In
any system of Parliamentary government, an important criterion of the
performance of the electoral method used is the extent to which it succeeds
in providing effective representation of the people. The Universal
Declaration of Human Rights refers to government by freely chosen
representatives as being essential if the right of people to take part in
government is to be realized. A consistent feature of elections of the
Tasmanian House of Assembly with the Hare-Clark method has been that, with a
wide choice of candidates, a very high proportion of voters has seen the
election of the candidate they have chosen. The performance of the Hare-Clark
method has contrasted strongly with the single-member-district methods in use
for Lower House elections in the other Australian States and for election of
the Federal House of Representatives. These elections regularly leave almost
half of the voters nominally represented by people whom they have
rejected.

With these elections, the practice of parties issuing 'how-to-vote'
instructions is firmly established. The combination of this practice with the
use of single-member districts has had many unfortunate results, probably the
most serious being that candidates and Members of Parliament are strongly
encouraged by the system to be concerned about the views of the few people
who control party endorsements rather than those of the voters.

The Provisions for elections of the Federal Senate are much more
satisfactory than those for the House of Representatives or for State Lower
Houses other than the Tasmanian House of Assembly. Being designed to give
proportional representation, the method used in Senate elections at least
ensures that parties are represented approximately in proportion to the
voting support they receive.

iii

Unfortunately, the practice of parties issuing how-to-vote instructions
is also followed in Senate elections. In States other than Tasmania, voters
have come to regard this as a normal procedure and most of them follow the
instructions of one party or other. The practice has therefore had the effect
of limiting the capability of the method to translate the considered choice
of the voters into effective representation, and, with some important
exceptions, it has operated almost as a party-list method.

Tasmanians and all of those elsewhere who are interested in strengthening
and improving democracy are fortunate to have someone of Dr. Howatt's
qualifications and experience to investigate problems in the machinery of
elections and representation. Even In this interim report, he has made a
significant observation that may be new even to most of those concerned with
the operation of electoral systems, at least in the non-Tasmanian States. He
has shown that the use of Senate-style voting tickets, in contrast to the
free selection of candidates provided for voters under the
Tasmanian-pioneered Hare-Clark system, can actually affect
adversely the parties that use the tickets.

Tasmanian voters are fortunate to have the freedom of choice and accurate
representation that the Hare-Clark method ensures. Any suggestion of a major
departure from existing practice should be scrutinized very carefully to
avoid the possibility of loss of any of the special characteristics of the
method that has served the voters of Tasmania so well in the past.

WHY
SENATE-STYLE REGIMENTED VOTING DISTORTS THE PROPORTIONALITY OF ELECTION
RESULTS, THEREBY PENALIZING THE MAJOR PARTIES THAT PRACTISE IT, RESULTING IN
THE OVER-REPRESENTATION OF MINORITY PARTIES OR GROUPS, THUS INEVITABLY
WEAKENING THE TWO-PARTY SYSTEM AND INCREASING THE LIKELIHOOD OF INSTABILITY
IN PARLIAMENT

Although
the writer will save most of his prefatory remarks for the final report, his
appreciation to those noted below is so great that acknowledgment of their
invaluable advice and assistance cannot be postponed:

The writer of course is solely responsible for the views in the
report.

George Howatt,
Special Research Fellow,
Department of Political Science.

The
University of Tasmania,
June, 1979.

PART
1. INTRODUCTION AND PURPOSE OF REPORT.

To assess the method commonly known as "Senate-style regimented voting".

1.
Prefatory note.
This report is the outgrowth of a recommendation by Mr. Neil Robson, M.H.A.,
to Premier Lowe that the writer be requested to prepare a report for
Parliament analysing and assessing Electoral Bill (No. 2) 1977 (viz., the
Robson bill), which provides for the rotational printing
of candidates' names on ballot--papers for Tasmanian State elections.
Obviously, there are various ways of deciding how names should be placed on
ballot-papers - for example, according to the alphabetical order of surnames
or by lot; this latter method, now used in Tasmania, superseded the former
and was used for House of Assembly elections for the first time in 1976.

The various alternatives to the Robson bill need to be examined before the
bill itself can be assessed properly. One alternative which has been
mentioned by some as a possibility is the method used by the major political
parties and others for (a) determining the position of candidates' names
within groups on the ballot-paper for Senate elections and (b) for directing
electoral support to particular candidates.

In effect, the method empowers the management of the contesting parties,
firstly, to list the names of its candidates on the ballot-paper in whatever
order it wishes (irrespective of specific criteria such as alphabetical order
or drawing by lot) and then to so advise the electoral authorities. Secondly,
party management then issues "how-to-vote cards
with specific preference numbers printed beside the names of the various
candidates. Party management then appeals to its electoral supporters
(through the distribution of these cards at Polling booths and by advertising
them in the press and elsewhere) to copy onto their ballot-papers the numbers
exactly as they appear on the how-to-vote cards. The parties under this
system are in effect saying to their potential supporters "Please take
our voting card, but don't think for yourselves; merely copy as we have
directed, without any selection on your part, the preference numbers onto
your ballot-paper precisely as the numbers appear on our
card".

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2 -

These
political parties, which are privately controlled organizations not elected
by the public (and hence perhaps not even representative of it) do not
consult the public in choosing the candidates they endorse - thereby
presenting the risk of offering candidates not representative of their
supporters. The effect of the inability to consult the public in selecting
candidates (obviously not an easy task) could be offset considerably by
offering the voters a wide choice of candidates; this idea need not be a
dream, but a reality, and in fact is done regularly in Tasmania for electing
the House of Assembly and, in a somewhat corresponding way, the Legislative
Council.

However, the political parties in Senate elections (in contrast to the
model furnished by Assembly elections in Tasmania) do not offer a wide choice
of candidates, but instead restrict the choice to a minimum, namely, to only
three candidates even in the case of the major parties, where there are,
nevertheless, five vacancies to fill. In effect, the controllers of these
parties say to their supporters, "We'll offer you fewer candidates than
there are vacancies to fill, thus reducing to the lowest limit the number of
choices we make available to you, even though the electoral system readily
enables a party to give its supporters a wide choice of candidates". In
short, party management in Senate contests is saying to the voters "We
don't want you to think for yourselves; instead we only want you to be
ciphers for us, in order to copy down numbers according to our
directions". (1)

(1)
Voters who have not experienced the opportunity enjoyed by Tasmanians of
selecting their own choices from a wide range of candidates offered by their
party may not, understandably, realize how extremely restrictive the Senate
system is, compared with the Tasmanian-pioneered method, called the
"Hare-Clark system", used to elect its lower house, called the
House of Assembly. In these Hare-Clark elections the voters mark their own
choices freely, as they please, without any direction from the party they
support.

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3 -

3.
Though faulty even for Senate Elections, the regimenting of voters by means
of numbered party tickets would be both extremely undesirable and impractical
for Hare-Clark elections.

Such a method is highly undesirable even for Senate elections as will be
explained in the final report. However, since elections for the Tasmanian
House of Assembly are conducted on a far higher plane and in a very different
manner from Senate elections, these differences would make Senate-style
tickets both impractical and most undesirable for electing Members to the
Assembly, as will be detailed in the final report. This final report will
further point out how attempts to apply Senate-style regimented voting to
Assembly elections also would jeopardize (if not rupture from the start) the
continuance of the two-party system in Tasmania, the stable functioning of
Parliament, and the control - strong and healthy - (as compared with other
States and nations) which the voting public in Tasmania now exercises over
its Parliament - a control unique in its excellence. Further, the final
report will explain how this precious heritage special to Tasmania - and
which could serve, if known, as an urgently needed model for the rest of the
world - would be severely damaged, if not destroyed, by the introduction of
Senate-style regimented voting for Assembly elections. (2)

(2) Although
examining the subject of Senate-style tickets needs to refer from time to
time to certain features of the Hare-Clark method, space does not permit, nor
would it be germane, in this paper to attempt an evaluation or appreciation
of this special system, which is unique in the manner in which it is applied
in Tasmania.

Readers wishing a few words of assessment of the system, such as can be
covered in a brief newspaper article, could refer to Appendix E of this
paper. A longer, but still very summarized assessment, may be found in
Tasmanian Parliamentary Paper No. 22 of 1958, by the writer entitled Democratic
Representation under the Hare-Clark System.

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4 -

4.
Some factors which have contributed to the writer's conclusions.

The writer is deeply proud to be regarded as a fervent admirer of the
Tasmanian-pioneered Hare-Clark system, motivated by his belief that the inherent
features of this special method could solve problems of representation in
many lands, thereby enabling these States and nations to meet the challenges
of change, to respond to the needs of their people, and solve problems which
at present seem to be increasing in almost all countries.

Nevertheless, the writer's admiration and support for the Hare-Clark
system has not blinded him from seeing ways in which the application of
Hare-Clark principles could be refined and strengthened. Evidence of his wish
not only to commend the Hare-Clark system but also to seek improvements in
applying its principles could be demonstrated in many ways. One is to note
the appearance of the twenty-one articles listed below, published by "The
Mercury", all of them written to advocate adoption of some
refinement to improve the system; this and other evidence do not show
complacent and uncritical admiration of all aspects of the way the Hare-Clark
system is at present applied.

The writer has undertaken various major research projects on electoral
systems, including, for example, a Ph.D. thesis for the University of
Tasmania focussed on the Hare-Clark system. Years of research and thought on
electoral systems and practices leave the writer with no doubt that the use
of numbered how-to-vote cards by political parties is unqualifiedly
undesirable and would be a most retrograde step, for reasons which the final
report will set out.

The
following list is confined to articles by the writer which appeared in "The
Mercury", usually on the editorial page:-

1. "Hare-Clark is World's Model System", October
l9, 1956.
2. "Electoral System, with Changes, Will be Model for World",
October 30, 1957.
3 "Display of Accord between People and Parliament", October 31,
1957.
4. "Parliament More Effective if Membership of Assembly Increased",
November 1, 1957.
5. "Filling Vacancy by Recount Achieves Democratic Result",
December 24, 1957.
6. "If a Deadlock Occurs on Saturday?", April 29, 1959.
7. "Seven-Seat Electorate Defended", June 4, 1959.
8. "'Deadlock' Plan Return Would Be Welcomed", July 14, 1960.
9. "Problem of Unused Remainders in Hare-Clark System", September
3, 1963.
10. "Ensuring Full Representation of Voters", September 4,
1963.
11. "Ensuring Majorities in All State Elections", September 5,
1963.
12. "Overcoming Deadlocks", April 24, 1964.
13. "Hare-Clark Voting System Has Proved Superiority Over Others in
Reflecting People's Choice", June 12, 1969.
14. "Political Balance of Power Crises Could be Avoided", November
8, 1971.
15. "Ensuring Workable Majority in Parliament", November 9,
1971.
16. "Response to Voting Ideas Encouraging", November 23,
1971.
17. "Now Is Time to Force Pledge for Change to End Deadlocks",
March 24, 1972.
18. "Clear-cut Decision Needed in Forthcoming State Election",
April 3, 1972.
19. "Risk of an Indecisive Election: A Plan for Averting Too-Narrow
Margins", April 17, 1972.
20. "Refinements in Voting System Can Ensure Majority Rule", April
18, 1972.
21. "Electoral Justice Still Needs to be Safeguarded", April 24,
1972.

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5 -

(Articles
by the writer appearing in other publications or articles merely descriptive
of the Hare-Clark system without advocating reform of some kind are not
included in the above list).

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6 -

PART
II - WHY SENATE-STYLE REGIMENTED VOTING DISTORTS THE PROPORTIONALITY OF
ELECTION RESULTS, THEREBY
PENALIZING THE MAJOR PARTIES THAT PRACTISE IT, RESULTING IN THE
OVER-REPRESENTATION OF MINORITY PARTIES OR GROUPS,THUS INEVITABLY WEAKENING
THE TWO-PARTY SYSTEM AND INCREASING THE LIKELIHOOD OF INSTABILITY IN
PARLIAMENT.

Regimented
voting, Senate-style reduces the equity of election results by distorting the
proportionality of the election outcome; such regimentation can
and does result in some parties, namely, the larger ones, receiving fewer
seats when on a proportional basis, they are entitled to more seats.
Conversely, such regimentation can and does give smaller parties or groups
more seats than they would be entitled to on a proportional basis.

In short, regimented voting, Senate-style can under-represent the parties
supported by the greater number of voters and over-represent the parties or
groups attracting less support. The fact that such regimentation does
under-represent the major parties and over-represent minor ones can be seen
clearly from examples cited here in Part II. More will be cited in the final
report.

Under the time-tested Hare-Clark feature of giving the voters a free
selection of candidates, the larger parties gain their fair share of the
seats while not depriving any eligible minority of their fair share also. If
any party or group obtains a full quota, or close enough to a full quota, it
will win a seat as it is justly entitled to, under Senate or Hare-Clark
conditions.

However, suppose no party has sufficient votes (in primaries plus possible
accumulated preferences) to fill a quota for the last seat to be filled - a
common enough situation: who is entitled to that seat when two or more have
partial quotas but not full ones? Under usual Hare-Clark conditions this
problem is answered easily and naturally enough (as regards the vacancies
within an electorate) - namely, by the rule of the order of elimination of
candidates.

In practice, owing to the fact that candidates, in the absence of numbered
how-to-vote cards, seek support as individual persons, there is a natural
spread of support (in primary votes and preferences) over many candidates.
When surplus votes are transferred, as well as the preferences of excluded
candidates, the votes normally are distributed - owing to absence of numbered
how-to-vote cards - over the range of the continuing candidates.

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7 -

As
a result the voting support for a given party tends to be spread over several
candidates (the number varying of course according to the stage of the
scrutiny process). In practice, therefore, under usual Hare-Clark conditions,
the size of a party's vote will determine the order of elimination of
candidates and thereby the number of quotas filled and seats won.

Under usual Hare-Clark conditions the final seat in an electorate will be
won by the party which shows the highest average no. of votes per candidate
at the time of the last exclusion. In other words, when voters are given the
opportunity, as provided by existing Hare-Clark conditions, to select
candidates freely as they choose, a normal spreading of support for a party's
candidates occurs, being reflected in a well-spread primary vote or, as the
case may be, during the distribution of surplus votes.

An equitable criterion for allocating Parliamentary seats is that the
members of Parliament should be elected in proportion, as nearly as possible,
to the number of votes of their supporters. The Hare-Clark system, which
allows a natural spread of support as a result of the free, undirected
marking of choices by the voters, normally meets this criterion when filling
the vacancies of a given electorate.

In contrast, the Senate practice of electing candidates, based upon
regimenting the vote by means of party how-to-vote cards, has an in-built
feature which distorts this criterion. In practice, and conspicuously so in
the Mainland States, the No. 1 candidate of each party is elected with a
huge, abnormal surplus, which is passed on to the No. 2 candidate who is also
elected with a surplus. This means, in the usual 5-vacancy Senate election,
that the No. 3 candidate of the party is left with many fewer votes than if
his party's vote were more evenly spread over all its candidates. As a
consequence, the No. 3 candidate of each or both parties is left in a weaker
position.

As regards major parties, spreading the vote (as occurs in Hare-Clark
practice) conserves their voting strength by enabling their candidates to
stay in the count longer, thereby increasing their chances of winning more
seats, namely, winning -the number which their vote would, on a proportional
basis, entitle them to.

-
8 -

In
contrast, the Senate practice of regimenting the vote, resulting in huge
surpluses for candidate No. 1 and No. 2 on the party ticket, leaves its No. 3
candidate in a weakened position "starving" for votes which have
been denied to No. 3 because of the effect of the regimented ticket. As a
consequence the major parties have frequently lost the last seat to a minor
party or Independent candidate even though they had obtained sufficient
support for electing all their three candidates if normal Hare-Clark
conditions had applied, as illustrated in Figures 1 and 2. In Figures 1 and 2
if the seats had divided, in both examples, 3 to 2 instead of 2-2-l, it would
have been a more equitable result since, at the stage of the last exclusion,
the average vote for the candidates of both major parties exceeded the total
for the minor party or Independent.

In these cases both major parties were more entitled, on a proportional
basis, to the seat, won by the minor party or Independent. In other words,
both major parties forfeited an opportunity to win an additional seat by
wasting their strength, through regimented voting, with huge surpluses for
?rds of their candidates while the other ?rd was forced, unnecessarily by
normal Hare-Clark practice, into elimination.

Senate-style regimented voting therefore not only deprives, in practice, the
elector of a free choice of candidates, it also can, and frequently does,
deprive the supporters of major parties of the additional seats to which they
would be entitled on a more fairly proportional basis.

A brief explanation regarding the outcome of the Assembly
elections in Denison in 1976:-

In
this case the party with the slightly larger vote (the ALP) happened to be
disadvantaged because, by chance, the Liberal party voters distributed their
support for their candidates more evenly than did Labor supporters, thereby
gaining more seats though receiving a smaller vote in Denison than Labor. As
the Labor votes were more concentrated (i.e. less well spread over their
candidates than the Liberals), they were less effective in winning seats. In
effect, Labor, by accident, suffered: the same disadvantage as if it had
concentrated and directed its vote by means of Senate-style tickets. This
example of 1976 was exceptional to the usual experience under the Hare-Clark
system; adoption of regimented voting would convert this fortuitous happening
into a regular feature.

For a variety of reasons., some of them given in the appendices, the
functioning of the Senate would be improved incomparably by the adoption of
Hare-Clark practice in electing it. Conversely, the use of Senate-style
regimented voting would produce disastrous consequences if used for electing
the Tasmanian House of Assembly, for reasons noted in this interim report
plus those to be covered in the final report.

- 9 -

Owing
to the relatively small local electorates used for choosing the House of
Assembly, as compared with State-wide voting for the Senate, the
encouragement which regimented voting would give to non-major party
candidates would be enormous, and could well end the 2-party system in
Tasmania in the first election in which it was tried. Firstly, regimented
voting would certainly reduce the number of votes which the major parties
would receive, and secondly, even the smaller totals would be less effective
since observing party tickets (if they could be enforced) would elect with
large surpluses those candidates high on the tickets, leaving lower placed
candidates in a much weakened position and unable, probably in frequent
occurrence, to win the last seat in many, perhaps in all, electorates

Regimented voting would certainly reduce the vote-attracting ability and,
consequently, the vote totals of any major party which attempted to apply
Senate-style voting, which, bad enough for State-wide electorates and with
restricted nominations, would prove disastrous for any major party which
attempted to apply it for State elections - for reasons to be detailed in
final report, as they are too numerous for including in this interim
report.

For example, there is no known realistic way (at least none known. to the
writer) for determining workable criteria for ranking a preference order for
candidates when the number of endorsements (as is the case under Hare-Clark
conditions) is roughly twice the number of seats which a party can expect to
win. A party ticket under these circumstances (which obviously are quite
different from those now in practice for the Senate) would have to declare
publicly its recommended order of preferences. If the preferences were
intended to be heeded (if not why recommend any), they would, in effect, be
saying which 3 of its candidates were assured of seats in Parliament and
which 3 should be consigned to defeat.

Criteria to be workable would have to win the general consent of the party
and the community concerned. Hence, the criteria would not only have to be
fair, but be seen publicly to be fair. In the absence of fair criteria, what
basis for selection could be used - only some form of lobbying and making
deals which certainly would rupture internally a party which attempted to put
it into effect. Inevitably such internal disruption would spread disaffection
among the voters, and cripple any major party experiencing such internal
trauma, as will be explained in the final report.

BECAUSE OF REGIMENTED
VOTING EACH
MAJOR PARTY ELECTED 2
CANDIDATES EACH WITH
FULL QUOTAS, THUS
LEAVING THEIR THIRD
CANDIDATES WITH
FEWER VOTES THAN
IF THE PARTY VOTE
HAD BEEN SPREAD OVER ITS3
CANDIDATES.

(EACH COLUMN REPRESENTS THE
NO. OF VOTES RECEIVED BY THE RESPECTIVE CANDIDATES)

AS
THE THIRD CANDIDATE OF THE ALP GROUP (MR. DEVITT) HAD THE LEAST NUMBER OF
VOTES, HE WAS EXCLUDED, AND HIS PREFERENCES ELECTED THE INDEPENDENT
CANDIDATE, DR. TURNBULL.

IF THE VOTE OF A PARTY WERE SPREAD EVENLY OVER ITS 3
CANDIDATES, ALL WOULD BE AHEAD OF THE INDEPENDENT CANDIDATE.

(EACH COLUMN REPRESENTS THE
NO. OF VOTES RECEIVED BY THE RESPECTIVE CANDIDATES)

AS
THE CANDIDATE WITH THE LEAST VOTES, IS NOW THE INDEPENDENT CANDIDATE, DR.
TURNBULL, HE WOULD BE EXCLUDED, HIS PREFERENCES THEN DECIDING THE 5TH SEAT.
(SEE TEXT FOR FURTHER EXPLANATION AND FOR REASONS WHY, IN THIS EXAMPLE, A 3-2
DIVISION OF SEATS WOULD BE MORE EQUITABLE THAN A 2-2-1 RESULT).

IF THE VOTES OF THE MAJOR PARTIES WERE SPREAD EVENLY
OVER THEIR CANDIDATES, ALL OF THEM WOULD BE AHEAD OF THE DLP CANDIDATE.

(EACH COLUMN REPRESENTS THE
NO. OF VOTES RECEIVED BY THE RESPECTIVE CANDIDATES)

AS
THE CANDIDATE WITH THE LEAST VOTES IS NOW THE DLP CANDIDATE, MR. GAIR, HE
WOULD BE EXCLUDED, HIS PREFERENCES THEN DETERMINING WHICH PARTY WOULD WIN THE
5TH SEAT. (SEE TEXT FOR FURTHER DETAIL AND FOR REASONS WHY, IN THIS EXAMPLE,
A 3-2 DIVISION OF SEATS WOULD BE MORE EQUITABLE THAN A 2-2-1 RESULT).

AS
THE UTG (UNITED TASMANIA GROUP) CANDIDATE, DR. BOB BROWN, HAD THE LEAST
NUMBER OF VOTES HE WAS EXCLUDED AND HIS PREFERENCES, WHICH STRONGLY FAVOURED
THE LIBERAL PARTY, LED TO THE ELECTION OF 3 LIB. CANDIDATES.

UNDER
SENATE-STYLE REGIMENTED VOTING THE CONCENTRATION OF PRIMARY VOTES ON THE
FIRST-LISTED LIB. CANDIDATE, WITH A CONCENTRATION OF PREFERENCES FLOWING TO
THE 2ND. LIB. WOULD LEAVE FEWER VOTES FOR THE THIRD LIB. THE 3RD. LIB WOULD
THEN HAVE FEWER VOTES THAT THE UTG (UNITED TASMANIA GROUP) CANDIDATE. (SEE
TEXT FOR FURTHER EXPLANATIONS AND FOR REASONS WHY A 4-3 DIVISION, AS IN FACT
OCCURRED UNDER NON-REGIMENTED VOTING, IS A MORE EQUITABLE RESULT THAN 3-3-1.)

AS
THE DLP CANDIDATE HAD THE LEAST NUMBER OF VOTES HE WAS EXCLUDED, AND HIS
PREFERENCES, WHICH STRONGLY FAVOURED THE LIBERALS, ENABLED THEM (BY WINNING
THE LAST SEAT NARROWLY) TO GAIN 4 SEATS TO LABOR'S 3).

THE
RELATIONSHIP OF THE CANDIDATES CONCERNED IS SET OUT BELOW, WITH THE VOTES
ALLOCATED AS THEY WOULD BE IF SENATE-STYLE TICKETS HAD BEEN FOLLOWED:-

Quota = 4,014

(EACH COLUMN SHOWS THE NO.
OF VOTES FOR THE RESPECTIVE CANDIDATES)

IN
THE ACTUAL ELECTION, WHEN NUMBERED CARDS WERE NOT USED AND AS A RESULT THE
VOTE WAS NOT REGIMENTED, THE DLP CANDIDATE BECOMES LOWEST IN VOTES AND IS
EXCLUDED AS SEEN IN FIG. 4-A. HOWEVER, IF THE VOTE IS CONCENTRATED, AS
NECESSARILY HAPPENS IF SENATE-STYLE TICKETS ARE USED, THE FIRST 2 LIB. CANDIDATES
ARE ELECTED WITH FULL QUOTAS, AS SEEN ABOVE, THUS NECESSARILY LEAVING FEWER
VOTES FOR THE 4TH. LIB. CANDIDATE, WHOSE VOTE FALLS BELOW THAT OF THE DLP
CANDIDATE. THE LIB. CANDIDATE IS THEREFORE EXCLUDED, AND HIS PREFERENCES
WOULD ELECT THE DLP CANDIDATE, PRODUCING A 3-3-1 OUTCOME. (SEE TEXT FOR
FURTHER PARTICULARS AND FOR REASONS WHY A 4-3 DIVISION OF SEATS IS A MORE
EQUITABLE REFLECTION OF THE POLLING THAN A 3-3-1 RESULT.)

THE
ALP WAS DISADVANTAGED BECAUSE ITS VOTE WAS MORE CONCENTRATED THAN THE
LIBERALS! THOUGH PARTY TOTALS WERE ONLY MARGINALLY DIFFERENT, A SLIGHTLY
GREATER CONCENTRATION IN THE ALP VOTE WAS ENOUGH FOR IT NOT TO WIN THE
SEVENTH SEAT. WITH SENTATE-TYPE TICKETS, THE CONCENTRATION OF VOTES BY THE
PARTY USING THEM WOULD BE MASSIVE, IN COMPARISON WITH THIS, AND WOULD BE A
REGULAR, INEVITABLE OCCURRENCE, NOT AN EXCEPTIONAL INCIDENT, AS IN THIS
EXAMPLE. (SEE TEXT FOR FURTHER EXPLANATION.)

Why
the problems of deciding an order for recommending candidates are
insuperable. For example, what would be the criteria? - preference for Ministers
because of their administrative knowledge? preference to those who have
served longest in Parliament, in recognition of this experience? - a position
high enough on the party list to guarantee the election of a woman member? or
a new member? or the representative of an ethnic group? or one to represent a
specific geographic area? etc. The list of possible criteria and
considerations is endless, and can be solved best only by the way, it is
decided now - by the free choice of the voters.
Why the problems of applying how-to-vote cards in Senate and House of
Assembly elections are quite dissimilar. As one example, in a Senate election
the three candidates for the major parties can perhaps justifiably see the
possibility or hope of winning all 3 seats. In a Hare-Clark election however,
with many more endorsements, a how-to-vote card, if followed, would ensure
victory for some and certain defeat for others.
Possible reactions of members of Parliament in a closely balanced house if
they were placed low on a how-to-vote card. Would they be so disillusioned as
to contemplate forcing a premature election? Would some prominent members
with popular support outside their political party be urged by their friends
to stand as Independents rather hold a losing position on a party ticket? And
by doing so perhaps even hold the balance of power after the ensuing
election?
Would how-to-vote cards create internal factions within the political parties
resulting in less unified strength?
Would numbered tickets be viewed as weakening the public accountability of
Members of Parliament? Now, though pre-selected by private organizations all
members owe their election to a free vote of the people, not to a favoured
place on the ballot-paper.
What effect would the use of numbered how-to-vote cards have on the
activities of candidates and political parties in their campaigns, e.g., it
remove the incentive of those placed low on the how-to-vote cards to work
vigorously?

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20 -

7.

8.

9.

10.

11.

12.

Would
there be adverse criticism of the method by which some candidates were placed
higher on the how-to-vote card than others? - Could a high position be
counter-productive if the electors in general thought the selection was not
justified?
Would many Tasmanian electors see the attempt to introduce numbered tickets
as a manoeuvre to take an important right of choice away from the people and
to transfer it to privately controlled, unelected political party
organizations? The present system encourages electors to think for
themselves. Would they passively accept the loss of this encouragement?
Under the present system the party organization pre-selects a panel of
candidates and the voters select whom they want in Parliament. With
how-to-vote cards the party would both pre-select and, in effect, select,
thereby greatly reducing the role of the elector. Would the confidence which
people hold in the present parties be diminished or lost if the people saw
their traditional practice of choosing candidates impaired by the use of
numbered tickets?
In general, it is difficult to withdraw rights once they have been given and
have become established practice. What would be the effect of efforts which
could be seen to be an attempt to remove the electors' present rights to
choose candidates?
Effect on informality? Is there a danger in increasing the amount of
informality? Remembering that Tasmanian voters have been accustomed to making
their own selections, would the use of how-to-vote cards and the resulting
endeavour by some voters to perform the dual task of combining free selection
with an attempt to follow to some extent a party how-to-vote card cause
increased informality through duplication and/or omission of numbers
Possibility of a late withdrawal of nomination. Could a candidate after
receiving a low position on a party how-to-vote card become sufficiently
disillusioned as to decide at the last moment before close of nominations to
withdraw his nomination and submit another as an Independent. If this event
occurred, many repercussions could ensue.

As the reader will realize, the above is only a small sample of
considerations yet to be analysed and weighed. These subjects and a further
examination of some of the material in this interim report will be dealt with
in the final report.

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21 -

PART
IV
-
SUMMATION

If
the ideal of government by the consent of the governed is the goal of
advocates of democracy, the ideal criterion must be the test that the
judgment of the people should be the guiding factor and the best safeguard
for obtaining government responsive to the needs of the people.

Hence, what is required is machinery for ascertaining the people's
judgment, and already the Hare-Clark system does this better than any other
method in the world, despite the need for certain refinements in applying the
Hare-Clark principles.

A key necessity for gaining a reliable indication of the judgment of the
voters is to give them a choice both between political parties (to identify
their broad policy preferences) and between individual candidates within that
party (so that they, the voters, can select on the basis of the differing
personal qualities between individuals of the same party philosophy). Of all
electoral methods the Hare-Clark system provides these 2 vital
requirements.

Alone of all electoral systems, the Hare-Clark method allows the voter to
make separate judgements both on the party policy and on a range of
candidates within that party; in other words, the unique, Tasmanian-pioneered
Hare-Clark system provides the means for enabling voters to judge effectively
both measures and men, both policies and people.

Under the single-member system, with only one candidate per electorate per
party, an elector may be forced to vote for a candidate whom he does not
favour personally because this candidate's opponent belongs to a party whose
policies he finds unacceptable. Under most list systems of proportional
representation the voter is given either a restricted choice or no choice
between candidates of his preferred party (in any case, no range of choice
comparable to the unique range offered by the Hare-Clark system); hence, the
possibility which is an essential ingredient for expressing an adequate
judgment, namely, an opportunity to choose between a range of candidates with
the same general party philosophy, is denied under both the single-member
system and, the list systems of proportional representation.

Most fortunately, this opportunity does flourish under the Hare-Clark
system as it now operates, by assuring the electors a free and unfettered
choice between parties and, between individual candidates within parties.
Senate-type regimented voting would (if used as applied federally) eliminate
restrict, or lessen this choice - hence one of the most precious criteria for
assessing the basis of representation and for determining the quality of
government, would be impaired, if not destroyed, by use of Senate-style
voting tickets.

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22 -

To recapitulate: before any party candidate can be elected to the
Tasmanian House of Assembly, he must pass two tests, first approval by his
party pre-selectors for nomination as a candidate of his party. Next, he must
win the approval of the people expressing themselves through free choice.
This double test is unique to Tasmania and is an invaluable heritage which
needs to be passed on to other countries. But this heritage would be
destroyed if the pre-selectors were given both the power to endorse and,
thereby in effect, the power to elect through control of the placement of
names on the party ticket and/or ballot papers.

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23 -

PART V - APPENDICES

Appendices
A to D are reprints of articles by the writer which comment on the
undesirability of Senate-type voting tickets and also note, within the
confines of brief press space, some of the reasons why the Hare-Clark system
as it now operates is superior to the Senate system.

When
the number of members per House of Assembly electorate was increased from six
to seven in 1958, (which change meant that the parties would need to consider
increasing the number of endorsements from six, the usual number then, to
seven or eight candidates per electorate), there was some talk in a few
circles that Tasmania should follow the regimented voting style used for
Senate elections.

For various reasons (some of them given in the article which follows) the
writer considered the suggestion of following this Senate practice a very
retrograde idea, and wrote this article in the hope of showing that instead
of adopting Senate practice for Hare-Clark elections, the practice of
regimenting the voters should be dropped and replaced, instead, by the Hare-Clark
method of allowing the voters to select candidates as they pleased, without
the use of numbered tickets.

The writer showed the draft of the article to recently retired Premier
Cosgrove, who read it and said he had no alterations to suggest. Re the idea
of using regimented tickets for Hare-Clark elections [which of course are
quite different from Senate contests in that considerably more candidates
need to be endorsed by a party for Hare-Clark elections than it can hope to
elect] Sir Robert Cosgrove rejected it emphatically and without hesitation
said,

"With Senate-style regimented voting the first three candidates on a
ticket wouldn't need to work [since they would be elected anyway, if the
ticket were followed] and the last three or four candidates (depending on
whether seven or eight were endorsed by the party) wouldn't have any real
incentive to work, since they would have no chance of being elected. Besides,
the rivalry among candidates and their supporters for a winnable place on the
ticket would result in such in-fighting within the party both before and
after the nominations that the whole idea of using numbered cards was a sure
way to put the cat among the pigeons".

(The complete statement by former Premier Cosgrove will be included in the
final report).

The
Senate elections have again revealed, especially on the Mainland, serious
defects in an otherwise excellent electoral system. These could be remedied
by adopting features from the Tasmanian-pioneered Hare-Clark model.

Although the method for electing the Senate has many points of similarity
with the Hare-Clark system, it falls short of the Hare-Clark standard in
several important ways

These defects in the Senate system include the compulsory marking of
preferences for all candidates. This, a carry-over from the former,
non-proportional method of preferential block voting is not necessary. It is
a senseless provision serving no good whatever.

It results in an excessive amount of informal voting. Under Hare-Clark
voting, informality averages around 4 per cent in contrast to an average of
around 11 per cent for Senate elections in Tasmania.

Many Tasmanians, who know that marking three preferences is sufficient for
a valid vote in State elections, follow this habit when voting in Senate
elections, thus making their votes informal.

Marking every square is an unreasonable burden.

The requirement of compulsory numbering of all candidates is offensive
psychologically because it compels the elector to express preferences for
opponents to his own party or for candidates whom he may despise.

An elector should be free to vote for as few or as many candidates as
wishes. To force an elector to vote for candidates he does not want, in order
to support the candidates he prefers, is a serious infringement of voting
freedom. This infringement may sometimes alter election results.

Each elector is given, in effect, a single vote. Once this vote helps to
elect a candidate, it is unnecessary thereafter to examine or consider it.
Most ballot papers are never examined beyond the second preference.

Roughly speaking, fewer than 15 per cent of the votes are examined beyond
the third preference in most elections. Hence, marking a number in every
square on the voting paper is a futile effort.

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26 -

Compulsory
preference numbering of all candidates means enforced cross voting, and could
produce results not desired by the electors. The decision of an electorate
made under conditions of compulsory numbering of all candidates could be
different from that expressed when electors may choose for themselves how
many preferences they wish to register.

Compare, for example, the experience revealed by the Hare-Clark system,
which requires a minimum marking of only three preferences. In practice, most
electors under Hare-Clark vote for the candidates of their own party, and
then stop.

One effect is that independent and minority party candidates in Hare-Clark
elections must poll almost a quota of primary votes to win elections.

If voters were required against their will, to number all candidates, the
effect in past elections would have been to elect some independents who were
not, in fact, able to reach quotas under existing conditions.

If supporters of minority party candidates are numerous enough to elect a
senator, they are justly entitled to the seat. But if the seat is won by
preferences obtained compulsorily from major parties, the minority party
obtains more representation than it should.

A second defect in Senate voting, especially as seen in Mainland
elections, is the practice of the political parties in advising their
supporters to vote in a regimented 1-2-3, down-the-ticket fashion.

Under Hare-Clark elections it is interesting to note in contrast that
Tasmanian parties do not endeavour to dragoon their supporters into voting in
a prescribed order. Consequently, Tasmanians exercise their judgment and
choose between candidates in State elections.

Candidates owe their election, therefore, to the support they receive from
the electors, not to their position on the ballot paper.

Elections under Hare-Clark conditions are consequently more healthy and
real, resulting in better representation of the voters and higher prestige
for elected members. In the party-regimented Senate elections of the Mainland,
electors become conditioned to party tickets, and the individuality of Senate
candidates is largely lost.

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27 -

The
parties on the Mainland (and sometimes in Tasmanian Senate elections) advise
their supporters to follow the very practice which can hurt their party's
interest the most.

Instead of permitting the electors to spread their primary votes naturally
over several candidates, as under Hare-Clark elections, they do their best to
concentrate votes on the No.1 candidate and thus give him an abnormal
surplus.

This practice of regimenting the vote would have resulted in the election
of Mr. Little, DLP candidate for the Senate in Victoria, if there had been
five vacancies to fill instead of six.

A party's best interest is served by keeping as many of its candidates in
the count as long as possible. Under unregimented conditions this occurs as a
result of the natural spreading of support by the voters.

In contrast, under the prevailing regimented conditions, a party wastes
its voting strength by electing its No. 1 and No. 2 candidates with full
quotas early in the count. This leaves fewer votes for their No. 3 candidate,
who therefore could be forced into elimination unnecessarily.

The basic features of the Senate PR system are splendid and yield
representative results incomparably superior to the lopsided, "all or
none" results of the old Senate system which preceded it. But despite
its general excellence, the present method requires further reforms, for
which fortunately, the Hare-Clark system can serve as a guide.

When the writer mentioned to the editor the point that numbered
how-to-vote cards when combined with regimented voting (the practice then
as now) could actually cause major parties to LOSE seats which they could
otherwise win, he seemed quite interested and accepted the article for
publishing. He supplied the heading "Senate how-to-vote cards
boomerang -- VOTE-TO-ORDER DOESN'T PAY", for the article, which
follows:-

There
are two major faults in the way the proportional representation system is
applied in Senate elections.

The first is due to the party regimentation of voters through how-to-vote
cards. The big parties can actually hurt their chances by such cards, because
in a normal five-vacancy poll, concentration on a No. 1 candidate can distort
the total vote and help a minority party.

The second fault is the compulsion on the voter to fill in a preference
for every candidate. This is unnecessary and mainly futile.

Basically, the proportional representation system is sound and fair. It
has eliminated the grossly lop sided, violently-fluctuating "all or
none'' of the former preferential block system.

That system once produced a lone Labor Senator and 35 non-Labor members.
And in 1946, 33 Labor Senators were returned with an Opposition of only
three.

In the last election the compulsory marking of all preferences made the
informal vote shockingly high in all States.

Once again, the parties regimented the electors with numbered how-to-vote
cards.

In Victoria, the election showed that such regimentation could distort the
electors' wishes.

For example, although the DLP did not win any of the six Senate seats, Mr.
Little, DLP candidate, would have been elected if there had been only the
usual five vacancies.

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29 -

Some
constitutional provisions, like staggered Senate elections every three years,
increase the likelihood of deadlocks with the lower House, but much
improvement in other directions can be achieved without constitutional
amendments.

It would be a major advance to abolish compulsory numbering of preferences
for all candidates. This compulsion serves no good and produces a crop of
evils.

1. It causes excessive informal voting. Informality in Senate elections
often runs to 10 per cent and sometimes higher.

Ireland has used a similar PR system since 1923. But informality is around
1 per cent - mainly because an Irishman need mark only one preference. In
Tasmania a system and ballot-paper largely similar to the Senate method are
used for electing the State's House of Assembly. Voters have to mark a
minimum of three preferences. Informality is gene rally around 4 per cent or
1ess.

2. Compulsory numbering of all candidates is offensive psychologically. It
compels the elector to express preferences even for candidates he may
despise.

To force an elector to vote for candidates he doesn't want in order to
support those he favours is a deplorable infringement of voting freedom. When
an elector can vote for as many or as few candidates as he pleases, voting
becomes a meaningful selective process, not a mathematical exercise.

In counting, most ballot-papers are never examined beyond the second preference,
and fewer than 15 per cent are examined beyond the third preference in most
5-vacancy elections. Hence, fully marking a ballot-paper is largely
futile.

3. Compulsory numbering of all candidates means enforced cross-party
voting and could produce results not desired by the electors. Most Tasmanians
in their State elections vote for the candidates of their own party and then
stop.

So Independent and minority party candidates pick up very few preference
from supporters of the major parties. If voters had had to number all
candidates some Independents not able to reach quotas under existing
conditions would have been elected.

If supporters of minority party candidates are numerous enough to elect a
Senator, he is justly entitled to the seat.

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30 -

But
if the seat is won by preferences obtained compulsorily from major parties,
the minority party obtains more representation than the electors really
wish.

Regimentation can operate against the interests of the party imposing it
on its supporters.

In the absence of regimentation, so long as the supporters of a party keep
their votes within the party ticket, the party can expect to obtain maximum
success. PROVIDED it does NOT advise its supporters to concentrate their No.
1 vote on a specified candidate and then number the preferences in a uniform
order.

Under PR elections a party's best interest is served by keeping as many as
possible of its candidates in the count for as long as possible.

This occurs as a result of the natural spreading of votes over several
candidates as seen in State elections in Tasmania, where the party doesn't
tell its supporters to vote 1-2-3 down the ticket.

But if it does regiment a party wastes votes by electing its No. 1 and No.
2 candidates with full quotas early in the count.

This leaves fewer votes for their No. 3, who could be forced into
elimination.

For example, in a 5-vacancy election with its larger quota, Senator
Sandford, ALP, would have been lowest towards the end of the count and
eliminated, thus electing Mr. Little.

But if the main parties did not regiment their vote, but let it spread
naturally their No. 3 candidate could have enough votes to stay ahead of Mr.
Little, who consequently, would be eliminated, as can be seen by the figures
applied to a 5-vacancy count.

O'I'HER MAJOR REFORMS ARE STRONGLY NEEDED IN THE METHOD OF FILLING CASUAL
VACANCIES AND IN CONDUCTING DOUBLE DISSOLUTION ELECTIONS.

When Brian Fitzpatrick read "The Herald" article of
December 17, 1958, he asked the writer for further information on the claim
regarding the effect of regimenting the vote in Senate elections. The
writer supplied the explanation given on p. 4 of the March 1959 issue;
Brian Fitzpatrick wrote an introduction to the explanation which he
entitled "The Bad Luck of Mr. Little".

The introduction, by Brian Fitzpatrick, from p.3, is as follows:-

Showing
an extraordinary quirk of the Commonwealth Senate voting-counting system, and
incidentally supplying political party managers with headachey future
problems in advising voters about the most effective order of preference,
this article is the work of Mr. George Howatt.

He is an American student of Australian electoral methods, a former
Fulbright Scholar working at present in the University of Tasmania.

In the recent federal election there happened to be an extra Senate vacancy
to be filled for Victoria. This meant that six places were to be filled,
instead of the customary five.

The upshot was that the ALP won three seats, the LCP the other three, and
DLP candidate, Mr. Little, not running into a place.

But had the situation been as usual, with only five candidates to be
elected, Mr. Little, instead of running seventh and failing to get one of the
six seats, could have run fifth, and won one of the five seats'.

However, as Mr. Howatt shows in his second illustration, a different
distribution of ALP first preferences - spreading them over the three
candidates, instead of concentrating them on Labor's top candidate - could
still have kept Mr. Little out.

At first sight, it is hard to swallow the likelihood of a candidate's vote
standing him in better stead when there are fewer seats to be won. But in
Tasmania, electoral experts have special knowledge of the vagaries of the
Hare-Clark system of Proportional Representation, as used in federal
elections for the Senate since the Chifley Labor Government introduced the
system in 1949.

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32 -

For
the Hare-Clark PR system has been used in state elections there for more than
half a century. Mr. Howatt submitted his curious analysis to two top men in
the electoral business, both of whom agreed that it was wholly correct.

The
explanation, provided briefly by the writer is as follows:-

These
figures below show how Mr. Little, in the November 1958 federal election DLP
Senate candidate in Victoria, would in fact have been elected if five
Senators instead of six had been chosen in that State.

In the examples it is sufficient to illustrate by showing only the last
stage of the count, when the percentages of votes received by the various
parties after the distribution of preferences would be approximately as
follows: ALP, 43.0 per cent; DLP, 12.9 per cent; and LCP, 44.1 per cent. In
the example, these percentages are expressed as whole numbers to facilitate understanding.
The five-seat quota of 16.7 per cent, becomes 167 votes.

In Illustration A, therefore, the ALP with 430 votes (i.e. 43.0 per cent
would fill two quotas of 167 votes (16.7 per cent) and have a remainder of 96
votes resting with its third candidate, Senator Sandford. The LCP with 441
votes (44.1 per cent) would fill two quotas and have a remainder of 107 votes
to the credit of Senator Hannan. As Mr. Little of the DLP would have 129
votes (12.9 per cent) he would be ahead of the ALP candidate and win
election, as shown below.

Illustration A: Mr. Little is elected - because the major parties regiment
their supporters into concentrating their primaries by voting 1, 2, 3, down
their respective party tickets. Thus:-

As both Sandford, ALP; and Hannan, LCP; would have fewer votes than
Little, DLP; either Sandford or Hannan (in this case, Sandford) would be
eliminated, and Mr Little would receive the preferences and be elected. On
the other hand, if the ALP and LCP do not waste their vote by concentrating
it on their No. 1 and No. 2 candidates, Mr Little becomes lowest on the poll
and is eliminated, his preferences electing Senator Hannan, LCP; on the basis
of illustrative figures shown.

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33 -

Illustration
B: Mr Little is not elected - because in this example the primary vote of
the major parties is spread over several candidates, as normally could be the
case under unregimented conditions. Election results with the same party vote
totals as above, but under the unregimented conditions illustrated, are as
follows:-

As spreading the vote conserves the strength of the major parties, Mr
Little becomes lowest on the poll, resulting in his elimination and the
transfer of his preferences, which elect Hannan, LCP. In the absence of
regimentation of voters, as seen in State elections in Tasmania and other
places using a system similar to the Senate PR. method, a natural spreading
of the No. 1 vote and preferences takes place. In Illustration B the
variations in the spreading could be considerably greater than shown without
the lowest major party candidate falling below Mr Little.

In this election (Nov. 22, 1958) both the ALP and LCP placed the DLP next
in preference after their own candidates.

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34 -

APPENDIX 'D'

Note
regarding articles below, from "The Mercury", February 27,
1962, and "The Examiner", March 6, 1962:-

Once again the subject of using numbered how-to-vote cards became the
point of some public discussion. In response, the writer prepared
these two articles to point out why Senate-style regimented voting not only
was undesirable for choosing the House of Assembly but also could prevent
the achievement of fairer results in Senate elections.

"The Mercury" article, entitled "Weakness in
Senate Poll", is as follows:-

Weaknesses
in Senate voting methods are again brought to mind by the recent release of final
election figures for all States. Most of these weaknesses would be corrected
by the application of certain features from the Tasmanian Hare-Clark
system.

First, the compulsory marking of all preferences again resulted in
excessively high informality, averaging 10.6 per cent nationally. Informality
was greatest in NSW with a State average of 12.8 per cent. In Tasmania
informal votes accounted for 10 per cent in contrast to an average of around
4 per cent under Hare-Clark voting in State elections, for which a ballot
paper is valid if marked correctly for a minimum of only three choices.

Second, compulsory numbering of all candidates is offensive
psychologically to many electors, who resent having to give preferences to
candidates they disfavour or despise.

Third, compelling an elector to extend preferences to all candidates not
only delays greatly the counting process but also can misrepresent the
intention of electors. For examples when Mr Devitt (the third ALP Senate
candidate was excluded, all his 15,507 ballot papers had to show a preference
for either Mr Orchard (Lib.) or Dr Turnbull (Ind.).

Studies show that most electors in past Hare-Clark elections express
choices for their party ticket and stop - an understandable course. But in
the recent Senate contest supporters of Mr Devitt were compelled to show
preference for either their chief traditional opponents or for a former Labor
Minister now competing against their party. Forcing electors to choose
between candidates, none of whom they may like, gravely infringes voting
freedom and potentially can alter the results intended by the electors.

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35 -

LIKE
SHEEP

This potential misrepresentation becomes more serious when combined with
the unfortunate practice by political parties of endeavouring to regiment
their supporters into voting, in sheep-like fashion, 1-2-3 down the paper.
Though practised universally in Mainland Senate elections, regimented voting
has scarcely occurred in Tasmanian Hare-Clark contests.

Under Hare-Clark voting, candidates therefore owe their election to the
support they win from the electors, not to the order in which they are listed
on the ballot-paper.

Many evils come from regimented voting, but for the moment let us consider
how it could, in fact, change what election results otherwise might be. The
possibility of obtaining different election results from the same election
figures arises in cases when no party (or independent candidate) has enough
votes of its own to fill the last quota in a multi-member electorate.

One of several such illustrations from the last Senate election occurred
in Tasmania, where the fifth Senate seat (and 20 per cent of Tasmania's
available Senate representation) was won by a candidate who polled only 11.6
per cent of the total primary vote. In this contest, after four seats were
filled, Mr. Devitt ( ALP) had 15,507 votes to his credit, Mr. Orchard (Lib.)
16,326, and Dr. Turnbull (Ind.) 21,448. As Mr. Devitt was recorded as having
the smallest vote, he was excluded and his papers divided between Orchard and
Turnbull according to the preferences compulsorily indicated on them.

Yet at the stage before Devitt's exclusion the Labor group had a total of
68,189 votes, the Liberals 69,608, and Turnbull 21,448. Suppose the party
totals had been divided equally between the three candidates of each party
then each Labor candidate would have had 22,929 votes and each Liberal
candidate 23,202. Under these conditions, Dr. Turnbull, having only 21,448
votes would have been the lowest candidate and therefore eliminated, his
preferences deciding the fifth seat. An exact spreading of the vote among the
major party candidates would not have been needed in order to keep them ahead
of Dr. Turnbull during the cut-up, provided the spread was sufficient to keep
each of their candidates ahead of Turnbull's total.

STRENGTH WASTED

Under unregimented Hare-Clark voting the electors freely distribute both
their primaries and preferences, over a wide choice of candidates. As a
result, a natural spreading of primaries and preferences generally occurs.
This also incidentally helps the major parties to retain their electoral
strength during the cut-up, as can be seen from past Hare-Clark
elections.

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36 -

For
example, in 1928 in Denison, Mr. Mahoney, Ind. Labor candidate, polled 75.3
per cent of a quota in primaries but was not elected because the votes of the
major parties (which polled respectively 40.9 and 40.4 per cent of the
primary vote) were well spread, and because Mr. Mahoney did not pick up many
preferences.

In the recent Senate election, because of different voting and
vote-counting conditions Dr. Turnbull was able to win a seat though obtaining
only 69.4 per cent of a quota of first preferences (i.e. 11.6 per cent of the
total vote).

Under regimented voting, a party wastes its voting strength by electing
its No. 1 and No. 2 candidates with full quotas early in the count. This
leaves fewer votes for their No. 3 candidate, who therefore could be forced
into elimination unnecessarily in instances when his party lacks three full-
quotas.

The basic principles of the Senate PR system are excellent and result in
incomparably more representative Senates than the previous "one in, all
in", system which not only denied minority representation but grossly
distorted the representation of the major parties. Nevertheless some
corrections in applying the basic principles are needed.

"The
Examiner" article,
entitled "A Solution to Senate Voting Faults", is as follows:-

Adoption
of certain Hare-Clark voting features could remove faults in Senate voting
noted by ''The Examiner" Canberra correspondent, who wrote on
Saturday week: "The anomalies of the present Senate voting system have
reached the proportions of near absurdity".

He observed that Dr. Turnbull "made the grade into the Senate on his
not very impressive primary poll" of 11.6 per cent, but that Senator
McManus "knocking on the door of a theoretical quota" by obtaining
14.1 per cent of the primary vote in Victoria is defeated.

In NSW, however, the D.L.P. with merely 7.9 per cent of the primary vote,
almost won a seat, the correspondent reported.

Two features of the Tasmanian Hare-Clark voting could remove these anomalies,
as illustrated by the Senate election in Tasmania.

First, under the Hare-Clark conditions the extension of preferences beyond
a minimum of three is voluntary, not compulsory.

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37 -

If
applied to Senate voting, optional extension would reduce informality,
shorten greatly the counting process, and spare many electors the resentment
they feel in having to give preferences to candidates they may disfavour or
despise.

The present requirement to mark all preferences in Senate elections can
also misrepresent the intention of electors.

OFFENSIVE

For example, when Mr. Devitt (the third ALP candidate) was excluded, his
supporters were compelled to show a preference either for their chief political
rivals, the Liberals, or for a former Labor Minister now competing against
their party.

Forcing electors to choose between candidates, none of whom they may like,
offends against voting freedom, and, in addition, can potentially alter the
election results intended by the voters.

This potential misrepresentation is sharply increased if the major parties
try to regiment their supporters into voting sheep-like, 1-2-3 down the
ballot-paper.

This unfortunate practice in Senate elections is the rule on the mainland
and is frequent in Tasmania.

Since regimentation does not occur under Hare-Clark voting, the electors
vote freely, picking and choosing candidates in the order they want.

FAIRER

This free selection by the voters in Hare-Clark elections results in a
natural spreading of primaries and preferences over all of a party's
candidates, as seen in past elections.

Spreading the vote also incidentally helps the major parties to maintain
their electoral strength. during the cut-up, thus giving a fairer reflection
of public opinion and reducing the likelihood of the anomalies noted by the
Canberra, correspondent.

Let us consider how unregimented voting and the resultant spreading of the
vote could produce different election results from the same election figures.

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38 -

An
illustration is given by the Senate results in Tasmania, where the fifth seat
(and 20 per cent. of the State's representation) was won by a candidate
polling only 11.6 per cent of the total primary vote.

DIFFERENCE

In this election, after four seats were filled, Mr. Devitt (ALP) had
15,507 votes to his credit, Mr. Orchard (Lib.) 16,326, and Dr. Turnbull
(Ind.) 21,448.

As Mr. Devitt was recorded as having the smallest vote, he was excluded,
and his papers divided between Orchard and Turnbull, according to the
preferences compulsorily indicated on them.

Yet at the stage before Devitt's exclusion the Labor group had a total of
68,789 votes, the Liberals 69,608, and Turnbull 21,448.

Suppose the party totals had been divided equally between the three
candidates of each party -then each Labor candidate would have had 22,929
votes and each Liberal candidate 23,202.

Under these conditions Dr. Turnbull, having only 21,448 would have been
the lowest candidate and therefore eliminated, his preferences deciding the
fifth seat.

An exact spreading of the vote among the major party candidates would not
have been needed to keep them ahead of Dr. Turnbull during the cut-up,
provided the spread was sufficient to keep all other candidates ahead of
Turnbull's total.

Under regimented voting a party wastes its voting strength by electing its
No. 1. and No. 2 candidates with full quotas early in the count.

This leaves fewer votes for their No. 3 candidate, who therefore could be
forced into elimination unnecessarily in cases when his party lacks three
full quotas.

An example illustrating the effect of spreading the vote can be seen in
Denison in the State elections of 1928. Then Mr. Mahoney, Ind. Labor
candidate, polled 75.3 per cent of a quota in primaries but was not elected
because the votes for the major parties (40.9 and 40.4 per cent respectively)
were widely spread and because Mr. Mahoney did not pick up many
preferences.

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39 -

CHANGES
NEEDED

In the recent Senate election as a result of different voting and
vote-counting conditions, Dr. Turnbull was able to win a seat through
obtaining only 69.4 per cent of a quota of first preferences (11.6 per cent
of the total vote).

The basic principles of voting by proportional representation for the
Senate are sound and desirable, and far superior to the previous "all or
none" system of preferential, block voting.

But if complaints about anomalies such as those cited by the Canberra
correspondent are to be eliminated, some corrections in applying the basic
principles are needed.

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40 -

APPENDIX 'E'

This
article from "The Mercury", December 20, 1976, entitled
"Hare-Clark Proved Again" is included to provide a summary,
however brief, of some of the merits unique to the Hare-Clark system:-

Once
again the demonstrated advantages of the Hare-Clark system can make
Tasmanians feel proud that their State pioneered the adoption of this special
electoral method.

Comparing the Tasmanian model with other methods reveals its many
superiorities. First, a uniquely wide choice of candidates:

No other electoral system in the world provides the voter with such a
broad selection of candidates.

In the recent election each voter was offered eight or nine candidates to
choose from in each major party, not to mention smaller parties or
independents.

This wide range thus gave the Tasmanian elector not only a choice of
parties, but also a choice of candidates within parties.

Unless given this selection within parties, voters may not be able to
express their true judgment, as seen in the single-member electorates used
generally in the other States, where normally only one candidate is allowed
to stand for each competing party.

There, in the absence of the many choices available to Tasmanians, the
elector must accept, whether to his liking or not, this sole pre-selected
choice of his party's organization, or else vote for a candidate of another
party with whose policies he may not agree.

With only one endorsement per electorate, a party can hardly expect to
satisfy a wide range of opinion within it, especially where, in a two-party
system, each party attempts to represent a broad spectrum of views.

This invidious situation, inherent to single-member electorates, is
further compounded if those empowered to pre-select for their party are not
well representative of the whole of a party's supporters.

By contrast, since multiple endorsements are essential to the Hare-Clark
system, party pre-selection authorities have little excuse for not offering
their supporters a balanced selection of candidates.

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41 -

Second,
minority representation:

The possibility under the Hare-Clark system for presenting balanced teams
of candidates is likely to supply the electors with satisfying representation
within a two-party framework.

Nevertheless, for those voters who may want different representation, the
Hare-Clark system provides ready opportunity for minority representation, by
ensuring that any group of electors as large as a quota of votes, namely, a
fraction as small as 12.5 per cent of the electorate, may win a seat.

By contrast, the single-member system, by restricting the selection of
candidates, creates the need for more satisfying representation yet prevents
it from being achieved, since the system provides only one vacancy per
electorate, not seven.

Third, a strong Opposition:

Election by quota guarantees that a party must receive one seat for each
12.5 per cent of the vote which it receives.

Hence, a party polling as low as 37.5 per cent of the vote will obtain
three seats in a seven-member electorate.

In a House of 35 members an Opposition is therefore not likely to fall
below about 15 seats in a two-party situation.

By contrast, since the single-member system does not ensure any necessary
relationship between votes received and seats won, an Opposition party may be
reduced to far below its fair share of the seats on a proportionate basis, as
seen at present in the Queensland Parliament and the Federal House of
Representatives.

Fourth, assurance of majority rule:

The Hare-Clark system as now applied guarantees a close relationship
between votes received and seats won, because members are elected on equal
quotas from multi-member electorates.

This high degree of accuracy is likely to result in a party with a
majority at the polls receiving a majority in Parliament.

This likelihood could be made a certainty by the adoption of a few
refinements in the counting procedure.

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42 -

These
refinements, summarized by the writer in a series of articles on these pages
before the 1972 State elections, would guarantee that a party with a
State-wide majority would invariably receive a majority in Parliament, and
usually one of workable size.

The single-member system, by contrast, may result in a party with a
minority of votes receiving a majority of seats or in the governing party
holding onto office by razor-thin majorities, as illustrated as present by
the Parliaments of South Australia, New South Wales, and Great Britain.

Fifth, other advantages:

Too numerous to list here are a multitude of other advantages which the
Hare-Clark system can provide, for instance, eliminating safe seats and
uncontested elections and reducing greatly the dangers of
gerrymandering.