To date, the austerity cuts have savaged the European defence
budgets. Although there are some sources that try to map the cuts in
defence budgets and the ways how they translate into the reduction of
capabilities, these studies analysed bigger sample groups (i.e. limited
scope of analysis for individual countries), e.g. from the EU
perspective--while the European Parliament's study remains the most
comprehensive study on the topic to date, it is now dated (1) and the
CER study by T. Valasek primarily aims to make the case for EU's
pooling and sharing. (2) One study by RAND on this topic is limited to
several key NATO Allies--only Poland from the V4 group is covered. (3)

When we consider the DAV4 project that focuses mainly on the future
of the defence cooperation, there has been no comprehensive study
focused solely on the austerity cuts and the V4 group. This paper humbly
aims to fill this gap. This is achieved through, firstly, a closer look
at the V4 defence budgets with regard to the level of defence spending
(SIPRI data) and the number of military personnel (NATO data), secondly,
by comparing the respective structures of these defence budgets (NATO
data) in order to identify the long-term spending trends and the effects
of austerity cuts, and thirdly, through analysis as to how these
spending trends and economic realities translated on the level of the V4
countries' armed forces.

V4 DEFENCE BUDGETS IN THE AUSTERITY ERA

The following chapter will shed a light on the state of defence
expenditures in the V4 countries and the changing balance within the V4
countries defence expenditure in the timeframe of the last nine years.
First, there is the most obvious measurement--the defence spending as
percentage of GDP, which is depicted in the timeline (2005-2013) in the
Graph 1. None of the V4 countries met the 2% of GDP defence expenditure
NATO guideline since 2007 and the year 2005 was the last year in which
at least two countries from the V4 group spent 2% on their defence.

To give these numbers at least some context with regard to the
general effects of economic crisis, let us consider the annual
development of GDP. From the following Graph 2 it is obvious that the
crisis translated into the negative GDP development in the region in
2009, when all V4 countries, with the Polish exception experienced,
negative GDP growth. It is also clear that the defence budgets were,
again with the Polish exception, slashed even before the economic crisis
hit the V4 countries in 2009.

As was already pointed out, (6) the internal dynamism of the V4
group has significantly shifted as a result of different defence
expenditure trends in the last decade. In 2002, according to SIPRI data,
Poland's military expenditures (measured in constant USD 2010)
equalled the combined defence spending of the other V4 countries. In
2013 Poland's defence budget was more than two times larger than
the combined budgets of the other three Visegrad countries. While the
global economic crisis played a role, closer look on the defence
expenditure data clearly shows, that the cuts in military expenditure
started even before the crisis, which only made it worse and flattened
the Czech defence expenditure around 1% of the GDP and slightly below it
in the Hungarian and Slovak cases.

The Czech Republic: Defence budget as Cinderella

Although the absolute amount allocated for defence did not, in
Czech Crowns, significantly decrease before 2008 (it rather stagnated
thanks to the growing GDP), (7) the economic crisis played a role, after
2008, in bringing the defence expenditure down even in national
currency. When the defence expenditure is compared in constant 2010 USD,
it shows gradual and long-term decrease in defence spending not
corresponding to national currency expenditures.

As a result of inconsistencies in defence spending, the Czech armed
forces, which became fully professional in 2005, accumulated internal
debt amounting to something between 80 and 90 billion CZK (around 3,7-4
billion USD) equalling two years of defence expenditure. (8)

Hungary: Chronic underspender

Hungary currently spends about 0.8% of its GDP on defence. It is
staggering that this extremely low level of spending is planned to be
maintained in the foreseeable future as well. According to the
governmental resolution from 2012, the defence expenditure should be
maintained on the 2012 level until 2016 and rise by 0.1% of GDP annually
afterwards. By the beginning of the next decade (2022) the defence
spending should reach 1.39% of the GDP. The massive decrease in military
personnel in 2006 is associated with the professionalisation of the
Hungarian Defence Forces which started in 2004. The level of internal
debt is not publicly known.

Poland: Strategic spender

Poland was able to maintain steady defence expenditures thanks to
the law from 2001 that says that "the amount of funds assigned each
year for this purpose shall not be lower than 1.95 per cent of the GDP
from a preceding year." (10) However, as the result of the economic
slowdown in 2009, the government reduced the annual defence budget by 9%
(11) and in 2010 the Tusk government considered an amendment that would
enable the government to flexibly lower the expenditures any given
fiscal year but required that the six year average would still meet the
1.95% of the GDP. (12)

Slovakia: Economic crisis at fault?

Slovakia's defence expenditure has been stagnating (thanks to
the growing GDP) until 2009 but the planned figures for defence spending
were not achieved in any given year although the government tried to
update the armed forces financing plan three times. The Slovak armed
forces have, consequently, between 2002 and 2011 accumulated deficit in
allocated resources equalling twice the annual defence budget (cca 1.9
billion USD).13 However, it seems that Slovakia was the only country
where the decline in defence expenditure can be at least partially tied
to austerity cuts as a consequence of the economic crisis.

To sum up this section one has to point out that, without Poland,
the V4 group armies seem to be, in the last almost a decade,
unsustainably financed, which the impacts of the economic crisis only
magnified. Consequently, when measured in constant 2010 USD, the
"bang for the buck" of the three Visegrad countries between
2005 and 2013 decreased by 40% in the Czech and Hungarian cases, by 30%
in the case of Slovakia, and rose by 20% in Poland.

The structure of the defence expenditures in the V4 group

The structure of the defence expenditure shows how the money
allocated for defence budget is actually spent, although even the funds
spent on equipment do not necessarily mean enhanced capabilities for the
army in the long perspective. After the end of the Cold War, the social
and economic function of armed forces has become priority instead of its
defence purpose in many European states--the army, after all, secures
jobs for soldiers, administrative staff and industry workers. The result
of this paradigmatic shift is the sharp increase of personnel
expenditures and armament policy that primarily reflects the needs of
national defence industry and not priorities outlined by defence policy.
(14)

Example for this can be the two of the most expensive acquisitions
of the Czech Army--the Czech L-159 Alca multi-role combat aircraft
(1999-2008) and the procurement of the modernised T-72M4 CZ (2000-2005)
that came in a time when the Czech army was changing its posture to
focus on foreign deployments, for which these two types of armament were
considered useless. (15) The following part will try to demonstrate the
effects of the economic crisis and subsequent budget cuts on the
structure of the defence expenditure in the V4 group states in the last
decade.

The Czech Republic: Rising structural problems

From the table 1 it is clear that in the Czech case the major
consequence of the austerity cuts on the defence expenditure was rising
proportion of the money spent on personnel. Understandably, as the
overall sum allocated for defence budget decreased (after 2010),
mandatory expenditures proportionally rose. Greater catastrophe was
avoided only by letting 4,500 ministry staff and soldiers go in 2009 and
further personnel reductions in 2011 and 2013 (as seen in graph 3).

However, only 83% of the budget is spent on the actual military
since the soldiers pensions and associated expenses comprise about 7
billion CZK (cca 315 million USD) out of the 41.9 billion CZK (cca 1.9
billion USD from the 2014 defence budget). (16) The negative effects of
almost plateaued expenditure as % of GDP after 2010 have thus created a
structural problem in the Czech defence budget resulting in limited
resources for needed investments and modernisations.

Hungary: Focus on deployability

According to Hungarian national military strategy from 2012 the
structure of defence budget should aim to achieve 40-30-30% proportion
of personnel, operation and maintenance, and procurement costs in the
mid-term. (18) These do not directly correspond to NATO expenditure
categories but it is obvious that the effects of economic crisis were
not as severe as in other V4 countries and austerity cuts in the defence
budget were not as dramatic to produce further structural problems
because the military was accommodated to low defence spending to begin
with.

In general, however, the Hungarian army lagged behind in
modernizing and only about 5% of the budget was allocated to
modernisation rendering the Hungarian armed in dire lack of modern
equipment and forcing the army to rely on "second hand"
modernisation. This often entailed making use of used equipment supplied
by the Allies free of charge or for a nominal amount of money as was the
case with armoured vehicles leased by the USA in Iraq and Afghanistan.
Also, the lease of the Gripen fighter jets negotiated in 2002 ate up a
huge portion of the defence budget slowing or even halting the
modernisation in other areas. (19)

Hungarian defence expenditures seem to have traditionally lower
personnel expenditure level even with the pensions contribution (7.9% of
the defence budget). (20) High percentage of other expenditures (i.e.
maintenance and operations) seem to be pointing to high deployability of
the Hungarian army.

Poland: Focus on modernisation

Polish structure of defence expenditure shows comparably little
long term fluctuations. The Polish budget is the only one which
experienced steady defence expenditure as % of GDP and thanks to
economic growth also an increase in absolute terms over the last decade.

Up until 2013 Poland spent between 15 to 22 percent of its defence
budget on equipment modernisation. However, the expeditionary missions
in both Iraq and Afghanistan have highlighted the need for a better
equipment kit for its forces and Poland currently aims to shift, over
the next decade, about one-third of the defence budget to equipment
modernisation. (21) It is worth noting that thanks to continuous
economic growth combined with steady defence "Poland is on a path
to overtake Spain and the Netherlands in total defence spending in the
next 2 years. (In terms of pure defence investment, Poland already ranks
5th behind the UK, France, Germany, and Italy)." (22)

Slovakia: Personnel expenditure soar

Slovakia, on the other hand, seems to show similar patterns in the
structure of its defence spending as the Czech Republic--soaring
personnel expenditures and limited resources for equipment modernisation
and for expenditure related to maintenance and operations. From this
perspective Slovakia fares the worst from the V4 group. In absolute
terms the Slovak personnel expenditures were even higher (658 million
USD vs. 617 million USD in 2012) than the Hungarian even though in 2012
Hungary had circa 24 thousand personnel and Slovakia only about 20
thousand. (23)

One of the problems was in the sudden increase in military pensions
that occurred between 2009 and 2011. Second problem was the inability to
cut the number of civilian personnel which, by 2006, was supposed to
reach the targeted number 4.4 thousand. (24) In reality this number was
still around 7 thousand in 2012. (25) Moreover, almost 85% of the Slovak
defence budget is spent on personnel, operation, and maintenance costs,
leaving only 10% for procurement. (26)

It is obvious that, from the perspective of the structure of the
defence expenditure, the Czech and Slovak defence expenditure have been
affected the most by the austerity cuts. The rising percentage of
personnel expenditure and shrinkage of resources for equipment goes
contrary to general European trends in defence spending since the
relative share of Euros allocated to equipment spending in Europe had,
despite overall dwindling defence resources, risen. Since 2001 the
spending on personnel has grown, in absolute terms, only in the
Netherlands, Poland, Norway, Belgium, the Czech Republic and Slovakia.
(27)

V4 ARMIES IN THE AUSTERITY ERA

It is appropriate time to look at how these developments and
economic realities translated into the level of the respective national
armies and on a way how the armies have struggled to fulfil the same
tasks with fewer resources. The focus of this chapter will be to
illustrate how the V4 armies have coped with this situation and if/how
the political ambitions for these armies were modified, if/how the force
structure was reformed, if/which capabilities were slashed, and if/which
modernisation plans were postponed.

The Czech Republic: Step Back to Service Headquarters

The Czech armed forces underwent in recent time not only force
reductions (2009, 2011, 2013) but even structural changes. The Defence
Strategy of 2012 also reduced the level of ambition for deployments in
international operations. Deployment of a brigade size unit without
rotation (up to 3 thousand personnel) is now limited only to article 5
collective defence operations and just a battallion size unit with
rotation (up to 1,500 soldiers or 5.7% of the armed forces) is now
intended for other international operations. (28) What is striking in
this respect is the fact that this brigade size unit intended for up to
6 month deployment without rotation, at the moment, lacks critical
supplies, some of which will suffice only for one week of combat and the
procurement of which would cost up to 20 billion CZK (around 0.9 billion
USD), (29) almost half of the 2013 defence budget.

The initial Czech reaction to the crisis was to cut the budget by
over 20% between 2009 and 2011, to significantly reduce personnel (4,500
ministry staff and soldiers in 2009) and to withdraw most Czech troops
from the Kosovo mission. Subsequently, the work was initiated on the
White Paper on Defence in order to bring some order into the process of
scaling down the armed forces in the new budgetary stringent
environment.

The course of replacement/modernisation of soviet-made infantry
fighting vehicles BVP-1 and BVP-2, the backbone of Czech mechanised
units, could not be decided by the end of 2013 as planned by the White
Paper. The replacement for the soviet made fleet of Mi-24/35 fighter
helicopters was also delayed meaning that both types will be probably
replaced exactly by the end of their life-cycles. Helicopters should be
replaced between 2016-18 by cheaper to operate and maintain multi-role
helicopters (30) and IFV between 2018-20. Further, the development of
the mobile surface-to-air missile system KUB should be discontinued
after 2015 and the system retired by 2017 when the life-cycle of
appropriate rockets ends. The military proving grounds also face
reduction by 33% by 2015. The cuts in defence expenditures have further
translated into the reduction of the armed forces through the re-selling
of military property. (31)

In 2013, a series of changes in the structure of the armed forces
was launched, suggested earlier by the White Paper on Defence from 2011,
in the course of which the Czech air force left the military airfield in
Prerov. Much more important was the reduction of two army's
operational commands in 2013. Joint Forces command in Olomouc was
replaced by two significantly smaller Service HQs within the General
Staff and Joint Support Command of Stara Boleslav was replaced by three
specialised Agencies (Logistics, Military Medical and CIS). It has
achieved not only better fluidity amongst the chain of command but also
a reduction of strength since 1,600 budgetary positions were cancelled.
The rationale behind this was the experience gathered from foreign
deployments. It became obvious that joint forces operational command
would be provided within the Allied framework and that the utility of
Czech joint forces command is low. (32) The Czech Special Forces unit
was also transferred from the military intelligence command to the
General Staff of the ACR as of beginning of 2015. (33)

Commentators agree that it was only an attempt to rationalize the
command structures after the reduction that occurred in the strength of
the armed forces (34) in order to bring back the desired proportion
between officers, NCO's and regular soldiers. (35)

The problem is that the structural problems at the heart of Czech
defence spending (personnel expenditure) will get even more serious
because of the planned novelisation of the law changing the framework
for military personnel salaries, effective by the beginning of 2015, in
the course of which the mandatory expenditure should rise by 1.5 billion
CZK (about 68 million USD). (36) This primarily aims to bring new
recruits into the army given that some units in the Czech armed forces,
mainly combat support, lack up to 40% of their personnel. (37) Another
problem lies in the undermanned reserve force that totals only 1.3
thousand personnel, although the amendment to the law regulating the
Czech Armed Forces that would increase the funding in order to raise the
force's size to 5 thousand personnel (38) is to be submitted to the
parliament in the Fall 2014. (39)

Hungary: From Mechanised Units to Light Infantry

In the wake of the crisis, Hungary suspended its participation in
the NATO helicopter programme, put multiple procurement programmes under
review (40) and implemented slight troop reduction conducted in late
2011. The cuts also affected the PRT deployed in Afghanistan, the
efficiency of which was already decreasing due to a worsening security
situation. (41)

The economic crisis erupted during the final stages of
implementation of a 10-year reform plan that was based on a
defence-review conducted by the Hungarian government in 2002-03 and was
supposed to end in 2014. The first years were focused on legislative
changes and adaptation of the force structure in course of which
conscription ended in 2005 and the number of personnel was reduced. From
2006 on the reform efforts focused on training and equipping units
designated for deployment and only from 2010 the modernisation process
was broadened to encompass the entire force although the defence reform
progressed rather slowly overall due to a serious lack of funding. The
financial crisis further impaired this process and resulted in a
reduction of the armed forces from three brigades to only two, one of
which was designated for collective defence and the other for
crisis-management operations. Moreover, the armoured and heavy-artillery
units had been also reduced, as have the training facilities and air
fields. The army's MI-8 transport helicopters are in need of
replacement by 2015, whilst a decision was made to upgrade the MI-17
helicopters to allow for further ten years of use. The MI-24s, in
service for 30 years, will continue being used without any upgrades.
(42)

The army had to transform from mechanised units into light infantry
but did not reform its command structure that is from 2007 based on
Joint Operational Command that replaced the separate service (Land and
Air) commands. (43)

A new 10-year development plan was drawn up in 2012 by the defence
ministry that named future priorities: Developing the Gripen programme,
electronic projects, the development of basic cyber defence capabilities
and helicopter purchases. (44) In order to save more money, the Gripen
contract was renegotiated in 2012. Under the new contract the lease was
extended for another 10 years and thus freed some funds in the strained
defence budget between 2012 and 2016. The saved money is to be spend on
lubricants for vehicles, the purchase of Norwegian Kongsberg URH-radios
and armoured vehicles, (45) and the operation of the HDF's signal
and information systems. (46)

For foreign deployment the level of ambition is now set at 2,000
deployable troops with one brigade on duty for 6 months plus 1 or 2
battalions on rotation. (47) In 2013, the Hungarian army sustained
deployment of approximately 1,000 soldiers in international crisis
management missions. The largest ones are the operations in Afghanistan
and Kosovo. The commitment to maintain this relatively high contingent
(5.55% of the military personnel) was highlighted by the new National
Military Strategy, adopted in December 2012. (48)

One of the major reforms executed since 2010 was the creation of a
voluntary reserve force that significantly enhanced capabilities of the
Hungarian army with regard to internal deployments in the state
emergencies and disaster management as was the case with floods that
Hungary experienced in 2013. (49) In reaction to this the number of
reserve forces should be raised from 5.3 thousand to 8 thousand in the
near future. (50) This is a part of strategy to reduce costs for
guarding military facilities that were prior to 2010 costly (cca 8.3
million USD lost between 2005-2010) outsourced to private companies.
These services are now secured by the 2 thousand strong Armed Security
Guards unit within the Hungarian MoD all of which are at the same time
defence reservists to be called for disaster-relief missions should the
demand arise. (51)

Given the long-term underfinancing of the defence it is unlikely
that Hungarian military capabilities would improve significantly before
2020. The transformation from mechanised units into light infantry is
characteristic for the future development thanks to significantly
constrained funds available for modernisation.

Poland: Creation of Joint Operational Command

Poland started to professionalise its armed forces in 2008, in the
course of which the size of military personnel decreased from 150
thousand to 100 thousand and National Reserve Force was established,
which was further boosted in 2011 in order to reach 20 thousand
personnel. Also, special operations forces, which were made a separate
service in the country's military structure, experienced
significant reinforcement from 1.5 thousand in 2009 and should have
reached 3.5 thousand personnel in 2012 and by 2014 should become a fully
interoperable partner nation of the US special operation forces. As a
parallel process to the professionalisation the modernisation was also
carried out as laid down in the 2009-2012 Defence Plan. As the crisis
hit Poland in 2009, an annex to this defence plan was designed to
restructure Poland's armed forces in order to cut costs and
increase their effectiveness. The Land Forces lost one of four
divisional HQs, the 6th Air Assault Brigade was reorganised into an
airborne brigade to increase its mobility, a new Land Forces Aviation
Brigade was established in 2012 consisting mainly of helicopters, and
all artillery and low-level air-defence assets were concentrated in
three artillery and three air-defence regiments that will probably
continue to use the OSA and KUB SAM systems beyond 2016. (52)

As part of the modernisation process, Poland also established two
new high-level military commands in January 2014. The goal was to create
a joint operational command by replacing the separate service commands,
converting them into departments, and turning the general staff into a
strategic planning and advisory command. (53) Instead of 4 separate
commands for the Army, the Navy, the Air Forces and Special Forces, two
joint commands were created--the General Command that is responsible for
command during peace-time and the Operational Command that is
responsible for command during war-time, time of crisis and for troops
deployed abroad. (54)

Polish immediate reaction to the economic crisis was to reassess
its defence priorities and defence commitments. Polish military
contingents were withdrawn from three UN-led operations (Lebanon, Syria
and Chad), while the number of Polish troops in Afghanistan was, in May
2009, increased to 2,000. (55) As a consequence of the economic crisis
Polish ministry of Defence decided to reduce the personnel expenditure
in 2009, in particular by cutting civilian jobs by up to 10%. (56)

The programs effected by the 2009 budget cuts include the reduction
of procured PZL Mielec M-28, maritime patrol and reconnaissance variant,
from 20 to 16 that were delivered in 2011 and 2014, (57) and significant
reduction in the procurement of multi-role helicopters from 51 to 26.
The main document for modernisation was announced in October 2009 as a
14-point modernisation plan which included a 10.7 billion USD
procurement plan for the period 2009-2018.

In order to secure funds for missile defence project, a new version
of the 2001 law on the Restructuring and Technical Modernisation and the
Financing of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Poland was passed in
2013 that earmarks any yearly increase of the defence budget caused by
the growth of Poland's GDP in the years 2014-2023 to the funding of
the AMD program. Additionally, the share of the AMD program's
financing in the overall level of spending on technical modernisation of
the armed forces cannot fall below 20%. (58)

The level of ambition when it comes to Polish sustainable
deployments abroad stays classified but is generally thought to be
around 4 thousand troops (4% of the armed forces). By 2015-16, however,
Poland plans to have two brigade combat teams between 2.5 and 3 thousand
soldiers strong each ready for deployment in the full spectrum of
operations, and further two battalions for low-intensity conflict. (59)

Given these spending trends and long-term level of defence
expenditure the Polish armed forces will continue to be the exception in
the V4 region and the only army that will keep the full-spectrum
military force. It is further most likely that the capability gap
between Poland and other V4 countries will not become narrower but will
probably deepen.

Slovakia: Tough choices ahead

Thanks to the economic crisis Slovakia had to cut the 2009 defence
budget by about 124 million USD (-12%), cancel plans to buy transport
aircraft and postpone many modernisation programmes. (60) Most notably,
the Defence Ministry had to delay plans to purchase new fighter planes
in order to focus on the Slovak contribution to foreign deployments.
(61)

In 2011 the process of the Strategic Defence Review was initiated
that resulted in prioritisation of only four out of ten tasks resulting
from the legislation and strategic framework. These are as follows: 1.
Contribution to the international crisis management operations (up to
600 persons or 4.6% of the armed forces) including NATO Response Force
and EU Battle Groups, 2. Protecting the air space in the framework of
NATO Integrated Air Defence System (NATINADS), 3. Keeping mechanised
battalion in high readiness and host nation support, 4. Domestic crisis
management. (62) Also work on the White Paper on Defence was initiated.

There were also discussions whether the small Slovak tank battalion
should be scrapped at the end of 2011 or if the air defence system S-300
should be retired earlier in order to secure enough funds for future
modernisation. Even the army's task to assist during domestic
crisis and disaster management was questioned thanks to the economic
environment. (63) The new minister of defence, Mr. Glvac, however, opted
to keep both capabilities. (64)

The main conclusions of the White paper on Defence from 2013 were
that more than 70% of land armament and equipment of the Slovak armed
forces is past its life-cycle because no major modernisation project for
replacement of any of the main types of armaments and equipment has been
conducted during the last 20 years and that units of the Slovak army
lack up to 15-20 % of the military personnel. (65)

Exposed to the global financial and economic crisis, the Slovak
Armed Forces underwent a major reorganisation as of July 2009. In
accordance with a military strategic development document known as Model
2020, the reform process intended to make the Armed Forces more
economically viable and to retain highly qualified personnel. The
reorganisation of the General Staff of the Slovak Armed Forces brought a
reduction in the number of individual staffs, from eight to three. The
structure of the armed forces in the target configuration includes three
Services with their HQs: HQ Land Forces, HQ Air Force, and HQ Training
and Support Forces. (66)

Based on the the Defence Ministry's strategy from 2011 the
extensive modernisation of individual components of the Slovak army
should be one of the main point for the following years. To this end
almost 4.1 billion USD is expected to be gradually spent on rearmament
over the next decade, on top of the Ministry's budgetary chapter.
Most of these funds should be spent on the modernisation of armoured
vehicles, while some 996 million USD are to be invested in the Slovak
Air Force. This amount does not cover, however, the possible replacement
of MiG-29 fighters, whose service life extends beyond the planned
framework of the future model. (67) These additional funds, however, did
not materialize to date.

Slovakia seems to face difficult choices which capabilities to
prioritize in the future and will certainly have to, in the near future,
reduce the spectrum of capabilities it currently possesses to secure
enough funds for long-term modernisation in order to keep the mechanised
character of its units.

Conclusion

Main findings of this paper could be summarised as follows but
almost always with the exception of Poland--the utility of the V4 group
research framework on this topic is therefore limited. When looking at
the development of the V4 states defence expenditures, it is obvious
that even stagnating defence budgets are, in the mid- and long-term,
creating unsustainable environment for the armed forces--probably thanks
to rising costs of new equipment. The conditions of small states'
armies did not allow the V4 countries to make significant cuts in the
number of military personnel like bigger countries in Europe were able
to execute in order to protect their equipment expenditures that are
vital for modernisation. Consequently, the V4 countries were left with
soaring personnel expenditures and gradually diminishing funds for
investments--as the defence expenditures lowered, the percentage of
mandatory expenditures rose. The choice between reductions in the size
of the armies (armies becoming numerically irrelevant) and postponement
of modernisation was made, although, in reality, it is a choice between
being relevant in the short-term and becoming irrelevant in the
long-term (thanks to lagging modernisaton).

It is interesting that the Czech (2013) and Slovak (2009) armies in
this period and with relation to austerity cuts underwent transformation
into separate service commands HQ whereas Hungary (2007) and Poland
(2014) had taken the opposite course and established joint operations
command HQ.

Another finding relates to the growing gap between Poland and its
three Visegrad partners that has emerged. When measured in constant 2010
USD, the "bang for the buck" of the three Visegrad countries
between 2005 and 2013 decreased by 40% in the Czech and Hungarian cases,
by 30% in the case of Slovakia, and rose by 20% in Poland. In 2002,
according to SIPRI data, Poland's military expenditures equalled
the combined defence spending of the other V4 countries. In 2013,
Poland's defence budget was more than two times larger than the
combined budgets of the other three Visegrad countries. The internal
dynamism in the V4 group has therefore, with regard to defence,
significantly shifted.

From the previous chapters it is clear that the V4 group (minus
Poland) basically opted to maintain the personnel level and reduced the
equipment expenditure with Slovakia and Hungary on the one side as bad
examples, the Czech Republic somewhere in the middle with some personnel
cuts, and Poland as an exception. It is likely that Slovakia faces, in
the short-term, similar need to transform its mechanised units into
light infantry ones just as Hungary has done simply because the
soviet-era equipment will fall apart during this decade, given that no
drastic cuts in capabilities will be executed or "pooled and
shared" (e.g. "smart" sharing of fighter jets within the
V4 group). The utility of the academic focus on future defence
cooperation of the V4 is therefore confirmed.

However, it also seems that Slovakia was the only country where the
decline in defence expenditure can be at least partially tied to
austerity cuts as a consequence of the economic crisis but it has also
magnified already existing problems, such as unproportional number of
civilian jobs in the defence ministry. Falling defence budgets in the
Czech Republic and long-term low defence spending of Hungary are on the
other hand most probably results of strategic free-riding in a time
period where defence expenditures did not matter as long as these states
provided significant contributions to foreign deployments within the
NATO framework. But writing this almost at the end of the eventful year
2014 seems to warrant the final note that these times are now gone.

Received: 15 October 2014

Accepted: 25 October 2014

Published online: 15 December 2014

doi: 10.3849/1802-7199.14.2014.02.035-048

Acknowledgement

This research paper was funded from the research project
"Adaptation of the Security System of the Czech Republic to
Changing Economic, Social, Demographic, and Geopolitical
Realities".

(1) EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, DG-External Policies of the Union. The
Impact of the Financial Crisis on European Defence: Annex. April 2011.

(2) VALASEK, Tomas. Surviving austerity: The case for a new
approach to EU military: The Case for a New Approach to EU Military
Collaboration. London, England: Centre for European Reform, 2011.

(67) The Slovak Government adopted a strategic review of defence.
Armyrecognition.com [online], 23.12.2011. Available from:
http://goo.gl/Yle6iX

Mgr. Jakub Kufcak

Jakub Kufcak, born in 1989, works at the moment as an analyst in
the Association for International Affairs (AMO) and as a contributing
editor for the Portal odbornych studentskych textu (POST). Before that
he collaborated with the Committe on Foreign Affairs, Security and
Defence of the Senate of the Parliament of the Czech Republic as a
research assistant. Mr. Kufcak graduated in 2012 from the Faculty of
Social Sciences, Charles University in Prague--Bachelor programme
International Area Studies and obtained his Master's degree in
German and Austrian Studies as summa cum laude at the same faculty in
2014. In 2010/2011 spent Mr. Kufcak one semester at the Freie
Universitat in Berlin. He also completed, in 2013, a one year
Robinson-Martin Security Scholars Program at the Prague Security Studies
Institute (PSSI). To his fields of interest belong German foreign and
security policy, problematics of Georgian NATO membership and defence
cooperation in V4 format.