On November 13, 1916, the British statesman Henry Charles Keith Petty-Fitzmaurice, better known as the fifth Marquess of Lansdowne, writes a memorandum to the British cabinet questioning the direction of the Allied war effort in World War I.

Born in 1845, Lord Lansdowne held various positions in the British government over the course of his career, including governor-general of Canada, viceroy of India, secretary of state for war during the Boer Wars and foreign secretary. In this last position, Lansdowne signed an alliance agreement with Japan (1902) and in 1904 negotiated the Anglo-French "Entente Cordiale" with his French counterpart, Theophile Delcasse. Having switched his allegiance from the Liberal to the Conservative Party before becoming war secretary, Lansdowne became leader of the opposition party in the House of Lords after a Liberal victory in 1906.

In 1915, with the country at war, Lansdowne was named a minister in the newly formed coalition government of Prime Minister H.H. Asquith. By the following year, with the Allies locked in a bloody stalemate with Germany on the Western Front and reeling from a disastrous invasion of the Ottoman Empire, Lansdowne began to openly question the direction of the British war effort. "No one for a moment believes we are going to lose this war," he began his memo of November 13, 1916, "but what is our chance of winning it in such a manner, and within such limits of time, as will enable us to beat our enemy to the ground and impose upon him the kind of terms which we so freely discuss?"

Though he was immediately attacked by his colleagues in the cabinet--Sir William Robertson labeled him one of the "cranks, cowards, and philosophers, some of whom are afraid of their own skins being hurt"--Lansdowne was not alone in his pessimism. None other than David Lloyd George--the secretary of war, who would become prime minister the following year--admitted to a dinner companion less than a week later that he was "very depressed about the war." For his part, Lansdowne remained vocal about his misgivings. He was not given a post in the Conservative-dominated Lloyd George cabinet in 1917, but continued his work in the House of Lords.

In November 1917, Lansdowne published a letter in the Daily Telegraph reiterating his arguments for a negotiated peace. "We are not going to lose this war," Lansdowne repeated, "but its prolongation will spell ruin for the civilized world, and an infinite addition to the load of human suffering which already weighs upon it...We do not desire the annihilation of Germany as a great power ...We have no desire to deny Germany her place among the great commercial communities of the world."

Though he was again lambasted by his British critics, U.S. President Woodrow Wilson was said to have been "impressed" with Lansdowne’s arguments. They came to nothing, however, and as became clear through post-war research, even if the British establishment had agreed to pursue peace negotiations, Germany in 1917 would never have accepted peace based on the antebellum status quo.

THE OCCUPATION OF CONSTANTINOPLE, 13 NOVEMBER 1918 – 23 SEPTEMBER 1923

Object description - British officer and sergeant discover in Constantinople dockyard wonderful old guns made of solid brass, used for firing old stone cannon balls. The mascot finds a new kennel. In the backgroud USS Hazelwood, HMS Sloop and minesweeper HMS Abidgton.

Letter from Sir Cecil Spring-Rice to Sir Arthur Nicolson, concerning William Jennings Bryan's Opinion of the Great War.

'Bryan spoke to me about peace as he always does. He sighs for the Nobel Prize, and besides that he is a really convinced peaceman. He has just given me a sword beaten into a ploughshare six inches long to serve as a paper-weight. It is adorned with quotations from Isaiah and himself. No one doubts his sincerity, but that is rather embarrassing for us at the present moment, because he is always at us with peace propositions. This time, he said he could not understand why we could not say what we were fighting for. The nation which continued war had as much responsibility as the country which began it. The United States was the one great Power which was outside the struggle, and it was their duty to do what they could to put an end to it. -- I felt rather cross and said that the United States were signatories to the Hague Convention, which had been grossly violated again and again without one word from the principal neutral nation. They were now out of court. They had done nothing to prevent the crime, and now they must not prevent the punishment. --

He said that all the Powers concerned had been disappointed in their ambitions. Germany had not taken Paris. France had not retaken Alsace, England had not cleared the seas of the German navy. The last month had made no appreciable difference in the relative positions of the armies, and there was now no prospect of an issue satisfactory to any Power. Why should they not make peace now, if they had to make peace a year hence after another year's fruitless struggle. It would be far wiser if each said what it was fighting for and asked the United States to help them in arriving at a peaceful conclusion. --

I asked him if he thought that under present circumstances Germany would give up Belgium and compensate her for her suffering. If not, how could the United States Government go on record as condoning a peace which would put the seal on the most disgraceful act of tyranny and oppression committed in modern times? I didn't believe there was a man in the country not a German or a Jew who could advocate such a cause. --

He got rather angry and said that if that was what we wanted, why did we not say so. He added, Who can tell who was really responsible for what had happened in Belgium or whether the treaty wasn't only a pretext?' I reminded him that he was a great admirer of Gladstone, who was like him, a great lover of peace, and that Gladstone had always maintained that if we had gone to war for Belgium in 1870, we should have gone to war for freedom and for public right and to save human happiness from being invaded by a tyrannous and lawless power, and that in such a war as that while the breath continued in his body he was ready to engage. This rather surprised him as he had read in the newspapers that Gladstone had always maintained that the Belgian Treaty was not binding."

21st (Service) Battalion (6th City)
Formed in Manchester on 13 November 1914 by the Lord Mayor and City. Moved to Morecambe in January 1915.
April 1915 : moved to Grantham and placed under command of 91st Brigade in 30th Division. Moved to Larkhill in September 1915.
Early November 1915 : landed at Boulogne.
20 December 1915 : Brigade transferred to 7th Division.
November 1917 : moved with Division to Italy.
13 September 1918 : left Division and returned to France. On arrival joined 7th Brigade in 25th Division.

At about 1.40 pm on 13 November 1915 a small boat arrived at North Beach. From it stepped Field Marshal Lord Kitchener, Commander in Chief of the British Army. He had come to Anzac to see the positions there for himself. As he walked up the pier with other generals, he was recognised and men came running from all over towards the pier where they surrounded the great man. Charles Bean watched Kitchener walk up from the pier:

The tall red cap [Kitchener] was rapidly closed in among them-but they kept a path and as the red cheeks turned and spoke to one man or another, they cheered him–they, the soldiers-no officers leading off or anything of that sort. It was a purely soldiers’ welcome. He said to them, ‘The King has asked me to tell you how splendidly he thinks you have done-you have done splendidly, better, even, than I thought you would.’[Kevin Fewster, Frontline Gallipoli – C E W Bean’s diary from the trenches, Sydney, 1983, p.176]

Kitchener spent just over two hours at Anzac surveying the Turkish line from Australian trenches inland of the Sphinx and at Lone Pine. Two days later, after further consultation with senior commanders, he recommended to the British War Cabinet that Gallipoli–Anzac, Suvla and Helles–be evacuated. Without significant reinforcement and the bringing in of considerable artillery resources, little progress could, in his opinion, be made against the strengthening Turkish trenches. This was especially so at Anzac where a further surprise attack, such as had been conducted in August against Chunuk Bair and Kocacimentepe, was virtually impossible. Moreover, local commanders were extremely worried about the problems of supplying Gallipoli throughout the winter with its many severe storms.

Your letter of the 7th1 took only three days to get here; the proofs followed yesterday. Many thanks for both. I am particularly glad that so far your sons have safely and honourably survived all dangers.

I have been able to breathe more freely for the last few days. For the past eight months I had the most exhausting job at this hospital, but I have now left the Surgical Department for good. I am at present organizing an observation ward for psychopathic soldiers and shall probably very shortly be doing only psychiatric and psychotherapeutic work, as has long been my wish. It is likely that I shall have to write a great many reports for the court, but I am sure I shall have time for analytical studies. In these few days, during which I have been busy with about a dozen patients, I have already made some interesting findings about the origin of paralyses in the war-wounded. (...)

In the First World War it was decided to billet the soldiers in local towns and villages. Some people became concerned about the soldiers corrupting local girls. The Headmistresses' Association and the Federation of University Women suggested the formation of Woman's Patrols to stop local woman from becoming too friendly with the soldiers.

The War Office gave permission for these patrols to take place outside military camps. They were also very active in public parks and cinemas. After visiting 300 cinemas in three weeks, the Women's Patrol Committee recommended that lights were not dimmed between films.

Women's Patrols worked closely with the local police and the Women Police Volunteers. It is estimated that during the First World War over 2,000 patrols were established, including over 400 in London.

_-*-_

(1) Letter in The East Grinstead Observer from Charles Jenks of 34 Cantelupe Road (6th November, 1915)
I am writing to inform the council of the serious annoyance caused by inhabitants and visitors who use the public seats in the Mount Noddy Recreation Ground by the contemptible tactics of the Woman's Patrol. Having heard from various friends as well as from soldiers billeted at my house, of these women's actions, I went to the Mount Noddy Recreation Ground on Saturday evening from 9.30 pm to 10 pm. I saw two women make repeated journeys round the ground flashing electric torches on every seat as they passed. They also sat down on a seat adjacent to a couple who, as far as I could see were behaving in a perfectly correct manner. When this couple walked away the patrols directed a ray of light from a pocket torch on them, possibly with a view of finding out who they were. The council need to take steps to protect inhabitants and the exceedingly well-behaved troops quartered in the town from having this unjust slur cast upon their supposed behaviour.

(2) Letter signed 'One of the Annoyed' that appeared in The East Grinstead Observer (13th November, 1915)
Something must be done to stop these so- called "Ladies" from interfering with respectable girls and their friends. I'm not ashamed to admit that I made friends with several soldiers and I have found them to be perfect gentlemen. On two or three occasions one or two of these ladies spoke to me about the behaviour of the girls and soldiers in the town. These women seem to know all the girls in East Grinstead and Forest Row and all their business. They mentioned several things that I had done. They seem to know the exact place and time so I suppose they were watching me. I trust they will soon find something more useful to occupy their time.

(3) Unsigned letter in The East Grinstead Observer (13th November 1915)
It is about time something was done about ancient spinsters following soldiers about with their flash lights. I have seen a great deal of the soldiers who have been here and I consider that they have have been unfairly treated. Walking in the roads and fields accompanied by friends is no crime. What would these spinsters think if soldiers flashed a light upon them in their gardens or darkened drawing rooms?

(4) Letter in The East Grinstead Observer from M. Conner, 7 St. John's Road (20th November 1915)
I am not a member of a woman's patrol but I know several of these women and I admire their spirit and sacrifice. These women have an earnest desire for the welfare and morality of the girls. Preventative work is better than rescue work.

(5) Report by Women's Patrol during the war.
At a public house we watched three girls get into conversation with a sailor. Soon we beckoned to another and all five walked away. We followed until the girls, seeing us behind, turned sharply and left the men.

(6) Interview with a member of a Women's Patrol.
A special duty from the very first was to turn girls and lads out of the deep doorways and shop entrances. This is a job the police constable did not care to do, owing to the amount of abuse he got. But we never have any difficulty. Indeed the rule now is that as soon as we appear, out they come of their own accord, some sheepishly touching their caps with the remark: "All right, Miss." And yet we have not said a word.

(7) Helena Swanwick worked for the Women's International League during the First World War.
Sex before marriage was the natural female complement to the male frenzy of killing. If millions of men were to be killed in early manhood, or even boyhood, it behoved every young woman to secure a mate and replenish the population while there was yet time.

(8) Stephen McKenna, While I Remember (1921)
Anyone who lived in London during those feverish months had forced upon his notice a spectacle of debauchery which would have swelled the record of scandal if it had been made public but which is mercifully forgotten because it is incredible.

(...) Early in February 1915, the Indian Government requested the support of an Australian air force unit for the Indian Army’s campaign in Mesopotamia. Forty five men, including White, were selected and the group was named the Mesopotamia Half Flight.

On 1 April White was promoted captain and adjutant of the Half Flight. The unit embarked for India on 20 April and after reaching Bombay were transferred to Basra (now part of present day Iraq).

On 13 November 1915 White and Captain Francis Yeats-Brown, 17th Indian Cavalry were taken prisoners of war. The following extract is from the official statement made by White on 31 December 1918 to the Administrative Headquarters, AIF describing what happened that day in the lead up to their capture: (The text remains as written.)

On 12th November, whilst at AZIZIEH, the, divisional Commander, Major General TOWNSHEND, ordered that the Telegraph lines in rear of the Turkish positions before BAGDAD be destroyed by Aeroplane, which was to land behind the enemy’s lines. Volunteers were asked for by the Flight Commander, and, with Captain F. YEATS-BROWN. 17th Indian Cavalry, (who was my observer), I volunteered for this task. I was flying a MAURICE-FARMAN Longhorn Aeroplane with a 70 h.p. Renault engine. Owing to the distance to be covered i had to carry tins of petrol and oil to fill up my tanks after landing for the return journey.

I left on 13th November 1915 and found that the telegraph lines ran along the main road from FELUDJAH to BAGDAD and not at some distance from it, as shewn in the Official maps. For this reason I had great difficulty in finding a place to land owing to the large number of Turkish troops of all arms that were marching along the road. I landed on a small patch of ground bounded by canals where the line was about 200 yards from the road, and where there appeared to be only Arabs and no regular troops about, but through trying to land as close as possible to the wires, and owing to the smallness of the patch of ground, I struck a telegraph pole after landing and broke the longeron and ribs of my lower left plane. Some Arabs opened fire from about 200 yards immediately I had landed and a cavalry man, whom I had passed over in landing, rode off for assistance to what we had mistaken for a deserted building, but was really a gendarmerie barracks. I filled my tanks and kept off the Arabs and Gendarmerie with the rifle which we carried in the aeroplane, while Capt-Yeats-Brown blew up the telegraph wires with guncotton. But the enemy had cover and were able to advance on us along the canal, and I was unable, not having a machine gun, to keep them off long enough to attempt temporary repairs, and though we started the engine, the aeroplane became entangled in the broken telegraph wires and we were quickly taken prisoners, although Capt. YEATS-BROWN attempted to taxi away at the last moment.

The Arabs struck White and Yeats-Brown with their rifle butts and because White had particularly exasperated them by shooting the rifle, struck him several times on the head. One blow delivered with an adze, left a particularly bad wound. Both prisoners were then taken to Baghdad where after three weeks in hospital, including a week’s solitary confinement for White, they were sent to Mosul. White was imprisoned at Mosul for two and a half months before being sent to Afion Kara Hissar the principal concentration camp of Australian prisoners of war in Turkey. He was imprisoned there for two years and three months. (...)

The battle of the Ancre, 13-19 November 1916, was the final phase of the first battle of the Somme. It involved an attack on the German front line as it crossed the Ancre River, a sector of the front that had first been attacked on the first day of the battle without success. The attack along the Ancre had originally been planed for 15 October, as part of the battle of the Ancre Heights, but had been postponed repeatedly by bad weather. By November the original plan had been reducing in scope from an attempt to push the Germans back up to five miles along the Ancre to one to capture Beaucourt and push the Germans back at most two miles.

This was a strong sector of the German front. The first British objective involved an advance of 800 yards and would require the capture of at least three lines of trenches. The next target was the German second line, from Serre south to the Ancre. Finally it was hoped to capture Beaucourt, on the Ancre.

The attack would be launched by II Corps south of the river and V Corps to the north, with V Corps carrying out the main offensive. The attack immediately north of the river was to be carried out by the 63rd (R.N.) Division, under Major-General C. D. Shute. This was the first time they had taken part in an attack on the Western Front, and so extra care was taken to make sure everybody knew what was expected of them. Amongst their officers was Lieutenant-Colonel B. C. Freyberg, later to hold high command in the Second World War, who commanded the Hood Battalion (the Naval battalions were named after famous sailors – Hood, Drake, Nelson and Hawke). The division captured the German front line despite heavy German resistance.

Further north the attack made less progress, and so despite Freyberg’s optimism the attack on Beaucourt was delayed until the next day. 51st Division captured Beaumont Hamel, and 2nd Division managed to capture parts of Redan Ridge, but further north no progress was made.

The attack was renewed on 14 November. This time the 63rd Division was able to secure Beaucourt, which fell at 10.30am. The success at Beaucourt encouraged Gough to plan for a more ambitious offensive, but Haig ordered him to wait until after he could return from the Chantilly Conference of 15-16 November.

One final attack was made, on 18-19 November. This began in snow and sleet and descended into chaos. On the right of the line the 4th Canadian Division captured its first objectives, but elsewhere little was achieved.

The attack was a relative success. Beaumont Hamel and Beaucourt were captured, but Serre and the northern part of the German line remained untouched. Once again mud intervened to help the defenders, preventing the use of the few available tanks, and making all communication difficult. All the early successes on the Ancre achieved was the creation of a British held salient on the Ancre, which proved to be a very dangerous area to be posted over the winter of 1916-17.

Amongst the casualties on the Ancre was the writer H.H. Munro, better known as Saki, killed by a sniper’s bullet on 14 November during the attack on Beaumont Hamel.

The War Diary for Ancre Attack on 13 November 1916
(written by H Lecky, Captain, 2nd in command on behalf of Lt Col E St G Smith)

Sir

In accordance with our BM 868 dated 15th Nov 1916, I have the honour to submit the following history of the action, as regards my Unit from zero hour on.

Before Zero. From the time the battalion entered their assembly places and up to zero, only three minor casualties occurred, one broken ankle, one shell shock and one other wound from shell fire.

Zero. At zero the battalion advanced and occupied our own front line and support trenches (Gordon and Roberts) as laid down. Very few casualties were sustained in doing so, the same being the case whilst in these trenches and up to zero + 46 minutes when we moved forward in four waves. During this time the enemy was bringing his barrage to bear on the ground we had left, Sunken Road, Carnlea and Buckingham Palace Rd. My Battalion HQ being in the latter place.

Zero + 46 min. The battalion advanced in four waves and met little opposition until within 20 yards of the German wires. The mist at this time was very thick and one could only see some 25 yards to the front and flank. At this point the Bosche machine Guns opened a heavy fire more especially in front of my 3 left companies. Also several machine guns were enfilading the line from our left Beaumont Hamel direction. Snipers were busy and were endeavouring to pick off the officers.

My left company commander reports that he was never in touch with the division on his left, nor saw any of them during the preliminary stages of the advance. The majority of the losses sustained were caused immediately in front of the enemy front wire, and especially in front of the strong post which was subsequently found to be a medical dugout, which extended underground from their front their front trench to their reserve trench and which had 4 entrances in each line. This dugout was capable of taking 1500 men, had electric plant installed, an ammunition store and was evidently used to reinforce the different lines as well as an Aid Station. The Bosches had machine guns covering each entrance and various snipers scattered around in between. Two of the entrances in the first line were subsequently bombed by two bombing parties led by 2nd Lts McMahon and Cox, and occupants surrendered. Both officers were wounded in the enterprise and a special report is being rendered about them.

This eased the pressure in the Front on my left, which had been partly held up, and batches of men, led by the few remaining officers and NCOs who collected men around them, went through. Time about 9am. My right company had pushed through with the first advance and carried on to the enemies second line. finding them more or less exposed. Small parties under NCOs were detached to advance and guard the left, and it was two of these parties which Father Thornton afterwards led, and which captured seven Bosches who informed them of the whereabouts of a German Battalion and its HQ, who apparently were taking shelter from our heavies and barrage. These two parties then advanced under Father Thornton and the remainder of the battalion + staff surrendered after some parleying and a little firing ( I append report of Sgt McCormack)

Battalion HQ. I moved forward with by battalion HQ at zero + 1.5 having previously sent an officer over with the first waves to select a suitable HQ in Bosche second line. I also informed by runner the signal section and OC 4th Bedfordshire Regt of the time and place that I was crossing our front parapet. We met no opposition until some 30 yards from the wire when we came into a heavy machine gun fire and fire from snipers. I here lost 2 officers of my HQ and several other ranks. I also came upon Lt Phillips with his section of 190 Brigade Machine Guns and odd Dubliners who were sheltering from the fire in shell holes. As far as I could see there was only one gap in the wire to our right front, and with the aid of Lt Phillips who brought a machine gun to bear in the direction we were being fired on from and also some men who I posted to keep the enemies snipers down, the whole party along with the machine gun section got through the gap ) I here lost Lt Bailey, my adjutant).

On getting into the Bosche front trench, I ordered 2nd Lt McMahon to organise a bombing party and to proceed to the left up the trench and bomb and snipe the Bosches who were holding up my left companies. This he did with ability, and afterwards I found out that 2nd Lt Cox had also on his own initiative gone forward against the strong point with a bombing party and some snipers. The actions of this latter officer I particularly wish to bring to notice, as besides shooting 3 snipers himself, he saved the lives of many of his comrades and permitted the advance on the left front, which was held up, by seizing 2 of the entrances to the Strong Post dugout, capturing the MGs there and the enemy party with them. Going forward again he was dangerously wounded in the head by a bomb flung by a Bosche who had previously surrendered.2nd Lt McMahon then sent a party down and occupied the Medical dugout, finding the German doctors and some wounded and unwounded German officers and men.

After sending off the bombing party under 2nd Lt McMahon. and trying to clear up the situation on my left hand, I proceeded with my HQ to the second enemy trench, and shortly afterwards got in touch with Major Wills of the 4th Beds Regt, and also Lt Col Cartwright and Lt Col Hutchinson commanding 1st and 2nd Royal Marines Light Infantry. I sent parties to my left and front to clear up the situation. There was a considerable MG enfilading fire coming in to us from my left and left rear. Also snipers all over the place.

Father Thornton had been with me up to this time, and he here left me and he went forward with a party of my men about 30 strong, who had joined us under Sgt McCormack and Sgt Priest. I had no officers left on my staff at that time, all having been killed or wounded, except 2nd Lt Cox who had gone off with the aforementioned bombing party. The patrols on my left came back to say they could not find any of our own troops towards that flank, but that Bosche snipers and MGs were enfilading the ground in that direction. Time about 9am.

Scattered parties of various Battalions now began to arrive, and I found a Strong Post on my left with 190th MG section and one Lewis gun. I saw Lt Col Cartwright and Major Wills again & orders came through to push forward every available man, so I sent forward all available, including 3 guns of the 190th MG Section + Lewis Gun, and got in touch with trench mortars who had arrived in Bosche front line + 188 MG Section, asking the latter to send me on a proportion of his guns, but he replied that he had orders not to go forward, but protect flanks and look out for counter attacks. The mist was still very thick and I could get no information concerning my left.

About 12 noon I fond my left safe, and men belonging to the left companies going forward. 2nd Lt Cox was carried in wounded and some of my men up the trench to the left reported that there was an entrance to a large dugout some distance up in that direction and that two German officers (medical) and others wished to surrender. I sent Lt Commander Sprang to take their surrender, he had preciously arrived at my HQ from the front with Father Thornton and his party + 400 prisoners and I detained him to act as my adjutant as he had no men of his own with him and could not find his own battalion. He did very excellent work while with me.

In the dugout which I made my battalion HQ, one of my runners brought up 12 prisoners absolutely cowed. Lt Commander Sprang informed me that he had been as far as the Beaucourt Road, and that Bosche MGs and snipers were busy there, but no other opposition and small parties off all units were on green line and Station Road. Much the same information I received from the Brigade. Shortly afterwards I received orders to proceed to Hamel with as many men as I could collect. The majority of my men had gone forward and 15 officers had become casualties . It was then dark. I collected what men I could and with the remnants of my staff reported to 190th Infantry Brigade HQ where where we were sent on to support the advance on Beaucourt. My party was used in carrying bombs and sandbags up to the red line. which had been captured by 1 HAC.

In the forenoon of 14th November I received orders to withdraw my men and reorganise on original assembly position and collect all men of 190 Infantry Brigade and occupy Roberts trench. Stragglers belonging to 188th and 189th brigades were to be sent back to their HQ. I according collected all men and occupied Roberts Trench until relieved on the morning of 16th Nov when I led my men back into shelters on the Englebelmer - Martinsart Road.

13 November 1916: different units, same day
Lieutenant, Temporary Captain Anthony Dorman MC, 30, died while serving with 13th (Service) Battalion, the East Yorkshire Regiment (4th Hull). His brother Arthur, 20, died as a Private with the 24th (Service) Battalion, the Royal Fusiliers (2nd Sportsmans). Sons of John Joseph and Emily Keziah Dorman, of Brooklands, Horeham Road, Sussex, neither has a known grave and both are commemorated on the Thiepval Memorial to the Missing. The brothers are also commemorated in the Parish Church of St. Mary the Virgin, Warbleton, East Sussex.

Also 13 November 1916
Alexander, 19, and George Henderson, 22, died while serving with 1/5th Battalion, the Seaforth Highlanders, in the attack on Beaumont Hamel. Sons of James and Ann Henderson, of West Dunnet, Caithness. Alexander lies in Mailly Wood Cemetery, but George has no known grave and is commemorated on the Thiepval Memorial to the Missing.

The action of El Mughar, 13 November 1917, was part of the wider battle of Junction Station*, which saw the British capture the railway junction that linked the Turkish Seventh Army around Jerusalem with the Eighth Army on the coast.

The original plan had been for the infantry of XXI corps to capture the villages of El Mughar and Katrah, west of Junction Station. By early morning the 52nd Division had reached those positions, but had been unable to make progress. The same was true of the cavalry attack further north, which also came to a halt against strong Turkish positions.

At 2.30 pm it was decided to try a cavalry attack on the position at El Mughar. The Turkish position was a ridge than ran north from the Wadi Mughar, with the village of El Mughar at the southern end of the ridge. It was a well chosen position, and the Turks were well entrenched on the ridgeline, but barbed wire was in short supply, and the trenches at El Mughar were unwired.

The attack was made by two cavalry regiments – the Buckinghamshire Yeomanry and the Dorset Yeomanry, supported by the Berkshire Battery of the Royal Horse Artillery, six machine guns, with the Berkshire Yeomanry in reserve and help from a field artillery brigade of the 52nd Division.

The attack began at 3.00 pm. The attacking forces had to cross 3,000 yards of open ground, sloping up towards the ridgeline. After trotting for the first 2,000 yards, the cavalry galloped across the last 1,000 yards, and soon gained their objectives on top of the hill. The long uphill advance took its toll on the cavalry horses, preventing a pursuit down the eastern side of the hill.

Further south El Mughar village remained in Turkish hands. It was attacked by two battalions from the 52nd Division and the dismounted Berkshires. Fighting continued until 5 p.m. when the village was in British hands.

The victory at El Mughar helped to clear the way to Junction Station, which fell on the next day. The three cavalry regiments involved lost 16 dead and 114 wounded, as well as 265 horses (one third of the total). The heaviest losses amongst the horses were suffered by the Dorsets, after they dismounted, losing the advantage of speed. The Turks lost 400 dead and 1,100 captured.

The attack at El Mughar was only one of a series of cavalry charges that were a feature of the campaign in Palestine. The British army in Palestine had an overwhelming advantage in cavalry (mostly from Australia and New Zealand although the regiments that fought at El Mughar were all English). They were also helped by a general lack of barbed wire on the Turkish side, which allowed the cavalry to keep up the momentum of its charge right into the Turkish lines.

The battle of Junction Station, 13-14 November 1917, saw the British defeat a Turkish attempt to defend the line of the railway to Jerusalem. The centre of that line was Junction Station, where the line from Jerusalem joined the main north-south line. East of Junction Station the Turkish line ran almost alongside the railway, but ran through hilly country unsuitable for the British cavalry. West of Junction Station the line ran west to the villages of El Mughar and Katrah, on either side of the Wadi Jamus, and then turned north.

General Allenby decided to turn the Turkish right flank. XXI corps would attack south of Katrah, along the line of the main road from Gaza to Junction Station. On their left the Yeomanry and Anzac Cavalry Divisions would attack to their left, from El Mughar to the north.

The advance began at 7 a.m. on 13 November. After pushing back Turkish outposts, the advance became stuck at around 10 a.m. Both the 52nd Division, attacking Katrah and El Mughar, and the cavalry further north, came to a halt in front of strongly located defences.

The key to the British victory was a dramatic cavalry charge at El Mughar. At 2.30 pm it was decided to use the 6th Mounted Brigade to attack the Turkish lines on the ridge north of the village. Despite having to advance across 3,000 yards of open terrain, the cavalry successfully reached the ridge (Action of El Mughar), and their dismounted reserve captured the village itself.

To their right Katrah was eventually captured by the 52nd Division. The next day, 14 November, the 75th Division captured Junction Station, cutting the Turkish rail link to Jerusalem. By the end of the next day, the British had captured Ramleh and Ludd on the railway line north, and had advanced east to Latron.

The Turkish armies were now split in two. The Eighth Army, under Kress von Kressenstein, was on the coast, protecting the railway north, while the Seventh Army was isolated at Jerusalem. All supplies had to come over poor roads from Nablus, forty miles to the north, or from Amman, on the Hejaz Railway, fifth miles to the east. However, their position around Jerusalem was a strong one, protected by the difficult ground of the Judean Mountains. Allenby’s first attempt to capture Jerusalem, would grind to a halt in those hill (battle of Nebi Samwil).

Major HUNT asked the Prime Minister whether, in view of the apprehension felt and expressed by people in this country, and especially amongst the soldiers, as to the correspondence with this country of Prince Albert of Schleswig-Holstein, who is employed on the Intelligence Department of the German Army in Berlin, he can give this House and the country the assurance that all letters to and from this prince are examined by the Censor?

Mr. MACPHERSON I would refer my hon. and gallant Friend to the answer which was given yesterday on this subject to the hon. Member for West Clare by my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

Major HUNT Did the right hon. Gentleman make it quite clear that all letters to and from this prince were examined by the Censor—it is not clear to me?

Mr. MACPHERSON My recollection is that he did make it quite clear that all the letters of Prince Albert of Schleswig-Holstein were treated in the same way as the letters of everyone else, and were controlled by the Censor

Commander WEDGWOOD Can we be certain that all letters are censored, because all letters are not carefully read?

Paul Painlevé (5 December 1863 – 29 October 1933) was a French mathematician and politician. He served twice as Prime Minister of the Third Republic: 12 September – 13 November 1917 and 17 April – 22 November 1925. (...)

Painlevé was a leading voice at the Rapallo conference that led to establishment of the Supreme Allied Council, a consultative body of allied powers that anticipated the unified Allied command finally established in the following year. He appointed Ferdinand Foch as French representative knowing that he was the natural Allied commander. On Painlevé's return to Paris he was defeated and resigned on 13 November 1917 to be succeeded by Georges Clemenceau. Foch was finally made commander in chief of all Allied armies on the Western and Italian fronts in May 1918.

The Rothschilds as Recruiters for Buckinghamshire in the First World War

(...) The British Jewry Book of Honour lists three Rothschilds who had commissions in the regiment during the First World War. One of them, Major Evelyn Achille de Rothschild, was wounded on 13 November 1917 in the cavalry charge at El Mughar in the Palestine campaign and died four days later. His cousin Neil Primrose also fell. He was the son of Hannah Rothschild who, to the chagrin of both families, married the 5th Earl of Rosebery. Neil Primrose, Evelyn de Rothschild's cousin, also served in the Royal Bucks Hussars in Palestine. He was killed on 15 November 1917.

Please tell Feisul we rode to El Jefer, and found Zaal and the Abu Tayi afraid to come with us. Sherif Ali and Auda did their best to work them up, but they were not for it. The Abu Tayi have almost revolted against Auda, and I doubt whether we shall see much more good from them: they have seen too much good from us.

Thence we went to Bair, where we found Mifleh ibn Zebn. He with Fahad and Adhub ibn Zebn went with us, and did most splendidly. I think them three of the best Arab sheikhs I have met. Fahad was badly hit in the face in the train scrimmage, but will, I hope, recover.

From Bair we rode to Azrak where we met the Serahin. Sheikh Mifleh ibn Bali rode with us to the bridge, and did his best, but he and his tribe are not in it with the Beni Sakhr.

Emir Abd el Kader came with us to Azrak, where we made the plan of attack on the bridge at Tell el Shehab. He said he would come with us, and we had no idea anything was wrong, but the same day he rode off (without warning either Ali or myself or the Arabs with us) to Salkhad, where he is still sitting. Tell Feisul I think he was afraid: much talk, and little doing, in his way. Neither Ali nor myself gave him any offence.

Tell el Shehab is a splendid bridge to destroy, but those Serahin threw away all my explosive when the firing began, and so I can do nothing - If the Turks have not increased their guard we can do it later: but I am very sick at losing it so stupidly. The Bedu cannot take the bridge, but can reach it: the Indians can take it, but cannot reach it!

From Tell el Shehab we turned back to the Railway south of Deraa, and destroyed two locomotives. We must have killed about 100 Turks too. It was a most risky performance but came off all right. Little Ali is a very plucky youth, and came to my rescue on each occasion very dashingly. He will certainly get himself killed unless he continues to travel with a person as skilful and cautious as myself. Besides being in the thick of it when anything happens he keeps very good control of the Arabs on the march, and has been very decent to me - I think he is quite in the front rank of Sherifs - but he really must go easy with himself, or I will want a successor to travel with!

Please give Feisul (and Snagge) any extracts you like from the report to Clayton enclosed. Tell him the whole country of the Hauran fellahin is slipping towards him, and they only require arms, money and a shock to get all moving together. We can get no news of what happened at Gaza.

I think the attached might go to the Press. Ali deserves a mention, for he is a very uncommon youth. My personal requests in another paper.

Yours,

T. E. Lawrence

[Enclosed with the above] - On November the eleventh a detachment of the Northern Army of Sherif Feisul, under the command of Sherif Ali ibn Hussein el Harith, attacked the Railway and troop trains between Deraat and Amman. Two locomotives and some coaches were completely destroyed, and a bridge blown up. The Turks lost heavily in killed and wounded. The Arabs lost seven men.

October 28, 1916, was a black day for Australia: it was a triumph for the unworthy, the selfish, and anti-British in our midst. It was a triumph for the insidious propaganda that had been actively at work in every Allied country since the war began. Our troops in the trenches were taunted by the enemy - "Australians, your comrades have deserted you." The defeat was interpreted by those sections amongst us who had led the campaign as proof that Australia was war weary, that their campaign of lies and poisonous propaganda had done its work sufficiently, and not only misled the electors on this one question, but had sapped their loyalty to the Empire.

November 13th - All the other boys arrived and as soon as they were aboard we cast off and anchored in the harbour till 4 pm. Then we weighed anchor and started on our long journey across the ocean.
The weather was clear and fresh with a good breeze ahead and our old ship parted the waves some as she steamed out around Wellington Heads and headed out into the straight. Darkness followed and a sparkling sunset and the hills of dear old N.Z. faded – for how long providence was to decide.

New Zealand Mounted Rifles Wounded Machinegunner.

A dramatic photograph from the camera of machinegunner Trooper Rowland Smith. This image taken somewhere in Palestine 1918. No other information is written on the obverse of the photo but the puggaree hat band flashes show that the operation being carried out is involving a large contingent of the NZMR. The hat on the left sitting on the ground carries the patch colours of the Wellington Mounted Rifles, the two other troopers supporting the wounded machinegunner are both members of the Canterbury Mounted Rifles. Trooper Smith was himself a member of the Auckland Mounted Rifles Machinegun section.

Rowland arrived in Egypt from New Zealand with the 29th to 34th Reinforcements on the S.S. Tofua, his only written notes is a comprehensive Trip Diary that finnishes with his arrival at Camp in Egypt 27th December 1917. This places the events in the above photograph in the last year of the war. The NZMR Brigade was in action either in the Jordan Valley, Jericho or involved in the attacks around Es Salt or Amman in the last year of 1918.

Viscount WOLMER asked the Under-Secretary of State for War (1) how many cases of influenza in the British Army in France and England were reported during the months of September and October, 1918; what hospital accommodation was there to cope with these cases; whether any fresh hospital accommodation was provided; if so, how many beds; (2) how many officers and men of the British Army died in England and 2657 France, respectively, from influenza or pneumonia during the months of September and October, 1918?

Mr. MACPHERSON I regret that the figures for the United Kingdom for the month of October are not yet available. The figures for September are:

I cannot give the figures in the detailed form desired in the case of France. In September there were 92 admissions to hospital on account of pneumonia and 24 deaths. The figures for October are: 2,702 admissions to hospital and 1,044 deaths due to pneumonia, and 24,894 admissions to hospital and 421 deaths due to influenza.

As regards hospital accommodation, on 1st September there were 96,000 vacant beds in hospitals in the United Kingdom, and since that date an additional 8,000 beds have been provided.

Viscount WOLMER Is the right hon. Gentleman taking steps to have the mortality statistics of the Army compared with the civilian statistics?

Mr. MACPHERSON I cannot say whether we are doing that now, but I will see that it is done.

Viscount WOLMER asked the Under-Secretary of State for War whether he has received complaints in regard to the overcrowding of hospitals; and whether steps have been taken in all those hospitals in which influenza or pneumonia cases are numerous to reduce the number of inmates?

Mr. MACPHERSON No complaints have been received regarding overcrowding in hospitals. It is impossible in every case to reduce the number of inmates owing to the widespread and very extensive nature of the outbreak, and the fact that the hospitals are at present strained to the utmost by the arrival of wounded from overseas.

Viscount WOLMER asked the Under-Secretary of State for War how many cubic feet of air space per patient is considered necessary by the military authorities for patients in military hospitals suffering from influenza and pneumonia?

Mr. MACPHERSON At present 600 cubic feet of air space has been provided as a minimum in every hospital, and with adequate ventilation and efficient warming there is no evidence that this is insufficient for ordinary cases. It is recognised that cases of influenza and pneumonia require additional air space, and this is given whenever practicable.

Viscount WOLMER Will the right hon. Gentleman say how much extra allowance is given for influenza and pneumonia cases?

Mr. MACPHERSON I cannot say offhand, but I shall be delighted to make inquiries and inform my hon. Friend.

Colonel McCALMONT Is it not the case that in many districts where there has been this epidemic the figures have been very much lower for the troops than for the civilian population?

We now keep meeting small or large parties of British or French prisoners moving west on their way home. What a splendid mood they must be in compared with us.

In spite of it all, we can be proud of the performance we put up, and we shall always be proud of it. Never before has a nation, a single army, had the whole world against it and stood its ground against such overwhelming odds; had it been the other way round, this heroic performance could never have been achieved by any other nation. We protected our homeland from her enemies - they never pushed as far as German territory.

* Herbert Sulzbach was born in Germany in 1894. He volunteered for the German Army in 1914 and served until 1918. He kept a diary during the First World War and this was published as With the German Guns, Fifty Months on the Western Front, 1914-1918 in 1935.
Sulzbach, who was Jewish, was forced to leave Germany in 1937. He moved to England and during the Second World War served in the British Army where he was involved in re-educating German prisoners. After the war Sulzbach worked for the German Embassy in London. Herbert Sulzbach died in 1985.
http://www.spartacus.schoolnet.co.uk/FWWsulzbach.htm

Following a request by the States Food Control Committee, the Lieutenant Governor has telegrammed and written to the UK Government on the matter of flour supplies. The need to replenish local stocks is becoming urgent, General Wilson assured the Food Controller in London. If no flour is forthcoming, then ‘the island is threatened with a very serious shortage at an early date’.

Jersey presently consumes 80 tonnes of flour per week, most of which needs importing. While there is some local production of wheat, the island’s mills are unable to turn out more than 20 tonnes of flour weekly. What’s more, it’s very low quality, given the antiquated nature of the milling machinery.

To avoid a catastrophic situation, the States have maintained a policy of keeping one month’s supply of flour in protected storage. This is reducing, however, with no more than 120 tonnes expected left by early December.

Orders have been placed with several UK flour merchants, the Lieutenant Governor has explained to the British Government, but rail network congestion and a lack of available shipping is preventing its delivery to Jersey. Hopefully the powers that be in Whitehall can help expedite matters.

A quarter-century before boldly leading Britain in World War II, Winston Churchill spearheaded a World War I military debacle—Gallipoli.

As 1914 staggered to its bloody conclusion, the “Great War” dissolved into a horrific grind along the 500 battle-scarred miles of the Western Front. Britain and France had suffered nearly a million casualties in the war’s first four months alone, and the deadly stalemate in the trenches increasingly frustrated Britain’s 40-year-old First Lord of the Admiralty who asked the prime minister, “Are there not other alternatives than sending our armies to chew barbed wire in Flanders?” That rising star of British politics, Winston Churchill, believed he had the solution for breaking the impasse—a second front.

Although the political head of the Royal Navy, the ambitious Churchill also fancied himself a military strategist. “I have it in me to be a successful soldier. I can visualize great movements and combinations,” he confided in a friend. The young minister proposed a bold stroke that would win the war. Abandoning his earlier plan to invade Germany from the Baltic Sea to the north, he now championed another proposal under consideration by the military to strike more than 1,000 miles to east. He proposed to thread his naval fleet through the needle of the Dardanelles, the narrow 38-mile strait that severed Europe and Asia in northwest Turkey, to seize Constantinople and gain control of the strategic waterways linking the Black Sea in the east to the Mediterranean Sea in the west. Churchill believed the invasion would give the British a clear sea route to their ally Russia and knock the fading Ottoman Empire, the “sick man of Europe” that had reluctantly joined the Central Powers in October 1914, out of the war, which would persuade one or all of the neutral states of Greece, Bulgaria and Romania to join the Allies.

Britain’s war cabinet backed the plan, which had been under consideration even before the Ottoman Empire joined the war. The first step would be an attack on the Gallipoli Peninsula on the northern side of the Dardanelles, an operation that Churchill, who now became the plan’s chief advocate, knew would be risky. “The price to be paid in taking Gallipoli would no doubt be heavy,” he wrote, “but there would be no more war with Turkey. A good army of 50,000 and sea-power—that is the end of the Turkish menace.”

The British War Office, however, refused to send as many troops as he wished, but Churchill sent in the fleet anyway. The attack on Gallipoli began on the morning of February 19, 1915, with long-range bombardment of the peninsula by British and French battleships. Despite initial success, the attack stalled as the weather grew worse and Allied minesweepers drew heavy fire. Under pressure from Churchill to continue the attack, the British naval commander in the region, Admiral Sackville Carden, suffered a nervous collapse and was replaced by Vice-Admiral John de Robeck. Days later on the morning of March 18, British and French battleships entered the straits and launched an attack. Again, the Allies had the upper hand in the initial hours until undetected mines sank three ships and severely damaged three others. With half of his fleet out of commission, de Robeck ordered a withdrawal. Churchill wanted his commander to press on, but de Robeck wanted to wait for army support forces, which were now being provided after all. As the fleet hesitated, it lost the advantage.

In the wake of the failed naval attack, the Allies launched a major land invasion of Gallipoli on April 25. The month-long delay allowed the Turks to rush reinforcements to the peninsula and boost their defenses, and the British, French and members of the Australian and New Zealand Army Corps (ANZAC) could make little progress from their beachheads. The turquoise waters of the Aegean Sea turned crimson as the stiff Turkish resistance struck down the waves of Allied forces that washed ashore. The Battle of Gallipoli became a slaughter and quickly morphed into a stalemate just as bloody, just as pointless as that on the Western Front. In the first month after storming the peninsula, the Allies lost 45,000 men. The ill-fated Gallipoli Campaign lasted nine months before the evacuation of the last Allied troops in January 1916. Each side sustained 250,000 casualties with 46,000 Allied troops and 65,000 Turkish troops dead.

The invasion had been scuttled by incompetence and hesitancy by military commanders, but, fairly or unfairly, Churchill was the scapegoat. The Gallipoli disaster threw the government into crisis, and the Liberal prime minister was forced to bring the opposition Conservatives into a coalition government. As part of their agreement to share power, the Conservatives wanted Churchill, a renegade politician who had bolted their party a decade earlier, out from the Admiralty. In May 1915, Churchill was demoted to an obscure cabinet post.

“I am the victim of a political intrigue,” he lamented to a friend. “I am finished!” Displaying the steely determination that would serve him well in World War II, however, the marginalized Churchill did not slink from the fight. In November 1915, the statesman turned soldier. Churchill resigned from the government, picked up a gun and headed to the front lines in France as an infantry officer with the Royal Scots Fusiliers. After several brushes with death, he returned to politics in 1917 as the munitions minister in a new coalition government headed by Liberal Prime Minister David Lloyd George.

Churchill, however, remained haunted by Gallipoli for decades. “Remember the Dardanelles,” his political opponents taunted when he stood up to speak in the House of Commons. When running for Parliament in 1923, hecklers called out, “What about the Dardanelles?” The “British Bulldog” embraced Gallipoli as a brilliant failure. “The Dardanelles might have saved millions of lives. Don’t imagine I am running away from the Dardanelles. I glory in it,” he responded.

Although many shared the views of a political insider who in 1931 speculated that “the ghosts of Gallipoli will always rise up to damn him anew,” Churchill became prime minister in 1940 with Britain once again embroiled in war. Upon taking office, he wrote, “All my past life had been a preparation for this hour and for this trial.” That included Gallipoli.

13 November 1915: The resignation of the First Lord of the Admiralty, deeply though it is to be regretted, is perfectly intelligible and very natural

We deeply regret the resignation of Mr. CHURCHILL. His absence from the counsels of the Government is a great national loss, for in our opinion - though we dare say that there are few now who share it - Mr. CHURCHILL had the best strategic eye in the Government.

That he has not been included in the new War Committee of the Cabinet is the occasion rather than the cause of his resignation. No doubt, even after all that has been said by members of the Government, he feels that his exclusion is a censure on the Dardanelles expedition, with which his name is associated in the popular mind.

Our own view, frequently expressed, is that though the expedition has been so mismanaged the strategical idea has been proved by what has happened since to have been not only sound but brilliantly prescient. There have been two opportunities of winning the war. One was last October, before the fall of Antwerp. The other was this spring, when a great effort by land and sea would have won through to Constantinople and saved us all our troubles in the East now. Mr. CHURCHILL saw them both at the time, and though his ideas were adopted, neither in Flanders nor in the East did they have anything like a fair chance.

Perhaps this thought is in his mind when he says in his letter that even when decisions of policy are rightly taken the speed and method of execution may determine their success. But bitterly though he must feel the attacks on his war policy, he would not have left the Government had he felt that he could do effectual service in it. He leaves it because he refuses to be responsible for a war policy over which as a mere member of the Cabinet not on the War Committee he has no control.

And if we are right in our estimate of the bent of Mr. CHURCHILL’s abilities, his resignation, deeply though it is to be regretted, is perfectly intelligible and very natural. In the North of England we think we understand Mr. CHURCHILL. His faults are known to us, but even if they were greater than they are they would be hidden by the occasional flash of his genius. And such illumination is not so common in the conduct of our affairs that we can afford its eclipse. Of the personal tragedy of Mr. CHURCHILL’s decision this is not the time to speak. For the whole air is heavy with such tragedies.