The military support to the Kurds must contain all of the defensive aspects that a sufficient and modern defensive power needs. However, the collapse of the Kurdish forces in the Shengal area was not only due to ineffective defensive weapons, it was also due to corruption inside their forces, which were untrained, militia market forces. Consequently, the Western allies must have demands and requests for the formation of a non-militia Kurdish Army, and the support must include military experts and expertise that can help the Kurds build a modern army because the Kurds have never had a proper army.

A sufficient defensive power is a neglected Kurdish right

The rebuilding of the Iraqi state was a difficult and complicated process, and the transitional steps were without reliable solutions for the underlying negative factors that caused the conflict and war before. The key problems were marginalized and there were several inadequate solutions of these issues. One of the mistakes was the unsatisfactory solution of the internal security dilemma and the protection of the Kurdish minority from further atrocities and crimes that could be committed by the central authority or by other external actors in the region.

According to history, there has been a long internal conflict between the Arab authority of Baghdad and the Kurds in the last century before the fall of the dictator’s regime of Baath in 2003. Since the birth of Iraq, every single Iraqi government has faced the Kurdish problem but has failed to find a reliable solution. They have denied the Kurdish people their rights and have oppressed the Kurds. In the end, the Baath regime destroyed parts of the Kurds and committed the crime of genocide against them.

Therefore, a definite defensive project capable of preventing further atrocities against the Kurds in the new post-Saddam period was necessary and essential. It was a naive instrumentalist idea that believed a power-sharing policy and the Kurdish participation in the Iraqi Army could solve the internal security dilemma[i]. Leaving the Kurds without a specific strategy to strengthen the Kurdish defense was not only the fault of America and its allies, it was also the fault of the Kurdish leaders, who had primitive security demands and accepted the constitutional agreement, as they naively believed the threats were over.

The Iraqi internal conflict shows that the past and the new ethnic conflicts have a critical impact on the political actors’ behaviors. The political leaders of the different communities are using historical and present injustices to their advantage. Furthermore, the main ethnic communities focus on their own self-interests and seek to maximize their power at the expense of others. As the realists argue, there is a self-help system wherein the groups seek to strengthen their power, security, and autonomy[ii].

The optimistic liberalists suppose that the actors do what is most appreciated or in the common interest[iii]. On the contrary, the Iraqi case shows the opposite[iv]. This optimistic view can only work where the communities have shared aspirations and are voluntary participating in the common community. This way of thinking has failed in Iraq because the voluntary participation of the common community is missing. When the free and voluntary desire does not exist or when the participation is based on temporary political games, the positive intersubjective interaction and communication does not work. No doubt, that the intervention and removal of the dictator Saddam Hussein was a rescue for the Kurds and the majority of the Iraqi people. Nonetheless the state-building process in 2003 was a project imposed by an outside power; therefore, the risks for a stalemate and conflict were always high.

According to paragraph A in Article 9 of the new Iraqi constitution[v], the Iraqi Army is composed of components of the Iraqi people without discrimination and exclusion. The army shall defend Iraq and shall not be used against the Iraqi people. Moreover, according to Article 117, point 5[vi], the regional government is responsible for the establishment and organization of the internal security for the region including police, security, and guards.

According to this agreement, the Kurds are part of the Iraqi Army, and they can have their own security forces. There is not any agreement that assures an establishment of a Kurdish defensive army capable of preventing outside military threats. The Kurds do not have the right to have advanced military weapons and build a modern army. The agreement should have focused on a sufficient defensive power of the Kurdish territory equal to the Iraqi defense capacity. The Kurds should have advanced military support and equipment based on a defensive aim. They were and still are victims of external military assaults from the neighboring states of Iran and Turkey. They were victims of genocide, and the establishment of a relevant self-defense power would be the only rational reaction to prevent further atrocities against them.

The Iraqi government had always been against an advanced Kurdish Army and did not give them the necessary weapons. The Kurdish regional government primitively tried to strengthen their defensive forces in spite of the Iraqi government’s protests and dissatisfaction. Neither the central government nor the Kurds have trusted each other. The Kurdish participation in the Iraqi Army has been insufficient, and there has been marginalization and discrimination toward the Kurds, especially in the disputed areas. The majority of the Kurds have never looked at the army as their own force and never trusted in the new Iraqi Army, as it was on the verge of an attack against the Kurds in 2011 due to internal disputes over oil ownership. There have been accusations on both sides. The Iraqi president, Nuri al-Malki, accused the Kurds of buying weapons without the central government’s permission. The Kurds have accused President Nuri al-Malki of building his own army and accused the Iraqi authorities of Arabization policies in the army by removing the Kurdish officers and replacing them with Arabs. The Kurds have been worried about the equipment of the Iraqi Army and the new advanced weapons the Iraqi Army has bought. Thus, the ethnic groups have shown the typical symptoms of an internal security dilemma.

The Jihadists of the Islamic State (IS) is a serious threat to regional and international security, and the world can no longer look at their crimes passively. Nevertheless, the military support to the Kurds after the genocidal attacks from IS against the Kurdish Ezidis and other minorities is somehow the correction of the mistake made during the rebuilding of Iraq after 2003. The cost of this mistake was high as parts of the Kurdish community had been on the verge of genocide. The IS attack showed how vulnerable the Kurdish forces are. In fact, the Kurdish forces own weapons and military vehicles obviously fall short of the required demands of an ordinary army.

The military support to the Kurds must contain all of the defensive aspects that a sufficient and modern defensive power needs. However, the collapse of the Kurdish forces in the Shengal area was not only due to ineffective defensive weapons, it was also due to corruption inside their forces, which were untrained, militia market forces. Consequently, the Western allies must have demands and requests for the formation of a non-militia Kurdish Army, and the support must include military experts and expertise that can help the Kurds build a modern army because the Kurds have never had a proper army. They have forces belonging to the two main political parties of Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and The Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), and the forces are loyal to the interests of the political parties.

The Kurds must have the capacity to prevent attacks from an organized military army, and the Kurdish Army must not be weaker than the Iraqi Army. A balance of military power is required for preventing offensive actions from both sides, especially the Iraqi government, which had oppressed the Kurds before. A modern Kurdish Army could prevent the attacks of the IS without much trouble and could have saved thousands of innocent lives. A capable army is indispensable due to the internal and external threats that exist against the Kurds.

[v]Iraqi constitution, 2005, Article 9, paragraph A. The Iraqi Armed Forces and Security Services will be composed of the components of the Iraqi people with due consideration given to its balance and its similarity without discrimination or exclusion and shall be subject to the control of the civilian authority. The Iraqi Armed Forces shall defend Iraq and shall not be used as an instrument of oppression against the Iraqi people, shall not interfere in the political affairs and shall have no role in the transfer of authority.

[vi]Iraqi constitution, 2005, Article 117, Fifth: The Regional Government shall be responsible for all the administrative requirements of the region, particularly the establishment and organization of the internal security forces for the region such as police, security forces and guards of the region. Available at: