CIVIL DEFENSE: THE TRUMAN ADMINISTRATION:
United States. 1945-1952. One of President Truman's early actions in 1945 was to
complete the drawdown of civil defense as the progress of World War II made
attack on North America increasingly unlikely. In the absence of a threat, Executive Order 9562 disestablished the Office
of Civilian Defense, an action consistent with a series of other terminations of
wartime offices.

Early post-war examinations of civil defense roles in the Truman administration
set the policy course for the future development of civil defense. Although the
United States Strategic Bombing Survey reported in 1946 that wartime civil
defense measures in Germany and Japan had had an impact on national survival and
called for national efforts to minimize the effect of any future attacks on the
United States, this was a minority view. The War Department Civil Defense Board,
directed by Major General Harold R. Bull, released the Bull Report in 1947
advocating that civil defense was properly a civilian, not military,
responsibility, and that this responsibility was best fulfilled as self-help by
individuals and local organizations. This view was mirrored in the National
Security Resources Boardís handbook on civil defense published in 1950; it
assigned responsibility to individuals and local governments. This view of very
limited Federal government responsibility for passive, civilian protection of
its citizens remains a persistent theme for the entire history of civil defense
and emergency management, and is in stark contrast with the Federal governmentís
perception of the importance of the active, military defense of the nation.

As a result, President Truman took no action to reactivate a Federal civil
defense program beyond the level of supporting planning for future crises.
Truman believed civil defense was a state and local responsibility, even though
there was interest from these levels of government in Federal leadership.
Limited defense budgets meant that the armed services had little interest in
taking on additional responsibilities, and there was a widespread perception
that the Soviet Union would not pose a nuclear threat until 1953 at the
earliest.

The events of 1949-1950 changed all this. The first detonation of a Soviet
nuclear device in August 1949 set the stage. In response, President
Truman established the Federal Civil Defense Administration in December 1949.
This was followed in June 1950 by the start of the Korean War, and in November
1950 by intervention by forces of the Chinese Peoples Liberation Army. In
this environment the invasion of Korea was seen as a possible diversion to be
followed by an attack on Europe and the United States. In response
Congress passed two key pieces of legislation. The Federal Civil Defense Act of
1950 provided the statutory authority for the Federal Civil Defense
Administration; the Defense Production Act established the basis for dispersal
of the industrial base. The key provisions of the Federal Civil Defense Act
included authority for planning, sheltering, and evacuation and support to
states and localities with planning, technical guidance and assistance,
training, and fifty-fifty matching grants for equipment.

To meet this mandate, the Federal Civil Defense Administration projected a $3
billion Civil Defense program, and the first budget request for $403 million was
submitted to Congress in March 1951. Of this, $250 million was programmed to
initiate a shelter program to identify existing shelters, upgrade potential
shelters, and construct new shelters in target areas identified by the
Department of Defense and the Federal Civil Defense Administration.

In a clear precursor to the fate of future Civil Defense budgets, Congress cut
the 1951 request to $31.75 million. To some degree, this cut may have resulted
from the failure of the Soviets to attempt to capitalize in Europe on the
commitment of United States military forces in Korea. However, significant
internal issues in the Civil Defense program may have been more important.
Federal initiatives faced stiff opposition in the Appropriations Committees
(especially from Clarence Cannon and Albert Thomas of the House Appropriations
Committee) based both on philosophical and legal grounds. Because the Federal
Civil Defense Act of 1950 fixed primary responsibility for Civil Defense on
states and localities, Representatives and Senators argued that the federal
responsibilities did not include paying for large acquisition and construction
programs.

At the same time Civil Defense may not have been well served by its leadership
and the lack of technical and programmatic expertise of its staff. Administrator
Millard Caldwell lacked a Civil Defense background and
is reported to have had some difficulty in
working effectively with legislators, a surprising situation given his prior
service as a Congressman and Governor. An initial estimate of $300 billion to
provide a nationwide system of deep shelters to protect the entire population
rapidly changed from a hypothetical comprehensive solution into the adequate
solution. As a result, Congressional leaders had difficulty envisioning how
commitments in the millions of dollars range would have a measurable
impact on the overall population protection problem. The disconnect between the
perfect solution, what was possible, and the perception of how annual programs
contributed to meeting either was to bedevil Civil Defense programs for the next
three decades.

Even when debate focused on the actual proposed $250 million program for the
first year, the results were no better. Federal Civil Defense
Administration staffers suggested a varied and confusing range of shelter
programs: large underground community shelters, family shelter subsidies,
dual-use shelter subsidies, and surveys and upgrades of existing shelters.
Administration staff could not describe how they arrived at the projected budget
request, for what the money would be used, or the operational benefit in terms
of lives saved. The lack of a focused and supported approach made even
Congressional advocates, including Estes Kefauver and Brien McMahon, ineffective
in their efforts to develop reasonable compromises in an environment that
focused on economy and a balanced budget.

The Federal Civil Defense Administration and Congress rapidly reached an
impasse. Although the first year of operations of any new governmental program
is potentially subject to a steep learning curve, the poor program definition
and lack of internal coordination created an impression of ineffective program
management and intransigence that influenced the effectiveness of Civil Defense
for years to come. This intransigence and the failure to learn from experience
were clear when the same budget request came back to Congress each year for the
next two years, to meet the same fate, with average annual budgets of $50
million being approved.

President Truman supported the efforts of the Federal Civil Defense
Administration, and forwarded their budget requests as submitted each year.
However, the Civil Defense budget never reached the level of priority needed to
receive significant Presidential efforts to ensure its passage.

Sources: Blanchard, B. Wayne, American Civil Defense 1945-1984: The Evolution
of Programs and Policies, Washington, District of Columbia, United States of
America, U. S. Government Printing Office, 1986. Vale, Lawrence J., The Limits
of Civil Defence in the USA, Switzerland, Britain and the Soviet Union, New
York, New York, United States of America, St. Martinís Press, 1987.