Intelligence for an Age of Terror

Description

During the Cold War, U.S. intelligence was concerned primarily with states; non-state actors like terrorists were secondary. Now the priorities are reversed and the challenge is enormous. States had an address, and they were hierarchical and bureaucratic. They thus came with some 'story'. Terrorists do not. States were 'over there', but terrorists are there and here. They thus put pressure on intelligence at home, not just abroad. The strength of this book is that it underscores the extent of the change and ranges broadly across data collection and analysis, foreign and domestic, as well as presenting the issues of value that arise as new targets require collecting more information at home.

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About Author

Gregory F. Treverton is director of the RAND Corporation's Center for Global Risk and Security. Earlier, he directed RAND's Intelligence Policy Center and its International Security and Defense Policy Center and was associate dean of the Pardee RAND Graduate School. His recent work has focused on terrorism, intelligence and law enforcement, with a special interest in new forms of public-private partnership. Dr Treverton has served in government for the first Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, handling Europe for the National Security Council (NSC); most recently, he served as vice chair of the National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs). He holds a B.A. summa cum laude from Princeton University and a master's degree in public policy and a Ph.D. in economics and politics, both from Harvard University. His books include Reshaping National Intelligence for an Age of Information (Cambridge University Press, 2001), New Challenges, New Tools for Defense Decisionmaking (2003) and National Intelligence Systems: Current Research and Future Prospects (Cambridge University Press, 2009, coedited with Wilhelm Agrell).

Contents

1. Introduction; 2. The changed target; 3. The Cold War legacy; 4. The imperative of change; 5. The agenda ahead; 6. The special challenge of analysis; 7. Many customers, too many secrets; 8. Covert action: forward to the past?; 9. Rebuilding the social contract.