1

REPORT ON THE ELECTION CAMPAIGN FOR THE SECOND DUMA

NOVEMBER 4 (17)

Resolution
of the St. Petersburg and Moscow Committees, Polish Social-Democrats
and the
Latvians{5}

1.We have had to accept a struggle on the Duma basis only through the
fault of the treacherous bourgeoisie.

2.We must base the election campaign on opposition between
revolutionary and “peaceful” struggle, showing the great danger of Cadet
hegemony in the emancipation movement. Hence the question: is a bloc with
the Cadets (agreement at the first stage) admissible?

3.At the first stage, Social-Democracy must, as a general rule, act
independently; by way of exception—agreements at the first stage with the
parties recognising the constituent assembly, armed uprising, etc.; at the
second stage—agreements of a technical character, only for the
proportional distribution of mandates. There is nothing more dangerous than
to tell the masses: vote with us for the conciliators. Krushevan is
dangerous not because he has a seat in the Duma, but because he is a
particle of the Black-Hundred organisation supporting the government. For
the sake of small separate exceptions you support Cadet hegemony, thereby
upsetting the whole of our principled position (the Caucasus, Moscow,
St. Petersburg, Poland refuse to have agreements). If the Black-Hundred men
are returned, the Duma will simply be more violent. Why do you believe that
it is not the Cadets but the Social-Democrats who are to blame for a return
of the Black-Hundred men—in the event of a split in the vote?

First published in 1960 in Vol. 14 of the Fifth Russian edition of the Collected Works

Printed from the minutes

2

SUMMING-UP SPEECH ON THE REPORT ON THE ELECTION CAMPAIGN FOR THE SECOND
DUMA

NOVEMBER 4 (17)

Agreementat elections is a bloc (you tell the masses:
do ut
des{1}
).
We say: we sometimes go along with the revolutionary bourgeoisie, but never
with the opportunist and treacherous bourgeoisie. The election campaign
will proceed between two extremes: 400 Cadets + 100 Social-Democrats
(through agreement) and 200 Black-Hundred men + 250 Cadets + 20 or 50
Social-Democrats (without agreement). To put forward both an agent and a
fighter is to hit out at one’s own positions. The Black-Hundred men will be
defeat ed through agreements, but then the Social-Democrats will also be
defeated (morally).

First published in 1960 in Vol. 14 of the Fifth Russian edition of the Collected Works

Printed from the minutes

3

SPEECH IN THE DEBATE ON THE MENSHEVIK ELECTORAL PLATFORM

NOVEMBER 6 (19)

Ihave merely said that the platform contrasts
revolutionary and peaceful methods and nothing more, the rest being
unsatisfactory. Nothing is said about how the Social-Democrats differ from
other groups of “working people” (Socialist-Revolutionaries), as the
Social-Democratic group in the Duma does in its
declaration.{6} No distinction is made between scientific and vulgar
socialism.

Nothingis said about the need to distinguish between the proletariat’s
stand and that of the petty proprietor. The platform does not come out for
a bloc, but it is a bloc, because any petty bourgeois will subscribe to
it. In a platform
we cannot remain silent about the other parties, and this one says nothing
about them, apart from a vague indication: “more resolute”, etc.

First published in 1960 in Vol. 14 of the Fifth Russian edition of the Collected Works

Printed from the minutes

4

SPEECHES ON THE QUESTION OF CONVENING A “LABOUR CONGRESS”

NOVEMBER 7 (20)

1

Lenininsists that the question of a “labour congress” is a burning
one and should be discussed.

2

Leninpoints to the publication of letters by Plekhanov, Martov and
others in the bourgeois press, and to the fact that Kostrov, for instance,
failed to table in the Duma group the proposal on the demand for a Cadet
ministry (which came front the C.C.), thereby Committing a breach of Party
discipline, and a good thing too. The agitation for a “labour congress”
is used to put spokes in the wheels of our Party’s activity. We have the
C.C. organ, but no Central Organ, and why not? There is enough money, the
C.C. organ is published regularly, but there is no organisation, and that
is why there is no C.O.

First published in 1960 in Vol. 14 of the Fifth Russian edition of the Collected Works

Printed from the minutes

5

MINORITY OPINION ENTERED AT THE ALL-RUSSIA CONFERENCE OF THE R.S.D.L.P. ON
BEHALF OF THE SOCIAL-DEMOCRATIC DELEGATES OF POLAND, THE LATVIAN TERRITORY,
ST. PETERSBURG, MOSCOW, THE CENTRAL INDUSTRIAL REGION AND THE VOLGA AREA

TheBund delegates have tabled a resolution at the conference which
almost entirely repeats the resolution of the Bund’s Seventh Congress, and
which gives a historical
assessment of the Duma
boycott.{7} The undersigned delegates to the conference have abstained
in the voting on this resolution for the following reasons. It is wrong and
impossible to separate the question of why we go into the
Duma{8} from the question of how we get there. Recognition
that the boycott is correct means that the basic character of all our
tactics remains absolutely the same under the present participation in the
election as it was during the boycott of the First Duma. To recognise that
the Cadet majority of the First Duma was a hindrance to the activity of the
revolutionary elements, while endorsing agreements between the Cadets and
the Social-Democrats at the first stage of the elections is to have our
general premises beaten by our practical policies. To recognise and support
Cadet hegemony in agitation before the masses by putting up common
electoral rolls only to condemn this hegemony later in a special additional
resolution, is to compromise in the strongest possible way all the tactics
and all the principles of revolutionary Social-Democracy. Those are the
grounds on which we place before the entire R.S.D.L. Party the following
minority opinion.

“Thetactics of boycotting the State Duma, which helped the mass of
the people to form a correct opinion of the impotence and lack of
independence of that institution, found complete justification in the
farcical legislative activities of the State Duma and in its dissolution.

“Butthe counter-revolutionary behaviour of the bourgeoisie and the
compromising tactics of the Russian liberals prevented the immediate
success of the boycott and compelled the proletariat to take up the
struggle against the landlord and bourgeois counter-revolution also on the
basis of the Duma campaign.

“TheSocial-Democrats must wage this struggle outside the Duma and in
the Duma itself in order to develop the class-consciousness of the
proletariat, to further expose to the whole people the harmfulness of
constitutional illusions, and to develop the revolution.

“Inview of this state of affairs, and for the purposes mentioned
above, the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party must take a most
energetic part in the present Duma campaign.

“Theprincipal objects of the Social-Democratic election and Duma
campaigns are: firstly, to explain to the people the uselessness of the
Duma as a means of satisfying the demands of the proletariat and the
revolutionary petty bourgeoisie, especially the peasantry. Secondly, to
explain to the people the impossibility of achieving political liberty by
parliamentary methods as long as the real power remains in the hinds of the
tsar’s government, and to explain the necessity of an armed uprising, of a
provisional revolutionary government and of a constituent assembly elected
by universal, direct and equal suffrage by secret ballot. Thirdly, to
criticise the First Duma and reveal the bankruptcy of Russian liberalism,
and especially to show how dangerous and fatal it would be for the cause of
the revolution if the liberal-monarchist Cadet Party were to play the
predominant and leading role in the liberation movement.

“Asthe class party of the proletariat, the Social-Democratic Party
must remain absolutely independent through out the election and Duma
campaigns, and here, too, must under no circumstances merge its slogans or
tactics with those of any other opposition or revolutionary party.

“Therefore,at the first stage of the election campaign, i.e., before
the masses, it must as a general rule come out absolutely independently and
put forward only its own Party candidates.

“Exceptionsto this rule are permissible only in cases of extreme
necessity and only in relation to parties that fully accept the main
slogans of our immediate political struggle, i.e., those which recognise
the necessity of an armed uprising and are fighting for a democratic
republic. Such agreements, however, may only extend to the nomination of a
joint list of candidates, without in any way restricting the independence
of the political agitation carried on by the Social-Democrats.

“Inthe workers’ curia the Social-Democratic Party must come out
absolutely independently and refrain from entering into agreements with any
other party.

“Atthe higher stages of the election, i.e., at the assemblies of
electors in the towns and of delegates and electors in the countryside,
partial agreements may be entered into exclusively for the purpose of
distributing seats proportionately
to the number of votes cast for the parties entering the agreement. In this
connection, the Social-Democratic Party distinguishes the following main
types of bourgeois parties according to the consistency and determination
of their democratic views: (a) the Socialist-Revolutionaries, the Polish
Socialist Party and similar republican
parties[2]
;
(b) the Popular
Socialists{9} and the Trudoviks of a similar
type[3]
;
(c) the Cadets.”

Notes

[2]
Perhaps the Zionist
socialists{10} also come under this category. —Lenin

[3]
Perhaps including certain Jewish democrats. We are not competent to
judge of these matters without having the opinion of the Jewish
Social-Democrats. —Lenin

{4}The Second (First All-Russia) Congress of the
R.S.D.L.P. was held at Tammerfors from November 3 to 7 (16–20),
1906. It was attended by 32 delegates with vote: 11 from the Mensheviks, 7
from the Bund, 6 from the Bolsheviks, 5 from the Social-Democracy of the
Kingdom of Poland and Lithuania, and 3 from the Social-Democracy of the
Latvian Territory. Members of the Central Committee and the Central Organ
Editorial Board at tended with voice only.

TheMenshevik C.C. secured a majority for the Mensheviks by bringing in
a number of fictitious organisations, which enabled them to impose
Menshevik resolutions on some questions. By 18 votes (Mensheviks and
Bundists) to 14, the Conference adopted the Menshevik resolution “On the
R.S.D.L.P.’s Tactics in the Electoral Campaign”, which allowed blocs with
the Cadets. To counter this opportunist resolution, Lenin motioned, on
behalf of 14 delegates, a “Minority Opinion”, the Bolshevik platform for
the electoral campaign, which emphasised the need for the working-class
party to be organisationally and ideologically independent. It allowed for
the possibility of temporary agreements only with the Trudoviks and the
S.R.s as representing petty-bourgeois democracy (pp. 188–91). Lenin
criticised the Menshevik draft electoral platform, which the C.C. submitted
for approval by the Conference, and motioned a number of amendments. Under
Bolshevik pressure, the Conference adopted a resolution introducing the
amendments.

TheConference adopted a resolution “On Unity in the Electoral
Campaign in the Localities” with Lenin’s amendment, which put a curb on
the Menshevik C.C. in practising the tactics of setting up bloc with the
Cadets in the localities
(see present edition, Vol. 11, pp. 322–23).

Lenininsisted on the need for an emergency Party congress. The
Conference decided to call the next congress not later than March 15 (28),
1907. Although the Bolsheviks demanded a discussion of the question of a
“labour congress”, believing agitation for it to be a violation of Party
discipline, the Conference did not discuss the question, confining itself
to a compromise resolution, “On the Limits of the Agitation for a Labour
Congress”.

Therewas no time to discuss the questions of fighting the Black
Hundreds and the pogroms, or the partisan activity. The Conference
authorised the C.C. to issue a brief report on the Conference, containing
all the draft resolutions and minority opinions. But the Menshevik C.C., in
its organ, Sotsial-Demokrat, published only the Conference
resolutions, without the Bolsheviks’ “Minority Opinions”.

Leninanalysed and criticised the work of the Conference in his “Blocs
With the Cadets” and “Party Discipline and the Fight Against the
Pro-Cadet Social-Democrats”
(see present edition, Vol. 11, pp. 307–19 and 320–23).
p. 186

{5}
Lenin’s report was based on the Bolshevik resolution, later presented
at the Conference as a “Minority Opinion” on behalf of the delegates of
the Social-Democracy of Poland, the Latvian Territory, St. Petersburg,
Moscow, the Central Industrial Region and the Volga area (pp. 188–91).

TheSocial-Democracy of the Latvian Territory—until 1906,
the Latvian Social-Democratic Labour Party—was set up in June 1904 at the
party’s First Congress. At the Second L.S.D.L.P. Congress in June 1905, the
party adopted its programme. From 1905 to 1907, the L.S.D.L.P. guided the
revolutionary action by the workers. Lenin said that “during the
revolution the Lettish proletariat and the Lettish Social-Democratic Party
occupied one of the first and most important places in the struggle against
the autocracy and all the forces of the old order”
(see present edition, Vol. 16, p. 260).

Atthe Fourth (Unity) Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. in 1906, the
L.S.D.L.P. entered the R.S.D.L.P. as a territorial organisation, and after
the Congress was called the Social-Democracy of the Latvian Territory.
p. 186

{6}
A reference to the Bolshevik draft declaration by the Duma
Social-Democratic group, which was written by Lenin. Slightly abridged, it
is quoted by Lenin in his article “The Declaration of Our Group in the
Duma”
(see present edition, Vol. 11, pp. 32–37).
p. 187

{7}
A reference to the resolution “On Tactics” adopted by the Bund’s
Seventh Congress, which was held at the end of August and beginning of
September 1906.
p. 189

{8}The Second Duma met on February 20 (March 5), 1907. The
elections to the Duma were indirect and unequal, and were held in an
atmosphere of reprisals and trials by military tribunals. Still, the Second
Duma turned out to be more Leftist than the First, the reason being the
more distinct demarcation between the parties than in the First Duma
period, the growing class consciousness of the masses and the participation
of the Bolsheviks in the elections.

TheBolsheviks used the Duma as a rostrum for exposing tsarism and the
treacherous role of the counter-revolutionary bourgeoisie, for proclaiming
and propagandising the Party’s revolutionary programme, for releasing the
peasantry from the influence of the liberals and creating a revolutionary
bloc in the Duma of representatives of the working class and the
peasantry. This was an entirely new, revolutionary Marxist line of
behaviour for proletarian delegates to take in a parliamentary
institution. Mean while, the Mensheviks pursued the opportunist line of
supporting the Cadets.

Bymid-1907, when it became obvious that the workers and peasants
lacked the strength to defeat tsarism, the tsarist government decided to
disperse the Duma. On the night of June 2 (15), 1907, the Social-Democratic
group, in the Duma was arrested, and the Duma itself dissolved by the
tsar’s decree the following day.
p. 189

{10}Zionist socialists—members of the Zionist Socialist Labour
Party, a petty-bourgeois Jewish nationalist organisation formed in
1904. They believed the main task of the Jewish proletariat to be a
struggle for obtaining their own territory and establishing a national
state. They preached class co-operation with the Jewish bourgeoisie, strove
to isolate Jewish workers from the revolutionary movement of the Russian
and international proletariat, and tried to sow hostile feelings among the
workers of different nationalities. The nationalistic activity of the
Zionist socialists served to obscure the class consciousness of the Jewish
workers and did great harm to the working-class movement.

Afterthe February 1917 bourgeois-democratic revolution, the Zionist
Socialist Labour Party merged with the Socialist Jewish Labour Party
(S.J.L.P.) to form the United Jewish Socialist Labour Party.
p. 191

{9}Popular Socialists (P.S.)—members of the petty-bourgeois
Trudovik Popular Socialist Party which in 1906 split away from the Right
wing of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party (S.R.s). The Popular Socialists
favoured a bloc with the Cadets. Lenin used to call them “Social-Cadets”,
“philistine opportunists”, “S.R. Mensheviks”, vacillating between the
Cadets and the S.R.s, and emphasised that the party “differs very little
from the Cadets, for it deletes from its programme both republicanism and
the demand for all the land”
(see present edition, Vol. 11, p. 228).
It was headed by A. V. Peshekhonov, N. F. Annensky, V. A. Myakotin and
others.
p. 191