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It must be remembered that historically China has had multiple periods of great technological progress and development. Going ahead of the rest of the world by sheer force of centrally directed effort. They are also characterized by then taking those advances and using it to kill enormous numbers of fellow Chinese. Chinese 'civil wars' dwarf the rest of the world in terms of death toll.

It must be always remembered that China is not a united nation. It's a nation repeatedly held together by the force of brutal central power, that catastrophically falls apart on a regular basis.

Xi-Jinping has clearly consolidated his position as the single most powerful man in China's modern history, a feat so far only achieved by Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping. On one hand this is excellent news for India - for never has a man so incompetent as Xi taken over paramountcy in our single most potent adversary. On the other, it is clear that China is in a failure-reinforcing loop, having conferred so much power on someone who can charitably be described as a serial failure. However the results of such serial failure is increased revisionism in order to divert attention abroad, and India will in all probability be a prime target for this unwanted attention. The question now is what will the contours of Xi's paramountcy be and what does it bode for India?

Those seeking to link Xi's strength to an unprecedented 3rd term as president or general secretary are patently wrong. Neither of these posts have consistently indicated whom true power in China lies with. Liu Shaoqi was effectively tortured to death by red guards while still serving as president of china in 1968, and General Secretary Zhao Ziyang was thrown into house arrest for going soft on Tiananmen Square protestors in 1989. Clearly then position is no gauge of power - the mind capture of the party cadres through sheer fear is. This is exactly what Xi achieved through his massive purges across all levels of the party and military and the clearest indicator of this mindspace capture is the enshrining of Xi thought along with that of Deng and Mao. The problem of such absolute mindspace capture - surrounding yourself with yes men - is, you create a closed information loop - that filters out any bad news. While this is wonderful for public relations, it is terrible for policy. Signs of this have been clear for a long time with Xi's serial failures on the economy and diplomacy as well as his plans for the future.

The most consistent of Xi's diplomatic failures has been the South China Sea (SCS) littoral, with North Korea and India being his most recent and spectacular. China's attempts at winning support for and neutralising opposition to its SCS expansionism, is driving more countries into the arms of the United States, in a way that they organically never would. A logical policy would be carrots and sticks - the issue is Xi's policy is saturated with sticks and the carrots are almost nonexistent. Even presidents like Duterte, who initially spurned the US have found no reassurance or rewards in their friendship with China and backpedalled. A simple survey of the major littoral navies surrounding China - Vietnam, Singapore, Malaysia, Brunei, Indonesia, Philippines, Australia, Japan and Korea, show a steady increase in tonnage, numbers and lethality as opposed to a decade back. If the former 7 have been spurred by the SCS imbroglio, then the latter 2 are mostly driven by North Korea.

Assessment is rather sober if not pessimistic on an "Asian Century" - good watch...His opinions on East/South-East Asia may have merit, but falls into the same edge of ignorance on the Indian sub-continent...

Xi-Jinping has clearly consolidated his position as the single most powerful man in China's modern history, a feat so far only achieved by Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping. On one hand this is excellent news for India - for never has a man so incompetent as Xi taken over paramountcy in our single most potent adversary. On the other, it is clear that China is in a failure-reinforcing loop, having conferred so much power on someone who can charitably be described as a serial failure. However the results of such serial failure is increased revisionism in order to divert attention abroad, and India will in all probability be a prime target for this unwanted attention. The question now is what will the contours of Xi's paramountcy be and what does it bode for India?

Those seeking to link Xi's strength to an unprecedented 3rd term as president or general secretary are patently wrong. Neither of these posts have consistently indicated whom true power in China lies with. Liu Shaoqi was effectively tortured to death by red guards while still serving as president of china in 1968, and General Secretary Zhao Ziyang was thrown into house arrest for going soft on Tiananmen Square protestors in 1989. Clearly then position is no gauge of power - the mind capture of the party cadres through sheer fear is. This is exactly what Xi achieved through his massive purges across all levels of the party and military and the clearest indicator of this mindspace capture is the enshrining of Xi thought along with that of Deng and Mao. The problem of such absolute mindspace capture - surrounding yourself with yes men - is, you create a closed information loop - that filters out any bad news. While this is wonderful for public relations, it is terrible for policy. Signs of this have been clear for a long time with Xi's serial failures on the economy and diplomacy as well as his plans for the future.

The most consistent of Xi's diplomatic failures has been the South China Sea (SCS) littoral, with North Korea and India being his most recent and spectacular. China's attempts at winning support for and neutralising opposition to its SCS expansionism, is driving more countries into the arms of the United States, in a way that they organically never would. A logical policy would be carrots and sticks - the issue is Xi's policy is saturated with sticks and the carrots are almost nonexistent. Even presidents like Duterte, who initially spurned the US have found no reassurance or rewards in their friendship with China and backpedalled. A simple survey of the major littoral navies surrounding China - Vietnam, Singapore, Malaysia, Brunei, Indonesia, Philippines, Australia, Japan and Korea, show a steady increase in tonnage, numbers and lethality as opposed to a decade back. If the former 7 have been spurred by the SCS imbroglio, then the latter 2 are mostly driven by North Korea.

Contrary to popular myth, China was not upset at the DPRK's accelerated nuclear and missile testing per se, but rather by its timing, as the counter-currents it set in motion - the deployment of anti-ballistic missile defences and the strengthening of US forces in the region, were not in keeping with China's own defence modernisation schedule. Doklam similarly was seen as a routine land grabbing exercise that went horribly wrong for China, exposing the unwillingness/inability to risk military action to protect negligible territorial gains because the long term costs: negating nuclear deterrence and catalysing an alliance against it, were too expensive to absorb. Doklam also provided a clear template for other countries to use in the face of incessant small scale land grabbing, in effect destroying decades of carefully crafted strategy. In short Xi has destroyed the two main pillars of China's long term dominance strategy in the space of 8 years.

His economic record is equally abysmal. He has presided over a slowing economy, with signs of stagnation in plain sight: China's infamous ghost cities, and the hidden issues like the massive non-performing asset problem of the public sector. Unimaginatively, his solution to these has been the very worst kind of failure reinforcing: One Belt One Road (OBOR). The assumption here is that infrastructure construction can overcome the lack of the other factors: entrepreneurship, labour, land, social structures, local capital, and financial viability. Apparently bridges and roads can overcome Pakistan's feudalism problem, its terror superstructures, military stranglehold of the economy, and its lack of an investment climate, while miraculously enabling Central Asia produce to become road-transport viable, which they patently are not. In many way's these ghost cities - badly thought out infrastructure problems are one of the key drivers of China's NPAs. Now Xi has a very good rationale for keeping growth state driven, Deng's brief flirtation with private ownership, having unleashed a vocal middle class that were the core of the Tiananmen Square protests. The problem is Xi is not moving to any sustainable model of PSU growth, but squandering China's vast currency reserves at demonstrable failures to keep the public contract dependent middle class loyal to the party. The worry is what happens when all these countries default on their payments to China? The answer is simple: look at Hambantota and Gawadar, both of which continue to leech money with no end in sight. In effect what Xi has ensured is short term loyalty to him, at the cost of expanding china's NPA problems regionally and well beyond its current assets or revenue generation potential.

[BIn short what the 19th party conference achieved was a consolidation and celebration of failure, coerced through reign of terror. The problem with a cabinet of yes-men is that the probability of miscalculation on military matters in disproportionate. [/b]The real question is when will China's reserves run out and the unsustainability of Xi's OBOR-PSU charade start imposing real economic hardships on Chinese citizens? It is this point - the intersection of military miscalculation and tangible economic hardship for the average Chinese that India will have to prepare to meet Chinese misadventure. Abhijit Iyer-Mitra is Senior Fellow at the Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies. He tweets as @Iyervval

My issue is all this is linear analysis assuming Xi is incompetent and is setting up for failure.What if he succeeds?

Also its clear to anyone awake Xi has consolidated power after 5 years. And gottten rid of many of the old gang. What des he want to do with power? What markers for success or failure?

This may be a controversial statement to make, but the phenomenon in China is less about personalities and more about context:

1. The strong man election in India ~ is the result of irrational aspirations of a booming demographic... that tiger Modi rides... whereas...2. The elevation of Eleven ~ is the result of unpredictable internal strife to come in China given the economic and political forces aligning...

The second statement is perhaps more controversial than the first, but the key to understanding XI's superpower is the Chinese is internal situation.The anticipated deterioration of the internal situation and the fear thereof is what is aligning forces to life XI up to Mao'ian heights...Make no mistake, either a small positive or a even smaller negative turn of events from this pessimistic trajectory will spell doom for XI, if not China.

ramana wrote:My issue is all this is linear analysis assuming Xi is incompetent and is setting up for failure.What if he succeeds?

XI is the party is the China - then the question is what is China's success?Creating a new world order?Creating a new economic system for the world with Chinese Characteristics?Or keeping an unwieldy country of warring states intact under Socialism with Chinese Characteristics?

ramana wrote:Also its clear to anyone awake Xi has consolidated power after 5 years. And gottten rid of many of the old gang. What des he want to do with power? What markers for success or failure?

All data to date seems to indicate that this power is to handle the coming internal strife. All investments externally is to ensure the successful retirement of oldies and handle the lack of young people paying for oldies - so who cares if BRI, OBOR, CPEC are all debt traps... they will pay for the Chinizens retirement and then some... how to make money when there are no young people onlee? All external distractions provided - a la Dosa-slam, Soothe - China - Sea, etc. are all just that... things to keep the internal crazies under the umbrella of the very very very...Powelphool Chailmench Uber alles Eleven Gin Peg

PS: I am waiting for him to be announced as the reincarnation of Dalai Lama, then there can be no one greater!

ramana wrote:imposing real economic hardships on Chinese citizens? It is this point - the intersection of military miscalculation and tangible economic hardship for the average Chinese that India will have to prepare to meet Chinese misadventure. Abhijit Iyer-Mitra is Senior Fellow at the Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies. He tweets as @Iyervval

My issue is all this is linear analysis assuming Xi is incompetent and is setting up for failure.What if he succeeds?

Also its clear to anyone awake Xi has consolidated power after 5 years. And gottten rid of many of the old gang. What des he want to do with power? What markers for success or failure?

1) Again we have someone (Iyer-Mitra) who asks us to plan on a chini attack like that is the inevitable or worst that can happen. This despite Cheen not being engaged in a shooting war precisely because as a mercantilist nation is gains the most during times of peace and is most aggressive during peace,

2) Again, our counter strategy to OBOR and Xi is dependent on the hope they are incompetent and will collapse on their own.

Iyer-Mitea mentioned “ghost cities” as a throwaway one-line comment. Think carefully about the term. Anyone who even remotely understands economics (who understands the inability of most of the world outside the developed West to build a single highway or a single neighborhood for lack of funds) would understand the mindblowing power of whatever fvcking system that can literally finance the building of cities.

And top of those “ghost cities” they can pour another trillion into a scheme like OBOR. This the sign of the maturing of the chini printing press. This is not the sign of someone in charge of a collapsing economy.

Waiting for a war from Cheen or waiting for them to collapse on their own. Waiting and hoping are not strategies.

Especially not in this case where the Cheen strategy has been clear-cut and simple for decades. They trade, they produce, they build, they encrouch in the gray zone, they engage their printing press. And they do not engage in war.

Under Xi, it will be more than likely more of the same. Except now there is a new wrinkle of a Cheen that is beginning to be scientifically and technologically innovative under a supportive dictator who himself is a technocrat.

The time lost by India in matching its politics to its economics is an advantage for China.Chinese President Xi Jinping

While the global repercussions of the six-day national congress of the Communist Party of China, that ended last week, will continue to be discussed for some time, for India the effects are immediate. The 2,300 delegates at the congress elected a 25-member Politburo, of which seven constitute its Standing Committee (PSC), equivalent to a small but empowered Cabinet in the Westminster form of government. Analysts have of course immediately observed that there was no visible successor to President Xi Jinping among the five new appointees to the PSC, besides himself and Premier Li Keqiang, who continue in their old positions. However, most of the remaining 18 members of the Politburo have had close past links with Mr Xi. This probably is to avoid the situation in the past when a successor would shrink the dominance of the President as the end to his second and final term approached. Mr Xi may yet induct a successor mid-term or ordain a third term for himself, in breach of the post-Deng Xiaoping convention. Mr Xi has also ignored other Deng prescriptions outlined from 1980 onwards, such as the need for collective leadership, non-renewal of Politburo membership of those aged over 68 and abandoning the foreign policy injunction that China must “hide its capacities, bide its time and never take the lead”. With the CPC amending Article 2 of its constitution, to imbed “Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era”, Mr Xi has been put on the same pedestal as Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping. At the same time only one among the Standing Committee’s seven members appears a hardcore Xi follower. Four of them are from organisations seen as his rivals. That may be mere trade-off for Mr Xi extracting support for his elevation as “core” leader.

From the Indian perspective, the prominence given to the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in the deliberations is noteworthy for policymakers. Also significantly, its implementation schedule runs parallel to the Chinese politico-economic vision spelt out by Mr Xi. For instance, China aims to become a “moderately prosperous society” by 2020; a “basically modernised nation” by 2035; and a “rich and powerful socialist nation” by 2050. These lampposts relate, of course, roughly to a hundred years counted from the founding of the Communist Party in 1921 and the founding of the People’s Republic of China’s in 1949 respectively. The BRI markers are for Phase I — mobilisation 2013-16; Phase II — Planning 2016-21; Phase III — Implementation 2021-49. Thus, BRI is the sinews of a Sino-centric new global commercial and political architecture. The consolidation of power by Mr Xi is of course only the logical and final step in a process that he has undertaken since assuming power in 2012, combining greater authoritarian control with nationalism. He has built his repute on a number of moves. First is his successful anti-corruption drive used to sideline rivals and cleanse the party and government, including the military’s secretive networks. Next, he has avoided a hard landing for the Chinese economy despite doomsayers predicting a collapse due to excessive dependence on exports and overhang of debt. Finally, he has successfully inserted China into the strategic space vacated by President Donald Trump, a veritable God-sent who inter alia junked the Barack Obama-sponsored Trans Pacific Partnership, which would have isolated China commercially from a large swathe of trans-Pacific trade. China also raised its international profile by firmly supporting the Paris climate treaty when the United States turned tail.

India also needs to note that besides dominating the CPC and Politburo, Mr Xi has an iron-clad hold over the powerful Central Military Commission (CMC). He is upgrading and modernising equipment and doctrines as indeed command and control structures to make the Chinese military nimbler and deadlier. He has reduced seven districts into which the PLA was divided into five regional commands. Thus, India has to be extremely wary of any post-Doklam standoffs as the Chinese ingest setbacks and take a long view of settling scores or righting imbalances. In any case, they now have an open alliance with Pakistan instead of the earlier below-the-radar cooperation. The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, being a part of BRI, imparts a new dimension to the full spectrum Sino-Pakistan collaboration. Chinese innovation and growth is on a higher trajectory than that of India. The fact that electric car manufacturer Tesla is heading to China to set up its first plant abroad, despite Prime Minister Narendra Modi visiting its plant in America some time ago, shows the attractiveness of China due to its reserves of rare minerals needed for batteries and the size of its market. Despite assurances on Tesla’s intellectual property being safe in China, the assumption that Chinese will poach it will prove right. Similarly, in the field of energy, China buying 14.16 per cent of Russian oil and gas giant Rosneft and being a frontrunner to quietly pick up a five per cent stake in Saudi Aramco, which Saudis prefer to a public IPO, shows the challenge facing India.

It is true that Prime Minister Modi has, like Mr Xi, consolidated power but his two key economic steps — demonetisation and the rollout of the Goods and Services Tax (GST) — have so far brought disruption without visible gain. Unlike Mr Xi, he has crucial state elections which will test his popularity and distract from governance. The time lost by India in matching its politics to its economics is an advantage for China. India is thus still in starting blocks to balance the looming ascendance of China in the Indo-Pacific region. It needs domestic harmony and deft aligning abroad to construct a counter-strategy. Otherwise President Xi’s “China Dream”, articulated in 2013, may turn out to be India’s nightmare.

The time lost by India in matching its politics to its economics is an advantage for China.Chinese President Xi Jinping

While the global repercussions of the six-day national congress of the Communist Party of China, that ended last week, will continue to be discussed for some time, for India the effects are immediate. The 2,300 delegates at the congress elected a 25-member Politburo, of which seven constitute its Standing Committee (PSC), equivalent to a small but empowered Cabinet in the Westminster form of government. Analysts have of course immediately observed that there was no visible successor to President Xi Jinping among the five new appointees to the PSC, besides himself and Premier Li Keqiang, who continue in their old positions. However, most of the remaining 18 members of the Politburo have had close past links with Mr Xi.This probably is to avoid the situation in the past when a successor would shrink the dominance of the President as the end to his second and final term approached. Mr Xi may yet induct a successor mid-term or ordain a third term for himself, in breach of the post-Deng Xiaoping convention. Mr Xi has also ignored other Deng prescriptions outlined from 1980 onwards, such as the need for collective leadership, non-renewal of Politburo membership of those aged over 68 and abandoning the foreign policy injunction that China must “hide its capacities, bide its time and never take the lead”. With the CPC amending Article 2 of its constitution, to imbed “Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era”, Mr Xi has been put on the same pedestal as Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping. At the same time only one among the Standing Committee’s seven members appears a hardcore Xi follower. Four of them are from organisations seen as his rivals. That may be mere trade-off for Mr Xi extracting support for his elevation as “core” leader.

{So the lack of successor is to prevent lame duck syndrome. Xi Jinping wants to be effective till his term is over. The PSC mostly consist of his acolytes and a successor can be chosen from among them. It does not have to be from the PSC. Many of the PSC will retire by the time their term ends as they near 68. Also Xi dispensing with the cautions/prescriptions of Deng Xiaoping, is because the nature of Chinese communist party has changed from those times. The first two prescriptions are to ensure there is no infighting inside Communist Party and the third prescription is to ensure China does not get too much attention. The current situation allows dispensing those cautions! Xi Jinping accommodating his rivals is a sign of his command over the party system.}

From the Indian perspective, the prominence given to the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in the deliberations is noteworthy for policymakers. Also significantly, its implementation schedule runs parallel to the Chinese politico-economic vision spelt out by Mr Xi. For instance, China aims to become a “moderately prosperous society” by 2020; a “basically modernised nation” by 2035; and a “rich and powerful socialist nation” by 2050. These lampposts relate, of course, roughly to a hundred years counted from the founding of the Communist Party in 1921 and the founding of the People’s Republic of China’s in 1949 respectively. The BRI markers are for Phase I — mobilisation 2013-16; Phase II — Planning 2016-21; Phase III — Implementation 2021-49. Thus, BRI is the sinews of a Sino-centric new global commercial and political architecture. The consolidation of power by Mr Xi is of course only the logical and final step in a process that he has undertaken since assuming power in 2012, combining greater authoritarian control with nationalism. He has built his repute on a number of moves. First is his successful anti-corruption drive used to sideline rivals and cleanse the party and government, including the military’s secretive networks. Next, he has avoided a hard landing for the Chinese economy despite doomsayers predicting a collapse due to excessive dependence on exports and overhang of debt. Finally, he has successfully inserted China into the strategic space vacated by President Donald Trump, a veritable God-sent who inter alia junked the Barack Obama-sponsored Trans Pacific Partnership, which would have isolated China commercially from a large swathe of trans-Pacific trade. China also raised its international profile by firmly supporting the Paris climate treaty when the United States turned tail.

India also needs to note that besides dominating the CPC and Politburo, Mr Xi has an iron-clad hold over the powerful Central Military Commission (CMC). He is upgrading and modernising equipment and doctrines as indeed command and control structures to make the Chinese military nimbler and deadlier. He has reduced seven districts into which the PLA was divided into five regional commands. Thus, India has to be extremely wary of any post-Doklam standoffs as the Chinese ingest setbacks and take a long view of settling scores or righting imbalances. In any case, they now have an open alliance with Pakistan instead of the earlier below-the-radar cooperation. The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, being a part of BRI, imparts a new dimension to the full spectrum Sino-Pakistan collaboration. Chinese innovation and growth is on a higher trajectory than that of India. The fact that electric car manufacturer Tesla is heading to China to set up its first plant abroad, despite Prime Minister Narendra Modi visiting its plant in America some time ago, shows the attractiveness of China due to its reserves of rare minerals needed for batteries and the size of its market. Despite assurances on Tesla’s intellectual property being safe in China, the assumption that Chinese will poach it will prove right. Similarly, in the field of energy, China buying 14.16 per cent of Russian oil and gas giant Rosneft and being a frontrunner to quietly pick up a five per cent stake in Saudi Aramco, which Saudis prefer to a public IPO, shows the challenge facing India.

It is true that Prime Minister Modi has, like Mr Xi, consolidated power but his two key economic steps — demonetisation and the rollout of the Goods and Services Tax (GST) — have so far brought disruption without visible gain. Unlike Mr Xi, he has crucial state elections which will test his popularity and distract from governance. [b]The time lost by India in matching its politics to its economics is an advantage for China. India is thus still in starting blocks to balance the looming ascendance of China in the Indo-Pacific region. It needs domestic harmony and deft aligning abroad to construct a counter-strategy. Otherwise President Xi’s “China Dream”, articulated in 2013, may turn out to be India’s nightmare.

Very well put.

OK quite a good article but for the gratuitous swipes at India.

Rajiv Mishra, the head of Softbank on Fox Business News said he would head to China and US for his investments due to the investments policies there. So nothing new here.

De-monitization is an anti-corruption drive without the jailing that Xi Jinping had to do.GST creates a unified one giant market of India which is what it was before the British introduced octori taxes. Yes it has teething troubles but will be implemented smoothly and the kinks straightened out.And NaMo's #CongressMukthBharat is also a way for consolidating political power.

chola wrote:I looked across the Xi related headlines in the past week and while digging through all the subjective opinion pieces and political mumble jumble chaff for concrete things to predict what’s coming, I’ve come to realize this:

Cheen has a fvcking dictator with complete power fully dedicated to science, technology AND the private sector!

Life under Xi will be acceleration of a monstrous combination of authoritarian control that can steamroll over red tape and human lives combined with an already insane dog-eat-dog private sector producing bloody efficiency and forced innovation through inhumanely competitive culling.

I was told by a veteran technology analyst (one of the more respected on Wall Street IMHO) at lunch this week that inevitably Cheen will gain the edge in science because there is no proper sense of ethics. Western researchers will balk at gene cutting that can lead to eugenics or AI and big data that leads to the complete destruction of privacy. There are no such concerns in Cheen.***

Behind the U.S., the following countries have the most ranked institutions out of the 1,250 schools on the overall list:China: 136Japan: 76U.K.: 73Germany: 58

The fact that Xi is supporting a technology-driven PRC that already has the number one engineering university n the world and houses the second most ranked universities has to be our greatest challenge bar none.

Unless we have a Modi in place for the duration of Eleven’s reign we could be left in the backwaters permanently.

*** He said the stuff they are looking at in quantum mechanics combined with the lack of ethics could be frightening. They already have the two fastest supecomputers in the world by a very wide margin. So if they come across the ability to create an economically viable black hole or artificial sun both of which can annihilate our planet if an experiment loses control(!!!), the chinis would not hesitate to try it.

Adding one more story to what I think is the greatest challenge posed by the Xi’s admin. A dictator technocraft leading a Cheen that is showing signs of a science renaissance and technological innovation.

According to a senior security source with direct knowledge of China’s encryption efforts, at least 600 top Chinese ministers and military officials use quantum-encrypted links for all confidential communications. “China has strategic vision going forward decades,” says the security source, who asked not to be named because of the subject’s sensitivity. Quantum encryption “is the future. The PLA has the resources and the vision to master this technology.”...So far, only China has invested the billions of dollars needed to bring quantum encryption to real-world use. “The barriers to entry are quite high—basically, it needs a state-level entity,” says Clark. Ringing Earth with quantum-enabled communications satellites “is a moon-shot, Manhattan-project scale project,” says one senior Western cybersecurity expert and government adviser, referring to the major technological effort required to get men on the moon and develop the American atom bomb. “And today, we [in the West] just don’t have politicians with the vision to commit resources on that scale to any kind of long-term scientific program…. That’s why the Chinese are leading the game.” (The official did not wish to be quoted, by name, criticizing his employers.)

Read the article. It is sobering and frightening at the same time.

A day might be dawning where implementation of the most disruptive science is so expensive and with lead time so long that you need both a dictatorial system with a long term vision AND a printing press to achieve success. However, the printing press is almost always owned by to free market democracy like the US, EU and Japan. And dictatorships inevitably have shit economies never mind having the printing press.

Only Cheen is both a dictatorial state and owns the rare ability to print money like the US, EU and Japan.

eijing: Xi Jinping Thought will now be taught, researched and promoted in universities across China, ensuring that the leader's eponymous philosophy is implanted into students' hearts and minds.

At least twenty universities have established research institutes for Xi's ideology, which was enshrined in the Communist Party's constitution during its 19th national congress this month.

The distinction places Xi on a par with Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping. It means that his dogma -- "Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era" -- will become a mantra for a new generation.

According to media reports on Sunday, the research institutes will not "hide in the ivory tower" but advocate the incorporation of Xi thought in all aspects of daily life.

"We will gather many experts and professors to disseminate and preach Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era in businesses, neighbourhoods and villages," Jiang Hongxin, head of Hunan Normal University's newly-founded Xi Thought research centre, told the People's Daily, the party mouthpiece.

Jiang's attitude mirrors that of many institute directors, who in interviews with Chinese media over the weekend espoused a deep devotion to spreading Xi-isms.

"The (research) centre has a unique duty, which is to push forward Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era in curriculums, in classrooms and in minds," Chen Xianda, a professor at Renmin University of China, told the Beijing-based Guangming Daily.

One institute director said the centre was the school's way of "answering Xi's call" to educate young people, while another said the Xi Thought organisation would "guide the entire school, from top to bottom, in implementing the spirit of the 19th congress".

"We must always keep in mind the generosity of General Secretary Xi Jinping," Zhou Qihong, a party secretary at Wuhan Donghu University, told the People's Daily.

The lessons must "enter brains and hearts", he said. The education ministry also released guidelines on Monday for mandatory elementary and high school extracurricular programmes that include activities to "foster emotional attachment to the Chinese Communist Party".http://www.news18.com/news/world/chines ... 61881.html

if we scan the works of science fiction, 101% of all future powerful technologically advanced states are depicted as - ruled by personality cult tyrants (noko)- in name a democracy but deep surveillance semi police states (usa fits the mould)- ruled by religious elders and their political nominees (the ummah)- ruled by one party, which does not allow any other party (china)

so far I have read of no bumbling, benign entity like India in any scifi or futurist work. let us face facts , the worlds natural resources per capita is shrinking, water wars are going to kick off in earnest post 2050 , to survive let alone thrive a country needs to unified socially and politically and weaponize its 'anger at injustice' by turning its wrath outward to control resources, dominate strategic areas , deny resources to enemy states, build allies ... you can couch it in any sugar coated pill but thats what international politics is all about

and those that are loose and democratic are shown as attacked and on the run from various militaristic federations like the imperial order, first order etc in star wars

does it look like india is future proof or future ready ? not with such deep rot in our admin systems, politics, BIF forces gleefully digging their knives into every crack in our social fabric ... most of our elites are exporting their kids to other countries while laying in a nest egg to fund a lavish retirement locally. infact so are most of the chinese elites, but those that are with the one party kool aid are all in and tolerating no dissent in "what needs to get done" and doing some huge convulsive things which will benefit the 1 billion

in a long long time, namo is the first jedi who has unfurled the banner of revolt against the creeping irrelevance of India and the descent into breakdown and chaos. his armies are as yet small and traitors, moles and spies are crawling all over camp.

Singha wrote:in a long long time, namo is the first jedi who has unfurled the banner of revolt against the creeping irrelevance of India and the descent into breakdown and chaos. his armies are as yet small and traitors, moles and spies are crawling all over camp.

Perhaps all the more reason why 2019 has to be won and won overwhelmingly. Congress and sadak chAAP can parade their dogs, donkeys, tape worms, etc., all they want.

The feasibility of China wishing to push for a major Indian military embarrassment remains an option.

Chinese President Xi Jinping (Photo: PTI)

If one applies any sense of rationale the automatic conclusion would be that Doklam was a planned input or a seized opportunity as an influencing element for the 19th congress of the Communist Party of China — it was a Xi Jinping special, a contribution to China’s naked ambition under him to be viewed as a power which could address issues as it wished and coerce even large nations to submission. President Xi has personally achieved much in the last fortnight, with the elevation of his status and philosophy to that of his illustrious predecessors, Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping. Through the last five years he worked passionately to achieve this and perceived that at the time of decision on his future status and position in history, he had to be seen as the sole facilitator of China’s progress to superpower glory. A part of the process to do the above was the projection of China’s international power. The activities which were designed to do this included the high-profile Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) conference in Beijing in May 2017. Preceding that for a period of time the South China Sea (SCS) issue, and China’s refusal to yield any space on its claims, occupied the narrative. This culminated in the refusal to abide by the decision of the international tribunal that gave credence to the US allegation of China being outside the rule-based international order.

As a natural competitor for strategic space in Asia, India was viewed as one emerging nation, a neighbour too, with which China had not achieved anything using coercive power anytime in recent past. This perception appeared to further cement after India’s refusal to be present at the BRI conference in Beijing. So an issue had to be created, and Doklam presented just that opportunity. Perhaps it occurred just incidentally and was grabbed as being suitable to ratchet up the strategic advantage. It did not go China’s way due to India’s steady, mature and non-coercive response. After 72 days, with attempts at crude psychological warfare through military demonstrations in the depth and one of the most ineffective and poorly-thought information campaigns employing state media; it turned to India’s advantage. There were few options for President Xi but to draw down. A conflict situation on the border could not have reached any finality before the big event — the 19th congress. Despite all calculations there wasn’t a single guarantee that China would be in a position of military advantage any time without opting to enlarge the conflict; that in the international environment of today would not have given China any strategic advantage either. A careful analysis of the reports and statements in Global Times and People’s Daily belied any notion that China, 27 years after adopting “war under informationised conditions” as a basic doctrine, had achieved anything substantial in the PLA’s non-contact strategy. Such blatancy, lack of subtlety and utterly misplaced arrogance more often works to the advantage of the adversary. Victory and defeat are terms that can’t be explained through such standoffs. Mr Xi achieved much at the 19th congress in coming to be the undisputed leader of China for the next five years. In fact, with no identified potential successors, Mr Xi rules the roost with prospects of a third term. His philosophy, titled “Thoughts on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era”, is now enshrined in the constitution; it supplements and in fact overrides the Maoist and Deng philosophies.

How will this translate into effect in terms of Mr Xi’s attitude towards India, now that he has achieved what he wished to at the 19th congress and the future lies open? He would be wary of the sudden changes taking place in US foreign policy with engagement by important US functionaries in different nations prior to President Donald Trump’s coming visit to Asia, particularly China. It is likely that Mr Xi will await further US moves and assess the emerging quad alliance — US, India, Australia and Japan — and the seriousness with which it may create alternatives to the One-Belt-One-Road (OBOR), bridge the oceans and access other continents.

The addressing of India after Mr Xi’s anointment can go many ways. First, an abrasive followup to the attitude adopted during and just after Doklam. This could be an ego-based response to seek opportunities in the near future to overcome the embarrassment at Doklam. Much depends on how deep is the perception of China’s embarrassment in the PLA’s and Mr Xi’s own thinking. It needn’t be restricted to overt border-based military activity or walk-in operations to claim lines, forcing more standoffs. It would appear extremely immature, though given the Chinese response in the state media, this is the kind of action which will restore so-called “pride” in China’s perceived self-superiority. However, it would have learnt its lessons in handling border standoffs too. The year 2018 could be considered an important one by China in terms of Sino-Indian relations, in which China may invest much with intent to politically embarrass Prime Minister Narendra Modi in order to weaken him before the 2019 general election. A strong personality like Mr Modi in power in India is never to China’s advantage.

The feasibility of China wishing to push for a major Indian military embarrassment remains an option. Wary of the fact that India’s strategic confidence is increasing and with greater military modernisation this will only increase further, China could well be tempted to trigger a situation in which escalation remains in its control. It is likely to re-examine the dynamics of its collusive cooperation with Pakistan and determine how winnable such a situation will be. A top-of-the-head assessment lends itself to the deduction that given India’s recent advances and redeployment at its northern borders, its capability to hold its own in the event of a border war is high. That is what the Army and Air Chiefs keep harping on when confronted about dual threats. It is general war that will remain a questionmark; the unbridled use of missiles and rocketry in depth against strategic objectives, a field in which India has advanced, but the asymmetry remains. The political objectives which China may seek are yet unlikely to be delivered through such actions as escalation to the oceans would still remain in India’s hands. Prudent minds in the PLA would have war-gamed this to the last. Wars are not just fought out of frustration, their terminal state is more important than the romance of the trigger. Under these circumstances, after Doklam in particular, a greater degree of realism may have entered the PLA’s war room considerations. None of these should point towards anything immediate in terms of a Sino-Indian standoff.

Read it this morning.I frankly do not think that XI Gins is going to display either kindness,compromise or any flicker of weakness in his stated objective to make China the centre of the world-with him at the centre obviously.XI wants to be know as "the Great Thinker",where his "thoughts" will be the equiv. of Chairman Mao's red book.He has armtwisted the party into handing him supreme powers and is motivating them to follow him like der Fuhrer to the end .

... Donald Trump’s first trip to Asia as president is, in reality, simple. All he has to do on the three initial stops—the most important of the five visits—is listen to Japan, talk with South Korea and dictate to China.

The selection of the first stop is significant. Fortunately, long gone are the days when American leaders signaled Chinese preeminence by beginning Asia trips with Beijing.

In these “Japan passing” years, Japanese prime ministers pleaded with U.S. presidents to adopt more resolute, determined policies with regard to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. Arrogant, distracted and negligent American leaders ignored the advice, which is one of the reasons the American people are in such peril today. It’s time Washington put an end to this unbroken record of underperformance.

Trump, to his credit, has already developed a good relationship with Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, so listening to him will not be either novel or hard.

...

In Japan, therefore, Trump need only listen.

In South Korea, he should talk to Moon Jae-in, the “progressive” president who took office in May. Moon, if he had his way, would be supporting the North Korean regime with aid, trade, and investment, effectively giving Kim Jong-un the means to build an even more fearsome arsenal.

So far, Trump has done a good job in restraining Moon from implementing his version of the “Sunshine Policy” of “engagement” of the Kim family regime, but the forty-fifth president by no means can declare victory. Moon, whenever, the opportunity presents, will be seeking to build bridges with the North.

Up to now, Kim Jong-un has rebuffed Moon’s overtures, but sometime soon the North Korean will switch course and hold his hand out for South Korean cash. In the meantime, President Trump needs to convince Moon that it is in his interest to support American policy even if it means he must spurn offers of “cooperation” from Pyongyang.

Also Trump needs to talk with Moon about his recent reconciliation with China. For more than a year, Beijing has been prosecuting an ugly campaign first to prevent Seoul from deploying the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system and then to punish the South for actually doing so. The Chinese have been outraged that Seoul went ahead over their objections to base THAAD, as the American-built anti-missile system is known, on South Korean soil because, among other reasons, they felt its radars would peer into China.

Tuesday, the Chinese and South Korean foreign ministries issued a joint statement putting the feud behind them. Some are speculating that Moon gave Beijing secret assurances in order to end the spat. In any event, Tong Zhao of the Carnegie Tsinghua Center for Global Policy suggested to CNN that the joint statement was Beijing’s way of undermining the U.S.-South Korea alliance. Trump needs reassurance from Moon, who has harbored pro-China views throughout his career.

Finally, Trump should listen to and address South Korean fears that the United States might not defend the South.These days, the country’s politicians, like many in the region, are skittish about American staying power. The periodic B-1 overflights of the peninsula are more about messaging resolve to Seoul and Tokyo than conveying threats to Pyongyang and Beijing.

So in the South Korean capital it would be good for Trump to both talk and listen.

In Beijing, Trump should insist on doing all the talking. As Beijing’s diplomats are fond of saying, “he who has tied the knot shall untie it.” The Chinese in fact tied the North Korea knot by providing two—and probably three—generations of Kim leaders with the means to make nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles, so it is up to them to take away these instruments from the 300-pounder whom they sometimes call Fatty the Third.

And Xi can untie this particular knot. Having consolidated his position as China’s dominant political figure at the just-concluded Communist Party 19th National Congress and its First Plenum, he has no excuse not to marshal Chinese power.

And there is a lot of Chinese power to marshal. China accounted for 92.5 percent of North Korea’s external trade last year. China from year to year provides more than 90 percent of the North’s crude oil, much of it on concessionary terms. China is the source of at least a third of North Korea’s food, maybe 45 percent, something especially important because the drought this year was the worst since 2001. There are some years that China supplies 100 percent of the North’s aviation fuel.Beijing is Pyongyang’s primary backer in diplomatic councils, particularly the UN.

China provides many things to the Kim regime, but the most important is confidence in the minds of senior figures that they are safe from the United States, South Korea and the international community.

Beijing may not have the power to change Kim Jong-un’s mind on the need for his arsenal—it’s possible no one can do so—but the Chinese can, if they want, convince regime elements that it is no longer in their interests to stick with either Kim’s weapons programs or Kim himself, who, after hundreds of executions and purges, is not particularly popular.

Chinese observers argue that Kim Jong-un’s defiance of China’s wishes proves Beijing does not have significant influence, but recent events suggest otherwise. Kim has accelerated the pace of missile tests—fifteen of them so far this year—but has not conducted one after September 15.

Moreover, the last major belligerent statement from Pyongyang was Foreign Minister Ri Yong Ho’s threat of September 25, made in New York shortly after the conclusion of the UN General Assembly meeting, to detonate a thermonuclear device in the atmosphere. Then, Pyongyang went quiet until a few days ago. It was only after the 19th Congress closed that a senior North Korean official told the world, through CNN’s Will Ripley, to take Ri’s sensational threat “literally.”

What to make of the lull around the Congress? My theory is that either Beijing told Pyongyang not to do anything provocative at the most sensitive time in the Communist Party’s political calendar or the North Koreans knew better than to anger the Chinese. If nothing else, the absence of provocative acts shows Beijing can control its only formal ally when it really wants to.

And Kim’s warm congratulatory message to Xi at the conclusion of the 19th Congress is another sign that either the Chinese can make their Korean allies do what they want or that the Koreans know their place.

American presidents have fallen for Chinese-North Korean denial and deception tactics for decades. Trump, who wields overwhelming economic and financial power over China, does not need to become another victim of the illusion.

Trump should tell Xi Jinping that the Chinese need to untie this particular knot and do so now.

Xi Jinping, in order to have a "trouble-free" ascension at the 19th CPC Congress, had to do a lot of stage-management BEYOND PRC's BORDERS.

1) Quietly back down from Doklam confrontation, where he knew PLA would get an embarrassing bloody nose if they pushed the issue.2) Press Fatboy Kim to retreat from his pledge to test an ICBM-borne thermonuke over the ocean.3) More? Perhaps in AfPak, possibly around the Boyle "rescue" drama?

What does this tell us about the CPC as an institution?

Are they more prone to a "log kya kahengey/duniya kya kahegi" mentality than we usually think? Or is this something specific to the context of Xi and the present day vision of Nishan-e-Cheen?

If all these events beyond PRC's borders stood to pose a serious risk to Xi's gambit for ascension... then it shows us that Xi's pitch for supremacy was largely predicated on his promise to extend Chinese supremacy (Pax Sinica) BEYOND China's borders. This is in contrast to the two earlier Core Leaders, whose supremacy was almost entirely predicated on their capacity to ensure the Communist Party's enduring supremacy WITHIN China's borders.

The recently-concluded 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China was an intricately choreographed political theatre which showcased President Xi Jinping’s primacy, his vision and his status as the helmsman of the party and the nation. China’s confidence in the validity of its chosen path and its ambitions of “restoring” its global leadership role were also on full display.

While this conclave was more about reaffirmation of trends evolving since Mr. Xi’s ascendance to power at the 18th Party Congress, rather than charting out new policy directions, it has significant implications for India.

Signature ideology

The Congress has confirmed Mr. Xi’s standing as the most powerful Chinese leader in the post-Deng era. His vision for the future of China, “Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era”, is enshrined in the party constitution as part of its guiding ideology.

A Xinhua commentary gushingly suggests that “Xi Jinping’s thought will be China’s signature ideology and the new communism”, the implication being that it supersedes and encompasses the doctrinal offerings of previous leaders.

Mr. Xi has become the only leader after Mao (with his “Mao Zedong Thought”) to have his eponymous ideological contribution written into the party charter while in office. “Deng Xiaoping Theory” was adopted after Deng’s death, and contributions of two of Mr. Xi’s predecessors, Hu Jintao (“Scientific Outlook”) and Jiang Zemin (“Three Represents”), are not named after them. {Xi initially wanted his ideology to be incorporated into CPC's Constitution simply as "Xi Jinping Thoughts" in line with those of Mao. But, it took a longish term, “Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era”. We don't know whether it was a pushback from Jiang/Hu remnants or Xi himself finally decided for this terminology.}

While this self-elevation and his position as the “lingxiu”, a wise and great leader, makes Mr. Xi the principal arbiter of China’s future directions over the next five years and possibly beyond, it is does not yet put him on a par with Mao and Deng. Arguably, Deng did not need a theory named after him or to hold many offices to bring about transformational changes in China. Mr. Xi is a transformative leader in the making but has a long way to go before he can rival Mao and Deng in impact and legacy.

Mr. Xi has, however, taken decisive steps to move away from Deng’s legacy in four key areas: collective leadership; identification of successors well ahead of the transfer of power; a measure of differentiation between the party and the state; and the dictum of China biding its time, keeping a low profile and never claiming leadership.

Deng had institutionalised collective leadership to correct the problems of “excessive concentration of power” witnessed under Mao. With Mr. Xi steadily accumulating levers of authority and eliminating rivals, there has been a shift towards personalised rule in his first term and now at the Party Congress. The erosion of checks that it involves has attendant risks for China.

The new team

The new Politburo is packed with Mr. Xi’s close associates. By one count, there are as many as 14 of his allies among 25 members of the Politburo. {By another account, Xi can confidently get 18 votes from the 25 member Politburo}However, the composition of the seven-member Politburo Standing Committee (PBSC) is more balanced and possibly the result of a compromise, thus suggesting limits to Mr. Xi’s authority. Premier Li Keqiang has retained his position, along with Mr. Xi, and of five new members, only one (Li Zhanshu) is seen as a Xi protégé, while others have links to his predecessors but cannot be described as rivals. {Of course, Li Zhanshu is a very close confidante of Xi. Their relationship seemingly goes back to the early 80s. He has been Xi's right-hand man since 2012 and in the new PSC, he is number three. Li Keqiang, the Prime Minister himself, has worked closely with Xi ever since he & Xi were identified by Jiang to take over from the Hu Jintao/Wen Jiabao combination. In the first term too, Xi-Li combination has worked closely though Xi has made Li almost powerless by snatching away all his decision-making powers through various committees that he himself leads. Li is not expected to oppose Xi in the second term too. Next is Wang Yang, who is Vice Prime Minister and also a Hu protege. He comes from the 'Hu Jintao Youth League Faction' that Xi has systematically abolished. Wang Yang is the only 'compromise' candidate to placate different factions within CPC. The second Wang in the PSC, Wang Huning, is a professional and has worked with Jiang, Hu and Xi. He has complete trust of Xi in him and Wang Huning has formulated the ideological framework for Xi. This brings us to the sixth member of PSC, Zhao Leji, who is a replacement for Wang Qishan who was pointman for Xi in his audacious and brutal anti-corruption drive. Zhao Leji would head the dreaded CCDI now. He is from the Shaanxi province just like Xi Jinping. Many say that there is a Shaanxi Clique which is favoured by Xi. Zhao leji is therefore a strong Xi supporter. Now, we come to the last PSC member Han Zheng, who has worked with Xi in Shanghai when the latter was Shanghai's CPC Secretary. Though he was rumoured to be a member of the Shanghai Clique (owing allegiance to Jiang), the Jiang faction has lost influence and Han has become a close confidante of Xi. I would therefore say that Xi is extremely well-supported within the PSC. } Mr. Xi had changed virtually all Provincial Party Secretaries in the months ahead of the 19th Congress, and appointments since the Congress have underlined his sway over personnel matters.

In another departure from the post-Deng practice, no potential successor to Mr. Xi has been included in the new line-up of the PBSC. This has kept open the possibility of him staying on as the paramount leader or the power behind the throne well beyond 2022, when he completes his second term as the party leader.

Though the party constitution rules out “life tenure”, it sets no term limits for any office, unlike the state constitution which has a two-term limit for presidency and other senior positions. It is still too early to figure out how the post-2022 scenario will pan out, but it seems unlikely today that Mr. Xi will completely exit from the leadership position as his predecessor Hu Jintao did at the end of his second term.

The absence of a succession plan has potential perils in a party which has witnessed destructive factional feuds in the past.

Mr. Xi’s penchant for the dominance of the party, including in the economic domain, has received a boost at the Congress. In his work report, he reaffirmed a key message of his 2013 third plenum policy statement that the market should play the “decisive” role in allocation of resources but the state would take the “leading role” in the economy. His preference for maintaining a strong state and party role in the economy with minimal privatisation of state-owned assets and firm control over social and financial risks is unlikely to change in the wake of the Congress. Likewise, while he is positioning China as a defender of globalisation, it comes with a strong dose of mercantilism.

For India, one key outcome of the party conclave is the articulation of China’s increasingly explicit great power ambitions. In his speech, Mr. Xi talked about China becoming “a global leader of composite national strength and international influence” and moving closer to the centre-stage by mid-century. A Xinhua commentary of October 24 is more candid: “By 2050… China is set to regain its might and re-ascend to the top of the world.”

In sync with Mr. Xi’s “Chinese dream” enunciated five years ago, an overarching theme of the Party Congress was the “great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation” and “restoration” of China’s centrality on the global stage. In his speech, Mr. Xi spoke of China as a “strong country” or “great power” as many as 30 times, jettisoning the earlier coyness about the country’s great power ambitions.

The preoccupation with building up global combat capabilities to safeguard China’s overseas interests also figures prominently in Mr. Xi’s vision. Arguably the most ambitious restructuring of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) in the last 50 years currently underway is focussed on joint command, power projection capability and the party’s control on the military. Mr. Xi has set the goal of completing modernisation of the armed forces by 2035 and transforming the PLA into a world-class military by 2050.{As I said in my post earlier, the 2035 timeline suggests that PRC feels confident of taking on US at that time and defeating it. However, it may want to avoid a war and assume sole pole leadership without that. It gives itself additional 15 years i.e. until c. 2050 to achieve that.}

In a significant departure from China’s position in the post-Mao period of not seeking to export its model, Mr. Xi has suggested that “the Chinese path… offers a new option for other countries and nations who want to speed up their development while preserving their independence, and it offers Chinese wisdom and approach to solving problems facing mankind”. It is to be seen how far China will go to promote its model as an alternative to liberal, capitalist democracy and the “Washington Consensus”.

However, China is likely to intensify its efforts to shape its periphery and forge a “world community of shared destiny” centred around it.{Traditionally, this has how Imperial China had behaved in its Sinicization efforts}With the U.S. in temporary retreat and the West distracted by internal challenges, China considers this to be a period of strategic opportunity to take its great power project to the next level in the new era that Mr. Xi has envisioned.

The BRI gauntlet

Mr. Xi’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is the key instrument in this grand strategy and it is now embedded in the party constitution. There is nothing to suggest that China is inclined to address India’s concerns about the BRI.

In a development possibly linked to China’s enhanced global agenda, for the first time since 2003, the Politburo includes a diplomat, State Councillor Yang Jiechi. As the Chinese special representative for boundary talks with India, he has had extensive interactions with us.

It may also be noted that since his 2014 visit to India, President Xi has emerged as the principal Chinese interlocutor for Prime Minister Narendra Modi. In the past, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh engaged primarily with Premier Wen Jiabao. Given Mr. Xi’s pre-eminence, his being personally invested in the relationship with India has its advantages.

Looking ahead, a more assertive China will be one of the most critical factors shaping India’s external environment, apart from engendering new challenges in the management of bilateral relations, more so as the footprints of the two re-emergent countries will increasingly overlap.

Ashok K. Kantha, a former Ambassador of India to China, is Director of the Institute of Chinese Studies and Distinguished Fellow with Vivekananda International Foundation, New Delhi

It was a dramatic morning on October 25, when Xi Jinping, General Secretary of the Communist Party of China (CPC) and the country’s President, introduced the new leadership line-up that would steer China’s destiny for the next five years. There was an air of optimism in the Great Hall of the People, when Mr. Xi introduced to the world his six fellow travellers who would form the Standing Committee of the Politburo.

The Standing Committee is on the top of China’s leadership tree. As soon as the ceremony was over, a jet plane with all the seven members on board headed for Shanghai. Once in China’s commercial capital, the team, including Li Keqiang, Li Zhanshu, Wang Yang, Wang Huning, Han Zheng and Zhou Leji, travelled to the city’s Xintiandi area.

Xintiandi, whose name translates as “new heaven and earth”, is usually a crowded place. China’s new leadership was visiting this zone on a special mission. They headed straight to its well-known museum. Housed in an elegant grey brick building, in the tree-lined former French concession, this is the birthplace of the CPC. In 1921, Mao Zedong and 12 other delegates met secretly in the building, representing the 57 members of the nascent party. Now, in the same structure, China’s new Standing Committee took its well-publicised oath. They were making it unambiguous to the world that time and money had not diluted the CPC’s abiding allegiance to its ‘red roots’.

A video clip posted by China Central Television showed President Xi leading the oath-taking ceremony. Behind him, standing in a row, the six dark-suited men, facing a hammer and sickle replica, repeated the oath: “It is my will to join the Chinese Communist Party… carry out the party’s decisions, strictly observe party discipline, guard party secrets, be loyal to the party… be ready at all times to sacrifice my all for the party and the people, and never betray the party.”

Later, the state broadcaster showed the leaders strolling in the compound. A poster on a big hoarding behind them read: “Raise high the flag of the Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese characteristics for a New Era. Stay true to the original aspiration and keep the mission firmly in mind.”

The group then left for the South Lake in the neighbouring Zhejiang Province, where they gathered in the replica of the ‘Red Boat’, in which the founding members of the CPC had escaped, after the police had stormed into their meeting in Shanghai. In his speech, Mr. Xi said: “The tiny red boat that carried the nation’s hopes 96 years ago has become a giant ship that carries the hopes of over 1.3 billion Chinese people.”

Party fundamentals

President Xi’s emphatic focus on party fundamentals contrasts his first term in office. Soon after the 18th Party Congress in 2012, Mr. Xi had left for Shenzhen, the cradle of China’s economic reforms. There, he placed a wreath at the bronze statue of former leader Deng Xiaoping, signalling China’s focus on market-friendly reforms. But much has changed in the last five years. In a novel experiment, Mr. Xi is fusing Confucius and Marx to realise “advanced socialism” by 2050.

“No leader in the history of the People’s Republic has so emphasised the importance of Chinese traditional culture as Xi. Yet, he is adamant in preserving a Marxist outlook in modern China,” writes Eric X. Li, a political scientist based in Shanghai, in the South China Morning Post. He raises a pertinent question: “Can we weave together a coherent narrative that absorbs modern Marxism into 5,000 years of China’s heritage?” Only time will tell.

When China set off on its path of economic liberalisation towards freer markets about 1980, it chose to retain its communist one-party system and tight political control. The Soviet Union did not choose this model when it began to unravel about 1990 and paid a heavy price for it. The Chinese model looks even wiser in hindsight as it has maintained enviable economic growth and navigated the country to second place, after the US, in Gross National Income.

Most observers believed it was only a matter of time before China would also loosen political control and allow its people more freedom in the area of speech, access to information, and political organising. The recently concluded party proved otherwise. The reappointed president, Xi Jinping, has made it clear that he is a party man and the party will extend its reach and discipline.

Driving the dream

Jinping has said that the Communist Party will have a prime place in the pursuit of his ‘China Dream’ of national rejuvenation, calling it a ‘new era’ in his speech. The Chinese have always had a strong sense of nationalism. Their response to buying things of Japanese and South Korean origin waxed and waned in keeping with how well their government thought of those countries. Most recently, the government angered by South Korea deploying a US missile system turned on public outrage leading to a boycott of South Korean products. Now, the party is firmly in the driver’s seat.

The party is estimated to have 89 million members and was generally considered a preferred track for the ambitious. Now, there are going to be required study sessions for party members of Jinping’s speech. They are going to revive the practice of members criticising each other and themselves. (This practice under Mao had children criticising their parents and teachers and sending them to re-education centres.) Membership dues based on a person’s salary are being adjusted and collected retroactively.

Party-speak

Public organisations have a party official ensconced in high office with a say in important personnel decisions. Now, an old rule that any organisation with three or more party members should set up a party cell is being enforced. The party’s influence extends to the private sector.The Wall Street Journal recently reported that multinationals operating in China have party committees. Party consultants help private companies integrate party work.

Control of speech is going to come under tighter regulation. Online groups are closely watched and now punishment for ‘spreading rumours’ is being raised. The chat leader is going to be made responsible. The government which would like greater control in IT businesses like Alibaba, Tencent, and Weibo is said to be eyeing a small share of their equity. This will put it directly in conflict with US policies where the Committee on Foreign Investment has taken a dim view of Chinese companies seen to be connected to the government and refused them permission to acquire US companies.

‘Comrades’ Zuckerberg, Cook and Nadella were at the Great Hall of the People to personally congratulate Jinping. They will have tough choices to make in the coming days.

The world's largest armed forces should be "absolutely loyal, honest and reliable to Xi", said a new guideline issued by the Central Military Commission. "The army should follow Xi's command, answer to his order, and never worry him," Xinhua quoted the guideline as saying.

On Sunday, a song titled "Be a good soldier for Chairman Xi" was released by the People's Armed Police, a paramilitary force under the Military Commission.

Nearly a half-century ago, the army sang "Be a good soldier for Chairman Mao".

The recently concluded 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China (CPC) amended the Party’s Constitution to include the promotion of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) as one of the major future objectives. This has been seen as an “unexpected” development in Beijing’s political practice in some quarters.1 The amended constitution emphasises that China would work closely with the international community for “shared interest” and “shared growth” through the pursuit of the BRI.2 The use of phrases such as “shared growth” and “shared interest” is nothing new in Chinese official parlance and may look superfluous. But the BRI’s inclusion in the CPC’s amended Constitution is a significant development since the international community mostly views the initiative as an economic strategy that is linked to China’s external engagement policy, and less of a “political” proposition. {If international community had taken such a view, it was immensely foolish because nothing that China does is divorced from its political goals. I think we have understood that clearly here in BRf} No matter how minor this amendment might appear to be, it signifies a ‘Chinese state strategy’ in the making, both in the domestic and international contexts.

Past National Congresses have also witnessed amendments to the Party’s Constitution. From the first amendment in 1982, the CPC Constitution has been amended six times before this, each of which brought about changes to the party’s governing principles and functioning style, and adding new leadership thoughts in the process. A similar pattern can be seen in the 2017 amendments as well. By acknowledging Xi Jinping’s strong leadership, the amended Constitution emphasises the importance of Communism in China and how the Communists have progressed smoothly since the 18th National Congress under the guidance of Comrade Xi Jinping as “chief representative”.

Xi’s flagship thought of “Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era” has also been entered into the Constitution, essentially implying that China would denounce the Western model of democracy and would like to persist with a system that draws its inspiration from Marxism-Leninism along with Mao Zedong’s thought and Deng Xiaoping’s theory and other established principles. The naming of Xi Jinping along with his thought was one of the highpoints of the 19th National Congress, for it elevated Xi’s position as a strong leader equivalent to Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping. Both Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao failed to secure the distinction of having their name mentioned alongside their thoughts in the CPC constitution, even though their principal thoughts do figure in constitution. In fact, in the Communist system, naming a particular leader’s thoughts is a symbolic gesture and signifies his or her leadership persona.

Likewise, the reference to the BRI in the Constitution was another big recognition for Xi Jinping himself since it was primarily known as his project. Further, the inclusion of BRI in the constitution signifies that it is a long-term national project that will continue to be pursued even if Xi were to step down from the presidency in 2022. (But there is speculation that Xi might continue to hold power as the Chairman of the Central Military Commission (CMC) and perhaps as the general secretary of the Party beyond 2022, the two most important positions that really influence the Party’s supervisory process in China’s political structure.) Moreover, since its formal announcement in 2013, BRI has primarily been seen as Xi’s “leadership” project. By naming the BRI in the CPC Charter, China has placed more policy weight on the initiative and offered it a legal sanctity. Further, its inclusion in the Charter reiterates the fact that the BRI is not merely an economic policy but rather a ‘political project’ that Beijing would like to pursue as part of its national developmental programme.

At the same time, the constitutional amendment links BRI with China’s aspiration to ‘build a community of shared interest’ and to achieve “shared growth” through “discussion and collaboration”. {So far, BRI has proceeded without much 'discussion and collaboration'. The countries have been chosen carefully so that China could thrust its plans upon them. But, China seems to recognize the widespread criticism and has for namesake, included "discussion and collaboration”.} This implies the leadership’s ambition to shape the world order through the progress and success of BRI. On the practical side, this implies China’s determination to further promote BRI internationally. China, under Xi’s leadership, has spent enormous resources and energy to promote this flagship initiative since 2013 when Xi formally introduced the initiative to the outside world.

If Xi’s first tenure were to be seen as the ‘promotional’ phase of BRI, the induction of BRI into the Chinese constitution coinciding with the start of his second term as President would imply the beginning of its second ‘execution’ phase. In fact, to launch the execution plan, Beijing convened a forum in May 2017 which witnessed the attendance of 70 heads of international organisations, representatives from 130 countries and 29 national leaders. Releasing a “List of Deliverables” document during the forum, China emphasised the priority areas – policy, infrastructure, trade, financial and people-to-people connectivity – of the BRI.3

The execution of BRI concerning these priority areas is, however, an uphill task. Domestically, the initial promotion and execution of BRI was carried out quite non-systematically. A number of provinces were initially offered a free hand to promote BRI and to sign deals abroad. By inducting BRI into the constitution, China has made it a procedural feature, offering more power to the central government. Earlier, provincial governments aimed to implement BRI as part of their five-year plans. For instance, Xinjiang and Guangxi from Western China were looking to promote infrastructure and trade connecting routes as priorities with the neighbouring Central Asian region. And the targets of Fujian, Guangdong and Shanghai from China’s eastern coastal regions prioritised foreign trade, shipping and logistics and e-commerce while promoting further “opening up”. Moreover, the induction of BRI into the constitution exerts the central leadership’s political control over the provinces since power struggles between different provinces and between the centre and the provinces area known issues in China.It may be recalled that due to his strict anti-corruption drive, Xi Jinping faced political opposition from various quarters and their business communities in various provinces, mainly in Hunan, Gansu, Guangxi, Chongqing and Beijing. 4

The amendment clubbing BRI with “shared interests” and “shared growth” through “discussion and collaboration” elucidates the foreign policy intent that Beijing attaches to its external engagement policy. That means, Beijing may like to employ a more serious approach for convincing the international community to formally join the BRI, and sign agreements that would be beneficial to China and the outside world. This would further imply that China would pursue a more ‘purposeful’ external engagement policy where the top-down directives of the CPC would exert more pressure on Chinese banks, state-owned companies, private companies and business operators to promote investment decisions abroad that will reflect Beijing’s strategic objectives. The performance of the state-owned companies and private companies in promoting the BRI abroad has been under review for some time now. Beijing is slowly implementing a strict capital control mechanism to finance projects abroad under the BRI through different categories.5

In terms of foreign policy, China would like to employ a more consultative process to execute BRI deals, through “discussion and collaboration”. Beijing would be pursuing this consultative process from a position of strength as the world’s second-largest economy. Foreign exchange reserves of US$ 3.1 trillion are likely to enable China offer deals which many smaller economies will find hard to resist or ignore. In addition, the constitutional amendment implies that China is still counting on a set of countries that are yet to offer open or full support to the BRI or have expressed reservations about participating in the initiative.

Both the United States and Japan sent representatives to attend the BRI summit in May 2017, but neither is yet to offer full support for the initiative. Also, Beijing has not completely given up hope of gaining India’s support for the BRI. The recent Doklam border standoff and rising competition on various issues between the two countries may not really encourage China to vest too much hope on India. But the idea of promoting a “forward looking constructive” relationship between China and India, as discussed between Xi Jinping and Narendra Modi during the Xiamen BRICS summit in 2017,6 is not entirely a proposition outside the purview of the BRI.

To sum up, the inclusion of BRI in the CPC constitution was a deliberate political move. The BRI, with a proposed US$900 billion investment,7 is undoubtedly an initiative with global scope that is moreover closely linked to China’s future. Xi, in his speech to the National Congress, acknowledged the importance of BRI for the future of the Chinese economy. Stressing BRI as a “priority”, he emphasised on opening China further to the outside world and encouraged an equal emphasis on “bringing in” and “going global” in order to promote stable engagement with the international community. This implies that China’s external engagement policy will be more BRI-centric in the years to come. Nationally, the inclusion of BRI in the CPC charter was a historic moment for Xi Jinping personally. If Mao Zedong is remembered as the founding father of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and Deng Xiaoping for his “Reform and Opening-up” policy which transformed China into what it is today, Xi Jinping will certainly be remembered for his Belt and Road policy in the years to come.

SS, There are a lot of idealist scholars in Indian chatteratti circles who toe the international consensus bokwas, Realist scholars are marginalized as jingoes.I agree BRI/OBOR will transform Central Asia.It will unify Eurasia into a giant market

The US push for Indo-Pacific will fulfill this objective as it will contain China in the Pacific and India in Sub-Continent. This will drive China towards Europe via the land route.

However its not in India's interest that China loses its Pacific focus as it is on the eastern shores of the Pacific Ocean and has legitimate interests and we don't want them to drive into Central Asia.

BTW I saw a BBC documentary on a land port in Khazakstan which is the entryway towards the rail route to Europe via Russia.Huge transformation is taking place there.

For China, for centuries perhaps for millennia, world domination simply meant, domination of yellow races. Even when I listened to the aam Chinese about middle Kingdom, they only meant that middle Kingdom was in the middle of yellow races.

First time they really came into contact with and felt inferior to as a race was with the west, in fact they felt humiliated by west, but were never felt inferior to or superior to browns, as Indians never had much contact with Han, except as academic interests. The Indians were always in the blindspot for them,

2008 was perhaps the first time they saw that they can truly dominate the world. For them world means yellow races+West.

They are not aware of any challengers. India for them is like Somalia. They think that Indians need bread.

Whereas till 2008 China rise was peaceful, BRI is for west domination rather than, for anything else. They are expecting no challenger.

Their assessment is correct that West is losing its edge, and it would not be difficult to dominate West. US has already lost/never had any interest to confront China but were complicit in the rise of China.

They may find a challenger in India and nobody else. India is also wavering, unable to find suitable strategy, in fact, MEA statements often shows India in poor light. Unless India declares China as it's adversary unequivocally, consistently, tactically and strategically, chances of China domination of India is more than 50%.

The easiest way to check or test India's will is to watch the progress of CPEC. If CPEC happened, then, India will be exploited by China, and India will become totally irrelevant in world affairs, and Indians will live in poverty for ever.

I think it may sound oxymoron but it is moving towards Imperial Democracy...

Imperial as it concentrates power in one person in the present instance Xi Jinping.Democracy for it means term limits or leadership changes without violence and not dynastic.

...It may be called the modern “Communist Manifesto” for the New Era but it was an evolutionary process to stage the “Third Revolution” of the People’s Republic of China (PRC).

The First Revolution started with Chairman Mao Zedong in 1949. He led the Cultural Revolution and the Great Leap Forward to get rid of the backward “feudal” society. The founding generation of PRC considered that the dynastic heritage was an outdated relic of Confucian traditions and a stumbling-block for modernity until the end of Qing Dynasty in 1911. For them, the republicanism that ensued under Dr. Sun Yat-sun and Gen. Chiang-Kai-Shek of the Republic of China was also a transplant of Christian missionaries, Western doctors and English educators to make China a Western nation. For the PRC leadership, Mao’s efforts crystallized the revolutionary force to create an “egalitarian and socialist” society, which eventually ended-up in disaster and tragedy for China.

With Mao’s passing in 1976, the Second Revolution was engineered by Deng Xiaoping. His economic reform and trade liberalization led to unleash the entrepreneurial zeal of the Chinese people. The Deng Revolution made China a manufacturing powerhouse and the largest economy after the United States within a generation.

Now that President Xi has consolidated absolute power as the “chairman of everything”—from the Party, state, military, economy and most importantly the culture—he has sent a “comprehensive and systematic” message that the PRC now has the “cultural confidence” of Confucius to rejuvenate the Chinese nation and its cultural heritage in “socialism with Chinese characteristics for a New Era.” This is the Third Revolution to create a “moderately prosperous society.”

The Communist Party is in name-only, but the socialist aspects of Xi’s Report resonate with the egalitarian ideas that Mao once espoused through his First Revolution.

President Xi’s “rejuvenation” of the Chinese culture with Confucian values is the hidden message of the New Era of transformation for progressive and assertive China. It would reinvent the Communist Party into a Confucian Party of China—the New Era of CPC—to unify the nation as a Confucian Union.

The Confucian vision of cultural confidence is now combined with Deng’s foundation of a capitalist economy with Chinese characteristics; i.e., running the economy by the “visible hands” of the State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs). President Xi highlighted the importance of SOEs in his long-speech as high-value for Beijing’s new leadership.....

For all my anti=PRC antipathy, can't help but admire the sheer ch00tzpah and spunk they do have in getting *impossible* things done. The weeghur beards dancing tai chi during Ramadan is something no toher country in the world (save NoKo) could even dare contemplate only.

Believers urged to replace religious artefacts in their homes with posters of Communist Party leader if they want to benefit from poverty-relief efforts

But is it working? Bigtime, apparently.

Thousands of Christians in an impoverished county in rural southeast China have swapped their posters of Jesus for portraits of President Xi Jinping as part of a local government poverty-relief programme that seeks to “transform believers in religion into believers in the party”.

Front page full pic shows this here:Followed by this:

Kinda poetic that the same evanjihadis who used lucre (derived from colonial plunder, at least in part) to entice the rural poor to abandon native traditions and take up xtianity, are now seeing the CCP beat them at their own game - just like CCP did in Trade, Tech and Turf (e.g., South china sea). Lol, only.

P.S. Possibility also exists that maybe many recent desi converts attracted to EJ lucre could be ghar-wapasi-ed, perhaps, with adequate incentives onlee....

Mohan Malik in Twitter says it well here:

Mohan Malik 马立克‏ @jmohanmalik20m20 minutes agoMore Mohan Malik 马立克 Retweeted Mohan Malik 马立克XI is GODThousands of Christians have swapped their posters of Jesus for portraits of Xi Jinping as part of a local govt poverty-relief program to “transform believers in religion into believers in the party”

See this story.So I am 99% sure they were guilty of something, but I am 121% sure that the incident was orchestrated. Trump returns trimuphant with American eyes all on these liberated "children", whereas what really happened was that Trump could not raise the issues of the Fauln Gong and Tibetal Splittists or other unfortunates in the Chinese torture dungeons. Neat.Are the chinese evil or what?

UlanBatori wrote:See this story.So I am 99% sure they were guilty of something, but I am 121% sure that the incident was orchestrated. Trump returns trimuphant with American eyes all on these liberated "children", whereas what really happened was that Trump could not raise the issues of the Fauln Gong and Tibetal Splittists or other unfortunates in the Chinese torture dungeons. Neat.Are the chinese evil or what?

A lot of people were surprised that Trump went out if hus way for three black kids. To be perfectly honest, it wasn’t surprising to white Americans that blacks would be caught stealing. They are caught all the time in the US!

Xi’s support for the sciences to match their manufacturing prowess is the most impactful and dangerous (to us) element of his reign.

The push into science and technology dictated by Xi will mean a lot more advances in the coming years. Scientists will literally have their heads on the line to produce.

Each advancement paired with Cheen’s insane ability to build chit means more fake islands, more world class airplanes for both mil and civil markets and more ships and crafts to invade the oceans and space to put up stakes.

We have dealt with a Cheen that can outproduce us for years but our access to better technology from both Roos and the West meant that we were able to maintain an edge in quality if not quantity.

But what happens if Xi’s vision of a technologically advanced Cheen comes to fruition? Where they are as good or better with the best of the West? (And they already are in things like supercomputers and quantum communication. They will be making a push for dominance in the near future for hypersonics and electro-magnetic launchers.)

Chinese scientists are undertaking some of the world’s biggest experiments, rolling out the latest medical advances on a massive scale and pushing the boundaries of exploration in the ocean and space.

China’s president, Xi Jinping, pointed to this in his speech at the Communist Party of China’s recent national congress where he called on his countrymen to “make greater contributions to mankind”.

The party revised its charter, which is now referred to “Xi Jinping Thought”, making Xi an ideologue on a par with Mao.

His speech, punctuated with repetitive, often-used socialist phraseology, outlined the country’s achievements and goals. Xi called for “great energy” to be devoted to implementing an innovation-driven development strategy.

“We have seen much accomplished towards making China a country of innovators, with major advances made in science and technology.”

He cited examples including the Tiangong-2 space laboratory or Heavenly Palace 2, which forms part of China’s space programme to strengthen national security. While the US Defence Department has raised concerns about China’s increasing space activities, China insists its plans are peaceful even though it has tested anti-satellite missiles.

The country’s space programme also planned a return trip to the moon. It also includes the creation of a 500m aperture spherical telescope named Tianyan, meaning heavenly eye.

China’s self-developed C919 passenger jet debuted this year and has been vaunted as the cornerstone of China’s soaring civil aviation ambitions, to compete with Boeing and Airbus.

Much research and development is being carried out in the ocean too. China has commissioned a deep sea manned submersible, Jiaolong, named after a mythical dragon. It can dive more than 7 000m, the greatest of any manned research vehicle.

Construction on islands and reefs in the South China Sea has seen steady progress.

But this has only fanned China’s involvement in territorial rows in these parts as it has a growing military presence there.

Geopolitical analysts say other countries fear China may be using marine technology to advance its control of disputed waters.

On the Chinese Academy of Science website, Xi summed up the vision for his country, “Great scientific and technological capacity is a must for China to be strong and for people’s lives to improve”, adding that the country and even humankind “won’t do without innovation, nor will it do if the innovation is carried out slowly.”

Lofty words but indications are that the country has a strong foothold in the global digital economy. China’s science and technology plans are thriving and already well on track.

A lively back-and-forth between two communist veterans — Wang Huning, the acknowledged “deep thinker” of the Communist Party of China (CPC), and Sitaram Yechury {Wang Huning, is a professional and has worked with Jiang, Hu and Xi. He is now in the PSC after the 19th Congress. He has complete trust of Xi in him and Wang Huning has formulated the ideological framework for Xi. }, General Secretary of the Communist Party of India (Marxist), enlivened a week-end interaction on the sidelines of a conference of political parties in Beijing.

The animated discussion with Mr. Yechury took place, when Mr. Wang — recently elevated to the apex seven-member standing committee of the CPC Politburo — pulled aside representatives of 26 communist party leaders for a separate no-holds-barred meeting of comrades at the conference.

Apart from Mr. Wang, five others including Mr. Yechury spoke on the occasion. The rest were communist party leaders from Cuba, South Africa, Russia and Britain.

A source privy to the meeting told The Hindu that Mr. Yechury sought clarity on how the Community of common future, proposed by Chinese President Xi Jinping, would be different from the “interdependent and interconnected world” proposed in 1987 by former and last Secretary General of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), Mikhail Gorbachev.

Within four years of the Gorbachev’s utopian prognosis, the Soviet Union had collapsed.

Flawed formulations

Mr. Wang reassured his Indian guest that the CPC was acutely conscious of the flawed formulations of the Gorbachev era, especially the former Soviet leader’s inability to grasp the “contradictions” in the Soviet Union, which needed to be resolved, before a new path could be excavated.

During the 19th Party Congress of the CPC in October, Chinese President, Xi Jinping recognised that the “principal contradiction” in the new era in China was “between unbalanced and inadequate development and the people’s ever-growing needs for a better life.”

Marxists have concluded that contradictions are ‘dynamic opposing forces’ prevailing in society. By identifying and solving the “principal contradiction,” society develops peacefully. Left unsolved, it can lead to chaos and eventually revolution.

Mr. Yechury also probed deeper into the CPC’s perception of a “multipolar world,” in view of relentless pursuit by the United States towards concentration of global power. The discussion also covered other big questions facing humanity: international terrorism and engendering a conflict-free world.

Analysts say Mr. Wang has acquired a high profile on President Xi’s watch.

The Hong Kong-based South China Morning Post reported earlier that Mr. Wang’s rise “reflected the pressing need for [President] Xi to have someone at the top to provide ideological backing for his ambitious reform programmes.”

The much anticipated 19th party congress of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) ended in October with President Xi Jinping as its general secretary tackling a wide range of political, economic and social issues confronting China.

His thoughts on "socialism with Chinese characteristics for a new era" will be pored over for how he intends to lead China in the years ahead. At this juncture, what are we to make of Mr Xi's economic agenda as gleaned from his report to the party congress?

At one level, there were few surprises. He trotted out many ongoing economic policies, such as "supply-side structural reform" based on deleveraging of debt as well as further state-owned enterprise (SOE) reform based on a mixed-ownership model.

It should be noted, however, that the party congress is usually not the occasion to delve into economic matters in great detail. By tradition, this task is left to the Premier of the State Council (Mr Li Keqiang), who will go deeper into the finer points of economic and social policies when he presents his report to the People's Congress (China's Parliament) next March.

In any case, China's economy is currently in a better shape as its so-called "economic slowdown" has been stabilised.Growth for 2017 is likely to go up to 6.9 per cent from the 6.7 per cent of 2016. China's vast foreign reserves have started to rise again, along with the strengthening of the yuan and rapid recovery of exports. The government has also started to seriously deal with the debt problem.

With things looking up, there is no compelling need for short-term policy intervention. Not surprisingly, Mr Xi chose to address long-term issues: specifically how to realise his "China Dream for the rejuvenation of the Chinese nation".

XI'S ECONOMIC DREAM

Mr Xi unveiled his "China Dream" at the 18th party congress in 2012. This "dream", in its original conception, implied a strong nation with a strong military.

However, Mr Xi has now added a new dimension to this vision, buttressing it with concrete strategic economic targets.

In this economic vision, the long-term development of China's economy is marked by three distinctive milestones.

* Becoming a "xiaokang" (moderately well-off) society by 2020.

This 2020 deadline also coincides with the first centennial of the founding of the CCP.

But how is xiaokang defined?

It is at heart a nebulous concept based on vague and variable standards. To the ordinary Chinese, xiaokang simply conveys the feeling of being "neither affluent nor poor", of having just satisfied his basic needs of "wenbao" or having enough to "wear and eat".

The xiaokang concept was actually first introduced by Deng Xiaoping when he publicised his Four Modernisation programme in December 1979. At the time, the goal was simply for China to reach a basic xiaokang level of living by the end of the 20th century. Subsequently, the term came to be loosely and widely used as a code word for China's socio-economic development.

As articulated by Mr Xi at the recent party congress, China would have realised its xiaokang goal in 2020, when it would have eliminated absolute poverty. China has long been a showcase in the global war on poverty. By 2016, over 800 million people in China had been lifted out of poverty because of its economic and social programmes over the past three decades.

China today has basically eradicated open urban poverty, leaving only a small number of really poor people in the rural areas.

By 2016, the rural poverty rate had fallen to 4.5 per cent, with those below the poverty line living mostly in remote regions or areas populated mainly by ethnic minorities. However, 4.5 per cent still translates into a sizeable 43 million people. In recent years, Mr Xi has taken a personal interest in the anti-poverty war campaign, nudging it along as it heads towards its 2020 deadline.

Meanwhile, based on its current growth momentum, China's economy should be able to grow at an average rate of 6.5 per cent for 2017-2021. Assuming all goes well, how does China's economy look in macroeconomic terms when it becomes a xiaokang society on target?

By 2021, China's per capita GDP is forecast to be about US$12,000, or just at the threshold of developed economy status.

But this also implies that China would have escaped the middle-income trap. This figure is still relatively low, at about the level of today's Argentina or Poland.

In total GDP terms, China's economy would have grown from today's US$11 trillion to US$15 trillion, still below the United States' current US$19 trillion (S$25.6 trillion).

*A modern socialist economy by 2035.

Mr Xi understands very well that the initial phases of a xiaokang society involve only the elimination of absolute poverty or the satisfaction of people's basic needs. But "basic needs" everywhere vary over time and so xiaokang remains a moving target.

Thus, Mr Xi, in his address, called for continuing efforts to "struggle for another 15 more years" so as to build a "modern socialist economy" by 2035; this second phase will be based on higher levels of xiaokang and its extension throughout the country.

Assuming China's economy from 2020 to 2035 grows 5 per cent on average - this projected rate seems realistic because of China's relative low per capita level in 2020 and hence its strong demand-side growth potential - China by 2035 would clearly be a developed economy, and also the world's largest economy with a total GDP of US$30 trillion. But China would still not be a truly affluent society like the US, as China's per capita GDP by then would still be about US$23,000, exactly the level of Taiwan's today, but only half that of the US.

Precisely because of this, there is room still for yet more growth, leading to the third milestone:

*China to become a "fuqiang" (prosperous and strong) country by 2050.

The year 2049 will also be the first centennial of the founding of the People's Republic.

Using similar economic growth arithmetic and assuming China's economy continues to expand at 3.5 per cent on average for another 15 years from 2035, China by 2050 will fully realise Mr Xi's "China Dream" of achieving rejuvenation to become rich and powerful.

Its per capita GDP by then would be about US$40,000 or the same as today's Germany's but still lower than the US level. In total GDP, China would be a gigantic economy of US$50 trillion, almost three times more than the US' total GDP today.

There is a caveat for the above. The projections are in nominal GDP at 2016 prices and current exchange rates. For international comparison of GDP, purchasing power parity (PPP) is often used. But GDP in terms of PPP tends to exaggerate the real size of a low-income economy. Going by the PPP yardstick, China in 2014 had already become the world's largest economy!

We also need to bear in mind that as China's economy continues to grow over time, the exchange rate of the yuan would also rise while the US dollar may eventually fall. Because of this exchange rate effect, China's per capita and total GDP in 2035 or 2050 would likely be significantly larger in US dollar terms.CHALLENGES FOR THE NEXT LAP

China ended its three decades of double-digit high growth in 2012 at 7.7 per cent. Growth has since decelerated gradually at an average rate of 7.2 per cent during the 2012-2016 period.

This has led to overblown reports about China's "big slowdown" in the international media. In fact, China's current "low growth" is low only in terms of China's own historical growth track. For China's vast economy today of US$11 trillion, any growth of 6-7 per cent is still a very high growth rate.

What is important now is for China to cultivate new growth drivers for the next lap. Here lies the real challenge for Mr Xi's long-term vision of China's economy.

China's economy had performed remarkably well in its catch-up phase of development. But with a declining labour force, China's future growth will depend on productivity growth, which in turn depends critically on successful institutional changes (for example, market reform and better governance) as well as innovation and further technological progress.

So, will Mr Xi attain his economic dream given China's trajectory and what we know of the factors underpinning its growth? At one level, his long-term developmental goals look eminently achievable.

China is clearly not lacking in capital requirement, human resources and entrepreneurship. China in recent years has achieved remarkable progress in science and technology. It has also made a good start, and is even leading in some areas of the new economy, such as artificial intelligence and the Internet of Things.

But what about the impact of institutional change and market reform? Here, much of the answer depends on one's political value judgment. Mr Xi's strong leadership can translate into strong political will to carry out needed institutional changes and structural reforms. But his penchant for tighter political and ideological controls could also complicate state-market relations, particularly pertaining to SOE {State Owned Enterprises} reform.

Much uncertainty, therefore, remains as to how the tensions inherent in the phenomenon of "guojin mintui" (as the state advances, the private sector retreats) will eventually work out.

I think dragon could go down. You guys are not paying attention to the Xi Jinping reforms. He had to takeover the PLA. Corruption is rampant. Sarah Palin was talking about bridge to nowhere. In China rhey have cities to nowhere. Their OBOR is to breakout of Pacific Ocean constraint. Putin is siding due to Ukraine caper by Ombaba.