On July 19th the Federal Minister for Education,
Zubaida Jalal announced in the National Assembly
that the government 'might' include in the
curriculum, Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah's
historic speech of August 11, 1947 made before
the members of the Constitution Assembly. If
carried through, this would be a significant
departure from the Pakistani State's earlier
policy. The State had ignored the speech, plus
challenged its veracity. The key operational part
of the speech read, "You are free to go to your
temples, you are free to go to your mosques or to
any other place of worship in this State of
Pakistan. You may belong to any religion or caste
or creed and that has nothing to do with the
business of the State. You will find that in the
course of time, Hindus will cease to be Hindus,
Muslims will cease to be Muslims, not in the
religious sense because that is the personal
faith of each individual but in the political
sense as citizen of the State."

MMA's parliamentary leader Qazi Hussain Ahmed did
not oppose the inclusion of the speech. He,
however, demanded inclusion of other speeches by
the Quaid in the curriculum. That is political
point scoring. Other speeches can be made
available for students to read. The August 11
speech is extraordinary. It enunciates the
character of, and a vision for, a just Muslim
State. It would treat all its citizens with
equality.

These are corrective and alteration times for
Pakistan. Not just of policies and institutions
but also of something more fundamental; the
State's own ideological moorings. The business of
ideology in Pakistan has never been an easy one;
as would have been the case for any State created
in the name of religion and one that subsequently
faced unending problems in state building, policy
formulation and political evolution. The earliest
warning on problems flowing from the State's
adhoc approach to ideology was documented in the
50s Munir Commission report. Tensions between
religious parties, which had opposed the creation
of Pakistan, and the State which constantly
undermined the evolution of democracy and also
leaned heavily on US support for its own stature,
prevented an informed and conclusive debate on
State ideology. In fact, the issues of
manipulation of Constitution, army in politics,
relationship between the federating units, a weak
judiciary and spineless Election Commission and
an ineffective police force, the unresolved
Kashmir issue, abiding insecurity vis-a-vis
India, the burning issue of Palestine and the
alliance with the US, all influenced and
distorted the debate on State and ideology.

The 70s power play between political parties and
the State institutions again defined the debate
and 'ideology' related decisions. The popularly
elected, brilliant, yet blundering politician
Prime Minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, when
confronted with a religious party - dominated
opposition nexus with the army, he sought refuge
in quick fix 'ideological' steps. The Prime
Minister under siege declared Qadianis as a
religious minority, introduced the religion
column in passports, announced ban on drinking
and declared his intension to enforce Sharia. The
problem was more with the way the politically
hounded Bhutto clutched these 'ideological'
measures for his survival, not the merits or
demerits of these measures. Ideology was reduced
to a tool for survival when the army-religious
parties attacked Bhutto with 'ideological'
weaponry. They promised to remove Bhutto and
enforce the Sharia. Quaid-e-Azam's legitimate
vision communicated in his August 11 speech was
again trashed. Political and power compulsions
were ascendant.

The 80s were much worse. Under General
Zia-ul-Haq's military dictatorship the symbols of
Islam were deployed for promoting, what the
dictator and his cabal concluded was in
Pakistan's national interest. After the 1979
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, religious fervour
and commitment were incorporated as important
tools in the jointly authored US and Pakistan
anti-Soviet policy. This incorporation led to the
militarisation of the otherwise multidimensional
concept of Jihad. The outcome was training and
recruiting for the anti-Soviet international
'jihad' students from the old and newly set up
madrasas, the indoctrination of these young minds
in the validity and piety of destruction of the
'other' and the creation of an international
Muslim brotherhood around the concept of armed
jihad and sheer hatred against occupiers of
Muslim lands (Afghanistan).

Clearly, in opting for this full-fledged
partnership, the responsibility of the Pakistani
State to protect the life, liberty and property
of its own citizens, became secondary. Saudis,
with their commitment to providing matching funds
for this international 'jihad' and their own
objective to stave off the political threat posed
by the revolutionary Islamic Republic of Iran,
lead to Saudi money pouring in to set up
madrassas in Pakistan. These were to help promote
the military objectives of the jihad and the
anti-Iranian ideological objectives. What emerged
as the Pakistan State's 'ideology' in the
eighties was convenient, yet domestically
destructive, which was largely reactive and
highly militarised.

Significantly, the corollary to this ideology on
the domestic front was Zia-ul-Haq's version of
Islamisation of State-controlled institutions,
including schools, judiciary, electronic media
and even certain dimensions of the armed forces.
The school curricula reflected intolerance and
sectarianism, while also undermining the overall
quality of the syllabus, highly controversial
laws like the Hudood Ordinance, law of evidence
and subsequently the Blasphemy Law were enacted.
These mutilated the essence of justice and fair
play promoted by Islam. In government offices
women were instructed to cover their head and
offerings of prayers was made obligatory.

As an extension of its international jihad
policy, the State patronised, promoted and
protected sectarian groups, who killed the
innocent and unprotected, at will. This then was
Pakistan's 'ideology' played out by the military
dictator. His legacy was cancerous intolerance
and a stifling hold of the State over the
individual's personal matter of religion. Within
sections of the armed forces too, a particular
interpretation of religion was institutionalised.
This was, as we subsequently discovered a
dangerous addition, to the perfectly plausible
supra-national Muslim consciousness that existed
in the armed forces of the Islamic Republic of
Pakistan. This new religious orientation
undermined the lynchpin that holds together the
armed forces - institutional discipline.

In the nineties, despite civilian rule, this
brand of Islamisation was not substantively
reviewed. The military still controlled and
influenced, directly and through its alliance
with religious parties, the militarised
infrastructure put in place in the eighties. This
fear of this establishment supported
infrastructure also prevented the weak and
incompetent political governments, from reviewing
disputed laws passed in the name of Islam. In
fact, Nawaz Sharif, himself, passed a
Constitutional amendment, seeking greater powers
for the Prime Minister to enforce Sharia. When
criticised, Nawaz Sharif had turned to the men
from religious seminaries and had urged them to
be his "army" for helping him implement Sharia.
During his last days, he had also invited a
religious scholar to come and give moral lessons
to his Cabinet. Meanwhile, Benazir Bhutto much
less prone to dabbling with controversial
ideological moves had also entered into a
political alliance with one of the sectarian
parties in Punjab.

The end of 1999 saw the return of military rule
and very little changed in the ideological ethos
of the State. General Pervez Musharraf personally
attempted revision in the implementation
procedure of the Blasphemy Law in 2000. He
rapidly retraced his steps when warned of a
religious backlash. In the year 2001, Musharraf
raised the impact of political extremism and
misdirected religious zeal on society. He raised
this during his address at the Seerat-ul-Nabi
Conference in mid 2001. Evidently, he did not
share the outlook dominating political, and often
religious, sections in the Muslim world that
enforced modesty and the 'chaardewari' for women
which was the best certificate of the
'muslimness' of a society. Musharraf proactively
promoted appointment of women to important
positions. Subsequently, 33% women were elected
to the local government across the country and
the number of women representatives in the
provincial and National Assembly, as well as in
the Senate was substantially increased.

However, it was not until post 9/11 that the
State of Pakistan controlled by military began a
roll-back on the three main fronts that it had
ironically promoted in the name of Islam, as a
result of Pakistan-US 'jihad' partnership. Now
when the post 9/11 US policy forced rollback on
the sub-state but state patronised
infrastructure, Islamabad began the rollback.
Gradually but definitively. Along with the
infrastructure, rollback on the problems with
curriculum and laws was also begun.

The Musharraf government has faced major
criticisms from different political sections in
Pakistan that argue that this entire roll back
and reform is Washington-led. That Washington has
sought this as undeniable. Yet, the more relevant
and compelling truth is
that it has long been Pakistan's own need,
articulated by groups like the Human Rights
Commission of Pakistan and individuals like
Khaled Ahmad that the State apparatus not be made
subservient to either a linear and static
approach to Islam, nor be hostage to any
individual interpretation of religion or national
interest.

At present, the debate around the Wana operation,
the reform in curriculum, changes in legislation
and introduction of laws against inhuman
practices like Karo Kari, is a positive
development. Facilitated by proliferation of
television channels, various contending views on
these issues expressed by politicians, the State,
peoples' organisations, including religious
scholars are being put forth. If backed by public
support these moves will have staying power. The
merits and demerits of these moves, established
against the touchstone of Islamic values and
humanism, through informed public will drain
vested interest and ignorance from the crucial
question of State and ideology in Pakistan.
Fortunately, on this issue the Pakistani State
has begun to re-orient itself; even if it's a
long and bumpy journey ahead.
_______

[2]

The Times of India
July 22, 2004, Op-Ed.

BEYOND IDEOLOGY: THE CASE AGAINST RSS GOVERNORS
Alok Rai

Thrown off-balance by Verdict 2004, the once
deputy prime minister of India is blustering with
threats of dire but unspecified consequences: The
Congress, he said, will have to pay a heavy price
for this! Well, the Congress can take care of
itself, but it behoves us as concerned citizens
to spend a little time with the matter that has
so exercised the hon'ble Mr Advani: The summary
dismissal of four RSS functionaries whom his
government had installed as provincial governors.

The sainted Mr Advani, projected as another
Sardar Patel from time to time, is seeking to
play Gandhi, positioning himself somewhere above
(and outside) Parliament from where he can
criticise the established legal order. But the
muttered threats diminish him cruelly into
something like a Hindu Jinnah.

Advani's affectations apart, the underlying issue
is not merely the technical one of whether the
president is legally right in dismissing the four
governors. It is the deeper moral question of
whether self-confessed RSS types should have been
- or should ever be - appointed to high offices
where they are in a position to pervert the
workings of the Constitution to which their
allegiance can only ever be tactical and
hypocritical. If not, then irrespective of Mr
Advani's posturings, the great wrong was that of
having appointed such people in the first place,
and we should be grateful for what the president
has done.

In the bad old days before the formation of the
NDA government, a lot of people who should have
known better, persuaded themselves that the
constraints of office would "normalise" the BJP.
In becoming a mainstream party, it would shed its
manic elements. There is a profound sense in
which the BJP has been "compromised" by its years
in office. There isn't much point in naming
names. Let us merely remember, just when Enron is
about to hit us with a Rs 26,000 crore bill, that
the statesman-like Mr V actually cleared the
second phase of the Enron project - having
rubbished it earlier - during the 13 days when he
was the prime minister in 1996, before
unsuccessfully seeking the initial vote of
confidence!

And yet, it is not the widespread corruption that
is the most worrying thing about these people.
Their demonstrated venality is what might even
delude us into accepting them as "normal",
muddled and corruptible - just like the rest of
us. The thing that puts them firmly beyond the
pale of constitutional politics is their
so-called "idealism", their carefully projected
air of sanctimonious virtue, their mealy-mouthed
saintliness.

The processes whereby the RSS manages to produce,
en masse, a certain kind of personality have not
received the academic attention they deserve. But
while the etiology and inner structure of this
kind of personality might be imperfectly
understood, we are familiar with its behaviours.
I refer not only to the bloodied foot-soldiers of
"Gujarat 2002", but rather to the perfumed
leaders who, with clean hands and clean
consciences, presided over this orgy of violence.
Not only the unmentionable Modi but also Mr
"Flip-flop" Vajpayee and Mr Advani. Two years
after those gruesome events, they still haven't
grasped the horror of what happened, and are
publicly concerned about whether the violence
lost or won elections for them, and consequently
whether or not it was something they should
apologise for, or boast about.

This question - How do they do it? - has a direct
bearing on the matter of the dismissed governors.
My own sense of it is that the RSS, after the
manner of similar organisations, creates in its
cadres an area of self where merely human
considerations no longer apply. It has been
supposed, simplistically, that the demonising of
the Muslim is an end in RSS ideology. My sense of
it is that the "demonised Muslim" is merely the
means whereby a trans-moral personality is
created. It is of the essence of this kind of
"engineered" personality that it is, in most
respects, normal, and sometimes even rather
refined. (The case of the concentration camp
commandant who returned to Wagner and Bach after
a hard day at the gas chambers is legendary.) The
area of self functions as a secure and privileged
enclave, beyond the reach of rational argument,
and the cries of human pain and suffering. The
merely human being, once possessed of
self-hypnotising, dogmatic certainties, and
absolved of moral responsibility, is rendered
into pure will, an instrument of history, or the
nation, or the Aryan ideal.

It seems merely an elementary precaution to
exclude such worthies from every office that
requires an explicit fidelity to the Constitution
of India. It cannot be argued that theirs is an
ideology just like any other - because if mere
ideological affiliation were a disqualification,
then Khurana and even Nawal Kishore Sharma should
have been excluded. But the RSS is not, as they
themselves routinely declare, a political party
with a particular ideology - it is a secret
society. And whatever little has filtered out
about the aims of this secret society, it aims at
nothing less than subverting the liberal and
secular Constitution of India. Can it now claim
the protection of a liberal order that it seeks,
day in and day out, to pervert and malign?

_____

[3]

21 July 2004

WHITHER GENDER PARITY?
WOMEN AND THE PATRIARCHAL VALUES TODAY

Ram Puniyani

The Muslim Personal Law boardís meeting gave the hope
that it will abolish triple talaq, will take a step
towards justice for Muslim women. But that was not to
be. While there are multiple factors coming in the way
of reform in Muslim personal laws, things are not too
bright for Hindu women as well. The rise of politics
in the name of religion has created an atmosphere
where the social relations, the one between men and
women, between upper caste and dalits are going in a
reverse gear.

There are multiple glaring instances, which have
happened during last few months, which force one to
think as to where are we heading for as far as gender
parity is concerned. We did hear about many cases of
honor killing in Pakistan during last few years. Cases
where the male relatives of the women killed them as
they decided to choose their own life partners against
the wishes of their men folk, father, brother etc are
on the rise. This abominable practice was heard of and
one understands has been prevalent in Pakistani
society. While one had heard of two cases of women
being burnt alive as Sati, and than glorified by the
family. Sati was a custom against which reformers like
Ram Mohun Roy struggled in the late Nineteenth
century. Cases of its occurrence in late Twentieth
century did shake the conscience of most of us. While
a large number of people condemned it, there were
people who came up with the concept of Rani Sati
temples to ëhonorí this custom. Of all the condemnable
reactions which took place in the wake of Roop Kanwar
being burnt, the worst of course was the protest march
taken out by the then Vice President of Bhartiya
Janata Party, Mrs. Vijaya Raje Scindia, a widow
herself. This march which was taken to the Parliament,
the highest law making body in the country, had the
slogan that to commit sati is not only the glorious
tradition of Hindu women, its their right also. This
march was meant to stall the legal measures, which
were being contemplated to prevent such incidents in
future.

One and a half decades down the line, things are no
better. If at all new forms of womenís oppression are
coming up. The worst amongst them being the
replication of honor killing, the practice which one
was hearing of in Mullah dominated Pakistan. Somewhere
in March 2004, a young man killed his sister and
brother in law in Thane. After being arrested for the
crime he gloriously proclaimed that his sister had
married against the wishes of the family so he
undertook this crime and that he is proud of what he
did. Somewhere in June 2004, a boy killed his sister
in Nagpur. The girl apparently was talking to her
boyfriend on phone. She had made up her mind to marry
him. Her decision to marry the boy of her liking was
not approved of by the family, i.e. father and
brother, and so in the rage of anger the boy killed
his own sister.

The latest issue (July 2004) of a national
Newsmagazine reports a speech by none other than the
Chief Minister of Madhya Pradesh, the firebrand Uma
Bahrati. As per the report, RSS ideologue
Govindacharya had proposed to her through Mr. Advani.
She apparently was favorable to the proposal. She
sought permission from her brother for this. Her
brother, Swami Lodi, did not approve of the alliance
so she rejected the proposal and took Sanyas. Why the
all-powerful person of the stature of Uma Bahrati has
to get the nod of her brother for marrying the person
of her choice.

The rising occurrence of incidents of girl being
either denied permission to marry the person of her
choice or being killed because she exercises the
option and goes ahead, is reflective of the deeper
cultural rot which is setting in the society due to
the rise of politics in the name of religion. The
ideology of this politics is based on the pre-modern
feudal values. Feudal society, where the nexus of
landlord and priest ruled the roost in the society,
was founded on the hierarchical notions of caste and
gender. In this scheme of things the supremacy of
Landlord is unquestionable as he had the divine power.
And it was the priesthood, cutting across different
religions, which propagated and upheld these values.
According to this in European society the serf was
bonded to the land and the feudal lord was the
controller of his life.

In India, the things were parallel but different. Here
there was no centralized Church, but the local
alliance between the landlord and the priest served
the same purpose. In Maharashtra this alliance goes by
the popular name of Shetji-Bhatji (Landlord-Brahmin).
In this scheme of things the peasant the Shudra was
tied to the land, was himself a semi property of the
landlord, so could not own his property. As far the
woman is concerned, the pattern in most of the
geographical locations and in the prevalent norms in
most religious communities was the same. Its that
woman is the property of man. So obviously a property
in turn cannot own a property herself. She needed
protection and in turn control. In her childhood this
control is the prerogative of father, during adult
life that of husband and in old age in case of
husbands death its son or another male relative who is
the controlling authority. In one of the colloquial
languages a word is used for women, Trimmat, the one
guided by opinions of three persons, depending on the
stage of her life.

Secularization process breaks the authority of
landlord not only on land but also of his control
over, serf, shudra, who now is an independent
landowner, land to the tiller, if that takes place. At
times guillotine, at times revolutions brought to end
this divine power of landlords and Kings. Bhudan
(donation of land) or halfhearted land reforms could
not end this hegemony totally. As far as women are
concerned, the introduction of education, and their
entry into social space should have abolished the
concept that woman is the property of man. One hears
of the word Kanyadan, donating of daughter, at the
time of marriage. There is nothing like Putradan
(donating of son) as an equivalent. As son is the
recipient of the property. Husbands in many
traditions are addressed as Master, Dhani, and Swami
etc.

The process of transition of women from property,
controlled subjects to the people in their own rights
began and Savitribai Phule is the major initiator in
this direction. The coming times saw the emergence of
the likes of Pandita Ramabai, Anandi Gopal etc. who
took extreme pains to come out of the shackles of
patriarchal control. Indiaís freedom movement also saw
a great participation of women in the struggle for
freedom. As Indiaís secularization process was not
complete the remnants of it kept hierarchical values
alive even after independence. The Indian Constitution
did accept the total equality of caste and gender. But
can any deprived section get its rights just for
asking. No way. A struggle to get oneís social and
political goals is the only way to get it. The laws
and constitution provide the ground on which such
struggles can stand and march ahead.

It is likely that these tendencies became stronger in
Pakistan after the Mullah influenced changes brought
in by Zia Ul Haq in early eighties. In India the rise
of the social power of Hindutva around the same time
has given a fillip to the retrograde values as far as
gender is concerned. At this point, Hindutva defends
the subjugation of women as a political agenda. For
that matter any politics, which goes on in the name of
religion, does the same. Hindutva ideology is joined
in this arena by Post modernists, the ilk of Ashish
Nandyís, who will come forward to defend these
traditions, closing their eyes to the social
relations, to the notions of hierarchy. The question
is not just whether Uma Bharati can marry the person
of her choice or not, the question is a broader one.
And it pertains to the surge of politics, which aims
to suppress the human rights of weaker sections of
society. The question pertains to the abuse of the
emotions associated with religion for the sake of
power. One hopes that the cases of honor killings
reported around are the last oneís. One hopes that
rather than asserting that women were worshipped in
Ancient India (! before they were consigned to the
ëholyí flames of her husbands funeral pyre) one comes
to recognize that women are equal citizens, equal in
social rights and both genders have to have parity in
all matters of our social and political existence.

We were greatly disturbed to see report in Indian
Express today i.e. 16 July 2004, that in Uttar
Pradesh Class XI' s textbook the following
passage occurs

"The place where Babri mosque is situated at
present was the birth place of Shri Ram. A temple
existed there for centuries which was disfigured
by Babar to build the mosque at the same site.
The mosque that now been razed while recovery of
artifacts below that site during excavation has
proved the existence of a temple at the site,"
says the history text, Bharat Ka Vrahad Itihas,
on page number 296. This passage was included in
2003 after excavation was carried out at the
instance of Allahabad High Court.

To say the least, this is patently false & no
such false information should be given to the
students and communalise their minds. May we
request you to kindly get this passage removed
from the textbook immediately. Under your secular
government such textbooks should not be
prescribed. We will be highly obliged if an early
action is taken and we are informed about it.

The Times of India
JOSHI 'FORGETS' TO RETURN ICHR'S FREEDOM FILES
Akshaya Mukul
TIMES NEWS NETWORK[ THURSDAY, JULY 22, 2004 05:36:42 AM ]
NEW DELHI: Twelve confidential files related to
the prestigious "Towards Freedom" project of the
Indian Council of Historical Research taken by
former HRD minister Murli Manohar Joshi on March
9, 2000, have gone missing.

The files, No. 18-30/72-ICHR/Admn.I in three
parts, each containing 170, 210 and 131 pages,
were never retur-ned despite a reminder by
IC-HR's then member-secretary R C Agrawal to
Joshi's PS Al-ok Tandon on August 19, 2002. The
matter has been brought to the notice of new
dispensation in the HRD ministry and search for
the files is on.

The issue of the missing files resurfaced
recently when ICHR chairperson D N Tripathi, a
Joshi appoi-ntee, wanted to revive the "Towards
Freedom" project and asked for the files only to
be told these are missing for five long years.

Much to Joshi's chagrin, Tripathi has asked the
officiating member-secretary A K Ambasth to
recover the files. He says Joshi's office had no
business to keep files of an autonomous body for
so long and not return them despite a reminder.
"Unfortunately all this happened in the earlier
regime," Tripathi told TNN over phone from
Gorakhpur.

According to him, the files of autonomous bodies
are never kept by the administrative ministry. At
best, these co-uld be shown to the ministry.

ICHR records show Joshi aske-d for the files
wh-en there was a controversy about "Towards
Freedom" project. Two years later in 2002, the
project was back in news since a three-member
panel was set up to look into the volumes edited
by historians Sumit Sarkar and K N Panikkar.
Joshi promised Parliament to come up with a white
paper on the project.

ICHR's general council entrusted the job of
prep-aring the white paper to Devendra Swarup, an
RSS functionary, Joshi's favo-urite and one-time
history lecturer.

______

[6]

Ahmedabad Newsline / Indian Express
July 21, 2004

'A POLICEMAN CANNOT BE DISALLOWED FROM RETAINING
HIS RELIGION WHEN HE'S ON DUTY. THIS HAPPENS EVEN
IN PARLIAMENT HOUSE AND IN THE ARMED FORCES'

MEN IN KHAKI PROUDLY WEAR HINDU IDENTITY ON THEIR SLEEVES

Anand S T Das

Ahmedabad, July 20: At the Naroda Police
Station, in a corner of Senior Inspector V.S.
Gohil's chamber is a mini temple. There are idols
and pictures of Hindu gods and goddesses on a
shelf. Garlands, flowers, and agarbattis indicate
there is daily puja.

Gohil readily admits as much. He says he's
religious, of course, and is bewildered that
anyone should question the elaborate ''puja
sthal'' with fairy lights inside his chamber.

''Being a police officer does not mean that I
cease to be a Hindu,'' he said. ''What's wrong
with this?''

The army recently initiated a drive to emphasise
its secular character by asking staff on duty not
to sport signs of their religion on their person
or display them in offices and vehicles. And in
most states, police stations are discouraged from
displaying religious pictures or idols.

But things are evidently different with police in
Gujarat. The men are in khaki. If it weren't for
their nameplates - many don't even have them -
there's no way you'd know their religion. There
should be no need, either. But chances are that
as you step into any police station in Ahmedabad,
you can't help feeling that the force is Hindu
first.

At the Vejalpur Police Station, two large, framed
pictures of Goddess Durga and Lord Shiva on a
wall. Beneath them is the table at which an
assistant sub-inspector sits.

And at the police chowki in Juhapura,
Sub-Inspector G.P. Rathore's room has a wooden
niche with a picture of Goddess Durga in it.

If Naroda is the place where Muslims were burnt
alive in the post-Godhra riots while the police
allegedly stood watching, the Vejalpur-Juhapura
area has a sizable Muslim population.

But Director-General of Police A.K. Bhargava
seemed sure of himself when he said that ''no
Muslim visiting a police station to lodge a
complain feels frightened because of these
pictures and idols. They know that a policeman
remains a policeman despite being a Hindu.''

Like him, most inspectors in charge of police
stations said there's nothing wrong with the
practice. Some seemed proud of the fact. And some
said there was nothing in the police manual to
prevent it.

''All this doesn't reflect any pro-Hindu bias,''
said Senior Inspector N.K. Desai of Khadia Police
Station. ''We have the gods around because we
seek their blessings for greater efficiency in
our daily work as policemen. This is not to show
we are Hindus.''

Like Desai's police station, those at Satellite,
Navrangpura, Kalupur, Khadia, Sola, Shardanagar,
Meghaninagar, and other areas too bear
unmistakable Hindu identities, with pictures or
puja sthals where worship is regular. Even police
vans have pictures of Hindu deites. The practice,
say those who have been in the force for long,
has always been there but has grown in the last
few years. But police chief Bhargava said he
wouldn't initiate any move to end it.

''There's no need to rake up an issue that has no
significance,'' he said. ''Policemen who are
Hindus have a right to worship their gods and
goddesses. If they do it at the police station,
what's wrong? A policeman cannot be disallowed
from retaining his religion when he's on duty.
This happens even in Parliament house and in the
armed forces.''

Reminded of the army's recent directive, he said:
''This is not the first time they're trying to do
it. Have they been able to stop it?''

But there are former police chiefs who think
otherwise. Said S.N. Sinha, who retired as DGP in
1996, ''This is an undesirable trend and should
be strictly discouraged.''

And C.P. Singh, who was DGP from 1999 to 2001,
said, ''This trend was present in a subdued
fashion for decades, but has grown recently,
particularly in the last two years. The police
force should be absolutely professional and
secular - in looks and practice.''

______

[7]

The Times of India, July 22, 2004
Families of 'disappeared' persons seek justice

AMRITSAR: Families of those who mysteriously
disappeared during the days of militancy
submitted affidavits about their relatives at a
camp organised by the Khalra Mission Committee on
Wednesday.

Many such persons had been 'killed by the police
in fake encounters and their bodies cremated,
describing them as unidentified.' The National
Human Rights Commission had issued a public
notice that about 2,097 persons had allegedly
been killed in encounters by the police. Their
bodies were cremated in the crematoriums of
Durgiana Temple, Amritsar, Tarn Taran and Patti.
Paramjit Kaur Khalra, committee chairperson and
wife of Jaswant Singh, who 'disappeared' in 1995,
said the affidavits would be submitted to the
NHRC. Sukhdev Singh of Pakhoke village said that
his younger brother Jaspal Singh, a journalist,
"went missing' 10 years ago. He said he arrived
at the camp after reading the NHRC advertisement.

Gurbant Singh of Wadala Kalan said that his son
was picked up by the police but never returned
home. He said later they came to know that his
body was cremated as unclaimed. He said he was
too poor to plead the case.

______

[8]

The newly-established Centre for Studies on
Indian Muslims, at the Department of Islamic
Studies, Hamdard University, New Delhi, invites
you to a talk by Dr. Anna Bigelow on 'Shared
Shrines and Inter-Communal Relations in
Malerkotla, Punjab'.

[Malerkotla is the only town in Indian Punjab
where Muslims remain in sizeable numbers. Dr.
Bigelow, Assistant Professor of Religious Studies
at the North Carolina State University, USA, has
done her Ph.D. on Malerkotla, focussing
particularly on relations between the town's
Muslim, Sikh, Hindu and Dalit communities]

Buzz on the perils of fundamentalist politics, on
matters of peace and democratisation in South
Asia. SACW is an independent & non-profit
citizens wire service run since 1998 by South
Asia Citizens Web: www.sacw.net/
The complete SACW archive is available at:
bridget.jatol.com/pipermail/sacw_insaf.net/

South Asia Counter Information Project a sister
initiative, provides a partial back -up and
archive for SACW: snipurl.com/sacip
See also associated site: www.s-asians-against-nukes.org

DISCLAIMER: Opinions expressed in materials carried in the posts do not
necessarily reflect the views of SACW compilers.

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