The Saker on the Turkish coup

Major
developments in Syria and Turkey

This
week has been marked by two major events: the USA and Russia agreed
to a common plan for military coordination in Syria and the failed
coup in Turkey has been followed by a massive purge of the Turkish
elites.

Syria:

The
Russians had really no
option but to accept to
work with the USA in Syria. They way in which they did it was very
elegant, however: Lavrov
and Kerry have agreed to a joint long-term ceasefire whose
exact terms are to remain secret, which indicates to me that the
Russians forced the US into concessions which the latter don’t want
to be made public. How do we know that it was Russian who forced
concessions on the USA and not the other way around? Simple – there
was no US “leak” to the media and the Russian bombers
have resumed
their operation with a new intensity.
Besides, it is pretty obvious that in Syria at least Moscow holds all
the cards now and Kerry has therefore no means to put pressure on
Russia even if he wanted to.

But
the main development for Syria is still the coup in Turkey.

Turkey:

What
happened in Turkey is huge. So big, in fact, that I even suspect that
the numerous rumors about an Erdogan-orchestrated false flag could
have been started by the US propaganda machine (since when to even
mainstream media outlets even discuss false flags?). Not everybody
bought into the false flag theory, not Sibel
Edmonds and
not M.
K. Bhadrakumar.
Not only did these two reject the false flag theory, they also
explained in detail the role of the USA in this coup. To their
testimony I can only add that I have been contacted by several
well-informed readers from countries neighboring Turkey who have also
told me that at least a “faction” inside the USA has had advance
knowledge of the coup.

If
all of the above is true, that might also explain why some have
sincerely felt that this might have been a false flag. If the
Russians really did warn Erdogan, then his best move would have been
to let the coup begin to unmask all the conspirators and their
sympathizers and only then to crack down on them.

The
magnitude of the purge in Turkey is nothing short of amazing: Erdogan
is clearly engaged on a massive and brutal campaign to ruthlessly
purge entire social classes which he perceives, probably correctly,
as hostile to his rule. So while we can rejoice that a US-backed coup
has failed, we should have no illusions about how is now in power in
Turkey: a ruthless and unpredictable megalomaniac who should never,
ever, be trusted.

There
are, however, objective reasons to also welcome these developments.

First
and foremost, the Turkish military is now being decapitated and it
will be in no condition whatsoever to try to crush the Kurdish
resistance or, even less so, to invade northern Syria.

Second,
Erdogan and Daesh are apparently on a collision course (the official
Turkish version is that they did the airport bombing) and that means
that Daesh lost a key supporter.

Third,
now that the Turkish threat has been neutralized for the foreseeable
future (5 years at least), Russia is in a much better position to
deal with the Takfiri crazies in Syria and with their Wahabi backers
in Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states.

Fourth,
there is a non-trivial possibility that Turkey will now openly
declare the US/NATO/EU as an enemy of the regime. Not only is the USA
harboring the CIA-controlled Gulen, but it turns out that some
of the aircraft involved in the coup took off from Incirlik.
Considering that Incirlik is basically US-run, this means that the US
fingerprints are all over the coup. Right now Erdogan is still too
weak to take on the US and NATO, but if he succeeds in completely
purging his enemies from the centers of power in Turkey, I would not
put it past him to simply leave NATO completely. This is not likely,
only possible, but should that happen that would be a formidable loss
for the Empire.

Fifth,
there are interesting conversations taking place in the public debate
in Russia. Zhirinovski, who is often used by the Kremlin to “test
the waters” for various Kremlin-backed ideas, is now suggesting
that Russia should form a trilateral military alliance with Iran and
Turkey. Again, there are many formidable obstacles to overcome before
anything like that happens but, again, this is now at least possible
(maybe not an alliance, but some kind of cooperation is likely)

Sixth,
for the Syrian government the failed coup is quite literally
God-sent. Not that Assad and Erdogan will ever have a love-fest
again, but Assad must now realize that his most formidable adversary
has now been neutered and that this completely changes the strategic
dynamic of the war for the liberation of Syria from the Takfiris. Add
to this the agreement between Russia and the USA which, however
insincere and temporary, at least precludes a direct US attack on
Syria (as demanded by the 51 Neocon crazies at Foggy Bottom). Add to
this the very real possibility that Trump will be in the White House
next year and I would suggest that, all in all, things sure look way
better today for Syria than they did just a couple of weeks ago.

Seven,
no matter what happens next, Turkey as a whole has been tremendously
weakened by this coup and the subsequent purge. Not only that, but
this one if far from over, Edmonds even speaks of a possible “2nd
wave coup”. But even if that does not happen, and even if Erdogan
remains in power, the Kurds now will be facing a much weakened enemy
and might decide that it is “now or never” for them to try to
free themselves form the Turkish yoke. So there is a very real
possibility that Turkey will simply fall apart (again, “possibility”
is not the same as “likelihood”). But since we are still far away
from this possibility actually materializing, it would be premature
to go there. However, even if Turkey does not break up, a much
weakened Turkey is likely to have to agree to the kind of concessions
which a powerful Turkey would never have accepted: this is not only
true for the Kurds, but also for the Russians and Iranians. In other
words, now is the ideal time to begin some very intense and far
reaching negotiations to try to force Turkey to become a responsible
and predictable actor in the region.

The
biggest problem with all this is, of course, the rise of the kind of
neo-Ottoman Islamism which Erdogan has promoted to come to power and
which is now infecting large segments of the Turkish society. There
is now a real risk for Turkey to go down the terrible path which
Algeria had to take to deal with the FIS and, later the GIA (the big
difference being that the FIS never really got to power). This is why
the neo-Ottoman Islamists are now ruthlessly purging both the secular
Kemalists and Islamist Gulenists (a weird de-facto alliance
for sure).

Russia
and Iran have to be extremely proactive in trying to “channel”
Erdogan into some kind of semi-sane form of state Islamism which
would not serve as a Petri dish for the kind of horrors which costs
so many lives in Algeria. The good news is that Turkey certainly has
the potential of finding a unique form of conservative Sunni Islam
which does not have to find inspiration in the Wahabi crazies of
Daesh or the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. Maybe Chechnia under
Kadyrov could at least in some aspects inspire a modern form of
modern Islamic traditionalism?

Again,
the main problem is Erdogan himself. But since this is unlikely to
change in the foreseeable future, all the countries neighboring
Turkey have to accept this reality, however uncomfortable, and try to
make the best of a radically new situation.

For
the time being we reasonably can assume that Erdogan will prevail. If
that is indeed what happens, he will be way too busy to deal with
major international issues. What is certain is that Erdogan has
imposed a three
months long state of emergency and
that he
will be meeting with Putin in early August.
Whether Putin “saved Erdogan” as some claim, or whether Russia
just gave him advanced warning of the coup, it is pretty darn clear
that Erdogan now vitally needs Putin’s support and that Putin knows
that. Soon the world will find out what exactly Putin had in mind
when, following the downing of the SU-24, he announced sanctions
against Turkey and then added “Одними помидорами вы
не отделаетесь” (you will not get away just with
tomatoes). There will be a price to pay for Erdogan and Erdogan knows
it. But Putin also knows that now is the time to negotiate with
Erdogan, so the price will be substantial, but reasonable. At the end
of the day, Russia and Turkey need each other, at least to prevent
another, it would be the 13th, Russian-Turkish war.