Wednesday, November 30, 2011

"... What’s even more astonishing is that he sent these emails in his own name using his personal e mail address, which allowed every recipient to identify him. This despite the fact that his father, who works for the Shin Bet, managed to get a gag order restricting publication of his name. More on Mom and Dad below..."

"... Because the FSA is an increasingly important player that will likely influence the outcome of events in Syria, the United States and its partners should make contact with its members and learn as much as possible about the group. Questions concerning its nature, its potential as an armed force, and the role of Islamists can be resolved through such contact as well as intelligence work. If the results are positive, then the FSA should be assisted wherever outside aid would be both possible and effective. Arms, advice, training, and money could be provided through clandestine channels, if nothing else...."

Tuesday, November 29, 2011

"... On Monday, the day after the Arab League voted to impose sanctions on Syria, Lavrov addressed Arab ambassadors in Moscow. He stressed the Kremlin’s policy that internal problems “should be resolved peacefully through national dialogue aimed at promoting civil harmony and without outside interference.”

The meeting seemed to be a warm up for an expected veto by Russia if the Arab League asks the United Nations Security Council to approve sanctions against Syria.

Russia has a lot at stake in Syria.... Russia’s show of naval force comes one week after an American naval task force, led by the USS George H.W. Bush, the Navy’s newest aircraft carrier, arrived off Syria’s coast.

If gunboat diplomacy is the cards, Russia has an advantage on land. Hundreds of active duty Syrian officers have trained at Russian military academies....

For now, Moscow is talking peace — but is starting to brandish its big stick. “A scenario involving military intervention in Syrian affairs is absolutely unacceptable for us,” Foreign Ministry Spokesman Alexander Lukashevich said on Friday, on the eve of the Arab League’s vote to impose sanctions. Then, on Sunday, within hours of the Arab League vote, a Russian Navy General Staff officer briefed Izvestiya about the deployment of the aircraft carrier to Syrian waters...."

"... Reform-based Islamic movements, such as the Muslim Brotherhood, work within the political process. They learned a bitter lesson from their armed conflict in Syria against the regime of Hafez al-Assad in 1982, which cost the lives of more than 20,000 people and led to the incarceration or banishment of many thousands more. The Syrian experience convinced mainstream Islamic movements to avoid armed struggle and to observe `strategic patience` instead. ..."

National Security Advisor to the Vice President Tony Blinken told reporters on Monday that he expects Biden to discuss U.S. assistance in fighting the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), which has been attacking Turkish forces recently.

"The PKK is a common enemy of Turkey, the United States, and Iraq, and we expect to focus on that," Blinken said.

Blinken also said Biden hopes to discuss the situation in Syria, the upcoming meeting of Cypriot leaders in January, the war in Afghanistan, "and the prospects for progress in normalizing relations between Turkey and Armenia." ... Regarding Turkey's deteriorating relationship with Israel, Blinken said, "I suspect that that will come up."

"It pains us to see the two of them at odds because they're both such close partners of the United States," Blinken said. "And the bottom line is that improved relations between Turkey and Israel would be good for Turkey, good for Israel, and good for the United States and indeed good for the region and the world so that's something we will continue to encourage." ..."

"... Al-As'ad's statements are indicative of an increasing trend of Syrian opposition members--or foreign activists lobbying on their behalf--making selective demands of outsiders to provide military support, albeit on their own terms.

This has been particularly evident in the public discussions on whether a no-fly zone (NFZ) should be imposed over Syria. An anonymous 25-year-old FSA member boasted, "The [Assad] regime would only last thirty days" with a NFZ. Another FSA member, Lt. Col. Abdullah Yousef, claimed, "If there is such a zone, the regime will not last for a week."... ... Syrian opposition groups do not agree on the intended objectives of international military support. All of the groups endorse President Assad's downfall, including the Syrian National Council, which lists "toppling of the regime" as a founding goal. Yet, rather than simply acknowledging that outside intervention is to help assure regime change, each group claims that they only need support to protect civilians. Although this strategy makes sense after Libya demonstrated that a regime change double-team by domestic and external forces is a resource intensive, uncertain, and open ended commitment, it is impossible to distinguish between the two intertwined objectives...

Finally, apparently beggars can be choosers, as Syrian opposition groups are also selective about which countries should participate in the intervention. An elder statesman of the opposition, Haitham al-Maleh, initially called for NATO to intervene under the principle of R2P, but later clarified his position:"I do not and did not agree to NATO intervention...NATO means America and I'm against that." Lt. Salem Odeh, a Syrian army defector, noted: "I just hope there will be Turkish military intervention. It's better, and they have longstanding blood ties from old times, and they are closer to the East than West." An exiled Muslim Brotherhood member agreed: "If other interventions are required, such as air protection...then the people will accept Turkish intervention. They do not want Western intervention." Another, more tolerant, activist in Deir al-Zour welcomed the idea that "Arab governments should make a no-fly zone over Syria."

Before NATO, Turkey (a NATO member, by the way), or "Arab governments" intervene in Syria, they must provide a plausible explanation as to how military force can succeed in civilian protection and/or regime change. Moreover, given the competing and disjointed demands among Syrian opposition groups, any intervention force should explain why it has privileged the interests of one group over another. Even then, the likelihood of the intervention succeeding is uncertain. The notion that external military force is an easily controlled tool that can be applied piecemeal to assure regime change is dubious. Nonetheless, if the level of violence against the civilian population worsens, and diplomatic and economic sanctions fail to compel a change in Assad's behavior, it is an option that must be debated and considered."

"... An aide to Mr. Peres said the president thought that Jordan would not want to publicize the visit, so the Israelis kept it quiet in advance. They were surprised — and pleased — when the Jordanians made it public.

Jordanian analysts said the trip seemed to be part of the king’s efforts to increase his regional role as well as a message to the Palestinians that they could not avoid negotiations with Israel even as they sought unity between the Fatah-dominated Palestinian Authority and Hamas, which rules in Gaza.

It is also considered a warning to Khaled Meshal, the Hamas chief, that his coming trip to Jordan, his first official visit in years, should not be seen as a sign of a shift in Jordanian policy. Like the Persian Gulf monarchs, King Abdullah fears giving too much license to Islamist forces..."

"...There are good reasons to think that Morocco’s Islamists are different. Unlike much of the Washington cognoscenti, I have actually met them. While they are not my cup of tea, over tea, they know how to talk like moderates. And they will be forced to govern that way.
Even with a massive majority, the Islamist party (known officially as the Party of Development and Justice and known universally by its initials in French, PGD) lacks a 50% majority to govern alone. It expects to go into coalition with the establishment Istiqal party (which favors the moderate-minded king) and several secular Socialist parties. Its coalition will fly apart if it tries to impose sharia, overturn the rights of women and Jews or ban alcohol, bikinis or interest payments...
The PGD is seen as uncorrupted by politics, largely because they have never had the power to trade political favors for money. The new constitution, adopted by referendum in July, vests complete control over domestic affairs to the national parliament and the new prime minister, who will be appointed from the PGD leadership. If they succumb to the world’s second-oldest temptation, they will lose their luster among their core voters.
That’s exactly what happened to Islamist parties in Muslim-majority Malaysia, where the Islamists won provincial elections and lost them at the next election when voters realized that they were just as human as other politicians. A similar pattern emerged in Iraq...
What about the PGD itself? I met the author of the PGD’s party platform on a sunny terrace near a swimming pool, just steps from the hotel bar. He didn’t seem the least perturbed, though he ordered tea. His name is Khalfi Mustapha and, in perfect American English, he explained that he learned about democracy while interning in the congressional office of Rep. Jim McDermott (D-Wash.)...."

"...This demonisation of Iran at times seems to set the stage for a military attack on Iran by the US and Israel. The propaganda build-up is very similar to that directed against Saddam Hussein's Iraq in 2002. In both cases, an isolated state with limited resources is presented as a real danger to the region and the world. Unlikely and sometimes comical conspiracy theories are given official credence, such as the supposed plot of an Iranian-American used-car dealer in Texas teaming up with the Iranian Revolutionary Guard to assassinate the Saudi ambassador in Washington. Iran's nuclear programme is identified as a threat in much the same way as Saddam Hussein's non-existent WMD.It therefore came as a shock when the distinguished Egyptian-American lawyer Cherif Bassiouni, who led the Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry into this year's unrest, said flatly in his 500-page report last week that there is no evidence of Iranian involvement in events in Bahrain...
No doubt the kings and emirs of the Gulf sincerely believe their own conspiracy theories. Many of those tortured during the brutal repression in Bahrain have since given evidence that their torturers repeatedly asked them about their links to Iran. Middle-aged hospital consultants were forced to sign confessions admitting that they were members of an Iranian revolutionary plot. After accepting the Bassiouni report, King Hamad bin Isa al-Khalifa said that, though his government could not produce clear evidence, Tehran's role was evident to "all who have eyes and ears".
The same paranoia about Iran runs deep among Sunnis across the Middle East. One Bahrain dissident, who fled to Qatar earlier this year, told me that "people in Qatar kept asking me if there was a tunnel leading from Pearl Square [the rallying point for the demonstrators] to Iran. They were only half-joking."
The identification of Shia political activism with Iran in the minds of the Sunni has gone too deep to be erased. Last week saw a resurgence of protests among the two million Shia in Saudi Arabia,... As in the past, the Saudi Interior Ministry claimed that confrontations between the police and protesters were "ordered by masters abroad" – which is invariably the Saudi state's way of referring to Iran.
The Saudi opposition says that comments by non-Shia Saudis on Twitter and the internet show that the government policy of blaming everything on Iran may not quite carry the conviction it once did. "We stand on the edge of the halls of fire," commented one woman graphically.
The protests in Eastern Province are likely to intensify. As elsewhere in the Arab world, youth no longer obeys traditional leaders. The Saudi and Bahraini monarchs may blame Iranian television for inflaming the situation, but what really fuels Shia anger is what they see on YouTube or read on Twitter or the internet. What influences protesters is less Iran and more the example of young demonstrators similar to themselves demanding political and civil rights in Cairo and Syria.
In the year of the Arab Awakening the traditional Saudi way of getting local notables to quiet things down no longer works. Last week these complained to the governor of Eastern Province, Prince Mohammad bin Fahd, who had asked them to come to a meeting in the provincial capital, Dammam, that they could no longer persuade their people to end the protests because their calls for moderation earlier this year had produced no concessions from the Saudi government with regard to discrimination against Shia. Shia prisoners held without trial since 1996 have not been released.
In Saudi Arabia and Bahrain, belief in the hidden hand of Iran behind the protests has led to both governments making a serious mistake. They have come to believe they are facing a revolutionary threat, when the Bahraini and Saudi Shia would be satisfied with a fair share of jobs, official positions and business. The Shia want to join the club, not blow it up. By refusing to see this, the Saudi and Bahraini monarchs destabilise their own states.
Iran has never been as strong as its enemies portray it or as it would like to be. In many ways the demonisation of Iran's leadership as a regional menace fulfils Iran's ambition to present itself as a regional power. In practice, its bloodthirsty rhetoric has always been combined with a cautious and carefully calculated foreign policy...."

"Yemen’s Shiite Muslim Houthis killed 24 Salafist Sunni Muslims yesterday after a week of sporadic fighting between the two religious communities in the north of the country near the border with Saudi Arabia.

The Houthis attacked the Dar al-Hadith religious school in the Dammaj region in Saada, according to Abdulhamid al-Hajouri, the principal of the school. About 60 Salafists, who are considered conservative Sunni Muslims, were wounded in the clashes, Abu Ismail, spokesman for the group in Dammaj, said in a phone interview today. Several Houthi fighters were also killed and wounded, Dhaifallah al-Shami, a leader of the Shiite group, said..... .... The conflict has in the past drawn in Saudi Arabia, a Sunni Muslim-led monarchy. Saudi Arabia lost more than 100 soldiers in a three-month battle against the Houthis that ended in February 2010."

... and the lousy Jordanian government spin that ensued. Notice that the Jordanian Ministry of 'Media Affairs' handled the matter of a "married couple & their young child" himself, although he said that this was a daily occurrence, he took time out to comment on that specific incident . According to the free & highly creative (not) Jordan Times:

"... Syrian soldiers opened fire on a married couple and their young child as they attempted to enter the Kingdom according to Minister of State for Media Affairs and Communications and Government Spokesperson Rakan Majali. Initial reports from civilians living near the border region identified the gunfire as clashes between Syrian and Jordanian forces, a claim the spokesperson denied. The Syrian family arrived in the Kingdom and received emergency medical attention, Majali indicated...

The incident will not register a response from the Jordanian government, the spokesperson said..."

Well, according to our sources, this is not really what happened. The Jordanians who will 'not register a response', have been overwhelmed by the severe Syrian response to their attempt to cover the incursion of Arab-Afghans into Syrian territory. According to same sources, the clashes left nearly 9 killed Arab-Afghans & scores of wounded on both sides of the fence. Incredible last sprint prior to America's exit from Iraq!

A few comments on some of the points raised (with the caveat that I have no special knowledge or information about the subject).

Regarding Pakistan’s long-range missile capability, it would be safe to assume that it is currently between 2500 and 3500 km. No reliable published data is available, and I base this on the reported range of the Shaheen 2, its further development, possible payload weight reductions, and the possible availability of the Ghauri 3 (present status unclear).

As for employment, under the present set up the country’s nuclear capability is strictly meant for deterrence of an attack, focussed mainly on India. If deterrence failed, it could be used to defeat the attack.

It would surprise me very much if the Chinese (or anyone else) had any say in the disposition, much less usage, of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons.

Mention has been made here, and on an earlier thread, about “grabbing” Pakistan’s nukes. I would suggest this is pure fantasy. It’s not as if this hasn’t occurred to anyone; in fact, a generally held belief in the country is that this is the main aim of the US in the region. It is widely believed in the military; even the army chief, Gen Kayani, is quoted as saying the "real aim of U.S. strategy is to de-nuclearize Pakistan" (though this may well have been for public consumption)

Basically what this is telling the undertakers-wannabes of Assad's Syria is 'vote or no vote, adoption or no adoption crippling or not, try implementing these sanctions!'

"...But as the meeting chaired by Qatar got underway, cracks appeared over the feasibility of the measures with some countries warning against hasty decisions and Syria's neighbors expressing reservations, diplomats said.Iraq, Jordan and Lebanon, have close economic ties with Damascus,... Algeria and Oman have questioned the "feasibility" of sanctions on Syria.Algeria and Oman have cautioned against hasty decisions because they consider that "the negative impact of the sanctions will be catastrophic for the people before affecting the regime," one diplomat said...Among those who appear opposed are Syria's immediate neighbors Lebanon and Iraq, which has already said "it is not possible... to impose economic sanctions on Syria."..."

"Despite the elaborate rhetoric surrounding the “pivot” to the Pacific represented by President Obama’s Asian trip, the ongoing reality of the US engagement in the Middle East continues to intrude. The imposition of new Iran sanctions, rising worries about Egypt and urgent exchanges with allies about Western policy toward Syria indicate that traditional US concerns will not fade. Further, the November 22nd Republican foreign policy debate in which the Administration faced strong criticism for its Iraq and Afghan policies ensure that these non-Asian issues will remain current. Indeed, the renewed turmoil in Egypt has rekindled an age-old debate in Washington regarding the tension between stability and democracy. The State Department’s public position has been to urge to military authorities to press forward as quickly as possible to civilian rule. Behind the scenes, however, there are rising concerns that public order is at risk – which in turn might open the door to extremists. In private messages, the Saudis have urged Washington to play things cautiously. US officials are taking encouragement from what they see as positive developments in Bahrain, Yemen, and Libya but nonetheless remain acutely aware that a peaceful transition in Egypt holds the key to regional stability. Anything short of that risks throwing the region into disarray. At a time when the Administration is seeking to generate regional solidarity on a tougher policy toward Iran this possibility is most unwelcome. In the same region, US relations with Turkey remain of interest. Officials much welcome Turkey’s tough attitude to Syria, but are concerned by what they see as Turkey’s increasingly increasingly strident criticism of Israel. Overall they see Turkey as trying to “rewrite the rules of the Middle East” in ways that are challenging to the US..."

Saturday, November 26, 2011

"... “The Iranians were propagandists,”Mr. Bassiounisaid. “You can’t expect them not to want to take advantage of a situation like that. … But to say they were funding, they were agitating? We found no evidence of that. Now whether the government has [that evidence] and is not showing it to us, I can’t tell.”

In an interview Wednesday, Bahraini Ambassador to the United States Houda Nonoo defended the government’s claims of Iranian involvement. She pointed to Iranian state media provocations and official statements calling Bahrain Iran’s 14th province.

But asked for evidence of direct material support, she hedged. “We don’t have that evidence, but it’s there,” Ms. Nonoo said. “It’s not evidence you can touch or see physically, but we know it’s there.” (been watching too much Poltergeist-type movies Nounou?)

"... Amateur footage shows a tank deliberately trying to hit protesters in the eastern Saudi Arabian city of Qatif on Wednesday. Our Observer told us that this kind of violence is unprecedented in Saudi Arabia. Similar incidents have, however, recently taken place in Bahrain and Egypt.
The demonstrators had gathered in the city centre for the funerals of two people killed during rallies last week. Security forces cracked down on protesters once again; two people were killed and nine injured. In a statement, the Interior Ministry said “these losses took place during an exchange of gunfire with unidentified criminals who infiltrated the population and opened fire from residential areas.” According to the Interior Ministry, two of the injured were policemen.
Since March, residents of Qatif, which is a majority Shiite city, have held frequent anti-government demonstrations. Shiites represent just 10 percent of the total population, and are considered to be heretics by the country’s Sunni leaders. They are marginalised at every level: religious, political and social.
I have been in Qatif since the start of the demonstrations and have taken part in most of them. What I can say is it’s unusual for security forces to use such violence as they did on Wednesday. As people left the cemetery after the two protesters’ funeral, a group of people started shouting anti-government slogans. Very quickly, the police moved in, as you can see in the images. According to my sources, the two people who died were shot at by snipers stationed in the big water tower that can be seen in the background of the video. Then a tank arrived and began to try to mow people down. Most people ran out of the way, but in the last three seconds, you can see the tank hit a man. [Editor’s Note: It is not clear from the video whether the tank actually hit a person or an object].
Authorities said the two people that died on Wednesday were killed in an exchange of fire between criminals, but I don’t believe that. I know people who went to protest – they are young, mostly between 20 and 30 years old. They are unemployed and feel marginalized by the authorities. I tried to find out who the leader of the movement was, but there is none. Since the beginning of the unrest, I haven’t seen any armed protesters...."

Excerpts from RAND's report: "Forecasting the Future of Iran: Implications for U.S. Strategy and Policy"

Political Issues

• President Ahmadinejad will remain influential in Iran and will see only a slight reduction in power prior until his second Presidential term ends naturally in 2013.

• Iran’s next Supreme Leader is likely to be only slightly more moderate than Supreme Leader Khamenei. Ayatollahs Rafsanjani and Shahroudi are currently the stongest candidates, with Shahroudi being favored over Rafsanjani.

• The current system of velayat‐e faqih appears stable, and further conservative shifts in the system as seen in the aftermath of the 2009 presidential election are unlikely.

Economic and Civil Society Issues

• There is substantial pressure for economic reform in Iran, which has only been partially met by the reforms introduced in January 2011 (which occurred after data collection for this study

ended).

• The IRGC’s influence appears unlikely to grow significantly in the next few years, and may even diminish.

• The influence of Iran’s bonyads will likely hold constant or grow slightly in the coming years.

• Recent setbacks experienced by the women’s movement in Iran are likely to be short‐lived and completely reversed within the next few years.

• Iran will not submit to full IAEA compliance, but is unlikely to restart its nuclear weapons program unless there are significant changes to Iran’s internal calculus.

• Iran will develop a strategic relationship with Iraq that will not be destabilizing to or compromise the new Iraq government. Domestic and international pressure will prevent the nations from developing the closer alliance sought by Iran’s leaders.

• In Afghanistan, Iran’s relations will be less influential than in Iraq, and will be focused on stability

The conclusions from the sensitivity analysis that explored the influence of the US, the Supreme Leader, Iran’s President, and the IRGC are:

• Waiting for a turnover in leadership is a game both the US and Iran are playing to lose. Both nations need to realize and accept that national outlooks are evolving gradually and are not dictated solely by the personalities of their incumbent leaders. Neither nation benefits from maintaining strained relations, nor remaining staunchly entrenched in its own position vis‐à‐vis the other.

• A new Supreme Leader coming to power probably will be a fortuitous event for the US, likely leading to modest improvements across a broad range of issues, but the differences between Iran’s next Supreme Leader and Khamenei are likely to be subtle. However, the fate of Iran’s nuclear program lies with the Supreme Leader, and a new Supreme Leader, even if he half as influential as Khamenei, could restart Iran’s weapons program.

• Ahmadinejad’s rhetoric colors Iran’s foreign relations, but his influence does not weigh heavily on the course of Iran’s foreign policy. A new president with a more pragmatic outlook could lead to slight improvements on many issues, but the biggest benefit would be the opportunity to engage with a less strident personality.

• The IRGC is not dominating Iranian policy decisions. Even significant growth in the organization’s power and conservatism would do little to affect the current character of Iran.

Thus, US fears of a radicalizing religious and militant Iran are likely misplaced. Moreover, the IRGC is a key element of the conservative block, and if the IRGC’s influence diminished, it could enable Iran’s more progressive elements to begin making inroads..."

"... Israelis may therefore interpret the latest signs of hesitation - namely, the U.S. and IAEA failure to fully sanction the Central Bank of Iran - to mean that the clock has virtually run out. If so, this would break the deadlock among the Israeli political and military elite over whether sanctions obviate the need for military action. Sanctioning the Central Bank would have prohibited Iran from engaging in dollar-denominated transactions of any kind. Yet the Obama administration fears that such a move would rattle oil markets and already-fragile economies. U.S. officials have also said in the past that there is more time to stop Iran, whether out of trust in America's greater military capacity or a belief that sanctions will ultimately force Tehran to back down...."

"The American military command in Iraq usually declines to acknowledge insurgent rocket strikes on its bases, not wanting the enemy attackers to know whether they have hit something. But the Americans made an exception on Friday.
In a statement about the risks to civilians of insurgent rocket and mortar fire near American bases — a message that was intended for an Iraqi audience and distributed to the local news media in Arabic — the command disclosed that Katyusha rockets fired at a base outside Babil, south of Baghdad, three days earlier had wounded two American soldiers who are among the last several thousand in Iraq.
The statement suggested such rocket attacks had been staged for propaganda purposes to create the impression that the Americans are fleeing under fire after more than eight years of war. “Terrorists groups are conducting attacks against American forces in order to create a false idea that they have forced us to leave,” the statement said....
The public relations office of the American military command in Baghdad did not respond to a query about the attack.
As it withdraws, the American military is moving its forces deployed in the north into bases farther south, toward the Kuwaiti border."

"... A revolutionary theocracy and major world oil supplier, the Islamic Republic of Iran has, since its inception, demanded recognition as a regional power, sought to lead the Muslim world and dreamed of creating an Islamic superpower...
The fall of Hosni Mubarak in Egypt robbed Israel of a stable southern border and the certainties of a 32-year-old peace treaty, while open rebellion in Syria is bringing instability to the Jewish state’s northern border.
When the United States overthrew Iraq’s Saddam Hussein in 2003, it removed an historical barrier to Iran’s regional ambitions, accomplishing in weeks what Iran had failed to do in eight years of brutal war.
Now U.S. troops are withdrawing from Iraq, Washington is leaving behind a Shiite-dominated, Iran-leaning government in Baghdad.
The loss of friendly dictatorships in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya has thrown U.S. diplomacy in the Middle East into flux. Disagreements with Saudi Arabia over the handling of protests in Bahrain and Yemen have also driven a wedge of doubt between the two allies... ... ...
In the foreseeable future, Iran will emerge as the most powerful state in the Persian Gulf region.“As a great civilization with a keen sense of history, Iran has always perceived itself as a rightful leader of the Middle East.”
“Such a development is the natural consequence of its strength and the American policy that has removed all barriers to the assertion of its influence,” said Mr. Takeyh. “The Islamic Republic remains an opportunistic power that will take advantage of more favourable circumstances to project its influence.”

"... At the meeting, which was held in Istanbul and included Turkish officials, the Syrians requested "assistance" from the Libyan representatives and were offered arms, and potentially volunteers.
"There is something being planned to send weapons and even Libyan fighters to Syria," said a Libyan source, speaking on condition of anonymity. "There is a military intervention on the way. Within a few weeks you will see."
The Telegraph has also learned that preliminary discussions about arms supplies took place when members of the Syrian National Council [SNC] – the country's main opposition movement – visited Libya earlier this month.
"The Libyans are offering money, training and weapons to the Syrian National Council," added Wisam Taris, a human rights campaigner with links to the SNC... ...
Sources in the Libyan town of Misurata suggested that some weapons may already have been sent. Some smugglers were caught selling small arms to Syrian buyers in Misurata, said a man who trafficked guns to Libya's rebels during the country's civil war.
Post-conflict Libya is awash with arms, many of them taken from the vast military stores maintained by Col Mummar Gaddafi's regime. Kalashnikov assault rifles, modern missiles and even tanks found their way into Libya...."

Friday, November 25, 2011

"... notice that the two incidents that Richard's source puts together here have happened at least 10 days if not longer apart. Would Hizbullah really take a somehow obtained Israeli drone into an ammo-depot in south Lebanon with UNIFIL patrols in the area and leave it there for ten plus days? Would it not rather immediately truck it into the much more secure Bekaa valley or into Syria for further evaluation in a specialized weapon lab?

Richard continues the story with pure speculation:

The Daily Star headline is about a "huge blast" but the story itself only says "an explosion" and "the blast". There is nothing like "huge" in the story. From that and his source Richard somehow comes to an allegedly given "size of the explosion" that indicates to him that "a good deal of [Hizbullah's] weapons cache in the south" has been destroyed.

Where did he get that from? And does he really believe that Hizbullah would keep Zelzal missiles, which have a range of up to 400 kilometers, just a few miles from the Israeli border? For what? To attack Port Said in Egypt? Zelzal's could reach Tel Aviv even from Lebanon's norther border. Hizbullah keeping them in the south would be lunacy.

(THE FOLLOWING IS REAL GOOD WORK BY 'b') There isthis videofrom the Israeli website infolive.tv uploaded on November 23 which quotes Richard's story and shows pictures from a quite big smoke column coming up behind of what looks like a telecommunication building. But the video put to the story does not show the relevant explosion. The video material is simply stolen fromthis video which was uploaded to youtube on November 2nd by MENA and is supposed to show an explosion that happened in Beirut on April 8 2007.

So where did Mr. Silverstein and his source get that "huge explosion" that alleged destroyed a weapon cache from? From hot air?

“However, the army did not find any remnants and the explosion did not cause any visible damage. Probably, what happened was a result of a mine or cluster bomb possibly dropped by Israel [in 2006] exploding.”

The Daily Star sent a reporter into the area and here is what he found:

Most residents testified that they hadn’t heard an explosion but a local man, Hajj Ali Fakih, said he had heard a “huge” blast come from a patch of woodland known locally as Al-Jabal al-Kabir, or Big Mountain.

Hezbollah operatives carrying high-tech communications equipment spread throughout the village and accosted The Daily Star, asking why its reporter was making inquiries related to the blast.

The army and the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon sent patrols to Siddiqin, although the peacekeeping organization said that it had received no official word on the explosion.

“Following today’s media reports, we were in close contact with the Lebanese Army and until now we have not information to confirm that there was an explosion,” UNIFIL deputy spokesperson Andrea Tenenti told The Daily Star.

“We have 350 patrols a day and this is part of our area of operations so we do have troops there on the ground. We have no investigation at the moment.”

Nothing there we know of says UNIFIL, the Lebanese Army said someone heard an explosion, Hizbullah and most residents in the area said nothing relevant happened. Some explosion happened says an anonymous "security source" to the Daily Star and one lone man from the village.

A complicate Israeli intelligence plot destroyed an arms cache by purposefully letting a drone intentionally fall into Hizbullah's hands which then, at least ten days later, somehow ended up in said arms cache and gets exploded by IDF intelligence destroying the Hizbullah arms cache so that "a good deal of its weapons cache in the south has been destroyed" says Richard Silverstein based on his secret source.

Ah - no Richard. I don't buy that. And I am quite sure that most other thinking people will not buy that either.

(BTW - could the "secret source" the Daily Star has here be the same one that is talking to Richard?)

"...Nuclear aircraft carrier USS George HW Bush has reportedly anchored off Syria. As an Arab League deadline to allow observers into the country passes with no response from Damascus, the possibility of intervention in Syria seems to be growing.
The George H.W. Bush Carrier Strike Group along with additional naval vessels are to remain in the Mediterranean to conduct maritime security operations and support missions as part of Operations Enduring Freedom and New Dawn.The US 6th Fleet is also patrolling the area, Interfax news agency reports.
Meanwhile, America and Turkey are urging their citizens to leave Syria. The US released a statement on Wednesday urging American citizens to “depart immediately while commercial transportation is available.” ..."

Of course this comes from an 'Israeli source' who talked to his sources in AMAN. One has to remember that such explosions did & do happen in arms cahes from Nevada through the suburbs of Lyon to South Lebanon ... Stories after the fact are like comfort foods!

"... Now comes an exclusive report from an authoritative Israeli source with considerable military experience, that IDF military intelligence (Aman) has out foxed Hezbollah by deliberately crash-landing a booby-trapped Trojan Horse drone in southern Lebanon.... ...

And now I can tell them what happened. For over a year, Hezbollah has been attempting to discover how to jam the ground signals commanding the drone so as to disable them in flight. When it discovered the downed craft, its operatives must’ve crowed that they’d finally discovered the key to success. This bit of hubris is how Aman drew Hezbollah into its net. Its soldiers dutifully collected the imagined intelligence trophy and brought it to a large weapons depot it controlled in the area. Once inside the arms cache, Aman detonated the drone causing a massive explosion... ... Given the size of the explosion, we should expect that a good deal of its weapons cache in the south has been destroyed.

Hezbollah is known for being highly professional and quite crafty in its intelligence capabilities having penetrated the IDF intelligence network in the 2006 war. That’s why I find it almost inexplicable that its fighters wouldn’t have at least considered the craft might be a Trojan Horse. It’s possible that Hezbollah did consider the idea and searched for an explosive charge & didn’t find one. In that case, the IDF must’ve very cleverly concealed it.

At any rate, as soldiers, even brilliant ones, often do, Hezbollah made a fatal error which the IDF exploited. And before Israel’s supporters jump for joy at another Israeli victory in the unending war on terror, remember that in 1999, a Hezbollah cell phone was brought to the vaunted IDF Unit 8200 headquarters for examination. The soldiers preparing to view it joked “If it explodes, we’ll know.” It did indeed explode seriously wounding the two senior Israeli intelligence officers. Not to mention the major amount of egg it splattered on the face of Israel’s renowned intelligence agency.

The moral being, in this dirty game called asymmetrical warfare, you and your enemy circle each other warily seeking to exploit any weakness. And you will make mistakes ...

But let’s not lose sight of the fact that though many Israelis and the pro-Israel right are crowing about this “victory” against terror, that sabotage and black ops aren’t even successful tactics, let alone strategy in dealing with Israel’s issues with Syria or Lebanon. So what if Israel blew up 100 rockets? Hezbollah will only replace them. And then some. It already has many thousands more missiles than it had before the 2006 war. And it certainly has many arms caches hidden in southern Lebanon.... .... these acts of terror or sabotage don’t degrade anything in the long or even medium-term. Hezbollah just regroups and comes out stronger than before...."

"... Remember the old chestnut? What’s the difference between a laboratory rat and a human being? The lab rat finally ceases scurrying through a maze when it realizes there is no cheese at the end. Human beings, on the other hand, never stop trying.

Confronted with the maze that is the Middle East and Central Asia these days, the Chinese are the lab rats. Take Iran, for instance.

Though careful not to directly challenge the Americans, China’s diplomats and businessmen have followed a sinuous route, publicly urging Iran to back away from plans to produce nuclear weapons, but refusing to support American and European calls for tougher sanctions.

True to form, the Americans have been pushing trade sanctions in various degrees of severity ever since American diplomats were taken hostage in Tehran back in 1979.

The Chinese argue the current stiff sanctions won’t convince the Iranians to stop their nuclear program. But those sanctions have certainly helped the Chinese gain a remarkable foothold in Iran.

So much so, that today 15% of China’s petroleum and gas imports come from Iran, which makes Iran more vital to China than Saudi Arabia is to the United States [the Saudis provide 11% of U..S. petroleum imports].

At one time or another, all the great powers have had their eyes on Iran’s oil and gas reserves, the second largest in the world. But, because of the U.S. embargo, Iran suffered from a woeful lack of modern technology, engineering expertise, and capital.

The Chinese, however, have been willing to offer Iran much of what it needs to develop its energy resources--as well as sophisticated arms, anti ship-missiles and nuclear technology.

In return, of course the Chinese obtained access to Iran’s massive reserves. In 2004, for instance, Iran signed a $100 billion dollar deal for a Chinese company to develop Yadavaran, Iran’s largest undeveloped oil ﬁeld. That concession in exchange for China’s receiving 10 million tons of Iranian liquiﬁed natural gas annually for a period of 25 years.

That deal was followed by other huge gas and oil exploration contracts, as well as a plan to deliver Iranian oil from the Caspian Sea, through a pipeline from Kazakhstan to China.

In another convoluted agreement, a Chinese company CNPC bought the Iranian subsidiary of Sheer Energy in Calgary, Alberta, thus winding up with a 49 percent stake in another Iranian oil field.

The flourishing Chinese-Iranian trade is not restricted to the energy sector.

Chinese companies have won contracts to build everything from broadband fiber optics, to television sets, to automobiles, not to mention a $680 million contract to expand the Tehran subway system.

And all the while, Washington has continued to view Iran as THE menace looming over the Gulf. Thus the Americans made an ally out of Saddam Hussein after he invaded Iran, and continued to back him despite his use of nerve gas and long range rockets against civilian targets.

Again, in 1991 when Iraq’s Shiites and Kurds rose against the Iraqi tyrant following the first Gulf War, the United States stood by as tens of thousands of Iraqis were slaughtered by Saddam—despite the fact that George W. Bush had himself called for the uprising. The reason for the betrayal: Washington was afraid that an Iraq governed by its Shiite majority would open the doors to an Iranian takeover of Iraq.

Fast forward twenty years. After having spent literally trillions of dollars to oust Saddam, U.S. troops are withdrawing from Iraq, leaving the shattered country governed by---a Shiite majority. Many of those Shiites sympathetic to Iran and still deeply embittered by America’s betrayal in 1991.

But even as they withdraw from Iraq, America has been pouring hundreds of billions of dollars into Iraq’s neighbors to ensure a massive and enduring military presence in the oil-rich Gulf. Their major purpose again, a bulwark against Iran.

That American military build-up has long provided Iran’s leaders with a rationale for developing nuclear weapons: not to incinerate Israel, but to defend Iran against an American/Israel attack. For years now, American officials have calmly and openly discussed such military action as a very viable option.

However, despite enduring U.S. hostility, the regime in Tehran is still very much in place, its nuclear weapons program still apparently active. Indeed, there are those who argue that the embargo and constant threat of an American cum Israel attack have in fact strengthened the hands of Tehran’s often feckless and feuding leadership.

Meanwhile Chinese traders have been prospering. Chinese/Iranian commerce has mushroomed from $3.3 billion in 2001 to $30 billion in 2010, and is expected to hit $50 billion by 2015. The prize, though is the gas and petroleum.

No wonder, then, that the Chinese are as solicitous of Tehran’s interests as the folks in Washington are of the Saudis.

The Chinese are making impressive inroads throughout the region—which, ironically, in the end, may cause them to back off their stubborn support of Iran."