This Post provides a first half of a Guide to “gun control” as
an issue in current American politics. The problem is complex, so
the Guide is long! So long, in fact, that only the first half
appears this week, providing key Background and current Commentary.
The second half follows next week, covering the most recent
developments and introducing some academic Analysis.

The first third of this Post summarizes Key Points about
American gun politics, the second third provides more Background.
The last third summarizes initial reaction to the shootings in
Newtown, Connecticut whose victims included many school-children.
The end of the Post notes some recommended Readings. Please read
only as far as interests you!

Some of this Guide was written in December soon after the
Newtown shootings. The rest was written this week (130112-130119),
after vice-president Biden presented recommendations for further
gun reform and president Obama formally endorsed them.

KEY POINTS 1

Some basics of American gun politics are as follows. (The
section on Background provides more detail and some
references.)

Politics 1.1

In American politics, regulation of guns has become extremely
controversial, particularly since the beginning of “culture wars”
in the 1970s. What could be a merely practical issue has become, to
vocal advocates, a highly ideological issue.

By now, extreme advocates of gun rights deny the legitimacy of
any regulation wile extreme advocates of gun regulation deny the
legitimacy of private ownership of guns. Nevertheless, the USA has
a long history of BOTH gun rights AND gun regulation.

Gun owners are mostly responsible ruralites who own guns legally
and use them lawfully for hunting, target-shooting, and self
protection. A few extremists consider guns necessary to defend
themselves against government “tyranny.”

Gun critics are mostly urbanites who suffer from chronic
inner-city criminal violence. Or they are suburbanites who suffer
from periodic “rampages” (killing sprees by disaffected
individuals, often youths).

Advocates of gun RIGHTS are numerous and intensely committed,
well organized and well financed. Advocates of gun “CONTROL” are
even more numerous, but less committed, poorly organized, and
little financed.

As a result, gun advocates have long dominated both electoral
and policy politics. They have defeated control advocates and
defeated most control proposals – indeed, kept such proposals
largely off the American political agenda.

Gun advocates have also crippled any regulations that have
actually been adopted, by denying the relevant agencies legal
authority and necessary information, adequate budgets and
personnel, even agency leadership and academic research.

Policy 1.2

The USA now has about as many guns as people (over 300 million).
About 40% of households (mostly rural) legally own and use at least
one gun (often two or more), for recreation or personal protection.
About 60% of households (mostly urban) have no gun.

New policy must start from existing reality. Confiscating
existing guns from nearly half the population is not feasible
either politically (gun ownership is a constitutional right) or
technically (many gun transactions occur beyond the reach of
government).

Unfortunately, extreme gun advocates regard virtually any
government measures on guns as a preliminary to confiscation. The
Gun Lobby has even obtained legislation making it illegal for the
government to keep serious records on guns or to fund research on
guns.

The existing“gun control” policy paradigm addresses violence by
focusing on guns. It attempts to identify “bad” people who should
not be allowed to own guns and “bad” guns that ordinary people
should not own. This paradigm has proved largely symbolic and
ineffective.

Current proposals for more “gun control” mostly remain within
the existing paradigm, trying to fix some of its obvious
inadequacies. That is worth doing and should help reduce inner-city
gun violence by criminals and gangs. However, it will little affect
suburban rampages.

The most effective fixes WITHIN the existing paradigm improve
information for identifying criminals, something the Gun Lobby
accepts. Limiting the firing capacity of guns – something the Gun
Lobby opposes – may have little effect anyway.

Measures OUTSIDE the existing paradigm would improve school
security (which could work) and deny the mentally ill access to
guns (which probably won’t work, since one can’t predict who might
commit gun crimes). The Gun Lobby prefers these options to focus on
guns.

Problem 1.3

This policy domain requires asking: Exactly what is the problem
to which “gun control” is supposed to be the solution? Evidently to
reduce violence that harms people, particularly violence that
involves guns. Where does that problem lie and how can it be
addressed?

Qualitatively, suburban RAMPAGES in which a deranged young
person kills many people are dramatic and affecting. Nevertheless,
such events are relatively rare, highly idiosyncratic, and
virtually impossible to predict and prevent.

Quantitatively, America’s main problem of fatal violence
involving guns is PERSONAL – mostly suicides by individuals, also
homicides between family or friends. Accidental death from personal
firearms is rare. Policy can do little about any of this.

The main real problem that policy could address is inner-city
violence involving guns. Here the costs are both individual (death,
injury, incarceration) and social (neighborhoods ruined by
insecurity and crime and by falling economic activity and property
values).

Approaches to these problems can be either technological or
social. The “public health” paradigm focuses on guns and their
technology. The “public safety” paradigm focuses on criminals and
their communities.

Public Health regards guns as a “vector” (like mosquitoes) that
transmit violence (like malaria). The cure is prevention: reduce
guns. In principle, such a “technological fix” is easier than
trying to reform human behavior. In practice, reducing guns has
proved difficult.

Public Safety focuses on the few people (such as urban gangs)
who commit most gun violence. This approach engages with these
people, warning them of enforcement but also offering help to
reduce violence. It has proven remarkably effective at reducing
urban gun violence.

(On this last point see Matthew D. Makarios and Travis C. Pratt
2012 “The effectiveness of policies and programs that attempt to
reduce firearm violence: A meta-analysis” Crime &
Delinquency 58,2 (March) 222-244. What is most effective is
enforcing laws, particularly through “probation strategies” of
increased contact of police, probation officers, and social workers
with potential violators. Next most effective are policing
strategies and community programs.)

BACKGROUND 2

In the course of American political history, the issue of how
much to regulate guns has gradually become more controversial,
particularly during the intensification of “culture war” since the
1970s. The battle has ebbed and flowed as extreme claims from one
side have provoked reaction from the other, particularly when the
two sides were of different races. Politicians’ use of extreme
claims to mobilize partisan “bases” has made it increasingly
difficult to compromise on practical policies.

Extreme gun critics have argued that the American Constitution
(Second Amendment) precludes ANY purely private ownership of guns.
Extreme gun defenders have argued that the same Amendment precludes
ANY regulation of guns. In fact America has always had BOTH gun
rights and gun control, the need for both was written into both
national and state constitutions, and the national Supreme Court
still affirms both. (Adam Winkler 2011Gunfight: The battle over
the right to bear arms in America. New York NY: Norton, 361
pages. For a briefing, see Jill Lepore 120419 “The lost amendment”
at newyorker.com.)

The Second Amendment says – with what reads today as
tantalizing ambiguity – “A well regulated militia being necessary
to the security of a free state, the right of the people to keep
and bear arms shall not be infringed.” Since the late 1800s,
interpretation has polarized between collective and individual
rights. During the 1900s, the mainstream favored the collective
interpretation. In 2008 the Supreme Court declared for the first
time that the Second Amendment endorses the right of individuals to
own guns, though noting that legislatures could certainly regulate
exactly how that right can be exercised.

This Post cannot survey the numerous contending interpretations
of the Second Amendment. Nevertheless, an instructive recent book
argues that the Founders viewed gun ownership as a combination of
civic right and civic obligation, a classically republican view
long since abandoned by both modern liberalism and modern
conservatism. Current debates need not return to the original
“republican” position, but should articulate SOME constitutional
basis for some reasonable policy. (Saul Cornell 2006A well
regulated militia: The Founding Fathers and the origins of gun
control in America. New York: Oxford University Press, 270
pages.)

Lax national regulation 2.1

In the 1930s, after the Prohibition of alcohol induced dramatic
black market violence, a Democratic administration adopted some
regulation of “gangster weapons” such as fully automatic “machine
guns.” In 1968, after the political assassinations and urban race
riots of the 1960s, a Democratic administration marginally
strengthened the limited 1930s measures. Elites were horrified by
elite murders and alarmed at mass urban unrest. At the mass level,
the assertion by some urban blacks of their gun rights provoked
some rural whites to intensify their own counter-assertion of gun
rights. In 1986, a Republican administration weakened gun control
by limiting government record-keeping and loosening regulation of
sales at “gun shows.”

In 1993, in a delayed response to gun incidents during the
1980s, a Democratic administration strengthened gun control by
requiring BACKGROUND CHECKS on gun purchasers and, in 1994, banning
individual purchase of ASSAULT WEAPONS (that rapidly fire large
clips of ammunition). In the late 1990s, attempts by the national
government to enforce these additional restrictions may have
provoked still further intensification of rural white assertion of
gun rights. Then and since, advocates of gun rights have mobilized
at the STATE AND LOCAL level to loosen existing state restrictions
on gun use, for example on the right to carry weapons in public
places. Previous American law had allowed virtually any law-abiding
citizen to purchase a gun, but allowed only few people to carry
one! (On subnational variation, see Brian Resnick 121218 “How to
make sense of America's wildly different, confusing patchwork of
gun control laws” at nationaljournal.com/domesticpolicy.)

The pattern since around 2000 has been a cycle of youth
rampages, followed by temporary public indignation, followed by
persisting inaction by the NATIONAL LEGISLATURE. In these cycles, a
main actor has been the NATIONAL RIFLE ASSOCIATION (NRA), the main
lobbying group protecting and advancing gun rights. In the view of
many, the NRA is the single most influential lobbying group in the
country on ANY issue, with a devastating ability to defeat
politicians who dare to disagree with it. That is what in 2004
induced a Republican administration to allow the 1994 ban on
assault weapons to expire.

Similarly, in recent decades, as appointments by Republican
presidents have tilted the national Supreme Court to the right, the
NATIONAL JUDICIARY has increasingly affirmed the rights of
individuals to own guns that are appropriate for legitimate uses,
particularly self defense. However, unlike the NRA, the Court still
considers it permissible to regulate the ownership and use of guns,
particularly very destructive guns not appropriate for legitimate
uses.

Broad gun distribution 2.2

The USA has about 300 million guns – 80% of them purchased since
1974 and likely to remain usable for many decades. This is almost
as many guns as America has people, and many more guns per person
than other industrialized democracies. The rate of deaths from guns
is also much higher. In recent decades, a series of RANDOM RAMPAGES
by disaffected youth has afflicted schools and other public venues,
facilitated by the broad distribution of guns. (Katherine S. Newman
2004. Rampage: The social roots of school shootings. New
York NY: Basic Books, 399 pages.)

However, most gun deaths in America come not from occasional
rampages but from the CONSTANT CARNAGE of day-to-day gun violence
between individuals, again facilitated by the broad distribution of
guns. Opponents of gun control argue that it is now too late to do
anything about the broad distribution of guns, which will remain
available to wrongdoers regardless of future restrictions. So any
new legislation should target wrongdoers, not guns. Proponents of
gun control argue for starting to limit the broad distribution of
guns and ammunition, particularly the most dangerous kinds. (For a
briefing, see Ezra Klein 121215 “Twelve facts about guns and mass
shootings in the United States.” Also Brad Plumer 121214 “Why are
mass shootings becoming more common?” and Brad Plumer 121217 “Graph
of the day: Perhaps mass shootings aren’t becoming more common.”
All of these are on the Wonkblog at washingtonpost.com.)

About 35% of American households have a gun (in December 2012,
50% of ruralites but only 26% of urbanites, 49% of Republicans but
only 25% of Democrats.) These rural owners are not barbarous
country bumpkins, but mostly respectable law-abiding middle-class
citizens who are among the persons least likely to commit gun
crimes. Nevertheless, America is distinctive not only for its high
number of guns, but also for the high esteem in which many
Americans hold guns – for some, a veritable cult. Originally in
America guns were for frontier self-protection and rural hunting,
then ostensibly for self-protection even in settled society.
Recently guns have increasingly figured also either as just “toys”
for affluent collectors or as emblems of dissident identities.

In the late twentieth century an increasing reason for
passionate support for extreme gun rights became commitment of some
groups to extreme individualism and even – in the case of
right-wing militias – insurrectionism. These groups now see as much
need to defend American “freedom” against the current national
government as there was need to fight the British for independence!
However, the Revolutionary ideals these groups invoke are the most
radical ones, of the backwoodsmen who, as they left the Appalachian
mountains to settle the American interior, spread their
insurrectionary culture to the South, lower Midwest, and Mountain
West.

(For the argument that gun rights “insurrectionism” is
incompatible with democracy, see Joshua Horwitz and Casey Anderson
2009Guns, democracy and the insurrectionist idea. Ann
Arbor MI: University of Michigan Press, 274 pages.)

Divided public opinion 2.3

As regards public opinion, as late as the 1990s large majorities
supported gun control (by percentages in the high 50s to mid 60s).
By the 2000s, that had declined to a smaller majority (mid-to-high
50s, temporarily rising to at most 60% after major gun incidents).
Immediately after Obama’s election in both 2008 and 2012, gun
lovers rushed to buy guns, fearing that Obama would restrict them
(and in some cases perhaps fearing Obama himself).

Since 2009, Americans have been fairly evenly split, at most 49%
saying that it was more important to regulate guns than to protect
gun rights, often only slightly less saying the reverse. After the
Newtown incident, support for gun control increased only slightly,
from 47% to 49%. These contrasting public attitudes toward gun
control are not symmetrical, in the sense that support is broad but
shallow while opposition is focused and intense. Most supporters of
control actually know little about the topic and, because they do
not own guns, would not be much affected by control. In contrast,
gun owners have always believed strongly that it is important to
protect gun rights (in December 2012, 65%). Even after Newtown,
they continue to believe strongly that owning a gun improves
personal safety (68%). (Pew Research Center 110113 and 121220)

It is worth noting the demographics of these opinions. (Single
figures are for January 2011; “slashed” double figures are for
both January 2011 and December 2012 after Newtown.) Within the
TOTAL population, support for gun CONTROL was only 45% among
registered voters, 42%/42% among whites, 40%/41% among men, and
26%/27% among registered Republicans. Thus within these categories,
support for gun control increased at most only slightly after
Newtown.

Between some regions, however, support diverged more sharply. In
January 2011, support for control was 60% and 50% on the East and
West coasts, only 48% and 44% in the Midwest and South. In a
slightly different breakdown after Newtown, support for control was
65% in the Northeast, but only 48% in the West, 45% in the Midwest,
and 44 % in the South. (Among WHITES, in January 2011, support for
gun RIGHTS was 78% among Tea Party adherents, 67% among men, and
63% in rural areas. Regionally, white support for rights was 40%
and 55% on the East and West coasts, 56% and 60% in the Midwest and
South.)

The first third of this section reports some expert commentary
immediately after the Newtown shootings in December. The middle
third then follows president Obama’s initial reactions to that
incident in December. The last third notes his eventual reaction,
the appointment of vice president Biden to review policy options
and report them to the president in mid-January.

Expert commentary 3.1

Early on the Saturday morning after the Newtown shootings I
happened to hear some astute commentary on the BBC World Service
(the 121215 broadcast of Weekend, the first story in both the 0700
GMT and 0800GMT hours). Academic expert on gun politics Robert
Spitzer explained that, even after the Newtown incident, if there
is any room for controlling guns, it will be very small, because of
the dominance that the Gun Lobby has achieved in this policy
domain. It MIGHT be possible to further restrict the access to guns
of mentally ill people and to restrict the purchase of guns and
ammunition over the internet without any checks on the background
on the purchaser. But even this will be difficult, because the Gun
Lobby has a “lock” on the Republican party, which can block reform
in the House. Another American commentator then noted that the Gun
Lobby has a “lock”on many Democrats as well: the relatively
conservative ones that, in the last several elections, the party
promoted in relatively conservative constituencies in order to take
seats from Republicans. (That second commentator was American
journalist Catherine Mayer, who currently runs the European
operations of Time magazine.)

Spitzer continued: Not only has the Gun Lobby intimidated most
politicians into being afraid to raise the possibility of
controlling guns, it also has succeeded in defining the terms of
discourse on the issue, turning attention away from “gun wrongs”
(the harm that guns do to people) to “gun rights” (guaranteed by
the Second Amendment to the American Constitution). The Gun Lobby
has succeeded in denying that gun rights CAUSE gun wrongs and
largely succeeded in denying to others the possibility of pointing
out that causal connection. The gun lobby has even succeeded in
making it “politically incorrect,” in the aftermath of a gun
tragedy, to raise the issue of what to do about gun violence: To do
so would display lack respect and sympathy for the victims!

All of this might seem excessively pessimistic except that, in
its initial reactions to the Newtown incident, the Obama
administration stuck almost exactly to that script! Immediately
after the tragedy, Obama mostly expressed only sympathy. Departing
SLIGHTLY from his response to previous incidents, he DID state
briefly that “As a country, we have been through this too many
times. .... And we're going to have to come together and take
meaningful action to prevent more tragedies like this, regardless
of the politics.” But he didn’t say WHAT action. And his
spokesperson soon added that “now was not the time” to consider
that!

As Obama himself noted in his initial reaction to the Newport
shootings, this is already the fourth time during his first term
that he has had to respond to a local gun tragedy. As most
commentators have noted, the first three times, he was extremely
effective at expressing the nation’s grief, but he said nothing
about what should be done to prevent future incidents, except to
call for a “national conversation,” which did not occur. In
particular, previously he had said nothing about gun control,
presumably out of political prudence. That reticence MAY have
contributed to his reelection. Nevertheless, now that he has
already been reelected, many observers think he should do something
about guns. Reportedly Obama himself already planned to introduce
some gun legislation during his second term, for example attempting
to restore the ban on assault weapons.

Obama’s reactions 3.2

The evolution of Obama’s comments was an important part of the
reaction of American politics to the Newtown incident. He started
by expressing sympathy for the victims (not mentioning guns),
followed by an impassioned call for action (still not saying what),
followed by the announcement of a task force to design an
appropriate policy response (including further regulation of
guns).

In his initial reaction to the Newtown shootings, Obama was
again extremely effective at expressing the nation’s horror,
weeping openly at the brutal death of twenty elementary
schoolchildren. “I react not as a President” he said “ but as
anybody else would -- as a parent.”

This approach disappointed some who DID want him to react as
president, indicating what he proposed to do about this
longstanding problem. Nevertheless, Obama’s empathetic reaction
played a major policy role. A key weakness of elite advocacy of gun
control has been a failure to “frame” the issue in terms that mass
publics find compelling. Control advocates eventually recognized
that failure and began “framing” the issue as one of parents’
concern for the safety of their children, something to which
ordinary Americans can readily relate. Intentionally or otherwise,
Obama did that very effectively.

Within a few days, at a memorial service in Connecticut for the
victims, Obama’s grief turned into resolve to act. Thus Obama’s
second major comment on this incident came on Sunday evening in a
brief speech in Newtown at the end of a memorial service for the
victims. Obama said that he had “been reflecting on this the last
few days” and concluded that “we will have to change.” This time he
dwelt much longer on America’s failure to prevent such incidents
and pledged that “In the coming weeks, I will use whatever power
this office holds to engage my fellow citizens ... in an effort
aimed at preventing more tragedies like this.” This implicitly
noted that he might have to act largely on his own, because the
legislature might not be able to do much. He may also have been
noting that the powers of presidents are actually quite limited –
it has been said, to the “power of persuasion,” of which this
speech by Obama was a masterly exercise.

Nevertheless, Obama STILL did not explicitly mention guns, or
America’s lax control of them. Or how to strengthen control through
legislation. Evidently the very word “gun” still remained too
controversial to utter! Moreover, Obama specified the “fellow
citizens” to whom he referred as ranging “from law enforcement to
mental health professionals to parents and educators” – but NOT to
the congress that could produce new legislation on guns! Most
commentators assumed that implicitly Obama WAS referring to gun
legislation. Evidently he was trying to “lead from behind”:
creating blanks to encourage others to fill them in, and waiting
for OTHERS to do that, so that any association of HIM with their
formulations would not jeopardize those formulations.

Thus in December Obama’s substantive reactions to the Newtown
incident were extremely studied, carefully reflecting his
assessment of the prospects for gun control and the best way to go
about it. Evidently that assessment was informed by his experience
throughout his first term: Basically it is congress not the
president who must formulate and pass legislation. With Republicans
always poised to mobilize against him, Obama has to be careful
about the extent to which he endorses any particular course of
action.

(See Reid Wilson 121214 “Stopping gun violence starts with
Obama” at nationaljournal.com. On initial reaction from congress
see Fawn Johnson 121214 “Much grief, but little action from
congress on guns” at nationaljournal.com. And Jonathan Allen 121216
“After Connecticut school shooting, Washington quiet on gun
control” at politico.com. Also Chris Cillizza 121216 “The gun
debate: Are the Newtown, Conn., killings a tipping point?” at
washingtonpost.com. The multi-billionaire mayor of New York – who
in 2012 launched a super PAC to support candidates who advocate gun
control and will do the same in 2014 – immediately called on
Obama to lead on this issue: Sean Sullivan 121216 “Bloomberg: Gun
control should be Obama’s ‘number one agenda’” at
washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-fix. For a political science take on
media coverage, see Danny Hayes “The media will quickly forget
about guns — unless Washington stops them” on Wonblog at
washingtonpost.com.)

(For initial comments on what Obama can do about guns, see Reid
J. Epstein and Josh Gerstein 121218 “President Obama's options on
gun control”at politico.com. Further on possible new gun control
measures, see 121217 “What gun control could look like” at npr.org
and Sarah Kliff 121215 “What would ‘meaningful action’ on gun
control look like?” on Wonkblog at washingtonpost.com. Specifically
on the most lethal weapon used at Newtown, see 121220
“Assault-style weapons in the civilian market” at npr.org. Also
Brad Plumer 121217 “Everything you need to know about the assault
weapons ban, in one post” on Wonkblog at washingtonpost.com.)

The NRA’s response 3.3

The NRA’s initial response to the Newtown shootings was silence.
Ostensibly this was to respect the victims but presumably it also
reflected the challenge that Newtown potentially posed to NRA
opposition to regulation of guns. Since then, the NRA response has
been extremely forceful and has contained many true points, such as
that virtually no government gun policy can prevent random rampages
like Newton. Nevertheless, the NRA’s response has also been
remarkably shrill and increasingly offensive – certainly not
calculated to win the support of any “moderates” remaining between
gun advocates and gun critics. (Anna Palmer 121219 “NRA shifts to
crisis mode” at politico.com.)

The NRA’s eventual response has been absolutely uncompromising.
Sympathy for the victims of Newtown required directing attention,
not to guns, but to criminals. “The only thing that stops a bad guy
with a gun is a good guy with a gun,” announced Wayne LaPierre, the
NRA vice president. The NRA’s position was both self-righteous and
aggressive. Self-righteous because it asserted an absolute right,
under the Second Amendment, to promote Americans’ ownership of any
and all kinds and amounts of guns and ammunition. Having thus
helped flood the country with dangerous arms, the NRA asserted
indignantly that the government had failed in its responsibility to
protect citizens from them! The solution was to station armed
guards in all schools. Still more guns! (Eric Lichtblau and Motoko
Rich 121221 “N.R.A. Envisions ‘a good guy with a gun’ in every
school” at nytimes.com. Again later, Rachel Weiner 130116 “NRA:
‘Attacking firearms and ignoring children is not a solution’” on
Post Politics at washingtonpost.com.)

By the middle of January the NRA had advanced to an all-out
personal attack on president Obama. An NRA ad accused him of
hypocrisy for sending his own daughters to school under armed guard
while saying that he was “skeptical” about posting armed guards to
schools. Never mind that a president’s children need special
protection! Never mind that, actually, Obama included more police
protection for schools in his eventual proposals! Even moderate
commentators found this NRA ad appalling. (Justin Sink 130116
“Obama initiates fight with NRA” at thehill.com. Also Ron Fournier
130116 “Has the NRA finally gone too far?” at nationaljournal.com.
Also Mike Lillis 130119 “NRA stumbles in fight with Obama over
gun-control proposals” at thehill.com.)

Regardless, the NRA remains a formidable opponent, not least
because of the influence it has established within congress through
campaign contributions. Meanwhile, in most states, the NRA
continues to succeed at WEAKENING existing regulation of guns! (See
Charlie Cook 121217 “Why the NRA is still so strong even after
Newtown shootings” at nationaljournal.com. Also Chris Cillizza
130116 “The NRA’s influence — in 6 charts” on The Fix at
washingtonpost.com. Also the detailed Peter Wallsten and Tom
Hamburger 130116 “NRA’s lobbying bags big legislative wins in
states over the past two decades” at washingtonpost.com.)

READINGS

A standard introduction to American gun politics – clearly
pro-control – is Robert Spitzer 2012 The politics of gun
control, 5th ed. Boulder CO: Paradigm Publishers,
247 pages. Currently the most important advance in the political
science of gun violence is Kristin A. Goss 2006. Disarmed :
the missing movement for gun control in America. Princeton NJ:
Princeton University Press, 282 pages. An alternative textbook is
Harry L. Wilson 2007 Guns, gun control, and elections: The
politics and policy of firearms. Lanham MD: Rowman &
Littlefield, 275 pages (moderately pro-gun). An older but still
useful briefing is John M. Bruce and Clyde Wilcox eds. 1998
The changing politics of gun control. New York NY: Rowman
& Littlefield, 270 pages.

The most important recent book on realistic alternatives for gun
policy is James B. Jacobs 2002 Can gun control work? New
York NY: Oxford University Press, 287 pages. (His answer is, not
really.) An important earlier skeptical analysis of “gun control” –
by an enforcement officer turned political scientist – is William
J. Vizzard 2000 Shots in the dark: The policy, politics, and
symbolism of gun control. Landham MD: Rowman &
Littlefield, 257 pages. A follow-up to the 2002 Jacob volume is
Timothy D. Lytton ed. 2005Suing the gun industry: A battle at
the crossroads of gun control and mass torts. Ann Arbor MI:
University of Michigan Press, 418 pages. It asks to what extent
private litigation can substitute for hard-to-achieve public
legislation. An impressive collection of articles diverse articles
is Bernard E. Harcourt ed. 2003 Guns, crime, and punishment in
America. New York NY: New York University Press, 436
pages.

总访问量：博主简介

韦爱德Edwin A. Winckler (韦爱德) is an American political scientist (Harvard BA, MA, and PhD) who has taught mostly in the sociology departments at Columbia and Harvard. He has been researching China for a half century, publishing books about Taiwan’s political economy (Sharpe, 1988), China’s post-Mao reforms (Rienner, 1999), and China’s population policy (Stanford, 2005, with Susan Greenhalgh). Recently he has begun also explaining American politics to Chinese. So the purpose of this Blog is to call attention to the best American media commentary on current American politics and to relate that to the best recent American academic scholarship on American politics. Winckler’s long-term institutional base remains the Weatherhead East Asian Institute at Columbia University in New York City. However he and his research have now retreated to picturesque rural Central New York.