Neoconservatism and Democracy Promotion

Noah Millman continuesthediscussionaboutneoconservatism. He makes many very good points, and I recommend reading the entire post. I’ll comment on just a few of his observations. Regarding Salam’s complaints about the U.S. role in the 1971 war, Millman writes:

Realistically, he’s not complaining that America didn’t intervene against Pakistan; he’s complaining that America didn’t reduce its level of support for Pakistan in the wake of the crackdown – or use its leverage to induce Pakistan to act with more restraint. Neither action sounds remotely like neoconservatism either in theory or in practice [bold mine-DL]. What they sound most like is the Carter policy in the late stages of the Shah’s reign in Iran – a policy that absolutely can be defended on the merits, but for which I strongly doubt you can find a single neoconservative defender.

I alluded to this in my first post on this subject a few days ago: neoconservatives are great ones for invoking ideals and morality in foreign policy when it involves taking action against non-aligned or hostile states, but most don’t do this when it involves reducing or cutting off support for U.S. clients or allies. Neoconservatives often view foreign threats in terms of great global ideological struggles, and this means that they are more willing than many others to tolerate abusive behavior from clients and allies as long they remain on Washington’s side of the struggle. The odd thing about Salam’s choice of using a Cold War example to support his argument is that neoconservatives were then and still are today likely to be very “taken with treating the world as a chessboard.”

One of the main neoconservative criticisms of Carter was that he put too much pressure on U.S. clients in Iran and Nicaragua in the name of human rights, and they faulted Carter for undermining friendly authoritarian rulers to the detriment of U.S. goals in the Cold War. Today, we hear many of the same arguments that Obama has supposedly been too hard on Egypt’s military rulers, and that he has been too accommodating to Islamist groups there and elsewhere. (This happens to be exactly the wrong criticism of Obama’s Egypt policy, but let’s leave that aside for the moment.) While perhaps as many as two or three neoconservatives have objected to U.S. indulgence of and continued support for the post-coup government in Egypt, most neoconservatives and other hard-liners in the GOP welcomedthe coup, and they have criticized the administration for not being supportive enough of the new dictatorship there. Most certainly don’t wantthe U.S. to cut off aid. This points us to one of the basic contradictions within neoconservatism: it tries to be both moralizing Wilsonianism that pretends that American values and interests advance together and an ideology justifying global hegemony with all of the sordid arrangements with local governments that this entails. Freddie de Boer recently noted just that:

An endlessly adventuring military means a government that must break bread with some of the ugliest governments in the world, for reasons of simple expediency and need.

The point isn’t just that neoconservatives are inconsistent. They are usually unlikely to criticize abuses of power by friendly despots with whom the U.S. potentially has the most influence. They are often among the least likely to demand that the U.S. stop enabling such abuses through continued support for fear of the “signal” this will send to other clients and allies.

Millman addresses neoconservative support for democracy promotion later on in his post:

They want to spread democracy because they believe that democracies will be naturally more aligned with each other and because democracies will be naturally less inclined to undertake expansionist wars that threaten the international system.

Millman thinks that the “insight” behind this ignores the possibility of aggressive democratic states, and he’s right. I would point out how this idea goes awry in practice in a few other ways. The most obvious flaw in this view is that it cannot account for the many democratic states that have historically been non-aligned or have recently sought to pursue more independent foreign policy courses of their own. Many rising democratic powers have no desire to align themselves with the U.S. on a regular basis, and their interests will frequently diverge from those of Western states just as often as the interests of authoritarian states do. Regime character may be significant in special cases, but it doesn’t explain very much and tends to lead the U.S. in the wrong direction in dealing with many other countries. If regime character occasionally helps us understand why a few regimes behave in a certain way, it is more often useless or misleading.

Another problem is that emphasizing the importance of the character of a regime typically leads to advocacy for regime change on the flawed assumption that a more democratic government in Iran or Russia or China would be more accommodating to the U.S. than the current rulers. In most cases, a more democratic regime will be no less intent on securing what it perceives to be national rights, and could even be more aggressive in pursuing similar foreign policy goals. We have also seen how greater democratization in allied and non-aligned countries has made their governments more likely to disagree sharply with the U.S. on major issues than their less democratic predecessors once did. Countries with strong nationalist sentiments such as Iran, Russia, and China would probably elect equally confrontational or possibly even more adversarial leaders than the ones they have now.

Neoconservative advocates of democracy promotion also tend to credit “pro-Western” elected governments for being much more thoroughly democratic than they are, and this often makes them accept those governments’ self-serving claims about their own political progress at face value and to view the opposition to their “pro-Western” friends as agents of rival powers. This underscores that the primary concern is not the successful establishment of a functioning liberal democracy in other countries, but rather ensuring that the “right” leaders have the “correct” foreign policy orientation in order to bring these countries into Washington’s camp.

The most glaring recent example of this was in Georgia, where the first peaceful post-election transfer of power took place two years ago. The neoconservatives’ preferred leader and his allies had seriously abused their power while in office and governed in an increasingly heavy-handed and semi-authoritarian manner. His Western boosters ignored or explained away all of this right up until the end, but that simply blinded them to the extent of popular dissatisfaction with the governing party. As Saakashvili’s party faced electoral defeat from the first effective challenge from the opposition in years, they took as gospel whatever false and slanderous things he told them about his opponents. In practice, neoconservatives don’t seem to think that regime character matters as much as they often claim, because they are mostly indifferent to the authoritarian tendencies of foreign elected leaders as long as those leaders profess to be on “our side.” If an elected leader happens to choose the “wrong” orientation, of course, neoconservatives will insist that he should be thrown out of office right away.

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11 Responses to Neoconservatism and Democracy Promotion

All of what you say, and what Millman says too, is true. But, in my view, it gives the neo cons way too much credit. Theirs is not a theory with inconvenient holes in it, with inconsistencies, blindspots, exceptions, etc.

No, theirs is a commitment to bellicosity for its own sake, combined with an endless series of ad hoc, after the fact rationalizations to back up that commitment in particular instances. There is no overarching theory. There is no minimal effort to make what the alleged theory says match reality, or even for the various parts of the “theory” to combine coherently.

Democracy, regime character, bandwagon/balancing, international law as important or not, etc, etc, etc…all of these are simply buttons to push, when they seem to at least superficially fit the facts. When they don’t fit the facts, so much the worse for the facts! Or, the theory is conveniently modified and amended. Like some modern exponents of the geo centric model of the universe, the neo cons build each new failure into their “theories.”

The entire enterprize has no intellectual validity, and is not really meant to. It is a figleaf for warmongers and the MIC, not a real academic or philosophical POV.

The entire enterprize has no intellectual validity, and is not really meant to. It is a figleaf for warmongers and the MIC, not a real academic or philosophical POV.

I am very tired right now to answer your other post but re: this one. How can you explain making Michael Saakashvili a Senior Statesman of Fletcher School Of Law And Diplomacy in Tufts? Below is what his welcome with there:

“We welcome President Saakashvili, the leader of ‘The Rose Revolution,’ to the Fletcher and Tufts community,” said Admiral James Stavridis, dean of The Fletcher School. “He is an accomplished leader and statesman, renowned for changing the course of his country’s history and moving it strongly into the trans-Atlantic community, as well as for his impact on the region and indeed the world.” (c)

Is this some kind of a joke? “Accomplished leader”? Really? What criteria do they use there? Intellectual validity or not–but that is what is happening in the REAL “academic” world. I wonder what graduate students will he “educate”.

P.S. I would also have some issue with stated “prestige” of Kiev University Institute of International Relations (which Saak graduated), which never was prestigious and was a backwater compared to MGIMO.

“In practice, neoconservatives don’t seem to think that regime character matters as much as they often claim, because they are mostly indifferent to the authoritarian tendencies of foreign elected leaders as long as those leaders profess to be on “our side.””

This is true. And it’s very similar to the liberal “humanitarian” interventionists that also pick and choose which “humanitarian” intervention needs to happen more in line with perceived imperial interests than with actual humanitarian interests or not.

If the neocons’ “democracy” cant had any basis in sincerity, they would be calling for the invasion of Saudi Arabia.

If the liberal humanitarians’ R2P cant had any basis in sincerity, they would be calling for the invasion of Israel.

Pardon me for cynically thinking that both “democracy” and “humanitarianism” are fig-leafs for both groups.

The hub of which the wheel of military interventionism revolves around is Israel. The neocons are terrified if the US starts cutting back on foreign adventures it could signal the end of the “special relationship” between Israel and the US.

I supported the neocon policy view, which I now believe was manipulative propaganda, as long as it was believable to me that it was in support of freedom, self-determination, democracy and human rights. Once I began to discover this was not factually the case, I increasingly questioned underlying assumptions and actual consequences, which I discovered were entirely at odds with the invocation of high ideals.

The sad truth is, any policy that really isn’t to the benefit of most of the country, still has to be sold to that public. The neocons are the forward propaganda face of a narrow set of interests that don’t coincide with public interest and certainly not democratic accountability. Surely, they will plead for democracy if it usefully advances the interests they serve, subvert it when it does not. How is that any different from any totalitarian movement’s cynical political practice?

One law school, and not an Ivy League one, note, hires as a more or less honorary, fake “statesman,” a Color Revolutionary clown. Here is what he will be doing there:

“In this role, President Saakashvili will conduct major addresses and lectures on European governance and other contemporary international and regional issues.”

In other words, he will not teach any classes, but will be trotted out now and again to shoot his mouth off about something in a pseudo academic, not for credit, “lecture” or “address.”

In any event, he was the president of his country, he was a member of parliament, he studied in other places besides the school in Kiev that you mentioned. Look, I don’t love the guy either, but his appointment to this BS post hardly stands as an indictment of US colleges and law schools tout court. I really think you are straining here, to make your point.

Spot on, in everything! I am old enough to remember the Cold War, and, indeed, at that time being a neocon meant giving total support to any friendly dictator faced with a domestic uprising for fear that other friendly dictators would lose their confidence in our willingness to protect them from their domestic rivals as well.

As for the idea that democracy means towing our line in foreign policy, I am grateful to am ambassador/professor I had in college who introduced me to the “Groucho Marx syndrome.” (“I wouldn’t want to belong to any club that would accept me as a member.”) Any government with real domestic legitimacy will necessarily have a foreign policy more geared to its own interests than anyone else’s. Any regime that automatically toes our line is doing so only because it lacks domestic legitimacy any therefore relies entirely on a foreign sponsor. And the surest way for a government to undermine its domestic legitimacy is for it to be too strongly associated with a foreign power.

So, the dominance (I don’t know precise percentages) of the Soviet dissidents (mostly of Jewish descent) in, as an example, so called Russian Studies programs is also a figment of my imagination. Even when I know personally a number of them. And the fact, again as an example, that Russian narrative in the US is framed by these very dissidents is a total illusion.

Look, I don’t love the guy either, but his appointment to this BS post hardly stands as an indictment of US colleges and law schools tout court.

Oh goody. So, reading lectures is NOT and educational process. All right. As for liking or not liking Saak–I specifically emphasized the phrase “accomplished”. I’ll give you a hint–the guy lost the third of his country as the result of absolutely insane policies and he is accomplished? Forget about the state of affairs in Georgia which ranged from torture of opposition in Saak’s jails to effectively mafia state. Sure. I’ll give you example–I don’t like Brent Scowcroft but I RESPECT him, because the guy is an accomplished politician and a scholar. Liking or not has nothing to do with my point.

The “total illusion” is that the appointment of one “statesman” to a mostly ceremonious post at one law school is indicative of anything.

As for Russian history professors (who have nothing to do with law schools), all I can do is repeat…when I went to a State university, the professors there did NOT present a “dissident” view of the USSR as the only view. At a non descript, non elte school, the picture presented was much, much more nuanced than that. Both in the lectures and in the assigned reading. That view, the dissident view, I agree, is prevalent in the popular imagination and is what you will hear “on the news” and from national politicians, but that is not the fault of scholars of Russian history. No, that is the fault of political and economic actors and factors which you downplay consistently.

And your focus on Russia has perhaps misled you in this regard. As I mentioned before, the “dissident” or “renegade” view is the standard one presented in the news and in politics (but again, not by US scholars) of many, if not most, alien cultures and societies, particularly those which the forces of interventionism have on their agenda. Thus, as Said mentioned, Islam is defined by Ayaan Hirsi Ali and Salman Rushdie, and the Third World in general, and Africa in particular, by VS Naipaul. China by Xu Zhiyong and Jung Chang. Burma (Miramar) by Aung San Suu Kyi, and so on. So, of course, Sakharov defines the USSR in the same way.

It is NOT the case that US scholars of all these different regions and cultures and societies and nations are all simplistic and biased, rather a simplistic and biased view is presented as the whole story by the interventionists (right and left), who dominate politics, and by the lockstep mainstream media.

I also think that you are misled by your own vast knowledge of Russian history. That level of detail is simply not necessary to policy makers. They don’t need an Andrew-approved, top notch Russian history scholar to tell them that, duh, the Ukraine, Crimea, the base at Sevastopol, the Black Sea, Moldova, Georgia and Belarus matter to Russia, and its leaders. And they have gotten that info…they just choose to disregard it, for political reasons, and because they think, in their hyper power arrogance, that they can.