Great Britain and the American Civil War eBook

Indeed, the cause of Seward’s explanation to
Lyons was the receipt of a despatch from Adams, dated
June 28, in which the latter had reported that all
was now smooth sailing. He had told Russell that
the knowledge in Washington of the result of their
previous interviews had brought satisfaction, and
Russell, for his part, said that Lyons had “learned,
through another member of the diplomatic corps, that
no further expression of opinion on the subject in
question would be necessary[232].” This
referred, presumably, to the question of British intention,
for the future, in relation to the Proclamation of
Neutrality. Adams wrote: “This led
to the most frank and pleasant conversation which
I have yet had with his lordship.... I added that
I believed the popular feeling in the United States
would subside the moment that all the later action
on this side was known.... My own reception has
been all that I could desire. I attach value to
this, however, only as it indicates the establishment
of a policy that will keep us at peace during the
continuance of the present convulsion.”
In reply to Adams’ despatch, Seward wrote on
July 21, the day after his interview with Lyons, arguing
at great length the American view that the British
Proclamation of Neutrality in a domestic quarrel was
not defensible in international law. There was
not now, nor later, any yielding on this point.
But, for the present, this was intended for Adams’
eye alone, and Seward prefaced his argument by a disclaimer,
much as stated to Lyons, of any ill-will to Great
Britain:

“I may add, also, for myself,
that however otherwise I may at any time have
been understood, it has been an earnest and profound
solicitude to avert from foreign war; that alone has
prompted the emphatic and sometimes, perhaps,
impassioned remonstrances I have hitherto made
against any form or measure of recognition of
the insurgents by the government of Great Britain.
I write in the same spirit now; and I invoke on
the part of the British government, as I propose to
exercise on my own, the calmness which all counsellors
ought to practise in debates which involve the
peace and happiness of mankind[233].”

Diplomatic correspondence couched in the form of platform
oratory leads to the suspicion that the writer is
thinking, primarily, of the ultimate publication of
his despatches. Thus Seward seems to have been
laying the ground for a denial that he had ever developed
a foolish foreign war policy. History pins him
to that folly. But in another respect the interview
with Lyons on July 20 and the letter to Adams of the
day following overthrow for both Seward and for the
United States the accusations sometimes made that
it was the Northern disaster at Bull Run, July 21,
in the first pitched battle with the South, which made
more temperate the Northern tone toward foreign powers[234].
It is true that the despatch to Adams was not actually
sent until July 26, but internal evidence shows it