In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings Against
Frederick P. Kessler, Attorney at Law:

Office of Lawyer Regulation

Complainant-Appellant,

v.

Frederick P. Kessler,

Respondent-Respondent.

DISCIPLINARY
PROCEEDINGS AGAINST KESSLER

Opinion Filed:

October 14, 2010

Submitted on Briefs:

February 8, 2010

Oral Argument:

Source of Appeal:

Court:

County:

Judge:

Justices:

Concurred:

Ziegler,
J., concurs (opinion filed).

Gableman,
J., concurs (opinion filed).

Dissented:

Not Participating:

Attorneys:

For the complainant-appellant there were briefs by Paul W. Schwarzenbart and Lee, Kilkelly, Paulson&Younger, S.C.,
Madison.

For the respondent-respondent there was a brief by Jeremy P. Levinson and Matthew W. O’Neill,
and Friebert, Finerty&St. John, S.C.,
Milwaukee.

2010 WI 120

notice

This opinion is subject to
further editing and modification.The
final version will appear in the bound volume of the official reports.

No. 2008AP834-D

STATE OF WISCONSIN:

IN SUPREME COURT

In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings

Against Frederick P. Kessler, Attorney at Law:

Office of Lawyer Regulation,

Complainant-Appellant,

v.

Frederick P. Kessler,

Respondent-Respondent.

FILED

OCT 14, 2010

A. John Voelker

Acting Clerk of Supreme Court

ATTORNEY disciplinary proceeding.Proceeding
dismissed.

¶1PER CURIAM. The Office of Lawyer Regulation (OLR)
has appealed from a referee's report and recommendation finding that the OLR
failed to satisfy its burden of proof that Attorney Frederick P. Kessler
violated SCR 20:8.4(a) and (c).[1]

¶2OLR's appeal raises three issues:

·Does SCR 20:8.4(c) require that an attorney's
untrue or deceptive statement be used to defraud another in order to be
actionable?

·Was Attorney Kessler's deceptive statement
privileged under the First Amendment to the United States Constitution?

·If a violation is found, what is the appropriate
discipline?

¶3This court will affirm a referee's findings of fact unless they
are clearly erroneous.Conclusions of
law are reviewed de novo.SeeIn
re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Eisenberg, 2004 WI 14, ¶5, 269 Wis.2d43, 675 N.W.2d747.We adopt the referee's findings of fact.Although we disagree with the referee's
conclusion of law that in order to constitute misconduct under SCR 20:8.4(c) a
deceptive statement must be used to defraud another, we nevertheless agree with
the referee that the OLR failed to satisfy its burden of proof that Attorney
Kessler violated the rule.Consequently,
we dismiss the proceeding.[2]

¶4Attorney Kessler was admitted to practice law in Wisconsin
in 1966 and practices in Milwaukee.He is also currently a member of the Wisconsin legislature.He was first elected to public office in 1960 and has participated in
campaigns for the Wisconsin State Assembly, the Milwaukee County Circuit Court,
and the United States House of Representatives.

¶5In the spring 2004 election for District I Court of Appeals, Judge
Charles Schudson was the incumbent seeking re-election.Attorney Kessler's wife, Joan Kessler, who
was then in private practice with the Milwaukee law firm of Foley &
Lardner, declared her candidacy for the position and ran against Judge
Schudson.

¶6On July 1, 2002, Judge Schudson wrote a letter (the Schudson
letter) to Judge Charles Clevert, Jr., district judge for the U.S. District
Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin, in relation to the sentencing of
Attorney Charles Hausmann for a criminal conviction.Judge Schudson's letter was unsolicited and
recommended leniency in sentencing.

¶7Attorney Kessler became aware of the Schudson letter and believed
it might constitute a violation of SCR 60.03(2).[3]He asked Joan Kessler to obtain a copy of the
letter because he thought it would provide Joan Kessler an advantage in the
campaign if Judge Schudson were disciplined.Joan Kessler obtained a copy of the Schudson letter and other
information about Hausmann's case through a colleague in Foley & Lardner's Chicago office, who used
the firm's PACER account to obtain at least some of the information.The PACER system is a federal internet-based
service that allows individuals or law firms to access documents and other
information from federal judicial case files.

¶8On October 25, 2003, Attorney Kessler spoke to Mary Moser, the
widow of former District I Court of Appeals Judge William Moser, at a memorial
service for Judge Moser.Mrs. Moser
was a supporter of Joan Kessler's candidacy and had previously on her own
initiative telephoned the Kessler residence to indicate her support and to
offer assistance to Joan Kessler's campaign.While at the memorial service, Attorney Kessler invited Mrs. Moser to
lunch.

¶9On October 27, 2003, Attorney Kessler telephoned Mrs. Moser
to schedule a luncheon meeting for the purpose of asking her if she would be
willing to file a complaint against Judge Schudson with the Wisconsin Judicial
Commission based on the letter Judge Schudson wrote on Attorney Hausmann's
behalf.Mrs. Moser agreed to meet
Attorney Kessler for lunch.On October
28, 2003, Attorney Kessler met with Mrs. Moser at a Milwaukee restaurant.He gave her copies of the Schudson letter and
the docket sheet from the Hausmann case, which indicated that the letter was a
public document, along with a copy of portions of the judicial code.He also provided her with a draft of a letter
complaint to the Judicial Commission.Attorney Kessler told Mrs. Moser that he believed Judge Schudson had
violated the judicial code by writing the letter on Hausmann's behalf, and he
asked if she would be willing to file a complaint with the Judicial Commission
against Judge Schudson.

¶10In soliciting Mrs. Moser to file a complaint, Attorney Kessler
sought to remain anonymous.At the lunch
meeting, Mrs. Moser asked Attorney Kessler how she could explain how she
learned about the Schudson letter if she were asked.According to a statement Mrs. Moser made to a
special investigator, Attorney Kessler said she could just tell people she had
heard it at a cocktail party and that it didn't matter because the letter was a
public record.[4]

¶11Mrs. Moser initially told Attorney Kessler that she wanted to think
about filing the complaint.After
discussing it with her family and a friend who had served on the Judicial
Commission, she told Attorney Kessler she would file the complaint.She edited the draft letter that Attorney
Kessler had provided her and filed a complaint against Judge Schudson with the
Judicial Commission, attaching copies of the Schudson letter and the PACER
document.

¶12The Judicial Commission notified Judge Schudson of the complaint on
January 23, 2004.On January 26, 2004,
Judge Schudson responded, acknowledged that the letter had violated SCR
60.03(2), and apologized.

¶13On March 8, 2004, a column in the Milwaukee Journal Sentinel
reported on the Schudson letter and the complaint that had been filed with the
Judicial Commission.Because Judge
Schudson had not waived his right to confidentiality in writing to the Judicial
Commission, the filing of the complaint and his response were supposed to be
confidential under Wis. Stat. § 757.93
(2003-04).[5]

¶14The election for the District I Court of Appeals seat occurred on
April 6, 2004.In the final weeks before
the election, Joan Kessler's campaign ran radio and television ads referring to
the complaint filed with the Judicial Commission against Judge Schudson.The ads stated the Judicial Commission was
investigating whether Judge Schudson had violated the judicial code by
"using his influence to try and help a convicted felon."Joan Kessler prevailed in the election.

¶15The complaint against Judge Schudson was resolved on June 26, 2004,
by the Judicial Commission issuing a letter notifying him that the complaint
was dismissed "with an expression of warning."

¶16After the election Mrs. Moser was contacted by the special
investigator retained to investigate a grievance that Judge Schudson had filed
against Joan Kessler.[6]Mrs. Moser contacted Attorney Kessler about
the contact from the special investigator and Attorney Kessler told her to tell
the truth.

¶17On April 4, 2008, the OLR filed a complaint against Attorney
Kessler alleging two counts of misconduct.The first count alleged that by inducing and assisting Mrs. Moser to
file the complaint with the Judicial Commission for the purpose of concealing
that he and/or the Joan Kessler campaign was the true source of the information
and impetus for the Judicial Commission complaint, and by advising Mrs. Moser
that if asked she should falsely state she learned about the matter at a
cocktail party, Attorney Kessler violated SCR 20:8.4(a) and (c).

¶18Count Two of the complaint alleged an additional violation of SCR
20:8.4(a) and (c).This count arose out
of an e-mail invitation to a fundraiser sent by the Joan Kessler campaign.The Joan Kessler campaign Website showed a
copy of a solicitation letter containing only Joan Kessler's signature
block.Four people calling themselves
"Friends of Judge Schudson" sent a letter to Joan Kessler saying that
her campaign Website had included her personal solicitation of financial
contributions, contrary to SCR 60.06(4).[7]In response, Attorney Kessler drafted an
affidavit for the signature of Joan Kessler's Website developer saying that the
claim was untrue.The Milwaukee
Journal Sentinel reported the Joan Kessler campaign alleged that Judge
Schudson's campaign had tampered with the Kessler campaign Website to make it
look as though Joan Kessler had violated an ethics rule.The parties subsequently stipulated that
Count Two of the complaint be dismissed.

¶19Jonathan V. Goodman was appointed referee in the matter.A hearing was held before the referee on
August 19, 2009.The referee issued his
report and recommendation on September 16, 2009.The referee concluded that Attorney Kessler's
directive to Mrs. Moser that, upon inquiry, she say that she heard about Judge
Schudson's misconduct at a cocktail party was not dishonest, fraudulent, or a
misrepresentation.The referee concluded
that the directive was deceptive in that it was not true.However, the referee adopted the definition
of "deceit" as contained in Webster's Third New International
Dictionary, as cited in State v. Dalton, 98 Wis.2d725, 298 N.W.2d 398, (Ct. App. 1980):"[T]he act or practice of
deceiving (as by falsification, concealing or cheating)...any trick, collusion,
contrivance, false representation, or underhand practice used to defraud
another." (Emphasis supplied by referee.)Id.at 739.

¶20The referee concluded since there was no evidence that Attorney
Kessler's directive to Mrs. Moser was actually used to defraud another, the OLR
failed to prove the allegations in Count One of the complaint by clear,
satisfactory, and convincing evidence.Accordingly, the referee recommended that Count One of the complaint be
dismissed.

¶21The OLR has appealed, arguing that Attorney Kessler did violate SCR
20:8.4(a) and (c) when he advised Mrs. Moser to lie in order to conceal his
role in supplying her information and in drafting the complaint for her to file
with the Judicial Commission.The OLR is
not challenging the referee's findings of fact, but rather is challenging the
referee's legal conclusion that Attorney Kessler's statement to Mrs. Moser did
not constitute a violation of SCR 20:8.4(a) and (c).The OLR asserts that the referee's legal conclusion
is predicated on an erroneous understanding of the law.

¶22The OLR argues that the referee erred by deconstructing the
verbiage of SCR 20:8.4(c), and in doing so, adding another element to the rule,
i.e., that a deceitful statement must be acted upon, in this case by a third
person.The OLR argues that neither the
language of the rule, nor cases construing it, suggest that an attorney's
deceptive statement must be used to defraud another in order to be actionable
under SCR 20:8.4(c).The OLR asks this
court to reverse the referee's legal conclusion that Attorney Kessler did not
violate the rule by telling Mrs. Moser to lie in order to conceal his
involvement in filing the complaint against Judge Schudson.

¶23Attorney Kessler asserts the referee correctly recommended
dismissal of Count One of the OLR's complaint based on the absence of evidence
that he engaged in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation
within the meaning of SCR 20:8.4(c).Attorney Kessler says although SCR 20:8.4(c) is a kind of catch-all
rule that extends beyond conduct constituting the practice of law, it does not
reach every utterance made in every sphere of an attorney's life.He says the referee was correct in concluding
that although characterizing the lunch with Mrs. Moser as a "cocktail
party" was not true, the OLR proved no violation of the rule.Attorney Kessler says the "cocktail
party" comment was nothing more than a suggestion as to how Mrs. Moser
might deflect a casual question about the source of her knowledge.He says similar to attributing information to
"a little birdie" or "the grapevine," the "cocktail
party" comment is an example of how people innocently deflect questions
they would rather avoid in a manner that is less awkward than a flat refusal to
answer.

¶24Attorney Kessler also argues that the First Amendment protected his
anonymous participation in a meritorious complaint about Judge Schudson, a
public official.Attorney Kessler argues
the United States Supreme Court has repeatedly held that criticism of judges
and other public officials is entitled to the highest level of protection.See, e.g.,Landmark Commc'ns, Inc.
v. Va., 435 U.S. 829,
838-39 (1978); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1976).He notes the Supreme Court has also held that
the intent to conceal identity in the exercise of political speech is
protected.He argues anonymity has long
been recognized as an important aspect of encouraging criticism of officials
and candidates.

¶25The OLR responds that the First Amendment does not shield false
statements, and if Attorney Kessler's statement to Mrs. Moser is properly
construed as a suggestion to lie, then it is not protected by the First
Amendment.

¶26The referee's findings of fact have not been shown to be clearly
erroneous, and we therefore adopt them.Although we disagree with the referee's legal conclusion that in order
to constitute misconduct under SCR 20:8.4(c) a deceptive statement must be used
to defraud another, we nevertheless agree with the referee's ultimate
conclusion that the OLR failed to meet its burden of proving that Attorney
Kessler's comment to Mrs. Moser violated the rule.

¶27We find no support for the referee's conclusion that a deceitful
statement must actually defraud someone before it will be found to violate SCR
20:8.4(c).State v. Dalton, the
court of appeals decision cited by the referee in support of this proposition,
is not on point.Dalton was convicted of first-degree murder,
kidnapping by deceit, and first-degree sexual assault.One of the issues raised on appeal was
whether the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction for kidnapping by
deceit.Evidence presented at Dalton's trial showed that
he represented he would transport his victim to the unemployment compensation
office.While Dalton did not challenge
the other elements of the kidnapping charge, he argued there was insufficient
evidence to show the kidnapping was carried out with deceit since there was no
proof that he made express or implied representations to the victim.The court of appeals rejected this argument,
saying that deceit necessarily implies that the victim be unaware that he or
she is being kidnapped.

¶28The court of appeals said, "Limiting proof of deceit to
express or implied misrepresentations would offer no protection to the victim
who was artfully deceived by a person who lured and trapped his victim without
resort to misrepresentation."Dalton, 98 Wis.2dat 740.Because the Dalton court was defining
"deceit" in the context of a criminal statute, that case is
inapposite here.There is no language in
SCR 20:8.4(c) or in prior attorney regulatory cases that would engraft onto the
rule a requirement that a deceitful statement must be actually used to defraud
someone before a rule violation may be found.

¶29Although we disagree with the referee's interpretation of the rule,
we nonetheless agree with the referee that Attorney Kessler's "cocktail
party" comment did not constitute a violation of SCR 20:8.4(c).[8]Attorney Kessler's statement to Mrs. Moser
did not itself contain a misrepresentation.For example, Attorney Kessler did not tell Mrs. Moser that he had
learned of the Schudson letter at a cocktail party or that Judge Schudson had
telephoned Judge Clevert as well as wrote a letter.

¶30What Attorney Kessler did was to suggest that Mrs. Moser make
a misrepresentation in the future if confronted with a particular
situation.There is no evidence in the
record, however, that (1) Mrs. Moser was ever confronted with the question of
how she learned of the Schudson letter, and (2) that she ever told anyone that
she had heard about the Schudson letter at a cocktail party.Had Mrs. Moser actually made the statement
pursuant to Attorney Kessler's suggestion, we would be confronted by a
different case.

¶31This does not mean that we are, in effect, adopting the referee's
interpretation that someone must be defrauded in order for there to be a
violation of SCR 20:8.4(c).The concept
of someone being defrauded includes the requirement that the hearer relied on a
false statement and took action (or refrained from taking action) that led to
the person incurring damage of some sort.The rule makes no reference to the impact of a misrepresentation on a
hearer of the false statement.

¶32The rule does, however, require that there be, at a minimum, a
dishonest or deceitful statement or a misrepresentation.That did not occur in this case.Attorney Kessler's statement suggested that
Mrs. Moser make a misrepresentation in the future, but it did not itself make a
false statement of fact.Moreover, Mrs.
Moser apparently did not follow through with Attorney Kessler's suggestion and
she never made any false statement of fact about the source of her
knowledge.Thus, we cannot find a
violation of SCR 20:8.4(c) under the particular facts of this case.In addition, since we find that the OLR
failed to establish a violation of any supreme court rule, we do not address
Attorney Kessler's First Amendment argument.

¶33Our application of the requirements of the rule, however, should
not be interpreted to be an endorsement of Attorney Kessler's behavior.Suggesting that someone not tell the truth is
never laudable.If Attorney Kessler did
not want Mrs. Moser to divulge his name, he could have simply asked her not to
answer any question about the source of her knowledge of the Schudson
letter.He should have advised her that
if she chose to respond to a question about the source of her knowledge, she
should reveal his identity.

¶34IT IS ORDERED that the disciplinary proceeding against Frederick P.
Kessler is dismissed without costs.

¶35ANNETTE KINGSLAND ZIEGLER, J. (concurring).I concur and agree that in this case, we are
bound by the referee's findings of fact because they have not been shown to be
clearly erroneous.Per curiam, ¶26.As Justice Prosser, Justice Roggensack, and
Justice Ziegler noted in the Gableman decision, seeIn re
Judicial Disciplinary Proceedings Against Gableman, 2010 WI 62, ¶52, 325
Wis. 2d 631, 784 N.W.2d 631, this court is to observe the
findings of facts or stipulation of facts as they exist in the record.As Justice Prosser, Justice Roggensack, and
Justice Ziegler further observed in the Gableman decision, it is not
within our province to call for a jury trial or a further fact-finding
process.Seeid., ¶54
n.24.I am pleased that we now have
unanimous agreement on our proper role in such matters.

¶36Simply stated, the per curiam's analysis in this case is consistent
with the analysis of Justice Prosser, Justice Roggensack, and Justice Ziegler
in the Gableman decision.Seeid., ¶52
("On review, we employ the rules applicable to civil proceedings and we
accept the Panel's findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous.No party contends the Panel's fact findings
are clearly erroneous or that there is any need for further fact-finding.").However, the per curiam's analysis is
inconsistent with the writing of Chief Justice Abrahamson, Justice Bradley, and
Justice Crooks in the Gableman decision, in which those three justices
disregarded the Judicial Conduct Panel's findings of fact and the parties'
stipulation of facts. SeeIn re Judicial Disciplinary Proceedings
Against Gableman, 2010 WI 61, ¶¶37, 46, 325 Wis. 2d 579, 784
N.W.2d 605.I am pleased to see
that here, Chief Justice Abrahamson, Justice Bradley, and Justice Crooks afford
proper deference to the facts before this court.The level of deference which we apply to the
referee's findings of fact in this case should be consistent with the deference
we owed the Judicial Conduct Panel's findings of fact and the factual stipulation
in the Gableman decision.SeeGableman, 325 Wis.2d631, ¶52.

¶37For the foregoing reason, I respectfully concur.

¶38I am authorized to state that Justice PATIENCE DRAKE ROGGENSACK
joins this concurrence.

¶39MICHAEL J. GABLEMAN, J. (concurring).I agree with and fully adopt the conclusions
of Justice Zeigler's concurrence.We are
bound by the referee's findings of fact in this case because they have not been
shown to be clearly erroneous.I write
separately merely to avoid even the appearance of commenting directly or
indirectly on a case in which I was a party.

[1]SCR 20:8.4(a) and (c)
state it is professional misconduct for a lawyer to:"(a) violate or attempt to violate the
Rules of Professional Conduct, knowingly assist or induce another to do so, or
do so through the acts of another;" and "(c) engage in conduct
involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation;...."

[2] In most cases the dismissal of
a proceeding occurs by unpublished order.Because the conduct at issue here occurred in the course of a judicial
campaign conducted by the respondent's spouse, Joan F. Kessler, and because Ms.
Kessler is now a sitting judge, we deem it appropriate to issue our decision in
the form of a published per curiam decision in order to provide a full
explanation for the decision we reach.

A judge may not allow
family, social, political or other relationships to influence the judge's
judicial conduct or judgment.A judge
may not lend the prestige of judicial office to advance the private interests
of the judge or of others or convey or permit others to convey the impression
that they are in a special position to influence the judge. A judge may not testify voluntarily as a
character witness.

[4]Mrs. Moser did not
testify at the hearing before the referee so her statement to the special
investigator is the only evidence in the record of how Attorney Kessler responded
to her question about how she should respond if someone asked how she had
learned about the letter.The
"cocktail party" reference was made in response to a leading question
posed by the special investigator.Attorney Kessler says he has no
specific recollection of making the "cocktail party" comment but he
also said he had no reason to believe that Mrs. Moser would testify falsely.

(1)(a) All
proceedings under ss. 757.81 to 757.99 relating to misconduct or permanent
disability prior to the filing of a petition or formal complaint by the
commission are confidential unless a judge or circuit or supplemental court
commissioner waives the right to confidentiality in writing to the commission.
Any such waiver does not affect the confidentiality of the identity of a person
providing information under par. (b).

(b) Any person
who provides information to the commission concerning possible misconduct or
permanent disability may request that the commission not disclose his or her
identity to the judge or circuit or supplemental court commissioner prior to
the filing of a petition or a formal complaint by the commission.

(2) If prior to
the filing of a formal complaint or a petition an investigation of possible
misconduct or permanent disability becomes known to the public, the commission
may issue statements in order to confirm the pendency of the investigation, to
clarify the procedural aspects of the disciplinary proceedings, to explain the
right of the judge or circuit or supplemental court commissioner to a fair
hearing without prejudgment, to state that the judge or circuit or supplemental
court commissioner denies the allegations, to state that an investigation has
been completed and no probable cause was found or to correct public
misinformation.

(3) The petition
or formal complaint filed under s. 757.85 by the commission and all subsequent
hearings thereon are public.

(4) This section
does not preclude the commission, in its sole discretion, from:

(a) Referring to
the director of state courts information relating to an alleged delay or an
alleged temporary disability of a judge or circuit or supplemental court
commissioner.

(b) Referring to
an appropriate law enforcement authority information relating to possible
criminal conduct or otherwise cooperating with a law enforcement authority in
matters of mutual interest.

(c) Referring to
an attorney disciplinary agency information relating to the possible misconduct
or incapacity of an attorney or otherwise cooperating with an attorney
disciplinary agency in matters of mutual interest.

(d) Disclosing to
the chief justice or director of state courts information relating to matters
affecting the administration of the courts.

(e) Issuing an annual
report under s. 757.97.

[6]An attorney
disciplinary complaint was later filed against Joan Kessler by the Lawyer
Regulation System.The complaint alleged
that Joan Kessler had falsely told a special investigator that to her knowledge
neither she nor anyone in her campaign nor anyone she knew had any part in
filing the complaint against Judge Schudson with the Judicial Commission.The complaint also alleged that Joan Kessler
had falsely told a special investigator that she did not know who had leaked
information about the complaint against Judge Schudson to the Milwaukee
Journal Sentinel.The disciplinary
proceeding against Joan Kessler is being resolved in a separate opinion issued
today.In re Disciplinary Proceedings
Against Kessler, 2010 WI 121 (Case No. 2009AP1529-D).

[7]SCR 60.06(4) reads as
follows:Solicitation and Acceptance of
Campaign Contributions.

A judge, candidate for
judicial office, or judge-elect shall not personally solicit or accept campaign
contributions. A candidate may, however, establish a committee to solicit and
accept lawful campaign contributions. The committee is not prohibited from
soliciting and accepting lawful campaign contributions from lawyers, other
individuals or entities even though the contributor may be involved in a
proceeding in which the judge, candidate for judicial office, or judge-elect is
likely to participate. A judge or candidate for judicial office or judge-elect
may serve on the committee but should avoid direct involvement with the
committee's fundraising efforts. A judge or candidate for judicial office or
judge-elect may appear at his or her own fundraising events. When the committee
solicits or accepts a contribution, a judge, candidate for judicial office, or
judge-elect should also be mindful of the requirements of SCR 60.03 and
60.04(4); provided, however, that the receipt of a lawful campaign contribution
shall not, by itself, warrant judicial recusal.

[8] We note that the OLR has not
alleged that any of Attorney Kessler's other statements to Mrs. Moser were
misrepresentations.For example, there
is no claim that Attorney Kessler misrepresented to Mrs. Moser what Judge
Schudson had done or what the applicable provision of the Code of Judicial
Conduct required.Likewise, the OLR has
not contended that Attorney Kessler violated any ethical rule by soliciting
Mrs. Moser to file the complaint rather than filing it himself.We do not find it laudatory that Attorney
Kessler attempted to hide behind a third person for political reasons, but
there is no claim of an ethical violation in that regard presented to us here.