Unfortunately for the people of the world everything is going according to the New World Order Plan. But what is this New World Order Plan? In a nutshell the Plan is this. The Dark Agenda of the secret planners of the New World Order is to reduce the world's population to a "sustainable" level "in perpetual balance with nature" by a ruthless Population Control Agenda via Population and Reproduction Control. A Mass Culling of the People via Planned Parenthood, toxic adulteration of water and food supplies, release of weaponised man-made viruses, man-made pandemics, mass vaccination campaigns and a planned Third World War. Then, the Dark Agenda will impose upon the drastically reduced world population a global feudal-fascist state with a World Government, World Religion, World Army, World Central Bank, World Currency and a micro-chipped population. In short, to kill 90% of the world's population and to control all aspects of the human condition and thus rule everyone, everywhere from the cradle to the grave.

"I place economy among the first and most important virtues, and public debt as the greatest of dangers. To preserve our independence, we must not let our rulers load us with perpetual debt." Thomas Jefferson (1743-1826) 3rd President of the United States and chief drafter of the Declaration of Independence.

International Usurers, the unseen hand of "money power" behind much of what transpires as history, attempted to set up a central bank in America long before the private banking cartel called the Federal Reserve System; the earliest being the First Bank of the United States chartered in 1791 by the US Congress. The first "Bank of the United States" was capitalised at $10,000,000 and fully subscribed almost instantly, with the federal government holding the largest block of ownership, 20 percent. Europeans, that is, the international usurers led by the Rothschilds, also purchased a substantial interest in the bank.

The contentious nature of central banking was here highlighted in the extended debate over the constitutionality of the proposed Bank of the United States: Alexander Hamilton was enthusiastic while Thomas Jefferson vehemently opposed it. This violent debate led to the evolution of pro- and anti-bank factions that ultimately brought into being the first American political parties: the pro-bank Federalists and the anti-bank Democratic-Republicans. The Federalists argued that a national bank –a central bank- was necessary to bolster the credit of the nation and assist the fiscal operations of the federal government. The Jeffersonian Republicans feared the grasp of international finance around the throat of Congress and its pernicious entrapment in debt of government and the people.

This antagonism over the issue of a central bank was so heated that its charter could not be renewed in 1811 for the Jeffersonian Republicans, and then in the majority, refused to renew the charter. Its opponents called the bank's federal charter unconstitutional and this opposition was based in large measure on the very restraints the bank imposed on private, state-chartered banks, which was also seen as an affront to states' rights. However, it was reconstituted in 1816 but controversy raged; Henry Clay and the Whigs enthusiastically supporting it and Andrew Jackson and the Democrats passionately opposing it. Consequently, America's first experiment with a nascent central bank and paper-money banking was over. However, the administration under James Madison, the 4th President of the United States, would soon be proposing a second more powerful central bank. The Madison administration's ill-judged war of 1812 on Great Britain, ostensibly to vindicate "free trade and sailor's rights" but actually to seize Canada, was financed by borrowing paper money from the banks and individuals and printing interest-bearing treasury notes. This caused an enormous inflation of money and credit that in turn caused specie to be exported out of the country, creating a classic inflationary boom. Soon most US banks merely handled depreciating bank paper.

The economic woes were compounded by the British invasion of Chesapeake in August 1814. This precipitated the suspension of specie payments by the banks thereby removing the only check on inflation and allowing the banks to expand their issues. This rapid expansion of irredeemable paper currency seemed to provide the economy with a degree of flexibility, expansibility, and wealth-creating power absent in a gold-backed currency. A popular saying at the time was that paper money was "as good as gold," if not better, because it was cheaper. However, the reality was different and the federal government found itself in financial difficulty since revenue collected in depreciated bank paper, treasury notes and bonds could only be sold on by offering significant premiums. Additionally, merchants complained of the enormous "inequalities in the exchanges," that is, they had to deal with differing exchange rates between cities and states within the Union. This, of course, complicated the affairs of domestic business and commerce and to remedy these difficulties, the Madison administration proposed a second national bank. Such an institution – a national bank- would it claimed remedy these difficulties vis-à-vis two essential objectives: one, to boost the credit of the Federal Government; two, to provide a "uniform national currency." A more prudent course would have been to the silver standard and bona fide specie payments and reducing paper currency and thereby bringing not only uniformity but also stability. However, this option did not suit the designs of those who craved a central bank and a fiat paper currency and so it was rarely offered as an alternative.

Although the end of the war in January 1815 reduced the economic pressure as justification for a new national bank, the Madison administration continued it's lobbying for one in Congress; repeating an earlier argument that the Federal Government bereft of a central bank would have great difficulty raising money during a future war or national emergency and that the government itself could only provide a sound national "circulating medium." However they added two new arguments. First, a central bank could pressure the state banks to resume specie payments and second, coerce them to curtail their excessive note issues. These arguments were countered by those opposed to central banks and their issue, hard-money Federalists and Old Republicans such as Congressman Ward of Massachusetts, who contended that all government had to do to compel state banks to resume paying hard money was to refuse to accept the notes of non-specie paying banks for the payment of import duties, the purchase of public lands and the buying of government bonds. Others, such as John Randolph of Virginia, warned that instead of remedying the evils described by the proponents of the new bank the central bank monster would only aggravate them. Senator William Wells, a hard-money Federalist from Delaware gave an articulate reasoned objection to the proposed super bank:

"This bill came out of the hands of the administration ostensibly for the purpose of curtailing the over issue of Bank paper: and yet it came prepared to inflict on us the same evil, being itself nothing more than a simple paper making machine; and constituting, in this respect, a scheme of policy about as wise, in point of precaution, as the contrivance of one of Rabelais' heroes, who hid himself in the water for fear of the rain. The disease, it is said, is the Banking fever of the States; and this is to be cured by giving them the Banking fever of the United States."

Despite these intelligent and passionate objections of its opponents, the charter for the second Bank of the United States was passed by both houses of Congress and signed into law by President Madison in April 1816. The Second Bank of the United States was planned to be capitalized at $35 million, composed of $7 million in specie and $28 million in government bonds. When the bank opened in early 1817 however its actual paid in capital was only $2 million in specie and $21 million in bonds. For, stockholders had paid the rest in stock notes (i.e. promissory notes secured by their stock), which was already the customary way of forming bank capital. The bank was empowered to found branch offices throughout the nation and by the end of the year there were 19 of them.

However, the true nature of central banks soon surfaced when it was discovered that the Second Bank of the United States had entered into a clandestine agreement with the private banks of the Atlantic cities controlled by the network of families often called the Eastern Establishment. In this compact, the private banks owned by the clique of international bankers agreed to resume paying specie on February 20, 1817, on the preconditions that the branch banks would not require of them the payment of balances in hard money and that they could issue currency and make discounts to compensate for the modest curtailments being made by the city banks. That is, they attempted to bring about public confidence in the currency and economic stability by a nominal resumption coupled with the partial substitution of national bank notes for state ones. Pennsylvania state senator Condy Raguet remarked that:

"The directors of the new bank fancied that if they could only persuade the city banks to call that a sound currency which was in reality an unsound one, the evil of depreciation would be cured."

In short, these moneymen attempted to remedy the situation and cure the evil of depreciation by psychology and not sound economic law. A worse policy was adopted by the central bank in its dealings with the southern and western banks where it encouraged them to inflate. Here, the Federal bank branches paid out their own notes and drafts when discounting, but accepted provincial bank notes as payment. Further, merchants used federal branch notes and drafts, which were current everywhere, to purchase eastern manufactures while state notes supplied the local currency. This combination caused huge balances against the state banks to accumulate in the branch offices of the Federal bank.

Moreover, the Federal branches retained them as a fund upon which they drew interest rather than return the redundant notes for payment. Furthermore, the Federal bank did nothing to compel the state banks to reduce their paper note issues or credits nor did it pressure them to resume actual specie payments. Condy Raguet summarised the policy of the Second Bank of the United States during its first year and a half of operation (1817–18) thus:

"[Immediately] they began to add to the mass [of paper money and credits] already redundant, by emissions of their own notes; and in the course of few months added to the mass of bank loans an amount greatly beyond the reductions which had been made. By this means the currency, although nominally convertible, was depreciated below its former low state, and was thrown back, instead of being advanced on the road of restoration… [Instead of helping to reduce the excessive indebtedness, the bank worsened it] This unwise procedure of replunging the people into the debts from which they had been partially extricated, and of involving others who had hitherto escaped, was continued for a time; but the dreadful day of retribution at length arrived."

By mid-1818, the directors of the Second Bank of the United States (being one of the only true specie paying banks in the country) realised that their actions –of excessive lending and paper note issue- dangerously exposed them to the possibility of depleted reserves and the prospect of suspending payment and thus the loss of the federal charter. Consequently, to save its skin, the Second Bank of the United States abruptly called in loans and required balances due them by the state banks to be paid in hard money or national bank notes. This curtailment policy precipitated the panic of 1818/19 that, in the words of William M Gouge, political economist from Philadelphia, ensured that:

"The Bank was saved, but the people were ruined."

The relatively low-inflation decade of the 1820s America is used by the apologists as an example of the successful maturing of the regulatory policies of the federal bank; that the state banks were restrained from inflating to excess by the regular requirement that they pay their balances to the federal branch offices in specie (often called metal money or hard money). Moreover, that under the able management of Nicholas Biddle (1786-1844) of Philadelphia, a prominent member of the Pennsylvania House of Representatives, the Bank of the United States followed a prudent, conservative policy. In short, under its new president Nicholas Biddle's stewardship a period of sound money under federal bank regulation was achieved and was vindication of the existence, nature and function of the Second Bank of the United States.

However, prescient contemporary critics had a very different view. It was true that in 1823 the Second Bank of the United States began to flourish under its new president, Biddle, and assumed responsibilities that of a central banking akin to those of the Bank of England. However, because these responsibilities usually manifested as restraints, private banks resented them and complained of oppression. Critics argued that the newly mandated Federal Bank's objectives were twofold: first, it followed a policy of controlled inflation, that is, a steady and consistent, but not unduly excessive, inflation of money and credit; and second, a policy to protect the state banks rather than restrain them.

One critic William M. Gouge in his monograph Short History of Paper Money and Banking in the United States (1833) gives a trenchant critique of the system and its apologists by pointing out that:

Bank inflation during the decade [1820s] was significant enough to produce a regular cycles of business expansions and painful business depressions. The years 1821, 1824, 1827, and 1830/31 were boom times while years 1822, 1825, 1828, and 1832 were times of bust, of business contraction and crisis.

Regardless of the existence of preventive legislation or the regulatory powers of a national, central bank the very nature of fractional-reserve banking inevitably causes such economic cycles (boom-bust).

"The evils produced by the system of paper money and moneyed corporations are of such a nature that they cannot be remedied by acts of legislation. When they come they must be endured. If we will have the system, we must bear its consequences."

Periodic suspensions of specie payments were "necessary incidents" of a mixed currency system of paper and precious metal.

The federal bank indulged the state banks by refraining from pressing them for the settlement of bank balances. Consequently, many state banks continued to evade paying specie (hard money) throughout the decade.

After 1822, the Bank of the United States resumed the practice of lending its own notes or credits while accepting payment in state bank paper money thereby increasing its own paper issue while simultaneously bringing the state banks under its power. Two examples are:

1)In the two years previous to the panic of 1825, the Bank of the United States increased its circulating notes by 105% while the state banks did so by only 57%.

2) During 1830–1831, the Bank of the United States increased its circulation by 64% while the banks of New York increased their notes by only 29% and those of Pennsylvania by 21%.

Thus, the institution - the Bank of the United States- invested with the duty of regulating and restraining the inflationary tendencies of US banks deliberately inflating at twice their rate.

The enlarged issues of the federal bank provided the state banks with a new form of paper reserves upon which they could discount and increase their circulation. That is, the state banks regard the notes and drafts of the Bank of the United States as equivalent to specie in the same manner that as the "country" banks regarded the notes of the eastern mercantile banks. This allowed them to exchange them for specie at the branch offices as well as using them to pay balances (when demanded) owed the federal bank. Thus:

"Each extension of the business of the United States' Bank in exchanges, increased its circulation of branch drafts, and each increase of branch drafts, after the new mode of operation was fairly established, enabled the State Banks to increase their issues, by providing them with means to meet such demands against them as might be made by the United States Bank."

Put differently, the more the federal bank calling itself the Bank of the United States inflated, the more the state banks believed they could do also with impunity.

The Bank of the United States protected the general system of bank inflation by its buying and selling of domestic and foreign bills of exchange. Biddle, the president of the Bank of the United States, in a published essay admitted that when the price of foreign bills was rising on the market, his bank would sell some of the bills it had previously purchased in order "to keep the exchange market easy and to prevent the excessive price of bills."

Condy Raguet criticised these dubious exchange dealings by the federal bank in The Free Trade Advocate and Journal of Political Economy by arguing that a free and unfettered exchange market was "the best regulator of [national] currencies" and the tendency of metallic money to flow abroad during periods of inflation was the only effective check upon excessive bank issues. Raguet concluded that any perturbation to the "natural" or "market rate" of exchange was pernicious. Moreover, it was precisely the rising price of foreign bills (demonstrating that the demand for imports was outpacing the supply of exchangeable goods) that rendered the shipment of specie the most profitable remittance to Europe and caused the importing merchant to withdraw specie from the banks. Thus, the federal bank was acting to depress the only sure mechanism (the exportation of specie) for stopping an inflation-induced business expansion and reducing the excessive issues of paper and extensions of credit. Furthermore, Biddle boasted that to protect the nation's specie stock his bank had withheld or threatened to withhold discounts and accommodations from merchants who were known to be shipping specie. On this state of affairs Raguet concluded:

"We cannot therefore but conclude that the dealing in bills of exchange by the bank, upon the principles professed, removes the great check upon over-trading and over-issues of paper, created by the free competition of the exchange market."

Raguet's thorough analysis of the federal bank's activities proved that their exchange and discounting operations were not designed to restrain the state banks from issuing paper currency to excess but to protect them while inflating by inhibiting the exportation of specie.

Political Machinations of the private institution calling itself the "Bank of the United States"

"You are a den of thieves — vipers! I intend to rout you out, and by the Eternal God I will rout you out!"President Andrew Jacksonc.1835 referring to the bankers and international financiers plotting against him, his party, his country and his people.

Because of its pernicious activities and its growing menace the Bank of the United States became known as "the monster," and the noxious enemy of the common people. This popular antagonism against the bank united under the leadership of Andrew Jackson (1767-1845), who became the 7th president of the US in 1829. Jackson understood the dark powers behind the move to create a central bank and rallied wide support to counter the pernicious stratagem of these "international bankers" of empowering an unconstitutional central bank within the Republic of the United States of America. Jackson, like other enlightened souls such as Thomas Jefferson, not only understood the nature of the bank's unconstitutionality but also the reason for the concerted effort by the money powers to get it established and in control of the nation's money supply and thereby get control of the executive officers of the nation. In 1828, Jackson's advisers had told him that the central bank and its controllers had worked against him and were disappointed that they were unable to control him. Thus, contained in the first message of his first presidency a severe reflection on the private organisation calling itself the "Bank of the United States."

During President Andrew Jackson's warfare upon the Bank of the United States, Biddle's character and his administration of the bank and fiscal policy were violently assailed by the president and his followers. Such that the bank issue dominated the campaign of 1832, in which Jackson decisively defeated Henry Clay, his chief opponent, although Biddle, his cohorts and bank did everything in their power to stop Jackson. For, in July 1832, President Andrew Jackson had vetoed the bill to extend the national charter for the Bank of the United States another 20 years and Biddle had responded by carrying out bank business that would contract the US economy causing general suffering believing the electorate would blame it on Jackson, not vote for him and thereby deny him re-election. However, although this gambit failed and Jackson was re-elected, Biddle continued to constrict credit for another two years in an attempt to destroy Jackson's popularity and force opponents centred on Jackson to re-charter the Federal Bank. Jackson however continued his sustained and colourful attacks on the bank's constitutionality and although the bank's charter had four years to run, Jackson determined to destroy it ahead of that time by withdrawing government funds from it.

Thus, when the attorney-general of the United States Roger B Taney (1777-1864) declared the move legal Jackson began the process of withdrawing US deposits from the Bank of the United States and placing them in various state-chartered private institutions, which became known as "pet banks." Taney became Jackson's chief adviser in the attack on Biddle's Bank, and was transferred to the treasury department in September 1833 for the special purpose of removing the government deposits. This brought Taney into conflict with the Senate, which passed a vote of censure (in June 1834) refusing to confirm his appointment as secretary of the treasury. Biddle's bank carried on as best it could until its national charter lapsed in 1836, but it was immediately chartered by Pennsylvania as the "Bank of the United States, of Pennsylvania." Biddle remained president until 1839, two years before the bank failed.

The long, rancorous struggle over the bank's constitutionality became known as the "Bank War" and although Jackson appeared to prevail it was a pyrrhic victory. For, the destruction of the Bank of the United States merely delayed, be it almost 80 years, the creation of a powerful central bank in America. That is, until the creation in 1913 of the Federal Reserve System.

Biddle was, like most, if not all, fiat money men, an ardent inflationist and ultimately his predilection brought his bank to its knees. And so this begs the question: could such an institution as the Bank of America long endure under a more monetary conservative regime and perform its regulatory role faithfully under a different, more fiscally prudent president? The astute contemporary critic of central banking, William M. Gouge was in no doubt that it would not for:

"The fault is in the system. Give the management of it to the wisest and best men in the country, and still it will produce evil."

Gouge like most discerning men – "hard money men" - understood that the nature of central banks was such that with even the best intentions fractional-reserve central banking ultimately leads to financial ruin for those who most depend upon it most: nations and their peoples. For central banks are simply fractional-reserve profit-making institutions whose innate, inevitable tendency is to inflate the circulation of its paper credit instruments and thus the economy itself. Furthermore, by arrogating the status of a governmental body the power of central banks, such as Bank of the United States, over other private banks is almost complete. Furthermore, since this quasi-government bank serves the purpose of government then its natural tendency was to preserve for the government the option of borrowing paper money to finance their grandiose schemes and their wars. This simple expedient of borrowing is the preferred mode of most governments since most governments would rather borrow than, for obvious reasons, tax to the maximum its constituency. A hard-money man, Senator Samuel Tilden (1814-86) from New York, described it thus:

"How could a large bank, constituted on essentially the same principles, be expected to regulate beneficially the lesser banks? Has enlarged power been found to be less liable to abuse than limited power? Has concentrated power been found less liable to abuse than distributed power?"

This is not rhetoric but wisdom. For, Tilden like most thinking people understood the essentially corrupting nature of central banking and the tendency of central bankers, invested with such power, to abuse their powers and bring the banking system and those who depend upon it to their knees. Moreover, the record of Federal Reserve System - the current US central bank created in 1913- is testament to this very disturbing fact …..