The text divides thinking into â€œimplicitâ€ and â€œexplicitâ€ (2002, 114) thinking. This â€œimplicitâ€ thinking appears to be the same thing as â€œautomatic,â€ â€œperipheral,â€ â€œheuristic,â€ and â€œunconsciousâ€ while â€œexplicitâ€ appears to be the same thing as â€œcontrolled,â€ â€œcentral,â€ â€œsystematic,â€ and â€œconsciousâ€ (Morris, Squires, Taber, & Lodge, 2003, 4). Additionally, implicit memory is refered to as â€œMemory System Iâ€ and explicit memory is called â€œMemory System IIâ€ (Bjorklund & Pellegrini, 123).

One of the text’s most interesting sections is the application of implicit attitude tests on very young children. For instance, even if they could not answer a question about remembering old students, children act as if they recall old kindergarten classmates (119-120). The authors also mention other research (Clements & Perner, 1994) showing how implicit belief becomes more reliable than explicit belief before the child is three years old. This implicit superiority continues throughout life. It is interesting that explicit thinking has such little access to one’s implicit state, as self-reports can be unreliable predictors of behavior (Kurzban & DeScioli, 2005).

Not that all implicit attitudes are necessarily good, however: research implying a possible human predisposition towards xenophobia (Hammond & Axeldor, 2006) and research that shows that whites and blacks both hold negative implicit attitudes of blacks (Bower, 2006) show the potentially negative effects of implicit cognition, as well.

Bjorklund & Pellegrini also describe Donald’s (1991) division of the levels of culture into â€œepisodic culture,â€ â€œmimetic culture,â€ â€œmythic culture,â€ and â€œtheoretic cultureâ€ (123-124). However, if they are describing Donald’s work correctly I must disagree with Bjorklund & Pellegrini. In particular, I do not believe our ancestors were as primitive as this theory purports, nor as we so developed. The theory assumes that chimpanzees and early men live â€œentirely in the presentâ€ without â€œimitation, in which one individual represents the actions and goals of another and attempts to reproduce the the outcome archived by another…â€ However, complicated cultures with varying styles of dominance, grooming, and food gathering exist even within baboons (Sapolsky & Share, 2004). As it appears that primatese use technology together social strategies to achieve what they want (Tomasello & Call), I do not see how there is evidence deying chimpanzees access to mimetic culture.

Likewise, while it is clear that humans have access to â€œexternal symbolic storage systemsâ€ (Bjorklund & Pellegrini, 124) and other gizmos, I do not think that much of human behavior progresses much beyond mimetics. That is, while the development of moral reasoning and personal identity (see, for example, Moshman, 2005) would seem to follow theoretic or at least mythic cultural paths, I don’t think these things influences behavior that much. This ties into what I wrote above. One theory for why self-reports are so bad is that most behavior is driven by automatic processes the conscious brain simply does not have access to (Lieberman, Schreiber, & Ochsner, 2003). For instance, while moral reasoning is associated with some (but not other) forms of pro-social behavior (Eisenberg-Berg & Hand, 1979). I am not aware of any research demonstrating students who have more advanced moral reasoning behave more â€œmorallyâ€ because of this reasoning (as opposed to students who learn moral reasoning acting more morally anyway, etc). This sentence is written out of ignorance â€“ I simply don’t know the field that much â€“ but I am skeptical that most human social behavior is more complicated than memetic culture.

On the whole, my take on this chapter is this: humans have very well developed and well evolved implicit memory and cognitive structures, which they use nearly all the time. Animals as well have very well developed and well evolved (for their typical lives) implicit memory and cognitive structures, which they use nearly all the time. Humanity is distinguished, not by a reliance on explicit memory and explicit cognitive structures, but by more explicit structures than other animals. Thus we are more reasonable and rational than other creatures in the jungle. But i do not believe that we are more reasonable and more rational than the reverse.