Abstract:
Australian diplomacy could ease rising tensions across the Taiwan Strait, if Australian policymakers rediscovered an appetite for involvement in the flashpoint. Tensions between Taiwan and China are rising, driven in part by an increasingly assertive government in Beijing, growing Taiwanese estrangement from the Chinese mainland, and deteriorating US–China relations.
If key regional governments fail to help de-escalate tensions, the consequences are likely to be serious.
Rather than continue the debate about Australia’s position on its ANZUS obligations should the United States invoke the treaty in a Taiwan conflict, Australia should work with other regional powers to advocate for more robust risk avoidance and crisis management mechanisms.

Abstract:
Although Benny Gantz’s party lost the head-to-head battle, Avigdor Liberman’s favorable influence on the coalition
math has left the general in a stronger position—and taken some diplomatic weight off the Trump administration’s
shoulders.
Israel’s third round of elections last week seemed inconclusive at first, but the deadlock may now be broken.
Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu did better this time than in September’s round two, but his gains were
insufficient to form a new government. Potential kingmaker Avigdor Liberman jettisoned his previous idea of
getting the two top parties to join forces; instead, personal antipathy and policy differences have led him to
definitely state that he will not join any government Netanyahu leads. Thus, while centrist Blue and White Party
leader Benny Gantz may have options to shape a new government, Netanyahu has no pathway on his own.
In theory, the center-left bloc has the requisite number of seats for a bare majority in the 120-member Knesset,
since anti-Netanyahu forces won 62 seats. In reality, the situation is more complex.

Topic:
Foreign Policy, Government, Politics, Elections

Political Geography:
Middle East, Israel, North America, United States of America

Abstract:
After the fall of Sirte, Erdogan and Putin’s desired ceasefire can only be achieved with Washington’s support.
Over the past week, regional and European actors have increased their diplomatic activity around Libya in
response to intensifying violence in the nine-month-old civil war. On January 8, less than a week after the Turkish
parliament approved sending forces to support the Tripoli-based Government of National Accord (GNA), President
Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Russian leader Vladimir Putin met in Istanbul and called for a Libya ceasefire to begin
on January 12. Whether or not Moscow and Ankara manage to pause the violence temporarily, their growing
influence in Libya represents an epic failure of Western attempts to resolve the conflict diplomatically.
The longer-term effort to jumpstart Libya’s political transition requires a wider international effort at peace and
reconciliation—something Russia and Turkey can support but not lead. Putin and Erdogan seemed to acknowledge
that fact at their summit, endorsing a long-planned multilateral conference in Berlin aimed at recommitting all
relevant actors to support an end to hostilities and respect the UN Security Council’s mandatory but widely
ignored arms embargo. Even assuming Putin is serious and withdraws Russian mercenaries from the frontlines, a
full, lasting ceasefire cannot transpire until the other actors who support Gen. Khalifa Haftar’s so-called Libyan
National Army (LNA) agree to withdraw their equipment and personnel for a fixed period while negotiations are
launched—especially the United Arab Emirates, which provides the LNA with critical air superiority. At the same
time, Turkey would have to take commensurate de-escalatory steps of its own.
The United States is the only actor that holds enough weight with all the foreign parties to bring about an
authentic ceasefire. Despite being consumed with crises in Iran and Iraq, Washington should expend the
diplomatic effort required to pursue durable stability in Libya before the country slips further toward endemic
chaos.

Topic:
Diplomacy, United Nations, Conflict, Negotiation

Political Geography:
Russia, Turkey, Middle East, Libya, North Africa, United States of America

Abstract:
Sultan Haitham will now be free to put his own stamp on the country's government and foreign policy, and a
recent dust-up on the Yemeni border could provide the first indicator of his approach.
On February 20, Oman will begin its next era in earnest. The new sultan, Haitham bin Tariq al-Said, was officially
sworn in on January 11, but he has remained quiet and mostly out of sight during the forty-day mourning period
that followed the death of his cousin, Sultan Qaboos. Now that this period is drawing to a close, he is free to put
his stamp on Omani policy.
Notably, U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo will lead the first international delegation to see Sultan Haitham in
the post-mourning period. When the meeting was first scheduled, the secretary likely saw it as a chance to get to
know the new leader, and also as a symbolic visit to make up for sending such a low-level delegation to offer
condolences. Yet the two may have more to talk about now. Earlier this week, a flare-up occurred between Saudi
forces and Omani-backed locals in the Yemeni border province of al-Mahra. The confrontation may be Sultan
Haitham’s first regional test, and identifying the actors who help him get through it could help Washington discern
future power centers within Oman’s often opaque government.

Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Government

Political Geography:
Middle East, Yemen, Oman, United States of America, Gulf Nations

Abstract:
If the latest U.S. effort winds up backing the Palestinians into a territorial corner from the outset, then Washington
may not be able to move the process any closer to direct negotiations.
The newly released U.S. peace plan marks a very significant shift in favor of the current Israeli government’s view,
especially when compared to three past U.S. initiatives: (1) the Clinton Parameters of December 2000, (2)
Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice’s “Annapolis Process” of 2007-2008, and (3) Secretary of State John Kerry’s
2013-2014 initiative. The message is clear: the Trump administration will no longer keep sweetening the deal with
every Palestinian refusal, a criticism some have aimed at previous U.S. efforts.
Yet the new plan raises worrisome questions of its own. Will its provisions prove so disadvantageous to the
proposed Palestinian state that they cannot serve as the basis for further negotiations? And would such overreach
enable Palestinian Authority president Mahmoud Abbas to sway Arab states who have signaled that they want to
give the proposal a chance, convincing them to oppose it instead? If so, the plan may wind up perpetuating the
current diplomatic impasse and setting the stage for a one-state reality that runs counter to Israel’s identity as a
Jewish, democratic state.
This two-part PolicyWatch will address these questions by examining how the Trump plan compares to past U.S.
initiatives when it comes to the conflict’s five core final-status issues. Part 1 focuses on two of these issues:
borders and Jerusalem. Part 2 examines security, refugees, and narrative issues.

Abstract:
By granting Israel much more say over the sovereignty of a future Palestinian state and its ability to absorb
refugees, the document may undermine the administration’s ability to build an international coalition behind its
policies.
President Trump’s “Peace to Prosperity” plan was presented as a departure from previous approaches—a notion
that invited praise from its supporters (who saw it as a recognition of reality) and criticism from its opponents
(who saw it as an abandonment of valued principles). The plan does in fact diverge from past efforts in
fundamental respects, yet there are also some areas of continuity, and ultimately, the extent to which it gains
traction will be subject to many different political and diplomatic variables.
Even so, the initial substance of the plan document itself will play a large part in determining how it is viewed by
various stakeholders, especially those passages that veer away from the traditional path on core issues. Part 1 of
this PolicyWatch assessed what the plan says about two such issues: borders and Jerusalem. This second
installment discusses security, refugee, and narrative issues.

Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Refugees, Peace

Political Geography:
Middle East, Israel, Palestine, North America, United States of America

Abstract:
The surest way to counter Iran’s malign influence is to proactively focus on human rights issues that the new
prime minister can actually affect, such as organizing free elections and preventing further violence against
protestors.
On February 1, a plurality of Iraqi parliamentary factions gave President Barham Salih the go-ahead to nominate
Mohammed Tawfiq Allawi as the new prime minister-designate. The mild-mannered Shia Islamist nominee will
now attempt to form and ratify his cabinet in the next thirty days. As he does so, political blocs will probably rally
behind him while limiting his mandate to organizing early elections next year, having struggled through a long and
fractious process to replace resigned prime minister Adil Abdulmahdi. For the first time since the dramatic events
of the past two months, Iraqis and U.S. policymakers alike can catch their breath and consider their medium-term
options.

Abstract:
By triggering the nuclear deal’s dispute resolution mechanism, Britain, France, and Germany are opening
diplomatic space that could help the United States and Iran return to the negotiating table.
In a press conference following the assassination of Qasem Soleimani, President Trump reaffirmed his
administration’s “maximum pressure” policy against Iran and asked, once again, for European countries to leave
the nuclear deal. Meanwhile, Tehran announced what it called a “fifth and final remedial step” away from its
commitments under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. In response, the British, French, and German foreign
ministers stated on January 14 that they would trigger the JCPOA’s dispute resolution mechanism (DRM).
At the same time, however, the E3 clarified that they are not joining the Trump administration’s maximum
pressure campaign, which has steadily intensified ever since the United States withdrew from the JCPOA and
reimposed unilateral sanctions in 2018. Contrary to U.S. claims, the European decision will not immediately
provoke “snapback” UN sanctions on Iran (though that scenario could unfold later if the E3 plan fails and Iran’s
violations go before the UN Security Council). Instead, Europe is maintaining its evenhanded position somewhere
between Washington and Tehran in order to preserve the possibility of new negotiations, on both the nuclear
program and other regional issues.

Abstract:
During the war years in Syria, the northwest, specifically Idlib, has become a site of heavy internal displacement.
Observers on the ground recognize the green buses traveling to Idlib carrying migrants who have refused
reconciliation agreements with the Damascus regime. Since around 2014, a range of jihadist, Islamist, and Salafi
actors have wielded control in the area, the most recent being the al-Qaeda offshoot Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, which
has ruled—ineffectively and brutally—through its so-called Syrian Salvation Government. But the group's reign is
unlikely to last long if current trends persist. The regime's recent move against the town of Maarat al-Numan
suggests plans for a broader takeover in the northwest, aided by Russian firepower and other allies such as Iran.
In this Policy Note filled with local insights, jihadism expert Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi presents the current scene in
and around Idlib province, the last Syrian outpost still run by independent rebels. Absent an intervention by
Turkey, the Assad regime will likely prevail in a campaign that quashes the insurgency at a high humanitarian
cost.

Abstract:
The general’s peerless domestic stature would have served a crucial mediatory role during the eventual transition
to Khamenei’s successor, so his death brings significant uncertainty to that process.
Following the assassination of Qasem Soleimani, much attention has been focused on the foreign operations
conducted by the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps-Qods Force. Yet his organization also played a major role at
home, one whose future is now unclear. In particular, Soleimani himself was well positioned to be a unifying,
steadying figure once Iran faced the challenge of determining a successor to Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei.

Topic:
Politics, Military Affairs, Authoritarianism, Qassem Soleimani

Political Geography:
Iraq, Iran, Middle East, United States of America

Abstract:
If the latest conference is to succeed, the principal actors stoking the civil war must endorse a genuine ceasefire
and a return to Libyan internal dialogue.
On January 19, international leaders will convene in Berlin to discuss a way out of the nine-month civil war
between the so-called “Libyan National Army” led by Gen. Khalifa Haftar and the internationally recognized
Government of National Accord led by Prime Minister Fayez al-Sarraj. The Germans led several months of
preparatory efforts at the request of UN envoy Ghassan Salame, but had been reluctant to choose a specific date
until they were assured that the event stood a reasonable chance of producing practical steps to improve the
situation on the ground and jumpstart the UN’s stalled negotiation efforts between the LNA and GNA. Chancellor
Angela Merkel finally took that step after several key developments unfolded earlier this month, including a
January 8 ceasefire proposal by Russian president Vladimir Putin and Turkish president Recep Tayyip Erdogan, and
Putin’s subsequent failed attempt to have each side sign a more permanent ceasefire agreement in Moscow on
January 13 (the GNA signed but Haftar balked, though most of the fighting has paused for the moment).
Secretary of State Mike Pompeo has been averse to engage on Libya during his tenure, but he is expected to
attend the Berlin conference alongside National Security Advisor Robert O’Brien. Accordingly, the event gives the
United States a chance to play a much-needed role on several fronts: namely, pressuring the foreign actors who
have perpetuated the war and violated the arms embargo; working with Britain, France, Germany, Italy, and
Russia to codify a ceasefire at the UN Security Council; and backing Salame’s efforts to reinvigorate the Libyan
national dialogue, which Haftar preempted by attacking Tripoli last April despite European support to Salame.
Since 2011, Libya has struggled to establish a legitimate transitional government despite three national elections
and the creation of at least four legislative bodies. Challenges to the 2014 election results eventually led to rival
governments in the east and west, and the division solidified when Haftar started the first civil war with support
from his allies Egypt and the United Arab Emirates. That war halted in 2015, but several years’ worth of domestic
and international efforts failed to bring Sarraj and Haftar to an enduring resolution.

Abstract:
A host of crucial multilateral interests are baked into the U.S. presence, from keeping the Islamic State down, to
protecting vulnerable regional allies, to preventing Iran from taking Iraq's oil revenues.
The assassination of Qasem Soleimani has brought the tensions in U.S.-Iraqi relations to a boil, with militia factions
strong-arming a parliamentary resolution on American troop withdrawal and various European allies
contemplating departures of their own. Before they sign the divorce papers, however, officials in Baghdad and
Washington should consider the many reasons why staying together is best for both them and the Middle East.

Abstract:
By the time IS came to the fore in Iraq and Syria, many of its themes and activities were already second nature to
Tunisian jihadis who had heard similar messaging at home.
There are a number of reasons why Tunisians joined the Islamic State in Iraq, Syria, and Libya. One
underappreciated aspect of this is the way Ansar al-Sharia in Tunisia’s (AST) messaging primed members of the
group and others in society that were exposed to, attended, or followed online AST activities and events. In my
new book, Your Sons Are at Your Service: Tunisia’s Missionaries of Jihad, I describe this process, which I will
examine in brief here. In particular, I will explore AST’s motivational framing, which “functions as prods to action.”
The major themes AST crafted in its narrative were related to brotherhood, the defense of Islam, the creation of
an Islamic state, and “remaining” as an entity.

Abstract:
Khamenei and other regime officials have been quick to swear revenge, but for now they may focus more on
stoking patriotic and militaristic sentiment at home.
A few hours after Iran confirmed that Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Qods Force commander Qasem
Soleimani had been killed in Iraq, Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei issued a statement describing those who shed his
blood as “the most wretched of humankind.” Calling Soleimani the international symbol of “resistance,” he then
announced three days of public mourning in Iran. He also declared that “severe revenge awaits the criminals”
who killed Soleimani—an act that the United States had claimed credit for by the time he spoke. Other highranking
officials echoed this sentiment, including President Hassan Rouhani, Speaker of Parliament Ali Larijani,
and Defense Minister Amir Hatami, who explicitly promised “revenge” on “all those” involved in the assassination.
Despite this rhetoric, however, and despite Soleimani’s unmatched role in carrying out Iran’s regional policy of
adventurism and asymmetric warfare, the regime may avoid major, immediate retaliation if it sees such a move
as too costly or as a potential trigger for serious military conflict with the United States. On January 1, amid
escalating tensions in Iraq but before Soleimani’s assassination, Khamenei stated, “We would not take the country
to war...but if others want to impose something on this country, we will stand before them forcefully.” In response
to President Trump’s assertion that Iran played a role in the December 31 riot at the U.S. embassy in Baghdad,
Khamenei told listeners he had two messages for Washington: “First, how dare you! This has nothing to do with
Iran. Second, you should be reasonable and understand what is the main cause for these problems. But of course
they are not [reasonable].”

Topic:
Politics, Qassem Soleimani, Assassination

Political Geography:
Iraq, Iran, Middle East, United States of America

Abstract:
Unless Washington and its allies respond to the protestors’ legitimate demands for reform, the group will survive
through measures such as expanding its smuggling activity, promoting its financial institutions, and selectively
scapegoating corrupt politicians.
When IMF officials visited Lebanon late last month amid its accelerating economic freefall, many wondered
whether these developments might alter the behavior of Hezbollah, the designated terrorist group that has a deep
financial stake in the country’s public and private sectors. During a previous funding crisis—the increase in U.S.
sanctions against the group’s chief underwriter, Iran—the “Party of God” and its foreign sponsors formulated a
new strategy to evade these measures and create alternative sources of funding. Such sources allowed Hezbollah
to make further inroads into government agencies following the 2018 parliamentary elections. For example, the
group’s leaders insisted on controlling the Health Ministry, which commands Lebanon’s fourth-largest budget at
$338 million per year; they also gained more access to the Ministry of Public Works and Transport, the Agriculture
Ministry, and the Ministry of Energy and Water, whose assistance was used to fund their affiliated projects and
businesses.
That worked until Lebanon’s own economy began its current nosedive. Unemployment has hit a record high of 40
percent, and the lira has slumped by about 60 percent on the parallel market, hiking inflation. Officially pegged to
the dollar, the currency has plummeted 40 percent on the black market as local banks ration dollars necessary for
imports of food, medicine, and other essential goods. Meanwhile, Lebanon has one of the highest debt-to-GDP
ratios in the world (over 150 percent) and may not be able to pay $1.2 billion in Eurobonds this month. As with the
Iran sanctions, however, Hezbollah has a strategy to survive this domestic pressure, at least in the near term.

Abstract:
Enhancing deterrence and protecting Americans in Iraq and Syria requires a more formalized system for rationing
out retaliatory strikes at the proper intensity, time, and place.
When U.S. airstrikes targeted Kataib Hezbollah militia personnel and senior Iranian military figures on December
29 and January 3, they were releasing long-pent-up retaliation for a range of provocations by Iraqi militias. Yet
while these powerful blows may have injected some caution into enemy calculations, such deterrence is likely to
be a wasting asset.
The most proximal trigger for the strikes—the killing of an American civilian contractor during Kataib Hezbollah’s
December 27 rocket attack on the K-1 base in Kirkuk—was just one in a series of increasingly risky militia
operations against U.S. facilities. Only good fortune has prevented more Americans from dying in attacks
conducted since then, including January 8 (when Iranian ballistic missiles struck the U.S. portion of al-Asad Air
Base, causing more than a hundred nonlethal traumatic brain injuries), January 26 (mortar strike on the dining hall
at the U.S. embassy in Baghdad), January 31 (rockets fired at the U.S. site at Qayyarah West), February 10
(explosive device thrown at a U.S. logistical convoy south of Baghdad), and February 13 (rocket attack on U.S. site
at Kirkuk).
The United States has seemingly communicated to Tehran that it will strike Iraqi militias and Iranian targets if any
Americans are killed, but this redline has opened up a dangerous gray zone in which Iran and its proxies are
emboldened to continue their nonlethal attacks. Besides the fact that such high-risk attacks are destined to result
in more American deaths at some point, they will also produce many more injuries if permitted to continue, as
seen in the January 8 strike. More broadly, they will limit U.S. freedom of movement in Iraq and Syria,
undermining the point of being there in the first place.
This situation is unacceptable—the United States needs a way to deter such behavior even when attacks fall short
of killing Americans. When faced with similar challenges in past decades, the U.S. military established reckoning
systems that matched the punishment to the crime, with useful levels of predictability, proportionality, and
accountability.

Topic:
Foreign Policy, Military Affairs, Assassination, No-Fly Zones

Political Geography:
Iraq, Iran, Middle East, Syria, United States of America

Abstract:
Various displacement scenarios may unfold as the fighting escalates, each carrying a high risk of negative
humanitarian and economic consequences even if the parties live up to their promises.
The battle for Idlib province, the last stronghold of Syrian rebel forces, is heating up again. As Turkish troops clash
with Assad regime forces and displaced civilians continue piling up along the border, various foreign and domestic
players are considering moves that could send hundreds of thousands of refugees to other parts of Syria,
northern Iraq, or Europe.

Abstract:
Instead of focusing on Iran's missile retaliation or future threats, the Supreme Leader used his latest speech to
extoll the virtues of public unity behind the regime’s revolutionary goals.
On January 8, Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei delivered his first public speech since the U.S. assassination of
Qasem Soleimani and the subsequent Iranian missile strike on Iraqi bases housing American forces. As part of an
address that touched on regional solidarity against the United States and other notable subjects, he spent
considerable time claiming that Soleimani symbolized the Iranian people’s continued commitment to the
revolution. In doing so, he indicated that popular support for the regime remains a crucial objective for Iran’s
leaders, perhaps more so than issuing or acting on further military threats.

Abstract:
To keep recent rebel victories from cascading into a wider military collapse, Washington must urge the Gulf
coalition to firm up the government’s forces and move more quickly on peace talks.
On March 2, Yemen’s Houthi rebels seized the capital of al-Jawf province in the latest phase of a forty-five-day
campaign along multiple fronts. Stemming from shifts in the country’s increasingly fragile military balance since
last fall, the offensives show that Saudi Arabia is providing insufficient frontline support to the internationally
recognized government of President Abdu Rabu Mansour Hadi and its allies, while also failing to complete
backchannel peace talks with the Houthis. Unless talks reach fruition or the Houthis are checked militarily, rebel
forces will continue to use their ever-widening array of advanced Iranian weapons to exploit the government’s
weakness with more offensives.

Topic:
Conflict, Negotiation, Peace, Houthis

Political Geography:
Iran, Yemen, Saudi Arabia, United States of America, Gulf Nations

Abstract:
Even as their lack of transparency worsens the public health crisis, the Supreme Leader and other officials have
systematically gutted any civil society elements capable of organizing substantial opposition to such policies.
Iran’s ongoing coronavirus epidemic has left the people with less reason than ever to trust the information and
directives issued by their leaders. Part 1 of this PolicyWatch discussed the clergy’s role in aggravating this
problem, but the state’s mistakes and deceptions have been legion as well. They include scandalous discrepancies
between official reports after a period of denial that the virus had entered the country; a health system that was
unprepared to deal with such a disease promptly and properly; and official resistance to implementing
internationally recommended precautionary measures, such as canceling flights from China and quarantining the
center of the outbreak. These decisions have sown widespread confusion about facts and fictions related to the
virus, the most effective medically proven ways to control it, and the degree to which it is spreading throughout
the country. As a result, an already restive population has become increasingly panicked about the future and
angry at the state.
Yet can the coronavirus actually bring down the regime? The harsh reality is that the state has left little space for
opposition to organize around health issues, or any issues for that matter. Instead, it has sought to confuse the
people and redirect their anger toward external enemies, even as its own policies contribute to the crisis.

Abstract:
Whether they reveal a detailed plan or merely preview an aspirational document, U.S. officials still need to clarify
their goals at a time when elections are looming and Palestinian participation seems highly unlikely.
In a dramatic move, President Trump has announced that Israeli prime minister Binyamin Netanyahu and his
leading rival, Blue and White Party leader Benny Gantz, will visit the White House on January 28 to be briefed on
the administration’s long-awaited Middle East peace plan. Trump told reporters that the plan would likely be
released before the summit. Predictably, no invitation was extended to the Palestinian Authority, which severed
relations with Washington after the U.S. embassy was moved to Jerusalem in 2017.

Abstract:
The clergy’s ambitions for global Shia revolution made the city of Qom uniquely vulnerable to the disease, and
their resistance to modern medical science weakened the state’s ability to combat its spread.
On February 19, two days before the Iranian government officially announced the arrival of coronavirus, an
infected businessman who had recently returned from China to Qom passed away. The location and timing of his
death illustrate how the Shia holy city and the religious leaders and institutions who call it home have played an
outsize role in the disease’s disproportionately rapid spread inside Iran compared to other countries. How did this
situation come to pass, and what does it say about the current state of the clerical establishment, its relationship
with the regime, and its alienation from large swaths of Iranian society? (Part 2 of this PolicyWatch discusses the
regime's role in the outbreak and its resiliency to such crises.)

Topic:
Foreign Policy, Health, Religion, Shia, Coronavirus

Political Geography:
China, Iran, Middle East, Global Focus, United States of America

Abstract:
Besides highlighting Assad’s financial mismanagement, the recent unrest gives the international community a
genuine opportunity to push for transition while bolstering the more prosperous local administration in the
northeast.
Since mid-January, shop owners, government employees, students, and even children have been gathering in the
streets of various Syrian communities to express their frustration with the Assad regime’s economic policies and
untruths. Although the protests remain small for now, the fact that they have persistently carried on in the middle
of regime-controlled territory highlights Bashar al-Assad’s potential vulnerability on these issues.
In Suwayda, a Druze-majority province in the south, residents have protested the sharp drop in the value of the
Syrian pound/lira and the deteriorating economic situation in general. In the central-western town of Salamiya,
protestors were seen chanting “we want to live.” And in the Suwayda town of Shahba, demonstrators raised
loaves of bread in the air while openly criticizing Bouthaina Shaaban, Assad’s political and media advisor.
The latter protest was partly spurred by a recent interview on the pro-Assad television network al-Mayadeen,
where Shaaban not only claimed that the country’s current economy is “fifty times better than what it was in
2011,” but also declared that “Syrians are self-sufficient in everything.” In response, protestors sarcastically noted
that her comments referred to her own household’s economy, not Syria’s. Elsewhere, former agriculture minister
Nour al-Din Manna described Shaaban’s remarks about the war-torn country as “hard to believe,” and a closer
look at the country’s finances supports this disbelief.

Topic:
Foreign Policy, Economics, Syrian War, Currency

Political Geography:
Middle East, Lebanon, Syria, United States of America

Abstract:
Given the IRGC’s recent restructuring, the Qods Force will likely see more continuity than change under Qaani,
though his bureaucratic background is a far cry from Soleimani’s brand of charismatic, risky leadership.
On January 3, Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei appointed Brig. Gen. Esmail Qaani as chief commander of the
Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Qods Force, just hours after his predecessor, Qasem Soleimani, was killed by a
U.S. drone strike. The new commander’s background and military activities are not nearly as well known as
Soleimani’s, so taking a closer look at them can help determine whether and how the IRGC’s main extraterritorial
branch might change under his leadership.

Abstract:
A week after Donald Trump was elected president in November 2016, Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei played
coy, remarking, “I have no judgment on the American election...[Both parties have been] naughty toward us.” Of
course, his true reaction was far more complex. On one hand, he saw in the president-elect—who had spoken
much of disentangling U.S. forces from the Middle East—a prospect of decreased military pressure on his country.
On the other, he heard Trump’s raw vitriol directed at Iran’s leadership and the nuclear deal crafted by President
Obama. The eventual U.S. withdrawal from the JCPOA demonstrated that the new president could back up his talk
with punishing action.
In this close analysis of statements by Khamenei and other Iranian leaders, former seminarian Mehdi Khalaji lays
out the regime’s current views on President Trump and the United States. He shows that even after the American
assassination of Qods Force chief Qasem Soleimani, Iranian leaders could be open to negotiating with Washington
if they believe the regime’s existence depends on it.

Topic:
Foreign Policy, Politics, Elections, Donald Trump

Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, North America, United States of America

Abstract:
As in other conflict zones, Moscow cares little about reaching a peace deal so long as it can outmaneuver the
West strategically while securing port and energy access—with private contractors playing an increasingly
important role.
The Kremlin is now openly treating Libya as another focal point of its Middle East activities. After years of U.S.
neglect, the country has turned into a proxy war playground, and President Vladimir Putin is vying to become the
chief power broker. Earlier this month, he tried (but failed) to get Khalifa Haftar to sign a ceasefire agreement in
Moscow with Prime Minister Fayez al-Sarraj, head of the UN-recognized Government of National Accord (GNA).
Putin also participated in the January 19 Berlin conference aimed at getting the parties back on the path toward a
political solution. And though the prospects for such a deal remain uncertain, Moscow’s involvement in Libya will
continue either way.

Abstract:
To ensure that new protests, new sanctions, and new political leadership wind up helping rather than hindering
Iraqi sovereignty, Washington must handle upcoming developments with great care.
In the coming weeks, Iraq’s parliament may appoint a replacement for Prime Minister Adil Abdulmahdi. This is a
very positive development, since the country’s sundry Iranian-backed militias would like nothing better than to
keep the discredited leader under their thumb as an open-ended caretaker premier following his November
resignation. In contrast, a new leader with a new mandate could get the government moving again, pass a
budget, bring the criminals responsible for killing protestors to justice, and assuage angry protestors by making
visible preparations for early, free, and fair elections—thereby remedying the results of the widely disparaged
2018 vote.
Such is the political space that has opened up since the deaths of Iranian Qods Force commander Qasem
Soleimani and Iraqi militia chief Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis earlier this month. For the United States, the challenge is
how to support these changes without disrupting positive local dynamics.

Topic:
Foreign Policy, Politics, Sovereignty, Sanctions

Political Geography:
Iraq, Middle East, North America, United States of America

Abstract:
Fewer attacks and more prosecutions suggest the country’s integrated approach could eventually become a
model for the region.
For the first time since its 2011 revolution, Tunisia is not on the defensive in its battle with the Islamic State and al-
Qaeda. Data from 2019, paired with a more holistic approach to combating jihadists, bears out this claim.
Specifically, Tunis is expanding its toolkit beyond a purely military or law enforcement approach. Because of these
advances, which have developed over the past few years, Tunis and Washington will have widened opportunities
to engage on more complex aspects of reform that could make Tunisia a regional and global model. Both internal
and external challenges remain, such as from foreign fighters dwelling abroad, an overcrowded prison system,
and the threat of resurgent jihadism next door in Libya, but these need not diminish the accomplishments.
Moreover, Tunisia can now build on its achievements, continuing the process of reform after decades of
authoritarian rule.

Abstract:
The latest crackdown appears to have targeted senior defense and interior officials, spurring speculation that they
are linked to previously detained princes rumored to be plotting a coup.
On March 15, Saudi Arabia announced that 298 individuals have been arrested for bribery, embezzlement,
wasting public funds, and other corruption offenses. Although none of the detainees has been named, they
reportedly include high-ranking officers in the Defense and Interior Ministries, adding to rumors that recent royal
crackdowns may be related to a planned coup.

Abstract:
Total U.S. production from all sources will remain the world’s largest no matter how low prices go, leaving
Washington (and Texas) with considerable room to help domestic companies and press Riyadh and Moscow on
stabilizing prices.
Five years ago, U.S. shale production costs were so high that whenever oil prices dropped, the impact was felt first
and foremost by American producers. Many commentators and media sources assume that is still the case, but
the situation has changed dramatically. A recent IMF report with the dry title “The Future of Oil and Fiscal
Sustainability in the GCC Region” listed the “breakeven price” for various sources of crude. Naturally, Gulf oil had
the lowest cost at $18 per barrel, but the shocker was that U.S. shale came in second place at $22—50 percent
below the average deepwater project, 80 percent below Canadian oil sands, and 90 percent below Russian
onshore projects. Since costs vary widely, some projects presumably have a much lower breakeven price and
some much higher, but the general findings are nonetheless striking. If the IMF is correct, then U.S. production
should not be counted out, since the cost fundamentals are on its side.
To be sure, the current market structure is not on U.S. shale’s side. Small U.S. producers have to raise money on
financial markets and cannot rely on the deep government pockets available to producers in Russia and OPEC
states. As a result, many are staring at a very dire situation.

Abstract:
Recent efforts at settling the decades-long conflict in Afghanistan have featured an increasingly vibrant and visible display of women’s activism. Even with the support of the government and its international partners, Afghan women still face tremendous challenges to realizing their aspirations for a role in peacemaking. Based on extensive interviews throughout Afghanistan, this report attempts to better understand the changing public role of Afghan women today and their contributions to peacebuilding and ending violence.

Abstract:
A joint statement by the United States and North Korea in June 2018 declared that the two countries were committed to building “a lasting and stable peace regime on the Korean Peninsula.” Such a peace regime will ultimately require the engagement and cooperation of not just North Korea and the United States, but also South Korea, China, Russia, and Japan. This report outlines the perspectives and interests of each of these countries as well as the diplomatic, security, and economic components necessary for a comprehensive peace.

Topic:
Conflict Resolution, Security, Diplomacy, Economy, Peace

Political Geography:
Russia, Japan, China, Asia, South Korea, North Korea, Korean Peninsula, United States of America

Abstract:
The 2011 civil war in Syria attracted thousands of fighters from at least seventy countries to join the Islamic State. Al-Shabaab carried out large-scale attacks on civilian targets in Uganda and Kenya as retribution for the deployment of peacekeeping forces in Somalia. In this report, Martha Crenshaw considers the extent to which civil war and foreign military intervention function as a rationale for transnational terrorism, and how understanding the connections between terrorism, civil war, and weak governance can help the United States and its allies mount an appropriate response.

Abstract:
Current peace processes are designed to be more inclusive of women, civil society, youth, opposition political parties, and other frequently marginalized communities. Implementation of inclusive peace processes, however, has not progressed smoothly—and are frequently met with resistance. Based on an examination of instances of resistance in thirty peace and transition negotiations since 1990, this report enhances practitioners’ understanding of who resists, against whose participation, using what tactics, and with what motives.

Abstract:
Forced displacement affects over 70 million people worldwide and is among the most pressing humanitarian and development challenges today. This report attempts to ascertain whether a relationship exists between displacement in Afghanistan and vulnerability to recruitment to violence by militant organizations. The report leverages an understanding of this relationship to provide recommendations to government, international donors, and others working with Afghanistan’s displaced populations to formulate more effective policies and programs.

Abstract:
International trade is often framed in starkly divergent terms: either countries choose multilateral trade agreements (MTAs) and advance the cause of global economic liberalization, or they choose preferred trade agreements (PTAs) and put the entire system at risk. Canada has a long track record of pursuing PTAs and with the Trump administration’s opposition to multilateralism, and longstanding opposition in elements of the Republican and Democratic parties, this trend will likely continue. The question is whether progress will come at the expense of the global trade system.
Some economists believe PTAs to be trade-diverting, reducing trade with more efficient producers outside the agreement. Others insist that PTAs can create trade by shifting production to lower-cost producers in one of the participating countries. One prominent contrary argument holds that PTAs lead to discontinuities in tariff regimes between countries and regions, increasing transaction costs, disrupting supply chains, creating opportunities for corruption and harming global welfare, especially in developing nations.
While debate continues about the effects of PTAs, a closer examination suggests that worries are overblown about their negative impacts on global trade flows. Evidence indicates that they support rather than harm the international trading system. Countries shut out of PTAs are more motivated to seek out agreements in new markets, increasing liberalization overall. They may also seek a reduction in most-favoured nation (MFN) tariffs, which would deprive PTAs of their major tariff benefits. Studies have found complementarity between preferential and MFN tariffs, revealing that PTAs promote external trade liberalization. Even if a PTA reduces a given country’s incentive to push for multilateral liberalization, it raises the odds of that country liberalizing its trade to avoid getting left behind.
PTAs are a response to the difficulties of securing sweeping multilateral agreements. The World Trade Organization (WTO) Agreements authorize them under GATT Article XXIV, GATS Article V, and the enabling clause, and the WTO facilitates a degree of governance over PTAs through its dispute settlement process. Over the past 25 years, countries have adopted these deals at a rapid pace. Between 1994 and 2005, the number of PTAs increased from 50 to 200. By April 2018, 336 were in effect. At the same time, global trade has increased significantly. Between 1994 and 2010, the volume of world merchandise exports more than doubled. The proliferation of PTAs has resulted in a rise in international trade governance, because the countries involved shape their relationships in line with the WTO agreements. This juridification makes PTAs subordinate to the international system rather than giving them room to dissolve it. Canada should therefore have no fear of pursuing PTAs within the larger framework of the effort to achieve multilateral trade liberalization.

Abstract:
SESAME, which stands for Synchrotron-light for Experimental Science and Applications in the Middle East, is a large-scale techno-scientific project that was established under the auspices of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) and is set up according to the model of the European Organization for Nuclear Research (CERN) in Geneva. This multilateral endeavour, located in Jordan, brings together experts and researchers from the Mediterranean/Middle East, including from countries that do not have diplomatic relations (e.g. Israel and Iran, Cyprus and Turkey). It is conceived primarily as a project combining research capacity-building with vital peacebuilding efforts. In principle, these efforts may include the manifold technical and cooperative dimensions of anti-terrorist activities related to weapons of mass destruction (chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear, or CBRN), and also to disarmament and non-proliferation. The country where SESAME is located – Jordan – has been heavily involved in the fight against the so-called Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (IS).
This Policy Forum issue deals with the genesis of SESAME, and then describes its functioning, achievements, and potential benefits; the challenges it faces, especially funding; and its peacebuilding element. The SESAME project can be improved in concrete ways by meeting two peacebuilding-related criteria: firstly, by living up to its claim of being a contribution to rapprochement between the peoples of this conflict-torn region, whose security is affected by national rivalries or violent non-state actors; and, secondly, by providing inputs for the users’ community without adversely affecting that community’s predominant focus on research. This Policy Forum aims at acquainting especially young scientists with the technical and cooperative dimensions of SESAME’s CBRN-related counter-terrorist activities, as well as its disarmament and non-proliferation measures. Such scientists can make use particularly of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) programmes and of the nearby Amman-based academic and educational infrastructure.

Abstract:
This policy paper sets out the various interests and goals of global powers (the US,
Russia, China and the EU) in the Mediterranean, and the measures they are
undertaking to implement them. The document also describes Israeli policies vis-àvis the powers’ activities in this region, and points to the principles that should
guide them. The paper is based on a July 2019 meeting in Jerusalem of the research
and policy working group on Israel in the Mediterranean, held at the initiative of the
Mitvim Institute, the Hebrew University’s Leonard Davis Institute for International
Relations and Haifa University’s National Security Studies Center.

Topic:
International Relations, Security, Foreign Policy

Political Geography:
Russia, China, Middle East, Israel, United States of America, Mediterranean

Abstract:
The Canadian government allocates funds to departments through the annual federal budgetary process. With a Department of National Defence (DND) budget in the fiscal year 2019-20 of close to $22 billion,2 and expenditures spread out across a broad range of very different and distinct activities, expending the full allocation can be a significant challenge. While federal departments are permitted some carry-forward of eligible lapsing funds from one fiscal year to the next, in fiscal year 2018-19 the amount designated was up to five per cent of the operating budgets in their Main Estimates.3 With the federal government projecting significant budgetary deficits in the coming years, restricting or eliminating carry-forward of funding may be limited or eliminated to reduce deficits. Past practice within the department has been for the Investment Resource Management Committee (IRMC), chaired by the deputy minister, to decide on funding allocations of the carry-forward, based on departmental corporate priorities. While from an institutional perspective that aligns funding with optimal funding requirements, the consequence to organizations such as the Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF) is that only a limited amount of lapsed funding may be allocated the following fiscal year. Thus, the air force has a significant incentive regarding its budget: to “use it or lose it”.4
RCAF corporate over-planning (COP) is a principal in-year strategy to maximize the use of allocated financial resources. Yet, at the operational and tactical level, the concept and application of in-year over-planning is not sufficiently understood. This paper will frame over-planning within the context of the RCAF and then recommend strategies to integrate over-planning into the air force culture. Corporate over-planning is essentially a means toward an end; specifically, that of maximizing output given by defined resource allocation. The paper will first consider defence planning approaches and budget allocations, and then consider the strategic environment within which the organization operates. The third section will emphasize the need for change in how the RCAF manages financial resources, followed by a section on adapting to change. The fifth section will review the concept of over-planning. That will be followed by a discussion of RCAF institutional corporate over-planning. The seventh section will consider budgeting as communication and how this supports maintenance of a common operating picture within the RCAF on over-planning. The final section will focus on RCAF corporate over-planning by discussing the structural unexpended rate, applying an absorption rate in operations and maintenance activities, and planning investment opportunities.

Abstract:
After three years of limited discussion, the leaders of France, Germany, Russia and Ukraine renewed their peace talks to resolve the separatist conflict in Eastern Ukraine (Donbas). Efforts to facilitate a peaceful resolution to the conflict in the Donbas began five years ago with the meeting of the Trilateral Contact Group on Ukraine. This framework, developed by the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), attempted to facilitate a dialogue between Russia and Ukraine through the mediation of an impartial actor, and it culminated in the Minsk I (September 2014) and then Minsk II (February 2015) agreements. The Minsk II agreements comprised a 13-point peace plan, chief among which is an arrangement specifying support for the restoration of the Ukrainian-Russian border. While the implementation of the military portions of the Minsk II agreements were finalized within three months of signing, the political and security portions remained unresolved. Though President Vladimir Putin has declared his intent to protect the Russian-speaking peoples of the region, he has also stated he has no interest in reclaiming Eastern Ukraine. Not surprisingly, since Russia’s ultimate goal is undeclared, the conflict has proved very difficult to resolve.

Abstract:
An internationalist and a progressive, Justin Trudeau consistently boosts diversity, social justice, environmentalism and reconciliation with Indigenous peoples. A gifted retail politician, Trudeau prefers campaigning and contact with voters to the hurly-burly of the House of Commons. He possesses an empathy and emotional intelligence most people found lacking in his famous father, Pierre Trudeau. But are these attributes and causes out of sync with our turbulent times?
Mr. Trudeau is learning firsthand what British prime minister Harold MacMillan warned U.S. president John F. Kennedy what was most likely to blow governments off-course: “Events, dear boy, events.”
As Trudeau begins a second term as prime minister, the going is tougher. The Teflon is gone. He leads a minority government with new strains on national unity. Parliament, including his experiment in Senate reform, is going to require more of his time. Canada’s premiers will also need attention if he is to achieve progress on his domestic agenda. Does he have the patience and temperament for compromise and the art of the possible?
The global operating system is increasingly malign, with both the rules-based international order and freer trade breaking down. Managing relations with Donald Trump and Xi Jinping is difficult. Canadian farmers and business are suffering - collateral damage in the Sino-U.S. disputes.
In what was supposed to be a celebration of “Canada is back”, there is doubt that Canada will win a seat on the UN Security Council in June 2020. Losing would be traumatic for his government and their sense of Canada’s place in the world. It would also be a rude shock for Canadians’ self-image of themselves internationally.

Abstract:
Defence procurement in Canada has had some well-known challenges in recent years. Many commentators have suggested possible strategies for fixing the defence procurement system. The identified problems include overspending on defence programs, unnecessary and undue delays in re-equipping Canada’s fleet of aircraft, ships and ground transport, and defence budgets that remain unspent. The problems also include procuring authorities experiencing a shortfall in manpower and expertise, the inability to execute on defence procurements, unjustified sole-sourcing without a proper competition, political interference in selection issues, and the list goes on. The proposed solutions often address process-related matters: establish a single agency responsible for defence procurement or perhaps a cabinet secretariat to manage the involvement of three of four government departments who are often not on the same page.
To date, not much has been written or discussed in public policy forums on a critical question: How should the necessary capital assets be financed? At one extreme, Canada could simply write a cheque and pay for them up front, thereby placing the assets on Canada’s balance sheet. At the other extreme, Canada could drop the financing obligation into the laps of private-sector bidders and let them worry about the most efficient way of raising the necessary capital. A middle-ground solution could involve a public-private partnership (P3) structure, a model which seeks to balance the interests of the public and private sectors in a manner that leads to a better solution for all parties.
Any public policy discussion often begins with first principles. What is the government’s policy objective? It is to procure the best available equipment, with the most benefit to the Canadian economy or local interest groups and at the lowest possible cost. All three goals must be balanced in a manner that is politically acceptable, meets budget constraints and withstands public scrutiny. In major procurements, capital can be the largest single cost of a defence procurement.

Abstract:
Canada’s experience with the Phoenix pay system is not just a pay problem. It points to wider problems in Canada’s management of complex major projects. Learning from Phoenix is important for the Government of Canada as a whole and the Department of National Defence specifically, the latter arguably responsible for the largest portfolio of complex projects – both for weapon systems platform and information technology initiatives.
Fortunately, it appears that the Liberal government has taken notice. In the most recent Mandate Letters to Ministers, the Treasury Board President has been directed to ‘improve project management capabilities so that all major projects in government are led by a certified professional with at least five years of experience’. Additionally, the new position of Minister of Digital Government was tasked to ‘lead work to create a centre of expertise that brings together the necessary skills to effectively implement major transformation projects across government, including technical, procurement and legal expertise’ (and to lead in the replacement of the replacement pay system).
This paper attempts to shed some light on the matter of pursuing complex projects and the enormity of the task at hand. I say “enormity” because complex projects are difficult to deliver at all (let alone on time and budget), as in evidence by the number that continue to fail in the private and public sectors, regardless of the complex project capabilities of those responsible for delivering them.

Abstract:
On Feb. 11, 2016, Prime Minister Justin Trudeau briefed the Ottawa press corps after a meeting with the United Nations (UN) secretary-general, Ban Ki-moon. Having pledged during the 2015 election campaign to re-engage with the UN, he noted that doing so would include “looking towards a bid for the Security Council.”
Perhaps this comment should not have surprised. The Conservative government’s failure to win a Security Council (UNSC) seat in 2010 had been a subject of Liberal ridicule for years. Yet, council membership was not included among the Liberals’ 167 campaign promises, nor was it mentioned specifically in then-Foreign Affairs minister Stéphane Dion’s mandate letter.
One month later, Trudeau met with Ban again, this time in New York. Afterwards, with Dion looking on, Trudeau announced that Canada would be joining the 2020 Western European and Others Group (WEOG) election for one of two non-permanent seats on the Security Council in 2021-2022. The move was unprecedented. It marked the first time that a Canadian prime minister, and not the Foreign Affairs minister or a member of the foreign service, had publicly declared Canada’s initial interest in a council seat. It was also the first time that Canada had deliberately entered an already contested election: Ireland, Norway and San Marino would be its opponents for two WEOG seats. This brief history of Canadian interest in Security Council membership will suggest that attempting to return to the UNSC was the right decision, made at the wrong time, and for the wrong reasons.

Abstract:
On 14 January 2020 the United States, the European Union, and Japan (hereinafter referred to as “US-EU-Japan”) issued a trilateral joint statement, proposing a set of new rules to strengthen WTO regulation on industrial subsidies. While a total of seven joint announcements have been made so far, this is the first time that three WTO Members have presented specific ideas on how to amend existing subsidy rules. Many of the proposed amendments seem to primarily target China’s trade policy and practices.
Among the six amendment items proposed in the Joint Statement, it seems that the United States is paying particular attention to the sixth item, i.e. in making explicit the possibility of using the out-of-country benchmark and on introducing necessary requirements to do so in measuring the benefit conferred and, ultimately, in calculating the amount of the countervailing duties (CVDs).
Against this backdrop, in this Brief the author analyzes the relevant WTO provisions and GATT/WTO jurisprudence, and discusses various scenarios on future negotiations on WTO Reform on industrial subsidies.

Abstract:
The Agreement on Trade in Services and the Agreement on Investment between Korea and Turkey came into effect in August 2018. This article focuses on the construction sector and the cultural contents sector to seek possible cooperative measures between the two countries.

Abstract:
The shutdown of the GM Koreas Gunsan plant in May 2018 heightened social interest in the withdrawal of mutlinational corporations (MNCs). Against this backdrop, the forthcoming research The economic effects of multinational corporation withdrawal and policy responses studies the previous cases of MNC withdrawal, estimates the effects on labor market., and provides policy directions to address to the withdrawal. This note summarizes some of its important results.

Abstract:
This study examines changes in trade-related legal systems in North Korea and ac-tual trade transactions, and analyzes them in accordance with international standards (the WTO regulatory framework). Through this process, we will draw up measures to im-prove North Koreas trade system to open up the external economy as well as signing of a Comprehensive Economic Partnership Ar-rangement (CEPA). The results of this study will contribute to understanding the main characteristics of trade-related laws and sys-tems within North Korea and suggest promis-ing directions for their improvement.

Abstract:
The Korean government has been pursuing a New Southern Policy (NSP) focusing on the “3P” areas of cooperation ‒ People, Prosperity, and Peace. The NSP puts people at a center of policy, and emphasizes the enhancement of cultural conversation and people-to-people exchange between Korea and ASEAN. The majority of services trade, an area with a low level of cooperation between Korea and ASEAN, is inherently based on the exchange of people. Promoting services trade flows between Korea and ASEAN could contribute to achieving the vision of a People-centered community in the region. Also, when taking into account the fact that services are integral to the working of GVC, the government should pursue policies to promote services trade and to enhance cooperation with ASEAN in the services sector. To this end, we aim to identify the current status of service trade and service trade barriers between ASEAN and Korea. This report briefly covers ASEAN’s trade in services and the restrictiveness of service trade regulations in ASEAN, and then suggests policy recommendations based on the results.

Abstract:
We attempt to characterize a data- and AI-driven economy and establish a general equilibrium growth model in order to describe the data economy and examine how data and AI can affect the economy in the long run.
To sum up, this article provides three policy implications. First, the authority should have a balanced view between privacy protection and data usage in economy-wide technology in terms of long-run growth. Privacy should not be considered only as utility loss, but must be considered as a contributor to loss in growth rates. Second, economic growth can be achieved by using higher amounts of data as well as continuous development in AI technology. A caveat is that AI-technology can boost economic growth only when it applies to all industries as general purpose technology. Lastly, the authorities should keep considering how to deal with new issues that include data ownership, outlaw data sharing, data market, AI bias, and so forth. Our model can be used as a starting point to such examinations.