Wednesday, 24 March 2004

Distributed, dynamic terrorist networks cannot scale like hierarchical networks. The same network design that makes them resiliant against attack puts absolute limits on their size. If so, what are those limits?

A good starting point is to look at limits to group size within peaceful online communities on which we have extensive data -- terrorist networks are essentially geographically dispersed online communities. Chris Allen does a good job analyzing optimal group size with his critique of the Dunbar number.

His analysis (replete with examples) shows that there is a gradual fall-off in effectiveness at 80 members, with an absolute fall-off at 150 members. The initial fall-off occurs, according to Chris, due to an increasing amount of effort spent on "grooming" the group to maintain cohesion. The absolute fall-off at 150 members occurs when grooming fails to stem dissatisfaction and dissension, which causes the group to cleave apart into smaller subgroups (that may remain affiliated).

Al Qaeda may have been able to grow much larger than this when it ran physical training camps in Afghanistan. Physical proximity allowed al Qaeda to operate as a hierarchy along military lines, complete with middle management (or at least a mix of a hierarchy in Afghanistan and a distributed network outside of Afghanistan). Once those camps were broken apart, the factors listed above were likely to have caused the fragmentation we see today (lots of references to this in the news).

This leads us to optimal group size, which according to Chris Allen's online group analysis, can be seen at two levels: both small and medium sized. Small, viable (in that they can be effective at tasks) groups (or cells) are optimized at 7-8 members. A lower boundary can be seen at 5 (with groups less than 5 not having sufficient resources to be effective) and an upper boundary at 9. Medium sized groups are optimal at 45-50 members, with a lower limit of 25 and an upper limit of 80. Between these levels is a chasm that must be surmounted with significant peril to the group. This is due to the need for groups above 9-10 members to have some level of specialization by function. This specialization requires too much management oversight to be effective given the limited number of participants in each function. At 25 members, the group gains positive returns on specialization given the management effort applied (a break-even point).

This chasm (between 9-25 members) nicely matches the problem period in the development of terrorist and guerrilla networks that studies of guerrilla groups refer to. The amount of damage a small (7-8 member) group can do is limited to narrow geographies and therefore does not represent a major threat. Once a network grows to 45-50 members, they can mount large attacks across multiple geographies. They are also very difficult to eliminate due to geographically dispersion of cells. However, during the transition to a larger group they are vulnerable to disruption. This vulnerability necessitates fast counter-terrorist action (this gives credibility to the military strategists who claim we didn't have enough troops in Iraq immediately after the war, nor were we quick enough to establish martial law) during that short period of time a network is transitioning in size.

This size dynamic can also be seen in criminal organizations. The mafia (BBC), despite their widespread influence, has closely mirrored the limits on group size:

The Genoveses are the largest of the five families in New York and they recruited nine new foot soldiers, bring their total to 152.

The Gambinos, had a terrible year from 2000-2001, losing 33 members, but they still managed to retain 130, making them the second largest in terms of manpower.

Meanwhile the Luccheses have initiated three more gangsters, lifting them to third place with a total of 113 hoods on the streets, according to FBI reports.

Dempsey said he estimated there were only about 100 "foreign terrorists" in Baghdad, organized into about six cells. In Anbar province, which stretches across western Iraq and includes the strife-torn cities of Ramadi and Fallujah, Maj. Gen. Charles H. Swannack Jr. of the 82nd Airborne Division said he believed there were a total of 50 to 80 foreign fighters in eight to 10 cells.

This indicates a cell size (the optimal size of the smallest viable network) of between 5-12 members.

Note: The limits on organizational size does not mean that terrorist or crime organizations can't expand their ranks on a temporary basis. There are plenty of "contract" employees available. Also, there is also the potential for intergroup cooperation (we see this in both crime and terrorism).

Tuesday, 23 March 2004

What would be the economic impact of a terrorist attack on critical infrastructure? A good measure to use is the 2003 northeastern blackout. Anderson consulting ("Northeast Blackout to reduce US earning $6.4 billion") did a relatively thorough study of the impact. Here are the highlights:

Lost income to workers and profit reductions of companies: $3.12 to $5.2 billion.

Spoilage (food, etc.): $380 to $940 million.

Additional police and emergency services: $15 to $100 million.

Higher utility rates (for repairs and overtime): $1 to $2 billion.

The total economic impact estimated by Anderson ranges between $4.51 and $8.24 billion.

Other economic impacts (to put this blackout in perspective):

The 2002 Port shutdown: $1.67 billion

The 1998 GM strike: $2.7 billion

One interesting factoid: The blackout occured on a Thursday afternoon. If it had occured on a Monday or a Tuesday, lost production would have been double.

This estimate provides a good starting point for further analysis. Specifically, areas I have focused on (in my upcoming book) are:

Monday, 22 March 2004

Counter-terrorist forces (Mossad, CIA, DoD, etc.) routinely use assassination to disrupt terrorist networks. However, despite the apparent success of this approach (moral and propoganda), experience indicates that this technique is not very effective. Terrorist networks such as al Qaeda have proven to be extremely resiliant despite attempts at "decapitation."

The reasons for this are complex but understandable. Let's dive into this topic by first listing what organizational/network disruption means. Kathleen Carley, Ju-Sung Lee, and David Krackhardt in their paper "Destabilizing Networks" propose a well constructed set of criteria:

The rate of information flow through the network has been reduced (perhaps to zero).

The network, as a decision making body, cannot reach a consensus.

The ability of the network to accomplish tasks is impaired.

However, evidence indicates that terrorist networks aren't susceptable to these measures of disruption due to leadership removal. The reason is that in a distributed terrorist network, intra-networking between emergent leaders radically reduces the impact of leadership removal. The removal of leadership from a distributed network is rapidly repaired. The reasons for this are:

Meta-matrix design. Distributed networks are actually composed of a meta-matrix of networks -- networks for information transfer, knowledge sharing, task completion, etc. This layered approach network design reduces the impact of removal of leadership from the social network alone.

Dynamic design. Relationships in the network aren't dictated by assigned hierarchical relationships, rather they are based on a complex panoply of factors that are constantly changing. Therefore, the structure of the network is in constant flux in response to learning and adaptation by the individual nodes.

This analysis indicates that assassination isn't effective in disrupting terrorist networks. The belief that it will have a disruptive impact may be due to the "mirror imaging" of counter-terrorists that work in hierarchical networks. In fact, leadership removal may make the network more opaque to future analysis given the emergence of new leadership that may not be known.

Wednesday, 17 March 2004

In summary, we find that scale-free networks display a surprisingly high degree of tolerance against random failures, a property not shared by their exponential counterparts... However, the error tolerance comes at the expense of attack survivability: the diameter of these networks increases rapidly and they break into many isolated fragments when the most connected nodes are targeted.

Many people assume, wrongly, that terrorists are poor and uneducated. That is incorrect. Scott Atran (PDF: Who wants to be a Martyr?) has provided a high quality argument that terrorists are typically more well off and better educated than surrounding populations.

Education: "Officials with the Army Defense Intelligence Agency who have interrogated Saudi-born members of Al Qaeda being detained at Guantánamo Bay, Cuba, have told me that these fundamentalists, especially those in leadership positions, are often educated above reasonable employment level; a surprising number have graduate degrees and come from high-status families."

Poverty: "The Princeton economist Alan Krueger and others released a study in 2002 comparing Lebanese Hezbollah militants who died in violent action to other Lebanese of the same age group. He found that the Hezbollah members were less likely to come from poor homes and more likely to have a secondary school education."

The end result is that: "This allows terrorist agents to choose recruits who are intelligent, psychologically balanced and socially poised. Candidates who mostly want virgins in paradise or money for their families are weeded out. Those selected show patience and the ability to plan and execute in subtle, quiet ways that don't draw attention."

According to Atran, the driving factor in terrorist recruitment is religious intensity.

Skype is a breakthrough product. It is a PC to PC voice communications system (it doesn't route through centralized nodes although it may use the PCs of other users on the network if there are firewall/NAT problems). It is also secured with strong encryption. This software was developed in Estonia and is unlikely to fall under governmental controls.

More about Skype's encryption:

When you call another Skype user your call is encrypted with strong encryption algorithms ensuring you privacy. In some cases your Skype communication may be routed via other users in the peer-to-peer network. Skype encryption protects you from potential eavesdropping from malicious users... Skype encryption ensures that no other party can eavesdrop on your call or read your instant messages. Skype uses AES (Advanced Encryption Standard) – also known as Rijndel – which is also used by U.S. Government organizations to protect sensitive, information. Skype uses 256-bit encryption, which has a total of 1.1 x 1077 possible keys, in order to actively encrypt the data in each Skype call or instant message. Skype uses 1536 to 2048 bit RSA to negotiate symmetric AES keys. User public keys are certified by Skype server at login.

On Brave New War

G. Gordon Liddy Show (radio)...this is a seminal book in the truest sense of the term.. way ahead of the curve... go out and buy it right now -- G. Gordon Liddy

City JournalRobb has written an important book that every policymaker should read -- Glenn Reynolds (Instapundit)

Small Wars JournalWithout reservation Brave New War is for professional students of irregular warfare and for any citizen who wants to understand emerging trends and the dark potential of 4GW -- Frank Hoffman

Scripps Howard News ServiceA brilliant new book published by terrorism expert John Robb, titled "Brave New War," hit stores last month with virtually no fanfare. It deserves both significant attention and vigorous debate... - Thomas P.M. Barnett

Chet Richards DNIJohn has produced an important book that should help jar the United States and other legacy states out of their Cold War mindset. You can read it in a couple of hours – so you should read it twice...

Washington Times / UPIRobb correctly finds the antidote to 4GW not in Soviet-style state structures such as the Department of Homeland Security, but in decentralization -- William Lind (the father of 4th generation warfare).

Robert PatersonHaving painted a crystal clear picture of how a war of networks is playing out, he comes to an astonishing conclusion that I hope he fills out in his next book.

The Daily DishJohn Robb of Global Guerrillas has written the most important book of the year, Brave New War. - Daily Dish (The Atlantic)

Simulated LaughterWell-written. Brave New War reads more like an action novel than a ponderous policy book. - Adam Elkus

FutureJackedGo buy a copy of this book. Now. If you are low on cash, skip a few lunches and save up the cash. It is worth it. - Michael Flagg

ZenPunditThe second audience is composed of everyone else. Brave New War is simply going to blow them away. - Mark Safranski

Haft of the SpearThere aren’t a lot of books that make me recall a 12-year-old self aching for the next issue of The Invincible Iron Man to hit the shelves. Well done.
- Michael Tanji

Ed ConeHis book posits an Army of Davids -- with the traditional nation state in the role of Goliath. - Ed Cone (Ziff Davis)

Shloky.comThis is the first real text on next generation warfare designed for the general population and it sets the bar high for following acts. It is smart, it is a short read, and it will change your thinking. - Shlok Vaidya

Politics in the ZerosI suggest this is something Lefties need to start thinking about now, as that decentralized world is coming. - Bob Morris