David Naylor, 57, of Stourbridge Road, Bridgnorth - director of Express Hi-Fold Doors Ltd which manufactured the door - is standing trial at Guildford Crown Court where he denies two counts of manslaughter by gross negligence.

His company faces a charge of breaching general duty regarding articles and substances for use at work.

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G Live Fisherman's Friends manslaughter trial

Day 18 ends

We will resume tomorrow at 10am for a final summary, before the jury will be sent out to deliberate over their decision.

15:58

Judge Whipple gives the jury a direction about Mr Naylor’s character.

She said: “In relation to those points, you know that the defence case is that in relation to point two, there was no obligation.

“He says even if there was a breach in that regard, it doesn’t give rise to an obvious risk of death - far from it (point three).

“But even if that’s not right, and he did make a mistake, it simply cannot be said that it was approaching ‘gross’ conduct.

“For those reasons, Mr Naylor invites a not guilty verdict.”

15:53

“Members of the jury, you have these interviews, you will have them after.

“Let me remind you of the evidence that was given in relation to Mr Naylor’s character.

“First of all, the statement from Rob Willitts knew him for 25 years, said that ‘David was more expensive than the competition but we chose him because the product was good.’

“Daniel Naylor, his son, described his father as controlled, professional, a man said to collect his thoughts, got everyone together to find solutions to problems.

“You heard from Simon Hope, Eastern Atlantic Helicopters, he purchased five hi-fold doors in 15 years, regular maintenance contract, said he was very happy with his product, that Mr Naylor was professional.”

15:50

“First of all, Mr Naylor chose not to give evidence. You must not hold that against him,” she added.

“You have six interviews, you read through them, they are all collected through the jury bundle.

“Mr Green made the point he accepted that Schweiss, the sister company, had complied. The reason I go to the interviews is to remind you that Mr Naylor said it was a different sort of door - indicated that there were differences. Just so you have full evidence in mind.

“He talked about the Schweiss bi-fold door being stranded, he then says the drive system is different, different motors, drive boxes, chains, the latch system is different.

“No similarities between the two.”

15:47

Defence response

She continues: “The defence answer to this long list is two-fold.

“Whatever health and safety style criticisms may be justified, those do not, together or separately, come anywhere near this case as a ‘gross’ negligence.

“The quality of his misconduct was nowhere near that bad. I leave that to you.”

15:44

She adds that there was criticism over the door, which should have been checked when the door left the factory.

“There was no servicing checklist, this was brought in after the servicing engineers attended G Live.

“The owners manual was said to be quite confusing.

“It was said that internal and external sensors should be fitted as standard. There were no signs or warnings around the door.

“It was said that Mr Naylor was not a member of the professional association, but accepted it was not compulsory.”

15:44

“It was said there was no device to record when the door went up and down, no way to measure wear and tear.

“There was criticism of failure over a lack of schedule or plan to replace components.

“There was said to be inadequate inspection or maintenance of the door.

“One of Mr Schofield’s arguments were that the chains were not strong enough to supply a strong enough safety margin.

“Certainly it was a criticism that the chains didn’t have a sufficient margin.

“The technical file failed to reflect the actual door that was in operation. Mr Schofield shows there were calculations were different.

“There was criticism that employees were not formally trained. Reliance was placed on handing knowledge down the line from one employee to the next - that this might create ‘Chinese whispers’.”

15:40

“Members of the jury I next wanted to remind you of some evidence relating to question five,” she resumes.

“When we get there the prosecution rely on a number of other allegations in addition to what you’ve already heard relating to the design of the door of the G Live incident and so on.

“All these other failures do evidence a casual approach to health and safety and that should lead you to conclude that the failure in 2010 by Mr Naylor should properly be categorised as a gross failure.

“I’ve got my directions on how to apply that word, I know you will apply that.

“The allegations come from the evidence of Mr Schofield and Mr O’Brien. Between them perceive to be deficiencies by Mr Naylor that you may want to take into account.”

15:36

We're back

Judge Whipple re-enters the room and the jury are called back.

15:18

Brief break

The court adjourns for a brief break towards the end of Judge Whipple’s summing up.

15:16

“Mr O’Brien gave evidence to you as well. He agreed with Mr Isherwood.

“He agreed that misalignment caused the chain to break.

“He was able to identify at least one factor which contributed - namely the loose fit of the chain drive.

“According to Mr O’Brien’s spreadsheet, the majority of the components were out of tolerance. That was evidence that he relied on to describe to you.

“From this, it is clear one sprocket key was of the wrong size, he thought that was the case from day one. He confirmed the looseness of the sprocket.

“We get to a summary of this part of the evidence. You want to ask yourself if you accept the explanation of how the incident occurred as put forward by Mr Isherwood or Mr O’Brien, if you do, then the only thing that could have prevented it is an anti-drop device. No less a measure would have prevented the door from collapsing.

“You may conclude that others make mistakes too. Certainly the defence invites you to conclude that his mistakes should not be ‘gross’.”

15:12

“He tried to recreate the door as it would’ve been when first produced.

“The sprockets became misaligned.

“He confirmed under cross-examination there was no problem with the drive chain, all components made out of suitable materials.

“He thought the chain was as expected.

“THe immediate cause was the failure of the chains, control of the door was removed, allowed the bottom of the door to drop.

“The drive chains failed because of the bending process, rather than tensile pull.

“Witness marks showed there had been a gradual displacement, which may have led to a bending of chains.

“Misalignment as they went over the sprockets, forming an S chain, that would almost act as if it were trying to separate inner and outer of the chains.

“He said he didn’t know how long it took to occur, couldn’t age it at all.”

15:08

She continued summing up for the jury:

“Let me move on to the cause of the fall.

“You heard from Mr Isherwood, from the Health and Safety Laboratories, who provide support to the HSE.

“He was an engineer, worked as a mechanical engineer since he was 16. He gave certain measurements. The weight of the door came to 2.194 tonnes.

“He said that the chains fracture at the point where the pin passes through the inner chain.

“Sprockets he described as worn, out of alignment. Each moved inwards towards the gearbox, along the drive shaft.

“Sprocket keys, he noted that the left hand key wasn’t flush as you may expect.”

15:06

“Members of the jury, you know what happened that day,” she said as we look to the events of February 9 2013.

“I want to remind you of evidence from Katharine Thompson, (who operated the door on the day of the collapse).

“She said she opened the door to let them do that. She followed the normal procedure.

“She said she was checking there were no obstructions, she was happy with what she saw. She closed the door, she went to the control box, said she could see anyone coming from the inside.

“She pressed the red override switch, pressed the up arrow, the deadman’s switch, and said ‘I used that door everytime I worked there, five or six times a week.’

“It took about five or seven minutes to open fully. She could see the majority of the van outside: ‘I remember the noise, i cannot remember what i saw. I heard a clattering.’

“She told you she had been trained by Jonathan Hill. What does sadly appear to be clear is that people were beneath the door.”

15:01

Darren Bruce was the project architect. Judge Whipple continued:

“He told you he worked on the door under the end of November 2011. By the time Wilmot Dixon got involved, the architects were to deliver to Wilmot Dixon.

“There was a discussion about putting sensors on as building control (Guildford Borough Council) had asked. The point is that he drew up plans for how the sensor was to be implemented.

“He was shown photographs of where the bollards were, confirmed the photos were not consistent with his plan.

“Said it was Wilmot Dixon responsible for implementing the plans. He said building control had also expressed concerns whether someone could become trapped.

“He accepted that Hi-Fold Doors could not make Wilmot Dixon, or any client, install them.”

14:57

“Mr Sweeney gave some evidence, he said around March 2012, he had a meeting with James Murphy and another person present.

“At this meeting Mr Sweeney said he asked about the photocells which were already disconnected. Mr Murphy said not to worry.

“Mr Dewsbury was not an employee of Hi-Fold Doors. He said he came back on November 16 2011. He said that he fitted the photocells on the post outside but had no recollection of any override button. He was aware it had been fitted but did not know who had fitted it.

“He kept receipts, but came up with nothing except a parking ticket.”

14:55

She continued:

“In relation to photocells the evidence was this. You were told that building control had requested certain safety features to be installed. One of those were the photocells.

“For various reasons they could not be installed at that stage (December 2010). We know that they were in fact installed on 16 November 2011.

“We also know that by the time the accident happened, the photocells weren’t working at all and were disconnected.

“Jonathan Hill told you what happened when they were first fitted. On the first lift after they were installed, it was obvious that the door was cutting through the safety circuit. It was clear an override button was needed.

“A contractor didn’t have the means to do that, so I (Jonathan Hill) suggested he go to Maplins and he came back. Once the override button was installed, the door could be raised.

“To raise the door the start button had to be held and press the override until the door was 8ft off the ground.

“He confirmed it was James Murphy of Wilmot Dixon who installed the button. He said it was the contractor.

“Next you heard from Mr Murphy, he worked for Wilmot Dixon as project manager for G Live. When he was asked about the switch, he said he discussed it with the electrician and Jonathan Hill but what he discussed was simply what would happen if the beams were knocked out of line.

“He said he didn’t know the button was fitted as he had a meeting directly after that.”

14:50

“Let me move on now please from 2010 to the events subsequent to the installation of the door in that year.

“I want to group the evidence under certain headings.

“The first of those, the operation of the door. You heard from two employees - Adrian Sweeney and Jonathan Hill. They did the same job as buildings manager and responsible for G Live.

“In 2012 Sweeney took over. Mr Hill told you a small number of staff were permitted to use the door, he was one of them. Would use it two or three times a day to take deliveries.

“Sweeney took over from Jonathan Hill, he said the use of the door was to those already trained at G Live. He said he was told to make sure the outside was clear, no vehicles nearby. We heard about the Judas door, made sure it was was closed and locked, and which button would operate the door.”

She points the jury to the bundle which references the instructions for the door, which explicitly states no person should be underneath the door whilst it is in operation.

14:44

Was the failure causative?

“If you consider that Mr Naylor breached his duty by failing to apply options one or two to the G Live door, it would follow that his failure was causative.

“Mr Bennett, of MTech, and Mr Green, of the HSE were both witnesses of fact, not experts, but each expressed a view about the door.

“Given their respective background, experience, and role in the stories, you would think they were credible.

“Mr Bennett’s evidence you may think is not easy to reconcile with Mr O’Brien’s evidence on the fundamental issue.

“As to Mr Green, he is an inspector of health and safety at the HSE since 2009. He told you about the various steps they took including the issuing of notices.

“He said the improvement notices on each door, the hi-fold door and schweiss door were similar. They had exactly the same problem so they got the same notices. They were issued in 2014, some time after.

“In fact, Express stopped making the bi-fold door in 2014 so in that case the notice was withdrawn.

“Mr Green told you in 2015 Schweiss had complied with the notice, by using a different system. He told you the solution ‘could have done it to any door.’”

14:38

Judge Whipple said:

“He had run his theories past GFA, another company, but concluded there were three available options.

“The first was to install a top motor shaft including a safety break which would operate in the event of chain failure. It would need to be kept horizontal at all times. They offered a safety break that could do the job. The effect of that would be the door would descend 300mm or so but it would not fall.

“When cross-examined he accepted that it would require a substantial redesign of the door.

“Option two was to omit the use of drive chains altogether by using a direct drive motor onto the drive shaft. He thought that in theory it could work provided there was power to lift the door. This would mean no chain would be required. He thought that GFA had such from 2010.

“He did not know if anyone else had such a motor. There was no risk from failed chains.

“Option three was based on the design of the door at G Live. He thought to make the door safe would be to install chain break sensors. If either went slack the door would be held in place. This design involved the cables going slack as part of operation, so if it were installed, an override would have to be in place when the door was in position.

“He accepted that if chains were broken at the same time, incorporation of sensors would not have made a difference and the door would come down anyway.

“Mr O’Brien was asked about conclusions, it was his conclusion that there were no adequate safeguards. He was asked whether a reasonably competent door manufacturer would have installed safeguards to comply with ESHR standards, he said yes and did not see any sign that Mr Naylor complied.”

14:27

She said: “When asked, he said that duplicate chains could provide sufficient anti-drop safeguard so long as C-G had been complied with.”

Judge Whipple now points the jury towards the court bundle once more.

According to the report, Mr Schofield said the advice was wrong and that the double chain could provide a sufficient back-up.

“Can I just remind you of one other point put to him - he was asked about a different standard, which you haven’t got.

“That was a standard to establish when testing compliance, the idea is you take the suspension elements out one by one and see what they hold.

“Mr Schofield accepted that the chains would have passed that test.”

14:23

“Mr Schofield’s opinion in short is that the door did not comply with that standard,” she continued.

“Mr Schofield relied on the first paragraph of the standard which refers to the event of failure of a single component in the system.

“He told you the standard required and when he was asked about the views he had come to in relation to the standard, he said he had used a worst case scenario when looking at the standard.

“When you are looking at the sub paragraphs, his view was that C-G were relevant and he considered that the G Live door failed to meet that standard.”

14:20

Summing up continues

“There are two important points to make - firstly, negligence is not the same as health and safety.

“It may be evidence suggesting negligence, but it does not establish negligence in the law itself.

“That is simply part of the evidence that you have taken into account.

“Secondly, there are different types of health and safety standards.

“As part of the prosecution you were shown two different types of standards.”

14:17

“Mr Schofield gave evidence on a number of issues relating to health and safety. I want to focus on two aspects.

“First of all, let me remind you of his evidence on the essential health and safety requirements.

“Mr Schofield told you he examined the technical file of the door from July 1998, and told you the purpose was to demonstrate the safety.

“He told you one of the principles was that the design should make the machine fit for purpose.

“The first step is to aim for a design in itself is safe and eliminates risk as far as possible.

“If you cannot do that, protective measures should be providede.

“The third step, is that where there is a residual risk which cannot be eliminated by design, or removed by protective measures, the user of the machine should be made aware.

“His conclusion was that the door did not meet ESHRs because the first step of the above ‘hierarchy’, he did not think the machine had eliminated the risk.

“If drive chain integrity was being relied upon, the second chain, there would have to be an appropriate regime of special maintenance.”

14:13

She points the jury towards a bundle.

“Mr Isherwood has expressed a view as to why the Hi-Fold Door collapsed.

“Mr Schofield on why it failed to comply with health and safety standards.

“I will summarise their evidence in due course.”

14:11

Judge Whipple continued:

“What I want to do next is look at the expert evidence, particularly on the breach of duty.

“This is the evidence that lies at the heart of the prosecution case.

“Prosecution relies on this evidence to persuade you that the design was not acceptable without the anti-drop device.

“Both witnesses were called as experts - Mr O’Brien and Mr Schofield.”

14:10

“They hung the door, other aspects couldn’t be completed [December 2010].“It came with photocells, but they couldn’t be fitted.

“In January 2011, Mr Naylor wrote to Wilmot Dixon, enclosed a copy of the manual on a disk.”

14:07

She continued:

“They said there was a standard range stocked by Link Controls.

“We know what option was chosen, we see the confirmation of that purchase on page 88.

“We know that the motor and gear box was purchased from Link.

“Mr Lloyd told you that it was capable of holding up to 2.5tonnes safety and sufficiently.

“He didn’t know which particular supplier had manufactured the equipment used on the Guildford door, but Link employees confirmed they hadn’t been made aware there was any problem with their parts.”

14:05

“You have evidence that Wilmot Dixon included Hi-Fold Doors in its database of contractors.

“It subsequently placed the order for the door, on 14 May 2010.

“Mr Colley fabricated the door, he told you it was a pretty standard door.

“The gear box and the motor were purchased from Link Controls - you heard from two witnesses from Link Controls.

“They had both been working there in 2010 when the Guildford door had been manufactured.”

14:03

Judge Whipple continues her summing up:

“On March 17 2010, Mr Naylor provided a quote to Wilmot Dixon for the door.

“It might help you to have a look at that document.“After that he had email correspondence with a managing director of Compass. Mr Lambert told you he wasn’t the man responsible for providing health and safety advice to the company.”