How to Think About the New Middle East

Secretary of State John Kerry’s efforts to produce a cease-fire may not have succeeded in bringing the current conflict in Gaza to an end, but they have generated plenty of commentary. Kerry has been lacerated in the Israeli press, even in ostensibly sympathic outlets like the left-wing Haaretz, which headlined a scathing article on his diplomatic endeavors “What was he thinking?” For understandable reasons, the secretary sought to bring the killing to an end, reflecting not only a humanitarian impulse but also President Obama’s instructions, which required him “to push for an immediate cessation of hostilities based on a return to the November 2012 cease-fire agreement between Israel and Hamas.”

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While perhaps logical, the president’s guidance failed to take account of several new realities. First, the 2012 agreement had done nothing to prevent Hamas from building up an elaborate network of tunnels to launch rockets and infiltrate Israel—and Israel is not about to live with tunnels that penetrate the country and constitute, in the words of one Israeli, “a loaded gun at our heads.” Second, this is a different Egypt today, under President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, and it views Hamas as a threat rather than a potential ally. It has no interest in saving Hamas or allowing it to gain from the current conflict. Third, the Saudis, Emiratis and Jordanians see the Muslim Brotherhood, the Islamist group from which Hamas sprang, as just as threatening as Iran. Like Egypt, these moderate Arab states want to see Hamas lose and not win.

These new realities also help to explain why Hamas launched this round of fighting: It was isolated and in desperate shape financially. Egypt had cut off the smuggling tunnels from Sinai into Gaza, which accounted for most of Hamas’ revenues. Hamas’ other main source of funding, the Iranians, has dried up given differences over the Syrian conflict and Iran’s other priorities. Hamas expected that its reconciliation agreement with the Palestinian Authority would lead to the PA picking up Hamas’ financial obligations. But the PA would not do so, and Hamas could not pay salaries. With little to lose, Hamas launched this round of fighting, hoping that by being the focal point of resistance, winning sympathy because of large Palestinian civilian casualties, and imposing at least some losses on Israel, it could re-emerge as a player that must be dealt with and satisfied.

That cynical strategy, at a minimum, requires that Hamas gain something out of the conflict, and its only advocates are Turkey and Qatar. But this is a different Middle East than it was in 2012, when Egypt was ruled by the Muslim Brotherhood and Islamists seemed to be marching across the region. Today, Israel, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the Emirates and Jordan share the common goal of weakening Hamas. The Palestinian Authority shares this objective, but as Palestinian casualties increase in Gaza, its leader, Mahmoud Abbas, finds himself in an impossible position: He, too, is desperate to have the fighting stop but can ill afford for Hamas to emerge as the symbolic victor.

No doubt, the Obama administration recognized what was happening to Abbas and saw the rising tensions on the West Bank and the terrible civilian toll in Gaza, and hoped it could bring the conflict to an end. Once Hamas rejected Egypt’s first cease-fire proposal, and Egypt was largely passive, the Obama team seems to have believed that Turkey and Qatar might be able to use their respective influence with Hamas to produce a cease-fire.

Dennis Ross is counselor and William Davidson Distinguished Fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, and professor in the practice of diplomacy at Georgetown University. He served as special assistant to President Barack Obama from 2009-11.