Force de dissuasion

"Force de frappe" redirects here. For other uses of frappe, see Frappé.

This article is missing information about individual French nuclear tests, despite the fact that French nuclear testing redirects here. Please expand the article to include this information. Further details may exist on the talk page.(December 2012)

France deactivated all landbased nuclear missiles. On 27 January 1996, France conducted its last nuclear test (in the South Pacific) before signing the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) in September 1996. In March 2008, PresidentNicolas Sarkozy confirmed reports giving the actual size of France's nuclear arsenal and he announced that France will reduce its French Air Force-carried nuclear arsenal by 30%, leaving the Force de Frappe with 290 warheads.[2] In addition to its nuclear military programme, France has a large peaceful nuclear programme and ranks as one of the world's largest generators of nuclear power.

The decision to arm France with nuclear weapons was made in 1954 by the administration of Pierre Mendès-France under the Fourth Republic.[3]PresidentCharles de Gaulle, upon his return to power in 1958, solidified the initial vision into the well-defined concept of a fully independent Force de Frappe capable of protecting France from a Soviet or other foreign attack, independent of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, which President de Gaulle considered to be dominated by the United States to an unacceptable degree. In particular, France was concerned that in the event of a Soviet invasion of Western Europe, the US—already bogged down in the War in Vietnam and afraid of Soviet retaliation against the United States proper—would not come to the aid of its Allies in Western Europe. According to de Gaulle, France should never trust its defense and therefore its very existence to a foreign and thus unreliable protector.[1]

The strategic concept behind the Force de Frappe is one of countervalue, i.e., the capacity to inflict so much damage on a potential (and more powerful) adversary's population that it will be deterred from attacking (see Mutual Assured Destruction). This principle is usually referred to in French political debate as dissuasion du faible au fort (Weak-to-strong deterrence) and was summarized in a statement attributed to President de Gaulle himself:

Within ten years, we shall have the means to kill 80 million Russians. I truly believe that one does not light-heartedly attack people who are able to kill 80 million Russians, even if one can kill 800 million French, that is if there were 800 million French.[4]

General Pierre Marie Gallois said "Making the most pessimistic assumptions, the French nuclear bombers could destroy ten Russian cities; and France is not a prize worthy of ten Russian cities." [5]

In his book La paix nucléaire (1975), French NavyAdmiral de Joybert explained deterrence as:

Sir, I have no quarrel with you, but I warn you in advance and with all possible clarity that if you invade me, I shall answer at the only credible level for my scale, which is the nuclear level. Whatever your defenses, you shan't prevent at least some of my missiles from reaching your home and causing the devastation that you are familiar with. So, renounce your endeavour and let us remain good friends.[6]

While not referred to as such, the French nuclear posture of the time bears some significant similarities to other common policies of the era such as Mutually Assured Destruction and Massive Retaliation. It remains unknown whether the French government ever seriously considered their policy different from other NATO member strategies, or if their public statements were more aimed to improve morale and confidence in the French population. Certainly France's position in the 1960s and 70's required some changes in posture. After the French withdrawal from the integrated command structure of NATO to pursue their own defense systems, their position with their NATO allies was less clear. Equally both the French government and the French public took pride in their independence from US control and their ability to defend their own interests without NATO aid, even against the Warsaw Pact if necessary. As a result statements of nuclear policy spoke of a confrontation with Russia directly and without allied support, even though this was hugely unlikely as France remained in NATO. However no matter the scenario it would have been extremely impolitic for France to imply they wouldn't join a wider NATO war (instead waiting for a threat on their own soil) or to say that they would use nuclear weapons against West Germany, Italy or Belgium; the only places where Soviet forces could be advancing on France from. It may seem on the surface that an avowed policy of attacking civilians was a significant departure from the typical nuclear policies of the time, but it was not uncommon for states to refer to their nuclear abilities in terms of numbers of cities destroyed, and given the power of hydrogen bombs it is unclear how different attacks on populations and military forces would be in practice. Perhaps the most significant difference in French strategy is that it includes the option of a first strike attack even in response to non-nuclear provocation.

President de Gaulle's vision of the Force de Frappe featured the same triad of air-based, land-based and sea-based weapons deployed by both the United States and the Soviet Union. Work on these components had started in the late 1950s and was accelerated as soon as de Gaulle became the President of France.

In May 1956 a requirement for what became the Dassault Mirage IV bomber was drawn up;[5] this bomber was designed to carry AN-11 nuclear gravity bombs over targets in the Eastern bloc at supersonic speeds and was declared operational in October 1964. It has been modernized since then and converted to carry its successor the AN-22 bomb. The Mirage IV-P version was later armed with the ASMP missile and entered service in 1986. All bomber versions of the Mirage IV retired in 1996.

From 1973 until 2003 the CFAS also operated SEPECAT Jaguars which were limited nuclear capable by using the tactical AN-52 nuclear bomb which were certified for supersonic flight. A total of 100 were built between 1972-1982. They were compatible with modified Mirage III fighters and later with the standard Jaguar. The Mirage 2000 was in theory capable of carrying it but never did. The AN-52's were deactivated and placed into storage in 1991.

The Mirage 2000N entered service from 1988 and is capable of carrying gravity bombs, the ASMP and the new longer-ranged ASMP-A missile which entered service 2009. The Mirage 2000N is being replaced by the Dassault Rafale F3 as of 2011.

Since the French military judged that a full-scale invasion of Western Europe by the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact Allies was unlikely to be stopped by conventional armaments, these short-range nuclear missiles were meant as a "final warning" (ultime avertissement in French) which would tell the aggressor that any further advances would trigger a nuclear armageddon upon its major cities and other important targets.

The Pluton missile, introduced in 1974, was retired from service and scrapped beginning in 1993 and its successor, the Hadès missile, was produced in limited numbers during the early 1990s and then withdrawn from the Army and placed in arsenal storage in 1995. Next, the French Government decided to eliminate all of these missiles and the last Hadès was dismantled on 23 June 1997. That was the end of the French mobile land-based nuclear missiles.

The French fixed S3 IRBMs at the Plateau d'Albion, were considered to be approaching obsolescence and also deemed to be no longer necessary following the fall of the Soviet Union, were also disposed of. The silos have been imploded and the missile base closed 1999, eliminating the landbased missile leg of the French nuclear triad.

Since then, the ocean-based French nuclear weapons arsenal has been expanded to a squadron of 4 submarines, 1 of which is always on patrol.[8] Since 1985, some of the French ballistic missile subs have become obsolete. These subs have been retired and replaced by newer subs that also have 16 missile tubes apiece and carry the more advanced French M45 missile. A new submarine, the Le Terrible, was put into service on 20 September 2010, armed with the M51 missile, which is similar to the US Trident II.

France no longer possesses land-based nuclear missiles. The IRBM base at the Plateau d'Albion (Vaucluse region) was deactivated in 1999 and its missiles scrapped. All French Army units equipped with short-range missiles such as the Pluton and the Hadès were disbanded, their missiles scrapped and their fissile nuclear materials recycled.

The locations of the nuclear missiles are secret (although many storage facilities are already known to the public, the number of warheads inside is classified and changes frequently). Range of strike aircraft is extended to long range currently by the KC-135 and in the future by the forthcoming Airbus A330 MRTTaerial refueling fleet.

(French) Jean-Hugues Oppel, Réveillez le président !, Éditions Payot et rivages, 2007 (ISBN 978-2-7436-1630-4). The book is a fiction about the nuclear weapons of France; the book also contains about ten chapters on true historical incidents involving nuclear weapons and strategy (during the second half of the twentieth century).