Namdrol wrote:You have forgotten that I spent several weeks defending Tsongkhapa from what I considered to erroneous crticisms of his view on e-Sangha.

You have also forgotten that when someone opined that one could not realize the meaning of Dzogchen if they held Tsongkhapa's point of view about "Prasangika" [Prasangika being a Tibetan invention, a term coined at Sangphu by Batsab Nyima Drag in the 12th century] I swiftly reminded them that both Jigme Lingpa and Shabkar upheld Tsongkhapa's interpretation of Prasangika.

I distinctly recalled this, and was going to say so, but thought it best to leave it to Namdrol...Also, I'm going to start a new thread, regarding the tangent I brought up earlier, as I don't think it belongs in Academic Discussion Forum.

May any merit generated by on-line discussionBe dedicated to the Ultimate Benefit of All Sentient Beings.

Namdrol wrote:Therefore we can infer from this that since Candrakirti rejects reflexive cognitions based on world convention, in order to be consistent he must accept outer objects since those too are accepted based on worldly convention.

Tibetans may now argue amonst themselves.

As I understand the Karmapa there is not necessity to argue here. The outer objects are accepted in order to guide wordly beings using rules of the dabate although the meditation based on the view on outer objects will be not soteriologically efficient.

Quote from the Karmapa (The Feast; p.164):Nevertheless, there is no fault when the master Nāgārjuna conven-tionally relies on presentations of the relative truth that accord with theworldly perspective and that are merely temporary supports for those whodesire liberation to adopt what is beneficial and reject what is counterpro-ductive. Such presentations vanquish all the misconceptions of the infe-rior Buddhist and non-Buddhist philosophical systems, which propoundthe existence of things.

Namdrol wrote:Since meditation in Vajrayāna systems is based on an example wisdom gained during the introduction of the third and fourth empowerments, Gorampa points out in a treatise refuting some on Tsongkhapa's interperations of the Guhyasmaja sadhana that it does matter very much what your intellectual view might be; whether cittamatra or madhyamaka, since your meditation is not based on an intellectual analysis, but rather a path wisdom derived from the introduction of third and fourth empowerment.

Shouldn't this read:

that it does not matter very much what your intellectual view might be

Namdrol wrote:Since meditation in Vajrayāna systems is based on an example wisdom gained during the introduction of the third and fourth empowerments, Gorampa points out in a treatise refuting some on Tsongkhapa's interperations of the Guhyasmaja sadhana that it does matter very much what your intellectual view might be; whether cittamatra or madhyamaka, since your meditation is not based on an intellectual analysis, but rather a path wisdom derived from the introduction of third and fourth empowerment.

Shouldn't this read:

that it does not matter very much what your intellectual view might be

There are some, such as Gorampa and Shākya Chokden, whosay that this verse [verse 6.75 of the Entrance] proves thatChandrakīrti holds, from his own perspective, that self-aware-ness exists conventionally.

What does Gorampa actually say?

He says, quote

"This master [Candrakirti] explains the all-basis, the afflicted mind, reflexive cognition and so on from authoritative citations. Even though no distinction of whether they are true or not is made, the internal contradictions of conventions are accepted conventionally, but the refutation of those upon analysis is maintained from the perspective of the ultimate."

He continues:

"Someone's position that after one understands the passages which reject a reflexive cognition that is able to bear analysis have been understood from the MMK, the Vigrahavyavartani and the Prasannapāda, one should apply them to a rejection of reflexive cognition conventionally is errorenous. [It is erroneous] because just as in the MMK a lamp illuminating itself is rejected having refuted the given example for reflexive cognition, a lamp, through analysis, since also removal of darkeness [by a lamp] also rejected [in the MMK], the consequence would be that even conventionally [a lamp's ability] to remove darkness would not be acceptable. [It is erroneous] because when, in the Vigrahavyavartani, the self-evidential validity of that authoritative cognition is rejected, since validity through another is also rejected, the consequence would be that there can never be an authoritatively cognizing subject even conventionally. [Finally,it is erroneous] because when the Prasannapād cites sutras that state that a mind which experiences cognition without reflexive cognition cannot be found, the consequence would be that even the experiencing mind itself would not exist conventionally."

So you see, that passage is not about whether reflexive cognitons exist. The passage is concerned with how Candrakirti treats citations concerning conventionality.

In this case, what is being affirmed is not reflexive cognition. What is being rejected is the Gelug over-negation of reflexive cognition through showing contradictions implicit in rejecting reflexive awareness, as well as other conventions, conventionally.

If this passage and its reasoning is not clear for you, I can explain it further. But it not a passage stating that relexive cognition exists conventionally, it is a passage stating that reflexive cognition is to be accepted conventionally [i.e. without analysis], even if that convention contains many internal contradictions, which Gorampa admits that it does right up front. However, conventionally, those internal contradictions are not subject to analysis; just in the same way as when we turn on a light, we say "Turn on the light" in order to remove darkness, even though when analyzed, a light capable of removing darkness can never be found.

In other words, for Gorampa there is no doubt that these things like ālaya-vijñāna, the afflicted mind, and so on cannot bear analysis -- but as conventions we leave them alone with all their myriad internal contradictions just as we leave the convention that lamps remove the darkness of rooms alone.

For this reason, it is little irresponsible merely to just throw out soundbites of positions. I am sure that Gorampa's critique of Tsongkhapa's position [though I have not read it] on this issue also has problems, or that he selectively misreads Tsongkhapa's point of view and so on.

So just compare what Gorampa says here to the Jayananda citation I produced above. And for Buddha's sake man, at least learn Tibetan. I don't have time to do this in general!

Namdrol wrote:In other words, for Gorampa there is no doubt that these things like ālaya-vijñāna, the afflicted mind, and so on cannot bear analysis -- but as conventions we leave them alone with all their myriad internal contradictions just as we leave the convention that lamps remove the darkness of rooms alone.

For this reason, it is little irresponsible merely to just throw out soundbites of positions. I am sure that Gorampa's critique of Tsongkhapa's position [though I have not read it] on this issue also has problems, or that he selectively misreads Tsongkhapa's point of view and so on.

So just compare what Gorampa says here to the Jayananda citation I produced above. And for Buddha's sake man, at least learn Tibetan. I don't have time to do this in general!

N

Hope so, for Him "these things" cannot bear analysis althougt He performs the "ilussion-like" debate using them for the help of others.

Nagarjuna’s famous statement on this issue in his Rebuttal of Objections says:If I had any position,I thereby would be at fault.Since I have no position,I am not at fault at all.

If there were anything to be observedThrough direct perception and the other instances [of valid cognition],It would be something to be established or rejected.However, since no such thing exists, I cannot be criticized.

However, these not contradict possibility the analysis for one's own help will lead to the collapse until realization? The analysis is not meaningless. As for Mahamudra or Dzogchen it can be also the support.

Mariusz wrote:However, these not contradict possibility the analysis for one's own help will lead to the collapse until realization? The analysis is not meaningless. As for Mahamudra or Dzogchen it can be also the support.

I told you in the very beginning that Karmapa was misrepresenting Gorampa's position.

I guess you have not understood what I was trying to say -- so please try to listen. If you are going to follow what some Tibetan says, fine. Pick one scholar. Follow their point of view. Unless you are prepared or capable of reading the scholars with which they choose to disagree, please do not jump on Team Goramapa, Team Tsongkhapa, Team Karmapa or Team Mipham. I have made that mistake in the past. I now clearly recognize that it is an error to jump on the bandwagon of Post-Indian Madhyamaka developments. It is one thing to try to understand the intellectual history of Tibetan Madhyamaka --that can be interesting for some people. It is quite another to jump on the bandwagon of this or that school -- then this just becomes scholastic politics.

As far as Mahamudra and Dzogchen go, Madhyamaka is not absolutely required at all. While Madhyamaka can be a support, more often than not it turns into a meaningless intellectual game of proof and rebuttal, accepting and rejecting — leading to outlandish thread titles like the one that heads this thread.

What is meaningless is the endless games of dialectics [in which I have also playing] where each school and scholar triumphantly asserts that only they have the real key to Nagarjauna's intention. It is total nonsense.

What we do not need to transmitted to the West is the scholastic environment of competive sectarianism. This helps not one's practice at all. When we see clear misrepresentations of one scholar's point of view by another, as we have in this thread, how can we trust any of it?

Without understanding the political background of anxiety of Kagyu and Sakya about the burgeoning success of the Gelug tradition, how can we fairly assess the criticisms of Tsongkhapa by Rongton, Gorampa, Shakya Chogden, and so on? Without understanding the relationship between Shakya Chogden and his Karma Kagyu patrons, how can we understand his seeming championship of the gzhan stong position? Without understanding the relationship between Rendawa Zhonnu Lodo and his very critical assessment of various schools and trends during his day, how can we understand the writing of his main disciple, Tsongkhapa? Without understanding the hostile reception Candrakirti's works met at Sangphu when they were initially translated by Batsab with Jayananda, how can we really understand the Tibetan invention of Prasangika and Svatantrika? All of these things must be understood by any responsible scholar of Tibetan Madhyamaka. And even more basic, the conditions that produced Indian Madhyamaka were quite different than the conditions that produced Tibetan Madhyamaka. Tibetans introduced all kinds of issues in their prosecution of Madhyamaka that would have never occured to Indians. You have Tibetans arguing over points that to Indians would seem utterly irrelevant. I personally think Candrakirti would have been appalled at all the divisions and sub-divisions of Madhyamaka in which the Tibetans sincerly and ernestly engaged.

Namdrol wrote:What we do not need to transmitted to the West is the scholastic environment of competive sectarianism. This helps not one's practice at all. When we see clear misrepresentations of one scholar's point of view by another, as we have in this thread, how can we trust any of it?

Thank you for an advice, but I think you exaggerate. I follow for example what Khenpo Tsultrim Gyamtso replied every time that it is of no importance what the commonly acknowledged stance in a certain camp is; we have to investigate and find out for ourselves what we personally think is correct.If we look at the controversies between great masters or schools in this way, they can be helpful as models to gauge and refine our personal insights.

Mariusz wrote:If there were anything to be observedThrough direct perception and the other instances [of valid cognition],It would be something to be established or rejected.However, since no such thing exists, I cannot be criticized.[/i]

The point that Goramapa is making is that this is rejection of authority ultimately, not conventionally. The purpose of the Vigrahavyavartani is to reject svabhāva and the notion that there are inherently authoritative cognitions.

Nagarjuna is not rejecting conventional inference [anumāṇa] and direct perception [pratyakṣa] -- he is rejecting the notion that authorities [pramāṇa] amd objects of authority [prameya] are inherently authoritative. He is also rejecting the argument in this text that since emptiness is not an object, it cannot lead to valid knowledge, since valid knowledge knowledge must come from truly valid direct perceptions and inferences based objects of knowledge that truly exist.

Nagārjuna, Buddhapalita, Candrakirti, as well as Shantideva all use instances of conventional direct perception and inference in their writing.

Namdrol wrote:It not a passage stating that relexive cognition exists conventionally, it is a passage stating that reflexive cognition is to be accepted conventionally [i.e. without analysis], even if that convention contains many internal contradictions, which Gorampa admits that it does right up front. However, conventionally, those internal contradictions are not subject to analysis; just in the same way as when we turn on a light, we say "Turn on the light" in order to remove darkness, even though when analyzed, a light capable of removing darkness can never be found.

In other words, for Gorampa there is no doubt that these things like ālaya-vijñāna, the afflicted mind, and so on cannot bear analysis -- but as conventions we leave them alone with all their myriad internal contradictions just as we leave the convention that lamps remove the darkness of rooms alone.

N

Gorampa is making a mistake here.In the MMK Nagarjuna is refuting inherent production, and it is in this context that he brings in the example of the lamp. All his consequences are designed to show that nothing is inherently produced.

Because lamps do dispel darkness conventionally, there are no contradictions conventionally. The contradictions arise when the analysis probes under the convention, and this is the beginning of analysis for the ultimate.

Chandrakirti clearly refutes the existence of the alaya even conventionally in the avatara and it's bhasya. Shantideva refutes self-cognition even conventionally in Bodhicharyavatara etc so Gorampa's defense of these is not based on good scholarship.

Gorampa makes an error here as well:

"Someone's position that after one understands the passages which reject a reflexive cognition that is able to bear analysis have been understood from the MMK, the Vigrahavyavartani and the Prasannapāda, one should apply them to a rejection of reflexive cognition conventionally is errorenous. [It is erroneous] because just as in the MMK a lamp illuminating itself is rejected having refuted the given example for reflexive cognition, a lamp, through analysis, since also removal of darkeness [by a lamp] also rejected [in the MMK], the consequence would be that even conventionally [a lamp's ability] to remove darkness would not be acceptable.

the example of a lamp illuminating itself and others in MMK is used to show that there is no ultimate production. As for this, there is production conventionally, but not ultimately, just as a lamp does not illuminate itself or others ultimately. Conventionally, it does illuminate other, but is not self-illuminating.

If we follow the position Gorampa puts forward, then even though things are contradictory conventionally, we should still accept them. This gives disastrous consequences. Without the ability to refute something conventionally as a result of internal contradictions in the position, we have no power to refute anything.

Namdrol wrote:[It is erroneous] because when, in the Vigrahavyavartani, the self-evidential validity of that authoritative cognition is rejected, since validity through another is also rejected, the consequence would be that there can never be an authoritatively cognizing subject even conventionally.[Finally,it is erroneous] because when the Prasannapād cites sutras that state that a mind which experiences cognition without reflexive cognition cannot be found, the consequence would be that even the experiencing mind itself would not exist conventionally."

In these examples, is it rang rig rang ges which is referenced, or rang rig?

Namdrol wrote:Without understanding the political background of anxiety of Kagyu and Sakya about the burgeoning success of the Gelug tradition, how can we fairly assess the criticisms of Tsongkhapa by Rongton, Gorampa, Shakya Chogden, and so on? Without understanding the relationship between Shakya Chogden and his Karma Kagyu patrons, how can we understand his seeming championship of the gzhan stong position? Without understanding the relationship between Rendawa Zhonnu Lodo and his very critical assessment of various schools and trends during his day, how can we understand the writing of his main disciple, Tsongkhapa? Without understanding the hostile reception Candrakirti's works met at Sangphu when they were initially translated by Batsab with Jayananda, how can we really understand the Tibetan invention of Prasangika and Svatantrika? All of these things must be understood by any responsible scholar of Tibetan Madhyamaka. And even more basic, the conditions that produced Indian Madhyamaka were quite different than the conditions that produced Tibetan Madhyamaka. Tibetans introduced all kinds of issues in their prosecution of Madhyamaka that would have never occured to Indians. You have Tibetans arguing over points that to Indians would seem utterly irrelevant. I personally think Candrakirti would have been appalled at all the divisions and sub-divisions of Madhyamaka in which the Tibetans sincerly and ernestly engaged.

nice one.

however, although the Tibetans did elaborate a great deal on the prasangika/svatantrika divide, I think it is facile to say, as so many do, that this distinction did not exist in Indian madhyamika. To say that Tibetans invented them is misleading. TIbetans may have presented them as more unified and distinct from one another than they were in India, but Chandra clearly refers to "those who rely upon prasngas" and "those who rely upon svatantra" in his reproof of Bhavavivka in the Prasannapada.

Namdrol wrote:So please be more careful in future. And honestly, learn Tibetan.

how would you suggest one accomplish this if one cannot move from one's home, and there is no readily available teaching situation in one's home area? Is there a reliable and inexpensive online alternative? Should we learn Classical or vernacular, or both?

cloudburst wrote:Gorampa is making a mistake here.In the MMK Nagarjuna is refuting inherent production, and it is in this context that he brings in the example of the lamp. All his consequences are designed to show that nothing is inherently produced.

Because lamps do dispel darkness conventionally, there are no contradictions conventionally. The contradictions arise when the analysis probes under the convention, and this is the beginning of analysis for the ultimate.

If there were no contradictions, then these things could not be rejected ultimately. It is because these conventional entities do possess internal contradictions that they cannot bear ultimate analysis.

Chandrakirti clearly refutes the existence of the alaya even conventionally in the avatara and it's bhasya.

That is indeed what some people think. Other people think Candrakirti's view is more nuanced than that. Candrakriti, in citing the Lanka in the Bhasya, clearly states that ālayavijñāna is a synonym for emptiness, thus laying the ground for ālayavijñāna to be accepted conventionally.

Shantideva refutes self-cognition even conventionally in Bodhicharyavatara etc so Gorampa's defense of these is not based on good scholarship.

Santideva is rejecting a truly established mind and the argument of reflexive cognition that cittamatrins introduce to defend it. That is the context of Santideva's argument, and that is all.

Gorampa makes an error here as well:

[list]"Someone's position that after one understands the passages which reject a reflexive cognition that is able to bear analysis have been understood from the MMK, the Vigrahavyavartani and the Prasannapāda, one should apply them to a rejection of reflexive cognition conventionally is errorenous. [It is erroneous] because just as in the MMK a lamp illuminating itself is rejected having refuted the given example for reflexive cognition, a lamp, through analysis, since also removal of darkeness [by a lamp] also rejected [in the MMK], the consequence would be that even conventionally [a lamp's ability] to remove darkness would not be acceptable.

the example of a lamp illuminating itself and others in MMK is used to show that there is no ultimate production. As for this, there is production conventionally, but not ultimately, just as a lamp does not illuminate itself or others ultimately. Conventionally, it does illuminate other, but is not self-illuminating.

So some would have it.

If we follow the position Gorampa puts forward, then even though things are contradictory conventionally, we should still accept them. This gives disastrous consequences. Without the ability to refute something conventionally as a result of internal contradictions in the position, we have no power to refute anything.

I guess you are not understanding Gorampa's point [which is why I find this whole exercise to be one of utter futility since you seem only interested in rejecting rather than understanding]. Gorampa is saying that conventional thing possess internal contradictions — this fact [that they possess internal contradictions] is what allows them to be refuted ultimately. He is not saying that these internal contradictions are what appear prior to analysis. Thus your statement is the kind of unthinking fault-finding that I find troublesome in these conversations to begin with and why I no longer wish to participate in these kinds of discussions.

You do not read Gorampa openly. You read him polemically. I.e. for every statement advanced, a fault is found, for every fault that is found, a counter fault is found, and it just goes on and on. It seems impossible that people are capable of enjoying the subtlety of Tsongkhapa, Gorampa, and so on because they are so caught up in their political parties.

I am not saying that Gorampa is better than you, for on this score, indeed he is not.

Namdrol wrote:I guess you are not understanding Gorampa's point [which is why I find this whole exercise to be one of utter futility since you seem only interested in rejecting rather than understanding].

Perhaps you do not see how this exercise is not futile for some. You are completely incorrect that I only want to reject (do I appreciate the irony of this rejection? I do.) I learn a great deal here and did on e-sangha as well, and my understanding has grown over the years as a result of FIRST rejecting what seems wrong, THEN listening to arguments why my rejection may or may not be justified, THEN thinking about it.

Namdrol wrote: Thus your statement is the kind of unthinking fault-finding that I find troublesome in these conversations to begin with and why I no longer wish to participate in these kinds of discussions.

Incorrect, I thought about my response carefully. You may not agree with it, and perhaps I am not as intelligent as you are, I don't know, but that doesn't mean that it is an unthinking response based on team-think.

I cannot help but find your statement disingenuous as you say you no longer wish to participate, but participate you do. Who is making you? I for one am glad you do, becasue I learn a lot, mainly about views that I do not agree with. Through your and others' reasoned debate, I understand why I do not agree with them and how to more clearly express it. This does not mean that for example, I think Je Tsongkhapa is right and Gorampa wrong, as far as I know they are both Aryas. It means I know why I think one presentation is clearer and more effective for our time, and less convoluted. Different people are benefited by different views, so this is beneficial for me.

Namdrol wrote: You do not read Gorampa openly. You read him polemically. I.e. for every statement advanced, a fault is found, for every fault that is found, a counter fault is found, and it just goes on and on. It seems impossible that people are capable of enjoying the subtlety of Tsongkhapa, Gorampa, and so on because they are so caught up in their political parties.

Your position seems to be that your points are clearly reasoned correct views and that anyone debating or disagreeing with them is attached to some school and is therefore debating from that point of view for that reason. You no longer wish to debate but for some reason you do while complaining about it. This seems not very mature to me. It is a discussion forum after all.

Please do not be discouraged or troubled by the fact that others do not agree with you.... (warning to the faint of heart: sarcasm ahead) retire to the pure lands or increase your bodhichitta and keep helping those benighted souls who cannot appreciate the subtlety of your views.

Namdrol wrote:I am not saying that Gorampa is better than you, for on this score, indeed he is not. N

None of them were. Refuters of "incorrect interpretations" include all the famous Tibetan scholars from all schools whose names are appealed to as authorities here. But many of them were better than me on every score, at least that's my belief. But who cares? I accept that one may debate to educate both self and others. That's why I'm here, btw.

ps- disagree with some of your points re: Gormapa above, agree with others, perhaps I will find time to comment more later. I will have to think on it a bit while I go for my run, likely only to be accused of non-thinking by you later. Thanks.

It is not at all misleading. There were no separate schools of Madhyamaka in India [unless you count Yogacaras as Madhyamaka, and they certainly thought of themselves in this way.]

There was a difference in opinion among different Madhyamaka scholars about how best to use reasoning to refute opponents and that is the extent of it. The whole controversy hinged solely on Bhavaviveka's criticism of Buddhapalita for not using a fully formed syllogism to refute self-production; with Candra coming to Buddhapalita's defense. End of story.

The development of a "Prasanga" school occured at Sangphu because Phyapa and his students were hostile to Candrakirti's texts when they were introduced by Batsap. Thus, the division between Prasangika and Svatantrika is wholly a Tibetan invention.

Namdrol wrote:If there were no contradictions, then these things could not be rejected ultimately. It is because these conventional entities do possess internal contradictions that they cannot bear ultimate analysis.

I do not agree. (The Center of the Sunlit Sky; p.96) Correct and False Seeming. This distinction pertains only to what appears to ordinary beings. “Seeming reality” or the “correct seeming” is only thatwhich is correctly perceived and labeled (false seeming does not exist even conventionally) by ordinary beings according to theirstandards of correct and false... So the contradictions appears to ordinary beings.(p.195) For example, for someone who suffers from blurred vision and mistakenly clings to the appearance of some black dotsagainst the background of a white cup (False Seeming), a skilled physician first clarifies that these dots do not exist by saying, “They only appear because of your disease.”

Namdrol wrote:Candrakriti, in citing the Lanka in the Bhasya, clearly states that ālayavijñāna is a synonym for emptiness, thus laying the ground for ālayavijñāna to be accepted conventionally.

I do not agree.

...By understanding that these dots do not exist, the sick person puts an end to her misconception of there really being such dots in this cup (wordly daily-life consensus; correct seeming).

(p.195) Nevertheless, since the causefor the plain appearance of these dots has not yet been removed, they still appear.Hence, in order to stop their appearance, the physician has this person take apotent medicine that eliminates blurred vision altogether. Once the disease hasbeen removed, the “dots” are just like space without any reference points (freedom beyond all the seeming).

(p.221) The crucial point here and in Centrism in general is that inherent existence issimply an incoherent notion altogether that does not withstand analysis. What iscalled emptiness is just the result of pointing out this fact. In other words, whetherone conventionally speaks of “the thesis of emptiness” (svatantrika) or says, “I have no thesis,” (prasangika)both expressions just announce and highlight the Centrist procedure of demon-strating that all things lack inherent existence—that there are no reference points.

Karmapa Mikyo Dorje quotes his guru, the great siddha Sangye Nyenba Rinpoche:All you people who assert scriptures and reasoningsThat prove a real identityAre very much afraid of the notion that there is no real identityAnd thus perform all kinds of pointless negations and proofs.

Once you do not cling to either of these two thesesOf a real identity or the lack of a real identity,All disputes of negation and proof will subside.Then there is no harm even through billions of scriptures andreasonings.

Last edited by Mariusz on Thu Jan 26, 2012 10:45 pm, edited 2 times in total.

cloudburst wrote:You no longer wish to debate but for some reason you do while complaining about it.

I am not debating. I have no position to lose, or point to score. I am not discussing my own POV.

My purpose was to respond to Mariusz who produced a citation in which it can can easily shown that the ninth Karmapa, following the eighth, is engaging in the kind of straw man polemics Tibetan scholars are so famous for. Gorampa does it, Tsongkhapa does it [though he, like Rongton, is quite moderate in his production of strawmen], they all do it.

By immediately responding that Gorampa was wrong on this or that point, all you immediately do, if indeed you think he was an arya, is accumulate the negative merit of criticizing aryas.

I am attempting to encourage people to take a more constructive approach: instead of saying, as I have many times in the past, "Tsongkhapa was wrong to say that we may leave off the second two alternatives of the four extremes because they are double negatives", it is better think long and hard why he might give such an opinion. Rather than immediately assume that Gorampa is wrong in asserting that Candrakiriti accepts things like svasamvedana conventionally, it is better to ask yourself why he might assert that. These great scholars almost always have very solid reasons for saying what they do about this and that thing, and the thing is, we have to really question ourselves if we think something they said is wrong. That is my point.

As everyone can see - my last post above is also about the ālayavijñāna as not existed even conventionally but only from perspective of wordly beings the seeming only.

(The Center of the Sunlit Sky, p.470) The imaginary nature is like mistakenly apprehending the visual appearances that are caused by blurred vision to be floating hairs and such. Since this is nothing but names and superimpositions, it does not exist at all. Therefore, the imaginary nature is “the lack of nature in terms of characteristics.”

The other-dependent nature (ālayavijñāna) consists of dependently originating appearances, like the plain visual appearances seen by someone with blurred vision. These appear in an illusionlike manner but are without any nature of their own and do not really arise. Therefore, the other-dependent nature is “the lack of nature in terms of arising.”

The perfect nature. Like space, it is omnipresent and not established as anything whatsoever. It can be compared to the free space that is the natural object of unimpaired vision when the eye defect of blurred vision has been cured and one realizes that what appeared as floating hairs never actually existed anywhere. This aspect is “the ultimate lack of nature” per se.

This also the proof Madhyamaka and Yogacara as supplementary. Excuse me, so Madhyamaka is compatible with Yogacara even concerning the ālayavijñāna as not existed. But maybe Gorampa not accepted it as I'm reading Namdrol here? The Centrist only demonstrating that all things lack inherent existence—that there are no reference points and there is not for them the place for conventional as existed, not to mention the ultimate.