A Leadership Role

Restoring U.s. Credibility In The Middle East Peace Process

July 16, 1997|By Henry Siegman. Henry Siegman is a senior fellow with the Council on Foreign Relations and director of the U.S. Middle East Project.

As the Middle East reverts to the hatreds and violence that characterized the Arab world's relations with Israel for over four decades, the U.S. seems to have disengaged from the peace process. It is standing on the sidelines as the historic achievements of the Madrid conference of 1991 and the Oslo accords of 1993 are unraveling.

State Department officials have sought to justify this American disengagement with the misleading slogan "We cannot want peace more than the parties to the conflict do." As pointed out in a report issued recently by an independent task force sponsored by the Council on Foreign Relations, the U.S. has important interests of its own in the region, all of which would be seriously damaged if the peace process collapses.

The report urges the U.S. to become more deeply involved in Middle East peacemaking. The U.S. should seek to convince Israel and the Palestinians to agree to a new Declaration of Principles that would establish a framework for the difficult final-status negotiations that the parties have yet to engage in. For a majority of the task force, the most critical features of such a framework are: a) agreement that the goal of the peace process and the final-status negotiations is a viable Palestinian state on contiguous territory in Gaza and most of the West Bank; and b) agreement that the territory on which most Israeli settlers now live will be incorporated into Israel, thus avoiding the trauma of a major uprooting of the homes and lives of a large number of Israelis.

While these two principles may seem contradictory, they are not, for 80 percent of Israel's settlers live on territory that comprises only 10 percent of the West Bank, mostly along the previous Green Line that separated Israel and the West Bank before 1967.

Palestinians understand that such a state would have to be demilitarized so as not to pose a security threat to Israel. They must also understand that such a state will not return Israel to the pre-1967 borders. Israel's government must understand that if this peace process is to go forward, it cannot engage in unilateral actions that preempt discussion of issues which the parties have agreed are to be part of final-status negotiations. While continued expropriation of land and settlement activity in the territories may not violate the letter of existing agreements, they certainly contradict their essential spirit and purpose.

The task force report recommends that the question of sovereignty in East Jerusalem be left for last, and that the status quo in Israel's capital remain unchanged for now. For this "non-solution" solution to work, Israel must refrain from actions that change the demographics of East Jerusalem, such as its plans for the construction of a major Jewish housing project in Har Homa, although changes that are necessary to provide for the natural and proportionate growth of the existing Jewish and Palestinian populations must continue.

Also, the parties should not delay negotiations over the location and boundaries of an area within the current municipal borders of Jerusalem (whose historic boundaries were significantly enlarged in 1967) that would serve as the capital of a Palestinian state. Israeli acceptance of such an arrangement, however symbolic, is a necessary expression of respect for and recognition of Palestinian attachment to Jerusalem. The palpable absence of such respect in the style and attitude of the current Israeli government has been more damaging to the prospects for peace than differences over substance.

The Declaration of Principles urged by the task force is not a substitute for the detailed and difficult final-status negotiations. It is not intended to impose solutions to the many complex final-status issues that only the parties themselves can negotiate. Rather, the Declaration of Principles recognizes that a peace process that does not lead to Palestinian statehood is a non-starter. It asserts what should be obvious: If Palestinians are told that even faithful adherence to the provisions of the Oslo accords will not result in a viable Palestinian state, however demilitarized and however constrained its sovereignty, but will at best yield a series of isolated Bantustans that remain effectively under permanent Israeli military control, there is no reason for Palestinians to remain in such a process. For the U.S. to be seen as seeking Palestinian acquiescence to such an outcome, or as indifferent to its consequences, is to damage its credibility and the possibility of playing a more constructive role in the future.