The excellent covert operation that killed Osama bin Laden in Pakistan was flawless and awe inspiring. It has transcended the annals of intelligence operations to become a historic event, and it will rightfully be recounted in numerous articles, books, movies, and television specials. We should all be proud of this operation.

Unfortunately, as you will see documented below, this operation is also the latest proof that the CIA is no longer a strategic intelligence agency, as it was created to be, but has been transformed into an organization that primarily provides tactical “current” intelligence as well as technical support to the U.S. military.

Why is this a problem? Because tactical intelligence is limited in its focus, time, and geographical location and serves only to support specific one-off military operations on the battlefield.

Strategic intelligence, on the other hand, is the multi-disciplinary in-depth knowledge required for policymakers to create national or regional strategies.

So how was the CIA transformed from a strategic to a tactical organization?

The CIA was created by the National Security Act of 1947 to be the premier strategic intelligence agency for the U.S. government. Because its primary mission was to counter the Soviet Union’s global operations, multi-disciplinary strategic intelligence collection and analysis was routinely conducted during the Cold War.

After the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, however, the CIA suffered a major identity crisis and it embarked on a mission to find a reason to exist. This is not something I read in a book; this is something I directly experienced. I was a career CIA clandestine service officer during the Cold War, and my 20-year tour of duty, which ended in 1995, covered this transition period.

Having lost the Soviet Union as its raison d’être, the CIA could no longer sustain its large budgets and, for the first time in history, Congress demanded to know the details of CIA’s clandestine budget and even required the Agency to detail how many spies it had, how much each spy cost, and what they had done for the Agency in the last six months.

Congress was not pleased with the Agency’s answers to these questions. This resulted in drastic budget cuts, the termination of the majority of its foreign spies, and a mass exodus of its trained and experienced clandestine service officers, which was encouraged by the Agency with offers of “early out” bonuses.

Because of the drastic reduction of personnel and the loss of its global target, numerous CIA stations were closed, and because few of the remaining clandestine service officers were recruiting foreign spies, the Agency opted to obtain its intelligence through liaison relationships with friendly foreign intelligence services. In effect, the CIA outsourced intelligence collection to foreign governments.

After foundering for the decade after the fall of the Soviet Union, the Agency finally found its new global mission on September 11, 2001: al-Qaeda and the global jihad. From that point on, it has virtually stopped conducting strategic human intelligence (HUMINT) collection operations as well as strategic analysis.

But don’t take my word for it; take a look at the documentation below that speaks directly to the lack of strategic capability and the need to recreate a strategically focused clandestine service.

In 2001, the serious deficiencies of the clandestine service were revealed officially in the 9/11 Commission Report which stated that the clandestine service required no less than a transformation.

In its recommendations, the 9/11 Commission specifically stated that the CIA director should focus on:

…transforming the clandestine service by building its human intelligence capabilities…(and) stressing a better balance between unilateral and liaison operations. (Author’s note: “unilateral operations” are secret and compartmented operations that the CIA completely controls and conducts by itself).

By February 2004, the Agency had not enacted the 9/11 Commission’s recommendations. Faced with growing responsibilities in the war on terror, CIA Director George Tenet testified before Congress that budget cuts under the Clinton administration had adversely impacted the clandestine service. While he assured the committee that the CIA was attempting to rebuild its clandestine capability, he speculated that it would take “an additional five years of rebuilding our clandestine service” before it could adequately fight the war on terror.

In 2005, the drumbeat continued, this time by CIA Director Porter Goss in a speech to CIA employees. Showing how far the Agency had gotten from running its own operations, Goss indicated that the Agency relied on intelligence from liaison relationships, but clearly stated that the CIA would no longer rely solely on this intelligence, but would have unilateral operations “return” to the Agency as a main function:

As many of you know, I have been very pleased to spend a lot of my time and attention on a multitude of liaison relationships. These are important opportunities and I will continue to do so. But, without ignoring our vital liaison relationships and partners, we will not rely solely on this stream of intelligence to inform our policymakers. Unilateral operations will return to be part of the governing paradigm for the CIA.

Worse, at the very moment that Goss addressed his employees, the majority of his clandestine service officers were not living overseas as most Americans believe, but based out of headquarters in Langley, Virginia.

Embarrassingly, Goss had to emphasize to CIA personnel the need for clandestine service officers to actually live abroad where they could gain an understanding of foreigners and their cultures, rather than being based in Langley and “surging” to hotspots on a temporary basis:

I have talked much about Field forward. You cannot understand people overseas, much less influence them, from Langley. You cannot develop deep and trusting relationships with individuals and with governments overseas by flying in and flipping out a U.S. passport. We are working to change the ratio so that we have more of our case officers out in the field under new kinds of cover in places where they can do what they need to do for us…. “Surging” CIA officers instead of having an established presence, an expertise, and developed relationships at hand, is a poor formula, in my opinion. When I say we need to be global, this is an admission that we are not in all of the places we should be. We don’t have this luxury anymore.

While Goss’ comments above addressed the Agency’s clandestine collection operations, another document published in 2005 revealed that the lack of strategic capability also permeates intelligence analysis. The document, titled Analytic Culture in the U.S. Intelligence Communityandpublished by the CIA’s Center for the Study of Intelligence, addressed the many problems that prevent CIA intelligence analysts from writing strategic analyses, which the following quote zeroes-in on:

Our products have become so specific, so tactical even, that our thinking has become tactical. We’re losing our strategic edge, because we’re so focused on today’s issues.

During the past decade and a half, since the Cold War, the production and use of strategic intelligence by the United States government has plunged to egregiously low levels. This decline is badly out of sync with the broader needs of the republic, fails to meet the nation’s foreign policy requirements, ill-serves the country’s many national security officials, and retards the developing prowess of its intelligence analysts.

Finally, in Fixing Intel: A Blueprint for Making Intelligence Relevant in Afghanistan, published in January 2010, Major General Michael T. Flynn, then the intelligence chief for the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan, bluntly critiqued the intelligence community’s myopic tactical focus on insurgent groups, and its almost complete lack of focus on the fundamental strategic questions required and sought by policymakers:

Eight years into the war in Afghanistan, the U.S. intelligence community is only marginally relevant to the overall strategy. Having focused the overwhelming majority of its collec­tion efforts and analytical brainpower on insurgent groups, the vast intel­ligence apparatus is unable to answer fundamental questions about the envi­ronment in which U.S. and allied forces operate and the people they seek to persuade. Ignorant of local economics and landowners, hazy about who the powerbrokers are and how they might be influenced, incurious about the cor­relations between various development projects and the levels of coopera­tion among villagers, and disengaged from people in the best position to find answers – whether aid workers or Afghan soldiers – U.S. intelligence offi­cers and analysts can do little but shrug in response to high level decision-mak­ers seeking the knowledge, analysis, and information they need to wage a successful counterinsurgency.

So, as you have seen above, the 9/11 Commission, two CIA directors, two CIA studies on intelligence analysis, and the ISAF chief of intelligence in Afghanistan all inform us that the CIA and the intelligence community are not conducting strategic collection and analysis.

This cannot stand, because, as satisfying and exciting as it is to witness a historic covert operation like the bin Laden mission, the fact is that without an in-depth, multi-disciplinary knowledge of the people and areas that are of strategic importance to the United States, our policymakers cannot develop national and regional strategies to support our vital interests, and, just like in Vietnam, the result will be that we will win all the tactical battles, but lose the war.

Brian Fairchild served as a career Operations Officer in the Central Intelligence Agency's Clandestine Service with twenty years of experience operating under official and non-official cover. In 1998, he testified before Congress on counterterrorism issues, and he is currently the Director of Intelligence Operations for the Intrepid Group. Since 9/11, he has taught over ten thousand law enforcement officers, intelligence officials, and military personnel about the Muslim Brotherhood and the global Jihad movement. The Intrepid Group provides video tutorials on these subjects on its website and YouTube channel.

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1.
Wally

what would the point be of strategic intelligence in a country where the presidents (and presumably their occult sponsors) are either surreptitiously(Bush) or openly (Obama) in league with hostile foreign powers (Red China, Mohammedan Saudi Arabia)?
It’s down to Americans to tear down this corrupt system and they don’t have much time left.

Been off your meds lately? Obama is in league with domestic threats engaged in making repairations to “his people” but otherwise simply incompetent. Bush’s sins were domestically: failing to veto almost any garbage that passed through congress, and internationally: disbanding the Iraqi army. There is no cabal except in your fevered imagination.

I’ve been always uncomfortable of the CIA turning into a paramilitary organization. Of course, during the Cold War the CIA always ran operations against Soviet Agents, but that was more spy vs. spy stuff and the operations were nowhere near as complex as the one that got bin Laden. But now the CIA can call in a wide variety of armed assets, many of which we don’t even know about. Is it growing into another branch of the armed services? Who knows. Because of its secrecy, there isn’t much we publically know about it. But what we DO know is that it has grown dramatically after 9/11.

But what happened to the days when the CIA mainly gathered intelligence and then let the Pentagon carry out the actual military operations? The invasion of Afghanistan was probably the first American invasion of a country carried out mainly by the CIA, with military Special Ops forces providing them the “muscle” to kill as many Taliban and al Qaeda forces as possible. The CIA’s powers have only grown since then. But in focusing on the Taliban and al Qaeda, has the CIA lost its global view of threats coming from other countries, such as China or Russia, let alone Iran? The CIA should really get back to its roots and turn back into an intelligence-gathering agency, and not another branch of the armed forces. You would think they would have their hands full simply doing that.

The CIA moved from being an intelligence gathering agency to a paramilitary “dirty-tricks” agency almost from the start. The agency instigated a number of coups in various countries during the Cold War.

I believe that the mistake in the agencies foundation was to allow all the old OSS guys to run with little oversight. Instead of analysts, you had special operations running the show from day one. It was natural they would prefer action over intel.

I think since 9/11, the U.S. has significantly increased its budget for intelligence gathering. What are we getting for all this money? Is it just another excuse to hire Democrats? We need an adult who analyzes what we need and then implement a plan to achieve the desired result. As usual, where is Congress in all this? Just content to go along to get along?

The operation that killed Osama was not flawless. Parts of a secret helicopter were left behind. How much damage if any was done to our ability to use stealth aircraft is a open question. I do not fault anyone involved with the operation for this, sometimes s** happens. This still makes the operation a success, the mission was accomplished and all personnel involved came home safe.

To my knowledge the CIA has always done both strategic and tactical work. The different tasks are done by different people and departments. When the CIA reduced it’s use of human intelligence and focused on signal intelligence a large part of it’s effectiveness was lost. Human intelligence gathering requires tactical method of intelligence gathering in order to accomplish strategic goals. The raid that killed Osama is proof of this. The fact is that massive amounts of information was collected on this raid were only possible by accomplished be using tactical intelligence gathering in order to collect both tactical and strategic intelligence.

I note that Tenet blamed “budget cuts” but was too polite to mention the disastrous tenure of his predecessor, John Deutsch: a career analyst who despised the operations side, thinking them “cowboys;” and who formalized his contempt by making another analyst with similar views Deputy Director/Operations. The result was a mass talent drain from the actual humint side of the Agency every bit as bad as that which had occurred after the Church Committee in the 70s, as experienced field officers resigned or were forced out. No wonder Tenet was forecasting a five year estimate to repair the damage.

The fact that a tactical operation was carried out does not mean that no strategic intelligence was gathered. I’d be more worried if we read about a lot of strategic CIA coups in the Times.

After 9/11 it is easy to blame the CIA. Any report that does not mention the obvious political foulups (Jamie Gorelick’s wall) is a transparent whitewash. The attack happened because our political leadership found it more convenient to ignore everything that transpired since the Iranian Revolution. The CIA becomes a convenient scapegoat. I’d start with Carter and blame every president since.

No president could or would muster the required response until after 9/11. Were enough of us ready to support war with Iran? Or were we more content to hobble our political opponents? If you want an answer, look at what happened to Bush after Iraq. It’s not the CIA, it’s us.

It was not sloppy. Thing happen that are beyond the reasonable control of the people involved. I believe the tail section was outside the wall and would likely have to been destroyed from the air rather than risk the mission or the personnel. The fact that Pakistan did not return the tail section immediately is an indication that they are not an honest partner in the war against savages..

And why should we have expected any different from Pakistan? They have never been a reliable “partner.”

As far as destroying the helicopter, my gosh what would it have taken to simply toss a few grenades on the way out? Or stick a block of C-4 or the explosive du jour with a 5 minute timer on it after you took 7 seconds to climb the wall and 7 seconds to climb back? They were there for 40 minutes, weren’t they?

One has to look not only at the transition of change in the CIA in foreign interventions and tactical warfare. One has to also look at the Coast Guard, DEA, FBI, State and local law enforcement departments/agencies, private sector ‘consultant/services’ organizations which is a story unto itself.

The concept of ‘war’ has changed into ‘nation building’ and is overall, a constitutional mess!

“Outsiders” as critics of the workings of our Central Intelligence Agency should remember always that they’re uninformed. Those in the “media” with seemingly good “sources” are only marginally better informed.

Let’s pay attention only to those like Mr Fairchild here who know whereof they speak from long experiece….first hand.

The “Outsiders” are really just speculators building upon very sketchy evidence.

Charlie….there was a time when your comment would be exceptionally valid. Your conclusions however, have not been the case for some time now. There has been progressive non allegiance to secrecy within our active, retired and former employees of the military, the CIA, the State Department and their foreign counterparts. Maybe the general public is unable to discern manipulated psyops from hard intell, but rest assured there is no shortage of folks with the abilbities, who can assimilate, validate and use such….and that should be a real concern. Our national security services have become far to ideologically politicized and fragmented and that is dangerous!

The CIA is broken. I worked closely with multiple cladestine agents in the 90s. They were nice people, but did were not particularly capable. It’s not budgets or mission that is the problem – it’s the nature of bureaucracy. The CIA can’t do much becuase it’s risk averse bureacracy and more concerned with funding than actually collecting actionable intelligence. It recruits the dull; it takes minimal risks; and packages up newspaper articles, rumors, and info from walk-in scum as intelligence. When it does engage is real humint collection, the people responsible get punished, like the water boarders and the renditioners who actually get useful information.

Keep funding the NSA and outsource intelligence gathering to individuals who aren’t constrained by the lawyers and bean counters in Washington. Abolish the CIA.

This a thoughtful article and I agree with a great deal of it. In fact, the reality of which you speak in the 90s was the reason I chose not go with the agency and pursued my own path. Two caveats: 1)A tactical victory like the Osama raid can constitute/lead to significant strategic gains. 2) A perfect example of monumental incompetence on the strategic level within our intel community is the current Libyan intervention, in which a tactical victory, the elimination of Gaddafi, will only make the strategic failure even more costly.

Reading this and seeing a number of historical references about our intelligence ignorance and its failures, I am reminded of another … our failure to assess the intentions of Imperial Japan from 1939 onward – especially in reference to our similar relationship to the current government of China.

I am forced to view this all with no ending level of alarm. Given how many times I have read commentary by Chinese general staff on our blind-spots and weaknesses, their view of us as their primary enemy, our continual stupidity towards not only protecting our national interests and our efforts to demonize them, NOT TO MENTION the very astute analysis a number of them have made about the Japanese failure to effectively cripple us and how they would do things differently (and extremely ruthlessly), any sane person can see that a potential catastrophe looms in our future – one we may not have a chance to recover from.

Nice piece of self promoting hogwash. Seems to me, if I recollect right, Clinton is the one to claim credit for the peacetime dividend which included gutting functions like the CIA. The Soviet Union may have fallen but communism was not dead. But hey, why spoil the good news when you can get re-elected. And as I further recall, seems the exploits of our men and women of the CIA were into “wet works” which implies getting your hands dirty, doesn’t it? The whole group doesn’t have to be dedicated to “strategic” analysis. I would say that goes part and parcel with living in the midst of your enemies while gathering intel.

While our intelligence may have failed at preventing 9/11, I’m sure that the investment and rebuilding of HUMINT over the decade following that tragedy (Thank Bush 43!) is also largely responsible for delivering OBL “POS” to his eternal place in hell. My worry is that with elections coming up and budget cuts on the way that Barry will take the opportunity to further use politics to inflict pain and suffering on Americans because our intel assets will be reduced for the sake of “redistributing” the wealth.