The Categorization of Conflict

DAVID FASTABEND

From Parameters, Summer 1997, pp. 75-87.

The UN forces in Bosnia had called it "celebratory
fire." The Implementation Force (IFOR) commanders renamed it "indisciplined
fire." The men of the 1st Armored Division called it "a bad thing."
Uncertain of the welcome of Croat, Serb, or Muslim factions in the tense,
initial days of Operation Joint Endeavor, the "Iron Soldiers"
of the 1st Armored did not appreciate Kalishnikovs shattering the air in
commemoration of Ramadan, the Serbian Orthodox New Year, or the whim of
indisciplined celebrators.

On 21 January 1996, an AK-47 let loose near a US dismounted patrol in
the Zone of Separation. As rounds ripped through the troop formation of
D Company, 3d Battalion, 5th Cavalry, the soldiers realized that this fire
was not celebratory and instinctively sought cover. Tumbling behind
the protection of their overwatching M2 Bradley Fighting Vehicle, the patrol
chambered rounds and brought their weapons off safe.

The rules of engagement were to "use only the minimum force
necessary to defend yourself." But they also authorized deadly
return of fire: "You may open fire against an individual who fires
or aims his weapon at you, friendly forces, or persons with designated
special status under your protection." The distraction of AK-47
rounds slamming off the side of the Bradley may have added microseconds
to the decision process. But in microseconds this post-Cold War engagement
was over. The attacker was an elderly, intoxicated civilian. Local residents
rushed out of their homes and wrestled him to the ground. They were thoroughly
apologetic for their inebriated neighbor. The patrol disarmed him, detained
him, and turned him over to local police authorities. D Company, 3-5 Cav,
then continued its reconnaissance into the New World Order.

That night at our mess table in Tuzla Base, we relentlessly dissected
the day's incident. We felt no shame in this, for as members of the Combined
Arms Assessment Team, second-guessing was our job.[1]

"This was a very bad thing." declared one observer. "That
Bradley should have traversed turret and hosed down that guy, his house,
and his neighbors' houses left and right. This is a peace enforcement
mission. Too bad for the drunk, but with such a clear violation of the
Agreement[2] he had it coming. Immediate, decisive reaction would have
sent a clear signal to all the factions that the kinder and gentler days
of the UN are over. Now the factions will declare open season on IFOR."

"No," argued another observer, "this was a very good
thing. We can hardly convince the factions that compliance with the Agreement
is to their benefit if neighborhoods go up in smoke every time somebody
makes a mistake. This is a peace keeping mission. Whatever faction
that guy belonged to would hardly view us as neutral if we hosed him down.
Yeah--he had it coming. But that would not be the perception of his group.
By either prudence or indecision, Delta 3-5 Cav preserved our neutrality
today."

"Actually," offered a third party, "it is debatable whether
this is a peace keeping or a peace enforcement mission. If
you believe that all these factions accept the legitimacy of the General
Framework Agreement for Peace, then this is peacekeeping. But we all know
that their attitudes vary widely. I doubt that our senile, trigger-happy
friend today has ever even heard of the Dayton Accords."

Our conversation touched on much that night, from the strategic potential
of tactical actions to God's proclivity to look out for drunks. We were
revisiting an enduring Army debate: the categorization of conflict. As
illustrated in the above anecdote, diverse interpretations of category--peace
keeping vice peace enforcement--can lead to disparate judgments
and conclusions. On a broader scale, conflict, war, operations
other than war, and other ways of categorizing military activity can
similarly influence our perceptions and our actions. How did we arrive
at these fundamental categorizations? Are our current categories about
right? Can we do better? The initial draft of the 1998 revision of FM 100-5,
Operations, suggests that we can.

Categorical Thinking

We categorize continuously and for good reason. There are immense benefits
to categorical thinking. If athletes are preparing for a weekend game,
for example, it is helpful to know that the general category of sport will
be football. With the declaration of a particular sport comes a
useful framework of football theory, procedures, and expected behavior.
Categorization both narrows the universe of potential problems and expedites
their solution.

Although there are benefits to categorical thinking, there are limits
as well. Categories may not neatly model the underlying reality. A team
that shows up ready to play football may face disaster if the game turns
out to be soccer. A team that trains for either football or soccer
might be handicapped confronting opponents who play both football
and soccer simultaneously. This metaphor is leading, of course, to our
post-Cold War dilemma. No one can say with certainty who we'll play next
weekend, or what the game will be.

How We Slice It

Many of our doctrinal disputes over the last two decades have been associated
with the categorization of conflict. People appear to care, and care vehemently,
about "how we slice it."

The premiere categorical controversy of the 1980s was intense; more
specifically, it was about intensity. Job One of the Cold War was
the "big war": the defense of Western Europe against attack by
the Warsaw Pact, whether conventional, nuclear, or both. But outside this
principal focus on Armageddon lay Vietnam, the Arab-Israeli wars, and a
seemingly endless series of insurgencies and disturbances that distracted
our attention and appeared to merit recognition in doctrine. Enter the
spectrum of conflict, in which we attempted to categorize conflict
by its intensity: high, medium, or low.

Some officers may pine for the days of the Cold War, but few lament
the demise of the spectrum of conflict. The notion of low-intensity conflict
(LIC) drew paradoxically intense criticism. A sampling:

Lieutenant Colonel John Fulton of the School of Advanced Military Studies
argued that in creating LIC, "the doctrine community may be creating
a doctrinal foster home for orphaned warfare concepts. . . . LIC's definition
is too broad, and the category is too large."[3]

Colonel Dennis Drew of Air University found it to be a "dismally
poor title for a type of warfare in which thousands die, countless more
are physically or psychologically maimed and, in the process, the fate
of nations hangs in the balance."[4]

General John R. Galvin stated, "The simple classification into
high and low intensity conflict can be dangerous if it inhibits our understanding
of what the fighting is all about."[5]

In addition to a cottage industry of anguished essays and doctrinal
food fights, the spectrum of conflict category generated real operational
problems. Allied and partner nations were offended to find themselves the
object of only low-intensity support, particularly when their fate
did indeed "hang in the balance." The term was irretrievably
wed to Cold War counterinsurgency,[6] even though its technical definition
was much broader. Finally, the term was absent from the lexicon of the
Department of State and other interagency participants.[7]

Although the Army and Air Force had been comfortable enough with the
term to organize the Army-Air Force Center for Low Intensity Conflict (CLIC)
at Langley Air Force Base, Virginia, LIC's debut in joint doctrine was
short-lived. A test version of Joint Publication 3-07, Doctrine for
Joint Operations in Low Intensity Conflict, met with such enthusiastic
protest that the Army-Air Force Center for Low Intensity Conflict abandoned
its namesake term in the final publication. The 1986 version of Unified
Action Armed Forces (JCS Pub 2), meanwhile, charged the joint community
with preparation for two general categories of activity, "effective
prosecution of war" and "military operations short of war."[8]
In 1990, the test version of JCS Pub 3-0, Operations, proffered
an operational continuum of three "general states" of
peacetime competition, conflict, and war within which
various types of military operational activities are conducted.[9]

The Army, too, was reluctant to give the spectrum of conflict top billing.
Although it had introduced the term to doctrine in the 1981 FM 100-20,
Low Intensity Conflict, only the high end of the spectrum was of
real interest in the 1982 and 1986 versions of the keystone doctrinal statement,
FM 100-5, Operations. In the 1993 revision of FM 100-5, however,
the Army undertook a deliberate expansion in the scope of its keystone
doctrine. The fundamentals of Army operations (Chapter 2) presented a range
of military operations encompassing war and operations other
than war, and closely paralleled the draft JCS Pub 3-0 with three states
of the environment: war, conflict, and peacetime.
The topic of operations other than war was given its own chapter
and even its own set of principles.

The latest surge of joint doctrinal activity brings the saga up to date.
The joint community abandoned the operational continuum model of the test
version of JCS Pub 3-0, even though the Army had institutionalized it in
FM 100-5. The 1995 version of JCS Pub 3-0 established a bifurcated range
of military operations, consisting of war and military operations
other than war.[10] The latter category, Military Operations Other
Than War (MOOTW), was further articulated to differentiate those actions
involving the use or threat of force from those that do not.

Joint Pub 3-07, Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than
War, was approved in June 1995. The next month, however, at their July
1995 conference, the regional commanders-in-chief (CINCs) decided "we
should minimize the term MOOTW in our messages and publications."[11]
In an August 1995 unclassified message the Director of the Joint Staff
noted, "Improper usage of the term military operations other than
war can create confusion and may imply there is a diminished need to provide
for the security of US/multinational forces."[12]

Categorical Discontent

Categorical contentment continues to elude us. On its surface, the current
distinction between war and military operations other than war
appears explicit and simple. The devil, as usual, is in the details. First
come the concerns of the intellectual purists, who are reluctant to define
the MOOTW phenomenon by what it is not. Once past the discomfort
of definition by negation, however, one could proceed to the doctrinal
definition of war, understanding that military operations other
than war include everything else. If only we could agree on a definition
of war. . . .

The 1993 revision of FM 100-5 defines war as "a state of open and
declared armed hostile conflict between political units such as states
or nations; may be limited or general in nature."[13] Yet there is
no definition of war in joint doctrine, and that is intentional.[14] The
FM 100-5 definition, moreover, is hopelessly at odds with the 1993 operational
continuum of peace, conflict, and war.

This ambiguity with respect to war and conflict is not restricted to
the military. An Associated Press article in late 1996 complained of the
wide disparity in current accounting of conflicts and war. The National
Defense Council Foundation reported "a conflictive world" of
64 "hot spots." The Center for Defense Information listed 27
active conflicts. The CIA announced a total of 28.[15]

One potential clarification would be a constitutional approach that
accepts war as whatever the Congress declares it to be. This approach,
however, could bring the term war to obsolescence, since by this
definition all military operations since World War II have been military
operations other than war. Michael Howard commented on this ambiguity
in The Lessons of History:

It is quite possible that war in the sense of major, organized conflict
between highly developed societies may not recur. . . . Nevertheless violence
will continue to erupt within developed societies as well as underdeveloped,
creating situations of local armed conflict often indistinguishable from
traditional war.[16]

Former Chief of Staff of the Army General Gordon Sullivan remarked on
the distinctions between war and MOOTW:

Their simplicity can be seductive. Categorizing "war" as separate
from all other uses of force may mislead the strategist, causing him to
believe that the conditions required for success in the employment of military
force when one is conducting "war" differ from use of military
force in "operations other than war."[17]

For all the agony and good intentions associated with bringing Operations
Other Than War (OOTW) into the house of doctrine in the 1993 revision of
FM 100-5, the Army has gained little approbation. Some view the inclusion
of OOTW under the roof of keystone doctrine as a serious dilution of our
warrior ethos. Others, however, view the OOTW chapter in the 1993 FM 100-5
as mere lip service. In their perspective, OOTW was brought into the house
of doctrine, but then perniciously quarantined in a back closet with its
own unique principles and special considerations, reinforcing the perception
of OOTW as being completely "other than" what we do as an Army.

Nor has the Army's lone, dogged effort in its operational continuum
(peace, conflict, war) to redefine conflict as a state between peace
and war gained favor with the passage of time. FM 100-5 states that
conflict is "characterized by hostilities to secure strategic
objectives" but does not volunteer how such activity is distinct from
war. It is simply too ambitious, moreover, to hope that a doctrinal
definition can reverse centuries of usage in the English language in which
conflict has always been a broader notion that encompasses war as one form
of conflict.[18]

The category controversy, now over a decade in duration, was given new
energy in late 1995 when the Army's Training and Doctrine Command issued
a message citing the August 1995 Joint Staff directive to minimize the
use of MOOTW:

The term "OOTW" has served us well to provide increased visibility
for new types of operations over the past several years. We have reached
a point in our post-Cold War doctrinal development so we can speak with
more precision about Army operations in peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance,
peacemaking, and other specific missions. Since "OOTW" has served
its purpose, we should begin to retire the term, while maintaining and
enlarging the vital lessons learned in specific areas.[19]

The message went on to explain that the intent was not "to replace
the term with another buzz word, or eliminate it outright. Simply want
to let Army use of it fade away over a period of several years."[20]

The TRADOC Commander's OOTW philosophy arguably became the most widely
distributed "personal for" message in Army history, generating
a controversy within the doctrine community that refuses to "fade
away." Those who have resisted the dichotomy between war and OOTW
rejoice. Another group, suffering from what can only be characterized as
"categorization combat fatigue," have little stomach to revisit
the wrenching debates of the past. They will typically admit that there
are deficiencies in the term, but they have no confidence that there is
a magic alternative phrase awaiting discovery. Their cynicism may have
been borne out in the intervening months, because although the TRADOC message
specifically eschewed replacing OOTW "with another buzz word,"
the Army instinct for categorization was irrepressible. A draft revision
of FM 100-20 was labeled "Stability and Support Operations,"
precipitating the rumor that SASO would replace OOTW. Finally, some in
the doctrine community are legitimately concerned that it was the Army
that conceived the term and sold it to the joint doctrine community. It
would be unseemly, in their opinion, to walk away. To parody their protest
somewhat: "It's too late. The Army sold this term to the joint community.
They adopted it, and so did many of our allies and multinational partners.
We can't think about this anymore."

Comprehensive Doctrine: FM 100-5, Operations (1998)

But think about it we must, for the Army has initiated yet another revision
of FM 100-5, Operations. The revision cannot ignore the categorization
issue, moreover, because the initiating directive includes guidance to
"Fold . . . military activities short of general war into the body
of Army operational doctrine and not treat them as separate. . . . [T]he
term OOTW should not appear."[21] At the same time, Army Chief of
Staff General Dennis Reimer and Army Secretary Togo West have declared
that "America's Army is a capabilities-based force" that "does
not pick its missions and must, therefore, remain capable across the full
spectrum of requirements."[22] The 1998 revision of FM 100-5 must
be a comprehensive doctrine that establishes our best thinking on the conduct
of operations across this entire "spectrum of requirements."

There is a growing perception in the US Army that "operations are
operations." Whether those operations occur in a strategic environment
of war or other than war is not uniformly significant. For
political and diplomatic leadership it is a vital distinction. For an operational
lawyer, it is noteworthy. For a soldier in 3-5 Cav trying to crawl inside
his flak jacket, however, it is irrelevant. Soldiers do what they are told
to do, and doctrine should offer the best available thought on what it
will take to accomplish the given task.

The initial coordinating draft of the 1998 revision of FM 100-5 proposes,
therefore, that although there are advantages to categorical thinking,
there are limits as well. There are fundamental ideas--principles, tenets,
functions, guidance for command, planning, execution, and logistics--applicable
across the entire range of "the things we do." They are addressed
without categorization. There are other aspects--purposes, phases, types
of maneuver, and imperatives--unique to various categories of activity.
The draft revision identifies those general categories and their associated
particulars. Comprehensive doctrine must strike a balance, simultaneously
illuminating what is common and what is unique across the range of operations.
(See Figure 1 below.)

Figure 1. Common and Unique Elements of Operations.

The draft revision applies the purpose of an operation to distinguish
four general categories: offense, defense, stability,
and support.

Offensive operations are those undertaken to carry the fight to the
enemy. They are the decisive form of warfare--the commander's ultimate
means of imposing his will on the enemy.

Defensive operations are those undertaken to cause an enemy attack
to fail. Alone they achieve no decision; they must ultimately be combined
with or followed by offensive action.

Stability operations apply military power to influence the political
environment, facilitate diplomacy, and disrupt specified illegal activities.
They may involve the threat or use of force.

Support operations provide essential supplies and services to assist
designated groups. They are conducted mainly to relieve suffering and assist
civil authorities in response to crises. Support operations are characterized
by lack of an active opponent.

The draft revision addresses each category of operations in its own
chapter, elaborating the unique purpose, types, phases, and imperatives
of the relevant category.

Just as important as the idea of category is the notion of combinations
of these categories. "Pure" operations in any of the offensive,
defensive, stability, and support categories will be a rarity. Units typically
implement combinations of these categories over time and across echelons
of command.

Across the time span of an operation, a force may shift emphasis from
one operational category to another. Initial Desert Shield deployments
of Third US Army were primarily a stability operation to deter Saddam Hussein
and reassure our allies. Soon we had a force strong enough to defend
Saudi Arabia and compel him to remain in Kuwait. With Desert Storm we transitioned
to an offensive operation that compelled him to leave Kuwait, and support
operations were subsequently required to meet the needs of the citizens
of Kuwait and northern Iraq.

The combination of categories is also evident across the vertical echelons
of command and control. A headquarters will often have subordinate units
conducting different operations, yet all operating in the context of the
higher commander's intent. A corps, for example, may be conducting an offensive
operation in its main effort, while several brigades conduct a defense.
Some units may be engaged in a stability operation in the corps rear areas,
or even support operations for battlefield refugees.

At senior levels, commanders will almost invariably be exercising combinations
of these categories of operations. When assigned a mission, therefore,
a commander analyzes the factors of the situation to determine how and
to what degree the categories are to be incorporated into the overall concept
of the operation. No category is left unconsidered, and the potential to
transition rapidly from one general category to another is ever-present.

The 1998 revision will follow the joint lead and abandon the attempt
to treat conflict as a tool of categorization. Two important refinements
will enrich the treatment of conflict in Army doctrine. The first will
be the recognition that linkage pervades all aspects of conflict. The draft
acknowledges linkage across three complementary spheres of influence, or
domains, of conflict: the physical, the informational, and
the moral.

In the physical domain, human beings and their machines move and fight.

In the informational domain, military activities influence the ability
to acquire, use, protect, manage, and deny enemy use of data and information.
This is the realm of the electromagnetic spectrum and information warfare.

The moral domain is the domain of perception, ideas, beliefs, and commitment.
It is in the moral domain, where we shape the will of an adversary, that
military operations are ultimately won or lost.

These domains are presented as simultaneous, completely interdependent
aspects of the conflict environment, not as tools of categorization. They
reinforce the linkage of Army, joint, multinational, and interagency activity
in strategy, operations, and tactics.

Second, comprehensive doctrine requires a comprehensive set of principles.
The draft revision of FM 100-5 proposes a fused set of principles of
operations. Many of the valuable ideas associated with the 1993 principles
of operations other than war were salvaged as imperatives in the appropriate
stability or support operations chapters.

The Coming Debate

The initial coordinating draft proposals described above are but an
opening argument. The Army should welcome a debate on the fundamental issue
of categorization, for a vigorous dialogue will be essential for a sound,
collective understanding in doctrine. Some aspects of that debate are already
visible.

"Comprehensive doctrine is a mistake."

Some will argue that the very notion of comprehensive doctrine is a
mistake. They might contend that doctrine should not prepare the Army for
operations which they view as bad policy, diplomacy and national strategy
notwithstanding. Doctrine should address only actual combat, for, they
fear, non-combat activities dilute the warrior ethos and overall readiness:

The ability of the restructured force to fight and win two regional
conflicts is suspect. One big reason for this is the focus on OOTW, and
the debilitating effect such operations have on the capability of the military
to be combat ready, deployable, and psychologically able to fight.[23]

This is a politically charged issue, and the Army should certainly review
the training and readiness implications associated with our recent deployments.
But it is not clear that these requirements are completely counter to readiness
for combat. The current assessment of our Bosnia deployment, for example,
is that proficiency for large-scale maneuver by battalion and brigade declines
after extensive commitment in such operations. But many small-unit skills
are reinforced, as noted by a brigade commander in Bosnia:

I read a lot that would indicate that folks within the Army think we're
losing a lot of our skills in terms of heavy operations. Some of that's
obviously true. But crews are spending lots of time in Bradleys and tanks.
The artillery community is working hard here. We do daily hip shoots--dry.
Much work is being done to keep those skills up to a high level. The engineers
have never worked as hard as they do in this sector. These guys do more
combat engineering in a month than most engineers do in an entire career--with
mine clearance overwatch, route clearance, construction of cantonment areas--the
base camps--they're stressed out. And within this command post, the planning
process has not suffered a bit . . . I think this brigade could transition
to heavy operations in short order.[24]

Many of the nay-sayers believe that stability operations and support
operations are squishy, unmanly duty, but those who have been more directly
involved dispute that perception. Commenting on his Operation Joint Endeavor
experience, an officer of the 1st Armored Division noted, "It would
be incorrect to describe that mission as a peacekeeping operation. It's
far more accurate to characterize it as a combat operation in which no
shots were fired."[25]

It is not clear, moreover, that the notion of readiness for a comprehensive
range of strategic requirements is a radical departure for our doctrine.
The following citation from doctrine seems remarkably current:

United States military forces must be able to operate effectively across
the spectrum of war, in any area where conflict may occur, and under any
foreseeable restraints, employing their military power selectively in accordance
with assigned missions and prescribed limitations. The force they apply
must be both adequate to, and consistent with, assigned objectives. United
States military forces must, therefore, be capable of operating effectively
throughout the world in . . . wars in infinite combinations of locale,
intensity, duration, and participants.[26]

The fact that the above citation is from the 1962 version of
FM 100-5, Operations, tells us that this is not the first time that
the Army has perceived the need for comprehensive doctrine.

"OOTW is a good category. Leave it alone."

Others will argue that comprehensive doctrine is not a mistake, and
that OOTW is a useful categorization. The defenders of OOTW have two authentic
motivations. First, they fear that loss of the label signals a concomitant
loss of attention and resources for the activities associated with it.
Second, they point out the utility of affording a clear distinction that
reinforces the military strategic role short of war.

A careful examination of the 1998 revision should allay the first concern.
The equal treatment of the four categories of operations significantly
mainstreams these activities, freeing them from "other than"
status. The second concern is legitimate, but it does not follow that a
strategic distinction such as war and other than war has
similar utility at the operational and tactical levels. To attempt to draw
tactical implications from a strategic descriptor--an ambiguous one at
that--simply will not do.

There is evidence, in fact, that the label can have some unfavorable
consequences. During the early phases of the train-up for Operation Joint
Endeavor, trainers at the Combat Maneuver Training Center in Hohenfels,
Germany, found that units slated for duty in Bosnia initially tended to
overlook fundamental requirements associated with intelligence preparation
of the battlefield, fire planning, and security. Trainers reported that
many units assumed these combat activities were not relevant to an "other
than war" situation. This perception was corrected, but the consequences
of a mere label cannot be dismissed.

"Categorize by combat."

Recognizing that a strategic distinction between war and OOTW is problematic
at the tactical level, others are prepared to use tactical distinctions
as the basis of categorization. Combat and non-combat is
an alluring way to categorize operations, for there is widespread agreement
that the use or threat of violence dramatically alters the nature of human
activity. Fair enough. This distinction is present (but often overlooked)
in the joint doctrine elaboration of MOOTW activities, and it is the basis
for discriminating between stability operations and support operations
in the draft revision of FM 100-5. But combat, real or potential, is so
interwoven with non-combat activities in most military operations that
it is an impractical means of categorization. To categorize by combat would
suggest that D Company, 3-5 Cav, was on a non-combat operation until
the drunk staggered into his front yard and started firing; then the operation
instantly transmuted to combat. It is impossible to associate substantive
planning and execution guidance with such a fleeting, transient model of
categorization. As Major General Carl F. Ernst noted in the Joint Task
Force Somalia After Action Report, "All commanders must believe they
are always only a heartbeat away from a gunfight."[27]

"This is embarrassing."

It was the Army that sold the joint community and our multinational
partners on "OOTW." How, then, can we walk away from the term?

Have we no shame? Indeed, this is enough to make even a doctrine-writer
blush. But the history of doctrine is no stranger to false starts. In the
past we have seen claims for the efficacy of the bayonet attack, the marginal
military utility of aeroplanes, and the irrelevancy of conventional forces
in a nuclear age. What can we say? We beg forgiveness and ask for the opportunity
to get on with the search for a better idea.

It is always possible, moreover, that there is room for some creative
tension in our approach to categorization. We have pointed out that the
distinction between war and OOTW is most applicable at the strategic levels
of consideration. The joint community may be prepared to accept the term,
along with its implicit deficiencies, but only the hobgoblin of consistency
would insist that the term must also be imposed on operational and tactical
considerations of land warfare. Consistency is one thing; contradiction
is another. The notion of four categories of operations does not contradict
the joint description of a strategic environment of war or OOTW. It is
entirely possible that an alternative, noncontradictory method of categorization
is more appropriate at the operational and tactical levels.

Categories and Consequences

More than a century ago, the English philosopher F. H. Bradley wrote
that "appearance leaves the world more glorious, if we feel it is
a show of some fuller splendour; but the sensuous curtain is a deception
. . . if it hides some colourless movement of atoms, some . . . unearthly
ballet of bloodless categories."[28] Eight years into the post-Cold
War era, we have a deeper appreciation for the "fuller splendour"
of the complete range of military operations. Our strategic environment
is complex and chaotic, an environment that routinely frustrates the strictures
of bloodless categories.

This frustration will not cause us to resist the impulse to categorical
thinking. Indeed, in times of chaos and complexity, nothing is more instinctive.
But categorization brings consequences. We ignore the logical channeling
and predispositions derived from our categorizations of conflict at great
risk. The proposed revision of FM 100-5 attempts to strike a balance, categorizing
our operations according to purpose, while acknowledging that only agile,
flexible combinations of these categories can meet the complete range of
strategic requirements. Is this about right? Let the debate begin.

How can I read it? How can I comment?

The Initial Draft of the 1998 FM 100-5 was put into Army distribution
on 4 April 1997. To view the complete draft, offer comments, or download
the book, visit the FM 100-5 web site at: http://www-cgsc.army.mil/cdd/f465.htm

Comments can be entered at the web site or sent to the writing team
by fax to 913-758-3309 or DSN 585-3309, or by email to: fm1005@leav-emh1.army.mil

NOTES

1. The Center for Army Lessons Learned organized and dispatched a group
of observers to capture lessons learned--a Combined Arms Assessment Team
(CAAT). The author was Team Chief of CAAT I - Bosnia.

2. The General Framework Agreement for Peace (GFAP), popularly known
as the "Dayton Accords." Task Force Eagle soldiers were encouraged
to use the term GFAP in lieu of "Dayton Accords."

6. One of the first doctrinal uses of the term, in the 1981 FM 100-20,
was focused almost exclusively on counterinsurgency. Over the next several
years, a series of 100-20 Field Circulars expanded the scope of low-intensity
conflict. (Richard M. Swain, "Removing Square Pegs from Round Holes:
Low-Intensity Conflict in Army Doctrine," Military Review,
67 [December 1987]).

14. Action officers involved in attempts to insert explicit definitions
of war in joint doctrine have informed me that legal advisors resist attempts
to define war in order to preserve room for interpretation of military
operations before both Congress and international courts.

18. A message by Colonel (ret.) Peter Herrly on the doctrine "list
serve" (army-doctrine @sc.ist.ucf.edu, 02:56 PM 12/18/95, subject:
"OOTW or What?") offered an insight into the history of the "operational
continuum":

There was a strong effort with an early Army authored draft of Joint
Pub 3-0 to get the Armed Forces to adopt a "continuum" with the
three stages of peace, "conflict," and war. That use of "conflict"
to describe the middle area was fatally flawed--because of the simple fact
that for virtually all Americans "conflict" is a very general
term which ENCOMPASSES "war" (as one form of human conflict).
No general/admiral on the Joint Staff or any other service staff was ever
able to get past the basic problem with taking a normal English word and
distorting it in such a fashion. As General Powell told me when I brought
the whole issue up with him, using "conflict" like that would
require reeducating entire generations of military officers.

19. Commander, TRADOC, Message, "Commander TRADOC's Philosophy
on the Term `Operations Other Than War,'" Personal For Message DTG
272016Z Oct 95. Released by Colonel Robert Killebrew, HQ TRADOC, 31 March
1997.

Colonel David A. Fastabend has served since June 1996 on the FM 100-5
Writing Team at the School of Advanced Military Studies, US Army Command
and General Staff College, Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas. Before his current
assignment he held a War College fellowship as the Army National Security
Fellow at the Hoover Institution, Stanford University. He has commanded
a combat engineer battalion, served as the speechwriter for USCINCPAC,
and written several articles on military doctrine. He is a graduate of
the US Military Academy, the US Army Command and General Staff College,
and the School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS). He holds master's degrees
in civil engineering from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and
in military arts and science from SAMS.