Lars Olberg, Research Associate[1]
Lawyers’ Committee on Nuclear Policy, New York
November 2005pdf version

On 28 April 2004, the United Nations Security Council unanimously
adopted resolution 1540 on non-state actors and weapons of mass
destruction. It was welcomed by the UN Secretary- General, Kofi
Annan, as a supplement to the non-proliferation regime.[2] Others
regard the resolution not just as a supplement, but rather as perhaps
the most far-reaching international policy re-orientation since
the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) entered
into force 35 years ago.[3] The resolution calls upon member states
to report on implementation measures they have taken or intend to
take.[4] The reports were to be submitted by October 28, 2004.
While only about 50 states met that deadline, by June 1, 2005 about
120 states had reported. It is therefore now possible to perform
a preliminary assessment of the reports and the measures the states
took or plan to take. We begin with a brief overview of the origin
and main points of the resolution.

I. Resolution 1540

Resolution 1540 is the latest initiative of the Security Council
aimed at stemming the global threat of terrorism. Its adoption was
motivated by a heightened sensitivity to the security of weapons
of mass destruction (WMD) and the risk of non-state actor (terrorists,
businesses, unauthorized state officials) acquisition of and trafficking
in WMD-related items. The awareness grew significantly after the
revelations in February 2004 of the nuclear proliferation network
market run by Pakistani scientist A.Q. Khan.[5] As one attempt to
counter these threats the Security Council adopted the resolution.
It acted under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, thus unmistakably
conferring a mandatory character on the obligations.

The main obligations for UN member states are contained in operative
paragraphs (OP) 1 to 3. OP1 prohibits states to provide:

any form of support to non-State actors that attempt to develop,
acquire, manufacture, possess, transport, transfer or use nuclear,
chemical or biological weapons and their means of delivery.

To prevent any non-state actor from engaging in these acts autonomously,
without state support, OP2 obligates states to adopt and enforce
appropriate effective laws which prohibit the acts under their national
legislation. OP3 prescribes that states take and enforce a comprehensive
system of domestic controls on WMD and related materials.

The main objective of the resolution, preventing non-state actor
trafficking in and acquisition of WMD, is non-controversial and
indeed universally endorsed. However, important criticisms of the
resolution going to both process and substance were raised in its
genesis as well as afterwards.

One set of objections concerned how the resolution was negotiated.
The process of negotiation stretched over a long time period. In
the beginning the drafting was solely undertaken by four permanent
members of the Security Council, the United States, United Kingdom,
Russia, and France; the fifth permanent member, China, took a secondary
role. The permanent members spent some six months working on the
text of the draft resolution before the text was officially shared
with the ten elected members of the Council on 24 March 2004. However,
elected members of the Security Council as well as non-Council members,
NGOs, and the press were aware that the text was in gestation and
pushed to have input. Accordingly, consultations were held with
the elected members of the Security Council, the Non-Aligned Movement
(NAM), and NGOs; some of those consultations took place before the
official release. Further, on 22 April 2004, an open session of
the Council was held where over one third of all member states of
the United Nations made statements.[6]

This form of practical, though relative, democracy was not the
result of “security leaks” but rather awareness of the permanent
members that the political sensitivity of the issues required input
by member states and global civil society.[7] Nonetheless, the impact
of this input had was limited. Major points were not taken into
account; among them the emphasis on nonproliferation to the virtual
exclusion of disarmament and the problematic role of the Council
as a global legislator. One developing country commented that a
great effort was necessary just to get the chance to speak, only
to be ignored in the end. However, some minor accommodations were
made. For instance, it was proposed that there be a preambular reference
to the recognition in the presidential statement of 31 January 1992
(S/23500) of the need for member states to fulfill disarmament obligations.[8]
In the final text of resolution 1540, preambular paragraph 2 contains
the language of this proposal. The entire exercise will serve to
intensify calls for more transparency and consultation in Security
Council decisionmaking.

A related set of objections went to whether and how the Security
Council should engage in what amounts to global legislation, requiring
states to adopt and enforce national laws and measures in response
to a global problem. Some defend the Security Council’s initiative
based on the necessity and urgency of action. While acknowledging
the urgency, others reply that the Council could have limited its
role, for example by providing that the resolution’s mandatory measures
were subject to expiration and encouraging the use of the primary
established process of global law-making, negotiation of multilateral
agreements.[9] Even strong supporters of the resolution acknowledge
its innovative character, similar to that of resolution 1373 on
the suppression of terrorism: “It abrogates the Westphalian concept
of state sovereignty because it forces nations to take certain actions
without their consent. Thus, it is a challenge to the traditional
structure of international law.”[10] This question is widely discussed
among international lawyers and will not be further elaborated here.[11]

Another set of objections went to the substance of the resolution.
As was raised strongly both by non-nuclear weapon states and by
NGOs, the thrust of the resolution, reflecting the general trend
in international fora especially since the September 11 attacks,
is towards preventing the proliferation of WMD, especially to non-state
actors. There is little recognition of disarmament measures relating
to reduction and elimination of stocks of nuclear materials and
explosives and to control of biological-weapons relevant research.
Yet it is widely recognized that such measures are highly relevant
to preventing acquisition of WMD by terrorists and other non-state
actors. There was also widespread concern about the resolution’s
support for the Proliferation Security Initiative. Robust in early
drafts, it is muted and implicit in the final text; OP10 calls upon
all states “to take cooperative action to prevent illicit trafficking.”
Many states did not want this provision to be understood as an authorization
for interdictions not otherwise permitted by international law.

A more technical objection concerned the vagueness of the resolution’s
language. Although the resolution contains definitions, added to
a later draft,[12] of the terms “means of delivery,” ”non-State
actor” and ”related materials,” the level of precision is still
far from that one achieved in the relevant international bodies.
One example is the term “related materials.” The Council refrained
from using the term “dual-use goods” as it raises controversial
issues and would have complicated the adoption and the implementation
of the resolution. However, this meant that the resolution ignores
the work of the Wassenaar Arrangement[13] and the Zangger Committee;[14]
in both settings experts have dealt with dual-use goods for many
years. While the resolution provides that its definitions are for
purposes of the resolution only, some diplomats fear that resolution
1540 will have the practical effect of undermining the detailed
definitions and control lists created by these bodies. The use of
vague terms poses the risk of abrogating higher standards, and lays
a foundation for differences in implementation.[15]

II. The 1540 Committee

The 1540 Committee, established in accordance with OP4 of the resolution,
consists of all members of the Security Council. It is headed by
Ambassador Ioan Motoc of Romania. The Committee has a two year mandate,
ending in April 2006. However, it seems almost inevitable that the
mandate will be prolonged, as the Committee cannot cope with its
tasks in the first two years. The reports that member states submitted
are reviewed by three subcommittees. When the need for clarifications
or additions exists, the country is informed. In August 2005, Ambassador
Motoc met with representatives of different regional groups, seeking
to raise the number of reports. By October 2005 the Committee is
supposed to have finished reviewing the first set of reports. Subsequently,
states will be given two more months to hand in second reports with
clarifications and additions to the first reports. The review of
the second set of reports will take the remaining time of the first
mandate of the Committee.

III. Quantitative Analysis

The analytical part of this paper is based on 48 reports submitted
to the Committee by 1 June 2005.[16]
A chart summarizing the results of examination of the reports is
an appendix to this paper (see pdf
version). In evaluating the reports, special attention
was paid to the measures that the reporting states took after the
adoption of resolution 1540 to ensure their compliance. In OP4,
the Security Council called upon all member states to submit reports
to the Committee regarding their implementation of the resolution
no later than six months after its adoption, i.e. 28 October 2004.
Only 51 states met that deadline. By January 2005, 86 had been submitted;
by 1 June 2005 the number had reached 119. This is a high number
for the short time allowed compared with reports submitted to other
bodies.[17]

In the 48 reports examined, states indicate that by the time of
submission altogether 27 measures had been taken on 17 relevant
provisions of the resolution, and 50 measures are in the planning
phase. The provision as to which the most states (seven) adopted
post-resolution measures is OP2. It obligates states to:

adopt and enforce appropriate effective laws which prohibit
any non-State actor to manufacture, acquire, possess, develop,
transport, transfer or use nuclear, chemical or biological weapons
and their means of delivery, in particular for terrorist purposes,
as well as attempts to engage in any of the foregoing activities,
participate in them as an accomplice, assist or finance them.

OP3a, which deals with accounting and security measures, is the
part of the resolution as to which states have the most measures
in the planning phase, namely ten.

Reporting compliance varies visibly in regard to the different
provisions of the resolution. Ninety percent of the reports contain
a reference to OP2 and OP3d, but OP8d regarding informing the public
and industry of non-proliferation obligations and laws was mentioned
in just 63% of the reports. Also the number of post-1540 measures
taken by different countries vary substantially. The five most active
countries report measures taken in relation to six provisions. A
number of countries reported one to four measures, but 18 states,
more than one third of the sample, made no reference to any measures
taken after the adoption of the resolution.

IV. Measures Initiated in Response to Resolution 1540

A. Obligations under international treaty regimes, OP8

With regard to OP8 concerning implementation of multilateral treaties
on non-proliferation of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons,
of the 48 reports examined, ten indicate that the states are in
the process of ratifying the IAEA Additional Protocol, or they recently
implemented certain obligations under the 1993 Chemical Weapons
Convention (CWC), or they started fulfilling their obligations under
other international treaty regimes like the Convention on the Physical
Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM). For states that were parties
to the relevant treaty regimes the obligations existed before the
adoption of resolution 1540. All the states which report their recent
implementation of the CWC ratified this instrument between 1994
and 1997. Now it is up to eleven years after the ratification. Though
it is regrettable that it took that long for these states to take
implementation steps under the CWC, it can be seen as a positive
outcome of the resolution that it gave an incentive for the states
to comply with their treaty obligations. Some even speak of a “boost
to the OPCW’s efforts concerning national implementation of the
CWC.”[18] Indonesia, for example, is developing a plan of action
under the CWC that is envisaged to be in place at the end of 2005.
The work on this plan started before the adoption of the resolution
1540, but was accelerated after April 2004.[19] Although not directly
connected to the system of established treaties, resolution 1540
contributes in this way to promoting compliance with these treaty
regimes.

States also refer to the CPPNM under OP3b (“develop and maintain
appropriate physical protection measures”). The convention is the
only international legally binding undertaking in the area of physical
protection of nuclear material. In July 2005 a Diplomatic Conference
was called to adopt amendments to the convention designed to strengthen
its existing provisions and expand its scope to cover, among other
points, physical protection against theft of nuclear material used
for peaceful purposes, in domestic use, storage and transport; and
physical protection of nuclear material and peaceful nuclear facilities
against sabotage.[20] These amendments will substantially strengthen
the convention. The new rules will come into effect once they have
been ratified by two-thirds of the 112 states parties of the convention,
expected to take several years. The amendment process started before
the adoption of resolution 1540 and was not initiated by it. Nonetheless,
during these recent CPPNM negotiations the resolution was discussed
from time to time in the context of ensuring that the language in
both instruments was complementary.[21] Diplomats from various states
stated that although the resolution as such had no direct impact
on the amendment of the CPPNM, the changed situation and awareness
of non-proliferation, which is expressed by the resolution, definitely
had.

B. Measures taken or envisaged under OP2 and OP3

OP2 and OP3 are the paragraphs of the resolution containing the
main obligations. Correspondingly, one would expect that states
would take the most measures on these paragraphs. As stated above
(section III), the provisions of OP2 and OP3d were indeed most cited
in the reports. However, regarding the provision as to which the
most planned measures were reported, namely OP3a, only ten out of
the 48 countries report measures that they are planning to take
under this paragraph; only two states report measures already taken
in this field. OP2 is the provision as to which the largest number
of measures have been taken (seven) and planned (four states plan
measures). Still, these figures are relatively low compared to the
48 reports of states examined in this study. However, this should
not be seen as a sign of non-compliance. States had just six months
to hand in the first report to the 1540 Committee after the adoption
of the resolution and thus after learning about their obligations.
For the vast majority of countries this was not enough time to negotiate,
draft and adopt in their parliaments any “appropriate effective
laws” as envisaged under OP2 and “effective measures to establish
domestic controls” as prescribed by OP3. Furthermore, as one staff
member of the 1540 Committee commented, one should not underestimate
the lack of understanding of the resolution. To many states the
obligations accruing from the resolution are not clear.

States’ second reports, filling in gaps of the first reports, will
be an important indicator of the will of states to comply with the
main obligations of the resolution. States receive after the assessment
of their first reports by the 1540 Committee a matrix showing what
they were expected to report about and what they actually reported
on. In the next set of reports a lack of understanding of the obligations
will no longer be a reason for not reporting on these paragraphs.

C. Measures taken or envisaged under OP7

In OP7 of the resolution the Security Council recognized that:

some States might require assistance in implementing the provisions
of this resolution within their territories and invites States
in a position to do so to offer assistance as appropriate in response
to specific requests to the States lacking the legal and regulatory
infrastructure, implementation experience and / or resources for
fulfilling the above provisions.

In the reports almost every state refer to this OP and the larger
states express their general willingness to meet requests for assistance.
Some states make statements about regional group of states to which
they will offer assistance. Thus New Zealand reports that it has
together with Australia already begun discussions with some Pacific
Island states about the resolution, and will be further discussing
with them what type of assistance they would find useful to help
them implement it.[22] Norway reports that it is in the process
of identifying states, primarily in Central Asia, for possible assistance
regarding implementation of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.[23]

Some states make detailed remarks about assistance. Canada states
that its government has announced the creation of a permanent Counter-Terrorism
Capacity Building Program.[24] Through this program, Canada will
provide counter-terrorism related training, resources and expertise
to partner states to enable them to prevent and respond to terrorist
activity. The assistance offered mainly lies in the field of legislative
drafting and legal policy assistance related to the ratification
and implementation of non-proliferation and arms control-related
conventions and measures related to nuclear material and biological
agents.[25] Columbia reports that it needs “assistance in improving
skills transfer and training” and “physical equipment enabling it
to respond appropriately to the challenge of detecting, monitoring
and prosecuting non-State actors who possess radioactive materials
or weapons of mass destruction”.[26]

The United States reports extensively on bilateral and multilateral
cooperation with many countries in the field of WMD materials security
and control.[27] However, the examples of cooperation mainly refer
to projects that were initiated before the adoption of the resolution.
The only new project will commence in Asia in 2005, assessing both
the legislative and regulatory frameworks for criminalizing the
use of weapons of mass destruction for terrorist acts, and the ability
of law enforcement institutions and specialized agencies to effectively
investigate and prosecute such acts.[28] It is striking that out of
all the ways of providing assistance that are listed in the U.S.
report, only one is in the framework of established international
bodies: the United States will have trained 13,000 IAEA inspectors,
export control officials and other nonproliferation experts by 2013.
All other measures are mainly on a bilateral basis. This corresponds
with the general attitude towards global treaty regimes the United
States has shown in recent years.

The United Kingdom started work on its report very soon after the
adoption of the resolution, in effect of means of providing assistance
under OP7. It created a kind of model report which it distributed
to a number of countries, and some used the model in drafting their
own reports. For example, some followed the UK example of dividing
the report on the OPs into categories of “action taken” and “planned/ongoing
action.”

D. Reporting by some states affected by terrorism

Some states have experienced serious terrorist attacks and also
are known to have terrorist groups on their territory. Ideally,
these states would have shown a sincere interest in compliance with
resolution 1540 and in reporting on their compliance. This has not
always proved to be the case, raising questions about the political
legitimacy of Security Council counter-terrorism efforts. The report
of Indonesia, for example, is very short, containing just five pages,
and refers only to parts of OP1, 2 and 3. It also only contains
information about measures taken before the adoption of the resolution.
The report does refer to, without fully describing, Indonesian Law
No. 15/2003 regarding the Eradication of Criminal Acts of Terrorism,
adopted after the Bali attacks of 12 October 2002. This law contains
several provisions that became mandatory under resolution 1540.

Similarly, the report Yemen submitted is the shortest of all reports
assessed in this study.[29] It consists of just five lines in which
Yemen states that it does not possess any kind of WMD. This “report”
was submitted only after the Chairman of the 1540 Committee reminded
Yemen of its reporting obligation two months after the deadline
was passed. Keeping in mind among other things the attacks on the
USS Cole of 12 October 2000, several states regard the anti-terrorism
measures taken by Yemen as unsatisfactory. For example, in its 2003
report, “Patterns of Global Terrorism,” the U.S. State Department
states that “[t]he Republic of Yemen Government continued to cooperate
with US law enforcement and to take action against al-Qaida and
local extremists in 2003 …. However, there is still more work to
be done to improve counterterrorism capabilities, including implementing
a Maritime Security Strategy and increasing border security”.[30]
Yemen did not make use of the OP7 option of requesting assistance
from other states in implementing its obligations under the resolution.
The same is true for Saudi Arabia, which also does not mention OP7
in its report.[31]

E. Reporting by some states of proliferation concern

The reports of some countries that pose proliferation concerns
are of different nature. Some are salient in their completeness
or substance. Others are rather mediocre. The report of Iran belongs
to the former category. It is quite comprehensive, containing information
about all operative paragraphs.[32] In its report Iran states that
it considers resolution 1540 to be a shortterm step aimed at filling
the gap in the non-proliferation regimes. It believes that the most
effective way of preventing non-state actors from acquiring WMD
is through the total elimination of such weapons. The country’s
report is silent about any post-1540 measures. Under OP8d Iran refers
to the adoption of “The Law of National Implementation of the CWC.”
However, the work on this bill started before the adoption of resolution.

Pakistan also delivered a comprehensive report to the 1540 Committee,[33]
and was one of the first countries to make a submission. The report
refers to a new law, “Export Control on Goods, Technologies, Material
and Equipment related to Nuclear and Biological Weapons and their
Delivery Systems Act.” The content of the act covers measures falling
in the sphere of OP2, 3b and 3d. The act also provides the authority
to administer rules and regulations framed under this legislation.
This makes it easier to adjust the act to new threats. It is emphasized
that the act’s jurisdiction is broad, covering Pakistanis visiting
or working abroad. A special oversight board may be established
to monitor the implementation of the act. All of these steps can
be subsumed under “lessons learned from the A.Q. Khan network.”

Malaysia submitted a report with some omissions; no references
to OP3a and OP3c are made.[34] Also, Malaysia does not report any
new measures taken or planned, including only a vague statement
that “Malaysia is striving to enhance its control over WMD including
by enacting appropriate specific legislations and by implementing
its obligations under the relevant international conventions and
legal instruments to which it is a Party.”[35] In the light of the
fact that one of the businesses in the A.Q. Khan network was based
in Malaysia, one could have expected a complete report and the planning
of some concrete steps.

F. Reporting by the permanent five members of the Security Council

Of the five permanent members of the Security Council, only two,
France and the United Kingdom, report post-1540 measures to comply
with the resolution. France states that at the end of June 2004
it amended its national Order of 22 September 2001 on the manufacture,
import, export, possession, transfer free of charge or in return
for payment, acquisition and transport of certain biological agents
which cause infectious diseases, pathogenic microorganisms and toxins.
This amendment is described in the French report as measure to prevent
non-state actors from getting access to WMD as prohibited under
OP2.[36] The Order also affects end-user controls, referred to OP3d
and OP6.[37] In addition, post-1540-measures were taken in the field
of OP8d, which calls upon states to inform industry and the public
regarding their obligations under the international non-proliferation
regime. In October 2004 France distributed widely a brochure on
dual-use, not only to companies but also to the national, regional,
decentralized and external public “services” concerned, which are
a vital element in the state’s actions regarding small and medium-sized
enterprises.

In its report the United Kingdom highlights under OP2 that post-1540
it has adopted regulations on the transfer of uranium enrichment
technology. They prohibit making unauthorized disclosures concerning
uranium enrichment technology, as this technology can be used to
produce weapons grade uranium and has been sought by those seeking
to develop nuclear weapons.[38] The United Kingdom also enacted
post-1540 national legislation in the field of OP3a. On 1 July 2005
a set of security measures for dangerous goods transported by road
became mandatory. In addition, a similar code for transport by rail
will be introduced shortly.[39]

It can be said for the report submitted by the Russian Federation
that it is the most comprehensive of all evaluated reports; it makes
comments regarding every operative provision of the resolution.
But Russia, along with China, makes no reference to any measure
taken after the adoption of 1540. The U.S. report is by far the
longest, consisting of 61 pages. It refers to projects that were
taken before the resolution, even dating back until 1954. The report
contains detailed information about interaction among departments
involved, their competencies, and the steps taken, providing examples.
However, the only reference to measures taken after the adoption
of the resolution is found under OP7 regarding assistance, a non-mandatory
provision of the resolution (see IV(C), above).

Russia and the United States are major powers with global interests
that prior to the adoption of resolution 1540 or the September 11
attacks were well aware of the need to prevent proliferation and
WMD terrorism. Accordingly, like other large countries, they have
legislation, regulations, and other measures addressing key provisions
of the resolution. This may explain in part their failure to report
measures initiated in response to the resolution. Nonetheless, due
to the political sensitivity attaching to the nuclear-armed permanent
five imposing rules on the rest of the world and the need to set
an example, one would have thought they would have made every effort
to take new steps.

V. Reporting regarding disarmament

Among disarmament leaders in recent years have been the countries
of the New Agenda Coalition, Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New
Zealand, South Africa, and Sweden. Not surprisingly, in their reports
they stressed the importance of disarmament. Mexico notes that,
in an individual capacity and within the coalition, it is continuing
to promote the full implementation of the principles of irreversibility,
transparency and verification of nuclear arms control and disarmament.[40]
In the very first part of its report, even before referring to the
operative paragraphs of the resolution, Sweden states that it has
a long tradition of strong support of disarmament and non-proliferation
and is committed to multilateral approaches to meet the threats
of proliferation of WMD.[41] For Brazil, a consistent and sustainable
long-term international strategy must be necessarily followed by
concrete measures in the field of disarmament; it is convinced that
only the complete elimination of WMD can ensure that these weapons
will never fall in the hands of non-state actors.[42] Egypt prefaces
its report with the statement that the “best method to ensure that
[WMD] may not be acquired by terrorist groups or non-State actors
… is for the international community to follow a path that ends
in ridding the world of weapons of mass destruction.”[43] However,
Egypt’s report does not offer comprehensive information on the implementation
of the operative paragraphs of the resolution. South Africa, also
a disarmament advocate, does not stress this topic in its report,[44]
but expressed in another context its fear that resolution 1540 will
have a negative impact on the disarmament agenda.

New Zealand delivered a very comprehensive report in which it refers
to all paragraphs and reports on measures it took in relation to
OP3a and OP7. The country excels in stressing the connection of
resolution 1540 and disarmament. In the first sentence regarding
OP1 New Zealand recalls its policy that “all weapons of mass destruction
should be eliminated, and that this elimination should be verified
and enforced through robust legally binding multilateral disarmament
instruments.”[45] In relation to OP9 New Zealand states that non-proliferation
is a problem that can not be seen out of context but has rather
to be addressed comprehensively: the “most effective non-proliferation
moves we could make collectively would be to ensure and enhance
compliance with the NPT in all its aspects including nuclear disarmament
and a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty with strong verification provisions“.
New Zealand also highlights in relation to OP8d the role that NGOs
can play in disarmament and nonproliferation education.

When it comes to disarmament, the reports of the permanent five
contain fewer references than those of the New Agenda countries.
China’s 17 page report nowhere mentions the word “disarmament.”
The Russian Federation refers only to two legal acts that regulate
the implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention. France states
that it favors initiating negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament
on a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty. Other substantial references
to disarmament and its relationship to non-proliferation cannot
be found in the report. The United Kingdom states that it “has long
promoted the universal adoption and full implementation of main
multilateral disarmament and non-proliferation treaties and will
continue to do so.”[46] The U.S. report lacks reference to disarmament
measures applicable to the United States and rather emphasizes its
efforts to ensure progress on non-proliferation and compliance with
arms control agreements by other countries. The report notes that
the United States has worked to ensure that non-proliferation is
a topic of discussion in various fora, including the Conference
on Disarmament. The report also cites section 403 of the Arms Control
and Disarmament Act, which requires an annual report to be submitted
to the Department of State that identifies each and every question
that exists with respect to compliance by other countries with their
arms control, non-proliferation, and disarmament agreements with
the United States. Generally, the U.S. report does not acknowledge
the interdependence of non-proliferation and disarmament, emphasized
by New Zealand among others.

VI. Conclusion

It took the 1540 Committee a long time, until the beginning of
2005, to establish itself and start substantive work. At the end
of its two-year mandate in April 2006 its task will not be completed;
it will just have assessed the second set of state reports. There
is a common understanding among involved actors that a renewal of
the mandate is necessary and inevitable. In its second term the
Committee will be in a position to assess whether inadequate reporting
stem from a lack of understanding or capacity, or if it, more disturbingly,
reflects a lack of will to cooperate with the Committee. Beyond
reporting issues, the more difficult question can be asked: are
states in compliance with the resolution? If not, what steps are
to be taken to achieve compliance? At the moment it is too early
to ask such questions, especially as there is no common understanding
among states regarding what the resolution requires. Finally, when
and where compliance is achieved, the bottom-line question will
need to be addressed: has it made a significant contribution to
preventing WMD terrorism? At this point, it can be said that there
has been a high level of state participation in reporting, and that
the resolution has inspired at least a modest increase in activity
relevant to preventing WMD terrorism, particularly in complying
with existing requirements of treaty regimes and in cooperating
with other states. The second series of state reports will hopefully
confirm these trends and in addition reveal far more vigorous implementation
of 1540 requirements.