Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility Volume 1

Why Rent from Knetbooks?

Because Knetbooks knows college students. Our rental program is designed to save you time and money. Whether you need a textbook for a semester, quarter or even a summer session, we have an option for you. Simply select a rental period, enter your information and your book will be on its way!

Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility is a series of volumes presenting outstanding new work on a set of connected themes, investigating such questions as:--What does it mean to be an agent?--What is the nature of moral responsibility? Of criminal responsibility? What is the relation between moral and criminal responsibility (if any)?--What is the relation between responsibility and the metaphysical issues of determinism and free will?--What do various psychological disorders tell us about agency and responsibility?--How do moral agents develop? How does this developmental story bear on questions about the nature of moral judgment and responsibility?--What do the results from neuroscience imply (if anything) for our questions about agency and responsibility?OSAR thus straddles the areas of moral philosophy and philosophy of action, but also draws from a diverse range of cross-disciplinary sources, including moral psychology, psychology proper (including experimental and developmental), philosophy of psychology, philosophy of law, legal theory, metaphysics, neuroscience, neuroethics, political philosophy, and more. It is unified by its focus on who we are as deliberators and (inter)actors, embodied practical agents negotiating (sometimes unsuccessfully) a world of moral and legal norms.

David Shoemaker is Associate Professor in the Department of Philosophy and Murphy Institute at Tulane University. He is the author or co-author of two books and thirty-five articles, many of them having to do with the issues of agency, responsibility, and personal identity.

1. Introduction2. The Possibility of Action as the Impossibility of Certain Forms of Self-Alienation, David Shoemaker3. The Possibility of Action as the Impossibility of Certain Forms of Self-Alienation, Sarah Buss4. The Fecundity of Planning Agency, Michael E. Bratman5. Can I Only Intend My Own Actions? Intentions and the Own Action Condition, Luca Ferrero6. Regret, Agency, and Error, Daniel Jacobson7. Phenomenal Abilities: Incompatibilism and the Experience of Agency, Oisin Deery, Matt Bedke, and Shaun Nichols8. Reasons-Responsiveness, Agents and Mechanisms, Michael McKenna9. Responsibility, Naturalism and 'the Morality System', Paul Russell10. The Three-Fold Significance of the Blaming Emotions, Zac Cogley11. Unwitting Wrongdoers and the Role of Moral Disagreement in Blame, Matthew Talbert12. Partial Desert, Tamler Sommers13. Values, Sanity, and Responsibility, Heidi L. Maibom14. Fairness and the Architecture of Responsibility, David O. Brink and Dana K. NelkinIndex