Renewing the US-European Relationship

PIERRE SHOSTAL

From Parameters, Winter 1994, pp. 48-56.

Despite the hopes that abounded as the 1990s opened,
post-Cold War Europe is an unstable and dangerous place. A single massive
threat of the proportions of Nazi Germany or Soviet Russia is not likely
to occur again soon. But economic chaos, rampant nationalism, and ethnic
hatreds are the type of kindling which could ignite major regional conflict.
Economic interdependence and the effects of modern communications would
make it difficult for the United States to shield itself from European
upheaval. Thus, unless greater stability can be fostered, the United States
might again find its security threatened by European developments.

What does stability mean in today's Europe? During most of modern history,
it meant finding a balance in which no single power was so dominant as
to threaten the existence or vital interests of its neighbors. Neither
post-Soviet Russia nor any other European power appears likely to pose
this kind of threat in the near future. Today's European security challenge
looks more like a race to head off or contain regional conflicts before
they become uncontrollable. Rather than confronting a single adversary,
we will find ourselves dealing with many problems of bedeviling complexity.
What should we build on in confronting them?

Our Postwar Lessons

The American-led response to the Soviet Cold War challenge was a new
set of integrative political, military, and economic structures, notably
NATO and the European Community. We and our West European partners realized,
in establishing these institutions, that a traditional power arrangement
based primarily on nation-states would no longer meet their security needs.

These new institutions succeeded beyond all expectations: Western Europe
achieved unprecedented stability and prosperity; its adversary, the Soviet
Union, collapsed. While the dangers facing Europe following the disappearance
of the Soviet Union are great, the West has emerged from the Cold War with
tremendous advantages. One of the most important is the experience that
by engaging Western Europe in a grand design of European integration and
Atlantic partnership, the United States fostered a degree of interdependence
that makes war among West European countries almost unthinkable.

In a new era in which Western Europe should, by virtue of its stability
and prosperity, bear increasing responsibility for the rest of the continent's
security, there are many reasons why American leadership will still be
needed. What they boil down to is that the prosperous and democratic part
of Europe is having tremendous difficulty in coming to terms with the continent's
new problems. There is no single European country with the resources or
acceptance from its partners to organize the effort. The hope that Germany,
following reunification, would spearhead a European response to this challenge
will not be fulfilled in the short or medium term.

German Unification and Its Aftermath

While Britain and France both had reservations about German unification
following the fall of the Berlin Wall, they found they had no choice but
to accept it. Subsequent hand-wringing, particularly by the French, over
their relative loss of influence in Europe indicates a deep European reluctance
to accept German leadership openly. While the Germans have demonstrated
an assertive approach on some issues (e.g., recognition of Croatia and
expanding European Union membership), historically-grounded inhibitions
make them unable to exercise across-the-board leadership.

Issues on which Germany will continue to be reluctant to lead are primarily
those of military security and peacekeeping.[1] This reluctance remains
acceptable for the time being to Germany's European partners, fearful of
too sudden an expansion of German power. It also reflects the views of
many Germans, who are uncomfortable with the notion of their country playing
a military role that goes beyond its NATO commitments. Despite the German
constitutional court's recent decision that the Bundeswehr may participate
in military activities outside the NATO area, the new government which
takes office in Bonn late this year probably will make only slow progress
toward a more robust international security role.

While they lack Germany's economic power and influence, particularly
in Central and Eastern Europe, Britain and France will thus continue to
be our main partners on European security activities that extend beyond
the NATO area. This arrangement allows time for the development of new
multinational European military structures, such as the Eurocorps, in which
the Germans can play a significant role. In time, these arrangements can
lead to greater European initiative in security matters and an accepted
German role in this field. But a lot of bad things can happen in Europe
before then.

What this suggests is the continued need for a strong American political
and military commitment to NATO while the Europeans develop greater responsibility
in the security field. The most tangible part of our commitment--our troop
presence--should remain large and stable enough to be effective in case
of emergencies. It also should be capable of reinforcement so as to respond
to specific needs. Nevertheless, our presence should be tied to European
readiness to contribute enough of their soldiers and resources to a common
effort.

The Maastricht Treaty and Its Lessons

Paradoxically, German unification provided the main impetus to the current
effort to "deepen" or intensify West European integration through
the Maastricht Treaty. The treaty, which went into effect in November 1993,
sets out the ambitious goal of achieving a common foreign and defense policy.
Skepticism is in order about the near-term realism of this goal, particularly
in light of the weak performance of the European Union (EU) in the Balkans
crisis. Expansion of the EU to include such neutrals as Austria, Finland,
and Sweden can only make a common foreign and security policy an even longer-term
goal.

Achievement of another of the Maastricht Treaty's goals--a common European
currency--has somewhat better prospects of being achieved in the next several
years, though the path will be rocky. The governments that participate
in this effort would give up a large measure of sovereignty, perhaps smoothing
the way to common policies in other areas. Under Maastricht, those countries
that meet strict criteria set out in the treaty would adopt a common currency
by 1999. The number of countries that could meet these criteria now is
small. If they include both Germany and France, there would be good chances
of achieving a momentum that would carry other countries.

The Maastricht criteria for monetary union reflect the Bundesbank's
policy principles, a sign that the monetary field is one in which German
influence in Europe is already paramount. As has been true since the European
Community's founding, economic cooperation probably will remain in the
near future a more powerful motor for integration than political or security
efforts.

In an excellent analysis, Douglas Stuart asserts that Maastricht mistakenly
concentrates attention on expanding progress toward a fully integrated
West European economic system.[2] He argues that the Europeans should focus
more on "widening" of the European Union to include newly independent
states of East and Central Europe, and on building ties to Turkey and other
Islamic states.

While it is true that the West Europeans need to address these issues,
we should recognize that German unification drastically reshuffled the
geopolitical cards. The resulting power shift in Germany's favor requires
the EU to strengthen its core if it is to continue as a stabilizing framework
for Western Europe. Serious weakening of that core would risk a return
to largely national policies among member states. Thus, despite the difficulties,
the goal of common foreign and security policies among its key Western
members remains important.

The road to approval of the Maastricht Treaty, which included the 1992
Danish and French referenda, suggests other problems that need addressing.
The large anti-Maastricht votes in both countries--as well as opinion polls
which show low public support and understanding for the treaty in other
countries[3]--also indicate substantial voter fears of loss of control
over decisions that affect their countries. European leaders have concluded
from this experience that they need to do a better job at dialogue with
their publics about next steps in the integration process.[4]

Complicating Europe's efforts to formulate geopolitical priorities is
mounting concern with instability in North and Black Africa. This preoccupation
is especially strong in the European Union's southern tier--those countries
most exposed to the social and political shock waves coming from across
the Mediterranean.

For Americans, the aftermath to German unification and the collapse
of the Soviet power system has a triple lesson. The first is that Western
Europe will in the next few years remain focused on consolidating progress
toward internal integration, while also bringing in new members and dealing
with instability on its borders. The second lesson is that no European
government will seize the reins of foreign and security policy leadership
in the near term. Indeed, the Maastricht goal of a common foreign and security
policy tends to discourage national attempts at leadership. Third, Europe
will remain for a considerable time dependent on US leadership. In the
Balkans, for example, it was only after the United States began to assert
itself that there was even slight progress toward a political solution.

Which Lessons Should We Heed?

Preparations for the January 1994 NATO Summit brought to a head discussion
of Western strategy toward the former members of the Warsaw Pact. In its
broadest terms, the question has been about which lessons to draw from
20th-century European history.

One school, recalling Germany's humiliation and desire for revenge following
the Versailles Treaty, argues that the West should give priority to encouraging
Russia, the successor states of the Soviet Union, and the other former
members of the Warsaw Pact to become partners in a Europe without dividing
lines. Under this view, the greatest danger to a stable Europe would be
an isolated and resentful Russia.

The other school, recalling the turbulence in Central and Southeastern
Europe which contributed to the outbreak of both World Wars, argues for
promoting stability through giving priority to building NATO's ties with
the formerly communist Central European countries in which democracy has
already made a strong start.[5] This priority, according to the partisans
of "Central Europe first," should be expressed through offering
these states a clear prospect of early membership in NATO.

How Russia will eventually organize its society and deal with the outside
world is not yet clear. Much will depend on whether it seeks to remain
a multinational empire held together by force or becomes a Western-style
democratic nation-state. The evidence thus far is mixed.

A few things are, however, already known about Russian foreign policy.
One is that there exists a consensus among Russian elites that their country's
external relations must be based on a defense of Russian "national
interests."[6] This means that any Russian leader must be able to
portray his country's relationship with the West as one in which Russia's
importance is recognized. As Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev wrote, Russia
cannot be excluded from efforts to resolve such a major European problem
as Bosnia.[7]

Initially constructive Russian behavior in Bosnia suggests that the
West should not succumb to negative self-fulfilling prophecies about Moscow's
future diplomacy. At the same time, efforts to reconstitute a Russian empire
in the "near abroad" through force and intimidation must be rejected.
In such an eventuality, benefits for Russia of cooperation with the West
must be withheld.

How can the security needs of the newly free Central European states
be met while still encouraging constructive Russian conduct? Zbigniew Brzezinski
has suggested offering Russia a special treaty of friendship and alliance
even as NATO itself expands its membership eastward into Central Europe.[8]
Such a treaty offer would be contingent on Russia demonstrating concretely
that it is behaving toward its neighbors like a democratic nation-state
rather than as an empire with possible designs on them.

As Brzezinski suggests, such a good-neighbor Russia could be associated
with Europe-wide cooperative undertakings without being a member of NATO
and the EU. If Russian performance in these activities supports a more
formal relationship, the cooperation that develops could defuse lingering
suspicions in Moscow about NATO.

We can expect the Visegrad countries--Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic,
and Slovakia--to expand their cooperative activities with NATO under the
recently adopted Partnership for Peace as far and as fast as they can.
Early NATO membership for them is not, however, a desirable prospect. Dealing
with Russian suspicions will take time. Moreover, the armed forces of these
countries need thorough restructuring and will not be able in the short
term to participate fully in Alliance military activities.

Beyond this, there is a fundamental NATO issue to be addressed with
these Central European countries. Under the NATO Treaty's Article 5, "an
armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall
be considered an attack against them all." As Poland learned in 1939,
an ineffective security guarantee is of little value in the face of an
attack. In other words, NATO's armed forces would need to be structured
to carry out a security guarantee for these countries if they became members.
Some argue for revising NATO members' treaty obligations toward each other
as a way out of this dilemma. It is difficult to see, however, how a dilution
of security guarantees could be stabilizing.

Richard Nixon argued shortly before his death that progress by the Visegrad
countries toward membership should be gradual and that Russia must not
be given a veto over NATO's decision.[9] The Partnership for Peace is certainly
flexible enough to offer Russia the opportunity to participate in Alliance
activities to the extent that its policies are compatible with the Alliance's
commitment to "the preservation of democratic societies, their freedom
from coercion and intimidation, and the maintenance of the principles of
international law."[10] Such participation would help smooth the way
toward a more formal relationship between NATO and Russia.

Inviting Russia into the Partnership may seem to some like inviting
the fox into the chicken coop, but there is much to be said for trying
to train this particular fox in the advantages of responsible international
behavior. Russia's vast size and historical lack of attachment to Western
political values will make sorting out its relationship with the West enormously
difficult. Moreover, security problems on its Asian borders would seem
to preclude even eventual full membership in NATO. But these complexities
should not prevent the development of a cooperative relationship in which
Russia is exposed to Western political and economic culture and encouraged
to act responsibly. We cannot be certain that such an effort will succeed,
and the West might need to make difficult decisions if Russian actions
revert to undemocratic past patterns.

Russian behavior in three areas will be critical in forming Western
policy. First, how will Moscow perform in the Balkan crisis--will it continue
to cooperate in the search for a constructive political solution? Second,
how will it conduct its relations with the former Soviet republics, and
with Ukraine in particular? If these ties are based on voluntary cooperation
and Russian respect for their sovereignty, European security would be much
enhanced. If the contrary is true, Western rearmament would definitely
be on the agenda. Third, what will Russian behavior be regarding the implementation
of arms control agreements and cooperation on halting the spread of weapons
of mass destruction? Russian performance in this area thus far has been
encouraging but will require careful monitoring.

A Long-Term US Commitment

We learned through bitter experience in the 1930s and 1940s how our
vital interests in Europe can be threatened if we are not actively involved
there. Our successful commitment after World War II to building European
and Atlantic structures fostered an era of unprecedented stability in the
Western part of the continent. The opportunity exists to extend these structures
eastward to encompass much of the remainder of Europe and to develop cooperative
relations with Russia. There are also great dangers. As Vaclav Havel observed,
one sees:

It is not hard to imagine the potential for local and regional conflict
growing out of such an atmosphere. Unfortunately, Western Europe's performance
in foreign and security policy since 1990 does not portend an early assertion
of its leadership in dealing with such problems. Perhaps more than at any
time since the early 1970s, a consensus prevails in Europe that continued
US leadership and a substantial American military presence are needed.

Recalling the US role in two world wars and in the Cold War, Senator
Richard Lugar argues for a modest investment now to stabilize and secure
the peace in Europe. To do this requires, in his view, a new bargain with
Europe "not only to stabilize the continent but also to induce Europe
to become the outward-looking and meaningful ally Washington needs to reduce
its own global burden."[12] Lugar's proposal that the United States
and Western Europe together seek to project democracy and security both
eastward and southward should become a central principle for a renewed
transatlantic partnership.

Lugar includes the Balkans in his proposal. The crisis in that region
may confront us with difficult decisions about deploying troops there.
An American refusal to send troops to help enforce agreed political arrangements
might become fatal to these efforts. It also would raise serious questions
about the worth of our overall commitment in Europe.

If we do send troops to the Balkans and they are withdrawn because of
casualties, the political effect on NATO would be even more disastrous.
Before sending troops to the Balkans, the President would need to tell
the American public that such a deployment might be costly and lengthy.
The reason for such a step would be that keeping the Balkan conflict from
spreading is fundamental to our interest in maintaining European stability.

Many predicted in the early 1990s that the US-European relationship
would become a more contentious one, especially in the economic sphere.
The recent GATT accord defused some of this concern, but the risk of economic
quarrels undermining transatlantic cooperation still exists. Industry on
both sides of the Atlantic is being restructured to meet sharpened international
competition, and resultant unemployment creates domestic pressures to get
tough with trading partners. Just as we did during the Cold War, we will
need to keep frictions over individual economic problems within limits
so as not to damage our basic ties. Putting the whole range of US-European
relations within a broad revised political framework might help keep individual
problems manageable when disputes erupt.

The Goal of Devolution

The profound changes of 1989-90 make it too soon for Europe to assume
now the responsibilities of leadership that Americans have borne for half
a century. This does not, however, mean that a gradual devolution of responsibility
should not be a goal. It should, and this concept should be at the core
of a new Atlantic Compact in which the United States explicitly declares
that European stability remains central to our own national security.

In this context, the Bonn-Paris axis will continue to play a central
role in European deliberations. While the Germans move incrementally toward
assuming greater political responsibility in Europe, France will also gradually
free itself from old policies. Coming to terms with a greater German role
should impel France toward increased involvement in NATO and with the United
States. While the French will remain difficult partners, this evolution
in their position would facilitate maintaining our own European commitment.

Putting together a renewed transatlantic partnership along these lines
will require patience, clarity of purpose, and skill from the United States
and its European partners. We should build on what has been achieved in
the postwar partnership and extend democratic government, market economies,
and cooperative structures eastward and southward.

From the Europeans devolution will require taking adequate account of
American interests while they pursue the goal of common policies. Americans
will have to get used to not having our way as often as in the past. We
probably will need in time to accept some restructuring of NATO that reflects
both our gradually diminishing role and the new security missions the Alliance
will assume. There should be no hurry to such efforts since premature steps
in this direction could encourage those in our country who argue for a
sharply reduced American commitment now.

A true revolution took place in Europe in 1989-90. It did not, however,
end dangers to American security from that continent. We continue to need
a commitment there, a commitment that must be adapted to a changing environment
and a growing European role.

NOTES

1. In a 12 July 1994 decision, the Constitutional Court in Karlsruhe
found in favor of the Kohl Government's position that the German Constitution
or Basic Law permits Bundeswehr participation in UN peace missions outside
the NATO area. That position had long been contested by the opposition
Social Democrats, who argued that the Basic Law would have to be amended
to allow operations "apart from defense." Notwithstanding the
court's decision, public opinion remains profoundly divided on the issue.

Pierre Shostal is a Department of State Foreign Service Officer currently
teaching at the Defense Intelligence Agency's Joint Military Intelligence
College in Washington. His most recent overseas assignment was as Consul
General in Frankfurt, 1990-93. Before that he was director of the State
Department's Office of Central European Affairs, 1987-90, where he was
directly involved in US policymaking on German unification. He also has
served in Hamburg, Brussels, Moscow, Zaire, and Rwanda.