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Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression, Volume III
Translation of Document 004-PS
Copy
The Political Preparation of the Norway Action
(The enclosures mentioned in the report have been omitted
from this paper since they are only relative to specific
matters. The complete report including appendices has been
submitted to the Deputy of the Fuehrer by Reichsleiter
Rosenberg on 17 June 1940)
The Office of Foreign Relations [Aussenpolitisches Amt] of
[Page 20]
the National Socialist Party (NSDAP) has had contact with
Vidkun Quisling, leader of the Nasjonal Samling in Norway,
for years. The director of the "Office North" [Amt Norden]
of the office of Foreign Relations -- later victim of a
fatal accident -- paid him (Quisling) a personal visit on
one of his trips to Scandinavia.
When in 1939 the general political situation was beginning
to grow critical Quisling gave the Office of Foreign
Relations an estimate of the situation and his opinion about
the possible intentions of Great Britain with relation to
Scandinavia in case of conflict (Great Britain's) with the
German Reich. Prior to the convention of the Nordic
Association [Nordische Gesellschaft] in Luebeck, Quisling
was received by Reichsleiter Rosenberg in Berlin. He (
Quisling) pointed out the decisive geopolitical importance
of Norway in the Scandinavian region and the advantages
gained by the Power in control of the Norwegian coast in
case of conflict between the German Reich and Great Britain.
He further explained the extraordinarily clever, democratic
and particularly anglo-saxon propaganda which had been
accepted favourably by almost the entire nation, also
because of Norway's economic dependence on the seas and
therefore on England. Since he did not believe that the
small nations would remain neutral in case of conflict--as
had been the case in the World War of 1914 -- but was
convinced that they would become involved in one way or the
other he requested support for his party and press in
Norway, basing his request on the "pangermanic" ideology.
Reichsleiter Rosenberg also requested Director [Amtsleiter]
Scheidt to arrange a meeting between Quisling and his Deputy
Hagelin with State Secretary [Staatssekretaer] Koerner,
bearing in mind that this matter might be of particular
interest to General Field Marshall Goering with regard to
air strategy. This meeting with the State Secretary Koerner
did take place. At the same time Staff Director
[Stabsleiter] Schickedanz, directed by
Reichsleiter Rosenberg, submitted the attached memorandum to
Reich Minister and Chief of the Chancellery Reichsminister
und Chef der Reichskanzlei Lammers for the information of
the Fuehrer by the end of June 1939 (Enclosure No. 1).
After the Luebeck convention Director [Amtsleiter] Scheidt
took a vacation trip to Norway to further pursue this
matter. His observations are found in the attached report
(Enclosure No. 2). Even during his presence in Germany
Quisling had requested a short, pertinent training program
for reliable party functionaries especially selected by him.
This request was granted by
[Page 21]
Reichsleiter Rosenberg. In August 1939 a 14 day course was
held at the School of the Office for Foreign Relations of
the NSDAP [Aussenpolitisches Schulungshaus der NSDAP] in
Berlin for 25 followers of the Nasjonal Samling who had been
selected by Quisling.
In September Burgermeister Dr. Winkler revealed that he had
been charged with the financial aspects of Quisling's
request by General Field Marshal Goering through State
Secretary Koerner. The outbreak of war and the beginning of
the Polish campaign delayed the decisions (Enclosure No. 3).
A further reminder of Reichsleiter Rosenberg to General
Field Marshal Goering in the course of a talk about the
importance of Norway in connection with the matters set
forth originally by Quisling had no practical results.
At the same time political tension increased in Norway as
Russian activity made itself felt in the Baltic regions. Of
this Quisling kept the office (APA) informed through his
deputies in Germany. The outbreak of the Russo-Finnish war
at the end of November helped to further increase the anti-
German currents in all Scandinavia and played into the hands
of the anglo-saxon propaganda which was now building up to
full strength. Greater Germany was represented as a secret
ally of Soviet Russia and as the real culprit in Finland's
misfortune. At the same time the Western Powers promised
Finland military support which could only be supplied via
Norway and Sweden. The possibility of a plan by Great
Britain to occupy Norway and possibly Sweden to effectively
close the blockade against Greater Germany and further to
gain convenient air bases against Germany began to take
shape under the pretence of altruistic help to Finland. Its
aim was to involve also the Nordic Nations in a conflict
against Greater Germany. Quisling informed the office (APA)
about these new possibilities shaping on the political
scene, acting through his deputy in Germany.
As the activities of the Allies became more and more
noticeable in Norway Quisling again came to Germany to voice
his fears. He was received by Reichsleiter Rosenberg in the
early part of December and he again presented his ideas.
Firmly convinced that in the long run a genuinely neutral
position in the great conflict would become impossible for
the small nations and in his in faith in the victory of
Greater Germany in this conflict Which also was an
ideological one, Quisling considered it his duty. Supported
as he as by a small but determined minority-to tie Norway's
fate to that of a Greater Germany as the new centre of
[Page 22]
strength of a nordic-germanic life community.
We knew that his courageous group was the only pro-German
Party. His deputy in Germany, Hagelin, had also arranged for
a talk between Quisling and Grand Admiral Raeder which took
place about this time. During a report to the Fuehrer
Reichsleiter Rosenberg again mentioned Norway. He
particularly pointed out her importance in the case of
England deciding to occupy Norway with the tacit consent of
the Norwegian Government, for the purpose of strengthening
the blockade and under the pretence of help for Finland.
Grand Admiral Raeder, too, upon his request, was called to
the Fuehrer in connection with his talks with Quisling. As a
result of these steps Quisling was received by the Fuehrer
for personal instructions on the 16th of December and again
on the 18th of December. During this interview the Fuehrer
emphasized repeatedly that the most preferable attitude of
Norway as well as all of Scandinavia would be one of
complete neutrality. He lad no intentions to enlarge the
theatres of war to draw other nations into the conflict. If,
however, the enemy were preparing an enlargement of the
zones of war with the aim to further throttle and threaten
the Greater German Reich then, of course, he would be
obliged to arm against such steps. Then the Fuehrer promised
Quisling financial support for his movement based on the
pangermanic ideology and for the purpose of combatting the
increasing enemy propaganda. The military matters of the
questions were now transferred to a special military staff
which assigned special missions to Quisling and heard his
opinions (Encl. No. 29). The political treatment was to be
handled by Reichsleiter Rosenberg, expenses were to be
carried by the Foreign Office Auswaertiges Amt and
Reichsminister for Foreign Affairs [Reichsminister vom
Aussenpolitischen Amt] was to be kept informed at all times.
Maintenance of liaison with Quisling was assigned to
Director [Amtsleiter] Scheidt who, as matters developed
further, was attached to the Naval Attache in Oslo,
Commander [Korvettenkapitaen] Schreiber. Strictest secrecy
was ordered for the entire matter.
Then, in January, during a conference between Reichsleiter
Rosenberg and Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop it was decided
to appropriate to Quisling an initial sum of 200000
Goldmark. This money was to be taken to Oslo, in two
installments, by the liaison agent Scheidt where it was to
be handed to Quisling. In the Foreign Office [Auswaertiges
Amt] Privy Councilor [Geheimrat] Von Grundherr was the only
one to be told of this arrangement (Encl. No. 3).
[Page 23]
As shown in the attached documentary memoranda Quisling's
reports transmitted by his deputy in Germany Hagelin
concerning the possibility of active intervention of the
Western Powers in Norway with consent of the Norwegian
Government became more and more alarming. These reports
continuously supplemented with more and more accurate
confirmations by Quisling's confidants were in certain
contrast with the opinions of the German Legation in Oslo.
The Legation believed in the neutral intentions of the
Norwegian Government of that time, the Nygardsvold, and was
further convinced that the Government would take arms in
defence of its neutrality policy. The Foreign Office
[Auswaertiges Amt] held the same opinion as is shown in the
attached documentary memorandum dated January 8 which is the
result of a talk between Director [Amtsleiter] Scheidt and
Privy Councilor [Geheimrat] Von Grundherr (Encl. 8). It is
of special interest that Hagelin, Quisling's Deputy in
Germany, whose intimate connection with Quisling was not
known in Norway succeeded in getting a foothold in the
circles of the Nygardsvold Government. Thus he heard the
uncolored opinions of the members of the Government who
conducted themselves like a secret Norwegian-Anglophile
society.
In the documentary memorandum of January 13 he relates the
opinions expressed to him by two Norwegian Ministers. The
gist of the opinions was that Germany had already lost the
war and that Norway-if only because of its large Merchant
Marine-could not do other than favour England in her
politics, in war even more so than in peace. And further
that the entire nations agreed with this policy (Encl. 9).
During the night of February 16 to 17 the English raided the
"Altmark" in the Joessingsfjord. The reaction of the
Norwegian Government to the Altmark-affair seemed to
indicate that certain secret arrangements had been made
between the Norwegian Government and the Allies. This was
further emphasized in Director Scheidt's consolidated report
covering January 20th to February 20th (Encl. No. 11) after
he had received Hagelin's report. Hagelin had overheard the
conversation between two members of the Storting during
which one member said to the other that the actions of the
two commanders of the Norwegian torpedo boats had been a
"prearranged affair The same report also refers to the
English demands for air bases in Norway and for freedom of
trade in the Norwegian Waters It goes on to say that
although the Norwegian Government refused those demands it
was agreed that violations by the English would be answered
with paper protests only. Such re-
[Page 24]
ports, and confirmations thereto were time and again
supplied through Quisling. In complete contrast to those
opinions the German Legation, even after the Altmark Affair,
relied fully upon the good will of the Norwegians. The
Ambassador cited the signing of the Norwegian-German trade
agreement as weighing heavily in favour of his point of
view. He already considered the Norwegian Government
Nygardsvold somewhat dependent on the Greater German Reich
(Encl. Nos. 11 and 12). All these reports were currently
submitted to the Fuehrer by Reichsleiter Rosenberg. Quisling
always emphasised that more than 90% of the country was
behind England and that he only represented a minority
which, however, was chosen by virtue of its intuition to
take charge later on as representatives of a new Norwegian
nation.
Apart from financial support which was forthcoming from the
Reich in currency, Quisling had also been promised a
shipment of material for immediate use in Norway such as
coal and sugar. Additional help was promised. The shipments
were to be conducted under cover of a new Trade Company to
be established in Germany or through especially selected
existing firms while Hagelin was to act as consignee in
Norway. Hagelin had already conferred with the respective
Ministers of the Nygardsvold Government as for instance the
Minister of Supply and Commerce [Versorgungs-und
Handelsminister] and had been assured permission for the
import of coal. At the same time the coal transports were to
serve possibly to supply the technical means necessary to
launch Quisling's political action in Oslo with German help.
It was Quisling's plan to send a number of selected,
particularly reliable men to Germany for a brief military
training course in a completely isolated camp. They were
then to be detailed as area and language specialists to
German Special Troops who were to be taken to Oslo on the
coal barges to accomplish a political action. Thus Quisling
planned to get hold of his leading opponents in Norway
including the King, to prevent all military resistance from
the very beginning. Immediately following this political
action and upon an official request of Quisling to the
Government of the German Reich the military occupation of
Norway was to take place. All military preparations were to
be completed previously. Though this plan contained the
great advantage of surprise it also contained a great number
of dangers which could possibly cause its failure. For this
reason it received a quite dilatory treatment while, at the
same time, it was not disapproved as far as the Norwegians
were concerned.
[Page 25]
In February, after a conference with General Field Marshal
Goering, Reichsleiter Rosenberg informed the Secretary in
the Office of the Four Year Plan [Ministerialdirektor im
Vierjahresplan] Wohlthat only of the intention to prepare
coal shipments to Norway to the named confidant Hagelin.
Further details were discussed in a conference between
Secretary Wohlthat, Staff Director Schickedanz and Hagelin.
Since Wohlthat received no further instructions from the
General Field Marshal, Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop-after
a consultation with Reichsleiter Rosenberg-consented to
expedite these shipments through his office. Based on a
report of Reichsleiter Rosenberg to the Fuehrer it was also
arranged to pay Quisling ten thousand English pounds per
month for three months commencing on the 15th of March to
support his work. This money was to be paid through liaison
agent Scheidt.
Meanwhile Hagelin, through his connection in Norway as
trusted agent of the Norwegian Navy, had been commissioned
with the purchase of German AA-guns (Flaks) through the
German Navy Ministry. Through this connection he gained more
and more insight into the actual ideas and intentions of the
Norwegian Nygardsvold Government and into the Allied
preparations which had already started in Norway. While in
Germany on the 20th of March to attend conferences regarding
the delivery of the German AA guns, he made a detailed
report about the increasing activities of the Allies in
Norway, tolerated by the Nygardsvold Government. According
to his reports the Allies were already checking the
Norwegian coastal towns for landing and transport
possibilities. He also stated that the French Commandant
Kermarrec who was charged with this reconnaissance had a
confidential talk with Colonel Sunolo, Commandant of Narvik,
who is a follower of Quisling; during the course of the talk
he told him of the Allied intentions to land motorized
troops in Stavanger, Dronthoim and possibly also at Kirkenes
and to occupy the airport at Sola (Encl. no. 14)
At the same time Hagelin increased his oral and written
warnings regarding the confidential agreements between the
Allied and the Norwegian Governments stipulating that in
case of an Allied occupation of coastal towns the Norwegian
Government would not go beyond paper protest, as was the
case in the Altmark Affair. And again, in his report of
March 26 (Encl Nos 15 and 16) he pointed out that the speech
of the Norwegian Foreign Minister Koht dealing with
Norwegian neutrality and containing some protests was not
being taken seriously either in London by the English nor in
Norway by the Norwegians. It
[Page 26]
was well known that the Government had no intentions to take
a stand against England. However, to keep up appearances
towards Germany up to the last minute the Norwegian
Government intended to issue an order to fire. This was to
demonstrate that everything within their power had been
done. There was a continuous series of conferences between
the King, the Commanding Admiral, the Crown Prince and the
newly appointed Minister of War Ljundberg who had been
placed in office at the special request of England as early
as January. A person close to the King as well as the
commanding Admiral explained to Hagelin that the above
mentioned actions by England were quite unavoidable since
she knew that she could only win the war if she were in
control of the Norwegian ports. Furthermore England feared a
German counterblow which was not to be allowed to
materialize. The Norwegian Government was also notified by
London that Germany intended to mine the waters between
Jutland and the Norwegian coast. Based on a message from
England this plan was revealed on or about March 15 during a
secret session of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the
Storting by Foreign Minister Koht. As a matter of fact,
during the course of the military preparations for the
occupation of Norway this plan had been adopted by the
German military authorities and to this day it is a mystery
how this plan got to London. In view of all this news
Quisling could no longer back his earlier advice to continue
watching the development of the situation in Norway. He now
had to point out that any further delay would mean a grave
risk. The above was probably the most decisive report ever
to be submitted here by Hagelin. Reichsleiter Rosenberg
immediately transmitted it to the Fuehrer (Encl. No. 15).
While still in Berlin Hagelin was requested by Colonel
Schmundt to make speedy arrangements for a conference
between Quisling and a Colonel of the General Staff, at some
neutral location. This conference was held in Copenhagen in
the beginning of April.
In confirmation of all this information coming from Quisling
and his confidants and in contrast to the opinion held up to
the end by German Legation in Oslo and by the Foreign
Office, the Allies, on April 8th. initiated their first
major blow as an introduction to their intended occupation
of Norway. During the night from the 7th. to the 8th. Of
April they mined the Norwegian coast and made public
announcement of this act. Norway's reaction, consistent with
the reports always received by the Office of Foreign
Relations [Aussenpolitisches Amt] of the NSDAP, was nothing
more than protests on paper growing weaker by
[Page 27]
the hour. Then, after proper preparations and by command of
the Fuehrer Greater Germany undertook the counterblow in the
morning of April 9th. and occupied the most important
Norwegian airfields and seaports.
Reports about the further political developments in Norway
proper are found in the appended documentary memorandum
(Encl. Nos. 18 to 30).
After the success of the occupational operations in Norway
seemed assured the Fuehrer called for Reichsleiter Rosenberg
for a short talk before lunch, on April 25th. He oriented
him (Rosenberg) about the developments of the military
action in Norway where the English Auxiliary Corps had just
suffered a decisive defeat combined with the capture of
important documents and plans. He further revealed to
Reichsleiter Rosenberg that he had based this most daring
decision which was now approaching successful completion on
the continuous warnings of Quisling as reported to him by
Reichsleiter Rosenberg. And that it actually happened in the
Drontheimfjord that behind the stern of the last German
Troop Transport there appeared the bow of the first English
destroyer which convoyed the Allied Troop Transport fleet.
This destroyer was wiped out by the German Navy.
Berlin, 15 June 1940

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