Women in Pakistan like
their counterparts elsewhere in the world have been victims of the double
oppression of class and gender. Given a socio-economic milieu in which the vast
majority of the populace are victims of social, political and economic
deprivation, women have had to struggle to win concessions from society and have
had a difficult time maintaining themselves and their families.

The situation in Pakistan requires a discussion of
women because the regime ideologically relies on Islamic fundamentalism
including its anti-female tenets. In developing and disseminating this ideology
the military regime has had to rely on the most conservative of Pakistani
political formations; i.e., the ultra-right wing of the Jammiat-e-Islami.
Fundamentalist religious groups in Pakistan, while ambivalent on some issues
such as the relationship of labor and capital, agrarian taxation, and property
are in total agreement when it comes to women; they are inferior to men, and
their proper place is in the home serving the male.

The
second reason for writing on women is that a fascist state is being
institutionalized based on grass-roots organizations and support from the lower
middle class. Indicators of this are the establishment of zakaat and salaat committees,
patronage systems, and tighter control of educational institutions. The
committees have been formed to distribute taxes on wealth, and to report
citizens who fail to abide by state regulations. Support from urban lower class
people is garnered by awarding titles and privileges to them. In education,
liberal professors have been removed from their positions as in the case of
Punjab University and madrasas,
religious centers of learning, are being encouraged. These generate a
traditionally oriented intelligentsia supportive of the state and the political
right. Fascism has been no respecter of women and in Pakistan the development of
fascist tendencies combined with strong religious support portends and ominous
future for women.

A third reason for considering women's issues is
that for the first time women are organizing a nation-wide movement to fight for
the preservation and extension of rights currently under attack. Since 1981
women have constituted the vanguard of the political movement in Pakistan and
therefore need to be taken seriously. Women's struggle in the Pakistani context
means a struggle for democratization of society and for its secularization. As
such, the women's movement is critically important in its opposition to the
present military regime.

This article examines, first, the nature of the
Pakistani state, its transformation and linkage with religious fundamentalist
ideology, and the measures taken against women by Zia-ul-Huq's military regime.
The second section traces the historical evolution of the women's movement,
situates the discussion within the Pakistani class formation, and notes the
class representation within the women's movement itself. Third, the women's
movement is critiqued in terms of its strengths and weaknesses and finally,
future courses of action are considered.

The state in Pakistan

Historical Trajectory and Transformation of the State

One cannot isolate the military's record on women
from its relationship to the state and fundamentalist religious ideology. In
order to understand the significance of the measures directed against women by
the current regime, the development and transformation of the Pakistani state
must be analyzed, especially its sources of support and its ideological base.
The events bringing the current regime to power are well known. In 1968 a
popular uprising in both East and West was directed against national and class
privileges. In the Western wing, much of the organizing work was undertaken by
the left, but because it was so factionalized, the beneficiary of this movement
was the populist government of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto. Bhutto himself belonged to a
particular class from which he never entirely divorced himself.

His regime exhibited all the flaws and weaknesses
of any social-democratic formation in the Third World. Having come to power
through the support of large sectors of the popular classes, workers and
peasants, Bhutto upon assuming control of the state apparatus, proceeded to
realign his party, and brought into it many of the same persons and classes
against whom his original supporters had struggled. This suggests that Bhutto's
primary alliance was with the landed classes which came to dominate the
leadership in his party. Moreover, it suggests that Bhutto made this alliance
aware that popular movements in Pakistan were urban based, and assumed that as
long as he could control large sectors of the urban population, he could
continue to rule. This meant that the industrial bourgeoisie did not regain its
hegemony during his period, and that large segments of the urban middle class
were pacified through the creation of massive public works programs and state
sponsored forms of employment.

These measures, however, were insufficient to
counteract existing inherent contradictions in the basic nature of the state and
society in Pakistan. Pakistan at its inception was a nation with a very weak
bourgeoisie, which was highly dependent on the state for its development and
advance. The state apparatus itself was in the hands of a fledgling petty
bourgeoisie which increasingly dominated the bureaucracy. This petty
bourgeoisie, immediately following partition, was in the process of transforming
itself into a dominant class. Given a weak political infrastructure, the
underdevelopment of the bourgeois class, and the completely mercenary nature of
the country's ruling strata, power moved from the realm of political parties to
the bureaucracy. An additional factor in internal class dynamics was the
military, which perceived its future to be with the bureaucracy and hence became
allied with it. A serious error made by Bhutto was the attempt to transform the
bureaucracy and the military. Having reconstituted his party, the Pakistan
People's Party, to accommodate the landed classes, Bhutto proceeded to try and
accommodate those segments of the disenfranchised petty bourgeoisie. This he
attempted by changing the traditional method of recruitment into the civil
services, and as a corollary, making the bureaucracy subservient to the party
and by reorganizing the military through forced retirements, appointment of
loyal officers to positions of power and other measures.

These
attempts were inadequate for consolidating Bhutto's power and revealed once
again the nature of class alliances in Pakistan. The only classes that would
have stood by Bhutto were systematically made peripheral to the political
process, i.e., the national minorities, workers and peasants. The latter two did
have concessions made to them, but the former were brutally repressed. The right
wing elements, which never had much public following in electoral politics in
Pakistan, and who were much more cognizant of the increasing polarization in
society were definitely the prime movers in the upsurge to unseat Bhutto. Other
groups were also active demanding democratic rights for national
minorities and more radical reforms. Bourgeois political parties also opposed
Bhutto's attempts at instituting the People's Party as the hegemonic party in
the country. Thus a strange coalition of forces emerged in opposition to Bhutto:
the industrialists, who had felt the brunt of his nationalization policies,
political forces of the center and right which felt disenfranchised and the
military and bureaucracy who saw their privileges being taken away.

It was in this context that the military stepped
in, ostensibly to restore democracy. Having come to power, however, they
immediately lost the support of the more radical elements that had participated
in the movement. The bourgeois political parties continued to bask in the vain
dream of a return to power, but they were soon disillusioned, and rapidly
attempted some accommodation with or came to oppose the regime. The
industrialists, too, had not recovered their confidence in the capacity of the
state to curb the popular classes so, many of them continued to withhold their
support, often choosing to invest overseas. The group that had nothing to lose
and everything to gain from an alliance with the military were the right-wing
fundamentalist elements. Immediately following the coup they realised that this
was their only chance to implement their agenda and therefore they cooperated
with the military.

What occurred following the 1977 coup, therefore,
was a return to power of the military-bureaucratic apparatus. This time,
however, there was a difference. In previous periods there had been a modernist
flavour to the state which was a consequence of the liberal training and
tradition to which many individuals within the ruling strata belonged. An irony
of the original Pakistan movement was that the demand for a nation of Muslims
came from its modernist elements not from the traditional petty bourgeoisie. In
1977, however, a shift occurred. Many of the prominent military figures involved
in the 1977 coup were not Sandhurst trained, they were trained in the United
States. Nor was their background the same as that of people like Ayub Khan, they
belonged to the more traditional sectors of their class. Similarly, in the
bureaucracy, right wing elements had engaged in a conscious and concerted policy
of infiltration. Thus, the two state institutions which dominate the state
apparatus became increasingly right wing and traditionalist.

An additional factor that must also be taken into
account is the basic antagonism between secularism (exemplified by liberal
bourgeois democratic ideology) and forms of class, minority, and gender
exploitation. I would argue that in newly emergent countries like Pakistan,
secularism and democracy necessarily lead to a radical transformation of society
particularly at the level of social relations. Given the degree of polarization
that exists, however, both phenomena are recognized by the ruling strata as
being totally inimical to their interests. Secular and constitutional rule are
too uncertain as methods of control of the populace and should be avoided rather
than encouraged. What does this analysis imply for the state as it exists in
Pakistan today? I would argue that the collaboration between the fundamentalist
religious forces and the military, though still in place, is now no longer
central. Instead what is emerging is a fascist state in which middle class elements are being
involved in close collaboration and participation.

When this internal dynamic is coupled with the
international configuration, within which Pakistan is located, the situation
becomes even more alarming. Economically, the regime is heavily dependent on
external sources of support for its survival. No country that claims its major
source of foreign exchange earnings to be remittances from labor employed
overseas (as does Pakistan) is on very strong economic grounds. This economic
support has been forthcoming, but under conditions which signify ill for the
bulk of Pakistani masses. Ideological explanations are never quite enough,
however, and economic necessity does not guarantee any regime international
assistance. We need to look at other levels of explanation that also have a
bearing on the Pakistani state. Politically, the configuration in what is known
as Near Asia has changed radically in the past few years. The emergence of
Khomeini's regime in Iran and the revolution in Afghanistan have meant that two
countries have been lost to U.S. hegemony.(1) The changes in Afghanistan and
Iran have in turn dramatically altered Pakistan's position so that it (instead
of Iran) now serves as the new gendarme in the region. Given the mercenary
character of Pakistani armed forces, their strength and numbers, it is
particularly suited to this task. Its agreement to fulfill this role means its
continues survival. The U.S has promised 3,5 billion dollars over a five year
period as a reward. From the standpoint of the U.S. this assistance entails
ignoring the worst types of repression of democratization and constitutional
rule it means tacitly, if not overtly, supporting the emergence of right-wing
fascism. Pakistan once again has bartered away its freedom to U.S. imperatives
involving the continual oppression of its people and denying them civilian
rule.

From the above discussion, it should be apparent
that a conjuncture has been reached where the possibilities of a return to a
liberal democratic state becomes increasingly limited. For a defeat of the
Islamist elements in Pakistani society and the overthrow of the military a
protracted struggle will have to be waged. For this to be effectively launched
it will have to be conducted by the most oppressed sectors of the population:
national minorities, workers and women. As indicated by past experience,
mainstream political parties are the only elements able to bring a return to
secularism because its absence hurts them the most.(2)

This analysis is particularly important and
relevant for both the women's movement, as for other classes with democratic
aspirations. On the gender question, its implications are especially clear:
Islamization in Pakistan today necessarily implies a tremendous setback to
women's rights. Struggle against it cannot be waged in the context of what Islam
does or does not permit. Rather, it must be recognized that an advance on this
question requires a direct attack on the very discourse itself, on the
legitimacy of those who seek to impose it, and underlines the need for a
restoration of secular institutions which would serve to restore and advance
women's rights, and those of other oppressed classes in our society.

Women's Oppression Today: the Military's
Record

Based on the previous section it can be seen that
even though the regime in no longer dependent on fundamentalist groups for its
survival their support continues to be significant. This can be clearly seen in
the referendum that was held on December 19, 1983, where fractions of the
Jammiat constituted the only political group in the country that encouraged
people to vote. The relationship between the religious right and the military is
not a contradictory one in that they continue to push for the same goals, i.e.,
a capitalist economic sector and a repressive political system where economic
inequalities are maintained even though individual beneficiaries may
change.

It is in the realm of the political that
deep-rooted changes have occurred. "Democracy" is now no longer possible for the
Pakistani masses. What we are promised instead is a form of "divine
rule" with Zia
as leader, sharing power with candidates carefully screened by the military, and
elected by voters equally screened. These are extremely significant changes in
that Islamic symbols are being used to justify a repressive and brutal political
system. It is at the political level that the regime has and will continue to
have support of the mullahs (religious
leaders). If any tension exists between them it is because the mullahs view the
regime as not moving far and fast enough. It is this rapprochement of the
military and mullahs that bodes ill for women. Since the regime must throw
crumbs to the mullahs to maintain their support, the most vulnerable group are
women. Consequently, aside from the suppression of democratic rights of the
population as a whole, women have been subject to virulent attack.

This attack has been both ideological and concrete.
The ideological attack was carefully orchestrated with the help of the mullahs.
The last few years have seen the emergence of mullahs in mosques and in the
state-controlled media proselytizing against women and proclaiming the wonders
of the Iranian model with regard to its position on women. This position is
exemplified most clearly by the "veil and four walls" controversy generated by
Israr Ahmed and others. What Israr and his cohorts have tried to put across is
the notion that a woman's place is in the home; that she is not capable of the
same thought and rationality as men and is designed for housework and to be an
object of pleasure for her spouse and entirely dependent upon him. In
popularizing this notion, sermons were given by Israr and supplemented by
state television. This campaign has seemingly been successful
particularly among many middle class Pakistani males who view the emancipation
of their women as a threat to their property and control. The fact that the
state is permitting such statements to be made and is employing these
individuals means a reinforcement for the sentiments of many men who have never
accepted the notion of women being equal or deserving independence. That this is
the case is indicated by an instance in the fall of 1983 when local landlords in
Nawabpur paraded three nude women through the town-square. Such a public display
of brutalizing and victimizing women is new. Equally important, cases of rape
have gone up radically during the same period.

Besides creating an ideology against women, the
current regime has taken specific steps to diminish women's rights. Indeed, ever
since its proclaimed intent to institute a religious state (Nizam-e-Mustafa)
women have been one of the key groups targeted for acts against them. In
November 1983, Zia signed a "Law of Evidence" Ordinance whereby the status of
woman is reduced to half that of a man in terms of her ability to bear witness
in court. This law also makes her testimony inadmissible in cases of rape. It
also states that the murder of a woman does not warrant the same penalty as that
of a man. The degradation of women to the status of half a being is the
culmination of a series of attacks on women. Prior to this, the government
issued other proclamations banning the participation of women athletes in
international and mixed sports events, attempted to repeal the 1961 Family Laws
Ordinance and announced its intention to eliminate coeducation and institute
separate universities for women. The purpose is to drive women out of the
professions back into the home. The intent is to create a milieu which can
appeal to the worst instincts in men giving them the right to thoroughly
subjugate women. What the regime did not openly proclaim it tried to accomplish
through its surrogates, the ultraconservative religious leaders. None of this
has been taken by Pakistani women passively: they have responded with anger,
vigor and initiative.

Historical overview of women's movement in
Pakistan

Beginnings and Evolution: 1940-1977

Any discussion of the historical development of a
particular social movement must address the class structure of that movement.
The origins of the women's in Pakistan can be traced back to the
pre-independence period when bourgeois women constituted a vocal element in the
anti-colonial struggle as well as in the Pakistan movement.(3) Their involvement
led to a recognition of their contribution by Jinnah who made a strong plea for
the removal of constraints against women. As early as 1944 he stated that: "No
nation can rise to glory unless your women are side by side with you. We are
victims of evil customs. It is a crime against humanity that our women are shut
up within the four walls of the house as prisoners. There is no sanction
anywhere for the deplorable condition in which our women have to live. You
should take your women along with you as comrades in every sphere of
life.(4)

Viewing the independent state of Pakistan as
essentially a secular state, Jinnah asserted that women had claims to the same
rights as did minorities, nationalities or other oppressed groups within the
framework of a bourgeois democratic state. Even at this early stage the mullahs
opposed the rights of women and were also vehemently opposed to the creation of
Pakistan justified on the grounds that the Muslims of India had the rights to a
separate homeland. Voicing their total opposition to the creation of Pakistan,
they called Jinnah "kafir" or unbeliever because of his support for a secular
state.(5)

Following the creation of Pakistan, women
recognized some of their demands through the legal code. Women attained voting
rights, and the Family Laws Ordinance was passed in 1961. Under this law, women
were officially able to inherit agricultural property (in consonance with
Islamic law), second marriages were made contingent upon agreement by the first
wife, divorce was made more difficult for the male, women attained the right to
initiate divorce for the first time, and a system of registration of marriages
was also introduced.

By virtue of the family law coming into effect the
rights of educated politically aware women were safeguarded. However, this law
did not penetrate very far. Working class women in the urban areas were only
marginally able to benefit from it. The condition of rural women isolated as
they were from the political scene and from the center of organizational
activity, continued pretty much as before. A few women's organizations existed
at this time. They can be roughly divided into two categories: charitable
women's organizations and organizations run by progressive women. The most well
known among the former category was the All Pakistan-Women's Association (APWA),
among the latter, Anjuman-e-Jamhooriat Pasand Khawateen. Although there existed
a basic difference among the two in that APWA was an association of upper-class
women providing services for women from less well-off socio-economic strata,
whereas the Anjuman contained as its members women from more diverse class
backgrounds, the latter was never really able to take off. My sense is that one
of the contributing reasons for the failure of the Anjuman was that it failed to
consciously separate women's issues from those of peace, social inequality, etc.
Being closely linked in its leadership to the pro-Moscow Communist Party, they
failed to develop an independent position on women. The dominant pattern of work
among publicly known women's organizations came to be social work-charitable
organizations. By and large, these groups reflected their class position:
altruism combined with reforms, reforms imposed from the top, changing the
system to make it bearable but without fundamentally transforming reality or
even directly confronting the inequities extant in it.

During the regime of Zulfiquar Ali Bhutto, the 1973
Constitution granted women rights including education to all rural and urban
women. This was also the period that saw the mushrooming of leftwing political
parties and a variety of women's groups in the professions, trade unions, and
student's groups. Women did not feel threatened by Bhutto hence they chose to
exploit the favorable environment to push for an extension of women's rights
within the framework of the state.

An exception was the role played by women in the
1977 campaign against Bhutto. Bourgeois women led this movement, not protesting
the abrogation of democratic rights by the regime (a criticism which many left
groups and the national minorities levied against him), but mounting a
right-wing opposition to his economic policies and the inflationary impact on
their dwindling incomes.

In 1980 women emerged again on the political scene.
This time, however, the organizations that moved to the forefront are
qualitatively different in their emphasis, activities and approach. This change
partially reflects the nature of the transformation of women's status and
socio-economic involvement in the society and to the transformation of the
Pakistani state.

Transformation of the Women's
Movement

The transformation in the women's movement is
directly connected with political processes in the country, as well as the
transformation of the class structure. What this means is that two parallel
developments have occurred. First given economic trends in the country a middle
class developed which has become dependent on women entering the work force.
This was particularly critical in the urban areas, where traditionally
middle class families had been loathe to see their women step
outside the house. Second, the increasing hold of the left which drew great
numbers of men and women into the political process, led to the spontaneous mass
movement that came into being towards the close of Ayub Khan's rule. Both these
trends meant that women engaged in political processes in which they had not
previously participated.

The late sixties and early seventies saw a
blossoming of intellectual thought and grass-roots political organization,
albeit in embryonic form. Women in large numbers joined the professions and
though their numbers were relatively small they made significant progress.
Television in particular broke the taboos generally connected in Pakistani
society with music and the arts. College going women with artistic talents took
advantage of this opportunity and became instrumental in portraying a different
woman.

The mushrooming of left-wing political parties
mainly Maoist in character, tied as they were of the working class and the
peasantry, drew into the political arena women who were previously totally
dissociated from this process. Not only did this serve to politicize more women
than ever before, but it also gave them badly needed organisational experience.
The first move against women and the political parties came shortly after Zia
came to power. Attacks were mounted against two groups, bourgeois political
parties, and the oppressed : workers, peasants and women. Women were faced with
a two-pronged attack which threatened their active participation in civic
society. This attack was partly ideological, an atmosphere of hate being created
against them through state and religious proclamations; and second, a threat to
their economic involvement in the work force. In response women realized that it
was imperative that they organize and challenge the regime.

New
Organizational Formations

September 1981 saw the birth of the Women's Action
Forum (WAF), a mass-based popular front of many women's organizations and
concerned individuals. The catalyst of WAF was a Zina case, where a
fifteen year old woman was sentenced to flogging because of marrying a man of a
lower class background contrary to her parent's wishes. This sentence triggered
a response among women. Action was necessary as this case followed various other
attacks on women including professors being molested, women being tortured for
their political beliefs and affiliations, restrictions instituted against their
professional activities and the imposition of a dress code for female public
employees. It was also recognized that help could not be expected from other
quarters, either from the Movement for Restoration of Democracy (MRD) or the
left since these groups were fighting for their survival, and had not taken an
active part in fighting for women's rights in earlier periods.

Women recognized that this was a fight they must
lead themselves, that the need was to educate each other and fight for their
rights to overcome previous inequalities. Created initially by professional,
middle class women, WAF received the endorsement of seven women's groups. These
groups, while maintaining their independent existence, decided to rally under
WAF's banner in a popular front dedicated to one common goal: the achievement of
basic human rights for all Pakistani women. These rights include education,
employment, physical security, choice of marital status, planned parenthood and
non-discrimination. Recognizing the enormity of the task confronting them, the
organizers proceeded cautiously. Initially they devoted their attention to fighting to preserve rights under attack from
the military. Given their limited numbers at this point a lobbying cum-pressure
group approach was used. The first action undertaken was a national signature
campaign based on five issues affecting women. Over seven thousand signatures
were collected between October and December 1981, and the document was presented
to the Zia-ul-Haq.

Realizing that the state was likely to concede only
token demands to them if they limited their activities to submitting petitions,
WAF decided to broaden its base. Towards this end, in January 1982, the Karachi
chapter of WAF organized a two day symposium on "Human Rights and Pakistani
Women" while simultaneously running workshops on education, law,
consciousness-raising and health. This was merely the first of a series of
symposia and workshops held on a wide variety of topics of interest to women in
English and Urdu as well as some of the regional languages.

WAF also began to reach out to minorities as well
as to working class women. Their panels and workshops reflected their
seriousness and included such topics as inflation, crimes against women,
consumer consciousness, and the nationality question. More recently there has
been considerable discussion in the organization regarding organizing,
particularly in areas where working class women are concentrated.

While striving to deepen its base, WAF was at the
same time extending it. October 1981 saw the creation of its second chapter in
Lahore, the capital of the Punjab province. This was soon succeeded, by one in
Islamabad, and more modest beginnings in Peshawar, Bahawalpur, Lyallpur, and
Quetta. It was made clear that anybody who so wished could initiate a WAF
chapter, provided that they were willing to adopt the charter drawn up by the
Karachi chapter. The activities of each new chapter is subject to scrutiny by
the two oldest chapters, i.e., Karachi and Lahore. If any discrepancy is noted
between the activities of the local chapter and WAF's charter, the delinquent
chapter is subject to expulsion.

WAF's chapters are also encouraged to incorporate
as many women's organizations as possible in each area in order to expand the
organization, facilitate coordination, avoid duplication of effort, and
facilitate coalition building. WAF considers the gender question central in the
formation of a united front for women. Their position is that women need to form
a mass
organization to fight for their rights. In their attempts to realize this
goal, WAF constitutes a dynamic force. Its activities are constantly expanding,
its membership growing, and the base expanding at an accelerated pace. By virtue
of this dynamism WAF has shown that women are indeed a
powerful force in the Pakistani political scene.

WAF is also attempting to structure the
organization in such a way that it remains democratically open. Each chapter is
free to determine what its organizational structure should be. Within the
organization representation and consent of members is given importance, as is
work contribution, rather than official status. A working committee handles
organizational matters connected with different chapters, and each chapter has a
representative whenever all the chapters meet. In terms of its structure,
membership and program, WAF represents a radical departure from previous women's
groups.

WAF has served as a catalyst for other groups to
become active on women's issues particularly groups connected with bourgeois
political parties, e.g., the Tehrik-e-Istiklal, as well as women's groups with
leftwing sympathies, e.g., the Tehrik-e-Niswan, and Tehrik-e-Khawateen. Shortly
after WAF emerged, its successes became apparent to all observers of the
political scene. Bourgeois and middle class women were flocking to WAF's
meetings, alarmed at the turn of events since the military take-over. Among
WAF's membership were women with strong connections to bourgeois political
parties, particularly the Tehrik-e-Istiklal, the protege of Asghar Khan, a retired armed forces officer. It is commonly felt
by women within WAF that once bourgeois parties realized the political value of
women's mobilization, they wished to capture the movement and utilize it for
their own political advancement WAF members with long-standing political
experience recognized the danger of having women's issues again made subservient
to a broader political agenda, or appropriated in a fashion not
necessarily reflective of women's need or demands.

Within the Lahore chapter where elements from the
bourgeois political elements were most heavily represented, and the most
politically developed membership existed, this resulted in conflict within the
organization. The net result was that elements connected with bourgeois
political parties split off from the main organization and created a separate
chapter which they call WAF (democratic) as opposed to the original group which
is called WAF (national). The lack of success of the splinter group is evident
from the fact that they have not had much success in mobilizing more than a
handful of women. This is not to suggest that the women involved in WAF
(democratic) are not seriously committed to women's issues, but for many of them
the issue is subservient to the dictates of their political party affiliations,
or it is a part-time involvement. The possibilities for any serious advancement
by this group appears to be extremely limited.

In contrast, other women's groups that have emerged
or become more active since the creation of WAF constitute a left-wing
alternative and are the Tehrik-e-Khawateen in Lahore. Each group places the
women's question within the overall framework of the class question, and in
consequence primarily focus on those sectors with whom the left has
traditionally worked, i.e., working women, the peasantry, and students. They
have shown varying degrees of success in mobilizing these sectors of the
population.

Around some events they have also shown a
willingness to cooperate with WAF. Particularly in the case of Tehrik-e-
Khawateen, they have had a positive effect in organizing rural women and in
pulling WAF further to the left. The interaction of these groups with WAF has
been principled in that they have not attempted to take over the organisation.
They continue to carry on their own activities, and whenever specific events
warrant, cooperate with WAF to maximize the impact of their work and prevent a
further deterioration in women's situation. Unlike the bourgeois groups which
split off from WAF, these latter groups are engaged in independent
work.

Class Structure Within the Women's Movement: Shifts
and implications.

In the early years of Pakistan few women were
gainfully employed in the formal sector. This picture has been radically
transformed largely as the consequence of a modernist developmental policy prior
to the current regime where women entered schools and colleges and learned
skilled trades. The extension of education and skills means that large numbers
of middle class women are now gainfully employed. This has not necessarily
resulted in an improvement of their position within the household, where they
are still expected to perform domestic labor (unless they are privileged enough
to hire others to take over this task). For the educated, skilled woman worker,
however, it has meant a certain degree of heightened awareness. It is from this
sector that the leadership of the women's movement comes, and it is also the
sector from which most WAF recruits are coming. There is, however, the informal
sector of the economy in which women are also employed in large numbers such as
domestics.

Traditionally, there has been a fair degree of
independence among these women from their men folk, partly in consequence of the
depressed conditions of their families. Like the Blacks in the United States,
many of the males in these families have had to leave the household for extended
periods to seek employment elsewhere. The women are left behind to manage and in
the process learn and acquire a certain degree of militancy and consciousness
regarding their own situations, which is impossible to entirely eliminate upon
the return of male family members.

There is a third category of women emerging, i.e.,
the wives of laborers who have gone to work in the Middle East. Like the women discussed above, one would
expect to see radical changes occur in the demeanor of these women. To date very
little work has been done examining what the nature of these changes are. One
cannot automatically assume that they will acquire the same consciousness as
their counterparts discussed above. This is partially mitigated by the material
well-being of these families.

Rural women vary dramatically from their urban
counterparts. Even within this category, however, there is additional variation
depending upon whether women come from settled agricultural areas or are located
in the tribal economy. Further differentiation occurs depending upon their
relation to property. Rural women in settled agricultural settings have
traditionally enjoyed greater mobility than their urban counterparts. This is
primarily the consequence of their active and prolonged participation in the
labor force. It is also a function of the lack of support for fundamentalists in
the countryside. Government statistics totally overlook women's labor force
participation, since data gatherers have traditionally relied on males to
collect material, in terms of critical decisions of marriage, divorce and
education, however, women remain the victims of male prejudice and control.
Within the rural economy as in the urban, middle class women have been socially
the most repressed. Affluence to a middle class rural family is often displayed
by putting their womenfolk behind the "veil". In adhering to this custom,
upwardly mobile families are merely duplicating the feudal forms still
observable in Pakistani society whereby women of landed families were kept
cloistered. Changes are occurring in all three categories and all are part and
parcel of radical rural transformation that has been occurring since the late
fifties.

Agrarian transformation has meant a steadily
deteriorating life style for the vast majority of rural and urban dwellers
including an increased dependence on the market. This in turn has meant
an increased workload for women in the rural sector. With the
introduction of new crops, women are productively employed in sectors which were
previously unavailable to them. Agrarian change has also meant that certain
types of jobs previously available to women are being eliminated because of the
penetration of urban markets into the countryside. This contradictory dynamic
has meant that women's lives have become harder. They have had to adjust to
changes in productive employment, and often have had to bear the brunt of having
households torn asunder because of migration by one or more household members to
the city.

At the level of social relations, urban influences
can be clearly seen in the villages. These are reflected not just in superficial
changes, e.g. clothing, but also in attitudes towards education or travel by
women. Traditional religious influences of Islamic orthodoxy mean very little to
the vast bulk of the rural peasant populace. While spending time in rural areas
of Pakistan, one is struck by the fact that, particularly among the landless,
most families try to educate their women if facilities are readily available.
Taboos still exist prohibiting women from going away to school and economic
realities make this impossibility even when the will exists.

There exists in today's Pakistan then one general
trend that unites the urban and rural areas. This is the overall deterioration
in the economic well being of large segments of its population. This is
expressed by a concentration of economic resources in the rural areas and
inflationary influences in the cities. Both these trends mean that women have to
work for wages and their men folk, whether they like it or not, have to
acknowledge the necessity of female participation in the labor force. The latter
does not of course mean that these same individuals accept this as necessarily
leading to the emancipation of women. On the contrary, it is precisely among
segments of the population hardest hit by economic recession that Islamic
ideology serves as a useful tool.

As in the development of any fascist state elements
of these classes especially in the urban areas prove the most likely recruits.
It remains up to forces opposed to the development of fascist ideology, which in
Pakistan's case fundamentalist Islamic Ideology serves to reinforce, to work to
prevent that. And the women's movement has shown itself capable of taking on
that challenge. Obviously, it still has a long way to go. It is no coincidence
that the women's movement has gone through an enormous transformation in the
class basis of its members. This is certainly true of groups such as
Tehrik-e-Khawateen, but it also applies to the Women's Action Forum. The shift
in the class composition of the women's movement has important implications for
the direction it takes. It means that altruism in no longer on the agenda and
issues of equality, secularism and democratic rights hold the center stage.
There are various limitations that do still exist in the movement. For example,
there is constant conflict among members representing different class interest
and continued debates about direction and tactics. Often these debates tend to
be resolved in ways looked askance at by women who belong to left parties, but
the debates have the potential of moving the movement further to the
left.

There is an attempt by the regime and its
proponents in the media to portray the movement as the creation of a handful of
western-educated women having no roots in their own culture. This charge has
failed to take hold in popular perception both because the women's movement
today is deeply embedded in our own reality, and also because most people view
women as being actively engaged in struggle against the forces of repression.
Whether this perception continues will depend on how fast and how deeply the
movement is able to incorporate women of the most repressed economic classes and
become what it purports to strive for – a mass movement.

The women's movement in its current phase:
achievements and limitations

What does all this amount to? What has this
reconstituted women's movement, spearheaded by WAF, accomplished and where is it
headed? There is no simple answer to this: the accomplishments must be seen in
terms of both the short-run and the long-term; similarly, the limitations. In
its battle with the regime, the women's movement superficially appears to have
lost more often that it has won. Two hundred women demonstrated in Lahore in
February 1983 against the proposed changes in the Law of Evidence. At least
twenty of the participants were injured in their clash with the police, and
another thirty arrested. Despite this demonstration and support women got from
men, the proposed changes were nevertheless rammed through the assembly less
than a month later. Since then women were able to pressure Zia from signing the
law into effect. In the winter of 1984, however, the Law of Evidence was finally
put into effect.

Similarly in their attempts to prevent floggings of
women, as well as to pressure the regime to send women athletes to international
sports events, they were unsuccessful. The move to institute separate
universities for women and the dismantling of the Family Laws Ordinance of 1961
have both been temporarily shelved, but indications are that the regime is to
reopen these matters and in a form opposed by WAF and other women's groups. The
movement has had two main victories in its confrontation with the regime: the
first in the removal of Israr Ahmed from television, although he still continues
to hold his post as a member of Zia's Consultative Council.

The second is the case where women from a small
rural town were publicly insulted and subjected to indignities at the hands of a
local propertied family. In this case, the regime saw fit to prosecute the
family. In both these instances there is a similarity: particular individuals
are dispensable, but the overall policies and positions vis-à-vis women remain
unchanged.

From other vantage points the gains of women seem
fairly substantial. One can examine these in terms of the specific organizations
concerned, such as the WAF, as well as in terms of the maturation of the women's
movement. Women have, for the first time, organized in a way that makes them an
important force with which any political group in Pakistan will have to contend.
They have broken out of the old pattern of paternalism and charitable work that
characterized previous organizations. They have initiated a process of
education, organization and informational work that will leave a mark on women
regardless of whether WAF survives or not. WAF as the key expression of the
women's movement has steadily been broadening and deepening its base of support.
In doing so, they have been conscious that it is not sufficient to merely
critique the regime on the grounds it sets, but to deal with issues that
immediately touch the lives of average Pakistani woman whose concerns are not
with universities or women's involvement in sports.

Towards this end WAF has initiated discussions on
topics of more immediate concern; child labor, growing narcotics use, scarcity
of public services, and crimes against women. They have initiated serious
research on the status and condition of women in order to concretize their
position and activities. They have continued to publicly demonstrate their
opposition to the current regime. Towards this end they have blitzed the media
with articles, comments, inquiries, and in so doing have recruited more and more
women into their ranks, as well as gained increasing support among men. The
latter reflects their ability to make the women's issue a central one, and their
capacity to relate it to other progressive causes. They have paved the way
towards non-sectarianism and shown that despite the current repressive
environment, mass organizing is not only possible, but necessary.

Unlike the bourgeois political parties, they have
not maintained a highly skewed organizational structure. Learning from their
experiences with left groups they have recognized the need to proceed step by
step and to keep pace with reality at all times. The task of organizing women is
much more difficult than that of organizing either workers or peasants. In the
former case one has to struggle against economic forces as well as the social
taboos against changing many elements that directly affect women's lives. The
desire of WAF to constitute a mass force can be seen as a consequence of the
nature of the questions they are addressing and as a consequence of the lessons
learned from the past where too often groups isolated themselves from the bulk
of the population because of the rigid positions they took. Such rigidity often
led to the degeneration of differences to personal squabbles, factionalization
and stagnation.

We have earlier alluded to the open nature of the
women's movement, drawing women from all classes. This phenomena has been an
integral part of the movement, although there is not always agreement between
the women who belong to the older women's groups, e.g., APWA (which have a
strong upper class bias) and some WAF members who have either just entered the
political scene, or have had previous experience with different left groups.
Although thus far all these various groups have worked well together, it is
possible that there may be a parting of the ways when and if more radical
elements begin to push for changes that link class and gender, directly confront
Islamic ideology, and seek means of struggle outside formal structures. Even
though such a division may not be immediate its eventuality must be borne in
mind.

Even within WAF different chapters are incredibly
uneven in their membership and this unevenness is reflected in their work. WAF's
Lahore chapter is by far the most politically advanced and more willing to take
action than other chapters. In this they are assisted by the presence of
Tehrik-e-Khawateen, which shares their militancy. This unevenness is being
resolved as the activities of one chapter becomes an example to others. Karachi
WAF recently organized its first demonstration and many of its members feel more
confident now of engaging in similar actions in the future.

Since the organization is dynamic and growing, new
recruits sometimes hinder progress. This means that the organization is always
engaged in struggle of the more politically conscious members against those less so, the more militant members
against those more trepeditious. This is a natural outcome of organizing a
movement, since all women do not share the same experiences, needs, and/or
interests, they have varying degrees of commitment. It is too soon to know which
tendencies will win, but equally, it is too soon to start boycotting the
movement because its most well-known organization has not gone far
enough.

As stated earlier, WAF adopted a non-structured
approach in its organization, membership, and parliamentary procedures within
the organization. Both these factors have had their negative elements:
consensual decision-making often prevents serious debate of the issues
particularly when such a variety of opinions and class categories is
represented. For WAF it has often meant waffling on whether or not to recognize
Zia's regime as legitimate, whether to direct attacks against it or to appeal to
it, whether to pose the question of women's oppression in Pakistan as being
directly linked to Islamic ideology, or whether to try and reformulate Islamic
discourse so as to appeal through it for the improvement of women's
rights.

On the matter of centralization of authority within
the organization, it is generally felt that this issue has been resolved by
leaving it up to individual chapters to arrive at their own resolution of the
matter. It is interesting to note that the chapter most often accused of this,
i.e., the Lahore chapter continues to be the one most active, and most swift in
its actions. It is also the first chapter that has suffered a split. The balance
between democracy and centralism is a tricky one, and undoubtedly the scales
tilt in one direction or another from time to time. Within the structure of WAF,
however, one sees this as less likely to happen if open discussion is
encouraged. The process of elections within the organization is also designed to
prevent this from happening.

What unevenness and class heterogeneity suggests
is that once the regime begins to take a more antagonistic stand towards WAF and
the general women's movement, there is a possibility that the more uncertain
elements within it will fall away. The extent of this falling away is impossible
to predict, given that a large section of the women involved have had no
previous political experience, and therefore have not been tested. There is no
doubt, however, that some women will leave who have close ties to bureaucratic
elements and more stake in the system. Its urban character also means that WAF
and the women's movement have not been able to reach rural women. This is a
shortcoming that will be rectified as more women enter the movement and a
deliberate attempt is made to spread into the countryside. Given the linkages
between urban workers and their rural counterparts, it is expected that as
working class women become more and more integrate into the movement this link
will be strengthened.

Inherent in the women's movement, as in other
progressive formations previously existing in Pakistan, is a tendency towards
tailism, i.e., allowing the direction of struggle to be determined by the state.
By letting the regime set the agenda, women will be permitting the forward
motion of their activities to be determined by the state and not by their own
definition. The women's movement too could become entrapped by this tendency.
The more advanced elements in the movement seem to be cognizant of this
possibility, but the newer recruits are so tied into day to day reactions to the
military's policies that the wider issues and needs can easily be lost sight of.
By letting the regime set the agenda, women will be permitting the forward
motion to be determined on the terms of the state and not on their own
definition of what needs to be done. There is a critical need, therefore, while
responding to the attacks on women not to let this absorb all their energy. It
also needs to be kept in mind that legal rights really mean very little to most
Pakistani women. Transforming that reality necessitates educational and
informational work rooted in an autonomous women's movement. WAF is, to some
extent, trying to deal with this by setting up legal, publicity and research
cells to provide additional information and infrastructural backup support to
lend weight to the importance of such information.

Certain chapters, as well as individuals within
WAF, have stressed the non-political character of the movement. What this means
is not being apolitical but unattached or autonomous of any political formation.
The assertion of being non-political has served the organization well as a
tactical device. This, combined with the fact that the wives of many prominent
bureaucrats and upper class males are active in its ranks, has contributed to
the regime allowing WAF to continue. However, this assertion does not hold true
for all women's groups and there are indications that this is a fragile
existence. The treatment meted out during the last demonstrations indicate that
the regime is becoming uncomfortable with the women's movement and beginning to
see it as a threat. This response is unavoidable if the movement is to continue
to be dynamic. What this means, therefore, is that the movement must link its
cause with the struggles for human and democratic rights of all Pakistanis or
suffer set backs over and over again. It is unreasonable to expect that a regime
which suppresses the rights of the bulk of the population will grant them to
women. As soon as WAF openly makes this linkage with other oppressed groups it
is likely that the regime will ban it from meeting publicly and legally.
However, unless it makes this connection, the Women's Movement will ultimately
lose the goodwill of other sectors that are also engaged in a struggle for their
rights.

Conclusion: future directions

Critical to the success of the movement is the
manner in which it is able to understand the contradictions of the state and
manipulate these to its own advantage, and integrate the question of women's
rights within the broader framework of domination and suppression of oppressed
classes as a whole.

In order to undertake these tasks, women must
engage in serious theoretical work whereby they can pinpoint the structure of
the current state, the possibilities and direction of its transformation as well
as the causes of women's oppression. The analysis at the level of the state
involves a reading of the development and institutionalization of the fascist
state, and fascist ideology (cloaked in the guise of Islam), the local and
international dimensions of this process, the location of different political
formations and social classes vis-a-vis these phenomena, and the possible allies
with whom women can link in furthering their cause. This last is, I believe, a
crucial dimension for women today and in their future struggle.

The movement also needs to understand the social
and cultural roots of women's oppression. Religion is an additional factor in
this analysis. This necessitates two things: first, continuing as an autonomous force
(albeit self-consciously linked to other oppressed groups), and a movement
that poses resolution of its problem in opposition to Islamic discourse. The
point is not to reject Islam but to clearly state that the issue of women's
rights is a secular issue of human rights. To continue the discussion with the
fundamentalists regarding what is a "just" versus a repressive Islam is to fall
into a trap that is being set for women: a no win situation. Not only is this
anti-Islam stance doomed to failure but in the long run women will have
contributed to thwarting a return to democratic norms and secular discussion.
Elements within the movement are cognizant of this problem but so far the
practice of WAF has been not to take a position.

Another major issue is how to deal with the regime.
Many women, both within the Women's Action Forum, as well as those connected
with parties and organizations further to the left, have criticized the
organization for engaging in activities where they appealed to Zia's
regime for a betterment of their conditions, and did not demand that they
be given these rights. These critics view the regime as illegitimate, hence
perceive no justification for granting it a certain degree of legitimacy.
Indications are that WAF is changing in this respect. For example, as their
numbers have grown, and they have become more confident, women have resorted
less to petitions and more to direct action.

That women have gained national attention is
without doubt. Whether they will be able to combine this with fundamental change
for all Pakistani women is a more complicated matter. In order to accomplish
this the movement must avoid becoming entrapped in Islamicist discourse and must
avoid letting itself be limited to the question of legal rights. The latter runs
the danger of letting both the state and bourgeois elements within the movement
determine its tenor. Even if these rights were granted they mean very little in
actually transforming the reality of most Pakistani women. In order to achieve
real change, therefore, formalism must be shed, and this can only be done if the
agenda is set by those elements within the movement that are the most advanced
and understand the combined effects of gender, class and national
oppression.

The women's struggle in Pakistan will not be won
overnight. Regardless of whether the military regime remains or goes it is a
struggle that will continue. Social relations of oppression cannot be easily
transformed. The proponents of the women's movement, must, therefore, prepare
for an extended struggle. This they can do if they develop the organizational
capacity to face a future when they are no longer permitted to operate legally,
by forging close links with the most progressive sectors of the society and by
maintaining their relative autonomy on the gender question.

Since August 1983 the political situation has
undergone a qualitative change. When WAF initiated its work it was appropriate
for it to maintain its non-political stand. However, it becomes very important
that WAF and the movement develop some kind of working relationship with the
active struggle for the restoration of democratic rights. By so doing women can
force other progressive groups to seriously address the question of women's
rights and women will have created a reservoir of good will that will serve them
in carrying their struggle into the future. Now and in the future however it is
vital that the autonomy of the movement be maintained.

The women's movement is at a crossroads. It can go
further, remain confined to a losing battle with the state or run the danger of
becoming co-opted by it. Which of these tendencies wins depends on how the
movement handles the various theoretical, tactical and organizational questions
addressed earlier. It also depends on other progressive groups. The women's
movement cannot go it alone in challenging the regime. It is necessary for women
to understand that their issues are not isolated from those of other segments of
society. This understanding can be created only if they are willing to engage in
serious dialogue and action with other groups, and if women are able to expand
their activities to address the needs and encourage the involvement of women
from the most oppressed classes. The corollary of this is that progressive
organizations, particularly of the left, must understand that the women's
movement cannot develop as far or as fast as they might like. There must also be
a certain degree of understanding that the relationship between such an
autonomous movement and the left is not an antagonistic one but will serve to
strengthen both forces which seek to fight oppression. The need therefore is to
forge a real alliance not merely one of appearances.

Women have taken certain preliminary steps towards
this. It now remains for other progressive elements to join ranks so that a
reconstituted Pakistan emerges, not merely democratic, but a place where
domination and subordination become words one merely encounters in history books
as does the mention of military rule.

Notes

(1) The U.S. can no longer utilize Iran as a source
of control in the area as it was able to do during the Shah's time. Afghanistan,
on the other hand, was never under U.S. aegis. However since the invasion of
Afghanistan by the URSS any possibility of change that the U.S. might have
envisaged has been shattered. It also means that Pakistan has acquired a status
as a front-line state, which the U.S. wishes to use to stop "Soviet
expansionism".

That this "special" status will continue to be
attributed to Pakistan is of course questionable. Partly this will be determined
by the internal constellation of forces within Pakistan, but an additional
factor is the outcome of Indian politics in the aftermath of Indira Gandhi's
assassination.

(2) Both secularism and democratic rights are
issues, the subversion of which affects workers, peasants, the landless, women,
minorities, and nationalities. For the bourgeois classes a restoration of these
rights means a greater degree of share in political power and greater access to
decisions determining surplus distribution and appropriation; their immediate
being and placement in society remains relatively unchanged.

(3) Most of the Muslim women involved in this
process did not work independently among women but more often than not alongside
male family members.

(4) Quaid-e-Azam, Mohammad Ali Jinnah, Aligarh
University, 1944.

(5) This term signifying "unbeliever" refers to
Jinnah's opposition to a theocratic state of Pakistan as a homeland of Muslims,
but not an
Islamic state (itself a contradiction in terms). It had also in the
post-partition period provided the basis for suppressing the rights of the
nationalities, in particular, as well as of other sectors of the populace. All
Muslim religious leaders in this period did not oppose the creation of Pakistan
on the same grounds. There was a substantial segment among them, led by people
like Maulana Azad, who saw the struggle as being primarily anti-British,
anti-colonial, and nationalist (within the context of an united India).
Similarly, the Khilafat movement leadership struggled in an anti-colonial
effort, and refused to recognize the validity of an Islamic state claiming that
the "nation" of Islam was not a geographically localized entity but rather the
world. It is interesting to note that this position denies the rationale for a
theocracy such as is now being supported and pushed by mullahs in Pakistan. It
is also interesting to note that this history of religious opposition to
Pakistan on these particular grounds is repressed in Pakistan as is the secular
character and democratic program for an independent Pakistan envisaged by
Jinnah. In government offices in today's Pakistan, Jinnah's picture (which one
always saw
present) is often conspicuous by its absence).

The current women's movement in Pakistan has been
instrumental in the emergence of women's organizations working for the
protection of women's rights. Women lawyers have been in the forefront of this
movement. The Punjab Women Lawyer's Association was formed in 1982, and has
since then played an important role in highlighting the major problems
confronting women in the area of law. The membership of the Association
comprises of women lawyers and law graduates. Law students are eligible for
student membership. The Association was the founder member of Women's Action
Forum, an organisation actively working for the rights of women.

Activities

The Association initiated the struggle against
discriminatory laws and has brought this issue to public view. Our effective
campaign against these laws and our efforts towards the establishment of an
equal status for women have received appreciation and acclaim, nationally and
internationally. The famous protest against the new law of evidence staged by
women in Lahore on the 12th of February, 1983, was the result of the call given
by the Punjab Women Lawyer's Association, Since then, the Association has, in
collaboration and with the support of other organisations, been an effective
pressure group for the prevention of discrimination against women in all
fields.

The activities of the Association have not been
concentrated on resistance alone. Programmes have been designed and carried out
for the progress of women and women lawyers. Activities in the past have included numerous seminars and symposia on
laws concerning women. These programmes have been of tremendous help in
increasing awareness of their rights amongst women, which is a one of the major
objectives of the Association. The Association has also participated in and
sponsored programmes organised by many women's organisations jointly. One of
such programmes is the celebration of the International Women's Day every year
since 1983.

Aims and
Objectives

1. For a forum where practicing women lawyers,
women graduates of law and undergraduates of law can get together in order to
discuss common issues.

2. To ensure independence, freedom and equality for
women lawyers in practicing their vocation.

3. To encourage more women to join the legal
profession by providing assistance and guidance to women who are undergraduates
of law.

4. To disseminate information where legal
provisions or its lack of implementation frustrates the freedom and independence
of the legal profession.

5. To provide free legal aid to destitute women and
children, Also to make them aware of their legal rights.

6. To scrutinise legal provisions so that lobbying
of equitable laws generally and particularly regarding women and children can be
carried out.

7. To seek the passage of legislation for granting
women and children effective, easier and convenient ways in which they can
exercise their rights.

8. To publish articles, pamphlets, periodicals or
newsletter to enhance the awareness of individuals to their legal rights and to
make them familiar to the forums through which they can assert their
rights.

9. To co-operate with organized women's
associations, other judicial associations in particular, associations formed by
men or women in the legal profession.

Issues addressed by the association

1. Family and personal status laws

The Association has worked continuously for a
change in the substantive as well as the procedural law which has given undue
advantage to Muslim husbands, in the areas of divorce, the consequential
financial settlements and child custody. The law of polygamy has been and still
is a subject of great controversy. The Association has always supported the view
that polygamy should be recognised as a social evil and legal bars should be
placed on this practice. We, however, maintain that a change in the law of
divorce has to precede any steps in this direction in order to prevent
subjecting women to further hardships.

The inequality in the law of inheritance as
applicable to Muslims, is cause of great concern to women. Incidentally this law
is one of the major reasons for Pakistan's refusal to ratify the U.N. Convention
on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women. In spite of the sensitive
nature of the issue, in view of the involvement of Muslim Personal Law in the
matter, the Association is continuing its efforts for the enforcement of more
equitable law in this area.

II. Islamic penal laws

The Punjab Women Lawyers Association was the first
women's organisation to attack the discriminatory provisions of the Hadood
Ordinances, regarding rape, adultery and other offences specifically punishable
under Islamic Law, enforced in 1979. As an initial step the Association
highlighted the objectionable provisions of these laws which adversely affected
the status of Muslim women in Pakistan. The main objection to these laws was to
the provisions regarding quantum of evidence required to prove the offence for
awarding the maximum punishment to the offender. The provisions restricted
admissible oral evidence to male, Muslim witnesses only. thereby ousting the
evidence of women even in case of rape where they are the victims of the
offence.

Furthermore, the evidence provisions of these laws
coupled with the law of Qazf (false imputation of rape or adultery), was created
a dangerous position for victims of rape. If they are unable to prove rape they
are on the one hand liable to be punished for slander, and on the other they can
be punished for adultery. This serious flaw in the law was highlighted by the
case of a blind girl, Safia Bibi. The association has tried to combat the
disadvantages issuing to women out these laws by taking up cases of victims and
contesting them in the courts. One of such cases was that of Safia Bibi. The
Association gained the support of other women's organisations on these issues,
and also brought the injustices of these laws to public view through the press
and other media. In the wake of the Hadood Ordinances came the proposal for a
new law of evidence, which not only confirmed the evidence provisions of Hadood
Ordinance, but also provided that in all other matters the evidence required
would be that of two men or one man and two women.