FURY AND TURMOIL: DAYS THAT SHOOK KOREA

By CLYDE HABERMAN, Special to the New York Times

Published: July 6, 1987

SEOUL, South Korea, July 5—
On Friday, June 19, after a night of violent demonstrations that saw riot policemen lose control of the streets to anti-Government protesters, President Chun Doo Hwan was ready to call troops into Seoul and other embattled cities.

Orders to move were issued that day to army units, and some began to take up positions outside the capital, knowledgeable politicians and foreign diplomats say.

They discussed the military threat in painting a fuller picture of the events that ultimately produced the startling announcement last Monday in which Roh Tae Woo, the chairman of the ruling party, altered the face of South Korean politics. 'Very Close' to Using Troops

What was contemplated on June 19, the politicians and diplomats said, was not martial law but a lesser action known as a garrison decree. It would have authorized the use of soldiers to maintain order, but would also have left the Government and all its agencies in civilian hands.

The country, several well-informed people said, had come much nearer to military intervention than most South Koreans realized at the time. ''We were very close,'' a diplomat said.

But a few hours before troops were set to move, Mr. Chun suddenly shifted direction, as he often had done in his seven years in power. His instinct is to deal quickly and forcefully with dissent, people familiar with his thinking say. But he is also prepared to sheath his temper, they add, if that seems the wiser course.

From moderates within his Government and ruling party, Mr. Chun heard warnings that military action would jeopardize the 1988 Summer Olympic Games in Seoul, would anger the United States and other countries important to South Korea, and perhaps would even have made it impossible for the President to transfer power next February, as planned, to his hand-picked successor, Mr. Roh.

Besides, several officials said, many commanders did not want to get involved, in the belief that the military's reputation had been sullied whenever it was called out against South Koreans in the past.

Instead of immediate action, Mr. Chun pulled back and settled for a stern warning. On the night of June 19, his figurehead Prime Minister, Lee Han Key, went on television to threaten unspecified ''extraordinary'' measures if the protests did not end. Drastic Compromises

That decision, well-placed analysts said, may have turned the tide in South Korea's political crisis, for it affirmed the Government's commitment to seek a political solution to end the most sustained street violence in seven years. It led senior officials and ruling-party leaders to consider drastic compromises that they had rejected out of hand before.

Ultimately - although it took 10 days - it produced the decision by Mr. Roh to capitulate to major opposition demands for direct presidential elections, release of political prisoners and restoration of civil rights to dissidents, including the best-known political figure, Kim Dae Jung. Two days later, on July 1, Mr. Chun gave his approval.

Suddenly, Mr. Roh must run for a presidency that he had expected to have handed to him. Just as suddenly, the opposition is forced to prepare not only for an election that had seemed improbable but also for the possibility that it might actually take office next year.

How Mr. Roh reached his decision is still not fully clear. Although he said in an interview on Saturday that he had discussed the political situation with many Koreans of varied backgrounds, he made his intentions known only to close advisers.

Even before then, pressure for decisive action had been building within the governing Democratic Justice Party. Still, when his final announcement was made to the party's executive council, it was a true bombshell.

He was looking, Mr. Roh said in the interview, for ''sweeping, epoch-making, bold measures.''

It appears that he had no face-to-face meetings with President Chun between June 24, when he says he made up his mind, and June 29, when he publicly disclosed his plans. In the interview, Mr. Roh would not directly discuss any conversations that may have taken place at the Blue House, the presidential residence. A Pair of Old Allies, But Sometimes Also Political Rivals

But party officials and diplomats say they believe that Mr. Roh kept Mr. Chun fully informed through third parties about his thinking. The President may not have known in advance about every detail of what would become an eight-point plan, these officials said, but he understood the critical details, especially those involving direct presidential elections and political freedom for Kim Dae Jung, a man openly loathed in the Blue House.

''Mr. Roh knew the President's mind,'' a National Assembly member from the Democratic Justice Party said.

Some analysts also discerned a calculated attempt to enhance Mr. Roh's political stature, which had begun to wilt in the crisis. This maneuvering was not without complications.

On one hand, Mr. Chun and Mr. Roh are old allies, fellow graduates of the Korea Military Academy, class of 1955, and partners in a mutiny of generals that brought them to power in late 1979. But they have also fallen into rivalry on occasion. This may have been one of those times, political analysts said.