THIS MATTER came on
April 25, 2003, before a duly convened panel of the Virginia State Bar Disciplinary
Board (the "Board"), consisting of Roscoe B. Stephenson, III (the "Chair"),
V. Max Beard (Lay Member), William C. Boyce, Jr., Robert L. Freed and Peter
A. Dingman, pursuant to a Show Cause Order entered September 25, 2002, and duly
served upon Joseph Dee Morrissey ("Respondent"). The Virginia State Bar (the
"Bar") was represented by Edward L. Davis, Esq., Assistant Bar Counsel. Appearing
for Respondent were H. Morgan Griffith, Esq. ("Griffith"), and Michael L. Rigsby,
Esq. ("Rigsby"). The proceedings were recorded and transcribed by Theresa S.
Griffith of Chandler & Halasz, Registered Professional Reporters, Post Office
Box 9349, Richmond, Virginia, 23227; telephone number (804) 730-1222.

The Hearing commenced
promptly at 9:00 a.m., with the Chair reciting the purpose of the Hearing to
determine whether, upon the allegation that Respondent had failed to comply
with the obligations imposed by Part Six, Section IV, Paragraph 13.K.(1) of
the Rules of the Supreme Court of Virginia, arising in relation to the suspension
imposed on Respondent in a proceeding styled Virginia State Bar, ex rel,
Third District Committee, Section II, Joseph D. Morrissey, Chancery No.
HK, 1655 (Richmond Cir. Ct. Feb. 18, 2000), Respondent's license to practice
law in the Commonwealth of Virginia should not be further suspended or revoked.
The Chair then polled the members of the Board as to whether any of them were
conscious of any personal or financial interest or bias which would preclude
any of them from fairly hearing this matter. Each member, including the Chair,
answering in the negative, the Hearing proceeded.

As preliminary matters, the Board
was presented with a Motion for Continuance advanced on behalf of Respondent
and a Motion of Rigsby for leave to withdraw as counsel, should the Hearing
proceed as scheduled, on the grounds that Rigsby's testimony would be required
as to some issues in the case, Respondent being absent from the Hearing and,
to his counsel's knowledge, in the country of Ireland. The Board first heard
argument on Rigsby's Motion to Withdraw. Griffith, arguing for Respondent, asserted
that the testimony of Rigsby would be critical to the case of Respondent on
the issue of notice in that Respondent was unavailable to testify to those issues,
being in Ireland where Respondent is reportedly pursuing an advanced degree
while teaching at a local college. The Bar responded, arguing that the absence
of Respondent was voluntary, the Hearing date having been set in February by
agreement with Rigsby, and Respondent having had ample opportunity to be present
if he so chose. Further, the Bar stated that it would not seek sanctions against
Rigsby for proceeding as attorney in this matter, nor would the Bar object to
his testimony on the grounds of his participation in the case as attorney for
Respondent.

The Board then retired to consider
the Motion to Withdraw and, after deliberation, reserved its ruling on this
Motion, electing to first hear argument on the Motion to Continue.

Griffith argued for Respondent that the matter should be continued as it was
the preference of Respondent that Henry L. Marsh, III, Esq., participate as
lead counsel on behalf of Respondent and Mr. March was unavailable on April
25, 2003, having on April 23rd, by letter to the Chair, advised that he would
be attending a conference in Boston, Massachusetts, from April 24, 2003, through
April 26, 2003. Griffith stated that, if Rigsby were permitted to withdraw,
Griffith would be "minimally competent" to proceed with the Hearing in this
matter, but that Respondent would be disadvantaged by the absence of his preferred
lead counsel. The Bar again argued that this matter had been previously continued
twice at Respondent's request and was scheduled for April 25, 2003, with the
agreement of Rigsby on behalf of all of Respondent's counsel. The Board, then,
retired to consider both Motions.
Upon resuming the Hearing, the Chair announced that the Motion to Continue was
denied, but that Rigsby's withdrawal would be permitted, at his option. That
is, counsel was advised, the Board determined that it was clear that Respondent's
absence was voluntary, and that no issue was presented under Rule 3.7 of the
Rules of Professional Conduct regarding Rigsby's testimony, in that the Board
would not object to his testimony and the matter of filing of notices was largely
uncontested. Rigsby's testimony would be limited to matters within his own personal
knowledge. The Board then took a recess to allow counsel for Respondent to determine
whether Rigsby would withdraw and in what fashion they would proceed given the
rulings of the Board.

The Hearing then resumed with Rigsby
electing to remain as counsel. The Hearing proceeded then with the Bar presenting
its evidence through its exhibits, filed, received and heard herein, and its
witnesses: Vivian Byrd, Deputy Clerk of the Disciplinary System, Barbara Sayers
Lanier, Clerk of the Disciplinary System, Michael Huberman, Assistant Commonwealth
Attorney for Henrico County, Kevin Watson, a former client of Respondent who
testified via telephone from the Stone Mountain Correctional Center in Norton,
Virginia, Clady Watson, Kevin Watson's grandmother, and Talaya Glenn, an Assistant
Clerk of the Disciplinary System. For the record it is noted that Kevin Watson
gave his testimony at the Stone Mountain Correctional Center in Norton, Virginia,
before Craig Miller, of Linda C. Miller, Court Reporters, P.O. Box 115, Norton,
VA 24273; telephone (276) 679-1000, who transcribed his testimony.

After the Bar rested its case, Respondent
presented his evidence through his exhibits filed, received and read herein
and the testimony of Alice David, a former legal assistant of Respondent, and
Rigsby. Respondent then rested and the parties argued their case.

The Board then retired to consider the evidence and arguments presented to it.
The Board concluded that the following facts had been proved by clear and convincing
evidence:

1. That on February 18, 2000, a three-judge
court entered an Order of Suspension in Chancery No. HK-1655, Circuit Court
of the City of Richmond, which order included requirements imposed by Part Six,
Section IV, Paragraph 13.K.(1) (hereinafter cited as "Rule 13K"), requiring
in brief summary:

that the Respondent shall forthwith
give notice, by certified mail, return receipt requested, of the suspension
of his license to practice law in the Commonwealth of Virginia to all clients
for whom he is currently handling matters and to all opposing attorneys and
presiding judges in pending litigation. The Respondent shall also make appropriate
arrangements for the disposition of matters then in his care, in conformity
with the wishes of his clients. The Respondent shall give such notice within
14 days of the effective date of the suspension order, and make such arrangements
as are required herein within 45 days of the effective date of the suspension
order. The Respondent shall furnish proof to the Bar within 60 days of the effective
date of the suspension order that such notices have been timely given and such
arrangements for the disposition of matters made . . . .

2. Respondent pursued an appeal from
the above-described Order of Suspension and on March 27, 2000, the Supreme Court
of Virginia stayed the suspension of Respondent's license pending the appeal.
On November 3, 2000, the Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed the judgment of
the three-judge court and on December 15, 2000, the three-judge court entered
an "Order Imposing Suspension". That later order did not reference Rule 13K.

3. On January 18, 2001, Vivian R.
Byrd sent a letter to Respondent enclosing a copy of the "Order Imposing Suspension",
reminding Respondent of "your duty under the Rules of Court" and quoting Rule
13K which is, by its own terms, applicable to "any attorney who is disbarred
or suspended".

4. On January 22, 2001, by courtesy
copy sent to Ms. Byrd of a letter addressed to James T. Maloney, Respondent
acknowledged receipt of Ms. Byrd's January 18, 2001, letter and asked Mr. Maloney
to assist with preparation of a list of all clients "so that [Respondent] can
formally notify them".
5. On February 13, 2001, Ms. Byrd wrote to Respondent reminding him of his obligations
under Rule 13K.

6. On June 21, 2001, Barbara Sayers
Lanier, Clerk of the Disciplinary System, wrote to Respondent again reminding
him of his obligations under Rule 13K and again quoting the Rule in its entirety.

7. On September 5, 2001, Ms. Lanier
again wrote to Respondent reminding him of his responsibilities under Rule 13K
and noting that the Bar, as of that date, had not received any proof of his
compliance with Rule 13K.

8. On December 28, 2001, Respondent
sent a letter to Ms. Lanier which, among other things, asserted that he "gave
notice of my suspension to all of my clients following the December 15, 2000,
suspension".

9. On January 7, 2002, Ms. Lanier
wrote to Respondent informing him, among other things, that "at this time, our
office has not received copies of the suspension notification letters with certified
return receipts".

10. On January 11, 2002, Respondent
wrote to Ms. Lanier asserting that "there were no suspension notification letters
because I had no clients at the time".

11. On January 15, 2002, Ms. Lanier
responded to that letter, sending to Respondent a copy of his January 22, 2001,
letter which indicated that "you intended to comply with this Rule" [Rule 13K].

12. No proof of notification was
thereafter received by the Bar prior to the issuance of the Show Cause Order
in this matter.

13. Exhibits presented by Respondent
at the Hearing and the testimony of Ms. David and Rigsby indicated that, on
or about February 9, 2001, Respondent did send notice letters to a number of
clients and that many such letters indicated copies were also sent to opposing
counsel. Some courts may also have been notified at that time.

14. After Rigsby was consulted by
Respondent regarding the Show Cause Order in this matter, in October or November
of 2002, Ms. David found a file containing copies of letters to clients and
certified mail, return receipt cards in Respondent's former offices. This file
was offered to the Bar, for the first time, on April 1, 2003, and was retrieved
by the Bar from Rigsby's office on April 23, 2003.

15. Kevin Watson was a client of
Respondent who had been represented by Respondent in trial court proceedings
and in appellate proceedings before the Court of Appeals of Virginia. On January
3, 2001, Mr. Watson's Petition for Appeal was scheduled to be heard by an authorized
representative of the Supreme Court of Virginia. Mr. Watson and his grandmother
both testified that neither was advised prior to the date and time of that hearing
of the fact of Respondent's suspension or that the matter would be presented
not by Respondent, but by James T. Maloney. This unadvised and unapproved substitution
was particularly egregious given the grandmother's testimony that she had advised
the Respondent that she had little money for lawyers and that the Respondent
had assured her that he got good results in Henrico County. Michael Huberman,
the Assistant Commonwealth's Attorney responsible for the prosecution of the
matter in which Mr. Watson was a defendant, testified that he was also not advised
of the suspension of Respondent's license by Respondent either prior to or subsequent
to the hearing on the Petition for Appeal. The Exhibits submitted by the Bar
included a letter from the office of the Clerk of the Supreme Court of Virginia
attesting that the Court never received notice from, prior to the hearing in
the Watson case, that his license had been suspended.

IN CONSIDERATION WHEREOF, THE
BOARD FINDS: That the matters presented to the Board at the Hearing on April
25, 2003, showed by clear and convincing evidence that Respondent failed to
comply with the requirements of Rule 13K, as to his obligation to give timely
notice to his clients, opposing counsel and courts before which matters were
pending, to make appropriate arrangements in compliance with the wishes of his
clients and to furnish proof thereof to the Bar.

The Board thereupon invited the parties to submit such evidence and arguments
as they might offer respecting the appropriate sanction to be imposed in this
matter. The Bar submitted a summary of Respondent's previous record regarding
professional disciplinary matters which includes, three matters which were dismissed
with terms, one private reprimand, one public reprimand, one six-month suspension,
a three-year suspension (the underlying matter), and his disbarment by the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia. The Bar requested
that the Board revoke the license of Respondent, arguing that the circumstances
of this case and his prior record demonstrate a lack of the necessary respect
for his profession and merits the complete revocation of his license. Respondent's
counsel argued that the Board should draw a distinction between cases of active
misconduct and violations of administrative requirements, suggesting that compliance
with Rule 13K is an administrative matter, that "umbrage by the Bar" at the
tardiness of the delivery of certain proofs of notice does not merit revocation
and that the evidence showed substantial compliance with Rule 13K.

The Board retired to consider the
appropriate disposition and, by unanimous decision, concluded as follows:

ORDERED that, the license of Respondent,
Joseph Dee Morrissey, to practice law in the Commonwealth of Virginia, be, and
the same hereby is, REVOKED, effective April 25, 2003 (a summary order being
entered that date); and

FURTHER, ORDERED that, as directed
in The Board's April 25, 2003, Summary Order in this matter, a copy of which
was served on Respondent by certified mail, Respondent must comply with the
requirements of Part 6, Section IV, Paragraph 13 (M), of the Rules of the Supreme
Court of Virginia. All issues concerning the adequacy of the notice and arrangements
required by the Summary Order shall be determined by the Board; and

FURTHER ORDER that, pursuant to Part
Six, Section IV, Paragraph 13.B.8(C), of the Rules of the Supreme Court of Virginia,
the Clerk of the Disciplinary System shall assess costs; and