Wednesday, November 14, 2018

On Abyss Wagers, 3 of 5

IV.
Abysmal Similarities

What do Pascal’s and Gödel’s
Wager have in common? The argument always has the clause, “... but if not-X,
then in the resulting chaos it doesn’t matter what you bet, so you lose
nothing.” An argument skirting the edge of the abyss! For Pascal’s wager, the
chaotic not-X is no-God; for Gödel’s Wager (really mine,
but I give it to him) the chaotic not-X is unreason; for Smith’s wager, not-X
equals unjust God; for the Dissenter’s Wager, not-X equals tyranny. In each
case, not-X is so bad that all bets are off; therefore bet on X!

As long as the Wager’s
breakdown case is dire enough, then bet against breakdown, ‘cause if you lose
then the bet’s off. A neat cheat; it reminds me of Edward Teller, on the eve of
the first H-bomb test, wagering with other physicists that the bomb won’t ignite a runaway reaction in the
atmosphere. No way to lose Teller’s Wager! I fault Teller’s ethics, but not his
logic.

One can argue against
Pascal’s Wager, because of its hidden assumptions; Smith’s Wager also turns out
to have hidden assumptions. (e.g. that any unjust god has already gone
completely mad). Does Gödel’s Wager still hold?
For arithmetic to be inconsistent; shall we regard that as the end of
rationality and accountability? Or at least bettability? If 1+1=1 then are all
bets off? (I bet that Pope Russell would say so. “I am one, and the Pope is
one; together we are one, and I am the Pope.”)

So are Smith and
Dissenter Wagers flawed, and Pascal’s too, but Teller’s and Gödel’s
are valid? If so, then the difference is that the first three involved
personalities (gods and governments) who, by virtue of which, are necessarily
limited and crafty enough to be negotiated with; whereas the last two involve
mathematical and physical law, which apply without limit.