William
H. Davidson, II and Andrew F. Lindemann, both of Davidson, Morrison &
Lindemann, of Columbia, for Respondent.

JUSTICE
KITTREDGE: This medical malpractice case turns on whether the six-year statute of repose in section 15-3-545(A) of
the South Carolina Code (2005) applies to causes of action arising under the
Tort Claims Act. We hold that it does and affirm.

I.

In 1996, Marta
Kerr’s excised mole was allegedly misdiagnosed as benign by a pathologist at Richland Memorial Hospital (Hospital). In 2001, Kerr learned the 1996 specimen, upon
reexamination, contained evidence of melanoma. This misdiagnosis allegedly
contributed to Kerr’s death in 2002 due to complications of melanoma cancer.
Kerr’s estate brought suit in 2003 against Hospital, more than six years after
the alleged misdiagnosis.

The
trial court granted summary judgment to Hospital after holding the statute of
repose bars such a case and the Tort Claims Act shields a governmental entity
from liability for an independent contractor’s actions. The case is before
this Court via Rule 204(b), SCACR, certification.

II.

The threshold issue
is whether the statute of repose affects actions against government entities
under the Tort Claims Act. S.C. Code Ann. § 15-78-10 to -220 (Supp. 2008). We hold the statute of repose
applies.

Specifically,
section 15-3-545(A), which has not been amended since Harrison, states:

In
any action, . . . to recover
damages for injury to the person arising out of any medical . . . treatment . .
. by any licensed health care provider . . . acting within the scope of his
profession must be commenced within three years from the date of the treatment,
omission, or operation giving rise to the cause of action or three years from
date of discovery or when it reasonably ought to have been discovered, not
to exceed six years from date of occurrence, or as tolled by this section.

(emphasis added).
Accordingly, the statute of repose provision within section 15-3-545(A) applies
as an absolute outer limit applicable in any medical malpractice action.

Additionally,
the statute of repose portion of section 15-3-545(A) is substantive law, unlike
a statute of limitations, which is procedural law. Capco of Summerville,
Inc. v. J.H. Gayle Const. Co., Inc., 368 S.C. 137, 142, 628 S.E.2d 38, 41
(2006) (“A statute of limitations is a procedural device that operates as a
defense to limit the remedy available from an existing cause of action. A
statute of repose creates a substantive right in those protected to be free
from liability after a legislatively determined period of time.”). Further,
when the Legislature enacted the Tort Claims Act, the Legislature knew of the absolute
time limit imposed by the statue of repose. Berkebile v. Outen, 311
S.C. 50, 53, 426 S.E.2d 760, 762 (1993) (citation omitted) (“A basic
presumption exists that the legislature has knowledge of previous legislation
when later statutes are passed on a related subject.”).

Next,
we turn to the Tort Claims Act itself. “The primary rule of statutory
construction is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the
legislature.” Mid-State Auto Auction of Lexington, Inc. v. Altman, 324
S.C. 65, 69, 476 S.E.2d 690, 692 (1996) (citation omitted). The General
Assembly indicated its intent in the Tort Claims Act by stating, “[t]he provisions of this chapter establishing limitations on and
exemptions to the liability of the State, its political subdivisions, and employees,
while acting within the scope of official duty, must be liberally construed in
favor of limiting the liability of the State.” S.C. Code
Ann. § 15-78-20(f) (2005).

When reading the Tort Claims Act as a whole, which we must, we
hold the above unambiguous expression of intent pervades the entire act. Mid-State Auto, 324 S.C. at 69, 476 S.E.2d at
692 (“In ascertaining the intent of the
legislature, a court should not focus on any single section or provision but
should consider the language of the statute as a whole.”). Specifically,
section 15-78-40 of the South Carolina Code (2005) states, “[t]he State, an agency, a political subdivision, and a governmental
entity are liable for their torts in the same manner and to the same extent as
a private individual under like circumstances, subject to the limitations upon
liability and damages, and exemptions from liability and damages, contained
herein.” Similarly, section
15-78-50(b) of the South Carolina Code (2005) provides, “[i]n no
case is a governmental entity liable for a tort of an employee where that
employee, if a private person, would not be liable under the laws of this
State.” Accordingly, the Legislature clearly intended to limit government
liability through the Tort Claims Act, and at no time did the Legislature intend
government liability to exceed that of a private entity.

Conversely, Kerr is inviting this Court to contravene the
unambiguous intent of the Legislature and expand liability for a government
hospital beyond a private hospital’s potential liability. In fact, Kerr’s
counsel conceded the statute of repose bar in a private action when stating,
“by the time this client came to see me, [the estate] had clearly lost [its]
right under [section] 15-3-545(A), the right to pursue any private entity because of the
medical malpractice statute of repose. Six years had transpired.” To permit
this medical malpractice action to proceed beyond the statute of repose would
be to disregard the Tort Claims Act, particularly sections 15-78-40 and 15-78-50(b).

Having
found Hospital was entitled to summary judgment based on the statute of repose,
we need not reach the additional ground relied upon by the trial court. Wilson v. Moseley, 327 S.C. 144, 147, 488 S.E.2d 862, 864 (1997) (holding if one ground
proves dispositive, then this Court need not address the remaining grounds
relied on by a trial court when it granted summary judgment).

III.

As the six-year
statute of repose in section 15-3-545(A) applies
as an absolute outer limit applicable in any medical malpractice, the
grant of summary judgment to the Hospital is