Tacitus: The Histories, Volumes I and II eBook

them executed. But most of these envoys escaped
capture either by their own ingenuity or the loyal
help of friends. Thus, while Vitellius’
plans were known, Vespasian’s were for the most
part still a secret. This was partly due to Vitellius’
negligence, but also to the fact that the garrisons
on the Pannonian Alps stopped all messengers.
By sea, too, the Etesian[453] winds from the north-west
favoured ships sailing eastward, but hindered the
voyage from the East.

Terrified at last by the imminence of invasion and
the alarming 99 news that reached him from
all quarters, Vitellius instructed Caecina and Valens
to prepare for war. Caecina was sent on ahead,
Valens, who was just recovering from a serious illness,
being delayed by his weak state of health. Great,
indeed, was the change in the appearance of the German
army as it marched out of Rome. There was neither
energy in their muscles nor fire in their hearts.
Slowly the column straggled on, their horses spiritless,
their arms neglected. The men grumbled at the
sun, the dust, the weather, and were as ready to quarrel
as they were unwilling to work. To these disadvantages
were added Caecina’s inveterate self-seeking
and his newly-acquired indolence. An overdose
of success had made him slack and self-indulgent, or,
if he was plotting treachery, this may have been one
of his devices for demoralizing the army. It
has often been believed that it was Flavius Sabinus[454]
who, using Rubrius Gallus as his agent, tampered with
Caecina’s loyalty by promising that, if he came
over, Vespasian would ratify any conditions.
It may have occurred also to Caecina to remember his
quarrels and rivalry with Valens, and to consider that,
as he did not stand first with Vitellius, he had better
acquire credit and influence with the new emperor.

After taking an affectionate and respectful farewell
of Vitellius, 100 Caecina dispatched a body of
cavalry to occupy Cremona. He soon followed with
the detachments of the First, Fourth, Fifteenth, and
Sixteenth legions in the van. The centre was composed
of the Fifth and Twenty-second, and in the rear of
the column came the Twenty-first Rapax and the First
Italian legion, with detachments from the three legions
of Britain and a select force of auxiliaries.
When Caecina had started, Valens wrote instructions
to the legions belonging to his old command[455] to
await him on the march, saying that he and Caecina
had arranged this. Caecina, however, took advantage
of being on the spot, and pretended that this plan
had been altered so as to enable them to meet the
first outbreak of the war with their full strength.
So some legions were hurried forward to Cremona[456]
and part of the force was directed upon Hostilia.[457]
Caecina himself turned aside to Ravenna on the pretext
of giving instructions to the fleet. Thence he
proceeded to Patavium[458] to secure secrecy for his
treacherous designs. For Lucilius Bassus, whom
Vitellius, from a prefect of auxiliary cavalry had