Demographisches Profil (engl.)

This entry describes a country’s key demographic
features and trends and how they vary among regional, ethnic, and
socioeconomic sub-populations. Some of the topics addressed are population
age structure, fertility, health, mortality, poverty, education, and
migration.

Egypt is the most populous country in the Arab world and the third most
populous country in Africa, behind Nigeria and Ethiopia. Most of the country is
desert, so about 95% of the population is concentrated in a narrow strip of
fertile land along the Nile River, which represents only about 5% of Egypt’s
land area. Egypt’s rapid population growth – 46% between 1994 and 2014 –
stresses limited natural resources, jobs, housing, sanitation, education, and
health care.
Although the country’s total fertility rate (TFR) fell from roughly 5.5 children
per woman in 1980 to just over 3 in the late 1990s, largely as a result of
state-sponsored family planning programs, the population growth rate dropped
more modestly because of decreased mortality rates and longer life expectancies.
During the last decade, Egypt’s TFR decline stalled for several years and then
reversed, reaching 3.6 in 2011, and has plateaued the last few years.
Contraceptive use has held steady at about 60%, while preferences for larger
families and early marriage may have strengthened in the wake of the recent 2011
revolution. The large cohort of women of or nearing childbearing age will
sustain high population growth for the foreseeable future (an effect called
population momentum).
Nevertheless, post-MUBARAK governments have not made curbing population growth a
priority. To increase contraceptive use and to prevent further overpopulation
will require greater government commitment and substantial social change,
including encouraging smaller families and better educating and empowering women.
Currently, literacy, educational attainment, and labor force participation rates
are much lower for women than men. In addition, the prevalence of violence
against women, the lack of female political representation, and the perpetuation
of the nearly universal practice of female genital cutting continue to keep
women from playing a more significant role in Egypt’s public sphere.
Population pressure, poverty, high unemployment, and the fragmentation of
inherited land holdings have historically motivated Egyptians, primarily young
men, to migrate internally from rural and smaller urban areas in the Nile Delta
region and the poorer rural south to Cairo, Alexandria, and other urban centers
in the north, while a much smaller number migrated to the Red Sea and Sinai
areas. Waves of forced internal migration also resulted from the 1967 Arab-Israeli
War and the floods caused by the completion of the Aswan High Dam in 1970.
Limited numbers of students and professionals emigrated temporarily prior to the
early 1970s, when economic problems and high unemployment pushed the Egyptian
Government to lift restrictions on labor migration. At the same time, high oil
revenues enabled Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and other Gulf states, as well as Libya and
Jordan, to fund development projects, creating a demand for unskilled labor (mainly
in construction), which attracted tens of thousands of young Egyptian men.
Between 1970 and 1974 alone, Egyptian migrants in the Gulf countries increased
from approximately 70,000 to 370,000. Egyptian officials encouraged legal labor
migration both to alleviate unemployment and to generate remittance income (remittances
continue to be one of Egypt’s largest sources of foreign currency and GDP).
During the mid-1980s, however, depressed oil prices resulting from the Iran-Iraq
War, decreased demand for low-skilled labor, competition from less costly South
Asian workers, and efforts to replace foreign workers with locals significantly
reduced Egyptian migration to the Gulf States. The number of Egyptian migrants
dropped from a peak of almost 3.3 million in 1983 to about 2.2 million at the
start of the 1990s, but numbers gradually recovered.
In the 2000s, Egypt began facilitating more labor migration through bilateral
agreements, notably with Arab countries and Italy, but illegal migration to
Europe through overstayed visas or maritime human smuggling via Libya also rose.
The Egyptian Government estimated there were 6.5 million Egyptian migrants in
2009, with roughly 75% being temporary migrants in other Arab countries (Libya,
Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Kuwait, and the United Arab Emirates) and 25% being
predominantly permanent migrants in the West (US, UK, Italy, France, and
Canada).
During the 2000s, Egypt became an increasingly important transit and destination
country for economic migrants and asylum seekers, including Palestinians, East
Africans, and South Asians and, more recently, Iraqis and Syrians. Egypt draws
many refugees because of its resettlement programs with the West; Cairo has one
of the largest urban refugee populations in the world. Many East African
migrants are interned or live in temporary encampments along the Egypt-Israel
border, and some have been shot and killed by Egyptian border guards.

For the first two-thirds of the 20th century, Algeria’s high fertility rate
caused its population to grow rapidly. However, about a decade after
independence from France in 1962 the total fertility rate fell dramatically from
7 children per woman in the 1970s to about 2.4 in 2000, slowing Algeria’s
population growth rate by the late 1980s. The lower fertility rate was mainly
the result of women’s rising age at first marriage (virtually all Algerian
children being born in wedlock) and to a lesser extent the wider use of
contraceptives. Later marriages and a preference for smaller families are
attributed to increases in women’s education and participation in the labor
market; higher unemployment; and a shortage of housing forcing multiple
generations to live together. The average woman’s age at first marriage
increased from about 19 in the mid-1950s to 24 in the mid-1970s to 30.5 in the
late 1990s.
Thousands of Algerian peasants – mainly Berber men from the Kabylia region –
faced with land dispossession and economic hardship under French rule migrated
temporarily to France to work in manufacturing and mining during the first half
of the 20th century. This movement accelerated during World War I, when
Algerians filled in for French factory workers or served as soldiers. In the
years following independence, low-skilled Algerian workers and Algerians who had
supported the French (harkis) emigrated en masse to France. Tighter French
immigration rules and Algiers’ decision to cease managing labor migration to
France in the 1970s limited legal emigration largely to family reunification.
Not until Algeria’s civil war in the 1990s did the country again experience
substantial outmigration. Many Algerians legally entered Tunisia without visas
claiming to be tourists and then stayed as workers. Other Algerians headed to
Europe seeking asylum, although France imposed restrictions. Sub-Saharan African
migrants came to Algeria after its civil war to work in agriculture and mining.
In the 2000s, a wave of educated Algerians went abroad seeking skilled jobs in a
wider range of destinations, increasing their presence in North America and
Spain. At the same time, legal foreign workers principally from China and Egypt
came to work in Algeria’s construction and oil sectors. Illegal migrants from
sub-Saharan Africa, particularly Malians, Nigeriens, and Gambians, continue to
come to Algeria in search of work or to use it as a stepping stone to Libya and
Europe.
Since 1975, Algeria also has been the main recipient of Sahrawi refugees from
the ongoing conflict in Western Sahara. An estimated 90,000 Sahrawis live in
five refugee camps in southwestern Algeria near Tindouf.

More than a decade after the end of Angola’s 27-year civil war, the country
still faces a variety of socioeconomic problems, including poverty, high
maternal and child mortality, and illiteracy. Despite the country’s rapid
post-war economic growth based on oil production, more than 40 percent of
Angolans live below the poverty line and unemployment is widespread, especially
among the large young-adult population. Only about 70% of the population is
literate, and the rate drops to around 60% for women. The youthful population –
about 45% are under the age of 15 – is expected to continue growing rapidly with
a fertility rate of more 5 children per woman and a low rate of contraceptive
use. Fewer than half of women deliver their babies with the assistance of
trained health care personnel, which contributes to Angola’s high maternal
mortality rate.
Of the estimated 550,000 Angolans who fled their homeland during its civil war,
most have returned home since 2002. In 2012, the UN assessed that conditions in
Angola had been stable for several years and invoked a cessation of refugee
status for Angolans. Following the cessation clause, some of those still in
exile returned home voluntarily through UN repatriation programs, and others
integrated into host countries. As of August 2014, about 73,000 Angolans were
still living in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Zambia, Namibia, the
Republic of the Congo, and other countries.

Equatorial Guinea is one of the smallest and least populated countries in
continental Africa and is the only independent African country where Spanish is
an official language. Despite a boom in oil production in the 1990s,
authoritarianism, corruption, and resource mismanagement have concentrated the
benefits among a small elite. These practices have perpetuated income inequality
and unbalanced development, such as low public spending on education and health
care. Unemployment remains problematic because the oil-dominated economy employs
a small labor force dependent on skilled foreign workers. The agricultural
sector, Equatorial Guinea’s main employer, continues to deteriorate because of a
lack of investment and the migration of rural workers to urban areas. About
three-quarters of the population lives below the poverty line.
Equatorial Guinea’s large and growing youth population – about 60% are under the
age of 25 – is particularly affected because job creation in the non-oil sectors
is limited, and young people often do not have the skills needed in the labor
market. Equatorial Guinean children frequently enter school late, have poor
attendance, and have high dropout rates. Thousands of Equatorial Guineans fled
across the border to Gabon in the 1970s to escape the dictatorship of MACIAS
NGUEMA; smaller numbers have followed in the decades since. Continued
inequitable economic growth and high youth unemployment increases the likelihood
of ethnic and regional violence.

Argentina's population continues to grow but at a slower rate because of its steadily declining birth rate. Argentina's fertility decline began earlier than in the rest of Latin America, occurring most rapidly between the early 20th century and the 1950s and then becoming more gradual. Life expectancy has been improving, most notably among the young and the poor. While the population under age 15 is shrinking, the youth cohort - ages 15-24 - is the largest in Argentina's history and will continue to bolster the working-age population. If this large working-age population is well-educated and gainfully employed, Argentina is likely to experience an economic boost and possibly higher per capita savings and investment. Although literacy and primary school enrollment are nearly universal, grade repetition is problematic and secondary school completion is low. Both of these issues vary widely by region and socioeconomic group.

Argentina has been primarily a country of immigration for most of its history, welcoming European immigrants after its independence in the 19th century and attracting especially large numbers from Spain and Italy. European immigration diminished in the 1950s, when Argentina's military dictatorships tightened immigration rules and European economies rebounded. Regional migration, however, continued to supply low-skilled workers and today it accounts for three-quarters of Argentina's immigrant population. The first waves of highly skilled Argentine emigrant workers headed mainly to the United States and Spain in the 1960s and 1970s. The ongoing European economic crisis is driving the return migration of some Argentinean and other Latin American nationals, as well as the immigration of Europeans to South America, where Argentina is a key recipient.

Ethiopia is a predominantly agricultural country –
more than 80% of the population lives in rural areas – that is in the
early stages of demographic transition. Infant, child, and maternal
mortality have fallen sharply over the past decade, but the total
fertility rate has declined more slowly and the population continues to
grow. The rising age of marriage and the increasing proportion of women
remaining single have contributed to fertility reduction. While the use
of modern contraceptive methods among married women has increased
significantly from 6 percent in 2000 to 27 percent in 2012, the overall
rate is still quite low.
Ethiopia’s rapid population growth is putting increasing pressure on
land resources, expanding environmental degradation, and raising
vulnerability to food shortages. With more than 40 percent of the
population below the age of 15 and a fertility rate of over 5 children
per woman (and even higher in rural areas), Ethiopia will have to make
further progress in meeting its family planning needs if it is to
achieve the age structure necessary for reaping a demographic dividend
in the coming decades.
Poverty, drought, political repression, and forced government
resettlement have driven Ethiopia’s internal and external migration
since the 1960s. Before the 1974 revolution, only small numbers of the
Ethiopian elite went abroad to study and then returned home, but under
the brutal Derg regime thousands fled the country, primarily as refugees.
Between 1982 and 1991 there was a new wave of migration to the West for
family reunification. Since the defeat of the Derg in 1991, Ethiopians
have migrated to escape violence among some of the country’s myriad
ethnic groups or to pursue economic opportunities. Internal and
international trafficking of women and children for domestic work and
prostitution is a growing problem.

Migration continues to transform Belize's population. About 16% of Belizeans live abroad, while immigrants constitute approximately 15% of Belize's population. Belizeans seeking job and educational opportunities have preferred to emigrate to the United States rather than former colonizer Great Britain because of the United States' closer proximity and stronger trade ties with Belize. Belizeans also emigrate to Canada, Mexico, and English-speaking Caribbean countries. The emigration of a large share of Creoles (Afro-Belizeans) and the influx of Central American immigrants, mainly Guatemalans, Salvadorans, and Hondurans, has changed Belize's ethnic composition. Mestizos have become the largest ethnic group, and Belize now has more native Spanish speakers than English or Creole speakers, despite English being the official language. In addition, Central American immigrants are establishing new communities in rural areas, which contrasts with the urbanization trend seen in neighboring countries. Recently, Chinese, European, and North American immigrants have become more frequent.

Immigration accounts for an increasing share of Belize's population growth rate, which is steadily falling due to fertility decline. Belize's declining birth rate and its increased life expectancy are creating an aging population. As the elderly population grows and nuclear families replace extended households, Belize's government will be challenged to balance a rising demand for pensions, social services, and healthcare for its senior citizens with the need to reduce poverty and social inequality and to improve sanitation.

Benin has a youthful age structure – almost 65% of the population is under
the age of 25 – which is bolstered by high fertility and population growth rates.
Benin’s total fertility has been falling over time but remains high, declining
from almost 7 children per women in 1990 to 4.8 in 2016. Benin’s low
contraceptive use and high unmet need for contraception contribute to the
sustained high fertility rate. Although the majority of Beninese women use
skilled health care personnel for antenatal care and delivery, the high rate of
maternal mortality indicates the need for more access to high quality obstetric
care.
Poverty, unemployment, increased living costs, and dwindling resources
increasingly drive the Beninese to migrate. An estimated 4.4 million, more than
40%, of Beninese live abroad. Virtually all Beninese emigrants move to West
African countries, particularly Nigeria and Cote d’Ivoire. Of the less than 1%
of Beninese emigrants who settle in Europe, the vast majority live in France,
Benin’s former colonial ruler.
With about 40% of the population living below the poverty line, many desperate
parents resort to sending their children to work in wealthy households as
domestic servants (a common practice known as vidomegon), mines, quarries, or
agriculture domestically or in Nigeria and other neighboring countries, often
under brutal conditions. Unlike in other West African countries, where rural
people move to the coast, farmers from Benin’s densely populated southern and
northwestern regions move to the historically sparsely populated central region
to pursue agriculture. Immigrants from West African countries came to Benin in
increasing numbers between 1992 and 2002 because of its political stability and
porous borders.

Bolivia ranks at or near the bottom among Latin American countries in several areas of health and development, including poverty, education, fertility, malnutrition, mortality, and life expectancy. On the positive side, more children are being vaccinated and more pregnant women are getting prenatal care and having skilled health practitioners attend their births. Bolivia's income inequality is the highest in Latin America and one of the highest in the world. Public education is of poor quality, and educational opportunities are among the most unevenly distributed in Latin America, with girls and indigenous and rural children less likely to be literate or to complete primary school. The lack of access to education and family planning services helps to sustain Bolivia's high fertility rate - approximately three children per woman. Bolivia's lack of clean water and basic sanitation, especially in rural areas, contributes to health problems.

Almost 7% of Bolivia's population lives abroad, primarily to work in Argentina, Brazil, Spain, and the United States. In recent years, more restrictive immigration policies in Europe and the United States have increased the flow of Bolivian emigrants to neighboring Argentina and Brazil.

Botswana has experienced one of the most rapid declines in fertility in sub-Saharan
Africa. The total fertility rate has fallen from more than 5 children per woman
in the mid 1980s to approximately 2.4 in 2013. The fertility reduction has been
attributed to a host of factors, including higher educational attainment among
women, greater participation of women in the workforce, increased contraceptive
use, later first births, and a strong national family planning program. Botswana
was making significant progress in several health indicators, including life
expectancy and infant and child mortality rates, until being devastated by the
HIV/AIDs epidemic in the 1990s.
Today Botswana has the third highest HIV/AIDS prevalence rate in the world at
approximately 22%, however comprehensive and effective treatment programs have
reduced HIV/AIDS-related deaths. The combination of declining fertility and
increasing mortality rates because of HIV/AIDS is slowing the population aging
process, with a narrowing of the youngest age groups and little expansion of the
oldest age groups. Nevertheless, having the bulk of its population (about 60%)
of working age will only yield economic benefits if the labor force is healthy,
educated, and productively employed.
Batswana have been working as contract miners in South Africa since the 19th
century. Although Botswana’s economy improved shortly after independence in 1966
with the discovery of diamonds and other minerals, its lingering high poverty
rate and lack of job opportunities continued to push workers to seek mining work
in southern African countries. In the early 1970s, about a third of Botswana’s
male labor force worked in South Africa (lesser numbers went to Namibia and
Zimbabwe). Not until the 1980s and 1990s, when South African mining companies
had reduced their recruitment of foreign workers and Botswana’s economic
prospects had improved, were Batswana increasingly able to find job
opportunities at home.
Most Batswana prefer life in their home country and choose cross-border
migration on a temporary basis only for work, shopping, visiting family, or
tourism. Since the 1970s, Botswana has pursued an open migration policy enabling
it to recruit thousands of foreign workers to fill skilled labor shortages. In
the late 1990s, Botswana’s prosperity and political stability attracted not only
skilled workers but small numbers of refugees from neighboring Angola, Namibia,
and Zimbabwe.

Brazil's rapid fertility decline since the 1960s is the main factor behind the country's slowing population growth rate, aging population, and fast-paced demographic transition. Brasilia has not taken full advantage of its large working-age population to develop its human capital and strengthen its social and economic institutions but is funding a study abroad program to bring advanced skills back to the country. The current favorable age structure will begin to shift around 2025, with the labor force shrinking and the elderly starting to compose an increasing share of the total population. Well-funded public pensions have nearly wiped out poverty among the elderly, and Bolsa Familia and other social programs have lifted tens of millions out of poverty. More than half of Brazil's population is considered middle class, but poverty and income inequality levels remain high; the Northeast, North, and Center-West, women, and black, mixed race, and indigenous populations are disproportionately affected. Disparities in opportunities foster social exclusion and contribute to Brazil's high crime rate, particularly violent crime in cities and favelas.

Brazil has traditionally been a net recipient of immigrants, with its southeast being the prime destination. After the importation of African slaves was outlawed in the mid-19th century, Brazil sought Europeans (Italians, Portuguese, Spaniards, and Germans) and later Asians (Japanese) to work in agriculture, especially coffee cultivation. Recent immigrants come mainly from Argentina, Chile, and Andean countries (many are unskilled illegal migrants) or are returning Brazilian nationals. Since Brazil's economic downturn in the 1980s, emigration to the United States, Europe, and Japan has been rising but is negligible relative to Brazil's total population. The majority of these emigrants are well-educated and middle-class. Fewer Brazilian peasants are emigrating to neighboring countries to take up agricultural work.

Burkina Faso has a young age structure – the result of declining mortality
combined with steady high fertility – and continues to experience rapid
population growth, which is putting increasing pressure on the country’s limited
arable land. More than 65% of the population is under the age of 25, and the
population is growing at 3% annually. Mortality rates, especially those of
infants and children, have decreased because of improved health care, hygiene,
and sanitation, but women continue to have an average of almost 6 children. Even
if fertility were substantially reduced, today’s large cohort entering their
reproductive years would sustain high population growth for the foreseeable
future. Only about a third of the population is literate and unemployment is
widespread, dampening the economic prospects of Burkina Faso’s large working-age
population.
Migration has traditionally been a way of life for Burkinabe, with seasonal
migration being replaced by stints of up to two years abroad. Cote d’Ivoire
remains the top destination, although it has experienced periods of internal
conflict. Under French colonization, Burkina Faso became a main labor source for
agricultural and factory work in Cote d’Ivoire. Burkinabe also migrated to
Ghana, Mali, and Senegal for work between the world wars. Burkina Faso attracts
migrants from Cote d’Ivoire, Ghana, and Mali, who often share common ethnic
backgrounds with the Burkinabe. Despite its food shortages and high poverty
rate, Burkina Faso has become a destination for refugees in recent years and
currently hosts about 50,000 Malians.

Burundi is a densely populated country with a high population growth rate,
factors that combined with land scarcity and poverty place a large share of its
population at risk of food insecurity. About 90% of the population relies on
subsistence agriculture. Subdivision of land to sons, and redistribution to
returning refugees, results in smaller, overworked, and less productive plots.
Food shortages, poverty, and a lack of clean water contribute to a 60% chronic
malnutrition rate among children. A lack of reproductive health services has
prevented a significant reduction in Burundi’s maternal mortality and fertility
rates, which are both among the world’s highest. With two-thirds of its
population under the age of 25 and a birth rate of about 6 children per woman,
Burundi’s population will continue to expand rapidly for decades to come,
putting additional strain on a poor country.
Historically, migration flows into and out of Burundi have consisted
overwhelmingly of refugees from violent conflicts. In the last decade, more than
a half million Burundian refugees returned home from neighboring countries,
mainly Tanzania. Reintegrating the returnees has been problematic due to their
prolonged time in exile, land scarcity, poor infrastructure, poverty, and
unemployment. Repatriates and existing residents (including internally displaced
persons) compete for limited land and other resources. To further complicate
matters, international aid organizations reduced their assistance because they
no longer classified Burundi as a post-conflict country. Conditions have
deteriorated since renewed violence erupted in April 2015, causing another
outpouring of refugees. In addition to refugee out-migration, Burundi has hosted
thousands of refugees from neighboring countries, mostly from the Democratic
Republic of the Congo and lesser numbers from Rwanda.

Cabo Verde’s population descends from its first permanent inhabitants in the
late 15th-century – a preponderance of West African slaves, a small share of
Portuguese colonists, and even fewer Italians, Spaniards, and Portuguese Jews.
Over the centuries, the country’s overall population size has fluctuated
significantly, as recurring periods of famine and epidemics have caused high
death tolls and emigration.
Labor migration historically reduced Cabo Verde’s population growth and still
provides a key source of income through remittances. Expatriates probably
outnumber Cabo Verde’s resident population, with most families having a member
abroad. Cabo Verdeans have settled in the US, Europe, Africa, and South America.
The largest diaspora community in New Bedford, Massachusetts, dating to the
early 1800s, is a byproduct of the transatlantic whaling industry. Cabo Verdean
men fleeing poverty at home joined the crews of US whaling ships that stopped in
the islands. Many settled in New Bedford and stayed in the whaling or shipping
trade, worked in the textile or cranberry industries, or operated their own
transatlantic packet ships that transported compatriots to the US. Increased
Cabo Verdean emigration to the US coincided with the gradual and eventually
complete abolition of slavery in the archipelago in 1878.
During the same period, Portuguese authorities coerced Cabo Verdeans to go to
Sao Tome and Principe and other Portuguese colonies in Africa to work as
indentured laborers on plantations. In the 1920s, when the US implemented
immigration quotas, Cabo Verdean emigration shifted toward Portugal, West Africa
(Senegal), and South America (Argentina). Growing numbers of Cabo Verdean labor
migrants headed to Western Europe in the 1960s and 1970s. They filled unskilled
jobs in Portugal, as many Portuguese sought out work opportunities in the more
prosperous economies of northwest Europe. Cabo Verdeans eventually expanded
their emigration to the Netherlands, where they worked in the shipping industry.
Migration to the US resumed under relaxed migration laws. Cabo Verdean women
also began migrating to southern Europe to become domestic workers, a trend that
continues today and has shifted the gender balance of Cabo Verdean emigration.
Emigration has declined in more recent decades due to the adoption of more
restrictive migration policies in destination countries. Reduced emigration
along with a large youth population, decreased mortality rates, and increased
life expectancies, has boosted population growth, putting further pressure on
domestic employment and resources. In addition, Cabo Verde has attracted
increasing numbers of migrants in recent decades, consisting primarily of people
from West Africa, Portuguese-speaking African countries, Portugal, and China.
Since the 1990s, some West African migrants have used Cabo Verde as a stepping
stone for illegal migration to Europe.

Chile is in the advanced stages of demographic transition and is becoming an aging society - with fertility below replacement level, low mortality rates, and life expectancy on par with developed countries. Nevertheless, with its dependency ratio nearing its low point, Chile could benefit from its favorable age structure. It will need to keep its large working-age population productively employed, while preparing to provide for the needs of its growing proportion of elderly people, especially as women - the traditional caregivers - increasingly enter the workforce. Over the last two decades, Chile has made great strides in reducing its poverty rate, which is now lower than most Latin American countries. However, its severe income inequality ranks as the worst among members of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. Unequal access to quality education perpetuates this uneven income distribution.

Chile has historically been a country of emigration but has slowly become more attractive to immigrants since transitioning to democracy in 1990 and improving its economic stability (other regional destinations have concurrently experienced deteriorating economic and political conditions). Most of Chile's small but growing foreign-born population consists of transplants from other Latin American countries, especially Peru.

Costa Rica's political stability, high standard of living, and well-developed social benefits system set it apart from its Central American neighbors. Through the government's sustained social spending - almost 20% of GDP annually - Costa Rica has made tremendous progress toward achieving its goal of providing universal access to education, healthcare, clean water, sanitation, and electricity. Since the 1970s, expansion of these services has led to a rapid decline in infant mortality, an increase in life expectancy at birth, and a sharp decrease in the birth rate. The average number of children born per women has fallen from about 7 in the 1960s to 3.5 in the early 1980s to below replacement level today. Costa Rica's poverty rate is lower than in most Latin American countries, but it has stalled at around 20% for almost two decades.

Costa Rica is a popular regional immigration destination because of its job opportunities and social programs. Almost 9% of the population is foreign-born, with Nicaraguans comprising nearly three-quarters of the foreign population. Many Nicaraguans who perform unskilled seasonal labor enter Costa Rica illegally or overstay their visas, which continues to be a source of tension. Less than 3% of Costa Rica's population lives abroad. The overwhelming majority of expatriates have settled in the United States after completing a university degree or in order to work in a highly skilled field.

Cote d’Ivoire’s population is likely to continue growing for the foreseeable
future because almost 60% of the populace is younger than 25, the total
fertility rate is holding steady at about 3.5 children per woman, and
contraceptive use is under 20%. The country will need to improve education,
health care, and gender equality in order to turn its large and growing youth
cohort into human capital. Even prior to 2010 unrest that shuttered schools for
months, access to education was poor, especially for women. As of 2015, only 53%
of men and 33% of women were literate. The lack of educational attainment
contributes to Cote d’Ivoire’s high rates of unskilled labor, adolescent
pregnancy, and HIV/AIDS prevalence.
Following its independence in 1960, Cote d’Ivoire’s stability and the blossoming
of its labor-intensive cocoa and coffee industries in the southwest made it an
attractive destination for migrants from other parts of the country and its
neighbors, particularly Burkina Faso. The HOUPHOUET-BOIGNY administration
continued the French colonial policy of encouraging labor immigration by
offering liberal land ownership laws. Foreigners from West Africa, Europe (mainly
France), and Lebanon composed about 25% of the population by 1998.
Ongoing economic decline since the 1980s and the power struggle after HOUPHOUET-BOIGNY’s
death in 1993 ushered in the politics of “Ivoirite,” institutionalizing an
Ivoirian identity that further marginalized northern Ivoirians and scapegoated
immigrants. The hostile Muslim north-Christian south divide snowballed into a
2002 civil war, pushing tens of thousands of foreign migrants, Liberian refugees,
and Ivoirians to flee to war-torn Liberia or other regional countries and more
than a million people to be internally displaced. Subsequently, violence
following the contested 2010 presidential election prompted some 250,000 people
to seek refuge in Liberia and other neighboring countries and again internally
displaced as many as a million people. By July 2012, the majority had returned
home, but ongoing inter-communal tension and armed conflict continue to force
people from their homes.

Djibouti is a poor, predominantly urban country, characterized by high rates
of illiteracy, unemployment, and childhood malnutrition. More than 75% of the
population lives in cities and towns (predominantly in the capital, Djibouti).
The rural population subsists primarily on nomadic herding. Prone to droughts
and floods, the country has few natural resources and must import more than 80%
of its food from neighboring countries or Europe. Health care, particularly
outside the capital, is limited by poor infrastructure, shortages of equipment
and supplies, and a lack of qualified personnel. More than a third of health
care recipients are migrants because the services are still better than those
available in their neighboring home countries. The nearly universal practice of
female genital cutting reflects Djibouti’s lack of gender equality and is a
major contributor to obstetrical complications and its high rates of maternal
and infant mortality. A 1995 law prohibiting the practice has never been
enforced.
Because of its political stability and its strategic location at the confluence
of East Africa and the Gulf States along the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea,
Djibouti is a key transit point for migrants and asylum seekers heading for the
Gulf States and beyond. Each year some hundred thousand people, mainly
Ethiopians and some Somalis, journey through Djibouti, usually to the port of
Obock, to attempt a dangerous sea crossing to Yemen. However, with the
escalation of the ongoing Yemen conflict, Yemenis began fleeing to Djibouti in
March 2015, with more than 35,000 arriving by April 2016. Most Yemenis remain
unregistered and head for Djibouti City rather than seeking asylum at one of
Djibouti’s three spartan refugee camps. Djibouti has been hosting refugees and
asylum seekers, predominantly Somalis and lesser numbers of Ethiopians and
Eritreans, at camps for 20 years, despite lacking potable water, food shortages,
and unemployment.

Ecuador's high poverty and income inequality most affect indigenous, mixed race, and rural populations. The government has increased its social spending to ameliorate these problems, but critics question the efficiency and implementation of its national development plan. Nevertheless, the conditional cash transfer program, which requires participants' children to attend school and have medical check-ups, has helped improve educational attainment and healthcare among poor children. Ecuador is stalled at above replacement level fertility and the population most likely will keep growing rather than stabilize.
An estimated 2 to 3 million Ecuadorians live abroad, but increased unemployment in key receiving countries - Spain, the United States, and Italy - is slowing emigration and increasing the likelihood of returnees to Ecuador.

The first large-scale emigration of Ecuadorians occurred between 1980 and 2000, when an economic crisis drove Ecuadorians from southern provinces to New York City, where they had trade contacts. A second, nationwide wave of emigration in the late 1990s was caused by another economic downturn, political instability, and a currency crisis. Spain was the logical destination because of its shared language and the wide availability of low-skilled, informal jobs at a time when increased border surveillance made illegal migration to the US difficult. Ecuador has a small but growing immigrant population and is Latin America's top recipient of refugees; 98% are neighboring Colombians fleeing violence in their country.

El Salvador is the smallest and most densely populated country in Central America. It is well into its demographic transition, experiencing slower population growth, a decline in its number of youths, and the gradual aging of its population. The increased use of family planning has substantially lowered El Salvador's fertility rate, from approximately 6 children per woman in the 1970s to replacement level today. A 2008 national family planning survey showed that female sterilization remained the most common contraception method in El Salvador - its sterilization rate is among the highest in Latin America and the Caribbean - but that the use of injectable contraceptives is growing. Fertility differences between rich and poor and urban and rural women are narrowing.

Salvadorans fled during the 1979 to 1992 civil war mainly to the United States but also to Canada and to neighboring Mexico, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Costa Rica. Emigration to the United States increased again in the 1990s and 2000s as a result of deteriorating economic conditions, natural disasters (Hurricane Mitch in 1998 and earthquakes in 2001), and family reunification. At least 20% of El Salvador's population lives abroad. The remittances they send home account for close to 20% of GDP, are the second largest source of external income after exports, and have helped reduce poverty.

Eritrea is a persistently poor country that has
made progress in some socioeconomic categories but not in others.
Education and human capital formation are national priorities for
facilitating economic development and eradicating poverty. To this end,
Eritrea has made great strides in improving adult literacy – doubling
the literacy rate over the last 20 years – in large part because of its
successful adult education programs. The overall literacy rate was
estimated to be almost 74% in 2015; more work needs to be done to raise
female literacy and school attendance among nomadic and rural
communities. Subsistence farming fails to meet the needs of Eritrea’s
growing population because of repeated droughts, dwindling arable land,
overgrazing, soil erosion, and a shortage of farmers due to conscription
and displacement. The government’s emphasis on spending on defense over
agriculture and its lack of foreign exchange to import food also
contribute to food insecurity.
Eritrea has been a leading refugee source country since at least the
1960s, when its 30-year war for independence from Ethiopia began. Since
gaining independence in 1993, Eritreans have continued migrating to
Sudan, Ethiopia, Yemen, Egypt, or Israel because of a lack of basic
human rights or political freedom, educational and job opportunities, or
to seek asylum because of militarization. Eritrea’s large diaspora has
been a source of vital remittances, funding its war for independence and
providing 30% of the country’s GDP annually since it became independent.
In the last few years, Eritreans have increasingly been trafficked and
held hostage by Bedouins in the Sinai Desert, where they are victims of
organ harvesting, rape, extortion, and torture. Some Eritrean
trafficking victims are kidnapped after being smuggled to Sudan or
Ethiopia, while others are kidnapped from within or around refugee camps
or crossing Eritrea’s borders. Eritreans composed approximately 90% of
the conservatively estimated 25,000-30,000 victims of Sinai trafficking
from 2009-2013, according to a 2013 consultancy firm report.

Guatemala is a predominantly poor country that struggles in several areas of health and development, including infant, child, and maternal mortality, malnutrition, literacy, and contraceptive awareness and use. The country's large indigenous population is disproportionately affected. Guatemala is the most populous country in Central America and has the highest fertility rate in Latin America. It also has the highest population growth rate in Latin America, which is likely to continue because of its large reproductive-age population and high birth rate. Almost half of Guatemala's population is under age 19, making it the youngest population in Latin America. Guatemala's total fertility rate has slowly declined during the last few decades due in part to limited government-funded health programs. However, the birth rate is still more than three children per woman and is markedly higher among its rural and indigenous populations.

Guatemalans have a history of emigrating legally and illegally to Mexico, the United States, and Canada because of a lack of economic opportunity, political instability, and natural disasters. Emigration, primarily to the United States, escalated during the 1960 to 1996 civil war and accelerated after a peace agreement was signed. Thousands of Guatemalans who fled to Mexico returned after the war, but labor migration to southern Mexico continues.

Guyana is the only English-speaking country in South America and shares cultural and historical bonds with the Anglophone Caribbean. Guyana's two largest ethnic groups are the Afro-Guyanese (descendants of African slaves) and the Indo-Guyanese (descendants of Indian indentured laborers), which together comprise about three quarters of Guyana's population. Tensions periodically have boiled over between the two groups, which back ethnically based political parties and vote along ethnic lines. Poverty reduction has stagnated since the late 1990s. About one-third of the Guyanese population lives below the poverty line; indigenous people are disproportionately affected. Although Guyana's literacy rate is reported to be among the highest in the Western Hemisphere, the level of functional literacy is considerably lower, which has been attributed to poor education quality, teacher training, and infrastructure.

Guyana's emigration rate is among the highest in the world - more than 55% of its citizens reside abroad - and it is one of the largest recipients of remittances relative to GDP among Latin American and Caribbean counties. Although remittances are a vital source of income for most citizens, the pervasive emigration of skilled workers deprives Guyana of professionals in healthcare and other key sectors. More than 80% of Guyanese nationals with tertiary level educations have emigrated. Brain drain and the concentration of limited medical resources in Georgetown hamper Guyana's ability to meet the health needs of its predominantly rural population. Guyana has one of the highest HIV prevalence rates in the region and continues to rely on international support for its HIV treatment and prevention programs.

Honduras is one of the poorest countries in Latin America and has the world's highest murder rate. More than half of the population lives in poverty and per capita income is one of the lowest in the region. Poverty rates are higher among rural and indigenous people and in the south, west, and along the eastern border than in the north and central areas where most of Honduras' industries and infrastructure are concentrated. The increased productivity needed to break Honduras' persistent high poverty rate depends, in part, on further improvements in educational attainment. Although primary-school enrollment is near 100%, educational quality is poor, the drop-out rate and grade repetition remain high, and teacher and school accountability is low.

Honduras' population growth rate has slowed since the 1990s, but it remains high at nearly 2% annually because the birth rate averages approximately three children per woman and more among rural, indigenous, and poor women. Consequently, Honduras' young adult population - ages 15 to 29 - is projected to continue growing rapidly for the next three decades and then stabilize or slowly shrink. Population growth and limited job prospects outside of agriculture will continue to drive emigration. Remittances represent about a fifth of GDP.

Cameroon has a large youth population, with more than 60% of the populace
under the age of 25. Fertility is falling but remains at a high level,
especially among poor, rural, and uneducated women, in part because of
inadequate access to contraception. Life expectancy remains low at about 55
years due to the prevalence of HIV and AIDs and an elevated maternal mortality
rate, which has remained high since 1990. Cameroon, particularly the northern
region, is vulnerable to food insecurity largely because of government
mismanagement, corruption, high production costs, inadequate infrastructure, and
natural disasters. Despite economic growth in some regions, poverty is on the
rise, and is most prevalent in rural areas, which are especially affected by a
shortage of jobs, declining incomes, poor school and health care infrastructure,
and a lack of clean water and sanitation. Underinvestment in social safety nets
and ineffective public financial management also contribute to Cameroon’s high
rate of poverty.
International migration has been driven by unemployment (including fewer
government jobs), poverty, the search for educational opportunities, and
corruption. The US and Europe are preferred destinations, but, with tighter
immigration restrictions in these countries, young Cameroonians are increasingly
turning to neighboring states, such as Gabon and Nigeria, South Africa, other
parts of Africa, and the Near and Far East. Cameroon’s limited resources make it
dependent on UN support to host more than 300,000 refugees and asylum seekers.
These refugees and asylum seekers are primarily from the Central African
Republic and more recently Nigeria.

Colombia is in the midst of a demographic transition resulting from steady declines in its fertility, mortality, and population growth rates. The birth rate has fallen from more than 6 children per woman in the 1960s to just above replacement level today as a result of increased literacy, family planning services, and urbanization. However, income inequality is among the worst in the world, and more than a third of the population lives below the poverty line.

Colombia experiences significant legal and illegal economic emigration and refugee flows. Large-scale labor emigration dates to the 1960s; Venezuela and the United States continue to be the main host countries. Colombia is the largest source of Latin American refugees in Latin America, nearly 400,000 of whom live primarily in Venezuela and Ecuador. Forced displacement remains prevalent because of violence among guerrillas, paramilitary groups, and Colombian security forces. Afro-Colombian and indigenous populations are disproportionately affected. A leading NGO estimates that 5.2 million people have been displaced since 1985, while the Colombian Government estimates 3.6 million since 2000. These estimates may undercount actual numbers because not all internally displaced persons are registered. Historically, Colombia also has one of the world's highest levels of forced disappearances. About 30,000 cases have been recorded over the last four decades - although the number is likely to be much higher - including human rights activists, trade unionists, Afro-Colombians, indigenous people, and farmers in rural conflict zones.

Comoros’ population is a melange of Arabs, Persians, Indonesians, Africans,
and Indians, and the much smaller number of Europeans that settled on the
islands between the 8th and 19th centuries, when they served as a regional trade
hub. The Arab and Persian influence is most evident in the islands’
overwhelmingly Muslim majority – about 98% of Comorans are Sunni Muslims. The
country is densely populated, averaging nearly 350 people per square mile,
although this varies widely among the islands, with Anjouan being the most
densely populated.
Given the large share of land dedicated to agriculture and Comoros’ growing
population, habitable land is becoming increasingly crowded. The combination of
increasing population pressure on limited land and resources, widespread poverty,
and poor job prospects motivates thousands of Comorans each year to attempt to
illegally migrate using small fishing boats to the neighboring island of
Mayotte, which is a French territory. The majority of legal Comoran migration to
France came after Comoros’ independence from France in 1975, with the flow
peaking in the mid-1980s.
At least 150,000 to 200,000 people of Comoran citizenship or descent live abroad,
mainly in France, where they have gone seeking a better quality of life, job
opportunities, higher education (Comoros has no universities), advanced health
care, and to finance elaborate traditional wedding ceremonies (aada).
Remittances from the diaspora are an economic mainstay, in 2013 representing
approximately 25% of Comoros’ GDP and significantly more than the value of its
exports of goods and services (only 15% of GDP). Grand Comore, Comoros’ most
populous island, is both the primary source of emigrants and the main recipient
of remittances. Most remittances are spent on private consumption, but this
often goes toward luxury goods and the aada and does not contribute to economic
development or poverty reduction. Although the majority of the diaspora is now
French-born with more distant ties to Comoros, it is unclear whether they will
sustain the current level of remittances.

Despite a wealth of fertile soil, hydroelectric power potential, and mineral
resources, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) struggles with many
socioeconomic problems, including high infant and maternal mortality rates,
malnutrition, poor vaccination coverage, lack of access to improved water
sources and sanitation, and frequent and early fertility. Ongoing conflict,
mismanagement of resources, and a lack of investment have resulted in food
insecurity; almost 30 percent of children under the age of 5 are malnourished.
The overall coverage of basic public services – education, health, sanitation,
and potable water – is very limited and piecemeal, with substantial regional and
rural/urban disparities. Fertility remains high at almost 5 children per woman
and is likely to remain high because of the low use of contraception and the
cultural preference for larger families.
The DRC is a source and host country for refugees. Between 2012 and 2014, more
than 119,000 Congolese refugees returned from the Republic of Congo to the
relative stability of northwest DRC, but more than 540,000 Congolese refugees
remained abroad as of year-end 2015. In addition, more than 1.7 million
Congolese are internally displaced, the vast majority fleeing violence in the
DRC’s eastern provinces between rebel group and Congolese armed forces.
Thousands of refugees have come to the DRC from neighboring countries, including
Rwanda, the Central African Republic, and Burundi.

Despite being one of the poorest countries in Latin America, Nicaragua has improved its access to potable water and sanitation and has ameliorated its life expectancy, infant and child mortality, and immunization rates. However, income distribution is very uneven, and the poor, agriculturalists, and indigenous people continue to have less access to healthcare services. Nicaragua's total fertility rate has fallen from around 6 children per woman in 1980 to just above replacement level today, but the high birth rate among adolescents perpetuates a cycle of poverty and low educational attainment.
Nicaraguans emigrate primarily to Costa Rica and to a lesser extent the United States. Nicaraguan men have been migrating seasonally to Costa Rica to harvest bananas and coffee since the early 20th century. Political turmoil, civil war, and natural disasters from the 1970s through the 1990s dramatically increased the flow of refugees and permanent migrants seeking jobs, higher wages, and better social and healthcare benefits. Since 2000, Nicaraguan emigration to Costa Rica has slowed and stabilized. Today roughly 300,000 Nicaraguans are permanent residents of Costa Rica - about 75% of the foreign population - and thousands more migrate seasonally for work, many illegally.

Panama is a country of demographic and economic contrasts. It is in the midst of a demographic transition, characterized by steadily declining rates of fertility, mortality, and population growth, but disparities persist based on wealth, geography, and ethnicity. Panama has one of the fastest growing economies in Latin America and dedicates substantial funding to social programs, yet poverty and inequality remain prevalent. The indigenous population accounts for a growing share of Panama's poor and extreme poor, while the non-indigenous rural poor have been more successful at rising out of poverty through rural-to-urban labor migration. The government's large expenditures on untargeted, indirect subsidies for water, electricity, and fuel have been ineffective, but its conditional cash transfer program has shown some promise in helping to decrease extreme poverty among the indigenous population.

Panama has expanded access to education and clean water, but the availability of sanitation and, to a lesser extent, electricity remains poor. The increase in secondary schooling - led by female enrollment - is spreading to rural and indigenous areas, which probably will help to alleviate poverty if educational quality and the availability of skilled jobs improve. Inadequate access to sanitation contributes to a high incidence of diarrhea in Panama's children, which is one of the main causes of Panama's elevated chronic malnutrition rate, especially among indigenous communities.

Paraguay falls below the Latin American average in several socioeconomic categories, including immunization rates, potable water, sanitation, and secondary school enrollment, and has greater rates of income inequality and child and maternal mortality. Paraguay's poverty rate has declined in recent years but remains high, especially in rural areas, with more than a third of the population below the poverty line. However, the well-being of the poor in many regions has improved in terms of housing quality and access to clean water, telephone service, and electricity. The fertility rate continues to drop, declining sharply from an average 4.3 births per woman in the late 1990s to about 2 in 2013, as a result of the greater educational attainment of women, increased use of contraception, and a desire for smaller families among young women.

Paraguay is a country of emigration; it has not attracted large numbers of immigrants because of political instability, civil wars, years of dictatorship, and the greater appeal of neighboring countries. Paraguay first tried to encourage immigration in 1870 in order to rebound from the heavy death toll it suffered during the War of the Triple Alliance, but it received few European and Middle Eastern immigrants. In the 20th century, limited numbers of immigrants arrived from Lebanon, Japan, South Korea, and China, as well as Mennonites from Canada, Russia, and Mexico. Large flows of Brazilian immigrants have been arriving since the 1960s, mainly to work in agriculture. Paraguayans continue to emigrate to Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay, the United States, Italy, Spain, and France.

Peru's urban and coastal communities have benefited much more from recent economic growth than rural, Afro-Peruvian, indigenous, and poor populations of the Amazon and mountain regions. The poverty rate has dropped substantially during the last decade but remains stubbornly high at about 30% (more than 55% in rural areas). After remaining almost static for about a decade, Peru's malnutrition rate began falling in 2005, when the government introduced a coordinated strategy focusing on hygiene, sanitation, and clean water. School enrollment has improved, but achievement scores reflect ongoing problems with educational quality. Many poor children temporarily or permanently drop out of school to help support their families. About a quarter to a third of Peruvian children aged 6 to 14 work, often putting in long hours at hazardous mining or construction sites.

Peru was a country of immigration in the 19th and early 20th centuries, but has become a country of emigration in the last few decades. Beginning in the 19th century, Peru brought in Asian contract laborers mainly to work on coastal plantations. Populations of Chinese and Japanese descent - among the largest in Latin America - are economically and culturally influential in Peru today. Peruvian emigration began rising in the 1980s due to an economic crisis and a violent internal conflict, but outflows have stabilized in the last few years as economic conditions have improved. Nonetheless, more than 2 million Peruvians have emigrated in the last decade, principally to the US, Spain, and Argentina.

Suriname is a pluralistic society consisting primarily of Creoles (persons of mixed African and European heritage), the descendants of escaped African slaves known as Maroons, and the descendants of Indian and Javanese contract workers. The country overall is in full, post-industrial demographic transition, with a low fertility rate, a moderate mortality rate, and a rising life expectancy. However, the Maroon population of the rural interior lags behind because of lower educational attainment and contraceptive use, higher malnutrition, and significantly less access to electricity, potable water, sanitation, infrastructure, and health care.

Some 350,000 people of Surinamese descent live in the Netherlands, Suriname's former colonial ruler. In the 19th century, better-educated, largely Dutch-speaking Surinamese began emigrating to the Netherlands. World War II interrupted the outflow, but it resumed after the war when Dutch labor demands grew - emigrants included all segments of the Creole population. Suriname still is strongly influenced by the Netherlands because most Surinamese have relatives living there and it is the largest supplier of development aid. Other emigration destinations include French Guiana and the United States. Suriname's immigration rules are flexible, and the country is easy to enter illegally because rainforests obscure its borders. Since the mid-1980s, Brazilians have settled in Suriname's capital, Paramaribo, or eastern Suriname, where they mine gold. This immigration is likely to slowly re-orient Suriname toward its Latin American roots.

Despite the start of oil production in 2003, 40% of Chad’s population lives
below the poverty line. The population will continue to grow rapidly because of
the country’s very high fertility rate and large youth cohort – more than 65% of
the populace is under the age of 25 – although the mortality rate is high and
life expectancy is low. Chad has the world’s third highest maternal mortality
rate. Among the primary risk factors are poverty, anemia, rural habitation, high
fertility, poor education, and a lack of access to family planning and obstetric
care. Impoverished, uneducated adolescents living in rural areas are most
affected. To improve women’s reproductive health and reduce fertility, Chad will
need to increase women’s educational attainment, job participation, and
knowledge of and access to family planning. Only about a quarter of women are
literate, less than 5% use contraceptives, and more than 40% undergo genital
cutting.
More than 300,000 refugees from Sudan and almost 70,000 from the Central African
Republic strain Chad’s limited resources and create tensions in host communities.
Thousands of new refugees fled to Chad in 2013 to escape worsening violence in
the Darfur region of Sudan. The large refugee populations are hesitant to return
to their home countries because of continued instability. Chad was relatively
stable in 2012 in comparison to other states in the region, but past fighting
between government forces and opposition groups and inter-communal violence have
left nearly 60,000 of its citizens displaced in the eastern part of the country.

Uruguay rates high for most development indicators and is known for its secularism, liberal social laws, and well-developed social security, health, and educational systems. It is one of the few countries in Latin America and the Caribbean where the entire population has access to clean water. Uruguay's provision of free primary through university education has contributed to the country's high levels of literacy and educational attainment. However, the emigration of human capital has diminished the state's return on its investment in education. Remittances from the roughly 18% of Uruguayans abroad amount to less than 1 percent of national GDP. The emigration of young adults and a low birth rate are causing Uruguay's population to age rapidly.

In the 1960s, Uruguayans for the first time emigrated en masse - primarily to Argentina and Brazil - because of economic decline and the onset of more than a decade of military dictatorship. Economic crises in the early 1980s and 2002 also triggered waves of emigration, but since 2002 more than 70% of Uruguayan emigrants have selected the US and Spain as destinations because of better job prospects. Uruguay had a tiny population upon its independence in 1828 and welcomed thousands of predominantly Italian and Spanish immigrants, but the country has not experienced large influxes of new arrivals since the aftermath of World War II. More recent immigrants include Peruvians and Arabs.

Social investment in Venezuela during the CHAVEZ administration reduced poverty from nearly 50 % in 1999 to about 27 % in 2011, increased school enrollment, substantially decreased infant and child mortality, and improved access to potable water and sanitation through social investment. "Missions" dedicated to education, nutrition, healthcare, and sanitation were funded through petroleum revenues. The sustainability of this progress remains questionable, however, as the continuation of these social programs depends on the prosperity of Venezuela's oil industry. In the long-term, education and health care spending may increase economic growth and reduce income inequality, but rising costs and the staffing of new health care jobs with foreigners are slowing development.

While CHAVEZ was in power, more than one million predominantly middle- and upper-class Venezuelans are estimated to have emigrated. The brain drain is attributed to a repressive political system, lack of economic opportunities, steep inflation, a high crime rate, and corruption. Thousands of oil engineers emigrated to Canada, Colombia, and the United States following CHAVEZ's firing of over 20,000 employees of the state-owned petroleum company during a 2002-2003 oil strike. Additionally, thousands of Venezuelans of European descent have taken up residence in their ancestral homelands. Nevertheless, Venezuela continues to attract immigrants from South America and southern Europe because of its lenient migration policy and the availability of education and health care. Venezuela also has been a fairly accommodating host to more than 200,000 Colombian refugees.

The Central African Republic’s (CAR) humanitarian
crisis has worsened since a coup in March 2013. CAR’s high mortality
rate and low life expectancy are attributed to elevated rates of
preventable and treatable diseases (including malaria and malnutrition),
an inadequate health care system, precarious food security, and armed
conflict. Some of the worst mortality rates are in western CAR’s diamond
mining region, which is impoverished because of government attempts to
control the diamond trade and the fall in industrial diamond prices. To
make matters worse, the government and international donors have reduced
health funding in recent years. The CAR’s weak educational system and
low literacy rate have also suffered as a result of the country’s
ongoing conflict. Schools are closed, qualified teachers are scarce,
infrastructure, funding, and supplies are lacking and subject to looting,
and many students and teachers are displaced by violence.
Rampant poverty, human rights violations, unemployment, poor
infrastructure, and a lack of security and stability have led to forced
displacement internally and externally. Since the political crisis that
resulted in CAR’s March 2013 coup began in December 2012, approximately
370,000 people have fled to Chad, the Democratic Republic of the Congo
(DRC), and other neighboring countries, while an estimated 385,000 are
displaced internally. The UN has urged countries to refrain from
repatriating CAR refugees amid the heightened lawlessness.