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Monday, September 30, 2013

This draft presidential statement was proposed by Australia and Luxembourg. Security Council will discuss it today afternoon (Monday, 30 Sep).

28 September 2013

Statement
by the President of the Security Council

1.The Security Council recalls its Resolutions
2042 (2012) and 2043 (2012) and 2118 (2013), and its Presidential Statements of
3 August 2011, 21 March 2012 and 5 April 2012.

2.The Security Council reaffirms its strong
commitment to the sovereignty, independence, unity and territorial integrity of
Syria, and to the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations.

3.The
Security Council calls on all parties to respect the UN guiding principles of
humanitarian emergency assistance while stressing the importance of such
assistance being delivered on the basis of need, devoid of any political
prejudices and aims.

4.The Security Council is
appalled at the unacceptable and escalating level of violence and the death of
more than 100,000 people in Syria as reported by the UN Secretary-General and
the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights.It is gravely alarmed by the significant and rapid
deterioration of the humanitarian situation in Syria. It notes with grave
concern that several million Syrians are in need of immediate humanitarian
assistance and that without urgent increased humanitarian action, their lives
will be at risk.

5.The Security Council condemns
the widespread violations of human rights and international humanitarian law by
the Syrian authorities, as well as any human rights abuses and violations of
international humanitarian law by armed groups.

6.The Security Council also
condemns all violence committed in Syria, irrespective of where it comes from,
including all acts of sexual and gender-based violence and abuse, and recalls
that international humanitarian law prohibits rape and other forms of sexual
violence.

7.The Security Council further
condemns all grave violations and abuses committed against children in
contravention of applicable international law, such as recruitment and use,
killing and maiming, rape and all other forms of sexual violence, attacks on
schools and hospitals as well as arbitrary arrest, detention, torture, ill
treatment and use as human shields.

8.The Security Council moreover
condemns increased terrorist attacks resulting in numerous casualties and
destruction carried out by organisations and individuals associated with
Al-Qaeda, and calls on all parties to commit to putting an end to terrorist
acts perpetrated by such organisations and individuals. The Council reaffirms,
in this regard, that terrorism in all its forms and manifestations constitutes
one of the most serious threats to international peace and security, and that
any acts of terrorism are criminal and unjustifiable, regardless of their
motivation, wherever, whenever and by whomsoever committed.

9.The Security Council recalls
the obligations under international humanitarian law to distinguish between
civilian populations and combatants, and the prohibition against indiscriminate
and disproportionate attacks against civilians and civilian objects, as well as
the prohibition on the use of chemical weapons and the employment of weapons, projectiles
and material and methods of warfare which are of a nature to cause superfluous
injury or unnecessary suffering. The Council urges all parties to immediately
cease and desist from all violations of international humanitarian law and
violations and abuses of human rights, and calls on all parties to reaffirm
their obligations under international humanitarian law and to take all
appropriate steps to protect civilians, including by desisting from attacks
directed against civilian objects, such as medical centres, schools and water
stations, and also calls on all parties to avoid establishing military
positions in populated areas. The Council recalls in this regard that the
Syrian authorities bear the primary responsibility to protect their populations.

10.The Security Council also
recalls that under international humanitarian law, the wounded and sick must
receive, to the fullest extent practicable, and with the least possible delay,
medical care and attention required by their condition and that medical and
humanitarian personnel, facilities and transport must be respected and
protected. To this end, the Council urges free passage to all areas for medical
personnel and supplies, including surgical items and medicine.

11.The Security Council stresses
that the magnitude of the humanitarian tragedy caused by the conflict in Syria
requires immediate action to facilitate safe and unhindered delivery of
humanitarian assistance in the whole country. It condemns all cases of denial
of humanitarian access, and recalls that arbitrarily depriving civilians of
objects indispensable to their survival, including wilfully impeding relief
supply and access, can constitute a serious violation of international law.

12.The Security Council urges all
parties, in particular the Syrian authorities, to take all appropriate steps to
facilitate the efforts of the United Nations, its specialized agencies and all
humanitarian actors engaged in humanitarian relief activities, to provide
immediate humanitarian assistance to the affected people in Syria, including by
promptly facilitating safe and unhindered humanitarian access to civilians in
need of assistance in all areas under their control and across conflict lines.
It also encourages further cooperation between the United Nations, its
specialized agencies and all parties concerned, including Syrian civil society
organisations, to facilitate access and the delivery of assistance in the
entirety of the Syrian territory.

13.The Security Council further
urges the Syrian authorities to take immediate steps to facilitate the
expansion of humanitarian relief operations, and lift bureaucratic impediments
and other obstacles, including through:

(a)expediting the approval of
further domestic and international Non-Governmental Organizations to engage in
humanitarian relief activities;

(b)easing and expediting the
procedures for the operationalization of further humanitarian hubs, the entry
and movement of humanitarian personnel and convoys by granting the necessary
visas and permits in a predictable manner, the importation of goods and
equipment, such as communication tools, protective armoured vehicles and
medical and surgical equipment, needed for humanitarian operations;

(c)promptly facilitating safe and
unhindered humanitarian access to people in need through the most effective
ways, including across conflict lines and, where appropriate, across borders
from neighbouring countries in accordance with the UN guiding principles of
humanitarian emergency assistance; and

(d)accelerating approval for the
implementation of humanitarian projects, including those in the revised Syria
Humanitarian Assistance Response Plan.

14. The Security Council also urges all parties to:

(a)take all appropriate steps to
ensure the safety and security of United Nations personnel, those of its
specialized agencies, and all other personnel engaged in humanitarian relief
activities, without prejudice to their freedom of movement and access, and stresses
that the primary responsibility in this regard lies with the Syrian
authorities;

(b)immediately demilitarize
medical facilities, schools and water stations, and agree on the modalities to
implement humanitarian pauses, as well as key routes to enable promptly - upon
notification from relief agencies - the safe and unhindered passage of
humanitarian convoys along these routes to access people in need; and

(c)designate empowered
interlocutors with the necessary authority to discuss with humanitarian actors
operational and policy issues.

15.The Security Council expresses
its deep concern at the consequences of the refugee crisis caused by the
conflict in Syria, which has a destabilising impact on the entire region. It
expresses its appreciation for the significant efforts that have been made by
the neighbouring countries and the countries of the region, notably Jordan,
Lebanon, Turkey, Iraq and Egypt, to accommodate the refugees from Syria.

16.The Security Council reaffirms
the importance of the principle of non-refoulement, the right for refugees to
return voluntarily to Syria and encourages countries neighbouring Syria to
protect all people fleeing the violence in Syria, including Palestinians. It
urges all Member States, based on burden sharing principles, to support these
countries in assisting refugees and affected communities. The Council
underlines the need for all parties to respect and maintain the security and
civilian character of camps for refugees and internally displaced persons.

17.The Security Council also
urges all Member States to respond swiftly to the United Nations’ humanitarian
appeals to meet the spiralling needs of people inside Syria and in neighbouring
countries, and to ensure that all pledges are honoured in full. It further urges all Member States, in
coordination with international financial institutions and United Nations
agencies, to increase their support to address the increasing political,
socio-economic and financial impact of the refugee crisis on hosting countries.

18.The Security Council stresses
the need to end impunity for violations of international humanitarian law and
violations and abuses of human rights, and reaffirms that those who have
committed or are otherwise responsible for such violations and abuses in Syria
must be brought to justice.

19.The Security Council
emphasizes that the humanitarian situation will continue to deteriorate in the
absence of a political solution to the crisis, reiterates its endorsement of
the Geneva Communiqué of 30 June 2012 (Annex II of resolution 2118 (2013)) and demands
that all parties work towards the immediate and comprehensive implementation of
the Geneva Communiqué aimed at bringing an immediate end to all violence and
violations and abuses of international law, and facilitating a Syrian-led
political process leading to a transition that meets the legitimate aspirations
of the Syrian people and enables them independently and democratically to
determine their own future. It reiterates the need to convene as soon as
possible an international conference to implement the Geneva Communiqué in
order to facilitate a Syrian-led political process leading to a transition that
would hasten an end to the conflict in Syria.

20.The Security Council requests
the Secretary-General to regularly inform the Council about the humanitarian
situation in Syria and its impact on neighbouring countries, including on
progress towards implementation of this presidential statement.

Thursday, September 26, 2013

PP1. Recalling the
Statements of its President of 3 August 2011, 21 March 2012, 5 April
2012, and its resolutions 1540 (2004), 2042 (2012) and 2043 (2012),

PP2. Reaffirming its
strong commitment to the sovereignty, independence and territorial
integrity of the Syrian Arab Republic,

PP3. Reaffirming
that the proliferation of chemical weapons, as well as their means of
delivery, constitutes a threat to international peace and security,

PP4. Recalling that
the Syrian Arab Republic on 22 November 1968 acceded to the Protocol
for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or
Other Gases and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at
Geneva on 17 June 1925,

PP5. Noting that on
14 September 2013, Syria deposited with the Secretary-General its
instrument of accession to the Convention on the Prohibition of the
Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and
on their Destruction (Convention) and declared that it shall comply
with its stipulations and observe them faithfully and sincerely,
applying the Convention provisionally pending its entry into force
for the Syrian Arab Republic,

PP6. Welcoming the
establishment by the Secretary-General of the United Nations Mission
to Investigate Allegations of the Use of Chemical Weapons in the
Syrian Arab Republic (“the Mission”) pursuant to General Assembly
resolution 42/37 C (1987) of 30 November 1987, and reaffirmed by
resolution 620 (1988) of 26 August 1988, and expressing
appreciation for the work of the Mission,

PP7. Acknowledging the
report of 16 September 2013 (S/2013/553) by the Mission, underscoring
the need for the Mission to fulfil its mandate, and emphasizing
that future credible allegations of chemical weapons use in the
Syrian Arab Republic should be investigated,

PP8. Deeply outraged
by the use of chemical weapons on 21 August 2013 in Rif Damascus, as
concluded in the Mission’s report, condemning the killing of
civilians that resulted from it, affirming that the use of
chemical weapons constitutes a serious violation of international
law, and stressing that those responsible for any use of
chemical weapons must be held accountable,

PP9. Recalling the
obligation under resolution 1540 (2004) that all States shall refrain
from providing any form of support to non-State actors that attempt
to develop, acquire, manufacture, possess, transport, transfer or use
weapons of mass destruction, including chemical weapons, and their
means of delivery,

PP10. Welcoming the
Framework for Elimination of Syrian Chemical Weapons dated 14
September 2013, in Geneva, between the Russian Federation and the
United States of America (S/2013/565), with a view to ensuring the
destruction of the Syrian Arab Republic’s chemical weapons program
in the soonest and safest manner, and expressing its
commitment to the immediate international control over chemical
weapons and their components in the Syrian Arab Republic,

PP11. Welcoming the
decision of the Executive Council of the Organization for the
Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) of [XX September 2013]
establishing special procedures for the expeditious destruction of
the Syrian Arab Republic’s chemical weapons program and stringent
verification thereof, and expressing its determination to
ensure the destruction of the Syrian Arab Republic’s chemical
weapons program according to the timetable contained in the OPCW
Executive Council decision of [XX September 2013],

PP12. Stressing that
the only solution to the current crisis in the Syrian Arab Republic
is through an inclusive and Syrian-led political process based on the
Geneva Communiqué of 30 June 2012, and emphasising the need
to convene the international conference on Syria as soon as possible,

PP13. Determining
that the use of chemical weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic
constitutes a threat to international peace and security,

PP14. Underscoring that
Member States are obligated under Article 25 of the Charter of the
United Nations to accept and carry out the Council's decisions,

1.
Determines that the use of chemical weapons anywhere
constitutes a threat to international peace and security;

2.
Condemns in the strongest terms any use of chemical weapons in
the Syrian Arab Republic, in particular the attack on 21 August 2013,
in violation of international law;

3.
Endorses the decision of the OPCW Executive Council [XX
September 2013], which contains special procedures for the
expeditious destruction of the Syrian Arab Republic’s chemical
weapons program and stringent verification thereof and calls for its
full implementation in the most expedient and safest manner;

4. Decides that the
Syrian Arab Republic shall not use, develop, produce, otherwise
acquire, stockpile or retain chemical weapons, or transfer, directly
or indirectly, chemical weapons to other States or non-State actors;

5. Underscores that
no party in Syria should use, develop, produce, acquire, stockpile,
retain, or transfer chemical weapons;

6. Decides that
the Syrian Arab Republic shall comply with all aspects of the
decision of the OPCW Executive Council of [XX September 2013] (Annex
I);

7. Decides that the
Syrian Arab Republic shall cooperate fully with the OPCW and the
United Nations, including by complying with their relevant
recommendations, by accepting personnel designated by the OPCW or the
United Nations, by providing for and ensuring the security of
activities undertaken by these personnel, by providing these
personnel with immediate and unfettered access to and the right to
inspect, in discharging their functions, any and all sites, and by
allowing immediate and unfettered access to individuals that
the OPCW has grounds to believe to be of importance for the purpose
of its mandate, and decides that all parties in Syria shall
cooperate fully in this regard;

8. Decides to
authorize an advance team of United Nations personnel to provide
early assistance to OPCW activities in Syria, requests the
Director-General of the OPCW and the Secretary-General to closely
cooperate in the implementation of the Executive Council decision of
[XX September 2013] and this resolution, including through their
operational activities on the ground, and further requests the
Secretary-General, in consultation with the Director-General of the
OPCW and, where appropriate, the Director-General of the World Health
Organization, to submit to the Council within 10 days of the adoption
of this resolution recommendations regarding the role of the United
Nations in eliminating the Syrian Arab Republic’s chemical weapons
program;

9. Notes that the
Syrian Arab Republic is a party to the Convention on the Privileges
and Immunities of the United Nations, decides that
OPCW-designated personnel undertaking activities provided for in this
resolution or the decision of the OPCW Executive Council of [XX
September 2013] shall enjoy the privileges and immunities contained
in the Verification Annex, Part II(B) of the Chemical Weapons
Convention, and calls on the Syrian Arab Republic to conclude
modalities agreements with the United Nations and the OPCW;

10. Encourages
Member States to provide support, including personnel, technical
expertise, information, equipment, and financial and other resources
and assistance, in coordination with the Director-General of the OPCW
and the Secretary-General, to enable the OPCW and the United Nations
to implement the elimination of the Syrian Arab Republic’s chemical
weapons program, and decides to authorize Member States to
acquire, control, transport, transfer and destroy chemical weapons
identified by the Director-General of the OPCW, consistent with the
objective of the Chemical Weapons Convention, to ensure the
elimination of the Syrian Arab Republic’s chemical weapons program
in the soonest and safest manner;

11. Urges all Syrian
parties and interested Member States with relevant capabilities to
work closely together and with the OPCW and the United Nations to
arrange for the security of the monitoring and destruction mission,
recognizing the primary responsibility of the Syrian government in
this regard;

12. Decides to
review on a regular basis the implementation in the Syrian Arab
Republic of the decision of the OPCW Executive Council [XX September
2013] and this resolution, and requests the Director-General
of the OPCW to report to the Security Council, through the
Secretary-General, who shall include relevant information on United
Nations activities related to the implementation of this resolution,
within 30 days and every month thereafter, and requests
further the Director-General of the OPCW and the Secretary-General to
report in a coordinated manner, as needed, to the Security
Council, non-compliance with this resolution or the OPCW Executive
Council decision of [XX September 2013];

13. Reaffirms its
readiness to consider promptly any reports of the OPCW under Article
VIII of the Chemical Weapons Convention, which provides for the
referral of cases of non-compliance to the United Nations Security
Council;

14. Decides that
Member States shall inform immediately the Security Council of any
violation of resolution 1540 (2004), including acquisition by
non-State actors of chemical weapons, their means of delivery and
related materials in order to take necessary measures therefore;

Accountability

15.
Expresses its strong conviction that those individuals
responsible for the use of chemical weapons in the Syrian Arab
Republic should be held accountable;

Political
transition

16.
Endorsesfully
the Geneva Communiqué of 30 June 2012 (Annex II), which sets out a
number of key steps beginning with the establishment of a
transitional governing body exercising full executive powers, which
could include members of the present Government and the opposition
and other groups and shall be formed on the basis of mutual consent;

17.
Calls
for
the convening, as soon as possible, of an international conference on
Syria to implement the Geneva Communiqué, and calls
uponall
Syrian parties to engage seriously and constructively at the Geneva
Conference on Syria, and underscoresthat
they should be fully representative of the Syrian people and
committed to the implementation of the Geneva Communiqué and to the
achievement of stability and reconciliation;

Non-Proliferation

18.
Reaffirms that all Member States shall refrain from providing
any form of support to non-State actors that attempt to develop,
acquire, manufacture, possess, transport, transfer or use nuclear,
chemical or biological weapons and their means of delivery, and calls
upon all Member States, in particular Member States neighbouring
the Syrian Arab Republic, to report any violations of this paragraph
to the Security Council immediately;

19.
Demands that non-State actors not develop, acquire,
manufacture, possess, transport, transfer, or use nuclear, chemical
or biological weapons and their means of delivery, and calls upon
all Member States, in particular Member States neighbouring the
Syrian Arab Republic, to report any actions inconsistent with this
paragraph to the Security Council immediately;

20.
Decides that all Member States shall prohibit the procurement
of chemical weapons, related equipment, goods and technology or
assistance from the Syrian Arab Republic by their nationals, or using
their flagged vessels or aircraft, whether or not originating in the
territory of the Syrian Arab Republic;

Compliance

21.
Decides,
in the event of non-compliance with this resolution, including
unauthorized transfer of chemical weapons, or any use of chemical
weapons by anyone in the Syrian Arab Republic, to impose measures
under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter;

Taking into account the decision of the Syrian Arab Republic to accede to the Chemical Weapons Convention and the commitment of the Syrian authorities to provisionally apply the Convention prior to its entry into force, the United States and the Russian Federation express their joint determination to ensure the destruction of the Syrian chemical weapons program (CW) in the soonest and safest manner.

For this purpose, the United States and the Russian Federation have committed to prepare and submit in the next few days to the Executive Council of the OPCW a draft decision setting down special procedures for expeditious destruction of the Syrian chemical weapons program and stringent verification thereof. The principles on which this decision should be based, in the view of both sides, are set forth in Annex A. The United States and the Russian Federation believe that these extraordinary procedures are necessitated by the prior use of these weapons in Syria and the volatility of the Syrian civil war.

The United States and the Russian Federation commit to work together towards prompt adoption of a UN Security Council resolution that reinforces the decision of the OPCW Executive Council. This resolution will also contain steps to ensure its verification and effective implementation and will request that the UN Secretary-General, in consultation with the OPCW, submit recommendations to the UN Security Council on an expedited basis regarding the UN’s role in eliminating the Syrian chemical weapons program.

The United States and the Russian Federation concur that this UN Security Council resolution should provide for review on a regular basis the implementation in Syria of the decision of the Executive Council of the OPCW, and in the event of non-compliance, including unauthorized transfer, or any use of chemical weapons by anyone in Syria, the UN Security Council should impose measures under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.

The proposed joint US-Russian OPCW draft decision supports the application of Article VIII of the Chemical Weapons Convention, which provides for the referral of any cases of non-compliance to the United Nations General Assembly and the United Nations Security Council.

In furtherance of the objective to eliminate the Syrian chemical weapons program, the United States and the Russian Federation have reached a shared assessment of the amount and type of chemical weapons involved, and are committed to the immediate international control over chemical weapons and their components in Syria. The United States and the Russian Federation expect Syria to submit, within a week, a comprehensive listing, including names, types, and quantities of its chemical weapons agents, types of munitions, and location and form of storage, production, and research and development facilities.

We further determined that the most effective control of these weapons may be achieved by removal of the largest amounts of weapons feasible, under OPCW supervision, and their destruction outside of Syria, if possible. We set ambitious goals for the removal and destruction of all categories of CW related materials and equipment with the objective of completing such removal and destruction in the first half of 2014. In addition to chemical weapons, stocks of chemical weapons agents, their precursors, specialized CW equipment, and CW munitions themselves, the elimination process must include the facilities for the development and production of these weapons. The views of both sides in this regard are set forth in Annex B.

The United States and the Russian Federation have further decided that to achieve accountability for their chemical weapons, the Syrians must provide the OPCW, the UN, and other supporting personnel with the immediate and unfettered right to inspect any and all sites in Syria. The extraordinary procedures to be proposed by the United States and the Russian Federation for adoption by the OPCW Executive Council and reinforced by a UN Security Council resolution, as described above, should include a mechanism to ensure this right.

Under this framework, personnel under both the OPCW and UN mandate should be dispatched as rapidly as possible to support control, removal, and destruction of Syria’s chemical weapons capabilities.

The United States and the Russian Federation believe that the work of the OPCW and the UN will benefit from participation of the experts of the P5 countries.

The United States and the Russian Federation strongly reiterate their position on Syria as reflected in the Final Communique of the G-8 Summit in Northern Ireland in June 2013, especially as regards chemical weapons.

The two sides intend to work closely together, and with the OPCW, the UN, all Syrian parties, and with other interested member states with relevant capabilities to arrange for the security of the monitoring and destruction mission, recognizing the primary responsibility of the Syrian Government in this regard.

The United States and the Russian Federation note that there are details in furtherance of the execution of this framework that need to be addressed on an expedited basis in the coming days and commit to complete these details, as soon as practicable, understanding that time is of the essence given the crisis in Syria.

Annex A

Principles for Decision Document by OPCW Executive Council

1. The decision should be based on para 8. Art. IV and para. 10 of Art V of the CWC.

2. The decision should address the extraordinary character of the situation with the Syrian chemical weapons.

3. The decision should take into account the deposit by Syria of the instrument of accession to the CWC.

4. The decision should provide for the easy accessibility for States Parties of the information submitted by Syria.

5. The decision should specify which initial information Syria shall submit to the OPCW Technical Secretariat in accordance with a tightly fixed schedule and also specifies an early date for submission of the formal CWC declaration.

6. The decision should oblige Syria to cooperate fully on all aspects of its implementation.

7. The decision should address a schedule for the rapid destruction of Syrian chemical weapons capabilities. This schedule should take into account the following target dates:

B. Destruction of production and mixing/filling equipment by November.

C. Complete elimination of all chemical weapons material and equipment in the first half of 2014.

The shortest possible final deadline, as well as intermediate deadlines, for the destruction of Syrian chemical weapons capabilities should be included into the schedule.

8. The decision should provide stringent special verification measures, beginning within a few days, including a mechanism to ensure the immediate and unfettered right to inspect any and all sites.

9. The decision should address the issue of duties of the OPCW Technical Secretariat in this situation and its need for supplementary resources to implement the decision, particularly technical and personnel resources, and call upon states with relevant capacities to contribute to this end.

10. The decision should refer to the provisions of the CWC obliging the Executive Council, in cases of non-compliance with the Convention, to bring the issues directly to the attention of the UN General Assembly and the UN Security Council.

Annex B

Joint Framework on Destruction of Syrian CW

The Russian Federation and the United States of America agree on the need to achieve rapid elimination of Syria’s chemical weapons, thus reducing the threat posed to the people of Syria. They are each prepared to devote high-level attention and resources to support the monitoring and destruction mission of the OPCW, both directly and in cooperation with the United Nations and other States concerned. They agree to set an ambitious goal of eliminating the threat in a rapid and effective manner.

Both parties agree that a clear picture of the state of Syrian chemical weapons could help advance a cooperative development of destruction options, including possible removal of chemical weapons outside of the Syrian territory. We agree on the importance of rapid destruction of the following categories:

1. Production equipment

2. Mixing and filling equipment

3. Filled and unfilled weapons and delivery systems

4. Chemical agents (unweaponized) and precursor chemicals. For these materials, they will pursue a hybrid approach, i.e., a combination of removal from Syria and destruction within Syria, depending upon site-specific conditions. They will also consider the possibility of consolidation and destruction in the coastal area of Syria.

5. Material and equipment related to the research and development of chemical weapons

The two parties agree to utilize the “universal matrix”, developed in the course of consultations by our two National Security Councils, as the basis for an actionable plan.

They agree that the elimination of chemical weapons in Syria should be considered an urgent matter to be implemented within the shortest possible time period.

The parties agree to set the following target dates:

A. Completion of initial OPCW on-site inspections by November.

B. Destruction of production and mixing/filling equipment by November.

C. Complete elimination of all chemical weapons material and equipment in the first half of 2014.

The Russian Federation and the United States will work together closely, including with the OPCW, the UN and Syrian parties to arrange for the security of the monitoring and destruction mission, noting the primary responsibility of the Syrian government in this regard.

PP1. Expressing its horror at the use of chemical weapons on 21 August 2013 in Rif Damascus and the large scale fatalities that resulted from it,

PP2. Expressing profound concern at the risk of further use of chemical weapons by the Syrian authorities, considering the significant stockpiles of chemical weapons detained by the Syrian authorities,

PP3. Affirming that the use of chemical weapons constitutes a serious violation of international law,

PP4.Affirming that the use of chemical weapons on this scale marks the gravest escalation in the disproportionate, indiscriminate and systematic use of weapons by the Syrian authorities against its own people, and can constitute a war crime and a crime against humanity,

PP5.Recalling that Syria is party to the 1925 Geneva Protocol which prohibits the use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gas, and of bacteriological methods of warfare,

PP6.Stressing that those responsible for attacks on civilians, and any attacks using chemical weapons, including attacks by forces under their control, must be held accountable,

PP7.Recalling resolution 1540 (1984) which affirms that proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, as well as their means of delivery, constitutes a threat to international peace and security,

PP8.Determining that the situation in Syria constitutes a threat to international peace and security,

Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

1. Condemns the use of chemical weapons by the Syrian authorities on 21 August 2013 against the civilian population of Rif Damascus in violation of its obligations under international law;

2. Demands that these authorities strictly and urgently observe their obligations under international law with respect to chemical and biological weapons, in particular resolution 1540 (2004) and the 1925 Geneva Protocol

3. Demands the immediate cessation of the use of chemical weapons by the Syrian authorities;

4. Demands that the Syrian authorities fully comply with the Mission mandated by UNSG to investigate a number of allegations of use of chemical weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic, and ensure the security of the Mission,

5. Demands Syria to reaffirm unconditionally its obligation under the Geneva Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases, and of bacteriological methods of warfare, signed at Geneva on 17 June 1925, and to access the Convention on the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and to ratify the Convention of the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological and toxin weapons and their destruction;

6. Decides that the Syrian authorities shall unconditionally destruct, remove or render harmless, under international supervision and take all necessary measures and appropriate means in that regard : (a) all chemical and biological weapons and all stocks of agents and all related subsystems and components and all research, development, support and manufacturing facilities and (b) all means capable of delivering chemical weapons and related major parts, and repair and production facilities;

7. Demands that the Syrian authorities submit to the Secretary-General, within fifteen days of the adoption of the present resolution, an exhaustive, complete and definitive declaration of the locations, amount and types of all items related to its chemical warfare program specified in paragraph 6;

8. Decides that the Mission to investigate allegations of the use of chemical weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic, in close coordination with the Organisation for the prohibition of Chemical Weapons, will carry out immediate on-site inspections of Syria's chemical, biological and related vehicles, based on Syria's declaration and the designation of any additional locations by the Mission itself;

9. Decides that Syria shall allow immediate, unconditional and unrestricted access to any and all areas, facilities, equipment, records and means of transport which the Mission wishes to inspect in accordance with the mandate given by the present resolution, as well as to all officials and other persons linked to the Syrian chemical and biological weapons program including their means of delivery, and stresses the importance of ensuring that the Mission have all necessary resources and authority for the fulfillment of its work in Syria;

10. Demands the Syrian authorities to take all necessary steps and appropriate measures to ensure the proper custody of all chemical weapons, precursors and agents, and vehicles as mentioned in paragraph 6 pending their destruction, removal or rendering harmless, and to prevent their proliferation and dissemination;

11. Requests the Head of the Mission, in close coordination with the Director General of the OPCW to communicate to the Security Council, within [10 days] after the submission by the Syrian authorities referred to in OP6, his first report on the application of the mandate given by the present resolution including the cooperation extended by the Syrian authorities, and to provide additional reports on a monthly basis;

12. Decides that direct or indirect supply, sale or transfer to and from the Syrian Arab Republic, of chemical or biological weapons and related precursors, agent and materiel of all types, including technical assistance, training, financial or other assistance shall immediately be prohibited, and, in this context;

12. Calls upon all Member States to inspect, in accordance with their national authorities and legislation and consistent with international law, in particular the law of the sea and relevant international civil aviation agreements, all cargo to and from Syria, in their territory, including seaports and airports, if the State concerned has information that provides reasonable grounds to believe the cargo contains items the supply, sale, transfer, or export of which is prohibited by paragraphs 5 of this resolution;

13. Decides to establish, in accordance with rule 28 of its provisional rules of procedure, a Committee of the Security Council consisting of all the members of the Council, to undertake the following tasks: (a) to seek from all States, in particular those in the region and those producing the items, materials, equipment, goods and technology referred to in paragraph 5, and from the secretariat of the OPCW information regarding the actions taken by them to implement effectively the measures imposed by this resolution and whatever further information it may consider useful in this regard; (b) to examine and take appropriate action following information regarding alleged violations of measures imposed this resolution; (c) to consider and decide upon requests for exemptions; (d) to determine as may be necessary additional items, materials, equipment, goods and technology to be specified for the purpose of paragraph 5 above; (e) to designate as may be necessary individuals and entities subject to the measures imposed by paragraph 12 above; (f) to promulgate guidelines as may be necessary to facilitate the implementation of the measures imposed by this resolution and include in such guidelines a requirement on States to provide information where possible as to why any individuals and/or entities meet the criteria set out in paragraph 12 and any relevant identifying information; (g) to report at least every 90 days to the Security Council on its work and on the implementation of this resolution, with its observations and recommendations, in particular on ways to strengthen the effectiveness of the measures imposed by this resolution;

14. Decides to establish immediate travel ban and asset freeze against individuals responsible for any violations of this resolution as designated by the Committee of the Security Council,

15. Decides to refer the situation in Syria since March 2011 to the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court,

16. Decides that all Member States shall cooperate fully with and provide any necessary assistance to the Court and the Prosecutor pursuant to this resolution and urges concerned regional and other international organisations, including the International Independent Commission of Inquiry, to cooperate fully with the Court and the Prosecutor;

17.Affirms that it shall keep the Syrian authorities' actions under continuous review, and stresses its intention, in the event of non-compliance by the Syrian authorities with the provisions of this resolution in light of the reports requested in OP10, to adopt further necessary measures under Chapter VII;