Sure, we can all breathe easier now, but still feels a little bumpy out there, eh? Though maybe you should ignore the incipient nausea…just relax & embrace the ride! ‘Cos I’m perversely encouraged by these fresh mini-bouts of panic we’ve been seeing this year. They’re a useful reminder investors still have a real wall of worry to climb here. Which is probably the most important & necessary pre-condition underwriting the durability of today’s bull market. [And yes, it’s only a bull market…when investors (esp. the man in the street) go from hoping they’ll make money, to knowing they’ll make money, that’s when we enter bubble territory]. However, we still need to see whether my macro investment thesis eventually plays out here – a thesis I express via a question:

Globally, we’re still conducting a truly unprecedented monetary (& fiscal) experiment…could we end up ultimately inflating the most incredible bubble ever?

If you think that’s ridiculous, we really don’t need to debate it here. Or rehash a complete litany of facts & figures which prove history must repeat itself – the ever-flattening US yield curve being the latest bogeyman. But I have to ask, what’s so bloody alarming about entirely average market P/E ratios…when interest rates are still anything but average?! And despite their trajectory, we’ll obviously continue to enjoy ultra-low long & short-term rates in absolute terms, while central banks (in aggregate) also continue to print money:

Yep, there’s the real boiler-room of this market – in every sense of the word – as this chart nicely demonstrates:

Which should surprise nobody…since Greenspan popped his cherry in the ’87 Crash, the Fed’s consistently failed to recognise its own actions (and/or neglect) were the primary driver of successive market bubbles. Just like it’s also failed to recognise (let alone avert) any of the resulting crashes. [Regardless, the other major central banks still swallowed the Fed’s market-based philosophy hook, line & sinker]. Which makes a mockery of the notion (& general market consensus?) the Fed & other global central banks actually know what they’re doing here…and will somehow stick the perfect landing! Not to mention, the White House & Congress have just passed maybe the largest ever pro-cyclical US fiscal stimulus package – there’s more fuel for the bonfire. So I really couldn’t disagree:

This will doubtless end in tears…

But if you agree, by definition that also implies there’s probably one hell of a goddamn party left in the tank here!

We shall see…

As I’ve said before, this is no hill for me to die on – if necessary, I’m open to seeing this bubble thesis ultimately refuted, just as much as seeing it proven. But keeping such a thesis front & centre has provided me with an extraordinarily useful (& sensible) perspective on today’s markets. Rest assured, it doesn’t tempt me to rush out & buy speculative junk, but it’s actively encouraged me to remain essentially fully invested in this market. And to relentlessly re-allocate my portfolio towards high quality growth stocks…businesses I believe can thrive even in what might prove increasingly fragile economic & fiscal scenarios, but whose valuations might also expand aggressivelyin a continuing bull market & a potential bubble to come.

And in that vein (& continuing from my last post), let’s crack on & take a fresh look at my top 5 disclosed holdings:

[I’ll comment on each holding’s 2017 performance, then focus on its current prospects & valuation. NB: All share prices/market caps are cob May-15th, but each stock’s portfolio allocation is listed as of year-end 2017 (which facilitates tracking my 2018 portfolio performance). As always, questions/comments about these holdings are more than welcome here & by email.]

Donegal Investment Group was a value rock star last year, delivering a 47% gain. Per the chart, this was driven by investor reaction to two key value catalysts. [Illustrating the free lunch value/event-driven stocks can offer: A catalyst may be well-known, but investors often wait ’til it’s triggered before buying]. The first came in July, with the sale of the Grianan estate for €17 million. [Notably, it earned a mere €0.3 million pa…earnings-focused investors tend to discount potential sale values of low-yielding corporate assets (esp. land)]. The second came in October – a last-minute settlement, with an agreement to finally buy out Donegal’s 30% stake in Monaghan Middlebrook Mushrooms for €45.5 million. [I flagged a likely/substantial value uplift being achieved here vs. the prior €26 million court valuation]. This year, things have stayed on plan – remarkably so, revisiting my original investment write-up from 5 years ago. [I can’t complain about the near-150% share price gain, my one beef is the pace – arguably, the same milestones/returns could have been delivered in maybe half the time?] But we may be close to an inflection point…

In February, Donegal confirmed receipt of the primary MMM consideration, triggering a substantial NAV revaluation (to €8.24 per share) & an imminent return of capital – well flagged, but again the shares responded with a 15%+ jump! Granted, there was more news: The Nomadic speciality dairy business has attracted potential acquirers & is now conducting a review to maximise shareholder value. Which was perhaps inevitable…Nomadic is Donegal’s only growth business, but is likely worth far more to a large(r) food/dairy company which can market/extend the brand to a broader customer base. Noting the premiums Big Food’s paying for small fast-growing natural/organic/authentic brands, Nomadic may be worth a multiple of its current book value – the €47.5 million share redemption this week at a premium €9.25 per share might well reflect an NAV adjusted for Nomadic’s potential sale value. It’s telling the company & directors personally continue to buy shares in the market periodically up to & including current price levels (inc. a recent €4.4 million deal to buy out Ronnie Wilson’s 5% stake in Donegal).

Presuming a Nomadic sale, we should get within spitting distance of my long-standing €9.46 Base Case NAV estimate – with plenty of potential upside to come from the upcoming (& perhaps subsequent) redemption offer(s), more investment property sales, the sale of the non-core animal feed business (which should have been initiated long ago), and not forgetting the fate of the core seed potato business. The latter is intriguing – despite the obvious promise, management’s failed to expand it organically, or by acquisition – at this point, like Nomadic, you have to wonder what it’s worth to a larger company? Not to mention, it’s unwise to under-estimate the value of agri-intellectual property.

We may have an answer sooner than expected – look at this snippet from the recent interims: ‘…if as expected shareholders approve the proposed return of capital this will result in further significant change. The Board recognises this and as such is undertaking a strategic review to assess all suitable options for the purpose of maximising long term shareholder value.’ With most of the company’s portfolio tagged as non-core/potentially for sale, this new review might well conclude the seed business is non-core too. So maybe the entire company ends up on the block – which would, in turn, suggest a formal wind-down, de-listing & even a (partial) management buy-out may soon be on the cards. Noting a true owner-operator board (ignoring options, its aggregate stake’s worth over 5 times annual compensation), plus two engaged investors (Argos/Quaero Capital & Pageant Holdings) who control 18%+ of the company, we can anticipate shareholder value will be maximised regardless…Donegal Investment Group remains a compelling event-drivenholding.

Applegreen’s come a long way from a single forecourt (in Ballyfermot) 25 years ago! Management celebrated the anniversary with three acquisitions – vs. a history of single/small acquisitions, it highlights their escalating confidence in a unique business model & the opportunities ahead as a listed company. The first acquisition was a 50% stake in the Joint Fuels Terminal, to ensure a more price-competitive & direct supply for a majority of its Irish fuel needs. Second was the Brandi Group in South Carolina, comprising 34 petrol filling stations (inc. Burger King, Subway & Blimpie offerings), plus another 8 stand-alone BK restaurants. This establishes a proper US platform for Applegreen to pursue its growth strategy down the East Coast (they hit 68 US sites as of year-end), and should help facilitate a US roll-out of its usual/diverse food offerings (formerly limited to 7-Eleven). [And confirms the company may be open to more stand-alone restaurants, presumably acquisition/franchise-related]. Finally, we have the Carsley Group acquisition of 6 service areas & 1 petrol filling station – mostly located on the A1 – such large & strategically important sites offer good volume & brand visibility to support the company’s UK growth strategy.

The resulting growth was spectacular – total estate was up 41% last year, at 342 sites, with the company boasting 20-30%+ CAGRs in adjusted EBITDA, food & store gross profit, and site growth over the last 3 years. It’s perhaps surprising the shares only enjoyed an 11% gain in 2017 (vs. my original investment write-up), but management did take advantage of new all-time highs to execute a €47 million share placing, likely causing some market indigestion. [But left net debt at just €10 million as of year-end]. Fortunately, final results have since triggered a 20%+ rally year-to-date, as investors were reassured the new acquisitions were bedding down nicely & it fully sank in that Applegreen will almost inevitably clock up another 25-30% growth in 2018, based on the huge step-up in its estate last year & continued scale from its development/acquisition growth strategy this year.

So where does this leave us in terms of valuation? Fortunately, there was such a huge gap between investors’ standard P/E-based* approach vs. my own perspective on Applegreen’s unique float-driven model & underlying free cash flow-based valuation, that the shares still trade (despite new all-time highs) well shy of my original €8.61 Fair Value per share. [*And a 24 forward P/E is much cheaper than it might look, as the company’s rapid development/growth trajectory leaves a significant % of the estate yet to attain maturity, in terms of an eventual revenue/profit run-rate]. Then again, my valuation’s a year old now: So applying the same methodology (as last year’s write-up), Applegreen’s underlying (i.e. maintenance) free cash flow has increased spectacularly – from €35 million to €62 million (see p. 80) – and yes, I still believe it’s worth the same 20.0 P/FCF Fair Value multiple. Which implies:

But cash flows can obviously be volatile – again, we really need to examine & appreciate the underlying dynamics. [For context, here’s Applegreen’s 2012-2016 working capital components, in terms of days outstanding]. As you’d expect, inventory & receivables were a minor headwind, so we’ll home in on total trade & other payables. Per the balance sheet (p. 78), we see a €44 million increase, with days outstanding increasing from 42 days to 46 days. In terms of its historical evolution, this looks pretty reasonable…and achievable, I wouldn’t be surprised if the company inherited improved fuel payment terms from its JFT acquisition (to match its JV partner).

Big picture though, there’s no rush to formally update my valuation at this point. We can afford to just sit back & relax, as continued expansion in Applegreen’s underlying free cash flow looks pretty inevitable here. Looking ahead, even when the company no longer enjoys improving working capital terms, its site & revenue growth trajectory will continue to generate more earnings & more cash float, which funds more site & revenue growth, which…well, it’s a simple but beautiful flywheelof repeated investment & growth, with no meaningful limit in terms of (global) market share. Of course, such a scenario obviously requires the same flawless execution & financial conservatism we’ve witnessed to date, but investors can definitely feel reassured with two entrepreneurial yet prudent owner-operators at the wheel…the CEO & COO still own a 52.5%controlling stake in Applegreen.

After my original investment write-up last April, a mere 3% gain for the rest of 2017 was disappointing. In reality, shareholders’ total return (inc. dividends) was a far more respectable 11%. But looking at the chart, some lingering disappointment’s perfectly understandable – on two occasions within the last year, the shares rallied 20%+ to surpass 50p per share (& looked set to keep rising), only to abruptly reverse those gains entirely… The latest culprit was the recent Q4 trading update. Before we analyse it, we need some context: As I’ve previously noted, old & new investors continue to approach Record with some trepidation – doubtless, because of this long-term price chart – and have tended to cherry-pick any bad news in its updates & results. This time, investors seem to have focused exclusively on a flagged 10% drop in FY-2019 passive hedging management fees (as passive hedging performance fees are introduced on certain mandates), which produced a knee-jerk 13% price decline that looked overdone (or even unfounded) to me.

Management’s traditionally conservative outlook & a scrupulous policy of highlighting potential (new) risks is partly to blame – they specifically itemise an expected drop in passive hedging fees, whereas they still ‘expect that these performance fees will more than offset the reduction in management fees over the longer-term’. In reality, management appears to be prudently flagging potential timing risks on recording passive hedging performance fees during the initial transition phase. At worst, this actually implies a potential 5% reduction in total revenues, as passive revenues currently comprise about 54% of total revenues.

Granted, it introduces a new element of P&L volatility. [And whether clients demand/Record offers this performance fee approach to other/new mandates is clearly relevant]. But so what..? Virtually all asset managers earn performance fees, with most far more dependent on such fees & sitting on much less sticky AUM than Record enjoys with its passive hedging mandates – so I’d argue it still deserves a superior valuation multiple. And let’s not forget, this is passive hedging…Record won’t be earning performance fees (or not) by shooting the lights out on wild currency bets! In reality, it will have a set of performance KPIs, related to the term structure of hedging, managing/exploiting basis* risks & opportunities, the actual/potential impact of increased regulation and credit & collateral exposure, greater visibility & metrics around best execution, etc. [*See the basis discussion in last year’s final results]. Judging by Record’s reputation with clients & its 35-year track record, we can reasonably expect it to deliver consistent/top-notch execution against any such performance metrics.

So while this new mandate approach to passive hedging could well prove a valuation headwind over the next year (albeit, mitigated by a 7.2% dividend yield), longer-term investors will hopefully look back on this in due course as an interim investment phase, as Record responds to new market/regulatory developments, and seeks to improve its competitive advantage via continued innovation & enhancement of its differentiated/bespoke passive (& dynamic) hedging services. [Consistent increases in Record’s passive hedging fee rate over the last decade seems ample proof it isn’t simply being forced to make some kind of fee concessions here]. In the end, progress & success will continue to be measured by two key metrics – total AUME & number of clients:

Both are close to all-time highs, the number of clients has risen steadily, while total AUM’s up 7% in the last year (11%, adjusting for announced client wins/losses), up 12% in the last 3 years, and up 79% in the last 5 years. Passive hedging AUM growth looks even better: Up 10% in the last year (14%, adjusting for announced client wins/losses), up 29% in the last 3 years, and up 140% in the last 5 years! I see no reason why Record can’t/won’t deliver similar growth over the next 5 years – in fact, in last year’s write-up, I documented a number of tailwinds (e.g. increasing macro/currency volatility) which could potentially accelerate AUM growth. And with the founder Neil Record & the board owning a 45% controlling stake, we can rely on true owner-operators to be aligned here with shareholders – we already saw a major step-change in capital allocation last year (with a £10 million tender offer & a commitment to pay out 100% of earnings as dividends), and I believe we should also presume management has an equally ambitious long-term growth plan in place.

So how does one update an Alphabet investment thesis? Confirm: Yes, it’s still one of my largest positions, it allows me to sleep like a baby (hmmm, that phrase is sooo wrong!?), I love the growth runway still ahead of online advertising as it eviscerates old media advertising, and I breathlessly await a glorious new future populated with driverless cars & intelligent robots. Check! Alphabet’s like some fantastic gilded castle surrounded by an insanely wide & lethal moat…and deep inside the castle you discover they have this incredible unicorndecacorn farm. Just look at this chart – isn’t it a thing of real beauty?!

But while revenue (& profits) climb relentlessly, you’ll notice the share price tends to evolve in fits & starts – plateauing periodically for sometimes a year or two, then rallying (sometimes violently) to establish a new price level as investors are once again startled into a fresh perspective on the company & its valuation. After a 21% gain last year (vs. my original investment write-up), we seem to have settled down since into another sideways pattern.

And yeah, I blame Facebook…

Because Alphabet vs. Facebook is a game I like to play, as it reminds me: i) of all the (risk-averse) reasons I chose to specifically invest in Alphabet, not Facebook, and ii) Facebook risks might still contaminate Alphabet regardless. Just reflect on their origin stories: Page & Brin were just two nerds doing something quite wonderful & magical in a garage, surprised & delighted to get their first investor check, whereas Zuckerberg was a resentful Harvard kid who screwed over his pals to lay claim to software that would surely get him laid & put one over the jocks. And the Google motto was ‘Don’t Be Evil’…while at Facebook it was ‘Move Fast & Break Things’, which was more akin to ‘We Promise To Be Slightly Less Evil Each Time Something Goes Horribly Wrong’.

While Facebook users (& commentators) are being absurdly hypocritical as they virtue-signal how shocked & horrified they are learning how their privacy/data has been abused & exploited, in reality it always seemed inevitable this (or some variation of it, i.e. social media is sad & bad) would happen. Consumers like to forget there’s no free lunch…ads & data pay the bills! And social media’s entirely different from search: Sure, maybe Google’s taken over your home office/study…but with Facebook, it feels like they’ve literally infiltrated & corrupted your social circle, your family, your sitting-room & even your bedroom! Hence, the feelings of outraged violation specifically directed at Facebook, not Google. And unfortunately, Facebook’s almost entirely dependent on: i) a single product/network (they’re praying Instagram users won’t realise it’s Facebook), whereas Alphabet obviously has its fingers buried in multiple moonshot pies, and ii) monetising & actually exploiting your privacy/data, whereas Google’s primary monetisation driver has & will be literally the search phrase you’re typing.

Which explains why Alphabet/Google’s business model probably faces far less risk & unwelcome attention, in terms of a potential user/media backlash (though old media has an obvious vested conflict of interest), and/or the possible operational & financial consequences of regulatory intervention. Brin’s 2017 Founders’ Letter is worth reading – you’ll find what seems like a far more genuine & thoughtful consideration of the potential risks & responsibilities of Big Tech. Of course, both that letter & the original Alphabet letter are a great reminder the company’s already configured to pre-emptively break up/spin off businesses itself, ideally to enhance & realise shareholder value. But meanwhile, that still won’t necessarily/fully mitigate the possible looming risk of a Facebook-related regulatory spillover/action (though notably, Facebook’s share price has now essentially recovered its losses!).

In the end though, we have to frame it in terms of valuation…and fortunately, that provides easy & quite compelling reassurance! Let’s just do a back-of-the-envelope here: Taking the same approach as my original thesis (and using the latest 10Q/Q1 earnings release & 10K), Alphabet has $109 billion in net cash & marketable/non-marketable securities – implying an ex-cash $643 billion market cap. We’ll continue to treat Other Bets losses ($2.7 billion last year) as balance sheet venture capital investment, so let’s focus on the Google segment: Noting 2017 revenue of $110 billion & applying just half the most recent 26% growth rate, we can conservatively assume a $125 billion revenue run-rate today. Applying last year’s operating margin of 29% (inc. corp/misc. expense, but exc. a $2.7 billion EC fine), we arrive at an operating profit run-rate of $36 billion – at an average 18% tax rate, that implies a $29 billion net earnings run-rate, for an ex-cash 21.9 earnings multiple.

But we know Alphabet continues to under-monetise/invest prodigiously across many of its (sub) business units in its Google segment. [*Inc. YouTube: Consider Netflix & Spotify…now picture what valuation YouTube might actually command as a stand-alone listed company!?] Arguably, the same is true of Search itself, even though it appears far more ‘mature’ in an Alphabet context. So, referencing the old Google ‘20% Time’, we’ll treat 20% of operating costs (i.e. $18 billion) as valuable intangible investment. Assuming a conservative 3 year life/amortisation, we back out two thirds of this expense to arrive at what I believe is a far more accurate estimate of Google’s underlying earning power:

A 38% adjusted operating margin, and adjusted net income of $39 billion, leaving (core) Google trading on what’s in reality an adjusted/ex-cash 16.4 earnings multiple – an astonishingly cheap multiple for perhaps one of the best & moatiest 20-25%+ growth juggernauts in the world. Of course, at this point, I haven’t even scratched the surface, in terms of the rest of Alphabet’s empire of startup businesses…let alone mention the potential implications of DeepMind, AlphaGo, and most recently Google Duplex!?

Yeah but…again, what about the potential regulatory threat, which is presumably the lurking beast impacting Alphabet’s valuation today? Sure, we could while away the hours debating & agonising over that…but in absolute terms, all stocks (regardless of valuation) present some inescapable level of unquantifiable potential downside risk. But consider Alphabet’s ex-cash 21.9 P/E multiple, and particularly the adjusted ex-cash 16.4 P/E multiple of the (core) Google business, from a relative valuation perspective. In reality, most listed companies out there – many of which are ripe for disruption & boast anaemic underlying growth rates – trade for similar & even higher multiples!? So which would you prefer to buy in today’s (or tomorrow’s) world?

Well, well…a year ago, how many readers would have bet I’d end up with an actual crypto-stock as my largest holding? That’s what a 3/4-bagger does for you! Some will dismiss it as madness, some as sheer luck. Obviously, I would disagree… To the doubters, I can only suggest they reconsider my Crypto ‘Trading Sardines’ post, which I published (quite deliberately) ahead of my original Kryptonite 1 investment write-up last September. Clearly, I wasn’t looking to dive head-first into some simple Bitcoin bet, some non-diversified over-valued cash-burning investment company, some bunch of promoters feeding the ducks, some kind of crypto name-change Hail Mary of a company, et al. In reality, I knew exactly what I was looking for – a listed profitable & diversified blockchain investment company, one run by an experienced & non-promotional management team – which, as it turned out, was a pretty bloody unique spec!?

CEO George McDonaugh (& team) actually had the foresight & experience to arrive at a quite unique investment strategy…one that recognised the most effective way to assemble a portfolio of blockchain/cryptocurrency-related investments was via initial coin offerings (ICOs). Such a portfolio would offer the same dynamics/economics as a traditional seed/early stage venture capital portfolio – a ground-floor opportunity to invest in startups which might only require millions in funding, but which might ultimately offer investors (despite the inevitable failures) the huge long-term upside potential of a unicorn (or even decacorn). But it also avoids some of the key disadvantages of the traditional VC model: For example, the KR1 team assembled a portfolio of over two dozen high quality projects in essentially a year…a traditional VC firm, blessed with far more resources, could only dream of that kind of investment pace! Not to mention, KR1 enjoys near-immediate mark-to-market/liquidity/exit opportunities on most of its ICO/token investments – again, something VC firms can only ever dream of…

But let’s not forget KR1’s ‘city discipline’: They aim to lock in what’s hopefully a (multi-bagger) gain on a portion of each holding, ideally during its initial post-ICO trading phase. And so far, that’s exactly what they’ve achieved: Last year I noted they realised an average 15-bagger gain on four different ICO investments, they reported an actual 42-bagger gain in December, while earlier this month they reported an average realised 11-bagger gain in Q1-2018 on a further six ICO investments! Perhaps most remarkable was this announcement of three new investments in early-February – i.e. in the midst of the recent crypto-collapse – but regardless, they’ve all commenced trading since & are actually 4-baggers on average today for KR1!

So in reality, despite the volatility, mark-to-market’s arguably far more of a blessing than a curse for KR1…once you grasp how an ICO can effectively compress the normal economics of seed/early stage VC (a startup funded with millions could ultimately be worth billions) into a single explosive upfront event! It’s like IPO premiums…but on steroids. And as any fund manager will confirm, harvesting IPO premiums is a really consistent & lucrative source of investment alpha – the challenge being actual IPO access & allocations. But in the crypto-space, KR1 management’s networking (today & over the years) has helped unlock unique access/allocations to potential multi-bagger ICOs. So while I look forward to the long term VC potential of its portfolio, meanwhile KR1 is proving to be an incredible ICO-flipping machine – one which I continue to believe, in terms of its unique team/strategy/returns, deserves a potential 3.3 times book multiple. [Moving up from NEX to an AIM listing would also help – at this point, management needs to focus on this as a high priority]. To date, I feel vindicated not only by KR1’s 148% gain in Q4-2017 (with a 100%+ gain showing up in the week after my write-up!), but also by its impressive 30%+ gain year-to-date…right now, how many other crypto-stocks globally have racked up/hung on to an actual gain in 2018?!

But in terms of a multiple to book, we’re obviously not there yet – so apologies, I haven’t felt all that compelled to track & share an updated KR1 NAV estimate. [But hopefully, in due course, I’ll revisit the subject properly with a fresh KR1 post!] Frankly, I can’t take that much crypto-volatility up close…and it may not matter all that much, as long as KR1 can continue to enjoy substantial returns & compounding from new multi-bagger ICOs. And big picture, KR1’s NAV was 7.43p per share as of end-June, and I estimated a subsequent fully diluted NAV of 7.16p per share as of end-September – since then, the total crypto market has increased 160%+ from $144 billion to $377 billion, despite the crypto-collapse. So if that’s any indicator (and yes, it’s obviously not a perfect indicator) of KR1’s NAV today, it suggests KR1 (at a current 13.5p per share) is probably just as cheap a bargain today as it was last September at a mere 4.125p per share…

And yes, we’re done – best of luck!

Again, all comments/questions about these holdings are welcome here/by email.

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12 thoughts on “Wexboy Portfolio Prospects – Part II”

There may be stock market corrections ahead but right now we have a perfect money storm. Low interest rates, more people invested in funds and living off unearned income than at any point in history, the emergence of big time savers from the developing world (eg. China), housing and property investments being increasingly nailed by Governments (to protect young home buyers) – all putting upward pressure on equity markets as a growth haven.

In the last 3 years, Applegreen has enjoyed 20-30%+ Adjusted EBITDA & site growth…which was actually a repeat of the prior decade, when it enjoyed 23%+ site & Adjusted EBITDA growth.

But with 342 sites as of year-end 2017 (& another 20% site growth now locked in YTD, per today’s AGM statement: https://investegate.co.uk/applegreen-plc–apgn-/rns/agm-statement/201806060700064137Q/), the company literally faces zero constraint in terms of actual market share. [Its market share in the US & UK is infinitesimal, with significant scope in Ireland for continued development & consolidation (Applegreen only has approx. half the local market share of Topaz/Circle K)]. Therefore, presuming management continues to execute, I see little reason for Applegreen’s flywheel of continued 20%+ growth to slow any time soon:

Looking to buy back into Donegal if some weakness would arise. Thanks for your comments on Total Produce. Wasn’t aware of your history with the stock. If it drifts any lower, i would be inclined to enter with a small position, for now i’m holding off. Numbers of Greenyard food were not good, due to a variety of reasons, maybe a reflection on the future numbers of Total produce. So on the watchlist.

I’m very interested in your undisclosed holdings…. Any chance of shedding a light in them in the future?

together with value and opportunity, if you had a newsletter, i would subscribe

Post-redemption, Donegal will be a much smaller company, with an approx. EUR 37 million market cap – hence, the new ‘strategic review to assess all suitable options for the purpose of maximising long term shareholder value’.