Event Title

Presenter Information

Location

Duke Law School

Start Date

21-1-1993 9:00 AM

End Date

21-1-1993 10:15 AM

Description

United States Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia has become an important figure in American constitutional law. Over the past five years, he has worked significant changes in our legal landscape. Yet, Justice Scalia's most important opinion in federal courts law is his most recent one-last summer's decision in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife. This ruling, in the author's view, will mark a transformation in the law of standing-the law of "judicial control of public officers." Building upon his prior academic writings and opinions as both a Justice and a federal appellate court judge, Scalia concluded for the Defenders majority -without apparent embarrassment - that "legislatively pronounced" "public rights" cannot provide the basis for standing in the federal courts unless they coincide with the Justices' views of discrete, concrete, and tangible injury. The decision is difficult to square with the language and history of Article III, with the injury requirement itself, with more modest visions of judicial power, and with timehonored notions of public law litigation. It is, therefore, worthy of some exploration and even some criticism. In this brief Article, the author will attempt to provide a measure of each.

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Jan 21st, 9:00 AMJan 21st, 10:15 AM

Justice Scalia, Standing, and Public Law Litigation

Duke Law School

United States Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia has become an important figure in American constitutional law. Over the past five years, he has worked significant changes in our legal landscape. Yet, Justice Scalia's most important opinion in federal courts law is his most recent one-last summer's decision in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife. This ruling, in the author's view, will mark a transformation in the law of standing-the law of "judicial control of public officers." Building upon his prior academic writings and opinions as both a Justice and a federal appellate court judge, Scalia concluded for the Defenders majority -without apparent embarrassment - that "legislatively pronounced" "public rights" cannot provide the basis for standing in the federal courts unless they coincide with the Justices' views of discrete, concrete, and tangible injury. The decision is difficult to square with the language and history of Article III, with the injury requirement itself, with more modest visions of judicial power, and with timehonored notions of public law litigation. It is, therefore, worthy of some exploration and even some criticism. In this brief Article, the author will attempt to provide a measure of each.