Of Nothing

I’ve just finished listening to a debate between philosopher William Lane Craig and cosmologist Lawrence Krauss on the debate topic “Is there evidence for God?”. I have a load of these on my iPod – some are very good (Craig vs Austin Dacey is probably the best), while some represent 2 hours of my life that I’ll never get back. They get a bit repetitive after a while. The debate with Krauss was somewhere in the middle. Craig was polished and concise, presenting the same 5 arguments (contingency, Kalam, fine-tuning, moral, resurrection of Jesus) he’s presented for decades. Krauss was less organised and much less focussed. I’ve responded to some of Craig’s claims elsewhere. I’ll focus on some of what Krauss said.

First and foremost, I’m getting really rather sick of cosmologists talking about universes being created out of nothing. Krauss repeatedly talked about universes coming out of nothing, particles coming out of nothing, different types of nothing, nothing being unstable. This is nonsense. The word nothing is often used loosely – I have nothing in my hand, there’s nothing in the fridge etc. But the proper definition of nothing is “not anything”. Nothing is not a type of something, not a kind of thing. It is the absence of anything.

Some of the best examples of the fallacy of equivocation involve treating the word nothing as if it were a type of something:

Margarine is better than nothing.

Nothing is better than butter.

Thus, margarine is better than butter.

We can uncover the fallacy by simply rephrasing the premises, avoiding the word nothing:

It is better to have margarine than to not have anything.

There does not exist anything that is better than butter.

The conclusion (margarine is better than butter) does not follow from these premises.

Now let’s look at Krauss’ claims again. Does it make sense to say that there are different types of not anything? That not anything is not stable? This is bollocks. What Krauss is really talking about is the quantum vacuum. The quantum vacuum is a type of something. It has properties. It has energy, it fluctuates, it can cause the expansion of the universe to accelerate, it obeys the (highly non-trivial) equations of quantum field theory. We can describe it. We can calculate, predict and falsify its properties. The quantum vacuum is not nothing.

This suggests a very simple test for those who wish to talk about nothing: if what you are talking about has properties, then it is not nothing. It is pure equivocation to refer to the quantum vacuum as nothing when a philosopher starts asking the question “why is there something rather than nothing?”. She is not asking “why are there particles rather than just a quantum vacuum?”. She is asking “why does anything exist at all?”. As Stephen Hawking once asked, why does the universe go to all the bother of existing?

We can now see that this question cannot be answered by any of the methods we normally call scientific. Scientific theories are necessarily theories of something, some physical reality. Equations describe properties, and thus describe something. There cannot be equations that describe not-anything. Write down any equation you like – you will not be able to deduce from that equation that the thing that it describes must exist in the real world. Existence is not a predicate, as Kant memorably explained.

The question “why does anything exist at all?” may have no answer, or it may be meaningless, or it may find its answer in an entity that exists necessarily rather than contingently, or perhaps because there are many more possible worlds that contain something rather than nothing we can argue that the probability of nothing existing is low (van Inwagen, see also Mawson). We can be certain that the answer is not “because empty space is filled with quantum fields that can create particles”.

Thankfully, there are cosmologists whose thinking is not as sloppy as Krauss’. Let me give a few quotes to really drive home my point:

Cosmologists sometimes claim that the universe can arise ‘from nothing’. But they should watch their language, especially when addressing philosophers. We’ve realised ever since Einstein that empty space can have a structure such that it can be warped and distorted. Even if shrunk down to a ‘point’, it is latent with particles and forces – still a far richer construct than the philosopher’s ‘nothing’. Theorists may, some day, be able to write down fundamental equations governing physical reality. But physics can never explain what ‘breathes fire’ into the equations, and actualised them into a real cosmos. The fundamental question of ‘Why is there something rather than nothing?’ remains the province of philosophers. (Martin Rees, Just Six Numbers)

The concept of a universe materializing out of nothing boggles the mind … yet the state of “nothing” cannot be identified with absolute nothingness. The tunneling is described by the laws of quantum mechanics, and thus “nothing” should be subjected to these laws. The laws must have existed, even though there was no universe. … we now know that the “vacuum” is very different from “nothing”. Vacuum, or empty space, has energy and tension, it can bend a warp, so it is unquestionably something. As Alan Guth wrote, “In this context, a proposal that the universe was created from empty space is no more fundamental than a proposal that the universe was spawned by a piece of rubber. It might be true, but one would still want to ask where the piece of rubber came from.” (Alexander Vilenkin, Many Worlds in One)

In a quantum system, the notion of a vacuum is a little different from our usual conception of such a state. It is not simply ‘nothing at a’. Rather, it is what is left when everything that can be removed from the system has been removed: it is the state of lowest energy. (John Barrow, New Theories of Everything)

Krauss made a few other claims that were questionable – unfortunately he didn’t have much time to expand on them. It sounded like at one stage, after Craig had appealed to Bayesian probability theory, Krauss said something like: “this is not how scientists do science. Craig is talking about probabilities; I am talking about evidence”. I have no idea what Krauss meant by that. He kept saying that “evidence is falsifiable”, which isn’t quite correct. It is hypotheses that are confirmed or falsified by evidence.

He also kept asserting that the universe is not fine-tuned. At one point he implied that the multiverse explained fine-tuning, in which case the universe is fine-tuned and we know how. The only specific example Krauss gave was entropy. After Craig discussed the low entropy of the universe, as calculated by Penrose, Krauss responded by describing reheating in inflationary theory (I think). When inflation ends, the decay of the inflaton reheats the universe, refilling it with radiation to replace the energy which was diluted so dramatically by inflation. This has nothing to do with what Penrose is talking about. Penrose is concerned with the entropy associated with the degrees of freedom of the gravitational field, while reheating is about the entropy associated with ordinary matter and radiation. Penrose’s point is that, while a uniform distribution of energy is a high entropy state when we only consider the degrees of freedom of ordinary matter/radiation, it is an extraordinarily low entropy state of the gravitational field i.e. the entropy of spacetime itself. Once again, Krauss ran out of time before he really explained himself, so I’m not sure if I fully understood him.

In any case, I’ve ranted for long enough. I’m continually shocked at how poorly Craig’s opponents do. His opening speech remains almost unchanged after a few decades. You can watch his debate with Frank Zindler in 1993 and get 90% of his opening speech today. Krauss made some good points, but was in general very underprepared. We’ll see if Sam Harris can do any better …

95 Responses

To be in a physical state is to be something! To be described by a physical state, say a state vector in Hilbert space or a point in phase space or a solution of the equations of general relativity, is to have properties. Nothing is not a type of something. It does not denote a region of state space. Nothing cannot be a physical state because a physical state describes something. We cannot write down the wavefunction of ‘not anything’. Asking for evidence for the existence of a physical state that describes ‘not anything’ simply makes no sense. There is literally not anything for there to be evidence of!

We can, however, ask if it is logically or metaphysically possible that nothing exists, that is, if there are logically or metaphysically possible worlds in which there is not anything that exists. I’ll leave that question to philosophers – it cannot be answered by proposing equations and examining their solutions.

1. Definition: the universe is the entirety of physical reality.
2. The universe has a beginning.
3. Thus, the universe has no physical cause.
4. If all causes are physical causes (materialism), then the universe has no cause. The universe came from nothing and by nothing.
5. Nothing can come from nothing. (The ability to make a universe is a property, and whatever possesses this property must therefore be something. It take this to be equivalent to Craig’s “anything that begins to exist must have a cause”.)

6. The universe cannot have come from nothing. (By 5).
7. Thus, not all causes are physical causes. Materialism is false.

We conclude that the universe must have a cause, but that this cause is not a physical cause. From here, Craig argues that the cause must be spaceless, timeless, immaterial, immensely powerful and personal.

I’m not trying to defend those premises. My point is that premise 6 is precisely the opposite of the view you’ve attributed to Craig. He is claiming that the universe has a beginning, not that it came from nothing.

Incidentally, note the difference between “the universe came from nothing” and “God made the universe out of nothing.” The first says that the universe has no cause of any kind. The second says that the efficient cause of the universe is God, but it has no material cause.

Interesting post, but Craig does defend the notion of God creating the universe from nothing. When he suggests that “out of nothing, nothing comes” he conveniently gives God-based explanations an exception to the rule. In fact he asserts the creation from nothing is evidence for God, because something could not come out of nothing then it must have been miracle.

I’m writing a paper and the problems I have with the Kalam argument, this is one of them.

When Craig refers to God ‘creating the universe out of nothing,’ he does NOT mean that God ‘takes a bit of nothing and turns it into something.’ In fact, he has made precisely this statement in his podcast. What ‘God creating the universe from nothing’ means is that the universe has NO PHYSICAL CAUSE. That is not, however, to deny the principle that it must have a cause of the EFFICIENT sort, e.g. something which produces its effects.

How about you take off your blinders and stop accusing people of giving ‘convenient God-based exceptions’ when you simply don’t understand their arguments and twist their words to suit your interests?

2. For example, you can define T to be “the set of all sets”, but that doesn’t mean it is a meaningful definition — see Russell’s paradox. In the same way, defining U to be “the totality of all that exists” doesn’t mean this is a meaningful definition.

3. I am not a physicist, but my layman’s understanding of the Big Bang is that it means our *current* universe began to exist at some time, not that U began to exist at some time. Otherwise why would people like Turok speak of cyclical big bangs?

Cyclical big bang scenarios are not plausible given (a) the absence of a possibility to avoid the singularity when collapsing (as proven in the Hawking-Penrose singularity theorems), (b) the increase in entropy that would result with each successive cycle, (c) the fact that the mean mass density of the universe is, according to observations, insufficient to halt and reverse the expansion of the universe, and perhaps most importantly, (d) the fact that the universe is actually ACCELERATING in its expansion according to astronomical observations.

As for Russell’s paradox, the statement “all of physical reality” is NOT at all analogous to the statement “the set of all sets.” It is not self-referential. It does not contain itself. I suggest you actually study set theory before making such — pardon the language — ludicrous claims in the future.

Craig argues ex nihilo all the time. The first part of his presentation at Rick Warren’s church, he goes into detail about why the universe came from nothing and how the Bible also says it came from nothing. The difference is that he thinks Goddidit.

The DIFFERENCE is that one scenario involves the absence of a physical cause (given that energy came into being in the Big Bang itself, so the Big Bang cannot be preceded by any physical causes), while the second scenario involves the absence of BOTH a physical cause AND any other cause of the efficient sort. If you can’t wrap your head around that, and if you let your prejudice and emotions ‘guide’ your reasons rather than decide these issues honestly, I’m afraid I can only feel sorry for you.

>>>”If you can’t wrap your head around that, and if you let your prejudice and emotions ‘guide’ your reasons rather than decide these issues honestly…”

Sounds like a version of the ‘no true Scotsman’ argument to me… are you genuinely trying to claim that your own prejudices and emotions *aren’t* involved in your ‘reasoning’ process?

>>>”while the second scenario involves the absence of BOTH a physical cause AND any other cause of the efficient sort.”

You seem to be ‘begging the question’ that there is some kind of ’cause’ other than a ‘physical’ one. So, what is the difference exactly between NO PHYSICAL CAUSE and NO CAUSE at all? Assuming – of course – that you have precisely no prior experience of ‘non physical causation’ and, given that physicists/ cosmologists cannot offer any understanding of the idea of a ‘non physical cause’, why exactly would you continue to give the idea credence, other than for the fact that it comports with your own arbitrary (and apparently theistic) presuppositions, reached on the basis of prejudice and emotion?

“I am not a physicist, but my layman’s understanding of the Big Bang is that it means our *current* universe began to exist at some time, not that U began to exist at some time. Otherwise why would people like Turok speak of cyclical big bangs?”

The current understanding (caveats galore to come …) is that U begins at some time.
1. The Friedmann-Robertson-Walker (FRW) model has a(t) = 0 at some point in the past. The metric represents the entire universe, not just the current universe, and the spacetime cannot be continued through the singularity, so this does represent a beginning of time.
2. The Hawking-Penrose theorems show that the beginning is not an artefact of the symmetry assumed in FRW. *IF* general relativity holds and *IF* gravity is always attractive then a singularity is unavoidable. Asymmetries and the pressure of ordinary matter cannot create a bounce.
3. If inflation is true, then there are forms of energy that “antigravitate”. (I read a book on antigravity once … Couldn’t put it down!). Even then, stronger forms of the singularity theorems come into play. I’ll quote Guth (http://arxiv.org/pdf/hep-th/0702178v1):
“If the universe can be eternal into the future, is it possible that it is also eternal into the past? Here I will describe a recent theorem which shows, under plausible assumptions, that the answer to this question is no … There is of course no conclusion that an eternally inflating model must have a
unique beginning, and no conclusion that there is an upper bound on the length of all backwards-going geodesics from a given point. There may be models with regions of contraction embedded within the expanding region that could evade our theorem. … The theorem does show, however, that an eternally inflating model of the type usually assumed … cannot be complete. Some new physics (i.e., not inflation) would be needed to describe the past boundary of the inflating region. One possibility would be some kind of quantum creation event.”
4. What about Turok’s bouncing model? Guth again:
“One particular application of the theory is the cyclic ekpyrotic model of Steinhardt & Turok. This model has Hav > 0 for null geodesics for a single cycle, and since every cycle is identical, Hav > 0 when averaged over all cycles. The cyclic model is therefore past-incomplete, and requires a boundary condition in the past.”
So, this current expanding phase may not be the first, but there still has to be a beginning.
5. What about the no boundary condition? It’s not a singularity, but it’s still a beginning.
6. What about quantum gravity? There are still singularities in perturbative string theory. So if the correct theory of quantum gravity is going to swoop in and save the day then it’s got some work to do. As Brendon’s graphic shows, until we can predict what gravity and matter do in the quantum regime, it is always possible that the beginning predicted by most theories we have now will be averted by some future theory.

So, we don’t know because we don’t have a theory of quantum gravity. The beginning is avoidable. It has proven rather stubborn, though. It’s possible that the universe is infinitely old. But what’s the most reasonable conclusion? I dunno.

1. Definition: the universe is the entirety of physical reality.
2. The universe has a beginning.
3. Thus, the universe cannot have an individual cause within physical reality
4. Thus, its cause must be external: God
5. God has no cause
6. Nothing can come from nothing.
7. God does not exist.
8. The Universe has no cause
9. Nothing can come from nothing
10. The Universe does not exist

Hmmm, surely this is fallacious, so let’s go back to point 5. Everything comes from something, but God cannot have an external cause, thus God is its own cause.

But then let’s go back to point 4. The cause of the Universe cannot be an element of physical reality, but it can be its own cause. As a matter of fact, the set of all elements of physical reality is not supposed to obey the same laws as each separate element of physical reality, just like the set of all sets (incidentally sometimes called the Universe) is not a set.

We are thus left with three possibilities: either (i) the Universe is its own cause and God does not exist (atheism), or (ii) God exists, is its own cause and is the external cause of the Universe (theism), or (iii) God is the Universe and is its own cause (Deism).

None of these options seem refutable to me, the three of them are based on faith. I much prefer option (iii) from a personal point of view, but will never be able to prove (i) or (ii) wrong…

>>>”We are thus left with three possibilities: either (i) the Universe is its own cause and God does not exist (atheism), or (ii) God exists, is its own cause and is the external cause of the Universe (theism), or (iii) God is the Universe and is its own cause (Deism).”

Why only 3? It is frankly, irrelevant, whether any of these can be ‘disproved’ since only (i) contains any possible empirical content – as is, the term ‘God’ can be displaced with the unknown ‘X’ and it is not at all clear that any meaning would be lost. So what, exactly, is the relevance of the term ‘G-o-d’, above? Either you are using the term ‘God’ in some vacuous ‘pantheistic’ sense – perhaps because of some emotional dislike of non-theistic conclusions – or you are presupposing some kind of teleology; but why the insistence on some kind of teleological explanation, when there simply isn’t any evidence for teleology in the first place?

Theo, that is a shocking paraphrase of the Cosmological Arguments. You’ve committed the all-too common schoolboy error of not reading it properly and thus straw manning it:

“Everything comes from something, but God cannot have an external cause, thus God is its own cause.”

No. The arguments don’t claim this. They claim:

A) Whatever BEGINS to exist has a cause (not “everything that exists” as you say)

B) Whatever exists has an explanation of its existence, either in the necessity of its own nature or in an external cause (not “everything must come from something”)

God is a necessary being who did not begin to exist (he’s eternal). The universe, however, is a contingent being which began to exist. Thus, God needs no cause. the universe, however, does need a cause.

No arguments are made, anywhere in the Cosmological Arguments, that things can be “self-caused”. This would be a logical absurdity because (X) would have to exist before it existed.

All the “contradictions” are your entirely your own by mis-representing the argument. It’s the most common and sloppy mistake a person can make when responding to them.

Byrom, stating that God is “eternal” while time itself was created precisely at the big bang is not even a schoolboy error, it simply makes no sense at all. By the way, the set of all sets, sometimes called the Universe, is subject to the Russell paradox by definition, so there is absolutely no problem in it being self-caused (or self-contained, which *is* Russell paradox…). So yes, God can be self-caused, it’s not because it’s not in the cosmological argument that it’s wrong. Anyway, I was absolutely not responding to that argument, just pointing out that its use of logics is irrelevant once one understands that logics cannot even deal with the concept of the “set of all sets”. It cannot deal with such a concept but should be supposed to be able to deal with the concept of “God”. This is simply absurd. But I will let you within your self-contained but probably not self-caused arrogance and ignorance of logics and physics…

Theo: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Russell's_paradox . Russell’s paradox does not apply to the set of all sets, but to the set of all sets that do *not* contain themselves. The paradox points to the failure of naive set theory, rather than logic itself.

The set of all sets is not the universe. The set of all sets is an idea, the universe is physical reality. A set is not a physical thing. The set of all set cannot cause or be caused, nor can it come into existence.

If “self-caused” means “causes itself to come into existence”, then this is a simple contradiction – the entity in question would have to both exist (so that it can cause an effect) and not exist (so that it can come into existence) at the same time.

“We don’t know because we don’t have a theory of quantum gravity. The beginning is avoidable. It has proven rather stubborn, though. It’s possible that the universe is infinitely old. But what’s the most reasonable conclusion? I dunno.”

I’d put it slightly more strongly than that. There are good reasons to believe that our universe has a beginning. There are also good reasons to doubt our ability to make reliable scientific inferences in this case.

Hey Luke, I found this to be a very useful and thoughtful review of the debate (or certain parts of the debate).
I’ve also listened to the interview you did with Luke over at commonsenseatheism which was also really enlightening.
As a philosophy student (among other things lol) I must say that a lot of the probability stuff and physicsy stuff often goes over my head and I don’t really know where to begin to properly understand this stuff.

Do you know any good introductory books for cosmology in general, fine tuning and nothingness in particular (for relevancy for fine-tuning and kalam arguments) for someone with literally no physics or statistical/bayes background?
Where should I start? Do you have any advice for a beginner like me, e.g. common pitfalls etc?
I am serious about delving deep into these topics because I am determined to get to a point where I do understand all the science necessary for the phil of religion debates.
Whilst I love WLC and am a Christian myself (yes how dumb am i, right ;P) I would like to be sure that I read stuff on the topic that is objective and do sometimes feel a bit uneasy learning sciencey stuff from WLC when he openly admits he would believe even if scienctific evidence counted against his premises.

“Do you know any good introductory books for cosmology in general, fine tuning and nothingness in particular (for relevancy for fine-tuning and kalam arguments) for someone with literally no physics or statistical/bayes background?”

Michael,

Obviously I’m not Luke, but I thought I’d give you an answer anyway. I recommend Stephen Barr’s “Modern Physics and Ancient Faith”. Barr is a physicist working in the field, and a christian. His book is 99% physics and 1% ancient faith, but he ties the two together. It is a few years old now, but not too old I think. it would be a good start.

I was at this debate, and tend to agree with some of your assessments (I, too thought that Dr. Krauss didn’t adequately or directly respond to many of Dr. Craig’s arguments. His approach was too frenetic and disjointed, IMO.)

During the debate, Dr. Craig repeatedly called-out Dr. Krauss on his use of the word “nothing” (more than likely due to Krauss’ talk, A Universe from Nothing).

In your post, you seem to also argue that a “philosophical nothing” has a distinctly separate meaning from a “cosmological nothing”.

Now, I get how the philosophical concept of “nothing” relates to an intended philosophical question like, “Why is there something rather than nothing?”.

But, if cosmology isn’t even able to talk about / correlate to this concept of “nothing”, then it just seems odd to me to even pose such a philosophical question.

In your opinion, would it be scientifically accurate to state that (as far as we know) there no such thing as “nothing” – or, that a definition such as (per your post) “a lack of anything” is not really true/accurate in an actual sense?

Would love to hear your feedback if you get the time – Thanks in advance!

“you seem to also argue that a “philosophical nothing” has a distinctly separate meaning from a “cosmological nothing”.”

NO!!!

I once heard a philosopher talking on this subject who commented: “It’s very hard to thing about nothing. Just when you think you’ve got it, you realise you’ve been thinking about something all along!”.

Nothing, to repeat, is not a type of something. There cannot be different types of not anything – we distinguish things based on their properties, and nothing has no properties.

So there cannot be a “cosmological nothing” and a “philosophical nothing”. These would both be types of things, so we would be treating nothing as if it were a type of something.

Hi Michael,
Your comment has given me an idea. I might do a post on good popular level cosmology books, and a fine-tuning bibliography. Stay tuned. Regarding nothingness, all I used was the dictionary!
Luke

Hey Luke,
Thanks so much! That would be really useful, and I would link a lot of my friends to it too.
Of course yes I completely agree about nothingness, I meant to say more about whether the scientific evidence for the Big Bang actually constitutes a literal beginning of the universe, ie there being nothing and then the Big Bang happening.
Craig’s contention is that time and space had their very beginning at the Big Bang but what I’d like to know is if the equations and evidences do point to that extreme an answer?
And if so, do most cosmologists agree with him today that time and space did have a beginning at the Big Bang?

“In this regard, the predominant view on existence among contemporary philosophers of an analytic persuasion might be summarized in two theses … The second thesis commonly, though not universally, held by analytic philosophers might be summed up in the familiar dictum, ‘Existence is not a predicate’. More accurately, it should be written either as ‘Existence is not a (first-level) property’ or as ‘”Exists” is not a (first-level) predicate’.”

I just realized that I criticized you for being apparently while sounding pretentious. My apologies for the keyboard rage. I still maintain that Godel, Lewis, Plantinga, Kripke and modal logic operators in general point to existence being a predicate.

My point in the above quotation was not to end the discussion but to start one. It’s a classic “drive-by comment” to just say “Oh, nobody believes *that* anymore”, as if that settles it. My quote simply points out that “existence is not a predicate” is apparently still widely believed, and so Ms Rice is going to have to give us an argument.

To be more precise, the idea I’m defending is “existence is not a property”. My argument doesn’t depend on whether there is some sense in which existence can function as a predicate. But I’d be very happy to hear your argument.

Have you read Godel and Plantinga’s ontological arguments? They use modal operators to construct their argument. If you do not consider the operators “necessary” and “contingent” predicates, they still seem to completely get around Kant’s objection.

I’m not arguing that Kant’s reply dismantles the ontological argument. A I understand it, the strengths of Plantinga’s formulation is precisely that it avoids Kant’s counterargument. (I read Godel’s once, but I’ve forgotten it and probably didn’t understand it anyway.)

I am somewhat sympathetic to this nothing rant, but I think a few points are at least stated a bit naively. First, philosophers like Craig are just as bad at abusing the idea of nothing as cosmologists like Krauss. Craig’s idea of nothing is an absurdity, that he then tries to use to invent a god. Also, Krauss employs the same folk usage of nothing that Craig also uses widely in his arguments. Krauss’ usage is no more or less slippery than Craig’s.

Second, I would like to address this statement: “if what you are talking about has properties, then it is not nothing.” The idea has the flavor of being right, and it may be close, but the statement is too bold. An identical statement would be to substitute zero for nothing. Nothing and zero are interchangeable, and they have been for 3,000 or more years. It is not the case that zero has no properties; zero has many, albeit some rather bizarre, properties. Nothing and zero may not have all the same kinds of properties as entities, but “no properties” goes too far.

To make the true statement that nothing is a complete lack of entities is not equivalent to saying that nothing has no properties. False equivalences, indeed.

Anyway. Like I said, I’m sympathetic to the rant. Nothing is used too loosely; but I think your counterpoints are somewhat off, Luke.

Thanks for your comment, Patrick.
* How does craig use the idea of nothing in a slippery way? He seems to be referring to “not anything”, or non-being, and there doesn’t seem to be anything wrong with that. Could you provide a quote of his to illustrate what you mean?

* I disagree that zero and nothing are interchangeable. Zero is not a thing, at least not in the usual sense. Zero doesn’t have properties in the same way that an apple has properties. The Greeks spoke of a *substance* as something which can have properties. There must be some stuff, something that actually exists, for us to hang properties on. An apple has redness and roundness, but for the apple to really exist there must be some substance that has these properties.

The modern equivalent for substance is probably something like “energy”. For example, a neutron is a form of energy (remember – mass is a form of energy). The properties of the neutron include having zero charge.

necesseary = “exemplified in any possible world if exemplified in some of them”

Sounds as second order predicate as well – if we conceive being as set of predicates then talking of exemplification is introducing decond order predicate.Also talking about conditional exemplification seems to be such a thing….

But I can not see why are you so anxious about that predicate thing :D……Maybe it is just me but there seems to be HUUUUGE difeerence between existence being predicate and existence being a Second order predicate 😀

Please consider that if necesseary is second order predicate as I argued above then it cannot be first order predicate so it seems that one cannot ascribe necessity to something by virtue of mere definition…so Plantinga cannot define “maximal greatness” as having property of being exemplified in every PW if exemplified in some PW as this is not proper (first-order) predicate………One cannot reach to statement that maximal greatnes is necesseary by means of its definition alone. That truth can not be known a priori and it has to be established independently. Also it cannot be introduced via definition…..

Of course maybe definition can predicate on metalevel (second order predicates) but it seems to me that it can not…Frege’s point seems to be such that it cannot…….Definition presents set of predicates and gives it a “name”…….Whether this set is exemplified , and on what conditions is a different matter….

The problem with negation especially with words like “nothing” is paradoxes they entail…that is obvious….

For example if nothing cannot have any properties -can we predicate about it?

We can hardly escape substantialization of “nothing” -if it is a “state” or “situation” where exists no thing -it means that it is something………..

Also this state has apparently property of being accurately described by sentence” no thing exists”…….sa again it is something………

So state of nothingness may be a square circle, absurd -something inconceivable- one should either define it better…..or abandon…….the latter option seems to entail that questions “why there exists something rather than nothinhg?” are meaningless………….The same hold for proofs based on such questions…….

stating that God is “eternal” while time itself was created precisely at the big bang is not even a schoolboy error, it simply makes no sense at all.

It makes perfectly good sense. You may be thinking of eternity as “a really really long time.” But time is not eternity and eternity is not time. Time is the measure of change in corruptible being (physical matter). Without matter (incl. energy) there is no time. That is, the empty space-time stage of Newton cannot exist in relativity. cf. Einstein. Thus time can not exist unless matter exists. Eternity is a state of no change, thus of no duration measured by time, and so also of no physical matter. Hope this helps.
+ + +Nothing and zero are interchangeable

But there is a difference between a bank account with zero balance and not having a bank account at all. The physicist Stephen Barr discussed the difference between zero and nothing in an essay once, but I have not the url handy.

The idea of timelessnes is problematic per se…..’Cause we assert things in time…If I say that “Great Tooth Fairy exist” I say it in time.. hence my statement is instantiated in time -posesses temporal characteristic…. So its properties , including its truth exist in time…

The truth of proposition however according to classical definition is occurence of fact that is described by the statement…Hence such an occurence of a statement must be temporal….So if “GTF exist” can be asserted the occurence of GTF existence must be temporal….but this seems to be equal to stating that existence of GTF is temporal, cause occurence of existence of something and existence of something are hard to distinguish…

So existence of GTF must be temporal and if it is so then GTF itself must be temporal…..Even if existence is not a property we can replace it with another predicate that represents property……..If we can meaningfullly and correctly state that “GTF is good” then we can say that its goodness is temporal….and that GTF is temporal as well cause thing is defined by sum of its predicates and properties…..

Of course GTF can be replaced by anything with similar outcome -this shows that anything that we can meaningfully assert MUST exist in TIME…..hence we get argument in favour of naturalism…..

Also even if timelessness is meaningful no timeless being can create anything temporal…..Timelesness entails full actualization and lack of potency to ANY change…….On the other hand the ability to change requires being temporal….

Now creation of something entails actualizing some potency…

But if only a timeless being exist then there is no potency…Cause the being has no potency and nothingness cannot have ANY potency as potency i a property……But if creation is actualization of potency then in such a circumstance nothing can be created….

This shows that atemporal GTF cannot create anything..and temporal god should probably exist in space if it exists in time (’cause space and time are intertwined) so it should be natural (physical)…So we see that GTF either is atemporal and powerless or physical…

Logically we can exclude the first posibility (as GTF is defined by its omnipotence) and science presumably excludes the possibility of god being physical (also Dawkins Boeing 737 argument destroys this particular option)….Hence we get proof of atheism 😀

contrary to those who believe that argument from evil and from lack of evidence are the only arguments for atheism :D….

As you stated before without matter there is no time and ,hence space is connected with time…no spacetime at all if there is no matter….so if we assume that matter is money and spacetime is “bank account” we can say that unless no money exist there will be no bankaccounts…It’s money(matter) that is “substantial” not space (bank account) that seems to contain it -though this may be counteintuitive…

Of course there is a problem -ehat then creates matter? Can it be nothing?
Maybe not -but this requires as properly defining “nothing” – it is possible that this term is not meaningfull at all….

And it is also possible that if we work out some definition we will indeed equate nothing with zero…

In fact if we agree that true statement conveys some structure (subject-predicate) aplicable to reality (either directly or by means of analogy ) then if statement is temporal that structure is also temporal as that structure is property of a statement and property of temporal being is also temporal.. That structure is also ,however, property of some being or fact which is described by that proposition (as it is aplicable to reality -it is common to both statement and reality which constitutes the truth)….If it is temporal then that being or fact should also be temporal cause it does not make sense for atemporal being to have temporal properties (if the property is temporal we can assert about its state in particular moments of time -e. g. whether it is property of certain being in moment t -so , it entails, we can ascribe temporal characteristics to its subject)…

So if proposition is meaningful and true proposition and temporal (and it is) its content (which is common to it and to some fact described by propostion) is also temporal, which entails that described fact is also temporal…….So meaningful, true temporal propositions describe only temporal facts….But all propostions are temporal which entails that all meaningful and true propositions describe temporal facts which excludes possibility of stating anything true about timeless being….so there is problem with timelessness indeed….

1) I don’t think it can be asserted that “the universe began to exist” in the commonly accepted meaning of beginning to exist It can be said that the universe has a finite age, but it did not begin to exist, given that there was never a time when it did not exist.

2) I disagree that the ability to create universes must necessarily be a property of something. We could also say that “Nothing” cannot have any restrictions, therefore everything can come from “Nothing”.

3) Given that there is something, it is possible for something to exist (obviously). Even if the case was Absolute Nothing, the possibility f existence would still be there. I guess that for some people asserting that Absolute Nothing must co-exist with the possibility of something must be bizarre, even contradictory.

I suppose everything you say could possibly be true, but I think no-one would ever think so if it wasn’t that they were trying to find an alternative to the simple thought that ‘God must have caused it’.

Let me give a counter example. The problem of evil and suffering is perhaps the strongest argument against the existence of God. A christian could avoid it by saying “Ah, but perhaps God has a good reason which we cannot know”. And a non-believer would likely scorn that response, arguing that speculation doesn’t answer the obvious problem staring us in the face.

I suggest it is the same, but opposite in the case of the origin of the universe. All that speculation doesn’t really answer the obvious problem staring us in the face that nothing is caused by nothing.

I think a more honest approach to the question of God is to admit that there are strong arguments either way, and then we can discuss how we resolve them.

The problem with this is that the universe did not begin to exist at the Big Bang and hence it was not “caused by nothing”. Time begins at the Big Bang, but that’s different. In fact this means that the universe has always existed (as long as there has been time) and therefore did not begin to exist. Usually only two options are considered, either things began to exist or they have existed forever. But the idea that time itself starts (St. Augustine’s idea in fact) is a third option, not considered by Kalam (and I know that Craig is well aware of it).

Apart from that, the idea of Absolute Nothing is rather problematic. I agree that in empty space nothing causes nothing (quantum mechanics notwithstanding). But that is just empty space and *PHYSICS*, not Nothing.

By the way, the idea that a person (be it a magician or a god) can will something into existence is just magical thinking. Causing things to exist is not a characteristic of persons, it is just an arbitrary addition to the concept of a person, of which God is an instance. It is just as arbitrary as claiming that teapots can create universes.

“Time begins at the Big Bang, but that’s different. In fact this means that the universe has always existed (as long as there has been time) and therefore did not begin to exist.”
I think you have made many assumptions here. (1) Do we know time began at the big bang, or did it just start for our universe? Multiverse proponents might disagree with you. (2) Does beginning necessarily involve time? (3) Does causation necessarily involve time?

“By the way, the idea that a person (be it a magician or a god) can will something into existence is just magical thinking.”
Do you believe that we can choose? If so, then I can will my thoughts into existence, which means I can will electro-chemical processes in my brain to occur, which in turn can will myself to type at the keyboard like I am now. So I think we have two choices – either no choice (a paradox!) or we can indeed will things into existence. So how can you be so confident that a god couldn’t do the same, and more?

“Causing things to exist is not a characteristic of persons, it is just an arbitrary addition to the concept of a person, of which God is an instance. It is just as arbitrary as claiming that teapots can create universes.”
What’s so arbitrary? The existence of a creative powerful God is a hypothesis, just as is his/her/its non-existence. We then test both hypothesis against the evidence we have. Some think one hypothesis explains the evidence better, some think the other. I don’t think that’s different in principle to any other hypothesis testing.

The existence of a creative powerful God is a hypothesis, just as is his/her/its non-existence.

In order for this to be a hypothesis we would need a cognitively meaningful concept for the term ‘God’ which, I suggest, we do not have. For example, we can ask whether there exists such a thing as a ‘flying pig’, since ‘flying pigs’ can be readily conceptualized. Most discussion of ‘God’, however, is of the following kind:

A: An Unie exists.
B: Prove it!
A: It has rained for 3 consecutive days – that is my proof.

(This example was borrowed from George Smith’s (The Case Against God’)

Without establishing the ontological validity of an Unie, in the first place, any subsequent discussion regarding the existence of an Unie is profoundly question-begging and thus it is with ‘God’.

Do you really think we don’t have a “cognitively meaningful concept for the term ‘God’”? What have all these atheists and theists been defining themselves by and arguing about all this time?

I think we all know quite enough what the word “God” means, and I suspect you know just as well as I do. Of course we may haggle over some aspects of the definition, just as people haggle over detail in science, history, law, etc, but that doesn’t stop us knowing what the term means. (For example, two witnesses is court may agree that a certain person in a police line-up committed the crime, even if they disagree about the colour of his shoes.)

I agree that your Unie argument is question-begging, but your “thus it is with ‘God’” doesn’t follow at all and you give no reason to think that it does.

Take this argument:

1. The settings of physical constants in the universe are due to either physical necessity, chance or design.
2. They aren’t due to necessity or chance.
3. Therefore they are due to design.

Now that argument is logically valid, the terms can all be defined unambiguously, and the discussion can then centre on whether the premises are true or false. We may each have our views on that, but certainly a case can be made to support both premises. But it happens to be an argument in a book by a philosopher who is a christian, and he uses it as part of an argument for the existence of God.

So the whole thing is not question-begging, and I suggest your point is shown to be irrelevant. I’m sorry, I don’t wish to be rude, but I think you’ll have to do better than that.

If something could come out of nothing then you would not be talking about nothing anymore, even if you called it nothing – you are just confusing what we mean by the word, just like if you drew a circle and called it a square.

Let me clarify: The minute you assign any casual powers to nothing you are no longer talking about nothing. That nothing comes from nothing is true *by definition.* Arguing about whether nothing can do this or that is like arguing about the various shapes a square can take on.

What have all these atheists and theists been defining themselves by and arguing about all this time?

Perhaps you’d like to tell me! I could offer some thoughts on this but space is limited and a full explanation would undoubtedly be lengthy but, suffice to say that non-theists must accept a large share of the blame by granting far, far too much to theists from the start, by asking the theist to ‘prove’ the existence of the Unie long before any coherent ontological status has been established for the Unie itself. So, whilst it is easy – and perfectly coherent – to ask the question, ‘Do flying pigs exist?’, it is presently less than useless to ask ‘Do supernatural entities exist?’, when the term ‘supernatural’ is ontologically vacuous.

>>>”I think we all know quite enough what the word “God” means, and I suspect you know just as well as I do.”

On the contrary – whilst it is true that I can imagine a great many things, I have precisely no reason to associate anything that exists within my imagination to the letters ‘G-o-d’. Two obvious reasons for this spring straight to mind, as follows – ‘God’ (in the upper or lower case) is usually asserted to be both ‘supernatural’ and ‘immaterial’ although neither term has any positive ontological status. As such, I have absolutely no means of conceptualising a ‘thing’ that is ‘supernatural’ and/or ‘immaterial’ and, indeed, I challenge you to provide any coherent understanding of either term. Until this task has been fulfilled, it is meaningless to ask of ‘God’, does it exist or not, since – quite literally – we do not know what we are talking about, as is the case with the Unie.

It is possible to approach things from a variety of perspectives, of course, and one could, for example, investigate the empirical evidence for intercessory prayer. But even if the evidence for this were good, there would be no necessary reason to attribute the phenomenon under investigation to any so-called ‘supernatural’ entity – never mind to ‘God’ – when there could be a perfectly lawful explanation. Thus, to answer your earlier question, much of the discussion between theists and non-theists is implicitly predicated upon a naturalistic conception of ‘God’ – not surprising really, but – according to theists – ‘God’ isn’t ‘naturalistic’ so it can’t be ‘God’ that we’re discussing on such occasions.

>>>”Of course we may haggle over some aspects of the definition, just as people haggle over detail in science, history, law, etc, but that doesn’t stop us knowing what the term means.”

On the contrary – again – one can ‘haggle’ over *every* aspect of the definition because the ‘definition’ must cohere but, if one cannot understand what it is to be ‘immaterial’, for example, one has no means to make sense of the remaining so-called ‘attributes’. Thus, if ‘God’ is asserted to send unbelieving ‘souls’ to hell – for example – one ought not merely to presuppose that an ‘immaterial’ entity (such as a ‘soul’) can experience pain, without having any nerve endings, or a central nervous system… and so on. In this manner, theism is profoundly question-begging because it has not – and, indeed, cannot – offer any meaningful answers to such questions. It can only presuppose them.

>>>”I agree that your Unie argument is question-begging, but your “thus it is with ‘God’” doesn’t follow at all and you give no reason to think that it does.”

Well, now I’ve given you, perhaps, just a little more food for thought. If you still doubt what I’m saying, then perhaps you’d like to prove me wrong by offering a logically-valid ontology/concept of the ‘immaterial’ – after all, if some ‘thing’ is comprised of neither matter nor energy, what’s left over to be? – or of the ‘supernatural’? Given how confident you seem, I’m sure this will be a cinch…

>>>”So the whole thing is not question-begging, and I suggest your point is shown to be irrelevant.”

Err, sorry – maybe you didn’t notice – but the ‘argument’ that you cited doesn’t even mention ‘God’. That is because it is not (as quoted) an argument for theism at all, nor is it even, necessarily, an ‘argument’ for a deity, thus it is your point that is 100% irrelevant to anything that I have suggested.

>>>”I’m sorry, I don’t wish to be rude, but I think you’ll have to do better than that.”

If you knew some theology, I suggest you’d be forced to admit that it is theists and theologians who need to do better – much better – before they will be able to put ‘God’ onto anything resembling a coherent (positive, as opposed to negative) ontological footing. So, go on, surprise me – if something is neither matter nor energy, what’s left over to be? Remember, I’m asking you to tell me what the term *does* refer to, *not* what it doesn’t refer to…. (i.e. matter or energy). Good luck with that!

Chris, there’s a lot of words there, but I understand you to be making two main claims:

(a) There is no point in discussing anything until a “coherent ontological status has been established” for it. You are confident this cannot be done for God.

(b) This is tantamount to saying we need a full definition of something before discussion of its existence can be meaningful.

Before I attempt to rise to your challenge, can you please clarify and answer a couple of questions.

1. Are the statement (a) and (b) a reasonable summary of what you are saying?

2. You say there are problems with defining the ontological status of something that is supposed to be immaterial. Can you please first of all do the same for “material”, in a similar way you are asking me to do for God and the immaterial?

3. While you are at it, can you please also do the same for (i) me, (ii) my grand-daughter, (iii) the Higgs boson and (iv) for the number 5?

>>>”Before I attempt to rise to your challenge, can you please clarify and answer a couple of questions.

1. Are the statement (a) and (b) a reasonable summary of what you are saying?”

No, not quite. (B) does not follow from (A). What is required is a coherent concept, which certainly need not be the same as a full definition. Without a coherent concept, how could one possibly begin to know what is being talked about, in the first place? So, no, when someone asserts the existence of a ‘supernatural’, ‘immaterial’ entity, I have – literally – no idea what they are talking about, for 2 reasons:

1. These terms are ‘negative’.
2. There is no ‘universe of discourse’ within which to make sense of them.

It is the *combination* of these is sufficient to render any meaningful discussion impossible because there is simply nothing that they can conceivably refer to, hence my challenge. If I am referring to an item in my kitchen as ‘not the fridge’, this is no great problem. If I claim to refer to something that is ‘neither matter nor energy’, then the question arises as to what is ‘left over’ to be…

The fundamental problem with the ‘immaterial’ and the ‘supernatural’, therefore, is that we simply have no *rational* means of attempting to distinguish a ‘something’ from a ‘nothing’.

As mentioned, there are other approaches to the ‘God’ of particular religions – thus one could discuss (and test) specific doctrines and demonstrate, pretty conclusively, that intercessory prayer doesn’t work, etc, all of which is consistent, of course – as is all the circumstantial evidence – with the non-existence of the Christian/Islamic/Judaic/etc ‘God’.

But, all the same, we need to know ‘what’ we are talking about, if not necessarily ‘who’. It is certainly a prerequisite, moreover, if one wants to form any meaningful hypothesis in order that that hypothesis might be tested. So, clearly, scientists have what they believe to be a clear, logically-coherent concept of the Higgs Boson, which is the only reason that people are presently able to carry-out experiments (at CERN) to see if it actually exists. Similarly, if you or your grand-daughter were to go missing, the Police would not have too much trouble establishing who, never mind what, they were actually looking for, since ‘material’, carbon-based life forms have a clear, positively-defined ontological status. As for the number 5, this is clearly an abstract concept about which I suggest you talk to a mathematician. But – of course – if you want to compare ‘God’ to a perfectly abstract entity, wholly without motive force, be my guest!

So, if something exists, it exists *as* some thing. If that ‘something’ cannot be distinguished from a ‘nothing’, then there is, literally, nothing of which to speak. That is simply a rational approach to epistemology. As suggested, there is a long tradition (the via negativa) within theology, however, that understands the basic difficulty – the impossibility of providing a positively-defined concept – and which has made no bones about offering an entirely negative ‘conception’ of ‘God’. The only problem is that this is, quite literally, no ‘conception’ at all because whatever can be conceived of, is not ‘God’ and, thus, there is simply nothing (called ‘God’) that can be conceived of.

Other theologians, e.g. British philosopher, Keith Ward, have explicitly denied that the existence of ‘God’ is a ‘scientific’ hypothesis but, since he provides no clear means of demarcating ‘science’ from ‘non science’, it is all-but impossible to evaluate his assertions. Since ‘scientific practice’ is essentially the application of ‘rational empiricism’, he appears to be saying that there are no ‘rational empirical’ methods by which such existence could be established. According to Ward, for example, he states (Why There Almost Certainly Is a God) that one cannot begin the ‘debate’ from materialist premises at all: the ‘debate’ “is about whether the physical universe really is the ultimate reality, or whether the ultimate reality has the nature of mind or consciousness.”.

This seems to me to be a clear instance of trying to ‘eat one’s cake and have it’ and – NB – that, having shifted the goalposts, one is still *none the wiser* about what exactly is being asserted, as no attempt is made to provide a concept of ‘disembodied consciousness’. Thus, he has offered an assertion that he claims to be ‘True’, whilst simultaneously denying that one has any rational methodology by which to establish the validity of his assertion. Please – read his book for yourself. I’ve cited Ward’s book because I believe, surprisingly, that it is one of the best and also because I believe that it is fairly typical amongst modern theistic philosophers.

>>>”2. You say there are problems with defining the ontological status of something that is supposed to be immaterial. Can you please first of all do the same for “material”, in a similar way you are asking me to do for God and the immaterial?”

Sure – in brief, we inhabit a material universe and *everything* of which we know is comprised of matter and/or energy or is/appears to be utterly dependent upon a material substrate. We have a good (if far from perfect) understanding, furthermore, of what is entailed by material existence, i.e. the properties of materiality, and we can make (and refine) testable predictions on this basis. Thus, we can develop increasingly specific/detailed concepts and usefully ask whether these concepts do or don’t cohere. The fundamental problem of the ‘immaterial’ is that ‘not material’ tells one precisely *nothing* about what *is* being asserted, whilst simultaneously ruling-out (i.e. matter/energy) everything of which we do have some knowledge. But, again, if you want to compare ‘God’ to an abstract entity, such as those that might exist in my imagination, be my guest!

Hi Chris. Thanks for your reply to my questions. But I must admit I am a little surprised at your response. For your previous comments indicated quite forcefully that you felt a “coherent ontological status” could not easily be established for God, if at all. Yet when I asked for comparable statements about some other familiar objects, to see what level of detail you were expecting, you offered very simple and brief statements that would seem to make my task relatively easy. Whether I am up to the task remains to be seen, however! : ) I will approach your challenge on several different levels.

1. It seems to me that this can easily be, or become, a philosophical game – define “define” as we used to say, meaning one can always ask for further definitions in an endless regression. But in the important things of life, we get by well enough without that. So I was tempted to simply say that God is too important matter to play such games about, and I would prefer to discuss with someone who really wanted to know rather than hide behind academic tricks. I decided this would be unfair to you, for I don’t have any idea about your motives. So I am not making this accusation about you, but I think the comment should still be made.

2. It is clear that we can define God well enough for philosophers, believers and unbelievers, to discuss his existence. You can find adequate definitions in Wikipedia and the Stanford Encyclopedia. On one level at least, I think your “problem” is not a failure of definition but of imagination – we can define immaterial, you just can’t imagine it. But (I think) scientists can define properties of fundamental particles like charm and strangeness, but I don’t think they can imagine them, and certainly cosmologists can define negative time (time in reverse) mathematically, but who can imagine this? So this shouldn’t stop discussion.

3. Some of your specific examples and objections seem to me not to be true. You say a negative ontological status is a problem, yet “atheist” does not cease to have meaning because it is negative and dark is not meaningless because it is the absence of light. And in the context of this blog “nothing” is not a meaningless word despite it being the ultimate negative. This seems just to be a wrong objection.

You provide some definition of “material” that begs the question. if you read up on what philosophers say about that definition, you’ll find it’s very difficult, yet your “coherent ontological status” of “material” simply restates the problem (“comprised of matter” and “utterly dependent upon a material substrate”. If you can’t define “material;”, then it’s no wonder you can’t define “immaterial”!

Likewise you offered no “coherent ontological status” for me, or my grand-daughter (who doesn’t actually exist) nor the number 5. For my non-existent grand-daughter, you provided a simple statement that the police would know who they were looking for (when in fact they couldn’t) – and as we can see, we can also state what we are looking for when we talk about God.

4. Names are labels, and when two people use the same name, it doesn’t always mean the same, or it isn’t always clear. If one person describes Barack Obama as a great visionary leader thwarted by nasty Republicans from bring important change, and another describes him as an illegal President born outside the US, and a Muslim, who is hell-bent on destroying America, are they talking about the same person or not? It is an interesting question, and applies to God even more so. I’ll refer to this problem in my next two points.

5. Rather than define God (i.e. fill a label with meaning), we can start at the other end by looking at characteristics. That is why I included the brief design argument previously. It is a valid argument and I think the premises are plausible and reasonable – in fact more likely than their contradiction. Thus I find the conclusion to be most likely true. But the conclusion doesn’t mention God, simply a design, and by implication (or by re-wording the argument) a designer.

Now there are many arguments for the existence of God which I find plausible and reasonable, and each can be worded in such a way as to bring out characteristics rather thanusing the word “God”. I won’t take up space here with the details, but we can end up with a long list of conclusions such as the universe was caused by something outside the space-time universe, it was designed, there exists a moral “lawgiver”, etc. All of these statements and characteristics would have meaning because a good philosophical argument would define its terms. Then we can decide what label to pin on the phenomenon or entity that those statements and characteristics apply to. Like Aquinas, this I call “God”.

And so we have a “coherent ontological status” for God – and you’ll note it probably wouldn’t even mention “immaterial”!

6. And so to your Unies. Can you similarly build a definition of them? If you use similar arguments to establish propositions, and then say this I call a Unie, then you have defined God but given him/her/it a different label – no big deal. And if you can’t build that definition, then there is no parallel between God and Unies and it was as I said a silly example.

Conclusion (at last):

I say again, your objections are pedantic and mostly in error (IMO). We can define God well enough, via Wikipedia or the process in #5, at least as well as you can define “material” and my grand-daughter, and way better than your Unies.

So, are we going to stop playing semantic games that help avoid the truth and get down to the real question of whether God really exists and cares for us????

Hope this isn’t too frank and challenging, but you seem to appreciate that approach. Best wishes.

>>>”So, are we going to stop playing semantic games that help avoid the truth and get down to the real question of whether God really exists and cares for us????”

Sorry, but you’ve yet to tell me what exactly it is that we are discussing. Until you can clarify what exactly you mean by the term ‘God’, in something more than purely negative terms it really is vacuous to ask “whether God really exists and cares for us?” You are doing no more than merely presupposing that ‘Unies’ also exist and care for us.

>>>”Yet when I asked for comparable statements about some other familiar objects, to see what level of detail you were expecting, you offered very simple and brief statements that would seem to make my task relatively easy.”

Sure. If there is any basis to theistic assertions, it really shouldn’t be a difficult task.

>>>”So I was tempted to simply say that God is too important matter to play such games about, and I would prefer to discuss with someone who really wanted to know rather than hide behind academic tricks.”

The point that I’m making shouldn’t be difficult to grasp. If you simply replace ‘God’ with the unknown ‘X’, then you may begin to understand. As such, it would clearly be nonsensical to assert that ‘X’ is too important to play such games about. Either you believe ‘X’ to be merely self-evident, in which case no explication is needed, or some explication is needed. Since the former is not true, some positive explication of the term ‘X’ is needed. Unfortunately, none is forthcoming.

If you choose to assert that ‘X’ is ‘not visible’, ‘not material’, ‘beyond nature’, ‘not coloured’, ‘not constrained by place’, etc, you have, quite literally, defined ‘X’ into non-existence as there is simply no other way to make sense of what you would have asserted. To deny this point is to assert, in effect, that ‘X exists: I cannot tell you what ‘X’ is, I cannot tell you what ‘X’ does and I certainly can’t tell you how ‘X’ does it’. This is just incoherence, but it is where things are at, presently, with reference to your ‘God’. This is why some ontological basis needs to be established – there must be some reason to think that we could, conceivably, be talking about ‘something’ that exists, rather than something that is only a figment of your imagination.

>>>”It is clear that we can define God well enough for philosophers, believers and unbelievers, to discuss his existence. You can find adequate definitions in Wikipedia and the Stanford Encyclopedia. On one level at least, I think your “problem” is not a failure of definition but of imagination – we can define immaterial, you just can’t imagine it.”

You keep asserting that an adequate concept exists, but you’ve yet to present it. Your presuppositions are so deeply rooted, it seems, that you are really having trouble recognising that it is merely your presupposition. As such, there really is nothing for me to imagine… if I tell you that ‘X’ is ‘not material’, I’m curious to know what you think you would have learned, from this, about the existence or nonexistence of ‘X’…. if you were to maintain that ‘X might exist’, you would be merely ‘begging the question’ that something can ‘exist’ despite comprising neither ‘matter nor energy’ – the very thing that is in question – and it would then be your burden of proof to demonstrate as much. But lacking any demonstration whatsoever – to paraphrase the late Christopher Hitchens – that which is asserted without evidence can be equally dismissed without evidence.

>>>”Some of your specific examples and objections seem to me not to be true. You say a negative ontological status is a problem, yet “atheist” does not cease to have meaning because it is negative and dark is not meaningless because it is the absence of light. And in the context of this blog “nothing” is not a meaningless word despite it being the ultimate negative. This seems just to be a wrong objection.”

With respect, you don’t seem to have given this a lot of thought, yet you seem quick to assert that I am mistaken. ‘Atheism’ is easy to define. It simply refers to a person who is without theistic belief, thus it is not entirely negative in nature – i.e. it applies to people, thus there is no difficulty. Clearly, darkness, also, is not *merely* the absence of light. It is still a ‘something’, i.e. it is a material state, and can be rationally understood as a material state where there is a partial or complete absence of photons. If, by contrast, you were to refer to somewhere that is *not* a material state and where there is no light, I would have to conclude that you are referring, not to a state of ‘darkness’, but, literally, to ‘nothing’.

>>>”You provide some definition of “material” that begs the question. if you read up on what philosophers say about that definition, you’ll find it’s very difficult, yet your “coherent ontological status” of “material” simply restates the problem (“comprised of matter” and “utterly dependent upon a material substrate”. If you can’t define “material;”, then it’s no wonder you can’t define “immaterial”!”

No, it isn’t question-begging, it is simply that my understanding of ‘materiality’ is no more advanced than that which scientists are able to offer. That scientists’ understanding is incomplete does not imply that ‘matter’ does not exist. As such, your point (that the definition is fuzzy) is irrelevant. Moreover, your final point is correct, but hurts you far more than it hurts me. If you *do* have some means by which to delineate the material from the immaterial, then I suggest that you present it. Despite this, you still seem to believe that ‘immateriality’ is coherent. I’m still waiting for the demonstration.

>>>”Likewise you offered no “coherent ontological status” for me, or my grand-daughter (who doesn’t actually exist) nor the number 5. For my non-existent grand-daughter, you provided a simple statement that the police would know who they were looking for (when in fact they couldn’t) – and as we can see, we can also state what we are looking for when we talk about God.”

If your grand-daughter doesn’t exist then I don’t know what you were trying to prove. As for the number 5, this is an abstract concept, which is irrelevant. As stated, I don’t need to demonstrate the ontology of the number 5 to make my point – if you want to compare ‘God’ to the number 5, be my guest – the number 5 has no motive force. I am assuming that you do exist and, therefore, you are a material entity. Even allowing for an imperfect understanding of materiality, people can still be recognised to be material entities. Again, if you are trying to make an argument, I suggest that you do so.

>>>”Rather than define God (i.e. fill a label with meaning), we can start at the other end by looking at characteristics. That is why I included the brief design argument previously. It is a valid argument and I think the premises are plausible and reasonable – in fact more likely than their contradiction. Thus I find the conclusion to be most likely true. But the conclusion doesn’t mention God, simply a design, and by implication (or by re-wording the argument) a designer.”

And? What are the characteristics to which you refer? The ‘design argument’ you presented is not a theistic argument and does not offer any argument for ‘immateriality’ nor for ‘supernaturalism’. By the approach you seem to be taking, you appear to be (at risk of) arguing that any intelligence greater than ours would, by definition, be deserving of the title ‘God’. Presumably, then, the term ‘God’ could conceivably apply to a robot, itself created by humans? Since this is irrelevant to the ‘God’ of theists, however, it’s of no concern to me.

>>>”Now there are many arguments for the existence of God which I find plausible and reasonable, and each can be worded in such a way as to bring out characteristics rather than using the word “God”. I won’t take up space here with the details, but we can end up with a long list of conclusions such as the universe was caused by something outside the space-time universe, it was designed, there exists a moral “lawgiver”, etc. All of these statements and characteristics would have meaning because a good philosophical argument would define its terms. Then we can decide what label to pin on the phenomenon or entity that those statements and characteristics apply to. Like Aquinas, this I call “God”.

And so we have a “coherent ontological status” for God – and you’ll note it probably wouldn’t even mention “immaterial”!”

Almost all theists consider their ‘God’ to be different, not just by degree, but by kind. Thus, if you want to consider a ‘natural’, ‘material’ entity, such as a robot, to be a ‘God’, then – again – be my guest. But, more fundamentally, we are back in the realm of the Unie…
A: An Unie exists.
B: Prove it!
A: My proof is that objective moral values exist. Therefore an Unie exists.

The argument is absurd and absurdly circular, without any independently existing concept of an Unie, which possesses the necessary characteristics to explain the existence of ‘objective moral values’. Short of this, the idea of the Unie remains nonsensical and does not have any explanatory power, and we could, just as well, have attributed the existence of objective morality to ‘X’.

>>>”I say again, your objections are pedantic and mostly in error (IMO). We can define God well enough, via Wikipedia or the process in #5, at least as well as you can define “material” and my grand-daughter, and way better than your Unies.”

That you find them “pedantic” is merely illustrative of your having not grasped them, I’m afraid, as your most recent post appears to indicate. If you can offer a definition, then please do so and then we can see how it fails to enlighten. The burden of proof is upon you, then, to demonstrate that you can offer some reason – any reason at all – for thinking that the ‘God’ (of the theists) is a ‘something’ rather than a ‘nothing’. Clearly, we can do this with ‘matter/energy’ in a way that cannot be done with ‘God’. If you disagree, then I eagerly await your demonstration. Good luck with that!

1. You say I offered no definition of God, but I offered Wikipedia’s and the Standford Encyclopedia – I am sure you can look them up if you wish. I also offered a process to arrive at a definition of God from the various theistic proofs. You have offered me no reason not to accept either definition.

2. You have offered no new thoughts, no rebuttal of what I said, no definitions of ‘material’ or ‘atheist’ that are not circular, yet you continue to argue that the God definitions are unacceptable to you. You seem not to be worried about the inconsistency in this.

3. You jump sometimes between ontology and epistemology and don’t seem to worry about that inconsistency either.

There are only two reasons I can see for such inconsistency – either you enjoy playing philosophical games just for the heck, or you choose to apply to God a standard of “coherent ontological status” that you don’t apply to any of the other entities I’ve asked you to define, to keep a concept that you find unpalatable at bay.

I suppose I could enjoy the former, but I’d need you to actually be consistent to make it fun. But I couldn’t enjoy the latter – I would rather help you if I could, but I don’t suppose I can.

I don’t see the value in playing games without rules of logic and consistency, so I will thank you for the discussion and find something better to do.

[…] On to the argument from quantum physics. It is not true that virtual particles can come into existence out of nothing: virtual particles exist within a quantum vacuum, which is “a sea of fluctuating energy” governed by physical laws. As astronomer Luke Barnes has stated, the quantum vacuum “has properties. It has energy, it fluctuates, it can cause the expansion of the universe to accelerate, it obeys the (highly non-trivial) equations of quantum field theory. We can describe it. We can calculate, predict and falsify its properties.” It is not nothing. […]

[…] read up further on this subject, I recommend the following articles: On the Origin of Everything, Of Nothing, More Sweet Nothings… window.fbAsyncInit = function() { FB.init({appId: "", status: true, […]

Luke I have to challenge you on your use of quotes from Alan Guth and Alex Vilenkin. It may well be the case the idea of a universe form nothing is quite wrong or meaningless. But to try and imply Lawrence Krauss is somehow at odds with Guth and Vilenkin seems to be utterly misleading. One of the annoying things I found about Krauss’s book was that it was just a repetition of what these two have ben saying for years and years and frustratingly has no mention of other models of the early universe.
I think if one reads the full quote from Guth you will see the true picture of what is being said so Ill type it out in full so your readers will see what’s really being said . The first paragraph talks of Tryons’s vacuum fluctuation model and seems to back what you and David Albert are saying, but if you carry on reading you will see the conclusion Guth reaches is quite different:

(from the Inflationary Universe by Alan Guth (1998 edition page 273):
“In this context, a proposal that universe was created from empty space seems no more fundamental than a proposal that the universe was spawned by a piece of rubber. It might be true but one would still want to ask where the piece of rubber came from.
In 1982, Alexander Vilnkin of Tufts University proposed an extension of Tryon’s idea. He suggested that the universe was created by quantum processes starting from “literally nothing” (Guth italicized this for emphasis) meaning not only the absence of matter, but the absence of space and time as well. This concept of absolute nothingness is hard to understand, because we are accustomed to thinking of space as an immutable background which could not possible be removed. Just as a fish could not imagine the absence of water, we cannot imagine a situation devoid of space and time. At the risk or trying to illuminate the abstruse with the obscure , I mention that one way to understand absolute nothingness is to imagine a closed universe, which has a finite volume, and then imagine decreasing the volume to zero. In any case, whether one can visualize it or not , Vilenkin showed that the concept of absolute nothingness is at least mathematically well defined, and can be used as a starting point for theories of creation.
As with Tryon’s suggestion, Vilenkin’s proposal was based on a quantum description of general relativity. While a completely successful merging of these two theories does not yet exist, we know enough about each theory, Vilenkin took the notion of quantum tunneling: A quantum system can suddenly and discontinuously make a transition from one configuration to another, as long as no conservation law makes the transformation impossible. Putting these ideas together one can imagine that the universe started in the totally empty geometry – absolute nothingness – and then made a quantum tunneling transition to a non empty state. Calculations show that a universe created this way would typically be subatomic in size, but that is no problem. While Tyron had fretted over the implausibility of a quantum fluctuations of cosmic proportions, Vilenkin was able to invoke inflation to enlarge the universe to its current size: ”

Guth quotes in his introduction Lucretius who says “nothing can be created from nothing” and then ends the introduction with saying “it now seems likely the Lucretius was wrong. Conceivably everything can be created from nothing.”

Whilst its true that Vilenkin gives the caveat you state , he is claiming that the laws of physics existed before the universe did. The laws of physics allowed the universe to be created from nothing (The title of the chapter of the book you quote was “A Universe From Nothing”). This might be correct it might be bollocks but it seems misleading in the extreme to somehow contrast it with Krauss. Krauss seems to be making the same claim as Guth and Vilenkin. So what’s the agenda here?

That is confusing! Notice I didn’t quote Guth. I quoted Vilenkin, and in that quote Vilenkin quoted Guth. So what’s happened is:
1. Vilenkin describes his model.
2. Vilenkin says “yet the state of “nothing” cannot be identified with absolute nothingness.”
3. Vilenkin quotes Guth to the same effect.
4. Going over to Guth’s book, Guth follows his quote with a description of Vilenkin’s model.
5. Guth concludes that the state of “nothing” really is absolute nothingness.

I read Guth’s book a long time ago – I might have to read it again. On the face of it, it looks like Guth is making the same equivocation that Krauss is. I (and Vilenkin) agree with the start of Guth’s quote, but not the end!

I’ve tried to find a more recent discussion from Guth. When he discussed creation from nothing in the literature, he puts quotation marks around “nothing” (http://arxiv.org/pdf/1203.6876v1.pdf). I wonder if he’s commented on Krauss’ book ad the resulting discussion ….

Ok so let’s look at that quote you gave from Vilenkin:
“As Alan Guth wrote, “In this context, a proposal that the universe was created from empty space is no more fundamental than a proposal that the universe was spawned by a piece of rubber. It might be true, but one would still want to ask where the piece of rubber came from “
Now let’s look at the next sentence….
“The picture of quantum tunnelling from nothing has none of these problems….Prior to the tunnelling; no space or time exists, so the questions of what happened before is meaningless. Nothing (Vilenkin puts this in italics for emphasis) – a state with no matter, no space and no time- appears to be the only satisfactory starting point for the creation. “
So Vilenkin is saying the same thing as Guth, no surprise as Guth got it from Vilenkin.

Let’s look at the wider picture.
In the 1970’s Tryon suggested the universe might be a vacuum fluctuation. But as the comments in your post suggest that’s not something from nothing. You, Guth,Vilenkin , Barrow , Rees, Albert criticise this idea of something from nothing quite rightly. But it’s a straw man. Guth and Vilenkin are criticising this idea of something from nothing with one they feel is more tenable. They are claiming the original state of the universe is an empty geometry with no space or time, not just no matter. There are no “things” in this empty geometry and so they make a case to describe this as nothing. Whether that’s appropriate or not is maybe an interesting semantic question. But no one can seriously claim as David Albert does that that a universe with space and time coming from a state with no space or time is no different from a first coming from a hand. Moreover this idea is not Krauss’s, it comes form Vilenkin 1982 paper :http://mukto-mona.net/science/physics/a_vilinkin/universe_from_nothing.pdf
“Creation of universe From Nothing “where he used the phrase” the universe is created by quantum tunnelling from literally nothing “
Now Vilenkin is not as well known as Guth, so whilst the idea was Vilenkin’s, Guth has been its champion, going around giving presentations and writing materials claiming the universe may be “The ultimate free lunch”. The idea is most associated then with Guth and Vilenkin, Krauss just got it on youtube. Can you see now why I feel that quoting Guth and Vilenkin against Krauss is misleading? In fact none of your quotes deal with Vilenkins idea; they all deal with Tyron’s idea, but these are not the same.

Kraus makes a claim along the lines of the universe might come from nothing on the front of his book, Vilenkin said the same thing on the back of his book, are we really going to see that as radically different?

One of things I find most disappointing about Krauss’s book is that he totally ignores other models, now that’s a criticism that I think is far more important.
Personally I think cosmology is now exploring others ideas, the idea that universe came from something not nothing. For example Ashketar and others have shown how a quantum bounce can reduce the probability of inflation to 1, gives a smooth transition form contraction to expansion, helps us test a model for quantum gravity and may make predictions for the B mode polarisation. For a review see here:http://arxiv.org/abs/1206.1511
Interestingly the collaborator in the paper you quote with Guth, Yasunori Nomura, recently published a paper arguing the multiverse which Guth claims must have a beginning has no such thing so it could not have come from nothing http://arxiv.org/abs/1205.5550
I would much sooner see Guth’s reaction to this than to semantic issue of what we define as “nothing”.

Hi Luke, I happened to be reading the transcript of the debate between Craig and Krauss and I noticed this passage form Krauss
“quantum mechanics tells us that space and time themselves, not the space in which these things are appearing, but space itself spontaneously appears. There was no space, there was no time. And a region of space and time spontaneously appears. It’s very different than the quantum fluctuations that are happening in empty space in which Dr. Craig talked about. I agree: that’s not complete nothing. It’s a version of nothing, in itself. It’s so remarkable we should be amazed by it. But quantum gravity says that space and time can come out of nothing, so that where there’s no space, no time. “

Now lets look at your quote
“Now let’s look at Krauss’ claims again. Does it make sense to say that there are different types of not anything? That not anything is not stable? This is bollocks. What Krauss is really talking about is the quantum vacuum. The quantum vacuum is a type of something. It has properties..”

Now Luke I observe two things:
1) First off you made a straw man argument of what Kraus was saying .
His argument is not as simple as particles pop out of a vacuum and ehcen so did the universe. He’s repeating the same sort of claim that Vilenkin is making. Space and time can tunnel into existence from a state of no space and time. Clearly not a fluctuation from the vacuum.

2) The claim made by Krauss is identical to the claim made by Guth and Vilenkin.
Now it seems to me you are an honest/intelligent bloke that maybe didn’t sit through some of the same lectures other have many years ago so perhaps you are unaware of these ideas although.if you’ve read guths and Vielnkins books you should be, I also noticed them in a rather popular first year undergraduate text bookhttp://www.amazon.co.uk/Introduction-Modern-Cosmology-2nd-Edition/dp/0470848359
Do you not think it would be appropriate to either (a) apologise to Dr Krauss for implying he is talking “bollocks” and is guilty of “sloppy thinking” or (b) make exactly the same accusation against Guth and Vilenkin. I really don’t see how any other course of action is appropriate and I hope you are the bigger man to not simply ignore this important point and hope no one notices.

I’m getting rather familiar with Liddle’s textbook – I’ll be using it as the class text when I give the third year cosmology lectures later this semester. Liddle’s brief discussion on page 113 is a good example of the equivocation on the word “nothing” I highlighted in my post. He says:

“One possibility is that the Universe originated by quantum tunnelling … The most puzzling aspect of that is that since time and space do not exist independently of the Universe, the tunnelling must be from nothing. Meaning not just empty space, but from a state where space and time had yet to exist!”

Now, that last sentence is literally self-contradictory – the word “yet” is temporal. But ignoring that, the most important point is that his definition of “nothing” is “a state where space and time had yet to exist”. I assume that he is using the word “state” in its physics-jargon sense, meaning a complete specification of a physical system, like a point in phase space or a vector in Hilbert space. In that case, a state is a description of something. The fact that, in an ultimate theory of nature, there may be states to which no time and space can be assigned, but which lead to time-ful and space-ful states doesn’t mean that something has come from nothing.

When Krauss says: “But quantum gravity says that space and time can come out of nothing, so that where there’s no space, no time”, he’s making the same mistake. Maybe space and time can come out of no space, no time, but in quantum field theory the ultimate stuff of the universe is quantum fields, so it cannot (logically cannot!) describe a scenario in which fields come from no fields. I’m not sure what quantum gravity theory Krauss is thinking of, but the same applies to all of them: string theory cannot describe ‘no strings -> strings’, loop quantum gravity cannot describe ‘no loops -> loops’. David Albert said this particularly well in his review of Krauss’ book:

“The particular, eternally persisting, elementary physical stuff of the world, according to the standard presentations of relativistic quantum field theories, consists (unsurprisingly) of relativistic quantum fields. And the fundamental laws of this theory take the form of rules concerning which arrangements of those fields are physically possible and which aren’t, and rules connecting the arrangements of those fields at later times to their arrangements at earlier times, and so on — and they have nothing whatsoever to say on the subject of where those fields came from, or of why the world should have consisted of the particular kinds of fields it does, or of why it should have consisted of fields at all, or of why there should have been a world in the first place. Period. Case closed. End of story.”

My argument is that any physical theory must start with basic elementary stuff, and then postulate how the stuff can be arranged and what the stuff can do. Maybe time and space aren’t elementary stuff. Fine. Maybe we can get space and time to emerge from spaceless and timeless elementary stuff. Fine. But whether it’s particles or spacetime or universes being produced, this isn’t something from nothing, and it doesn’t and can’t tell us where the elementary stuff of the universe came from.

(Perhaps you’re assuming that fields can only exist in empty space, so to create empty space is to create quantum fields and thus to create the basic stuff of the universe. If that is the case, then we cannot use quantum field theory to describe a state with no space, and so we cannot describe how ‘no space – > space’.)

What Vilenkin’s models show, as best I understand them, is that the probability of an inflating region of spacetime being created in a volume, in certain circumstances, is independent of the size of the volume. In particular, the volume can be arbitrarily small. At best, it describes something out of not much, but it doesn’t describe something out of nothing, and it certainly doesn’t explain why there is anything at all. I read the relevant section of Vilenkin’s book as an admission of this point, though I should probably read it again. Vilenkin’s 1992 paper “Quantum origin of the universe” (http://adsabs.harvard.edu/abs/1982PhLB..117…25V) says explicitly: “I shall discuss a model in which the universe is created by quantum tunnelling from “nothing”, where by “nothing” I mean a state with no classical space time … “nothing” is a pure space-time foam, without any classical space-time substrate”. Elsewhere (http://prd.aps.org/pdf/PRD/v27/i12/p2848_1) Vilenkin says: “”Nothing” is the realm of unrestrained quantum gravity; it is a rather bizarre state in which all our basic notions of space, time, energy, entropy, etc. lose their meaning.” Vilenkin’s constant qualifier of “when I say nothing I really mean …” I take as acknowledgement that his use of the word “nothing” is hyperbole, that he is not really talking about “not-anything”. Guth, I’m still not sure.

Still, if Vilenkin and Guth are making the same mistake as Krauss, then so be it.

Luke I think you are misunderstanding my point. I am not arguing that the universe came from nothing or that said cosmologists are correct call their models something from nothing. I have never claimed that, in fact I think Ive already mentioned that I think cosmology is now shifting emphasis to a universe from something for example bouncing universe scenarios as in LQC. So I don’t see the relevance of your reply.
What I am arguing is that you were incorrect to imply that Krauss was simply arguing that nothing = quantum vacuum and you were incorrect to imply that Krauss was saying something different to Guth and Vilenkin. I believe I’ve presented all the evidence needed to make these point and I haven’t seen either a clear admission that I’m correct or contrary evidence to show I’m incorrect. I was hoping you would be able to do one of these two, guess not.
Btw glad you are using Liddle, it’s always goo d when students don’t have to pay extortionate amounts for text books.

[…] it has physical properties – which means that it isn’t nothing. As cosmologist Luke Barnes has argued, “if what you are talking about has properties, then it is not nothing.” And for Krauss to add […]