Continuing
the analysis of the Militia in the Constitution begun in PART ONE
and PART TWO of this commentary, we turn to...

3.
The roles of the States, Congress, the President, and the Courts
with respect to "the Militia of the several States". By incorporating
"the Militia of the several States" as they existed and operated prior
to its ratification, the Constitution makes several matters perfectly
clear:

(a)
The States. The Constitution recognizes and permanently includes
as part of its federal system only "the Militia of the several
States". It neither recognizes nor creates any "Militia of the
United States" at all--because no such militia ever existed, and the
Founding Fathers evidently desired that no such militia be formed.
True, "the Militia of the several States" may be "call[ed] forth"
by Congress "to execute the Laws of the Union, suppress Insurrections
and repel Invasions"; "such Part of them as may be employed in the
Service of the United States" for those purposes may be "govern[ed]"
as Congress directs; and "[t]he President shall be Commander in Chief
* * * of the Militia of the several States, when called into the actual
Service of the United States". Article I, Section 8, Clauses 15 and
16; and Article II, Section 2, Clause 1. But even when temporarily
"call[ed] forth", "govern[ed]", and subjected to the President's command
"in[ ] the actual Service of the United States", "the Militia of the
several States" nevertheless retain their identities and natures as
permanent State institutions. The Constitution authorizes neither
Congress nor the President to do anything that detracts from, let
alone contradicts, these identities and natures.

For
that reason, the Constitution authorizes neither Congress nor the
President to employ the Militia so as to attack, subvert, or in any
other way undermine any State's existence, powers and authority, or
her "Republican Form of Government"--or to refuse to employ the Militia
to protect those attributes. None of "the Militia of the several States"
can be used, actively or passively, against any of "the several
States".

Although
the Constitution recognizes "the Militia of the several States" as
State institutions, the States themselves cannot dispense with the
Militia, in whole or material part, because the Constitution presupposes
the permanence of the Militia, and the Constitution is "the supreme
Law of the Land", which all State officials "shall be bound by Oath
or Affirmation, to support". Article VI, Clauses 2 and 3. If the States
could dissolve their Militia or allow them to fall into decrepitude,
could disregard the Militia's historic principles, could deprive the
Militia of their historic purposes and functions, or could deny the
Militia the means necessary to perform those purposes and functions,
the States could thereby

destroy
a component of the Constitution's federal structure no less important
than the States themselves;

nullify
Congress's power to "call[ ] forth the Militia" for constitutional
purposes;

deprive
the President of an important means to fulfill his duty to "take
Care that the Laws be faithfully executed";

render
unfulfillable the duty of the United States to "guarantee to every
State in this Union a Republican Form of Government" and to "protect
each of them against Invasion; and * * * against domestic Violence";
and even

disarm
themselves from "engag[ing] in War" when "actually invaded, or
in such imminent Danger as will not admit of delay", because (absent
dispensation from Congress) they would have no other armed forces
to deploy in their own defense.

See
Article I, Section 8, Clause 15; Article II, Section 3; Article IV,
Section 4; and Article I, Section 10, Clause 3. These dire consequences
disprove even the arguable existence of any license in the States
to disestablish their Militia.

Thus,
because the Constitution guarantees the permanent existence of "the
Militia of the several States" in the plenitude of their historic
principles, with all the means necessary to perform their purposes
and functions, the States cannot disarm the Militia. For disarmed
Militia are no Militia at all. On the other hand, if Congress fails,
neglects, refuses, or is simply unable to exercise its own constitutional
power and duty "[t]o provide for * * * arming * * * the Militia",
or attempts to usurp a power to disarm the Militia (through some National
"gun-control" statute), the States must themselves arm their Militia,
and take whatever other actions may be necessary to thwart the enforcement
of such an unconstitutional statute.

Because
the Militia are State institutions, the Constitution reserves to the
States an exclusive power and duty to "govern[ ] such Part of them
as may [not] be employed in the Service of the United States", and
a concurrent power and duty to provide for "organizing, arming, and
disciplining" their Militia if Congress fails, neglects, refuses,
or is unable to do so, in whole or in part. See Article I, Section
8, Clause 16; Amendment X; Amendment XIV, Section 1; and Houston
v. Moore, 18 U.S. (5 Wheaton) 1 (1820). Indeed, if negligent or
criminal Congressmen, by shirking their duties or conspiring to defeat
the Constitution, could by nonfeasance, misfeasance, or malfeasance
render the Militia impotent and thereby put the Nation and States
in peril, and the States nevertheless were powerless to correct the
situation, "the Militia of the several States" would be nothing but
a verbal shadow without substance.

The
Constitution reserves to the States "the Authority of training the
Militia according to the discipline prescribed by Congress". Article
I, Section 8, Clause 16. If Congress fails to "prescribe[ ]" such
"discipline", and in all cases where any Congressionally mandated
"discipline" does not apply, the States do not need Congress's permission
to administer their Militia as they may judge to be necessary and
proper. Prior to ratification of the Constitution, the States' powers
over their Militia were plenary. The Constitution delegated to Congress
certain limited powers with respect to the Militia--which powers,
if Congress properly exercises them, are "the supreme Law of the Land"
that supersede conflicting State laws. Article VI, Clause 2. Otherwise,
the States retain a concurrent power to enact laws to govern their
Militia. Amendment X.

The
Constitution does provide that "[n]o State shall, without the Consent
of Congress, * * * keep Troops, or Ships of War, in time of Peace".
Article I, Section 10, Clause 3. But "Militia" are not "Troops". For
the Constitution delegates to Congress a power "[t]o provide * * *
for governing such Part [of the Militia] as may be employed in the
Service of the United States", and only "such Part"--necessarily reserving
to the States the governance of all of their Militia not "employed
in the Service of the United States", with no suggestion that the
States may exercise such governance only with "the Consent of Congress".

Just
as the States require no prior permission from Congress to exercise
their concurrent powers over their Militia, they are not subject to
Congress's disapproval of any such exercise, except through Congress's
proper exercise of one of its own Militia Powers. The key element
here is that Congress must properly exercise one of those powers.
Thus, if a State were to prescribe that her Militiamen must be armed
with rifles of .223 caliber, but Congress ordained that all Militiamen
nationwide must be armed with rifles of .308 caliber, Congress's mandate
would have to prevail, to the extent that no Militiaman could exempt
himself from the Congressional requirement by pleading that he was
in compliance with the State requirement. For the Constitution delegates
to Congress a power "[t]o provide for * * * arming * * * the Militia";
a statute specifying the minimum caliber for Militia "arm[s]" is plainly
constitutional; and "the Laws of the United States which shall be
made in Pursuance [of the Constitution] * * * shall be the supreme
Law of the Land". Article I, Section 8, Clause 16; Article VI, Clause
2. (Of course, Congress could not prevent the State from requiring
each of her Militiamen to possess a rifle of .223 caliber in addition
to the rifle of .308 caliber that Congress specified.)

On
the other hand, if Congressmen steeped in usurpation and tyranny were
to enact a general "gun-control" statute banning the private possession
by all Americans of all rifles--thereby effectively destroying "the
Militia of the several States" by depriving them of the necessary
means to perform their functions--any State could exercise her reserved
power to maintain her Militia by enacting a statute that required
all State citizens to possess one or more rifles suitable for Militia
service. Indeed, it would be each State's absolute constitutional
right and duty to do so. The purported Congressional statute could
not supersede such a State law, because it would not have been "made
in Pursuance of [the Constitution]", but in derogation and attempted
destruction thereof. And "[a]n unconstitutional act is not a law;
* * * it imposes no duties; it is, in legal contemplation, as inoperative
as though it had never been passed". Norton v. Shelby County,
118 U.S. 425, 442 (1886).

Even
if such a "gun-control" statute might be valid in a territory not
subject to any State's jurisdiction, such as the benighted District
of Columbia, it could never be valid within any State, because

maintenance
of "the Militia of the several States" is one of the attributes
of State sovereignty--indeed, an essential function of every State
government necessary for the existence of the States and through
them of the United States--which the Constitution explicitly recognizes;

the
Colonies and independent States exercised the power and duty to
maintain Militia before the Constitution was ratified, and retain
under the Constitution a concurrent power and duty of scope greater
than the similar power and duty delegated to Congress (which appertain
to three specific purposes only); and

Congress
may exercise none of its powers in such wise as to abridge any
attribute of State sovereignty.

Contrast
Article I, Section 8, Clause 17 with Lane County v. Oregon,
74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 71, 76-78 (1869). Importantly, in Lane County the
question was whether a Congressional power the Supreme Court recognized
as valid (the power to emit legal-tender paper currency) could override
a State's sovereign power to determine the medium in which to collect
her taxes (gold and silver coin), which sovereign power is only implicit
in the Constitution. In the case of general "gun control", however,
the question would be whether a plainly invalid Congressional power
could override a State's sovereign power that the Constitution explicitly
recognizes and incorporates as part of its federal system. For any
purported Congressional power to disarm common Americans directly
contradicts the actual constitutional power, and duty, of Congress
"[t]o provide for * * * arming * * * the Militia", and (to the extent
it is exercised and enforced) destroys the efficacy if not the very
existence of "the Militia of the several States".

Thus, all general "gun-control" legislation emanating from the General
Government is subject to effective nullification by the States on
the basis of the Militia Clauses of the original Constitution alone,
without reference to the Second Amendment.

(b) Congress. Because the Constitution itself recognizes "the
Militia of the several States" as part of its federal structure, and
empowers them for certain important National purposes, the Militia
are not optional, discretionary, or disposable for Congress. Because
the Militia are "the Militia of the several States", not of
the United States, Congress lacks all authority either to create or
to dissolve them--just as it lacks authority to create or dissolve
a State's legislature, executive, or judiciary. Congress also lacks
authority to disregard, neglect, or impede the Militia, with respect
either to the performance of their constitutionally mandated services
to the Nation, or to their practical ability to perform those services.
Instead, Congress's powers and duties are "[t]o provide for calling
forth the Militia" for particular National purposes, and to make them
fully effective for those purposes by "provid[ing] for organizing,
arming, and disciplining" them. Article I, Section 8, Clauses 15 and
16.

The
Constitution does delegate to Congress the power "[t]o provide for
organizing * * * the Militia". Article I, Section 8, Clause 16. "To
provide for organizing" does not, however, entail a power to create
"the Militia of the several States" from whole cloth, according to
some eccentric definition that politicians might devise in the Capitol.
For the Founding Fathers knew that "the Militia of the several States"
had existed for nearly 150 years prior to ratification of the Constitution;
yet they did not provide in the Constitution for disbanding these
pre-existing Militia in order to clear the ground for erecting some
entirely novel establishment under the rubric "Militia". Doubtlessly,
this was because the Founders understood the term "Militia" as it
had been understood for nearly 150 years theretofore: namely, to mean
nothing less than almost the whole body of the people of each State,
properly armed and accoutred for military service. And they constitutionalized
this historic definition precisely so that Congress alone could never
change it. Whereas they employed the verb "organiz[e]" in a general
sense, in order to provide Congress with some latitude to structure
the body of the armed people in whatever manners might prove most
effective from era to era. Thus, "[t]o provide for organizing * *
* the Militia" means putting the pre-existing and permanent "Militia
of the several States"--the whole body of the armed people in each
State--into the form best suited to their purposes and functions as
circumstances counsel.

This
power should be contrasted with Congress's powers "[t]o raise * *
* Armies" and "[t]o provide and maintain a Navy". Article I, Section
8, Clauses 12 and 13. "To raise" and "[t]o provide" these things themselves
both imply that, prior to Congress's action, no "Armies" or "Navy"
exist. Distinguishably, Congress is not empowered to "raise" or "provide"
the Militia, but only "[t]o provide for" taking certain other actions
with respect to the Militia, which the Constitution presumes are already
in existence.

Furthermore,
nothing in the Constitution suggests that Congress must "raise and
support * * * Armies", or "provide and maintain a Navy", should it
conclude that neither is "necessary and proper". See Article I, Section
8, Clause 18. To the contrary: the Constitution requires that, even
when Congress does "raise" an army, "no Appropriation of Money to
that Use shall be for a longer Term than two Years". Article I, Section
8, Clause 12. This enables the House of Representatives--the House
of Congress electorally closest to the people and (in political theory,
at least) most concerned with protecting their lives, liberties, and
property--to prevent an army from continuing in existence when it
serves no purpose that justifies its expense, or when it threatens
Americans' freedoms. Similarly, had the Founding Fathers contemplated
a navy as a permanent establishment, they would not have bothered
to empower Congress "[t]o * * * maintain" one. So, Congress can "raise
Armies" and "provide a Navy" if it deems that course prudent; but
it can also refuse to do so, or refuse to continue to "support Armies"
or "maintain a Navy". Distinguishably, though, the Constitution plainly
presumes that "the Militia of the several States" existed as of its
ratification, and will continue to exist thereafter, whatever Congress
may do or not do. Which, of course, follows from the historic definition
of the "Militia" as the whole body of the people of each State, armed
and accoutred for military service with appropriate firearms and ammunition
always maintained in their personal possession.

Moreover,
"[t]o provide for organizing * * * the Militia", or for "arming, and
disciplining" them, cannot license Congress to proceed in whatever
whimsical manner its Members may choose. First, in light of the critical
purposes the Militia may be called upon to serve--"to execute the
Laws of the Union, suppress Insurrections and repel Invasions"--the
Constitution cannot possibly contemplate, or tolerate, complete Congressional
inaction on this score. See Article I, Section 8, Clause 15. Nonfeasance
is not an option. For with the delegation of any constitutional power
comes the imposition of a corresponding constitutional duty to exercise
that power whenever necessary and proper. Compare United States
v. Marigold, 50 U.S. (9 Howard) 560, 567 (1850), with the Preamble
("insure domestic Tranquility" and "provide for the common defence");
Article I, Section 8, Clause 18; and Article VI, Clause 3 ("Oath or
Affirmation, to support this Constitution"). Surely, Congress cannot
have exercised its constitutional power, and fulfilled its constitutional
duty, "[t]o provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining, the
Militia" if they remain unorganized, unarmed, and undisciplined, whether
in whole or in large part.

Second,
the Constitution cannot possibly contemplate, or tolerate, Congressional
negligence or error, either. Misfeasance, too, is not a option. The
Constitution does not define the verbs "organizing, arming, and disciplining,
the Militia". But, that does not leave Congress wholly at sea. In
the Founding Fathers' minds, the proper definitions naturally arose
from the Colonial and State history with which all Americans of their
era were intimately familiar. So, "organizing, arming, and disciplining,
the Militia" constitutionally means proceeding according to the historic
pattern of American experience: the whole body of the people, armed
and trained along contemporary military lines with appropriate firearms
and ammunition always maintained in their personal possession. Because
if the whole people--or any significant subset of them, for that matter--are
not "organiz[ed], arm[ed], and disciplin[ed]" according to that pattern,
they do not constitute "Militia" in the American sense of that term
at all.

Third,
under no circumstances can the Constitution possibly contemplate,
or tolerate, Congress's refusal to follow the law. Malfeasance is
beyond the pale. Inasmuch as the power "[t]o provide for organizing,
arming, and disciplining, the Militia" does not allow Congress to
leave the Militia unorganized, unarmed, and undisciplined through
sloth or incompetence, it most assuredly precludes Congress from actually
disorganizing, disarming, or disarraying the Militia--whether this
results from intentional malevolence or from willful blindness to
or reckless disregard of the consequences of its actions. "To provide
for organizing, arming, and disciplining, the Militia" are affirmative
verbs. And "[a]ffirmative words are often, in their operation, negative
of other objects than those affirmed". Marbury v. Madison,
5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 174 (1803). Thus, those words not only delegate
a power, and impose a duty, but also create an absolute disability.
Under no circumstances may Congress leave the Militia unorganized,
unarmed, or undisciplined--let alone knowingly and intentionally impose
such conditions.

Of
the three requirements for the Militia--organization, arms, and discipline--arms
are the most important. Organization and discipline are next to useless
without arms. Even a rabble in arms can give some good account of
itself, and can slowly organize and develop discipline while it maintains
an minimally adequate posture of self-defense. But unarmed people
are almost always helpless, hapless, and hopeless.

Although
Congress has a constitutionally duty to "arm[ ]" the Militia, and
a constitutional disability to disarm them, it need not act directly.
"To provide for * * * arming * * * the Militia" does not necessarily
require actual "arming" of individuals by the government itself from
public arsenals. (Perhaps the necessary involvement of the government
is why Congress's power as to an army or navy is "[t]o raise" or "[t]o
provide" simpliciter, rather than "[t]o provide for raising".)
Indeed, for the government to arm the Militia is probably the politically
least prudent way for Congress and the States to fulfill their responsibilities
on that score, as well as being the course least in keeping with historic
practices. Instead, Congress and the States can and ought to "provide
for * * * arming * * * the Militia" by relying on the method universally
used in the pre-constitutional Colonial and State Militia Acts: individual
self-help through resort to private commerce in arms and ammunition
in the free market.

Requiring
members of the Militia to arm themselves largely shifts the economic
burden from taxpayers to those individuals who have the ability to
pay. More importantly, though, it protects all individuals from the
sudden imposition of usurpation and tyranny that would be possible
were the provision of arms a governmental monopoly. After all, for
individuals throughout the Nation to arm themselves for Militia purposes
demands

a
large number of private manufacturers, distributors, and retailers
of arms and ammunition;

a
nationwide free market for commerce in arms, ammunition, and accoutrements;

no
general "gun-control" statutes at the National, State, or local
levels; and

a
judicial system that does not hold the production, sale, possession,
and use of firearms and ammunition hostage to predatory trial
lawyers.

Unfortunately, one important condition for constitutionally "arming
* * * the Militia" is almost totally absent in contemporary America:
namely, the legal requirement found in every pre-constitutional Militia
Act, that common Americans purchase (or otherwise acquire), possess
in their homes, and regularly train with their personal firearms,
or be subject to fines or other penalties. But an anti-constitutional
condition is all too prevalent: namely, general "gun-control" statutes
that deny to almost everyone the right to possess or use certain types
of firearms (such as "assault weapons"), kinds of ammunition, or accoutrements
(such as "high-capacity magazines") within some jurisdictions, or
that totally disarm large segments of the population on the basis
of some geographical criteria (such as "gun-free zones") or legal
disabilities attaching to the person.

The
present plethora of general "gun-control" statutes at the National,
State, and local levels arises from politicians' and judges' disregard
of the precept that "the Constitution is filled with provisions that
grant Congress or the States specific power to legislate in certain
areas; these granted powers are always subject to the limitation that
they may not be exercised in a way that violates other specific provisions
of the Constitution." Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 29 (1968).
For example, at the National level most "gun-control" statutes have
been enacted under color of Congress's powers "[t]o lay and collect
Taxes" or "[t]o regulate Commerce". Article I, Section 8, Clauses
1 and 3. In effect, this sets aside the explicit power and duty to
"arm[ ] * * * the Militia" in Article I, Section 8, Clause 16 in favor
of a contradictory power to "disarm[ ]" everyone hidden in Clauses
1 and 3. Apparently, no one among Washington's power elite has noticed
(or cares to take into account) that "[t]he fundamental [constitutional]
principles" in Clauses 1, 3, and 16 "are of equal dignity, and neither
must be so enforced as to nullify or substantially impair the other".
Dick v. United States, 208 U.S. 340, 352 (1908). Or, that no
rational constitutional jurisprudence can employ Clauses 1 and 3 so
as to transmogrify the affirmative duty of Clause 16 into a negative
power. Modern legislators, judges, and law professors may be that
illogical or dishonest. But to impute such stupidity or duplicity
to the Founding Fathers is defamatory in the extreme.

States
and localities cannot enact general "gun-control" statutes either,
because such statutes directly interfere with Congress's fulfillment
of its duty "[t]o provide for * * * arming * * * the Militia"--indeed,
undermine the very existence of the Militia as the armed body of the
people--which the Constitution mandates and requires the States and
their subdivisions to treat as "the supreme Law of the Land". Article
VI, Clause 2. Moreover, the permanent incorporation of "the Militia
of the several States" into the Constitution requires the States to
keep up their Militia, whatever Congress may do or not do. Because,
in American historical experience, the whole population of free males
comprised "the Militia of the several States", and was always armed
to almost the last man with the latest firearms suitable for military
service, the States must maintain at least that level and quality
of armament throughout their citizenry--which result, of course, general
"gun-control" statutes are intended to prevent. That is, the existence
of "the Militia of the several States" as a permanent part of the
Constitution's federal structure renders all general "gun-control"
statutes unconstitutional.

Congress
has a further constitutional power and duty, when "necessary and proper",
"[t]o provide for calling forth the Militia to execute the Laws of
the Union, suppress Insurrections and repel Invasions". Article I,
Section 8, Clauses 15 and 18. Self-evidently, it would be next to
useless to "call[ ] forth the Militia" for these purposes of "homeland
security", were the Militia not properly "organiz[ed], arm[ed], and
disciplin[ed]". So the constitutional mission of the Militia underlines
the absolute necessity for Congress to secure "the right of the people
to keep and bear Arms", by "provid[ing] for * * * arming * * * the
Militia".

(c)
The President. The President cannot participate in--or even
passively tolerate--any program aimed at disarming common Americans
because, by historic definition, "the Militia of the several States"
consist of the body of the American people, armed and trained along
contemporary military lines with appropriate firearms and ammunition
always maintained in their personal possession. "The President shall
be Commander in Chief * * * of the Militia of the several States,
when called into the actual Service of the United States". Article
II, Section 2, Clause 1. So, for the President to cooperate in disarming,
or to stand idly by while others disarm, the people would be for him
to help destroy the Militia, and thereby eliminate his own position
as "Commander in Chief" thereof, in direct defiance of his own constitutional
appointment. It would hardly overstate the case to label such constitutionally
self-contradictory behavior "legally psychotic".

Moreover,
the President also labors under a duty to "take Care that the Laws
be faithfully executed". Article II, Section 3. Performance of this
duty may require that the Militia be "call[ed] forth * * * to execute
the Laws of the Union". Article I, Section 8, Clause 15. The efficacy
of the Militia in this service will require that they be properly
"organiz[ed], arm[ed], and disciplin[ed]". Clause 16. Therefore, the
President cannot enforce, or allow others to enforce, any general
"gun-control" statute (National, State, or local) that results in
disarming all or a large part of the people who comprise the Militia.
For any such statute must be unconstitutional. And "[a]n unconstitutional
act is not a law; * * * it imposes no duties; it is, in legal contemplation,
as inoperative as though it had never been passed". Norton v. Shelby
County, 118 U.S. 425, 442 (1886). If "not a law" at all, then
such a "gun-control" statute cannot possibly be among "the Laws [to]
be faithfully executed" by the President. Rather, the President must
"execute[ ]" "the supreme Law" of the Constitution to set such a inherently
invalid statute aside entirely and permanently, and to prevent its
enforcement in any particular against anyone.

(d)
The Courts. Perhaps the less said about the contemporary courts the
better. To expect them to recognize and protect, let alone to advance,
"the right of the people to keep and bear Arms" plumbs the depths
of blindness and folly. Modern judges are drawn from the legal intelligentsiia,
the vast majority of whom are corrupted and compromised by anti-constitutionalist
ideology, the lust for power, outright personal greed heedless of
its anti-social consequences (especially the so-called "plaintiffs'
bar" of personal-injury trial lawyers), and a thoroughgoing contempt
for common Americans and this country's traditions. Moreover, in the
main they wallow on the Bench in grandiose self-importance and narcissistic
self-absorption that rivals the rank self-adulation characteristic
of talentless movie stars and tone-deaf pop vocalists. Worst of all,
most of them utterly belie their titles of "Your Honor" by practicing
continual, cynically calculated intellectual dishonesty--a vice for
which vanishingly few are ever held accountable, as the errors or
lies of one rotten judge are appealed to some other equally unscrupulous
jurists, in most cases simply to be covered over with a whitewash
compounded of different errors or lies.

Assuming
for the sake of argument, though, that one could successfully appeal
to rationality and fairness in the courts, four conclusions would
be undeniable:

"The
right of the people to keep and bear Arms" cannot be subjected
to any "compelling governmental interest test", because neither
the General Government nor any State can possibly put forward
any "interest"--and certainly no "compelling interest"--for destroying
or debilitating "the Militia of the several States" that the Constitution
incorporates in its federal system as a governmental institution
or entity. If We the People ever deceive themselves into believing
that they have a "compelling interest" in abolishing or emasculating
their own Militia, they must amend the Constitution to that effect.
Article V.

No
firearms, ammunition, or accoutrements can be banned, confiscated,
punitively taxed, or subjected to licensing or registration simply
on the basis of whatever "bad names" "gun-control" wordsmiths
may fashion to demonize them. For essentially any firearm, ammunition,
or accoutrement could be used by "the Militia of the several States"
in one of their many roles--particularly as guerrillas, partisans,
or resistance fighters opposing usurpation and tyranny--and therefore
must be freely available to members of the Militia, in their personal
possession, at all times.

No
warrant exists for the establishment of almost all "gun-free zones",
there being no place in this country where the laws need not be
enforced (especially against violent criminals and psychopaths),
where it might not be necessary to suppress sudden insurrections,
or especially where Americans must not be ready at all times to
repel invasions in the persons of agents of global terrorism.

Finally,
the constitutional reasoning of Lane County v. Oregon, 74 U.S.
(7 Wall.) 71, 76-78 (1869), absolutely prohibits Congress from
enacting general "gun-control" statutes that destroy or debilitate
"the Militia of the several States". Lane County teaches that
Congress cannot exercise its monetary power so as to require the
States to employ Congressional legal-tender paper currency, in
preference to some other media of exchange they desire to use
in the performance of their sovereign functions--even when the
Supreme Court holds that Congress enjoys a power to emit such
currency, and the Constitution explicitly withdraws from the States
all power to create any form of money on their own. Article I,
Section 10, Clause 1. If so, then Congress cannot require the
States to suffer their Militia to be disarmed, either, when Congress
itself has no power whatsoever to "[dis]arm[ ]" the Militia, but
only a power to "arm[ ]" them; when the Constitution explicitly
recognizes the Militia as "the Militia of the several States",
not "of the United States"; when no provision of the Constitution
disables the States from maintaining their Militia with proper
armaments; and when the Militia comprise one of the two great
sovereign powers of any government: the Power of the Sword, and
the Power of the Purse. Indeed,
inasmuch as Lane County holds that Congress cannot interfere with
any State's exercise of her sovereign Power of the Purse, how
Congress could interfere with any State's exercise of her even
more important sovereign Power of the Sword passes understanding.
For part 4 click below.

I
am now working on a constitutional program of "homeland security"
based on "the Militia of the several States". This is probably the
most important project on which I have ever embarked. It will also
be the most difficult to fund, because next to no one among the powers
that be, "conservative" or "liberal", wants to see the Militia revitalized.

Therefore,
I appeal to common Americans for whatever financial support they can
offer to advance this work. Contributions should be made out to me,
marked "Militia Project", and mailed to 13877 Napa Drive, Manassas,
Virginia 20112. All contributions will be hypothecated to this work
only.

Even
if you cannot contribute, please drop me a line to let me know that
you believe this effort is important.

Thank
you in advance.
Edwin Vieira, Jr.

Footnotes:

1,
Anyone who has ever attended a firearms-training course conducted
by NRA-certified instructors can appreciate why "knowledge", "skills",
and "attitude" are central to everything concerning the lawful and
competent use of firearms.

Edwin Vieira, Jr., holds four degrees from Harvard:
A.B. (Harvard College), A.M. and Ph.D. (Harvard Graduate School of Arts
and Sciences), and J.D. (Harvard Law School).

For more than thirty years he has
practiced law, with emphasis on constitutional issues. In the Supreme
Court of the United States he successfully argued or briefed the cases
leading to the landmark decisions Abood v. Detroit Board of Education,
Chicago Teachers Union v. Hudson, and Communications Workers of America
v. Beck, which established constitutional and statutory limitations on
the uses to which labor unions, in both the private and the public sectors,
may apply fees extracted from nonunion workers as a condition of their
employment.

He has written numerous monographs
and articles in scholarly journals, and lectured throughout the county.
His most recent work on money and banking is the two-volume Pieces
of Eight: The Monetary Powers and Disabilities of the United States
Constitution (2002), the most comprehensive study in existence of American
monetary law and history viewed from a constitutional perspective. www.piecesofeight.us

He is also the co-author (under
a nom de plume) of the political novel CRA$HMAKER:
A Federal Affaire (2000), a not-so-fictional story of an engineered crash
of the Federal Reserve System, and the political upheaval it causes. www.crashmaker.com

The
last-mentioned point is of fundamental importance. When the Constitution
incorporated "the Militia of the several States" into its federal system,
it did so without defining them in any of those particulars.