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Sunday, December 16, 2012

THE WOLOF PEOPLE: AFRICA`S DARKEST, TALL AND REGAL-LOOKING PEOPLE

The Wolof are an ethnic group found in Senegal, The Gambia, and Mauritania.In Senegal, the Wolof form an ethnic plurality where about 43.3% of the population are Wolofs.In The Gambia, about 16% of the population are Wolof. Here, they are a minority, where the Mandinka are the plurality with 42% of the population, yet Wolof language and culture have a disproportionate influence because of their prevalence in Banjul, The Gambia's capital, where a majority of the population is Wolof.In Mauritania, about 8% of the population are Wolof. They live largely in the southern coastal region of the country.

A painting of Wolof man wearing traditional "Baobao" robe Wolof people live in the 'Savanna zone' of northwest Senegal. They can be found from the Senegal river in the north to the Gambia river in the south (indicated by the green areas on the map). They are the largest people/group of Senegal, and make up 43.5% of the total population of Senegal and number about 3 million.In rural areas the Wolof are mainly farmers.

Wolof Womanfrom Senegal with pipe. Postcardphoto-François-Edmond FortierThe Wolof language is a West Atlantic language of the Niger-Congo family. It is an important language as it is used as the language of trade even outside the main Wolof areas. About 30% of the population speak Wolof as their first language and about 80% understand it.

History

Woman of the Wolof people and her child (Senegal). Ca. 1888.
The Wolof first entered Senegal from the north east in about the 11th Century coming to the lower Senegal Valley. They are said to be composed of an amalgam of Mandingo, Sereer and Fula. Cheikh Anta Diop believes that they came from the Nile valley and that the Wolof were part of the formation of the ancient Egyptian civilisation. From the 13th to the 15th centuries, Wolof kings conquered and ruled a large area called the Djolof. Towards the end of the 16th century this broke up into the chiefdoms of Walo, Baol, Cayor, Sine and Saloum. Wolof tribe man, Cheikh Anta Diop, the great African historian/scholarThese in turn where destroyed by the French in the 19th century, the last Wolof King, Lat Dior, being defeated in battle and killed in 1886. Since the times of the Wolof Kingdoms until recent times the Wolof lived in highly stratified societies based primarily on blood relationships. There were three highly separated castes: freemen (gor or jambur); those of slave descent (jaam); and artisans (ñeeño). Intermarriage rarely took place between the castes. The Wolof have always had closer contacts with the European powers than the other people groups in Senegal and were also largely behind the slave trade between the 15th and 19th centuries.

Wolof Queen Ndeté-Yalla, Senegal, showing her robes and bead jewelry, 1850s; based on a drawing made from life by a Senegalese Catholic priest. For details, see http://hitchcock.itc.virginia.edu/Slavery, Image Reference Boilat03.

http://www.diaspora.uiuc.edu/news1206/news1206-1.html The French built factories along the Senegal River to exploit the gum-producing area and to trade in slaves. Wolof chiefs also traded slaves thus giving them a source of revenue and power. In 1815, the slave trade became illegal, although slaves were still being traded late in the 19th Century. This had important ramifications for the power of the chiefs and the process of Islamization.At this time families headed by marabouts (i.e. elders who considered themselves as Muslim clerics) were immigrating from the east. The chiefs often valued the marabouts for their prayers and amulets, books and rosaries, and magic powers. In return the marabouts were given land and allowed to start villages. The marabouts slowly detached themselves from court life and became the leaders of the commoners living in the countryside.At this time the court was characterized by 'a dissipated style of living'. Overindulgence, extravagance, drunkenness, and immorality were rampant and were basically stimulated by the soldiers. By contrast the marabouts lived lives regulated by the Koran, less extravagant, reserved and disciplined which also led to improved economic conditions. The soldiers of the court tended to oppress and mistreat the people but left the marabouts alone for fear of their magic. 'Mistreated people' also began to go to the marabout villages as a refuge thus increasing the marabouts' following.From the 17th Century onwards the influence of the marabouts had increased so much, that they revolted against the court army. The chiefs were weakened by their loss of control over trade and revenues after the decline of the slave trade and because more and more of the wealth from the trade in peanuts went to the marabouts. This brought them money and therefore guns which together with the development of the peanut trade contributed to the success of the marabout revolution (jihad).Colonial policy in Senegal and Gambia was directed to establishing peace so trade could develop. Irrespective of whether governors chose the side of the marabouts or chiefs the influence of the marabouts grew and Islam spread more rapidly and thoroughly. Thus today nearly 99.9% of Wolof people are Muslim.

Characteristics and Importance of the Wolof

The Wolof people are a very dark skinned, tall, proud, regal-looking people. They tend to be lazy about learning other languages, and have a domineering and contemptuous attitude toward their neighbours. and are very ethnocentric. Open sensuality is part of their lifestyle. Gambian Wolof woman doing her gigThe Wolof have been more affected by the West than other Senegalese groups. However, they have the most highly developed sense of national identity of any of the Senegalese. Through the years, they have played a major role in the import-export trade as middlemen and primary producers of the main cash crop, peanuts. They tend to be a major element of the civil service and play an important part in political parties. In fact Wolofs hold a disproportionate share of cabinet posts and seats in the National Assembly. They are highly urbanized and they are the main element in the major cities of Senegal (Dakar, St.Louis, Thies, Kaolack). In the urban areas they may be found in businesses such as fabrics, dressmaking, dyeing, jewellery making, and elaborate hair-dressing.

Mauritanian Wolof fishermen

During the course of their history the Wolof have absorbed many traits from other cultures thus share a variety of cultural characteristics with their neighbours. Language is one such element. Despite this the Wolof have remained a distinct ethnic group which is very appealing to people of other groups. In fact those in close contact with them, particularly in the towns, tend to adopt Wolof traits and claim themselves to be Wolof even when the link is somewhat tenuous. One particularly important characteristic of the Wolof is their capacity to influence the ways of others, adapt to changing situations yet remain a distinct culture. They are admired by other groups due to their initiative and ability to adapt. Both the Serer and the Lebu have undergone 'Wolofization'. Wolof people

Religion

The Wolof Style of Islam

Islam is an inseparable part of Wolof culture. However Wolof society is considerably freer than most Muslim societies. For instance women are free to appear in public. One important feature of Wolof Islam is that it tends to be centred around membership of one of the three main brotherhoods. About 30% of Wolofs belong to the Mourides, about 60% belong to the Tijaniyas, and about 10% belong to the Qadiriyas. During the Colonial period the brotherhoods were the main means by which the Sufi form of Islam was spread. Since independence Islam has become the primary force in Senegalese society due to the brotherhoods' ability to adapt to changing social conditions, the spread of Koranic primary schools, and Senegal's growing ties with the Islamic world.

Prayer in a sand

Pre-Islamic beliefs survive only to a small extent among the Wolof and are found mainly in isolated rural areas. When Islamic beliefs were adopted, procedures at naming ceremonies, circumcision, marriage, divorce, and burial started to follow Islamic patterns. However it has been noted that the Islam of the Wolof is strongly mixed with spiritism. Numerous taboos operate in Wolof society. For example, a pregnant women may not work in the fields or it is believed the harvest will be less; a knife is placed beside the head of a newborn baby until it is seven days old to protect it from evil spirits. Marabouts (Muslim clerics) practise white magic, for a price. Their practices include writing special Koranic texts on paper and then placing them in small leather pouches or washing the ink from these texts with water, and preserving it in bottles or sprinkling it over the body. Senegalese Wolof marabout Chiekh Bethio Thioune surrounded by supporters as he endorses former Senegalese Wolof president Abdoulaye Wade.

Animistic beliefs

Wolof society gives the impression of revolving around Islam, and Islam does in fact hold a central place in Wolof society. However it is practiced at two levels. The visible level is "orthodox" Islam with its ritual prayers, fasts and festivals. But at the heart of their beliefs and practices is "folk" Islam, a syncretistic mix of Sufi Islam and African traditional religion. Wolof traditionalist/animist Many of the pre-existing animistic practices have been given Islamic dress. That is to say, they are performed by Muslims, and the names of Allah and Muhammad invoked. It is in folk Islam where people deal with the important issues of life: health and sickness, the fear of evil spirits, witches and black magic, advancement in life. Amulets and charms are worn to protect the wearer from all sorts of maledictions. Wives will seek to prevent their husbands from marrying a second wife by seeking someone with magical powers. People will try to get ahead of their competitors through black magic, all the while giving the appearance of being their best friends. Sacrifices are made to the family spirits, family totems are respected and ceremonies for the exorcism of spirits have changed little from pre-Islamic days. The new born baby is protected from evil spirits by placing a knife, a branch from the echallon tree and charms beside its head. And it is from the pre-existing beliefs that many of their still strongly held superstitions arose, such as the taboos on a woman, pregnant for the first time, working in a field or going fishing with a man; the knife carried by women in their period of mourning after the death of their husbands to chase evil spirits away; taking Monday as the day of rest as this is the day that the spirits of the earth rest; or taboos on cutting the fingernails of a baby which is being breast fed for fear that it will become a thief.

Social Organization

Castes

Youssou Ndour, A wolof and great African musician from Sebegal

The Wolof basically have a stratified social system made up of three main castes - freeborn, those of slave descent, and artisan which includes smiths, leatherworkers and musicians. This system is somewhat modified in the towns. Wolof tribe man Ousmane Sembene with his trademark pipe, Great African Film-makerIt has been observed that the freeborn caste tend to maintain a favoured position by holding on to their former status and by applying the Islamic rules more strictly than those of slave descent or artisans. Slave-descendants no longer work for the descendants of their former masters but the freeborn still have material advantages due to their position. However today materially the slave-descendants should be able to gain a position comparable to that of the freeborn. Similarly village heads were almost always of freeborn status and always in villages of mixed castes. Intermarriage between castes is not common. Two famous Wolofs: Former Senegalese president Abdoulaye Wade and international musician AkonThe freeborn consider themselves more religious than slave-descents since more of them go on the pilgrimage to Mecca. However the costs for slave-descendants are much higher as they must compensate their former masters during their absence. People who return from the pilgrimage gain the title of El Hadji (men) or Adjouratou (women) and also gain much prestige. Since slave-descendants and artisans cannot occupy positions of authority or prestige in mixed communities these groups tend to hold on to tribal religion and the ceremonies and activities related to the age-set system more than the freeborn. Slave-descendants and artisans also receive gifts from the freeborn in return for carrying out ritual services for them. Aminata Sow Fall, the famous Senegalese African writer

Indicators of wealth

Kinee Diouf Senegalese Wolof international model

In Saloum indicators of wealth included: Firstly, the number of wives. The Wolof in this area had from 1 to 4 wives, only the wealthy could have more than one wife; Second, the possession of durable luxury goods, including metallic beds, bicycles, motorcycles, sewing machines and modern sporting-guns. Also only rich farmers tend to own mud brick houses and it is mainly the rich who manage to gain the title of El Hadji. Wolof womanWolof ceremonial traditionsCeremonies such as weddings, funerals, and baptisms, while not unique, have traditional elements distinctive to the Wolof. Many aspects of these traditional ceremonies have merged and been modified through the 20th century.Some Wolof proverbs canbe checked here:http://wolofresources.org/language/download/proverbs.pdf

Action
1. “Maa mën” : defal ñu gis. (2)
“I can do it”; (then) do it so we can see.
“Actions speak louder than words.”
2. Àkk àkkum gaynde, song songum bukki. (6)
Charge with the spirit of a lion but attack like a hyena.
Enthusiasm before action, composure at the moment of action.
3. Def ca ba ngay man. (12)
Do it while you can.
“Strike while the iron’s hot.”
“Opportunity knocks but once.”
“Seize the day.”
“Time and tide wait for no man.”
4. Fa ñuy tëgge ab xàndoor, deesu fa ñaani njël ; fa ñu koy bey lañu koy ñaane. (11,12)
Where they make hilaires (an African tool for removing weeds from a field) they do
not pray for dawn; it is those who are weeding who pray for it.
It is in the place where a good idea is put into practice that its value becomes visible, not in
the place where the idea was spoken.
5. Jabar, doonte ne yeena jéllooy sàkket, ab xer damm. (2,3)
(In the matter of a) wife, even if you only have a wall of reeds between you, a post
can break.
Even if a marriage seems easy to organise, the future bridegroom will always have to do
more and spend more than he anticipates.
Tanor owns a large garage and his business is going well. One day, one of his cousins is
promoted to head of an important public service. Tanor expects that his cousin will give
him the contract to maintain the service vehicles. Some time later he learns that the
contract has been given to another mechanic. Tanor makes known his resentment to one of
his friends who says to him that he had been too confident and that he should have gone to
see his cousin right after his promotion, and quotes this proverb.
6. Maa la men deesu ko wax, dees koy jëf. (11,12)
“I am better than you” is not something which is said; it is shown by action.
“Actions speak louder than words.”
It is not words which count but action.
7. Nit la mu jëf la du la mu wax. (15)
A man is measured by what he does, not what he says.
“Actions speak louder than words.”
8. Soo jiwul, doo góob. (20)
If you do not sow, you will not reap.
“Nothing ventured, nothing gained.”
“The sluggard craves and gets nothing, but the desires of the diligent are fully
satisfied.” (Proverbs 13:4 NIV)

9. Wax yomb na, wànte def yombul. (13,20)
Talk is easy, but doing is not.
“Actions speak louder than words.”
“It is easier said than done.”
10. Jëm ci làmb di bàkku, jóge cay bàkkoo ko gën. (11,12)
Dem sa làmb ja di bàkku jóge fa di bàkkoo ko gën. (7,14)
It is better to boast coming from the wrestling match, than to boast on the way to
the match.
“Actions speak louder than words.”
Glory comes from the results of action, not from talk.
“The king of Israel answered, "Tell him: ‘One who puts on his armour should not
boast like one who takes it off.’"” (1 Kings 20:11 NIV)
11. Pëndub tànk a gën pënduw taat. (2,6,8)
Tànk yu pënd a gën taat yu pënd. (14)
Dust on the feet is better than dust on the behind (from sitting).
Action is better than sitting doing nothing.
Magatte Wade, Wolof and a Senegalese international enterpreneur/CEO/founder ofAdina World Beat Beverages, aSan Francisco

Advice
12. Boroom làmmiñ du réer. (20)
Someone with a tongue will not get lost.
One should always ask when one doesn't know.
“Listen to advice and accept instruction, and in the end you will be wise.”
(Proverbs 19:20 NIV)
13. Tere, tere, mu të, bàyyil mu gis. (2,6,7,14,15)
Prohibit, prohibit, he refuses to listen, leave him to see.
If someone refuses to listen to advice, leave him to discover the consequences himself.
“Blessed is the man who always fears the LORD, but he who hardens his heart
falls into trouble.” (Proverbs 28:14 NIV)
14. Ku la ne “sangul”, sab taar la bëgg. (2,8,19)
Ku la ne “sangul”, sab taar a tax. (11,12)
Whoever tells you to go and bathe wants you to be beautiful.
The person who gives you good advice is your friend and has your best interests at heart,
even if it is hard to hear.
“Wounds from a friend can be trusted, but an enemy multiplies kisses.” (Proverbs
27:6 NIV)
15. Déggal ndigal i ñett, bàyyil ndigal i ñett. (1)
Follow the advice of three people, and ignore the advice of three (others).
A saying of Kotche BARMA. When he said this he was advising people to follow the
advice of one's father, one's mother and one's eldest son, and to resist the advice of one's
wife, one's slave and one's griot. The first three are motivated by the interests of the man,
whereas the latter are motivated by self interest and are only interested in his belongings.

Wolof girl from The Gambia

Art

Wolof woman dancing

One searches in vain to find the usual forms of art that first come to the Western mind such as painting, wood carvings or masks. Rather the Wolof express their artistic instincts in the embroidery that adorns their clothing, in the hairdos that they spend so many hours creating, and in their jewellery. They express themselves in song and dance, in poetry and story telling. Speech itself becomes an art form well served by a rich language filled with proverbs.The Tama of the Wolof Drums, especially the Wolof talking drum (tama) can be found everywhere and are heard at every major event. The xalam or Wolof lute is harder to find but still plays a part in Wolof celebrations as the traditional story-tellers or griots travel around seeking their livelihood.Wolof man African man playing the xalam

The communities which foreran the brotherhoods grew up in the early years of Islam and were based in Islamic mysticism, or Sufism. The members of the small Sufi communities in the early period lived an ordered life in which individual moral and physical discipline, as well as mystical theology and ritual, were emphasized. These orders had only limited appeal to the few men willing to give up their worldly possessions and live an ascetic life to achieve a state of union with God. Later, however, the organizational basis of these communities changed, the stress on individual moral and physical discipline declined, and the Muslim orders took on the form which attracted followers throughout the Far and Near East and North Africa. By the end of the eleventh century the informal communities of ascetics were being converted into organized brother- hoods whose members, living together in regulated communities, adhered to a body of

spiritual rites.

Islamic Wolof men

The change in emphasis from individual self-discipline to mystical theology, which is of particular importance to this study, came in the late twelfth and early thirteenth centuries and is often associated with Ibn al-Arabi of Murcia (d. 1240 A.D.), whose esoteric mystical interpretation of Islam pointed the way for the development of the later brotherhoods in which the mass of brothers could satisfy their religious duties by devotion and obedience to a handful of mystically adept leaders. In addition the brotherhoods in the later period softened the strict rules of orthodox Islam, stressing the state of a man's heart rather than his actual behavior, and popularizing Muslim traditions to make them understandable at the lowest level. Local practices and beliefs alien to Islam were tolerated as long as they did not contradict the desired union with Allah which all true brothers wished to achieve.

Although these factors vulgarized and distorted Islamic teachings, they also made Islam appealing to simple men. The mass of members of the orders apparently often forgot the teachings of the Qu'ran and of Muhammad; ignorant of the major doctrintes of Islam, they concentrated on obedience to their leaders. This attitude was made possible largely because of the emphasis of later Sufism, which stressed the ability of the brotherhood leader to act as intermediary between Allah and man. Whereas early Sufism had emphasized individual effort, it was later believed that most men could not achieve union with the Divine by themselves. Concurrent with the shift in emphasis pre- Islamic beliefs in magic were mingled with Islam. Belief grew in legends about the miracles performed by early mystics and the magical ability of current leaders who had received divine grace or baraka from Allah. The leaders were revered as saints, and their tombs became the centers of pilgrimages because of the miracles which might occur there. Montet, a French writer, reports that in Morocco in the nineteenth century such leaders were believed to have innumerable powers: they could, for example, lift large loads alone, repel bullets, or go for long periods without food and water; they could be ubiquitous, become invisible, or be instantly transported to far-off places; or they could walk on water or dry up an ocean; and they were capable of keeping away evil spirits, healing the sick, and resurrecting the dead. Montet concludes from his observations in Morocco that Sufism had degenerated into anthropolatry:

"Living or dead, the saints, however illiterate they may be . . . are adored."

The leaders of the brotherhoods were called shaykhs, or in North and West Africa, Marabouts. Marabout is a French term coming from the Arabic word for fortified camp or monastery and is used for a Muslim holy man, whether or not he is connected with the brotherhoods. According to the Not surprisingly, this devotion of the brotherhood members to their leaders was practically demonstrated through material contributions. An offering, or ziara, which was sometimes quite large, as well as the member's dime, or tenth of his crops, were paid to the brotherhoods. Land around the center of the brotherhood was worked by the members

(usually lay affiliates and full brothers together), and the men made payments (habus or wakaf) to the brotherhood for the use of this land. The leaders also received other types of contributions including payments for initiation and labor corv&es since adepts of an order were morally obliged to sow and harvest for their leader. Through these and similar contributions the brotherhoods, and more specifically the leaders, had large material resources. Indeed, the periodic payments and labor corvees were not all that a Marabout could demand. As Depont and Coppolani said, everything a man had could be taken by the leaders: "the goods of their

followers are their property, their horses are their mounts and their huts . . . are accessible to these venerable parasites."

Because of the frequent contributions of money by the members and the absolute control exercised by the leaders, the brotherhoods appeared to many French observers as states within the French colonial state. Indeed the French commentators had to recognize that the members' blind obedience to the leaders and their loyalty to the brotherhood as a whole were the major sources of political strength of the Muslim orders. With the brotherhoods tightly unified behind them, the leaders could speak with great authority. Consequently, the tariqas often wielded enormous political power in North Africa and elsewhere. As one nineteenth-century writer aptly commented: "Never has autocracy shown itself with more prominent and decided appearance; never either has the dogma of obedience been proposed and accepted in more formal or absolute terms. It is therefore permissible to affirm that in this double principle of authority on one side and personal abnegation and passive obedience on the other, resides the principal factor of the extraordinary power of the Muslim religious orders. "

The Advent of the Brotherhoods in West Africa

Thus, the tight organization of the Muslim brotherhoods and the unquestioned authority of the leaders made the brotherhoods particularly suited as vehicles of social and political reform when they began to attract converts among the Wolof at the end of the nineteenth century. Before this, although they had been in contact with Muslims for many centuries, the Wolof had not felt the full impact of the orders. Soon after their appearance in the Middle East the brotherhoods had spread to North Africa, where in the twelfth century they stimulated the powerful Almohad (al-muwahhidun) movement with its strong appeal to the mass of Berbers. Shortly thereafter the North African brotherhoods began to filter into West Africa, where their introduction coincided with and reinforced the general Islamization of the area immediately to the south of the Sahara.

Alphonse Gouilly, a twentieth-century French administrator and scholar, has divided the Islamization process into five periods which help to place the advent of the brotherhoods in their proper context. The first period, which Gouilly calls the Berber phase, was in the eleventh century, when the Almoravids (al-murabitun) conquered the hitherto pagan kingdom of Ghana in the western Sudan. The second, or Mandingo, phase took place during the fifteenth century, when converted Negro Africans, using Islamization as a weapon of their states, began to convert other Africans. In the sixteenth century came the Sonrai period when, owing particularly to the kingdoms on the eastern Niger, Islam spread rapidly in the Niger area. During the Peul phase in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries the Tukulors in the Futa Toro (Senegal), the Futa Djalon (Guinea), and the Hausa regions (Northern Nigeria) conducted holy wars to spread their version of Islam to neighboring pagan and Muslim tribes. The last phase came at the end of the nineteenth century when various Islamic states fought to spread their authority, using the cover of Islam as a justification. Although missionaries and traders belonging to the orders had entered West Africa long before, Sufi brotherhoods were particulary important in the fourth and fifth periods.

The brotherhood which apparently first appeared in West Africa was the Qadriyya tariqa. Founded by the sharif21 Si Muhammad Abd al-Qadar al-Djilani (1079-1166), originally from Baghdad, the order spread over the Middle East and North Africa at an early date. It soon divided into myriad branches, some re- taining only the most tenuous connections with the motherhouse in the Middle East. The Qadiri order was introduced into the Sahel region in the fifteenth century by Muhammad Abd al-Karim al-Maghrib. But it was Al-Mukhtar ibn Ahmad (1729-1811), the son of one of al-Maghrib's disciples of the Arab Kunta tribe, who founded a center for the order north of Timbuktu which became the base for the order in West Africa.

The second important brotherhood to come from North to West Africa was the Tijaniyya order founded by a Qadiri named Sharif23 Ahmad ibn Muhammad al-Tijani (1735-1815). At the age of twenty-one he traveled from Ain Mahdi (Morocco) to Mecca. After his return to North Africa he had a revelation from the Prophet (c. 1781) and, as a result, founded the Tijani brotherhood. Sometime thereafter al-Tijani sent a missionary from the Ida Ou Ali ethnic group, Muhammad al-Hafiz ibn al-Mukhtar ibn Habib al-Baddi, to Mauritania. There, he converted the Ida Ou Ali, who then had considerable influence in the proselytization of the surrounding area, including portions of Senegal.

Following al-Tijani's death, his spiritual successors quarreled, causing a division of the order into two motherhouses, one at Fez and one at Ain Mahdi. Most of the important Tijaniyya branches in West Africa are affiliated with the former center. Intensive missionary activity was conducted in West Africa in association with various commercial undertakings. The most important conversion in this period was that of Umar Tall (1794/7-1864), a member of the Tukulor ethnic group in the Futa Toro. While in Mecca, where he arrived in 1828, he met one of al-Tijani's close companions, who named him Moqaddim of the order in West Africa. Umar Tall then returned to West Africa, going first to the area presently called Northern Nigeria, where he remained until 1838. He then went to Massina and the Futa Djalon, and did not return to his home territory until 1846, by which time he claimed the rank of khalif in the Tijani order and had gathered an army of volunteers. In 1851-1852 he launched a holy war and conquered a large part of the Sudan touching on Senegal in the Futa Toro region. When Al-Hajj Umar died in 1864, much of the large area he had converted reverted to its old religious traditions. The Futa Toro, however, because it was peopled by a majority of Tukulor, remained almost solidly Tijani. Furthermore, the Islamization movement was continued by Umar Tall's disciples, who conducted various smaller holy wars, some of which were of major importance in the conversion of the Wolof.

Equally important among the Wolof was the Murid brotherhood, which was founded in 1866 by a Wolof Marabout of Tukulor ancestry of the M'Bake family, Muhammad Ibn Muhammad ibn Habib Allah (1850-1927), called Ahmad Bamba. In approximately 1880 Ahmad Bamba was initiated into the Qadiri tariqa by Shaykh Hajj Kamara, and later, judging this insufficient, he traveled to Mauritania to be initiated by Shaykh Sidia, the head of a major Qadiri branch derived from the Kunta center. He joined Lat Dyor's entourage, and, by 1886, when Dyor was killed, Bamba had gained a reputation for learning and piety. In that same year he received a revelation of his mission to found his own order, which he based in Touba (in Diourbel).

From the outset the French authorities feared Ahmad Bamba, who they believed hoped to re-establish a Wolof state under his own control. He had attracted followers of Lat Dyor, Al-Bur Ndyaye, Maba, and many others identified with opposition to the colonialists. Rumors circulated about his anti-government statements and occasionally about the large scale collection of arms and volunteers by his followers. Bamba lived his life under close surveillance by the French and was exiled in 1895 and again in 1897.

The Reasons for the Wolof Conversion

A partial answer to the second question raised in this paper, concerning the factors in the Senegalese situation which made the brotherhoods particularly attractive to the Wolof, is that the Wolof, already imbued with Islamic ideas, were particularly receptive to an intensive Islamization effort by the brother- hoods. But more fundamental reasons can be found from an examination of traditional Wolof society at this time.

SENEGAL: Woloff Marabout, or Priest from, old print, 1890

The nineteenth century was a period of confusion and insecurity for the Wolof, who sought first to express their opposition to the colonial authorities both as individuals and as a group, by adherence to the brotherhoods. Their organizational strength and the authority of their leaders made the brotherhoods particularly suitable organizations for political protest, providing the members with strong protection against injury or punishment in a fight against any hated group and promising them Paradise if they died fighting for the brotherhood. Religious sects or "revitalization movements" have played such roles at various times in Africa: The Christian Harris movement in the Ivory Coast was, for example, such a group; and Suret-Canale states that the development of new religious groups is a response to "the sharpening through the effects of colonialism, of the internal contradictions of African society." Respected authorities on North African Islam, such as Depont and Coppolani, complained that the orders there were recruiting many discontented elements of society and were becoming major centers of resistance. Of the brotherhoods in Senegal which resisted the colonialists, some of the most powerful were branches of the Tijaniyya led by Umar Tall and his disciples and Ahmad Bamba's Murid order, which became a symbol of resistance shortly after it founding in 1866. It is hard to know whether or not Bamba deliberately attempted to opposed the French; indeed, it is quite probable, as Suret-Canale has suggested, that the Murids did not have "a revolutionary character principally and directly turned against the colonial domination," but that they were led to express protests against colonial oppression only to the extent that the colonial regime oppressed them. It makes little difference in this context what Ahmad Bamba's actual intentions were, for the results were similar whether or not he wished to fight the French. His reputation among the Africans, as well as among the French, was that of opposing the colonialists; the discontented flocked to him as they had to the brotherhoods in North Africa, and, although their first strong following came principally from the Wolof, the Murids later drew from other ethnic groups as well.

Former Senegalese preisdent Abdoulaye Wade (a Wolof) consulting a maraboutA second factor in the Senegalese situation which pushed the Wolof toward the brotherhoods was the Muslim orders' initial stance as vehicles of social reform. There were conflicts among the social classes or sectors within the Wolof as there were within other ethnic groups in Senegal. Although this attraction is the most nebulous to speculate upon because of the extreme difficulty of knowing exactly which social sectors within the ethnic groups were opposed or allied, it is a vital consideration, for friction among various parts of the population was an important element in Senegalese politics. A disruption of the balance between sectors could and did in many cases lead to the emergence of certain sectors' interests in a new group which would be a stronger champion of its interests than the individual sector had been. The brotherhoods thus provided a chance for the dissatisfied sectors of the Senegalese population

to seek to better their position. This was true not only among the Wolof, but also among the Tukulor and other tribes in the area. Thus Suret-Canale, as well as the Senegalese scholar Chiekh Tidjane Sy and others, believes that Al Hajj Umar's Tijani branch expressed "the need for liberation of former captives, of women, of youth, against the tyranny of traditional 'feudal' or familial cadres." In the early twentieth century the nearby French Soudan provides another example of such a group when the Rimaybe and the Bella, former captives of the Peul and the Tuareg respectively, sought a change in their situation through joining the Hamalliyya, a Tijani sub-group. People of low social caste, unsatisfied chiefs, and Marabouts all tried to find the solution to their problems in this brotherhood. Thus, in his explanation of one of the major Hamallist uprisings in 1930, a French commandant notes that the major Hamallist Marabout in his region was recruiting former captives who, upon joining the Muslim order, broke completely with their former masters and even tried to kill them.

In Wolof territory in the end of the nineteenth century the Islamic holy wars led by the successors of Al Hajj Umar, such as Maba, expressed the desires of large groups of the population for an improvement in their position relative to other groups. Vincent Monteil, a noted French scholar, suggests in fact that the Muslim leaders sided with the Wolof peasants against the warriors and the nobles in a class war over frictions that had built up between the two groups over centuries, as the nobles and warriors pillaged the peasants at will. Thus, jihad leaders, in carrying out their holy missions, were also acting as heads of a class revolution.

Monteil's view is not difficult to support, as many early European writers describe widespread pillaging by kings and nobles. There is additional proof in local traditions, such as the tale of the revolt in the Djolof kingdom in which the Mauritanians and Marabouts sided with the people against the ruling classes, although these eventually reasserted their authority. French colonial authorities also tended to interpret the Muslim wars among the Wolof as class wars. Robert Arnaud wrote in 1912: "In Wolof country formerly the intrusion of Islam constituted a veritable social revolution and was in reality an opposition of the proletarian caste to the aristocracy, a class struggle; the cultivators had very strong sentiments of repulsion against the warriors who exploited them. Thanks to Islam they formed a bloc against the aristocracy which had remained fetichist, the crowd against its oppressors. The warriors did not conceal the dislike they felt for the Marabouts."

However, to explain the Muslim holy wars simply as social revolutions is probably not sufficient. Even accepting that there was a widespread and fixed enmity between the Wolof peasants and nobles, it appears that not only, or even mainly, the peasants sought to improve their social position by joining the brotherhoods. All dissatisfied sectors of the Wolof turned to the Muslim orders, including the nobles who had lost their power through the French invasion.

A glance at the Murid movement shows some of the complexities of the situation. Ahmad Bamba,as the French administrator Paul Marty points out, was surrounded by warriors and nobles who had been involved in the last struggles against the French, although the mass of his followers came from the rural population which was composed of former slaves or poor freemen. This combination indicates that the nobles saw in the Murid movement an opportunity to regaintheir authority, whereas the former slaves, Marty suggests, saw in the Muridiyya a new form of security to replace the old, tightly controlled system to which they had been accustomed -- a security which was no more than a new

type of slavery under the descendants of their former rulers. Marty may have overlooked the fact that many peasants must have turned to the Murids because the brotherhood seemed to provide an escape from control by their former rulers, but his analysis does illustrate the point made here that the motivations of the men who became Murids were varied and complex; that the desire for social reforms was certainly a major factor stimulating the Wolof to join the brotherhoods, but that one cannot therefore interpret the success of the brotherhoods among the Wolof as being solely, or even primarily, due to the desire of the lower classes to assert themselves against the nobles.

It would also be a mistake to ignore the important social implications of the Muridiyya (and other brotherhoods) since the new lords, the Marabouts, were drawn from a wider section of the population than the old ruling class, at least in the early years. There was in the early years, moreover, a degree of social mobility in the brotherhoods which the old tribal system lacked. Land ownership and political power in general were now divided between the aristocrats, who became Marabouts, and the old maraboutic families, some of which had been poor and without power before the nineteenth century. In addition a peasant disciple, if he worked hard and obeyed his Marabout, could hope to be elevated to the position of a lesser Marabout, an advance in status not normally possible in the secular tribal system. Nonetheless, the nobility together with the maraboutic families provided the bulk of the Marabouts, especially the important ones, and the mass of peasants and low caste artisans remained subjected as they had been under the tribal system.

Whatever the nature of the social reforms which the Muslim brotherhoods espoused in the middle and late nineteenth century, the "sclerosis" which Suret-Canale mentions soon set in. The momentum for change was lost and the maraboutic leadership became closely associated with the colonial regime and the old aristocracy. This had occurred in the Umarian Tijani brotherhood in Senegal before the Murids rose to importance, and by the early 1900's it was true of the latter brotherhood as well. Colonial authorities began to remark on these alliances which became increasingly evident. A political report of 1904 states: "It is therefore necessary for us to observe with care the alliance which tends to be formed between the aristocracy . and the Marabouts. The Marabouts enrich themselves by their (alms) collections, the aristocracy . . . to the contrary, which only drew its fortune from its arbitrary power and its attacks which are no longer permitted, grows poorer from day to day. The descendants of the old families, therefore, give to the rich "sikh" [Marabout] their daughter or their relative in exchange for a large dowry."

The 1915 political report comments on the Marabouts' increasing collaboration with the colonialists: "And it is precisely because these religious chiefs profit from these situations that they have an interest in being with us and in that case they would be our support. Their interests are in effect linked with ours and the more we develop the acquisitive faculty of the indigene by the creation of new needs, the more we augment the wealth of the brotherhoods through the followers and of which the sum is higher than the taxes paid to the administration. It is for this reason that in this period of crisis [the first world war] we have nothing to fear from the maraboutic influence.

Most of the Muslim orders in Senegal, then, had become part of the "Establishment" by the early twentieth century. After this period only the Hamalliyya, which developed in the early twentieth century, was identified with social reforms, but it did not have much influence in Senegal and, like the other orders, lost most of its reforming character once it had become established.

Closely connected with the whole question of the reformist character of the Muslim brotherhoods at their foundation is the attraction which these groups had as substitutes or reinforcements for tribal society. This is the third, and perhaps the most important, reason for the conversion of the Wolof to Islam in the end of the nineteenth century. The phenomenon involved

is not at all unique to Senegal or to Africa. It is readily observable that, when the equilibrium of a group is disturbed, the members of that group tend to compensate by actions foreign to their normal pattern of living and often join substitute groups which promise to restore the lost balance. Another example of this behavior seems to be that described by David Apter among the Fon of Dahomey.

The Wolof had a highly developed state system, and their social structure was tightly connected to their religious beliefs and customs. The arrival and entrenchment of the colonialists destroyed these living patterns and introduced new elements which challenged old values and habits. In order to conquer the area, the French had to break the power of the Wolof kings and nobles. The Wolof kingdoms were broken into smaller units: those who resisted were beaten in war; those who did not, or who eventually made peace, found themselves dependent on the colonial system for their authority, as their former sources of power were destroyed and their lines of revenue abolished.46 Thus the Wolof were forced to look for a means of replacing their old way of life.

A major factor in the disintegration of Wolof society for which the French were responsible was the introduction of peanuts as a commercial crop into the traditional agricultural system. Wolof family living patterns were closely tied to agriculture. Land was owned by the family as a whole and could not be sold. It was the duty of the chief of the family to distribute some of the land among the members of his family, who would work the major part of their time in the common field. The cultivation of a commercial crop of peanuts changed this system altogether. Farmers now had the strong incentive of money and the new goods it could buy to cultivate the small private plots which had hitherto been an unimportant addendum to their principal work in the common field. However, many farmers apparently continued to show token recognition to the position of the heads of their families through annual gifts in money or kind. One administrator wrote: The personal goods, formerly of negligible quantity now surpass in importance the collective family goods. Thus, by the force of things, a disaggregation of family solidarity [occurs] which has shown its consequences in all domains. "

The disintegrative force of the introduction of peanuts into the agricultural system was beginning to be felt in Senegal by the end of the nineteenth century. Peanuts had been grown in Senegal for a long time -- the sixteenth-century traveler Andre Alvarez de Almada had noted them during his visit48 -- and the French had begun to foster their growth long before the mid-nineteenth century, but it was around this date that they began to encourage their cultivation in earnest in an attempt to make Senegal a profitable colony. After 1850 peanuts were being produced for export in significant amounts, and by the end of the century peanut growers were moving from the center of production at Cayor to other regions to look for new fields and thus to extend the impact of peanuts .

The undermining of the powers of the chiefs and the introduction of commercial agriculture by the French are only two of the many factors contributing to the breakdown of the Wolof living patterns. In addition, the mere presence of the colonialists with their apparently superior way of life raised questions about old ways of doing things, and the establishment of French forts and trading centers drew increasing numbers of people into French service as clerks, soldiers, domestics, etc., thus adding a new dimension to the economic and social options open to the Wolof. Furthermore, population movements to the north of the Senegal as well as increased contact through trade and war with the Futa Toro peoples are additional kinds of influences which may have contributed to the insecurity of the Wolof in the nineteenth century, leading them to turn to the brotherhoods for reinforcement.

The brotherhoods, despite their tight hierarchical organization, had a long history in the Muslim world of a flexibility characterized by their habit of accepting the customs of the people among whom they found themselves, imposing only their political authority and a few major Islamic prescriptions. Thus it was not difficult for the tariqas to adjust themselves to the Wolof situation, acting as

a replacement for the old framework of political and social authority and providing a structure in which the Wolof could find a defined role to play. As elsewhere in Africa, where, as Marcel Cardaire points out, Islam succeeded because of the isolation of pagan tribesmen who, finding their old system crumbling, turned away to find a new one, the Muslim orders were able to help the Wolof adapt to changes in Senegal.

The Political Significance of the Wolof Conversion

While in general the Wolof as members of brotherhoods followed their old ways, despite the overlay of Muslim customs and sayings, their political leadership was definitely modified by the new affiliation. They now turned to the Marabouts when they wanted anything done, and the former nobles and kings, as they were absorbed into the ruling structure of the Muslim orders, found as Marabouts an even greater authority than their pagan counterparts had had. The Marabouts combined the feudal-type authority over land of the nobles with a much greater authority, based on religion as well as force, over the lives of their subjects. In different brotherhoods the position of the leaders was, not surprisingly, different. Of the branches of several orders which the Wolof joined, the Murid order had a noticeably more powerful leadership because of the emphasis which Ahmad Bamba had placed on the virtues of working

for one's leader and of complete discipline. The Murids' first loyalty was to their brotherhood personified by its Marabouts, whose every command had a considerable degree of authority. While the stress on discipline was less in other orders, all of the leaders of the brotherhoods among the Wolof had considerable political power.

It seems clear that the answer to the third question raised in the beginning of this paper has been largely answered. The Wolof conversion in the end of the nineteenth century was politically significant because the political leaders of the ethnic group became the Marabouts. How important and unusual this fact was for the development of Senegalese politics can be seen by comparing the Wolof with their neighbors the Tukulor, who had been in contact with Islam at least since the eleventh century. Thorough Islamization of this group did not take place until the torodo (torodbe) drove out the pagan Peul Denyianke dynasty in 1776, but thereafter the Islamization of the Tukulor was intensified, and a series of Muslim chiefs called almanys ruled until the end of the nineteenth century, when the French took over the area. Islam was thus a factor of great importance in Tukulor history for many centuries, and that ethnic group traditionally felt it was the carrier of Muslim civilization and was superior to the pagan groups around it. Since the early eighteenth century, the Tukulor, led by the torodo, had launched holy wars on their neighbors. By this time they were in direct contact with representatives of Muslim brotherhoods. Indeed, the Qadriyya orders, led by members of the Ida Ou Ali and later of the Kunta groups, had many followers among the Tukulor, although with the coming of Umar Tall the overwhelming majority of the group became Tijani. Interestingly enough, however, the Tukulor Marabouts did not become a major political force in the Futa Toro as they did among the Wolof. This fact is all the more striking when one considers that the major branches of the Sufi brotherhoods among the Wolof were founded by Marabouts of Tukulor ancestry. There were, of course, powerful Tukulor Marabouts on regional and local levels, but most of the nationally politically important Marabouts who appeared in the early twentieth century had a largely Wolof following and did not live in the Tukulor regions. Why, then, should the brotherhoods among the Tukulor, who were ex- posed to Islam longer than were the Wolof, be of significantly less political importance ?

One reason often put forward in Senegal by Tukulor and non-Tukulor alike is that the Tukulor, through their long contact with Islam, became more closely acquainted with the Qu'ran and the doctrines of Islam than did the Wolof and, being more educated in the religion, had less need for the Marabouts to act as intermediaries between them and Allah. Furthermore, with a better knowledge of Islam, they were less likely to glorify the powers of their Mara- bouts. Since the intellectual gap between the Marabouts and their disciples was smaller among the Tukulor than among the Wolof, the Marabouts could therefore gain less authority. But this interpretation is difficult to accept. Blind obedience and extreme respect for the Marabout could be found in many brotherhoods, even among peoples in North Africa with as long an acquaintance with Islam as the Tukulor. Nor does the lack of Qu'ranic education explain the exceptions to the rule who are Tukulor and have Tukulor followers.

A more satisfactory answer is found in the traditional socio-economic structure of the Futa Toro, where politics and society in general were directed by important clan leaders, a clan in the Futa being comprised of several families, although not all of one family necessarily belongs to one clan. The leaders of these clans headed important families which owned large concessions of the land in the nineteenth century, and indeed still do, despite land reforms. While the social structure of the Tukulor in the Futa Toro by no means remained unchanged throughout the many centuries since the introduction of Islam, the changes resulted onlyin an accretion of custom. Thus the fall of the Denyianke led to the rule of the Muslim almamys but did not alter the economic and political control of the area by Tukulor clan leaders. In fact, the almamys were named by the great families, so that their power stemmed not from their role as Muslim leaders but from their family connections. The Marabouts in the Futa,then, never had the opportunity to rise to power. Even Al Hajj Umar, who united many clans for a short time in a religious war, did not change the Futa system. This continued social, economic, and political power of the clans among the Tukulor should be compared to the decline in power of Wolof traditional rulers in the nineteenth century when the political and social system of that group was threatened by contacts with the French, and Marabouts and brotherhoods stepped in to reinforce and replace a disintegrating tribal system, thereby becoming politically powerful because they replaced the traditional kings and nobles. Thus, it is primarily in the differences between the pre- Islamic social structure of the two groups that the differences in their response to Islamization lie, resulting in the political dominance of Muslim leaders among the Wolof.