A bold operation is one which has no more than a chance of success but
which, in case of failure, leaves one with sufficient forces in hand to
cope with any situation. A gamble, on the other hand, is an operation which
can lead either to victory or to the destruction of one's own forces.

IRWIN ROMMEL, "Account of the War in Africa," RommelPapers

By the end of the first week of November it was clear that Chinese Communist
Forces had intervened in the Korean War. This intervention, long feared
and by some expected, had become a fact. The intervention came in sufficient
force to drive Eighth Army back to the Ch'ongch'on River and to delay the
advance of X Corps in the east toward the Changjin Reservoir. After accomplishing
this, the Chinese Communist Forces withdrew from immediate contact with
Eighth Army behind a screen of North Korean soldiers. The big question
now loomed-what was the purpose and extent of the Chinese intervention?
The U.N. command and intelligence agencies had to ponder and answer it
in determining the future conduct of military operations.

TheChineseCommunistForces

A look at the background of the Chinese Communist Forces seems necessary
to an understanding of the problem. While the Chinese Communist Party itself
dates from 1921, Chinese Communist fighting forces may be said to have
come into existence with the outbreak of the Nanchang rebellion in China
on 1 August 1927. This date is commemorated as the founding date of the
Chinese Communist Forces by the Chinese ideograms in the upper left-hand
comer of the CCF flag and insignia. [1] A month before the Nanchang rebellion,
Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek had expelled the Communist Party from the
Kuomintang. From that time on the two groups became increasingly hostile
toward each other and engaged in an intermittent civil war lasting for
two decades, until at last Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalist Government in
1949 was driven from the China mainland to Formosa.

For a time in 1934 it had appeared that Chiang Kai-shek was on the point
of destroying the Communist forces in China. But in a series of battles,
be-

ginning on 21 October of that year and lasting through the 29th, the
Communists broke through the Nationalist forces that had surrounded them
in Kiangsi Province and started out on what has since been called the "Long
March" to Yenan in Shensi Province, far to the northwest. Approximately
100,000 Communist soldiers began this march with Lin Piao leading the FirstArmyCorps.

Finally, on 20 October 1935, a year after they had started from Kiangsi,
20,000 survivors of the Long March met units of the 25th, 26th,
and 27thRedArmies in Shensi that had been there
since 1933. The veterans of the Long March had traveled more than 6,000
miles; they had crossed 18 mountain ranges, 24 rivers, 12 different provinces,
and had averaged nearly 24 miles a day for the 235 days and 18 nights of
actual travel. [2]

In Shensi Province the Chinese Communists then began a reorganization
and consolidation of their forces. They established there a secure base
that became the foundation for their future operations. Survivors of the
Long March were organized into the 8thRouteArmy,
commanded by Chu Teh. By 1947 the Chinese Communist Army was entrenched
in North China and Manchuria with about 600,000 troops. The Soviet withdrawal
from Manchuria had taken place in April of the preceding year. Chu Teh,
commander of the Chinese Communist Army, at that time announced the primary
mission of his force was the piecemeal annihilation of the Nationalist
Armies by guerrilla-type action.

The Chinese Communist Army in Manchuria was called the North-East People's
Liberation Army (NEPLA). Lin Piao commanded this army, which by the end
of 1947 had cut Nationalist lines of communication to Manchuria and isolated
that important area from the rest of China. In the spring of 1949 NEPLA
was redesignated the FourthFieldArmy, incorporating
five army groups, the XII through XVI, which in turn comprised the
CCF 38th through 58thArmies, a total of 60 divisions
of about 10,000 men each. This gave a total of approximately 600,000 men
in the FourthFieldArmy. The Korean volunteers and
Manchurian Korean veterans in this army numbered about 145,000.

Lin Piao's FourthFieldArmy played a prominent
role in the Chinese Communist Forces' great triumph of wresting control
of the China mainland from the Nationalists in 1949. Some elements of his
army marched all the way from Manchuria to South China where they made
the amphibious attack against Hainan Island in the spring of 1950 and began
preparations for a similar attack against Formosa. The FourthFieldArmy had fought from Manchuria to Hainan Island in the China Civil
War without a major defeat. In June 1950 these elements of the FourthFieldArmy marched to Canton and entrained there for An-tung,
Manchuria, across the Yalu River from Korea. Lin Piao was now taking them
back to the Korean border to stand ready for any eventuality arising from
the impending Communist invasion of South Korea. Still other elements of
the FourthFieldArmy moved during the

summer from other points in China back to Manchuria. A part of the army
had always remained there. [3]

Following on the heels of the FourthFieldArmy,
elements of the ThirdFieldArmy, which consisted
of the 20th through the 37thArmies, moved to Manchuria
in the late summer and early autumn of 1950. By mid-October the Chinese
forces of the Third and FourthFieldArmies
had concentrated more than 400,000 troops in Manchuria close to Korea.
A Chinese Communist army comprised normally three divisions, although a
few of them had four. A full-strength Chinese division had approximately
10,000 soldiers. It was elements of the FourthFieldArmy,
the best field army of the Chinese Communist Forces, that first intervened
in the Korean War. [4]

EighthArmyEstimateofCCFIntervention

On 25 October, Col. Percy W. Thompson, G-2 of U.S. I Corps, made special
arrangements to transport the first Chinese prisoner, captured that day
at Unsan by the ROK 1st Division, to the Eighth Army advanced command post
at P'yongyang for interrogation. There could be no doubt that he was Chinese;
he spoke neither Korean nor Japanese. His story seemed straightforward
and credible. [5] With this first interrogation of a captured Chinese soldier
in Korea by U.S. Army intelligence officials began the build-up of a large
body of information on Chinese Communist units in Korea. The Chinese Communist
prisoners captured in the Eighth Army zone of responsibility grew steadily
in number from the 3 captured at Unsan and Onjong on 25 October. By 29
October 10 had been captured; by 20 November, 55; by 20 November, 84; and
by 23 November, as Eighth Army assumed its final deployment for the attack
designed to reach the Yalu, 96 CCF prisoners had been captured. They identified
six Chinese Communist armies-the 38th, 38th, 40th,
42d, 50th, and 66th, of which they were members-as
being in Korea. (Each army had three divisions, thus the six totaled eighteen
divisions.) Eastward in its zone, X Corps had captured prisoners from the
42dArmy. [6] As events

were to prove, the 42d Army near the end of this period had sideslipped
from the X Corps area southwest into the Eighth Army zone.

Within the first week of CCF intervention in Korea, prisoners had been
taken from four different Chinese armies in the Eighth Army zone. Eighth
Army interrogated these first Chinese prisoners intensively, even using
a lie detector on three selected and flown to P'yongyang. [7] But in evaluating
the interrogations, Eighth Army intelligence officials were skeptical of
the stories of large Chinese forces in Korea and, lacking what they believed
adequate confirmation, did not accept the substance of the prisoners' accounts.
One intelligence item reproduced at different headquarters minimized the
scale of Chinese intervention, stating that of 344 prisoners taken at Unsan
in two days only two were Chinese. This statement was certainly inaccurate
because that number of prisoners was never captured at Unsan. This figure
could have been obtained only by counting the many disorganized and retreating
North Koreans captured on the road from the Ch'ongch'on River to Unsan.
After the Chinese entered the fight against the ROK 1st Division just above
Unsan, very few prisoners were captured and these were wounded Chinese.
[8]

The initial estimate at Eighth Army headquarters based on prisoners'
reports was that the presence of Chinese troops at Unsan and Onjong indicated
some reinforcement of North Korean units with troops taken from the Chinese
Communist Forces in order to assist in defense of the border approaches,
but that there were "no indications of open intervention on the part
of Chinese Communist Forces in Korea." [9] On 30 October the 1st Cavalry
quoted in one of its

[7] Interv, author with. Col Robert G. Fergusson (Deputy ACofS G-2,
Eighth Army Oct-Nov 50), 23 Jun 58.
[8] EUSAK PIR 107, 27 Oct 50: 1st Cav Div PIR 100, on an., 30 Oct 50.
Colonel Thompson says that at the time this report appeared he had
objected to the statistical statement appearing in the 1st Cavalry
Division PIR which allegedly was based on a I Corps report. Colonel
Thompson, I Corps G-2; Colonel Hennig, Commanding Officer 10th AAA
Group, supporting the ROK 1st Division at Unsan: and Colonel Hazlett,
KMAG adviser to the ROK 1st Division, all have told the author there was
no such number as 344 prisoners taken at Unsan. And there is no
indication in the combat records that that many prisoners were taken
there.
[9] EUSAK PIR 106, 26 Oct 50; 1st Cav Div WD, 30 Oct 50; I Corps WD,
Intel Summ 135, 30 Oct 50; New York Times, October 28, 1950.

THE BIG QUESTION 753

[Caption] LIN PIAO

reports from a I Corps estimate of a day or two earlier, "There
are no indications at this time to confirm the existence of a CCF organization
or unit, of any size, on Korean soil."

The first week of Chinese action in Korea, however, did cause General
Walker to restrain I Corps, which, acting on his warning, ordered the 24th
Division back to the Ch'ongch'on River from its advanced position. This
order on 1 November disturbed the Far East Command. General Hickey telephoned
General Allen about the withdrawal and the latter had to explain why General
Walker and his staff considered it advisable. [10]

During the first phase of Chinese intervention the units involved tried
to conceal their identity by using code names. This succeeded rather well
at first. The 54thUnit, for instance, was not suspected
of being in reality the 38th Army, which prisoners said it was,
but was accepted as being only a small part of it. Similar evaluations
were made of the 55th, 56th, 57th, and 58thUnits, each of which represented a CCF army. In point of fact, the
54thUnit was the 38th Army; the 55thUnit,
the 38th Army; and the 56thUnit, the 40th
Army. This misconception was further deepened by the Chinese use of a battalion
code to represent a full division; thus the 1stBattalion,
55thUnit, was actually the 115thDivision,
38th Army. Chinese officials maintained from the first the fiction
that the Chinese fighting in Korea were volunteers. Thousands of interrogations
of Chinese prisoners later and scores of captured Chinese documents proved
this contention false. [11]

Eighth Army intelligence noted on 31 October that out of a total of
eleven Chinese prisoners taken in the Eighth Army zone by that date, six
claimed to belong to the 56thUnit and two claimed the 55thUnit. The army intelligence estimate on that date spoke of these
two units as "token units" and surmised that they probably were
concerned with protecting the approaches to the Kanggye area. By 1 November,
however, on the

eve of the 8th Cavalry disaster at Unsan, Eighth Army intelligence had
changed its view so far as to say that the enemy forces in the vicinity
of Unsan included "possibly at least two Chinese units of regimental
size." [12]

By 4 November, Eighth Army intelligence had accepted two Chinese units
of division size in Korea. The next day it raised this estimate to "three
divisional sized Task Units," tentatively identified as the 54th,
55th, and 56thUnits, totaling approximately 27,000
men. It will be noted that the Chinese code unit still was underestimated-now
being accepted as of division size rather than army size, which it in fact
was. [13]

On 6 November, at the very time as it chanced that the CCF withdrew
from general contact with Eighth Army, General Walker wrote a letter to
General MacArthur in which he expressed his views of the tactical situation
on his front. He said in part:

There has never been and there is now no intention for this army to
take up or remain in passive perimeter or any other type of defense. Every
effort is being made to retain an adequate bridgehead to facilitate the
resumption of the attack as soon as conditions permit. All units continue
to execute local attacks to restore or improve lines. Plans have been prepared
for the resumption of the offensive employing all forces available to meet
the new factor of organized Chinese Communist forces. These plans will
be put into execution at the earliest possible moment and are dependent
only upon the security of the right flank, the marshaling of the attack
troops and the restoration of vital supplies. [14]

On 13 November Eighth Army received its first report of a prisoner from
the CCF 42dArmy. The report came from the ROK II Corps on
the right flank of the army front. In the next few days other Chinese prisoners
from the 42dArmy were taken in this same general area around
Tokch'on. All came from the 374thRegiment, 125thDivision, 42d Army. [15] This Chinese army at the time was
sideslipping southwest from the Changjin Reservoir area in the X Corps
zone to the right flank of Eighth Army, while elements of the CCF ThirdFieldArmy were replacing it in northeast Korea.

At the end of the third week in November, as U.N. forces made ready
to resume their attack toward the border of Korea, Eighth Army intelligence
estimated there were about 60,000 Chinese troops in Korea. Various field
reports reaching the Department of the Army in Washington differed in their
estimates, their figures ranging from 46,700 to 70,000. [16]

The opinions held by the ranking members of the Eighth Army staff on
the extent of Chinese intervention, capability, and intention seem to have
varied. General Walker apparently shared the view held by Lt. Col. James
C. Tarkenton, his G-2, that the Chinese in Korea

numbered only a few divisions composed possibly of volunteers; that
there were no organized CCF armies, as such, in Korea; and that China would
not enter the war. [17] Colonel Dabney, Eighth Army G-3, was skeptical
of this view. He arrived at the conclusion that the Chinese might well
have crossed the Yalu River in great strength, but he too was still searching
for final answers.

In the two weeks after the Chinese broke off their First Phase Offensive
and withdrew from contact with Eighth Army, the impact of the Chinese menace
on the American command gradually subsided. Among Eighth Army staff members,
the motive generally ascribed for the first CCF intervention in October
and early November was that the Chinese wanted to protect the power plants
south of the Yalu River. Many now thought they would dig in on a defensive
line to do this. As the days passed and the front remained quiet, fear
of massive Chinese intervention dwindled.

A careful study of Eighth Army daily intelligence reports for the month
of November 1950 reveals that, despite daily reference to the Chinese potential
north of the Yalu River in Manchuria, there was a tapering off of concern
about full Chinese intervention from about 10 November until 24 November,
when Eighth Army resumed its offensive. In this connection it should be
noted that the controlling Eighth Army viewpoint could scarcely avoid being
influenced somewhat by that of the Far East Command, which seems to have
been that China would not intervene with major forces.

TheXCorpsEstimate

The capture of sixteen prisoners from the 370thRegiment
of the 124th Division by the ROK 26th Regiment on 29 October
convinced the X Corps G-2 that "integral CCF units have been committed
against U.N. forces." [18] General Almond said at this time he intended
to attack with sufficient strength to find out if the Chinese were in only
regimental or in greater strength. The 7th Marines' attack on the road
to the Changjin Reservoir disclosed that the Chinese were there in at least
division strength.

Elements of X Corps encountered and captured only a few Chinese soldiers
from another division, the 126th, near the Changjin Reservoir. On
the east side of the Pujon Reservoir, a few more were captured who said
they were from the same division. These prisoners reported that a third
division, the 125th, was in the Changjin Reservoir area. Because
this division guarded the road and rail line approaching Yudam-ni and the
reservoir from the southwest-the central part of the peninsula-X Corps
was not in contact with it until the third week of November. By then most
of this enemy division had already moved southwestward into the Eighth
Army zone.

Although X Corps did not have as harsh an experience with Chinese forces

in the First Phase Offensive as did Eighth Army, it nevertheless received
intelligence which indicated large-scale Chinese intervention. In mid-November,
for instance, two civilian draftsmen, formerly employed by the Traffic
Department of the P'yongyang Railway Bureau, reported on what they saw
and heard of Chinese intervention before they left Manp'ojin on 26 October.
According to them, there had been a continuous flow of CCF soldiers through
Manp'ojin beginning on 26 October. One of the men estimated 80,000 Chinese
had passed south through the border town. Chinese officers had variously
told the two men that 200,000 and 400,000 Chinese soldiers were to enter
Korea. [19]

The lack of enemy activity in front of X Corps during the second and
third weeks of November prompted the corps intelligence officer to state
officially on 18 November that "the enemy's recent delaying operations
are apparently concluded and he is once again withdrawing to the north.
The speed of his movements has caused a loss of contact at most points."
General Almond himself at this time did not think that the Chinese had
intervened in the Korean War in force. [20]

As the date approached for the U.N. attack intended to complete the
occupation of all Korea, X Corps, like Eighth Army, seemed to take the
view that enemy forces in front of it would fight only a delaying defensive
action. On 22 November, corps intelligence reported that the enemy was
"apparently preparing to make a defensive stand in his present positions,"
and that there was "no evidence to indicate any considerable number
of CCF units have crossed the border since the initial reinforcement."
[21]

The next day, however, elements of the 7th Marines captured two Chinese
soldiers seven miles west of Hagaru-ri who said they belonged to the 267thRegiment, 89thDivision, which had crossed the Yalu
ten days earlier. The men had deserted from their unit the night before
and walked toward the U.N. lines. [22] The most interesting and important
thing about these two deserters was that, if their story was true, not
only was there another new Chinese division in Korea, but it came from
a new army, the 20th, a new army group, IX, and, most important
of all, from a new field army, the CCF ThirdFieldArmy,
which in the summer had been in the Shanghai area.

In preparing for its part in the impending U.N. offensive, X Corps anticipated
that when the Eighth Army advance reached Huich'on, and X Corps itself
neared the Kanggye road above Huich'on in the U.N. double envelopment attack,
the enemy would react violently, and the possibility of enemy ground and
air reinforcements from Manchuria could not be overlooked. [23]

While X Corps recognized the capabilities of CCF strength beyond the
border, it seems clear that on the eve of

the impending U.N. attack-set for 24 November in the west and 27 November
in the northeast-corps believed that not more than one or two CCF divisions
were on its front and that the enemy's efforts in the near future would
be wholly defensive in character. General Almond, the corps commander,
held this view. As in the case of Eighth Army, the controlling X Corps
view was probably influenced by that of the Far East Command.

TheFarEastCommand'sandMacArthur'sEstimates

Of all the intelligence levels of the U.N. command and the American
government, perhaps the most decisive in evaluating the intention and capability
of Chinese intervention in the Korean War was that of the Far East Command
in Tokyo. The evaluation by General MacArthur and his intelligence officers
of Chinese intervention and Chinese military capability in Korea in October
and November 1950 seems to have been the determining factor in shaping
the future course of U.N. military action in that country.

Why this was so requires explanation, for normally the intelligence
evaluation of whether a foreign power has decided to intervene in a war
in national force involves political intelligence at the highest level.
Field and theater commanders could expect such an evaluation to by made
by the government in Washington with the advice of its Central Intelligence
Agency. The intelligence responsibility of Eighth Army and X Corps was
tactical; strategic intelligence responsibility rested with the Central
Intelligence Agency, the Department of the Army, and the theater headquarters,
with the ultimate political intelligence the responsibility of the President
and his immediate advisers. But apparently the Central Intelligence Agency
and the administration generally did not evaluate the available intelligence
so as to reach a conviction on the question of whether the Chinese intended
to intervene in the Korean War different from that held by General MacArthur.
It must be inferred that either Washington was undecided or that its view
coincided with that of the Commander in Chief, Far East, since it did not
issue directives to him stating a different estimate. The conclusion, then,
is that in the developing situation of November the views of the Far East
Command were decisive on the military course to be taken in Korea at that
time.

The Korean War had scarcely started when the Far East Command began
to consider the threat of CCF intervention. On 28 June its daily intelligence
summary stated that the possibility existed that North Korea might receive
Chinese Communist reinforcements from Manchuria. In early July General
MacArthur informed the Joint Chiefs of Staff in Washington that if Chinese
combat forces did become involved in the war the assistance of the Strategic
Air Command would be required to destroy communications into and through
North Korea from China. At this time the Far East Command estimated there
were 116,000 CCF regular troops in Manchuria. An increase in CCF troop
strength there became perceptible during the month and continued steadily
thereafter. Much of the information concerning CCF troop movements from
south to north China came from Chinese

Page 758 SOUTH TO THE NAKTONG, NORTH TO THE YALU

[Caption] CHOU EN-LAI

Nationalist sources on Formosa. Chiang Kai-shek's government received
a steady stream of intelligence from its agents on the China mainland,
and it, in turn, provided General MacArthur's command with numerous reports.
[24]

Many of the intelligence reports received at Tokyo, as is usual in such
matters, were inaccurate and unreliable. Such were several reports in August
and September that CCF troops had crossed the border into North Korea.
One of these reports, on 29 August, alleged that four CCF armies had crossed
the Yalu and were deployed in North Korea. [25]

On 8 September the daily intelligence summary included a report of the
Chinese Nationalist Ministry of Defense G-2 that if the outcome of the
war seemed doubtful, elements of Lin Piao's FourthFieldArmy probably would be committed. This report further indicated
that such troops would not be used as CCF units but would be integrated
into the North Korea People's Army. [26]

The Far East Command learned in mid-September of an alleged conference
in mid-July in Peiping where it was decided to support North Korea short
of war. Chou En-lai was quoted, however, as having said that if the North
Koreans were driven back to the Yalu, the CCF would enter Korea. Far East
Command intelligence, in commenting on this report, said that the Chinese
Communist authorities apparently were worried over Korea and would regard
a U.N. advance to the Yalu as a "serious threat to their regime."
[27] Two weeks later, on the last day of September, the daily intelligence
summary reported on an alleged high-level conference in Peiping on 14 August,
at which it had been decided to provide 250,000 CCF troops for use in Korea.
[28]

A new note of more official character entered into the intelligence
clamor on 3 October. The Chinese Communist Foreign Minister, Chou En-lai,
summoned Ambassador Sardar K. M. Panikkar of India to his office in Peiping
and told him that if the United States or United Nations forces crossed
the 38th Parallel, China would send troops to de-

fend North Korea. He said this action would not be taken if only South
Korean troops crossed the 38th Parallel. This information was communicated
quickly by the Indian Ambassador to his government, which in turn informed
the United States and the United Nations. The government at Washington
immediately dispatched the message to General MacArthur in Tokyo. [29]
Representatives of other nations reported similar statements coming from
Chinese officials in Peiping. Then, on 10 October, the Peiping radio broadcast
as a declaration of Chinese Communist intentions a statement to the same
effect. On 15 October the Department of the Army informed MacArthur's headquarters
of another report from a reliable source that Moscow was preparing a surprise
for American troops when they approached the northern border. [30]

In early October an escaped American officer informed American intelligence
authorities that he had been interrogated in North Korea by three Soviet
officers and that one of them, a senior colonel, told him on 22 September
that if U.S. forces crossed the 38th Parallel new Communist forces would
enter the war in support of North Korea. [31]

On 5 October for the first time Far East Command intelligence listed
as number one priority in enemy capabilities "Reinforcement by Soviet
Satellite China." But this estimate did not long remain in first priority;
it dropped to second place the next day, to third place on 9 October, and
remained there through 13 October. On 14 October the intelligence estimate
again raised the reinforcement of North Korea to first priority. There
it remained during the Wake Island Conference. [32]

The Far East Command daily intelligence summary for 14 October carried
a lengthy analysis of the problem and presumably represented the official
view of Maj. Gen. Charles A. Willoughby, Far East Command G-2. This intelligence
estimate accepted a total strength of thirty-eight CCF divisions in nine
armies in Manchuria. It expressed the view that Russia would find it convenient
and economical to stay out of the conflict and let the Chinese provide
the troops if there was to be intervention. It went on to say that the
interest of all intelligence agencies was focused on the "elusive
Lin Piao" and the Yalu River. One significant paragraph stated:

Recent declarations by CCF leaders, threatening to enter North Korea
if American forces were to cross the 38th Parallel, are probablyinacategoryofdiplomaticblackmail.
[Italics supplied.] The decision, if any, is beyond the purview of collective
intelligence: it is a decision for war, on the highest level; i.e. the
Kremlin and Peiping. However, the numerical and troop potential in Manchuria
is a fait-accompli. A total of 24 divisions are disposed along the Yalu
River at crossing points. In this general deployment, the grouping in the
vicinity of Antung is the most immediately available Manchurian force,
astride a suitable road net for deployment southward. [33]

This same report pointed to the recent fall of Wonsan as a serious loss
to the enemy and one jeopardizing his entire defense structure. It went
on to say, "This open failure of the enemy to rebuild his forces suggests
that the CCF and Soviets, in spite of their continued interest and some
blatant public statements, have decided against further expensive investment
in support of a lost cause."

Meanwhile, President Truman on 10 October had announced his intention
to fly to the Pacific for a meeting with General MacArthur over the coming
weekend to discuss "the final phase of U.N. action in Korea."
The conference between the President, General MacArthur, and selected advisers
of each took place on Wake Island, Sunday, 15 October. Most of the talk
concerned plans for the rehabilitation of Korea after the fighting ceased.
General MacArthur said he expected formal resistance to end throughout
North and South Korea by Thanksgiving Day and that he hoped to get the
Eighth Army back to Japan by Christmas. In response to President Truman's
question, "What are the chances for Chinese or Soviet interference?",
notes of the conference indicate that General MacArthur replied substantially
as follows:

Very little. Had they interfered in the first or second months it would
have been decisive. We are no longer fearful of their intervention. We
no longer stand with hat in hand. The Chinese have 300,000 men in Manchuria.
Of these probably not more than 100,000 to 200,000 are distributed along
the Yalu River. Only 50,000 to 60,000 could be gotten across the Yalu River.
They have no Air Force. Now that we have bases for our Air Force in Korea,
if the Chinese tried to get down to Pyongyang there would be greatest slaughter.
[34]

General MacArthur then discussed briefly the chance of Russian intervention,
holding the view that it was not feasible and would not take place.

General MacArthur has challenged the accuracy of the notes of the conversations
at the Wake Island Conference. He maintains that the question concerning
possible Chinese or Soviet intervention was low on the President's agenda,
and that while he replied that the chances of such intervention were "very
little," he added that this opinion was purely speculative and derived
from the military standpoint, while the question fundamentally was one
requiring a political decision. His view, he states, was also conditioned
by the military assumption that if the Chinese did intervene United States
forces would retaliate, and in a peninsular war could work havoc with their
exposed lines of communication and bases of supply. He says, in effect,
that he took it for granted that Chinese knowledge of this capability would
be a powerful factor in keeping them from intervening. [35]

[34] Substance of Statements Made at Wake Island Conference on October
15, 1950, compiled by General of the Army Omar N. Bradley, Chairman, JCS,
from notes kept by the conferees from Washington. Copies of this
Substance of Statements were forwarded to General MacArthur by the JCS
on 19 October 1950, and receipted for by his aide on 27 October. Neither
General MacArthur nor his headquarters advised the JCS of any
nonconcurrence with this record of the conference. See Bradley, Letter
of Submittal, 2 May 1951, to Senator Richard Russell, Chairman, Senate
Armed Services Committee, included as part of the document (printed by
the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on Foreign Relations,
U.S. Senate (Washington, 1951); New York Times, October 11, 1950; Dept
of State Pub 4263, UnitedStatesPolicyintheKoreanConflict, July1950-February1951, p. 19.
[35] MacArthur, MS review comments, 15 Nov 57.

THE BIG QUESTION Page 761

It must be noted that General MacArthur's opinion on the subject was
not questioned by the President or any of the others present, who must
be assumed to have had knowledge of the highest level of intelligence bearing
on the matter. In fact, so thoroughly did they seem to agree with his opinion
that the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff asked him when he could
spare a division for European duty. So it would seem that General MacArthur
in responding to the President's question merely voiced the consensus of
the highest officials from the seat of government. This is how matters
stood at mid-October.

On 20 October the Far East Command daily intelligence summary carried
a report from a source it regarded as reliable that 400,000 CCF troops
were at the border alerted to cross on the 18th or 20th. The Far East Command
stated that precautionary measures had been taken of conducting daily air
reconnaissance flights over all avenues of approach to the U.N. forces
from the Yalu but that "so far no positive movements except intermittent
though large-scale truck convoys have been picked up." [36] On this
same date, the Far East Command issued CINCFE Plan 202, which was to be
the basis for withdrawal of U.N. forces from Korea when the fighting ended.
This plan assumed there would be no intervention either by Chinese or Soviet
forces. [37]

Strangely enough, beginning on 25 October and continuing throughout
the month, and at a time when the U.N. forces were actually fighting the
Chinese Communist Forces in North Korea and capturing Chinese prisoners,
the Far East Command daily intelligence summary placed Chinese intervention
second in priority to guerrilla operations in enemy capabilities. The intelligence
summary for 27 October carried the story of the first CCF prisoners captured
two days earlier. The G-2 comment on the prisoners' account of Chinese
intervention was that it was "based on PW reports and is unconfirmed
and thereby unaccepted." [38]

The next day, 28 October, after discussing further the question of possible
CCF intervention, the intelligence estimate said:

From a tactical viewpoint, with victorious U.S. Divisions in full deployment,
it would appear that the auspicious time for such [Chinese] intervention
has long since passed; it is difficult to believe that such a move, if
planned, would have been postponed to a time when remnant North Korean
forces have been reduced to a low point of effectiveness. [39]

On 31 October the daily summary discussed the fact that ten Chinese
prisoners had been taken by Eighth Army and that the ROK II Corps had suffered
reverses. It then said that the situation "may signify the commitment
of Chinese Communist Forces in the Korean conflict." The United Nations
Command report to the Security Council covering the period 16-31 October,
in mentioning the capture of Chinese prisoners, said there was no positive
evidence

On 3 November, however, the Far East Command accepted the estimate that
16,500 CCF troops were in contact with U.N. forces in Korea and that possibly
the total might be 34,000. This intelligence report listed CCF strength
in Manchuria totaling 833,000 men, of whom 415,000 were Chinese Communist
regular ground forces. On this same day the Joint Chiefs of Staff in Washington
dispatched a message to MacArthur expressing their concern over what appeared
to be "overt intervention in Korea by Chinese Communist units,"
and asked his views on the matter. He replied the next day that while it
was a distinct possibility, "there are many fundamental logical reasons
against it and sufficient evidence has not yet come to hand to warrant
its immediate acceptance." [41]

On the same day, 3 November, that MacArthur received the inquiry from
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Peiping radio broadcast a joint communiqué
in Chinese by the Chinese Communist Party and various political parties
participating in the Peiping government. It declared the Korean War was
a direct threat to the safety of China and that the Chinese people should
take the initiative and exert utmost efforts to resist the United States
and assist North Korea. The Far East Command G-2, in commenting on this
broadcast, said that preceding ones had sounded like "bombast and
boasting. The above does not." [42] Two days later, on 5 November,
the daily intelligence summary stated that the Chinese Communist Forces
had the potential to launch a large-scale counteroffensive at any time
and without warning. [43]

On the heels of this estimate came General MacArthur's well-publicized
special communiqué on 6 November which charged the Communists with
having "committed one of the most offensive acts of international
lawlessness of historic record by moving without any notice of belligerency
elements of alien Communist forces across the Yalu River into North Korea,"
and of massing a great concentration of possible reinforcements behind
the sanctuary of the Manchurian border. Concerning the future, he said,
"Whether and to what extent these reserves will be moved forward to
reinforce units now committed remains to be seen and is a matter of the
gravest international significance." [44]

The Far East Command intelligence report the next day raised its accepted
number of CCF troops in Korea to 34,500; 27,000 in the Eighth Army zone
and 7,500 in the X Corps zone. [45] On the 8th it carried a rather detailed
analysis of the CCF in Korea. It accepted 8 CCF divisions from 4 armies
with a strength of 51,600 men as being in contact with U.N. forces; it
accepted 2 more

divisions with 12,600 men as probably in contact, and still another
2 divisions with 12,600 men as possibly being in the X Corps zone but not
in contact with U.N. forces. This analysis gave a total of 76,800 CCF troops
as probably being in North Korea. [46]

The report of a conference in Peiping on 17 October when Chinese officials
allegedly decided to go to war received further consideration on 12 November,
in the light of more information, and the G-2 comment was that "this
information may be evaluated as probably true." Reports continued
to reach Tokyo from the Chinese Nationalist government on Formosa that
the Chinese Communists intended to throw their main forces against the
United Nations in Korea and also to increase their participation in the
Indochina fighting. [47]

At mid-month, the U.N. Command reported to the Security Council that
elements of twelve CCF divisions had been identified in forward areas,
nine in Eighth Army zone, three in X Corps. As the third week of November
passed, the Korean front was relatively quiet. Far East Command intelligence
took notice of the continuing propaganda actively being carried on in Peiping
and elsewhere by radio broadcasts, letters to newspaper editors, rallies,
and other devices, in what seemed to be a campaign to prepare the nation
for a defensive intervention war in Korea. The Far East Command now apparently
accepted Chinese Communist strength in Korea at a maximum of 70,051 and
a minimum of 44,851. Apparently this estimate did not change up to the
beginning of the U.N. attack on 24 November. [48]

The Department of the Army estimate of CCF strength in Korea was essentially
the same as that of the Far East Command, Eighth Army, and X Corps. In
the week preceding the resumption of the U.N. attack on 24 November it
accepted the estimate of 51,600 CCF troops in Korea, and a probable total
of 76,800 CCF troops in Korea. It credited these troops to four CCF armies
(the 38th, 39th, 40th, and 42d) with twelve
divisions, giving each division a strength of 6,300 men. [49]

It is obvious that the Far East Command was in possession of a great
amount of intelligence concerning the Chinese and their relation to the
Korean War. But the vital questions still remained. Just what did General
Willoughby, MacArthur's G-2, think, and, most important, what did General
MacArthur himself think, of the probability of full-scale Chinese intervention?

While General Willoughby frequently pointed out in his intelligence
summaries the potentialities of CCF intervention, it appears on all the
evidence

[46] FEC DIS 2983, 9 Nov, and 2988, 14 Nov 50.
[47] FEC DIS 2989, 15 Nov 50.
[48] Dept of State Pub 4051, UnitedNationsCommandNinthReporttotheSecurityCouncil, UnitedNations, 1-15November1950, p. 9; FEC DIS
2993, 19 Nov 50. The original CCF strength in Korea before casualties
was given as between 50,400 and 76,600. This indicated that FEC
intelligence believed that approximately 5,500 CCF soldiers had become
casualties in the fighting up to that time. See also FEC DIS 2994-2998,
20-24 Nov 50.
[49] See DA Wkly Intel Rpts 91, 17 Nov 50, pp. 19-21, and 92, 24 Nov 50,
p. 32. A full treatment of the Department of the Army and the Joint
Chiefs of Staff levels in the Korean War may be found in Schnabel,
Theater Command.

Page 764 SOUTH TO THE NAKTONG, NORTH TO THE YALU

that he did not think it would take place. When Maj. Gen. Leven C. Allen
passed through Tokyo in early September on his way to Korea to assume the
post of Chief of Staff, Eighth Army, Willoughby in a conversation with
him played down the possibility of Chinese intervention and said the Chinese
were sensible and would keep out of the Korean affair. [50] When General
Ruffner, Chief of Staff, X Corps, in talking with General Willoughby in
November, expressed concern about the great number of CCF divisions identified
in the Eighth Army and X Corps zones, Willoughby answered they may have
been only elements of that many divisions-not that many full divisions.
[51] And in November when General Hickey, Acting Chief of Staff, Far East
Command, with the G-2, G-3, and G-4 of that command, visited the X Corps
in Korea to form a first-hand estimate of the degree of Chinese intervention,
he asked General Willoughby substantially the following question: "If,
as General Almond states, Chinese forces have intervened, how many Chinese
troops do you estimate are now in Korea?" General Willoughby reiterated
that only volunteers had entered Korea and that probably only a battalion
of volunteers of each division identified was actually in Korea. In this
same conversation, in response to a question from General Almond about
what had happened to the 8th Cavalry Regiment in the Eighth Army zone,
General Willoughby reportedly replied that the regiment had failed to put
out adequate security, been overrun by a small, violent surprise attack,
and had scattered during the hours of darkness. [52]

The Far East Command intelligence reports themselves during October
and November 1950, although filled with intelligence data and estimates
of the CCF capabilities, seem never to reflect the evaluated opinion that
the Chinese would intervene in full force.

General MacArthur's view seems to have paralleled closely that reflected
in the Far East Command intelligence evaluations, but he may have been
somewhat more apprehensive of massive Chinese intervention. On 7 November
he sent a report to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in response to their request
for one, that reflects his views and outlook at the time. His message,
paraphrased, said:

Unquestionably . . . organized units of CCF have been and are being
used against U.N. forces; that while it is impossible to determine accurately
the precise strength it is enough to have taken the initiative in the west
and to have slowed appreciably our offensive in the east. The pattern seems
established that such forces will be used and increased at will, probably
without a formal declaration of hostilities. If this enemy build-up continues,
it can easily reach a point preventing our resumption of the offensive
and even force a retrograde movement. An attempt will be made in the west,
possibly within 10 days, again to assume the initiative if the flow of
enemy reinforcements can be checked. Only through such an offensive can
an accurate measure of the enemy strength be taken. [53]

Despite this somewhat somber view, MacArthur two days later expressed
himself optimistically in a message to the JCS with respect to future possible

I believe that with my air power, now unrestricted so far as Korea is
concerned except as to hydroelectric installations, I can deny reinforcements
coming across the Yalu in sufficient strength to prevent the destruction
of those forces now arrayed against me in North Korea. [54]

On the day the U.N. attack began, 24 November, General MacArthur gave
further evidence of the degree to which this view guided his thinking.
In a communiqué that day he announced:

The United Nations massive compression envelopment in North Korea against
the new Red Armies operating there is now approaching its decisive effort.
The isolating component of the pincer, our Air Forces of all types, have
for the past three weeks, in a sustained attack of model coordination and
effectiveness, successfully interdicted enemy lines of support from the
North so that further reinforcement therefrom has been sharply curtailed
and essential supplies markedly limited. [55]

Perhaps even more revealing of MacArthur's state of mind was his special
communiqué to the United Nations later the same day in which he
said:

The giant U.N. pincer moved according to schedule today. The air forces,
in full strength, completely interdicted the rear areas and an air reconnaissance
behind the enemy line, and along the entire length of the Yalu River border,
showed little sign of hostile military activity. The left wing of the envelopment
advanced against stubborn and failing resistance. The right wing, gallantly
supported by naval air and surface action, continued to exploit its commanding
position.

Our losses were extraordinarily light. The logistic situation is fully
geared to sustain offensive operations. The justice of our course and promise
of early completion of our mission is reflected in the morale of troops
and commanders alike. [56]

In these dispatches General MacArthur expressed a viewpoint which apparently
dominated his thinking during most of the critical period of October and
November 1950 while he and the United Nations wrestled with the problem
of CCF intervention. He seems to have believed, first, that the Chinese
would not intervene in full force, and, second, that should they do so,
his air power would destroy them. General MacArthur very likely expected
to fight a battle with the Chinese Communist Forces short of the Yalu,
but he expected to win it through the decisive effect of the interdiction
and close support capabilities of his air power. This reliance on air power
in dealing with the CCF was perhaps the crucial factor in MacArthur's calculations.

Actuality

The statement of Chou En-lai to the Indian Ambassador on 3 October,
the announcements made over the Peiping radio, the timing of CCF troop
movements as learned from prisoners, and other forms of intelligence, taken
in connection with later events, make it seem reasonably clear that the
Chinese Communist government had decided by early

October on intervention in North Korea if United Nations troops other
than ROK's crossed the 38th Parallel. Whether the Chinese Communists believed
the United Nations Command would cross the Parallel is unknown, but there
is at least one good reason to think the North Korean Government believed
the U.N. Command would stop at the 38th Parallel. Kim Il Sung, Commander
in Chief of the North Korea People's Army, in an order to the army dated
14 October 1950, stated in part, "Other reasons that we have failed
are that many of us felt that the 38th Parallel would be as far as the
US Forces would attack...." [57]

Within a few days after the leading elements of the U.S. forces crossed
the 38th Parallel at Kaesong on 9 October, elements of the CCF were crossing
the Yalu River at the Manchurian border into North Korea. The first of
these troops apparently crossed the boundary on 13 or 14 October, although
it is possible that some may have crossed on the 12th.

Four CCF armies, each of three divisions, crossed the Yalu River between
14 and 20 October. Two of them, the 38th and the 40th, crossed
from An-tung, Manchuria, to Sinuiju, North Korea; the other two, the 38th
and 42d, crossed from Chi-an, Manchuria, to Manp'ojin, North Korea.
All four armies were part of Lin Piao's FourthFieldArmy
and upon arrival in Korea were subordinated to the CCF XIIIArmyGroup. The 1stMotorizedArtilleryDivision,
two regiments of the 2dMotorizedArtilleryDivision,
and a cavalry regiment also crossed into Korea at An-tung about 20-22 October
in support of the four armies already across. [58]

Three of the four CCF armies entering Korea deployed in front of Eighth
Army, the fourth deployed in front of X Corps. From west to east these
armies took the following positions: the 38thArmy was in
front of Unsan, the 40thArmy in front of Onjong. The 38thArmy, marching from Manp'ojin through Kanggye, reached a position
on Eighth Army's right flank in the Huich'on area. Very likely it was troops
from this CCF army that General Dean saw in the early dawn one morning
in mid-October twenty miles north of Huich'on as he was being taken by
his captors to Manp'ojin. The 38th and 40thArmies
entered combat with U.N. forces for the first time on 25 October; the 38th
entered combat on the 26th.

The fourth army, the 42d, moved from Manp'ojin through Kanggye
to the Changjin Reservoir area in front of the X Corps main axis of advance
in northeast Korea. It, like the 38th and 40thArmies,
first entered combat against forces under U.N. command on 25 October. The
west flank units of this army, elements of the CCF 125thDivision,
overlapped into the Eighth Army zone and apparently constituted the enemy
force that dispersed the ROK 7th Regi-

At the time, then, that General MacArthur was expressing to President
Truman and his advisers at Wake Island on 15 October his belief that there
was very little likelihood that the Chinese Communist Forces would intervene,
that, if they did, no more than 60,000 could get across the Yalu and that
his air force would destroy them, approximately 120,000 CCF soldiers either
had already crossed, were in the act of crossing, or were moving from their
assembly and training areas to the crossing sites for the purpose of crossing.

Following the first four armies in approximately ten days, two more
CCF armies crossed into North Korea at the end of October. These were the
50th and 66thArmies which, crossing from An-tung
to Sinuiju, had completed their crossing into North Korea by 31 October.
Each of these armies was composed of three divisions recently brought up
to war strength. In these two armies approximately 60,000 more CCF troops
came into North Korea, to make a total during the month of approximately
180,000 troops. The 50thArmy deployed southward on the CCF
west flank and remained in reserve during the CCF First Phase Offensive.
An element of this army did, however, exchange fire with the 19th Infantry
Regiment on 1 November near Kusong. [60]

Also, before the end of October the CCF 42dTruckRegiment
entered Korea at Sinuiju from An-tung, and the 5thTruckRegiment and the 8thArtilleryDivision entered
Manp'ojin from Ch-ian. Both truck units supported the First Phase Offensive.
[61]

In the X Corps zone, the 42dArmy had sent the 124thDivision south of the Changjin Reservoir where it fought the delaying
battle in late October and the first part of November with elements of
the ROK 3d Division and the U.S. 7th Marines. The 126thDivision
remained in reserve in the reservoir area, but it had a number of minor
engagements and patrol actions with the U.S. 7th Division in the Pujon
Reservoir area. The 125thDivision moved southward from Yudamni
to block the axis of approach from

Sach'ang-ni to the north. By 13 November it had moved southwest across
the X Corps-Eighth Army boundary into the Eighth Army zone where it appeared
before the ROK 8th Division in the Tokch'on area on the Eighth Army east
flank.

These six armies, five in the Eighth Army zone and one in the X Corps
zone, composed the CCF XIII ArmyGroup with a total of 18
divisions, each division at the standard strength of about 10,000 men.
In the Chinese Army the division and regiment numeration proceeds progressively
in sequence. The organization of the XIIIArmyGroup
illustrates this. (Table5)

A third major CCF entry into North Korea now took place. The IXArmyGroup, ThirdFieldArmy, entered
Korea during the first half of November. This army group had come by rail
directly to the border from Shantung Province, China, in late October and
early November and had started crossing at once. It comprised three armies,
the 20th, 26th, and 27th, each of three divisions.
Each of these armies was reinforced by a division taken from the 30thArmy, this giving each army four divisions. [62] The IXArmyGroup entering Korea in the first part of November, therefore, added
12 infantry divisions to the 18 already there, for a total now of 30 divisions.
In addition to these 30 infantry divisions, the Chinese Communist Forces
also had in North Korea a number of artillery, cavalry, and support units.

The IXArmyGroup moved southeast to the Changjin
Reservoir area, large units of it arriving there on or before 13 November.
On that date, elements of the IXArmyGroup relieved
the 42dArmy of its responsibility in that sector, and the
124th and 126thDivisions of the 42dArmy
followed the 125th southwest into the Eighth Army zone. By the end
of the third week of November, therefore, the XIII ArmyGroup
of the CCF FourthFieldArmy, with 18 divisions of
infantry (180,000 men), was concentrated in front of Eighth Army, and the
IXArmyGroup of the CCF ThirdFieldArmy, with 12 divisions of infantry (120,000 men), was concentrated
in front of X Corps. A formidable total of approximately 300,000 CCF infantry
troops

[62] The 89thDivision reinforced the 20th Army; the 88th Division, the
26thArmy; and the 90thDivision, the 27th Army.

THE BIG QUESTION Page 769

[Caption] PENG TEH-HUAI

were now deployed in North Korea. [63]

The entry of the Chinese Communists into the Korean War necessarily
brought changes in the enemy command. It appears that Peng Teh-huai, Deputy
CCF Commander, established a joint CCF-NKAHeadquarters in
Mukden and there made basic decisions concerning enemy operations. A subordinate
headquarters, called the N.K. Army-CCFCombinedHeadquarters, under Kim Il Sung, Commander in Chief of the North
Korean Army, was publicly given credit for controlling military operations
in Korea, but it seems certain that actual control rested in Mukden. There
is some indication that the CCF XIIIArmyGroup at
first may have been under Kim Il Sung's North Korean command. The IXArmyGroup apparently was under complete CCF control from
the beginning.

Conclusion

Starting with an acceptance of only a few Chinese "volunteers"
mixed with North Korean units, the U.N. Command in the course of a month
had gradually raised its estimate to accept about 60,000 to 70,000 Chinese
troops in Korea by 24 November, less than one-fourth the number actually
there. How was it possible for the U.N. Command to mistake so grossly the
facts in the situation, even after it had met a considerable part of these
Chinese forces in combat?

The answer seems clear enough. First, although the Chinese Communist
government had several times openly stated it would intervene if U.N. forces
other than ROK troops crossed the 38th Parallel, American authorities were
inclined to disbelieve this and to consider these statements to be in the
nature of threats and diplomatic blackmail. Second, the actual troop movements
across the Yalu and deployment south were made at night and so in the main
were not subject to aerial observation. During the day, aerial observation
failed to discover

the troops, who remained hidden in the hills under perfect camouflage
discipline. Third, because they were not adequately confirmed, the reports
from prisoners and Korean civilians of mass CCF movements across the border
were not accepted by intelligence authorities. The intelligence system
of Eighth Army, for various reasons, did not work as well in North Korea
as it had in South Korea during the days of the Pusan Perimeter.

A word should be said about the CCF march discipline and capabilities,
which in large part accounted for the secrecy with which the Chinese Communists
entered and deployed in North Korea. This march capability and performance
equaled the best examples of antiquity. In Xenophon's account of the retreat
of the 10,000 Greeks, a day's march on the average came to a little less
than 24 miles. The Roman military pace was set to cover 20 miles in 5 hours,
the usual day's march for a Roman legion. In normal training exercises
the Roman legions had to make three such marches every month. On occasion
the legions were required to march 24 miles in 5 hours. When Caesar besieged
Gergovia in Gaul, he marched 50 miles in 24 hours. [64]

In a well-documented instance, a CCF army of three divisions marched
on foot from An-tung in Manchuria, on the north side of the Yalu River,
286 miles to its assembly area in North Korea, in the combat zone, in a
period ranging from 16 to 19 days. One division of this army, marching
at night over circuitous mountain roads, averaged 18 miles a day for 18
days. The day's march began after dark at 1900 and ended at 0300 the next
morning. Defense measures against aircraft were to be completed before
0530. Every man, animal, and piece of equipment were to be concealed and
camouflaged. During daylight only bivouac scouting parties moved ahead
to select the next day's bivouac area. When CCF units were compelled for
any reason to march by day, they were under standing orders for every man
to stop in his tracks and remain motionless if aircraft appeared overhead.
Officers were empowered to shoot down immediately any man who violated
this order. [65]

These practices, especially the march and bivouac discipline, explain
why United Nations aerial observation never discovered the CCF deployment
into Korea. The Chinese Communist Forces moved 300,000 men into position
in October and November and none of them was ever discovered by the U.N.
Command prior to actual contact. While the planes were overhead searching
for possible Chinese movement into Korea, the Chinese, perfectly camouflaged,
lay hidden below. The aerial observers did not see them nor did the aerial
photographs reveal their presence.

ThePregnantMilitarySituation

On 6 November General MacArthur took official notice of the recent CCF
offensive and summed up his estimate of the changing situation in Korea.
He said

[64] See Xenophon, TheAnabasis, and William Duncan's Caesar (includes
Caesar's Commentaries), pp. 46-50.
[65] FEC Intel Digest 16, 16-31 Jan 52, March of a CCF Army, pp. 33-39;
I Corps WD, 30 Oct 50, Intel Summ 135, 30 Oct 50. Although the march
described actually occurred early in 1951, a few months after the
initial CCF intervention, the initial CCF troops entering Korea
apparently marched at an equal rate of speed at night to reach their
assembly areas.

THE BIG QUESTION 771

[Caption] GENERAL MACARTHUR

the defeat of the North Koreans had been decisive when the Chinese intervened
in "one of the most offensive acts of international lawlessness of
historic record." Speaking in high praise of General Walker, he said
the possible trap "surreptitiously laid calculated to encompass the
destruction of the United Nations Forces" was avoided, "with
minimum losses only by the timely detection and skillful maneuvering of
the United States commander responsible for that sector." General
MacArthur announced his future intentions in these words, "Our present
mission is limited to the destruction of those forces now arrayed against
us in North Korea with a view to achieving the United Nations' objective
to bring unity and peace to the Korean nation and its people." He
intended, obviously, to destroy the Chinese forces in Korea as well as
the remaining North Koreans. To accomplish this he considered it necessary
to establish an integrated continuous front in western and central Korea
for co-ordinated large-scale offensive action. [66]

That same day, 6 November, General Walker issued Eighth Army's operation
plan for a renewal of the offensive. It called for an advance to the Korean
border with three corps abreast-the U.S. I Corps on the west, the U.S.
IX Corps in the center, and the ROK II Corps on the east in the army zone.
[67] In preparing for the projected offensive, tentatively set for 15 November,
Eighth Army had to bring the IX Corps into the line. Steps had already
been taken to accomplish this. On 2 November the ROK III Corps had assumed
responsibility for the then IX Corps zone, and IX Corps completed its move
to Sunch'on on 4 November. The next day at noon the IX Corps became operational
there with control of the 2d Infantry Division. [68]

Colonel Stebbins, Eighth Army G-4, estimated that Eighth Army needed
3,000 tons of supplies daily for passive defensive operations and 4,000
daily for active combat. At no time in October or up to about 20 November
was Eighth Army able to supply this minimum need for active offensive combat.
The 4,000

tons daily was finally achieved by bringing forward approximately 2,000
tons daily to P'yongyang by rail from the south, by unloading 1,000 tons
daily at Chinnamp'o, and by bringing approximately 1,000 tons daily into
North Korea by airlift. [69]

While Eighth Army was striving to overcome the logistical difficulties
that delayed its resumption of the attack in mid-November, X Corps in northeast
Korea continued its headlong rush to the border against scattered and ineffective
opposition except in the 1st Marine Division sector below the Changjin
Reservoir. There the Marine division and regimental commanders, much to
the X Corps commander's dissatisfaction, deliberately slowed their advance.

From the very beginning of X Corps operations in northeast Korea, General
Smith had looked with disfavor on the wide dispersal of the subordinate
units of the Marine division. On 7 November in a conference with General
Almond, he again urged the concentration of the division. The recent experience
of X Corps with the CCF 124thDivision and Eighth Army's
encounter with the CCF in the west apparently caused General Almond to
be more amenable to General Smith's arguments for concentrating the Marine
division, and he agreed to it. Smith then went further and argued that
the division should not advance to the Kot'o-ri plateau at the south end
of the Changjin Reservoir with winter at hand, but General Almond felt
that the marines should hold Hagaru-ri at the southern end of the reservoir.
With the withdrawal of the CCF from contact both in the west and northeast
Korea about 7 November, confidence soon reasserted itself in both Eighth
Army and X Corps, and X Corps on 11 November reiterated its directive to
proceed to the Yalu. Both Eighth Army and X Corps were still enjoined under
General MacArthur's directive of 24 October to proceed to the Yalu. Apparently
General Almond hoped that the troops could reach the border quickly, turn
over the area to ROK troops, and withdraw before winter really set in.
[70]

After the 7th Marines reached the Kot'o-ri plateau on 10 November, neither
Colonel Litzenberg, the regimental commander, nor General Smith, the division
commander, showed any inclination to hurry the advance. General Smith plainly
indicated that he was apprehensive about his western exposed flank, that
he wanted to improve the road up the pass from the division railhead at
Chinhung-ni, that he wanted to develop a secure base at Hagaru-ri, and
that he wanted to garrison key points on the main supply road back south.
And most of all he wanted to concentrate the full strength of the Marine
division in the Hagaru-ri area before trying to advance further toward
the Yalu.

Reservoir area of Korea in 1950. It arrived with violent force and subzero
temperatures on 10 November, the day the marines reached the Kot'o-ri plateau.
From that day on the troops there were involved in a winter campaign. Patrols
sent out from Kot'o-ri on 11 and 12 November found only small scattered
enemy groups in the hills, and the next day a Marine unit advanced to Pusong-ni,
halfway to the reservoir. On 14 November the 7th Marines, wearing their
heavy arctic parkas, trudged in subzero weather toward Hagaru-ri over a
road now covered with an inch of snow. Vehicles froze up on the move, brakes
grabbed, transmissions were stiff, and the men themselves had difficulty
in moving forward. Entering Hagaru-ri, the marines found it burned out
by previous bombing attacks and practically deserted. Natives told them
that the 3,000 Chinese soldiers occupying the town had departed three days
earlier, going north and west. A Chinese soldier from the 377thRegiment, 126thDivision, captured near Hagaru-ri
during the day, said elements of his division were east of the reservoir.
That night, 14-15 December, the temperature dropped to 15 degrees below
zero. [71]

The next day the 7th Marines completed its movement into Hagaru-ri,
and Colonel Litzenberg made arrangements for a perimeter defense. The 1st
Battalion protected the northwest approaches, the 2d Battalion the southern,
and the 3d Battalion the northeast approaches to the town. That same day
the 2d Battalion, 5th Marines, arrived at Kot'o-ri, beginning the concentration
of the rest of the 1st Marine Division in the Changjin Reservoir area behind
the 7th Marines. The 5th Marines now guarded the main supply route back
to Hamhung.

Two days after the first Marine units entered Hagaru-ri, General Smith
and Maj. Gen. Field Harris (Commanding General, 1st Marine Air Wing) on
16 November looked over the ground there and selected the site for a C-47
airstrip. Smith felt that such an airstrip would be needed to supplement
supply by road and for fast evacuation of casualties. Engineer troops began
work on the airstrip on 19 November, and others continued work on improving
the road up the pass from Chinhung-ni. The first trucks climbed through
the pass to Hagaru-ri on the 18th. Smith held the Marine advance to Hagaru-ri
while this work continued.

Thus it was, that with virtually no enemy opposition, the marines advanced
at an average rate of only a mile a day between 10 and 23 November. But
this caution on the part of General Smith in concentrating the division
and his insistence on securing its supply lines and of establishing a base
for further operations in the frigid, barren wastes of the Changjin Reservoir
area were to prove the division's salvation in the weeks ahead.

Although the projected Eighth Army attack on the 15th had to be postponed
because of logistical difficulties, the army on the 14th ordered an attack
to be made, on a day and hour to be announced, to seize a line running
generally from Napch'ongjong, on the west coastal road, eastward through
Taech'on-

Onjong-Huich'on to Inch'o-ri. This was to be the line of departure for
the projected co-ordinated attack. The army was then to be prepared to
continue the advance on order to the northern border of Korea. General
Walker's order reflects an intention to proceed with a closely co-ordinated
attack in order to have the army under control at all times. It also reflects
a considerable degree of caution and a certain respect for the enemy forces.
It appears on the weight of the evidence that General Walker wanted to
make the attack. He expected opposition, but apparently believed he could
reach the border. His chief of staff, General Allen, shared this view.
[72]

On 17 November, with the logistical situation improved, Eighth Army
announced to its subordinate organizations that the attack north would
start on 24 November. General MacArthur notified the Joint Chiefs of Staff
at the same time of the tentative attack date, emphasizing that the delay
in mounting the offensive had been due to logistical difficulties. He optimistically
reported that the intensified air attacks of the past ten days had isolated
the battlefield from added enemy reinforcements and had greatly reduced
the flow of enemy supplies. [73]

Up to the launching of the 24 November attack the U.S. Eighth Army and
the X Corps had suffered a total of 27,827 battle casualties in the Korean
War; 21,529 in Eighth Army and 6,298 in X Corps. Of the Eighth Army total,
4,157 had been killed in action, 391 more had died of wounds, and 4,834
were missing in action. [74]

On the afternoon of 2, November Eighth Army advised I and IX Corps and
the ROK Army that H-hour for the army attack was 1000 24 November. Word
of the attack hour had reached the front-line units by 23 November. That
was Thanksgiving Day. The army front was generally quiet. Patrols went
out several thousand yards in front of the line with little enemy contact.
Nearly everywhere the enemy seemed to have withdrawn during the past week,
leaving behind light outpost and covering positions. At no place did U.N.
forces uncover what could be considered a main line of resistance. [75]

As Eighth Army units moved out in attack on 24 November they encountered
only a few small enemy squad- and platoon-sized groups employing small
arms fire. Even in the ROK II Corps zone of attack enemy opposition was
unexpectedly light. In most places the U.N. advance was unopposed.

[Caption] INSIGNIA OF MAJOR U.S. GROUND FORCE UNITS IN KOREAN WAR IN
1950

Page 776 SOUTH TO THE NAKTONG, NORTH TO THE YALU

gether with several chiefs of U.S. press bureaus in Tokyo, had flown
to Korea the morning of the 24th to witness the beginning of the attack.
General Walker joined them in visits to I Corps, IX Corps, and 24th Division
headquarters along the Ch'ongch'on. At I Corps headquarters General Milburn
cast a momentary shadow over the bright picture being drawn when he told
the party that his patrols had found the Unsan area heavily defended, and
in his opinion the projected IX Corps attack there would not progress easily.
General Church briefed the party at the 24th Division headquarters shortly
after noon on the progress of the attack. Optimism and enthusiasm as to
chances of the attack succeeding seemed to prevail. [76]

In the afternoon when General Leven Allen returned to Eighth Army headquarters
from the airstrip where he had accompanied the party, he remarked to some
of the staff members, "I think the attack will go. General MacArthur
would not have come over if he did not think so." [77]