Overall point-of-view:

As a general matter, I value procedure very highly - It is my
belief that good procedure leads to good decisions. Now, I don't mean
that a "good" decision is one that satisfies everyone. Rather, I
believe that a "good" decision is one in which every person feels that
he or she has had a fair chance to make their position heard, that the decision maker
actually did consider all points of view without prejudice, and that those who
didn't get what they wanted are willing to accept the decision.

Thus, the larger part of my platform is the reformation of ICANN
and its procedures. However, I also believe that ICANN will be unable to
be reformed until certain personnel changes are made.

And I do have some opinions on policy matters themselves.

To a large extent I am a firm believer that government is the
proper embodiment for public debate and public policymaking - to my mind a body
such as ICANN is Internet government no matter how many
"private corporation" flags it might try to fly.

And I am not one who reacts with an instant "way to
go" when someone utters the words "deregulation" or "privatization".
My studies of our history have taught me that private industry and private behavior
are not always for the general good, that regulation, indeed governmental
regulation, must sometimes be imposed to protect the public from certain
self-interested actions of the few.

On the other hand, I do believe that governmental bodies ought
to keep their fingers out of things that don't need the active oversight and
regulation. To a large degree I feel that the Domain Name System of the
Internet needs no regulation, that economic and social forces will cause it to
evolve in "the right way" without the intrusive and controlling
efforts of a governance body such as ICANN.

As such you may find that my point of view is bimodal - If I
find that something needs regulation, I tend to believe that it ought to be done
by a governmental body, or at least a body that isn't afraid to recognize that
it is like a government (and thus must operate with notions of "due
process".) But if I find that something does not presently need
regulation, I tend to take a rather more libertarian, hands-off approach.

My own personal politics tend towards the liberal or
"green" point of view.

But when it comes to financial matters, I firmly believe in
sound practices with strict controls. I have found ICANN to be lacking in
financial common sense.

Oh yes, one more thing - I am willing to be convinced that a
position I might espouse is ill advised and I'm willing to change my mind.

Individuals do matter:

To my mind, one of our greatest strengths is that of the
individual person to have an idea. Creative thought is the province
of individual human beings. I have never seen a corporation have an
idea. I have never seen an association or club have an idea. The only
thing on this planet that can have a creative thought is a living, breathing
person. It is time for ICANN to open itself up so that individual people -
you and I - can meaningfully participate in the development of policies that
impact how we use the Internet.

Over the last hundred years we have seen corporate entities
receiving more and more "rights" that were previously available only
to individual people. In ICANN we see that trend reaching a point where
corporate entities are now receiving more rights than do individual
people. That is wrong.

ICANN was in need of reform before it was even created - its initial
structure was the creation of a secretive process that both actively and
passively excluded any but those who were insiders to the process. The
Boston Working Group, which I co-founded, attempted to deal with a very
limited set of these pre-creation problems. Most of our proposals were ignored
by ICANN and those that were adopted have been silently removed, ignored, or
emasculated. For example, ICANN is as secretive as ever.

In the 18 plus months since ICANN's formation numerous other
structural and operational problems have been revealed. Not the least is
the capture of ICANN by special interests - particularly pro-trademark groups
and name registries and registrars.

ICANN's decision at the Yokohama meeting to revisit the entire
at-large structure, with even the existence of the at-large up for
reconsideration, is a very clear symptom of the extent to which ICANN has become
a tool of those who want the Internet to be nothing but a mindless shopping mall
in which users are reduced to mere purchasers of trademarked products and
restrained from having any say in how the Internet operates, what its policies
might be, or even, who gets access.

Reform
of ICANN - Openness/transparency/accountability

An "open" process is
one in which all interested parties can participate in a meaningful way
and as equals to all other parties.

A "transparent" process is
one in which the entire decision making process, from inception to
closure, is revealed and recorded. To be fully transparent, a
process must reveal inputs, issues, criteria, biases, misunderstandings,
evolution of decision maker positions, compromises, votes taken, etc, etc.

An accountable decision maker is one
who is both identifiable and can be held to account for his/her decisions.
Board members are typically made accountable by elections and recalls - assuming that the
electorate can obtain enough information to evaluate how their board members
have performed. Staff members must be held accountable by the board.

One could look long and hard. But
one is unlikely to find an organization that spends as much effort as ICANN does
actively rejecting these principles.

It is my position that ICANN must
operate with absolute openness, transparency, and accountability. This
means that absolutely every input, every discussion, every decision - everything
- must be done in open session with a written or electronic record. All
decisions must be made by recorded vote - with the position of each director
clearly shown.

The only exception to this would be
matters pertaining to personnel and litigation. And even a decision that a
matter falls into those categories must be made in public.

In addition, actions by
"staff" are the epitome of non transparent and non accountable decision making.
ICANN's staff must be required to operate according to the same principles and
the board must be obligated to adopt, on the record, staff actions.

Reform
of ICANN - Full recognition of at-large members as "members"
under California law.

Under California law,
"members" of a non-profit/public-benefit corporation, such as ICANN
obtain several rights.

ICANN's staff prepared the following list of these
rights. (The numbers in parenthesis are the relevant section
of the California Corporations Code.)

A meeting of members must be held in each year in which directors are
to be elected. (5510). Members may apply to the Attorney General to order
such meeting if not timely held. (5510)

Special meetings of members may be called by 5% of the members. (5510)

Members are entitled to written notice of member meetings. (5511)

Members may act by written ballot except to cumulatively vote for
directors. (5513)

Proxies are allowed unless withdrawn by bylaws or articles.
Proxies may be limited by articles or bylaws. Proxies are revocable. (5613)

Members may bring derivative actions, subject to the usual conditions.
(5710) No bond shall be required if enough members bring the action.
(5710)

Most amendments to articles must be approved by Board and members (and
any other persons specified in articles). (e.g. SOs). (5812)

Board must send annual report (as defined in 6321) to members within
120 days after the end of the fiscal year. (6321)

Membership lists and accounting books and records and minutes must be
made available to members for proper purposes. (6330, 6333 and 6338)

Members may amend the bylaws; however, the bylaws may provide that the
amendment may occur only with the approval of a specified person other than the Board. (e.g. SOs). (5150)
Note, however, that the Board may amend the bylaws without the approval of members unless the action would
materially and adversely affect the right of members as to voting or transfer.

Directors elected by members may be removed by members. (5222)

The bylaws must specify a quorum requirement. (5512)

Members can bring legal actions to determine the validity of
elections. (5617)

Section 5056 of the California
Corporations Code normally defines who is a "member" of ICANN: [emphasis added]

5056. (a) "Member" means any
person who, pursuant to a specific provision of a corporation's articles or
bylaws, has the right to vote for the election of a director or
directors or on a disposition of all or substantially all of the
assets of a corporation or on a merger or on a dissolution unless the
provision granting such right to vote is only effective as a result of
paragraph (2) of subdivision (a) of Section 7132. "Member" also
means any person who is designated in the articles or bylaws as a member and,
pursuant to a specific provision of a corporation's articles or bylaws, has
the right to vote on changes to the articles or bylaws.

(b) The articles or bylaws may
confer some or all of the rights of a member, set forth in this part and
in Parts 2 through 5 of this division, upon any person or persons who do
not have any of the voting rights referred to in subdivision (a).

(c) Where a member of a
corporation is not a natural person, such member may authorize in
writing one or more natural persons to vote on its behalf on any or all
matters which may require a vote of the members.

(d) A person is not a member by
virtue of any of the following: (1) Any rights such person has as a
delegate. (2) Any rights such person has to designate or select a
director or directors. (3) Any rights such person has as a director.

This makes it pretty clear that the
California legislature, with the consent of the governor, have determined that
it is a good idea for people who vote for board positions to also have rights to
make sure that the corporation is properly run.

However, ICANN has attempted to avoid
the clear meaning of this statute.

They do this through a two part bit of
legerdemain:

First, they simply declare that members
are not "members"!: [emphasis added]

ARTICLE II: MEMBERSHIP

Section 1. GENERAL

The Corporation shall not have members as defined in the
California Nonprofit Public Benefit Corporation Law ("CNPBCL"),
notwithstanding the use of the term "Member" in these bylaws, in a
selection plan adopted by Board resolution, or in any other action of the
Board. Instead, the Corporation shall allow individuals (described in these
bylaws as "Members") to participate in the activities of the
Corporation as described in this Article II and in a selection plan
adopted by Board resolution, and only to the extent set forth in this
Article II and in a selection plan adopted by Board resolution.

Second they focus on the italicized
words of 5056(a): "pursuant to a specific provision of a
corporation's articles or bylaws" and "right to vote":

ARTICLE II: MEMBERSHIP

...

Section 2. Plan for Selection of Five "At Large" Directors in the
Year 2000

Five persons shall be nominated and selected by no later than November 1,
2000, to become "At Large" Directors according to a selection
plan adopted by the Board. They shall be seated at the conclusion of
the Annual Meeting of the Corporation in 2000.

This so-called "selection plan
adopted by Board resolution" is nothing less than the election in which we
are all participating right now.

By avoiding even the use of the word
"election" (and using "selection" instead) the ICANN
side-show artists are attempting to claim that there isn't even any voting going
on - and you will note that the California statute depends on people having a
"right to vote".

One has to be pretty silly, or stupid,
not to recognize that there is, in fact, an election going on. But ICANN
is depending on blind acceptance of their artifice.

By placing the definition of the selection/election process into a "plan adopted by Board
resolution" ICANN is trying to claim that the selection/election is not
made "pursuant to a specific provision of a corporation's articles or
bylaws".

This is a legal shell game that has no
purpose except to evade the clear intent of the California law and to eviscerate
the rights accorded to people who are in all senses of the word,
"members" of ICANN.

It is a shell game that should be
stopped.

There are those who say that if ICANN
has members that ICANN will be subject to derivative lawsuits. I
agree. I believe that ICANN should be subject to derivative lawsuits -
that is simply part of the cost of being accountable. ICANN can avoid being
liable to such lawsuits simply by acting properly and conforming its actions to
the dictates of law.

One might also want to remember that
the bulk of ICANN's expenses have been to pay legal bills - and these costs have
been incurred to create precisely the kind of prejudicial rule
that we've been talking about here. And since we, the Internet users, will
ultimately bear ICANN's costs, we will ending up paying for the costs of our own
disenfranchisement.

Today most of the substance of
ICANN's actions are determined by ICANN's "staff" - working in
secret, working with unknown third parties, possibly making unknown deals.

In well run non-profit
organizations, "staff" is used to carry out the will of the
Board of Directors. In such organizations, "staff" has
very little discretion.

In ICANN's case, the Board of
Directors has essentially abrogated its duty to set policy and has
relinquished decision making power. As a practical matter, ICANN's
board exercises neither oversight nor independent review of
"staff" actions.

This is wrong.

I advocate that ICANN's
"staff" be substantially reined-in, that its discretionary powers be
reduced to a minimum, that "staff" have no power to consummate any
significant actions without express and explicit approval by the board.

Reform
of ICANN - Voting rather than
"consensus"

Consensus based decision making
requires a great deal of trust in the person who evaluates whether consensus
exists. ICANN has become a cauldron of competing interests with a history
of practices are, at best, questionable.

There is no trust within ICANN that is
adequate to support consensus politics.

The principle of accountability
requires that one be able to ascertain what board member supported what
decisions. Consensus decision making makes that nearly impossible.

It is important that all bodies within
ICANN - the board, the staff, the Support Organizations, the
"Councils", the "Assemblies" - all of these need to abandon
the adherence to soft and fuzzy - and pliable - consensus decision making and
use clear voting on clearly articulated issues.

Reform
of ICANN - Robert's Rules of Order
(modified to work in an electronic context) rather than chaos.

Electronic discussions often
devolve into little more than disorganized chaos.

This problem has been solved in
non-electronic contexts through the use of procedural rules, such as
Roberts Rules of Order.

Mark Langston and others have
examined Roberts Rules and have come up with modifications that are
appropriate for use on e-mail forums.

ICANN, in all of its bodies -
from the board to the councils, from the working groups to the
assemblies - ought to abandon its vague, and pliable,
"consensus" mechanisms and start using orderly processes
including, when needed, counted votes on clearly stated questions.

The original ICANN proposals contained a provision for a Chief
Technology Officer. This was a good idea. It gives the board a
source of technical knowledge upon which it might rely.

Apparently there was a secret reservation in the minds of some
ICANN founders that the office of CTO would be reserved for the late Jon
Postel, and only for Jon Postel. (This reservation is not written on any
publicly visible ICANN document nor was it ever publicly expressed by the proponents
of ICANN. The fact that such an unwritten reservation existed raises
serious questions about what other secret reservations may still be waiting to
surface.)

During a recent ICANN budget cycle, there was a quiet change to
ICANN's structure in which the role of CTO was eliminated citing the
unavailability of Jon Postel to fill the position.

It is sad that Jon died. But his death does not diminish
the need for a CTO within ICANN.

Various third parties, usually associated with the Protocol
Supporting Organization (PSO), argue that the PSO fills the CTO's shoes.
That would be improper because the scope of the PSO is merely disputes over
protocol numbers selected by standards bodies - as such it is unlikely to be an
ecumenical or impartial view of all technical issues.

The principle of accountability
requires that all members of the board of directors be subject to the
will of the electorate for decisions made during their term.

That principle is violated when
there is a person on the board of directors who has obtained the seat
not by virtue of any election.

The President/CEO is present merely to
execute the will of the board. It is wrong for the President/CEO to be
given voting privileges without the balance of being held responsible for how
that vote is used.

The President/CEO ought to be generally
allowed by the board to be present at board meetings (except those pertaining to
personnel matters concerning the President/CEO) - it will improve the clarity
with which the President/CEO understands his/her duties and assignments.
But it ought to be clearly known that such presence is merely a courtesy that is
extended by the board and may be modified or revoked as appropriate.

Reform
of ICANN - No censorship.

I am appalled at some of the
garbage that some participants post on mailing lists. There is no
excuse from behavior that is obscene or defamatory.

However, I do not believe that
the response should be official censorship - as occurs when someone is
blocked from posting by some arbiter of good taste or appropriate
content.

Rather, I believe that shunning is more
appropriate - that each of us ought to make our own decisions about who is
offensive and who is not. And that each of us use the technical
tools that are present in virtually all modern e-mail readers to block those who
we find offensive.

Any record or archive of an ICANN
related e-mail list or discussion forum ought to contain the uncensored,
unedited content of the list.

Jones, Day, Reavis & Pogue is ICANN's law firm, and has been
so since the day of ICANN's birth. Indeed Jones-Day actually performed the
incorporation ceremony in its Los Angeles offices.

Jones, Day, in the person of its principle man-on-the-ICANN-scene,
Joe Sims, was present for at least half a year before ICANN was born, working in
the shadows, responding to unknown interests and possibly making unknown deals.
About all we know about that period is that those who were not insiders to Joe
Sims process were ignored and that those who objected were treated with
condescension and abuse.

Over the life of ICANN, Jones, Day has been the the dominant
creditor of ICANN.

Even now Jones, Day continues to receive a lion's share of every
dollar that flows into ICANN.

And one of Jones, Day's partners, Louis Touton, left the firm to
become ICANN's Vice-President, Secretary, and General Counsel.

There is in my mind a question about the appearance of
propriety.

As a member of the board of directors I would have the right to
rely upon the expertise of entities such as ICANN's law firm - that is unless I
felt that I was not receiving the degree and quality of advice that, in my
opinion, I felt would be necessary for me to properly exercise my duties.
Given my interactions with Jones Day, I do not feel comfortable relying on their
work.

There are many good people at Jones, Day, and I have no doubt
that much, if not all, of its work is adequate. But the firm has no
special credentials to offer to ICANN. And its services have been , to my
mind, extremely expensive, not simply in terms of dollars but also in terms
of the alienation that has been created between ICANN and the public.

Consequently, were I on the ICANN Board of Directors, I would
work to replace Jones, Day, Reavis & Pogue.

Louis Touton left a partnership
position at Jones, Day, Reavis & Pogue to become ICANN's Vice-President, Secretary, and General Counsel.

I believe that ICANN would be better off without him for the
following reasons.

First, it has been my experience that it is a bad idea, both
from a legal and business perspective to have the corporate counsel involved in
non-legal operations. It tends to defocus both points of view.

Second, I have found that this person continues the tradition of
condescension and uncooperativeness that has been the hallmark of ICANN's
officers since the outset. ICANN needs people who build relationships
without first looking at the social register or statements of net worth.

Third, in my personal interactions with this person, I have
found him to be evasive and unwilling to provide even the most basic of
information. I do not have confidence in him.

As a member of the board of directors I would have the right to
rely upon the expertise of people such as ICANN's legal counsel - that is unless
I felt that I was not receiving the degree and quality of advice that, in my
opinion, I felt would be necessary for me to properly exercise my duties.
Given my interactions with Louis Touton, I do not feel comfortable relying on
his work.

Mike Roberts is ICANN's President and CEO, and as such he
receives an automatic seat on ICANN's board. He holds a
"temporary" position - one that he has held since late 1998 - nearly
two years.

There is nothing positive I can say about Mike Roberts. I
have never had a positive interaction with him. I have rarely heard a
statement from him that I believe is not laden with hidden agendas, unstated definitions,
silent reservations, and secret conditions. And I have heard him proclaim, without any
showing of evidence, that there was "consensus" for some policy
decision when it was clear to me, and to others, that opinion in the internet
community was far from agreement.

I have observed him at the helm of ICANN's business processes
and believe that if ICANN had been a for-profit entity, it would have long since
turned turtle and sank in a sea of red ink.

I believe that Mike Roberts has done an outstanding job of
creating ill-will towards ICANN and distrust of ICANN's actions.

Under Robert's hand, ICANN's "staff" has assumed
virtual control of major policy decisions. This staff operates nearly in
total secrecy and without any form of public review.

The DNSO is controlled by those who make money from domain names
and trademarks - there is no real means by which those who simply use the
Internet or who are individual owners of domain names can participate except in
token roles.

The DNSO's General Assembly is
presently a useless, voiceless, powerless body. Over its lifetime the GA
has served only as a posterchild that the Names Council drags out whenever it
wants to fabricate some kind of public support for the GA's decisions.

That is wrong.

The General Assembly must be able to
establish its own processes free from interference by the Names Council, in
particular the GA should have the freedom to establish its own nominations
process for the DNSO's seats on the ICANN board.

No issue should pass out of
the DNSO unless it has been approved by the General Assembly.

DNSO
"constituencies" reflect a pre-conceived notion of who
ought to be permitted to have a say in how the Internet's Domain
Name System is run and who gets access to DNS.

Constituencies ought not to
be the result of someone's pre-conceptions, but rather ought to
reflect actual groupings of interests.

Since interests change,
there ought to be no formalized "constituencies" at
all. Rather, every person who wants to participate in DNSO
matters ought to be able to do so and have a vote. If that
person wishes to align himself/herself with others of similar mind,
then that person may do so. If that person wishes to break
past alliances, he/she ought to be free to do so.

The key is the principle of
one-person-one-vote.

Corporations and
associations ought not to get a vote - they ought to operate through
people who voluntarily chose to cast their vote in accord with what
the corporation or association wants.

It is unlikely that my
point of view - that there ought to be no formal constituencies
whatsoever - will prevail. Consequently my fallback position
is this:

Every constituency in the
DNSO should expire yearly and have to repetition for recognition.

Reform of
ICANN - Get ICANN out of the clerical services business

Have you ever considered what ICANN
does with respect to "protocol parameters"?

It does two things:

First, ICANN runs a clerical
service to write down numbers in a registration book.

Where does it get
these numbers? From the IETF. ICANN calls this "IANA" -
but its really simply a clerical service in which the IETF comes up with a
number, sends it over to ICANN's IANA, and it gets written down. There's
no creativity involved - technical or otherwise.
Sometimes the IETF lets this clerical service give numbers to third parties, in which case the IETF typically
gives some not very
complicated instructions such as: "add one to the previous number and assign the
result". For more complicated things, the IETF designates an
"expert" to which ICANN's IANA must go to ask what to do.
ICANN provides this service free of charge.

The second thing ICANN does with respect
to "protocol parameters" is to have a "Protocol Supporting
Organization", the role of which appears to be moderating disputes, should any
arise (none ever has) between standards bodies regarding one of those numbers
mentioned in the preceding paragraphs.

It strikes me that ICANN, a worldwide
policy making body, the epitome of Internet Governance, ought not to be running
something as mundane as a clerical registry on behalf of one standards body.

The role of the Protocol
Supporting Organization is to deal with disputes between standards
bodies over "protocol parameters".

Since these parameters are
merely numeric values there has never, in the entire 30 year history of
the Internet, been a dispute between standards bodies over a protocol
parameter.

Consequently, there is no need
for a policy organization to deal with this issue.

ICANN should not try to use the
PSO as some sort of technical advisory committee to ensure at the work
of the DNSO and ASO conforms to some notion of Internet technical purity
- that job should be performed with the DNSO and ASO and by the board
with the assistance of an ICANN CTO.

Domain Name Policy

Domain Name Policy -
"Stability"

This word "stability"
has been bandied about, mainly by those opposed to new Top Level
Domains, as a reason to "go slow" or to "do testing"
to otherwise impose impediments to the quick rollout of new TLDs.

Yet no one has bothered to
define what "stability" means and who are the beneficiaries.

Let me begin by remembering
that the Internet was designed to survive nuclear holocaust. The
net was designed so that even if part of it was vaporized (literally) it
could continue to function.

DNS has that same
characteristic - DNS has massive redundancy and caching. And even
if part of DNS were to fail, the rest of the system will continue to
operate and provide service.

DNS as a technology is very
robust, even with hundreds of thousands, and even millions of new TLDs.
Live experiments and day-in-day-out operations of expanded DNS systems
distinct from that operated by ICANN have demonstrated that DNS
technology itself is not a source of potential "instability".

So what could be this thing
called "instability".

First: Let us distinguish
between stability of a DNS root from the stability of a DNS TLD.

Stability of the DNS root can be
achieved in one of two ways, and these ways are not mutually exclusive, they
may coexist:

Professional grade operations -
good computers, good operations, good facilities, good procedures, good
connectivity, external backups, alternate sites, etc.

The current DNS root used by just
about everyone on the Internet has been operated informally for years - it has
never suffered a major failure. (There have, however, been failures in
TLD operations, which is a distinct thing.)

And I have never seen a failure in
any of the more informally run root systems that I use (and which are used by
the computer delivering these web pages to you).

So, I think it would be an error to
be in a panic about the stability of the DNS root even if we were to add
hundreds of thousands or even millions of new TLDs.

Second: Let us examine
"stability" of a TLD (as opposed to "stability" of the DNS
root):

Who reaps the direct
benefits of "Stability"? There is no duty on the
part of content providers to make a web page visible at a given URL. A
content provider is totally free to rename pages or to delete them
entirely. Similarly, there is no obligation that e-mail addresses exist indefinitely.
In fact, an entire DNS name could be released or transferred to another party,
thus invalidating all references that use that name.

Users of the Internet have absolutely
no guarantees that references to content will remain available from one moment
to the next.

The overwhelming preponderance of
failures of users to get content for which they have a correctly entered name is
caused not by DNS outages but rather by the simple fact that content is volatile,
it moves, it mutates, it vanishes.

The balance of failures is caused by
raw connectivity failures in the Internet or by congestion. It has been
estimated by some commentors that at any given instant perhaps 3% of all
Internet locations are unreachable from any given point. And congestion,
particularly at points where ISP's connect to one another, causes data transfers
to freeze of become so slow as to be unusable.

So, we can see that making DNS TLDs
more "stable" won't improve the user's experience.

And none of those who cry
"instability" seem to care much about that.

What the loudest of the
"stability" advocates seem to care about is that their e-stores to
sell products over the Internet will always open so that they can make a sale
whenever a user wishes to part with his or her money.

So it seems that to a large extent the
beneficiaries of this "stability" are not network users but rather
those who have something to sell over the net.

There are, of course, others that have
an interest in making sure that there content is available whenever a user
requests it - emergency services comes to mind. Users do benefit from
this.

"Stability" is not free -
there is a cost involved in running an armored computer facility with redundant
everything. It seems to me that the burden of those costs ought to be born
by those who obtain direct benefit.

So this is how I answer those who
demand "stability": If you are a commercial interest then you
foot the bill to make your TLD as "stable" as you like. If you
are publishing material that benefits the public health or safety (and not doing
so in a way that is essentially an advertising vehicle) then it is fair to
expect the costs of "stability" to be born by the public.

In practical terms this means the
following: TLD operators ought to be required to make prominent and public
disclosures containing sufficient information for a potential domain name
registrant to evaluate the degree of "stability" that the TLD operator
is offering. A TLD operator could promote its facilities, its operations,
or even its contractual relationship with other TLD operators to continue
service even in the face of a business failure, etc.

TLD operators that run high-availability
systems will, I expect, charge higher prices. A registrant who cares about
"stability" ought to make sure that the contract between the
registrant and the TLD operator gives the registrant the contractual right to
obtain the promised level of performance.

Domain
Name Policy - Use existing laws, don't invent new ones

ICANN, despite its denials, has enacted
de facto worldwide laws that have as their practical effect the vast expansion
of trade and service mark rights.

ICANN's rules supersede those of
nations.

That is wrong.

ICANN should not be making law, much
less should it be making supranational law.

(This lawmaking is especially egregious
as it occurs without the participation of those who are most frequently the
victims who lose rights and property as result.)

ICANN's UDRP is a case in point - most
nations have laws that govern trade and service marks. And there are
international treaties on the subject. ICANN's UDRP is an unnecessary
addition to that body of law, particularly since it was created by a body, ICANN,
that has no status as a legislature.

If a trademark owner believes that some
domain name infringes on his/her rights in the trademark, there is an adequate
body of law to determine if infringement has, in fact, occurred and, if it has,
to accord relief.

Because it is duplicative of existing
laws - laws that have been enacted by established legislatures - ICANN's UDRP
should be eliminated entirely and absolutely.

Sure, this would cause trademark owners
to sometimes have to travel to where an alleged infringer may be. And that
is a burden given the worldwide visibility of domain names. However, our
legal systems do evolve - the fact of evolution is built into their most basic
foundations - and we ought to trust the slow, but sure, evolutionary processes
of law to find a balanced result than to leap to an arbitrary law, such as the
UDRP, created by a mere "private corporation" from processes that
allow only one side, the trademark owners, to participate.

Before getting into the
revisions, I would like to mention that I do not believe that ICANN
ought to impose a UDRP at all - I believe that existing law is adequate
protection for those who claim to have a protectable interest in a name
or trademark or service mark.

Assuming, however that the UDRP
is retained, here are some ways it ought to be revised:

The UDRP ought to be made available
to protect the rights of all people or entities that have a protectable
interest in a name. It is not right that the current UDRP is available
as a remedy only to those who have trade or service marks.

The UDRP ought to be amended to
make it clear that it is inapplicable unless the accused domain name is actually
used in a way that violates the laws of the jurisdiction in
which the the accused name operates. Thus, a domain name that is
simply held in a portfolio would not be subject to action under a revised
UDRP. And equally, holding a domain name out for sale would not be
subject to action under a revised UDRP.

The UDRP ought to be amended to
recognize that there are many rights in a name that exist beyond trademark
rights. These includes rights of parody, rights of criticism, rights
of free speech, rights to create names for non-commercial use, etc.

The UDRP ought to be amended so
that its maximum initial remedy is to enjoin the actual use that violates
the laws of the jurisdiction in which the the accused name operates.
Only if the use then continues ought the UDRP grant the remedy of transfer
or cancellation of the domain name.

The UDRP ought to be amended so
that the intention of the owner of the accused domain name is not relevant
to the outcome. The UDRP ought to be designed to remedy actual harm
caused to the complainant, not to punish a domain name holder for bad
attitude.

The UDRP ought to be revised so
that there is no built in incentive for arbitrators to favor the
complainant.

The UDRP ought to be revised to
allow the defendant/respondent more realistic and fair time periods in which
to respond to an complaint and to react to a judgment.

My position has always been that there ought to be no impediment to the creation of new TLDs - but with one proviso: There is a limit out there somewhere on the number of TLDs, probably somewhere between one and several million, where DNS loses its value as a
hierarchical system.

So I'd let anybody operate any TLD for any purpose they chose - the creation and imposition of charters is up to the TLD operator.
(And an operator could change the charter if the contract with his/her customers doesn't prohibit
it.)

I would not impose any operational requirements in the name of "stability" - I figure that is a contractual matter between the TLD operator and his/her customers. If a registrant wants stability and escrowed databases, then he/she can go to a TLD that offers that kind of service (presumably for a price.)

I'd not place any obligation on TLD operators to honor anything like a UDRP.
I figure that if somebody registers a domain name and actually uses it to infringe on a trademark that there's an adequate legal foundation for the injured party to obtain a remedy - there's no need for us to need to create new and ad hoc legal system.

I'd probably require TLD operators to create and publish certain policies - privacy, availability of the zone files, statement of backup practices - just so that the customers have a way of evaluating what they are buying.
But I'd allow the privacy statement to be as strong or weak as the TLD operator wanted - take a look at the CaveBear privacy policy for an example:
http://www.cavebear.com/archive/privacypolicy.htm

My concern about the one-to-several million number of TLDs needs to be handled by the imposition of some sort of
barriers to prevent unproductive collecting. I am somewhat afraid of monetary barriers because that allows the rich to buy in.
I personally like lottery systems - I kinda like some sort of plan that says:

We will introduce 1,000[*] new TLD's slots each year. Every natural person is entitled to purchase one "ticket" (perhaps for some nominal price to recover *reasonable* costs[**].)
The 1000 winners will be selected in sequence - and each winner gets to select the character string they want to use for his/her TLD - there would be absolutely
no examination of the name in terms of trademark or obscenity - that kind of thing ought to be up to the external legal system. (In case
of duplicate character strings, priority goes to the winner that came first in that year's drawing sequence.)
I'd allow the winners to sell their tickets or prizes at any time (including a winning ticket that has not yet selected the character string) for any price they can get.

[*] I picked the number 1000 because it's probably enough to cover the needs of the first year or two while the bugs are worked out of the system. After that, it could readily go to 10,000/year - that gives us 100 years before we reach the million TLD mark.

[**] I'm kind of fond of the notion that the costs should be underwritten by the current suite of TLD's - they got a big free ride, especially the NSI ones, and its time for them to return the favor.

I might be moved to consider some sort of keep-alive mechanism - for example, the TLD winner (or
successor) has to say "we're still here" once a year and keep at least a reasonable number of name servers operational - a lapse of a few years would be reason to reclaim the TLD name and slot.

I figure that all that ICANN ought to be doing is selling slots in a DNS root zone file.
To the greatest extent reasonable, ICANN ought to keep its nose out of what people do with those slots - any disputes can, and ought, to be resolved by the existing legal systems, even if that means that some trademark owner has to hop a plane and file a lawsuit in Estonia or Niue or somewhere.
And - here's a US centric aspect - I'd respond to orders to do something to a slot only if it got past all the hurdles needed for foreign
judgments to be enforced in California (or wherever.)

How I will conduct myself

There is an active verb that goes
with the term "Director" - and that is to
"direct". It is my intention to not sit passively by and let
"staff" run amok, as they are now doing, or to let Internet policy
happen by silent acquiescence.

I'm as fallible as everyone else. So I'll do my best to be open and
transparent in all my ICANN related activities so that you can catch my mistakes
and give me guidance.

I'm generally available by e-mail and I'll try to maintain a web page about
what I'm doing and thinking.

During board meetings I intend to take notes of my actions and have them
published into the minutes. I'll try to include a statement of what
information I hear, where it comes from, how credible I consider it, what the
issues are, what the tradeoffs are, my evaluation, my vote, etc, etc. I
anticipate that the corporate secretary will resist incorporating this in the
meeting minutes to which I will respond as appropriate.