Enseignement

Présentation/résumé de la thèse

This thesis focuses on the relationship between partners based on markets with heterogeneous forms of competition. Generally speaking, this thesis propose to investigate vertical industrial relationships from a systemic point of view. This study is mainly a theoretical approach based on networks theory and game theory. A great part of the study addresses the issue of bargaining between the agents involved in those networks.

Publication

Agents located from downstream to upstream along an estuary and exposed to a flooding risk have to invest in facilities like a seawall (or dike). As the benefits of that local public good increase along the estuary, upstream agents have to bargain for monetary compensation with the most downstream agent in exchange for more protection effort. The paper analyses different bargaining protocols and determines the conditions under which agents are better off. The results show that upstream agents are involved in a chicken game when they have to bargain with the most downstream agent.

We propose a concept to study the stability of social and economic networks when players are farsighted and allocations are determined endogenously. A set of networks is a von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable set with bargaining if there exists an allocation rule and a bargaining threat such that (i) there is no farsighted improving path from one network inside the set to another network inside the set, (ii) from any network outside the set there is a farsighted improving path to some network inside the set, (iii) the value of each network is allocated among players so that players su§er or benefit equally from being linked to each other compared to the allocation they would obtain at their respective credible bargaining threat. We show that the set of strongly effcient networks is the unique von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable set with bargaining if the allocation rule is anonymous and component effcient and the value function is top convex. Moreover, the componentwise egalitarian allocation rule emerges endogenously.

This article analyses the outcomes of different negotiation procedures between three agents located along a river in a Rubinstein alternating offers model where agents bargain over transfers and water consumption levels. Unlike for simultaneous bargaining, agreements in sequential bargaining are not efficient for society, even if the period between stages becomes infinitely small. This ineffciency results from the player's inside options, which are given by their temporary disagreement payoffs. Results also show that depending on the sequence of moves, inside options and impasse points can strengthen or weaken the relative position of the players involved in the negotiation process