Evolutionary Psychology: A Paradigm Whose Time May
Come:
A Response to J. Raymond Zimmer

Rodger K. Bufford* and Jonathan M. Garrison

Graduate School of Clinical Psychology
George Fox University
Newberg, OR 97132-2697

From PSCF
(September 1998): 185-193) INCOMPLETE!!!

Evolutionary Psychology (EP) is a controversial modern
psychological theory. An offshoot of sociobiology, EP proposes that humans have developed
psychological mechanisms which reflect their evolutionary past, but which may not
currently maximize fitness for survival. Proponents contend that EP offers a meta-model
which can unify and transform modern psychology - which they point out is now fragmented by
many micro-theories and detached empirical findings, and further divided by the emergence
of hermeneutical approaches. Zimmer, an EP enthusiast, proposes (PSCF
50, no. 3: 176-84) that EP offers a paradigm which is compatible with Christian beliefs.
We agree that EP offers some unique integrative features, but - along with other
critics - doubt that it will soon become a dominant psychological theory. Also, while EP
provides some opportunities for integration with Christian beliefs, major EP proponents
are hostile toward religion - except as an evolutionary social phenomenon - and their
anti-Christian views are likely to be thoroughly interwoven into EP. Thus EP must be
approached with care to identify the ways it is in tension with Christian beliefs as well
as the ways it is compatible with them.

Zimmer enthusiastically recommends Evolutionary Psychology (EP) on the
premises that (a) EP is a paradigm that "promises to irrevocably change the traditional
social sciences" in the coming years,1 and (b) it is a paradigm that is
compatible with Christian beliefs and "establishes religious activity as biologically, as
well as intellectually and emotionally, motivated."2 He illustrates this
compatibility by proposing an evolutionary-flavored hypothesis of religion that, Zimmer
declares, indicates human awareness of something beyond nature and offers unique starting
points for integrating EP theories and Christian views.

While Zimmer is not alone in his support for
EP - and many are similarly
impressed by this paradigm - the overall reviews of EP are decidedly mixed, as others have
offered significant questions and criticisms of this emerging perspective. We tentatively
agree that EP does have unique areas of compatibility with Christian beliefs, but we also
acknowledge particular areas of existing and potential conflict. The specific hypothesis
that Zimmer offers has been addressed in the literature, and indirectly dismissed; but
other concepts may prove to be fruitful starting points for dialogue between Christianity
and EP.

Evolutionary Psychology:
Playing to Mixed
Reviews

EP proposes that there is variation in hereditary traits, that some
traits are more conducive to survival and some less so, and that those traits that are
more conducive to survival at any given time tend to become prevalent within the
population. Many have proposed that this evolutionary history provides the framework
through which human psychology can be understood.3

Proponents of sociobiology, a forerunner of EP,
postulated that traits (or mechanisms) evolved in a way that predisposed humans toward
"inclusive fitness," or the goal of maximizing their gene representation in future
generations.4 Evolutionary psychologists differed by declaring that these
traits or mechanisms, rather than having a nature or purpose of their own, merely
represented the psychological grid that was crafted in the past by evolution and through
which information from our current environments is filtered.5 Mechanisms,
therefore, could be activated in ways that were not necessarily fitness maximizing.
Evolutionary psychologists have proposed that by understanding the environments in which
these mechanisms evolved we come to know our inherited psychological grid and can better
understand our interaction with present stimuli.6

Dispassionate discourse on the proposals of EP seems to be the
exception rather than the rule. For its enthusiasts, EP is often characterized as the
coming paradigm that will vanquish lesser pretenders: a meta-theory that will restore the
scientific underpinnings to a foundationless community of social scientists. To its
detractors, it is sometimes portrayed as a field in which research designs and methods are
suspect, conclusions are vulnerable to unscrupulous political use, and more parsimonious
explanations of behavior are ignored.

Support for EP

Zimmer is not alone is his belief that EP
"will usher in a new science
of human behavior based on the Darwinian paradigm."7 Key apologist David M.
Buss declared that EP was a paradigm "whose time had come," and that only those in the
"backwaters of academia" could fail to understand the basics of its various theories.8
Others have suggested that EP is a theory around which psychology can organize itself.9

The current state of the social sciences has been described by EP
proponents as conceptual confusion in which there are mixtures of mini-theories and
empirical findings that proliferate but do not connect or complement.10
Psychology, with its embrace of postmodernistic relativism, has been characterized as
becoming increasingly distant from the natural sciences. EP advocates suggest this is a
precarious position in an age when advances in the biological study of the human mind are
influencing both scientific and political communities.11 Tooby and Cosmides
observed that the growing separation from the rest of science has greatly hampered
progress for psychology and the social sciences.12

In answer to this purported disarray and lack of
progress in the social sciences, evolutionary psychologists have promoted EP as a strong,
organizing meta-theory. Buss declared that psychology "must be anchored or informed by
evolutionary principles,"13 and Tooby and Cosmides have presented their
Integrated Causal Model as an evolution-based bridge between the social sciences and the
rest of science.14

LaCerra and Kurzban asserted that a renaissance in the sciences has
been achieved as evolutionary psychologists working in various fields have provided
bridges among disciplines - a synthesis "long awaited by scholars and
scientists."16
They attributed this accomplishment to the evolutionary psychologist's acknowledgment of
the human species as a part of the natural universe and, as such, subject to natural laws.
The reemphasis on natural laws and "hard" science is a theme with evolutionary writers.
Tooby and Cosmides sharply criticized what they have called the Standard Social Science
Model (SSSM) for encouraging "intellectual isolationism" in abandoning causal analysis in
favor of approaching social phenomena as "texts to be interpreted ... as one
might interpret literature."17

Embracing EP has been proposed as the antidote to such
"soft science."
Harris and Pashler proposed that an understanding of Darwinian principles could help
psychologists become more disciplined in advocating functional explanations for behavior
within the conceptual framework of evolution.18 Knight argued that focusing on
functionalism, in the context of EP, could foster a return to a hypothetico-deductive
theoretical base.19 Holcomb - who is not necessarily an EP advocate
- declared that
research in EP had a firm basis in evolutionary biology.20

Criticisms of EP

Others are less convinced of the scientific integrity and validity of
EP research. They point to research design flaws, dubious scientific methods, and
controversial applications of EP conclusions as areas of concern. Additionally, critics
charge that more parsimonious explanations for behavior are ignored or inadequately dealt
with by EP researchers.

It is ironic that EP, which is billed by its
supporters as the paradigm by which psychology can return to an emphasis on the scientific
method, is harshly criticized as a theory which emphasizes "just so" stories consisting of
post hoc explanations for common behaviors. Some conclusions from EP research, such as
"findings" that men like pretty, young, healthy women, hardly seem noteworthy -
and invite
derision when combined with evolutionary post hoc analysis of such "mechanisms." Holcomb
noted that such post hoc explanations preclude falsifiability and must be regarded as
pseudoscientific reasoning.21

Holcomb also noted the dearth of EP research that involved testing
novel predictions as opposed to predictions that have already been demonstrated in
alternative theories. Resolving this problem would require EP hypotheses that would
predict behavior which rival models, such as strict cultural explanations, would not
predict. Merely predicting the familiar, he concluded, keeps EP from being completely
scientific.22 Said differently, there is little reason to adopt a new theory
which merely explains old data which is already adequately explained by existing theories.

Others have criticized the methodology of EP as consisting of
non-experimental - sometimes non-quantitative - approaches that rely on poorly defined
attitudes and concepts, measured by surveys and questionnaires of equally dubious
reliability. Similarly, EP findings have been challenged as capricious and weak due to
poor research designs and methods. Schlinger complained that evolutionary theorists don't
conduct experiments or cite experimental data but rely on questionable anecdotal and
statistical evidence to support their theories.23

EP theorists, additionally, are faulted for depending on cross-species
analysis in formulating theories about environmental challenges and adaptations.24
The appropriateness of such methods has been challenged on the basis that seemingly
identical behaviors in separate species may indicate superficial, as opposed to
functional, similarities. EP has not proposed an objective way of resolving this issue,
Schlinger noted.25

In addition to criticisms of theory as inadequately developed, concern
has been raised about the political nature and potential misuse of EP conclusions.
Caporael and Brewer asserted that evolutionary positions are sometimes linked to social
agendas, based on the worldview belief that what is, should be - or will be.26 In
other words, if mechanisms exist within us as a result of evolution, there is a tendency
to believe that these mechanisms are inevitable.27 The fear exists that this
perspective may be used to justify a passive social response to violent, racist, or sexist
behavior because it merely expresses our true natures.28

Some of the harshest criticism of EP, however, involves the complaint
that theorists ignore or underestimate alternative explanations of behavior. Harris and
Pashler rejected the domain specific adaptations proposed by EP to explain mate choice.29
They proposed a more parsimonious explanation in terms of domain general faculties of
rational choice and cognition. Cultural evolution and the transfer of information across
generations may also resolve certain adaptive problems in more economical ways than domain
specific mechanisms.30 Buss, particularly, has been criticized for dismissing
culture merely as dependent on evolved mechanisms for its existence.31

Many also charge that EP theorists' perspectives of behavior have
neglected group variables and social context.32 For example, proponents of
feminist theory have claimed that membership in dominant versus subordinate groups offers
a more parsimonious assessment of gender differences than does EP.33

EP Responses to Criticisms

The criticisms of EP have been addressed, to one degree or another, in
the literature. Wright responded to the charge of post hoc storytelling by admitting that
coming up with plausible stories is, in a way, what evolutionary theorists do.34
He quickly added, however, that some "just so stories" are clearly better than others and
are helpful in conceptualizing the nature of past adaptive information processing problems
and solutions. Others have pointed out that once this initial "story-telling
part" of
conceptualization has occurred, specific, empirical hypotheses can then be formulated and
tested.35

Buss addressed additional criticisms by declaring
that, while certain levels of evolutionary theory were not subject to falsification,
derivatives of larger concepts were indeed subject to being disproved.36 He
further stated that the empirical methods used by EP psychologists - such as experimental
methods, questionnaire methods, analysis of public documents, observational methods, and
psychophysiological techniques - are the same as the ones used by psychologists from other
perspectives. Additionally, EP was presented as a paradigm that did not imply genetic
determinism or ignore social context and environment.37

EP's Current Status

Zimmer's statement that EP may
"irrevocably change the
traditional sciences"seems premature in view of the concerns presented by its critics.38
EP appears to be an adolescent paradigm at present - enthusiastic, speculative, and pushing
boundaries. Holcomb described and endorsed it as a protoscience;39 Zimmer
concurs. In Holcomb's view, EP has some qualities of a mature science and lacks others; it
is more than mere speculation, but not ready to be measured as a mature scientific entity.

Many critics seem to endorse EP as a useful
paradigm - but one that is
not likely to take over the scientific community.40 Evolutionary perspectives
are declared likely to have an impact on psychological theory, some training in EP is
advocated as a part of the education of every psychologist, and evolutionary psychologists
are commended for proposing interesting hypotheses for examination and debate.41
Nevertheless, the proposals that EP theorists have offered are characterized as far from
conclusive. While the impact of EP on the social sciences may be less than its advocates
propose, the evolutionary perspective does seem to offer intriguing possibilities for
dialogue with religion and, ironically, with an old foe - Christianity.

Evolutionary Psychology
and Christianity

Zimmer declares that EP theories may be complementary, and not
antagonistic, to Christian views.42 We agree that there are definite areas in
which EP perspectives appear to be compatible with Christianity, and certain areas of
interaction may prove interesting starting points for dialogue between these two fields.
There are also elements which suggest potential and actual conflict and which suggest
needed cautions as integration with Christian views is considered.

Particular Compatibilities:
EP and Christian
Theology

Human nature is flawed. Buss described what he termed
an anti-naturalistic fallacy - the tendency for people to have grandiose visions of what it
is to be human. According to Buss, humans want to see themselves as one with nature and
each other; war and aggression are seen as aberrations, as corruptions of the grand human
nature by cultural inadequacies.43 This view is sharply at odds with the EP
position that, through evolution, aggressive and selfish traits have become inherent
qualities.44

Proponents of what Tooby and Cosmides have labeled the
Standard Social Science Model (SSSM) staunchly resist attempts to declare that humans have
anything resembling inherent qualities. For SSSM theorists, human nature is essentially
viewed as an empty container waiting to be filled by socialization. Accordingly,
psychology's role in the SSSM is reduced to the study of the process of socialization and
how this process influences domain general capacities. In the SSSM, these capacities must
be conceptualized as content free and content independent; the strong emphasis is on human
malleability. The moral appeal of the SSSM, Tooby and Cosmides claim, comes from this
malleability and the hope that social interventions can prevent or alleviate the
sufferings and problems of humanity.45

Wright presented the opposing EP
perspective - that accepting the idea of
a human nature is the first part of becoming an evolutionary psychologist. He further
added that the picture of human nature, understood in EP terms, is not flattering. Wright
wrote of the tendencies of this inherent nature: "We are addicted to
status ... we are self promoters and social climbers ... our
generosity and affection have a narrow underlying purpose ... we value the
affection of high status people ..."46

The traditional Christian view of humanity closely
resembles what EP theorists have proposed: that human nature is inherently
self-centered.

As competing paradigms collide, an ideological and moral conflict
ensues. Tooby and Cosmides described this conflict as a morality play in which those who
view humans as having a nature - and a nature that is selfish - are accused of adopting
ideological perspectives that constrain and limit.47 Buss acknowledged that
evolutionary psychologists are often accused of being ideologically driven; in response,
he pointed out that many that make this criticism are themselves ideologically driven by
the idea - despite the evidence - of human malleability and improvability.48

The traditional Christian view of humanity closely resembles what EP
theorists have proposed: that human nature is inherently self-centered. All forms of what
Christians call sin have been attributed, at least by some theologians, to selfishness.49
This view of human nature, too, has been criticized by some social scientists as
constraining - and also as limiting the potential malleability of human nature. Traditional
Christianity has even been attacked as one of the cultural inadequacies that has had a
corrupting influence on humans.

The compatibility between the Christian and EP views of human nature is
obvious. It is ironic, in view of the past conflicts between these two perspectives, that
Christianity and EP - at least on the issue of human nature - are ideologically compatible and
similarly criticized by many in the social sciences as morally deficient in "constraining"
human potential.

Relativism and Subjectivism Rejected

Tooby and Cosmides said that the social sciences have
abandoned the scientific enterprise, and they criticized this turning away from natural
sciences toward explanations of social behavior based on relativistic frames of reference.
The growing popularity of this perspective, they somewhat cynically suggested, has less to
do with illumination than with an aversion on the part of scholars for the difficult task
of producing scientifically valid knowledge which is consistent with other knowledge and
which can withstand critical examination. They concluded with a damning indictment:

Those who jettison the epistemological standards of
science are no longer in a position to use their intellectual product to make any claims
about what is true of the world or to dispute the others' claims about what is true.50

Agreement with this statement is evident in the writing of David Snoke,
who declared that inductive epistemology was not only the basis for science, but that it
provided the foundation for universal ethics from the Christian context. The position of
many in modern philosophy that inductive epistemology is dead rests on the premise that
there is no absolute certainty which can be used as a starting point. Snoke suggested that
science and modern religion had "painted themselves in a corner" in declaring that
"anyone
can choose to believe anything, and there is nothing we can do about it."51

Snoke noted that philosophers and theologians seemed
to struggle with ideas of probability and uncertainty in ways that working scientists did
not - and that while absolute certainty was philosophically unattainable, working certainty
(through the laws of evidence and experience) was imminently feasible - and has served as
the basis for most of the scientific advances that have occurred. He also argued that we
become certain of religious propositions in Christianity in much the same way. Rather than
an emphasis on a large "leap of faith," Snoke contended that the Bible portrays faith as a
smaller jump subsequent to a person being convinced through experience and evidence
obtained through examining Scripture, witnesses, testimony, and signs.52 Our
view is that faith is an essential element of all scientific - and even
nonscientific - views:
faith that what has happened in the past will continue to happen in the future, and that
we know with sufficient certainty so that we can base our lives on our understanding of
the world around us.

Finally, EP and traditional Christianity may be thought of as sharing
concerns about the encroachment of relativism into areas that have heretofore been
informed by inductive epistemology. Tooby and Cosmides viewed the anti-scientific
sentiment as "leaving a hole in the fabric of our organized knowledge of the world where
the human sciences should be."53 Snoke, who acknowledged that some have sought
to protect the faith by constructing epistemologies that prevent any experiences from
conflicting with Christianity, viewed such efforts as leading to a relativism that
ultimately renders Christian belief incoherent and irrelevant.54

Peaceful Coexistence: EP and Genesis

At first glance, the area that has traditionally been the battleground
between evolutionists and Christians - how we interpret Genesis - now seems to be the epitome
of peaceful coexistence for EP. A common Christian perspective in recent scientific
literature seems to be that literary consistency in Genesis is achieved only through a
poetic interpretation of the first few chapters of the Bible. There are, however, some
interesting evolution-friendly variations on this theme - and some questioning perspectives
that echo concerns raised by evolutionary theorists themselves.

Many Christians in the scientific community interpret the early
chapters of Genesis as a message filled with poetry and symbolism which was never intended
to be a scientific, literal description of creation.55 The text itself, Waltke
asserted, argues against a sequential, historical narrative; the creation of light on the
first day - and of the sun, moon, and stars on the fourth day - should serve as indicators
that Genesis 1 has been constructed for theological rather than scientific reasons.56
The conclusion reached by proponents of this view is that interpretations of this passage
provide few constraints for scientific conceptualizations of origins.57

Other evolution-friendly theories are interesting
though more speculative. Wilcox, arguing from evidence in paleoanthropology, suggested
that changes in artifacts and behavior occurred around 150,000 years ago which indicated
the sudden appearance of anatomically modern beings that bore the "image of God";58
Zimmer used Genesis 1:26-31, to compare the six days of creation with six epochs of
evolutionary development proposed by scientists;59 and Fischer argued for the
insertion of an historical Adam and Eve into an existing race of evolving humans.60

While evolution-friendly accounts of
Genesis - in both
standard and creative form - seem to predominate, other Christian scientists, who
incorporate the fossil record and the questions of evolutionists themselves, raise
concerns. Clark wrote of a traditional Darwinian view of a slow, continuous evolution as
having become untenable for many scientists - many of whom have subscribed to a newer theory
known as punctuated equilibrium.61 Mills also wrote of this theory, proposed by
Eldredge and Gould in 1972, which described evolution as progressing with sudden jumps
punctuated by longer periods of little change. He noted that this theory was formulated to
account for fossil gaps in the geological record - but complained that the theorists
provided no mechanism for the sudden appearance of new life forms at the macroevolutionary
level. Mills, a professor of biochemistry, proposed that his idea of God as a provider of
new genetic information at critical points did not alter but complemented this theory of
punctuated equilibrium. This proposal of God as a provider of genetic information also
addressed his concerns about the mathematical improbabilities of genetic information
needed by complex organisms being supplied from simple one-celled organisms.62
Newman stated similar concerns, which he declared invalidated evolutionary perspectives;
he opted for old-earth creationism - a view which acknowledges the geological
record - but
advocated (as did Mills) the miraculous interventions of God.63

Many Christians in the scientific community agree that
evolutionary perspectives and Christianity are at least partly compatible.

Some Christians, however, continue to reject evolution entirely.
Johnson, for example, contends that scientific creationism was inadequate on two grounds.
First, he argued, evolution has been defined in such a way as to presume metaphysical
naturalism - a view inherently in conflict with creationism. Second, he claimed that the
data do not support the evolutionary hypothesis. For Johnson, evolution fails both as
worldview and as science.64

Johnson's view notwithstanding, many Christians in the scientific
community agree that evolutionary perspectives and Christianity are at least partly
compatible. Despite this agreement among many Christians and EP advocates, an important
area of potential conflict involves the question of whether the field of EP is as open to
Christianity.

Potential Conflict: EP's View of Christianity

Zimmer proposes that a universal impulse toward God represents a
significant opportunity for Christian integration with EP. He contends that humans have
evolved so that they are aware of something beyond nature-something transcendent,
otherworldly, or supernatural - because such awareness was adaptive in fostering monogamy
and long-term care of offspring. He postulates that religious activity is at least in part
biologically motivated. As a result "humans psychologically require the divine in order to
raise children productively and to maintain group (or societal) cohesion." He concludes
that "the essence of the biblical creation of humans in the image of God is
unexpectedly imaged by a proposal in evolutionary psychology on the adaptive function of
human awareness of something beyond nature."65

While Zimmer and many other scientifically minded Christians have been
fairly open to evolutionary perspectives, the writing of some EP proponents suggests that
evolutionary psychologists may not view Christianity-or religion in general - so charitably.
Thus they will likely reject Zimmer's proposals. EP advocate Wright was particularly
pointed in declaring that religion allowed the ancient sages to expand their power,
keeping the masses satisfied with limited material goods by fostering a future-world
orientation. Wright proposed that religious teachings were comparable to the act of
injecting heroin to produce a feeling of harmony in the short-term - but with adverse
long-term consequences.66

At other times EP advocates have been more appreciative of the
practical aspects of religion. Wright declared religion to be useful in curbing appetites
harmful to evolutionary self-interest, in serving as an intergenerational vehicle for
conveying fitness maximizing maxims, and as a proponent of monogamy. He viewed these
factors as a stabilizing force in society.67 Gould theorized that the evolution
of larger brains and consciousness forced humanity to deal with mortality. Gould believed
that the development of religion was the human answer to this challenge.68

EP proponents' reactions to religion may be characterized as cynical
and pragmatic. It is the latter position which seems to give the most trouble to Zimmer's
belief that a universal impulse toward God represents a significant opportunity for
Christian integration with EP. For EP proponents the "God idea" can be easily invoked as
an explanation without serious consideration of "the God who is there" (the ontological
reality of God).69 We concur with Zimmer that transcultural expression has been
a mark of significance as evolutionary psychologists attempt to identify adaptive
mechanisms. However, the ease with which alternative explanations have been constructed
for this particular transcultural expression points simultaneously to two areas of
concern: the capricious nature of EP's post hoc analysis, and the evidence that EP
psychologists often reject the notion that religion points to anything beyond nature.

EP proponents' reactions to religion may be characterized
as cynical and pragmatic.

The ease of incorporating Zimmer's hypothesis suggests that hypotheses
that are congruent with EP - such as conceptualizing religious mechanisms which fit
evolutionary paradigms - may prove less fruitful for integrative efforts than proposals
which start from EP expectations and propose counterintuitive hypotheses. Wright touched
on this issue when he expressed wonder at the longevity of a religion that proposed
parameters that seemed to him counter to evolved appetites.70 Might other
religious practices which are counterintuitive to the EP paradigm prove interesting as
beginning points of dialogue between the two fields as well?

Summary and Conclusion

While in agreement with Zimmer that EP provides some unique
opportunities for integrative efforts, we are neither so positive about the prospects of
EP as a unifying psychological theory, nor so optimistic about its potential for
integrative gains. In particular, we are concerned that many EP psychologists hold
worldviews no less hostile toward Christianity that those of major proponents of other
psychological theories. We are concerned that easy acceptance of EP may be an easy way
which is less fruitful than an effort to examine the ways in which EP is in tension with
widely held Christian views. Ultimately both agreements and tensions must be explored. But
we are concerned that a too-casual endorsement of EP may lull us into eschewing the more
difficult - but more important - task of discovering important tensions and disagreements. The
worldview issues are both subtle and pervasive. They are also vitally important. In the
words of Bevan and Kessel,

most often implicit, ideologies are complex, not easily
broken into elements-they are like sand at a picnic: they get into
everything. All of this means that to talk of scholarship and science as separate from the
life experience, the intentions, the values, the worldview, and social life of the people
who create it is to deny its fundamental character as a human activity.71

The challenge for us in dealing integratively with EP psychology is to
distinguish sand and sandwich, to consume the one while not being choked by the other.

In short, EP remains a minor theory within psychology. Thus an
enthusiastic embrace of EP seems premature. This is equally true for EP as a psychological
theory per se and for EP as a theory for integration with Christian beliefs.
We advocate that Christians proceed with caution rather than full speed ahead.