The
Bush administration has been let off the hook by the Senate Intelligence
Committee’s skewering of U.S. intelligence agencies for providing unfounded
or overstated conclusions on Iraq’s “weapons of mass destruction” (WMD). The
key issue, unaddressed by the Senate committee, is whether the Bush
administration created pressure for the intelligence agencies to reach such
an exaggerated opinion of the Iraqi threat.

The Democrats on the
committee foolishly bought into an agreement that will likely postpone a
committee report on that more important issue until after the election. Yet
voters would profit from information about whether the Bush administration
pressured the intelligence community or exaggerated, twisted the truth or
even lied about the Iraqi threat in its rush to justify war. The very fact
that the Republicans wanted a delay in resolving such important questions
should indicate where the evidence leads.

Suspiciously and
surprisingly, up until high profile declarations by President Bush and Vice
President Cheney in August 2002, the CIA had never stated categorically that
Saddam Hussein had WMD. According to Bob Woodward, in his book Plan of
Attack, the vice president noted on August 26, 2002 that “Simply stated,
there is no doubt that Saddam Hussein now has weapons of mass destruction.”
According to Woodward, one month later, the president said, “The Iraqi
regime possesses biological and chemical weapons.” After those speeches, CIA
director George Tenet--a holdover from the Clinton administration and,
according to some intelligence officials, eager to win a place in the
president’s conservative inner circle—rushed to commission a new National
Intelligence Estimate on Iraqi WMD. The last prior intelligence estimate on
the subject was done in 2000 and was duly cautious—as intelligence estimates
usually tend to be.

Yet in the wake of the high
profile comments of the president and vice president, the new October 2002
estimate stated boldly and without caveats, in its summary of “Key
Judgments,” that “Baghdad has chemical and biological weapons.” Yet the
evidence in the body of the report to back up this key judgment was thin and
sometimes even contradictory to this conclusion. The thinness of the
intelligence community’s evidence was reflected in the Senate committee’s
searing finding that the community’s conclusions on Iraqi WMD were mostly
unsubstantiated or overreaching. Furthermore, such grandiose conclusions
from a normally cautious intelligence community, after categorical
statements by its masters and funders, seem to indicate a response to
pressure. After all, the process is supposed to work the other way around.
Statements of high-powered policymakers are supposed to reflect the best
estimates that the intelligence community has to offer, not vice versa. In
August and September 2002, the president and vice president’s statements
clearly went beyond what the intelligence community had concluded at that
time.

Even if some would naively
believe that this suspicious chronology did not indicate administration
pressure, the administration is still responsible for the analysis that its
intelligence community produces and should have actively reviewed, detected
and questioned the overly ambitious conclusions based on thin evidence.

In another example of top
administration officials going beyond the intelligence community’s findings,
President Bush, at a meeting with 18 members of Congress on September 26,
2002, declared that, “Saddam Hussein is a terrible guy who is teaming up
with al Qaeda.” Yet despite its harsh criticism of the intelligence
community, the Republican-controlled Senate committee commended the CIA for
its finding that no close relationship existed between Iraq and al Qaeda.
The 9/11 Commission recently reached the similar conclusion that no
collaborative relationship existed between Saddam Hussein’s regime and the
terrorist group. On this issue, CIA analysts that came before the committee
reported feeling pressured by administration officials but should be
commended for not wilting under the heat.

Does other evidence exist
that the Bush administration pressed the intelligence community to agree
with its harsh assessment of the Iraqi threat? First, in a highly unusual
move, the administration set up a competing office in the more hawkish
Pentagon to explore links between Iraq and terrorist groups—most likely to
stiffen the CIA’s backbone on this issue. In addition, Vice President Cheney
made five to eight out-of-the-ordinary visits to the CIA. Normally, CIA
officials go to the offices of high-level officials to give briefings on
their findings. Furthermore, the Senate committee reported that the
repetitive questions asked by administration officials were regarded by some
intelligence analysts a pressure tactic.

So although the Senate
committee report is useful, it allows the Bush administration to escape
addressing the most important question facing voters in November: Did the
Bush administration pressure the intelligence community to hype the Iraqi
threat in order to justify shedding American blood in an unnecessary and
ill-advised war?