3. Somalia, Global Security and the War on Terrorism-- Security concerns prior to

11 September-- Terrorism and political Islamic movements in the 1990s-- Terrorism and radical Islam in Somalia today-- The misdiagnosis of collapsed states as safe havens-- Conclusion: Policy Implications-- Notes.

(source: Nielsen Book Data)

Close analysis of how non-state actors adapt to state collapse is critical for effective strategies of peace building, development, and counter-terrorism in those crises. In Somalia, the nature of state collapse has changed significantly since 1995. Armed conflict is more localized; lawlessness is better contained by local authorities; and warlords have been weakened by an emerging commercial elite whose interests lie in stability, not plunder. Risk-aversion drives political behaviour and partially explains the reluctance of local elites to support a revived central government. Somalia has to date not been particularly attractive as a safe haven for terrorists due to the risk of betrayal and extortion foreigners face there. Instead, terrorist networks have used Somalia principally as a short-term transshipment site into Kenya. Efforts to revive a central state in Somalia risk creating a "paper state" - one which lacks a capacity to govern and is prone to police corruption, providing an environment in which terrorist networks thrive. (source: Nielsen Book Data)

This book examines how the United States should improve its counterinsurgency (COIN) capabilities through, for example, much greater focus on understanding jihadist strategy, using civil measures to strengthen the local government, and enabling local forces to conduct COIN operations.It provides a broad discussion of the investments, organizational changes, and multilateral arrangements that the United States should pursue to improve its COIN capabilities.It examines the challenge of 21st-century insurgency, exemplified by the global jihadist movement, and describes the civil, information, perception-and-cognition, and security capabilities required for effective counterinsurgency. (source: Nielsen Book Data)

Overview of Capabilities Needed to CounterType III Insurgency; Chapter Five

Civil Capabilities; Chapter Six

Information Capabilities; Chapter Seven

Perception and Cognition; Chapter Eight

General Security Capabilities; Chapter Nine

Local Security Capabilities; Chapter Ten

U.S. Security Capabilities; Chapter Eleven

Multilateral Counterinsurgency.

The difficulties encountered by the United States in securing Iraq and Afghanistan despite years of effort and staggering costs raises the central question of the RAND Counterinsurgency Study: How should the United States improve its capabilities to counter insurgencies, particularly those that are heavily influenced by transnational terrorist movements and thus linked into a global jihadist network? This capstone volume to the study draws on other reports in the series as well as an examination of 89 insurgencies since World War II, an analysis of the new challenges posed by what is becoming.