/6/According to a note attached to the source text, Rusk neither approved nor disapproved this recommendation, presumably because his approval was not necessary until it was concurred in by other agencies.

/7/None of these letters, which were transmitted on June 9, is printed, but see footnote 2, Document 184.

Khrushchev will regard the Vienna talks as far more important than a
probing of the President's views. In discussing foreign relations in general,
Khrushchev will expound the Soviet line on peaceful coexistence, stressing
in particular the need for both sides to avoid actions which could produce
nuclear war and the thesis that the US must draw appropriate conclusions
from the growth of Soviet power. He will seek specific agreements, and will
expect that the conference outcome will set the pattern for Soviet diplomacy
for some months to come. Khrushchev would prefer that the talks end on a note
of accord, and may make some conciliatory gestures for this reason. But his
attachment to this aim will depend primarily on the outcome of the talks on
major issues. Probably Khrushchev's foremost aim will be to obtain some commitment
to hold resumed negotiations on Berlin and Germany. Short of a categorical
rejection of any further negotiations on Berlin, Khrushchev would probably
be willing to accept considerably less than his optimum demands on conference
arrangements. Khrushchev's approach to disarmament questions is less predictable,
but the possibility of modifications in the present rigid Soviet position
on a test ban agreement or general disarmament cannot be excluded.

Introduction

The Vienna talks will be the culmination of a procession of Soviet approaches--some
made as early as last November--for a meeting between Chairman Khrushchev
and President Kennedy. This record leaves little doubt of Khrushchev's keen
interest in the meeting.

The record also contains clear pointers to the topics the Soviet leader will want to discuss. He will stress the need--

(a) to arrive at an early, negotiated "interim" settlement of the Berlin
question,

Khrushchev may also invite the President to visit the Soviet Union, and
despite his intimations to the contrary, may raise the questions of Cuba
and Laos. And, of course, he will wish to sound out President Kennedy
as a leader, to test the man against impressions and hypotheses formed by
Soviet diplomats and propagandists.

While this much is clear, these matters are of such scope and elasticity that they give Khrushchev considerable leeway in deciding how to play his cards. Before examining these particulars, it is useful to analyze several trends in Soviet policy which will have a bearing on Khrushchev's approach to the conference.

Soviet diplomacy over the past year has shown marked inconsistencies. These
inconsistencies have been partly the result of immediate circumstances, but
in almost every instance they also reflect certain deeper, inherent features
of present-day Soviet foreign policy.

In the first instance, "flexibility" is the hall-mark of Khrushchev's style.
This flexibility takes shape in several ways. But most pertinent here is the
tactic of alternating assertive and détente phases in the expectation
that the West can be induced to yield positions peacefully through negotiations
in a period of détente by virtue of the pressures that led up to it.
Khrushchev's handling of the Berlin issue can be explained to an important
degree in these terms.

Beyond this contrived ambivalence, there is also a true inconsistency in
Khrushchev's diplomacy which has been increasingly discernible in recent years.
The implications of the nuclear age, the political isolation in which Stalin's
rigid policies placed the USSR and the communist movement, and internal requirements
of the Soviet regime, compelled Stalin's successors to develop a new look
in foreign policy--a strategy based on minimizing the risks of nuclear war,
consolidation of Soviet holdings in Eastern Europe, a paternalistic alliance
(where possible) with the forces of nationalism in the underdeveloped world,
a generally gradualist approach to the goal of bringing communist parties
to power, and more open and normal state relations between the West and
the USSR.

On the other hand, the USSR's acquisition of a growing strategic strike force
and increasing economic power have lent a new, assertive impulse to Soviet
policies in recent years. Khrushchev maintains that the change in the world
"correlation of forces" to the USSR's advantage should compel the West to
recognize the "reality" of irrevocable communist rule in Eastern Europe,
to "normalize" such anomalies as West Berlin and the unrecognized status
of East Germany, and to refrain from "counter-revolution" (intervention)
in the face of communist advances outside the bloc.

Both of these trends are compatible with the Soviet understanding of that
elastic concept, peaceful coexistence. And Khrushchev would like to have the
best of each. He seems to hope that by incessant though relatively unprovocative
pressures (primarily political) he can consolidate and extend Soviet influence,
particularly in the underdeveloped world. At the same time, he seems to hope
that when these pressures do arouse adverse reactions, he can minimize the
military risks (in relations with the US) and the political liabilities (in
relations with nationalist neutral governments). But a harmonious blending
of these approaches is not always possible, even in the day-to-day functioning
of Soviet diplomacy. Over the long run, these two trends hold profoundly
different implications for Soviet relations with the free world.

Finally, even deeper contradictions flow from the dual role the Soviet leaders play as rulers of the USSR and heads of the communist world. In the former role, their primary concerns are the security and the political-economic well-being of the Soviet state. But the impulses these concerns lend to Soviet policy often are circumscribed or nullified by the obligations and loyalties assumed by the USSR as center of the bloc and communist movement. This factor is most conspicuous in Soviet relations with Communist China, not only because of mutual obligations but because Peiping's challenge from the left to Soviet leadership of the communist world imposes upon the Soviet leaders a need to prove their militancy if they are to hold the support of other communist parties. At the heart of the matter are the conflicting national interests of the USSR and Communist China (as defined by the communist rulers) and the difficulty of reconciling the divergent policies and views of these two communist superpowers in a political system based on the proposition that there is a single source of authority and truth.

Pressures arising out of the Sino-Soviet dispute have been an important consideration
behind the assertiveness characterizing Soviet foreign policy over the past
year. They may well influence Khrushchev's behavior at Vienna. Still, Communist
China by no means has a veto--whether direct or indirect--over Soviet policies.
In recent months, the USSR has continued to pursue policies which, in several
specific instances, run directly counter to Chinese Communist interests.

This ambivalence is nowhere better illustrated than at the Geneva test ban
negotiations. There is little doubt that Moscow's desire to inhibit Communist
China's acquisition of nuclear weapons has been one important reason why
the Soviets have seriously entertained the idea of a supervised nuclear test
ban. And there is equally little doubt that Peiping's ambition to become a
nuclear power is one important reason why the prospects for a test ban agreement
have dimmed during the resumed session of the conference.

General Approach

Despite the agreement to keep the Vienna meeting informal, Khrushchev will
regard these talks as far more important than a mere probing of President
Kennedy's views. His own position convinces him of the importance of having
the ear of the man in charge, and he will want to impress upon the President
his views as to how US-Soviet relations, and the affairs of the world,
should be governed. He probably will seek specific agreements, if only to
prove to his own audiences that his summit diplomacy pays off. And he will
expect that the conference outcome--both the particulars and the general atmosphere--will
set the pattern for the style of Soviet diplomacy for some months to come.

Khrushchev will come to Vienna in a confident mood, his confidence swelled
by the events in Laos, in Cuba, and in outer space, and by the general
growth of Soviet power. But it would be a mistake to overestimate this confidence.
Khrushchev's vacillation over pressing the Berlin issue during the past year
indicates an awareness of the potential dangers involved. He might well feel
that a vigorous US response to a sharp Soviet challenge on Berlin would
be more likely, not less so, in the wake of Cuba and Laos. There is also convincing
evidence of Moscow's concern over its exposed position in Cuba, the growing
US-Indian rapprochement, and increased US defense expenditures. In addition,
Khrushchev has his own problems within the bloc--with Communist China and
Albania--and internal problems as well.

During the talks, Khrushchev might, for effect, strike a note of anger and
bluster--particularly in response to strong language on sensitive issues.
But it seems likely that he will generally assume an attitude of reasonable
firmness, coupled with a pitch for improved US-Soviet relations.

Khrushchev would prefer that the talks end on a note of accord, that they
convey the beginning of a new period of relaxed international tensions. (However,
mindful of the Sino-Soviet polemics of last year, Khrushchev will not be prepared
to go so far in this regard as he did following his talks with President Eisenhower.)
In addition to other, more general, considerations which are cited below,
he probably believes that a détente atmosphere would establish a political
deterrent of sorts to forceful US action against Cuba, and against Laos in
the event the current negotiations break down. He might also hope that this
atmosphere would take some of the steam out of an expanding US arms program.
And, while not essential, an atmosphere of US- Soviet accord would harmonize
with the type of Party Program Khrushchev evidently plans to present at the
CPSU Congress next October (which it is anticipated will emphasize consumer
welfare, and ultimate communist victory through economic competition and peaceful
coexistence).

Khrushchev might be prepared to make some conciliatory gestures for the sake of outward harmony; he might even have "saved up" some lesser concessions for this purpose. But his attachment to harmony will not be without conditions; it will depend to a large extent on the outcome of the talks on the major substantive issues.