After a post Vietnam period of intense analysis, discussion, and debate, the Army changed
the operations doctrine as expressed in FM 100-5. Among the reasons for the Army's shift in
operational emphasis were the rapid technological changes in weapon firepower and mobility as well as a growing
disparity between the strength of allied and Soviet bloc conventional forces. The original
doctrinal revisions, first published in 1976, were revised again in 1982. Because the 1976
version was a radical change from previous operations doctrine, it remained the subject of
intense debate within and outside the Army. In fact, the 1982 revision represented a departure
from the 1976 version in several major aspects. However, all doctrine is dynamic and the 1982
version is not yet final as current discussion and debate prove. FM 100-5 is the capstone Army
manual and directly or indirectly affects every aspect of Army force structure and operations.

The doctrine stated that the Army might face two different
combat environments in the future. The first was a "sophisticated battlefield
with an existing infrastructure of communications, air defense, logistics
facilities, and ports," such as found in a European type of theater of
operations. The other would be an arena where the Army would either have "to
create an infrastructure or . . . fight without one," for example in Southwest
Asia or sub-Saharan Africa. The opponents could range from well-armed insurgents
or terrorists to mechanized and armored
units with the most advanced weaponry. Army doctrine also warned that future
conflict would likely be intense, expensive, and very lethal; the use of nuclear
and chemical weapons was not ruled out.

FM 100-5 postulated that the Army faced four challenges:

1. A battlefield of non-linear maneuver will replace the
traditional battlefield of clearly
demarcated front lines. This means that the Army must conduct deep strikes
against the enemy while it is engaged simultaneously in rear area combat.
The Army must conduct command and control countermeasures,
operate on low levels of logistical support, survive

[7]

against highly lethal weapons systems, perhaps fight outnumbered,
and perhaps under the threat of use of nuclear or chemical weapons. These new
demands of the modern battlefield clearly
required a reexamination of Army doctrine.
2. The new demands of combat impose higher standards on
leaders. Leadership and unit cohesion will play vital roles in motivating troops
to fight resolutely even though they may find themselves temporarily encircled
or outnumbered. The highly fluid battlefield requires commanders at all levels
to display "skill, imagination, and flexibility" to the fullest extent possible.
3. Personnel and unit readiness is a necessity since future
conflicts will offer little time for
leisurely deployment. Such readiness, however, is of little value "without
logistical readiness-the availability and
proper functioning of materiel, resources, and systems to maintain and sustain
operations on a fluid, destructive, and resource-hungry battlefield."
4. Therefore, the fourth challenge, training, ties all of the
above factors together. For if the officers and men are not professionally and
mentally prepared for battle, then the battle is lost. However, training is
envisioned as more than individual preparation. It includes the training of
units both individually and in combined arms exercises.

Army doctrine defined maneuver and firepower as "inseparable
and complementary elements of combat." Although one element
may be emphasized more than the other, depending on the combat solution, "the
coordinated use of both characterizes all operations."
Today, fire support units must be as maneuverable as the combat units they
support.

Since the Army doctrine was the blueprint for future combat
operations, four major areas of Army
planning were directly interrelated:
force development, sustainment, mobilization, and training. All are
intrinsically related although treated separately in this chapter.

Army planners and programmers used the five-volume Force
Modernization Master Plan (FMMP, DA Pam 5-26) as a roadmap for the modernization
of systems and operations during the 1980s and 1990s. This will guide Army
staffers in improving and easing the transition of Army forces into the Army of
Excellence configuration. The Deputy
Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans pub-

[8]

lished the latest FMMP on 1 August 1984, which included the
planned transition of units for the coming decades.

After determining the ideal size of the Division 86 force structure, Army planners discovered that although each component's raison d'etre was sound, resources were inadequate to support the proposed force structure. A change in Army leadership also brought a new appreciation of the potential of light forces and an accompanying call for more light infantry divisions. Nevertheless, the Army could organize no new divisions, either heavy or light, if the existing Division 86 structure lacked resources. Therefore, Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA), tasked the Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) to study the problem and design a new combat-effective, responsive, and balanced total force within the guidelines of current Army resources. TRADOC, however, received several limitations for the study from HQDA. These included keeping the force structure within programmed Army end strength of 780,800 personnel; determining whether the Army could be manned at Authorized Level of Organization (ALO) 2; designing a light division structure capable of fighting a low intensity conflict; reducing the resources of heavy divisions; and moving division assets to corps level. Several issues discussed at the Army Commander's Conference in August 1983 were also included as restrictions: to simplify units' missions, to increase deployment ability, and to enhance some units' ALO structure. The resulting TRADOC study, "Army of Excellence (AOE)," proposed a force structure that met HQDA's guidance, which was gradually being implemented. The Army's 17th and 18th Infantry Divisions will be activated in 1985 with two active light infantry brigades and one reserve component light infantry brigade. Following that, the 7th Infantry Division and 25th Infantry Division will be reconfigured as new light infantry divisions. Furthermore, the Army will reactivate the 29th Infantry Division, an Army National Guard unit, in the same light structure. The Army reduced simultaneously the assets of the heavy division to ten maneuver battalions. All units considered better employed elsewhere were assigned to Echelons Above Division (EAD). Work also progressed on providing the light infantry division with additional corps augmentation and support units.

Certain analysts considered the Army of Excellence to be
inappropriate for an Army in the middle
of a massive modernization program. They questioned the rationale for the new
light infantry division as well as the change in Division 86 configuration and
movement of assets to EAD level on a reduced scale. Although many planners
considered

[9]

these moves doctrinally acceptable, critics wondered if the
changes, in effect, traded combat effectiveness for an expanded structure.

The reorganization of the 82d Airborne and 101st Airborne
(Air Assault) Divisions emphasized their combat capability and streamlined
their structures. The new light infantry division design proposed
under the AOE study was modified to meet the divisions' special
requirements. The changes in force structure also had to incorporate the
improved modern equipment being introduced to the force to support the AirLand
Battle doctrine. Other improvements
included better strategic and local mobility, additional communications
equipment, additional antitank firepower, and a lower leader-to-led ratio. As
with the heavy divisions, the Army assigned corps-level units to support the
divisions. These support units included a
parachute rigging unit, a light armored battalion, and several
truck companies. Upon conversion to the new force structure each streamlined
division will have 20 percent fewer troops. The 101st will convert during FY 86
and the 82d the following year.

TRADOC also studied the Echelons Above Corps (EAC) structure
and doctrine as did the Combined Arms Center at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. One
of the products was FC 100-16-1 Theater Army, Army Group, and Field Army
Operations, a circular which, with FM 100-16, discussed combat support and
combat service support operations and doctrine at the EAC level. The relevant
parts of both manuals were being combined into a revised FM 100-16 at the end of
FY 84. The Combined Arms Center reviewed EAC force structure with respect to
recent changes in Army doctrine as
expressed in the AOE study. The center's analysts expected this study to
continue through 1985 and planned to match the EAC force structure to the
current doctrine.

The 9th Infantry Division High Technology Test Bed at Fort
Lewis, Washington, was redesignated the Army Development and Employment Agency (ADEA)
and kept the same mission of quickly identifying, testing, and recommending to
the Department of the Army operational concepts, doctrine, organization,
materiel requirements, technology, and
training developments, which improve the light infantry division's combat power,
development capability, mobilization ability, and sustainment. The 9th Infantry
Division will remain as the High Technology Light Division. This term itself was
changed to High Technology Motorized Division to differentiate it from the new
design light infantry division and to focus on the different
equipment and operational doctrine of a motorized division.

The motorized division was organized to fulfill requirements
not met by heavy, airborne, air assault, or light divisions. Thus, the mo-

[10]

torized division has the strategic mobility of an air assault
division and the ground antiarmor capability of a heavy division. Although
organized to engage in mid- to high-intensity conflicts with Soviet type
opposition, the 9th Infantry Division also remained available for deployment
worldwide, not only to areas where its superior ground tactical mobility was
best employed. The Army might assign the 9th to a corps or joint task force
where it would fight in conjunction with
other types of divisions. The 9th's force structure configuration
was designed to expand lodgments made by other units.

The structure of the 9th Infantry Division, however, centered
around several essential weapon systems, such as the fast attack vehicle
(FAV) and armored gun system (AGS). Currently, these items remain below
authorized levels. Nonetheless, the division was combat
ready in its existing force structure configuration for immediate
deployment. It will operate under this new design in FY 87 and will be converted
completely to a motorized division in FY 92 with full operational capability
soon thereafter.

Besides its role as a motorized division in the Army's force
structure, the 9th Infantry Division will
retain its test bed role to examine and to test new concepts and technological
advances for the Army. The results should indicate which ideas and technologies
will be of use to other Army units. Another of the Army's goals with the motorized
infantry division was to reduce division personnel to roughly 13,400 by FY90,
keeping within DOD manpower guidelines.

The Army continued to increase the role of National Guard and
Army Reserve components in the Total Army concept. The Army provided these
forces additional units, appropriations, modern equipment, and more responsible
missions. Furthermore, Army staffers monitored closely the reserve components to
create a well-balanced and equipped force.
This resulting mixture was not a permanent
figure or fixed percentage but fluctuated with the Army's perception of its
doctrine, missions, and costs. Thus, DOD planners expected that the Selected
Reserve strength will be higher than that of the Active Army by 1988. However,
for such forces to be valuable they must be properly equipped. Consequently, the
Army expended tight budget dollars to provide new equipment for the reserve
units. The Army also added one new National Guard division (35th Infantry
Division) in FY 84 and expected to add another in FY 85. These were the first
additional National Guard divisions in forty years. The Army will augment the
Army Reserve with 165 new units over the next five years. The Army also retained
the current reserve component percentages of Total Army strength in combat
support and combat service support (approximately 67 percent), division

AirLand Battle doctrine, as the name implies, involves air
assets. Thus the Army and Air Force having agreed already in 1983 that FM 100-5 would be used for joint tactical
training and field exercises, expanded the manual's role in joint planning of
future force development and operational concepts. Both air and ground arms
agreed that it was important to use combined air and ground power in a
complementary manner to support the theater commander's
objectives.

On 22 May 1984, Army Chief of Staff General John A. Wickham,
Jr., and Air Force Chief of Staff General Charles A. Gabriel signed a Memorandum
of Agreement identifying thirty-one initiatives for development
by the Army and Air Force. Titled the "U.S. Army-U.S. Air Force Joint Force
Development Process (JFDP)," it was commonly
referred to as "The 31 Initiatives." (See Appendix A.) In this agreement,
the chiefs perceived the thirty-one initiatives as the initial
step in a long-term, dynamic process to institutionalize jointness.

These thirty-one initiatives had a far-reaching impact by
consolidating and eliminating programs as
well as clarifying roles and missions.
The initiatives deleted several programs, such as the Air Force Comfy Challenge
electronic combat system. The Army Mohawk Joint Surveillance and Target Attack
Radar System was incorporated into the Air Force C-18 system. A study was
mandated of potential modifications of traditional roles and missions, including
the Army's assuming rotary wing lift support for special operations forces and
the Air Force's undertaking responsibility for area surface-to-air missile
defense. The initiatives required greater joint war-fighting concepts
and capabilities. These included an assessment of how to counter jointly the
heliborne assault threat and tactical missile systems
as well as how to improve identification-friend-or-foe systems. Moreover, the
initiatives looked at long-term requirements and concepts
coordination in new aircraft starts, tactical reconnaissance systems,
and intratheater airlift. The thirty-first initiative, the Program Objective
Memorandum (POM) priority list, was the most crucial, since it attempted to make
the JFDP permanent by formalizing cross-service participation in the POM
development process. All of the initiatives required the service staffs and
unified, specified, and major commands to coordinate in new areas that,
ultimately, would provide the necessary catalyst to institutionalize jointness.

To infuse jointness throughout the two services, Generals
Wickham and Gabriel directed the Army DCSOPS and the Air

[12]

Force DCSOPS to implement the agreement. As a result, they
disbanded the original study group and in
June 1984, created a permanent office,
the joint Assessment and Initiatives Office, to assume
the study group's responsibilities and tasked the service proponents to
participate.

While FM 100-5 was being reviewed as current doctrine, TRADOC
was working on its successor, Army 21, which forecast the years 2000-2015 and
the AirLand Battle concept in the twenty-first century. TRADOC examined
future concepts to prepare, through doctrinal development,
forces design, and resource planning, for the future Army and its combat role.
Army 21, an evolutionary concept, will cover areas not previously emphasized.
The Army fully expects that technological advances will alter the shape of Army
21.

The Army force structure established light divisions to
counter low-intensity threats to United States interests. These divisions were
to be highly mobile strategically and were to have more than one-third of
personnel in combat arms specialties. Army planners envisioned using light
divisions to secure airheads for follow-on heavier units as well as for
operations in restricted terrain during high-intensity conflicts.

The present commitment was to convert or to activate five
light infantry divisions by FY 89; the timetable was:

1. 7th-Fort Ord. Complete conversion in FY 85.
2. 25th-Hawaii. Begin and complete conversion in FY 86.
3. 10th Mountain Division-Fort Drum. Activate over period of
FY 85-89 with part of one brigade and its support temporarily at Fort Benning.
4. 6th-Alaska. Activate from FY 86-87.
5. 29th-ARNG, Maryland and Virginia. Activate from FY 86-87.

The 10th Mountain Division represented the only new activation.
The Army will create other light divisions from existing units, except for the
6th, which will incorporate the 172d Infantry Brigade.

Since 1981 and the continuing spiral of terrorism, the
Special Operations Forces (SOF) of the United States have received increased
attention and support from the President and Congress. As a demonstration of
increased legislative interest, the Readiness Subcommittee of the House Armed
Services Committee established a new
panel to oversee improvements in Special Operations Forces. Furthermore, the
Army implemented the 1984 SOF Master Plan during the year. The plan reviewed
force structure requirements and assets,
then recommended ways to correct deficiencies during the years 1986-1990.

[13]

The Chiefs of Staff of the Army and Air Force agreed that all SOF rotary wing support would be provided from Army assets. An Army Air Force Working Group was laying the groundwork for the transfer of Air Force rotary wing assets to the Army at the end of FY84. However, the Deputy Secretary of Defense had not given final approval to implement the decision and the House Armed Services Readiness Subcommittee opposed this decision based upon testimony and information provided to the special SOF panel.

A fourth active component special forces group was activated
in September 1984. Other activations included a Ranger regimental
headquarters, 75th Infantry Regiment (Ranger, on 1 July 1984 and the 3d Ranger
Battalion on 1 October 1984) . Furthermore, the Army planned to activate Special
Operations Communications Support Elements (SOCSE) in FY 86 and to increase
their strength in FY 88. These SOCSE's provided additional resources to
establish, maintain, and operate Command, Control, and Communications (C 3)
systems among theater, special operations, Army SOF subordinate,
and other commands as needed. The SOCSEs will operate C 3 missions
simultaneously in two theaters.

An austere Special Operations Support Element (SOSE) was
under development to provide support to SOF units for short, low visibility
operations. The SOSE included support unavailable elsewhere
within the theater. It will be able to support two theaters simultaneously.
An FY 86 activation is planned.

TRADOC analyzed a combat service support concept for the 1st
Special Operations Command (SOCOM) to determine whether support
services should be provided by units integral to 1st SOCOM or by augmentation
with selected active and/or reserve units. TRADOC also reviewed a combat arms
reorganization plan that would allow the Army to satisfy all unified and
specified commands' requirements without increasing space requirements.
Moreover, a reorganization of the 4th Psychological Operations Group was
investigated.

As a part of the Army's planned expansion to a 28-division
force structure, it activated the 35th (Santa Fe) Infantry Division (Mechanized)
in 1984. Identified by the National Guard Bureau in 1983 as the ninth National
Guard division, the 35th Infantry Division (Mechanized)
comprised the 67th Infantry Brigade of Nebraska, the 69th Infantry Brigade of
Kansas, and the 149th Armored Brigade of Kentucky.
Prior to their consolidation into the 35th Infantry Division these units existed
as separate brigades. Other units from Colorado, Kansas, Kentucky, Missouri, and
Nebraska, both in existence and newly organized, will fill out the 35th
Division's remaining organization. At the
end of FY 84, the division's tenth maneuver battalion and

[14]

air defense battalions were unidentified. The division
headquarters is located at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, and the National Guard
plans to have the division completely organized by FY 89.

One of the major components of the AirLand Battle doctrine was the ability to deploy rapidly personnel and materiel for both strategic and tactical purposes. The glaring absence of such capability, both in sealift and airlift, became a major issue during congressional hearings and interservice studies. As one commentator noted, no matter how excellent the quality and quantity of the people and equipment, if they cannot be moved to where they are needed, they are worth nothing. The Congressionally Mandated Mobility Study (CMMS) of 1981 established a 66 million-ton-miles-per-day (MTM/D) goal for strategic airlift and 100,000 short-tons-per-day goal for sealift to meet projected 1986 defense requirements for four scenarios. The goals represented the minimum capabilities based upon probable available fiscal assets and, in fact, did not meet the operational lift needs for any of the projected scenarios. Furthermore, less developed areas of the world, particularly Southwest Asia, remained unsuitable for air lift. These potential trouble spots, as well as other likely flash points for the outbreak of low intensity conflict, necessitated dependence upon an augmented sealift capability.

Under the congressional requirement, the Military Airlift Command
was to have the capability to move 60 tactical fighter squadrons, 1 Marine
amphibious brigade, and 6 Army divisions to the Middle East within ten days. To
accomplish this ambitious goal, the Air Force planned to add 50 C-5Bs, 44 KC-10s
and 3 of the new C-19s to its fleet. These aircraft and the Civil Reserve Air
Fleet (CRAF) modification program will
ease the airlift problem, but a projected 17.5 MTM/D shortfall still existed for
FY 89. This, in turn, meant that insufficient
airlift was available to move three Army divisions to the Middle
East within the ten-day limit established by the CMMS.

General Mahaffey, then Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for
Operations and Plans, testified before
the Senate Armed Services Committee's
Subcommittee on Sea-power and Force Projection in March 1984. He stated that
"Airlift is the cornerstone of force projection during the early days of
deployment." (Armed Forces Journal [AFJ], July 1984) Another complicating factor
was the Army's plan to increase the amount of outsized equipment that only new
C-5Bs could carry. A possible solution lay in the C-17, which had the capability
to carry outsized equipment and use forward area airfields. Even with congressional
funding, the G-17 would not be available for seven years. The CRAF program, in
which civilian airlines provided planes to supplement
military airlift capability, also faced problems from eco-

[15]

nomic dislocation in the commercial airline industry. In
fact, projected cargo capacity will
probably drop over the next several years.

These problems were concerned primarily with strategic
airlift. At that time, no tactical airlift or sealift requirements were established.
On 22 May, the Chiefs of Staff of the Army and Air Force agreed to establish an
office to determine tactical airlift requirements.
The Senate Armed Services Committee told the Department
of Defense (DOD) on 31 May to provide a report on tactical airlift requirements
by March of the following year.

The Navy's Military Sealift Command also fell short of meeting sealift needs for both the Army and Marine Corps. Although the CMMS requirements ordinarily would have been met, an OSD-conducted study showed that, based upon a worst-case scenario in FY 88 (rather than FY 86), the Navy would have a 9 percent shortfall of lift. A later review of the study by the Maritime Administration showed that the shortfall would be in the 20-25 percent range because the American Merchant Marine's sealift capacity was falling, not remaining constant as planners had postulated. Furthermore, the Navy had a shortage of roll-on/roll-off ships, essential for rapid deployment of Army materiel as well as ships able to steam faster than eighteen knots. A shortage of break bulk ships also loomed on the horizon as more and more shippers converted to containerization.

The Navy pursued programs to increase its sealift
capabilities. The Near-Term Pre-positioning Force consisted of thirteen ships
(break bulk, lighter aboard ship, roll-on/roll-off [RO/RO], and tanker)
stationed in the Indian Ocean to shorten the response time of Army forces by
having the units' materiel already in the region, awaiting the arrival of
troops. The Fast Logistics Ships program increased
Army surge capability by converting T-AKR container ships to an RO/RO
configuration. These boats traveled faster than eighteen
knots and could deliver an Army heavy division to the Persian Gulf region in 14
to 16 days. At the end of FY 84, Military Sealift Command had contracts on 8
RO/RO ships (also known as SL-7s) or roughly 45 percent of all RO/RO
flying U.S. flags. The Navy received
four SL-7s during the fiscal year. Berthed on the East Coast, they will be able
to put to sea within four days.

Composed of 288 ships, the National Defense Reserve Fleet
contained the military's troopships and needed a minimum of 90-120 days to begin
operations. Part of this fleet, the Ready Reserve
force, was upgraded from 34 ships, available in FY 84, to 77 by 1988. Response
time was established at 5 to 10 days, meeting the troops as they arrived at
embarkation ports. The Navy requested $31 million for purchasing 19 vessels in
FY 85.

[16]

Besides converting container ships to an RO/RO
configuration, the Army and Navy worked together to adapt the converted
vessels to carry outsized Army equipment that was too large for containerization.
Two programs, flatrack and seashed, were used to modify these vessels. Flatracks
were posts and decks that could be arranged either vertically or horizontally to
make space for bulky items. Seasheds could change a single container cell into
three contiguous cells with temporary decks for storing heavy lift equipment.
All of the services looked at airlift and sealift mobility with renewed interest,
and future plans and budgets included an increased emphasis on the ability to
deploy the land force wherever it may be needed.

Maj. Gen. Bobby J. Maddox, first Chief of the Army Aviation
Branch, stated in Army (March 1984) that "Army aviation will play a key role in
any future AirLand Battle because of the unique maneuver
capability and firepower it possesses and the added dimension its systems bring
to the battlefield. Army aviation offers a significant potential
for substituting technology for manpower to neutralize or defeat
any adversary's tactical war-making machinery." The AirLand Battle concept
outlined in FM 100-5 as operational doctrine reemphasized
the Army's concerns for close air support. Almost all phases of the AirLand
Battle doctrine demanded the participation of U.S. Army helicopter assets. The
Army's aviation assets, however, were divided between several arms for support.
Consequently, on 12 April 1983, the Secretary of the Army recognized aviation's
role as a combat arm and approved formation of an Aviation Branch. The Army
Chief of Staff concurred with the Secretary's decision, and on 6 June ordered
studies conducted for the establishment of an Aviation
Branch and its role and missions. The Aviation Branch spent FY 84 formulating
doctrine and operational plans as well as identifying the assets, force
structures, personnel, and training requirements for the new branch.

The Army expected its aviation resources to destroy enemy
armor and mechanized infantry either directly with TOW missiles or indirectly
with laser target identification. This action would delay enemy advances, which,
in turn would allow allied forces to seize the initiative. The Army Attack
Helicopter Battalion was the most maneuverable
and deadly unit that a division commander could use. Additional Army aviation
assets provided air assault capability, reconnaissance,
communications, command, and control assets to commanders; supplied special
electronic mission aircraft (SEMA); inserted and extracted SOF personnel; and
evacuated the wounded.

The United States Army Aviation Center (USAAVNC), Fort
Rucker, Alabama, worked on planning the force structure to con-

[17]

duct all these functions. Their complex task of
fielding a new branch and separate combat arm was complicated by the concurrent
change from Army 86 to an AOE force structure. Army aviation had a key role on
any future battlefield and aviation doctrine within the capstone of FM 100-5. It
influenced the Army's ability to conduct the operational requirements identified
therein. New aviation weapon systems already fielded, in production, or in
planning stages included the UH-60A Black Hawk, the AH-64 Apache, the Army
helicopter improvement program (AHIP), the CH-47D Chinook, the light helicopter
program (LHX), SEMA, and the heavy lift helicopter
program. The Army made preliminary recommendations of aviation force structure
and operational doctrine for all levels (division,
corps, and echelons above corps [EAC]). Army aviation planners
and analysts emphasized the combined arms concept that Army ground and air units
employed in Vietnam. This integration of ground and air assets was vital to the
accomplishments of AirLand Battle operational goals.

The role and missions of Army aviation will change significantly
by the end of this century if the Army implements current plans and is able to
maintain the present rate of progress. By 2000, the Army will reduce its rotary
wing fleet from twenty-two types of helicopters to seven. A new generation of
light helicopters designed for scout,
attack, utility, and observation roles was under development,
and the Army considered a new heavy lift helicopter. A tilt rotor aircraft may
also be introduced to assume rotary-wing operations.
The Army may adapt helicopters to carry air-to-air missiles,
such as the Stinger, for a defensive air-to-air capability although
some aviators sought them to use offensively against enemy aircraft. Special
electronic mission aircraft (SEMA) will play a more important role in the next
decade in target designation, reconnaissance,
and electronic warfare.

An Army study group worked on Army Airborne Intelligence
2000, a study on the use of SEMA. The Army focused attention on both manned and
remotely piloted aircraft and linked these with requirements for intelligence
gathering and electronic warfare to determine the best aerial platform for a
particular mission. These will not be limited to Army platforms but will look at
all applicable Air Force vehicles as well. The Army study will be combined with
the Air Force's "Theater Intelligence Reconnaissance and Surveillance"
study in FY 85 as the services cooperate to identify common aerial
reconnaissance platforms for joint Combat Electronic Warfare
Intelligence (CEWI) activities.

[18]

The Army also planned to expand the aviation flying-hour program
from 124,000 hours (18.4 hours/aircraft/month for 560 aircraft)
to 134,233 hours (more than 19.5 hours/aircraft/month for 600 aircraft) in FY
85. Aviation training would increase from 15.6 hours to 16.8
hours/aviator/month. As the new Apache helicopter was fielded, the Army
increased night training and planned for further
increases in FY 85. General Robert W. Sennewald, Commanding
General of Forces Command, U.S. Army (FORSCOM), announced
that all AH-64 Apache attack helicopter training would be consolidated at Fort
Hood, Texas, by mid-1985.

With a suitable and properly equipped force structure, and
the capability to deliver these forces where required, a significant determinent
of success is the ability to sustain the force-the ability to supply the force
with the ammunition, spare parts, petroleum, oils, and lubricants (POL), and
water required to accomplish the mission.
Dr. Lawrence J. Korb, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower,
Reserve Affairs, and Logistics, voiced concern over what he termed the services'
"dangerously low sustainability posture." He blamed this deficiency on defense
budget cutbacks following the Vietnam War; the lack of "glamor" of this type of
materiel compared to new or modernized
weapon systems; and the popular notion
that American industry would be able to mobilize quickly for wartime production
in a national emergency. (Defense 84, January) Others also identified the
increasing technological complexity and cost of new weapon systems as factors
that extended production time and contributed to the shortage of sustainment
items. Each weapon system requires an adequate supply of spare parts, ammunition,
POL, and other items necessary to make that system continue to function
effectively on the battlefield. Like sealift and airlift, sustainment
items do not have as high a priority as weapon systems, and both are overlooked
and underfunded. Suddenly, the Army has weapons and a force structure, but no
way to deliver them to a theater or to sustain them once they arrive.

Commanders of unified and specified commands placed "near-term
improvement in materiel sustainability" as their most important
priority. They saw that the current military forces lacked an adequate
capability to sustain the force and probably would suffer from this condition
for several more years, despite Army awareness and attention to the problem.
Army planners recognized that a bal-

[19]

ance between weapon system production and modernization and
the acquisition of sustainment items was needed.

Although the Department of Defense Guidance for Fiscal Years
1983-1987 listed sustainment as a high priority, progress in meeting near- and
mid-term goals was slow. The reason was that sustainment money was programmed to
the outyears of fiscal years 1986-1988 both in the 1983-1987 and 1984-1988
Guidance. Dr. Korb observed that these
increases were removed from the budget as each outyear turned into a budget
year. Army funding for fiscal years 1985-1989 did not meet the Department of
Defense Guidance for sustainment by fiscal year 1988. Furthermore, proposed
cumulative funding through FY 88 fell short of requirements by $2.5 billion.
This remained a difficult problem. An examination of the Army's ammunition and
tracked vehicles (tanks and armored personnel carriers) programs illustrates the
problem. The ammunition program placed
increased procurement funding in the outyears while the tracked vehicles program
budgeted less procurement funding. However, as the outyears approached actual
budget years, the program's share of
funding reversed.

The Army used its funds for sustainment in the most economical
manner and improved sustainment, though much remained to be accomplished.

The War Reserve program improved sustainment, strategic mobility,
and support of contingency operations. War reserves assumed a particularly vital
role in combat operations of the type described in FM 100-5. These intense and
highly lethal scenarios will place a heavy burden on the intheater
pre-positioned war reserve materiel stocks, which will be the only materiel
immediately available for commanders to
use to sustain their forces' fighting ability. War reserve stocks included all
replacement items, ammunition (including missiles),
equipment, and POL procured during peacetime and used to replace combat wear and
losses until the Communications Zone can forward supplies from a mobilized CONUS
industrial base.

The intheater pre-positioned war reserve materiel was located
as near the planned area of use as possible in order to conserve the time needed
to resupply units. During FY 84, the Army stored materiel
in Hawaii, Panama, Alaska, Japan, Korea, and the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO) alliance countries. Pre-positioning
these stocks overseas was vital since the Army's strategic lift capacity
remained limited, and the planned mobilization of the national industrial base
was expected to require time. The Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for
Logistics (ODCSLOG) planners considered pre-positioned stocks as adequate if
they could sustain

[20]

the operations of all forward-deployed and reinforcing U.S.
units until CONUS resupply was established on a normal basis. A safety factor,
taking into account underestimation of consumption and/or delays in the
establishment of resupply from the United States, was inherent in the stockage
levels. The FY 84 levels of war reserve stocks were so low that the industrial
resources would need an eight- to ten-month lead time to replace combat losses
and use.

Some war reserve stocks were positioned within the United
States to meet other Army requirements. These CONUS war stockpiles,
for example, served as backup for certain materiel pre-positioned
overseas and would be a source of equipment for a worldwide
contingency force (such as the Army's Rapid Development Force units). In
addition, the Army earmarked materiel for upgrading
reserve units to a war footing.

Other war reserves were available for purposes other than sustainment.
Pre-positioning of materiel configured to unit sets (POMCUS), and non-POMCUS for
special contingencies, contained stocks
for the initial supply of arriving units or materiel in excess of unit
authorization for special contingencies in CONUS, the Pacific, and especially
Europe.

Each year, members of the Army's major commands meet with
ODCSLOG personnel to identify problems, discuss solutions, and plan for actions
to resolve war reserve issues. The Army held four of these war reserve
conferences during the year.

The War Reserve Automated Process (WRAP) was a standard
automated system that determined wholesale and retail secondary item war reserve
requirements and prepared the funding and programming
reports required under the Army's current policies and guidance. The reports
produced by WRAP serve as the official documentation
justifying the secondary item war reserve budgets and programs. In FY 84, the
Army developed, tested, and sent WRAP to all Headquarters, Army Materiel
Command, major subordinate commands (MSCs). At the end of FY 84, it was
operational at the wholesale level and will be deployed and operational at the
retail level by the end of August 1985.

POMCUS stocks are war reserves stored in Luxembourg, the
Netherlands, Belgium, and Germany for the use of specified CONUS-based units,
which will deploy to NATO shortly after mobilization.
Since POMCUS are complete equipment authorizations for the deploying units, the
units' personnel can be airlifted to Europe without their accompanying
equipment. This conserves valuable space
and allows the maximum number of personnel to be

[21]

airlifted, given current strategic airlift and sealift
capability shortages compared-to the
Army's requirements.

The Army kept POMCUS stocks in operating condition by storing
them either inside specially constructed facilities or in the open, as
appropriate. Specialists maintained the equipment under a cyclic set program in
which all unit sets not stored in humidity-controlled
buildings were inspected and repaired every two years with the remainder
maintained on a four-year cycle. Significantly, REFORGER units used POMCUS
stocks, and all equipment employed during REFORGER exercises was cleaned,
inspected, repaired, and returned to
storage after the completion of the exercise.

The Army continued filling POMCUS stocks during FY 84.
Congress included funds in the FY 84 defense appropriations bill for Division
Sets 5 and 6, to be located in Belgium and the Netherlands.
The bill also required that the levels of active component stockage not fall
below 70 percent and reserve component stockage
below 50 percent. However, since the construction of facilities necessary to
store these division sets remained unfinished, the Army shipped no equipment
during FY 84.

ODCSLOG personnel responded to the twin concerns of the Vice
Chief of Staff of the Army over the state of POMCUS readiness
and the lack of an accurate gauge to measure the progress of stocking the POMCUS.
ODCSLOG determined that the Vice Chief of Staff concerns were justified and
proposed corrections, namely to articulate the total POMCUS requirement and use
the POMCUS Authorization Document ( PAD) to identify which units the Army could
add to POMCUS each fiscal year as additional storage
facilities became available.

The Army maintained small elements from the 7th Support
Command and the 54th Area Support Group in Rheinsberg, Germany,
to implement POMCUS. Army planners also worked to obtain
congressional approval to acquire permanent facilities for these two units and
to improve community support at the remote sites in northwestern Germany where
they were stationed.

Although the Army's operational doctrine matured and modernized
equipment entered the force, the Class IX Management System to support these
initiatives has remained unchanged since 1970. General Richard H. Thompson and
Lt. Col. Robert P Stisitis pointed out in Army Logistician (Nov/Dec 84)
that the current prescribed load lists (PLLs)
and authorized stockage lists (ASLs) were outmoded, overstocked, and only
partially supported combat readiness. ODCSLOG decided to make doctrinal and
managerial changes to upgrade the system provided to combat, combat sup-

[22]

port, and combat service support units. Several initiatives
in the modernization of the Class IX Management policy balanced the
forward-positioned stocks with those stockpiles depending upon delivery through
the transportation and distribution system and, thereby, improved the system's
responsiveness to units and guaranteed
that materiel readiness would be sustained during combat. In FY 84, the Army
attempted to guarantee- 85 percent stockage of a unit's items. The new policy,
under study, recommended stocking only those items essential to fulfill
immediate requirements. (See Charts 1 and 2.)

A major part of the PLL/ASL problem was the expansion of the
support list allowance card (SLAG) brought about by the influx
of new equipment into the force. Spare parts for new equipment
created an additional burden on the unit's time, space, personnel,
and mobility because they coexisted with stockage of parts for older equipment.
Furthermore, the technological sophistication
of new weapon systems usually increased the number of spare parts a unit must
maintain to keep "down-time" to a minimum.

ODCSLOG planners worked to reduce stockage list allowances of
new equipment and to develop a system to identify and remove

[23]

from the PLL and ASL parts for equipment no longer used. In
the future, the PLL/ASL will stock, as nondemand-supported provisioning
items, only high-mortality parts essential for the equipment in operation and
parts necessary to satisfy safety and legal requirements.
The implementation of the new criteria could reduce requirements
for parts by 90 percent. These interim criteria will be replaced
by a standard Total Army mandatory parts list (MPL) based upon an empirical
validation. Other items essential to the combat readiness of equipment, but not
included under these criteria, will be stored at corps or installation level,
thereby maintaining readiness but
alleviating storage problems for the forward supporting and supported units.
Fringe requisitioning at the depot level will make nonessential items available
at the depot level. AMC planners worked on developing a program to update
wholesale data bases, which should improve the management of stocks at all
levels and enhance combat readiness.

The second part of the new supply policy used the standard
combat PLL and ASL program to develop an MPL. At the direction
of the Chief of Staff of the Army, ODCSLOG investigated the problem of a
sufficient breadth (number of lines stocked) and depth (number of items for each
line) in the Total Army PLLs and ASLs to maintain critical equipment during
combat. Aided by simulations, ODCSLOG
planners determined the operational availability
of equipment required for combat operations, a departure from the previously
used peacetime demand-oriented system to project wartime requirements.

AMC tested a high-priority delivery system in the United
States Army, Europe (USAREUR), to fulfill not-mission-capable supply
requirements for specified end items. Using commercial delivery services, this
Rapid II system reduced the order shipping time to 90 hours-CONUS to Europe.

As the Army fields an increasing number of modern weapon
systems employing modules, the emphasis of ASL management will change from parts
to be discarded to those that can be repaired.
The Army made an important policy change last year when it gave major commands
the responsibility to manage reparable parts. Logisticians at the end of FY 84
worked to develop a synchronized supply,
maintenance, and distribution system to improve reparable management while
keeping costs and stockage low.

ODCSLOG improved the supply policy and distribution system by
developing two new microcomputer systems. The Unit Level Logistics
System (ULLS) began as the tactical organizational paperless
service support system, a SMART (Supply and Maintenance

[24]

Assessment and Review Team) program initiative in the 24th Infantry
Division. It automated almost all of the PLL transactions, decreased
the PLL workload, and increased transaction accuracy at the unit level. The
Standard Army Retail Supply System (SARSS) will be fielded in forward support
battalions to receive and process ULLS data, generate stock issue and inventory
management data, and prepare transactions for Direct Support Unit Standard
Supply System processing. All of these transactions were designed to decrease
response time to meet lower level units' high-priority needs.

The Army Logistics Center, after reexamining recent technological
advances and the threat to the rear area divisional support area, reappraised
its centralized materiel management policy. Planners believed that daily
logistical functions were more likely to survive hostile action if they
dispersed among the division's direct support units. The 9th Infantry Division
(Motorized) served as a test bed for decentralizing daily logistical functions
management. The 9th provided a demanding test for the new system because the
division was configured for rapid deployment. Its maneuver units were highly
mobile because of organic ground and air transportation
assets. The Army designed proposed doctrinal changes in supply
policy to provide a logistics system that could support rapidly moving combat
elements similar to the 9th Infantry Division.

The Army logistical organization, at the end of FY 84,
followed several principles while developing a supply policy to meet FM 100-5
doctrinal requirements. For example, logisticians identified the challenges
of force modernization and made progress in meeting them. Planners recognized
also that they must strike a balance between the level of stockage and the level
of usage to keep PLLs and ASLs more mobile and less expensive. The distribution
system was the vital key to the timely and adequate resupply of combat units.

In 1980 the Secretary of Defense designated the Army the DOD
Executive Agent for land-based water resources. Since then the Army has worked
on developing, coordinating, and implementing
a totally integrated tactical water support system. Primarily,
ODCSLOG, as the Army's water resources proponent, focused its attention on the
needs of the United States Central Command (USCENTCOM) because operations in
that area of the world would occur in an arid environment with high ambient
temperatures and few sources of fresh
water. ODCSLOG used a systems approach to
determine water support requirements for such functions
as detection, production, treatment, distribution, storage, and cooling. The
Army transferred the responsibility for all of

[25]

these functions, except for detection and production, from
engineer elements to combat service
support units.

A two-part program was used to satisfy CENTCOM water requirements.
The first, completed by the end of the FY 82 funded delivery period, fulfilled
the minimum essential needs of the near-term force. Redesignated petroleum,
engineer, and transportation units used commercially obtained equipment to
establish and operate the System. The
second involved the creation of a comprehensive tactical water support
capability for the expanded force by the close of the FY 87 funded delivery
period. ODCSLOG programmed the necessary materiel and force structure
requirements to meet the deadline.

ODCSLOG successfully demonstrated a 300,000-gallon-per-day,
barge-mounted, reverse osmosis water purification unit during the Joint
Logistics Over the Shore Exercise II. The Army will deploy the water
purification unit in CENTCOM. It also pre-positioned more equipment for water
units in CENTCOM's Near-term Prepositioning
Force (NTPF). In addition, the National Training Center started unit water
training.

The Army was responsible for the inland distribution of bulk
Petroleum, Oils, and Lubricants to all services in both developed and
undeveloped theaters. Its mission was to maintain a flow of fuels and lubricants
from a combination of offshore tankers and pier-side discharge
systems through a network of onshore storage and distribution
systems to the user. This mission was critical for force readiness and
sustainment. Requirements steadily increased during the year.

In response to growing requirements, the Army established a
General Officers Steering Committee and an Action Officers Workshop
to study POL Logistics-Over-the-Shore (LOTS) and inland distribution
capabilities. Both groups emphasized the need to modernize
the petroleum systems within the Army Facilities Component System; to revise the
1978 "Petroleum Distribution in a Theater of Operations" study; to modify the
Army Concept of Operations to include the
increased use of tactical pipeline; and to work on inland distribution plans.

The Action Officers Workshop completed the evaluation of aluminum
instead of steel piping and the use of new quick lock couplings
rather than steel bolted couplings in POL tactical pipelines. In January 1984,
the Army accepted the aluminum pipe and the quick lock couplings, both
commercially available equipment, as Class IX items in the Army Facilities
Component System and included the equipment in an Inland Petroleum Distribution
System (IPDS) design. ODCSLOG saw the
benefits of the new equipment and realized that the movement of large volumes of
POL through pipelines was

[26]

the most efficient and least labor-intensive method.
Therefore, it programmed a larger use of tactical pipeline to offset the Transportation
Medium Truck Company (POL) force structure shortfalls. Initial procurement began
in FY 84.

Last year, the 5,000-gallon collapsible fabric POL storage
tank was the largest in the Army's inventory. This year, the Army started
procurement of the Bulk Fuel Tank Assembly (EFTA), a 5,000-barrel
(210,000-gallon) collapsible storage tank. It was used successfully
during the joint Logistics Over the Shore Exercise II.

An Army/Navy OPDS (Offshore Petroleum Discharge System)
Steering Group was established in FY 84 to prepare joint OPDS policy, procedure,
acquisition, and compatibility. The group will have a Common Offload and
Discharge Memorandum of Agreement ready
for Chiefs of Staff signature next year. This agreement will clarify each
service's responsibilities. The OPDS is scheduled for demonstration testing in
FY 85.

The Petroleum Distribution System, Korea (PDSK), handled the
general support POL mission. ODCSLOG changed its Table of Distribution
and Allowances (TDA) organization to that of a Table of Organization
and Equipment unit providing an in-place cadre to support a rapid increase of
personnel and mission during wartime. The PDSK became the 2d Petroleum Group,
Korea, in September 1984 and required
neither additional personnel for its peacetime mission nor increases
in the manpower ceiling of the Eighth U.S. Army.

The Army could not sustain its forward-deployed and deploying
forces because of inadequate air and sealift capability and a shortage of war
reserves. Planners, however, implemented several actions to improve sustainment.
One major sustainment program, Host Nation Support (HNS), used allied assets to
fulfill part of the U.S. Army's combat support and combat service support
requirements and to attain the Army's
force structure objectives. Since the NATO area was vital to U.S. interests (the
majority of troops were deployed there), most HNS was also found in Europe.

The United States and the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) signed a Wartime Host Nation Support (WHNS) Agreement on 15 April 1982. According to this agreement, West Germany will supply wartime essential services from its civil sector and perform service support functions for U.S. forces from a newly created 50,000-man reserve. The United States agreed to provide a ten-division force by D-day. At the end of FY 84, the two countries were developing the Civilian Support Technical Agreement to identify the civilian support the FRG will make available during war and the Military Technical Agreement to specify reservists' support. The former is planned for com-

[27]

pletion in FY 86 and the latter by the end of FY 85. On 21
January 1983, West Germany and the United States signed the Reinforcement
Exercise Technical Agreement, which established German support
for U.S. peacetime exercises such as REFORGER. The two countries,
this year; agreed on the single source of equipment issue, the allocation of
funds, and the approval of HNS as a part of the NATO infrastructure, which
established guidelines for future activations.

Bilateral agreements with NATO allies assure HNS for vital
U.S. lines of communication. Belgium, Luxembourg, the Netherlands,
the United Kingdom, Germany, Norway, Denmark, Canada, and Italy have signed
general (government to government) agreements
and technical (host nation ministry of defense and Headquarters,
United States European Command) agreements. Furthermore,
Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg signed joint Logistical Support Plans (JLSP),
and negotiations were under way with Norway, Italy, and Denmark. Negotiations
for JLSP have not yet been started with Spain, Portugal, and Greece while
awaiting State Department approval. The United States European Command
established Logistical Coordination Cells (LCC) to act as in-country agents to
develop JLSP They were essential for the continued rapid delineation and
agreement on the detailed support to be
given to U.S. forces. The LCCs will also develop joint Implementation Plans to
provide operational plan-level detail.

The HNS policy for Southwest Asia was in the initial negotiation
stage with U.S. allies in that region. Discussions covered the development of
possible contingency support for U.S. forces by these countries.

The Combined Defense Improvements Projects (CDIP) program,
which handled HNS in Korea, continued its successful operation.
During FY 84, Japan provided support to the United States through base rentals
and by assumption of construction costs.

The Western Command (WESTCOM) continued to work on the
Friendly/Allied Nation Support (FANS) program, which determined
and cataloged other Pacific countries' ability to provide the U.S. with supply
and service support.

A suitable force structure, a flexible imaginative doctrine,
and a sustainment capability all depend upon the mobilization of national
reserves to support deployed forces with reinforcing units, replacement
personnel, and replenishment supplies. Mobilization brings the required
resources to the necessary state of readiness or

[28]

to production. This task is accomplished by expanding
existing facilities and establishing
training bases to process untrained civilians;
bringing reserve component personnel onto extended active duty; preparing CONUS
transportation systems to move men and materiel; and converting factories to the
production of war materiel. Mobilization
of the Total Army implies that the Army will complete these actions effectively
and quickly.

An initial mobilization action occurs when the President of
the United States calls up reserve units to active duty. In that situation,
current Army doctrine states that approximately 20 percent of Army Reserve
elements will deploy overseas within 30 days after mobilization, 64 percent
within 60 days, and almost all within 90 days. These units, however, represent
only those designated for outside continental United States (OCONUS) deployment.

In FY 84, the Army added full-time reserve staff to vital
active commands and posts to assist in mobilization planning. In addition,
the Army continued to add reserve management information systems to the
Continental Army Management Information System (CAMIS)-the primary Army Reserve
and National Guard information system.
Selected reserve centers and National Guard armories
already using CAMIS will be joined by more than 5,000 subscribers
by October 1986.

Since the Corps of Engineers was responsible for several of
the mobilization actions mentioned above, it provided the United States with a
strong reserve for engineering services and construction
management through its civil works and military programs. The Corps' peacetime
construction force (two-thirds involved in civil works) formed the backbone of
the mobilization preparedness program.
This program expanded during the year. Engineers in cooperation with Major Army
Command staffs identified specific
construction projects required for personnel mobilization. Furthermore, the
civilian personnel of the engineer districts worked with Army installation
planners to prepare mobilization master plans and Installation Support Books
that established the necessary actions to satisfy personnel mobilization
requirements. Most engineer districts and divisions established plans to support
the Army's mobilization bases and to augment their staffs to meet personnel
mobilization surges. The Chief of Engineers created a program of direct and
general support districts to integrate the newly transferred civil works
personnel into the military construction
program. Direct support districts (fourteen districts handling peacetime
military construction) supported installation commanders
and facilities engineers in the United States. Since mobiliza-

[29]

tion demands could overwhelm these districts, general support
districts (twenty-two civil works
districts with no peacetime military construction) will provide reserve support.

The Installation Support Book (ISB) program, which provided
essential information to district support and general support staffs for
designing and building mobilization facilities, expanded during
FY 84. The Corps of Engineers provided funds for adding 30 ISBs to the 101
installations, 55 reserve component mobilization stations, and 46 Development
and Readiness Command production base
facilities already in the program.

The Corps' mobilization preparedness level continued to decline
because of reductions in its civil works manpower and the amount of design and
construction work it authorized and performed.
The augmentation of the military construction program suffered as a result.
However, the Corps' emergency operations centers for floods, hurricanes, and
other disasters did prepare Corps personnel to operate under extreme conditions
that were similar in certain respects to those found during mobilization.

The Corps established the Corps of Engineers Corrective Action
Program (CECAP) to provide an automated inventory of mobilization
issues raised by OCONUS and CONUS districts and divisions.
CECAP also identified a responsible proponent to resolve each issue and to
monitor progress on the issue until its resolution. While contending with the
same mobilization problems of CONUS, OCONUS districts and divisions faced
several additional unresolved issues such as wartime construction requirements,
resource management, and command
relationships.

TRADOC completed the Training Base Capacity Study II and
forwarded it to HQDA. The exhaustive study reviewed the equipment
requirement to support the training base after full mobilization.
The study group estimated equipment costs to meet present mobilization
requirements at nearly $3.8 billion. Based on the TRADOC study, HQDA planners
wrote a Program-Development Increment
Package to alleviate some of the shortages in future POM cycles. Planners also
used the study to examine the stated requirements
for accuracy. It will be updated annually to monitor changing
equipment requirements.

The Corps of Engineers prepared a proposal to amend Title 10,
United States Code (USC) 2808, and sent it to the Office of Management and
Budget (OMB) in January 1984. The proposal allowed a presidential determination
of "imminent threat" to trigger
mobilization (training base) construction using previously appropriated
MILCON funds. Title 10, USC 2808, required that mo-

[30]

bilization construction start after a public declaration of
national emergency or war. The FY 85.military authorization bill, forwarded to
Congress on 3 February 1984, included the proposal. The final bill, signed by
President Ronald Reagan on 20 August, did not contain
it. The defeat of the Corps' proposal led to reassessing the timing
and direction of the long-term effort to possess needed mobilization
authority and to obtain relief from unreasonable statutory constraints.

Industrial mobilization complements personnel mobilization.
The industrial base provides the equipment and materiel to support
and sustain the forces engaged in combat, combat support, and combat service
support. The Department of Defense continued
to emphasize initial combat capability over industrial preparedness.
This directly affected the Army because of low equipment
and materiel stockpiles. Serious deficiencies still existed between the time
required to mobilize the production capacity of U.S. industry and the time to
meet ongoing combat demands. Several
studies and reports (Ichord hearings, General Accounting Office
reports) called attention to the defects of DOD's "short war" planning
philosophy. These deficiencies in industrial preparedness
were readily apparent in MOBEX 78 and MOBEX 80.

Dr. Korb stated that the United States had neglected
industrial mobilization since World War Il but in the past several years had
emphasized industrial preparedness in several ways. The President established
the Emergency Mobilization Preparedness Board in 1982. In 1984, DOD and White
House planners worked on emergency
legislation that the President could use in a national emergency
to remove impediments, such as long production lead times, to quickly meet
mobilization requirements. During FY 84, the Army stockpiled critical components
for systems with long lead times to shorten weapon systems production time upon
mobilization.

The Secretary of the Army noted in the October 1984 Association
of the United States Army Green Book that the Army was "not satisfied
with our present ability to mobilize quickly." He stressed several areas that
needed improvement: "getting more manpower with required skills, raising the
readiness levels of reserve components
combat service support units, improving the capability of continental U.S.
installations to handle deploying units and upgrading
our command and control structure to ensure the timely movement of critical
resources." He stated that the Army was working
on improving these areas. While some progress had been made, the Secretary
acknowledged that much more needed to be done.

Following the publication of the operational doctrine in FM
100-5, the Army changed its training programs to complement the offensive
emphasis of the revised manual. The philosophy to train as the Army fought
permeated all levels of the Army organization as trainers incorporated this
concept into all elements of the training program. These included individual,
unit, and combined arms activities;
institutional instruction; and training support. The demands occasioned by FM
100-5 doctrine required a level of training and proficiency far greater than
that of our potential adversaries. American
soldiers must often fight outnumbered in both personnel and equipment, as well
as at the end of extended supply lines. The Army's primary training mission, in
support of the Army of Excellence, was to
turn newly inducted civilians into disciplined and skilled soldiers; to provide
a cadre of highly capable noncommissioned
officer trainers; and to improve the officer corps' capabilities. A new force
structure placed further demands on training requirements
as did fielding new or modernized weapon systems and adding new training
courses. The Army responded by increasing instructor
personnel authorization by 600 spaces, despite overall limited
resources.

The soldier's most important peacetime activity is to train
and prepare for war. Such training is vital for a force that fights according
to a doctrine calling for rapid deployment of operational forces into a highly
confusing, violent, and lethal theater of operations.
All members of the Total Army need to understand and be trained under the
principles of FM 100-5 so that they can fight and win the battle in such an
environment.

The thirteen-week Infantry One-Station Unit Training (OSUT)
program at the Infantry Training Center, Fort Benning, Georgia, took civilians
and turned them into well-trained infantrymen. Those who will use Bradley
fighting vehicles received additional training during a three-week, add-on
course designed to familiarize them with the new equipment. The OSUT course
emphasized tactical realism, reinforcement
of mastered subjects in subsequent lessons, and after-action reviews. These
actions improved the soldier's tactical and
technical proficiency. In FY 84, the OSUT proved successful as evidenced by
soldiers scoring an average of 268 out of 300 points on the demanding final
Advanced Physical Readiness Test (APRT) and 92.4 percent on the
Performance-oriented Infantry Qualification
Test (POIQT) containing thirty-two Skill Level I tasks.

Initial Entry Training provided soldiers with a foundation of
basic skills. Upon completion of basic training, the soldiers were

[32]

well motivated and well disciplined, but still needed further
training on Skill Level I subjects. After
arrival at their assigned units, they received additional training to sharpen
their skills, to learn new and more advanced tasks, and to become team members.

A unit's efficiency and effectiveness depends upon its
members' confidence in each other and in their leaders. Consequently, the Army
worked to ensure that all leaders were tactically and technically competent to
instill confidence in their subordinates. The Army also recognized that future
conflicts, described in FM 100-5, would be highly lethal, demanding proficient
leadership to conserve unit fighting
strength on the complex modern battlefield. Therefore, it not only provided
training for the soldiers' current assignments, but also trained them for more
responsible future assignments.

The Army also expanded and established several programs for
the professional development of career soldiers. For example, funding was
provided to begin an FY 87 expansion in the number of senior NCOs engaged in
training. The First Sergeant's Course will be expanded to 1,010 students per
year, while the Sergeant Major Academy will train an additional 128 sergeants
annually. The Army, after analyzing the NCO ranks, identified a shortage of
Skill Level 2/3 technical training for combat support/combat service support
soldiers. In response, Army trainers began primary and basic technical courses
to improve the technical competency of E-5 and Er6 NCOs and make them fully
qualified in their respective military occupational specialties (MOS). By FY 86,
the Army will have 157 such courses in operation.

The emphasis in FM 100-5 on maneuver warfare demanded unit
cohesion, small unit leadership, and independent operations. Leadership
qualities of competence, toughness, resourcefulness, and flexibility were
necessary to take full advantage of the latest doctrine. Thus the length of most
officer basic courses increased from four to five weeks to offer more field
training in tactical, maintenance,
physical, and leadership skills. Trainers added a seven-day Tactical Leadership
Course (TLC) to the Infantry Officers Basic Course to improve newly commissioned
second lieutenants' tactical and leadership skills. Following TLC, the officers
went through a light infantry field training exercise (FTX) and a mechanized infantry
FTX. The Army incorporated the twenty drills of the TLC into the light infantry
unit training program and may use them for active and reserve component field
units as well.

Moreover, the appearance of a new three-tier training plan
for warrant officers revised and expanded existing courses. Under the new
program all newly appointed warrant officers will attend a six-

[33]

week, entry-level leadership course, and later during their
career take an advanced course with selected officers attending a senior-level
course. The new policy's mandatory entry-level training will improve the
officer's ability to handle responsibility.

The conversion and establishment of divisions into the light
infantry configuration and the
restructuring of the 9th Infantry Division
(Motorized) prompted the Army to explore the units' training programs as they
experimented with new operational concepts. This was especially true of the
units found in the light infantry force.

The Infantry School established a light infantry training program
to improve light infantry skills during OSUT; to conduct special
light infantry training at Fort Benning for unit leaders; and to increase
gradually the percentage of Ranger-trained leaders in the light infantry
divisions. The key battalion leaders will be Ranger-trained,
and all infantry platoons will have some Ranger-trained personnel. The light
infantry training program comprised three courses: the Light Leader Course, the
Light Fighter Course, and the Light Infantry OSUT COHORT

Ranger-qualified senior NCOs conducted the four-week Light
Leader Course at the Ranger School, Fort Benning. The course trained battalion
sets of unit leaders (team leader to company commander) to become better
trainers themselves by improving their proficiency in leadership abilities and
soldier skills. The first class commenced in August, and a new Light Leader
Course was planned for FY 86.

All light divisions conducted a Light Fighter Course that
concentrated on squad and platoon
training. The course lasted four weeks for infantry companies and one week for
noncombat units. The 7th Infantry Division began training in the fall with the
two-phase course. All soldiers who passed Phase I training were certified as
light infantrymen and were sent to Phase II. In this phase, the light leader
graduates trained their units in various tactical skills, which included
rappelling from helicopters, traveling on snowshoes and skis, setting up hasty
ambushes, and performing reconnaissances.

The proposed fifteen-week Light Infantry OSUT COHORT Course
will employ a battalion of the 7th Infantry Division as a test unit during FY
85. After careful analysis of the results achieved in this battalion's training
cycle, the Army will determine whether to continue the course.

The Ranger School, currently limited to a nine-week Ranger
training program, will expand in FY 87 to support the Army's emphasis
on increasing light infantry training requirements. The school's priorities were
to soldiers assigned to Ranger battalions and

[34]

light infantry units as well as to all Infantry Branch
lieutenants. The goal was to increase the number of hardened, combat oriented,
tactically skilled leaders to light
infantry divisions. The expansion will also support the larger SOF force
structure, which added a Ranger battalion and Ranger regiment.

This training program supported the Army's goal of rapidly establishing
a high-quality light infantry force. The Army will monitor
and study the training process and the results. TRADOC will evaluate the
organizational concept and performance of the light infantry division in terms
of the new units' ability to meet the rigorous
light infantry standards and the Infantry School's ability to support the
training program during the transition of Division 86 units into light infantry
units. However, light infantry was not the only unit training in progress.

Each unit, whether using a single weapon system or providing
a support function, must be proficient in its specialty. Using the Army Training
and Evaluation Program (ARTEP), units established
programs for individual and collective training in critical battle tasks. The
Army revised its ARTEPs during the year, especially
through the use of expanded training and evaluation outlines.
Using these, commanders determined training performance and planned to correct
deficiencies.

Individual and unit training formed the basis for the Army's
readiness, while the training of the
battalion task force inculcated principles
of combined arms warfare in units. Furthermore, FM 100-5 identified
the battalion as the basic combat unit. Thus the combined arms task force
concept integrated various complementary weapon systems with a greater level of
combat support and combat service support. One significant problem associated
with battalion task force-size training was a lack of space to exercise full
capability. The battalion's new weapon systems extended the range and scope of
live-fire exercises beyond all but a few
military reservations.

One Army response was the establishment of the National Training
Center (NTC) at Fort Irwin, California. According to Maj. Gen. Frederic J.
Brown, Commanding General, U.S. Army Armor Center, starting full-scale operation
in 1982, "the tough, realistic, force-on-force
training with MILES as the NTC is the best combined arms training, short of
actual combat, that has ever been conducted in the U.S. Army" (Armor, Nov/Dec
84) The NTC's large maneuver area, skilled opposing force, live fire, multiple
integrated laser engagement system
(MILES), and standardized evaluation combined to offer an unparalled training
operation. Operations group observer-controllers,
through computer-aided standardized evaluations, pro-

[35]

vided thorough after-action reviews to each unit following
the two-week-long training mission. MILES
provided timely and accurate determinations
of individual and vehicle hits and near-misses that allowed,
in turn, simulation of realistic force-on-force combat with realistic weapons
simulation and casualty determination.

The NTC also improved the proficiency of unit leaders as they
rotated through the center as well as enlisted personnel who had the opportunity
to use skills learned at their home station. The units that trained at the NTC
also incorporated "lessons learned" into their home station training programs.
Thus NTC influence extended far beyond the two-week course and spread throughout
the Army, thereby improving readiness.

In FY 84, the NTC first witnessed a unit (2d Brigade, 2d Armored
Division) equipped with Ml Abrams tanks and M2 Bradley fighting vehicles
training at the center. These new weapons improved
the brigade's ability to maneuver more rapidly across rough terrain.
Simultaneously, while on the move, the improved technology increased their
ability to hit targets accurately. Thermal
sights enhanced the crew's target acquisition when operating under conditions of
reduced visibility. FY 84 also witnessed the first National Guard battalions
using the NTC. These were the 2d,Battalion,
136th Infantry (Mechanized), from Minnesota and the 1st Battalion, 108th Armor,
from Georgia.

Army personnel and units engaged in numerous exercises during
the fiscal year. Most occurred at the units' home stations with the aim to
familiarize personnel with small unit tactics. Each exercise,
whether CPX (command post exercise), FIX (field training exercise), STX
(situational training exercise), or CALFEX (combined
arms live-fire exercise), was an essential block of the foundation
for larger combined arms training such as that conducted at the NTC. Moreover,
leaders received training in FCXs (fire coordination
exercises), LCXs (logistics coordination exercises), and MCXs (movement
coordination exercises).

Each year the Army participates in two major Joint Chiefs of
Staff (JCS)-sponsored and -conducted command post exercises selected from four
possible scenarios: mobilization, general war/nuclear crisis, NATO
reinforcement, and regional exercise. In FY 84, the CPXs were NIGHT TRAIN 84 and
PRESSURE POINT 84. NIGHT TRAIN 84, a nine-lay CPX conducted in two phases
between 5 and 13 April 1984, focused on survivability, continuity of operations,
and reconstitution following a nuclear strike against the United States. HQDA
established eight exercise objectives to
evaluate Army command and control, decision making, residual capabilities,
military assistance to civil authorities, and

[36]

capability to support reconstitution efforts during a nuclear
crisis. This marked the first time in an extended interval that the Army
examined its ability to transfer command and control functions to alternate locations.
The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) directed the participation of
several federal civil agencies in NIGHT TRAIN 84 under its own exercise title of
Readiness Exercise (REX) 84 BRAVO. The participants identified several
deficiencies during the exercise, but in general found improved results compared
to the previous nuclear CPX. However, the Army contended that the design of the
previous three nuclear CPXs made it very difficult, if not impossible, to assess
the progress and trends of correcting past deficiencies.

The other major JCS-sponsored and -directed command post
exercise was PRESSURE POINT 84, which evaluated crisis management procedures and
the operational and logistical aspects of sustainment
in a major conflict. The federal civil and military agencies of both the United
States and the Republic of Korea (ROK) participated
in the two-phase exercise from 17 October to 22 November 1983. Unlike the most
recent comparable exercise, POTENT PUNCH 81, which evaluated plansand operations during the initial stages of a conflict in Korea, PRESSURE POINT
84 concentrated mainly, but not exclusively, on sustainment of forces
during a crisis. The Army found this emphasis useful, because it could evaluate
sustainment capabilities in greater depth than before and it could better articulate
the severity of shortfalls in materiel and other critical areas of sustainment.
The exercise scenario portrayed an escalation of worldwide tensions that led to
several regional conflicts, including the outbreak of a conventional war on the
Korean peninsula. The participants had already faced many of the crisis
management, mobilization, and deployment
problems of PRESSURE POINT 84 during POTENT PUNCH 81. However, this CPX
examined these issues in greater detail in the new context of sustainment.

Any Army after-action assessment of PRESSURE POINT 84 noted a
continuing shortage of ammunition stocks, several major equipment
items, and combat arms replacements that severely limited the Army's
ability to sustain combat operations. Although of less importance,
limitations placed upon the Army by chronic deficiencies in medical, engineer,
and transportation support capabilities appeared.
Conversely, significant improvement in planning and operational
procedures, including, with certain reservations, the procedures
for supply support to the Republic of Korea, demonstrated the advantages accrued
from "lessons learned" in previous exercises.

The Army also conducted several large-scale exercises to
test combat readiness. Logistical planners held LOGEX 84, a CPX war

[37]

game, at Fort Pickett, Virginia, from 8 through 20 July 1984,
to train participants in the command and staff procedures of joint operations
within a NATO AirLand Battle scenario. Furthermore, LOGEX 84 demonstrated the
interaction between combat, combat support, and combat service support units,
operations, and missions. The exercise provided rewards for proper planning and
execution and exacted penalties for violations of doctrine or sound practice.
This demonstrated the effects of the participants' decisions on combat
operations. In addition, trainers taught current doctrine, as found in FM 100-5,
and introduced emerging concepts. Early deploying reserve components received
training in their wartime mission, in addition to meeting and working with
members of other units and services they would deal with in wartime.

Participants included members of 11 Active Army, 38 Army
National Guard, and 48 Army Reserve units from CONUS and USAREUR, as well as
active and reserve component personnel from the U.S. Navy, U.S. Air Force, and
U.S. Marine Corps. Personnel of military
organizations from nine allied nations represented those countries' logistical
support activities to make LOGEX 84 as realistic
as possible. The training covered policies and procedures for operations in the
theater environment, necessary operations to support
the AirLand Battle, and appropriate responses to Soviet/Warsaw
Pact operational concepts and tactics. The trainers used microcomputer
technology to generate and transfer to player units a significant amount of
real-time scenario information.

The Army also increased its participation in several more
highly visible, large-scale, complex joint and combined exercises from 28 in FY
83 to 31 in FY 84. These exercises, particularly the OCONUS ones, improved the
Army's ability in combined combat operations with allied forces, projected its
operational capability, tested joint and strategic mobility, and trained Total
Army personnel to work in the joint arena with members of other U.S. services.
Two of the most ambitious and well-known exercises were REFORGER and TEAM
SPIRIT.

REFORGER (Return of Forces to Germany) involved the deployment
of U.S. units from all three services and their reserve components
to Germany for training with NATO units. They performed all operations under
simulated wartime conditions designed to test the U.S. military's ability to
deploy rapidly and operate in Europe. REFORGER also demonstrated both our
military credibility and our commitment to our allies within NATO. The Army
deployed 16,966 soldiers from elements of the 5th Infantry Division (Mechanized);
1st Brigade, 2d Armored Division; 224th Engineer Battalion;
2d Battalion, 75th Rangers; and other active and reserve com-

[38]

bat, combat support, and combat service support units. Once
in Europe, the NATO allies and U.S. forces conducted a series of exercises
called AUTUMN FORGE that stressed the solidarity of the Allied
Command and tested host nations' capabilities to mobilize and commit their
forces for the defense of Western Europe.

Over 200,000 ROK and U.S. personnel in three corps elements
and nine divisions participated in TEAM SPIRIT 84, which was held in Korea
during the spring of 1984. A further four divisional headquarters
simulated second and third echelon activities. This year marked I Corps' (Fort
Lewis, Washington) first participation in TEAM SPIRIT. Other American units
involved included a headquarters and
brigade task force from the 2d Infantry Division (stationed in ROK), a brigade
headquarters and battalion task force from the 7th Infantry Division, a
headquarters and brigade from the 25th Infantry
Division, and 2d Engineer Group. Beyond active forces, the Koreans activated two
reserve divisions for the exercise. The exercise
planners emphasized interoperability by interchanging units from one
organization to another. Thus, divisions included ROK and U.S. Army elements and
later ROK and U.S. Marine units.

The newly created combined aviation force (CAF) participated
for the first time in TEAM SPIRIT 84. Composed of the 17th Aviation Group
(Combat) and ROK aviation units, the CAF offered ground commanders maximum use
of scarce aviation assets and provided tactical air mobility. Exercises begun in
September 1983 identified deficiencies in the areas of air mobility, attack, air
assault, and observation. The 17th
Aviation Group, for instance, had an assault helicopter battalion and a medium
transport helicopter battalion, but lacked attack, scout, and observation
helicopters. Conversely, ROK aviation units had attack and air assault
helicopters but no medium lift aircraft. Additional C 3 systems and logistical
strengths and weaknesses also affected the allies' air support role. U.S. and
ROK assets were combined into the CAF, thereby employing the available assets of
each army to best complement the aviation role. The CAF used 15 Black Hawks, 27
Hueys, 31 Chinooks, and 24 500-MDs (ROK Army's attack/scout helicopters) to
provide exercise forces with agility,
depth, initiative, and synchronization.

Central America became even more turbulent as Marxist guerrilla
operations spread farther and grew more violent in the region.
The President of the United States continued to demonstrate his commitment to
U.S. allies in Latin America by conducting joint and combined exercises there.
These exercises assisted host nations in
enhancing the readiness and capability of their military forces and demonstrated
American willingness to support our al-

[39]

lies against aggression, to provide a local military
presence, and to offer American units the opportunity to conduct joint exercises
involving all services and their
components. Honduras was the major theater of operations for these exercises.
The U.S. Army played a major role in a regular series of training operations.

The two largest exercises were AHUAS TARA II and GRANADERO I.
United States Readiness Command and FORSCOM provided joint operations command
support as well as the Army forces employed. Experienced in operating joint
exercises, USREDCOM established a joint Task Force (JTF) headquarters to plan
for AHUAS TARA II. After the exercise began, JTF II, under the command of United
States Southern Command, controlled the units and operations. During the course
of the exercise, 5 August 1983 to 8 February 1984, the commander of JTF II
directed units from all services as well as several Honduran Army units. The 43d
Support Group, Fort Carson, Colorado, provided logistical and administrative support
while the 41st Combat Support Hospital, Fort Sam Houston, Texas, supplied
medical support. The hospital personnel also engaged
in humanitarian projects in the Honduran countryside. The 3d Battalion, 319th
Field Artillery, Fort Campbell, Kentucky, worked with two Honduran Army mortar
battalions that were converting to
105-mm. towed howitzer battalions. Meanwhile, the 7th Special Forces Group
assisted Honduran infantry battalions in counterinsurgency and antitank
exercises. To support the wide-range
exercise, the 46th Engineer Battalion, Forts Rucker and McClellan,
Alabama, built one airfield, upgraded another, and instructed
Honduran forces in anti-armor defenses. The U.S. Marines, in addition to
assisting a Honduran battalion in amphibious
operations, also directed a combined Honduran Army and U.S. Army-Navy-Marine
maritime interdiction training exercise. Army forces, working in challenging and
difficult conditions, often had to construct new base camps for operations.
However, Army personnel still found time for humanitarian projects, which included
medical treatment for Honduran citizens, veterinary care for their animals,
assistance to orphanages, and distribution of clothing received from several
American military installations.

Based on the results of AHUAS TARA II, Secretary of Defense Caspar W Weinberger ordered the Commander in Chief of SOUTHCOM to continue the
American operations through June 1984. The Commander
in Chief redesignated JTF II as JTF "Alpha" and assigned it the operational
responsibility for command and control, support functions, communications, and
security of heavy equipment in the follow-up exercise,
GRANADERO I.

[40]

Conducted during May and June 1984, GRANADERO I resembled
AHUAS TARA II because it was a combined and joint exercise. The 864th Engineer
Battalion, Fort Lewis, Washington, arrived a month before the start of the
exercise and built two airfields capable of handling C-130 aircraft. On 23 May,
JTF 7 arrived to commence the exercise with the 227th Assault Helicopter
Battalion, Fort Hood, Texas; the 47th Field Hospital, Fort Sill, Oklahoma;
several teams of the 7th Special Forces Group, Fort Bragg, North Carolina; the
169th Tactical Air Support Squadron (TASS), Peoria, Illinois; a USAFRED (U.S.
Air Force Forces, Readiness Command) unit; and several logistical and
communications units. El Salvador sent an infantry
battalion, while Honduras provided an infantry and an airborne
battalion. Panama assigned an observer team to the exercise. The units spent a
week engaged in combined operations and a second
week performing a multinational airborne/air assault at Jamastran
near Honduras' southern border with Nicaragua. As during AHUAS TARA II, Army
personnel performed humanitarian acts to assist
the local inhabitants, including medical and veterinary care as well as an
airlift of food and medical supplies for Indian refugees.

New weapon systems, a new force structure, and a changing
operational doctrine necessitated
increased training for Army personnel. The Army also faced training restrictions
imposed by scarce resources, which
reduced the amount of available fuel and ammunition.
In addition, most of the available maneuver areas were too small to handle the
increased ranges of weapons and vehicles. Since new weapon systems, such as the
Ml, M2, and M3, introduced more capabilities
and ways of employment than their predecessors, personnel required a concomitant
increase in training on these systems. Budgetary
constraints implied either a reduction of the amount of training
time or of the size of the force to receive training. Rather than choose a
reduction, Army leadership decided to increase the use of training devices and
simulations, thereby conducting necessary training
in the most economical manner.

Training devices served as training enhancers and resource
conservers. One of the most important of
these devices was MILES, which used lasers to simulate realistic combat
exercises. Fully fielded in the active component, funding for MILES was begun in
the reserve components. The Army also
introduced MILES equipment for Ml, M2, and M3 vehicles, thus completing the
system for major Army close combat vehicles.

Other major advances in training equipment were in the area
of simulators and computer-assisted simulations. The Army's use of simulators
for missile and artillery firing practice represented an

[41]

inexpensive yet efficient means to train gunners while
conserving extremely costly ammunition. Combined with unit training devices,
this equipment achieved a substantial savings of Class II, V, and IX materiel.
However, these savings were not sufficient, so TRADOC and AMC designed more
advanced simulators to conserve more
materiel and enhance training.

The unit conduct-of-fire trainer (UCOFT), a computer
simulator, will assist tank and infantry fighting vehicle crews in meeting
gunnery table proficiency. UCOFT successfully completed validation and verification
testing during the year. Fielding will begin in March 1985. Army planners
expected UCOFT to pay for itself, on mileage savings alone, within 7.6 years.
However, since UCOFT significantly reduced ammunition requirements programmed
for training, the payback period, if
ammunition savings are included, will be shortened to three years. Army trainers
expected UCOFT to save each tank battalion $473,000 for 105-mm. shells and
$1,295,000 for 120-mm. shells. The entire field force could be equipped with
UCOFT devices for the cost of several M1 tanks.

The Army Armor Center, in conjunction with AMC and TRADOC,
also worked on other training simulators for the armor force. Trainers designed
the videodisc gunnery simulator (VIGS) to substitute for the first two gunnery
tables and provide a foundation for UCOFT and PCMT (platoon combat mission
trainer) training. The PCMT, another computer-assisted system, reproduced the
combined arms environment through the
generation of digital images to depict the external environment as viewed from
inside an armor vehicle. The software allowed
platoons, while in the simulator room, to perform maneuver missions, solve field
problems, and handle free play. USAARMC expected
that it would be available by FY 85 and would substantially reduce
training costs within the armor force.

Work also progressed on the Army training battle simulation
system (ARTBASS), an automated
interactive battle simulation for commanders
and staffs of maneuver battalions. ARTBASS was the beginning
of a conversion from manual to computer-assisted war gaming. The eventual goal
is an automated or computer-driven system. By the 1990s FORSCOM wanted to have a
complete set of automated battle simulations to train combat, combat support,
and combat service support personnel from
platoon level to echelons above corps. In FY 85, FORSCOM will distribute ARTBASS
to the first maneuver battalions.

The cost of firing a live TOW missile (about $10,000) and a
Hellfire missile ($40,000) made extensive
firing prohibitively expensive. Nevertheless, Army aviators had to maintain
their target acquisition proficiency, and simulators provided the means. Army
aviators also

[42]

increased their flying proficiency by using flight training
simulators. The Apache helicopter program was the first in which Army planners
concurrently funded a simulator along with a helicopter. Since flying the Apache
was 10-15 times more expensive than flying in the simulator, the Army expected
substantial cost savings. FORSCOM also worked on the design of the ACATT
(aviation combined team training) computer simulator, which aviation battalions
should receive in FY 86 or FY 87.

The Army also was involved in simulators and simulations on a
joint services level. USREDCOM worked on a joint theater-level simulation (JTLS),
which will offer air, land, and sea battle simulation.
The Army planned on placing JTLS at USREDCOM, the Army War College, and the Army
Concepts Analysis Agency in early FY 85. The USREDCOM also continued the
development of the joint Exercise Control System UECS), a computer-aided system
for automating the operation of command
and staff training exercises. It will be field tested during BOLD VENTURE 85, a
USREDCOM CPX conducted at Fort Lewis, Washington.

The Air Force, under Project Warrior, established the Warrior
Preparation Center at Ramstein Air Force Base, Germany, to train Air Force and
Army commanders and staffs in combined force employment
in NATO. The Warrior Preparation Center taught Warsaw Pact threat status and
countermeasures, as well as performed battle simulation. The center proved to be
a valuable tool for Air Force and Army staffs to use to sharpen their command
and control skills.

Congress, through the efforts of the House Armed Services
Committee, had encouraged the joint services to coordinate their training
research and development work in 1978. The committee then reemphasized its
guidance in 1980, and DOD established the joint Service Research and Development
Program. The Navy started manpower and personnel elements for the program and
the Army followed suit in FY 84, appropriating $6 million for training
and technology projects. The Training Activities Subcommittee
of the Office of the Secretary of Defense Steering Committee on Training and
Training Technology oversaw the program. The subcommittee, composed of military
and civilian members of the four services, reviewed potential projects and
selected four or five a year for funding.

The perennial debate over officer training versus officer
education continued during the year.
While acknowledging that unit-level
tactical training remained vital, most commentators favored more education in
war fighting and principles of wax at higher level military schools such as the
U.S. Army Command and General Staff

[43]

College (USACGSC). The CGSC's curriculum, a two-year course
in 1929, was shortened to one year after World War II and later reduced
to ten months. The emphasis on tactical and operational lessons of warfare was
further abbreviated to allow more time to study the complex Cold War arena; to
maintain units at a high level of readiness; to develop new officer skills; and
better to use constrained resources.
Tactical and operational lessons were shortened from a total of 665 hours in
1951 to approximately 170 hours in 1984. The CGSC, in FY 84, increased tactics
lessons in the electives program and included three one-week-long, college-wide
exercises to remedy the drift away from the study of the lessons of warfare. The
current conduct of war under FM 100-5 and its increased use of technologically
sophisticated weaponry and highly mobile forces increased the amount of tactical
and operational material, that the tactics section of the CGSC curriculum had to
cover.

CGSC consequently added an eleven-month Advanced Military
Studies Program to provide an in-depth study of the science and art of war at
the tactical and operational levels (division and corps). In FY 84, the pilot
stage of the program had a small, high-quality
faculty capable of teaching as many as ninety-six CGSC graduates annually. The
students will receive instruction in all aspects
of G1, G2, G3, and G4 operations as well as a study of ranges of possible
conflicts from terrorism to nuclear war. The new course emphasized thinking
based on the study of military theory and application, both historical and
contemporary, to allow officers to arrive
at creative yet practical solutions to operational problems.
According to Colonel Huba Wass de Czege (Military Review, Jun 84) , the
Advanced Military Studies Program was the Army's "long-term investment in future
capability."

Army Chief of Staff General Bernard W. Rogers in 1977 ordered
a study to be made of officer training and education requirements
through the 1990s. The Review of Education and Training for Officers (RETO)
study group completed its analysis of requirements from pre-commissioning through
general officer levels the following year. The study group made several recommendations
such as expanding officer basic courses and changing advanced
courses into functional courses dedicated to specific duty positions. Another
recommendation was the establishment of a course to teach staff skills. The RETO
study group based this recommendation
upon several findings. First, the selection rate of officers
for CGSC was below 50 percent of total eligible officers, which meant that the
majority of Army officers received their last formal education at the officers
advanced course. Second, CGSC

[44]

graduates were not assigned to tactical-level staff
positions, thereby depriving tactical units of trained and qualified staff
officers. However, the complexity of
modern warfare placed a premium on staff skills at these lower echelons.

Initially, the Army planned the proposed staff officer course
as an alternative program of instruction (POI) for those officers not chosen for
the CGSC course. After exploring this proposal, the Army found that all Army
officers required non-branch specific instruction
in staff skills beyond the officers advanced course level. Therefore, this
alternative POI proposal was dropped, and a working
group was formed at Fort Leavenworth in 1979 to design a new POI and program of
implementation for a Combined Arms and Services Staff School (CAS3). According
to Lt. Col. Karl Farris, CAS3 was "to provide Active and Reserve component
officers the instruction necessary to
serve as staff officers with Army field units." (Military Review, Apr 84)
The school's instruction had to meet three objectives: "to teach what staffs are
by defining and tracing the development
of staff roles; to teach what staffs do by presenting instruction
on common and collective staff procedures and skills; and to teach how staffs
operate." The goals of CAS3 were derived from these objectives and were
prominently displayed in each classroom:

1. Improve the ability to analyze and solve military problems.
2. Improve the ability to interact and coordinate as a member of a staff.
3. Improve communication skills.
4. Improve one's understanding of Army organization, operations,
and procedures.

The Army, following another RETO study group recommendation concerning the POI, set up a two-phase CAS3. The first, or non-resident, phase contained fifteen self-paced modules, which all officers completed at their home stations. After passing the open book examination, they were eligible for the resident, or second, phase. The first phase provided a common background in communicative arts; historical development of staffs, staff skills, roles, and relation ships; decision-making process; quantitative skills; personnel and administration operations; basic principles of logistics; training management; staff leadership; budget; reserve components and mobilization; tactics; threat forces; and organization of Army divisions.

Phase II, a nine-week resident course held at Fort
Leavenworth, used small group seminars to improve upon the skills learned in
Phase I. The student body was divided into twelve-person groups, each led by a
lieutenant colonel battalion commander. The students

[45]

rotated through various staff positions within the fictitious
52d Infantry Division (Mechanized), a
roundout unit based at Fort Riley, Kansas. The instruction focused on six broad,
problem-solving exercises in staff
techniques, training management, budget, mobilization,
preparation for combat operations, and a command post exercise.
By the end of the course, each student had worked extensively on solving over
sixty complex individual and group problems.

The pilot program began in April 1981 with 117 officers from
all Army branches as well as the National Guard and Army Reserve.
CASs conducted two validation and verification courses the following year. Based
on these courses, the Army made adjustments
to the program and began regular classes.

The Extension Training Management Division at Fort Leavenworth
sent Phase I packets to all Officer Personnel Management Directorate
(OPMD)-managed officers after they completed the officers
advanced course. The officer's period of eligibility for the resident phase
began with successful completion of Phase I and lasted through the officer's
ninth year of service.

All OPMD-managed officers, starting with year group 1977, had
to attend CAS3. For those in earlier year groups, the Military Personnel
Center (MILPERCEN) made the selection. However, CAS3 must expand its facilities
before full implementation can begin. In the summer of 1983, the CGSC started an
expansion of its facilities to handle the instructional load of CAS3. With
completion scheduled for the fall of 1985, CAS 3 will begin educating 4,500
captains per year.

At the end of FY 84, the instructors, students, and Army
educators were satisfied with the results
of CAS3. The junior officers received
broad training applicable to all of their duty positions and, upon graduation,
had a common understanding of staff procedures,
which would be valuable on the modern battlefield. Overall, CAS3 met, and in
some cases exceeded, its instructional goals. The small-group, staff-leader
method of instruction in conjunction with peer interaction and the exercise
method of instruction contributed to this
result.

The Army, in an attempt to increase the mid-level officer
schooling program's cost effectiveness,
required that all officers attending advanced schools and certain special
programs add an extra one- to three-year service obligation to their careers
upon graduation. The new regulations took effect during the summer and fall of
1984. Officers attending an advanced course that began on or after 1 October
1984 would incur a one-year obligation. Legal officers attending
the judge Advocate General's Graduate Course were required
to serve two additional years. Starting 1 July 1984, officers

[46]

selected as astronaut candidates had a three-year service
obligation added to their careers after they left the space program.

The Army continued to expand modernization training initiatives
during FY 84, particularly in four areas. The first area was the development of
an automated and viable data base to support Army Modernization Training (AMT).
The Assistant Secretary of the Army for Financial Management approved the
Mission Elements Need Statement (MENS)
and the Project Managers (PM) Charter during FY 84. This data base combined all
modernization training information into one system so that AMT managers will be
better able to implement AMT.

Second, HQDA established a New Equipment Training (NET)
Manager's Workshop to provide NET managers with information on the AMT process.
It also provided new equipment trainers with a method to bring problems to the
attention of both the training community and Army leadership for resolution.

The Consolidated Training Support Work Group (CTSWG) process
was the third area receiving attention. It was an ad hoc forum for the major
players in the New Equipment and Doctrine and Tactics Training activities that
review consolidated training plans to resolve problems therein. Formerly there
were eight CTSWGs, one conducted by each materiel developer every six months.
The Army reduced that number to two held every six months, known as CTSWG East,
which met at Fort Monmouth, New Jersey; and CTSWG West, which met at St. Louis,
Missouri, in the spring of 1984, and at Detroit, Michigan, in the fall of 1984.
The fourth area of improvement provided initiatives for training reserve
components. Active reserve component representatives developed several realistic
and supportable training plans, which emphasized the reserve components' unique
training requirements.

The Standards in Training Commission (STRAC) worked on determining the amount of training ammunition required by individuals, crews, and units of the Total Army to attain and sustain weapons proficiency. The commission considered aids, devices, simulators, simulations, and sub-caliber firing in developing qualification training strategies for thirty-eight systems. STRAC drafted DA Circular 350-XX, which documented the type of attainment and sustainment event; integration of training devices and simulators; standard training strategy; frequency of repetition; and training ammunition requirements to attain and keep the four established separate training readiness conditions. After being reviewed Army-wide, the draft was revised as DA Circular 350-84-2, Standards in Weapons Training, for FY 85 publication.

The Army Study Program denotes a collection of analytical
activities sponsored and carried out by
HQDA agencies and major commands to provide
quality information to help senior Army leaders make sound decisions. During FY
84, a new initiative, the Issue Assessment
Process (IAP), ensured that the Army's analysis community studied the most
important problems. Started in the fall of 1983, UP quickly reached the stage
where its products influenced the analytical
program of the Arroyo Center, the Army's policy and analytic organization. The
Chief of Staff also decided during the fiscal year to move the Arroyo Center
from the jet Propulsion Laboratory of the California Institute of Technology to
the Rand Corporation.