Nissen draws on Logic: The Theory of Inquiry, and also uses quotations from four others of Dewey's books, mostly in the section on truth. The monograph is an unrelenting attack on Dewey's theories, following the lead of Bertrand Russell's criticisms in Schilpp's The Philosophy of John Dewey. Nissen takes key terms of the theories, renders each into a form which he finds clearer, and comparing this form with other statements from Dewey, judges the results Dewey achieves to be incorrect, (...) trivial, or absurd.--M. B. M. (shrink)

John of Jandun, the early 14th-century master of arts, is selected as a representative of Latin Averroism in an attempt to show that conventional classifications of mediaeval thought break down, and to indicate how the term "Averroist" ought to be qualified and elaborated. Advocacy of the existence of a sensus agens to explain the actualization of immaterial sensible forms residing potentially in material objects, and of the existence of a single soul which is not the form of the body (...) but is united with the body only in the actual process of intellection, places John of Jandun in the tradition of Augustinians like Peckham, Bonaventure, and Scotus. Nevertheless such doctrines are developed in the spirit of the Aristotelianism of the faculty of arts. The author appends to the text a note on some bibliographical problems of his subject's writings as well as a listing of his works. Fifty pages of careful notes accompany a lucid text, in which philosophical issues are first stated, then placed in the context of the middle ages, and finally seen with the light given them by John of Jandun.--M. F. (shrink)

This study is concerned with certainty and examines the work of Dewey for the light he sheds on this problem. Hart concentrates on the process of verification, the final stage of inquiry in Dewey's theory. He does this because he believes that, according to Dewey, through the process of verification we may attain "flexible" certainty. The first chapter discusses the background of the problem. The second chapter, "A Dewey Dictionary," contains passages selected from Dewey's works on about sixty topics which (...) Hart considers important for his later discussion. In the third chapter, a chronological account of the development of Dewey's theory of inquiry and his views on verification is meticulously presented. The fourth chapter is devoted to a systematic presentation of the place of verification in Dewey's philosophy. In the fifth chapter are the author's critical reflections: Hart holds that the basic principles of Dewey's theory cannot be justified but must be taken on faith. Here Hart does not seem sufficiently appreciative of Dewey's pragmatism. Dewey could answer: such principles are adopted because they are fruitful and will be maintained only so long as they continue to be fruitful. An epilogue concludes the study.—F. S. M. (shrink)

For John M. Anderson philosophy, as the love of wisdom, is a concern for what is ultimate. The essays in this volume take to heart this understanding of philosophy, and are therefore responses to the ultimate. The first four essays by Kaelin, Schrag, Baillif and Johnstone, deal with Anderson's own account of ultimacy as it is presented in his reflections on the aesthetic occasion, the experience of the sublime, on freedom and on insight. The concern for what is ultimate (...) is formulated differently by each of the other eight essays. Desmond articulates ways of our encounter with the ultimate by means of what he calls essential perplexity. Gendlin reflects on Aristotle's characterization of thinking as an activity that is ultimate. Biemel and Lingis present death as an aspect of the ultimate. Hersch sees our loss of meaning and value as the result of our refusal of finitude and thus of our denial of the ultimate which reveals itself in this finitude. Ginsberg initiates us into the ultimacy of the human encounter that is dialogue. Verene speaks of the ultimate through his account of the fool. For Kockelmans philosophy, unlike science, deals with what-is as it manifests itself in our encounter with our lived world which is a source of meaning, and in that sense an ultimate. Finally, John M. Anderson writes of the awareness of our becoming more than we are, and does so by bespeaking the origin of the dialogue we are. (shrink)

Education, Religion and Society celebrates the career of Professor John Hull of the University of Birmingham, UK, the internationally renowned religious educationist who has also achieved worldwide fame for his brilliant writings on his experience, mid-career, of total blindness. In his outstanding career he has been a leading figure in the transformation of religious education in English and Welsh state schools from Christian instruction to multi-faith religious education and was the co-founder of the International Seminar on Religious Education and (...) values. John Hull has also made major contributions to the theology of disability and the theological critique of the "money culture." This volume brings together leading international scholars to honour John Hull's contribution, with a focus on furthering scholarship in the areas where he has been active as a thinker. The book offers a critical appreciation of his contribution to religious education and practical theology, and goes on to explore the continuing debate about the role of religious education in promoting international understanding, intercultural education and human rights education. A possible basis for integrating Islamic education into Western education is suggested and the contribution of the philosophy of religion to pluralistic religious education is outlined. The contributors also deal with issues relating to indoctrination, racism and relationship in Christian religious aspects, and examines aspects of the the theology of social exclusion and disability. (shrink)

Philosophers have recently revived the study of the ancient Greek topics of virtue and the virtues—justice, honesty, temperance, friendship, courage, and so on as qualities of mind and character belonging to individual people. But one issue at the center of Greek moral theory seems to have dropped out of consideration. This is the question of the unity of virtue, the unity of the virtues. Must anyone who has one of these qualities have others of them as well, indeed all of (...) them—all the ones that really do deserve to be counted as virtues? Even further, is there really no set of distinct and separate virtuous qualities at all, but at bottom only a single one—so that the person who has this single condition of “virtue” is entitled also to the further descriptions “honest” and “well-controlled” and “just” and “friendly” and “courageous” and “fostering” and “supportive,” and so on, as distinguishable aspects or immediate effects of his unitary “virtue”? (shrink)

So, on 22 July 1865, under the title ‘Philosophy and Punch’, did England's premier comic weekly greet the election of J. S. Mill as MP for Westminster. Mill held his seat for only one term, until the general election of 1868, when his Whig-Liberal colleague Robert Wellesley Grosvenor was re-elected, but Mill was replaced by the loser in 1865, the Conservative W. H. Smith, Jr., who, though he never went to sea, became the ruler of the Queen's navy. The reasons (...) for that reversal have engaged the attention of many, including Mill himself; I should like to introduce into the discussion material from an ignored source, the comic weeklies, which took a continued and close look at Mill's behaviour during his parliamentary years. While this evidence generally does not disconfirm earlier judgments—including my own— it does more than merely add to the induction. First, it shows how different political stances led journals to focus on different aspects of Mill's parliamentary career, and to adopt different rhetorical strategies in portraying him in picture and word. Second, it demonstrates how the hardening of party allegiances during the parliament of 1865–68, which accelerated in the preparatory campaigns for the general election of 1868, affected Mill adversely. Third, it suggests strongly that it was not his ‘crotchets’ or ‘whims’, especially women's suffrage and proportional representation, that damaged his chances for re-election, but his advocacy of causes unpopular with the majority of Liberals as well as with Conservatives. (shrink)

The obligation of a court to follow the law of a superior court is commonly taken to be stronger than the obligation of the higher court to respect its own precedent. The Supreme Court has recently asserted this stronger obligation in the most forceful terms. What follows is an attempt to demonstrate that this is wrong as a matter of policy and as a matter of law.

For John M. Anderson philosophy, as the love of wisdom, is a concern for what is ultimate. The essays in this volume take to heart this understanding of philosophy, and are therefore responses to the ultimate. The first four essays by Kaelin, Schrag, Baillif and Johnstone, deal with Anderson's own account of ultimacy as it is presented in his reflections on the aesthetic occasion, the experience of the sublime, on freedom and on insight. The concern for what is ultimate (...) is formulated differently by each of the other eight essays. Desmond articulates ways of our encounter with the ultimate by means of what he calls essential perplexity. Gendlin reflects on Aristotle's characterization of thinking as an activity that is ultimate. Biemel and Lingis present death as an aspect of the ultimate. Hersch sees our loss of meaning and value as the result of our refusal of finitude and thus of our denial of the ultimate which reveals itself in this finitude. Ginsberg initiates us into the ultimacy of the human encounter that is dialogue. Verene speaks of the ultimate through his account of the fool. For Kockelmans philosophy, unlike science, deals with what-is as it manifests itself in our encounter with our lived world which is a source of meaning, and in that sense an ultimate. Finally, John M. Anderson writes of the awareness of our becoming more than we are, and does so by bespeaking the origin of the dialogue we are. (shrink)

By the death, last summer, of Jack Robson, the world of utilitarian studies and a wider world of scholarship on both sides of the Atlantic lost one of their most distinguished figures. It would not be appropriate here, even if it were possible now, to attempt a full and measured assessment of his work. Writing only a few months after the news of his death, while the sense of loss is still so sharp for all his many friends, two things (...) are possible. Something can and should be said to acknowledge and celebrate Robson's achievement as a scholar; and to this can be added some personal recollections of one whose human qualities were as outstanding as his scholarship. (shrink)