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DOMINI UM,

fortunarum suarum Romae collocavit ;" and this indirect definition agrees, in part, with one in the Code, which will presently be cited.

There are various definitions of domicilium in the Corpus Juris. One of these (Dig. 50. tit. 1. 8. 27. § 1) determines that a person must be con­sidered to have his domicilium in a municipium, if he buys and sells there, attends the public spec­tacles, keeps the festival days there, and, in fine, enjoys all the advantages of the municipium, and none of the colonia, or the place where he is merely for the purpose of cultivation (ubi colendi ruris causa versatur). In another passage (Cod. 10. tit. 40 (39.) s. 7), it is stated that a civis is made by origo, manumissio, allectio vel adoptio ; but that domicilium, as an edict of Divus Hadrianus declares, makes a person an incola. Domicilium is then defined in the following terms: " In eo loco singtilos habere domicilimn non ambigitur ubi quis larem rerumque ac fortunarum smnmam con-stituit, unde rursus non discessurus si nihil avocet, unde cum profectus est peregrinari videtur, quod (quo?) si rediit, peregrinari jam destitit."

In a passage in the Digest (50. tit. 1. s. 5), " incolam esse" and "domicilium habere " are used as equivalent terms.

It was important, for many purposes, to deter­mine where a man had his permanent abode. An incola was bound to obey the magistrates of the place where he was an incola, and also the magis­trates of the place where he was a civis ; and he was not only subject to the municipal jurisdiction in both municipia, but he was bound to perform all public functions (publica munera). If a man was bound (obligatus), to pay a sum of money in Italy, and had his domicilium in a provincia, he might be sued either in Italy or in the province (Dig. 5. tit. 1. s. 1.9, § 4). A son followed the civitas which was the naturalis origo of his father, and did not follow his father's domicilium. If a man had no legal father ( Justus pater), he followed the origo of his mother. In the Praescriptio longi temporis decem vel viginti annorum, it was enacted by Justinian, that the ten years' prescription should apply, if both parties (tarn petens quam possidens) had their domicilium in the same provincia ; if the two parties had not their domicilium in the same province, the prescription of twenty years applied. (Cod. 7. tit. 33. s. 12.)

The modern law of Domicile is a branch of what is sometimes called international law ; and many of the principles which are admitted in modern times are founded on the Roman rules. (T?te Law of Domicile by Robert Phillimore, 1847 ; Burge, Commentaries on Colonial and Foreign Laiust vol. i.) [G. L.]

DOJVirNIUM. Dominium signifies quiritarian ownership of a thing : and dominus, or dominus legithnus, is the owner. Possessor is often used by Roman writers as equivalent to owner ; but this is not a strictly correct use of the word. In like manner, " to have ownership" is sometimes expressed by " possidere ;" and the thing in which there is property is sometimes called "possessio." (Savigny, Das Recht des Besitzes^ p. 85, 5th ed.)

The complete notion of property or ownership comprehends the determination of the things which may be the objects of ownership ; the power which a man may have over such objects, both as to duration of time and extent of enjoyment; the modes in which ownership may be acquired and

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lost ; the -persons who are capable of acquiring, transferring, or losing ownership.

Res is the general name for anything which is the object of a legal act. The chief division of r§s is into res divini juris, and res humani juris. Res divini juris are those which are appropriated to religious purposes, namely, res sacrae, sanctae, re-ligiosae ; and so long as they have this character, they cannot, .be objects of property. Res humani juris are all other things that can be the objects of property ; and they are either res publicae or res privatae. Res publicae belong to the state, and can only become private property by being de­prived of this public character. [agrariak leges.] Res universitatis are the property of a universitas, and are not the property of any in­dividual. The phrase res nullius is ambiguous ; it sometimes means that the thing cannot be the property of any individual, which is affirmed of things divini juris ; when applied to things humani juris, it sometimes means that they are not the pro­perty of an individual but of a universitas ; yet such things may become the property of an in­dividual ; res hereditariae are res nullius until there is a heres. Res communes are those which cannot be the objects of property, and therefore are res nullius, as the sea.

Res corporales are defined to be those " quae tangi possunt;" incorporales are those " quse tangi non possunt, sed in jure consistent," as here-ditas, ususfructus, OflLiGATioNES ; and they are consequently incapable of tradition, or delivery. The distinction of things into corporeal and incor­poreal did not exist in the older Roman law ; and it is a useless distinction. An incorporeal thing is merely a right, and so it is explained in the Institutiones (ii. tit. 2, ed. Schrader).

Corporeal things are divided into immobiles, or solum et res soli, and mobiles. The ground (solum), and that which is so attached to the ground as to be inseparable from it without being destroyed, as a building for instance, arc res immobiles. Mobiles res are all such as can be removed from one place to another without the destruction of their character. The class of res mobiles " quae pondere, numero, mensura constant," are such things as wine, oil, corn, silver, gold, which are of such a nature that any the same number, weight, or measure, may be considered the same thing. .[MuTUUM.] There is another class of res, consisting of those " quae usu consumuntur, minuuntur," and those " quae non, &c." The term siugulae res compre­hends either one thing or several things, separately considered as ones. Such things are either simple, as an animal, a stone ; or compounded of parts, as a carriage, or a ship. Any number of things, not mechanically connected, may in a legal sense be viewed as one, or as a universitas. (Dig. 41. tit. 3. s. 30 ; 6. tit. 1. s.23, § 5.)

Some things are appurtenant to others, that is, as subordinate parts they go with that which forms the principal thing. (Dig. 18. tit. 1. s. 49.) If a thing, as a house or a ship, was purchased, the buyer got every thing that was a part of the house or ship. (Dig. 21. tit. 2. s. 44.)

Fructus are what is produced out of a thing by its own productive power j as the grass in a field, the fruit on a tree.

The division of things into res mancipi and res j nee mancipi, was one of ancient origin ; and it con-] tinued to a late period in the empire. Res mancipi