Operation MERIDIAN 1 was an air strike carried out of the aircraft
of TF 63 on oil refineries at Pladjoe,
Palembang on the Island of

Sumatra. The targets in the Palembang area
were at Songei Gerong, which had been the East Indies oil refinery for the
Standard Oil

Company. The other was at Pladjoe, the former
Royal Dutch Shell refinery. Both were quite large and between them produced
and supplied

50% of the oil used by Japan, including 75% of
the vital aviation fuel. The targets were situated about 50 miles inland up a
network of rivers

and creeks and surrounded by jungle and swamp
on the south east of the island.

American long-range reconnaissance aircraft
had reported that there was a strong anti-aircraft gun defence and the
presence of fighter

aircraft based at the airfields of Lembak,
Palembang, Talangbetoetoe and Mana; also from a fighter training base nearby.
Unfortunately no

reports had been made of a defensive balloon
barrage around the refineries. The objective was to put refineries at
Palembang out of action.

17th &
18th

During their passage
south easterly TF 63 carried out intensive exercises.

19th

The exercises
continued.

1930 hours. Destroyer WESSEX, who had been delayed at
Trincomalee waiting parts for her faulty radar, joined TF 63.

20th

0700 hours. On arrival at the refueling RV, in
approximate position 5S, 97-30E, the refueling force TF 69 was not in sight.

0822 hours. TF 69 was located by aircraft and refueling
commenced at 0900 hours. The weather conditions at the time were not
good, there being frequent rain squalls, with a moderate southerly swell and
wind force 3-5, the oilers reported much gear damaged by destroyers.

1850 hours. KING GEORGE V, the cruisers and destroyers
had all been refueled.

This was the first
under way refuelling by KING GEORGE V and she took 10 hours to
complete.

At 1530 hours 13/1/45, TF 69, consisting of
destroyer URCHIN (Senior Officer) and the RFA oilers ECHODALE, WAVE KING and
EMPIRE SALVAGE had sailed from Trincomalee and proceeded to the first oiling
rendezvous.

1900 hours. Cruiser CEYLON detached from TF 63 and
joined TF 69. TF 63 then set course for the flying off position.

During the passage
Vice Admiral Rawlings became ill and was confined to his bed so operational
control of TF 63 was exercised by Rear Admiral Vian.

21st - 22nd

During the night,
Force 63 approached the flying off position, but owing to bad weather and
unfavourable weather forecasts, it was decided to turn back to the
westward.

22nd - 23rd

During the night,
Force 63 approached the flying off position, and again, owing to bad weather
and unfavourable weather forecasts, it was decided to turn back to the
westward.

The weather problem was caused by an inter-tropical front
(now known as an Intertropical
Convergence Zone) which lay
against the Sumatran coast until the 23rd January. Whilst it provided a
convenient screen in which to operate, it detracted on the whole from
success because spray and the torrential rains affected the serviceability of
the large number of aircraft necessarily parked on deck.

24th

0400 hours. TF 63 arrived at the approximate position
5-41S, 103-32E, between the Island of Pulau Enggano and the coast of Sumatra,
coded as 'Position TA'; and approximately 200 miles from the target, Pladjoe
refinery.

0615 hours. The first aircraft began taking off and
during the next 45 minutes the strike force of 52 Avengers each armed with 4
x 500 lb bombs, 12 Fireflies armed with 60lb rockets, 56 Corsairs and 20
Hellcats were assembled.

En route to the
refuelling area KING GEORGE V topped up destroyer URSA with oil following
which URSA was detached in the evening to proceed to the Cocos Island with
signals for despatch.

On arrival at the refueling
area TF 63 commenced refuelling in two groups. ILLUSTRIOUS and VICTORIOUS
also topped up with aviation spirit. Oiling was slow owing to buoyant hoses
parting at the joints.

The refuelling force TF 69 now included the RFA oiler
ARNDALE who had sailed from Freemantle on 15/1/45.

26th

TF 63 continued
refuelling. At this stage it had become clear that the fuel situation would
allow no more than one further strike at Palembang.

Destroyer URSA
rejoined.

27th

TF 63 continued
refuelling.

28th

TF 63 continued
refuelling.

On completion of refuelling
TF 63 headed back to flying off position TA.

29th

0600 hours. TF 63 arrived In position TA, the weather
was poor with heavy rainstorms in a belt 30 miles off the coast. So H Hour
was postponed from 0615 until 0640. By which time the carriers
were in a clear patch between two rainstorms, but others soon arrived.

0640 hours. The first aircraft began taking off and
during the next 54 minutes the strike force of 48 Avengers each armed with 4
x 500 lb bombs, 12 Fireflies armed with 60lb rockets, 48 Corsairs and 16
Hellcats were assembled.

0850 hours. The attack commenced; after dropping their
bombs the Avengers headed for the RV.

0900 hours. TF 63 gained a radar indication of an enemy
aircraft in the vicinity of the fleet.

0917 hours. The bogey was sighted by Seafires of the CAP;
it was a fast single-engine aircraft which escaped by diving into clouds.

0939 hours. A few enemy aircraft approached TF 63 from
the north. They probably did not sight the fleet, which was then under low
cloud. Seafires were sent to intercept and shot down one Dinah [Mitsubishi
Ki-46] 28 miles west of the fleet

1010 hours. The strike started to land on. This was
completed by 1100 hours.

Seven aircraft failed
to return.

1026 hours. A group of twelve plus enemy aircraft were
reported approaching from the north. Corsairs and Seafires of the fighter
patrols were vectored out. The Corsairs reported sighting two single engined
enemy aircraft carrying bombs which were chased far to the eastward. One
Corsair from VICTORIOUS failed to return.

1028 hours. A few enemy planes were detected passing the
fleet on a southerly track some 40 miles to seaward. No fighters were sent to
intercept as the enemy seemed to have no knowledge of the fleet's position.

1100 hours. The last of the strike force was landed on.
TF 63 then commenced its withdrawal north westward towards the refuelling
area.

The two strikes on the oil refineries severely disrupted production. According
to post war analysis the strikes crippled production and reduced the Japanese
fuel reserves.

1152 hours. A raid was detected approaching low from the
southward and seven Seafires of the low patrol were sent to intercept. This
Seafire patrol was flying wide of the fleet to the northward when given their
first vector. They intercepted the raid as it was sighted from the fleet. The
enemy formation, which was originally reported by radar as 'one large',
consisted of one Helen [Nakajima Ki-49] and six Sallies [Mitsubishi Ki-21].
The enemy formation attacked from the port quarter of the fleet upwind,
height about 50 feet. They broke up when the Seafires intercepted and
appeared to try to carry out low-level bombing attacks on ILLUSTRIOUS and INDEFATIGABLE.

From the form of the
attack when it first developed it was thought that the enemy aircraft were
carrying torpedoes and the fleet was accordingly maneuvered so as to present
a difficult torpedo target. Most of the attackers succeeded in reaching the
main body and were shot down close to the ships. Of the seven aircraft which
attacked, certainly six and probably all seven were destroyed. Gunfire from
the fleet accounted for one aircraft. But the standard of fire discipline and
fire control in the fleet was low.

1203 hours. During the air attack the ILLUSTRIOUS was
struck by two 5.25in shells fired by our own forces and suffered 12 fatal
casualties and 21 wounded (see following).

The attacking Japanese aircraft were described as above
in the official British report. However some reports state that the attacking
aircraft were seven Kawasaki Ki-48, ‘Lilies’, of the Japanese
Army's Shichisi Mitate Tokubetsu Kōgeki Tai.

A Walrus amphibian, with recovered aircrew, had just
landed on ILLUSTRIOUS, when two Sallies attacked the ILLUSTRIOUS. One dropped
a bomb astern of the ILLUSTRIOUS that failed to explode and they then flew
down the length of the deck. The cruiser EURYALUS was shooting at the
attacking aircraft and failed to check her fire as the enemy flew over the
ILLUSTRIOUS. Two of EURYALUS's 5.25in shells struck the ILLUSTRIOUS hitting
the superstructure and destroying the Walrus and killing some of the rescued
aircrew.

From 1212 to 1430
hours the fleet was shadowed by an aircraft which remained 45 to 60 miles
to the eastward. It is possible that this aircraft may have been keeping
track of us by receiving either our radar or our beacon transmissions.

1818 hours. A quarter of an hour before sunset, a single
enemy aircraft approached from the north-eastward at 15,000 feet. The enemy
aircraft remained in the vicinity until about 1910 hours, during which
time TF 63 was steering a course towards Ceylon.

As soon as night fell
course was altered to the westward at 23 knots to arrive at the refuelling
area on 30th

30th

1315 hours. TF 63 commenced re-fueling from TF 69, all
ships with the exception of VICTORIOUS and ILLUSTRIOUS either filling up or
topping up for the passage to Fremantle.

After refuelling
destroyer, URSA was detached to take messages to the Cocos Island for
transmission and then to proceed independently to Fremantle.

2200 hours. Refuelling was completed and TF 63 set
course for Fremantle.

February

1st - 3rd

TF 63 on passage to
Fremantle

4th

0600 hours. TF 63 arrived at Fremantle.

When the fleet arrived in Fremantle the public welcome
stunned the arriving crews. Every vantage point was packed with people, all
cheering and waving.

At Fremantle a Board of Inquiry was convened on board ILLUSTRIOUS
to investigate the circumstances attending the unfortunate incident which
occurred when the Fleet was attacked by Japanese bombers off Western Sumatra
and ILLUSTRIOUS sustained damage and casualties from 'friendly' gunfire.

On the Orders of the CinC, British Pacific Fleet, the Fleet
was split into two groups, ABLE and BAKER, before leaving Fremantle. Group
ABLE comprising INDOMITABLE, ILLUSTRIOUS, INDEFATIGABLE, ARGONAUT, BLACK
PRINCE, GRENVILLE, UNDINE, UNDAUNTED, WAGER and WESSEX. Group ABLE sailed
late on the 4/2/45 for Sydney.

On passage to Sydney
the Fleet carried out an intensive program of exercises. These included:

Fleet maneuvers with
ships conning from emergency positions.

GUNNERY :

(i) 14
inch throw short firing by KING GEORGE V.

(ii) AA
throw off firings by KING GEORGE V, VICTORIOUS, and EURYALUS

(iii) Dive
bombing exercise

(iv) Fire
direction exercise

(v) Range
and inclination exercise.

COMMUNICATIONS :

No difficulties were
experienced in the use of American Signal publications and procedure, except
in the case of the United States Radar reporting and fighter direction
methods, which must be practiced further to become efficient. Maneuvers
were carried out daily by V/S, W/T and R/T.

11th

Group BAKER arrived
at Sydney

As the fleet
steamed into Sydney Harbour, thousands of people were gathered at various
points waving and cheering the return of the Royal Navy and, according to one
historian, 'the city went mad'. In port, members of the fleet received an
extremely warm welcome. 'The hospitality of the Australian families, with
their own sons still overseas or POWs and with a far higher percentage of
their population in the forces than ourselves, had to be seen to be believed’.

1130 hours. Admiral
Sir Bruce Fraser the CinC,
British Pacific Fleet, Admiral Sir Guy Royle the First Naval Member of the
Commonwealth Naval Board and Rear Admiral G.D. Moore, Flag Officer in Charge,
Sydney; arrived on board KING GEORGE V where the Flag Officers met the
Commanding Officers of the ships of the British Pacific Fleet.

The British Pacific Fleet had established
a Barracks, Accounting Base and Manning Depot in
the docklands area at Woolloomooloo at the
head of Woolloomooloo Bay. It was commissioned on 20/11/44 as HMS GOLDEN HIND

Most Royal Navy ships were designed to operate in
climates that had brief and temperate summers. Therefore they did not have
air-conditioning, or evaporation plant that could produce sufficient fresh
water for the boilers and the crew when operating in the tropics.

The result was that in the tropical areas of the Pacific
the heat below decks became unbearable; 127¼ F (53¼C) was
recorded in one instance. This made physical labour exhausting and it was
difficult to avoid becoming drowsy while doing paperwork. Crews took lots of
showers and drank as much water as possible, quickly overwhelming the
evaporators and forcing water rationing.

There was also a lack of standardisation in Royal Navy
equipment. This was particularly so with the aircraft which constituted the
British Pacific Fleet's main offensive weapon. Admiral Fraser informed the
Admiralty that, 'The Royal Navy had too many different types of aircraft,
which made logistics difficult, and recommended standardisation of the
machines and designing a plane specifically for carrier warfare'. The Royal
Navy was using the Seafire, which was a modified Spitfire. Although a good
plane in the air, the Seafire had problems withstanding the stress of the
sudden stops of carrier landings. Many of the planes in the fleet were of US
design, which the RN had then modified, and this made it impossible to obtain
some spare parts from the Americans. The RN was also using bombs that would
not fit aboard their aircraft carriers and had to be stored on other ships.
This process added to the time and energy required for resupply at sea.

The RN therefore had a number of design, equipment and
logistical problems to overcome for Pacific operations. Most of which they
muddled through rather than resolved. Keeping the fleet equipped with fuel,
food, water and ammunition was an ever present concern for Fraser, his staff,
subordinate commanders and the Admiralty.

Without the generous help of USN bases, fuelling
facilities and spare parts, the British Pacific Fleet would have been hard
put to keep going. Eventually even Admiral King backed away from the requirement
of self-sufficiency. In a letter to Admiral Fraser from Washington, Admiral
Somerville recounted that 'recently King has admitted that pooling of
resources to some extent must obviously be necessary if we are to keep the
maximum number of ships, both US and British, ready for operations’.

12th - 26th

The Fleet remained at
Sydney where the ships made good minor defects which had developed during
nearly four weeks at sea, and the ships' companies were given 48 hours local
leave.

Whilst at Sydney, the British Pacific Fleet was allocated
Task Force Numbers so as to conform to American procedure. Battleships,
carriers, cruisers, and destroyers were designated Task Force 113 and the
Fleet Train was designated Task Force 112. Task Force 113 remained as such
until it was allocated to the Commander 4th Fleet when it
became Task Force 57

During the afternoon
the 1st Battle Squadron RVed with the 1st Aircraft Carrier
Squadron. TF 113 then set course northerly.

The Fleet was due to be shadowed and attacked by RAAF
aircraft. A few blue aircraft were tracked, but no attack
developed. Weather prevented our carriers from flying off fighter
opposition. Altogether this was a disappointing exercise which provided
little value.

After dark, SWIFTSURE
and GAMBIA carried out shadowing exercise with the Fleet.

March

1st

TF 113 continued on a
northerly course. The weather was still rough.

In the morning TF
113 Carried out Visual Radar Control Air Defence Exercise.

1200 hours. TF 113 was in position 29-18S, 155-04E.

In the afternoon TF
113 exercised tactical maneuvering.

EURYALUS and all
destroyers carried out Radar Interrogation Exercises (INTX)

TF 113 carried out
Range and Inclination exercises on EURYALUS.

After dark the 4th Cruiser
Squadron carried out a Night Encounter Exercise.

2nd

Early in the morning
destroyer URANIA was detached and returned to Sydney.

1000 hours. The refuelling force of four tankers
escorted by minesweeper HMAS WHYALLA (known as a corvette in the RAN) was
located.

For refuelling TF 113
divided into two groups, the Main Body requiring no fuel, and the fuelling
force of all cruisers and destroyers.

The refuelling force was placed under the Command of Rear
Admiral Commanding CS4. Screens for both forces were relieved as
necessary, and fuelling was completed by 1700 hours by which time all
destroyers and 5.25 in. cruisers had been topped right up and

6 in. cruisers had fuelled for exercise. The
detailed fuelling program made by CS 4 seemed to be expeditiously and
smoothly carried out. Unnecessary high steaming by fuelled ships from
the Fuelling Force joining the screen of the non fuelling Force would be
saved if they were ordered to proceed to the nearest position in the screen,
other screening vessels adjusting position as if rotating.

1200 hours. TF 113 was in position 25-50S, 155-39E.

After dark 4th
Destroyer Flotilla exercised flotilla night attacks on the Fleet in cruising
disposition 5A. From this, and similar attacks on subsequent nights, the
weakness of a circular screen to prevent a determined or suicide minded enemy
flotilla fighting their way into decisive torpedo range of the Main Body was
shown.

3rd

In the morning TF 113
Carried out aircraft Direction and Radar Reporting Exercise No
1. Attacking planes flew 90 miles ahead of the Fleet before commencing
their approach. EURYALUS and ARGONAUT were stationed 15 miles 30 degrees on
either bow of the Fleet as Radar Pickets. Full fighter protection was
flown off by the carriers. Some very interesting Torpedo Bomber and Dive
Bomber raids developed, and the Fleet was maneuvered evasively and as
necessary for flying off standby fighters to meet raids as they
developed. On such occasions unnecessary and unrealistic confusion was
caused to radar plots by aircraft which hovered over the Fleet after
completing their attacks; they should have formed up and remained well clear,
but in sight of the Fleet.

1200 hours. TF 113 was in position 21-25S, 156-40E.

In the afternoon the
carriers exercised A.A. throw off firings. SWIFTSURE and GAMBIA carried
out independent exercises. The 1st Battle Squadron exercised
H.A. Drills with single aircraft and then with EURYALUS, SWIFTSURE, and BLACK
PRINCE, exercised emergency conning and communications. It was found that
when in a single line ahead ships had to haul out of line for their secondary
control position personnel to read the Flagship's Signals.

After dark the 27th Destroyer
Flotilla carried out divisional night attacks on the Fleet representing a
damaged force returning to base. One cruiser with destroyers in any
threatened sector moved out to counter attack, and the exercise finished in
true Saturday night style with a blaze of starshell searchlight and smoke.

The 27th Destroyer
Flotilla continued to shadow during the night.

4th

TF 113 continued on a
northerly course.

1200 hours. TF 113 was in position 15S, 156-32E. UNICORN
escorted by two destroyers detached

5th

TF 113 continued on a
northerly course.

In the morning
QUICKMATCH was detached to investigate radar surface contacts to
eastward. The contacts were identified as the troop transport USAT
SEABARB 7909grt and Australian coastal transport ALAGNE. No warnings of these
ships had been received.

The SEABARB was en route to Cairns, Queensland where she
was to embark the advanced party of the 2/9 Australian armoured Regiment and
transport them to Morotai Island in preparation for the invasion of Borneo.
Morotai Island had only been secured on 14/1/45.

FAA planes Exercised
Dummy Suicide attacks on the Fleet. Enemy aircraft occasionally strafing
with bursts short, attacked every ship in the Fleet in a most realistic
manner for two hours, and providing very useful training. Carried out
Height Find Exercise.

Several groups of
apparently large aircraft flying from East to West detected ahead of the
Fleet and displaying I.F.F. Total number of aircraft estimated at
50. They were eventually identified as friendly transports by carrier
aircraft.

1200 hours. TF 113 was in position 08- 29S, 153-27E.

In the afternoon HOWE
carried out 14in Long Range Throw Shoot Firing on KING GEORGE V.

A.A. Throw-off
Firings by all ships of the Fleet.

More aircraft
detached ahead, flying from west to east and not displaying I.F.F. No
warning had been received of these or the forenoon aircraft.

After dark TF 113
altered course 30 minutes, to avoid a Radar Contact. The KEMPENFELT
detached to investigate the contact, which was identified as the eastbound
troop transport USS STRATFORD 2286grt. No warning of this ship had been
received.

6th

TF 113 continued on a
northerly course.

In the morning
UNICORN and her two destroyer escorts rejoined TF 113 following which TF 113
carried out Visual and Radar controlled fighter direction exercise for the
battleships, cruisers, and aircraft carriers; 9 detected, with Fireflies
representing hostile snoopers, and with 24 fighters acting as a CAP and 2
Avengers as friendly A/S patrol.

1200 hours. TF 113 was in position 06-42S, 148-32E.

1315 hours. TF 113 formed into groups disposed astern
for passage into the Bismarck Sea.

In the afternoon
SWIFTSURE and GAMBIA carried out 6 in. throw off firings. Groups
exercised emergency conning and communication.

The airborne A/S
patrol and CAP was maintained at readiness to deal with possible snoopers
from the enemy base at Rabaul.

KING GEORGE V, HOWE,
EURYALUS and 4th D.F. carried out Radar Interrogation
exercise.

As night fell it had
been hoped to operate night fighters from INDOMITABLE, but weather conditions
were not suitable.

7th

1000 hours. TF 113 were off the north east coast off the
Island of Manus, in approximate position 1-53S, 147-30E.

1000 hours. UNICORN and a destroyer screen detached for
Ponam Island.

The UNICORN was carrying MSR 4 [MAINTENANCE, SUPPORT
& REPAIR 4] they were an advanced party of MONAB IV. MSR 4 were to take
over the airbase on Ponam Island that had been built by the Americans and
completed in August 1944 and had been used by USN aircraft up to its handover
to the Royal Navy. On 2/4/45 the airbase was commissioned as HMS NABARON,
Royal Naval Air Station PONAM. The stores and equipment of MONAB 4 arrived on
the 11/3/45 on board SS Clan MacAULLY 10492grt. The advanced party of MONAB
1V and the second echelon of MSR 4 arrived on 13/4/45 on board escort carrier
SPEAKER. The main body of MONAB IV arrived on the 25/4/45 on board SS EMPIRE
ARQUEBUS 6440grt, direct from the UK.

(EMPIRE ARQUEBUS was a standard US C1 cargo ship, ex USS
CAPE ST VINCENT, but was now a commissioned RN LSI(L) HMS CICERO, although
she does not appear to have operated in her latter guise.)

Following the
departure of UNICORN, TF 113 commenced an Air Defence Exercise with 6
shore based Corsairs as Blue aircraft simulating torpedo, dive, suicide, and
level bombers. TF 113 operated a CAP of eight Hellcats and eight Seafires.

After the exercise,
TF 113 divided into groups and entered Seeadler Harbour, Manus between 1300
and 1600 hours.

Battleships and
aircraft carriers anchored on the western side of the harbour.

(Seeadler Harbour is at the eastern end of Manus and
a superb natural anchorage, 15 miles long by 4 miles wide and 120ft
deep)

8th - 11th

TF 113 was anchored
in Seeadler Harbour.

During this period the fuelling of the Fleet was carried
out, with destroyers and cruisers proceeding alongside the oilers at their
berths in the Eastern Anchorage, it being intended that capital ships and
carriers should be fuelled at their own berths in the Western Anchorage.

It was soon found that the swell was too heavy for
fuelling the carriers in these berths, VICTORIOUS, the first to fuel,
smashing both her own catamarans; a tug had then to be provided to tow the
oiler clear of her.

In view of the above, a signal was made to the Senior
British Naval Officer asking for berths to be allocated in the Eastern
anchorage to complete the fuelling of the carriers. This was arranged
accordingly and U.S. Navy steel catamarans were provided by the Commander Naval
Base Manus for the VICTORIOUS. Fuelling was successfully completed but
not before the INDOMITABLE had smashed one of her catamarans in the process.

The catamarans carried by our carriers are for use in
calm water and are in no way suitable for the open anchorages of the
Pacific. The U.S. Navy has developed steel 'fenders' from the pontoon
structures used widely by them for lighters and sea bridges. We shall be
dependent on the U.S. Navy for the loan of theirs until we can get our own. They
cannot be carried in a ship and once erected would have to be towed from
place to place as required.

Even in the Eastern anchorage the swell caused damage
when ammunition ships, oilers, etc were alongside the cruisers and it is
apparent that in an exposed anchorage such as Manus a large supply of hard
fenders is most necessary. Some coconut trees were obtained locally and all
ships were instructed to make additional fenders.

It was later arranged that on all future occasions of
fuelling our carriers, U.S. Navy steel catamarans should be provided, and
that the carriers should be allocated the best available berths in the
Eastern Anchorage.

12th

TF 113 commenced a
series of exercises; however these did not involve KING GEORGE V or HOWE.

13th

Aircraft carrier
ILLUSTRIOUS and destroyers URANIA and UNDAUNTED arrived from Sydney and
proceeded to fuel in the Eastern Anchorage.

14th

Exercises continued.

15th

The 1st Battle
Squadron proceeded to sea for exercises, but the receipt of messages from the
CinC British Pacific Fleet, DTG 141205Z and DTG 141208Z instructing TF 113
and TF 112 to report to CINC PAC forthwith for duty in operations connected
with Operation ICEBERG, changed the situation. All exercises were immediately
cancelled and HOWE was ordered back to harbour whilst KING GEORGE V proceeded
to get in V/S touch with AC 1 to arrange for re-embarkation of aircraft and
air personnel.

Arrangements were
made to top up the fleet with fuel, ammunition, and stores as quickly as
possible and it was decided the Fleet could be ready to sail at noon on the
17th March. CinC PAC was informed accordingly in CTF 113's
signal DTG 150611Z.

The final US decision to accept the BPF for operations
alongside the US Fifth Fleet was not taken until 15/3/45. Despite late
opposition from Admiral King, Admiral Nimitz insisted that the BPF form part
of his Central Pacific Command. Admiral Nimitz's decision was justified
within days when on 19/3/45 the US aircraft carriers INTREPID, WASP II, and
FRANKLIN were all damaged and put out of action, reducing the number of
carriers available for Operation ICEBERG, the Okinawa landings.

The staff's of the BPF Flag Officers were now tasked with
planning and implementing the necessary operations to ensure the Fleets
timely departure, these were:

(a) Fuelling,
embarkation of aircraft, stores, etc. The time table for these was in
some measure the sport of the swell and the lack of

boats.

(b) Final preparation of operation orders and
arrangements for fuelling in the forward area for a period of up to three
weeks continuous

operations.

(c) The
speed (9 knots) at which the tankers of the Fleet Train could be moved to the
first re-fuelling area.

(d) Adjustment of aircraft between the
maintenance/escort carriers UNICORN, SPEAKER and SLINGER so that the Fleet
might

leave as fully
equipped as could be contrived)

Many American naval officers did their best to ignore
Admiral King's requirement on supply matters. In fact, a good number of
admirals in the Pacific had problems with this stipulation. The requirement
had to be heeded, though, at least on paper. The Americans were more than
willing to provide the British with any surplus items they had available.
Commanders and supply officers, however, had to turn down requests that had
to go through Washington, at least officially. The doctrine of
self-sufficiency was always the rationale for this response.

16th

Preparations
continued.

17th

Preparations
continued.

The Fleet Train oiling force, designated TU 112.2.1,
comprising oilers RFA CEDARDALE 8132grt, 12.5 knots, MV SAN AMBROSIO 7410grt,
12 knots and MV SAN ADOLPHO 7365grt, 12 knots, escorted by escort carrier
STRIKER with replacement aircraft embarked, escorted by destroyer
WHIRLWIND, sloop CRANE and frigate FINDHORN sailed from Seeadler Harbour.
This was in order to be in position at the appointed time for the BPF to top
with fuel, as near to what was to be their operational area as possible.

The Fleet Train force designated TU 112.2. 2 comprising
escort carrier SPEAKER, with Hellcats of 1840 Sqdn. embarked, to provide a
CAP for the Fleet Train, escorted by destroyer KEMPENFELT and sloop PHEASANT
sailed at the same time.

The aircraft carriers were delayed to complete the
embarkation and adjustment of aircraft which had been hampered by adverse
weather conditions. They sailed at 1100/18/3/45 with a screen of six
destroyers and completed the passage to Ulithi Atoll as a separate force.

Cruiser BLACK PRINCE remained at Manus to complete the
fitting of American SG Radar.

SG Radar was a centimetric radar, the USN equivalent
of the RN Type 271. However the SG had become the holy grail for navigating
officers for new and un­expected reasons. The charts of the Pacific
islands were dangerously inaccurate, but close approaches to shore were now
the rule not the exception, which made the map-like PPI display of SG a
comforting sight for a captain closing an unknown and poorly charted coast.

The EURYALUS was delayed by a foul cable and jammed
cable holder, but rejoined the Fleet shortly. The URSA also remained behind
to dock for hull repairs.

0815 hours. The battleships and cruisers carried out AA
sleeve firings. Four sleeves were shot down. Seven U.S.N. aircraft took part
in this and the practices went off in an unusually prompt and efficient
manner.

1720 hours. EURYALUS dropped depth charges for practice.

1800 hours. KING GEORGE V carried out Type 253 Radar
Interrogation tests of ships in company.

0830 hours. KING GEORGE V and ARGONAUT carried out Range
and Inclination Exercises.

1100 hours. KING GEORGE V carried out a 5.25in long
range throw off firing at ARGONAUT.

SWIFTSURE carried out
a damage control exercise.

1200 hours. EURYALUS carried out a VT fuse test shoot,
throwing off at the ARGONAUT. Owing to a number of early bursts,
EURYALUS had to be ordered to cease fire and move further from the screen
before resuming.

1400 hours. HOWE carried out a 5.25in long range throw
off firing at the SWIFTSURE.

1600 hours. KING GEORGE V carried out a blind main
armament control long range throw shoot firing at the SWIFTSURE.

1730 hours. KING GEORGE V and HOWE carried out VT fuse
test shoots.

20th

The 1st Battle
Squadron continued on course for Ulithi Atoll.

0730 hours. The cruisers were ordered to proceed 4 miles
ahead for entering harbour.

Ulithi atoll
is at the western end of the Caroline Islands, 360 miles southwest of Guam,
850 miles east of the Philippines and 1300 miles south of Tokyo. It is a
typical volcanic atoll, with a coral reef, white sand beaches and palm trees.
Ulithi Atoll consists of forty small islands that barely rise above sea level,
the largest being only half a square mile in area. However the reef runs
roughly twenty miles north and south by ten miles across, enclosing a vast
anchorage with an average depth of 80 to 100 feet. The anchorage was well
situated for the concentration of naval vessels that were to take part in
Operation ICEBERG.

The main body of the USN invasion covering Force, TF 58
had sailed from Ulithi on 14/3/45 and headed north. Its objective was the Inland Sea, bounded by
Kyushu, western Honshu, and Shikoku; the task of TF 58 was to prepare for the
invasion of the Ryukyu Islands by attacking airfields and naval
bases in the Japanese homeland. The formidable task force was composed of 10
large aircraft carriers, 6 smaller carriers, 8 fast battleships, 16 cruisers,
and dozens of destroyers and auxiliaries.

Although Ulithi Atoll was some distance from the nearest
Japanese air base it was necessary for the forces at Ulithi to be alert for
air attack. On 11/3/45 the anchorage was attacked by two kamikaze Yokosuka
P1Y bombers, ‘Frances’, one of which hit and damaged aircraft
carrier USS RANDOLPH.

The distance between the Fleet and the American anchorage
at the northern end of the
harbour(about 10 miles) was too great for ships'
boats. Realising this, the US authorities placed an L.C.I. at the
disposal of the Vice Admiral Rawlings; this proved of the greatest value, not
least so as a 'staff boat' for Staff Officers in their many lengthy trips in
bad weather.

21st

The British force
continued refuelling and
ammunitioning before sailing for
Operation ICEBERG. The fuelling was done from USN tankers, destroyers
and cruisers proceeding alongside the tankers as detailed. The tankers
serviced the battleships and carriers at their anchorages.

5000 fuses Mark 40
were supplied by ComSerRon 10 to KING GEORGE V, HOWE, ARGONAUT and EURYALUS
to replace fuses Mark 32. The supply was very promptly executed and U.S. Navy
personnel advised and assisted ships' staffs when carrying out the un-fusing
and re-fusing of ammunition.

22nd

In the morning Vice
Admiral C.H. McMorris, U.S.N., Chief of Staff to CinC PAC, accompanied by
Captain H.S. Hopkins, R.N., British Pacific Fleet Liaison Officer, arrived by
seaplane from Guam to discuss general matters with Vice Admiral Rawlings, 2iC
British Pacific Fleet. Admiral Nimitz had intended to come to Ulithi
himself but he had been laid up the previous day with a cold. The Flag
Officers of the British Pacific Fleet came on board KING GEORGE V for lunch
and to meet Vice Admiral McMorris.

1600 hours. BLACK PRINCE arrived at Ulithi.

The considerable activity which had prevailed during the
last days at Manus increased in intensity at Ulithi, but transferred itself
mainly to Flag Officers meetings and their staff officers. There was a
continuous stream of intelligence and other material (flown by special plane
from Guam), the arrival of which required hurried modification and
re-modification of such plans as had already near-crystallised. Typing
the distribution to the Fleet of both plans and intelligence matter went on
throughout the night of the 22/3/45, the boat shortage and the swell in the
anchorage in no way assisting. In spite of everything, the British Pacific
Fleet, now designated Task Force 57 was ready to sail on 23/3/45.

The overall objective of Operation ICEBERG was to
capture Okinawa Gunto and, gaining control of the Nansei Shoto area, use them
to attack the main islands of Japan with their sea and air approaches. Within
ICEBERG the objective of the BPF [TF 57] was to neutralise the six airfields
in the Sakishima Gunto as continuously, and for as long as possible. H Hour
for the US landing on Okinawa had been set for 0830 hours 1/4/45.

En route to the
re-fuelling area bombardment exercises were carried out by KING GEORGE V,
HOWE and SWIFTSURE.

25th

0310 hours. With EURYALUS, BLACK PRINCE and ARGONAUT
spread 8 miles apart, 8 miles ahead of the Fleet, radar contact was made with
TU 12.2.5 and TU 112.2.1.

0600 hours. An RV was made with the refuelling group and
destroyers commenced refuelling. It had been hoped to complete the refuelling
in five hours from the tankers, but the north easterly wind, swell and hose
problems were causing the operation to exceed the projected time frame. Some
of destroyers were therefore ordered to refuel from KING GEORGE V, HOWE and
STRIKER.

Destroyers QUALITY
and WHELP, both with defects, were detached to operate with TU 12.2.5 and TU
112.2.1 and destroyers KEMPENFELT and WHIRLWIND joined TF 57.

1530 hours. Refuelling was terminated and TF 57 set
course for the operation area at 23½ knots.

26th

0635 hours. When TF 57 was in approximate position
23-15N, 125-21E, 100 miles south of the island of Miyako-Jima, fighter sweeps
were flown off to attack the airfields of Ishigaki on the island of
Ishigaki-Shima and Miyako on the island of Miyako-Jima.

0800 hours.
The US 77th division made the first landings of Operation ICEBERG,
when they landed on the Kerama Islands. These are a group of islands 15 miles
west of Okinawa and the landings were designed to secure a seaplane base and
a fleet anchorage to support the main invasion.

In the evening after
the last aircraft had been recovered at dusk, TF 57 moved off to the south
eastward.

27th

At sunrise, which was
at approximately 0600 hours, TF 57 had returned to yesterday’s
flying off position and flew off a strike force to attack Ishigaki airfield.

It had been intended
that the capital ships would carry out a bombardment of Ishigaki airfield but
Guam reported a typhoon to the southward whose track would threaten the
fuelling area and dislocate the refuelling. Therefore the CinC TF 57 decided
to withdraw early to the refuelling area.

In the evening after
the last aircraft had been recovered at dusk, TF 57 moved off south eastward
toward refuelling area MIDGE.

28th

0730 hours. TF 57 made contact with Task Units 112.2.5
and 112.2.1 in area MIDGE, a rectangle extending 50 miles to the south and
100 miles to the west of 19-55N, 129-40E; fuelling and transfer of aircraft
continued throughout the day. The Fleet was divided into two groups for this
operation, the non-fuelling group proceeding so as to remain within touch of
the fuelling group. The Fleet disengaged from the Tanker Group for the night.

29th

In the morning TF 57
re-engaged with the Tanker Group.

In the afternoon the
RA Commanding. Destroyers transferred his flag from EURYALUS to WHIRLWIND;
WHIRLWIND with STRIKER and CRANE then detached for Leyte.

EURYALUS then
rejoined the remainder of the cruisers in TU 5.

During the day, mails
and correspondence brought out by the Tanker Group were distributed by
destroyers around TF 57.

Destroyers QUALITY
and WHELP rejoined TF 57.

Destroyers KEMPENFELT
and WHIRLWIND re­joined the Tanker Groups.

For the night TF 57
formed up into Cruising Disposition 5A.

30th

In the morning TF 57
re-engaged with the Tanker Group.

1430 hours. Fuelling was completed and TF 57 formed up
in Cruising Disposition 5B. Departure was taken at 22 knots for the operating
area and AC 1

assumed tactical
command.

31st

0530 hours. ARGONAUT and WAGER were detached to a
position 3000, 30 miles from the Fleet centre to act as pickets to
prevent enemy aircraft returning with our own strikes. ARGONAUT was chosen
for this purpose as having the most suitable radar.

0630 hours. A fighter sweep was sent in from a
flying-off position 23-10N, 125-23E and thereafter fighter patrols were
maintained over the islands of Ishigaki and Miyako. There appeared to be
little activity in either island. Two bomber strikes were sent against
Ishigaki airfield, installations and barracks.

At dusk TF 57
disengaged to the south westward and CTF 57 assumed tactical com­mand.

ARGONAUT and WAGER
opened out to their picket positions before the fighter sweep was launched.

0640 hours. From the flying-off position 23-26N,
125-25E, the first fighter sweep was launched.

0650 hours. Bogeys were detected by radar to the
westward, height 8,000 feet, closing at 210 knots. The fighter sweep was
recalled to intercept and additional fighters were flown off.

The raid split up
more than 40 miles from the Fleet.

One enemy ZEKE
aircraft machine-gunned INDOMITABLE in a low attack killing one rating and
wounding two officers and four ratings. Still flying very low it made a
similar attack on KING GEORGE V but without causing casualties.

Considerable
difficulty was experienced in identifying enemy planes from the FAA planes
that were hard on the enemy heels.

0727 hours. An enemy Kamikaze plane dived into the base
of the INDEFATIGABLE's island. Four officers and ten ratings were killed, and
sixteen of her complement wounded. The flight deck was put temporarily out of
action.

0755 hours. ULSTER was near missed by what appeared to be
a 500 lb. bomb from an aircraft then being chased by one of our fighters.
ULSTER reported that the bulkhead between the engine-room and the after
boiler-room had blown, flooding both compartments, but that the ship was
floating well. Casualties were two killed and one seriously wounded. She was
unable to steam but her armament remained effective. The QUIBERON was ordered
to stand by her and as soon as the raid was over the GAMBIA was ordered to
tow ULSTER to Leyte.

0830 hours
the first landings by US forces took place on the island of Okinawa.

1200 hours. GAMBIA with the ULSTER in tow left TF 57.

Two days later the destroyer reported that she was short of drinking
water and supplies were passed to her from the GAMBIA, sixteen casks being
veered astern one at a time on the end of a light wire line. On 4/4/45,
minesweepers HMAS BALLARAT and LISMORE RVed with the GAMBIA and provided an
anti-submarine escort for the rest of the passage. Two hours after the
meeting, the tow-line carried away when two badly worn links in the ULSTER's
cable parted. It took GAMBIA five hours to recover her wire and pass a

6 ½ -inch wire hawser which was secured to the destroyer's two
remaining shackles of cable. The ships arrived off the entrance to Leyte Gulf
in the evening of the 5/4/45 and the tow was transferred to a naval tug.
GAMBIA had towed the ULSTER 760 miles at an average speed of eight knots.

1215 hours. A bombing strike was sent in against
Ishigaki to bomb airfields and runways. No activity was noted.

1430 hours. Reports were received from combat patrols
over the islands that more aircraft had been sighted at Hirara and Ishigaki
airfields. These were attacked by the fighter patrols and were followed by a
fighter sweep. It was estimated that about 14 enemy aircraft were destroyed
on the ground during this attack and others damaged.

1730 hours. A low flying bogey was detected by radar to
the north westward. Hellcats were sent to intercept this raid which developed
into 2 plus but the enemy avoided them in cloud.
Soon afterwards the Fleet sighted the enemy and opened fire, sometimes it is
regretted, at friendly fighters.

One enemy aircraft
dived on the VICTORIOUS; her swing under full helm was successful and the
plane touched its wing only on the flight deck edge spinning harmlessly into
the sea where its bomb exploded clear of the ship. The manuscript
instructions to the pilot were blown on board the VICTORIOUS, an interesting
document, denoting priority of targets for suicide planes.

The matter of differentiating between friendly and enemy
aircraft became daily more important. With the Kamikazes being chased by
friendly fighters right on to the Fleet's guns, there was only a matter of
seconds in which to act. Presented at certain angles there is very little
difference between the Kamikaze Japanese single-engine aircraft and some of
the FAA fighters. On the other hand the means of controlling, particularly
of, stopping, the fire of the innumerable small guns that are now scattered
about ships, often with poor communications, made the problem difficult.

At dusk TF 57
disengaged to the south eastward and CinC TF 57 assumed tactical command.

2nd

0510 hours. In moonlight, two fighters were flown off
INDOMITABLE and sent to Ishigaki airfield. Two other aircraft were flown off
at the same time and destined for Miyako airfield, but these were unable to
proceed owing to radio failures. No activity was reported from Ishigaki.

It was evident from experience the day before that the
Japanese had started staging into the Sakishima airfields and it was
therefore decided to cancel the planned bombardment in favour of air operations. Also the absence of enemy activity
noticed by the first fighter sweep the previous day made it appear likely
that the enemy might be leaving the airfields at first light.

0630 hours From a flying off position 230-12N, 126-02E a
fighter Ramrod was flown off to attack all airfields before TF 57 withdrew.
Little activity was noticed, but one airborne Zeke was shot down over
Ishigaki by Hellcats.

1045 hours. The fighter Ramrod was recovered, following
which TF 57 withdrew to fuelling area MIDGE, maintaining a CAP of 12 aircraft
until dark.

The CinC TF 57 was
very disappointed to have to cancel the bombardment again, for although
bombing was far more successful in cratering the runways etc. Rawlings
particularly wished to bombard for the sake of the personnel manning the
battleships and cruisers, many of whom were very young and untried.

As TF 57 left the
operational area CinC TF 57 resumed tactical command.

During the period 23rd March to 2nd
April inclusive, losses of aircraft were 25, compared to 47 enemy destroyed
or probably destroyed and 38 damaged, on the ground. Enemy vessels sunk and
damaged were one lugger sunk, 13 other small vessels probably sunk, and over
40 small craft damaged.

3rd

0630 hours. There was no sign of the Tanker Group in
rendezvous position MIDGE ONE, 19-12N, 128-00E. Weather: heavy N.E.
swell, wind north, force 5. SWIFTSURE, ARGONAUT and EURYALUS were ordered
ahead to carry out a search for the Fleet train.

0900 hours. TF 57 made W/T contact with Tanker Group.

1320 hours. TF 57 RVed with TU 112.2.5 and 112.2.2.

The weather and cross
swell were too heavy to attempt refuelling. TF 57 remained in the area
throughout the day, but towards the evening

meteorological
information suggesting more suitable weather to the westward. TF 57 and the
Fleet Train turned west to area MOSQUITO.

A US Task Group, TF
58, was ordered to cover Sakishima Gunto during the absence of TF 57.

4th

En route to area
MOSQUITO.

0630 hours. TU 112.2.3 arrived in replenishment position MOSQUITO
from San Pedro Bay, Leyte. TU 112.2.3 included escort carrier SLINGER with
replacement aircraft embarked and two further oilers, RFA's ARNDALE 8296grt,
12 knots and DINGLEDALE 8145grt, 11.5 knots. This brought the number of
oilers available for refuelling to five.

During replenishment,
Captain E. C. Ewen, USN, the senior USN Liaison Officer, was transferred from
the INDOMITABLE to KING GEORGE V.

1930 hours. TF 57 having disengaged from the Tanker
Group; TF 57 set course at 20 knots for the operational area. Owing to the
numerous delays in fuelling, KING GEORGE V and the HOWE had to proceed,
nearly 50% short of their full fuel stowage and the aircraft carriers had
been able to embark only sufficient Avgas for the forth­coming two days'
operation.

Rawlings took the decision to stop replenishment even
though refuelling was incomplete as he judged it essential to leave with
these shortages in order to be back at the time promised. He did not like
battleships steaming about short of fuel for although they should have enough
oil for the operation as planned, it left little in hand to meet any change
of programme, and if a ship short of fuel received under­water
damage her position might become embarrassing.

6th

0450 hours. Four fighters were flown from INDOMITABLE,
two each to Miyako and Ishigaki airfields to attack any enemy aircraft taking
off at dawn, but early reports from these planes indicated little or no
activity in the islands. Heavy low cloud over the islands impeded operations.
However eight aircraft not previously noticed at Ishigaki were attacked with
apparent satisfactory results.

0530 hours. ARGONAUT and URANIA with a CAP were detached
to act as Radar pickets to the north westward.

0635 hours.
TF 57 was in position 23-16N, 125-36E and CAPS were flown off to cover both
islands. The craters in the runway at Miyako airfield were observed to be
filled in.

0650 hours. ARGONAUT and URANIA not being required to
operate as pickets, were ordered to rejoin TF 57.

0850 hours.
TF 57 was detected by an enemy aircraft who escaped in cloud.

In the forenoon Hellcats returning from
Miyako, shot down a Frances, after a 30 mile chase.

1700 hours.
Bogeys were detected by Radar. Fighters intercepted them and splashed one
Judy. One Kamikaze out of an estimated raid of four broke through in cloud
and dived on the ILLUSTRIOUS, who took radical avoiding action. The
aircraft's wingtip hit the island, spinning the aircraft into the sea where
the bomb exploded. Only slight damage and no casualties were
caused.

After the dusk the CAP had been flown on
and TF 57 disengaged to the south eastward and CTF 57 assumed tactical
command.

During the
day the following signal was received by the CinC TF 57:

To:
COM 5th Fleet (R) CTF 58 CTF 57 CTF 51 CTF 56 CTF 17

From C IN C
PAC

I share your
hope we can bring enemy to decisive battle. Expect all out enemy re­actions
in prospect.

Good luck. - Nimitz.

7th

0530 hours.
AC 1 assumed tactical control.

0530 hours.
ARGONAUT and URANIA were detached to the north westward to act as Radar
pickets, with orders to rejoin TF 57 at 0810 hours.

In view of
Admiral Nimitz's appreciation that an all out enemy air reaction against the
land and sea forces in and around Okinawa was imminent, the bombardment of Ishigaki planned to take place p.m. was
cancelled in favour of air
operations only, clouds over the island also influencing the decision.

A report was
received that an enemy surface force had been sighted in the early hours
leaving the Inland Sea and steering to the southward.

0610 hours. CAPS for the Fleet and islands, and ASP were
flown off from position 23-16N, 125-36E. The island CAPS reported little
activity on the islands, but noticed that bomb craters on Ishigaki had been
filled in, and that Hirara and Nobara airfields appeared serviceable. It was
therefore decided to send in three bomber strikes during the day to re-crater
these fields. These strikes were successfully carried out without loss.

In the afternoon a USN Privateer aircraft (a navalised
Liberator bomber) sighted and reported a downed FAA Corsair pilot who had lost, his way and landed in the sea about 70
miles from TF 57. The Privateer having reported him dropped dinghies and
remained in the vicinity until relieved by FAA Fireflies. URANIA escorted by
two fighters was despatched to the rescue of the Corsair pilot. URANIA
recovered him, but unfortunately he was found to be dead.

1930 hours.
CTF 57 assumed tactical command and the Fleet set course to refuel in area
COOTIE, an American area closer to TF 57's operating area than areas MIDGE or
MOSQUITO and which C IN C PAC had approved TF 57 using.

USN TG 52 was instructed to cover
Sakishima Gunto during the day in the absence of TF 57

In the
evening CTF 57 learned that aircraft from TF 58 had dealt severely with a
Japanese surface force which had sallied forth from the Inland Sea. Reports,
which indicated that the enemy lost 1 battleship, 1 cruiser, 4 destroyers
sunk, with 2 destroyers burning. This news filled crews of the ships of TF 57
with admiration and at the same time, envy. This was a suicide attack on the
US forces off Okinawa by the world's largest battleship the YAMATO, the
light cruiser YAHAGI and 8 destroyers. The USN attacked the Japanese Force
with 386 aircraft from TF 58.

These were
the first intimation that a change of plan was contemplated for TF 57;
Rawlings thought it looked an attractive change. Rawlings discussed the
situation with AC 1, following which they decided that the attacks on the
Formosan airfields could be undertaken.

1817 hours. CTF 57 made a signal to inform COM 5th Fleet that TF 57 was
ready to attack Formosa.

10th

TF 57 continued patrolling in the
southern area during most of the day.

0845 hours.
AC 1's Chief 'Staff Officer was transferred to KING GEORGE V by destroyer and
the various details of the strike plans were discussed with Rawlings and his
staff.

Following the
discussion, Rawlings made a signal to inform all concerned of his intentions:

From
approximate position SAMSON 196½¼ from western tip Yonakumi
Jima will strike Matsuyama and Shinchiku airfields 11-12 April forenoons.
Will replenish COOTIE area 13th April. On 16th will
arrive Leyte.

1203 hours.
TF 57 was in position 20-35N, 125-55E when the final signals were transmitted
to Guam.

1700 hours.
TF 57 was steering for the flying-off position and CTF 57 handed over
tactical command to AC 1. The operation was named ICEBERG OOLONG.

11th

0600 hours.
TF 57 arrived at the flying-off position, 30 miles 202¼ from Yonakumi
Shima. There was a fresh N.N.E. wind, moderate sea and short swell. Cloud
base was about 1,000 feet with intermittent rain and drizzle.

Course was reversed and in daylight it
was soon apparent that conditions were unlikely to improve in the flying area
during the day while weather reports showed that conditions over Matsuyama
precluded any hope of attack. It was considered that a small fighter sweep
coasting round North Formosa might find Shinchiku, but that their return
journey would be a considerable gamble and surprise lost. Conditions were
most unsuitable also for air-sea rescue. Operations were accordingly
postponed 24 hours, and the Fleet continued to the south eastward.

1813 hours.
CTF 57 received CinC US 5th Fleet's order to all Task Group
Commanders to prepare for heavy enemy air attacks on 12th April.

2000 hours.
CTF.57 assumed tactical command.

Course was reversed during the night to
bring the Fleet to the flying-off position at dawn.

0704 hours. Seafires had an encounter with four
eastbound Zekes, one of which was shot down.

0715 hours. In position 23-58N, 122-46E the main strike
force of 24 bombers and 20 fighters was flown off.

1135 hours. A shadowing Dinah was chased by Corsairs,
which, after releasing their drop tanks, caught and destroyed it.

1410 hours. A Dinah escorted by two Oscar's escaped our
fighters in cloud

1530 hours. Hellcats to the north westward of the Fleet
shot down a Zeke.

In the evening the
enemy made a sortie from Ishigaki, which was intercepted by fighters.

At dusk all aircraft
were recovered and TF 57 moved away from the operational area.

2100 hours. CTF 57 assumed tactical command.

From signals received CTF 57 became aware that during the
day US forces off Okinawa were being heavily attacked by Kamikaze's and that
Formosa-based planes were taking part. Rawlings came to the conclusion during
the evening that TF 57 must contrive to remain for a further period; even it
could do little more than occasionally strike at the Sakishima Gunto. TF 57
should anyhow provide an alternative target to take some of the weight. AC 1
had evidently come to the same conclusion, for at 2113 hours he
informed Rawlings that, in view of the very heavy air attacks being launched
against US forces on and around Okinawa, he felt that our remaining aircraft
and aircrews could manage a fifth operating period provided that our losses
to­morrow should remain small. In the event, the Formosa attack days
acted as tonic. I therefore made the following signal:

To COM 5th Fleet
(R) CTG 52.1 CINC BPF, CINC PACCTF 112.

From CTF 57.

In view of
current situation expect to be ready further operations 16th - 17th
April. If Formosa weather bad tomorrow intend deal with Ishigaki and
significant intercepted traffic between Sakishima and Formosa both ways.

13th

0530 hours.
AC 1 assumed tactical command.

0550 hours.
Four fighters were flown off. A bogey originally detected at 0540 hours
developed into an ineffective raid by four Vals accompanied by a radar fitted
search plane. One Val dive bombed, but missed INDOMITABLE.

0615 hours. In position 23-58N, 122-46E the CAP proper
was flown off.

0640 hours. A small group of bogeys was intercepted 25
miles to the north west, two Zekes were splashed by Corsairs and the
remainder retired to the northward.

Following receipt of the order to the US Fleet to half
mast colours, Rawlings gave orders that British ships in harbour or near
thereto, should conform. 'Since US ships do not, I understand, fly their
colours in the operation areas and the half-masting of our colours at sea in
war is I believe only done when convoying or burying the deceased, the
position was not clear as regards TF 57.’ However Rawlings ‘felt
it fitting and in keeping with what I knew to be the feeling of the British
Fleet for this great leader and sincere friend of the British Empire, to mark
the occasion irrespective of precedent'; therefore Rawlings ordered
colours to be half-masted for the last hour before sunset.

During the refuelling operation, oiler RFA WAVE KING
established a record at the time for the number of ships refuelled in one day and pumped 5050 tons of oil in 9 hours.

At dusk TF 57
disengaged from the Tanker Force for the night.

15th

0730 hours. TF 57 rejoined the Tanker Group, now
consisting of three tankers.

1400 hours. Fuelling and general replenishing was
completed and TF 57 set course to cover the Sakishima area again.

16th

0530 hours. AC 1 assumed tactical command.

No picket cruiser was
stationed owing to the shortage of fighter aircraft. (No supply of new
aircraft had been available during the replenishment period)

0600 hours. 17 minutes before sunrise, in position
23-28N, 125-18E the CAP was flown off in excellent operating weather.

0622 hours. An enemy snooper at 20,000 feet escaped
before the CAP had time to gain height.

0630 hours. The first
strike took off to attack Ishigaki airfields.

0930 hours.
The second strike took off to attack Miyako airfields.

1230 hours.
A further strike took off to attack Ishigaki airfields.

1530 hours.
A further strike took off to attack Miyako airfields.

1536 hours.
Fighters failed to find a 320 knot bogey closing from the westward, the bogey
fading at 25 miles. A possible explanation for these mysterious bogeys is
that they were piloted flying bombs launched too far away and which failed to
reach TF 57 before exhausting their fuel.

1722 hours.
Hellcats shot down a Myrt which was apparently stalking a USN Privateer
search plane.

In spite of
having received no replenishment aircraft since 9/4/45 and the lack of
fighters consequently felt, AC 1 informed CTF 57 that he considered a sixth
operation period, if confined to one day, would be possible. Rawlings,
therefore, in view of the sustained heavy enemy air attacks on our Fleet
mates at and around Okinawa, informed Commander 5th Fleet as
follows:

At dusk TF 57 disengaged to the south
eastward and CTF 57 assumed tactical command at 2110 hours.

17th

0520 hours. AC 1 assumed tactical command.

0600 hours. TF 57 was in position 23-34N, 125-38E. CAP was flown off.

0609 hours. A few bogeys were detected to the north west
of the Fleet. Fighters sent to investigate splashed one Zeke.

0630 hours.
The first strike took off to attack Miyako airfields.

1627 hours.
Bogeys were detected 110 miles west of the Fleet. Fighters intercepted at 55
miles and two out of 6 Zekes were shot down, the others escaping in cloud.

1750 hours.
The close range weapons on KING GEORGE V suddenly opened fire on what
appeared to be a blazing aircraft diving vertically on the ship. It turned
out to be a falling dropped tank from a Corsair overhead, both parties
missed.

Rawlings
signal informing COM 5th Fleet that TF 57 would be available to
strike again on 20th April was approved by him.

A further
signal was also received:

From CINCPAC

To CTF 57 (R)
5th Fleet, CINC BPC.

It was
gratifying to note, your message of 16th to COM 5th Fleet.
Your Force is always ready to make still greater efforts whenever there is an
opportunity to hit the enemy. Appreciate your offer which is traditional of
British Navy.

1945 hours.
CTF 57 assumed tactical command of TF 57, which then withdrew to fuel in area
MOSQUITO ONE.

18th

0630 hours. TF 57 commenced
fuelling from Tanker Group of 5 tankers in area MOSQUITO ONE. Mails, stores,
and correspondence were transferred but no replenishment aircraft were
available.

The second day in replenishing area was
necessary in order to rest aircrews, and for maintenance work on aircraft.

1300 hours.
TF 57 disengaged and set course for the Sakishima area, leaving KEMPENFELT (D27)
in the fuelling area with 2 tankers, SPEAKER and the sloops WOODCOCK and
FINDHORN, with orders to proceed to Leyte at dawn on 21st April.

20th

0520 hours.
AC 1assumed tactical command.

0555 hours.
In position 23-33N, 125-02E the CAP was flown off.

The plan for the day followed generally
the pattern of previous strikes, namely to crater the runways on all Miyako
and Ishigaki airfields and to maintain a CAP over them to prevent repair
work, destroying any enemy airborne, and to strafe any grounded planes. In
addition, 2 strikes by rocket-firing Fireflies were ordered to attack coastal
shipping and ground installations.

There was no enemy airborne opposition
over the islands and none came near the Fleet. The several bogeys detected
during the day were all found to be friendly search planes when intercepted.

1910 hours.
TF 57 set course for Leyte, having completed 12 strike days out of 26 days
between first and last strikes.

1930 hours.
CTF 57 assumed tactical command.

22nd

During the day, and taking advantage of
the presence of Chief Staff Officer to CinC BPF on board KING GEORGE V, Rear
Admiral E. J. P. Brind, C.B., C.B.E. (Flag Officer Commanding, 4th
Cruiser Squadron), and Captain J. P. Wright, D.S.O. (C.S.O. to AC 1), were
transferred by destroyer to KING GEORGE V for conferences.

Uppermost in
Rawlings mind during the first few days at Leyte was the question of the
future employment of Task Force 57. Rawlings had been informed by the CinC
BPF, that alternative employment for the Fleet in the immediate future was
under consideration as follows:

(a) Continuation
of Operation ICEBERG as already planned.

(b) Withdrawal
from ICEBERG and engagement on an operation in Borneo with target date for
leaving Leyte of approximately 15th May.

The CinC's
signals made the latter appear the most probable.

On 27/4/45 a
signal was received from CinC BPF making it clear that the Fleet would not
participate in the Borneo operation and CinC, Pacific in a signal informed
Rawlings that TF 57 should continue with Operation ICEBERG. This was very
satisfactory.

In Rawlings's
signal to COM 5th Fleet he stated his intention and ability, unless otherwise
ordered,to proceed from Leyte with TF
57 on 1st May to continue the neutralisation of Sakishima Gunto
for a period of from three to four weeks before requiring to withdraw for
major replenishment. Operations were planned for a cycle of two days of
strikes followed by two for replenishment, the first strikes to be carried
out on 4th and 5th May.

The RN transferred fuel at sea using hoses trailed astern
of the tankers since they lacked catamarans to keep ships apart and the
appropriate derricks and block and tackles to sail side by side while
fuelling. Admiral Vian called this method 'an awkward, un-seaman like
business’. This approach was dangerous and resulted in incidents like
the one on 3/5/45 when the UGANDA fouled one of her propellers on a hose.
Because of the method used it took the RN twice as long as the USN to
replenish their ships. When the RN mastered the techniques that the US
Pacific Fleet had mastered, such as having ships refuel abeam of their
tanker, the time required was reduced.

TF 112 set course for
area COOTIE.

TF 57 set course for
their operational area to commence Operation ICEBERG TWO.

4th

0500 hours.
AC 1 assumed tactical command.

The plan for the opening of operations of ICEBERG TWO
was:

(a) To make airfields of the Sakishima Gunto
unserviceable by bombing runways and air installations.

(b) To conduct an offensive against flak
positions and to assist in cratering runways by ship bombardment.

(c) To maintain an offensive CAP over the
islands.

The particular plan for the first day was for the
bombarding force to bombard Miyako air­fields and flak positions at about
noon, from medium range, with the Carrier Force about 30 miles to the
southward)

0540 hours.
In position 23-44N, 125-11E the CAP was flown off

0600 hours. Enemy air activity in the vicinity of
Sakishima was detected, the general trend of traffic being to the eastward.
One small group approached the Fleet and Hellcats shot down one Zeke before
the others escaped in cloud.

0605 hours. Bomber strikes were flown off against
Miyako.

0815 hours. Bomber strikes were flown off against
Ishigaki.

1000 hours. In position 23-54N, 125-10E the bombarding
force comprising KING GEORGE V, HOWE, SWIFTSURE, GAMBIA and UGANDA escorted
by destroyers GRENVILLE (D5), UNDINE,
URCHIN, URANIA, UNDAUNTED and URSA, and EURYALUS
and BLACK PRINCE, detached from the carrier force and closed Miyako at 24
knots. The carriers provided an additional CAP for this force as well as
aircraft for spotting.

1155 hours. The bombarding force passed through position
24- 33.5N, 125-10E on the bombarding course of 070 degrees at 15 knots. KING
GEORGE V and HOWE were in open order line ahead and screened by 25th
DF and EURYALUS and BLACK PRINCE, who occupied the two port, i.e. inshore,
positions on the screen. SWIFTSURE, GAMBIA and UGANDA in open order line
ahead were stationed 270¼, 3 miles, i.e. fire off port quarter of the
Fleet Flagship. Condi­tions were ideal.

1205 hours. Fire was opened. KING GEORGE V and HOWE
bombarded Hirara airfield and the A.A. defence area to the north of the
airfield, respectively.

EURYALUS and BLACK
PRINCE carried out a simultaneous air burst shoot on the A.A. defence area of
Nobara airfield.

On completion of the
air burst shoot, SWIFTSURE and GAMBIA bombarded Nobara airfield, and UGANDA
bombarded Sukama air strip.

In spite of
comparatively close ranges, no form of opposition from the shore was
encountered.

1247 hours. Fire was checked after firing 77 rounds of
14in and 188 rounds of 5.25in.

The shots fired by UGANDA were the first shots fired in
anger at sea by a Canadian warship against the Japanese.

Photographs showed
that the runways at Nobara and Sukama were well hit and that all rounds from
the HOWE fell in the target area, but no photographs were obtained to show
results of the bombardment by KING GEORGE V.

A few minutes after the bombardment was commenced CTF 57
received a signal from AC 1 to say that the FORMIDABLE had been hit. At 1131
hours she was struck by a Zeke Kamikaze, and was reduced to a speed of 18
knots. CTF 57 accordingly informed the Bombarding Force and instructed ships
to speed up the bombardment. As signals were corrupt and the situation not
quite clear, CTF 57 ordered the cease fire a little earlier than planned and
at 1247 hours turned the force to the southward and closed the
carriers at 25 knots.

1500 hours.
The bombarding force rejoined the carriers.

1945 hours.
CTF 57 assumed tactical command and TF 57 withdrew from the area for the
night.

5th

Because the operational condition of the
FORMIDABLE was not clear, the programme for the day was arranged on the basis
that FORMIDABLE would keep 8 fighters at readiness to reinforce the CAP if
required.

0420 hours.
FORMIDABLE reported that repairs to her centre boiler room were complete and
that full speed was available.

0500 hours.
AC 1 assumed tactical control.

0545 hours.
In position 23-10N, 125-29E the CAP was flown off.

Bombing missions were carried out against
runways on Miyako and Ishigaki.

1400 hours. Fuelling was completed and TF
57 set course to return to the operational area. By this time the FORMIDABLE
had made good her damage and was fully operational.

NORMAN was ordered to escort oilers WAVE KING
and WAVE MONARCH to Leyte; and WHIMBREL and AVON escorted oilers

SAN AMBROSIO, SAN ADOLPHO and CEDARDALE to
Leyte.

9th

0510 hours. AC 1 assumed tactical command. The
weather although showery was much improved and continued to improve during
the day.

0545 hours.
In position 23-06N, 126-00E, CAPS were flown off. Weather over the targets
was reported as satisfactory. All runways at Hirara were reported as
serviceable.

0830 hours. In
position 23-40N, 125- 34E. The first bomber strike was flown off.

Three further bomber strikes were flown
off during the day.

1145 hours.
TF 57 was sighted by a bogey which approached within 30 miles. Fighters drove
it off but were unable to catch it.

1645 hours.
Bogeys were detected very low 22 miles to the westward coming in fast. Four
Seafires intercepted at 15 miles, but allowed themselves to be decoyed away
by one aircraft which they shot down. Meanwhile four other enemy planes
evaded another division of Seafires, and after climbing to about 3,000 feet
penetrated to the Fleet.

From 1650 hours onwards the Fleet
was radically maneuvered by emergency turns at 22 knots. One minute after
such a turn of 60 degrees to starboard was executed, a Kamikaze made a 10
degrees angle dive onto the VICTORIOUS from her starboard quarter. The enemy
was well hit by close range weapons but crashed onto the flight deck near the
forward lift.

1656 hours.
Another Kamikaze made a shallow power glide from astern on VICTORIOUS. Though
hit hard by gunfire, and well on fire, it hit the flight deck aft a glancing
blow, and burning furiously, passed over the side. Damage to the ship was
limited.

1657 hours.
A third Kamikaze made a pass at VICTORIOUS but then shifted target to the
HOWE further ahead, and approached from the starboard quarter in a long
shallow dive. This time the attacker was hit at a more reasonable range, and
continued to be so until it crashed in flames 100 yards from the HOWE after passing
over the quarterdeck.

1705 hours.
A fourth Kamikaze approached FORMIDABLE and then INDOMITABLE, being engaged
by both ships, without apparent result. It then turned and dived into the
after deck park of the FORMIDABLE. There was a large explosion and fire and a
great deal of smoke. Speed was reduced to 15 knots to aid control of the fire
which was extinguished at 1720 hours.

1755 hours.
FORMIDABLE reported being fit to land on aircraft.

The state of
the Carrier Squadron was now as follows. The FORMIDABLE and VICTORIOUS could
operate, but the former had only four bombers and 11 fighters serviceable,
and also had two pom-pom mountings out of action. The VICTORIOUS could
operate a few aircraft at a time, but the damage to her lift seriously
reduced her speed of handling. In the circumstances CTF 57 concurred with a
recommendation from AC 1 that the Fleet should withdraw to fuel, sort out and
make good the damage, etc. and return to strike on 12th /13th
May. Rawlings informed Commander 5th Fleet of this intention.
As TG 52.1 had been ordered to cover Sakishima on days when TF 57 was not
striking, these two alterations to the programme dictated first by weather
and then by damage consideration, must have caused inconvenience to QJG 52.1.

1950 hours.
TF 57 left the operational area and course was set for area COOTIE.

2000 hours.
CTF 57 assumed tactical command.

USN Task Unit 52.1.3 covered Sakishima
during 10th and 11th May.

10th

0610 hours.
In area COOTIE ONE, TF 57 RVed with the Logistic
Support Group TF 112 comprising oilers RFA ARNDALE and DINGLEDALE, MV AASE
MAERSK6184grt, 10.5 knots (Danish,
taken over by MOWT in 1940) and MV SAN AMADO
7316grt, 12 knots, tug WEASEL, and escort carriers RULER and
STRIKER escorted by destroyer NEPAL, sloops
CRANE, PHEASANT and WOODCOCK and minesweepers (known as corvettes in
Australian Navy) HMAS WHYALLA and BALLARAT.

0630 hours.
Refuelling and the exchange of mail correspondence and stores, and the
replenishment of aircraft commenced and continued throughout the day.

AC 1 visited
VICTORIOUS and FORMIDABLE to inspect damage, and found that temporary repairs
being carried out showed that both ships would be sufficiently repaired to be
operational to continue the programme of strikes.

AC.1 and CS.4
then boarded KING GEORGE V to discuss with CTF 57 measures to give better
protection to the carriers, and in the light of the enemy's apparent change
of tactics in attacks on TF 57. The enemy appeared to have abandoned his
previous practice of a high approach in favour of a low one, thereby greatly
reducing the length of warning and making interception by fighters much more
difficult. To combat this, it was decided:

(a) To station two radar pickets, each consisting of a
6in cruiser and a destroyer, 12 miles to the north west, and south westward
of the

Fleet so as to increase
the range of detection. Two fighters would be allocated to each picket and at
first contact with the enemy,

other fighters would be
sent to the .threatened sector.

(b) To bring in the 5.25in. cruisers from the screen and station
them with the main body of the Fleet to increase AA protection for the

carriers
whenever in the operation area.

(c) To
station a destroyer astern of each carrier to afford more gun protection in
what appeared to be the enemy's favourite position for

attacking carriers.

(d) To
increase mutual gun support when attack threatened by bringing in the
carriers to the 2,000 yards circle, and the battleships and

cruisers of the main body until their distance from adjacent
carriers was 2,000 yards.

This new
disposition was to be given a trial during the next-strike period.

The question
of reducing the distance between ships had been under review for some time. There
were many factors to take into con­sideration, not least of these being
the interference caused to flying in and off and forming up. Its adoption for
trial now was a measure of the improvement of the pilots' skill, etc. during
the present operations.

The Fleet was
also instructed that in future attacks enemy aircraft must be brought under
fire much earlier than had been the case recently. Commanding Officers of
ships were ordered to give this matter their personal attention.

1915 hours.
The Fleet disengaged from the Tanker Group for the night.

11th

0630 hours. KEMPENFELT,
having made good defects at Leyte rejoined TF 57.

0640 hours.
TF 57 again formed on the Tanker Group, and all fuelling and transfer of
stores, aircraft, correspondence, and personnel was completed in time for the
Fleet to disengage at 1640 hours and take departure for the operations
area.

NEPAL joined TF 57.

QUEENBOROUGH, who had developed shaft
vibration, was sent back to Leyte, with SPEAKER.

Oilers AASE
MAERSK and SAN AMADO escorted by the WHYALLA
and BALLARAT also returned to Leyte.

12th

0510 hours.
AC 1 assumed tactical command.

0520 hours.
The four counter-Kamikaze destroyers took station, one close astern of each
carrier.

Radar pickets, SWIFTSURE with KEMPENFELT,
and UGANDA with WESSEX, were stationed 12 miles 315 degreesand
225 degrees respectively from the Fleet centre.

0540 hours.
In position 23-40N, 126-51E, in overcast weather, the TF 57 and island CAPS
and the first bomber strike were flown off.

Four bomber strikes were flown off during
the day.

1915 hours.
The radar pickets rejoined.

1930 hours.
The dusk CAP was landed on and the Fleet withdrew to the southward for the
night.

2010 hours.
CTF 57 assumed tactical command.

13th

0510 hours.
AC 1 assumed tactical command.

Radar pickets and counter-Kamikaze destroyers
were stationed.

0540 hours.
In position 24-20N, 126-55E, in fine weather, the TF 57 and island CAPS were
flown off.

Four bomber strikes were flown during the
day, three to Miyako and one to Ishigaki.

0948 hours.
A possible submarine contact was obtained close to TF 57 in position 24-20N,
126-48E. Three destroyers were detached to hunt for it with a CAP of 4
Corsairs

1203 hours.
A possible contact was attacked with depth charges, and 2 Avengers were flown
off for ASP, and another armed with depth charges was sent to assist the
hunt. The possible contact was later reported as stationary, and although the
hunt was continued through­out the afternoon no S/M contact was found. It
now considered that a S/M was never present.

1920 hours.
The dusk CAP was landed on and the Fleet withdrew to fuel in area COOTIE.

The other incoming Tanker Group was late
at the rendezvous. They were found by search aircraft from the CAP and
directed to TF 57. This group consisted of RFAs WAVE KING and WAVE MONARCH
escorted by NIZAM and STRIKER.

1100 hours.
Refuelling and replacement of aircraft commenced from the second group.

Forty tons of bombs were transferred by
BLACK PRINCE from FORMIDABLE to the INDEFATIGABLE. This was necessary because
the dimensions of the American bombs supplied to ships at Leyte had prevented
the full number required being stowed in INDEFATIGABLE.

During the forenoon, search aircraft were
sent to find and direct hospital ship TJITJALENGKA to TF 57.

MV
TJITJALENGKA 10972grt, 15 knots, was a Dutch passenger ship that had been
requisitioned by the MOWT in 1940 and used as troopship. On 8/7/42 she was
chartered to the Admiralty after having been fitted out as a hospital ship
with beds for 504 patients.

TJITJALENGKA had been requested by CTF 57
to remain at call within 30 miles of a position 85 miles to the eastward of
the normal dawn position of TF 57 in the fuelling area. Casualties by now fit
to be moved were transferred to TJITJALENGKA by destroyer in the afternoon.

1910 hours.
The Fleet disengaged from the Tanker Group for the night.

During the absence of TF 57 Sakishima was
covered by USN TU 52.1.3.

At this stage
it became necessary to consider the date on which TF 57 would leave the
operations area for major storing in the rear bases. The oilers and repair
ships of the Fleet Train, based at Leyte, required early notice of a firm
date for re-disposition in order that with their slow speed they might reach
their new stations in time to meet TF 57 and fulfill their functions.

As TF 57 was
due at the storing ports early in June, and as it was evident that a
considerable amount of work would be required to make good the battle damage
to carriers, it appeared desirable to conclude operations with the twelfth
strike day on 25th May, and so ensure the Fleet being ready to
resume operations when required in July.

After
consultation with AC 1, CTF 57 accordingly sent the following signal:

Action COM 5th
Fleet C IN C PAC

Info C-in-C,
B.P.F. VA(Q) FONAS(A) CTF 113

From CTF 57

Propose with
your concurrence TF57 continues present strikes until 24 and 25 May then CTF
57 in KING GEORGE V, 3 destroyers proceed Guam arriving 1000 hours 28th
leave 0600 hours 30th for Manus. If you concur request
authority these four ships fuel with US supplies Guam. Remainder TF 57 to
Manus after fuelling COOTIE on 26th arriving in forenoon 30th.
Could carry out further strikes if losses remain light on 28th and
29th May which would delay above programme for four days. CTF112
will divert slow tankers to Manus or COOTIE which necessitates early decision
on your needs.

15th

0630 hours.
TF 57 reformed on the tanker group, and fuelling and exchange of stores,
aircraft and correspondence was continued

Destroyers TROUBRIDGE and TENACIOUS
joined TF 57.

GRENVILLE detached from TF 57 and joined
TU 112.2.5, to be left in the servicing area.

1705 hours.
With replenishment completed TF 57 disengaged from the Tanker Group and
departure was taken for the operations area.

During the day the following signals were received:

CTF
57. From COM 5th
Fleet

Not necessary, keep up coverage of Sakishima after 25th.

CTF 57. From CINOPAC

Arrival KING GEORGE V and 3 destroyers Guam 28th
May approved. Will be pleased to welcome you. Guam has available fuel for
topping off.

16th

0510 hours. AC
1 assumed tactical command.

Radar pickets were sent out and counter
Kamikaze destroyers closed their carriers.

0540 hours.
In position 23-40N, 126-51E, the TF 57 and island CAPS and the first bomber
strike for Miyako were flown off.

Five bomber strikes were sent to the
islands, during the day, three to Miyako and two to Ishigaki.

1935 hours.
The dusk CAP landed on and the Fleet withdrew to the southward for the night.

1950 hours.
CTF 57 assumed tactical command.

17th

0510 hours. AC
1 assumed tactical command.

Radar pickets were sent out and counter
Kamikaze destroyers closed their carriers.

The day broke
with very light winds of only one or two knots, a state of affairs which
persisted and proved a handicap throughout the day. The state of boiler
brickwork in several ships, and the defective centre stern tube bush in
INDOMITABLE, made high speeds most undesirable; but without high speeds,
little safety margin was left for operating aircraft.

0540 hours.
From a position 85 miles 110 degrees from Miyako the TF 57 and island CAPS were
flown off.

Bomber strikes were sent to the islands
during the day.

1915 hours. The
dusk CAP was landed on and the radar pickets were recalled and TF 57 withdrew
to area COOTIE to fuel.

1800 hours.
The Tanker Group reversed course to enable them to RV with ammunition carrier
ROBERT MAERSKz which was expected in position COOTIE ONE at 0600 hours
18/5/45. Meanwhile the transfer of bombs by BLACK PRINCE continued until
dark.

19th

0645 hours.
TF 57 reformed on the Tanker Group which now included MV ROBERT MAERSK
2294grt, 14 knots, (Danish ship requisitioned 6/40 by MOWT) with supplies of
bombs, who had been escorted to the area by minesweeper HMAS CAIRNS

The transfer of bombs, fuel and stores
was continued.

VICTORIOUS and later INDOMITABLE went
alongside ROBERT MAERSK and embarked bombs by whip and inhaul method, the
rate of transfer being about 75 bombs per hour.

Continuous rain and low visibility in the
afternoon prevented flying and seriously upset the numbers of replenishment
aircraft to be flown onto FORMIDABLE and the flyable duds which were to be
flown from her to CHASER.

TJITJALENGKA was contacted by aircraft
and directed to the Fleet. TJITJALENGKA then embarked sick and casualties.

NORMAN joined TF 57 replacing the NEPAL.

1800 hours.
Oilers CEDARDALE, SAN AMBROSIO and SAN ADOLPHO escorted by BENDIGO and CAIRNS
detached for Manus. PARRETT acted as additional escort until 21/5/45 when she
detached to Leyte.

1930 hours.
NEPAL was detached to Leyte to augment the escorts available to CTF. 112 for
the forthcoming, move south by the Fleet Train.

1930 hours.
TF 57 departed for the operations area.

20th

The flying-off position for the day was
to be 23-39N, 126-40E.

0458 hours.
First light, the clouds were low, about 8/10 and the horizon clear.

0500 hours.
The four anti–Kamikaze destroyers who included QUILLIAM, left the
screen as previously arranged, and started to close their carriers to form
astern of them. The Fleet was proceeding at 16 knots.

0510 hours.
AC 1 assumed tactical command.

0515 hours.
The Fleet ran into dense fog.

0524 hours.
QUILLIAM, endeavouring to form astern of the INDOMITABLE, collided with her.
Fortunately no casualties were sustained, but superficial above water damage
was caused to the INDOMITABLE, and serious damage to the bow of the QUILLIAM.
As soon as the damaged destroyer was clear of the screen, NORMAN was ordered
to take her in tow.

0615 hours.
BLACK PRINCE was sent to stand by both ships and escort them to area COOTIE.

0745 hours.
By which time the weather had improved slightly, CAPS and the first strike
was flown off. Because of weather conditions this proved to be the only one.

During the
forenoon CTG 99.2's signal was received, indicating the intention of that
group to strike Miyako with shore based aircraft at 1700 hours. It was
therefore decided to withdraw CAPS from that island by 1600 hours. The
strike planned for Ishigaki at 1630 hours was not altered. These
intentions were communicated to CTF 51 and CTG 99.2. In the event, however,
and presumably because of weather, CTG 99.2 cancelled his strike.

1210 hours.
Two bogeys were detected 50 miles to the westward tracking 040 degrees.
Fighters sent to intercept found both aircraft were friendly bombers. No
information of their presence or mission was known to CTF 57.

1900 hours.
All CAPS were recovered and TF 57 withdrew to the southward for the night.

1930 hours.
CTF 57 assumed tactical command.

2100 hours.
TF 57 passed close to BLACK PRINCE who reported that the QUILLIAM was
satisfactorily in tow.

On 21/5/45
BLACK PRINCE transferred the tow to tug WEASEL.

21st

0510 hours.
AC 1 assumed tactical command.

Flying off had been planned for 0540
hours from a position 85 miles 110¼ from Miyako. The weather at dawn
was similar to the previous day except that the Fleet was clear of fog
patches. Flying-off was therefore postponed.

0600 hours.
Four Hellcats were flown off to investigate the weather within a 30 mile
radius. They reported clear weather to east and west, and improving weather
to the northward. Acting on this information the first strike was flown off
at 0655 hours.

Five bomber strikes were flown off during
the day, three to Miyako and two to Ishigaki.

1423 hours.
A high snooper was detected approaching TF 57 from the westward. Fighters
were ordered to 30,000 feet and at 1442 hours intercepted 36 miles to the
south westward at 26,000 feet. The enemy, a Myrt, was shot down 4 minutes
later by Hellcats from the INDOMITABLE.

During the
day Commander Third Fleet's signal was received. This indicated the nature of
future operations for the British Pacific Fleet. In the light of this, and
after consulting with AC 1, CTF 57 decided to release FORMIDABLE early for
repair of battle damage. It was felt that this was necessary to ensure that 4
carriers would be available for operations on completion of the forthcoming
storing period. This decision was communicated to Commander Fifth Fleet.

1930 hours.
The dusk CAP was landed on, radar pickets were recalled, and TF 57 then
withdrew to area COOTIE.

1930 hours.
CTF 57 assumed tactical command.

During the absence of TF 57 the USN Task
Unit 52.1.3 covered Sakishima.

Fuelling, and exchange of aircraft and
stores and bombs, was carried out throughout the day.

GRENVILLE (D25) re­joined TF 57 as
Senior Officer Destroyers, and WESSEX took her place as escort to TU 112.2.5.

After receiving mails and discharging
excess complement the damaged QUILLIAM proceeded in tow of tug WEASEL to
Leyte. NORMAN acting as escort. CTF 112 was requested to arrange for a larger
tug to meet and relieve WEASEL. (American tug USS TURKEY was sent out from
Leyte, where the tow arrived safely on 28/5/45)

1800 hours.
FORMIDABLE was detached with orders to proceed to Manus and then Sydney to
expedite repair of battle damage. She was escorted by destroyers KEMPENFELT
and WHIRLWIND, both of whom were due for refit.

1915 hours.
The Fleet disengaged from the Tanker Group for the night.

23rd

0745 hours.
TF 57 reformed on the Tanker Group, and fuelling and exchange of stores was
continued.

Light cruiser HMNZS ACHILLES joined TF
57.

Owing to the plummer block on the centre
shaft overheating and wiping in INDOMITABLE, her speed had to be limited to
22 knots.

1800 hours.
CHASER, SPEAKER and NAPIER were detached for Manus.

1815 hours.
TF 57 detached from the Tanker Group taking departure for the operations area
with only 3 carriers in company.

CTF 57 had hoped to bombard Miyako on
24/5/45, but with the reduced number of aircraft available it was judged
wiser to forego this plan in favour of an entire air effort.

24th

0510 hours.
AC 1 assumed tactical command.

Dawn visibility was low, sky overcast
with rain and drizzle. Flying-off was postponed.

0900 hours.
Four fighters flown off reported weather improving slowly in the vicinity.

1045 hours.
In position 23-40N, 126-52E the first strike was flown off against Miyako.

1245 hours.
The first strike was flown off against Ishigaki.

A further strike was flown off against
each target.

1907 hours.
The last CAP was landed on and radar pickets were recalled. TF 57 then
withdrew to the southward for the night.

1940 hours.
CTF 57 assumed tactical command.

25th

0510 hours.
AC 1 assumed tactical command

0600 hours.
In position 23-40N, 126-52E the first strike was flown off against Miyako.

A further two strikes against Miyako were
flown off at 1115 hours and 1400 hours.

The returning strike from Ishigaki made
contact with the submarine USS BLUEFISH, who reported that during the
previous night lights had been observed on Ishigaki airfield. The submarine
commander had therefore bombarded the airfield.

1910 hours.
The last CAP was landed on and radar pickets were recalled. TF 57 then
withdrew to the southward for the night.

2200 hours.
KING GEORGE V (Flag Vice Admiral Rawlings CTF 57) with destroyers TROUBRIDGE,
TENACIOUS and TERMAGANT detached from TF 57 and set course for Guam.

The remaining
ships of TF 57 under command of AC 1 set course for area COOTIE to top off
ships, with fuel as necessary for them to reach Manus.

The following
signals were subsequently ex­changed between C IN C PAC and CTF 57:

CTF 57.
Info C-in-C, BPF. C IN C PAC ADV 5th Fleet

From COM 5th
Fleet

I would
express, to you, to your officers and to your men, after two months
operations as a Fifth Fleet Task Force, my appreciation of your fine work and
co-operative spirit. Task Force 57 has mirrored the great traditions of the
Royal Navy to the American Task Forces.

Spruance.
COM, 5th Fleet Info C IN C PAC ADV C.-in-C, BPF.

From CTF57

We are proud
to have been in a position to lend a hand in this crucial operation and hope
we may continue so doing until Victory. Will pass your generous message with
great personal pleasure, to all of the British Pacific Fleet who have been
honoured by serving under you. Regret my Flagship and I were not able to
greet you on your return to Guam.

The objective
of the British Pacific Fleet [TF 57] had been to:

(a) Render
the six Japanese airfields unusable to the enemy by constant bombing and
cratering of the runways, plus destruction of

buildings.

(b) Destroy
enemy aircraft on the ground and in the air

(c) Prevent
aircraft originating in Formosa from using the islands as a staging area to
attack the American fleet at Okinawa or reinforce

land based aircraft in Japan.

The objective
had generally been achieved, but as Vice Admiral Rawlings (CTF 57) reported,
'however thoroughly the airfields were neutralised by
day, the enemy was determined and able to effect repairs by night'. One of
the reasons the Japanese could do this was because the strike Avengers were
dropping 1000 lb. semi-armour piercing bombs that were surplus to the FAA
attacks on the TIRPITZ. These weapons were useless for cratering runways.

During TF
57's period of operations against the Sakishima Gunto, the Force was at sea
for 62 days, broken by eight days spent in Leyte Gulf. In the course of its
operations TF 57 flew 4852 aircraft sorties and discharged 875 tons of bombs
and rocket projectiles. About one hundred Japanese aircraft were destroyed
and more than seventy damaged.

During the
second part of the operations, nine oilers supplied the fleet with 87,000
tons of fuel oil and 756 tons of aviation spirit, enabling it to remain at
sea for a month between 700 and 900 miles from its base.

TF 57 carried
out almost 8,000 aircraft sorties with the loss in action of 85 aircraft.
Half that number again was lost to kamikaze strikes.

Admiral King
USN, CinC US Navy, in his report to the Honourable James Forrestal, Secretary
of the Navy, wrote:

A fast British carrier task force, under the command of Vice Admiral
Rawlings, was assigned to Admiral Spruance's Fifth Fleet to assist in the air
support operations for the Okinawa assault. From 26 March to 20 April, and
again from 4 May to 25 May, planes from this force rendered valuable service
in neutralizing the enemy air installations on Sakishima Gunto, southwest of
Okinawa. Carriers of the force were subjected to frequent attacks by suicide
planes, but none of them was put out of action. Battleships and cruisers of
the force bombarded Miyako Jima on 4 May with satisfactory results.

26th

En route to Guam.

Noon position 20-04N, 132-08E

1700 hours. Altered
course to 122¼

1800 hours.
Sighted one Coronado aircraft on patrol

27th

En route to Guam.

0846 hours.
Sighted one Coronado aircraft on patrol.

Noon position 16-01N, 138-49E

2000 hours.
Reduced speed to 19 knots.

28th

0715 hours.
Land in sight, reduced speed to 17 knots and altered course to 100¼.

0905 hours.
Stopped one mile off Orote Point, Guam, where all ships embarked pilots and
the British Naval Liaison Officer to the CinC Pacific Fleet, Acting Captain
H.S. Hopkins, R.N. boarded KING GEORGE V.

0920 hours.
Entered Apra Harbour.

0940 hours.
KING GEORGE V secured to buoy whilst destroyers TROUBRIDGE and TERMAGANT
proceeded to a tanker to fuel. The TENACIOUS anchored and fuelled from
tanker after the TERMAGANT had finished topping up.

Vice Admiral Rawlings, 2inC British
Pacific Fleet called on Admiral Nimitz, the CinC US Pacific Fleet immediately
after arrival in Guam, and in the evening dined ashore at Admiral Nimitz'
invitation.

29th

1030 hours.
Admiral Nimitz wearing 'white undress', came on board KING GEORGE V
where he inspected the Marine Guard of Honour and was afterwards introduced
to the Senior Officers, Commanding Officers of destroyers, and Senior Staff
Officers. Nimitz then addressed the assembled company, which included a
representative team of officers and men from the three destroyers.

1630 hours.
An ‘at home’ was held on board KING GEORGE V, the invitation
being extended by the Vice Admiral Rawlings, 2iC British Pacific Fleet,
Captain and Officers of the ship to the United States Authorities at
Guam. The number attending unfortunately had to be limited but about 100
Officers and a few military and naval nurses attended the party, which was
held on the Quarter Deck.

In the evening, the Vice Admiral
Rawlings, entertained Admiral Nimitz and other senior United States Officers
to dinner on aboard KING GEORGE V.

The welcome
given to this small representative portion of the British Pacific Fleet was
most warm, and every facility, both social and recreational, was extended to
the Officers and men of the Flagship and accompanying destroyers. An
issue of beer was made to the ship's companies in the canteen ashore, and
motor transport was put at the disposal of Officers and ratings for
sightseeing tours of the Island. Practically 50% of the ship's
companies were landed each day.

30th

0700 hours.
KING GEORGE V sailed from Apra Harbour, preceded by destroyers TROUBRIDGE, TERMAGANT,
and TENACIOUS, who formed an A/S screen as soon as the harbour was cleared.

0715 hours.
Set course 270¼, 24 knots for Manus.

0835 hours.
Altered course to 195¼ and commenced zigzag.

Between 0850 and 1015 hours,
KING GEORGE V carried out long range and close range firings at two sleeve
targets provided by CTG. 94.10.

Destroyers carried out similar practices
between 1030 and 1145 hours.

1200 hours.
TROUBRIDGE carried out firing at smoke burst target.

Noon position 12-10N 143-35E

1700 hours.
Altered course to 190¼.

31st

0325 hours.
Altered course to 145¼ and resumed zig zag

Noon position 03-43N, 144-07E.

The Captain of the Fleet, Captain E.W.
Longley Cook RN, was transferred to TENACIOUS for passage to Manus and thence
to Sydney by air, so as to arrive before the Fleet.

June

1st

0255 hours.
Course was altered to 175¼, speed 22 knots.

0600 hours.
Off Manus, in TBS touch with destroyer GRENVILLE.

0630, hours. TROUBRIDGE, TERMAGENT, and TENACIOUS were detached to
Manus. Screen was then taken over by destroyers GRENVILLE, UNDINE,
URCHIN, and WESSEX. Speed was increased to 23 knots, course as
requisite to pass through the off lying islands.

5/6/45 The
main body of the British Pacific Fleet arrived at Sydney on this day. The
objective of the Fleet returning to Sydney was to facilitate the storing of
ships, repair the carriers' battle damage, boiler cleaning, and generally
store for the next operational period.

Four days'
leave was granted to each watch whilst in Sydney, the resultant invasion
being quickly dispersed by the hospitable Australians who accommodated in
their own homes a large percentage of the libertymen for the period
of their leave.

18th

At Sydney where their Royal Highnesses
the Duke and Duchess of Gloucester honoured Vice Admiral Rawlings, 2iC
British Pacific Fleet, with their presence on board KING GEORGE V for
luncheon.

19/6/45 Commander
Hutchinson RN, Staff Officer Operations to the Vice Admiral Rawlings 2iC
British Pacific Fleet, Commander Smeeton RN, Staff Officer Air
Plans, Commander Lewin RN, Staff Fighter Direction Officer, both on staff of
the Vice Admiral Commanding, First Aircraft Carrier Squadron, together with
Captain Ewen, USN LO, with the Pacific Fleet left Sydney by air for Leyte, to
discuss forthcoming operation with the Staff of Admiral Halsey, Commander US
Third Fleet. The party returned to Sydney on 25/6/45.

24th

At Sydney where again their Royal
Highnesses the Duke and Duchess of Gloucester honoured Vice Admiral Rawlings
with their presence on board KING GEORGE V for luncheon.

28th

0730 hours.
The ships of the British Pacific Fleet, now designated TF 37, started to
leave Sydney Harbour, split into the following groups so as to
facilitate individual practice requirements:

In the orders
for passage, it was arranged that each Task Unit, under its Flag Officer,
should proceed independently, making the most of all opportunities for
carrying out individual practices, keeping within 30 miles of KING GEORGE V
during the day, and closing to radar touch by nightfall. The aircraft
carriers were ordered to follow a track approximately 10 miles to the
Eastward of the route of the main force, otherwise acting independently for
flying practices. Throughout the passage economy of oil in destroyers
was the determining factor.

1030 hours.
Destroyers carried out sleeve target firing.

1145 hours.
KING GEORGE V, GAMBIA and BLACK PRINCE carried out long and close range
AA firing position in 75 degrees South Head, 10 miles. The sleeve
targets were towed by Naval Aircraft from NAS NOWRA. (Naval Air Station near
Nowra, New South Wales)

29th

1000 hours.
KING GEORGE V carried out range and inclination exercises with GAMBIA and
BLACK PRINCE and on completion, the cruisers carried out radar calibration
exercises with KING GEORGE V at 10,000 yards.

Noon Position 29-10S, 154-52E

1500 hours.
The EURYALUS joined CS 4 from Brisbane.

30th

0300 hours.
A Radar contact was obtained with a group of ships bearing 280 degrees, 21
miles. These were identified as destroyers QUICKMATCH, QUIBERON, QUALITY and
QUADRANT who, to ease the fuelling situation, had been sent previously to
fuel at Brisbane before proceeding independently from there to join AC 1 and
relieve WESSEX and WRANGLER.

Bombardment communication exercises
between KING GEORGE V and EURYALUS

Dummy Air Reporting Exercises carried out
by the cruisers.

Noon position 22-46S, 156-07E.

1200 hours.
IMPLACABLE, escorted by destroyers TEAZER and TERPSICHORE, joined AC 1.
NEWFOUNDLAND and GAMBIA (Flag CS4) joined the other two cruisers of CS
4. These ships had sailed from Manus.

1930 hours.
TF 37 commenced night encounter exercise. For this exercise, KING GEORGE V
was assumed to be a damaged battleship, with three 6in cruisers in company,
returning to base. The attacking force under RA (D) consisting of TG.
37.4 with the BLACK PRINCE and EURYALUS attached.

2040 hours.
The exercise was completed.

2050 hours.
WESSEX was detached by AC 1 to return to Sydney.

2050 hours.
WRANGLER was detached by AC 1 to proceed to Brisbane to fuel, and for onward
passage to Manus.

July

1st

1015 hours.
EURYALUS which was suffering from leaking boiler tubes which were estimated
to require 48 hours to repair detached from TF 37 and proceeded to Manus.

Noon position 16-19S, 156-33E

1450 hours.
TERPSICHORE and TEAZER joined TG 37.4, having been detached by AC 1 on
account of their low percentage of fuel remaining.

2nd

0830 hours.
KING GEORGE V carried out bombardment communication exercise with BLACK
PRINCE.

1000 hours.
KING GEORGE V carried out 5.25in throw off shoot, using BLACK PRINCE as a
target.

Between 1030 and 1130 hours,
destroyers carried out Rapid Open Fire Exercises.

Noon position 10-08S, 154-37E

Destroyers exercised manoeuvres
during the afternoon and at 1500 hours, formed screening diagram No. 36
on KING GEORGE V.

2000 hours.
The cruisers, having exercised independently during the day, carried out
Night Encounter exercises which were completed at 2300 hours.

3rd

Bad weather postponed until 1000 hours
the AA throw off firing which had been scheduled for 0800 hours.
Fighters (from the 1st Carrier Squadron) carried out a
strafing attack on the Fleet which had been disposed in a circular formation
so as to exercise coordination of gun control.

Noon position 06S, 149-03E

1800 hours.
Destroyer BARFLEUR, which had suffered slight damage from prematures
during the practice firing, was instructed to proceed ahead of

1100 hours.
KING GEORGE V entered Seeadler Harbour, Manus, followed by the remainder of
TF 37.

Waiting at Manus to join TF 37 was HMNZS
ACHILLES who had just completed a refit in one of the floating docks in
Seeadler Harbour.

5th

TF 37 was at Manus where they stored,
ammunitioned, and fuelled in preparation for the forthcoming operation.

TF 37's
stay at Manus, which was of 36 hours duration, was taken up more or
less completely by meetings to discuss the best way of utilizing the forces
at our disposal and of adapting these forces to American methods when the
British and American Task Forces were operating in company. A
considerable amount of American operation orders was received on board
the Flagship on arrival at Manus which, together with our own operational
orders, had to be distributed to the Task Force before sailing.

6th

Early in the
morning CTF 37 signalled COM
US 3rd Fleet:

I hereby
report Task Force 37 for duty with the 3rd Fleet. We are much
looking forward to this out first operation under your orders.

1010 hours.
KING GEORGE V, cruisers, and destroyers carried out A.A. throw off firing at
aircraft provided by the carriers.

1120 hours.
Commenced fuelling destroyers from KING GEORGE V and light cruisers UGANDA,
NEWFOUNDLAND and ACHILLES.

Noon position: 03-12N, 153-04E

1545 hours.
Whilst BARFLEUR was fuelling alongside KING GEORGE V, the Rear Admiral
Destroyers took the opportunity of going on board KING GEORGE V for
discussions with the Vice Admiral, Rawlings, CTF 37.

1040 hours.
A fighter direction exercise with aircraft flown off from the VICTORIOUS was
carried out.

Noon position: 7-23N, 156-31E

2112 hours.
TF 37 commenced maneuvering exercises by TBS.

9th

Between 0500 to 0830 hours
course of speed of TF 37 was adjusted as necessary to pass large convoys and
a number of single ships sailing in both directions and apparently en route
for Eniwetok and Guam and vice versa.

0515 hours.
A.A. throw-off shoots.

1015 hours.
Dive bombing exercise with strafing attacks by fighters using live
ammunition. A height calibration exercise was carried out
simultaneously.

1050 hours.
Jackstays were rigged fore and after for aircraft from VICTORIOUS to practice
message drops on to KING GEORGE V.

0113 hours.
TF 37 detected by radar the US Logistic Group, TG 30.8 and course altered to
pass to the Westward.

0400 hours.
TG 37 re-commenced oiling.

1155 hours.
The QUIBERON reported a sub contact. KING GEORGE V cast off from the
oiler and the Fleet was turned 50 degrees to starboard.

1200 hours.
The contact was reported as non sub and TF 37 resumed the oiling course.

Noon position: 35-08N, 152-31E

1210 hours.
Because of trouble with fuel hoses, KING GEORGE V was changed over from the
SAN AMADO to the WAVE EMPEROR to continue fuelling.

1837 hours.
TF 37 disengaged from oiling force for the night.

WAVE EMPEROR
being empty was sent back south to Eniwetok escorted by the BARLE as it
was evident, as it had been throughout the planning stage, that the tanker
capacity would be a most critical and anxious factor. In the event this
move was to prove invaluable and justified the risk of moving one of our best
oilers with a solitary escort. Fortunately, the submarine threat
developed near the Philippines and not on the Eniwetok run.

15th

0545 hours.
Recommenced oiling. KING GEORGE V fuelled from DINGLEDALE, and UGANDA
from SAN AMADO thus completing the fuelling of TF 37, with the exception of
some of destroyers who, by this time, required topping up again.

Noon Position: 35-49N, 151-36E.

1400 hours.
TF 37 disengaged from oiling force and set course to RV with COM 3rd
US Fleet.

1635 hours.
The carriers carried out sleeve target firing.

16th

0430 hours. TF 37 sighted the US Task
Force TF 38 to the westward and TF 37 maneuvered so as to pass to
the eastward of the US Fleet which had by then commenced to oil.

TF 38 was in
fact the US Third Fleet. The CinC of the US Third Fleet was Admiral Halsey
who flew his flag in battleship USS MISSOURI. TF 38 consisted of three task
forces TF 38.1, TF 38.3 and TF 38.4 and in total contained 17 aircraft
carriers, 8 battleships, 19 cruisers and 59 destroyers. Tactical command of TF 38 was exercised
by Vice Admiral J.S. McCain flying his flag in the aircraft carrier
USS SHANGRI-LA.

0710 hours.
TF 37 altered course to close battleship USS MISSOURI (Flag of Admiral
Halsey, CinC the US Third Fleet)

0745 hours.
QUADRANT and TERMAGANT closed KING GEORGE V and FORMIDABLE respectively to
transfer CTF 37 and AC 1 and their staffs to the MISSOURI for a conference
with the Commander Third Fleet.

Admiral
Halsey knew Rawlings and Vian only by their reputations, but he was reluctant
to meet with them. The source of Halsey's reservation was the issue of full
operational control of the British fleet. Without that control, he realized
that the inclusion of the British in his command would be a difficult matter.
He tried to rectify the issue with a message to Nimitz proposing that he use
the British Pacific Fleet on the flank of U.S. naval forces. Nimitz rejected
this proposal, as his agreement with Fraser and King that the British be
self-sufficient made it impossible to accept Halsey's idea. Nimitz ordered
Halsey to 'Operate TF 37 separately from TF 38 in fact as well as in name.'
Nimitz was being rather legalistic in view of his agreement with Admiral
Fraser.

Halsey began
a conference of naval leaders aboard his flagship by explaining that the
strikes against the home islands were designed to weaken enemy resources
before the invasion started. Then he gave Rawlings three options:

1. The
British could operate as a component element of the fleet; Halsey would
provide them with the orders he gave his US

detachments, which the British were strongly recommended to consider as
'suggestions.' That would allow the Allies to concentrate

their power against the Japanese and make the British ships for
all practical purposes a task force under U.S. command.

2. Rawlings
could operate as a semi-independent force separated by 60 to 70 miles of
ocean from U.S. ships.

3. The
Royal Navy could operate totally on its own.

Halsey
recalls that Rawlings never hesitated in his response: 'Of course, I'll
accept number l.'

The British
admiral impressed Halsey. A British liaison officer assigned to Halsey's ship
observed, 'The day’s conversation in the Third Fleet flagship could not
have been more cordial and at their end the fleet commander sent for me to
tell me how confident he felt about the prospects of cooperating with the
British.' The Royal Navy officers he met with felt the same way. Vian stated
later that Halsey 'showed he was fully aware of our difficulties, and from
that moment onwards, by kindly word or deed, he availed himself of every
possible opportunity to offer encouragement and to smooth our path.’

1050 hours.
To familiarize the Americans with the type of planes employed in the British
Pacific Fleet, a 'recognition' flight of Seafires and Fireflies was flown
over the ships of TF 38.

Noon position: 38-33N, 146-57E

1500 hours.
A 'recognition' flight, this time by American type planes, was flown over TF
37 by TF 38.

1515 hours.
CTF 37 and AC 1 returned on board their respective flagships.

1600 hours.
TF 38 disengaged having completed oiling and with TF 37 in company set course
for the flying off position (37-10N, 143-19E.).

On 16/7/45
the Potsdam conference, code name TERMINAL, commenced, in which amongst other
subjects, the future prosecution of the war against Japan was discussed. On
this day also the USA carried out the first atomic bomb test at Alamogordo,
New Mexico. On 17/7/45 President Truman received a message from Los Alamos,
New Mexico, 'Babies born successfully,' code words meaning the atomic bomb
test was a complete success.

17th

The mission
of the US third Fleet, of which the British Pacific Fleet (TF 37
comprising one battleship, four aircraft carriers, eight light cruisers
and 18 destroyers,) was now an integral unit, was:

1. To reduce enemy tactical air forces.

2. To attack
strategic targets on the mainland.

3. To
explore Japanese defences in northern Honshu and Hokkaido.

4. To
destroy Japanese shipping.

These
operations were to soften up the Japanese defences and undermine military and civilian moral in preparation for

Operation OLYMPIC,
the invasion of Southern Kyushu.

0330 hours.
AC 1 assumed tactical control of TF 37 and the cruiser radar pickets were
detached to their stations.

The US third
Fleet employed destroyers equipped with ADR Radar, known as Tomcats, as radar
pickets. The BPF only had ADR (Aircraft Direction Radar) which provided
range, bearing and height and incorporated a large vertical circular map that
was transparent and which was covered with grid references of 360 degrees in
some of the cruisers; so these were used as radar pickets. Since the radar
pickets operated at least 50 miles from TF 37 it meant they were not
available for their main function of AA defence.

0350 hours.
In low cloud and poor visibility, when TF 37 was approximately 250 miles
north east of Tokyo the first Ramrod of Fireflies, armed with 60lb rockets
from IMPLACABLE and Corsairs from VICTORIOUS took off to attack the airfields
in the Miyagi Prefecture including Sendai and Matsushima. The Ramrod crossed
into Japan at the mouth of the Abukuma river.

(A Ramrod was
a combined fighter-bomber mission whose primary goal was the destruction of a
ground target.)

0630 hours.
A Seafire CAP was launched from the IMPLACABLE.

0830 hours.
Although the weather over Japan was good, in the launch area it had
deteriorated so much that all flying was cancelled.

In the afternoon KING GEORGE V and
destroyers QUALITY and QUIBERON detached from TF 37.

The remainder of TF 37 with TF 38 moved
off south easterly.

AC 1 assumed tactical control.

1700 hours.
KING GEORGE V, QUALITY and QUIBERON joined US Task Unit TU 34.8.2 comprising
five battleships, two light cruisers, and ten destroyers under the command of
Rear Admiral Oscar C. Badger USN, flying his flag in battleship USS IOWA, to
bombard the heavily industrialized Mito-Hitachi area of Honshu. The weather
was overcast with rain; visibility was three miles so the shoot was conducted
by Radar. The aircraft carrier USS BON HOMME RICHARD, who had embarked AI
radar-equipped Hellcats, provided a night CAP for TU 34.8.2.

2310 hours.
The bombardment commenced. No enemy opposition was encountered during the
operation.

Battleships fired 1797 shells into the
target area, of which KING GEORGE V contributed 267 x 14in shells and the
five US battleships 1238 x 16" shells and 292 x 6" shells. Damage
was caused to the Taga and Mito Works of Hitachi Manufacturing Company and
the Yamate Plant and the copper refining plants of Hitachi Mine.

18th

0110 hours.
The bombardment ceased and KING GEORGE V, QUALITY and QUIBERON detached at
high speed to rejoin TF 37.

The weather in the flying off area was
slightly better that the previous day.

0530 hours.
The first aircraft from TF 37 flew off to carry out Ramrods against targets
Northeast of Tokyo; the strike included the first Seafire Ramrod by 801 and
880 Sqds.

0730 hours.
KING GEORGE V, QUALITY and QUIBERON rejoined TF 37.

At the end of the days flying TF 37 moved
off south easterly towards the replenishment area.

Replenishment
continued throughout the day with TF 37 steering a south westerly course.

At dusk TF 37
detached from TU 112.2.6.

21st

Early in the morning TF 37 RVed with Task
Unit TU 112.2.6 and recommenced replenishment.

Replenishment
continued throughout the day with TF 37 steering a south westerly course.

At dusk TF 37
detached from TU 112.2.6.

22nd

Early in the morning TF 37 RVed with Task
Unit TU 112.2.6 and recommenced replenishment.

Replenishment
continued throughout the day with TF 37 steering a south westerly course.

Destroyer NAPIER
detached from TU 112 and joined TF 37.

At dusk TF 37
detached from TU 112.2.6 and steered north westerly at 23 knots towards the
operational area off the island of Shikoku.

23rd

TF 37 en route to
operational area.

24th

0300 hours. AC 1 assumed tactical control.

0345 hours. In approximate position 32N, 135E. The CAP
was flown off and first Ramrod launched against the port of Tokushima on the
island of Shikoku, a well defended target with around 200 AA guns

During the course of
the day 416 sorties were flown of which 260 were against targets in the
Inland Sea and the Islands of Shikoku, Kyushu and Honshu. In these sorties a
Firefly of 1772 Sqd was the first British aircraft to overfly Tokyo; and an
Avenger of 848 Sqd became the first British aircraft to bomb Japan.

A Ramrod of six
Avengers of 849 Sqd from VICTORIOUS, two Corsairs from FORMIDABLE and two
Fireflies from INDEFATIGABLE carried out a strike against shipping in Beppu
Bay, Kyushu. During the sortie they located the escort carrier KAIYO 13,600
tons, in the north of the bay and carried out an attack in which she was hit
by bombs from the Avengers. KAIYO was seriously damaged and driven aground by
her crew to prevent her sinking.

This was the only attack on an enemy aircraft carrier
carried out by the FAA in the war.

During the day the FAA
had flown 131 CAP sorties and 284 Ramrod sorties dropping a total of 93 tons
of bombs.At dusk all aircraft were
recovered and CTF 37 assumed tactical command and TF 37 steered easterly.

25th

0300 hours. AC 1 assumed tactical control.

0345 hours. The CAP was flown off and first Ramrod was
launched. The targets were the same as the day before.

In the evening a
group of bogies was intercepted approaching TF 37; they turned out to be
Aichi B7A's, reporting name GRACE. Hellcats from FORMIDABLE intercepted the
attackers, shooting down three and driving off the remainder.

At dusk, after all
aircraft had been landed on, CTF 37 assumed tactical control and steered
southerly towards the replenishment area, 'BRITISH TIZZY'.

26/7/45 The Potsdam declaration, which was an ultimatum
demanding the immediate unconditional surrender of the armed forces of Japan,
was agreed by the President of the United States, the President of the
National Government of the Republic of China, and the Prime Minister of Great
Britain. The declaration ran to 13 clauses. Clause 13 stated 'We call upon
the Government of Japan to proclaim now the unconditional surrender of all
the Japanese armed forces, and to provide proper and adequate assurances of
their good faith in such action. The alternative for Japan is complete and
utter destruction'. The declaration was passed to the Japanese ambassador in
Switzerland on 27/7/45. The Japanese, however, ignored the ultimatum,
prompting President Truman to approve plans to drop atomic weapons on Japan.

27th

In the morning
replenishment re-commenced.

KING GEORGE V reammunitioned from ROBERT MAERSK
embarking 94 x 14in shells and 155 cordite cases. This was the first time a
RN battleship had reammunitioned with heavy
calibre shells whilst under way.

UGANDA detached from TF 37 and returned to Canada
following the passing of Canadian legislation preventing service in Pacificby any personnel who had not
volunteered for this duty.

At the end of
replenishment TF 37 detached from TU 112 and steered north westerly back
towards the operational area.

28th

0330 hours. AC 1 assumed tactical control.

0400 hours. In approximate position 31-30N, 134E. The
CAP was flown off and first Ramrod was launched. The targets were the port of
Harima, attacked by 20 Avengers, and targets of opportunity, mainly in and
around the Inland Sea. The naval base of Maizuru was attacked by fighters.

FAA aircraft sank
coast defence ship No 4 in Ise Bay and the coast defence ship No 30 off Yura.

At dusk all aircraft
were recovered and CTF 37 assumed tactical command.

29th

0330 hours. AC 1 assumed tactical control.

0400 hours. The CAP was flown off and first Ramrod was
launched but was recalled when it was found that fog was obscuring the
targets.

1200 hours. KING GEORGE V screened by destroyers UNDINE,
ULYSSES and URANIA, and designated Task Unit TU 37.1.2, detached from TF 37
and steered northerly to RV with the US Task Unit TU 34.8.1., to carry out a
bombardment of the city of Hamamatsu.

TU 34.8.1 was under the command of Rear Admiral John F
Shafroth USN and consisted of battleships SOUTH DAKOTA, flag Rear Admiral
Shafroth, MASSACHUSETTS, and INDIANA, 4 heavy cruisers and 10 destroyers.
Aircraft carrier BON HOMME RICHARD was attached to provide a CAP and spotter
aircraft. The city of Hamamatsu was a transport hub, with several important
armament factories, including the Nakajima aircraft factory, Suzuki Motors et
al. The target for KING GEORGE V was the Japanese Musical Instrument Company
which was manufacturing propellers.

Before the
bombardment commenced, destroyers URANIA and ULYSSES were in collision in
which the ULYSSES sustained slight damage.

2319 hours. 20075 yards from her target, KING GEORGE V
opened fire; she fired 265 x 14in shells, of which only seven hit the target.

During the bombardment
the UNDINE twice opened fire on small groups of ships, which were probably
fishing boats.

2356 hours. Fire was checked and KING GEORGE V steered
east the southerly to rejoin TF 37.

This was the last
time KING GEORGE V or any other British battleship fired their main armament ‘in
anger'.

30th

0330 hours. AC 1 assumed tactical control.

0400 hours. The CAP was flown off and first Ramrod was
launched but the first strike was again confronted by fog over the coast. The
targets for the day were airfields around Tokyo and the Maizuru naval base.

When GAMBIA and
ACHILLES came upon the ARBUTUS they gave her a rousing welcome.

1000 hours. Replenishment commenced. The weather in the
area was less than ideal, with a heavy swell running caused by a succession
of typhoons to the east of the area. However, because the British were now
mastering replenishment at sea (RAS) the weather did not affect the operation
as much as it would have done just a few weeks before.

KING GEORGE V again
refuelled by the abeam method and was able to take on fuel at 840 tons per
hour. (KGV maximum fuel capacity 4100 tons, average capacity 3886 tons).

KING GEORGE V also
reammunitioned, embarking 80 x 14in shells and 64 cordite cases from ROBERT MAERSK.

During the replenishment the Rear Admiral
Destroyers (Rear Admiral Edelsten) was transferred by jackstay from BARFLEUR
to the SPEAKER for passage back to Manus.

At dusk TF 37 detached from TU 112 for
the night.

August

1st

In the morning TF 37 continued with
replenishment from TU 112.

At dusk TF 37 detached from TU 112 for
the night.

2nd

In the morning TF 37 continued with
replenishment from TU 112.

At dusk TF 37 detached from TU 112 for
the night.

3rd

In the morning TF 37 continued with
replenishment from TU 112.

On completion of the RAS, TF 37 set
course northerly for the operational area.

4th

En route to the operational area a
special signal was received from Fleet Admiral Nimitz to all units of the US
third Fleet ordering them to cease offensive strikes and stay at least 300
miles from the coast of Japan and sail northerly.

During the
day, destroyer USS BENHAM joined TF 37 she was carrying British Liaison
Officers who had come to confer with Vice Admiral, Sir Bernard Rawlings about
the forthcoming dropping of the first A Bomb.

5th

Sailing north easterly.

During the
day the BENHAM detached from TF 37. As she was leaving Rawlings signalled,
'Very sorry to release the first American Man-of War I have had under my
command'.

6th

The atomic bombing of Hiroshima

At
approximately 0245 hours three B29 Superfortresses of the 509th
Composite Group took off from the North Field airbase on the Island of
Tinian. At 0815 hours over the city of Hiroshima (seaport, industrial
centre and headquarters of the Japanese 2nd Army, position
34-23N, 132-26E) one of the B29's, Enola Gay, piloted by Colonel Paul Tibbets
dropped the first uranium-based Atom Bomb, code named LITTLE BOY. The effect
of the blast was the equivalent of 12,700 tons of TNT. Fires destroyed a built-up area of about four square miles and huge damage was
done outside that area. An estimated 140,000 people
died from either the direct or indirect effects of the bomb.

0815 hours.
TF 37 was steering a north easterly course in approximate position 34-30N,
146E, they were 770 miles west of the explosion.

In the late afternoon TF 37 detached from
TU 112 and steered north westerly towards the operational area.

8th

On arrival at in the operational area the
weather was unsuitable for flying operations so TF 37 turned south easterly
seeking better weather.

Due to the weather conditions no
offensive action was carried out.

At 1700
hours Moscow time on 8/6/45 the Japanese ambassador to Russia, Naotake
Sato was summoned to a meeting with the People's Commissar for Foreign
Affairs of the USSR, Vyacheslav Molotov. At the
meeting he was informed that at 1800 hours
Moscow time, midnight 8/8/45 Japanese time, the USSR would declare war on
Japan.

Within one
hour of the meeting the Soviet army invaded Japanese-occupied Manchuria.

On 8/8/45
Admiral Halsey circulated advanced copies of his Operation Plan 10 - 45 for
the initial occupation of Japan and setting up Task Force 31, the Yokosuka
Occupation Force. The plan included a symbolic British Force comprised of
seamen and Royal Marines.

9th

0330 hours.
AC 1 assumed tactical control.

0400 hours.
In approximate position 38-35N, 144-12E. The first CAP and Ramrods were
launched. The target of the first Ramrod was the port of Matsushima.

Whilst flying over Onagawa Bay, a Ramrod
led by Lieutenant Gray RCNVR, sighted a number of Japanese ships and dived in
to attack. Furious fire was opened on the aircraft from army batteries on the
ground and from warships in the Bay.

0920 hours.
Lt Robert Hampton 'Hammy" Gray flying Corsair Mk IV KD658 115/X, from
1841 Squadron on FORMIDABLE selected for his target an enemy warship. He
swept in oblivious of the concentrated fire and made straight for his target.
His aircraft was hit and hit again, one bomb was shot off and the airplane
caught fire, but he kept on. He pressed on to within fifty feet of the
Japanese ship and let go his bomb. He scored a direct hit,hitting the AMAKUSA below the No. 2 gun
platform and penetrating into the engine room before exploding. His target,
the escort AMAKUSA, of the Etorofu Class, 870
tons, 3 x 4.7" and 4 x 25mm, sank almost immediately in
position 38-26N, 141-28E, with the loss of 71 crew. Lieutenant Gray did not
return from the mission.

On August 31,
1945, Lt. Hampton Gray was officially awarded the Distinguished Service
Cross, and on November 13, 1945, he was further awarded the Victoria Cross.
This was only the second VC awarded to the FAA in the whole war.

GAMBIA, NEWFOUNDLAND and destroyers
TENACIOUS, TERMAGANT and TERPSICHORE forming TU 37.1.8 RVed with US TU 34.8.1
to carry out a bombardment of the Japan steel works and docks at Kamaishi.

TU 34.8.1 was under the command of Rear Admiral John F
Shafroth USN and consisted of battleships SOUTH DAKOTA, flag Rear Admiral
Shafroth, MASSACHUSETTS, and INDIANA, heavy cruisers CHICAGO, BOSTON, QUINCY
and SAINT PAUL and 10 destroyers. US aircraft maintained a CAP over the force.

1254 hours. From an average range of 14,000 yards, the force opened fire. They made four passes
and in total fired 803 x
16" shells, 1,383 x 8" shells and 733 x 6" shells. The
bombardment caused more damage than the July bombardment and large quantities
of pig iron were destroyed. The sounds of the bombardment were broadcast live
on radio in the U.S.

1450 hours. The bombarding force checked fire and departed
from the scene to return to their respective Task Forces.

During the retirement TU
37.1.8 was attacked by enemy aircraft, which were engaged by the ships of the
Task Unit. GAMBIA was credited with shooting one down.

The atomic bombing of
Nagasaki

0349 hours. Three B29 Superfortresses of the 509th
Composite Group took off from the North Field airbase on the Island of
Tinian. The first B29 to take off was Bockscar piloted by Major Charles
"Chuck" Sweeney; this aircraft was carrying a Plutonium atomic bomb
code named FAT MAN. The other two B29's were the Great Artiste and the Big
Stink; both were carrying recording instruments, but Big Stink also carried
two British observers, Group
Captain Leonard Cheshire VC and Professor William G. Penney.

0910 hours.
Bockscar reached the RV and immediately spotted Great Artiste. The Big
Stink was nowhere in sight. The two aircraft then circled for 40 minutes
waiting for the Big Stink which failed to show.

0950 hours.
Bockscar and The Great Artiste finally headed in the direction of
Kokura. The Big Stink was nowhere to be seen. The additional 30 minutes
that Bockscar and the Great Artiste took to wait ended up costing the mission
clear, visual bombing conditions over Kokura. These crucial minutes saved
Kokura from utter destruction and placed Nagasaki forever in the history
books.

1020 hours.
The two B29's arrive over Kokura. They found that visibility over the city
was obscured by clouds and smog. Sweeney's orders were specific in that
the atomic bomb had to be dropped visually on the target.

1132 hours.
Sweeney made the decision to reduce power to conserve fuel and head for
secondary target, Nagasaki, 95 miles to the south.

1156 hours.
Bockscar and the Great Artiste arrive over Nagasaki.

1202 hours.
FAT MAN explodes with a force of 22,000 tons of TNT. Three shock waves
were felt by both planes. Approximately 40%
of Nagasaki was destroyed and
out of a population of 270,000,
approximately 70,000 people were dead by the end of the year.

Although the Big Stink missed the RV Group, Captain Cheshire and Professor Penney
did see the Nagasaki detonation from the air at a distance.

1202 hours. At the time of the explosion TF 37 was
approximately 880 miles to the north east of Nagasaki.

During the day the
aircraft of TF 37 flew 137 CAP sorties and 258 Ramrod sorties dropping 105
tons of bombs.

At dusk following
recovery of all aircraft CTF 37 assumed tactical control.

At 0230
hours The Japanese Supreme War Guidance Council held a meeting. After the
meeting their readiness to accept the Potsdam Declaration was transmitted to
the US Government through the neutral Governments of Switzerland and Sweden.
The official reply of the US Government was received on the 13/8/45, but the
Japanese learned the purport of the reply from a San Francisco broadcast on
the 12/8/45. The Supreme War Guidance Council reconvened on the 13/8/45 and
continued the meeting until late at night, discussing the American reply.

0400 hours.
The first CAP was launched.

0500 hours.
The first Ramrod was launched. The target was shipping in Onagawa Bay, and
targets of opportunity in northern Honshu.

During the day aircraft of TF 37 flew 132 CAP sorties and 227 Ramrod
sorties dropping 90 tons of bombs.

At dusk all aircraft were recovered and
CTF 37 assumed tactical command.

TF 37 withdrew to the east for
replenishment.

11th

En route to replenishment area.

12th

In the morning TF 37 RVed with TU 112 and
turned on to a south westerly course and commenced replenishment.

During the British Pacific Fleet's operations against the
Japanese, Replenishment at Sea - RAS - was always a problem; but by mid
August the supply situation had become critical. Also it had been planned
that by mid August the BPF would return to Manus and if necessary to their
main base at Sydney for repair, re-supply and rest. However, the indications
were that the Japanese may well be about to surrender and Rawlings wanted to
keep at least a token British Force in the area.

Admiral Nimitz' orders specified that the Allied fleets
were to continue pressure on Japan until 13/8/45, a problem for both Halsey's
Third Fleet and Rawlings' TF 37. Halsey's fleet needed resupply and rest,
both of which could not be had at sea, and Rawlings' force was scheduled to
return to Manus on the 10th.

Halsey's Third Fleet though didn't have any RAS problems
since the USN had now built up a large and sustainable Fleet Train. In the
event both Halsey and Rawlings compromised; Halsey retained most of the Third
Fleet off Japan and Rawlings would keep a token force on station that would
refuel from the US Fleet Train.

KING GEORGE V refuelled from US oiler the
USS SABINE 7470 grt, 18 knots. Whilst KING GEORGE V was alongside SABINE,
battleship USS MISSOURI (Flag of Admiral Halsey) went alongside the other
side and as Halsey stated in his memoirs. 'I went across to 'the Cagey
Five' as we called her, on an aerial trolley, just to drink a toast with Vice
Admiral Rawlings.'

On completion of
replenishment the remaining units of TF 37, namely, KING GEORGE V,
INDEFATIGABLE, GAMBIA, NEWFOUNDLAND, BARFLEUR, TROUBRIDGE, TENACIOUS,
TERMAGANT, TERPSICHORE, TEAZER, NAPIER, NIZAM, WAKEFUL and WRANGLER were
re-designated TG 38.5 and were fully integrated into the US Third Fleet,
under the command of Vice Admiral John S McClain USN.

Around midday TG 38.5
turned on to a south easterly course.

During the day
aircraft from INDEFATIGABLE carried out 21 Ramrod sorties against targets in
the Tokyo area. They also flew 42 CAP sorties.

14th

TG 38.5 steering
south westerly.

Early in the morning US aircraft dropped leaflets over
Japan containing the Allied peace proposals; up to this time the Japanese
population were not aware of these proposals. When this event was bought to
the Emperor’s attention, fearing a backlash by the Japanese military,
Hirohito convened an immediate meeting with Suzuki and his government.
Following the meeting Hirohito asked the Swiss government to relay to the
Allies a message stating that he had issued an Imperial Rescript that denoted
Japanese acceptance of the provisions of the Potsdam Declaration. The message
also stated that he was ordering his commanders to cease fire and to
surrender their forces, and to issue such orders as might be required by
representatives of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, General
MacArthur. The decision to accept the Potsdam Declaration and agreeing to
surrender was broadcast by Domei
Tsushinsha, the Japanese Federated News Agency.

At midday TG 38.5 was in
approximate position 33-30N, 144E at which point they turned westerly and
steered WNW towards Honshu.

1900 hours. President Truman announced that a cease fire
was in effect, and that the war was over.

15th

TG 38.5 steering WNW
towards Honshu.

Early in the
morning INDEFATIGABLE was
authorised to carry out a strike against kamikazes on Kisarazu airfield, 30
miles south of Tokyo.

Three Seafires of 887
and four Seafires of 894 Squadrons were assigned as escorts to six Avengers
of 820 Squadron and four Fireflies of 1772 Squadron, for the dawn strike.

0545 hours. When the Ramrod was over Odaki Bay, they
were jumped by ten Mitsubishi A6M5 (Zeke) and four Mitsubishi J2M Raidens
(Jack) of the 302nd Kokutai. In the ensuing dogfight, the
Seafires claimed seven shot down, three probable's and four damaged. While
this was a confused action with some US Navy Hellcats flying nearby also
joining in, it is very possible that Sub‑Lieutenant Gerry Murphy, who
destroyed two Zeros, fired the last shots of the final dogfight of the Second
World War. One Seafire and an Avenger were lost.

The pilot of the
Seafire, Sub Lt. Fred Hockley RNVR, was captured and executed after the cease
fire.

'Japan has surrendered, cease all offensive actions, take
all war time precautions for defence'.

Admiral William F.
Halsey's cease fire order to the US Third Fleet, which included TG 38.5 was
memorable, he signaled:

'It now gives me great pleasure to order all units of
Magnolia (code name for TF 38) to cease fire.

However, fire on all enemy planes, not vindictively, but
in a friendly sort of way.'

1120 hours. KING GEORGE V signalled TG 38.5 with a flag
hoist 'End Hostilities and splice the Mainbrace'. This was just after
INDEFATIGABLE had recovered her aircraft. As the signal was being hoisted a
Japanese Yokosuka D4Y Judy aircraft came out of cloud and headed
straight for INDEFATIGABLE. Fortunately he was followed by a US Corsair from
the TF 38 CAP that shot him down and he splashed between INDEFATIGABLE and
GAMBIA with bits of the crashed plane falling on GAMBIA.

Following this
incident, all forces remained alert and CAP's were continued.

During the day 47 CAP
sorties were flown.

16th

TG 38.5 remained on
patrol approximately 150 miles southeast of Tokyo, replenishing as necessary
from the USN Fleet Train.

Vice Admiral Rawlings
addressed the ships companies of TG 38.5; his speech was also broadcast to
the US Third Fleet.

On 16/8/45 the Admiralty sent the following message to
all British naval vessels:

'The surrender of the Japanese Empire brings to an end
six years of achievement in war unsurpassed in the long history and high
tradition of the Royal Navy.

The phase of naval warfare which came to an end three
months ago enriched the record of British sea power by such epic actions and
campaigns as the Battle of the Atlantic, the domination of the Mediterranean,
the maintenance of the Russian supply lines and the great combined operations
of 1943 and 1944. The world wide story is completed with the inspired work by
sea and air of the British Pacific Fleet and the East Indies Fleet. The Board
are deeply conscious of the difficulty and novelty of the problems facing the
British Pacific Fleet, the patience and skill with which they were overcome,
and the great contribution in offensive power made by the Task Force
operating with our American Allies. No less memorable is the work of the East
Indies Fleet in the protection of India and Ceylon and in operational support
of the Burma campaign.

At this moment our eyes are turned to the Far East and it
is fitting to recall in remembrance those who gave their lives in the days of
disaster in 1941 and 1942. To their relatives and to the relatives of all
officers and men of the Royal Navy and Royal Marines and of the Naval Forces
of the Commonwealth and Empire and of all in Admiralty service who have paid
the full price of victory, the Board extend their profound sympathy.'

17th

TG 38.5 remained on
patrol approximately 150 miles south east of Tokyo.

18th

Off the south coast
of the Island of Honshu, TG 38.5 was joined by battleship DUKE OF YORK (Flag
- CinC BPF Admiral Fraser) and destroyers WAGER and WHELP.

19th

TG 38.5 remained
on patrol off Honshu.

On 19/8/45 Japanese delegates lead by Lt Gen T. Kawabe,
who had become Vice Chief of the General Staff in April, plus fifteen other
members arrived in Manila to discuss the surrender arrangements with General
MacArthur. These arrangements included the entry of Allied warships into
Tokyo Bay and for naval and marine forces to land in the vicinity of Yokosuka
Naval Base on L-Day, which was scheduled for 26/8/45.

20th

TG 38.5 carried out a
RAS.

Mid morning the high speed transports USS BAR, SIMMS and
PAVLIC commenced the embarkation of British and Commonwealth seamen and Royal
Marines who were to form the token Commonwealth force to be landed in Japan
on L Day. BARR embarked approximately 160 from KING GEORGE V and GAMBIA, the
SIMMS approximately 100 from NAPIER, NIZAM and GAMBIA and the PAVLIC 160 from
GAMBIA and NEWFOUNDLAND.

L-Day had been originally scheduled for 26/8/45 but on
20/8/45, a threatening typhoon forced Admiral Halsey to postpone the landing
date until 28/8/45. Allied ships were to enter Sagami Wan, the vast outer
bay, on L minus 2. On 25/8/45, word was received from General MacArthur that
the anticipated typhoon would delay Army air operations for 48 hours, and
L-Day was consequently set for 30/8/45 and the entry of the Sagami Wan
ordered for the 28/8/45.

With a typhoon
imminent in the area of the Third Fleet operations and with the losses that occurred
in the typhoon of 18/12/44 in mind Halsey was not anxious to keep his ships,
many of them small vessels crowded with troops, at sea in typhoon weather,
and he asked and received permission from MacArthur to put into Sagami Wan
one day early. Therefore the entry into Sagami Wan was bought forward to
27/8/45 and L-Day became 29/8/45.

27th

To facilitate the safe entry of the Allied Fleet into
Sagami Wan, the Japanese were ordered to provide pilots. At 0800 hours
the Japanese destroyer HATSUKAKURA with two Japanese emissaries, six
interpreters, and thirteen pilots embarked, arrived off Sagami Wan and
was met by destroyer USS NICHOLAS. The pilots were transferred to the
NICHOLAS who then distributed them around the Allied Fleet; the pilots for
the British ships were embarked on the WHELP. The Japanese emissaries were
taken to meet with Rear Admiral Robert B. Carney, Halsey's Chief of Staff,
and Admiral Badger on board MISSOURI to receive instructions for the
surrender of the Yokosuka Naval Base and to guide the first Allied ships into
anchorages. A problem that became apparent during the meeting concerned the
sweeping of mines in the Uraga Strait at the entrance to Tokyo Bay. The
Japanese had been warned as early as 15/8/45 to begin minesweeping in the
waters in Tokyo Bay to facilitate the operations of the US Third Fleet. They
said a lack of suitable minesweepers had prevented them from clearing Sagami
Wan and Tokyo Bay.

In the morning TF 37
and TG 30.2 together with the US Third Fleet, guided by the local
pilots, anchored in Sagami Wan. All ships were on the alert and ready for any treacherous move on the part of the
Japanese, and battle ensigns were flown, but the entry was without incident.

KING GEORGE V had
been continuously at sea for
52 days (since 6 July) and had steamed a total of 19,200 miles, a record for
an RN battleship.

All the aircraft
carriers, except USS COWPENS, remained out at sea ready to launch air strikes
if there was any sign of Japanese treachery.

COWPENS and DesDiv 99
were detached to form TG 35.1.6, which conducted flight operations
immediately off Sagami Wan during the afternoon.

At sunset there was a strange phenomenon. The setting sun
appeared to descend squarely into the crater of Mount Fujiyama, the spectacle
had such symbolism that anyone with a camera endeavoured to get photographs
of it because it clearly told of Japan's fate.

INDEFATIGABLE and
destroyers BARFLEUR, TROUBRIDGE, TENACIOUS, TERMAGANT, TERPSICHORE,
TEAZER, WAKEFUL and WRANGLER remained at sea with TF 58 off the Japanese
coast to the east of Tokyo, with her aircraft ready to respond to any
Japanese treachery.

In the evening two British POW's hailed one of the
US Third Fleet picket boats from the shore of Sagami Wan. They were picked up
and taken on board light cruiser USS SAN JUAN, the command ship of a
specially constituted Allied Prisoner of War Rescue Group. Their harrowing
tales of life in the prison camps and of the extremely poor physical
condition of the prisoners prompted Admiral Halsey to order the rescue group
to stand by for action on short notice.

28th

At anchor in Sagami
Wan.

0630 hours.
US minesweepers REVENGE, TOKEN, TUMULT and POCHARD entered Uraga Strait and
commenced to sweep north up the channel. The REVENGE thus became the first
Allied ship to enter Tokyo Bay.

1300 hours.
TG 31 anchored off Yokosuka. The Japanese Base commander Vice Admiral
Michitaro Totsuka then reported aboard the SAN DIEGO and in conference with
Rear Admiral Badger they completed the necessary arrangements for the actual
occupation of the naval base.

29th
L-Day

0500 hours. TF 37 and TG 30.2 prepared to get under
way from Sagami Wan to enter Tokyo Bay.

There was a strong feeling among the crews of the ships
of the British Pacific Fleet that DUKE OF YORK, which had not fired a shot in
anger in the Pacific, should not have the honour of
leading the Fleet into Tokyo Bay.

As the Allied ships were entering Tokyo Bay they were
covered by an air umbrella of hundreds of planes from the TF 38 carriers off
shore. Even larger numbers of US land-based fighters and bombers from Okinawa
and Iwo Jima patrolled the skies over the Japanese homeland.

The evacuation of POWs had been taken over as the
function of the Supreme Commander General MacArthur. However the TF 38
carrier aircraft surveillance flights carried out at tree-top height with cameras
had brought out a tremendous amount of detailed information about the
conditions and health, etc of the Allied POW's. Therefore Admiral Halsey
wanted to commence the recovery and evacuation at the earliest opportunity.
But MacArthur had not approved the Navy's initial offer to start the
evacuation as early as possible. However, the vast resources of the fleet
hospital ships, evacuation vessels, food, clothing etc, were ready to swing
into action. In the hope that the Navy would get the go ahead to at least
initiate action around the waterfront, Admiral Halsey included the
hospital ship USS BENEVOLENCE with the first group of ships to enter Tokyo
Bay.

1420 hours.
On 29/8/45 Fleet Admiral Chester Nimitz arrived in Sagami Wan from
US Naval Air Base, Tanapag, Saipan, in a PB2Y Coronado seaplane. After
landing he boarded battleship USS SOUTH DAKOTA which then became his
flagship. After Nimitz embarked, she got under way and entered Tokyo Bay.

1300 hours.
Light cruiser USS SAN JUAN, high speed transports USS GOSSELIN and REEVES and
hospital ship USS BENEVOLENCE set course for the Omori POW camp which was
situated on an artificial island off Tokyo. When the Americans arrived at the
camp they found conditions unspeakable with evidence of brutality and
wretched treatment. Under the command of Commodore Rodger W. Simpson USN they
commenced immediate evacuation of the approximate 620 Allied inmates, of
which about 230 were British, to BENEVOLENCE. The Americans also moved on to
other camps in the Tokyo-Yokohama area.

1910 hours.
The first RAMPs (Recovered Allied Military Personnel) arrived on board
BENEVOLENCE and by midnight 739 men had been brought out.

30th

At anchor in Tokyo
Bay.

The mission of the Fleet Landing Force, TG 31.3, that
contained approximately 3000 seamen and marines from the US Third Fleet, 5400
marines of the US 4th Marines and approximately 420 British and Commonwealth
seamen and marines; was to seize and demilitarize the Island Forts in the
Uraga Strait and to seize and occupy Yokosuka Naval Base.

The landings had been based on an H-Hour for the
main landing by the US 11th Airborne Division of 1000 hours, but
last-minute word was received from MacArthur early on 30/8/45 that the first
serials of 11th Airborne Division would be landing at Atsugi airfield at 0600
hours. Consequently, to preserve the value and impact of simultaneous
Army-Navy operations, H-Hour was bought forward to 0930 hours.

0900 hours. The first British Troops, seamen and
marines, landed from USS PAVLIC at Fort 4 at the entrance to Tokyo Bay.
PAVLIC then moved on to Fort 2 where British troops landed at 1015 hours.
At both Forts the white surrender flag was flying and a small group of
soldiers were standing near the landing ramp with a surrender flag. The
surrender of the Forts was supposed to be to the British, but the Japanese
would only surrender to the Americans, so the Stars and Stripes were raised
by the British landing party. The landing parties found coastal guns had been
rendered ineffective and the few Japanese remaining as guides and
interpreters amazed the British with their cooperativeness.

1040 hours. USS SIMMS landed her ANZAC troops on the
island of Azuma Shima, which had been extensively tunnelled for use as a
small boat supply base. Captain
Buchanan RAN, CO of the
NAPIER and Captain (D7) was the first ashore and accepted the surrender of
the Island from the Japanese Naval
Commander, who had been in charge of the base stores.

1100 hours. The USS BAR landed D Company, four Platoons
from KING GEORGE V and one from the GAMBIA, of the British Landing Force at
Yokosuka Naval Base. The landing force was under the command of
Lieutenant-Commander Davis-Goff RNZN from GAMBIA and he took the surrender of
that section of the Azuma
Shima base from Commander Yuzo
Tanno, officer-in-charge of naval stores.

In the afternoon USS
PAVLIC re-embarked the British
Landing Force from the island forts, and with evacuated Japanese personnel,
landed them at the Navigation School in the Yokosuka naval base. The landing
force then took over the area between Azuma Shima and the area controlled by
D Company.

When Admiral Fraser was informed that evacuated British
POW's were on board BENEVOLENCE he embarked on WHELP and took passage to her.
On board BENEVOLENCE he spoke with the POW's and learned of the conditions
they had endured during their captivity. Admiral Fraser having listened to their grim stories was clearly
affected by what he had seen and heard. When he returned to the DUKE OF YORK
he was mad at the Japanese for
their treatment of the POW's.

Escort carrier
SPEAKER and frigate DERG arrived in Tokyo Bay from Manus. SPEAKER was without
aircraft, having flown off all her aircraft to INDEFATIGABLE and RULER.
She was however the first aircraft carrier to enter Tokyo Bay. SPEAKER was to
be used for the evacuation of British and Commonwealth POW's. Within minutes
of SPEAKER dropping anchor off the Omori POW camp, landing craft from the USS
GOSSELIN came alongside to disembark POW's.

On board USS
MISSOURI Admiral Halsey's flagship, preparations were underway to host the
formal surrender ceremonies on 2/9/45. MISSOURI had been selected since she
was named after President Truman's home state.

September

1st

At anchor in Tokyo
Bay.

2nd

At anchor in Tokyo
Bay.

The surrender ceremony took place on USS MISSOURI,
which was anchored in berth F
71, Tokyo Bay. It commenced
at 0902 hours with an introductory statement by General MacArthur
after which he directed the representatives of Japan to sign the two
Instruments of Surrender. At 0904 hours Foreign Minister Shigemitsu
signed, followed two minutes later by General Umezu. General MacArthur then
led the Allied delegations in signing, first Fleet Admiral Nimitz as United
States Representative, then the representatives of China, the United Kingdom,
the Soviet Union, Australia, Canada, France, The Netherlands and New Zealand.

The chairs that the delegates sat on were supplied from
DUKE OF YORK.

0914 hours.
Admiral Sir Bruce Fraser signed for the United Kingdom

General Sir Thomas Blamey signed for Australia

Colonel Lawrence Moore Cosgrave signed for Canada

Air Vice Marshall Leonard M. Isitt signed for New
Zealand.

Following a few brief remarks by MacArthur, the
ceremonies concluded at 0925 hours.

During the surrender ceremony a massive flight of
Hellcats and Corsairs from the US Task Group 38.1, which was cruising off the
south coast of Honshu Island, flew overhead.

3rd

1300 hours. SPEAKER escorted by DERG with RFA WAVE KING
in company sailed from off Omori POW camp with 477 British and
Commonwealth RAMPs embarked. SPEAKER was the first vessel to sail down Tokyo
Bay with RAMPs. Every ship she passed had cleared the lower deck and their
crews were on the deck cheering and waving.

1400 hours. SPEAKER sailed past KING GEORGE V from whom
she received a tremendous round of cheering.

5th

KING GEORGE V and the
remainder of the British Pacific Fleet reverted to RN control.

8th

KING GEORGE V
provided a Royal Marine detachment to mount a guard at the British Embassy in
Tokyo.

17th

The Union Flag was formally hoisted over the British Embassy in Tokyo by a
Marine from cruiser NEWFOUNDLAND whose Royal Marine detachment had relieved
the Marine guard provided by KING GEORGE V.

Post War Notes

HMS KING GEORGE V
remained in the Far East as part of the Pacific Fleet after the surrender.
During the immediate post war period the ship was deployed in support of the
allied forces in Japan and visited Melbourne for an R&R period in late
1945. She took passage to UK from Hobart in January 1946 with a call at Cape
Town the next month. After arrival at Portsmouth on 6th March she
became Flagship ofthe
Home Fleet until 1950 when placed in Reserve.

Laid up in the
Gareloch she was neverre-commissioned
and was placed on the Disposal List in 1957. Sold to BISCO for demolition by
Arnott Young she wastowed to Dalmuir
on the Clyde to be de-equipped on 20th January 1958. Demolition was completedat Troon where she arrived during May 1959.