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Wednesday, November 25, 2015

Key Takeaway: Kurdish forces
recaptured the Yazidi-majority district of Sinjar, west of Mosul from ISIS on
November 13. Confrontations between the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and
the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) will grow increasingly likely as both seek
to control Sinjar, while Kurdish control over the mixed-demographic district is
already leading to heightened tensions between Yazidis and Sunni Arabs. Kurdish
forces included Peshmerga affiliated with the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP);
PKK-affiliated fighters from the Syrian People’s Protection Units (YPG);
Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) forces; and local Yazidi militias. The city of
Sinjar remains under mixed KDP Peshmerga and PKK control. Areas east of the
Sinjar were recaptured primarily by the Peshmerga, with the exception of Tel
Qasab, a village southeast of Sinjar, which was captured by a YPG-affiliated
Yazidi militia. However, areas west of Sinjar reportedly involved few
Peshmerga. These areas remain primarily under the control of the PKK, YPG, and
PKK-affiliated local Yazidi militias. Villages north of Sinjar and Sinjar
Mountain contain forces from all Kurdish fighting forces excluding Peshmerga
affiliated with the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), and it is unclear as to
what specific villages are controlled by which forces. Areas north of the
mountain have been under mixed Peshmerga and PKK control since before the
Sinjar operation, which ISW is retrospectively representing on this map. ISW
has also retrospectively assessed that the KDP Peshmerga do not have control
over the Kasak intersection area, northwest of Mosul, which is still held by
ISIS. KDP Peshmerga control the town of Kasak itself, but not the surrounding
roads. ISW has thus adjusted the depicted control of terrain in the Kasak area.

Tuesday, November 24, 2015

Russia
and Turkey have long been at odds over Syria, with Moscow backing President
Bashar al Assad and Ankara supporting the opposition to overthrow him.
Tensions increased dramatically with the start of the Russian air campaign on September 30. The Turkish shoot-down of a Russian combat aircraft on November 24 is
an escalation in this tense stand-off between Russia and a NATO member.
Although both sides may refrain from additional aggressive activities at once,
tensions between Russia and Turkey have been continuously growing and are
likely to expand, further testing the strength of the US commitment to its NATO
partner. These tensions will also severely hinder efforts to build a
"grand coalition" including Turkey and Russia.

Turkey’s
decision to fire on a Russian Su-24 that briefly violated its airspace resulted from more than concerns about the
integrity of its borders. Russian airstrikes have been helping Assad, Hezbollah, and Iranian
proxy forces advance in Turkmen areas near the Turkish border in recent
days. Turkey claims that those airstrikes hit Turkmen
villages. Turkey regards the Turkmen of Iraq and Syria as kin, works to
protect and advance their interests, and tries to defend them. The
Turkish shoot-down is probably intended to deter Putin from continuing to
provide air support to Assad operations against them, among other things.

The
incident highlights the grand strategic implications of American policy in
Syria, moreover. The West, led by France, has been drifting in the
direction of cooperating if not allying with Putin, whom many wrongly believe
is in Syria to fight ISIS. That drift empowers Putin and overlooks the
larger objectives of Putin’s maneuvers, as Leon Aron points out. Putin aims to disrupt NATO fundamentally
as part of a larger effort to recoup Russia’s losses following the collapse of
the Soviet Union. He has been deliberately and aggressively prodding
Turkey from his airbase in Syria, just as he has been consistently violating
the airspace of US allies in the Baltics and US partners in Scandinavia.
He is counting on Washington to remain so myopically focused on the fight
against ISIS that it overlooks and tacitly accepts these assaults on the
Western alliance structure. It would be an enormous mistake if we did so.

This timeline is a joint presentation by the Institute for the Study of War (www.understandingwar.org) and the Critical Threats Project at the American Enterprise Institute (www.criticalthreats.org). The text is drawn from daily media tracking and analysis conducted by the superb analytical teams at ISW and CTP. The Syria Team at ISW includes Jennifer Cafarella, Christopher Kozak, and Genevieve Casagrande. The Ukraine/Russia Team is headed by Hugo Spaulding. This presentation was created by Frederick W. Kagan, director of the Critical Threats Project (fkagan@aei.org). ISW analysts can be reached at press@understandingwar.org.

Two Turkish F-16
planes shot down a Russian SU-24
jet on November 24 that Turkey claimed was in Turkish airspace and ignored repeated warnings. Two Russian pilots ejected from the plane, which reportedly
crashed in the Turkmen village of Yamadi in Syria near the Turkish border.A minor Syrian rebel
group affiliated with the Free Syrian Army named Brigade 10 released footage alleging to show a deceased Russian
pilot. One additional pilot survived and is in
hands of Turkmen forces in Syria according to unconfirmed reports. Turkish
President Recep Erdogancalled an emergency
security meeting. NATO is also expected to hold an immediate
meeting.

Russia condemned the downing of the jet and warned of future
consequences. The Russian Ministry of Defense confirmed the downing of the jet,
but denied it had violated Turkish airspace. Russian President Vladmir Putin called
the downing of the plane a "stab in the back"
and promised “serious
consequences...for Russian-Turkish relations.” Putin called the Turkish
military the "accomplices of terrorists." He said at the end of his
statement: “Do they want to make NATO serve ISIS? I understand that every state
has its own regional interests and we’ve always respected
that, but we will never allow the kind of crime that happened to today to take
place.” Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov canceled his scheduled to visit
Turkey for bilateral talks on November 25.

The downing of the
Russian jet followed Turkish warnings about its willingness to intervene to
halt a renewed pro-regime offensive against a majority Turkmen area in
Northeastern Latakia Province. Pro-regime forces supported by Hezbollah,
Iranian-backed militias, and Russian airstrikes, and Russian artillery attacked
rebel positions in the Mount Turkman region of Northeastern Latakia Province
near the Turkish border on November 19.Fifteen hundred Turkmen refugees fled to the Turkish border
by November 23, according to the governor of Turkey’s Hatay province, Ercan
Topaca, who also claimed that the regime attack targeted 15 villages populated by a total of
35,000 civilians. Local activists immediately decried the attack, calling it
the “Mount
Turkman Massacre,” and the main Syrian political opposition group, the Syrian
National Coalition, called for immediate rebel
reinforcementsto the area.

Pro-regime
forces have seized at least five villages and a number of hilltops in the Mount
Turkman area amidst these ongoing clashes. Syrian al-Qaeda affiliate Jabhat
al-Nusra is supporting Syrian rebel groups, including Syrian Turkmen, to defend
against the regime’s attack. The complex mix of
anti-regime groups in the Mount Turkman area helps legitimize Russia’s claim to
be assisting pro-regime forces eliminate “terrorists” in Syria despite the fact
that Russia and pro-regime forces are intentionally targeting civilian areas.
The commander of a new Turkmen rebel group named the Sultan Abd al-Hamid
Brigade, established in January 2015, denied the scale of the regime’s
advance, claiming that rebel forces continue to control major
strategic positions throughout the area.

Turkey formally protested these developments and stated that it would not
tolerate a worsening situation in the Mount Turkman area. Turkey summoned the Russian Ambassador on November
20 to demand an end to the military operation, warning that Russian airstrikes
against civilian Syrian Turkmen villages “could lead to serious consequences.”
Turkish political and security officials met two days later in a security summit to discuss the regime’s
offensive. Turkish Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoglu announced Turkey will
"not hesitate" to take necessary action to protect Turkmen
populations on Syrian soil, and added that Turkish security forces “have been
instructed to retaliate against any development that would threaten Turkey’s
border security.” Davutoglu added that “If there is an attack that would lead
to an intense influx of refugees to Turkey, required measures would be taken
both inside Syria and Turkey.” Turkish Foreign Minister Sinirlioglu
contacted U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry and sent
a letter to Britain, which holds the UNSC presidency, callingfor a U.N. Security Council meeting to
address the issue.

Turkey has longstanding
relations with Syrian Turkmen communities and provides military support to at
least one Syrian Turkmen rebel brigade. Turkish Prime Minister Davutoglu
nonetheless downplayedTurkey’s special treatment of Turkmen in Syria,
stating, “We have reacted to all the attacks aimed at civilians close to our
border without making any discrimination in regards to whether they have been
Turkmen, Arab or Kurdish, not only because they have been Turkmen.”

Turkey’s reaction could
constrain Russia near the Syrian-Turkish border, but Russia is unlikely to
downgrade its operations in Syria. Russia continues to prioritize projecting
power onto NATO’s southern flank, and will likely escalate its air campaign in
Syria on other fronts in a show of force. The Russian Ministry of Defense
summoned the Turkish defense attaché in Moscow to discuss the incident, and
stated that it is “designing a complex of measures directed to respond such
incidents.” The participation of al-Qaeda in the clashes near the
Syrian-Turkish border will continue to provide Russia with the ability to
justify its airstrikes in the guise of a counter-terror mission. NATO is
unlikely to pursue further escalation, but could take a more aggressive stance
against Russia’s intervention in Syria.|

The incident could
affect prospects for a successful negotiated settlement in Syria, at minimum.
Turkey is a major supporter of Syrian armed opposition groups to include both
Turkmen and Arab groups. Turkey continues to call for the removal of Syrian
President Bashar al-Assad from power, which Russia is maneuvering to prevent
through the framework of the Vienna negotiations. Continued Russian support to
pro-regime offensives targeting Syrian territory of concern to Turkey may disincentivize Turkey from agreeing to halt the violence in Syria.

Friday, November 20, 2015

Key Takeaway: Russia shifted its air campaign in an effort to
mimic the U.S.-led anti-ISIS coalition's recent offensive to target
ISIS-run oil and natural gas infrastructure from November 18-19. Russian
military chief of staff Col. Gen. Andrey Kartapolov announced on
November 18 "Russian warplanes are now flying on a free hunt" against
ISIS-operated oil tanker trucks traveling back and forth from Syria and
Iraq, claiming that Russian strikes had destroyed over 500 ISIS-operated oil trucks
in the past "several days." This claim follows a November 16 U.S.-led
coalition strike near Deir ez-Zour, which destroyed at least 116 ISIS-operated oil tanker trucks.
The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that its long-range
warplanes based in southern Russia conducted strikes against ISIS in
both Deir ez-Zour and ar Raqqa Provinces. There was a notable influx of
Russian strikes in the countryside of Deir ez-Zour, an area crucial to
ISIS’s oil revenue. Local reporting has not yet substantiated claims of
Russian airstrikes in ar Raqqa. French warplanes, however, continued to
heavily bombard ISIS’s position in ar Raqqa from November 18-19. The
targeting of ISIS-held oil infrastructure will allow Russia to present
its interests as aligned with Western countries such as France despite
Russia’s continued targeting of Syrian armed opposition groups in
support of the Syrian regime’s ground campaign. Russia's recent
escalation against ISIS in Deir ez-Zour may also be intended to demonstrate
the irrelevance of the U.S.'s newest initiative inside Syria.

Russia continues to use its intensified air campaign in Syria to
position itself as an effective anti-ISIS actor amongst the
international community. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed
to carry out 253 sorties from the Bassel al-Assad International Airport
in Latakia as well as its base located along Russia’s southern border
with Georgia, doubling the average number of sorties flown each day. The
Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that long-range warplanes
fired 50 cruise missiles against ISIS in Aleppo, Idlib, and Deir ez-Zour
Provinces. However, cruise missile strikes have thus far only been
documented against rebel-held terrain in northern Idlib and western
Aleppo Provinces. Russian warplanes continued to carry out airstrikes
against rebel positions in Latakia, Hama, Idlib, and Dera’a Provinces in
support of regime ground operations. Russia continues to indiscriminately target civilians
and continues to provide air support to pro-regime forces, including
Iranian-backed proxy groups. The Russian air campaign in Syria primarily
supports the Assad regime’s efforts against the armed opposition
despite Russia’s recent increase in strikes against ISIS targets.

The following graphic depicts ISW’s assessment of Russian airstrike
and cruise missile locations based on reports from local Syrian activist
networks, Syrian state-run media, and statements by Russian and Western
officials.

High-Confidence reporting. ISW places high confidence in reports
corroborated both by official government statements reported through
credible channels and documentation from rebel factions or activist
networks on the ground in Syria deemed to be credible.

Low-Confidence reporting. ISW places low confidence in secondary
sources that have not been confirmed or sources deemed likely to contain
disinformation.

Thursday, November 19, 2015

Key Take-Away: The combined Kurdish offensive against ISIS in Sinjar is less significant as a tactical gain against ISIS than as a symbolic victory for multiple Kurdish factions that will ultimately compete for dominance. Coalition airstrikes and advisers supported the KDP Peshmerga operation, while fighters from the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), the Syrian Women’s and People’s Protection Units (YPJ and YPG), and local Yazidi militias also participated. The competition between the KDP and the PKK will likely intensify during the ongoing political crisis in Iraqi Kurdistan over the KDP-held regional presidency. PKK and Peshmerga mobilization in Iraq, even when directed against ISIS, threatens local Arab populations who fear Kurdish occupation on both sides of the Iraq-Syria border. It also threatens Turkey, among other regional actors, who fear Kurdish autonomy and the potential for Kurdish forces to gain the upper hand in Mosul ultimately. The Kurdish victory at Sinjar therefore requires that the anti-ISIS coalition balance the interests of Kurds and Sunni Arabs in northern Iraq. Ethnic tensions were also exposed in Tuz Khurmato, where PUK Peshmerga clashed with ethnic Turkmen Iranian proxy militia members. The clash was violent enough to cause ISF, Peshmerga, and proxy militia forces to move forces to Tuz Khurmato to prevent escalation, while delegations of PUK, Iranian, Iranian proxy, and Iraqi government leaders and officials arrived to negotiate ceasefires between the combatants. This ethnic fault line challenges the interests of Iran as well as the U.S.-led coalition in a sector of northern Iraq’s Disputed Internal Boundaries (DIBs) where the ISF is less dominant than either Iranian proxies or forward-deployed PUK Peshmerga. Ethnic tension and intra-Kurdish competition both work to the detriment of northern Iraq’s security at a tenuous time for PM Abadi’s government.

Wednesday, November 18, 2015

Key Takeaway: Russia announced a new phase of its air campaign
in Syria on November 17 following a new directive from Russian President
Vladimir Putin. This new directive comes as FSB Director Alexander
Bortnikov confirmed the downing of Metrojet Flight 9268 to be “a terrorist act.” President Putin vowed to “punish” those responsible and stated
that the Russian air campaign in Syria “must be intensified in such a
way that the criminals understand that retribution is inevitable." The
Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) announced that the new air operations
plan will double the size
of Russia’s strike force able to target positions inside of Syria to
include 25 long-range strategic bombers, 8 SU-34s, and 4 SU-27s. These
new warplanes will be based from the Mozdok airbase in Northern Ossetia
along Russia’s southern border with Georgia and flown over Iranian and
Iraqi airspace to launch operations inside Syria. The new phase will
also include an increased number of combat sorties from the Bassel
al-Assad International Airport in Latakia Province.

Russian Minister of Defense Sergey Shoygu reported
during a briefing with President Putin that 12 long-range Tu-95 bombers
carried out airstrikes against ISIS' positions in ar Raqqa and Deir ez-Zour on
November 17. One Tu-160 and one Tu-95 fired 34 Kalibr cruise missiles at
targets in Aleppo and Idlib Provinces on November 17. The U.S. was
alerted of Russia’s intention to use sea-based cruise missiles
in addition to long-range aircraft prior to these strikes according to
an anonymous U.S. defense official. Multiple sources including the
Russian MoD and the French
MoD stated that Russia used cruise missiles to strike ISIS positions in
Raqqa. French newspaper Le Monde reported that Russia launched cruise
missiles from the Mediterranean, citing anonymous sources. The Kremlin did
not confirm cruise missiles targeting ISIS in ar Raqqa. Local ground
reporting only confirmed cruise missile strikes against rebel positions
in Idlib and Aleppo Provinces with some local Syrian sources
reporting that the missiles were fired from the direction of the
Mediterranean. Notably, the majority of Russian airstrikes
from November 16-17 targeted rebel positions, not ISIS.

Russia’s intensified air campaign may open the opportunity for Russia
to continue its efforts to draw Western countries into a new
counterterrorism coalition in the Middle East. French Defense Minister
Jean Yves Le Drian stated that
the cruise missile strikes near ar Raqqa may indicate “this grand
coalition with Russia is possible.” Increased airstrikes by both France
and Russia prelude further cooperation between the two countries. Russia
will continue to present itself as an effective anti-ISIS actor in
Syria to the international community, despite the continuous low number
of Russian airstrikes targeting core ISIS terrain.

The following graphic depicts ISW’s assessment of Russian airstrike
locations based on reports from local Syrian activist networks, Syrian
state-run media, and statements by Russian and Western officials. The
recent influx in Russian strikes throughout Syria caused a notable
inflection in ground reporting as well as discrepancies within Western
and Russian media sources. Those strikes that have been reported
inconsistently from news sources deemed reliable within the past
48-hours are represented by an “Unknown Russian Strike” categorization.
Instances of cruise missiles are only depicted if reliable picture or
video documentation of the missile has been released.

High-Confidence reporting. ISW places high confidence in
reports corroborated both by official government statements reported
through credible channels and documentation from rebel factions or
activist networks on the ground in Syria deemed to be credible.

Low-Confidence reporting. ISW places low confidence in
secondary sources that have not been confirmed or sources deemed likely
to contain disinformation.

Monday, November 16, 2015

Key Takeaway: Russia continues to prioritize the preservation of the Assad regime rather than the defeat of ISIS through its air campaign in Syria. Russian airstrikes primarily supported regime ground operations against the Syrian armed opposition from November 13 – 15, concentrating in the southern countryside of Aleppo and the northern countryside of while pro-regime ground forces attempted to advance. ISW assessed Russian airstrikes against only one ISIS-held location with low-confidence during the reporting period. Meanwhile, the French Ministry of Defense announced French aircraft dropped 20 bombs against ISIS in ar Raqqa on November 15 in retaliation for the violent string of terrorist attacks carried out by ISIS in Paris on November 13. Russia will likely leverage the Paris attacks to drive its efforts to form a new counterterrorism coalition in the Middle East. Russia will continue to present itself as a decisive partner against ISIS in Syria to the international community, despite the relatively low number of Russian airstrikes targeting core ISIS terrain.

The Russian air campaign in Syria is accelerating the radicalization of the Syrian armed opposition. The brutality of the Assad regime against civilian populations throughout four years of armed conflict has driven rebels into partnerships with Syrian al-Qaeda affiliate Jabhat al-Nusra, a powerful anti-Assad ground force. Russia’s air campaign uses similarly indiscriminate tactics against civilians. U.S. officials have confirmed the Russian use of cluster munitionsagainst populated locations in Hama and Idlib Provinces. Open source reporting indicates the use of cluster munitions in Aleppo Province as well. Russian airstrikes have reportedly killed over 254 civilians from September 30 – October 26 alone, according to the Syrian Network for Human Rights. Russian airstrikes reportedly targeted at least 12 medical facilities throughout Syria, according to statements from Doctors Without Borders on October 29. Local sources also reported the use of white phosphorus during Russian airstrikes in Idlib Province on November 12. Russia’s violent intervention is already driving the unification of rebels under powerful jihadist and hardline elements of the armed opposition. Three rebel groups made up of foreign fighters pledged allegiance to Jabhat al-Nusra from September 23 to October 3, and three groups merged under hardline Islamist Ahrar al-Sham beginning in early September 2015 following reports of increased Russian presence in Syria.

The following graphic depicts ISW’s assessment of Russian airstrike locations based on reports from local Syrian activist networks, Syrian state-run media, and statements by Russian and Western officials.High-Confidence reporting. ISW places high confidence in reports corroborated both by official government statements reported through credible channels and documentation from rebel factions or activist networks on the ground in Syria deemed to be credible.Low-Confidence reporting. ISW places low confidence in secondary sources that have not been confirmed or sources deemed likely to contain disinformation.

Friday, November 13, 2015

Key Takeaway: The
Russian air campaign continued to support regime ground operations
against the Syrian opposition in Aleppo, Latakia, Idlib, Hama, and
Dera’a Provinces from November 11 - 12. Russian warplanes targeted
rebel-held terrain in the southern Aleppo countryside, enabling
pro-regime forces to seize the towns of al-Hader and al-Eis located southwest of Aleppo City on November 12. Russian warplanes began to bombard both
of these towns on October 15 in conjunction with the start of the
regime’s ground offensive against rebels in the area. These advances
have brought the regime and its allies within sixteen miles of the two
besieged Shi’a-majority towns of Fua’h and Kafraya in northeastern Idlib
Province. Iraqi Shi’a militia Harakat Hezbollah al-Nujaba claimed that
the group is preparing for operations to break the rebel siege on
these two towns. Russian warplanes began targeting rebel-held towns
surrounding Fu’ah and Kafraya on November 4. These reported airstrikes
violate terms of a UN-implemented ceasefire established on September 24.
Local sources also reported the use of white phosphorus during Russian airstrikes near the Jebel Zawiya mountain range in southern Idlib Province on November 12.

The
Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) announced the expansion of its air
campaign into Dera’a Province. ISW assessed Russian airstrikes against
one location in Dera’a Province with high-confidence and five others
with low-confidence from November 11 – 12, the largest concentration of
reported Russian strikes in Dera'a since the start of Russian airstrikes
on September 30. Local sources began reporting instances of Russian
airstrikes in Dera’a Province as early as October 28. The influx in
reported strikes follows reports of regime mobilization for an upcoming offensive near the Golan Heights. Israeli warplanes later conducted at least one airstrike near
the Damascus International Airport on November 11 targeting an alleged
weapon shipment intended for Lebanese Hezbollah. Continued Israeli
targeting of Iranian proxy forces in Syria could exert additional
pressure on Russia’s relations with Iran and the Syrian regime,
particularly if Russia received advance warning of the strike through
the Russian-Israeli air coordination mechanism established on September 21.

The following graphic depicts ISW’s assessment of Russian airstrike
locations based on reports from local Syrian activist networks, Syrian
state-run media, and statements by Russian and Western officials.High-Confidence reporting. ISW places high confidence in
reports corroborated both by official government statements reported
through credible channels and documentation from rebel factions or
activist networks on the ground in Syria deemed to be credible.Low-Confidence reporting. ISW places low confidence in
secondary sources that have not been confirmed or sources deemed likely
to contain disinformation.
Approaching the besieged enclaves from the east provides a more
accessible target than pushing from the south through core rebel-held
terrain in Idlib Province.
**One Russian airstrike
location from November 2 – 10 has been changed from low- to
high-confidence as a result of additional reporting.

Thursday, November 12, 2015

From ISW's October 31, 2015 to November 8, 2015 Weekly Intelligence Summary:

Current dynamics in Iraq and Syria threaten to
sow the seeds of future Arab-Kurd conflict. The U.S.-led anti-ISIS coalition depends on
Kurdish forces as a primary ground partner in both Iraq and Syria. Iraqi
Kurdish forces will soon launch an offensive to retake the ISIS-held town of
Sinjar in northwestern Iraq near the Syrian border with support from the
U.S.-led anti-ISIS coalition. Kurds and Arabs have historically contested the
town, which Kurds sometimes refer to as a land-bridge to Syria. Arab-Kurdish violence
in Iraq could reignite even as ISIS loses terrain. Meanwhile, Syrian Arab
fighters operating alongside Kurdish forces in northern Syria attacked the
ISIS-held town of al-Hawl near the Iraqi border west of Sinjar. Syrian Kurdish
forces have nonetheless faced persistent accusations of "ethnic
cleansing" against Arab civilians during operations to clear ISIS-held
areas in Northern Syria. Arab-Kurdish tensions in both countries will grow if
Kurdish forces attempt to seize other disputed regions. Competition over
territorial gains could fuel intra-Kurdish conflict, both between Iraqi and
Syrian Kurds as well as within the divided Iraqi Kurdistan Regional Government
(KRG). Continued Kurdish expansion will also face strong opposition from
Turkey. Turkish President Recep Erdogan pledged to take a harsh stance against
the outlawed Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) across the border in Iraq and Syria
after successfully consolidating his political power in parliamentary
elections.

Wednesday, November 11, 2015

Key Take-Away: Iraqi Security Forces have advanced towards and are proximate to infrastructure necessary for assault on downtown Ramadi. Encirclement of the city has been slow as the Iraqi Security Forces are still clearing the city’s environs, a necessary step before launching an offensive against the city.ISW’s Control Map of Ramadi has changed to clarify the positions of the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) in Ramadi’s environs.

Changes to Map:

ISW has changed the control map of Ramadi from the previous
iteration on November 2 to reflect a more refined assessment of where the ISF
maintain presence. The ISF are launching efforts to recapture Ramadi from
Habaniya base, east of Ramadi. It is likely that the ISF also maintain forward
positions around Ramadi but do not have control over much of Ramadi’s outskirts
in a doctrinal sense. Rather, they contest Ramadi’s suburbs and surrounding
neighborhoods in the outskirts by attacking an area, along with tribal fighters,
and then launching clearing operations in the same area. This disposition is
more effective than previous tactics that involved the ISF shuttling back and
forth between the front lines and its bases, especially if the ISF maintain a
forward presence, in the manner of the successful clear and hold operations during
the Surge. As these areas are still being cleared but have an ISF presence in
them, the relevant areas on the map have been denoted as “Contested with ISF
presence.”

Situation Report:

The ISF is approaching three important infrastructural facilities
around Ramadi: the Ramadi Barrage, the Warrar Dam, and the Palestine Bridge.
Control over these locations is necessary to cut off ISIS’s supply routes into
the city as well as to prepare for future operation to recapture the downtown
area. The ISF are advancing towards the Palestine
Bridge (2) that connects Albu Thiab area north of Ramadi with the city’s western
environs. The ISF are likely advancing towards the bridge from both the east and
the west, though this has not been confirmed. Seizing the bridge is important in
order to prevent ISIS from using the Euphrates River to resupply its positions
in Ramadi, according to the U.S. military. The ISF are also advancing towards
the former Anbar Operations Command (AOC) headquarters compound (8) north of
Ramadi, likely from Albu Faraj area east of the compound. The AOC headquarters
is a strategic position that overlooks the ISIS-controlled Warrar Dam (4), a
key dam that controls Euphrates River water levels and acts as a bridge into
Warrar neighborhood in central Ramadi. If the ISF secure the AOC headquarters
and approaches the Dam, they will cut off ISIS’s ground access to Ramadi from
the north and secure an important facility and access point into the center of
the city. Security forces also continued operations to encircle Ramadi and the ISIS-held
Ta’mim neighborhood area from the west. The ISF advanced into the Glass Factory area (9) on
November 8. This area is adjacent to the Ramadi Barrage (3), a dam that
controls water flow to Lake Habaniya, south of Ramadi, and acts as a bridge
into the Warrar neighborhood.

If the ISF can hold the Glass Factory and approach the Ramadi
Barrage, they would overlook multiple access points into central Ramadi: from
the west over the Ramadi Barrage; from the north over Albu Faraj Bridge; and
from the Anbar University area and the southern axis. ISW will monitor both whether
the ISF around Ramadi ensure that cleared areas remain cleared and the capacity
of forward-deployed ISF units to resist ISIS’s counter-attacks. The ISF’s
seizure of key infrastructure around the city will set important conditions in
the operation to recapture Ramadi from ISIS.

Key Takeaway: Russian airstrikes continued
to support regime ground operations in Aleppo, Hama, Homs, Idlib, and
Dera’a from November 9 - 10. Pro-regime forces relieved several
hundred regime soldiers besieged by ISIS in the Kuweires Airbase east
of Aleppo City on November 10 with air support provided by Russian
warplanes. Russian airstrikes began to target ISIS’s positions
surrounding Kuweires Airbase on October 12, preceding the start of the regime’s ground campaign against Kuweires on October 15.
The regime largely relied upon Russian air power as well as
reinforcement from hundreds of Iranian-backed proxy forces. The breaking
of the siege represents a significant psychological victory for the
regime and its allies. Russia will likely use this victory to validate
its intervention in Syria and portray itself and the regime as decisive
forces against ISIS in Syria. Russian airstrikes also continued to
target rebel-held terrain south of Aleppo City as pro-regime forces
continue to push southwest towards the town of Hader.

Russian airstrikes targeted Syrian opposition forces in Hama and
Idlib Provinces from November 9 - 10 as rebels continued to make gains against
regime forces following rebels’ seizure of the town of Morek in
northern Hama Province on November 4. Regime forces have in fact lost
terrain in Hama Province since the start of Russian airstrikes in Syria
on September 30. U.S. support to Syrian rebels has also largely assisted
rebel advances in Hama Province. The U.S. provided increased shipments
of TOW anti-tank missiles to “moderate” Syrian opposition groups
following Russia’s intervention. U.S.-backed rebels launched a total of 115 TOW missiles in the month of October alone.

Russian warplanes allegedly targeted the city of Inkhel 50 km north of Dera’a city amidst reports of
a buildup of regime military forces in northwestern Dera’a Province.
Pro-regime military buildup in southern Syria may indicate the regime’s
intent to launch a future offensive to retake the town of Tel Harra in
northwest Dera’a, which housed a joint Syrian-Russian signals
intelligence (SIGINT) base before rebels seized Tel
Harra in October 2014. These reports raise the question of future
Russian support towards an Iranian backed regime offensive near the
Golan Heights in Southern Syria, particularly in light of recent Russian
agreements with Syria’s southern neighbors Israel and Jordan.

The
following graphic depicts ISW’s assessment of Russian airstrike
locations based on reports from local Syrian activist networks, Syrian
state-run media, and statements by Russian and Western officials.

High-Confidence reporting.ISW
places high confidence in reports corroborated both by official
government statements reported through credible channels and
documentation from rebel factions or activist networks on the ground in
Syria deemed to be credible.

Low-Confidence reporting. ISW
places low confidence in secondary sources that have not been confirmed
or sources deemed likely to contain disinformation.

Tuesday, November 10, 2015

The Syrian regime and its allies reestablished
a ground line of communication (GLOC) to the hitherto-besieged
Kuweires Airbase east of Aleppo City in their first significant victory since
the start of the Russian air campaign in Syria on September 30. Activist
sources and Syrian
state television reported that an advance party of regime
forces established contact with several hundred Syrian Army soldiers besieged by
ISIS in Kuweires Airbase on November 10 after seizing the adjacent village of
Kuweires al-Sharqi. Clashes are reportedly ongoing as newly-arrived regime
reinforcements attempt to expand the base’s defensive perimeter. The advance
marks the culmination of one component of a multi-pronged
offensive which began on October 15. The
success of the operation relied heavily upon Russian air support as well as
reinforcement from hundreds of Iranian-backed proxy fighters. U.S. officials
previously reported in mid-October that up
to 2,000 Iranian, Hezbollah, and Iraqi Shi’a militia fighters had
massed southeast of Aleppo City in order to participate in ongoing offensives
targeting Kuweires Airbase as well as rebel-held terrain in the southern Aleppo
countryside.

The successful relief of the regime
forces trapped in Kuweires Airbase will provide a powerful morale boost to the
military forces loyal to Syrian President Bashar al-Assad. The operation
constitutes a much-needed symbolic victory for the Syrian regime following major
territorial losses in the first half of 2015 as well as an initial lack
of significant progress following the Russian intervention.
The rescue of several hundred Syrian Army soldiers who have been besieged since
December 2012will
tamper simmering discontent regarding his conduct of the Syrian Civil War. Alawite
populations along the Syrian Coast – a core base of popular support for the
Syrian regime – organized
several protests this summer criticizing the
government for failing to relieve Kuweires Airbase and other besieged
pro-regime enclaves in northern Syria.

The Syrian regime’s operational
intent following the offensive to secure Kuweires Airbase remains unclear. Kuweires
Airbase provides no tangible benefit to the Syrian Air Force, which maintains a
well-defended and functional airfield at the Aleppo International Airport
thirty kilometers to the west.The position of the base itself,
however, provides a potential staging ground for regime forces to conduct
follow-on operations that challenge ISIS’s presence in eastern Aleppo Province.
A continued presence in Kuweires Airbase could allow the Syrian regime to
contest ISIS-held terrain on the eastern outskirts of Aleppo City as well as
critical ISIS supply lines connecting ar-Raqqa City to the Turkish border. Claims that the elite
Syrian Army ‘Tiger Forces’ will soon redeploy from Kuweires to Hama
Province nevertheless suggest that the Syrian regime does not intend
to use the airfield as a launch pad for major offensive operations in the
near-future.The base also remains vulnerable to
an ISIS counterattack unless regime forces can seize additional terrain to
provide their salient with defense-in-depth. Alternatively, the Syrian regime
may intend to withdraw from Kuweires Airbase after securing safe passage for
the exfiltration of the base’s garrison. A withdrawal from the airfield would
free significant amounts of manpower, equipment, and aerial resupply assets for
use on other fronts.

The advances east of Aleppo City
nonetheless do little to change the immediate strategic outlook for President
Assad. Pro-regime forces have thus far achieved only
tactical gains throughout other parts of
northwestern Syria despite expanded support from Russia and Iran. Meanwhile,
rebel forces seized
the operationally-significant town of Morek along the strategic M5 Highway on
November 5 as part of a new offensive threatening regime-held Hama City. ISIS
also continues to pressure key supply lines for the Syrian regime in both Homs
and Aleppo Provinces. Activists reported that ISIS deployed a convoy
of at least forty vehicles from ar-Raqqa City to eastern
Aleppo Province on November 9 in a likely response to the imminent fall of
Kuweires Airbase. These challenges suggest that the Syrian regime and its
allies will struggle to translate symbolic gains into enduring operational success.

Key Takeaway:The
Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed airstrikes in Aleppo,
Damascus, Idlib, Lattakia, Homs, Hama, and Raqqa from November 6 –
November 8. Credible local sources substantiated strike claims in
Aleppo, Damascus, Idlib, Homs, and Hama during this time period, but
failed to verify reports of Russian airstrikes in Raqqa province. Russian
airstrikes continued to support regime ground operations with limited
effect. Russian warplanes targeted rebel-held territory in Aleppo city
and in the southwestern Aleppo countryside amidst ongoing clashes
between pro-regime and rebel forces in the area. Pro-regime forces have
failed numerous attempts to advance on the ground. Russian airstrikes
also targeted rebel-held territory in Idlib and Hama countrysides,
likely in response to continued rebel advances in Northern Hama. Jabhat
al-Nusra (JN) and rebel forces seized the strategic town of Morek, north
of Hama City on November 4 and continued to make tactical gains in the
surrounding villages including Ashtan and Um Hartayn on November
6. Rebel advances in Hama indicate that the Russian air campaign is
insufficient to prevent rebel gains in the area amidst increased
shipments of U.S. TOW anti-tank missiles to moderate rebels. It is
possible that rebel forces are taking advantage of a decrease in Russian
rotary wing air support following the deployment of Russian helicopters
to the T4 (Tiyas) and Sharyat airbases in Homs on November 4.

Russian
airstrikes also targeted ISIS-held territory in Aleppo and Homs
Provinces from November 6 to November 8. Russian warplanes targeted
ISIS-held towns of al-Bab in Northeastern Aleppo and Palmyra and Maheen
in Eastern Homs. Russian strikes near
the Kuweires airbase east of Aleppo city, besieged by ISIS set
conditions for a renewed regime advance toward the base after regime
forces regained control of
the Khanaser-Ithraya highway from ISIS on November 4. Re-establishing
control of the highway allowed the regime to reinforce Kuweires andseizethe
village of Sheikh Ahmad, three kilometers south of the airbase on
November 9. Coalition warplanes also targeted ISIS-held territory from
November 6 to November 8, conducting strikes in Hasakah, Deir ez-Zour,
and northern Aleppo. Both Russian and coalition airstrikes are therefore
occurring in northern Aleppo and possibly Deir ez Zour and Raqqa
against ISIS, exercising
de-confliction and raising questions of varying effects upon ground
conditions. Coalition airstrikes are precise, whereas Russian airstrikes continued to target civilian populations despite Russian claims to the contrary. Russian strikes on Douma in the Eastern Ghouta suburb of Damascus killed at least 23 civilians, including women and children on November
7. The strike follows recent regime aerial attacks in Douma, the
stronghold of prominent Islamist group Jaysh al-Islam. The regime and
Russia likely seek to disrupt an ongoing offensive by Jaysh al-Islam
against pro-regime forces south of Douma near regime-held neighborhoods
in Damascus.

The
following graphic depicts ISW’s assessment of Russian airstrike
locations based on reports from local Syrian activist networks, Syrian
state-run media, and statements by Russian and Western officials.High-Confidence reporting.ISW
places high confidence in reports corroborated both by official
government statements reported through credible channels and
documentation from rebel factions or activist networks on the ground in
Syria deemed to be credible.Low-Confidence reporting. ISW
places low confidence in secondary sources that have not been confirmed
or sources deemed likely to contain disinformation.