The State of Oregon, as petitioner on behalf of the State of Alaska, (1) appeals
from a judgment of the Polk County Circuit Court that refused to register a 1987 Alaska
support order. The trial court denied registration of the Alaska order because it concluded
that, under the Revised Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act (RURESA), (2)
a
subsequent, 1989 Josephine County, Oregon, support order modified and effectively
superceded the Alaska order. On appeal, the state argues that, because the 1989
Josephine County order did not "specifically provide" for modification of the preexisting
Alaska support order, the Oregon and Alaska orders operated concurrently and,
consequently, under the now-applicable statute, the Uniform Interstate Family Support
Act (UIFSA), the 1987 Alaska order is controlling because it was "issued by a tribunal in
the current home state of the child." ORS 110.333(2)(b). We agree with the state and
reverse.

The material facts are undisputed. In 1983, father and mother were
divorced in Alaska, and the Alaska court ordered father to pay $500 per month support
for the parties' one child. In July 1987, the Alaska court issued a consent order reducing
father's support obligation to $200 per month and further requiring father to pay $50 per
month toward arrearages.

In November 1997, the Oregon Support Enforcement Division held an
administrative hearing on father's challenges to the registration of the 1987 Alaska order.
ORS 110.417. In December 1997, the hearings officer issued an administrative order
vacating the registration of the 1987 Alaska order. That order concluded that, under the
RURESA, the 1989 Josephine County order "registered the [Alaska] order, modified it,
and established arrearages, all at the request of the State of Alaska" (emphasis added)
and, consequently:

"What the state seeks to do here has already been done. The Alaska order
in question was registered and an arrearage was established in January
1989. This proceeding therefore is barred by res judicata."

The state sought review of that administrative order in Polk County Circuit
Court. ORS 416.427(6). The state asserted that the 1989 Josephine County proceeding
did not result in a modification of the Alaska order but, instead, that that proceeding
resulted in entry of a "new support order being generated by the State of Oregon on behalf
of the State of Alaska" and that, upon entry of that order, the 1987 Alaska and 1989
Oregon orders operated concurrently. The state further argued that, given that the two
orders existed concurrently, the Alaska order controls under the now-applicable UIFSA
provision. See ORS 110.333(2)(b).

In July 1998, the Polk County Circuit Court issued an order denying
registration of the 1987 Alaska order. In its underlying letter opinion, the court
explained:

"The * * * Josephine County Circuit Court support order was a
modification of the Alaska support order under [RURESA]. Oregon has
continuing jurisdiction for support issues as long as the obligor remains
resident of Oregon (ORS 110.327).

"The State of Alaska must recognize the Oregon modification of its
order under AS 25.25.612." (Emphasis added.)

On appeal from the ensuing judgment, the state asserts that both the
administrative order and the trial court's judgment sustaining that order were based on a
false major premise, viz., that the 1989 Josephine County order so "modified" the 1987
Alaska order that the latter precluded any continuing support obligation (and consequent
accumulation of arrearages) under the former. The state argues, particularly, that under
the controlling law in 1989, the RURESA, a subsequent support order could not "nullify"
a preexisting foreign support order "unless otherwise specifically provided by the court,"
ORS 110.272 (1987), and that the Josephine County court's order did not so "provide."
Thus, the state reasons, the Alaska order and the Josephine County order existed
concurrently and, while father is entitled to credit towards support due under the Alaska
order for amounts paid under the Josephine County order, he remains obligated under the
Alaska order.

Father responds that, at the time the Josephine County court entered the
1989 order, the parties and the court intended that that order modify the Alaska order.
Father acknowledges that the Josephine County order is "silent as to whether it [was]
intended to be a new support obligation or modification of the pre-existing Alaska order."
However, he asserts that we may, nevertheless, conclude from extrinsic evidence that the
Josephine County order was intended to modify the Alaska order. Father contends,
particularly, that ORS 110.271 (1987) "does not require that the order contain a specific
statement nullifying the initiating state's order" but that the "focus of the statute appears to
be upon the general intent of the court, rather than the specific language of the resulting
order." (Emphasis in original.)

Before addressing the particular merits of the parties' arguments, it is useful
to revisit the purpose and general operation of the RURESA. In addition to the "anti-nullification" provision, ORS 110.272 (1987), three features of that statutory scheme bear
on our analysis.

First, ORS 110.011 (1987) provided that the purpose of the RURESA, like
its predecessor the URESA, was to "improve and extend by reciprocal legislation the
enforcement of duties of support." (Emphasis added.) Thus, "[t]he act is procedural only,
it does not create any duties of family support." Miskimon v. Miskimon, 173 Mich App
393, 399, 433 NW2d 419, 422 (1988). See also Despain v. Despain, 78 Idaho 185, 190,
300 P2d 500, 503 (1956) (URESA is "an auxiliary or supplemental remedy for the
enforcement of orders of support").

Second, ORS 110.006 (1987) provided that RURESA was to be "so
construed as to effectuate its general purpose to make uniform the law of those states
which enact it." As described below, the overwhelming majority of jurisdictions that
have considered the issue have concluded that, under the RURESA, a subsequent support
order issued by a "responding state" does not preclude the continuing validity and
accumulation of arrearages under a prior foreign support order unless the latter court
specifically so provides. See generally Annotation, Construction and Effect of Provision
of Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement ActThat No Support Order Shall Supercede Or
Nullify Any Other Order, 31 ALR 4th 347 (1984) (canvassing authority under both
URESA and RURESA).

The issue thus narrows to whether the Josephine County court, in acting on
the civil enforcement request, could, and did, so "modify" the 1987 Alaska order as to
preclude any continuing support obligation under that order. We note, at the outset, that
there is no question as to the Josephine County court's authority, in responding to a
request for enforcement under the RURESA, to enter a prospective support order in an
amount lower than that specified in the original court's order. See, e.g., Thompson v.
Thompson, 366 NW2d 845, 847 (SD 1985) ("[I]n RURESA actions * * * to enforce the
support provisions of a decree issued by a court of another state or circuit, the trial court
may enter its own prospective support order, raising or lowering the amount of the
support obligation, if the circumstances then and there before the trial court dictate and
warrant such a change."); Miskimon, 173 Mich App at 397, 433 NW2d at 421 ("[A] trial
court, in a responding state, may enter its own prospective support order which differs in
amount from the foreign support order."). The issue, rather, is whether the latter order
somehow precludes enforcement of the former--or whether, under the RURESA, the two
orders were independently and concurrently enforceable. The answer to that question lies
in the correct construction and application of ORS 110.272 (1987), which provided:

"A support order made by a court of this state pursuant to this
chapter does not nullify and is not nullified by a support order made by a
court of this state pursuant to any other law or by a support order made by a
court of any other state pursuant to a substantially similar act or any other
law, regardless of priority of issuance, unless otherwise specifically
provided by the court. Amounts paid for a particular period pursuant to any
support order made by the court of another state shall be credited against the
amounts accruing or accrued for the same period under any support order
made by the court of this state."

"[A]n initiating state is not bound by the terms of a foreign support order
when calculating arrearages due under the original judgment of support.

"[T]he original support order is only affected by the payments credited to it
pursuant to the anti-nullification provision. The reason for the credit is to
prevent duplication of payment. An obligor is not relieved of his duties
under the original order, and he is entitled to credit for only the amounts he
is actually paid. Therefore, an arrearage can accumulate if the foreign
support order calls for payments which are less than the amount owing
under the original order.

"* * * * *

"This ruling is not unfair to plaintiff since he could have moved, in
the Michigan courts, to decrease his support obligations." 173 Mich App at
397, 433 NW2d at 422-23 (citations omitted).

Similarly, in Thompson, the South Dakota Supreme Court concluded that,
although a South Dakota trial court could issue a prospective support order in an amount
different from the original Wyoming decree, the latter order did not preclude collection of
ongoing arrearages under the former:

Finally, Oregon's subsequent enactment of the UIFSA did not, and does not,
alter the continuing validity of the 1987 Alaska support order. ORS 110.333(2) provides,
in part:

"If a proceeding is brought under ORS 110.303 to 110.452, and two
or more child support orders have been issued by tribunals of this state or
another state with regard to the same obligor and child, a tribunal of this
state shall apply the following rules in determining which order to recognize
for purposes of continuing, exclusive jurisdiction:

"* * * * *

"(b) If more than one of the tribunals would have continuing,
exclusive jurisdiction under ORS 110.303 to 110.452, an order issued by a
tribunal in the current home state of the child controls and must be so
recognized, but if an order has not been issued in the current home state of
the child, the order most recently issued controls and must be so
recognized."

Given the concurrent existence and operation of the Alaska and Oregon orders, and
applying the "tie-breaking" principles described in ORS 110.333(2), the Alaska order is
controlling because the child's current home state is Alaska. Consequently, the 1987
Alaska support order remains valid and enforceable, and the trial court erred in
concluding otherwise.

Reversed and remanded for registration of 1987 Alaska support order.

1. Unless otherwise specifically indicated, all references to "the state" are to
the State of Oregon, on behalf of the State of Alaska.

2. The RURESA, formally codified at ORS 110.005 to ORS 110.291, was
enacted in 1979, see Or Laws 1979, ch 484, replacing the original statutory scheme, the
Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act (URESA), which was enacted in 1953.
See Or Laws 1953, ch 427. Effective July 1, 1994, the RURESA was repealed and
replaced by the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act (UIFSA). See Or Laws 1993, ch
449.

4. During that interim, Oregon repealed the RURESA, which had been in
effect in 1989 when the Josephine County court entered its order, and adopted the current
statutory scheme, the UIFSA. See ___ Or App at ___ (slip op at 1 n 2).

"(c) The order has been vacated, suspended or modified by a later
order;

"(d) The issuing tribunal has stayed the order pending appeal;

"(e) There is a defense under the law of the state to the remedy
sought;

"(f) Full or partial payment has been made; or

"(g) The statute of limitation under ORS 110.411 precludes
enforcement of some or all of the arrearages.

"(2) If a party presents evidence establishing a full or partial defense
under subsection (1) of this section, a tribunal may stay enforcement of the
registered order, continue the proceeding to permit production of additional
relevant evidence and issue other appropriate orders. * * *"

6. Briefly, under the RURESA, the "initiating" jurisdiction (generally the state
where the obligee resides) certifies a petition for enforcement of an existing support order
to a court of the "responding" jurisdiction (generally the state where the obligor resides).
Upon receipt of the petition, if the responding court determines that a duty of support
does, in fact, exist, the court may order the obligor to pay support and subject the obligor's
property to that order. See ORS 110.201(1) (1987). The effect of the responding court's
order vis-á-vis the original support order--and particularly the operation of ORS 110.272
(1987) with respect to civil enforcement--is the crux of this appeal.

7. No Oregon decision addresses the availability of modification under the
RURESA. In State ex rel Louisiana v. Phillips, 39 Or App 325, 591 P2d 1196, on recons
40 Or App 547, 591 P2d 1196 (1979), a decision under the then-extant URESA, this court
concluded that a responding court "had authority to modify the decree as to future
payment." 40 Or App at 549. Phillips is not controlling here for any of three reasons.

First, as noted, Phillips was decided under the URESA, not the RURESA.
The Phillips court relied on the URESA's "anti-suppression" provision, ORS 110.271
(1977), which was repealed and replaced by ORS 110.272 in 1979--and which did not
include the latter's "unless otherwise specifically provided" proviso.

Second, at the time Phillips was decided, ORS 110.175 (1977) provided, in
part:

"When a petitioner who is an obligee * * * seeks relief in this state
under this chapter, he submits to the jurisdiction of the responding court in
this state as to the responding court's power to set aside, alter or modify any
provisions for the payment of future support in the order, decree or
judgment which imposed the duty of support upon the obligor."

That provision, which was unique to Oregon and without any counterpart in any of the
uniform acts, was repealed upon Oregon's enactment of the RURESA. See Or Laws
1979, ch 484, § 47.

Third, Phillips purported to rely on State ex rel Nebraska v. Brooks, 35 Or
App 805, 583 P2d 12 (1978), stating that in Brooks we had "concluded [that] a
responding state had authority to modify a foreign order of support as to future payments
made in the responding state." Phillips, 40 Or App at 549. That description of Brooks
was inaccurate. Indeed, in Brooks, we had expressly reserved the issue. 35 Or App at
807-08.

8. Accord ORS 110.006 (1987) (RURESA "uniformity of interpretation"
provision). It is, frankly, difficult to assess what role, if any, such a "uniformity" directive
properly plays in Oregon's statutory construction. Even putting aside the potential
difficulties of prospective delegation, there is the surreal prospect of the first state to
consider an issue fixing the law of every other state by virtue of "uniformity." Cf. GPL
Treatment, Ltd. v. Louisiana-Pacific Corp., 323 Or 116, 124-26, 914 P2d 682 (1996)
(looking to the decisions of other Uniform Commercial Code jurisdictions "[i]n
examining the context" of the "merchant's exception," ORS 72.2010(2)); Marks v.
McKenzie High School Fact-Finding Team, 319 Or 451, 457-63, 878 P2d 417 (1994)
(canvassing decisions of other jurisdictions with comparable public records laws,
including decisions rendered after Oregon's statute was enacted, as evincing analysis that
is "persuasive as to what the legislature would have intended, had it considered the
specific issue").

9. See also State v. Valdez, 941 P2d 144, 150 (Alaska 1997) (describing
operation of URESA: "Courts have strived to maintain the separate, independent
character of URESA procedures like those employed in the present case so that (1) the
support obligation can be enforced in a new jurisdiction; (2) the responding court may
make its own determination about the needs and abilities of the parties; and (3) the prior
order may simultaneously remain in effect."); In re Marriage of Popenhager, 99 Cal App
3d 514, 521, 160 Cal Rptr 379, 383 (1979) ("[A] reciprocal support order, like the instant
one, which differs in face amount from a prior dissolution action support order but does
not expressly mention modification, cannot automatically and after-the-fact, modify the
dissolution order; the amount on the face of the reciprocal order merely represents the
sum currently enforceable."); In re Marriage of Kramer, 253 Ill App 3d 923, 931, 625
NE2d 808, 814-15 (1993), rev den 156 Ill 2d 558, 638 NE2d 1116 (1994) ("In the
absence of a clear statement of intent to modify the prior support order, the California
order should be seen as providing an additional and separate means of enforcing the child
support obligation, rather than as modifying the Nebraska decree.") (citing extensive
authority); Banton v. Mathers, 159 Ind App 634, 642, 309 NE2d 167, 172 (1974) (listing
authority); Howard v. Howard, 191 So 2d 528, 531 (Miss 1966) (addressing URESA:
"[T]he original order of support rendered in the court of the initiating state is unaffected
by the orders subsequently rendered in another state under the Uniform Act, except to the
extent that payments made pursuant to one must be credited against payments accruing or
accrued under the other for the same period or periods."); Hodgins v. Hodgins, 814 SW2d
710, 711 (Mo App 1991) (addressing URESA: "A defendant in an URESA action can be
required to pay a greater or lesser amount of child support than that required to be paid in
an underlying decree from the court having jurisdiction in the dissolution action. Such a
variation from the underlying order of support does not act to alter the underlying order.")
(Citations omitted.) See generally Annotation, 31 ALR 4th 347.

10. As noted, ___ Or App at ___ (slip op at 2 n 3), the Josephine County court's
order is the only component of the record of the 1989 proceedings that is included in this
record. The parties did not include, for example, any transcript of the 1989 proceeding.
In all events, in the absence of an "obvious clerical error" that renders the written order
"internally inconsistent and ambiguous on its face," State v. Rood, 129 Or App 422, 426,
879 P2d 886 (1994), the court's written order controls, and reference to extrinsic evidence
of intent is improper. See Haynes v. Burks, 290 Or 75, 94, 619 P2d 632 (1980) (Tanzer,
J., specially concurring); State v. Swain/Goldsmith, 267 Or 527, 530, 517 P2d 684 (1974).