Israel’s dual approach to Gaza and the West Bank: an overview

The areas now
known as the West Bank and Gaza, despite geographic differences, were once
similar in social, cultural and economic terms. But through a long process of
one occupation after another, they were set apart and differentiated.

During almost
thirty years of the British mandate, between WWI and the creation of the state
of Israel, along with degrees of capitalist development, the two regions
remained similar. After the first Arab-Israeli war, and with the establishment
of the state of Israel, the West Bank and Gaza Strip were created, and each
fell under the occupation of a different neighbouring Arab state (Egypt and
Jordan) for about twenty years. This had different consequences for each.

Gaza lost
much of its territory, including agricultural lands and pastures to Israel, and
was faced with a massive influx of refugees, nearly three-times the size of its
native population. Hostile Egyptian policy towards Gaza, closing off access to
Egypt, further deteriorated the socio-economic situation of the tiny strip,
halting the evolution of traditional economic, social and cultural structures.
The situation in the West Bank, first under the control of and later annexed by
(Trans-) Jordan, was somewhat different. As part of Abdullah’s ambitions,
Palestinian refugees were offered Jordanian citizenship, and while many of them
lived in camps, their situation was better than their fellow Palestinians in
Gaza.

Israel’s
initial plan after the 1967 occupation of Gaza and the West Bank was to annex
Gaza and divide the West Bank with Jordan. The plan was to create Palestinian
enclaves in heavily populated areas and to annex the rest, including the Jordan
valley and the entire border with Jordan and the Dead Sea, leaving only a
corridor open into Jordan (Allon Plan).

Not sure of
the future of Jordan and not trusting Palestinians to form a state in a
continuous territory in the West Bank, the Drobless and later Sharon Plans
envisaged the establishment of settlements on the hilltops surrounding
Palestinian towns and villages and the creation of as many Palestinian enclaves
as possible. Although these plans were not formally adopted, many aspects
of them formed the basis of all the failed “peace plans” that ensued. In Gaza,
which Israel had once occupied for a year after the 1956 Suez War, Israeli
military administration faced more radical resistance and adopted a much
harsher policy of suppression, deportations and even forced relocation of some
refugees.

At the same
time, it began establishing Jewish settlements in different parts of Gaza,
taking both strategic locations and prosperous lands on the Mediterranean
shore, taking control of all water sources. Consequently, Gaza remained
undeveloped, impoverished, less educated, more religious and more and more
reliant on UNRWA and foreign donations. In the West Bank, on the other hand,
relatively more developed structures were in place, the local Palestinians were
more educated, and except for a few interruptions, they were allowed to run
their municipal and village administrations semi-autonomously.

Despite the
differences, the policies of suppressing resistance, limiting movement by
establishing numerous roadblocks and checkpoints, controlling access to water,
and most importantly, establishing Jewish settlements were also followed in the
West Bank. As part of a deliberate policy, both West Bank and Gazan economies
became more and more dependent on Israel. With the closure of many Palestinian
factories and farms, hundreds of thousands of Palestinians had to earn a living
by commuting to Israel and its settlements as cheap labourers.

This policy
of course changed following the construction of the separation wall to prevent
terrorist activities inside Israel and encroaching into the West Bank beyond
the Green Line, also following the closure of the Gaza border.

Differentiations
intensified

In both areas
the Palestinian resistance was led by predominantly secular Palestinian
organizations. However, Israel soon found new allies among Palestinian
religious fanatics who opposed their secular and left counterparts. The
Mujamma-al Islamiya, a front charity organization of the Muslim Brotherhood in
the1970s received generous support from the state of Israel to establish
mosques, schools and clinics. Years later, and just before the first Intifada,
Hamas and Islamic Jihad emerged out of this extensive ‘charity’ entity,
presenting Israel with a formidable fundamentalist religious enemy.

Some major
changes did occur following the Oslo Accords of 1993 and1995, particularly in
the West Bank, including the creation of a quasi-Palestinian state, the
emergence of a growing number of Palestinian social, economic, academic and
cultural institutions, NGOs, and a rapidly growing new middle class. The West
Bank remained more or less calm, unlike Gaza, where the more desperate,
impoverished, highly unemployed and less educated population was more easily
radicalized and mobilized by Hamas and Islamic Jihad, leading to Sharon’s
decision to unilaterally ‘disengage’, while removing settlements.

Israel’s two
approaches to these two Palestinian territories became more pronounced after
Hamas’ electoral success and eventual forceful takeover of the government in
Gaza in 2007. The policy of collective punishment and complete closure of Gaza
from land, air and sea made the region even more impoverished on the one hand,
and strengthened Hamas and jihad on the other.

However,
Hamas’ popularity was not because Gazans turned to Islamic fundamentalism;
indeed many Gazans were against Hamas’s obscurantist, brutal and openly
anti-Semitic policies. Its growing popularity was because it was fighting
against Israel, who Gazans saw as the source of their miseries. Hamas got
support from the Islamist regimes and radical Islamists in the Middle East.
More Gazans were pushed towards Hamas with the weakening influence of the
Palestinian Authority in Gaza, and the diminishing capabilities of UNRWA, whose
funding was cut by shortsighted or ill-intentioned western governments,
including the Harper government in Canada.

The
subsequent confrontations with Israel and rocket launches by Hamas exacerbated
the conditions. Massive bombardments throughout Gaza in 2008, 2009, and
2012 led to thousands of Gazans killed or injured and infrastructure and
utilities destroyed. Israel also further reduced the maritime boundary of Gaza,
which not only took away Palestinians’ chances to access and explore the newly
found natural gas resources in the Mediterranean, but also deprived already
impoverished Gazan fishermen from fishing. The most recent bombardments with new
rounds of thousands of Gazans dead or injured and massive destruction of cities
is the continuation of the same policy.

In the West
Bank, the situation has been different. Urban development projects have been
under way through all the major cities and their suburbs. Ramallah, the
administrative capital and the economic center of the Palestinian Authority
(which now formally calls itself the State of Palestine), is rapidly growing
and constructing modern office buildings, apartments, mansions, hotels,
restaurants, schools, hospitals, and boutiques. So, to different degrees, are the
other seven cities under the control of the PA. The majority of the 155,000
government employees, along with the thousands of employees of internationally
supported NGOs that form the bulk of the new middle class live in these urban
areas.

The rapidly
growing middle class and other key structural changes that have taken place in
the West Bank have many social and political ramifications. Once a
predominantly agricultural society, the agricultural sector today employs only
11.5 percent of the working population. The service sector is the largest
employer (36.1%), followed by trade (19.6%) and construction (14.4%), and
manufacturing over 12%. The survival of all these sectors of the economy is
very much dependent on maintaining good relations with Israel. The complex and
contradictory position of the new middle classes needs special attention. On
the one hand it is comprised of professionals, doctors, lawyers, academics,
managers, and all progressive intellectuals and artists, without whom a modern
society cannot survive, and no viable Palestinian state would be possible. On
the other hand, these strata, like their counterparts in other parts of the
world, and unlike the vast majority of their fellow Palestinians in Gaza, have
things to lose, and are politically cautious. So, while deploring the continued
occupation of their territories and the humiliations they suffer daily, they
also have concerns related to continued employment, their kids’ education,
their mortgages, etc.

The decline
of radicalism in the West Bank also reflects the experience they had during the
second Intifada, when in 2002 Israeli forces re-occupied Ramallah, cut off the
city’s electricity, water and communications systems, and with tanks and
bulldozers destroyed much of the infrastructure and buildings of the city,
including Yasser Arafat’s compound. As well, they obviously also look at the
experiences of Gaza in 2008-2009, 2012 and now in 2014. Despite all these,
considering the fact that 70 percent of Palestinians are below the age of 29, high
unemployment and hopelessness can trigger another uprising with disastrous
consequences

It seems that
so far as Palestinians submit to the terms and condition of the right-wing
Israeli government, they can survive and even prosper to a certain extent in
the enclaves left for them in the West Bank. From the Israeli viewpoint, if the
Palestinian Authority does its job properly, an important part of which is
protecting and securing borders with Israel and the separation wall, and acts
as a sort of colonial administration, it can grow and expand. It is noteworthy
that of the 155,000 employees of the PA, 66,000 or 42 percent are security and
police personnel, making it proportionally one of the largest police force in
any country of the world. But if Palestinians in the West Bank and the PA
seriously challenge the imposed Israeli policies, not accepting the continuous
expansion of the Jewish settlements, insisting on ending the occupation,
maintaining their claim over East Jerusalem as the Palestinian capital, the
right of return for refugees, and an equitable access to water, then they will
have to suffer the predicament faced by Gaza.

It is not
inconceivable that Gaza could have also shared somewhat similar experiences as
the West Bank. But this was not an option for Israeli’s right coalition or for
Hamas. In the same manner that Hamas needs Israel to justify its existence, the
right-wing Israeli government needs Hamas to justify its policy of preventing
the formation of a viable Palestinian state and continued expansion in the West
Bank. Just before the start of the current Israel-Hamas war, Hamas’ popularity
was at its lowest. Its sources of funding were severely reduced particularly
after the closure of tunnels by the new Egyptian regime, and it was not able to
pay the salaries of its employees, while 37,000 PA employees in Gaza continued
to receive their paychecks. The Hamas leadership’s unexpected acceptance of the
formation of a unity government under PA rule was a major sign of its weakness.
Had they been seeking it, this could have been an opportune moment for
Netanyahu’s right wing coalition to welcome this development as a step towards
a genuine peace process. Instead, both Netanyahu and Hamas leadership turned
the brutal killing of three young Jewish settlers, followed by the brutal
murder of a Palestinian teenager, into another opportunity for military
confrontation. It was also a good excuse also for Netanyahu to announce the
latest land grab in the West Bank.

Could there be a
third option?

The present situation
in both Palestinian regions cannot continue forever. For Palestinians to
achieve their legitimate demands and have a lasting peace with Israel, they
need to unite and gain serious support from two external forces; the
international community, and progressive and pro-peace groups in Israel.

At the international
level, while initiatives like the BDS (Boycott, Divestment and
Sanctions) Movement have had success they cannot create the type of
momentum similar to that of the anti-apartheid movement, largely because major
financial support for Israel comes from the US government and Christian and
Jewish organizations.

More education,
mobilization and initiatives are needed particularly in the western countries.
As for the Israeli pro-peace left, while it has tragically dwindled, it is
still a very important actor with the potential of assisting Palestinians. A
genuine and just peace cannot come before the Israeli public elects a
progressive government and replaces the hawkish and rightwing coalition, and
before the Palestinians are united and work towards a democratic secular state
and lasting peace with Israel.

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