United States Constabulary
Army of Occupation
Germany and Austria
1946-1952

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M24 light tank

For greater mobility, the troops were
equipped with jeeps and M8 and M20 light armored cars. Ten light
armored cars were assigned to each troop… Also, supporting weapons,
such as recoilless rifles and mortars, were provided. Troopers were
armed with pistols, and when necessary, with rifles and sub-machine
guns. Provisions were also made for motorcycle and horse cavalry
troops, and L5 observation planes. M24 light tanks were positioned as
mobile reserves in and around major cities when a show of force was
necessary.

Armor Magazine

Fort Knox: Sep/Oct 2007. Vol. 116, Iss. 5; pg. 26,
9 pgs

Abstract (Summary)

Immediately, Harmon went to work, outlining his
proposed mission for the U.S. Constabulary: To maintain general
military security and to assist in the accomplishment of the objectives
of the military government in the occupied zones of Germany and Austria
by means of an active patrol system prepared to take prompt and
effective action to forestall and suppress riots, rebellions, and acts
prejudicial to the security of the U.S. occupational forces. For the
first time in U.S. military history, a peacetime integrated armed force
was created under a single command and employed as a defensive
deterrent supported by American nuclear power.

#

As the post-World War II U.S. Army was rapidly
downsizing, a new breed of mounted warriors emerged to deal with the
political, military, economic, diplomatic, and personnel turbulence of
occupation and communist expansion. There were, however, serious doubts
about tiieir ability to succeed as the cold war began to escalate. As
Carl von Clausewitz noted, the study of war and lessons learned are
significant; however, each new age of warfare takes on a nature all its
own. This is the story of the U.S. Constabulary during a period of
international tensions.

In May 1945, Prime Minister Winston S. Churchill
advised President Harry S. Truman, “An iron curtain is drawn down upon
their [Soviet Union] front. We do not know what is going on behind.”1
At the end of me year, Allen W. Dulles, from the Office of Strategic
Services and later director of the Central Intelligence Agency,
addressed the Council of Foreign Relations. He noted, “Germany today is
a problem of extraordinary complexity,” adding, “It defies a solution.”
In East Germany, Dulles said, “An iron curtain has descended over the
fate of these people and very likely conditions are truly terrible.”2

Events in Germany began to move rapidly toward
unmanageable chaos. When the Nazi regime was totally defeated and
surrendered that spring, the U.S. Army entered into a period of
displacement. The war was won and American troops in Frankfurt,
shouted, “We wanna go home.”3 The mood of many soldiers had drastically
changed. By the end of 1945, redeployment back to the United States
became almost a surge. Experienced war veterans were clamoring for
their “ruptured duck,” an insignia worn on the right chest signifying
honorable discharge. Mountains of wartime equipment were stored and
began to fall into disrepair.

The Soviet military was also undergoing
reorganization in meir occupied countries. Unlike the United States,
Premier Joseph Stalin was determined to keep a formidable force in
Eastern Europe, equipped with a staggering number of offensive tanks
manned by over a million men. Even before me United States could
implement a suitable military government policy, me Soviet high command
began a major reconstruction of its military forces. The emphasis was
placed on greater mobility with large mechanized formations and new
equipment. The provocation for a military conflict with the Soviet
Union was becoming more and more a possibility.

Furthermore, the Red Army began expelling millions
of Germans from their former territories in the east and Sudetenland.
Traditional German boundaries were redrawn as determined by President
Franklin Roosevelt, Winston Churchill, and Joseph Stalin at the Yalta
Conference in February 1945. Meanwhile in the American zone, depleted
American military units became primarily static, trying to manage not
only German refugees but also displaced Poles. In addition,
anti-Semitic attacks and pogroms in Soviet-occupied Poland in 1945 and
1946 led to the immigration of thousands of Jewish refugees into the
American zone.

Lieutenant General Joseph T. McNarney had more
than a daunting summons. He succeeded General Dwight D. Eisenhower in
November 1945 as the military governor and commander of U.S. forces in
the European theater. How was he going to bring some semblance of order
to the chaos in the occupied American zone? What type of organization
and leadership would be required to establish structural integrity for
a country destroyed by total war and undergoing disarmament and
demilitarization? Adding to this process was the growing political
discord between the victorious powers.

The man General McNarney chose to “inherit the
wind” was a cavalryman and armor warrior, Major General Ernest N.
Harmon. Known for his profane language in the tradition of General
George S. Patton, he became the driving force to construct an elite
mobile force based on the wartime cavalry organization model. Harmon
believed the cavalry spirit was ideal for operations in the unruly
atmosphere existing in the American zone. He planned to have the
Constabulary fully organized and operational by 1 July 1946, with a
mobile force of up to 38,000 men to patrol 40,000 square miles,
including 1, 400 miles of interzonal boundaries. Approximately 16
million Germans lived in this area composed of flatlands, hills,
mountains, and forests all crossed by numerous meandering streams.4
Most provocative, however, were Red Army forces positioned in eastern
European countries.

Immediately, Harmon went to work, outlining his
proposed mission for the U.S. Constabulary: “To maintain general
military security and to assist in the accomplishment of the objectives
of the military government in the occupied zones of Germany and Austria
by means of an active patrol system prepared to take prompt and
effective action to forestall and suppress riots, rebellions, and acts
prejudicial to the security of the U.S. occupational forces.”5

General Harmon’s mobile force was under me command
of another cavalryman, Lieutenant General Lucian K. Truscott Jr.,
commander of the Third Army. Known for his gravel voice and a
determination to win, Truscott once told his son every good commander
must “have some son-of-a-bitch in him.”6 Though too optimistic, his
idea was to use the Third Army as a general reserve tactical force and
the Constabulary as a first line of mobile defense.

Part of General Harmon’s planning team were
Colonels William S. Biddle, former commander of the 113th Cavalry
Group, and Charles H. Reed, former commander of the 2d Cavalry Group.
BoUi had impressive wartime records. After the war, they became
important members of the general board on evaluating wartime mechanized
cavalry operations and equipment. Harmon told the surprised officers,
“operational elements of the occupational forces were to comprise two
major forces - a tactical force, comprising roughly of a corps, and a
Constabulary force.”7 Reiterating Truscott’s intent, Harmon mentioned
to his team that before the Constabulary could be used as a mobile
defense force it had to restore order in the American zone.

The planning team decided, with Harmon’s
concurrence, to establish a table of organization and equipment for a
multi-capable police security force. The Constabulary was to be
organized in three brigades with three regiments each. Each regiment
had three squadrons of five troops.

However, their equipment excluded heavy weapons,
such as self-propelled artillery, medium tanks, and tank destroyers.
For greater mobility, the troops were equipped with jeeps and M8 and
M20 light armored cars.

Ten light armored cars were assigned to each
troop. In addition, two troops were motorized with 1 1/2-ton utility
trucks. Also, supporting weapons, such as recoilless rifles and
mortars, were provided. Troopers were armed with pistols, and when
necessary, with rifles and sub-machine guns. Provisions were also made
for motorcycle and horse cavalry troops, and L5 observation planes. M24
light tanks were positioned as mobile reserves in and around major
cities when a show of force was necessary.8

The 1st and 4th Armored Divisions, and wartime
cavalry groups became the nucleus for the Constabulary. Major General
Fay B. Prickett, who commanded the 4th Armored Division, was stunned by
Harmon’s new proposal. At the time, the division was deployed as a
tactical static occupation force. Part of Prickett’s team was another
cavalryman, Lieutenant Colonel Albin F. Irzyk, who recalled, “We were
hit by a thunderbolt.” Like many in the 4Div, Irzyk was astonished over
the new police security mission, “we were forming a unit such as had
never before been in the Army. This was a completely new drawing
without any precedent.”9 Prickett had to divest the division of the
armored equipment that propelled it across Europe and create an
organization with light mobile equipment.

To establish pride in his unique unit, Harmon
prescribed a readily distinguishable uniform. He chose the
combined-arms symbol and modified it. Like the armor insignia, he
selected the colors blue and yellow with a red lightning bolt. The
insignia colors, however, were rearranged. The spirit of the insignia
signified the quick striking power of a mounted unit. Vehicles and
special helmet liners were rimmed with yellow and blue stripes. The
unit’s motto, “Mobility, Vigilance, Justice,” became the watchword
throughout the American zone.

Critical to the development of leadership, Harmon
and his staff prescribed a training school for the new force. His
emphasis on leadership was always a priority. He once stated, “More
training must be devoted to the meaning and requirements of one’s
combat mission. This will require commanders of all echelons to be more
careful and concise in the assignments of the mission.”10

In March 1946, the Constabulary Training School at
Sonthofen was established in the southernmost tip of Bavaria. The
proposed school had an interesting history. It was Adolph Hitler’s
strong belief that a force of arms never defeated Germany during World
War I. Germany’s problem, he stated, was due to a lack of strong
uniformed political leadership. The objective was to form a preparatory
school for the National Socialistic Ordensburgen, which meant a castle
of a religious order or fraternity. As a result, a male youth school
was created on “behalf of and for the Nazi Party.” Selected students
were expected to be of Aryan descent, in perfect health, demonstrating
an unimpeachable character and a proficiency in sports.

Also considered were leadership abilities while
members of the Hitler Jugend. Nazi Party leaders, not parents, selected
students. They were to be guided by the principle, “state first,
individual second.” The school was named “Die Adolph Hitler Schule.”

The guiding educator at Sonthofen was Colonel
Henry C. Newton, who graduated from the Los Angeles Polytechnic
University and was commissioned in field artillery. During World War
II, he had considerable experience with the armored force at Fort Knox,
engaging in research and tactics on armored infantry. He was also
instrumental in organizing and commanding the Armored Force Officers
School, which included courses in tactics and techniques in armor
warfare. The school’s graduates referred to the institution as,
“Newton’s College.” Newton’s new mission at Sonthofen was to manage and
coordinate the activities of six academic departments, tactics,
communication, vehicle maintenance, public safety, general subjects
(map reading and unarmed defense), and geopolitics. The latter
department provided courses on German history, the country’s geography,
politics, and characteristics of the German people.” To assist in
training, the Trooper’s Handbook was distributed to all Constabulary

units. 12 The book was written under the direction
of Lieutenant Colonel Warren D. Haskell, a former state police
commissioner. Eventually, the school became the heart and soul of the
Constabulary.

To facilitate his movement throughout the American
zone, Harmon liberated former Reichsmarschall Hermann W. Göring’s
private train and had it painted in Constabulary colors. However, he
kept Göring’s interior fittings intact because it “suited my
purpose just fine.”13 When he stepped from his train, Harmon was
impeccably dressed with cavalry britches and highly polished boots.
This demeanor became his hallmark, and for some young officers and
troopers, created many anxieties, especially those who did not meet his
expectations. Senior officers greeted him with snappy salutes, which
were returned in kind. Many of his public actions were also designed to
impress the Germans. At first, they called the Constabulary, “Harmon’s
Gestapo.” Soon the population realized the troopers’ importance in
maintaining law and order and attitudes began to change. The Germans
now had another name for the Constabulary, “Blitz Polizei.” Harmon
remembered the populace of Munich calling his arrival, “The Second
Coming.”14

No doubt, Harmon left an unforgettable impression.
One trooper recalled the general coming on like a tiger. On one
occasion after a detailed squadron inspection, he made a “ferocious
speech laced with every known profanity and a few that he must have
created. We thought that he was really something.” Another newly
arrived trooper recalled Harmon stating, “It was time to get off our
beer-soaked asses and become soldiers again.”"

When Colonel Biddle from Harmon’s planning staff
took command of the 11th Constabulary Regiment, he was not as abrupt as
his boss: “Troubles are not new to the 11th Cavalry. For example, in
1901 [when the regiment was organized], the commander of the 1st
Squadron telegraphed the War Department for more officers, saying, ‘I
have 400 horses that have never seen a soldier, 400 recruits that have
never seen a horse, and four second lieutenants that have never seen
either a soldier or a horse.’” Biddle added that the squadron got over
that hump. He reminded his command that me 11th Cavalry’s motto is
“Allons;” in oilier words, “let’s go.”16

Meanwhile, Secretary of War Robert P. Patterson
announced in April 1946 a planned merger of the cavalry and armored
force into a single combat arm. The War Department advanced this
opinion based on wartime experiences and President Harry S. Truman’s
initiative for service unification. The Army had already prompted some
preliminary unification earlier with the abolition of horse cavalry
units, which were formed into mechanized cavalry groups and cavalry
reconnaissance squadrons during the first years of the war. However,
Harmon planned to reintroduce horse cavalry units to traverse rough
terrain and neutralize hostile crowds and riots.

When Secretary Patterson made his announcement,
the Constabulary was experiencing its most taxing organizational
period. Nevertheless, Harmon was determined to complete his mission,
even though more and more American soldiers were demanding to be
demobilized and sent home.

Before long, me question of fraternization became
a volatile issue. Most German and Austrian civilians resented
fraternization with American soldiers. German women who did were
loathed and insultingly referred to as “Yank brides” and “chocolate
girls.” The Germans felt the policy of open fraternization led to
serious disturbances. Part of the problem was the failure to understand
the situations that led to prostitution by many Fräuleins. For
them, it was a period of wartime desperation. They had to rely on basic
human needs for survival. Many had children and families to support.
This obviously made it difficult for the Constabulary to curb the
oldest profession. More so, Constabulary headquarters feared that
German resentment regarding American soldiers having relationships with
Fräuleins could lead to the birth of a new German nationalism.17

Another display of resentment occurred when a
Bürgermeister’s wife gave a Nazi salute followed by, “Heil Hitler”
to a Constabulary patrol passing through a small town. These leftover
attitudes of Nazi feelings were not uncommon among many Germans. The
Constabulary also discovered subversive clubs, whose purpose was to
place obstructions and decapitating wires on and across roads
frequented by U.S. military patrols.18

That critical April, a counterintelligence corps
(CIC) detachment was assigned to the Constabulary. This relationship
was especially important during cases of Frageboden violations. A
Frageboden was a questionnaire used by the American military government
to identify Nazi officials, such as party members and dreaded members
of the Sturmabteilung (SA) and Schutzstaffel (SS) who attempted to
falsify questionnaires to avoid arrest. While coordinating with the
Constabulary, the CIC interrogated and apprehend many suspected
National Socialistic officials. By the end of 1946, Constabulary
troopers apprehended 22,000 illegal border crossers and turned them
over to me military government for legal disposition. Due to activities
of the troopers and German border police, this negative trend was
gradually reversed until the Czechoslovakia crisis in 1948.

To supplement Constabulary operations, Harmon used
reconstituted German border police, whose members were selected only
after being cleared of any connections with the National Socialist
Party, its philosophy, and members of the SA and SS. The formation of
such a force had a positive effect on me civilian population. More so,
it allowed the Constabulary to spend more time monitoring political
agitators, displaced persons, border incursions, and gathering
intelligence.

A year after the war ended, it was still evident
that security threats in the American zone continued to come from local
and infiltrating communists, former Nazis, and a restless German
population. Adding to these concerns were two divergent and problematic
groups of displaced persons - the Poles and Jews. For centuries, the
Poles hated the Germans for past territory violations and invasions.
The Jews, in turn, wanted revenge for the Nazi Holocaust. With the
Holocaust behind them, many were anxious to move to their traditional
home in Palestine. Consequently, they had no desire to assimilate into
the German population because of the Nazi anti-Semitism that still
existed.

Another problem Constabulary headquarters became
aware of was the issue of dismantling and reparations. The communists,
more man the other zonal powers, were determined to strip East Germany
of heavy industry, plus acquire what they could from West Germany. The
rationale was that the Soviet Union demanded Germany make good their
war losses. Stalin’s goal was to transform his occupation zone into a
single-party communist political system and, at the same time, denude
the economic base for a unified Germany. Coal mining equipment,
aluminum, locomotive engines, jet engines and ball bearing plants, just
to mention a few, were among the wartime industries dismantled. The
Krupp works and LG. Farben chemical facilities located in the Eastern
zone met the same fate. Hydrogenation plants that were producing
synthetic gasoline were totally dismantled and sent to the Soviet
Union. They did not hesitate to dismantle all plants engaged in
manufacturing arms, ammunition, tank parts, and other military
equipment.19

During the first 6 months after becoming fully
operational, Constabulary elements uncovered numerous black-market
rings involving scarce merchandise, much of which was coming from the
Soviet zone. Germans, Jews, and Poles operated the illegal rings. By
the end of the year, 2,681 major black-market operations were exposed.
The problem leading to this situation was an overabundance of currency
and a scarcity of agricultural goods, which were being hoarded by
German farmers. Also the black marketeers dealt with jewelry, drugs,
cigarettes, clothing, large sums of money, and aforementioned
agricultural goods. Most of the Constabulary “swoop raids” were
conducted in displaced-persons camps and German homes. One typical
example occurred in November 1946 when a Constabulary squadron
discovered the largest cache of black-market money at the time. An
alert sergeant found over two million Reich Marks hidden in a civilian
sedan crossing over from the Soviet zone into the American zone.20

An exciting Constabulary mission for these young
troopers was to chase down cattle rustlers, which was a flourishing
business as soon as the war ended because of the huge demand for fresh
meat. Horse cavalry elements gained the honorable distinction, as did
many of their fellow troopers, of being called “Circle C Cowboys.”

The Constabulary also had a serious problem with
refugees from the Baltic countries. They had no desire to return to
their homelands, which were overrun and now occupied by Soviet military
forces. The most sensitive issue was the situation of the Ukrainians
and anti-Soviet Russians, many whom had joined the Nazi war machine.
Other refugees in eastern European countries, such as Czechoslovakia,
Hungary, and Rumania, fled their homelands and refused reparation.
These people resented the Soviet Union’s domination and communization
of their homelands.21

One of the least recognized activities was the
Constabulary’s G2 function. A historian later wrote that the
intelligence net created by Colonel A.R. Reeves, assistant chief of
staff, Constabulary G2 section, was “exemplary.” This was because the
Constabulary was spread throughout the American zone, and as a result,
they were able to acquire pertinent information. Each trooper was
constantly reminded to be “intelligence-conscious.” Weekly classes were
held on how to cooperate with other intelligence agencies. These
intelligence operations were critical; they kept the military and
political network abreast of all activities that potentially threatened
internal security, such as communists and socialists engaging in
promoting strikes, population unrest, propaganda activities, and
supporting political uprisings and riots.22

Aside from the intelligence and police security
missions, Constabulary elements paid considerable attention to
political activities of the KPD (German communist party) and SED
(socialist unity party of Germany). The military government, now under
the command of General Lucius D. Clay in Berlin, was concerned over the
shortage in essentials of life, such as food, shelter and clothing, in
the American zone. This could lead to political agitation, plus the
potential for a major German uprising directed against American supply
areas and command posts.

The military government made Reeves’s G2 section
aware that interviews with various German communists and socialist
party members indicated their prevailing suspicious attitude of
anything American. The communist agitators demonstrated a mood that was
becoming increasingly more antagonistic. Reeves observed that the
transition from wartime cooperation to the current period of suspicion
and dislike was reflected in the communist publication, Das Neue Wort.
One article noted that KPD members in the American zone were convinced
that a final military conflict between communists and capitalists was
inevitable. Reluctantly, a few members of the KPD and SED interviewed
admitted that in the Soviet zone political freedom was restricted,
reasoning, “it only affected the reactionaries who deserve to be
restricted.” As the Soviet Union was consolidating its control over
their zone and Eastern Europe, its authoritative one-party communist
system did not tolerate dissenting opinions. German communists
rationalized that the Soviet zone was more “security-conscious,”
because it was, as paranoid propagandists would have it, under constant
attack from the west.23

In September 1946, Secretary of State James E.
Byrnes delivered his startling Stuttgart speech indicating there would
be a change in U.S. foreign policy regarding the German economic
situation. It was evident that Germany could no longer be treated as a
separate economic unit for each occupying power. Byrnes stated that it
was obvious that the military role of the allied powers in western
Germany had changed. At first, it was one of occupation and control;
the new goal was to defend and revitalize Germany. Byrnes let it be
known that me removal of heavy industries by the Soviets should not be
continued. Now, he argued, there was a necessity for generating
peacetime German economy, trade, and self-sufficiency.24 Consequently,
the United States and me United Kingdom moved to create Bizonia as a
single economic unit and suspend dismantling operations.

By now, the most noticeable effect redirecting the
Constabulary’s mission was the result of the breakdown of the Four
Power Authorities (United States, England, France, and Soviet Union)
arrangements over the sensitive issue of German reparations. At the end
of 1946 and into 1947, Stalin tightened his totalitarian grip over
conquered countries. President Truman, along with a concerned state
department, believed communist expansion was bent on probing for
European economic and political weaknesses. These events now signaled
the President to issue early in 1947 historic doctrine that provided
economic and military assistance to deal with the immediate communist
menace in Greece and Turkey.

The impact of a new direction in U.S. foreign
policy was based on containment and a fear of appeasement. With this in
mind, the War Department made a final decision a year after Secretary
Patterson’s announcement that the cavalry and armored force be
consolidated into a single armored cavalry arm. The combination term
“armored cavalry” soon became controversial and unpopular because of
branch disagreements. The traditionalist upheld the term “cavalry”
because of long historical association with horses and the modernist
felt armor and mechanization was the new method of warfighting
requiring an independent designation and branch.25

Nevertheless, the transition to a tactical force
was put in motion. General Clay, the military governor, told Lieutenant
General Albert C. Wedemeyer, director of Army Plans and Operations at
the Pentagon, that arrangements had been drawn up to round out U.S.
forces in Europe. Clay proposed to reorganize me Constabulary into
armored cavalry regiments, with two additional supporting artillery
battalions. Clay also requested three armored infantry battalions from
the states to be incorporated into armored cavalry regiments as a
combined arms mobile force.26

By now, General Harmon felt he had set the course,
and it was time for a new commander. Organizing the Constabulary had
taken its toll on the armor warrior. Setting up a police security force
at a time of rapid demobilization of officers and enlisted personnel
had been more than an exhausting challenge. By early 1947, the
Constabulary had reached its peak strength of nearly 30,917 men.
General Harmon lamented that the Constabulary was constantly suffering
from a loss of trained personnel due to persistent turnovers. On 1 May
1947, Major General Withers A. Burress took command.

It was now evident that the Constabulary elements
were becoming engines of change. Plans were made to inactivate most
units and reorganize the 2d, 6th, and 14th Constabularies into armored
cavalry regiments.

In June 1947, Secretary of State George C.
Marshall launched his economic assistance plan designed to deal with
the plight of Europe, which was still responding from the destructive
nature of total war and the demonic effects of hunger, poverty,
desperation, and harsh European winters. Stalin’s foreign minister, VM.
Molotov, rejected the plan, calling it a capitalistic scheme that
meddled in the internal affairs of other countries. Stalin made sure
that east European countries under Soviet occupation did not comply
because part of the Marshall plan required participating nations to
have freely elected democratic institutions.

While the debate was going on over the Marshall
plan, the Constabulary G2 received an alarming report in August from
the European Command advising that the Soviets were operating three
uranium mines in Czechoslovakia with hundreds of German prisoners of
war. One mine was reported to have the richest uranium vein in Eastern
Europe. Once extracted, the ore was crushed, washed, rinsed, boxed, and
rushed to the Soviet Union.27

During General Burress’ tour, tensions became even
more volatile when a communist coup occurred in Czechoslovakia in
February 1948, causing again a large flow of Sudeten Germans and
Volksdeutsh from other east European countries into the American zone.
The creation of another Soviet satellite caused intense intelligence
gathering by Reeves’s G2 and CIC elements. It seemed this international
provocation by the Soviets would accelerate the organization of armored
cavalry regiments. However, diplomatic efforts were not in agreement
with military capabilities. No sooner had General Burress taken command
when the European Command advised him that troop cuts were again
expected.

The major personnel and equipment problems had
originated in the United States. The President and Congress routinely
cut Army budgets while a national military strategy began to rely more
on nuclear weapons. An economy-minded, Republican-controlled Congress
made the Army’s future unstable. An influential Republican isolationist
and proponent of limited government, Senator Robert A. Taft, challenged
the country’s post-war role in internationalism. The Ohio senator was
not enthusiastic about committing American ground forces in Europe. For
national defense, he supported the Navy and a strategic policy relying
on nuclear airpower. The military cuts were so drastic that during his
tour as chief of staff, General Eisenhower remarked that implementing
me rapid demobilization of the wartime Army was more unpleasant than
being head of the occupation forces in Germany.28

Meantime, Major General Isaac D. White had
succeeded General Burress. White served under Harmon during the war as
an armor commander, later commanding the 2d Armored Division. At the
time, he commanded the Cavalry School at Fort Riley, Kansas. His
mission, beginning in May 1948, was to continue to reorganize the
Constabulary based on an Army general board report for a new table of
organization and equipment for new armored cavalry regiments (light).
Lieutenant General Clarence C. Huebner, the commander of U.S. ground
forces in Europe, told White to reform the Constabulary from a police
security force to a multitasked, hard-hitting armored cavalry fighting
force as soon as possible.

Like his predecessors, General White’s mission was
far from easy. He had the task of organizing and training a new
military force predisposed by personnel turbulence, budget cuts,
equipment problems, and the uneasiness of the cold war. The tactical
concept he perceived was to use armored cavalry as a fast-moving,
combined-arms team to penetrate and disrupt the enemy’s communications
and supply installations. His view was to mold armored cavalry into a
self-contained organization similar to the regimental combat teams of
World War II known for their ability to use cavalry tactics of
exploitation and pursuit.29 In June 1948, the Constabulary school at
Sonthofen was closed.

That same month, the Soviet Union withdrew
representatives from the quadripartite administration of Berlin. Days
later, the western powers officially announced currency reform for
Trizonia (United States, England, and France). Consequently, the
Soviets stopped all ground traffic in and out of Berlin. Thus, began
the infamous Berlin blockade, which was finally lifted in May 1949.

Colonel George A. Rehm, meanwhile, reported to
General White and took command of the 6th Armored Cavalry. Rehm’s
objective was similar to what was happening with the other armored
cavalry regiments. For example, he immediately began a rigorous
training schedule, stressing the importance of armored cavalry as a
mobile defense element. The problem he had, as did the other armored
cavalry commanders, was ensuring the regiments could defend the
American zone with fewer soldiers all armed with worn-out World War II
equipment. Thus, Huebner and White’s tactical ideas at the time were
far from realistic. In reality, the armored cavalry regiments became
more of a defensive combat force. Unfortunately, the armored cavalry
regiments’ tactical recourse was to act as tripwires if the Soviets
crossed the border with their massive manpower and tanks.

The doctrine directing the reconstituted
Constabulary elements to armored cavalry regiments was finally resolved
by the end of the decade. The regiments were to deploy as a light
armored force “to engage in offensive or defensive combat, either
mounted, dismounted, or a combination of both, primarily in execution
of security and reconnaissance missions.”

The principle of economy of force was added to the
field manuals, meaning high commanders now had the means to
discriminate employment and distribution of their forces. In addition,
the regiments were to be tasked as screening, reconnaissance, and
counter reconnaissance elements as prescribed by higher echelons for
independent action without reinforcements.30

Finally, the Constabulary’s intelligence, and
police security missions came to an end. The United States, England,
and a reluctant France, agreed on an occupation statute for western
Germany, assuring the Germans self-government and economic
independence. All dismantling provisions and industrial restrictions
had been removed, giving West Germany more economic freedom and
opportunities. On 8 May 1949, the Basic Law was adopted and the Federal
Republic of Germany was established with Bonn as its capital.
Meanwhile, the North Atlantic Treaty was signed and went into effect in
August 1949 as a defensive counterbalance to expected Soviet aggressive
overtures. For the first time in U.S. military history, a peacetime
integrated armed force was created under a single command and employed
as a defensive deterrent supported by American nuclear power. There was
no place for a Constabulary in this new international arena and a
restored democratic West Germany. The Constabulary headquarters was
inactivated in November 1950, and by end of 1952, the last few
operational Constabulary squadrons met the same fate.

Earlier, General Clay had returned to the United
States with the satisfaction of seeing the transfer of military
government to German civil authority. Regarding the Constabulary, Clay
said, “It won the respect and admiration of all, including the German
population.” This was a ringing endorsement from one of the Army’s
greatest leaders and administrators during the early cold war period.31
In the 1950 Congressional Record, 81st Congress, recorded that the
Constabulary was “probably the keenest, most vigilant eye” the country
possessed, always “ready to live up to [its] mission.”32

In June 1950, Congress passed the Army
Reorganization Act. The traditional offices of the chief of infantry,
chief of cavalry, chief of field artillery, and the chief of coast
artillery were abolished. This congressional action finally gave legal
recognition to the armored force, which had actually occurred in 1942.
The armored force now absorbed the cavalry branch. Mechanized cavalry
simply became armor. The act was the coup de grace to traditional
cavalrymen, who held fast to past historical exploits, and a victory
for the modernists.

The U.S. Constabulary was built on the cavalry
organizational model and created during a tumultuous period in American
military, diplomatic, and political history. Surely, it was a period of
postwar uncertainty. Armored and mechanized cavalry elements, along
with supporting units, were called on to perform a unique mission under
unparalleled conditions. They adjusted to extraordinary international
tensions and internal complexities.

It can be persuasively argued that the
Constabulary was instrumental in liberating the Germans in the American
zone from the chains of their totalitarian past. These young troopers
filled a void created by the redeployment of World War II veterans
eager to get home. Isolationism again became a postwar demand by many
Americans and their congressmen. Army budgets were cut, seriously
affecting manpower and research required for mechanized warfighting.
All these actions stifled preparedness for the emerging contingencies
of the cold war. Yet, in spite of this, the Constabulary spirit
prevailed, redirecting its legacy toward a tactical orientation,
armored cavalry. Certainly, the Constabulary became a distinct engine
of change. It created a model and doctrine for today’s mounted force
and became a new breed - the U.S. Army’s “cold war mounted warriors.”

Digest of an off-the-record speech at meeting of
the Council of Foreign Relations, 3 December 1945, in “That Was Then:
Allen W. Dulles on the Occupation of Germany,” Foreign Affairs,
November-December 2003.

4 Major General Ernest N. Harmon, History of the
United States Constabulary (For the Biennial Report to the Chief of
Staff, U.S. Army), Ernest N. Harmon Papers, U.S. Army Military History
Institute (MHI), Carlisle Barracks, PA, p. 6.

17 Weekly Intelligence Summary, number 24, for the
period from 160001 November to November 1946, Civil Security,
97-USF8-2.6, in G2 Section, Record Group (RG) 407, National Archives
(NA), College Park, MD.

20 Black Market, Quarterly Reports of Operations,
July to December 1946, in General Historical and Operational Reports,
97-USF8-0.3, RG 407, NA, pp. 1-2.

21 James. M. Snyder with Warren Goldman, The
Establishment and Operations of the United States Constabulary. 3
October 1945-30 June 1947, Historical Sub-Section C-3, United States
Constabulary 1947, Headquarters, United States Constabulary, MHI, p.
248.

This history is one of the most extensive and
researched projects of the early Constabulary.

Dr. George F. Hofmann is a history professor at
the University of Cincinnati. He served in the U.S. Army’s armored
force. He is the author of The Super Sixth: A History of the Sixth
Armored Division; Cold War Casualty: The Court Martial of Major General
Robert W. Grow; Through Mobility We Conquer: The Mechanization of U.S.
Cavalry, which won the 2006 LTG Richard G. Trefry Award from the Army
Historical Foundation for an historical analysis of the assimilation of
cavalry into the Armor Force; and co edited, with GEN Donn A. Starry,
Camp Colt to Desert Storm: The History of U.S. Armored Forces. He also
contributes to History in Dispute, World War II, The Journal of
Military History, The Journal of Slavic Military Studies, and is a
valued contributor to ARMOR.