Earlier this month, I wrote about two dynamics in the bilateral U.S.-Russian relationship that reduce the prospects for further nuclear reductions. Next, it is worth looking at the prospects for cuts in the context of multilateralism.

The most recent test failure of the Ground Based Interceptor (GBI) – or more specifically the Capability Enhancement-1 (CE-1) – has sparked a debate over whether the United States should continue investing in Ground based Missile Defense (GMD). The debate has intensified because of the planned purchase of 14 additional model CE-2s to be based in Alaska. While the members of the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) have continually stated that apparent problems can be easily fixed, doubt about the program’s reliability has continued to rise in the minds of lawmakers. Current U.S. policy regarding the ground based interceptors should change. The U.S. government and the MDA should halt the deployment of systems that have not been proven reliable, while continuing to fund research and development. In addition, there is little utility in scaling up deployment of the systems, because by the time credible threats emerge from states such as North Korea and Iran, the systems will already have become obsolete.

The British government recently released its Trident Alternatives Review, a report meant to assess alternatives to like-for-like renewals of the Trident nuclear submarine fleet. The report has concluded that while there are alternatives to replacing the fleet, “none of these alternative systems and postures offers the same degree of resilience as the current posture of continuous at-sea deterrence, nor could they guarantee a prompt response in all circumstances.