. I don't have to bow the knee to anyone and acknowledge him as king.

I believe that there is a King, and He made all the things you hold dear, and you (along with all of us) owe Him a debt of gratitude that can never be repaid. I pray you will arrive there, someday.

> I don't say one thing and do another, of course.

Then you're a better "Christian" than I am, I'm afraid. I go astray all the time. Fortunately, our Lord is a forgiving God.

> It is true, however, that I have no Church elders to keep me in line. Just my family and friends.

I find Calvinism to be a humbling theology. I need my family, friends, and elders all to keep an eye on me.

> So if enough people intuit it, it must be so? Is that our authority? People's intuition?

Actually, it is sufficient for me that I intuit it.

That's fine with me too, but intuition isn't proof, and it's probably not much evidence either. I do accept, however, C. S. Lewis' argument that a hunger for something implies the existence of that which is hungered for.

> It is relevant in that Calvin was notoriously hostile to philosophy; I don't reciprocate the hostility. Calvin was a remarkable thinker and a great theologian.

Calvin's hostility to philosophy was due to the pagan Greeks, perhaps, who were then (of course) expert debaters. Paul himself took them on at least once and (according to Biblical accounts) did quite well against them, but is still quick to point out that belief in Christ will be dismissed as heresy by the Jews and "foolishness" by the Greeks. "Professing themselves to be wise, they became as fools." Paul taught that all are "dead in sin", that "no one seeks righteousness, no, not one." It follows from this that we cannot perceive God unless God Himself awakens us from our death-unbelief.

> Again, they are not your premises. Christianity was the melding of Judaism with pagan Greek philosophy.

I don't think so. Christianity is the melding of Judaism with Judaisms' culmination in Christ and the teachings of the New Testament. Christ, in His own words, came to "fulfill scripture, not to overturn it." I don't see what Greek philosophy has to do with it.

> The Greeks got there first.

God got there first.

> Aristotle, who would be used extensively in medieval Christian theology, believed in an Uncaused Cause, but that was a metaphysical principle, the causal source of our world, impersonal, and caring nothing for us or our worship. Nevertheless, Aristotle's Ethics is a moral realist philosophy.

Aristotle was a pagan who gave us a lot of wonderful intellectual tools and methods.

It's been a pleasure, Andrew. I'm not signing off, I'm just grateful that you have taken the time and energy to respond very intelligently and courteously to my questions.

Dawkins has stated, in various articles one could entitle "Three Cheers for Evolution!", that the beauty of evolution is that it makes atheism intellectually respectable. Which makes it sound less like he appreciates evolution for what it tells us about science than for what it tells us about God... or would if we let it.

To be fair to Dawkins, he seems to find evolution beautiful because it's an elegant solution to the problem of organized complexity, more than that it does away with God. The "intellectually respectable" bit is where Dawkins was mistaken. In The Blind Watchmaker he stated that, without evolution, he would be forced to believe in God to solve the problem of organized complexity. I demur. As Dawkins himself will occasionally point out, God is a bigger mystery than organized complexity. Dawkins's willingness to believe in God absent evolution is an argumentum ad ignorantiam. Because there was an apparent lack of evidence for a hypothesis (a natural explanation for organized complexity), therefore another chosen hypothesis (God) was considered proven. This is a fallacy.

Well, then as I stated, you could postulate fewer assumptions. You could assume, for example, that you cannot trust what you call your instincts that a higher morality exists. Since it can be explained as an outgrowth of materialism (via evolution), then you should assume that morality, rather than being an absolute, is a mere conceit, that must have arisen because of the tautological but nevertheless worshiped "survival of the fittest" mantra.

This is an epistemological distinction. My belief in the existence of morality is justified. I do not believe that evolution provides a sufficient defeater. Indeed, I don't believe that it can be a defeater. Let us assume that evolution is the sole origin of morality. Does it not then follow, given no other standard, that we should ignore the "mistakes" of evolution? Shouldn't we behave in whatever way will maximize our differential reproductive success? So I have to ask myself which is more likely - that it is not true that evolution is the sole source of morality or that I should refrain from taking any risks to save the life of a child not related to me? Given the long chain of reasoning that would lead one to the belief that evolution is the sole source of all morality, with fairly large holes in the argument and the immediate plausibility of the moral premise it denies, this is a fairly easy choice.

We don't know that, do we? For all we know, there will be plenty of punishment and reward some day. I believe it will. To be fair, you have to at least grant the possibility.

I do grant the logical possibility that God exists. I thought that had been clear all along.

I would be more interested in your response to the arguments put forth by presuppositional apologetics.

I've cut out much of your other arguments since they rely, for their force, on presuppositional apologetics. I.e. you have mostly asserted that things which we both agree clearly exist (meaning, logic, values, etc.) couldn't exist unless God does. I read most of the debate between Drs. Wilson and Drange. I'm a little surprised you chose that argument since, while I don't think Dr. Drange made a particularly great case for his own arguments against Christianity, I think he easily refuted Dr. Wilson's arguments. (And I'm not the only one.) However, the link I just gave is from a presuppositional apologist who believes Dr. Wilson could have done a better job, so it's not necessarily the case that presuppositional apologetics stand refuted.

As it turns out, Michael Martin, an atheist philosopher of religion has dealt with TAG fairly extensively and nothing I say could improve on his work. (See this page here and scroll down to the section titled Presuppositionalism.)

The major problem of presuppositionalism is that, like Dawkins, it relies on an argumentum ad ignorantiam, at best. I have pointed out a couple of times that I don't accept God as an answer to the mysteries of the world, because the existence of God would be an even greater mystery. However, it does not follow from this that the existence of God is refuted. The fact that God is a mystery doesn't mean it's not possible for him to exist. Similarly, the fact that we don't necessarily have an answer (yet) to all the problems of philosophy does not entail the truth of the God hypothesis. You have to demonstrate that such-and-such (meaning, logic, moral values, etc.) is impossible without God. I don't believe that TAG comes remotely close to discharging its burden. At best, they have an argument against materialism (actually, I think they have a very good one there, which is why I am not a materialist), but the argument does not prove the existence of God. Even if it did, it wouldn't prove the truth of Christianity. One of the reasons I think Calvin was hostile to philosophy is that it just isn't possible to prove Christianity philosophically. It might be possible to prove the existence of a god, but at best you'd wind up with Aristotle's Uncaused Cause, an impersonal metaphysical principle.

If God exists, He predates moral realism by a good long way. Even by worldly measure, moral realism does not predate Judeo-Christianity, and we Calvinists don't throw away the Old Testament as if it tells us nothing.

I believe moral realism predates Judaism. The ancient Egyptians were moral realists before Abraham as were other societies. Obviously, if you are right and God exists, moral realism doesn't predate God himself. I'm just making a claim of intellectual heritage here.

That's fine with me too, but intuition isn't proof, and it's probably not much evidence either. I do accept, however, C. S. Lewis' argument that a hunger for something implies the existence of that which is hungered for.

It depends on the intuition. Some intuitions are self-evident. The Law of Non-Contradiction, properly understood, cannot be denied. But it can't be proved as such. My argument for my intuitions is that they are self-evident - properly understanding them is all one needs to be justified in believing them.

I am a great admirer of C.S. Lewis, but I've never been terribly impressed with his "Argument from Desire." (However, The Abolition of Man was an excellent skewering of the logical positivists thirty years before they finally collapsed.) I desire the ability to fly under my own power. This is not evidence that there's anyone who can do it.

I don't think so. Christianity is the melding of Judaism with Judaisms' culmination in Christ and the teachings of the New Testament. Christ, in His own words, came to "fulfill scripture, not to overturn it." I don't see what Greek philosophy has to do with it.

Surely, you can see the presence of Greek philosophy in Christian theology throughout the ages? The Council of Nicaea was heavily indebted to Greek philosophy to help solve the various metaphysical conundrums that Christianity presented, culminating in the doctrine of the Trinity. None of this makes Christianity false, but the debt seems quite clear to me. Following Nicaea, the debt becomes even greater with Augustine and Aquinas and many others.

It's been a pleasure, Andrew. I'm not signing off, I'm just grateful that you have taken the time and energy to respond very intelligently and courteously to my questions.

Now that I know you're coming at things from a presuppositionalist position, the debate makes a lot more sense to me than it did earlier. I am more used to discussing things with evidential apologists, so it has certainly been educational.

Any way you slice and dice it, that's is an assumption on your part, even if you do share it with other philosophers. I go further and call it a faith. Either way, it is unproven and unprovable by conventional logical means. If it's where your instinct leads you, great, but there are other instincts, and other assumptions, and all are clamoring to be the standard-beared.

> Does it not then follow, given no other standard, that we should ignore the "mistakes" of evolution? Shouldn't we behave in whatever way will maximize our differential reproductive success?

In a materialist vision, we would have no cause to suspect evolution of these things you call mistakes. There are only things that you would prefer vs. things you wouldn't prefer. Survival is evolution's goal and does not even raise to the level of a moral.

> Shouldn't we behave in whatever way will maximize our differential reproductive success?

Does evolution work that way? I don't think evolution offers survival as a moral imperative (even if social Darwinists do), it just is. I think the mechanism itself is indifferent to who survives, and the surviving speces follow evolution like it or not, aware of it or not.

> So I have to ask myself which is more likely - that it is not true that evolution is the sole source of morality or that I should refrain from taking any risks to save the life of a child not related to me?

My position is that morality does not have any authority or meaning in a Darwinistic setting. The tautological beauty of it is that you can't make a bad decision, so long as the species survives. If you try to save the kid and lose your life, congratulations, you were true to your species and it is that behavior which leads to man's survival. If you don't risk your life and the kids drowns, congratulations, you showed the caution that explains how man has survived for so long. Just so stories.

> Given the long chain of reasoning that would lead one to the belief that evolution is the sole source of all morality, with fairly large holes in the argument and the immediate plausibility of the moral premise it denies, this is a fairly easy choice.

It would lead me to believe that morality is just a survival instinct and has no higher meaning. It only seems like it does, but it has to seem that way or our delusions of the moral good would not be able to help us survive. I think this is where materialism leads. As Doug Wilson puts it, in a materialist world, there is no such thing as logic or debate. I am a can of Coke and you are a can of Pepsi, and someone shook us both up, and we're fizzing at each other, and there is no way to separate out the chemicals that represent "thought" from the ones that merely represent chemicals.

> I've cut out much of your other arguments since they rely, for their force, on presuppositional apologetics. I.e. you have mostly asserted that things which we both agree clearly exist (meaning, logic, values, etc.) couldn't exist unless God does. I read most of the debate between Drs. Wilson and Drange. I'm a little surprised you chose that argument since, while I don't think Dr. Drange made a particularly great case for his own arguments against Christianity, I think he easily refuted Dr. Wilson's arguments. (And I'm not the only one.)

I don't even think he addressed Wilson's arguments, let alone refuted them. We all presuppose something. Someone who does not believe in God is left with a universe without a creator, and devoid of meaning. Why should the universe be meaningless, but reason be meaningful? Someone who accepts reason, without accepting God, needs to explain how it can exist.

> The major problem of presuppositionalism is that, like Dawkins, it relies on an argumentum ad ignorantiam, at best.

I don't see it, but I will grant a case could be made.

> I have pointed out a couple of times that I don't accept God as an answer to the mysteries of the world, because the existence of God would be an even greater mystery.

I don't know how mysteries get rated on a scale of lesser to greater, but the mystery of how morality can exist out there somewhere in the universe without God doesn't get off Scot free.

> However, it does not follow from this that the existence of God is refuted. The fact that God is a mystery doesn't mean it's not possible for him to exist. Similarly, the fact that we don't necessarily have an answer (yet) to all the problems of philosophy does not entail the truth of the God hypothesis. You have to demonstrate that such-and-such (meaning, logic, moral values, etc.) is impossible without God.

I would have to use logic to prove it? That's the problem, isn't it? Like I said, we all presuppose something.

I would say it depends on who has the burden of proof. Your view rests on the presumption that something without intelligence can give birth to intelligence; something without morality can give birth to morality; something without order can give birth to something with order. Explaining how such things could be is far more remarkable than explaining how a God of logic and morality can give birth to a universe where it means something.

> It depends on the intuition. Some intuitions are self-evident. The Law of Non-Contradiction, properly understood, cannot be denied. But it can't be proved as such. My argument for my intuitions is that they are self-evident - properly understanding them is all one needs to be justified in believing them.

To me, it doesn't seem self-evident that morality can exist apart from God.

> Surely, you can see the presence of Greek philosophy in Christian theology throughout the ages?

Of course, we are Western civilization, after all. What I don't see is that Christianity is essentially Greek, or that Greek philosophy was anything but a supporting player. Christianity is still an Eastern concept, and the theology butts heads with Greek philosophy and culture in many ways. It's one of the reasons, I think, why Reformed Christianity, which is now a small minority of Protestant churches, even though three or four centuries ago it pretty much defined all of Protestantism. The evangelical movement is mostly Arminian, and fits in nicely with American concepts of individuality, which America owes to the Greeks. The earliest theological battles of the Church were against Gnostics, who held (oversimplified) that the spirit was good and the body was bad, and that knowledge was the key to salvation. Gnosticism was very Greek. Paul the Jew had to fight these notions tooth and nail to preserve Christianity as essentially a Hebrew faith.

Christianity is a part of Western culture. But it would survive just fine without Western culture. I doubt the converse is true, and I think we're about to find out.

So what's your background, Andrew? Are you a Ph.D? A philosophy professor? Or is this just your idea of fun?

I'm a computer geek by trade, in my mid-fifties, a trombone player by compulsion, but the weak link in my character is I can't resist a good controversy. You know much more about philosophy than I do, I'm afraid. But I have enjoyed deciphering your arguments.

Does evolution work that way? I don't think evolution offers survival as a moral imperative (even if social Darwinists do), it just is. I think the mechanism itself is indifferent to who survives, and the surviving speces follow evolution like it or not, aware of it or not.

Yes, everybody agrees with that. (Not historically of course, but Nietzsche, Wagner, and Shaw are now all dead.)

My position is that morality does not have any authority or meaning in a Darwinistic setting. The tautological beauty of it is that you can't make a bad decision, so long as the species survives. If you try to save the kid and lose your life, congratulations, you were true to your species and it is that behavior which leads to man's survival. If you don't risk your life and the kids drowns, congratulations, you showed the caution that explains how man has survived for so long. Just so stories.

This is not true, however. The question isn't whether the species survives. (Most of the species we sprang from are long dead now.) The question is which individual's genes survived to create the species we are today.

I would say it depends on who has the burden of proof. Your view rests on the presumption that something without intelligence can give birth to intelligence; something without morality can give birth to morality; something without order can give birth to something with order. Explaining how such things could be is far more remarkable than explaining how a God of logic and morality can give birth to a universe where it means something.

I agree with this, of course. A God of logic and morality giving birth to the universe clearly makes sense of logic and morality. The problem is why does a God of logic and morality exist? This is much stranger than logic and morality simpliciter, since one includes the other with all sorts of additional attributes.

On the subject of Greeks and Christianity: I agree with most of what you said there. There certainly was a tension between Judaism and Greek philosophy at first, which eventually resulted in the compromise which we are now pleased to call Christianity. If we just focused on the Apostles, though, I grant that Greek philosophy had not yet made that much headway. See this article for specifics on the intersection between Judaism and Greek philosophy. I believe the whole idea of "omnipotent, omniscient, and omnibenevolent" with God being infinite and perfect and all the rest is specifically a Greek concept, not a Hebrew concept.

So what's your background, Andrew? Are you a Ph.D? A philosophy professor? Or is this just your idea of fun?

The last I'm afraid. By trade, I'm a mathematician. I began in philosophy, veered into mathematics, but have continued to study philosophy as a hobby ever since. However, I rarely engage in this sort of debate since I'm certainly not interested in trying to convert anybody to atheism. Moral realism is another matter, since I believe that disbelief in moral realism can do real harm. I suppose there is something to the idea that certain forms of Christianity do as well. E.g., it is probably very easy for an Arminian to act immorally as well, since we're all depraved and saved purely by faith anyway.

> See this article for specifics on the intersection between Judaism and Greek philosophy. I believe the whole idea of "omnipotent, omniscient, and omnibenevolent" with God being infinite and perfect and all the rest is specifically a Greek concept, not a Hebrew concept.

I would have to dig out the verses, but if you would check the Westminster Confession, I'm positive that there are scriptural references for all three concepts.

Well, of course there is. It was drawn up in 1646. The Greek influence on Christianity began in the 1st century A.D. at least. (It may have influenced Judaism prior to that since Judea had been thoroughly Hellenized by then.)

But there are no references to such concepts in the Hebrew Bible. Greek philosophy starts infuencing the religion with the Gospel of John. ("Logos," the universal reason, was borrowed from the Stoics.)

I meant to say that if there is a reference to it in the Westminster Confession, then it has scriptural references to substantiate the claim.

The Westminster Confession states:

"I. There is but one only, living, and true God, who is infinite in being and perfection, a most pure spirit, invisible, without body, parts, or passions; immutable, immense, eternal, incomprehensible, almighty, most wise, most holy, most free, most absolute; working all things according to the counsel of His own immutable and most righteous will, for His own glory; most loving, gracious, merciful, long-suffering, abundant in goodness and truth, forgiving iniquity, transgression, and sin; the rewarder of them that diligently seek Him; and withal, most just, and terrible in His judgments, hating all sin, and who will by no means clear the guilty."

Now for the scriptural references...

1. God as omnipotent:

GEN 17:1 And when Abram was ninety years old and nine, the Lord appeared to Abram, and said unto him, I am the Almighty God; walk before me, and be thou perfect.

REV 4:8 And the four beasts had each of them six wings about him; and they were full of eyes within: and they rest not day and night, saying, Holy, holy, holy, Lord God Almighty, which was, and is, and is to come.

ROM 11:36 For of him, and through him, and to him, are all things: to whom be glory for ever. Amen.

2. God as omniscient:

ROM 11:33 O the depth of the riches both of the wisdom and knowledge of God! how unsearchable are his judgments, and his ways past finding out! 34 For who hath known the mind of the Lord? or who hath been his counsellor?

PSA 147:5 Great is our Lord, and of great power: his understanding is infinite.

3. God as omnibenevolent:

EXO 34:6 And the Lord passed by before him, and proclaimed, The Lord, The Lord God, merciful and gracious, longsuffering, and abundant in goodness and truth, 7 Keeping mercy for thousands, forgiving iniquity and transgression and sin, and that will by no means clear the guilty; visiting the iniquity of the fathers upon the children, and upon the children's children, unto the third and to the fourth generation.

[By the way, all of that is the name of the Lord -- just His name!]

These concepts were around for quite a while before the Greeks got there.

I'm not trying to deny the role of the Greeks. Along with C.S. Lewis, I don't think the choice of Jesus's birth in Judea and at that time were an accident. The Greeks contributed undeniably to the assortment of intellectual tools by which we grapple with these important issues. Certainly, Paul was well-schooled in arts of logic and rhetoric, as were probably all of the the rabbis from that era. Look at the history of the times: the Jews were captured by the Babylonians ca. 620 B.C., were liberated from the Babylonians by the Persians and restored to their homelance ca. 550 B.C., were ruled by Alexander and his successors, and then finally taken over by the Romans ca. 40 B.C. The Persians were very enlightened and cultured, as were the Greeks (if not quite the Macedonians), as were the Romans. There *had* to have been some influence.

But the influence, I would hold, is mainly in the interpretative arts, not in the raw stuff of Judeo-Christianity itself. The Word was already there. The Greeks certainly helped the interpretation.

After I wrote my comment, I realized that I had misinterpreted you. Sorry about that.

But the influence, I would hold, is mainly in the interpretative arts, not in the raw stuff of Judeo-Christianity itself. The Word was already there. The Greeks certainly helped the interpretation.

If you're arguing that most of the message of Judeo-Christianity comes from Jewish tradition and the life and words of Christ himself, then I would tend to agree. But when we are talking about the theology and the philosophy of Christianity, the heritage from pagan Greek philosophy is unmistakable.

The arguments of the presuppositional apologists are very similar to Plato's arguments for the Forms or for moral realism, except now tied to God, or the Stoics' arguments for Logos, now tied to God, etc. This is most explicit in medieval theology when Aristotle's arguments were recast for the Christian God. I'm fine with your intuitive belief that nothing immaterial can exist without God, but the arguments for immaterial abstract objects without God predate the arguments for them with him.