The following is a preliminary translation of
an essay by Ye Ren, published in the July and August 1995
issues of
The 90's
- an influential and popular Hong Kong magazine covering
politics and culture. This document is being provided for
reference purposes only.

This article is also available in its original Chinese, in
both
text
and
GIF
versions.

Part One:
THE DEMOCRACY MOVEMENT IN EXILE IS TRAPPED BY COMMUNIST
MENTALITY

Summary: Chai Ling's "hoping for bloodshed" speech is
actually quite simple, but a considerable number of democracy
fighters are fearful of this topic. They all condemned the film
("The Gate of Heavenly Peace") as having ulterior motives.
Exiled democracy fighters are the spoiled "only-child" of
Chinese democracy. They are fighting the Communist Party with
the Communist Party's mode of thinking. Their attitude toward
Western democracy is like that of "Lord She loving the dragon."
(Translator's note: "Lord She Loving the Dragon" is an ancient
Chinese fable about Lord She, who loves dragons so much
that he has dragons painted and carved all over his house. A
real dragon hears of Lord She's love for dragons and goes to
see him. As soon as the dragon appears, however, Lord She is
scared and runs away. This metaphor is often used to describe
people who think they like something until they see the real
thing.)

The Gate of Heavenly Peace (hereafter referred to as GATE), a
film about the 1989 democracy movement, made by Carma Hinton and
others, was discussed in the press even before it was finished
and this discussion provoked vehement denunciation of the film by
some exiled democracy fighters. Xue Xiaoguang of
United Daily News, Hong Kong, and Patrick Tyler of the
New York Times, both of whom wrote about the film in their papers, were put on
trial by public opinion together with Carma Hinton. China Spring
published a commentary denouncing Xue's article along with a
photo-copy of the article, as if presenting criminal evidence.
Beijing Spring published an editorial accusing Xue of "following
the logic of a bandit". The World Journal, perhaps uneasy about
having run Xue's piece and having reported on Tyler's piece,
published an editorial on May 8th, solemnly stating that "the
blame for the Tiananmen Massacre should not be shifted onto the
students".

A Frenzied Reaction Incited by a Documentary Film

The reason for such an uproar over a documentary is that the
film used (revisited) an interview given by student leader Chai
Ling to an American journalist before the June 4th Massacre. In
it Chai Ling said: "What we are actually hoping for is bloodshed,
for the moment when the government has no choice but to brazenly
butcher the people. Only when the Square is awash with blood will
the people of China open their eyes." Looking back on the events
of 1989, it seems clear that although the students would still
have suffered some form of government retaliation, the number of
casualties would have been less for both the students and the
citizens had they left Tiananmen Square earlier. Should leaders
like Chai Ling who resisted leaving the Square and who even hoped
for bloodshed bear some responsibility for the tragic outcome of
June 4th? The film in effect raised this question.

If, due to bad judgment, a general exposed his troops to heavy
enemy fire and thus incurred huge losses, should he be held
responsible? This is not a question that would stir up endless
controversy. And when holding this general responsible for his
role, we do not deny that it was indeed enemy fire, not the
general, which killed his troops, and that he himself also risked
his life. To raise an obvious issue like this does not require
any devious mindset or outlandish logic.

In China, intellectuals and other participants of the movement
have been discussing this issue among themselves ever since June
Fourth. Outside China, open discussion of this issue in the
academic world has also been seen as perfectly normal. Before
June Fourth, the student leaders themselves were deeply divided
over whether or not to leave the Square. Since they never reached
a consensus, it is only natural that the debate should continue
to the present. And in a democratic society, such debates are
taken for granted.

Is the Communist Party trying to transfer the blame for the
massacre?

Yet judging from all the denunciations of GATE, a considerable
number of democracy fighters seem to abhor the discussion of this
issue. To them, the filmmakers raised the issue out of ulterior
motives and were therefore extremely immoral. Bai Meng, the
former head of the public address system at Tiananmen Square,
sounded an alarm in an article in Beijing Spring: "Carma Hinton,
who had grown up in China like an aristocrat and who has deep
ties at the highest levels of the Chinese Communist Party, has
gathered together a handful of characters with dubious political
background, and fabricated a film called GATE." Bai Meng then
went on to examine each of these dubious characters: Dai Qing,
Hinton, Xue Xiaoguang, Liu Xiaobo, Zhou Duo, Gong Xiaoxia, etc..
The outcome of his investigation: Every one of these characters,
including the father of one of them, turned out to have serious
problems in their political attitude. These people are banding
together and "aiming weapons which are even more lethal than
those used by the Chinese government at us, the children of
Tiananmen."

Chai Ling, who is at the center of the controversy, displayed an
even more acute insight than her former deputies. In an interview
published in the World Journal just before the 6th anniversary of
June Fourth, she pointed out, "Recently, a small number of people
in the Western media have tried to divide the students from
Tiananmen into radicals and moderates. By using the tactic of
currying favor with some, and attacking others, they intend to
transfer the blame for the bloodshed onto the so-called hard-line
students. Following this attempt, the Chinese communist news
agency Xinhua clamored about opposing radicalism. We must be
vigilant and pay close attention to this well-planned and
well-organized attempt to divide the forces for democracy." Is
Chai Ling suggesting that the Chinese Communists have already
joined up with Chinese-language newspapers abroad, the
New York Times, and American filmmakers in a coordinated effort with its own
official media to transfer the blame for the massacre onto people
like herself through careful plotting? I find it hard to believe
that even in the wildest dreams of the Communist Party it could
imagine itself being so successful at forming united fronts.

What we see here is a very peculiar phenomenon. Those who
advocate themselves as devoting their lives to democracy are not
willing to use democratic methods to discuss an issue. Their
treatment of people who hold different opinions is to immediately
check their family background, investigate the history of their
political attitudes, and to uncover an "evil master-mind" behind
them. The language they use, such as "characters with dubious
political background, "a small number of people in the media,"
and "curry favor with some and attack others," reminds one of the
terms used in the days of political persecution campaigns in
China. Their behavior resembles that of the Communist Party, and
the way they go about advocating democracy resembles McCarthyism.

Enlightenment or Public Space?

There are reasons why a democracy movement which was so
inspiring to the Chinese people and so moving in the eyes of the
world has deteriorated to such a state.

Ever since the May Fourth Movement (1919), the idea of
enlightenment has had a profound influence on generations of
Chinese intellectuals and has contributed significantly to
China's progress. The inadequacy of this tradition, however, has
never been fully examined. This idea of enlightenment is best
explained through a metaphor used by the writer Lu Xun early in
this century: People are asleep in an windowless iron cell
without knowing that they would all eventually stifle to death.
Only one person among them is awake. Enlightenment means that
this one person will try to wake up the rest, and together they
will smash the iron cell. According to this line of thinking,
there are two kinds of people, those who are asleep and those who
are awake; those who are saviors and those who need to be saved.
The future of a society is determined by whether those who need
to be saved would listen to the wake-up call of their saviors.

The interpretation of 1989 movement from this perspective is as
follows: The unprecedented scale of the student movement was a
result of years of enlightenment efforts. The students, being the
ones who were awake, no doubt must try to save the world. Their
mission was to awaken more people. Chai Ling's "hoping for
bloodshed" speech may sound somewhat cruel, but if bloodshed
could further awaken the people, it would be an effective way to
save them.

There is, however, another way to interpret history: Heroes
certainly do exist, but the majority of the people are not
heroes. They don't easily take risks or sacrifice themselves for
a cause. But that does not mean that the workers and peasants of
China are necessarily more ignorant than the students and
intellectuals, or that they necessarily need those who had read
books to tell them what their interests are. From this
perspective, the reason why such a large scale movement could
erupt had more to do with the appearance of some degree of
"public space" in Chinese society, especially in the
universities. In this space, people were able to exchange ideas
more freely, could form common bonds, and could find support for
one another. Instead of facing state power as isolated
individuals, people were now protected somewhat by the "public
space" within which they operate.

For example, student movements did take place before 1989, and
the government did try to suppress them. But because during the
1980s some form of "public space" gradually developed in the
universities, the students were able to support and protect one
another. When the government arrested one student, the whole
university would go out to protest. This process made the price
of punishing individuals higher for the government, and it
reduced the risk for individuals engaging in political protest.
Thus the students became increasingly "brave". The ordinary
people, by contrast, did not have the protection of this kind of
"public space". When students were arrested for demonstrating,
they at most got beaten up, and after two or three days were
welcomed back to campus as heroes. But a worker doing the same
would most likely get ten years in jail. Similarly, in 1989, when
two ordinary individuals expressed their anger towards the
oppressive system, as the students were doing, by throwing ink at
Mao's portrait, they were arrested by students, "the saviors of
the nation," and turned over to the police. Without any "public
space" protecting them, they ended up suffering long years in
prison. Given the different stakes, how could we expect the
ordinary people not to be more "ignorant"?

The scale of the 1989 movement was due, in large part, to an
expanded "public space". It enabled large numbers of people who
were neither risk-takers nor heroes to "bravely" throw themselves
into the movement with relatively little fear. Therefore, when
faced with the threat of government force, the key strategy for
the long term development of the democratic movement was how to
preserve the existing "public space". The Coalition Conference
(lianxihui) was thinking along these lines when it proposed to
move the struggle away from the Square and concentrate on
building democratic institutions on the campuses. This proposal,
however, was rejected by the radicals. Miss Chai's enlightenment
through bloodshed indeed came true. All that blood certainly
awakened the people. But once awake they discovered that there
was no more "Public space" left, so they all recoiled.

Individuals as Tools of History

I believe that when Chai Ling talked about "hoping for
bloodshed" she felt no sense of guilt, because the idea is
completely compatible with her education. For all of us who were
"nurtured" by the Communist Party, the role models have been
"revolutionary martyrs" who would not hesitate to sacrifice their
lives for their beliefs and ideals. Even a defeated army should
not surrender. Those who believe in these moral standards also
believe that all others should abide by them. The individual is
merely the tool of history, and the present is merely the
stepping stone to the future. In traditional Chinese culture a
laudable male was one who would sacrifice himself for the dao,
the correct way; and the laudable female was one who would
sacrifice herself for the preservation of her chastity. Human
beings were merely offerings on the altar of moral codes, ideals,
and creeds.

Chai Ling believed that she was fighting for democracy, and she
has learned since childhood that those fighting for an ideal must
be willing to give up their lives. That is why she could say that
"the students are willing to sacrifice themselves" without even
thinking about it. Bai Meng said recently in her defense that
"Under the circumstances of those days, 'death,' 'blood,' and
'giving one's life to liberty' were on the lips of everyone in the
Square." So Chai Ling's "hoping for bloodshed" did not seem
excessive at all. She believed that the democratic ideal was so
lofty that it needed a well-stocked altar. No wonder she often
went ballistic when anyone suggested that the altar should be
cleared away - that the students should leave the Square.

Democracy's "Only Child"

The influences of tradition and Communist education, however, do
not explain all. Neither does "the moral degradation of a entire
generation," as suggested by Ding Xueliang. I do not believe that
there is a generation which is particularly heroic or
exceptionally despicable. Many who took part in the same movement
in 1989, such as Wang Juntao, Wang Chaohua, as well as other of
Chai Ling's generation, such as Wang Dan, and Wuer Kaixi, all
grew up under the influence of the idea of enlightenment and
schooled by Communist education. But when discussing June Fourth,
they often talk about their responsibility to the dead, although
they were the ones who had tried their best to get the students
to leave the Square. By contrast, Chai Ling, who tried her best
to block those efforts, has not once expressed in public that her
conscience was bothered nor has she discussed any mistakes she
might have made.

One wonders how a public figure, a world famous political star
could go on for six years facing the media and stubbornly holding
onto an infallible self image. To understand this imperviousness
to criticism we have to look at the environment in which she has
been operating.

Even though Chai Ling's strategy of holding onto the Square was
wrong, it was a forgivable mistake, especially for a young,
inexperienced student. But once hailed as a world-class hero, it
would take considerable moral courage and self-awareness to
reflect on one's mistakes. Yet these qualities are what Chai Ling
lacks.

Westerners, who believe in freedom and democracy, were
overwhelmed by the media's unprecedented portrayal of a
heart-wrenching battle between good and evil. Due to sympathy for
the exiled democracy fighters and anger towards the autocratic
government, the media heaped lavish praises on these people and
showed uncharacteristic tolerance for their shortcomings. Chai
Ling's blood speech had already been known in 1989, but it did
not arouse any interest in the media, which usually has an
appetite for controversy. The oppressive government was so cruel,
and the forces for democracy so weak, of course the exiles must
be supported. June Fourth has clearly delineated the good and the
evil, and the exiles clearly represented democracy for China and
the interest of the Chinese people. As a result, in the West the
exiles became the "only child" of Chinese democracy, the only
supportable people that the Free World has. It is understandable,
therefore, that the media so pampered them.

Fighting Communism with Communist Behavior

The overwhelming praise by public opinion encourages human
weakness. This effect is especially pronounced on a person like
Chai Ling, who joined the movement at a moment's inspiration
without any previous interest in politics or any plans for the
long haul, who escaped from danger relatively fast and ended up
in the West where she was treated as a hero. It is easy for a
person like this to mystify her few months of struggle. People
like her have a limited understanding of democracy. They do not
realize that in a democratic society public figures could
sometimes enjoy tremendous popularity, but the seemingly
unanimous praise heaped upon them usually does not last forever.
Winston Churchill was so highly regarded that he could have been
the guardian angel of England, or even democracy itself. Even a
person of this stature was criticized a few years ago as having
been too rigid in his policies toward Hitler and thus failed to
avert war, causing the British people to pay a heavy price that
should have been avoided. For someone used to living in a
democratic society all this is perfectly normal.

But people like Chai Ling do not see things that way. Once they
have been pampered like an only child for awhile in the West,
they begin to believe that they are the embodiment of justice
itself, and no one should criticize them. Therefore, as soon as
public opinion experiences a slight shift on them, we hear, "Now
I'm in doubt of the fairness of the media in the free world."
(Bai Meng's opening line of his defense of Chai Ling, published
in Beijing Spring)

Such a reaction is not surprising. From my observations of these
people and in my personal dealings with them, I've come to know
well their habit of using the Communist Party's methods to oppose
the Communist Party. Their love for Western democracy is every
bit as much as Lord She's love for the dragon. I am not shocked
at all at Chai Ling's hint that the
New York
Times, etc. are in cahoots with the Chinese Communist Party in
order to split the democracy movement. Some leaders of the
Chinese Communist Party have been known to remark that Gorbachev
was an agent of the CIA sent into the Soviet Union. Surprise?

Part Two:

THE WAY OUT FOR THE OVERSEAS DEMOCRACY MOVEMENT

Summary: The biggest problem of the democracy
exiles is that they've escaped abroad and they've escaped the
control of the communist system, but their modes of thought and
behavior are still stuck in the Communist swamp-mud. If the
democracy movement can openly split up into different factions
and use their own ideas to compete with each other and rally
support, this will help to break the simplistic, diametric way of
thinking: the belief that there are only two camps, that of
ourselves and our enemies.

Competition Without a Referee

An overly pampered "only child" will come down with an illness
called the "only child syndrome," a familiar term used on the
mainland. I have already listed the symptoms above. One way of
treating the illness is to avoid keeping the child isolated in
his own home, encourage him to go out and mingle with other
people and learn the rules of the game in the real world. Most of
the exiles, however, lack the opportunity to do so.

Not being able to return to China, the exiles have been drifting
away from the concerns of the people back home. Even among
Chinese students studying abroad they have little popular appeal.
In the past six years, democracy exiles have isolated themselves
within a small circle and entertained themselves by tooting their
own horns. In a democratic society, six years is a long time.
People have voted out one president, and voted in another. A
political figure must constantly face political challenges from
his opponents. No one can claim to be representing the interests
of the whole people, forever. Six years ago, President Bush spoke
on behalf of the American people; today it has become President
Clinton. Yet in the circle of the democracy exiles, time stands
still. It seems as if they could exist forever as the
representatives of the Chinese people, yet they do not need the
support of the Chinese people in order to stay in business.

After June Fourth, the image of the Chinese government has
become the worst since reform began, but the overseas students'
interest in the democracy movement has reached a very low point -
there had been more interest in democracy before 1989 even on
Beijing campuses. I have not, however, noticed any sense of
crisis felt by the exiles. Why should they? Their prominence
doesn't depend on support among the Chinese. What they are
dependent on is the positive image created by the media in the
past. Therefore their number one concern is to maintain that
perfect image and to suppress any dissenting voices that might
threaten it, so that they can continue to seclude themselves in
the "home" of Western democratic society and throw their weight
around like an "only child" who thinks he owns the place.

In a healthy democratic society, political opponents engage in
open competition and abide by certain moral standards. Clinton
would not go as far as accusing Bush, who was more pro-China, for
plotting along with the Communists. Nor would Bush attack Clinton
for being a hidden "Red". What restrains them from doing so may
not necessarily be high moral standards, but their audience, who
are the voters. The voters are the referee of the competition. If
in attacking your opponent you violate the rules, the referee
will fault you, that is, the voters will accuse you of being
unfair. Facing criticism in the press, a politician would have to
think: Am I doing something wrong? What are the problems with my
policies? Why are people still dissatisfied? The democracy
exiles, however, have been divorced from their "voters" ever
since they've been honored as the representative of the Chinese
people's quest for democracy six years ago. Without "voters" as
referee, the rules of competition are easily broken. These people
show no tolerance for any dissenting voices in public opinion,
they even "run up to the stands and beat up the spectators". If
Dai Qing, Liu Xiaobo, Zhou Duo and others are considered as
dissenters within the movement and "deserve" to be bashed, Xue
Xiaoguang, Hinton, and Tyler are only spectators. Should sports
stars expect everyone to only cheer for them?

Should the Democracy Movement be Exempted from the Supervision
of Public Opinion?

When public figures have no need for the public, when
politicians have no need to answer to voters, they will be
morally corrupted. In the past six years, endless infighting has
heart the movement's reputation and alienated many people. So the
voices calling for unity are rising: Stop fighting! Stop
fighting! The spectators on the stands are "booing" us.

In the May issue, Beijing Spring reported that Zheng Yi, who is
on the advisory board of the magazine and who serves on the board
of Human Rights in China, criticized publications of the
democracy movement for printing articles which are harmful to the
movement. He stressed that "Our publications are not for a small
circle of exiled dissidents but should serve the transformation
to democracy in mainland China. The Communist Party is always
talking about how unified it is. It would be ridiculous if our
publications give readers back home the impression that the
democracy movement is engulfed by infighting and power struggles
--dog eat dog.

Mr. Zheng made a correct diagnosis but prescribed the wrong
medicine. The reason why the spectators are booing is that the
competitors are violating the rules of the game. To stop the
competition all together would only cause the spectators to
leave. Mr. Zheng believes that it is inappropriate for movement
publications to publish attacks on the movement or opinions
harmful to the movement. But who is the arbiter of what benefits
and what harms the movement? Should the democracy movement be
exempt from the supervision of public opinion? Mr. Zheng felt
deeply hurt and disappointed at the press's reporting on Chai
Ling's speech, saying that the movement "being so harshly
criticized shows how difficult it is to do anything in China."
Well then, in order to make doing things easier in China should
we set up a censorship system abroad? What is the purpose of the
movement anyway? Isn't one of its top goals the freedom of
speech? What right do democracy exiles have to start limiting
speech in the free world, where they are finding refuge?

What's really ridiculous is that Mr. Zheng seems to think that
debates in the democracy publications would only be interpreted
as "dog eat dog" by the Chinese people while the monotone of the
Communist Party press would impress them as "unity". Does he
think the Chinese people are stupid? He should try to conduct a
pole in China and see how many people really believe in People's
Daily editorials. Mr. Zheng himself has accepted the methods of
the Communist Party and believes in its effectiveness. Is this
what the democracy elite mean by enlightening the masses?

It is true that without having any experience in democracy, most
Chinese are not used to the rules of the game. The behavior of
the democracy exiles is a good example of this. Yet the mission
of the democracy movement is to get the Chinese to accept the
rules of the game in democracy. Nowadays, however, the democracy
fighters seem to be sincerely learning from the Communist Party.
In the same issue of Beijing Spring Wan Runnan pointed out, "The
Communist Party is very mature politically. Although there are
all kinds of disagreements within it, to the outside it talks
endlessly about uniting around the 'central leadership of Jiang
(Zemin)'. ... The opposition, on the other hand, has no center."
So he proposed uniting around Wei Jingsheng. "They have their
central leadership of Jiang, and we have our central leadership
of Wei," Wan Runnan proclaimed, "and that will be a sign of our
political maturity." Did Mr. Wan stop to think that if once the
democracy movement matured its structure would be
indistinguishable from the Communist Party, why bother to oppose
the Communist Party in the first place? Was it not the Party's
tight unity around the 'central leadership of Deng' that caused
the bloodshed in the streets of Beijing?

The World Seen in Diametric Opposites

This rhetoric shows that a key problem faced by the exiled
dissidents is that they have escaped the communists system by
coming abroad, hey are still trapped in the swamp mud of
Communist mode of thinking and behavior. They have created a
distinct political culture which I would call "post Communist
culture". Having lived under the Communist system for so long,
People have internalized the rules of the game and the way of
thinking. Even when fighting the system, the only weapon they
know is what that system gave them. The result is that the
Communist Party is overthrown, but the transition to democracy
does not take place. In the world of the Communist Party, there
is only one distinction: "the people" and "the enemies"; "we" and
"they". People who oppose the system believe in this same
dualistic division, only reversing the "good" and the "bad". That
is, all acts of opposition and protest are good, and the rulers
are bad. Also similar to the Communist Party, the political
opposition views itself as representing the interest of the
society as a whole. This way of thinking greatly hindered the
development of democracy.

The foremost concerns of the exiled dissidents seem to be
"drawing a clear line between ourselves and our enemies,"
"holding firm one's class stand," "purify our ranks," and
eliminate dissent. Out of these concerns came the "mature"
political proposal of "uniting around the central leadership of
Wei" and the cries against criticism of the movement. As a
result, Dai Qing, Liu Xiaobo, Zhou Duo, Xue Xiaoguang, Hinton and
Tyler are all excluded from the ranks of "us" and included in the
ranks of "them". These people all have a potential of being
involved in a plot of the Communist Party. Therefore, "we" must
defend Chai Ling's moral image in order to prevent "people with
ulterior motives" from discrediting the democracy movement,
discrediting "us" by picking on a few things that she had said.

Way to the Future: The Democracy Movement Should Split Up

Having reached this sorry state, is there a way out for the
democracy movement? The way to cure a child who has contracted
the disease called "the single child syndrome" is to put that
child into society and have him learn how the real world works.
Unfortunately this is impossible for the exiles. Unable to return
to China, they are confined to their "home" in the democratic
West and indulging in the attention they get. Are we going to
simply stand by and watch the spoiled brats throw tantrums? There
must be some kind of remedy.

If there is no way for the "single child" to get out of the
pampering home, the next best thing is to have more children. For
the exiled democracy movement, that means to split up. There is
no lack of healthy forces in the movement. There is no lack of
people who have a sense of responsibility. But they are too
accommodating in the name of unity. So the movement becomes a
hodgepodge, and the so called "responsible opposition" has no
ground to grow. No individual or clique should monopolize the
right to represent the democratic forces of China and to
represent the interest of the Chinese people. Splitting up the
democracy movement would enable groups which represent different
opinions, different interests, and adopt different tactics to
compete openly and provide more choices for China's future.

Would splitting up weaken the forces for democracy? Lets face
it, the movement has been such a hotchpotch that it has greatly
disappointed people. It enjoys very little support even among
Chinese students in the United States. Certain individuals are
even seen by their fellow students as "democracy clowns". The
movement has really reached a state that matches the Communist
Party's charge that it was the work of "a small handful". Even if
this "small handful" bound together there is not much strength.
In other words, there is not much there to be weakened. Yet there
are enough of a "small handful" to form a tight little circle,
toot their own horn and take great delight in their own show.
They forget that their legitimacy should derive from the support
of the public. If the movement openly split up, then the circle
won't be closed and tooting ones own horn won't be so easy. That
will force these people to face the public instead. That was the
situation in which the earlier democracy fighters operated.
Because they were few in numbers, they paid attention to their
relationship with the public. Before 1989 we didn't have so many
stars in the democracy movement, but the public (at least among
the students) had greater interest in the cause of democracy.
Factions within the movement publicizing their different
approaches and openly competing for public support would help
break through the Communist mode of simplistic division between
"us" and "them"; "the people" and "the enemy". By contrast, the
idea of sticking together and try to maintain an image that "we
represent the overall interest of the Chinese people" is nothing
more than a continuation of Communist culture.