Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954, Iran,
1951–1954

SUBJECT

Conversation between Messrs. George McGhee, Burton
Berry, and William Rountree of the State Department, and Allen Dulles and Kermit Roosevelt of CIA, Thursday, 10 May 1951

1. Mr. Dulles emphasized to Mr.
McGhee the urgent importance
that CIA attaches to the Iranian
situation. He stated that he felt the time might come very shortly when
the Shah would have to choose between making a fight for his kingdom and
going into exile. If he chooses to fight, his course of action would
probably have to be that of dissolving the Majlis, replacing Mossadeq as Prime Minister with a man
upon whom he could rely, and governing the country as his father did, by
decree. Mr. Dulles suggested
that the Shah might require considerable moral and practical support
before he would undertake such a course and that we should be prepared
to throw all our weight where it would do the most good to preserve Iran
from Soviet domination. He went on to say that he had discussed with
DCI this proposition and that
DCI had indicated his desire to do
whatever would be helpful in this regard. Consideration might be given
to sending an individual in whom the Shah had great personal confidence
to Tehran to stiffen the Shah’s will to resist and to assure him of
American support. In response to Mr. McGhee’s question, Mr. Dulles indicated that there seemed to be general
agreement that Ambassador George
Allen2 would be
the best possible person for the job, but that it was recognized that
there were very grave practical difficulties in the way of his use.

2. In subsequent discussion it was agreed that it would not be feasible
to send George Allen to Tehran
under the circumstances. Various other individuals were considered in
this connection, but most had to be discarded for one reason or another.
Mr. Dulles suggested that
NelsonRockefeller might quite plausibly
visit Iran as well as other parts of the Near East, and State Department
representatives felt this suggestion had great merit. The names of
Colonel Sexton and General Gerow were also mentioned, as were Mr.
Charles Suydam and Dr. Claude E.
Forkner. The latter two were considered to be
particularly promising.

3. It was agreed that Mr. Dulles,
in the course of his forthcoming trip to New York, would get in touch
with Mr. Suydam to discover from him what individuals in the US had made the most impression upon the
Shah during his visit to this country. He would also see Dr. Forkner with a view to evaluating his
possible usefulness and, in case he seemed to be the right man for the
job, to find out whether he would be willing to go to Iran.

4. Mr. Rountree said that he
would consult with Mr. Ray Muir to obtain from him suggestions on
individuals who seem to know the Shah particularly well. Mr. Berry stated that he would keep in
close touch with Mr. Roosevelt
and that they would explore carefully the suggestions which Mr.
Dulles had made together
with such other approaches as might occur.3

George Allen served as U.S.
Ambassador to Iran during the Iran crisis of 1946.↩

At
the Director’s meeting held on May 24, Dulles reported that “he had been conducting
discussions with State on Iran including the possibility of the Shah
taking a strong stand. There was discussion of the probable
necessity of getting money to Iran so that it would be available for
emergency use.” (Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director
of Intelligence, Job 80B01676R, Box 23, Folder 5, Director’s Staff
Meetings)↩