This
matter is before the Court on Defendant St. Louis County,
Missouri's (“the County”) motion to dismiss
(Doc. 5). The issues are fully briefed and ready for
disposition. For the following reasons, the Court will grant
the motion in part, dismiss Count II in part and without
prejudice, and grant Plaintiff Dornella Conner leave to amend
her complaint.

I.
Background

The
facts in this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action, in the light most
favorable to Conner, are as follows. On November 25, 2014,
De'Angelas Lee was driving a vehicle in which Conner was
a front-seat passenger (Am. Comp. (Doc. 4) ¶¶ 7-8).
As the vehicle exited a gas station parking lot, a SWAT-like
police vehicle (“SWAT vehicle”), bearing a St.
Louis County Police Department (“SLCPD”) logo,
approached the gas station and attempted to enter the parking
lot (Id. ¶¶ 10-11). As Lee's vehicle
exited the parking lot, a SLCPD police officer, Officer Doe
I, jumped out of the passenger side of the SWAT vehicle, and
“open[ed] fire” into the passenger window of
Lee's vehicle (Id. ¶ 14). Unknown
projectiles from Officer Doe I's weapon, as well as
broken glass, struck Conner's face, causing her serious
physical injuries, including permanent loss of vision in her
left eye (Id. ¶¶ 16-17). The petition
alleges that Officer Doe I did not order Lee to stop his
vehicle, that Conner was not armed, and that she did not pose
any physical threat to Officer Doe I or any other person
(Id. ¶ 15, 18). Officer Doe II, a “field
supervisor, ” was also in the SWAT vehicle during the
incident (Id. ¶ 23). He did not intervene when
Officer Doe I used force against Conner, and according to
Conner, his failure to do so was the result of a SLCPD custom
or practice (Id. ¶¶ 23-24).

According
to Conner, the County failed to properly supervise its police
officers, failed to conduct fair investigations into previous
allegations that SLCPD officers had used excessive force, and
thereby fostered and supported an environment that directly
led to Officer Doe I's unconstitutional use of force
against her (Id. ¶¶ 26-27). Conner further
alleges that the County and Officer Doe II developed and
promulgated “customs, policies, and/or practices of
unconstitutional conduct in violation of the Fourth
Amendment, ” including (1) conducting stops or
detentions without reasonable suspicion, (2) discharging
weapons without probable cause, (3) using unnecessary and
unreasonably excessive force against citizens, and (4)
creating an atmosphere in which its officers felt free to
confront citizens at their discretion and without lawful
authority, i.e., for merely exiting a gas station parking lot
(Id. ¶ 29).

Conner's
complaint indicates that she is suing Officer Doe I and
Officer Doe II in both their individual and official
capacities, and asserts three counts (Id.
¶¶ 3-4, 31-49). In Count I, Conner claims that
Officer Doe I violated her clearly established rights to be
free from excessive force and to not be deprived of liberty
without due process of law (Id. ¶¶ 31-36).
In Count II, she alleges that Officer Doe II and the County
had a custom or policy of “negligently hiring and
retaining officers, failing to properly train and/or
supervise officers in the use of excessive force . . ., and
in failing to conduct fair and impartial
investigations”; and that her injuries were directly
and proximately caused by “failures, negligence and/or
carelessness” of Officer Doe II and the County
(Id. ¶¶ 37-44). In Count III, she claims
that Officer Doe II-in his individual and official
capacities-“with knowledge and deliberate indifference
to and/or reckless disregard for the rights of the citizens
of St. Louis County, has tolerated, created, failed to
correct, promoted, or ratified a custom, pattern, and
practice on the part of St. Louis County police officers who
engage in unjustified, unreasonable, and/or illegal use of
excessive force, including deadly force.” She also
claims that Officer Doe II knew or should have known that the
inadequate training and supervision would result in the use
of excessive force by Officer Doe I and other SLCPD officers
(Id. ¶¶ 45-49).

II.
The County's Motion to Dismiss

The
County now moves to dismiss Count II, arguing that it does
not state a plausible § 1983 claim against the County;
that it states only a claim of negligence under Missouri law;
and that the County enjoys sovereign immunity from negligence
claims pursuant to Mo. Rev. Stat. § 537.600 (Docs.
5-6).[1] In response, Conner contends that Count II
asserts more than a state-law negligence claim. More
specifically, she argues that Count II states a viable §
1983 claim against the County because it incorporates her
allegations that the County failed to supervise its police
officers, failed to conduct fair investigations into
complaints that officers had used excessive force, and
thereby fostered an environment that directly led to Officer
Doe I's use of excessive force against her. She further
contends that Count II states a § 1983 claim against the
County because it incorporates her allegation that the County
had unconstitutional policies or customs of negligently
hiring and retaining SLCPD officers and failing to properly
supervise them or to train them in the use of excessive
force. Alternatively, Conner seeks leave to amend her
complaint either to allege that the County has waived its
sovereign immunity by procuring an insurance policy,
see Mo. Rev. Stat. § 537.610; or to otherwise
remedy any pleading defects (Doc. 8).

III.
Motion to Dismiss Standard

Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires “a short and
plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is
entitled to relief.” The pleading standard of Rule 8
“does not require ‘detailed factual allegations,
' but it demands more than an unadorned,
the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.”
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555
(2007). To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must show
that the pleader is entitled to relief, in order to give the
defendant fair notice of what the claims are and the grounds
upon which they rest. Id.

Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) provides for a motion to
dismiss based on the failure to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted. To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to
dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter,
accepted as true, to “‘state a claim to relief
that is plausible on its face.'” Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 129 S .Ct.1937, 1950 (2009). This obligation
requires a plaintiff to plead “more than labels and
conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a
cause of action will not do.” Twombly, 550
U.S. at 555. A complaint must contain either direct or
inferential allegations respecting all the material elements
necessary to sustain recovery under some viable legal theory.
Id. at 562. This standard “simply calls for
enough fact to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery
will reveal evidence of [the claim or element].”
Id. at 556. When ruling on a motion to dismiss, this
Court must take the allegations of the complaint as true and
liberally construe the complaint in the light most favorable
to the plaintiff. Kottschade v. City of Rochester,
319 F.3d 1038, 1040 (8th Cir. 2003). The Court is “free
to ignore legal conclusions, unsupported conclusions,
unwarranted inferences and sweeping legal conclusions cast in
the form of factual allegations.” Wiles v. Capitol
Indem. Corp., 280 F.3d 868, 870 (8th Cir. 2002).

IV.
Analysis

The
Court will grant the County's motion to dismiss Count II
in part and without prejudice. Count II states a viable
§ 1983 claim against the County arising out of allegedly
unconstitutional policies or customs involving SLCPD officers
conducting unlawful stops and detentions, discharging their
weapons without probable cause, using unnecessary and
unreasonably excessive force, and creating an atmosphere
wherein officers felt free to confront citizens without
lawful authority. However, Count II does not state a §
1983 claim arising out of Conner's allegation that the
County had a custom of negligently hiring, supervising, and
training SLCPD officers.

&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;It is
well established that a municipality cannot be held liable,
on a respondeat superior theory, for the unconstitutional
conduct of its agents and employees. Monell v. Dep&#39;t
of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978). However, a
municipality may be liable under &sect; 1983 if the
unconstitutional conduct was a result of an official
municipal policy or custom. Id. at 690-91. An
official policy involves &ldquo;a deliberate choice to follow
a course of action made from among various alternatives by an
official who is determined by state law to have the final
authority to establish governmental policy.&rdquo; Ware
v. Jackson Cty., Mo., 150 F.3d 873, 880 (8th Cir. 1998).
A municipal policy may take the form of a policy statement,
local ordinance, regulation, or decision officially adopted
and promulgated by the municipality&#39;s officers.
Id. In contrast, a municipal custom is demonstrated
by (1) the existence of a continuing, widespread, persistent
pattern of unconstitutional misconduct by the
municipality's employees; (2) deliberate indifference to
or tacit authorization of such ...

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