With respect to the China representation issue at the United Nations, the
Secretary recommended the “important question” device as the best tactic to use since it offered
us a reasonable chance of getting a clear, blocking one-third. In
response to the President's question whether Ambassador Stevenson thought this tactic would get
us more votes than the moratorium, the Secretary said that Ambassador
Stevenson thought that it
would. He said that any “two Chinas” proposal was unacceptable to the
GRC.

The President asked about the usefulness of the Swedish proposal for a
commission to study the problem and report back to the 17th United
Nations General Assembly.

Mr. Cleveland said that the GRC was allergic to the Swedish proposal
because of its fears about the composition of the commission.

The Secretary thought GRC fears were well
founded as the Commission would likely recommend some sort of two Chinas
solution.

The President asked that some variant of the Swedish proposal, acceptable
to the GRC, be devised. He said that to
use only the “important question” device would be too transparent a
blocking measure. It was important, he declared, to formulate a more
attractive proposal, apparently moving towards a final solution of the
China representation issue. Nigeria and certain other countries would be
willing to support us on the China representation issue if we presented
a proposal offering suitable rationale.

Mr. Rusk said that, in view of
United States interest and the damage to the United Nations that might
result, the China representation issue was, on its merits, an important
question.

The Secretary said that there are governments who recognize Peiping but
do not want Peiping in the United Nations. They would vote against
United Nations membership for Peiping if they had a justification to use
vis-a-vis Peiping. He thought that the proposal for a commission to
study the China representation issue might be more attractive to such
countries if the commission were also to look into the problem of the
allocation of United Nations seats, not just the problem of the China
seat. No one, however, he said, would be fooled by whatever device we
used.

In reply to the President's question as to what Ambassador Stevenson and his USUN colleagues
thought about the various proposals, Mr. Cleveland said that they seemed to prefer the “successor
state” formula. The President was concerned to have Ambassador Stevenson's agreement on the proposal
to be used as he would have to carry the fight in the United
Nations.

Mr. Cleveland said that there was
also the timing problem; other countries want to know what we will do
before they will decide their position. In response to the President's
query when the United States proposal should be floated, the Secretary
said that it should be deferred until after the talks with Premier
Ch'en.

The President said that, as the moratorium was impossible, to fight for
it would be the ultimate futility. What we must work on now is the
“important question” and what to add to it in order to win.

We must also convince the GRC the United
States and GRC have a common objective:
to keep the Chinese Communists out of the United Nations. We want to
give away as little as possible of the GRC position in order to attain our common purpose. The
GRC must recognize that there is
good faith on both sides and that there is no ambiguity in the United
States position. If we were defeated on the China representation issue,
it would be almost as bad for the United States as the GRC. Some friendly countries like Nigeria,
Pakistan and Great Britain say they can't vote with us, and Japan says
we can't win. But we can't allow ourselves to be beaten; we must do what
we have to in order to win. The GRC will
be asked to give up as little as is essential to winning.

With respect to Outer Mongolia's United Nations membership application,
the President said the GRC must not veto
the application. He also indicated that United States recognition of
Outer Mongolia should be put aside in the interests of victory on the
China representation issue.

The Secretary said that we did not want to organize abstentions to defeat
the Outer Mongolian membership application although we and the GRC would abstain. There was the
possibility that, in addition to Mauritania, Kuwait and Sierra Leone
might also be involved. In any case, if Mauritania was kept out of the
United Nations, we would infuriate the Africans and our goose would be
cooked.

*Source:
Kennedy Library, National
Security Files, Countries Series, China. Secret. Drafted by Rinden
and approved in S on August 8 and by the White House on August 10.
According to Kennedy's
Appointment Book, other participants were present for part of the
discussion, which included Southeast Asia as well as preparations
for Ch'en Ch'eng's visit.
(Kennedy Library)