SYSTEM OPERATIONS v. SCIENTIFIC GAMES DEV. CORP.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

January 12, 1977

SYSTEM OPERATIONS, INC., a Delaware Corporation, and Mathematica, Inc., a New Jersey Corporation, Plaintiffs,
v.
SCIENTIFIC GAMES DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, a Michigan Corporation, and Dittler Brothers, Inc., a Georgia Corporation, Defendants

On July 9, 1976 S.O.I. executives were meeting with lottery officials about a second instant game and various details regarding game design and prize structure as well as advertising were discussed. A program plan was subsequently prepared for submission to and approval by the Ohio Lottery Commission. There is testimony which suggests that Ohio may have been preparing to exercise its option under its first contract with the plaintiffs; however, it is also clear that plaintiffs had no firm commitment regarding the option or any contract at all for the running of a second instant lottery in Ohio. In addition, it appears from the testimony that at all times Scientific Games knew that S.O.I. was under contract with Ohio to operate an instant game; that Scientific Games took the action it did while the game was still in progress; and that it was very interested in obtaining the contract for the second instant lottery game in Ohio through competitive bidding.
*fn2"
Scientific Games did not know of the various meetings between S.O.I. and lottery officials regarding a second instant or any other lottery game.

On July 13 or 14, 1976 Scientific Games sent a letter to Mr. Gerald Patronite, the Director of the Ohio State Lottery and to Mr. David Leahy, the Chairman of the State Lottery Commission. (Exh. P-1). This letter, which will be examined in greater detail later, informs the Director and Commissioner that Scientific Games has become aware of "certain information" which it believes is "vitally important" to the lottery in progress in Ohio. The letter seeks an opportunity to demonstrate "the clear significance of our discovery", in the belief that it "will assist you in the service you are conscientiously attempting to render to the State of Ohio". The letter is accompanied by a two page "explanation" of this Court's previous decision, with references to the guidelines allegedly put forth by the Court
*fn3"
and references to the "insecurity of the competitor's product".

Some time between July 16th and 23rd Scientific Games received a telephone call from a Mr. Prososki, an auditor with the Ohio Lottery, who apparently made some vague references to some problems which he thought the lottery was having. He asked if Scientific Games knew anything.
*fn4"
The reply was to the effect that Scientific Games had "a method of reading the numbers". The auditor was also informed that a formal request for the information or demonstration would be necessary. Less than a week after this call, the auditor called again and requested a meeting and demonstration at the State Auditor's office before a Mr. Blum.

On July 26, 1976 the plaintiffs appeared before this Court seeking an order to show cause and a temporary restraining order. Plaintiffs presented the Court with a copy of the defendant's letter to Mr. Patronite, the Ohio Lottery Director, and asserted that same constituted interference with a contractual relationship. The Court granted a temporary restraining order under which Scientific Games could conduct its demonstration or test, but not under the two conditions which were contained in its letter. (Exh. P-1). The defendant could not require the Lottery Director to choose a certified public accountant to witness the demonstration and report back to the Director; nor could it require that the Lottery Director or other Commission officials witnessing the test not make the information regarding the particulars of the demonstration and the results known to any competitor.

On July 29, 1976, Mr. Stephen Parisi, Legal Counsel to the Ohio Lottery, responded to the defendant's original letter (P-1). Noting the difficulty in determining exactly what it was that Scientific Games wished to bring to the attention of the Ohio Lottery and acknowledging the Commission wished "to obtain any legitimate information available to it in order to continuously examine the operating procedures of the Ohio Lottery", (Exh. P-2), the defendant's offer, vague though it was, was accepted. A date of August 2nd was initially suggested, however, that date was not convenient for all parties.

"While a trader may lawfully engage in the sharpest competition with those in a like business, by offering extraordinary inducements, or by representing his own goods to be better and cheaper than those of his competitors, yet when he oversteps that line and commits an act with the malicious intent of inflicting injury upon his rival's business, his conduct is illegal, and if damage ensues from it the injured party is entitled to redress. And it does not matter whether the wrongdoer effects his object by persuasion or by false representation. The courts look through the instrumentality or means employed to the wrong perpetrated with the malicious intent, and provides the remedy to redress that wrong. [Citation omitted]." (Emphasis original).

Id., at 587, 588, 175 A. at 66.

"Malice in the legal sense is the intentional doing of a wrongful act without justification or excuse. And a 'wrongful act' is any act which in the ordinary course will infringe upon the rights of another to his damage, except [and unless] it be done in the exercise of an equal or superior right."

From the testimony and exhibits and the inferences drawn from this evidence, this Court is of the view that Scientific Games committed "wrongful acts", as defined above. With full knowledge of the relationship between S.O.I. and the Ohio Lottery, the defendant contacted state officials and attempted to show them that plaintiffs' product was inferior and insecure. If the defendant's actions were successful, they would most likely result in the termination of plaintiffs' contract, an event which would benefit the defendant. Indeed it may be inferred from the testimony that the defendant knew it stood to benefit in this or in other ways and was acting in furtherance of that objective.
*fn5"
Moreover, the Court is convinced that the defendant intended to interfere with the existing contractual relations. In short, activities of the type present here are clearly actionable and, standing alone, would warrant the equitable remedy sought.
*fn6"
The important issue remaining, however, is whether the defendant's actions were "justified". Were the steps taken by Scientific Games privileged and, if so, what is the scope of that privilege?

"[It] is essential in determining the availability of justification or privilege as a defense to assay the relationship of the parties inter sese within the social and factual context presented, as well as to weigh the relative merits of the rights and advantages affected by the alleged tortious conduct."

Systems Operations, Inc., supra at 765-766. See also, Middlesex Concrete, supra, recognizing the public interest as a basis for privilege. In the instant case, the defendant's actions are no less privileged. Scientific Games was generally doing what it was permitted to do in the public interest within this Court's previous order. While it may also have acted with ill will toward the plaintiffs, with the hope of injuring its business relations and reputation, this alone does not defeat the privilege. Middlesex Concrete, supra, 37 N.J. at 519, 181 A.2d 774 citing Prosser, Law of Torts, now in 4th Ed. at p. 943.

Although the Court finds that in general the defendant's actions in the instant case were privileged, the precise scope of that privilege is still in question.

"The justification must be 'as broad as the act, and must cover not only the motive and the purpose, or, in other words, the object sought, but also the means used.' [Citation omitted]." (Emphasis added).

Louis Kamm, Inc., supra, 113 N.J.L. at 589, 175 A. at 67. The privilege to protect the public interest in this case extends far enough to cover the object sought by the defendant -- malicious in part though it was. Whether the privilege extends so far as to cover the means which the defendant attempted to use in informing the Lottery Director of the alleged security problems with plaintiffs' ticket is another matter.

In the July 13th letter which Scientific Games sent to the Ohio Lottery Director and Commission Chairman, the disclosure of the "vitally important" "discovery" was conditioned upon the promise that ". . . anyone witnessing the demonstration not make this information available to any competitor." In addition, on the two page enclosure, the defendant stated:

". . . it is our preference to demonstrate that the accuracy and dependability of our technique can be objectively verified to your complete satisfaction by any of several reputable independent auditors. * * *

. . . [We] prefer not to reveal our testing techniques, but . . . we will test the tickets and samples in the presence of certified public accountants chosen by the Lottery Director from among any of the big 8 international accounting firms, and if they determine that a ticket or sample can be readily compromised . . . they will so inform you in an affidavit executed by them.

. . . [This] would be our preference, since it eliminates the possibility, however remote, of any inadvertent disclosure of our methodology and technology to any other competitor in your state or elsewhere."

Defendant's Mem. in Opposition p. 13. Indeed, the two page attachment to the Patronite letter suggests that this Court has already ruled that Scientific Games is entitled to the confidence of lottery directors. Such is not the case. In its earlier opinion this Court did not have before it the precise question of whether the information turned over to lottery directors constituted a trade secret. In fact, the Court expressed doubt as to whether such was the case. Systems, supra at 763. While it stated the obvious law on the subject -- viz., if the information or technique were a trade secret the defendant could insist upon the confidence of the lottery director, the Court did not specifically rule one way or the other on that issue. Indeed the Court noted:

". . . if defendant truly desires to act in the public interest, it should be willing to explain how a ticket was broken in any event."

Id., at 763.

The foregoing aside, the defendant's argument misunderstands what is being determined here. The Court is determining the extent of the privilege under which Scientific Games may interfere with the contractual and business relations of the plaintiff, S.O.I. The defendant does not have to disclose anything at all, to anyone, if it chooses not to. If it does decide to disclose a bona fide trade secret in another context, less affected with the public interest, it can insist upon the confidence of those obtaining the information. When it chooses, however, to take action which constitutes wrongful interference with contractual relations, the scope of the privilege controls the propriety of defendant's activities, not what it considers best for itself.
*fn7"
In addition, disclosure of trade secret information may itself be privileged.

"A privilege to disclose or use another's trade secret may arise from the other's consent or from other conduct on his part by which he is estopped from complaining. A privilege to disclose may also be given by the law, independently of the other's consent, in order to promote some public interest." (Emphasis supplied).

Restatement of Torts, § 757, comment d at 9 (1939). For the reasons suggested earlier, disclosure of the ticket testing information by a lottery director to the manufacturer under contract would be privileged in the public interest.

For all of the foregoing reasons, and the Court finding that all of the prerequisites for preliminary injunctive relief have been met, Oburn v. Shapp, 521 F.2d 142, 147 (3d Cir. 1975), the plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction is granted. Plaintiffs shall submit an order consistent with this opinion.

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