Tuesday, December 28, 2010

In the newly
released Hardball Times
Annual 2011, Baseball Info Solution’s John Dewan presented his yearly
review of team defense based on his Plus/Minus system. Perhaps a little
surprising, the speedy Oakland Athletics (+77) paced baseball in this area. This
is noteworthy because the Green and Gold held the 24th-worst spot in
the rankings just one short season ago.

For their
part, Oakland, who had already boasted supreme outfield coverage (procuring a
+43 tally in this area), went to work improving their infield for the 2010
season. Shortstop Orlando Cabrera was blight on the defensive landscape,
turning in a season in which he was -30 runs below average. Similarly, they
employed Adam Kennedy as their everyday third baseman who was -5 runs below
average. Across the diamond, they used the drug-addled remnants of Jason Giambi
for 58 games (who had wasted his entire defense in front of congress apparently).

Realizing
this bunch of aging fielders was not going to do the pitching staff any favors,
the A’s began to make maneuvers. At the trade deadline in 2009, Billy Beane
moved their defensive-less shortstop to the Twins and implemented the rangier
Cliff Pennington as the starter.A week
later, the A’s granted Giambi his outright release. This allowed for a defensive-minded
first baseman in Daric Barton to take over. Last January, Oakland tapped their outfield
surplus to acquire third baseman Kevin Kouzmanoff from the San Diego Padres. The
only constant around the infield diamond between the ’09 and ’10 unit would be
second baseman Mark Ellis.

Pennington
gave the A’s a supreme defender at short, finishing with a +10 rating, seventh-best
in the game. Meanwhile Barton was a +27 first baseman, the best in baseball and
13 runs better than the next closest player in Ike Davis. Perhaps because of maturity
and dedication to his defensive craft or a statistical anomaly, Kouzmanoff
improved his Plus/Minus totals from +7 with the Padres in ’09 to +20 in ’10 with
the A’s.

The moves
provided an immediate upgrade to the defense and assisted in elevating Oakland’s
pitching staff to one of the best in the American League. After allowing 4.70
runs per game and posting a below-average .682 defensive efficiency ratio, the next
year the A’s had the American League’s best defensive efficiency ratio (.709)
and allowed the fewest runs per game (3.86). Indeed, a significant portion of
this improvement was associated with shoring up the infield defense.

The only
other team to have such a dramatic improvement in that timeframe was none other
than the Minnesota Twins.

After
finishing baseball with the 23rd-worst Plus/Minus ratings with a -31
total, the Twins managed to climb their way into respectability, concluding the
2010 season with a +37 rating.

Minnesota
Twins

Middle Infield

Corner Infield

Outfield

Total

2008

-13

-21

-8

-42

2009

-59

+17

+11

-31

2010

+36

+17

-16

+37

(via Hardball
Times Annual 2011)

In the previous
offseason, the Twins targeted their middle infield which had been the worst in
all of baseball. Admittedly, the relocation from an artificial turf field to a
natural one helps in slowing down some of the would-be hits at the Dome, the
team also grabbed two of the best defenders at their position.

Like Oakland,
the Twins realized that Orlando Cabrera was simply not an elite defender and
quickly traded for Milwaukee’s J.J. Hardy at the conclusion of the 2009 season.
As I wrote back in March, Hardy was destined
to be a middle infield repairman for the Twins. While sidetracked by injuries
that limited him to 858 defensive innings, Hardy was still +5 runs above
average, good enough for tenth in baseball. Although members of the Twins
organization indicate Hardy’s lack of foot speed played a critical role in his
exodus from Minnesota, data suggests that Hardy’s
range was outstanding the past three years, possibly due to his positioning
and anticipation rather than his outright quickness.

Hardy’s
middle infield mate, Orlando Hudson, was acquired in early February for a
nominal one-year, $5 million dollar deal. Hudson’s long outstanding reputation
as a defensive wiz, finishing in the top ten of Dewan’s Plus/Minus system five
times in the past six seasons, lent itself well to the Twins way of baseball.
To his end, Hudson provided the Twins with the best second baseman effort (+22)
in the majors.

In all, the
Hardy/Hudson combination helped the Twins move from a -59 team up-the-middle to
a +36 team. This tandem made up for the defensive shortcomings exposed in the
outfield when Jason Kubel was subjected to extended time wearing a glove. Now, with
a similar outfield alignment projected in the 2011 season, the Twins have
stripped down the infield combination that helped a pitching staff that
transitioned from a fly ball one in ’09 (41% FB%) to a groundball one in ’10 (44.7%
GB%).

Essentially,
the Twins are making the gamble that the two birds in hand are not worth as
much as the two birds in the bush.

“He just seems to get really sloppy at second base, because of the
short throw and (because) he doesn’t have to use his arm. He’s just got to
really get a few things straightened out ... And that’s learning to get outs
when you’re supposed to get outs, and get away from all the flashy stuff and
get back to the basics of baseball, catching the ball and getting somebody out
and using your feet and making good throws. He gets too flashy, thinks that he
can do a lot of different things. We’re going to get him away from that.”

A year later,
after claiming the starting second base spot in 2008, Casilla received a demotion
in 2009 as he continued to display lapses on the field. After several fielding
gaffes, the then-Twins second baseman failed to run out a pop fly – trotting to first with the bat
in his hand.

He’s quick,
with decent hands and a fairly strong arm yet his lackadaisical reputation precedes
him. At the same time, there are plenty of indications that he could be a
defensive upgrade over the very good incumbent Hardy.

In his
small-sample size at short, Casilla managed to save +2 runs while turning 15
double plays in 17 opportunities (88% success rate). That double play rate is a
good indication of great footwork, awareness and release. While Hardy has a
very good arm, he only converted 55 double-plays in 101 opportunities (54.5%). Although
Casilla’s pace isn’t likely going to stay up in the 80 percentile as his
playing time increases if he stays at the 60-to-65%-range however he will remain
in the top of the league as one of the best twin-killers at short. In the end,
if he can keep his over-rambunctiousness under control while maintaining the
focus that Twins management requires, he has the potential to perhaps be a
superior groundball-stopper than Hardy (particularly if Hardy’s maladies
continue in Baltimore and keep him off the field).

The other
replacement, Tsuyoshi Nishioka, is even more of a mystery in terms of what he
is capable of providing. A recipient of a Gold Glove in Japan, critics like to
state that former Japanese convert Kaz Matsui also won several Gold Gloves at
short before moving to the Mets where he was below average as a defender at
short. This revelation got Matsui shifted to second where he was better suited.

“(1) The effect natural grass has on defense at second base is
small. Don’t have negative preconceptions. (2) Be careful about getting spiked
during double plays (3) Gather data on batters with speed.”

Obviously,
some of this advice can be interpreted as the issues that Matsui had when
making his conversion to Major League Baseball. The first issue involving the
natural grass versus artificial surfaces that are favored in Japan’s stadiums
is of moderate concern. For one, the hops produced on the artificial surface
winds up being much more “true” than that of real grass. You don’t wind up with
divot holes in the base paths that kick worm-burners up like they do on a dirt
surface. Likewise, balls that normal seem to accelerate on the fake green stuff
is slowed by the longer grass. However, by Matsui’s experience, the grass
factor had only a small effect on his game.

The second
piece of advice is aimed at the fact that American players will go hard into
second base to break a play up. This is not a tradition shared on the other
side of the Pacific. To speculate, Matsui was probably surprised by how little
amount of time he had to turn a double play and would likely rush his throws (he
made 13 throwing errors in his first season). In the same vein, Matsui also
demonstrated issues feeding a double play to his middle infield partner. His 29
double plays started were the fewest among qualified shortstops. Again, while
it is pure speculation, it might be different approach in feeding a second
baseman if there were less of a probability of him going ass-over-tea-kettle.
For instance, a shortstop might not need to hasten a throw to the bag to give
his partner additional time to pivot the relay before being barreled into by
the runner.

The final
word of advice from Matsui, “gather data on baserunners”, is fairly straight-forward.
Unlike those that develop within the minor league system, Matsui had little experience
educating himself on players in the majors. He was thrusted into a starting
role without the proper knowledge of his opposition and, unlike someone like
Cal Ripken who goes to great lengths preparing for each opponent Matsui was
likely manning a demanding position cold-turkey (particularly when you factor
in a language barrier). Either way, Matsui’s message to Nishioka is clear: Spend
time learning the competition.

Needless to
say, dismantling one of the better middle infield defensive units in baseball
can be frustrating and a painstaking process to watch. After all, the team had
moved from the worst to the third best in just one winter. For some, it may be
even more difficult to readily accept the unknown as well since Hardy and
Hudson represented two of the more tangible commodities while embracing Casilla
and Nishioka as improvements requires eschewing advanced defensive data.

Naturally, Casilla
and Nishioka will be behind the curve when it comes to knowledge of the
competition which Hardy and Hudson benefitted from. At the same time the new duo
has better tools – particularly speed – which could provide a big advantage (at
least the Twins are betting on that it does). A year from now, we will know if
Casilla hit well enough or remain focused to lock down the position for an
entire season. We will know if Nishioka heeded Matsui’s recommendation and become
a key component in the Twins lineup.

Then again,
it is entirely possible that the middle infield will regress back to pre-2010
numbers. Only time will tell.

About OtB

"Parker Hageman is the Michael Cuddyer of Twins bloggers -- not the flashiest guy out there, but a solid everyday player. Hageman produces spot-on analysis ... relying on in-depth stats and lots of charts. He takes a sober, performance-based view of players, letting others fall for a player's heart or his leadership skills in the clubhouse. Hageman is one of the four pillars holding up the Star Tribune's TwinsCentric blog."