This course will explore the forces that led to the 9/11 attacks and the policies the United States adopted in response. We will examine the phenomenon of modern terrorism, the development of the al Qai'da ideology, and the process by which individuals radicalize towards violence.

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This week we’ll examine the three main US political philosophies that underlie the country’s approach to counterterrorism. We’ll look at the beginnings of the US response to this growing threat and how US agencies involved in counterterrorism efforts have adapted over time. Finally, we’ll examine how the US attempted to combat Osama bin Laden’s growing threat to US security.

강사:

David Schanzer

Associate Professor of the Practice

스크립트

By 1999, the CIA's confidence with the tribal groups that they were working with, the Pashtun tribal groups had greatly elevated. And they felt much more strongly that they could pull off an effective, a capture operation. but concerns were deep that so many different things could go wrong, that it would end up not being capture but a, a kill. and that was greatly discussed in the inter agency committee. Now if you were called before the embassy bombings there was a feeling that we could not execute something where bin Laden would be killed, if looked like an assassination. But after the embassy bombings, the, the legality of potentially eliminating a threat with lesal, lethal force, was much greater because there was the concept of self defense. President Clinton ultimately issued a covert finding that justified, that if that it would be okay that if in the course of a capture operation that bin Laden might be killed. and he okayed that even knowing the risk and possibly likely hood that bin Laden would die. and so this covert action was authorized but it actually just never took place. The tribal groups we were working with, either didn't have the opportunity, or had the opportunity but didn't have the will. so despite the CIA continuing to try to get this action to, to happen it, it, it didn't. And so this opportunity to despite that it had been authorized never came to fruition. consideration was then given that, you know, if we think that these tribal entities are just too unreliable, too unprofessional, won't do the job we are not under our command, we're waiting for them, and nothing is happening. maybe what is really necessary is to use our own people. and of course, the special operations capability that I've discussed previously that's been developed since the Reagan years was available to, to do these kinds of activities. and now Department of Defense, however, was very reluctant to develop the plans and authorize this type of mission for a couple of reasons. first of all, Afghanistan, of course, is extremely remote area. and it's sided on one side by Pakistan, and on the other by Iran, and in the North by a series of Tajikistan, Uzbekistan. Countries which we really were harsh dictatorships, former Soviet republics that we really had very little relations with. obviously couldn't work with Iran. and we had a lots of concerns about the trustworthiness of Pakistan, and it's, relationship with the Taliban. So in order to launch these kinds of activities, you'd need to have some sort of basing. Some ability from where these, commando units could be inserted from, where they would take off, where they would be based. since intelligence would come up very quickly, and the action would need to happen also, very quickly. you needed to have a place where these units were stationed and ready, and were training and and, but those were not readily available. you also have to have a search and rescue capability in the event something goes wrong. And, of course, because of the Desert 1 and Blackhawk Down there was prevailing notion that this was always a possibility. so without you know, the, the intelligence that kept coming in was still hardly bullet proof. the idea, the concerns that we would actually put our own people's lives in jeopardy, in a high risk operation based on tenuous intelligence, when our we didn't even have the beginnings of the basing rights that would enable us to execute these operations. made this an option that was never seriously pursued in the years leading up to 9/11. Well if basing rights and things like that would prevent a special commando parade, a special operations action, what about an all out military invasion of Afghanistan? which ultimately happened after 9/11. Was it practical beforehand? And the answer to that was really no, this was never seriously considered. They didn't think that there would possibly be public support for it, even despite the embassy bombings as well as very little international support. And the cooperation you need from other countries and the neighbors to bring in large amounts of material troops, tanks was totally impractical and this was never really seriously considered. Another policy option for dealing with bin Laden was to deepen our relationship with the Northern Alliance. Northern Alliance is a, a group of ethnic Tajiks and other that were affiliated with them in the Northern part of Afghanistan, and were still engaged in a civil war with the Taliban. the Taliban did have control of the capitol and most of the south of the country, but it had not totally unified control of all of Afghanistan. the leader of the Northern Alliance Ahmed Shah Masood who actually would be assassinated by bin Laden right before the 9/11 attack, was seen to be a credible leader, somebody that possibly we could deal with. and the thought was that if we allied more strongly and we supported the Norther Alliance that would help us both to pressure the Taliban. possibly to turn bin Laden over, or maybe the Northern Alliance could execute a raid on bin Laden for us. when, CIA approached the Northern Alliance, and said oh we want you to try to capture bin Laden Massoud, scoffed. And said, you Americans that's really saying in some ways, that's not the way we do things over here in Afghanistan. You always want to deal with these legal niceties. the big problem was in terms of a raid, is that the Northern Alliance had its strongholds in in the North, and bin Laden was located in the South. And of course, if they were involved in some sort of intrusion, a raid into the, into the South there might be conflict with the very other, the Pashtun tribals that we were working with. And so, while this notion of developing a stronger relationship with the Northern Alliance had a lot of attraction it too was never pursued strongly enough to actually lead to any concrete actions against bin Laden. As 1999 moved to 2000, a new technology became available that had been being developed by the Air Force and the C.I.A, and that's the Predator drone. at the time it was exclusively a surveillance platform, and it did not have weaponry on it, so you could not actually strike a target with the drone. But, there is this deep desire for more credible intelligence on bin Laden. And the thought was that this platform might give that kind of availability, which could then form the basis of, for a, a cruise missile strike against bin Laden. yet National Security Council, National Security Director, Sandy Burger still had very exacting standards for the type of intelligence said that he wanted. He said, I want more than just to know where bin Laden is, more than a verified location. we'll need at least data on his pattern of movements, to provide some assurance that he will remain in place. And this demonstrates the level of intelligence that the White House demanded in order to get engaged on any type of military action at this time, despite the growing threat that the bin Laden presented. There's also concern with the drone that it, they made noise, and could be observed from the ground. And that in one of, during one of the test flights the people on the ground went scurrying for anti aircraft weaponry in order to try to shoot the drone down. so there was concern that if that happened, this could be a huge propaganda win for the Taliban, or for bin Laden and it was not worth the risk. On October 12th, 2000, Al-Qaeda struck again. this time it used a small boat filled with explosives to detonate a, a gigantic hole in the base of the USS Cole, killing 17 sailors and almost sinking this naval destroyer. the attack took place in, in the port of Aden, in, in Yemen. a country with which we had, somewhat tenuous relations with, and was seen as very much a, a hotbed of terrorist activities. we sent FBI agents immediately to the scene to investigate. the CIA conducted a intelligence investigation as well. While everyone involved certainly suspected that this had the fingerprints of Al-Qaeda it took time to develop actual proof that indeed this was the case. in November, December, the CIA issued a preliminary declaration that, indeed, Al-Qaeda was guilty of this. but President Clinton national security adviser Sandy Burger, felt that much stronger proof was necessary before a military response could be launched in response to the USS Cole. so all of these different activities, whether it be looking for the covert action of the tribal's, collecting enough intelligence to justify a cruise missile strike against bin Laden. the diplomatic efforts working with the, the Northern Alliance. All these episodes were all these initiatives were scrutinized, investigated considered over and over again within the intelligence community, within the White House. Can we possibly find a, a new stronger ground, can we possibly come up with new ideas, how to deal with bin Laden? real churning of activity ideas and a lot of frustration that we weren't able to take out what we knew was clear and growing threat. but ultimately time ran out on President Clinton's term which ended in January 2001. the task of dealing with Osama bin Laden, would have to be left to the next president.