MAY 25TH

Today in the Revolution ...

The Constitutional Convention convenes in Philadelphia with the prestige of George Washington presiding.

POOR RICHARD'S ALMANACK

He that would have a short Lent, let him borrow Money to be repaid at Easter.

— Benjamin Franklin,1738

AMERICANREVOLUTION.ORG

Indians and the
American Revolution

By Wilcomb E. Washburn

The late Wilcomb E. Washburn was one of America's
most versatile and accomplished historians, receiving his Ph.D.
(American Civilization) from Harvard University in 1955. This
is the annotated text of a presentation he made here in Riverside,
CA during the time he was Director of American Studies at the
Smithsonian Institution. The author of more than sixty books
and articles, he was noted for his expertise concerning the history
of Virginia and the American Indian. Works include The Indian
in America (1975) and The Assault on Indian Tribalism:
The General Allotment Law (Dawes Act) of 1887 (1975).

The role of the American Indian during the
American Revolution was a shadowy and tragic one, symbolized
by Benjamin West's painting, now in the National Gallery of Art,
of Colonel Guy Johnson, the British superintendent of Indian
affairs in the North, and Joseph Brant, the great Mohawk warrior. It
was a shadowy role, but an important one. It was shadowy not
only because the Indian operated physically from the interior
forests of North America and made his presence felt suddenly
and violently on the seaboard settlements, but because the Indian
was present also in the subconscious mind of the colonists as
a central ingredient in the conflict with the Mother Country.

After a century and a half of exploration
and settlement, the English colonists, in 1763, were finally
masters of the coastal areas of North America. With rapidly growing
populations they now turned inward away from the sea to a larger
destiny. The
Great War for Empire in the 1750s and 1760s had resulted
in the expulsion of the French political and military presence
from the interior. The powerful Indian nations who lived in the
region were now unable to play one European power off against
the other. Their conflicts with the English would now be conducted
without benefit of European allies. The need to coordinate British
power in America in the face of the French threat had led, in
1755, to the appointment of a superintendent of Indian affairs
for the northern department, an office to which Sir William Johnson
was appointed. In 1756 a similar superintendency for the southern
colonies was established, with Sir Edmond Atkin as superintendent.
The superintendents operated in subordination to the commander-in-chief
of British forces in America. While not taking the conduct of
Indian relations entirely out of the hands of the colonial governors
and assemblies, the existence of these new colonial officers
marked a significant diminution of the powers inherited and assumed
by the individual English colonies.

With the conclusion of the Great War for Empire,
the English government applied further controls over colonial
freedom to act, particularly in restricting settlement westward
within the chartered limits of the colonies. By the Proclamation
of 1763, the lands beyond the Appalachian mountain chain were
declared off limits to colonial governments, the lands being
"reserved" to the Indians under the cognizance of the
British Crown which reasserted its sovereignty and control over
the area. Although the anger of the colonies was tempered by
the knowledge that the freeze was a temporary measure and not
necessarily permanent, it marked another example of the tightening
noose placed by the home government over colonial freedom of
action.

The status of the Indian nations of the interior
is not easy to describe. Certainly they attributed to themselves
independent status which they felt able to maintain by force
of arms. The English government, on the other hand, asserted
ultimate sovereignty over Indian lands by virtue of the ancient
charters which former kings of England had granted to those undertaking
to plant colonies in the New World. Though speculative in origin
and based on ignorance of the geography of the New World and
of the power of the Indian nations in the interior, the charters
were brought forth in legal arguments whenever the possibility
of their full realization was possible.1

In their dealings with the Indian nations,
the English authorities utilized the treaty form of negotiation
in which solemn covenants were entered into as between equals.
During the period 1763 to 1775, a series of boundaries between
the colonists and the Indians of the interior were created from
Lake Ontario to Florida, confirming in the minds of Indians (and
of many colonists) the belief that the Indian country was closed
to speculation and settlement by the increasingly aggressive
colonists.

Lord Dunmore's War of 1774 marked the beginning
of the breakdown of the arrangements by which the seaboard colonies
and the Indian nations of the interior were to be kept apart.
Lord Dunmore, royal governor of Virginia, sought to seize the
abandoned Fort Pitt, captured from the French during the Great
War for Empire, in support of Virginia's charter claims. Dunmore's
move into the trans-Allegheny areas of western Pennsylvania (Virginia's
charter claims were to the west and northwest) led to war with
the Delawares
and Shawnees.
The conflict triggered a response from the Iroquois to the north who stood in the relation
of elder brothers to the Shawnees and Delawares. Superintendent
of Indian Affairs Johnson worked diligently to keep the
Iroquois out of war. He pointed out that the Six Nations (who
comprised the Iroquois Confederacy) had renewed and confirmed
the "Covenant Chain subsusting between us" at the Treaty
of Fort Stanwix, October 26, 1768. But the Iroquois demanded
to know why whites were not honoring the former treaties and
boundary lines and were moving beyond the mountains into the
Ohio River valley. While arguing in council to forestall Iroquois
involvement in Dunmore's War, Johnson on July 11, 1774, died
and was succeeded by his nephew and son-in-law, Guy Johnson.
Guy Johnson was relieved when, in a series of conferences culminating
in a great meeting at Onondaga in October 1774, the Iroquois
decided to ratify the pledge to remain at peace with the English
and to persuade the Shawnees to settle their differences with
the Virginians. Joseph Brant (left, in a portrait by Gilbert
Stuart), a Mohawk graduate of Eleazar Wheelock's Indian School
at Lebanon, Connecticut (later moved to Hanover, New Hampshire,
where it became known as Dartmouth College), was particularly
persuasive in these conferences.2

The English government, meanwhile, continued
its policy of restraining colonial expansion into the territory
reserved to the Indians. By the Quebec Act, the seaboard colonies
were seemingly shut off from expansion into the lands they claimed
by charter, those lands being incorporated into the new British
province of Quebec. The fact that this restriction was in the
form of an Act of Parliament, and not an administrative decree,
made it all the more damaging to the pretensions of the colonies.
By the act, the province of Quebec was extended as far south
as the Ohio River. Control was placed in the hands of a royal
governor with a standing army under his command to support him
and with no representative assembly to bother him. While the
Quebec Act is usually interpreted in terms of its religious significance
(its provisions for religious toleration of Catholicism outraged
good Protestants), in fact, as Francis Jennings has pointed out,
the act was more significant in putting a brake on the land speculation
of the seaboard colonists and fixing sovereignty and control
of the areas of potential expansion in England and in Parliament
rather than in America and in colonial legislatures.3

Whether one seeks to explain the subsequent
break as a direct consequence of the British government's attempt
to stymie colonial land speculation and expansion, or merely
indirectly related to it, there is no doubt that British restrictions
on colonial freedom of action in this as in other fields helped
to convince the colonists that violent reaction might be the
preferable alternative. Violence was not long in coming. When
the citizens of Boston threw overboard English tea (while, interestingly,
dressed as Indians), the English government responded by closing
the Port of Boston. In explaining the growing crisis to the Iroquois
at a conference in January 1775, Guy Johnson asserted that:

This dispute was solely occasioned by some
people, who notwithstanding a law of the King and his wise Men,
would not let some Tea land, but destroyed it, on which he was
angry, and sent some Troops with the General [Thomas Gage], whom
you have long known, to see the Laws executed and bring the people
to their sences, and as he is proceeding with great wisdom, to
shew them their great mistake, I expect it will soon be over.4

Neither the loyalists nor the patriots sought
to enlist Indian support at this time. Indeed, both sides urged
the Indians to remain neutral on the grounds that the disputes
were a family quarrel in which the Indians were not concerned.
Yet, informally, the line was not so clearly drawn. George Washington,
in the winter of 1774 -1775, recruited some gunmen from among
the minor Eastern tribes, the Stockbridge, Passamaquoddy, St.
John's and Penobscot Indians. By the fall of 1775, General Gage,
the British commander, would use Washington's actions to justify
his orders to Guy Johnson and John Stuart (who had succeeded
Atkin as superintendent of Indian affairs for the southern department)
to bring the Indians into the war when opportunity offered.5

In July 1775, the Continental Congress proposed
a plan similar to the superintendencies created by the Crown
for managing Indian affairs except that three geographical departments
instead of two were created. Commissioners were appointed for
each department. The Congress also drafted a talk which could
be delivered by the commissioners to any tribes in their district.
The talk asserted that:

This is a family quarrel between us and Old
England. You Indians are not concerned in it. We don't wish you
to take up the hatchet against the king's troops. We desire you
to remain at home, and not join either side, but keep the hatchet
buried deep.6

Not until the summer of 1776 did either the
Americans or British formally and officially attempt to involve
the Iroquois, the most powerful northern nation, on their side.
Informal approaches, however, were made with increasing frequency.
In July 1775, Ethan Allen, of Vermont, sent a message to the
Iroquois urging them to shun the King's side. Allen asserted:

I know how to shute and ambush just like the
Indian and want your Warriors to come and see me and help me
fight Regulars You know they Stand all along close Together Rank
and file and my men fight so as Indians Do I want your Warriors
to Join with me and my Warriors like Brothers and Ambush the
Regulars, if you will I will Give you Money Blankets Tomehawks
Knives and Paint and the Like as much as you say because they
first killed our men when it was Peace time.7

Meanwhile, the British were similarly exciting
the Six Nations. The Indians were invited "to feast on a
Bostonian and drink his Blood." With good anthropological
understanding the British provided a roast ox and a pipe of wine
as the symbolic substitute for the rebels. 8

The Iroquois at first resisted the blandishments
of both sides. As a Seneca warrior put it, in reply to the warnings
against the Americans made by Colonel John Butler, who acted
for Colonel Johnson in the latter's absence:

We have now lived in Peace with them a long
time and we resolve to continue to do so as long as we can -
when they hurt us it is time enough to strike them. It is true
they have encroach'd on our Lands, but of this we shall speak
to them. If you are so strong Brother, and they but as a weak
Boy, why ask our assistance. It is true I am tall and strong
but I will reserve my strength to strike those who injure me.
If you have so great plenty of Warriors, Powder, Lead and Goods,
and they are so few and little of either, be strong and make
good use of them. You say their Powder is rotten - We have found
it good. You say they are all mad, foolish, wicked, and deceitful
- I say you are so and they are wise for you want us to destroy
ourselves in your War and they advise us to live in Peace. Their
advice we intend to follow.9

Although the Indians refused to be swayed
by either side at this time, uncertainty as to how they might
be affected by the struggle caused bitter divisions to be formed
among them.

Meanwhile, in July 1776, Colonel Guy Johnson
and Joseph Brant, the Mohawk, had returned to New York from a
visit to England. While in London, Brant had been warmly received
and highly honored. George Romney had painted his portrait. Brant
had become more than ever convinced that the Indian future lay
with the British Crown and not with the American colonists. After
distinguishing himself at the Battle of Long Island, Brant slipped
through the patriot lines in order to return to Iroquoia and
bring his countrymen into the fight against the Americans. In
conjunction with Colonel Butler, the British commander at Fort
Niagara, Brant succeeded in getting four of the six Iroquois
nations to take up the hatchet against the Americans. Only the
Oneida and the Tuscarora refused. The decision for war was made
at a great congress at Irondequoit in July 1777, at which the
Indians were finally overwhelmed by massive gifts of rum, provisions
and useful goods.10

The bloody seal to the fateful decision made
by the Iroquois to break their traditional unity (as well as
their neutrality) was the Battle of Oriskany, August 6, 1777,
which occurred when American General Nicholas Herkimer was on
his way to relieve beleagured Fort Stanwix. Herkimer failed,
but the Seneca allies of the British in particular, suffered
heavy losses. Seventeen of the thirty-three Indians killed were
Seneca as were sixteen of the twenty-nine wounded. In Indian
terms, where success in battle was measured by the smallness
of one's own losses, the battle was a disaster. Even more galling
than the men lost was the fact that the Great Peace established
by the Iroquois Confederacy was now dissolved. Brother was fighting
brother. Oneidas and Tuscaroras had fought with Herkimer against
their fellow Iroquois on the King's side.11

Shortly after the battle of Oriskany, the
patriot cause seemed vulnerable to destruction at the hands of
General John Burgoyne who had moved south from Canada in June
1777 in order to cut off the middle and southern colonies from
those in New England. On the way, Indian auxiliaries in his command
murdered a young lady, Miss Jane McCrea, in a celebrated incident
which fed the fuel of patriot propaganda that (as Jefferson put
it in the Declaration of Independence) the King had "endeavoured
to bring on the inhabitants of our frontier the merciless Indian
savages, whose known rule of warfare is an undistinguished destruction
of all ages, sexes, and conditions." When General Philip
Schuyler received word during a conference with the Oneidas and
Tuscaroras at Albany, in September, that the American army had
engaged Burgoyne's at Freeman's Farm he immediately asked for
their assistance and received it. The warriors, fresh from their
participation in Herkimer's campaign, joined General Horatio
Gates' army and rendered invaluable assistance.12

The British thrust was turned back and warfare
in New York State in 1778 and 1779 consisted of guerrilla raids
by British supported Iroquois on interior New York settlements
such as that at Cherry Valley. The raids led to a massive counter
offensive planned by George Washington and commanded by General
John Sullivan which entered the Iroquois homeland and applied
a scorched earth policy to the villages and cornfields which
the Indians had prudently abandoned. Years later, in 1790, when
the Seneca leader, Cornplanter, was negotiating with Washington,
he recounted that "When your army entered the country of
the Six Nations we called you Town Destroyer; and to this day
when that name is heard our women look behind them and turn pale,
and our children cling close to the necks of their mothers."13

In the inland areas of the South, even more
powerful Indian nations existed than in the North The Southeastern
nations could muster 14,000 warriors: 3,000 each among the Cherokees,
Choctaws, and Creeks,
plus 5,000 hardy Chickasaws.. The southern Indians had been subjected
to the same encroachments by the colonists that the northern
Indians had experienced. By the Treaty of Sycamore Shoals on
the Watauga River in March 1775, the Transylvania Company had
obtained a title of sorts to much of present day Kentucky and
middle Tennessee. But the Cherokee chief Dragging Canoe had stalked
out of the negotiations, warning that any attempt to settle the
area would turn the land dark and bloody.14

The British sub-agents Alexander Cameron and
Henry Stuart attempted to warn the American settlers who were
encroaching on Indian lands at Watauga and Nolichucky.. Their
warnings enabled the settlers to prepare themselves against attack
and to characterize the British cautions - suitably distorted
- as evidence of British instigation of Indian attack. For the
most part, the Americans refused to heed the warnings to leave.
15

The patriots, who had appointed commissioners
to deal with the Indians as prescribed by the Continental Congress,
sought to persuade the natives that the King's agents were now
superseded by themselves. In April 1776 a conference was held
with representatives of the Cherokees, but most of the tribe
absented themselves. The colonial representatives urged the Cherokees
(and, in a later conference, the Creeks) to remain neutral and
not be swayed by British arms or arguments. The American case
was not persuasive and, in May 1776, a delegation from the north
composed of Shawnees, Delawares, and Mohawks, arrived among the
Cherokees and convinced them to take up the tomahawk against
the encroaching Americans. Devastation soon followed on the frontier.16
The response of the southern colonies was similar to that in
the North. Devastating strikes were made by American armies against
the Cherokees. Like the Iroquois, the Cherokees chose to let
their country be ravaged rather than attempt to engage the American
columns in pitched battles. Instead, they retired further west
and watched the colonial soldiers destroy their crops and houses.
Like the Iroquois, though to a lesser degree, the Cherokees were
riven by factional strife on how best to confront the deteriorating
situation.17

Thomas Jefferson's reaction to the Cherokee
attacks on the frontier expressed his sense of the seriousness
of the situation:

I hope that the Cherokees will now be driven
beyond the Mississippi and that this in future will be declared
to the Indians the invariable consequence of their beginning
a war. Our contest with Britain is too serious and too great
to permit any possibility of avocation from the Indians.18

The fate of the Cherokees dampened the inclination
of the Creeks to seek vengeance against the encroaching settlers
at the possible cost of similar retaliation. Nevertheless, an
opportunity to strike a coordinated blow occurred when late in
1778 a British fleet arrived in Georgia. Savannah fell to it,
and a force was sent inland to Augusta. By virtue of poor communication
(one might almost say a total lack of effective communication),
John Stuart, the Indian superintendent in Pensacola, was uninformed
of the move and was unable to bring Creek allies and local loyalists
to the assistance of the British troops.19

Although huge amounts of goods were annually
provided Britain's Indian agents for use in keeping her Indian
alliances firm (£75,000 sterling in 1778 for the southern
Indians alone), few results were evident to an increasingly skeptical
Parliament. In March 1779, in considering a money bill, heated
comments about the apparently fruitless expenditures of such
sums were made.20
Yet Indian goods continued to be vital in maintaining Indian
support. As one observer put it, "Reason and Rhetoric will
fall to the Ground unless supported by Strouds and Duffells.
Liberality is alone with Indians true Eloquence without which
Demosthenes and Cicero or the more modern orators Burke and Barre
might harangue in vain."21

Meanwhile, the new Spanish ally of the revolting
colonies outgeneraled the British in the Gulf Coast region. Bernardo
de Galvez, moving from New Orleans east along the coast to Mobile,
was able to seize that port on February 10, 1780, after General
John Campbell, the British commander in West Florida, had dismissed
his Choctaw auxiliaries without adequate thanks or recompense.
Campbell had earlier frittered away this support by calling them
in unnecessarily in response to false alarms.22

When Pensacola, further east, was next threatened
in March 1780 by the Spanish, 2000 Creeks under Alexander McGillivray
and William McIntosh rallied to the support of the British. The
Spanish settled down to wait for the Indians to depart, but victory
eluded them when, after six weeks, a British fleet arrived. Galvez
was forced to retire.23

In March 1781, a Spanish fleet again appeared
off Pensacola with a 4000 man army which overmatched 1500 British
soldiers, 400 Choctaws, and 100 Creeks. After fierce fighting,
in which the Indian allies of the British distinguished themselves,
the garrison capitulated May 8, 1781. The fall of Pensacola was
soon followed by the fall of Augusta and Savannah. British collapse
in the South was imminent and the King's Indian allies were forced
to choose their future course.24
The Cherokees and Chickasaws sought to negotiate peace with the
Americans. The Creeks continued to stand with the British; the
Choctaws wavered.25
When the British finally evacuated St. Augustine in 1783, they
were astonished to find that numbers of their Indian allies sought
to join them. As one Indian talk put it, "If the English
mean to abandon the Land, we will accompany them - We cannot
take a Virginian or Spaniard by the hand -We cannot look them
in the face." The commandant of the garrison expressed his
amazement at the Indian attitude:

The minds of these people appear as much agitated
as those of the unhappy Loyalists on the eve of a third evacuation;
and however chimerical it may appear to us, they have seriously
proposed to abandon their country and accompany us, having made
all the world their enemies by their attachment to us.26

In the Preliminary Articles of Peace of 1782,
no mention was made of the Indians. Despite their important role
and visible presence, they had receded into the shadows of European
diplomacy. Recognition of their existence and status was easier
to ignore or deny in Europe than in America. Brant, the Mohawk,
was outraged that the King seemed to be selling out the Indians
to the American Congress. Daniel Claus, the British agent for
the Six Nations in Canada, was astounded that the English negotiator
in Paris, Richard Oswald, had ignored, or been ignorant of, the
boundaries of the Indian country established by the Fort Stanwix
treaty line of 1768. "It might have been easily reserved
and inserted that those lands the Crown relinquished to all the
Indn. Nations as their Right and property were out of its power
to treat for, which would have saved the Honor of Government
with respect to that Treaty," he wrote. Other Englishmen
were outraged. "Our treaties with them were solemn,"
Lord Walsingham noted, "and ought to have been binding on
our honour." Lord Shelburne, on the other hand, vigorously
defended the Preliminary Articles, asserting that "in the
present treaty with America, the Indian nations were not abandoned
to their enemies; they were remitted to the care of neighbours."27

The Spanish representative at the Paris negotiations,
the Conde de Aranda, had similarly asserted that the territory
west of the Appalachians to the Mississippi, which England grandly
delivered to the American colonies, belonged to "free and
independent nations of Indians, and you have no right to it."
But the American negotiators rejected the Indian claim and asserted
the full authority of the colonies to possess the lands west
to the Mississippi.28

In their succeeding negotiations with the
Indians, the Americans attempted to convince the Indians that
by choosing the losing side in the struggle they had lost all
their rights. They asserted that the Indians were a conquered
people. James Duane in 1784 advised the governor of New York
not to treat with the Iroquois as equals, saying that "I
would never suffer the word 'nation' or 'six nations' or 'confederates,'
or 'council fire at Onondago' or any other form which would revive
or seem to confirm their former ideas of independence they should
rather be taught that the public opinion of their importance
has long since ceased."29

Neither the Iroquois, nor the Indians of the
Old Northwest, nor those of the South, tamely accepted colonial
assertions of sovereignty by right of conquest. Although most
of the powerful nations which had hitherto held back the tide
of English expansion had chosen the wrong side in the Revolution,
they still possessed land and power only partially diminished
by the war. The British government, embarrassed by the reproaches
of their erstwhile allies, continued to hold the forts of the
Old Northwest and to provide trade goods and sympathy to their
Indian allies though refusing military aid for a renewed attack
against the Americans. Attempts by American forces to impose
their will on the Indians confirmed the fact that the Indians
had not been conquered by the Americans during the Revolution,
for these attempts were repeatedly frustrated. In 1790, General
James Harmar's expedition into the Maumee Valley resulted in
an embarassing failure. In 1791, General Arthur St. Clair's army
was similarly defeated by the Indians near Fort Wayne, Indiana.
In the South, McGillivray of the Creeks played off Spanish and
American authorities, finally negotiating a treaty with the United
States in New York in 1790. In 1794, General Anthony Wayne finally
did manage to defeat the Northwest Indians at Fallen Timbers. But the resistance and strength
of the natives had refuted the notion that conquest could be
asserted rather than won.30

With the formation of the Constitution and
the establishment of a new government, Secretary of War Henry
Knox, Secretary of State Thomas Jefferson, and President George
Washington formulated a policy of honor and good will toward
the native Americans. As expressed in the Northwest Ordinance,
the policy asserted that:

The utmost good faith shall always be observed
towards the Indians; their land and property shall never be taken
from them without their consent; and in their property, rights,
and liberty, they shall never be invaded or disturbed, unless
in just and lawful wars authorized by Congress; but laws founded
in justice and humanity shall from time to time be made, for
preventing wrongs being done to them, and for preserving peace
and friendship with them.31

Yet the passions engendered by the American
Revolution, despite the good will expressed in the formal policy
enunciated by the government, was to lead to bitter and violent
confrontations on the frontier. The bloody ground of Kentucky
was to be repeated in region after region as the undisciplined
and unregulated expansion of the American people got underway.
In the end the Indian was the loser. That he would have been
a loser even if the King had repressed the rebellion is probable;
but his decline would not have been so swift or so bitter.

FOOTNOTES

1. I have discussed the early English charters
in my "Red Man's Land/White Man'sLaw: A Study of
the Past and Present Status of the American Indian" (New
York, 1971).

2. Barbara Graymont, "The Iroquois in
the American Revolution" (Syracuse, New York, 1972), pp.
48-50.

3. Francis Jennings, "The Imperial Revolution:
The American Revolution as a Tripartite Struggle for Sovereignty,"
unpublished paper delivered at The Newberry Library Conference
on the American Indian and the American Revolution, February
1975.

4. Quoted in Graymont, The Iroquois, p. 57.

5. James H. O'Donnell III, "The World
Turned Upside-Down: The American Revolution as a Catastrophe
for Native Americans," unpublished paper delivered at the
Newberry Library Conference on the American Indian and the American
Revolution, February 1975.

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