Conceptualizing Privacy
Daniel J. Solove
In this Article, Professor Solove develops a new approach for conceptualizing privacy. He begins by examining the existing discourse about conceptualizing privacy, exploring the conceptions of a wide array of jurists, legal scholars, philosophers, psychologists, and sociologists. Solove contends that the theories are either too narrow or too broad. With a few exceptions, the discourse seeks to conceptualize privacy by isolating one or more common “essential” or “core” characteristics of privacy. Expounding upon Ludwig Wittgenstein’s notion of “family resemblances,” Solove contends that privacy is better understood as drawing from a common pool of similar characteristics. Rather than search for an overarching concept, Solove advances a pragmatic approach to conceptualizing privacy. According to Solove, when we talk about privacy, we are really talking about related dimensions of particular practices. We should explore what it means for something to be private contextually by looking at privacy problems: instances of particular forms of disruption to particular practices. Solove demonstrates how practices involving privacy have changed throughout history and explains the appropriate way to assess the value of privacy. Introduction Currently, privacy is a sweeping concept, encompassing (among other things) freedom of thought, control over one’s body, solitude in one’s home, control over information about oneself, freedom from surveillance, protection of one’s reputation, and protection from searches and interrogations. Time and again philosophers, legal theorists, and jurists have lamented the great difficulty in reaching a satisfying conception of privacy.1 Arthur Miller has declared that privacy is “difficult to define because it is exasperatingly vague and evanescent.”2 According to Julie Inness, the legal and philosophical discourse of privacy is in a state of “chaos.”3 Alan Westin has stated that “[f]ew values so fundamental to society as privacy

have been left so undefined in social theory . . . .”4 William Beaney has noted that “even the most strenuous advocate of a right to privacy must confess that there are serious problems of defining the essence and scope of this right.”5 Privacy has “a protean capacity to be all things to all lawyers,”6 Tom Gerety has observed. According to Robert Post, “[p]rivacy is a value so complex, so entangled in competing and contradictory dimensions, so engorged with various and distinct meanings, that I sometimes despair whether it can be usefully addressed at all.”7 Several theorists have surveyed the interests that the law protects under the rubric of privacy and have concluded that they are distinct and unrelated.8 Judith Thompson has even argued that privacy as a concept serves no useful function, for what we call privacy really amounts to a set of other more primary interests.9 The widespread discontent over conceptualizing privacy persists even though the concern over privacy has escalated into an essential issue for freedom and democracy. To begin to solve some of the problems of privacy, we must develop an approach to conceptualizing privacy to guide policymaking and legal interpretation. Although the domain of law relating to privacy has made significant strides in dealing with privacy problems, it has thus far suffered numerous failures and difficulties in resolving them. Why does such a diverse body of law seem so outmatched and unsuited for the privacy problems we are currently experiencing? In a world constantly
4. ALAN F. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 7 (1967). 5. William M. Beaney, The Right to Privacy and American Law, 31 Law & Contemp. Probs. 253, 255 (1966). 6. Tom Gerety, Redefining Privacy, 12 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 233, 234 (1977); see also J. Thomas McCarthy, The Rights of Publicity and Privacy § 5.7 [E] (1999) (“It is apparent that the word ‘privacy’ has proven to be a powerful rhetorical battle cry in a plethora of unrelated contexts . . . . Like the emotive word ‘freedom,’ ‘privacy’ means so many different things to so many different people that it has lost any precise legal connotation that it might once have had.”); Robert Gellman, Does Privacy Work?, in Technology and Privacy: The New Landscape 193 (Philip E. Agre & Marc Rotenberg eds., 1997) (stating that privacy can be a broad and almost limitless issue); Hyman Gross, The Concept of Privacy, 42 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 34, 34 (1967) (stating that we can readily recognize a threat to privacy “yet stumble when trying to make clear what privacy is”); Glenn Negley, Philosophical Views on the Value of Privacy, 31 Law & Contemp. Probs. 319, 320 (1966) (“[T]he question of privacy has rarely been directly discussed in moral thought.”); Judith Jarvis Thomson, The Right to Privacy, in Philosophical Dimensions of Privacy 272 (Ferdinand David Schoeman ed., 1984) (“Perhaps the most striking thing about the right to privacy is that nobody seems to have any very clear idea what it is.”). 7. Robert C. Post, Three Concepts of Privacy, 89 Geo. L.J. 2087, 2087 (2001). 8. See, e.g., Ken Gormley, One Hundred Years of Privacy, 1992 Wis. L. Rev. 1335, 1339 (“[L]egal privacy consists of four or five different species of legal rights which are quite distinct from each other and thus incapable of a single definition.”); William L. Prosser, Privacy [A Legal Analysis], in Philosophical Dimensions of Privacy, supra note 6, at 104, 107 (“The law of privacy comprises four distinct kinds of invasion of four different interests of the plaintiff, which are tied together by the common name, but otherwise have almost nothing in common. . . .”); McCarthy, supra note 6, § 5.7 [B] 5-60 to 5-61 (noting agreement among commentators “that the only significant thing that the Constitutional right of privacy and the common law right of privacy share is the label”). 9. Thomson, supra note 6, at 281.

Barry v.2d 570. 433 U.S.g. e. Judicial opinions and statutes often depend upon some notion of the definition and value of privacy.15 Judges. 381 U. United States. City of New York. originating in Whalen v. Roe. Corp. 1983). 12.C. I make two principal arguments. In other words.C.2d 1119.. A number of circuit courts have recognized the constitutional right to information privacy. applying to intrusions “upon the solitude or seclusion of another or his private affairs or concerns. at 599-600.C. and it protects “the individual interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters. and scholars have often failed to adequately conceptualize the problems that privacy law is asked to redress. e. Driver’s Privacy Protection Act of 1994. §§ 6501-6503 (2002).. the numerous federal and state laws addressing privacy concerns depend upon an implicit conception of privacy. how can we erect a robust and effective law of privacy when the ground is constantly shifting? The difficulty in articulating what privacy is and why it is important has often made privacy law ineffective and blind to the larger purposes for which it must serve. 90:1087
being transformed by technology. J.” Whalen. we frequently do not have a compelling account of what is at stake when privacy is threatened and what precisely the law must do to solve these problems.C. Fourth Amendment law looks to whether a person has a “reasonable expectation of privacy. Thus.S.C. 1978).2d 1554.S. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D (1977). concurring). I set forth a new approach for conceptualizing privacy.’” Id. The “reasonable expectation of privacy” test currently employed by the Court to determine the applicability of the Fourth Amendment to a particular situation was first articulated in Justice Harlan’s concurring opinion in Katz v. Plante v.S. most theorists attempt to conceptualize privacy by isolating one or more common “essential” or
10. 425 (1977). In this Article. 1559 (2d Cir. see also Nixon v.S. 712 F. In doing so. 429 U. Westinghouse Elec. and as a result. Privacy problems are often not well articulated. United States v. the need to conceptualize privacy is significant.S. 5 U. 13.S.”11 The tort of intrusion upon seclusion also requires a determination of what is private.C. Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act of 1998. 11. Connecticut. 347 (1967). The constitutional right to information privacy is derived from the substantive due process right to privacy originating in Griswold v. 2701-2709 (2002). First. 18 U.S..13 is predicated upon a conception of privacy. Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act of 1974.
.. See. 429 U.14 Additionally. 18 U. See. I contend that. 1980). Adm’r of Gen. §§ 2721-2725 (2002). § 2701 (2002). 589 (1977). 20 U. Servs. yet the discourse about conceptualizing privacy remains deeply dissatisfying. Privacy Act of 1974.”12 Likewise. 1132 (5th Cir.S. 575 F.1090
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[Vol. with a few exceptions. the constitutional right to information privacy.g. 638 F. § 552a (2002). Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986. at 360-61 (Harlan. politicians. 479 (1965). the discourse seeks to conceptualize privacy in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions. A person must demonstrate an “actual (subjective) expectation of privacy” and “the expectation [must] be one that society is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable. Video Privacy Protection Act of 1988. 15. 389 U. § 1232g (2002). 15 U. § 652B. 577-80 (3d Cir. Gonzalez.. 18 U. §§ 2510-2522. Id. 14.”10 The tort of public disclosure of private facts applies only to “matter[s] concerning the private life of another. which informs what matters are protected and the nature and scope of the particular protections employed.S.S.

Anscombe trans. Legal Pragmatism and the Constitution.2002]
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“core” characteristics of privacy. John Dewey. Overcoming Law (1995). or. Daniel Farber. to regard it as a fixed rival system making like claim to completeness and finality. Although many of the contemporary scholars who identify themselves as pragmatists share certain ideas and assumptions. Genealogical Pragmatism: Philosophy. Consequences of Pragmatism: Essays. 18. and others. Solove. Holmes and Legal Pragmatism. 100 Yale L. and Community (1997). 1997) (1910). in escaping that alternative. For otherwise we seem to have no recourse save to define pragmatism . Judicial Review. 409 (1990).. 19. and emphasizes the importance of the concrete. The Revival of Pragmatism: New Essays on Social Thought. The Renaissance of Pragmatism in American Legal Thought. The Pursuit of Pragmatism. 1 (1996). Cornell West. Cornell West. Rev. at x-xi (Prometheus Books ed. When I use the term “pragmatism” and “pragmatic. see Richard Shusterman. PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS §§ 66-67 (G. Robin West. Ill. Law. A number of prominent contemporary scholars identify themselves as pragmatists. William Weaver. 1993 U. Thomas C. and the Bill of Rights.. they also have profound differences—sometimes more differences than similarities. 673 (1985). 941. .
. 1958). Rev. The Revival of Pragmatism. Grey. . several legal scholars have declared a renaissance of pragmatism in legal theory. Rev. Rev. Posner. Stuhr. THE INFLUENCE OF DARWIN ON PHILOSOPHY AND OTHER ESSAYS. in terms of the very past systems against which it is a reaction. Cal. Steven D.18 certain ideas recur among many pragmatists.” I am using it as a shorthand for a variety of ideas propounded by different thinkers. such as Richard Rorty. 1991). Rev. Pragmatism was originally developed by Charles Sanders Peirce. LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN. and Culture (1998). Robert Samuel Summers. L. see David Luban. For more background about the origins of pragmatism. 970-71 (1999). Why Pragmatism? The Puzzling Place of Pragmatism in Critical Theory. Pragmatism in Law and Society (Michael Brint & William Weaver eds. Legal Modernism 125-78 (1997).M. Pitt. rather they draw from a common pool of similar elements. Daniel J.E. Richard Rorty. John J. L. 535. Josiah Royce. For critical views of the “new” legal pragmatism.17 Second. 1331 (1988). 18 Cardozo L. Keeping Faith: Philosophy and Race in America (1993). adapts theory to respond to flux and change rather than seeking to isolate fixed and immutable general principles. historical. L.. 72 Minn. Instrumentalism and American Legal Theory (1982). 1569 (1990). and factual circumstances of life. Experience. L. Smith. 17. Practicing Philosophy: Pragmatism and the Philosophical Life (1997). 814 (1989). Pragmatism focuses on the palpable consequences of ideas rather than on their correspondence to an ultimate reality. Although pragmatism encompasses a diverse range of theories. Rev. See Richard A. Daniel A.”16 As Wittgenstein suggests. certain concepts might not have a single common characteristic. I argue that privacy is better understood by drawing from Ludwig Wittgenstein’s notion of “family resemblances. Judge Richard Posner. see also Morris Dickstein. In contrast. John Dewey declared that: [I]t is better to view pragmatism quite vaguely as part and parcel of a general movement of intellectual reconstruction.J. William James. urges philosophers to become more ensconced in the problems of everyday life. 46 U. JOHN DEWEY. Id. George Herbert Mead. Rev. The Darkest Domain: Deference. 41 Stan. 787. L. 63 S.19 I identify my approach as “pragmatic” because it emphasizes the contextual
16. See Symposium. Symposium. and Thomas Grey. Recently. Robin West. 84 Iowa L. I propound a pragmatic approach to conceptualizing privacy. 1977-1980 (1982). Liberalism Rediscovered: A Pragmatic Definition of the Liberal Vision. Farber.

I then develop a pragmatic approach to conceptualizing privacy. These headings include: (1) the right to be let alone—Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis’s famous formulation for the right to privacy. psychologists. In other words. others focus on the ends or goals of privacy. I use the headings to discuss the primary representatives of conceptual approaches in the discourse. norms. Some of the conceptions concentrate on means to achieve privacy. (2) limited access to the self—the ability to shield oneself from unwanted access by others. and sociologists.1092
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[Vol. and (6) intimacy—control over. I argue that they can be dealt with under six general headings. or limited access to. I begin by examining the existing discourse about conceptualizing privacy. and dignity. philosophers.” I am referring to activities. Wittgenstein’s notion of “family resemblances” suggests that there are other ways to conceptualize beyond a search for the common denominator. I explore the conceptions of a wide array of jurists. I contend that attempts to conceptualize privacy by locating the common denominator to identify all instances of privacy have thus far been unsatisfying. Under my approach. legal scholars. 90:1087
and dynamic nature of privacy. Looking broadly at the discourse. they track how scholars have chosen to theorize about privacy. By “practices. For example. one’s intimate relationships or aspects of life. customs. privacy is not reducible to a set of neutral conditions that apply to all matters we deem private. Despite what appears to be a welter of different conceptions of privacy. These headings are therefore not taxonomical. almost all of the criticisms boil down to claims that the theories are either too narrow or too broad. there is overlap between conceptions. from particular contexts rather than in the abstract. rather. seeking to understand privacy in terms of practices. which capture the recurrent ideas in the discourse. (5) personhood—the protection of one’s personality. and the conceptions discussed under different headings are by no means independent from each other. My approach diverges from traditional accounts of privacy that seek to conceptualize it in general terms as an overarching category with necessary and sufficient conditions. Expanding on Wittgenstein’s notion. (3) secrecy—the concealment of certain matters from others. I survey the criticisms of various scholars regarding each other’s conceptions of privacy and suggest a number of criticisms of my own. to say that a particular matter is “private” or to talk about “privacy”
. Further. which in turn bears significant similarities to the right to be let alone. Rather. In Part II. In Part I. individuality. In examining the discourse. (4) control over personal information— the ability to exercise control over information about oneself. and traditions. I suggest an approach to conceptualize privacy from the bottom up rather than the top down. control over personal information can be seen as a subset of limited access to the self.

we should conceptualize privacy by focusing on the specific types of disruption and the specific practices disrupted. “Privacy” is a general term that refers to the practices we want to protect and to the protections against disruptions to these practices. Next. and other ends. has lost flexibility in dealing with emerging privacy problems. democracy. With a series of examples... Logic. These practices are a product of history and culture. I illustrate how privacy law has fixed itself too firmly to certain conceptions of privacy. Olmstead v. the body. I illustrate these points by looking historically at certain matters Western societies have long understood as private: the family. Privacy does not have a universal value that is the same across all contexts. I turn to an account of how privacy should be valued. we should explore what it means for something to be private contextually by looking at particular practices. Many recognize the importance of privacy for freedom.S. dissenting). I suggest that instead of attempting to locate the common denominator of these practices. But what does it mean when we say that these aspects of life are “private”? This question is very important for making legal and policy decisions. we protect against disruptions to certain practices. 277 U. Therefore.20 I explain that privacy should be conceptualized contextually as it is implicated in particular problems. Many also assert it is worth protecting at significant cost. I then demonstrate how my approach can help courts conceptualize privacy in ways better adapted to address emerging issues. describing such a right as “the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men. Following philosopher John Dewey’s view that philosophical inquiry should begin as a response to dealing with life’s problems and difficulties. 21. 438.
. and as a result. and the home.”21 Society’s commitment to privacy
20. 478 (1928) (Brandeis.2002]
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in the abstract is to make a generalization about particular practices. Supreme Court Justice Louis Brandeis spoke of the profound importance of establishing and safeguarding a right to privacy. The value of privacy in a particular context depends upon the social importance of the practice of which it is a part. individual well-being. J. The Theory of Inquiry 106-10 (Jo Ann Boydston ed. A privacy invasion interferes with the integrity of certain practices and even destroys or inhibits such practices. Finally. United States. See John Dewey. social welfare. 1988). I A Critique of the Conceptions of Privacy What is privacy? We all have some intuitive sense that there are certain aspects of life that are “private” and view these aspects of life as related to each other. When we protect privacy. I examine some applications of my approach.

when I
. contrasting definitions of the same terms. Thus. In this Part. theorists of privacy have attempted to locate the essential elements common to the aspects of life we deem “private” and then formulate a conception based on these elements.” what are we protecting? Traditionally.1094
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[Vol. sociologists. Why is privacy valuable enough to make significant trade-offs to protect it? To answer this question. Although the extensive scholarly and judicial writing on privacy has produced a horde of different conceptions of privacy. In this Part. (3) secrecy. (4) control of personal information. efficient law enforcement. yet each has a distinctive perspective on privacy. My own approach to conceptualizing privacy emerges from studying various problems in the discourse. 90:1087
often entails restraining or even sacrificing interests of substantial importance. Therefore. analyzing and critiquing the privacy conceptions set forth in judicial opinions and legal scholarship as well as in works by philosophers. Often. A robust discourse has developed about conceptualizing privacy. such as freedom of speech and press. The conceptions are often too narrow because they fail to include the aspects of life that we typically view as private. and are often too broad because they fail to exclude matters that we do not deem private. Whenever we seek to theorize about a topic. I delve into the extensive literature on the subject. we need to have some notion of what privacy is. that theorists are often dissatisfied with the discourse because of these problems. we must do so amidst the background noise of differing terminology. When we protect “privacy. and others. psychologists. (5) personhood. (2) limited access to the self. and diverging theories of supporting and interconnecting concepts. and so on. The most prevalent problem with the conceptions is that they are either too narrow or too broad. and (6) intimacy. These headings often overlap. and a multitude of different conceptions of privacy have been proposed and critiqued. and that the discourse has by and large failed to transcend these difficulties. I do not claim that all privacy theorists are engaged in a dialogue with each other or that any statements about the discourse apply to every theorist who has examined privacy. I spend considerable time discussing what I call the “discourse” about conceptualizing privacy. I contend that these problems stem from the way that the discourse goes about the task of conceptualizing privacy. Although I often refer to the discourse as a whole. access to information. the same conceptions can suffer from being both too narrow and too broad. I have attempted to provide a comprehensive overview of the discourse to reveal that various parts of it suffer from similar problems. I believe that they can be discussed under six headings: (1) the right to be let alone.

protection of one’s reputation. Edward J. A. the ability to prevent disclosure of facts about oneself.” The usage of the word “privacy” constitutes the ways in which we employ the word in everyday life and the things we are referring to when we speak of “privacy. The majority of theorists conceptualize privacy by defining it per genus et differentiam. In other words. 962. L. supra note 3. 963 (1964) (proposing a “general theory of individual privacy which will reconcile the divergent strands of legal development”). O’Brien.”).Y. what makes it unique. theorists look for a common set of necessary and sufficient elements that single out privacy as unique from other conceptions.B.. a conception is a category. Rev. Parker. supra note 6. supra note 2. 475. Rev. at 56 (noting that intimacy is the “common denominator” of privacy). Inness.” conceptualizing privacy is understood as an attempt to articulate what separates privacy from other things.22 A conception of privacy is different from the usage of the word “privacy. 77 Yale L.g. Gerety. Gavison. Methods of Conceptualizing
1. See. 277 (1974) (seeking to articulate “some characteristic common to all or some of [a list of invasions of ‘different personal interests’]”). and an almost endless series of other things. I am making generalizations about the discourse and attempting to eliminate some of the background noise. A Definition of Privacy. 27 Rutgers L.2002]
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talk about the discourse as a whole. protection from invasions into one’s home. Privacy. The purpose of conceptualizing is to define the unique
22. Richard B.J. Privacy as an Aspect of Human Dignity: An Answer to Dean Prosser. control over personal information. 275. and what identifies it in its various manifestations. The Traditional Method When we conceptualize privacy. According to the traditional method of conceptualizing. see also infra Part I. an abstract mental picture of what makes privacy distinct from other things and the criteria for what makes things fall within the category. at 263 (“Intimacy is the chief restricting concept in the definition of privacy. at 25 (stating that control is the “basic attribute” of privacy). David M. Miller.” The word “privacy” is currently used to describe a myriad of different things: freedom of thought. at 423 (developing a “distinct and coherent” conception of privacy). supra note 1.U. Most attempts to conceptualize privacy thus far have followed the traditional method of conceptualizing. Since my critique is ultimately of the discourse’s methods and aims in conceptualizing privacy. freedom from surveillance. 475 (1968) (seeking to “isolate from restrictions and intrusions in general whatever is peculiar about invasions of privacy”). Bloustein. it is important to begin with some background about methods of conceptualizing. Law. People can use the word “privacy” improperly by referring to things outside the category or by not referring to things within the category. Charles Fried. Privacy. what are we attempting to do? Under what I will refer to as the “traditional method. e. 39 N.
. and Public Policy 16 (1979) (conceptualizing privacy as “fundamentally denoting an existential condition of limited access”).

. 24. at 277 (stating that “[o]ur definition of privacy should be . .23 The traditional method endeavors to conceptualize privacy by constructing a category that is separate from other conceptual categories (such as autonomy. This will be illustrated in depth infra Part I.B. true (fit the data)”). Wittgensteinian Family Resemblances I draw on some of the ideas of philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein to demonstrate that the traditional method is not the only way to approach the task of conceptualizing. For example. in addition to coherence. freedom. supra note 22. Given the great difficulties of capturing everything referred to by “privacy. and so on) and that has fixed clear boundaries so we can know when things fall within the category or outside of it. For specific examples. if a conception of privacy were to omit things we commonly view as private—such as medical information. intimate marital secrets. Coherence alone.
.1096
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[Vol. Under the traditional method. theorists often look to the usage of the word “privacy. see the discussion of the conceptions of privacy infra Part I. but the aim is to establish a conception that encompasses most of the things that are commonly viewed under the rubric of “privacy. would be incomplete as a way to evaluate a conception of privacy. usage of the word “privacy” must then be cleaned up to match the conceptual category of privacy.” Although the terminologies theorists employ differ. theorists assess a conception by determining whether it is coherent—that is.” yet maintain coherence by identifying a combination of common elements that are unique to privacy. e. freedom from surveillance. 90:1087
characteristics of privacy. See. . most theorists strive toward the central goals of the traditional method of conceptualizing privacy: to locate the “essence” of privacy. however. the core common denominator that makes things private.24 A successful conception thus aims to get close to the modern usage of the word “privacy.g. A few things might be left out.25 This is certainly not the only way to evaluate conceptions of privacy. Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889-1951) was an Austrian philosopher who focused extensively on problems in language and logic. whether it is logical and consistent.” They examine whether a conception of privacy includes the things we view as private and excludes the things we do not. 25. In
23. Parker. but it is the way most often used by theorists in the discourse.” the often disparate ways that the word “privacy” is used. Most often.B. Thus. and the lack of agreement over the precise meaning of the word. many scholars seek to establish clear criteria to distinguish “privacy” from other things. how are conceptions of privacy to be evaluated? The traditional method looks to determine whether a conception of privacy accurately captures what privacy is. and so on— theorists would likely reject the conception. 2.

and Philosophical Investigations. relationships.. tennis. Pears & B.”).
. § 66. 34.”31 He illustrates this point by using the example of various types of games: “board-games. Wittgenstein uses the term “language-games” to describe the activities involving language. not from any inherent connection between the word and what it signifies. Olympic games.”30 Thus. Wittgenstein suggests that meaning is not an objectively true link between a word and the things to which it refers. recognizing that he had made “grave mistakes” in Tractatus. There are a “multiplicity” of language-games.26 Wittgenstein embarks on the task of critiquing the traditional conception of language. Id. and so on. Philosophical Investigations. are referred to as “late” Wittgenstein. Rather. as a “form of life. Wittgenstein uses “games” as a metaphor to describe language as an active endeavor such as playing chess. such as “build. in examining the concept of language. and others appear. supra note 16. card-games. Specifically. to strive toward “making our expressions more exact. Wittgenstein. or a card game. Wittgenstein suggests that certain concepts might not share one common characteristic. telling a joke. ball-games. See Ludwig Wittgenstein.F.”34 Wittgenstein uses the term “family resemblances. we should endeavor to locate the essence of a word or expression.2002]
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a posthumous work.F. Tractatus is often referred to as “early” Wittgenstein. Id. as something we do. such as giving orders. he had substantially altered his views. After publishing his highly influential Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus in 1921. § 91. § 23. § 7. “but many common features drop out. written during the latter part of his career. 27. the meaning of a word comes from the way a word is used in language. reporting an event.28 Wittgenstein demonstrates a way to conceptualize language apart from the traditional method of conceptualizing. § 43 (“[T]he meaning of a word is its use in the language.” analogizing to the overlapping and crisscrossing characteristics that exist between members of a family. speculating. “a complicated network of similarities overlapping and criss-crossing: sometimes overall similarities. but similarities. 32. Wittgenstein disappeared from the philosophical scene for over a decade. According to the traditional view of language. rather they draw from a common pool of similar characteristics. and so on. Id. When he returned. 33. he explains that language does not have a single essence but involves a horde of different activities29 which have “no one thing in common” but “are related to one another in many different ways. Id. McGuiness trans. § 19.”32 There is not “something that is common to all. § 65. See id. at vi. Id. Because Wittgenstein’s thinking changed dramatically during his career. Wittgenstein thus sees language not as an abstract system of signs but as a functioning aspect of our daily lives.”27 In contrast.
26. See Wittgenstein. 30. Id. Id. 31. 29. 28.” Id. singing.”33 There are “many correspondences” between board games and card games. supra note 16. 1961). describing appearances. sometimes similarities of detail. along with other works such as On Certainty. Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (D. and a whole series of them at that.

but we do so for special purposes. He argues: “On the standard view. The empirical evidence. Id. HANNA FEINCHEL PITKIN. see P. There is no one answer. at 100-01 (contending that categories are not static entities but are tools created for particular purposes). Wittgenstein suggests that there are other ways to approach the conceptualization of certain things. In his excellent recent book. Steven Winter develops a related view of conceptualization. etc. they consist of a “central model” or paradigm example and related extensions radiating outward. 499. § 69. Wittgenstein uses the terms “blurred edges” and “indistinct picture. supra note 16. defines the way in which the spokes are related to each other. each child has certain features similar to each parent. supra note 16.39 As Wittgenstein asserts. temperament. Wittgenstein.”35 For example. definitional.” Id.38 We can draw fixed and sharp boundaries. INSIGHT AND ILLUSION: THEMES IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF WITTGENSTEIN 131-34 (1986). and the children share similar features with each other. categories are descriptive. and Mind 69 (2001). § 67. Rather. rather. and rigidly bounded. Winter. it means that not all conceptions have fixed and sharp boundaries separating them from other conceptions. 40. However.” Id.”37 this does not mean that conceptions are endless.M. presents a picture of categorization as an imaginative and dynamic process that is flexible in application and elastic in scope.1098
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[Vol. but with no single center point. Life. “though related to the central case in some fashion.36 One might make the objection that a conception consisting of a web of connected parts without a common denominator is deficient because it has no boundaries and thus is endless. they all bear a resemblance to each other. § 68. Boundaries can be fuzzy or can be in a state of constant flux. See generally id. Although Wittgenstein suggests that not all conceptions are “closed by a frontier.40 The ramification of Wittgenstein’s insight is not that all attempts to conceptualize by locating a common denominator are doomed.
. gait. conceptions can still be useful without having to be circumscribed by fixed and sharp boundaries. the traditional method of conceptualizing views things as spokes linked by the hub of a wheel. Winter contends that categories are “radial”. nevertheless cannot be generated by rule. § 71. Using another analogy. Id. but they may not all resemble each other in the same way. §§ 69. Wittgenstein. We have a web of connected parts. For more background into Wittgenstein’s notion of family resemblances. see also Winter. where all spokes overlap. not because the boundary is a necessary part of a conception. 37. colour of eyes. This common point. Yet the parts are still connected. As Judith Genova characterizes Wittgenstein’s insight: “Once one sees the variety of cases and the family resemblances between them. 90:1087
features. in contrast. the attempt to establish an a priori generalization is thwarted. These related extensions.” Steven L. HACKER. Wittgenstein suggests that sometimes there is no hub. at 71.S. supra note 36. 39. 38. in a family. WITTGENSTEIN AND JUSTICE: ON THE SIGNIFICANCE OF LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN FOR SOCIAL AND POLITICAL THOUGHT 63-65 (1972). but a variety of answers depending on a
35. 36. Nevertheless. all connected by a common point. A Clearing in the Forest: Law.

” Is privacy such a conception? In this section. Wittgenstein demonstrates that not all conceptions have a “core” or “essence. Nevertheless. and will demonstrate the difficulties of conceptions of privacy that seek to isolate its core characteristics.
. I aim to illustrate my overarching critique about the predominant approach of the discourse toward conceptualizing privacy. Conceptions of Privacy
As I have discussed before. In the remainder of this Part. I do not intend to imply that the discourse is devoid of merit. the Court’s jurisprudence on privacy reveals influences of many conceptions. The Right to Privacy. Samuel D. where the quest for a common denominator or essence leads to greater clarity. Although I am critical of most conceptions of privacy. Charles Fried. L.4 & I. and so on. I explore the philosophical and legal discourse to assess the conceptions that attempt to isolate a common denominator of privacy. Brandeis. who advocates a control-over-information conception.B. Further. 42. Wittgenstein shows us that such a quest can sometimes lead to confusion. JUDITH GENOVA. B.B. However. Beyond the specific critiques of each general category of conceptions. the theorists I discuss under one heading are also discussed under other headings. See infra Parts I.42 1. WITTGENSTEIN: A WAY OF SEEING 44 (1995). federal statutes. 4 Harv. The Right to Be Let Alone In 1890. 43. the philosophical discourse about privacy has proposed numerous conceptions that attempt to capture the common denominator of privacy. it does not reflect a single conception of privacy. such as Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. Warren & Louis D. many of the conceptions capture profound insights about privacy. the Court readily adopts a particular conception of privacy for particular areas of law. I will illustrate these rather abstract ideas by examining the various attempts to conceptualize privacy. The top-down approach of beginning with an overarching conception of privacy designed to apply in all contexts often results in a conception that does not fit well when applied to the multitude of situations and problems involving privacy. Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis penned their famous article. the constitutional right to privacy. The moral is: Look to the circumstances!”41 Shifting the focus away from finding a common denominator may prove immensely fruitful. 193 (1890). I contend that this explains the problems currently experienced in the discourse. For example. In contrast to the view of the traditional method.2002]
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variety of factors.6. In some instances. defines the scope of information over which we should have control by using an intimacy conception. and collectively. The Right to Privacy.43 hailed by a multitude of scholars as the
41. In fact. since some theorists have combined one or more conceptions. Rev. each of the conceptions has significant limitations if it is to serve as a conceptual account of privacy in general.

51. Richard C. Co.45 Warren and Brandeis began by noting new technological developments that were posing a potential threat to privacy and focused on how the common law could develop to protect the interest then called “privacy. through invasions upon his privacy. U.g. but in the peace of mind or the relief afforded by the ability to prevent any publication at all.”50 Warren and Brandeis observed that increasingly. 48. Id.g. Id. Harry Kalven has even hailed it as the “most influential law review article of all.”51 The authors noted that this type of harm was not typically protected by tort law. e.”49 They noted that the value of privacy “is found not in the right to take the profits arising from publication. Jr. Botsford.
. ROBERT ELLIS SMITH. The authors declared that the underlying principle of privacy was “that of inviolate personality. Warren & Brandeis. 251 (1891). 704 (1990). 327 (1966). Irwin P. It is likely that The Right to Privacy has had as much impact on the development of law as any single publication in legal periodicals. and it framed the discussion of privacy in the United States throughout the twentieth century. See. L.1100
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[Vol. The Birth of Privacy Law: A Century Since Warren and Brandeis. Warren & Brandeis. 31 Law & Contemp. subjected [an individual] to mental pain and distress. in fact. 479.48 Warren and Brandeis’s use of the phrase was consistent with the purpose of their article: to demonstrate that many of the elements of a right to privacy existed within the common law. 46.” The authors. 50. 481-82 (1990). at 200. Rev. supra note 43. Cooley. Privacy in Tort Law—Were Warren and Brandeis Wrong?. Ry. a way of explaining that attempted physical touching was a tort injury. Around the same time that Warren and Brandeis published their article. the Supreme Court referred to the right to be let alone in holding that a court could not require a plaintiff in a civil case to submit to a surgical examination: “As well said by Judge Cooley: ‘The right to one’s person may be said to be a right of complete immunity. Rev. it spawned at least four common law tort actions to protect privacy.. far greater than could be inflicted by mere bodily injury. however. 45. 39 Cath. 1888). It is certainly one of the most commented upon and cited articles in the history of our legal system.’” Union Pac. Turkington observed: [T]he article has acquired legendary status in the realm of legal scholarship. at 196. Kramer. did not spend much time setting forth a conceptual account of privacy. supra note 43. 49.S.47 Cooley’s right to be let alone was. e.”46 a phrase adopted from Judge Thomas Cooley’s famous treatise on torts in 1880. v. 141 U. Id. Thomas M. Legacy of the Warren and Brandeis Article: The Emerging Unencumbered Constitutional Right to Informational Privacy. Probs. 326. BEN FRANKLIN’S WEB SITE: PRIVACY AND CURIOSITY FROM PLYMOUTH ROCK TO THE INTERNET 128 (2000). U.. at 193. at 205.44 The influence of the Warren and Brandeis article cannot be questioned—the article inspired significant interest in and attention to privacy. “modern enterprise and invention have.. 703. Ill. Law of Torts (2d ed. 10 N. 90:1087
foundation of privacy law in the United States. Warren and Brandeis defined privacy as the “right to be let alone. 47. L. While the law of
44. See. he was not defining a right to privacy. 250. to be let alone. Turkington.” Harry Kalven.

557. 213 (1973) (Douglas.S.54 Brandeis fired off a dissent that was to become one of the most important documents for Fourth Amendment privacy law. intrusion or invasion except as they can be justified by the clear needs of community living under a government of law. 179. overruling Olmstead. as well as its substantive due process protection of the right to privacy. Id.
. See id. 385 U. Hill. 58. Bolton. 347 (1967). effective law enforcement. Eisenstadt v. 413 (1967) (Fortas. Doe v. “to live one’s life as one chooses. 54.” Justice Fortas observed. 357 U.. v. See. United States. 394 U. dissenting). 56. In Katz v. J. stating that the Framers of the Constitution “conferred. simply stated. In its Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. concurring) (citations omitted) (quoting Kent v. Id.. 438. 410 U.”59 The formulation of privacy as the right to be let alone merely describes an attribute of privacy. the right to be let alone. such as free speech. 116.53 In Olmstead.10 (1972). 57. the Court frequently has invoked Brandeis’s formulation of privacy as “the right to be let alone. Brandeis wrote his famous dissent in Olmstead v. at 478 (Brandeis. Inc. 53. dissenting).” which could be viewed as describing the content of
52. the Court held that wiretapping was not a violation under the Fourth Amendment because it was not a physical trespass into the home. privacy involved “injury to the feelings.”58 According to Justice Douglas: [The] right of privacy was called by Mr. Georgia. every American is left to shape his own life as he thinks best. at 350. Stanley v.S. free from assault. which focused more on tangible injuries. Being let alone does not inform us about the matters in which we should be let alone.52 Nearly forty years later. 564 (1969). do what he pleases.. 277 U.S. Warren and Brandeis did speak of “inviolate personality. and other important values. 55. e. J.S. 126 (1958)).S..S.” a psychological form of pain that was difficult to translate into the tort law of their times.” That right includes the privilege of an individual to plan his own affairs. as against the government. Baird. 389 U. 438 (1928).”55 Brandeis’s article and his dissent in Olmstead have had a profound impact on the law of privacy and on subsequent theories of privacy. 405 U. Time. for “outside areas of plainly harmful conduct. J. the right to be let alone—the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men.S. go where he pleases. 59. United States. at 466.S. 389 U.”57 “[The right to privacy] is. when he was a justice on the Supreme Court. 454 n.2002]
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defamation protected injuries to reputations. Katz. at 197. Dulles.56 the Court adopted Brandeis’s view. Justice Brandeis the right “to be let alone. 374.g. Understanding privacy as being let alone fails to provide much guidance about how privacy should be valued vis-àvis other interests.

In this way. Privacy: Philosophical Dimensions of the Literature.
66
60. the article was far ahead of its time. and is perhaps a more sophisticated formulation of that right. 65. Warren and Brandeis’s aim was not to provide a comprehensive conception of privacy but instead to explore the roots of a right to privacy in the common law and explain how such a right could develop. Warren and Brandeis’s article focused mostly on the gaps in existing common-law torts. O’Brien. In addition to the scholars discussed in this section. Personhood: The Right to Be Let Alone. supra note 6.g. at 1.”63 Edward Bloustein. at 5. and the authors failed to elaborate. Adam Carlyle Breckenridge. However. supra note 6. e. The article was certainly a profound beginning toward developing a conception of privacy. 14. supra note 1. e. 66.. 699. A punch in the nose would be a privacy invasion as much as a peep in the bedroom. in Philosophical Dimensions of Privacy. See. legal scholar Anita Allen explains: “If privacy simply meant ‘being let alone. See Bloustein. at 438. See. see. Ferdinand Schoeman.64 To its credit.” legal scholar Ruth Gavison argues. observed that instead of developing a conception of privacy. As many commentators lament. Braxton Craven. 2. supra note 22. And to be fair. Jr. 1976 Duke L. 90:1087
the private sphere. This conception recognizes the individual’s desire for concealment and for being apart from others.J. and it contained flashes of insight into a more robust theory of privacy. for example. 63. is the rightful claim of the individual to determine the extent to which he wishes to share of himself with others.. it often neglects to understand that “the typical privacy claim is not a claim for noninterference by the state at all. It is a claim for state interference in the form of legal protection against other individuals. Warren and Brandeis “never define what privacy is.. Limited Access to the Self A number of theorists conceptualize privacy as “limited access” to the self. at 970. To the extent that being let alone refers to “noninterference by the state.
.65 it still remains a rather broad and vague conception of privacy. defining privacy as the right to be let alone is too broad.’ any form of offensive or harmful conduct directed toward another person could be characterized as a violation of personal privacy. Anita L. 64.1102
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[Vol. 62. 61. supra note 22.”60 The right to be let alone views privacy as a type of immunity or seclusion.”). while the right to be let alone has often been invoked by judges and commentators. Allen.”62 According to philosopher Ferdinand Schoeman. Gavison. Gerety. The Right to Privacy 1 (1970) (“Privacy. at 263. Uneasy Access: Privacy for Women in a Free Society 7 (1988). in my view. a noted legal theorist of privacy. J.g. it is closely related to the right-to-be-let-alone conception. but this phrase is vague.61 For example.

July-Dec. Probs. Libel and Its Legal Remedy. supra note 62. Secrets: On the Ethics of Concealment and Revelation 10-11 (1983). 1890. 281 (1966) (Privacy “is constituted by the absence of interaction or communication or perception within contexts in which such interaction. Sci. Some view limited access as a choice.L. but these theories extend far more broadly than solitude. a form of individual control over who has access
67. Solitude is a component of limited-access conceptions as well as of the right-to-be-let-alone conception.2002]
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The limited-access conception is not equivalent to solitude. (c) invading (intruding upon. in other words. Ronald Pennock & J. Chapman eds.”70 According to Ernest Van Den Haag.”68 A number of contemporary theorists also have advanced limitedaccess conceptions. privacy is “the condition of being protected from unwanted access by others—either physical access. at 10.”69 Hyman Gross. (b) utilizing. the right of every man to keep his affairs to himself. . Privacy Law: Cases and Materials 40-41 (1999).
. For an additional proponent of limited-access conceptions. Godkin published an article noting that privacy constituted the “right to decide how much knowledge of [a person’s] personal thought and feeling . On Privacy. in Nomos XIII: Privacy 149. of being alone. Limited-access conceptions recognize that privacy extends beyond merely being apart from others. 68. E.. Privacy: Its Constitution and Vicissitudes.L.”72 David O’Brien argues that there is an important distinction among theorists who propound privacy as limited access formulations. . “Privacy is the exclusive access of a person (or other legal entity) to a realm of his own. The right to privacy entitles one to exclude others from (a) watching. . 80 (1880). 70.L. or in other ways affecting) his private realm. supra note 6. 71. Ernest Van Den Haag. 31 Law & Contemp. or perception is practicable .”).”71 Legal theorist Anita Allen asserts that “a degree of inaccessibility is an important necessary condition for the apt application of privacy. Allen. and to decide for himself to what extent they shall be the subject of public observation and discussion. Allen. at 65. . Gross. 281. see Edward Shils. E. . or. personal information. Turkington & Anita L. communication. the public at large shall have. Solitude is a form of seclusion. 1971). a well-known writer of the late nineteenth century.”67 Around the same time as the publication of Warren and Brandeis’s article in 1890. For a discussion of this article’s influence on Warren and Brandeis. . Godkin. see Richard C. 149 (J. Godkin. of withdrawal from other individuals. conceives of privacy as “the condition of human life in which acquaintance with a person or with affairs of his life which are personal to him is limited. Scribner’s Magazine. Soc. E. For philosopher Sissela Bok. The Rights of the Citizen. 69.W. embracing freedom from government interference as well as from intrusions by the press and others. IV—To His Own Reputation. 72. at 35-36 (emphasis removed). 12 J. . Sissela Bok. 69. or attention. private doings and affairs . advanced an early version of the limited-access theory when he observed that “nothing is better worthy of legal protection than private life. a legal theorist of privacy. Godkin.

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to the self. Others view limited access as a state of existence. Arguing for the latter view, O’Brien claims that privacy “may be understood as fundamentally denoting an existential condition of limited access to an individual’s life experiences and engagements.”73 “Privacy is not identical with control over access to oneself, because not all privacy is chosen. Some privacy is accidental, compulsory, or even involuntary.”74 For O’Brien, privacy boils down to the condition of being alone. This suffers from two problems. First, O’Brien neglects to incorporate into his conception an approach toward understanding the content of the private sphere. Second, O’Brien’s conception omits any notion of the individual’s power to make certain choices about revealing aspects of herself to others. For example, O’Brien would claim that a person stranded on a deserted island has complete privacy, but this is better described as a state of isolation. Privacy involves one’s relationship to society; in a world without others, claiming that one has privacy does not make much sense. According to sociologist Barrington Moore, “the need for privacy is a socially created need. Without society there would be no need for privacy.”75 Without a notion of what matters are private, limited-access conceptions do not tell us the substantive matters for which access would implicate privacy. Certainly not all access to the self infringes upon privacy— only access to specific dimensions of the self or to particular matters and information. As a result, the theory provides no understanding of the degree of access necessary to constitute a privacy violation. How much control we should have over access to the self? Proponents of the limitedaccess conception could respond that privacy is a continuum between absolutely no access to the self and total access. If privacy is such a continuum, then the important question is where the lines should be drawn—that is, what degree of access should we recognize as reasonable? This question can only be answered with an understanding of what matters are private and the value of privacy. Like the right-to-be-let-alone conception, the limited-access conception suffers from being too broad and too vague. In Privacy and the Limits of Law, legal theorist Ruth Gavison, in an attempt to address these shortcomings, develops the most compelling conception of privacy as limited access. Her aim is to define “a neutral concept of privacy” that is “distinct and coherent” because “the reasons for which we claim privacy in different situations are similar.”76 For Gavison, limited access is the common denominator of privacy: “Our interest in privacy . . . is related to our concern over our accessibility to others: the extent to which we are known to others, the extent to which others have
73. 74. 75. 76. O’Brien, supra note 22, at 16. Id. at 15. Barrington Moore, Jr., Privacy: Studies in Social and Cultural History 73 (1984). Gavison, supra note 1, at 423.

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physical access to us, and the extent to which we are the subject of others’ attention.”77 According to Gavison, privacy cannot be understood “as a claim, a psychological state, or an area that should not be invaded . . . [or] as a form of control.”78 Unlike many limited access theorists who neglect to elaborate on the value of privacy, Gavison argues that privacy as limited access to the self is valuable in furthering liberty, autonomy, and freedom.79 Further, Gavison explains what constitutes limited access, which consists of “three independent and irreducible elements: secrecy, anonymity, and solitude.”80 However, the way that Gavison defines access restricts privacy to matters of withdrawal (solitude) and concealment (secrecy, anonymity). Excluded from this definition are invasions into one’s private life by harassment and nuisance and the government’s involvement in decisions regarding one’s body, health, sexual conduct, and family life.81 Although Gavison contends that “the collection, storage, and computerization of information”82 falls within her conception, these activities often do not reveal secrets, destroy anonymity, or thwart solitude.83 Therefore, although Gavison avoids the broadness and vagueness of most limited-access conceptions, her attempt to define what “access” entails winds up being too narrow. 3. Secrecy One of the most common understandings of privacy is that it constitutes the secrecy of certain matters. Under this view, privacy is violated by the public disclosure of previously concealed information. According to Judge Richard Posner: [T]he word ‘privacy’ seems to embrace at least two distinct interests. One is the interest in being left alone—the interest that is invaded by the unwanted telephone solicitation, the noisy sound truck, the music in elevators, being jostled in the street, or even an obscene theater billboard or shouted obscenity. . . . The other privacy interest, concealment of information, is invaded whenever private information is obtained against the wishes of the person to whom the information pertains.84
77. Id. 78. Id. at 426. 79. See id. at 423. 80. Id. at 433. 81. Gavison openly recognizes that her theory excludes these things. See id. at 436. 82. Id. 83. See Daniel J. Solove, Privacy and Power: Computer Databases and Metaphors for Information Privacy, 53 Stan. L. Rev. 1393, 1422 (2001) (“The problem with databases emerges from subjecting personal information to the bureaucratic process with little intelligent control or limitation, resulting in a lack of meaningful participation in decisions about our information.”). 84. Richard A. Posner, The Economics of Justice 272-73 (1981).

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The latter privacy interest, “concealment of information,” involves secrecy. When talking about privacy as secrecy, Posner defines it as an individual’s “right to conceal discreditable facts about himself.”85 Posner sees privacy as a form of self-interested economic behavior, concealing true but harmful facts about oneself for one’s own gain. People “want to manipulate the world around them by selective disclosure of facts about themselves.”86 “[W]hen people today decry lack of privacy,” Posner argues, “what they want, I think, is mainly something quite different from seclusion; they want more power to conceal information about themselves that others might use to their disadvantage.”87 In a less normatively charged manner, Sidney Jourard emphasizes secrecy with his definition of privacy: “Privacy is an outcome of a person’s wish to withhold from others certain knowledge as to his past and present experience and action and his intentions for the future.”88 The privacy-as-secrecy conception can be understood as a subset of limited access to the self. Secrecy of personal information is a way to limit access to the self. This conception is narrower than limited-access conceptions, as secrecy involves only one aspect of access to the self—the concealment of personal facts. The conception of privacy as concealing information about the self forms the foundation for what is known as the constitutional right to information privacy. The constitutional right to information privacy is an offshoot of the Supreme Court’s substantive due process “right to privacy” cases such as Griswold v. Connecticut89 and Roe v. Wade.90 In Whalen v. Roe,91 the Court held that the constitutionally protected “zone of privacy” not only protected an individual’s “independence in making certain kinds of important decisions” but also encompassed the “individual interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters.”92 Consonant with the notion of privacy as secrecy, this formulation views privacy as avoiding disclosure. Accordingly, courts applying the constitutional right to information privacy have held that although confidential records (such as medical records) are

85. Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law 46 (5th ed. 1998). 86. Posner, supra note 84, at 234. 87. Id. at 271. Posner’s conception of privacy is infused with his own normative assessment of privacy as a form of deception. According to Posner, “[t]he economist sees a parallel to the efforts of sellers to conceal defects in their products.” Posner, supra note 85 at 46. 88. Sidney M. Jourard, Some Psychological Aspects of Privacy, 31 Law & Contemp. Probs. 307, 307 (1966). 89. 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 90. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 91. 429 U.S. 589 (1977). 92. Id. at 599-600.

Rev. v. the Court’s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence adheres to the notion that matters that are no longer completely secret can no longer be private. Broadlawns Med. 376 (D. As the Court observed in Katz: “What a person knowingly exposes to the public. is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection. 1997) (finding that Washington State’s version of Megan’s Law does not violate constitutional privacy because the “information collected and disseminated by the Washington statute is already fully available to the public and is not constitutionally protected”).2002]
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protected under constitutional information privacy. 638 F. Scheetz v. 1988) (finding that a prisoner has a constitutional right to privacy in his medical records). L.S. and other members of the public. 99. children. 729 F. e. Wis.g. 124 F. 179 (6th Cir. the Court has held there can be no “reasonable expectation of privacy” in things exposed to the public. Inc.D.D. Privacy is thus viewed as coextensive with the total secrecy of information. even if it is highly unlikely that anybody will see or discover them. Greenwood. Supp.N.. 1269 (S. 351 (1967).99 the Court held that the Fourth Amendment did not apply to surveillance of a person’s
93. Cline v.3d 1079.2d 570 (3d Cir.94 In a variety of legal contexts. As William Stuntz observes. 488 U. Corp. Supp. according to the Court.”95 In a series of cases. Id. 35 (1988). William J. in California v. Privacy’s Problem and the Law of Criminal Procedure. The Morning Call. 1991) (finding no right to privacy for disclosure of information in police reports).2d 202. Supp. 97.
. 98. Paul P. Westinghouse Elec.. no matter how limited or narrow the disclosure. not out of the interest in being free from unreasonable police coercion or from other kinds of dignitary harms that search targets may suffer. Rogers. Verniero. 876 (W. it can no longer remain private. the view of privacy as secrecy often leads to the conclusion that once a fact is divulged in public. 874. Russell v. Stuntz. 1022 (1995).S. 667 F. Riley. 1998) (finding that a community notification law for sex offenders (known as Megan’s Law) does not violate constitutional privacy because government’s interest in preventing sex offenses is compelling). Borough of Barrington. 94. 689 F. See.97 the Court held there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in garbage because it is knowingly exposed to the public: “It is common knowledge that plastic garbage bags left on or at the side of a public street are readily accessible to animals. scavengers.S. 1990) (finding violation of constitutional right to privacy by police disclosing that person had AIDS). 87 F. United States. Doe v. 389 U. Woods v.”98 Similarly. 93 Mich.”96 For example.J. Katz v. in Florida v. even in his own home or office. 1016. For example. 95. 207 (3d Cir. 1980) (finding that agency’s request for medical records to investigate work-related health hazards justified a minimal intrusion into the privacy of employees’ medical records. 347. 404 (3d Cir. 946 F.3d 396. Ctr. 1996) (holding that there is no constitutional privacy right in criminal records because “arrest and conviction information are matters of public record”).. 96.3d 176.. at 40. agency had to notify the workers and give them a chance to opt out). Fourth Amendment privacy “flows out of the interest in keeping secrets. 1094 (9th Cir. 170 F. 486 U. Carter v. United States v. Iowa 1987) (finding that hospital’s allowing chaplains access to medical records violated constitutional privacy). snoops. Gregoire. 445 (1989).93 nonconfidential records (such as arrest and conviction records) are not. White.

31 Law & Contemp. 344 (1966). “The Files”: Legal Controls Over the Accuracy and Accessibility of Stored Personal Data. supra note 83. to learning. however. secret
100. v.S.100 A number of theorists have claimed that understanding privacy as secrecy conceptualizes privacy too narrowly. supra note 71. See id. Kenneth L. Privacy. Arnold Simmel. 90:1087
property from an aircraft flying in navigable airspace because the surveillance was conducted from a public vantage point. Co. For a theoretical discussion of group privacy. even under the selective secrecy conception. at 1439. Probs. 476 U. Privacy Is Not an Isolated Freedom. Karst. As sociologist Edward Shils notes. at 450-51. See Solove.”103 Some theorists attempt to avoid these problems by focusing on selective secrecy. Bloustein. 476 U.1108
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[Vol. Dow Chem. see also California v. Criticizing a boss to a coworker does not mean that the employee desires that her boss know her comments. in Nomos XIII. the individual does not intend an act of disclosure to be limitless. e. the conception of privacy as secrecy maintained by many courts views secrecy as tantamount to total secrecy rather than selective secrecy. involves more than avoiding disclosure. Id. 342.
. secrecy is certainly not coextensive with privacy. Individual and Group Privacy 123-86 (1978).. Amitai Etzioni defines privacy as “the realm in which an actor (either a person or a group. 101. contrary to privacy as secrecy. Being a member of an organization. 105. a boundary around the group to which we are opening ourselves. See Shils.105 According to philosopher Judith Wagner DeCew. such as a couple) can legitimately act without disclosure and accountability to others. “requires the recognition that ordinarily we deal not with an interest in total nondisclosure but with an interest in selective disclosure. and to intimacy. Amitai Etzioni. United States. it also involves the individual’s ability to ensure that personal information is used for the purposes she desires. 103.” legal scholar Kenneth Karst states. 227 (1986) (holding that Fourth Amendment did not apply to aerial surveillance of property with high-tech camera which could enlarge objects so that objects half an inch in diameter could be seen).S. Legal theorist Edward Bloustein as well as anthropologist Arnold Simmel have criticized the theory of privacy as secrecy as failing to recognize group privacy.101 By equating privacy with secrecy. the harm caused by an invasion of privacy is understood as the disclosure of previously concealed information. Simmel observed: We become what we are not only by establishing boundaries around ourselves but also by a periodic opening of these boundaries to nourishment. Ciraolo. Further. at 305. 207 (1986) (holding that Fourth Amendment did not apply to surveillance of property from airplane flying at 1000 feet). see Edward J. 104. at 71. The Limits of Privacy 196 (1999). See.”104 Nevertheless. For example. But the opening of a boundary of the self may require a boundary farther out. is also regarded by many as a private matter. 102.g.102 “Meaningful discussion of privacy. this formulation fails to recognize that individuals want to keep things private from some people but not others. 81. supra note 72. especially an unpopular one.

109 the Court held that the release of FBI rap sheets (containing personal information from law enforcement records about millions of people) was an invasion of privacy within the privacy exemption of FOIA. 110. 489 U. In United States Department of Justice v.106 We often expect privacy even when in public. not the mere secrecy of it. 4.”107 This sentiment was also recognized by Stanley Benn. many commonly recognized privacy invasions do not involve the loss of secrecy. The books we read. the Court held that “there are few facts that are not at one time or another divulged to another. at 763-64. the Court recognized that the accessibility of information. while most theorists would recognize the disclosure of certain secrets to be a violation of privacy. its function might be to provide the individual with control over certain aspects of her life. [one’s private affairs] are matters that it would be inappropriate for others to try to find out about. without one’s consent. Judith Wagner DeCew. Control Over Personal Information One of the most predominant theories of privacy is that of control over personal information.”108 In elaborating upon the privacy exemption of the Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”). the Supreme Court appeared to understand the imperfections of understanding privacy as secrecy. and Respect for Persons. who observed that privacy is not that one’s private affairs “are kept out of sight or from the knowledge of others that makes them private. at 6. Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press. Privacy. However. secret military plans) and private matters are not always secret (for example.S. and the Rise of Technology 48 (1997). Inness. 108. Stanley I. supra note 3. 107. much less report on. Rather. Id. the Court has failed to recognize this insight in other contexts. As philosopher Julie Inness observes. but we nonetheless view them as private matters. the products we buy.”110 In other words. the people we associate with—these are often not viewed as secrets.2002]
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information is often not private (for example. Benn. According to Alan Westin: “Privacy is the
106. Secrecy as the common denominator of privacy makes the conception of privacy too narrow. in Nomos XIII. supra note 71. Not all activities we deem as private occur behind the curtain. privacy as secrecy omits the element of control: “[P]rivacy might not necessarily be opposed to publicity. Freedom. 749 (1989). one’s debts). In Pursuit of Privacy: Law. at 2. Ethics. Therefore.” and that there was an important distinction “between scattered disclosure of the bits of information contained in a rap sheet and revelation of the rap sheet as a whole.
. 109. Although the information in the rap sheet had previously been publicly disclosed. was important to protecting privacy.

.O. D. 65 Colum. beliefs. such as the right to make certain fundamental decisions about one’s body. his feelings. . Privacy and Behavioral Research 2 (Washington.”). disclosed. 489 U.”). at 7.S. groups. and Social Change. Privacy and Behavioral Research.g. Rev. supra note 43.’ which refers to a person’s ability to control the flow of his own personal information. L.U. sentiments. 763 (1989). Jr. and certainly no less. 1135 (1992) (“I will advance a concept of privacy based on the individual’s control of information. Who Owns Information?: From Privacy to Public Access (1994). and Privacy. supra note 4. see also Ian Goldberg et al. The Right to Privacy Revisited: Privacy.. however. or rearing of one’s children. Randall P. [E]ven if he has chosen to give them expression. than the freedom of the individual to pick and choose for himself the time and circumstances under which. 1184. makes it too narrow a conception. 81 B. Warren and Brandeis also appear at one point to suggest a control-over-information conception of privacy: The common law secures to each individual the right of determining. The theory’s focus on information. Benzanson. News.”116 The control-over-information can be viewed as a subset of the limited access conception. Westin.”).C. Miller.”111 Numerous other scholars have articulated similar theories. 407. e. Ethics. Rev. Office of Science and Technology. 90:1087
claim of individuals. ‘informational self-determination. 116. focuses almost exclusively on the importance of control over information for privacy. supra note 2. Breckenridge. and most importantly. at 198. and to what extent information about them is communicated to others. Reporters Comm. 115. 80 Calif. .. Anne Wells Branscomb.”113 According to Charles Fried.”115 The Supreme Court has even stated that privacy is “control over information concerning his or her person. United States Dep’t of Justice v. President Clinton’s Information Infrastructure Task Force (IITF): Principles for Providing and Using Personal Information 5 (1995). Trust. for Freedom of the Press. how. Ruebhausen & Orville G. rather it is the control we have over information about ourselves. supra note 22.P. at 25.
.112 Arthur Miller declares that “the basic attribute of an effective right of privacy is the individual’s ability to control the circulation of information relating to him. 418 (2001) (“We build our own definition of privacy on what we consider the most elegant definition. 1890-1990. supra note 66. G. 1967) (“The right to privacy is the right of the individual to decide for himself how much he will share with others his thoughts. and used. L Rev..1110
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[Vol. “Privacy is not simply an absence of information about us in the minds of others. at 1 (noting that privacy is “the individual’s right to control dissemination of information about himself”). 1189 (1965) (“The essence of privacy is no more. Executive Office of the President. the extent to which. reproduction. he generally retains the power to fix the limits of the publicity which shall be given them. Oscar M. to what extent his thoughts. 113. See Anne Wells Branscomb. and the facts of his personal life.”). Fried. See. 1133.”114 President Clinton’s Information Infrastructure Task Force has defined privacy as “an individual’s claim to control the terms under which personal information— information identifiable to the individual—is acquired. or institutions to determine for themselves when. in a recently published book. his attitudes. Brim. .
111. 112. at 482-83. ordinarily. 114. 749. Warren & Brandeis. and emotions shall be communicated to others. L. behavior and opinions are to be shared with or withheld from others. for it excludes those aspects of privacy that are not informational.

at 280. touch us. and trust) and presumably. control over who can sense us. However. is the core of privacy. at 281.”121 His theory speaks about the value of privacy (promoting respect. smell us. Richard S. and trust). 118. hear us. one could limit the scope of personal information to that which relates to the individual. Parker. supra note 63.”119 Parker’s definition would make most interpersonal contact in society a privacy invasion because it brings unwanted access to the self. looking at only intimate information excludes important information such as financial records. Some theorists attempt to define the scope of what constitutes personal information over which individuals should exercise control. and taste us. love. 121. Schoeman. it is also an issue of what society deems appropriate to protect.”122 Murphy’s definition is too broad because there is a significant amount of information identifiable to us that we do
117. supra note 22. Yet. Charles Fried links his definition of the scope of personal information to the value of privacy. Id. friendship. He defines privacy as “control over knowledge about oneself”120 that is necessary to protect “fundamental relations” of “respect. Privacy. at 483. It presumes privacy is something to be protected at the discretion of the individual to whom the information relates.”118 “Control over who can see us.J. observes: One difficulty with regarding privacy as a claim or entitlement to determine what information about oneself is to be available to others is that it begs the question about the moral status of privacy. Ferdinand Schoeman.2002]
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Additionally. the theory is too vague because proponents of the theory often fail to define the types of information over which individuals should have control. Property Rights in Personal Information: An Economic Defense of Privacy. we are frequently seen and heard by others without perceiving it as even the slightest invasion of privacy. is not simply a matter of individual prerogative. love.
. for example. Finally. Fried. friendship. 2383 (1996). For example. Id. 2381. would define the scope of information as “intimate” information (information necessary to form and foster relationships involving respect. in sum. Richard Murphy defines the scope of personal information as consisting of “any data about an individual that is identifiable to that individual. love. supra note 22. at 3. the privacy as control-over-information theory at most says that we protect as private all information over which individuals want to retain control. 84 Geo. friendship and trust. 119. Murphy. however. but their attempts run into significant difficulties. 122. L. 120. at 477. legal scholar Richard Parker’s theory defines the scope of personal information extremely broadly: “Privacy is control over when and by whom the various parts of us can be sensed by others.117 In other words.

which. thought of as the right of decision over one’s private personality. See James Boyle. Murphy’s definition thus provides no reasonable limitation in scope.
.124 The notion that individuals have a property right in information about themselves can be traced to John Locke. and joined it to something that is his own. For example. as James Boyle has observed. should be defined as a property right. privacy flows naturally from selfhood: “[E]very man has a property in his own person. the fact that a person is a well-known politician is identifiable to her. 126. Id. 17 U. and Spleens: Law and the Construction of the Information Society 54 (1996). Software. and thereby makes it his property. According to the Restatement of Torts: “One who appropriates to his own use or benefit the name or likeness of another is subject to liability to the other for invasion of his privacy. 128. Second Treatise of Government § 27. and left it in. supra note 4. As the authors of our own lives. we generate information as we develop our personalities. Shamans. 127. which protects people against others’ using their image or likeness for commercial gain.127 Unlike physical property. at 324. The growth of individualism spawned
123. he hath mixed his labor with. Locke deduced that property extends to the products of one’s labor: “Whatsoever then he removes out of the state that nature hath provided. 90:1087
not deem as private. Frequently.S.C. who most displays originality and novelty in her creations. 125. § 102(a) (1994).”126 Locke’s conception of property as the fruit of labor and as an extension of self have formed the backbone of intellectual property law. In addition to failing to adequately define the scope of information.”123 This notion is partially embodied in the tort of commercial appropriation. For example. John Locke. Westin concludes that “personal information.”125 From this principle. Westin. who asserted that individuals have property rights in their person and the fruits of their labor.1112
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[Vol.” Restatement (Second) of Torts §652C (1977). 124. at 19 (1980) (1690). but is not private. intellectual property protects the expression of ideas. Personal information as property is justified by viewing it as an extension of personality. “original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression.” the individual who mixes her unique personality with ideas.”128 The “romantic author” notion of intellectual property embodies Locke’s idea that one gains a property right in something when it emanates from one’s self. has developed around the notion of the “romantic author. According to Locke. the conceptions of privacy as control over information fail to define what is meant by “control” over information. and it is often understood too narrowly or too broadly. control is understood as a form of ownership in information. Theorists provide little elaboration as to what control really entails.

Haynes sued the author and the publisher under the public disclosure of private facts tort. The complexity of personal information is that it is both an expression of the self as well as a set of facts. HENRY JAMES. one’s garments.133 This case involved Nicholas Lemann’s highly praised book about the social and political history of African Americans who migrated from the South to northern cities.131 Often. supra note 2. Unlike physical objects. Jerry Kang. Penguin Books 1986) (1881). 132.). 131. supra note 72. 130. Shils. and once known by others. 1202. writing for the panel. Rev. 8 F. claiming that he had long since turned his life around and that the disclosure of his past destroyed the new life he had worked so hard to construct. 50 Stan. Miller. 1246 (1998). the extension of these concepts to personal information does not come without some difficulties. at 290. with all parties to that relationship having some claim to that information. the market value of information is not created exclusively by the labor of the individual to whom it relates but in part by the third party that compiles the information.”130 Given the unique nature of information. selfishness. Further. L. 1993) (Posner. the books one reads. information can be possessed simultaneously within the minds of millions.2002]
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the “belief that one’s actions and their history ‘belonged’ to the self which generated them and were to be shared only with those with whom one wished to share them. and irresponsible conduct. This is why intellectual property law protects particular tangible expressions of ideas rather than the underlying ideas themselves. For example. for most of that information is created from the interaction between the user and websites. concluded that there could be no liability for invasion of privacy
129. Alfred A. Information Privacy in Cyberspace Transactions. “and one’s house.132 For example. 133. the value of personal information for advertisers and marketers emerges in part from their consolidation and categorization of that information. Judge Posner. who suffered greatly from her former husband Luther Haynes’s alcoholism. there are problems with viewing personal information as equivalent to any other commodity. cannot be eradicated from their minds. individuals are not the lone creators of their web-browsing information.”129 “One’s self—for other people—is one’s expression of one’s self.
. the company one keeps—these things are all expressive.” observes Madame Merle in Henry James’s Portrait of a Lady..3d 1222 (7th Cir. Knopf. 1193. a historical record of one’s behavior. An example of the difficulty in assigning ownership to information is illustrated by Haynes v. Information can be easily transmitted. one’s furniture. J. PORTRAIT OF A LADY 253 (Geoffrey Moore ed. Personal information is often formed in relationships with others. at 213. Inc. The book chronicled the life of Ruby Lee Daniels.

Inness. Daniel Farber invokes the example of the flasher. she contends that “it is the intimacy of this information that identifies a loss of privacy. Gerety claims that Westin’s definition “on its face includes all control over all information about oneself.
. Id. supra note 106.139 David O’Brien also criticizes the conception of privacy as the control of information for being too narrow. in law as in life. flashing is seen as a violation of the privacy of others. at 58. Id.1114
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[Vol. and Isolation by Julie C. A flasher is controlling the visual access to his body by allowing it. one’s group. supra note 22. supra note 6. Daniel A. 514-15 (1993). 136. at 13. Inness. control over information is too broad a conception. 135. rather. In sum.138 To illustrate this point. yet preventing flashing is not a violation of the flasher’s privacy. 138. the conception is still too broad. smells. According to DeCew. O’Brien. Daniels had a right to speak about her own past.142 As DeCew points out. Even if narrowed to include only intimate information. we often lose control over information in ways that do not involve an invasion of our privacy. it is often formed in relationships with others. 10 Const. 139. Farber. to much less than this. at 14. Id. Gerety. Comment. to have her story told. Surely privacy should come. Not only does defining control prove difficult. 90:1087
because “[a] person does not have a legally protected right to a reputation based on the concealment of the truth”134 and because the book narrated “a story not only of legitimate but of transcendent public interest. Intimacy. the conception of privacy as control over information is too narrow because privacy is not reducible to
134. however. at 53. at 262-63. A claim of privacy is not the same as a claim of ownership. DeCew. supra note 3. 137.”136 According to Inness. 142. This was her life story. 141. this case illustrates that personal information rarely belongs to just one individual. Book Review: Privacy. not all personal information is private. understanding control as ownership presents difficulties in grappling with the unique shared nature of much private information. not just Luther Haynes’s. Ruby Daniels’s story was deeply interwoven with Haynes’s story. one’s institutions.140 Many privacy interests involve an individual’s “freedom to engage in private activities” rather than the disclosure or nondisclosure of information.”137 Thus one possibility is that the control-overinformation conception could be limited in scope by including only intimate information. at 1233. and other noxious disruptions of one’s peace of mind.141 O’Brien correctly recognizes that privacy is invaded not just by intrusions into information but also by nuisances such as noises.”135 Although it did not hinge on the shared nature of the information. Id. 510. 140. at 1228.

Rev. L. supra note 106. omit decisional freedom from the realm of privacy. Anita Allen similarly critiques the control-over-information conception for omitting issues such as abortion and sexual freedom. Schwartz. 40 Wm. the theory of privacy as control over information excludes many aspects of life that we commonly assume to be private. See id. For example. Anita Allen-Castellitto. they often define it as a form of ownership.
143.147 The implication is that privacy involves not only individual control.” the conceptions become overly limited or expansive. 52 Vand. Examined Lives: Informational Privacy and the Subject as Object. 32 Conn. See id. 1373 (2000). Anita Allen-Castellitto contends that privacy is not merely a matter of individual choice but must in certain instances be “coerced” by the government.
. Finally.148 In other words. Rev. When theorists attempt to define what constitutes “personal information. some theorists critique the control-over-personalinformation conception as being too narrow because it focuses too heavily on individual choice. Further. such as by being forced to hear propaganda. 723 (1999). Cohen. 815 (2000). L. L. given disparities in knowledge and power when bargaining over the transfer of their information. Rev. Internet Privacy and the State. contends DeCew. Schwartz. at 8. at 1661-64.”146 Schwartz also questions the assumption that individuals are able to exercise meaningful choices with regard to their information. not just a matter for the exercise of individual control. Conceptions of information control are too vague when they fail to define what types of information over which individuals should have control. 148.145 Additionally. or by being disrupted by a nuisance that thwarts one’s ability to think or read. 145. Paul M. Paul M. see also Julie E. 1609.144 In other words. supra note 62. when theorists attempt to define what “control” entails. Coercing Privacy. Privacy and Democracy in Cyberspace. 52 Stan. Rev. 146. at 2. DeCew. 1661 (1999). by being manipulated by subliminal advertisements. conceptions of information control are too narrow because they reduce privacy to informational concerns. To summarize. and focus too exclusively on individual choice. Allen. but also the social regulation of information. making the conception falter in a number of respects.2002]
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personal information. too broad. & Mary L. an architecture of information regulation. an assumption that fails to recognize “that individual self-determination is itself shaped by the processing of personal data. privacy is an aspect of social structure.143 Privacy. can be invaded even if nobody else knows something new about a person. Paul Schwartz argues that the conception of information control wrongly assumes that individuals have the autonomy to exercise control over their personal data in all situations. or too narrow. 147. conceptualizing privacy as control over personal information can be too vague. 144.

at 26. Id.15 (citing Freund’s formulation of personhood).”152 or an “assault on human personality. 90:1087
5. being. protects the individual’s interest in becoming. knowable. as a chooser. a. supra note 22. 154. Individuality. privacy protects individuality. brings one to a new consciousness of oneself. Intimacy. which examined over 300 privacy cases in the seventy years since Warren and Brandeis’s 1890 article and concluded that “[t]he law of privacy comprises four distinct kinds of invasion of four different interests of the plaintiff. noting that privacy amounts to respect for individuals as choosers: “[R]espect for someone as a person. supra note 6. see also Craven. Reiman. 314. 155.1116
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[Vol. Benn explains that being “an object of scrutiny. This theory is not independent of the other theories. Building upon Warren and Brandeis’s notion of “inviolate personality. Privacy. .”155 Drawing from Jean Paul Sartre’s Being and Nothingness. Jeffrey H. Paul Freund.”151 “an affront to personal dignity. at 971.” Prosser. Id. in Philosophical Dimensions of Privacy.150 Privacy is a unified and coherent concept protecting against conduct that is “demeaning to individuality. supra note 22. at 300. supra note 108.”149 The theory of privacy as personhood differs from the theories discussed earlier because it is constructed around a normative end of privacy.”157 According to Benn. Bloustein. or what information we should have control over. which are tied together by the common name. Id. Personhood Another theory of privacy views it as a form of protecting personhood. at 973. 153. at 107. 151. Benn. Bloustein’s article was in response to William Prosser’s 1960 article. supra note 8.
. namely the protection of the integrity of the personality. having a determinate character. 150. Id. 152. what aspects of the self should be limited. at 974. Bloustein. at 702 n. 157. at 7. 156. supra note 65. Privacy.” Paul Freund coined the term “personhood” to refer to “those attributes of an individual which are irreducible in his selfhood. as the focus of another’s attention. and remaining a person. American Law Institute.”156 The observed “becomes aware of himself as an object. 52nd Annual Meeting 42-43 (1975). or frustrated even by so limited an intrusion as watching. and it often is used in conjunction with the other theories to explain why privacy is important. distorted. .”153 Jeffrey Reiman also recognizes a personhood component to privacy: “The right to privacy . but otherwise have almost nothing in common. implie[s] respect for him as one engaged on a kind of self-creative enterprise. Dignity. which could be disrupted. and Personhood.
149. and Autonomy What is personhood? What aspects of the self does privacy protect? According to Edward Bloustein. as something seen through another’s eyes.”154 Philosopher Stanley Benn also develops a personhood conception of privacy.

the Court declared the sanctity of “the right of every individual to the possession and control of his own person. of meaning. 833 (1992).S. 159. See. 165. As early as 1891. Accordingly. 599-600 (1977). Wade.S. v.159 Eisenstadt v. Roe.2002]
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the result is that the observed person “is fixed as something—with limited probabilities rather than infinite. with personhood defined in terms of the individual’s capacity to choose.S. 141 U. e. the Court has conceptualized the protection of privacy as the state’s noninterference in certain decisions that are essential to defining personhood. Baird. Beliefs about these matters could not define the attributes of personhood were they formed under compulsion of the State. 160. 164. 166.S. at 251. 113. procreation. At the heart of liberty is the right to define one’s own concept of existence. 250 (1891). unless by clear and unquestionable authority of law.160 Roe v. Whalen v. Botsford. 161.
158. indeterminate possibilities. and child rearing.”158 In other words. of the universe.166 the Supreme Court provided its most elaborate explanation of what the “privacy” protected by the constitutional right to privacy encompasses: These matters. 438 (1972) (extending Griswold to the use of contraceptives by nonmarried individuals). 381 U.162 There. Third. 589. Fourth. family relationships. free from all restraint or interference of others.161 and others. 163. and of the mystery of human life. Id. the Court articulated this conception in Union Pacific Railway Co. Benn contends that surveillance restricts an individual’s range of choices and thus limits her freedom. The Supreme Court has espoused a personhood theory of privacy in its substantive due process decisions such as Griswold v.
. in holding that a court could not compel a plaintiff in a civil action to submit to a surgical examination. involving the most intimate and personal choices a person may make in a lifetime. 429 U.S. Id.”163 Later cases characterized privacy as an “interest in independence in making certain kinds of important decisions. contraception. 152-53 (1973).S. 479 (1965) (holding unconstitutional a statute criminalizing contraceptives for married couples because it invaded the “zone of privacy” created by the “penumbras” of the First. are central to the liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. Roe v. privacy is about respect for personhood. Connecticut. and Ninth Amendments). these cases involved decisions relating to marriage. at 851. 167.. Id.167 In other words. 410 U. Fifth.”164 Specifically. choices central to personal dignity and autonomy. 410 U.S.165 In Planned Parenthood v. 162. 113 (1973) (finding that the constitutional right to privacy encompasses the decision to procure an abortion). Casey. 505 U.g. Wade. 405 U.

personhood theories frequently fail to explain how personhood is to be protected. Michael Sandel. 172. for conceptions can overlap. 173. and Privacy: Moral Ideas in the Constitution?. Louis Henkin. This is essentially what Gross and
168. Michael Sandel argues that the Court’s privacy cases conflate privacy and autonomy.. Other commentators define personhood as a type of autonomy.”169 But as DeCew counters. at 1424-25. Gavison. 445 (1983). In Democracy’s Discontent.1118
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[Vol. and to say that the right to privacy protects freedom adds little to our understanding of the doctrine. at 438. dignity. there is an “intuitive notion of privacy invoked in the constitutional privacy cases. Merely restricting state interference is not always sufficient to protect privacy.”170 She argues that there is no need to view privacy as totally exclusive from autonomy and liberty. 750 (1989). e. 175. Democracy’s Discontent 93 (1996). Rev. indeed.g. criticizes Bloustein’s dignity conception because “there are ways to offend dignity and personality that have nothing to do with privacy. 102 Harv. Freund’s notion of attributes irreducible in one’s selfhood is far too vague. but to freedom from official regulation. Id. however. at 44. 1424 (1974).
. there is much that is unique to the self that we readily display and express in public. for example. at 438. Joel Feinberg. Autonomy. Privacy and Autonomy. 169. are really about liberty and autonomy. Rev. 174. 58 Notre Dame L.168 Louis Henkin contends that Griswold. supra note 169. Roe. “to call an individual ‘autonomous’ is simply another way of saying that he is morally free. Henkin. yet art is rarely exclusively a private affair. An artistic work is often an expression of the deepest recesses of an artist’s existence. Our personalities are not purely private.172 but as Jed Rubenfeld observes. beyond an account of where the state ought to leave individuals alone. but do not appear to involve loss of privacy. and Baird establish “not a right to freedom from official intrusion. at 44. Sovereignty. theories of privacy as personhood tell us why we value privacy (to protect individuality. and autonomy). supra note 1. Rev. L. Jed Rubenfeld. See. 1410. fail to elucidate what privacy is because the theories often do not articulate an adequate definition of personhood.”175 Further.”174 She elaborates: “Having to beg or sell one’s body in order to survive are serious affronts to dignity. DeCew.”173 Personhood theories are also too broad. and the Court’s privacy cases. Therefore. 737.171 Theories of privacy as personhood. The Right of Privacy. Id. 74 Colum. 90:1087
Some critics complain that personhood theories. but their usual focus on limiting state intervention in our decisions often gives too little attention to the private sector. not about privacy. L. Gavison. 170. 171. and merely substitutes “selfhood” for “personhood.” Bloustein’s discussion of personhood as “individuality” fails to define the scope or nature of individuality. supra note 106.

184. The Right of Privacy. “freedom to have an impact on others . supra note 173. “[t]he personhood thesis is this: where our identity or self-definition is at stake. O’Brien. Rubenfeld. 181. an unarmed occupation of individuals’ lives. for some forms conflict with others.” Laurence H. Id. at 782.”186
176. 180. supra note 173.”180 This fact leads Rubenfeld to conclude that personhood’s “final defense” rests on a view of what is fundamentally important to individual identity. 177.’ personhood inadvertently reintroduces into privacy analysis the very premise of the invidious uses of state power it seeks to overcome. Id. American Constitutional Law 1303 (1988). Id.”178 As Rubenfeld correctly observes. 179. “[t]he anti-totalitarian right to privacy . supra note 6. it must adopt and enforce its own conception of individual identity. Gross. “[b]y conceiving of the conduct that it purports to protect as ‘essential to the individual’s identity.181 However. there the state may not interfere. at 787.”182 When the state endeavors to protect personhood. at 758.”184 Privacy “is to be invoked only where the government threatens to take over or occupy our lives—to exert its power in some way over the totality of our lives. 178. Rubenfeld. Tribe. supra note 22. 182.179 “Personhood cannot exclude ‘intolerant’ identities without abandoning its value-neutrality as between identities. Id. . at 737. the law cannot protect all forms of self-definition. defining the right to privacy as “the fundamental freedom not to have one’s life too totally determined by a progressively more normalizing state.
.2002]
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O’Brien are claiming when they criticize Bloustein for telling us only why we value privacy rather than what privacy is. Antitotalitarianism In his influential article. .”185 As Rubenfeld elaborates. Rubenfeld argues. . at 794. and very few meaningful acts of self-definition have no effects on others. Id. Id. Jed Rubenfeld has provided a sophisticated account of the problems of the personhood theory of privacy. at 770.176 b. See id. 186. is central to any adequate conception of the self. impinging upon the freedom of individuals to define what is central to their identities for themselves. at 53. . Id. at 9. at 784. 183. at 754. prevents the state from imposing on individuals a defined identity.177 According to Rubenfeld. Rubenfeld offers an alternative conception.”183 Rubenfeld claims that privacy protects against a “creeping totalitarianism. According to Laurence Tribe. 185.

1120
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[Vol. To the extent it tells us anything meaningful about which exercises of state power must be curtailed. tort law. See Solove. Id. and the assumption of a specific sexual identity are undertakings that go on for years. enlist the body. and in sum substantially shape the totality of a person’s daily life and consciousness. In fact. and other legal devices. By abandoning any attempt to define a conception of identity. privacy is often destroyed by an aggregation of these minor encroachments. at 782. assault. define roles. trespass. we would have little privacy and scant space or security to engage in self-definition.189 Not all such exercises of state power are pernicious. Indeed. although Rubenfeld is correct that the state cannot be neutral when it becomes involved in one’s self-definition. at 801-02. it must depend upon an affirmative conception of personhood. criminal law.” that is. direct activities. Thus. To preserve people’s ability to engage in self-definition.187 Rubenfeld’s critique of personhood forbids him to sketch any conception of identity that the law should protect. 188. Without protection against rape. the state must actively intervene to curtail the power of customs and norms that constrain freedom. Rubenfeld. he fails in his attempt to abandon a personhood conception.”188 Rubenfeld defines these aspects of life as at the heart of identity because of their pervasiveness and longevity. For example. as Rubenfeld himself notes. he errs in assuming that he can develop his theory of antitotalitarianism without an account of personhood.
. supra note 83. they often occur in small encroachments into our private lives. 189. Therefore. Rubenfeld is correct that laws purporting to be protective of personhood can impose a view of what aspects of life are essential to the individual and hence supplant the individual’s own self-definition. he is creating a conception of personhood that focuses on pervasiveness and longevity as the defining factors. infringements on privacy are “creeping. operate on or even create intense emotional relations. However. Rubenfeld is too quick to condemn as “invidious” all state power that shapes identities. at 1434-35. marriage. supra note 173.
187. privacy is both a positive and negative right. and so on. As I explain in depth in another article. for to do so would be to seize from individuals their right to define themselves. not always by a large exercise of state power. If privacy concerns only those exercises of state power that threaten the “totality of our lives. Rubenfeld states: “[C]hildbearing. but a duty of the state to protect certain matters via property rights. collection of personal information. Rubenfeld’s conception of privacy collapses into a vague right to be let alone. inform values. 90:1087
Although Rubenfeld’s critique of the personhood conception is certainly warranted. it is not just a freedom from the state.” then it is difficult to conceive of anything that would be protected.

This theory appropriately recognizes that privacy is not just essential to individual self-creation. .”193 In contrast to many proponents of privacy as intimacy. supra note 3. The Unwanted Gaze: The Destruction of Privacy in America 8 (2000). . the theory of privacy as intimacy attempts to define what aspects of life we should be able to restrict access to. supra note 6. . Intimacy and Privacy. Id. 194.”192 By focusing on the relationship-oriented value of privacy. supra note 139. political scientist Robert Gerstein claims that “intimate relationships simply could not exist if we did not continue to insist on privacy for them.”190 The theory views privacy as consisting of some form of limited access or control. but also to human relationships. Intimacy. in Philosophical Dimensions of Privacy. As Daniel Farber correctly notes. and it locates the value of privacy in the development of personal relationships. She notes that there are two ways to do so: by looking at behavior or by looking at motivations. In Privacy. philosopher Julie Inness advances an intimacy conception of privacy: [T]he content of privacy cannot be captured if we focus exclusively on either information. She rejects an empirical examination of particular instances of human behavior as inadequate to define intimacy.
. at 76. at 265. and we value privacy so that we can maintain the desired levels of intimacy for each of our varied relationships.2002]
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6. and decisions. or what information we should be able to control or keep secret. For example. Robert S. We form relationships with differing degrees of intimacy and selfrevelation. one virtue of privacy as intimacy is that it “expand[s] moral personhood beyond simple rational autonomy. Gerstein. and Isolation. Inness.”194 According to Inness. access. 191. at 516. or intimate decisions because privacy involves all three areas. 192. the intimate relationships on which true knowledge of another person depends need space as well as time: sanctuaries from the gaze of the crowd in which slow mutual self-disclosure is possible. Jeffrey Rosen. Farber. Inness recognizes the need to define intimacy. This is because these behaviors “lack an intimate essence” and a theory that looks to behaviors could not account for the fact that intimacy “is not static across time or culture.”191 As Jeffrey Rosen observes: “In order to flourish.
190. 193. at 56. I suggest that these apparently disparate areas are linked by the common denominator of intimacy—privacy’s content covers intimate information. Intimacy An increasingly popular theory understands privacy as a form of intimacy. access. 265.

or liking. defines the scope of intimacy. Privacy is “the state of the agent having control over decisions concerning matters that draw their meaning and value from the agent’s love.200 He argues that Fried and Rachels’s view of intimacy “overlooks the fact that what constitutes intimacy is not merely the sharing of otherwise withheld information. 292.”202 “What is missing. Reiman states that “[o]ne ordinarily reveals information to one’s psychoanalyst that one might hesitate to reveal to a friend or lover. Reiman points out that merely providing special
195. Why Privacy is Important. 90:1087
“[I]ntimacy stems from something prior to behavior. and our ability to create and maintain different sorts of social relationships with different people. the dissemination of information about herself. or liking. 201. at 78. 202. she claims. intimate information is that which individuals want to reveal only to a few other people.”199 How is “intimate” information to be defined? For Fried and Rachels. “[i]ntimacy is the sharing of information about one’s actions. who understands privacy as control over information. “is that particular kind of caring that makes a relationship not just personal but intimate. Philosopher Jeff Reiman critiques Fried and Rachels for claiming that intimate information is merely scarce information that individuals want to keep away from others. Intimate matters or acts draw “their value and meaning from the agent’s love. at 91. in Philosophical Dimensions of Privacy.”201 The ability to love and to care for others transcends the mere sharing of secrets. Id. Id. That hardly means one has an intimate relationship with the analyst. 197. Id. caring.”203 To illustrate his point.1122
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. For example. supra note 6. at 290. An Anatomy of Values: Problems of Personal and Social Choice 142 (1970).”196 This.”198 Similarly. James Rachels contends that privacy is valuable because “there is a close connection between our ability to control who has access to us and to information about us. Reiman. privacy creates the moral capital which we spend in friendship and love. Charles Fried. 203. and her actions. 196. Id. care. 200. but the context of caring which makes the sharing of personal information significant. and which one has the right not to share with anyone. at 305. Id. supra note 154. Id.”197 Charles Fried. advances an intimacy conception to locate the value of privacy and circumscribe the scope of information over which we should have control. 199. These decisions cover choices on the agent’s part about access to herself.”195 It is the motives of an individual that matter. By conferring this right. at 304-05. 198. James Rachels. then. For Fried. at 77. beliefs or emotions which one does not share with all.” Reiman declares.

or caring as there are
204.”205 Intimacy is “the consciousness of the mind in its access to its own and other bodies and minds. Id.
Id. Gerety attempts to limit privacy with the terms “identity” and “autonomy. While Gerety complains about overbroad conceptions of privacy that have no meaningful limitation. Although trust. Gerety. these are not the sole ends of privacy. If this were the case. 206. love.2002]
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access to our bodies does not define sexual intimacy. supra note 106. like the theories he critiques. liking.”207 But Gerety’s intimacy theory of privacy. there are many sexual relationships devoid of love. and caring are not broad enough to comprise a conception of privacy. is too broad. love.208 Trust. although privacy helps us achieve these ends. supra note 6. at 268.” but these are very broad terms that could apply to almost every action or decision an individual undertakes. 208. insofar.204 Thus Reiman criticizes Fried and Rachels for focusing too heavily on the notion of control and limited access rather than on the attributes of intimate relationships.”206 In other words. Gerety attempts to develop his definition of intimacy a bit further. these ends do not comprise a complete conception of privacy. As Farber notes. As DeCew points out. a doctor’s examination of our genitals would be intimate. He thus claims that abortion is a private decision because it is “an intimate one. Id. this definition fails for the same reasons the limited-access conceptions fail: it does not adequately provide us with a scope and content to privacy. at 263. 205. at 274. DeCew.” and is certainly not sufficient as a way to determine which matters are private. he goes on to claim that “[i]ntimacy is the chief restricting concept in the definition of privacy. as these are generally or specifically secluded from the access of the uninvited. expressive of both [a woman’s] identity and her autonomy. Without limitations in scope. Tom Gerety also bases his formulation of privacy on intimacy. On the other hand. at least. at 306. at 56. his conception suffers from the same defect. and intimacy are facilitated by privacy. Beginning with the criticism that existing theories of privacy are far too broad because they lack any meaningful limitation in scope. However. discussing it later in his essay in terms of its expressiveness of individual identity and autonomy. his definition of intimacy is a form of limited access to the self. 207. information about our finances is private yet not intimate. privacy-as-intimacy theories are too narrow because they focus too exclusively on interpersonal relationships and the particular feelings engendered by them.
. the word “intimacy” is merely a different word for “privacy.

at 23. Because of these difficulties. They argue that privacy is reducible to other conceptions and rights. 210.”211 In sum. W. liking. some theorists.” Most often. or a business firm. as political scientist Priscilla Regan notes. Weinstein. or caring (such as buying gifts) that are not considered intimate. and Public Policy 213 (1995). settling upon any one of the conceptions results in either a reductive or an overly broad account of privacy. supra note 139.1124
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[Vol. these threats come from private and governmental organizations—the police. at 284. at 27. . Inness. and trust.”213 According to Thomson. at 515. supra note 71. Toward a New Approach to Conceptualizing Privacy
Although each of the conceptions of privacy described above elaborates upon certain dimensions of privacy and contains countless insights. Social Values. such as the state. privacy-as-intimacy conceptions can be too broad if they do not adequately define the scope of “intimacy. Thomson. privacy’s value does not lie exclusively in the development of intimate human relationships. supra note 3. The most prominent proponent of this view is Judith Thomson. Individuals not intimately related may nevertheless assert that their relation or activity is a private one in the sense that it is not the proper concern of the community or some institution. but it does not capture the dimension of private life that is devoted to the self alone.
. . Farber. 212. 211. C. love. the right to privacy consists of “the right to not be looked at and the right to not be listened
209. who claims that the right to privacy is not a distinct right. computer databases pose a significant threat to privacy but “do not primarily affect . Legislating Privacy: Technology. in Nomos XIII. 33.L. 213.”212 claim that the impoverishment of the discourse is symptomatic of the fact that privacy should not be understood as a distinct conception. and employers. however. supra note 6.209 Furthermore. Instead. Regan. banks. The Private and the Free: A Conceptual Inquiry. such conceptions are too narrow because they exclude many matters that do not involve loving and caring relationships. credit agencies. Priscilla M. Intimacy captures the dimension of the private life that consists of close relationships with others. referred to as “reductionists. welfare agencies.210 For example. relationships of friendship. a church. but is “overlapped by other rights. As Weinstein observes: [T]here is a wide range of instances where to speak of something as private is not to imply intimacy. 90:1087
many acts expressive of love.

Id. Although William Prosser described privacy as four distinct interests. I do not recognize him as a cluster theorist because he was speaking explicitly about the privacy interests that the law recognized rather than elaborating upon a conception of privacy. see also Kalven. supra note 44. H.220 Informational privacy involves “control over information about oneself.”223 Thus. 215. and religion. accessibility privacy. Id.2002]
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to”214—rights which she claims “are analogous to rights we have over our property. DeCew combines three theories of privacy: (1) control over information. for example. See generally Genova.” H. (3) flow of personal information—“an individual’s control over the processing—i. (2) choice—“an individual’s ability to make certain significant decisions without interference”. 221. and use—of personal information. and instead they cluster together certain of the conceptions. In a similar vein. McCloskey. Inness.J. Other scholars also recognize that privacy cannot be consolidated into a single conception. 222. and expressive privacy.”222 Expressive privacy “protects a realm for expressing one’s self-identity or personhood through speech or activity. DeCew. supra note 131. supra note 3. Id. Although privacy overlaps with other conceptions.”). and (3) personhood. at 280. 223. association. it does seem to reveal certain dimensions of experience that are not displayed in the same way by other conceptions. Kang.218 For example.”221 Accessibility privacy is the limited-access conception: “accessibility privacy focuses not merely on information or knowledge but more centrally on observations and physical proximity.”215 However. Privacy and the Right to Privacy. at 75. 37 (1980).217 and a difference in perspective and focus is not irrelevant. McCloskey also claims that “any right to privacy will be a derivative one from other rights and other goods. disclosure.
214. at 1202-03. (2) limited access. Wittgenstein speaks of conceptions as ways of seeing things. at 76.
. Id.. Id. at 36 217. there are three overlapping “clusters of privacy claims”: informational privacy.J.”219 According to DeCew. supra note 106. 216.216 They attempt to carve up the conceptual landscape as colonists divide conquered territory on a map.e. the acquisition. 219. 55 Phil. 220. at 327 (“[P]rivacy seems a less precise way of approaching more specific values. at 77. supra note 41. Jerry Kang defines privacy as a union of three overlapping clusters of ideas: (1) physical space—“the extent to which an individual’s territorial solitude is shielded from invasion by unwanted objects or signals”. 218. reductionists assume without sufficient justification that privacy derives from other more primary conceptions rather than vice versa. as. in the case of freedom of speech.

Id.
. If we no longer look for the essence of privacy. offering explanations. Thus far. § 67. Stanley Cavell. 225. Shusterman.
224. Wittgenstein. how are we to conceptualize privacy? I focus on this question in Part II. If we turn away from the search for common denominators and the quest for the essence of privacy. from searching for rigid conceptual boundaries and common denominators. I recommend a pragmatic approach to conceptualizing privacy. Excursus on Wittgenstein’s Vision of Language. explained.. 226. merely aggregating conceptions of privacy together still leaves us with insufficient guidance on how to understand privacy. at 19-36. Pragmatism 27-56 (1995). Although there are many interesting affinities in the thought of Wittgenstein and the pragmatists. supra note 18. II Reconceptualizing Privacy: A Pragmatic Approach Because the existing method of conceptualizing privacy has thus far proven to be problematic and unsatisfying. .”226 Likewise. . 2000). mapping out the terrain of privacy by examining specific problematic situations rather than trying to fit each situation into a rigid predefined category.224 As Stanley Cavell explains. We should act as cartographers. Wittgenstein’s notion of family resemblances frees us from engaging in the debate over necessary and sufficient conditions for privacy. Pragmatism has many affinities with Wittgenstein’s notion of family resemblances. at 17-64. . in The New Wittgenstein 35 (Alice Crary & Rupert Read eds. I have merely challenged the traditional method by which privacy is conceptualized.1126
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[Vol. in the particular case. pragmatism turns away from universals and focuses on specific situations. 227. then to understand the “complicated network of similarities overlapping and criss-crossing. and a complete account of the similarities and differences is beyond the scope of this Article. Rorty. supra note 16. supra note 18.”225 Cavell notes that “a new application of a word or concept will still have to be made out.”227 we should focus more concretely on the various forms of privacy and recognize their similarities and differences. or other kinds of summaries that take law-like form. Wittgenstein’s notion of family resemblances demonstrates that “universals are neither necessary nor even useful in explaining how words and concepts apply to different things. there are many differences as well. 90:1087
Although cluster formulations appear more in line with the Wittgensteinian family resemblances approach. see Hilary Putnam. Thus. and then the explanations themselves will be sufficient . For some interesting examinations of the relationship between pragmatic and Wittgensteinian thought. they still circumscribe privacy based on the boundaries of each of the clustered conceptions. Judith Genova characterizes Wittgenstein’s views as the following: “Knowledge is not a matter of guessing meanings.

. Stuhr ed. According to William James. all reflection sets out from the problematic and confused. 234. making generalizations based on one’s encounters with these problems.. at 72. supra note 232. Dewey claims that philosophy is still possible by exploring knowledge gleaned from experience. Many pragmatists go beyond making the epistemological claim that an ultimate or transcendent reality is not knowable. knowledge originates through experience. 236. in 12 The Middle Works of John Dewey 93 (Jo Ann Boydston ed.”236
228. and then testing these generalizations by examining their consequences in other contexts.”228 This is how the pragmatist approaches philosophical inquiry. philosophical inquiry begins with problems in experience. see also Dewey. are profound. Posner. supra note 20. and independently of. at 65-66. “Neither the old nor the new pragmatism is a school. 63 S. at 35. “have not ventured to deny that [an ultimate reality] would be the appropriate sphere for the exercise of philosophic knowledge provided only it were within the reach of human intelligence.” beginning with problems in experience. Transforming Experience: John Dewey’s Cultural Instrumentalism 4 (1998).” Dewey observed. from verbal solutions. a rejection of a priori knowledge. “not of grasping antecedently given sureties. supra note 20. closed systems. Michael Eldridge. Dewey. See John Dewey. towards action and towards power. supra note 232.”234 Specific problematic situations spur inquiry. from bad a priori reasons. Dewey.2002]
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but of listening to and observing the connections that obtain without interfering. not with abstract universal principles.
. 1660 (1990).g. e. at 106-10. or between a James and a Dewey. He turns towards concreteness and adequacy. and pretended absolutes and origins.231 John Dewey’s philosophy is particularly useful to the task of reconceptualizing privacy. How We Think (1910). at 154. towards facts. According to the pragmatists. William James. Pragmatism 25 (Promethius Books 1991) (1907).”230 As James observed. Rev. Cal. 1982). supra note 232. Dewey. Its aim is to clarify and ascertain. Experience and Nature 9 (1929). 229. 235.235 “[K]nowledge is an affair of making sure. observes John Dewey. Some philosophers.232 Philosophical inquiry must be “experimental. 1653. one of the more common ideas of pragmatism is a focus away from the notion of a priori knowledge—the view that there are objective and universal truths that exist prior to. Dewey. 232. Pragmatists reject the view of philosophy “as a purely theoretical quest for eternal truths or knowledge of an ultimate and unchanging reality. see also John Dewey..” Richard A.233 “Empirically. at 151. According to Dewey. 230. The differences between a Pierce and a James. My approach to conceptualizing privacy draws from a few recurring ideas of pragmatism:229 a recognition of context and contingency. supra note 41.” John Dewey. the pragmatist “turns away from abstraction and insufficiency. 231. Thinking is thus a “tool” for solving problems. Genova. 2000). See. 233. and a focus on concrete practices. from fixed principles. experience. What Has Pragmatism to Offer Law?. L.” Pragmatism and Classical American Philosophy: Essential Readings and Interpretive Essays 3 (John J. Reconstruction in Philosophy.

239. In Reply to Some Criticisms.”240 “On the other hand. “but only in connection with a contextual whole. therefore. supra note 20. and what important values are in conflict. John Dewey. although Dewey emphasizes that we must be careful not to allow conceptual schemas to impede our ability to assess concrete situations.”238 Turning away from attempts to define privacy in the abstract does not mean abandoning the quest to conceptualize privacy. and generalizes. and we cannot ignore the “contextual situation in which thinking occurs. the best way to avoid the problem of observation without direction on the one hand and observation overly distorted by one’s theoretical framework on the other hand is to maintain “sensitivity to the quality of the situation as a whole. Conceptions are “working hypotheses. is necessary to guide the crafting of a solution. Dewey. he recognizes the importance of conceptualizing and formulating generalizations based on experience. 238. To the contrary. supra note 232. the only way to “control and enrich concrete experience” is by making generalizations and theories. supra note 20.”237 Knowledge without its context loses much of its meaning. James. “[W]e never experience nor form judgments about objects and events in isolation.239 According to Dewey.”244 Thus. 241. at 33. at 76. at 76.242 As William James put it. “[t]he pragmatist clings to facts and concreteness. Understanding the nature of a problem.”243 According to Dewey. defining the problem involves careful observation along with an attempt to conceptualize by making generalizations and creating theories. 1984). at 72. Dewey.
. 242. Everything is forced into the predetermined conceptual and theoretical scheme. See id. a legal or policy analysis of a privacy problem without attempting to understand what privacy is represents a failure to define the problem adequately. 90:1087
A pragmatic approach to the task of conceptualizing privacy should not. begin by seeking to illuminate an abstract conception of privacy.” observes Dewey. observes truth at its work in particular cases. at 67.1128
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[Vol. in 5 The Later Works 216 (Jo Ann Boydston ed. Merely collecting facts will “lead nowhere. See id. supra note 230. the pragmatist has a unique attitude toward conceptions.” not
237. See Dewey. are completely overlooked. 244.” observes Dewey. 240.”241 Thus. “it is possible to have the work of observation so controlled by a conceptual framework fixed in advance that the very things which are genuinely decisive in the problem in hand and its solution. See Dewey. 243. what is at stake. but should focus instead on understanding privacy in specific contextual situations. supra note 20.. at 111-12. For Dewey.

When I speak of privacy as a dimension of practices.”246 Privacy is a dimension of certain practices and aspects of life. Post. and traditions.” I am referring broadly to various activities. Conceptualizing privacy is about understanding and attempting to solve certain problems. Practices can be disrupted in certain ways. The Social Foundations of Privacy: Community and Self in the Common Law Tort. customs. talking to one’s psychotherapist. 969 (1989). analyzing. Understanding privacy requires us to look to the specific ways in which privacy manifests itself within practices and the degree to which privacy is linked to the purposes. and ascribing value to a set of related dimensions of practices. Essays on Pragmatism and Truth. making certain decisions. searches of one’s person and property. such as interference with peace of mind and tranquility. Privacy and Practices
245. Robert C. Privacy invasions disrupt and sometimes completely annihilate certain practices. By “practices. and under my approach. Privacy is a dimension of these practices. See John Dewey. My approach is from the bottom up rather than the top down because it conceptualizes privacy within particular contexts rather than in the abstract. It is an approach because it does not describe the sum and substance of privacy but provides guidance in identifying. and the experienced situations. engaging in sexual intercourse. in 4 The Middle Works of John Dewey 100 (Jo Ann Boydston ed. Social Practices With its emphasis on the concrete. pragmatism locates the starting point for theorizing in specific contexts.. Examples of practices include writing letters. I contend that privacy problems involve disruptions to certain practices.2002]
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fixed entities. norms. 1. 1977). this Article advances an “approach” to understanding privacy rather than a definition or formula for privacy. An approach to conceptualizing privacy should aid in solving problems.245 Therefore. and must be created from within concrete situations and constantly tested and shaped through an interaction with concrete situations. I understand privacy to be an important (sometimes essential) constitutive part of particular practices. When we state that we are protecting “privacy. privacy “cannot be reduced to objective facts like spatial distance or information or observability. the factual. breach of confidentiality. Rev. and so on. invasion of solitude. L. privacy should be understood as part of these practices rather than as a separate abstract conception. it can only be understood by reference to norms of behavior.
. loss of control over facts about oneself. A. 957. 246.” we are claiming to guard against disruptions to certain practices. and structuring social relationships. As Robert Post aptly notes. 77 Calif. assessing costs and benefits.

The disclosure of a person’s criminal past can interfere with that person’s ability to reform herself and build a new life... We can focus on particular points of the web. Another form of disruption is surveillance. Gary T. Protecting Privacy in Surveillance Societies 9 (1989) (explaining how surveillance can lead to conformity). Marx. Paul M. surveillance. 1996). and Privacy 193 (David Lyon & Elia Zureik eds. Kang. anonymity in authorship is a longstanding practice that has the purpose of. at 1260 (describing how surveillance can lead to self-censorship). Surveillance differs from disclosure because it can impinge upon practices without revealing any secrets. and society protects against this disruption because of the importance of the purposes of anonymity. Rev.
. e. One form of disruption to this practice is the disclosure of concealed information. These “focal points” are not categories.247 We may want to protect against surveillance not merely to prevent disruptions of certain practices but to foster practices or to
247.g. There are certain similarities in particular types of disruptions as well as in the practices that they disrupt. Privacy and Participation: Personal Information and Public Sector Regulation in the United States. In this context. We should conceptualize privacy by focusing on the specific types of disruption and the specific practices disrupted rather than looking for the common denominator that links all of them. in Computers.1130
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threats to or violations of personal security. increase her selfconsciousness and uneasiness to a debilitating degree. Rather. they are areas of the web where we are focusing. Surveillance is a different kind of privacy problem than disclosure. promoting the unfettered expression of ideas. Schwartz. the value of protecting against disclosures differs in these two contexts. For example. destruction of reputation. Particular types of disruption do not interfere with all privacy practices in the same way. Surveillance. See. Disclosure also interferes with other practices. 560 (1995) (articulating how surveillance can inhibit free choice). then the act of conceptualizing privacy should consist of mapping the typography of the web. and they do not have fixed boundaries. For an extensive discussion of the effects of surveillance. among other things. Being watched can destroy a person’s peace of mind. and can inhibit her daily activities. Electric Eye in the Sky: Some Reflections on the New Surveillance and Popular Culture. and so on. in part. The value of protecting against such disclosures depends. imposing a different type of injury to a different set of practices. upon the social importance of rehabilitation. see David Lyon. Flaherty. 80 Iowa L. If privacy is conceptualized as a web of interconnected types of disruption of specific practices. Surveillance Society: Monitoring Everyday Life (2001). where we see certain things in more detail without being overwhelmed by the enormity of the whole web. such disclosure involves revealing the identity of the author. Since the purposes of the practices of anonymity and rehabilitation are different. David H. 553. but there are differences as well. supra note 131.

Lloyd L. 31 Law & Contemp.” In other words. at 71. a sort of bubble zone that surrounds a person. 34 (Ellen Frankel Paul et al. to pursue experimental projects in science.g. 272. art. and affairs are “private.248 Boundaries between the public and private spheres create the conditions for developing or expressing various aspects of selfhood. Its boundaries may be crossed by others only when we expressly invite them.. The Human Condition (1958). 279-80 (1966). Simmel. 1991).’ as freedom from interference.”). places. Privacy and the Law: A Philosophical Prelude. which associates the
248. Further. eds. As Lloyd Weinreb explains.. Milton R. Roe v. . Within these boundaries our own interests are sovereign. we are free to do our thing. insulated against outside influence and observation.” For a long time. we often refer to aspects of these practices as “private matters. Hannah Arendt. Probs.”252 Privacy is not simply a form of space. 250. at 318 (“In short. and living. forming certain kinds of interpersonal relationships. John Stuart Mill. 251. 113 (1973). privacy “is the claim that there is a sphere of space that has not been dedicated to public use or control. See. Jürgen Habermas. 410 U. privacy is experienced as ‘room to grow in. all initiative is ours. An important dimension of privacy is informational control. see also Jourard. Often. 75-77 (Norton ed. philosophers have discussed what has become known as the public and the private spheres. The notion of public and private spheres understands privacy by way of a spatial metaphor. On Liberty 11-13. Weinrib. the metaphor of space has significant limitations. Turning our focus from disruptions to the practices they disrupt. supra note 101. This condition of insulation is what we call privacy. we say that certain things.S. Katrin Byford aptly points out that this conception of privacy has difficulty grappling with the problems of privacy in cyberspace since cyberspace is not a physical space: “A territorial view of privacy. in The Right to Privacy 25. and as freedom to explore.. that is peculiarly our own. . 252. we establish: [a] territory . 72.g.2002]
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structure society in a particular way (by restricting the power of the government or employers). 2000). Wade. supra note 88. work. play. See. reference to privacy as a “space” is metaphorical only and this metaphor is not very helpful because it “does not specify at all the shape or dimensions of the space or what it contains. Konvitz.250 The Supreme Court has often spoken of “zones” of privacy.
. understanding privacy by way of the spatial metaphor.. e. According to legal theorist Milton Konvitz. 1975). The Right to Privacy. The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere (Thomas Burger trans. as well as engaging in certain forms of political activity. a sociologist. which does not readily translate into spatial terms.251 Although it is difficult to talk about privacy without invoking some notion of space. theorists speak of privacy as a spatial realm. 249.”249 According to Arnold Simmel. e.

at viii (Paul Veyne ed. Second. institutions.1132
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[Vol. Privacy in Cyberspace: Constructing a Model of Privacy for the Electronic Communications Environment.”253 We can avoid allowing the metaphor of space to limit our understanding of privacy yet still maintain a distinction between public and private. Historical Development of Privacy Practices It is reductive to carve the world of social practices into two spheres. and home to name a few. Foreword to A History of Private Life I: From Pagan Rome to Byzantium. our diary.
. they have been understood as private but because of different attributes. although certain matters have moved from being public to being private and vice versa. was not always a sanctuary for privacy. and our home private. Georges Duby. First. the matters we consider private change over time. 254. and then attempt to determine what matters belong in each sphere. L. Although classifying certain matters as public or private may be useful for certain general discussions. a. Particular matters have long remained private but in different ways. public and private. body. Family The family. 1987). what it means for something to be private is the central question. we often view the family as an institution
253. has no application in a realm in which there is no space.. as I have argued.254 the matters that have been considered public and private have metamorphosed throughout history due to changing attitudes. our sexual behavior. we should seek to understand practices rather than classify certain matters as public or private. In the next section. A number of aspects of life have commonly been viewed as private: the family. Today. While some form of dichotomy between public and private has been maintained throughout the history of Western civilization. We consider our Social Security number. 1. or they have been regarded as private for some people or groups but not for others. to say simply that something is public or private is to make a rather general claim. 24 Rutgers Computer & Tech. However. 90:1087
concept of privacy with the sanctity of certain physical spaces.J. The matters we consider to be private are shaped by culture and history. In other words. body. the change often has been more subtle than a complete transformation from public to private. and technology. I will demonstrate my point by tracing a brief genealogy of the privacy of the family. & Arthur Goldhammer trans. and have differed across cultures and historical epochs. and home. I explain why. Katrin Schatz Byford. 2. but we do not consider them private in the same way. viewed as the heart of the private sphere. living conditions. To say simply that these things are private is imprecise because what it means for them to be private is different today than it was in the past. 40 (1998). such classifications can be misleading.

and many women were not completely subservient to the men in the household. but a set of social responsibilities and impediments to individual self-development. see also Beatrice Gottlieb. State. 261.262
255. many marriages were initiated through individual choice. The Sweet Delights of Home. 58 Soc. Catherine Hall. The Home and the Family in Historical Perspective. at 181-86.. situation. In the world of the family. . However. the individual was not free but regulated by different forms of authority. My point is that in earlier times. Habermas. Georges Duby. Tamara K. . a symbolic capital in the form of reputation.2002]
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of intimacy. For many. 257 (1991). Michelle Perrot.255 Marriage was not an institution to develop the self through an intimate relationship with one’s family. 1988).. a network of connections and interdependent reputations built upon conformity to social norms. at 47-48. for much of Western history (and still today in some cultures). in A History of the Private Life IV. e. supra note 258 at 50. family life was inextricably linked to professional life. Michelle Perrot. and Family: Trajectories and Tensions: Introduction. See. Res. in A History of Private Life II: Revelations of the Medieval World 7 (Georges Duby ed. in A History of Private Life III: Passions of the Renaissance 400 (Roger Chartier ed. 258. certain attitudes and practices regarding the nature of the family were more prevalent and widely accepted than they are today.256 particularly for women. The Family Triumphant. & Arthur Goldhammer trans. 257. the family is seen as generally enhancing individual self-realization. the family increasingly became more conducive to the private life of the individual. Community.259 The family existed for “sociability rather than privacy. Hareven. entry into marriage was not considered to be an individual autonomous choice based on selfhood-enhancing criteria. See id. I am making broad generalizations. where a nuclear family lives together in the home..g.261 gradually shifting from an economic institution to a place of intimacy and self-fulfillment. Roles and Characters. 262.g. 1990). 256. for whom marriage was often a life of submission. at 123 (“A family legacy is more than just material goods. Privacy in Colonial New England 56 (1972). & Arthur Goldhammer trans. supra note 248. David H. See. Further. but were primarily controlled by parents and governed by economic and strategic concerns. as certainly numerous families were not devoid of love.257 For the expanding bourgeois. Beginning in the nineteenth century.258 The family was a business asset used in public commerce. in A History of Private Life IV: From the Fires of Revolution to the Great War 121 (Michelle Perrot ed. Roger Chartier. A heritage comprises a portfolio of connections. supra note 258..”260 Of course. Indeed. The Family in the Western World From the Black Death to the Industrial Age 52-53 (1993). Public Power. . 259.. 1989).
. the family was viewed as the locus of social control. and has (or strives toward) a loving relationship. 253. and status . in A History of Private Life IV. a miniature monarchy ruled by the patriarch. Private Power. & Arthur Goldhammer trans. marriages occurred not out of love or free choice. e. 260. Flaherty.”).

Hareven. throughout much of history.1134
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[Vol. 227. at 2118. Man and Wife in America: A History (2000). at 2152. and free to pursue his or her own goals. 1500-1990. . DeCew. at 181. at 69. Feminism confronts the fact that women have no privacy to lose or to guarantee. the family began to develop into a “private entity focused into itself. 269. See id. Feminism and the Public/Private Distinction. Reva B. creating a public professional world of business and a more private intimate world of the family. who argues: For women the measure of the intimacy has been the measure of the oppression.C. 126-27 (1852).J. doing so would “throw open the bedroom to the gaze of the public. For an overview of the feminist critique of privacy. State v. 268. . Siegel. and spread discord and misery. supra note 267. The most prominent of these theorists is Catharine MacKinnon. “[m]arriage has been described as a woman’s greatest obstacle to privacy. “The Rule of Love”: Wife Beating as Prerogative and Privacy. for women there is no private. 233 (1991). 264. Toward a Feminist Theory of the State 191 (1989). at 81-94. either normatively or empirically. 90:1087
Work and home began to be physically separated.”270 Thus. Roles and Characters. contention and strife. Rev. Res. “privacy” of the family consisted of an association of noninterference of the state in domestic affairs which served. 123. Perrot. For a critique of MacKinnon. where peace and concord ought to reign. or the state”263—led to a rebellion against arranged marriages. a “wife was obliged to obey and serve her husband. ironically. The growth of individualism—the “concept of the self as unique.268 Chastisement was justified by courts not wanting to interfere with marital privacy.”265 For women. supra note 262. In this sense. L. 271. at 2158. see generally Henrik Hartog. This is why feminism has seen the personal as the political. Allen. See id. and a related decline in the idea that the overriding obligation was to the kin. .”266 As Reva Siegel explains. The Public and the Private in Stately Homes of England.”271 This association has led to a number of feminist scholars attacking privacy in the domestic context. According to Anita Allen. 58 Soc. the family was for a long time not associated with selfdevelopment. Privacy and the Politics of Intimate Life (1996). Hussey. as Siegel explains. Lawrence Stone.”267 Husbands could also physically punish their wives (known as “chastisement”) so long as no permanent injury was inflicted.269 As one court explained. 2122 (1996). 267. 45 Stan. Ruth Gavison.272
263. and the husband was subject to a reciprocal duty to support his wife and represent her within the legal system. 21 (1992). see Allen. Catharine MacKinnon. 272.264 Gradually. 44 N. at 257. although wife beating would typically be classified as an assault. 105 Yale L. see Patricia Boling. 266. “to enforce and preserve authority relations between man and wife. supra note 62. the society. supra note 260. 2117. supra note 62. The private is public for those for whom the personal is political. transforming marriage into an institution of personal choice rather than of economic gain.
. Siegel. 270. 265. supra note 106.

359 (2000). see also Marie A. secrecy about certain diseases and physical conditions.” Id. and individual control and dominion over decisions regarding one’s body. theorists have viewed the body as at the core of privacy. “Athenian democracy placed great emphasis on its citizens exposing their thoughts to others. To the extent that family privacy consists of attributes such as independence. 251 (1891). Union Pac. the notion that a person belongs to herself. freedom from coercion.”278 In the Middle Ages. These mutual acts of disclosure were meant to draw the knot between citizens ever tighter. Peter Brown.119. Five Modern Notions in Search of an Author: The Ideology of Intimate Society in Constitutional Speech Law. “[P]rivacy theory entitled the body to protection as the physical embodiment of a person.” Gerety. at 266 & n. 141 U. Late Antiquity. Co.” Id. norms of touching and interpersonal contact. whereas property theory reduces the body to a mere object of ownership. someone who was civilized. 274. Public nudity was limited to men. freedom of thought. supra note 254. b. L. in A History of Private Life I.2002]
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That privacy of the family once meant the noninterference of the state in domestic affairs does not mean that this is inherently what privacy of the family means today. See id. the naked body was far from private in ancient Greece and Rome. at 245-46. such as concealment of certain bodily parts. For quite some time.”277 Public nudity “affirmed one’s dignity as a citizen. government intervention actually can enhance privacy. Botsford. To argue that there is less privacy of the family today because of this development is too broad a claim. at 34. L. Radhika Rao. the constitutional right to privacy is often characterized by the notion of self-ownership of the body. Property.U. 275. supra note 6. or is more carefully guarded by the common law. Tol. just as men exposed their bodies. Failinger.S. we accept greater government intervention in spousal relationships as well as in child rearing. Gerety claims that any concept of privacy “must take the body as its first and most basic reference for control over personal identity. 250. and pursuing activities of personal interest. v. Although we currently associate the body with concealment (we hide the nude body from others under layers of clothes). and the Human Body..275 These attributes were certainly not always associated with the body. the public display of the naked body “marked the presence of a strong rather than vulnerable person—and more. Ry. 276. 251 (1999). As Radhika Rao explains. In contemporary American society. 30 U. 277. Privacy.”274 The claim that the body is “private” is really a claim about certain practices regarding the body. 278. Women did not display their naked bodies in public. 80 B. Flesh and Stone: The Body and the City in Western Civilization 33 (1994). Rao critiques the tendency to reduce one’s control over one’s body to a simple property right.
. Rev.276 Richard Sennett observes that in ancient Athens. Richard Sennett. Body The evolution of attitudes toward the body is also instructive. it was not uncommon for people to bathe in
273.273 As the Supreme Court declared: “No right is held more sacred. self-development. Id. than the right of every individual to the possession and control of his own person. at 445. the subject of a privacy interest. Rev.

Families in urban areas often did not have a privy in the rear of their homes. Forms of Privatization: The Child: From Anonymity to Individuality.”285 We also currently associate the body with individual control and dominion. in A History of Private Life III. at 4. or in inns. at 5. people began to view the body as their own possession. among the wealthy (and spreading to the middle class). Stone.286 for a long time. “Up to the end of the eighteenth century.287 As attitudes toward the family changed and with new conceptions of individual identity. in A History of Private Life III.1136
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[Vol. supra note 263.288
279. 280. 281. they ceased to share beds with strangers at home. at 228. Of course. 282.283 Before the late nineteenth century. the individual is sovereign. Home: A Short History of an Idea 28 (1986). such practices differed based on the customs of each specific society as well as upon religious beliefs and the social status of individuals. 286. supra note 277. at 310. a system which afforded little or no privacy. and copulation.”281 After the sixteenth century. Sennett. 287. In the seventeenth century. Philippe Ariès. 285. Introduction. poor families (close to half of the population of England) lived in one room and had to urinate. people tried to distance themselves from their body and other’s bodies: “men and women become more secretive and modest about bodily functions. supra note 261. which might contain traces of saliva of others. supra note 261. Roger Chartier. Id. supra.284 This practice varied depending upon the wealth of families and where they lived. Id. close-stools and chamber pots had been scattered randomly about the house in the public rooms. at 316. In the Renaissance. defecation. at 30.279 and bathing was often part of celebrations and social congregation. at 163-64.
. Id. supra note 248.282 Another contemporary association is between the body and concealment of certain bodily functions such as urination. Forms of Privatization: Introduction. 284. over his own body and mind. in A History of Private Life III.280 Norms of interpersonal contact and nudity gradually shifted toward more concealment and distancing from others. defecate. This new modesty was so extreme at times that it even made it difficult for doctors to be at the bedside of women in labor. Mill. people became quite guarded about their bodies and reserved about their touching of others. 90:1087
front of others.”). As Lawrence Stone observes. and copulate in view of others. Jacques Gélis. supra note 261. 288. supra note 263. See Ariès. at 343. their blood) as belonging in part to the family and their ancestors. They ceased to eat and drink out of communal dishes and cups. Witold Rybczynski. at school. at 244. it was not anomalous for people to chat with friends while sitting above a chamber pot. Stone. people viewed their body (in particular. Although many subscribe to John Stuart Mill’s observation that the individual is “sovereign” over her body. 283. at 11 (“Over himself. at 229.

amend. To say the home is a “private” place is imprecise. The maxim that the home is one’s castle became widely used in the United States during the nineteenth century. 77 Eng.. New York. 293. 378 U. because although it has long been viewed as a private space. 107 (1998) (Ginsburg. J. have a long history. Payton v. Carter. Rev.”). and the personal rights which it secures. At the very core stands the right of a man to retreat into his own home and there be free from unreasonable governmental intrusion.”289 where the individual enjoyed a freedom from government intrusion. the Court reiterated its staunch protection of the home: “In none is the zone of privacy more clearly defined than when bounded by the unambiguous physical dimensions of an individual’s home. Const. often viewed as the quintessential place of privacy. 94 Harv. As early as 1886. and almost a century later.B. Minnesota v. In the eighteenth century. Currently.S.. Const. the home is a place where the public is physically locked out. United States. 294. 294 As the Court declared: “The Fourth Amendment. III. See Richard F. it still was not a place of solitude or individual self-development that it is today. J.” 4 William Blackstone. See Note. 1892. U.
.”291 The Court’s worship of the home has not wavered. 589 (1980). Id.2002]
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c.S.”). 297.293 and the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition of unreasonable searches and seizures. William Blackstone declared that the law has “so particular and tender a regard to the immunity of a man’s house that it stiles it his castle.S. 1604) (“[T]he house of every one is to him as his castle and fortress. 194. IV. Home A final example best illustrates the points I am attempting to make: the home. and will never suffer it to be violated with impunity. The first recorded case in which this notion was mentioned was Semayne’s Case. 511 (1961). U.S. 365 U. United States. 116 U. concurring). 253 (1964) (Douglas. L. at 1894 n.”292 This association has existed for a significant time and is embodied in the Third Amendment’s prohibition of the quartering of troops in homes during peacetime. See id.18.S. 1894 (1981). 295. 226. in no way extending an invitation to the public.296 According to Justice Douglas.”295 Although the home was long associated as being a haven from the government. in Boyd v. 616 (1886).290 the Court strictly protected “the sanctity of a man’s home. 195 (K. amend. 445 U. For a long time. at 630. 525 U.S. “[t]he home of course is the essence of privacy. dissenting) (“Our decisions indicate that people have a reasonable expectation of privacy in their homes in part because they have the prerogative to exclude others. 290. it was so in a different way than it is now. Maryland. 505. 296.S. the home has been regarded as one’s “castle. 291. Rep. 573. 83. The maxim that the home is one’s castle appeared as early as 1499. The Right to Privacy in Nineteenth Century America.”297 The home is understood as a place where individuals retreat to find peace of mind and to
289. Bell v. in no way dedicated to public use. Commentaries on the Laws of England 223 (1769). 292. Privacy in a Public Society: Human Rights in Conflict 13 (1987). Hixson. Silverman v.

The End of Privacy 83 (1999). 90:1087
cultivate intimate relationships. Michelle Adams. and it is reflective of.303 As Tamara Hareven explains: “[B]y contrast to the conception of the home in contemporary society as a private retreat from the outside world. at 256. Rev. 3. It may be frail—its roof may shake—the wind may enter—the rain may enter—but the King of England cannot enter—all his force dares not cross the threshold of the ruined tenement!” Charles J. As William Pitt once remarked: “The poorest man may in his cottage bid defiance to the Crown. of course. If the First Amendment means anything. and a conduit for. Id. 17. the home is associated with individual self-development.298 Michelle Adams aptly describes the current view of the home in Western societies as “a place of retreat to the (not always) protective sphere of family life. Hareven. 557 (1969). what books he may read or what films he may watch. Knowing Your Place: Theorizing Sexual Harassment at Home. 23-24 (1998).300 the Court held that obscenity statutes could not “reach into the privacy of one’s own home. 307. many homes merely consisted of a large. and lodgers. a shop with a place in the back or above to eat and sleep.”299 Further.” this concept became more widely held about 150 years ago and was at first limited to the urban middle classes. the home was not always routinely associated with such attributes. L. 305. is a generalization about the practices of particular families. 394 U. 299. 301. Id.307 Houses were hectic crowded places.305 Until the seventeenth century. Times. mainly the families of shopkeepers in urban centers. 1986. such as apprentices.S. sitting alone in his own house. and the house was a crowded bustling place with little opportunity for the family to retreat in isolation. it means that a State has no business telling a man. 40 Ariz. Willaim H. § 7 at 1. often crammed with one or
298. Gass. 306. supra note 279. For such families. familial and emotional intimacy. where each individual has the freedom to engage in personal activities that are not the business of others. For much of history. many did not view the home as “the family’s haven and domestic retreat. supra note 260. Sykes. Id.
.Y. multipurpose space.306 Among the rising bourgeois. homes were primarily devoted to work. Aug. Rybczynski.”304 This. servants. 304. Making Ourselves Comfortable.”301 Although today the home is seen as a place where one can retreat from the bustle of public life and enjoy tranquility and solitude. Georgia. 302. business was conducted in the house. 303. 300. at 25. at 565.302 Many people unrelated to the family would be present in the home. to preindustrial society the family conducted its work and public affairs inside the household. N. at 254.1138
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[Vol. in Stanley v. at 255. Thus. Id.

Marital disputes. for example. and began to be concentrated upstairs. at 45. supra note 263. 315. Flaherty. others squabbled. and sound carried readily throughout the house. solitude would often be disrupted because there were no corridors. Rybczynski. 314. supra note 257.”315 Even with rooms. Crowded beds were due to the scarcity of beds and the need for warmth. at 41 (“There were no corridors in these houses—each room was connected directly to its neighbor—and architects prided themselves on aligning all the doors enfilade. Rybcynski. at 28.317 there were special impediments to making the home a place of
308. Flaherty. at 18. supra note 279. at 43-44. restless children—nothing could be concealed and everything could be heard. As one historian observes about living quarters in Renaissance Europe: “An apartment building was a public theater. at 47. “The wealthy naturally increased the amount of private space available to them.” Arlette Farge. supra note 279. but even guests would share the bed. strangers would sometimes share the same bed. When rooms were assigned purposes. at 18. see also Rybczynski. supra note 257. at 257. Hareven.2002]
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more large families. see also Flaherty. Some held forth. 311.309 Beds were large. 309. supra note 261. Even in the sixteenth century.314 As specialized rooms became more prevalent.310 Not only would a couple sleep with their children. In eighteenth century New England. Community.”313 Beginning in the seventeenth century. Spying on others was easy. in A History of Private Life III. noisy tenants. but no one had any privacy. Houses in America followed this same pattern of development. “bedrooms were no longer mixed up with public rooms. See Hall.”). supra note 260. at 78. 312. State. See id.311 Even among the Puritans of colonial New England. In colonial New England. See Flaherty.312 Before the development of specialized rooms. the house became divided into distinct areas for women and men.. supra note 279. at 34 (describing crowded one-room homes of sixteenth and seventeenth century England).g. at 237. See. 310. equipped with no soundproofing to stop noise from echoing throughout the home.308 Dwelling places were noisy. most houses were built entirely of wood. illicit love affairs. homes began to be partitioned into rooms. supra note 257. Flaherty. supra note 279. scarce. 316. and a significant number of homes housed more than one family. and people would shuffle through rooms to move about the house. so that there was an unobstructed view from one end of the house to the other. at 76. most homes lacked separate rooms. but for the rest of the population. Flaherty. and perhaps not
. at 575-76. a couple would think nothing of sleeping in the same bed with another adult.316 Although solitude within the home developed first among the wealthy. supra note 261. at 76. supra note 257. e. At inns. at 91. Only the aristocracy could afford to purchase the space necessary to maintain privacy. at 33-44. supra note 257. supra note 262. Stone. at 40. 317. each assigned a distinct purpose and some even becoming personalized according to their occupants. See Gottlieb. families were twice as large on average as they are today. the vast majority. and crammed with multiple people. 313. Id. at 41. See id. and Family: Trajectories and Tensions: The Honor and Secrecy of Families. supra note 257. the idea of privacy did not extend beyond the bedroom. Rybczynski. built of creaky wood with cracks and peepholes. beds were placed in public areas and “family members slept behind curtains while social activities including outsiders were going on in other parts of the same room.

Id. supra note 261.319 Further. Between Public and Private: The Lost Boundaries of the Self 31 (1979). 323. 320. See Joseph Bensman & Robert Lilienfeld. Georges Duby. at 227. at 232-33. 322. Hareven. supra note 263. supra note 261.325 The gradual separation of work from home helped to alter the nature of the family and the home.”320 Eventually.318 The houses of the wealthy were continually on show. See Ranum. in A History of the Private Life II. Stone. the homes of many began to be separated physically from the place of work. in A History of Private Life III.
. central heating. supra note 256. The study was a private place for the master of the house only. prevented solitude in the home. at 538. Shils.321 The expansion of living space also contributed to the growing association of solitude with the home. where the master of the house could withdraw for quiet reading or for confidential conversations. supra note 260. very wealthy families were unable to function without servants “even to the point of being unable to dress or undress without assistance. Id. Flaherty. for example. supra note 261. Among larger homes in the eighteenth century. at 134. see also Gottlieb. The study became so private that it was used to store the master’s secret letters of extramarital affairs. The rise of the bourgeoisie made solitude more widely available. at 289. servants. Gini Graham Scott. hallways emerged. Even in the eighteenth century.”326
beyond the bed curtains. supra note 263. and gas and electric lighting limited the need for servants to be ever-present. the household was recast as the family’s private retreat. in A History of Private Life II. Roger Chartier. Toward Intimacy: The Fourteenth and Fifteenth Centuries.324 One’s professional life began to be viewed as a separate realm of existence from one’s life at home. 90:1087
solitude even among the affluent. at 259. at 234. and home emerged as a new concept and existence. prone to gossip and even blackmail. at 225. supra note 72. 319. at 243. supra note 282. 326.322 Privacy began to be possible within certain special rooms—the study. supra note 257. Mind Your Own Business: The Battle for Personal Privacy 32 (1995). at xii. See Philippe Braunstein.1140
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[Vol. the wealthy owners of stately homes in England were “torn between the conflicting needs of their private selves and their public personae” because they wanted to maintain their houses to display their riches and status but also wanted privacy. supra note 317. As Hareven notes: “Following the removal of the workplace from the home as a result of urbanization and industrialization. Ariès. in A History of Private Life III. 318.” Orest Ranum. 325. innovations such as plumbing. women had no comparable private room of their own. Figures of Modernity: The Practical Impact of Writing. Forms of Privatization: The Refuges of Intimacy. Preface. permitting an unprecedented ability to be alone and undisturbed. at 39-40. 324. supra note 256. at 1-2. Stone. at 226-27. 321.323 When employment shifted from agriculture to factories and offices in the late nineteenth century. at 40. According to Lawrence Stone.

Id. and home is merely a historical accident. body. should not detract our focus from practices.” what it currently means to call them “private” differs from what was meant in other times during history. Further sociological study is necessary to understand the origin of the desire for privacy in particular situations.
327. however. In his analysis of privacy in primitive cultures. However. we control our desires through practices. and that this explains why they became private when technology or other practices enabled this to occur. that such desire stems from biological need. body. one could claim that we always desired them to be so. sociologist Barrington Moore observed a general preference for seclusion during sexual intercourse (although this did not always occur in practice). This question.327 Moore writes: “[t]he fact that human beings can control certain impulses does not mean they lack these impulses. there is a wide variation among such practices based on factors such as urbanization. and a mere desire for privacy for a certain activity does not necessarily make such an activity private. The human psyche is no blank slate upon which social training can write any message. Even if the privacy of certain matters stems in part from biological desire. Some practices involving privacy may have roots in our biological natures. and numerous other changes in the quality and nature of life had profound effects for the perception of what the private life entailed. changing architecture of the home.
. when historical practices regarding the family. 328. Perhaps the interaction of biological desire and social practices creates the desire for privacy in certain contexts. emergence of new social places. at 70. increasing wealth and space. what I hope to have illustrated by the use of this brief historical sketch is that certain attitudes and practices were not universal. Moore. decreased crowding. transformation in the nature of the family. at 67. but were shaped by the realities of particular historical periods.”328 Even though certain matters and activities were not private in the way we understand them today. supra note 75. ethnic and religious subgroups. Privacy and Technological and Social Change The preceding discussion illustrates that technological and social change alters the extent to which privacy is a dimension of certain practices as well as what we mean when we speak about certain practices as involving privacy. The history I related is told at an enormous level of generality.2002]
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3. new attitudes toward the body. I am not claiming that the privacy of the family. The shrinking of the size of the family. While we may long regard certain matters as “private. and home are examined in more detail. and so on. Although what is public and private is shaped by culture and history. class and social status. separation of home from work.

For example. containing our most secret thoughts.
. Looking historically at practices deepens our understanding of the role that privacy has played in them and the effects that disruptions to them might cause. in America. Maryland. Privacy is an issue of power. Empirical and descriptive claims as to the current cultural understandings of privacy are very important in conceptualizing privacy. Smith. we must understand their historical development. 330. then we fail to adapt to the changing realities of the modern world. and
329. supra note 257. Id. see Flaherty. and the wax often used to keep letters sealed was not very effective. if we merely seek to preserve those activities and matters that have historically been considered private. mail was often insecure.329 On the other hand.331 As Ralph Waldo Emerson presumed. and normatively. the privacy of letters was formed in significant part by a legal architecture that protected the confidentiality of letters from other people and government officials. how are we to determine what to protect as private? We must make such determinations by evaluating practices empirically. at 23-25.330 There was widespread suspicion of postal clerks reading letters. such as Thomas Jefferson. 442 U. If we focus simply on people’s current expectations of privacy. In colonial America. and George Washington. thus altering society’s expectations of privacy. Alexander Hamilton. even if we need to create this privacy through the use of law.”). Since practices are dynamic. but the product of a vision of the larger social structure. a conception of privacy can only provide a status report on existing privacy norms rather than guide us toward shaping privacy law and policy in the future. privacy is not simply an empirical and historical question that measures the collective sense in any given society of what is and has long been considered to be private. historically. it was unlikely that “a bit of paper. supra note 48. at 50-51. 740 n. However.S. and a number of prominent individuals. Without a normative component. those subjective expectations obviously could play no meaningful role in ascertaining what the scope of Fourth Amendment protection was. 331. 90:1087
One might object to my approach because of its evolving nature. at 115-27. A conception of privacy must be responsive to social reality since privacy is an aspect of social practices. See Smith v. 735.1142
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[Vol. it is not simply the general expectations of society. it was difficult to seal letters. For an extensive discussion of the privacy of letters in colonial America. decried the lack of privacy in their letters and would sometimes even write in code. the government could gradually condition people to accept wiretapping or other privacy incursions. Similarly. our conception of privacy would continually shrink given the increasing surveillance in the modern world. If there is no consistent set of practices that should be considered private. We want certain matters to be private.5 (1979) (“[W]here an individual’s subjective expectations had been ‘conditioned’ by influences alien to well-recognized Fourth Amendment freedoms.

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protected only by a seal. 57 New German Critique 87 (1992). 727. and their actions. and the ends that these practices further. 335. which requires us to examine the value of privacy in particular contexts.333 In the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. the law evolved to provide strong protection of the privacy of letters. when analyzing the value of the privacy of the home in order to make legal and policy decisions.336 which means that practices are performed for particular reasons.S. it affects how people behave. B. supra note 211. The value of privacy not only illuminates what privacy is but also enables us to balance it with conflicting values. The Value of Privacy
One of the most integral aspects of conceptualizing privacy is to discern the value of privacy. See Michael Sullivan & John T. Thus. sealed parcels were protected from inspection by the Fourth Amendment. create. supra note 48. at 50-51. supra note 48. Regan. Smith.334 And the Supreme Court held in 1877 that despite the fact that people turned letters over to the government for delivery in the postal system. the value of privacy depends upon the purposes of the practices that are involved. Under my approach. Congress passed several laws prohibiting the improper opening of mail. To do this. 334. their choices. at 49. 336. at 46-49. at 56-57. we must focus on our practices— specifically. we must look to the purposes of
332. Quoted in Smith. For example. the nature of privacy in these practices.
. and goals. The value of privacy depends upon the importance of the purposes of the practices. 333. who was in charge of the colonial mails. aims. the role that privacy plays in these practices. 733 (1877). determining what the law should protect as private depends upon a normative analysis. Therefore. or halt certain practices. Between Impotence and Illusion: Adorno’s Art of Theory and Practice. Lysaker.”332 Despite these realities. Privacy is an issue of power.335 This example illustrates that privacy is not just found but constructed. our society shaped the practices of letter writing and using the postal system. required his employees to swear an oath not to open mail. Id. It occurred because of the desire to make privacy an integral part of these practices rather than to preserve the status quo. Ex Parte Jackson. By erecting a legal structure to protect the privacy of letters. disrupt. 96 U. and I now turn to this issue. Benjamin Franklin. the value of privacy is an important dimension of conceptualizing privacy. Practices are activities and modalities of living that have purposes. When we seek to protect. without anyone whose hands it had passed through having meddled with it. should travel safety from one end of the world to the other. and people’s expectation that letters would not be confidential. we are basing that decision on our view of the importance of the purposes of these practices.

We may think that privacy is an undesirable dimension of a certain practice or that a practice involving privacy is undesirable in its totality. which informs how we wish to structure power in society and how we want to empower the self. however.. One such cost is that unsettling existing practices can thwart people’s ability to exercise control over their lives. if so. A law that runs counter to this practice could create profound psychological distress as well as changes in behavior that result in restricting personal freedom. psyche. The approach I advocate does not look to history to locate certain matters that always have been private. Although we might think that society would be better off if all medical information were public. See Frisby v. rather it looks to history to understand the development of certain practices and the manner in which power is exercised in society. If privacy impacts the practice in a negative way. 319 U. affect the welfare. and in many cases. Often. the fact that most people take great pains to keep this information secret cannot be ignored. Schultz. conflicting values clash with our desire to protect this purpose.1144
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[Vol. If privacy furthers a desirable practice (or is so constitutive of the practice that the practice would be impossible without it). 487 U. Pacifica Found. I am not suggesting that we must avoid interfering with existing practices. Of course. then.
. our policy decisions must account for the effects of such interference on people’s psychological well-being. 90:1087
the privacy practices of the home. 474 (1988) (finding constitutional an ordinance prohibiting picketing on public streets in front of a specific residence because privacy interests are of the highest order and people are captive audiences in their homes).337 Given the value of a particular practice. the current practices of society have significant weight in what we should protect as private.S. Disruptions to certain practices affect other practices. in contrast to the discourse’s
337. and freedom of individuals. then privacy should be recommended. One such purpose is one’s ability in the home to escape from the hustle and bustle of the everyday world.S. How. but we must also recognize the costs of disrupting these practices. such as the free speech rights of people to protest outside a person’s home or to broadcast into the home certain potentially offensive television and radio messages. then less privacy would be desirable. The way we shape practices depends upon our vision of the good. Martin v. is privacy to be valued? First. FCC v. I contend that privacy should be valued instrumentally. 438 U. how it impacts that practice. we must ask to what extent privacy is a dimension of that practice and. Second. City of Struthers. 141 (1943) (holding that ordinance prohibiting door-to-door solicitation to prevent annoyance and crime was unconstitutional because less restrictive alternatives were available). 726 (1978) (holding that broadcast of George Carlin’s seven dirty words on the radio could be restricted to certain times of the day because people who unwittingly heard the monologue were a captive audience until they had time to switch to a new station).S. Of course.

” Julie Inness claims. as privacy fosters self-creation. 340. at 6 (contending that privacy has an “inherently positive value”). along with other scholars. As John Dewey observed. 344. distorted. at 95. I contend that there is no overarching value of privacy. Ronald Dworkin. 342.. According to Gavison. supra note 253. Byford. Indeed. Life’s Dominion: An Argument about Abortion. which could be disrupted. Boling and Inness claim that privacy is necessary for intimate human relationships. supra note 108. According to Stanley Benn: “[R]espect for someone as a person. an inherently positive value. persons with the potential to freely develop close relationships. Westin. privacy has an intrinsic value. “because it acknowledges our respect for persons as autonomous beings with the capacity to love. 339. and Individual Freedom 69-70 (1993). implie[s] respect for him as one engaged on a kind of self-creative enterprise.2002]
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tendency to value privacy in a general and abstract way.342 I contend that privacy has an instrumental value—namely. 343. Euthanasia. 341. but are evolving targets. at 26. there are a number of candidates for the value of privacy. 1988). which describe the value of privacy in the abstract. Bloustein argues that privacy protects dignity and individuality. I argue that privacy must be valued contextually. John Dewey. Id. ends are not fixed. as a chooser.”). independence. constantly subject to revision and change as the individual strives toward them. For example. privacy is essential for autonomy and freedom. at 442 (arguing that “we cannot avoid a functional analysis” of the value of privacy). According to many theorists.
. even for the hermit and the recluse. that it is valued as a means for achieving certain other ends that are valuable.”341 However. Gavison. Inness. supra note 4. care and like—in other words.g.338 Ronald Dworkin. supra note 1. Human Nature and Conduct. theories of privacy have viewed the value of privacy in terms of furthering a number of different ends.. Fried claims that privacy fosters love and friendship. or frustrated even by so limited an intrusion as watching.”344 In contrast to many conceptions of privacy. My first contention concerns the general method of valuation.”339 Several privacy scholars who claim that privacy is valuable in itself locate the source of the value in a form of respect that must be provided to all rational beings. supra note 3. Benn. See. at 39 (“[P]rivacy is neither a self-sufficient state nor an end in itself. one of the principal proponents of intrinsic value. e.343 “Ends are foreseen consequences which arise in the course of activity and which are employed to give activity added meaning and to direct its further course. It is basically an instrument for achieving individual goals of self-realization.
338. in 14 The Middle Works of John Dewey 155 (Jo Ann Boydston ed.”340 “[P]rivacy is valuable. argues that certain things “are valuable in themselves and not just for their utility or for the pleasure or satisfaction they bring us.

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[Vol. Id. 438 (1928). C. One of the most famous instances of the abuse of wiretapping was the FBI’s extensive wiretapping of Martin Luther King. These events underscore the wisdom of Brandeis’s observations in Olmstead—the landscape of privacy is constantly changing.S. one of the most significant threats to privacy in the twentieth century. Jr. and reputation. no one of these ends is furthered by all practices of privacy. Id. J. Jr. Practical Applications
Why should scholars and judges adopt my approach to conceptualizing privacy? To deal with the myriad of problems involving privacy. However. United States. dissenting) (internal quotations omitted). chastising the Court for failing to adapt the Constitution to new problems: “[I]n the application of a Constitution. The Court’s 1928 decision in Olmstead v. 348. for nearly forty years..348 Finally. at 474 (Brandeis. creativity. Garrow. for it is shaped by the rapid pace of technological invention. our contemplation cannot be only of what has been. (1980). Rather.”347 The Olmstead Court had clung to the outmoded view that the privacy protected by the Fourth Amendment was merely freedom from physical incursions.S.346 Justice Louis Brandeis vigorously dissented. or else the old conceptions will lead them astray in finding solutions.349 holding that the Fourth Amendment did apply to wiretapping. The problem with discussing the value of privacy in the abstract is that privacy is a dimension of a wide variety of practices each having a different value—and what privacy is differs in different contexts. This flexibility is impeded by the use of an overarching conception of privacy. For an account of some of the most notorious abuses of wiretapping by law enforcement officials. Trying to solve all privacy problems with a uniform and
345. see Whitfield Diffie & Susan Landau. scholars and judges will have to adopt multiple conceptions of privacy. but of what may be. The Court held that the wiretapping of a person’s home telephone (done outside a person’s house) did not run afoul of the Fourth Amendment because it did not involve a trespass inside a person’s home.
. imagination. 346. we must focus specifically on the value of privacy within particular practices. United States345 epitomizes the need for flexibility in conceptualizing privacy. As a result. freedom of thought. The FBI and Martin Luther King. 349. 90:1087
autonomy. at 465. the Court swept away this view in Katz v. 389 U. the Fourth Amendment failed to apply to wiretapping. See David J. the law must maintain great flexibility in conceptualizing privacy problems. My approach toward conceptualizing privacy does not focus on the value of privacy generally. Privacy on the Line: The Politics of Wiretapping and Encryption 109-223 (1998). 347 (1967) (overruling Olmstead). in 1967. 347. 277 U. and therefore. counter-culture.

At the time the photograph was taken. we should seek to understand the special circumstances of a particular problem. 802 S. 353. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652D (1981). See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652D cmt. “necessarily involves doffing the cloak of
350.W. and different conceptions of privacy work best in different contexts.”352 The court held that the student’s case should be dismissed because “[t]he picture accurately depicted a public event and was published as part of a newspaper article describing the game. a newspaper published a photo of a high school soccer player’s genitalia that he inadvertently exposed while running on the soccer field. Courts routinely employ this reasoning in cases involving the tort of public disclosure of private facts. App. the law has attempted to adhere to overarching conceptions of privacy that do not work for all privacy problems.”). Id. McNamara. The law has often failed to adapt to deal with the variety of privacy problems we are encountering today. Freedom Newspapers. 351. In McNamara.354 Appearing in public. 1991).W. What practices are being disrupted? In what ways does the disruption resemble or differ from other forms of disruption? How does this disruption affect society and social structure? These are some of the questions that should be asked when grappling with privacy problems. 352.2d 901 (Tex. Since the photograph was taken outside and in public. Instead.”351 The student contended that the newspaper “violated the bounds of public decency” and “could have used one of its other numerous photographs in its article.
. the student could not claim that an image of his exposed genitals was a private matter. I will discuss several examples that illustrate these points. In the remainder of this section. in which one is liable for widely publicizing “a matter concerning the private life of another” that “would be highly offensive to a reasonable person” and “is not of legitimate concern to the public.2002]
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overarching conception of privacy is akin to using a hammer not only to insert a nail into the wall but also to drill a hole. The case of McNamara v. Not all privacy problems are the same. Ct. 354. according to one court. Instead of trying to fit new problems into old conceptions. at 905. The student sued under the tort of public disclosure of private facts.”353 Although not explicitly stated. Inc. Much of the law of information privacy was shaped to deal with particular privacy problems in mind. the court appeared to be conceptualizing privacy as a form of secrecy.2d at 904-05. 802 S.350 demonstrates the deficiencies of failing to recognize the distinctiveness of particular privacy invasions. which is violated by the disclosure of concealed facts. [the student] was voluntarily participating in a spectator sport at a public place. B (1977) (“There is no liability [for public disclosure of private facts] when the defendant merely gives further publicity to information about the plaintiff that is already public.

are deeply connected to human dignity. We scrub. for it is no secret that people eliminate waste. Exam’r.E. the court dismissed a public disclosure action for the filming and broadcast of the wrongful arrest of a married couple because the arrest was filmed in a place “left open to the public eye. dress. July 9. Taft Broadcasting Co.. no secrets or concealed information are revealed. which relegate these aspects of life to the private sphere. See supra Part II. but are today deeply entrenched in most societies. 469 N. Under Florida’s public records law. The injury was not one caused by the disclosure of concealed information. Globe Newspaper Co.358 Dignity is. however. it is common knowledge that people urinate and defecate. 1979).357 A candid photograph of a person in the nude or engaged in elimination of waste engenders deep embarrassment and distress for most people.” Exposure differs from disclosure in that with exposure. and groom ourselves in order to present ourselves to the public in a dignified manner. I believe. 2001-30373-CICI.1148
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[Vol. discharge. and excretion because we are socialized into viewing them with disgust. and extraordinarily intrusive invasion of the personal privacy of that person’s surviving family members. Co. at 7 (7th Cir. and the owner of a website that specialized in posting gruesome autopsy photographs (along with a number of newspapers and media entities) were interested in obtaining the photographs. based upon social practices. Penwell v. 939 (Mass. Revealing the fact that a person urinates or defecates is not what privacy is about in this context. In response. Taft Broad. For example. the ability to transcend
355. These social practices. As discussed earlier.. Exposure involves the exposing of certain physical or emotional attributes which. but one of what I will call “exposure. Volusia County Office of the Med. We cloak the nude body in public based on norms of decorum. Cefalu v. absent any unusual physical features. 391 N. We seek to cover up smells. slip op. Earnhardt’s wife sought to keep the autopsy photographs of Earnhardt from the public. Over thirty photographs were taken of Earnhardt’s cadaver. 358. 2001). a famous race car driver who died while racing in 2001. 1028 (Ohio App. A Florida court upheld the law. in Penwell v. autopsy photographs are public documents.”356 The McNamara court. This conception of privacy would more appropriately account for the recent controversy over the autopsy photographs of Dale Earnhardt.”355 For example. the nude body does not reveal secrets or facts about a person. the Florida legislature passed a law restricting the disclosure of autopsy photographs unless the party seeking disclosure obtained a court order by showing good cause for disclosure.” Earnhardt v. why are people so upset about this form of exposure? The answer. Nevertheless. in part. is that social practices have developed to conceal aspects of life that we find animal-like or disgusting as well as activities in which we feel particularly vulnerable and weak. are often kept out of view of others.A. 356. stating that the “publication of a person’s autopsy photographs constitutes a unique.2d 1025. 90:1087
privacy which the law protects.. If no secrets are being disclosed.2d 935. The court further stated that “[t]here is a
. these practices developed over a long span of history. 357. App. No. 1984).E. applied an inappropriate conception of privacy in deciding the case. people currently take great strides to cloak their nude bodies and to urinate and defecate away from other people. Further. serious.

Indeed. e. These techniques were among those employed by the Nazis during the Holocaust.361 Ralph Nader. 362.” Id. 360. See.2002]
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one’s animal nature.” in certain instances. In a decent society that should be recognized per se. wiretapped his telephone and eavesdropped into his conversations. Id.2d 765 (N. and so on. “surveillance may be so ‘overzealous’ as to render it actionable. It is hedged in with rules about appropriateness as to place. The fact that the exposure occurred in a public place should have been treated as relatively unimportant.E. the fact that the student’s genitalia was exposed to the public may have eliminated its secrecy..”366 As the court illustrated: “A person does not automatically make public everything he does merely by being in a public place. 363.359 When social practices relating to dignity are disrupted. . Id.”). And to violate those rules is a cause for disgrace and shame.. 365. at 771. the court held that although observation “in a public place does not amount to an invasion of . General Motors interviewed Nader’s friends and acquaintances to learn the private details of his life. the result can be a severe and sometimes debilitating humiliation and loss of self-esteem. at 767. forcing them to eliminate waste in public. was a well-established tortious intrusion.”363 The harassing phone calls and the prostitutes did not involve “intrusion for the purpose of gathering information of a private and confidential nature. In Nader v. Id. General Motors Corp. and the mere fact that Nader was in a bank did not give anyone the right to try to discover the amount of money he was
substantial injury to families when strangers are permitted carte blanche to go through their loved ones’ autopsy photographs. Id. made threatening and harassing phone calls. 366. Another example demonstrates how the approach of conceptualizing privacy articulated in this Article will shift the focus of the courts to more pertinent and appropriate considerations.Y. at 770.362 The court proceeded to analyze one-by-one each of the particular acts of General Motors. 361. 255 N.g. privacy. one form of torture is to dehumanize and degrade people by making them dirty. William Ian Miller. See id. and kept him under pervasive surveillance while outside in public places. to feel worthy of respect.”364 The wiretapping. but the injury was not one of lost secrecy. however.360 Therefore. stripping them. at 9.365 On the question of the pervasive surveillance. hired prostitutes to entrap him into an illicit relationship. criticized the safety of General Motors’ automobiles for many years. 364. . 359.
. The court held that interviewing Nader’s friends was not an invasion of privacy: “Information about the plaintiff which was already known to others could hardly be regarded as private to the plaintiff. to be civilized. a prominent public figure and outspoken critic for consumer safety. 1970). The Anatomy of Disgust 147 (1997) (“Clearly defecation is degrading and contaminating.

Rather. 90:1087
withdrawing. as if they are hunted prey or prisoners under constant guard. Id. The disruption involved in this case was not a loss of secrecy. There was no evidence that General Motors discovered any embarrassing facts or that Nader’s reputation was harmed. his sexual behavior. General Motors’ campaign of harassment. and the paramount social importance of avoiding such exercises of power designed to deter.”371 As Brietel’s concurrence correctly noted. 368. and investigation created a form of systemic oppressiveness. the facts of this case suggest a different type of disruption.”369 According to Brietel.
. they may do so in combination. and discredit individuals. This type of power has a significant potential to render people vulnerable and helpless. J. surveillance. at 771. Brietel reasoned. his conversations. surveillance in public would constitute an invasion of privacy only if it revealed certain facts or information commonly deemed “private” such as financial information. 370. concurring).” these classifications are neither “frozen or exhausted. Judge Brietel contended that although the common-law privacy torts are “subdivided . . Id. at 772 (Brietel. Id. The purpose of General Motors’ plan was to employ its considerable power in a campaign to disrupt Nader’s personal affairs. The court should have focused on the way in which the company’s actions aimed to disrupt Nader’s life. “it is premature to hold that the attempted entrapment of plaintiff in a public place by seemingly promiscuous ladies is no invasion of any of the categories of the right to privacy. these aspects of his life were irrelevant to the consumer advocacy issues he was raising against General Motors. These are aspects of life we commonly consider to be private. Nor was there a loss of control over information. or serve to enhance other violations of the right to privacy. General Motors focused its assault on personal aspects of Nader’s life: his friends. one that should be conceptualized from the bottom up by focusing on the situation at hand. the court held that this issue depended “on the nature of the proof.
367. an exercise of power that is profoundly suffocating and threatening to a person’s private life. and his daily activities.1150
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[Vol. 369. . and with regard to Nader. the majority lost sight of the forest for the trees. In a well-reasoned concurring opinion.”367 Thus. however.. 371. Id. especially ones who are attempting to raise important social and political issues. harass. “while allegations treated singly may not constitute a cause of action. as nothing in this case indicates that any of Nader’s secrets were uncovered or disclosed.”368 Based on its example. Much of the information gleaned by General Motors was not intimate. Id.”370 Further. into separate classifications.

the court should have focused on social practices and their disruption. 374. 435 (1976). 442 U. at 743. at 443. A third application of the pragmatic approach to conceptualizing privacy demonstrates the profound problems with clinging to a particular conception of privacy that is not well-suited for grappling with the privacy problems of the Information Age.S. Id. In a series of decisions. held that there is no reasonable expectation of privacy for information known by or exposed to third parties. Indeed.376 the Court held that there was no reasonable expectation of privacy in pen registers (a listing of the phone numbers a person dials) because they were turned over to third persons (phone companies). 425 U. 373. 378. Maryland. e. See id. 375. United States. 401 U. Hoffa v. 376..S. 425 U. United States v. in Smith v. Id. people cannot “harbor any general expectation that the numbers they dial will remain secret.S.
. at 444. the court impeded a jury’s ability to consider the full situation. United States.377 Since people “know that they must convey numerical information to the phone company” and that the phone company can and does record this information. 745 (1971) (finding that the Fourth Amendment does not protect information conveyed to government informant who wears a radio transmitter). viewing privacy as secrecy. This focus would have enabled the court to better assess the nature and effects of the power that General Motors exercised. at 745-46.S. See. 377. 735 (1979).S. one of the most important reasons for protecting privacy is to prevent stifling exercises of power employed to destroy or injure individuals. Certain disruptions. Miller. are created cumulatively by the aggregation of isolated acts which together can be oppressive. rather than look for isolated privacy harms based on existing categories. 385 U. Miller.S. such as the one in Nader. this conception is ill-suited for the
372. the Court.374 the Court concluded that “the Fourth Amendment does not prohibit the obtaining of information revealed to a third party and conveyed by him to Government authorities. On Lee v.372 the Court concluded that a person does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in her financial records kept by her bank. In short.373 Analogizing to a series of cases in which a person’s friend betrays their secret or a person divulges information to a police informant or undercover officer.”375 Similarly. 343 U. White. 747 (1952) (finding that the Fourth Amendment does not apply when a person misplaces her trust by talking to a bugged government informant). In United States v. 293 (1966) (finding that the Fourth Amendment does not protect “misplaced confidence” when speaking to an undercover informant). the court should have assessed the whole situation.2002]
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Instead of dissecting the situation and placing each invasion into preexisting categories of privacy.”378 The Court’s jurisprudence in these cases conceptualizes privacy as a form of total secrecy. By slicing off parts of the case and compartmentalizing them into categories. however.g.

the court reasoned that the FCC’s asserted state interest in protecting consumer privacy was not “substantial. the importance of applying my approach toward conceptualizing privacy is illustrated by the current difficulties of courts in grappling with privacy problems created by the collection and use of personal information in today’s Information Age. For example. 1999). which determined that the regulations involved a restriction on commercial speech. Ohio 1965) (finding third parties liable for inducing breach of patientphysician confidentiality). and so on.3d 1224 (10th Cir. and our financial records are commonly understood as private matters even though third-parties may have access to (or even possess) that information.S.379 Life in the modern Information Age often involves exchanging information with third parties. 1 (1996) (psychotherapist-patient privilege). Finally. cable companies. Co. The people we call. West.S. e. Rev. 383 (1981) (attorney-client privilege).382 a telecommunications carrier challenged on First Amendment grounds the privacy regulations of the Federal Communications Commission (“FCC”).381 By conceptualizing using the metaphors and understandings of privacy created to solve other privacy problems. 90:1087
circumstances involved in these cases. but it is more appropriate as an account of modern practices. Upjohn Co. some of which the law strongly protects. The court. at 1234-35..383 In concluding that the regulations failed the Central Hudson test. 384.380 This is not the only way to conceptualize privacy.”384 Noting that privacy was a very broad concept. in U. analyzed the regulations under the Central Hudson intermediate scrutiny test. Hammonds v. In contrast to the notion of privacy as secrecy. United States. privacy can be understood as an expectation in a certain degree of accessibility of information. (forthcoming 2002).g. where cumulatively.
. 86 Minn. at 1233.1152
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[Vol.S. Supp. the papers we discard. 182 F.. supra note 83. we disclose a tremendous amount of data in various settings and transactions. 380. 383. Public Records. 243 F. v. such as phone companies. & Sur. 793 (D. Solove. Aetna Cas. Indeed. judges and legal scholars have not yet been able to adequately grapple with the privacy problems created by the collection and use of personal information. 449 U. Federal Communications Commission. See. such as those between attorney and client and between patient and physician. Solove. See Daniel J. 381. and the Constitution. Internet service providers. Thus. Id. which restricted the use and disclosure of customers’ personal information unless the customers gave their consent. at 1398. I do not believe that these problems can be conceptualized under the same paradigms as other privacy problems. Access and Aggregation: Privacy. 382. merchants. L. the
379. 518 U. Inc. We expect privacy because we do not expect unauthorized persons to delve through this information. Jaffee v. Id. we often share information in various relationships. Redmond. clinging to the notion of privacy as total secrecy would mean the practical extinction of privacy in today’s world. v.

This disruption of the way that power is allocated between individuals and large corporations goes to the structure of our society as a whole.S. intimidation or harassment. databases do not invade or disrupt our intimate lives. psychological trauma. This problem differs from the disclosure of a secret. or the pervasive surveillance of an individual. important aspects of the problem will be ignored or marginalized. supra note 83. Id. It is a problem that goes to the heart of what type of society we are constructing as we move headfast into the Information Age.
Id. birth date. and so on are not intimate facts about our existence. addresses. 388. harbored its own implicit conception of what would constitute a privacy invasion: [T]he government must show that the dissemination of the information desired to be kept private would inflict specific and significant harm on individuals. is a constrained way to view the disruption created by the aggregation and uncontrolled uses of personal information by private sector bureaucracies. types of cars we own. race. much of the information collected about individuals in databases consists of day-to-day.”385 The court. Trying to fit the problem into the conception of privacy as secrecy will not illuminate the problem very well. the exposure of a nude body. and so on). address. where the individual is left with specific injuries that can be readily translated into damages (for example.
. phone number. certainly not equivalent to our deeply held secrets or carefully guarded diary entries. West court was too fixated on a conception of privacy that viewed its invasion as a discrete harm. and so on. however. 386. akin to a tort harm. 387. In
385. I have discussed the privacy problem created by the collection and use of personal information by private sector companies at length elsewhere. This.”387 The U.386 The court further stated that a “general level of discomfort from knowing that people can readily access information about us does not necessarily rise to the level of a substantial state interest under Central Hudson for it is not based on an identified harm. a ruined reputation.388 Although many disruptions of privacy practices involve the disclosure of secrets. The conception of privacy as intimacy fails to capture the problem in this context because for the most part. such as undue embarrassment or ridicule. gender. Our names. however. in fact. or misappropriation of sensitive personal information for the purposes of assuming another’s identity. Id. See Solove. a broken leg.2002]
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court held that the FCC did not “specify the particular notion of privacy and the interest served. often nonsecret information such as name. at 1235.

The conception of privacy as control over information only partially captures the problem. It is often useful to define contexts of some breadth. Of course. I am not arguing that we must always avoid referring to privacy in the abstract. Conceptualizing privacy in particular contexts is an essential step in grappling with legal and policy problems. what makes this problem significant is the fact that this information is aggregated. the issue remains: At what level of generality should the contexts be defined? This is a difficult question. I am certainly not arguing against endeavors to conceptualize privacy. In other words. existing conceptions of privacy have not adequately accounted for this problem. Rather. attempts to locate a common denominator for conceptualizing privacy have been unsatisfying. This Article does not recommend that contexts be defined so narrowly as to pertain to only a few circumstances. The problem can be better understood and dealt with by conceptualizing privacy from the bottom up. such abstract reference to privacy often fails to be useful when we need to conceptualize privacy to solve legal and policy problems. We can evaluate the results of our conceptions by looking to how well they work in solving the problems. A bottom-up contextualized approach toward conceptualizing privacy will prove quite fruitful in today’s world of rapidly changing technology. Thus. Conclusion Thus far. so long as the generalization is not overly reductive or distorting. Conceptions that attempt to locate the core or essence of privacy wind up being too broad or too narrow. sometimes it is easiest and most efficient to do so. beginning with the problem itself rather than trying to fit the problem into a general category. The way we conceptualize privacy in each context profoundly influences how we shape legal solutions to particular problems. it may be worthwhile to begin conceptualizing privacy in a different way. in advocating a contextual analysis of privacy. processed. the issue
. The human mind simply cannot examine experience in its chaotic totality: it must bite off pieces to analyze. and I doubt there is a uniform level of generality that is preferable.1154
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[Vol. that it can be used to make important decisions about people’s lives. Focusing on particular contexts and practices is a way of carving up experience into digestible parts. and that the individual has scant knowledge of how the information is processed and used. Therefore. The problem is also engendered by the process by which the information is collected. All generalization is an imperfection. that it is often subjected to a bureaucratic process lacking much discipline and control. and used—a process which itself is out of control. most of our relationships are more like business transactions than intimate interpersonal relationships. Therefore. Although I critique attempts to locate an overarching conception of privacy. 90:1087
cyberspace.

these emerging problems. With the method of philosophical inquiry I am recommending.2002]
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of how we conceptualize privacy is of paramount importance for the Information Age. and thus more effectively grapple with.
. we can better understand. causing great disruption to numerous important practices of high social value. for we are beset with a number of complex privacy problems.