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Thursday, June 29, 2017

Vulnerable Asian states are bracing for possible pressure to
back a Saudi-UAE boycott of Qatar as efforts to mediate an end to the almost
month-old Gulf crisis seemingly stall and Saudi Arabia and the UAE struggle to
rally credible Muslim and international support for their campaign against the
recalcitrant Gulf state.

Countries like Bangladesh and Pakistan, two of the most
populous Muslim states, as well as India, home to the world’s fourth largest
Muslim population, fear that Saudi Arabia could threaten to expel millions of
migrant workers and expatriates in a bid to force them to join the boycott of
Qatar.

Saudi Arabia has a history of using as leverage migrant
workers, whose remittances constitute the backbone of foreign currency
liquidity of many supplier countries and whose Gulf jobs reduce pressure on
domestic labour markets. In the most dramatic instance, Saudi Arabia expelled some 700,000 Yemenis in 1990 in retaliation for Yemen’s refusal to
wholeheartedly back the US-Saudi led rollback of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait.

A similar
number from a host of countries were forced to leave the kingdom in 2013
after Saudi Arabia tightened its labour law to ban foreign workers from running
their own businesses and make them more dependent on the Saudi employer who
initially facilitated their employment.

Concern about possible pressure was fuelled by recent Saudi
and Emirati statements that suggested that there was unlikely to be a quick
resolution to the Gulf crisis. The statements suggested that the crisis was
about much more than alleged Qatari support for militants and Islamists.

Saudi Foreign Minister Adel al-Jubeir, in Washington to
lobby for US support, ruled out a compromise or face-saving solution when he
told journalists that demands tabled by a Saudi-UAE led block of economically
dependent nations were “non-negotiable.”

Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Bahrain and Egypt have given Qatar
ten days to comply with demands that include halting support for militants and
Islamists, closing a Turkish military base in the Gulf state, reducing
relations with Iran, and shuttering Qatar-sponsored media, including the
controversial Al Jazeera television network. Qatar’s detractors have threatened
further sanctions if it fails to comply with the demands.

UAE ambassador to Russia Omar Ghobash, in a clear and unabashedly
frank indication that the boycott is about imposing policies and values rather
than primarily about fighting political violence, defended the Saudi-UAE demand
that Qatar shut down media like Al Jazeera by saying: “We do not claim to have
press freedom. We
do not promote the idea of press freedom. What we talk about is
responsibility in speech.”

The UAE has long sought to muzzle Al Jazeera, which
revolutionized the Arab media landscape since its inception in 1996 by breaking
the mould of staid, heavily censored, government-controlled Arab broadcasting
with more hard-hitting, freewheeling reporting, and giving air time to critical
voices, Al Jazeera has over the years attracted criticism from multiple Arab
autocrats as well as others, including the Bush administration, which accused
it of being an outlet for Al Qaeda.

A US diplomatic
cable, released by Wikileaks, quoted UAE Crown Prince Mohammed bin Zayed as
urging the United States in the walk up to the 2003 US invasion of Iraq to
force Qatar to reign in Al Jazeera. Prince Mohammed allegedly went as far as
asking a US general to bomb Al Jazeera. It wasn’t clear if the UAE official was
referring to the tv network’s headquarters in Doha or its offices in Baghdad.

Abdulrahman
al-Rashed, a prominent Saudi journalist with close ties to the government,
echoed Mr. Ghorbash’s theme. Mr. Al-Rashed argued that the core of the conflict
was Qatari support for opposition groups in the kingdom and other Arab countries
and the fact that they were granted air time on Al Jazeera.

In an ominous warning, Mr. Al-Rashed suggested that Doha
could experience its own Raba’a al-Adawiya Square, a reference to a Cairo square
on which hundreds of supporters of the Muslim Brotherhood were killed in August
2013 by Egyptian security forces. The demonstrators were holding a weeks-long
sit in on the square to protest a Saudi and UAE-backed military coup that
toppled Mohammed Morsi, a Brother and Egypt’s first and only democratically
elected president, and brought General Abdel Fattah Al Sisi to power.

The coup was preceded by a mass demonstrations against Mr.
Morsi that, feeding on widespread criticism of his presidency, had been co-engineered
by security forces with the backing of Saudi Arabia and the UAE.

Saudi
and UAE media have in recent weeks run interviews with little known dissident
members of Qatar’s ruling Al Thani family as well as former military officers
opposed to the policies of Qatari emir Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani., suggesting
that the Gulf states may support regime change in Qatar. A Saudi lobbyist,
Salman al-Ansari, head of the Washington-based Saudi American Public Relation
Affairs Committee (SAPRAC), said Sheikh Tamim could meet with the same fate as
Mr. Morsi.

The risk of increased pressure on Muslim nations as well as
other trading partners of Saudi Arabia and the UAE stems in part from the fact
that the campaign against Qatar has failed to generate a groundswell of support
from Muslim nations and the international community. Most Muslim countries
remain on the side lines while the United States and members of the
international community have called for a negotiated solution.

Saudi Arabia and the UAE’s failure to garner widespread
support raised questions about the return on investment of Saudi Arabia and the
UAE’s long-standing checkbook diplomacy and the kingdom’s massive financial support
for Sunni-Muslim ultra-conservative educational, religious and cultural
institutions and political groups across the globe that was designed to enhance
soft power. Except for Egypt, no major Arab or Muslim state has joined the
boycott.

UAE officials repeatedly warned in recent days that Qatar’s
distractors would take additional punitive steps against the Gulf state if it
failed to cave in to their demands. Those steps could include not only pressure
on states dependent on export of labour but also measures against businesses countries
that fail to grant support.

“One possibility would be to impose conditions on our own
trading partners and say you want to work with us then you have got to make a
commercial choice,” Mr. Ghobash said. It was not clear if the ambassador was
also referring to the commercial interests of Muslim as well as non-Muslim
powers that could include the United States, Europe, and China.

Some industries are already feeling the heat without Saudi
Arabia and the UAE increasing pressure. Although not yet confronted with a
demand to halt all business with Qatar, shipping
companies no longer can load vessels
with goods destined for the Gulf state as well as its detractors that dock at
ports on both sides of the Gulf’s political divide. Instead, raising costs, goods
destined for Qatar have to be shipped on separate vessels that only head for
the Gulf state.

In a paper, SAPRAC reiterated the long-standing controversy
about the Qatari World Cup, including questions about the integrity of its bid
and criticism of its controversial labour regime. In doing so, the kingdom
seemed to be ignoring at its own peril the principle that people who live in glass
houses should not throw stones. Legitimate criticism of Qatar’s controversial
labour regime is equally valid for that of Saudi Arabia.

Designed to impose Saudi Arabia and the UAE ‘s will on a
recalcitrant Qatar, the boycott suggests that power politics irrespective of
cost trump the need for reforms in Prince Mohammed’s world.

The stakes for 31-year old Prince Mohammed and Saudi Arabia’s
ruling Al Saud family are high. Failure to deliver sustainable economic and
social reforms could undermine the prince’s popularity whose age has allowed
him to connect with significant segments of the kingdom’s youth, who account
for two thirds of the population, in ways his predecessors could not.

“The isolation of Qatar is but one example of how the
politics of the Gulf Arab states are getting in the way of economic
diversification and transformation,” said Karen E. Young, a senior scholar at
The Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington, in an analysis
of the impact of the Gulf crisis on the region’s economic reform plans. Ms.
Young noted that the depth of the crisis and the hardening of positions on both
sides of the divide “suggests that economic growth and the liberalization of
these political economies are secondary priorities for all parties involved.”

Irrespective of how the Gulf crisis is resolved, it already
has damaged institutional as well as informal building blocks of a
restructuring of the Saudi as well as the region’s economy. The GCC that groups
Saudi Arabia, Qatar, the UAE, Kuwait, Oman and Bahrain, has suffered a body
blow that it may not survive.

Continued Qatari membership is in doubt with the Gulf
state’s refusal to accept Saudi-UAE demands that would end its at times provocative
policies and render it a vassal of the kingdom. Kuwait and Oman are likely, in
the wake of the crisis, to be more reticent about further regional integration,
having long charted relatively independent, albeit less boisterous, courses for
themselves.

The fragility of GCC unity beyond Qatar was already on
public display three years ago when then US Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel
backed a Saudi push for greater military integration. In a rare public
statement against Gulf union, Omani Minister of State for Foreign Affairs
Yousef bin Alawi al-Ibrahim, a one-time representative of a separatist
movement, rejected the proposal in no uncertain terms.

"We absolutely don’t support Gulf union. There is no
agreement in the region on this… If this union materializes, we will deal with
it but we will not be a member. Oman’s position is very clear. If there are new
arrangements for the Gulf to confront existing or future conflicts, Oman will
not be part of it," Mr. Al-Ibrahim said.

The Omani official argued that the Gulf’s major problems
were internal rather than external and should be the region’s focus. Earlier,
Ahmed al-Saadoun, at the time speaker of the Kuwaiti parliament, also rejected
a Gulf union, saying that as a democracy Kuwait could not unite with autocratic
states.

This week, UAE
State Minister for Foreign Affairs Anwar Gargash suggested that Qatar and
the GCC would have to part ways if the Gulf state refused to accept demands by
its detractors that effectively emasculate it and put it under guardianship.
It’s unlikely that Kuwait and Oman would back such a move, which could split
the six-nation association down the middle. Kuwait responded to the crisis by
seeking to mediate while Oman helped Qatar circumvent the boycott by allowing
Qatari vessels to dock at its ports.

Complicating Prince Mohammed’s reform plans, laid out in a
document entitled Vision 2030, is the
kingdom and the UAE’s handling of the crisis as well as a renewed 20
percent drop in oil prices since January. The crisis, beyond the balance
between power politics and economic necessity, raises questions about key
issues needed to inspire confidence in an effort to diversify the kingdom’s
economy, streamline its bloated public sector, and strengthen the private
sector.

Sanctions imposed on Qatar challenge concepts of equitable
rule of law, the principle of freedom of movement, security of private
ownership, and a modicum of freedom of expression in a region in which that
basic right is already severely restricted. The sanctions include a ban on travel
to Qatar; ordering Saudi, Emirati, and Bahraini nationals to leave the Gulf
state; expelling Qatari nationals; shuttering offices of Qatari companies and
ejecting Qatari-owned assets, including thousands of Qatari camels and sheep;
prompting expelled Qataris to fire sell assets held in the Gulf states opposed
to it; and closing airspace for flights to and from Doha.

Restrictions on freedom of expression were taken to new
heights with a ban on expressions of sympathy for Qatar that in the UAE could
earn someone sporting
an FC Barcelona jersey with the logo of Qatar Airway, the sponsor of the
Spanish soccer giant, 15 years in prison. Space for creativity, a prerequisite
for building a 21st century knowledge economy, was further cast in
doubt by the Gulf states’ unprecedented effort to force closure of more
freewheeling Qatari media, including the controversial Al Jazeera
television network.

As the crisis drags on, concern is likely to rise among the
Gulf’s trading partners, oil and gas customers, and migrant labour suppliers. Those
concerns are reinforced by fears that protagonists on both sides of the Gulf
divide are likely to emerge from the crisis bruised and with their reputations
tarnished irrespective of how the dispute is resolved.

A
survey of young Saudi men conducted by Mark C. Thompson, a Middle East
scholar at King Fahd University of Petroleum and Minerals laid out what is at
stake for Prince Mohammed. Mr. Thompson concluded that youth in the kingdom
were willing to buy into Vision 2030’s concept of providing economic
deliverables in exchange for acceptance of an absolute monarchy that limits
basic freedoms.

“There was consensus amongst these young men that reducing
unemployment, providing affordable housing and decent healthcare should be the
government’s ‘top priorities’ as these issues are considered the most
contentious and problematic in wider society: as one young man argues ‘basically
if we have these then everything else is satisfactory’,” Mr. Thompson said.

The scholar noted however that initial enthusiasm for Prince
Mohammed’s vision “has evaporated amongst some young men, who complain that
whilst they were hopeful when the Vision was launched, as the months have
passed they see few tangible results.” Mr. Thompson argued that performance was
crucial because Prince Mohammed’s reform plans, the boldest to date, come on
the back of earlier promises of change by Saudi leaders that never
materialized.

Further undermining confidence is the fact that Prince
Mohammed’s plan involves a unilateral rewriting of the kingdom’s social
contract that offered a cradle-to-grave welfare state in exchange for political
fealty and acceptance of Sunni ultra-conservatism’s austere moral and social
codes. “The problem is that Vision 2030 has become synonymous with cutting
salaries, taxing people and stop-ping beneﬁts,” Mr. Thompson said.

Saudis have, since the introduction of cost-cutting and
revenue-raising measures, seen significant rises in utility prices and greater
job uncertainty as the government sought to prune its bloated bureaucracy and
encourage private sector employment. Slashes in housing, vacation and sickness
benefits reduced salaries in the public sector, the country’s largest employer,
by up to a third.

‘I was an intern at a SANG (Saudi Arabian National Guard) hospital
and most people there were angry about the Vision because their salaries were
being cut. The soldiers around here are also angry because they work all the
time. It’s unfair to take SAR 1000 ($266.50) from a 5,000 salary. My military
father is angry because most of his salary and allowances have been cut. Some
people’s incomes have already been reduced by 30% (except if you are a soldier
in the south). It seems that the government wants to solve the current economic
problems by force. They are doing this by raising taxes but not explaining
anything to us. Prices keep rising regardless!” Mr. Thompson quoted a medical
student as saying.

Increased grumbling and online protests persuaded the
government in April to roll back some of the austerity measures and restore
most of the perks enjoyed by government employees. Mr. Thompson cautioned that
to succeed, implementation of Prince Mohammed’s “vision needs to be accountable
and transparent, in other words a model of good governance… It is the
government’s responsibility to ensure that young Saudis feel they are part of
the National Transformation Plan, because if young Saudis believe they can make
meaningful contributions to national development, then they will contribute.”

A foiled attempt this month by the Islamic State to attack
the Grand Mosque in the holy city of Mecca was likely an effort to
undermine Prince Mohammed’s reform plans that involve a loosening of Sunni
Muslim ultra-conservativism’s strict and austere social codes and morals. A
siege of the mosque in 1979 prompted the government to give the kingdom’s ultra-conservative
religious establishment greater control of public mores.

The kingdom’s religious establishment has criticised Prince
Mohammed’s social liberalization effort, including introduction of modern forms
entertainment, but largely endorsed his economic plans. Social change has been
embraced by a significant swath of Saud Arabia’s youth.

A 24-year-old speaking to The
Guardian, cautioned however that ultra-conservatism maintains a hold on
significant numbers of young people. “You know that the top 11 Twitter handles
here are Salafi clerics, right? We are talking more than 20 million people who
hang on their every word. They will not accept this sort of change. Never,” the
youth said.

Friday, June 23, 2017

A list
of 13 conditions for lifting the Saudi-UAE led embargo of Qatar handed to
the Gulf state this week by Kuwaiti mediators offers a first taste of newly-promoted
Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman’s foreign policy approach that if
endorsed by the international community would call into question fundamental
principles governing international relations.

The demand, that if accepted by Qatar would turn the Gulf
state into a Saudi vassal, were unlikely to facilitate a quick resolution of
the three-week-old Gulf crisis. In fact, they may complicate a resolution that
would allow all parties to claim victory and save face.

Saudi Arabia and the UAE have reportedly given Qatar ten
days to comply with their demands, according to the list that was reviewed by
The Associated Press and The Wall Street Journal. Gulf states have yet to comment
on the list. It was also not clear what steps the two states might take if
Qatar rejected the demands.

Qatar has insisted that it would not accept any demands that
compromised its sovereignty or amounted to interference in its internal
affairs. It has also denied various Saudi and UAE allegations against it. The
Gulf state said further that it would only negotiate an end to the crisis once
the embargo had been lifted.

The demands go far beyond the declared aim of Qatar’s
protractors that it halts its support of jihadists and Islamists. Acceptance of
the demands would not only compromise its political sovereignty but could also
jeopardize its economic independence if Iran were to retaliate for Qatari
compliance.

Compliance would further create a dangerous precedent for freedom
of the press and expression.

The Saudi-UAE demands appeared to fall far short of a call
by the US State Department that the conditions for lifting the Saudi-UAE
diplomatic and economic embargo of Qatar be “reasonable
and actionable.”

The United States and other democracies would likely find it
difficult to support shuttering of Qatari-funded media, including the Al
Jazeera television network. Al Jazeera revolutionized the Arab media landscape
by introducing more free-wheeling, critical news reporting and debate that has
irked autocratic Arab leaders for more than two decades.

The network drew the ire of Saudi Arabia and the UAE for its
support of the 2011 popular Arab revolts that brought Islamist forces,
including the controversial Muslim Brotherhood, to the fore. Saudi Arabia and
the UAE have gone to great length to roll back the fallout of the revolts.

Similarly, the two Gulf state’s demand that Qatar reduce the
level of, if not break off, its diplomatic relations with Iran could endanger
the Gulf state’s economy that is dependent on its oil and gas exports. Qatar
shares with Iran ownership of the world’s largest gas field and cannot afford
an open conflict with the Islamic republic.

Saudi Arabia and the UAE are demanding that Qatar shut down
diplomatic posts in Iran, expel members of Iran’s elite Revolutionary Guard,
and only conduct trade and commerce with Iran in compliance with US sanctions
that are not internationally binding.

The demands put Qatar in a separate category from others in
the six-nation Gulf Cooperation Council, including the UAE, Kuwait and Oman, that
maintain diplomatic relations with Iran. The UAE, which has a territorial
dispute with Iran over three islands in the Gulf, is home to a large Iranian
community and serves as an important economic hub for the Islamic republic.

Similarly, acceptance of a demand that Qatar close a
military base of NATO member Turkey in the Gulf state would also undermine the
Gulf state’s sovereignty. Turkish
Defense Minister Fikri Isik said his country had no plan to close its base
in Qatar.

Other NATO members have military bases in the Gulf, including
the United States’ largest military facility in the Middle East in Qatar, and
British and French bases in the UAE. Turkey, like Qatar, supported the 2011
revolts as well as the Brotherhood.

Saudi Arabia and the UAE are further demanding that Qatar
cut ties to a host of organizations ranging from jihadists like Al Qaeda and the
Islamic State to Lebanon’s Hezbollah and the Muslim Brotherhood. Qatar has denied
contacts with the jihadists but has been open about its relations with
non-violent Islamists, including the Brotherhood and Palestinian group Hamas.

US
Secretary of State Rex Tillerson last week suggested that banning the
Brotherhood was all but impossible. Speaking to the House Committee on
Foreign Relations, Mr. Tillerson cautioned that designating the Brotherhood,
with an estimated membership of 5 million, as a terrorist organization would
“complicate matters” with America’s relations with foreign governments.

“There are elements of the Muslim Brotherhood that have
become parts of governments. Those elements… have done so by renouncing
violence and terrorism,” Mr. Tillerson said. He said groups affiliated with the
Brotherhood that commit violence had already been added to the US terrorism
list.

In a sign that compliance with the demands would not restore
confidence among Gulf states, Saudi Arabia and the UAE together with Egypt and
Bahrain insisted that Qatar expel their citizens, including those who had
adopted Qatari nationality, and no longer offer their nationals citizenship as
a way of ensuring that the Gulf state not meddle in their internal affairs.
They also demand that Qatar be audited for a period of ten years.

In a bid to garner US support for their demands, Saudi
Arabia and the UAE insisted that Qatar stop funding groups designated as
terrorist by the United States, extradite people wanted by the kingdom, the
Emirates, Bahrain and Egypt on charges of terrorism, and provide details of its
funding of Saudi and other Arab dissidents.

Qatar’s distractors differ with the Gulf state as well as
the United States on which groups and individuals classify as terrorists. Saudi
Arabia and the UAE have declared the Muslim Brotherhood a terrorist
organization, the United States has not. Bahrain’s Sunni minority government
relies on support of members of the Brotherhood.

Things get even more complicated when it comes to Hamas, an
offshoot of the Brotherhood that controls the Gaza Strip. Hamas has been
designated a terrorist organization by the US, the EU and Israel but not the
United Nations, the arbitrator of which designations are internationally
binding.

Egypt, financially dependent on Saudi Arabia and the UAE,
this week came to Hamas’ aid by supplying Gaza’s only
power plant with fuel. The plant was shut in April because of a dispute
between Hamas and the Palestine Authority (PA) on the West Bank headed by
President Mahmoud Abbas. The Egyptian supply came as Israel reduced its supply
of electricity to Gaza at the request of the PA.

The Egyptian move also came as a Hamas delegation visited
Cairo not only for talks with authorities but also with Mohammed
Dahlan, a Abu Dhabi-based, UAE backed former Palestinian security chief who
has ambitions to succeed Mr. Abbas as the leader of the Palestinians. Mr.
Dahlan advises UAE strongman Crown Prince Mohammed bin Zayed on issues of
national security. A deal between Hamas and Mr. Dahlan, who is at odds with Mr.
Abbas and cannot return to the West Bank, would offer him a way back into
Palestine.

In sum, Saudi Arabia and the UAE’s demands constitute an
effort to rewrite the rules of international relations that uphold the sovereignty
of nations and their right to graft their own policies. They effectively would
put Qatar under guardianship and undermine the principle of freedom of
expression and the media.

The demands complicate efforts by the United States and
others to resolve the Gulf crisis. They reopen an unresolved debate about the
definition of terrorism and the ability of countries to adopt independent decisions
on policies regarding media, citizenship, diplomatic relations, and economics.
In short, at stake in the Gulf crisis is far more than the fate of a tiny Gulf
state.

Last month the Ghanaian footballer Sulley Muntari left the pitch in disgust. During a match in Italy’s top league he was racially abused by a section of fans. He complained to the referee expecting a sympathetic ear, but instead was shown a yellow card. Fan-to-player racism is commonplace in professional football. Now football’s international governing body FIFA has introduced a new rule it hopes will stop racism on the terraces for good.

Different governing bodies have made gestural efforts to kick racism out of the game: the ‘No to Racism’ video, produced by the European football association UEFA and shown during Champions League matches, featured football’s biggest superstars condemning racial abuse. Yet, as the Muntari case and countless others show, these campaigns are yet to succeed.

FIFA’s new scheme is currently on trial at the Confederations Cup. During the tournament referees will be able to stop and suspend matches if they see or hear racist behaviour from fans.The order sounds simple enough: the match is abandoned, the supporters are unhappy, they root out the bad apples in their ranks and the abuse stops. FIFA President Gianni Infantino has called the changes “ground-breaking”.

However, in practice this type of collective punishment would be difficult to enact. Referees already experience massive pressure when making decisions on the pitch. Would they really call off a match potentially facing the wrath of thousands, even millions of fans?



Racism is a big deal… if I had this problem today, tomorrow or the next game I would walk off again.”

Sulley Muntari , Pescara central midfielder

James M. Dorsey, author of ‘The Turbulent World of Middle East Soccer’, told The World Weekly that while he applauds the sentiment, it is “an empty gesture”. Dr. Dorsey refers to FIFA’s “serious reputation problems”, sullied after numerous corruption scandals that saw its last president, Sepp Blatter, face criminal charges. The organisation, officially apolitical, is “tying itself up in knots” in an attempt to “look good”, Dr. Dorsey says.

Beyond corruption scandals, FIFA has come under fire from human rights groups for awarding the World Cup to known rights abusers. In preparation for the 2022 tournament in Qatar hundreds of foreign labourers have died in the construction of stadiums. Dr. Dorsey points to this hypocrisy: “To not be racially abused is a human right.” Looking at the abuse of workers in Qatar and Russia, it seems FIFA has a morality limit.

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About Me

James M DorseyWelcome to The Turbulent World of Middle East Soccer by James M. Dorsey, a senior fellow at Nanyang Technological University’s S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies. Soccer in the Middle East and North Africa is played as much on as off the pitch. Stadiums are a symbol of the battle for political freedom; economic opportunity; ethnic, religious and national identity; and gender rights. Alongside the mosque, the stadium was until the Arab revolt erupted in late 2010 the only alternative public space for venting pent-up anger and frustration. It was the training ground in countries like Egypt and Tunisia where militant fans prepared for a day in which their organization and street battle experience would serve them in the showdown with autocratic rulers. Soccer has its own unique thrill – a high-stakes game of cat and mouse between militants and security forces and a struggle for a trophy grander than the FIFA World Cup: the future of a region. This blog explores the role of soccer at a time of transition from autocratic rule to a more open society. It also features James’s daily political comment on the region’s developments. Contact: incoherentblog@gmail.comView my complete profile