The
Vietnam War
was the
longest war
America ever
experienced
until recent
times.
It was the
first war,
that was
televised
nightly,
focusing on
a measure of
body count
for the day.
It was a
very
political war
and by far
the most unpopular.

Vietnam War,
also known
as the
Second
Indochina
War,
military
struggle
fought in
Vietnam from
1959 to
1975,
involving
the North
Vietnamese
and the
National
Liberation
Front (NLF)
in conflict
with United
States
forces and
the South
Vietnamese
army. From
1946 until
1954, the
Vietnamese
had
struggled
for their
independence
from France
during the
First
Indochina
War. At the
end of this
war, the
country was
temporarily
divided into
North and
South
Vietnam.
North
Vietnam came
under the
control of
Vietnamese
Communists
who had
opposed
France and
who aimed
for a
unified
Vietnam
under
Communist
rule. The
South was
controlled
by
non-Communist
Vietnamese.

The
United
States
became
involved in
Vietnam
because
American
policymakers
believed
that if the
entire
country fell
under a
Communist
government,
Communism
would spread
throughout
Southeast
Asia. This
belief was
known as the
"domino
theory." The
U.S.
government,
therefore,
helped to
create the
anti-Communist
South
Vietnamese
government.
This
government's
repressive
policies led
to rebellion
in the
South, and
in 1960 the
NLF was
formed with
the aim of
overthrowing
the
government
of South
Vietnam and
reunifying
the country.

The
United
States did
not want to
allow the
possibility
of Communist
control over
Vietnam. In
June 1954,
during the
Geneva
Conference,
the United
States
pressured
Bao Dai to
appoint Ngo
Dinh Diem
prime
minister of
the
government
in South
Vietnam. The
United
States chose
Diem for his
nationalist
and
anti-Communist
credentials.
With U.S.
support,
Diem refused
to sign the
Geneva
Accords.
Diem
announced he
had no
intention of
participating
in the
planned
national
elections,
which Ho Chi
Minh and the
Lao Dong
were favored
to win.
Instead,
Diem held
elections
only in
South
Vietnam, in
October
1955. He won
the
elections
with 98.2
percent of
the vote,
but many
historians
believe
these
elections
were rigged,
since about
150,000 more
people voted
in Saigon
than were
registered.
Diem then
deposed Bao
Dai, who had
been the
only other
candidate,
and declared
South
Vietnam to
be an
independent
nation
called the
Republic of
Vietnam
(RVN), with
himself as
president
and Saigon
as its
capital.
Vietnamese
Communists
and many
non-Communist
Vietnamese
nationalists
saw the
creation of
the RVN as
an effort by
the United
States to
interfere
with the
independence
promised at
Geneva.

Diem
represented
the
interests of
the urban,
Catholic
minority in
South
Vietnam.
Although
Diem also
found some
support in
the
countryside
among
non-Communists,
he did not
enjoy a
broad base
of support.
The
repressive
measures of
the Diem
government,
designed to
persecute
Viet Minh
activists
and gain
control of
the
countryside,
eventually
led to
increasingly
organized
opposition
within South
Vietnam. The
United
States
initially
backed
Diem's
government
with
military
advisers and
financial
assistance
to keep it
from
collapsing.

When
Vietnam was
divided in
1954, many
Viet Minh
who had been
born in the
southern
part of the
country
returned to
their native
villages to
await the
1956
elections
and the
reunification
of their
nation. When
the
elections
did not take
place as
planned,
these Viet
Minh
immediately
formed the
core of
opposition
to Diem's
government
and sought
its
overthrow.
They were
greatly
aided in
their
efforts to
organize
resistance
in the
countryside
by Diem's
own
policies,
which
alienated
many
peasants.

Beginning
in 1955, the
United
States
created the
Army of the
Republic of
Vietnam
(ARVN) in
South
Vietnam.
Using these
troops, Diem
took land
away from
peasants and
returned it
to former
landlords,
reversing
the land
redistribution
program
implemented
by the Viet
Minh. He
also
forcibly
moved many
villagers
from their
ancestral
lands to
controlled
settlements
in an
attempt to
prevent
Communist
activity,
and he
drafted
their sons
into the
ARVN.

Diem
sought to
undermine
the Viet
Minh, whom
he
derogatorily
referred to
as Viet Cong
(the
Vietnamese
equivalent
of calling
them
"Commies"),
yet their
influence
continued to
grow. Most
southern
Viet Minh
were
committed to
the Lao
Dong's
program of
national
liberation,
reunification
of Vietnam,
and
reconstruction
of
society
along
socialist
principles.
By the late
1950s they
were anxious
to begin
full-scale
armed
struggle
against Diem
but were
held in
check by the
northern
branch of
the party,
which feared
that this
would invite
the entry of
U.S. armed
forces. In
1960,
however,
widespread
opposition
to Diem in
rural areas
convinced
the party
leadership
to
officially
sanction the
formation of
the National
Front for
the
Liberation
of South
Vietnam
(commonly
known as the
National
Liberation
Front, or NLF). The
NLF was a
classical
Communist-front
organization;
although
Communists
dominated
the NLF
leadership,
the
organization
also
embraced
non-Communists
who opposed
the South
Vietnamese
government.
The aim of
the NLF was
to overthrow
the Diem
government
and reunify
Vietnam.
Toward this
end, the NLF
began to
train and
equip a
guerrilla
force that
was formally
organized in
1961 as the
People's
Liberation
Armed Forces
(PLAF).

Diem's
support was
concentrated
mainly in
the cities.
Although he
had been a
nationalist
opposed to
French rule,
he welcomed
into his
government
those
Vietnamese
who had
collaborated
with the
French, and
many of
these became
ARVN
officers.
Catholics
were a
minority
throughout
Vietnam,
amounting to
no more than
10 percent
of the
population,
but they
predominated
in
government
positions
because Diem
himself was
Catholic.
Between 1954
and 1955,
operatives
paid by the
CIA spread
rumors in
northern
Vietnam that
Communists
were going
to launch a
persecution
of
Catholics,
which caused
nearly 1
million
Catholics to
flee to the
south. Their
resettlement
uprooted
Buddhists
who already
deeply
resented
Diem's rule
because of
his severe
discrimination
against
them.

In May
1963
Buddhists
began a
series of
demonstrations
against
Diem, and
the
demonstrators
were fired
on by
police. At
least 7
Buddhist
monks set
themselves
on fire to
protest the
repression.
Diem
dismissed
these
suicides as
publicity
stunts and
promptly
arrested
1,400 monks.
He then
arrested
thousands of
high school
and grade
school
students who
were
involved in
protests
against the
government.
After this,
Diem was
viewed as an
embarrassment
both by the
United
States and
by many of
his own
generals.

The
Saigon
government's
war against
the NLF was
also going
badly. In
January 1963
an ARVN
force of
2,000
encountered
a group of
350 NLF
soldiers at
Ap Bac, a
village
south of
Saigon in
the Mekong
River Delta.
The ARVN
troops were
equipped
with jet
fighters,
helicopters,
and armored
personnel
carriers,
while the
NLF forces
had only
small arms.
Nonetheless,
61 ARVN
soldiers
were killed,
as were 3
U.S.
military
advisers. By
contrast,
the NLF
forces lost
only 12 men.
Some U.S.
military
advisers
began to
report that
Saigon was
losing the
war, but the
official
military and
embassy
press
officers
reported Ap
Bac as a
significant
ARVN
victory.
Despite this
official
account, a
handful of
U.S.
journalists
began to
report
pessimistically
about the
future of
U.S.
involvement
in South
Vietnam,
which led to
increasing
public
concern.

President
John F.
Kennedy
still
believed
that the
ARVN could
become
effective.
Some of his
advisers
advocated
the
commitment
of U.S.
combat
forces, but
Kennedy
decided to
try to
increase
support for
the ARVN
among the
people of
Vietnam
through
counterinsurgency.
United
States
Special
Forces
(Green
Berets)
would work
with ARVN
troops
directly in
the villages
in an effort
to match NLF
political
organizing
and to win
over the
South
Vietnamese
people.

To
support the
U.S. effort,
the Diem
government
developed a
"strategic
hamlet"
program that
was
essentially
an extension
of Diem's
earlier
relocation
practices.
Aimed at
cutting the
links
between
villagers
and the NLF,
the program
removed
peasants
from their
traditional
villages,
often at
gunpoint,
and
resettled
them in new
hamlets
fortified to
keep the NLF
out.
Administration
was left up
to Diem's
brother Nhu,
a corrupt
official who
charged
villagers
for building
materials
that had
been donated
by the
United
States. In
many cases
peasants
were
forbidden to
leave the
hamlets, but
many of the
young men
quickly left
anyway and
joined the
NLF. Young
men who were
drafted into
the ARVN
often also
worked
secretly for
the NLF. The
Kennedy
administration
concluded
that Diem's
policies
were
alienating
the
peasantry
and
contributing
significantly
to NLF
recruitment.

The
number of
U.S.
advisers
assigned to
the ARVN
rose
steadily. In
January
1961, when
Kennedy took
office,
there were
800 U.S.
advisers in
Vietnam; by
November
1963 there
were 16,700.
American
airpower was
assigned to
support ARVN
operations;
this
included the
aerial
spraying of
herbicides
such as
Agent
Orange,
which was
intended to
deprive the
NLF of food
and jungle
cover.
Despite
these
measures,
the ARVN
continued to
lose ground.

As the
military
situation
deteriorated
in South
Vietnam, the
United
States
sought to
blame it on
Diem's
incompetence
and hoped
that changes
in his
administration
would
improve the
situation.
Nhu's
corruption
became a
principal
focus; Diem
was urged to
remove his
brother, but
he refused.
Many in
Diem's
military
were
especially
dissatisfied
with Diem's
government
and the
ARVN's
inability to
rout the
NLF, and
they hoped
for
increased
U.S. aid.
General
Duong Van
Minh
informed the
CIA and U.S.
ambassador
Henry Cabot
Lodge of a
plot to
conduct a
coup d'état
against
Diem.
Although the
United
States
wanted to
remove Diem
from power,
it did not
give formal
support for
a coup. When
the military
generals
finally
staged the
coup on
November 1,
1963, it
resulted in
the murder
of both Diem
and Nhu. In
the
political
confusion
that
followed,
the security
situation in
South
Vietnam
continued to
deteriorate.
Meanwhile,
the CIA was
forced to
admit that
the strength
of the NLF
was
continuing
to grow.

Succeeding
to the
presidency
after
Kennedy's
assassination
on November
22, 1963,
Lyndon B.
Johnson felt
he had to
take a
forceful
stance on
Vietnam so
that other
Communist
countries
would not
think that
the United
States
lacked
resolve.
Kennedy had
begun to
consider the
possibility
of
withdrawal
from Vietnam
and had even
ordered the
removal of
1,000
advisers
shortly
before he
was
assassinated,
but Johnson
increased
the number
of U.S.
advisers to
27,000 by
mid-1964.
Even though
intelligence
reports
clearly
stated that
most of the
support for
the NLF came
from the
south,
Johnson,
like his
predecessors,
continued to
insist that
North
Vietnam was
orchestrating
the southern
rebellion.
He was
determined
that he
would not be
held
responsible
for allowing
Vietnam to
fall to the
Communists.

Johnson
believed
that the key
to success
in the war
in South
Vietnam was
to frighten
North
Vietnam's
leaders with
the
possibility
of
full-scale
U.S.
military
intervention.
In January
1964 he
approved
top-secret,
covert
attacks
against
North
Vietnamese
territory,
including
commando
raids
against
bridges,
railways,
and coastal
installations.
Johnson also
ordered the
U.S. Navy to
conduct
surveillance
missions
along the
North
Vietnamese
coast. He
increased
the secret
bombing of
territory in
Laos along
the Ho Chi
Minh Trail,
a growing
network of
paths and
roads used
by the NLF
and the
North
Vietnamese
to transport
supplies and
troops into
South
Vietnam.
Hanoi
concluded
that the
United
States was
preparing to
occupy South
Vietnam and
indicated
that it,
too, was
preparing
for
full-scale
war.

On August
2, 1964,
North
Vietnamese
coastal
gunboats
fired on the
destroyer
USS
Maddox,
which had
penetrated
North
Vietnam's
territorial
boundaries
in the Gulf
of Tonkin.
Johnson
ordered more
ships to the
area, and on
August 4th
both the
Maddox
and the USS
Turner
Joy
reported
that North
Vietnamese
patrol boats
had fired on
them.
Johnson then
ordered the
first air
strikes
against
North
Vietnamese
territory
and went on
television
to seek
approval
from the
U.S. public.
(Subsequent
congressional
investigations
would
conclude
that the
August 4th
attack
almost
certainly
had never
occurred. In
2005 the
release of
previously
classified
documents
added more
support to
the finding
that the
August 4th
attack never
occurred.
The
documents
included an
account by a
National
Security
Agency (NSA)
historian
who
concluded
that NSA
intelligence
officers
"deliberately
skewed" the
evidence of
an attack
and failed
to pass on
information
to officials
that would
have shown
that no
attack
occurred.)
The U.S.
Congress
overwhelmingly
passed the
Gulf of
Tonkin
Resolution,
which
effectively
handed over
war-making
powers to
Johnson
until such
time as
'peace and
security'
had returned
to Vietnam.

After the
Gulf of
Tonkin
incident
Johnson
declared,
"We seek no
wider war."
United
States
bombing was
significantly
reduced.
Meanwhile,
North
Vietnam
began to
dispatch
well-trained
units of its
People's
Army of
Vietnam
(PAVN) into
the south.
The NLF
guerrillas
coordinated
their
attacks with
PAVN forces.
On February
7, 1965, the
NLF launched
surprise
attacks on
the U.S.
helicopter
base at
Pleiku,
killing 8
Americans,
wounding
126, and
destroying
10 aircraft;
on February
10th
they struck
again at Qui
Nhon,
killing 23
U.S.
servicemen
and wounding
21 at the
U.S.
enlisted
personnel's
quarters
there. The
attacks
coincided
with two
high-level
diplomatic
visits: one
in Hanoi by
Soviet
premier
Aleksey
Kosygin, and
the other in
Saigon by
U.S.
national
security
adviser
McGeorge
Bundy.

Within
hours of the
attacks,
Johnson
approved
reprisal air
strikes
against
North
Vietnam. In
Hanoi,
Kosygin
abandoned
his
initiative
to persuade
North
Vietnamese
leaders to
consider
negotiations
with the
United
States, and
instead
promised
them
unconditional
military
aid.
Johnson's
advisers,
chiefly
Bundy and
Defense
Secretary
Robert
McNamara,
believed it
was
imperative
to conduct
an intensive
air campaign
against the
North, in
part to
demonstrate
it would pay
a price for
supporting
the NLF.
Johnson
authorized a
sustained
bombing
campaign to
begin on
March 2nd.
Johnson's
senior
planners
reached the
consensus
that U.S.
combat
forces would
be required
to protect
U.S. air
bases, as
the ARVN was
considered
to be too
weak for the
task. On
March 8,
1965 the
first of
these
forces,
3,500 U.S.
Marines,
landed at Da
Nang. By the
end of
April,
56,000 other
combat
troops had
joined them;
by June the
number had
risen to
74,000.

When some
of the
soldiers of
the U.S. 9th
Marine
Regiment
landed in Da
Nang in
March 1965,
their orders
were to
protect the
U.S. air
base, but
the mission
was quickly
escalated to
include
search-and-destroy
patrols of
the area
around the
base. This
corresponded
in miniature
to the
larger
strategy of
General
William
Westmoreland.
Westmoreland,
who took
over the
Military
Assistance
Command in
Vietnam
(MACV) in
1964,
advocated
establishing
a large
American
force and
then
unleashing
it in big
sweeps. His
strategy was
that of
attrition-eliminating
or wearing
down the
enemy by
inflicting
the highest
death toll
possible.
There were
80,000 U.S.
troops in
Vietnam by
the end of
1965; by
1969 a peak
of about
543,000
troops would
be reached.

Having
easily
pushed aside
the ARVN,
both the
North
Vietnamese
and the NLF
had
anticipated
the U.S.
escalation.
With
full-scale
movement of
U.S. troops
onto South
Vietnamese
territory,
the
Communists
claimed that
the Saigon
regime had
become a
puppet, not
unlike the
colonial
collaborators
with the
French. Both
the North
Vietnamese
and NLF
appealed to
the
nationalism
of the
Vietnamese
to rise up
and drive
this new
foreign army
from their
land.

The
strategy
developed
against the
United
States was
the result
of intense
debate
between the
northern and
southern
members of
the Lao
Dong's
Political
Bureau in
Hanoi.
Truong
Chinh, a
northerner
and the
leading
Communist
ideologist
in Hanoi,
argued that
the southern
Vietnamese
must
liberate
themselves,
in
accordance
with a
"people's
war"
strategy
that would,
if
successful,
result in a
reunified
Vietnam; Le
Duan, a
southerner
who became
secretary
general of
the Lao
Dong,
advocated
the North's
full support
of the armed
struggle in
the South,
on the
premise that
Vietnam was
one nation
and
therefore
dependent on
all
Vietnamese
for its
independence
and
reunification.
Ho Chi Minh,
revered
widely
throughout
Vietnam as
the father
of
independence,
and other
party
leaders
ultimately
sided with
Duan's point
of view.
Duan's
triumph
represented
a major
turning
point within
the party in
which
southerners
came to
dictate
party policy
in Hanoi.
The Central
Committee
Directorate
for the
South (also
known as the
Central
Office for
South
Vietnam, or
COSVN),
formed in
1961 as the
leadership
group of the
newly merged
southern and
central
branches of
the Lao
Dong, was
able to
coordinate a
unified
strategy.
COSVN was
under the
direction of
Nguyen Chi
Thanh, a
southerner
and a PAVN
general, for
most of the
war.

After the
United
States
initiated
large-scale
bombing
against the
Democratic
Republic of
Vietnam
(DRV) in
1964, in the
wake of the
Gulf of
Tonkin
incident,
Hanoi
dispatched
the first
unit of
northern-born
regular
soldiers to
the south.
Previously,
southern-born
Viet Minh,
known as
regroupees,
had returned
to their
native
regions and
joined NLF
guerrilla
units. Now
PAVN
regulars,
commanded by
generals who
usually had
been born in
the south,
began to set
up bases in
the Central
Highlands of
South
Vietnam in
order to
gain
strategic
position.

Unable to
cross the
Demilitarized
Zone (DMZ)
at the 17th
parallel
separating
North from
South
Vietnam,
PAVN
regulars
moved into
South
Vietnam
along the Ho
Chi Minh
Trail
through Laos
and
Cambodia. In
use since
1957, the
trail was
originally a
series of
footpaths;
by the late
1960s it
would become
a network of
paved
highways
that enabled
the motor
transport of
people and
equipment.
The NLF
guerrillas
and North
Vietnamese
troops were
poorly armed
compared to
the
Americans,
so once they
were in
South
Vietnam they
avoided open
combat.
Instead they
developed
hit-and-run
tactics
designed to
cause steady
casualties
among the
U.S. troops
and to wear
down popular
support for
the war in
the United
States.

In June
1964 retired
general
Maxwell
Taylor
replaced
Henry Cabot
Lodge as
ambassador
to South
Vietnam. A
former
chairman of
the Joint
Chiefs of
Staff, the
military
advisory
group to the
president,
Taylor at
first
opposed the
introduction
of American
combat
troops,
believing
that this
would make
the ARVN
quit
fighting
altogether.
By 1965 he
agreed to
the request
of General
Westmoreland
for combat
forces.
Taylor
initially
advocated an
enclave
strategy,
where U.S.
forces would
seek to
preserve
areas
already
considered
to be under
Saigon's
control.
This quickly
proved
impossible,
since NLF
strength was
considerable
virtually
everywhere
in South
Vietnam.

In
October 1965
the newly
arrived 1st
Cavalry
Division of
the U.S.
Army fought
one of the
largest
battles of
the Vietnam
War in the
Ia Drang
Valley,
inflicting a
serious
defeat on
North
Vietnamese
forces. The
North
Vietnamese
and NLF
forces
changed
their
tactics as a
result of
the battle.
From then on
both would
fight at
times of
their
choosing,
hitting
rapidly,
with
surprise if
possible,
and then
withdrawing
just as
quickly to
avoid the
impact of
American
firepower.
The success
of the
American
campaign in
the Ia Drang
Valley
convinced
Westmoreland
that his
strategy of
attrition
was the key
to U.S.
victory. He
ordered the
largest
search-and-destroy
operations
of the war
in the "Iron
Triangle,"
the
Communist
stronghold
in the rural
provinces
near Saigon.
This
operation
was intended
to find and
destroy
North
Vietnam and
NLF military
headquarters,
but the
campaign
failed to
wipe out
Communist
forces from
the area.

By 1967
the ground
war had
reached a
stalemate,
which led
Johnson and
McNamara to
increase the
ferocity of
the air war.
The Joint
Chiefs of
Staff had
been
pressing for
this for
some time,
but there
was already
some
indication
that
intensified
bombing
would not
produce the
desired
results. In
1966 the
bombing of
North
Vietnam's
oil
facilities
had
destroyed 70
percent of
their fuel
reserves,
but the
DRV's
ability to
wage the war
had not been
affected.

Planners
wished to
avoid
populated
areas, but
when 150,000
sorties per
year were
being flown
by U.S.
warplanes,
civilian
casualties
were
inevitable.
These
casualties
provoked
revulsion
both in the
United
States and
internationally.
In 1967 the
chairman of
the Joint
Chiefs of
Staff,
General
Earle
Wheeler,
declared
that no more
"major
military
targets"
were left.
Unable to
widen the
bombing to
population
centers for
fear of
Chinese and
Soviet
reactions in
support of
North
Vietnam, the
U.S.
Department
of Defense
had to admit
stalemate in
the air war
as well. The
damage that
had already
been
inflicted on
Vietnam's
population
was
enormous.

In 1967
North
Vietnam and
the NLF
decided the
time had
come to
mount an
all-out
offensive
aimed at
inflicting
serious
losses on
both the
ARVN and
U.S. forces.
They planned
the Tet
Offensive
with the
hope that
this would
significantly
affect the
public mood
in the
United
States. In
December
1967 North
Vietnamese
troops
attacked and
surrounded
the U.S.
Marine base
at Khe Sanh,
placing it
under siege.
Westmoreland
ordered the
outpost held
at all
costs. To
prevent the
Communists
from
overrunning
the base,
about 50,000
U.S. Marines
and Army
troops were
called into
the area,
thus
weakening
positions
further
south.

This
concentration
of American
troops in
one spot was
exactly what
the COSVN
strategists
had hoped
would
happen. The
main thrust
of the Tet
Offensive
then began
on January
31, 1968, at
the start of
Tet,
or the
Vietnamese
lunar new
year
celebration,
when a lull
in fighting
traditionally
took place.
Most ARVN
troops had
gone home on
leave, and
U.S. troops
were on
stand-down
in many
areas. Over
85,000 NLF
soldiers
simultaneously
struck at
almost every
major city
and
provincial
capital
across South
Vietnam,
sending
their
defenders
reeling. The
U.S. Embassy
in Saigon,
previously
thought to
be
invulnerable,
was taken
over by the
NLF, and
held for
eight hours
before U.S.
forces could
retake the
complex. It
took three
weeks for
U.S. troops
to dislodge
1,000 NLF
fighters
from Saigon.

During
the Tet
Offensive,
the imperial
capital of
Hue
witnessed
the
bloodiest
fighting of
the entire
war. South
Vietnamese
were
assassinated
by
Communists
for
collaborating
with
Americans;
then when
the ARVN
returned,
NLF
sympathizers
were
murdered.
United
States
Marines and
paratroopers
were ordered
to go from
house to
house to
find North
Vietnamese
and NLF
soldiers.
Virtually
indiscriminate
shelling was
what killed
most
civilians,
however, and
the
architectural
treasures of
Hue were
laid to
waste. More
than 100,000
residents of
the city
were left
homeless.

The Tet
Offensive as
a whole
lasted into
the fall of
1968, and
when it was
over the
North
Vietnamese
and the NLF
had suffered
acute
losses. The
U.S.
Department
of Defense
estimated
that a total
of 45,000
North
Vietnamese
and NLF
soldiers had
been killed,
most of them
NLF
fighters.
Although it
was covered
up for more
than a year,
one
horrifying
event during
the Tet
Offensive
would
indelibly
affect
America's
psyche. In
March 1968
elements of
the U.S.
Army's
Americal
Division
wiped out an
entire
hamlet
called My
Lai, killing
500 unarmed
civilians,
mostly women
and
children.

After
Tet,
Westmoreland
said that
the enemy
was almost
conquered
and
requested
206,000 more
troops to
finish the
job. Told by
succeeding
administrations
since 1955
that there
was "light
at the end
of the
tunnel,"
that victory
in Vietnam
was near,
the American
public had
reached a
psychological
breaking
point. The
success of
the NLF in
coordinating
the Tet
Offensive
demonstrated
both how
deeply
rooted the
Communist
resistance
was and how
costly it
would be for
the United
States to
remain in
Vietnam.
After Tet a
majority of
Americans
wanted some
closure to
the war,
with some
favoring an
immediate
withdrawal
while others
held out for
a negotiated
peace.
President
Johnson
rejected
Westmoreland's
request for
more troops
and replaced
him as the
commander of
U.S. forces
in Vietnam
with
Westmoreland's
deputy,
General
Creighton
Abrams.
Johnson
himself
decided not
to seek
reelection
in 1968.
Republican
Richard
Nixon ran
for the
presidency
declaring
that he
would bring
"peace with
honor" if
elected.

Promising
an end to
the war in
Vietnam,
Richard
Nixon won a
narrow
victory in
the election
of 1968.
Slightly
more than
30,000 young
Americans
had been
killed in
the war when
Nixon took
office in
January
1969. The
new
president
retained his
predecessor's
goal of a
non-Communist
South
Vietnam,
however, and
this could
not be
ensured
without
continuing
the war.
Nixon's most
pressing
problem was
how to make
peace and
war at the
same time.
His answer
was a policy
called
"Vietnamization."
Under this
policy, he
would
withdraw
American
troops and
the South
Vietnamese
army would
take over
the
fighting.

During
his campaign
for the
presidency,
Nixon
announced
that he had
a secret
plan to end
the war. In
July 1969,
after he had
become
president,
he issued
what came to
be known as
the Nixon
doctrine,
which stated
that U.S.
troops would
no longer be
directly
involved in
Asian wars.
He ordered
the
withdrawal
of 25,000
troops, to
be followed
by more, and
he lowered
draft calls.
On the other
hand, Nixon
also stepped
up the
Phoenix
Program, a
secret CIA
operation
that
resulted in
the
assassination
of 20,000
suspected
NLF
guerrillas,
many of whom
were
innocent
civilians.
The
operation
increased
funding for
the ARVN and
intensified
the bombing
of North
Vietnam.
Nixon
reasoned
that to keep
the
Communists
at bay
during the
U.S.
withdrawal,
it was also
necessary to
bomb their
sanctuaries
in Cambodia
and to
increase air
strikes
against
Laos.

The DRV
leadership,
however,
remained
committed to
the
expulsion of
all U.S.
troops from
Vietnam and
to the
overthrow of
the Saigon
government.
As U.S.
troop
strength
diminished,
Hanoi's
leaders
planned
their final
offensive.
While the
ARVN had
increased in
size and was
better armed
than it had
been in
1965, it
could not
hold its own
without the
help of
heavy U.S.
airpower.

Johnson
had
initiated
peace
negotiations
after the
first phase
of the Tet
Offensive.
Beginning in
Paris on May
13, 1968,
the talks
rapidly
broke down
over
disagreements
about the
status of
the NLF,
which the
Saigon
government
refused to
recognize.
In October
1968, just
before the
U.S.
presidential
elections,
candidate
Hubert
Humphrey
called for a
negotiated
settlement,
but Nixon
secretly
persuaded
South
Vietnam's
president,
Nguyen Van
Thieu, to
hold out for
better terms
under a
Nixon
administration.
Stating that
he would
never
negotiate
with
Communists,
Thieu caused
the Paris
talks to
collapse and
contributed
to
Humphrey's
defeat as
well.

Nixon
thus
inherited
the Paris
peace talks,
but they
continued to
remain
stalled as
each faction
refused to
alter its
position.
Hanoi
insisted on
the
withdrawal
of all U.S.
forces, the
removal of
the Saigon
government,
and its
replacement
through free
elections
that would
include the
Provisional
Revolutionary
Government
(PRG), which
the NLF
created in
June 1969 to
take over
its
governmental
role in the
south and
serve as a
counterpart
to the
Saigon
government.
The United
States, on
the other
hand,
insisted
that all
North
Vietnamese
troops be
withdrawn.

In March
1969 Nixon
ordered the
secret
bombing of
Cambodia.
Intended to
wipe out
North
Vietnamese
and NLF base
camps along
the border
with South
Vietnam in
order to
provide time
for the
buildup of
the ARVN,
the campaign
failed
utterly. The
secret
bombing
lasted four
years and
caused great
destruction
and upheaval
in Cambodia,
a land of
farmers that
had not
known war in
centuries.
Code-named
Operation
Menu, the
bombing was
more intense
than that
carried out
over
Vietnam. An
estimated
100,000
peasants
died in the
bombing,
while 2
million
people were
left
homeless.

In April
1970 Nixon
ordered U.S.
troops into
Cambodia. He
argued that
this was
necessary to
protect the
security of
American
units then
in the
process of
withdrawing
from
Vietnam, but
he also
wanted to
buy security
for the
Saigon
regime. When
Nixon
announced
the
invasion,
U.S. college
campuses
erupted in
protest, and
one-third of
them shut
down due to
student
walkouts. At
Kent State
University
in Ohio four
students
were killed
by panicky
national
guardsmen
who had been
called up to
prevent
rioting. Two
days later,
two students
were killed
at Jackson
State
College in
Mississippi.
Congress
proceeded to
repeal the
Gulf of
Tonkin
Resolution.
Congress
also passed
the
Cooper-Church
Amendment,
which
specifically
forbade the
use of U.S.
troops
outside
South
Vietnam. The
measure did
not
expressly
forbid
bombing,
however, so
Nixon
continued
the air
strikes on
Cambodia
until August
1973.

Three
months after
committing
U.S. forces,
Nixon
ordered them
to withdraw
from
Cambodia.
The combined
effects of
the bombing
and the
invasion,
however, had
completely
disrupted
Cambodian
life,
driving
millions of
peasants
from their
ancestral
lands. The
right-wing
government
then in
power in
Cambodia was
supported by
the United
States, and
the
government
was blamed
for allowing
the bombing
to occur.
Farmers who
had never
concerned
themselves
with
politics now
flooded to
the
Communist
opposition
group, the
Khmer Rouge.
After a
gruesome
civil war,
the Khmer
Rouge took
power in
1975 and
became one
of the
bloodiest
regimes of
the 20th
century.

The
United
States began
conducting
secret
bombing of
Laos in
1964,
targeting
both the
North
Vietnamese
forces along
sections of
the Ho Chi
Minh Trail
and the
Communist
Pathet Lao
guerrillas,
who
controlled
the northern
part of the
country.
Roughly
150,000 tons
of bombs
were dropped
on the Plain
of Jars in
northern
Laos between
1964 and
1969. By
1970 at
least
one-quarter
of the
entire
population
of Laos were
refugees,
and about
400,000 Lao
had been
killed.

Prohibited
by the
Cooper-Church
Amendment
from
deploying
U.S. troops
and anxious
to
demonstrate
the fighting
prowess of
the improved
ARVN, Nixon
took the
advice of
General
Creighton
Abrams and
attempted to
cut vital
Communist
supply lines
along the Ho
Chi Minh
Trail. On
February 8,
1971, 21,000
ARVN troops,
supported by
American
B-52
bombers,
invaded
Laos.
Intended to
disrupt any
North
Vietnamese
and NLF
plans for
offensives
and to test
the strength
of the ARVN,
this
operation
was as much
a failure as
the
Cambodian
invasion.
Abrams
claimed
14,000 North
Vietnamese
casualties,
but over
9,000 ARVN
soldiers
were killed
or wounded,
while the
rest were
routed and
expelled
from Laos.

The
success of
Vietnamization
seemed
highly
doubtful,
since the
Communist
forces
showed that
the new ARVN
could be
defeated.
Instead of
inhibiting
the
Communist
Pathet Lao,
the U.S.
attacks on
Laos
promoted
their rise.
In 1958 the
Pathet Lao
had the
support of
one-third of
the
population;
by 1973 a
majority
denied the
legitimacy
of the
U.S.-supported
royal Lao
government.
By 1975 a
Communist
government
was
established
in Laos.

In the
spring of
1972, with
only 6,000
U.S. combat
troops
remaining in
South
Vietnam, the
DRV
leadership
decided the
time had
come to
crush the
ARVN. On
March 30th
more than
30,000 North
Vietnamese
troops
crossed the
DMZ, along
with another
150,000 PRG
fighters,
and attacked
Quang Trí
Province,
easily
scattering
ARVN
defenders.
The attack,
known as the
Easter
Offensive,
could not
have come at
a worse time
for Nixon
and his
national
security
adviser,
Henry
Kissinger. A
military
defeat of
the ARVN
would leave
the United
States in a
weak
position at
the Paris
peace talks
and would
compromise
its
strategic
position
globally.

Risking
the success
of the
upcoming
Moscow
summit,
Nixon
unleashed
the first
sustained
bombing of
North
Vietnam
since 1969
and moved
quickly to
mine the
harbor of
Haiphong.
Between
April and
October 1972
the United
States
conducted
41,000
sorties over
North
Vietnam,
especially
targeting
Quang Trí.
North
Vietnam's
Easter
Offensive
was crushed.
At least
100,000
Communist
troops were
killed. Vo
Nguyen Giap,
head of the
PAVN and
chief
military
strategist,
was
perceived as
too
conservative
in his use
of force and
was
compelled to
resign. His
successor,
Van Tien
Dung,
adopted more
aggressive
military
tactics but
also
counseled
the renewal
of
negotiations
with the
United
States.

Further
negotiations
were held in
Paris
between
Kissinger
and Le Duc
Tho, who
represented
North
Vietnam.
Seeking an
end to the
war before
the U.S.
presidential
elections in
November,
Kissinger
made
remarkable
concessions.
The United
States would
withdraw
completely,
while
accepting
the presence
of ten North
Vietnamese
divisions in
South
Vietnam and
recognizing
the
political
legitimacy
of the PRG.
Hanoi also
made
important
concessions,
such as
dropping its
insistence
on the
immediate
resignation
of Nguyen
Van Thieu,
who had
become
president of
South
Vietnam in
1967.
Kissinger
announced on
October 27
that "peace
was at
hand." The
negotiations
had not
involved
South
Vietnam,
however, and
the Saigon
government's
acceptance
of the terms
was not set
as a
precondition.
Thieu was
outraged by
the
agreement,
and Nixon
subsequently
refused to
sign it.

After the
1972
elections,
Kissinger
attempted to
revise the
agreements
he had
already
made. North
Vietnam
refused to
consider
these
revisions,
and
Kissinger
threatened
to renew air
assaults
against
North
Vietnam
unless the
new
conditions
were met.
Nixon then
unleashed at
Christmas
the final
and most
intense
bombing of
the war over
Hanoi and
Haiphong.

While
many U.S.
officials
were
convinced
that Hanoi
was bombed
back to the
negotiating
table, the
final treaty
changed
nothing
significant
from what
had already
been agreed
to by
Kissinger
and Tho in
October.
Nixon's
Christmas
bombings
were
intended to
warn Hanoi
that
American air
power
remained a
threat, and
he secretly
promised
Thieu that
the United
States would
punish North
Vietnam
should they
violate the
terms of the
final
settlement.
Nixon's
political
fortunes
were about
to decline,
however.
Although he
had won
reelection
by a
landslide in
November
1972, he was
suffering
from
revelations
about the
Watergate
scandal. The
president's
campaign
officials
had
orchestrated
a burglary
at the
Democratic
National
Committee
headquarters,
and Nixon
had
attempted to
cover it up
by lying to
the American
people about
his role.

The
president
made new
enemies when
the secret
bombing of
Cambodia was
revealed at
last.
Congress was
threatening
a bill of
impeachment
and in early
January 1973
indicated it
would cut
off all
funding for
operations
in Indochina
once U.S.
forces had
withdrawn.
In
mid-January
Nixon halted
all military
actions
against
North
Vietnam.

On
January 27,
1973, all
four parties
to the
Vietnam
conflict-the
United
States,
South
Vietnam, the
PRG, and
North
Vietnam-signed
the Treaty
of Paris.
The final
terms
provided for
the release
of all
American
prisoners of
war from
North
Vietnam; the
withdrawal
of all U.S.
forces from
South
Vietnam; the
end of all
foreign
military
operations
in Laos and
Cambodia; a
cease-fire
between
North and
South
Vietnam; the
formation of
a National
Council of
Reconciliation
to help
South
Vietnam form
a new
government;
and
continued
U.S.
military and
economic aid
to South
Vietnam. In
a secret
addition to
the treaty
Nixon also
promised
$3.25
billion in
reparations
for the
postwar
reconstruction
of North
Vietnam, an
agreement
that
Congress
ultimately
refused to
uphold.

On March
29, 1973,
the last
U.S. troops
left
Vietnam. The
Paris peace
treaty did
little to
end the
bloodshed
for the
Vietnamese,
however.
Problems
arose
immediately,
primarily
over the
delineation
of two
separate
zones, as
required by
the
agreement,
and the
mutual
withdrawal
of troops to
these
respective
zones.
Northerners
in the Lao
Dong
leadership
wanted to
keep
hostilities
to a minimum
in order to
keep the
United
States out
of Vietnam.
However,
southerners
on both
sides
refused to
give up the
fight. Thieu
quickly
showed that
he had no
desire to
honor the
terms of the
treaty. In
his view,
the
continued
presence of
North
Vietnamese
soldiers in
South
Vietnam
absolved him
of honoring
the
cease-fire
agreement.
Thieu
immediately
began
offensives
against PRG
villages,
and he
issued an
order to the
ARVN: "If
Communists
come into
your
village...shoot
them in the
head." In
October
Hanoi
authorized
southern
Communists
to strike
back against
ARVN troops.

Meanwhile,
the
withdrawal
of U.S.
personnel
resulted in
a collapsing
economy
throughout
South
Vietnam.
Millions of
people had
depended on
the money
spent by
Americans in
Vietnam.
Thieu's
government
was
ill-equipped
to treat the
mass
unemployment
and
deepening
poverty that
resulted
from the
U.S.
withdrawal.
The ARVN
still
received
$700 million
from the
U.S.
Congress and
was twice
the size of
the
Communist
forces, but
morale was
collapsing.
More than
200,000 ARVN
soldiers
deserted in
1974 in
order to be
with their
families.

The
apparent
weakening of
South
Vietnam led
Hanoi to
believe it
could win
control over
the south
through a
massive
conventional
invasion,
and it set
1975 as the
year to
mount a
final
offensive.
Hanoi
expected the
offensive to
last at
least two
years; the
rapid
collapse of
the ARVN was
therefore a
surprise
even to
them. After
the initial
attack by
the North
Vietnamese
in the
Central
Highlands
northeast of
Saigon on
January 7th,
the ARVN
immediately
began to
fall apart.
On March 25th
the ancient
imperial
city of Hue
fell; then
on March 29th,
Da Nang,
site of the
former U.S.
Marines
headquarters,
was
overtaken.
On April 20th
Thieu
resigned,
accusing the
United
States of
betrayal.
His
successor
was Duong
Van Minh,
who had been
among those
who
overthrew
Diem in
1963. On
April 30th
Minh issued
his
unconditional
surrender to
the PRG.
Almost 30
years after
Ho Chi
Minh's
declaration
of
independence,
Vietnam was
finally
unified.

In the
United
States,
military
conscription,
or the
draft, had
been in
place
virtually
without
interruption
since the
end of World
War II, but
volunteers
generally
predominated
in combat
units. When
the first
U.S. combat
troops
arrived in
Vietnam in
1965 they
were
composed
mainly of
volunteers.
The Air
Force, Navy,
and Marines
were
volunteer
units. The
escalating
war,
however,
required
more
draftees. In
1965 about
20,000 men
per month
were
inducted
into the
military,
most into
the Army; by
1968 about
40,000 young
men were
drafted each
month to
meet
increased
troop levels
ordered for
Vietnam. The
conscript
army was
largely
composed of
teenagers;
the average
age of a
U.S. soldier
in Vietnam
was 19,
younger than
in World War
II or the
Korean War.
For the
first time
in U.S.
military
history,
tours of
duty were
fixed in
length,
usually for
a period of
12 or 13
months, and
an
individual's
date of
estimated
return from
overseas
(DEROS) was
therefore
set at the
same time as
the
assignment
date.

Those
conscripted
were mostly
youths from
the poorer
section of
American
society.
They did not
have access
to the
exemptions
that were
available to
their more
privileged
fellow
citizens. Of
the numerous
exemptions
from
military
service that
Congress had
written into
law, the
most
far-reaching
were student
deferments.
The draft
laws
effectively
enabled most
upper- and
middle-class
youngsters
to avoid
military
service. By
1968 it was
increasingly
evident that
the draft
system was
deeply
unfair and
discriminatory.
Responding
to popular
pressures,
the
Selective
Service, the
agency that
administered
the draft,
instituted a
lottery
system,
which might
have
produced an
army more
representative
of society
at large.
Student
deferments
were kept by
Nixon until
1971,
however, so
as not to
alienate
middle-class
voters. By
then his
Vietnamization
policy had
lowered
monthly
draft calls,
and physical
exemptions
were still
easily
obtained by
the
privileged,
especially
from draft
boards in
affluent
communities.

Both
North and
South
Vietnam also
conscripted
troops.
Revolutionary
nationalist
ideology was
quite strong
in the
north, and
the DRV was
able to
create an
army with
well-disciplined,
highly
motivated
troops. It
became the
fourth-largest
army in the
world and
one of the
most
experienced.
South
Vietnam also
drafted
soldiers,
beginning in
1955 when
the ARVN was
created.
Although
many ARVN
conscripts
were
committed
anti-Communists,
the Saigon
leadership
did little
to educate
ARVN
soldiers on
the nature
of the war
or boost
their
morale. In
1965,
113,000
deserted
from the
ARVN; by
1972, 20,000
per month
were
slipping
away from
the war.

Although
equipped
with
high-tech
weaponry
that far
exceeded the
firepower
available to
its enemies,
the ARVN was
poorly led
and failed
most of the
time to
check its
opponents'
actions.
United
States
troops came
to dislike
and mistrust
many ARVN
units,
accusing
them of
abandoning
the
battlefield.
The ARVN
also
suffered
from
internal
corruption.
Numerous
commanders
would claim
nonexistent
troopers and
then pocket
the pay
intended for
those
troopers;
this
practice
made some
units
dangerously
understaffed.
Some ARVN
soldiers
were
secretly
working for
the NLF,
providing
information
that
undermined
the U.S.
effort. At
various
times,
battles
verging on
civil war
broke out
between
troops
within the
ARVN.
Internal
disunity on
this scale
was never an
issue among
the North
Vietnamese
troops or
the NLF
guerrillas.

The armed
forces of
the United
States
serving in
Vietnam
began to
suffer from
internal
dissension
and low
morale as
well. Racism
against the
Vietnamese
troubled
many
soldiers,
particularly
those who
had
experienced
racism
directed
against
themselves
in the
United
States. In
Vietnam,
Americans
routinely
referred to
all
Vietnamese,
both friend
and foe, as
"gooks."
This process
of
dehumanizing
the
Vietnamese
led to many
atrocities,
including
the massacre
at My Lai,
and it
provoked
profound
misgivings
among U.S.
troops. The
injustice of
the
Selective
Service
system also
turned
soldiers
against the
war. By 1968
coffeehouses
run by
soldiers had
sprung up at
26 U.S.
bases,
serving as
forums for
antiwar
activities.
At least 250
underground
antiwar
newspapers
were
published by
active-duty
soldiers.

After
Nixon's
troop-withdrawal
policy was
initiated in
1969, many
soldiers
became
reluctant to
risk their
lives for a
war without
a clear
purpose. No
soldier
wished to be
the last one
killed in
Vietnam.
Especially
toward the
end of the
war, the
fixed
one-year
tours of
duty in
Vietnam
resulted in
a
"short-timer"
mentality in
which combat
troops
became more
reluctant to
engage in
risky
military
operations
as their
departure
date
approached.
In some
cases,
entire units
refused to
go out on
combat
patrols,
disobeying
direct
orders.
Soldiers
sometimes
took out
their
frustrations
and
resentments
on officers
who put
their lives
at risk,
especially
officers
they deemed
to be
incompetent
or
overzealous.
The term
"fragging"
came to be
used to
describe
soldiers
attacking
their
officers,
most often
by tossing
fragmentation
grenades
into the
officers'
sleeping
quarters.
This
practice,
which took
place mostly
late in the
war, was a
clear sign
that
military
discipline
had broken
down in
Vietnam. As
the war
dragged on
and morale
sagged
within the
U.S. armed
forces, U.S.
military
personnel in
Vietnam
found it
increasingly
difficult to
carry out
their
service.

Incidents
in which
soldiers
were absent
without
leave (AWOL)
also became
more
frequent
toward the
end of the
war. Some
soldiers who
were AWOL
for 30 days
or more were
administratively
classified
as
deserters.
Most
deserted for
personal,
rather than
political,
reasons. Of
32,000
reported
deserters
who were
assigned to
combat duty
in Vietnam,
7,000 had
failed to
report for
deployment
to Vietnam,
and 20,000
had
completed a
full tour of
duty in
Vietnam but
still had
obligations
of military
service; the
remaining
5,000
reported
desertions
occurred in
or near
Vietnam.
Most who
went AWOL or
deserted
later
returned or
were found,
and they
received
less-than-honorable
discharges.
Consequently,
they
received
fewer
veterans
benefits and
little, if
any,
post combat
rehabilitation.

Opposition
to the war
in the
United
States
developed
immediately
after the
Gulf of
Tonkin
Resolution.
Early
protests
were
organized
around
questions
about the
morality of
U.S.
military
involvement
in Vietnam.
Virtually
every key
event of the
war,
including
the Tet
Offensive
and the
invasion of
Cambodia,
contributed
to a steady
rise in
antiwar
sentiment.
The
revelation
of the My
Lai Massacre
in 1969
caused a
dramatic
turn against
the war in
national
polls.

On
October 15,
1969,
citizens
across the
United
States
participated
in The
Moratorium,
the largest
one-day
demonstration
against the
war.
Millions of
people
stayed home
from work to
mark their
opposition
to the war;
college and
high school
students
demonstrated
on hundreds
of campuses.
Vietnam had
become a
unpopular
war with
little
regard for
the troops
committed to
combat. This
dissention
was exactly
what North
Vietnam
hoped for,
the country
had turned
bitter
towards the
war effort
and all who
participated.

The
Vietnam War
cost the
United
States $130
billion
directly,
and at least
that amount
in indirect
costs, such
as veterans'
and widows'
benefits and
the search
for
Americans
missing in
action
(MIAs). The
war spurred
serious
inflation,
contributing
to a
substantially
increased
cost of
living in
the United
States
between 1965
and 1975.
Over
2,600,000
served in
Vietnam,
with about
1,600,000
experiencing
combat or
close combat
support or
regular
attacks. Of
those who
served only
33% were
drafted. The
peak troop
deployment
was in 1968
at 543,482,
with an
average
montly draft
rate of
40,000. The
average
infantry man
saw 240 days
of combat in
one year,
thanks to
the mobility
of the
helicopter.
From 1959 to
1974 58,168
Americans
lost their
lives in
Vietnam,
with over
61% of those
killed
younger than
21. Five men
killed in
Vietnam were
only 16
years old,
and the
oldest man
killed was
62 years
old.
Although the
percentage
that died is
similar to
other wars,
amputations
or crippling
wounds were
300% higher
than in
World War
II. MEDEVAC
helicopters
flew over
500,000
missions.
More than
304,000 U.S.
soldiers
were
wounded,
half of them
very
seriously.
There were
2,338 MIAs
and 766 POWs
(114 died in
captivity).
No accurate
accounting
has ever
been made of
U.S
civilians
(U.S.
government
agents,
religious
missionaries,
Red Cross
nurses)
killed
throughout
Indochina.
There were
over
1,248,000
fixed-wing
combat
sorties
flown
between 1965
and 1973.
There were
6.2 million
tons of
munitions
dropped,
three times
that of
World War
II. Over 19
million
gallons of
rainbow
agent
herbicides
were sprayed
over 3.6
million
acres of
Vietnam,
contaminating
water
shelters.

After
returning
from the
war, many
Vietnam
veterans
suffered
from
Post-Traumatic
Stress
Disorder,
which is
characterized
by
persistent
emotional
problems
including
anxiety and
depression.
The
Department
of Veterans
Affairs
estimated
that 20,000
Vietnam
veterans
committed
suicide in
the war's
aftermath.
There are no
numbers as
to how many
Vietnam
veterans
developed
major
illness or
died, as a
result of
exposure to
herbicides
after the
war.
Throughout
the 1970s
and 1980s,
unemployment
and rates of
prison
incarceration
for Vietnam
veterans,
especially
those having
seen heavy
combat, were
significantly
higher than
in the
general
population.

Having
felt ignored
or
disrespected
both by the
Veterans
Administration
(now the
Department
of Veterans
Affairs) and
by
traditional
organizations
such as the
Veterans of
Foreign Wars
and the
American
Legion,
Vietnam
veterans
have formed
their own
self-help
groups.
Collectively,
they forced
the Veterans
Administration
to establish
storefront
counseling
centers,
staffed by
veterans, in
every major
city. The
national
organization,
Vietnam
Veterans of
America (VVA),
has become
one of the
most
important
service
organizations
lobbying in
Washington,
D.C.

The
Vietnam
Veterans
Memorial was
dedicated in
1982 to
commemorate
the U.S.
personnel
who died or
were
declared
missing in
action in
Vietnam. The
memorial,
which
consists of
a V-shaped
black
granite wall
etched with
more than
58,000
names, was
at first a
source of
controversy
because it
does not
glorify the
military but
invites
somber
reflection.
The Asian
ancestry of
its
prizewinning
designer,
Maya Lin,
was also an
issue for
some
veterans. In
1983 a
bronze cast
was added,
depicting
one white,
one black,
and one
Hispanic
American
soldier.
This led to
additional
controversy
since some
argued that
the
sculpture
muted the
original
memorial's
solemn
message. In
1993 a
statue of
three women
cradling a
wounded
soldier was
also added
to the site
to
commemorate
the service
of the
11,000
military
nurses who
treated
soldiers in
Vietnam.
Despite all
of the
controversies,
the Vietnam
Veterans
Memorial has
become a
site of
pilgrimage
for veterans
and
civilians
alike.

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