Iraq was only fourth on weapons of mass destruction danger list, inquiry hears

Iraq was ranked by the Foreign Office as only the fourth most dangerous of
rogue states trying to develop weapons of mass destruction in 2001, the Iraq
inquiry has been told.

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Saddam HusseinPhoto: AP

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Sir John Chilcot sitting as chairman of the Iraq war inquiryPhoto: BBC

By Gordon Rayner, Chief Reporter

10:40AM GMT 25 Nov 2009

Iran, North Korea and Libya were of greater concern to officials, who were confident that weapons inspections during the 1990s had dismantled Iraq’s nuclear capability.

Strict sanctions imposed on Saddam Hussein made it virtually impossible for him to re-start his nuclear programme, the inquiry heard, and even if sanctions were lifted it was likely to take five years before Iraq could build a nuclear weapon.

The issue of Iraq’s ability to produce or use weapons of mass destruction is central to the inquiry, which must determine whether the former prime minister Tony Blair misled parliament over the reasons for going to war in 2003.

Mr Blair told parliament that Iraq was a major threat to security in the Middle East, but Sir William Ehrman, director of international security at the Foreign Office from 2000 to 2002, said: "In terms of nuclear and missiles, I think Iran, North Korea and Libya were probably of greater concern than Iraq."

Tim Dowse, head of counter-proliferation at the Foreign Office from 2001 to 2003, said: "It wasn't top of the list. In 2001 and early 2002 I was probably devoting more of my time to Iran, Libya and (the rogue nuclear scientist) A Q Khan than I was to Iraq.

“The main effort in Iraq was to get smart sanctions and an agreed review list of what Iraq could import.

"In terms of my concerns on coming into the job in 2001, I would say we put Libya and Iran ahead of Iraq."

On the second day of the inquiry at the Queen Elizabeth Conference Centre in Westminster, Mr Dowse said: “We regarded the effect of WMD weapons inspectors until 1998 as effectively disarming Iraq.

“In terms of nuclear we were pretty confident that the IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency) did succeed in dismantling such a capability. With chemical weapons and biological weapons we were less confident. We thought that Iraq was still pursuing chemical and biological activities.”

One of the arguments used by the Government to justify the war in Iraq was that WMDs could fall into the hands of terrorists, but Mr Dowse said that, while Saddam Hussein had supported Palestinian terrorist groups, the assessment was that the Iraqi regime's contacts with groups linked to al Qaeda were "quite sporadic".

"There had been nothing that looked like a relationship between the Iraqis and al Qaeda," he said.

"In fact, after 9/11 we concluded that Iraq actually stepped further back. They did not want to be associated with al Qaeda. They weren't natural allies."

The two civil servants were also asked about the notorious claim - contained in the so-called “dodgy dossier” published by the Government before the invasion - that Iraq had WMDs which could be used within 45 minutes.

Mr Dowse said he had not placed any great significance on the 45-minute claim at the time, as he assumed it to refer to battlefield weapons, rather than inter-state missiles.

He said: “When I saw the report I didn’t give it any particular significance because it didn’t seem out of line with what we generally assessed to be Iraq’s capability in terms of weapons.

“I assumed it was referring to multi-barrelled rocket launchers that could be rapidly deployed in a battlefield. It subsequently took on a rather iconic status that I didn’t think those of us who saw the initial report gave it.”

Asked about suggestions that the 45-minute claim referred to WMDs which could be used by Iraq to strike another nation, Mr Dowse said: "I don't think we ever said that it was for use in a ballistic missile in that way."