THE PUNISHMENT OF THE APOSTATE
ACCORDING TO ISLAMIC LAW

ABUL ALA MAWDUDI

translated and annotated by

Syed Silas Husain and Ernest Hahn

1994

Dedicated to Christian converts from Islam,
who have contributed so much to the Kingdom of God and the Church,
who have ministered, physically and spiritually, among their Muslim
brothers and sisters,
who have died as martyrs for confessing Jesus the Messiah as their
Saviour and Lord.

Jesus said:

How blest you are, when you suffer insults and persecution
and every kind of calumny for my sake. Accept it with
gladness and exultation, for you have a rich reward in heaven;
in the same way they persecuted the prophets before you. (Matt. 5:11,12)

Why the need to translate Abul Ala Mawdudi's book The Punishment of
the Apostate according to Islamic Law?[1] Here are two reasons.

1. The Islamic law of apostasy is a symptom of a strong and pervasive
traditional Muslim attitude, religious and political, toward non-Muslims
and the non-Islamic world. Despite the legal pronouncement of Islam upon
Salman Rushdie the West has hardly recognized the law of apostasy in Islam.
It is imperative that Westerners, especially with the intensifying orthodox
Islamic revival throughout the world and the continued growth of Muslim
presence in the West, become more familiar with this law also.

2. Abul Ala Mawdudi has been one of the most influential religious
thinkers of the Muslim World in the 20th century. His presentation of
the subject is an unusually full and lucid exposition of the theological
and legal foundations of the traditional understanding of the law of
apostasy and its punishment in Islam and a contemporary rational
justification for its continued implementation.

It is hoped that the following points will further elucidate a rationale
for the translation of Mawdudi's book and provide a fuller context for a
wider discussion on the subject:

1. Many Muslims disagree with Abul Ala Mawdudi's understanding and
argumentation. In fact, Mawdudi's book indicates serious doubt of other
Muslims (at least on the Indian subcontinent) about the validity and
integrity of the law and the main issues at stake:
a. the actual meaning of apostasy;
b. its presence and significance in the Qur'an;
c. the relation of Qur'an 2:256 ("There is no compulsion in religion")
to the law. This particular verse is central to the more liberal
exposition of the law of apostasy found in the former Chief Justice
of Pakistan, S. A. Rahman's book Punishment of Apostasy in Islam[2],
in which he castigates the traditionalists' abuse of the sources of
Islam (the Qur'an and the Hadith). Still, virtually all Muslims in
the East who possess any serious grasp of early Islamic history recognize
the law of apostasy and its implementation as far back as Abu Bakr's
wars in Arabia against the Arabs who wished to secede from the Muslim
community shortly after Muhammad's death and the pervasive influence
of this law throughout Islamic history up to the present.

2. On occasions in the past, no doubt, Muslims have moderated the
penalty for the law of apostasy, whether because of external or internal
political pressures or other reasons. No doubt, in past and present
some converts have left Islam for Christianity (or other religions)
and lived as Christians with little or no obvious Muslim opposition.
Even fewer have been executed.

Nevertheless it is also true that in various parts of the world
converts -- their numbers are significant -- have endured persecutions
physically and psychologically, at times violently. The techniques
are varied. Some converts are tortured. Few in traditional Muslim
countries escape unscathed. At times even the convert's Muslim family
members are subjected to severe harassment to induce the convert
to return to Islam. The persecution emanates from governments,
officially or unofficially, from Muslim communities, or simply from
one or two zealous individuals, possibly a relative and even a father,
intent on taking the law into his own hands when he thinks the government
or community has failed to do its job. Even some converts from Islam
in the West exercise caution in Muslim circles, fearing possible
retaliation upon themselves or even their families in their native
lands, while, paradoxically, converts to Islam in the West (from
Christianity, Judaism, another religion or no religion) boldly and
with no need to fear announce their conversion privately and publicly
and extol the virtues of Islam, including its freedom!

3. People from the East, Muslim and non-Muslim minorities and
Westerners who have spent time in Muslim countries are aware of the
law of apostasy. But otherwise how many Westerners are aware that
it even exists, not to speak about its nature and history? Or, given
an awareness of its existence, does it exist simply as an aberration
of Islam? Is it possibly a later accretion with no roots in Islamic
sources, perhaps even a figment of Western imperialist and missionary
imagination, another false allegation of "the Orientalists"?

If Westerners are interested in International Human Rights,
including Muslim expressions of human rights, they will be interested
in the law of apostasy and Mawdudi's exposition of it in this work.[3]
Diplomats and other personnel concerned with immigration and refugees
may find it illuminating, probably even more so since (if our limited
evidence is at all indicative) many immigration officials seem unfamiliar
with it. If our government documentation centres provide basic information
on the persecution of Baha'is and Ahmadis, do they provide something
comparable on the persecution of Jews and Christians living as minorities
among Muslims? If not, is it because Christians have not provided them
with the information?

Are Christians in the West, in fact, concerned with such problems?
Should they be? If documentation centres are devoid of information
about Muslim apostates who have become Christians, does this reflect
the Western Christian Church's ignorance? Or, assuming church awareness,
is the plight of the convert a possible inconvenience and even embarrassment
to the church, especially a church whose great priority in its relations
with other religions has become simply reconciliation between religions
or peoples of different religions rather than the proclamation of God's
reconciliation with humankind through His Messiah? Is the suffering of
converts, converts to Christianity also, because of conversion a concern
of the ecumenical Church? Occasionally one hears of Muslim surprise
about (= disdain for?) Christians who appear indifferent toward their
persecuted Christian brothers and sisters. Did not early Christian
worship regularly include remembrance of the martyrs and other Christians
suffering for their faith, as they also shared in the Eucharist in
remembrance of the Messiah's suffering and death?

Though there are Muslims in the West who are aware and supportive
of Islam's law of apostasy, it is hardly surprising that they talk little
about it. On the other hand many Muslims concerned with Islam's image
in the West vehemently insist that Islam proclaims religious tolerance
and freedom, as if the law of apostasy never existed or is now obsolete.
Do they know the law of apostasy, its sources, its history, its current
implementation? Is it that they, to paraphrase Mawdudi, have removed it
from the rule book because it is inconvenient to keep it in the West?

Like the Islamic pronouncement upon Salman Rushdie, the law of apostasy
is not simply "an obscene edict from a fanatic sect in Islam".[4]
It has a profound connection with Islamic source materials, with all
traditional Sunni and Shi'i Islamic legal schools, with Islamic history
since its inception. Its legality is a contentious issue in some nations
today. Many able and sophisicated Muslim leaders and thinkers justify it
and call for its revival and implementation. In short the law of apostasy
in Islam is not just a relic of the past but quite alive and well.

B. Why This Translation: A Personal Note (Syed Silas Husain)

Until recently I had never felt the need for documentary evidence to
understand Islam's traditional punishment for apostasy. Since the time
of my conversion from Islam to Christianity in India about three decades
ago, I have personally experienced its intention and direction through
verbal and physical persecution, including two attempts on my life by
Muslims who believed that an apostate from Islam should be killed.
(By what Islamic standard did they measure themselves to be qualified
to assume this responsibility?)

But sharing such experiences with others carries no guarantee that others
will accept the truth of these experiences. After all, do not all religions
teach us to do good to others, at least not to harm them?

It was only a few years ago that a few friends and I sought authoritative
evidence in English to encourage Canadian Immigration officials to help
stop the deportation of a convert from Islam back to his Muslim homeland.
Where was this hard evidence to be found? To my surprise no Muslim
publisher or bookstore seemed to have anything on the subject in English.
My letters to Muslim theological schools and propagation centres in West
Asia, India, Pakistan and South Africa brought no response, apart from
a reply from Qom in Iran which stated that no literature on apostasy in
English existed and that I should beware of Western propaganda. The
immigration officials with whom I was in contact appeared to be unaware
of, or to ignore or even dismiss, the consequences of apostasy from Islam.
I had to continue looking for written evidence to establish for others
the credibility of even my own experience!

On the other hand, to know that many Muslims today uphold the traditional
Islamic law of apostasy and its punishment in Islam is not to suggest
that all Muslims everywhere thirst for the blood of apostates from Islam.
Many of us converts remain alive and well and normally move freely among
Muslims, especially in countries such as India and Canada -- though we
may be uneasy about travelling in some Muslim countries. We gladly attend
festival celebrations, weddings and funerals, aqiqah and circumcision
ceremonies.

We come to these gatherings, of course, because relatives and friends
have kindly invited us. And we are grateful for these opportunities.
We do not come to abuse Islam, to blaspheme Muhammad and the Qur'an,
to undermine government and society. Nor have we become Christians
for these purposes. In fact Muslim friends and relatives continue to
communicate with us; some may even solicit our counsel and our prayers
for themselves and for their families. Are they tolerant toward us
because they are less Muslim than they should be, or because they are
unfamiliar with traditional Islamic law and practice, or they simply
focus on Qur'an 2:256 ("There is no compulsion in religion") or they
respect the laws of their nation, living and letting live? Whatever
the reason, we thank God for Muslim brothers and sisters who remain
tolerant toward us.

Still, we naturally do have concerns about Muslims whose attitudes
and actions have been shaped by Islam's traditional law of apostasy.
What this law is all about and how it has been understood, what its
sources and purpose are, are competently presented in Abul Ala Mawdudi's
book, The Punishment of the Apostate in Islam. The author's
extensive apology for its contemporary validity and his own remarkable
influence throughout the Muslim world only enhance the value of his
presentation. Could we have chosen a better book or author to explain
Islam's law of apostasy and its punishment as masses of Muslims
throughout the world have understood it and continue to understand it
-- and at the same time to explain our own apprehension about this law
and its punishments, particularly when we are in company with Muslims
we do not know? To initiate further discussions on this topic we have
introduced the opinions of some Muslims who represent greater tolerance.

Our purpose in translating Mawdudi's book is thus not to malign Islam.
Rather it is, firstly, to present something which Muslims consider
authentic on the subject for Christians, especially those sharing the
Christian Gospel with Muslims, so that Christians may begin to grasp
the cost which a convert from Islam may have to pay to live as a disciple
of Jesus the Messiah, to learn to pray for the convert and to be ready
to help him, protect him and even suffer for him and with him. The
convert who may be unfamiliar with the law of apostasy should also,
of course, be instructed about it. Secondly, this translation is to
remind Muslim missionaries and those whom they invite to enter the
House of Islam, to note Mawdudi's pertinent admonition about careless
decisions in becoming a Muslim. To enter the fold may be easier than
to exit. Is the law of apostasy a part of the Muslim missionary's
da'wah, his invitation to non-Muslims to become Muslims?

Finally we hope that this translation will help national and international
organizations interested in human rights and refugees to better understand
the plight of those persons in many Muslim nations who have converted from
Islam to another religion and no longer feel safe where they currently
reside.

C. About Abul Ala Mawdudi

Remembering Abul Ala Mawdudi (1903-1979) is to remember a twentieth century
Pakistani deeply immersed in the planning and formation of Pakistan, and
as much in the revival and renewal of Islam not only on the Asian subcontinent
but throughout the whole Muslim world. Remembering him is to remember his
strong opposition to British rule in India, his unwillingness to cooperate
with Mahatma Gandhi and Indian nationalist movements, even his rejection
of the nationalist motivations of other Muslim movements for the independence
of India and the formation of Pakistan. Remembering him is to remember
a man passionately devoted to Islam, ready not only to talk but to act
and suffer on behalf of his faith, convinced of its superiority over all
religions and desirous that it be practised again as it was manifested
in its purity during the time of Muhammad and the Rightly-Guided Caliphs
for the welfare of all mankind.

Charles Adams offers us an excellent summary of his significance for Islam
and Pakistan:

No discussion of the demand for an Islamic state in Pakistan and
no account of the contemporary resurgence of Islam would be complete
without attention to the major role played by Abul Ala Mawdudi in
these movements. By far the most powerful and effective factors
that worked to create sentiment for an Islamic state in the years
immediately after the partition of the Indian subcontinent and the
creation of Pakistan were Mawdudi and the movement which he founded
and headed, the Jamaat-i-Islami. Indeed, it would be difficult to
think of any issue of religious significance that has arisen in
Pakistani public life concerning which the same could not be said.
Mawdudi was, until his death in 1979 but especially to the time of
his resignation as amir of the Jamaat-i-Islami in 1972, the best known,
most controversial, and most highly visible of all the religious
leaders of the country. He poured his energy unstintingly into speeches,
writings, and religious and political activities, leaving behind a rich
heritage of literature and thought on most of the issues that have
troubled Pakistanis over the years. The number, size, and range of
the published writings from his pen in the periods both before and
after the founding of Pakistan are truly remarkable. They are evidence
of an altogether unusual degree of devotion and great creativity.
Although these works were produced originally in Urdu primarily for
a Pakistani or Indian audience, many have been translated into other
languages of both the Islamic and the Western worlds. Thus, Mawdudi
has attracted attention outside the Indian subcontinent, especially
in other Muslim countries where he is now revered as one of the
foremost modern exponents and interpreters of Islam. Today Mawdudi
must rank among the more popular and respected authors in the Islamic
domains, if indeed he is not the single most widely read writer among
Muslims at the present time. His writings give strong expression to
the themes basic to the present-day Islamic resurgence. When the time
comes for the religious history of Islam in the twentieth century to
be written, Mawdudi's name will unquestionably have a prominent and
an honored place in its pages.[5]

In his introduction as translator and editor of Mawdudi's Toward
Understanding Islam, Khurshid Ahmad writes about Mawdudi:

It is no exaggeration to say that by the time of his death
he had become the most widely read Muslim author of our time,
contributing immensely to the contemporary resurgence of Islamic
ideas, feelings and activity all over the world.[6]

Toward Understanding Islam itself is a clear indication of
Mawdudi's powerful and extensive influence in promoting the cause
of Islam. It was originally published in Urdu in 1932 as a textbook
for students and for the general public. It has been translated
also into Arabic, Hindi, Persian, German, French, Italian, Turkish,
Portuguese, Swahili, Indonesian, Japanese, Malayalam, Tamil, Pashtu,
Bengali, Gujarati and Sindhi. In all these languages over a million
copies have appeared.[7]

Surely it speaks volumes for Mawdudi's popularity and authority
that he provides an Introduction to A. Yusuf Ali's The Holy Qur'an,
Translation and Commentary.[8]

In "A Bibliography of Writings By and About Mawlana Sayyid Abul
A'la Mawdudi" Qazi Zulqadr Siddiqi, S. M. Aslam and M. M. Ahsan
cite 138 works written by Mawdudi and 62 writings about him.[9]
They also note translations into other languages apart from Urdu
and English: Arabic, Bengali, Danish, French, Gujarati, German,
Hindi, Hausa, Indonesian, Italian, Japanese, Kannada, Malayalam,
Marathi, Pashtu, Portuguese, Persian, Sindhi, Swahili, Telugu,
Tamil, Turkish. In the list of 138 works Murtadd ki Saza Islami
Qanun men (The Punishment of the Apostate according to
Islamic Law), Lahore, 1953 is also noted on p. 8. Apparently
this work has never been translated into English or any other language.

D. Translating and Editing Concerns

No doubt, there is room for improving our translation. Still, we
would contend that this translation, perhaps at the expense of
elegance, accurately reproduces what Mawdudi has written. We welcome
corrections, of course!

A glossary is provided at the end of this work. This allows for
explanations for some technical vocabulary also which, it seems,
is better preserved in its original language in the translated text.

A number of Appendices have been included. Appendix A appears as
an extended Note in Mawdudi's original text. The others, it is
hoped, demonstrate the reality of the law of apostasy and its
punishment and the variety of opinions on the subject under discussion
and related matters held by responsible Muslim scholars and/or
Muslim community leaders.

E. Anticipating Some Readers' Thoughts

May we briefly bring the following matters to the readers' attention:

1. In one sense the content of Mawdudi's work covers more than
the title suggests. This is evident even from his Preface, which
has reference also to the question of the Islamic legality of
non-Muslims propagating their religions particularly in countries
predominantly Muslim. It has been included in the translation
simply because Mawdudi included it in his original text and because
it will be of interest to many Muslims and non-Muslims.

2. In another sense Mawdudi (unfortunately?) limits his topic to
the penal consequences of apostasy. A complete understanding of
apostasy must also consider the civil consequences of apostasy as
related to matters such as marriage, property, wills and inheritance
as expressed unanimously or variously by the different Islamic
schools of law in the past and present. Just as significantly
it must reckon more seriously with the nature of apostasy itself,
with a variety of past and present Muslim interpretations of
apostasy, with apostasy not only with reference to the apostate's
new point of allegiance but with apostasy simply as renouncing
Islam.[10]

3. Our intention in translating and annotating Mawdudi's work is
not to exalt Christianity at the expense of Islam, to forget
those sordid chapters and episodes in Christendom's history of
intolerance and persecution (of Muslims also), to ignore the present
commission of injustice and the omission of justice by Christians
in the world today, sins all the more flagrant in the light of the
Messiah's teachings and His personal implementation of His teachings.

4. Our concern, in indicating various Muslim responses to the law
of apostasy and its punishment in Islam, is not to decide for
Muslims which interpretation is correct or which is appropriate
for Muslim belief and practice today. Though our preference as
Christians is obvious, we are aware that Muslims themselves must
make these decisions. Still, we would venture to repeat that able,
intelligent, Islamically informed and committed Muslims hold
significantly different and dramatically opposed opinions on the
subject, a fact which should be recognized and not ignored by
Muslims as well as non-Muslims.

Should not the whole topic of religious tolerance and intolerance,
in fact, be aired more freely, especially because of the unprecedented
intermingling of different religious communities today? Surely all
religious communities must review their attitudes not only toward
their fellow believers but also toward the followers of other religions.
Would it then be possible for Muslims and Christians together to consider
their attitudes toward those of the other community and even toward
those who have left their community to join the other community?

Syed Silas Husain

Ernest Hahn
Mississauga, Canada

Notes

1. Originally published in Urdu as Murtadd ki Saza Islami Qanun men.
The edition available to us was published by Islamic Publishers Ltd.,
Lahore, 1963.

2. Institute of Islamic Culture, Lahore, 1972.

3. See Ann Elizabeth Mayer, Islam and Human Rights, Pinter Publishers,
London, 1991. She writes with reference to apostasy: "The Islamic human
rights schemes... are evasive on the question of protections for freedom
of religion.... The failure of a single one of these Islamic human rights
schemes to take a position against the application of the shari'a
death penalty for apostasy means that the authors of these schemes have
neglected to confront and resolve the main issues involved in harmonizing
international human rights and shari'a standards." (pp.186, 187)

Arij A. Roest Crollius (in Wie tolerant ist der Islam ed. Walter Kerber,
Kindt Verlag, Muenchen, 1991, p. 42) illustrates more clearly the basic
presupposition of the different charters: "A significant difference between
the United Nations' Charter (of Human Rights) and the Islamic Declaration
(of Human Rights) of 1981 is the starting point: the Charter is based on
the dignity of the individual human being, while the Islamic Declaration
of Human Rights is founded on the Qur'an and Hadith. Thus the shari'ah
is the foundation of this Charter and is presupposed by it. The United
Nations' Charter has a starting point which is seen as valid for all mankind,
i.e., the dignity of human nature. The portrayal of man which is presupposed
in the Islamic Declaration is the Islamic portrayal of man. Against this
the United Nations' Charter indeed does not exclude a religiously inspired
portrayal of man; still, it acknowledges none among the religions. In 1981
the General Assembly of the United Nations accepted a declaration eliminating
any form of intolerance and discrimination on the basis of religion or faith.
It is thus not easy to understand how such a declaration may be compatible
with the Islamic Declaration of Human Rights."

For a summary of this general contrast between International Human Rights
statements and Islamic Rights statements see Patrick Sookhdeo, The Law
of Apostasy in Islam and Its Relation to Human Rights and Religious Liberty,
an unpublished paper presented at the Glen Eyrie Consultation on the Persecuted
Church in the Muslim World, 1992, pp. 11-15.

4. Globe and Mail, Toronto, a letter to the editor. I have misplaced
the reference and date.

8. American Trust Publications for The Muslim Students' Association,
2nd edition, 1977. Mawdudi's "Introduction" covers 21 pages. A. Yusuf Ali's
Preface to the first edition of this popular translation and commentary
originated in Lahore and is dated 1934. However Mawdudi's contribution
is not found in the 4th edition, now entitled The Meaning of the Holy
Qur'an, Amana Corporation, Bentwood, 1992 and described as a "new edition
with revised translation and commentary".

The Punishment of the Apostate according to Islamic Law

Publisher's Request

At present the evil of apostasy has spread extensively among Muslims
because they are unfamiliar with their religion. In view of this fact
there is an urgency now as never before to present the actual injunctions
of Islam related to this problem.

Mawlana Sayyid Abul Ala Mawdudi, recognized as a well known and competent
scholar throughout the Muslim world, has fully covered and clarified all
aspects of this problem. He has dealt with the matter convincingly and
effectively from both the revelational and the rational perspectives.
He has demonstrated the perfection of the Islamic teaching on the subject
and has effectively countered the objections raised by Islam's opponents.
This valuable book should be distributed widely now in order to save
Muslims unfamiliar with the subject from this terrible evil.

Three editions of this book have been previously published. Even then,
the book has not been available for a period of time. We are publishing
the fourth edition by offset in a more attractive format. It is our firm
hope that our kind readers will enjoy this new edition and will co-operate
in giving it as wide a distribution as previous editions received.

This brief essay was written originally in response to a question and
was published in the October 1942 to June 1943 issue of the magazine
Tarjuman al-Qur'an. Since the topic deals with a very contentious
problem in Islamic law and has created a disturbance in the hearts of
most people, this essay is now presented as a separate publication.

The question alluded to above was as follows:

Has Islam established execution as the penalty for the apostate?
What proof of this is found in the Qur'an? If execution as the
penalty of apostasy cannot be established from the Qur'an, to what
extent can it be derived from the Hadith and the Sunnah?
Moreover what could have been the reason leading Abu Bakr to execute
the apostates? How can the legality of the execution of the apostates
be demonstrated rationally?

Under a truly Muslim rule should non-Muslims receive the same right
to propagate their religions as Muslims ought to receive to propagate
their religion? Under the Rightly-Guided Caliphs and their successors
were rights accorded to kuffar (infidels) and ahl-i kitab
("The People of the Book": Jews and Christians) to propagate their
religions? To what extent do the Qur'an, the Sunnah and reason
demonstrate the absence of this legality?

I have thought much about both these matters but have not been able
to arrive at any conclusion. Both sides have strong arguments.
The Qur'an and the Sunnah offer no special explanation about
these matters, at least as far as my limited understanding goes.
It will be good if an answer to this can be published in
Tarjuman al-Qur'an because many others like me are interested
in this discussion.

Two matters in the question require clarification:

1. What are the authentic injunctions of Islam regarding the execution
of an apostate and religious propagation by non-Muslim communities?

2. What arguments do we have which will satisfy us and which, we expect,
will satisfy others that these injunctions are rational?

Both of these matters are discussed on the following pages.

I
The Problem of the Apostate's Execution from a Legal Perspective

To everyone acquainted with Islamic law it is no secret that according
to Islam the punishment for a Muslim who turns to kufr (infidelity,
blasphemy) is execution. Doubt about this matter first arose among
Muslims during the final portion of the nineteenth century as a result
of speculation. Otherwise, for the full twelve centuries prior to
that time the total Muslim community remained unanimous about it.
The whole of our religious literature clearly testifies that ambiguity
about the matter of the apostate's execution never existed among Muslims.
The expositions of the Prophet, the Rightly-Guided Caliphs (Khulafa'-i
Rashidun), the great Companions (Sahaba) of the Prophet, their
Followers (Tabi'un), the leaders among the mujtahids and,
following them, the doctors of the shari'ah of every century are
available on record. All these collectively will assure you that from
the time of the Prophet to the present day one injunction only has been
continuously and uninterruptedly operative and that no room whatever
remains to suggest that perhaps the punishment of the apostate is not
execution.

Some people have been influenced by the so-called enlightenment of
the present age to the point that they have opened the door to contrary
thoughts on such proven issues. Their daring is truly very astonishing.
They have not considered that if doubts arise even about such matters
which are supported by such a continuous and unbroken series of witnesses,
this state of affairs will not be confined to one or two problems.
Hereafter anything whatever of a past age which has come down to us
through verbal tradition will not be protected from doubt, be it the
Qur'an or ritual prayer (namaz) or fasting (roza). It
will come to the point that even Muhammad's mission to this world
will be questioned. In fact a more reasonable way for these people,
rather than creating doubt of this kind, would have been to accept
as fact what is fact and is proven through certified witnesses, and
then to consider whether or not to follow the religion which punishes
the apostate by death. The person who discovers any established or
wholesome element of his religion to conflict with his intellectual
standards and then tries to prove that this element is not really
a part of the religion, already proves that his affliction is such
that, "You cannot become a kafir (infidel); since there is no
other choice, become a Muslim" (kafer natavani shod nachar Musalman sho).
In other words, though his manner of thought and outlook has deviated
from the true path of his religion, he insists on remaining in it
only because he has inherited it from his forefathers.

A. The Proof from the Qur'an for the Commandment to Execute the Apostate

Here I wish briefly to offer proof that will quiet the doubt in the hearts
of those who, for lack of sources of information, may think that perhaps
the punishment of death did not exist in Islam but was added at a later
time by the "mawlawis" (religious leaders) on their own.

God Most High declares in the Qur'an:

But if they repent and establish worship and pay the poor-due,
then are they your brethren in religion. We detail our revelations
for a people who have knowledge. And if they break their pledges
after their treaty (hath been made with you) and assail your religion,
then fight the heads of disbelief -- Lo! they have no binding oaths
in order that they may desist. (9:11,12)[1]

The following is the occasion for the revelation of this verse:
During the pilgrimage (hajj) in A.H. 9 God Most High ordered
a proclamation of an immunity. By virtue of this proclamation all
those who, up to that time, were fighting against God and His Apostle
and were attempting to obstruct the way of God's religion through
all kinds of excesses and false covenants, were granted from that
time a maximum respite of four months. During this period they
were to ponder their own situation. If they wanted to accept Islam,
they could accept it and they would be forgiven. If they wanted to
leave the country, they could leave. Within this fixed period
nothing would hinder them from leaving. Thereafter those remaining,
who would neither accept Islam nor leave the country, would be dealt
with by the sword. In this connection it was said: "If they repent
and uphold the practice of prayer and almsgiving, then they are your
brothers in religion. If after this, however, they break their
covenant, then war should be waged against the leaders of kufr
(infidelity). Here "covenant breaking" in no way can be construed
to mean "breaking of political covenants". Rather, the context
clearly determines its meaning to be "confessing Islam and then
renouncing it". Thereafter the meaning of "fight the heads of
disbelief" (9:11,12) can only mean that war should be waged against
the leaders instigating apostasy.[2]

B. Proof from the Hadith (Canonical Tradition) for the Commandment
to Execute the Apostate

After the Qur'an we turn to the Hadith. This is the command of the
Prophet:

1. Any person (i.e., Muslim) who has changed
his religion, kill him.[3]

This tradition has been narrated by Abu Bakr, Uthman, Ali, Muadh ibn Jabal,
Abu Musa Ashari, Abdullah ibn Abbas, Khalid ibn Walid and a number of
other Companions, and is found in all the authentic Hadith collections.

2. Abdullah ibn Masud reports:

The Messenger of God stated: In no way is it permitted to shed
the blood of a Muslim who testifies that "there is no god except God"
and "I am the Apostle of God" except for three crimes:
a. he has killed someone and his act merits retaliation;
b. he is married and commits adultery;
c. he abandons his religion and is separated from the community.[4]

3. Aisha reports:

The Messenger of God stated that it is unlawful to shed the blood
of a Muslim other than for the following reasons:
a. although married, he commits adultery or
b. after being a Muslim he chooses kufr, or
c. he takes someone's life.[5]

4. Uthman reports:

I heard the Messenger of God saying that it is unlawful to shed
the blood of a Muslim except in three situations:
a. a person who, being a Muslim, becomes a kafir;
b. one who after marriage commits adultery;
c. one who commits murder apart from having an authorization to
take life in exchange for another life.[6]

Uthman further reports:

I heard the Messenger of God saying that it is unlawful to shed
the blood of a Muslim with the exception of three crimes:
a. the punishment of someone who after marriage commits adultery is stoning;
b. retaliation is required against someone who intentionally commits murder;
c. anyone who becomes an apostate after being a Muslim should be punished by death.[7]

All the reliable texts of history clearly prove that Uthman,
while standing on the roof of his home, recited this tradition
before thousands of people at a time when rebels had surrounded
his house and were ready to kill him. His argument against the
rebels was based on the point of this tradition that apart from
these three crimes it was unlawful to put a Muslim to death for
a fourth crime, "and I have committed none of these three. Hence
after killing me, you yourself will be found guilty." It is evident
that in this way this tradition became a clear argument in favour
of Uthman against the rebels. Had there been the slightest doubt
about the genuineness of this tradition, hundreds of voices would
have cried out: "Your statement is false or doubtful!" But not
even one person among the whole gathering of the rebels could
raise an objection against the authenticity of this tradition.

5. Abu Musa Ashari reports:

The Prophet appointed and sent him (Abu Musa) as governor of Yemen.
Then later he sent Muadh ibn Jabal as his assistant. When Muadh
arrived there, he announced: People, I am sent by the Messenger
of God for you. Abu Musa placed a cushion for him to be comfortably
seated.

Meanwhile a person was presented who previously had been a Jew,
then was a Muslim and then became a Jew. Muadh said: I will not
sit unless this person is executed. This is the judgement of God
and His Messenger. Muadh repeated the statement three times.
Finally, when he was killed, Muadh sat.[8]

It should be noted that this incident took place during the blessed
life of the Prophet. At that time Abu Musa represented the Prophet
as governor and Muadh as vice-governor. If their action had not
been based on the decision of God and His Messenger, surely the
Prophet would have objected.

6. Abdullah ibn Abbas reports:

Abdullah ibn Abi Sarh was at one time secretary to the Messenger
of God. Then Satan seized him and he joined the kuffar.
When Mecca was conquered the Messenger of God ordered that he be
killed. Later, however, Uthman sought refuge for him and the
Messenger of Allah gave him refuge.[9]

We find the commentary on this last incident in the narration of
Sad ibn Abi Waqqas:

When Mecca was conquered, Abdullah ibn Sad ibn Abi Sarh took
refuge with Uthman ibn Affan. Uthman took him and they presented
themselves to the Prophet, requesting: O Messenger of God, accept
the allegiance of Abdullah. The Prophet lifted his head, looked
in his direction and remained silent. This happened three times
and he (the Prophet) only looked in his direction. Finally after
three times he accepted his allegiance. Then he turned towards
his Companions and said: Was there no worthy man among you who,
when he saw me withholding my hand from accepting his allegiance,
would step forward and kill this person? The people replied:
O Messenger of God, we did not know your wish. Why did you not
signal with your eyes? To this the Prophet replied: It is
unbecoming of a Prophet to glance in a stealthy manner.[10]

7. Aisha narrates:

On the occasion of the battle of Uhud (when the Muslims suffered
defeat), a woman apostatized. To this the Prophet responded: Let
her repent. If she does not repent, she should be executed.[11]

8. Jabir ibn Abdullah narrates:

A woman Umm Ruman (or Umm Marwan) apostatized. Then the prophet
ordered that it would be better that she be offered Islam again
and then repent. Otherwise she should be executed.[12]

A second report of Bayhaqi with reference to this reads:

She refused to accept Islam. Therefore she was
executed.

C. The Views of the Rightly-Guided Caliphs

After the above I note the views during the era of the Rightly-Guided
Caliphs:

1. During the time of Abu Bakr a woman named Umm Qarfa became a kafir
after accepting Islam. Abu Bakr requested that she repent but she did not.
Abu Bakr had her put to death.[13]

2. Amru ibn al-As, the governor of Egypt, wrote to Umar that a man
accepted Islam, then became a kafir, then accepted Islam and
then became a kafir. He committed this act several times. Now
should his Islam be accepted or not? Umar replied: As long as God
has accepted his Islam, you too should do so. Offer him Islam. If
he accepts it, leave him alone. Otherwise kill him.[14]

3. Sad ibn Abi Waqqas and Abu Musa Ashari sent a messenger to Umar
after the Battle of Tustar. The messenger presented a report of the
events to Umar. Finally Umar asked: Did anything unusual happen?
He said: Yes, Leader of the Faithful. We caught an Arab who had
become a kafir after accepting Islam. Umar asked: Then what
did you do with him? He said: We killed him. At that, Umar said:
Why did you not confine him to a room, put a lock on the door, keep
him there for three days and daily throw him a loaf of bread? Perhaps
during that time he may have repented. O God! This act did not take
place at my command or in my presence; nor after hearing about it am
I pleased with it. Nevertheless Umar enquired no further about the
matter from Sad and Abu Musa Ashari, nor did he plan to punish them.[15]

This proves that the action of Sad and Abu Musa was indeed within the
limits of the law, but that in Umar's opinion it would have been much
better to have given the person an opportunity to repent before killing
him.

4. Abdullah ibn Masud was informed that in one of the mosques of the
Banu Hanifah some people were testifying that Musaylimah was a messenger
of God. Hearing this, Abdullah sent police to arrest and bring them.
When they were brought before him, they all repented and promised never
to do it again. Abdullah let all of them go except one, Abdullah ibn
al-Nawahah, whom he punished by death. The people said: How is it
that you have given two conflicting verdicts in the same case? Abdullah
replied that Ibn al-Nawahah was the very man who has been sent by
Musaylimah as an ambassador to the Prophet (Muhammad). I was present
at that time. Another man, Hajar ibn Wathal, was also with him as
a partner in this diplomatic mission. Muhammad asked both of them:
Do you bear witness that I am the Messenger of God? They both responded
by asking: Do you bear witness that Musaylimah is the Messenger of God?
Hearing that, Muhammad replied: If it were permitted to execute the
delegates of a political mission, I would execute you both. After
relating this event, Abdullah said: For this reason I punished Ibn
al-Nawahah by death.[16]

It is clear that this event occurred during the time of Umar when
Abdullah ibn Masud was chief judge of Kufah under him.

5. Some men who were spreading the claim of Musaylimah were captured
in Kufah. Uthman was informed in writing about it. He wrote in
response that the true religion (din-i haqq) and the confession:
"There is no god except God and Muhammad is the Messenger of God",
should be presented before them. Whoever accepts it and reveals his
rejection of Musaylimah should be released. Whoever upholds the religion
of Musaylimah should be executed.[17]

6. A man who was formerly a Christian, then was Muslim, and again
became a Christian was brought before Ali. Ali asked him: What is
the cause of your conduct? He replied: I have found the religion of
the Christians better than your religion. Ali asked: What is your
belief about Jesus? He said: He is my Lord (Rabb); or else
he said: He is Lord of Ali. Hearing this, Ali ordered that he be
executed.[18]

7. Ali was informed about a group of Christians who had become
Muslims and then became Christians again. Ali arrested them,
summoned them before himself and enquired about the truth of the
matter. They said: We were Christians. Then we were offered the
choice of remaining Christians or becoming Muslims. We chose Islam.
But now it is our opinion that no religion is more excellent than
our first religion. Therefore we have become Christians now.
Hearing this, Ali ordered these people to be executed and their
children enslaved.[19]

8. Ali was informed that some people regarded him as their Lord
(Rabb). He called them and asked: What do you say? They
said: You are our Lord, our Creator and Sustainer. Ali said: You
are in a sad situation. I am a servant like you. Like you I eat
and drink. If I obey God, He rewards me. If I disobey Him, I fear
He will punish me. Therefore fear God and abandon your confession.
But they refused. The next day Qanbar came and reported the people
were saying the same thing. He called them, and on enquiring about
the matter, they repeated the same things. The third day Ali called
and threatened them: If you say the same thing, I will kill you
in a most terrible manner. Still they remained adamant in their
opinion. Finally Ali had a pit prepared and a fire burning in it.
Then he said: Look, stop this confession immediately. Otherwise
I will throw you into this pit. But they persisted in their
affirmation. Then at Ali's command all of them were thrown into
the pit.[20]

9. When Ali was in Rahbah, someone informed him that the occupants
of a particular house kept an idol in it and worshipped it. Hearing
this, Ali himself went there. The idol was discovered after searching.
Ali set the house on fire and it was burnt along with its occupants.[21]

10. A man who had been a Muslim but became a kafir was arrested.
This happened during the time of Ali and he was brought to Ali. Ali
gave him a one month period to repent and then enquired of him. But
he refused to repent. Finally Ali had him put to death.[22]

These ten examples cover the whole period of the Rightly-Guided Caliphate
and demonstrate that whenever apostasy occurred during the time of these
four caliphs, the punishment meted out for it was death alone. In any
of the events that these examples portray, the inclusion of another crime,
apart from the apostasy itself, cannot be demonstrated whereby it could
have been said that, in fact, the punishment of death had been given
for another crime, not for apostasy.

D. The First Caliph's Jihad (Holy War) against Apostates

But more weighty than all of these examples is the example of the
jihad of Abu Bakr Siddiq against "the people of apostasy".
The whole company of the Companions of the Prophet participated in it.
Even if in the beginning anyone disagreed with this war, later the
disagreement changed to agreement. This event therefore clearly
proves that those persons who received religious instruction directly
from the Prophet were united in deciding that an Islamic government
should wage war against any group that renounces Islam. Some people
argue that this event was a jihad because they understand the
apostates to have been in fact rebels who had ceased paying the
government tax (zakat), dismissed the government officials
and began to establish their own governments. But this argument is
definitely wrong on four accounts:

1. Not all the people against whom the jihad was conducted
withheld zakat. In fact they included various types of
apostates. Some Arabs believed in individuals who had laid claim
to prophethood and proclaimed their message in various corners of
Arabia. Others renounced their faith in the prophethood of Muhammad,
saying that if Muhammad had been a prophet, he would not have died
(law kana Muhammadun nabiyyan ma mata). Some people acknowledged
all the requirements of religion and were ready to pay even zakat.
But, they added, they themselves would collect and spend their
zakat and would not give it to the officials of Abu Bakr.
Still others said: We followed God's Messenger when he was among us,
but how amazing that Abu Bakr's rule is imposed upon us!

It was as if they opposed the establishment of the caliphate after
the prophet and the arrangement that all Muslims by compulsion were
attached to this focal point as they had been attached to the
personality of the Messenger of God.

2. For all these various kinds of people the Companions of the
Prophet used the word "apostate" (murtadd) instead of
"rebel" and the word "apostasy" (irtidad) instead of
"rebellion" when referring to that disturbance. From this it
is clearly evident that in their view the real crime that the
people had committed was apostasy and not rebellion. At the
time when Abu Bakr sent Ikrimah ibn Abi Jahl to wage a
jihad against the people in South Arabia who had
confessed the prophethood of Laqit ibn Malik al-Azdi,
he advised him: Wherever you find apostates from Oman to
Hadramaut and Yemen, crush them.

3. When doubt was expressed regarding the permissibility or
otherwise of waging a war against those who refused to pay
zakat, Abu Bakr replied: By God! I will wage war
against anyone who differentiates between namaz
(ritual prayer) and zakat (almsgiving). This clearly
means that in the view of the first caliph their real crime
was not the withholding of zakat but the acceptance
of one pillar (of Islam) and the rejection of another.[23]

Finally the companions agreed with the caliph to wage jihad
against those refusing to pay zakat only because they
were completely satisfied with the incumbent caliph's arguments
that the opponents had renounced the true religion by drawing
a (false) distinction between namaz and zakat.

4. More decisive than all of the above is Abu Bakr's proclamation
which he had issued in writing to each of the commanders of the
eleven armies at the time he sent the armies to the various parts
of Arabia to wage jihad against the apostates. Hafiz ibn
Kathir has copied the full proclamation in his book al-Badayah
w'al-Nahayah (Vol. 6, p. 316). The following sentences
especially merit consideration:

I have come to know about the movement of those among you
who have accepted following Satan and who, having no fear of God,
have turned from Islam to kufr. Now I have sent you
someone with an army of faithful followers[24] and have advised
him to accept nothing from anyone except faith and to execute
no one without first inviting him to God, the Mighty and Glorious
One. Then whoever accepts his invitation to God and, after
confession, maintains good conduct, he will accept his confession
and assist him in walking in the right path. And he will fight
whoever refuses until he returns to the commandment of God.
And he has been ordered to leave no one alive whom he has seized
among those who have refused, to set fire to their villages,
to destroy them, to enslave their women and children and to accept
nothing from anyone except Islam. Thus whoever accepts his word
does it for his own good and whoever does not will not be able
to impoverish God. I have also directed the commander whom
I have sent to announce my plan in all your assemblies and that
the sign of accepting Islam is the call to prayer. Do not oppose
the village where the call to prayer is heard. Where there is
no call to prayer, ask the people why. If they refuse, attack
them. If they confess, treat them as they deserve.[25]

E. Agreement of the Leading Mujtahids (Jurists)

To copy the consecutive writings of all the lawyers from the first
to the fourteenth century A.H. would make our discussion very long.
Yet we cannot avoid mentioning that however much the four Schools
of Law may differ among themselves regarding the various aspects
of this problem, in any case all four Schools without doubt agree
on the point that the punishment of the apostate is execution.

According to the School of Malik, as written in his book Muwatta:

From Zayd ibn Aslam, Malik has reported that the
Apostle of God declared: Whoever changes his religion should be
executed. Malik said about this tradition: As far as we can
understand this command of the prophet means that the person who
leaves Islam to follow another way, but conceals his kufr
and continues to manifest Islamic belief, as is the pattern of
the Zindiqs[26] and others like them, should be executed after
his guilt has been established. He should not be asked to repent
because the repentance of such persons cannot be trusted. But
the person who has left Islam and publicly chooses to follow
another way should be requested to repent. If he repents, good.
Otherwise, he should be executed.[27]

According to the Hanbali School as explained in the well authenticated
book al-Mughni:

In the opinion of Imam Ahmad ibn Hanbal any adult
and rational man or woman who renounces Islam and chooses kufr
should be given a three day period to repent. The person who does
not repent should be executed. This is also the opinion of Hasan
Basri, Zuhri, Ibrahim Nakhi, Makhul, Hammad, Malik, Layth, Awzai,
Shafi'i and Ishaq ibn Rahwiyah.[28]

Imam Tahawi has provided an interpretation of the Hanafi School
in his book Sharh Ma'ani al-Athar as follows:

The lawyers differ among themselves concerning whether or not
the person who has apostatized from Islam should be requested to
repent. One group says it is much better that the imam
(leader) requests the apostate to repent. If he repents, he
should be released. Otherwise he should be executed. Imam
Abu Hanifah, Abu Yusuf and Muhammad Rahmatullah are among those
who have expressed this opinion. A second group says there is
no need to request repentance. For them the condition of the
apostate resembles that of the harbi kafir ("the infidel
at war"). The infidels at war whom our invitation has already
reached need not be invited to Islam before initiating war against
them. Nevertheless every effort should be made to fully inform
all others who have not been previously invited to repent, before
attacking them. Likewise every effort should be made to bring
back to Islam the person who has apostatized for lack of information
about Islam. But the person who understands Islam well and
deliberately renounces Islam, should be executed without any
invitation to repentance. This opinion is supported by a statement
of Imam Abu Yusuf also who writes in his book al-Amla':
I will execute an apostate and will not ask for repentance.
If, however, he hastens to repent, I will leave him and commit
his affair to God.[29]

An extended explanation of the Hanafi school is found in the
Hidayah and reads:

When any person forsakes Islam -- Refuge is in God -- then
Islam should be presented to him. If he has any doubt, every
effort should be made to clear it. For it is highly possible
that he is afflicted by some doubt, which, if removed, will
avert his evil prospect of death by the better prospect of
re-embracing Islam. But according to the leading lawyers it
is not necessary to offer him Islam because he has already
received its invitation.[30]

Unfortunately at this time I have no reliable book dealing with
Shafi'i jurisprudence; yet the representation of this school
as found in the Hidayah is as follows:

It is recorded from Shafi'i that it is incumbent upon the
imam to grant the apostate a three day respite. It is
illegal for him to execute him before the respite expires,
since the apostasy of a Muslim could be the result of some
form of doubt. Thus there must be some time given him as an
opportunity for consideration and reflection. We consider
three days to be sufficient for this purpose.[31]

Probably these many witnesses will dispel all doubt about the
penalty for the apostate according to Islamic law. The penalty
is execution, and the penalty is because of apostasy itself and
not because of any other crime that may have been connected with
the apostasy.[32]

Some people, after hearing these discourses from the Hadith and
the Law, keep on asking: Where is the punishment written in the
Qur'an? Even though we have demonstrated the presence of this
order also in the Qur'an in the beginning of our discussion, yet,
for the satisfaction of these people, let us suppose the commandment
is not found in the Qur'an. Still the large number of Hadith, the
decisions of the Rightly-Guided Caliphs and the united opinions of
the lawyers suffice fully to establish this commandment.

We ask those who deem this evidence insufficient and request some
Quranic reference to prove the existence of this commandment:
In your opinion is the full Islamic penal code the same as that
which is found in the Qur'an? If your answer is in the affirmative,
it is as if you are saying that apart from those actions which the
Qur'an designates as criminal and for which a penalty is prescribed,
no other action will be punishable as a crime. Then consider this
matter again. Can you run any government in the world successfully
even for one day on this principle? If you answer in the negative
and you yourself also admit that an Islamic order of government must
reckon with other crimes also besides those crimes and their punishment
mentioned in the Qur'an and the need for a detailed penal code relative
to them, then we ask a second question. Which law will be more worthy
to be called Muslim: The law which was in use during the rule of the
Prophet and the four Rightly-Guided Caliphs and which was accepted
with full agreement and without break for thirteen hundred years by
the whole Muslim community's judges, magistrates and legal scholars
or the law formulated at present by some persons who have been
influenced and overcome by non-Islamic studies and non-Islamic culture
and civilization and who have not obtained even a partial education
in Islamic disciplines?

Notes

1. All Quranic quotations come from M. M. Pickthall, The Meaning
of the Glorious Koran, The New American Library, New York, n.d.,
unless otherwise noted.

Mawdudi's variations within these verses in brackets: "But if they
repent (from kufr)..."; "And if they break their pledges
after their treaty (i.e., treaty of accepting Islam)...." Arberry
translates ahad more appropriately as "covenant" rather than
"treaty". (The Koran Interpreted, Oxford University Press,
London, 1964)

For S. A. Rahman's rejection and reflection on Mawdudi's application
and interpretation of this verse, see Punishment of Apostasy in Islam,
Institute of Islamic Culture, Lahore, l972, pp. 10-13.

As the following line in the text indicates, Muslims understand this
verse to be revealed in A.H. 9 = After Hijrah. Muhammad's
emigration (hijrah) from Mecca to Medina marks the beginning
of the Islamic calendar.

2. After a detailed review of the Quranic evidence for the execution
of the apostate, Rahman concluded "that not only is there no punishment
for apostasy provided in the Book but that the Word of God clearly
envisages the natural death of the apostate. He will be punished
only in the Hereafter...." (ibid. p. 54)

Mohamed S. El-Awa is of the same opinion, noting also that he agrees
with Heffening's statement (under murtadd in the Encyclopaedia
of Islam): "In the Qur'an the apostate is threatened with punishment
in the next world only." (Punishment in Islamic Law: A Comparative
Study, American Trust Publications, Indianapolis, 1982, pp. 50, 51)

Majid Khadduri (War and Peace in the Law of Islam, John Hopkins
Press, Baltimore, 1955) cites Qur'an 2:217 (latter portion); 4:88, 89;
5:54; 16:106, noting also that while "only the second of these four
verses specifically states that death sentence should be imposed on
those who apostatize or turn back from their religion, all the commentators
agree that a believer who turns back from his religion (irtadda),
openly or secretly, must be killed if he persists in disbelief" (p. 150).
For his whole discussion on kafir and murtadd see pp. 149-152.
Cf. S. M. Zwemer, The Law of Apostasy in Islam, Marshall Brothers,
Ltd., London, 1924, pp. 33-35.

3. We have translated this and the following traditions from Mawdudi's
Urdu translations of the original Arabic texts. Cf. al-Bukhari, The
Translation of the Meanings of Sahih al-Bukhari, tr. Dr. Muhammad
Muhsin Khan, Kitab Bhavan, New Delhi, vol. 9, p. 45. The translator
translates din as "Islamic religion".

This and the following citations of Arabic source materials are Mawdudi's.

10. ibid. For more information on how Abdullah ibn Sad fabricated
Quranic passages, deceived Muhammad and later, under Uthman, became a
general and governor see The Life of Muhammad, A Translation of Ishaq's
Sirat Rasul Allah by A. Guillaume, O.U.P., London, 1955, p. 550;
Encyclopaedia of Islam[2] (under Abdullah ibn Sa'd); T. P. Hughes,
Dictionary of Islam (under Abdullah ibn Sa'd); I. Goldziher,
Die Richtungen der Islamischen Koranauslegung, Brill, Leiden,
1920, p. 35. Has any Muslim writer provided a serious analysis of the
dynamics involved in this event as alluded to in this tradition and
its commentary?

16. Tahawi, op. cit. Mawdudi adds the following note:
"To understand this matter one must know that the tribe of Banu Hanifah,
along with Ibn al-Nawahah and Hajar bin Wathal, had previously become
Muslims. When Musaylimah laid claim to prophethood, they acknowledged it.
Thus, when the Prophet said to Abdullah ibn al-Nawahah and Hajar ibn Wathal:
'If it were permitted to execute the delegates of a diplomatic mission,
I would execute you both', it clearly means that because of your apostasy
you ought to die. But since you have come this time as an ambassador,
the rule of the shari'ah cannot be applied against you. For more
information on the Wars of Secession (Riddah), Musaylimah and
others, see any edition of The Encyclopaedia of Islam.

24. lit. "migrants (from Mecca) and helpers (from Medina) and their
good followers".

25. For an early Muslim historian's report on the apostasy of the Arabs
at the time of Abu Bakr, see al-Baladhuri, Kitab Futuh al-Buldan
(The Origins of the Islamic State), tr. P. K. Hitti, Khayat, Beirut,
1966, esp. pp.116-162. The even earlier biography of Muhammad Ibn Ishaq
refers to the apostasy of Ubaydullah ibn Jahsh, who "had migrated with
the Muslims, but when he got to Abyssinia he turned Christian and died
there as such having abandoned Islam ..." (The Life of Muhammad:
A Translation of Ishaq's Sirat Rasul Allah, op. cit., p. 527).
Nothing indicates he was punished for apostasy. Do this and other early
events during the life of Muhammad suggest the possibility of a development
in the legal response to apostasy from Islam, perhaps even the matter of
consistency regarding the response? Cf. ibid., especially p. 504
regarding the truce of Hudaybiyya which seems to allow for the possibility
of followers of Muhammad returning to the enemy. For a useful account of
jihad in general and jihad against apostates in particular
see Khadduri, op. cit., esp. pp. 76, 77. Among Muslims today,
especially in the West, the nature of jihad is perhaps an even
more contentious issue than apostasy.

30. Bab Ahkam al-Murtaddin. The Urdu text has been translated.
A later reprinting of the English translation of the Hidayah:
The Hedaya, tr. Charles Hamilton Kitab Bhavan, New Delhi, 1985,
which appears to be a photocopy of the original edition in 1791.
The section "Of the Laws concerning Apostates" contains 22 pages.
A portion of it appears in this work as part of Appendix B and includes
Hamilton's versions of the above and following quotations.

Another reprint of the English translation (The Hedaya, Charles
Hamilton, Premier Book House, Lahore, 1975) claims to be an exact
reproduction of the second edition (1870), adding: "It is hoped that
the publication of this treasure of Islamic Jurisprudence which remained
out of print for more than half a century will be greatly appreciated."
The whole of Book IX, containing also ch. 9 on Apostates, is only outlined
and concludes with the note: "This subject is omitted, as it is inapplicable
to India" (pp. 205, 206). Would converts from Islam in India agree to its
inapplicability?

31. Again, our translation. See Note 30.

32. For Mawdudi, it seems, apostasy "pure and simple", quite apart
from any consideration of the apostate's rebellion against or threat
to the state, merits execution. Or, he would insist, the apostate
is a rebel against the state; his apostasy is his act of treason
against the state. Mawdudi's apparent rejection of any distinction
between the two is what appears especially to frustrate S. A. Rahman
and other like-minded Muslims, who would insist that the execution of
the apostate for "pure and simple" apostasy from Islam mocks Islam's
claim to proclaim religious freedom.

II
The Problem of the Propagation of Kufr in the House of Islam

Thus far we have discussed whether or not in Islam the punishment of
an apostate is execution. We now move to the next question, which
the enquirer has posed in these words:

Under a truly Muslim rule should non-Muslims receive
the same right to propagate their religions as Muslims ought to receive
to propagate their religion? Under the Rightly-Guided Caliphs and
their successors were rights accorded to the kuffar(infidels)
and the People of the Book to propagate their religions?

To a great extent the law of the execution of the apostate itself
has decided the matter in that when within the boundaries of our
authority we do not grant any person who is a Muslim the right to
leave Islam to accept another religion (madhhab) or way
(maslak), then we must infer from this only that within the
confines of the House of Islam (Dar al-Islam) we also do not
tolerate the proclamation and spread of any other religion in opposition
to Islam. To grant other religions and ways the right to propagate
and then to declare a Muslim's change to another religion a crime
are affirmations which contradict each other. The second law
automatically negates the first law. Therefore, the law of the
execution of the apostate, by its very nature, suffices to lead us
to conclude that Islam does not tolerate the propagation of kufr
within the boundaries of its authority. It might be said, however,
that the law protects only Muslims from the effects of the propagation
of kufr. Then the question would still remain whether or not
Islam allows within its boundaries non-Muslims and preachers from
abroad to spread the message of their respective religions and ways
among the non-Muslim population.

A. Investigating the Problem

For an investigation of this question it is necessary to properly
understand the true position of Islam and the nature of Islamic rule.
As it truly is, Islam itself offers mankind a way and categorically
claims that this way is the true way and all other ways are false.
The welfare of humanity rests upon this way alone. All other ways
lead humanity to nothing but destruction. Hence all people should
walk along this way and forsake other ways.

And (He commandeth you, saying): This is My straight
path, so follow it. Follow not other ways, lest ye be parted from
His way.... (6:154)

According to Islam every path of thought and action which any non-Muslim
promotes is crooked. The person following it ends up incurring loss
and nothing but pure loss.

... These invite unto the Fire, and Allah inviteth
unto the Garden, and unto forgiveness by His grace.... (2:221)

Islam's claim and message create no inner conflict within Islam. For
Islam the doubt that another way also may be true and a source of
salvation for mankind does not arise. Islam is fully confident that
it is the authentic way and all other ways are false. It asserts
firmly, seriously and sincerely that all other ways lead mankind to
hell and understands its own way alone to be the one way of salvation
for mankind.

Now when this is the real position of Islam, obviously our preference
about it is irrelevant. Moreover it is extremely difficult even to
tolerate the spreading of those messages among the children of Adam
which lead them to eternal destruction. It cannot give an open licence
to the proclaimers of falsehood to drag other people to the same pit
of fire toward which they themselves are going. At most it can tolerate,
and that with heavy heart, only that the person who wishes to remain
firm in kufr has the choice to abandon the way of his own welfare
and walk on the way of his own destruction. And this too it tolerates
only because the law of nature renders it impossible to instil faith
into someone forcibly. If, on the other hand, it were possible forcibly
to save people from the poison of kufr, then concern for human
welfare would necessitate restraining the hand of everyone in the process
of drinking the cup's poison. Islam's avoidance of compulsory protection
and salvation does not rest on its understanding of the right of people
to move toward the pit of destruction and to deem it wrong to stop and
to save them; rather the reason for avoidance of this good action rests
on the sole fact that in accordance with the law by which God created
the present arrangement of the universe, no person can be saved from
the destructive results of kufr unless he himself acknowledges
and confesses the error of his blasphemous manner of thought and action
and is ready to choose the Muslim way of life. For this reason, and
for this reason only, Islam gives the servants of God the option of
taking the path of destruction, if that is what they wish. From this,
however, it is absurd to expect that it will give these "suicidal
persons" the further option of inducing other servants of God to
proceed along the same path of destruction on which they themselves
are going. Where it has no authority, there it is helpless. But if,
where its rule is established and it has taken responsibility for the
welfare and prosperity of God's servants, it is impossible to give
licence to the preachment of theft, prostitution, opium and poison,
then how can it be possible there to give licence to preach the much
more dangerous kufr, shirk (idolatry), atheism and rebellion
against God?

B. The Fundamental Objective of Islamic Rule

Islam establishes its rule not only with the purpose of organizing
a nation but with a clear and fixed objective which it explains in
these words:

He it is who hath sent His messenger with the guidance
and the Religion of Truth, that He may cause it to prevail over all
religion, however much the idolaters may be averse. (9:33)

And fight them until persecution is no more, and religion
is all for Allah.... (8:39)

Thus We have appointed you a middle nation, that ye may
be witnesses against mankind, and that the messenger may be a witness
against you.... (2:143)

According to these verses the true purpose of the Messenger's mission
is to ensure the victory of the guidance and Religion of Truth, which
he has brought from God over every other competing order of life of
a religious nature. From this it necessarily follows that where the
Messenger achieves success in his mission, there he cannot let any
movement arise which competes with God's guidance and His religion
and strives for the ascendancy of another religion or order of life.

As the successors of the Messenger after the Messenger's departure are
heirs of the religion which he had brought from God, in the same way
they are heirs of the mission for which God had ordained him. The
very purpose of all their struggles, it is agreed, is to make all
religion the sole preserve of God.

Hence, wherever they control the affairs of this life and must be
fully answerable to God for the administration of a particular country
or territory, in no way during their tenure of supervision can they
there legally provide an opportunity to any other religion to spread
its message as competition to the religion of God, because the provision
of such an opportunity will certainly mean that all religion will not
be for God and whatever evil of any false order of life remains will
further grow. In the end, to what will they testify before God? Will
they testify: Where You have granted us the power to rule, there we
have provided evil an opportunity to raise its head against Your religion?

C. The Position of Dhimmis and Protected Ones in the House of Islam

Under Islamic rule the freedom given to non-Muslims to remain in their
religion and, in compensation for jizyah, the responsibility
undertaken for the protection of their life, property and religious
practice have at most only the following consequence: They may continue
to walk on the path they want. If, by going beyond this, they try to
make their way prevail, then no Islamic government worthy of its name
can ever give them this permission. The clear words of the Quranic
verse explaining the law of jizyah read:

... until they pay the tribute readily, being brought
low. (9:29)[1]

According to this verse the true position of Dhimmis under Islamic
rule is to be content to remain low (saghirun). As Dhimmis
they cannot try to become great (kabirun). Similarly non-Muslims
from abroad who come seeking protection may enter into the House of Islam.
They can certainly come for commerce, arts and crafts, politics, education
and all other cultural purposes. But they can never come with the purpose
of exalting the message of their religion at the expense of God's Word.
The sole purpose of the help which Allah gave His messenger and, following
him, the Muslims against the kuffar or in the future will give them,
and as a result of which the House of Islam was previously established or
will be established in the future at some point, was and will be in the
future also to make low the word of kufr and to lift high the
Word of God.

And Allah caused His peace of reassurance to descend
upon him and supported him with hosts ye cannot see and made the word
of those who disbelieved (kafaru) the nethermost, while Allah's
Word it was that became the uppermost (9:40)

Thus Muslims will be terribly "unmindful of good" and "ungrateful for
blessing" if, after benefiting from this help from God, they allow
those who disbelieved to attempt to raise their "nethermost" word to
become "uppermost" within their area of control.

D. The Course of Action During the Period of the Prophet and the Rightly-Guided Caliphs

The strict policy carried out during the rule of the Prophet and the
Rightly-Guided Caliphs has been described above. In Arabia Musaylimah,
Aswad Ansi, Tulhah Asadi, Sajah, Laqit ibn Malik Azdi and whoever else
proclaimed a message contrary to Islam were forcibly suppressed.
Non-Muslim nations covenanted with the Muslims by paying jizyah
and accepted living under Muslim rule as Dhimmis. Many of these
covenants, word for word, are found in the Hadith and history books.
But while these books detail all rights and privileges, nowhere is
there mention of any right which would allow them to proclaim their
religion within the boundaries of the House of Islam. Moreover the
details of the Dhimmis' rights, which Muslims themselves
graciously bestowed on non-Muslims, are found in the books on
jurisprudence (fiqh). But these books too are devoid of
any reference to this so-called "right". How Islamic rule should
treat non-Muslims coming from outside as protected ones is fully
explained by the lawyers. Here too we have not even the slightest
hint to suggest that Islamic rule should give any such person, who
may wish it, permission to promote his own religion within its boundaries.
If later "world-worshipping" caliphs and kings ever acted against
this principle, this does not prove that Islamic law allows it; rather
it demonstrates, in fact, that these people have become unfamiliar with
the duties of a truly Islamic government or have deviated from them.
The people who have considered the present concept of tolerance as
the standard of truth can present with great pride the achievements
of kings for appreciation before non-Muslims, such as those Muslim
kings who donated so many properties for non-Muslim places of worship
and schools and other kings during whose period full freedom was
provided the people of all groups to proclaim their respective religions.
But from an Islamic point of view all these achievements warrant
inscription on the list of the crimes of those kings.

Note

1. The whole verse reads: "Fight against such of those who have
been given the Scripture as believe not in Allah nor the Last Day,
and forbid not that which Allah hath forbidden by His messenger,
and follow not the religion of truth, until they pay the tribute
readily, being brought low." See Appendix A for Mawdudi's fuller
explanation of Dhimmi.

III
The Execution of the Apostate: A Rational Consideration

We must now discuss the second aspect of our question, i.e., if in
Islam the punishment of the apostate is really execution and if,
truly, Islam does not tolerate the rise and spread of any rival
religion within its borders, then what are our arguments that lead
us to understand its attitude to be correct and reasonable? First
we shall speak about the problem of the execution of the apostate.
Then we will deal with the question of prohibiting the preachment
of kufr.

A. The Arguments of the Critics

The most likely objections against the execution of the apostate
are these:

1. This idea is against the freedom of conscience. Every person
should have the freedom to accept whatever satisfies his heart
and to reject whatever does not satisfy him. As every person
initially must be able to accept or reject the way before him,
similarly he should also have the option later to remain on or
abandon the way of his original choice. The person who is ready
to abandon the way he has chosen to follow is ready to do it
because he no longer believes in the truth of that way. Then
how can it be right to offer him the gallows when he has determined
to leave that way because he no longer believes it? Does this mean
that if you cannot change a person's belief by arguments, then you
should force him to change his belief by threatening him with death?
And if he does not change, then do you punish him because he did
not change his belief?

2. In any case the faith which is thus forcibly changed or the
faith which people maintain because of the fear of death cannot
be a genuine faith. This faith will be manifestly hypocritical,
chosen to deceive in order to save one's life. Finally how can
a religion provide security by such deception and hypocrisy?
Following a religion or a way, whatever it may be, is meaningless,
unless the follower can believe it with a true heart. And it is
clear that belief within oneself cannot be created by force or
sustained by force. A man's neck can surely be bent by sheer force
but sheer force cannot create faith and confidence in anyone's mind
and heart. Hence, of what use is it if a person, a kafir
by conviction, hypocritically keeps living as a Muslim externally
in order to be saved from the punishment of death? Neither will
he be a true follower of Islam; nor in the presence of God can
this external display of Islam be the means of his salvation;
nor can the continued membership of such a person within the
Muslim community serve as a wholesome community gain.

3. If the principle is accepted that a religion has the right
to compel all the people who have entered into its sphere of
influence to continue to follow it and views it lawful to punish
by death those who leave its circle, then the proclamation and
promotion of all religions will cease. This would prove a serious
obstacle also for Islam itself. All people virtually are followers
of one religion or another. If, then, every religion approves the
punishment of execution for apostasy, it will be difficult not only
for Muslims to embrace another religion but also for non-Muslims
to embrace Islam.

4. Islam has adopted a totally contradictory stance in this matter.
On the one hand it says: "There is no compulsion in religion"
(la ikraha fi'd din: Qur'an 2:256) and "Whosoever will,
let him believe and whosoever will, let him disbelieve"
(fa man sha'a falyu'min wa man sha'a falyakfur: Qur'an 18:30).
On the other hand it itself threatens to punish by death the person
who renounces Islam and determines to move toward kufr. On
the one hand it severely criticizes hypocrisy and wants to see its
followers as righteous believers. On the other hand it itself,
through death threats, compels Muslims who have lost faith in Islam
to engage in a hypocritical show of faith. On the one hand it
severely reprimands those non-Muslims who hinder their co-religionists
from accepting Islam. On the other hand it itself directs Muslims
to execute any of their co-religionists who want to go over to another
religion.

Externally these objections appear so strong that one Muslim group,
conceding defeat before them, had to resort to the old policy of
a subdued people, i.e., when your opponents gain the upper hand in
a dispute over a problem in your religion, then tear it out of the
rule book and clearly state that the matter under dispute has nothing
whatever to do with your religion. A second Muslim group, finding
it impossible to reject the truth like the first group, acknowledged
the reality of the issue. Nevertheless its inability to formulate
a rational response to these intellectual criticisms left even the
staunchest Muslims convinced that, while doubtless the order to
execute the apostate is found in Islam, supporting it rationally
is difficult. I remember well about 18 years ago when on one occasion
a terrible agitation arose in India over the problem of executing
an apostate.[1] It called forth a downpour of objections from
everywhere. At this time even so true a Muslim as the now deceased
Mawlana Muhammad Ali capitulated to these arguments. Numerous
distinguished persons among the religious leaders ('ulama')
on this occasion represented the true legal aspects of the problem
very competently. But the arguments they presented to refute the
intellectual objections were feeble enough to make one wonder
whether they themselves perhaps felt in their hearts that the
matter lacked rational support. The effects of that weak defence
remain until now.

B. A Fundamental Misconception

The truth of the matter is this: If Islam is truly a "religion"
in the sense that religion is understood at present, surely it
would be absurd to prescribe the penalty of execution for those
people who wish to leave it because of their dissatisfaction with
its principles. Currently religion is considered to be a belief
or thought which a person selects with reference to metaphysical
concerns. To obtain salvation in the life after death there is
a way on which a man acts according to his belief. But what about
the organizing of society, the negotiating of the concerns of
this world and the shape of government? All this has to do with
this world only and has no connection with religion. According
to this concept the nature of religion is merely that of belief,
even that kind of belief which is concerned with a totally remote
phase of life whose existence and change has no noticeable effect
on the great and significant ramifications of human life. In the
matter of such faith a person must indeed be free. It makes no
sense that he should be free to choose a particular belief
regarding metaphysical matters but not be free to change it
when he begins to feel his previous belief to be wrong on the
basis of other proofs which confront him. Similarly, there is
no reason why he should be able to choose to follow a way on
which he fixes his hope for salvation in the other world and
not have the right to choose a new way as his hope of salvation
and abandon the previous way. Thus, if the nature of Islam is
simply the nature of religion as it is understood these days,
nothing could be more absurd than that Islam keep its door open
for those entering but station an executioner at the door for
those departing.

In fact, this has not at all been the nature of Islam. It is not
only a "religion" in the modern technical sense of that term but
a complete order of life. It relates not only to the metaphysical
but also to nature and everything in nature. It discourses not
only on the salvation of life after death but also on the questions
of prosperity, improvement and the true ordering of life before
death. It establishes a dependence of salvation after death upon
the true ordering of life before death. Granted that it is
nevertheless only a belief. Yet it is not a belief which is
concerned only with some remote phase of life. Rather, it is that
belief on whose foundation a plan for the whole of life rests.
It is not a belief whose existence or change has no noticeable
effect on the great and significant ramifications of human life
but a belief on whose continuation the continuation of civilization
and the state depend and the changing of which means changing the
order of civilization and state. It is not a faith which a person
may choose with only the concern of the individual in mind. It is
that faith on the basis of which a society of people establishes
a complete order of a civilization in a particular form and brings
into existence a state to operate it. A faith and idea of this
nature cannot be made into a game for the liberties of individuals.
Nor can the society, which establishes the order of civilization
and state on that faith, make way for any brainwave to enter, then
to be displaced by another brainwave, to come and go at will.
This is not a game or picnic intended to entertain a person in
a totally irresponsible manner. This is a terribly serious and
extremely delicate work whose fine balance affects the order of
society and state. Its success and failure affect the success
and failure of thousands and millions of God's servants. Its
outcome is a matter of life and death for a very large company
of people. When in this world was such a faith and membership
in a society holding this faith made the toy of individual free
wills? Does anyone suggest that this is Islam's expectation?

C. The Natural Requirement of an Organized Society

An organized society which has chosen the form of a state can
hardly provide a place within its sphere of activity for people
who differ from it in fundamental matters. Differences of lesser
significance can more or less be tolerated. But it is very difficult
to give people a place in society and make them a part of the state
if they completely oppose the foundations on which the order of
society and the state are established. In this matter Islam has
practised a degree of tolerance which no other order in the history
of the world has ever practised. All other orders either force
those who differ on fundamentals to conform to their principles
or they destroy them. Islam alone, while making them tributaries
and providing them with the greatest possible freedom of action,
gives them place within its borders and tolerates many of their
activities that directly conflict with the foundation of the
Islamic state and society. The sole cause of this toleration is
because Islam does not despair of human nature. It operates with
an enduring hope in the servants of God, trusting that when those
who at present do not see the light of the true religion will have
an opportunity to live under it and experience its gifts and blessings,
they will finally accept this truth. Therefore it works patiently
and continues to tolerate those obdurate elements which do not
assimilate into society and the state, hoping that at some point
they will experience transformation and accept assimilation. But
the sole treatment for the person whose hard heart, once transformed,
has again hardened and who demonstrates no capacity whatever to
assimilate into society's order is to cast him out. In any case,
the value of the individual, however great it be, cannot be great
enough to allow the whole order of society to be corrupted because
of it.

D. Response to Criticisms

The person who says "the execution of the apostate" means simply
a punishment for changing a faith after choosing it in fact himself
already interprets one matter wrongly and then himself imposes
a false commandment upon it. As indicated above the true position
of an apostate is that he by his apostasy provides proof that he
not only rejects the foundation for the order of society and state
but offers no hope that he will ever accept it in the future. When
such a person finds this foundation on which society and the state
are constructed to be unacceptable to himself, it will be appropriate
for him to move outside its borders. But when he fails to do this,
only two ways of dealing with him are possible. Either he should
be stripped of all his rights of citizenship and allowed to remain
alive or else his life should be terminated. In fact the first
form of punishment is worse than the second since in this terrible
state "he will neither die nor live" (Qur'an 20:74). Moreover,
alive, he becomes a greater danger for society, since his existence
will be a permanent plague spreading among the people and a source
of fear lest also the other whole and healthy members of society
be permeated with his poison. It is therefore better to punish him
by death and thereby at one and the same time to put an end to his
own and society's misery.

It is also wrong to interpret "the execution of the apostate" as
our forcing a person, by threatening him with death, to adopt
a hypocritical behaviour. In fact the matter is the opposite.
We want to block entrance into our society of those people who are
afflicted with the disease of capriciousness and keep on playing
musical chairs with theories and ideas for their own amusement,
and who lack totally the stability of belief and character which
the building of an order of life requires. Constructing an order
of life is a highly serious task. In the society which takes on
this task, there can be no place for fickle and unstable people.
Only those people should compose it who seriously accept the order
and, having accepted it, apply heart and soul to its construction
and maintenance. It is therefore a matter of true wisdom and
discretion that everyone who wishes to join this community should
first be informed that the punishment for reverting is death, so
that he may think a hundred times whether or not he ought to join
this community before he joins. Then only he will join the community
who will never leave it.

The basis for the criticism which we have noted under part 3 is
also wrong. What the critics have in mind is, in fact, the matter
of the "religions" and their propagation, which we have explained
in the beginning. Truly such religions should keep their doors
open for those who come and go. Closing them to those wishing to
leave would be an inappropriate action on their part. But any
reasonable person who has even some understanding of a co-operative
society cannot advise the religion on whose ideas and actions
society and state are constructed to keep open its door that would
spell its own ruin, the scattering of its own structure's parts,
the stripping away of the bonds of its own existence. Building
and destroying an ordered society and state have always been a
life-risking task. By its very nature this task will always remain
the same. It has never happened in the world, and it cannot be
expected to happen in the future, that any order of life can be
changed apart from playing with fire and blood. Only that order
of life can be ready for change, without hindrance, whose roots
have rotted and in whose foundation no confidence remains to
justify its continued existence.

Then there is the criticism of contradiction, which for the most
part will disappear automatically by carefully reading the above
discussion. "There is no compulsion in religion" (la ikraha
fi'd din: Qur'an 2:256) means that we do not compel anyone
to come into our religion.[2] And this is truly our practice.
But we initially warn whoever would come and go back that this
door is not open to come and go. Therefore anyone who comes
should decide before coming that there is no going back. Otherwise
he should kindly not come. Let someone explain what contradiction
is finally to be found here. Without doubt, we deplore hypocrisy
and want to see everyone in our community as a true believer.
But if hypocrisy overtakes anyone who steps away from his community
through the door he knows is no exit, the fault lies with himself.
To extricate him from this condition, we cannot expose our order
to anarchy. If he has such concern for righteousness that he does
not want to remain a hypocrite but wants to be true to the object
of his present belief, then why would he himself not come forward
to receive the punishment of execution?

True, the criticism that Islam does not consider it objectionable
to punish its followers who renounce it but objects that other
religions may punish their followers for leaving their religions
to embrace Islam holds some weight superficially. But the
contradiction which superficially appears from these two attitudes
in reality does not exist. Moreover, if in both cases a single
attitude were adopted, then assuredly there would be a contradiction.
Islam calls itself the truth and considers itself to be the truth
in all sincerity. For this reason it can never recognize those
moving toward the truth and those moving away from the truth to
be on an equal level. It is right for anyone coming to the truth
to come and whoever blocks his path deserves to be reprimanded.
It is not right for anyone reverting from the truth to revert and
whoever blocks his path does not deserve to be reprimanded.
There is no contradiction in this attitude. Surely, if Islam
calls itself the truth and then recognizes those moving toward
it and those moving away from it to be on the same level, no
doubt it would be acting in a contradictory manner.

E. The Basic Difference between a Mere Religion and a Religious State

Above we have noted the arguments of those who object to the execution
of the apostate and the arguments we have presented in response to them.
When comparing them, one thing clearly emerges and it is this:
Whatever objections the critics pose regarding the punishment of the
apostate, they make them bearing in mind only a single "religion"
(madhhab). In contrast, when we present our arguments to
demonstrate the validity of this punishment, we have in view no mere
"religion" but a state which is constructed on a religion (din)
and the authority of its principles rather than on the authority of
a family, clan or people.

As far as a mere religion is concerned, our critics and we agree that
such a religion has no right to punish the apostate when the order
and arrangement of society and the existence of the state are not,
for all practical purposes, established on its foundation. Wherever
and in whatever circumstances Islam actually assumes that character
of a religion which the critics understand religion to have, there
we ourselves also reject punishing the apostate by execution.
Islamic jurisprudence is not confined to the punishment of apostasy.
None of Islam's penal laws can be applied when the Islamic state (or,
in terms of the shariah, the "sultan") is not existing.
Thus the discussion on this aspect of the problem between our critics
and ourselves automatically ends.

Now only the second aspect of this matter remains to be discussed,
i.e., where religion itself is the ruler, where religious law is
state law, where religion has taken into its own hands the responsibility
of maintaining peace and order, does or does not religion have the right
to punish those who have promised loyalty and obedience to it and then
turn away. We answer this question in the affirmative. Do our critics
answer in the negative? If they do not, then the conflict completely
disappears. If they do, then we want to know their objection and the
evidence for it.

F. The Legal Right of the Government

This separate discussion asks whether or not a religious state is
intrinsically good. Since generations of Westerners have borne the
burden of the painful history of the Papacy and have been so hurt
by it, they even tremble with fear when they hear the term "state
religion". Hence, whenever they chance to converse on a topic which
sounds suspiciously related to "state religion" (however completely
unrelated it be with the Papacy), then the emotional excitement of
these poor souls incapacitates them from carrying on a rational
conversation on the topic in a dispassionate manner. As for their
Eastern disciples, they have borrowed from the West whatever treasure
of knowledge they have on social and temporal problems. Moreover,
they not only inherit their knowledge from their teachers, but
along with this inherited knowledge they also acquire their emotions,
proclivities and prejudices. Therefore, when discussion arises over
the execution of the apostates and other problems of a like nature,
then normally both Westerners and their Eastern disciples lose their
balance and begin to confuse the true legal and constitutional
question in their discussions which are related to the discussion
whether or not a state religion is inherently valid. Yet, if,
suppose, an Islamic state would mean "religious state" (madhhabi
riyasat) in the sense that Westerners understand it, then here
too this discussion is entirely unrelated to the problem. The sole
question is whether or not a state having jurisdiction over a portion
of the earth has the right to protect its own existence by declaring
those acts wrong which undermine its order. If anyone objects to this,
then let him tell us when a world state did not exercise this right.
And which state today does not exercise this right? Forget the
communist and fascist states. Look only at those democratic states
whose history and ideas have been a lesson in democracy for the modern
world and who today have the honour of holding high the banner of
democratic order. Do they not exercise this right?

G. The Example of England

Let us take England as an example. The people with whom English law
is concerned are divided into two large groups: British subjects and
aliens. The designation "British subject" belongs, firstly, to those
who are born, within or outside of Britain, of a lineage of fathers
who owe their allegiance and obedience to the king of England. They
are called natural born British subjects and are considered by themselves
as owing allegiance and obedience without voluntarily taking an oath
of allegiance to the king of England. The term applies, secondly, to
those who previously were aliens and then, after fulfilling some legal
conditions, took an oath of allegiance to the king of England and
received a certificate of British citizenship. Then the term "aliens"
refers to all those who are of another nationality and who owe allegiance
to another state but dwell within the borders of British rule. The
following principles of British law concerning these various types of
people are worthy of attention:

1. Every alien who has fulfilled the required legal conditions for
becoming a British subject has the choice of renouncing his previous
nationality and applying to become a British national. In this case
the Secretary of State, after investigating his situation, will take
from him the oath of allegiance and obedience to the king of England
and grant him a certificate of British citizenship.

2. Any person, whether he is a British subject by birth or has become
a British subject by personal choice, does not legally have the right,
while living within the borders of British rule, to opt for another
nationality and to take an oath of allegiance to another state or to
return to the nation to which he formerly belonged. He can acquire
this right only when he resides outside of British borders.

3. Even when an individual British citizen (whether a citizen by birth
or by naturalization) resides outside of British borders, he does not
have the right in times of war to renounce British nationality and to
opt for either becoming a citizen of a nation or giving allegiance to
a state which is at war with the king of England. Such an act according
to British law is high treason and punishable by death.

4. Likewise any British citizen who, while residing within or outside
British borders, has contact with the enemies of the king and provides
them with help and convenience, or does anything to strengthen the
king's enemies and weakens the defense and offense of the nation and
king, commits high treason and his punishment also is death.

5. To be intent upon the death of the king, the queen or the heir to
the throne or to plan it, to dishonour the king's consort, his oldest
daughter or the consort of the heir to the throne, to point a weapon
at the king or to aim it or to bring a weapon in his presence with the
purpose of harming or intimidating him, to use force to change the
religion of the state or to abrogate the laws of the state: All these
too are acts of high treason and their perpetrator likewise deserves
the penalty of death.

6. To strip or deprive the king of his position, his honours or his
titles is also a crime, whose penalty can be life imprisonment.

In all these cases "king" means the person who is de facto king,
whether or not he is de jure king. From this it is clearly
evident that these laws are based not on some emotional foundation
but on the principle that an established state, on whose establishment
the establishment of an ordered society on a portion of the earth is
dependent, has the right to use force to prevent the disintegration
of its composite parts and to preserve its order from harm.

So now you see that the status of those whom British law calls "aliens"
is, with minor difference, the same as that of those whom Islamic law
calls "Dhimmi".[3] As the term "British subject" designates
both one born a subject either by birth or by choice, similarly in
Islam the term "Muslim" designates two kinds of people:
1. those born of Muslim lineage;
2. those non-Muslims who have accepted Islam by their own choice.
Islamic law gives the same position to God and the Apostle which
British law gives to the King and the royal family in their capacity
as supreme authority. Further, as British law differentiates between
the rights and obligations of British subjects and aliens, similarly
Islam also distinguishes between the rights and obligations of Muslims
and Dhimmis. As British law does not give the right to any
British subject, while he is residing in the British Empire, to choose
another nationality or take an oath of allegiance to another state or
revert to his previous nationality, similarly Islamic law also does not
give any Muslim the right, while he is residing within the House of
Islam (Dar al-Islam), to choose any other religion or revert to
the religion he had renounced to embrace Islam. As, according to British
law, the British subject deserves the punishment of death because, while
residing outside of British borders, he chooses the nationality of an
enemy of the king of England and swears allegiance to any enemy government,
similarly, according to Islamic law, the Muslim also deserves the punishment
of death who, while residing outside the house of Islam, chooses the
religion of the infidels at war (harbi kafiron ka din). And as
British law is ready to give rights, such as aliens have, to those who
have chosen to give up British nationality for a nationality of a nation
at peace with England, similarly Islamic law also treats apostates, who
have left the House of Islam to join an infidel nation which has a treaty
with a Muslim government, in the same way it treats the kafirs
of that nation. For us, then, it remains an insoluble enigma how people
can understand the British legal position but they cannot understand
the Islamic legal position.

H. The Example of America

After Britain let us take the country of America as the second banner
bearer of democracy in the world. Although its laws differ to some
extent in detail from those of Britain, in principle they fully agree.
They differ simply in that the position given to the king in England
is given to the national government and the federal constitution of
the United States. Every person is a natural born citizen of the
United States who was born from the children of a citizen, whether he
was born inside or outside the United States. And a citizen by choice
can be any person, who, after fulfilling some legal conditions, takes
an oath of allegiance to the constitution to the United States. Apart
from both of these kinds of citizens the remaining people are aliens
according to American law. American law distinguishes between citizens'
and aliens' rights and obligations in the same way that British law
distinguishes between subjects' and aliens' rights and obligations.
An alien is free to become a citizen of the United States after he
has fulfilled the legal conditions for citizenship. But after he
becomes a citizen he does not have the freedom, while residing within
the borders of the United States, to renounce this citizenship and to
revert to his previous citizenship. Likewise a born citizen also
does not have the right, while in the United States, to choose another
nationality and to take an oath of allegiance to another state.
Analogously in the United States also the laws of treason and rebellion
with reference to citizens rest on the same principles on which the
British laws of treason and rebellion are founded.

The above response does not stop with these two powers. Consider the
law of any nation in the world and you will see the same principles
operative, i.e., any state uses force to prevent the disintegration of
those elements which unite it and to suppress anything tending to
destroy its order.

I. The Natural Right of the State

The validity or otherwise of the existence of a state in itself
is a separate discussion. In this matter a sharp difference exists
between the supporters of our view of the state and those of the
secular state. In our opinion constructing a state on any rule
other than the rule of God is totally invalid. Therefore, when
any state per se is established on an invalid foundation,
we cannot accept as valid this state's use of force to protect an
invalid existence and a false order. Contrary to this our opponents
consider the divine state to be invalid and only the secular state
to be valid. Hence, according to them, it is the intrinsic right
of the secular state to use force to protect its own existence and
order but intrinsically wrong for the divine state to act in the
same way. Yet leaving aside this discussion, it is a universally
accepted principle that the intrinsic nature of the state and
government demands that it have the right to use force to protect
its own existence and order. This right is an inherent right of
the state. If anything can negate this right, then it would be
only that state which, itself established on a false foundation,
wished to take advantage of this right. Because the existence of
a falsehood in itself is a crime, it becomes a graver crime if it
uses force to establish and maintain it.

J. Why Distinguish between the Kafir (Infidel) and the Murtadd (Apostate)

From the discussion thus far an ordinary person may be confused enough
to ask what finally the difference is between the person who was always
a kafir and another person who became a kafir after
apostatizing. If a law tolerates a person who has always been a
kafir and grants him a haven within its borders, then why, he
asks, does it not finally tolerate a person who embraced Islam and then
became a kafir or a Muslim by birth who chooses kufr.
What fundamentally distinguishes the kufr of the first kafir
from the kufr of the second kafir so that legally the one
is not a criminal but the second is a criminal, the first is made a
Dhimmi whose life and goods are protected and the second loses
all his rights and is "lifted into a noose"?

In response let it be said that human nature necessarily distinguishes
between one who was never affiliated and another who was affiliated
and then severed the affiliation. To be unaffiliated generates no
bitterness, hatred and hostility. But to affiliate and then sever
affiliation does generate these passions in almost one hundred percent
of these cases. The unaffiliated can never become the cause of these
evils in the way that the affiliated one who severs his affiliation can
become. You do not establish co-operation, friendship, confidentialities,
commerce, marriage and countless types of cultural and moral relationships
with an unaffiliated person as you do with an affiliated person whom you
associate with and trust. Therefore the unaffiliated cannot inflict
damage in the way the affiliated who severs the affiliation can. For
this same reason a person naturally treats the unaffiliated in a completely
different manner than he treats the affiliated who severs his affiliation.
In the life of an individual the result of a separation after union is
limited and is therefore generally confined to displeasure. In the life
of a society it causes extremely widespread damage. Hence the society's
action against the individual is also harsher. Where it is the large
group rather than the individual that separates, there the extent of
the damage increases greatly and hence results necessarily in an outbreak
of war.

Those people who are surprised that Islam adopts different attitudes
towards the kafir (infidel) and the murtadd (apostate)
perhaps do not know that no social order in the world treats equally
those who are not included in it and those who were but no longer are
included in it. Those who separate are certainly given some kind of
punishment and many times are even compelled to return. In this matter
especially the greater the importance the state gives to social
responsibilities, the more severe its response will be. Take the army,
for example. Military legislation throughout almost the whole world
shares the idea that enlistment in the army is by choice, not be
compulsion. However, once a person has entered the army on his own
free will, he is under compulsion to remain there. If he resigns,
his resignation cannot be accepted. If he leaves on his own accord,
he is a criminal. If he flees from active service in war, he merits
the punishment of execution. If he escapes from ordinary military
service, he can receive a life sentence. Anyone offering him refuge
or covering his crime is also considered a criminal. Revolutionary
parties adopt this same method of action. They compel no one to join
them, but whoever leaves after joining is shot.

This concern has to do with the individual versus the community.
Where the concern takes the form of community versus community,
there it becomes more violent. You have often heard the terms
"federation" (wafaq) and "confederation" (tahaluf).
States are given the choice of participating or not participating
in a union of this kind. But once a state enters as a partner,
constitutionally any exit is closed to it. Moreover, where
constitutionally no clause of this kind exists, there even exercising
the right to separate often culminates in war. In the nineteenth
century two wars focused on this issue. The first took place in
Switzerland when in A.D. 1847 seven Roman Catholic cantons decided
to leave the confederacy. Thereupon the remaining partners in the
confederacy went to war against the seceding cantons and forced them
to return. The second is the well known American civil war. In
A.D. 1860 seven states from the United States of America left the
union and established their own confederacy (tahaluf).
Thereafter another four states separated and joined this group.
Moreover six states held the common opinion that in principle each
state had the right to secede and that the federal government had
no right to force them to return to the federation of the United
States. And so in A.D. 1861 the federal government fought against
these states and, after three to four years of terrible bloodshed,
forced them to become members of the Union again.

Why, generally, do all social orders, especially those of a political
and military nature, take harsh action against separation after
union? The strongest argument in favour of this action is naturally
the social order's need of stability for its own welfare, a stability
in turn which completely depends upon the utmost confidence in the
harmony of those elements which brought the order into existence.
A collection of untrustworthy, shaky, and fissiparous elements
whose continuity cannot be trusted and whose stability is unreliable
can never generate any proper kind of community life. In particular
the social institution which carries the burden of providing the
important community services can never be willing to assume the
danger that it become composed of parts which may disintegrate at
any time. If a building made from fragile bricks and stones is
not a satisfactory place for human habitation, how then can a fort,
on which the peace of the whole nation depends, be made from such
fragmented parts! Recreational organizations whose concern is
confined to providing playhouses for children may certainly give
preference to the personal freedom of individuals over their own
group existence. But those institutions which are involved in
life threatening situations in the interest of any significant
community purpose can never function in this manner. Therefore
the state, the military and the various parties -- and any other
order of this kind -- which are seriously established to be engaged
in the dangerous service of any important community objective are
absolutely compelled to close all their exits to those wishing to
leave and to avoid the disintegration of the community's organized
segments. There is no more successful way to ensure stable and
trustworthy segments than in the very beginning to caution those
who enter that departure results in death. This way those who are
indecisive will avoid entering. Similarly the most effective way
to stop the present segments from disintegrating is to crush those
segments which insist on breaking away so that wherever separatist
tendencies find nourishment, there they will be eliminated automatically.

Nevertheless the fact must again be stressed here that to acknowledge
this plan to be correct does not mean that using this plan for every
social order is appropriate before considering whether it in itself
is good or bad. It is right solely for that social order which is
intrinsically good. With reference to an evil order, as we earlier
stated, it is by its very nature a tyranny. If, then, it employs
force in a tyrannical matter to keep its segments together, this
latter tyranny is even greater than the former.

K. The Danger of Counterattack

The examples of the punishment for apostasy employed by other world
orders which we have presented above remove still another point of
confusion which often keeps on perplexing people who view this problem
superficially. These people think that if the other religions also
establish the death penalty as law for those who leave their fold in
the same way Islam has done, this act will become an obstacle for the
preaching of Islam as it has become for the other religions. Above,
we have given a response in principle to this. But there is a practical
response to it also. In ignorance the critics offer their objection
to the word "if" as though it were not a fact, even though in fact
the thing about which they express this doubt is present as a reality.
Any religion in the world which has its own government has firmly
closed its door to apostasy within the area of its authority. The
misunderstanding arises only because nowadays the Christian nations
do not punish anyone who apostatizes from Christianity in their
countries and give every person the liberty to choose whichever
religion he wishes. As a result people begin to suppose that according
to their law apostasy is no crime and that this is a mercy allowing
for the propagation of religion free from all obstacles. But the fact
of the matter is this that Christianity is only a personal religion
for the individual peoples of these nations. As a religion it lacks
the corporate element which might serve as a base for their social
order and state structure. Therefore when anyone renounces Christianity,
they do not feel it sufficiently important to stop him. As for their
"corporate religion" on which the foundation of their society and state
is established, indeed they too declare apostatizing from it to be a crime
just as Islam declares apostasy from it to be a crime and they too suppress
it as harshly as an Islamic state. The corporate religion of the English
is not Christianity. Rather it is the power of the British nation and
the sovereignty of the British constitution and law as represented by
the British crown. Likewise the corporate religion of the United States
of America is not Christianity. Rather it is the authority of the
American nation and the federal constitution on which their society has
been organized into a state. Likewise the corporate religion of other
Christian nations is not Christianity but their respective national
states and constitutions. Let anyone of them, an adherent by birth or
by choice, apostatize a little from these religions (adyan) and
watch. He will find out for himself whether or not they consider
apostasy to be a crime.

An author on English law elucidates this matter well. He writes:

We do not propose to inquire fully into the grounds upon
which the state has assumed to itself the right of punishing certain
offences against religion. It is sufficient to say that it has been
experienced that certain acts or courses of conduct which are forbidden
by religion, are also productive of disorder and mischief to the community.
These acts have therefore been declared illegal, and offenders are
punishable, not for a breach of the law of God, as such, but for
offending against the law of the country.[4]

He continues:

The punishment for apostasy, or the total renunciation
of Christianity, was for a long period death. It was afterwards provided
that if any one educated in, or having made profession of, the
Christian religion, by writing, printing, teaching, or advised speaking,
maintained that there were more Gods than one, or denied the Christian
religion to be true, or the Holy Scripture to be of divine authority,
he should for the first offence be incapacitated for civil or military
employment, and for the second offence suffer imprisonment for three
years.[5] It is believed that there has been no prosecution under this
statute.

After a few lines he then writes:

Christianity has been said to be a part of the law
of England, and a gross outrage against it is punished by the state.
The offence includes the denying, whether orally or by writing, of
the being or providence of the Almighty, contumelious reproaches of
our Lord and Saviour Christ, profane scoffing at the Holy Scriptures,
or exposing any part thereof to contempt or ridicule.... It remains
merely to add that the law is rarely put in force....[6]

From this explanation it is clearly evident that since Christianity
(i.e., what they call the "Law" of God) is now not the law of the
country, therefore the state in the first place does not take upon
itself the responsibility for punishing those who rebel against it
(Christianity). Or if because until now Christianity is the religion
of the individuals holding power, it accepts this responsibility in
name only, yet avoids implementing it. But do they operate similarly
in regard to the law of the land itself which is really their corporate
religion? For all practical purposes you can find your answer in
a somewhat courageous individual who, while residing within British
boundaries as a British subject, refuses to submit to the supreme
authority of the British crown and the laws of the kingdom.

Thus, in fact, for all practical purposes that condition exists about
which it was asked, on the basis of misunderstanding, that "if" this
is so, then what will happen. But the existence of this condition
serves as no obstacle to religious propagation in present times because
in today's world renouncing one of the several religions which are
propagated to join another creates no rupture in "the community religion"
of the kingdoms of this world. In practice all religions remain obedient
to this community religion and are subject to those limitations to which
it has confined them. Therefore if, while remaining subject to its
order and obedient to its command, you have renounced one belief and
practice and opted for another belief and practice, the community
religion in fact will perceive no difference in you; nor will they
question you about any commitment of apostasy. To be sure, if you
deny the faith and practice of this community religion and try to
become a faithful believer of another community religion and a
practising Muslim, every leader today will be ready to do with you
what the ruler was ready to do with Moses three and a half thousand
years ago:

Suffer me to kill Moses, and let him cry unto his Lord, Lo!
I fear he will alter your religion or that he will cause confusion
in the land. (40:26)

L. Muslims by Birth

Related to this, one final question remains that causes confusion
in many minds with reference to the command to execute the apostate.
You can say about a person who initially was a non-Muslim, then
chose Islam and thereafter chose kufr again, that he knowingly
erred. Why did he not remain a Dhimmi? Why did he join a
community religion, knowing that its door of departure was closed
to him? But it is a somewhat different matter when a person himself
never accepted Islam but Islam naturally became his religion by virtue
of his being born to Muslim parents. If such a person, having arrived
at the age of discretion, is dissatisfied with Islam and wants to
leave it, it is a terrible injustice for you to compel him also to
remain in Islam by threatening to punish him by death. This not
only appears extreme but necessarily results in a goodly number of
born hypocrites finding nourishment within the community order of
Islam.

There is an answer in principle and a practical answer to this doubt.
In principle no distinction can be made in the rules between followers
by birth and citizens by choice. Nor has any religion ever made a
distinction between them. Every religion considers the children of
its followers to be its followers by nature and imposes on them all
the rules it imposes on citizens by choice. It is in practice
impossible and intellectually utter nonsense that the followers of
a religion or, in political terms, the children of subjects and
citizens initially be raised as infidels or aliens and when they
become mature they be left to decide whether or not to follow this
religion or take allegiance to that state in which they were born.
No community order in the world can ever function in this manner.
Survival and strength of the community order for the most part
depend upon the permanent population who have demonstrated their
allegiance to it and are guardians of its continuity of life.
And such a permanent population only comes into existence through
generation after generation taking responsibility for the continuity
of the order. If every generation of followers and citizens is
followed by another generation which is doubtful and uncertain
about preserving this following and citizenship and in maintaining
this order, then the foundation of this community order will be
permanently unstable and it will never be firm. Hence to change
allegiance and citizenship by birth to allegiance and citizenship
by choice and to keep the door open for every succeeding generation
to deviate from religion, constitution, laws and all loyalties is to
provide for a procedure which in itself is totally irrational and
which until now no religion, no community order and no state in the
world has chosen.

As for the practical response, the apprehension which our critics
have expressed in fact has never been apparent in the practical
world. Every community which has some power and zest for life
carefully arranges to transmit its traditions, its culture, its
principles and its loyalties to the new generations born within its
borders and to make them as reliable as possible on its own behalf.
Because of this education and training the vast majority of the
new generations, "more than 999 out of a 1000", are pleased to obey
the order and to grow up faithful to the order into which they were
born. Under these conditions only a few can be born who, for various
reasons, might grow up with a tendency towards deviation and rebellion
or get that way later. It is evident that for the sake of a few
individuals of this type no such change can be made in fundamentals
that would endanger and disturb the life of the total community.
If a few such individuals wish to deviate from the community religion,
two doors are open to them: Either they can leave the state and change,
or, if they are firm in their change and faithful in their adherence
to this other order which they have chosen and have seriously determined
to establish in the place of the religion of their fathers, then let
them place their life in danger and play the game of "life risk",
apart from which no order can be changed.

In any case the heart of the matter is that children born of Muslim
lineage will be considered Muslims and according to Islamic law the
door of apostasy will never be opened to them. If anyone of them
renounces Islam, he will be as deserving of execution as the person
who has renounced kufr to become a Muslim and again has chosen
the way of kufr. All the jurists of Islam agree with this
decision. On this topic absolutely no difference exists among the
experts of shari'ah.

Nevertheless there is one aspect of this matter where I see some
complication. It has to do with the fact that our community order
has remained extremely feeble and remiss for a long period of time.
Among the past several generations every generation has failed
badly to provide adequate Islamic education and training to the
next generation. Particularly in the past era of enslavement our
national insensitivity reached the point where hundreds of thousands
carelessly, and thousands consciously, surrendered their children
to infidel education and training. That is why the proportion among
us of those inclined to rebel and turn away from Islam has increased
to a dangerous level and keeps on increasing. If at some time in
the future an Islamic order of government is established,[7] the law
of executing the apostate is implemented and all those within the
confines of Islam are compulsorily imprisoned who are recognized as
Muslims by birth because they are children of Muslims, no doubt in
this situation the fear will arise that a very great number of
hypocrites will be included in the social order of Islam who will
pose as a permanent threat for every kind of treason.

In my opinion its solution -- and God conforms us to rectitude --
is to notify the Muslim population in the area where an Islamic
revolution occurs that people who in belief and practice have
defected from Islam and wish to remain as defectors should formally
disclose their non-Muslim identity and leave our social order within
a year from the date of the notification. After this period all
those who are born of Muslim lineage will be considered to be Muslim,
they will be subject to all Islamic laws, they will be compelled
to perform the religious duties and obligations, and then whoever
steps outside the fold of Islam will be executed. Following this
announcement utmost effort should be made to save as many sons and
daughters born of Muslims as possible from the lap of kufr.
Then whoever cannot be saved by any means should be cut off and
cast away, sadly but firmly, from his society forever. After this
act of purification a new life for Islamic society may begin with
only those Muslims who are dedicated to Islam.

Notes

1. The Urdu text notes that Mawdudi wrote this work was written in 1942.
For the probable reference to this event see Shabbir Akhtar, Be
Careful with Muhammad!, Bellew Publishing, London, 1989, p. 12
and Hazrat Mirza Tahir Ahmad, Murder in the Name of Allah, by
Syed Barakat Ahmad, Lutterworth Press, Cambridge, 1989, p. 20.

2. For a detailed discussion on 2:256, see Appendix E.

3. See Appendix A for Mawdudi's elucidation of this point, which he
had inserted into his Urdu text as a footnote. For a remarkable
presentation on the subject see Bat Ye'or, The Dhimmi, Fairleigh
Dickinson University Press, London, 1985.

5. ibid., The final sentence in this paragraph is actually
a footnote on the same page in the English text.

6. ibid., p. 62.

7. See Note 1 above.

IV
Concerning the Propagation of Kufr: The Rationale of the Islamic Stance

The questioner finally asks: If the propagation of kufr is not
permitted within the jurisdiction of Islamic rule, how can its prohibition
be justified from a rational perspective?

Prior to discussing this topic, it is necessary to understand clearly
the nature of that propagation of kufr which Islam prohibits.
Within the borders of the House of Islam, Islam does not prohibit any
non-Muslim from teaching his religion to his children or from explaining
his beliefs and principles to people through writing or lecturing or,
if he has some objections against Islam, from presenting them verbally
or in writing in a dignified manner. Moreover Islam does not prohibit
any Dhimmi within the House of Islam from accepting the religion
of any non-Muslim whose thoughts have influenced him. What in fact is
prohibited is the rise of any organized movement in support of the thought
and action of any religion or organization which invites residents within
the borders of the House of Islam to join that religion or organization.
Such an organized invitation -- it matters not whether it originates with
Dhimmis or outsiders[1] -- Islam is not prepared to tolerate within
its borders under any circumstances.

The clear and simple reason for this is that an organized invitation
will be necessarily either of a political or of a religious and ethical
nature. If it is of a political nature and has as its objective the
changing of the community lifestyle, then an Islamic state will oppose
this invitation in the same way that any other state in the world
opposes it. If it is an invitation of another nature, then Islam,
in contrast to purely secular states, cannot tolerate it because to
allow some creedal or ethical error to emerge under Islamic supervision
and protection is to undermine decisively the purpose for which Islam
grasps the reins of the nation to direct it. In this matter, purely
secular governments certainly function differently than an Islamic
government because the purposes of both governments differ. Secular
governments allow within their borders the spread of every kind of
lie, every creedal deviation and every type of evil act and immorality,
as well as every religious perversity also. They offer the purveyors
of these various wares a long leash as long as they remain faithful
to them, keep on paying taxes to them and avoid any activity which
might harm their political authority. Nevertheless, if they detect
even the slightest indication of harm to their political authority
from these movements, they do not hesitate in the least in declaring
them illegal and in crushing them. They function this way because
they are not interested in the ethical and spiritual prosperity of
God's servants. For them their political authority and their material
purposes are everything. But Islam has genuine interest in the spiritual
and ethical prosperity of God's servants and for the sake of this
prosperity takes the management of the nation into its hands. Hence,
as Islam cannot tolerate movements which instigate political dissension
or revolution, likewise it cannot tolerate movements which spread
moral dissension and creedal deviation.

Here again we face the same question which keeps on arising regarding
the problem of the execution of an apostate, i.e., what would happen
if also non-Muslim governments legislate against the propagation of
Islam within their borders? Briefly, in reply, Islam does not wish
to purchase the freedom to proclaim the truth in exchange for having
to give the freedom to proclaim falsehood and vanity. It says to
its followers: "If with a true heart you acknowledge me to be true
and in following me only you see your salvation and the salvation of
humanity, then follow me, uphold me and summon the world to me, whether
you come close to Abraham's garden or have to pass through Nimrod's fire.[2]
Your own faith demands this. Seeking God's good pleasure and then
fulfilling this demand or not fulfilling it depends upon your devotion
to God. But for the sake of delivering you from the dangers of this
path and easing your task, it is impossible for me to grant to the
devotees of falsehood the reciprocal 'right' to mislead the servants
of God and to drive them along paths where, I know, they face nothing
but ruin and destruction." This is Islam's unalterable decision,
a decision which Islam is not ready to negotiate with anyone. If now
or at any time in the future non-Muslim governments make the preaching
of Islam a crime as they previously have done, even then this decision
will not be modified. Furthermore, the truth of the matter is that it
was a terribly wretched hour for Islam when, in the opinion of the
infidels, it had become so harmless that they gladly began to tolerate
its invitation and preachment and to provide it with every convenience
to spread it under the care and protection of the law of kufr.
In fact these concessions of kufr to Islam are not welcome.
They indicate that the spirit of Islam is not present in its body.
Otherwise today's infidels are no purer of heart than Nimrod, Pharoah,
Abu Jahl[3] and Abu Lahab[4] so that, if the true essence of Islam
was present in this Muslim like body, they then would honour it with
their patronage and protection or at least grant it freedom to spread.
Ever since Islam's invitation has become only a place of recreation
in the garden of Abraham because of their favours, Islam has suffered
the humiliation of being included along with those religions which
can find a place of rest under every tyrant of a political and
civilized order. How greatly blessed that hour will be when these
concessions are withdrawn and the fire of Nimrod again will obstruct
the path of those who summon to the religion of truth. Then Islam
will have true followers and proclaimers who will humiliate Taghut[5]
and be able to make the truth victorious over him.

Notes

1. i.e., it would seem, non-Muslims who are or are not residing
within the House of Islam.

2. Commentators suggest Nimrod is the one who argues with Abraham
in Qur'an 2:258;

To understand this discussion one must bear in mind that according
to British law "alien" has reference to the person who comes to
Britain and resides within its borders but owes no allegiance to
the British crown. Such a person will be provided protection within
British borders on condition that he enters the country legally and
respects its law and order, but will be given no citizenship rights.
Citizenship rights belong only to those who owe allegiance to the
British crown. In addition, those coming from abroad can be given
the right to remain as aliens within British borders on a temporary
basis only. Permanent and natural residents in the British Empire
cannot be permitted to become "aliens" (i.e., they pay allegiance
to the British crown and to no one else) and remain within British
borders.

Contrary to this the constitutional law of Islam declares as "non-Muslim"
all those who do not owe allegiance to God and to the Apostle (Muhammad).
It then divides them according to their status and rights as follows:

1. Non-Muslims who are the protected ones (musta'min), i.e.,
those who have legally come from abroad into the Islamic kingdom and
take it upon themselves to respect the law and order of the country.
They receive protection but no citizenship rights.

2. To those who are permanent and native residents of the Islamic
kingdom Islamic law (in contrast to the constitutional laws of the
whole world) gives the right to remain in the kingdom as non-Muslims,
i.e., they owe no allegiance to God and the Apostle. If such people
pledge obedience to the Islamic kingdom and strive for its welfare,
Islamic law makes them Dhimmi subjects and provides them not
only with protection but, to an extent, the rights of citizenship also.

3. If non-Muslims also who have come from abroad want to become
Dhimmi subjects, they can be included in this company after
fulfilling the conditions of Dhimmiyyat ("Dhimmihood") and
receive partial citizenship (nim shahriyyat) rights along with
protection. But after they have become Dhimmi, they cannot be
given the right to leave the status of Dhimmah while they remain
in an Islamic kingdom. The only way for them to leave the status of
Dhimmah is to leave the kingdom.

4. In an Islamic empire the rights of full citizenship are special
solely for those people who are "Muslim", i.e., who, whether they are
residents in the empire from birth or have come after emigrating from
abroad, owe obedience and allegiance to God and the Apostle. But
the person who is a Muslim or has become a Muslim cannot then become
a non-Muslim while residing in the kingdom. If he leaves the kingdom
and wishes this status, then he may opt for it. If he opts for it
within the kingdom, not only does he not have the rights of a
Dhimmi or of a protected one but his action in itself will be
construed as rebellion (ghadr).

When a Mussulman apostatizes from the faith, an exposition thereof is to
be laid before him, in such a manner that if his apostasy should have
arisen from any religious doubts or scruples, those may be removed.
The reason for laying an exposition of the faith before him is that it
is possible some doubts or errors may have arisen in his mind, which
may be removed by such exposition; and as there are only two modes of
repelling the sin of apostasy, namely, destruction or Islam, and Islam
is preferable to destruction, the evil is rather to be removed by means
of an exposition of the faith; -- but yet this exposition of the faith
is not incumbent, (according to what the learned have remarked upon
this head), since a call to the faith has already reached the apostate.

An apostate is to be imprisoned for three days, within which time if he
return to the faith, it is well: but if not, he must be slain. -- It
is recorded in the Jama Sagheer that "an exposition of the faith
is to be laid before an apostate, and if he refuse the faith, he must be
slain:" -- and with respect to what is above stated, that "he is to be
imprisoned for three days," it only implies that if he require a delay,
three days may be granted him, as such is the term generally admitted
and allowed for the purpose of consideration. It is recorded from
Haneefa and Aboo Yoosaf that the granting of a delay of three days is
laudable, whether the apostate require it or not: and it is recorded
from Shafei that it is incumbent on the Imam to delay for three days, and
that it is not lawful for him to put the apostate to death before the
lapse of that time; since it is most probable that a Mussulman will not
apostatise but from some doubt or error arising in his mind; wherefore
some time is necessary for consideration; and this is fixed at three days.
The arguments of our doctors upon this point are twofold. -- First, God
says, in the Koran, "Slay the unbelievers," without any reserve of a
delay of three days being granted to them; and the prophet has also said
"Slay the man who changes his religion," without mentioning anything
concerning a delay: secondly, an apostate is an infidel enemy, who has
received a call to the faith, wherefore he may be slain upon the instant,
without any delay. An apostate is termed on this occasion an infidel
enemy, because he is undoubtedly such; and he is not protected, since he
has not required a protection; neither is he a Zimmee, because capitation-tax
has not been accepted from him; hence it is proved that he is an infidel
enemy. It is to be observed that, in these rules, there is no difference
made between an apostate who is a freeman, and one who is a slave, as the
arguments upon which they are established apply equally to both descriptions.

The repentance of an apostate is sufficiently manifested in his formally
renouncing all religions except the religion of Islam, because apostates
are not a sect: or if he formally renounce the religion which he embraced
upon his apostasy, it suffices, since thus the end is obtained.

If any person kill an apostate, before an exposition of the faith has
been laid open to him, it is abominable, (that is, it is laudable to
let him continue unmolested). Nothing however, is incurred by the
slayer; because the infidelity of an alien renders the killing of him
admissible; and an exposition of the faith, after a call to the faith,
is not necessary.

If a Mussulman woman become an apostate, she is not put to death, but
is imprisoned, until she returns to the faith. Shafei maintains that
she is to be put to death; because of the tradition before cited; --
and also, because, as men are put to death for apostasy solely for this
reason, that it is a crime of great magnitude, and therefore requires
that its punishment be proportionally severe, (namely, death), so the
apostasy of a woman being likewise (like that of a man) a crime of
great magnitude, it follows that her punishment should be the same as
that of a man. The arguments of our doctors upon this point are twofold.
-- First, the prophet has forbidden the slaying of women, without making
any distinction between those who are apostates, and those who are
original infidels. Secondly, the original principle in the retribution
of offences is to delay it to a future state, (in other words, not to
inflict punishment here, but to refer it to hereafter), since if
retribution were executed in this world, it would render defective the
state of trial, as men would avoid committing sin from apprehension of
punishment, and therefore would be in the state of persons acting under
compulsion, and not of free agents: but in the case of apostasy of men
the punishment is not deferred to a future state, because it is
indispensably requisite to repel their present wickedness, (namely,
their becoming enemies to the faith), which wickedness cannot be conceived
of women, who are, by natural weakness of frame, incapable thereof:
contrary to men. -- A female apostate, therefore, is the same as an
original female infidel; and as the killing of the one is forbidden, so
is the killing of the other also. She is however, to be imprisoned,
until she returns to the faith; because, as she refuses the right of
God after having acknowledged it, she must be compelled, by means of
imprisonment, to render God his right, in the same manner as she would
be imprisoned on account of the right of the individual. It is written
in the Jama Sagheer, -- "A female apostate is to be compelled
to return to the faith, whether she be free, or a slave" -- The slave
is to be compelled by her master; -- she is to be compelled, for the
reasons already recited; and this compulsion is to be executed by her
master, because in this a regard is had to the right both of God and
of the master. It is elsewhere mentioned that a female apostate must
be daily beaten with severity until she return to the faith.

The Islamic law expressly recognizes for non-Muslims liberty to preserve
their beliefs; and if it forbids categorically all recourse to compulsion
for converting others to Islam, it maintains a rigorous discipline among
its own adherents. The basis of the Islamic "nationality" is religious
and not ethnic, linguistic or regional. Hence apostasy has naturally
been considered political treason. It is true that this crime is punished
by penalties, but the necessity scarcely arose as history has proved.
Not only at the time when the Muslims reigned supreme from the Pacific
to the Atlantic Oceans, but even in our own age of political as well
as material and intellectual weakness among Muslims, apostasy of Muslims
is surprisingly non-existent.[1] This is true not only of regions
where there is semblance of a Muslim State, but even elsewhere, under
the colonial powers who have made all humanly possible efforts to
convert Muslims to other religions.[2] Islam is gaining ground today,
even among Western people, from Finland and Norway to Italy, from
Canada to Argentine. And all this in spite of the absence of any
organized missionary activity.

Notes:

1. Some Muslims and non-Muslims might wonder how Hamidullah,
a highly respected Muslim scholar, could make such a claim, unless,
for him, being Muslim can also mean simply to be a Muslim sociologically,
with no apparent heart commitment to God at all or through the
implementation of the traditional tenets of Islam. Muslims have
defined apostasy in different ways. This is not to speak of the
considerable number of Muslims who have espoused other religions
or who are perceived to have succumbed to communism or to the
godless secularism of the West. See also the Publisher's Request
preceding Mawdudi's Preface to this work.

2. Suffice it to say that colonial powers often opposed, as well as
supported, Christian missions.

People who turn away from Islam and do not repent but wage war and
create mischief in the land are also considered as murderers. "But
if they break their oaths after making compacts and taunt you for
your faith, you should fight with these ringleaders of disbelief
because their oaths are not trustworthy: it may be that the sword
alone will restrain them" (9:12).[1] And in Surah Al-Nahl, "But
whosoever accepts disbelief willingly, he incurs God's Wrath,
and there is severe torment for all such people" (16:106).

4. From Yusuf al-Qaradawi, The Lawful and the Prohibited in Islam,
American Trust Publications, Indianapolis, n.d., pp. 326, 327 under
"Capital Punishment":[1]

Apostasy from Islam after willingly accepting it and subsequently
declaring an open revolt against it in such a manner which threatens
the solidarity of the Muslim community is a crime punishable by death.
No one is compelled to accept Islam, but at the same time no one is
permitted to play tricks with it, as some Jews did during the Prophet's
time:

A party of the people of the Book say, 'Believe in what has been
revealed to the Believers' at the beginning of the day and reject it
at the end of it, in order that they may turn back (from Islam). (3:72)

The Prophet (peace be on him) limited capital punishment to these three
crimes only, saying,

The shedding of the blood of a Muslim is not lawful except for one
of three reasons: a life for a life, a married person who commits
zina (adultery), and one who turns aside from his religion and
abandons the community.

In any of these instances, the death penalty can be implemented only by
the proper authority after due process of law prescribed by the Shari'ah;
individuals cannot take the law into their own hands, becoming judges and
executioners, since this would result in absolute chaos and disorder.
However, the judge may turn the murderer over to the victim's next-of-kin
to be executed in his presence so that their hearts may be eased and the
desire for revenge extinguished. This is in obedience to the saying of
Allah Ta'ala,

...And whoever is killed wrongfully, We have given authority to the
heir; but let him not go to excess in killing (by way of retaliation),
for indeed he will be helped. (17:33)

Note:

1. From this publication: "Dr. Al-Qaradawi is a prominent Muslim scholar
who has devoted his life to the cause of Islam. Born in Egypt, he was
educated at al-Azhar University, the most distinguished institution of
Islamic learning in the world."

...To convert out of Islam means clearly to abandon its world order
which is the Islamic state. That is why Islamic law has treated people
who have converted out of Islam as political traitors. No state can
look upon political treason directed to it with indifference. It must
deal with the traitors, when convicted after due process of law, either
with banishment, life imprisonment, or capital punishment. The Islamic
state is no exception to this. But Islamic political theory does allow
converts from Islam to emigrate from the Islamic state provided they do
so before proclaiming their conversion, for the state does not keep its
citizens within its boundaries by force. But once their conversion is
proclaimed, they must be dealt with as traitors to the state.

Note:

1. For a recent study on al-Faruqi, as a prominent Muslim leader and
scholar in North America, see John Esposito, "Ismail R. al-Faruqi" in
The Muslims of America, ed. Y. Y. Haddad, Oxford University Press,
New York, 1991, pp. 65-79. For further Muslim confirmation of the
relation between apostasy and treason, note the quotations in Rudolph
Peters and Gert J. J. De Vries, "Apostasy in Islam" in Die Welt des
Islams, Brill, Leiden, Vol. XVII, 1976-77, pp. 16-18 and Patrick
Sookhdeo, The Law of Apostasy in Islam and Its Relation to Human
Rights and Religious Liberty, an unpublished paper presented at
the Glen Eyrie Consultation of the Persecuted Church in the Muslim
World, 1992.

The common view among Muslim jurists, as well as among Western orientalists,
is that apostasy from Islam is a crime for which the death penalty is
prescribed. The majority of the Muslim jurists ... classify this punishment
as being in the hadd (fixed punishment) category. (p. 50)

Nevertheless ... Islam is regarded by Muslims not as a mere religion
but as a complete system of life. Its rules are prescribed not only
to govern the individual's conduct but also to shape the basic laws
and public order in the Muslim state. Accordingly, apostasy from Islam
is classified as a crime for which ta'zir (discretionary) punishment
may be applied. The punishment is inflicted in cases in which the apostate
is a cause of harm to the society, while in those cases in which an
individual simply changes his religion the punishment is not to be
applied. But it must be remembered that unthreatening apostasy is an
exceptional case, and the common thing is that apostasy is accompanied
by some harmful actions against the society or state. A comparison
between the concept of punishing those who commit treason in modern
systems of law and those who commit apostasy in Islamic law would be
useful. Assuredly, the protection of society is the underlying
principle in the punishment for apostasy in the legal system of
Islam. (p. 64)

We believe that the Shari'ah of the Prophet Muhammad, peace be upon him,
is the religion of Islam which Allah has chosen for His servants and
does not accept from anyone other religion, because Allah, the Exalted,
said, "Surely, the true religion in Allah's sight is Islam," (3:19) and
He also said, "Today I have perfected your religion for you and I have
completed my favour upon you, and I have chosen Islam to be your religion." (5:3).
And "Whoever desires a religion other than Islam, it will never be accepted
from Him, and in the Hereafter he will be among the losers." (3:85)

It is our opinion that whoever claims the acceptability of any existing
religion today -- other than Islam -- such as Judaism, Christianity and
so forth, is a non-believer. He should be asked to repent; if he does not,
he must be killed as an apostate because he is rejecting the Qur'an.

The availability of religious freedom, then, effectively presupposes
the need to countenance desertion from the scriptured society. Whether
or not we Muslims should allow individuals in the Muslim community to
exercise free reflective choice is, of course, itself a matter for
considered judgement. And, of course, it is a matter of great moment.
My own view ... is that the potential risks inherent in the offer of
religious freedom are worth taking. Why? Well, if there is a God,
I would argue, it can be expected a priori that he wants
a voluntary response born of genuine gratitude and humility themselves
rooted in reflection and morally responsible choice. Seen in this
light, heresy and even apostasy are morally more acceptable than any
hypocritical attachment to orthodox opinion out of the fear of public
sanctions. Fortunately, for us, we have the evidence of the Koran
itself in favour of this view: 'there should be no compulsion in
religion' (2:256). Unfortunately, however, many learned authorities
have sought to cancel this noble sentiment by finding verses within
the sacred volume that favour the opposite opinion.

...Suffice it to say here that even in terms of a pragmatic (as opposed
to a moral or religious) outlook, there is much to be said in favour of
religious freedom....

Islam is, of course, like medieval Christianity, profoundly opposed to
heresy and apostasy. According to some authorities at al-Azhar, Islam's
policy-making centre, apostasy is punishable by death. A missionary
faith, with its political overtones, cannot naturally tolerate leakage
from the vessel of belief; indeed, it cannot turn a blind eye on the
heretic, the 'brother that walketh disorderly'.

The religious fear of heresy, apostasy and social dismemberment is fully
justified and understandable. But the concern with intellectual honesty
must also claim our attention....[1]

Note:

1. See also Shabbir Akhtar, Be Careful with Muhammad! The Salman
Rushdie Affair, Bellew, London, 1989, pp. 70-77, for the author's
longer discourse on apostasy (and blasphemy and treason).

In Islam apostasy is a flagrant sin and guilt for which certain punishments
have been specified in fiqh (Islamic law).

Apostasy means to renounce the religion or a religious principle after
accepting it.

In other words, one's departure from Islam to atheism is called apostasy.

A person who abandons Islam and adopts atheism is called an apostate.
There are special laws concerning apostates in the Islamic fiqh.
In this lesson we will be familiarized with them.

With regard to the above mentioned points, we will continue to discuss
the issue of apostasy and apostates in the following parts: (There
follows an outline.)

1. Types of apostasy: As it was mentioned, apostasy means
to return from Islam to atheism and polytheism. That is why it can
also be called "reaction". Therefore, from the standpoint of Islam
and the Islamic fiqh, reaction is to actually give up
Tawhid (monotheism) and return to atheism and polytheism.
Reaction is to abandon monotheism and take up paganism, idolatry
and materialism. Reaction is to return from faith and knowledge
to ignorance. Therefore, the exact examples of reaction in the
current world, especially Muslim-inhabited regions, are apostate
materialists, Marxists, and polytheistic capitalists and Zionists
who have abandoned Tawhid and resorted to Trinity and racism.
Heretical groups in the Muslim world, such as Ba'athists and the
likes of them are reactionary and apostate. Because by denying the
genuineness of Islam or many of its rules they have practically
become apostate and contracted the fatal disease of apostasy and
reaction.

Apostasy has two types: one is "voluntary" apostasy and the other
is "innate" apostasy. Therefore, there are also two types of
apostates: voluntary apostate and innate apostate who are treated
according to different rules.

In the jurisprudential book of Tahrir al-Wassilah voluntary
and innate apostates are defined as follows:

"An apostate, that is one who abandons Islam and takes up atheism
may be of two types:

1. Voluntary apostate: a person whose parents or either of them
were Muslim at the time of his or her development in mother's womb
and who takes up atheism after growing up.

2. Innate apostate: a person who is born of atheist parents and
who accepts Islam after growing up but returns to atheism later."[1]

2. The way to prove one's apostasy: After the meaning of
apostasy and its two types have been clarified, this question may
come to mind: How can a person's apostasy be proved?

In response I should say that since Islam is an easy religion, it
has adopted an easy and untroubled manner in this connection which
does not involve any slander and accusation. Here, before anything
else the judge attaches importance to the confession of the accused
person. Whatever the charged person says about himself or herself,
the judge takes it as an evidence. If the charged person confesses
to his apostasy, his word will be accepted and if he denies the charge
of apostasy and claims Islam, again his word will be taken as valid.

Tahrir al-Wassilah reads so in this regard: "Apostasy is
proved in two ways: First, the person himself confesses to his
apostasy twice. Second, two just and truthful men bear witness to
the person's apostasy. But women's testimony does not prove apostasy
in any case; either they bear witness individually, in a group or beside
a man."[2]

There should also be several conditions or prerequisites in a person
charged of apostasy to be convicted of this guilt. These conditions
are: adultness, wisdom, free will, and intention. Therefore, apostasy
does not apply to children, lunatics, and those who have been forced
to pretend it. Also, apostasy does not apply for a Muslim who utters
a blasphemous word or commits a blasphemous act neglectfully or jokingly
and without intention, or in a coma, or in anger; that is to say, he is
still a Muslim and considered a Muslim.

"If a person utters or does something indicative of apostasy, and he
claims that he was compelled to do so, or did not have real intention
and uttered it unconsciously, his or her claim is accepted, even though
there is already ample proof of his having done a blasphemous act."[3]

3. The punishment of apostates: The punishment that Islam has
considered for voluntary and innate apostates are different.

1. Voluntary apostate: If this apostate is a man, the following punishment
will be executed about him: "His wife is separated from him (that is, she
becomes forbidden to him) and as though her husband is dead, she should
not marry another man for a certain period of time and after that period
she can marry someone else if she wants.

"In addition to this, the property of a male apostate is divided among his
lawful heirs. In this division they won't await his death and his property
is distributed among them while he is still living; of course his debts are
first repaid (and the apostate himself is executed). The repentance of a
voluntary apostate is not accepted and has no effect in regaining his
property and wife. His inward repentance will be accepted by God (that
is to say, the other worldly chastisement will be lifted from him).

"In some cases a voluntary apostate's apparent repentance is also accepted
and as a result his prayers and worship will be accepted, his body will be
clean and touchable again; he will be allowed to gain new property through
legitimate ways such as trade, work, and inheritance. He can also marry a
Muslim woman or marry his former wife again."[4]

This is the punishment of a male voluntary apostate. As you observe, Islam
considers him a dead person and issues the rule of the dead about his
property and wife.

The words of the great Faqih Imam Khomeini indicate that if a voluntary
apostate repents, he will be relieved of death punishment. However, some
of the earlier Faqihs such as Allamah Helli believed that a voluntary
apostate should be executed immediately and that his repentance was not
acceptable.[5]

Imam Khomeini's statement in this regard is based on common law and
rationality. Some of the former Faqihs like Eskafi and Sahib al-Massalik
were of the same opinion. Concerning the documents invoked by the
opponents of this opinion, Sahib al-Massalik says: "...Reliable
jurisprudential documents generally indicate that an apostate's
repentance is acceptable, and any different interpretation of these
documents is doubtful.[6]

A similar statement has also been narrated from the Sunnis. For example,
Taliha Ibn Khowailad Assadi, a well-known apostate in the early years
of Islam who was defeated after apostasy and rebellion against Muslims,
repented after some time (and thus was pardoned). In the Nahavand
battle he was one of the commanders of the Muslims' army and was killed
in that battle.[7]

But the punishment of a female voluntary apostate is as follows: "Her
property remains in her ownership and is not transferred to her lawful
heirs, unless she dies. (A female apostate is not executed on charges
of apostasy.) She is separated from her husband without any need to
remain unmarried for a certain period, of course if no intercourse has
taken place between her and her husband. But if they have had sexual
intercourse, she should remain unmarried for a certain period as of the
moment of her apostasy just as if she were divorced. If the woman repents
in the middle of the period of remaining unmarried, she will become the
wife of her former husband without any need to hold marriage ceremonies
again."[8]

Therefore, a female apostate is never executed but is imprisoned.

2. Innate Apostate: An innate apostate is treated in this way: "His
or her property is not transferred to the heirs as a result of apostasy.
An innate man or woman is separated from his or her spouse as a penalty
for apostasy. In case of repenting before the expiration of the period
that the woman has to remain unmarried, they will again belong to each
other. But if repentance is uttered after the expiration of this special
period, they will no longer be each other's wife and husband."[9]

An innate apostate is not executed if he repents. This is a matter
agreed on by all faqihs (Islamic jurisprudents).

4. Apostate's Repentance: The case of an apostate's repentance
has become clear and, therefore, there is no need to explain it again.

5. A View of the Qur'anic Verses About Apostasy: There are many
verses in the Glorious Qur'an and numerous narrations in Islamic historical
and narrative books that help us have a deep understanding of the
phenomenon of apostasy. Let us take a look at some of them:

1. "O you who believe! Whoever from among you turns back from his religion,
then Allah will bring a people, He shall love them and they shall love Him,
lowly before the believers, mighty against the unbelievers, they shall
strive hard in Allah's way and shall not fear the censure of any censurer;
this is Allah's grace, He gives it to whom He pleases, and Allah is
Ample-giving, Knowing."[10]

2. "...And they will not cease fighting with you until they turn you back
from your religion, if they can; and whoever of you turns back from his
religion, then he dies while an unbeliever -- these it is whose works
shall go for nothing in this world and the hereafter; and they are the
inmates of the fire; therein they shall abide."[11]

3. "Surely (as for) those who return on their backs after that guidance
has become manifest to them, the Shaitan has made it a light matter to
them; and He gives them respite.

"That is because they say to those who hate what Allah has revealed:
We will obey you in some of the affairs; and Allah knows their secrets.

"But how will it be when the angels cause them to die smiting their backs.

"That is because they follow what is displeasing to Allah and are averse
to His pleasure, therefore He has made null their deeds."[12]

4. "O you who believe! If you obey a party from among those who have
been given the Book, they will turn you back as unbelievers after you
have believed."[13]

5. "And Muhammad is no more than an apostle; the apostles have already
passed away before him. If then he dies or is killed, will you turn
back upon your heels? And whoever turns back upon his heels, he will
by no means do harm to Allah in the least, and Allah will reward the
grateful."[14]

As you observe, these verses have approached apostasy from different
aspects and meditation upon them will shed light on many issues.

6. Answer to a Controversial Question: In connection with the
subject of apostasy and the punishment that the holy religion of Islam
has considered for it, the narrow-minded or the enemies of justice and
truth may attempt to create doubt in the people's minds by raising a
question and taking advantage of it opportunistically in their
anti-Islamic propaganda. This is the question: Do the Muslims not
claim that Islam is the religion of the freedom of belief and creed
and that there is no compulsion in choosing one's opinion? Then why
has Islam considered such heavy penalties and punishment for apostasy?

The answer to this irrelevant question is this: Yes, Islam and the
Glorious Qur'an have denied compulsion and coercion in belief, and
the Exalted God says so in the Glorious Qur'an:

"There is no compulsion in religion" (Surah Baqarah, verse 256).
But the issue of apostasy differs from the free adoption of an opinion
or belief.

In other words, I should say that from the viewpoint of the Islamic
fiqh, there is a skeptic who is seeking the truth and there
is also an obstinate apostate. These two are basically different
from each other.

A skeptic is one who does not want to take up a creed and follow a
religion in a hereditary way. He or she is doubtful and hesitant of
what parents and family or society have inculcated upon his or her
mind about God and Islam, and doubts whether they are true or not.
That is why he doubts and thus embarks on studying and searching
for the discovery of truth and reality.

Not only is this doubt not reproachable and bad from the viewpoint
of Islam, but it is also praised. Becaue the Glorious Qur'an
reproaches ancient nations for having imitated their ancestors in
religion and creed. Even research facilities should be provided for
the searching and studying of a skeptic out of the Muslims' public
treasury. Because the root of this doubt lies in honesty, sincerity,
and knowledge. Doubt is a very good passageway but a very bad place
to stop in.

However, apostasy is a matter of treason and ideological treachery
which originates from hostility and hypocrisy. The destiny of a
person who has an inborn handicap is different from the destiny of
one whose hand should be cut off, due to the development of a dangerous
and infectious disease.

The apostasy of a Muslim individual whose parents have also been
Muslim is a very infectious, dangerous, and incurable disease that
appears in the body of an ummah (people) and threatens people's
lives, and that is why this rotten limb should be severed.

An apostate is an adversary who has penetrated the Islamic ummah
as the faith column of the enemy of Islam and Muslims and who has taken
advantage of his natural situation.

Apostasy is escape from the pattern of creation and nature and that is
why the word voluntary has been adopted for such an apostate and that is
the reason why the punishment of a voluntary apostate is heavier than
that of an innate apostate. Can the penalty of escaping from the path
and pattern of nature and creation be anything other than annihilation?
This is the same thing that has been crystallized in the penal code of
Islam.

The anti-apostasy punishment of Islam are proper laws to rescue mankind
from falling into the cesspool of treason, betrayal, and disloyalty and
to remind the human being of his ideological commitments. A committed
man should not violate his promise and vow, especially his promise to
God. All the punitive laws of Islam have a similar goal. For example,
they ask, why is a thief's hand cut for stealing five hundred or one
thousand tomans? This is the denial of the value of the human being!
But the fact is that a thief's hand is not cut off for the sake of a
hundred or a thousand tomans, but his hand is severed for having
deprived the human society of security. In other words, a thief's
hand is cut for the revival of human values.

An objective and real proof of the fact that apostasy always has
a treacherous and warlike nature and revolves around high political
and social positions indeed, and not around the free adoption of
a belief, as it is alleged, can be seen in the events of the early
days of Islam.

After the demise of the Prophet of Islam (SAWA), most Arab tribes
became apostate under the influence of their errant, arrogant,
and idolatrous chiefs. These apostates were led by the false
claimers of prophethood. Their first step after the Prophet's
death was to attack Medina and other centers of Islam. In the wars
that the bellicose apostates waged against Muslims, fifty or sixty
thousand people were killed and the number of casualties is
unprecedented in Arab history.

Their most heinous ringleaders were "Ablaha ibn Ka'b" known as
"Asswad Ghassi"; in Yemen "Mosailimah Kadhdhab" at Hadra Moat,
and "Taliha Ibn Khowailad Assadi" in the Bani Assad tribe. These
wars and similar wars which occurred later show the tyrannical
nature of apostasy and justify the necessity of a decisive combat
against it.[15]

Another example which is expressive of the insincere nature of
the sinister phenomenon of apostasy is the ruthless inhuman
murder of faithful Muslims by Marxian apostates in Iran under
the shah's regime under the pretext of "changing their ideology".
They committed these crimes as "revolutionary assassinations".
Yet instead of assassinating the ringleaders of SAWAK (the shah's
secret police) they murdered anti-shah and anti-U.S. Muslims who
worshipped God. This is the shameful face of apostasy.

10. From Amnesty International, Law and Human Rights in the Islamic
Republic of Iran, Feb. 1980, MDE/13/03/80:

Apostasy and a Period for Repentance

In most schools (of Islam) the apostate is given the chance to return
from error and follow the ordained path. If this is not done he or,
according to the Shi'a Imamiya, she, will be executed. The period
which is given to the apostate to return varies according to the
schools but the Shi'a Imamiya are particularly harsh in that they say
that whoever was born into Islam and turns away from it should be
killed and no repentance accepted.

Apostasy means a plain and clear repudiation of Islam of a professing
Muslim .... Simple apostasy, which is not aggravated by rebellion,
treason or grave disorderliness, is not punishable in any manner in
this life....[1]

Note:

1. This and the following quotation came from Ahmadiyya Anjuman sources.
Generally Muslims do not recognize members of the Ahmadiyya Anjuman as
Muslims. See Encyclopaedia of Islam[2] in loco for a brief
account of this movement.

The Maulana's (Mawdudi's) ideas on apostasy, though originating from an
interpretive error of early Muslim jurisprudence (fiqh), are, in
fact, based on medieval Christianity.... The Tahrik-i Jamaati Islami
is a curious blend of medieval Christian practices, Deobandi/Wahabi
intolerance and Marxist incitement to disruption.

Appendix C
A Recent Pronouncement from Lebanon on Apostasy[1]

Several years ago a Lebanese family in Germany requested official
information from the Office of the Mufti in Lebanon regarding
the law of apostasy in Islam. The family received a response in Arabic,
the translation of which is as follows:

In the Name of the Merciful and Compassionate Allah

Dar al-Fatwa in the Republic of Lebanon,

Beirut

Praise be to Allah, the Lord of the Universe, prayers and peace be upon
our Master Muhammad, the Apostle of Allah, and upon his family, his
compatriots and his followers and those who have found the way through
him.

A question has come from ...: "What is the stand of the Islamic Law
regarding the Muslim who has renounced Islam and embraced another religion?"
The answer is, with Allah's help:

Etymologically, raddah (renouncing) means to go back on a thing
to something else. As far as religious law is concerned, it means the
severing of the continuity of Islam. The murtadd (apostate) is
the one who has renounced Islam. The state of raddah (apostasy),
should it continue and he die in it, will nullify the value of his work.
Such a person will have died outside Islam. This is based on the saying
of the Exalted One (i.e., Allah in the Qur'an): "Those who among you
renounce their religion and die as unbelievers, their works would have
failed them."

The loss of the merit of his works is linked to two conditions: apostasy,
and dying in the state of apostasy. These two conditions are necessary
and are not the same. Should the apostate renounce his apostasy and
return to Islam, his status would be valid as long as he gave these two
testimonies:

1. "I testify that there is no god but Allah, and that Muhammad is the
Apostle of Allah."

2. (The second testimony) should be a clear declaration that he is free
from every religion which is contrary to Islam; that he no longer adheres
to the faith which had caused him to apostatize; that he is not innocent
from the transgression he fell into on account of his apostasy.

The person who renounces his apostasy is not obliged to repeat the
performance of everything he had accomplished prior to his apostasy
(i.e., while he was still a practising Muslim) such as the hajj
(pilgrimage) and the prayers. His works will no longer be counted as
having failed him, now that he has returned to Islam. But he must
perform all that he has missed during the raddah and the period
leading up to it. For he is still under obligation (even) while he
was in the state of apostasy to perform all that is required of a Muslim.

Now should the apostate (male or female) persist in his apostasy, he
should be given the opportunity to repent, prior to his being put to
death, out of respect to his Islam. A misunderstanding on his part
may have taken place, and there would thus be an opportunity to rectify
it. Often apostasy takes place on account of an offer (of inducement).
So Islam must be presented to the apostate and things should be clarified,
and his sin made manifest. He should be imprisoned for three days so
that he may have the opportunity to reflect upon his situation. This
three day period has been deemed adequate. But if the man or the woman
has not repented of his (or her) raddah, but has continued to
persist in it, then he (she) should be put to death. (This is in
harmony with) his saying, may Allah's blessings and peace be upon him
(reference is made here to a saying of Muhammad as preserved in the Hadith):

"Kill him who changes his religion." This is based on the traditionist
authority, al-Bukhari.

He who executes the apostate is the imam (ruler or leader in
Islam), or with his permission, his deputy. When a person deserves
capital punishment in accordance with the will of Allah, the carrying
out of the penalty is left to the imam or the one allowed to do
so by his permission. But if someone, other than the imam or
his deputy has not abided by this rule and executed the apostate, he
should be punished because he has usurped the function of the imam.
This punishment is not specifically described. It is left up to the
judge to decide the amount of the punishment in order that it will
keep people from usurping the role of the imam.

An apostate may not be buried in the cemetery of the Muslims since by
his apostasy he has departed from them.

According to Imam Abu Hanifah, may the mercy of Allah be upon him, the
female apostate should not be put to death, but must be imprisoned
until she islamizes. Reference is then made to Khatib al-Sharbini,
Ibn Hajar al-Haythami, and other authorities. Allah knows best.
Praises be to Allah and to our Master Muhammad and his compatriots.
Thanks be to God, the Lord of the universe.

Done in Beirut on the 14th of Rabi' Athani in the year 1410 A.H.
(the equivalent of) 13 November 1989.

Signed:

Signed:

Lieutenant of the Mufti of the Republic of Lebanon

The translator added the following note: Dar al-Fatwa is the
official Sunni Muslim authority for the interpretation of the
Shari'ah (Law) in Islam. Every Muslim country designates
an official mufti, i.e., the expert who interprets the Law.
Imam Abu Hanifah is one of the four Orthodox (Sunni) Muslim authorities
whose interpretation of the Shari'ah is accepted among Muslims.

Note

1. We are grateful for a retyped copy of this fatwa in Arabic
(since the original text and stationery could not be clearly reproduced)
and for the English translation of the same. For security reasons we
omit the name of our benefactor and the name of the person who initially
solicited the fatwa.

The Original Arabic Text of the Prouncement:

Appendix D

A Prisoner's Testament in Iran[1]
Written Defence of Mehdi Dibaj
Delivered to the Court for His Trial as an Apostate from Islam
on December 3, 1993.

"In the Holy Name of God who is our life and existence"

In the Holy name of God who is our life and existence. With all
humility I express my gratitude to the Judge of all heaven and
earth for this precious opportunity, and with brokenness I wait
upon the Lord to deliver me from this court trial according to His
promises. I also beg the honoured members of the court present
to listen with patience to my defence and with respect for the
Name of the Lord.

I am a Christian, a sinner who believes Jesus has died for my sins
on the cross and, by His resurrection and victory over death, has
made me righteous in the presence of the Holy God. The true God
speaks about this fact in His Holy Word, the Gospel. Jesus means
Saviour "because He will save His people from their sins". Jesus
paid the penalty of our sins by His own blood and gave us a new
life so that we can live for the glory of God by the help of the
Holy Spirit and be like a dam against corruption, be a channel of
blessing and healing, and be protected by the love of God.

In response to this kindness, He has asked me to deny myself and
be His fully surrendered follower, and not fear people even if
they kill my body, but rather rely on the Creator of life who has
crowned me with the crown of mercy and compassion, and who is the
great protector of His beloved ones and their great reward.

I have been charged with "apostasy"! The invisible God who knows
our hearts has given assurance to us Christians that we are not
among the apostates who will perish but among the believers so
that we may save our lives. In Islamic Law an apostate is one who
does not believe in God, the prophets or the resurrection of the
dead. We Christians believe in all three!

They say "You were a Muslim and you have become a Christian." No,
for many years I had no religion. After searching and studying I
accepted God's call and I believed in the Lord Jesus Christ in
order to receive eternal life. People choose their religion but
a Christian is chosen by Christ. He says "You have not chosen me
but I have chosen you." From when? Before the foundation of the
world.

People say "You were a Muslim from your birth." God says "You were
a Christian from the beginning." He states that He chose us thousands
of years ago, even before the creation of the universe, so that
through the sacrifice of Jesus Christ we may be His! A Christian
means one who belongs to Jesus Christ.

The eternal God, who sees the end from the beginning and who has
chosen me to belong to Him, knew from everlasting whose heart would
be drawn to Him and also those who would be willing to sell their
faith and eternity for a pot of porridge. I would rather have the
whole world against me but know that the Almighty God is with me,
be called an apostate but know that I have the approval of the God
of glory, because man looks at the outward appearance but God looks
at the heart, and for Him who is God for all eternity nothing is
impossible. All power in heaven and on earth is in His hands.

The Almighty God will raise up anyone He chooses and bring down
others, accept some and reject others, send some to heaven and
others to hell. Now because God does whatever He desires, who
can separate us from the love of God? Or who can destroy the
relationship between the creator and the creature or defeat a heart
that is faithful to his Lord? He will be safe and secure under
the shadow of the Almighty! Our refuge is the mercy seat of God
who is exalted from the beginning. I know in whom I have believed,
and He is able to guard what I have entrusted to Him to the end,
until I reach the Kingdom of God, the place where the righteous
shine like the sun, but where the evildoers will receive their
punishment in hell fire.

They tell me "Return!" But from the arms of my God, whom can I
return to? Is it right to accept what people are saying instead
of obeying the Word of God? It is now 45 years that I am walking
with the God of miracles, and His kindness upon me is like a shadow
and I owe Him much for His fatherly love and concern.

The love of Jesus has filled all my being and I feel the warmth
of His love in every part of my body. God, who is my glory and
honour and protector, has put his seal of approval upon me through
His unsparing blessings and miracles.

This test of faith is a clear example. The good and kind God
reproves and punishes all those whom He loves. He tests them
in preparation for heaven. The God of Daniel, who protected
his friends in the fiery furnace, has protected me for nine
years in prison and all the bad happenings have turned out for
our good and gain, so much so that I am filled overflowing with
joy and thankfulness.

The God of Job has tested my faith and commitment in order to
strengthen my patience and faithfulness. During these nine years
he has freed me from all my responsibilities so that under the
protection of His blessed Name, I would spend my time in prayer
and study of His Word, with heart- searching and brokenness, and
grow in the knowledge of my Lord. I praise the Lord for this
unique opportunity. "You gave me space in my confinement, my
difficult hardships brought healing and your kindnesses revived
me." Oh what great blessings God has in store for those who
fear Him!

They object to my evangelizing. But "If you find a blind person
near a well and keep silent then you have sinned" (a Persian poem).
It is our religious duty, as long as the door of God's mercy is
open, to convince evil doers to turn from their sinful ways and
find refuge in Him in order to be saved from the wrath of a
righteous God and from the coming dreadful punishment.

Jesus Christ says "I am the door. Whoever enters through me will
be saved." "I am the way, the truth and the life. No one comes
to the Father except through me." "Salvation is found in no one
else, for there is no other name under heaven given to men by
which we must be saved." Among the prophets of God, only Jesus
Christ rose from the dead, and He is our living intercessor for
ever.

He is our Saviour and He is the Son of God. To know Him means to
know eternal life. I, a useless sinner, have believed in His
beloved person and all His words and miracles recorded in the Gospel,
and I have committed my life into His hands. Life for me is an
opportunity to serve Him, and death is a better opportunity to
be with Christ. Therefore I am not only satisfied to be in prison
for the honour of His Holy Name, but am ready to give my life for
the sake of Jesus my Lord and enter His kingdom sooner, the place
where the elect of God enter everlasting life, but the wicked to
eternal damnation.

May the shadow of God's kindness and His hand of blessing and
healing be upon you and remain for ever. Amen.

With respect,

Your Christian prisoner,

Mehdi Dibaj

Note:

1. This statement, with a brief introduction to it by Bernard Levin,
appeared in The Times of London, Jan. 18, 1994. In Dec. 1993
an Islamic court in Iran had ordered the execution of Mehdi Dibaj
on the charge of apostasy. Shortly thereafter he was released from
jail, probably because of international pressures. Since June 24,
1994 he was reported missing. On July 5th law enforcement officials
reported finding his body in a forest near Tehran.

Appendix E
Part 1: Interpreting Quran 2:256

While discussing the issue of apostasy in Islam, probably no verse
is more frequently cited to decide the issue, especially by Muslims
in the West who advocate freedom of religion, than Qur'an 2:256:
"There is no compulsion in religion."

S. A. Rahman makes the distinct claim:

This verse is one of the most important verses in the Qur'an,
containing a charter of freedom of conscience unparalleled in the
religious annals of mankind....[1]

While discussing the nature of jihad, Dr. Abdelwahib Boase,
formerly professor at University of Fez and then a research associate
at Westfield College, University of London, writes:

... it must be emphasized that jihad in the
military sense does not have as its object the propagation of religion.
The fallacy that Islam imposes on the non-Muslim the choice between
"conversion or the sword" is disproved by the Quranic injunction:
"There is no coercion in matters of faith."[2]

Muslims have never compelled non-Muslims to become Muslims, and
this myth has been propagated by Western Christian writers, like
yourself. In fact it is quite clearly written in the Qur'an
Surah 2 verse 256, "There is no compulsion in religion."[3]

A portion of a letter to the editor of a Toronto newspaper reads:

... it was Islam that proclaimed, "there is no compulsion in religion"
when the echo of the time was "onward Christian soldiers".... After all,
Muslims have been presented with the perfect belief system and they
would like to share it peacefully with all those people with whom
they share the Earth.[4]

An important commentary of the Ahmadiyya Community comments on this
verse:

... The verse enjoins Muslims in the clearest and strongest of words
not to resort to force for converting non-Muslims to Islam. In the
face of this teaching ... it is the height of injustice to accuse Islam
of countenancing the use of force for the propagation of its teaching.[5]

For S. A. Rahman discussion on the apostate and freedom of religion
does not simply begin and end with the citation of Qur'an 2:256.
True to his assertion that the verse "deserves detailed discussion",
he proceeds to discuss the matter, sadly noting also a variety of
concerns and opinions on the matter which "whittle down" the verse's
"broad humanistic meaning".[6] They are in summary form:

1. Some Quranic exegetes state that Qur'an 2:256 has been abrogated
by the following verses:

O Prophet! Strive against the disbelievers and the hypocrites! Be
harsh with them.... (9:73)

O ye who believe! Fight those of the disbelievers who are near to you,
and let them find harshness in you.... (9:123)

Say unto those of the wondering Arabs who were left behind: Ye will
be called against a folk of mighty prowess to fight them until they
surrender.... (48:16)[7]

2. Rahman also notes the various opinions of the Quranic commentators
regarding the circumstances surrounding the revelation (shan-i nuzul)
of Qur'an 2:256: a. the revelation blocked an Ansar woman from forcing
her Jewish boy to convert to Islam; b. the revelation blocked an Ansar
father from forcing his two Christian sons to convert to Islam; c. the
revelation permitted a member of the People of the Book to retain his
religion; d. the revelation referred to the People of the Book who
agreed to pay jizyah. He also notes, however, that the esteemed
Indian Muslim scholar, Shah Wali Ullah, does not confine the application
of such a verse to the particular incident only. "On the contrary, the
verse should be held to convey the commandment contained therein,
generally."[8]

3. Nevertheless Rahman notes a variety of interpretations which Muslim
scholars have given to this verse, not of least significance -- and much
to Rahman's dismay! -- that of the same Indian scholar Shah Wali Ullah
who, after giving the normal meaning, adds:

That is to say, the reasoned guidance of Islam has become
manifest. Therefore, so to speak, there is no compulsion, although, in
sum, there may be coercion.[9]

Rahman concludes his remarks on Shah Wali Ullah's gloss:

Such an interpretation can perhaps be attributed to the unconscious
pressure of orthodox tradition.[10]

Rahman then presents the position of Nawab Siddiq Hasan Khan in Fath
al-Bayan:

... one should not say of a person converted to Islam under the shadow
of the sword, that he was compelled to the Faith for "there is no compulsion
in religion". Another construction ... confines the verse to the People
of the Scriptures who submitted to the Muslims and agreed to pay jizyah
(poll-tax) but excludes the idolaters from its scope. In the case of the
latter, only two alternatives are said to be open -- Islam or the sword --
on the authority of al-Shabi, al-Hasan, Qatadah and al-Dahhaq.[11]

Then Rahman cites Ibn al-Arabi's work Ahkam al-Qur'an, adding
thereafter his own objections to this interpretation:

He (Ibn al-Arabi) declares dogmatically that to compel to the truth
is part of the Faith, on the authority of a hadith: "I have been
commanded to fight people till they recite the declaration of faith...",
which he considers to have been derived from the Quranic verse: "And
fight them until persecution is no more and religion is for Allah alone."
(8:39; 2:193)[12]

Recently a Pakistani Muslim friend, a doctoral candidate in South Asian
Islamic studies at the University of Toronto, kindly shared his
interpretation of Qur'an 2:256: Qur'an 2:256 obviously forbids compulsion
in religion. The Hadith obviously state that the apostate from Islam should
be executed. Since the Qur'an also states that Muslims are to obey the
Prophet as well as the Book, Qur'an 2:256 can have application only for
non-Muslims. Muslims must be compelled to remain Muslim.

Part 2: Surah 2:256: la ikraha fi d-dini

Tolerance or Resignation?

by Rudi Paret (Tuebingen)[13]

The Quranic passage la ikraha fi d-dini ("there is no compulsion
in religion") is generally understood to mean that no one should use
compulsion against another in matters of faith. There is much to commend
this interpretation. As it is understood here, the statement represents
a principle which has gained a recognition of international dimensions:
the principle of religious tolerance. Historically also the alleged
meaning of la ikraha fi d-dini appears to be warranted. "The People
of the Book", i.e., the members of the older revealed religions, particularly
the Jews and the Christians, were in principle never compelled to accept
Islam. They were obliged, while residing in territory under Islamic
domination (dar al-Islam), only to recognize the supremacy of Muslims
and, at the same time, as an external indication of this recognition, to
pay a separate tax. In all other matters they could maintain their inherited
beliefs and perform their practices as usual. They even were allowed to
establish their own internal administration.

To be sure, however, the situation was different for members of the pre-Islamic
pagan Arab society. After the community which the Prophet had established
had extended its power over the whole of Arabia, the pagan Arabs were forcefully
compelled to accept Islam; stated more accurately, they had to choose either
to accept Islam or death in battle against the superior power of the Muslims
(cf. surahs 8:12; 47:4). This regulation was later sanctioned in Islamic
law. All this stands in open contradiction to the alleged meaning of the
Quranic statement, noted above: la ikraha fi d-dini. The idolaters
(mushrikun) were clearly compelled to accept Islam -- unless they
preferred to let themselves be killed.

In view of these circumstances it makes sense to consider another meaning.
Perhaps originally the statement la ikraha fi d-dini did not mean
that in matters of religion one ought not to use compulsion against another
but that one could not use compulsion against another (through the simple
proclamation of religious truth). This seems even more likely in the light
of surah 10:100, 101:

And if thy Lord willed, all who are in the earth would believe together.
(Or "if thy Lord had willed, all who were on earth would have believed
together".) Wouldst thou (Muhammad) compel men until they are believers
(a-fa-anta tukrihu n-nasa hatta yakunu mu'minina)?

It is not for any soul to believe save by the permission of Allah. He has
set uncleanness upon those who have no sense (and therefore remain hardened).

Compare Surah 12:103:

And though thou try much, most men will not believe.[14]

Both of these passages demonstrate that the Prophet's zeal to convert
was doomed for the most part to be without success as a result of human
recalcitrance. In agreement with this it is possible to understand
la ikraha fi d-dini to mean that no one can be compelled to
(right) belief. The statement of the Qur'an, then, would be not a
proclamation of tolerance, but much more an expression of resignation.
For a transition from la ikraha fi d-dini to the following
portion of this verse (qad tabaiyana r-rushdu mina l-ghayi),
something to this effect would have to be supplied if the meaning
proposed here should agree: "(Since the individual cannot be compelled
to truly believe by external influences, he must himself find a way
to faith and that should not be difficult for him.) The correct way
(of faith) has (through the proclamation of Islam) become clear (so
that he can clearly be freed) from the error (of pagan unbelief)."

Whoever holds the interpretation of 2:256 as it has been presented
above need not therefore simply cast overboard the meaning of the statement
la ikraha fi d-dini as it usually has been understood for a long
time. In the contemporary world of Islam the acknowledgement of religious
tolerance is well established. And how can it be formulated more precisely
than by the pregnant Arabic statement: la ikraha fi d-dini! Still
the fact must always be kept in mind that in many ways the circumstances
governing early Islam differed from those of today and that the presuppositions
for a general and complete religious tolerance were not given at that time.

Notes

1. S. A. Rahman, Punishment of Apostasy in Islam, Institute of Islamic
Culture, Lahore, 1972, p. 16.
2. Arabia, The Islamic World Review, July, 1986, p. 79.
3. Letter of Hasan Moolla from Saskatchewan, dated January 20, 1986 to FFM.
4. Syed Nouman Ashraf, Public Relations Committee, Muslim Student Association,
University of Toronto in The Globe and Mail, July 15, 1992.
5. The Holy Qur'an with English Translation and Commentary, Sadr
Anjuman Ahmadiyya, Qadian, 1947, vol. 1, in loco.
6. Rahman, op. cit., p.16. His full discussion covers pp. 16-25.
Its openness and breadth differs from that of the Qur'an "expositor" whose
mere citation of 2:256 precludes for him (and for all?) the need for further
discussion.
7. A more recent publication states that Ibn Hazm accepted the abrogation
of 2:256 in order to avoid a contradiction between this passage and the
death penalty for apostasy. On the other hand, the author claims that
2:256 has not been abrogated (Mohamed S. El-Awa, Punishment in Islamic Law:
A Comparative Study, American Trust Publications, Indianapolis, 1982,
p. 51). For two general discussions on abrogation in Islam and some of its
complexities, including differing opinions within the traditional Schools
of Law about whether or not the Hadith can abrogate the Qur'an, compare
Islamic Jurisprudence: Shafi'i's Risala, translated with an
Introduction, Notes and Appendices by Majid Khadduri, The Johns Hopkins
Press, Baltimore, 1961, esp. pp.123-145 with M. H. Kamali, Principles
of Islamic Jurisprudence, Pelanduk Publications, Malaysia, esp. pp.
189-210. The doctrine of abrogation is especially rooted in Qur'an 2:106,
16:101, 87:6, 7.
8. Rahman, op. cit., p. 18.
9. ibid., pp. 18, 19.
10. ibid., p. 19.
11. ibid., p. 19.
12. ibid., p. 20. For further opinions see pp. 21-24, including
a brief rebuttal of Mawdudi's interpretation.
13. A translation of "Sure 2, 256: la ikraha fi d-dini: Toleranz
oder Resignation?" in Der Islam, Walter De Gruyter, Berlin,
Vol. 45, 1967, pp. 299-300. Compare the same thesis as discussed by
Adolf L. Wismar A Study in Tolerance, AMS Press Inc., New York,
1966, pp. 4-13. Apparently this work was originally published by Columbia
University Press in 1927.
14. Compare also 16:37 in Rudi Paret, Kommentar and Konkordanz,
Zweite Auflage, Kohlhammer, Stuttgart, 1977, p. 54: "Though thou art
ever so eager to guide them, God guides not those whom He leads astray."
(English translation, A. J. Arberry, The Koran Interpreted,
Oxford University Press, London, 1969, p. 262)

Appendix F
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948

The text of the Declaration reads:

"Whereas recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and
inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the foundation
of freedom, justice and peace in the world, whereas disregard and
contempt for human rights have resulted in barbarous acts which have
outraged the conscience of mankind, and the advent of a world in
which human beings shall enjoy freedom of speech and belief and
freedom from fear and want has been proclaimed as the highest
aspiration of the common people,

whereas it is essential, if man is not to be compelled to have
recourse, as a last resort, to rebellion against tyranny and
oppression, that human rights should be protected by the rule of law,

whereas it is essential to promote the development of friendly
relations between nations,

whereas the peoples of the United Nations have in the Charter
reaffirmed their faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity
and worth of the human person and in the equal rights of men and
women and have determined to promote social progress and better
standards of life in larger freedom,

whereas Member-States have pledged themselves to achieve,
in cooperation with the United Nations, the promotion of universal
respect for and observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms,

whereas a common understanding of these rights and freedoms is of
the greatest importance for the full realization of this pledge.
Now, therefore, the General Assembly proclaims this Universal
Declaration of Human Rights as a common standard of achievement for
all peoples and all nations, to the end that every individual and
every organ of society, keeping this Declaration constantly in mind,
shall strive by teaching and education to promote respect for these
rights and freedoms and by progressive measures, national and
international, to secure their universal and effective recognition
and observance, both among the peoples of Member-States themselves
and among the peoples of territories under their jurisdiction.

Art. 1 All human beings are born free and equal in dignity
and rights. They are endowed with reason and conscience and should
act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood.

Art. 2 Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms
set forth in this Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such
as race, color, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion,
national or social origin, property, birth or other status.
Furthermore, no distinction shall be made on the basis of the
political, jurisdictional or international status of the country or
territory to which a person belongs, whether it be independent,
trust, non-self-governing or under any other limitation of sovereignty.

Art. 3 Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of person.

Art. 4 No one shall be held in slavery or servitude; slavery
and the slave trade shall be prohibited in all their forms.

Art. 5 No one shall be subject to torture or to cruel, inhuman
or degrading treatment or punishment.

Art. 6 Everyone has the right to recognition everywhere as
a person before the law.

Art. 7 All are equal before the law and are entitled without
any discrimination to equal protection of the law. All are entitled
to equal protection against any discrimination in violation of the
Declaration and against any incitement to such discrimination.

Art. 8 Everyone has the right to an effective remedy by the
competent national tribunals for acts violating the fundamental
rights granted him by the constitution or by law.

Art. 9 No one shall be subject to arbitrary arrest, detention
or exile.

Art. 10 Everyone is entitled in full equality to a fair and
public hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal, in the
determination of his rights and obligations and of any criminal
charge against him.

Art. 11(i) Everyone charged with a penal offence has the right
to be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law in a
public trial at which he has had all the guarantees necessary for
his defence.

(ii) No one shall be held guilty of any penal offence on
account of any act of omission which did not constitute a penal
offence, under national or international law, at the time it was
committed. Nor shall a heavier penalty be imposed than the one
that was applicable at the time the penal offence was committed.

Art. 12 No one shall be subject to arbitrary interference
with his privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to attacks
upon his honor and reputation. Everyone has the right to the
protection of the law against such interference or attacks.

Art. 13(i) Everyone has the right to freedom of movement
and residence within the borders of each state.

(ii) Everyone has the right to leave any country,
including his own, and to return to his country.

Art. 14(i) Everyone has the right to seek and to enjoy
in other countries asylum from persecution.

(ii) This right may not be invoked in the case of prosecutions
genuinely arising from non-political crimes or from acts contrary
to the purposes and principles of the United Nations.

Art. 15(i) Everyone has the right to a nationality.

(ii) No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his nationality
nor denied the right to change his nationality.

Art. 16(i) Men and women of full age, without any limitation
due to race, nationality or religion, have the right to marry and
to found a family. They are entitled to equal rights as to marriages,
during marriage and at its dissolution.

(ii) Marriage shall be entered into only with the free and
full consent of the intending spouses.

(iii) The family is the natural and fundamental group unit
of society and is entitled to protection by society and the state.

Art. 17(i) Everyone has the right to own property as well
as in association with others.

(ii) No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his property.

Art. 18 Everyone has the right to freedom of thought,
conscience and religion; the right includes freedom to change his
religion or belief, and freedom, either alone or in community with
others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief
in teaching, practice, worship and observance.

Art. 19 Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and
expression; this right includes the right to freedom to hold opinions
without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and
ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers.

Art. 20(i) Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly
and association.

(ii) No one may be compelled to an association.

Art. 21(i) Everyone has the right to take part in the government
of his country, directly or through freely chosen representatives.

(ii) Everyone has the right of equal access to public service
in his country.

(iii) The will of the people shall be the basis of the authority
of the government; this will shall be expressed in periodic and genuine
elections which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and shall be
held by secret vote or by equivalent free voting procedures.

Art. 22 Everyone, as a member of society, has the right to social
security and is entitled to realization, through national effort and
international cooperation and in accordance with the organization and
resources of each State, of the economic, social and cultural rights
indispensable for his dignity and the free development of his personality.

Art. 23(i) Everyone has the right to work, to free choice of
employment, to just and favorable conditions of work and to protection
against unemployment.

(ii) Everyone, without any discrimination, has the right to
equal pay for equal work.

(iii) Everyone who works has the right to just and favorable
remuneration ensuring for himself and his family an existence worthy
of human dignity, and supplemented if necessary, by other means of
social protection.

(iv) Everyone has the right to form and to join trade unions
for the protection of his interests.

Art. 24 Everyone has the right to rest and leisure, including
reasonable limitation of working hours and periodic holidays with pay.

Art. 25(i) Everyone has the right to a standard of living
adequate for the health and well-being of himself and of his family,
including food, clothing, housing and medical care and necessary
social services, and the right to security in the event of unemployment,
sickness, disability, widowhood, old age or other lack of livelihood
in circumstances beyond his control.

(ii) Motherhood and childhood are entitled to special care
and assistance. All children, whether born in or out of wedlock,
shall enjoy the same social protection.

Art. 26(i) Everyone has the right to education. Education
shall be free, at least in the elementary and fundamental stages.
Elementary education shall be compulsory. Technical and profession
education shall be made generally available and higher education
shall be equally accessible to all on the basis of merit.

(ii) Education shall be directed to the full development of
the human personality and to the strengthening of respect for human
rights and friendship among all nations, racial or religious groups
and shall further the activities of the United Nations for the
maintenance of peace.

(iii) Parents have a prior right to choose the kind of education
that shall be given to their children.

Art. 27(i) Everyone has the right freely to participate in
the cultural life of the community, to enjoy the arts and to share
in scientific advancement and its benefits.

(ii) Everyone has the right to the protection of the moral
and material interest resulting from any scientific, literary or
artistic production of which he is the author.

Art. 28 Everyone is entitled to a social and international
order in which the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration
can be fully realized.

Art. 29(i) Everyone has duties to the community in which
alone the free and full development of his personality is possible.

(ii) In the exercise of his rights and freedoms, everyone
shall subject only to such limitations as are determined by law
solely for the purposes of securing due recognition and respect for
the rights and freedoms of others and of meeting the just requirements
of morality, public order and the general welfare in a democratic society.

(iii) These rights and freedoms may in no case be exercised
contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations.

Art. 30 Nothing in this Declaration may be interpreted as
implying for any State, group or person any right to engage in any
activity or to perform any act aimed at the destruction of any of
the rights and freedoms set forth herein."

Glossary

Abu Bakr - Muhammad's successor, the first caliph.

Ahl-i Kitab - "People of the Book" (Persian), usually
Jews and Christians, but possibly also other groups who possess a
Scripture; cf. Dhimmi; Arabic Ahl al-Kitab.

Ahmadiyya - Followers of Mirza Ghulam Ahmad (d. A.D. 1908)
of India (Pakistan) are members of the Ahmadiyya Anjuman. Though they
claim to be Muslims, mainline Muslims often reject them and may even
persecute them.

Ali - the fourth caliph; cousin and son-in-law of Muhammad.

aman - security; the pledge of safe conduct and security
granted by a Muslim authority to a harbi ("enemy") within
Dar al-Islam, who thus becomes a musta'min ("one secured").

amir - leader.

Ansar - "helpers"; the believers in Medina who welcomed
and helped Muhammad and the migrants (muhajirun) after their
migration from Mecca to Medina.

aqiqah - a sacrifice, on or about the seventh day
after a child is born, involving the naming of the child, cutting
the child's hair and the slaying of an animal.

Dar al-Harb - "the house of war"; the area of the world
not under Muslim sovereignty.

Dar al-Islam - "the house of Islam"; the area of the
world under Muslim sovereignty.

da'wah - Muslim invitation to non-Muslims to enter
the House of Islam, i.e., to become Muslim.

Dhimmi - non-Muslim living under Muslim rule,
particularly a member of the People of the Book, i.e., Jews and
Christians. See Appendix A.

fatwa - an authoratative legal declaration prepared
by a mufti.

fiqh - jurisprudence.

Hadith - the second source of Islam and the shari'ah;
reports of what especially Muhammad said and did, of Muhammad's sunnah;
Canonical Tradition.

harbi - a member of the Dar al-Harb; he may be
a polytheist (mushrik) or a member of the People of the Book.