1. Combat Identification contributes to combat effectiveness
by ensuring that military forces can distinguish between friendly,
neutral, and hostile entities in the battlespace. It also provides
assurance against an adversary using similar equipment or employing
ruses such as electronic counter-measures and the wearing of similar
uniforms or civilian attire.

2. The Ministry of Defence (the Department) defines
Combat Identification as a combination of three elements:

Situational Awareness:
Increasing combat effectiveness through the positive identification
of friend from foe via a timely, high fidelity common operating
picture.

Target Identification:
Protecting friendly forces (and neutrals) from inadvertent attack
by their own side (or, at least, minimising the risk of its occurrence)
through the positive identification of all potential targets in
the battlespace.

Tactics, Techniques and Procedures:
Developed to enhance joint Situational Awareness and Target
Identification capability because no purely technical solution
exists.

Figure 1 illustrates how each of the three elements
should combine to provide a balanced solution to the Department's
Combat Identification needs.

3. The Committee took evidence on the findings of
the Comptroller and Auditor General's Report on Combat Identification[1]
from the Permanent Under-Secretary of the Ministry of Defence,
the Director of Joint Warfare, and the Capability Manager (Information
Superiority). Our Report examines three key issues:

Why Combat Identification matters;

Whether appropriate data is gathered on the level
of fratricide;

Why timely decision-making on Combat Identification
is important.

Figure 1: The Combat Identification Equation

4. Our main conclusions are:

All casualties suffered by our Armed Forces are
a serious matter. Casualties among our own or allied troops from
"friendly fire" are a profoundly unfortunate risk of
war as are civilian casualties. In 1992, our predecessors concluded
that the Department should redouble its efforts to secure an agreed
approach to procuring what was then known as an Identification
Friend or Foe system. A decade later, the Department has only
just approved a policy paper on Combat Identification, and many
of the solutions required to implement that policy are years away
from fruition. It is unsatisfactory that the Department has
made such slow progress in developing Combat Identification solutions
to the risks of friendly fire, and it needs to increase the tempo
of its efforts.

In addition to the risks to our Armed Forces,
the absence of an effective Combat Identification capability can
also increase the risk of civilian casualties in conflicts. If
not addressed, public concern about civilian casualties may adversely
affect the willingness of the public to support future operational
deployments. The Department needs to provide a clearer account
than it has done so far of the steps it is taking to reduce the
risk of civilian casualties and when these measures will be in
place.

Most future military operations that our armed
forces undertake are likely to be in coalition with allies, which
obviously complicates combat identification and increases the
risks of friendly fire. The Department needs to develop the
existing methods of co-operation to address these additional risks.

The Department possesses a dearth of data on
the level of fratricide from past operations and exercises, and
undertakes limited analysis of the data that is available. The
Department should produce a database on the level of fratricide,
and ensure that the information gathered is robustly analysed
and disseminated appropriately within the United Kingdom and to
coalition partners.

5. Our detailed conclusions and recommendations are
as follows:

(i) The prevalence of operations with allies
in various coalitions emphasises the importance of the Department
contributing fully to NATO Combat Identification activities. Given
its limited resources and the number of groups that NATO has established
to look into Combat Identification, the Department has undertaken
to review the level of resources it has committed to NATO. The
Department should finish its review before the end of 2002, and
focus its resources where there is most scope to make progress.

(ii) Interoperability with our allies, especially
the United States, is of special importance given the frequent
close involvement of our Armed Forces with allies. In Afghanistan
the Department has regularly reviewed tactics, techniques and
procedures with its American counterparts. The Department should
establish a framework to enable it to reach similar timely agreements
with other NATO and non-NATO allies as operational circumstances
dictate.

(iii) As shown by the evidence from the
Gulf conflict (where one-fifth of casualties were from friendly
fire), the move towards manoeuvre warfare, with a less clearly
defined battlespace and more joint operations, increases the need
of the Department to undertake more analysis of the risks of friendly
fire in joint and coalition operations rather than focussing on
limited single service modelling.

(iv) By expressing the number of friendly
fire casualties as a proportion of troops deployed rather than
a proportion of all casualties, the Department is in danger of
underplaying the implications of such casualties for the morale
of the Armed Forces and the general public. The Department should
consistently measure fratricide as a proportion of overall casualties.

(v) The Bowman communications system will
provide a step-change in capability and be a key enabler for improving
Combat Identification. The Department is now confident that Bowman
is finally on track. Given the programme's long and troubled history,
we will follow the progress of the programme both in meeting its
current in-service date of 2004 and in delivering the promised
operational benefits in our examinations of future Major Projects
Reports.

(vi) The Rapier ground based air defence
system cost some £2 billion to acquire but is not yet fitted
with the Successor Identification Friend or Foe system. To minimise
the consequent risk of friendly fire incidents, Rapier would for
example only function at 25 per cent of its potential capability
in circumstances similar to those in Kosovo. Under more adverse
operational conditions the Department could relax these restrictions,
with attendant risk. Nevertheless, the delay in fitting an Identification
Friend or Foe system could limit the costly Rapier system to well
below its full capability. To minimise the risks of such circumstances
recurring, the Department needs to ensure that all relevant business
cases for equipment programmes explicitly consider Combat Identification
requirements.

(vii) Delays in decisions on acquiring up
to date Identification Friend or Foe capability before the Gulf
War meant that, as a short-term expedient to enable United Kingdom
Forces to co-operate fully with our allies in the air environment,
the system had to be procured as an Urgent Operational Requirement.
The Urgent Operational Requirement was expensive, has led to increased
maintenance costs, and provides another example of the adverse
effects of not explicitly considering Combat Identification requirements
in a timely manner.

(viii) The Successor Identification Friend
or Foe programme is now addressing the capability shortfall in
the air environment but a Combat Identification solution for the
land environment, identified as a requirement following the Gulf
War, will not start to enter service until 2006 at the earliest.
In the meantime, operational circumstances could require the Department
to procure an interim solution, with the associated cost penalties,
in order to play a full part in coalition operations. The Department
should set out clearly its plans for improving Combat Identification
in the land environment, establish firm timescales for each action
and ensure they are consistent with those of potential allies.

6. Historical evidence shows that between ten and
15 per cent of casualties during operations are caused by friendly
fire.[2] The Department
has stated that, in the Gulf, only 0.1 per cent of the force deployed
were killed by fratricide.[3]
Taken as a proportion of overall casualties, however, this figure
rises to nearer 20 per cent.

7. The Department has not undertaken much detailed
analysis on the level of fratricide from past operations and exercises,
and cites a lack of material as the reason. Most information that
does exist is American in origin. What analysis the Department
has done refers to a small number of its training exercises which
were single service and do not reflect the situation across all
environments or across all conflict scenarios. The Department
has said that it is starting to collect information on Combat
Identification from its own exercises as a matter of routine,
although at the time of our hearing few such findings had emerged
from the Saif Sareea II exercise held in Oman during 2001.[4]

8. The Department argue that a move away from attrition
warfare (like the Falklands conflict) to manoeuvre warfare (used
in the Gulf) reduces the risk of fratricide. Yet manoeuvre warfare
by its nature involves risk-taking, with a preference for high-tempo
operations within a fluid battlespace where friend and foe are
not clearly delineated. [5]
The Department has not assessed the risk of friendly fire in joint
and coalition operations although some work has been done with
the United States on its bi-annual Joint Combat Identification
Evaluation Team (JCIET), the latest of which was held in April
2002.[6]

9. In 1992, our predecessor Committee concluded that
the Department should redouble its efforts to secure an agreed
approach to procuring what was then known as an identification
friend or foe system.[7]
A decade later, the Department has only just approved a policy
paper on Combat Identification. In part the problem has changed
and is rather more complex than target identification, given changes
in the nature of warfare and in potential technological solutions;[8]
but progress has still been slow. Whilst the Department can point
to thirteen areas where developments in Combat Identification
have taken place in the past decade, many of the proposed solutions
are years away from fruition as Figure 2 illustrates.[9]

Figure 2: Progress in programmes related to Combat Identification

Programme

Description

Dates of entry into service

Bowman

Secure tactical communications system

2004 onwards

Successor Identification Friend or Foe

Programme to implement Mark XII Modes 4 and S IFF with the potential to upgrade to Mode 5

Long range all weather theatre surveillance and target acquisition system

2004-2008

Battlefield Target Identification (BTID)

A requirement for ground to ground target identification. An advanced concept technology demonstration will take place in 2005

At least 2006

Airborne System for Target Recognition, Identification, and Designation (ASTRID)

A programme improving air-to-surface detection capabilities.

2001-2010

UK Co-operative Engagement Capability (CEC)

Improvement to situational awareness and target identification for ships, which will interoperate with the US Navy

2008 onwards

Single Integrated Air Picture (SIAP)

A US-led programme to develop an interoperable tactical air picture

2001 onwards

Multinational Interoperability Programme (MIP)

A programme involving the UK and nine other nations to facilitate interoperable command and control systems, especially on land

2003

Shared Tactical Ground Picture

Five nation capability integration initiative

2009

10. One of the equipment programmes that will improve Combat Identification
is the Bowman secure tactical communications system, which is
intended to equip forces supporting land operations.[10]
The programme has had a long and troubled history, culminating
in the Department's decision to re-compete the requirement in
2000, and we have commented regularly on the issues involved in
recent years.[11] The
personal role radio, which was brought out of the Bowman requirement,
has recently been successfully introduced into service. The Department
is now confident that Bowman, which will cost £2.2 billion,
will be introduced into service in 2004 on some 20,000 platforms
and that it will greatly enhance situational awareness. Bowman
is intended to enable our armed forces to see where each of the
20,000 platforms and 45,000 radios are situated in the battlespace.[12]

11. In addition to the risks to our own armed forces, the absence
of an effective Combat Identification capability can also increase
the risk of civilian casualties in conflicts, particularly those
of low intensity, where a tank might for example be confused with
a tractor.[13] Research
efforts are being made to improve the ability to positively identify
entities through examining radar signatures or engine characteristics.[14]
Such programmes may improve positive identification by stand-off
platforms such as aircraft, but there is also a need to reduce
the risk of civilian casualties in ground operations, particularly
in built-up areas, where an adversary might try to hide among
the civilian population. Such scenarios potentially exist in many
of the peace support operations currently being undertaken by
our Armed Forces.

12. To achieve a common approach to Combat Identification it is
important that the United Kingdom plays a full role in NATO and
internationally on Combat Identification matters. Included in
the NATO bodies which have an interest in Combat Identification
is its Consultation, Command and Control Organisation which amongst
other issues is charged with ensuring the provision of a NATO-wide
cost effective, interoperable and secure Combat Identification
capability. This body sets Standardisation Agreements for Combat
Identification for member nations to ratify and the Department
has committed to being compliant with these Agreements. The National
Audit Office found that while the Department generally plays a
central role in the work of the NATO Consultation, Command and
Control Organisation it has not always been able to participate
as much as it would like due to a lack of resources. Occasionally
representatives from the Department have not always been able
to take up some positions open to them.[15]

13. Most future military operations that the United Kingdom undertakes
are likely to be in tandem with allies, particularly the United
States. It is vital that the United Kingdom works closely with
all its allies to ensure that all nations have a consistent approach
to Combat Identification in operations. The United States is more
advanced in digitising and therefore locating its forces, so it
may be less important for them to have identification friend or
foe systems than for the United Kingdom.[16]
The need to agree on a common approach between allies therefore
remains, and is particularly pertinent in operations such as those
in Afghanistan that rely heavily on co-operation between air and
ground forces. Recently, for example, four Canadian soldiers were
killed after being mistakenly identified for the enemy by a United
States aircraft.

14. The Department has taken care when deploying troops to Afghanistan
to ensure that the risk of fratricide was minimised through dialogue
with American forces regarding tactics, techniques and procedures.
Liaison through the two countries' enables the respective chains
of command to define areas where respective forces operate and
to determine how the global positioning system is operated.[17]
There is scope for similar dialogue with countries other than
the United States for other operations.

15. Despite having spent some £2 billion on acquiring the
Rapier ground based air defence system, the Department has estimated
that in a scenario such as occurred in Kosovo, Rapier would only
function at 25 per cent of its potential capability because it
currently lacks appropriate identification capability.[18]
In Kosovo, the High Velocity Missile and Javelin ground based
air defence systems were also placed under a "weapons hold"
procedure. Figure 3 illustrates the different procedures
that dictate weapons control status.

Figure 3: Weapons Control Status

Weapons Hold Weapon systems may only be fired in self-defence or in response to a formal order.

Weapons Tight Weapon systems may only be fired at targets positively identified as hostile.

Weapons Free Weapon systems may only be fired at targets not positively identified as friendly.

16. The Department recognise that ground based air defence is
an area where it currently has shortfalls in identification capability.[19]
These are to be remedied under the Successor Friend or Foe programme,
which will greatly alleviate the need for strict procedural control.[20]

17. Because of delays in taking decisions on acquiring appropriate
friend or foe capability, during the Gulf War the Department had
to implement an Urgent Operational Requirement for systems to
be procured to enable certain items of equipment to be utilised
during the conflict. Urgent Operational Requirements are not only
more expensive to procure but also involve the Department in incurring
increased maintenance costs because the appropriate economies
of scale cannot be achieved.

18. The Department has allocated £6.2 million towards an
advanced concept technology demonstrator for battlefield target
identification for armoured vehicles.[21]
This demonstration will allow individual nations to demonstrate
that their solutions are compliant with the NATO standardisation
agreement. The Department believes that it already has a compliant
solution.[22] However,
the actual demonstration, which will be led by the United States,
will not take place until September 2005. As a result, the United
Kingdom will not have a target identification solution for the
land environment in place until at least 2006. In the meantime,
the Department might have to resort to an Urgent Operational Requirement
with cost implications if it were required to operate with allies
like the United States in a sustained land campaign.