Washington,
DC, March 28, 2006 - The Central
Intelligence Agency and National Reconnaissance Office used the
nation's spy satellites and spy planes to obtain high-resolution
images of the nuclear facilities of allies, adversaries and neutral
nations alike, as illustrated in a collection of overhead reconnaissance
images posted on the Web today by the National Security Archive.

Today's posting includes 15 photographs and five photographic
interpretation reports from the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s. The images
were obtained by U-2 spy planes and CORONA and KH-7 reconnaissance
satellites. The interpretation reports were produced by the CIA's
Photographic Intelligence Center as well as its Imagery Analysis
Division and the National Photographic Interpretation Center.

All but two of the images were obtained for use in the book,
Spying
on the Bomb: American Nuclear Intelligence from Nazi Germany to
Iran and North Korea(W.W. Norton, 2006), by Archive
Senior Fellow Jeffrey T. Richelson. Two additional images were
obtained exclusively for this briefing book. All the photos were
located and extracted from the extensive collections of U-2 and
satellite imagery in the National Archives by Tim Brown of Talent-Keyhole.com.
Many had never been extracted from the Archives' holdings before
- including overhead images of French and Indian nuclear facilities.

The images and photographic interpretation reports illustrate
the variety of nuclear installations targeted by these programs
-- ranging from uranium mining facilities to nuclear tests sites
and the installations used to convert the mined material into
testable weapons -- as well as the growing capabilities U.S. overhead
reconnaissance systems.

On July 4, 1956, an aircraft, specially designed for the Central
Intelligence Agency by Kelly Johnson and the Lockheed "Skunk
Works" made the first of what would be 24 overflights of
Soviet territory. The plane, designated the U-2, had taken off
from Wiesbaden, Germany and would return to Germany when its mission
was completed. In between, its high-resolution camera photographed
the naval shipyards at Leningrad, the home to a number of Soviet
submarine construction programs, and several major military airfields
- coverage of which would permit the CIA to produce an inventory
of the new Bison heavy bombers. (Note 1)

Yongbyon, the center
of North Korean nuclear research activities, as photographed
on March 17, 1970, by a KH-4B CORONA satellite. (Click
for larger view)

President Dwight D. Eisenhower had given his approval in November
1954 to build the plane proposed by Lockheed - a plane which would
fly at 70,000 feet, at a speed of 500 knots, and to a range of
3,000 nautical miles with a pilot as the lone crew member. It
would carry a special long-focal length camera to photograph an
object as small as a man, and bring back images of roads, railroads,
industrial plants, nuclear facilities, aircraft, and missile sites
within a strip 200 miles wide by 2,500 miles long. (Note
2)

While there were no nuclear facilities on the target list on
the first mission, a variety of Soviet nuclear facilities including
weapons design sites and nuclear reactors would be among the nuclear
sites deep within the Soviet interior that the U-2 pilots would
photograph. U-2 overflights of Soviet facilities of any sort would
end on May 1, 1960, when Soviet air defense forces shot down the
U-2 flown by Francis Gary Powers. (Note 3)

But the U.S. would soon have a new, and in some ways better,
means of monitoring developments in the Soviet interior. August
19, 1960, marked the first successful completion of a CORONA mission
- CORONA being the codename for the satellite reconnaissance program
that President Eisenhower had assigned responsibility for to the
CIA in April 1958.

At that time and for a number of years thereafter, "successful
completion" meant that the satellite-borne cameras had successfully
photographed their targets and that the film capsule carrying
those photographs had been ejected and recovered in the air or
at sea by a special recovery squadron based in Hawaii. The pictures
they initially recovered did not have nearly the clarity and definition
of U-2 images - instead of resolution of six inches or a few feet,
the initial pictures had a resolution of 40 feet. But as CORONA
satellites carried more advanced camera systems, that resolution
improved to six feet for the final camera system (the KH-4B) carried
on the CORONA satellites. There were also improvements in the
quantity of film carried, which translated into longer lifetimes
and more targets photographed. The characteristics of the different
camera systems carried on CORONA satellites is given in Table
1.

The final CORONA mission was launched on May 25, 1972. By that
time another satellite program first authorized by President Eisenhower
had achieved success. In 1960, Eisenhower had given the Air Force
permission to go ahead with a program designated GAMBIT. Whereas
CORONA was a search satellite whose mission was to produce photographs
that showed thousands of square miles in a single photograph,
GAMBIT was designed to photograph much narrower swaths of the
earth (only about 120 square nautical miles) but with far greater
resolution. The improved resolution would translate into an ability
to produce better technical intelligence about military facilities,
including nuclear facilities and weapons systems.

In July 1963, the first GAMBIT satellite was launched, carrying
the KH-7 camera system.
Including the final KH-7 mission in June 1967, the GAMBIT/KH-7
program successfully returned imagery on 34 of the 38 missions,
which ranged in duration from one to eight days. Thirty missions
returned usable imagery for analysis. The quality of resolution
improved from about four feet for the initial missions to about
two feet in 1966. (Note 5)

KH-7 imagery allowed U.S. photointerpreters, using the U.S. reactor
at Hanford, Washington, for comparison, to estimate the reactor's
productive capacity. Oblique images of nuclear facilities, particularly
Chinese facilities, were often taken to provide data on the location,
size, and shape of their transformers. The CIA already understood
the capabilities of Soviet transformers, and high-resolution images
of the ones on Chinese facilities would allow superior estimates
of the power going in and the nuclear material coming out. (Note
6)

In 1966, the first of a new generation of GAMBIT satellites would
be launched with a new camera system that would completely supplant
the KH-7 system after the final mission of June 1967. The camera
system for the new generation, the KH-8, would commonly produce
images with a resolution of six inches - and on occasion far better.
While all KH-7 imagery, other than that of Israel, was declassified
in September 2002, no KH-8 imagery has been declassified. All
CORONA imagery was declassified in 1995 and is available at the
National Archives and Records Administration II facility in College
Park, Maryland. All U-2 imagery is also available at NARA II.

Soviet and Chinese nuclear facilities were the most important
targets of U.S. aerial and satellite imagery between 1960 and
1972 and for a number of years beyond. But these were by no means
the only nuclear facilities photographed by U-2 spy planes or
the CORONA and KH-7 satellites. During that period, the nuclear
facilities of France, India, Israel and Taiwan were also targets
of U.S. overhead reconnaissance activities. Specific targets included
nuclear weapons design laboratories, uranium mining facilities,
uranium enrichment and plutonium production plants, nuclear reactors,
and nuclear test sites.

The images presented below represent some examples of the images
obtained between 1960 and 1972. The photographs were located and
extracted from the reels of film held at NARA II by Tim Brown
of Talent-Keyhole.com. Two of these (Image 5 and Image 14) were
obtained specifically for this briefing book, while the others
were collected as part of the research behind the new book, Spying
on the Bomb: American Nuclear Intelligence from Nazi German to
Iran and North Korea, by National Security Archive Senior
Fellow Jeffrey T. Richelson. (Note 7) In addition
to the images, some of the photo interpretation reports for the
target facilities are included in this briefing book.

Images
and DocumentsNote: The following documents are in PDF format.
You will need to download and install the free Adobe
Acrobat Reader to view.

This photograph of the Tomsk facility in Siberia was obtained
on August 21, 1957, as part of U-2 Mission 4045, part of a group
of missions designated Operation Soft Touch. The images provided
a number of surprises to CIA photointerpreters, revealing, in
addition to the expected uranium enrichment facility, a plutonium-producing
reactor and a plutonium chemical separation facility. (Note
1)

This report, based on U-2 and ground photography, refugee sources,
clandestine reports, and open literature, covers the geology,
the mines and mining activities, and primary processing at the
mines and at the primary processing plant.

Construction began on Arzamas-16, the Soviet counterpart to Los
Alamos, in 1946. Located about 250 miles southeast of Moscow and
40 miles south of Arzamas, it became the most secret city in the
Soviet Union, surrounded by fences. First detected through communications
intelligence, it was photographed on February 5, 1960, during
U-2 Mission 8009. (Note 2)

This photographic interpretation report, updates two previous
reports on the same subjects, prepared before KH-7 imagery became
available. The "excellent quality" of the KH-7 imagery
provided "details not previously discernible" and permitted
"an analysis of changes which have occurred in the ancillary
facilities." The facilities covered in the report include
the waste processing facility, a probable fabrication facility,
administration and service area. The report also covers electric
power utilities and transportation facilities.

This report, focusing on the three reactor areas at Kyshtym,
the chemical processing area, and the Tatysh Production Area,
updates reports completed in October, November and December 1963,
and January, February and March 1964. There were six KH-7 missions
from late October 1963 through June 1964, including two after
March 1964. "Extensive refinements" of previous evaluations
were possible, according to the report (p.1), based on the KH-7
imagery.

At the time this photographic interpretation report was prepared,
the Jiuquan complex
(see Image 8) was referred to a Chih-Chin-Hsia.
This report indicates the progression of knowledge about the Chinese
program. The summary (p.1) notes that when earlier reports were
prepared "the nuclear implications of the complex were considered
to be only suspect" while "later photography ... indicates
that is a probable atomic energy complex ..." The report
addresses the areas responsible for production, construction support
and storage. It covers the workshop area, the main housing area,
and the clay pit area. It also contains a comparison with other
installations, including Baotou (see Image
10) and Kyshtym (see Document 3).

Internal evidence suggests that this report was produced in1964
and was thus able to incorporate imagery produced from several
KH-7 missions. The report, as released, consists largely of photographs
and drawings based on the overhead photography.

Trombay, the site of India's first reactor (Aspara) and a plutonium
reprocessing facility, as photographed by a KH-7/GAMBIT satellite
on February 19, 1966. Trombay is also the home of the Bhabha Atomic
Research Centre (BARC), which was known as the Atomic Energy Establishment
at the time the photograph was taken. (Note 3)

The Lanzhou Gaseous Diffusion Plant, as photographed on May 10,
1966, by a KH-7/GAMBIT satellite during Mission 4028. Early 1960s
U.S. intelligence analyses significantly underestimated Lanzhou's
ability to produce the highly enriched uranium needed for China's
first bomb. (Note 4)

The French nuclear test site at Mururoa, in the Pacific, as photographed
by a KH-7/GAMBIT satellite on May 26, 1967. France began testing
its nuclear weapons in 1960 in Algeria. Political pressure from
African states forced France to move its Algerian tests underground,
while Algerian independence forced France to look for an entirely
new test site. The French-controlled atolls of Mururoa and Fangataufa
were selected, and construction began in the mid-1960s. Atmospheric
testing there continued until late 1974. (Note
5)

The Jiuquan Atomic Energy Complex, as photographed on September
22, 1966, by a
KH-7/GAMBIT satellite. Construction began on the facility in August
1959. When completed, it would house a Plutonium Reprocessing
Plant and Nuclear Fuel Reprocessing Plant - the latter for converting
uranium hexafluoride to uranium metal - as well as a Nuclear Component
Manufacturing Plant. (Note 6)

After an extensive search that began in August 1958, Chinese
authorities selected a site in northwestern China - known as Lop
Nur - to test China's nuclear weapons. The first was tested on
October 16, 1964. This shot tower, which would hold a test device,
was photographed on December 8, 1966, during a KH-7/GAMBIT mission.
A test occurred on December 28, 1966.

The Baotou Nuclear Fuel Component Plant in central China, as
photographed on June 5, 1967 during KH-7/GAMBIT Mission 4038.
The plant produced uranium tetraflouride, which would be converted
into uranium hexalfluoride and used to produce enriched uranium.
At first, the U.S. Intelligence Community believed that Baotou
was home to a plutonium production facility.

The Marcoule Plutonium Production Plant, France, as photographed
on June 11, 1967 by a KH-7/GAMBIT satellite during Mission 4038.
The plant, designated G-1, went critical on January 7, 1956, and
reached full power in September.

The Pierrelatte Uranium Enrichment Plant, France, photographed
on June 11, 1967, by a KH-7/GAMBIT satellite. In 1958, ground
was broken at Pierrelatte for a gaseous diffusion plant. In July
1963, a special national intelligence estimate, The French
Nuclear Weapons Program, estimated that the facility would
be completed in 1967. (Note 7)

Yongbyon, the center of North Korean nuclear research activities,
as photographed on March 17, 1970, by a KH-4B CORONA satellite.
It was first photographed by a CORONA satellite in 1965, the same
year the Soviet Union sold North Korea a small research reactor.
Between 1965 and the end of the CORONA program in 1972, it would
be photographed 36 times. In 1980, a U.S. spy satellite would
detect the components of a nuclear reactor near a large hole at
the site. (Note 8)

Israel's Negev Nuclear Research Center, popularly known as Dimona,
during a KH-4B Mission on September 29, 1971. U-2 missions, starting
in early 1958, showed significant construction, including of an
underground facility at a site a dozen miles from Dimona. Israel
initially claimed that the site housed a textile facility. Eventually
it acknowledged the presence of a nuclear facility, but not the
presence of a chemical reprocessing facility nor Dimona's role
in the production of nuclear weapons. (Note 9)

4. William Burr and Jeffrey T. Richelson, "Whether
to 'Strangle the Baby in the Cradle': The United States and the
Chinese Nuclear Program, 1960-1964," International Security,
25, 3 (Winter 2000/01), pp. 54-99.