1. It is well settled in this state that when an issue requires interpretation of a statute
administered by an agency or when an agency could grant relief on some ground,
exhaustion of administrative remedies is required.

2. In an action to determine whether appellant is a motor carrier by challenging the Kansas
Corporation Commission's interpretation of K.S.A. 66-1,108 et seq., the trial court
properly dismissed appellant's action for failure to exhaust administrative remedies before
resorting to the courts.

GREEN, J.: Midwest Crane and Rigging, Inc. (Midwest Crane) appeals from the trial
court's judgment dismissing its declaratory judgment action. Before Midwest Crane filed its
judgment action, the Kansas Corporation Commission (the Commission) issued an order to show
cause under the Kansas Administrative Procedure Act (KAPA), K.S.A. 77-501 et
seq., as to why
Midwest Crane should not be sanctioned for refusing to allow an inspection of its cranes. In the
declaratory judgment action, Midwest Crane sought injunctive relief against the Commission and
a declaration that it was not subject to oversight by the Commission. The trial court dismissed
Midwest Crane's declaratory judgment action based on lack of subject matter jurisdiction after
finding that Midwest Crane had failed to exhaust its administrative remedies. We affirm.

The Commission received a complaint from law enforcement that Midwest Crane might
be conducting operations that would bring it under the definition of a motor carrier and thus
subject to the Commission's safety regulations. After receipt of the complaint, the Commission
issued a request on December 8, 2005, to Midwest Crane to inspect its records and to conduct a
compliance review. On January 30, 2006, a special investigator for the Commission attempted to
conduct an inspection of Midwest Crane's premises to determine whether any potential violations
of the Commission's motor carrier safety rules and regulations existed, but Midwest Crane
refused access to its premises. On February 17, 2006, the Commission issued an order to show
cause to Midwest Crane. The Commission determined that a hearing on the matter was
appropriate and allowed Midwest Crane the opportunity to show cause why any action against it
would be unwarranted.

Simultaneous with the matter pending before the Commission, on March 23, 2006,
Midwest Crane filed a verified petition for declaratory judgment and injunctive relief with the
district court of Johnson County in Case No. 06-C-2280. In the petition, Midwest Crane sought a
determination that the Commission lacked authority to regulate it because it was not a motor
carrier under Kansas law. Moreover, Midwest Crane sought an injunction restraining the
Commission from attempting to regulate Midwest Crane.

The Commission moved to dismiss the declaratory judgment action for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction. The trial court granted the Commission's motion to dismiss after finding that
it lacked subject matter jurisdiction to consider the issues raised in Midwest Crane's declaratory
judgment action. Specifically, the trial court determined that subject matter jurisdiction was
lacking because Midwest Crane had failed to exhaust its administrative remedies in the matter
pending before the Commission.

During the pendency of the declaratory judgment action, the Commission determined in
the administrative action that Midwest Crane was a motor carrier and was subject to the
jurisdiction of the Commission. On August 16, 2006, Midwest Crane appealed the Commission's
decision to the district court of Shawnee County in Case No. 06-C-1213. This appeal concerned
whether Midwest Crane was subject to the jurisdiction of the Commission.

On August 11, 2006, Midwest Crane timely appealed the district court of Johnson
County's decision.

On appeal, Midwest Crane argues that the trial court erred in finding that it lacked subject
matter jurisdiction to consider the issues raised in its declaratory judgment action. Specifically,
Midwest Crane contends that it was not required to exhaust its administrative remedies before
proceeding with its Chapter 60 declaratory judgment action. Whether a party is required to or has
failed to exhaust its administrative remedies is a question of law over which an appellate court's
review is unlimited. Miller v. Kansas Dept. of S.R.S., 275 Kan. 349, 353, 64 P.3d
395 (2003).

The Commission initiated its proceeding against Midwest Crane under KAPA. K.S.A.
66-1,129a(a) allows the Commission to initiate proceedings regarding motor carrier economic or
safety rules and regulations under KAPA. The Kansas Act for Judicial Review and Civil
Enforcement of Agency Actions (KJRA), K.S.A. 77-601 et seq., is the exclusive
remedy for
review of agency actions unless the agency is specifically exempted by statute. K.S.A. 77-603(a);
K.S.A. 77-606. The Commission has not been specifically exempted. The KJRA has consistently
been recognized as the exclusive means of review of an agency action. See, e.g.,
Schall v.
Wichita State University, 269 Kan. 456, 482, 7 P.3d 1144 (2000); Fowles v.
State, 254 Kan. 557,
565, 867 P.2d 357 (1994) (affirming the trial court's grant of summary judgment and stating that
the KJRA was the exclusive means to review the Kansas Lottery's refusal to pay a claim on a lost
winning ticket); Farmers Banshares of Abilene, Inc. v. Graves, 250 Kan. 520,
522-23, 826 P.2d
1363 (1992) (affirming the trial court's dismissal of a Chapter 60 action seeking mandamus and
injunctive relief against the Secretary of State on the basis that the plaintiff's exclusive remedy
was through the KJRA); Kansas Sunset Assocs. v. Kansas Dept. of Health &
Environment, 16
Kan. App. 2d 1, 3, 818 P.2d 797 (1991) (affirming a trial court's dismissal of a Chapter 60
declaratory judgment action against the Kansas Department of Health and Environment as barred
by the plaintiff's failure to comply with the procedural requirements of the KJRA).

Midwest Crane relies on Spor v. Presta Oil Co., 14 Kan. App. 2d 696, 798
P.2d 68
(1990), to support its argument that it did not need to exhaust its administrative remedies before
pursuing a determination regarding its status as a motor carrier in its declaratory judgment action.
In Spor, the court held that a claim for back wages may be brought in court without
first
exhausting administrative remedies with the Secretary of Human Resources. 14 Kan. App. 2d at
697-98. Nevertheless, Spor is distinguishable from the present case in two important
respects.
First, the claimants in Spor brought their claim for back wages with the trial court
before any
matter was brought at the administrative level. Midwest Crane, however, brought its declaratory
judgment action after the Commission had initiated administrative procedures but before any
ruling had been made by the Commission regarding Midwest Crane's status as a motor carrier.
Spor is additionally distinguishable from the present case because the
Spor court held that the
court and the Secretary of Human Resources had concurrent jurisdiction to hear back wage
claims under K.S.A. 44-324(a) and that the claimants had a choice of forum. 14 Kan. App. 2d at
697. On the other hand, no concurrent jurisdiction exists in this case to avoid the KJRA
exhaustion provision before going to court.

In addition, Midwest Crane relies on Zion Lutheran Church v. Kansas Comm'n on
Civil
Rights, 16 Kan. App. 2d 237, 240, 821 P.2d 334 (1991), aff'd 251 Kan. 206,
830 P.2d 536
(1992). The Zion court held that a party may institute an action in the trial court to
contest the
exercise of jurisdiction over it by an administrative agency without first having exhausted all
administrative remedies available. The court stated that exhaustion in an agency action was not
required if the agency's exercise of authority was in excess of its jurisdiction or if the agency
acted in a manner that was contrary to its statutory grant of authority. 16 Kan. App. 2d at 239. In
so holding, the Zion court stated that "'[i]t is a well-recognized exception to the rule
[of
exhaustion of administrative remedies] that judicial review of interlocutory rulings of an
administrative agency is proper if the agency has exercised authority in excess of its jurisdiction
or acted in some manner that is contrary to its statutory grant of authority.' [Citations omitted.]"
16 Kan. App. 2d at 239.

Midwest Crane relies on Zion to support its contention that the Commission
exceeded its
jurisdiction in determining that it was a motor carrier. As a result, it was entitled to bring a
declaratory judgment action in the trial court to challenge the Commission's abuse of authority.
Zion, however, is distinguishable from the present case because in Zion
the Chapter 60 petition
was filed in the trial court after the administrative agency had made an interlocutory ruling. Here,
however, there were no rulings made by the Commission regarding Midwest Crane's status as a
motor carrier before the filing of the declaratory judgment action. As a result, the exception to
exhaustion of administrative remedies, as set out in Zion, is inapplicable in the
present case.

When the declaratory judgment action was filed, the Commission had simply issued an
order to show cause to Midwest Crane. The order required Midwest to come forward and show
why it was not subject to the Commission's oversight. Midwest Crane construes the
Commission's order as "address[ing] whether [it] should be sanctioned for refusing to allow an
inspection of its cranes." Nevertheless, the order instead required Midwest Crane to appear and
explain why it was not subject to the Commission's oversight.

Without first exhausting administrative remedies that could have granted relief on some
ground before going to court, Midwest Crane filed a petition for declaratory judgment in the trial
court. Midwest Crane's action of filing the petition for declaratory judgment violated the
exhaustion doctrine. The Commission is charged with the statutory duty to regulate motor
carriers. K.S.A. 66-1,108 et seq. K.S.A. 66-1,108(e) defines a "'motor carrier'" as

"any person operating as a for hire motor carrier or a private motor carrier, and any of
their agents,
officers, representatives, as well as employees responsible for hiring, supervising, training,
assigning or dispatching of drivers and employees concerned with the installation, inspection and
maintenance of motor vehicle equipment or accessories or both."

Moreover, K.S.A. 66-1,108(f) defines a "'motor vehicle'" as "any automobile, truck, trailer,
semitrailer, tractor, motor bus or any other self-propelled or motor-driven vehicle used upon any
of the public highways of the state for the purpose of transporting persons or property." K.S.A.
66-1,108 also sets out definitions of various types of motor carriers, which we need not mention
to resolve this appeal.

Whether Midwest Crane is a motor carrier and under the jurisdiction of the Commission
requires the interpretation of statutes and the consideration of evidence. Under these
circumstances, exhaustion of administrative remedies is required. See Dean v. State,
250 Kan.
417, 422, 826 P.2d 1372, cert. denied 504 U.S. 973 (1992) (The interpretation of a
statute by an
agency was a necessary administrative act in implementing the statute, even though a court could
later construe the statute at variance with the agency's interpretation.); Farmers Banshares
of
Abilene, Inc., 250 Kan. 520, Syl. ¶ 1 ("Interpretation of statute is a necessary and
inherent
function of an agency in its administration or application of that statute."). Consequently, because
the issue of whether Midwest Crane was a motor carrier required the interpretation of statutes
administered by the Commission, exhaustion was required. See Leben, Challenging and
Defending Agency Actions in Kansas, 64 J.K.B.A. 22, 38 (June/July 1995).

Moreover, in its declaratory judgment action, Midwest Crane sought declaratory relief
and an injunction against the Commission. Nevertheless, declaratory and injunctive relief were
available through the KJRA when properly invoked. See K.S.A. 77-622(b). Because the forms of
relief sought by Midwest Crane were provided for in the KJRA, Midwest Crane's exclusive
remedy was through the KJRA. See Zarda v. State, 250 Kan. 364, 826 P.2d 1365,
cert. denied
504 U.S. 973 (1992). (In concluding that BOTA had the authority to resolve administrative
issues, although BOTA had no power to resolve constitutional issues, the court upheld the trial
court's dismissal for failure to exhaust administrative remedies.). The Commission should not be
subjected to litigation in the courts until all administrative remedies have been exhausted. See
Farmers Banshares of Abilene, Inc., 250 Kan. at 522-23. Therefore, we determine
that the trial
court properly dismissed Midwest Crane's declaratory judgment action for failure to exhaust
administrative remedies before resorting to the courts.