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In this personal injury action, the court affirmed the grant of summary judgment to Motiva Enterprises, H.D. Payne & Co., H.D. Payne and Co. of Greenwood, and Hayne B. Workman, holding none of the respondents had a master-servant relationship with the individual who was directly responsible for the plaintiffs' injuries.

Thomas Webb appeals his convictions for kidnapping, armed robbery, and first-degree burglary, arguing the trial court erred in (1) allowing the State to refer to Webb as a "wild animal" in its opening statement and closing argument; (2) allowing the State to include facts about Webb's hair in its closing argument; and (3) not allowing defense counsel to fully cross examine Joy Hines and Officer Mann regarding the charges against co-defendant Randy Gaunt.

In this appeal, Richard Murr argues the circuit court erred in granting Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company's (Carrier) motion for summary judgment. Specifically, Murr maintains he was entitled to liability coverage under the "temporary substitute" provision of his policy with Carrier. We reverse and remand.

Santiago Rios appeals his conviction for murder, arguing the trial court erred in (1) denying his request to suppress two statements he made to investigators because he did not knowingly and intelligently waive his Miranda rights and (2) failing to charge the jury on involuntary manslaughter and self-defense.

In this appeal, M. Lee Jennings (Husband) contends that the circuit court erred by granting Respondents' motions for summary judgment as to his cause of action for a violation of the Stored Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2712 (2006). Husband also argues that the circuit court erred by denying his motion to amend his complaint to add Thomas Neal as a party defendant. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings.

This is a cross-appeal of a jury verdict in favor of Respondent-Appellant Hiester Construction Company and Respondent Dilia & Odin Painting Company in an action brought by Appellants-Respondents Kenneth E. and Bonnie L. Wright for damages arising from the destruction of the Wrights' home as the result of a fire. The Wrights' appeal concerns various evidentiary and procedural issues during the trial. In its cross-appeal, Hiester Construction contends the trial court should have directed a verdict in its favor instead of submitting the matter to the jury.

In this appeal from the family court, the Court of Appeals affirmed the family court's decision to award the wife permanent periodic alimony and its division of the parties' debts. The court declined to rule on husband's argument regarding attorneys' fees when the husband's argument was solely based on the propriety of the family court's alimony and property awards.

Perry Keith Strickland appeals his convictions for voluntary manslaughter and assault and battery of a high and aggravated nature (ABHAN), arguing the trial court erred in denying his directed verdict motion.

In this breach of contract action, Tammy Maro appeals the trial court's grant of James Lewis's motion for directed verdict. Maro argues the trial court erred in granting the motion because she proved all elements of the breach of contract and breach of contract accompanied by fraud causes of action. Further, Maro argues the trial court erred in allowing certain documents into evidence and allowing questioning regarding the documents. We reverse and remand.

Horry County Solid Waste Authority appeals the trial court's decision to suppress evidence regarding the decedent's blood alcohol level in this wrongful death action. The County also claims the trial court erred in referencing the South Carolina Commercial Driver's License Manual in its charge to the jury warranting a new trial. We affirm.

In this child custody case, John High (Father) appeals from the family court's order granting Renee High (Mother) sole custody of the couple's two children, arguing the family court erred in: (1) refusing to qualify Teressa Harrington, LPC as an expert witness; (2) prohibiting the introduction of statements made by the couple's minor daughter to Harrington; (3) refusing to admit Harrington's records into evidence; (4) making certain findings of fact relevant to the issue of custody which are not supported by the record; (5) failing to consider important factors contained in the record in its award of primary custody to Mother; (6) awarding Mother sole custody based on the fact that Mother was historically the caregiver of the minor children; and (7) granting Mother custody based on the primary caretaker factor. In her cross-appeal, Mother argues the family court erred in (1) hearing Father's untimely motion to alter or amend, and (2) failing to award her attorney's fees and costs.