Sunday, April 2, 2017

The Endrew F. Decision Re-Defines a
“Free Appropriate Public Education" (FAPE) for Students with Disabilities (Part I of III)

Dear Colleague,

Introduction

On March 22nd,
the Supreme Court made history by considering the depth and breadth of the
“free appropriate public education” (FAPE) provision of the Individuals with
Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) for all students with disabilities (SWD).

In their unanimous decision (Endrew
F. v. Douglas County School District, 2017), the Supreme court expanded the
scope of SWD’s special education rights in direct contrast to their decision 35
years earlier in Board of Ed. Of Hendrick Hudson Central School Dist.,
Westchester Cty. v. Rowley (1982).

In the final
analysis, the Court ruled in Endrew that SWD’s Individualized Education
Plans (IEPs) and special education services must be “reasonably calculated to
enable a child to make progress in light of the child’s circumstances.”With this pronouncement, they rejected a
lower court’s decision that FAPE proffers “merely more than (a) de minimus” standard of education
for all students receiving special education services.

On one hand,
the Supreme Court decision appears to make it easier for students with
disabilities to demand and receive special education services and supports that
help them to educationally progress.

On the other
hand, given the current state of special education services across the
country, the decision will make it harder for schools to actually
provide these services.

_ _ _ _ _

At this point, you
know pretty much what all of the news agencies (and many bloggers) have
reported on this case.

But a close
reading of the case reveals (a) why the Supreme Court really had no choice
in making their ruling, and (b) how the differences in the Rowley and Endrew
cases provide strong guidance to school districts relative to FAPE in the
future.

And so. . . this
Blog message will begin a three-part series analyzing and addressing the Endrew
F. decision.

* In this Part I:We will let direct quotes from the Court’s
ruling “tell Endrew’s story”—including why the Court took this significant case,
how it differed from Rowley, and why it increases the “disability
spectrum” relative to IDEA’s FAPE requirement.

* In Part II
(in two weeks): We will discuss a service
and support blueprint for academically struggling students and SWDs that can
help schools organize their academic multi-tiered, “FAPE-proof” system.

* Finally, in
Part III (in four weeks):We will
discuss a service and support blueprint for behaviorally challenging students
and SWDs that can help schools organize their social, emotional, behavioral multi-tiered,
“FAPE-proof” system.

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

Who are Rowley and
Endrew?The FAPE Disability Spectrum
Expands

“The story begins”
. . . by contrasting the two very different students in the Rowley and Endrew
cases, respectfully.

According
(verbatim) to the Endrew decision [CLICK HERE
for the official document with the entire decision]:

Plaintiff
Amy Rowley was a first grader with impaired hearing. Her school district
offered an IEP under which Amy would receive instruction in the regular
classroom and spend time each week with a special tutor and a speech therapist.
The district proposed that Amy’s classroom teacher speak into a wireless
transmitter and that Amy use an FM hearing aid designed to amplify her
teacher’s words; the district offered to supply both compo­nents of this
system. But Amy’s parents argued that the IEP should go further and provide a
sign-language interpreter in all of her classes. Contending that the school
district’s refusal to furnish an interpreter denied Amy a FAPE, Amy’s parents
initiated administrative proceed­ings, then filed a lawsuit under the Act. Rowley,
458 U. S., at 184–185.

The
District Court agreed that Amy had been denied a FAPE. The court acknowledged
that Amy was making excellent progress in school: She was “perform[ing] better
than the average child in her class” and “advancing easily from grade to
grade.” Id., at 185. At the same time, Amy “under[stood] considerably
less of what goes on in class than she could if she were not deaf.” Ibid.
Concluding that “it has been left entirely to the courts and the hearings
officers to give content to the requirement of an ‘appropriate education,’” 483
F. Supp.528, 533 (SDNY 1980), the District Court ruled that Amy’s education was
not “appropriate” unless it provided her “an opportunity to achieve [her] full
potential commensurate with the opportunity provided to other children.”
Rowley, 458 U. S., at 185–186. The Second Circuit agreed with this
analysis and affirmed.

In
this Court, the parties advanced starkly different understandings of the FAPE
requirement. Amy’s parents defended the approach of the lower courts, arguing
that the school district was required to provide instruction and services that
would provide Amy an “equal educational opportunity” relative to children
without disabilities. Id., at 198. The school district, for its part,
contended that the IDEA “did not create substantive individual rights”; the
FAPE provision was instead merely aspirational. Brief for Petitioners in Rowley,
O. T. 1981, No. 80–1002, pp. 28, 41.

Neither
position carried the day. On the one hand, this Court rejected the view that
the IDEA gives “courts carte various judgments indicate should be
imposed.” Rowley, 458 U. S., at 190, n. 11. After all, the statutory
phrase “free appropriate public education” was expressly defined in the Act,
even if the definition “tend[ed] toward the cryptic rather than the
comprehensive.” Id., at 188. This Court went on to reject the “equal
opportunity” standard adopted by the lower courts, concluding that “free appro­priate
public education” was a phrase “too complex to be captured by the word ‘equal’
whether one is speaking of opportunities or services.” Id., at 199. The
Court also viewed the standard as “entirely unworkable,” apt to require
“impossible measurements and comparisons” that courts were ill suited to make. Id.,
at 198.

On
the other hand, the Court also rejected the school district’s argument that the
FAPE requirement was actu­ally no requirement at all. Id., at 200.
Instead, the Court carefully charted a middle path. Even though “Congress was
rather sketchy in establishing substantive require­ments” under the Act, id.,
at 206, the Court nonetheless made clear that the Act guarantees a
substantively ade­quate program of education to all eligible children, id., at
200–202, 207; see id., at 193, n. 15 (describing the “sub­stantive
standard . . . implicit in the Act”). We explained that this requirement is
satisfied, and a child has received a FAPE, if the child’s IEP sets out an
educational program that is “reasonably calculated to enable the child to
receive educational benefits.” Id., at 207. For children receiving
instruction in the regular classroom, this would generally require an IEP
“reasonably calculated to enable the child to achieve passing marks and advance
from grade to grade.” Id., at 204; see also id., at 203, n. 25.

In
view of Amy Rowley’s excellent progress and the “substantial” suite of
specialized instruction and services offered in her IEP, we concluded that her
program satis­fied the FAPE requirement. Id., at 202. But we went no
further. Instead, we expressly “confine[d] our analysis” to the facts of the
case before us. Ibid. Observing that the Act requires States to “educate
a wide spectrum” of chil­dren with disabilities and that “the benefits
obtainable by children at one end of the spectrum will differ dramatically from
those obtainable by children at the other end,” we declined “to establish any
one test for determining the adequacy of educational benefits conferred upon
all chil­dren covered by the Act.” Ibid.

_ _ _ _ _

The critical
points relative to the Rowley case
are the following:

* Amy was a student
whose disability involved having a hearing impairment.

* She was making
“excellent progress in school”—“perform[ing] better than the average child in
her (general education) class” and “advancing easily from grade to grade.”Her IEP provided her with “time each week
with a special tutor and a speech therapist” and a “district propos(al) that
Amy’s classroom teacher speak into a wireless transmitter and that Amy use an
FM hearing aid designed to amplify her teacher’s words. . .”

* The 1982 Supreme Court
only considered “the facts of (this) case before us,” and concluded that the individualized
educational program described above “satisfied the FAPE requirement”—presumably,
because Amy was making progress given the services provided.

* More
specifically, the Court defined the provision of FAPE for students “receiving
instruction in the regular classroom. . . (T)his would generally require an IEP
‘reasonably calculated to enable the child to achieve passing marks and advance
from grade to grade.’”

* Beyond this case, the Supreme Court did not
provide a “test” (or a series of decision rules) that could be used in
future cases to determine the presence of FAPE.

In fact, it
acknowledged that IDEA requires states to “educate a wide spectrum of children
with disabilities and that the benefits obtainable by children at one end of
the spectrum will differ dramatically from those obtainable by children at the
other end.”

_ _ _ _ _

This latter
statement is exactly why the 2017 Supreme Court accepted the Endrew
case.Spoiler alert:Because Endrew’s disability was largely
behaviorally related, he was not making educational progress in the regular
classroom, and he needed a substantially different special education placement
and program.

The Endrew
decision described Endrew, his disability, and its relationship to the case as
follows:

Petitioner
Endrew F. was diagnosed with autism at age two. Autism is a neurodevelopmental
disorder generally marked by impaired social and communicative skills,
“engagement in repetitive activities and stereotyped movements, resistance to
environmental change or change in daily routines, and unusual responses to
sensory expe­riences.” 34 CFR §300.8(c)(1)(i) (2016). A child with autism
qualifies as a “[c]hild with a disability” under the IDEA, and Colorado (where
Endrew resides) accepts IDEA funding. §1401(3)(A). Endrew is therefore entitled
to the benefits of the Act, including a FAPE provided by the State.

Endrew
attended school in respondent Douglas County School District from preschool
through fourth grade. Each year, his IEP Team drafted an IEP addressed to his
educa­tional and functional needs. By Endrew’s fourth grade year, however, his
parents had become dissatisfied with his progress. Although Endrew displayed a
number of strengths—his teachers described him as a humorous child with a
“sweet disposition” who “show[ed] concern[] for friends”—he still “exhibited
multiple behaviors that inhibited his ability to access learning in the
classroom.” Supp. App. 182a; 798 F. 3d 1329, 1336 (CA10 2015).

Endrew
would scream in class, climb over furniture and other students, and
occasionally run away from school Id., at 1336. He was afflicted by
severe fears of common­place things like flies, spills, and public restrooms.
As Endrew’s parents saw it, his academic and functional progress had
essentially stalled: Endrew’s IEPs largely carried over the same basic goals
and objectives from one year to the next, indicating that he was failing to
make meaningful progress toward his aims. His parents be­lieved that only a
thorough overhaul of the school district’s approach to Endrew’s behavioral
problems could reverse the trend. But in April 2010, the school district
presented Endrew’s parents with a proposed fifth grade IEP that was, in their
view, pretty much the same as his past ones. So his parents removed Endrew from
public school and enrolled him at Firefly Autism House, a private school that specializes
in educating children with autism.

Endrew
did much better at Firefly. The school devel­oped a “behavioral intervention
plan” that identified En­drew’s most problematic behaviors and set out
particular strategies for addressing them. See Supp. App. 198a– 201a. Firefly
also added heft to Endrew’s academic goals. Within months, Endrew’s behavior
improved significantly, permitting him to make a degree of academic progress
that had eluded him in public school.

Endrew’s
parents contended that the final IEP proposed by the school district was not
“reason­ably calculated to enable [Endrew] to receive educational benefits” and
that Endrew had therefore been denied a FAPE. Rowley, 458 U. S., at 207.
An Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) disagreed and denied relief.

Endrew’s
parents sought review in Federal District Court. Giving “due weight” to the
decision of the ALJ, the District Court affirmed. 2014 WL 4548439, *5 (D Colo.,
Sept. 15, 2014) (quoting Rowley, 458 U. S., at 206). The court
acknowledged that Endrew’s performance under past IEPs “did not reveal immense
educational growth.” 2014 WL 4548439, at *9. But it concluded that annual
modifications to Endrew’s IEP objectives were “sufficient to show a pattern of,
at the least, minimal progress.” Ibid. Because Endrew’s previous IEPs
had enabled him to make this sort of progress, the court reasoned, his latest,
similar was reasonably calculated to do the same thing. In the court’s view,
that was all Rowley demanded. 2014 WL 4548439, at *9.

The
Tenth Circuit affirmed. The Court of Appeals recited language from Rowley stating
that the instruction and services furnished to children with disabilities must
be calculated to confer “some educational benefit.” 798 F. 3d, at 1338
(quoting Rowley, 458

U. S., at 200; emphasis added by Tenth Circuit).
The court noted that it had long interpreted this language to mean that a
child’s IEP is adequate as long as it is calculated to confer an “educa­tional
benefit [that is] merely . . . more than de minimis.” 798 F. 3d, at 1338.
Applying this standard, the Tenth Circuit held that En­drew’s IEP had been
“reasonably calculated to enable[him] to make some progress.” Id., at
1342 (internal quo­tation marks omitted). Accordingly, he had not been denied a
FAPE.

_ _ _ _ _

The notable
differences between Amy and Endrew include the following:

* Endrew is a student with a different
disability than Amy—namely, autism, and the services provided in his IEP were not
addressing his significant social, emotional, and behavioral needs such that he
was not making progress in the regular classroom.

* Endrew’s IEP was not changing over
time—from the District’s perspective because he was “failing to make meaningful
progress toward his aims,” and from the Parents’ perspective—indicating that
“only a thorough overhaul of the school district’s approach to Endrew’s
behavioral problems could reverse the trend” of him not making progress.

* Endrew’s attendance at a “private school
that specializes in educating children with autism” resulted in behavioral
improvements and “a degree of academic progress”—based on IEPs that provided
him “a behavioral intervention plan that identified Endrew’s most problematic
behaviors and set out particular strategies for addressing them.”

Thus, Endrew was different than Amy because (a)
his disability was largely behaviorally-related (and not addressed in the Rowley
decision); (b) he was not making educational progress in the regular classroom
(with the services and supports in his IEP); and (c) he needed more specialized
and intensive interventions (in a substantially different special education
placement and program).

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

The Endrew Supreme Court Decision

In its Endrew
decision, the Supreme Court—in the context of Rowley and Congress’
motivation in passing the original IDEA—disagreed with the lower court
rulings and interpretations of FAPE, as follows (with my underlines added):

The Court in Rowley declined “to establish any
one test for determining the adequacy of educational benefits conferred upon
all children covered by the Act.” 458 U. S., at 202.

Simi­larly, we find little significance in the Court’s
language concerning the requirement that States provide instruc­tion calculated
to “confer some educational benefit.” Id., at 200. The Court had no need
to say anything more particular, since the (Rowley) case before it involved
a child whose progress plainly demonstrated that her IEP was designed to
deliver more than adequate educational benefits. See id., at 202,
209–210. The Court’s principal concern was to correct what it viewed as
the surprising rulings below: that the IDEA effectively empowers judges to
elaborate federal common law of public education, and that a child
performing better than most in her class had been denied a FAPE.

The Court was not concerned with precisely articu­lating
a governing standard for closer cases.
See id., at 202. And the statement that the Act did not “guarantee any
particular level of education” simply reflects the unob­jectionable proposition
that the IDEA cannot and does not promise “any particular [educational]
outcome.” Id., at 192 (internal quotation marks omitted). No law could
do that—for any child.

While Rowley declined to articulate an
overarching standard to evaluate the adequacy of the education pro­vided under
the Act, the decision and the statutory lan­guage point to a general approach: To
meet its substantive obligation under the IDEA, a school must offer an IEP
reasonably calculated to enable a child to make progress appropriate in light
of the child’s circumstances. The “reasonably calculated” qualification
reflects a recognition that crafting an appropriate program of educa­tion
requires a prospective judgment by school officials. Id., at 207. . . Any
review of an IEP must appreciate that the question is whether the IEP is reason­able,
not whether the court regards it as ideal. Id., at 206–207.

The IEP must aim to enable the child to make progress. After all, the essential function of an IEP is to
set out a plan for pursuing academic and functional advancement. See
§§1414(d)(1)(A)(i)(I)–(IV). This reflects the broad purpose of the IDEA, an
“ambitious” piece of legislation enacted “in response to Congress’ perception
that a major­ity of handicapped children in the United States ‘were either
totally excluded from schools or [were] sitting idly in regular classrooms
awaiting the time when they were old enough to “drop out.”’” Rowley, 458
U. S., at 179 (quoting H. R. Rep. No. 94–332, p. 2 (1975)).

A substan­tive standard not focused on student
progress would do little to remedy the pervasive and tragic academic stagna­tion
that prompted Congress to act. . .

The instruction offered must be “specially designed”
to meet a child’s “unique needs” through an “[i]ndividualized education
program.” §§1401(29), (14). . . As we observed in Rowley, the IDEA
“requires participating States to educate a wide spectrum of handicapped
children,” and “the benefits obtainable by children at one end of the spectrum
will differ dramatically from those obtainable by children at the other end,
with infinite variations in between.” 458 U. S., at 202.

Rowley sheds
light on what appropriate progress will look like in many cases. . . Accordingly,
for a child fully integrated in the regular classroom, an IEP typically should,
as Rowley put it, be “reasonably calculated to enable the child to
achieve passing marks and advance from grade to grade.” Id., at 203–204.
. .

Rowley had
no need to provide concrete guidance with respect to a child who is not fully
integrated in the regular classroom and not able to achieve on grade level.
That case concerned a young girl who was progressing smoothly through the
regular curriculum. If that is not a reason­able prospect for a child, his IEP
need not aim for grade-level advancement. But his educational program must be
appropriately ambitious in light of his circumstances, just as advancement from
grade to grade is appropriately ambitious for most children in the regular
classroom. The goals may differ, but every child should have the chance to meet
challenging objectives.

Of course, this describes a general standard, not a
for­mula. But whatever else can be said about it, this stand­ard is markedly
more demanding than the “merely more than de minimis” test applied by
the Tenth Circuit. It cannot be the case that the Act typically aims for
grade-level advancement for children with disabilities who can be educated in
the regular classroom, but is satisfied with barely more than de minimis progress
for those who cannot.

When all is said and done, a student offered an educa­tional
program providing “merely more than de minimis” progress from year to
year can hardly be said to have been offered an education at all. For children
with disabilities, receiving instruction that aims so low would be tanta­mount
to “sitting idly . . . awaiting the time when they were old enough to ‘drop
out.’” Rowley, 458 U. S., at 179. The IDEA demands more. It requires
an educational program reasonably calculated to enable a child to make progress
appropriate in light of the child’s circumstances.

Endrew’s parents argue that the Act goes even further.
In their view, a FAPE is “an education that aims to pro­vide a child with a
disability opportunities to achieve academic success, attain self-sufficiency,
and contribute to society that are substantially equal to the opportunities
afforded children without disabilities.” Brief for Petitioner 40. But the
majority rejected any such standard in clear terms. Id., at 198 (“The
requirement that States provide ‘equal’ educational opportunities would . . .
seem to present an entirely unworkable standard requiring impossible
measurements and comparisons”).

Mindful that Congress (despite several intervening
amendments to the IDEA) has not materially changed the statutory defi­nition of
a FAPE since Rowley was decided, we decline to interpret the FAPE
provision in a manner so plainly at odds with the Court’s analysis in that case.
Compare §1401(18) (1976 ed.) with §1401(9) (2012 ed.).

We will not attempt to elaborate on what “appropriate”
progress will look like from case to case. It is in the na­ture of the Act and the standard we adopt to resist
such an effort: The adequacy of a given IEP turns on the unique
circumstances of the child for whom it was created. This absence of a
bright-line rule, however, should not be mis­taken for “an invitation to the
courts to substitute their own notions of sound educational policy for those of
the school authorities which they review.” Rowley, 458 U. S., at 206.

At the same time, deference is based on the
application of expertise and the exercise of judgment by school author­ities.
The Act vests these officials with responsibility for decisions of critical
importance to the life of a disabled child.

The judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for
the Tenth Circuit is vacated, and the case is remanded for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion.

_ _ _ _ _

So, What does this
all Mean?

Conservatively, this decision means
that the Court recognized that:

1. In this case—given
Endrew’s specific disability and needs—and in future cases, the
lower court’s de minimus
criterion for FAPE was not appropriate.

Indeed, the Court
said that, “The goals may differ, but every child should have the chance to
meet challenging objectives.Of course,
this describes a general standard, not a for­mula. But whatever else can be
said about it, this stand­ard is markedly more demanding than the “merely more
than de minimis” test applied by the Tenth Circuit.

This will be the Court’s primary legacy from
this Case.

_ _ _ _ _

2. FAPE must be
determined in the context of how a student’s disability impacts the services
and supports needed in an IEP (“in light of a child’s circumstances”).

_ _ _ _ _

3. SWDs are not guaranteed
to make educational progress.

If, as with Amy,
they are educated in a regular classroom, they are “guaranteed” a (reasonable, not
ideal) “IEP that is “reasonably calculated to enable the child to achieve
passing marks and advance from grade to grade.”

If, as with Endrew,
a regular classroom education is not reasonable, the “IEP need not aim for
grade-level advancement. But his educational program must be appropriately
ambitious in light of his circumstances, just as advancement from grade to
grade is appropriately ambitious for most children in the regular classroom.
The goals may differ, but every child should have the chance to meet
challenging objectives.”

This language (especially the words,
“appropriately ambitious”) will be another
legacy from this Case.

_ _ _ _ _

4. The Court’s
language (immediately above) is a “general standard, not a formula.”

Having considered
only two cases, involving two different disabilities (of the 13 specified in IDEA),
and two different intensity levels of individualized educational need, the
Court does not believe it appropriate (or even possible) to identify set
decision rules relative to district’s provision of FAPE.

_ _ _ _ _

5. It affords
“deference” to the expertise and judgement of the professionals in a school
district—albeit in a partnership with the Parents—when writing an IEP, and it
“vests these officials with responsibility for decisions of critical importance
to the life of a disabled child.”

In fact, the ruling
requotes Rowley’s warning to other courts to not mistake the Court’s
decision to not provide decision rules on FAPE as “an invitation . . . to
substitute their own notions of sound educational policy for those of the
school authorities which they review.”

_ _ _ _ _

6. IDEA’s
provision of FAPE did not include “an education that aims to pro­vide a
child with a disability opportunities to achieve academic success, attain
self-sufficiency, and contribute to society that are substantially equal to the
opportunities afforded children without disabilities.”

_
_ _ _ _

More broadly, two additional
implications are suggested from the Case and ruling:

* When SWD cannot be fully educated in a
general education classroom, the criterion for progress of “achiev(ing) passing
marks and advance(ing) from grade to grade” may need to be adapted.

* When disability-related social, emotional,
and behavioral concerns are present, the IEP needs to include (IDEA says
“consider”) the (positive behavioral) interventions and supports—based on
functional behavioral assessments—needed by the student to make “appropriate
progress.”

_
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

Where Does the
Story End?

Endrew is now 17
years old (remember, the Case began when he was in 4th to 5th
grade).

While the Supreme
Court found unanimously for the Parents, it remains to be seen (as the Court
remanded the case back to the lower court “for further proceedings consistent
with this opinion”) as to whether the school district will be ordered to pay
for Endrew’s private schooling.

Relative to the
principles involved in the Case, it is unlikely that we will see another FAPE
case in the Supreme Court—perhaps, for another 35 years.

And yet, we do not
know what the Court means by an “appropriately ambitious” educational program,
or “progress appropriate in light of the child’s circumstances.”At the same time, some “boundaries” have been
set, and some criteria to not use, relative to FAPE, are more clear.

_ _ _ _ _

Thus, we are “back
in the classroom” . . . hoping that districts and schools have (a) good working
relationships with parents and their SWDs; (b) the fully credentialed and trained
personnel demonstrating the required professionalism; (c) the knowledge,
skills, and resources to appropriately serve all of their different SWDs; and (d)
the motivation and persistence to provide the services, supports, programs, and
interventions required by IDEA and due to their students—as defined by
the law, and clarified by the courts.

In my mind, while I
do not question the professionalism
of my colleagues, I AM
concerned about their knowledge and skills on behalf of our students.

This is based on
over 20 years as a Professor in two highly-ranked Colleges of Education, my 35+
years of consulting with schools in long-term relationships, the fact that our
country has a serious shortage of special educators (such that districts are
filling these positions with untrained, uncertified educators), my work as an
expert witness on countless cases in state and federal court, and my concerns
(shared in many previous Blogs) with the guidance coming from our federal and
state Office of Special Education in our Departments of Education.

But, I will leave
some of these concerns for the next two Blogs.

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

Summary

Clearly, the Endrew
decision is a critical one. . . for approximately 12% to 15% of the students
with disabilities in our schools, as well as for all educators . . .
given that most of our SWDs are taught, at some point each day, in our general
education classrooms.

Moreover, as in the
title to this Blog, with the Endrew decision, our responsibilities to
our SWDs just got easier . . . and harder.

We now have a more
definitively sense of what FAPE needs to be, while many districts and schools
still do not understand and/or have the multi-tiered systems of support (as
required by the Elementary and Secondary Education Act) to truly provide
FAPE.

I will try to
assist with the “harder side” of this decision in the next two Blogs:

* In Part II
of this Blog (in two weeks):We will
discuss a service and support blueprint for academically struggling students
and SWDs that can help schools organize their academic multi-tiered,
“FAPE-proof” system.

* Finally, in
Part III (in four weeks):We will
discuss a service and support blueprint for behaviorally challenging students
and SWDs that can help schools organize their social, emotional, behavioral
multi-tiered, “FAPE-proof” system.

_ _ _ _ _

Meanwhile, I hope
that the “microanalysis” of the recent Supreme Court Endrew decision has
been illuminating for you.It is always
interesting (and important) to read these decisions (as well as state
and federal laws) in their original text. Only then are we able to see
the inner connections and nuances that help us move the decisions into the
informed and effective practice.

Remember:If I can help you in any area of the school
and schooling process, I am always happy to provide a free one-hour
consultation conference call to help you clarify your needs and directions on
behalf of your students.

Connecting with Howie

Follow by Email

About Me

Howard M. Knoff, Ph.D. is the creator and Director of Project ACHIEVE.After 22 years as a university professor and over 12 years as a federal grant director for a state department of education, he continues his national work as a full-time national consultant, author, and presenter.

Dr. Knoff is recognized nationwide as an expert in the following areas:

·School Improvement and
Turn-Around, Strategic Planning and Organizational Development

·Differentiated Academic
Instruction and Academic Interventions for Struggling Students

·Social, Emotional, and
Behavioral Instruction and Strategic and Intensive Interventions for Challenging
Students

·Multi-tiered (RtI)
Services, Supports, and Program

·Effective Professional
Development and On-Site Consultation and Technical Assistance

From 2003 through 2015, he was the Director of the federally-funded State Improvement Grant (SIG; 2003-2009) which then became the State Personnel Development Grant (SPDG; 2009-2015) for the Arkansas Department of Education (ADE). These grants funded the state-wide scale-up of Project ACHIEVE--especially its school improvement, positive behavioral support, and multi-tiered RtI service system components. Through the ADE's Elementary and Secondary Education Act flexibility process, Project ACHIEVE was the state's school improvement model for all Focus schools.

Prior to that, Dr. Knoff was a Professor of School Psychology at the University of South Florida (USF, Tampa, FL) for 18 years, and Director of its School Psychology Program for 12 years. He also was the creator and Director of the Institute for School Reform, Integrated Services, and Child Mental Health and Educational Policy at USF, and was instrumental in leading the program to the accreditation of its doctoral program by the American Psychological Association.

Project ACHIEVE is a nationally-recognized school
effectiveness/school improvement program that has been designated a National
Model Prevention Program by the U. S. Department of Health & Human
Service’s Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration
(SAMHSA).Over the past 30 years, Howie
has implemented Project ACHIEVE components in thousands of schools or school
districts—training in every state in the country.He has also been awarded over $21 million in
federal, state, or foundation grants for this work, and recently received two
School Climate Transformation grants and one Elementary and Secondary
Counseling grant from the federal government to support work in Pennsylvania,
Michigan, and Kentucky.

Dr. Knoff received his Ph.D. degree from
Syracuse University in 1980, and has worked as a practitioner, consultant,
licensed private psychologist, and university professor since 1978.Dr. Knoff is widely respected for his
research and writing on school reform and organizational change, consultation
and intervention processes, social skills and behavior management training,
Response-to-Intervention, and professional issues.

He has authored or co-authored 18 books,
published over 100 articles and book chapters, and delivered over 1,000 papers
and workshops nationally—including the Stop & Think Social Skills
Program (preschool through middle school editions) and the Stop &
Think Parent Book:A Guide to Children’s
Good Behavior through Cambium Learning/Sopris West Publishers and Project
ACHIEVE Press, respectively.

Dr. Knoff has a long history of working
with schools, districts, and community and state agencies and
organizations.For example, he has consulted with a number of state departments of
education, the Department of Defense Dependents School District during Desert
Storm in 1991, and the Southern Poverty Law Center.He has also served as an expert witness in
federal court five times, in addition to working on many other state and local
cases—largely for legal advocacy firms who are representing special education
and other students in need.

Specific to
school safety issues, Dr. Knoff was on the writing team that helped produce Early
Warning, Timely Response:A Guide to
Safe Schools, the document commissioned by President Clinton that was sent
to every school in the country in the Fall of 1998; and he participated in a
review capacity on the follow-up document, Safeguarding our Children: An
Action Guide.

A recipient of the Lightner Witmer Award
from the American Psychological Association's School Psychology Division for
early career contributions in 1990, and over $21 million in external grants
during his career, Dr. Knoff is a Fellow
of the American Psychological Association (School Psychology Division), a Nationally
Certified School Psychologist, a Licensed Psychologist in Arkansas, and he has
been trained in both crisis intervention and mediation processes.Frequently
interviewed in all areas of the media, Dr. Knoff has been on the NBC Nightly
News, numerous television and radio talk shows, and he was highlighted on an
ABC News' 20/20 program on "Being Teased, Taunted, and
Bullied."

Finally, Dr. Knoff was the 21st President of the National Association of
School Psychologists which now represents more than 25,000 school psychologists
nationwide. He is constantly sought after for his expertise in a wide variety of school,
psychological, and other professional issues. You can e-mail him at: knoffprojectachieve@earthlink.net