If
(i) I have a PRIMA FACIE DUTY to do A (i.e., Act A is of a kind that I have a
PRIMA FACIE DUTY to do) and (ii) I do not have a PRIMA FACIE DUTY to do any act
other than A, then:

††††††††††† A is my ACTUAL DUTY.†

2.† Cases of Conflict.†

If
(i) I have a PRIMA FACIE DUTY to do A and (ii) I also have a PRIMA FACIE DUTY
to do one or more other acts different from A, then I have a conflict of PRIMA
FACIE DUTIES.† In such a case,

A
is my ACTUAL DUTY ů [just in case] On balance,
the PRIMA FACIE DUTY to do A outweighs the PRIMA FACIE DUTY to do any of the
alternatives.†

C.† Act A is right ů Act A is one's ACTUAL DUTY.

[Question:† Why is Rossís account NON-CONSEQUENTIALIST?]

HYPOTHETICAL AND CATEGORICAL
IMPERATIVES††

1.† IMPERATIVE IN CONDITIONAL FORM:† If you desire X, you ought to do Y [Y is the
best means of obtaining X].

2.† IMPERATIVE IN UNCONDITIONAL FORM:†

You
ought to do Z.

3.† A HYPOTHETICAL IMPERATIVE [i.e., an imperative
based on a desire] is an imperative in CONDITIONAL FORM or an imperative in
UNCONDITIONAL FORM that is DERIVED FROM an imperative in CONDITIONAL FORM.

4.† A CATEGORICAL IMPERATIVE [i.e., an
imperative that is not based on any desire] is an imperative in UNCONDITIONAL
FORM that is NOT DERIVED from an imperative in CONDITIONAL FORM.

KANT'S ACCOUNT OF AUTONOMY
AND HETERONOMY

††††††††††† HETERONOMOUS
CHOICE = a choice based on a desire [e.g., based on a hypothetical imperative +
desire].

††††††††††† AUTONOMOUS CHOICE = a choice not
based on any desire [e.g., based on a categorical imperative].

††††††††††† A person making a HETERONOMOUS
CHOICE is said to have a HETERONOMOUS WILL.†

††††††††††† A person making an AUTONOMOUS CHOICE
is said to have an AUTONOMOUS WILL.

THE KANTIAN CONCEPTION OF
IRRATIONALITY:

††††††††††† An act is irrational [in the Kantian
sense] [just in case] When the maxim of the act is willed by all rational
beings [i.e., when it is universalized], it yields a logical impossibility [i.e.,
a logical contradiction].

A
logical contradiction is a statement of the form p&-p.

Thus,
from the requirement not to be irrational [in the Kantian sense], Kant obtains
the first version of the Categorical Imperative:

No.
1.† [Universalizability Test] Never act
in such a way that one could not also will that one's maxim be universal law
[i.e., one ought never to act on a maxim if it is not logically possible that
the maxim be willed by all rational beings].

††††††††††† The first version of Kant's
Categorical Imperative is an attempt to provide purely descriptive necessary
and sufficient conditions for moral wrongness:

Act
A is Wrong ę The Maxim for A is not
Universalizable [i.e., it is not logically possible that the maxim be willed by
all rational beings].

HOW THE UNIVERSALIZABILITY
TEST CAN PRODUCE A LOGICAL CONTRADICTION

††††††††††† Suppose there are only 3 rational
beings, Bill, John, and Ken.†

††††††††††† Bill considers the maxim, M:† "I kill someone and no one else kills
anyone."† The Universalizability
Test requires that all rational beings be able to will the maxim without
contradiction.

††††††††††† (1) For Bill to will the maxim M, he
must will the result:

††††††††††† (B) Bill kills someone; John and Ken
do not kill anyone.

†††††††††††

††††††††††† (2) What is the result if John and
Ken will maxim M also?†

††††††††††† (a) If John wills maxim M, the
result is:

††††††††††† (J) John kills someone; Bill and Ken
do not kill anyone.

††††††††††† (b) If Ken wills maxim M, the result
is:

††††††††††† (K) Ken kills someone; Bill and John
do not kill anyone.

But
(B) and (J) and (K) together imply:

Bill
kills someone and does not kill anyone; John kills someone and does not kill
anyone; Ken kills someone and does not kill anyone.†

CONTRADICTION

Therefore,
on Kant's account, it cannot be rational to act on the maxim "I kill
someone and no one else kills anyone."

A
SERIOUS PROBLEM FOR KANT'S UNIVERSALIZABILITY TEST

††††††††††† Suppose, as before, that there are
only 3 rational beings, Bill, John, and Ken.†

††††††††††† (2) What is the result if John and
Ken will maxim M' also?

†

††††††††††† (a) If John wills maxim M', the
result is:

††††††††††† (J') John kills someone, regardless
of what Bill and Ken do.

††††††††††† (b) If Ken wills maxim M', the
result is:

††††††††††† (K') Ken kills someone, regardless
of what Bill and John do.

†

But
(B') and (J') and (K') together imply only:†
Bill kills someone and John kills someone and Ken kills someone.† THIS IS NOT A CONTRADICTION.† It is simply a very undesirable state of
affairs (undesirable to all three of them, if all three of them would be
dead).†

THE THREE VERSIONS OF THE
CATEGORICAL IMPERATIVE

No.
1.† [Universalizability Test] Never act
in such a way that one could not also will that one's maxim be universal law
[i.e., one ought never to act on a maxim if it is not logically possible that
the maxim be willed by all rational beings].

No.
2:† Treat every person as an end, and
never as a means only.

No.
3:† Act on maxims that could be
legislated as universal law in the Kingdom of Ends.

RAWLS'S SOCIAL CONTRACT
THEORY OF JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS

A REASONABLE person is willing to cooperate on fair
terms of social cooperation.

††††††††††† What are the fair terms of social
cooperation?† They are defined by principles
that would be selected in the hypothetical Original Position, behind a Veil of
Ignorance, where "those who enage in cooperation choose together, in one
joint act, the principles which are to assign basic rights and duties and to
determine the division of social benefits."[p. 144]†

†

††††††††††† What is the Veil of Ignorance?

Problems for Deontological
Theories

1.† Not All Moral Motives Fit the Model of
Duties:† Example of The Extra Reason Not
to Cheat:† Even if everyone else
cheated, it seems there would be some reason not to cheat.

2.† The Moral Priority of Caring over Duty.† The Example of the Caring Friend vs. the
Dutiful Friend:† Even if they produce
the same actions, from a moral point of view, most people rank the motivation
of the caring friend above the merely dutiful friend.†