Will the EU split into the East and the West?

On March 1, 2018 the European Parliament has adopted a resolution initiating a disciplinary procedure against Poland. Warsaw is accused of violating a number of fundamental democratic principles of the EU. If the Polish government does not agree to make concessions, the country may for a time be deprived of the right to vote in the European Council.

The problem is that to implement such a decision, the consent of all EU member-states is needed. Meanwhile, Hungary, against which charges of the same kind have been brought, can block sanctions against Warsaw.

According to many observers the increased tensions within the EU reflect not just the “growth of nationalistic sentiments” across Europe. Analysts, as well as high-level politicians, including French President E. Macron, are already openly talking about the EU’s moving towards “Europe of two speeds”. How serious is the threat of increasing contradictions between Europe’s east and west?

The “right”, “anti-liberal” turn has been observed in Europe for the last 20-25 years and not only in the new EU members but throughout the continent. According to the BBC in 2000 the average share of those who voted in the European countries for “populists” was 8%, at present it is about 25%. Michael Abramowitz and Nate Schenkkan of The Foreign Affairs note that now Islamophobia, “persecution of NGOs”, stiff rejection of EU policies and fear of migration play a key role in strengthening the positions of conservative and nationalist politicians -“populists” not only in Hungary, Poland, Austria and the Czech Republic. Similar ideas are spreading rapidly in the political discourse of almost every European country. More and more often “populists” are becoming potential partners in forming coalition governments. Thus, many political forces in Central and Eastern Europe, are increasingly rejecting the “EU pressure” because it is associated with sovereignty restrictions.

The embodiment of these trends was a series of political upheavals that occurred in Europe in 2017. First, both system-forming parties – the Socialists and the Republicans – suffered a crushing defeat in the French presidential and parliamentary elections. Then to the unexpected surprise of most observers the “most serious political crisis since the unification” began in Germany – negotiations for the creation of the ruling coalition lasted more than 6 months, ending only in March 2018. Finally, in December 2017, a new government was formed in Austria, which included the conservative People’s Party and the far-right Freedom Party. Clearly there is no talk about Vienna’s withdrawal from the EU. Nevertheless, the new Austrian ruling coalition has its own idea of the ways of reforming the EU – a very different one from the approaches of Germany and France. Chancellor Sebastian Kurz does not conceal his desire to limit the EU’s spheres of influence. Some commentators say that by this he strongly resembles some of his colleagues in Central and Eastern Europe, also dissatisfied with attempts to centralize power, undertaken by Brussels.

The highlight of the clash between different concepts of the European Union’s future was the judicial proceedings initiated by the European Commission against Poland “for political interference in its justice system” on December 20th, 2017.

In these conditions, on the one hand, both the new cabinet of Merkel as well as the French president who is facing ever greater resistance to his ambitious reform plans have even more serious doubts regarding the ability to “initiate the process of renewal of the European Union”. On the other hand, “the events which happened in the end of 2017 in Brussels, Budapest, Warsaw, Prague and Vienna are the unambiguous alarming evidence that the EU encounters an existential dilemma in confronting the nationalist leaders of Central Europe led by Poland and Hungary“. Meanwhile, the Euro zone crisis and the Brexit remain on the agenda. As a result, the well-known Russian expert Fyodor Lukyanov says: Europe turns to itself, and “the future of the continent” has not been so vague from the middle of the 20th century. ”

Political contradictions are closely intertwined with the economic ones. The work of well-known economists Filip Novokmet, Thomas Piketty and Gabriel Zucman published in 2017 bluntly call Eastern European nations “foreign-owned countries”. On the one hand, a stable inflow of investment provides economic growth and high employment. On the other hand, such a high dependence on foreign capital in the economy is fraught with serious shocks, in case a country, for some reason, loses its investment attractiveness. As historical examples show, the “flight” of foreign investors, as a rule, provokes a surge of unemployment, a deep decline in the economy, collapse of the banking system.

Meanwhile, after the UK leaves the European Union the annual budget of the EU will decrease by at least 10 billion euros. In this regard, the issue of decreasing subsidies to member countries, which will primarily affect the poorest countries, is being actively discussed. This “foreshadows yet another clash of the east and west of Europe.” Moreover, “some countries were told that their rejection of liberal values might be the reason to reduce their subsidies”. In response, the leading countries of Central and Eastern Europe “unequivocally say to Brussels: we are not your colonies”. In these conditions, “the Battles of Eastern and Western Europe threatens to slow down, or even completely slash to zero, a decade and a half of integration processes, and in a broader sense raises the question: is the EU united on the basis of common economic interests or common values?”

At the same time, the issue of Poland, Czech Republic or Hungary leaving the EU is not on the agenda. There are no objective reasons for this. The current CEE leaders largely owe their popularity to high rates of economic growth, the key factors of which are EU subsidies and foreign investments. Membership in the European Union is very beneficial for Eastern Europeans, as they receive more from Brussels than they give. Especially when it comes to issues of political and economic security. Formal belonging to the “West”, one of the main symbols of which is Schengen, is also very important for the overwhelming majority of citizens of these states from the psychological and philosophical point of view. The EU will also not give up Eastern European members, since the economic benefits of investing in growing economies, as well as export earnings to Central and Eastern Europe, are one of the main sources of growth for the whole Union. In addition, the experience of recent years has shown that with the problems of “Romanian corruption”, “Hungarian authoritarianism”, “Polish attacks on courts” and border disputes, like the Slovenian-Croatian one, “it is much easier to fight when the country is already included in pan-European structures,” Maxim Samorukov of the Russian Carnegie Center says.

The problem is that Brussels seems to have chosen a strategy that is very risky in the current circumstances, designed to “restore the Union’s self-confidence” – through a new expansion. In February 2018, the president of the European Commission, Jean-Claude Juncker, announced the strategy of joining the EU (until 2025) of at least some of the six states of the Western Balkans. According to Brussels’s plan the admission of new members should convince the rest to abandon the privileges of individual countries and delegate more authority to the “center.” The question is about taking decisions not by consensus but by the majority, as well as about developing mechanisms for monitoring compliance with common rules by member-states and punishing violators. The ultimate goal is “supranational institutions that will gradually take away key functions from the least competent national governments“.

However, experts at the American think tank Stratfor say that “the enthusiasm for the EU enlargement has largely dried up”. Besides, the Eastern European capitals are hardly to like the real goal of the EU reform, for which the leading “old” members of the club advocate – to minimize the chances of the CEE countries to play on the contradictions between the world powers. And even if those who believe that “at the heart of all such games there is always a desire to knock out as many financial preferences as possible from the European Union are right,” the population of Central and Eastern Europe is experiencing a growing anxiety and irritation as a result of realization that, if such trends continue in the politics of Brussels, the dreams of “life as in the West,” under whose auspices people often had to give up their national interests, will never come true. Meanwhile, to succeed in global competition, there is a need to limit or even reduce the “main achievement of the European” welfare society “- its social systems. This is increasingly spoken about in the old EU members.

Only time will tell whether the trends analyzed above are long-term.

If most of the CEE countries will not get rid of the “restricted, one-sided point of view”, according to which their national interests do not go beyond their state borders, then the ideas of the “all-European home” will remain only beautiful slogans for both the society and a large part of the ruling class. The real policy will remain at the level of “tactical pragmatism”, which will focus on those slogans and ideas, which at the moment are most in demand by voters. Even if it is a question of EU-scepticism and national populism. Probably, in the center and the east of the EU, a “new Eastern bloc” will be formed – led by the countries of the Visegrad Group (Hungary, Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia), but not limited to it. The countries of this “bloc” will promote the idea of the “Europe of Nations”: the transformation of the European Union into a confederation of independent states, united by a common free trade zone and “a few supranational functions.”

Thus, tensions between the east and the west of the European Union threaten to become its main headache in the coming years. “Pessimists predict the emergence of situational alliances within the EU that threaten to paralyze the work of its political institutions,” the BBC said. Thus, the initiative to expel Russian diplomats in connection with the “Skripal affair” in the end of March 2018, among other EU member states, was not supported by Austria and Slovakia. On the whole we can assume that the evolution of the future European order has only just started and will continue for several decades.

Sanctions Policy: The ‘European Paradox’

Since the end of the Cold War, economic
sanctions have increasingly been used by big players as a tool of foreign
policy. The initiators of sanctions use trade and financial restrictions to try
to force the target countries to change course politically as well as to
influence internal political processes. The United States has positioned itself
as the largest sanctions initiator. Over the past hundred years, the US has
used them more often than all other nations and the UN combined. The Americans
remain second to none in terms of the number of developed state institutions
involved in the policy of sanctions. The US sanctions apparatus far exceeds the
capabilities of the UN and any other country in terms of financial, human and
organisational resources.

The European Union is also showing increasing
activity as an initiator of sanctions. There are several conditions for this. First,
the EU is a powerful economy with huge human, financial and technological
potential. Economic power is the most important condition, without which an
effective policy of sanctions is simply impossible. After all, sanctions are
effective when the initiator can inflict much greater harm on the target
country than vice versa. Second, the European Union has not yet become an
independent military-political force. Its foreign policy is based on soft power
and economic instruments, so in conflict situations, sanctions are the best
option. Third, the EU coordinates its sanctions policy with the actions of the
United States, its main ally. The growing number of sanctions on the part of
Washington has also led to the growth of sanctions initiated by Brussels.

At the same time, there are a number of
distinguished features that define the EU approach. One of the key elements is
the commitment of Brussels to multilateral diplomacy. The EU avoids being the
sole initiator of sanctions. This is an important difference from the United
States. The Americans often impose sanctions without any regard for others.
They recognise the importance of coalition pressure on the target countries and
strive to involve their allies and a wider range of countries in launching
sanctions. However, their support for the United States is more instrumental –
the more sizable the coalition, the greater its potential for taking a toll on
the economies of sanctioned countries. However, for the EU, the multilateral
use of sanctions remains an important normative issue and even means of
conveying shared values. The European Union carefully implements UN Security
Council resolutions, and EU countries which are members of the UN Security
Council have often offered their own draft resolutions on sanctions.

The EU, however, allows sanctions which bypass
the decisions of the UN Security Council. Here the policy of Brussels differs
from the positions of Moscow and Beijing, which consider the UN Security
Council as the only legitimate source of sanctions. These countries also use
unilateral measures, but so far they’ve done it much less often in comparison
with the EU and especially the USA. However, by bypassing the UN, the EU is
trying to combine efforts with the United States and other Western countries,
that is, to provide a multilateral format. At the same time, the EU retains its
own view on many problems and calibrates a set of restrictive measures at its
sole discretion.

Another important distinction of EU policy is
its extremely reserved attitude towards extraterritorial sanctions. The
European Union authorities may well use secondary sanctions, that is, to punish
certain companies or organisations for violating existing restrictions.
However, Brussels uses such measures within its jurisdiction. The United
States, on the contrary, is increasingly introducing secondary sanctions
against foreigners, putting foreign companies on the SDN list or fining
violators.

Interestingly, over the past ten years, most of
the related fines were levied against European companies. This situation may
well be called the “European paradox.” EU authorities support many US sanctions
initiatives, but at the same time many Europeans are negatively affected by the
secondary sanctions. They pay the most fines. According to the Russian
International Affairs Council (RIAC), over the past 10 years, out of 201 US
Treasury fines, 40 were levied against EU companies and 133 were paid by US
companies. In just 10 years, the US Treasury has collected $ 5.6 billion in
fines. Of these, the Europeans paid more than $ 4.6 billion (83%), and the
Americans only paid 177.2 million (3%). This distribution resembles the “Pareto
law”: most of the revenue is generated by a minority of players. And this
minority is concentrated in Europe, whereas the smaller proportion was paid by
the US-based majority. Of course, such a distribution can hardly be the result
of the deliberate activity of American authorities. But the fact remains:
Europeans pay the most.

At least since the 1990s, The European Union has
tried to take measures to protect itself from secondary US sanctions. A serious
incentive was the US withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action
(JCPOA) on the Iranian nuclear programme. Washington unilaterally resumed
large-scale financial and sectoral sanctions against Iran. A significant number
of companies operating in the Iranian market, including European ones, turned
out to be facing the threat of secondary sanctions and subsequent penalties.
The EU has resumed the so-called 1996 Blocking Statute, which should shield
European companies from secondary sanctions. However, a significant number of
big EU companies have already left Iran. Many large European companies which do
business in Iran also conduct business in the US, and preferred to maintain
their loyalty to American requirements, even though Brussels was critical of
the US withdrawal from the JCPOA and introduced protective measures. The threat
of having problems with the US authorities in the form of fines and “weaning”
from the US market and financial system outweighs possible profits in the
Iranian market.

In Europe, some politicians proposed
establishing their own payment system, in the interests of European sovereignty
and financial independence. In January 2019, INSTEX SAS company was registered
in France (with the participation of Germany and the United Kingdom). It was
tasked with securing transactions between European companies and Iran,
bypassing US sanctions. So far the fate of this initiative remains unclear. The
big problem is its approval by other EU members. Also, the real functionality
of INSTEX remains unclear. In the end, nothing is preventing the Americans from
including INSTEX in their SDN list, making it “toxic”, or fining the company in
proportion to the volume of its deals with Iran.

The prospects for INSTEX are becoming even more
vague, against the background of diplomatic difficulties. After the US exit
from the JCPOA, Washington found itself in diplomatic isolation on the Iran
issue. However, this didn’t bother the Americans much. The situation began to
heat up after the United States lifted the restriction exceptions on the
purchase of Iranian oil, which they made for eight countries, including Italy
and Greece. In May 2019, Tehran announced that it would refuse to fulfil
certain obligations under the JCPOA. In response, Washington immediately
introduced harsh, newer sanctions against Iran. The EU reacted coolly to the
actions of Tehran. Now Iran could be considered isolated.

The diplomatic development of the situation
around the JCPOA is likely to seriously undermine European ambitions to create
an alternative payment system. If Iran once again becomes a pariah state (as
the Americans would like to see), then the reason that gave rise to the
discussion about it will disappear. As for fines against banks and companies,
Brussels is likely to leave these risks to the discretion of the business
community itself. Moreover, entrepreneurs haven’t demonstrated any serious,
noticeable activity lobbying for alternatives. Apparently, the business sector
feels comfortable in the dollar system, and the risks of secondary sanctions do
not outweigh the benefits the system presents and the costs of its
transformation. Moreover, outside of the Iranian problem, there is not a single
issue that the sanctions policy presents that could seriously stimulate
discussion about a European financial alternative. The commonality of the
political positions of the United States and the EU will ensure the status quo.

Related

How Romania’s battles over corruption hamstrung economic progress

When
Romania took over the rotating presidency of the Council of the European Union
in January, news coverage in Western Europe mostly focused on the tensions between Brussels and
Bucharest over the latter’s judicial reforms. Jean-Claude Juncker publicly
called Romania’s ability to fulfil its presidential duties into question; the European Commission, meanwhile, accused
the ruling Social Democrats (PSD) of backsliding on corruption.

Since
then, however, Romania has executed its presidential duties without a hitch, hosting
European leaders
for a major EU summit in Sibiu on May 10th that earned plaudits from top EU officials like Donald Tusk. In
hindsight, has the overarching media narrative ignored important developments
inside Romania? Does the Sibiu summit demonstrate that Romania has regained its
footing as one of Europe’s most dynamic economies?

Economic growth no longer extraordinary

Romania’s
economy, while still growing at an impressive rate, has slowed down from the remarkable rates the country was
registering as recently as 2017— when its 7% expansion outpaced nearly all
European peers. 2018 saw growth rates of 4%, while estimates point to 3.5% for 2019.

Bucharest’s
economic slowdown is due to a variety of factors, from tightened global financial conditions to falling
birth rates. Foreign investors, however, may also be skittish thanks to the
long-running battle between Romania’s political establishment and its
controversial anti-corruption agency, the National Anticorruption Directorate
(DNA). Under the leadership of agency head Laura Kövesi, the DNA undertook (by
its own count) 2,396 investigations targeting Romanian magistrates between 2014 and 2018.
Kövesi’s tenure saw over 1,000 figures from the country’s political and business circles convicted for
corruption.

The
DNA’s swathes of
indictments
targeting Romania’s leading political figures, with charges ranging from
forgery to money laundering, have certainly played into the country’s
reputation for corruption. That image has hamstrung Romania’s ability to
attract foreign capital and investment, from Europe and beyond.

EU
leaders, meanwhile, have heaped praise on the DNA’s stack of convictions, holding the
anti-corruption agency up as a model for other European countries to emulate.
Concerns have mounted, however, that the DNA is abusing its power and reverting
to communist-era investigative practice.

Long lists of convictions—but at what cost?

Hiding
behind the DNA’s unusually-high conviction rates were potential due process
violations,
including lengthy pre-trial detainment periods equivalent to imprisonment
before having been sentenced by a court of law, or otherwise threatening
suspects that a lack of cooperation could see their family members prosecuted.
Increased scrutiny of these violations may help explain why the number of cases
resulting in acquittals rose markedly, from 12.2% in 2017 to 36.3% in 2018.

Some
of the DNA’s most prominent targets have drawn parallels between its behaviour
and that of Romania’s Communist-era security services. Alina Bica, who formerly
served as chief prosecutor for organised crime and was arrested in 2014, described her experience with the DNA as “like in the 1950s
when the communists came. You get called an enemy of the state, you get put in
the truck…they damage your family.” Kövesi reportedly made a personal visit to
the Supreme Council of Magistrates to persuade them to sign off on Bica’s
arrest, while Bica’s husband was targeted with charges of tax evasion and her
lawyer was also detained.

Many
of those singled out by the DNA accuse the body of pursuing political or
personal vendettas. Bica, for example, claimed the charges against her stemmed from her 2012
investigation into Transgaz, where Kövesi’s brother served as a director. PSD
spokespeople have suggested treasurer Mircea Drăghici,
currently under investigation for embezzling party funds, is being targeted as part of the lead-up to this month’s European
elections.

Troubling collaboration with the intelligence services

Recent
revelations about the DNA’s investigative tactics have given new life to
comparisons between today’s anti-corruption czars and the communist-era
Securitate secret police. Earlier this year, Romania’s Constitutional Court ruled secret protocols between DNA prosecutors and
the country’s domestic intelligence agency, the SRI, were unconstitutional. The
Constitutional Court concluded that the SRI, successor to the Securitate, had
signed agreements allowing the intelligence agency to circumvent the authority
of prosecutors in criminal investigations, while simultaneously conducting over 20,000 wiretaps a year on behalf of the DNA—an excessive violation of privacy.

The
investigation by the Constitutional Court culminated in Kövesi’s removal from
her position in 2018. Kövesi herself
has been indicted
on charges of corruption and abuse of office, relating to allegations by
Romanian businessman Sebastian Ghita that Kövesi strongarmed him into paying for the repatriation of a fugitive from Indonesia. Romanian
police claim they footed the bill, but criminal proceedings are ongoing. The
former prosecutor nevertheless retains many fans in Brussels. Allies in the European Parliament want to name her
to the new position of EU Chief Prosecutor despite the ongoing investigation in
Romania.

Increased transparency

With
the steady release
of DNA documents
to the newly formed Special Section for the Investigation of Crimes Committed
by Magistrates and the National Union of Judges in Romania, which both operate
independently of the DNA, efforts to increase transparency in Romanian
governance may soon move beyond the bitter political rivalries that undermined
Romania’s political stability and global reputation.

While
the Sibiu summit was a political success, the economy is also regaining its
footing. Consumer confidence is recovering, with better prospects for future
savings. Wage growth
remains impressive
while lending activity continues to expand. And CFA Romania, an association of
investment professionals, released a
report predicting
Romanian economic activity will improve over the next 12 months. It seems that,
despite the corruption battles of the past several years, both Romanian
businesses and consumers remain optimistic about their future prospects.

Related

Any signs of a chill between France and Germany?

The past few months have seen many signs of growing
friction and divisions between the two European superpowers, Germany and
France. Before the February vote on changes to the EU Third Energy Package,
meant to expand the European Commission’s power to regulate Europe’s electricity
and natural gas market, France opposed, until the very last moment, Germany’s
position on the issue. In April, Paris and Berlin failed to agree on how much
more time Britain should be given to decide on its withdrawal from the EU.
During the recent presidential elections in Ukraine, France and Germany
supported various candidates. Moreover, they are equally divided on who will be
the new head of the European Commission. What is happening in relations between
members of the “European tandem”?

During the latter half of 2018, it looked as if relations between the EU’s
two powerhouses were reaching a new strategic level. In a joint
statement made in Meseberg in June, Berlin and Paris outlined their shared
vision of the European Union’s future development. In late August, French
President Emmanuel Macron and German Foreign Minister Heiko Maas simultaneously
spoke out about a new role for Europe to make it “sovereign and
strong.” During their informal meeting in Marseille in September, Emmanuel
Macron and Angela Merkel agreed on a coordinated response to the main
challenges facing Europe and on concerted work on shaping the “agenda for
Europe.”

In November, the two leaders spoke in favor of
creating a “European army,” “real Pan-European armed
forces” capable of defending Europe. And in January of this year, they
inked a broader cooperation accord in Aachen, which commentators described as a
“new big step” in bringing the two countries closer together. The Treaty of
Aachen covers new areas of political cooperation, including common projects and
commitments in the fields of defense and international relations.

Just a month later, however, the Franco-German rapprochement hit a snag
over two strategic projects worth billions of euros, namely the Nord Stream 2
gas pipeline and trade relations with the United States. Here the interests of Paris and Berlin differ
the most. Underscoring the seriousness of the rift, Emmanuel Macron
canceled a planned trip to a security conference in Munich in what many
commentators described as a “demonstrative” move. As for the issue of
completing the construction of the Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline, the compromise
reached by France and Germany and approved by the European Parliament, imposed
on Berlin “a formula that the German
government wanted to avoid.”

Regarding the issue of trade relations with the United
States, it wasn’t until mid-April that Brussels collectively managed to prevail
over France, which had been blocking the start of pertinent negotiations with
Washington. Any delay may cost the German automakers multi-billion dollar
fines from the United States. If the French succeed in delaying the start of
negotiations, Germany, which is already experiencing a sharp slowdown in
economic growth, may end up the loser again.

France’s sudden move left
the German media guessing whether Macron’s
actions were dictated by his displeasure about Berlin’s “slow response” to his
initiatives, or by Donald Trump’s threat to sanction companies involved in the
construction of the Nord Stream 2 pipeline, including the French concern Engie.
Or maybe Macron had resorted to this “show of force” in a bid to strengthen his
hand amid the conflict with the “yellow jackets” and growing tensions with Italy?

Indeed, the
statement made in Meseberg and the treaty signed in Aachen could have proved
too much of a compromise for Macron, if not a serious blow to his ambitions.
According to critics, “the Treaty of Aachen dodges the most sensitive topics
characteristic of modern Europe.” Including migration and political unification
of Europe – something Macron is so eager to accomplish. The treaty makes no
mention of a common EU tax and financial policy, while the issue of creating a
single economic space is spelled out declaratively at
best. Angela Merkel essentially
emasculated virtually all of Macron’s initiatives pertaining to the financial
and economic reform of the EU and the Eurozone. Emmanuel Macron has been
out to become one of the EU’s leaders, or even its sole leader, ever since he
became president in 2017. All the more so following Britain’s exit from the
bloc and amid the ebbing political authority and the planned resignation by
2021 of German Chancellor Angela Merkel, once the informal leader of a united
Europe.

The current political situation in France is also
calling for more decisive actions by President Macron. To ensure at least a
relative success in the upcoming European elections, he needs to enlist the
support not only of the traditional left-and right-centrists, but possibly of
some representatives of the new European right too. Whether or not Angela
Merkel stands down in 2021, or after the elections to the European Parliament
(as has been rumored since April), Emmanuel Macron essentially remains the only
top-level proponent of greater European integration. (Unless Merkel ultimately
moves to the head of the European Commission, of course). With Macron eyeing a
second presidential term in 2022, the advancement of the modernization model
for France depends directly on the success of the European project. And here
any significant changes in the European Union “mainly depend on the position of
France’s privileged partner
– Germany.”

All this means that Macron needs a breakthrough now that Berlin is going through a
“complicated power transit” with Merkel having resigned as the head
of the CDU and preparing to hand her post as Federal Chancellor over to a
successor. Therefore, she is now taking her time and, according to her
successor as CDU leader, Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer, is holding out for a new
vector in the development of the European project as “the common
denominator of the distribution of political forces after the elections.”
Does this mean that Berlin’s is staking on the success of its candidate in the
ongoing struggle for the next president of the European Commission? For the
first time ever, the CDU and the CSU have managed to nominate a common
candidate who has “good chances” of heading the EU’s executive body.

Meanwhile, Berlin is facing an intractable dilemma.
Since 1949, “avoiding by all means situations necessitating a hard choice
between France and the United States has been a key principle of German foreign
policy.” This approach “survived all governments and coalitions, and was
maintained after the reunification of Germany.”
Under the present circumstances, however, remaining firmly committed to the
transatlantic relationship threatens to further destabilize the European
integration project, which is now seen as being key to Germany’s future.
Simultaneously, a course aimed at minimizing damage from the policy of external
powers that threatens the fundamental German interests might necessitate
radical and ambitious geopolitical maneuvers that would almost inevitably
revive the Europeans’ and Americans’ historical fears of “German
instincts.”

US and British analysts already worry that “the

[geopolitical]

shackles that are voluntarily accepted [by Germany] can be
thrown off.” They also wonder how long it will take before new generations of
Germans want to restore their country’ full state sovereignty.

In Germany itself, promotion of such slogans have
already given the Alternative for Germany party (AfD) the third largest
fraction in the Bundestag. A major paradox of the current European and German
policy is that Berlin’s activity or passivity is equally detrimental to the
Pan-European project and could eventually lead to the EU’s fragmentation and
even disintegration.

However, the
Franco-German “tandem” is already being dogged with contradictions and
compromises, which are highly unpopular among many in the German establishment.
The cautious response by many EU members to the latest joint geopolitical
initiatives of Berlin and Paris, gave Germany more reasons to fear that Macron’s global ambitions could exacerbate
the differences that already exist in the EU. Many in Germany have long
suspected Macron of wishing to make the EU instrumental in his foreign policy
aspirations.

Some experts still believe that at the end of the day
the current chill between Germany and France may turn out to be just a sign of
the traditional “propensity for taking independent political decisions.” The
sides are sizing each other up to see “who will be setting the rules of the roadmap in the future.” Also, Paris’s tougher stance towards Berlin
may be a tactical ploy, a pre-election maneuver to “hijack” part of the agenda
from the “national populists” of Central, Eastern and Southern Europe where
many people are not happy about the German “diktat.”

Emmanuel Macron has proved once and again his ability
to ride the wave of public discontent with certain issues. His Plan for Europe,
published in early March, carefully avoids any mention of France’ and Germany’s
leading role in advancing EU reforms.

On the other hand, the foreign policy of the leading
European powers has a long history, and long-term geopolitical considerations
continue to play a significant role. Germany, for one, has traditionally been
looking for a counterweight to the Anglo-Saxons, while France – to German
dominance in Europe. As a result, the search by Paris and Berlin for common
points of political contact is now turning into intense efforts to find the
“lowest common denominator.” The overall impression is that we will only be
able to see a greater deal of certainty in relations between the two countries
after the results of elections to the European Parliament have been summed up.
The distribution of roles both within the “European tandem” and
in the EU as a whole depends on which political forces – pro-Macron or
pro-Merkel, the Europeans will vote for.