Saturday, 27 April 2013

The road forward with China

India must keep talking, while building more border roads

India's
ongoing build-up along the Line of Actual Control (LAC), the de facto border
with China, has run into trouble at Daulat Beg Oldi in Ladakh, where - as in
the lead-up to 1962 - its operational ambitions have outpaced the
country's logistics. Today, a strong patrol from the People's Liberation Army
(PLA) has parked itself on territory India claims, benefiting from easy access
over a good Chinese road across the Depsang Plains. Meanwhile, the Indian
army's access to that area is mainly through a recently reactivated,
weather-dependent landing ground. Without the ability to build up force, the
army has little choice but to negotiate. The PLA will demand operational
concessions, most likely the withdrawal of Indian defences in some other
contested sector.

While
it is necessary to acknowledge this tactical weakness, it must not be allowed
to persist. Over the preceding decade, New Delhi has taken steps to translate
India's long-standing disadvantage on the LAC into parity. Additional forces
have been sanctioned, including a mountain strike corps, two mountain divisions
and two armoured brigades; and forces have been relocated to the LAC from
Kashmir and the Indo-Pakistan border. Air power and air defence capabilities
have been greatly enhanced and a network of roads sanctioned.

But little of
this has come up on the ground yet, especially communications infrastructure.
Without a road network, the cruel Himalayan terrain reduces even the largest
divisions to isolated groups of soldiers sitting on widely separated hilltops.
For decades, New Delhi has failed to speed up road building, blaming in turn
state governments for not providing land; the environment ministry for blocking
construction; the Border Roads Organisation (BRO) for lacking capacity to take
on so many projects at the same time; geological difficulties; and even the
Chinese for blocking road construction close to the border.

New
Delhi must initiate an emergency inter-agency drive to cut through the
difficulties and cut the roads through the hills. A Strategic Roads Plan
already exists, crafted by Shyam Saran, a former special advisor to the prime
minister who invested years of tramping around the borders into this
comprehensive document. The BRO roads, the Pradhan Mantri Gram Sadak Yojana and
the special border area schemes need to be coordinated to optimise effort and
expense. And a high-powered government panel, perhaps a group of ministers
(GoM), must be charged with implementing the scheme in a time-bound manner.

Until this network of new Indian roads substantially changes the military equation
on the ground, India has little choice but to hasten softly in its military
build-up. Beijing's proposal to freeze troop levels on the LAC stems from the
confidence that its enviable infrastructure in Tibet acts as a force
multiplier, permitting its relatively small number of troops to concentrate and
disperse rapidly, running rings around India's immobile pickets. While Beijing
can appear reasonable in asking for troop levels to be frozen, it cannot
legitimately request a freeze on road building, which also benefits border
populations. And as India changes ground realities, it must face the current
ones, too - and keep talking with the Chinese army to ensure that tensions do
not get out of hand.

7 comments:

Perhaps a strong and more decisive center is required.The way northeast has been completely neglected (how many PMs after independence have visited NE states and how often) it would not be a surprise if we see NE become another Kashmir.

Having cross-crossed the landscape with roads and rail, they have the room to out-maneuver India both in the field and in the political/diplomatic space. Further, Indian citizens in these border areas enrich Chinese businesses by purchasing their goods and services because Indian goods are inaccessible.

Economically, strategically and politically connectivity is vital. Like Napolean, the Chinese are the ones choosing the field of battle and forcing India to respond on their terms. That brazenness and bravado is only supported by ability and hubris. Let them keep their hubris and let us match their ability.

You miss the whole goddamned point. Strong and more decisive Center? When was the last time we had a 'Strong and more decisive Center'? It is not the question of the political affiliation of the people in power. It is more a question of diet. A vegetarian is a vegetarian is a vegetarian. Our national animal is the tiger but we worship the cow. We are cows. I am sorry but we will continue to be screwed till we stop eating grass and green vegetables which only cows eat.

I appreciate your calm and reasoned response. At the same time, a country with a strong will would not just make a counter buildup but also force a Chinese withdrawal, despite the difficult logistics. I realise we have a very bad history with logistics in the Himalayas 1959-62, not to speak of general like Kaul who maintained determined infantry did not need artillery. Make 10 An-32 flights a day if neccessary; prepare to use airpower if neccessary; work day and night to extend roads and tracks if neccessary. But just do it. Of course, as your other readers have said, the will is lacking, which is why we're in this mess in the first place.

How many of these improvements in terms of paper approvals have actually translated to real improvements?Can you provide more info on that..I mean over the past week weve been told the IAF ALGs are decrepit