On 23 Sep 2009, at 18:48, Flammarion wrote:
He hasn';t made it clear that he is positing Platonism
as having expalntory value. Half the time he denies he
is positing Platonism at all.
And when he seeks to justify it, he makes brief comments
to the effect that is self-evident that 7 exists

On 24 Sep, 00:45, David Nyman david.ny...@gmail.com wrote:
2009/9/23 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com:
You concluded that the realisation of a computation doesn't
cause consciousness. But did you also mean to imply that nonetheless
the realisation of a computation IS consciousness?

On 24 Sep, 09:14, Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote:
On 24 Sep, 00:45, David Nyman david.ny...@gmail.com wrote:
2009/9/23 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com:
You concluded that the realisation of a computation doesn't
cause consciousness. But did you also mean to imply that

On 24 Sep, 01:19, David Nyman david.ny...@gmail.com wrote:
2009/9/23 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com:
Some people can argue that MGA is not needed. They believe that it is
obvious that consciousness is not something material at all, and that
it is a waste of time of both trying

On 24 Sep, 02:10, David Nyman david.ny...@gmail.com wrote:
2009/9/23 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com:
I thought you had denied that you were seeking some
ultimate metaphysically primitive justification, rather than defining
a particular set of constraints on the theoretical entities to

On 24 Sep, 02:28, David Nyman david.ny...@gmail.com wrote:
On Sep 22, 1:10 pm, Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote:
No it's what a program is... Would you be different if instantiated on a
x86
computer than on an ARM based one ?
There's a difference between being independent

On 24 Sep, 07:25, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
CTM has enough physical commitment to keep a whole
bunch of phsycalists happy. In fact i can;t see many
Ai research types being happy at retaining CTM only if phsycical
realism is abandoned. But then it is a moot point
since

2009/9/24 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com:
If you don't think CTM solves the HP then presumably you don't hold
that conscious states supervene on the physical tokens of particular
computational types.
They might do inexplocably. But the significant point
is that nothing else solves the HP

Hi,
I sum up the definition and results seen so far.
N = {0, 1, 2, ...}, the set of natural numbers (also called positive
integers).
N^N = {f such that f is a function from N to N} = the set of functions
from N to N.
Universal language: a language in which we can describe formally how

2009/9/24 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com:
Another point that has got rather lost here is that computationalists
tend to be a lot more concerned about cognition than experience, CTM
has no trouble explaining how people play chess.
It hasn't got lost - e.g. two sentences later I said I have

2009/9/24 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com:
The idealist defence agaisnt these refutations always involves things
being arranged just so so as to givew he imitation
of a material world with minds supervening on brains. And it
doesn't give a good reason why things should be just so. It's a

On 24 Sep, 14:32, David Nyman david.ny...@gmail.com wrote:
2009/9/24 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com:
If you don't think CTM solves the HP then presumably you don't hold
that conscious states supervene on the physical tokens of particular
computational types.
They might do

On 24 Sep, 14:50, David Nyman david.ny...@gmail.com wrote:
2009/9/24 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com:
Another point that has got rather lost here is that computationalists
tend to be a lot more concerned about cognition than experience, CTM
has no trouble explaining how people play

On 24 Sep, 14:32, David Nyman david.ny...@gmail.com wrote:
2009/9/24 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com:
If you don't think CTM solves the HP then presumably you don't hold
that conscious states supervene on the physical tokens of particular
computational types.
They might do

2009/9/24 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com:
AFAICS nobody has been arguing that any metaphysical posit is an a
priori truth. The claim that CTM entails the posit of AR is the
consequence of a reasoned argument. The alternative is that CTM is
false on the posit of PM.
You seem to be

2009/9/24 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com:
Right..so you are using third person to mean cognitive
and 1st person to mean experiential...?
I assume that when the term cognitive is used it is intended to be
cashed out in some third-person way. However, many terms seem to be
used somewhat

2009/9/24 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com:
Why harp on the fact that CTM isn't physicalist enough, if you think
physicalism is equally sueless? After all, phsycialism is just PM
+structure.
The difference is that the structure is finer-grained.
Agreed. But the harping was motivated

On Sep 24, 2:44 am, Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com wrote:
Of course Johnson's refutation didn't change any idealist
minds, but he pointed to the use of operational definitions
as the basis of science which ultimately had a lot more
influence than Berkeley.
That is very true. The

On Sep 24, 9:39 am, Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote:
Could you either
state clearly what work this label is supposed to do, beyond the posit
of AR on an abductive basis that we have already agreed on, or drop
your insistence on it?
I have explained that several times. It clarifies

On 24 Sep, 16:01, david.nyman david.ny...@gmail.com wrote:
2009/9/24 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com:
AFAICS nobody has been arguing that any metaphysical posit is an a
priori truth. The claim that CTM entails the posit of AR is the
consequence of a reasoned argument. The alternative

On 24 Sep, 16:48, David Nyman david.ny...@gmail.com wrote:
On Sep 24, 9:39 am, Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote:
Could you either
state clearly what work this label is supposed to do, beyond the posit
of AR on an abductive basis that we have already agreed on, or drop
your

On 24 Sep, 16:16, david.nyman david.ny...@gmail.com wrote:
2009/9/24 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com:
Why harp on the fact that CTM isn't physicalist enough, if you think
physicalism is equally sueless? After all, phsycialism is just PM
+structure.
The difference is that the

2009/9/24 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com:
You seem to be assuming a workign MGA
Actually I'm only assuming my own argument contra the physical
intelligibility of CTM,
I haven't seen you give an argument that CTM is incompatible
with phsycalism, only that CTM wouldn't give the seame

2009/9/24 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com:
But this is the very hinge of disagreement. CTM's Trojan Horse is the
incoherence of its posit of materialism.
Accordign to whom?
It's demonstrably as
dependant on AR as comp is;
What is dependent on AR? Materialism?
CTM. But you still won't

On 24 Sep, 18:16, David Nyman david.ny...@gmail.com wrote:
2009/9/24 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com:
You seem to be assuming a workign MGA
Actually I'm only assuming my own argument contra the physical
intelligibility of CTM,
I haven't seen you give an argument that CTM is

On 24 Sep, 18:17, David Nyman david.ny...@gmail.com wrote:
2009/9/24 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com:
But this is the very hinge of disagreement. CTM's Trojan Horse is the
incoherence of its posit of materialism.
Accordign to whom?
It's demonstrably as
dependant on AR as comp is;

2009/9/24 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com:
if it can't, we need another strategy to
disambiguate its actual relation to the physical account. The latter
conclusion is what motivates the reversal of matter and mathematics in
comp.
There is no ambiguity in the reduction of computation
to

David Nyman wrote:
2009/9/24 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com:
if it can't, we need another strategy to
disambiguate its actual relation to the physical account. The latter
conclusion is what motivates the reversal of matter and mathematics in
comp.
There is no ambiguity in the reduction

And HP stands for???
- Original Message -
From: David Nyman david.ny...@gmail.com
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Sent: Thursday, September 24, 2009 9:50 AM
Subject: Re: Dreaming On
2009/9/24 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com:
Another point that has got rather lost here is

On 24 Sep 2009, at 10:35, Flammarion wrote:
Platonism=AR. To be precise, Platonism disambiguates AR as an
ontological commitment and not just a commitment to mind-independent
truth.
So Platonism is different from AR.
comp (CTM) assumes AR, not platonism.
UDA uses AR, not Platonism. UDA uses

On 25 Sep 2009, at 02:07, m.a. wrote:
And HP stands for???
I guess it means Hard Problem (of consciousness).
I prefer to use mind-body problem (or hard mind-body problem in some
context).
I use also HPC (hard problem of consciousness) to distinguish it from
the HPM (hard problem of