creativesoul wrote:Why would ontological arguments not be required to pass this substitution test?

Ontology just ain't linguistics, but there are a large number of detailed reasons we can give for this, including:

(A) The linguistic conventions of referring to one thing might not at all grammatically parallel the linguistic conventions of talking about something else. So if we substitute the term normally found in sentences about the thing in question in context A with the conventional terms for talking about the thing claimed to be ontologically identical to it (but not normally found in sentences in context A), the substitution might not work per the grammatical conventions of that language. It would require particular grammatical permutations that might necessitate neologisms (if the term in question doesn't conventionally exist in the language in question in a parallel grammatical form).

(B) As was one of the points of the lightning/electrical state example, if typical language-users of the natural language in question do not at the time in question accept the ontological identity, the resulting sentence is going to "sound funny" to them no matter what you do with the terms grammatically and syntactically. It won't sound right to them until they accept the ontological identity, the words are in a parallel grammatical form, and those typical language-users basically accept the terms as synonyms.

(C) As was another point of the lightning/electrical state example, while saying that lightning is an electrical state is correct, that doesn't amount to saying that lightning is "just any old electrical state." So when we make the substitution, if we use the term "electrical state," people who are prone to reading things like an Aspie--and many people are--will think it sounds funny because they read it as "just any old electrical state," which wouldn't be what anyone is saying. For the Aspie-prone, we'd need to spell out just what sort of electrical state in some detail, although then the sentence is going to sound funny to typical language speakers of that natural language because obviously "lightning" is a lot shorter than specifying just what sort of electrical state in some detail. In other words, the syntactical difference, even if the longer phrase involving "electrical state" is gramamtically parallel, will make the sentence sound funny to most folks.

(D) If an ontological identity statement uses terms that are conventionally closely associated with each other in some context, the substitution might not work unless work is done to more than just one of the terms in the sentence in question, where some terms might require an "analytic description" substitution (that will result in the sort of syntactical difference described immediaely above, in (C)). I know that reads confusingly, so let me give an example. I run into this frequently when the ontology of time comes up, because in my view, time is ontologically identical to motion or processual change. So what always ends up happening is some physics-oriented person who can't think much beyond what I'd call the script they've memorized will go, "That doesn't make sense because then acceleration, say, would have to be defined as 'the rate of time of velocity per unit of time.'" (Conventionally, acceleration is "the rate of change of velocity per unit of time.") Well, what's going on there is simply that we're measuring one motion/change against another. What's going on ontologically with "per unit of time" is that we're looking at the motion/change of something like a clock--a digital meter changing numbers, or a second hand moving--and comparing the change of one thing--velocity (which is speed + direction) to the change of another thing--those changing numbers on the digital readout, or that changing second-hand. Additionally, the substitution of "time of velocity" for "change of velocity," as well as "per unit of change (in a clock)" for "per unit of time" both have the problem outlined in (B) above.

So one thing--language--is about conventional ways of referring to and talking about things, as well as conventional ways of thinking about/conceptualizing things, while another thing--ontology--is about what things really are, where that might not at all substitutionally match conventional ways of referring to and talking about things, OR conventional ways of thinking about or conceptualizing things. But things aren't what they really are just because people don't conventionally talk about them or think about them that way, or just because it might sound funny to try to substitute one thing for another in a sentence.

creativesoul wrote:Even those are recognizable marks. Although the meaningfulness of those is limited to just recognizing different characters, there's still a but of meaning attached to them, it's just that nothing's being said.

You have to do this via correlations (given my view)...

Of course.

Not often someone shares that aspect of my view. All meaning is attributed by nothing more and nothing less than drawing mental correlations between different 'objects' of physiological sensory perception and/or oneself. The problem is that a brain alone insufficient for drawing correlations, as is our faculty of physiological sensory perception. It is for this reason and more, that I say that it makes no sense to talk about the location of meaning.

Why would ontological arguments not be required to pass this substitution test?

Terrapin replied:

Ontology just ain't linguistics, but there are a large number of detailed reasons we can give for this, including:

(A) The linguistic conventions of referring to one thing might not at all grammatically parallel the linguistic conventions of talking about something else.

We'll have to do better than that. While the above statement is true, it is inapplicable to cases when and where an author is claiming that all 'X' is 'Y'. When one asserts "Meaning is a brain state", s/he has made a positive assertion that entails all sensible use(s) of the term "meaning"... necessarily so. If this point is in question, just think about it a minute. The only place to look for what meaning consists in/of is in what's being said when the term "meaning" is being put to use and/or further expounded upon. When talking about meaning in the most general way possible(with no further qualifications) one makes a universal claim. As argued directly above, it is utterly irrelevant to cases where an author is making a universal claim, that the linguistic conventions of referring to one thing might not at all grammatically parallel the linguistic conventions of talking about something else. You're claiming that they're all the same thing, and that carries the burden of strong justification with it.

You are making a universal claim. In effect, you're making a claim that applies in universal fashion to all known ontological senses of the term "meaning". The only way to check/verify/falsify/justifying and/or refute the ontological claim you're making is to focus solely upon the scope of your proposed alternative. I'm saying it's clearly inadequate. It falls well short of adequately replacing many other ontological uses. The proof of that is precisely the fact that you're currently offering defense for the fact that your proposed alternative definition doesn't adequately supplant all others in all contexts. That task you've chosen bears the burden of adequately taking an account of all ontological senses of the term "meaning". Otherwise, there is no justification for saying that all meaning is a brain state.

All the rest of your points relied upon answer (A), which is irrelevant to universal claims such as yours.

SpheresOfBalance wrote:By the way dumb ass, it's the brain and not the mouth, that is capable of knowing. Who knows what?

Whoosh! Again. Sorry, you're sadly mistaken, but then that's the plight of those that believe they absolutely know the meaning of another's words. All they can do is project their preconceptions upon others. So actually they are to be pitied.

Oh, because your would be child murdering, to save your frightened ass, says so? Sure whatever you say arising, what ever you say!

All mouth and trousers that's you.So you have a real problem living that one down, I've noticed. Even going so far as to try and enlist others fear of death, so as to create a mob of cowards. Come on post that link again. It's so funny watching you squirm, afraid of what you see in that mirror, instead always in denial!

Like I thought, you're dumb ass never has, nor never will understand the riddle of M.A.D. Which is why you failed that thought experiment.

*Yawn* Head your horse in another direction you sad little man.I'm afraid your crown is now tarnished, my dear princess! Actually it always has been, I've just illuminated it!

SpheresOfBalance wrote:Sorry, you're sadly mistaken, but then that's the plight of those that believe they absolutely know the meaning of another's words. All they can do is project their preconceptions upon others. So actually they are to be pitied.

You're so cocksure that you know nothing but appear to think you know loads but English English escapes you.

Actually, thanks! I'll take this opportunity of your deliberate misconstrual to promote once more the phrase and idea behind, "The meaning of your words is the response they get", so when trying to communicate ones thoughts to others bear in mind that whilst the words you choose fit your meaning they may well not fit the meaning they create in another. So check the response to see if it was the one you wanted as if it isn't it just might be the words chosen and not the thoughts, just a thought.

So you have a real problem living that one down, I've noticed. Even going so far as to try and enlist others fear of death, so as to create a mob of cowards. Come on post that link again. It's so funny watching you squirm, afraid of what you see in that mirror, instead always in denial!