North America has a good number of excellent Neo-Scholastic philosophers. Many of them were trained at the Dominican
House of Studies, River Forest, Illinois, in the Chicago area. This institution, and espcially Rev. William Kane,
O.P., promoted the study of the philosophy of nature.

John J. Rolbiecki (1939).61 Rolbiecki is an American Neo-Scholastic layman who taught in the school of philosophy
of the Catholic University of America, in Washington, D.C. He is a serious philosopher, and has also written on the political
philosophy of Dante Alighieri. He writes in English, even though his book on the prospects of philosophy was published in
1939. There were clerical students at the Catholic University, but Rolbiecki wanted a wider audience of lay students who are
thinking of spending more time in an intensive study of philosophy. His book on philosophical prospects is written from a
historical point of view, and has notice of ecclesiastical approval. He makes a survey of a number of philosophical topics,
however it is not an introductory textbook. Each chapter is a section of scholastic philosophy, but written in a modern colloquial
style, with some brief indications of future tasks of philosophy. Themes that run through the presentation are the need for
cooperation between science and philosophy, and a concern for students. Pedagogically, Rolbiecki wants to awaken interest
in philosophy, arouse an impulse for deeper investigation, and by lifting the philosophic veil only partially raise a real
curiosity in the reader.

Rolbiecki treats evolution as the problem of life. He rejects abiogenesis, and accepts the biological axiom, all life from
life (omne vivum ex vivo), but he is open to the possibility that life could be produced in the laboratory in the future.
He rejects the theory of Svante Arrhenius that life comes from some extra-terrestrial source. Rolbiecki endorses the view
that philosophy has something to say about the concept of life. He rejects Materialism, after noting that Fechner and Wundt
made psychology independent, so that philosophical psychology became empirical psychology, which became biology, which is
being transformed into bio-chemistry, and bio-chemistry is being reduced to chemistry pure and simple. Thus, Rolbiecki notes,
the enigma of life is disappearing like a mirage. Rolbiecki affirms the Vitalism of Hans Driesch. Rolbiecki believes that
evolution is now universally admitted in the scientific and philosophic circles. He generally affirms the essential distinction
between man and other animals, personally wants to see more empirical study. He notes that many affirm the evolution of man’s
body. He notes that St. Augustine did not account for the origin of all living things by special creation, but supposed that
the powers innate in nature could bring forth life.

Rolbiecki treats evolution as a fruitful concept. He tends to reject Hylemorphism of Aristotle and the Scholastics. Against
Kant, Rolbiecki holds a limited universe in space and time. Rolbiecki also maintains that Mechanicism is not a good explanation
for the cosmos. He approves of finality in the cosmos. He maintains that a Supreme Being created the universe and gave it
purpose. Against evolutionary society, Rolbiecki notes that the development of society has taken place quite in accord with
the nature of man. Against the agnosticism of Herbert Spencer, Roliecki holds that the argument of Aristotle and Aquinas for
a Prime Mover does lead to an affirmation of the Creator.

Celestine N. Bittle (1945).62 Bittle is an North American Neo-Scholastic Capuchin priest and educator. He has
written several textbooks in English in the philosophical areas of logic, epistemology, ontology and cosmology. In cosmology
he treated Hylemorphism extensively. His book on philosophical psychology is for the undergraduate student who already has
a fairly good acquaintance with this department of philosophy. The book treats empirical psychology only as a background for
the course. Bittle puts special emphasis on the unity of man, and not just on mental functions. Bittle bases his philosophy
on Aristotle, Aquinas and the Neo-Scholastics. His work is an excellent summary of Neo-Scholastic philosophical psychology
in the first half of the twentieth century. He does not write in thesis form, but his philosophical positions are well argued
and very clear. His treatment of philosophical psychology is very extensive and more complete than many English manuals. His
bibliography is suited to books available to students in English, although some French and Latin texts are noted. The major
contribution of Bittle to this dissertation is his vision of the future of man in this world and the endorsement of survival
after death as morally certain in philosophy.

Bittle treats evolution extensively. He maintains that evolution is philosophically possible, but the fact of evolution
is still debatable. He is against evolutionary Mechanicism and Materialism. Finality exists in nature where inherent natural
purposefulness can be found. Vitalism that is meristic is rejected, although there is a vital principle in plants, animals
and man. Bittle endorses Hylemorphism by maintaining two incomplete principles, primordial matter and the vital principle,
form living organisms, except for the substantial soul of man. There is a discontinuity between man and the other animals,
who only have a material vital principle. The evolution of the body of man is a fair working hypothesis. The human soul cannot
evolve. The future of man involves his free growth of self, an active and free role in the world, and the development of culture,
including abstract language. Survival after death for man is morally certain. Bittle opposes evolutionary abiogenesis. Bittle
describes social life with no indication of evolutionary determinism. Bittle notes that evolution of itself is not atheistic,
although some promoters of evolution are atheists.

Henri Renard (1946).63 Renard was a North American Neo-Scholastic Jesuit educator at the University of St. Louis.
His book on the philosophy of being had ecclesiastical approval. His book is in question form, rather than in thesis form.
He does respond to these questions with development of the problem, the Neo-Scholastic solution, and philosophical proofs.
In his replies to problems, Renard is valuable in citing the different schools of scholastic philosophy founded by Duns Scotus,
Suarez and Aquinas. Clearly, Renard is a follower of Aristotle, whom he cites thirty-two times, and Aquinas, whom he extensively
quotes in Latin. Renard recommends that the teacher who uses his book should read St. Thomas to pupils. Renard is aware of
current trends in Thomism, and cites both Maréchal and Boyer, and is aware of modern problems
involving Empiricism, the Idealism of Kant, and Neo-Hegelianism. Renard notes that philosophy can help theology.

Renard is concerned about metaphysics. He notes the decline of metaphysics due to the emphasis on the physical sciences,
attributed largely to Bacon, together with the contempt that the Renaissance had for the culture of the Middle Ages and for
the philosophy of St. Thomas. In the modern era, two views of reality arose. The emphasis on sense knowledge was found in
the English school of Empiricism, held by Hume, Locke, Mill, Spencer; by French Positivism espoused by Taine and Comte, and
by German Materialism espoused by Buchner and Feuerbach. The second trend is the subjective and psychological tendencies of
Descartes which led to Kant’s Idealism and the modern idealist school of Hegel. Neither Empiricism nor Subjectivism
will help with the analysis of reality necessary to deal with evolution. The restoration of metaphysics of Aquinas is necessary
to adequately deal with Evolutionism.

Renard treats the principles needed to make a philosophical study of Evolutionism. The principle of finality is necessary.
The doctrine of Hylemorphism is useful to understand evolution. The new material form of the species would be educed from
the potency of the matter by the action of an extrinsic agent. The fact of accidental change can prepare and dispose the substance
at least a longe for a substantial change, which would philosophically explain the process of evolution. He also notes
that philosophy is separate from theology, but can help theology. The existence of God can be demonstrated.

Brother Benignus (1947).64 Brother Benignus of Jesus, a Brother of the Christian Schools, was a North American
Neo-Scholastic professor of philosophy at Manhattan College in New York City. His book on nature, knowledge and God is an
introduction to Thomistic philosophy. The footnotes in the book are almost exclusively references to St. Thomas. The purpose
of Brother Benignus is to present a single coherent integral picture of philosophy, rather than just its various departments.
St. Thomas had such an integral view. The secondary purpose is to communicate this integral view of philosophy to students.
In method, Benignus tries to follow St. Thomas to: first, be concerned with some concrete being; second, follow pedagogical
order so that the new builds on what is already known; third, quickly explain the basic principles of philosophy; and fourth,
show repeated application of the principles of St. Thomas.

Benignus treats Evolutionism. He notes that St. Thomas has no theoretical objection to the Evolutionism, neither to the
hypothesis of abiogenesis nor to the hypothesis that all life evolved. Benignus notes the text of St. Thomas (Aquinas Summa
Contra Gentiles 3. 22) which indicates that matter has an appetite for the most perfect activity attainable. This means
that the first cause of the processes through which matter passes in evolution is the goal of those processes. Accordingly,
Benignus defends finality by noting the principle that "every agent acts for an end" (omne agens agit propter finem)
as St. Thomas says (Aquinas Summa Theologiae 1-2. 1. 2; Aquinas Summa Contra Gentiles 3. 2). The proof of the
Principle of Finality is from the fact that there has to be a reason to act (Principle of Sufficient Reason) and another proof
is that every act tends to some specific goal (from act and potency in change). Benignus argues against Mechanicism, since
the parts of an organism do not account for the whole; he argues against Materialism, since chemistry alone does not explain
life; and he argues against mere Vitalism, since there is no need to add some special life force to the adequate hylemorphic
theory.

Benignus treats the evolution of man. St. Thomas notes grades of biological life: vegetable, sensitive, and intellectual;
so that the perfection of life depends on the degree to which the movements of the living agent are determined by the agent
itself from within. Human life is superior to other animals since humans have intellect and free will. Man is a hylemorphic
composit. Man has a true vital principle distinct from his material body.

Benignus treats the fruitfulness of the concept of evolution. He notes that abiogenesis has no theoretical objection against
it. But science has not been able to account for the origin of life. While abiogenesis is not impossible, there is no evidence
in its favor. Evidence against abiogenesis is the fact that it does not happen now, where the conditions are favorable for
life. Concerning the evolutionary cosmos, Benignus maintains with St. Thomas (Aquinas Summa Theologiae 1.11; Aquinas
De Potentia Dei 1. 5; Aquinas Summa Contra Gentiles 2, 15-38) that God created the cosmos out of nothing by
a free act of His will. Concerning evolutionary atheism, Benignus gives philosophical proofs for God as creator, but also
notes the reality of secondary causes though which evolution could operate. Benignus’ proofs for secondary causes come
from St. Thomas (Aquinas Summa Contra Gentiles 3. 69).

Benignus also treats belief and ideology. Some scientists dislike divine creation and then make a dogma out of Materialism,
while some non-scientists simply find the doctrine of creation incredible and too astonishing for acceptance. Benignus notes
that human reason is limited because it is dependent on the senses. St. Thomas (Aquinas De Trinitate 3. 1) gives justification
for revelation of truths that can be obtained through reason, by citing Maimonides. St. Thomas (Aquinas Summa Contra Gentiles
1. 5. 7) also defends the rationality of faith, since man’s reason is limited and man should avail himself of the
easy way to attain his destiny. In any case faith perfects reason. St. Thomas (Aquinas Summa Theologiae 2-2. 5. 3.
c) notes that there can be no conflict between faith and reason, since truth is above both, and "only the false can contradict
the true."

Benignus treats the foundation of the Intelligent Design Theory. Even if there is design, this does not simply prove there
is a designer. Finality is one of the four Aristotelian causes. Every end or goal is subsequent to its cause. If solely in
time, the end would not exist until the future; during the process there would be no existence. But a cause (like the final
cause) must be prior to its effect. So the intrinsic finality of things needs a cause outside time; timeless. This would be
a transcendent final cause or causes. But the transcendental cause is one, for even if there is a plurality of orders in the
universe, all of them demand a First Order or Ordainer as their ground or cause.

Paul J. Glenn (1948).65 Glenn was a North American Catholic Monsignor and Neo-Scholastic who taught at St. Charles
Borromeo College in Columbus, Ohio. He has a doctorate in both theology and in philosophy. He wrote a class manual in fundamental
metaphysics, in English, as one of a series of eight books for college students. He notes that the book does not take the
place of the teacher, so there are no references, no study questions, and no foreign readings.

Glenn treats ontology, the "science of being," which is sometimes called general metaphysics. He warns that ontology cannot
be turned into a simple study. Significantly, in 1949, Glenn notes that there are few manuals in ontology available in the
English language. However, Glenn is a traditionalist in scholastic philosophy, and states that his purpose is traditional.
He differs from those for whom the "older writings" have small appeal. He notes that between 1937 and 1949, many Catholic
colleges have omitted ontology altogether, but may teach logic, ethics, and psychology. Further, he notes that psychology
is done in the laboratory, and "dragged momentarily from the academic scene." There appears to be a movement to the empirical
and the practical, that is somehow detrimental to Neo-Scholasticism.

Glenn treats metaphysical concepts that are useful in the evaluation of Evolutionism. He affirms the principle of causality
and the principle of finality. He treats the use of equivocal concepts. He notes how "species" is constituted metaphysically.
He affirms God as the Supreme Intelligence and Infinite Wisdom.

Mortimer Adler (1952).66 Mortimer Adler was a North American Jewish Neo-Scholastic educator at the University
of Chicago. He also produced the Great Books series for the Encyclopedia Britannica in Chicago. The Great Books program had
publications even for children to enter into dialogue, and Adler had the same kind of dialogue, presumably on a higher level,
with corporate leaders at the Aspen Institute in Colorado. Adler was a researcher into St. Thomas Aquinas. Although born a
Jew, he was baptized an Episcopalian, and converted to the Roman Catholic Church just prior to his death.

Adler’s book on the great ideas, originally called the Syntopicon to the Encyclopedia Britannica’s Great
Books of the Western World, was first published in 1953, but has been popular and in print until the latest edition in
1999. The book consists of 102 essays featuring ideas that collectively defined Western thought; the book is over one thousand
pages and contains more than half a million words. Adler presents the philosophical material, including points of view on
almost three thousand questions, in a way that is clear and fair to all sides. Adler gives the historical references, material
for lively debate and relevance for today. Adler was especially noted for his position that the written material is only the
beginning, and that dialogue and debate are the real work of philosophy. Adler’s work is a true modern descriptive (not
Neo-Scholastic) synthesis. Adler, in his own essay, notes that the twentieth century has seen dramatic discoveries and great
technological advances but these cannot be understood without seeing them in the larger context of the past. Relevant to this
dissertation are Adler’s treatment on evolution, chance, mechanics, matter, animal, man, soul, happiness, immortality,
life and death, astronomy and cosmology, liberty and God. In short, Adler’s work for discussion touches every thesis
proposed for the academic part of this dissertation.

Adler’s publications verify the man: philosopher, educator, and writer on topics associated with the evolution of
man’s political, economic, and future society. Also his general publications are no less useful as background to this
dissertation. Adler was a true philosopher and wrote: The Conditions of Philosophy, Philosopher at Large, Aristotle
for Everybody, Six Great Ideas, and Ten Philosophical Mistakes. Adler was concerned with education and wrote:
How to Read a Book, The Paideia Proposal, The Paideia Program, Reforming Education: The Opening of
the American Mind. Adler was concerned about the humanity of man, man’s politics and economics, and the future of
man, and his writings reflect this concern: The Difference of Man and the Difference It Makes, What Has Man Made
of Man, The Idea of Freedom, The Common Sense of Politics, The New Capitalists, and A Vision of
the Future.

George P. Klubertanz (1953).67 Klubertanz was a North American Neo-Scholastic Jesuit priest teaching at the
University of St. Louis. He acknowledges, in 1953, that new problems for philosophy have arisen in the twentieth century.
He does not use the thesis system, but does follow the scholastic topics. He writes in English, but gives both footnotes and
bibliographical sources in Latin, French, and English. Klubertanz notes that his book is too much for a single year of treatment
of the philosophy of human nature, and the teacher will need to reduce its use appropriately. His book is excellent with good
arguments, not just facts. His book is very useful for this dissertation due to an original arguments favoring Evolutionism.

Klubertanz treats Evolutionism directly in his book on the philosophy of human nature. There is a need to be careful with
terminology in this book, since Klubertanz only treats atheistic Evolutionism as an adversary. Klubertanz is a Neo-Scholastic
and notes that the writings of St. Thomas are closely integrated, so the texts must be re-read and re-thought in the light
of modern problems. Klubertanz has positive and original arguments favoring evolution. He endorses monophyletic evolution.
He uses equivocal causality, chance, and Providence to explain the dynamic possibility of evolution. Klubertanz answers the
two serious objections against evolution from the principle of causality, namely, no effect can be greater than its cause,
and effects need to be similar to their causes. He holds the possibility of the evolution of the body of man, but not the
soul of man. He holds the possibility of abiogenesis. Klubertanz notes that the factual establishment of evolution is extremely
difficult, and maybe impossible.

Timothy Gannon (1954).68 Gannon was a North American Neo-Scholastic layman and educator. He was professor of
psychology at Loras College in Dubuque, Iowa.

Gannon wrote on psychology as the study of human behavior. He wrote for college students. There is a bibliography at the
end of each chapter, with many articles, but all in English. He wrote in English, and was very concerned with scientific psychology,
although his book follows the scholastic order and endorses scholastic doctrine. He cites Aristotle, and recommends St. Thomas
in the suggested readings. His book was printed with ecclesiastical approval.

Gannon notes evolutionary themes. There is a essential discontinuity between man and animals. Man has conscious control
of himself, so that Gannon would not be in favor of evolutionary society. Gannon rejects Mechanicism, Materialism, and endorses
the Hylemorphism

of Aristotle. Gannon rejects social evolution by remarking about the danger of pressing parallels too far, for example
in applying the herd instinct to humans when the real causes of apartment life for humans may be environmental and economic.
Gannon also rejects the Determinism of Freud.

Gannon raises a serious problem for Neo-Scholastic philosophy of nature, since the sciences of biology and experimental
psychology upon which the philosophy of nature is partly built were in flux themselves. In other words, the philosophical
explanation of evolution would be difficult in the context of a shifting and reversing empirical biological science (for the
body of man) and a shifting psychological science (for the soul of man). Differences in empirical biology were fundamental.
Modern psychology slowly started about 1839 with Ernst Weber’s investigation of sensory reactions. Theodor Fechner (1801-1887)
and Wilhelm Wundt (1832-1920), two of the most influential pioneers in experimental psychology, regarded the new science as
the study of the conscious process. Sharing this view of psychology as the science studying the conscious process were von
Hemholtz, G. E. Müller, Lotz, Brentano, Stumpf, and Kulpe in Germany, and William James
(1842-1910) in America. Younger men who spread this view in the United States were Scripture and Ladd at Yale, Baldwin at
Princeton and John Hopkins, Cattell of Columbia, Frank Angell of Stanford, and Pace at the Catholic University of America.
But less than twenty-five years later, Sigmund Freud (1856-1939) was declaring that the unconscious is the only true domain
of the psychologist. Before another decade had passed, John B. Watson in the United States had openly rebelled against the
validity of Wundt’s method of introspection. Watson declared that only by abandoning all reference to consciousness
and by devoting itself to the objective observation of behavior could psychology become a real science. Watson promoted Behaviorism
(the study of any overt response) with Frank Angell in America, Vladimir Beckhterev and Ivan Pavlov in Russia, Lloyd Morgan
and George Romanes in England, and Jacques Loeb and von Uexküll in Germany. About the
same time, 1912, Franz Berntano 1838-1917) in Vienna was establishing the psychology of Gestalt (German for "form," "structure,"
or "configuration"). Gestalt became influential only late in the 1920s in the United States and more from the influence of
the Gestalt psychologist Max Wertheimer from Berlin. The purpose of this short history of modern psychology is at least a
question of definition; how to define psychology, the soul, human unity, and human personality. The facts about man are plentiful,
but the synthesis is wanting. The various schools of psychology are as far apart today as they have ever been. Added to the
difficulty of dealing with evolutionary biology and psychology is the mind-body dilemma proposed by the founder of modern
philosophy, René Descartes(1596-1650). Descartes’ Mechanicism was transmitted into
psychology in the form of psychophysical parallelism, which holds the mind and body can have events without affecting each
other. After a century of struggle with this problem, no solution has been reached by the Cartesians.

Gannon’s book has an introduction by Thomas Verner Moore, the former head of the department of psychology and psychiatry
at the Catholic University of America, who notes the difficulty of presenting a unified view of empirical psychology up to
1954. Scholars in America were influenced by the "New Psychology" at the close of the nineteenth century. This resulted in
Sensationalism, the false philosophy that knowledge can be completely accounted for by sensations from objects perceived.
At the same time, about 1800, educators in psychology broke with philosophy entirely. But due to Sensationalism, teachers
lost interest in the "New Psychology." Subsequently, Freud and Behaviorism became popular. As a result, especially due to
the loss of philosophy, there was still a problem in finding some true and adequate psychology. This left Neo-Scholasticism
with not much of a material object from which to construct a modern philosophy of man.

Kenneth Dougherty (1956).69 Dougherty was a North American Neo-Scholastic Catholic priest of Atonement Order
of New York. He has a doctorate and has published books in metaphysics, general ethics, and logic, in addition to cosmology.
He is an active teacher, and his books for college level students contain review questions and suggested readings at the end
of each chapter.

Dougherty’s treatment on cosmology covers the main doctrines of the Thomistic school concerning the universe. He
considers modern opposing views. Positively, he orders his presentation according to the four causes of Aristotle. At the
beginning of the course, he describes the object and method of cosmology. Illustrations from modern scientific data are employed
throughout the work, while the traditional scholastic treatment is more in favor of training students in abstract thought.
No doubt the method of Dougherty is more suitable to the college student of today. He sees no philosophical problem in holding
the creation of the cosmos, and then holding the mediate formation of the heavenly bodies and the earth through natural evolution.
He endorses Hylemorphism. He rejects Pantheism, Materialism, and Agnosticism. He endorses the principle of finality and notes
that man is the intermediate goal of the universe, while God is the ultimate goal of the universe. Dougherty’s view
of man as the first creature of importance in the universe is based on St. Thomas (Aquinas Summa Contra Gentiles 3.
112). Should rational animals be found on other planets, this would still prove that the intermediate goal of the universe
is rational animals, according to St. Thomas (Aquinas Summa Theologiae 3. 3. 5 and ibid. 3. 3. 7).

Dougherty is important for the issue of the survival of scholasticism. On the one hand, the material base of philosophy
is beginning to expand and seems to edge out metaphysics. On the other hand, Ignatius Smith, in the preface of Dougherty’s
book seems to indicate otherwise. We should look at both the negative and the positive evidence. Negatively, Dougherty’s
work appears to be a turning point of sorts. Although he uses the strict scholastic method, including the thesis system, he
incorporates more scientific facts in support of his theses, thus expanding the material base of his philosophical treatment.
Dates are important as a possible indication of a turning point. Dougherty’s first edition of cosmology was in 1952,
with a Japanese edition in 1959, and another edition in 1965. Father Ignatius Smith, the Dominican dean of the school of philosophy
at the Catholic University of America, agrees with this newness by noting a demand for new texts, new discussions, and a new
presentation. So it appears that the old Neo-Scholasticism is disappearing. Affirmatively, Father Smith notes that "the demand
for texts in scholastic philosophy continues," which is an indication of the vitality of the field. Smith notes that "this
demand is most evident in those areas of philosophy that have the closest contact with the physical sciences."

Vincent Edward Smith (1958).70 Smith was a North American Neo-Scholastic layman who is widely known for his
many books. He is the professor and director fo the Philosophy of Science Institute at St. John’s University in Jamaica,
New York. He received his doctorate from the Catholic University of America. He did additional studies at Fribourg, Harvard,
the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and the Institutum Divi Thomae. He was the editor of the magazine New Scholasticism.
He was the former president of the American Catholic Philosophical Association.

Smith is interested in philosophical pedagogy. He notes that in modern colleges, philosophy is an equivocal term, because
it may be logic, or the philosophy of nature including philosophical psychology, or either general or special ethics, or metaphysics,
which includes epistemology and natural theology. Smith notes that the treatment of the philosophy of nature is fundamental
in the order of learning of St. Thomas (Aquinas In Phys. 1. 1. 7; Aquinas De Trinitate 3. 1), even if metaphysics
and natural theology are more important.

Smith argues against evolution and Darwinism. Smith evaluates arguments for radical indeterminism from biology. In Darwin’s
theory of evolution, changes of one species to a higher species are brought about by slow accidental variations. The tendency
to variations, Smith admits, is a basic character of life. Smith says variation is a first principle of living things. In
ascribing the evolution of living things to slow accidental variations, Darwin chose natural selection by chance one of the
fundamental causes of the living world. Smith argues, however, that while chance is real, it cannot be the primary causality
in the biological world. Chance can exist only where there is a previous purpose or order, according to St. Thomas (Aquinas
In Phys. 2. 10; Aquinas Summa Contra Gentiles 2. 39). The man went to the market for food, and by chance met
his creditor. The cow searched for food, and by chance was hit by lightning. In short, events that result from chance, no
matter how numerous they may appear to be, must always be a secondary kind of reality, because they are a deviation from an
order which is more primary. Chance is relative and secondary. Chance cannot be the absolute and primary cause of biological
change, which is evolution.

John Courtney Murray (1960).71 Murray (1904-1967) was a North American Jesuit Neo-Scholastic. He was considered
a prominent American intellectual, whose picture appeared on the cover of Time Magazine (12 December 1960). He was
trained in scholastic philosophy and theology, but was mainly known for his theological efforts to reconcile Catholicism and
religious pluralism. He was born in New York City in 1904, and entered the New York Province of the Society of Jesus in 1920.
He studied the classics and philosophy at Boston College, graduating in 1927, and quickly obtaining his Master’s degree
only a year later. He taught Latin and English literature in the Philippines at the Ateneo de Manila. He returned to the United
States and was ordained a Roman Catholic priest in 1933. He studied at the Gregorian University in Rome for a doctorate in
theology, which he completed in 1937. He taught Catholic Trinitarian theology at the Jesuit theologate in Woodstock, Maryland.
In 1941, he became the editor of the Jesuit journal, Theological Studies. He was the leading public figure dealing
with tensions between religion and public life, as dealt with in his best known book, We Hold These Truths. He died
in Queens, New York, in 1967.

Murray slowly became an activist for freedom. He was consultant to the United States Catholic bishops and the religious
affairs section of the Allied High Commission, for whom he helped draft and promote the 1943 Declaration on World Peace.
This was an interfaith statement of principles for post-war reconstruction including the dispersal of state-collected taxes
to German churches. He collaborated with Robert Morrison MacIver of Columbia University to assess academic freedom and religious
education. Several American bishops consulted Murray on censorship and birth control and he argued for substantive public
debate. In 1966, he was appointed to serve on John F. Kennedy’s presidential commission that renewed Selective Service
classifications for inductees to the military. He supported a classification for those opposed to war on moral grounds, but
this suggestion was not accepted.

Murray was opposed for his activism on behalf of religious freedom. In 1944, Murray was an ecumenical traditionalist, and
argued "no salvation outside the Church." By 1944, Murray was cooperating with other theists for a right that was actually
demanded and protected in the First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. Historically, however, the civil rights
of Catholics were attenuated. Murray promoted human dignity for all in practice. In 1954, Alfredo Cardinal Ottaviani, prefect
of the Congregation for the Doctrine of Faith, in Rome, demanded that Murray cease writing on religious freedom, and stop
the publication of his two most recent articles. The same effort for religious freedom was being made in Europe by Yves Congar,
and it met with the same opposition.

Murray, at the Second Vatican Council, played a fundamental role in persuading the Council Fathers to positively endorse
religious freedom, which they did in the ground-breaking declaration Dignitatis Humanae (1965). He had not been invited
to the first session (of four) of the Second Vatican Council. He was invited to the 1963 second session. He drafted version
three and version four of the endorsement of religious freedom. Murray continued to write on religious freedom, even claiming
that the arguments offered by the declaration on religious liberty by the Second Vatican Council did not go far enough. Murray
used philosophy to define the term "human dignity," and he argued that this human dignity is the philosophical foundation
for the right to religious freedom.

Benedict M. Ashley (1961).72 Ashley was a North American Neo-Scholastic Dominican priest who was professor of
philosophy at the Dominican House of Studies and at the Aquinas Institute, River Forest, Illinois. He was also dean of the
department of philosophy at St. Xavier University, Chicago. He had received his doctorate in sociology at the University of
Notre Dame, Indiana, and received a second doctorate from the pontifical faculty in River Forest. Ashley cooperated in contributing
to the book on philosophy of science in honor of William Kane.

Ashley promoted dialogue. He wrote about the sociological aspects of science. Social science is founded on natural science.
There must be a dialogue between sociology and theology. Revelation shows the nature of the Church and its history in outline,
but profound analysis is needed to fill in that outline. Metaphysical methods are not adequate for the study of the concrete.
Theology does not concern itself with the same problems as the social sciences down to the historical particular. Therefore,
the social sciences need to evaluate the present time, the social forces, social trends, and social institutions. Social science
founded on natural science can open a Christian vision today by a dialogue between sociology (science) and theology (faith).

Olivia M. Barrett (1961).73 Barrett was a North American Neo-Scholastic Sister of Mercy (R.S.M.). She received
her doctorate (Ph.D.) in chemistry from Notre Dame University. She was the assistant professor of chemistry at St. Xavier
University, Chicago. She was on the committee for planning science studies at St. Xavier University.

Barrett was concerned about teaching evolution. Evolution, the nature and origin of life, is taught as part of a four semester
college course at St. Xavier University. The biological problems in empirical science provide an excellent opportunity for
the students to examine the validity of Aristotelian principles. The mind-body problem in psychology provides a good example
of the importance and perennial value of Aristotelian principles in the development of psychology. The basic question of the
curriculum is the relationship between science and philosophy. Pope Pius XII stressed, and Barrett personally believes, that
there must be a unity of science and philosophy. Principles of philosophy reveal the nature of scientific problems. Philosophy
helps to give precision to the choice of relevant material. Philosophy helps to see limitations in explanation. Philosophy
uses principles that may be useful in correlative areas. Philosophy may help to identify views that are similar, and which
are opposed. Therefore, philosophy, and especially the philosophy of nature, is useful to science.

Barrett has a unitary view of science and philosophy. Since all knowledge comes through the senses, knowledge begins with
observation, so Aquinas places natural sciences at the root of knowledge. Therefore, natural science becomes the very foundation
of a liberal education. Philosophers need science. Science needs sound philosophy. Mutual understanding and cooperation are
needed. The habit of science is the epitome of intellectual growth. The philosophy of nature includes both the philosophical
and the positive aspects. Barrett accordingly sides more with this unity of philosophy with science (William Kane’s
position) than the view that science and philosophy are essentially distinct (Jacques Maritain’s position).

Daniel A. Callus (1961).74 Callus was an English Neo-Scholastic Dominican priest. He cooperated in submitting
a study in the philosophy of science in honor of William Kane at the Dominican House of Studies in River Forest, Illinois.
Callus wrote about the history of science. Callus himself had a doctorate in Medieval history from the University of Oxford.
He was a Fellow of the Royal Historical Society, professor emeritus of the University of Malta, regent of studies at Blackfriars
in Oxford, lecturer in medieval thought at the University of Oxford, and widely known as an authority on thirteenth century
Oxford and Paris.

Callus treated the problem of unity of form. The problem is important in the study of evolution, since evolution is substantial
change in species. The problem of unity of form is whether the same individual has just one form, or many substantial forms.
If the substantial form is the determining principle of composite being, how can philosophy account for various perfections?
Does one substantial form give one perfection only, so there would be a substantial form for each perfection (many forms)?
Or does a single form determine the nature of the entire thing (one form)? Boethius maintained the single form for the whole
(omne esse ex forma est). The issue is not irrelevant to man, who is composed of vegetative (nutrition), animal (senses),
and human (intellectual) life. Is man one unit or three? The question was elaborated by degrees. The problem was eventually
solved by St. Thomas (Aquinas Summa Theologiae 1. 76. 1-7).

Charles DeKoninck (1961).75 DeKoninck was a Canadian Neo-Scholastic layman, dean of the faculty of philosophy
from 1939 to 1956 at the University of Laval, and editor of Laval Theólogique et Philosophique.
He was professor of natural philosophy and lecturer in theology at Laval University, Québec,
Canada. In 1966 Laval University named a building in his honor. He was widely known for his publications in the philosophy
of science. He was also visiting professor of philosophy at the University of Notre Dame, Indiana. DeKoninck contributed to
the studies in the philosophy of science in honor of Willam Kane of the Aquinas Institute. DeKoninck wrote about the philosophy
of science.

DeKoninck wrote about Darwin’s dilemma. Darwin rested his theory of evolution on observation. Darwin saw the geometrical
increase in organisms, and at the same time Darwin saw that the numbers of creatures appear to remain constant. From these
two observations Darwin deduced the struggle for existence. However, Darwin argues that all organisms struggle for existence,
animals and plants. Darwin was aware that it is more difficult to see this struggle for existence in plants, so Darwin himself
noted that he used the struggle for existence in "a large and metaphorical sense." However, to be exact, the Neo-Scholastic
philosopher would say that the term "struggle for existence" predicated about plants, animals and man as an equivocal term,
which means that struggle for existence is a very different concept when applied to men, animals and plants. DeKoninck, commenting
on this equivocal concept, states that there stands the dilemma.

However, the problem is not just about the application of terms, but rather understanding. Sir Julian Huxley takes the
equivocal struggle for existence very literally. In accord with this literal interpretation of the struggle for existence,
Sir Julian Huxley deduces that there is no purpose in nature, just struggle for a chance outcome. Then, Huxley maintains that
Darwin’s contribution is precisely that there is no purposeful activity in nature, and all natural activities must be
explained without any recourse to purpose. DeKoninck then goes on to show that the conclusion of Sir Julian Huxley has four
different flaws.

Jocelyn Garey (1961).76 Garey was a North American Neo-Scholastic Dominican nun with a pontifical license in
philosophy (Ph.L.) from the University of Fribourg, and a doctorate in philosophy (Ph.D.) from Laval University. She was a
professor of philosophy at Dominican University, River Forest, Illinois. She cooperated in the project of studies in the philosophy
of science in honor of William Kane of the Aquinas Institute. She wrote about the philosophy of science.

Garey treats "time," the number of movement. At first, her presentation appears far from our theme of evolution, except
for two reasons. First, her model is scholastic method for confronting a real problem, using text analysis, and finding a
Thomistic answer. Secondly, time is a being of nature, much like "species," that evolves. Garey’s problem arises from
the fact that motion exists in nature, while time is in the mind of man, so that if there are no men, there would be no time.
The young St. Thomas (Aquinas Scriptum in Liber Sententiarum 2. 12. 5. 2) thought that time was dependent on the mind.
Distinctions and definitions must be considered. Time is not just a "numbering number" which the mind of man counts, but a
"numbered number" which is a quality of time, so that "when" is an accident caused by time. In the opinion of Aristotle, time
is the number of movement according to before and after. In the opinion of Albertus Magnus maintains that the mind numbers
efficiently, but time is numbered formally, because it has multiplicity, distinctions, and otherness. In the opinion of mature
St. Thomas (Aquinas Summa Theologiae 1. 30. 3) time is not a number with which we count, but a number of things counted,
because before and after are different, that is, the "now" of each is different. Thus time is not just a being of reason (ens
rationis), but rather a being of nature, a kind of being (utcumque ens).

Melvin Glutz (1961).77 Glutz was a North American Neo-Scholastic priest of the Passionist Order (C.P.). He received
his doctorate in philosphy from the pontifical faculty of philosophy at the Aquinas Institute, River Forest, Illinois. He
was the professor of philosophy and the student master at the Passionist monastery in Chicago. He was the author of various
studies in psychology. He cooperated in contributing to studies in the philosophy of science in honor of William Kane at the
Aquinas Institute. Glutz wrote about the philosophy of science in his treatment of order in nature.

Glutz investigates order in nature. Glutz notes that Wolff and Leibniz wrongly viewed natural philosophy as only the application
of metaphysics. There are distinctions involved in the understanding of order of natural philosophy. Order extrinsically distinguishes
natural philosophy from science and theology. Order intrinsically distinguishes natural philosophy from cosmology. The reasons
for the distinction between metaphysical cosmology and natural philosophy is that natural philosophy uses its own proper principles,
and secondly, while the middle term in a metaphysical syllogism is always abstract, the middle term in a syllogism of natural
philosophy contains sensory matter in the definition. Further, since the order of learning is from the sensible (more accessible)
to the ontologically more perfect (more intelligible), natural philosophy is preparatory to metaphysics.

Glutz investigates the order to investigate nature. The order of learning can involve on the one hand, a process of questioning,
and on the other hand, teaching doctrine. Glutz notes that the thesis method is the best for remembering, reviewing, and disputation.
However, as a teacher, he prefers the method of Socrates that makes the student hunt for definitions. In this way, the teacher
gives the student formation, rather than just information. In the philosophy of nature, the teacher must allow the student
to observe. Next the student must learn to define. Let the student fashion a hypothesis. Then the student should be allowed
to prove the hypothesis by induction (demonstration quia). All of this analytical material is eventually ordered to
real science from deduction (demonstration propter quid).

Michael A. Hoskin (1961).78 Hoskin is a Neo-Scholastic who cooperated in the studies in the philosophy of science
presented to William Kane of the Aquinas Institute. Hoskin obtained his doctorate in mathematics at Cambridge, England. He
was a former Fellow of Peterhouse. He was the lecturer in the history of science at the University of Cambridge and at the
University of Leicester. He was the general editor of the Newman Association’s History of Philosophy of Science series.

Hoskin treats the historical development of the philosophy of nature. Samuel Clarke helped to bring the philosophical ideas
of Newton to Cambridge. Clarke went to Cambridge in 1691. His tutor, John Ellis, was a zealot for Descartes. The Traité de Physique by Rohault, published both in Latin and French, helped to make Cartesian philosophy
a success. Newton developed a rival cosmology to Descartes, but neither Newton’s books nor his philosophy made much
impact at Cambridge due to the use of Rohault’s textbook. Clarke helped the cause of Newton. Clarke annotated Rohault’s
book, answering objections and adding new material. Clarke was the champion of Newton at Cambridge, where eventually the cosmological
system of Newton prevailed.

Roman A. Kocourek (1961).79 Kocourek was a North American Neo-Scholastic associate professor of philosophy at
the College of St. Thomas, and lecturer at St. Paul Seminary, St. Paul, Minnesota. He majored in history at the University
of Minnesota, where he was granted a Master’s degree. His doctorate in philosophy (Ph.D.) is from Laval University.
He contributed to the studies in the philosophy of science in honor of William Kane of the Aquinas Institute. Kocourek wrote
about the philosophy of science.

Kocourek treats the implications for man in the study of philosophy. Heraclitus said that nature loves to hide. Aristotle
affirmed this, and added the reason, because induction may not give the specific nature of the thing. The first obstacle is
that matter is the basis of intelligibility. The second difficulty for the science of nature is that the intelligibility of
the object studied may exceed man’s ability to understand it. The goal of Greek philosophy was to carry man beyond the
changing existence of sensible nature. The ideal of Aristotle was to find man’s goal in the life of the intellect. Modern
philosophy either rejects this ideal, or does not even consider this ideal, or considers the ideal as desirable but not practical.
Kocourek concludes that philosophy can make a difference in the life of man, and especially philosophy of nature. Aristotle
held to the objective reality of nature. Aristotle often used the analogy and the principle that "art imitates nature." The
life of man is an art, and the study of nature can make a difference in the conception of man and of role of man in the universe.

Margaret Ann McDowell (1961).80 McDowell was a North American Neo-Scholastic and Dominican nun. She cooperated
in the studies in the philosophy of science in honor of William Kane of the Aquinas Institute. She was trained in science
from her master’s degree (M.A.) in plant physiology from the University of Ohio, to her master’s degree (M.S.)
in bacteriology from the Institutum Divi Thomas, and her doctorate (Ph.D.) in medical research. She was the professor and
chairman of the department of biology at the College of St. Mary of the Springs, Columbus. She has written many scientific
papers. In 1961, she moved from education to cancer research.

McDowell treated the philosophy of nature. The Aristotelian-Thomistic synthesis engages the modern scientific world. Science,
in the opinion of McDowell who is a practitioner, confirms the profound insights of the perennial philosophy of nature. This
philosophy is an aid to fruitful scientific exploration. It also may awaken the curiosity of the researcher, and point to
the First Cause. In addition, scientists need an outlook foster by the humanities and moral philosophy.

McDowell wrote on the rhythmic universe, with special reference to evolution. She notes that all observed marine animals
move in rhythm with the cosmos. This built-in rhythm in animals seems to provide an advantage for individual survival and
that of the species. Scientists have determined that the regulatory apparatus, the internal factor, in these animals is inherited.
However, the external factor is not. Among the external factors were light, tides, cosmic radiation, magnetic fields, temperature,
barometric pressure, and sun spots. Order is implicit in this rhythm, a combination of variation and constancy. The hypothesis
of ultimate regular motions in the universe causing a regular periodicity is that of Aristotle and St. Thomas (Aquinas In
Metaph. 12. 6). In fact, since Ptolemy lived after the time of Aristotle, St. Thomas attempted to bring Aristotle up-to-date
with the progress of natural science (Aquinas De Caelo 2. 17. 7). Nevertheless, St. Thomas was aware of the limitations
of his natural science and notes that "Whatever remains unstated, however, shall have to be investigated by ourselves or taken
on the authority of those who investigate such things or developed later from the facts now stated by those who treat these
matters" (Aquinas In Metaph. 12. 9).

McDowell treats the source of the order in the universe. She defines order as the sequence of one thing upon another according
to some principle. She notes that order is not random but the presence of an intelligent and intelligible pattern in the universe.
Scientists have always agreed on this, for example, Einstein said, "Der Herr Gott ist raffiniert, aber boshaft ist er nicht."
St. Thomas agrees, in his commentary on the second book of the Physics where Aristotle writes "Art imitates nature,"
when St. Thomas says, "The reason why art imitates nature is that the principle of activity of art is knowledge...but the
reason why natural things are imitable by art is that the whole of nature is ordered by some intellective principle to its
goal, in such a way that the work of nature is perceived to be the work of an intelligence, as it proceeds through determinate
means to certain goals, which process art indeed imitates in its operation" (Aquinas In Phys. 2. 4. 6). McDowell comments
that experimental determinations of rhythmicity indicate a more cosmic and universal basis, rather than a particular base.
Order occurs from intelligence and human intelligence is the analogue for the Supreme Intelligence of the universe. Chance
is the exception to order, so order does not result from chance.

Richard P. McKeon (1961).81 McKeon was a North American Neo-Scholastic philosopher. His doctorate (Ph.D.) is
from Columbia University. He was formerly dean of the division of humanities at the University of Chicago, member of the United
States delegation to UNESCO, United States counselor of UNESCO affairs at the American Embassy in Paris, and Distinguished
Service Professor of Greek and Philosophy at the University of Chicago. In 1961, he was on leave from the University of Chicago,
and working at the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences in Stanford, California. He cooperated in the studies
in the philosophy of science in honor of William Kane of the Aquinas Institute. McKeon wrote about the history of science.

McKeon treats philosophy dealing with new problems, perhaps a model for modern times. Between 1150 and 1250 A.D., there
was a cultural and scientific renaissance. There were new problems. New data were accumulated. The text of Aristotle was translated
at that time, and made available in the West. The problem of universals and the problem of the elements both developed from
being taught as part of the medieval curriculum, the Trivium, to demonstration, and to systematization. McKeon shows that
the problem of the elements is a counterpart to the problem of universals. Regarding universals, McKeon notes three steps.
First, science is of the universal. Second, universals are derived from particulars, and applied to particulars. Third, the
examination of universal predicates is involved in existence (for being) and experience (by reason). The result is a new scientific
method. Regarding elements, McKeon also note three steps. First, wholes come from parts, while parts are composed of simple
parts. Second, the nature of the parts depends on how the whole is conceived. Third, determination of samples is involved
in a complex of related questions. The result is a new interpretation of data. McKeon notes that the history of the problem
of the elements has been repeated and is now being repeated by modern assessment of the theory of the whole, then a reassessment
of the parts, and the result is a new theory.

Albert S. Moraczewski (1961).82 Moraczewski was a North American Neo-Scholastic Dominican priest. He received
his doctorate (Ph.D.) from the University of Chicago in pharmacology. His specialty is the pharmacological differences of
mitochondria from selected areas of the brain. He has carried out his research in the department of psychiatry of Baylor University
College of Medicine at the Texas Medical Center in Houston. He then became a research specialist on the staff of the Houston
State Psychiatric Institute. He cooperated in the studies in the philosophy of science in honor of William Kane at the Aquinas
Institute. He wrote about special problems of science involving the brain and mind.

Moraczewski, from the point of view of modern pharmacology, reviewed the philosophical mind-body problem. If mind and body
are distinct, how can chemical treatments act on the mind? Can psychotherapy (non-chemical) treat brain chemistry? To answer
these questions, history may offer some help. Plato maintained mind and body are linked, metaphorically, with the soul like
a charioteer to the body’s chariot. Descartes’ dichotomy of body and spirit leads to two compete entities. Dialectical
Materialism states the mind is just matter in motion. Leibniz maintained that the mind and body were in preestablished harmony
established by God; this theory influenced Fechner and Wundt in the "new science" of psychology. J. C. Eccles maintained that
the brain-mind liaison takes place mainly in the cerebral cortex, but since Eccles’ solution is mechanical, it is not
widely accepted. Aristotle, and Galen, hold the hylemorphic theory which allows the immaterial mind interdependence with the
body. To date, Moraczewski notes that the solution of Aristotle is the only adequate solution to the mind-body problem.

Moraczewski endorses Hylemorphism for three reasons. First, only Hylemorphism can satisfactorily explain the essential
unity of man. Second, only Hylemorphism can explain man’s dependence on biological composition. Third, only Hylemorphism
can explain the transcendence of man over biological composition. Therefore, only Hylemorphism can adequately explain man’s
peculiar nature.

Moraczewski’s work touches social evolution. Moraczewski notes that fear arouses biochemical factors that could compromise
freedom and moral responsibility. The mind does depend on the body externally. The will is influenced by emotions and feelings.
However, the mind and will function with a certain independence from material limitations. The mind and will are spiritual.
There is no basis for the theory that all mental illness is biochemical. Behavior can be influenced, but the ultimate determination
of behavior depends on the intellect and will, unless completely inhibited.

John A. Oesterle (1961).83 Oesterle was a North American Neo-Scholastic philosopher. His doctorate (Ph.D.) is
from Laval University. He was a Fulbright Research Scholar at the University of Louvain. He was assistant professor of philosophy
at the University of Notre Dame, Indiana. He cooperated in the studies in philosophy of science in honor of William Kane at
the Aquinas Institute. He wrote on scientific methodology.

Oesterle distinguishes between the verified universal and the provisional universal. This latter concept is a tool that
may be particularly valuable in the investigation of nature. An example of the verified universal is declaring that a swan
is a bird, since all swans are birds according to their nature. An example of a provisional universal is declaring that swans
are white, since not all swans have not been seen and white is an accident. The provisional universal is mentioned by St.
Thomas (Aquinas In Post. Anal. 1. 9. 4). There are two complimentary reasons for using the greater dimension of the
provisional universal. First, the nature of the human mind is experimental, which derives knowledge from the things themselves.
Second, there is an unexpected complexity in the things we seek to know, even sensible things. For example, the eye is the
organ of sight, and we initially recognize the eye with reference to our sensations, but now we must delve into anatomy, physiology,
chemistry, and physics.

Oesterle treats uncertainty in natural science. The bulk of our knowledge, Oesterle claims, is provisional and in constant
need of implementation. The history of science proves that we may be quite certain of our uncertainties. Most of our universals
are provisional. Even a true universal such as "what a man is" does not settle all that a man is, once and for all. On the
one hand, the definition of man as a rational animal is essential and good. On the other hand, the definition of man as a
rational animal is inadequate and incomplete. Much more remains to be said about man. So with the understanding how provisional
our knowledge really is, the provisional universal may be a very useful concept for the philosophy of nature.

Sheilah O’Flynn Brennan (1961).84 O’Flynn Brennan was a North American Neo-Scholastic. Her doctorate
(Ph.D.) f rom Laval University was in philosophy. She was a former Woodrow Wilson Scholar at the University of Oxford. She
was professor and chairman of the department of philosophy at St. Mary’s College, at Notre Dame University. She cooperated
in the studies in the philosophy of science in honor of William Kane at the Aquinas Institute in River Forest. She wrote about
the philosophy of science.

O’Flynn Brennan treats philosophy of nature. She first notes the importance of definition, since words can also have
secondary meanings. She is an Aristotelian-Thomistic philosopher. The danger is that word "nature" is continually modified
by science. For Aristotle, the form is primarily and most properly nature. Aristotle defines nature as the principle or cause
of being moved or at rest in that which it is, primarily, in virtue of itself, and not accidently. St. Thomas establishes
the meaning of nature right at the beginning of his commentary on the Physics of Aristotle. St. Thomas says, "Because
everything that has matter is mobile, consequently the subject of natural philosophy is mobile being. For natural philosophy
is about natural things, which are those whose principle is nature. Now nature is the principle of motion and rest in that
which is. Natural science, therefore, is about those things which have in themselves a principle of motion" (Aquinas In
Phys. 1. 1)

O’Flynn Brennan treats evolution and nature. St. Thomas comments, "These things are naturally moved, when they are
moved by their proper acts, to which they are in potency according to their nature" (Aquinas In Phys. 9. 8. 1). When
St. Thomas says "to their proper acts" he implies that these things are not in potency to just any acts or even to many acts,
but to certain determinate acts fixed by their nature, which is primarily their form. Their form brings them certain perfections
in which they find their fulfillment. St. Thomas implies an order of appetite intrinsic to things. Therefore, the passive
potency in the case of nature involves a determinate inclination, an appetite. An application may be seen in the case of evolution,
says O’Flynn Brennan. Though the active principle must certainly have been outside of nature, the whole process of evolution
would have been natural from the standpoint of the passive inclination of matter, always "desiring" as a goal the more perfect
fulfillment of its potency. The act conferred was natural, corresponding to a natural potency, though the power that conferred
it was not, says O’Flynn Brennan.

O’Flynn Brennan treats cosmic evolution. In considering evolution in this way, "nature" is taken as the whole system
of interrelated individual natures. In the case of inorganic things, non-living things, it is very difficult to determine
just what is good for them. Although the natural potency in a thing implies an intrinsic order to an act, giving rise to a
relation between an appetite and a good, this good need not be considered as a perfection of the thing in its own particular
being. If the whole universe is considered, the evolutionary perfection of a thing might contribute to harmony and the finality
of the universe. The observed tendencies of things to certain acts very often appear to benefit the whole universe, as seen
within the framework of the general intention of universal nature. St. Thomas sometimes gives the example of the tendency
of water to be warmed as a simple example of an intrinsic passive principle of natural movement, which could be seen as contributing
to the good of the whole. O’Flynn Brennan notes that the tendency known as "gravity" can also be seen as contributing
to the good of the whole universe and preserving general order. Therefore, the order of appetite and good in the universe
as a whole is what determines whether or not the movement of a thing toward a goal is natural.

Herbert Ratner (1961).85 Ratner was a North American medical doctor. He has his doctorate (M.D.) from the University
of Michigan. He did graduate work in bacteriology, public health, and nutrition. He was assistant professor of public health
and preventative medicine at the Loyola School of Medicine, Chicago. He had been associated with the Great Books program in
biology. He was the director of the Department of Public Health, Oak Park, Illinois. He is a Neo-Scholastic and a participant
in the studies in the philosophy of science in honor of William Kane of the Aquinas Institute. He wrote about scientific methodology.

Ratner was interested in the method of investigation and discovery in problems relative to the philosophy of nature. Did
William Harvey have some method when he discovered the circulation of blood? Harvey was competent in intellectual development
due to his studies at King’s School in Catebury, Caius College in Cambridge, and the Universitas Juristarum at the University
of Padua. Havey based his scientific method solidly on Aristotle, through observation, experiment, reason, and dialogue. Both
Aristotle and Harvey did research by observation. The circulation of blood was confirmed by reason and ocular experiment.
The opponents of Harvey were the traditional scholastics who were slaves to the conclusions of Aristotle, instead of the method
of Aristotle.

Edward D. Simmons (1961).86 Simmons was a North American Neo-Scholastic. His doctorate (Ph.D.) was from the
University of Notre Dame, Indiana. He was the associate professor of philosophy at Marquette University in Milwaukee. He was
a frequent contributor to the Neo-Scholastic magazine, The Thomist. He cooperated in the studies in the philosophy
of science in honor of William Kane at the Aquinas Institute. He wrote about scientific methodology. Simmons defends the scientific
method of Aristotle. In the very beginning of the Posterior Analytics Aristotle confronts the famous dilemma of Meno,
which disputes the possibility of learning. Meno says either a person already knows what he learns, and this is not learning,
or a person is ignorant of what he seeks to learn, and then cannot recognize it when it appears. Aristotle defends the integrity
of discourse by introducing the notion of the self-evident proposition. Self-evident propositions are the basic truths of
demonstration, and in these self-evident propositions scientific conclusions exist in potency. Aristotelian demonstration
represents a true advance in knowledge from the potentiality of the scientific conclusion to its actuality. In reply to Meno,
prior to demonstration, the conclusion is not known simpliciter, but at the same time, because it is known potentially
in its principles, it is not unknown simpliciter. Therefore, when a person grasps self-evident conclusions, there is
a potential grasp of the scientific conclusions virtually contained therein. Further, the premises of the demonstration, seen
together with the middle term of the syllogism, function after the fashion of efficient causes which actuate the potentiality
of the conclusion and make it be. All of this is important for this dissertation, since the level of certitude is affected
by the possibility of syllogistic demonstration.

Michael Stock (1961).87 Stock was a North American Neo-Scholastic Dominican priest. His doctorate in psychology
is from the Pontifical University of St. Thomas in Rome. His articles frequently appeared in the scholastic magazine, The
Thomist. He was the lecturer in psychology at the Dominican House of Studies in Dover, Massachusetts. He cooperated in
the studies in the philosophy of science in honor of William Kane at the Aquinas Institute. He wrote about special problems
of science.

Stock touches on interpretation of character. This is important to the present dissertation due to the modern consideration
of social evolution. Stock elucidates the major psychological formations known to depth psychology. Character defects can
occur in the psychological or moral (see Aquinas Summa Theologiae 2-2. 104. 5) process of acquiring self knowledge.
Some consequences are timidity, rigidity, erroneous conscience (see Aquinas Summa Theologiae 1-2. 94. 4) and scruples.
These basic attitudes flow from more or less unconsciously adopted behavior. Important and notable for our dissertation, Stock
does not regard any of the roots of these problems to be evolutionary. Stock notes the work of Sigmund Freud, who treated
mostly the mentally or emotionally troubled, and investigated their problems by means of the technique he invented. Freud
realized that factors which operate almost imperceptibly in normally functioning minds would be exposed by the stresses imposed.
This may be the reason Freud passed over the role of intelligence in his analysis of human activity. St. Thomas also considered
certain psychological problems only in terms of conditions of mental stress, such as rapture and prophecy, and St. Thomas
did not fail to mention analogies with mental disease (Aquinas Summa Theologiae 2-2. 171-175; Aquinas De Veritate
12-13). Stock appears to reject social evolution by way of inheritance, when Stock notes that a child is born with no
innate ideas about morality or anything else.

William A. Wallace (1961).88 Wallace was a North American Neo-Scholastic Dominican priest. He obtained a M.Sc.
in physics from the Catholic University of America, a doctorate (Ph.D.) in philosophy from the University of Fribourg, and
a doctorate in moral theology (S.T.D.) from the University of Fribourg. He has done research in magnetic and acoustic field
theory, and in ultrasonics. He was professor of natural science and the philosophy of science at the Dominican House of Studies
in Dover, Massachusetts. He cooperated in studies in the philosophy of science in honor of William Kane at the Aquinas Institute.
He wrote about the history of science. His historical method of research in literature is to try to find present content,
missing content, and new content. Wallace studies texts in terms of causes. Wallace hopes for dialogue with future scholars.

Wallace treats the philosophy of nature using Theodoric of Freiberg as an example. The natural philosophy of Theodoric
had a sound beginning due to his empirical foundations. He also used distinction well. There was an problem with scientific
analysis in the Middle Ages because there was no extensive mathematics, at least relative to gravity, and principles about
gravity were obscure, which forced Theodoric to stay on the qualitative and dialectical level. He also pointed out that some
confusion existed between the physical (science) and metaphysical (philosophy) approach to the problems of mechanics. He made
an attempt to examine gravity as a cause, but his great insight was to see gravity as an effect.

James A. Weisheipl (1961).89 James A. Weisheiple (1923-1984) was a North American Neo-Scholastic Dominican priest.
He received his doctorate in natural philosophy (Ph.D.) from the Pontifical University of St. Thomas Aquinas, in Rome. He
also has a doctorate in medieval history from the University of Oxford. He was professor of medieval philosophy in the Pontifical
Faculty of Philosophy at the Dominican House of Studies in River Forest, Illinois. He was formerly lecturer in natural philosophy
at Hawkesyard Priory, England. He was the bursar and archivist of the Albertus Magnus Lyceum. He contributed to the studies
on the philosophy of science in honor of William Kane at the Aquinas Institute. Not only did he do an article for this book,
but he was the general editor of the presentation.

Weisheipl treats the values needed by a philosophy of science. In the first third of the twentieth century, science was
viewed as the producer of useful gadgets, the discoverer of effective drugs, and the developer of quicker and better means
of communication. First, the atomic bomb at Hiroshima on 6 August 1954 brought the awareness of the need for morality in science.
Second, the launch and flight of Sputnik I in October 1957, brought the realization of the need for real science education
in the United States. However, the Russians were indoctrinated with Dialectical Materialism, and against their excessive specialization
arose the consciousness of the need for a deeper background in history, philosophy, and the Great Books. Third, science itself
had been growing from the time of Newton to Quantum Mechanics and Relativity. All of these needs and movements have unsettled
philosophers, who seek answers to the morality of science, to a broader philosophical view of science, and to a true philosophy
of nature. Science is an analogous concept. Its dignity must be recognized in its diversity and complementarity. There is
no incompatibility between science, philosophy, and religion. Each seek the same truth according to their own proper method.
The danger is Scientism, Fundamentalism and ideology.

Weisheipl treats the philosophy of nature. St. Thomas relies on observation to yield the causes of things, if possible,
saying, "These matters into which we inquire are difficult since we are able to perceive little of their causes, and the properties
of these bodies are more remote from our understanding than the bodies themselves are spatially distant from our eyes" (Aquinas
De Caelo 2. 17. 8). Albertus Magnus and St. Thomas recognized two types of astronomy, mathematical and physical (Aquinas
In Phys. 2. 3. 8-9). Physical astronomy was considered an integral part of the philosophy of nature (Aquinas In
Mataph. 6. 1). St. Thomas’ first proof of the existence of God from the example of solar motion and ends disjunctively
with Plato’s self mover of the first sphere, or Aristotle’s separated mover of the whole (Aquinas Summa Contra
Gentiles 1. 13). The second starts with various types of self-movements, showing how all must be reduced to some primum
movens se quid sit sempiternum , which is God as self movement. This proof of God from motion is the easier way (manifestior
via) which is the only one presented by St. Thomas (Aquinas Compendium Theologiae) for Brother Reginald of Piperno.
Even the argument for the existence of God from contingent bodies includes observation of nature, and reasoning about spiritual
substances which are radically necessary beings, their necessity is derived and beyond them there must exist an absolutely
necessary being whose necessity is in no way derived (Aquinas De Potentia Dei 5. 3). St. Thomas notes that Aristotle
erred in affirming the eternity of the world: such eternity cannot be demonstrated from reason (Aquinas De Substantiis
Separatis 2. 14; Aquinas De Aeternitate Mundi). St. Thomas notes that although Plato and Aristotle did posit that
immaterial substances and even heavenly bodies always existed, "we must not suppose on that account that they denied to them
a cause of their being" (Aquinas De Substantiis Separatis 9. 52). Accordingly, the philosophy of nature is important
and integral to the philosophy of St. Thomas.

Weisheipl treats evolution as an example of a problem that separates neo-biology, philosophy and theology. Weisheipl notes
that the Darwin Centennial held at the University of Chicago in 1959 allowed a number of scientists to proclaim that man is
no more than a form evolved from matter, and religion is just superstition. Some biologists claimed the triumph of science
over religion. Dialectical Materialism had been saying this for over a century. An appeal to perennial philosophy, says Weisheipl,
can be a foundation of a reply. The natural philosophy of Aristotle together with the empirical sciences form one science,
both materially and formally. They are two parts of the same science concerning mobile being (ens mobile). Each part,
science and philosophy, has the need of each other in the attempt to evaluate Evolutionism.

Weisheipl treats secondary causes. St. Thomas states that God normally rules His creation through intermediaries. The lower
and more gross bodies are ruled by the higher and more subtle bodies. The argument against this use of secondary causality
is that it would limit divine power. St. Thomas replies that divine power is in no way limited by the order it has established.
St. Thomas admits the possibility of intermediaries (Aquinas Resp. de Art. 30 ad 4; Aquinas Resp. de Art. 36 2).
St. Thomas notes that rectilinear motions, such as those of heavy and light bodies, arise from within bodies, from nature
as an active (formal) principle. Nature in this sense is predetermined to a certain end and to the means of attaining it.
The end, therefore, is already within the intentionality of nature as form. Once nature has attained its end, it must rest
in its acquisition, since it is its good. Physically there is no need for any "conjoined mover" to account for this motion.
This motion can be either downward from God to lower created things, or from created things upward to God by God’s providence.
Nature itself spontaneously moves toward the end which is its goal. St. Thomas notes, "There is in heavy and light bodies
a formal principle of its motion, because, just as other accidents proceed from the substantial form, so does place and consequently
movement toward place; not however that the natural form is a mover (motor), but the mover is the generator which begot
such a form upon which this motion follows" (Aquinas In Phys. 2. 1. 4; Aquinas De Caelo 1. 18; Aquinas Summa
Contra Gentiles 3. 82; Aquinas De Potentia Dei 5. 5).

Patrick H. Yancey (1961).90 Yancey was a North American Neo-Scholastic Jesuit priest. He received his M.A. in
biology from Gonzaga University, and his doctorate (Ph.D.) in biology from St. Louis University. He was professor and chairman
of the department of biology at Spring Hill College, Mobile, Alabama. He was a former member of the National Science Foundation.
He was the science editorial editor for the New Catholic Encyclopedia. He was a founder of the Albertus Magnus Guild,
and its executive secretary-treasurer. He cooperated in the studies in philosophy of science in honor of William Kane. He
wrote about the sociological aspects of science.

Yancey treats the history of the conflict between science and religion. Ever since the time of Voltaire and the French
Encyclopediadists, there has been an effort to discredit religion for antagonism toward science. On the other hand, the popes
have sponsored the Pontifical Academy of Sciences whose membership includes the world’s outstanding scientists, regardless
of religious beliefs. World Catholic leaders in science have been Copernicus, Galileo, and Mateo Ricci in China and Father
Marquette in Canada. Unfortunately, there seems to be less Catholic scientific leadership in the United States around the
mid-twentieth century. Reasons for this are: few Catholic scientists, immigrant status or the next generation, clergy distrust
of science, popularizers antipathy to religion, poor scientific instruction in Catholic schools, and poor reporting from the
media which includes poor Catholic reporting on interest in science.

Yancey explicitly treats evolution. There was significant controversy aroused by the publication of Darwin’s The
Origin of Species. The opposition to the theory of evolution was not limited to Catholics. However, since Darwin was an
Englishman and not a Catholic, the theory of evolution somehow came to be looked on as anti-Catholic. Some clergy may have
moved easily from this bias to a distrust and even a fear that science itself was dangerous to faith and morals. The truth
of the matter is, that long before Darwin, the Catholic Lamarck had proposed evolution to account for our present-day species
of plants and animals. It is interesting to note that the chief opponent of Darwin was not a Catholic, but the Protestant
scientist, Cuvier. The problem of contention between faith and science expanded when some of the followers of Darwin, notably
Huxley and Spencer in England and Hackel in Germany, made unwarranted extensions of the theory into fields of philosophy and
ethics. So evolution, only a modest scientific theory, itself became a philosophy, almost a creed.

Yancey is an activist who promotes dialogue. He was the founder of the Albertus Magnus Guild in 1952. It not only has local
chapters, but meets annually during Christmas week in conjunction with the American Association for the Advancement of Science.
Yancey also notes that one notable exception to the inactivity of Catholic scientists is the dialogue at the Albertus Magnus
Lyceum at the Dominican House of Studies in River Forest, Illinois. This has been the life work of Father William Kane, O.P.
Father Kane and his associates have worked tirelessly at a synthesis of philosophy and natural science. The steady output
of publications is a good sign of the progress of science among Catholics in the United States.

William H. Kane (1962).91 William Humbert Kane (1901-1970) was a North American Neo-Scholastic Dominican priest.
He was born William Dean Kane in LaGrange, a suburb of Chicago, in 1901. He attended Lyons Township High School, Aquinas College
in Columbus, Ohio, and entered the Dominican Order in Somerset, Ohio in 1920, with the Religious Order name Humbert. He was
ordained a Roman Catholic priest in 1927. He studied theology at the Dominican House of Studies, Washington, D.C., and he
studied medicine at the same time. The Dominican Order was preparing him to be a missionary in China, so he continued his
medical studies at the Catholic University of America in Washington between 1923 and 1926, and then attended the Georgetown
University School of Medicine from 1926 to 1928. Then he was sent to the Pontifical University of St. Thomas in Rome (then
known as the Collegio Angelico) for two years and he received his doctorate in philosophy (Ph.D.) summa cum laude,
in 1930. His thesis was on "Finality in Nature." He spent the rest of his life, thirty years, teaching: biology, logic, natural
philosophy, metaphysics, and theology. During that time Kane gave much thought to the texts of St. Thomas and modern problems.
He was sent to Rome to teach natural theology from 1948 to 1951. He was the first director of the Albertus Magnus Lyceum from
the time of its founding in 1951. The purpose of that Lyceum was to promote dialogue between science and philosophy. That
dialogue between science and philosophy became the life work of Kane.

Kane was an activist. He provided the philosophical background for the St. Xavier Plan (now Xavier University) for the
renewal of science teaching and philosophy of nature. This plan affected a system of 60 elementary and secondary schools with
some 800 teachers. The plan included curriculum reform and renewal beginning in 1932. Those completing the various requirements
of this plan could have advanced college placement at St. Xavier University, beginning in 1934. Barrett notes that Kane and
the Albertus Magnus Lyceum gave psychological, philosophical and theological help to form this plan of renewal. The philosophical
principles were a guide for the ideal education of a Christian person.

Dietrich Von Hildebrand (1973).92 Dietrich Von Hildebrand (1889-1977) was a German Catholic philosopher and
theologian who eventually settled in the United States from 1940 to 1977. He was born and raised in Florence, in Italy, in
a secular Protestant household. He was converted to Catholicism in 1914. In 1923, when Von Hildebrand was thirty-four years
old, he lectured at the Catholic Academic Association Congress in Ulm, Germany. In 1925, he gave several lectures at the Federation
of Catholic Students’ Unions in Innsbruck, Austria. He published a booklet Marriage in 1923 and another booklet
Purity and Virginity in 1925, both of which were enthusiastically approved by the papal nuncio in Munich, Eugenio Cardinal
Pacelli, who later became Pope Pius XII. In 1933, he fled from Germany to Austria, because he had been a vocal opponent of
Adolph Hitler and Nazism. He founded and edited an anti-Nazi weekly paper, The Christian Corporative State (Der
Christliche Ständestaat). For this he was sentenced to death in absentia by
the Nazis. 1n 1938, Hitler annexed Austria, and Von Hildebrand fled again. He settled near Fribourg, Switzerland. Then he
settled at Fiac, near Toulouse in France, where he taught at the Catholic University of Toulouse. In 1940, Hitler invaded
France, so Von Hildebrand fled to Portugal, Brasil, and finally to New York. In 1940, Von Hildebrand taught philosophy at
the Jesuit Fordham University on Rose Hill in the Bronx, New York. He continued teaching until 1960. Von Hildebrand spent
the rest of his life writing. He lived in the United States from 1940 to 1977, of thirty-seven of his eighty-eight years.
He died in New Rochelle, New York, in 1977.

Von Hildebrand was trained as a philosopher. He studied under Edmund Husserl at the University of Goettingen. Husserl distinguished
experiences that are intentional, like love, from experiences that are non-intentional, like being. The grasp of the object
for Husserl is an encounter. There is an intentionality of "feelings," but these are not bodily feelings as would be expected
in traditional rational psychology. For Von Hildebrand, spiritual feelings are a value response. For Aristotle, human beings
always will the good. Von Hildebrand answers Aristotle from a more ethical point of view, rather than from the scholastic
rational psychology point of view. Von Hildebrand notes that man should always choose the good of value response, but not
merely a good that is subjectively and selfishly satisfying. Von Hildebrand, even if not always in the Aristotelian and old
scholastic orbit, was a Catholic philosopher attempting to confront modern problems with the traditions of Catholic Christianity.
Pope Pius XII called him (informally) "the twentieth-century doctor of the Church." He was also known to have been a great
favorite of Pope John Paul II.

Von Hildebrand touched the subject of evolution. He noted that if atheistic evolution was true, everything just random
chance, then his treatment of the love of spouses was even more special. The metaphysics of love is a value response, and
love is not blind evolution but something special. The free choice of spousal love is not just a matter of evolutionary atoms
of matter marching into the future. His interest was in Personalism, so that marriage involved faithful love, and fundamental
moral attitudes. Society had to be founded on ethics, and especially Christian ethics, and not a matter of evolutionary development
of society. Responsibility for the future of man and the world is based on ethics, and this responsibility was not just an
evolutionary development of man. Von Hildebrand was interested in personal transformation, to become one with Christ through
personal encounter with Christ in the liturgy. Von Hildebrand was interested in the future of man, and tried to treat real
questions in the light of eternity.

Thomas M. King (1981).93 Thomas Mulvihill King was a North American Neo-Scholastic Jesuit philosopher and theologian.
He is professor of theology at Georgetown University, Washington, D.C. He was born on 9 May 1929 in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania.
He entered the Society of Jesus in 1951. He did his undergraduate studies at the University of Pittsburgh. He studied philosophy
and theology at Fordham University and Woodstock College. He was ordained a Roman Catholic priest in 1964. He received his
doctorate in theology from the University of Strasbourg in 1968. He began to teach at Georgetown University in Washington,
D.C. in 1968. He is a member of the American Teilhard Association. He is both priest and personalist, and known by students
and alumni alike for his late evening Mass at 11:15 P.M. at the Dahlgren Chapel on the Georgetown main campus nightly Sunday
through Friday. He started this service in 1969. In 1999, the Georgetown student newspaper, The Hoya, declared King "Georgetown’s
Man of the Century," and said, "No one has a more significant presence on campus and effect on students than Father King."

King treats evolution. He as written or edited several books on Pierre Teilhard de Chardin. He wrote Teilhard’s
Mysticism of Knowing in 1981. He wrote Teilhard and the Unity of Knowledge in 1983. He wrote Teilhard de Chardin
in 1988. He was the editor of The Letters of Teilhard de Chardin and Lucile Swan in 1993. He also wrote Teilhard’s
Mass in 2005. In addition, King’s concern about evolution is manifest in that he helped to co-found an annual gathering
of scientists interested in religion, which gathering is known as "Cosmos and Creation."

Francis J. Kovach (1988).94 He was a North American Neo-Scholastic layman. He is a student and commentator on
St. Thomas. He was made professor emeritus after teaching twenty-four years at the University of Oklahoma. He studied at the
University of Budapest. He was awarded his doctorate (Ph.D.) in philosophy from the Albertus Magnus University in Cologne,
Germany. He taught in three American colleges and Villanova University before settling at the University of Oklahoma. He was
a member of seven philosophical associations, including the American Catholic Philosophical Association and the American Maritain
Association. He was an editorial consultant to the magazine, The New Scholasticism.

Kovach is Neo-Scholastic author confronting traditional philosophy with modern thought. He has written a collection of
nineteen essays in English in the field of metaphysics, philosophy of nature, aesthetics, and ethics. His philosophical adversaries
are the Skeptics and the Agnostics of our time. In his book on scholastic challenges, Kovach takes a critical approach to
Medieval scholastic positions and modern contemporary theories. Kovach is inspired by the ever deepening and unsolvable differences
between Neo-Scholastic realism and the Skeptics and Agnostics of our time. He hopes to stimulate discussion and debate. His
first goal is a critical approach to scholasticism and modern thought for Kovach fears an ever deepening of unresolvable differences.
His second goal is that the essays on aesthetics will intensify interest among Neo-Scholastics and non-Scholastics alike.
He comments that the field of metaphysical aesthetics is much neglected. His other essays in the same book, scholastic challenges,
treat causality, the existence of God, infinity, and the morality of the lie used as a protective statement.

William E. Carroll (1999).95 Carroll was the professor of history at Cornell College, in Mt. Vernon, Iowa. Carroll
was at the University of Oxford faculty of theology who participated in the Blackfriars lecture series and the Aquinas Seminar.
His area of philosophical expertise is creation and science in the Middle Ages, and also science and religion. He involves
theology and scripture in his philosophy. Nevertheless, Carroll’s thought is grounded in Aristotelianism.

Carroll treats human evolution. Carroll is aware and cites Darwin and Non-Darwinism in theories of evolution. He points
out the distinction between Darwin and his modern followers such as Dennett. Carroll defends metaphysics, human nature, creation
of the rational soul. He is concerned about the place of God in creation as Creator. Carroll opposed Deism, Occasionalism,
Process Theology, and gives reasoned arguments against them. Carroll sees the need to give definitions, such as creation,
divine agency. Carroll also sees the need for distinction, such as to distinguish between creation and mere change, to distinguish
between biology, philosophy, and theology, and to distinguish between receiving existence and mere generation.

Carroll treats cosmology. He is familiar with modern cosmologists. He is also familiar with the history of philosophy,
for example, Occasionalism, and his very insightful treatment of St. Thomas. He is also familiar with theology, such as the
notion of creation ex nihilo prescribed by the Fourth Lateran Council (1215). Carroll notes that the key to cosmic
origins is the distinction between creation and change. On the one hand, where mere change exists, some "prior thing" must
change (ex nihilo, nihil fit). On the other hand, creation accounts for the existence of things, where there was no
"prior thing." It was St. Thomas who separated essence from existence. Thus any thing left to itself, separated from the cause
of its existence, would be absolutely nothing. Creation is the continuing complete causing of the existence of every thing
that is. Creation, thus, is a subject for metaphysics and theology, and not for the natural sciences.

Carroll explains evolution from a Neo-Scholastic point of view. God is at work in every operation of nature. The autonomy
of nature is not a limit on God, but a sign of the goodness of God. There are different levels of divine causality and creaturely
causality. Divine causality is not partial, not by co-causes, but wholly done by both in a different way; God is the Primary
Cause, transcendent enabling origin and also immanently present. Creaturely causality is not partial, but co-causes, wholly
done by both but in a different way, totally and immediately done by the creature as a secondary cause. So there are differing
levels of metaphysics of primary and secondary causality. The action is wholly done by both according to a different way.
The same effect is wholly attributed wholly to the instrument, e.g., the hammer, and wholly to the principle agent. For Aquinas,
the differing metaphysical levels of primary and secondary causation require us to say that any created effect comes totally
and immediately from God as the transcendent primary cause, and totally and immediately from the creature as secondary cause.
Secondary Cause is defined as the intrinsic dependence on the primary cause, while Instrumental Cause is defined as extrinsic
dependence on the primary cause, such a hammer used by the Primary Cause. God is the complete cause of the new thing. To paint
a picture, working from existing natural materials is (change) radically different from creation ex nihilo. To create
is to cause existence, and all things are totally dependent on the Creator for the very fact that they are. An evolving universe,
just like Aristotle’s universe, is still a created universe, which results in change.

Francisco J. Ayala (2005).96 Francisco J. Ayala was a noted North American Neo-Scholastic philosophical researcher.
He teaches at the University of California, at Irvine. He attended the international congress on evolution at the Pontifical
Atheneum Regina Apostolorum in Rome, on 23 and 24 April 2002 and submitted a paper. He writes in English.

Ayala treats Darwinism. Ayala demonstrates the scientific value of the discovery of Darwin. He notes that in the sixteenth
and seventeenth centuries Copernicus, Kepler, Galileo, and Newton conceived the universe as matter in motion which was governed
by natural laws. The postulate that the universe obeyed immanent laws which can explain natural phenomena is a scientific
revolution. Darwin extended that revolution to the world of living beings through the causality of genetic variation and natural
selection. On the one hand, Ayala defends the scientific character of Darwinism, and on the other hand its limited value in
the world of nature since moral and aesthetic values are more significant for man’s life and are not accessible to natural
science.

Ayala treats evolution itself. Ayala maintains that natural selection is much more than a purely negative process, for
it is able to generate novelty by increasing the probability of otherwise extremely improbable genetic combinations. Natural
selection is thus creative in a way, not by actually creating the entities upon which it operates, but by producing adaptive
genetic combinations that would not have existed otherwise. Ayala notes that chance is an integral part of the evolutionary
process. Chance enters the evolutionary process because natural selection does not anticipate the environments of the future.
Ayala notes that natural selection gives some appearance of purposefulness because it is conditioned by the environment. Here
it seems that some purposefulness is excluded by Ayala, but from a single clause, the philosophical position of Ayala on finality
is not entirely clear. Ayala notes that more than ninety-nine percent of all species that ever lived have become extinct without
issue. Thus chance is counteracted by natural selection, which preserves what is useful and eliminates the harmful. The theory
of evolution thus manifests chance and necessity jointly interlocked in a natural process that has produced the most complex,
diverse, and beautiful entities in the universe. The process is creative but not conscious. The theory of evolution can account
for everything in nature as the result of natural processes governed by natural laws. It accounts for all the organisms that
populate the earth, including humans, who think and love, endowed with creative powers, and able to analyze the process of
evolution itself that brought their bodies into existence.

Ayala treats Intelligent Design. He notes that the theory of evolution is superior because it also explains defective design.
Ayala notes design in the philosophy of St. Thomas in his proof for the existence of God, the fifth way, the argument from
design, but seems to lump St. Thomas with the Intelligent Design defenders. Ayala only mentions St. Thomas in passing, and
his argument is not the watchmaker argument of William Paley.

Paul Haffner (2005).97 He is a North American Neo-Scholastic who has attended the international congress on
evolution at the Pontifical Atheneum Regina Apostolorum in Rome, on 23 and 24 April 2002. He delivered a paper in English.
He participated in the dialogue at the congress. His presentation touches issues of evolution and of atheism.

Haffner treats evolution. He is concerned about evolution and the teaching ministry of the Church. First, he finds that
in St. Augustine of Hippo, St Gregory of Nissa, and St. Thomas (Aquinas Summa Contra Gentiles 3. 76) there are some
traces of creation which is not opposed to evolution. Second, there was an open discussion among theologians of the nineteenth
century about the compatibility of the theory of evolution with Christian doctrine. The third stage opened at the end of the
nineteenth century, when moments of tension occurred between theologians and doctrinal authority, not by the initiative of
these groups, but by the outside influence and activity of a group of Roman professors. As usual, the authority of the Church
expressed the essential and basic harmony between science and religion. However, there was also the necessity of rejecting
those movements that were incompatible with revelation (the Bible) such as the ideologies of Materialism and Modernism (relativism
in theology). The warning (Monitum) by the Holy Office in Rome regarding the works of Teilhard de Chardin was intended
to avoid the influence of evolutionist ideology on Catholic theology

Haffner notes a surprising openness on the part of the popes regarding evolution. Years before the warning of Teilhard,
Pope Pius XII in his encyclical Humani Generis (n. 36) maintained the teaching of the Church does not forbid research
or discussion on the doctrine of evolution about the origin of the human body from pre-existing living material. Pope John
Paul II taught that creation is able to be seen in the light of evolution as an event which is extended in time, as a continued
creation. Pope John Paul II recommends respect for the different methods used in various areas of knowledge to permit a view
of reconciliation when different areas of knowledge seem irreconcilable. In particular, the world of the spirit is not able
to be studied with the scientific method, but by philosophical analysis.

Haffner comments on monogenesis. The ecclesiastical discussion on monogenesis (which means one pair of proto-parents) and
polygenesis (many pairs of proto-parents) merits particular attention because it is strictly connected to Christian teaching
about original sin. Since polygenesis proposes many copies of the origin of the human species, it seems to lead to one of
three theologically unacceptable hypotheses: that original sin was not transmitted to all members of the human species; or
if transmitted, that the process of transmission was different from generation; or if transmitted by generation, that Adam
was not an individual but a group of persons. Because the act of infusion of the soul directly by God in the first man excludes
the possibility of empirical scientific research, science cannot deny the monogenetic origin of man, nor affirm the polygenetic
origin of humanity. The most secure position from the point of view of theology is monogenism.

Haffner draws a conclusion about evolution. First, Haffner concludes that the Magisterium (teaching office) showed a growing
concern about evolution. Second, the popes showed remarkable openness to new scientific ideas. Third, the popes showed a constant
appeal to human reason. Fourth, the position of the popes was not just Concordism (agree for the sake of peace), but dialogue
between science and religion to explore the limits of evolution. At the same time, Haffner does note the possibility of dangers
both for faith and for reason from the ideology of Materialism.

Stanley L. Jaki (2005).98 Stanley L. Jaki is a North American Neo-Scholastic who teaches at Seton Hall University
in New Jersey. He has a doctorate in physics and another doctorate in theology. He is a member of the Pontifical Academy of
Sciences, Rome. He participated in the international congress on evolution at the Pontifical Atheneum Regina Apostolorum
on 23 and 24 April 2002 in Rome. He wrote in English on Non-Darwinian Darwinism which touches on the problems of philosophy
of evolution.

Jaki treats Darwinism. Jaki wants to clearly distinguish science from ideology. Darwinism is an ideology. First, Darwinism
is ideological in its rejection of metaphysics and its rejection of the idea of substance. Second, Darwinism is ideological
in its rejection of finality or purpose. Third, Darwinism is ideological in its promotion of atheism. Fourth, Darwinism is
ideological in its reduction of science to genetics. Jaki also rejects Materialism as an ideology. Because Darwinism is a
anti-metaphysical dogma, an ideology, this promotes a strong relativism. Darwin himself had a theory of great scientific merit,
but Darwinism puts this achievement in disrepute.

Jaki treats theory. Jaki maintains that it is irrelevant whether Darwinism is termed a hypothesis or a theory. Jaki notes
that Darwinism is an incomplete science. Biology has to grow.

CONCLUSION: The outstanding contribution of the North Americans in the last half of the twentieth century is the metaphysical
analysis of Evolutionism, and philosophical explanation of how evolution could occur. Such major contributors are Klubertanz,
O’Flynn Brennan, Renard, Carroll, and Glenn.

A surprise conclusion is philosophers moving into other areas of the philosophy of nature and philosopher-activists. Yancy
in sociology, Kovach in aesthetics, Ratner in medicine, Moraczewski in biochemistry, and Stock in empirical psychology, all
added to the specialized knowledge that is the material object of the philosophy of nature, and needs the contribution of
a specialist. Communication in educational terms was promoted by philospher-activists Kane, Ashley and Barrett. Kovach was
a professor in a public university. Yancy was also an activist in the promotion of philosophical organizations. John Courtney
Murray was trained as a Neo-Scholastic and was an activist opposed by Rome, until his monumental work as advisor to the bishops
and in the preparation of the document on religious liberty at the Second Vatican Council; and in activism, Roman opposition,
and outstanding contribution to the Second Vatican Council his literary and personal activism paralleled Congar and De Lubac.
Von Hildebrand published an anti-Nazi newspaper.

Other conclusions for the large number of North American Neo-Scholastic philosophers can be conveniently divided into a
treatment of opinions on the philosophy of science, Evolutionism in itself, human evolution, and the fruitfulness of the evolutionary
concept.

Conclusions on the philosophy of science involve its method, its history, its content, special problems, and its social
implications.

Concerning method, every author in North America writes in English, and none use the thesis form. Ratner, Weisheipl, and
Simmons show the importance of philosophy for scientific methodology. Bittle, Renard, Benignus, Adler, Smith, Barrett, Von
Hildebrand, and Glenn have a great concern for students, and these are college students, not only candidates for the priesthood.
Glenn and Kane note that the book does not take the place of the teacher, who should give living references and living questions.
Adler and Weisheipl encouraged discussion and debate, and the Great Books discussions. Ashley, Kane Hoskin, Ratner, Kovach,
Haffner, and Murray promoted the use of dialogue in education, in research, and public life. Ratner, Kovach, and Kane note
that method, rather than just the conclusions of the ancients, is of prime importance for the success and survival of natural
philosophy. Glutz promotes the method of Socrates in education, although he and Carroll in natural philosophy want observation,
definition, hypothesis, proof by induction and later proof by demonstration. Ratner shows the validity of the method of Aristotle.
Klubertanz and Kovach note that as new problems arise St. Thomas has to be re-read and re-thought. Further, even in Klubertanz,
the reader must pay attention to definitions, since Klubertanz has a restrictive definition of Evolutionism; in short, definition
can be a problem. Smith notes that the term philosophy is equivocal, since it applies to four sciences: logic, philosophy
of nature, ethics, and metaphysics. DeKoninck shows that an equivocal term, and the lack of an exact definition, can lead
from a dilemma for Darwin to a completely univocal concept of "survival of the fittest" from which Sir Julian Huxley denies
purpose. Weisheipl notes that science is an analogous concept.

Concerning content, Renard, Barrett, Garey, Glutz, Wallace, Kane, Jaki, and Glenn show the need for metaphysics. Simmons
notes the need for logic as well. Rolbiecki, Barrett, McDowell, Wallace, Haffner, and Begninus want science and philosophy
to cooperate. Ayala notes the need for moral values, which are not accessible to natural science alone. Glutz notes that natural
philosophy, as more accessible to the senses and observation should precede metaphysics for students. Ashley wants science
and faith to cooperate. Renard believes philosophy can help theology. Positivism and Secularism both fail to find an explanation
for life, says Benignus. Klubertanz, in an attempt to give a philosophical explanation of evolution, is excellent in his presentation
of material causality. Barrett and Smith note the prime importance of metaphysics and natural theology, but with St. Thomas
places the philosophy of nature first pedagogically. Ashley notes that metaphysics has limitations dealing with concrete problems,
and should use the help of the social sciences. Oesterle notes the provisional nature of much of the philosophy of nature,
and suggests the use of the provisional universal. Kovach and Ayala agree that aesthetic values are more important in the
life of man and are not accessible to natural science.

Concerning history, Renard and Moraczewski give the history of hylemorphorism. Adler treats the philosophical history of
evolution, matter, form, chance, man, soul, happiness, immortality, cosmology, liberty and God. Barrett gives the history
of the development of a modern curriculum including a unitary study of science and philosophy. Callus gives the history of
the problem of unity of form, which is important for evolution because of substantial change from one species to another.
Garey, McKeon, and McDowell show the importance of the historical opinions of Aristotle, the scholastics, and St. Thomas.
Hoskin showed the value of historical study in the growth of philosophy of nature. Ratner showed the importance of learning
method in natural philosophy from history, rather than slavishly following the conclusions of the past.

Concerning special problems, Klubertanz, Garey, and Glutz make the reader alert to problems in definition. Klubertanz himself
uses the most important term, Evolutionism, in a restricted way. Further, something is happening to philosophy at mid-twentieth
century that seems to diminish the popularity of the Neo-Scholasticism. Glenn, in 1949, notes that there are few manuals in
ontology available in English, and some professors find "older writings" of small appeal. Carroll is firmly grounded in Aristotle
and Aquinas. Glenn, Carroll, and Moore note the contrasting development in the field of empirical psychology, up to at least
1954, which deprived the philosophy of man of a material basis in the study of evolution; this was a problem of definitions,
but a more fundamental problem about freedom, conscious control, and the very existence of the soul. Dougherty’s introduction
is by Fr. Ignatius Smith, O.P., dean of philosophy at the Catholic University of America, who on the one hand pleads the need
for "new presentations" and on the other hand notes "the demand for texts in Scholastic Philosophy continues...It is an indication
of vitality..." Glutz noted he would rather use the method of Socrates with students, although the thesis method was best
for memory, review, and scholastic disputation. McDowell and Weisheipl stress that scientists need the humanities and moral
philosophy. McKeon and Weisheipl stress that scientists need a philosophy of nature. Weisheipl and Haffner know no incompatibility
between science, philosophy and religion. Weisheipl rejects Scientism, Fundamentalism, and ideology.

Concerning social implications, Rolbiecki wants to stimulate lay students to a deeper and continued interest in philosophy.
Even in 1939, Rolbiecki writes in English on modern problems for a wider audience than seminarians preparing for the priesthood.
However, Rolbiecki raises questions to stimulate curiosity without demonstrative proof, whereas Bittle and Benignus as educators
provide extensive proof for each assertion, without using thesis form. Adler taught university students, heads of corporations
at the Aspen Institute, and even children through the Great Books movement, thus extending the sphere of philosophy exponentially.
Murray, trained as a Neo-Scholastic and using scholastic principles, like Von Hildebrand, was not as much concerned about
the origin of man as about the goals of humanity; it is the goals of man that round out the treatment of man in this dissertation.
McDowell has moved to cancer research, taking philosophy with her.

Conclusions on evolution in itself are varied. Rolbiecki, in 1939, holds that evolution is universally admitted in scientific
and philosophical circles. Bittle, in 1945, maintains that the fact of evolution is still open to debate, as does Benignus,
Kane, and Adler. Klubertanz, McDowell, and O’Flynn Brennan give an original and positive defense of evolution. Klubertanz
also will admit monophylectic evolution. Glenn and Jaki give a defense of the principle of finality, both in organic and inorganic
things, and Dougherty defends the finality of inorganic bodies. Adler sees finality as important. Smith and Jaki argue against
Darwinism, that chance is not a cause. Rolbiecki, Benignus, Dougherty and Bittle are opposed to Materialism, and the mere
Vitalism of Driesch. Rolbiecki, Begninus, Smith, and Bittle also reject Machanicism. Rolbiecki has reservations about the
usefulness of Hylemorphism for modern science, but Adler and Kane treat matter and form as important issues. Bittle, Renard,
Dougherty, Kane, and Benignus endorse Hylemorphism. Renard gives a possible philosophical explanation of evolution by accidental
forms preparing and disposing the substance for substantial change. Glenn holds "species" is constituted by substantial form,
but since the form of any individual body might have been conjoined with some other quantity of matter, it is rather the matter
than the form which ultimately constitutes the individual.

Conclusions on human evolution are varied. Rolbiecki and Moraczewski note the essential difference between man and animals,
but Rolbiecki, in 1939, wants more experimentation. Bittle endorses the essential distinction between man and the other animals,
and implicitly Benignus agrees. Rolbiecki, Klubertanz, and Bittle admit evolution of the body of man. Bittle and Klubertanz
deny the evolution of the human soul. McDowell notes an analogy between the intelligence of man and that of God. Bittle and
Von Hildebrand treat man’s personal and social growth in the world, and endorse survival after death as morally certain.
Adler also treats the soul and immortality. Adler and Von Hildebrand treat a vision of the future. Smith and Dougherty view
man as the mediate goal of nature and God as the final goal of all creation.

Conclusions on evolution as a fruitful concept are varied. Rolbiecki argues against abiogenesis, but is open to the production
of life from non-life in the future. Bittle is against abiogenesis. Klubertanz explains abiogenesis as possible part in the
divine plan. O’Flynn Brennan endorses an evolutionary view of the universe. McDowell argues from scientific observation
of order in the universe to the existence of a Supreme Intellegence. Benignus, Dougherty, Carroll and Glenn maintain that
God created the world out of nothing. Rolbiecki, Smith, and Dougherty maintain the universe in limited in extension and duration.
Adler treats theories of cosmology, while Carroll endorses Aquinas. Rolbiecki and Moraczewski do not affirm evolutionary sociology,
and find that the development of society has taken place in accord with human nature. Bittle from the view of rational psychology,
and Stock precisely from the view of empirical psychology, see no deterministic social evolution. Von Hildebrand sees the
need for Christian ethics. Adler treats freedom. Rolbiecki, Smith, Von Hildebrand, Carroll, and Renard confirm a Supreme Being
as a Creator. Adler treats God. Bittle and Jaki note that evolution of itself is not atheistic.