History of Scientific Realism

Logical positivism was the forerunnner of scientific realism, holding that a sharp distinction can be drawn between observational terms and theoretical terms, the latter capable of semantic analysis in observational and logical terms.

troubles with the analytic-synthetic distinction (for which see Quine (1950)

the theory ladenness of observation (for which see Kuhn (1970) and Quine (1960))

diffculties moving from the observationality of terms to observationality of sentences (for which see Putnam (1962))

the vagueness of the observational theoretical distinction (for which see Maxwell (1962)). Scientific realism is suggested, though arguably not entailed, to resolve all these difficulties.

Scientific Realism, edited by Jarrett Leplin, is an important anthology of articles on scientific realism.

Arguments for and against Scientific Realism

One of the main arguments for scientific realism is that scientific knowledge is progressive in nature, and that it is able to predict phenomena successfully. For example, a scientific realist would point out that science must have some ontological basis for humans to successfully send explorers to the moon. However the success of theories does not prove realism, as a constructivist may argue that success is part of the construction.

Against scientific realism, social constructivists (and other anti-realists) point out that scientific realism is unable to account for the rapid change that occurs in scientific knowledge during periods of revolution.