This material event contains a "Less than Cat 3" level of radioactive material.

Event Text

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT INVOLVING UNACCOUNTED FOR IONIZERS

The following information was received by fax:

"[The North Carolina Radiation Protection Section] received a telephone call and an e-mail from the [Radiation Safety Officer] RSO with RF Micro Devices [RFMD] in Greensboro that they had just resolved on issue with NRD,LLC that there were 24 Ionizers that were unaccounted for in RFMD inventory as of November 4, 2009 when they shipped by [common carrier]. [There were] 34 model P2021 ionizers (1.3 ounces each) in one box weighing 5 pounds to NRD,LLC for disposal. NRD,LLC is located at 2937 Alt. Blvd., Grand Island, NY 14072. The package was shipped by [common carrier] with a package reference # 677000/99562. NRD,LLC signed for 1 box, but only reported 10 ionizers were received on Nov. 23. 2009. At this point RFMD and NRD began discussions as to what happened to the other 24 ionizers(serial numbers A2GL910 thru A2GL933). Both sites have investigated, but cannot account for these ionizers.

"Please note-These ionizers are listed by NRD,LLC as Nuclecel Static Eliminators-Model P-2021 containing 10 mCi each of polonium 210 with a 1 year shelf life."

North Carolina Incident Number: 10-38

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf

This source is not amongst those sources or devices identified by the IAEA Code of Conduct for the Safety & Security of Radioactive Sources to be of concern from a radiological standpoint. Therefore is it being categorized as a less than Category 3 source

"At 1056 CDST on 08/13/10, it was discovered that a fish kill took place in LaSalle County Nuclear Station's cooling lake, due to increased temperatures. Approximately 2,000 fish, primarily gizzard shad, but also included bass and walleye were found by plant workers. As summer air temperatures increased, the cooling lake temperatures increased above 93 degrees F, the threshold at which species susceptible to increased temperature begin to perish. Illinois Department of Natural Resources (IDNR) has been notified that a fish kill has occurred. Efforts are under way to contact the IDNR district fish biologist to quantify the mortality.

"This notification is made in accordance with the LaSalle County Station Facility Operating License, Appendix B, Section 4.1 'Unusual or Important Environmental Events', and 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(xi).

"NUREG 1022 provides event reporting guidelines. The NRC encourages voluntary reporting of items of potential regulatory interest that do not meet any reporting criteria. Dominion Nuclear Connecticut (DNC) has elected to shut down Millstone Power Station Unit 3 to repair a small leak in the residual heat removal system connected to the reactor coolant system. The leak is in the vicinity of a component that was recently identified as not being in full compliance with its design requirements. Although the leak does not appear to be associated with the non-conforming component, it is inaccessible while the unit is operating. Therefore, DNC has elected to shut down the unit, repair the leak, and address the non-conformance.

"Due to failure of Service Water from RCP Motor Air Cooler valve MOV3134 to stroke satisfactorily during scheduled surveillance testing, [the licensee] entered TS 3.6.3 Condition A for Containment Isolation Valves. MOV3134 did not indicate full closed by remote indication in the Control Room when time-stroked at 0119, 8/14/10. Consequently, the isolation valve inside containment, MOV3131, was closed and deenergized to provide containment isolation. This isolated a source of Service Water cooling for containment, and the average temperature of containment started trending up from 117.5F at 0000, 8/14/10. At 1400, 8/14/10, containment average temperature exceeded 120F and entry into TS 3.6.5 Condition A was required. At 2200, 8/14/10, containment average temperature had not been restored to [less than or equal to] 120F, and TS 3.6.5 Condition B was entered. To ensure compliance with TS 3.6.5 Condition B, a ramp down to MODE 3 was initiated at 0045, 8/15/10.

"At 0057, 8/15/10, the NRC authorized enforcement discretion for Farley Nuclear Plant Unit 1 with regard to LCO 3.6.5 and containment temperature in excess of 120F. The ramp down was halted and power stabilized at 96% Rx power. The enforcement discretion duration is 18 hours starting from 2200, 8/14/10. There were two stipulations on the discretion:

"1. If the LLRT [Local Leak Rate Test] on MOV3134 fails, a controlled shutdown will be initiated. Time from the enforcement discretion will be used as necessary to achieve a controlled shutdown.

"2. If containment average temperature exceeds 122F, a controlled shutdown will be initiated. Time from the enforcement discretion will be used as necessary to achieve a controlled shutdown.

"An update will be sent if a ramp down is recommenced. There is no radiological release in progress."

The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.

* * * UPDATE ON 8/15/10 AT 0903 EDT FROM BILL ARENS TO HUFFMAN * * *

The LLRT of valve MOV3134 was completed satisfactorily at 0500 CDT on 8/15/10. The valve was declared OPERABLE (but degraded due to the need for additional limit switch and/or torque switch adjustments that do not affect its isolation capability). At 0800 CDT, service water cooling flow was re-established to the RCP Motor Air Coolers. The current containment temperature is 120.4 degrees Fahrenheit. The licensee plans to remain at 96% power until containment temperature drops below 120 degrees.

OFFSITE NOTIFICATION DUE TO DISCHARGE OF AMERTAP NEOPRENE BALLS INTO WATERWAY

"During the performance of TP-1539, Unit 1 Amertap ball check on 8/15/10 at 0933, it was discovered that approximately 1300 balls could have been lost to the environment via the external circulating water system from the #12 Amertap Ball System.

"The Xcel Energy environmental service informed the plant that reports were made to the Minnesota Pollution Control Agency at 1050 CDT on 8/15/10 and the Minnesota State Duty Officer at 1045 CDT on 8/15/10.

"The Prairie Island Indian Community Tribal Council will be notified.

"The #12 Amertap Ball System is shutdown and will remain out of service until repairs are completed."

VALID AUX FEEDWATER SYSTEM ACTUATION DURING POWER REDUCTION FOR TURBINE MAINTENANCE

"At 1524 EDT, on 8/15/2010, Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Unit 1 had a valid actuation of the Auxiliary Feedwater System in response to a trip of all Main Feedwater Pumps. The Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps were started manually in anticipation of the trip of all Main Feedwater Pumps. Main Feedwater Pump B had been tripped manually as part of the power reduction in preparation for taking the Main Turbine offline to perform repairs on the Electrohydraulic Control System. Main Feedwater Pump A was tripped manually before it experienced a loss of suction in response to an unplanned isolation of the Intermediate Pressure Heater string.

"Following manual actuation of the Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps, reactor power was further reduced, and at 1526 [EDT], Watts Bar Unit 1entered MODE 2.

"No plant safety systems beyond Auxiliary Feedwater were required or actuated in response to this event. The plant was stabilized using Auxiliary Feedwater and the Main Steam dump valves. Operators followed their Abnormal Operating Instruction, and reactor trip was not required. This event is being reported as a valid actuation of the auxiliary feedwater system in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)."