Terry Collins rolled the dice Thursday night — and his team won the prize.

Rightly recognizing that the magnitude necessitated an unconventional approach, the Mets' manager brought in his elite closer, Jeurys Familia, for a six-out save in the decisive Game 5 of the NLDS against the Dodgers. He could've stayed with flame-throwing Noah Syndergaard for a second inning in relief of starter Jacob deGrom, but Collins' gut told him differently.

Familia had never attempted a six-out save in 172 regular-season and postseason appearances entering Thursday. And that made some people nervous.

By taking Noah Syndergaard out and asking Jeurys Familia to get six outs, Terry Collins is opening the door to be second-guessed. Wow.

It brought back memories of a similar playoff opportunity in Dodger Stadium two years ago, but one that played out differently. More on that in a minute.

The six-out save or otherwise unconventional use of a closer has long been a rallying cry of adherents of advanced metrics. The logic: Use your best reliever in the most critical situation no matter the inning. In other words, when you most need outs, use your best weapon.

Yes, it’s a gamble. A mild gamble, many would argue, but still a gamble, which is why many managers remain reluctant to employ that strategy. But using a lesser option in a high-leverage situation seems, at the least, an equally suspect proposal.

Not that Syndergaard was necessarily a lesser option, but bringing in Familia — he of 43 saves and a 1.85 ERA during the regular season — would not appear to be a high-risk proposition, even for six outs.

Collins’ gamble paid off: Familia needed only nine pitches to get through the eighth and 12 to retire the Dodgers in the ninth to clinch the series for the Mets.

Six batters, six outs. Nary a threat.

Exactly how Collins planned it all along: He told his coaches before the game that Familia would pitch two innings if the situation called for it.

“If we’ve got the lead in the eighth inning, we’ve gotta roll the dice,” Collins told reporters after the game, via MLB.com. “If he’s not the best closer in the National League, he’s one of the best closers in all of baseball. You’ve gotta go to him. You’d be kicking yourself if they scored a run off somebody else when that guy should be in the game, in a game like tonight that means everything. So we stayed with the plan and it worked.”

For Collins and the Mets, the anti-traditionalist path was the path best traveled. Two years ago, another manager had that chance but opted for a more comfortable move.

Braves manager Fredi Gonzalez, in a pivotal juncture in Game 4 of the 2013 NLDS — coincidentally, also at Chavez Ravine — chose to leave Craig Kimbrel, then the game’s best closer, in the bullpen with a one-run lead in the eighth inning, opting instead to use reliever David Carpenter to face some of the Dodgers’ most dangerous hitters.

Gonzalez’s reasoning was that Kimbrel had never attempted a six-out save. Too much uncertainly. Too much risk. As was the case Thursday, observers amateur and professional scratched their heads as Kimbrel stood in the bullpen and watched Carpenter allow a leadoff double to Yasiel Puig and, five pitches later, a go-ahead homer to Juan Uribe that sealed the series. Braves fans were apoplectic: In the most critical situation of the team’s season, the best closer in baseball was a spectator — simply because it was the eighth inning and not the ninth.

Gonzalez did not use Collins' logic. He also did not kick himself, as Collins said he'd do, after the game took a wretched turn, saying he would’ve used Kimbrel for four outs if the situation called for it — but no more.

“I feel good about the decision. … I’m not second-guessing myself,” he said days later, via MLB.com. “I subscribe to the theory, and I will continue to do so, that you put guys in position where you feel they are going to be successful and you go with it."

Two managers, two elite closers, two decisions, two outcomes.

In the postseason, there’s a time for risks. A time for urgency. A time to go for it.