Event Title

Presenter Information

Location

Benson Center

Event Website

http://law.scu.edu/investment/index.cfm

Start Date

2-2-2013 9:00 AM

End Date

2-2-2013 10:30 AM

Description

Does the partisan orientation of a developing country’s leadership influence the country’s adoption of foreign investment-related laws and policies? Since the formative days of international business studies, observers have suggested that partisan politics might influence the policy environment for foreign investment. Curiously, however, the most well developed empirical literature on the determinants of foreign investment policy (particularly the strand exploring the determinants of expropriation) has largely if not completely ignored the potential role of partisanship. In this article I argue that partisanship offers a potentially useful proxy for the ideas that developing country leaders hold about the costs and benefits of foreign direct investment (FDI). Partisans of the left have historically been likely to view FDI as relatively undesirable, and have accordingly been relatively less likely than partisans of the right to adopt pro-FDI policies. However, I suggest that partisan thinking about FDI has converged in recent years, as the left has updated its beliefs about whether FDI is beneficial. I statistically test these expectations against a large dataset that analyzes the probability that developing countries will sign pro-FDI international treaties.

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Feb 2nd, 9:00 AMFeb 2nd, 10:30 AM

Empirical Research on Bilateral Investment Treaties

Benson Center

Does the partisan orientation of a developing country’s leadership influence the country’s adoption of foreign investment-related laws and policies? Since the formative days of international business studies, observers have suggested that partisan politics might influence the policy environment for foreign investment. Curiously, however, the most well developed empirical literature on the determinants of foreign investment policy (particularly the strand exploring the determinants of expropriation) has largely if not completely ignored the potential role of partisanship. In this article I argue that partisanship offers a potentially useful proxy for the ideas that developing country leaders hold about the costs and benefits of foreign direct investment (FDI). Partisans of the left have historically been likely to view FDI as relatively undesirable, and have accordingly been relatively less likely than partisans of the right to adopt pro-FDI policies. However, I suggest that partisan thinking about FDI has converged in recent years, as the left has updated its beliefs about whether FDI is beneficial. I statistically test these expectations against a large dataset that analyzes the probability that developing countries will sign pro-FDI international treaties.