The Creation/Evolution Controversy as an Example
of How They Should Not Interact

RAYMOND E. GRIZZLE

Department of Biology
Campbell University
Buies Creek, NC 27506

From: PSCF45 (December
1993): 222-228.

A foundational premise of modern science is that
its descriptions can only consist of natural causes: that is, God cannot be a
part of scientific descriptions. In this paper I describe a conceptual model
relating theological and scientific descriptions that takes a complementarian
viewpoint compatible with this foundational premise of modern science. The model
presents theology and science (using biological evolutionary theory as an
example) in a side-by-side fashion, stating that inquiries in each discipline
should influence the other. However, this model's major contribution is its
prohibition of direct comparisons between theological and scientific
descriptions which present us with mutually exclusive alternatives. This
prohibition is designed to eliminate the potential for theological descriptions
to become a part of science, and to prevent attempts at the misguided use of
scientific descriptions as "evidence" against the existence of God.

Although much remains obscure, and will long
remain obscure, I can entertain no doubt, after the most deliberate study and
dispassionate judgment of which I am capable, that the view which most
naturalists entertain, and which I formerly entertainedónamely,
that each species has been independently createdóis
erroneous. I am fully convinced that species are not immutable; but that those
belonging to what are called the same genera are lineal descendants of some
other and generally extinct species, in the same manner as the acknowledged
varieties of any one species are the descendants of that species. Furthermore, I
am convinced that Natural Selection has been the main but not exclusive means of
modification. (Darwin, 1859.)

And so, Charles Darwin concluded the
introduction section to his first edition of On the Origin of Species. In
the several hundred pages that followed, Darwin argued his case for evolution,1
and against the immutability of species, as well as against views other than his
own of what causes evolutionary changes. In the passage quoted above, Darwin
indicated that in his day the most widely held alternative position to
biological evolution was the "immutability of species," or
"stasis," which means that species only change in relatively minor
ways over time.2 The theological counterpart of this view was known
as "independent" or "special" creation. Nearly all
scientists were theistic at that time, and a fairly literal interpretation of
the first two chapters of Genesis had provided for some much of the theoretical
basis for biology. Hence, Darwin used both "immutability" and
"independent creation" interchangeably. In so doing, he mixed
theological and scientific descriptions (at least by today's standards),
implying to some that evolution and God's creative activity were mutually
exclusive alternatives.

Copernicus, Kepler, Galileo, and Newton freed the physical
sciences (especially astronomy and physics) from some of the constraints put
upon them by previous philosophies, including religion (Hummel, 1986; Lindberg
and Numbers, 1987). Darwin's theory was in essence an attempt to accomplish the
same thing for biology;2 and it has, of course, largely been
successful. But this does not mean that Darwin's theoryónor
the theories of Copernicus, Kepler, Galileo, and Newtonówere
attempts to do away with religion, to make God irrelevant to humanity. This was,
however, the conclusion drawn by some with respect to the new theories of
astronomy during and after the middle ages, and it also has been the conclusion
drawn by many with respect to Darwin's theory.

Philosophers, theologians, and scientists have argued that
science in no way eliminates religion, or does away with humanity's need for God
(see review by Ratzsch, 1986). Indeed, there is much ongoing philosophical
research in this area by those who hold the view that both science and theology
should be interacting disciplines (see Russell, 1990). Nonetheless, the mistaken
notion that religion has been replaced in some way by science (especially
evolutionary theory), or at least is in danger of having this happen, seems
widespread today. Such a view is held by many agnostic or atheistic scientists
(e.g., Wilson, 1980; Provine, 1988) and "recent" or
"young-earth" creationists,3 though they arrive at their
similar conclusions from two very different starting points. Atheistic
scientists typically argue a "God of the gaps" view of science and
religion, whereby God has really only been needed to fill in the gaps of
knowledge in scientific descriptions.4Recent creationists argue that
a reasonable and fairly literal interpretation of Scripture precludes the
magnitude of evolutionary changes described in biological evolutionary theory.5
Hence, evolutionary theory and theology become alternative, mutually exclusive
descriptions of the world.

In no way do I aim to summarily dismiss either of these
viewpoints by implying that the above brief appraisal does full justice to the
complex nature of these positions.6 I do, however, wish to sharply
disagree with both. I think the evidence for the evolution of species and the
antiquity of the earth is overwhelming, yet I fully submit to the authority of
Scripture. Therefore, I seek a middle ground where my views are influenced by
both science and theology.

The purpose of this paper is to present a conceptual model
that formalizes my view of how scientific and theological descriptions are
potentially related. The major contribution of the model is that no direct
comparisons of a mutually exclusive nature should be allowed between theological
and scientific descriptions. This means, in the case of biological evolutionary
theory, that only fully naturalistic descriptions can be posed as alternatives
for direct comparison. Terms such as "stasis," or perhaps
"spontaneous generation," should be substituted for
"creation" as proper, directly comparable, scientific alternatives to
biological evolution.7 In other words, it should be "evolution
vs. stasis," not "evolution vs. creation." In essence, then, what
I am proposing is one way in which theology and science should not
usually interact. I will expand upon this restriction and briefly discuss some
of the implications of the model.

Conceptual Model of Scientific and Theological
Descriptions

Figure 1 is a three-dimensional conceptual model
showing a "side-by-side" relationship between scientific (with the
emphasis on biology) and theological descriptions. The model is mainly based
upon some of the views of Ramm (1954), Barbour (1966), Bube (1971), MacKay
(1974, 1982), Polkinghorne (1983), Peacocke (1984; 1991), Van Till et al (1990),
among others. It is "complementarian"8 and it includes
"levels" of explanations. However, the levels that science and
theology occupy are constructed as side-by-side "categories" in order
to emphasize their partnership in describing the world.9 This is the
only direct departure which I am aware of from the above authors, who generally
view theology as the "highest" level of inquiry. I departed from their
model of science and theology as I understand it because it can imply
(though it does not necessarily) that lower-level descriptions should in some
way be subordinated to theology, and I do not hold this viewpoint. Hierarchic
levels based on complexity, however, are shown as imbedded within the science
category; levels of theological descriptions are not shown. These levels within
categories are not discussed further because they are not directly relevant to
the present paper.

The side-by-side, partnership aspect of the model follows
from my belief that all human knowledge is personal knowledge, held by fallible
persons. In an essay on the insights of Michael Polanyi, Walter Thorson (1981,
p. 132) nicely summarizes Polanyi's perspective (which I hold):

The important fact that a divine revelation is the
real source of our knowledge does not eliminate the purely
epistemological problems of communication, interpretation, and comprehension,
nor does it impart a special status of rational certainty to our knowledge
itself. We walk by faith; the truth is divine, but it is held by earthen
vessels, human and fallible.

There will always be uncertainty in our
pursuit of understanding, whether it be theological or scientific. The Holy
Spirit may reveal the truths in Scripture to a Christian, but the person
receiving that truth is still fallible. Thus, all theology is based upon an
interpretation of Scripture, and it is tentative, as is our science.
Furthermore, epistemologically both science and theology are similar in many
respects (Wyatt and Neidhardt, 1991).

There will always be uncertainty in our pursuit
of understanding,
whether it be theological or scientific. The Holy Spirit may
reveal the truths
in Scripture to a Christian, but the person receiving that
truth is still fallible.
Thus, all theology is based upon an interpretation of Scripture,
and it is tentative, as is our science.

This view leads me to the conclusion that some amount of
interaction between theological and scientific input is the best way to arrive
at tentative conclusions concerning topics that touch upon both categories.
Obviously, then, the "categories" in the model are not to be viewed as
"compartments" where there are no interactions between theology and
science. Rather, I view the categories of theology and science as
"complementary" with some amount of potential interaction.9
So, there is a sieve-like boundary between the theology and science categories
in the model. The arrows crossing categories show that interactions between
descriptions are possible and desirable. However, the sieve-like boundary also
indicates that there should be no direct comparisons of theological and
scientific descriptions in the sense of mutually exclusive alternatives.

Time is represented as an arrow providing the outside
boundaries of the entire model. This is meant to indicate that both kinds of
descriptions are imbedded in time. The dashed lines at the bottom of the model
indicate the status of time prior to the origin of the universe, which is, of
course, unknown. Also, there is no intention to imply anything about
space-time-matter relationships as addressed in the theories of physics.

Major events in time are shown along the left side of the
model. The dashed line above the "Origin of life" event indicates that
biological evolutionary theory is primarily only directly concerned with events
occurring after the origin(s) of living things. The actual origin(s) of life is
in the realm of "chemical evolution," which is a field of inquiry that
has largely developed in the last thirty or so years.10 Biological
evolutionary theory is primarily concerned with the "origins" of
species from pre-existing species and their subsequent modifications and
adaptations.

Discussion of the Model

As indicated, the disallowance of direct, cross-category
comparisons is the major contribution of the model. For example, no
"creation" description can be directly compared with a scientific
description. I am not aware of explicit statements by others that this should be
the case.11 I arrived at this position mainly because of the
pervasive and negative results of taking either a "theology-first" or
"science-first" position and immediately crossing categories (with
respect to the model), as I briefly discussed in the first paragraphs of this
paper. I suspect that much of the confusion surrounding evolutionary theory is
the result of this practice. Hence, my position is that direct comparisons of
mutually exclusive, alternative descriptions should occur when possible
within a single category, either science or theology. This can generally be
accomplished by "converting" a theological description to a
"scientific" form and then comparing it with the appropriate
scientific description, and vice versa. Cross-category comparisons must be made
at some point, but they will usually not be of a mutually exclusive nature.
Rather they will be meant to potentially provide modifications of both
descriptions. Some well-known examples of alternative descriptions within each
of the two categories are shown in Figure 1. Stasis, or the immutability of
species, is a mutually exclusive, alternative scientific theory to evolution,
and it is very similar to the theological description "special
creation," as mentioned above. However, it differs from special creation in
one very important pointóit does not contain any reference
to a supernatural cause.

This points to the crux of why I argue against direct,
cross-category comparisons of mutually exclusive descriptions. As discussed
above, the modern view of science is that its descriptions must be restricted to
natural causes.12 This is a fundamental, but apparently often
overlooked aspect of modern science. I emphasize this because I think the
implications of this restriction have not been fully appreciated, especially by
Christians. A major implication of this fact with respect to the evolution
issue, is that no matter what may become of biological evolutionary theory, no
scientific replacement for it could include God or any other
"creator." All concepts of creation obviously include a creator (e.g.
the God of Christianity), so all concepts of creation are a priori
outside the realm of science. A direct comparison of evolution with creation is,
in other words, a direct comparison of a scientific description that is
restricted by definition to natural causes, with a description that contains a
supernatural cause. If the comparison resulted in rejection of evolutionary
theory, then a supernatural cause would, at least by implication, be transported
into the realm of science, and this is not acceptable by modern standards. Such
a result might not be required logically, but such a possibility is really what
is being contested by all "either/or" groups involved in the evolution
controversy. In essence, direct, cross-category comparisons also have allowed
atheistic scientists (e.g., Provine, 1988) to indirectly answer the
"unanswerable" and "unscientific" question "Does God
exist?"óand their answer has been a resounding
"NO!" This model is aimed at preventing this kind of reasoning.

Implications of the Model and Conclusions

Gould (1987) has argued that biological evolutionary theory
is really "fact," and the "theory" is to be found in the
mechanism of natural selection. Most biologists do not seem to agree fully with
his position, because the word "theory" is still usually attached to
the word "evolution." Nonetheless, Gould makes some interesting and
useful points, and he argues forcefully that there can be little doubt among
reasonable individuals who have surveyed the available information that
biological evolution has occurred and is occurring. I feel that Gould has been
too free with his use of the word "fact," but I am inclined to agree
with his conclusionóthat a reasonable evaluation of
available information leads to an acceptance of biological evolution. In
particular, if no theistic alternatives (i.e. all descriptions involving a
creator) to biological evolution are allowed (as I have argued herein), then
acceptance of biological evolution seems inescapable.

I believe God
was ultimately responsible
for every new species
that has arisen, and God is ultimately responsible
for the
continuous "maintenance" of every organism on earth.
But God
cannot be a part of my scientific descriptions.
If evolution is not valid, then
what other scientific alternative do we currently have?

I arrive at this conclusion based on a consideration of only
one important area of factual informationóthe fossil record.
The fossil record indicates that only a small percentage of the plant and animal
species that have existed on earth are now alive. The vast majority of plant and
animal taxa have gone extinct. If the only alternative scientific descriptions
now available are stasis and evolution, then how could stasis be valid? Is there
no organic connection between extinct and extant taxa? The concept of stasis can
persist in light of the fossil record, if the fossil record is only a
record of God's many independent creative actions. In other words, if stasis is
correct, then we have arrived at the boundary of science every time a new taxon
(species or genus or family or whatever level it is assumed represents the
limits of biological change) appears in the fossil record. We have arrived at
such a boundary because the only description left includes God. I believe God was
ultimately responsible for every new species that has arisen, and God is
ultimately responsible for the continuous "maintenance" of every
organism on earth. But God cannot be a part of my scientific descriptions. If
evolution is not valid, then what other scientific alternative do we currently
have?

The opening to this paper was a quote from Charles Darwin,
followed by my criticism of him for mixing theological and scientific terms. I
would like to end this essay with another quote from Darwin, one with which I
have no quarrel because Darwin clearly separates his theology and science. In
fact, it's one of the best examples of science and theology in partnership of
which I am aware.

There is grandeur in this view of life, with its
several powers, having been originally breathed by the Creator into a few forms
or into one; and that, whilst this planet has gone cycling on according to the
fixed law of gravity, from so simple a beginning endless forms most beautiful
and most wonderful have been, and are being, evolved. (Darwin, 1860).

This essay is a direct result of interactions
with college students in an evolution course I recently taught. I thank them for
making me seriously examine the perceptions of those who have not had the
opportunity or need to extensively examine the controversy surrounding
evolutionary theory. Dan Ensley drew Figure 1 and provided valuable advice on
modifications to it. I am also grateful for the thoughtful reviews of an early
draft of the manuscript provided by Richard Bube, Wilbur Bullock, Jim Neidhardt,
Del Ratzsch, Charles Hummel and David Wilcox. Their comments and those of two
anonymous reviewers provided me with a wealth of information to ponder. The
manuscript in its present form differs from some of their suggestions and I, of
course, am fully responsible for its contents.

NOTES

1
I define biological
"evolution" as the theory stating that the organisms alive on earth
today are descended from organisms previously living on earth, most of which
have gone extinct. This is my understanding of what is generally meant by the
word evolution to most biologists today, and I think it is the essence of
Darwin's understanding of the word. I am aware of a variety of other ways in
which the word has been used, but in all cases herein, I use
"evolution" in the sense stated above.

2Neal Gillespie
(1979) reviewed the prevailing scientific views during Darwin's time, noting
that most naturalists had all but abandoned the notion that God had
independently created each species. So, Darwin's assessment of the opposition
would seem to be a bit exaggerated. However, Gillespie pointed out that the
concept of special creation still lingered in subtle but important ways among
those who doubted it. He argued that Darwin's aim was to put biology on the same
naturalistic (positivistic) basis as the rest of the sciences. In other words,
Darwin needed to soundly remove God from scientific descriptions. On the
Origin of Species was instrumental in doing this. And today, all of
science, by convention and definition, excludes God from its descriptions (Ratzsch,
1986; also see note 12 below). This is a critical component of my argument
hereinóGod cannot be a part of today's scientific
descriptions. This essay is essentially a consideration and extension of this
crucial point (see Grizzle, 1992 for further comments on this foundational
premise of modern science).

3
The major points of
"recent creationism" for the present essay include the belief that the
entire biosphere was created less than about 10,000 years ago, and only minor
changes have occurred in species over time. The concept of "progressive
creation" (Pun, 1982) is not dealt with herein. I appreciate the
usefulness, and in many senses what I believe to be the validity, of this
concept. However, because it includes a creator, I feel that most scientists
would consider the concept non-scientific. See Wilcox (1986) for a review of
creation concepts.

4 This is essentially
the same view that many held during the Middle Ages, and it accounts for the
strong reactions by some Christians to the new discoveries in astronomy at that
time (Barbour, 1966). It is also an extreme of the "science-first"
position described by Bube (1986).

5Young-earth
creationists represent an extreme of the "theology-first" position
described by Bube (1986).

6
See discussions of
variations in principles of biblical interpretation employed by young-earth
creationists, the role of values in decision making, etc. in Ratzsch (1986) and
Nelson (1986).

7
I recognize that my
choice of the word "stasis" is problematic. David Wilcox (personal
communication, 1992) pointed out that "stasis" might be viewed as
being in some sense similar to the concept of punctuated equilibrium (Eldredge
and Gould, 1972), an alternative to Darwin's "gradualism" (see Avers,
1989 for brief review). He also noted that unlike the term "creation,"
the term "stasis" does not explain the origins of species. So, the
scientific utility of "stasis" is questionable. First, there is no
intention to equate stasis with punctuated equilibrium. I use stasis to simply
mean that species do notchange over time, whereas punctuated equilibrium
addresses rates of change over time, obviously assuming that species do
change over time. The second objection to the use of stasis points to an
interesting implication of the model, and I discuss this more fully in the
section entitled "Implications of the Model."

8The concept of
"complementarity" is indeed complex. Ratzsch (1986) provides a brief
overview, noting major positions. Haas (1983a, b) and Sharpe (1991) provide
critical reviews of some aspects of complementarity. I do not want to push this
term too heavily here because the concept carries a lot of "negative
baggage" for some. Nonetheless, I feel strongly that many aspects of
complementarity are useful and valid, providing helpful insights into how
scientific and theological descriptions are potentially related (Grizzle, 1992).
As Richard Bube stated:

We may indeed debate whether one should say
that science and theology are complementary, but it does not appear that there
is any debate that scientific descriptions are often complementary to
theological descriptions of the same events. If this were not the case, what
other options do we have? (1983, p. 241-242.)

9The explicit
"side-by-side" relationship of science and theology was suggested by
Evans (1991). However, many have argued this view or something similar. For
example, Torrance (1982; especially see the figure on p. 95 in Neidhardt's
(1989) review of some of Torrance's views) and Whitehouse (1981) seem to present
a non-hierarchical, partnership-like relationship between theology and science.
Figure 12 in Hummel (1986) implies a partnership relationship of some kind.
Polkinghorne (1991) outlines some guidelines for interactions between science
and theology. See Russell (1990) for an interesting review from the perspective
of a personal odyssey of some of those currently working on science/theology
relations.

10Standard evolution
texts (e.g., Futuyma, 1986; Avers, 1989) give only brief treatments of the
origin of life. See Thaxton et al. (1984) for a critical assessment of current
thinking on the topic.

11Richard Bube has
indicated (personal communication, 1992) that this is essentially his position.

12Ratzsch (1986)
provides a good overview of the philosophy of science from a Christian
perspective, and notes the restriction of scientific descriptions to natural
causes as a fundamental characteristic of science as generally practiced today.
Gilkey (1986) emphasizes this characteristic of science in his essay on
creationism and science. However, there is not unanimous agreement that this
should necessarily be a restriction put upon science. For example, Geisler
(1984) explicitly argues against this restriction. The recent suggestion that
"intelligent causes" should be allowed in science is also relevant to
this restriction, at least by implication (see Thaxton, 1990). Nonetheless, it is
true that science today can only include natural causes in its theories. Hence,
I think it is fundamentally important that so long as this be the case, those
involved in science/theology dialogue explicitly recognize the restriction and
consider its implications. See also comments on note 2.

REFERENCES

Avers, C.J. (1989). Process and Pattern in
Evolution. New York: Oxford University Press.

Bube, R.H. (1983). "The Appeal (The
Necessity?) of Complementarity." Journal of the American Scientific
Affiliation, 39:3, 240-242.

Bube, R.H. (1986). "The Relationship
Between Scientific and Theological Descriptions." Journal of the
American Scientific Affiliation, 38:3, 154-163.

Darwin, C. (1859, 1860). On the Origin of
Species. (Both editions cited from: The Origin of Species by Charles
Darwin, A Variorum Text. (1959). M. Peckham. Philadelphia: University of
Pennsylvania Press.).