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2 We are asking for comments on this report by 8 April You can send comments by using the form on our website at: market-studies/ms14-01-response-form Or in writing to: Barbara Buettner Financial Conduct Authority 25 The North Colonnade Canary Wharf London E14 5HS Telephone: We make all responses to formal consultation available for public inspection unless the respondent requests otherwise. We will not regard a standard confidentiality statement in an message as a request for non-disclosure. Despite this, we may be asked to disclose a confidential response under the Freedom of Information Act We may consult you if we receive such a request. Any decision we make not to disclose the response is reviewable by the Information Commissioner and the Information Rights Tribunal. You can download this Market Study report from our website: Or contact our order line for paper copies:

3 General insurance add-ons market study : Provisional findings and proposed remedies MS14/1 Foreword by Christopher Woolard FCA Director of Policy, Risk and Research This report sets out the provisional findings of our market study into general insurance add-ons. This is our first market study, which marks an important milestone for us. It is our first opportunity to show what an FCA market study looks like in practice, and what consumers, firms and others can expect from us under our new competition objective. Competition and consumer protection go hand in hand in markets where engaged consumers face genuine choice, rivalry between firms drives better deals for consumers. Where competition does not work well, consumer interests are less well served. So in seeking to improve the way competition works in a market, we also advance our objective to protect consumers. Market studies consider problems through the lens of the market rather than solely through the conduct of firms. They can vary in scope and approach, but at their core they focus on understanding how markets work and whether they are delivering good consumer outcomes. General insurance has an important role to play in the daily lives of millions of consumers, helping to protect themselves, their families and their property against risks and unexpected events. Buying this insurance as an add-on alongside another insurance policy or product can be a quick and convenient way for consumers to secure the cover they need. However, the many instances of poor outcomes from products sold as add-ons in recent years suggest that these markets do not always work well for consumers. Our consumer research included an innovative behavioural experiment simulating the add-on sales process, to help us understand how consumers react to the process and how it affects their decisions. We publish the results of this experiment alongside this report, but we will also shortly be issuing an occasional paper on the use of behavioural experiments as a regulatory tool which discusses this experiment more widely. We also wanted to know whether consumers can genuinely access a range of options, or whether there were restrictions on choice. And we asked whether any market power held by firms translates into high prices or poor cover, and if that means consumers are getting poor value from their purchases. We found that competition in add-on markets is not effective, and our proposed remedies are focused on tackling this problem. The general insurance add-ons market study is the first of a programme of market studies that we have launched since we took on our competition mandate. Our approach will evolve over time, and we will continue to learn lessons, but the questions we pose in this study about consumer behaviour, market power and consumer outcomes are the kinds of questions that we will ask in our future market studies. Financial Conduct Authority March

7 General insurance add-ons market study : Provisional findings and proposed remedies MS14/1 TDT The Development Team UK United Kingdom US United States Financial Conduct Authority March

8 MS14/1 General insurance add-ons market study : Provisional findings and proposed remedies 1 Executive summary We (and previously the FSA) have been growing increasingly concerned that consumers are experiencing poor outcomes when buying general insurance alongside other products (or as an add-on ). Our concerns arose against the backdrop of a series of actions tackling the mis-selling of products sold as add-ons, including Payment Protection Insurance (PPI), card protection, identity theft protection, personal accident, home emergency and breakdown cover products. In July 2013 we confirmed that we would make the sale of general insurance add-ons the focus of our first market study under our competition objective. We wanted to assess whether competition in the markets for general insurance add-ons was effective and, if not, why not. We also wanted to understand the impact of this on consumers. We investigated the impact of the add-on mechanism by looking at five products as case studies. We mainly focused on the mechanism rather than the individual products selected, but we did draw conclusions about specific products where appropriate. This report sets out our provisional findings. We found that competition in the markets for general insurance addons is not effective and that this can lead to poor consumer outcomes. Consumers are significantly overpaying when they buy products as add-ons. We believe that there is a clear case for us to intervene in respect of the supply of general insurance add-ons, and this report also outlines a number of proposed remedies. Our approach The five markets we studied were travel, gadget, Guaranteed Asset Protection (GAP), home emergency and personal accident insurance. We compared add-on sales with sales on a stand-alone basis for these five products. We analysed a range of information from insurers and intermediaries, including product literature and data relating to sales, pricing, profitability and claims. We used behavioural economics as a key tool during the study. We carried out both quantitative and qualitative consumer research, and undertook an innovative behavioural experiment in which we tested consumers reactions to the add-on mechanism in a simulated environment. 6 March 2014 Financial Conduct Authority

9 General insurance add-ons market study : Provisional findings and proposed remedies MS14/1 Our concerns When we set out to do this work, we were concerned that: the add-on mechanism might affect consumer behaviour and the likelihood of consumers making good purchasing decisions the add-on channel would provide the primary product provider with a clear point of sale advantage that could restrict competition and choice for consumers the consequence of restricted competition and choice would be high mark ups or lower quality products consumers might end up buying inappropriate or unsuitable products, or receive poor value for money or both Our findings Our evidence suggests that many of these concerns are borne out in practice. Consumers face well documented difficulties in engaging with financial services. 1 These are exacerbated when insurance is sold alongside a more engaging product, such as a holiday or a car. Difficulties for consumers are made worse by the timing of the introduction of the add-on, by the lack of transparency about add-on cover and price, and the complexity of comparing packages of products with separate prices. We found that the add-on mechanism has a clear impact on consumer behaviour and affects the way they make decisions. Add-on buyers are less likely to shop around, less effective when they do shop around, and less sensitive to price. In the consumer survey, 58% of add-on buyers said they did not consider any other policy when purchasing their insurance compared to only 22% per cent of stand-alone buyers. One in four consumers who bought insurance as an add-on were not aware they could buy the product separately elsewhere. Consumers who bought insurance as an add-on were much less likely to be able to correctly recall how much they paid for their insurance in fact, 69% of add-on buyers could not give an accurate estimate of the price they paid. Our research also shows that when buying add-ons, consumers are often not engaging with the purchase and are buying products without clear intent, and as a result they are more likely to end up with products they do not need or use. In our survey, 38% of add-on buyers said they had not thought about buying insurance before the day of their purchase, compared with just 15% of stand-alone buyers. This rose to 59% for those buying GAP as an addon. When surveyed approximately three to four months after the purchase, 19% of add-on buyers almost 1 in every 5 were not aware that they owned the product (compared to 9% for stand-alone buyers). But our research also shows that consumers understanding of policies and product cover is poor for both add-on and stand-alone products. This highlights that there are challenges associated with the selling of general insurance products that do not relate to the add-on mechanism specifically. But we are clear that weak consumer engagement increases the point of sale advantage enjoyed by firms selling add-ons, and provides an opportunity and an incentive for them to sell products that might not meet consumers needs or to charge high mark-ups or both. A lack of competition for add-ons can lead to consumers receiving poor value for money from many add-on products. We have used the claims ratio (the proportion of the premiums consumers pay that is paid out in claims) as our core measure of value. 1 FCA, April 2013, Applying Behavioural Economics at the Financial Conduct Authority Financial Conduct Authority March

10 MS14/1 General insurance add-ons market study : Provisional findings and proposed remedies The claims ratios that we find for add-ons are almost all very substantially lower than for more mainstream general insurance products. In the case of add-on GAP and personal accident insurance the claims ratios are exceptionally low, indicating very poor value for money (10% and less than 9% respectively). However, poor value is not constrained to add-ons, and some stand-alone products represent poor value too. The picture does vary across different products. For example, our evidence suggests we should be much less concerned about travel insurance (which consumers buy frequently and are broadly familiar with) than the other products in our sample (which are less familiar and often not frequently bought). We conclude that in many cases competition is not currently delivering value for money add-on products. We estimate that consumers overpay for the add-on products in our study by around 108m to 200m per annum. We recognise that some of this overpayment might be returned to consumers through lower primary product prices (e.g. cheaper cars). However, we think it is highly unlikely that all the surplus is returned to consumers. In any event, we are concerned by the sizeable distortion to prices suggested by these figures. So we believe there is a clear case for us to intervene to make competition in the markets for general insurance add-ons more effective for consumers. Our proposed remedies This report sets out a number of proposed remedies that we believe will strengthen competition in the markets for add-ons by improving the way decisions are presented to consumers and the way add-ons are sold, and by putting pressure on firms to improve product value across both add-on and stand-alone products. In particular, we intend to: Impose a deferred opt-in on add-on sales of Guaranteed Asset Protection (GAP) we will break the point of sale advantage enjoyed by those selling add-on GAP by mandating that the sale cannot be concluded at the point of sale of the car or car finance but only at a later point, and that the consumer must be given information about alternatives if the product is offered at the point of sale at all. Ban pre-ticked boxes (so-called opt-outs ) for the sale of add-ons because of the negative impact they have on consumer behaviour and consumer outcomes. Require firms to publish claims ratios to shine a light on low-value products and increase pressure on firms to improve product value. Improve the way add-ons are offered through price comparison websites, focusing in particular on what information consumers can access about add-ons and when this is introduced. 8 March 2014 Financial Conduct Authority

11 General insurance add-ons market study : Provisional findings and proposed remedies MS14/1 Next steps We invite comments on our provisional findings and proposed remedies by 8 April. Our remedies will then be further refined and subject to cost-benefit analysis and formal consultation. We will publish our final findings in due course and will consult on remedies before the end of the year, with our remedies on GAP insurance being introduced on an accelerated timetable. We look forward to working closely with industry, consumer groups and other interested stakeholders as part of this process. Financial Conduct Authority March

12 MS14/1 General insurance add-ons market study : Provisional findings and proposed remedies 2 What are general insurance add-ons and why are we focusing on them? We started this work against a backdrop of concerns about markets in which consumers purchase insurance alongside other products. We define such sales as add-ons, as opposed to stand-alone sales where insurance is bought separately and is not dependent on the purchase of another product. Primary products are the products alongside which the add-on is sold. For example, home emergency insurance (add-on) may be sold alongside home insurance (primary product). Deferred add-ons refer to sales of insurance that are connected to but not made on the same day as the sale of a primary product. Characteristics of add-ons sales include: Add-on insurance is sold through a range of channels, including online, over the phone and face to face A common feature is that the add-on insurance is often introduced at a fairly late stage in the sale of the primary product Customers may be offered several add-ons in relation to a single primary product sale The timing of information provided and complexity of options makes it difficult for customers to understand or compare both the cover and price of add-on products Supply chains for the sale of add-ons vary in length and complexity but can include some or all of the following: insurers, intermediaries, retailers and price comparison websites (PCWs). Most add-on insurance sales are subject to FCA regulation in the same way as sales of stand-alone insurance, but there are some exemptions from regulation. In this chapter we explain why we chose general insurance add-ons for our first market study, what we mean by add-ons and how they are sold and regulated. 10 March 2014 Financial Conduct Authority

13 General insurance add-ons market study : Provisional findings and proposed remedies MS14/1 Why general insurance add-ons? In December 2012, the FSA launched a study into the sale of general insurance add-on products. This was prompted by increasing concerns that consumers were experiencing poor outcomes when buying such products. For example, in the 2012 Retail Conduct Risk Outlook, the FSA highlighted add-on sales as an emerging risk of harm to consumers. The FSA noted that It is sometimes the case that there is little profit margin in the primary general insurance product, so firms supplement their income through add-on sales with a high profit margin, some of which will historically have been included in a standard policy. Firms might therefore incentivise staff to pressure sell or to automatically include the add-on without explaining the cover properly or that it is optional. When products are bundled in this way it is not easy for consumers to understand the overall cost and value of the product to them. 2 There is also a history of FSA actions involving the mis-selling of products sold as add-ons, including payment protection insurance (PPI), personal accident, home emergency, breakdown cover, card protection and identity theft insurance. The thematic reviews of motor legal expenses insurance (MLEI) 3 and mobile phone insurance 4 that we published in June 2013 highlighted further examples of concerns associated with the sale of insurance products as add-ons. The Office of Fair Trading (OFT) has also carried out reviews of extended warranties 5, which are often insurance contracts, and found similar issues. These interventions were largely driven by and focused on conduct failings and related to a range of different products. Nevertheless, the fact that the add-on mechanism was a common feature of all of the above interventions prompted us to consider whether there are common features of add-on markets that increase the likelihood of misconduct and drive poor consumer outcomes. In addition to the past history of poor consumer outcomes in different markets for general insurance add-ons, the current investigation is prompted by the fact that markets for these products are large in aggregate, creating scope for potentially large consumer detriment. The total net written premiums for the five products we investigated directly as part of this market study was 2.5bn in 2012, of which 500m were sold as add-ons. FCA regulatory returns from underwriters indicate, however, that the sales of all products for which the add-on mechanism is a potential distribution channel were much larger, totalling 4.8bn in 2012 on a net written premium basis. We do not have reliable data on the proportion of addon sales in each of these markets, but if the proportion of add-on sales for the five products we investigated is on average representative of general insurance add-on markets more broadly, we estimate that annual add-on purchases by UK consumers could be around 1bn in total. What are general insurance add-ons and how are they sold? The term general insurance add-ons encompasses a huge variety of products which are sold through a range of channels and offered by a large number of different providers. 2 FSA Retail Conduct Risk Outlook 2012: page 78 3 TR13/1: Motor legal expenses insurance (MLEI): 4 TR12/2: Mobile phone insurance ensuring a fair deal for consumers: 5 OFT Market review of Domestic Electrical Goods, home page: OFT1403.pdf Financial Conduct Authority March

14 MS14/1 General insurance add-ons market study : Provisional findings and proposed remedies A general insurance add-on is a general insurance product sold alongside or as an add-on to another product, which is considered to be the primary product. The primary product alongside which the add-on is sold can be either a financial product such as another insurance product (often home or motor insurance) or a credit card or bank account, or a retail product (such as a holiday, a car, a phone or similar). Consumers encounter general insurance add-ons in many different ways, which reflects the fact that add-ons are sold through a range of distribution channels. For example, a consumer may be offered an add-on: online, either directly from a firm s website or through a price comparison website (PCW) for example when buying another insurance policy, such as home or motor, or a non-financial good or service face to face, for example when buying a car, gadget or booking a holiday over the phone, for example when buying insurance, or arranging a boiler service or repair Consumers may be offered a single add-on or several add-ons at one time. Our own review of add-on sales showed that consumers were frequently offered more than one add-on at a time. The Competition Commission 6 found that for private motor insurance, a consumer could be offered up to seven add-ons at once when shopping for motor insurance cover. Add-ons can be introduced at different points in the sales process for the primary product. For example, the addon may be offered upfront alongside the primary product, during the course of the sales process or only once the main purchase is almost complete. Our research and analysis suggests that introducing the add-on insurance to the customer only towards the end of the process of purchasing the primary product is common. We also found that consumers are often given little information about the add-on product s cover before they buy and that pricing is not always clear. Sometimes only the monthly cost is provided and no annual total is given, or the cost of the add-on is bundled with the price of the primary product. Definitions used As noted above, for the purposes of our study we defined: an add-on product as an insurance product that is sold to consumers as an add-on to a primary product purchase a stand-alone product as a separate insurance contract, independent of any other purchase of another product, policy or service While our definitions of add-on and stand-alone produces clear results for many products, we note that there are instances when it can be difficult to categorise a product clearly as either an add-on or stand-alone sale. The definitions are discussed in more detail in Annex B. 6 Competition Commission, Private Motor Insurance Market Investigation, Provisional Findings Report 17 December report.pdf 12 March 2014 Financial Conduct Authority

15 General insurance add-ons market study : Provisional findings and proposed remedies MS14/1 Our work also highlighted a third category the deferred add-on. These are sales where the insurance product is not sold at the same time as the primary product but is still related to it. For example, a consumer may contact, or is contacted by, their utility provider and sold an insurance product. We found this type of deferred add-on to be common in the sale of home emergency products. The sales processes commonly used by banks for card protection and identity theft protection cover could also fall under the definition of a deferred add-on, as these products were often offered when a consumer made a phone call to activate a new card. While the qualitative consumer research found that deferred add-on sales were often more closely aligned with how consumers buy stand-alone products, consumers may still be influenced by factors relating to their main purchase, such as brand recognition, relying on existing relationships and trust in a provider and past experience of service. Understanding the characteristics of different types of add-on sales and how consumers react to them is relevant to both our analysis of how well markets are working and our approach to remedies. The add-ons supply chain Broadly speaking, there are two types of firm involved in selling insurance add-ons: insurers and insurance intermediaries. An insurer is the person legally responsible for carrying the risk associated with an insurance product and for paying claims. An insurer might choose to sell insurance products directly to customers or via an intermediary or a chain of intermediaries, each of whom might take a different role in the distribution process. In this report we use the term distributer to mean either an insurer or an intermediary that sells an add-on product directly to a consumer. Supply chains for general insurance add-ons can vary in length and complexity. Consideration of the various supply chains informed the approach and methodology of the study, and is also relevant when assessing possible remedies. In its simplest form an insurer sells add-ons to their core products (motor and home). The insurer may outsource some activities, but will remain responsible for everything from product design, underwriting, sales and marketing, and claims handling and payment. Add-ons to core insurance products are also sold by intermediaries. The intermediary may have a role in the design and pricing of the add-on, including placing their own brand on another firms product. The insurer still remains responsible for underwriting the product and claims handling. For other add-ons sold alongside a retail product, the supply chain may be more complex. For example, a wholesale intermediary might make the initial arrangements with the underwriter, such as agreeing the policy cover and the wholesale price they pay to the underwriter. It will then distribute the product through one or more suppliers. The supplier at the end of the chain with whom the consumer interacts might be an FCA-authorised intermediary, or an appointed representative of another authorised firm. For example, the supply chain for GAP might involve a finance company, which is part of the same group as the car dealership, which acts as the wholesale distributor to the dealership. The wholesale intermediary may play the lead role in designing and in pricing the product or the pricing may be done by the car dealership. Financial Conduct Authority March

16 MS14/1 General insurance add-ons market study : Provisional findings and proposed remedies Alternatively, the intermediary firm may act as a managing agent, or similar. In this scenario the insurer is responsible for underwriting and paying claims, but the managing agent takes responsibility for everything from administering the policies to claims handling on behalf of the insurer. An additional step in the purchasing process for the consumer may be a PCW, where the core product is an insurance product, and we noted above that the information and price detail provided to the consumer by the PCW can vary. The business models of PCWs vary, but where PCWs are paid per click-through 7 they do not receive additional payment for add-ons sold. Instead, they receive a single fee regardless of whether the consumer purchases any add-ons. How general insurance add-ons are regulated The vast majority of activity relating to insurance products sold as add-ons falls within the full scope of our regulatory regime in the same way as for products sold stand-alone. Unless an exemption applies, UK based insurers and intermediaries must be authorised by the FCA. When an FCA regulated firm sells an insurance product, whether add-on or stand-alone, it must meet our conduct rules, set out in our Insurance Conduct of Business Sourcebook (ICOBS). These rules require that, where a firm sells a product, it must give the customer information about the firm, its services and the product. Specifically, firms must provide appropriate information about the policy so that the customer can make an informed decision. 8 Firms should also take reasonable steps to ensure that a customer only buys a policy under which he is eligible to claim benefits 9 and, where they give advice, a firm must ensure that the advice is suitable. 10 Not all activity relating to add-ons is regulated under our regime, and therefore some activity is outside the scope of this report. There is an exemption available to intermediaries who sell qualifying insurance policies connected to certain goods (the connected contract exemption). So, for example, intermediaries that sell extended warranties connected to electrical goods or cover for mobile phones and gadgets often fall outside FCA regulation. In addition, there are products sold as add-ons that some customers might perceive to be insurance but are structured so that they are not insurance contracts and therefore fall outside of our regulatory perimeter entirely. The most common examples of these are some extended warranty products. 7 A PCW is only paid a fee if the customer click-through to the insurer s website and buys the insurance 8 ICOBS 6.1.5R: 9 ICOBS 5.1.1G: 10 ICOBS 5.3.1R: 14 March 2014 Financial Conduct Authority

17 General insurance add-ons market study : Provisional findings and proposed remedies MS14/1 3 Approach and methodology The study s objective was to assess whether competition in the supply of general insurance add-ons is effective, and if not, to understand why. We also wanted to understand whether poor consumer outcomes from add-on sales could be the result of ineffective competition. We sought to understand the common impact of the add-on mechanism across several markets, although we also draw a number of conclusions about specific products. We selected five products travel, gadget, personal accident, Guaranteed Asset Protection (GAP) and home emergency insurance against a range of criteria to compare across add-on and stand-alone sales. A key focus of the study was to understand whether poor outcomes in add-on sales could reflect particular consumer behaviour and firms responses to them. In particular, we were concerned that the specific context of add-on sales might limit how far consumers explore alternatives or base their decisions on relevant measures of price and quality. Our concerns were informed by what we know about consumer behaviour from our own and other work on behavioural economics. We were interested in outcomes for consumers in terms of value for money, quality of products and consumer understanding of products. We drew on a wide range of evidence, including data obtained from firms, several types of consumer research, a public call for evidence, and engagement with stakeholders. This chapter sets out the approach we used for this market study and describes our methodology. Scope and approach The study s objective was to assess whether competition in the markets for general insurance add-ons is effective, and if not, to understand why. We wanted to understand whether poor consumer outcomes from add-on sales could be the result of ineffective competition. We considered that focusing on a small number of products and comparing add-on sales against sales of similar products sold on a stand-alone basis would provide a useful benchmark. We wanted to understand the impact of the add-on mechanism across several markets, rather than focus solely on individual products this differentiates this project from a more traditional market study. Financial Conduct Authority March

18 MS14/1 General insurance add-ons market study : Provisional findings and proposed remedies We selected five products to compare across add-on and stand-alone sales: travel, personal accident, gadget, Guaranteed Asset Protection (GAP) and home emergency. These were selected against the following criteria: they were available both on an add-on and stand-alone basis they had not recently been the focus of thematic work they covered different types of risks they were sold across different distribution channels consumers were likely to have different degrees of familiarity with the products the markets were at varying levels of maturity Travel was included in particular because we wanted to understand the impact of the add-on mechanism in relation to a product where we thought the market might be working reasonably well. We chose travel because it is a product that that has a significant range of stand-alone options, and because it is a product which consumers buy frequently and could be expected to be reasonably familiar with, both in terms of the product itself and where and how it can be purchased. Consumers paid premiums of 2.5bn in 2012 for these five products, of which approximately 500m were add-on sales. 11 Our aim was to consider these five products to see if there were commonalties across them that would allow us to draw conclusions about the add-on mechanism. We have also considered the relevance of any of these common findings to add-on sales more widely, in other words to products not included in this study but sold as add-ons. We recognise that general insurance add-on products can be very different. Such products can differ in terms of complexity, customer familiarity and price, and are sold alongside a varied range of primary products. However, as many of our concerns derive from the add-on mechanism itself, and not from the particular nature of any one addon product, we believe that similar risks of consumer detriment are likely to exist in markets for all general insurance add-on products. This has implications for the application of our proposed remedies as set out in chapter 7. Our findings therefore generally focus on common findings, but if we found a product to be a significant outlier, this is highlighted. We were mindful of the interaction of add-on sales with primary product markets, but investigating outcomes (e.g. value or profitability) in primary product markets or for the overall package was not within the scope of this study. However, where we consider that the interaction between the sale of primary and add-on products had a particular impact on consumer behaviour and outcomes, we acknowledge this. Our concerns and what we were testing For competition to function effectively consumers need to: have a range of options to choose from that could meet their needs be able to access appropriate information at the right time about the options available 11 As discussed in chapter 2, classification of add-on and stand-alone sales is not always straightforward. 16 March 2014 Financial Conduct Authority

19 General insurance add-ons market study : Provisional findings and proposed remedies MS14/1 assess the various options and decide whether to buy and if so which option is best for them, taking into account costs and benefits act on this assessment by buying from their preferred supplier Therefore competition may be weak either because consumers do not have appropriate options available at the right time or are unable to access, assess and act on the relevant information about those options. We wanted to evaluate whether competition was effective not only by considering whether there were any practical barriers to effective competition in place, but we also wanted to understand consumers behaviour when confronted with the add-on mechanism to see whether this in turn had an impact on competition. In the Call for Evidence we published in July 2013 we outlined what we thought the reasons might be for ineffective competition in the markets for add-ons. We set out that one of the areas we would focus on was the question of whether poor outcomes in add-on sales could reflect particular consumer behaviour and firms responses to them. In particular, we noted that we were concerned that the specific context of add-on sales might limit how far consumers explore alternatives or base their decisions on relevant measures of price and quality. Our concerns were also informed by what we know about consumer behaviour from our own and external work on behavioural economics. 12 For example, there is evidence to suggest that when the consumer is focused on their primary purchase they are less likely to shop around and compare value for money. This might be particularly true if the price of the add-on is relatively low, compared to that of the primary product. In this situation, consumers could be using a false reference point for comparison, considering the price of an add-on product against the price of the primary product rather than against the price of relevant alternatives. Consumers may also be susceptible to the endowment effect valuing their new and potentially expensive purchase more once they start the purchasing process and they already imagine the new product as their own. As a result, the potential sense of ownership once the sales process begins can strengthen the desire to protect the new purchase from loss or damage by purchasing insurance cover at the point of sale. On the supply side, we wanted to assess any potential barriers to entry or other constraints on competition that might make it harder for alternative providers to enter one of the relevant markets, expand in one or more of those markets, or otherwise affect the price and quality of add-on products. Suppliers might be enjoying a point of sale advantage. If there was little or no competitive pressure, we considered that consumers might be paying inflated prices and therefore not getting good value for money. This might be evidenced by low claims ratios or high mark ups. We also wanted to compare the quality of the products between different providers and with stand-alone equivalents, and understand whether firms might be responding to weak consumer pressures by selling poorer 12 For overviews of the research about potential behavioural influences on consumer decisions that involve add-ons and insurance more generally, see: Baker, T., & Siegelman, P. (2013). Protecting Consumers from Add-On Insurance Products: New Lessons for Insurance Regulation from Behavioral Economics. Connecticut Insurance Law Journal, 20, 13-1; Kunreuther, H. C., Pauly, M.V. and McMorrow. S. (2013). Insurance and Behavioral Economics. 1st ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press ; Huysentruyt, M., & Read, D. (2010). How do people value extended warranties? Evidence from two field surveys. Journal of risk and uncertainty, 40(3), ; or Erta, K., Iscenko, Z., Hunt, S. and Brambley, W.(2013) Appling behavioural economics at the Financial Conduct Authority, FCA Occasional Paper 1. For examples of academic research on the potential effects of add-on pricing on competition, see: Ellison, G. (2005). A model of add-on pricing. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 120(2), ; and Gabaix, X., and Laibson, D. (2006). Shrouded attributes, consumer myopia, and information suppression in competitive markets. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 121(2), Financial Conduct Authority March

20 MS14/1 General insurance add-ons market study : Provisional findings and proposed remedies quality products as add-ons. Low claims ratios, frequencies or pay-outs or high consumer complaints might also be evidence that quality was poor and/or consumers expectations were not being met. Therefore we considered the following as part of the study: How the add-on mechanism affects consumer behaviour and decision-making, for example shopping around, sensitivity to price or likelihood of buying insurance. Whether there is a difference in consumers awareness and understanding of the add-on product when compared to stand-alone purchases. The content and presentation of information consumers typically receive as part of the different ways in which add-ons are sold. What firms compete on, and whether add-on and stand-alone sales are in direct competition with each other. How price and quality of cover compare across similar products offered on an add-on or stand-alone basis. Whether there were material differences in claims frequencies and consumer complaints between add-on and stand-alone products. Whether products are good value for money, for example when measured by the claims ratio. Any barriers to entry or expansion. The profits earned by distributors or underwriters of add-ons. As a market study, this study was not intended to test for mis-selling or deliver a compliance review against our existing requirements. However, we reflect on the interaction between our findings, for example in relation to the information provided to consumers, and our rules in chapter 5. The evidence we gathered to support our analysis To better understand the markets in our study and to test our theories of harm, we asked over 80 firms (insurers and distributors) to provide us with information about the five products. We also commissioned consumer and behavioural research to explore our theory about the effect on consumer behaviour of the add-on sales process. All these pieces of work are described in more detail in the relevant annexes to this report, which set out both approach and findings. Firm data We selected a representative sample of firms to give us a view across each of the markets, covering a variety of different firm sizes and business models. To ensure that we captured the whole distribution chain we targeted insurers as well as distributors. We designed the questions to assess the value chain for indicators of ineffective competition, such as whether consumers were getting value from the sampled products and whether firms were in a position to earn excessive profits. For each sampled product we looked to capture firms with the highest sales in the markets as well as smaller firms to ensure we had a balance of different firms, both between insurers and distributors as well as between add-on sales and stand-alone sales. We sent questionnaires to insurers and distributors to request a range of information including: product details product cover 18 March 2014 Financial Conduct Authority

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