The New Jersey plan was similar to the Randolph/Virginia plan,
but called instead for the possibility of a plural executive.

Hamilton initially supported a lifetime appointment for an
executive, in addition to one branch of the legislature potentially
doing the same.[3]

Federalist 68 Outlined

Hamilton's
Understanding of the Electoral College

Federalist No. 68 is the continuation of Hamilton's analysis of
the Presidency, in this case concerned with the mode of selecting
the United States President. He argues for our modern conception of
the Electoral College,
though in the case of a tie, the power would be given to the House
of Representatives to vote on the election of the President.

In justifying the use of the Electoral College, Hamilton focuses
on a few arguments dealing with why the college is used, as opposed
to direct election. First, in explaining the role of the general
populace in the election of the President, Hamilton argues that the
"sense of the people", through the election of the electors to the
college, should have a part of the process. The final say, however,
lies with the electors, who Hamilton notes are

"Men most capable of analyzing the qualities adapted to the
station and acting under circumstances favorable to deliberation,
and to a judicious combination of all the reasons and inducements
which were proper to govern their choice."

Therefore, the direct election of the President is left up to
those who have been selected by the voters to become the electors.
The indirect election is justified by Hamilton because while a
republic is still served, the system allows for only a certain type
of person to be elected President, preventing individuals who are
unfit for a variety of reasons to be in the position of chief
executive of the country.

This is reflected in his later fears about the types of people
who could potentially become President. He worries that corrupted
individuals could potentially be elected president, particularly
those who are either more directly associated with a foreign state,
or individuals who do not have the capacity to run the country. The
former is covered by Article II,
Section 1, v of the United States Constitution, while the
latter is covered by Hamilton in Federalist 68, noting that the
person who will become President will have to be a person who
contains the faculties necessary to become President, stating
that,

"Talents for low intrigue, and the little arts of
popularity, may alone suffice to elevate a man to the first honors
in a single State; but it will require other talents, and a
different kind of merit, to establish him in the esteem and
confidence of the whole Union, or of so considerable a portion of
it as would be necessary to make him a successful candidate for the
distinguished office of President of the United States"

Hamilton, while discussing the safeguards, is not concerned with
the possibility of an unfit individual becoming President, instead
noting,

It will not be too strong to say, that there will be a
constant probability of seeing the station filled by characters
pre-eminent for ability and virtue.

Rules on
the Electors

Hamilton references specific rules for the electors, which
include:

The electors meet only within their own specific states to
select the President.

No individuals who have "too great devotion of the President in
office"

No individuals who currently hold elected positions within the
government may serve as electors.

All of these are justified by Hamilton as devices to keep the
people involved within the process, through removing different
obstacles to the final goal of an uncorrupted electorate.

Selection of the
Vice-President

Hamilton notes that the selection of the Vice President
should follow the same form as that of the President, through
selection by the Electoral College, though the Senate is to
deal with the voting in the case of an electoral tie. Hamilton also
answers criticism that the Senate should have been given the power
to select the Vice President instead of the Electoral College.
Hamilton notes that there are two major arguments against that
point. First, that the Vice President's power as President of the
Senate would mean that the tiebreaker of the Senate would be
beholden to the Senate for its power, and therefore would be unable
to make the necessary decisions as a tiebreaker without fear of
removal or reprisal. Second, the possibility of the Vice President
becoming President means that this individual should be elected by
the people and the college, because all of the powers vested in the
President must be assumed could fall into the hands of the Vice
President.

Works Referenced in
Federalist 68

The most plausible of these, who appear in print
references the work of the Federal Farmer (likely Richard Henry
Lee). On the electoral college, the Federal Farmer accepts the
concept of the electoral college, finding that The election of
this officer (the vice president), as well as of the President of
the United States seems to be properly secured.[5]

The passage For forms of government let fools contest, That
which is best administered is best, is a paraphrase of Alexander Pope's
An Essay On Man, which Hamilton uses
to talk about the Presidential selection process as a model for
producing good administration. In Pope, That which is
replaced by Whatever.

Reactions to Federalist No.
68

The
Anti-Federalist Papers

In Anti Federalist Papers 72, the anonymous
Republicus argues that the issues with the electoral
college deal with the ability of electors, rather than the people,
to elect the President. In his eyes, it removes the ability of the
people to select their leader and instead delegates that right to a
smaller amount of individuals.

Republicus further speculates if is it not probable, at
least possible, that the president who is to be vested with all
this demiomnipotence — who is not chosen by the community; and
who consequently, as to them, is irresponsible and independent-that
he, I say, by a few artful and dependent emissaries in Congress,
may not only perpetuate his own personal administration, but also
make it hereditary?[6]
Republicus's fears are of a hypothetical stronger executive whom he
compared to Britain's George III.

References

Madison, James. Notes in the Debates in the Federal
Convention of 1787. (version used is from Ohio University
Press. Athens, OH. 1961.)