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Foreign Policy Watch: India-Pakistan

China-Pakistan Equation: Is it India’s Dilemma?

In April, China struck 51 agreements with all-weather ally Pakistan, including the multibillion dollar economic corridor through the PoK that will expand the communist giant’s influence in India’s neighbourhood.

Before we deep dive, let’s first know historical background

India claims the entire erstwhile princely state of Jammu and Kashmir based on an instrument of accession signed in 1947. Pakistan claims Jammu and Kashmir based on its majority Muslim population, whereas China claims the Shaksam Valley and Aksai Chin.

The origin of the Sino-Pak equation could be traced in China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), finds root to the Border Agreement of 1963, considered a milestone in China-Pakistan relations.

The agreement ceded the 5000 plus square mile Trans Karakorum Tract to China and served as a precursor to the Karakoram Highway, conceived later as a strategic link defining China and Pakistan’s ‘all-weather friendship’.

The then Defence Minister of India, Krishna Menon, elaborately enunciated India’s position on the issue at the UN, condemning the agreement as illegitimate.

Besides, India lodged an “emphatic protest” to China and conveyed its concerns in a letter of protest.

Decades down the line, while India’s policy orientation and broader claim on Gilgit Baltistan remains unchanged, its stance on Chinese investments in the Karakoram Highway, and Chinese efforts to leverage this territorial link to build a strategic corridor, is perceived to be weakening over time.

The economic corridor is considered central to China–Pakistan relations and will run about 3,000 km from Gwadar to Kashgar.

The Corridor is an extension of China’s proposed 21st century Silk Road initiative.

According to a Firstpost report, this is the biggest overseas investment by China announced yet and the corridor is expected to be operational within 3 years.

Why Gwadar Port is strategically so important to China?

Gwadar forms the crux of the CPEC project, as it is envisaged to be the link between China’s ambitious One Belt, One Road (OBOR) in Maritime Silk Road project.

In total, more than $1 billion worth of projects are to be developed around the port of Gwadar by December 2017.

But, what are the geopolitical reasons to China’s OBOR project?

There are compelling geopolitical reasons, such as energy security, for China to push forward with its One Belt, One Road plans at a time when its trading partners are potentially excluding it from strategic agreements.

Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) countries, the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) and the EU-Japan agreement show comprehensive liberalisation agendas, but do not include China and have the potential to increase trading costs.

In response, China plans to negotiate free-trade agreements with 65 countries along the OBOR.

Further 8 are under negotiation with Japan, Korea, Australia, Sri Lanka, Norway, the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership, Asean and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC).

How will CPEC benefits to Pakistan ? Is it a Game changer for Pak?

China and Pakistan hope the massive investment plan will transform Pakistan into a regional economic hub as well as further boost the growing ties between Pakistan and China.

The CPEC is considered a significant project that seeks to cement Sino-Pakistan bilateral ties and further consolidate their strategic ties.

According to The Guardian, “The Chinese are not just offering to build much-needed infrastructure but also make Pakistan a key partner in its grand economic and strategic ambitions.”

What’s the claim from India in CPEC?

The corridor will run through India’s periphery, more significantly, Gilgit Baltistan, claimed by India as part of the erstwhile princely state of J&K.

In due course, this geographical reality of the CPEC could potentially impinge upon India’s geopolitical calculations and pose a strategic challenge.

How does China look at CPEC?

In December 2014, the Chinese state-run Xinhua published a statement announcing the closure of the strategic Khunjerab Pass and in the process referred to Gilgit Baltistan as part of Pakistan.

Until then, China had maintained that J&K was a bilateral problem/dispute between India and Pakistan.

Whether terming Gilgit Baltistan as part of Pakistan reflected a possible shift in the Chinese position on the J&K— a change from its previously held neutral position – was debated in the Indian media for a while.

In the Gilgit Baltistan segment, the CPEC project design includes a major expansion of the Karakoram Highway, establishing industrial parks in special economic zones, constructing hydropower projects, railway line and road building.

The project also entails building hydropower projects and motorways/highways in the so-called Azad Jammu and Kashmir (AJK).

What’s the India’s claim and response to it?

India’s High Commissioner to Pakistan, noted: “India has no worry over the construction of Pakistan-China Economic Corridor as an economically strong Pakistan would bring stability in the region.”

India is yet to comprehensively articulate its approach towards the CPEC despite the fact that the corridor bodes strategic implications for India.

The corridor will pass through the Gilgit Baltistan region where China has invested in the past in infrastructure and hydropower projects.

How will CPEC get materialised despite scepticism?

Ironically, in Pakistan itself, there is growing cynicism about the CPEC’s prospects and feasibility because of security-related concerns and inter-provincial political discord on route preferences.

Nevertheless, given the Chinese determination to find a route to oil-rich West Asia through Pakistan, and the Pakistani desperation to provide every possible assurance to China about safeguarding its investments, the project is likely to be implemented, even if its scope may be limited.

One has to remember that China and Pakistan have weathered geographical and logistical extremes in the past to build the highest metalled road on one of the toughest terrain, i.e. the Karakoram Highway.

Moreover, the Pakistani decision to raise a special security division to protect Chinese workers and interests in Pakistan, indicates its resolve to implement the project in all earnestness.

The Way forward

While India’s overall stance on PoK remains understated, the commencement of the CPEC warrants more serious attention than what has been accorded so far.

There is a need to carefully weigh the situation and devise a suitable and sustainable approach that could serve India’s long-term interests.

It is imperative that some of the explicit strategic concerns regarding the CPEC figure in the bilateral round of talks during the Indian Prime Minister’s forthcoming visit to Pakistan.

What do you think on such a big triangular geostrategic politics? How will it resolved from Sino-India relations? Let us know!

Any doubts?

As China wants India to join CPEC and OBOR , India should upheld diplomatically its keenness to join CPEC only if China is willing to change its route through Gilgit – baltistan region and if it is impossible for China to change its route then it must recognize India’s sovereignty over Gilgit – Baltistan , if any one of these two is fulfilled then India should join .. There has to be clear cut strategic interests of India with a touch of helping hand from Delhi to Beijing in China’s ambitious OBOR project.

Considering the strategic implication of supporting CPEC India should comprehensively work out with Pakistan as well China to realise a soft border . Without solving the border and kashmir dispute it will be a strategic loss to INDIA.

November 7, 2016

[op-ed snap] Is New Delhi (ND) reducing itself to a South Asian power? I

Context: ND’s decision to reply to Pakistan by raking up Baluchistan in various global fora demonstrates tactical considerations trump strategic thinking in India

Early objectives of this government: Neighborhood first, selling India’s growth story globally, and getting Sino-Indian relations on track- all these lay in tatters

Reason: Foreign policy without a grand strategic blueprint

Result: Reduced to the little box- South Asia because of our never-ending battle with Pakistan

ND’s new-found outrage about human rights violations in Baluchistan is suggestive of misplaced priorities. It is a sheer waste of India’s limited diplomatic energy, owing to shortage of diplomats in MEA

November 1, 2016

[op-ed snap] Civilians on LOC and border caught in cross fire

Context: Ceasefire violations have become a daily occurrence since the terrorist attack on the Army camp in Uri in September and the subsequent “surgical strikes” by the Army.

Since then there have been 60 ceasefire violations.

Indians suffering more: The density of civilian settlement is much higher on the Indian side in comparison to Pakistan’s. As a result, the increased firing across the border creates more pressure on India.

Hundreds have been shifted to shelters and bunkers for safety.

Post 2003 ceasefire agreement: After the two countries agreed to a ceasefire in 2003, the resultant calm had won the confidence of local residents.

Villagers began farming right up to the fence, tourism picked up, and even informal border trade increased.

Present situation: After the surgical strikes, the security forces retain a free hand in responding to infiltrations and instances of firing.

Government response: No senior government functionary has publicly addressed the issue.

September 29, 2016

[op-ed snap] To revive an old friendship Part 2

The way ahead for India-Russia relations: India needs to rebuild on its strengths and common concerns with Russians e.g. : Need to converge strategies on terrorism, Need to maintain a balancing act between USA and Russia, Need to revive and deepen India-Russia economic, scientific and technological ties, trying for an RIC (Russia, India, China) alliance, leveraging India-Russia ties to isolate Pakistan.

Need to converge strategies on terrorism: India and Russia need to converge their strategies vis-à-vis terrorism in West Asia and Afghanistan and also revitalize the previous India-Russia agreement on intelligence sharing.

Need to maintain a balancing act between USA and Russia: India needs to reassure Russia that India-US relations will not jeopardise Russian interests. India could also consider concluding similar military exercises and logistics agreements with Russia as it has with the US..

Need to revive and deepen India-Russian economic, scientific and technological ties: India needs a continuous engagement and follow-up plan to deepen its scientific and technological relations with Russia eg investments in the oil and gas sector and Joint manufacturing facilities.

Trying for an RIC (Russia, India, China) alliance: India should overcome contradictions with China and build an RIC alliance as suggested by Russia. Russia has its own concerns with China’s increasing international prominence.

This forum can help in effective resolution of mutual concerns.

Leveraging India-Russia ties to isolate Pakistan: The U.S. will always have a dual approach to India and Pakistan, because it needs both. Russia, on the other hand, will not which could be leveraged by India to isolate Pakistan.

September 28, 2016

India to review MFN status to Pakistan

What? India will review the Most Favoured Nation (MFN) status given to Pakistan at a meeting called by Prime Minister Narendra Modi

Context: The decision comes in the wake of the Uri attack

Background: The MFN status was accorded in 1996 under the WTO’s General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)

Both India and Pakistan are signatories to the agreement, according to which they have to treat each other and rest of WTO member countries as favoured trading partners

Indus treaty: PM Modi chaired a review meeting of the Indus Water Treaty, during which it was decided that India will exploit to the maximum the water of Pakistan-controlled rivers, including Jhelum, as per the water sharing pact

August 16, 2016

Pakistan invites India for talks on Kashmir dispute

Pak: It is the international obligation of both the countries to resolve the issue, notwithstanding India’s insistence that it would talk on contemporary and relevant issues in Indo-Pak relations

Context: The invitation was extended amid tension in bilateral ties due to the war of words between the two nations over the Kashmir issue

Background: Union Home Minister addressed Parliament on the Kashmir issue and said that India was willing to discuss only Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK) with Pakistan, and that the question of discussing Jammu and Kashmir with Islamabad just did not arise

India also virtually turned down Pakistan’s proposal that it would invite India for a dialogue on J&K and made it clear that it would talk on contemporary and relevant issues in Indo-Pak relations

July 18, 2016

Pakistan to take river dispute back to international court

News: Pakistan has decided to return to an international tribunal – Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA), The Hague – to settle a dispute with India

The dispute is over sharing waters of the Kishenganga and Ratle river projects

India’s stand: Pakistan is violating provisions of the Indus Waters Treaty (IWT), 1960, in rushing to a third forum – the PCA – without attempting to avail Treaty provisions in resolving the above matters

Background: Pakistan’s previous attempt at the PCA had backfired as the PCA had given a verdict defending India’s right to divert water of Kishenganga

The PCA had also quashed Pakistan’s argument that India’s hydro electricity power plans on the Kishenganga reduced flow of water for Neelum Jhelum Hydro Electricity Project (NJHEP)

Pakistan’s stand: Unlike the previous arbitration at the PCA, Pakistan will take up the issue of “design” of the Kishenganga and Ratle river projects in Kashmir

April 7, 2016

JIT visit took place in cooperative spirit: Pakistan

Context: Pakistani media reports which claimed that the JIT had drawn a blank in India

News: Pak foreign ministry statement that The visit of the JIT to India took place in the context of the cooperative approach being pursued by the Pakistan government as part of its commitment to effectively fight terrorism in all its forms

Doublespeak: statement that the JIT was denied access to security officers who were eyewitnesses to the Pathankot airbase attack

Importance: ininvestigation is now being seen as a key indicator of whether a more restrained and cooperative approach to handling terror will yield results not seen before

China, whose consent is necessary for admitting new members to the NSG, has consistently supported Pakistan’s entry into the NSG.

The Chinese willingness today to consider membership for both India and Pakistan will influence the thinking in Washington and key Western capitals.

Critics of the U.S.-Pakistan Nuke deal

Firstly, Pakistan has a terrible track record of nuclear proliferation and that a nuclear deal would be seen as rewarding such irresponsible behaviour.

Two, it would enable Pakistan to enhance its nuclear arsenal which, is directed against India, making the latter more insecure.

Third, U.S.-Pakistan nuclear deal will hyphenate India and Pakistan once again in the international discourse, something New Delhi viscerally detests.

Four sets of reasons why a ‘conditional nuclear deal’, in India’s national interest.

First of all, Pakistan’s admission to the global nuclear order is good news for the international non-proliferation regime.

Second, It is better for the international community to be in the know of Pakistan’s nuclear programme.

More importantly, It will bring the Sino-Pak. nuclear relations under international scrutiny.

Third, if India’s experience of inking the nuclear deal with the U.S. and other states, signing the India-specific Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA, the road to nuclear normalcy is not going to be a smooth one for Islamabad.

Pakistan should meet conditions

For one, Separation of its civilian and military facilities, leading to a less feverish production of fissile material by Pakistan, thereby producing fewer nuclear warheads.

Second, some restrictions on its weapons programme, materially and doctrinally.

Third, Pakistan will have to give up its opposition to FMCT negotiations as a precondition for the deal.

What about India’s National Security Interest ?

A U.S.-Pakistan civilian nuclear deal will make absolutely no difference to India’s national security interests.

We must, ask the U.S. and other stakeholders to press Islamabad to stop stalling the FMCT negotiations, and agree to a nuclear ‘No-first-use’ agreement with India, which is already part of the Indian doctrine.

India should insist that Pakistan, as part of the deal, should be asked to negotiate nuclear confidence building measures (CBMs) with India without linking them to conventional arms control.