Thursday, May 2, 2013

US is Abandoning and Outsourcing Afghanistan

Lt General R K Sawhney (Distinguished Fellow, VIF)

Sushant Sareen, Senior Fellow, VIF

What is often referred to as the Afghan endgame is in fact the US
endgame in Afghanistan. For the Afghans there is unlikely to be any
endgame because if the US desperation to exit from Afghanistan is
anything to go by, then Afghanistan is in for a very turbulent future.
All available indications suggest that Afghanistan is going to be
embroiled in what is almost a ‘death game’ or, if you will, a game of
survival. A large part of the blame for this will lie on the heads of
the Americans who seem to have lost the will, and perhaps run out of the
wealth, needed to take the war on terror to its logical conclusion.

Under the mistaken notion that appeasing and accommodating terrorists
(read Taliban) and their supporters and sponsors will halt the spread
of Islamic radicalism, the US seems to have become a willing party to
Pakistan's con-game in Afghanistan. Not only is the US now all set to
abandon Afghanistan but worse, also outsource it to Pakistan, in effect
throwing Afghanistan to the proverbial wolves. It is of course quite
another matter that this disingenuous policy of restoring peace and
stability in the Afpak region will prove disastrous, not just for
Afghanistan but also for Pakistan and rest of the region which will be
severely destabilised.

The simple paradox about Afghanistan is that if the war against
Taliban and their Al Qaeda associates and affiliates is not won, the
peace will be lost. And with it will be lost all the accomplishments and
achievements of the last more than one decade since the ouster of the
Taliban in 2001. Ironically, Even though the Americans and their Western
allies recognize that the Afghanistan of today is very different from
the Afghanistan of 2001, all their moves on the political, diplomatic
and military chessboard seem to be aimed at undoing all the good things
that happened after the defeat of the Taliban.

Notwithstanding the terror attacks of the Taliban which have
increased drastically over the last few years, the fact is that the
presence of foreign forces in Afghanistan has after decades of unrest
and war ushered in an era of progress, prosperity and relative
stability. This is not to say that Afghanistan is a model of development
and good governance and is becoming some kind of a land of milk and
honey. But unlike the malevolent and destructive influence of the
medieval Islamists, the benevolent influence of the West has planted the
seeds of modernity in Afghanistan and started a process of state and
nation building.

Afghanistan has a reasonably good army and police, which though a
work in progress, is slowly developing into a national asset. Violence
level in Afghanistan is much less than in Pakistan. Businesses (both
legit and not so legit) are doing fairly well, employment is being
generated, education institutions (including for girls) have spread by
leaps and bounds and are imparting secular and modern values to the next
generation of Afghans, health services have started functioning as has
the judicial machinery. Things may not ideal, and there is a lot of
scope for improvement. But at least they are moving the right direction.
Add to this the enormous growth in urbanisation and along with it the
growing aspiration levels among Afghans who are seeking to emulate the
successful models of modern and not medieval societies.

Underpinning all these positive developments is the new political
culture that has started developing in Afghanistan. The bulk of the
Afghan people, despite all the conservatism in society, cultural
barriers and even some misinterpretation of religion, appear to have put
their faith in the democratic order. Once again Afghanistan is not a
perfect democracy. But then neither is India even after over six decades
of uninterrupted democracy. What is important is that the Afghan people
deeply desire that political change must come through the democratic
process and any transition must be peaceful. More than anything else,
this yearning for democratic change is perhaps the greatest contribution
of the Western presence in Afghanistan, almost a game-changer provided
it is not short-circuited by imposing the barbaric Taliban on the
Afghans as part of a deal with Afghans’ nemesis, Pakistan.

At a time when the Afghan political class, including the erstwhile
warlords, are preparing for the 2014 elections, the Americans seem to be
undermining not only the democratic system but also the legitimate
government of Afghanistan by bending over backwards to appease Pakistan
and use them to bring the Taliban to power in Afghanistan. This is
nothing but a complete abdication of responsibility by the US and its
Western allies. Of course, capitulation before the forces of Islamic
radicalism and terrorism is being given the spin of ‘reconciliation’.
Quite asides the fact that the Taliban have given practically no
indication or inkling of a desire for any sort of reconciliation, much
less co-existence with those who do not subscribe to their medieval
mindset, the Americans have continued to parrot the ‘reconciliation’
mantra even though they probably know that the Taliban wouldn’t remain
the Taliban if they were reconcilable.

Clearly, the US has a lot, in fact everything, riding on this
‘reconciliation’ plank hoping that it will bring the Taliban on board.
What happens after the Taliban come on board doesn’t seem to have been
thought through. Worse, the Americans don’t have any Plan ‘B’ if Plan
‘A’ doesn’t work. Other than confusion, the US policy in Afghanistan is
based on a hope and a prayer that the enormous economic and political
stakes that people have developed in the Afghan system and the new
freedoms and empowerment that have been experienced by the ordinary
Afghans will ensure that the Taliban won’t get a walkover if they refuse
to reconcile. In other words, as far as the US is concerned, if Plan
‘A’ doesn’t work, the best case scenario in Afghanistan is either a
civil war to keep the Taliban and their Al Qaeda allies at bay, and the
worst case scenario is a Taliban takeover.

Although the US is insisting that it won’t exit from Afghanistan
completely after 2014, this commitment is likely to be reneged. For one,
the Taliban will be loath to ‘reconcile’ if there is even a minimal US
presence of 6000-8000 troops in Afghanistan. This raises the real
possibility that the US may agree to a complete pullout if troop
presence becomes a deal-breaker. For another, even if the US maintains a
small presence of troops behind after 2014, this will only be for a
couple of years at best, and certainly not beyond 2016 if not earlier.
The reason for this is that if civil war breaks out, the handful of US
troops will not make much difference. If anything, the US will find it
untenable and unsustainable to prop up the anti-Taliban forces from two
or three bases they occupy. There will also be logistics issues for
these bases which could well be surrounded by hostiles.

The real tragedy of Afghanistan is that the US will withdraw, leaving
behind an underequipped, undertrained, and under-resourced Afghan army.
The process of building the Army started in right earnest only a few
years back and despite the progress made in this direction, the fact
remains that the Afghan National Security Force is still in a fledgling
state. Without proper air support, logistics supply and an intelligence
network, the ANSF will find it difficult to discharge its security
responsibilities. While the West is promising to fund the army and
security forces for another decade, this commitment too remains very
iffy. So much so that sceptics are already drawing parallels with the
Soviets reneging on their financial and military commitments to the
Afghan government of Dr Najibullah.

Under the circumstances, the Afghan anger and suspicion of the
apparent US strategy of making Pakistan the pivot of their Afghan policy
and giving Pakistan the central seat on the Afghan table is entirely
understandable. Although the Pakistanis insist that they back an
‘Afghan-driven, Afghan-owned and Afghan-led’ peace process, the only
Afghans they seem to think capable of driving, owning and leading the
process are the Taliban. At the same time, after having proven their
ability to keep stoking trouble in Afghanistan, the Pakistanis are now
in the process of building leverages and bridges with all groups and
parties in Afghanistan so that each group can be used to counter the
other group if and when the need arises. The latest move in this
direction is the Pakistani effort to reach out to the elements of the
erstwhile Northern Alliance and rope them in to become part of the
Pakistani grand strategy in Afghanistan.

Despite having sponsored, supported and giving sanctuary to the
Taliban, the Pakistanis are not exactly comfortable with the prospect of
letting the Taliban have a free run in Afghanistan. Their best case
scenario is that the Taliban either agree to a power sharing arrangement
in Afghanistan (even though this will eventually lead to their taking
control of the country). At the same time, the Pakistanis are also not
ruling out the possibility of a Taliban takeover after a brief but
bloody civil war. The Pakistani hope that once the Taliban are
accommodated in Afghanistan power structure, they will rein in the
Pakistani Taliban. But if the Taliban get other ideas, the Pakistanis
will use the Haqqani Network, Hizb-e-Islami, amenable sections of the
erstwhile Northern Alliance and other groups to keep the Taliban in
check. In short, the Pakistanis, who have often accused the US of
pushing the war into their country, now appear to be creating conditions
to push the war back into Afghanistan. That such a policy is going to
unleash a wave of instability in the region is a no-brainer. But as is
their wont, the Pakistanis are deluding themselves that they have the
entire thing worked out, and the Americans are wittingly or unwittingly
playing along.

In this entire ‘Great Game’ which is folding on its borders, the
Indian government seems to be totally at sea on its options. Afghanistan
doesn’t figure anywhere or with any degree of seriousness in the
national debate. And if it does, it reflects the worst sort of myopia in
that the only focus is on the impact that a talibanised Afpak region
(whether run by Pakistan or by Afghan Taliban) will have on the Indian
state of Jammu and Kashmir. Quite frankly, if the forces of fanaticism
are allowed to take root in Afghanistan, more than Kashmir, peace in all
of India will be threatened. Instead of either towing the US diktat to
lower its presence in Afghanistan, or trying to remain relevant in
Afghanistan by riding on the US shoulder, India needs to forge an
independent policy to keep the Taliban at bay, even if this means going
against the US policy of appeasement and accommodation of Islamist
terror groups and their patron, Pakistan. This will involve a deeper
engagement with the Afghan government, not by placing boots on the
ground but through other diplomatic, economic and military means,
including tying up with Iran, Russia, the Central Asian States and even
China.

The sooner the Indian government and security establishment wake up
to the reality of Afghanistan, the more prepared India will be to tackle
the emerging situation in Afghanistan. Otherwise, be ready to once
again lock up the Indian embassy in Kabul and withdraw from Afghanistan,
at least until the Afghan War 2.0 that will become inevitable after
Islamist groups use Afghan soil to spread terror around the world.