Before your company can legally classify a worker as an independent contractor instead of an employee, serious research and analysis must be undertaken. Be sure to review and apply the IRS guidelines below to the specific job which you are considering independent contractor status for. Go through each factor and analyze the job on a step by step basis before arriving at a conclusion. Remember, this is a balancing act, so make sure the scale tilts significantly in your favor before solidifying IC status for your personnel:

IRS 20 Factor Test

Instructions. Workers who must comply with your instructions as to when, where, and how they work are more likely to be employees than independent contractors.

Training. The more training your workers receive from you, the more likely it is that they’re employees. The underlying concept here is that independent contractors are supposed to know how to do their work and, thus, shouldn’t require training from the purchasers of their services.

Integration. The more important that your workers’ services are to your business’s success or continuation, the more likely it is that they’re employees.

Services rendered personally. Workers who must personally perform the services for which you’re paying are more likely employees. In contrast, independent contractors usually have the right to substitute other people’s services for their own in fulfilling their contracts.

Hiring assistants. Workers who are not in charge of hiring, supervising, and paying their own assistants are more likely employees.

Continuing relationship. Workers who perform work for you for significant periods of time or at recurring intervals are more likely employees.

Set hours of work. Workers for whom you establish set hours of work are more likely employees. In contrast, independent contractors generally can set their own work hours.

Full time required. Workers whom you require to work or be available full time are likely to be employees. In contrast, independent contractors generally can work whenever and for whomever they choose.

Work done on premises. Workers who work at your premises or at a place you designate are more likely employees. In contrast, independent contractors usually have their own place of business where they can do their work for you.

Order or sequence set.Workers for whom you set the order or sequence in which they perform their services are more likely employees.

Reports. Workers whom you require to submit regular reports are more likely employees.

Payment method. Workers whom you pay by the hour, week, or month are more likely employees. In contrast, independent contractors are usually paid by the job.

Expenses. Workers whose business and travel expenses you pay are more likely employees. In contrast, independent contractors are usually expected to cover their own overhead expenses.

Tools and materials. Workers who use tools, materials, and other equipment that you furnish are more likely employees.

Investment. The greater your workers’ investment in the facilities and equipment they use in performing their services, the more likely it is that they’re independent contractors.

Profit or loss. The greater the risk that your workers can either make a profit or suffer a loss in rendering their services, the more likely it is that they’re independent contractors.

Works for more than one person at a time. The more businesses for which your workers perform services at the same time, the more likely it is that they’re independent contractors.

Services available to general public. Workers who hold their services out to the general public (for example, through business cards, advertisements, and other promotional items) are more likely independent contractors.

Right to fire. Workers whom you can fire at any time are more likely employees. In contrast, your right to terminate an independent contractor is generally limited by specific contractual terms.

Right to quit. Workers who can quit at any time without incurring any liability to you are more likely employees. In contrast, independent contractors generally can’t walk away in the middle of a project without running the risk of being held financially

It is common for companies to share confidential information with a third party in order to achieve an operational objective, where the third party may be a prospective joint venturer, an acquirer, an investor or even a client. Prior to disclosing such confidential information, however, these same companies usually require the execution of a confidentiality/non-disclosure agreement by the other party.

This blog has previously discussed issues surrounding confidentiality/non-disclosure agreements. Today’s topic however is specific: the time limits, if any, that should be considered in such agreements.

Most companies if given a choice would prefer to include in their NDA/confidentiality agreements a perpetual term, which essentially means that the confidential information can never be disclosed by the third party except in limited circumstances. Often times however, this desire is diluted in the course of negotiations, leading to a final agreement containing just a limited time for confidentiality, ie, for example, 2, 5 or even 10 years.

Unbeknownst to such parties, agreeing to this watered-down time limit may lead to substantial future risks with regard to confidential information. An example is the California case of Silicon Image, Inc. v. Analogk Semiconductor, Inc. In furtherance of its goal to protect its confidential information, Silicon Image took numerous prudent steps to protect its trade secrets, including: i) requiring its own employees, customers and business partners to sign confidentiality agreements; ii) maintaining a key card access system and by requiring visitors to sign in to protect its trade secrets; iii) protecting computer systems through network security and access control; iv) labeling confidential proprietary information and watermarking all information disclosed outside the company with the name of the individual receiving the information; and, v) providing training sessions to employees on its trade secret protection program.

Yet in spite of its strict adherence to the protection of its confidential information, Silicon Image decided to limit the term of its confidentiality agreements to a set number of years, instead of a perpetual term, due to the fact that that’s what other high-tech companies were doing, and due to the fact that many partners, investors and other third parties pushed back and refused to execute non-disclosure agreements containing a perpetual duration of confidentiality.

Despite its best practices described above, Silicon allowed itself to frequently enter into confidentiality agreements with terms of 2 to 4 years, which proved to be a serious error when the time came for Silicon to seek a preliminary injunction in California Court against a competitor it alleged misappropriated its confidential information.

In denying Silicon’s request for a preliminary injunction, the Court analyzed whether Silicon Image made reasonable efforts to protect its confidential information. One of the key factors the Court focused on was whether or not the non-disclosure agreements between Silicon Image and its customers and distributors provided adequate protection. Unfortunately for Silicon, the Court concluded that reasonable steps to protect trade secrets were not shown by Silicon, pointing particularly to the time limits included in its confidentiality agreements.

The Court held that “one who claims that he has a trade secret must exercise eternal vigilance,” requiring all persons to whom a trade secret becomes known to acknowledge and promise to respect the secrecy in a written agreement. A time limit contained in an NDA demonstrated to the Court that Silicon’s own expectations of maintaining its trade secrets were time limited and, thus, a failure to demonstrate “eternal vigilance” over its trade secrets.

As a result, Silicon lost a serious case in its attempt to protect its confidential information. The moral of this story is a simple one. Companies who include time limits in their confidentiality agreements do so at their peril. In order to avoid the Silicon Image outcome, it is prudent to stand firm and refuse to include a set time limit for the receiving party’s obligations to maintain the confidential information. The best practices are for the trade secret owner to insist that the obligation to maintain confidentiality survive as long as the information disclosed qualifies as a trade secret under the requirements of applicable law.

To prevail on a claim of fraudulent misrepresentation in Maryland, a plaintiff must establish, by the heightened evidentiary standard of clear and convincing evidence:

“(1) that the defendant made a false representation to the plaintiff, (2) that its falsity was either known to the defendant or that the representation was made with reckless indifference as to its truth, (3) that the misrepresentation was made for the purpose of defrauding the plaintiff, (4) that the plaintiff relied on the misrepresentation and had the right to rely on it, and (5) that the plaintiff suffered compensable injury resulting from the misrepresentation.” VF Corp. v. Wrexham Aviation Corp., 350 Md. 693, 703 (1998), quoting Nails v. S&R, 334 Md. 398, 415 (1994).

The defendant must actually be aware of the falsity, or atleast the potential for falsity. The requirement concerning knowledge of the falsity or reckless indifference as to the truth of the representation means either the defendant’s actual knowledge that the representation was false or the defendant’s awareness that he does not know whether the representation is true or false. Ellerin v. Fairfax Savings, 337 Md. at 231, 652 A.2d at 1124.

A defendant must have the intent, the scienter, to cheat another: “It is well recognized under Maryland law that an action for fraud cannot be supported … without any design to impose upon or cheat another.” VF Corp. v. Wrexham Aviation Corp., 350 Md. 693, 703 (1998).

The complaining party though, must have reasonably relied on the defendant’s representations. To determine whether one party’s reliance upon the allegedly fraudulent statements of another party is reasonable, a court looks to all the facts and circumstances present in the particular case. “In determining whether reliance is reasonable, a court is required to view the act in its setting….” Parker v. Columbia Bank, 91 Md. App. At 361-362.

The One of the most important circumstances in this regard is the plaintiff’s background and experience. For example, a complaining person who is knowledgeable in the commercial real estate realm could not be said to have reasonably relied on another’s false representations in that realm, as the complainant would have the requisite knowledge and resources to determine whether such statements were true in the first place.

I was recently asked to litigate a breach of contract claim on behalf of a party who was wronged by the breach of another party to a contract. The kind of contract is immaterial for the purpose of this article. It could have been an independent contractor agreement, or employment agreement, or an asset purchase, stock purchase, non-compete, or non-solicitation agreement, or any one of a dozen other types of contracts. Regardless, as I have said previously in these posts, there are certain contractual provisions that should be found in just about every contract. What may be possibly be the single most important provision, from my perspective, happened to have been omitted from this particular contract, that is, a provision addressing the potential recovery of attorney’s fees resulting from litigation.

I say that this may be the single most important provision in a contract not in a substantive sense, as the material terms of the contract must of course be included with specificity. The services to be performed or the products to be sold are obviously vital, since without which there may be no meeting of the minds and thus no contract in the first place. And there are other material provisions related to the deal itself that must be included as well, ie the duration of the agreement, compensation, termination, etc.

But aside from the substantive points of the deal, there is not a more important procedural, boilerplate, provision than a provision addressing attorney’s fees. Why? Because in many cases, the lack of such a provision makes litigating over a contract a financially untenable idea. A party to a contract may have the facts and the law on its side. The case may essentially be a slam dunk, if such things exist. However, if at the end of the day, the damages available to the winning party only barely exceed the amount the party paid to its attorney’s to prosecute the case, then regardless of how great a case it is, the filing of a lawsuit or arbitration makes little sense from a bottom line perspective. None of us, clients or attorneys, litigate in order to achieve moral victories. If maintaining a lawsuit does not make sense from a financial point of view, then regardless of right and wrong and getting even, I always advise my clients to consider the case strictly from a business perspective, leaving aside emotion.

That is why it is such a huge benefit when a contract at issue contains a prevailing party clause with regard to attorney’s fees. This magic language allows a wronged party to sue with the understanding that if the facts and the law support her case, then she will be made whole in regard to not only the actual damages she sustained as a result of the breach of contract, but in addition, all costs, expenses and attorney’s fees she expended in litigating the matter. Please then, I ask you to review EVERY agreement your business has signed, as well as every agreement you sign from here on out, and prior to execution, include a provision similar to the following:

“In the event of litigation [or arbitration] for any matter arising out of or related to this Agreement, the party prevailing in any such action shall be entitled to recover from the losing party its reasonable attorney’s fees and all other legal costs and expenses, including filing fees, expended in the matter.”

The importance of this provision cannot be overstated, since attorney’s fees on even a fairly “routine” matter can easily run into the tens of thousands of dollars, and for more complex cases against defendants with deep pockets, it would not be a surprise to see attorneys’ fees in the hundreds of thousands of dollars.

In TEKsystems, Inc. v. Bolton, (2010), the Maryland Federal District Court recently reinforced Maryland law on the point that the enforcement of a covenant not to compete is not dependent on whether the competing former employee solicits his former employer’s clients or uses its confidential information, but rather on whether or not the scope of the restrictive covenant is reasonable. The only factors that will determine whether the non-compete is valid are its temporal and geographical limits, the employer’s legitimate business interests, the employee’s unique and specialized skills, any undue hardship on the employee, and the public interest served by enforcing the restrictive covenant.

The non-compete found in the former employee’s employment agreement contained standard language prohibiting the former employee from engaging “in the business of recruiting or providing on a temporary or permanent basis technical service personnel, industrial personnel, or office support personnel” for a period of 18 months after termination of employment, and within a geographical limitation of a 50-mile radius of the employee’s former office. Both the period of time of 18 months and the geographical scope of 50 miles have been held as reasonable on numerous occasions by Maryland courts.
The Court also found that the employer had legitimate business interests in enforcing the covenant, the employee possessed unique and specialized skills, and the employee would not suffer undue hardship by enforcing the covenant. The enforcement of the non-compete was upheld against the former employee.

To read a comprehensive blog of all of the issues address by the Court in this case, visit the blog of the Business Law Section of the Maryland State Bar Association at http://marylandbusinesslawdevelopments.blogspot.com/search/label/Injunctive%20Relief.

When looking to hire new personnel, my small business clients often ask me to draft the contract between the business and the new hire. It is oftentimes not until this point that the business has examined whether the new hire is an independent contractor or employee. An agreement used for an employee will be different in many key respects than an agreement drafted for use with an independent contractor. With that in mind, the following is a summary of the key differences between an employee and an independent contractor.

Much of this information has been taken from the IRS website at www.irs.gov, which contains a wealth of information on the subject and which I highly recommend every business reads when facing this issue. Just recently, the IRS published IRS Summertime Tax Tip 2009-20, which is summarized below.

-Hiring a worker as an independent contractor instead of as an employee will generally lessen the amount of taxes a business pays, because when a worker is an employee, employers must pay state and federal unemployment tax, social security tax and workers compensation/disability premiums to a State Insurance Fund. When a worker is an independent contractor, the business is not required to withhold these taxes or make these payments. That responsibility falls on the worker.

-The IRS uses three characteristics to determine the relationship between businesses and workers: Behavioral Control, Financial Control, and the Type of Relationship.

-Behavioral Control looks at whether the business has a right to direct or control how the work is done. The more control a business can exert over the work to be performed, the more likely the worker is an employee. Conversely, the more freedom and discretion the worker has in performing the work, the more likely the worker is an independent contractor. Do not confuse this with the business’s ability to control the result of the work done, a business is always permitted to exert control over results, and such control has no bearing on the contractor/employee discussion. Rather, the IRS examines the means by which the worker does the work.

-Financial Control looks at whether the business has the right to direct or control the financial and business aspects of the worker’s job. In other words, if the worker is on an employer’s payroll and receives a steady paycheck, the likelihood increases that the worker will be deemed an employee.

-The Type of Relationship factor relates to how the workers and the business owner perceive their relationship. It should be noted that the IRS will make its determination using substance over form, meaning that while it is interested in how the relationship between the parties is perceived by the parties, the IRS will make its determination ultimately regardless of how the parties paper their relationship.

In addition to the above points, the IRS has made clear in earlier publications that the following factors will also play a role in its determination:

-Who supplies the equipment, material, tools, workstations, and other items in order for the worker to perform the job. The more materials that the business supplies, the more likely the worker is an employee.

-Who controls the worker’s hours of employment.

Many times the characterization of the relationship between a worker and a business will be easy to determine. Sometimes, however, the line between employee and independent contractor will be blurred. It is in such a situation that the above factors must be analyzed carefully so that at the outset, a well written agreement hat accurately captures the parties’ relationship can be drafted and executed by the parties.

Maryland law is well settled that a non-compete must be reasonable in geographic scope and duration in order to be held enforceable. However, Maryland courts will enforce a covenant not-to-compete that does not contain a geographic limitation in certain narrow and limited circumstances. The U. S. District Court for the District of Maryland stated in Intelus v. Barton and Medplus, Inc., 7 F. Supp. 2d 635 (1998) that every non-compete must be examined to determine reasonableness based on the specific facts at hand, even non-competes that fail to contain a finite geographic limitation. The Intelus court stated:

“Competition unlimited by geography can be expected where the nature of the business concerns computer software and the ability to process information. . . Because of the broad nature of the market in which Intelus operates, a restrictive covenant limited to a narrow geographic area would render the restriction meaningless.”

In determining the reasonableness of a non-compete that does not contain a geographic limitation, Maryland courts will consider the nature of the industry and the national and perhaps global nature of the competition. In Intelus, the court concluded that the restriction was reasonably related and limited to Intelus’s need to protect its good will and client base, and therefore upheld the enforceability of the non-compete.

In Hekimian Labs, a Florida federal court, interpreting Maryland law, found that where “testimony indicated that competition within the business of remote access testing is such that the whole world is its stage” and “that there are only about 20 companies that compete in this business, and they do so on a worldwide basis,” then “to confine the restrictive covenant to a specified geographical area would render the Agreement meaningless.”

The Florida Court concluded that if the agreement did contain a geographical restriction, the offending party would only need to move outside of this restricted area and the damage to the harmed party would be the same. Because of the national and international scope of the competition between the parties, the absence of a specified geographic limitation was reasonably necessary for the protection of the party attempting to enforce the non-compete, and the covenant was upheld.

Maryland law permits a party to request injunctive relief from a Maryland federal or state court even when a contract states that all disputes must be referred to arbitration. The Court of Appeals of Maryland held in Brendsel v. Winchester Construction Company, Inc., 898 A.2d 472 (2006) that:

“[A]n interlocutory mechanics’ lien is in the nature of a provisional remedy, not much different than an interlocutory injunction or attachment sought to maintain the status quo so that the arbitration proceeding can have meaning and relevance, and the predominant view throughout the country is that the availability of such remedies by a court is permitted by the Federal and Uniform Arbitration Acts and is not inconsistent with the right to enforce an arbitration agreement.”

In its ruling, the Maryland Court of Appeals focused on the need for courts to have the ability to preserve the status quo by granting injunctive relief while a dispute is sent to arbitration. Without this ability, the Court held, a ruling by an arbitrator could very well be immaterial, as the damage done to a party could by that time be irreparable.

“Accordingly, we hold that where a dispute is subject to mandatory arbitration under the Federal Arbitration Act, a district court has the discretion to grant a preliminary injunction to preserve the status quo pending the arbitration of the parties’ dispute if the enjoined conduct would render that process a “hollow formality.” The arbitration process would be a hollow formality where “the arbitral award when rendered could not return the parties substantially to the status quo ante.” Lever Brothers, 554 F.2d at 123.”

Therefore, Maryland courts are permitted to intercede and grant injunctive relief in spite of an arbitration clause where the absence of such relief would cause the arbitration to be nothing more than a “hollow formality.”
This power exists even when a contractual provision states that the parties must refer all disputes to arbitration.

Mona Electric v. Truland, 193 F. Supp. 2d 874 (2002), as well as the appeal of that case, provide support for the position that a terminated employee who executed a non-solicitation provision when hired, but which did not contain an accompanying non-compete covenant, will not be in violation of the non-solicitation agreement if the clients and customers of the employee’s former place of business, and not the employee himself, initiate contact with the former employee for the purpose of conducting business. The District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia held:

“there is no evidence that Gerardi violated the Agreement by “soliciting” Mona’s customers. Truland hired Gerardi as a Service Account Manager. Gerardi’s responsibilities in this new position include preparing estimates and working in the field. A part of Gerardi’s position at Truland is handling customer solicitation calls. In the electrical contracting field, customers often solicit bids from the electrical contractors. Plaintiff has not presented any evidence that Gerardi has initiated calls to customers during his employment at Truland. Rather, the evidence is that Gerardi responded to customer calls to Truland for bids. Gerardi’s acts of responding to customers who solicited him for bids clearly do not violate the Agreement. Gerardi did not sign an agreement that prohibited him from competing with Mona, he signed an agreement that precisely prohibited his “solicitation” of Plaintiff’s customers. Plaintiff asserts that the Agreement prevents Gerardi from submitting estimates to customers who call him to request bids. This would turn the non-solicitation agreement into a non-competition agreement, and under the unambiguous terms of terms of the Agreement, only solicitation of Mona’s customer’s is prohibited. Thus, were the Court to find the Agreement valid, no evidence has been presented in this case that Gerardi violated the terms of the Agreement, and summary judgment should be granted for the Defendant.” Mona Electric v. Truland, 193 F. Supp. 2d 874 (2002).

“Despite Mona’s assertion to the contrary, the district court held and we agree that the plain meaning of “solicit” requires the initiation of contact. (J.A. at 135.) Therefore, in order to violate the nonsolicitation agreement, Gerardi must initiate contact with Mona’s customers. Mona argues that Gerardi solicited when he submitted estimates to Mona’s customers. However, this does not fall within the plain meaning of “solicit.” If Mona intended to prevent Gerardi from conducting business with its customers it could have easily stated that in the agreement. Taking the facts in the light most favorable to Mona, there is no evidence that Gerardi solicited Mona’s customers. Therefore, summary judgment was proper and the district court is affirmed.” Mona Electric v. Truland, 56 Fed. Appx. 108 (2003). [On appeal]

Conclusion

The Mona case and its appeal give substantial support to the position that: 1) if an employee executed only a non-solicitation agreement and not a covenant not-to-compete; and 2) because Maryland courts will interpret “solicitation” as requiring some action on the employee’s behalf to initiate contact, then by itself, the employer would fail in its attempt to prevent the former employee from doing business with the business’ clients and customers, PROVIDED that the business cannot show that the employee actively solicited those customers. The employee is barred from soliciting, ie. from taking any action to initiate contact in order to gain business. Courts will strictly construe this requirement and delve into the actual conduct of the employee in order to determine whether the employee actually “solicited” customers.

Need an Attorney to help your Maryland or DC business? Contact Raymond McKenzie at 301-330-6790 or ray@mckenzie-legal.com

Breach of Contract

If you are forced to file suit in Maryland for breach of contract, do not let a poorly drafted contract hurt your chance of prevailing. Do not lose a case that you should win simply because of faulty contract language, language that could have been avoided had you retained an experienced Maryland business attorney to assist.

A contract drafted in Maryland with little or no input from a Maryland corporate lawyer can fail to include several necessary components that help to make a contract legally enforceable. These deficiencies can be fatal to your business’s chance of prevailing in a lawsuit. As a result, make sure that an experienced Maryland business attorney reviews your contracts, and that such contracts address, at minimum, the following five points:

1. Jurisdiction: If you want the ability to sue in Maryland courts, your contract must contain language where the parties submit to the jurisdiction of Maryland state and/or federal courts. This language allows you to sue a business in Maryland courts, even if the company is not incorporated in, or have offices in, Maryland. Without this language in your contract, you will most likely be forced to sue the corporation in its home state. Suing out of state can be significantly more expensive and time consuming.

2. Choice of Law: A Maryland choice of law provision states Maryland law will be used to decide the dispute. Many non-lawyers confuse choice of law with jurisdiction, and interpret the phrase “Maryland law will govern this contract” to mean that a dispute has to be heard in Maryland. That is not the case. Rather, this clause simply means that regardless of where a dispute is heard, whether in Maryland Circuit Court or Virginia or anywhere else, Maryland law will be used to decide the matter.

3. Non-compete and non-solicitation clauses: Do you want to prohibit the other party from competing with you entirely, or just stop them from soliciting your clients? If the former, then you are in need of a non-compete clause, which must be limited in geographic scope, limited in duration, and narrowly defined to protect only the interests of your business in order to be enforceable. Maryland courts will typically enforce reasonable non-competes. However, a non-compete that overreaches will often be struck down. If the latter, then you need a non-solicitation agreement, which allows the other party to compete with you, provided they do not solicit your current or former clients. A non-solicitation clause need not have geographic or time limitations so long as it only forbids the solicitation of your clients by the other party.

4. Default and Termination provisions: Make sure that your contract’s default and termination provisions are clear with regard to: a) what breaches may be cured and what breaches cannot be; b) what the time period exists for any cure; and c) whether amounts due over the life of the contract still owed even if the contract is terminated.

5. Dispute Resolution: Choose the type of dispute resolution system that you feel best fits your business. Mediation, arbitration and litigation are options, and they can be used in compliment of one another. Regardless of what method of dispute resolutions you choose, always allow your business the option of filing for emergency injunctive relief in Maryland court when necessary to avoid irreparable injury to your business.

Need an Attorney to help your Maryland or DC business? Contact Raymond McKenzie at 301-330-6790 or ray@mckenzie-legal.com