The Civil War

The spark that ignited the war occurred in Beirut on April 13, 1975,
when gunmen killed four Phalangists during an attempt on Pierre
Jumayyil's life. Perhaps believing the assassins to have been
Palestinian, the Phalangists retaliated later that day by attacking a
bus carrying Palestinian passengers across a Christian neighborhood,
killing about twenty-six of the occupants. The next day fighting erupted
in earnest, with Phalangists pitted against Palestinian militiamen
(thought by some observers to be from the Popular Front for the
Liberation of Palestine). The confessional layout of Beirut's various
quarters facilitated random killing. Most Beirutis stayed inside their
homes during these early days of battle, and few imagined that the
street fighting they were witnessing was the beginning of a war that was
to devastate their city and divide the country.

Despite the urgent need to control the fighting, the political
machinery of the government became paralyzed over the next few months.
The inadequacies of the political system, which the 1943 National Pact
had only papered over temporarily, reappeared more clearly than ever.
For many observers, at the bottom of the conflict was the issue of
confessionalism out of balance--of a minority, specifically the
Maronites, refusing to share power and economic opportunity with the
Muslim majority.

The government could not act effectively because leaders were unable
to agree on whether or not to use the army to stop the bloodletting.
When Jumblatt and his leftist supporters tried to isolate the
Phalangists politically, other Christian sects rallied to Jumayyil's
camp, creating a further rift. Consequently, in May Prime Minister
Rashid as Sulh and his cabinet resigned, and a new government was formed
under Rashid Karami. Although there were many calls for his resignation,
President Franjiyah steadfastly retained his office.

As various other groups took sides, the fighting spread to other
areas of the country, forcing residents in towns with mixed sectarian
populations to seek safety in regions where their sect was dominant.
Even so, the militias became embroiled in a pattern of attack followed
by retaliation, including acts against uninvolved civilians.

Although the two warring factions were often characterized as
Christian versus Muslim, their individual composition was far more
complex. Those in favor of maintaining the status quo came to be known
as the Lebanese Front. The groups included primarily the Maronite
militias of the Jumayyil, Shamun, and Franjiyah clans, often led by the
sons of zuama. Also in this camp were various militias of
Maronite religious orders. The side seeking change, usually referred to
as the Lebanese National Movement, was far less cohesive and organized.
For the most part it was led by Kamal Jumblatt and included a variety of
militias from leftist organizations and guerrillas from rejectionist
Palestinian (nonmainstream PLO) organizations.

By the end of 1975, no side held a decisive military advantage, but
it was generally acknowledged that the Lebanese Front had done less well
than expected against the disorganized Lebanese National Movement. The
political hierarchy, composed of the old zuama and politicians,
still was incapable of maintaining peace, except for occasional,
short-lived cease-fires. Reform was discussed, but little headway was
made toward any significant improvements. Syria, which was deeply
concerned about the flow of events in Lebanon, also proved powerless to
enforce calm through diplomatic means. And, most ominous of all, the
Lebanese Army, which generally had stayed out of the strife, began to
show signs of factionalizing and threatened to bring its heavy weaponry
to bear on the conflict.

Syrian diplomatic involvement grew during 1976, but it had little
success in restoring order in the first half of the year. In January it
organized a cease-fire and set up the High Military Committee, through
which it negotiated with all sides. These negotiations, however, were
complicated by other events, especially Lebanese Front-Palestinian
confrontations. That month the Lebanese Front began a siege of Tall
Zatar, a densely populated Palestinian refugee camp in East Beirut; the
Lebanese Front also overran and leveled Karantina, a Muslim quarter in
East Beirut. These actions finally brought the main forces of the PLO,
the Palestine Liberation Army (PLA), into the battle. Together, the PLA
and the Lebanese National Movement took the town of Ad Damur, a Shamun
stronghold about seventeen kilometers south of Beirut.

In spite of these setbacks, through Syria's good offices, compromises
were achieved. On February 14, 1976, in what was considered a political
breakthrough, Syria helped negotiate a seventeen-point reform program
known as the Constitutional Document. Yet by March this progress was
derailed by the disintegration of the Lebanese Army. In that month
dissident Muslim troops, led by Lieutenant Ahmad Khatib, mutinied,
creating the Lebanese Arab Army. Joining the Lebanese National Movement,
they made significant penetrations into Christian-held Beirut and
launched an attack on the presidential palace, forcing Franjiyah to flee
to Mount Lebanon.

Continuing its search for a domestic political settlement to the war,
in May the Chamber of Deputies elected Ilyas Sarkis to take over as
president when Franjiyah's term expired in September. But Sarkis had
strong backing from Syria and, as a consequence, was unacceptable to
Jumblatt, who was known to be antipathetic to Syrian president Hafiz al
Assad and who insisted on a "military solution." Accordingly,
the Lebanese National Movement successfully pressed assaults on Mount
Lebanon and other Christian-controlled areas.

As Lebanese Front fortunes declined, two outcomes seemed likely: the
establishment in Mount Lebanon of an independent Christian state, viewed
as a "second Israel" by some; or, if the Lebanese National
Movement won the war, the creation of a radical, hostile state on
Syria's western border. Neither of these possibilities was viewed as
acceptable to Assad. To prevent either scenario, at the end of May 1976
Syria intervened militarily against the Lebanese National Movement,
hoping to end the fighting swiftly. This decision, however, proved ill
conceived, as Syrian forces met heavy resistance and suffered many
casualties. Moreover, by entering the conflict on the Christian side
Syria provoked outrage from much of the Arab world.

Despite, or perhaps as a result of, these military and diplomatic
failures, in late July Syria decided to quell the resistance. A drive
was launched against Lebanese National Movement strongholds that was far
more successful than earlier battles; within two weeks the opposition
was almost subdued. Rather than crush the resistance altogether, at this
time Syria chose to participate in an Arab peace conference held in
Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, on October 16, 1976.

The Riyadh Conference, followed by an Arab League meeting in Cairo
also in October 1976, formally ended the Lebanese Civil War; although
the underlying causes were in no way eliminated, the fullscale warfare
stopped. Syria's presence in Lebanon was legitimated by the
establishment of the Arab Deterrent Force (ADF) by the Arab League in
October 1976. In January 1977 the ADF consisted of 30,000 men, of whom
27,000 were Syrian. The remainder were token contingents from Saudi
Arabia, the small Persian Gulf states, and Sudan; Libya had withdrawn
its small force in late 1976. Because of his difficulties in reforming
the Lebanese Army, President Sarkis, the ADF's nominal commander,
requested renewal of the ADF's mandate a number of times.

Thus, after more than one and one-half years of devastation, relative
calm returned to Lebanon. Although the exact cost of the war will never
be known, deaths may have approached 44,000, with about 180,000 wounded;
many thousands of others were displaced or left homeless, or had
migrated. Much of the once-magnificent city of Beirut was reduced to
rubble and the town divided into Muslim and Christian sectors, separated
by the so-called.