The term "Husserlian phenomenology" not only embraces
Husserl's own research interests and achievements, but can also
refer to a number of distinctive attitudes and methods that any
phenomenologist working in this tradition can bring to bear on further
themes (2). I would accordingly like to carry out some methodological
Selbstbesinnung on Husserlian phenomenological practice as I understand
it, focusing on such methods as critique of presuppositions, retrieval
from anonymity, and the radical reduction to the living present.
However, since methodological consciousness is founded in the experience
of actually using the method(s) concerned (3), I shall refer to one of
my own recent research projects--not reporting on it for its own sake,
but merely taking it as one example of a style of research that can also
be carried out by others on different themes. The example will
nevertheless also indicate how a specific research topic can (re)shape
the methods we bring to it. And at the end, I shall briefly turn to that
topic in its own right in order to show how such Husserlian
investigations converge with Patocka's reflections on our situated
embodiment.

We are always coming to phenomenological work in media res; there
is already a tradition underway, and we inherit its findings along with
its methods. Thus when I began a study of "interkinaesthetic
affectivity" (Behnke 2008a), I was able to rely on my own previous
investigations of interkinaesthetic experience (Behnke 2007: 76ff.), but
had to come to a suitable working understanding of Husserl's notion
of affection (Behnke 2008b). Then I had to consider how to bring the
affective-interkinaesthetic field to itself-givenness on the basis of
the best possible evidence pertaining to a shifting, subtle
"atmosphere" or "medium" (in contrast, for example,
to a relatively stable object of cognitive interest whose abiding
features are to be explicated) (4). I found that to attain such evidence
in "filled and firsthand" fashion, I had to undergo the
affective-interkinaesthetic field from within by participating in it as
a sentient/sensitive motility, being there with it in such a way that I
am not only suffused by it (rather than having it as the object of my
reflective regard), but moved by it (5). This required not only
understanding myself as a kinaesthetic consciousness in general
(Claesges 1964: 119ff.), but thematizing the "kinaesthetics of
undergoing" in particular by turning to the affective register (for
example, to what I can directly feel somaesthetically, in my own body)
and appreciating the way in which I am kinaesthetically
"welcoming" or "barring off" whatever I feel,
sensing how I am moving-with the shifting vectors and valences as they
emerge, or else "freezing up," inhibiting their flow.
Proceeding in this way, however, I was not simply describing natural
experience within the ready-made world; instead, what I found myself
bringing to lucid awareness was the ongoing "how" of the
living texture of transcendental life6. What are some of the
methodological issues that are at stake here?

Let us begin with the key notion of "critique of
presuppositions." Although Husserlian phenomenology has been
criticized for claiming to be a "presuppositionless"
philosophy, the critics typically equate
"presuppositionlessness" with being "desituated," as
if we were not embodied, historical, linguistic beings. But Husserl
makes it quite clear that the principle of
"presuppositionlessness" means making no use of
presuppositions unless and until they have received a genuinely
phenomenological realization (7). Thus presuppositions must be both
brought to light and tested (8). Those that receive evidential
confirmation can be accepted, while the others remain in strategic
suspension: we make no use of them in our descriptions and judgments.
They may indeed become themes for phenomenological elucidation--for
example, as correlates to be traced back to the subjective operations in
which they are constituted--but we cannot simply assume and appeal to
them as we work. In the case of somaesthetic affection, one obvious
candidate for suspension is the naturalized body, which is accordingly
set out of play (9). But a more fundamental presupposition must be
addressed here as well--namely, that of the ready-made world (10). To
bring this to light as a prejudice, however, requires retrieving
constituting subjectivity from anonymity and inquiring into its
achievements (11); for example, although kinaesthetic performances play
several major constitutive roles, kinaesthetic life itself often remains
doubly anonymous--not only "out of awareness," but
"proceeding without the explicit control of the active, awake
I"--and these performances should accordingly be thematized and
described.

Yet above and beyond issues specifically related to kinaesthetic
functioning, the overall task of retrieving presuppositions and other
performances from anonymity can also be seen in terms of two different
directions of research. The first involves the correlational a priori
per se: rather than automatically accepting a ready-made world in its
being and being-thus, we inquire back into the effective performances of
constituting transcendental subjectivity--a dimension that remains
hidden for naive consciousness (12). But in addition to--and as a part
of--a correlational retrieval, there is also what may very provisionally
be called a stratificational retrieval: working out the correlational a
priori also requires investigating non-actional yet co-functioning
performances and their correlates, so that as previously anonymously
presupposed levels and performances "become indices of problems
concerning evidence," they lead us ever further into "the vast
system of constitutive subjectivity" (13). What might a
stratificational retrieval entail?

A static approach to strata sets aside not only questions of
genetic origins, but also temporal ongoingness per se, and considers the
structure of the experience in a "freeze-frame" mode,
typically using a series of abstractive moves to disclose one-sided
founding relations, in search of an ultimately self-sufficient level
with respect to which the other levels are non-self-sufficient. Thus,
for example, feeling and valuing are said to presuppose pregiven
objectivities that function as substrates for further acts whose
correlate is the affective tone or valence of the objectivities
concerned: object-consciousness founds feeling-consciousness (14). But
what happens when these strata are thought generatively? We may find
some clues in a text that was originally a part of Husserl's
1920/1924 lecture course on ethics (15). Pursuing what an earlier
lecture had termed a "reductive analysis" of
surrounding-worldly objects to "mere things"16, Husserl uses
the method of Abbau, systematically dismantling higher levels of feeling
and willing--and their sense-bestowing accomplishments, which are what
make the objects in question cultural objects--to reach an abstract
world of merely natural things, sheer spatiotemporally extended objects
free from both value-predicates and practical predicates. Part of this
analysis was already indicated in Ideen II in terms of a clarification
of the theoretical-cognitive attitude in which the "mere
things" of the natural sciences are constituted. But in the later
text, Husserl begins to see the very idea of such a "lowest"
ontological region of sheer material nature as an accomplishment of the
modern natural sciences: this Abbau is exactly what Galileo and
Descartes effectively carried out, yielding the "physical
nature"--and its noetic correlate, "pure experience of the
physical"--that makes physical natural science possible (17). Thus
the "ultimately founding" level turns out to be a
presupposition that is correlated to a certain type of theoretical
stance, and if we do not retrieve the constitutive sources of this
presupposition from anonymity, we are--as Husserl later says
(6/52)--taking for "true being" what is actually the
achievement of a particular method.

Furthermore, although the experience of a natural thing at the
lowest level of objective apperception may be the "lowest" in
static-phenomenological terms, it is a complex rather than a primitive
object, involving, for example, temporal synthesis. This motivates a
genetic-phenomenological account of the performances in which such an
object comes to be given, an account in which the ordering principle is
temporal sequence (18). Yet even here Husserl continues to speak of
"strata", and even of a phenomenological
"archaeology" unearthing the "hidden constitutive
structures" of the apperceptive sense-performances whose correlate
is the seemingly "ready-made" world--a search for ultimate
origins that, as with archaeology in the usual sense, proceeds by way of
"reconstruction" (19). This, however, raises questions of
evidence: can something functioning as an "ultimate origin" in
the sense of temporal priority--and perhaps something "buried"
deep in the past--become itself-given for me here and now, in
"filled and firsthand" fashion? Or must we observe infants, or
consider limit cases such as persons blind from birth learning to see
after an operation? (20) Husserl appeals, for example, to the notion of
a primal, undifferentiated kinaesthetic capability whose development is
exemplified by the way in which the infant's sheer joy in motility
eventually leads to the mastery of differentiated kinaesthetic systems
that are freely at one's disposal (HM8/327ff.). But this kind of
genetically primal "stratum" can be difficult (though not
impossible) to retrieve as an adult (21). Moreover, in one passage
(HM8/394) Husserl emphasizes that genetic acquisitions ongoingly
function together at all levels, with all strata coexisting within
immanent temporality. And in the course of my own investigation, I found
that the very model of stacked "strata"--whether they are
ordered in the temporal fashion displayed in an archaeological
excavation, with the oldest layers at the bottom, or in hierarchies of
one-sided founding relations--becomes irrelevant when we are
investigating the ongoing functional activity of these coexisting
"strata" in their dynamic efficacy. We can accordingly suspend
any automatic acceptance of the assumption that we are necessarily
dealing with a "stratificational" type of organization--a move
that can then allow us to discern a number of mutually co-founding,
interpenetrating, and interfunctioning moments (e.g., in the case of my
investigation into interkinaesthetic affectivity, the key moments are
sensuous salience, affective tone, and the kinaesthetics of undergoing),
all in play here and now, in the living present, and available in
principle for evidential retrieval from anonymity.

At this point, let us recall that the goal of the critique of the
ready-made world--a critique that retrieves the silent labor of
subjective functioning from anonymity and penetrates into its deep
structure--is not to abandon the world-experiencing life we started
with, but to understand it. Thus, for example, if a tangible thing is
constituted for us, what we experience is indeed the thing. It is true
that other "implicated" dimensions are constituted at the same
time, such as the sensuous moments presenting features of the thing, yet
these sensuous moments are not themselves immediately given in their own
right--they are subsumed, so to speak, in the whole of the thing to
which we are perceptually attending, and only emerge as such when we
perform the kind of phenomenological work I have been discussing (22).
It is here that I accordingly propose speaking not of a
"stratificational" retrieval, but of becoming lucidly aware of
the usually anonymous moments "through-which" the experience
ongoingly proceeds, appreciating them in their dynamic efficacy,
"in-the-act", which is to say: not as "levels" in a
static structural hierarchy, and not as pre-objective "stages"
left behind on the way to object-constitution, but as dimensions still
permeating the experience and continuing to function as living
"Durchgang"-moments in the temporal ongoingness of a complex
whole--as "intermediating" moments-"through"-which a
phenomenon is given (23). Now if we return to the theme of affection, we
find that although the immediate experience of "sheer"
sensuous affection apart from "something" of which it is a
moment is relatively rare (24), an affective salience such as a sensuous
gleam, rustle, or pang may indeed function at the very beginning of my
engagement with the object it contributes to constituting, attracting me
with an affective force that I am already kinaesthetically partnering
"before I know it." But such moments can also exert their
affective force during the course of an ongoing experience--for example,
as shifting dimensions of tone color and phrasing in a musical
performance, dimensions that need not be thematized in their own right
in order to enjoy the song. They nevertheless can be thematized in
principle, which once again brings up the question of Evidenz (above and
beyond the question of fine-tuning our ability to appreciate certain
kinds of distinctions). What methodological considerations come into
play in this context?

I find the reduction to the primal standing-streaming living
present to be very helpful here (25). But to indicate how it can be
worked out in terms of the investigation that is serving as my example,
it is first necessary to touch upon the (still controversial) notion of
the hyletic-apperceptive structure of sensuous experience (26). In a
text that may have been written around February 1932, Husserl refers to
apperception in terms of apprehensional core (the hyletic moment) and
apprehension-as (HM8/344). However, this need not assume a simplistic
scheme in which some sort of bare sense-data are supposed to function as
preexisting raw materials upon which a form is then imposed (27).
Instead, what is implied here is that mutually co-functioning moments
can be distinguished from one another through processes of coincidence
in variation: on the one hand, the sculpture in the garden catches my
eye now with a dull gleam and now with an iridescent flash, but is
apprehended as the same sculpture in each case; on the other hand, what
I initially heard as a low-flying jet airplane turned out to be
hurricane-force wind in the treetops, but in each case the core sensuous
moment was a thunderous roar. Given this reciprocity of mutually
co-functioning moments, then, what we might term a "hyletic
reduction" and an "apperceptive retrieval" turn out to be
two sides of the same coin.

Now there are several passages where Husserl refers to
abstractively dismantling co-functioning apperceptions in order to reach
a primal hyletic sphere of ultimate "perceptions" that are no
longer "apperceptions," and he does so by refraining from
taking these moments as "adumbrations-of" something (28). At
this point, we are certainly not describing how mundane things are
typically given in the natural attitude. Instead, what is at stake is a
new type of transcendental experience in which I am lucidly
living-through the shifting play of primal sensuous affection and its
intimately interwoven affective tone, in its equally intimate
correlation with primal kinaesthetic functioning, in the primal
standing-streaming present: it is a matter of appreciating primal
temporalization not as an abstract or empty form, but in terms of a
contentually filled and affectively tinged specificity in which I myself
am already kinaesthetically participating (even if I am not consciously
controlling my participation). When I actually attempt to thematize
these matters in full evidential awareness, taking the somaesthetic
saliences I am currently undergoing as an example, it becomes clear that
what must be suspended in order to perform the radical reduction to the
living present is the tendency to take the events that I am feeling as
adumbrations-"of" the privileged (and enduring) experiential
"object" that might be termed "my own lived body
sensuously felt from within" (29). For the purposes of the
investigation serving as my example, however, it is appropriate to
deactivate this familiar apperception, not only in order to focus on the
affective texture of the living present in its own right, but also to
make room for an alternative apperception in which I am free to sense
the same sensuous events as registering not a "state" of my
own body, but the tugs and pulls, the vectors and valences, of the
interkinaesthetic-affective field. In other words, here an apperceptive
variation becomes a methodological strategy for opening up the very
field of research of the investigation in question (30).

The tendency to apprehend sensuous feelings as adumbrating bodily
states is nevertheless merely one example of a much more deeply
sedimented apperceptive tendency: namely, a "habitual thematic
direction toward objects of external apperception," a global
apperceptive style that "determines the course of the further
formation of apperceptions" in terms of the "objective
thematic," so that even subjective functioning itself is
objectively apperceived, by way of the psychophysical apperception, as a
component part of the world (34/64f.; cf. 399). Husserl even raises the
question of an original instinct of objectivation (31) that is already
at work in the primal syntheses producing the objectivities that will
ultimately be experienced as persisting substances--identical,
transtemporal unities as substrates for further determination, yielding
not only an enrichment of their sense, but the production of knowledge
as an abiding acquisition (32). And if we penetrate even more deeply
into this tendency toward the integration and preservation of
transcendencies, we can see it already at work in the primal
"conservation" of the "settled," retentional past as
"the same" (33).

Another way of addressing this is to point out that Husserl's
interest in retrieving the deep structures of transcendental life from
their anonymity stands within the horizon of a larger project that he
saw as his own historical task: that of a universal, absolutely grounded
science upon which all other sciences depend (34). And if this is indeed
the task, it is crucial to focus on concordant unities rather than on
the shifting play of multiplicities. According to Cairns,

Husserl spoke of the levels of pre-being, that have become mere
passageways to the awareness of the world, as having once themselves
been termini ad quem for the ego's interest. The development of the
world is teleologically directed upon the substitution of unities for
multiplicities, and the latter become anonymous, uninteresting to the
ego (35).

This is nothing other than a genetic account of
"Durchgang"-moments as mere phases to be transcended, and is
certainly congruent with the project of providing an ultimate foundation
for science. However, in the investigation I have taken as my example,
not only are my theoretical reflections nested within practical projects
(36), but the very theme of the investigation is radically different: I
am not dealing with an abiding thing and its (relatively) fixed
determinations, but with the shifting dynamics of an
interkinaesthetic-affective field that permeates me and moves me. It
therefore makes perfect methodological sense to renew the reduction to
the primal living present and to let the affective saliences come and go
as they will without marshaling these moments in service of the
constitution of an object-like entity. In fact, if the radical reduction
to the living present is to be radically attuned to the style of
givenness of the matters that are at stake here, my task is not even to
make what I am experiencing into an "object" of my attention
at all; instead, what I am thematizing in lucid awareness is how I am
living-through what I am experiencing, in the ongoing immediacy of the
kinaesthetics of undergoing precisely "this," of resisting or
yielding to it in precisely this way as it shifts and unfurls (37). In
short, the embodied texture of interkinaesthetic affectivity is to be
lived from within, and not constituted as an object that we observe: the
research topic itself requires the researcher to set aside the
presuppositions pertaining to the phenomenological analysis of an
objective world of "things," and to adopt instead a
qualitatively different style of experiencing that retrieves a deep
dimension from its anonymity, allowing its silent voice to be heard. And
once we are alive to these matters, we can find them everywhere we turn
(38).

It was nevertheless one of the findings of the descriptive project
motivating the present methodological reflections that in many public
settings, the entire register of interkinaesthetic affectivity seems to
be muted or dimmed: people do indeed move around the world and interact,
yet seem strangely unaware not only of the affective forces
criss-crossing the interkinaesthetic field, but also of their own flesh
as a medium through which these affective forces are propagated, leading
to the lived experience of being-moved. What is going on here? I will
briefly turn to Patocka both for a way of identifying the problem and
for some clues toward a possible response.

Body, Community, Language, World (39) can be read as an extended
meditation on the "profound truth" (17) that can be learned
from subjective corporeity (or what I am calling sentient/ sensitive
motility), which is "not a thing," but is always "a
moment of a situation in which we are" (27). And one of the most
important dimensions of this situatedness is what Patocka terms an
elementary "protofact" or "ground" (133): we are
affectively rooted in--and addressed by--a physiognomic world in such a
way that even prior to the positing or presentation of something like
"being," there is always an affective, prelinguistic
sensibility caught up in movements of attraction or repulsion (134,
140). Patocka links this sphere with the instinctual, with the life of
the animal and the child. But he also insists that in the human, this
persisting base is transformed by being overlaid with two further
"movements of human life" for which it serves as the
foundation (143). For my purposes, what is crucial is that with the
emergence of the second movement--set in the realm of work, tools, and
social roles--the first movement tends to be ignored, marginalized,
repressed, and suppressed, if not completely shattered (148, 150, 158).
My fieldwork confirms Patocka's diagnosis: coming home on the bus,
for example, I found that the trees in the park we were passing were far
more vividly present as vibrant fellow members of the affective field40
than were the other humans riding in the bus, each of them seemingly
enclosed in a private "mental" space for which their bodies
merely provided some anonymous physical support. Husserl refers to an
affective incitement as "knocking at the door" (4/219f.; cf.
11/166)--but in many cases, there was no one home, only a disinhabited,
utilitarian body, serving, but not lucidly lived by, the person in
question. Why is this so prevalent? Patocka links the vital-affective
movement of harmony with the world, of sinking roots and anchoring our
existence, with a sphere of safety and vital warmth created by the human
microcommunity into which every infant is born and upon which it depends
(149, 157). But when we look to recent history, we may well wonder
whether the lived, kinaesthetic experience of trust and safety is truly
possible in our uprooted world. So what should we do?

If we note the metaphors that Patocka uses for his three movement
of human life, we can see that they are sometimes seen as stacked
strata, each serving as the basis for the next, and sometimes in terms
of a sequence of developmental stages. But he also speaks of the third
movement of human life (the "movement of existence in the true
sense") in terms of the possibility of authentically reintegrating
the previous movements into our life (151). In terms of the
methodological distinctions developed in this paper, this means that
affection and sensibility are neither "lower" psychic
functions to be transcended in favor of "higher" levels of
mental life, nor "past" stages of development to be
transcended in mature life, but interfunctioning moments-through-which
life proceeds, Durchgang-moments within broader dynamic movements that
"presuppose and interpenetrate each other" (147). And we can
learn to appreciate these co-functioning moments in-the-act. In this way
we can learn to live our sensibility profoundly rather than
superficially (140), accepting the challenge posed by the affective
plenitude with which the world calls out to us, a world in which we are
confronted with two fundamental possibilities: "to come to
ourselves, or to forget ourselves" (137) (41). If Patocka is right
about the body--which is not a substrate, but a vital process (155) that
is simultaneously a moment in a situation and irreducible to the
situation (27) (42)--then the moment of homecoming that anchors us in
our own affective body and its shifting play of sensibilities both
requires and can generate a special type of situation, a resonant
interkinaesthetic community in which there is enough local safety and
warmth to support the lived experience of one's own flesh as a
medium permeated by these ever-present affective forces (43). Creating
such a situation of mutual nourishment requires that we become lucidly
aware of, rather than oblivious to, our own styles of kinaesthetic
comportment (44)--our interkinaesthetic openness and availability, our
ability to partner and move-with the situation and with others. But
creating a field of mutual replenishment where we are enlivened by the
presence of others and in turn enliven them also requires an ethos of
open generosity, as well as the courage to steer our "pilgrim"
steps (139) toward a homecoming into a future that is not guaranteed in
advance. If in our uprooted, nomadic world, "in the harsh turmoil
of the reality of labor and conflict, no longer shielded by the
community of kin" (177), we are a people in search of an oasis of
safety and trust, we may find that the wellsprings we seek lie in the
deep structures of our own situated motility--if we are able to retrieve
our own ("ownmost") possibilities from anonymity and to give
them a genuinely phenomenological realization.

Zirion, A. 2006. "The call 'back to the things
themselves' and the notion of phenomenology", Husserl Studies
22(1): 29-51. doi:10.1007/s10743-006-9004-9

(1) All references in this form refer to Husserl 1950ff., cited by
volume/page number(s); references to Husserl 2001ff. will use the
abbreviation HM, followed by volume/ page number(s); references to
Husserl 1999 will use the abbreviation EU, followed by page number(s).
References to Husserl's work are illustrative rather than
exhaustive.

(2) What is at stake here is the scientificity of phenomenology,
including, for instance, the requirement that its research results be
intersubjectively confirmable by the Arbeitsgemeinschaft in question
(see, e.g., 20-1/319ff., 6/439); the sense of its proceeding as a path
that can be taken again at any time, as well as carried further (see,
e.g., 6/123, 440); the issue of the eidetic universality of its
observations (see, e.g., 17/256); and the possibility of a radical
clarification and critique of its own principles (see, e.g., 17/194,
294f.; 6/445; 8/passim, 34/passim). For more on the scientificity of
phenomenology, see also Zirion 2006, and on the contrast between
"pure phenomenology" as science and "phenomenological
philosophy," see, e.g., Aguirre 1970: 23ff.

(4) For Husserl, the best evidence is the fullest, most perfect,
most original (see, e.g., 17/209, 287f., 293); what I would additionally
like to emphasize, however, is that obtaining the best possible evidence
requires developing appropriate modes of comportment attuned to the
style(s) of experience/phenomena in question.

(5) Cf. HM8/114; see also 351f. on "fuhlendes
Dabei-Sein". Note that holding back, withholding my kinaesthetic
complicity and refusing to partner an affective invitation, is already a
way of responding to it: as Husserl notes (6/108), holding still is
itself a mode of lived movement. A limit case might be the experience of
being paralyzed by extreme fear or anxiety, hardly able to act or react
at all--cf. 34/262f.

(6) Husserl certainly does acknowledge the importance of
descriptions of the structures of mundane life in the natural attitude
(see, e.g., 34/218f.). He nevertheless insists on the radicality of the
shift in interest and attitude that opens up a new universal field of
transcendental experience for transcendental-phenomenological
investigation; see, e.g., 34/91, 159f., 178, 291f., 323, 352, et passim,
and cf., e.g., 6/140, 151, 153, 214.

(8) These twin methodical moments may be given terminological form
as a moment of "Aufweisung" and one of "Ausweisung",
although Husserl does not explicitly reserve these terms for this
purpose or use them consistently.

(9) More specifically, what had to be suspended for the
interkinaesthetic affectivity project was the psychophysical
apperception (cf. 34/79, 398): rather than automatically accepting the
notion of the "psychophysical" and thinking in terms of it, we
must see it as the correlate of a "hidden apperceptive
traditionality" whose "constitutive history" must be
revealed and explicated in phenomenological terms (34/363; cf. 159f.,
441ff.).

(10) This may be designated the "prejudice of all
prejudices"--see, e.g., 34/151, 303, and cf. 17/283; HM8/41; 8/461,
465, 479.

(11) Correspondingly, such a subjectivity may be designated the
"presupposition of all presuppositions"--see, e.g., 17/282,
and cf. 279. Note that a move such as suspending automatic acceptance of
the validity of a "naturalized" body may be characterized as a
"Ruckgang" to the Lebenswelt, while the more fundamental move
of tracing the ready-made world back to constituting subjectivity has
been characterized as a "Ruckfrage"; see EU/49 (in [section]11
of the Introduction). Lohmar 1996 focuses on identifying the original
manuscripts underlying the main text of EU rather than on the materials
used in the Introduction ([subsection]1-14), for which Landgrebe was
chiefly responsible, and he supplies only a few indications, discovered
by chance, of specific manuscript passages that Landgrebe drew upon in
[subsection]1-14 (see Lohmar 1996: 35, 43f., 70 n. 12). But I am happy
to report that I was able to find (quite by accident) a source where
Husserl makes the Ruckgang/Ruckfrage distinction in much the same way as
it appears in EU/49: see 34/582f., in the citation from a brief text (B
I 10, 52a) dated 4.II.31. Elsewhere, however, Husserl does not seem to
maintain this terminology consistently (although the conceptual
distinction it points to remains important for him).

(12) See, e.g., 6/209; 34/396. Note that this concealment does not
pose a problem for the natural attitude, where the living,
predelineating intentionality "carries me along" despite its
anonymity (17/242). But Husserl is hardly satisfied with leaving such
performances to their anonymity (cf., e.g., 6/114f.): they must not only
be retrieved, but critiqued (see, e.g., 17/179).

(13) 17/277. The notion of non-actional (nichtaktuelle) yet
co-functioning performances requires some clarification concerning the
distinguishable yet overlapping ways in which Husserl uses the term
aktuell: to mean "currently actual" in a temporal sense; to
mean "actional" in the sense that the I is actively engaged;
and to mean "effectively in operation" in the sense of
actually (rather than merely potentially) functioning. When Husserl
contrasts "activity" and "passivity", the tendency
is to take "activity" in terms of I-engagement (e.g., as an
act in which the I is "directed" toward something in
"intentions in the proper sense"), and "passive"
correspondingly means "ohne Tun des Ich, mag auch das Ich wach sein
und d.i. tuendes Ich sein," e.g., the I does not have to
"do" anything to produce the primal streaming life that
emerges in passive temporalization: the streaming "happens"
(34/179). Despite the importance of this distinction, however,
understanding "activity" solely in terms of I-engagement blurs
another possible use of the term: namely, to refer to a process that is
not only currently actual, but dynamically ongoing and exerting a
particular functional efficacy proper to it--an efficacy that can be
phenomenologically discerned "in-the-act," whether it is
operating within an actional (I-engaged) performance or a non-actional
one.

(14) See, e.g., 31/5. Here it is not possible to address the
substantial literature on the theme of "objectivating" and
"non-objectivating" acts.

(16) See 37/xli n.1, where the reference is to Husserl's
"Einleitung in die Philosophie" (Winter Semester 1919/20), F I
40, 110b ff.; cf. the general scheme of hierarchically stacked strata
organizing regional ontologies: Ding-Leib/ Seele-Geist, with each higher
stratum once again presupposing the lower strata.

(17) See 37/297; this hint from the early 1920s toward a
historical-generative dismantling is carried out somewhat more
explicitly in the 1927 lecture course on "Natur und Geist"
(see, e.g., 32/124ff., 242ff.) before blossoming into the form familiar
to us in Part Two of the Crisis (cf. 32/xxxix).

(18) For example, we may speak of events of salience, affection,
advertence, and engagement, with each event genetically motivating the
next.

(21) There are a number of approaches in transformative somatic
practice that are indeed oriented toward retrieving these primal
possibilities, particularly the work of Emilie Conrad Da'Oud and
Bonnie Bainbridge Cohen.

(23) Husserl uses the term "Durchgang" in a number of
quasi-technical ways whose explication deserves an essay of its own; for
an initial orientation, see 39/13-18. Of course, he also not only
routinely refers to higher and lower levels, but speaks of
phenomenological research as penetrating to ever deeper depths--see,
e.g., 34/168, 193. If we are to continue speaking of the
"deep" structures of subjective functioning in the context of
the present paper, however, we must specify that what is at stake here
is a transparent-dynamic "archaeology" in which moments at
various degrees of mereological complexity are investigated in terms of
their ongoing functional efficacy within more encompassing wholes.

(24) I vividly recall a "glowing red," glimpsed through a
partly open door, that maintained both its radiant sensuous plenitude
and its affective tone (it was a wonderful sight) for quite some time
while resisting all of my attempts to see it as an appearance "of
" a red thing. (Eventually, I investigated further and found out
"what", in lifeworldly terms, it "was"--but this has
never cancelled the luminous splendor of the initial experience, which
remains, in memory, what it was before the affective event was
reinscribed as an adumbration-"of " a particular thing seen
under certain circumstances.)

(25) See, e.g., 34/162ff., 185ff., 384ff.; HM8/108ff., 117.

(26) There are, of course, many critiques of Husserl's
approaches to the hyletic dimension under its varying titles of
sensation, impression, and affection. For some orientation to the
difficulties, see, e.g., Holenstein 1972: 86-117. Sokolowski 1964:
54ff., 94ff., 102ff., 177ff., 204ff., addresses a number of problems
with the matter-form structure; de Almeida 1972 offers both a critique
of the form-content model and an alternative account (see especially Ch.
1); Aguirre 1970: xviii ff. acknowledges the difficulties but points to
the legitimacy of the notion of apperception and develops it in Part
Three of his work; the treatment of sensibility in Kern 1975 is helpful
(see, e.g., [subsection]28ff.), as is the theory of apprehension offered
in Lohmar 1993, which emphasizes its dynamic, anticipatory function (see
especially 129ff.); and a defense of the notion of somaesthetic hyletic
experience can be found in Gallagher 1986: 141ff.

(27) See, e.g., 17/292, EU/74f.; cf., e.g., de Almeida 1972: 91,
96, 97 on the reciprocal interplay between what is sensuously given and
what is intentively meant.

(28) See HM8/134, 352; cf. Cairns 1976: 84 and Aguirre 1970: 174ff.
Note that such an "apperceptive epoche" (a suspension of the
automatic efficacy of functioning apperceptions in order to thematize
the moment of primal affection) can also be thought as an
"apperceptive reduction" (tracing "pregivenness-as"
back to the constitutive performances of specific apperceptions), since
it must bring these very apperceptions to light precisely in order to
suspend them.

(29) For some of the strata involved in the constitution of such an
object, see Behnke 2001: Part II.C.

(30) Steps here include accepting (on the basis of an appropriate
phenomenological realization) Husserl's rethinking of the
"impressional" moment within inner time-consciousness in terms
of the event of affection, here taken correlationally with the accent on
the kinaesthetics of undergoing; the radical reduction to the living
present, which encourages us to experience our own bodily life in terms
of the paradigm of an ongoing tone (and its shifting tone colors) rather
than the paradigm of a fixed thing; and the alternative apperception
that re-constitutes me as a dynamic moment in a field, a strand in a
living texture that I contribute to ongoingly re-weaving (or weaving
anew and differently): I not only register the affective tone of the
interkinaesthetic field from my own situated standpoint, but
co-constitute it, perhaps shifting it.

(35) Cairns 1976: 94. Textual support for Cairns's report can
be found in 39/17 (cf. Holenstein 1972: 95), where Husserl does indeed
use the term "Durchgang." Cf. also the reference to
"Durchgangsseiendes" in Cairns 1976: 80.

(36) For example, my research into the kinaesthetics of undergoing
is relevant to restorative embodiment practices.

(37) Here I can only touch on the question of how lucidly
living-through what I am experiencing can change the experience itself,
which is linked with the question of how it is possible for something
new to emerge during the course of such experience, something that does
not merely reiterate the apperceptive foreshadowing of the past or
fulfill the empty predelineations motivated by the current style of the
experience. Elsewhere (Behnke 2004: 35ff.; 2009: [subsection] 3, 6) I
have described how an improvisatory consciousness and a practice of
"not-knowing" at the leading edge of the living present can
play a role. The present research project is additionally beginning to
clarify how bringing awareness to what is felt corporeally and
intercorporeally can shift it: by undergoing the affective event in
lucid awareness, retrieving it from anonymity and becoming more open to
it as well as more available for being moved by it, I am, quite
precisely, affected by its motivational force more fully--a tightness
(or a situation) eases, breath (or interkinaesthetic partnering) flows
more freely, and so on, because such release is quite precisely called
for by the restriction in question, and we are now allowing matters to
move on.

(38) Here it is appropriate not only to note that the matters
investigated in this project affected how the methods used to
investigate them had to be understood and employed, but also to
acknowledge that carrying out such an investigation can change the
researcher as well.

(39) Patocka 1995 is based on student notes from Patocka's
lectures at Prague's Charles University during the 1968-69 academic
year; parenthetical page references refer to the English translation
(Patocka 1998).

(40) Here the critique of the psychophysical apperception opens the
way for the recognition of a true biosocial plenum (Behnke 2008a:
156ff.).

(41) Here we see Patocka carrying on, in his own historically
situated way, both a Husserlian theme of ethical renewal through
transcendental self-clarification and a Heideggerian hermeneutics of
authenticity.

(42) "I am in a situation in such a way that the situation is
not distinct from me and I am not bereft of influence on it" (48).

(43) Husserl points out (6/111) that even though we are not always
thematically occupied with ourselves, we always, and inevitably, belong
to the affective domain. When feeling this is too much to bear, we
can--mercifully--shut it out. But we can also retrieve these deep
dimensions through restorative embodiment work, and keep them alive
through practices of renewal and regeneration. Cf. Behnke 2002.

(44) See Behnke 2006 for descriptions of the style of lucid
awareness at stake here.