This paper examines the claim that de Finetti and Savage totally rejected the notion of indeterminate, as distinct from imprecise, probabilities. It argues that their examination of imprecise reasoning refers both to descriptive and normative issues, and that the inability for a decision-maker to commit to a single prior cannot be limited to measurement problems, as argued by Arthmar and Brady in a recent contribution to this Journal. The paper shows that de Finetti and Savage admitted that having an interval of initial probabilities may sometimes have normative relevance, thereby leaving an opening for indeterminate probabilities.

en_US

dc.relation.ispartof

History of Economic Ideas

en_US

dc.relation.isbasedon

10.19272/201706101009

en_US

dc.title

De finetti and savage on the normative relevance of imprecise reasoning: A reply to arthmar and brady

en_US

dc.type

Journal Article

utslib.description.version

Published

en_US

utslib.citation.volume

1

en_US

utslib.citation.volume

25

en_US

utslib.for

1499 Other Economics

en_US

utslib.for

2202 History And Philosophy Of Specific Fields

en_US

utslib.for

1499 Other Economics

en_US

utslib.for

2202 History And Philosophy Of Specific Fields

en_US

pubs.embargo.period

Not known

en_US

pubs.organisational-group

/University of Technology Sydney

pubs.organisational-group

/University of Technology Sydney/Faculty of Business

utslib.copyright.status

open_access

pubs.issue

1

en_US

pubs.publication-status

Published

en_US

pubs.volume

25

en_US

Abstract:

This paper examines the claim that de Finetti and Savage totally rejected the notion of indeterminate, as distinct from imprecise, probabilities. It argues that their examination of imprecise reasoning refers both to descriptive and normative issues, and that the inability for a decision-maker to commit to a single prior cannot be limited to measurement problems, as argued by Arthmar and Brady in a recent contribution to this Journal. The paper shows that de Finetti and Savage admitted that having an interval of initial probabilities may sometimes have normative relevance, thereby leaving an opening for indeterminate probabilities.