On War & Stuff

Afghanistan: How the War Was Won

The United States won the war in Afghanistan in 2002. That’s right — seven years ago. How do I know? Because Bernard Finel says so. He even quotes some other dude as saying basically the same thing:

This war should have been over the moment we disposed of the Taliban.

Fellas. It was. And that’s exactly the problem. The U.S. had 5,200 troops in Afghanistan in 2002. It still had only 15,200 troops in 2004 when the insurgency was already picking up steam. The United States, as is its wont, considered the war won and the job done when it wasn’t. That is why we are where we are today.

Just in case this is somehow difficult to grasp, let me repeat: The United States hasn’t been fighting a full-scale war in Afghanistan for the past eight years. It had a light military presence in the country for seven years while its enemies regrouped. Because it neglected Afghanistan and failed to commit what was needed and finish what it had started, it is now in an unsalvageable situation. No amount of “we-chased-the-Taliban-away-and-destroyed-al-Qaeda’s-camps-and-we-won-we-won-we-won” fantasising will change this fact.

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24 Responses

I think if we had committed 200,000 men in 01-02, we’d be in a worse situation unless we were basically administering the entire country from the village up. What renders it un-salvageable is next door. That, and who lives there.

Bush basically fought Afghanistan as an economy of Force. As will this guy, starting next year. Forget 18 months.

The last people to attempt to remake Astan in the West’s image were the Afghan and Soviet Communists.

This will probably be seen as an abortive exercise in folly. And he will effectively abort next summer when the casualties climb with mid-terms looming.

And blaming Bush isn’t cutting it anymore. He’s gone. And whatever he did, it worked for our interests – why we are there – for 8 years.

This guy couldn’t give us 1 year (Ft Hood). And he won’t give us anything like the results in Iraq.

Victory and defeat in war is not a binary outcome. We accomplished all we could have reasonably expected to accomplish in 2002. The fact that some people — who on the whole seem to know very little about military history — pine for some sort of decisive outcome that solves the problem once and for all and that ensures that “never again” does a threat materialize really does not concern me.

In the 8 years since 9/11 there have been no major terrorist attacks launched from Afghanistan and the AQ presence there is either small or non-existent. You want to call that “failure”? Go ahead. I think the only failure is our failure to recognize what success looks like given the limits of American power.

Exactly, and yet you wrote in the original post: “We won the war in Afghanistan in 2002.” I didn’t make that up.

Personally, I think hubristic victory narratives aren’t at all helpful for a nation in preparing for the next terrorist attack, which at this point seems all but inevitable. If you refuse to grasp history, you’re bound to embark on another hasty and useless revenge mission when that happens.

@elf:

With all due respect, what you call “blaming Bush” I call acknowledging one’s fuckups. What *doesn’t* cut it, IMO, is blaming all your woes on Pakistan. For one thing, Islamabad had supported the Taliban since the movement’s inception, so it was hardly news to anybody but probably Bush and his inner circle that your enemies would flee across the border if given the chance.

You didn’t need 200,000 troops in 2001. You could’ve done a swell job with just 20,000 had your leaders had the patience and, frankly, intelligence to see it through — in other words, to keep their eye on the ball.

You are deliberately taking my arguments out of context. I believe we won, but only by using my very limited definition of victory — routing the Taliban, scattering AQ, etc. I have explicitly argued over and over, that it is a mistake to assume that “victory” must require some sort of final solution to the threat being discussed. We accomplished everything we could have hoped to accomplish in 2002. In that sense, we did win. The fact that we have not accomplished the fantasy-land goal of turning Afghanistan into Switzerland is not a justification for calling it defeat or failure.

The Israelis have been trying to deal with a similar challenge emanating from Lebanon for nearly three decades. There is reliable way to prevent future threats. We can’t control the future. All we can is mitigate or attack threats as they emerge.

I would suggest all who are interested in this issue read “Radicalized Islam,” by Oliver Roy. Roy presents the point that Islam is more of a decentralized phenomenon populated by non-state actors. His background is in sociology and anthropology which gives him a unique ability to see what’s behind the issues. Roy suggests that the concept of “rogue states” and “failed states” are negligible among contemporary terrorist movements.

He says that local police and intel groups are the best front line against terrorism (see “Securing the City: Inside America’s Best Counterterror Force — the NYPD”). By invading Afghanistan and Iraq we have helped provide fuel to the fire by stirring up the religious feelings of the Muslim masses in those countries. We cannot fight non-state bad guys by occupying states. This is a waste of men and treasure.

No, Jari, not better. Because what you didn’t include was that I followed it up with a link to a longer argument where I argue at length that there is a distinction between winning a war and preventing a threat from ever emerging in the future.

You’re assuming that everyone has to share your definition of victory — namely that the Taliban (and presumably any successor movement sharing its ideology and tactics) be prevented from ever again threatening Afghanistan, the West, and the United States.

You are free to argue that this war in Afghanistan ought to be conceived as a war to end all war in the region… but at least be honest enough to admit that your critique of my argument is grounded in an ahistorical and extremist assessment of war and of the utility of force.

The only war that would meet your criteria of “victory” is World War II. Everything else would have to be coded as some sort of failure because of the residual and on-going threat that remained after hostilities ceased.

I’ve got to side with Bernie here. While I acknowledge that we’ve turned Afghanistan into a goat rodeo, the objectives that we set in 2001/2002 were met. For some reason, we weren’t satisfied to leave at that point.

Then we decided, apparently, that we needed to take on a bigger mission of denying sanctuary to AQI in Afghanistan. But because we knew the Af-Pak border was more like an interstate border in the US than an international border, we figured that the job wouldn’t be done until we built a new nation in Afghanistan. That is a mission statement that would earn you a failing grade in even an Officer Basic Course (task: build nation; purpose: deny sanctuary – wtf?).

As Bernie points out in his last comment, you’re operating on two different definitions of “victory.”

I think you folks are talking past each other. Finel/Schmedlap is sort of right that the *military* targets were reached in 2001/2002. What failed, as in Iraq, was the phase IV, or more correctly the absence of phase IV. I dont have the numbers around here, but there was a huge gap between money promised and money actually delivered to Afghanistan 2002-2005. To put it in military terms: The offensive was fine, but the logistical followthrough and the consolidation of gains was a complete screwup. Add to this the political dimension, with US pols promising magical ponies for all afghanis and in reality funding a bunch of westerners to have a extended vacation in Kabul.

There still seems to lack a understanding that humanitarian work and military work is the new combined-arms operation. We could learn a thing or two from Hezb when it comes to community organizing…

Yeah, there’s that, plus Bernard is again erecting strawmen. In the 558 posts I have written for this blog since May 2008 I challenge you to find ONE mention of “winning” or “victory” in anything but derogatory sense. So, no, I have NOT defined victory, and Finel has no idea what I would mean by it should I choose to use that word Americans so love.

I’m all for a robust debate on Afghanistan, but we really need to get history straight first.

In 2001-2002, OEF was but a skeleton crew tasked mainly to hunt down al-Qaeda and Taliban stragglers. The United States turned everything else over to the international community. The UN set up a small peacekeeping force to oversee security in Kabul. That outfit, called ISAF, was a mess from the start. Finally, the UK agreed to take the reins, followed by Turkey. The US went on with its own mission in the East while the South was left to its own devices. US troop numbers in Afghanistan *stayed below 20,000 until 2006* when, as NATO/ISAF took charge, they discovered Helmand was out of control.

So, you know, for all intents and purposes *you did leave* in 2001. You were “satisfied” to get out when you shouldn’t have. 5,200 troops in a country the size Afghanistan can hardly be called a military presence. As Fnord pointed out, there was no Phase IV. There was no nation building. There was no nothing. Afghanistan was a non-entity for the U.S. If your goal was to *temporarily* remove the Taliban from power and to *temporarily* disrupt al-Qaeda — i.e. it was just a quick revenge mission — then yeah, okay, maybe we can say those goals were met, but it’s a real stretch, and the banging of goal posts being moved is so loud I can even hear it here in Finland.

I agree with your last post, though maybe not for reasons that you expect…

“If your goal was to *temporarily* remove the Taliban from power and to *temporarily* disrupt al-Qaeda — i.e. it was just a quick revenge mission — then yeah, okay, maybe we can say those goals were met…”
That is exactly what many of us refer to when we say the mission was accomplished by 2002. We should have left at that point.

“As Fnord pointed out, there was no Phase IV…”
Exactly. Many of us did not want a phase IV. We wanted to go in, kill AQI operatives, destroy their facilities, and leave. I think hindsight is clear that we were right. It’s a nice thought to think that we can “fix” Afghanistan. I’d love to it. But I don’t think the US Gov’t has the competence to do it. Hopefully I’m proven wrong.

“So, you know, for all intents and purposes *you did leave* in 2001. You were “satisfied” to get out when you shouldn’t have.”
Kind of. I think we pursued the worst possible COA – leave enough troops to remain involved, but not enough to do anything more than rile up opposition and get shot at. Many of us here in the US were expecting to – and wanted to – get out then. The reason that we maintained any presence was because of asinine calls for “killing bin Laden.” It was a revenge mission than anything else, as you rightly pointed out.

“… the banging of goal posts being moved is so loud I can even hear it here in Finland.”
I understand that. The vast majority of the voices in the media and elsewhere seemed to never speak a word about leaving Afghanistan until we “finish the job,” meaning “kill/capture bin Laden.” Those of us who advocate(d) otherwise really did not – and to a very large degree still do not – have a voice heard beyond our own earshot. Or perhaps we were assumed to be part of the anti-war movement. We have been, and will continue to be, drowned out by louder and more numerous voices who frame the mission in terms understandable to the lowest common denominator (kill/capture bin Laden) or as the intelligentsia, such as Biddle, outlines in The American Interest.

I would prefer that we simply leave Afghanistan. But, if we’re going to try to nation build, then I think we’ve got to push ahead with a plan that connects resources and means to that end (meaning a whole of government surge and a CinC who can convince the American people that the sacrifice is “worth it”). What we did for the past 8 years was a half-hearted, half-assed presence that did as much or more harm than good.

Unless my reading of Pope Stanislaus Americanus Pontifexes McCrystalmas is incorrect, then he’s joined the LCD crowd calling for UBL’s head in a box. I agree, UBL is more than just another brigand.

Jari, you’re right about us blowing it (maybe) with letting AQ slip the leash at Tora Bora (although in that terrain, I don’t know if a few thousand more woulda made a diff). JAWBREAKER makes it redactulously clear (TM pending) that the US Generals on site wanted to avoid political fallout more than they wanted UBL. Although the buck stops at the Commander in Chief, I really think the Generals let us all down, from CENTCOM probably blocking a more vigourous pursuit of UBL under Clinton (Zinni), to the not using Ranger BN’s to block UBL escape routes from Tora Bora, to the entire PH IV (not!) bill of goods sold to POTUS about Iraq. Let’s remember Bush probably had to discover that he was being bullshitted somehow about Iraq going just fine, only a few dead enders – he had to find out for himself and from female civilian staffers. Before someone mentions he should have listened to the Press, please review the bulk of the media coverage from the 04 election season -Yes indeed – to now concerning Bush. Katrina coverage makes a good place to compare.

Our Generals failed us, and it wasn’t until people started making end runs around them or denouncing them publicly – McMasters thinly veiled, Yingling openly – that people and policies started changing. Is POTUS ultimately responsible? Always BUT then we have to ask details.

Nation building…last war, this is the new war. We have no right to build nations, there are already people there, who may not want a “nation” at all.

“Well, what should be the response to AQ using Afghanistan and AF/PAK as a training and staging area for attacks? A base in other words? ”

What we did, go in there and wipe them out, then leave. A one year job, which we did.

Leaving after that is not retreat. It’s called “using your head”. Our army is beyond the breaking point, with captains and majors bailing out on this stupid, stupid, useless excuse for a war. Thanks a lot, for killing our brave soldiers for nothing, for wasting our precious resources, for a fools errand, and a phony war. Someday we will need those boys, for real, and they will not come. They will remember the lies of this war.

“Our army is beyond the breaking point, with captains and majors bailing out on this stupid, stupid, useless excuse for a war. Thanks a lot, for killing our brave soldiers for nothing, for wasting our precious resources, for a fools errand, and a phony war. Someday we will need those boys, for real, and they will not come. They will remember the lies of this war.”

I share your frustration over how operations have been handled. But, as for Officer attrition, speak for yourself. I, and most people I know, left because we weren’t interested in spending 80% of our careers in staff positions, dicking around with PowerPoint slides. We were more than happy to deploy and take on whatever mission was given to us. Most of us, if a war broke out in which our professional skills are needed, would be happy to return. But if all we’re wanted for is making more slides and doing mindless staff work that a mentally-handicapped individual with no military experience is capable of doing, then no thanks. Most of us didn’t view our efforts as wasted on account of how well the war was prosecuted. Our efforts were viewed as wasted because most of the tasks assigned to us were so far below our abilities and so irrelevant to our training.

You wrote: “You’re assuming that everyone has to share your definition of victory — namely that the Taliban (and presumably any successor movement sharing its ideology and tactics) be prevented from ever again threatening Afghanistan, the West, and the United States.”

So, according to you and your peculiar definitions of victory the last one standing on the battlefield somehow isn’t the winner?

You wrote: “Victory and defeat in war is not a binary outcome. We accomplished all we could have reasonably expected to accomplish in 2002. The fact that some people — who on the whole seem to know very little about military history — pine for some sort of decisive outcome that solves the problem once and for all and that ensures that ‘never again’ does a threat materialize really does not concern me.”

No, maybe there’s another antonym for victory… Oh come on, stop your snobbery: You simply have an extremely hard time distinguishing the last battle from the first battle or even a battle from a war, or even victory and defeat. According to your definition the U.S.A. also won the Vietnam War and even the Japanese won the Pacific War, simply because they won the opening round, that’s how far the “absence of logic” goes now.

You wrote: “Victory and defeat in war is not a binary outcome. We accomplished all we could have reasonably expected to accomplish in 2002. The fact that some people — who on the whole seem to know very little about military history — pine for some sort of decisive outcome that solves the problem once and for all and that ensures that ‘never again’ does a threat materialize really does not concern me.”

No, maybe there is another antonym for victory… Oh come on, stop your snobbery: You simply have an extremely hard time distinguishing the last battle from the first battle or even a battle from a war, or even victory and defeat. According to your definition the U.S.A. would also have won the Vietnam War and even the Japanese should have “won” the Pacific War, simply because they won the opening round, that’s how far the “absence of logic” goes now…