United
Nations

Distr.

GENERAL

S/25977

21 June 1993

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

NOTE BY THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

The Secretary-General has the honour to transmit to the Security Council a
report submitted by the Executive Chairman of the Special Commission established
by the Secretary-General pursuant to paragraph 9 (b) (i) of Security Council
resolution 687 (1991).

93-36314 (E) 240693 /...

Annex

Fifth report of the Executive Chairman of the Special

Commission, established by the Secretary-General

pursuant to paragraph 9 (b) (i) of Security Council

resolution 687 (1991), on the activities of the

Special Commission

INTRODUCTION

1. The present report is the fifth on the activities of the Special
Commission, established by the Secretary-General pursuant to paragraph 9 (b) (i)
of Security Council resolution 687 (1991), submitted to the Security Council by
the Executive Chairman of the Commission. It is the fourth such report provided
in accordance with paragraph 3 of Security Council resolution 699 (1991). It
covers the period from 14 December 1992 to 14 June 1993. It is further to the
reports contained in documents S/23165, S/23268, S/24108 and Corr.1 and S/24984.

I. ORGANIZATIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE ISSUES

2. Since the last report, there have been further changes in the composition
of the Special Commission. Mr. Nicola Circelli has replaced
Col. Armando Caputo; Mr. Peter Dunn has replaced Mr. John Gee, who left to take
up the position of Director of Verification in the Provisional Technical
Secretariat of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons; and
Mr. Ron Manley has replaced Professor Bryan Barrass upon the latter's
retirement. Mr. Manley has since also submitted his resignation to take up the
position of Head of the Chemical Weapons Branch of the Verification Division
with Mr. Gee. The Commission hopes to be in a position to submit a nomination
for his replacement to the Secretary-General shortly.

3. The organizational structure remains essentially as reported previously.
Currently there are 32 staff in the Office of the Executive Chairman in
New York, 25 in the Bahrain Field Office and 83 in the Baghdad Field Office.

4. There is still no agreement on the sale of Iraqi oil to finance United
Nations operations resulting from the cease-fire resolution. Current expenses
have been met from voluntary contributions and advances from Member States and
funds made available from frozen Iraqi assets in accordance with Security
Council resolution 778 (1992). However, in the absence both of Iraqi agreement
to sell oil and of Iraq's acknowledgement of its obligations under resolution
699 (1991) to meet the full costs of the tasks authorized by section C of
resolution 687 (1991), the problem of the financing of the Commission's
operations remains a matter of great concern and further cash contributions by
Governments are urgently required. This is particularly important now as a
contract has been concluded to remove from Iraq the irradiated uranium fuel
currently stored at Tuwaitha and at Location B, reprocess it and permanently
store the wastes. This will involve for the Commission the largest expenditures
it has incurred to date. The net contact price amounts to $24,565,000.
However, there will be certain ancillary costs for special risk insurance and
for radiation protection and other equipment currently estimated to cost in the
neighbourhood of $800,000. These items are available at much lower rates to the
United Nations and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) than to the
contractor. While the United Nations Controller has given a guarantee that the
United Nations has a legal responsibility to meet the costs of this contract,
thereby allowing it to go ahead, it has been agreed that meeting the costs of
the contract will have first call on all future incoming funds. Consequently,
in order to continue operations, the Special Commission must receive funds
adequate not only for operations, but also first to meet the outstanding funds
for the contract. The funds currently available to finance the contract will
have been expended by late August.

5. Governments have continued to support the operation of the Special
Commission through the contribution of personnel, services and equipment.
Resolution 687 (1991) foresaw government support in the form of both voluntary
contributions and advances, pending a long-term solution to the financing issue.
Supporting Governments were asked, in accordance with paragraph 5 (b) of
resolution 778 (1992), to inform the Commission of the cost of those
contributions that they consider advances. Some responses have been received,
most of which indicate that the support provided to date should be viewed as
voluntary contributions. A statement of the Commission's operating costs,
together with further information on organizational and administrative issues,
can be found in appendix I.

II. STATUS, PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES

6. The status, privileges and immunities of the Special Commission, IAEA and
the United Nations specialized agencies involved in the implementation of
Security Council resolution 687 (1991) continue to be regulated by the relevant
agreements and Council resolutions and decisions.

7. The Special Commission and IAEA, on the one hand, and the Government of
Bahrain, on the other, have extended for a further six months, until
30 September 1993, the agreement provided for in the exchange of letters
relating to the facilities, privileges and immunities of the Special Commission
and IAEA in Bahrain. The formal response from the Government of Bahrain was
received by the Secretary-General on 29 April 1993.

8. In Iraq, there have been continuing problems in the implementation of the
Special Commission's status, privileges and immunities. The security of
Commission personnel and property in Iraq had improved somewhat, but the
situation recently deteriorated with attacks on Commission personnel and
property (see appendix III). It thus continues to remain a serious concern.

III. DEVELOPMENTS

A. Political developments: the attitude of Iraq

9. Inspections of sites declared by Iraq or designated by the Commission have
continued. However, Iraq still refuses to cooperate with the Commission and has
exhibited a most unwelcome trend in relation to field operations, namely to seek
to restrict the manner in which the Commission's rights are implemented. The
main problems are as follows:

(a) (i) Iraq continues to maintain its position on the plans approved
under Security Council resolution 715 (1991) for ongoing monitoring
and verification, stated in the letter of 19 November 1991 from the
then Foreign Minister of Iraq addressed to the President of the
Council;

(ii) On 31 January 1993, the Iraqi Government officially informed the
Executive Chairman of the Special Commission in writing that Iraq
considered the new arrangement of interim monitoring at the
Ibn Al-Haytham facility to be conducted under resolution 687 (1991).
The Commission understood this to mean that Iraq would prevent this
team, or any other team, from operating under the terms of the plan
approved under resolution 715 (1991);

(iii) On 1 April 1993, General Amer, Chairman of the Iraqi Military
Industrialization Corporation, reading from prepared notes and
stressing that this was the official Iraqi position on the issue of
monitoring, is reported by the Chief Inspector of an inspection team
to have said:

"Iraq accepted the first monitoring team to the Ibn Al-Haytham
Centre in accordance with resolution 687 (1991). However, it
appears from the modalities of the monitoring team that the
Special Commission is trying to overlap in a discreet fashion
Iraqi obligations under resolution 687 (1991) and resolution
715 (1991). This is very clever. Iraq knows that, using Iraqi
cooperation under resolution 687 (1991), the Special Commission
wants to assert Iraqi obligations under resolution 715 (1991).
Iraq is fully aware of this effort. If the objective of the
Special Commission is to make sure that no prohibited activities
are going on, prohibited items are destroyed and Iraq has no
capability to reactivate proscribed programmes, Iraq has no
objections as this is part of resolution 687 (1991). However, if
the objective is to start a de facto implementation of resolution
715 (1991) without Special Commission testament to the Security
Council that Iraq is in full compliance with resolution
687 (1991) and without implementing paragraph 22 of that
resolution, Iraq will not welcome this mission. The monitoring
missions would not be welcome. But, even in this case, Iraq will
still cooperate with the Special Commission to see the true
objectives of these missions and to explore the intentions of the
Special Commission. Iraq told the Special Commission that
resolution 715 (1991) could be discussed only in connection with
the implementation of paragraph 22 of resolution 687 (1991). You
should never think or believe that it could be done otherwise.";

(iv) On 6 June 1993, the Special Commission informed Iraq of its intention
to install cameras to monitor rocket test stands at two sites. On
7 June 1993, a senior Iraqi representative informed the chief of the
UNSCOM expert team dispatched to Iraq for the installation of the
cameras that Iraq would not accept any monitoring activities and would
insist that the Special Commission limit itself to inspection
activities under resolution 687 (1991). This position was confirmed
in a letter of 8 June 1993 from Mr. Riyadh Al-Qaysi, Iraqi Deputy
Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the Deputy Executive Chairman of the
Special Commission, which stated that the installation of the cameras
did not fall within the purview of resolution 687 (1991) "but rather
comes within the framework of matters and questions that are still the
subject of dialogue between the Iraqi authorities on the one hand and
the Special Commission on the other". In a further letter dated
11 June 1993, Mr. Al-Qaysi added that "what we requested ... was a
'postponement of the decision' on the subject" until the proposed
dialogue;

(v) Iraq's position is maintained despite assurances by the Commission
that, if Iraq cooperated, its legitimate concerns would be met and the
Commission's activities would be carried out in a manner which is not
unduly intrusive;

(b) Iraq's full, final and complete disclosures of its proscribed weapons
programmes, due under Security Council resolution 707 (1991), and its initial
declarations, due under the plans for ongoing monitoring and verification,
contain major shortcomings that will need to be rectified if they are to form
the basis for a definite material balance of Iraq's past weapons of mass
destruction programmes and for effective monitoring and verification of
compliance. The information so far provided is tailored to what the Iraqi
authorities consider the Special Commission to know already, rather than
constituting a frank and open disclosure of all the true facts. One set of
declarations, concerning the legal and administrative actions taken by Iraq to
give effect to its obligations relating to ongoing monitoring and verification,
has never been submitted;

(c) Iraq continues to refuse to divulge information indicating the names
of foreign companies from which it has purchased equipment and materials. This
is clearly unacceptable. Accurate information is essential if the Special
Commission is to establish a material balance for proscribed items and, with
IAEA and the Sanctions Committee, to devise a workable and realistic mechanism
for import control required by paragraph 7 of resolution 715 (1991);

(d) In the period under review, there have been a number of serious
incidents of breaches by Iraq of the Commission's rights, privileges and
immunities. In January 1993, as reported in document S/25172, Iraq sought to
deny the Commission the use of its own aircraft to transport personnel and
equipment into and out of Iraq to and from Bahrain. In February 1993, Iraq
threatened to shoot down a helicopter providing supporting overhead surveillance
for an inspection team if the aircraft did not leave the vicinity of the site.
In June, Iraq has blocked the installation of monitoring cameras (see
subpara. (a) (iv) above), missed two deadlines for the removal and delivery to
the Special Commission of equipment for the production of chemical weapons
precursors and delayed an inspection of a site by a full day;

(e) The events referred to in subpara. (d) above also fit into a general
pattern of Iraqi conduct. Iraq has, through its conduct since the last report,
consistently demonstrated its desire to limit the Commission's inspection rights
and operational capabilities through seeking to place restrictions on inspectors
in the course of their work. While many of these Iraqi actions have taken place
during the course of inspections under resolution 687 (1991), the Commission has
no doubt that they form part of a long-term campaign to establish a practice for
the conduct of inspections that would severely restrict the rights provided in
the plans for ongoing monitoring and verification and relevant Security Council
resolutions. Iraq is thus clearly seeking to assert for itself the right to
interpret how the resolutions should be implemented. Included in this campaign
have been attempts by Iraq to dispute the Commission's instructions on the
destruction of equipment intended for the production of banned weapons; to
restrict the scope of inspections and information gathering; to restrict access
and impose delays on inspections; to restrict the exercise of the Commission's
aerial rights; to impose limits on the duration, size and composition of
inspections; to require advance notice of inspection activities; and to limit
the right to take photography. Further details on these incidents can be found
in appendix III. Each incident has varied in seriousness. Some might not be
significant were they not part of a general trend. However, when taken
together, these incidents add up to a major impediment that would effectively
impede credible long-term monitoring and verification. This again underlines
the need to obtain from Iraq as soon as possible its formal acknowledgement of
its obligations under resolution 715 (1991), so that the Council's requirements
laid down in that resolution can be met.

10. Thus the situation remains essentially unchanged from the time of the last
report: the intention to proceed from inspection and survey through destruction
to ongoing monitoring and verification has, in large part, continued to be
thwarted by the actions of the Iraqi Government. While preparations for the
implementation of the plans are being made, the basic conditions for their
full-scale implementation have not yet been met.

B. Operational developments

11. In the chemical weapons area, further inspection and destruction activities
have been conducted, with the emphasis remaining on destruction. Attempts to
elicit further information on Iraq's chemical weapons programme through a
"seminar" held during an inspection proved unproductive because of the
uncooperative attitude of the Iraqi counterparts. No further weapons or
associated equipment have been found by inspection teams or declared by Iraq.
However, further progress has been made in identifying what equipment and plant
need to be destroyed. In this regard, a serious instance of Iraqi obstruction
has arisen. Iraq was instructed to move certain items of equipment acquired for
chemical weapon precursor production to Muthanna for destruction under
Commission supervision there. It replied that it wished to reuse the equipment
for the production of pesticides. Iraq, despite the Commission's insistence
that its decision is final on the grounds that the equipment was acquired
expressly for chemical weapons production and that, even if converted for
pesticide production, it could easily and rapidly be reconverted for weapons
production, has still not moved all the equipment as instructed. Full accounts
of inspection and destruction activities can be found in appendices IV and V
respectively.

12. Further biological inspections were also conducted, as was a "seminar" with
Iraqi counterparts on biological weapons issues. The same non-cooperative
attitude was met in this area as with chemical weapons. However, inspection
activities did assist in identifying additional facilities to be included in the
plan for ongoing monitoring and verification.

13. On ballistic missiles, efforts have concentrated on three main aspects:
trying to establish a definitive material balance for the SCUDs supplied by the
former Soviet Union; trying to account for Iraq's production capacity in the
ballistic missiles area; and establishing an interim monitoring regime for
Iraq's dual-capable missile research and development facilities. This last has
proved necessary because of Iraq's refusal to acknowledge its obligations under
the plans for ongoing monitoring and verification (see appendix II).

14. Aerial surveillance activities have continued apace, using both U-2 (a
total of 141 missions now flown) and helicopter platforms (236 targets now
flown). Helicopter missions continue to be flown in support of ground
inspections and to provide a time-series photographic record of sites which will
need monitoring under the plans for ongoing monitoring and verification. Plans
are also in place to mount additional sensors to the helicopters to give them
greater monitoring and deterrence capability. Details of both these operations
are contained in appendix V.

C. Iraq's declarations

15. Iraq's failure to provide full and honest declarations was touched upon in
paragraph 9 (b) above. On 14 February 1993, Iraq provided a second set of
declarations entitled "Updated monitoring information. Report No. 2". These
add little to the first declarations. Attempts to elicit fuller information on
chemical and biological issues were met with a totally unacceptable and
uncooperative response, as noted above. Despite internationally verified
evidence to the contrary, Iraq denies ever using chemical weapons. It refuses
to hand over the missile-firing records essential if the Commission is to verify
Iraqi claims to have accounted for all the Soviet-supplied SCUD missiles.

IV. ISSUES AND PRIORITIES FOR THE FUTURE

16. From the above, it can be seen that, despite further progress, no major
breakthrough has been achieved that could make it possible to change the
conclusion of the previous report. The most important developments have taken
place in the area of destruction of proscribed items, but still much remains to
be done. The main areas that require action before the Commission will be in a
position to report to the Security Council that Iraq is in substantial
compliance with its obligations remain as follows:

(a) Acknowledgement by Iraq of its obligations under Council resolutions
707 (1991) and 715 (1991);

(b) Supplementation and revision of Iraq's "reports" to the point where,
in the view of the Commission, they conform with the full, final and complete
disclosures required under resolution 707 (1991), particularly as concerns
former suppliers, and with initial declarations required under the plans for
ongoing monitoring and verification adopted by resolution 715 (1991);

(c) Destruction of all items of equipment identified by the Special
Commission as requiring destruction;

(d) The initiation and smooth functioning of the plans for ongoing
monitoring and verification to ensure that Iraq does not reacquire the weapons
proscribed to it;

(e) Acceptance and implementation by Iraq of all the Commission's
privileges and immunities, including ensuring the safety and security of the
personnel and property, landing rights for aircraft and non-obstruction of the
inspections and logistics.

17. Further inspection activities are planned in each of the weapons
categories. Destruction activities now focus on chemical weapons and equipment
for their production. Preparations for the implementation of the plans for
ongoing monitoring and verification are under way and ideas on the potential
form of an import control regime for after the lifting of sanctions have been
discussed. New staff recruitment reflects the shift of emphasis towards
attempting to establish whether Iraq still has items which should be declared;
tracking down Iraq's supplier networks; interim monitoring; preparations for
ongoing monitoring and verification activities; and further elaboration of the
ideas for import monitoring.

18. The priorities remain to obtain Iraq's acknowledgement of its obligations
under resolutions 707 (1991) and 715 (1991) and to obtain satisfactory
amendments to the various declarations, especially in relation to suppliers.

Appendix I

Organizational and administrative issues

A. Staffing of the Special Commission

1. The Commission currently has a total of 140 positions distributed amongst
its three offices. Fifty positions are supported by the Commission. The
balance of the staff are on loan from their Governments for assignments ranging
from 3 to 12 months. Personnel, equipment and services have been provided for
the Commission's activities by Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada,
China, the Czech Republic, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, India,
Indonesia, the Islamic Republic of Iran, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Nigeria,
Norway, New Zealand, Poland, the Republic of Korea, Romania, the Russian
Federation, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, Ukraine, the United Kingdom of
Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the United States of America and Venezuela.
The responsibilities of the Director-General of IAEA are carried out by the
Action Team set up within IAEA, the staff of which charged to the Commission's
budget are indicated in paragraph 3 below. The Action Team draws upon the part-time services of numerous staff of various IAEA departments, funded under the
regular IAEA budget.

2. The staff of the Commission are distributed as follows:

(a) Headquarters of the Commission in New York. The headquarters of the
Commission in New York has a total of 32 staff assigned to it: 18 positions
(8 in the Professional category and 10 in the support staff category) are
currently charged to the operating budget of the Commission; and 14 positions
are filled by staff assigned to the Commission by various Member States.

(b) Office of the Commission in Bahrain. The Bahrain Field Office has a
total of 25 staff assigned to it on a regular basis to provide financial,
administrative, logistic and training support to the inspection activities of
the Commission and IAEA pursuant to section C of resolution 687 (1991). Eleven
positions (three Professionals and eight local support staff) are charged to the
operating budget of the Commission. Functions break down as follows:

Administration and logistic support 3 Professionals

8 Local staff

Aerial and photographic support 1 Adviser

Air transport 13 Transall C-160 crew members

(c) Office of the Commission in Baghdad. A total of 83 persons are
currently assigned on a long-term basis to the Commission's Baghdad office to
provide logistic, communication and medical support to the inspection teams of
the Commission and IAEA and in support of the chemical destruction programme and
interim monitoring activities. Fourteen positions (nine Professionals, one
international support staff and four local support staff) are under the
Commission operating budget. The other 69 staff are provided by Governments.

3. The Action Team has a total of seven staff charged to the operating budget
of the Commission (see also above):

Operational and technical support 5 Professionals

Administrative support 1 Professional

1 Support staff

C. Financial situation of the Special Commission

4. Under Security Council resolution 699 (1991), Iraq is responsible for
meeting the costs of all United Nations operations resulting from section C of
resolution 687 (1991). To date, Iraq has made no contribution to the Special
Commission's expenses. Indeed, it has rejected two Security Council
resolutions, 706 (1991) and 712 (1991), which sought an interim solution to the
financing issue.

5. Consequently, the Commission has had to rely on voluntary contributions, in
cash and in kind, and on cash advances. Since the inception of its operations
in April 1991, a total of $42.4 million has been contributed by a limited number
of countries to support the operations of the Special Commission. This amount
includes a total of $33 million transferred from the escrow account established
under Security Council resolution 778 (1992) and loans to be repaid from Japan,
of $2.5 million, and the United States, of $2 million.

6. Resolution 778 (1992) requested the Secretary-General to ascertain the
costs of United Nations activities concerning the elimination of weapons of mass
destruction. On 3 November 1992, the Special Commission wrote to Governments
that have supported the Commission's operations through the provision of
equipment, services, personnel and transportation to ascertain whether they
considered their support to be voluntary contributions or an advance, for which
reimbursement will eventually be required. Germany has indicated that it
considers a part of its contributions - $10 million - to be an advance requiring
reimbursement. Saudi Arabia made a contribution of $30 million to the escrow
account for the Special Commission activities. An additional $3 million has
been made available from the escrow account to the Special Commission for a
grand total of $33 million.

7. Expenditures crossed the $40 million mark at the end of May 1993. This
amount includes the cost of major projects like the successful removal in 1992
of unirradiated nuclear fuel out of Iraq under a contract between IAEA and the
Russian Federation for $2 million. The $40 million also includes the first
instalment of $6 million for the cost of the contract for the removal of
irradiated nuclear fuel which will have to be paid in the coming months. The
remaining $32 million have been used to cover the cost of all other activities
and operations of the Commission and IAEA.

8. An additional $35 to $40 million will be required between now and the end
of 1993 to maintain the current level of activities:

(a) Removal of nuclear fuel contract: the balance of $18.565 million will
be required to cover the $24.565 million contract. An estimated additional
$0.8 million will be needed to cover the cost of spare parts, logistic support,
insurance, etc;

(b) Ongoing operations: $10 to $15 million will be needed to maintain the
pace of ongoing programmes and to cover the cost of planned operations;

(c) Loans: $4.5 million will be needed to cover repayments should the
United States and Japanese loans be called. The above amount does not include
the $10 million that Germany has disbursed until the end of 1992 for the air
support provided to the Special Commission and which it has indicated that it
considers an advance to be repaid.

9. The Commission's expenditures have always been kept to the bare minimum and
it has essentially been operated on a shoestring budget for lack of an
appropriate funding mechanism. The uncertainty of the Commission's financial
future currently has an impact on the ability to plan operations effectively.
The implementation of Security Council resolution 715 (1991) will require a
reassessment of staffing and logistic support requirements both at headquarters
and in the field. A full-scale plan of operations could result in at least a
doubling of current operational expenditures.

Financial status of the Special Commission

List of contributions US$

United States 2 000 000

2 000 000 ( loan)

Japan 2 500 000 ( loan)

Kuwait 1 000 000

United Kingdom 175 400

Saudi Arabia 1 730 000

(Escrow account) 30 000 000

Various

(Escrow account) 3 000 000

Total contributions, including loans 42 405 400

Expenditures, up to 31 May 1993 39 815 000

Estimated requirements

for 1 June-31 December 1993 37 810 000

Total 77 625 000

Projected shortfall for 1993 operations 35 219 600

Note: The total shortfall is $50 million when the loans of $4.5 million
from Japan and the United States and the contribution of $10 million from
Germany are taken into account.

Appendix II

Inspection activities

A. Chemical weapons inspections

1. UNSCOM47, consisting of two sub-teams, one designated CBW3 and the other
IAEA 16, conducted inspection activities during the period from 5 to
14 December 1992, mainly in the chemical and bacteriological weapons field. The
last report to the Council under resolution 699 (1991) was prepared before the
results of this inspection had been assessed. Seven potential chemical
weapons-related sites were visited, including a pharmaceutical plant. Nothing
related to Security Council resolution 687 (1991) was found at any of these
sites.

2. The two sub-teams jointly conducted a search of the "PetroChemical-3"
headquarters. On arrival at the site, an incident occurred: documents were
observed being removed from the premises. Some documents were subsequently
returned and verified to be unrelated to Security Council resolution 687 (1991).
However, the team was unable to establish whether these were the same as those
removed.

3. Three question-and-answer "seminars" were held with Iraqi counterparts,
specifically on Iraq's "full, final and comprehensive report" on chemical
weapons. Little information was obtained. Indeed, the Iraqi side made it clear
that it would not answer any question it considered "trivial, unethical or
outside the scope of Security Council resolution 687 (1991)".

4. UNSCOM55 conducted chemical inspection activities from 6 to 18 April 1993.
A number of potentially chemical weapons-related sites were visited, including
the Fallujah sites, formerly part of the Muthanna State Establishment.

5. On 15 April 1993, during the UNSCOM55 inspection, the Chief Inspector
handed over to the Iraqi side a letter requiring the removal by 31 May 1993 of
certain items of equipment used in the PCl3/POCl3 production plant at Fallujah to
Muthanna for destruction there under Special Commission supervision. These
items had been acquired by Iraq specifically for the production of these
chemical weapons precursors and as part of Iraq's chemical weapons programme.
Consequently, the Commission decided that they needed to be destroyed.
Irreversible conversion was not an option and, in any case, Iraq continues not
to accept monitoring of dual-purpose equipment under the terms of the plans for
ongoing monitoring and verification approved by the Council in its resolution
715 (1991) adopted unanimously under Chapter VII of the Charter. In such
conditions, the Commission cannot guarantee the fate of any equipment redeployed
by Iraq.

6. Iraq replied to this demand on 29 April 1993 saying that it wished to
redeploy this equipment for use in insecticide production. On 14 May 1993, the
Commission responded that it had taken into account Iraq's request for reuse of
the equipment but that it stood by the earlier decision that, because the items
were specifically acquired for the purpose of chemical weapons production, the
equipment be removed and destroyed. Iraq responded to this letter on
27 May 1993, saying that the Commission had gone to extremes, adverse to Iraq,
in interpreting its mandate, criticizing it, the Sanctions Committee and the
Security Council respectively for their decisions relating to the destruction of
equipment associated with weapons programmes, to Iraq's requests for imports and
to the decisions to maintain sanctions. It accused the Commission and the
Committee of following a policy of revenge against the Iraqi people and
requested that the Commission change its decision. The Commission again
responded on 4 June 1993, reminding Iraq of its obligations under the relevant
resolutions and the Commission's rights and duties. It explained that the
equipment in question could not be rendered harmless as it was intrinsically
capable of being used for prohibited purposes and could quickly be reconverted
for such. It gave Iraq until 10 June 1993 to complete the removal of the
equipment and warned Iraq that failure to do so would result in the Commission
reporting the matter to the Council. On 11 June 1993, Iraq responded that it
"remained prepared to give the Special Commission, through bilateral technical
consultations, practical guarantees to ensure peaceful use of this equipment in
the long term". The Commission has informed Iraq that its decision on
destruction is final. As of 14 June, some of the equipment had been removed to
Muthanna, but much remained at Fallujah. No formal communication had been
received from the Iraqi authorities as to their intentions regarding the
remaining equipment. The matter was thus brought to the attention of the
President of the Security Council and a formal report made to the Council on
16 June 1993 (S/25960).

B. Biological weapons inspections

7. UNSCOM47 also inspected three biological sites, including a visit to the
Al Hakim Single Cell Production Facility. Nothing related to Security Council
resolution 687 (1991) was found. However, some of the sites will have to be
subjected to compliance monitoring.

8. Two question-and-answer "seminars" were held on biological weapons issues.
As with the chemical issues, no useful information was obtained.

9. UNSCOM53/BW3 conducted inspection activities from 11 to 18 March 1993.
Seven sites were inspected, including one that was undeclared and never
previously visited by the Commission. The items inspected included research
equipment, munitions and munition-filling equipment (which transpired to be
conventional items). No evidence was found of activities related to Security
Council resolution 687 (1991) but, as with most bacteriological weapons-related
activities, many sites were found to have a dual-purpose capability.
Consequently, the team made recommendations for compliance-monitoring
activities.

C. Ballistic missile inspections

10. UNSCOM50 was conducted from 12 to 21 February 1993. This inspection
recorded serial numbers of specific machinery and details of raw materials (to
assist in the determination of the Iraqi supplier network) and assessed the
capabilities of certain establishments and facilities in Iraq, including the
Nasser State Establishment, the Yawm Al Azim Facility and the TECO test stand at
Zaafaraniyah. The team also supervised the destruction of the dies and molds at
Taji used or intended for use in proscribed missile activities.

11. The mission of UNSCOM51 was to check specific information that items
proscribed by Security Council resolution 687 (1991) were present in an area
west of Baghdad. The items were reported to be related to ballistic missiles
with a range greater than 150 kilometres and their associated vehicles. Three
undeclared sites, suspected of concealing them, were thoroughly inspected: a
large military ammunition production plant and two military units. The
Commission designated each site for a short-notice inspection by UNSCOM51. The
team conducted its activities on 22 February and mixed proven operational
practices with a number of new operational modalities. The inspection team was
established and dispatched to Iraq in very short order; it was augmented by the
inspection personnel from UNSCOM50, already in Iraq. The designated sites were
inspected immediately upon the arrival of the team in Iraq. Helicopter and
high-altitude surveillance aircraft were fully integrated into the overall
inspection programme. No proscribed items or activities were observed by any of
the inspection elements.

12. However, during the inspection, a serious breach of the Commission's aerial
surveillance rights occurred. A helicopter was initially prevented from
establishing aerial surveillance over one site. Iraqi officials employed
repeated and open threats of force to impede the helicopter's mission. On one
occasion, this threat was aggravated by Iraqi personnel aiming and training
their anti-aircraft guns on the helicopter. These actions on the part of Iraq
put Commission personnel in real danger and constituted a gross violation of the
Commission's rights and immunities. This serious incident was reported by the
Executive Chairman to the Security Council on 24 February 1993. A full account,
in the form of the note handed over to the President of the Council on that
occasion, follows.

"Incident involving a Commission helicopter on

22 February 1993

"1. On 22 February 1993, one of the Special Commission's helicopters was
flown in support of an inspection of three sites by Special Commission
ground inspection teams. This flight had been notified to and acknowledged
by the Iraqi authorities under established modalities.

"2. The Special Commission had information that missiles and launchers
proscribed by resolution 687 (1991) might be concealed at the sites
concerned and the helicopter air surveillance was undertaken so as to
ensure that nothing was removed from the sites during the course of the
short-notice ground inspection.

"3. At 1320 hours, the crew of the Special Commission's helicopter, on
approaching one of the sites, was informed by radio from the accompanying
Iraqi helicopter escort that the Commission's helicopter would not be
permitted to fly over the site and it was forced to circle 1 to
2 kilometres north-west of the site. The crew contacted the Commission's
Chief Inspector on the ground and informed him of the refusal received from
the Iraqi authorities. The crew were ordered by the Chief Inspector to
proceed again in the direction of the site. As the crew carried out these
instructions, they were informed by the Iraqi helicopter escort that, if
the Commission's helicopter did not turn away from the site, it would be
shot down. Visual observation from the helicopter confirmed that the
anti-aircraft guns on the ground were being trained on and were tracking
the helicopter. On receipt of this information, the Chief Inspector
ordered the helicopter to withdraw to the other inspection sites.

"4. While circling the other inspection sites, the Iraqi authorities
ordered the helicopter to return to its base at Rasheed and again
threatened to shoot down the helicopter if it did not return to Rasheed.
In the circumstances, the captain had no alternative but to proceed in the
direction of Rasheed. While en route there a new communication was
received from the Iraqi authorities that aerial inspection of the site
could now take place. The helicopter proceeded to the site where the Iraqi
authorities imposed new restrictions, permitting it to fly only over the
western side of the area. Shortly thereafter, the helicopter had to return
to Rasheed because of lack of fuel, landing there at 1512 hours.

"5. At Rasheed airbase, the Special Commission's Chief Aerial Inspector
strongly protested to the local Iraqi officials the above events and
indicated that one result had been that the aerial inspection had not been
able to complete the tasks assigned to it. He indicated his intention to
refuel and to return to the area to complete the assignment. The local
Iraqi officials, after checking with higher authorities by telephone,
interposed no objection, and the flight thus took place.

"6. In a subsequent interview between the Special Commission's Chief
Inspector and General Amer Rashid, in response to the former's strong
protest at the Iraqi threats to shoot down a Special Commission helicopter
undertaking assigned aerial surveillance in support of a ground inspection
under Security Council resolution 687 (1991), General Amer responded that
the statements that the helicopter would be shot down were standard
military practice."

D. Interim monitoring

13. Iraq's continued failure to acknowledge its obligations under resolution
715 (1991) is a major factor preventing the initiation of long-term monitoring
by the Commission of Iraq's activities. Meanwhile, as has been ascertained in
the course of recent Commission ballistic missile inspections, Iraq is actively
pursuing missile-related activities that are covered by the long-term monitoring
plan, to include the establishment of a dedicated missile research and design
centre north-west of Baghdad.

14. This facility, known as the Ibn Al Haytham Missile Research and Design
Centre, was established by Iraq on 4 April 1992 as the main centre for research
and design activity in Iraq involving ballistic missiles not prohibited by
resolution 687 (1991). This Centre is involved not only in the maintenance of
existing permitted missile systems, but also in the design of new missile
systems, including the Ababil 100 with a range close to 150 kilometres. The
Centre employs many of the scientists and technicians who were involved in the
proscribed ballistic missile programmes prior to the Gulf War and adoption of
resolution 687 (1991).

15. In the absence of Iraq's acknowledgement of resolution 715 (1991), which
delays long-term monitoring efforts across the whole spectrum of Iraqi
missile-related activities, interim monitoring of the Ibn Al Haytham Centre was
initiated by the Commission to track Iraqi ballistic missile programmes to
ensure that no proscribed activity is taking place. The first interim
monitoring team, IMT1a, was sent into Iraq on 25 January 1993, where it spent
eight weeks investigating the work of the Ibn Al Haytham Centre. The focus of
the IMT1a mission was in the area of liquid propulsion systems and related
technologies.

16. Based upon the results of IMT1a, the Commission dispatched to Iraq a new
team of interim monitors, IMT1b, to relieve IMT1a on 27 March 1993. The purpose
of the team was mainly to investigate and assess Iraq's capabilities to produce
solid propellant missile systems and to establish the relationships between the
various facilities involved in such activities within the Military
Industrialization Corporation. It conducted its activities over a 52-day period
27 March to 17 May 1993, centred around 2 facilities: the Al Rasheed Factory,
comprising the 3 plants, and the Al Qa'qaa' Establishment. In addition, the
team visited the Ibn Al Haytham Research Centre, the focus of the previous
monitoring team's activities, and other sites related to missile research and
development in and around Baghdad.

17. The main issues discussed with the Iraqi counterparts included details of
Iraq's missile designs; Iraq's knowledge of solid propellant technology; Iraq's
general capabilities in missile production, both of complete systems and of
components; Iraq's ability to increase the range of existing systems; the
current status of Iraq's production facilities; and its plans for missile
research, development, testing and production.

18. The information obtained by the team has improved the Commission's
understanding of Iraq's past weapons programmes and of its technology baseline.
It should, furthermore, be of use as and when the Commission is able to commence
ongoing monitoring and verification activities in accordance with the plan
approved by the Security Council in its resolution 715 (1991).

19. A third interim monitoring team entered Iraq on 5 June 1993. The main
focus of this team is Iraq's production capacity in the ballistic missiles area.
A full assessment and inventory will be made of Iraq's high-precision machine
tools. Accompanying the team was a smaller sub-team whose task was to install
cameras to monitor rocket test stands at two sites. Iraq was informed of the
Commission's intention to install these cameras on 6 June 1993 but, as noted in
the main body of the report, Iraq has to date blocked their installation on the
grounds that they comprise sensors for monitoring under resolution 715 (1991), a
resolution which Iraq says it will not accept, despite its being adopted
unanimously by the Security Council acting under Chapter VII of the Charter.

20. Each interim monitoring team has been initially accompanied by a specialist
team from the Commission, to oversee the establishment of the modalities of
inspection and conduct preparatory discussions with Iraqi officials concerning
the implementation of the interim monitoring regime. Interim monitoring of
Iraqi missile-related facilities will continue as long as the Commission deems
necessary.

E. Removal of nuclear fuels

21. Under paragraph 12 of Security Council resolution 687 (1991), Iraq is
required to place all its nuclear-weapons-usable materials under the exclusive
control, for custody and removal, of IAEA, with the assistance and cooperation
of the Special Commission. It has already proved possible to remove from Iraq
all the fresh uranium fuel assemblies intended for use in the reactors at
Tuwaitha.

22. However, the complex legal and practical problems involved in removing,
reprocessing and permanently storing the resultant wastes from the irradiated
fuel assemblies used in the reactors and now stored at Tuwaitha and Location B,
have so far delayed the removal of this nuclear fuel.

23. In late 1992, IAEA again approached the nuclear-weapons-States with a
request for proposals for removal of the irradiated fuel assemblies,
reprocessing and permanent storage of the resultant wastes. On the basis of
replies received, negotiations have been entered into with CIR Minatom of the
Russian Federation for a contract that would cover all aspects of removal,
reprocessing and permanent storage of the resultant wastes. The Special
Commission, which will be required to finance the contract, has been actively
participating in these negotiations.

24. From 19 to 24 April 1993, an IAEA survey mission, with the participation of
representatives of the United Nations, the Special Commission, CIR Minatom and
its principal subcontractor for operations in Iraq - the Nuclear Assurance
Corporation of the United States - visited Iraq to survey the sites where the
removal of the fuel will be undertaken and to arrive at understandings with the
Government of Iraq on its provision of services, equipment and manpower for the
preparation and removal from Iraq of the 208 irradiated fuel assemblies.

25. A contract was concluded in Vienna on 14 June 1993. IAEA, the United
Nations and the Special Commission insisted that the fuel assemblies are to be
dealt with in accordance with all requisite international and national safety
requirements and that the contract be for a fixed price without the possibility
of major cost overruns.

Appendix III

List of incidents

A. Restrictions on the scope of inspections

1. During the course of the first interim monitoring team's mission, several
other discussions occurred that indicated a misconception, deliberate or
otherwise, on the part of Iraq. The Iraqi counterparts questioned the right of
the team to make an inventory of or to tag certain items of equipment at the
sites monitored, requesting that specific criteria be established and used to
decide which items might be so treated. The team did not accept this position.
Iraq indicated that certain items were of no concern to the Special Commission,
when clearly the decision as to what is of concern to it lies with the
Commission. Furthermore, some of the items involved have the potential to be
used for proscribed purposes. The counterparts also complained about the
purpose of this team, stating that it was to control, not monitor, Iraq's
activities.

B. Denial of, or restrictions on, access and delays

to inspection

2. On four occasions, Iraq has sought to deny the Commission's basic aerial
rights - once in relation to entry of transport aircraft into and out of Iraq
(see S/25172) and thrice in relation to overflight of sites for aerial
surveillance by helicopter. Except for the flight over the two sites on the
outskirts of Baghdad (see S/24985), the Commission was eventually able to
conduct the flights. However, as already reported to the Council, one of these
flights had to be conducted with a restricted flight pattern, and not before
Iraq had threatened to shoot the helicopter down if it did not leave the
vicinity of the site.

3. Iraq has also hindered access for inspection teams, sometimes seeking, on
spurious grounds, completely to deny access. One team was initially denied
access because inspection would "breach the sanctity of universities and would
upset the students". In each instance, the inspection eventually took place.
In the period under review, a total of eight Commission inspection activities
were seriously delayed, in one case by over four hours. One, the aerial
surveillance on the outskirts of Baghdad, has been blocked.

C. Restrictions on aerial rights

4. Paragraphs 11 (f) and (h) of the six-monthly report of 17 December 1992
(S/24984) described at length the problems faced until that date by the Special
Commission. Problems have continued since. In addition to the incidents
referred to in paragraph 2 above, Iraq has created further difficulties in
relation to the Commission's aerial rights.

5. In his letter of 5 August 1992, Mr. Al-Zahawi, Adviser in the Iraqi
Ministry for Foreign Affairs, informed the Executive Chairman of the Special
Commission that his request to use the Al-Rasheed airfield as the point of entry
and departure for inspection teams was unworkable as the airfield was
unserviceable. The Deputy Executive Chairman replied the next day, expressing
the desire to use Al-Rasheed airfield as soon as it became operational.
Recently, Sudanese Airways Boeing 707 aircraft have been observed using this
airfield. However, inquiries by Commission personnel about the possibility of
using it as the point of entry and exit have met with the response that such a
decision would be political. No progress has been made on this issue.

6. Iraq has created problems in the operation of the aerial inspection team.
It has sought: to establish "no-go" areas over which the team may not fly and
which may not be included in the boxes designated the night before aerial
inspections; to prevent the team taking photography and using binoculars while
flying between designated sites and even over the designated site; to regulate
the altitude at which the helicopters may fly over certain areas; and to demand
10 minutes' notice before an aerial inspection starts.

7. Each time the Commission's high-altitude U-2 surveillance aircraft flies,
Iraq lodges a formal complaint about its activities. Iraq persists in calling
the aircraft a United States spy plane and has recently described it as being
used for "despicable criminal purposes", despite its United Nations registration
and mandate. On 10 March 1993, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Iraq,
Mr. Al-Sahaf, addressed a letter to the Secretary-General (S/25387), which
alleged that the aircraft had been used to assist in the planning of an Israeli
operation to assassinate President Saddam Hussein.

D. Limits on the duration, size and composition of

inspections

8. Iraq has sought to limit the duration of both monitoring and aerial
surveillance activities, indicating, in relation to the former, that it should
be of finite duration and, in relation to the latter, that aerial inspections
should not last longer than 15 minutes.

9. Iraq has also sought to limit the size of inspection teams at certain sites
it deems sensitive, such as universities, and to interfere in the composition of
the team by, for example, seeking to exclude the Commission's own interpreters
from a team. It has also sought to establish that those involved in the
chemical destruction group at Al Muthanna are not permitted to take part in
other inspection activities and to limit the turnover of Commission personnel in
the helicopter support staff.

10. It is clear from the Status Agreement of May 1991 that the Commission has
the right to decide the expertise it needs to conduct inspections and hence the
right to choose the number and the types of experts it needs on each team and to
inspect each site. Iraq is obliged to allow personnel named by the Commission
access to conduct their tasks.

E. Advance notice of inspection activities

11. For aerial surveillance activities, Iraq has sought to establish that it
should receive advance notice of the site to be surveyed. No-notice inspections
are essential to the effectiveness of the Commission.

F. Provision of data

12. As noted in paragraphs 9 (b) and 15 of the main body of the report, Iraq
has failed to provide adequate declarations either of its past proscribed
programmes or of its dual-capability facilities, which would need to be
incorporated into the plans for ongoing monitoring and verification. The
Commission has sought to supplement those declarations during each of its
inspections. However, Iraq refuses to offer information willingly, or at all,
in certain key areas, e.g. on its supplier networks or its previous use of
chemical weapons. Consternation has also been expressed by Iraqi counterparts
that the Commission continues to ask questions about Iraq's past programmes,
despite the fact that these questions are asked because of Iraq's failure to
fulfil its obligation to make full, final and complete disclosures on all
aspects of its past programmes.

13. Furthermore, Iraq has been unable or unwilling to produce specific items of
equipment that the Commission has evidence were supplied to Iraq. Teams
continue to find equipment and documents containing information pertinent to
their mandate under the resolutions and ongoing monitoring and verification
plans.

G. Photography

14. Iraq has sought to limit the Commission's unrestricted right to photograph
any item or activity it deems of relevance to its task. Iraq has delayed
photography until "permission" has been obtained from more senior officials; it
has sought to prevent photography over a designated site; and it has sought to
limit aerial photography to items within a set perimeter and inspection team
photography to items Iraq deems to be related to resolution 687 (1991). If this
last rule were applied, it would open the possibility of Iraq deciding what was
"687-related" and could be used by Iraq to exclude all dual-purpose facilities,
items and activities covered by the plans approved under resolution 715 (1991).

H. Security

15. The issue of security was dealt with at length in appendix II to document
S/24984. Since that report and in addition to the threats to the Commission's
aircraft referred to above, there have been continued incidents of vandalism of
Commission vehicles, including the smashing of windscreens, windows and mirrors
and the breaking of aerials. Four of these incidents occurred while the
vehicles were being driven by Commission personnel. In one such incident, the
drivers were medics and the vehicle bore Red Crescent markings. These
ambulances have also come under attack whilst parked in hotel car parks.

16. Items continue to be taken from the offices and personal quarters of the
Commission. Staff continue sporadically to receive threatening and harassing
telephone calls in their hotel rooms in the middle of the night. On
8 June 1993, members of an inspection team had light bulbs thrown at them while
they were walking to a restaurant in Baghdad.

Appendix IV

Destruction of Iraq's chemical agents and munitions

1. The present report focuses on developments since the last report.

A. Operations at Muhammadiyat

2. On 21 February 1993, activities started at Muhammadiyat, a chemical weapons
storage site west of Baghdad. Most of the stable, filled munitions have been
transported to Muthanna (99 250-gauge bombs, 21 500-gauge bombs and 9 DB0
bombs). Destruction on site of unfilled (52 DB0 bombs and 1,105 DB2 bombs) and
unstable filled (81 250-gauge bombs and 6 500-gauge bombs) munitions has
started. Remaining at Muhammadiyat are 5,127 250-gauge and 1,094 500-gauge
bombs (unfilled) and 20 mustard-agent-filled 250-gauge bombs.

B. Incinerator operations

3. The incinerator operates at temperatures in excess of 1,100o C and so meets
the specifications set by the Destruction Advisory Panel for the destruction of
mustard agent and precursors. During the third week of March 1993, a combustion
efficiency monitoring system was installed to monitor performance by
continuously measuring concentrations of the combustion gases.

4. Mustard agent is destroyed either by direct injection into the furnace or
in a toluene/benzene/diesel mix. Some of the mustard agent has polymerized,
complicating the process of extraction and destruction.

C. Hydrolysis operations

5. The neutralization of nerve agents by hydrolysis continued. In early
February 1993, hydrolysis of the bulk stocks of the nerve agent sarin was
completed, followed shortly after by the completion of the explosive
incineration of 122mm sarin-filled rockets on 14 February 1993. On 23 April the
destruction of the remaining sarin from the Al Hussein warheads was completed.
On 15 February 1993, operation of the hydrolysis plant turned to destruction of
the tabun precursor D4.

D. Destruction of munitions

6. During the period covered by the present report, destruction of the
following munitions was completed: 122mm rocket motors and components, R400
aerial bombs and tail fin assemblies, unfilled 250-gauge bombs (by cutting) and
unfilled DB2 bombs (by crushing). Drainage of 250- and 500-gauge aerial bombs
continued and a technique of venting the 155mm mustard-filled projectiles was
developed and adopted as the key initial step in the method for their
destruction.

1. During the period under review, the Information Assessment Unit has been
strengthened and the Commission has been able to make good use of its improved
capabilities.

2. The Unit is mandated to carry out the collection and management of
information and to assess available data, in order to create a strong foundation
for the Special Commission's implementation of the tasks entrusted to it by the
Security Council.

3. With regard to information collection, the Unit is, inter alia, identifying
information gaps and preparing proposals for how they might be filled using the
Commission's collection capabilities. These capabilities include the
high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft (U-2), which is currently carrying out up
to three surveillance missions per week over Iraq. U-2 imagery is the property
of the Commission. It is processed for the use of the Commission (and IAEA)
with the help of the United States Government. The Unit is responsible for the
tasking of the U-2, coordinating its operations and, with the support of United
States specialists, the assessment and interpretation of the imagery.

4. The Unit is furthermore responsible for the aerial inspection activities
using the Commission's helicopters in Baghdad as a platform. Thus the Unit
identifies targets for aerial inspections carried out by the aerial inspection
team permanently based in Baghdad. The aerial inspections utilize first and
foremost photography, but other means are also in planning. The imagery
resulting from these surveys is analysed by the Unit's photographic
interpreters. The imagery, as well as other data acquired through the aerial
surveillance activities, are made available for operational planning purposes.

5. The Unit also maintains contacts with relevant agencies within the
supporting Governments and requests and obtains from them information of
relevance for the work of the Commission.

6. The management of the large amount of data made available to the Commission
is a growing responsibility for the Unit. The sources for the data to be dealt
with by the Unit are, in addition to Iraq's own declarations, the inspection
reports, the aerial surveillance products and the information from Governments.

7. The Unit has spent considerable time in developing ways and means for
effective and dynamic management of the wealth of data collected by it. An
information management evaluator has been assisting the Commission in developing
a data management system corresponding to the needs of the Information
Assessment Unit. Inside the Unit, a fully functional data management system is
now in place. Some more equipment has to be purchased and recruitment of
further operating personnel is under way.

8. The assessment or analytical work on available data carried out in the Unit
constitutes, in many respects, the heart of the Commission's activities. This
work sets the agenda for the operations side and provides the Executive Chairman
with the substance and the technical foundation for reports to the Security
Council, for the political evaluation of the extent of Iraq's implementation of
its obligations under the cease-fire arrangements and for assessments of the
magnitude of the remaining tasks. The significance and importance of the
analytical work will only grow with the gradual introduction of monitoring and
verification in the activities of the Commission.

9. It is the ambition to keep the Unit, on a continuous basis, staffed with
analysts knowledgeable in all the relevant weapons and production categories.
However, as there are both practical reasons and reasons of principle for
expanding their experience in the field, analysts will regularly participate in
inspection teams.

Aerial surveillance programmes

10. As of 15 June 1993, 236 targets had been subjected to helicopter
surveillance, and 141 U-2 missions had been flown.

High-altitude surveillance

11. As additional staff has become available to the Unit, particularly
additional photographic interpreters, the Unit has been increasingly able to
provide specific taskings for U-2 missions. Prior to this, the U-2 operated
primarily on the basis of a general priority list, rather than specific taskings
to photograph specific sites.

Helicopter surveillance

12. Over the past several months, the focus of the helicopter photographic
surveillance programme has been on sites which, at least potentially, are to be
subjected to long-term monitoring. Some 60 monitoring missions have been
completed. The first such mission at a given site is intended to produce
comprehensive photographic coverage of it; subsequent missions would normally
involve photography only of changes at the site evident from visual observation.

13. Helicopter surveillance missions continue to be executed in conjunction
with ground inspections; typically, the aerial inspection team on board the
helicopter is used to "secure" a site subjected to a surprise inspection. In
this context, to "secure" a site is to maintain surveillance so as to spot any
attempt by Iraqi authorities to remove proscribed items prior to the site being
sealed off by the ground inspection team. Subsequently, the aerial inspection
team can conduct a normal photographic mission of the site.

14. During UNSCOM51, for example, both the heliborne aerial inspection team and
the U-2 were used for surveillance of the sites being inspected by the ground
teams.