The guide outlines several methods of protecting one’s identity in order to avoid retaliation and can considerably reduce the risks that a blogger’s identity will be linked to his or her online writings through technical means.

]]>http://advocacy.globalvoicesonline.org/2011/06/21/anonymous-blogging-with-wordpress-and-tor-guide-in-spanish/feed/4Alert: Ali Abdulemam goes missing in Bahrainhttp://advocacy.globalvoicesonline.org/2011/03/18/alert-ali-abdulemam-goes-missing-in-bahrain/
http://advocacy.globalvoicesonline.org/2011/03/18/alert-ali-abdulemam-goes-missing-in-bahrain/#commentsFri, 18 Mar 2011 13:45:49 +0000http://advocacy.globalvoicesonline.org/?p=4753We just received the following news from the Bahrain Human Rights Society alerting us about the missing of our dear friend and colleague Ali Abdulemam.

Ali Abdulemam, a leading Bahraini blogger and Global Voices Advocacy author, has been arrested earlier on 4 September 2010 and released on 23 February 2011 after Bahrain King ordered the release of group of prisoners, including political prisoners and activists, among them Ali:

Ali AbdulEmam, know by some by his nickname “the blog-father” for setting up the first free uncensored online forum in Bahrain for political and social debate, is today missing from his home and his family are unable to establish contact with him.

His Uncle described the scene last night when 50 heavily armed policemen came to arrest him, just a few weeks after he was released as a part of concessions to placate Bahraini protesters. He had been accused of being part of an “organisational cell” and was known as one of the 25, who were arrested for plotting to overthrow the government.

At around quarter past one in the morning of the 18th of March the housing complex in Aali were Ali rented a flat from one of his cousin awoke to hear the metal gate outside being riddled with bullets.

Around 50 masked and heavily armed security personel then proceeded to break down the wooden door of the house. Ali's cousin, his wife and his daughter were asleep in the ground floor flat. They burst in on them before the wife or the daughter had a chance to cover up and demanded to know where Ali was while pointing a gun at their faces.

They replied that Ali and his wife had not been home for three days and they had no idea where he was. Incensed that their repeated questions were not yeilding any results, they trashed the house and then moved up a floor where there were two more flats and kicked the doors in. One was Ali's flat that had been vacated a few days ago in response to the growing threats, and the other belonged to another family who had nothing to do with the situation. The other family were also not there and it is believed that Ali may have hinted to them to stay with relatives.

After tearing the flats apart and breaking everything they could, they filled a large suitcase with every kind of camera, hard drive, video recorder or DVD that they could find. They then returned to the terrified occupants of the ground floor and repeated their demands, this time threatening to take the daughter instead. The Father and Mother said they would take their daughter only over their dead bodies, after a short stand off the police backed off, possibly realising that the family really had no idea where Ali or his wife and children were. They had left the house three days previously for a secret location, but had been phoning family members to reassure them of their safety. Now the lines of communication are dead and the family have no idea if he is in Bahrain or if he managed to get out of the country, or if the police have caught up with him.

An interview with Ali AbdulEmam after his release from prison can be found here:

On his blog “Nour Al Akl” or The enlightened Mind, he refuted all religious arguments – specially Islam – and he wrote long detailed posts on the fallacy of religions. In the beginning of Summer 2010, a facebook page titled “Allah” was created by an anonymous user. The creator of the page used his excellent command of the Arabic language and composed poetic stanzas that mimic Qura'anic verses. The page attracted many fans; there were those who liked the creativity of the author, those who were offended and joined to defend their religion, and those who were merely curious.

According to this report, an Internet cafe worker, where Waleed has been spending several hours a day, after his mother cancelled his Internet connection at home, has provided the Palestinian intelligence services with a snapshots of his Facebook pages. His online activities have been monitored for few months before arresting him in the cafe on October 31, 2010. Waleed has not been charged yet. A facebook group and a petition dedicated to his support have been created recently:

News has surfaced that [Waleed] is undergoing torture where he is being detained and that his life is at the stake because he could very likely be facing a death sentence (at best prolonged imprisonment), and in addition, the angry Muslim masses are demanding his head, as also evidenced by their comments on reports of his case in the internet. The Palestinian intelligence has reportedly told the media that he will be referred for a martial court. His legal position is not clear, and all evidence is pointing to that he will be brutally persecuted for using his right to freedom of expression. Waleed's case is of utmost importance because it also signifies the persecution of a whole minority class which is atheists and freethinkers in the Muslim world. Waleed needs the attention of the international media, plus strong legal assistance which his friends and supporters unfortunately are not able to provide for him.

This guide is for bloggers with self-hosted* WordPress blogs who believe their sites may be blocked by government filters. Its goal is to help bloggers use a mirror site to make censored content available to readers despite these filters. It contains step-by-step instructions for setting up a mirror for an original (”source”) WordPress blog.

Introduction

When it comes to accessing banned web sites and blogs, most online free speech advocates focus on bypassing censorship using circumvention tools. While this is important, teaching Internet users how to evade censorship is not enough. Many people are not aware of or do not have access to circumvention tools, as countries that filter the Internet also tend to block proxy servers and other circumvention technologies. When circumvention tools are used, they often affect connection speeds, making Internet access even slower in places where connectivity is already poor.

To make your content accessible you cannot simply rely on circumvention technologies or the technical knowledge of your readers*. Taking your users’ needs into account and keeping ahead of the blocking efforts of their governments are the first steps toward implementing creative workarounds that make your site's content available to all potential readers, regardless of where they live.

One way to increase access to blocked sites for Internet users in countries that filter online content is through mirroring: duplicating a site's content on another domain name or subdomain. Mirror sites automatically reflect any changes made to the original site, allowing blog authors to get around censorship by providing multiple locations where readers can access their content.

* A self-hosted WordPress blog is one that is not hosted on the WordPress.com free blogging service, but rather on a separate server using the WordPress.org publishing platform. For more information, see wordpress.org.

This guide is for bloggers with self-hosted* WordPress blogs who believe their sites may be blocked by government filters. Its goal is to help bloggers use a mirror site to make censored content available to readers despite these filters. It contains step-by-step instructions for setting up a mirror for an original (”source”) WordPress blog.

Introduction

When it comes to accessing banned web sites and blogs, most online free speech advocates focus on bypassing censorship using circumvention tools. While this is important, teaching Internet users how to evade censorship is not enough. Many people are not aware of or do not have access to circumvention tools, as countries that filter the Internet also tend to block proxy servers and other circumvention technologies. When circumvention tools are used, they often affect connection speeds, making Internet access even slower in places where connectivity is already poor.

To make your content accessible you cannot simply rely on circumvention technologies or the technical knowledge of your readers*. Taking your users’ needs into account and keeping ahead of the blocking efforts of their governments are the first steps toward implementing creative workarounds that make your site's content available to all potential readers, regardless of where they live.

One way to increase access to blocked sites for Internet users in countries that filter online content is through mirroring: duplicating a site's content on another domain name or subdomain. Mirror sites automatically reflect any changes made to the original site, allowing blog authors to get around censorship by providing multiple locations where readers can access their content.

* A self-hosted WordPress blog is one that is not hosted on the WordPress.com free blogging service, but rather on a separate server using the WordPress.org publishing platform. For more information, see wordpress.org.

]]>http://advocacy.globalvoicesonline.org/2010/08/20/our-guide-mirroring-a-censored-wordpress-blog-is-now-available-in-arabic/feed/0A First Glimpse at the Internet Filtering in Tunisiahttp://advocacy.globalvoicesonline.org/2010/08/18/a-first-glimpse-on-the-internet-filtering-in-tunisia/
http://advocacy.globalvoicesonline.org/2010/08/18/a-first-glimpse-on-the-internet-filtering-in-tunisia/#commentsWed, 18 Aug 2010 16:43:32 +0000http://advocacy.globalvoicesonline.org/?p=3664We learned that the censorship imposed illegally on hundreds of Tunisian blogs and websites, both Tunisians and foreigners, was “shut off” temporarily for few hours on Monday, August 16, 2010. And although the information on this brief lifting of the censorship in the country is still contradictory – as some claimed they had no access to certain websites, while to others the same websites were accessible- it is still early to determine what really happened at the top level of Tunisian censorship, which is, remember, dark, top-secret, centralized at the highest level of the state and is never in the control of the several Tunisian ISPs, though, with an excess of zeal, they have the ability to add an extra layer of censorship to their customers.

Thus, we learned that access to Flickr, the photo sharing site (censored April 22, 2010) and video-sharing sites, blip.tv and wat.tv (respectively censored on the 22nd and 28th of April, 2010), has been restored. Ditto for many French and Arabic news websites. Curiously, during this same period, which lasted only a few hours, access to the two popular video-sharing websites, Dailymotion and Youtube (respectively censored September 3, 2007 and November 2, 2007) has not been restored. Something that raises some questions – but mostl importantly, provides some answers – about the nature of Tunisia’s secretive censorship infrastructure.

During this period, which lasted only a few hours, prompting hope amongst Internet users in Tunisia, many have raised the question of why YouTube and Dailymotion have remained inaccessible while other social websites like Flickr, became available from Tunisia. Why was the French Wikipedia page of Ben Ali inaccessible while the websites of Tunisian opposition parties, now censored, became available? Why was the blog Nawaat accessible while Nawaat’s Twitter page remained barred?

To understand what really happened, and then ascertain if any change in strategy at the organ level of censorship occurred, it is useful to clarify first the filtering techniques applied in Tunisia.

We will summarize the four Tunisian censorship processes. These four techniques have been adopted by the Tunisian censors at various times in the history of Tunisian Net, then gradually combined to form one of the most repressive online censorship machine.

Selective blocking by URL: such as is the case of Wikipedia. Indeed, rather than blocking the entire online encyclopedia, the censors selectively block the most “offensive” pages. This is why the French Wikipedia page on Ben Ali or the page relating to the practice of censorship in Tunisia remain inaccessible. Same for the Google video. If the majority of videos are still available, some, however, are blocked.

DNS Filtering: At the second stop, the Tunisian censors block the site by banning the domain and subdomain attached to it. This is the method most commonly used, especially to ban Tunisian bloggers emitting unpleasant opinions [...] A situation that caused a cat-and-mouse game between bloggers and the censor through the successive creation of new sub-domains, which soon subsequently, are added the the block list.

IP Filtering: With the step above, the total blockage of the IP address of the site in question, whether or not the subdomain is used; this is the case of youtube.com, dailymotion.com and many others.

Keyword Filtering: Finally, we practice, for the most recalcitrant, a radical blocking through both, DNS and Keyword Filtering that block access to any URL path containing a specific keyword. This is the case with Tunisnews.net or Nawaat.org. With the latter procedure, any URL containing the string “Nawaat”, regardless of the domain, is systematically blocked. With this technique, the censors are trying to block every scrap of information on the keyword level that could appear on the screen of Tunisian Internet users.
The Keyword Filtering when applied for example on the “Nawaat” string in any URLs results in a 404 page. Which practically means that @nawaat Twitter account is automatically blocked, as is the Nawaat Facebook account and all Google cache and search result pages that contain “nawaat” in their URL paths. [...] In addition, the keyword in the URL blocks any image related to “Nawaat“, including those hosted on Google’s image search servers. Similarly, the string “Tunisnews” produces the same effects. Note that Keyword Filtering can be applied to block any content containing that specific string on any domain or subdomain.

So, in order to answer the questions raised above, let's now recall the following facts that occurred during that brief lifting of the censorship in Tunisia, on monday, August 16th, 2010:

All sites censored by DNS filtering, including Flickr, were temporarily unblocked.

Both video-sharing websites, YouTube and Dailymotion, which are blocked in Tunisia by DNS and IP filtering, were not unblocked.

Ben Ali's page on Wikipedia, which is censored by selective URL filtering, has not been unblocked.

Nawaat’s page on Twitter, which is subjected to a keyword Filtering, was also not available during the brief “lifting” of censorship.

This very revealing incident of the brief lifting of censorship has offered us, and for the first time, some insights about the extraordinary sophistication of the technical infrastructure of filtering in Tunisia. Thus, if the temporary “lifting” was a matter of a maintenance procedure, this leads us to note that there are at least two independent sub-facilities: one dedicated to DNS level filtering, and the second dedicated to keywords and IP filtering (and perhaps there is a third layer specially dedicated to the IP filtering). Thus, if a layer of these filters fails or is deactivated for some reason, such as maintenance or a server update, the independent secon–and possibly third–layers continue to operate.

Consequently, we can assume that this latest incident, the temporary “lifting” of censorship, has affected only one layer of the Tunisian censorship machine, the one responsible for the DNS filtering. This is what was observed on Monday. If we take the example of Nawaat (one of the few Tunisian sites censored by DNS and keyword filtering), we discovered that the DNS filtering was not working during that period, but during the same time, the keyword filtering within the URL was functioning efficiently. Thus, during this brief “lifting” of censorship, nawaat.org was accessible at the domain name level, but any URLs carrying the string “nawaat” were blocked (see below screenshots of the test on nawaat.org from Tunisia):

Click to enlarge

Now the other question that may arise, and that is important, is to know why the DNS filtering system stopped working for several hours while the other one or two layer(s) continued to ban “normally” all sites covered by IP, URL and keywords filtering?

It is possible that the Tunisian censors are currently improving their control over the network infrastructure for a better monitoring of “sensitive” topics, or even a more rigorous analysis of data packets traveling between the Tunisian network and the international one. A sophistication of the infrastructure could be very useful for mass logging and control of the online activities of users in Tunisia. With over one million and a half Tunisians on Facebook, hundreds of blogs (which are increasingly critical), more than a hundred of which are already censored, and a rather politicized stream of Tunisians on Twitter and other social web sites, the Tunisian regime has no choice but to increase its control over the network through a sophistication à la chinoise of its filtering and tracing infrastructure. Still, if there was an update of the infrastructure, such as another notch of sophistication, do not hesitate to all be vigilant and attentive to the processes used.

It is also probable that this was a “simple” update server; and rather than unblocking all of the traffic, the censor has maintained a layer or layers of URL, keywords and IP filtering while unblocking the other layer, that of DNS blocking. Once the update or change to the server made, everything was back to “normal”.

It seems that international delegation is visiting our country to discuss freedom of the press and the veracity of allegations of civil society activists on Internet censorship …. we therefore expect that the lifting of censorship is temporary just long enough to fool the delegation mentioned above.

It is indeed possible, but unlikely for the following reason: in some circumstances, the Tunisian censors have unblocked sites to fool the international community. This happened during the WSIS and in certain international events in Tunisia. But each time, this was limited to certain sites such as those of political parties currently censored. Thus, the temporary lifting has never been as systematic as we experienced on monday, but rather on a site by site basis. In any event, during the interlude of “freedom”, neither the blog Nawaat nor Tunisnews have escaped the vile censorship filters.

Obviously all of these assumptions are mere speculations. This is an effort on our part to try to better understand one of the most secretive system of repression in Tunisia and to help demystify its processes. And obviously, we invite anyone with further information to make them public, and a fortiori, it may be that former collaborators of this repressive system finally reveal what can help Tunisia to get rid of this evil.

It is only a matter of time and, sooner or later, revelations, from those who are now involved in the censorship taking place, will occur. Also, remember our email Nawaat [@] gmail [dot] com. Our site is always open to any collaborator. It goes without saying that these collaborators have the absolute assurance about the confidentiality of their identity.

]]>http://advocacy.globalvoicesonline.org/2010/08/18/a-first-glimpse-on-the-internet-filtering-in-tunisia/feed/1Blackberry face growing pressure in the Gulf and India over encryption codehttp://advocacy.globalvoicesonline.org/2010/08/05/blackberry-face-growing-pressure-in-the-gulf-and-india-over-encryption-code/
http://advocacy.globalvoicesonline.org/2010/08/05/blackberry-face-growing-pressure-in-the-gulf-and-india-over-encryption-code/#commentsThu, 05 Aug 2010 15:31:00 +0000http://advocacy.globalvoicesonline.org/?p=3574The United Arab Emirates’ Telecommunications Regulation Authority (TRA) and The Saudi Communications and Information Technology Commission (CITC) announced, respectively on August 1st 2010 and on August 5th, 2010, that they will block some functions of the Blackberry due to non-compliance with the regulatory requirements in both countries.

And while the UAE will cut off some BlackBerry services such as BlackBerry Messenger, BlackBerry E-mail and BlackBerry Web-browsing as of October 11, 2010, Saudi Arabia had ordered the kingdom's three mobile phone providers, Etihad Etisalat-Mobily, Saudi Telecom Company (STC) and Zain Saudi Arabia, to block all BlackBerry's services, including e-mail and instant messaging, starting from tomorrow, Friday, August 6th, 2010.

The main reason of the ban seems to lie in the way BlackBerrys handle data and in the judicial and security concerns of the encrypted communications sent to computer servers outside of the two countries. Since BlackBerry’s Messages are sent in an encrypted format through BlackBerry’s servers in Canada, which are run by the manufacturer Research in Motion (RIM), both Gulf states regulatory bodies are upset that they are unable to monitor the data traffic on BlackBerry's handsets.

With suitable technical investment in domestic Internet monitoring, the UAE can decode a great deal of BlackBerry traffic without RIM’s help. When it comes to secure, encrypted communications, neither RIM nor any other telecommunication provider will be able to help them beat the encryption and spy on their own journalists or readers. The power lies far less in the hands of RIM, and far more in the hands of savvy Net users’ choice of the right tools.

It is also a stark reminder of the current regime’s disingenuous attitudes, its invasive censorship practises, and its intensifying control over the flow of information between the country’s citizens, its millions of expat residents, and all of their contacts with the outside world. Unlike other smartphones, such as Apple’s ubiquitous iPhone, data transferred using BlackBerrys has proved difficult to intercept and monitor for third parties, including the UAE’s state security services and other ill-intentioned eavesdroppers.

BBM user Badr Ali Saiwad Al Dhohori, an 18-year-old resident of Ras Al Khaimah, has reportedly been held in Abu Dhabi since 15 July. The authorities were able to trace the organiser, known as “Saud,” because he included his BlackBerry PIN in a BBM message he sent calling for the protest. They held Saud for a week and interrogated him to trace those he had been messaging. Accused of inciting opposition to the government, he has lost his job. At least five other members of the group have reportedly been summoned by the police or are still being sought.

In the main time, the pressures from government authorities worldwide on Blackberry maker, the Canadian Research In Motion, are growing for access to Balckberry data. In an attempt to prevent an outright ban in India, RIM has recently agreed to allow Indian security agencies to monitor its BlackBerry services:

The company has offered to share with security agencies its technical codes for corporate email services, open up access to all consumer emails within 15 days and also develop tools in 6 to 8 months to allow monitoring of chats

Update 1 (August 5th 2010): Indonesia is considering banning BlackBerry services. Gatot Dewabroto, spokesman for the Ministry of Communication and Information declared: “We don’t know whether data being sent through BlackBerrys can be intercepted or read by third parties outside the country.”

Update 2 (August 6th 2010): It has been reported that the Algerian government is reviewing the use of BlackBerry. “We are looking at the issue. If we find out that it is a danger for our economy and our security, we will stop it,” the Telecommunications Minister Moussa Benhamadi said.

Update 3 (August 6th 2010): Lebanon is considering to assess security concerns relating to the use of BlackBerry in the country. “We are studying the issue from all sides — technical, service-wise, economic, financial, legal and security-wise,” the acting head of the Telecoms Regulatory Authority told Reuters. “We are discussing this with the concerned administrations and ministries.”

Update 4 (August 6th 2010): Yestrday, August 5th, 2010, the Tunisian mobile operator, Tunisiana, announced that it will suspend the email function of the Blackberry phones for three days citing concerns about security risks.

]]>http://advocacy.globalvoicesonline.org/2010/08/05/blackberry-face-growing-pressure-in-the-gulf-and-india-over-encryption-code/feed/0A Jordanian student sentenced to two years in prison over IMhttp://advocacy.globalvoicesonline.org/2010/07/19/a-jordanian-student-sentenced-two-years-in-prison-over-im/
http://advocacy.globalvoicesonline.org/2010/07/19/a-jordanian-student-sentenced-two-years-in-prison-over-im/#commentsMon, 19 Jul 2010 13:54:46 +0000http://advocacy.globalvoicesonline.org/?p=3489According to the Next Web – Middle East, citing the Ammannet website, a Jordanian computer engineering student, by the name of Imad Al-Ash, has been arrested since February, 2010, and sentenced on July 13th, 2010, by state security court to two years in prison over charges of lèse majesté for sending an IM (Instant Message) to his friend:

The IM by Al-Ash allegedly contained words that “insulted the supreme entities” (translated from Arabic) known to others as His Majesty King Abdullah of Jordan. Amongst the charges were also allegations of participation in public online forums expressing ‘controversial religious opinions’, none of which the court had substantial proof of, as expressed by his attorney.

According to a statement provided by his father to Ammannet, the college student was submitted to torture during the five months investigation carried out by the Security Services and was forced to confess crimes which he never committed.

Following the recent massive wave of online censorship carried out by the Tunisian censor, targeting major social websites, such as the popular video-sharing websites, flickr, blogs aggregators, blogs, facebook pages and profiles, the anti-censorship movement adopted very creative, outspoken and brave tactics in protesting the online censorship. A censorship that is not only harming the country's average Internet users but is also affecting professionals whose work is relying on web 2.0 services and platforms, like youtube, flickr and other media-sharing websites.

Far from being exaggerated, the Tunisian anti-censorhip movement is one of the best innovative in the world and has been adopting creative approaches and tactics from its early beginning to its current stage. From Yezzi Fock Ben Ali! (Enough is enough, Ben Ali!) and its online protest “Freedom of Expression in Mourning” organized during The World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS) held in Tunis in November 2005, to the Google Earth bombing for a free Tunisia, and the several national days and white notes against censorship, despite its technical and tactical advantages, has never managed to go offline and reach out to the average masses of Tunisian Netizens. It was mainly limited to a hard core of digital activists and bloggers who are pushing for a political and social change by making sure to remain independent from any political party while putting their struggle for online free speech within the continual and broader battle for fundamental rights and justice led by the civil society.

But things are about to change, since the new wave of online censorship is affecting everybody and is not anymore targeting the very dissent and political blogs and websites. Which is why it was not surprising at all to see how much the Tunisian internet community is abuzz with discussions related to various aspects of censorship policy and how much it is embracing and contributing to the anti-censorship protest.

The new anti-censorship efforts, which were prepared and organized publicly online by grassroots activists – on facebook, twitter and Google Groups and Docs – were involved in a wide range of initiatives and here are the most important ones:

a virtual and online protest, banned few hours after its launch and called Sayyeb Sal7 (Facebook page), an expletive in Tunisian dialect which means “leave me with peace!” and mockingly refers to ‘Ammar 404‘, an “imaginary person invented by Tunisia as a metaphor for the invisible censor blocking their access to many websites“;

providing tips, on how to bypass the ban, and easy circumvention tools to access banned websites and blogs using the viral twitter linking technique.

an outreach effort to involve the artistic circle and media figures in Tunisia was successful enough to bring new voices to the fore of Tunisia's citizen protest against censorship, with new songs being produced and TV (NesmaTV) and radio (MosaiqueFM) presenters addressing, and not without mockery, the censorship which, according to one of them, is infantilizing Tunisian citizens.

Slim and Yassine, joined at a certain point by Lina Ben Mhenni, mastered the art of communication by making sure to update their friends and sympathizers about each step they are taking, producing a serie of videocasts published on the not-yet-blocked video-sharing website vimeo as well as on facebook.

And the expected happened: on May 21, a day before the rally, the two main organizers were arrested and investigated during the entire day. They appeared later on separate video messages where they were forced by the security forces to call off the rally and urge protestors to stay home. Slim was also forced to sign a document stating that he “understood that his call for a demonstration is wrong.”

The Police demanded that Slim records a video asking people not to show up for the planned demonstration. Apparently, Slim had to negotiate the terms of this “friendly public service announcement.” Afterwards, he had to sign a document saying that he “understood that his call for a demonstration is wrong” and then he was driven out by the police to record that “friendly reminder to stay home” aimed to dissuade people from demonstrating.

The same evening, a communiqué signed by the friends of Yassine & Slim – translated here by our friend from Morocco, Hisham (also available in French and in Arabic) alerted the public opinion and called for a plan B: “walk on Avenue Habib Bourguiba, in downtown Tunis, wearing white shirts and sit in the cafes on May 22nd at 3 pm, as a symbolic act to protest internet censorship“:

#manif22mai – May 22, 2010 – photo by Olfa (@mimouna on twitter)

Friday May 21th, from 11 am local Tunis time and until now (6.30 pm), it has become impossible to contact any of both organizers of the citizen's march, Slim Amamou and Yassin Ayari. This comes despite the fact that both organizers insisted they wouldn't turn off their cell phones, not today, nor tomorrow, and that in the case their phones were not working they would use any internet connection from any public space nearby. Add to this the fact that Slim's car was parked near Habib Bourguiba Street, and that most probably both organizers were contacted by the Ministry of the Interior to announce the march was disallowed (…), we assume tat they are now at the headquarters of the Ministry of the Interior or any of its affiliate centers.

Tomorrow, May 22 is the day of the march, called for by Slim and Yassin, who strictly followed the procedures prescribed by the law protecting the right to protest set forth by the constitutional (specifically Law No. 4 of 24 January 1969 “organizing public meetings and processions and demonstrations and gatherings,” particularly the chapters from Part II and Chapter I in Part I). We call on all citizens to consult the text of the law governing the right to demonstrate French.

[...]

No one can declare the march “illegal” (nor “legal” for that matter) if the initiators can't lead it. And until this moment it seems there is no possibility that they would. But at the same time, and as friends of Slim and Yassin, we can't ignore the many indicators that prove that the march has been banned indeed. And it is necessary to inform everybody of all obstacles and difficulties so as not to leave Slim and Yassin exposed to liability or legal consequences in case the march is declared illegal.

The initiative was clearly supported by Slim and it calls on supporters to walk on Avenue Habib Bourguiba wearing white shirts and sit in the cafes on Saturday at three o'clock pm, as a symbolic show of protest against [internet censorship]. At the same time we call on everyone to respect the campaign slogans and principles and focus on the issue of internet censorship and continue all efforts aimed at denouncing censorship by following legal means. Of course, we are also calling for the release of Slim and Yassin (if they are not freed before three o'clock on Saturday 22 May), free of any legal prosecution, since they upheld all legal procedures as mentioned earlier.

On May 22, Tunisians living abroad took to the street in front of their country's embassies and consulates in Paris, Bonn and New York. In Tunis, dozens of young Tunisians have managed to converge on Avenue Habib Bourguiba and took part in the protest. And even if the presence of uniformed and plain-clothes police barring access to the flash mob site and making it impossible for an important number of sympathizers – easily recognizable by their white T-shirts – to join the protest or remain seated in the café terraces, Tunisia's first flashmob protesting online censorship was a successful story that should inspire us all.

A “behind-the-scenes” look at YouTube's content removal and deactivation policies

The panel, which was moderated by Rebecca MacKinnon, also includes Jillian York, who focus on the case of Facebook, and Oiwan Lam, with some cases from Hong Kong, discusses content removal and deactivation across a number of platforms, as well as the importance of context and transparency in dealing with activist content on these platforms.