QSpace Community:http://hdl.handle.net/1974/7782015-08-02T22:27:13Z2015-08-02T22:27:13ZOn the Conceptual Status of JusticeJohannsen, Kylehttp://hdl.handle.net/1974/133782015-07-04T02:55:31Z2015-07-02T04:00:00ZTitle: On the Conceptual Status of Justice
Authors: Johannsen, Kyle
Abstract: In contemporary debates about justice, political philosophers take themselves to be engaged with a subject that’s narrower than the whole of morality. Many contemporary liberals, notably John Rawls, understand this narrowness in terms of context specificity. On their view, justice is the part of morality that applies to the context of a society’s institutions, but only has indirect application to the context of citizens’ personal lives (unlike the rest of morality). In contrast, many value pluralists, notably G.A. Cohen, understand justice’s narrowness in terms of singularity against a plural background. On their view, justice is one fundamental value amongst a plurality of fundamental values.
The purpose of my thesis is to establish that the pluralist conception of justice’s narrowness is (a) theoretically significant and (b) true. To establish its theoretical significance, I argue that proper attention to the ways in which different understandings of narrowness inform the work of contemporary egalitarians explains a considerable amount of disagreement between them concerning the content and scope of distributive justice. On the one hand, I’ll argue that if we understand justice’s narrowness in the manner Cohen and other pluralists do, i.e., understand a conception of justice to be a conception of a particular fundamental value, then both luck-egalitarianism and the claim that justice extends to the personal context are compelling. On the other hand, I’ll argue that if we understand justice’s narrowness in a contextual manner, i.e., understand justice to comprise one or more all-things-considered principles adopted for the institutional context, then both luck-egalitarianism and the claim that justice extends to the personal context prove implausible.
To establish the truth of the pluralist conception of narrowness, I argue first, that the contextual understanding is only plausible if fairness should be understood procedurally instead of substantively; and second, that substantive fairness cannot be eliminated, as specifying the content of procedural fairness requires a substantive criterion. The upshot is that justice’s narrowness is best understood in terms of singularity against a plural background, rather than in terms of context specificity.
Description: Thesis (Ph.D, Philosophy) -- Queen's University, 2015-06-29 11:22:26.9922015-07-02T04:00:00ZAddressing Potential Exploitation In Clinical Research on Human SubjectsRoss, Andrew Dean Foleyhttp://hdl.handle.net/1974/131402015-06-22T22:37:15Z2015-06-22T04:00:00ZTitle: Addressing Potential Exploitation In Clinical Research on Human Subjects
Authors: Ross, Andrew Dean Foley
Abstract: Numerous claims have been made to the effect that clinical research on human subjects can be exploitative — and hence morally problematic — even if there is informed consent and in the absence of any harm. If such claims are true, it follows that research ethics bodies ought to include avoidance of exploitation amongst their guiding principles. In order to evaluate these claims and provide guidance to implement a principle of avoidance of exploitation, three main questions must be addressed: what exactly do we mean by “exploitation”; how does exploitation affect the morality of clinical trials on human subjects; and what can be done to tackle exploitation in clinical trials. Chapter 2 provides an expository account of the historical context of the claims that sparked the current debate. Chapter 3 addresses the first main question by outlining three main types of exploitation accounts — namely micro fairness exploitation, macro fairness exploitation, and mere use exploitation — with examples of each from the literature. This typology is used in subsequent chapters to conduct a type-by-type analysis in order to determine whether or not particular controversial practices could constitute exploitation. Chapter 4 examines the nature of the connections (if any) between the three types of exploitation and a) concerns about standards of care and placebo controls, as well as b) concerns about participants’ post-trial access to successfully tested interventions. Both of these concerns arose in the context of international research conducted in Low and Middle Income Countries, but neither is necessarily unique to that context. Chapter 5 examines if and when benefits to entire communities might be necessary to avoid exploitation of either the communities themselves or individual trial participants. Chapter 6 advances a proposal aimed at reducing exploitation in commercial clinical trials by recognizing commercial clinical trial participation as a form of labour, which ought to be financially compensated, and suggesting the adoption of a locally indexed “living wage” model as a minimum standard of compensation.
Description: Thesis (Ph.D, Philosophy) -- Queen's University, 2015-06-18 14:29:25.0572015-06-22T04:00:00ZVoluntarism and Adoption: Understanding Parental ObligationsNajand, NIKOOhttp://hdl.handle.net/1974/127642015-02-27T06:13:06Z2015-02-26T05:00:00ZTitle: Voluntarism and Adoption: Understanding Parental Obligations
Authors: Najand, NIKOO
Abstract: Given the increasing variety of non-traditional family arrangements, together with reproductive technologies and adoption practices, assumptions about what constitutes a family and what constitutes a parent have been called into question. By using adoption as a paradigm example, my thesis examines different concepts of parenthood, what it means to be a parent, and how parental obligations are incurred.
I support a pluralist concept of parenthood, according to which genetics, gestation, or intent to raise a child may each be sufficient to capture who is considered to be a parent in a variety of cases including adoption, contract pregnancy, or gamete donation. Using a pluralist concept of parenthood, I then consider how parental obligations are generated.
While some have argued for a causal account of parental obligation (i.e., parents incur obligations by bringing a child into existence), I favor a voluntarist account. A voluntarist account argues that parental obligations are best understood as generated through consensually and voluntarily taking on the role of parent with the intent, rights, and obligations of raising a child.
I argue that causal accounts fail to provide an adequate explanation of the source of obligations because a) causation is not sufficient and not always necessary to ground obligation, b) causal accounts lead to troubling restrictions on women’s reproductive autonomy, c) causal accounts cannot justify why other factors such as intent are irrelevant, and d) causal accounts have difficulty non-arbitrarily limiting the number of people involved in a causal chain in the creation of a child.
Moreover, I explain why, on the whole, a voluntarist account is preferable. Voluntarism with regard to parental obligations has the following advantages: a) making sense of different meanings of the term “parent”, b) avoiding the pitfalls of causal accounts, and c) explaining the significance of the parent-child relationship.
Using a voluntarist framework, I then examine the ethical implications for women and men, and for children who are placed for adoption.
Description: Thesis (Ph.D, Philosophy) -- Queen's University, 2015-02-25 16:04:14.862015-02-26T05:00:00ZRelationships and the Limits of Reasonable PartialityRitcey, Nolan S.http://hdl.handle.net/1974/126892015-01-10T06:22:50Z2015-01-09T05:00:00ZTitle: Relationships and the Limits of Reasonable Partiality
Authors: Ritcey, Nolan S.
Abstract: The problems associated with an overly impartial moral psychology are well discussed
in the literature on utilitarianism, consequentialism, and rational decision moral theory.
Criticisms of these approaches to morality center on how they invite us to think
in terms which alienate us from those things which matter to us most, our friends
and family, our special projects, and our personal integrity. To the extent that these
criticisms are successful, they recommend viewing morality and moral reasoning in
the context of personal concerns. This inquiry is an investigation into how to understand
the reasons of partiality as genuine reasons, and to determine, broadly, how to
understand reasonable partiality.
The account presented here has descriptive and normative elements. It is descriptive
of the grounds of special responsibilities and the restrictions on what relationships
are capable to support special responsibilities. It is normative insofar as it answers
questions regarding what relationships should support special responsibilities and
what significance they should have in comparison to other important considerations.
The primary focus is on how relationships do, and should, modify a moral agent’s
practical outlook. The practical relevance of relationships is modeled on a theory of
joint action, which sets out how joint actions modify an individual’s practical outlook
by making certain considerations necessarily salient.
The resulting position is primarily deflationary with regard to the conflict between
morality, on the one hand, and partiality on the other. The joint action presentation
reveals that relationships do not need to conflict with morality, but can, and should,
incorporate moral principles into the central aims and action sequences which are their
mainstays. Reasonable partiality is simply the form of reasoning that adequately recognizes the joint enterprises that compose a person’s relationship. Accordingly,
controversial acts of reasonable partiality, such as transfers of wealth, are categorized
as substantive positions within a theory of what counts as adequate recognition, not
necessary to all partiality
Description: Thesis (Ph.D, Philosophy) -- Queen's University, 2015-01-09 09:35:20.1162015-01-09T05:00:00Z