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Bernard Williams and Thomas Nagel have argued forcefully that the classical moral theories, utilitarianism and Kantianism, are insufficiently responsive to certain features of the first‐person standpoint. Defends their view that prescriptive statements that routinely impose too heavy costs on agents are not confirmable. The difficulty of fulfilling a request reduces an agent's obligation to fulfil it, and when its exigency is compounded by circumstances such as the agent's involuntary subjection, or his being asked to bear certain burdens unexpectedly or by himself, the obligation is further...

Bernard Williams and Thomas Nagel have argued forcefully that the classical moral theories, utilitarianism and Kantianism, are insufficiently responsive to certain features of the first‐person standpoint. Defends their view that prescriptive statements that routinely impose too heavy costs on agents are not confirmable. The difficulty of fulfilling a request reduces an agent's obligation to fulfil it, and when its exigency is compounded by circumstances such as the agent's involuntary subjection, or his being asked to bear certain burdens unexpectedly or by himself, the obligation is further reduced. The reality constraint with regard to facts about agency and moral motivation thus sets limits on the systems of social rules that are eligible for endorsement.