For the facts of this case see the principal judgment,
Loizidou
v. Turkey, reported at (1997) 23 E.H.R.R. 513.

The Law

19. Article 50 provides as follows:
If the Court finds that a decision or a measure taken by a legal authority or
any other authority of a High Contracting Party is completely or partially in
conflict with the obligations arising from the ... Convention, and if the
internal law of the said Party allows only partial reparation to be made for the
consequences of this decision or measure, the decision of the Court shall, if
necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.
20. The applicant and the Cypriot Government submitted that an award of
compensation should be made in the present case in the light of the Court's
finding of a violation of her property rights. In the course of the hearing
before the Court the applicant withdrew a claim, which had been made in her
memorial for the restoration of her rights.
The Turkish Government, on the other hand, submitted that there was no
entitlement to just satisfaction.

I. Entitlement to just satisfaction

21. In the submission of the Turkish Government it cannot be held liable in
international law for the acts of the "Turkish Republic of Northern
Cyprus". There is no legal basis for holding Turkey liable as it is well
settled in international law that the first condition that has to be satisfied
for a State to incur liability is that the unlawful act or conduct is
attributable to the State on whose behalf the perpetrator of the unlawful act or
conduct was acting.
Regard should be had to the fact that the Commission has accepted, even in cases
where the allegedly unlawful act resulted directly from the actions of a
national authority, that a national authority cannot incur liability where
jurisdiction in the relevant sphere has been transferred to an international organization
(see M. and Co. v. Germany, D.R. 64, page 139).
Any power that Turkey has in Cyprus is derived from the Zürich and London
Agreements of 1959 and the treaties signed in 1960, which remain in force.
Subsequent agreements or texts (such as the Geneva Declaration of 30 August
1974, the "ten-point" agreement of 1979 or the Set of Ideas of 1992)
have not conferred any new responsibilities on Turkey. The activity complained
of, in other words the alleged unlawful act, must result directly from an act
attributable to the State, whether it be an administrative act, an act of the
military authorities, of the legislature or of the judiciary. There is no case
where a third-party State has been held liable for the acts of another State--
whether or not such State is recognized--which exercises effective authority
through constitutionally established organs.
It would therefore be incompatible with principles of international law to award
compensation against Turkey.
In addition, the Turkish Government stressed that the question of property
rights and reciprocal compensation is the very crux of the conflict in Cyprus.
These issues can only be settled through negotiations and on the basis of
already agreed principles of bi-zonality and bi-communality. Inevitably the
principle of bi-zonality will involve an exchange of Turkish Cypriot properties
in the south with Greek Cypriot properties in the north and, if need be, the
payment of compensation for any difference. An award under Article 50 would
undermine the negotiations between the two communities and would spoil the
efforts to reach a settlement on the basis of agreed principles and criteria.
In conclusion, it was submitted that compensation was not "necessary"
under the terms of Article 50. Moreover the claim should be disallowed on the
basis that this provision requires that the "decision" or
"measure" involved be that of a "High Contracting Party".
For the reasons given above that was not the situation in the present case.
22. The applicant pointed out that the Court's principal judgment on the
merits had established that there was a continuous breach of Article 1 of
Protocol No. 1 which was imputable to Turkey. In accordance with the principle ubi
ius ibi remedium it was necessary to make an award to ensure that the
applicant was not left without a remedy.
23. The Cypriot Government emphasized that Article 50 proceedings do not
constitute an appeal from the Court's judgments on the preliminary objections
and the merits. It was not open to those appearing before the Court to seek to
re-litigate issues upon which the Court had already decided. Article 50 was
applicable in the present case since no reparation had been made by the Turkish
Government in respect of the violation of the applicant's property rights.

24. The Delegate of the Commission also maintained that
the applicant should receive just satisfaction. The fact that political efforts
were being made to resolve the "Cyprus problem" was not a valid reason
for refusing to make an award.

25.
The Court recalls its finding in paragraph 57 of its principal judgment on the
merits in the present case "that the continuous denial of the applicant's
access to her property in northern Cyprus and the ensuing loss of all control
over the property is a matter which falls within Turkey's
"jurisdiction" within the meaning of Article 1 and is thus imputable
to Turkey".The
Court also found that the applicant must be regarded to have remained the legal
owner of the land for purposes of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 and that "as
a consequence of the fact that [she] has been refused access to the land since
1974, she has effectively lost all control as well as all possibilities to use
and enjoy her property" (ibid., paragraph 63). It concluded that the
continuous denial of access to her property was an unjustified interference with
her property rights in breach of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (ibid.,
paragraph 64).

26. In view of the above the Court is of the opinion that
the question of Turkey's responsibility under the Convention in respect of the
matters complained of is res judicata. It considers that it should make
an award under Article 50. It is not persuaded by the argument that in doing so
it would undermine political discussions concerning the Cyprus problem any more
than it was by the same argument at the merits stage as regards finding a
violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (paragraphs 59 and 64).
That being the case the Court finds that the applicant is entitled under
Article 50 to a measure of just satisfaction by way of compensation for the
violation of her property rights.

II. Pecuniary damage

27. The applicant stressed that she did not claim compensation for any
purported expropriation of her property. In the light of the Court's
finding that she is still the legal owner of the property no issue of
expropriation arises. Her claim is thus confined to the loss of use of the
land and the consequent lost opportunity to develop or lease it. With
reference to a Valuation Report assessing the value of her property and the
return that could be expected from it, she claimed 621,900 Cypriot pounds (CYP)
by way of pecuniary damage concerning the period between 22 January 1990, the
date of the acceptance by Turkey of the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court,
and the end of 1997.The method employed by the Valuation Report involved calculating the
market price of the property as at 1974 and increasing it by 12 per cent per
year to calculate the value that the property would have had if the northern
part of Cyprus had not been occupied by the Turkish army. It was emphasized that
the property was situated in an area of Kyrenia, which in 1974 had been
undergoing intensive residential and tourist development. The occupation of the
properties had deprived the owner of her right to lease and thus resulted in a
substantial loss of rent.
The sum claimed by way of pecuniary damage represented the aggregate of ground
rents that could have been collected during the period of 1990-97 calculated as
6 per cent of the estimated market value of the property for each of the years
in question.
28. The Cypriot Government supported the applicant's claim. In particular it
contended that Turkey's continued unlawful occupation of part of the Republic of
Cyprus should not be used as a reason to reduce the amount awarded by way of
pecuniary damage. To do so would be to permit a wrongdoer to benefit from his
wrongdoing since the violation of the Convention found in the present case arose
as a consequence of the unlawful invasion and occupation of part of the island
by Turkey.
29. The Turkish Government maintained that the claim for damage should not be
entertained by the Court for the reasons set out above (see paragraph 21 above).
It did not offer any comments on the amount claimed by the applicant under this
head.

30. The Delegate of the Commission submitted that the
valuer's opinion on the development potential of the land which had been
prepared on the applicant's behalf did not provide a realistic basis for the
assessment of the pecuniary damage. The historical events in Cyprus affected not
only the applicant individually but numerous other people in a similar
situation. They could not therefore be completely disregarded. The applicant was
entitled to be fully compensated for loss of access to and control of her
property but not for the diminished value of that property due to the general
political situation. In his view CYP 100,000 would be a more appropriate award.

31. The Court recalls that the applicant is still the
legal owner of nine plots of land and one apartment and that its finding of a
violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 was based on the fact that, as a
consequence of being denied access to her land since 1974, she had effectively
lost all control as well as all possibilities to use and enjoy her property (see
the principal judgment cited above, paragraphs 60-64). She is therefore entitled
to a measure of compensation in respect of losses directly related to this
violation of her rights as from the date of Turkey's acceptance of the
compulsory jurisdiction of the Court, namely 22 January 1990, until the present
time.

32. Although the Turkish Government has limited its
submissions to contesting the applicant's right to compensation and has thus not
sought to challenge the applicant's approach to the calculation of her economic
loss, the Court does not for this reason alone accept without question the
estimates provided by the applicant.
33. In this regard the Court considers as reasonable the general approach to
assessing the loss suffered by the applicant with reference to the annual ground
rent, calculated as a percentage of the market value of the property, that could
have been earned on the properties during the relevant period.
However, the applicant's valuation inevitably involves a significant degree of
speculation due to the absence of real data with which to make a comparison and
makes insufficient allowance for the volatility of the property market and its
susceptibility to influences both domestic and international. Her method of
assessment pre-supposes that property prices in the Kyrenia area would have
risen consistently by 12 per cent each year from 1974 until 1997 and that the
applicant would have actually sought to or have been able to rent her plots of
land at 6 per cent of this enhanced value. Even making allowances for the
undoubted development potential of the area in which the land is situated, the
presumption that the property market would have continued to flourish with
sustained growth over a period of 23 years is open to question. The Court
accordingly cannot accept these percentage increases as a realistic basis for
calculating the applicant's loss.34.
Taking into account the abovementioned uncertainties, inherent in any attempt to
quantify the real losses incurred by the applicant, and making an assessment on
an equitable basis the Court decides to award CYP 300,000 under this head.

III. Non-pecuniary damage

35. The applicant also claimed CYP 621,900 in respect of non-pecuniary
damage. She contended that various aggravating factors directly concerning
her should be taken into account in the Court's assessment. These encompassed
distress and feelings of frustration in face of the prolonged deprivation of her
rights as well as feelings of helplessness connected to the presence of the
Turkish army in northern Cyprus and her unsuccessful efforts to have the
property returned to her. It also had to be borne in mind that the applicant had
grown up in Kyrenia where her family had lived for generations and was now a
displaced person in her own country. The fact that the Turkish Government had
not sought to provide any justification for the interference with her property
rights was a further aggravating factor to be taken into account.
In the applicant's submission there were also factors related to
considerations of the public interest and the public order of Europe. In
addition to the obligation to compensate there was in the present situation a
need for a large award of non-pecuniary damages to act as an inducement to
observe the legal standards set out in the Convention. The slowness and
depressing effects of the procedural pathways open to the applicant, the
dilatory attitude of the respondent Government and the various unfounded
objections raised by it throughout the procedure also had to be taken into
account.
A further aggravating factor related to the consistent policy of Turkey and her
agents in the occupied area to exercise control over, and to exclude, the Greek
Cypriot owners of property on a discriminatory basis. Such policies amounted to
racial discrimination, were a source of distress to the applicant and
constituted an affront to international standards of human rights.
36. The Cypriot Government supported the applicant's claims under this head.
It considered that the sense of helplessness and frustration was deeply felt by
the applicant in relation to denial of access and that there was a strong family
relationship with regard to the property in question, which forms part of the
family heritage. The ethnic discrimination practiced against Greek Cypriots was
also a relevant consideration and must have had an impact upon the feelings of
the applicant.
37. The Turkish Government offered no observations under this head.
38. The Delegate of the Commission considered that an award should be made but
was unable to accept some of the "aggravating circumstances" invoked
by the applicant, in particular her arguments that she had been deprived of her
home-- the Article 8 complaint having been dismissed by the Court--and that she
had been discriminated against as a Greek Cypriot--no complaint under Article 14
having been raised in the original application. He further considered that no
punitive element should be imported into the application of Article 50 since the
"public policy" considerations adduced by the applicant concerned the
global situation of displaced Greek Cypriots and thus went far beyond the
perimeters of the individual case. He considered that CYP 20,000 would be an
appropriate award.
39. The Court is of the opinion that an award should be made under this head in
respect of the anguish and feelings of helplessness and frustration, which the
applicant must have experienced over the years in not being able to use her
property as she saw fit.
40. However, like the Delegate of the Commission, the Court would stress that
the present case concerns an individual complaint related to the applicant's
personal circumstances and not the general situation of the property rights of
Greek Cypriots in northern Cyprus. In this connection it recalls that in its
principal judgment it held that "it need not pronounce itself on the
arguments which have been adduced by those appearing before it concerning the
alleged lawfulness or unlawfulness under international law of Turkey's military
intervention in the island in 1974" (cited above, paragraph 56). It also
rejected the applicant's allegations that there had been a violation of the
right to respect for her home (ibid., paragraphs 65-66) and made no
finding concerning the question of racial discrimination, which had not formed
part of the applicant's complaint under the Convention.
Making an equitable assessment, the Court awards CYP 20,000 under this head.

IV. The applicant's costs and expenses

41.
The applicant, who had submitted detailed bills of costs in connection with the
different stages of the proceedings before the Commission and Court, claimed CYP
137,084.83 by way of costs and expenses, inclusive of value added tax. The
Cypriot Government supported her claim which was composed of the following
items:
(a) CYP 34,571.25 concerning the proceedings before the Commission;
(b) CYP 30,190 concerning the preliminary objections phase before the Court;
(c) CYP 49,112.38 concerning the merits phase before the Court;
(d) CYP 23,211.20 concerning the Article 50 proceedings.
She submitted that in this kind of exceptional case involving many hearings
before both the Commission and Court it was justified to have recourse to the
services of two Cypriot lawyers as well as Queen's Counsel.
42. The Turkish Government did not comment on the applicant's submissions
under this head.
43. The Delegate considered that the costs were excessive since it was not
necessary for the applicant to have been represented at most stages of the
proceedings by two lawyers and additional advisers. In addition, the applicant
had obtained substantial support from the Cypriot Government.
44. The Court considers that, within the context of the applicant's property
complaints, the present case raised complex issues of fundamental importance
concerning the Convention system as a whole. It also involved several hearings
before the Commission and three hearings before the Court. The applicant was
thus entitled to avail of the services of two Cypriot lawyers and a specialist
Queen's Counsel from the United Kingdom in order to represent her interests.
It concludes that the costs and expenses were actually and necessarily
incurred and reasonable as to quantum and should be awarded in full.

V. The Cypriot Government's costs and expenses

45. The Cypriot Government submitted that it also should be reimbursed the costs
and expenses in bringing the case before the Court. It claimed CYP 48,315.77 in
this respect. It explained that it was seeking to recover expenses only--and not
compensation--since significant resources had been allocated to the case, an
approach which had been amply justified by the two judgments of the Court.
46. The Turkish Government made no remarks concerning this claim.
47. The Delegate of the Commission, however, opposed it.
48. The Court recalls the general principle that states must bear their own
costs in contentious proceedings before international tribunals (see, for
example, Article 64 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice and the
Advisory Opinion of the Court in "Application for Review of Judgment No.
158 of the United Nations Administrative Tribunal", I.C.J. Reports 1993,
page 211, paragraph 96). It considers that this rule has even greater
application when, in keeping with the special character of the Convention as an
instrument of European public order (ordre public), High Contracting
Parties bring cases before the Convention institutions, whether by virtue of
Article 24 or of Article 48 (c), as part of the collective enforcement of the
rights set out in the Convention or by virtue of Article 48 (b) in order to
protect the rights of their nationals. In principle, it is not appropriate, in
the Court's view, that states which act, inter alia, in pursuit of the
interests of the Convention community as a whole, even where this coincides with
their own interests, be reimbursed their costs and expenses for doing so.
Accordingly the Court rejects the Cypriot Government's claim for costs and
expenses.

VI. Default interest

49. According to the information available to the Court, the statutory rate of
interest applicable in Cyprus at the date of adoption of the present judgment is
8 per cent per annum.
For these reasons, THE COURT1.
Dismisses by 15 votes to 2 the respondent State's claim that the applicant has
no entitlement to an award of just satisfaction under Article 50 of the
Convention;2. Holds by 14 votes to 3 that the respondent
State is to pay to the applicant, within three months, CYP 300,000 for pecuniary
damage;3. Holds by 15 votes to 2 that the respondent State
is to pay to the applicant, within three months, CYP 20,000 for non-pecuniary
damage;4. Holds by 13 votes to 4 that the respondent State is
to pay to the applicant, within three months, CYP 137,084 and 83 cents for costs
and expenses;5. Holds by 15 votes to 2 that simple interest at an annual rate of 8 per
cent shall be payable on the above amounts from the expiry of the abovementioned
three months until settlement;6. Dismisses unanimously the Cypriot Government's
claims for costs and expenses;
7. Dismisses unanimously the remainder of the claim for just
satisfaction.
In accordance with Article 51(2) of the Convention and Rule 53(2) of Rules of
Court A, the following dissenting opinions are annexed to this judgment:
(a) partly dissenting opinion of Mr Morenilla;
(b) partly dissenting opinion of Mr Mifsud Bonnici;
(c) dissenting opinion of Mr Gölcüklü;
(d) dissenting opinion of Mr Pettiti.

Partly Dissenting Opinion of Judge Morenilla

I agree with the majority that the applicant should receive just satisfaction
for the continuing denial of access to her property in northern Cyprus and the
ensuing loss of all control over it which was imputable to Turkey, as stated by
the Court in the principal judgment of 18 December 1996. (Reports of Judgments
and Decisions 1996-VI, page 2,236, paragraph 57). I disagree, however, with
points 2 and 4 of the operative provisions for the following reasons:
As regards point 2, the majority has unrealistically disregarded the general
political situation of the region where the applicant has property when
examining her claim for pecuniary damage for the loss of use of the land and the
consequent loss of opportunity to develop or lease it during the past eight
years, and when making an equitable assessment of this (paragraphs 33 and 34 of
this judgment). As with the Delegate of the Commission (paragraph 30), I
consider that CYP 100,000 would be the appropriate compensation.
As regards point 4, I find excessive the sum of CYP 137,084.83 for costs and
expenses awarded to the applicant to be paid by the respondent State. Under
Article 50 of the Convention, as interpreted by case law of the Court (see, Pine
Valley Developments Ltd v. Ireland (Article 50) (1993) 16 E.H.R.R. 379,
paragraph 19), the injured party is entitled to recover costs which were
necessarily incurred. But in the present case, I do not consider it necessary
for the applicant to have been represented before the Commission and the Court
by two Cypriot lawyers and a foreign international law specialist, since, in my
view, one lawyer would have sufficed to deal properly with the legal issues
involved in this case. I therefore consider that the respondent State should
only be held liable to pay one-third of this amount.

Partly Dissenting Opinion of Judge Mifsud Bonnici

1. I could not vote in favor of granting to the applicant the sum of CYP
137,084.83 for the costs and expenses claimed by her. The sum is equivalent to
£185,064.52 at the rate of exchange quoted by the applicant of 1 CYP = £ 1.35.
2. Like the Delegate of the Commission in his oral pleadings before the Court
and a minority of my brother judges, I find the claim to be excessive and
exaggerated.
3. It is of course clear that the case was complicated and difficult, but,
nevertheless these qualifications do not justify the hefty bill of costs and
expenses which was submitted and which, surprisingly, the majority of the Court
accepted. That Government contributed to this result by omitting to make any
submissions in the matter. The Turkish Government, likewise, did not make any
submissions as to the applicant's approach to the calculation of her economic
loss (see paragraph 32 of the judgment) but even so, as the Court rightly
observes, it cannot, for this reason alone accept without question the
applicant's submissions. In my view the same holds good for the question of
costs and expenses.
4. To illustrate my criticism of the applicant's claim under this head, I will
limit myself to the following details:
(a) According to the bill of costs dated 26 June 1995 the fees for the two
Cypriot lawyers engaged in the research and preparation of submissions, as well
as submissions in reply and the conduct of the oral hearing on the merits,
amounted to £18,900 (CYP 14,000) while those relating to the services of
specialist Counsel and advocate for research work, a visit to Cyprus for
consultations, preparation of submissions in reply and conduct of oral hearing
on the merits amounted to £35,888 (CYP 29,416), i.e. a total of £
54,788.
(b) For that part of the case which dealt with the preliminary objections, on
the same description--the Cypriot lawyers charged £12,150 (CYP 9,000) while the
specialist Counsel and advocate billed £24,000 (CYP 17,760)--a total of £36,150.
(c) Lastly, for the third and last stage--that concerning Article 50--for the
preparation of the applicant's memorial and the oral hearing, the bills amounted
to £9.045 (CYP 6,700) and £18,795 (CYP 15,406) a total of £27,840
respectively.
The memorial in question consisted of 22 double-spaced pages, a third of which
are devoted to quotations mostly from judgments of the Court.
A grand total of £118,778 in lawyers' fees is in my opinion excessive and
unjustified.
(d) Finally, to illustrate further why I did not vote in favor of awarding the
costs and expenses, in full and "en bloc" I noticed that, in
connection with her claims under Article 50, the applicant commissioned a
Valuation Report of her property in Cyprus, by a firm of Cypriot valuers. The
total cost amounted to CYP 1,734. Their approach set out in this report was not
accepted by the Court as it involved a significant degree of speculation and did
not make any allowance for the volatility of the property market and its
susceptibility to domestic and international influences (paragraph 33). In spite
of this, the cost was allowed.

Dissenting Opinion of Judge Gölcüklü

I regret that I am unable to agree with the opinion of the majority of the Court
concerning "just satisfaction".
My opinion on the application of Article 50 not only extends and reiterates my
dissent regarding the judgments on "preliminary objections" of 23
March 1995 (1995)
20 E.H.R.R. 99 and on the "merits" of 18 December 1996, but is also
based on substantive issues inherent in the concept of just satisfaction as
provided for in Article 50 of the Convention.
1. According to the words of that provision, the Court's case law and the
unanimous opinion of legal writers, Article 50 does not necessarily create an
absolute obligation for the Court to award compensation.
The discretionary nature of the Court's powers regarding just satisfaction is
derived both from its power to determine if necessary to award compensation and
from the fact that such a decision by the Court does not concern a matter of ordre
public. There is therefore no requirement under the Convention, nor any
subsequent practice of the Court obliging it to award any particular sum to the
applicant.
The Court itself, even in strictly individual cases having no bearing on
inter-national politics, has very often--and in connection with certain Articles
of the Convention systematically--chosen not to award just satisfaction, taking
the view that the finding of a violation already constituted sufficient
satisfaction.
As President Bernhardt also pointed out in his dissenting opinion attached to
the principal judgment, the Loizidou case concerns the possessions of a large
number of people, a question which forms an inseparable part of the solution to
the Cypriot problem. The proposals of the directly interested parties appear in
the "Set of ideas on an overall framework agreement on Cyprus" .
Ignoring the complexity and political difficulties of an international problem
that has already lasted 35 years and confining it to an individual dimension
will surely not help to bring about a rapid solution.
2. I am of the opinion that in this case "just satisfaction" should not
be awarded, nor should costs be reimbursed.
3. This Loizidou case is not an isolated case concerning the applicant alone
(the intervention of the Greek Cypriot administration is manifest proof of
that); it concerns on the contrary all the inhabitants of the island, whether of
Turkish or Greek origin, who were displaced following the events of 1974, a fact
which should cause no surprise.
At the heart of the Loizidou v. Turkey case lies the future political status of a
State that has unfortunately disappeared, a question to which all the
international political bodies (the United Nations, the European Union, the
Council of Europe, etc.) are now seeking an answer. A question of such
importance can never be reduced purely and simply to the concept of the right of
property and thus settled by application of a Convention provision which was
never intended to solve problems on this scale.
I agree entirely with Judge Morenilla's statement in his dissenting opinion that
"the majority has unrealistically disregarded the general political
situation of the region where the applicant has property when examining her
claim for pecuniary damage for the loss of use of the land and the consequent
loss of opportunity to develop or lease it during the past eight years, and when
making an equitable assessment of this (paragraphs 33 and 34 of this
judgment)."
4. Lastly, as I observed above, by intervening in this case, that is by bringing
it before the Court, the Greek Cypriot administration has completely altered the
nature of the case for Convention purposes. It has become an interstate case. In
spite of its deceptive appearance, the judicial and legal stage in this case is
occupied by the representatives of the Greek Cypriot administration. As the
Court has itself accepted in interstate cases, the parties must themselves bear
the costs and expenses they incur in such proceedings. The applicant should not
therefore be awarded costs. In the alternative, I would say, in agreement with
Judge Morenilla in his dissenting opinion, that in the present case it was not
necessary "for the applicant to have been represented before the Commission
and the Court by two Cypriot lawyers and a foreign international law specialist,
since ... one lawyer would have sufficed to deal properly with the legal issues
involved in this case".

Dissenting Opinion of Judge Pettiti

I voted with the minority against the decisions set out in point 1 of the
operative provisions (the principle) and in points 2 to 5 awarding various sums
to Mrs. Loizidou.
This was necessary so that I could remain consistent with my votes and
dissenting opinions in the first two Loizidou judgments, particularly as the
present judgment again refers, as regards international law, to the first
judgment. My votes in the first two judgments were prompted by the political
situation in Cyprus and my interpretation of international law. The fact that an
international force controls the "green line" and prohibits the free
movement of persons from one zone to the other and access to property in another
zone should in my opinion have been taken into account by the Court. Current
political developments show that the problem of Cyprus unfortunately goes well
beyond the dimensions of a mere lawsuit.