Tag Archives: mining

Abstract: Chile and Norway are two ‘natural resource intensive economies’, which have had different development trajectories, yet are closely similar in industrial structure and geophysical conditions. The questions of how and why Chile and Norway have developed so differently are explored through an analysis of how knowledge accumulation occurred and how it was transformed by learning into technological innovation in mining, a sector which has long traditions in Norway and has been by far the largest export sector in Chile for centuries. Similar types of ‘knowledge organisations’ with the direct aim of developing knowledge for mining were developed in both countries. Formal mining education, scientifically trained professionals, organisations for technology transfer and geological mapping and ore surveys are compared in the search for differences which may explain the underlying reasons for variations in economic growth.

The effect of mining on the economic development of countries with abundant natural resources is a central issue of the history of economics. The question is straightforward: Why does mining have a positive effect on some countries while in others its contributions to the economic development are scant, not to mention the huge environmental problems that mineral extraction and processing generate? The “resource curse” myth does, unfortunately, hold true in most developing economies, but it is hard to take on board when we consider countries with very long mining traditions like Australia, the USA and Canada, to mention but three, and their high levels of income. There is, therefore, a need for studies that do not demonize the sector but rather search out deep causes and well-founded arguments to explain the conditions in which mining has a positive effect, or other, on development.

Kristin Ranestad approaches the issue from a comparative institutional perspective. The examples she uses, Chile and Norway, are in some ways congruent, in that both have a long mining tradition and they are not dependent countries with development problems; indeed, in terms of development per inhabitant, they are clear leaders in South America and Europe.

Ranestad identifies the similarities and differences in the levels of education of the mining engineers and technicians; the proportional presence of the latter in mining; the deployment of advanced information systems, such as scientific journals or attendance at congresses and exhibitions; the existence of study travels and work abroad; and the intensity of geological mapping and ore surveys.

The conclusions Ranestad draws leave little room for doubt. All the above facets that affect technological knowledge in modern mining are to be found in both countries, yet there are important differences in terms of quality and quantity, with Norway always coming out on top, except in terms of university education. Chile loses out as there is no direct relationship between the size of the mining sector and the level of development of other factors, where it trails Norway by some way.

The reasons, although not explained in depth here, lie to a large extent in the presence of large North American groups like Kennecot or Anaconda in Chile since the First World War. These controlled the huge deposits of Chuquicamata or El Teniente, where they introduced modern mining production technologies that boosted export capacity, although they always acted in isolation. At the same time, there was a large group of small and medium size Chilean mines that was working with minimum technology, almost non-existent externalities and a highly deficient exploitation of the deposits, which were frequently abandoned well before they had been fully exploited with the technology of the time. In contrast, Norway was streets ahead in all aspects and its mines were far more diversified and making far better use of their resources. They were also far more in tune with the economic environment.

The approach seems to be an interesting one since economic historians frequently, and mistakenly, argue in favor of the importance of quickly reaching historical landmarks that affect institutional and technological development, while overlooking the real significance of these for the production system. We tend to give an overwhelming importance to the age of technical schools, professional associations or scientific publications rather than to reflect more on how much influence they have had and how mature they are.

There may be some question marks hanging over Ranestad’s figures for the numbers of active engineers in each country. According to her reasoning and to the sources consulted, the argument stems from the idea that training was an endogenous affair since she draws on the mining schools’ own records to fix the figures of engineers. So we cannot, on the basis of the information provided, know what percentage of engineers had been trained abroad. In Spain, for example, which was a leading mining power at the time, there was a relatively high number of engineers who had studied abroad prior to the Second World War. Indeed, foreigners and Spaniards who had studied abroad accounted for some 250 mining engineers, according to one database constructed using the annuals of mining engineers, even though it did not include man professionals working in large companies in Spain, like Rio Tinto Co, Tharsis, la Asturiana or Peñarroya, which did not even bother to inform about such matters (see Bertilorenzi, Passaqui and Garçon 2016, pp. 143-162). The author herself, when talking about foreign engineers, notes: “However, their dominance was negative in the sense that the lack of collaboration with domestic engineers and leaders prevented knowledge transfer within the sector”. Yet she does not back this up with hard figures.

Nevertheless, her contribution is a valuable one which affords a novel approach that is perfectly applicable to other works of comparative economic history. In the case of Chile, there is no explanation of the differences to the sector following the nationalization of the copper industry between 1853 and 1971. In perspective, though, it is not comparable with the Norwegian situation in the sense of the sector’s capacity to transfer knowledge to other sectors and to the country as a whole. A prime example is Orkla, which is today a huge, widely diversified conglomerate that has little do to with mining, but which in the 1920s produced copper and pyrites more profitably than its competitors, despite its mineral being 10% poorer in quality. It would even sell technology to Rio Tinto, no less. It would also be worthwhile analyzing whether the nationalization of copper mining and the government control of oil in Norway have had similar repercussions for the inhabitants of each country. A starting point would be to ask Chilean pensioners whether they have similar benefits to their Norwegian counterparts, even though the answer does seem foregone.

By Pierre van der Eng, The Australian National University (Canberra) (pierre.vandereng@anu.edu.au)

Abstract: Indonesia has long been a major producer of minerals for international markets. Starting in 2014, it implemented legislation banning exports of unprocessed minerals and requiring producers to invest in processing facilities to add more value before export. This paper establishes what light past experiences in Indonesia with mining sheds on this recent development. It quantifies and discusses the growth of mining production in Indonesia since 1870. It analyses the institutional arrangements that past governments used to maximise resource rents and domestic value adding. The paper finds that production and exports of mining commodities were long dominated by oil, but increased and diversified over time, particularly since the 1960s. The development of the mining sector depended on changes in market prices, mining technologies and the cost of production, but particularly on the institutional arrangements that guided the decisions of foreign investors to commit to mining production and processing in Indonesia.

Review by Miguel A. López-Morell

Mining is an economic activity that abounds with paradoxes and differs greatly from manufacturing and agriculture. Mining involves sourcing underground natural resources which, in turn, depends on the presence of certain minerals in the area, on the total costs of extraction, transport, refining, etc. and the current and expected demand for the mineral(s). The exact amount to be sourced is uncertain. Furthermore, mining is often environmentally unfriendly and as a rule, non-regenerative. It has a limited life as it ends the moment the material is exhausted. This unless new technologies or price hikes turn the extraction of any remanents profitable. Mining also associates with important negative externalities, as a consequence from the changes to the landscapes and the pollution it causes. Hence, teh potential market failures make case for state intervention and in regulating mining activity, the state has to strike a balance between wealth generation, employment and the ensuing negative factors. This sort of considerations and issues gain greater weight when extraction is to be carried out by foreign companies.

There are two broad areas that encompass an ongoing debate around the degree of state intervention in mining. On the one hand, ownership and control of the deposits and, on the other hand, taxation. The debates around taxation dwell on the extent to which the state can generate revenue through compulsive contributions based on local production and/or exports. The debate about ownership and control essentially starts with the idea that, regardless of who owns the top soil, whatever is underground belongs to the state. The discussion that ensues deals with how the state should enable individuals and/or companies to explore and exploit underground riches by ceding rights of explotation through concessions and permits. For instance atttutes towards mining in Germany, Peru, Mexico, Japan and Uruguay at the beginning of the 20th century resulted in a system of almost absolute freedom for domestic and foreign individuals and companies to make claims and exploit their mines. Examples of restrictive policies include the nationalization of oil in Mexico (1938), tin in Bolivia (1952) as well as that of copper in the Democratic Republic of Congo (1967 and again 2010) and Chile (1971).

A large number of studies on the mining sector have emphasized the role of lobby groups in achieving better legislative conditions for exploiting and exporting mineral resources. At the same time, however, these studies also document how widespread administrative corruption has given rise to what is known as the “mineral resource curse” hypothesis or the apparent paradox that countries endowed with large mineral resources have not seen this wealth reflected in their GDPs. Morover, that these same countries often suffer sinificant imbalances in the distribution of the income, with mining districts falling into abandonment or in a precarious state. These are countries that have been unable to develop alternative economic activities to mining, suffer from poor infrastructure, and pollution from mining.

The paper by Pierre van der Eng, distributed by NEP-HIS on 2014-09-25 offers an important contribution to better understanding the “mineral resource curse”. Van der Eng takes a long-term view to address the policies undertaken by the Indonesian authorities to maximize income form their mining, be it through direct or shared exploitation or through specific tax policies. Over a 140 year period he establishes the various historical stages that have characterized the evolution of the Indonesian mining industry in terms of employment, exports, production and generation of added value and, most importantly, income absorbed by the national economy through the various types of mining.

Pierre van der Eng

At is birth in 1945, the Indonesian Republic inherited a system of tight control over the deposits in the region (as excercise by th Dutch through the former monopoly of the Chartered East Indies Company). In the decades following independence, the Indonesian governments maintained and reinforced the policy of tight control. At the same time, it set up an interesting shared management model of the deposits between a specialized public body and foreign mining companies (known as Contracts of Work or CoW). The CoW resulted in a significant improvement in both the control of production and revenue from taxes.

The CoW legally ceased to exist in 2009. Since then Indonesia began to decentralized a significant part of the collection of mining taxes. The loss of this revenue has been compensated with measures designed to increase the effort of the mining companies in the country and by retaining higher percentages of the added value generated by the mining industry. For example, in early 2014 the Indonesian government introduced a prohibition on mining firms exporting raw or concentrated minerals, which effectively force multinationals like Freeport-McMoRan to develop copper refineries inside the country while, at the same time, compensate for the lost revenue assosiated with the fall of the international oil price.

The Indonesian case is considered “paradigmatic” example of a good management policy of mineral resources. This thanks to Indonesia avoding the state-monopoly model (popular amongst oil producing countries). The Indonesian approach also shows that it is possible to find ways for the country to absorb a high proportion of the value added by mining productions while, at the same time, direct or manage investment in a strategic sector. The Indonesian approach seems to suggest that it is possible to align the incentives and outcomes of state companies and foreign multinationals. Specially as the latter complement a lack of capital and the country’s know-how. In the Indonesian case the lattter occurred while relating to a number of Japanese investments, which contributed to the Indonesian economy with capital, workers and technology. In these circumstances, the Indonesian government was able to supply oil and other raw material needs of the Japanese, who in turn reduced their dependence on more distant suppliers.

In short, the paper by Pierre van der Eng is opportune. A much welcome contribution to the world of mining history. There are few historical economic studies available on the micro and macroeconomic effects of mining on the economies of countries rich in mining resources. The view offered may also set off deeper reflection about how much pressure can be brought to bear on the profits of businesses whose presence in an area is fleeting. It may also inspire more comparative studies by countries.

References

Crowson, P. (2008) Mining Unearthed: The definitive book on how economic and political influences shape the global mining industry. London: Aspermont.