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An anonymous reader writes "Reverse engineering expert Halver Flake has recently mused on Dan Kaminsky's DNS vulnerability. Apparently his musings were close enough to the mark to cause one of the Matasano team, who apparently already knew of the attack, to publish the details on the Matasano blog in a post entitled 'Reliable DNS Forgery in 2008.' The blog post has since been pulled, but evidence of it exists on Google and elsewhere. It appears only a matter of time now before the full details leak."
Reader Time out contributes a link to coverage on ZDNet as well.

DNSSec is still the only ultimate patch for this. Source port randomization just makes it difficult to do given currently available processing and bandwidth capacity. Instead of 16 bits of entropy to crack (DNS Transaction ID) we now have rougly 32 (DNS Transaction ID + Source port).

Given enough bandwidth, we're still vulnerable to poisoning, but it's not feasible today.

DNSSec is more future proof. No matter how much bandwidth you have, guess a full certificate is orders of magnitude harder.

Paul is an idiot and a douchebag. He's been lying to you for a long time to cover his own ass: BGP routes are filtered everywhere which means that not only do you have to break the port, and the sequence number, you also have to break the route filtering every AS is already doing.

Meanwhile, had BIND simply gone and removed the stupid ADDITIONAL-section processing like DJBDNS did, you wouldn't be having the described vulnerability.

LAN security doesn't enter into it- if your cache is on the same machine, and you're using switched ethernet to the border, any remaining attack vectors "close to home" remain on the same level as transparent proxies and whatnot.

That's what the Open Server Root Network [orsn.org] is for, to prevent those "above us" from being able to apply politics to the DNS infrastructure, primarily the fear of ICANN being under the control of the US Government.

BGP routes are filtered when they're exchanged between eBGP routers. If you don't filter, you're an idiot. This I agree with.

You're not talking about BGP route filtering, though; you're talking about some kind of reverse path filtering (making sure that a route to the source address exists on the interface that you received the packet from). In practice, you almost never do this on BGP routers, as RPF makes some (somewhat naive) assumptions about the symmetry of Internetwork traffic.

Most people who have some kind of RPF deployed have it on a customer-facing device, as you generally only have one route per customer (and can make assertions about traffic NOT coming via that route, AND traffic COMING via that route.)

That said, not an awful lot of people even have RPF deployed. Certainly nowhere near 100%. And it only takes one (or a handful of machines) that can forge UDP source addresses for this to be an issue.

Getting BGP feeds from nearly every provider requires giving them your AS numbers (including those of all your downstreams and upstreams), and IP blocks- you already have the source routing information. They do this to prevent you from publishing routes for microsoft.com into some black hole someplace.

In fact, many ISPs do infact drop packets with an "invalid" source address- one that they couldn't have learned. All ISPs should do this, and immediately render

It's a hard call in some cases. There's an argument that most (any?) multihomed customers should be able to send packets asymmetrically. That said, nobody with even half a brain should be running a NAS/LNS with single-homed customers WITHOUT RPF, although the (admittedly, in.au) number of people i've crossed paths with who are doing it wrong is staggering.

Conversely, if i'm peering with you and six other guys, and happen to be carrying traffic to your network (but not advertising a route back to some of MY peers, for e.g. traffic engineering reasons) across a given link, you have no business dropping that traffic.

RPF is a good idea, but it kind of breaks one of the more fundamental paradigms of the Internets.

*ding* You win a cookie. That's exactly what we're saying. There are more ISPs that don't filter traffic than those that do. IP filtering is expensive business at ISP traffic rates. My little Cisco 1760 handles the 5-7Mbps that goes through it rather well. Multiply that by thousands, and that's what ISP's deal with. (Note: a full rate DS3 will swamp a 2851, and that's a pretty damned expensive bit of gear. but it's cheaper than a DS3 PCI(-X/e) card.)

BIND supports DNSSec; DNSSec is about cryptographically signing your DNS entries so resolvers know that the response they got was from the legitimate authoritative server for the domain.

This means that it's not something you can "just patch" - it actually requires people to do some work, which means it'll take a very long time to actually be widely deployed (by "people" I mean "every single person who administers one or more DNS zones"). You also have the usual problems with crypto, i.e. establishing a "web

Although, it has been mentioned that there are a number of competing similar commercial solutions available from the big routing / switching manufacturers. However then you would expect them to want to delay DNSSec as much as possible.

Perhaps someone whose income depends on phishing, and who is at the same time bright enough to build a reasonably complicated rootkit. This person is smart, and has a clear financial incentive to figure this out. I'd argue that it would take him N/4 days.

Give an evil genius some credit, 2 hours tops and half that time's spent reading/., most of the other half on other evil online things; like pr0n and goatse.

I mean they coordinated this massive "patch" that's supposed to fix it. Now that it's fixed, it's not a secret anymore, or it this one of those cia secrecy where the reputation of those involved is at stake?

How would patching a DNS server break a web server? My guess is that someone was blaming the patch for a problem that they created themselves.

"Certified" fixes for MS products come from Windows Update or in certain extreme circumstances you have to request the file such as the case with the Exchange 2003 issue with calendar updates to Exchange 2007 systems. The dates get mangled so the server is unable to read further updates. Just an example from my world.

Well I guess I don't know the credibility of what I came across in researching a different matter, but there was this description on experts-exchange.com (nope dont have the resolutions)here [experts-exchange.com]. I guess that's why I'm asking... any real world success / horror storries? Our issue turned out to be a newly rebuilt box after a failed hard drive with a mis-configured hosts file (that had had the patch applied, but was not the culprit).

Frankly, we should just do away with the subject line entirely. They generally just get filled with "Re:Re:Re:Re:Unoriginal First comment" anyways. It serves no purpose in a system like slashdot's, and causes things like the above.

Frankly, we should just do away with the subject line entirely. They generally just get filled with "Re:Re:Re:Re:Unoriginal First comment" anyways. It serves no purpose in a system like slashdot's, and causes things like the above.

Interesting you say that. Whenever I get mod points, the subject line is one of the things I look at to see where to grant my mod points.

Reading every posting to see which ones are worth modding up would be too much work. I look for replies in a thread where the author has taken

I got this much and am working on extracting more but hitting a roadblock.

Matasano Chargen Â Blog Archive Â Reliable DNS Forgery in 2008: Kaminskyâ(TM)s Discovery. Well the cat is finally out of the bag. I suspected this was how the

the cat is out of the bag. Yes, Halvar Flake figured out the flaw Dan... One of them involves mucking about with the QID in DNS packets andand the other requires you to know the Deep Magic. First, QIDsBobâ(TM)s a resolver and Alice is a content DNS server. Bob asks Alice for the address of WWW.VICTIM.COM. The answer is 1.2.3.4.Mallory would like the answer to be 6.6.6.0. It is a (now not) secret shame of minethat for a great deal of my career, creating and sending packets was, to me, Deep Magic. Then it became part of myjob, and I learned that it is surprisingly trivial. So put aside the idea that forging IP packets is the hard partof poisoning DNS. If Iâ(TM)m Mallory and Iâ(TM)m attacking Bob, how can he distinguish my packetsfrom Aliceâ(TM)s? Because I canâ(TM)t see the QID in his request, and the QID in my responsewonâ(TM)t match. The QID is the only thing protecting the DNS fromMallory (me). QID attacks began in the olden days, when BIND simply incremented the QIDwith every query response. If you can remember 1995,hereâ(TM)s a workable DNS attack. Think fast: 9372 + 1. Did you get 9372, or even miss and get 9373?You win, Alice loses. Mallory sends a constant stream of DNS responses for WWW.VICTIM.COM.All are quietly discarded â"- until Mallory gets Bob to query forWWW.VICTIM.COM. If Malloryâ(TM)s response gets to your computer before thelegitimate response arrives from your ISPâ(TM)s name server, you will be redirected wherewhere Mallory tells you youâ(TM)re going

5.
The cat is out of the bag. Yes, Halvar Flake figured out the flaw Dan Kaminsky will announce at Black Hat.
6.
1.
7.

8.
Pretend for the moment that you know only the basic function of DNS â" that it translates WWW.VICTIM.COM into 1.2.3.4. The code that does this is called a resolver. Each time the resolver contacts the DNS to translate names to addresses, it creates a packet called a query. The exchange of packets is called a transaction. Since the number of packets flying about on the internet requires scientific notation to express, you can imagine there has to be some way of not mixing them up.
9.

10.
Bob goes to to a deli, to get a sandwich. Bob walks up to the counter, takes a pointy ticket from a round red dispenser. The ticket has a number on it. This will be Bobâ(TM)s unique identifier for his sandwich acquisition transaction. Note that the number will probably be used twice â" once when he is called to the counter to place his order and again when heâ(TM)s called back to get his sandwich. If youâ(TM)re wondering, Bob likes ham on rye with no onions.
11.

12.
If youâ(TM)ve got this, you have the concept of transaction IDs, which are numbers assigned to keep different transactions in order. Conveniently, the first sixteen bits of a DNS packet is just such a unique identifier. Itâ(TM)s called a query id (QID). And with the efficiency of the deli, the QID is used for multiple transactions.
13.
2.
14.

15.
Until very recently, there were two basic classes of DNS vulnerabilities. One of them involves mucking about with the QID in DNS packets and the other requires you to know the Deep Magic.
16.

17.
First, QIDs.
18.

19.
Bobâ(TM)s a resolver and Alice is a content DNS server. Bob asks Alice for the address of WWW.VICTIM.COM. The answer is 1.2.3.4. Mallory would like the answer to be 6.6.6.0.
20.

21.
It is a (now not) secret shame of mine that for a great deal of my career, creating and sending packets was, to me, Deep Magic. Then it became part of my job, and I learned that it is surprisingly trivial. So put aside the idea that forging IP packets is the hard part of poisoning DNS. If Iâ(TM)m Mallory and Iâ(TM)m attacking Bob, how can he distinguish my packets from Aliceâ(TM)s? Because I canâ(TM)t see the QID in his request, and the QID in my response wonâ(TM)t match. The QID is the only thing protecting the DNS from Mallory (me).
22.

23.
QID attacks began in the olden days, when BIND simply incremented the QID with every query response. If you can remember 1995, hereâ(TM)s a workable DNS attack. Think fast: 9372 + 1. Did you get 9372, or even miss and get 9373? You win, Alice loses. M

Use Google search snippets to expose little details of the document...

I'm guessing some persistent folks will eventually be able to piece the bits together.

i.e. see how much you can piece together from the summary with the result shown by google.
Adjust your search by including unique words towards the end of the snippet in one search to try to get the text that follows.

21 Jul 2008... One of them involves mucking about with the QID in DNS packets and the... The QID is the only thing protecting the DNS from Mallory (me)....

21 Jul 2008... If Mallory wins, the next 10000 or so people that ask that cache where WWW.VICTIM.COM is go to 6.6.6.0. 3. Then thereâ(TM)s that other set of...
21 Jul 2008... Then thereâ(TM)s that other set of DNS vulnerabilities.... Then letâ(TM)s set up an evil server with it, and register it as EVIL.COM....

Well, as soon as he had posted that thing he got a Cease & Desist letter from MPAA for disclosing the intellectual property of Wachowski Brothers for The Matrix: Rebuttal. The movie was supposed to answer all the questions pertaining to the first movie and this attack was the secret way that Zion crafts used to hack into the Core. Of course, the Core refused to get its DNS servers patched because they didn't need anyone's help.

...is not just that you can race legit DNS servers for legit queries, is that you can request recursive resolution for bullshit DNS servers, while submitting fake answers WITH malicious informational records that let you poison second-level domains. So by requesting xxjk3j.google.com while submitting your own coolly crafted answer, you can make the victim DNS use YOUR DNS as authoritative for the future google.com replies.

If this is the real deal, there's some bogosity here. This is certainly not a new attack or flaw in the dns protocol, any more than run of the mill dns cache poisoning is.
Spoofing responses from the root servers (to hijack a TLD) is difficult; their TTLs are long, there are many of them (more unpredictability), and most DNS servers service so many requests that it's unlikely that your spoofed answer will be the first one to hit the server and thus poison the cache once the TTL for that TLD has expired.

The way I understood it is that by specify an "Additional" RR packaged with the bogus Reposnse RR. Once I finally get through with xxffgg.bankofamerica.com, I also get my "Additional" RR processed, which in this case would be to point www.bankofamerica.com to my own server. Since I have remained within the baliwick of bankofamerica.com, the change is accepted without reservation and poisons the cache (with an abnormally large TTL). Legitmate requests for www.bankofamerica.com would not go to the authoritati

Yes that's the right idea, but it seems that just changing this concept of a "balliwick" would solve the issue.

There's no legitimate need for your bogus "www.bankofamerica.com" RR to be accepted when you're asking about "xxffgg.bankofamerica.com."

It makes sense to accept it when you're simply asking about "bankofamerica.com"; that's how normal glue works, but you already have the information you need regarding the domain itself, so accepting more unsolicited information doesn't provide you with anything.

I fail to see the point in pulling this information. The only people who will CARE about it are those who know how to exploit it, and they're the exact people who'll be able to find it regardless of if it's removed.
I wouldn't mind betting this will show up on Wikileaks pretty soon (if it's not already).
For those who've not heard of it: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Streisand_effect [wikipedia.org]

The licensing on djbdns used to be pretty unacceptable, although it's gotten much better in the last few years. The packaging and documentation of djbdns and dan's other tools are awkward at best. Dan's software deliberately violates the UNIX File System Hierarchy, the 'daemontools' package he uses to run his software is extremely dangerous in most environments because it hands off control of daemons to non-root users, and ucspi-tcp is similarly nasty to package and maintain in a server environment without

2. With possibly the exception of qmail, you can put everything anywhere you like. The/service path location is only hardcoded in svscan, for instance, and the other weird paths such as/command are only used in the install scripts, which you probably don't want to use anyway.

3. I wish there was a credible alternative to djbdns. I only know of PowerDNS, haven't had time to try it yet, what about the others? Bind is a non-starter for me, just like sendmail (but Postfix is ok).

Alright, so I'm not even someone who does DNS/networking stuff even for a hobby (just a math grad who skimmed the RFCs once or twice) so if I can figure this out from what's up now then any competent bad guy can as well.

Anyway my guess is that it involves a combination of the birthday attack and the request for multiple nonexistant nameservers. That is as the attacker you trick poisontarget.com into trying to resolve the following locations.

AAA.google.comAAB.google.com....XXX.google.com

Now you forge a single response packet that works for all of these requests and send many different copies with different TXIDs. Thus to succeed you need only hit ONE of the TXIDs used in the real requests.

In these forged responses you also have a forged glue record (as suggested in some of the links) which gives you control of lookups for all of google.com at poisiontarget.com after a single success.

Then again maybe I missed something basic which means this doesn't work.

The described attack's a nasty tactic. I hadn't thought of it, or rather I had but discarded it under the impression that all DNS software had changed years ago to filter out additional RRs that weren't responsive to the actual query to prevent exactly this sort of attack. I hope Dan's patches include such a filter.

The cat is out of the bag. Yes, Halvar Flake figured out the flaw Dan Kaminsky will announce at Black Hat.1.

Pretend for the moment that you know only the basic function of DNS -- that it translates WWW.VICTIM.COM into 1.2.3.4. The code that does this is called a resolver. Each time the resolver contacts the DNS to translate names to addresses, it creates a packet called a query. The exchange of packets is called a transaction. Since the number of packets flying about on the internet requires scientific notation to express, you can imagine there has to be some way of not mixing them up.

Bob goes to to a deli, to get a sandwich. Bob walks up to the counter, takes a pointy ticket from a round red dispenser. The ticket has a number on it. This will be Bob's unique identifier for his sandwich acquisition transaction. Note that the number will probably be used twice -- once when he is called to the counter to place his order and again when he's called back to get his sandwich. If you're wondering, Bob likes ham on rye with no onions.

If you've got this, you have the concept of transaction IDs, which are numbers assigned to keep different transactions in order. Conveniently, the first sixteen bits of a DNS packet is just such a unique identifier. It's called a query id (QID). And with the efficiency of the deli, the QID is used for multiple transactions.2.

Until very recently, there were two basic classes of DNS vulnerabilities. One of them involves mucking about with the QID in DNS packets and the other requires you to know the Deep Magic.

First, QIDs.

Bob's a resolver and Alice is a content DNS server. Bob asks Alice for the address of WWW.VICTIM.COM. The answer is 1.2.3.4. Mallory would like the answer to be 6.6.6.0.

It is a (now not) secret shame of mine that for a great deal of my career, creating and sending packets was, to me, Deep Magic. Then it became part of my job, and I learned that it is surprisingly trivial. So put aside the idea that forging IP packets is the hard part of poisoning DNS. If I'm Mallory and I'm attacking Bob, how can he distinguish my packets from Alice's? Because I can't see the QID in his request, and the QID in my response won't match. The QID is the only thing protecting the DNS from Mallory (me).

QID attacks began in the olden days, when BIND simply incremented the QID with every query response. If you can remember 1995, here's a workable DNS attack. Think fast: 9372 + 1. Did you get 9372, or even miss and get 9373? You win, Alice loses. Mallory sends a constant stream of DNS responses for WWW.VICTIM.COM. All are quietly discarded --- until Mallory gets Bob to query for WWW.VICTIM.COM. If Mallory's response gets to your computer before the legitimate response arrives from your ISP's name server, you will be redirected where Mallory tells you you're going.

Obvious fix: you want the QID be randomly generated. Now Alice and Mallory are in a race. Alice sees Bob's request and knows the QID. Mallory has to guess it. The first one to land a packet with the correct QID wins. Randomized QIDs give Alice a big advantage in this race.

But there's a bunch more problems here:

*

If you convince Bob to ask Alice the same question 1000 times all at once, and Bob uses a different QID for each packet, you made the race 1000 times easier for Mallory to win.
*

If Bob uses a crappy random number generator, Mallory can get Bob to ask for names she controls, like WWW.EVIL.COM, and watch how the QIDs bounce around; eventually, she'll break the RNG and be able to predict its outputs.
*

16 bits just isn't big enough to provide real security at the traffic rates we deal with in 2008.

Your computer's resolver is probably a stub. Which means it won't really save the response. You

Kaminsky posted a test [doxpara.com] to see whether your DNS server is still vulnerable (it seems that you'll need to allow scripts from toorrr.com). If the server is vulnerable, he appears to be recommending OpenDNS [opendns.com] as a stopgap measure. Their nameservers are 208.67.222.222 and 208.67.220.220 .

If you're really paranoid, switch to OpenDNS first before running the test...

On a related note, doxpara.com = 66.240.226.139 , but I can't get anything but a 404 at the IP address. Should I be nervous?

Okay, I don't dabble deep in DNS but I have a few quick questions. The RR thing is nasty because sub-domain authority implies domain authority. That's just silly and I'm stunned that something so simple is still true. I imagine there are a million and one "good" reasons for it, but it appears to be a gaping hole that could easily have been removed.

However, on the "let's spoof a DNS response" front - if a DNS server/client is being sent lots of spoof reponses, how long until they are picked up by a filter and blacklisted, tarpit'd or similar at the ISP end? This is the solution surely, even if you can send millions of packets with incorrect QID's and similar identifiers at a DNS server, like any other service at some point it has to say "you're trying to be naughty" and blacklist any packets, sound an alert, get the upstream filters to block such traffic etc. (This is, of course, assuming that there are at least some systems in place to stop or limit source-IP forgery in the first place). It might even be a good idea, at this point, for such servers to not trust their data, and constantly compare their copies with those available from the nameservers. If "fluctuation" of the data (between real and spoofed responses) is detected, then sound an alert on that domain.

How many responses does an average DNS server get that are invalid because of purely accidental causes (e.g. corrupted packets, mis-configured routers etc.)? Surely it's so few that it can instantly blacklist any suspicious activity, like trying to poison recursive caches in this manner.

I imagine that most home routers are extremely stupid and can't stop such things because they rely almost exclusively on the ISP's DNS servers to do their job and a flood of fake packets will not be picked up (this is, however, one of the reasons that I've always used "DMZ" or PPP half-bridge settings on ADSL routers to throw all external packets towards a real server rather than relying on some VxWorks firmware to handle IP-based attacks). But the servers? They *should* be filtering, cleansing and blacklisting packets even before you get into whether they have the most up-to-date patches, and a security fix to enhance the randomness of X etc.

It seems that the DNS servers are too trusting of "correct" packets that come as part of packet-floods of incoming data that is *obviously* false. DNS clients accepting data appearing to come from a trusted host is not nice, I agree, but recursive DNS servers should know better.

Or have I missed something incredibly obvious here?

I don't really care because my ISP wasn't vulnerable to this attack when I first tested it about 10 minutes after the first posting about its potential on the blog, and I'm pretty sure that they wouldn't have had any more advanced warning than anyone else.

Having said that, the DNS servers provided by LGfL's broadband supplier are, apparently, vulnerable. (London Grid for Learning, a London-wide schools extranet that virtually every London school, of which there are hundreds, use for their Internet connection, DNS servers, content filtering, etc. as well as their external content host). But, knowing LGfL and the way UK IT operations that are in any way involved with government work, that's not surprising at all.

You don't need the address for the NS server as you're getting a result already. If you didn't ask for the information then it shouldn't be in the reply - if it is just discard the entire packet as bogus and keep listening for the real one.

Ok, here's the gist: It's difficult to spoof a response for the right domain name, because of the random query IDs. You need too many requests and caching servers don't usually ask for the same name very often. But it's easy to get a caching server to ask for many different names in a subdomain, so do that and send your fake answers. One of them is going to get accepted sooner or later. Include spoofed glue for the real subdomain (www...) in your answers. Because the glue is for the same domain, it is accepted. Tadaa, poisoned DNS.

Well that would work, although since VeriSign's "SiteFinder" stunt some DNS servers (including bind) have an option to denote a zone as being "delegation only" zone, which would stop this attack from working. I don't know how widespread use of this option would be, though.

Assuming it's not, than poisoning.com would make it much easier: with one successful attack you could poison dozens of popular domains.

What could be interesting is combining this attack with zombies -- that way you don't need to trick a u

Nope, apparently it has to be a subdomain of the domain you're attacking, due to bailwick filtering - see, for example this post [osdir.com]. If it wasn't for bailwick filtering, an attacker could just launch a request to a DNS server they controlled and avoid having to guess anything. (Supposedly, this used to work, though.)

I still have it in my RSS reader. I sent the others in my security group the link referenced in the feed, but it ended up with a 404 page. I thought it was a blip on their server, but now I see they retracted the post. It's a bit late for that, as I'm sure I'm not the only one who subscribes to their blog.

Just another example of how you can't erase knowledge once it's been disseminated.

For the mod points too.. I'm sure some kind hearted (or ruthlessly evil, given the content) soul will mod you informative for your troubles. I would, had I not precluded my chance to do so by posting this request.

... it ended up with a 404 page. I thought it was a blip on their server, but now I see they retracted the post.

They fail. If they've removed it with no intention of making it available again it should be 410 Gone [w3.org], not 404 Not Found [w3.org].
Am I the only person who reads the HTTP spec? It's not exactly hard to understand...

Actually you have the answer within your own post. As you said "If they've removed it with no intention of making it available again". According to the spec "If the server does not know, or has no facility to determine, whether or not the condition is permanent, the status code 404 (Not Found) SHOULD be used instead." It is quite possible that the page was only taken down temporarily, with the intent to restore it on the official disclosure date. So use of code 410 which would be in violation of the spec, and 404 the proper reply code.

They fail. If they've removed it with no intention of making it available again it should be 410 Gone [w3.org], not 404 Not Found [w3.org].Indeed but it is only a SHOULD not a MUST and keeping the information as to whether the condition is temporary or permanent (indeed that may not even have been decided at the point the content is removed) would be a PITA so noone does it.

Does going to your local University and registering mail.google.com.myuni.edu mean that you're going to get a lot of phishing? Yes, but only for people searching with myuni.edu as their default search domain. (likely, only on MyUni's internal network, and then only for people who aren't super-seasoned salt-cured security people who automatically type "mail.google.com." every time)

That is different - that's just advertising and silliness off the way the wildcard matching works for WHOIS.

The issue is when you can force the target to resolve blah.google.com to poison www.google.com and then include a glue response for www. in with the blah. response which is then accepted because the domains match at to the right of that level.

This isn't even close to the same attack. Newer DNS server have randomized query IDs, so spoofing DNS packets isn't nearly as trivial as it used to be. This attack appears to combine the birthday paradox attack strategy (sending lots of queries and replies so the probability of a spoofed QID matching is much higher) with adding resource records for the actual name you want to poison (under the same domain).

Just because it has "security" in the name, doesn't make it secure, Alice.

The patches make it clear that ADDITIONAL-section processing is to blame- just as it has been numerous times over the last twenty or so years. DJBDNS doesn't do ADDITIONAL-section processing and so it immune. BIND tries to do a lot of hand-waving to continue doing ADDITIONAL-section processing even though it's clearly a bad idea- in order to protect egos.

So the guy who rejects advise from the security community on src port randomization and ADDITIONAL-section handling; the guy who has had countless vulnerabilities, and the very same guy who has lied about BIND8 and BIND9's complete rewrites, that's the guy you're taking at his word regarding the security of DNSSEC?

By the way, DJBDNS supports all RR types- including those that haven't been invented yet, simply because it has an extensible data format.

Yes, DNSSEC is a joke; it doesn't protect against anything happening in reality, and it requires a significant infrastructure that will simply never arrive. Paul is telling everyone to wait for that magic moment where everyone will be able to turn off their "insecure DNS" and replace it with "secure DNS"- it'll just never happen.

Meanwhile, had Paul actually listened to security professionals, Kaminsky's attack would never have happened. And yet, you think he his so above reproach that you practically consid