Belarus Needs CSTO, CSTO needs Belarus

Six out of seven member states attended an unofficial summit meeting of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) in Astana, Kazakhstan, on August 12-13. Isolated from the West and in the midst of an economic crisis, Belarus was one...

Six out of seven member states attended an unofficial summit meeting of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) in Astana, Kazakhstan, on August 12-13. Isolated from the West and in the midst of an economic crisis, Belarus was one of the most enthusiastic summit participants. CSTO chair this year, Belarusian president used the floor as to draw attention to his immediate concerns: social unrest and the power of internet.

While other CSTO members were also concerned about violence in Afghanistan and US troop withdrawal plans, Alyaksandr Lukashenka brought the situation in North Africa and the Middle East into focus. Even though Tunis, Libya, Syria, Bahrain, Egypt and Yemen are far from Belarus and far beyond the CSTO immediate sphere of interests, the protests in those countries hit close to home, and he stressed that an adequate CSTO response to anti-government protests is necessary.

The Belarusian leader believes social inequality, corruption, and political conflicts rather than political repression and authoritarianism as the primary sources of protests. The Belarusian side also thinks that outside tinkering has played a role. Drawing lessons from the protesters’ use of internet and social networks (the case even in Belarus) Lukashenka called on CSTO members to strengthen their capabilities in cyber warfare and internet surveillance.

Today Lukashenka seems the most enthusiastic CSTO advocate. He is actively campaigning for increasing in the role of the CSTO and strengthening the Collective Rapid Response Forces. CSTO is the only military block in which the isolated Belarus takes part, and as a result the country takes its responsibilities with utmost seriousness. As Lukashenka noted, Belarus “does not have a single CSTO document that is still not ratified”.

In contrast to Uzbekistan, whose President Islam Karimov didn’t attend the summit as he was busy flirting with NATO and disappointed with CSTO, Belarus not only played a leadership role at the summit, but has devoted the front pages of its official newspapers and web sites to the meeting. Gone are the times when Minsk would take liberties and boycott CSTO meetings (as happened in 2009 after Russia's ban on Belarus’ dairy products). Today CSTO is the only forum where Belarus is still welcome.

The organization’s focus is on Central Asia, but Belarus fits right in, at least as far as the regimes of member states are concerned: in 2011 out of the seven CSTO members only Kyrgyzstan and Armenia were classified as “partly free” while the rest were considered “not free” by the Freedom House. All of CSTO members are also leaning toward Russia; not surprisingly, some Western analysts suggest CSTO could become an anti-NATO alliance.

Convenient for Belarus, CSTO has a right to offer expedient aid to member states, which includes sending “peacekeepers” to member-states territories in cases of anti-governmental protests. It can only do so when officially asked for help, which takes care of the situations in which such “help” could be unwelcome. Belarus’ position on such interventions became clear last year when Lukashenka appealed for intervention in Kyrgyzstan to restore Kurmanbek Bakiyev to power.

Interestingly, among the priorities proposed by Belarus at the nonofficial summit was creating a legal framework for drafting a list of personae non gratae on the territories of CSTO countries. Denying visas to US and EU officials as well as international human rights advocates on a unilateral basis is clearly not enough for Belarus.

Belarus’ activism in CSTO is also useful for Russia. Busy taking to the West and preparing for presidential elections, Moscow can safely leave CSTO diplomacy to beleaguered Minsk and avoid potential accusations of imperialism.

Can Belarus Retaliate Against New US Sanctions?

U.S. Embassy in Minsk

Today the U.S. Department of the Treasury sanctioned four Belarusian enterprises of Belneftekhim Concern, Belarus’ largest petrochemical conglomerate. Sanctions hit some of thee most profitable state-owned companies in Belarus – OAO Naftan, OAO Grodno Azot, JSC Grodno Khimvolokno and OAO Belshina. The U.S. government froze all assets of these companies within its reach and prohibited U.S. persons from engaging in commercial or financial transactions with them.

Ironically, today Belarusian President pardoned nine participants of December protests against falsification of presidential elections. Names of those pardoned have not been released yet and it is unclear whether some of the former presidential candidates will be released. According to Belarusian official press, they wrote personal requests to President Lukashenka asking to pardon them.

Although most of the sanctioned companies do little business in the United States, losses to the already struggling Belarusian economy may be significant. Belshina is one of Europe’s largest tire manufacturers. Naftan is a subsidiary of Belneftekhim Concern that produces petroleum products. Also a subsidiary of Belneftekhim Concern, Grodno Azot and Grodno Khimvolokno are Belarus' largest petrochemical plants manufacturing fertilizers, fibers and consumer goods. Belarus Government will have to privatize some of its most lucrative enterprises because of the ecoomic crises. Being on the U.S. sanctions list will certainly make these companies less attractive to investors.

Since 2007 the United States targeted several companies affiliated with Belneftekhim for being owned or controlled by Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenka. The U.S. sanctions against undermining democratic processes, human rights abuses and political oppression in the country. Today the State Department reiterated its call on the official Minsk to release immediately and unconditionally all political prisoners.

Proponents of sanctions argue that they are the only language which the official Minsk understands. Unlike Europe, the United States has almost no economic interests in Belarus and can afford wide-scale sanctions. Earlier this year Europe also introduced economic sanctions against but they stopped short of any serious measures. Europe depends on oil and gas transits though Belarus. More importantly, it is difficult for all EU member states to reach consensus on how to deal with Belarus. It appears that in the United States both Democrats and Republicans are committed to follow the same tough policy towards Belarus.

What can do Minsk in response to the new US sanctions? In 2007, following the introduction of the US sanctions, most of the US Embassy staff had been expelled from Belarus. This time, Belarusian authorities will look for ways to retaliate again but they may be too weak to escalate the conflict. The country is in the midst of the worst economic crises since the collapse of the Soviet Union and is eagerly looking for financial aid. Perhaps the only move which the official Minsk could do would be to expel the remaining U.S. diplomats from Minsk.

However, this will not inflict any serious damage to the U.S. interests in the region and will shut down opportunities for direct communication with the world's only remaining superpower. Belarusian authorities still hope to obtain a loan from the International Monetary Fund, which the United States can easily block.

Official Minsk may also further strengthen repressions against political opponents to demonstrate that they are undeterred by the new sanctions. Under this scenario, Belarus may lose more than gain. This will make the prospect of normalization of relations with the West even more remote. However, when balancing the prospects of losing power and normalizing relations with the West, Belarusian authorities may opt for political survival and more dependence upon Russia.

When Belarusian authorities intensify human rights violations and the West imposes sanctions in response Belarus' dependence upon Moscow increases even more. Moscow comes out as the only geopolitical winner for the time being.

Regardless of possible long-term efficiency of sanctions, the West should not overlook a more important task of supporting civil society in Belarus. Weakening the Belarusian regime is easier but not necessarily more effective than strengthening a real alternative to it.