As the previous articles have made
clear, innovation is essential to
developing the breakthrough
ideas and practicable solutions
that contribute to social progress.
The process of innovation is very difficult,
however: full of challenges and characterized
by paradoxes. It is understandable,
therefore, that people look for checklists,
normatives, and practices they can adopt
and follow—or shortcuts and workarounds
that will enable them to avoid getting involved
with innovation altogether. Experienced
leaders, however, know that innovation
is necessary to further social progress,
and successful innovators know that the
challenges and paradoxes inherent in the
endeavor cannot be avoided.

One way to smooth the path of innovation
is to be alert to the most common challenges
that arise. Interestingly, some of the
most onerous barriers to innovation—especially
in a global, cross-organizational context—have less to do with the skills of the actors
involved than with distinct paradoxes
that are embedded in the process. As with
any paradox, these contain conundrums
and sometimes fly in the face of conventional
wisdom. At the Rockefeller Foundation,
we have identified three paradoxes in our
work with innovators around the world.

1. How to pursue innovation without falling prey to “cultification.”
2. How to collaborate without being derailed by compromise.
3. How to scale up breakthrough inventions within the established conventions of organizations.

These paradoxes can be managed, but
they are stubborn, and they can lead to a
state of innovation dissonance—a palpable
tension between the regularity of the status
quo and the uncertainty that comes with
change. The dissonance shows up in many
ways. People find themselves unsure about
how to behave in certain unaccustomed
situations. They may have to shoulder new
responsibilities and therefore make uncharacteristic
missteps. Or they may feel
concern, even anxiety, about the nature of
new relationships.

The presence of these paradoxes, however,
should not make us shy away from the critical
need to innovate and collaborate, because
the benefits to social progress are inarguable.
What’s more, handling the paradoxes often
leads to institutional and individual growth.

The Paradox of Cultification

The many proponents of innovation have
done an effective job of making the case for
innovation and also of defining associated issues
and bringing to light practices and methods.
This focus is laudable, but ironically it has
also produced, through its very success, a kind
of cult around innovation, its methods, and
its most successful practitioners. As a result,
innovation has become the default mode for
people in almost any situation where some
change or improvement might be desirable.
Innovation is now so fervently favored that it
almost cannot be questioned.

Experienced leaders know that innovation is necessary to further social progress, and successful innovators know that the challenges and paradoxes inherent in the endeavor cannot be avoided.

We all know, however, that a large percentage
of our time and our organization’s
energy is necessarily spent on activities that
don’t require innovation. We also know that
scaling up an innovation depends on the
operation of relatively routine tasks and
processes, many of which are in place and
already have been proved effective.

An example of this paradox is the experience
of the mHealth Alliance, cofounded by
the Rockefeller Foundation. The mission of
the alliance is to improve health by championing
the use of mobile technologies—most
typically cell phones—to support a wide variety
of health-care-related activities, from
the collection of patient information to the
integration of systems and platforms.

There is so much potential in the
mHealth Alliance that there has been an explosion
of new projects and pilot programs.
The proliferation of programs has reached
such a level that Patricia Mechael, executive
director, says they are struggling with what
she calls “pilotitis.”

Why is this a problem? Because organizations
expend so much of their energy in
the conceptualizing and testing phases that
execution—financing, manufacturing, scaling
up, marketing, and managing—gets less
attention. As a result, a high percentage of initiatives
do not progress beyond the pilot stage.

This is precisely what happened in the
mobile apps industry in Uganda, where pilotitis
became such a problem that even the few
projects that did come to fruition failed to catalyze
systemic change. Finally, in early 2012,
the Ugandan minister of health declared a
moratorium on all electronic health care
pilots until other critical issues—such as coordination,
interoperability, ownership, and
institutional structures—could be resolved.

Some organizations in the mobile health
industry have avoided falling under the spell
of the innovation cult. Switchboard, for example,
is deliberately focusing on execution
issues rather than the invention of yet another
mobile app. The nonprofit has partnered with
existing mobile operators to network health
care workers in Liberia and Ghana. Switchboard
can now scale up and replicate its success
in new areas, such as Tanzania, where it is
developing what may be the largest network of
health workers in the developing world.

The lesson from mHealth, Switchboard,
and others we have studied is that in organizations
where innovation has achieved cult status, execution takes a back seat to invention.
To succeed in the face of this paradox,
we have found that there are two paths to
follow. First, organizations can link pilot
approval phases to the solving of associated
executional demands. By so doing, they will
heighten the status of non-invention activities
and reduce the number of shooting-star
pilots. Second, leaders can choose to focus
their organization’s efforts solely on execution
and let others do the invention. They
can then assert their well-functioning operational
capabilities as an essential asset
to the broader process of innovation.

The Paradox of Collaborative Compromise

Organizations almost always pursue innovation
when they need a solution to a complex,
rather than a simple, problem. The
search typically involves multiple players
with different experiences and approaches,
multiple commitments to different groups
affected by the problem, and unacknowledged
and intertwining problems.

In the face of such complexity, organizations
often look to their leaders to set priorities
and make judgments about how resources
should be allocated. Ideally, a collaborative
approach—in which the diverse resources,
disparate views, and separate goals are integrated—can yield an innovative solution that
is greater than the sum of its parts. Often,
however, the collaboration becomes a competition
for resources and a protracted negotiation
over priorities. This is particularly
true when senior leaders turn their attention
away from the collaboration and hand it over
to deputies after the excitement of launch is
over. Factions may form and positions may
harden. The result is rarely a solution, but
rather a compromise, and often at the lowest
common denominator.

One organization that has had to work
through this paradox is Global Pulse, a UN
initiative and Rockefeller Foundation grantee,
that seeks to encourage UN agencies and
member governments to make greater use
of Big Data. The initiative required the UN’s
bureaucratic wheels to turn in a new way, because
real political and technical constraints
had to be overcome. Not only can it be a technical
nightmare to share real-time data that
exist in different forms and locations, it can
cause political problems. UN agencies work
through member states, and if data shared
by a UN agency have not gone through the
proper national government channels and
are somehow misused, it can cause problems
for the UN agency.

Early on, Global Pulse recognized that
the main challenge they faced was not skepticism
about the potential of big data, but
rather concern about the risks involved in
collaboration. Who will decide what? How
will resources be allocated? How will sectors
and governments be prioritized? How
will we protect our IP, our reputation, and
our strategy? Who will come out “ahead”?

So the leaders spent a good deal of time getting
early buy-in from the participants. Once
there was sufficient buy-in, a core data and research
team was formed. The members were
decision-makers—called secondments—from
UN and government agencies with domain
experts in fields ranging from transnational
crime to early childhood education, as well as
volunteers from partners in the private sector
and academia, including statisticians and
technical experts in big data analytics.

The role of the secondments was to help
the technical experts understand the onthe-
ground issues; the experts were there to
help the secondments master the concepts
of big data. Together, their purpose was to
integrate the multiple views, goals, and approaches
into superior, workable solutions.
“The idea was to create a space conducive to
open and active debate,” says Robert Kirkpatrick,
director of Global Pulse. “We maintain
minimal hierarchy on the team so that
good ideas can flow free.”

Global Pulse created a series of proof-of-concept
projects to demonstrate the opportunities
presented by big data. Each project
involved interdisciplinary teams, typically
including a secondment, a partner expert,
a data scientist, a culture and language expert
from the relevant country, and a project
manager who could “translate” between
and among the players.

One question they explored was whether
there were real-time digital data sources that
could serve as a proxy for actual food prices.
If so, that capability could help decision-makers
gain insights into food price inflation,
day by day rather than month by month. In
consultation with colleagues at the World
Food Programme, the project team formulated
preliminary research hypotheses and
posed them to its partners. Then, together
with Price Stats, a company that daily tracks
the prices of five million products advertised
online, they completed the project.

This and other proof-of-concept projects
demonstrated what might be possible
through the innovative use of big data. Global
Pulse’s leaders spent several months presenting
the projects to colleagues in the UN.
Soon Global Pulse was being invited to give
presentations to individual units within UN
agencies. These presentations led to a much
richer understanding of how big data could
be applied to specific lines of work. As a result,
colleagues throughout the UN now seek
to co-develop projects with Global Pulse.

The lesson from Global Pulse and other
initiatives we have studied is that collaboration
can be derailed by individual, disciplinary,
and organizational concerns—all of
which can be valid. Leaders who choose not
to make executive decisions may do so in a
genuine belief in the power of collaboration,
but they may not fully understand the real
difficulties it can create when a committee-created
innovation comes to be translated
into on-the-ground execution. No wonder
collaborations often turn into elaborate
rituals of bartering and protectionism.

Proof-of-concept programs like those at
Global Pulse can quickly build trust, create
knowledge, build collaboration skills, and
avoid compromised solutions. One needs
the right combination of people to make
these programs work. These are usually
people who are skilled translators and are
willing to engage in battle over substantive
issues and still respect one another’s goals.

The Paradox of Invention Within Convention

A third paradox of innovation involves the
disconnect between the process of invention—developing the core, original breakthrough—and the effort required to scale
it up and integrate it into a larger, conventional
system. The skills of the inventor are
rarely those of the integrator.

This is a particular problem in large organizations
that have optimized themselves
around a founding innovation. They know
they must continue to innovate, but the
proven methods of innovation go against
the conventions of how they currently operate.
Their organization is not constructed of
small, flexible entities with porous borders
through which people, ideas, and resources
can easily flow. So they often pursue innovation
by forming separate innovation teams,
such as ad hoc units, skunk works, one-off
projects, or partnerships with outsiders.

Even when these innovation efforts are
successful, the organization may find them
challenging to manage. The organization
wants to encourage and support these initiatives
but it also wants to protect its organizational
assets, further its own departmental
interests, and not neglect its current
operations. The tensions intensify when the
parent organization wants to bring its nascent
innovation back into the fold and scale
it up—without mangling the invention and
without any disintegration of the methods
and structures that have made it successful.

Just as the actors at Global Pulse worried
that collaboration across entities could
threaten their situations, actors within a
large organization have similar concerns
when the space probe tries to dock with the
mother ship. How will this solution affect
our current ones? How can we be sure this
grain of exotic sand will become a practical
pearl and not just an irritant to a system that
already works well?

Root Capital faced this paradox and
has figured out an effective way to pursue
innovation outside its main organization
and, when the invention is ready to scale up,
to bring it inside and take advantage of the
parent’s superior resources and processes.

Root Capital is a nonprofit social investment
fund that lends capital, delivers
financial training, and strengthens market
connections for small and growing rural
businesses in Africa and Latin America. It
created Root Lab as a way to be both freer
and less ad-hoc about innovation. The initiative
is driven by an R&D team that is
based in a physical laboratory, and whose
members also include innovation officers in
each of the field offices. The lab has a dedicated
budget, but it does not operate with
the same risk-reward expectations as other
units in the company. Nor is the lab required
to follow the same processes.

The field officers are focused on finding
new opportunities, piloting innovation
loans, determining what went right and
what went wrong, and then culling and systematizing
the learning. They work closely
with Root Capital’s core loan officers, interacting
on problems that emerge and taking
in the essential and nuanced perspective
that only a core loan officer could have. Field
officers then take these ideas and experiences
back to the lab, where they build out
the potential innovation.

This partnership between the lab and
the African field offices led to a startling discovery:
three-quarters of African crops are
grown for domestic use. This finding contradicted
the long-held notion that the best
way to raise rural incomes was to grow high-value,
organically grown, fair-trade crops
for export. Root Capital, which had concentrated
its loan activities on supporting export
endeavors, adjusted course and began
piloting innovation loans to community
farmers. After much iteration, Root Capital
moved this activity into its core operation
and has built it into an $8 million business.

The lesson from Root Capital is that the
process of invention, even when pursued
through an entity separate from the main
organization, should not operate in secret.
In the quest for the next innovation, an organization
need neither marginalize its innovation
capability nor place it on a pedestal.
Regular interaction between the innovation
group and the implementation group yields
the best innovations. Equally, integration of
an invention should not take place in one fell
swoop—as in a massive implementation or
transformation program—but incrementally,
so that field learning can flow back into
inventive thinking.

Innovation Dissonance

While engaging in the process of innovation,
we inevitably run up against one or more of
these three paradoxes. They create tensions
between actors and disciplines, and between
intentions and executional issues. But the
tension is a sure sign that innovation is happening,
that people are working through
their differences, finding common ground,
and sparking new combinations and directions
that would never have appeared otherwise.
It is, therefore, a productive tension
that we call “innovation dissonance.”

We believe that innovation occurs
when different points of view and different
elements are reframed, reimagined, or
recombined in new ways. To manage this
coming-together of disparate elements and
crossing-over of multiple boundaries requires
an understanding of the paradoxes
that put pressure on collaboration and an
ability to identify and relieve them enough
for innovation to thrive.

We have seen that people and organizations
around the world are finding their own
path to innovation—by being innovation enthusiasts
without kowtowing to every practice
of the cult, by integrating disparities
without neutralizing their distinctive contribution,
by building extended teams that
know how to integrate invention outposts
into the larger landscape of the organization,
and by recognizing that the dissonance
involved is usually short-lived and that social
benefit can last for lifetimes.

As people at the Rockefeller Foundation
have been learning for 100 years, innovation
isn’t easy, but it may be that wrestling with
these innovation paradoxes creates much
of the energy that drives the creation of new
products, processes, and services that can
fundamentally improve the lives of poor or
vulnerable people.

Zia Khan is vice president for strategy and evaluation at the Rockefeller Foundation. Previously, he advised clients on strategy and innovation while leading the San Francisco office of Katzenbach Partners, now a part of Booz & Company.

Kippy Joseph is associate director, innovation, at the Rockefeller Foundation. Previously, she led the Young Foundation’s education portfolio.