Brigadier
Lloyd (originator of conversion) said Waterloo’s
peak would be no problem, with buses departing every four seconds. Transwatch
sees Waterloo
as easy prey, “if roads are managed to avoid congestion”. No bus
timetables have ever been prepared to prove conversion claims. The core
assumption from the beginning to the present day is that all buses would depart
immediately they are full, and that buses would be continually available to
meet any demand, hence timetables are not needed. It is a totally impractical
method. The time taken to fill some buses would vary immensely according to
destination. Conversionists have laboured under an illusion that passenger distribution
is equal for all destinations. That is the basis of their arithmetic. An option
which cannot apply – even on paper – is for untimetabled buses to
depart when part filled. That would leave control in the hand of drivers, as
terminal supervisors have never been mentioned in proposals. Such an option
would increase fleet sizes. Timetabled buses are unavoidable for passenger,
crews & management.

Transwatch
states that Victoria
coach station is “said to be able to handle 10,000 passengers per
hour” five times its present
level, and compares this with what rail terminals are actually handling already! It was not stated who had said so.

In
its submission to the Select Committee, Transwatch referred to the nimble bus
versus the cumbersome train. See Select-8 for a complete rebuttal of their
submission.

In its web site, Transwatch claimed that
‘probably a bus would use a
terminal space 3-4 times as efficiently as the train. With similar
calculations, it can be shown that, in terms of both capacity & use, road
transport out-performs rail by a factor of 3-5 across the network. This is
important. It suggests that alternatives to rail are not only technically
feasible, they would be technically highly efficient’. (Journal of the
Institute of Economic Affairs Volume 24, No. 2, June 2004). Again that
mysterious plan - with no costs, nor building timescale.Claims must not start with probably
and end with certainty.

Transwatch claimed on Radio2 (Jeremy
Vine programme, 24 July 2007) that ‘its calculations showed that only 25%
of the space of a rail passenger terminal would be required for buses replacing
trains’. No formula or costs, or timescale was given to support this wild
claim, which were not challenged. It did not mention that it envisaged them
having three levels (which research shows would be insuffucient), or for buses
to ‘do a loop beyond the terminal’, see Fact 5 below.

According to Transwatch: ‘terminal capacity is a
separate issue and more difficult to demonstrate simply’. It is crucial
and only difficult in the absence of a timetable based on a full analysis of
the precise journeys which passengers make. Conversion proposals have tended to
ignore the practicalities of operation, at which any transport operator - road
or rail - would regard as the first essential step. Lloyd sought to dispense
with timetables for the very reason that they would prove the impracticability
of his dream

Fact 1 – Only one study has been published of a
rail route conversion – part of the route from Liverpool Street station. The station
area which would be a bus station was virtually the same. However, the number
of buses departing in the peak would be eight times as many as the number of
buses departing from Victoria coach station, and using an area half that of
Victoria coach station. There would be a bus every 9 seconds, and they would
cross – on the level – a flow of over 28,500 passengers per hour.
Moreover, the number of buses envisaged departing is seriously under-estimated. (see Railway
Conversion – the Impractical Dream)

Fact 2 – This study included a plan drawing of
the station (Liverpool Street),
which reveals that it would have 30 bays for 37 destinations. The plan showed a
series of unexplained dots, which research revealed represented 57 slender
cast-iron columns supporting a vast roof. Unlike, the so-called “nimble
bus” which cannot travel in reverse at speed, the
‘cumbersome’ train can. This means the bus must have the facility
to turn. Buses – especially articulated buses - would have to more nimble
to manoeuvre between these columns without bringing down the roof of this
listed building. A photo (from the collection of from Bishopsgate Institute) of
the station showing these columns is included in Railway Conversion – the impractical dream. (click to see photos)

Fact 3- The route from Liverpool Street station & five
branches was selected by the scheme’s author, who claimed it was the
busiest commuter line in the world. Waterloo
was busier. Moreover, it concerned only half of its commuter journeys &
none of the main line passengers. My book (see above) reveals that the width
available leaving the station would not accommodate a lane in each direction
– as the study required - but only one single-lane for two-way traffic.

Fact 4 - The idea of multi floors has not been thought
through. The time required by buses to pass to/from upper floors has not been
evaluated. There are no drawings, no costs, no assessment of the area that
would be occupied with ramps. It is overlooked that local authorities can block
such schemes as they did BR plans to build above Fenchurch Street & Euston,
and would be very likely to do so, especially with stations that are listed
buildings with large roof spans. It would be costly. Every terminal (over 50)
will be out of action for at least a year. Some large through stations will
require multi-story replacements to avoid buses clogging the ground floor area.
Passengers will be diverted to existing roads, which will double up as
“terminals”. As there will be hundreds to be rebuilt
simultaneously, along with increasing clearances of many tunnels & bridges,
removing rail infrastructure and laying concrete, the entire system would be
out of use for years.

Fact 5 - To ‘do a loop, beyond the
terminal’ – as the conversion mini lobby advocates - is ridiculous.
The narrow congested streets around most major city stations make this totally
impractical. They would have to cross pedestrian flows outside the terminal,
leading to more accidents. Some terminals are not at street level anyway, and
surrounding streets would give no space for ramps. Buses would return to the
terminal at unpredictable times.

Fact 6 – ‘Managing roads to avoid
congestion’ has yet to be achieved. It should be proven on an existing
road that has widths similar to a railway double track, before attempting it
from a converted city rail terminal.

Fact 7
– Liverpool Street is already handling six
times as many passengers pa, as Victoria
bus station in a similar acreage. The volume it could handle if there was
greater passenger demand is even higher, merely by lengthening all trains to
equal the longest currently in use. A further increase would arise from
signalling alterations. Victoria
coach station management do not subscribe to the view that it could handle an
increase of 500%.

Fact 8 - Claims must not start with
‘probably’ and end with certainty as they do with many
conversionist claims.

Fact 9 – No mention is made of the manpower
required to clean buses, lorries, bus stations, etc., nor to maintain and clean
toilets, waiting areas, etc. Existing railway manpower is included in total
railway staffing with which the crudest “comparisons” were –
occasionally - made with a handful of lorry or bus drivers. The analogous
manpower required to maintain and repair structures (and route) are completely
ignored.