The Ambassador
of Japan called on the President at the former's request. The Secretary of State
was present. The Ambassador expressed his usual appreciation of certain
courtesies and considera­tions shown him and his Government.

He then handed
to the President a communication from the Prince Premier of Japan to the
President of the United States (copy at­tached). The President read it with
interest and complimented the tone and spirit of it.

The President
then spoke somewhat as he did at the last meeting a week ago Sunday about the
idea suggested by the Japanese Prime Minister of a personal meeting between the
President and the Prime Minister at as early a date as possible for the purpose
of having a frank discussion of all important affairs existing between the two
countries. The President again spoke of the difficulty of going as far as Hawaii
and elaborated on the reasons why it would be difficult to get away for twenty‑one
days. He then turned to Juneau, Alaska, as a meeting place, which would only
require some fourteen or fifteen days, allowing for a three or four days
conversation with the Japanese Prime Minister. The only point raised by the
Ambassador in this connection was that the conversation be held as early as
possible.

The Ambassador
then handed to the President a communication from his Government in reply to
the communication of the President to the Japanese Government, dated August 17,
1941 (copy attached). The President expressed his keen interest to get this
reply and pro­ceeded to read it. At two or three stages he stopped to comment
briefly and, as he stated each time, study would later, of course, be given to
the subject. For example, he remarked that there was nothing in the note to
prevent the Japanese from reinforcing their Army and Navy in the Indochina area
while the conversations were going on, even though there was no advance
whatever by the Japanese forces. At another point he injected some oral comment
to the effect that Japan is in no possible danger from Russia at the present
time and he emphasized this very strongly. At still another point he referred
crit­ically to the Japanese oil complaints and their baseless nature. He then
reminded the Ambassador that under the oil quota allowed Japan by this
Government, Japan was in a position to have a number of tankers loaded with oil
and transported to Japan if and when it so desired.

At the
conclusion of the reading of the communication, the Presi­dent said to the
Ambassador that he could say to his Government that he considered this note a
step forward and that he was very hopeful. He then added that he would be
keenly interested in having three or four days with Prince Konoye, and again he
mentioned Juneau.

C [ORDELL] H [ULL]

[Annexes]

THE JAPANESE PRIME
MINISTER (PRINCE KONOYE) TO PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT

I deeply
appreciate the courtesy of Your Excellency in delivering personally to
Ambassador Nomura the reply of the United States Gov­ernment to the proposal of
the Japanese Government regarding a meeting between Your Excellency and myself.

In the face of
universal warlike turmoil Japan and the United States are the last two major
Powers who hold the key to inter­national peace. That the two nations should
fall in the worst of relations at this time world mean not only a disaster in
itself, but also the collapse of world civilization. Japan is solicitous for
the maintenance of the peace of the Pacific and the peace of the world and she
desires therefore to improve Japanese‑American relations.

The present
deterioration of the Japanese‑American relations is largely due, I feel,
to a lack of understanding which has led to mutual suspicions and
misapprehensions, and also encouraged the machinations and maneuvers of Third
Powers.

Without first
eliminating such causes, it is impossible to expect adjustment of Japanese‑American
relations. This is why I wish to meet Your Excellency personally for a frank
exchange of views.

The preliminary
informal conversations, disrupted July last, were quite appropriate both in
spirit and content. But the idea of con­tinuing those conversations and to have
their conclusion confirmed by the responsible heads of the two Governments does
not meet the need of the present situation which is developing swiftly and may
produce unforeseen contingencies.

I consider it,
therefore, of urgent necessity that the two heads of the Governments should
meet first to discuss from a broad stand­point all important problems between
Japan and America cover­ing the entire Pacific area, and to explore the
possibility of saving the situation. Adjustment of minor items may, if
necessary, be left to negotiations between competent officials of the two
countries, following the meeting.

Such is my aim
in making the present proposal. I sincerely hope my views in this regard are
fully understood and reciprocated by Your Excellency.

Because of the
nature of the meeting as stated above, I would prefer that it will take place
as soon as possible.

[TOKYO,]
August 27, 1941.

STATEMENT BY THE
JAPANESE GOVERNMENT HANDED BY THE JAPANESE AMBASSADOR (NOMURA) TO PRESIDENT
ROOSEVELT ON AUGUST 28, 1941

The Japanese Government
has received the communication con­veyed by the Secretary of State and the
President of the United States to the Japanese Ambassador on August 17, 1941.
The Japa­nese Government desires to state its views as follows:

The Japanese
Government profoundly regrets that despite the pledge it has given heretofore
as well as its repeated explanations concerning Japan's actions and measures in
the foreign field, the United States Government continues to entertain
misgivings.

The United
States Government mentions certain situations and measures which it regards as
inimical to a peaceful settlement in the Pacific area. In an atmosphere of
world crisis and international confusion, it is sometimes difficulttoascertain when an event is a cause and
when it is a consequence.

When a nation is
obstructed in the path of natural and peaceful development or when the means of
its existence is threatened, not only is it imperative that that nation should
take defensive measures, but it is also required to do so for the maintenance
of a just peace. This was the motivating policy of the Japanese Government.

Meanwhile, the
United States had taken certain measures which could be interpreted in Japan asindicative of a continuing unfriendly pressure at variance with the then
current amicable conversations.

The United
States Government certainly regards some of its actions as merely counter‑measures
against Japan's policy and procedures which were considered as conflicting with
American interests and principles. On the other hand, to the Japanese
Government those procedures were determined by considerations of self‑protection
for meeting national requirements or removing environmental and politi­cal
obstacles against national security.

With admirable
modesty of mind, the Government of the United States has seemed frequently
unaware that its words and policies are automatically weighted with the immense
power of America's accom­plished facts, natural endowment and potential might.
The Presi­dent of the United States; and the Secretary of State, in their own
unquestioning adherence to the ways of peaceful procedures, might find it
difficult to believe that other nations, anywhere, could consider themselves
threatened by the United States.

Yet, as long as
there is lacking the assuagement of that possible threat, there will be some
less favorably endowed (especially in essen­tial resources) who will feel
compelled to consider defensively their relations with the United States.

In consequence,
the Japanese Government welcomes the invitation by the Government of the United
States to an exchange of views in regard to basic policies and attitudes as the
foundation of an under­standing that will condition lasting and extensive peace
in the Pacific area. For such peace, the Government of Japan is ready for such
a united effort toward a peaceful settlement covering the entire Pacific
situation the Government of Japan, like the Government of the United States,
would be proud to make sacrifices.

Japan's measure
in Indo‑China was intended to accelerate the set­tlement of the China
Incident; and at the same time it was calculated to remove all menace to the
peace of the Pacific and to secure to Japan an equitable supply of essential
materials. It was a measure of self-­defense the Japanese Government felt
obliged to take. But the Jap­anese Government has no intention of threatening
thereby other countries.

Therefore, the
Japanese Government is prepared to withdraw its troops from Indo‑China as
soon as the China Incident is settled or a just peace is established in East
Asia.

Furthermore, in
order to remove all possible doubt in this regard, the Japanese Government
reaffirms herewith its repeated declaration that its present action in Indo‑China
is not a preparatory step for military advance into neighboring territories.
The Japanese Gov­ernment believes the above pledge will suffice to clarify also
Japan's intentions toward Thailand.

As regards
Soviet‑Japanese relations, the Japanese Government declares likewise that
Japan will take no military action as long as the Soviet Union remains faithful
to the .Soviet‑Japanese neutrality treaty and does not menace Japan or
Manchoukuo or take any action contrary to the spirit of the said treaty. On the
other hand, the Japanese Government sincerely hope that the United States
Government will avoid any action that might give rise to a fear of menace to
Japan through collaboration with the Soviet Union.

In a word, the
Japanese Government has no intention of using, without provocation, military
force against any neighboring nation.

Quite properly,
discussions between the Japanese Government and the Government of the United
States directed toward ascertaining if there existed a basis for negotiations
for a peaceful settlement cov­ering the entire situation,—such discussions
would naturally envisage the working out of a progressive program, obtainable
by peaceful methods. The Japanese Government shares fully that view with the
Government of the United States.

It is also
stated by the United States Government that no proposals or suggestions
affecting the rights and privileges of either the United States or Japan would
be considered except as these might be in con­formity with the basic principles
to which the United States has long been committed. The fundamental national
policy long cherished by the Japanese Government is again in full agreement on
that point.

Regarding the
principles and directives set forth in detail by the American Government and
envisaged in the informal conversations as constituting a program for the
Pacific area, the Japanese Govern­ment wishes to state that it considers these
principles and the prac­tical application thereof, in the friendliest manner
possible, are the prime requisites of a true peace and should be applied not
only in the Pacific area but throughout the entire world. Such a program has
long been desired and sought by Japan itself.

The Japanese
Government now confidently hopes that from the larger viewpoint of a
constructive world peace, and in the light of the current international
situation, past differences may be merged in an agreement of principles and a
cooperative effort based on order and justice. The meeting of the responsible
heads of our respective Governments would confirm and give such sanction to our
purposes that peace in the Pacific would be instituted by that meeting.

(PEACE AND WAR, UNITED STATES FOREIGN
POLICY 1931-1941,UNITED STATES
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICEWASHINGTON:
1943)