Relations with Regional Powers

Although the shah had been unpopular among the rulers of the six
states on the Arab side of the Persian Gulf, the Revolution in Iran,
nevertheless, was a shock to them. Iran under the shah had been the main
guarantor of political stability in the region. Under the Republic, Iran
was promising to be the primary promoter of revolution. All six
countries--Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United
Arab Emirates (UAE)--were ruled by hereditary monarchs who naturally
feared the new rhetoric from Tehran. Indeed, during the first year
following the Revolution, throughout the Gulf region numerous acts of
political sabotage and violence occurred, claiming inspiration from the
Iranian example. The most sensational of these was the assault by Muslim
dissidents on the Grand Mosque in the holy city of Mecca, Saudi Arabia.
Other clashes occurred between groups of local Shias and security forces
in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Bahrain.

The outbreak of war between Iran and Iraq further alarmed the Persian
Gulf Arab states. In 1981 they joined together in a collective defense
alliance known as the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). Although the GCC
announced its neutrality with respect to the Iran-Iraq War, Iran
perceived its formation as part of the Iraqi war effort and generally
was hostile toward it. The GCC for its part suspected Iran of supporting
antigovernment groups throughout the Persian Gulf. These concerns were
heightened in December 1981, when authorities in Bahrain announced the
discovery of a clandestine group that had plans to carry out sabotage
and terrorist acts as part of an effort to overthrow the government;
several of the plotters had links to Iranian clerics. In December 1983,
a series of bombings occurred in Kuwait, including incidents at the
American and French embassies; the Arab nationals who were captured and
charged with these acts of terrorism were members of an Iraqi Shia
movement, Ad Dawah, that was headquartered in Tehran. In May 1985, a
suicide driver unsuccessfully tried to kill the ruler of Kuwait.

Despite GCC suspicions of Iranian involvement in subversive
activities, until 1987 more cooperation than confrontation was found
between Iran and the GCC members. In general, Iran avoided dealing with
the GCC as an entity, preferring to ignore its existence and to treat
each country separately. Iran's relations with the six component states
varied from friendliness to hostility. For example, Iran and the UAE
maintained relatively cordial relations. The political ties between the
two countries were reinforced by economic ties. An Iranian mercantile
community in the UAE was concentrated in Dubayy, a city that
emerged--following the destruction of Khorramshahr--as an important
transit center where international goods destined for Iran were
offloaded into smaller boats capable of entering small Iranian fishing
towns that served as ports of entry despite their lack of docking
facilities. In Bahrain, where the ruling family was Sunni Muslim and a
majority of the population was Shia, lingering suspicions of Iranian
intentions did not inhibit the government from improving diplomatic
relations with Tehran. Because there were no outstanding issues between
Iran and Qatar, relations between them were generally correct.

Iran's relations with the other three GCC members--Kuwait, Oman, and
Saudi Arabia--have been more complex and, throughout the early and
mid-1980s, have been characterized by alternating periods of tension and
mutual accommodation. For example, immediately after the Revolution,
Iranian propaganda singled out the sultan of Oman as an example of the
kind of "un-Islamic tyrant" who should be overthrown. This
hostility sprang from the revolutionaries' perception of the Omani ruler
as having been a close friend of the shah. Iran's view had developed in
the 1970s when the shah sent military assistance, including an Iranian
military contingent, to help the sultan crush a long-term rebellion.
More significant, however, the Iranian leaders regarded the sultan as
subservient to the United States. They denounced his policies of
supporting the Camp David accords, providing facilities for American air
crews who attempted the unsuccessful rescue of the hostages in April
1980, signing an agreement for American military use of the air base on
Masirah Island, and discussing with the United States construction of an
airfield on the Musandam Peninsula overlooking the Strait of Hormuz.
Oman generally refrained from responding to Iranian charges and
consequently avoided an escalation of the verbal barrages. Despite the
many areas of friction, tensions between Iran and Oman gradually abated
after 1981. The movement toward more correct diplomatic relations
culminated in 1987 with a state visit of the Omani foreign minister to
Iran. Iran's relations with Saudi Arabia and Kuwait were strained
because both of these countries provided major financial support to Iraq
after the Iran-Iraq War began. In addition, Iran accused them of
providing logistical assistance for Iraqi bombing raids on Iranian oil
installations. For their part, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait believed that
Iran supported subversive activities among their Shia minorities. They
also resented Iranian attacks on their shipping. Saudi Arabia annually
confronted embarrassing incidents during the pilgrimage season when
Iranians tried to stage political demonstrations. Nevertheless, both
Saudi Arabia and Kuwait made efforts to seek a rapprochement with Iran
in 1985 and 1986. The Saudi efforts were more successful and resulted in
an exchange of visits of the Saudi and Iranian foreign ministers in
1985. The Saudis and Iranians also began to cooperate in some areas of
mutual interest, such as international oil policy. In contrast,
relations between Kuwait and Iran did not improve significantly. In the
fall of 1986, Iran began to single out Kuwait's ships for retaliatory
attacks, and this led to a worsening of diplomatic relations.

Political tensions between Tehran and Kuwait increased significantly
after the United States agreed to reflag Kuwaiti oil tankers. Iran
accused Kuwait and its neighbors, especially Saudi Arabia, of being mere
puppets of the "Great Satan." During the pilgrimage to Mecca
in the summer of 1987, Iran encouraged the pilgrims--150,000 of whom had
come from Iran--to demonstrate against the United States and the corrupt
rulers of the Gulf. More than 400 pilgrims, including at least 300
Iranians, were killed in a stampede in Mecca when Saudi security forces
attempted to break up a demonstration.

Turkey, Pakistan, and Afghanistan

Relations with Turkey and Pakistan since the Revolution generally
have been amicable and without any major issues. Before the Revolution,
Iran had joined both countries in a defensive alliance (that included
Britain with the United States as an observer), the Central Treaty
Organization, and in an economic agreement, the Regional Cooperation for
Development. Iran withdrew from both agreements after the Revolution.
Nevertheless, Iran's economic ties with Pakistan and Turkey have
expanded significantly. Both countries have become important trade
partners of Iran. Turkey also has become the major transit route for
goods traveling by truck and rail between Europe and Iran. The increased
volume of trade with Turkey and Pakistan has been facilitated both by
their location and by the ideology of "neither East nor West,"
which advocates reducing imports from the industrialized nations in
favor of importing more from Muslim and Third World countries.

Although Iran maintained diplomatic relations with Afghanistan in
1987, Iran was critical of both the Marxist-Leninist government in Kabul
and the presence of Soviet troops in the country. Although distrustful
of the ideologies of most groups, Iran's leaders generally supported the
cause of the Afghan resistance. Iran provided financial and limited
military assistance to those Afghan resistance forces whose leaders had
pledged loyalty to the Iranian vision of Islamic revolution. Iran also
hosted about 2.3 million refugees who had fled Afghanistan.

Israel and the Non-Gulf Arab States

Prior to the Revolution, Iran and Israel had been de facto allies in
the Middle East. One of the very first acts of the provisional
government was to denounce that relationship and to turn over the former
Israeli mission in Tehran to the Palestine Liberation Organization. All
trade with Israel was banned, especially the sale of oil. Iranian
leaders contended that Israel's existence was illegitimate, because it
came about as a result of the destruction of Palestine. Therefore, Iran
advocated eradicating Israel and reconstituting Palestine. Those Arabs
who advocated compromise with Israel, such as Anwar as Sadat of Egypt,
were excoriated as traitors. In general, Iran's relations with the Arab
states have been based on perceptions of each state's relations with
Israel. Thus, Iran has been hostile toward those states it regarded as
willing to accept Israel's existence--Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, and
Tunisia--and friendly toward those it regarded as sharing Iranian
views--Algeria, Libya, and Syria. Despite its uncompromising position,
however, Iran is known to have purchased weapons clandestinely from
Israel as recently as 1985.

Syria has been revolutionary Iran's principal ally in the Middle
East. This relationship involved both political and economic ties. The
de facto alliance between the two countries emerged at the beginning of
1982. At that time, Iran supported the government of Hafiz al Assad
against the Muslim Brotherhood, which had risen in rebellion against the
secularizing policies of the ruling Baath Party. Iran's backing of the
Syrian government was significant because the Muslim Brotherhood was the
first Islamic political group to claim the Iranian Revolution as the
primary inspiration for its rebellion. Soon after the Muslim Brotherhood
had been crushed, Damascus shut down the pipeline through which Iraqi
oil crossed Syria to reach Mediterranean ports. This action against
another Arab state, which also was ruled by a Baath party, was an
important gesture in support of the Iranian war effort. The action was
also a hostile blow against Iraq because Iraqi Persian Gulf ports had
been blockaded since the beginning of the war, and the only other exit
route for its oil exports was through a smaller pipeline traversing
Turkey. Iran had agreed to provide Syria 20,000 barrels of oil per day
free of charge as compensation for the transit fees Syria would lose by
closing the pipeline. Iran also agreed to sell Syria additional oil it
required, at a heavily discounted price. In 1987 this agreement was
again renewed. Syria also provided Iran arms from its own stock of
Soviet- and East European-made weapons.