to compel the respondent Judge to decide on the merits of a motion filed by the petitioner inwhich he asks that the Court fix at P10,000.000 the amount of thebail for his liberty pending trial.

Here’s what happened:

Petitioner was charged with the crime of kidnapping. When hefound out that an Information had been filed and that a warrant of arrest had been issued against him, he went into hiding. Hislawyer, at the instance of his wife, fined a motion asking that the

Court fix the amount of the bond at P10K for the petitioner’s

release pending trial, but the Provincial Fiscal of Pampangaopposed the motion on the ground that the filing was prematurebecause the petitioner had been arrested. The respondent Judgedismissed the motion on the ground that

the petitioner doesnot have the right to ask for the court to admit him to bailpending his arrest or surrender.

The petitioner contends that as, under the Constitution, "allpersons shall before conviction be bailable by sufficient sureties,except those charged with capital offenses when evidence of guilt is strong," Article III, Section 1, paragraph (16), Constitution of the Philippines, and that the words "all persons" used in saidconstitutional provision have been interpreted to mean "allpersons, without distinction, whether formally charged or not yet so charged with any criminal offense".ISSUE: WON the judge erred in not granting the petition foradmission to bail.HELD/RATIO: No.There is no question as to the soundness of the rule invoked bypetitioner. Such is the law in this jurisdiction. But, the rule issubject to the limitation that the person applying for admission tobail should be in the custody of the law, or otherwise deprived of his liberty.In the case of

Herras Teehankee vs. Rovira

, 75 Phil. 634, this Court held:xxx According to this provision, the general rule is that any person, before being convicted of any criminaloffense, shall be bailable, except when he is chargedwith a capital offense and the evidence of his guilt isstrong.

Of course, only those persons who have beeneither arrested, detained or otherwise deprived of their liberty will ever have occasion to seek thebenefits of said provision.

But in order that a personcan invoke the constitutional precept,

it is not necessary that he should wait until a formalcomplaint or information is filed against him

.

Fromthe moment he is placed under arrest, detention orrestraint by the officers of the law, he can claim thisguarantee of the Bill of Rights, and this right heretains unless and until he is charged with a capitaloffense and evidence of his guilt is strong.

And in the case of

Manigbas vs. Luna

, 52 O.G. 1405, it was held:xxx the right to bail only accrues when a person isarrested or deprived of his liberty.

The purpose of bailis to secure one's release and it would beincongruous to grant bail to one who is free.

Thus,`bail is the security required and given for the release of a person who is in the custody of the law.'Without surrendering himself, he filed the motion in which heasks that the court fix the amount of the bail bond for his releasepending trial. It is, therefore, clear that the petitioner is a freeman and is under the jurisprudence not entitled to admission tobail.

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MIRANDA VS. TULIAO486 SCRA 377 (2006)

(I am allowing you to hate me for this digest. Sobrang gulong-

gulo ako. I’ll just attach the original. The issue raised by the

petitioners kasi is not about bail, but the court discussed it in such a way that bail got included. They contrasted. Basically,it just says the court acquires jurisdiction over the person of

the accused when he/she submits motions, etc even if he’s not

detained. But the exception is the petition for admission to bail

–

the accused has to be held in detention in such case. Since

we’re in a hurry, I think that’s the only thing we need, or so I

make myself believe.)

Facts:two burnt cadavers were discovered in Purok Nibulan, Ramon,Isabela, which were later identified as the dead bodies of VicenteBauzon and Elizer Tuliao, son of private respondent VirgilioTuliao who is now under the witness protection program.Two informations for murder were filed against SPO1 WilfredoLeaño, SPO1 Ferdinand Marzan, SPO1 Ruben B. Agustin, SPO2Alexander Micu, SPO2 Rodel Maderal, and SPO4 Emilio Ramirezin the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Santiago City, but the venuewas later transferred to the RTC of Manila which convicted all of the accused and sentenced them to two counts of reclusionperpetua except SPO2 Maderal who was yet to be arraigned at that time, being at large. The case was appealed to the SupremeCourt on automatic review where we accused therein wasacquitted on the ground of reasonable doubt.Sometime in September 1999, SPO2 Maderal was arrested. On 27April 2001, he executed a sworn confession and identifiedpetitioners Jose C. Miranda, PO3 Romeo B. Ocon, and SPO3Alberto P. Dalmacio, a certain Boyet dela Cruz and Amado Doe, asthe persons responsible for the deaths of Vicente Bauzon andElizer Tuliao.Respondent Tuliao filed a criminal complaint for murder against petitioners, Boyet dela Cruz, and Amado Doe, and submitted thesworn confession of SPO2 Maderal. Acting Presiding JudgeWilfredo Tumaliuan issued warrants of arrest against petitionersand SPO2 Maderal.Petitioners filed an urgent motion to complete preliminaryinvestigation, to reinvestigate, and to recall and/or quash thewarrants of arrest.Judge Tumaliuan noted the absence of petitioners and issued aJoint Order denying said urgent motion on the ground that, sincethe court did not acquire jurisdiction over their persons, themotion cannot be properly heard by the court. In the meantime,petitioners appealed the resolution of State Prosecutor Leo T.Reyes to the Department of Justice.the new Presiding Judge Anastacio D. Anghad took over the caseand issued a Joint Order reversing the Joint Order of JudgeTumaliuan. Consequently, he ordered the cancellation of thewarrant of arrest issued against petitioner Miranda. He likewiseapplied this Order to petitioners Ocon and Dalmacio.On 12 November 2001, this Court issued a Resolution resolvingto grant the prayer for a temporary restraining order against Judge Anghad from further proceeding with the criminal cases.Shortly after the aforesaid resolution, Judge Anghad issued a Joint Order dated 14 November 2001 dismissing the two Informationsfor murder against petitioners. On 19 November 2001, this Court took note of

respondent’s cash bond

evidenced by O.R. No.15924532 dated 15 November 2001, and issued the temporaryrestraining order while referring the petition to the Court of Appeals for adjudication on the merits.FIRST ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORWith all due respect, the Honorable Court of Appeals gravelyerred in reversing and setting aside the Joint Order of JudgeAnastacio D. Anghad dated August 17, 2001, September 21, 2001,October 16, 2001 and November 14, 2001 issued in criminalcases numbered 36-3523 and 36-3524; and, erred in upholding,affirming and reinstating the Order dated July 6, 2001 issued bythen Acting Presiding Judge Wilfredo Tumaliuan, on the allegedrule that an accused cannot seek any judicial relief if he does not submit his person to the jurisdiction of the court.Court: A]n accused cannot seek any judicial relief if he does not submit his person to the jurisdiction of the court. Jurisdictionover the person of the accused may be acquired either throughcompulsory process, such as warrant of arrest, or through hisvoluntary appearance, such as when he surrenders to the policeor to the court. It is only when the court has already acquiredjurisdiction over his person that an accused may invoke theprocesses of the court (Pete M. Pico vs. Alfonso V. Combing, Jr.,A.M. No. RTJ-91-764, November 6, 1992). Thus, an accused must first be placed in the custody of the law before the court mayvalidly act on his petition for judicial reliefs.

Proceeding from this premise, the Court of Appeals ruled that petitioners Miranda, Ocon and Dalmacio cannot seek any judicialrelief since they were not yet arrested or otherwise deprived of their liberty at the time they filed their "Urgent Motion tocomplete preliminary investigation; to reinvestigate; to recalland/or quash warrants of arrest."

Petitioners counter the finding of the Court of Appeals byarguing that jurisdiction over the person of the accused isrequired only in applications for bail.

Furthermore,petitioners argue, assuming that such jurisdiction over theirperson is required before the court can act on their motion toquash the warrant for their arrest, such jurisdiction over theirperson was already acquired by the court by their filing of theabove Urgent Motion.

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CrimPro (Bail, Motion to Quash)

AJ | Amin | Cha | Janz | Julio |Martin | Vien

The voluntary appearance of the accused, whereby the court acquires jurisdiction over his person, is accomplished either byhis pleading to the merits (such as by filing a motion to quash or

other pleadings requiring the exercise of the court’s jurisdiction

thereover, appearing for arraignment, entering trial) or by filingbail. On the matter of bail, since the same is intended to obtainthe provisional liberty of the accused, as a rule the same cannot be posted before custody of the accused has been acquired by thejudicial authorities either by his arrest or voluntary surrender.

Our pronouncement in Santiago shows a distinction betweencustody of the law and jurisdiction over the person. Custodyof the law is required before the court can act upon theapplication for bail, but is not required for the adjudicationof other reliefs sought by the defendant where the mereapplication therefor constitutes a waiver of the defense of lack of jurisdiction over the person of the accused.

Onecan be under the custody of the law but not yet subject to thejurisdiction of the court over his person, such as when aperson arrested by virtue of a warrant files a motion beforearraignment to quash the warrant. On the other hand, onecan be subject to the jurisdiction of the court over hisperson, and yet not be in the custody of the law, such aswhen an accused escapes custody after his trial hascommenced.

Custody of the law is literally custody over thebody of the accused. It includes, but is not limited to,detention.

Therefore, in narrow cases involving special appearances, anaccused can invoke the processes of the court even though thereis neither jurisdiction over the person nor custody of the law.However, if a person invoking the special jurisdiction of the court applies for bail, he must first submit himself to the custody of thelaw.. If we allow the granting of bail to persons not in the custody of the law, it is foreseeable that many persons who can afford thebail will remain at large, and could elude being held to answer forthe commission of the offense if ever he is proven guilty. On theother hand, if we allow the quashal of warrants of arrest topersons not in the custody of the law, it would be very rare that aperson not genuinely entitled to liberty would remain scot-free.This is because it is the same judge who issued the warrant of arrest who will decide whether or not he followed theConstitution in his determination of probable cause, and he caneasily deny the motion to quash if he really did find probablecause after personally examining the records of the case.