Thursday, December 31, 2015

The latest Iraqi public opinion poll covered three major topics, the second of
which was the security situation in the country. Greenberg Quinlan Rosner
Research conducted the poll from August to September 2015 querying 2,000 Iraqis
from all parts of the country. The war was by far the most important issue
according to the Iraqis questioned. Confidence in the security forces was split
along ethnosectarian lines, and most believed that the conflict would last at
least another year.

When asked what were
the most important issues facing the government security was number one. Nearly
half of respondents, 48% said that topic was the biggest issue facing Iraq.
With the war still raging in central and western Iraq and Mosul and most of
Anbar province still under the Islamic State’s control it was no surprise that
Iraqis felt that way. Violence has actually been a pressing issue since early
2013 when the insurgency began picking up after its nadir in 2008-2009. However
compared to December 2014 security declined 13% in importance due to
improvement in the south. When broken down by region every part of Iraq except
the south believed that security was deteriorating. In Baghdad 59% said worse
compared to 19% better. In the west 78% said worse, 6% better, and even in
Kurdistan 63% responded worse, 31% better. The south was the one exception with
43% feeling security had gotten worse, but 53% felt that it was better. After
Mosul fell in June 2014 there was widespread belief that Baghdad would be
attacked, which would open the way to the rest of the country. That didn’t
happen however and most people in places like Basra, Dhi Qar, Maysan, etc. now
feel relatively secure that IS is not able to reach their provinces leading to
the responses in the survey.

Which 2 issues are the most important for the
government to address?

Security 48%

Corruption 43%

Basic Services 37%

Jobs 30%

Displaced 15%

Sectarianism 12%

High Prices 5%

Education 3%

Central
Government-Kurdistan dispute 2%

How important is security for the government
to deal with?

June 2012 27%
Important

April 2013 31%
Important

September 2013 50%
Important

February 2014 52%
Important

December 2014 61%
Important

September 2015 48% Important

Is security getting better or worse?

Baghdad 59% Worse,
19% Better

South 43% Worse, 53%
Better

West 78% Worse, 6% Better

Kurdistan 63% Worse,
31% Better

Each major group in
Iraq felt differently about the security forces. While 54% said that they
trusted the Iraqi army compared to 22% for local forces or 21% both/neither
that was skewed by the responses by Shiites. For that group 66% believed that the
army protected them, while only 22% of Sunnis did and 12% of Kurds. For Sunnis
they were almost evenly split between local forces, 37%, and the army, 34%. Only
8% of Kurds were confident in the army against 64% for local forces meaning the
Peshmerga. Another factor was that the three groups saw the composition of the
army differently. 60% believed that the army represented all Iraqis against 29%
who said it only represented Shiites. Again that was due to 90% of Shiites feeling
the army was national in character. The Sunnis and Kurds however thought that
the armed forces were Shiite at 58% and 60% respectively. For Sunnis their
loyalties were almost evenly split between the armed forces and tribal
fighters. They might have had an even better opinion of the army, but it was
widely believed that former Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki purged Sunni
officers for loyalists, and then Abadi got rid of Maliki’s men to put in his
own. Kurds didn’t look upon the army positively at all given their regions’
history of conflict with the central government. Instead they put their
confidence in the Peshmerga.

Who do you trust to keep you safe the Iraqi
army or local forces?

Overall 54% Army,
21% Both/neither, 22% Local forces

Shiites 66% Army,
22% Both/neither, 12% Local forces

Sunnis 34% Army, 23%
Both/neither, 37% Local forces

Kurds 8% Army, 13%
Both/neither, 64% Local forces

Does the army represent all Iraqis or only
Shiites?

Overall 60% All
Iraqis, 29% Only Shiites

Shiites 90% All
Iraqis, 7% Only Shiites

Sunnis 29% All
Iraqis, 58% Only Shiites

Kurds 14% All
Iraqis, 60% Only Shiites

The Hashd al-Shaabi
were seen largely the same way as the army. When asked who did they trust to
provide security the army or Hashd the army just inched out the Hashd because
of Sunni respondents. Overall, 35% said the army would do the best job, but the
Hashd were right there with 31%. Another 25% said both or neither. The army was
able to come out ahead because 48% of Sunnis said they would prefer it over the
Hashd, 27%. 45% of Shiites on the other hand liked the Hashd more than the army
at 30%. Kurds didn’t like either one with 0% saying the army, 1% saying the
Hashd and 32% both/neither. Many Sunnis have a negative opinion of the Hashd
seeing them as a sectarian Shiite force carrying out mass arrests and
destroying property. That opinion is shared by the Kurds as well. The Peshmerga
and Hashd have clashed in several areas in Diyala and Salahaddin, and the Kurds
believe that the two sides will eventually challenge each other in the future
for control of the disputed territories. That leads the Hashd to be seen as a
threat. To Shiites the Hashd came to the rescue when Mosul fell and are believed
to be protectors of the nation.

Who do you trust more to provide security the
army or the Hashd al-Shaabi?

Overall 35% Army,
31% Hashd, 25% Both/neither

Shiites 30% Army,
45% Hashd, 23% Both/neither

Sunnis 48% Army, 4%
Hashd, 27% Both/neither

Kurds 0%, 1% Hashd,
32% Both/Neither

Even with those divided
opinions a majority of Iraqis believed that the Hashd should be used in the
fight against the Islamic State. 81% of Iraqis said that the Hashd be utilized
in the war. Unsurprisingly 99% of Shiites supported the idea, as well as 50% of
Sunnis versus 42% being opposed. Kurds on the other hand felt the opposite with
80% being against, and 6% for. The next question was how important people felt
about the Hashd participating in the fight against IS. 81% said it was very to
somewhat important. 100% of Shiites felt that way, 52% of Sunnis and only 5% of
Kurds. Again, many Kurds were thinking about Iraq after the war and had strong
trepidations about the Hashd, and do not want to see its influence grow
fighting the Islamic State. Even though many Sunnis believed the Hashd were a
Shiite force around half still wanted them to help in the war effort.

Do you support or oppose the use of the Hashd
in the fight against IS?

Overall 81% Support,
16% Oppose

Shiites 99% Support,
1% Oppose

Sunnis 50% Support,
42% Oppose

Kurds 6% Support,
80% Oppose

How important are the Hashd to the fight
against IS?

Overall 81%
Very/Somewhat Important, 15% Little/Not important

Shiites 100%
Very/Somewhat Important, 0% Little/Not important

Sunnis 52%
Very/Somewhat Important, 41% Little/Not important

Kurds 5%
Very/Somewhat Important, 78% Little/Not important

Most Iraqis believed
that the war would last at least a year. People were given five options on how
long they believed it would take beat IS. 22% of Shiites, 4% of Sunnis and 3%
of Kurds thought it would take 6 months. 31% of Shiites, 15% of Sunnis and 7%
of Kurds picked 6-12 months. Most seemed to believe it would take 1-2 years,
which 23% of Shiites, 24% of Sunnis, and 17% of Kurds selected. More Sunnis,
30%, and Kurds, 41% however thought it would take 2 or more years versus just
6% of Shiites. There was also a minority who said the war would never end, 1%
of Shiites, 5% of Sunnis, and 14% of Kurds. Despite the huge shock of losing
Mosul and Tikrit in the summer of 2014 Iraqis seemed to have calmed down and
now see the war as something that is finite, meaning that it will eventually
end in a few years if not sooner.

How long do you think it will take to defeat
IS?

Within 6 months 22%
Shiites, 4% Sunnis, 3% Kurds

6-12 months 31% Shiites,
15% Sunnis, 7% Kurds

1-2 years 23%
Shiites, 24% Sunnis, 17% Kurds

2 years or more 6%
Shiites, 30% Sunnis, 41% Kurds

Never 1% Shiites, 5%
Sunnis, 14% Kurds

The Islamic State
exacerbated existing fissures within Iraqi society, which were shown in the
poll. Respondents for example saw the army and Hashd through an ethnosectarian
lense with the Shiites preferring the army and Hashd, against the Sunnis and
Kurds who preferred their own forces. There was also a few seeming
contradictions. For one, the security situation was seen as getting worse, but
most believed that the war would end sooner rather than later. Sunnis and Kurds
didn’t like the Hashd but more than half of the former thought they were needed
in the fight. What these results show is the complexity of Iraqi society.
Things are not as clear cut as they seem. Yes, there are ethnosectarian
differences, but they do not always play out as people would think.

Wednesday, December 30, 2015

In December 2015 Greenberg Quinlan Rosner Research released
a new public opinion poll on Iraq. The company has done several such surveys
over the last couple years, and the data is some of the most comprehensive
available on how Iraqis are feeling about their country. The survey was done
from August 12 to September 3 and included 2,000 people from all major regions
of the country. The results showed that Prime Minister Haidar Abadi was still
widely popular in Iraq, far above any other national leader. On the other hand,
the public had a low opinion of the ruling parties and government in general, and
had different thoughts on what needed to be fixed in the country apart from
what politicians talk about.

Prime Minister Haidar Abadi was by far the most popular
politician in the poll. He had an approval rating of 65%, and 58% of respondents
said they wanted to continue in the direction he was leading the country. The
only region that disagreed was Kurdistan with only 14% agreeing with the
premier. In comparison, in Baghdad and the south 76% wanted to follow Abadi,
and 42% in western Iraq. When compared to other national leaders the prime
minister also had the highest rating with 54% versus 30% for Muqtada al-Sadr,
17% for Ammar Hakim head of the Supreme Council, 16% for ex-Vice President
Nouri al-Maliki, 15% for Kurdish President Massoud Barzani, 11% for Speaker of
Parliament Salim Jabouri, 10% for former VP Iyad Allawi, 9% for Iraq’s
President Fuad Masum, and 5% for dismissed VP Osama Nujafi. When broken down by
sect 75% of Shiites approved of the prime minister and 39% for Sunnis versus 34%
unfavorable. Only Kurdish respondents had a bad view of him at 82% unfavorable.
Abadi came in with a very positive approval rating when he was first elected in
December 2014 at 75%. Even though it dipped after that he was still far above
any other politician. August when the survey was done was also when the premier
announced his reform program in response to national protests, and that could
have maintained his support. The low rating amongst Kurds was likely due to
Baghdad’s on going dispute with the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) over
the budget and oil exports.

Do you
approve/disapprove of the job PM Abadi is doing?

65% Approve

29% Disapprove

I want to continue in
the direction PM Abadi is taking Iraq versus I want to go in a different direction
than the PM

Overall 58% Follow PM, 21% Different Direction

Baghdad 76% Follow PM, 8% Different Direction

South 76% Follow PM, 11% Different Direction

West 42% Follow PM, 17% Different Direction

Kurdistan 14% Follow PM, 77% Different Direction

How do you feel about
Iraq’s political leaders?

Abadi 54% Favorable, 31% Unfavorable

Sadr 30% Favorable, 45% Unfavorable

Hakim 17% Favorable, 57% Unfavorable

Maliki 16% Favorable, 73% Unfavorable

M. Barzani 15% Favorable, 68% Unfavorable

Jabouri 11% Favorable, 63% Unfavorable

Allawi 10% Favorable, 75% Unfavorable

Masum 9% Favorable, 68% Unfavorable

O. Nujafi 5% Favorable, 79% Unfavorable

Opinion of PM Abadi
by sect

Shiites 75% Favorable, 15% Unfavorable

Sunnis 39% Favorable, 34% Unfavorable

Kurds 5% Favorable, 82% Unfavorable

The survey showed the majority of Iraqis had a very low
opinion of the country’s ruling parties. The Badr organization had the most
favorable responses at 36% with 43% not liking the party. After that Sadr’s
Ahrar bloc had 20% favorable 49% unfavorable, Abadi’s Dawa came in with 18%
favorable 57% unfavorable, the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan had 15% favorable
56% unfavorable, the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI) 14% favorable 57%
unfavorable, the Kurdistan Democratic Party 14% favorable 59% unfavorable,
Gorran came in with 11% favorable 62% unfavorable, Nujafi’s Mutahidun had 10%
favorable 66% unfavorable, and Allawi’s Iraqi Nationalists finished with 6%
favorable 71% unfavorable. After the fall of Mosul in June 2014 the Badr
Organization was quick to respond with its militia, which became part of the
Hashd al-Shaabi/Popular Mobilization units, while its leader Hadi Ameri took a
commanding role in security operations. That probably accounts for why his
party had the best rating out of the ruling parties. Still they were all held
in low regard.

Favorable/Unfavorable
View Of Iraq’s Political Parties

Badr 36% Favorable, 43% Unfavorable

Ahrar 20% Favorable, 49% Unfavorable

Dawa 18% Favorable, 57% Unfavorable

PUK 15% Favorable, 56% Unfavorable

ISCI 14% Favorable, 57% Unfavorable

KDP 14% Favorable, 59% Unfavorable

Gorran 11% Favorable, 62% Unfavorable

Mutahidun 10% Favorable, 66% unfavorable

Iraqi Nationalists 6% Favorable, 71% Unfavorable

Despite Abadi’s high rating the majority of people believed
that the country was going in the wrong direction. 65% felt that way compared
to 26% who thought Iraq was heading the right way. Since 2012 most Iraqis had a
negative opinion of the way the nation was heading. The easiest way to explain
the pessimistic responses in 2015 would be to blame the war against the Islamic
State. Since the feelings were steady for several years however other issues
were probably at play, which led to the next question.

Is Iraq going in the
right or wrong direction?

Nov 2010: 45%
Right, 44% Wrong

Aug 2011: 37%
Right, 50% Wrong

Nov 2012: 40%
Right, 54% Wrong

Sep 2013: 31%
Right, 65% Wrong

Dec 2014: 34%
Right, 55% Wrong

Sep 2015: 26%
Right, 65% Wrong

When asked what were the most important topics the
government needed to deal with security and corruption were at the top of the
list. Security was at 48% followed by corruption at 43%. After that services,
37%, jobs, 30% were the next highest. The displaced, sectarianism, inflation,
schools, and the Baghdad-Irbil dispute all received 15% or less showing they
were not major concerns. Instead, the war, graft, and the lack of opportunities
and services were what Iraqis believed were the most pressing issues. That’s
been true for the last decade as the insurgency rose and fell and returned,
while the government has never been able to resolve chronic shortages in things
like electricity in part due to the widespread theft amongst government
officials.

What two issues are
the most important for the government to address?

Security 48%

Corruption 43%

Basic services 37%

Jobs/unemployment 30%

Internally displaced 15%

Sectarianism 12%

High prices 5%

Education 3%

Central government-KRG dispute 2%

Few believed that the authorities were dealing with these
problems. When asked how had the government responded to people’s needs three
out of four regions said worse with the south at 68%, the west 50%, and
Kurdistan 85%. Only in Baghdad did 37% say better versus 35% worse. Those were
all higher than when people were asked that same questions in December 2014
showing growing frustration. Likewise, provincial governments did no better
with 59% saying worse in Baghdad, 72% worse in the south, 66% worse in the
west, and 70% worse in Kurdistan. Again, those were all worse then December
2014 with the exception of Kurdistan that was up 6%. This ties in with the low
opinion of Iraq’s leaders and parties. Iraqis didn’t believe that their needs
were being met, and blamed their representatives.

Is the government
responsive to the people’s needs?

Baghdad 35% Worse, 37% Better

South 68% Worse, 24% Better

West 50% Worse, 20% Better

Kurdistan 85% Worse, 9% Better

Is the local
government responsive to the people’s needs?

Baghdad 59% Worse, 33% Better

South 72% Worse, 22% Better

West 66% Worse, 21% Better

Kurdistan 70% Worse, 23% Better

Two solutions that have been proposed to help resolve Iraq’s
chronic violence and political discord are to pass laws aimed at reconciliation
and decentralize power neither of which rated well with respondents. When asked
which law was the most important to be passed for political accommodation none
of the three major ones before parliament seemed important. The Amnesty Law
that would deal with prisoners got the most positive results, but that only
stood at 26%. Even amongst Sunnis it only got 36%. The Federal Court law that
would reform the judiciary received 16% and the National Guard Law that would
create new regional defense units got 12%. Premier Abadi has tried to push the
latter as a means to include Sunni forces into the government, but just 10% of
Sunni respondents in the poll believed it was necessary. When the topic of
giving the provinces more power was brought up it didn’t fare any better. Only
18% thought that would be very effective in solving problems with 54% saying somewhat.
When asked what would be the best way to accomplish political reconciliation decentralizing
power to the governorates the numbers went down to 14% thinking it would be
very effective and 43% somewhat. This has been something that Abadi has pushed as
well and the provincial councils have been lobbying for years for.

Which of the
following laws before parliament are the most important to achieve political
accommodation?

For Sunnis the two most important issues were a fair
judiciary, 59%, and equitable sharing of resources amongst the country’s sects,
52%. Mass arrests and prisoners being held indefinitely without warrants or
after release orders have been issued have been long time complaints by the
community as they feel like they are facing group punishment by the government.
That would be partly dealt with by the Amnesty Law, which was why it received
the highest importance from Sunni respondents amongst the three bills asked
about. The sharing of resources and political power, which was at 40% amongst
Sunnis ties in with the sects’ belief that they have gotten the short end of
the stick by the Shiite parties since 2003. Even though government offices are
all doled out by quotas and Sunni parties have been given a mix of meaningful,
speaker of parliament, and symbolic positions, vice president, and a larger
percentage of posts within each administration then their percentage in the
population that has not changed the widespread belief that they have been
marginalized. That applies to sharing the country’s oil wealth and development
as well. How or even if these feelings can be overcome is one of the questions
Iraq has struggled with for over a decade now and may not be resolvable since
some Sunnis will not be happy until they rule the country once more.

For Shiites the two biggest issues were a fair judiciary as
well, 51%, and improving the economy, 37%. Many see Iraqi courts as being
corrupt and pliant to the ruling parties, and they also turn a blind eye to the
institutionalized abuse that takes place for anyone that is arrested in order
to obtain a confession. The judiciary for example, was a major point for
protests that started across Iraq during the summer. The fact that the Federal
Court law was not seen as an effective way to deal with this problem by both
Sunnis and Shiites may reflect the fact that they don’t believe it will address
the root problems with the judicial system. The economy is also stagnating due
to the drop in oil prices. Since Iraq is a petroleum dependent country it has
little leverage to pull itself out of this problem as it is dealing with forces
outside of its control.

Finally, for Kurds the two top priorities were improving the
economy, 37%, and equitable sharing of political power, 36%. Kurdistan’s
economy has been hit even harder than the rest of the country because former
Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki stopped sending the region its share of the
budget due to the dispute over who should control oil resources in 2014. While
budget payments were temporarily revived under Abadi when a new agreement was
made, that fell apart as well. In turn, that has meant the regional government
has not been able to pay its workers for months nor the oil companies that it
depends on to develop its energy sector that is paying the bills. Like the rest
of Iraq the KRG is an oil dependent and public sector heavy economy meaning that
any changes in the petroleum industry trickles down to all segments of the
population. The Kurds also feel that they are not getting their fair share of
power in Baghdad due to the Shiite parties. This hit a low point with the
Maliki administration who directly challenge the Kurdistan Regional Government
(KRG) over a number of issues, and those negative feelings have carried over to
Abadi. Like the Sunnis these perceptions are hard to change.

What these results show is that what has been bandied about
both within and without Baghdad as some steps to resolve the country’s problems
are not seen as important by the public. It also highlights that there are some
issues upon which both Sunnis and Shiites agree upon like fixing the judiciary
that the ruling parties could work on that would find widespread support. Then
again there are more intractable disputes such as power sharing that are likely
to go nowhere as both Sunnis and Kurds believe they are not getting enough
positions as they are due, while Shiites think they have enough or even too
much. The fact that so many Iraqis have a very low opinion of their government
and the people elected to run it means they have little faith that these
problems will be properly addressed anytime soon. Overall, Iraqis seemed to be very
dissatisfied about their nation with few exceptions. That explains why there
have been protests almost every year in the country that only gain token
responses from the country’s leaders. Sadly the ruling parties are more concerned
with preserving their own power and thinking of politics as a zero sum game
where no concessions can be given to their rivals that blocks almost all
serious work from being done other than what is necessary such as passing a
budget so that things can keep running as they are. Until that changes many
Iraqis will continue to feel frustrated.

Tuesday, December 29, 2015

Both the taking of Ramadi by the Islamic State and its
recapture by the Iraqi forces were a long time coming. IS attacked the city for
almost a year, while the operation to free it took five months. The aftermath
of securing the area, re-establishing governance and services will take even
longer. Despite these difficulties the liberation of Ramadi was a huge setback
for the militants proving that they lack the resources to hold urban areas in
Iraq, and a boost for the Iraqi government that was severely criticized for
losing the city in the first place.

Both before and after the summer 2014 offensive, which saw
the seizure of Mosul and Tikrit, the Islamic State remained focused upon Anbar
and its capital Ramadi. The province was one of its major bases, and was the
first place it seized territory when the insurgency was reborn. Its Sunni
population and its tribes were also seen as an enticing base for the
organization to build within. The final push that took Ramadi came in two
waves. First, in mid-April
IS started a new series of attacks, which led to the seizure
of several neighborhoods. On April
16 a security source told the National Iraqi News Agency that 70% of the city
was under IS control. The final assault came in mid-May. IS sent in reinforcements
from Mosul and Salahaddin, and began
with men dressed in military uniforms and driving Humvees to infiltrate the
defenses, and then unleashed thirty suicide car
bombs against the government complex
in the downtown. The Iraqi Security Forces and allied tribes quickly crumbled,
IS took the city, and immediately beganexecutingpeople.
This was a huge victory for IS. It solidified the group’s control over more
than half of the governorate topped off by capturing the provincial capital. It
also caused dissent amongst local tribes and undermined the government’s
attempt to create a new Sahwa in Anbar. Ramadi was the birthplace of the
Awakening and its loss was a sign that Baghdad could not protect its allies
there. For example, several sheikhs accused the government of betraying them
during the battle as they felt abandoned when the ISF pulled out of the city.
Anbar’s tribes would only back the side that would stand by them to assure
their self-preservation, and after Ramadi the government did not look like it
could play that role.

There were also repercussions for Prime Minister Haider
Abadi. First, he was talking about
freeing all of Anbar after Tikrit was taken in March. Then Ramadi fell and his
strategy looked like a failure. Second, even before Ramadi was lost the premier
was coming under increasing
pressure from Nouri al-Maliki and pro-Iranian Hashd groups such as Badr and
Asaib Ahl Al-Haq (AAH). They complained they were being kept out of the Ramadi
fight, and being constrained in Anbar overall even though they were already
operating in places like Garma. Even though Abadi is commander and chief and
the Hashd are supposed to be under his command Badr’s Hadi Ameri said they
would fight in Anbar no matter what the premier said. Third, the Anbar
provincial council undercut Abadi as well authorizing
the Hashd to deploy to the governorate since it was shell shocked after the
fall of Ramadi. Finally, members of the prime minister’s own Dawa Party and
State of Law (SOL) list came out against him. One SOL parliamentarian said
that IS’s victory in Ramadi proved that the United States was helping the
insurgents, and that Iraq should turn towards Iran instead. A Dawa official claimed
elements of the security forces and the tribes the Abadi was arming were
working with IS. Abadi had been riding high just a few months beforehand when
Iraqi forces retook Tikrit the first major city to be liberated from IS. Then
he lost all of that prestige with Ramadi. Not only that it allowed his rivals
like Maliki and Ameri to attack his governance, and his alliance with the
Americans as everything was blamed on the two. That split continued as plans
were made to retake the city.

The divide between Abadi and the pro-Iranian Hashd continued
when the offensive to retake Ramadi began. Immediately after the city was taken
the prime minister said there would be a swift response to liberate it. Ameri contradicted
him by saying he had his own plan for Anbar, and that did not include going
after Ramadi right away. Ameri’s strategy was quickly revealed to not include
the city at all, but going
for Fallujah instead. That meant the day the Ramadi offensive began the
Hashd started
their own one in Fallujah. Hashd leaders like Ameri were directly
challenging Abadi’s leadership of not only security in Anbar, but the entire
country. Ameri and others had already been calling for them to take over
command of operations instead of the security forces. Now the fall of Ramadi gave
them the opportunity to claim the premier had failed, and now they were going
to bring victory to the province. Not only that, it split the forces that could
have been arrayed against Ramadi. That hurt because the lack of manpower has
been an on going dilemma for the Iraqi forces as they have not been able to
hold many of the towns and suburbs that they cleared. In turn, the Hashd did
not have the fighters to be successful in Fallujah either causing problems in
both cities.

On the other hand, the United States stepped up its support
to make sure that Ramadi would be retaken. U.S. advisers in Anbar helped
plan the operation. The Americans trained
the army units fighting for the city, and a new force of tribal fighters. Washington
also wanted to keep the Hashd out of Ramadi to make sure that it was an Iraqi
Security Forces’ (ISF) victory. That eventually happened as Hashd units left
bases where U.S. advisers were working, and then a mass
exodus occurred by October under pressure from Baghdad. An Iraq Oil Report article
claimed there was an agreement between the Abadi government, the U.S. and the
Hashd to withdraw from the operation. The Americans got their tribal fighters
into the Hashd so that they could get paid. Finally, the U.S. fired
artillery from bases they were stationed at and carried out air strikes to
support the ISF’s advances. The Americans were determined that Ramadi would be
liberated. They also wanted to make sure that it would help PM Abadi after all
of the criticism he received for losing the city. That meant building up ISF
and Sunni Hashd units to capture Ramadi, and pushing the Shiite Hashd out that
were trying to undermine the premier. While much of this happened behind the
scenes by the end of the battle the Iraqi papers were full of stories of U.S.
special forces and helicopters taking part. It’s not clear how much the
Americans were involved in end, but their influence was apparent to all especially
to the pro-Iran Hashd who were opposed to their presence and assistance.

The final attack on Ramadi started on December
22. The elite Golden Division led the operation crossing a bridge that was
construction by the ISF to cross the Warar canal into the center of the city. Iraqi
police units came from a different direction. Five days later the Khalidiya
Council said
that IS was withdrawing to the east taking civilians with them as civilian
shields. Then the next day the ISF declared victory and hoisted the Iraqi flag
over the government center that was taken by the Islamic State seven months earlier.
This was a huge accomplishment for the ISF, which had been humiliated back in
May. Not only was it able to liberate the city, the ISF did it largely on their
own with Shiite Hashd units mostly on the periphery. This helped PM Abadi as
well because he could say his forces and leadership were the right way to take in
the fight against IS unlike the pro-Iranian groups who quickly got bogged down
in Fallujah, and worked against the Ramadi campaign from the start. Most
importantly it exposed the Islamic State. The group can put up a grinding
defense, but it lacks the fighters to hold any city against a large and
determined government force. At the same time, reaching the middle of a city is
only the start of the larger battle to rid Iraq of the insurgency.

The taking of the downtown was not the end of the struggle
for Ramadi or against the Islamic State. There are still IS elements in many of
the surrounding suburbs and towns and it has re-infiltrated into others. A
member of the Anbar council said
that there were insurgents in 25% of the city and in the outlaying region that
would have to be dealt with. It will take a lot to permanently clear out these
fighters, something the ISF has always struggled with. The government is trying
to create a new
police force to carry out these duties, but the numbers that have appeared
in the press are nowhere close to what is required. There are also fears that
tribes will want to exact revenge upon those who worked with IS. For example,
there was a story that
claimed that tribes had lists of collaborators. Carrying out vendettas will not
help bring stability to the city or prove that the government is back in
control. Last, 80% of the city is reportedly destroyed,
and a member of the Anbar Council believed that it would take 10 years worth of
budgets to rebuild it. None of these issues are easy to tackle. Fighting will
continue in the city and its environs and could quickly deteriorate to what it
was like right before the city fell with neighborhoods under IS control. The
tribal vengeance can only be deterred if the government is strong, but it may
not have the forces or judicial capacity to fully deal with the situation.
Finally, real stability can not return to Ramadi until it is reconstructed,
services are restored and the authorities have real power over the entire area.
These are the challenges that lie ahead and could very well be replayed in
future military operations in places like Fallujah and Mosul. If the government
can’t get Ramadi right it may not be up to the task of providing real security
to other cities after they are freed of IS in the future. The victory in the
city therefore, brings both promise and peril that will play out in the coming
months.

Monday, December 28, 2015

The third week of December 2015 saw continued pushes by the
government’s forces in Anbar and Salahaddin, and a new wave of attacks by the
Islamic State in northern Iraq. The most successful of the former was in Ramadi
where the joint forces were making their way towards downtown. The Fallujah
operation led by the Hashd restarted after a 2 month hiatus. IS on the other
hand went from probing actions against the Kurds to large scale attacks against
them in Ninewa and Kirkuk. Despite that the momentum continued to be against
the insurgents.

From December 15-21 there were 140 reported security
incidents. There were 62 in Baghdad, 26 in Ninewa, 15 in Anbar and Salahaddin
each, 7 in Diyala and 7 in Kirkuk, along with 6 in Babil and 2 in Basra. The
140 was up from 128 the second week of the month, and 118 the week before that,
but not different from other weeks in recent months.

Those attacks led to 242 dead and 326 wounded. There were 20
Sahwa, 23 Peshmerga, 25 members of the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF), 33 Hashd,
and 145 civilians killed, and 2 Sahwa, 11 Peshmerga, 23 Hashd, 34 ISF, and 178
injured. By province there were 74 fatalities in Anbar, 64 in Ninewa, 62 in
Baghdad, 20 in Salahaddin, 17 in Kirkuk, 8 in Babil and 1 in Diyala.

Ramadi was where the heaviest fighting in the country was
taking place. From December 15-21 the government’s forces were trying to
consolidate their control over the perimeter of the city. There were operations
in the Palestine
Bridge, Albu Faraj, and Albu
Diab all north of the city. These areas have changed hands several times
and remain contested. IS was fighting back in those areas with over a dozen car
bombs.

After two months of being dormant the Fallujah offensive
restarted. The joint forces said they cleared Maamer
to the south of the city even though fighting continued there afterward, and
attacked Niamiya
for the third time since July. The pro-Iranian Hashd groups started the
Fallujah operation unilaterally despite Prime Minister Haider Abadi saying that
Ramadi was going to be the focus after it fell to IS in May. It was attacked in
July the same time as Ramadi and after some initial success quickly got bogged
down in the surrounding towns before being shut down in October. The operation
was supposed to show what the Hashd could do on its own without U.S. support
and was an open challenge to Abadi’s leadership. It has not worked out as
planned.

In recent weeks the Islamic State has increased its
terrorist attacks in Baghdad to make up for its lack of offensive operations in
the rest of the country. During the third week of December there were 62
incidents in the capital province, the most since the first week of May. The
eastern section of the province had 19 incidents, followed by 17 in the south,
12 in the north, 8 in the west, and 6 in the center. In the east, there is
always a mix of culprits. There were two sticky bombs that were probably the
work of IS, but several bodies dumped in the district were probably done by
vigilantes or Hashd groups. There was also a robbery by men in military
uniforms showing the growing lawlessness in the country. That could have been
common criminals or rogue elements of the ISF or Hashd. In the previous weeks
the south had the most incidents. There IS has been more active with mortar fire
on Arab
Jabour, and sniper fire on a checkpoint in Dora.
There was renewed activity in Abu Ghraib in the west as well with mortars
on an army base, an IED
on an army convoy, and a motorcycle
bomb targeting a market. IS has attacked Baghdad for years hoping to stoke
sectarian tensions and undermine the government.

Security Incidents In Baghdad, Dec 15-21, 2015

Center: 6: 1 - Grenade, 1
Shooting, 1 Sticky Bomb, 3 IEDs

East: 16: 1 - Robbery, 2
Sticky Bombs, 5 IEDs, 8 Shootings

Outer East: 3 – 1 Sticky
Bomb, 2 IEDs

North: 8 – 2 Shootings, 2
Sticky Bombs, 4 IEDs

Outer North: 4 – 1 Shooting,
3 IEDs

South: 10 – 2 Shootings, 2
Sticky bombs, 6 IEDs

Outer South: 7 – 1 Mortar, 1
Shooting, 5 IEDs

West: 3 – 1 Robbery, 1
Kidnapping, 1 IED

Outer West: 5 – 1 Mortar, 1
Shooting, 1 Motorcycle Bomb, 2 IEDs

Diyala has been relatively quite lately. In September and
October IS was setting off car bombs there nearly every week and there was a
slew of mortar fire as well. That eventually ended, but the third week there
were two days of mortars again.

Kirkuk has been one of the more secure provinces in central
Iraq, but that ended recently. Starting on December
17 IS attacked Turkmen Hashd in Bashir. The next day it attacked
the Peshmerga in two towns in Dibis and Hawija leaving 12 dead and wounded.

IS also began attacking the Kurds in Ninewa. December
16 seven towns were assaulted with 14 car bombs, 4 suicide bombers and
mortars killing 12 Peshmerga including a general and 6 Yazidi fighters. The
next day three more towns were attacked. December
18 13 Peshmerga died and 4 were injured in fighting in another town. December
19 two suicide bombers were used in an assault leaving 28 dead and 4
wounded Peshmerga, and then finally on December
20 the 13th town was targeted leaving 11 dead Peshmerga and 9
wounded. During the last winter IS attempted similar operations using the foggy
conditions to sneak up to the frontlines and hoping that it would hide their
movements from Coalition air strikes. Despite the heavy fighting the Kurds held
their positions. During the 2014-15 winter IS launched a similar offensive in
the north. It appears they are doing the same thing now.

The Peshmerga were not the only ones in Ninewa targeted
during the week, the Bashiqa camp, which housed Turkish soldiers was hit for
two days. On December
16 IS launched a huge rocket barrage on the base killing seven volunteers,
and wounding four Turkish trainers and eleven volunteers. Two day later it was hit again
injuring three more volunteers. The camp had recently caused a huge controversy
between Baghdad and Ankara when the latter sent in a large military force
without informing the Iraqi government. IS tried to exploit that publicity by
firing on the base. Ironically elements of the Hashd claimed they were the ones
that attacked the camp since they had led the protests against the Turkish
presence there.

On December
21 a U.S. air strike was blamed for killing 16 civilians and wounding 5
more in Mosul. The Americans were allegedly targeting a building used by IS
leaders. The U.S. has been increasing its attacks in Iraq lately, so it was probably
inevitable that something like this would happen.

IS executed 38 people in the Mosul area and Tal Afar. That
included two
Peshmerga, three families, five
traders, and one imam. They also
pushed
12 people off a tall building on December 19. Some have speculated that
these murders are occurring because IS feels threatened by an eventual Mosul
operation. It appears that this is actually part of their governance and
punishments to enforce their control over the population and how they are following
their Salafi beliefs.

Salahaddin had its usual mix of harassing attacks up and
down the length of the province. Tarmiya and Taji are constantly hit by IEDs
and shootings. IS fired rockets at Samarra on December
19. The militants also made probing attacks upon Alam just to the south of
Tikrit, and there was continued clashes to the west of Samarra. The government
are still fighting in the Makhoul Mountains to the northeast of Baiji, and
clearing operation are on going in that district as well. This is significant
as before the ISF and Hashd were only capable of carrying out one major
operation at a time due to logistics and transportation problems. They are now
fighting in both Ramadi and the greater Baiji area.

Finally, November was the last month of the IS car bomb
campaign. Before December there were over 50 vehicle borne improvised explosive
devices (VBIEDs) per month. In the 1st week of December there were
just 36, 37 the next week, and 49 the third. Another sign that the offensive
was over was the fact that all the VBIEDs were in Anbar, 29, Ninewa, 15, and
Salahaddin, 6, and used in military operations. Previously a number of
governorates were hit in both military and terrorist attacks. The shift to the
former accounts for the relatively low casualties these bombings caused during
the week, 12 dead and 17 wounded. If those had gone off in civilian areas they
would have left behind far more carnage. Another change is that despite the
fewer VBIEDs being used, far more are hitting their target then before. From
December 8-14 11 out of 26 found their targets, and then 12 out of 37 the next
week. In previous
months only 18% of the car bombs were successful.

About Me

Musings On Iraq was started in 2008 to explain the political, economic, security and cultural situation in Iraq via original articles and interviews. I have written for the Jamestown Foundation, Tom Ricks’ Best Defense at Foreign Policy and the Daily Beast, and was responsible for a chapter in the book Volatile Landscape: Iraq And Its Insurgent Movements. My work has been published in Iraq via NRT, AK News, Al-Mada, Sotaliraq, All Iraq News, and Ur News all in Iraq. I was interviewed on BBC Radio 5, Radio Sputnik, CCTV and TRT World News TV, and have appeared in CNN, the Christian Science Monitor, The National, Columbia Journalism Review, Mother Jones, PBS’ Frontline, the Center for Strategic and International Studies, the Institute for the Study of War, Radio Free Iraq, Rudaw, and others. I have also been cited in Iraq From war To A New Authoritarianism by Toby Dodge, Imagining the Nation Nationalism, Sectarianism and Socio-Political Conflict in Iraq by Harith al-Qarawee, ISIS Inside the Army of Terror by Michael Weiss and Hassan Hassahn, The Rise of the Islamic State by Patrick Cocburn, and others. If you wish to contact me personally my email is: motown67@aol.com