1. Whether the Agreement on Detainers Act, K.S.A. 22-4401 et seq., applies
under the facts of a case is a question of law subject to unlimited review.

2. Article IV(a) of K.S.A. 22-4401 states: "The appropriate officer of the
jurisdiction in which an untried indictment, information or complaint is pending
shall be entitled to have a prisoner against whom he has lodged a detainer and
who is serving a term of imprisonment in any party state made available in
accordance with Article V(a) hereof upon presentation of a written request for
temporary custody or availability to the appropriate authorities of the state in
which the prisoner is incarcerated: Provided, That the court having jurisdiction
of such indictment, information or complaint shall have duly approved,
recorded and transmitted the request."

3. A detainer is a notification filed with the institution in which a prisoner is
serving a sentence, advising that he is wanted to face pending criminal charges
in another jurisdiction.

4. The purpose of the Agreement on Detainers Act is to minimize the adverse
impact of a foreign prosecution on rehabilitation programs of the confining
jurisdiction.

5. Neither a pretrial detainee nor a parole violator has a sufficient interest in the
rehabilitation programs of his or her confining institution to justify invocation of
the Agreement on Detainers Act.

6. The Agreement on Detainers Act is only concerned that a sentenced prisoner
who has entered into the life of the institution to which he or she has been
committed for a term of imprisonment not have programs of treatment and
rehabilitation obstructed by numerous absences in connection with successive
proceedings related to pending charges in another jurisdiction. There is no
indication in the language of the Agreement or in the legislative history that its
provisions were intended to apply to persons being detained for trial who are not
serving prison sentences.

7. Pretrial detainees are not under the protection of the Agreement on Detainers
Act. A detainer that is filed prior to sentencing is not one that effectively
invokes the provisions of the Agreement.

8. A writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum that is not preceded by a valid
detainer under the Agreement on Detainers Act does not trigger the provisions
of the Agreement.

9. Under the facts of this case, we hold the provisions of the Agreement on
Detainers Act, were not invoked and the charges against the accused were
erroneously dismissed.

Michael A. Russell, assistant district attorney, argued the cause, Nick A.
Tomasic, district
attorney, and Carla J. Stovall, attorney general, were with him on the brief for
appellant.

Kirk C. Redmond, of the Death Penalty Defense Unit, of Topeka, argued the
cause, and Ronald
F. Evans, of the same unit, was with him on the brief for appellee.

The opinion of the court was delivered by

LARSON, J.: The State of Kansas appeals from the trial court's dismissal of
capital-murder charges against Demetrius Hargrove on the grounds that his speedy trial rights
under the Agreement on Detainers Act (Agreement), K.S.A. 22-4401 et seq., had
been
violated. The State's appeal contends the trial court erred: (1) when it applied the Agreement
to the present case, and (2) by abusing its discretion in finding that more than 120 days were
chargeable to the State, pursuant to the speedy trial provision in Article IV of the Agreement.
We answer the first issue and do not reach the second.

Factual background and proceedings

The ultimate questions in this appeal relate to the proceedings after charges were
filed but, based on evidence presented at the preliminary hearing, we first set forth the facts
which were developed to substantiate the charges in this case.

In early 1998, Hargrove and Christopher Trotter were selling drugs. One of
their regular customers, who also sold drugs on their behalf, was Elmer Berg. Over time,
Berg accumulated a debt to Hargrove in the amount of $1,500. Hargrove told Trotter at one
point that he would no longer sell cocaine to Berg.

On February 19, 1998, Hargrove advised Trotter he was coming over to get
some cocaine to sell. Hargrove arrived at Trotter's residence, and Berg stopped behind him in
a separate car. With Berg was his sister, Misty Castor. Because Trotter did not have scales at
his house, Trotter and Hargrove went to go to Hargrove's house to divide and weigh the
cocaine.

When Trotter entered Hargrove's car, he asked Hargrove why Berg was
following them. Hargrove stated he was going to sell cocaine to Berg. Trotter reminded
Hargrove of his prior statements that he was no longer going to sell cocaine to Berg due to
Berg's failure to pay the owing drug debt. Hargrove looked at Trotter, then stated that he was
going to "knock" Berg, which means to kill him.

Hargrove drove to Coronado Park and then stopped. Berg stopped behind him.
Hargrove then reached under the seat of his car and pulled out a .38 caliber revolver. He
walked to Berg's car. Trotter heard four gun shots and a female say, "No." Hargrove
returned to his car. En route to Trotter's home, Hargrove threw the gun down a sewer drain.

The police later discovered the dead bodies of Berg and Castor in the vehicle,
Berg having been shot twice in the chest and head, and Castor having been shot twice in the
neck and back. The police investigation which ensued ultimately resulted in the filing of
charges.

On February 11, 1999, Hargrove was charged with two counts of first-degree
murder and one count of criminal possession of a firearm. On February 12, 1999, the
Wyandotte County Sheriff's office sent a request for detainer to the Correction Corporation of
America in Leavenworth, Kansas, a federal holding facility where Hargrove was awaiting trial
on federal kidnapping charges. The document stated, in pertinent part:

"Enclosed is our warrant for [Demetrius Hargrove] who is presently in your
custody. Please lodge a detainer on subject in our favor and notify this office when he is
available for pick-up.

"We will extradite. Should subject refuse to waive extradition, contact this
office by phone."

It is undisputed that the State's prosecutors did not know of the filing of this
document. On August 17, 1999, Hargrove was sentenced on a federal kidnapping conviction
to 35 years' imprisonment. Eight days later, the State petitioned the Wyandotte County
District Court for a writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum, and on the same day the
writ was
granted. In granting the writ, the court ordered:

"It is therefore considered and ordered that a Writ of Habeas Corpus Ad
Prosequendum issue out of and under the Seal of [this court] . . . directed to said U.S.
Marshall
to release the body of said Demetrius Hargrove, to the Wyandotte County Sheriff's Department
commanding him to produce the body of [Hargrove] . . . at the criminal docket . . . on the 14th
day of September, 1999."

On September 10, 1999, Hargrove made his first appearance in Wyandotte
County. On November 22, 1999, the State amended the charges, dropping the first- degree
murder charges and adding one count of capital murder in violation of K.S.A. 21-3439. At
this point, Hargrove's counsel was permitted to withdraw and the Kansas Death Penalty
Defense Unit was appointed. Numerous motions usual in a death penalty cases were filed and
continuances granted at the request of both parties. Hargrove was bound over following a
preliminary hearing on March 20, 1999. On May 25, 1999, the trial court found the speedy
trial provisions of K.S.A. 22-3402 did not apply in this case because Hargrove was not being
held in custody "solely" on the charges herein as the result of his kidnapping sentence in the
United States District Court, District of Kansas.

On October 13, 2000, a copy of the detainer was faxed from the United State
Marshals Service to defense counsel. On October 18, 2000, Hargrove moved to dismiss the
charges against him for the State's failure to comply with the Agreement, K.S.A. 22-4401.
The motion was heard on October 24, 2000.

Hargrove argued that his right to a speedy trial under the Agreement was
violated in that he had spent approximately 405 days in the custody of the State of Kansas,
which was well beyond the 120-day limit. The State responded that it was not its intent to use
a detainer or the Agreement to gain custody of Hargrove, that K.S.A. 22-4401 did not apply
because Hargrove was not serving a sentence at the time the detainer was lodged, and that
even if the 120-day limit did apply major portions of the delay time was chargeable to
Hargrove.

Hargrove contended that he should not be penalized for making motions, and
that the court often left his motions pending for an excessive amount of time. He argued in
the alternative that even if a certain amount of time was charged to him, the State had still
exceeded its 120-time limit. He also contended that the statute does not require an individual
to be serving a sentence at the time a detainer is lodged, but rather at the time the individual is
transferred.

The trial court found in Hargrove's favor and dismissed the charges with
prejudice. The court noted that up until its discovery, "everyone involved in the case . . . was
under the assumption that there was no detainer filed." The court also noted that, although
there was no bad faith involved, the defense counsel had been told at "every stage of the way
. . . no detainer existed." The court found that Hargrove had consistently been concerned
about his right to a speedy trial, and the court found "no fault with the efforts of the defendant
in this case to protect his right to a speedy trial." In dismissing the charges, the court
concluded:

"It gives me no pleasure or joy to reach the conclusions that I have and every tortured
scenario
that I have been able to--to predicate has fallen simply because there's no basis in law for it. . . .
There's never been any juncture where the defendant has not been concerned about his right to a
speedy trial too. He never waived or gave up those rights. You can't waive or give up a right
that you didn't even know you had."

The State appeals the court's dismissal, raising the two issues previously set
forth.

Analysis

The State first argues that the trial court erred by applying the Agreement to the
present case. The State contends the provisions of the Agreement do not and never were
intended to apply to persons being detained for trial who are not serving prison sentences.
Whether the Agreement applies under these facts is a question of law subject to our unlimited
review. State v. Lewis, 263 Kan. 843, 847, 953 P.2d 1016 (1998).

We have numerous discussions in Kansas cases relating to the Agreement, see,
for example, State v. Robbins, 272 Kan. ___, ___, 32 P.3d 171 (2001); State v.
Rodriquez,
254 Kan. 768, 771-75, 869 P.2d 631 (1994); State v. White, 234 Kan. 340, 343-44,
673 P.2d
1106 (1983); State v. Clark, 222 Kan. 65, Syl. ¶¶ 1, 2, 3, and 4, 563
P.2d 1028 (1977), but
we have not previously considered whether the Agreement applies to an individual who is
merely a pretrial detainee in another jurisdiction and has not been convicted of any crime nor
serving a term of imprisonment.

Highly summarized, if the Agreement applies, Article III requires a prisoner to
be brought to trial within 180 days where the prisoner has requested final disposition of a
complaint, and Article IV requires a trial to be commenced within 120 days if the prisoner is
returned pursuant to a request for temporary custody where the charges are pending.
Robbins,
slip op. at 10.

The specific portion of the Agreement on which this case turns is K.S.A.
22-4401, Art. IV(a), which states:

"The appropriate officer of the jurisdiction in which an untried indictment,
information or complaint is pending shall be entitled to have a prisoner against whom he has
lodged a detainer and who is serving a term of imprisonment in any party state made
available in
accordance with article V(a) hereof upon presentation of a written request for temporary custody
or availability to the appropriate authorities of the state in which the prisoner is incarcerated:
Provided, That the court having jurisdiction of such indictment, information or
complaint shall
have duly approved, recorded and transmitted the request." (Emphasis added.)

The legislative sanction for failure to comply with the 120-day time limit is
dismissal of the charges with prejudice. Also, the detainer becomes without effect. K.S.A.
22-4401, Art. V(c).

In Mauro, the United States Supreme Court combined and considered two
cases
concerning the Agreement. Highly simplified, in both cases the defendants were transferred
pursuant to writs of habeas corpus ad prosequendum. But, in one of the cases, the
writ was
preceded by a detainer delivered to the sending state. The Court held the situations in the two
cases differed and ruled that a writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum by itself does
not
invoke the requirements of the Agreement. 436 U.S. at 357-61.

The State asks us to look to the Mauro Court's definition of "detainer" and
the
adoption of that definition by several other courts. See United State v. Hart, 933
F.2d 80 (1st
Cir. 1991); United States v. Muhammad, 948 F.2d 1449 (6th Cir. 1991), cert.
denied 502
U.S. 1119 (1992); United States v. Trammel, 813 F.2d 946 (7th Cir. 1987);
United States v.
Saffeels, 982 F.2d 1199 (8th Cir.), cert. granted, judgment vacated, and
case remanded 510
U.S. 801 (1993). In attempting to decide whether a writ of habeas corpus ad
prosequendum
was a detainer, the Court stated:

"The Agreement itself contains no definition of the word 'detainer.' The
House and Senate Reports, however, explain that '[a] detainer is a notification filed with the
institution in which a prisoner is serving a sentence, advising that he is wanted to face
pending
criminal charges in another jurisdiction.' H.R. Rep. No. 91-1018, p. 2 (1970); S. Rep. No.
91-1356, p. 2 (1970)." (Emphasis added.) 436 U.S. at 359.

The State relies on the "in which a prisoner is serving a sentence" wording to
conclude that Hargrove was not serving a sentence when the initial "hold" was filed, which,
therefore, does not institute the operation of the Agreement. And, because a writ of habeas
corpus ad prosequendum is not a detainer unless a "written request for temporary
custody" had
been filed, that the Agreement has no effect in our case.

In Reed, a notation "Hold for U.S. Marshals" was not deemed a detainer
because it was made by a State officer, but more applicable to the State's argument of not
invoking the Agreement, the opinion states:

Reynolds' holding relates to not placing on the receiving State the burden of
requiring a sending State to promptly comply with the Agreement's provisions, see 218 Neb.
at 761, and we do not deem it to be in any manner applicable to our case.

The issue and result in Leisure appears to be consistent with the State's
arguments, as it states: "Agreement on Detainers did not apply to a pretrial detainee, nor when
appearance in state court was obtained throughout writ of habeas corpus ad
prosequendum
rather than detainer." 838 S.W.2d 49, Syl. ¶ 3. In Carter, detention on a
federal parole
violation was not a "term of imprisonment" and therefore, the speedy trial term of Agreement
on Detainers Act did not apply. See 193 Ill. App. 3d 353, 549 N.E.2d 763, Syl. ¶¶
1-4. In
Dorsey, it was held that a "[d]efendant who was being detained by Michigan
authorities while
awaiting trial and was also serving a sentence at the county jail was not qualified as an
intended beneficiary of the Interstate Detainers Agreement, [citation omitted] which applies to
persons already convicted and serving time in prison." 490 N.E.2d 260, Syl. ¶ 1.

Hargrove relies on our decision in Clark, 222 Kan. 65. There, we refused to
narrowly define a detainer under the Agreement, stating: "A detainer is a hold order or
informal demand by one exercising public authority for the possession of a person already in
lawful custody." 222 Kan. at 67. Under this definition, a demand need only be made on the
public authority who has "lawful custody" of the prisoner. However, as in Mauro,
the facts of
Clark are distinguishable in that Clark was clearly incarcerated at the time the detainer
was
filed. Clark did not involve a pretrial detainee.

The authoritative value of Clark in regards to its finding that a temporary
request for custody by itself invokes the Agreement is questionable in light of subsequent
decisions of the United States Supreme Court, including Mauro and Cuyler v.
Adams, 449
U.S. 433, 66 L. Ed. 2d 641, 101 S. Ct. 703 (1981). In Cuyler, the Agreement was
found to
be an interstate compact, "the interpretation of which presents a question of federal law." 449
U.S. at 442. We are bound by decisions of the United States Supreme Court concerning
questions of federal law. Lawrence Paper Co. v. Gomez, 257 Kan. 932, 934, 897
P.2d 134,
cert. denied 516 U.S. 869 (1995) (quoting Ritchie v. Johnson, 158 Kan.
103, 117, 144 P.2d
925 [1944]).

Hargrove's reliance on several decisions from other state courts, including Felix
v. United States, 508 A.2d 101 (D.C. 1986), People v. Zetsche, 188 Cal. App.
3d 917, 233
Cal. Rptr. 720 (1987), and State v. Helmstetter, 914 P.2d 474 (Colo. App. 1995), are
helpful
to his arguments but different factually and in the arguments made.

In Felix, it was held that once a person has been convicted and has begun
serving that sentence in the sending jurisdiction, such person's status is distinguishable from
that of a pretrial detainee, and such person is entitled to the speedy trial protection of the
Agreement. 508 A.2d at 105-08. The facts of Felix differ from ours because there a
request
was made by Felix for disposition of the charges against him while we have no such request by
Hargrove.

The District of Columbia Court of Appeals in the Felix opinion recognized
that
it had in Christian v. United States, 394 A.2d 1 (D.C. 1978), cert. denied
442 U.S. 944
(1979), held that the Act does not protect pretrial detainees but reasoned that Felix's status
changed once he was convicted and made the request. There is language in the
Christian
opinion, which Felix distinguishes, that is actually more helpful to the State's
contentions here.
Christian states:

"The Agreement was enacted to cure the disadvantages of the detainer system
inuring to sentenced prisoners who had entered the life of the institution to which they had been
committed. There is nothing in the legislative history or in the Agreement itself to indicate that
its provisions were intended to apply to persons who were not involved in rehabilitative
programs. Article IV(e) was designed to avoid the shuttling back and forth between
jurisdictions and the resulting disruptive effect such transfers would have on a consistent
treatment program and to promote the speedy disposition of outstanding charges upon which the
detainers were based. For these reasons, courts which have addressed the issue have recognized
that a prisoner who is being temporarily incarcerated pending disposition of charges is not
entitled to invoke the protections of the Agreement. United States v. Harris, 566
F.2d 610 (8th
Cir. 1977); United States v. Roberts, 548 F.2d 665 (6thCir.), cert.
denied 431 U.S. 920, 97 S.
Ct. 2636, 53 L. Ed. 2d 246 (1977); United States v. Evans, 423 F. Supp. 528
(S.D.N.Y.
1976), aff'd, 556 F.2d 561 (2d Cir. 1977); Cresong v. Nevil, 51 A.D. 2d
1096, 381 N.Y.S. 2d
355 (1976); Seymour v. State, 21 Ariz. App. 12, 515 P.2d 39 (1973); Davidson
v. State, 18
Md. App. 61, 305 A.2d 474 (1973). In Roberts, the court stated:

'We conclude that the Agreement is only concerned that a sentenced prisoner
who has entered into the life of the institution to which he has been committed
for a term of imprisonment not have programs of treatment and rehabilitation
obstructed by numerous absences in connection with successive proceedings
related to pending charges in another jurisdiction. There is no indication in
the language of the Agreement or in the legislative history that its provisions
were intended to apply to persons being detained for trial who are not serving
prison sentences. [United States v. Roberts, supra at 670-71.]'

This reasoning is sound. If a prisoner is in custody to await trial, and is not involved in
special
institutional treatment or rehabilitative programs geared toward his eventual release into society,
the potential for abuse of the detainer system is not present." 394 A.2d at 40.

It appears the cases which Felix brings before us, Christian, Roberts, et
al.,
provide much more support to the State's position than to Hargrove.

Zetsche does involve a prisoner who was first a pretrial detainee (not entitled
to
any protection under the Agreement) but was later granted protection under the Agreement but
found to have entered a plea within the Article IV time period. See 188 Ca. App. 3d at
924-26.

Helmstetter is the strongest case cited by Hargrove. There, the Colorado
Supreme Court upheld the trial court's dismissal of charges against the defendant based on a
violation of the anti-shuttling provisions of Article IV(e). 914 P.2d at 477-78. However, the
State did not argue either at the trial level or on appeal that the detainer filed prior to
pronouncement of sentence did not fall within the purview of the Agreement. The issue before
us, as in Felix, was not considered by the court in finding the Agreement to be
applicable and
upholding the dismissal of charges.

Our research reveals one other federal circuit court and one additional state
supreme court that have addressed the issue we face. In United States v. Currier, 836
F.2d 11
(1st Cir. 1987), the defendant was in state custody while awaiting sentencing when, on May 9,
1986, a document purporting to be a detainer was filed against him by federal authorities. On
May 16, and July 11, 1986, the defendant appeared in federal court pursuant to writs of habeas
corpus ad prosequendum. Defendant was sentenced and began serving his prison
sentence for
the state charges on June 18, 1986. He was subsequently convicted of the federal charges, and
he appealed his convictions claiming that his rights under the Interstate Agreement on
Detainers Act, Art. IV(e), 18 App. U.S.C. § 1 et seq. (1982) had been violated. The First
Circuit Court of Appeals refused to find that defendant's failure to raise the issue until after he
was convicted constituted a valid waiver, but the court found that because the detainer was
filed prior to sentencing it did not invoke the provisions of the Agreement by stating: "We
conclude, therefore, that the first 'detainer' [the May, 9, 1986 detainer] did not trigger the
prohibition of Article IV(e) because when the document issued in May, appellant had
not yet
begun serving his state sentence." (Emphasis added.) 836 F.2d at 16. Application of this
decision to our facts would require that we find the February 12, 1999, "detainer" did not
trigger the protection of the Agreement.

In State v. Herrick, 686 A.2d 602 (Me. 1996), the Maine Supreme Court
considered whether a detainer filed prior to sentencing triggered the protection of the
Agreement after sentencing or whether a new detainer must be filed. A detainer was filed
against Herrick in December 1994 by Maine, while he was being held on a bond violation in
Wisconsin. Herrick was sentenced for the Wisconsin violation on February 8, 1995. On
February 15, 1995, Herrick sent a letter to officials in Maine attempting to invoke the 180-day
speedy trial provision under Article III of the Agreement. A second detainer was filed by
Maine on May 4, 1995, and on May 23, 1995, Maine authorities received his February 15th
letter. Herrick appealed his conviction, arguing that the detainer filed in December became a
detainer under the Agreement once he began serving his sentence. The Supreme Court
rejected his argument and held as follows:

"The letter sent by [Maine authorities] in December 1994 was not a 'detainer' for the purposes
of the [Agreement] because Herrick was not yet serving a prison sentence. Herrick's attempts to
invoke his rights under the [Agreement] prior to May 1995 did not trigger the 180-day time
limit contained in Article III because there was no effective detainer lodged against
him at that
time. Once an effective detainer was lodged against Herrick and he invoked his rights under the
[Agreement], he was brought to trial within 180 days." (Emphasis added.) 686 A.2d at 604.

One of the purposes of the Agreement, stated in Article I, and discussed by this
court in State v. Rodriguez, 254 Kan. 768, 771, 869 P.2d 631 (1994), is "to
'encourage the
expeditious and orderly disposition of such charges' because outstanding detainers 'produce
uncertainties which obstruct programs of prisoner treatment and rehabilitation.'" If an
individual, such as Hargrove, is not serving a sentence at the time the detainer is filed, he has
no vested interest in the programs of treatment and rehabilitation available to prisoners. If a
detainer is filed at that time, no credible argument can be made that it comes within the ambit
of the Agreement.

Application of all of the case law we have previously cited produces the
following holdings in this case. Pretrial detainees are not under the protection of the
Agreement. A detainer filed prior to sentencing is not one that effectively invokes the
provisions of the Agreement. Once sentencing and service of that sentence occurs, then the
provisions of the Agreement may become effective and can be invoked.

In our present case, the detainer filed against Hargrove was filed prior to
sentencing. Therefore, it was ineffective under the Agreement and it did not invoke the
protection of the Agreement. The writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum
subsequently used
by the State, under the Mauro standard and the numerous other cases cited, was
issued as one
that was not preceded by a detainer under the Agreement. The writ of habeas corpus ad
prosequendum therefore, did not trigger the provisions of the Agreement either. The
Agreement was not invoked under the facts of our case.

Hargrove contends in the alternative that the initial filing should be immediately
transformed into a detainer under the Agreement once sentencing occurs. Hargrove fails to
recognize this would work an unnecessary hardship on a state which files detainers to have to
constantly check on the status of all detained individuals. We reject this argument.

We also reject Hargrove's suggestion that adopting the State's arguments would
prohibit law enforcement agencies from ever filing a detainer against individuals in custody
who had not yet been sentenced. The hold or detainer requested against a pretrial detainee
remains effective, it just does not trigger the Agreement at that time. Our decision will not
limit or restrict law enforcement agencies from obtaining custody of individuals being held by
other jurisdictions.

Hargrove also argues it is contrary to the purposes of the Agreement, and the
requirement of Article IX that it be "liberally construed to effectuate its purposes," to have
prisoners affected by outstanding detainers which were filed prior to sentencing that could be
left on file unchecked by the time limits of the Agreement. Hargrove's argument fails to
recognize that the Agreement never mentions pretrial detainees, and had the legislature
intended for them to come with the scope of the statute, it could have easily done so. It
appears the drafters of the Agreement wished it to cover sentenced prisoners involved in
treatment and rehabilitation and not in situations such as Hargrove found himself in this case
where his custody was obtained by Wyandotte County to face capital-murder charges 8 days
after his federal sentencing.

As it is presently written, the Agreement applies to detainers filed against
individuals presently serving sentences. To "liberally construe" the Agreement to protect
individuals not within the express language of the statute would violate our duty of
construction to follow the intent of the legislature as expressed: "[W]hen a statute is plain and
unambiguous, the appellate court must give effect to the intent of the legislature as expressed
instead of determining what the law should or should not be." State v. Hildebrandt,
270 Kan.
1, 5, 12 P.3d 392 (2000). As the statute states: "The appropriate officer of the jurisdiction in
which an untried indictment, information or complaint is pending shall be entitled to have a
prisoner against whom he has lodged a detainer and who is serving a term of
imprisonment."
K.S.A. 22-4401, Article IV(a). From this language alone, there is an unambiguously
expressed requirement that an individual be both a prisoner and serving a sentence of
imprisonment at the time the detainer is lodged in order for the detainer to come within the
scope of the Agreement.

The trial court erred in finding the provisions of the Agreement were invoked
under the facts of this case.