Replacing regular troops with reservists is a cut too far, says MP

There are very few easy answers in politics. Decisions are usually grounded in
the balance of financial priorities. Given the difficult hand dealt by
Labour, this Government is doing a competent job in slowly turning finances
round, writes John Baron MP

Army reservists on a training exercise in ColchesterPhoto: CHRIS RADBURN/PA

By John Baron, Conservative MP for Basildon and Billericay

9:30PM BST 14 Sep 2013

But plans to replace 20,000 regular troops with 30,000 reservists will prove a cut too far. It will not produce the cost savings envisaged, but will create unacceptable capability gaps which may yet cost us dear.

Given the mounting evidence that reserve proposals risk failure, a number of us on the

Conservative back benches are asking the Government to think again. Surely it would be better at least to delay the axing of regular battalions until we were sure that the Army reserve plans will work?

Our concerns centre around a number of unanswered questions over the extent of cost savings with these proposals. Reliable reports of the MoD’s failure to meet its reserve recruitment targets are circulating and add urgency. We need answers.

For example, the Government’s own figures admit that it costs more to train reservists than regulars. Calculations show that, after tax, an ex-regular reservist receiving the £5,000 incentive will be on a higher scale of take-home pay than a serving brigadier. Furthermore, incentive payments of £500 per month per reservist suggest smaller employers are reluctant to let key members of staff go for any extended period.

Yet the Government has not made its case as to the extent of cost savings. At no time in parliament has the government presented a fully-costed plan. We have asked for details, but so far the government has been long on promise, yet short on delivery – not the best policy when dealing with the country’s defence.

We must then consider the wider cost of the capability gap created through the loss of these 20,000 experienced troops. There are doubts as to whether the increase in untested reserves can plug this gap, both numerically and professionally.

The TA’s present mobilisation rate of 40 per cent - the MoD believes 40 troops are deployable for every 100 – would suggest we need 50,000 reservists to close the gap, regardless of whether deployed as whole units or not.

Meanwhile, no-one can doubt the professionalism of our Armed Forces. Whatever the policy shortcomings in Iraq and Afghanistan, our troops did a phenomenal job given the resources available. The TA also played its part when supplementing regular forces, and in particular in specialised roles such as medicine.

However, the nature of conflict itself is changing. Wars fought in binary terms are now giving way to more fluid geopolitical forces, both state and non-state. War is becoming more asymmetrical. Our future forces will need to be even more professional and flexible – shortcuts will be a high-risk strategy.

Moreover, these reservist plans are having a distorting effect on the ground. Well-recruited battalions are being disbanded – the 2nd Battalion, the Royal Regiment of Fusiliers being one example – whilst more poorly-recruited, and therefore expensive, battalions are being preserved. Such a policy merely reinforces failure.

It is quite clear the Government’s proposals are decisions borne of financial necessity and not strategic design. Once again, it comes down to financial priorities, but here the stakes could not be higher – funding white elephants, such as HS2, or ensuring the defence of the realm.