In the previous chapters we attempted to demonstrate, first
through figures, what is today beyond any doubt: that African
agriculture is in the midst of a serious crisis. We have
demonstrated that the origins of this crisis go back to the
earliest contacts between European capitalist economies and
African precolonial, precapitalist economies. We recalled that
the colonial period led to a disintegration of peasant economies,
and stressed the fact that the first post-independence decade,
through the policy of increased extraversion conducted by the
newly independent states, precipitated the crisis by
systematically orienting the national economies to the world
market. We observed that the solutions to the crisis put forward
during the second post-independence decade were useless and
illusory. Finally, we tried to show that, throughout this period
of domination which took various forms depending on the period,
the peasantry, the basic productive force, bore most of the
burden; and that it suffered and continues to suffer the
exploitation of capital in various forms of subordination.

It is by looking at these facts that we can reflect on the
possible alternative and the conditions for this alternative. It
is obvious that solutions cannot be sought only at the level of
the rural areas, non even only at the economic level. The crisis
which we are living through is a political, economic and social
crisis which calls into question the whole of the existing
structures in African states, and the types of relations linking
them to the world capitalist system.

By posing the problems thus, we are bound to place ourselves
in the context of the class struggle at the national and
international level which determines the policies thus followed.
And without being thoroughly acquainted with the interests that
bind these classes together or the struggles that their
opposition arouses, it is impossible to pose correctly the
problems of the alternative. These call for a clear view of the
attitude of each class to the crisis which does not in reality
affect everyone equally. Thus, in order to reflect lucidly and
objectively about the alternative, it is essential to pose a
number of problems, the terms of which situate the crisis and
alone make it possible to envisage possible solutions.

In order to grasp these crucial problems, which necessarily
bring into play class interests in contemporary African
societies, it is necessary first of all to be able to appreciate
the class composition of these societies. Without being fully
informed of the social processes at work, one cannot know why
this or that policy is carried out and persisted in, despite
these negative consequences.

This, therefore, implies having a reasonably clear idea of the
class nature of the existing political rulers who have a vested
interest in the harmful policies hitherto pursued. Next, it is
necessary to think about the popular class alliances that might
lay claim to political power and carry out a different
development policy. Finally, it is necessary to look at what
other development policy the popular alliance could carry out.
This can only be sketched out, given the great variety of
situations in African states, the variety being linked to a whole
series of economic, ethnological, sociological and other
problems.

Hitherto, so far as we are aware, there has rarely been an
analysis of the alternative in these terms, and that is so not
because the need for such an analysis is not felt, but because
its extension to Africa beyond the framework of a single country,
given the numerous differentiating factors mentioned, makes it
difficult to carry out. It is important to undertake such a
study, however, even though it may suffer from inadequacies or
weaknesses.

This stratification itself is the product of the impact of
capitalism on precolonial and colonial traditional societies. The
most striking impact has been, if not to engender, then at least
to exacerbate, the exploitation of man by man within African
societies. Thus, at the time of independence, a fraction of the
society occupied economically dominant positions, made up for the
most part of those who had thrown in their lot with the colonial
power. It got a share of the surplus labour extorted from the
toiling masses and its political ambitions were strengthened.
This fraction included essentially bourgeois strata, bureaucratic
strata, and 'feudal' forces, which were usually agrarian and
religious.

The bourgeois strata included essentially big traders acting
as middlemen between big capital and the masses, and big planters
in varying numbers depending on the geographical zone. The
African industrial bourgeoisie was still practically non-existent
(except for Egypt and South Africa?). The bureaucratic strata
included the former African representatives in French
metropolitan institutions (Assembly, Senate and even government),
officials in the colonial administration and army, and
paramilitary forces' personnel. The 'feudal' forces included
essentially the religious forces that were sometimes very
powerful in the rural areas, both economically and politically.

Alliances of interests generally brought these strata
together; they dominated the political sphere at the time of
independence even though latent contradictions existed, notably
between the petty bourgeoisie of officials without an economic
base and the bourgeois strata already possessed of solid bases.

At the other end of society, there was the other fraction
which included the mass of small peasants, the small minority of
the working class (except in a few rare countries which have
marked peculiar features where it was already numerically
important: Egypt, South Africa, but their independence does not
date from the 1960s). Alongside these two groups of classes,
there was the stratum of low-level employees, artisans, etc., the
great majority of whom had no well-defined stable job.

The first fraction, dominant on the eve of independence, was
often successful in securing the political support of the second
to negotiate independence to its advantage. But this was not
always without violent conflict.

In fact, there were sometimes sharp struggles within the first
fraction despite alliances, which were sometimes only temporary,
to determine which stratum would inherit from the colonial power.
And these struggles were reflected at the level of the masses
with the same intensity, more through manipulation than through
class interest.

Thus, in many countries the petty bourgeoisie of officials
which was to constitute the backbone of the bureaucratic
bourgeoisie confronted bourgeois strata that had an economic base
and were more closely linked to the colonial power.

Where this petty bourgeoisie succeeded in taking power it was
in general to install a state-run economic system, the means of
providing itself with its own economic base. Conversely, the
trading bourgeoisies and their class allies generally pursued the
same policy inherited from the colonial period, a liberal system
which made no attempt to deck itself in an appearance of
socialism.

The petty bourgeoisie, especially when it succeeded in
mobilizing alongside it the broad masses on a radical platform,
generally tried to secure a base for its regime, by, among other
things, taking external trade away from the traders,
nationalizing the economic interests of big capital, taking a
whole series of measures which enabled it to claim to be
socialist.

But historical experience has proved that, after a few years
of management which amounted virtually to a private management of
public property, it was transformed into a true bureaucratic
bourgeoisie whose economic base was built up from control of the
state and public property.

Like every bourgeoisie in an underdeveloped country faced with
the omnipotence of big capital, it is condemned, in order to
consolidate itself, to strengthen these links with the world
market. Thus, the bureaucratic bourgeoisie always ends up
entering the order of the world capitalist system just like any
other bourgeoisie. Big capital is all the more ready to make a
few concessions to it on statizations because it knows that it
can always extract enormous profits from the countries controlled
by the bureaucracies, and acquire economic positions out of all
proportion to the slight concessions made.

Thus, in the long run, the bureaucratic bourgeoisie and the
other commercial or agrarian bourgeoisies always end up looking
for a deal, their interests coinciding in the alliance with big
capital.

We feel that what has just been described can be said of all
African bourgeoisies, and of their composition and sometimes of
the way in which they came to be formed. Today they control most
African states and manage them in accordance with their common
interests.

The increasingly common interventions by the military on the
political stage can only be interpreted as arbitrating within the
bourgeois classes, or between the bourgeois classes and the
radical intellectual petty bourgeoisie. These armies can neither
have nor offer new solutions. Their political orientations cannot
but be inspired by the lines followed either by the classic
African bourgeoisies or by the radical bourgeoisies in
transition.

In fact, the most important thing about African armies that
seize power is that, in general, they are the product of the
colonial system. They are linked either to the African
bourgeoisies, or to the radical petty bourgeoisies. In any event,
the army as a social group linked to a given class can neither
imagine nor have a political line of its own that can be any
different.

If we turn now to the broad masses, mainly the peasantry and
the working class but also the middle strata that might join it,
it cannot be said that since independence consciousness of common
interests has strengthened as it has among the bourgeois strata
and classes.

They are usually not organized on the basis of their own
well-perceived interests. The result is that they act as a force
to be manoeuvred and manipulated by ruling political parties that
are generally bourgeois in nature. The political organizations
that exist in this or that African country (usually, they are
only single parties with every possible political language and
contradictory political practices) and that claim to be Marxist
and try to mobilize the masses so that they can liberate
themselves and assume the historic tasks that fall on them are
only tiny organizations with a very weak capacity for
mobilization because of the petty bourgeois intellectual origins
of the militants in these organizations

The classes in power really have no interest in seeing the
masses organize themselves freely and develop their political
consciousness clearly. It follows that the organizations that
represent them officially are, in fact, simply links in the state
structures.

And yet, peasantries, working classes, middle classes and
petty bourgeois strata represent more than 97% of the population
in most African countries. In many countries, the peasantry alone
represents 80% of the adult working population. The
characteristics of this key stratum naturally vary in detail from
country to country, but it has many common traits.

If we leave aside the rural bourgeoisie that is very small in
most countries, the differentiations among the peasants
themselves are generally not very significant. The most typical
feature of the African peasantry seems to be its excessive
dispersal in often tiny villages. The consequence of this is that
disseminating ideas among the peasants is not easy, which makes
it difficult to bring them together in an organization
independent of the political authorities and fighting for their
own cause.

From that flows the lack of concern on the part of the
authorities for their cause. This shows itself in illiteracy and
in the inadequacy, even the total absence, of infrastructure in
the rural areas. The peasants, the main producers of agricultural
products, are the first ones to be affected by famine,
malnutrition and poverty. It follows that a radical
transformation in an African state ought to take as its starting
point a radical change in the conditions of existence in the
countryside. And that would require that the peasants be able to
come together freely in a solid organization which would be a
powerful force of dialogue and decision-making on all the great
problems of the nation.

As for the working class, it is only really of any size in a
tiny number of African countries. Where it is somewhat organized,
their organizations do not escape the rule that in most countries
all organizations are subordinate to political parties, to
government: the trade unions and particularly their leadership,
made up of aristocrats whose job is to muzzle the workers by
stifling any incipient sign of combativeness, do not play their
role.

As for the middle classes - the clerks, artisans, etc. -
sometimes they are organized in trade unions that are independent
of the workers' unions, sometimes they are simply integrated into
these unions. Their possibilities of struggling are thus no
greater.

Only the small intellectual unions of teachers or white-collar
workers are frequently active and embark on large-scale actions
against governments for their clearly understood interests. But
without the active support of the rest of the mass of workers,
their capacity for struggle has difficulty pushing the dominant
structures in the directions of real and profound change.

Such, schematically, has been the evolution of class
structures, types of organizations and forms of struggle in most
African states since independence. It gives little ground for
hope that, in the near future, there will be any marked
improvement. But nor should it lead to total pessimism. The
potential forces for change exist. They need to be able to act so
as to take in hand their own fates and benefit from the fruit of
their creative labour.

In order to reply to this question, we need to start from a
simple observation: the incapacity of most ruling political
classes to undertake a policy which would overcome the crisis and
guarantee decent living conditions for all strata of the
population. If such is the situation, it is not without reason.
We think that it is essentially due to the level of consumption
of these ruling classes and their vast expenditure which lead to
a waste of national resources and the massive impoverishment of
the vast majority of the population.

The policy that they have hitherto followed has not made
possible national accumulation for investment to put all the
nation's manpower to work. What is produced by those who work is
diverted to minority interests whose national character is
questionable. Only the popular strata can implement a national
popular programme by putting an end to useless expenditure of
dubious national interest.

In our opinion, these popular strata in most countries in
Africa would include the peasantry (farmers, herders, fishermen),
the working class, the intermediate classes, that is, employees,
artisans, small traders, the petty bourgeoisie of officials in
the administration, teaching, etc. The interests of these classes
and strata are not always identical. But they can come together
in the phase of constructing a national popular programme.

We believe that every possible pressure from all national and
international agencies must be brought to bear for these strata
to secure freedom of organization. This would be for them the
first step to having real access to the structures of power. They
will necessarily transform these structures since these
transformations - transformations in depth - will be the
condition for true and visible improvement in their own
conditions of existence and, by the same token, the improvement
of the conditions of existence of all strata of the population.

On the basis of their common interests, these popular strata
could constitute a popular alliance bringing together their
completely free autonomous organizations They are, we feel, the
only ones likely to implement a national popular programme which
could overcome the crisis. That naturally presupposes that they
control every structure of power.

Although our work is mainly focused on agriculture, it is
clear that an alternative to the crisis cannot rest solely on an
agricultural programme. It must of necessity take into account
all aspects of economic and social life. Thus, while stressing
agricultural problems, we shall relate them to other economic
sectors without whose transformation agriculture has no hope of
truly developing to ensure food self-sufficiency for African
countries. We have stressed sufficiently the failure of the
development strategies hitherto pursued in the framework of the
existing socio-political systems. Proposing a national popular
programme that could constitute an alternative to these
strategies can only emerge from a sustained work of reflection
which must be the constant preoccupation of researchers,
especially African researchers.

It would seem that among the political powers that be some are
beginning increasingly to see the necessity of an alternative.
The question is: will they be in a position to promote such a
programme, given the powerful dominant interests that will oppose
it? Whatever the case may be, in the Lagos Plan of Action adopted
at the OAU's first economic summit in Lagos in April 1980, the
OAU included some phrases that give the impression that it is
increasingly realized that only solutions aimed at the real
satisfaction of the basic needs of the inroad masses can solve
the serious crises affecting Africa, which are only intensifying.

Thus, in chapter I of this programme, devoted to Food and
Agriculture, it is stated: 'At the root of the food problem in
Africa is the fact that Governments have not usually accorded the
necessary priority to agriculture both in the allocation of
resources, and in giving sufficient attention to policies for the
promotion of productivity and improvement of rural life.' Such an
admission is an advance over the usual blame attributed to
natural disasters and the deterioration of the terms of trade,
although of course these do play a part in the crisis as
aggravating factors.

Again, in the introduction to the document, stress is
repeatedly laid on the notion that Africa must cultivate the
virtue of self-sufficiency. But there is a big difference between
statements of principles and all-embracing policies designed to
realize them, and one may doubt whether the move from the one to
the other is possible in the socio-political conditions currently
existing in most African states.

In the Lagos document, technical measures are proposed in all
areas of economic life to achieve this self-sufficiency. But
since the political conditions that would make the application of
these measures possible are not mentioned, there is an obvious
risk of remaining once again at the level of statements of good
intentions. That being the case, when it comes to the content to
be given to a national popular programme in the event of the
broad masses holding the reins of political power, one can do no
more than offer reflections since here too there is the risk of
lapsing into utopianism by wanting to go into detail about the
reorganization of a concrete society, starting from abstract a
priori assumptions. But these reflections on a popular
programme should make it possible to put forward a few general
ideas which would be worth analysing further and eventually
challenging through research, failing any possibility of concrete
experimentation.

Thus, without falling into a pragmatism that totally ignores
theoretical achievements capable of helping in the elaboration of
a comprehensive policy directed towards the interests of the
broad masses, we feel that experimentation and trial and error
will play a not insignificant role in building up such a
programme to bring closer socio-economic measures which quite
often seem to be ruled out because of the whole heritage of the
past. We shall thus be obliged to spend more time on the scale of
the problems that will have to be faced than on the formulation
of ready-made solutions.

Starting from this careful approach, we think that the first
problem that ought to be examined - and which is both economic
and political - is that of borders. We shall formulate it in this
way: given that the political prerequisites, that is, the
alteration of the internal relations of domination that exist in
the various countries, were achieved, is it possible in the tiny
confines of most African states to implement a national popular
programme that calls for delinking from the world capitalist
system? Explicitly, would it be possible for a small African
state that fundamentally altered its socio-political structures
to implement a comprehensive economic policy of independence
breaking with the system and sustain this policy over time? What
is quite clear is that the pressures from imperialism and other
African states, especially neighbouring ones linked to
imperialism, will be very strong. It will need a powerful
mobilization of the entire working people of this country to be
able to stand up to it.

The disappearance of borders, which are usually artificial
creations corresponding to the interests of the colonial economy,
is both an economic and a political necessity. The intra-African
trade patterns that existed before the imposition of colonialism
were disrupted and replaced by trade oriented towards the
metropolis. Railways, ports and even the development of cities,
were conceived in this perspective, leading to an unequal
development between seriously underdeveloped countries.

In order to restructure the economies of most countries,
borders that correspond to no socio-historical, or even ethnic
and geographical, reality would have to disappear, even if
gradually, and give way to viable economic units capable of
resisting the assaults of imperialism. Of course, it is true that
imperialism too sometimes makes similar suggestions, but it does
so for its own aims designed to strengthen the dependency of
several states brought together under its sway.

The creation of large economic zones transcending borders that
should be challenged can therefore only be a popular achievement
if it is carried out by alliances among popular strata which
truly and effectively suppress artificial and anachronistic
barriers that do not reflect the history of their people, and
which would be brakes on the implementation of popular programmes
in their respective countries. This would make possible the
creation, between states embarked on a strategy of delinking from
the world capitalist system, of the conditions for the
implementation of a unified and coherent development plan, taking
account of the economic potential of the various countries and
their necessary complementarily. Thus, the way would be open to
solid intra-African economic links and a collective autocentred
autonomy.

The disappearance of the borders inherited from the colonial
system can, in the framework of an alternative to the crisis,
open up far-ranging perspectives for the economic development of
Africa. But the OAU, as it exists, does not exhibit the least
sign of embarking on this path because of the major
contradictions running through it and the dominant class
interests of the states belonging to it. Thus, the future of
Africa to attain an autocentred collective autonomy of
development can only be the work of popular alliances effectively
controlling all powers, and on the lines that we have sketched
out above.

This real unification, as opposed to unification that is
simply a matter of diplomatic proclamations, would make possible
the unification of African producers to face the demand of the
market for the products that Africa is obliged to sell on that
market. Indeed, delinking with the world capitalist system can in
no way mean a total break with this system. It means that the
socio-economic structures of Africa would no longer be organized
and oriented in terms of the interests of this system as is
currently the case, but in terms of the interests of the toiling
African masses. It is through this true unification of producers
that Africa would be able to have a considerable influence on the
world prices of the raw materials that it supplies until it is
able to realize the goal sought, which is the on-the-spot
processing of these raw materials to meet the needs of African
economies.

It is because they can provoke isolation and rivalry among
countries producing cocoa, coffee, iron ore, uranium etc., that
the developed countries control price-fixing on the world market.
The existing governments, because of these rivalries, their
attachment to personal power or even the vulnerability of many of
them to corruption, simply play into the hands of the developed
capitalist countries and the imperialist monopolies.

By adopting a monopoly situation for the various African
commodities popular governments could, if not reverse the
direction of dependence in Africa's favour, at least create a
degree of balance between the various parties in the world
market. African products could then be sold at prices close to
their value, that is, taking account of the quantities of labour
incorporated into them, which return to the labour provided in
Africa its value, and taking account of all the factors that come
into the fixing of prices as if these goods were produced in the
developed capitalist countries.

The union of producers faced with the demands of the world
market will only be fully effective if external trade - commodity
imports and exports - as well as the import of capital are
conducted exclusively by the popular government. That is
essential in order to avoid big capital becoming involved in the
economies by controlling important sectors.

With these basic conditions set down, there is still a need to
reflect on the manner of reorganizing production and exchanges
among the various sectors of the economy to achieve
self-reliance, the immediate aim of which is food
self-sufficiency.

In approaching this question, it cannot be forgotten that
there are priorities to be realized and which are realizable once
the political prerequisites have been realized. There is a need
to:

- Raise agricultural production and productivity
substantially and rapidly, with priority for food production.

- Ensure that the increase in agricultural production is
accompanied by a substantial raising of the standard of
living of the peasants in the countryside.

- Promote a selective industrialization coordinated with
and sustaining the development of agriculture.

- Give the manpower in these industries wage levels that
guarantee the full reproduction of their labour power and the
upkeep of their family.

- Produce mainly for the domestic market in both
agriculture and industry and be oriented wholly towards mass
production.

It goes without saying that these, the most pressing, measures
must be accompanied by other complementary measures guaranteeing
their success. They include:

- Putting an end to the rural exodus and reducing
urbanization to a level low enough not to hinder economic and
social policy overall. This can be achieved by creating the
conditions for a massive voluntary return to the countryside
where development policy will be concentrated far more than
in the towns.

- Completely transforming teaching and education to adapt
them to new forms of development and to make them respond to
these needs.

It would then be necessary to reflect on the sectoral and
overall policies that would be needed to carry out these first
urgent measures rapidly.

The new economic and social policy must be centred mainly on
the development of the rural areas which have hitherto been bled
white to be able to carry out policies linked to the interests of
a few possessing classes and hence unpopular policies.

The starting point for a policy to develop the rural areas
seems to lie in the peasants and the rural areas as a whole
having the possibility of organizing themselves freely and
independently. These organizations which would be created all
over the rural areas must be able to enjoy full decision-making
powers. The basic cell of these organisations in the rural areas
might be the village, as Guy Belloncle suggests in his book La
Question Paysanne en Afrique Noire (published by Editions
Karthala).

However, it is important not to over-romanticize the
traditional village structures. They sometimes involve
ideologically-backed social relations that might constitute
brakes on development. In fact, in most countries at the village
level there exist lineage, tribal or caste relations solidly
sustained by fossilized ideologies hostile to progress.

These outmoded relations must be undermined by organization
and work; they often involve disguised or visible links of
dependency that obscure and restrict 'democratic power
structures', about which Guy Belloncle writes in the book
mentioned above. It is then that true village communities could
come into being shorn of age-old defects where, with the equality
of all in decision-making eliminating the hierarchy of
established authorities, they would reinforce the solidarity of
all in the community as a whole. An organization thus built from
the village upwards and spread to the whole countryside with
strong structures could constitute the backbone of the new
governments in countries where the rural areas are so dominant.

Being thus organized at the national level the peasantry, or
more precisely the rural inhabitants, would actively participate
in the preparation of the economic and social policy of the new
governments and in supervising its implementation. The rural
areas would be present at the highest level of the new political
system through their leading bodies and their delegates, and at
the base through the whole village community.

In many countries this reorganization of the rural areas would
necessitate the amalgamation of numerous villages that are too
small and too scattered. Through this amalgamation of villages to
achieve a relatively large size, it is possible to realize a
number of goals, the most important of which is certainly to
shift peasant life and work from the narrow family framework to
the village communal framework. At one stroke this would
facilitate the circulation of information, be it political or
technical. More egalitarian access to inputs and the means of
production would be promoted. Access to the infrastructure of
schools, health facilities and other basic services would be
achieved much more cheaply.

The countryside must offer every facility to guarantee the
total security of the rural worker and his family throughout
their lives in the framework of the village community.

How can this be achieved on the economic level? We do not
think there is any need to have recourse to vast sums of capital
coming from abroad, which are swallowed up in endless studies for
which the peasant has to pay but whose results he never sees.

Use must first be made of the immense resources of the rural
areas, hitherto wasted, pillaged, misappropriated, taxed and
transferred to the benefit of other social strata.

Access to land: First, access to land must be secured
to all and be equitable for all. In countries where big
landowners exist, all land will purely and simply be transferred
to the village communities which will be responsible for their
fair allocation while moving towards their collective
development.

For land that requires irrigation, the labour could be
performed by human investment by the village community, aided
technically, where necessary, by the governing organs of popular
power.

What must be avoided at all costs is big impressive dams built
at the cost of millions of dollars borrowed from abroad,
repayment of which mortgages national economic policy and is
beyond peasant resources.

Production: On the level of production, with nothing
ruled out, every product that can be a source of food must be
sought out and developed: crop products and products of
gathering. Research will be necessary into the conservation or
processing of some of them. The fact is that it is not uncommon
in the African bush and forest to see fruit trees bear their
whole crop at certain seasons. These perfectly edible fruits
finish up going rotten for lack of means of picking and
preserving them.

Added to this is the tendency in some fairly well-off strata -
except in periods of famine, of course - to consider some
products as non-'noble', products of gathering in particular,
whereas they may be very rich in calories and vitamins. There is
work to be done to sensitive and to inform people so as to turn
these into products of mass consumption, which would make it
possible to enrich and vary diets.

As for cash crops not intended for consumption, like cotton,
or which are not for everyday consumption, like coffee and cocoa,
there can be no question of halting their production since they
constitute important resources for countries and peoples. There
will need to be studies of how to regulate production of them in
terms first of the food needs of the population, and then of the
demands of the international market.

Inputs and improving techniques: This is one of the
most difficult problems to solve since the inputs are not,
generally, produced on the spot and their cost on the world
market is high and rising sharply from year to year. Imports of
them must thus be reduced and limited to what is strictly
necessary given the very limited resources of national economies
and the impact of their cost on peasant resources. While imports
of them must be limited, it is not, however, possible to do
without inputs to improve productivity and considerably reduce
extensive agriculture, which is a source of rapid deterioration
of soils.

A solution must be found to the dilemma that consists in
having recourse to the world market, whereas the goal is to
delink from this market, and the need to modernize agriculture.

That is where the strategy of industrialization in Africa
should be mainly concentrated, putting itself at the service of
agricultural development.

A host of industries would be established throughout the rural
areas of Africa which could meet agriculture's need for inputs of
all sorts; the making of ploughs, carts and seeders, the
production of fertilizers insecticides, selected seeds, etc.

Here more research needs to be devised and carried out so that
the products of these industries do indeed correspond to the
particular characteristics and natural conditions of African
agriculture. African peasants have had enough of the unfortunate
experience with imported technology, that, in addition to its
high cost, was sometimes ill-adapted to their working conditions
and their natural environment. In order to limit the damage and
reduce dependence, we think that the technical conception of
these industries necessitates the collaboration of artisans,
peasants and technicians trained in rural technical institutes,
and the help of other underdeveloped countries that have
registered striking successes with this sort of experience. We
are thinking in particular of certain countries in Asia which
were absolutely determined to free themselves from the tutelage
of imperialism, to put an end to their domination and dependence.

Organization: We have already discussed at length the
crucial need for powerful well-structured organizations of the
peasantry as the prerequisite of rural development, and we must
now reflect on the forms that these organizations might take to
be able to put into effect the strategy that we have just
outlined.

It might, for example, be possible to conceive a union of
rural cooperatives which would have as its basic cell the whole
village community united in a co-operative. The village
co-operative would look after all the problems of the village
community, even if the community were composed mainly of peasants
in the vast majority of cases. What we mean is that it would be
responsible also for solving the problems of herdsmen, fishermen,
artisans, etc., in order to coordinate the activities of
different groups of producers and create social harmony within
the village community.

The co-operative will thus have a very extensive field of
action. It will be responsible for the collection and marketing
of the products of the whole village community. It will create
distribution circuits and control the credit system. Thus, it
will facilitate and ensure balance in the exchanges between
producers at the local level. In the same way, it will be the
sole intermediary in exchanges between the village and the world
outside the village, especially exchanges with the Co-operative
Union. This will purchase its products and sell it the inputs and
other products that it needs. A profit margin will be allowed the
co-operative. Its profits will go into a loan account and be used
for public works in the village community.

It must be laid down that the main aim of the loan account is
to strengthen solidarity within the community. Its prime purpose
will thus be to help its members in difficulties: peasants who
lack machinery, herdsmen needing watering troughs, etc.

The co-operative, with a mainly economic function, will be
under the control of the village assembly which will have a much
more political function. The village assembly will be able at any
time to check the management of the co-operative and it will
transmit directives to it to meet the needs of the community. In
addition, the assembly will undertake and sustain the political,
economic and social mobilization of the community. Gradually, it
will seek the means to move from family to communal labour and
farming in more and more areas.