Many Lebanese are
puzzled these days by what is happening in Lebanon particularly vis-à-vis the
hard-line adopted by representatives of the Shiite sect in government and
society.

What seemed in the
beginning as a mere political opposition, to some governmental policies, led
by the ministers of Amal and Hezbollah (the two main Shiite parties) evolved
into a sectarian crisis as the “Highest Muslim Shiite Council” declared
illegitimate all Cabinet sessions held in the absence of the five Shiite
ministers of Amal and Hezbollah and banned all other Shiites from bypassing
these two groups in dealing with the Cabinet.

On the surface, the
problem seems a struggle for power-sharing within the executive branch. The
National Reconciliation Charter (colloquially known as the Taif accord) and
subsequent constitutional amendments, which organized government functions
among the sects in Lebanon, promulgated solutions for power-sharing crises but
these seem to have become irrelevant for the Shiite ministers. Why?

Many observers relate
the Shiite opposition to a revisionist attitude of the Taif accord prompted by
regional changes and demographic considerations. Others fear that the Shiites
in Lebanon have become hostages of regional powers, namely Iran and Syria, who
over the past fifteen years fueled the Shiite community in Lebanon with money
and arms.

Political Shiism
and Taif Revisionism

Application of the
Taif accord (or misapplication thereof) under Syrian occupation between 1990
and 2005, has given the Syrian occupant unlimited control over every aspect of
political, economic, social and military life in Lebanon; a formula that
benefited many who accepted the occupation and allied themselves with it;
among those are the two Shiite parties Amal and Hezbollah. The Taif accord
ended what many described as “Political Maronism”; however, the Syrian
occupation that followed prepped the grounds for what many perceive as the
substitute: “Political Shiism”.

Political Shiism and
all that it represents (allies of Syria in Lebanon of all sects) were neither
a Lebanese invention nor a product of the Taif accord and certainly not an
expressed goal of the Lebanese Shiite community. Political Shiism is at best a
byproduct of the Syrian occupation of Lebanon and the Iranian expansionist
plans in the region. Political Shiism emerged of the corrupt governments that
were instituted by the Syrian occupation and that ruled Lebanon since 1990.
These successive governments benefited a few Lebanese power-holders who sought
to strengthen their grip on the nation by hijacking the state and dismantling
its institutions. State institutions were replaced by a system of individual
favoritism reinforced by receptivity to the will of Syria and Iran.

The Shiite community
through this “Political Shiism” gained tremendous political, economic and
military power and assumed command (with the blessing of the Syrian
occupation) over most of Lebanon’s governmental institutions and vital harbors
from the Presidency of the Republic and all that it controls to the foreign
affairs, to the internal affairs, to the Sureté Générale, etc.

Throughout this
process, Hezbollah evolved from a radical group of terrorists into a radical
organization accepted by mainstream politics in Lebanon under the rubric of
resistance but still on the list of terrorist groups in the West. Hezbollah’s
power swelled in 2000 as Israel made a unilateral withdrawal from South
Lebanon (similar to its withdrawal from Gaza recently) following guarantees to
the security of the Israeli northern towns[1].
This Israeli withdrawal gave the so-called resistance movement an opportunity
to claim magnanimous role in the liberation of Lebanon and to become the
uncontested armed wing of this new “Political Shiism.”

As Syria was forced
out of Lebanon following the assassination of former PM Hariri and under
pressure from the international community (UNSC Res. 1559) and an outraged
Lebanese street (March 14th 2005), the Political Shiism found
itself orphaned and its resources (financial and military) threatened. The
Taif accord as far as liberating the occupied Lebanese territories from Israel
has been fulfilled and UNSC Res. 425 has been fully implemented[2].
Hence the need for the armed resistance movement was legally nullified. Add to
that UNSC Res. 1559 requires among other things, the disarmament of all
militias in Lebanon, which meant Hezbollah’s. All these nullified claims of
legitimacy of the arms of Hezbollah and its need for financial support from
Iran and military cover from Syria.

These developments were coupled with
unspoken suspicions that Hezbollah’s extensive security and intelligence
apparatus was privy to the Hariri assassination scheme. They also explain the
Shiite frantic attempts to hold on to power (by holding on to Lahoud) and to
derail the international investigations (objecting to the International Court
and to the expansion of the investigations) even if that effectively meant doing
away with the Taif accord and destabilizing Lebanon. Sayyed Hassan Nassrallah,
Hezbollah’s leader, made it clear time and again that the Shiite demographic
supremacy will continue to accept the Taif accord only in a context similar to
Political Shiism as described above. Against this background, one can explain
the Shiite pro-Syrian demonstration of March 8th 2005, the boycott by
the Shiite ministers of the Cabinet meetings and the recent riots in Beirut on
January 14th 2006 instigated by Hezbollah.

Many analysts express
grave concerns over these developments particularly the recent riots in Beirut,
during which thugs carrying sticks and
rocks attempted to invade the Grand Séraille where Prime Minister Seniora was meeting with US Assistant Secretary of
State for Near Eastern Affairs Mr. David Welch and attacked in the process the
Lebanese security officers. Observers contrast these riots with the peaceful
sit-ins organized by the anti-Syrian groups and with more restrained
demonstrations of Hezbollah in the past and wonder whether the pro-Syrian Shiite
demonstrators were trying to inflict physical harm on Mr. Seniora and his
American guests. Hezbollah has a history of hostage-taking in Lebanon and many
Lebanese fear that the Party of God will stop at nothing to maintain its power.

Political Shiism and
Regional Powers

Regional changes that
took place since 2000 in the Middle East including the war on terrorism and the
fall of the Baath regime in Iraq have triggered a cascade of changes in the
sectarian balance of powers in the region giving the Shiites a number of
political victories at no cost: 1) Al-Qaeda has reclaimed the title of master
terrorist from Iran and Hezbollah, giving these two a break from international
scrutiny; 2) Iran’s arch-enemy and the Shiite oppressor in Iraq, Saddam Hussein,
was thrown in jail and his regime in the abyss; 3) The US attack on Iraq has
seemingly tied the American military hands in the region and given some the
misperception that the American leadership in the world can be sidelined. With
allies in southern Iraq (Iraqi Shiites), in Syria (The Assad Regime) and in
Lebanon (Political Shiism), there is nothing to stand in the face of Iran’s
expansion towards the Mediterranean and its goal to become the regional
superpower (rivaling Saudi Arabia and Israel), a goal that Iran is trying to
balance by fulfilling its nuclear aspirations.

In light of these
regional changes, observers are left to wonder if the Shiite community in
Lebanon is free to join its Lebanese counterparts in the independence-from-Syria
movement and the rebuilding of a modern state, or if it is owing to Iran and its
local brokers (Syria and Hezbollah) and therefore must remain opposed to efforts
aimed at bringing Lebanon into the 21st century, or at least remain
on the fringes of these efforts.

The Shiite boycott of
the Seniora Cabinet has already had its international repercussion and its toll
on the Lebanese economy. The international conference of the granting nations
that were to take place in Beirut this year has been postponed, many fear
indefinitely, leaving the Lebanese market a chip in the hands of Iran to bargain
with for Russia’s and China’s support, and also leaving the Lebanese economy at
the mercy of a sole source (Iran) whose money trickles to a sole recipient (the
Shiites) for a sole purpose, to exert pressure on Israel and the USA. Non-Shiite
Lebanese will have to starve to death in Lebanon, emigrate to find jobs abroad
and sustain their families back home, or become slaves of Political Shiism.

Political Shiism and
the International Matrix

In the international
framework, the choice for the leaders of Political Shiism in Lebanon seems clear
today as it has always been historically: it is a choice between an eastern camp
and a western camp. The eastern camp led by Russia and China, with Iran as the
regional broker, is trying to guarantee itself a piece of the global economic
pie in the Middle East. The western camp, led by the USA and Europe who won the
cold war, feels it is only right for it to claim the world. They prefer the
Eastern camp as they believe it represents more their values. This equation may
have been valid in the 1980s and early 1990s when China and the former Soviet
Union were wooing revolutionary Iran by playing up to Iran’s hostility to the
West and offering economic, military, diplomatic, and technical assistance. In
the 21st century, the equation has changed. America is firm in its
goals in the Middle East; the Bush administration will not waver. China and
Russia are concerned over their share of the international global market but
realize that the cold war is over. If China’s interests are satiated in the Far
East and Russia’s worries are appeased in Chechnya, an agreement over market
allocations and oil distribution will be in order. This will render Iran
obsolete as a regional broker in the new global equation, and those who bet on
it will find themselves short-changed.

For ordinary Lebanese,
the choice is simply one between speaking English or speaking Farsi; wearing
like Jacques Chirac or like Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. Most Lebanese, including most
Shiites, will chose English over Farsi; they will prefer to study and work in
the USA and Europe over Iran and Syria, and given the financial means they will
purchase a “Chanel” suit and an “Armani” tie for their socials. For most
Lebanese including most Shiites, the choice is clear. The Shiite leadership,
however, remains on the other bank.

[1]
The understanding of April 1997 masterminded by the late Rafic Hariri

Regaining the authority of the State up to internationally recognized
Lebanese borders requires the following:

a) Pursuing the implementation of Resolution No. 425 and all Security
Council's resolutions promulgating the total elimination of the Israeli
occupation.

b) Adhering to the Truce Agreement signed on March 23, 1949.

c) Taking all necessary measures to liberate all the Lebanese territory from
the Israeli occupation, extending the authority of the State over all its
land, deploying the Lebanese Army along the internationally recognized
Lebanese borders and pursuing the reinforcement of the existence of the
International Security Forces in Southern Lebanon so as to ensure the
withdrawal of Israel and to allow for the return of law and order to the
border zone.

* The voice of
one… or maybe of thousands.

The Center for Democracy in Lebanon received the
following reply to Don Quixote's article (above) by Dr. Carl Saab*.

Is Democracy Enough?

January 17, 2006

Dear Don
Quixote,

Your
views shared with us yesterday (1-11-06) through the Democracy In Lebanon
website (without reference to its inflammatory title) tie the regional with the
international on the geopolitical scene, with quite a big stretch of
unsubstantiated assumptions requiring a big leap of faith from an uninformed
reader. As a result, being uninformed in the face of authoritarian roar, a
placid reader may soon develop your serious analysis into deep conviction at a
time when utmost sectarian decompression is advised. Be it as it may, I kindly
argue the following case for democracy, teasing the mind of a placid reader a
bit further. Democracy reached adolescence this century but remains quite
controversial. To better define democracy is to place this word within the
context of social norm, how it’s used and applied (social practice is the cradle
of language, nothing else is).

Briefly,
the word democracy brings to mind ‘free election’, ‘majority vote’, ‘power to
self-rule and determination’, and other consequences thereof. There are flagrant
misinterpretations of democracy, or surrogates to democracy, such as
‘conditional democracy’ and ‘evilness of non-democratic alternatives’.
Non-democratic alternatives include dictatorship (obviously) but also extend to
tribalism and many forms of divine or spiritual leaderships. An example of
conditional democracy is when a minority suspends democracy to eliminate or
neutralize the majority (by physical violence or even ‘unfair’ judiciary and
legislative means), then reinstitutes democracy after becoming itself majority,
thus proclaiming supreme state power (e.g. colonial conquests, oppression of
non-Jewish citizens in Israel, etc.) Accordingly, the following examples echo
‘democratic incongruence’:

-Castro, Lenin and Hitler publicly pledged
democracy

-India
(in the ‘far East’) is the largest non-Western democracy

-Slavery was legitimate in the U.S.A. (a country
founded on democratic ideals)

-Iran
and Israel are both democratic countries

Notwithstanding ethical considerations, and the genealogy (conditions of birth)
of democracy, let us reflect on our deep commitment for democracy not in any
other disguised form; shall we or shall we not accept the free will of the
majority expressed by universal referendum? Let us carefully look at Algeria,
Egypt, Iraq, Palestinian territories, Venezuela and, more pertinent, Lebanon and
examine the ailments of democracy ranging from oppression, electoral fraud and
physical harm against the majority of the masses. Arguably, some of these
ailments can be chronically cured by remedying poverty and ignorance. But should
we not admit that, even if ‘cured’, the masses could still willfully,
informatively and deliberately choose to be so, to act as such and to believe as
they please?

We may
have a tough time accepting that one may just favor sour and bitter over sweet,
or poverty over worldly riches, or stickiness over cleanliness… But once that
flag of democracy is waved, the rules of the game cannot suddenly change! All
bets are off when that torch of Lady Liberty is held high and votes cast should
be counted immediately without prejudice or delay; that is democracy under the
sun! Even if the majority decides to suspend its treatise with the rest of the
globe or chew on Qat (stimulant) the whole day, that wish is to be respected. If
the majority in Lebanon chooses sectarianism, tribalism and alliance to foreign
countries (democratically), shall we forcefully oppress the masses?

But
something doesn’t click here, does it? Democracy should not be the ultimate goal
of a healthy society, may be a requirement or only a minor condition but
certainly not a sufficient one. Democracy alone cannot maintain social order.
What comes after democracy? What are the guarantees for a functional, non-self
destructive society? These are the questions that should be asked and answered
fundamentally, sectarian rhetoric aside. I bet the masses in Lebanon and even in
larger democracies where oppression shadows democracy deserve a dignified reply
to that question.

Perhaps
this is one answer; democracy is only a roadmap to social security through
fairness, equality and meritocracy. Let’s role back the flag of democracy then
if we’re not ready to discuss what lies immediately ahead of democracy. Granted
Iraqis recently went to vote quasi-freely, but they then returned to their
ravaged homes and slept on empty stomachs intoxicated with democratic stupor,
only to wake up next day with a democracy hang-over.

Democracy in Lebanon, unfortunately spells sectarianism, which happens to be the
default normative order. If we accept that, if we only shout Democracy and stop
at that, then your contribution to the Democracy In Lebanon website
echoes the same voices heard on the evening news in Lebanon. With such a
sectarian undertone, we would have miserably failed to lay out a road map for
justice and equality.

In the
end, even if what you said might be true, some things are better left unspoken,
like silent windmills.

Sincerely,

Carl
Saab*

*
Carl Saab, born and raised in Lebanon, he graduated from the American University
of Beirut (AUB) with B.S. and M.S. degrees. He then traveled to the United
States where he obtained his Ph.D. degree from the University of Texas and
completed his three-year fellowship at Yale University, Department of Neurology.
Dr. Saab was appointed visiting lecturer at AUB, School of Medicine, and
currently serves as Assistant Professor of Research at Brown University,
Department of Surgery, pursuing basic science research in the field of
neuroscience.