To Edmund Jenings

[dateline] Hague July 17. 1782

[salute] Sir

I am honoured with yours of the 14. You might well Smile at the Supposition that I
know nothing about the Negotiations for Peace. I have no direct Information about
it, Since the 2 of June,1 but I presume the Reason is, there is nothing to communicate. I am indirectly informed,
that Greenville, after a long time recd a Commission to treat with all the belligerent
Powers.2 But as our Ennemy dont acknowledge Us to be a Power, they have thus reserved to themselves
a Place for Chicane.

Mr Fox has Shewn himself, an able Man. He has at last taken a decided Part, and if
he adheres to it, with Fortitude and Constancy, he will carry his Point, make himself
Prime Minister and give Peace to his Country and to Europe, upon the best Terms that
are attainable by G. Britain. His opinion, against receiving again the Dependence
of America, if offered is perfectly just.3 It would be, ruinous to G. B. to receive it, as was fully demonstrated in a Parcell
of Letters I sent to you two Years ago.4 Pray what is become of them. Can you get them back? I should be very glad to see
them again. Since they are not worth printing, in London I would have them published
here in French.

I have the Honour to agree with you, in your opinion that the Master will get the
better of the Vassal, in their Contention for Preeminence, but there is another Emulation
going on, between the Same Vassal, and a certain hoary head,5 where I think the Vassal will get the better.

I have had the Honour to Sup at the great Feast at Court, in Company with the great
Personages you Saw at Brussells, and had several fine opportunities to take their
Phisiognomies very near.6 Their appearance and their Behaviour, were very agreable. Yet who would wish to be,
in their Situation? their Forebodings may very probably be as gloomy as yours.

Will not Fox's decisive Conduct compel the Master and the Vassal to be explicit? The
Declarations of Conway, Richmond, and even shelburne, are so possitive, that the Intention
is to acknowledge American Independence,7 that it Seems difficult for them to evade and equivocate, much longer, especially
as Fox and Burke, Cavendich8 &c will not forget their Declarations. All Europe will consider the Kings Honour
Dignity, Parole, engaged to acknowledge our Independence, if he retreats he will,
Sink his Character lower than ever in every Court of Europe. I think that Shelburne
will not be able to with Stand the Torrent. He must call in the Bedfords to his Aid.9 These will not be able to support him long, and presently, Several of the old Ministry
will come in again. But none of them can disavow, the Declarations, in which King
and all are compromised, to acknowledge American Independence, either conditionally
or without Conditions. Fox uttered a Volume of good Sense, when he attached the Salvation
of his Country to the Words “Without Conditions.” This sentiment has convinced me
that he has a more comprehensive View of the State of the Nation, of France, Spain,
Holland America, and the Neutral Powers, than all the other Men in England, and has
formed a more Sagacious Judgement upon the whole.

Between you and me, Where shelburne says, he has Proofs lately recd that he is not
disagreable to the Americans, he means a flattering Letter that Franklin has written
him.10 I dare say he has no other Proof—at least he has none from me, who confess that I
have as little Confidence in him, as you have or Mr Fox. I have long foreseen, that
his Ambition his Trimming System, and insideous Character, <would> might Slide itself into the Place of the old Ministry, and put the last finishing
Hand to the Ruin of G. B. and have ever wondered, that Fox and Burke did not see it
sooner. They however depended I suppose upon the Marquis of Rockingham.

There now remains nothing but for Fox Burke, &c to be Steady. They have Seized the
precise Idea and the only one that can be of Service to their Country. If they persevere,
they will have the Glory, far greater than even that of a Chatham,11 of restoring as much Friendship between G. B and America, as is now in the nature
of Things possible, and in as short a time as possible, and at the Sametime that of
obtaining the best terms possible from the other belligerent Powers. Fox appears to
have considered the advantage they give to France Spain and Holland by keeping the
Question of American Independence open. An immense Advantage it is, that of throwing
the odium of the Continuance of the War upon America { 183 } { 184 } or rather upon England, that of Saying, with Truth We cant give Peace to the World
yet, because the English cant perswade themselves to pronounce the Word Independence.
This Point, fairly settled America will be Steady to her plighted faith and Honour
it is true, but She will say, “I am Satisfied, Satisfy my Allies.” Their Allies must
then take upon themselves the sole Merit of continuing the War. This Sentiment, will
constrain them to a Moderation to which they have no Motive while the other Question
is open.

2. On 10 June, Fox sent Thomas Grenville a revised commission, authorizing him to negotiate
with France and “with any other of the Enemies of G. Britain.” In his reply to Fox
of 21 June, however, Grenville questioned whether his power to negotiate with any
“Princes and States” could apply to America until it had been recognized as independent (Mary A. Giunta,
ed., The Emerging Nation: A Documentary History of the Foreign Relations of the United
States under the Articles of Confederation, 1780–1789, Washington, D.C., 1996, 1:428, 434–435). By the date of this letter, Fox's resignation
had made moot the issue of Grenville's powers to negotiate.

3. Here and later in the letter, JA analyzes the effect of Shelburne's replacement of Rockingham and Fox's subsequent
resignation. These events had considerable significance with regard to the domestic
political situation in England, but their effect on prospects for Anglo-American peace
negotiations were more apparent than real. As JA points out later in the letter, it made little difference who was in power, because
the debates in the Houses of Commons and Lords on 9 and 10 July, respectively, made
it clear that one way or another, all parties were committed to recognizing American
independence and concluding a peace treaty (Parliamentary Hist., 23:152–196). But the nature of the negotiations and the timing and form of the recognition
remained uncertain. Fox favored recognizing the United States as independent and sovereign
in advance of peace negotiations and gave the refusal of the cabinet to support his
position as a reason for resigning. Fox's position led many Americans, including JA, to see him as the more desirable person with whom to negotiate. By contrast, Shelburne,
who would now control the negotiations and was mistrusted by virtually everyone, had
long opposed granting full independence to the United States. As a result, and despite
what Shelburne might say publicly, JA and others suspected that Shelburne continued to favor some form of settlement with
the United States short of full independence (Stanley Ayling, The Life of Charles James Fox, London, 1991, p. 102; Scott, British Foreign Policy, p. 325–327; see also JA's letter of 20 July to Jenings, below).

4. It was the perceived need to remove any illusions held by Shelburne or anyone else
about an Anglo-American settlement that stopped short of full independence that finally
led to the publication, beginning in August, of the “Parcell of Letters” that JA had sent to Jenings in 1780. The letters numbered twelve, ten of which were published
in Parker's General Advertiser and Morning Intelligencer between 23 Aug. and 26 Dec. 1782 under the title “Letters from a Distinguished American.”
All twelve letters are printed under the date of [ante 14–22 July] 1780, the span in which they were written (vol. 9:531–588). This was done because, significant
as their publication is in 1782, JA's motives for writing them in the summer of 1780 and then sending them off to be,
as he assumed, expeditiously published are perhaps even more important for understanding
his diplomacy.

5. That is, George III was the “Master” and Shelburne was his “Vassal.” The “hoary head”
was probably Benjamin Franklin, whom JA apparently believed would be outwitted by Shelburne.

6. That is, JA had attended the “Fête” on 16 July honoring the arrival of the Grand Duke Paul and
Grand Duchess Maria Feodorovna of Russia at The Hague. JA, however, was not originally invited. According to C. W. F. Dumas, it was only after
he raised { 185 } the issue with the Duc de La Vauguyon, and the ambassador took the matter up with
the Dutch government, that an invitation, which arrived on the morning of the 16th,
was issued to JA (PCC, No. 93, II, f. 76, 85).

7. For Henry Seymour Conway's declaration during the debate in the House of Commons on
9 July that recognition of American independence was a guiding principle of the Shelburne
ministry, see Parliamentary Hist., 23:165–166. In the House of Lords on 10 July, Charles Lennox, 3d Duke of Richmond,
who served as the master general of ordnance in both the Rockingham and the Shelburne
ministries and was Charles James Fox's uncle, reportedly declared “that the independence
of America should not stand in the way of so desirable an object as peace with that
country.” Shelburne followed, reiterating what Richmond had said and stating that
despite his long-held belief that granting independence to the United States would
be a disaster for Britain, he had concluded that there was now no other choice if
peace was to be obtained (same, 23:188–195).

8. Lord John Cavendish had resigned as chancellor of the exchequer. For his statement
during the Commons debate on 9 July, see same, 23:179–180.

9. The Bedford Party had taken a particularly hard-line stand with regard to the American
colonies during the late 1760s. In the summer of 1782, rumors circulated in London
that Shelburne might seek the support of former members of the Bedford Party to shore
up his position (Lord Fitzmaurice, Life of William Earl of Shelburne, London, 1912, 2 vols., 1:321, 361–392; John Norris, Shelburne and Reform, London, 1963, p. 245–246).

10. During the Lords debate on 10 July, Shelburne reportedly said that “it had been insinuated
elsewhere, that had his principles been known relative to American independence, the
people of America would be backward to treat with him for peace; but he had learned
sufficient by the information he received during the last two months that he was Secretary
of State, and since, that there was no man with whom the Americans would more willingly
treat than himself” (Parliamentary Hist., 23:193–194). The letter from Franklin to Shelburne referred to by JA was probably that of 22 March, a copy of which Franklin sent to JA with his letter of 20 April, but that letter also included another to Shelburne of 18 April (Franklin, Papers, 37:24–25, 165–167; vol. 12:432–433).

11. A reference to William Pitt, 1st Earl of Chatham, known for his leadership during
the Seven Years' War. Later he opposed the Stamp Act and called for its repeal, but
he also strongly opposed independence for the American colonies (JA, D&A, 1:308; vol. 9:21).