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BEIRUT 00001699 001.2 OF 004
Classified By: Ambassador Jeffrey D. Feltman for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d
).
SUMMARY
--------
1. (C) In a 10/29 meeting with the Ambassador, Prime
Minister Fouad Siniora recommended simultaneous pursuit of
two options regarding presidential elections. First, he
urged continued push for an absolute majority ("half plus
one") election, despite the fact that March 14 might not be
able to pull it off and that Patriarch Sfeir does not like
it. Second, he asked that the USG help lock in agreement on
a set of principles (for example, UNSCR 1701, Siniora's
seven-point plan, and the National Dialogue's four decisions)
that would bind the elected president and subsequent
government. He suggested exploring this approach when the
Secretary meets her counterparts in Istanbul. Siniora also
SIPDIS
mused that the Patriarch might ultimately give names, but his
expectations regarding the quality of candidates the
Patriarch might name were low. In the event of a vacuum,
Siniora believes the more likely outcome is that President
Lahoud will stay in office, extending the status quo, rather
than form a second government. Regarding fund-raising
efforts for the Special Tribunal, Siniora reported that he
suggested to the UN Secretary General that the UN and Lebanon
undertake joint efforts. He also made a pitch for help in
reforestation, after devastating forest fires in Lebanon's
north and Chouf regions. End summary.
STRATEGY FOR SUCCESSFUL ELECTIONS
-------------------------------
2. (C) The Ambassador, accompanied by PolOff, met with Prime
Minister Fouad Siniora and advisor Mohamad Chatah on October
29. The Ambassador opened the meeting by briefing Siniora on
the message the U.S. is delivering regarding potential
actions that might be taken against individuals who
participate in a second cabinet or who take steps to
undermine Lebanon's legitimate institutions. The PM
expressed appreciation.
3. (C) Regarding Secretary Rice's upcoming Istanbul
meeting, Siniora laid out two tracks that he sees are
possible outcomes of the elections and how the USG can play a
supporting role. He dubbed the first the "confrontation
track," whereby a president is elected with a half plus one
majority. The Patriarch, he noted, does not support this
track because he fears the consequences. The Patriarch also
opposes a vacuum in the presidency during which the Siniora
government fills the void. Siniora remarked that moving
forward without the Patriarch's support is "suicide." The
confrontation track assumes that March 14 is able to garner a
half plus one majority, an assumption which is not a
done-deal, commented Siniora.
4. (C) The second track is to elect a president who meets a
minimum set of requirements by supporting specific
principles: support for UNSCR 1701 (emphasis on disarming
Hizballah), the seven-point proposal Siniora put forward to
end the summer 2006 war and the four decisions resulting from
the spring 2006 National Dialogue. Whoever is elected,
Siniora posited, should then be bound by these principles.
5. (C) Siniora recommended that the first track - half plus
one strategy - remain on the table as a driving force
encouraging MPs to attend the parliamentary session,
regardless of whether it is achievable by March 14. (Siniora
reported that he believes France will accept a candidate
elected with a half plus one majority, but would prefer to
avoid this scenario.) At the same time, Siniora urged that,
simultaneously, we also pursue the second track. Pursuing
this second track entails assessing how to improve the
chances of a candidate who supports the identified
principles, and then soliciting support from the Patriarch,
the Vatican, and other countries for this strategy. Siniora
recommended that Secretary Rice work on these agreed
principles with the attendees at her side-meetings in
Istanbul. It would also be beneficial for the USG to
emphasize, in Istanbul and externally, the MPs' civic
obligation to vote. Siniora emphasized that the Patriarch
must play an active role in this process because the
BEIRUT 00001699 002.2 OF 004
Patriarch may decide to suggest names, irrespective of the
principled approach, out of fear of a vacuum or a half plus
one president.
IF THE PATRIARCH SUGGESTS NAMES...
-------------------------------
6. (C) Siniora relayed that he sent a representative (Radwan
Sayegh) to visit the Patriarch on October 27 and, from this
visit, got the impression that the Patriarch may ultimately
choose to suggest names, one from pro-government forces, one
from the opposition, and one who falls in the middle.
Siniora noted that in such a scenario, the candidate who
falls in the middle would most likely be the winner. Siniora
speculated that, ideally, the Patriarch might suggest someone
young and new. On the other hand, he expected that any names
from the Patriarch could include former Bar Association head
Shakib Qortbawi, from the National Bloc, and former President
Amine Gemayel -- neither of whom qualify as being young or
new. He did not think the Patriarch would choose former
Minister of Finance Demianos Kattar. Siniora said he will
try to find out whether the Patriarch is still supporting
John Obeid, Fares Bouez or Charles Rizk, and he will also
press the Patriarch to support the second track based on
agreed principles.
7. (C) Responding to the Ambassador's suggestion that the
Patriarch announce his intention to attend the November 12
parliament session himself in order to build momentum for MP
attendance, Siniora was receptive, on the condition that
Speaker Nabih Berri does indeed call for the session.
However, if Berri does not call for one, then it would be too
divisive for the Patriarch to show up. He said that MP
Michel Murr has been the most outspoken in supporting this
idea.
8. (C) Siniora did not appear confident that the recent
flurry of meetings between party leaders will produce a
breakthrough. However, he was more optimistic about tangible
results from Saudi King Abdallah bin Abdul Aziz Al Saud's
meeting with German Chancellor Angela Merkel and Secretary
Rice's meetings in Istanbul. He also said that he will ask
Acting Foreign Minister Tareq Mitri, currently in Geneva, to
meet with the Vatican's Secretary for Relations with States
Archbishop Dominique Mamberti.
LAHOUD LIKELY TO STAY IN OFFICE
IF NO PRESIDENT IS ELECTED
-------------------------------
9. (C) Siniora reported that Egyptian Foreign Minister Ahmed
Aboul Gheit, in his October 25th visit to Lebanon, did not
say he supported a constitutional amendment (despite media
reports to the contrary) and cautioned President Emile Lahoud
against forming a second government. Siniora believes Lahoud
is no longer considering forming a second government, but
instead is thinking to stay in office until a president is
elected, regardless of what happens by the midnight November
23 deadline. In the event that no president is elected,
Lahoud (who denies the existence of the Siniora cabinet)
believes his departure would create a vacuum, an outcome to
avoid.
REVIEWING OTHER CANDIDATES
--------------------------
10. (C) In response to the Ambassador's inquiry as to whether
there is truth to the rumor that former MP Suleiman Franjieh
is plotting his candidacy while on a hunting trip to France,
Siniora laughed. Noting that Franjieh hoped to be elected if
the March 14 majority became the parliamentary minority, the
PM commented that the March 14 rejection of the two-thirds
quorum would then be a tool seized upon by Franjieh: "that
is the majority cooking the poison,, only so they are then
forced to eat it." Siniora labeled Franjieh's purported plot
a "fantasy."
11. (C) Upon hearing that Gilbert Chagoury, a Nigeria-based
wealthy industrialist known to have funded (and might still
be doing so) Michel Aoun, is accompanying Franjieh in France,
Siniora suggested that the U.S. deliver to Chagoury a stern
message about the possibility of financial sanctions and
travel bans against those who undermine Lebanon's legitimate
institutions. He also dismissed Central Bank Governor Riad
BEIRUT 00001699 003.2 OF 004
Salameh's candidacy as implausible, calling it "too flagrant
because it would be like electing Syrian President Bashar
al-Asad to be Lebanon's next president." On MP Nassib
Lahoud, Siniora commented that he is the best half plus one
candidate and the only one from the entire list of Maronite
presidential candidates who deserves to be elected.
SLEIMAN'S VISIT TO EGYPT
------------------------
12. (C) Siniora noted that Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak
called to brief him on Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) Commander
Michel Sleiman's October 21 visit to Egypt. Mubarak relayed
that he focused the meeting on praising Sleiman for the
army's efforts during the Nahr al Barid fighting. When
Sleiman told Mubarak that Lebanon needed a president that
pleases Syria, Mubarak agreed that positive relations with
Syria are an important consideration, but that it should be
on the basis of mutual respect. Mubarak told Siniora that
was the extent of election-talk.
13. (C) Siniora acknowledged that Sleiman still appears to
be Syria's preferred candidate. As for himself, Siniora is
maintaining a positive relationship with Sleiman. He said
Sleiman consulted with him prior to his visit to Egypt, and
then briefed him upon his return. He hears that Sleiman is
making positive statements about him and he is doing the
same, praising his role as General. Along these lines,
Siniora is planning to host an event with Sleiman, all of the
officers, and the heads of the Eighth Regiment to express his
appreciation for the LAF.
FURTHER REFUTING OF U.S.
MILITARY BASE RUMOR
------------------------
14. (C) Siniora and his advisors are strategizing on how to
quell the continuing furor over the rumor that the U.S. plans
to build military bases in Lebanon. Ideas include reaching
out to retired military officers to make a statement and
providing statements to friendly, credible journalists.
Meanwhile, Siniora asked the Ambassador to make a brief, firm
statement denying (again) the allegation. It is Siniora's
assessment that this entire ordeal was crafted by Syrian
intelligence. Siniora stated his belief that additional
refuting by the Ambassador would be helpful. (Note: Per
Siniora's request, the Embassy issued a press statement later
that day reiterating that the story is not true. End Note)
SPECIAL TRIBUNAL FUNDING
------------------------
15. (C) When asked about funding progress for the Special
Tribunal, Siniora said he spoke to UN Secretary General Ban
Ki Moon and suggested the UN and Lebanon join forces to reach
out to potential donors to raise funds. Siniora is waiting
for an answer from the UN to his proposal. The Ambassador
inquired whether it might be a good idea for Naziq Hariri,
Rafiq's widow, to undertake a fund-raising tour; Siniora (who
does not like Nazek, who in turn detests him) was
non-committal, noting that potential donors would wonder why
she isn't footing the bill herself.
16. (C) Noting that the cabinet had approved the 2008
budget with Special Tribunal funding included, Siniora
reported that he was pleased with the eight-hour meeting of
the Council of Ministers on October 27. Topics covered
included the 2008 budget, oil and transportation policies,
and draft bills. He remarked that never before has the GOL
discussed policies, but instead focused only on measures.
The current government, in contrast, has managed to send over
120 important bills to Parliament (even though the Parliament
is not meeting).
FIRES DESTROYING YEARS OF TREE PLANTING
--------------------------------
17. (SBU) Siniora relayed his deep concern regarding the
devastation caused by Lebanon's fires, saying that the fires
destroyed more of the forest than that which has been planted
over the last 17 years. Currently the GOL is working with a
reforestation NGO and would appreciate any support the USG
could offer. (Note: the Ambassador made a disaster
declaration to carry out clean up and reforestation in two of
BEIRUT 00001699 004.2 OF 004
the affected areas, and post is investigating an offer from
the U.S. Forest Service for additional assistance. End Note)
FELTMAN

Raw content

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 BEIRUT 001699
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
NSC FOR ABRAMS/SINGH/GAVITO/YERGER
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/29/2027
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, LE
SUBJECT: LEBANON: SINIORA ADVOCATES PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE
BASED ON PRINCIPLES
REF: SECSTATE 148539
BEIRUT 00001699 001.2 OF 004
Classified By: Ambassador Jeffrey D. Feltman for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d
).
SUMMARY
--------
1. (C) In a 10/29 meeting with the Ambassador, Prime
Minister Fouad Siniora recommended simultaneous pursuit of
two options regarding presidential elections. First, he
urged continued push for an absolute majority ("half plus
one") election, despite the fact that March 14 might not be
able to pull it off and that Patriarch Sfeir does not like
it. Second, he asked that the USG help lock in agreement on
a set of principles (for example, UNSCR 1701, Siniora's
seven-point plan, and the National Dialogue's four decisions)
that would bind the elected president and subsequent
government. He suggested exploring this approach when the
Secretary meets her counterparts in Istanbul. Siniora also
SIPDIS
mused that the Patriarch might ultimately give names, but his
expectations regarding the quality of candidates the
Patriarch might name were low. In the event of a vacuum,
Siniora believes the more likely outcome is that President
Lahoud will stay in office, extending the status quo, rather
than form a second government. Regarding fund-raising
efforts for the Special Tribunal, Siniora reported that he
suggested to the UN Secretary General that the UN and Lebanon
undertake joint efforts. He also made a pitch for help in
reforestation, after devastating forest fires in Lebanon's
north and Chouf regions. End summary.
STRATEGY FOR SUCCESSFUL ELECTIONS
-------------------------------
2. (C) The Ambassador, accompanied by PolOff, met with Prime
Minister Fouad Siniora and advisor Mohamad Chatah on October
29. The Ambassador opened the meeting by briefing Siniora on
the message the U.S. is delivering regarding potential
actions that might be taken against individuals who
participate in a second cabinet or who take steps to
undermine Lebanon's legitimate institutions. The PM
expressed appreciation.
3. (C) Regarding Secretary Rice's upcoming Istanbul
meeting, Siniora laid out two tracks that he sees are
possible outcomes of the elections and how the USG can play a
supporting role. He dubbed the first the "confrontation
track," whereby a president is elected with a half plus one
majority. The Patriarch, he noted, does not support this
track because he fears the consequences. The Patriarch also
opposes a vacuum in the presidency during which the Siniora
government fills the void. Siniora remarked that moving
forward without the Patriarch's support is "suicide." The
confrontation track assumes that March 14 is able to garner a
half plus one majority, an assumption which is not a
done-deal, commented Siniora.
4. (C) The second track is to elect a president who meets a
minimum set of requirements by supporting specific
principles: support for UNSCR 1701 (emphasis on disarming
Hizballah), the seven-point proposal Siniora put forward to
end the summer 2006 war and the four decisions resulting from
the spring 2006 National Dialogue. Whoever is elected,
Siniora posited, should then be bound by these principles.
5. (C) Siniora recommended that the first track - half plus
one strategy - remain on the table as a driving force
encouraging MPs to attend the parliamentary session,
regardless of whether it is achievable by March 14. (Siniora
reported that he believes France will accept a candidate
elected with a half plus one majority, but would prefer to
avoid this scenario.) At the same time, Siniora urged that,
simultaneously, we also pursue the second track. Pursuing
this second track entails assessing how to improve the
chances of a candidate who supports the identified
principles, and then soliciting support from the Patriarch,
the Vatican, and other countries for this strategy. Siniora
recommended that Secretary Rice work on these agreed
principles with the attendees at her side-meetings in
Istanbul. It would also be beneficial for the USG to
emphasize, in Istanbul and externally, the MPs' civic
obligation to vote. Siniora emphasized that the Patriarch
must play an active role in this process because the
BEIRUT 00001699 002.2 OF 004
Patriarch may decide to suggest names, irrespective of the
principled approach, out of fear of a vacuum or a half plus
one president.
IF THE PATRIARCH SUGGESTS NAMES...
-------------------------------
6. (C) Siniora relayed that he sent a representative (Radwan
Sayegh) to visit the Patriarch on October 27 and, from this
visit, got the impression that the Patriarch may ultimately
choose to suggest names, one from pro-government forces, one
from the opposition, and one who falls in the middle.
Siniora noted that in such a scenario, the candidate who
falls in the middle would most likely be the winner. Siniora
speculated that, ideally, the Patriarch might suggest someone
young and new. On the other hand, he expected that any names
from the Patriarch could include former Bar Association head
Shakib Qortbawi, from the National Bloc, and former President
Amine Gemayel -- neither of whom qualify as being young or
new. He did not think the Patriarch would choose former
Minister of Finance Demianos Kattar. Siniora said he will
try to find out whether the Patriarch is still supporting
John Obeid, Fares Bouez or Charles Rizk, and he will also
press the Patriarch to support the second track based on
agreed principles.
7. (C) Responding to the Ambassador's suggestion that the
Patriarch announce his intention to attend the November 12
parliament session himself in order to build momentum for MP
attendance, Siniora was receptive, on the condition that
Speaker Nabih Berri does indeed call for the session.
However, if Berri does not call for one, then it would be too
divisive for the Patriarch to show up. He said that MP
Michel Murr has been the most outspoken in supporting this
idea.
8. (C) Siniora did not appear confident that the recent
flurry of meetings between party leaders will produce a
breakthrough. However, he was more optimistic about tangible
results from Saudi King Abdallah bin Abdul Aziz Al Saud's
meeting with German Chancellor Angela Merkel and Secretary
Rice's meetings in Istanbul. He also said that he will ask
Acting Foreign Minister Tareq Mitri, currently in Geneva, to
meet with the Vatican's Secretary for Relations with States
Archbishop Dominique Mamberti.
LAHOUD LIKELY TO STAY IN OFFICE
IF NO PRESIDENT IS ELECTED
-------------------------------
9. (C) Siniora reported that Egyptian Foreign Minister Ahmed
Aboul Gheit, in his October 25th visit to Lebanon, did not
say he supported a constitutional amendment (despite media
reports to the contrary) and cautioned President Emile Lahoud
against forming a second government. Siniora believes Lahoud
is no longer considering forming a second government, but
instead is thinking to stay in office until a president is
elected, regardless of what happens by the midnight November
23 deadline. In the event that no president is elected,
Lahoud (who denies the existence of the Siniora cabinet)
believes his departure would create a vacuum, an outcome to
avoid.
REVIEWING OTHER CANDIDATES
--------------------------
10. (C) In response to the Ambassador's inquiry as to whether
there is truth to the rumor that former MP Suleiman Franjieh
is plotting his candidacy while on a hunting trip to France,
Siniora laughed. Noting that Franjieh hoped to be elected if
the March 14 majority became the parliamentary minority, the
PM commented that the March 14 rejection of the two-thirds
quorum would then be a tool seized upon by Franjieh: "that
is the majority cooking the poison,, only so they are then
forced to eat it." Siniora labeled Franjieh's purported plot
a "fantasy."
11. (C) Upon hearing that Gilbert Chagoury, a Nigeria-based
wealthy industrialist known to have funded (and might still
be doing so) Michel Aoun, is accompanying Franjieh in France,
Siniora suggested that the U.S. deliver to Chagoury a stern
message about the possibility of financial sanctions and
travel bans against those who undermine Lebanon's legitimate
institutions. He also dismissed Central Bank Governor Riad
BEIRUT 00001699 003.2 OF 004
Salameh's candidacy as implausible, calling it "too flagrant
because it would be like electing Syrian President Bashar
al-Asad to be Lebanon's next president." On MP Nassib
Lahoud, Siniora commented that he is the best half plus one
candidate and the only one from the entire list of Maronite
presidential candidates who deserves to be elected.
SLEIMAN'S VISIT TO EGYPT
------------------------
12. (C) Siniora noted that Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak
called to brief him on Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) Commander
Michel Sleiman's October 21 visit to Egypt. Mubarak relayed
that he focused the meeting on praising Sleiman for the
army's efforts during the Nahr al Barid fighting. When
Sleiman told Mubarak that Lebanon needed a president that
pleases Syria, Mubarak agreed that positive relations with
Syria are an important consideration, but that it should be
on the basis of mutual respect. Mubarak told Siniora that
was the extent of election-talk.
13. (C) Siniora acknowledged that Sleiman still appears to
be Syria's preferred candidate. As for himself, Siniora is
maintaining a positive relationship with Sleiman. He said
Sleiman consulted with him prior to his visit to Egypt, and
then briefed him upon his return. He hears that Sleiman is
making positive statements about him and he is doing the
same, praising his role as General. Along these lines,
Siniora is planning to host an event with Sleiman, all of the
officers, and the heads of the Eighth Regiment to express his
appreciation for the LAF.
FURTHER REFUTING OF U.S.
MILITARY BASE RUMOR
------------------------
14. (C) Siniora and his advisors are strategizing on how to
quell the continuing furor over the rumor that the U.S. plans
to build military bases in Lebanon. Ideas include reaching
out to retired military officers to make a statement and
providing statements to friendly, credible journalists.
Meanwhile, Siniora asked the Ambassador to make a brief, firm
statement denying (again) the allegation. It is Siniora's
assessment that this entire ordeal was crafted by Syrian
intelligence. Siniora stated his belief that additional
refuting by the Ambassador would be helpful. (Note: Per
Siniora's request, the Embassy issued a press statement later
that day reiterating that the story is not true. End Note)
SPECIAL TRIBUNAL FUNDING
------------------------
15. (C) When asked about funding progress for the Special
Tribunal, Siniora said he spoke to UN Secretary General Ban
Ki Moon and suggested the UN and Lebanon join forces to reach
out to potential donors to raise funds. Siniora is waiting
for an answer from the UN to his proposal. The Ambassador
inquired whether it might be a good idea for Naziq Hariri,
Rafiq's widow, to undertake a fund-raising tour; Siniora (who
does not like Nazek, who in turn detests him) was
non-committal, noting that potential donors would wonder why
she isn't footing the bill herself.
16. (C) Noting that the cabinet had approved the 2008
budget with Special Tribunal funding included, Siniora
reported that he was pleased with the eight-hour meeting of
the Council of Ministers on October 27. Topics covered
included the 2008 budget, oil and transportation policies,
and draft bills. He remarked that never before has the GOL
discussed policies, but instead focused only on measures.
The current government, in contrast, has managed to send over
120 important bills to Parliament (even though the Parliament
is not meeting).
FIRES DESTROYING YEARS OF TREE PLANTING
--------------------------------
17. (SBU) Siniora relayed his deep concern regarding the
devastation caused by Lebanon's fires, saying that the fires
destroyed more of the forest than that which has been planted
over the last 17 years. Currently the GOL is working with a
reforestation NGO and would appreciate any support the USG
could offer. (Note: the Ambassador made a disaster
declaration to carry out clean up and reforestation in two of
BEIRUT 00001699 004.2 OF 004
the affected areas, and post is investigating an offer from
the U.S. Forest Service for additional assistance. End Note)
FELTMAN