This petition seeks to set aside the
Decision of 15 February 1996 and the Resolution of 28 March 1996 of public
respondent National Labor Relations Commission in NLRC NCR CA No. 009753-95
(NLRC NCR Case No. 00-12-08759-94) which modified the decision of the Labor
Arbiter finding petitioners not guilty of illegal dismissal.

Petitioner Philippine Aeolus Automotive
United Corporation (PAAUC) is a corporation duly organized and existing under
Philippine laws, petitioner Francis Chua is its President while private
respondent Rosalinda C. Cortez was a company nurse[1]of petitioner corporation until her termination on 7
November 1994. Jlexj

On 5 October 1994 a memorandum was issued by
Ms. Myrna Palomares, Personnel Manager of petitioner corporation, addressed to
private respondent Rosalinda C. Cortez requiring her to explain within
forty-eight (48) hours why no disciplinary action should be taken against her
(a) for throwing a stapler at Plant Manager William Chua, her superior, and
uttering invectives against him on 2 August 1994; (b) for losing the amount of P1,488.00
entrusted to her by Plant Manager Chua to be given to Mr. Fang of the CLMC
Department on 23 August 1994; and, (c) for asking a co-employee to punch-in her
time card thus making it appear that she was in the office in the morning of 6
September 1994 when in fact she was not. The memorandum however was refused by
private respondent although it was read to her and discussed with her by a
co-employee. She did not also submit the required explanation, so that while
her case was pending investigation the company placed her under preventive
suspension for thirty (30) days effective 9 October 1994 to 7 November 1994. Lexjuris

On 20 October 1994, while Cortez was still
under preventive suspension, another memorandum was issued by petitioner
corporation giving her seventy-two (72) hours to explain why no disciplinary
action should be taken against her for allegedly failing to process the ATM
applications of her nine (9) co-employees with the Allied Banking Corporation.
On 21 October 1994 private respondent also refused to receive the second
memorandum although it was read to her by a co-employee. A copy of the
memorandum was also sent by the Personnel Manager to private respondent at her
last known address by registered mail. Jurismis

Meanwhile, private respondent submitted a
written explanation with respect to the loss of the P1,488.00 and the
punching-in of her time card by a co-employee.

On 3 November 1994 a third memorandum was
issued to private respondent, this time informing her of her termination from
the service effective 7 November 1994 on grounds of gross and habitual neglect
of duties, serious misconduct and fraud or willful breach of trust.[2]

On 6 December 1994 private respondent filed
with the Labor Arbiter a complaint for illegal dismissal, non-payment of annual
service incentive leave pay, 13th month pay and damages against PAAUC and its
president Francis Chua.[3]

On 10 July 1995 the Labor Arbiter rendered a
decision holding the termination of Cortez as valid and legal, at the same time
dismissing her claim for damages for lack of merit.[4]

On appeal to the NLRC, public respondent
reversed on 15 February 1996 the decision of the Labor Arbiter and found
petitioner corporation guilty of illegal dismissal of private respondent
Cortez. The NLRC ordered petitioner PAAUC to reinstate respondent Cortez to her
former position with back wages computed from the time of dismissal up to her
actual reinstatement.[5]

On 11 March 1996 petitioners moved for
reconsideration. On 28 March 1996 the motion was denied;[6]hence, this petition for certiorari
challenging the NLRC Decision and Resolution.

The crux of the controversy may be narrowed
down to two (2) main issues: whether the NLRC gravely abused its discretion in
holding as illegal the dismissal of private respondent, and whether she is
entitled to damages in the event that the illegality of her dismissal is
sustained.
Jjjuris

The Labor Code as amended provides specific
grounds by which an employer may validly terminate the services of an employee,[7]which grounds should be strictly construed since a
persons employment constitutes "property" under the context of the
constitutional protection that "no person shall be deprived of life,
liberty or property without due process of law" and, as such, the burden
of proving that there exists a valid ground for termination of employment rests
upon the employer.[8]Likewise, in light of the employee's right to
security of tenure, where a penalty less punitive than dismissal will suffice,
whatever missteps may have been committed by labor ought not to be visited with
a consequence so severe.[9]

A perusal of the termination letter
indicates that private respondent was discharged from employment for
"serious misconduct, gross and habitual neglect of duties and fraud or
willful breach of trust." Specifically -justice

1. On August 2,
1994, you committed acts constituting gross disrespect to your superior Mr.
William Chua, the Plant Manager.

2. On August 23,
1994, the Plant Manager entrusted you the amount of P1,488.00 to be sent
to CLMC for Mr. Fang but the money was allegedly lost in your possession and
was not recovered.

3. On September 6,
1994, you caused someone else to punch-in your time card to show that you were
at work when in fact you were doing a personal errand for Richard Tan. As per
time card you were in at 8:02 A.M. but you only arrived at 12:35 P.M.

4. On July 28,
1994, you received an amount of P900.00 from Miss Lucy Lao to open an
ATM card of nine (9) employees. On September 24, 1994, one of the employees
complained by the name of Tirso Aquino about the status of his ATM Card and
upon query from the bank it was found out that no application and no deposit
for said person has been made. Likewise, it was found out that you did not open
the ATM Card and deposit the P800.00 for the 8 other employees. It
turned out that said deposit was made after a month later.[10]

As to the first charge, respondent Cortez
claims that as early as her first year of employment her Plant Manager, William
Chua, already manifested a special liking for her, so much so that she was
receiving special treatment from him who would oftentimes invite her "for
a date," which she would as often refuse. On many occasions, he would make
sexual advances - touching her hands, putting his arms around her shoulders,
running his fingers on her arms and telling her she looked beautiful. The
special treatment and sexual advances continued during her employment for four
(4) years but she never reciprocated his flirtations, until finally, she
noticed that his attitude towards her changed. He made her understand that if
she would not give in to his sexual advances he would cause her termination
from the service; and he made good his threat when he started harassing her.
She just found out one day that her table which was equipped with telephone and
intercom units and containing her personal belongings was transferred without
her knowledge to a place with neither telephone nor intercom, for which reason,
an argument ensued when she confronted William Chua resulting in her being
charged with gross disrespect.[11]

Respondent Cortez explains, as regards the
second charge, that the money entrusted to her for transmittal was not lost;
instead, she gave it to the company personnel in-charge for proper transmittal
as evidenced by a receipt duly signed by the latter.[12]

With respect to the third imputation,
private respondent admits that she asked someone to punch-in her time card
because at that time she was doing an errand for one of the company's officers,
Richard Tan, and that was with the permission of William Chua. She maintains
that she did it in good faith believing that she was anyway only accommodating
the request of a company executive and done for the benefit of the company with
the acquiescence of her boss, William Chua. Besides, the practice was
apparently tolerated as the employees were not getting any reprimand for doing
so.[13]

As to the fourth charge regarding her
alleged failure to process the ATM cards of her co-employees, private respondent
claims that she has no knowledge thereof and therefore denies it. After all,
she was employed as a company nurse and not to process ATM cards for her
co-employees.
Jksm

The Supreme Court, in a litany of decisions
on serious misconduct warranting dismissal of an employee, has ruled that for
misconduct or improper behavior to be a just cause for dismissal (a) it must be
serious; (b) must relate to the performance of the employees duties; and, (c)
must show that the employee has become unfit to continue working for the
employer.[14] The act of private respondent in throwing a stapler
and uttering abusive language upon the person of the plant manager may be
considered, from a lay man's perspective, as a serious misconduct. However, in
order to consider it a serious misconduct that would justify dismissal under
the law, it must have been done in relation to the performance of her duties as
would show her to be unfit to continue working for her employer. The acts
complained of, under the circumstances they were done, did not in any way
pertain to her duties as a nurse. Her employment identification card discloses
the nature of her employment as a nurse and no other.[15]Also, the memorandum informing her that she was being
preventively suspended pending investigation of her case was addressed to her
as a nurse.[16]

As regards the third alleged infraction, i.e.,
the act of private respondent in asking a co-employee to punch-in her time
card, although a violation of company rules, likewise does not constitute
serious misconduct. Firstly, it was done by her in good faith
considering that she was asked by an officer to perform a task outside the
office, which was for the benefit of the company, with the consent of the plant
manager. Secondly, it was her first time to commit such infraction during her
five (5)-year service in the company. Finally, the company did not lose
anything by reason thereof as the offense was immediately known and corrected. Es m

On alleged infraction No. 4, as may be
gleaned from and admitted in the memorandum of petitioners to private
respondent dated 20 October 1994[17]and the notice of termination dated 3 November 1994,
the money entrusted to her was in fact deposited in the respective accounts of
the employees concerned, although belatedly. We agree with the submission of
the Solicitor General that -Es msc

The mere
delay/failure to open an ATM account for nine employees is not sufficient, by
itself, to support a conclusion that Rosalinda is guilty of gross and habitual
neglect of duties. First, petitioner did not show that opening an ATM is one
of her primary duties as company nurse. Second, petitioner failed to
show that Rosalinda intentionally, knowingly, and purposely delayed the opening
of ATM accounts for petitioners employees. It is of common knowledge that
a bank imposes upon an applicant certain requirements before an ATM account can
be opened, i.e. properly filled up application forms, identification
cards, minimum deposit etc. In the instant case, petitioner did not prove that
the delay was caused by Rosalindas neglect or willful act (emphasis supplied).[18]

Gross negligence implies a want or absence
of or failure to exercise slight care or diligence, or the entire absence of
care. It evinces a thoughtless disregard of consequences without exerting any
effort to avoid them.[19]The negligence, to warrant removal from service,
should not merely be gross but also habitual. Likewise, the
ground "willful breach by the employee of the trust reposed in him
by his employer" must be founded on facts established by the employer who
must clearly and convincingly prove by substantial evidence the facts and
incidents upon which loss of confidence in the employee may fairly be made to
rest.[20]All these requirements prescribed by law and
jurisprudence are wanting in the case at bar.

On the issue of moral and exemplary damages,
the NLRC ruled that private respondent was not entitled to recover such damages
for her failure to prove that petitioner corporation had been motivated by
malice or bad faith or that it acted in a wanton, oppressive or malevolent
manner in terminating her services. In disbelieving the explanation proffered
by private respondent that the transfer of her table was the response of a
spurned lothario, public respondent quoted the Labor Arbiter -

Complainants
assertion that the cause of the altercation between her and the Plant Manager
where she threw a stapler to him and uttered invectives against him was her
refusal to submit to his advances to her which started from her early days of
employment and lasted for almost four years, is hardly believable. For indeed,
if there was such harassment, why was there no complaints (sic) from her during
that period? Why did she stay there for so long? Besides, it could not have
taken that period for the Plant Manager to react. This assertion of the
complainant deserves no credence at all.[21]

Public respondent in thus concluding appears
baffled why it took private respondent more than four (4) years to expose
William Chua's alleged sexual harassment. It reasons out that it would have
been more prepared to support her position if her act of throwing the stapler
and uttering invectives on William Chua were her immediate reaction to his
amorous overtures. In that case, according to public respondent, she would have
been justified for such outburst because she would have been merely protecting
her womanhood, her person and her rights. Esmm is

We are not persuaded. The gravamen of the
offense in sexual harassment is not the violation of the employee's sexuality
but the abuse of power by the employer. Any employee, male or female, may
rightfully cry "foul" provided the claim is well substantiated.
Strictly speaking, there is no time period within which he or she is expected
to complain through the proper channels. The time to do so may vary depending
upon the needs, circumstances, and more importantly, the emotional threshold of
the employee.
Esmso

Private respondent admittedly allowed four
(4) years to pass before finally coming out with her employer's sexual
impositions. Not many women, especially in this country, are made of the stuff
that can endure the agony and trauma of a public, even corporate, scandal. If
petitioner corporation had not issued the third memorandum that terminated the
services of private respondent, we could only speculate how much longer she
would keep her silence. Moreover, few persons are privileged indeed to transfer
from one employer to another. The dearth of quality employment has become a
daily "monster" roaming the streets that one may not be expected to
give up one's employment easily but to hang on to it, so to speak, by all
tolerable means. Perhaps, to private respondent's mind, for as long as she
could outwit her employer's ploys she would continue on her job and consider
them as mere occupational hazards. This uneasiness in her place of work thrived
in an atmosphere of tolerance for four (4) years, and one could only imagine
the prevailing anxiety and resentment, if not bitterness, that beset her all
that time. But William Chua faced reality soon enough. Since he had no place in
private respondent's heart, so must she have no place in his office. So, he
provoked her, harassed her, and finally dislodged her; and for finally venting
her pent-up anger for years, he "found" the perfect reason to
terminate her. Mse sm

In determining entitlement to moral and
exemplary damages, we restate the bases therefor. In moral damages, it suffices
to prove that the claimant has suffered anxiety, sleepless nights, besmirched
reputation and social humiliation by reason of the act complained of.[22]Exemplary damages, on the other hand, are granted in
addition to, inter alia, moral damages "by way of example or
correction for the public good"[23]if the employer "acted in a wanton, fraudulent,
reckless, oppressive or malevolent manner."[24]

Anxiety was gradual in private respondent's
five (5)-year employment. It began when her plant manager showed an obvious
partiality for her which went out of hand when he started to make it clear that
he would terminate her services if she would not give in to his sexual
advances. Sexual harassment is an imposition of misplaced
"superiority" which is enough to dampen an employee's spirit in her
capacity for advancement. It affects her sense of judgment; it changes her
life. If for this alone private respondent should be adequately compensated.
Thus, for the anxiety, the seen and unseen hurt that she suffered, petitioners
should also be made to pay her moral damages, plus exemplary damages, for the
oppressive manner with which petitioners effected her dismissal from the
service, and to serve as a forewarning to lecherous officers and employers who
take undue advantage of their ascendancy over their employees. Ex sm

All told, the penalty of dismissal is too
excessive and not proportionate to the alleged infractions committed
considering that it does not appear that private respondent was an incorrigible
offender or that she inflicted serious damage to the company, nor would her
continuance in the service be patently inimical to her employers interest.[25]Even the suspension imposed upon her while her case
was pending investigation appears to be unjustified and uncalled for.

WHEREFORE, the Decision of public respondent National Labor
Relations Commssion finding the dismissal of private respondent Rosalinda C.
Cortez to be without just cause and ordering petitioners Philippine Aeolus
Automotive United Corporation and/or Francis Chua to pay her back wages
computed from the time of her dismissal, which should be full back
wages, is AFFIRMED. However, in view of the strained relations between the
adverse parties, instead of reinstatement ordered by public respondent,
petitioners should pay private respondent separation pay equivalent to one (1)
month salary for every year of service until finality of this judgment. In
addition, petitioners are ordered to pay private respondent P25,000.00
for moral damages and P10,000.00 for exemplary damages. Costs against
petitioners.
Kyle

[7] Art 282. Termination by Employer - An employer may
terminate an employment for any of the following causes: (a) Serious misconduct
or willful disobedience by the employee of the lawful orders of his employer or
representative in connection with his work; (b) Gross and habitual neglect by
the employee of his duties; (c) Fraud or willful breach by the employee of the
trust reposed in him by his employer or duly authorized representative; (d)
Commission of a crime or offense by the employee against the person of his
employer or any immediate member of his family or his duly authorized
representative; and, (e) Other causes analogous to the foregoing.