It's easy to feel lost in information today, but “big data” can also help us understand the formulations we use in interpreting information, including politics. Google has scanned millions of books published over centuries. Can billions upon billions of words in digital form help us understand our history and character?

Thanks to digitization, we can now establish when the word “liberal” first took on a political meaning. For centuries it had had what scholars have called pre-political meanings, such as generous, tolerant, or suitable to one of noble or superior status—as in “liberal arts” and “liberal education.” But now using Google’s Ngram Viewer we can see what the word “liberal”—as an adjective—was used to modify. Up to 1769 the word was used only in pre-political ways, but in and around 1769 such terms as “liberal policy,” “liberal plan,” “liberal system,” “liberal views,” “liberal ideas,” and “liberal principles” begin sprouting like flowers.

My research with Will Fleming finds that the Scottish historian William Robertson appears to be the most significant innovator, repeatedly using “liberal” in a political way, notably in a book published in 1769. (I presented more details in a lecture at the Ratio Institute, viewable here.) Of the Hanseatic League, for example, Robertson spoke of “the spirit and zeal with which they contended for those liberties and rights,” and how a society of merchants, “attentive only to commercial objects, could not fail of diffusing over Europe new and more liberal ideas concerning justice and order.”

Robertson’s friend and fellow Scot Adam Smith used “liberal” in a similar sense in The Wealth of Nations, published in 1776. If all nations, Smith says, were to follow “the liberal system of free exportation and free importation,” then they would be like one great cosmopolitan empire, and famines would be prevented. Then he repeats the phrase: “But very few countries have entirely adopted this liberal system.”

Smith’s “liberal system” was not concerned solely with international trade. He used “liberal” to describe application of the same principles to domestic policy issues. Smith was a great opponent of restrictions in the labor market, favoring freedom of contract, and wished to see labor markets “resting on such liberal principles.”

Related Story

Elsewhere, Smith draws an important contrast between regulating “the industry and commerce of a great country … upon the same model as the departments of a publick office”—that is, to direct the economy as though it were an organization—versus “allowing every man to pursue his own interest his own way, upon the liberal plan of equality, liberty and justice.” In drawing such a contrast, Smith again is signaling the label “liberal” for the latter, which he favors.

Smith also compliments a school of French economists: “In representing perfect liberty as the only effectual expedient” for making national wealth as great as possible, “its doctrine seems to be in every respect as just as it is generous and liberal.” At the core of Smith’s idea of liberal principles is the idea of natural liberty:

All systems either of preference or of restraint, therefore, being thus completely taken away, the obvious and simple system of natural liberty establishes itself of its own accord. Every man, as long as he does not violate the laws of justice, is left perfectly free to pursue his own interest his own way, and to bring both his industry and capital into competition with those of any other man, or order of men.

For Smith, natural liberty was not an axiom. He made exceptions to it and acknowledged that he was doing so. Still, it is his main principle, and the burden of proof is on those who would contravene it. In an open letter to Smith in 1787, Jeremy Bentham saluted him for having taught society the presumption of liberty. Bentham then proceeded to challenge Smith on one of his exceptions, saying that Smith had failed to meet the burden of proof when he made an exception to natural liberty by endorsing an existing law setting a maximum interest rate.

Shortly after The Wealth of Nations was published, Robertson wrote to Smith, saluting it as an antidote to "illiberal arrangements" and saying, “Your Book must necessarily become a Political or Commercial Code to all Europe, which must be often consulted by men both of Practice and Speculation.” Robertson’s expectation, widely shared at the time, proved accurate. And as Smith’s system spread, so did his term for it. The term became familiar in British officialdom, popping up occasionally in Parliamentary debate and even in King George III’s address at the opening of Parliament in 1782.

The term was exported to Europe and the United States as well. Some scholars have argued that the modern usage of “liberal” originated on the European continent before spreading to Britain. But using Google’s scans of books in French, Spanish, Italian, and German, we can see that usage in these countries trails Britain. I wouldn’t go so far as Arthur Herman does in the title of his splendid 2001 book, How the Scots Invented the Modern World, but it was Scots who originated the use of “liberal” in a political sense.

On the Continent, “liberal” was used, as compared to in Britain, more to denote constitutional reform and political participation, as opposed to natural liberty. Britain’s exceptional history of stable government and islandhood helped to make Smith’s focus on natural liberty possible. In his recent book Inventing Freedom: How the English-Speaking Peoples Made the Modern World, Daniel Hannan quotes Smith in a 1763 lecture. After the 1707 union of England and Scotland the “dominions were then entirely surrounded by the sea … No foreign invasion was therefore much to be dreaded ...They were therefore,” Smith continued, “under no necessity of keeping up a standing army.” The Parliament shared power with the Crown, under a rule of law. “In this manner,” Smith said, “a system of liberty has been established in England before the standing army was introduced; which as it was not the case in other countries, so it has not been ever established in them.”

After Smith’s death in 1790, his peers and students, such as Dugald Stewart and then Stewart’s flock of influential students, including those of the Edinburgh Review, reinforced “liberal” discourse and guaranteed that the term’s usage continued to spread. In the 1820s the suffix “-ism” was attached to create “liberalism.” and later in the century the Liberal Party rose in British politics.

William Gladstone, the party’s leader, served four terms as prime minister of the United Kingdom. To Gladstone and Liberal Party associates such as Richard Cobden and John Bright, “liberal” was understood largely as Adam Smith first used the term in a political sense. Gladstone advanced free trade abroad, reduced government expenditures, and reduced taxation. Joseph Schumpeter put it this way: “Gladstonian finance was the finance of the system of 'natural liberty,' laissez-faire, and free trade.” As for domestic deregulation, the Liberal Party’s record was mixed, but it has to be understood in the context of pressure toward interventionism. In his book The Rise and Fall of Liberal Government in Victorian Britain, Jonathan Parry writes, “Politicians were faced with the need to respond to the mass electorate, and they compromised accordingly … Liberals were committed to using the powers of central and local government pragmatically and constructively, so as to secure order, economy, free-market conditions and self-improvement.”

It was especially after 1880 that the Smithian sense of “liberal” began to lose traction to other, often contrary, meanings. The principal presumption of today’s “liberalism” often lies with the status quo, or even with the idea that the government should “do something” to solve perceived problems.

Google’s work enables us to establish who first used “liberal” in a political sense, what it meant, and how it spread. By knowing about the inception of “liberal” principles, we better understand the confusing semantics of politics today. Today, many of those who admire Adam Smith call themselves “classical liberals.” Maybe someday they will again be able to say simply “liberal.”

Most Popular

The legend of the Confederate leader’s heroism and decency is based in the fiction of a person who never existed.

The strangest part about the continued personality cult of Robert E. Lee is how few of the qualities his admirers profess to see in him he actually possessed.

Memorial Day has the tendency to conjure up old arguments about the Civil War. That’s understandable; it was created to mourn the dead of a war in which the Union was nearly destroyed, when half the country rose up in rebellion in defense of slavery. This year, the removal of Lee’s statue in New Orleans has inspired a new round of commentary about Lee, not to mention protests on his behalf by white supremacists.

The myth of Lee goes something like this: He was a brilliant strategist and devoted Christian man who abhorred slavery and labored tirelessly after the war to bring the country back together.

On August 21, the “moon” will pass between the Earth and the sun, obscuring the light of the latter. The government agency NASA says this will result in “one of nature’s most awe-inspiring sights.” The astronomers there claim to have calculated down to the minute exactly when and where this will happen, and for how long. They have reportedly known about this eclipse for years, just by virtue of some sort of complex math.

This seems extremely unlikely. I can’t even find these eclipse calculations on their website to check them for myself.

Meanwhile the scientists tell us we can’t look at it without special glasses because “looking directly at the sun is unsafe.”

Just seven months into his presidency, Trump appears to have achieved a status usually reserved for the final months of a term.

In many ways, the Trump presidency never got off the ground: The president’s legislative agenda is going nowhere, his relations with foreign leaders are frayed, and his approval rating with the American people never enjoyed the honeymoon period most newly elected presidents do. Pundits who are sympathetic toward, or even neutral on, the president keep hoping that the next personnel move—the appointment of White House Chief of Staff John Kelly, say, or the long-rumored-but-never-delivered departure of Steve Bannon—will finally get the White House in gear.

But what if they, and many other people, are thinking about it wrong? Maybe the reality is not that the Trump presidency has never gotten started. It’s that he’s already reached his lame-duck period. For most presidents, that comes in the last few months of a term. For Trump, it appears to have arrived early, just a few months into his term. The president did always brag that he was a fast learner.

An analysis of Stormfront forums shows a sometimes sophisticated understanding of the limits of ancestry tests.

The white-nationalist forum Stormfront hosts discussions on a wide range of topics, from politics to guns to The Lord of the Rings. And of particular and enduring interest: genetic ancestry tests. For white nationalists, DNA tests are a way to prove their racial purity. Of course, their results don’t always come back that way. And how white nationalists try to explain away non-European ancestry is rather illuminating of their beliefs.

Two years ago—before Donald Trump was elected president, before white nationalism had become central to the political conversation—Aaron Panofsky and Joan Donovan, sociologists then at the University of California, Los Angeles, set out to study Stormfront forum posts about genetic ancestry tests. They presented their study at the American Sociological Association meeting this Monday. (A preprint of the paper is now online.) After the events in Charlottesville this week, their research struck a particular chord with the audience.

More comfortable online than out partying, post-Millennials are safer, physically, than adolescents have ever been. But they’re on the brink of a mental-health crisis.

One day last summer, around noon, I called Athena, a 13-year-old who lives in Houston, Texas. She answered her phone—she’s had an iPhone since she was 11—sounding as if she’d just woken up. We chatted about her favorite songs and TV shows, and I asked her what she likes to do with her friends. “We go to the mall,” she said. “Do your parents drop you off?,” I asked, recalling my own middle-school days, in the 1980s, when I’d enjoy a few parent-free hours shopping with my friends. “No—I go with my family,” she replied. “We’ll go with my mom and brothers and walk a little behind them. I just have to tell my mom where we’re going. I have to check in every hour or every 30 minutes.”

Those mall trips are infrequent—about once a month. More often, Athena and her friends spend time together on their phones, unchaperoned. Unlike the teens of my generation, who might have spent an evening tying up the family landline with gossip, they talk on Snapchat, the smartphone app that allows users to send pictures and videos that quickly disappear. They make sure to keep up their Snapstreaks, which show how many days in a row they have Snapchatted with each other. Sometimes they save screenshots of particularly ridiculous pictures of friends. “It’s good blackmail,” Athena said. (Because she’s a minor, I’m not using her real name.) She told me she’d spent most of the summer hanging out alone in her room with her phone. That’s just the way her generation is, she said. “We didn’t have a choice to know any life without iPads or iPhones. I think we like our phones more than we like actual people.”

Antifa’s activists say they’re battling burgeoning authoritarianism on the American right. Are they fueling it instead?

Since 1907, Portland, Oregon, has hosted an annual Rose Festival. Since 2007, the festival had included a parade down 82nd Avenue. Since 2013, the Republican Party of Multnomah County, which includes Portland, had taken part. This April, all of that changed.

In the days leading up to the planned parade, a group called the Direct Action Alliance declared, “Fascists plan to march through the streets,” and warned, “Nazis will not march through Portland unopposed.” The alliance said it didn’t object to the Multnomah GOP itself, but to “fascists” who planned to infiltrate its ranks. Yet it also denounced marchers with “Trump flags” and “red maga hats” who could “normalize support for an orange man who bragged about sexually harassing women and who is waging a war of hate, racism and prejudice.” A second group, Oregon Students Empowered, created a Facebook page called “Shut down fascism! No nazis in Portland!”

Anti-Semitic logic fueled the violence over the weekend, no matter what the president says.

The “Unite the Right” rally in Charlottesville was ostensibly about protecting a statue of Robert E. Lee. It was about asserting the legitimacy of “white culture” and white supremacy, and defending the legacy of the Confederacy.

So why did the demonstrators chant anti-Semitic lines like “Jews will not replace us”?

The demonstration was suffused with anti-black racism, but also with anti-Semitism. Marchers displayed swastikas on banners and shouted slogans like “blood and soil,” a phrase drawn from Nazi ideology. “This city is run by Jewish communists and criminal niggers,” one demonstrator told Vice News’ Elspeth Reeve during their march. As Jews prayed at a local synagogue, Congregation Beth Israel, men dressed in fatigues carrying semi-automatic rifles stood across the street, according to the temple’s president. Nazi websites posted a call to burn their building. As a precautionary measure, congregants had removed their Torah scrolls and exited through the back of the building when they were done praying.

The nation’s current post-truth moment is the ultimate expression of mind-sets that have made America exceptional throughout its history.

When did America become untethered from reality?

I first noticed our national lurch toward fantasy in 2004, after President George W. Bush’s political mastermind, Karl Rove, came up with the remarkable phrase reality-based community. People in “the reality-based community,” he told a reporter, “believe that solutions emerge from your judicious study of discernible reality … That’s not the way the world really works anymore.” A year later, The Colbert Report went on the air. In the first few minutes of the first episode, Stephen Colbert, playing his right-wing-populist commentator character, performed a feature called “The Word.” His first selection: truthiness. “Now, I’m sure some of the ‘word police,’ the ‘wordinistas’ over at Webster’s, are gonna say, ‘Hey, that’s not a word!’ Well, anybody who knows me knows that I’m no fan of dictionaries or reference books.

If the president is concerned about violence on the left, he can start by fighting the white supremacist movements whose growth has fueled its rise.

In his Tuesday press conference, Donald Trump talked at length about what he called “the alt left.” White supremacists, he claimed, weren’t the only people in Charlottesville last weekend that deserved condemnation. “You had a group on the other side that was also very violent,” he declared. “Nobody wants to say that.”

I can say with great confidence that Trump’s final sentence is untrue. I can do so because the September issue of TheAtlantic contains an essay of mine entitled “The Rise of the Violent Left,” which discusses the very phenomenon that Trump claims “nobody wants” to discuss. Trump is right that, in Charlottesville and beyond, the violence of some leftist activists constitutes a real problem. Where he’s wrong is in suggesting that it’s a problem in any way comparable to white supremacism.