I can confirm that the directive on interrogation
referred to in Para 135 of the Judgment in Ireland v UK
prohibiting the use of the five techniques found to constitute
degrading treatment (hooding, wall standing, sleep deprivation,
food deprivation, and white noise) remains in force. The training
given to those Service personnel in appointments which could require
them to conduct interrogation of captured enemy personnel takes
full account of this directive, of the Geneva Convention and of
the Laws of Armed Conflict.[3]

3. In May 2006 we published a Report on the UK's
compliance with the UN Convention Against Torture (UNCAT).[4]
Amongst the areas covered in that Report were the applicability
of UNCAT to the armed forces and the jurisdiction of UK courts
and courts martial over military personnel for actions which may
be in breach of prohibitions against torture and inhuman or degrading
treatment under UNCAT, the European Convention on Human Rights
(ECHR), and domestic and international law.[5]
UNCAT prohibits torture and inhuman and degrading treatment, in
similar terms to the ECHR.[6]

4. In oral evidence, on 27 March 2006, we asked
Lieutenant General R. V. Brims CBE DSO, Commander Field Army,
about whether he was satisfied troops were fully aware of the
prohibition on the use of the five conditioning techniques. Lieutenant
General Brims said:

On hooding we have given very clear direction and
hooding itself will not take place. It is permissible to blindfold
in some other way in certain circumstances but we care not to
do that at the moment I think if you went and asked most
troops, "What are the five things that have been banned?",
they would look at you and be unable to communicate to you. If
you wrote down these five things, "What is your view on them?",
they would say, "You should not do them", if you follow
the answer.[7]

In our Report, we drew attention to Mr Ingram's letter
and Lieutenant General Brims's comments without drawing any conclusions
of our own.[8]

6. At the conclusion of the court martial - at
which only one person, Corporal Payne, was convicted, of inhumane
treatment - the head of the army, General Sir Richard Dannatt,
accepted that Baha Mousa and others "were subjected to a
conditioning process that was unlawful". He went on to state
that the duty of British military personnel to behave in accordance
with the law "was forgotten or overlooked in this case".[12]

7. We wrote to the Secretary of State for Defence
on 22 May 2007 to raise a number of issues arising from the Payne
court martial, including:

the apparent discrepancy between
the evidence presented to the Committee that the use of the conditioning
techniques had been prohibited and the evidence presented to the
court martial, and accepted by the Crown, that the use of hooding
and stress positioning was part of the standard operating practice
of 1 Queen's Lancashire Regiment in 2003 and had been sanctioned
by Brigade headquarters;

whether any of the conditioning
techniques had ever been sanctioned or authorised for use in Iraq,
or in any other circumstances, by the Ministry of Defence or by
any of the armed forces, to prolong or maintain 'shock of capture'
prior to interrogation; and

whether the Government intends
to take any further steps to revise the training, guidance and
procedures for the treatment of detainees and internees.[13]

8. The Secretary of State, in his reply of 15
June 2007, said he was unable to provide the information we had
"rightly" sought because the legal process concerning
Corporal Payne was not concluded and a review of the lessons to
be learned from the death of Baha Mousa had been commissioned
by the former Chief of General Staff, General Sir Mike Jackson,
and was due to report "shortly".

9. The report of the review referred to by the
Secretary of State, which was carried out by Brigadier Robert
Aitken, was published on 25 January 2008. At the same time, the
Secretary of State announced that the Army Prosecuting Authority
had concluded that there were no further criminal lines of inquiry
in relation to the Baha Mousa case.[14]
The Aitken report concluded that:

The great majority of officers and soldiers who have
served in Iraq have done so to the highest standards that the
Army or the Nation might expect of them, under extraordinarily
testing conditions. There is no evidence of fundamental flaws
in the Army's approach to preparing for or conducting operations:
we remain the envy of our allies for the professionalism of our
conduct. [15]

Aitken went on to note that "the doctrine, training
and education required to deal specifically with detained civilians
has been comprehensively reviewed", that "measures have
been put in place to ensure that all those involved in prisoner
handling or interrogation are now significantly clearer about
the correct procedures" and "the procedures of the Military
Criminal Justice System are fit for purpose".[16]

10. Aitken did not address the question of why
soldiers in 1 Queen's Lancashire Regiment came to think that the
proscribed conditioning techniques were, in fact, lawful, explaining
that this was an issue to be considered by a subsequent, broader
enquiry.[17] He went
on to set out a number of contextual factors, however. He concluded
it was likely that the prohibition on the use of the conditioning
techniques had been restricted only to Northern Ireland operations
and did not extend outside of the intelligence community.[18]
By 2003, the doctrine in use at the Defence Intelligence and Security
Centre only required prisoners to be treated in line with international
law and did not make specific mention of the five techniques.
"Determining how and when specific direction in 1972 came
to be lost in 2003 would have to be a matter for separate investigation"
Aitken concluded.[19]

11. Aitken also drew attention to deficiencies
in training and guidance for troops. Training packages "described
in detail the manner in which prisoners of war were to be treated,
but made scant mention of the treatment of civilian detainees".[20]
The rules and practices relating to interrogation and tactical
questioning (IT&Q) were "not as clearly articulated"
in 2003 as they are now.[21]
Current policy on IT&Q specifically proscribes the use of
the five conditioning techniques, but this was not spelled out
in guidance on the handling of internees and detainees which has
more general application. Aitken concluded that it was "understandable"
that the contents of the more specific IT&Q policy were "not
widely known throughout the Army".[22]
Aitken also drew attention to the training of some members of
the army in proscribed IT&Q techniques, in order to prepare
them for the treatment they may receive from an enemy. This practice
was discontinued in 2005.[23]

12. The Secretary of State announced on 14 May
2008 that a further inquiry into the circumstances surrounding
the death of Baha Mousa would be held under the terms of the Inquiry
Act 2005.[24] Terms of
reference have yet to be announced.