Monday, July 14, 2008

BUSTER: First, TSA doesn't have a watch list. TSA is a customer of the Terrorist Screening Center, a component of the FBI that is responsible for maintaining the consolidated terrorist watch list. The center has said publicly that there are less than 400,000 individuals on the overall consolidated watch list, 95 percent of whom are not U.S. persons and the vast majority of whom are not even in the U.S.

TSA uses two subsets of this list, the no-fly and selectee lists. These small subsets of the overall list are reserved for known or suspected terrorists that reach a threshold where they should not be allowed to fly, or should get additional scrutiny.

MYTH: There are 1 million names on U.S. Government terror watch lists.

BUSTER: There are less than 400,000 individuals on the consolidated terrorist watch list and less than 50,000 individuals on the no-fly and selectee lists. Individuals on the no-fly and selectee lists are identified by law enforcement and intelligence partners as legitimate threats to transportation requiring either additional screening or prohibition from boarding an aircraft.

MYTH: The ACLU's math estimates that there will be 1 million people on government watch lists this July.

BUSTER: Assumptions about the list are just plain wrong. While a September 2007 report may have said that there are 700,000 records on the terrorist watch list and it was growing by an average of 20,000 per month, that is not the same as the number of individuals on the watch lists. A new "record" is created for every alias, date-of-birth, passport and other identifying information for watch listed suspects. The ACLU does not account for the name-by-name scrub that took place in the Fall of 2007 by all government agencies involved with the lists through the Terrorist Screening Center. This review reduced the no-fly and selectee lists by almost 50 percent and eliminated records of individuals that no longer pose a threat.

MYTH: Ted Kennedy, Catherine Stevens, and "Robert Johnson" are all on the no-fly or selectee watch lists.

BUSTER: These individuals are NOT on the no-fly or selectee lists. They, and other Americans, are being misidentified as individuals on the selectee list. Today watch list matching is carried out by the airlines for every passenger manifest. In cases when individuals with similar names are misidentified, folks experience inconvenience like no remote check-in but they are allowed to fly. Once TSA's Secure Flight initiative is in place the number of misidentifications will be GREATLY reduced. Under Secure Flight, TSA assumes watch list matching from dozens of airlines and implements a uniform, efficient matching process. Today the Department of Homeland Security's Traveler Redress Inquiry Program (TRIP) is a single point of contact for individuals who have inquiries or seek resolution regarding difficulties they experienced during their travel screening at transportation hubs--like airports and train stations--or crossing U.S. borders.

FACTS ABOUT TERROR WATCH LISTS:

Terror watch lists keep legitimate terror threats off of airplanes every day, all over the world.

According to the Congress' investigative arm, the Government Accountability Office, terror watch lists have, "helped combat terrorism" and "enhanced U.S. counterterrorism effort."

Our partners in the law enforcement and intelligence communities work tirelessly and in some cases under great physical danger to identify individuals that pose a terror threat. The simple truth is that it would be negligent to not use this information to our advantage.

146 comments:

When I was in the service we controlled sensitive but unclassified data for reasons of Operational Security, or OPSEC. Basically, seemingly innocent data could be used by an enemy. So, I can understand TSA withholding names actually on the lists. However, I can't understand why are the exact numbers on the No Fly and Selectee lists sensitive info. How is the exact number in any way too dangerous to release? What could any potential enemy do with that number? OPSEC isn't supposed to be a blanket excuse for withholding data, there has to be a legitimate vulnerability that could be exploited if the information is released. Please provide specific reasons why the exact number should be considered sensitive data. Especially since you already give a ballpark figure.

If we are to trust what people post on blogs, we might believe that "The preparation of [liquid] bombs is very much more complex than tossing together several bottles-worth of formula and lighting it up. In fact, in recent tests, a National Lab was asked to formulate a test mixture and it took several tries using the best equipment and best scientists for it to even ignite." -- here

Sorry, TSA, but let's provide Americans with more facts, and less lies!

Copied and Pasted from EFF.org, originally posted October, 2007:

EFF Comments on Terror Watch List

Since 2003, the government has been building, testing and using the Terrorist Screening Database, stitching together several disparate terrorist lists from various agencies into one vast, centralized database that is a single consolidated watch list of suspicious individuals. Information in the TSDB can be used to decide whether individuals will be allowed to enter the country, get on an airplane, become citizens, or if they will be detained at routine traffic stops. It?s a central factor in other programs, like Secure Flight, the Transportation Security Administration?s proposed plan to ?screen? millions of travelers.

This week, EFF filed comments on some proposed changes to the Terrorist Screening Records System, which includes the watch list as well as other records. EFF urged the FBI to reconsider its 2005 decision to exempt the TSRS from crucial Privacy Act requirements, which makes it impossible for citizens to use the courts to access or challenge false or inaccurate data that may have found its way into the system. (In place of Privacy Act provisions, the FBI substitutes its own complaint system ? which follows no timelines and has no independent oversight or accountability.)

False and inaccurate data is a well-documented problem for the TSRS. For instance, in 2005, the Department of Justice?s own inspector general found that the watch list had major data accuracy flaws. And last month, the DOJ?s IG again issued a damning assessment of the system, finding that it had a substantial error rate, suffered from incomplete and inaccurate information, and noting that the Terrorist Screening Center (TSC), which runs the list, was slow to respond to citizen complaints.

In a sample of 105 records, 38 percent were found to have inconsistencies and inaccurate information. Even more disturbing is the fact that, as the Washington Post notes, ?nearly half the initial name matches proved worthless.? And the TSC?s slow response time means that innocent travelers who happen to find themselves caught in that margin of error would have to wait months to have problems addressed.

The problems with the watch list show that the Privacy Act is as necessary now as ever. Citizens must have an enforceable right to access data collected about them, and to correct that data. And if watch lists are going to be compiled, the TSC needs to have reliable systems in place to assure accuracy and completeness of information. Without these reforms, problems with misidentification and wrongful inclusion on the watch list are likely to continue.

END of article.

Here are some links:

Original article:http://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2007/10/eff-comments-terror-watch-list

The TSA seems to be operating on security through obscurity with a little security theater thrown in to fool the masses. Security through obscurity doesn't work. Period. The list can be probe. If Mr. Terrorist's cousin can fly with no hassle because he's not on the no-fly or selectee list, then Mr. Terrorist knows of one name not on the list, and that's all Mr. Terrorist needs. Because of family ties, Mr. Terrorist probably looks enough like his cousin to use his ID. Mr. Terrorist is trained as well as a BDO and believes in what he's doing, so Mr. BDO doesn't notice anything suspicious, and neither does Mr. TSO. Mr. Terrorist is now on the plane. But wait! Mr. TSO did his job, and screened Mr. Terrorist well. Mr. Terrorist has no dangerous items in the plane. Not even that 5oz bottle of shampoo he bought just for this trip. So it doesn't really matter that Mr. Terrorist flew from NY to LA, now does it?

I'm not sure that I can believe any of your statistics when the first one you cite is incorrect: "Two Million People Travel Every Day."

First, two million are not unique passengers. If a passenger has to connect once or twice on the way to reach his final destination, then that passenger is counted twice (or three) times to get to the 2 million number. So no, two million people don't travel every day.

Second, a half-truth exists in that statistic and the reason for its use in your chart. If a person is connecting, their name will be run only once through the database and more likely than not, will only be screened once on their multi-leg trip. So that 2 million number is too high for the purposes for which you are using it.

You can check with the U.S. Department of Transportation, Bureau of Transportation Statistics to verify the foregoing. And this is not the first time I have raised the fallacy of that 2 million number, but you have conveniently ignored it.

Christopher, you've cited exactly zero sources in support of your claims. Are we to believe it is so simply based on your word?

Why are people whose names are included on blacklists your organization uses considered so dangerous that we should restrict their freedom to travel from one state to another by barring them from using commercial airlines or hassling them more than other travelers, but not dangerous enough to charge them with a crime?

Would you really have us go along with a policy that restricts people's liberty based on government blacklists?

While the list seems like a great way of stopping terrorists from boarding planes, in a game of cat and mouse it seems like it would be quite ineffective. After all, the media tells the public they have massive amounts of funding. Knowing they have the money, it seems that they could pay to create new identities, causing the list to be ineffective. I know there is a new ID system proposed, but until then do we have multilayer protection against fake identifications?

First of all, thanks to Brandon for posting links to the reports -- especially the Justice IG report. When I get a few minutes, I will look at the GAO report Christopher so proudly quotes. I will expose just how out of context those words are.

Christopher -- I'll bet your post is in reaction to the worldwide heat you're now getting from the former Assistant Attorney General who is on the list -- complete with his recently-renewed TS clearance.

Since you hoped we'd forget, I'll remind the public about the 60 minutes report in which they explored this very issue. There was even a series of interviews with the woman who was the head of the Terrorist Screening Center. I remember some interesting facts that she herself confirmed:

1. There are dead people on the list;2. The 9/11 hijackers are STILL on the list;3. Real known terrorists' names are too sensitive to put on the list at all.

Oh yeah -- The guy who had this former DOJ guy's job before him was none other than Comrade Chertoff.

1. Where is the information from a TSA SSI expert about x-ray images of Apple's latest laptop computer Bob wrote that he would provide?

2. Where are the un-doctored full frontal images created by the electronic strip search machines?

3. Where is the Privacy Impact Assessment for the new form that TSA provides to people who claim to be unable to present credentials at TSA airport checkpoints?

4. In the context of ensuring air travel safety, what is the difference between two people, both of whom are willing to cooperate with TSA's invasive interrogations, one of whom politely declines to show ID, the other of whom claims he lost or misplaced his ID?

5. Why are the reported 10 people per day who decline to show ID considered so likely to be a threat to air travel security that TSA restricted their right to travel by refusing to allow them past TSA's airport checkpoints?

6. How does the cost of this new policy of invasive interrogations at government checkpoints in airports compare to that of to the previous policy of thoroughly screening anyone who did not show ID regardless of his reasoning?

Why on earth should any citizen trust an agency that tells us 3.41 ounces of any liquid can bring down a 747, that refuses to explain the change in its ID policies, that interrogates citizens about their political affiliations and tax returns for no reason whatsoever, and that still doesn't screen all of the cargo that goes on planes?

Former DOJ Prosecutor Jim Robinson IS on the list.http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20080714/ap_on_go_ca_st_pe/terror_watchlist

Brilliant! Apparently the "no-fly" or "extra hassle" lists are just as effective at deterring terrorists as is your inance "shoe dance" policy (which, by the way, makes us the laughing stock of the rest of the civilized world which stopped the shoe nonsense YEARS AGO)

In principle, I would be in favor of watch lists. This would be a real, low cost, security measure that does not bother most people, except for a few small details:

1. The list is ways too big. 400,000 individuals on the consolidated terrorist watch list is way too much, and makes it impossible not to have name confusions. Remember, the list sources are so crazy they included even Nobel prize winner 90-year-old Nelson Mandela.

2. The watch lists are checked by airlines, who then give people their boarding pass (marked SSSS if you match the list) and let the person roam freely around until they voluntarily go through security, which does not check the list.

3. I am one of the watch list victims. My name cannot possibly be confused with anyone else (long complicated eastern European name). I know I am not remotely related to any terrorist activity. Therefore, I know the list is flawed.

"the list seems like a great way of stopping terrorists from boarding planes"

Do you really think so?

Who are these people whose names are on the DHS blacklists? Apparently, they're not dangerous enough to charge with a crime, or we would do so rather than simply hassling them at airports before letting them travel or turning them away. If they are outside the United States, then of what use is this list in restricting access to domestic flights? If they are inside the United States, why are we restricting their liberties without any due process of law? If they are so dangerous that we must restrict their movement, should we not arrest them and then let a judge or jury determine whether they should be imprisoned or placed under house arrest?

It is not the duty of the TSA or any other part of the Executive Branch to judge guilt and impose punishment. Those are reserved for the Judicial Branch. However, that is precisely what the TSA is doing. Those people whose names are on government blacklists are punished without ever having a trial, without any chance to face their accuser, and with no chance defend themselves.

No matter how sophisticated the security embedded into an I.D., a well-funded criminal will be able to falsify it. Honest people, however, go to Pro-Life rallies. Honest people go to Pro-Choice rallies, too. Honest people attend gun shows. Honest people protest the actions of the President of the United States. Honest people fly to political conventions. What if those with the power to put people on a 'no fly' list decided that they didn't like the reason for which you wanted to travel? The honest people wouldn't be going anywhere.

"Highly suspicious characters such as Senator Edward Kennedy (D-Mass.) are on the watch list. So are the notorious Gary Smith and Robert Johnson. What? You’ve never heard of Gary Smith or Robert Johnson? They’re so dangerous that countless of iterations of them are stopped at airports all the time, all because they’ve got really common names.

"TLP Director Barry Steinhardt tells us why 1 million names on a watch list is as good as nothing on Daily Kos, and proposes some common-sense solutions. Chief among them: giving non-terrorists who are on the list a way of getting off the list. Right now, it takes an act of Congress to get your name off the list. Given how quickly and expeditiously Congress works, you can expect a wrong name to come off the list roughly around the same time that hell freezes over. (Congress did manage to get Nelson Mandela removed from the list.)

"So if Senator "E. Kennedy", an actual member of Congress, can’t get his name off the list, well, good luck to ya!"

"More than one million names are now on the terrorist watch list. This is truly mind-boggling. Only the United States government bureaucracy could create a terrorist watch list that affects nuns, war heroes, members of Congress, and persons holding top secret security clearances.

"Congress spit on this five-alarm blaze by removing Nelson Mandela from the list. What is it going to take for Congress to extinguish this horrific blaze which provides no redress for millions of travelers to be removed from the list who do not have the global presence to ‘merit’ an act of Congress?

"Today, the ACLU called on the administration and Congress to pass legislation requiring the terrorist watch list to ensure those on the list pose a real threat to national security and to create a process for persons on the list to be removed. These are common sense solutions. Unfortunately, it seems that common sense is not a strong suit of this administration or Congress.

Sorry, Christopher, but your claim re: Senator Kennedy is pure BS. If he weren't busy having chemo & radiation for his brain tumor, I'm sure he'd be happy to share w/the readers of this blog, AS HE HAS ALREADY DONE IN SENATE COMMITTEE HEARINGS, his personal experience w/your agency & 'the list', along w/his frustration at how long, even w/the resources available to him IN THE SENATE, it took him to get the matter resolved.

TSA owes an apology to every single American who has been denied a boarding pass, detained and questioned by law enforcement, humiliated at a checkin counter, missed a flight, or been delayed so much as 10 minutes by the un-American no-fly list.

It is inconsistent with American values to have a secret blacklist of names of people who are denied rights with no due process and no effective means of redress. Your "redress" process is a joke that usually has no impact at all, and you denied even the existence of a no-fly list until the media aggregated reports from various David Nelsons.

I don't care if the TSC, the TSA, or Santa Claus made the blacklist. It is un-American and disgusting, and TSA enforces it with their ID checks and forces it upon the airlines. Every single TSA leader and architect of the no-fly list should be put on trial for treason and imprisoned for life. Every single implementer of the no-fly list should be barred from public service for life, stripped of their pension, and named in the press.

Why couldn't you cut out the PR crap for a few seconds and at least apologize to the tens of thousands of innocent no-fly-list victims in your post? You owe them at least that much.

As mentioned in several other posts, no, I haven't heard of Robert Johnson. :D

Seriously, though, how many people out there with names such as mine, travel every day? There might be 400k names on the list (if TSA's numbers are to be believed) and 40-50k on the haraSSSSment list, but how many of those names are multiple hits? If 5 Robert Johnsons check in to fly that day, there's only one name on the list but 5 Robert Johnsons are harassed.

Thus I despise TSA's misrepresentation of this number.

Even if TSA's numbers are to be believed, it's saying that, not including multiple hits, that up to 20% to 25% of travelers can be harassed every day. Is that much of America really a threat? Guess TSA thinks so ...

I think part of what really makes people upset about these lists is theextreme secrecy. When you are on one of these, it feels like you havebeen accused of some crime, or at least misbehavior, but you have noidea what you did and no way to truly clear your name.

In late 2006, I found myself on one of these lists or a partial matchfor some name on one of these lists -- I'll never know exactly whathappened, of course. The first time I was unable to check in normallyand had to wait in a 45-minute line so that a "special" ticketing agentcould glance at my license and ask my birthdate, I had no idea what wasgoing on. The second time, I was given slightly more information andtold to use my middle name on my tickets to avoid matching (no idea ifthat actually helps or not). It was some 8 months and several flightslater that I finally heard about DHS TRIP -- and not from any one ofthe airline agents that I asked for help, but from Bruce Schneier's blog.

I filled out the DHS TRIP form, and later received a letter saying,essentially, "If anything needed to be changed, it was changed," andgiving instructions on how to appeal this (lack of) decision. For allI knew, they decided I was a problem, and I wouldn't be allowed to flynext time -- with no advance notice, of course.

I went back and forth on what to do, and finally decided I should tryto appeal. I called up to ask about it, and the agent asked me to readthe first paragraph of the letter I was sent. It turned out this wasthe letter they send to people who were cleared. I haven't had problemssince, but I have no idea if that is a coincidence or not, since I nowmake sure that I always sign up for frequent flier programs so they havemy full name and birthdate (which seemed to help before I signed up forDHS TRIP, though that could be a coincidence too, of course).

This whole time was rather stressful. I travel a lot for work, and ifI was suddenly unable to fly, I was probably going to have to relocateor quit my job. Of course, now I'm pretty sure that was never a realpossiblity, but I didn't know that at the time. No one would tellme anything -- even though apparently I wasn't the person they werelooking for.

I understand there is some need for secrecy, but I don't understand theneed to keep people in the dark about their status and how to correct it.

They owe an apology to all of us not just the ones who have been hastled. Remember not only are these policies absurd and useless, they are completely 100% funded by your tax dollars.

I have never seen a group of people as shockingly inept as the upper management of this idiotic organization. People on here say things about security theater and security through obscurity well its really neither...theres more science in a divining rod than in your security procedures.

The reason they don't justify anything is because they put maybe 20 minutes of thought into 90% of the things they do. More thought goes into the 'justification' than the actual policy, but its not a real justification its just fear mongering.

Logically though, everyone who works for the TSA should be on the selectee list, they would know exactly how to get through the layers of false security. See how well that flies...it might at least show your committed to what you say

"If a former assistant U.S. attorney general has trouble getting his name off the government's terrorist watchlist, there's little hope the rest of us can succeed in doing so.

...

"I suppose if I were convinced that America is a safer place because I get hassled at the airport, I might put up with it," [Jim Robinson, former head of the Justice Department's criminal division] said. "But I doubt it."

"BUSTER: These individuals are NOT on the no-fly or selectee lists. They, and other Americans, are being misidentified as individuals on the selectee list."

What a load of manure you are spreading Christopher. I bet you were a handful growing up.

True Sen. Kennedy and the others you mentioned are NOT on the list, the problem is they are not OFF the list either.

If a so called no-fly or selectee, is on the list and MY NAME matches, then I am ON the list.

This would be similar to putting out a BOLO for a black male with no other descriptors. Would that give a police officer the right to harass every black male in their path? Of course not, but that is what the TSA is doing with the list.

Don't you think you would get a better reception is you get out of spin mode and go into truth mode for a change?

Try explaining that airline tickets are purchased without any descriptors except for a name. The last time I bought tickets they did not ask my weight, age, height or even sex.

Try telling the people that if their name is Teddy Kennedy they will get a ssss because some Teddy Kennedy somewhere has done something to make you suspicious. Apologize to the innocent Teddy Kennedys for the extra intrusion into their lives. (Wal~Mart gift cards would be nice)

The TSA is becoming an uninvited drunken party guest, it keeps babbling that it is right while it pukes on the house plants. I don’t care how right you are I am getting tired of seeing you puke.

BTW still waiting on that pesky question about the legalities of the forced ID verification. The question is not going away, tell your lawyers to dust off their law books and figure it out. Your bosses are waiting.

What if those with the power to put people on a 'no fly' list decided that they didn't like the reason for which you wanted to travel? The honest people wouldn't be going anywhere.

Already/still happening. I was put on the no-fly list as punishment for political activities protected under the first amendment. Even after the August 2007 "purge" I still can't fly common carrier.

This isn't about stopping terrorists, this is about controlling the population. Always has been, always will. And by the time the government is forced to create the airplane version of AMTRAK, it will be too late.

I think Jen summed it up perfectly: "I think part of what really makes people upset about these lists is theextreme secrecy. When you are on one of these, it feels like you havebeen accused of some crime, or at least misbehavior, but you have noidea what you did and no way to truly clear your name."

We are being considered guilty until proven innocent, and there is nothing we can do about it!

The no-fly list is a perfect example of lazy thinking - instead of doing the actual work of developing contacts, chasing leads, and making good arrests, the national security state is making up huge lists, hoping to catch one terrorist by pestering a million people. At the tail end of this chain of nonsense is the TSA, who have so little leeway in their actions that they dare not decide for themselves that a small child whose name is on the list is not a threat to airline travel.

Believe it or not, there are some things that are worse than being blown up - and one of those is to live your life in such sheep-like fear that you can accept this kind of stupidity as normal.

I don't blame the 'officers' of the TSA - they have no choice other than to follow orders from their 'superiors' (and I do use that term loosely. On the other hand, TSA supervisors seem to be hiring a lot of people who like their uniforms, badges, and the tiny authority it gives them just a little too much.

Excerpted from FT, a poster relating his recent transit of a checkpoint in Atlanta:

"...'Look, I have no problem with you doing your job, provided you follow the SOP. The SOP says that the bag stays in my sight, so I want it to stay in my sight.'... The supervisor said, "'SOP' stands for 'Standard Operating Procedure.' If you've seen the actual SOP we have a problem. Our SOP is a national intelligence secret. Have you ever seen it?" I didn't laugh. . . really . . . "

The above abominable statement by a TSA supervisor in Atlanta is representative of the TSA as a whole.

It occurs to me that you could prove everything you're saying, assuming it's true, if you'd make the list public. If you've got nothing to hide, you shouldn't have any problems making the list public. What are you afraid of?

"MYTH: Ted Kennedy, Catherine Stevens, and "Robert Johnson" are all on the no-fly or selectee watch lists.

BUSTER: These individuals are NOT on the no-fly or selectee lists. They, and other Americans, are being misidentified as individuals on the selectee list."

And The Oddsey wasn't written by Homer, but by another ancient Greek with the same name...

It is not that Senator Theodore Kennedy is on the list, but that another Ted Kennedy's name is on the list, and anyone with a similar name is harassed.

This means for every single "Robert Johnson" on the list, thousands of other "Robert Johnson" folks are being harassed.

There are even some simple and obvious partial fixes to stopping some of those folks in error: If the "Robert Johnson" on the list is 40-50 years old, don't stop the three year old kid, etc.

In other words, for any such list to work, some modicom of intelligence must be used in it's application.

BUT, that still leaves us with the wholly un-American activity of blacklisting citizens on a super-secret list and denying them perfectly normal activities, just because some un-named government bureaucrat decided to single them out with no due process and no easy way to "clear" themselves from the list or get redress for being harassed by the government for the horrific crime of having a name similar to one that some faceless person in the government doesn't like.

Those bureaucrats honestly sound like the domestic enemies of the Constitution that I took a solemn oath to protect against so many years ago.

I would just like to let you know that I have successfully traveled using my sister's ID to avoid haraSSSSment because I somehow seem to have gotten onto your unending list. I am no terrorist, just really fed up with the hassle. In fact, you have forced me to break the law, probably for the first time in my life. Thank you TSA. You are stupid, and that is why.

Keith said "people who like their uniforms, badges, and the tiny authority it gives them just a little too much."

You're right, Keith. Readers should do a search for the terms sublimation (psychological, not chemical) and obsessive compulsive personality disorder. The results of that search will perfectly describe a screener's personality.

On another topic, anonymous, quoting a TSA supervisor in Atlanta, wrote: "Our SOP is a national intelligence secret."

You, the TSA, need to find this person and give him a great deal of retraining. What an idiot!

Quote from Anonymous: "It occurs to me that you could prove everything you're saying, assuming it's true, if you'd make the list public. If you've got nothing to hide, you shouldn't have any problems making the list public. What are you afraid of?"

To paraphrase a TSO in another recent thread: refusing to identify yourself (or provide solid justification for policies, etc) means that you have something to hide and is suspect behavior.

With the possible exception of Australia, the English speaking world has gone balmy. (Australia is trying to regain its sanity.) Try going to Germany, Russia, Italy, Japan and see how professional the people in their airports are. No secret lists, no bullying, no petty cruelty. No confiscation of electronic equipment.

I just saw the CNN report "Flying Fiasco"; this issue has the attention of the mainstream media, not just us left field radical bloggers. Pay attention to that.

There are two issues I have here:

1) There is still no means to stop a terrorist with a fake ID (or even a 'real' ID obtained using fraudulent documentation) from bypassing your "no fly" list.

2) Many of the terrorists you're looking for aren't likely to appear on any "list" maintained by anyone, providing this false sense of security. New terrorists are trained all the time, and suicide bombers, for example, aren't terrorists yet until they plot an attack. So unless you have this predicting the future stuff down to a science like in the movie Minority Report, how do you know who you're looking for? Besides, the government has a hard enough time tracking down it's own employees and veterans!

Does this remind anyone else of Senator McCarthy? 'I Hhold in my hand a list of 400,000 terrorists but its to secret for you to see". Everytime I hear the words TSA and intelligence in the same post I kinda laugh.

My fiance (Margaret Anderson) was on the slectee list for a long time. We figured out though that printing the boarding pass at home usually resulted in no SSSS while getting it at the airport did. FANTASTIC GUYS!

I'm sure I'll get all these 'oh I don't believe you posts' well I can easily scan and provide two boarding passes for the same flight one with and one without SSSS (haven't been photoshopped either), but I won't until I see some semblance of proof from the TSA bloggers on anythign they post

Hmmm, let me try this new game. I say that two plus two equals fish, why because I said so. With no sources to back up these claims they are about as believable as mine. I'll take the ACLU over the TSA any day of the week. They've been around a lot longer.

At least Christopher tried not to inject any humor like the ID thread.

You know, who cares if "your name is on the list" or if "your name is on similar to ones on the list"? Either way you're screwed, and the redress TSA promises doesn't work as anecdote after anecdote points out.

If you punish the TSA and DHS employees who are not cleaning up these obvious mistakes you get results (hint: personal responsibility, like jail time and financial liability are the only way to force accountability in a bureaucracy like DHS).

Otherwise you just get whining about "no, the list isn't that big! but we can't show you the list so just take our word for it! we're so trustable, we'd never get it wrong! forget about all the times we did"

Love the lies. "it's only 400000 people AND aliases" -- what normal people call NAMES. Spin is no substitute for reality. If you TSA people had any self respect you'd resign rather than work for such a monster of an organization.

Don't worry TSA guys, you'll be pariahs, like the folks who lobbied for big tobacco, or collaborated with the germans in WWII. And don't worry, we won't forget.

Nelson Mandela was the leader of the ANC which is a communist rebel group. Yes I know that many Americans think he's the greatest thing since sliced bread but we were in a cold war against communism with real wars in Vietnam and other wars we meddled in not all that long ago folks. If you knew your history understanding Nelson Mandela being on such a list isn't that difficult. Yes he's no threat to us now. But times have changed since the cold war.

Also, since he came to the US quite a few times I'm pretty sure he wasn't on the No-Fly list that the TSA has. Unless of course he never flew commercially so it wouldn't matter.

OK, isn't it about time to call in the troops to start posting in support of the no-fly list since the majority of the comments made so far are not accepting of Christopher's attempt to make us true believers?

I just went through security at LGA; let me tell you, I'm gonna have to ask for the SSSS more often! I was ushered to the front of the line like royalty; actually felt guilty cutting in front of all those people. SSSS has it's perks! Hey, do you think you could make the me t blog post about the registered traveller program? I actually have some useful input regarding that program.

Quote from anonymous: "Umm...sure. Right. Somehow, I can't buy this from an anon poster. Do the black helicopters keep tabs on your movements, too?"

If posting anonymously is a hindrance to credibility, then why did you post anonymously?

The first anonymous poster claims to be on the no fly list. Since this is pretty much the extent of TSA's power to do anything to him, why not post his name? What does he have to lose? He (or she) already supposedly can't fly. Heck, if they really were put on the no fly for exercising their 1st amendment right, he or she should have a fairly open and shut case. The ACLU would probably take the case. Absent any identifying information, why should we take his claim at face value?

"I'm sure I'll get all these 'oh I don't believe you posts' well I can easily scan and provide two boarding passes for the same flight one with and one without SSSS (haven't been photoshopped either), but I won't until I see some semblance of proof from the TSA bloggers on anythign they post"

Not everyone who gets SSSS is on the selectee list. You can be assigned randomly, or based on certain characteristics. For example, if you always fly one way, you'll probably get additional screening. It doesn't mean you are on either list.

The no-fly list is a perfect example of lazy thinking - instead of doing the actual work of developing contacts, chasing leads, and making good arrests, the national security state is making up huge lists, hoping to catch one terrorist by pestering a million people.

Lazy thinking like assuming that "developing contacts, chasing leads, and making good arrests" isn't already being done by CIA, FBI, DIA, and the rest of the security community? Lazy thinking like assuming that these techniques weren't the same ones used to make the very lists you despise?

Also, since he [Nelson Mandela]came to the US quite a few times I'm pretty sure he wasn't on the No-Fly list that the TSA has. Unless of course he never flew commercially so it wouldn't matter.********************************Actually, Secretary of State Rice has said, publicly, several times, since this came to light, that each time he did she had to give special permission for him to do so BECAUSE he was the No Fly List. I believe at one point she even termed it 'embarassing' that she had to do this each time.

I understand that Michael Chertoff testified before a congressional committee this week. He gave similar examples and when pressed for documentation he provided none. One of the committee members commented that his attitude was "trust us" we know what we are talking about. Guess we're not the only ones who have this problem.

As a retired U.S. Navy veteran I take great exception to the remark by Blogger Glen where it states the following,

"Profanity (and I thought some sailors knew how to curse)"

This is nothing less than a personal attack by Glen on the whole U.S. Navy. It is inappropriate and in poor taste. To disparage the service men and women of the U.S. Navy is certainly an indication of a less than professional member of the TSA.

It seems to me everyone knows at least one person who has trouble with the watch lists. It does not matter if their name is intentionally on it or if their name matches someone put on it. What matters is that these people are being harassed, and there is nothing they can do about it, short of winning a Nobel prize and getting a special congressional order like Mandela.

That indicates that, no matter what secret number of names are on this list, there are too many names. End the watch list, now! Or at the very least publish it, and show us you have nothing to hide.

In addition to thinking the watch list has gotten way out of control, I also do not understand the logic of the no fly list. If anyone is that dangerous and you know it, they should not be walking around free.

Christopher Muir wrote:Give me a break, the state investigates the state, and then produces a nice little sound byte to feed to the masses. This does not make me feel any safer.

Were that the case, then certainly the GAO wouldn't have released other, far more unflattering investigative reports on the TSA or DHS in general.

Personally, I'd say that's about all there is to that argument.

Abolish Government, Smash the State.

Oh, yes. There we go. That is the answer. Clearly. I don't know about the rest of you guys, but me? I just love waking up in the morning and having a big, steamy cup of anarchy to just put that little skip into my step.

Can you please provide us simple statistics that can explain the size of the problem much better, and are certainly not "classified" (or should not be): how many travelers, daily, get "super searched" due to the watch list, and how many are denied boarding due to the no fly list?

So when are you going to come out, sing a few songs, tell a few jokes, maybe do a skit or two, and then explain how you are testing out the search-free pilot only checkpoints and then justify how this is goin gto make us all safer -- unless the pilot has nipple rings.

As we all know a background check can not accurately predict behavior as evidenced by the alleged TSA pervert in Denver. We also should know that every commercial flight has more than one pilot in the cockpit.

With those two things in mind can the TSA please explain how doing an ID only check for pilots makes the aircraft safer than using the standard weapons screen?

No individual may enter a sterile area or board an aircraft without submitting to the screening and inspection of his or her person and accessible property in accordance with the procedures being applied to control access to that area or aircraft under this subchapter.

As we know from previous posts, a screening is a search for explosives, weapons and incendiaries.

Atrios:"Travelling by airplane in the US is nothing more than mass training of Americans to the requirements of the coming police state. The whole point is to make you learn to acquiesce without question, en masse, to completely absurd directives by dull functionaries wearing uniforms."

I don't know if any myths were busted by this blog entry. There are only assertions with no evidence to back them up. I could go onto my blog and post that the TSA has a watchlist of 5 poeple. then I could call it a Mythbusting and it would carry as much weight.

Anonymous said... Looking back over the Blog I re-read the "Delete-O-Meter post.

As a retired U.S. Navy veteran I take great exception to the remark by Blogger Glen where it states the following,

"Profanity (and I thought some sailors knew how to curse)"

This is nothing less than a personal attack by Glen on the whole U.S. Navy. It is inappropriate and in poor taste. To disparage the service men and women of the U.S. Navy is certainly an indication of a less than professional member of the TSA.

I request that Glens insulting remarks be removed.

Oh come on please. The TSA is offensive enough without hunting up crap like that.

While the list is a good bandaid, and so is electronic strip search, but neither go far enough. Someone can still fly with fake or stolen ID. The electronic strip search only checks outside the body. The only real solution is to physically strip search and body cavity check everyone that boards or maintains a commercial aircraft. Any weapons and destructive devices will be found.

This system works 100% in the nation's prisons and I'm proud to say we have the largest per capita prison population in the world. So, we have a tested system. With proper medical training, all TSOs can be inspecting potential terrorists within a few months.

With a potential for terrorist attack in Denver, the best place to test market the plan is at that airport.

"It seems to me everyone knows at least one person who has trouble with the watch lists. It does not matter if their name is intentionally on it or if their name matches someone put on it. What matters is that these people are being harassed, and there is nothing they can do about it, short of winning a Nobel prize and getting a special congressional order like Mandela.

"That indicates that, no matter what secret number of names are on this list, there are too many names. End the watch list, now! Or at the very least publish it, and show us you have nothing to hide.

"In addition to thinking the watch list has gotten way out of control, I also do not understand the logic of the no fly list. If anyone is that dangerous and you know it, they should not be walking around free."

I generally agree, though I'll add that it's not the Executive Branch's place to say who should walk around free and who should not -- that's for the Judicial Branch.

If we knew who the terrorists were, we could just arrest them all, rather than stopping them when they try to fly. So what do you mean by "a known terrorist"? A previously convicted hijacker? A card-carrying member of Al-Queda? A Green Party member, who seeks to change our established form of government? Someone on probation, convicted of non-violent civil disobedience for protesting the Star Wars program at Vandenberg Air Force Base? A member of Earth First!?

There is good reason to believe that any list of "known terrorists" contains "suspected" terrorists, not actual terrorists, and is full of errors besides. Particularly when the list is secret and neither the press nor the public can examine it for errors or political biases.

"Johnnie Thomas" was on the watch list because a 28-year-old "FBI Most Wanted" man, Christian Michael Longo, used that name as an alias. But Longo was arrested two days after joining the "Most Wanted" list for murdering his family. After he had been in custody for months, 70-year-old black grandma "Johnnie Thomas" gets stopped every time she tries to fly. Her story is in the May 2002 issue of New Yorker magazine. It's not clear why an ordinary criminal like Longo was on the list in the first place -- nor why he wasn't removed from the list when he was captured two days later. What is clear is that this secret watch-list is poorly controlled and ripe for abuse. And, of course, there is no guarantee that an actual terrorist would be carrying their real ID.

There are many ways to deter terrorism, but checking IDs against a watch list is not one of them. It is an exercise in futility that provides a false sense of security.

Q. So then how should we figure out who is a terrorist?

It's a good question, that goes to the heart of the post-9/11 civil liberties issues.

Who is a terrorist? Any IRA member from the last twenty years? A member of the Irgun (led by former Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin)? Nelson Mandela, imprisoned for sabotage for 27 years by the South African government? A WTO protester? The US Government killed more Afghani civilians in the last year than the number of US people killed on 9/11; does that make US soldiers terrorists? Israel and Palestine both claim that the other is terrorist. So do India and Pakistan. So do leftists and rightists in Colombia.

Ultimately the line between "terrorist" and "freedom fighter" is a political one. Our freedom to travel should not depend on a politician's decision about whether they agree with our aims or not. Every "anti-terrorist" measure restricts people based on their politics, not just based on whether they use violence. Violence was already illegal.

In other words, any list of "terrorists" will inevitably contain many individuals that have never committed a terrorist act, and not contain many individuals that have actually committed a terrorist act.

Q. Won't elimating ID checks make air travel more dangerous?

No. First, air travel is far less dangerous than driving a car or riding a bicycle. This includes the danger from terrorist incidents as well as the much more common mechanical problems and human errors.

A car is dangerous because it's a heavy mass of metal moving at high speeds compared to what is nearby. The energy in that motion can easily crush humans (either inside or outside the car), or other objects like trees, buildings, or cars. Safely using a car requires the application of good human judgment every second. Whenever that judgment is missing (unconscious driver) or poor (intoxicated, enraged, or suicidal), then a car is a danger to those in and around it.

An airplane is dangerous because it's a "car" with much more mass, much higher speeds, the ability to move in three dimensions instead of two, and carrying a much greater load of high-energy material (gasoline). Commercial air travel has been safer than car travel only because of rigorous professionalism, having co-pilots always ready to take over, and safety precautions far exceeding those of amateur-operated cars.

The 9/11 hijackings made it clear that those safety precautions did not keep the pilots in control of the plane. What makes air travel particularly dangerous is that all law-abiding passengers and crew have been disarmed. It's clear that when passengers realize the deadly goals of hijackers, they have the courage to attack the hijackers, with their bare hands if necessary. But we would all be safer if the honest passengers had weapons as good or better than the weapons smuggled aboard by hijackers. There is plenty of anecdotal evidence that even with today's security screening, many honest people accidentally bring weapons onto airplanes, and are not detected. If honest people can do it, so can hijackers -- and unlike the honest people, they'll use their weapon to seize the plane.

My philosophy is to "educate and then trust the general public". This philosophy is in line with the basic values of democracies. The government's approach to homeland security is "keep everything secret and trust nobody". This is in line with the basic values of authoritarian governments.

Please, keep your fear mongering to your dinner table...Hollywood and the left is as Communist as they ever were, now you just wrap yourselves in the flag of 'progressive-ism' than Marx-ism...Same song, same dance, just too cowardly to admit it...Just another *-ism due for the trash heap of history

I swear to goodness you folks would light these boards up if Lord forbid something happens..

Yelling "See you didn't protect us fascist pigs"...

Stand the line whiners, take the responsibility, walk the walk then talk the talk...

Till then appreciate those that have so much on their shoulders, protecting your once a year travel and complaining that you have to show an ID .. the same ID that you gladly pulled out to buy that last quart of liquor...the same ID that was swiped into the register of some giant corporation...and not a single complaint...

wow, I have never seen so many whiners in a blog. What is next? Police officer shouldn't give me tickets when I speed. Boo hoo!!! It is frustrating when you have a group a people trying to protect the country and all they get for it is whining because they can't bring their liquids in their carry on. I wish TSA would announce one day that they would not secure flights for one day and we would really see what would happen.

"Were that the case, then certainly the GAO wouldn't have released other, far more unflattering investigative reports on the TSA or DHS in general.

Personally, I'd say that's about all there is to that argument."

I'm skeptical of any investigative reports released. Think about it like this, if allegations of corruption among Microsoft execs were made public, would you want an audit/investigation to be carried out by a team of Microsoft employees? Any results, be they good or bad, would be tainted.

hsvtso dean also wrote:

Abolish Government, Smash the State.

"Oh, yes. There we go. That is the answer. Clearly. I don't know about the rest of you guys, but me? I just love waking up in the morning and having a big, steamy cup of anarchy to just put that little skip into my step."

Um, yeah, I agree. Unless you were being sarcastic, then I don't share your sentiment.

I fully support CREWPASS, the program that will validate pilot's credentials to streamline security screening for the professionals who already are in control of their airplanes and already have access to the flight deck. This program will use a secure database already in use for cockpit jumpseaters, preventing the use of fraudulent documentation, due to the fact the pilot's photo and employment status is looked up in the computer in real time and checked against the person presenting the ID; the system does NOT solely rely on the documents presented by the individual. This verification system is already in use and this shouldn't cost any more money to implement for access to the secure area. CREWPASS will also allow TSA to focus more resources on screening those who pose an actual threat while shortening the lines for everybody.

1. How many people have to manually check in per day because of name similarities with the watch list?

2. How many people are SSSSed because of the watch list every day?

3. How many people per day are denied flight due to the no fly list?

Give us these numbers and we can decide if the lists are appropriate or not. At the moment, considering the number of persons who we know having trouble with the lists, they seem too long. You will only convince us they are not with these numbers.

"It seems to me everyone knows at least one person who has trouble with the watch lists."

That's probably not far off the mark, if you do the math -- 300 million Americans divided by 1 million named on the list (I trust the ACLU before the TSA any day, thanks -- the ACLU doesn't make a habit of lying to me).

Why lists work for law enforcement and investigative agencies is that they have actual suspects and cases that they are investigating. The lists help add threads and avenues to real investigations. If you've detained someone, and find their alias on the list, it really can help you figure out who you've caught.

As a dragnet applied to the general public, using the list is a horrible idea because of the false positives. The cost of the "misidentified" become a larger problem than the benefits of using it.

But whether or not the TSA will keep using it is answered by the CYA posture in: "The simple truth is that it would be negligent to not use this information to our advantage." -- whether or not it is effective, or truly a damaging waste of time, TSA must continue to use the watch lists because they would be perceived as negligent if they did not.

With that reasoning, maybe TSA should hire some psychics and palmreaders. It would be negligent to not take advantage of all sources of "information", no matter how improbable or unreliable.

Anonymous said... Is this a blog or your new place to post press releases?July 14, 2008 4:01 PM

Yes.

Anonymous said... When I was in the service we controlled sensitive but unclassified data for reasons of Operational Security, or OPSEC. Basically, seemingly innocent data could be used by an enemy. So, I can understand TSA withholding names actually on the lists. However, I can't understand why are the exact numbers on the No Fly and Selectee lists sensitive info. How is the exact number in any way too dangerous to release? What could any potential enemy do with that number? OPSEC isn't supposed to be a blanket excuse for withholding data, there has to be a legitimate vulnerability that could be exploited if the information is released. Please provide specific reasons why the exact number should be considered sensitive data. Especially since you already give a ballpark figure. July 14, 2008 4:14 PM

For what it’s worth, we tried to get the actual number and release it in this blog post. As you know, the list is not ours, so we couldn’t get the numbers and release them on our own.

Anonymous said... Why don't the airline companies trust you to check the IDs against the watch list? Are they afraid you'd reject too many of their customers? July 14, 2008 4:18 PM

Simply because we don’t have scanners and computers at our ticket/ID checking locations. Have you read about the paperless boarding pass pilots? I for one am very interested to see where this goes.

Anonymous said... You should link to real sources to support your "mythbusting". July 14, 2008 4:27 PM

I hate to open up the whole “it’s classified” argument again, but that’s the case here. How do you or anybody else expect us to link to sensitive and classified information? There are no links.

Anonymous said... If you've got nothing to hide, you shouldn't have any problems making the list public. What are you afraid of? July 15, 2008 8:04 PM

We have never rallied the troops to fill the blogs with positive responses. I think that’s quite obvious if you read all of the comments.

Anonymous said... You have a number of people using their signatures as links to commercial products; yetis, acne meds, laptop bags, Ipod accessories, etc. Is this allowed? July 16, 2008 12:52 PM

Nope, It’s not allowed. Unfortunately, a few slip through every now and then.

Anonymous said... Looking back over the Blog I re-read the "Delete-O-Meter post.As a retired U.S. Navy veteran I take great exception to the remark by Blogger Glen where it states the following, "Profanity (and I thought some sailors knew how to curse)"This is nothing less than a personal attack by Glen on the whole U.S. Navy. It is inappropriate and in poor taste. To disparage the service men and women of the U.S. Navy is certainly an indication of a less than professional member of the TSA.I request that Glens insulting remarks be removed. July 16, 2008 10:24 PM

I request that Glens insulting remarks be removed. July 16, 2008 10:24 PM

Are you for real? Wow…

Bob

EoS Blog Team

July 18, 2008 7:40 PM

........................Yes, I am for real! Glen equated people who curse with sailors. Sailors are those service men and women who man the ships and aircraft of the United States Navy. They are going in harms way on a daily basis and are probably more highly trained than any of your baggage screeners.

The comment was an insult. The comment was made by an employee of the Federal Govvernment.

Yes, I expect to see Glen's comment edited, much like you have for Kip, or I will pursue other means of correction.

Yes, I am for real! Glen equated people who curse with sailors. Sailors are those service men and women who man the ships and aircraft of the United States Navy. They are going in harms way on a daily basis and are probably more highly trained than any of your baggage screeners.

The comment was an insult. The comment was made by an employee of the Federal Govvernment.

Yes, I expect to see Glen's comment edited, much like you have for Kip, or I will pursue other means of correction.

July 18, 2008 8:59 PM

Here is the definition of sailor.

1. a person whose occupation is sailing or navigation; mariner.

2. a seaman below the rank of officer.

3. a naval enlistee.

4. a person adept at sailing, esp. with reference to freedom from seasickness: He was such a bad sailor that he always traveled to Europe by plane.

5. a flat-brimmed straw hat with a low, flat crown.

Hmmm? I don't see the part where it says United States Navy? According to number 5, Glen may have been referring to a flat-brimmed straw hat with a foul mouth?

Trollkiller wrote:Have they moved the podiums yet or is the TSA still breaking the law?

Can't speak for any other airport, except the one in the video that Bob posted and Huntsville itself, but the podiums are, indeed, still there.

Like I said, it could end up being a technicality. Due to some 4th Amendment challenge some years back, some court somewhere (sue me; I'm too lazy to look crap up right now) ruled that when someone walks through the WTMD or has their bag x-rayed, they have given implied consent for the searches, such as bag checks and hand-wanding and such.

As a result, pretty much since the beginning of TSA, the de-facto start of the official "screening area" is the WTMD/X-Ray (which is why, most commonly, you'll find these two devices standing more or less side-by-side).

Anything in front of it is still considered "public area" - I think I wrote once on here about how someone declared that they had inert hand grenades just before he put his bags through the x-ray, and we politely informed him that they would need to be put back out in his vehicle (as they're not allowed in checked baggage either) and find some other means to ship them where he's going. If he had waited until after his bag had gone into the x-ray, we'd have had a stack of paperwork several inches thick to write up.

The TDC podium, usually situated fairly well out in front of the screening checkpoint itself, nevermind the WTMD/X-Ray machine, is well and truly inside the public area of the airport.

I think someone asked one time about the invisible barriers between tenants in an airport and where whatever is makes whomever responsible for lost-and-found, and this is also where this comes into play at. At Huntsville, for example, anything discovered as being left behind between the WTMD and the top of the stairs (see configuration; the stairs I mention are at the back of the security checkpoint leading up into the Sterile Area) is handled by our own lost-and-found department. Anything outside of that area is handled by the hotel desk's lost-and-found, except for items left on planes, which are handled by their respective airlines.

If not, you may want to tell about 24,100 people that they are offensive. :)

Bob

EoS Blog Team

While I appreciate your post I don't think Glen was talking about a hat.

I feel that a representative of any federal agency should use care when making comments.

Glen's comments demonstrate a lack of professionalism and are in fact offensive. Demeaning comments by TSA staff have no place and cannot be defended.

I have requested that the offensive portion of his remarks be edited only to have you defend those remarks Bob. The small edit would not have changed the intent of his post and would have satisfied any issues I had with that post.

You do what you think is the correct thing. I will approach this from a different angle.

I'm sure you guys can stand another Congressional Inquiry. TSA seems to be pretty adept at that. I'm sure Kip has time to answer a few more questions from our elected leaders.

@Bob: "I hate to open up the whole “it’s classified” argument again, but that’s the case here. How do you or anybody else expect us to link to sensitive and classified information? There are no links."

Well, if you can't cite sources, it ain't "mythbusting", it is merely smoke-blowing.

The post is sloppily written and almost seems to deliberately confuse the number of potential terrorists, the number of names, and the numbers of people affected by the watch lists. The graphic is even more misleading. Why not add another even bigger (irrelevant) enclosing circle with 1 billion Chinese people?

@Bob "Anonymous said... Why don't the airline companies trust you to check the IDs against the watch list? Are they afraid you'd reject too many of their customers? July 14, 2008 4:18 PM

Simply because we don’t have scanners and computers at our ticket/ID checking locations. Have you read about the paperless boarding pass pilots? I for one am very interested to see where this goes."

That was the second half of perhaps an ill-formed question. Let me rephrase it as:

"How can we take your ID policy seriously if you let potential terrorists print and deliver boarding passes to you?"

Seriously, that hole opens up an easy detour around two of your layers of security: the watch list checking that you leave to the airlines (because it costs too much to buy scanners and computers) and the ID checking itself (you don't need a real ticket to enter the boarding area, just a pass that matches your ID).

Christopher Soghoian demonstrated this glaring hole 2 years ago with this stunt. And his proposed fix matches what you say you still lack: "Give TSA employees scanners/computers, so that they can verify the validity of the boarding passes when you reach the security checkpoint."

Now, granted, I haven't known all but a handful of people in the US Navy, but those that I have known were all (very, very) proud to be fully fluent in vulgarian.

But since that's not exactly what he said, I'd also point out that the idiom used is considerably older than the US Navy anyway.

I'm actually with Glen and Bob and a couple others on this one.

Chill out, dude; take the chip off your shoulder, take a deep breath, count to ten, whatever. There are so many reasons why you could hate TSA, there's no reason to get yourself in a wad over something as trivial and worthless as this argument.

Quote from Anonymous: "wow, I have never seen so many whiners in a blog. What is next? Police officer shouldn't give me tickets when I speed."

Nice strawman. No one is saying that there shouldn't be penalties when a LAW is broken.

TSA is arguably breaking the law by requiring ID or you don't travel. Should they not be accountable as well?

Boo hoo!!! It is frustrating when you have a group a people trying to protect the country and all they get for it is whining because they can't bring their liquids in their carry on. I wish TSA would announce one day that they would not secure flights for one day and we would really see what would happen.

They're already not securing our flights, though they put on a good show. Nothing's happening.

Quote from Bob: "I hate to open up the whole “it’s classified” argument again, but that’s the case here. How do you or anybody else expect us to link to sensitive and classified information? There are no links."

Bob, DHS is one of the worst abusers of "classified" information, often overclassifying information so it doesn't have to be shared. So pardon me if "classified" or SSI doesn't necessarily fly with me.

As I work in the government industry, I know about sensitive and classified information. I also know that there's a lot of unclassified information out there too tagged FOUO (or its equivalent, SSI). As a representative of the government, sharing such information WOULD be an official use.

I don't think anyone's arguing that TRULY sensitive information shouldn't be shared. However, I'm quite skeptical about SSI and classified information as used by TSA and DHS to justify "just trust us" mentality. If there is a VALID reason, it should be shared. We're already living under the policy, why not explain WHY we have to instead of just saying "just because"?

Now, granted, I haven't known all but a handful of people in the US Navy, but those that I have known were all (very, very) proud to be fully fluent in vulgarian.

But since that's not exactly what he said, I'd also point out that the idiom used is considerably older than the US Navy anyway.

I'm actually with Glen and Bob and a couple others on this one.

Chill out, dude; take the chip off your shoulder, take a deep breath, count to ten, whatever. There are so many reasons why you could hate TSA, there's no reason to get yourself in a wad over something as trivial and worthless as this argument.

While I agree that this argument is a bit silly, it's easy enough for Glen to apologize if he offended anyone. When I was taken to task for seemingly being condescending, I apologized even though it was not my intent. It was perceived as such by someone, and that was enough to warrant an apology. At the very least, Glen could say "I'm sorry. It was not my intent to offend."

More than a couple people continue to write "claims to be a TSO" when referring to me or something I say. Since it's apparently become necessary to establish my identity as being legitimate (ergo, 'just a guy in a white shirt' that I've mentioned before), then allow me to present the following images:

Our first image is about as bland as it gets, taken just after I got home, on a blank spot on the wall where a bookshelf once stood before we gave it to the comforting arms of our attic to clear up some space in the computer room.

The next image is that of the nameplate on the front of my shirt. Yes, that nameplate, the infamous one that Ayn R. Key and I had a couple rounds over. It's visible in the first image, too, but this is a nice, clear, detailed image of it.

It's a little beat up, but that's the same nameplate that TSA issued me when I first hired on back in October of 2002, so it's got some mileage.

The next image is my geek cred. I mentioned it before, figured I'd take an shot of it for kicks and giggles. Behold, my lightsaber (ForceFX Darth Vader base, upgraded with the Luxeon laser kit for a brighter, less breakable blade!)

And last, but certainly not least, is a modified image of my government credentials. Since I'm not terribly sure how much could likely be revealed without stepping across the line and inviting bad things to happen, I've blotted out my last name, my badge number, and the expiration date. You're left with everything else - including one terrible image that, for some reason, they refuse to replace after about four years. It was a completely candid shot, though. Basically, it went something like this:

"Hey, Dean!" "...huh?" *FLASH!* "Thanks!""...wha'?"

It looks like one of those FBI be-on-the-lookout posters that they put wanted terrorists on!

And yes, I've shaved my head since this particular picture was taken and slapped on that card. Boy, I really needed to shave that day, too...

Also, at the top, you can see what I meant by the little cross-thingy being broken where I can't just hang it on the back of my SIDA badge (the very edged top of which is visible in the first pic hanging from the shirt pocket on the side opposite the nameplate).

The 9/11 hijackings made it clear that those safety precautions did not keep the pilots in control of the plane. What makes air travel particularly dangerous is that all law-abiding passengers and crew have been disarmed. It's clear that when passengers realize the deadly goals of hijackers, they have the courage to attack the hijackers, with their bare hands if necessary. But we would all be safer if the honest passengers had weapons as good or better than the weapons smuggled aboard by hijackers. There is plenty of anecdotal evidence that even with today's security screening, many honest people accidentally bring weapons onto airplanes, and are not detected. If honest people can do it, so can hijackers -- and unlike the honest people, they'll use their weapon to seize the plane.

The 9/11 hijackings were not successful because the hijackers were able to smuggle some kind of weapon on board. They succeeded because they knew the crews were forbidden to resist a hijacking.

Before 9/11, a hijacker could successfully take control of an aircraft with nothing more than a ball point pen.

TSA would have a lot more credibility if it stopped lying to the American public.

I am rather surprised that this has not been addressed:------MYTH: There are 1 million names on U.S. Government terror watch lists.

BUSTER: There are less than 400,000 individuals on the consolidated terrorist watch list------

To leave this as a busted myth when it is completely and totally evidently not busted (since the busting does not refer to the same thing as the myth; names are not individuals), is either disingenuous, dishonest or sloppy.

As to the name individual thing, in general, lets follow it. So, your name is Ted Kennedy. Let us assume you have some mechanism for appealing your being on the list. You call up.

You: "I am on the no-fly list and would like to be removed"Them: Consults. "You'll be happy to know sir, that you are not on the list nor ever were."You: "But every time I show up, I get hassled and searched and questioned. They tell me I am on the list."Them: Re-checks. "No sir, you are most certainly not on the list."You: Contemplates. "Ok, is my name on the list?"Them: "No, sir. You are an upstanding citizen and we have no problem with you."You: Contemplates. "Ok, is there a fellow named Ted Kennedy on the list?"Them: Checks. "No sir, there is not."You: Mystified. Aha! "Ok, is there an Alias on the list which is Ted Kennedy?"Them: "Oh yes sir, there is."You: "But you said my name was not on the list!!!"Them: "Well of course sir, it is not. It is someone else's name, not yours."You: "But they are the same name!!"Them: "No sir. The look the same and spell the same, but the one on the list is not really a name, it is an alias, and it is not yours."You: "Well, can I have it removed."Them: "No sir, only the person with the name can have it removed by appeal."

Anonymous wrote:Any information you (or anyone else) could provide as to why your name tag is clearly legible and others are not would be appreciated.

I... don't know?

Every uniformed white-shirt I ever came across (both here in Huntsville, and the day-trip I took to Birmingham for some training once earlier this year) all had the same nameplate and I never had a problem reading any of them.

Though I know in some images and videos you may find online, it's too far away to get a real close look at them, but I'm assuming that's not what you're talking about.

Yeah, no, that's the nameplate I was issued when I first hired on, and, to the best of my knowledge, it's the same one everyone else has. Though when we get to start wearing the blue uniform, I understand it's going to change from firstname.serialnumber format to lastname.rank format, so the text on the plate will be getting smaller, then.

I wrote a good bit of this, then realized that it wasn't quite what you wanted, and purged the whole thing to redo it. I had been making a list of all the SSI-acceptable things that TSA has policies on but never actually released a press statement about, and what you had actually wanted what differences between public statement and actual policy.

Yay for paying attention to details.

Anyway, I'm fairly certain this all passes SSI muster, since it's just more or less an up-to-date version of the TSA Traveler's Guide from the TSA website, with everything edited to be, uh... what's the word? Accurate. Yes. Some things were clarified, too.

This list is considerably shorter than what I had been writing before, and is just about as exciting (read: not) once you get into it. Most of it's probably actually already known about anyway, but you wanted it, so here it is. And it's in no particular order, either, I just plopped it here when I found it.

Most of that is true enough, except for the well-known fact that it's actually 3.4oz (or 100ml) instead of 3oz. Originally it was just 3oz, and then that changed in, like, a week or so to bring it in line with our Eruopean friends, because 3oz was some weird number in mL for them.

Scissors - metal with pointed tips and blades shorter than four inches

It might be a trivial thing that most people can figure out on their own, but the measurement starts from the point of the fulcrum, not from the point where the blade actually begins. Since this isn't an issue on most scissors, though, most people aren't likely to care. :D

Realistic Replicas of Firearms

This is one that gives people all sorts of fits. Some would describe a realistic replica as being, y'know, black and metal and has an action that moves properly and such, like an AirSoft™ gun. Others, though, take a far more stricter view of this - I've once seen a report of a capgun being stopped on grounds of being a realistic replica, and its owner charged by local law enforcement because of it. Oh, yeah, it was bright orange plastic with a canary-yellow handle, and the 'revolver' part didn't revolve at all. How, exactly, that qualified as a 'realistic replica' I'll never know.

Expect much in the way of uneven enforcement on that one.

Gel shoe inserts - Gel shoe inserts are not permitted, but shoes constructed with gel heels are allowed and must be removed and screened.

This is another one that often gets maligned by the public, and rightfully so because of how it's worded.

Specifically, they mean gel inserts for shoes. Like, it's a plastic bag in the shape of a foot that slides into your shoe, and if you squeeze it or fold it, you can literally see the gelatinous interior flowing around the bends and your fingers and stuff.

Common sense, incoming: The common Dr. Shoal's™ stuff at Wal-Mart doesn't count, given that it's soft, molded plastic, and not an actual "gel."

If you are asked to undergo a personal screening you will be provided a screener of the same gender except in extraordinary circumstances. In some cases you may have to wait for a screener of your gender to conduct the screening. You will be advised if the wait will be more than a few minutes.

And, in some cases, it doesn't happen. Period. At Huntsville, for example, we have a 'no cross-gender screening' rule. None whatsoever. Period, done, finito.

Of course, that could also just qualify as a local policy and might not mesh with what you had asked in particular, but it's one of those... hm... delicate situations that most of the airpots have their own way of handling.

I've... pretty much ripped apart the TSA website now, and most of the rest of it looks like it's fairly well in working order. There are a couple of other things that might have gotten past me, though.

Other things, like why the TSA never put out a blurb about passengers now having unlimited passes through the WTMD after just years and years of only having two passes (and, even older, just a single pass), or why they never made a statement about the revising of the travel document stuff (which people still don't want to believe me on~).

So, so many problems the TSA has in terms of public relations would be over in a flash if they just made a couple of updates to the stated policy to reflect what's actually accurate. I mean, I know it isn't TSA's strong suit, but I'm not talking about every single little regulation -- I'm specifically talking about making an attempt at it for the big mama chicken subjects like the TDC stuff.

I know I made you wait a couple weeks for that one, CGBG, and I apologize for it; did I at least come close to what you wanted? It helps to be a little more specific, otherwise I get easily distracted and go off on tangents. :D

Dean, I pointed out on several occasions just how poorly the TSA main site is both written and composed. At one time (perhaps even now) you would see references to 3oz, 3.4oz and 100ml. I realize that 3.40z=100ml but what is the traveling public going to do when they see gross inconsistencies on TSA's site? Terms like half baked, poorly written, sloppy come to mind when you see things like that. That site, unfortunately does represent your organization and what it says to the public is "we don't know what we're doing." Suggestion, have a retired English teacher do the proofreading for your site before it gets posted. Keep it up to date. That isn't too difficult and it would give that retired English teacher a few chuckles in the process.

Keeping the site both consistent and up to date, would make your own job easier. Also the use of common sense also helps. I remember a child having GI Joe accessories (guns, knife, hand grenades) confiscated because they were too realistic. At the time I didn't know whether to either laugh or cry at the utter and total stupidity of the screener. I also remember an injured Army type, home on leave who had his jaw wired shut, having the wire cutters (for cutting the wires holding his jaws together) confiscated from him by TSA. He was in uniform, traveling under orders and had his life put at risk by a TSA functionary. Had the soldier had to vomit, he would have drowned in his own vomit.

Your organization still leaves much to be desired and all the secrecy/obfuscation does is to reinforce the publics opinion that TSA still hasn't figured out what direction they're supposed to be going (think of F-Troop).

re: Your organization still leaves much to be desired and all the secrecy/obfuscation does is to reinforce the publics opinion that TSA still hasn't figured out what direction they're supposed to be going (think of F-Troop).

.................................I think you just hit the proverbial nail smack dab on the head!

An Anonymous person wrote:[a whole bunch of stuff, and ended with an F-Troop reference]

And... how is that any different from what I've been saying for awhile now, except for the obvious derision?

Also, by the way, suggestions made toward me go absolutely nowhere. I'm a peon on the line in an airport, dude, not a bureaucrat or an executive, and barely even qualify as a functionary.

Just as an observation though, said soldier was flying through San Francisco back in 2004. At the time, yeah, the wire cutters were on the prohibited items list.

That's a small technicality, though, in the face of a big farking issue of stupidity on their parts. Why the supervisor didn't step in and allow them based on a legitimate medical purpose, I don't know. I remember hearing about this when it happened; we all at Huntsville just kind of shook our heads and let out a big collective sigh.

In the midst of a discussion of the infamous 2004 soldier-with-jaw-wired-shut and wire cutters incident, HsvTso Dean said in passing:

Why the supervisor didn't step in and allow them based on a legitimate medical purpose, I don't know.

See, here's a dilemma that I don't know how to resolve. Do we want to allow exceptions to the SOP or not?

If you grant TSOs (or supervisors) the ability to grant exceptions to the SOPs, you create problems with inconsistencies, which many (including me) have criticized loudly here. ("But they let me take this on the plane at [insert airport] ... why can't I take it on here?") But if you don't allow for exceptions, you end up with embarrassing situations like this.

I don't know TSA's SOP, much less the culture under which TSOs and supervisors operate. But I'm guessing that either (a) supervisors are not given the authority to override the SOP in any situation, or (b) supervisors have the authority, but are discouraged from using it, verbally or non-verbally. [Anyone who works for TSA want to confirm or deny? Dean?]

That discouragement can be awfully subtle, of course. It's always "safer" to follow the rules; no-one up the chain will fault you for following the SOPs precisely, while you are subject to discipline if you waive the rules and someone up-the-line disagrees with your judgment call. (Notice that the TSOs involved in the nipple-piercing incident were backed 100% by TSA because they followed the rules ... even though it was obvious that the rules were inadequate in that very unusual situation.)

And so, with supervisors unable, or unwilling, to override the procedures, you get to obvious ridiculous incidents ... like the wire-cutter-and-jaw incident, the nipple-piercing incident, or the pilot-and-catering-knife incident.

So I don't know how to resolve that. I want consistency, so I know what to expect when I approach a checkpoint. But I also want TSOs to be able to exercise their best judgment in my favor when it's obviously in everyone's best interest, and doesn't compromise security.

It is easy in any organization to lose track of the purpose of the organization. TSA's goal is to make airline travel safer, not to enforce rules & regulations. Now enforcing rules & regulations may be a perfectly legitimate mechanism to achieve the goal of safer travel ... but the rules are a means to an end, not the end themselves. I suspect that TSA struggles with this issue just like any business.

So ... I'm rambling. I just don't know how you put a rule in place that says "use common sense" without creating a nightmare of consistency problems.

And... how is that any different from what I've been saying for awhile now, except for the obvious derision?

Also, by the way, suggestions made toward me go absolutely nowhere. I'm a peon on the line in an airport, dude, not a bureaucrat or an executive, and barely even qualify as a functionary.

They might do well to listen to you. From where I sit, much of TSAs issues are due to poor upper echelon management with the people on the bottom of the food chain not getting sufficient information to effectively do their assigned tasks. You do use your brains and demonstrate the use of common sense. I can't say that of every TSA type I've come in contact with during travels. Chertoff and Hawley should never have been trusted with the security of our airports, flying freight, and our waterways.

So ... I'm rambling. I just don't know how you put a rule in place that says "use common sense" without creating a nightmare of consistency problems.

See the Nuremberg defense (I was just following orders) and see how blindly following orders worked for those people. When dealing with people you've got to use common sense or you come across as the surly DMV employee.

Jim Huggins:I don't know TSA's SOP, much less the culture under which TSOs and supervisors operate. But I'm guessing that either (a) supervisors are not given the authority to override the SOP in any situation, or (b) supervisors have the authority, but are discouraged from using it, verbally or non-verbally. [Anyone who works for TSA want to confirm or deny? Dean?]

It's... actually... kind of a mix of the two.

There are situations where even supervisors do not have the authority to override the SOP. Specifically, when the SOP very clearly, in black and white, states "this must not happen" or "the screener must do this."

And then there are other situations where the Supervisors have that authority.

Kip Hawley wrote, in an internal memo, that the SOP is not Holy Writ, and that we will not be struck dead by lightning from the sky for not adhering to it rigidly. It wasn't written for all circumstances and scenarios, he said, and one's best judgment should take the day. This was about a month or so ago, in 2008. Back in 2004, it was a slightly different atmosphere, where there was an actual "You may not deviate whatsoever from these guidelines" clause in the SOP.

Most Supervisors, however, aren't going to exempt a passenger from the SOP for anything less than extraordinary or compelling reasoning. To do otherwise would probably make upper management turn an eye at the Supervisor and start some kind of investigation or another.

Just as a for-example, not wanting your digital camera x-rayed because it might erase the memory is not one of the reasons to be exempted - our SOP states quite plainly that digital cameras must be x-rayed, and it doesn't matter how much you want to argue about it. Film cameras, however, are a different beast altogether.

Me, myself, I would have considered the wirecutters that the soldier had to be a pretty extraordinary and compelling circumstance to grant him the exemption, even without having the need to summon over the Supervisor.

Kip Hawley wrote, in an internal memo, that the SOP is not Holy Writ, and that we will not be struck dead by lightning from the sky for not adhering to it rigidly. It wasn't written for all circumstances and scenarios, he said, and one's best judgment should take the day. This was about a month or so ago, in 2008. Back in 2004, it was a slightly different atmosphere, where there was an actual "You may not deviate whatsoever from these guidelines" clause in the SOP.

First, thanks for the detailed and thoughtful response.

Second ... I'm glad to hear that the attitude on these issues from The Powers That Be is changing. Moving away from the 2004 "SOP is Holy Writ" standard should allow for a little more common sense to prevail.

Jim Huggins wrote:I'm glad to hear that the attitude on these issues from The Powers That Be is changing.

A lot of people think Kip Hawley is an idiot, or a corrupt bureaucrat, or any number of other fouler things, but of the three Administrators that I can think of off the top of my head that TSA's had in my almost-six years of being here, he's been the best one that's done the most both for the screening personnel themselves and for evolving the screening process.

Granted, some of those ways, people really, really don't like. The advent of liquid explosives have given us the novel problem of not being able to identify on x-ray (by far, one of the best ways to spot them) an improvised explosive device, given that, y'know, liquid explosives in a bottle look exactly like coke, or water, or any other liquid you want to put in there. And the advent of better x-ray technology and screening has started to result in the intelligence of more threats being made by smuggling items on persons instead of inside property - hence, the MMW.

Not very popular changes, but he's certainly doing his job the best way he knows how. TSA is a lot more limber on its feet compared to how it was under Loy or Stone (I think that was their names; I never really got into caring who he Administrator was before Kip), which was more like a giant stone juggernaut: it could smash you with a single fist, but it was a slow and ponderous thing, and if it missed, you were completely able to get around it and move on with life without having to worry about anything else. Now, at least, you have the onion approach.

Moving away from the 2004 "SOP is Holy Writ" standard should allow for a little more common sense to prevail.

That's the idea. Whether or not that works in practice is a different story; time will tell.

Does anyone else find it totally ironic that the government agency that operates in constant and total disregard for our rights has the absolute audacity to rename its operations center to "Freedom Center".

Is this a word game ? The claim was there are over a million names on the watchlist, The post says there are less then 400,000 individuals. No statements about how many possible names are listed for each individual.

I can no longer print a boarding pass at home or check in online. There may be "only" 400,000 individuals on the Watch List, but there are millions who share the same names as those 400,000.

In effect, the true size of the Watch List is equal to the number of individuals with the same name as someone on the list.

My name is Michael Smith and, though I'm not on the list, some other Michael Smith is. So,I am treated as if I'm on the list until I arrive at the airport and the airline counter agent confirms I'm me and not him.

TSA counts Michael Smith as "one person," but in reality, all of us Michael Smiths are "on the list".

New customer enrollments for Verified Identity Pass's (VIP) Clear registered traveler program are suspended by the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) after a laptop computer with records of 33,000 pre-enrolled applicants went missing.

...

was stolen from a locked office at the San Francisco Airport,

Geesh...you can't even protect your own stuff, what is going to happen to my laptop after you guys (and your brother/sister/aunt/uncle agency) decide to seize mine without probably cause and ship it all over the country to "ahem' investigate it (and probably make copies of all my Jimmy Buffett music?

I would dearly love to know how one gets on a watch list. Or in my case, how to get OFF said list. I do not have an 'ethnic' name or identity or appearance. I purchase my tickets well in advance with a regularly used credit card with a normal street address billing address. I'm a 55-year-old, suburban housewife, for cryin' out loud! But my checked baggage is ALWAYS searched. Always. Carefully packed clothing and bags are disturbed, opened, not repacked in any semblance of the original order, so when I arrive, things are broken or crushed or otherwise unusable.

I am hardly a fastidious person, but I am totally grossed out at the thought that the searchers are wearing gloves to protect themselves from contaminants -- as well they should -- but don't change the gloves from one search to the other. That means that if there is some biological or chemical threat, they are protected, but it's being spread into other bags headed for other destinations. Hello? Is anyone thinking about that? Not to mention the gross thought of someone else's sweat, bodily waste matter, or even something as harmless as leaking shampoo being deposited onto my clothing. Which has happened. The first thing I do now when I reach my destination is find a washing machine and dump everything into it.

I rarely fly any more unless I absolutely have to. An 18 hour drive is preferable to the hassle of having my bags searched and the general rudeness of the TSA staff.

It is particularly unnerving that I do not feel 'safe' in posting my name or contact information. I know that will mark me for some kind of government retaliation. I fully realize that they can easily track me down through my computer address, which makes me wonder if I should even post this. What are we coming to?

Second, a half-truth exists in that statistic and the reason for its use in your chart. If a person is connecting, their name will be run only once through the database and more likely than not, will only be screened once on their multi-leg trip. So that 2 million number is too high for the purposes for which you are using it.

The 400,000 on the watch list is not a subset of the 2,000,000 people that fly every day. Nor do the people on the no fly list try to fly every day.

If you aren't trying to show how they are related, why are you making them overlap? Are you trying to portray the watch list as holding 40% of the flying public, and that your no-fly list, or that your selectees are 2.5% of the flying public (50,000/2,000,000), and that the No Fly List is a fraction of that? Are you trying to overstate the danger?

You brag about arresting about 2 people per day for crimes like 'suspicious behavior' or 'false documents', so your event detection rate is something like 1/1,000,000 and those crimes aren't anywhere close to terrorism.

The "Traveler Redress Inquiry Program " is a load of crap..... I've been trying to get them to address my problems & have sent my passport both electronically & by mail with no action or further contact by them. So, please.... do push this pantload as a "Traveler Redress".........

An "inconvenience" is waiting in a long line at the post office. Being detained in a dark room in Jamaica after a family vacation while your FOUR YEAR OLD and his blue teddi bear are searched and swabbed for bomb substance is a constitutional violation and a terrifying experience!!! Don't go fooling yourselves, TSA, this program is flawed and is causing harm to innocent American citizens who have no redress. The TRIP website is a joke, as is this entire program.

Firstly, two million are not unique passengers. If a passenger has to connect once or twice on the way to reach his final destination, then that passenger is counted twice (or three) times to get to the 2 million number. So no, two million people don't travel every day.

Second, a half-truth exists in that statistic and the reason for its use in your chart. If a person is connecting, their name will be run only once through the database and more likely than not, will only be screened once on their multi-leg trip. So that 2 million number is too high for the purposes for which you are using it.

What if a passenger is misidentified, and the passenger misses his flight, even though he arrived at the airport the recommended amount of time before the flight. Is the airline obliged to put him on a different flight free of charge? If it is the last flight of the day, who pays for the hotel room at the airport? If the delay makes the trip pointless, is the airline required to refund the ticket cost? What about the cost of any hotel reservations that will not be used due to the delay?