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Joint Publication 3-13.

2

Psychological Operations

07 January 2010

PREFACE
1. Scope

This publication provides guidance for the planning, execution, and assessment of psychological operations in support of joint, multinational, and interagency activities across the range of military operations. 2. Purpose

This publication has been prepared under the direction of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS). It sets forth joint doctrine to govern the activities and performance of the Armed Forces of the United States in joint operations and provides the doctrinal basis for interagency coordination and for US military involvement in multinational operations. It provides military guidance for the exercise of authority by combatant commanders and other joint force commanders (JFCs) and prescribes joint doctrine for operations, education, and training. It provides military guidance for use by the Armed Forces in preparing their appropriate plans. It is not the intent of this publication to restrict the authority of the JFC from organizing the force and executing the mission in a manner the JFC deems most appropriate to ensure unity of effort in the accomplishment of the overall objective. 3. Application

a. Joint doctrine established in this publication applies to the Joint Staff, commanders of combatant commands, subunified commands, joint task forces, subordinate components of these commands, and the Services. b. The guidance in this publication is authoritative; as such, this doctrine will be followed except when, in the judgment of the commander, exceptional circumstances dictate otherwise. If conflicts arise between the contents of this publication and the contents of Service publications, this publication will take precedence unless the CJCS, normally in coordination with the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has provided more current and specific guidance. Commanders of forces operating as part of a multinational (alliance or coalition) military command should follow multinational doctrine and procedures ratified by the United States. For doctrine and procedures not ratified by the United States, commanders should evaluate and follow the multinational command’s doctrine and procedures, where applicable and consistent with US law, regulations, and doctrine. For the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

Clarified the role of psychological operations (PSYOP) in relation to information operations, public affairs, strategic communication, and irregular warfare Emphasized specific missions performed by joint PSYOP forces Provided key considerations for effective joint PSYOP Explained the role of US Special Operations Command and US Joint Forces Command as it relates to exercising combatant command (command authority) over PSYOP forces Enhanced the discussion for the requirement to establish a joint psychological operations task force Redefined the term “propaganda” to clarify employment by the adversary Introduced the concepts of civil authority information support and military information support Clarified the legal authorities for the conduct of psychological operations Clarified the approval process for PSYOP programs and the process for delegation of product approval and dissemination Clarified how PSYOP support the special operations core tasks Identified the lettering change in the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System, Volume II, as it pertains to the PSYOP tab Improved Appendix A, “Capabilities,” to better explain Service capabilities to support achievement of US national objectives by using organic assets for production and dissemination of PYSOP products

Overview The need to consistently integrate all instruments of national power has increased. In today’s complex and rapidly evolving information environments, the need to integrate all instruments of national power has taken on increased relevance to sustain operational success. In the operational environment, effective influence is gained by consistency between what we say and do, and how well we understand and respond to our audience. Within the military and informational instruments of national power, the Department of Defense (DOD) is a key component of a broader United States Government (USG) communications strategy. To be effective, all DOD communications efforts must inherently support the credibility, veracity, and legitimacy of USG activities. The specific purpose of psychological operations (PSYOP) is to influence foreign audience perceptions and subsequent behavior as part of approved programs in support of USG policy and military objectives. PSYOP professionals follow a deliberate process that aligns commander’s objectives with an analysis of the

Department of Defense (DOD) is a key component of United States Government (USG) communications strategy.

Purpose of psychological operations (PSYOP).

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Executive Summary environment; select relevant target audiences (TAs); develop focused, culturally, and environmentally attuned messages and actions; employ sophisticated media delivery means and produce observable, measurable behavioral responses. PSYOP is employed across the range of military operations. PSYOP forces operate across the range of military operations. PSYOP that are continuously planned and assessed contribute significantly to the success of both peacetime engagements and major operations. PSYOP are governed by explicit legal authorities that direct and determine how the capability is utilized. Policy makers develop realistic and relevant policies that are within the capabilities of PSYOP to support. DOD policy, for instance, addresses the intent of the organization, guides decisionmaking, and prompts action to integrate PSYOP into military operations and other USG strategies. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the combatant commanders (CCDRs) refer to national strategies as they establish guidance that provides the necessary strategic direction for employment of PSYOP. Joint PSYOP activities span all levels of war and support policy and commanders’ objectives from strategic to tactical levels. When conducted at the strategic level, PSYOP are designed to support USG departments and agencies, geographic combatant commands, or multinational partners. PSYOP activities conducted at the operational level generally support the implementation of regional policies and military plans. Tactical PSYOP activities normally are conducted in support of local military or civil authorities. In conflict, PSYOP as a force multiplier can degrade the enemy’s relative combat power, reduce civilian interference, minimize collateral damage and maximize the local populace’s support for operations. Early planning and employment of PSYOP forces will maximize the potential to influence foreign audiences within the area of interest. PSYOP require sustained application, as part of a broader USG communication strategy. PSYOP are a critical component in all phases

Policy governs DOD PSYOP.

National strategies provide key guidance.

Joint PSYOP span all levels of war.

PSYOP is employed as a force multiplier.

PSYOP require sustained application across all phases of an operation.

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Executive Summary and in some phases may be the joint force commander’s (JFC) main effort. PSYOP are synchronized with all other force activities. The synchronization of PSYOP with all other actions of the US and multinational forces precludes messages or actions at one level from contradicting or weakening the effectiveness at another. To maximize TA receptivity to PSYOP, planning should incorporate the use of indigenous resources, key communicators, and dissemination platforms as soon as operationally feasible. Quantifiable and timely assessment criteria to determine measures of effectiveness (MOEs) are required for every PSYOP campaign.

PSYOP incorporates indigenous resources.

Criteria to assess PSYOP effectiveness must be established.

Roles, Responsibilities, and Relationships Planning guidance for combatant commanders. The Unified Command Plan and Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) provide direction and guidance to CCDRs concerning joint operation planning and their respective responsibilities. DOD information activities include information operations (IO), PSYOP (as a core capability of IO), public affairs (PA) (to include visual information), and defense support to public diplomacy (DSPD). Strategic communication (SC) integrates various instruments of national power with other activities across the USG to synchronize crucial themes, messages, images, and actions. PSYOP are the key capability that supports SC by influencing foreign audiences in support of US objectives. IO is the integrated employment of the core capabilities of electronic warfare (EW), computer network operations (CNO), PSYOP, military deception (MILDEC), and operations security (OPSEC), in concert with supporting and related capabilities to influence, disrupt, corrupt, or usurp adversarial human and automated decisionmaking while protecting our own. As a core capability of IO, PSYOP play a central role in the achievement of the JFC’s information objectives through its ability to induce or

PSYOP are part of DOD’s information activities.

PSYOP support strategic communication.

PSYOPare a core capability of information operations (IO).

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Executive Summary reinforce adversary attitudes and behavior favorable to these objectives. The IO cell chief. In order to ensure all aspects of IO are properly integrated and synchronized into the combatant command planning process, an IO cell chief is chosen. This cell chief convenes meetings of the IO cell periodically in order to facilitate the integration of core, supporting, and related capabilities. Within the IO cell, the PSYOP representative integrates, coordinates, deconflicts, and synchronizes the use of PSYOP with other IO capabilities. CNO support PSYOP with dissemination assets to include interactive Internet activities. CNO activities can deny or degrade an adversary’s ability to access, report, and process information. PSYOP create and reinforce MILDEC actions that are executed to deliberately mislead adversary military decisionmakers about US military capabilities, intentions, and operations. MILDEC operations that integrate PSYOP targeting provide the JFC with the ability to influence the adversary to take specific actions (or inactions) giving the joint force the advantage. It is essential that PSYOP plans and messages are protected prior to execution through the proper use of information security, information assurance, physical security, and OPSEC. EW platforms provide a means of disseminating PSYOP messages and shaping the information environment through the electronic dissemination of PSYOP products. EW validates the assessment of PSYOP effectiveness by providing information on threat responses to broadcasts. PA and PSYOP activities are separate and distinct, but they must support and reinforce each other, which requires coordination, synchronization, and occasionally deconfliction. JFCs must ensure that appropriate coordination between PSYOP and PA activities are consistent with the DOD Principles of Information, policy or statutory limitation, and security.

PSYOP are supported by computer network operations.

PSYOP support military deception.

PSYOP actions are protected with security precautions.

Electronic warfare support PSYOP.

Public affairs and PSYOP, although are discrete efforts, support each other.

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Executive Summary

Command And Control US Special Operations Command and US Joint Forces Command. In accordance with Secretary of Defense (SecDef) and Forces for Unified Commands Assignment Tables, Commander, United States Special Operations Command (CDRUSSOCOM) exercises combatant command (command authority) (COCOM) over all Active Component PSYOP forces. Commander, US Joint Forces Command (CDRUSJFCOM) exercises COCOM over all assigned Reserve Component (RC) PSYOP forces once they are activated. When directed by SecDef, the CDRUSSOCOM or CDRUSJFCOM transfers PSYOP forces to geographic combatant commanders (GCCs). When these forces are transferred, the command relationship of the gaining commander (and the losing commander will relinquish) over those forces must be specified; in most cases that will be operational control (OPCON). Commanders centralize PSYOP planning combatant command due to its importance commander’s strategic concept. When a establishes a subordinate joint force they PSYOP staff positions on the JFC’s staff. at the to the CCDR include

PSYOP planning is centralized.

Organization of PSYOP forces.

The requested PSYOP force size and planned disposition may exceed the command and control capabilities of the joint force components. In these cases the CCDR may identify the requirement to establish a joint psychological operations task force (JPOTF) or psychological operations task force (POTF) as a component of the joint force. PSYOP forces may be organized as a JPOTF or a PSYOP support element (PSE). The JFC may delegate OPCON of all PSYOP forces to the JPOTF or may exercise OPCON of specified PSYOP forces through the units or components to which they are assigned. The JPOTF is responsible for providing PSYOP support to joint or multinational operations at the tactical and operational levels. The JPOTF is also responsible for deconflicting all PSYOP that occur under the joint task force and other commands as designated by the establishing authority.

The joint psychological operations task force.

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Executive Summary Centralized planning and direction and decentralized execution are the referred methodologies. If the JFC determines that PSYOP planning and execution requires control by a component command with that mission as its sole purpose, then the JFC requests establishment of a JPOTF, POTF, or PSE. Control should favor centralized planning and direction and decentralized execution. Control is exercised from the lowest level that accomplishes the required coordination. Considerations for PSYOP may dictate that control be at high national levels. The entire US military PSYOP capability is available for employment by the supported GCC. Operations may require use of RC PSYOP forces. Early identification of PSYOP requirements through the Global Force Management Board is necessary to facilitate RC activation, processing, and training. The high demand for PSYOP forces to support worldwide operations make reachback a critical component for PSYOP success. Planning “Guidance for Employment of the Force” and the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan set neartime priorities. Guidance for Employment of the Force and the JSCP set priorities for activities undertaken in the near term – usually the period covered by budget execution (present through two years). These plans define how a GCC will conduct all DOD activities within their area of responsibility. Joint planning integrates US military actions with other instruments of national power and multinational partners to achieve specified end states. CCDRs translate national and theater strategy into strategic and operational concepts through the development of security cooperation strategies and implementation plans, and operation and campaign plans. PSYOP have significant impact on the JFC objectives as they involve the need to mobilize the civilian population, while simultaneously isolating the adversary, taking away its ability to muster popular support. Phasing helps JFCs and staffs to visualize and think through the entire operation or campaign and to define requirements in terms of forces, resources, time, space, and purpose.

Early identification of PSYOP requirements by the supported combatant commander is essential.

PSYOP can have significant impacts on achieving objectives.

Phasing the operation.

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Executive Summary PSYOP are based on objectives, and are coordinated and synchronized. To plan for the effective employment of PSYOP, JFCs and their staffs must possess a thorough knowledge of national security policy and objectives, as well as national and theater military objectives. They must ensure PSYOP planning is consistent with IO, PA, and DSPD planning as well as overall USG objectives. In addition, they must ensure all PSYOP activities are closely coordinated and synchronized to ensure that consistent themes and messages are communicated to TAs. CCDRs clearly articulate PSYOP support requirements in terms of the required capabilities. CCDRs submit requests for PSYOP forces to the Joint Staff. The Joint Staff is responsible for validating PSYOP force requests and will assign either US Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) or US Joint Forces Command as the Joint Force Provider, depending on the activity, type of forces necessary, and availability.

Combatant commanders identify and request PSYOP support needed.

PSYOP offer SecDef options for engagement that PSYOP can be a forcemultiplier, enhancing other potentially avoid the employment of additional combat elements of national power. forces, reduce the period of confrontation, and enhance the diplomatic, informational, military, and economic instruments of national power. PSYOP are important to the shape and deter phases of an operational plan. CCDR activities executed during the shape phase assist in determining the character of future operations. During the deter phase, PSYOP provides powerful operational leverage in support of flexible deterrent options. PSYOP forces can be employed to gather information, undermine a potential opponent’s will or capacity to wage war, and enhance the capabilities of multinational forces. Coordination of DOD PSYOP with other USG agencies facilitates the communication of the objectives of each organization and synchronization of effort. The joint interagency coordination group at the combatant command headquarters is an interagency staff group that establishes regular, timely, and collaborative working relationships between civilian and military operational planners. Department of State’s (DOS’s) Bureau of International Information Programs engages audiences on issues of

DOD PSYOP is synchronized and coordinated with other USG agencies.

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Executive Summary foreign policy, society, and values to help create an environment receptive to US national interests. In addition to DOS, PSYOP should be coordinated with other USG agencies, including, but not limited to, the Central Intelligence Agency; International Broadcasting Bureau; Broadcasting Board of Governors; Departments of Commerce, Homeland Security, Transportation, Energy, and Justice; Drug Enforcement Administration; and the US Coast Guard. When PSYOP are planned during multinational operations, planners must coordinate with multinational partners to ensure the attainment of US and multinational security objectives. PSYOP in irregular warfare. Irregular warfare (IW) is defined as a violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant populations. Ultimately, IW is a political struggle for control or influence over, and the support of, a relevant population. When PSYOP occur in IW, their role usually is much greater than during major operations and campaigns. Conducting IW focuses on two approaches – direct and indirect. The direct approach addresses the requirement to pursue adversaries, and their infrastructure and resources. PSYOP are key supporting operations to each contextual application of indirect approaches to executing IW. The ideological and political factors associated with IW create a fertile field for psychological operations. Joint Psychological Operations Process The joint PSYOP process has seven phases. The joint PSYOP process is a standard framework by which PSYOP assets and critical enablers plan, execute, and evaluate PSYOP with proficiency and consistency throughout major campaigns, operations, and peacetime engagements. The joint PSYOP process consists of seven phases: planning; target audience analysis (TAA); series development; product development and design; approval; production, distribution, dissemination; and evaluation. Each of these phases is designed to apply to any type or level of operation. Collectively, the phases address important considerations and include the necessary activities for the proper integration of PSYOP with the CCDR’s military strategy and mission.

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Executive Summary Combatant commanders need approval to execute PSYOP. CCDRs are required to obtain approval prior to conducting PSYOP. A PSYOP program provides the required SecDef guidance for PSYOP execution. PSYOP objectives, usually determined by the highestlevel PSYOP element involved in the operation (e.g., CCDR), provide the framework for developing the PSYOP plan. The goal of PSYOP planning is to integrate PSYOP into the commander’s vision and concept of operations. Staff planners adjust the PSYOP plan as necessary to support the commander’s objectives. The information learned as a result of TAA is used in the development of PSYOP products, actions, or series. Series are reviewed for their suitability, length or duration, potential to affect the intended audience, accuracy of persuasive arguments or techniques to influence behavior change, and the resources available to execute them. The work completed during the planning, analysis, and series development phases are vital for designing the prototypes of PSYOP products. Evaluating the TA’s understanding and acceptance of the arguments conveyed in a PSYOP product is a key task. Pretesting products also helps establish a foundation for conducting post testing of entire series after dissemination occurs. A judicious and efficient approval process for PSYOP series and the management of the series development and approval process are fundamental in providing supporting PSYOP to emerging, ongoing, and future operations. Once production is complete, products are transferred to the disseminating unit or agency in accordance with a predetermined timeline. The most appropriate dissemination means are determined through TAA, and intelligence about the operational area.

PSYOP are integral to the commander’s vision and concept of operations.

Target audience analysis (TAA).

Evaluate the target audience’s reaction.

Effective approval processes are needed.

Determine the most appropriate dissemination means through TAA.

PSYOP messages also are communicated through Face-to-face communication is effective. preplanned face-to-face contact with the local populace. Repeated face-to-face communication with local leaders, key communicators, and citizens is the

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Executive Summary most effective technique to support the commander’s mission. Assess PSYOP effects. Assessing the effects of PSYOP series on TAs relies on PSYOP impact indicators and analyses produced in earlier phases. PSYOP assessment criteria are focused on the achievement of supporting PSYOP objectives by TAs. The results of the evaluation are thus two-fold as they: (1) Yield substantive information about the trends toward achieving the supporting PSYOP objectives. (2) Contribute data that are relevant for the commander’s overall MOEs. Employment Integrate PSYOP with supported organization planning and decisionmaking. PSYOP are integrated in joint and multinational military operations as well as actions conducted by other designated governmental agencies. To be effective, PSYOP must be fully integrated with the supported organization’s planning and decision-making activities. PSYOP are a key capability in furthering US endeavors to deter aggression, and to maximize the commander’s efforts to shape the operational environment, insert combat forces, neutralize the threat, and secure the region. When authorized, PSYOP forces may be used domestically to assist lead federal agencies during disaster relief and crisis management by informing the domestic population. Employing PSYOP in conjunction with other activities to further national security goals in specific locations may prevent escalation of hostilities, shorten the duration of hostilities, or hasten a return to normalcy. As an information activity in military engagement, security cooperation, and deterrence PSYOP are employed to shape environments and influence relevant audiences to discourage armed conflict. PSYOP can reduce the need for a lethal response to adversary actions. During crisis response and limited contingency operations, PSYOP focus on mitigating the effects of the crisis and stabilizing the operational environment.

PSYOP, a key capability in non-domestic activities, may be used domestically to support lead federal agencies.

PSYOP support shaping the operational environment.

PSYOP in crisis response, limited contingency, and major operations or campaigns.

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Executive Summary PSYOP are planned and integrated throughout all phases of operations or campaigns. During major operations, PSYOP are integrated with both conventional and special operations (SO) activities. SO are relevant across the range of military operations and the nine SO core tasks, including PSYOP should be integral parts of a theater strategy, operation plan, or campaign plan. SO usually are most effective when integrated with operations conducted by conventional forces. PSYOP can be integrated in all direct action activities, employing within the physical and political risks, operational techniques, and use of force to achieve specific objectives. PSYOP can be integrated in the four special reconnaissance (SR) activities by providing an additive capability to SOF conducting SR actions. PSYOP are employed in advising, assisting and training indigenous and other forces. When conducted independently, the primary focus of unconventional warfare is on political-military and psychological objectives. PSYOP are employed to advise, assist, and train indigenous or surrogate forces in developing and implementing an effective PSYOP capability. PSYOP are employed to prepare key audiences for US foreign internal defense and security force assistance operations, and to directly assist the host nation (HN) in establishing an environment that promotes internal stability and security through democratic systems. PSYOP in counter terrorism. PSYOP are a critical capability in conducting counter terrorism through the application of the direct and indirect approaches in support of DOD’s global operations against terrorist networks. When authorized, PSYOP forces conduct public information dissemination to support national security or disaster relief within US territory to reduce civilian casualties and suffering. USG strategy to combat weapons of mass destruction (WMD) consists of three pillars: nonproliferation, counterproliferation (CP), and consequence management. PSYOP can facilitate USG CP informational activities directed at state and non-state actors to prevent and dissuade the production, acquisition, and delivery of WMD.

Support to combating weapons of mass destruction.

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Executive Summary Integration with civil affairs. PSYOP can be integrated with civil affairs operations activities to increase support for the HN government and reduce support to destabilizing forces. PSYOP forces can be employed in conjunction with other IO capabilities and provide a critical means of communicating with foreign audiences to inform, direct, and influence. Military operations are synchronized with operations of other USG agencies as well as with foreign forces, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), and regional organizations for the purpose of accomplishing objectives. Success depends on the ability to blend and engage all instruments of national power. Interagency and PSYOP coordination occur at all levels of warfare to ensure synchronization of activities intended to influence TAs. PSYOP and IO staff planners arm the joint interagency coordination group with timely information to assist in the coordination process. PSYOP units should be integrated into all multinational operations to ensure that PSYOP activities are coordinated. PSYOP must begin early, preferably before deployment, to prepare a population for the arrival of multinational forces and develop communication channels that can be used from day one of an operation. When the Armed Forces of the United States are integrated into a multinational command structure, peacetime PSYOP policies and wartime conduct should be coordinated and integrated to the maximum extent possible for the attainment of US and multinational security objectives. However, US PSYOP normally will be approved in US channels regardless of the composition of the multinational force chain of command. PSYOP forces can provide civil authority information support elements (CAISEs) within the United States and its territories. When authorized for employment in this manner, PSYOP forces utilize their media development, production, and dissemination capabilities to deliver administrative and command information to populations in the impacted area. Their mission becomes to inform rather than to influence. All CAISE efforts should be

PSYOP are integrated into multinational operations, but normally approved via US command channels.

PSYOP may work with civil authority information support elements domestically.

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Executive Summary coordinated with ongoing military and lead federal agency PA efforts. Enablers Continuous intelligence support is critical to PSYOP success. Ongoing intelligence support is critical to all phases of the PSYOP process. During Phase I (Planning), of the PSYOP process, planners identify information requirements and use the intelligence process to request needed information used in conducting TAA in Phase II. TAA includes thorough examination of the political, military, economic, cultural, religious, and psychological or social conditions that make up the operational environment, and impact the behavior of the audiences within that environment. Intelligence plays a critical role in Phase VII (Evaluation) by confirming or denying PSYOP MOEs. Development of PSYOP-related information should be predicated on a detailed collection plan with specific collection requirements to exploit all available sources and techniques. Any factor that presents a recurring and identifiable obstacle to achieving success of a military PSYOP program is deemed a threat. The early identification of threats and opportunities increases the potential for successful fulfillment of PSYOP program goals and objectives. Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance support. PSYOP rely on theater intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) operations to provide intelligence products based on a whole of government approach that occurs within the intelligence community. ISR assets also are critical in collecting data to confirm or deny PSYOP MOEs. Communications between commands that are planning and executing PSYOP are necessary for effective use of capabilities. A joint PSYOP communications plan should be prepared to ensure that communications systems are compatible and adequate. Logistic support is also critical. The execution of the joint PSYOP process in sustained operations requires critical logistic support. PSYOP units are dependent primarily on the supported unit for all classes of resupply, maintenance, base support,

Threat identification.

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Executive Summary commercial item restock and dissemination contracting support. Locally available resources for required supplies and services, whether through the host government or commercial entities, must be identified in advance. Early identification of host nation support is critical to the establishment of agreements or contracts to provide needed supplies, equipment, and facilities for PSYOP. Capabilities Each Service has the inherent capabilities and assets to create and deliver PSYOP products. Each Service has the inherent capability to support achievement of US national objectives by using organic assets for production and dissemination of PSYOP products. Studies on all topics of interest can be requested through a combatant command’s PSYOP staff officer or intelligence request for information manager, who will enter them in the community on-line intelligence system for end-users and managers system for managing intelligence production requirements. PSYOP studies are unique in format; however, other military intelligence products can contain this type of intelligence information. In general, they profile the salient features of a country or its people; provide an analysis of the influences that lead different social, occupational, and ethnic groups of that country to act as they do; discuss issues that elicit strong responses from the indigenous population; assess attitudes; identify vulnerabilities; and suggest ways and means to influence people. US Army PSYOP capabilities. Army Service PSYOP assets provide a vital instrument of engagement across all military phases in support of the full range of military operations and interagency coordination in a foreign setting and under special circumstances during domestic emergencies as well. United States Army Special Operations Command is the Army component command of USSOCOM. Its mission is to command (if directed), support, and ensure the combat readiness of assigned and attached Army PSYOP forces for worldwide use.

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Executive Summary Army Active Component Psychological Operations Group organizes, equips and collectively trains assigned and attached forces to rapidly deploy anywhere in the world and conduct PSYOP and other specified communication tasks in any environment in support of CCDR and the interagency as directed by the President and SecDef. Reserve Component Psychological Operations Group organize, train, and equip assigned and attached forces to deploy anywhere in the world and conduct PSYOP and other specified communication tasks in any environment in support of CCDRs and the interagency as directed by the President and SecDef. The Army provides the preponderance of PSYOP planners assigned or attached to the joint force. In addition to dedicated PSYOP units, conventional Army units can also support PSYOP. With routine interaction with TAs, they are in an ideal position to support PSYOP product dissemination and collect limited MOE indicators for transmission to PSYOP planners. US Navy PSYOP capabilities. The US Navy employs a wide range of dissemination assets, product reproduction capabilities, and planning resources that can support joint and Service PSYOP missions. Navy afloat and ashore IO cells coordinate with joint PSYOP experts to identify maritime audiences, develop themes and products, and plan dissemination. The Navy has ultrahigh frequency, veryhigh frequency, and high frequency broadcast capabilities to deliver PSYOP messages to afloat and ashore target audiences. Boarding parties can disseminate products to crews of civilian vessels to achieve PSYOP objectives. Several Navy aircraft support PSYOP. United States Air Force (USAF) PSYOP is focused on the employment of air, space, and cyberspace capabilities as the Air Force’s primary means of preparing, shaping, and exploiting the psychological dimension of the operational environment. USAF PSYOP forces support JFC objectives through a variety of operations and activities that include development of

US Air Force PSYOP capabilities.

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Executive Summary psychologically informed targeting strategies. Many USAF platforms are used to execute missions in support of JFC PSYOP objectives. Air Mobility Command IO and PSYOP planners are uniquely postured to observe and support strategic and global PSYOP in addition to supporting the operationallevel PSYOP efforts of a single geographic combatant command. Marine Corps PSYOP capabilities. The Marine Corps has the capability to conduct PSYOP at the tactical level via PSYOP teams using loudspeaker broadcasts, print media, and face-to-face communication. The Marine Corps expeditionary PSYOP capability is found within the Marine Corps Information Operations Center (MCIOC). The MCIOC coordinates and integrates the conduct of PSYOP programs that complement IO with the JPOTF, CCDRs, interagency, DOS, intelligence community, IGOs, and NGOs, and others as necessary. CONCLUSION This publication establishes psychological operations. joint doctrine for

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CHAPTER I
OVERVIEW
“In this war, which was total in every sense of the word, we have seen many great changes in military science. It seems to me that not the least of these was the development of psychological warfare as a specific and effective weapon.”
General of the Army Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1945

1.

General

a. In today’s complex and rapidly evolving information environment, the need to integrate all instruments of national power has taken on increased relevance to sustain operational success. Key terrain has undergone a fundamental shift from exclusively geographic to now include relevant populations. This has created an increased need for a broad set of capabilities and policy to engage local, regional, and global audiences. The informational, cultural, social, moral, political, and physical aspects of the operational environment are as critical to operational success as the traditional orientation on adversary military capabilities has been in the past. In the operational environment, effective influence is gained by consistency between what we say and do, and how well we understand and respond to our audience. b. Within the military and informational instruments of national power, the Department of Defense (DOD) is a key component of a broader United States Government (USG) communications strategy. DOD communications strategy and the separate and unique capabilities of psychological operations (PSYOP), public affairs (PA) (to include visual information), and defense support to public diplomacy (DSPD) address a variety of communication roles and specific audiences as permitted by operational parameters and policy. DOD informational activities can be used to inform, direct, or persuade. To be effective, all DOD communications efforts must inherently support the credibility, veracity, and legitimacy of USG activities. See Chapter II, “Roles, Responsibilities, and Relationships,” for additional clarification of DOD information activities. c. PSYOP play an important role in DOD communications efforts through the planned use of directed programs specifically designed to support USG and DOD activities and policies. The specific purpose of PSYOP is to influence foreign audience perceptions and subsequent behavior as part of approved programs in support of USG policy and military objectives. PSYOP professionals follow a deliberate process that aligns commander’s objectives with an analysis of the environment; select relevant target audiences (TAs); develop focused, culturally, and environmentally attuned messages and actions; employ sophisticated media delivery means and produce observable, measurable behavioral responses. It is important not to confuse psychological impact with PSYOP. Actions of the joint force, such as strikes or shows of force have psychological impact but they are not PSYOP unless their primary purpose is to influence the perceptions and subsequent behavior of a TA. Regardless of the mission set, all PSYOP

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Chapter I are conducted within carefully reviewed and approved programs and under missiontailored product approval guidelines that flow from national level authorities. d. PSYOP forces operate across the range of military operations. PSYOP that are continuously planned and assessed contribute significantly to the success of both peacetime engagements and major operations. The combatant commander (CCDR) receives functional and theater strategic planning guidance from the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP), Unified Command Plan, and Guidance for Employment of the Force (GEF). These documents are derived from the Secretary of Defense (SecDef) National Defense Strategy, which interprets the President’s national security policy and strategy, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff National Military Strategy. (1) In peacetime, PSYOP are planned and integrated to further national defense strategies through the geographic combatant commander’s (GCC’s) theater campaign plan (TCP). CCDRs incorporate PSYOP programs and integrate them into the broad range of activities required for military engagement, security cooperation, and deterrence (i.e., Phase 0). For example, in steady-state geographic combatant command TCPs, PSYOP units can deploy to support approved counterinsurgency, demining, or foreign humanitarian assistance (FHA) programs under either a joint force commander (JFC) or US diplomatic control. (2) PSYOP reinforce US policies that center on preventing hostilities and advocating peaceful resolutions when possible. PSYOP are key in furthering US endeavors to deter aggression, and to maximize the JFC’s efforts to shape the operational environment. PSYOP communicate well-orchestrated and planned information to international audiences to clarify intent, prevent escalation of tension, ease concerns, and mitigate the potential effects and capabilities of adversary information activities. (3) When diplomatic and other measures fail to deter conflict and lethal capabilities are employed, PSYOP can assist the JFC by setting conditions for the insertion of combat forces; neutralizing threats; facilitating efforts to contain conflict; stabilizing the operational area; and enhancing efforts to achieve conditions that allow a return to steady state operations. PSYOP can inform, direct, educate, and influence targets to increase US combat power, and decrease enemy hostile aggression. Proper integration of PSYOP may reduce operational risk, collateral damage, as well as military and civilian casualties. (4) PSYOP forces can be employed domestically as civil authority information support elements (CAISEs) under direction and authority of a designated lead federal agency. CAISEs are legally authorized to provide support to civil authorities only by broadcasting and disseminating public information.

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Overview 2. Legal Framework and Authorities a. Introduction (1) PSYOP are governed by explicit legal authorities that direct and determine how the capability is utilized. This legal foundation establishes PSYOP as a communications means, and allows their integration with those strategies that apply the instruments of national power. Leaders and planners accurately interpret relevant laws and policies to employ PSYOP forces in any situation or environment, internationally and domestically. The outcome of this level of proficiency is the effective incorporation of PSYOP as an integral component of US measures designed to achieve national objectives. (2) PSYOP are employed during military operations as well as operations led by civilian agencies. They can be a vital asset to government agencies in many situations when DOD is not the lead. The legal framework for PSYOP allows for this DOD capability to be integrated with national level strategies and support other USG agencies. b. Law (1) The legal authorities for PSYOP are established in a number of documents, and are in place to enable the proper integration of PSYOP. The legal framework for PSYOP applies to: (a) Establishing the PSYOP capability. (b) Authorizing PSYOP execution. (c) Approving PSYOP products and actions. (d) Establishing authorities for use of PSYOP forces in civil support operations (domestic operations) and for use of PSYOP in sovereign territory, air, seas, and airways. (2) Although the following list is not all-inclusive, consideration should be given to the following specific legal issues when conducting PSYOP: (a) The requirement that US PSYOP forces will not target US citizens at any time, in any location globally, or under any circumstances. (b) Geneva and Hague Conventions. These international conventions preclude the injury of an enemy through “treachery” or “perfidy.” It is also a violation of Geneva Convention III to publish photographic images of enemy prisoners of war. (c) International agreements with host countries may limit the activities of PSYOP units (e.g., status-of-forces agreements).

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(d) Domestic laws including copyright law and broadcasting law. c. Policy (1) Policy makers develop realistic and relevant policies that are within the capabilities of PSYOP to support. Executive and agency level policies reflect the laws and provide the necessary guidance to place PSYOP into action to achieve objectives. DOD policy, for instance, addresses the intent of the organization, guides decisionmaking, and prompts action to integrate PSYOP into military operations and other USG strategies. (2) Military leaders and planners consistently refer to and interpret both broad and specific policies on issues that affect our national security. They study US positions formulated to address a number of issues, such as terrorism, the trafficking of illegal drugs, and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). An in-depth understanding of PSYOP, and how they are best integrated with other US capabilities, is a prerequisite to determining how PSYOP contribute to US communication objectives in dealing with these and other global issues. (3) PSYOP can assist USG mitigation efforts of issues that arise from unintended consequences. d. Strategy. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) and the CCDRs refer to national strategies as they establish guidance that provides the necessary strategic direction for employment of PSYOP. CCDRs’ analyses of the national strategies’ objectives are a critical step in determining PSYOP requirements. Understanding other government agency (OGA) approaches in executing national strategies is another important step for decisionmakers for determining how PSYOP are to be employed, i.e., PSYOP contributions to strategic communications (SC) efforts. 3. Levels of War

a. Joint PSYOP activities span all levels of war and support policy and commanders’ objectives from strategic to tactical levels. The impact of PSYOP activities at one level may have significant implications at other levels. b. When conducted at the strategic level, PSYOP are designed to support USG departments and agencies, GCCs, or multinational partners. Typically, PSYOP activities conducted at this level are focused on achieving broad US and multinational objectives in regions of the globe with diverse audiences. However, an individual or adversary leadership also may be a strategic PSYOP target. At the strategic level, PSYOP forces constitute one DOD capability applied as part of a broader USG approach. PSYOP applied at the strategic level are often transregional in character, and may involve detailed coordination with one or more GCCs and the interagency.

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Overview c. PSYOP activities conducted at the operational level generally support the implementation of regional policies and military plans. d. Tactical PSYOP activities normally are conducted in support of local military or civil authorities. They are generally designed to create an immediate, localized effect supporting broader operational objectives.
“To seduce the enemy’s soldiers from their allegiance and encourage them to surrender is of especial service, for an adversary is more hurt by desertion than by slaughter.”
Flavius Vegetius Renatus, The Military Institutions of the Romans, c. 378 AD

4.

Purpose

a. Every activity of the force has potential psychological implications that may be leveraged to influence foreign targets. PSYOP contribute to the success of wartime strategies and are well-matched for implementation in stable and pre-conflict environments. PSYOP are applied across the range of military operations and, as a communication capability, constitute a systematic process of conveying messages to selected foreign groups to promote particular themes that result in desired foreign attitudes and behaviors. PSYOP are used to establish and reinforce foreign perceptions of US military, political, and economic power and resolve. b. PSYOP are integrated to shape the security environment to promote bilateral cooperation, ease tension, and deter aggression. In peacetime, PSYOP are fully integrated with US ambassador and GCC’s theater-wide priorities and objectives, and are used in conjunction with other US measures to stabilize the region. PSYOP are an ideal means of conveying the intent of the GCC through supporting public diplomacy efforts, whether to foster relations with other nations or to ensure their collaboration to address shared security concerns. c. In conflict, PSYOP as a force multiplier can degrade the enemy’s relative combat power, reduce civilian interference, minimize collateral damage and maximize the local populace’s support for operations. 5. Missions

a. The overarching purpose of joint PSYOP forces is further clarified by the application of their activities across the range of military operations. b. Missions performed by joint PSYOP forces include: (1) PSYOP in Support of Combat Operations. They are planned to influence the perceptions, attitudes, objective reasoning, and, ultimately, the behavior of adversary,

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Chapter I friendly, and neutral audiences and key population groups in support of US combat operations and objectives. Operations supported by joint PSYOP forces support include the following: (a) Offense. (b) Defense. (c) Stability operations. (2) Military Information Support to DOD Information Capabilities in Peacetime. This support can shape and influence foreign attitudes and behavior in support of US regional objectives, policies, interests, theater military plans, or contingencies. Operations or activities supported by joint PSYOP forces may include, but are not limited to: (a) FHA/disaster relief. (b) Noncombatant evacuation operations. (c) Maritime interception operations. (d) Support to USG country team or host nation (HN) civil programs (e.g., counterdrug, demining, human immunodeficiency virus awareness, security institution building, ethnic tolerance, and reconciliation). (3) Civil Support to Domestic Lead Federal Agencies. This entails conducting public information dissemination activities, utilizing Title 10, United States Code (USC) assets to support lead federal agency and local efforts as defined in the National Response Framework. These efforts are conducted during disaster relief operations following natural or manmade disasters within the United States and its territories. (4) Support to Special Operations (SO) (discussed in Chapter VI, “Employment”). 6. Key Considerations for Effective Joint Psychological Operations a. Early planning and sustained employment (1) Joint Publication (JP) 3-0, Joint Operations, states “PSYOP must be integrated into all plans at the initial stages of planning to ensure maximum effect.” This enables the JFC to shape the cognitive dimension of the information environment and set terms of initial and subsequent engagement. Early planning and employment of PSYOP forces will maximize the potential to influence foreign audiences within the area of interest.

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Overview

(2) PSYOP require sustained application, as part of a broader USG communication strategy. Effective PSYOP are proactive and set conditions for obtaining subsequent phase objectives. PSYOP are a critical component in all phases and in some phases may be the JFC’s main effort. b. Integration of PSYOP. PSYOP must be planned, coordinated, and integrated with the communication strategies of the USG and multinational partners at all levels from the strategic to the tactical. The synchronization of PSYOP with all other actions of the US and multinational forces precludes messages or actions at one level from contradicting or weakening the effectiveness at another. c. Use of indigenous dissemination means. The determining factor in selection of dissemination means is the target audience analysis (TAA) process. To maximize TA receptivity to PSYOP, planning should incorporate the use of indigenous resources, key communicators, and dissemination platforms as soon as operationally feasible. Communications through indigenous means generally have greater credibility than PSYOP disseminated through USG broadcast assets. While organic PSYOP dissemination assets remain essential to the execution of the joint force operations, they are intended for relatively short-term use (Phases I-IV) when many indigenous communications platforms are disrupted. d. Command emphasis and resourcing. Active involvement by the commander will emphasize the importance of PSYOP. PSYOP-relevant concerns may be included in commander’s critical information requirements as priority intelligence requirements. Allocation decisions and logistics support of concept of operations (CONOPS) will also reflect the emphasis a commander places on PSYOP. e. Responsive PSYOP approval process. Once delegated, the PSYOP approval process belongs to the commander. PSYOP approval authority should be delegated to the lowest practical level authorized by the Office of the Secretary of Defense. A timesensitive process is crucial to providing responsive PSYOP. f. Assessment (1) Quantifiable and timely assessment criteria to determine measures of effectiveness (MOEs) are required for every PSYOP campaign. The assessment criteria should be established early within each planning phase, evaluated often, and adjusted as necessary throughout the campaign to ensure the joint task force (JTF) objectives are met. (2) To create measurable effects in the human environment, commanders need to ensure that the information requirements for PSYOP and other information support activities are reflected in the collection plan; allocation of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) assets; and the codified output of selected elements within the joint force battle rhythm.

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CHAPTER II
ROLES, RESPONSIBILITIES, AND RELATIONSHIPS
“Psychological warfare has always rested as an uneasy activity in democracies, even in wartime. It is partly to do with the suspicion that using the mind to influence the mind is somehow unacceptable. But is it more unacceptable to shoot someone's brains out rather than to persuade that brain to drop down their weapon and live?”
Dr. Phillip M. Taylor, Munitions of the Mind, Manchester University Press, 1995

1.

General

The Unified Command Plan (UCP) and JSCP provide direction and guidance to CCDRs concerning joint operation planning and their respective responsibilities. The roles, responsibilities, and relationships contained in this chapter reflect general guidance derived from a combination of this strategic guidance as well as directives, instructions, joint and Service doctrine, and current practices within the PSYOP community. 2. Roles and Responsibilities a. The Secretary of Defense (1) Participates in the establishment of national security policy and objectives. (2) Recommends to the President the mobilization of Reserve Component (RC) assets, as necessary. (3) Provides strategic PSYOP advice to USG agencies and multinational partners. (4) Approves all PSYOP programs submitted as part of a CCDR’s operation plan (OPLAN). (5) Through an execute order, delegates product approval and dissemination authority to the appropriate level for operational- and tactical-level products during contingency and wartime operations. b. The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD[P]) (1) Approves and oversees all PSYOP policy and programs not delegated to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict and Interdependent Capabilities (ASD[SO/LIC&IC]). (2) Delegates product approval and dissemination authority to the appropriate level for peacetime programs.

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Chapter II (3) Retains approval authority for strategic-level and politically sensitive products during contingency and wartime operations. (4) Approves all PSYOP programs not submitted as part of a CCDR’s OPLAN. For a full description of PSYOP program and product approval authorities, see the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 3110.05, Joint Psychological Operations Supplement to the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan. c. The Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (USD[I]) (1) Ensures appropriate intelligence support and coordination are provided for PSYOP plans, programs, and activities. (2) Oversees the integration and support of PSYOP into information operations (IO) plans, programs, and activities, and capabilities, as appropriate. (3) Ensures that PSYOP are supported by other IO capabilities, as appropriate. d. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict and Interdependent Capabilities (1) Acts as principal staff assistant and civilian advisor to SecDef, Deputy Secretary of Defense, and USD(P) on PSYOP matters. (2) Provides guidance on the planning and conduct of PSYOP activities and their integration into USG activities during peacetime, and more specific guidance for the planning and conduct of these activities across the range of military operations. (3) Develops, coordinates, and oversees the implementation of DOD policy for PSYOP activities. (4) Reviews, evaluates, coordinates, and oversees PSYOP plans, programs, and resources to ensure adherence to approved policy and planning guidance. (5) Reviews, analyzes, and evaluates the various policies, processes, and programs of the DOD components that impact on the capability to plan, resource, prepare forces, and execute PSYOP; initiates and coordinates actions or taskings that enhance the readiness, capabilities, and effective use of PSYOP forces. (6) Provides policy guidance and recommendations to consider and incorporate PSYOP in contingency planning. (7) Makes recommendations to the USD(P) for all matters concerning the combatant commands’ PSYOP plans, programs, activities, and requests for deployment of PSYOP personnel and equipment.

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(8) Ascertains where shortfalls in intelligence support to PSYOP exist and recommends activities to the USD(I) that support the capabilities and plans of DOD components to conduct PSYOP programs and activities. (9) Represents the USD(P) and SecDef in interagency deliberations and international negotiations dealing with PSYOP, as required. (10) Establishes standing departmental and interagency working groups, as appropriate, to facilitate the conduct of effective PSYOP activities. e. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs reviews PSYOP plans and programs, and provides recommendations to the ASD(SO/LIC&IC) on the development of specific PSYOP programs affecting the GCCs. f. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs provides PA guidance for PSYOP plans and programs. g. The General Counsel, DOD conducts legal reviews of all proposed PSYOP plans and programs for consistency with US public law, regulations, and internationally recognized legal standards as applicable. h. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (1) Advises the President, SecDef, and National Security Council on all PSYOP matters. (2) Represents SecDef on the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) PSYOP Working Group and in other multinational military forums. (3) Coordinates and directs the preparation of multinational PSYOP plans and US participation in multinational military PSYOP training programs. (4) Provides PSYOP representation to the interagency organizations and their working groups. (5) Provides the general policy and establishes production priorities for the PSYOP Studies Program. (6) Provides the guidance for PSYOP conducted by the CCDRs. (7) Prepares strategic plans and issues policy for the use of military PSYOP across the range of military operations. (8) Reviews the PSYOP plans and programs of the CCDRs to ensure they are adequate, feasible, and consistent with USG and DOD policy.

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(9) Provides PSYOP plans and programs to the Office of the Secretary of Defense for review and approval. (10) Reviews the CCDRs’ peacetime PSYOP plans and programs. (11) Establishes, in conjunction with the Commander, US Special Operations Command (CDRUSSOCOM) joint doctrine for PSYOP. (12) Provides a joint, prioritized statement of military requirements for PSYOP capabilities to meet the needs of SecDef, the Service Chiefs, CCDRs, and the CJCS. (13) Provides an integrated statement of joint PSYOP training requirements and ensures that these requirements are appropriately addressed. (14) Apportions PSYOP forces to the combatant commands through the JSCP. (15) Prepares integrated logistic and mobilization guidance for PSYOP capabilities. (16) Provides a unified, prioritized list of PSYOP intelligence and counterintelligence requirements to meet the needs of the CCDRs, Joint Staff, and Services. (17) Ensures integration of PSYOP activities into the CJCS Exercise Program and Joint Experimentation Program. (18) Incorporates PSYOP instruction into joint professional military education programs. (19) Ensures integration of PSYOP activities into military planning. i. CCDRs (to include CDRUSSOCOM when designated the supported commander for PSYOP) have the following responsibilities: (1) Ensure that staffs and organizations within their commands have sufficient representation and working proficiency in the planning and conduct of joint PSYOP. (2) Request liaison officers from other USG agencies when appropriate. (3) Working in coordination with the Joint Staff and the United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), develop plans and programs to support PSYOP requirements identified by supported CCDRs. (4) Develop and submit to the CJCS additional PSYOP requirements necessary to support CCDR plans and programs.

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(5) When directed by SecDef, accept the attachment of PSYOP forces and employ those forces as directed. (6) Designate specific staff responsibility for maintaining a PSYOP planning element, coordinating PSYOP actions, and ensuring that regional plans, activities, and operations support national objectives. (7) Develop intelligence and counterintelligence requirements necessary to perform PSYOP analysis, planning, and execution. (8) Plan, support, and conduct PSYOP in support of theater military missions and US national and regional objectives. (9) Coordinate military information support with the chiefs of US diplomatic missions within the GCC’s area of responsibility (AOR). (10) Prepare PSYOP plans and, upon approval, conduct PSYOP to support the execution of operations. (11) Foster cooperative PSYOP policies among multinational military forces and regional security organizations. (12) Ensure advance contingency planning for use of non-DOD informational and related capabilities in PSYOP. (13) Establish a PSYOP reporting system to provide relevant information about adversary propaganda, measured impact of friendly PSYOP activities, and any anticipated changes to ongoing PSYOP activities. (14) Integrate PSYOP activities into the preparation and review of joint OPLANs to ensure appropriate collaboration and deconfliction of IO, PA, and civilmilitary operations (CMO). (15) Recommend regional specific PSYOP forces training requirements to USSOCOM. j. Commander, US Special Operations Command. CDRUSSOCOM is the designated joint proponent for PSYOP which, includes leading the collaborative development, coordination, and integration of the PSYOP capability across DOD. CDRUSSOCOM exercises combatant command (command authority) (COCOM) over assigned PSYOP forces. CDRUSSOCOM has the following responsibilities in addition to those detailed in the JSCP: (1) Prepares program and budget to fund approved PSYOP programs for assigned forces. In fulfilling this responsibility, the CDRUSSOCOM coordinates with

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Chapter II the CJCS, Service Chiefs, and the other CCDRs to ensure that all PSYOP and support requirements are addressed. (2) Provides trained and ready PSYOP forces to support SecDef and the other CCDRs with PSYOP support. (3) Performs as joint proponent for development of PSYOP in joint doctrine; training and education for individuals and units; joint capabilities; joint mission-essential task lists; and identification of critical individual skills, training, and experience. (4) Prepares and provides assigned PSYOP forces to the other CCDRs and USG lead agencies, when directed by SecDef. (5) Supports the geographic combatant commands’ PSYOP planning, coordinating, synchronization, and execution efforts, and the United States Strategic Command’s IO responsibilities. (6) Develops joint PSYOP programs of instruction, and when directed, trains DOD and foreign military personnel in PSYOP techniques and procedures. (7) Recommends PSYOP policy guidance to the CJCS, Service Chiefs, and US military commanders, as required. (8) Develops and validates priorities for PSYOP training, intelligence, and military requirements and provides these to the CJCS to support Service, combatant command, and Joint Staff responsibilities as they relate to PSYOP. (9) Provides visibility of PSYOP issues, activities, tasks, and capabilities to the CJCS, Service Chiefs, and commanders at other US military command levels. (10) Coordinates with the Commander, United States Joint Forces Command (CDRUSJFCOM) to integrate PSYOP activities into joint training and experimentation plans and programs. (11) Develops concepts to support national security objectives, reviews Service PSYOP doctrine development for consistency with joint doctrine, and ensures that joint and Service PSYOP training supports national objectives. (12) Observes and evaluates PSYOP forces in exercises to develop joint tactics, techniques, and procedures for PSYOP forces. (13) Manages the PSYOP Studies Program and coordinates PSYOP input to the Defense Intelligence Production schedule. (14) Coordinates and synchronizes transregional PSYOP.

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Roles, Responsibilities, and Relationships (15) Coordinates with the Service Chiefs for planning and providing sustainment of PSYOP forces assigned to the other CCDRs for conduct of PSYOP. k. Commander, United States Strategic Command (CDRUSSTRATCOM). CDRUSSTRATCOM supports CDRUSSOCOM’s transregional PSYOP programs and activities as well as the programs and plans of GCCs with integration and coordination of strategic IO capabilities. l. Commander, US Joint Forces Command (1) Exercises COCOM over assigned RC PSYOP forces once activated. (2) Identifies CDRUSSOCOM. and coordinates PSYOP capability requirements with

(3) In coordination with the Secretaries of the Military Departments, CDRUSJFCOM provides for global force management of assigned PSYOP forces to support the regional PSYOP plans, programs, and activities of the combatant commands and other USG agencies, as required. m. Commander, United States Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM). Supports the deployment of forces, and the distribution and dissemination requirements for PSYOP through its joint mobility assets. n. The Military Departments and Services (1) Provide civilian and military personnel with appropriate PSYOP training and planning skills. (2) Provide capabilities organic to Service forces to execute PSYOP actions and dedicated PSYOP forces and equipment. (3) Develop Service PSYOP doctrine relating to the primary functions assigned to the particular Service. (4) Provide PSYOP forces or detachments (not assigned to the CDRUSSOCOM or CDRUSJFCOM) to CCDRs or USG lead agencies, when directed by SecDef. (5) Provide departmental intelligence and counterintelligence assets that are trained, equipped, and organized to support planning and conduct PSYOP. (6) Incorporate PSYOP instruction into Service training and education programs. (7) US Army Reserve Command provides RC PSYOP forces for the Department of the Army to CDRUSJFCOM.

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(8) Directorate of Psychological Operations and Civil Affairs. The principal staff directorate that advises the Commanding General, United States Army Special Operations Command (USASOC) on all matters pertaining to PSYOP. It coordinates with all Army major command staff elements and other special operations forces (SOF) as required to ensure PSYOP is properly organized, trained, equipped, and resourced to meet USASOC Commander’s Title 10, USC responsibilities and USSOCOM’s UCP responsibilities. It provides subject matter expertise for coordination with external PSYOP related organizations and agency initiatives. It maintains situational awareness on all PSYOP staff actions and requirements within the command. For further detail concerning Service PSYOP capabilities, refer to Appendix A, “Capabilities.” o. The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency (1) Establishes and implements a plan to satisfy PSYOP relevant intelligence requirements. (2) Assists in the preparation of intelligence and counterintelligence estimates and appraisals of foreign groups designated by USD(P), CJCS, Service Chiefs, CDRUSSOCOM, and other CCDRs. (3) Provides training for intelligence analysts to ensure a capability to respond to intelligence production requirements in support of PSYOP programs. (4) Recommends employment of PSYOP forces in support of US policy. (5) Provides indications of potential vulnerability to adversary information or foreign intelligence service activities. p. The Director, Defense Information Systems Agency provides computer systems support for the transmission of PSYOP products from the continental United States (CONUS) production facilities to overseas PSYOP forces. q. The Director, National Security Agency/Chief, Central Security Service provides intelligence information to satisfy intelligence collection requirements. r. Joint Force Commanders Serving in Multinational Commands (1) Implement multinational PSYOP plans to the extent consistent with international law, including the law of armed conflict, and treaty/international agreement obligations in relations with the governments of countries where US forces are assigned. (2) Request guidance from SecDef on implementation of multinational policies and objectives, as appropriate.

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Roles, Responsibilities, and Relationships

(3) Coordinate joint PSYOP commanders and national forces of HNs.

planning

with

appropriate

multinational

For more on specific responsibilities within DOD, refer to Department of Defense Directive (DODD) S3321.1, Overt Psychological Operations Conducted by the Military Services in Peacetime and in Contingencies Short of Declared War. s. Other United States Government Agencies (1) During peacetime, the Department of State (DOS) provides overall direction, coordination, and supervision of interdepartmental activities overseas. In peacetime operations or in conflict, the DOS may restrict PSYOP messages and themes used within specific countries or areas. (2) OGAs impacted by military PSYOP, including peacetime PSYOP activities, may provide recommendations to joint planners to ensure consistency of effort. 3. Relationships

a. General. There are a variety of functions and capabilities that help a JFC formulate the command’s message and communicate with local, international, and US domestic audiences as part of broader policy and in support of operational objectives. DOD information activities include IO, PSYOP (as a core capability of IO), PA (to include visual information), and DSPD. See Figure II-1 for additional details concerning DOD informational activities. (1) PA and PSYOP are separate and unique activities that are governed by policy and practice in terms of audiences, focus, and scope. SC integrates various instruments of national power with other activities across the USG to synchronize crucial themes, messages, images, and actions. SC is policy driven, and generally conducted under DOS lead. DOD strategic communication activities are designed to support the continuity of DOD strategic and operational level messages and activities with overall USG policy and SC themes. (2) Although each of these activities is distinct, commanders must ensure that there is a general compatibility of messages within the broader communications strategy. This must be accomplished without blurring of traditional lines of separation between PA and PSYOP and their respective audiences. To this end, it is critical that all DOD military information activities are conducted in a manner that reinforces the credibility, veracity, and legitimacy of DOD and USG activities. In very narrow circumstances, PSYOP may support military deception operations designed to preserve operational surprise and the safety of friendly forces, but this is done only after the commander and staff carefully weigh the likely benefits of a deception operation against a potential shortand long-term loss of credibility with the media or local audiences.

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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INFORMATION ACTIVITIES
INFORMATION ACTIVITY
US Government (USG) Strategic Communication (Department of State Lead)

PRIMARY TASK
Coordinate information, themes, plans, programs, and actions that are synchronized with other elements of national power Use DOD operational and informational activities and strategic communication processes in support of Department of State's broader public diplomacy efforts Integrate information operations core, supporting, and related capabilities as part of a military plan Influence target audience perceptions, attitudes, and subsequent behavior Provide truthful, timely, accurate information about DOD activities (Inform)

United States (US), allied, national, international, and internal audiences

Keep the public informed, counter adversary information activities, deter adversary actions, and maintain trust and confidence of US population, and friends and allies

Maintain credibility and legitimacy of US/multinational partner military operations with audience

Figure II-1. Department of Defense Information Activities

b. Psychological Operations and Strategic Communication

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Roles, Responsibilities, and Relationships (1) SC consists of a focused USG effort to understand and engage key audiences to create, strengthen, or preserve conditions favorable for the advancement of USG interests, policies, and objectives through the use of coordinated programs, plans, themes, messages, and products synchronized with the actions of all instruments of national power. (2) PSYOP are the key capability that supports SC by influencing foreign audiences in support of US objectives. Given its focus on foreign TAs, PSYOP personnel should possess a good understanding of the language and culture of the TA and ensure this knowledge is effectively used in the preparation of PSYOP products. c. Psychological Operations and Information Operations (1) General. As a core capability of IO, PSYOP play a central role in the achievement of the JFC’s information objectives through its ability to induce or reinforce adversary attitudes and behavior favorable to these objectives. PSYOP can be particularly useful during pre- and post-combat operations, when other means of influence are restrained or not authorized. Because of its wide ranging impact, it is essential PSYOP be fully coordinated and synchronized with relevant activities and operations. (2) IO is the integrated employment of the core capabilities of electronic warfare (EW), computer network operations (CNO), PSYOP, military deception (MILDEC), and operations security (OPSEC), in concert with supporting and related capabilities to influence, disrupt, corrupt, or usurp adversarial human and automated decisionmaking while protecting our own. There are five supporting capabilities: information assurance, physical security, physical attack, counterintelligence, and combat camera (COMCAM), and three related capabilities: PA, CMO, and defense support to public diplomacy. PSYOP must be coordinated with counterintelligence, MILDEC, and OPSEC to ensure deconfliction control measures are in place, and that all capabilities within IO are coordinated to achieve the objectives established in planning. PSYOP effectiveness is increased by synchronizing the core, supporting, and related capabilities of IO; particularly CNO, MILDEC, CMO, PA, and EW. (3) In order to ensure all aspects of IO are properly integrated and synchronized into the combatant command planning process, an IO cell chief is chosen (in accordance with Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual [CJCSM] 1630.01, Joint Information Operations Force). This cell chief convenes meetings of the IO cell periodically in order to facilitate the integration of core, supporting, and related capabilities. Within the IO cell, the PSYOP representative integrates, coordinates, deconflicts, and synchronizes the use of PSYOP with other IO capabilities. Specific examples of this kind of interaction between PSYOP and the other IO core capabilities follow: For further guidance concerning IO, refer to JP 3-13, Information Operations.

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Chapter II (a) Psychological Operations and Computer Network Operations. CNO support PSYOP with dissemination assets to include interactive Internet activities. CNO activities can deny or degrade an adversary’s ability to access, report, and process information. This capability supports PSYOP by providing access to digital media within the information environment to reach intended targets. (b) Psychological Operations and Military Deception. PSYOP provides the JFC the ability to reduce the allocation of forces and resources required to deceive the adversary and facilitate mission accomplishment. PSYOP create and reinforce MILDEC actions that are executed to deliberately mislead adversary military decisionmakers about US military capabilities, intentions, and operations. MILDEC operations that integrate PSYOP targeting provide the JFC with the ability to influence the adversary to take specific actions (or inactions) giving the joint force the advantage. PSYOP support to MILDEC operations must be carefully considered by the commander and staff, weighing the likely benefits of a deception operation against a potential short- and long-term loss of credibility with the media or local audiences. (c) Psychological Operations and Operations Security. It is essential that PSYOP plans and messages are protected prior to execution through the proper use of information security, information assurance, physical security, and OPSEC. Additionally, it is essential during the effort to influence foreign audiences that PSYOP not reveal critical information or indicators of friendly operations to the adversary. (d) Psychological Operations and Electronic Warfare. EW platforms provide a means of disseminating PSYOP messages and shaping the information environment through the electronic dissemination of PSYOP products. The joint restricted frequency list deconflicts these two capabilities. When appropriate, EW platforms can also provide a means of denying enemy forces the ability to disseminate adversarial information. These platforms can also degrade the adversary’s ability to see, report, and process information by jamming selected frequencies. EW validates the assessment of PSYOP effectiveness by providing information on threat responses to broadcasts. d. Psychological Operations and Public Affairs (1) PSYOP are used to influence the attitudes, opinions, and behavior of foreign TAs in a manner favorable to US objectives. (2) Military PA forces plan, coordinate, and synchronize public information, command information, and community engagement activities and resources to support the commander’s operational objectives. Through timely dissemination of factual information to international and domestic audiences, PA puts operational actions in context, facilitates the development of informed perceptions about military operations among information consumers, and undermines adversarial information efforts. PA operations and activities shall not focus on directing or manipulating public actions or opinion.

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Roles, Responsibilities, and Relationships

(a) PA and PSYOP activities are separate and distinct, but they must support and reinforce each other, which requires coordination, synchronization, and occasionally deconfliction. These planning activities are generally accomplished in the IO working group, the IO cell, or other planning groups. In the event that formal planning groups are not established, informal coordination should be accomplished between these two capabilities as well as with other related capabilities. JFCs must ensure that appropriate coordination between PSYOP and PA activities are consistent with the DOD Principles of Information, policy or statutory limitation, and security. (b) PA is normally the source for official information for the media. Information disseminated by the joint force regardless of source or method of distribution will reach unintended audiences. Efforts of one capability must not undermine those of another. While PA will have no role in executing PSYOP operations, PA can use PSYOP products to educate the media about PSYOP missions, as appropriate.

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CHAPTER III
COMMAND AND CONTROL
“As the excited passions of hostile people are of themselves a powerful enemy, both the general and his government should use their best efforts to allay them.”
Lieutenant General Antoine-Henri Baron de Jomini Summary of the Art of War, 1838

1.

General

a. In accordance with SecDef and Forces for Unified Commands Assignment Tables, CDRUSSOCOM exercises COCOM over all Active Component (AC) PSYOP forces. CDRUSJFCOM exercises COCOM over all assigned RC PSYOP forces once they are activated. When directed by SecDef, the losing commander (CDRUSSOCOM or CDRUSJFCOM) transfers PSYOP forces to GCCs. When these forces are transferred, the command relationship of the gaining and losing commanders over those forces must be specified. In most cases that the gaining unit commander will have operational control (OPCON). PSYOP planning should consider the requirements to delegate directive authority for common support for PSYOP forces. b. Commanders centralize PSYOP planning at the combatant command due to its importance to the commander’s strategic concept. When a CCDR establishes a subordinate joint force they include PSYOP staff positions on the JFC’s staff. The inclusion of PSYOP staff positions on the JFC’s staff ensures nesting of supporting PSYOP plans with the CCDR’s plan. PSYOP forces required to execute the PSYOP plans are requested through SecDef in the same manner that other external forces are requested. c. During planning, the CCDRs identify the capabilities required to execute their assigned missions. CCDRs establish subordinate joint forces and designate the required subordinate components. The requested PSYOP force size and planned disposition may exceed the command and control (C2) capabilities of the joint force components. In these cases the CCDR may identify the requirement to establish a joint psychological operations task force (JPOTF) or psychological operations task force (POTF) as a component of the joint force. The CCDR may decide to establish the JPOTF or POTF as a component of an existing joint force component such as a joint special operations task force (JSOTF) or SO task force. PSYOP forces may be organized as a JPOTF or a psychological operations support element (PSE). Establishing a JPOTF gives the JFC flexibility in arranging the C2 structure of the attached or assigned PSYOP forces. The JFC may delegate OPCON of all PSYOP forces to the JPOTF or may exercise OPCON of specified PSYOP forces through the units or components to which they are assigned. (1) The JPOTF is responsible for providing PSYOP support to joint or multinational operations at the tactical and operational levels. During planning, the JPOTF coordinates with applicable Service, functional components, and staff elements to determine PSYOP requirements. During execution the JPOTF continues this coordination. The JPOTF may request direct liaison authority to coordinate and III-1

Chapter III synchronize operations with other USG agencies or departments, or multinational officials. (2) The JPOTF is also responsible for deconflicting all PSYOP that occur under the JTF and other commands as designated by the establishing authority. Deconfliction is accomplished through the PSYOP approval process, establishment of direct coordination lines, liaison, and the synchronization conducted by IO staffs. In the absence of a PSYOP component, the requirement to deconflict PSYOP is executed in the same manner as all operations are, in the operations staff sections. (3) Mission requirements will dictate the JPOTF organizational structure and the functions it will perform. It also may be organized as a combined joint psychological operations task force (CJPOTF) if multinational partners provide PSYOP staff personnel and forces to support operations. (a) A CJPOTF supports multinational military operations, as well as operations involving intergovernmental and regional organizations. (b) If US PSYOP forces are under the OPCON of a US commander, SecDef typically will delegate PSYOP product and dissemination approval authorities to the supported GCC in the execute order. The GCC may subdelegate PSYOP product approval authority to a US military officer who is serving as the commander of a multinational operation. If US PSYOP forces are under the OPCON of a non-US commander for the purposes of developing multinational products only, PSYOP product approval authority will remain with the GCC, be subdelegated to the senior US military officer or diplomatic official involved in the operation, or be subdelegated to the non-US commander, with SecDef approval. (c) An order (e.g., execute order, operation order, or fragmentary order) will often provide additional guidance for PSYOP product approval and dissemination/release procedures. The scope and limits of PSYOP activities and products will be provided. As an example the PSYOP scope (e.g., operational, tactical), means (e.g., satellite, Internet, or leaflets), TA (e.g., adversary leaders, foreign populace) or message content (e.g., humor, specific symbols, detainees’ photos) may be restricted to various levels of command. In all cases, the risk of unintended effects is weighed with ensuring there is a timely approval process/authority for commanders. d. PSYOP planners will identify TAs and PSYOP objectives, themes, activities, and products that support the JFC’s plan. Subordinate commanders will identify requirements for PSYOP forces to the JFC. Depending on mission requirements, PSYOP staff support may be provided to the commander of a subunified command, JTF, or component command to enhance planning and coordinating capability.

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Command and Control
PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS ORGANIZATIONS USCENTCOM (United States Central Command) activated a joint psychological operations task force (JPOTF) for Operation ENDURING FREEDOM on 4 October 2001. It was centered on the 8th Regional Psychological Operations (PSYOP) Battalion, with augmentation from the 3rd Dissemination PSYOP Battalion, the 9th Tactical PSYOP Battalion, and the 15th Tactical PSYOP Battalion (Reserve). Over time it grew to include support to Operation ENDURING FREEDOM throughout the USCENTCOM AOR [area of responsibility] as well as its major focus of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM. Eventually all of the active duty PSYOP battalions in the 4th PSYOP Group augmented the JPOTF as well as most of the reserve battalions from the 2nd and 7th PSYOP Groups. The USCENTCOM JPOTF organized itself into several subordinate units to better support all the operations in the USCENTCOM AOR. As of 2007, subordinate units included: JPOTFIraq, JPOTF-Afghanistan, PSYOP Support Element (PSE) - Horn of Africa, PSE-NAVCENT (United States Naval Forces, Central Command), and military information support teams in six different countries in the AOR. SOURCE: USCENTCOM PSYOP Officer June 2002 to July 2005

2.

Organizing Psychological Operations Forces

a. If the JFC determines that PSYOP planning and execution requires control by a component command with that mission as its sole purpose, then the JFC requests establishment of a JPOTF, POTF, or PSE. These may serve as a component or staff element of the JFC or as a subcomponent or staff element under an existing component such as a JSOTF. Control should favor centralized planning and direction and decentralized execution. Control is exercised from the lowest level that accomplishes the required coordination. Considerations for PSYOP may dictate that control be at high national levels. (1) A PSE is a tailored element that provides planning or PSYOP execution capability. The PSE size, composition, and capability are determined through mission analysis and the requirements of the assigned mission. The composition of a PSE can be multi-Service or interagency, depending on mission requirements. PSE command relationships, execution, and product approval authority are provided in an approved program or in an execute order. (2) An Army PSYOP battalion has C2 and product development capability. Production and dissemination capabilities are supported by Army PSYOP dissemination battalions, other service assets, third country military assets, or through commercial contract.

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Chapter III (3) Retention of OPCON of the JPOTF by the JFC and integration of its functions optimizes interaction with other operational activities and streamlines the approval process. (4) Dissemination assets, primarily PSYOP teams, may be attached in CONUS to deploying units, attached in theater based on mission requirements, or deployed with the JPOTF and remain in support of the entire joint force. When attached to a maneuver unit, tactical PSYOP forces normally are placed under the control of the maneuver unit commander. (5) Factors that will affect the size and composition of the PSYOP force include, but are not limited to: (a) Capability required. (b) Scope and duration of the operation. (c) Policy, funding, and foreign or HN sensitivities and their impact on other combatant command and supporting component objectives. For more information on Joint Force organizational options, refer to JP 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States, or JP 3-33, Joint Task Force Headquarters. b. If PSYOP planning and execution can be handled by augmenting the JFC’s staff, the joint force PSYOP officer will ensure that component staffs are aware of the PSYOP products available. Working through the various component operations staffs, the joint force PSYOP officer will ensure continuity of psychological objectives, and themes to stress and avoid. c. When deployed in support of joint force operations, EC-130J COMMANDO SOLO as a rule remains under the OPCON of the commander, JSOTF. Navy PSYOP dissemination assets include the ability to conduct PSYOP broadcasts on ultrahigh frequency (UHF), very high frequency (VHF), and high frequency (HF); leaflet/handbill reproduction capability; and psychological operations distribution unit (PDU)-5 leaflet canisters with the aircraft to deliver them. Navy assets normally remain under the OPCON of the Navy component commander. The Air Force PSYOP assets, leaflet canisters MK19 or PDU-5 with the aircraft to deliver them, typically remain under the OPCON of the Air Force component commander. Coordinating authority is granted between the components and the JPOTF to facilitate PSYOP dissemination. US Air Force (USAF) PSYOP personnel assigned to an Air Force air and space operations center IO team (IOT) plan activities intended to produce psychological effects and coordinate those efforts with the JPOTF. For further detail, refer to Appendix A, “Capabilities.”

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Command and Control

“. . . PSYOP (psychological operations) and COMMANDO SOLO. We have an EC-130 aircraft that is rigged out as a broadcasting studio. And it broadcasts — . . . we were broadcasting in Afghanti — in the various languages with Afghan music intermittently to put on a five-hour radio program covering all of Afghanistan in theater. We were running two fivehour broadcasts per day out of this aircraft, short wave and AM. The leaflet drops — . . . from 14 October to 21 October, the B-52s, which obviously dropped other things, dropped over 10 million leaflets across Afghanistan. And our MC-130s also were dropping leaflets there. The 4th PSYOP Group [Airborne] that you mentioned is down at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, and it’s a very unique operation of video, graphics arts, printed media, some very good professionals down there that work on the PSYOP themes that are approved here at national policy, at the State Department, et cetera.”
Mr. Robert Andrews, Principal Duty Assistant Secretary of Defense (Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict) Defense LINK News Transcript, December 12, 2001

d. The entire US military PSYOP capability is available for employment by the supported GCC. PSYOP units apportioned for theater planning purposes are identified in Annex D to the JSCP. e. Operations may require use of RC PSYOP forces. Early identification of PSYOP requirements through the Global Force Management Board is necessary to facilitate RC activation, processing, and training. Required RC PSYOP forces must be included in the time-phased force and deployment data (TPFDD), along with AC PSYOP forces; otherwise, data essential for Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) will not be available and deployment of forces required for the operations may be delayed. f. The high demand for PSYOP forces to support worldwide operations make reach-back a critical component for PSYOP success. Reach-back assets must be considered during planning to minimize transportation requirements and provide flexibility to support future operations. Improvements in technology will continue to increase the ability of PSYOP to support multiple geographic areas with limited assets. The US Army 4th Psychological Operations Group (POG) (Airborne) and USSOCOM Joint Military Information Support Command (JMISC) both have the ability to create products and electronically send them to forward locations for final production, either by military assets or by commercially contracted means. For further details concerning JOPES, refer to CJCSM 3122.01A, Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) Volume I, Planning Policies and Procedures, and CJCSM 3122.03C, Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) Volume II Planning Formats.

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CHAPTER IV
PLANNING
“Success will be less a matter of imposing one’s will and more a function of shaping behavior ― of friends, adversaries and, most importantly, the people in between.”
Secretary of Defense Robert Gates 26 November 2007

1. Joint Operation Planning and Phasing a. General (1) GEF and the JSCP set priorities for activities undertaken in the near term ― usually the period covered by budget execution (present through two years). The GEF is used mainly by the CCDRs and those who support them to guide the development of campaign and OPLANs. The JSCP specifically tasks CCDRs to develop OPLANs consistent with the GEF. These plans define how a CCDR will conduct all DOD activities within their AOR. (2) Joint planning integrates US military actions with other instruments of national power and multinational partners to achieve specified end states. This chapter focuses on security cooperation and joint operation planning. Joint operation planning includes contingency and crisis action planning and can result in campaign plans, OPLANs, or operation orders depending on the scope and complexity of the situation. Joint operation planning and planning for a campaign are not separate planning types or processes; rather, campaign planning represents the art of linking major operations, battles, and engagements in an operational design to accomplish theater strategic objectives. CCDRs translate national and theater strategy into strategic and operational concepts through the development of security cooperation strategies and implementation plans, and operation and campaign plans. PSYOP have significant impact on the JFC objectives as they involve the need to mobilize the civilian population, while simultaneously isolating the adversary, taking away its ability to muster popular support. For additional guidance on planning, refer to JP 5-0, Joint Operation Planning. b. Phasing. Phasing helps JFCs and staffs to visualize and think through the entire operation or campaign and to define requirements in terms of forces, resources, time, space, and purpose. Integration of PSYOP into the joint operation planning process assists in synchronizing planned PSYOP activities with other joint operations and the activities of the other instruments of national power to create the effects required to achieve objectives and attain the end state. For additional information on phasing see JP 5-0, Joint Operation Planning, and JP 3-0, Joint Operations.

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Chapter IV (1) Shape Phase. Joint, multinational, and various interagency activities are performed to shape, and deter adversaries from placing US interests at risk and to assure or solidify relationships with friends and allies. CCDRs are able to take shaping actions before committing forces to assist in determining the shape and character of potential future operations. In many cases, these actions enhance bonds between future multinational partners, increase understanding of the region, help ensure access when required, strengthen future multinational operations, and prevent crises from developing. Joint PSYOP can be key contributors to shaping the international security environment and are routinely employed to shape the operational environment during peacetime. Joint PSYOP may provide an effective means to deter adversary actions, build international partnerships, and prevent or contain local disruptions. PSYOP activities shall be based on the GEF and must be thoroughly integrated and consistent with the GCC’s security cooperation strategy and any other direction provided by the President or SecDef. The peacetime joint PSYOP program, executed as part of the GCC’s security cooperation implementation plan, is coordinated and integrated with each component and the country team in each country involved. When PSYOP forces are deployed under a GCC peacetime PSYOP program, approval authority for PSYOP products and activities is typically delegated to the chief of mission, who then further delegates the authority to a member of the staff. (2) Deter Phase. The intent of this phase is to deter undesirable adversary action by demonstrating the capabilities and resolve of the joint force. The objective is to convince adversaries that planned or potential actions that threaten US vital interests will result in outcomes that are decisively undesirable and cause alternative courses of action (COAs) more favorable to US objectives. During shape and deter phases the GCC expands partnerships, enhances relationships, and conducts actions to prepare for potential crises. Flexible deterrent options supported by PSYOP may be initiated in this phase as part of pre-hostility activities. (a) PSYOP can be executed aggressively and offensively in support of all the instruments of national power. (b) PSYOP are crafted to address unique circumstances with appropriate PSYOP objectives supported by PSYOP series (all products that pertain to a particular audience in support of a single objective). (3) During the seize initiative phase, the objectives of PSYOP forces may be: (a) Deploy a PSYOP force tailored to mission requirements with the capability to dominate the information environment early. (b) Advise the commander on supporting psychological actions throughout the operation. (c) Create and exploit opportunities.

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Planning (d) Provide the capability to communicate US and multinational intent. (e) Develop the situation by seizing the initiative in the environment thus, forcing the adversary to react without sufficient time to plan. (f) Influence TAs in the operational area. (g) Influencing TAs in support of unified actions that establish conditions conducive to political solutions by changing behaviors that will defuse or reduce factional tensions, recognize and preempt inherent dangers, and disrupt illegal activities. (h) Retain the initiative which requires planning beyond the initial operation and anticipating possible events. Follow-on forces are tailored to meet specific concerns of the long-term mission. Initiative requires delegating decision-making authority to the lowest practical level. (4) During the dominate phase, the objective of PSYOP forces may be: (a) Change behaviors of selected TAs that will generate support for US and multinational operations. (b) Illustrate the legitimacy and credibility of US and multinational systems and programs. (c) Lessen external support for an adversary — political, military, economical, and human. (d) Reduce interference with US and multinational operations. (e) Reduce casualties and collateral damage, and hasten a transition to postconflict operations. (5) During the stabilize phase, the objectives of PSYOP forces may be: (a) Change the perceptions and behavior of selected foreign TAs towards favoring US and multinational objectives. (b) Support the peacetime elements of US policy. (c) Support the GCC’s security cooperation strategy. (d) Support the US country team. (6) During the enable civil authority phase, the objectives of PSYOP forces may be:

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Chapter IV
PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS IN THE PERSIAN GULF Planning for psychological operations (PSYOP) began immediately after the [Iraqi] invasion of Kuwait [Operation DESERT SHIELD]. A PSYOP planning group consisting of military and civilian personnel from USCENTCOM (US Central Command), SOCOM (US Special Operations Command), and the 4th Psychological Operations Group (Airborne) was formed at USCENTCOM Headquarters at MacDill Air Force Base, FL, in early August of 1990. This group became the nucleus of the PSYOP command and control element that deployed to Saudi Arabia. Leaflet, radio, and loudspeaker operations were combined and this combination was key to the success of PSYOP. Leaflets were the most commonly used method of conveying PSYOP messages. Twenty-nine million leaflets consisting of 33 different messages were disseminated in the Kuwait theater of operations. Delivery means consisted of MC130, HC-130, A-6, F-16, B-52, and artillery. A building block approach for leaflet operations was used, with the first leaflet themes being ones of peace and brotherhood. Increasing the intensity of the PSYOP message as events evolved, leaflet themes transitioned to emphasizing the United Nations (UN) imposed 15 January deadline. After the UN deadline passed and Operation DESERT STORM began, themes emphasizing abandonment of equipment and desertion were used. Exploiting the effects of specific munitions leaflets were also used to inform Iraqi units that they were going to be bombed. Feedback from interviews with enemy prisoners of war validated the success of leaflet operations. “Voice of the Gulf” was the Coalition’s radio network that broadcast from ground based and airborne transmitters, 18 hours per day for 40 days. The radio script was prepared daily and provided news, countered Iraqi propaganda and disinformation, and encouraged Iraqi defection and surrender. Loudspeaker teams were used effectively throughout the theater. Each tactical maneuver brigade had loudspeaker PSYOP teams attached. Many of the 66 teams came from the Army Reserve Components. Loudspeaker teams accompanied units into Iraq and Kuwait, broadcasting tapes of prepared surrender messages. Messages were transmitted in Arabic and were developed by cross-cultural teams. These messages were similar to those on the leaflets being dropped. Iraqi soldiers were encouraged to surrender, were warned of impending bombing attacks, and told they would be treated humanely and fairly. Many Enemy Prisoners of War mentioned hearing the loudspeaker broadcasts in their area and surrendered to the Coalition forces because they feared more bombing. SOURCE: Final Report to Congress Conduct of the Persian Gulf War, April 1992

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Planning (a) Support multinational, OGA, intergovernmental organization (IGO), and nongovernmental organization (NGO) participants. (b) Change the behavior of a specific TA that can support the accomplishment of US and local civil authority’s objectives. (c) Support the GCC’s security cooperation strategy. (d) Support the US country team. 2. Planning Considerations

a. General. To plan for the effective employment of PSYOP, JFCs and their staffs must possess a thorough knowledge of national security policy and objectives, as well as national and theater military objectives. In addition, PSYOP planners must possess joint operation planning skills, with knowledge of PSYOP doctrine, tactics, techniques, procedures, and force structure; and a thorough understanding of the customs, morals, and values of the foreign TA. They must be able to integrate with IO and related activities. PSYOP planners must understand SC as a means to advance national interests and objectives through the use of coordinated information, themes, plans, programs, and actions synchronized with other instruments of national power. They must ensure PSYOP planning is consistent with IO, PA, and DSPD planning as well as overall USG objectives. In addition, they must ensure all PSYOP activities are closely coordinated and synchronized to ensure that consistent themes and messages are communicated to TAs. Lessons learned in PSYOP planning include: (1) Integrated PSYOP planning occurs at the onset of the planning stage of operations and continues throughout the remaining stages to mitigate the effects of potentially rapidly changing political and diplomatic circumstances. (2) Positive psychological effects increase when PSYOP forces are integrated with conventional forces. PSYOP forces use their knowledge of local customs and attitudes to prepare conventional forces for the cultural context of their operations. Conventional forces apply that information which reinforces PSYOP messages and themes. This result is more profound in prolonged stability operations where there is sufficient time to generate observable effects. (3) There is a great need to share information between agencies and with multinational partners to ensure that PSYOP are part of a well-orchestrated information effort that generates consistent messages across multiple media outlets. The appropriate delegation of PSYOP approval authority to the lowest practical level, enables the timely delivery of PSYOP products. b. Requesting PSYOP Forces. CCDRs clearly articulate PSYOP support requirements in terms of the required capabilities. Concise capability requirements enable force providers to provide the right PSYOP force at the right time and place.

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(1) CCDRs submit requests for PSYOP forces to the Joint Staff. The Joint Staff is responsible for validating PSYOP force requests and will assign either USSOCOM or United States Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM) as the Joint Force Provider, depending on the activity, type of forces necessary, and availability. USSOCOM PSYOP forces will predominately support SO missions and contingency operations, and USJFCOM PSYOP forces will predominately provide support to conventional forces. However, based on the requirement or availability of forces, the exact composition of the force may be a mixture of USSOCOM and USJFCOM PSYOP forces. (2) Requests for personnel to assist in conducting PSYOP assessments, planning efforts, or support to exercises, will be submitted by CCDRs directly to USSOCOM or USJFCOM with an info copy provided to the Joint Staff. These requests follow the same guidance above. c. Military Engagement, Security Cooperation, and Deterrence (1) To be effective, peacetime military PSYOP are conducted in accordance with DODD S-3321.1, Overt Psychological Operations Conducted by the Military Services in Peacetime and in Contingencies Short of Declared War (U), or other approved programs, and require interagency coordination and authorization at the national level. Actions that can be applied to meet military engagement, security cooperation, and deterrence objectives and can be supported by joint PSYOP include foreign internal defense (FID), security assistance, and humanitarian and civic assistance, antiterrorism, DOD support to counterdrug operations, show of force operations, and arms control. (2) Security cooperation strategies and implementation plans integrate diplomatic, informational, military, and economic activities involving other nations intended to shape the security environment in peacetime. Based on guidance from the SecDef and CJCS, the CCDRs develop plans and employ forces and personnel in peacetime to protect and promote US interests and regional objectives. Generally, the CCDRs, Services, and DOD agencies will develop or update security cooperation strategies, annually. The Services and DOD agencies will coordinate their strategies with the CCDRs to ensure that they support and complement the CCDRs’ strategies and implementation plans. (a) Peacetime PSYOP programs shall be submitted to the Joint Staff for each fiscal year concurrent with the security cooperation strategies. As a minimum, they will contain theater objectives, priority countries, information themes encouraged to employ PSYOP in peacetime engagement activities including, but not limited to, conducting military-to-military PSYOP programs and support to combating terrorism and counterproliferation (CP) activities.

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Planning

Military Engagement, Security Cooperation, and Deterrence “Military engagement, security cooperation, and deterrence activities encompass a wide range of actions where the military instrument of national power is tasked to support OGAs (other government agencies) and cooperate with IGOs (intergovernmental organizations) (e.g., UN [United Nations], NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization]) and other countries to protect and enhance national security interests and deter conflict. These operations usually involve a combination of military forces and capabilities as well as the efforts of OGAs, IGOs, and NGOs (nongovernmental organizations) in a complementary fashion. Because DOS (Department of State) is frequently the federal agency with lead responsibility and nearly always is a principal player in these activities, JFCs (joint force commanders) should maintain a working relationship with the chiefs of the US diplomatic missions in their area. Commanders and their staffs should establish contact and maintain a dialogue with pertinent OGAs, IGOs, and NGOs to share information and facilitate future operations.”
JP 3-0, Joint Operations

(b) Peacetime PSYOP programs must be approved by the ASD(SO/LIC&IC) before execution. As appropriate, PSYOP activities will be coordinated with interagency organizations to ensure coherency with other USG efforts. For further details concerning security cooperation planning, refer to the GEF, and JP 30, Joint Operations. d. Crisis Response and Limited Contingencies. PSYOP can be a decisive capability in crisis response and limited contingency operations when integrated in military operations. When national strategies are unable to influence a deteriorating or potentially hostile situation, military force or threat of its use may be required to demonstrate US resolve and capability, to support the other instruments of national power, or to terminate the situation on favorable terms. PSYOP support joint and multinational activities across the range of military operations to include strikes and raids, counterterrorism (CT), FID, enforcement of sanctions, maritime intercept operations, peace operations (e.g., peace enforcement operations), noncombatant evacuation operations, or other flexible deterrent options as directed. In military operations involving the use or threat of force, PSYOP offer SecDef options for engagement that potentially avoid the employment of additional combat forces, reduce the period of confrontation, and enhance the diplomatic, informational, military, and economic instruments of national power. Examples of PSYOP activities are shown in Figure IV-1.

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EXAMPLES OF JOINT MILITARY PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS ACTIVITIES ACROSS THE RANGE OF MILITARY OPERATIONS

MILITARY ENGAGEMENT, SECURITY COOPERATION, AND DETERRENCE Modify the behavior of selected target audiences toward US and multinational capabilities Support the peacetime elements of US national policy objectives, national security strategy, and national military strategy Support the geographic combatant commander’s security strategy objectives Support the objectives of the country team Promote the ability of the host nation to defend itself against internal and external insurgencies and terrorism by fostering reliable military forces and encouraging empathy between host nation armed forces and the civilian populace

CRISIS RESPONSE AND LIMITED CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS Mobilize popular support for US and multinational military operations Gain and sustain popular belief in and support for US and multinational political systems (including ideology and infrastructure) and political, social, and economic programs Attack the legitimacy and credibility of the adversary political systems Publicize beneficial reforms and programs to be implemented after defeat of the adversary Shift the loyalty of adversary forces and their supporters to the friendly powers Deter adversary powers or groups from initiating actions detrimental to the interests of the US, its allies, or the conduct of friendly military operations Promote cessation of hostilities to reduce casualties on both sides, reduce collateral damage, and enhance transition to post-hostilities

MAJOR OPERATIONS AND CAMPAIGNS

Explain US policies, aims, and objectives Arouse foreign public opinion or political pressures for, or against, a military operation Influence the development of adversary strategy and tactics Amplify economic and other nonviolent forms of sanctions against an adversary Undermine confidence in the adversary leadership Lower the morale and combat efficiency of adversary soldiers Increase the psychological impact of US and multinational combat power Support military deception and operations security Counter hostile information activities

Figure IV-1. Examples of Joint Military Psychological Operations Activities Across the Range of Military Operations

e. Major Operations and Campaigns. CCDR activities executed during the shape phase assist in determining the character of future operations. The most comprehensive

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Planning activity is preparing the operational area, which involves intelligence operations to understand clearly the capabilities, intentions, and possible actions of potential adversaries, as well as the geography, weather, demographics, and culture(s) of the operational area. During the deter phase, PSYOP provides powerful operational leverage in support of flexible deterrent options. PSYOP forces can be employed to gather information, undermine a potential opponent’s will or capacity to wage war, and enhance the capabilities of multinational forces. PSYOP activities during war are shown in Figure IV-2. f. Interagency and Multinational Coordination (1) Coordination of DOD PSYOP with other USG agencies facilitates the communication of the objectives of each organization and synchronization of effort. The joint interagency coordination group (JIACG) at the combatant command headquarters is an interagency staff group that establishes regular, timely, and collaborative working relationships between civilian and military operational planners. The JIACG will assist the JTF, when formed, to provide interagency connectivity by either deploying forward to the JTF location or by providing a reachback point of contact at the combatant command location. PSYOP planners at the JTF level should coordinate with OGAs through the JIACG or designated centers, groups, bureaus, cells, offices, elements, boards, working groups, and planning teams. The JIACG does not veto or approve plans but provides inputs and assists with coordination of those plans. (2) Department of State. DOS’s Bureau of International Information Programs (IIP) engages audiences on issues of foreign policy, society, and values to help create an environment receptive to US national interests. IIP contributes to USG SC efforts by interacting with foreign opinion makers and others through a wide range of print and electronic outreach materials published in various languages. IIP also provides information outreach support to US embassies and consulates in more than 140 countries worldwide. The office’s products and services are uniquely designed to support DOS’s initiatives, as well as those of other US foreign policy organizations. It also manages information resource centers overseas and offers reference specialists based in Washington, DC, to answer specialized information queries from abroad. (3) In addition to DOS, PSYOP should be coordinated with other USG agencies, including, but not limited to, the Central Intelligence Agency; International Broadcasting Bureau; Broadcasting Board of Governors; Departments of Commerce, Homeland Security, Transportation, Energy, and Justice; Drug Enforcement Administration; and the US Coast Guard. (4) When PSYOP are planned during multinational operations, planners must coordinate with multinational partners to ensure the attainment of US and multinational security objectives.

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Chapter IV

SPECIFIC PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS GUIDANCE AND PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS
 Convey to the target audience an awareness of US resolve to attain

national security objectives
 Consider and plan for the early conduct of military psychological

operations (PSYOP) and, if required, use of host-nation resources and nonPSYOP military assets for media production and dissemination; e.g., use of Navy ship printing facilities for production of PSYOP products
 Plan the movement of PSYOP specific equipment  Integrate PSYOP measures into counter command and control plans  Assist multinational military and/or civilian governmental organizations in

developing coordinated PSYOP programs
 Use host-nation and US country teams to gain local support  Deter and discourage would-be aggressors from threatening vital US

interests
 Include the use of the Psychological Operations Automated System  Maintain the capability to accomplish US-only objectives when PSYOP

forces and capabilities are provided to multinational commands
 Consider the effects of terrain, weather, and a chemical, biological,

radiological, and nuclear environment on forces, equipment, and the planned method for dissemination of PSYOP products
 Coordinate plans with staff elements or agencies involved with public

information or information operations
 Integrate tactical exploitation of national capabilities and assets before and

Planning For more on interagency and multinational operations, refer to Chapter VI, “Employment.” For NATO doctrine on PSYOP, ratified by the United States, see Allied Joint Publication -3.10.1, Allied Joint Doctrine for Psychological Operations. 3. Guidance a. As plans are developed the following concepts should be kept in mind. (1) Persuasive Communications. All communications that systematically convey information with the intent of affecting the attitudes, perceptions, and behaviors of the TA are persuasive communications. (2) Command Disruption. Disruption of communications systems not only directly interferes with the capabilities of an adversary to succeed in combat but also can have a serious impact upon the morale, cohesion, discipline, and public support essential to efficient operations. (3) Counterinformation. Competing parties can deny opponents the information they require to formulate decisions. The DOD Information Security Program establishes procedures to protect classified information, and the OPSEC program establishes measures to deny unclassified but sensitive indicators of friendly activities, capabilities, and intentions. (4) Intelligence Shaping. It is possible to convey or deny data to opposing intelligence systems with the objective of causing opposing analysts to derive desired judgments. These judgments interact with the perceptions of opposing planners and decisionmakers to influence estimates upon which capabilities, intentions, and actions are based. b. The following guidance is provided for the development of tab A, (Psychological Operations) to appendix 3, (Information Operations) to annex C, (Operations) of plans and orders. Additional information on tab A is provided in Appendix B, “Considerations for Tab A, (Psychological Operations) to Appendix 3, (Information Operations) to Annex C, (Operations).” (1) Research and Analysis. Research is conducted and requisite information and relevant data are collected and analyzed to plan PSYOP. The intelligence, information, and data are further assessed to determine competing and complementary US objectives and strategies, and the supportability of COAs to achieve these objectives from a PSYOP standpoint. The planner determines key questions about friendly, neutral, and adversary intentions, capabilities, and activities. The answers to these key questions are termed critical information and are used to develop requirements for intelligence collection and analysis. (2) Development. The perceptions, knowledge, and factors that influence particular targets must be evaluated. Both the sources upon which particular targets rely

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Chapter IV and the US ability to influence those sources must be determined. Target information interests and activities need to be identified. Information and indicators that should be conveyed and denied to targets to reinforce desired appreciations and preserve essential secrecy must be ascertained. Execution means and methods to convey or deny information and indicators have to be selected. A plan supporting all phases of a CCDR’s campaign should address TAs, and include theater and national-level objectives. Planners should identify the assets necessary to execute the plan and list them in OPLAN TPFDDs; otherwise, it may become difficult to obtain these assets in time to execute the plan. Planners should also develop a tracking mechanism to monitor the dissemination or PSYOP activities. c. Production Requirements. The forces, assets, and capabilities needed to produce PSYOP products must be analyzed and determined during the request for forces (RFF) or request for deployment order (RDO) process. These factors must be compared to the forces assigned or available for planning. Tasks for available PSYOP resources, including specific requirements, also must be provided on the RFF or RDO for approval to the Joint Staff. Requirements for PSYOP resources in excess of those available to the combatant command will be forwarded to the Joint Staff. 4. Support of Irregular Warfare

a. General. Irregular warfare (IW) is defined as “a violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant populations. IW favors indirect and asymmetric approaches, though it may employ the full range of military and other capabilities, in order to erode an adversary’s power, influence, and will.” (1) Some of the operations and activities that can be conducted as part of IW are insurgency; counterinsurgency (COIN); unconventional warfare (UW); terrorism; CT; FID; stability, security, transition, and reconstruction operations; PSYOP; CMO; intelligence and counterintelligence activities; transnational criminal activities, including drug trafficking, illicit arms dealing, and illegal financial transactions, that support or sustain IW; and law enforcement activities focused on countering irregular adversaries. (Some IW activities, such as terrorism and transnational crime, violate international law. US law and national policy prohibit US military forces or OGAs from engaging in or supporting such activities. However, since our adversaries employ terrorism and transnational criminal activities against the interests of the United States and its partners, these activities are included below as examples of the range of operations and activities that can be conducted as part of IW.) IW provides a logical, long-term framework for analyzing the irregular threat and is both a form of armed conflict and warfare. (2) IW is complex and focuses on the control or influence of populations, not on the control of an adversary’s forces or territory. Ultimately, IW is a political struggle for control or influence over, and the support of, a relevant population. The factions involved in the conflict seek to undermine their adversaries’ legitimacy and credibility and to isolate their adversaries from the relevant populations and their external

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Planning supporters. At the same time, they also seek to strengthen their own legitimacy and credibility to exercise authority over that same population. (3) When PSYOP occur in IW, their role usually is much greater than during major operations and campaigns. They impact directly on the operational focus of IW in ways unlike that of combat operations. b. Approaches. Conducting IW focuses on two approaches – direct and indirect. A JFC will often conduct both approaches simultaneously to defeat our adversaries and those of our partners. (1) Direct Approach. The direct approach addresses the requirement to pursue adversaries, and their infrastructure and resources. Some adversaries, such as terrorists and insurgents fighting for a religious or tribal cause, may be so committed that they simply cannot be persuaded or coerced into laying down their arms; these individuals must be either killed or captured. (2) Indirect Approach. PSYOP are key supporting operations to each contextual application of indirect approaches to executing IW. The indirect approach has multiple applications within the context of IW: (a) Focus on addressing the underlying economic, political, cultural, or security conditions that fuel the grievances of the population, rather than on applying military power directly against the military and paramilitary forces of adversaries. Both approaches are necessary, but the direct application of military power is unlikely to be decisive. (b) Disturb, disrupt, and displace adversaries by attacking them physically and psychologically where they are most vulnerable and unsuspecting, rather than attacking where they are strongest or in the manner they expect. (c) Empower, enable, and leverage interagency and other partners to attack adversaries militarily or confront them nonmilitarily, rather than relying on direct and unilateral military confrontation by US joint forces. (d) Take actions with or against third-party states or armed groups to influence adversaries, rather than taking actions to influence adversaries directly. (e) Attack adversaries using a combination of conventional and nonconventional methods and means rather than relying only on conventional military forces. Nonconventional methods and means might include clandestine or covert actions, operations in combination with irregular forces, or the nonconventional use of conventional capabilities. (f) Subvert the power and influence of adversaries over the relevant populations by isolating them physically and psychologically from their local and

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Chapter IV international support through the use of PSYOP, public diplomacy, and PA activities; security operations; population and resource control measures; and other means. c. Psychological Operations and IW. The ideological and political factors associated with IW create a fertile field for psychological operations. Examples of PSYOP applications to selected activities within IW are: (1) FID. PSYOP are used to promote the ability of the HN to defend itself against internal and external insurgencies and terrorism by fostering reliable military forces and encouraging empathy between HN armed forces and the civilian populace. PSYOP also may be used to modify the behavior of selected target audiences toward US and multinational capabilities. The main objectives of PSYOP during FID are to build and maintain support for the host government while decreasing support for insurgents. (2) CT. PSYOP are an essential part of the capabilities required for CT, in particular in application of the indirect approach to shape, stabilize, and influence the environment in which violent extremist organizations (VEOs) operate. CT focuses on populations, and in some operational areas, the information presented can determine which side will gain the favor of public opinion. Terrorist groups have gained sympathy and support of moderate audiences through disinformation partly based on their propaganda focusing on miscues of the friendly forces. In CT operations, TA identification and the use of PSYOP to influence the TAs’ behavior are important. Within an operational area there may be several TAs and multiple synchronized themes, messages, and means of delivery required for each. The intent of PSYOP in CT operations is to shape and influence the terrorist network’s informational environment. (3) Stability Operations. Successful execution of stability operations tasks depends on informing the local populace and influencing attitudes to secure the trust and confidence of the population. PSYOP exerts significant influence on foreign TAs. (4) COIN Operations. PSYOP can influence foreign populations through information to influence attitudes and behavior and to obtain compliance or noninterference with friendly joint operations. PSYOP can provide public information to support humanitarian activities, ease suffering, and restore or maintain civil order. PSYOP can serve as the supported commander’s voice to foreign populations by conveying the JFC’s intent. (5) UW. UW involves ideological, religious, political, economic, and social factors which promote intense, emotional partisanship. These factors, associated with armed resistance activity, create a fertile field for PSYOP ― a critical component of UW operations. PSYOP planning should begin early.

a. US military PSYOP are developed and executed through a multiphase approach. The joint PSYOP process is a standard framework by which PSYOP assets and critical enablers plan, execute, and evaluate PSYOP with proficiency and consistency throughout major campaigns, operations, and peacetime engagements. The integration and execution of PSYOP hinge upon the proper implementation of this process. b. The joint PSYOP process consists of seven phases: planning; TAA; series development; product development and design; approval; production, distribution, dissemination; and evaluation. Each of these phases is designed to apply to any type or level of operation. Collectively, the phases address important considerations and include the necessary activities for the proper integration of PSYOP with the CCDR’s military strategy and mission. 2. Planning: Phase I

a. CCDRs are required to obtain approval prior to conducting PSYOP. To gain approval, the CCDR submits a proposed PSYOP program(s) through the Joint Staff to the Office of the Secretary of Defense for interagency coordination and SecDef approval. CJCSI 3110.05D, Joint Psychological Operations Supplement to the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan FY 2006 contains a list of PSYOP programs approved for use by the CCDRs for SecDef approved missions, operations, and UCP directed activities. Some of these programs include security institution building, and operations such as maritime interdiction, noncombatant evacuation, counterdrug, and FHA However, PSYOP programs can be proposed to meet whatever unique operational need or situation arises for the CCDRs. b. Peacetime. PSYOP programs are integrated with the TCP. The TCP reflects national security and defense strategies and planning guidance. PSYOP programs are devised to support both the GCC’s objectives in the region and the embassies’ country plans. The Joint Staff forwards proposed PSYOP programs to the Office of the ASD(SO/LIC&IC) for review, interagency coordination, and USD(P) approval. The appropriate combatant command receives the approved PSYOP program from the Joint Staff to execute. Peacetime PSYOP planning facilitates the transition to contingency

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Chapter V planning by integrating knowledge and experience of the operational area into the joint planning processes. c. Contingencies and Major Operations. PSYOP programs are designed to support all phases of a campaign or OPLAN. During contingencies, CCDRs may submit their PSYOP program as part of their overall OPLANs. The Joint Staff forwards all OPLANs to the Office of the Secretary of Defense for review, interagency coordination, and execution authority. The Office of the ASD(SO/LIC&IC) reviews and staffs the PSYOP portions of the OPLANs through the interagency coordination process. SecDef approves the PSYOP program normally as part of the OPLAN. An execute order is sent to the combatant command containing approval for the PSYOP program, the authority to execute PSYOP, the approval authority for products, and other related guidance. If there is a need to conduct PSYOP prior to gaining approval for an OPLAN, the CCDR submits a proposed PSYOP program in accordance with the procedures used during peacetime. d. The National Security Strategy, National Military Strategy, UCP, GEF, and the JSCP provide guidance to the geographic combatant commands to devise theater strategies. Theater strategies form the basis for employment planning, drive peacetime planning, and provide a point of departure for force projection operations and general war planning. PSYOP planners on the theater special operations command (TSOC) staff are responsible for devising specific execution strategies and PSYOP objectives to meet the mission requirements. A PSYOP program describes these in conjunction with establishing the appropriate authorities and guidelines that reflect precisely national policy objectives and the CCDR’s intent and objectives. In addition to objectives and themes, national policies for PSYOP execution include the attribution posture the USG takes in acknowledging responsibility for PSYOP activities. US involvement can be open, partially (technical assistance only) or not acknowledged at all as determined by the CCDR. The attribution posture allows the commander to attribute actions to US, concurring partner nations, or, in the case of sensitive activities, acknowledged as soon as operationally feasible. e. A PSYOP program (see Figure V-1) provides the required SecDef guidance for PSYOP execution. All PSYOP actions, products, and messages are required to comply with, complement, and adhere to the stated parameters in the approved PSYOP program. PSYOP objectives, usually determined by the highest-level PSYOP element involved in the operation (e.g., CCDR), provide the framework for developing the PSYOP plan. f. The goal of PSYOP planning is to integrate PSYOP into the commander’s vision and CONOPS. PSYOP programs are initiated as a result of the first phase of the PSYOP process. These programs are developed by the executing element and continue through subsequent phases. Staff planners adjust the PSYOP plan as necessary to support the commander’s objectives.

g. PSYOP programs become part of the TCP or OPLAN. Further PSYOP planning is based on the commander’s objectives and takes into account the key components of an approved PSYOP program including PSYOP objectives, potential TAs, themes to stress and themes to avoid, the appropriate attribution status, the necessary dissemination platforms for PSYOP messages, and the choices of media authorized. Phase I activities are summarized in Figure V-2. 3. Target Audience Analysis: Phase II

a. An approved PSYOP program contains a list of potential foreign TAs. During this phase, the JPOTF, or other designated PSYOP element analyzes these foreign groups and individuals by following a model specifically tailored for PSYOP. Much of the data required to initiate and complete a thorough analysis of potential TAs are obtained through the supported commander’s collection efforts. These requirements are determined early in the planning phase as intelligence organizations and other enablers provide much of the necessary data and information. The data are derived from a multitude of classified and open sources, such as finished intelligence, unit documentation, and special studies, or through technological means and assessments. b. During this phase of the PSYOP process, foreign groups or individuals are examined carefully and closely for their ability to be influenced. This provides insights on how best to persuade the TA to change its behavior to one that is more favorable to US interests. The results of TAA provide the foundation for the remaining phases of the

joint PSYOP process which in turn allows for the achievement of the objectives expressed in the supporting PSYOP program(s). Analysis does not stop but continues throughout the entire operation, updating information as information is learned; the environment changes; and new TAs are required or selected. 4. Series Development: Phase III

The information learned as a result of TAA is used in the development of PSYOP products, actions, or series. PSYOP personnel design a series of products and actions, determine the appropriate mix of media, and develop an execution plan. Each series focuses on a single objective and TA. Series are reviewed for their suitability, length or duration, potential to affect the intended audience, accuracy of persuasive arguments or techniques to influence behavior change, and the resources available to execute them. 5. Product Development and Design: Phase IV

The work completed during the planning, analysis, and series development phases are vital for designing the prototypes of PSYOP products. There are three categories of PSYOP products: visual, audio, and audio-visual used to target selected audiences. Fixed and deployable US PSYOP capabilities, assets belonging to partner nations, and commercial vendors provide the technical expertise and tools to design and create all types of products. The PSYOP program lists the types of media including the use of

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Joint Psychological Operations Process electronic messages that are approved for production and dissemination to support the CCDR’s mission. During phase IV, evaluating the TA’s understanding and acceptance of the arguments conveyed in a PSYOP product is a key task. Pretesting products also helps establish a foundation for conducting post testing of entire series after dissemination occurs. 6. Approval: Phase V

A judicious and efficient approval process for PSYOP series and the management of the series development and approval process are fundamental in providing supporting PSYOP to emerging, ongoing, and future operations. During phase V, PSYOP series undergo a formal internal review by PSYOP personnel. The commander of the PSYOP unit producing the series is the first official approving authority in the PSYOP approval process. The potential of the series to achieve the desired outcome and the continuity of messages and media are judged. Once approved by the PSYOP commander, the series is formally submitted through an established approval process to obtain final approval for production and dissemination. As the series passes through the approval process, action officers responsible for obtaining approval of the series at each echelon, maintain visibility of the series until returned to the originating unit. PSYOP series are approved at the lowest level of command as dictated by SecDef deployment order. Final approval may reside at the CCDR, JFC, JTF, or by maneuver unit commanders to assist in the timely approval and subsequent execution of PSYOP series. 7. Production, Distribution, and Dissemination: Phase VI

a. PSYOP have organic production assets, fixed and mobile, and have the ability to request other USG resources or locally controlled resources within theater. Once production is complete, products are transferred to the disseminating unit or agency in accordance with a predetermined timeline. Products are distributed via air or ground transport, or transmitted digitally via secure means or through multiple means. Products are distributed using US military or coalition modes of transportation, HN assets or nationalized enterprises, commercial vendors, NGOs, OGAs, or a combination of these modes. b. The most appropriate dissemination means are determined through TAA, and intelligence about the operational area. Radio and television (TV) broadcasts, the Internet, aerial leaflet drops, and loudspeaker transmissions are some of the means used throughout the world to disseminate PSYOP messages. PSYOP messages also are communicated through preplanned face-to-face contact with the local populace. Through an understanding of the local culture, customs, and morals, PSYOP personnel communicate confidently with local populace. Repeated face-to-face communication with local leaders, key communicators, and citizens is the most effective technique to support the commander’s mission.

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Chapter V 8. Evaluation: Phase VII

a. Assessing the effects of PSYOP series on TAs relies on PSYOP impact indicators and analyses produced in earlier phases. Initial assessment criteria are established in Phase I and are refined in Phase II. PSYOP assessment criteria support the commander’s MOEs, and help determine the effects of an operation. PSYOP assessment criteria are focused on the achievement of supporting PSYOP objectives by TAs. PSYOP have an established procedure to evaluate the effectiveness. They should continuously assess the effectiveness of PSYOP series on achieving the commander’s objectives. b. The impact of PSYOP series are evaluated within the context of competing information, spontaneous events, and other uncontrollable environmental and psychological factors that influence TA behavior. Unanticipated and spontaneous events have potential to influence a group’s behavior and contribute to or undermine objective accomplishment. Series evaluation assists in focusing TAA and provides the basis to adjust or maintain series. The results of the evaluation are thus two-fold as they: (1) Yield substantive information about the trends toward achieving the supporting PSYOP objectives. (2) Contribute data that are relevant for the commander’s overall MOEs.

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CHAPTER VI
EMPLOYMENT
“The nation that will insist on drawing a broad line of demarcation between the fighting man and the thinking man is liable to have its fighting done by fools and its thinking done by cowards.”
Sir William Francis Butler, 19th Century

1.

Support to Unified Action

a. PSYOP are integrated in joint and multinational military operations as well as actions conducted by other designated governmental agencies. PSYOP are employed across the range of military operations in both conventional and SO activities. To be effective, PSYOP must be fully integrated with the supported organization’s planning and decision-making activities. b. PSYOP are a key capability in furthering US endeavors to deter aggression, and to maximize the commander’s efforts to shape the operational environment, insert combat forces, neutralize the threat, and secure the region. When PSYOP are integrated properly, the risk to friendly forces is minimized and collateral damage and expenditures of assets can be significantly reduced. CCDRs also incorporate PSYOP into activities to support military engagement, security cooperation, and deterrence. In these efforts, it is common for PSYOP to be used as a primary means to inform and influence. When authorized, PSYOP forces may be used domestically to assist lead federal agencies during disaster relief and crisis management by informing the domestic population. 2. Psychological Operations and the Range of Military Operations

a. General. In response to instability or turmoil that jeopardize US objectives in a region, the joint force can be engaged in multiple operations simultaneously across the range of military operations, and during different phases. In these situations, PSYOP can be employed continuously in either a supported or supporting role. Employing PSYOP in conjunction with other activities to further national security goals in specific locations may prevent escalation of hostilities, shorten the duration of hostilities, or hasten a return to normalcy. b. Military Engagement, Security Cooperation, and Deterrence. As an information activity in military engagement, security cooperation, and deterrence, PSYOP are employed to shape environments and influence relevant audiences to discourage armed conflict. The goal should be to establish and maintain a concerted and coordinated information effort with multinational partners, thus increasing the capability to successfully influence and inform relevant populations. Enhancing multinational partner information activities can multiply the effectiveness of the indirect approach. PSYOP can reduce the need for a lethal response to adversary actions. c. Crisis Response and Limited Contingency Operations. During these operations, PSYOP focus on mitigating the effects of the crisis and stabilizing the

operational environment. They are characterized by time-sensitive planning and rapid deployment in support of USG or multinational operations. d. Major Operations and Campaigns. PSYOP are planned and integrated throughout all phases of operations or campaigns. During major operations, PSYOP are integrated with both conventional and SO activities. 3. Psychological Operations and Special Operations Activities

a. SO are relevant across the range of military operations and the nine SO core tasks, including PSYOP (see Figure VI-1) should be integral parts of a theater strategy, OPLAN, or campaign plan. While SO can be conducted unilaterally in support of specific theater or national objectives, the majority of SO are designed and conducted to enhance the likelihood of success of the overall theater campaign. b. SO usually are most effective when integrated with operations conducted by conventional forces. PSYOP may support the other SO core tasks in the following ways: (1) Direct Action (DA). DA are short-duration strikes and other small-scale offensive actions conducted as a special operation in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive environments and which employ specialized military capabilities to seize, destroy, capture, exploit, recover, or damage designated targets. PSYOP can be integrated in all DA activities, employing within the physical and political risks, operational techniques, and use of force to achieve specific objectives. PSYOP can increase the collection of relevant information used to shape and determine if, when, or

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Employment where DA activities are required. PSYOP can increase the success of DA strikes and raids by decreasing civilian interference, target resistance, and the need for on-site consequence management through cultural and linguistic expertise in direct (face-to-face) communication. PSYOP forces collect video, still imagery, and voice data that can be used to counter adversary misinformation and reduce the need for future DA activities by informing audiences of DA success, capabilities, and legitimacy. (2) Special Reconnaissance (SR). SR are actions conducted as a special operation in hostile, denied, or a politically sensitive environment to collect or verify defined or time-sensitive information of strategic or operational significance. PSYOP can be integrated in the four SR activities by providing an additive capability to SOF conducting SR actions. PSYOP can facilitate target acquisition through the collection of information on target locations, activities, and potential actions. PSYOP assessments can be used as rapidly produced time-sensitive intelligence that assist the development or refinement of SR area assessments and support SR actions. In the event of a compromise, PSYOP can facilitate recovery of personnel and equipment. Upon completion of target or threat assessment, PSYOP activities should be considered when determining the most effective means of engagement. (3) UW. UW are activities conducted to enable a resistance movement or insurgency to coerce, disrupt, or overthrow a government or occupying power by operating through or with an underground, auxiliary, and guerrilla force in a denied area. UW is unique in that it is a SO that can either be conducted as part of a GCC overall theater campaign, or as an independent, subordinate campaign. When conducted independently, the primary focus of UW is on political-military and psychological objectives. PSYOP are employed to advise, assist, and train indigenous or surrogate forces in developing and implementing an effective PSYOP capability. When required, PSYOP are employed to inform, direct, and influence key audiences. The end state is an irregular force capable of conducting information activities to recruit, legitimize, establish, and maintain popular support for the resistance. For further guidance concerning DA, SR, and UW, refer to JP 3-05, Joint Special Operations. (4) FID. From a SOF perspective, activities that support FID center on enhancing a HN’s ability to appropriately and effectively integrate legitimate security or military forces with other national level capabilities to eliminate internal threats and prevent the emergence of new threats. The same is true when conducting security force assistance (SFA) in support of foreign security forces. PSYOP are employed to prepare key audiences for US FID/SFA operations, and to directly assist the HN in establishing an environment that promotes internal stability and security through democratic systems. PSYOP increase HN support for programs that provide positive populace control and protection from adversary activities. PSYOP forces advise, train, and assist HN counterparts and government agencies to develop and implement effective information activities. The end state is the HN ability to conduct information activities in support of achieving and maintaining internal security.

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Chapter VI

For further guidance concerning FID, refer to JP 3-22, Foreign Internal Defense. (5) CT. CT is action taken directly and indirectly against terrorist networks to influence and render global environments inhospitable to terrorist networks. Ideological support serves as the center of gravity for violent extremist movements. Global media and mass communication provide terrorists and extremists with a cost effective capability to recruit, train, plan, legitimize, and resource lethal and nonlethal operations. PSYOP are a critical capability in conducting CT through the application of the direct and indirect approaches in support of DOD’s global operations against terrorist networks. (a) The four PSYOP missions can be integrated in CT activities and provide the following additive capabilities to enable partners to combat VEOs), deter tacit and active support for VEOs, and erode support for extremist ideologies. (b) PSYOP inform, direct, and influence targets at all levels of war to increase USG efforts to effectively defeat violent extremism. PSYOP provide cultural, linguistic, and social expertise required to analyze human terrain influenced by extremist ideology. As part of SC, PSYOP mitigate the effects of VEO information, thus reducing their credibility and access to resources and safe havens. (c) When authorized, PSYOP forces conduct public information dissemination to support national security or disaster relief within US territory to reduce civilian casualties and suffering. For further guidance concerning CT, refer to JP 3-26, Counterterrorism. (6) CP of WMD. DOD CP policy focuses on preventing the acquisition of WMD and delivery systems, stopping their proliferation, and deterring their use. USG strategy to combat WMD consists of three pillars: nonproliferation, CP, and consequence management. PSYOP can be employed to support all of these USG efforts. PSYOP can facilitate USG CP informational activities directed at state and non-state actors to prevent and dissuade the production, acquisition, and delivery of WMD. PSYOP inform audiences about the consequences of using WMD; facilitate the collection of information about activities to develop, acquire, and use WMD, i.e., rewards program; support USG planning of consequence management both domestically and abroad; and provide civil authorities the capability to inform local audiences about the availability of basic needs, shelter, medical services, and requirements. For further guidance concerning CP, refer to JP 3-40, Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction. (7) Civil Affairs Operations (CAO). CAO are military operations conducted by civil affairs forces that enhance relationships between military forces and civil authorities through the application of functional specialty skills that normally are the responsibility of civil government. PSYOP can be integrated with CAO activities to

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Employment increase support for the HN government and reduce support to destabilizing forces. PSYOP can publicize the existence and successes of CAO to enhance the positive perception of US and HN actions in the AOR and transregionally. PSYOP inform and direct civilians concerning safety and welfare to reduce civilian casualties, suffering, and interference with military operations. Regional language and cultural expertise, and specialized communications equipment provide the capability to engage audiences with culturally-accepted informative messages. For additional information on CAO, see JP 3-57, Civil-Military Operations. (8) Information Operations. IO are described as the integrated employment of the five core capabilities in concert with specified supporting and related capabilities, to influence, disrupt, corrupt, or usurp adversarial human and automated decisionmaking while protecting our own. IO are conducted in all phases of an operation, across the range of military operations, and at all levels of war. PSYOP forces can be employed in conjunction with other IO capabilities and provide a critical means of communicating with foreign audiences to inform, direct, and influence. PSYOP units provide personnel to conduct IO staff functions to coordinate, synchronize, and deconflict core, supporting, and related capabilities. SOF and conventional forces working within the same operational area should synchronize plans and activities to prevent duplication of effort and information inconsistencies, fratricide, inadvertent destruction of intelligence sources, and information inconsistencies. For additional information on IO, see JP 3-13, Information Operations. 4. Interagency Coordination

a. Military operations are synchronized with operations of other USG agencies as well as with foreign forces, NGOs, IGOs, and regional organizations for the purpose of accomplishing objectives. Success depends on the ability to blend and engage all instruments of national power. Interagency coordination forges the vital link between the military instrument of power and the economic, diplomatic, and informational instruments of power as well as the efforts of NGOs and IGOs. Successful interagency coordination enables agencies, departments, and organizations to mount a coherent and efficient collective operation. b. Interagency and PSYOP coordination occur at all levels of warfare to ensure synchronization of activities intended to influence TAs. Strategy and policy integration at the national level is accomplished through high-level interagency coordination committees and working groups. CCDRs link national policy to the tactical and operational levels of military operations by using their joint interagency coordination group, the US country team, and subordinate joint force headquarters as coordinating staff sections. Planners responsible for coordinating multiple USG messages spanning multiple combatant commands are synchronized and deconflicted by coordinating with the appropriate JTF staff elements, such as the JIACG. PSYOP and IO staff planners arm the JIACG with timely information to assist in the coordination process.

a. PSYOP units should be integrated into all multinational operations to ensure that PSYOP activities are coordinated. b. PSYOP must begin early, preferably before deployment, to prepare a population for the arrival of multinational forces and develop communication channels that can be used from day one of an operation. PSYOP provide the commander with a controlled mechanism to communicate with all elements of a population: civilians, military, or belligerent factions. A detailed analysis of a country’s culture, religion, political climate, and military organization can help the multinational force commander to effectively apply PSYOP to communicate policy, provide information, and persuade groups to cooperate with friendly forces. c. When the Armed Forces of the United States are integrated into a multinational command structure, peacetime PSYOP policies and wartime conduct should be coordinated and integrated to the maximum extent possible for the attainment of US and multinational security objectives. However, US PSYOP normally will be approved in US channels regardless of the composition of the multinational force chain of command. For further details concerning multinational operations, refer to JP 3-16, Multinational Operations. 6. Psychological Operations Support to Civil Authorities within the United States and its Territories

a. In the same manner that infantry units with a primary mission to find, fix, and kill the enemy can be used to provide humanitarian relief to US citizens following natural disasters or other crises, PSYOP forces can provide CAISE within the United States and its territories. b. When authorized for employment in this manner, PSYOP forces utilize their media development, production, and dissemination capabilities to deliver administrative and command information to populations in the impacted area. Their mission becomes to inform rather than to influence. Messages typically include such things as the location of relief sites, how to obtain essential services, disease prevention tips, current civil authority instructions, and similar messages. PSYOP dissemination assets such as radio broadcast systems, print production, and loudspeaker teams also can augment commercial or civil capability shortfalls associated with the contingency.

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Employment c. All CAISE efforts should be coordinated with ongoing military and lead federal agency PA efforts. d. During periods where CAISEs will be needed, such as the annual hurricane season, scheduled national special security events, or times of crisis, CAISEs need to be prepared to deploy to provide support at designated locations.

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CHAPTER VII
ENABLERS

“The enemy bombards our front not only with a drumfire of artillery, but also with a drumfire of printed paper. Besides bombs which kill the body, his airmen also throw down leaflets which are intended to kill the soul.”
Field Marshal Paul von Hindenburg 1847 - 1934

1.

Intelligence Operations

a. Intelligence operations are wide-ranging activities conducted by intelligence staffs and organizations for the purpose of providing commanders and national-level decisionmakers with relevant, accurate, and timely intelligence. PSYOP also have unique intelligence requirements. b. Ongoing intelligence support is critical to all phases of the PSYOP process. PSYOP require detailed analysis of the conditions which exist within the operational environment, and detailed demographics on potential TAs. The greatest demand for detailed intelligence support to PSYOP takes place during Phase II (Target Audience Analysis) and Phase VII (Evaluation). c. Phase II (Target Audience Analysis), includes thorough examination of the political, military, economic, cultural, religious, and psychological or social conditions that make up the operational environment, and impact the behavior of the audiences within that environment. This information is obtained through integration in the intelligence process, which provides the basis for common intelligence terminology and procedures, and consists of six interrelated categories of intelligence operations. During Phase I (Planning), of the PSYOP process, planners identify information requirements and use the intelligence process to request needed information used in conducting TAA in Phase II. d. Intelligence plays a critical role in Phase VII (Evaluation) by confirming or denying PSYOP MOEs. These may include both quantitative and qualitative metrics such as changes in TA participation in the political process; increased surrenders or defections; or enhanced civilian cooperation with coalition requests or directives. e. PSYOP intelligence requirements include current intelligence, background studies, intelligence estimates, and current cultural information, which may not be available from military intelligence sources. Knowledge such as information on taboos, traditions, venerated figures, myths, and current attitudes can assist in PSYOP product development as well as developing assessment criteria for MOEs. Each command must evaluate its assigned missions and operational areas and identify specific PSYOP intelligence needs. The thoroughness of this evaluation and identification will determine how well intelligence-gathering organizations can gather essential information and produce relevant intelligence products. Development of PSYOP-related information should be predicated on a detailed collection plan with specific collection

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Chapter VII requirements to exploit all available sources and techniques. It should include basic intelligence and country studies on foreign cultures and particular target groups as well as current intelligence on foreign group attitudes, behavior, and capabilities. f. PSYOP units and staff elements should communicate mission specific requirements for raw and finished intelligence products to the intelligence community so time sensitive requirements are prioritized, tasked, processed, exploited, and disseminated in a timely manner. PSYOP units and staff elements ensure that information gaps are identified and prioritized as intelligence requirements to drive collection. g. Any factor that presents a recurring and identifiable obstacle to achieving success of a military PSYOP program is deemed a threat. The early identification of threats and opportunities increases the potential for successful fulfillment of PSYOP program goals and objectives. The ISR collection manager, in coordination with the PSYOP planner, develops an ISR collection plan with specific information requirements pertinent to PSYOP. Intelligence assets can then be tasked to collect the information for analysis. Generally, regardless of the nature of the operation, there are three recurring threats to the effectiveness of military PSYOP. (1) Conflict threats are those that stem from state and non-state actors using military and economic power to gain control of a region and influence or counter the strategic intent of the United States and its allies or coalition partners. PSYOP planners should identify specific information requirements for which the intelligence collection manager can levy collection requirements, assisting the PSYOP planner in recognizing the PSYOP effort to influence the behavior of individuals toward a desired goal. (2) Technological threats are products of governments, organizations, groups, and individuals worldwide who use communications resources. Access to electronic attack and electronic protection assets gives third parties a capability to degrade US military PSYOP efforts. PSYOP information requirements that fall in the technological environment include those that determine capabilities to broadcast signals that may jam or interfere with US broadcasts, counter, or degrade US and multinational PSYOP messages, and conduct other technical operations. These information requests result in current, general military, target, and scientific and technical intelligence products. (3) Instability in one country’s economic, religious, cultural, and political structures can threaten regional stability. These changes may be sudden or anticipated, temporary or permanent, and may alter the perceptions held by the country’s populace. This can pose a threat to the success of US military PSYOP if planners do not recognize the potential for these changes in perception. The PSYOP planner needs to submit specific information requirements so the collection manager can task collection assets to assist in determining changes to political, religious, economic, and cultural structures. h. Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance. Theater ISR CONOPS are based on a coherent collection strategy that fully integrates and optimizes the use of all

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Enablers organic, multinational, allied, open source, and requested national ISR assets. PSYOP rely on theater ISR operations to provide intelligence products based on a whole of government approach that occurs within the intelligence community. (1) ISR assets also are critical in collecting data to confirm or deny PSYOP MOEs. (2) Allocation of ISR to collect MOE data takes place during Phase VI of the PSYOP process. For further detail concerning intelligence support to operations, refer to the JP 2-0 series. 2. Communications System

a. Communications between commands that are planning and executing PSYOP are necessary for effective use of capabilities. A joint PSYOP communications plan should be prepared to ensure that communications systems are compatible and adequate. Theater communications architecture must include plans for integration of PSYOP support requirements into secure voice and data nets, satellite communications systems, and a capability to communicate with US national level agencies, multinational, and HN communications systems. b. The psychological operations automated system (POAS) is hosted on the USASOC SECRET Internet Protocol Router Network (SIPRNET). POAS plays an important part in supporting PSYOP worldwide — for the combatant commands, the Joint Staff, and the interagency community. Its unique capabilities facilitate the research and analysis that underlie foreign TA analysis, PSYOP product development, finished PSYOP intelligence production, special projects, and operational deployments by conventional as well as SOF. Users can draw on a number of different database collections: (1) DOD Message Traffic Archive. The archive contains daily defense message system (DMS) messages from different government agencies and military sources, including the DOS, Central Intelligence Agency, and Director of National Intelligence Open Source Center. The system has the capability to do full searches and retrieval from DMS message traffic with a continuous real-time message feed and indexing. This feature allows the immediate retrieval of material for analysis that provides information used to determine behavioral trends in selected target groups over time. The message archives are extensive, covering October 1989 to the present, and readily accessible. (2) PSYOP Study Collection. This collection holds all existing PSYOP studies and assessments produced by the strategic studies detachments (SSDs). This collection contains the most complete archive of available PSYOP studies.

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Chapter VII (3) Radio and TV Collection. This collection has statistics on radio and TV facilities in various countries. It includes such information as location, equipment range, and frequencies, and users can search the collection based on facility characteristics. (4) The POAS electronically archives studies and also offers analysts access to various classified and unclassified databases. Most of these studies can be obtained through the 4th POG’s (Airborne) home page on the SIPRNET or through the SIPRNET Intelink website. PSYOP relevant intelligence information and products of all types are posted on this site as soon as they are completed. All PSYOP studies are posted on the Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications System (JWICS) Intelink website along with studies that are excluded from the SIPRNET Intelink website because of dissemination restrictions or classification constraints. On JWICS, they can be found on the USSOCOM home page under intelligence products. In the unlikely event that an end user does not have access to SIPRNET or JWICS, but requires and knows of a specific study, the POAS staff can, by exception, forward a copy. 3. Logistics

a. The execution of the joint PSYOP process (described in Chapter V, “Joint Psychological Operations Process”) in sustained operations requires critical logistic support. The combatant command or appropriate Service component staff must integrate PSYOP logistic support into planning. PSYOP units are dependent primarily on the supported unit for all classes of resupply, maintenance, base support, commercial item restock, and dissemination contracting support. For major operations and contingencies, supported units have the responsibility to fund and acquire the logistic support to develop, produce, disseminate, and assess the effects of multimedia products. Moreover, gaining units facilitate the repair and maintenance of PSYOP production and dissemination equipment through funding and contracting support. See Figure VII-1 for PSYOP logistic requirements. b. It is critical for the supported unit to understand both common and unique PSYOP sustainment requirements to insure continuous, responsive, and effective PSYOP. The gaining unit must identify these items and forecast their procurement and sustainment in advance. In addition, fixed site facilities also may be required during extended operations to house and secure sizeable and highly technical equipment and electronic components used for large-scale production and dissemination of multimedia PSYOP products. c. There are three main categories of PSYOP support requirements:

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Enablers

PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS LOGISTICS REQUIREMENTS
TYPES OF SUPPLIES OR SERVICES
Service Common

(1) Service Common. PSYOP forces use a broad range of equipment that require service common expendable and major end-item components from across the

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Chapter VII categories of supply. These assets are generally acquired and sustained through normal supply channels. (2) PSYOP Unique. PSYOP use specialized production assets, communications systems, and broadcast platforms. Parts and maintenance for this equipment are coordinated at the theater level, and must be programmed during planning. (3) Commercial Contracting. PSYOP frequently require the services of private enterprises for a wide range of requirements including the production and dissemination of multimedia products. Professional organizations specializing in research and polling are often contracted to assess TA responses. d. The potential for PSYOP to rely on less sophisticated equipment found in various parts of the world must be considered. Host-nation support (HNS) personnel and organizations may perform many of the support-related functions needed, thus reducing the strain on US logistic systems. Locally available resources for required supplies and services, whether through the host government or commercial entities, must be identified in advance. Early identification of HNS is critical to the establishment of agreements or contracts to provide needed supplies, equipment, and facilities for PSYOP. e. During multinational operations, US logistic systems, unless otherwise determined by agreements, directives, or approved OPLANs support PSYOP integration and execution. HN forces involved in US-sponsored or US-supported PSYOP activities may provide some level of logistic support, and should be identified in advance.

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APPENDIX A
CAPABILITIES
“To capture the enemy’s entire army is better than to destroy it; to take intact a regiment, a company, or a squad is better than to destroy them. For to win one hundred victories in one hundred battles is not the acme of skill. To subdue the enemy without fighting is the supreme excellence. Thus, what is of supreme importance in war is to attack the enemy’s strategy. Next best is to disrupt his alliances by diplomacy. The next best is to attack his army. And the worst policy is to attack cities.”
Sun Tsu The Art of War

1.

General

Each Service has the inherent capability to support achievement of US national objectives by using organic assets for production and dissemination of PSYOP products. Aircraft, ships, units, and military equipment can have deliberate psychological effects on TAs when used in or as a psychological operations action. 2. Studies Programs

a. The SSD of the 4th POG (Airborne), is an important source of finished PSYOP analytical intelligence products that are tailored to the needs of the entire PSYOP force, the GCCs, and the intelligence community. The CJCS provides general policy guidance and establishes production priorities for the program. CDRUSSOCOM, as the supporting CCDR, manages the PSYOP Studies Production Program, issues taskings, and monitors production. Products of the PSYOP studies program primarily are designed to support the operational requirements of the combatant commands and of US PSYOP forces worldwide, although they also are used by a variety of other organizations (e.g., DOS). Studies provide CCDRs with PSYOP perspectives on issues of direct significance to peacetime strategy, joint operation planning, and operational preparations. Studies on all topics of interest can be requested through a combatant command’s PSYOP staff officer or intelligence request for information manager, who will enter them in the community on-line intelligence system for end-users and managers system for managing intelligence production requirements. b. PSYOP studies are unique in format; however, other military intelligence products can contain this type of intelligence information. In general, they profile the salient features of a country or its people; provide an analysis of the influences that lead different social, occupational, and ethnic groups of that country to act as they do; discuss issues that elicit strong responses from the indigenous population; assess attitudes; identify vulnerabilities; and suggest ways and means to influence people. 3. Joint Military Information Support Command

a. General. In 2003, an Office of the Secretary of Defense decision led to the establishment of a strategic PSYOP capability by creating the JMISC. The JMISC is a

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Appendix A direct reporting unit under the COCOM of CDRUSSOCOM, but remains under the OPCON of the Director, USSOCOM Center for Special Operations. b. Mission. The JMISC plans, coordinates, integrates and, on order, executes strategic-level, transregional PSYOP to promote US goals and objectives. The JMISC works by, with, and through the geographic combatant commands, the interagency, and partner nations, utilizing multimedia disseminated within the culture and language of intended audiences. c. Description. The JMISC is comprised of senior military and civilian PSYOP personnel that provide professional TAA, PSYOP planning, program development and execution, and sophisticated commercial-quality PSYOP prototype products. The organization includes behavioral scientists, and cultural and geopolitical experts who conduct quantitative and qualitative strategic analysis in support of strategic PSYOP. d. Functions. The JMISC serves as the USSOCOM component for all matters pertaining to strategic-level PSYOP execution, planning, and training. Commander, JMISC serves as the principal advisor to CDRUSSOCOM for strategic-level PSYOP during contingency operations. Key JMISC functions include: (1) Develop strategic-level PSYOP tactics, techniques, and procedures for CDRUSSOCOM. (2) Manage and execute transregional information programs to influence designated foreign TAs, across regional boundaries. (3) Operational and strategic planning. (4) Strategic and regional analysis on geopolitics, culture, media, communications infrastructure, key communicators, social conditions, demographics, information environment conditions, perceptions, behavior, values, and beliefs. (5) Coordinate and collaborate information activities with interagency partners. (6) Product development. (7) Coordinate PSYOP execution authorities. 4.

United States Army Assets

a. Army Service PSYOP assets provide a vital instrument of engagement across all military phases in support of the full range of military operations and interagency coordination in a foreign setting and under special circumstances during domestic emergencies as well.

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Capabilities b. United States Army Special Operations Command. USASOC is the Army component command of USSOCOM. Its mission is to command (if directed), support, and ensure the combat readiness of assigned and attached Army PSYOP forces for worldwide use. The USASOC commander exercises command of CONUS-based AC Army special operations forces (ARSOF) PSYOP. When directed by CDRUSSOCOM, USASOC provides mission-ready PSYOP forces to the geographic combatant commands for employment. Specific USASOC functions include: (1) Assisting in developing and coordinating joint and AC Army PSYOP requirements, issues, and activities. (2) Assisting in developing joint and Army PSYOP doctrine, organization, institution training, materiel, supplies, and services. (3) Preparing and submitting Army PSYOP forces program and budget documents. (4) Prepare and deploy ARSOF PSYOP for contingency operations, SO missions, as well as missions in a joint environment in peacetime, conflict, and war. (5) Planning and conducting other training, operations, and support, as directed. c. Army Active Component Psychological Operations Group. The AC POG organizes, equips, and collectively trains assigned and attached forces to rapidly deploy anywhere in the world and conduct PSYOP and other specified communication tasks in any environment in support of CCDRs and the interagency as directed by the President and SecDef. (1) The AC POG is capable of conducting the following tasks: (a) Deploy/redeploy and sustain all assigned and attached forces. (b) Execute tactical PSYOP in support of rapid deployment forces, SOF, and other contingencies. (c) Organize and execute operational level task-forces in support of JFCs. (d) Execute DSPD through military information support teams. (e) Execute multimedia development, production, distribution, and dissemination in support of all operations. (f) Operate CONUS-based multimedia operations center as the digital and analog backbone of global CT network.

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Appendix A
“The role of psychological operations (PSYOP) in the information age is to assist military commanders in articulating their mission objectives, to help identify the decision makers who can promote or interfere with these objectives, and to recommend appropriate courses of action to properly influence them. In this regard, PSYOP are applicable across the operational continuum because command objectives may vary at any point in time and because key decision makers exist at every level of military endeavor. . . . By converting command objectives into the people who have the ability to act on them, and by recommending the use of available military and nonmilitary resources, PSYOP Soldiers attempt to educate and motivate targeted decision makers to act, or refrain from acting, in ways that support the commander’s objectives.”
Colonel Robert M. Schoenhaus 7th PSYOP Group Commander, June 1999 Field Manual 3-05.30, Psychological Operations

(g) Produce special studies, analyses, and assessments of foreign TAs in support of assigned units or as otherwise directed. (h) Execute civil authority information support. (2) The AC POG currently contains the following organizations: (a) SSD. The group manages the SSD’s strategic and operational analysis efforts necessary for mission planning. The SSD is organized into regionally-focused strategic studies teams comprised of civilian PSYOP analysts holding advanced degrees and regional expertise. Analysts specialize in target regions and provide PSYOP-relevant information, strategic analysis, and advice during the planning and execution of missions. The SSD publishes and disseminates PSYOP studies. (b) PSYOP Battalion. The battalion is organized, trained, and equipped to provide supported commanders with planning, product development, production, and dissemination from operational to tactical levels. These battalions are regionally oriented and maintain a functional support relationship with their respective GCCs and TSOCs. The battalions support other regions as directed. (c) PSYOP Dissemination Battalion. The battalion provides regional and tactical PSYOP units with audio, visual, and audiovisual production support, product distribution support, signal support, electronic maintenance support, and media broadcast capabilities. The battalion provides production support to PSYOP forces from the Media Operations Center (MOC) location at Ft Bragg, North Carolina, and through teams deployed with PSYOP units around the world. The MOC is the media production and product archives hub for the PSYOP community and is critical to achieving the commanders’ PSYOP objectives. d. Reserve Component Psychological Operations Group. The RC POGs organize, train, and equip assigned and attached forces to deploy anywhere in the world A-4 JP 3-13.2

Capabilities and conduct PSYOP and other specified communication tasks in any environment in support of CCDRs and the interagency as directed by the President and SecDef. (1) The RC POGs are capable of conducting the following tasks: (a) Validate, deploy/redeploy, and sustain all assigned and attached forces. (b) Execute tactical PSYOP in support of conventional forces. (c) Organize and execute operational level task-forces in support of JFCs and provide augmentation to GCCs for strategic level PSYOP support. (d) Execute multimedia development, production, distribution, and dissemination in support of all operations. (e) Execute civil authority information support. (2) The RC POGs currently contain the following organizations: (a) Tactical PSYOP Battalion. The battalion provides support to corpslevel units and below, task forces, and SOF. The battalion’s companies are the primary provider of PSYOP support to conventional forces by enhancing the commander’s ability to influence the behavior of TAs. (b) Strategic Dissemination Company. This company provides support in the following areas: audio, visual, and audiovisual production; product distribution: electronic maintenance; and media broadcast. e. Psychological Operations Staff Planners. The Army provides the preponderance of PSYOP planners assigned or attached to the joint force. Responsibilities of PSYOP staff planners include: (1) Plan, coordinate, synchronize, and integrate PSYOP into operations to create effects required to meet the commander’s intent and support achievement of objectives (2) Prepare the PSYOP portion of OPLANs and orders. (3) Monitor status of all nonlethal effects, assets, and activities. (4) Define nonlethal targeting objectives and recommend employment of PSYOP capabilities to achieve objectives. (5) Request, receive, and integrate PSYOP units and capabilities into operations.

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Appendix A (6) Recommend required changes or updates to existing approved programs to provide the capability with required authorities as needed to meet the commander’s intent. f. The 1st IO Command (Land) provides IO support to the Army and other military forces through deployable IO support teams, IO reachback planning and analysis, and the synchronization and conduct of Army CNO, in coordination with other CNO and network operations stakeholders, to operationally integrate IO, reinforce forward IO capabilities, and to defend cyberspace to enable IO throughout the information environment. g. In addition to dedicated PSYOP units, conventional Army units can also support PSYOP. With routine interaction with TAs, they are in an ideal position to support PSYOP product dissemination and collect limited MOE indicators for transmission to PSYOP planners. 5. United States Navy Assets

a. The US Navy employs a wide range of dissemination assets, product reproduction capabilities, and planning resources that can support joint and Service PSYOP missions. Navy ships and shore sites have facilities to print documents, posters, articles, leaflets, and handbills. Most aircraft carriers and large deck amphibious assault ships are capable of high-volume quality printing required to support PSYOP. b. Navy afloat and ashore IO cells coordinate with joint PSYOP experts to identify maritime audiences, develop themes and products, and plan dissemination. Also, within the fleet, capabilities exist for most Asian and European languages. c. The Navy has UHF, VHF, and HF broadcast capabilities to deliver PSYOP messages to afloat and ashore target audiences. Boarding parties can disseminate products to crews of civilian vessels to achieve PSYOP objectives. d. Several Navy aircraft support PSYOP. F/A-18 HORNET aircraft can drop PDU5 leaflet canisters to disperse print materials deep inland over hostile territory. The P-3 ORION airframe is certified to drop the PDU-5b. Shipborne helicopters can provide leaflet drops and loudspeaker broadcasts. Navy C-2A GREYHOUND transport aircraft can disperse a large volume of leaflets by static-line airdrops from the aft cargo ramp. EA-6B PROWLER aircraft (and its successor, the EA-18G GROWLER) can jam adversary broadcasts and also transmit brief .wav files on a wide range of frequencies. e. The Navy employs the Sound Commander tactical loudspeaker system and conventional loudspeakers for ship-to-ship and ship-to-shore audio communications. This includes the delivery of PSYOP messages. f. The Navy has two COMCAM units: Navy Expeditionary Combat Command, Detachment Combat Camera, located in Norfolk, VA, and Fleet Combat Camera Group

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Capabilities Pacific, located in San Diego, CA. These units can produce audiovisual products to support PSYOP. The ships and aircraft of the fleet can also provide limited audiovisual production capabilities. g. The Navy Information Operations Command (NIOC) Norfolk, located at the Little Creek Naval Amphibious Base, Norfolk, VA, provides limited specialized training in planning and executing PSYOP, and is available to assist fleet units. NIOC San Diego provides similar training to units in the Pacific. NIOC Norfolk maintains a close relationship with the 4th POG (Airborne), Fort Bragg, NC, for training, equipment employment, product dissemination, and tactics, techniques, and procedures development in the area of Navy PSYOP. The NIOC Norfolk plans directorate provides maritime influence planning support to the fleet. For additional information see Navy Warfare Publication (NWP) 3-53, Navy Psychological Operations. 6. United States Air Force Assets

a. USAF PSYOP is focused on the employment of air, space, and cyberspace capabilities as the Air Force’s primary means of preparing, shaping, and exploiting the psychological dimension of the operational environment. The USAF uses the term influence operations to group the activities of PSYOP, MILDEC, and OPSEC. b. USAF PSYOP forces support JFC objectives through a variety of operations and activities that include development of psychologically informed targeting strategies. USAF IOTs are located in joint or air operations centers (JAOCs) and assist commanders in the five core capabilities of IO. PSYOP officers coordinate and liaise between the JAOC and the JTF IO staff to utilize all-source analysis of an adversary’s sociological, cultural, and demographic information to recommend effective PSYOP strategies. USAF PSYOP forces fill individual billets on joint manning documents, and are capable of providing direct support and general support roles to units conducting PSYOP. c. Many USAF platforms are used to execute missions in support of JFC PSYOP objectives. EC-130 COMMANDO SOLO aircraft are equipped to broadcast PSYOP radio and TV products. Transport aircraft perform static line leaflet airdrop missions. USAF fighter and bomber aircraft can dispense leaflets by dropping leaflet canisters. d. USAF PSYOP capabilities are growing beyond the traditional dissemination roles of airborne broadcasts and leaflet drops. Behavioral influences analysis (BIA) provides an analytical framework to facilitate understanding and exploitation of the perceptual and behavioral context of the operational environment. BIA directly supports PSYOP TAA, providing a more robust assessment of target audiences. e. Because of the global nature of USTRANSCOM and its Air Force component, Air Mobility Command (AMC) is in a position to be aware of the synchronized IO efforts across the geographic combatant commands. Thus AMC IO and PSYOP planners are

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Appendix A uniquely postured to observe and support strategic and global PSYOP in addition to supporting the operational-level PSYOP efforts of a single geographic combatant command. Coordination with USTRANSCOM IO planners and the AMC IO team is highly encouraged. 7. United States Marine Corps Assets

a. The Marine Corps has the capability to conduct PSYOP at the tactical level via PSYOP teams using loudspeaker broadcasts, print media, and face-to-face communication. The Marine Corps expeditionary PSYOP capability is found within the Marine Corps Information Operations Center (MCIOC). The MCIOC provides reachback capabilities for forward deployed PSYOP teams in the form of audience analysis and interdepartmental coordination. While forward deployed, Marine PSYOP units receive PSYOP guidance from the MCIOC, an existing JPOTF, or the 4th POG (Airborne). b. The MCIOC coordinates and integrates the conduct of PSYOP programs that complement IO with the JPOTF, CCDRs, interagency, DOS, intelligence community, IGOs, and NGOs, and others as necessary.

The guidance in this appendix relates to the development of tab A, (Psychological Operations) to appendix 3, (Information Operations) to annex C, (Operations) for plans and orders. a. Situation (1) What is the situation relevant to PSYOP in the operational area? (2) What are the approved PSYOP programs? (3) What are the significant operational environment factors influencing PSYOP activities? (4) What are the competing PSYOP goals in the operational area? (5) What are the PSYOP tasks to be accomplished? b. US (or US and Allied/Coalition) Perspective (1) How will the PSYOP tasks be accomplished? (2) What resources will be used? (3) What will be the general phasing of current actions with future actions? c. Neutral Perspective (if applicable) (1) What are the projected actions of the neutral populations under various circumstances? (2) What activities and resources are available to these neutral intentions? (3) What actions and behavior by the neutral population(s) support mission objectives? (4) Which actions and behavior may interfere with mission objectives? (5) What resources are available to execute alternative COAs? (6) What objective and subjective factors could affect decisions and resource effectiveness?

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Appendix B (7) What are the characteristics of decisionmakers and their key advisors, major staff planners, staff sections (to include particularly influential individuals), and intelligence system analysts? d. Adversary Perspectives (1) Decisionmakers and Staffs (a) What COAs might affect friendly task accomplishment? (b) What resources are available to execute each COA? (c) Who are the decisionmakers who can direct development or allocation of resources of COAs pertinent to the task assigned? (d) What are the characteristics of adversary decisionmakers, their key advisors, and staff (particularly intelligence analysts)? (2) Intelligence Systems (a) What are the intelligence systems that support decisionmakers and their staffs? (b) What are the intelligence systems’ capabilities pertinent to the situation? (c) What are the objective and subjective factors and the characteristics of collection planners and decisionmakers that affect their development and selection for use of information gathering resources? (d) What are the groups of related planner and decisionmaker critical information? (e) What is the estimated background knowledge and desired and harmful appreciations for each group? (3) Target Audiences (a) What groups can influence plans, decisions, and operational effectiveness in task accomplishment? (b) How susceptible are these groups to PSYOP? (c) What group behavior is favorable or harmful to task accomplishment?

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Considerations for Tab A, (Psychological Operations) to Appendix 3, (Information Operations) to Annex C, (Operations) (d) What are the apparent goals, motivations, and characteristics of each group? (e) Who are the leaders who can cause these groups to behave in various ways? (f) What is the estimated background knowledge and desired and harmful appreciations for each group? (4) Command Systems (a) What communications systems and command centers will be used to plan COAs and control, coordinate, and supervise execution of the planned COA? (b) What is the purpose and what are the characteristics of each C2 communications net? (c) What are the PSYOP targets for jamming or attacking? (d) When should PSYOP to demoralize and disorganize opposing command be executed? (e) When should PSYOP to reduce opposing operational effectiveness be executed? (f) When should PSYOP to enhance the effectiveness of planned deceptions be executed? (g) When should PSYOP to support OPSEC to the maximum advantage be executed? e. Mission. How will PSYOP support the maneuver commander’s mission? f. Execution (1) Concept of Operations (a) Overview 1. What is the commander’s intent? 2. What is the overall concept for using PSYOP in support of task accomplishment? 3. Who will plan and conduct strategic PSYOP in peacetime and in support of preconflict deterrence options? Who are the supporting commanders?

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Appendix B

4. Who will plan and conduct strategic and theater PSYOP in support of sustained hostilities? Who are the supporting commanders? 5. Who will plan and conduct joint PSYOP in support of operational COAs? Who are the supporting commanders? (b) General Guidance to Units and Forces 1. What are the valid PSYOP themes to be promoted to induce strategic and theater PSYOP objectives? 2. What are the valid or invalid PSYOP themes to be discouraged? Include indications of specific foreign TA sensitivities and harm that might occur if foreign TAs accept the themes. (c) PSYOP Actions Suitable for Use 1. What is the guidance for the conduct of military operations, actions, and personnel behavior to promote valid PSYOP themes? 2. What is the guidance for avoiding military operations and actions and personnel behavior that would result in harmful foreign TA attitudes and behavior? 3. What are the cultural and psychological characteristics of foreign TAs, which will aid operational planners and personnel in selecting COAs and interacting with foreign TA members? (d) Adversary Propaganda Activities 1. What adversary propaganda will be directed at US personnel and at foreign groups in the operational area? 2. What is the guidance for countering such adversary operations? (e) Outline of Each Planned PSYOP 1. What is the foreign TA and set of PSYOP objectives, overall themes, subgroups to be targeted (to include their characteristics), and specific themes to be promoted for each subgroup? 2. What are the provisions for testing, producing, stocking, and disseminating PSYOP materials and for measuring PSYOP effectiveness? 3. What are the command and staff arrangements? supporting commanders? Who are the

4. What resources are required to plan and conduct PSYOP actions? Include civil capabilities, indigenous assets, exploitation of detainees for PSYOP, and military PSYOP resources. 5. What are the logistic requirements? Include production, distribution, and stocking of PSYOP materials; transport of PSYOP material and personnel to operational areas and their basing and support while conducting PSYOP; provisions for the supply and maintenance of US and indigenous PSYOP material; and fiscal and personnel matters. 6. What are the requirements for implementing schedules and PSYOP control sheets? 7. What is the OPSEC planning guidance? Include planning for, preparing for, and conducting PSYOP and PSYOP actions to maintain essential secrecy for the commander’s intent and to gain and maintain essential secrecy for OPSECsensitive PSYOP COAs. (2) Situation Monitoring (a) How will intelligence, multidiscipline counterintelligence, security monitoring, and operational feedback be provided? (b) What is the requirement for running situation estimates; periodic estimates of target appreciations responsive to information, actions, and attitudes and behavior; and current reporting of intelligence and multidiscipline counterintelligence information, security monitoring results, and implementing actions? (c) What resources are required? What is their availability? (3) Control (a) How will control be affected and implementation centrally coordinated? (b) What are the coordinating instructions? (c) How will implementation planning and supervision of the planned action be accomplished? (d) What is the need for specific PSYOP? (e) What coordination is required with adjacent commands and civilian agencies, to include US diplomatic missions and US Agency for International Development?

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Appendix B (f) What coordination is required with MILDEC and OPSEC planners, EW planners, and planners in the fields of civic action; FHA; CMO; detainees, command, control, and communications; legal; captured US personnel; and operations? (4) Tasks (a) What responsibilities must be assigned to implement the concept? (b) Is designation of an executive agent to coordinate implementation among multiple organizations required? (c) How will feedback be provided to measure PSYOP effectiveness? g. Administration and Logistics (1) Logistics (a) What is the guidance for stocking PSYOP and information materials, and provisions to disseminating organizations? (b) What are the provisions for the maintenance of PSYOP-unique equipment? (c) What are the provisions for control and maintenance of indigenous equipment and materials? (d) What are the fiscal matters relating to special funds? (e) What are the personnel matters relating to indigenous personnel? (2) Administration (a) What are the requirements for special reports? (b) What are the requirements for planning and operations in support of education programs regarding detainees? (c) What will be the participation in interrogation of detainees to obtain information essential or peculiar to PSYOP? h. Command and Control (1) Refer to appropriate sections of annex K, (Communications System) and provide pertinent extracts of information included in the basic plan or annex K, to include the following:

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JP 3-13.2

Considerations for Tab A, (Psychological Operations) to Appendix 3, (Information Operations) to Annex C, (Operations) (2) What are the recognition and identification instructions? (3) What is the electronic policy? (4) What are the headquarters locations and movements? (5) What are the code words? (6) What is the frequency allocation? 2. Tab A Format CLASSIFICATION “HEADQUARTERS, US EUROPEAN COMMAND APO AE 09128 25 May 200X TAB A TO APPENDIX 3 TO ANNEX C TO USEUCOM OPLAN 4999-05 PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS (PSYOP) ( ) References: List documents essential to this annex. a. JP 3-13.2, Psychological Operations. b. Presidential Decision Directive/NSC-68, International Public Information (IPI). c. CJCSI 3110.05D, Joint Psychological Operations Supplement to the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan FY 2006. d. List plans, estimates, basic PSYOP studies, special PSYOP studies, special PSYOP assessments, and other documents that have a significant bearing on the conduct of PSYOP. 1. ( ) Situation. Summarize the psychological situation in the operational area, any ongoing PSYOP programs and any significant factors influencing PSYOP activities. a. ( ) Overview. Describe the general situation, competing goals, and the task to be accomplished. b. ( ) US (or US and Allied) Perspective. Outline intentions (how the assigned task will be accomplished), capabilities (resources to be used), and activities (current actions and general phasing of future actions). c. ( ) Neutral Perspective (if applicable). Outline estimated neutral intentions under various circumstances, the resources available to a neutral party, and their activities.

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Appendix B Describe neutral actions and/or behavior that would enhance mission accomplishment. Indicate apparent current COAs that might affect mission accomplishment and summarize resources available to execute alternative COAs. (Include the abilities to execute IO strategies.) State objective and subjective factors that could affect decisions and resource effectiveness. Identify staff functions and particularly influential key communicators. Describe the characteristics of decisionmakers, their key advisors; major staff planners; staff functions, particularly influential communicators; and intelligence system analysts. d. ( ) Enemy Perspectives (1) ( ) Decisionmaker and Staff. Identify the decisionmakers who can direct development or allocation of required resources of PSYOP COA execution pertinent to the task assigned. Outline feasible alternative actions that would favor or harm friendly operational effectiveness. Indicate COAs that might affect friendly task accomplishment and summarize resources available to execute each COA. Describe the characteristics of adversary decisionmakers, their key advisers, and staff (particularly intelligence analysts). (2) ( ) Intelligence Systems. Identify intelligence systems that support decisionmakers and their staffs. Summarize intelligence systems’ capabilities pertinent to the situation. Cite references for detail. Describe objective and subjective factors and the characteristics of collection planners and decisionmakers that affect their development and selection of information-gathering resources. (3) ( ) Target Audience. Identify groups that can influence plans, decisions, and operational effectiveness in task accomplishment, and identify their susceptibility to PSYOP. State group behavior favorable and harmful to task accomplishment. Describe the apparent goals, motivations, and characteristics of each group and key leaders who can influence or motivate groups to behave in various ways. (4) ( ) Command Systems. Describe communication and computer systems and command centers used to plan, control, coordinate, and supervise execution of the planned COA. Identify the purpose of each communications system and its characteristics. State targets for jamming or attacking. Indicate when to execute operations to demoralize and disorganize opposing command, reduce opposing operational effectiveness, enhance the effectiveness of planned deceptions and PSYOP, and support OPSEC to the maximum advantage. 2. ( ) Mission 3. ( ) Execution a. ( ) Concept of Operations

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JP 3-13.2

Considerations for Tab A, (Psychological Operations) to Appendix 3, (Information Operations) to Annex C, (Operations) (1) ( ) Overview. State the commander’s intent. Outline the overall concept for using PSYOP in support of task accomplishment. Sequentially address strategic PSYOP in peacetime and in support of deterrence options; strategic and theater PSYOP in support of sustained hostilities (conduct of war globally or in a region, and support for campaigns and operations); and joint tactical PSYOP in support of operational COAs. State who will plan and conduct each PSYOP and specify the supported/supporting commands. (2) ( ) Provide the following as general guidance to units and forces involved: (a) ( ) Valid, approved PSYOP themes to be stressed to achieve strategic and theater PSYOP objectives. (b) ( ) Valid or invalid PSYOP themes and symbols to be avoided to include indications of specific TA cultural sensitivities that might occur if these themes and symbols are accepted by TAs. (c) ( ) PSYOP actions suitable for use: 1. ( ) Guidance for the conduct of military operations and actions, and personnel behavior, to promote approved PSYOP themes. 2. ( ) Guidance for avoiding military operations and actions, and personnel behavior that would result in harmful TA attitudes and behavior. 3. ( ) Description of the cultural and psychological characteristics of TAs to aid operational planners and personnel in selecting COAs and interacting with TA members. (d) ( ) Description of adversary propaganda (including disinformation and misinformation) directed at US personnel and at foreign groups in the operational area and guidance for countering such adversary operations. (3) ( ) Provide an outline of each planned PSYOP operation. Indicate for each TA an approved set of supporting PSYOP objectives and, as applicable, subgroups to be targeted, subgroup characteristics, and specific themes to be promoted for each subgroup. As appropriate, refer to intelligence studies, special psychological operations study, and special psychological operations assessment for detailed intelligence. State provisions for testing, producing, stocking, and disseminating PSYOP materials and for measuring PSYOP effectiveness. List resources required for PSYOP actions (e.g., civil capabilities, indigenous assets, and exploitation of detainees. Indicate requirements for implementing schedules and PSYOP operation control sheets. (4) ( ) In the basic concept description and in each tab describing separate operations, provide OPSEC planning guidance. The guidance should address planning for, preparing for, and conducting PSYOP and PSYOP actions to maintain essential

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Appendix B secrecy for the commander’s intentions and to gain and maintain essential secrecy for OPSEC-sensitive PSYOP COAs. how intelligence, multidiscipline b. ( ) Situation Monitoring. Describe counterintelligence, security monitoring, and operational feedback will be provided. State requirement for running situation estimates; periodic estimates of TA actions, attitudes, and behavior; and current reporting of intelligence and multidiscipline counterintelligence information, security monitoring results, and implementing actions. Identify resources required and their availability. c. ( ) Control. Outline how control will be affected and implementation centrally coordinated. State coordinating instructions. Describe accomplishment of implementation planning and supervision of the planned action. Identify the need for specific PSYOP. Address coordination with adjacent commands and civilian agencies, including US diplomatic missions, US Information Agency, and US Agency for International Development. Also address coordination with MILDEC and OPSEC planners, EW planners, and planners in the fields of civic action, humanitarian assistance, PA, CAO, detainee, counterintelligence, communications system, legal, operations, and etc. d. ( ) Tasks. Assign supported/supporting command relationships, to include other USG agencies required to implement the concept. When multiple organizations are involved, designate an executive agent to coordinate implementation. Ensure that tasks clearly fix responsibilities and provide for feedback about MOEs. 4. ( ) Administration and Logistics. Provide a statement of the administrative and logistic arrangements applicable to PSYOP but not covered in the basic plan or another annex thereof. Include data on: a. ( ) Logistics (1) ( ) Stocking of disseminating organizations. PSYOP, information materials, and supplies to

APPENDIX C
REFERENCES The development of JP 3-13.2 is based upon the following primary references: 1. United States Laws a. Title 10, USC. b. Title 50, USC. c. Public Law 402, Smith Mundt Act. 2. Executive Branch Documents

a. Deputy Secretary of Defense Memorandum, 8 June 2007, Policy for Department of Defense (DOD) Interactive Internet Activities. b. Executive Order 12333, United States Intelligence Activities. c. Secretary of Defense Memorandum, Forces for Unified Commands Assignment Tables. d. National Security Directive 51, US Government International Broadcasting. e. National Security Decision Directive 130, US International Information Policy. f. Presidential Decision Directive/NSC-68, International Public Information (IPI). g. National Security Strategy of the United States. h. National Drug Control Strategy. i. National Security Decision Directive 77, Management of Public Diplomacy Relative to National Security. 3. Department of State Publication DOS Publication 9434, Treaties in Force. 4. Department of Defense Publications a. DODD 2311.01E, DOD Law of War Program. b. DODD S-3321.1, Overt Peacetime Psychological Operations Conducted by the Military Services in Contingencies Short of Declared War. c. DODD 3600.1, Information Operations (IO).

The lead agent for this publication is the USSOCOM and the Joint Staff doctrine sponsor for this publication is the operations directorate of a joint staff. 3. Supersession

This publication supersedes JP 3-53, 5 September 2003, Doctrine for Joint Psychological Operations. 4. Change Recommendations a. Recommendations for urgent changes to this publication should be submitted: TO: CDRUSSOCOM MACDILL AFB FL//SOKF-J7-DD// INFO: JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC//J-7-JEDD// CDRUSJFCOM SUFFOLK VA//JT10// Routine changes should be submitted electronically to Commander, Joint Warfighting Center, Joint Doctrine Group and info the Lead Agent and the Director for Operational Plans and Joint Force Development J-7/JEDD via the CJCS JEL at http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine. b. When a Joint Staff directorate submits a proposal to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that would change source document information reflected in this publication, that directorate will include a proposed change to this publication as an enclosure to its proposal. The Military Services and other organizations are requested to notify the Joint Staff J-7 when changes to source documents reflected in this publication are initiated. c. Record of Changes: CHANGE COPY DATE OF DATE POSTED NUMBER NUMBER CHANGE ENTERED BY REMARKS ____________________________________________________________________ ____________________________________________________________________ ____________________________________________________________________

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Appendix D

5.

Distribution of Publications

Local reproduction is authorized and access to unclassified publications is unrestricted. However, access to and reproduction authorization for classified joint publications must be in accordance with DOD 5200.1-R, Information Security Program. 6. Distribution of Electronic Publications

a. Joint Staff J-7 will not print copies of JPs for distribution. Electronic versions are available on JDEIS at https://jdeis.js.mil (NIPRNET), and https://jdeis.js.smil.mil (SIPRNET) and on the JEL at http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine (NIPRNET). b. Only approved joint publications and joint test publications are releasable outside the combatant commands, Services, and Joint Staff. Release of any classified joint publication to foreign governments or foreign nationals must be requested through the local embassy (Defense Attaché Office) to DIA Foreign Liaison Office, PO-FL, Room 1E811, 7400 Pentagon, Washington, DC 20301-7400. c. CD-ROM. Upon request of a JDDC member, the Joint Staff J-7 will produce and deliver one CD-ROM with current joint publications.

PART II — TERMS AND DEFINITIONS Unless otherwise annotated, this publication is the proponent for all terms and definitions found in the glossary. Upon approval, JP 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, will reflect this publication as the source document for these terms and definitions. civil affairs. Designated Active and Reserve Component forces and units organized, trained, and equipped specifically to conduct civil affairs operations and to support civil-military operations. Also called CA. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-57) civil-military operations. The activities of a commander that establish, maintain, influence, or exploit relations between military forces, governmental and nongovernmental civilian organizations and authorities, and the civilian populace in a friendly, neutral, or hostile operational area in order to facilitate military operations, to consolidate and achieve operational US objectives. Civil-military operations may include performance by military forces of activities and functions normally the responsibility of the local, regional, or national government. These activities may occur prior to, during, or subsequent to other military actions. They may also occur, if directed, in the absence of other military operations. Civil-military operations may be performed by designated civil affairs, by other military forces, or by a combination of civil affairs and other forces. Also called CMO. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-57) combating terrorism. Actions, including antiterrorism and counterterrorism, taken to oppose terrorism throughout the entire threat spectrum. Also called CbT. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-26) counterintelligence. Information gathered and activities conducted to protect against espionage, other intelligence activities, sabotage, or assassinations conducted by or on behalf of foreign governments or elements thereof, foreign organizations, or foreign persons, or international terrorist activities. Also called CI. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 2-0) counterpropaganda operations. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) critical information. Specific facts about friendly intentions, capabilities, and activities vitally needed by adversaries for them to plan and act effectively so as to guarantee failure or unacceptable consequences for friendly mission accomplishment. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 2-0) detainee. A term used to refer to any person captured or otherwise detained by an armed force. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-63) direct action. Short-duration strikes and other small-scale offensive actions conducted as a special operation in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive environments and which employ specialized military capabilities to seize, destroy, capture, exploit, recover, or damage designated targets. Direct action differs from conventional

GL-5

Glossary offensive actions in the level of physical and political risk, operational techniques, and the degree of discriminate and precise use of force to achieve specific objectives. Also called DA. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-05) foreign internal defense. Participation by civilian and military agencies of a government in any of the action programs taken by another government or other designated organization to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency. Also called FID. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-22) information operations. The integrated employment of the core capabilities of electronic warfare, computer network operations, psychological operations, military deception, and operations security, in concert with specified supporting and related capabilities, to influence, disrupt, corrupt or usurp adversarial human and automated decision making while protecting our own. Also called IO. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-13) intelligence operations. The variety of intelligence and counterintelligence tasks that are carried out by various intelligence organizations and activities within the intelligence process. Intelligence operations include planning and direction, collection, processing and exploitation, analysis and production, dissemination and integration, and evaluation and feedback. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 2-01) intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance. An activity that synchronizes and integrates the planning and operation of sensors, assets, and processing, exploitation, and dissemination systems in direct support of current and future operations. This is an integrated intelligence and operations function. Also called ISR. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 2-01) interagency coordination. Within the context of Department of Defense involvement, the coordination that occurs between elements of Department of Defense, and engaged US Government agencies for the purpose of achieving an objective. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-0) intergovernmental organization. An organization created by a formal agreement (e.g., a treaty) between two or more governments. It may be established on a global, regional, or functional basis for wide-ranging or narrowly defined purposes. Formed to protect and promote national interests shared by member states. Examples include the United Nations, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and the African Union. Also called IGO. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-08) irregular warfare. A violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant population(s). Irregular warfare favors indirect and asymmetric approaches, though it may employ the full range of military and other capacities, in order to erode an adversary's power, influence, and will. Also called IW. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 1)

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JP 3-13.2

Glossary joint psychological operations task force. A joint special operations task force composed of headquarters and operational assets. It assists the joint force commander in developing strategic, operational, and tactical psychological operation plans for a theater campaign or other operations. Mission requirements will determine its composition and assigned or attached units to support the joint task force commander. Also called JPOTF. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-13.2) joint special operations task force. A joint task force composed of special operations units from more than one Service, formed to carry out a specific special operation or prosecute special operations in support of a theater campaign or other operations. The joint special operations task force may have conventional non-special operations units assigned or attached to support the conduct of specific missions. Also called JSOTF. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-05) measure of effectiveness. A criterion used to assess changes in system behavior, capability, or operational environment that is tied to measuring the attainment of an end state, achievement of an objective, or creation of an effect. Also called MOE. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-0) military deception. Actions executed to deliberately mislead adversary military decision makers as to friendly military capabilities, intentions, and operations, thereby causing the adversary to take specific actions (or inactions) that will contribute to the accomplishment of the friendly mission. Also called MILDEC. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-13.4) operations security. A process of identifying critical information and subsequently analyzing friendly actions attendant to military operations and other activities to: a. identify those actions that can be observed by adversary intelligence systems; b. determine indicators that adversary intelligence systems might obtain that could be interpreted or pieced together to derive critical information in time to be useful to adversaries; and c. select and execute measures that eliminate or reduce to an acceptable level the vulnerabilities of friendly actions to adversary exploitation. Also called OPSEC. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-13.3) overt peacetime psychological operations programs. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) perception management. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) propaganda. Any form of adversary communication, especially of a biased or misleading nature, designed to influence the opinions, emotions, attitudes, or behavior of any group in order to benefit the sponsor, either directly or indirectly. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in JP 1-02.)

GL-7

Glossary psychological operations. Planned operations to convey selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups, and individuals. The purpose of psychological operations is to induce or reinforce foreign attitudes and behavior favorable to the originator’s objectives. Also called PSYOP. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-13.2) psychological operations impact indicators. An observable event or a discernible subjectively determined behavioral change that represents an effect of a psychological operations activity on the intended foreign target audience at a particular point in time. It is measured evidence, ascertained during the analytical phase of the psychological operations development process, to evaluate the degree to which the psychological operations objective is achieved. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-13.2) psychological operations support element. A tailored element that can provide limited psychological operations support. Psychological operations support elements do not contain organic command and control capability; therefore, command relationships must be clearly defined. The size, composition and capability of the psychological operations support element are determined by the requirements of the supported commander. A psychological operations support element is not designed to provide full-scale psychological operations capability; reachback is critical for its mission success. Also called PSE. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in JP 1-02.) public affairs. Those public information, command information, and community relations activities directed toward both the external and internal publics with interest in the Department of Defense. Also called PA. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-61) public diplomacy. 1. Those overt international public information activities of the United States Government designed to promote United States foreign policy objectives by seeking to understand, inform, and influence foreign audiences and opinion makers, and by broadening the dialogue between American citizens and institutions and their counterparts abroad. 2. In peace building, civilian agency efforts to promote an understanding of the reconstruction efforts, rule of law, and civic responsibility through public affairs and international public diplomacy operations. Its objective is to promote and sustain consent for peace building both within the host nation and externally in the region and in the larger international community. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-07.3) public information. Information of a military nature, the dissemination of which through public news media is not inconsistent with security, and the release of which is considered desirable or nonobjectionable to the responsible releasing agency. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-13)

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JP 3-13.2

Glossary special reconnaissance. Reconnaissance and surveillance actions conducted as a special operation in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive environments to collect or verify information of strategic or operational significance, employing military capabilities not normally found in conventional forces. These actions provide an additive capability for commanders and supplement other conventional reconnaissance and surveillance actions. Also called SR. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-05) strategic communication. Focused United States Government efforts to understand and engage key audiences to create, strengthen, or preserve conditions favorable for the advancement of United States Government interests, policies, and objectives through the use of coordinated programs, plans, themes, messages, and products synchronized with the actions of all instruments of national power. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 5-0) strategic psychological activities. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) target audience. An individual or group selected for influence. Also called TA. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-13) unconventional warfare. A broad spectrum of military and paramilitary operations, normally of long duration, predominantly conducted through, with, or by indigenous or surrogate forces who are organized, trained, equipped, supported, and directed in varying degrees by an external source. It includes, but is not limited to, guerrilla warfare, subversion, sabotage, intelligence activities, and unconventional assisted recovery. Also called UW. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-05)

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Glossary

Intentionally Blank

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JP 3-13.2

JOINT DOCTRINE PUBLICATIONS HIERARCHY
JP 1

JOINT DOCTRINE

JP 1-0

JP 2-0

JP 3-0

JP 4-0

JP 5-0

JP 6-0

PERSONNEL

INTELLIGENCE

OPERATIONS

LOGISTICS

PLANS

COMMUNICATION SYSTEMS

All joint publications are organized into a comprehensive hierarchy as shown in the chart above. Joint Publication (JP) 3-13.2 is in the Operations series of joint doctrine publications. The diagram below illustrates an overview of the development process:

JP published and continuously assessed by users Formal assessment begins 2427 months following publication Revision begins 3.5 years after publication Each JP revision is completed no later than 5 years after signature