BYRD v. ABATE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

October 31, 1996

WILLIAM BYRD, Plaintiff, against CATHERINE M. ABATE, Commissioner of Correction; "JOHN DOE," Correction Officer, Anna M. Kroll Correctional Facility, and DAVID N. DINKINS, Mayor of the City of New York, Individually and in their official capacities, Defendants.

In October, 1991, Byrd was in the custody of the New York City Department of Correction for a parole violation and was confined on Rikers Island. Upon his arrival at Rikers Island, Byrd had undergone routine screening to determine his security classification, pursuant to the Department of Corrections policy to classify and separate inmates who posed a threat to the security of the facility, each other, or themselves, because of their risk of violence. The policy provides that inmates are to be classified based upon the severity of the current charges and/or warrants; prior convictions, especially violent crimes and escapes; and information about the inmate's prior institutional behavior.

Once an inmate is classified, his score determines the housing area with the appropriate level of security, and, if indicated, with special medical or social attention. Byrd had been recommended by a social worker for mental observation.

Late in the evening of October 3, 1991, or early in the morning of October 4, 1991, plaintiff was transferred to a cell located in the Lower 3 housing area. All the inmates in this housing area had been determined to be suffering from some type of mental illness and to be in need of mental observation. At approximately 9:30 on the morning of October 4, 1991, plaintiff was released from his cell and went to the recreation room ("Common Room") of the Lower 3 housing area, where he sat down and watched television. Once in the Common Room, he did not speak to anyone and no one spoke to him.

Rule 56(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that a court shall grant a motion for summary judgment "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with affidavits . . . show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." See Silver v. City Univ., 947 F.2d 1021, 1022 (2d Cir. 1991).

"The party seeking summary judgment bears the burden of establishing that no genuine issue of material fact exists and that the undisputed facts establish her right to judgment as a matter of law." Rodriguez v. City of New York, 72 F.3d 1051, 1060 (S.D.N.Y. 1995). In determining whether a genuine issue of material fact exists, a court must resolve all ambiguities and draw all reasonable inferences against the moving party. See Brady v. Town of Colchester, 863 F.2d 205, 210 (2d Cir. 1988); Matsushita Elec. Indus. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 89 L. Ed. 2d 538, 106 S. Ct. 1348 (1986). If there is any evidence in the record regarding the issues on which summary judgment is sought from which a reasonable inference could be drawn in favor of the nonmoving party, summary judgment is improper. See Knowles v. New York City Dept. of Corrections, 904 F. Supp. 217, 220 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).

However, a prison official is not liable for every injury imposed by a prisoner upon a fellow inmate. The test to determine liability contains both an objective and a subjective element. A prison official only violates the Eighth Amendment when the alleged deprivation is objectively sufficiently serious and the prison official charged acted with a sufficiently culpable state of mind. Farmer, 114 S. Ct. at 1977; Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 8, 117 L. Ed. 2d 156, 112 S. Ct. 995 (1992).

With respect to the objective component of the deliberate indifference test, a "sufficiently serious" deprivation occurs when a "prison official's acts or omission ... result[s] in the denial of 'the minimal civilized measure of life's necessities." Farmer, 114 S. Ct. at 1977 (quoting Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347, 69 L. Ed. 2d 59, 101 S. Ct. 2392 (1981)). In Knowles v. New York City Dept. Of Corrections, 904 F. Supp. 217, 220 (S.D.N.Y. 1995), the court held that plaintiff's injury, a deep cut to plaintiff's face, inflicted by a sharp instrument in the possession of another inmate, and requiring sixty stitches to close, constituted such a denial and readily satisfied the objective element of an Eighth Amendment claim. Id. at 221.

In the instant case, Byrd was blinded in his left eye when a fellow inmate stabbed him with an unknown instrument. The loss of an eye plainly constitutes a "denial of the 'minimal civilized measure of life's necessities.'" Farmer, 114 S. Ct. at 1977 (quoting Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 347; see also Pippion v. Peters, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13892, No. 93 Civ. 3492, 1994 WL 530801, at *3 (N.D.Ill. 1994) (assault by fellow inmates resulting in fourteen stitches in prisoner's right eye and eleven in left was sufficiently serious deprivation). Accordingly, Byrd has satisfied the objective element of his Eighth Amendment claim.

With respect to the subjective element, the "sufficiently culpable" state of mind in an Eighth Amendment claim against a prison official is one of "deliberate indifference" to an inmate's health or safety. Farmer, 114 S. Ct. at 1977 (quoting Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 302-303, 115 L. Ed. 2d 271, 111 S. Ct. 2321 (1991)). To show deliberate indifference, an inmate must show that the prison official charged knew that the inmate faced a substantial risk of serious harm, and disregard that risk by failing to take reasonable measures to abate it. Id. at 1984.

With respect to C.O. Hults' knowledge of the harm faced by Byrd, it is undisputed that there was no history of tension or hostility between Byrd and any of the other inmates in the Lower 3 housing area, and that Byrd did not notify C.O. Hults or any officer of a threat to his safety and did not feel threatened. However, under Farmer, an inmate need not show that he faced an excessive risk of attack for reasons unique to him; an inmate's Eighth Amendment claim of deliberate indifference may also rest on an assertion that the inmate faced an excessive risk of attack shared by other inmates in his situation. Farmer, 114 S. Ct. at 1982.

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