SECTION 17 Good Governments admit of Changes in
the Superstructures, whilst the Foundations remain unchangeable.

IF I go a step farther,
and confess the Romans made some changes in the outward form of their
government, I may safely say they did well in it, and prosper'd by it. After
the expulsion of the kings, the power was chiefly in the nobility, who had been
leaders of the people; but it was necessary to humble them, when they began to
presume too much upon the advantages of their birth; and the city could never
have been great, unless the plebeians who were the body of it, and the main
strength of their armies, had been admitted to a participation of honours. This
could not be done at the first: They who had been so vilely oppressed by
Tarquin, and harass'd with making or cleansing sinks, were not then fit for
magistracies, or the command of armies; but they could not justly be excluded
from them, when they had men who in courage and conduct were equal to the best
of the patricians; and it had been absurd for any man to think it a
disparagement to him to marry the daughter of one whom he had obey'd as
dictator or consul, and perhaps follow'd in his triumph. Rome that was
constituted for war, and sought its grandeur by that means, could never have
arriv'd to any considerable height, if the people had not been exercised in
arms, and their spirits raised to delight in conquests, and willing to expose
themselves to the greatest fatigues and dangers to accomplish them. Such men as
these were not to be used like slaves, or oppressed by the unmerciful hand of
usurers. They who by their sweat and blood were to defend and enlarge the
territories of the state, were to be convinced they fought for themselves; and
they had reason to demand a magistracy of their own, vested with a power that
none might offend, to maintain their rights, and to protect their families,
whilst they were abroad in the armies. These were the tribunes of the people,
made, as they called it, sacrosancti or inviolable; and the creation of
them was the most considerable change that happened till the time of Marius,
who brought all into disorder. The creation or abolition of military tribunes
with consular power, ought to be accounted as nothing; for it imported little
whether that authority were exercised by two, or by five: That of the decemviri
was as little to be regarded, they were intended only for a year; and tho new
ones were created for another, on pretence that the laws they were to frame
could not be brought to perfection in so short a time, yet they were soon
thrown down from the power they usurped, and endeavoured to retain contrary to
law: The creation of dictators was no novelty, they were made occasionally from
the beginning, and never otherwise than occasionally, till Julius Caesar
subverted all order, and invading that supreme magistracy by force, usurped the
right which belong'd to all.[1] This indeed was a mortal change even
in root and principle. All other magistrates had been created by the people for
the publick good, and always were within the power of those that had created
them. But Caesar coming in by force, sought only the satisfaction of his own
raging ambition, or that of the soldiers, whom he had corrupted to destroy
their country; and his successors governing for themselves by the help of the
like rascals, perpetually exposed the empire to be ravaged by them. But
whatever opinion any man may have of the other changes, I dare affirm, there
are few or no monarchies (whose histories are so well known to us as that of
Rome) which have not suffer'd changes incomparably greater and more mischievous
than those of Rome whilst it was free. The Macedonian monarchy fell into pieces
immediately after the death of Alexander: 'Tis thought he perished by poison:
His wives, children and mother, were destroyed by his own captains: The best of
those who had escaped his fury, fell by the sword of each other. When the
famous Argyraspides[2] might have expected some reward of their
labours, and a little rest in old age, they were maliciously sent into the East
by Antigonus to perish by hunger and misery, after he had corrupted them to
betray Eumenes. No better fate attended the rest; all was in confusion, every
one follow'd whom he pleased, and all of them seemed to be filled with such a
rage that they never ceased from mutual slaughters till they were consumed; and
their kingdoms continued in perpetual wars against each other, till they all
fell under the Roman power. The fortune of Rome was the same after it became a
monarchy: Treachery, murder and fury, reigned in every part; there was no law
but force; he that could corrupt an army, thought he had a sufficient title to
the empire: by this means there were frequently three or four, and at one time
thirty several pretenders, who called themselves emperors; of which number he
only reigned that had the happiness to destroy all his competitors; and he
himself continued no longer than till another durst attempt the destruction of
him and his posterity. In this state they remained, till the wasted and
bloodless provinces were possess'd by a multitude of barbarous nations. The
kingdoms established by them enjoy'd as little peace or justice; that of France
was frequently divided into as many parts as the kings of Meroveus or Pepin's
race had children, under the names of the kingdoms of Paris, Orleans, Soissons,
Aries, Burgundy, Austrasia, and others: These were perpetually vexed by the
unnatural fury of brothers or nearest relations, whilst the miserable nobility
and people were obliged to fight upon their foolish quarrels, till all fell
under the power of the strongest. This mischief was in some measure cured by a
law made in the time of Hugh Capet, that the kingdom should no more be divided:
But the apanages, as they call them, granted to the king's brothers,
with the several dukedoms and earldoms erected to please them and other great
lords, produced frequently almost as bad effects. This is testified by the
desperate and mortal factions, that went under the names of Burgundy and
Orleans, Armagnae and Orleans, Montmorency and Guise: These were followed by
those of the League,[3] and the Wars of the Huguenots: They were no
sooner finish'd by the taking of La Rochelle, but new ones began by the
intrigues of the duke of Orleans, brother to Lewis the 13th, and his mother;
and pursued with that animosity by them, that they put themselves under the
protection of Spain: To which may be added, that the houses of Condé,
Soissons, Montmorency, Guise, Vendôme, Angoulême, Bouillon, Rohan,
Longueville, Rochefoucault, Eperne and I think I may say every one that is of
great eminency in that kingdom, with the cities of Paris, Bourdeaux, and many
others, in the space of these last fifty years, have sided with the perpetual
enemies of their own country.

Again, other great alterations have happened within the same kingdom:
The races of kings four times wholly changed: Five kings deposed in less than
150 years after the death of Charles the Great: The offices of maire du
palais, and constable, erected and laid aside: The great dukedoms and
earldoms, little inferior to sovereign principalities, establish'd and
suppress'd: The decision of all causes, and the execution of the laws, placed
absolutely in the hands of the nobility, their deputies, seneschals, or
vice-seneschals, and taken from them again: Parliaments set up to receive
appeals from the other courts, and to judge sovereignly in all cases, expressly
to curb them: The power of these parliaments, after they had crushed the
nobility, brought so low, that within the last twenty years they are made to
register, and give the power of laws, to edicts, of which the titles only are
read to them; and the general assemblies of estates, that from the time of
Pepin had the power of the nation in their hands, are now brought to nothing,
and almost forgotten.

Tho I mention these things, 'tis not with a design of blaming them, for
some of them deserve it not; and it ought to be consider'd that the wisdom of
man is imperfect, and unable to foresee the effects that may proceed from an
infinite variety of accidents, which according to emergencies, necessarily
require new constitutions, to prevent or cure the mischiefs arising from them,
or to advance a good that at the first was not thought on: And as the noblest
work in which the wit of man can be exercised, were (if it could be done) to
constitute a government that should last forever, the next to that is to suit
laws to present exigencies, and so much as is in the power of man to foresee:
And he that should resolve to persist obstinately in the way he first entered
upon, or to blame those who go out of that in which their fathers had walked,
when they find it necessary, does as far as in him lies, render the worst of
errors perpetual. Changes therefore are unavoidable, and the wit of man can go
no farther than to institute such, as in relation to the forces, manners,
nature, religion or interests of a people and their neighbours, are suitable
and adequate to what is seen, or apprehended to be seen: And he who would
oblige all nations at all times to take the same course, would prove as foolish
as a physician who should apply the same medicine to all distempers, or an
architect that would build the same kind of house for all persons, without
considering their estates, dignities, the number of their children or servants,
the time or climate in which they live, and many other circumstances; or, which
is, if possible, more sottish, a general who should obstinately resolve always
to make war in the same way, and to draw up his army in the same form, without
examining the nature, number, and strength of his own and his enemies' forces,
or the advantages and disadvantages of the ground. But as there may be some
universal rules in physick, architecture and military discipline, from which
men ought never to depart; so there are some in politicks also which ought
always to be observed: and wise legislators adhering to them only, will be
ready to change all others as occasion may require, in order to the publick
good. This we may learn from Moses, who laying the foundation of the law given
to the Israelites in that justice, charity and truth, which having its root in
God is subject to no change, left them the liberty of having judges or no
judges, kings or no kings, or to give the sovereign power to high priests or
captains, as best pleased themselves; and the mischiefs they afterwards
suffer'd, proceeded not simply from changing, but changing for the worse. The
like judgment may be made of the alterations that have happen'd in other
places. They who aim at the publick good, and wisely institute means
proportionable and adequate to the attainment of it, deserve praise; and those
only are to be dislik'd, who either foolishly or maliciously set up a corrupt
private interest in one or a few men. Whosoever therefore would judge of the
Roman changes, may see, that in expelling the Tarquins, creating consuls,
abating the violence of usurers, admitting Plebeians to marry with the
patricians, rendering them capable of magistracies, deducing colonies, dividing
lands gained from their enemies, erecting tribunes to defend the rights of the
commons, appointing the decemviri to regulate the law, and abrogating their
power when they abused it, creating dictators and military tribunes with a
consular power, as occasions requir'd; they acted in the face of the sun for
the good of the public; and such acts having always produced effects suitable
to the rectitude of their intentions, they consequently deserve praise. But
when another principle began to govern, all things were changed in a very
different manner: Evil designs, tending only to the advancement of private
interests, were carried on in the dark by means as wicked as the end. If
Tarquin when he had a mind to be king, poison'd his first wife and his brother,
contracted an incestuous marriage with his second by the death of her first
husband, murder'd her father and the best men in Rome, yet Caesar did worse: He
favour'd Catiline and his villainous associates; bribed and corrupted
magistrates; conspir'd with Crassus and Pompey; continued in the command of an
army beyond the time prescribed by law, and turned the arms with which he had
been entrusted for the service of the commonwealth, to the destruction of it;
which was rightly represented by his dream, that he had constuprated his
mother: In the like manner when Octavius, Antonius and Lepidus, divided the
empire, and then quarrelled among themselves; and when Galba, Otho, Vitellius
and Vespasian set up parties in several provinces, all was managed with
treachery, fraud and cruelty; nothing was intended but the advancement of one
man, and the recompence of the villains that served him: And when the empire
had suffered infinite calamities by pulling down or rejecting one, and setting
up another, it was for the most part difficult to determine who was the worst
of the two; or whether the prevailing side had gained or lost by their victory.
The question therefore upon which a judgment may be made to the praise or
dispraise of the Roman government, before or after the loss of their liberty,
ought not to be, whether either were subject to changes, for neither they nor
anything under the sun was ever exempted from them; but whether the changes
that happened after the establishment of absolute power in the emperors, did
not solely proceed from ambition, and tend to the publick ruin: whereas those
alterations related by our author concerning consuls, dictators, decemviri,
tribunes and laws, were far more rare, less violent, tending to, and procuring
the publick good, and therefore deserving praise. The like having been proved
by the examples of other kingdoms, and might be farther confirmed by many more,
which on account of brevity I omit, is in my opinion sufficient to manifest,
that whilst the foundation and principle of a government remains good, the
superstructures may be changed according to occasions, without any prejudice to
it.