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Global Research & AnalysisWed, 21 Feb 2018 22:51:23 +0000en-UShourly1https://wordpress.org/?v=4.9.3Navalny Launches ‘Voters’ Strikes’ Across Russiahttps://jamestown.org/navalny-launches-voters-strikes-across-russia/
Thu, 01 Feb 2018 22:47:53 +0000https://jamestown.org/?p=78874On Sunday, January 28, demonstrations and protests organized by Alexei Navalny shook Russia once again, this time calling for what he has called “Voters’ strike” protests. While Navalny’s website claims these protests took place in 118 cities across Russia (Navalny.com, January 28), the authorities counted only 46 different actions comprising 3,500 people (Mvd.info, January 28). The protests were arranged by …

]]>On Sunday, January 28, demonstrations and protests organized by Alexei Navalny shook Russia once again, this time calling for what he has called “Voters’ strike” protests. While Navalny’s website claims these protests took place in 118 cities across Russia (Navalny.com, January 28), the authorities counted only 46 different actions comprising 3,500 people (Mvd.info, January 28). The protests were arranged by Navalny to register anger at the Russian government’s decision to bar him from running in the 2018 presidential election due to his criminal conviction for embezzlement. This conviction is widely seen as contrived and was recognized as such by the European Court of Human Rights earlier in January.

The largest “voters’ strike” took place in Moscow, where up to 1,000 people, led by Navalny himself, gathered on Pushkin Square around 2:00 pm, surrounded by a crowd of journalists. They proceeded to march down to Manezh Square, in front of the Kremlin, although the authorities had closed it in anticipation of Navalny’s protest. The Moscow protestors chanted: “Russia will be free,” “I am sick,’ “I am a brother of Navalny,” and “This is our city.” Around 5:00 pm, the protestors split up and around 100 went to protest in front of the Duma, but they dispersed a few hours later (Novaya Gazeta, January 28). Protests in Barnaul, Khabarovsk and Kemerovo drew about 150 participants. Magnitogorsk, Kurgan and Orenburg saw not more than 100 participants. Just under a thousand people marched in Ekaterinburg, whereas the strikes in Vladivostok, Krasnoyarsk, Tomsk and Irkutsk each drew about 200 people. Six hundred demonstrators turned out in Novosibersk, and 550 in Nizhny Novgorod (Mvd.info, January 28). In Russia’s northern “capital” of St. Petersburg, about 2,000 people arrived to strike (Lenta News, January 28); however they faced a similar array of obstacles to holding a successful rally.

If the Moscow march was representative, some of those involved were quite young, being early teenagers. For instance, 13-year-old Ivan was interviewed in Moscow and said, “I learned about the event from the Internet. I think that there will not be anyone worse than Putin, so I would trust a more open person. I decided to show that I exist. I came here to support Alexei [Navalny] and the overthrow of Putin as president” (Novaya Gazeta, January 28). Most of the other people interviewed in the article were also young, and the videos that exist of numerous demonstrations show that mostly young people attended. The youth of Russia have become a recent source of concern for the Kremlin (see EDM, November 6, 2017) given the unregulated nature of the Internet as an alternative means of influencing large numbers of people.

In most places, the response of the authorities was to arrest participants and leaders of the strikes. As a result a total of 257 were detained amongst all the protests. In Moscow, 16 were arrested. In Cheboksary more than 50, nearly 45 in Ufa, 31 in Kemerovo, 23 in Murmansk, and 16 in Tula (Novaya Gazeta, January 28). Navalny himself was arrested during the Moscow rally and charged with arranging a meeting without permission (article 20.2 of the code of administrative offenses). He was released late Sunday night while a full list of offenses was drawn up against him. His strained ally and actual contender in the election, who is framing herself as the “against all” candidate, Ksenia Sobchak, was waiting for him when he was released (Novaya Gazeta, January 28). Given all the cat-and-mouse games that the authorities and the opposition keep playing, it remains a mystery as to why the government does not simply permit Navalny to run. This decision would almost certainly increase voter turnout, while still producing a resounding mandate for Putin in his fourth term. Perhaps previous statements prohibiting Navalny from running have locked the Russian authorities into a position they do not feel able to change. If so, the protests on January 28 serve as another reminder that there are costs to keeping Navalny off the ballot as well.

]]>Moscow Works to Block North Caucasus Nations From Making Common Causehttps://jamestown.org/moscow-works-block-north-caucasus-nations-making-common-cause/
Fri, 26 Jan 2018 16:41:17 +0000https://jamestown.org/?p=78833Moscow’s ability to run the country depends on keeping the non-Russians apart and at odds with each other. This gives the center the ability to play one group off against another as well as prevents the non-Russians from forming a common front against ethnic Russians. Consequently, any cooperation among non-Russians on any issue quickly becomes a matter of extreme concern …

]]>Moscow’s ability to run the country depends on keeping the non-Russians apart and at odds with each other. This gives the center the ability to play one group off against another as well as prevents the non-Russians from forming a common front against ethnic Russians. Consequently, any cooperation among non-Russians on any issue quickly becomes a matter of extreme concern to the Kremlin, on which it can be counted on to take quick action. Even so, however, the attractions of cooperation are great; and Moscow may not succeed.

Earlier this month, the Russian Congress of the Peoples of the Caucasus and the Inter-Regional “New World” Organization announced plans to hold a conference in Pyatigorsk to demand the restoration of direct elections of the heads of regions and republics. More than 100 representatives of the titular nationalities of Adygea, Karachaevo-Cherkessia, Kabardino-Balkaria, North Ossetia, Ingushetia, and Dagestan announced they were coming (Caucasus Times, January 22).

Such a meeting—especially in the still restive North Caucasus—would have constituted a serious challenge to a Russian law Vladimir Putin signed in April 2013 that requires the subjects of the Russian Federation to give up their right to directly elect their heads. As a result, the Russian authorities moved swiftly, first denying the group the right to meet in Pyatigorsk and then, in an effort to contain and coopt, offering to host an alternative session not in the North Caucasus but in Moscow (Kavkazsky Uzel, January 24; Chernovik, January 24).

Organizers say they will still try to make the same points, holding common sessions and breakout roundtables on the best way to promote the return of direct elections both via official structures and popular action. Their conference will build on the activities of groups in Ingushetia, Karachaevo-Cherkessia and Dagestan over the last year. Among these was most prominently the declaration of the council of taips (subgroups of the Ingush nation) calling for the restoration of direct elections there. That was followed by similar actions in the other two republics (On Kavkaz, January 21).

By forcing the organizers to move the meeting to Moscow, the Russian authorities likely will succeed in reducing the number of people attending—it simply costs far more to travel to the Russian capital than to Pyatigorsk. The central government will also be better positioned to control the media coverage in the North Caucasus the session might have been expected to attract had it been allowed to convene at its planned venue. But the Russian action may backfire by attracting the attention of other non-Russians far beyond the Caucasus to this cause, especially given the increasingly overheated atmosphere in advance of the March 18 presidential elections.

That is especially likely if, as expected, the meeting nonetheless goes ahead with an appeal like the one the Ingush taips issued earlier. That group declared that “the deprivation of citizens and entire ethnic communities of the right to elect and be elected is a clear violation of the Constitution of the Russian Federation and should be subject to criminal penalties. This anti-constitutional law unceremoniously and demonstratively removes the population from participation in the political and social life of the country.” In an election year, such argumentation could generate some support across the country.

]]>Russian Truckers Declared ‘Foreign Agents’https://jamestown.org/russian-truckers-declared-foreign-agents/
Thu, 14 Dec 2017 21:58:07 +0000https://jamestown.org/?p=78592Following an inspection by the Ministry of Justice, the Russian truckers organization Association of Russian Carriers (Obedinenie Perevozchikov Rossii—OPR) has been declared a “foreign agent.” The organization was originally formed to protest the introduction of the Platon toll system in 2015 (see EDM, November 30, 2015). The truckers were included on the register of foreign agents following an unscheduled audit …

]]>Following an inspection by the Ministry of Justice, the Russian truckers organization Association of Russian Carriers (Obedinenie Perevozchikov Rossii—OPR) has been declared a “foreign agent.” The organization was originally formed to protest the introduction of the Platon toll system in 2015 (see EDM, November 30, 2015). The truckers were included on the register of foreign agents following an unscheduled audit of their documentation. A spokesperson from the organization, Andrei Buzhatin, said that the reasons for their inclusion on the register are unclear: “We had a check from the Ministry of Justice, and they told me that they sent us the verification materials three days ago, but we do not know why they requested this, as we generally have no contacts with foreigners” (Newsland.com, December 1). The instructions to register came after a meeting underneath the New Year Tree on Lenin Square, in St. Petersburg, where the truckers came to demonstrate against once more against the Platon toll system. Platon “is not aimed at regulating our roads,” the protesters declared, “It is just a plunder of our country. Because of the Platon system, goods have increased in value two or three times. All of this money comes out of our pockets” (Newsland.com, November 27).

In an interview with the venerable liberal newspaper Novaya Gazeta, Buzhatin said, “We are planning a new strike from December 15 to 25. The authorities are again trying to raise fines for non-participation in the Platon system—from 5,000 to 20,000 rubles [$85–$340]. This has outraged carriers, not only members of the OPR. But this is not the only reason. Also, the excise duty is rising. This, like Platon, affects every person in Russia. There are also other problems in our industry. The Ministry of Transport recently invented a regular check of professional fitness, as well as divisions between private entrepreneurs and professional drivers. Specialists who talk about such criteria are clearly divorced from reality.” Promising to “stop the traffic as much as possible… [and] everywhere we will set up protest camps,” Buzhatin continued to criticize as counterproductive the authorities’ approach to the protesters, saying, “You can drive us away as much as you like, but it is silly. As practice shows, this does nothing for the punishers, and we just add OPR members. Fighting with your own people is wrong. Maybe they will be able to intimidate someone, but this does not solve the problem. Already today in our industry there are radical people who are tired of everything. We, as a union, are trying to establish with them some contact, to restrain their protest. But no one knows in what “partisan” direction these people will turn. It is very difficult to understand what motivates the authorities in our country” (Novaya Gazeta, December 5). Thus, the actions of the authorities may be creating the very threat they seek to fight against.

The truckers initially became a source of opposition to the Kremlin over plans to introduce the “Platon” system to track and tax Russian long-distance drivers. The system is said to be owned in part by Igor Rotenburg, the son of a close friend of Vladimir Putin, Arkady Rotenburg (see EDM, November 30, 2016). The truckers’ strike has been endorsed by opposition leader Alexei Navalny. And in the battle for hearts and minds ahead of the election (if Navalny is permitted to run), his influence could be important. Indeed, in the restricted Russian political landscape, social/economic protest has become one of the only ways in which opposition to the authorities can be given voice. The truckers, moreover, appear to be one of the few organizations capable of generating truly national opposition to the system—as witnessed by the March 2017 demonstrations, which saw more than 10,000 drivers participate in protest actions throughout Russia, including in St. Petersburg, Kazan and Primorsky (Gordonua.com, March 27). The irony is that the while the West has tried to increase pressure on the Putin regime through external sanctions, the latter’s own short-sighted and avaricious actions may actually create far more significant problems.

]]>Coveting Thy Neighbor: Russia’s Kerch Bridge Enabling Seizure of Ukrainian Oil and Gashttps://jamestown.org/coveting-thy-neighbor-russias-kerch-bridge-enabling-seizure-ukrainian-oil-gas/
Wed, 06 Dec 2017 22:16:31 +0000https://jamestown.org/?p=78497In the heat of the spring and summer of 2014, a full-scale Russian invasion to create a land bridge to recently annexed Crimea appeared overwhelmingly likely. Such a move by Russia never materialized, though fears of its imminent possibility continued to crop up as violence and tensions along the Donbas front line flared up periodically over the past several years …

]]>In the heat of the spring and summer of 2014, a full-scale Russian invasion to create a land bridge to recently annexed Crimea appeared overwhelmingly likely. Such a move by Russia never materialized, though fears of its imminent possibility continued to crop up as violence and tensions along the Donbas front line flared up periodically over the past several years (see EDM, March 30). Yet, throughout this time, the Kremlin continued to seek to cement its hold on the Crimean peninsula. The long-dreamed-of Russian bridge to Crimea was seen as the solution, and planning began in March 2014 (TASS, April 21, 2016).

The combined road-and-rail bridge that will link Russia proper with Crimea (whose only physical land connection is with Ukraine) is currently under construction. The bridge crosses the Kerch Strait, which is a small international waterway that connects the Black Sea to the Sea of Azov, a strategic and economically important body of water for Ukraine (see EDM, July 13, September 6). The ports of Berdyansk and Mariupol lie in the Sea of Azov; in 2013, they handled 2.16 billion and 15.5 billion tons of cargo, respectively (Ccb.at.ua, March 19, 2014). Based on previous treaty agreements between Ukraine and Russia, a mutual arrangement must be reached before any construction in the Kerch Strait is allowed to begin (Fao.org, April 22, 2004). Indeed, the Ukrainian government has not agreed to the ongoing construction of the Kerch Strait Bridge by Russia. This flagrant violation of international law by Moscow, on top of the violation of international law from annexing Crimea, further isolates Russia and gives the West additional reason to sanction the country. Furthermore this $3.5 billion mega project is beset with immense technical and financial challenges that make constructing the bridge even more daunting (see EDM, March 25, 2016). Why then is the Kremlin so determined to see it through?

The answer perhaps lies in the Kremlin’s desire to cement its hold on the natural resources of both the Azov Sea as well as the northern Black Sea more broadly. The northern Black Sea is home to a vast amount of untapped oil and gas resources that Russia gained after its annexation of Crimea; and it has sought to secure its hold over these resources (see EDM, April 14, 2014 and February 17, 2016; The New York Times, May 17, 2014). Meanwhile, the resources found in the small area of the Ukrainian portion of the Sea of Azov amount to 20 billion cubic meters of natural gas, by the estimates of the Crimean oil and gas company Chernomorneftegaz. This is roughly worth $3.4 billion at European Union market price, without factoring in extraction costs (Rpi-research.com, 2012). In context, this would represent 10 percent of Russian state-owned Gazprom’s 2016 exports to Europe by volume (Gazpromexport.ru, accessed November 5). The Kremlin has shown how far it is willing to go to control Ukrainian resources in the Black Sea by illegally seizing them and then using military force to protect its claim (Dpsu.gov.ua, September 7, 2016). In a recent exercise, Russian units demonstrated that if a Ukrainian naval vessel attempted to reassert control over stolen assets, it would be met with a severe military response (UNIAN, October 20).

Given the disrepair of the Ukrainian navy, the construction of the Kerch Strait Bridge could represent the final step in turning the Azov Sea into a Russian lake (RIA Ukraine, March 27, 2014). Besides already adding additional military forces to the theater—essentially creating “Fortress Crimea” (see EDM, December 9, 2014; November 14, 2017)—the Kremlin has talked about allowing the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) to take jurisdiction over the bridge in order to prevent “terrorist actions,” and has overseen the construction of an Azov Fleet by the separatist, Moscow-backed government in Donetsk, giving Russia the ability to employ paramilitary as well as conventional military capabilities to respond to Ukrainian movements in this body of water (Komsomolskaya Pravda, September 9, 2016; Gordon, March 5, 2016). Furthermore, the very proportions of the bridge are such that they will severely limit the ability of Ukrainian vessels to navigate through the Kerch Strait into and out of the Azov Sea. And in fact, Russia has already closed the Strait entirely for short periods to complete construction (see EDM, September 6), and may try to do so again in the future based on any number of possible justifications.

In demonstrating that Russia is not afraid to flout international law in and around Crimea, it is likely that the construction of the Kerch Strait Bridge will enable it to do the same regarding the currently largely untapped resources in the Azov Sea (Usgs.gov, June 2011). Russia’s de facto control of the Azov Sea will only embolden it to seize existing oil and gas infrastructure and build new facilities to extract resources that are legally within Ukrainian maritime territory.

This all fits with Russia’s efforts to further cripple Ukraine’s access to the sea in order pursue a dual-track strategy of projecting Russian power along the northern Black Sea as well as to enrich the Kremlin and its allies as they exploit the natural resources in the wider Black Sea basin. These goals operate hand-in-hand and should be viewed as a continuation of Russia’s use of oil and gas not just as an instrument of foreign policy but also as a driver of it. Given this increased threat environment, Ukraine will need to continue to build its shore defense capabilities and adapt its naval strategy to respond appropriately to these threats. In Kyiv, the emphasis is often placed on the army at the expense of the navy, but as Russia more aggressively closes in on Ukrainian shores, the issue of a second front or amphibious landing near Mariupol necessitates that the government create a capable amphibious coastal defense force. Only time will tell if Ukraine will shift its strategy in time.

]]>Russia Bans Its Contract Soldiers From Online Social Networks, Prepares to Accept Foreign Citizens in the Armyhttps://jamestown.org/russia-bans-contract-soldiers-online-social-networks-prepares-accept-foreign-citizens-army/
Fri, 20 Oct 2017 17:45:59 +0000https://jamestown.org/?p=78140The Russian Ministry of Defense published a legislative proposal, on October 4, that introduces a number of critical changes to the law “On the status of military personnel” (RBC, October 4). The bill is supposed to become law in early 2018. The most crucial part of the proposal states that contact soldiers (kontraktniki) currently serving in the Russian Armed Forces …

]]>The Russian Ministry of Defense published a legislative proposal, on October 4, that introduces a number of critical changes to the law “On the status of military personnel” (RBC, October 4). The bill is supposed to become law in early 2018.

The most crucial part of the proposal states that contact soldiers (kontraktniki) currently serving in the Russian Armed Forces are prohibited to “publish on the Internet any personal information (including photos, video materials, data pertaining to geolocation and/or any other related information) or data that concerns other soldiers” that may contribute to identification of their current location, status and service (Regulation.gov.ru, accessed October 18). The “explanatory letter” accompanying the draft says that “personal data of Russian soldiers is being increasingly used for geopolitical [sic], terrorist, extremist and criminal purposes” (Newizv.ru, October 5). If this proposal becomes law, the Russian Armed Forces will follow the operational protocol of the Federal Security Service (FSB) and the Federal Protective Service (FSO).

The draft proposal also claims that personal data of Russian military personnel (pertaining to their current location and the kinds of tasks and activities they performed) could be used by “special forces of certain states as well as various terrorist and extremist organizations for the purpose of carrying out information-psychological effects aimed at destabilizing the internal situation [in Russia]” (TASS, October 4). This is a near-direct quote from the Russian Information/Cyber Doctrine of 2016 (see EDM, December 16, 2016).

Commenting on this legislation, the editor-in-chief of the military magazine Arsenal Otechestva, Viktor Murakhovsky, claimed that the proposal responds to the rapid development of new media and increasing use of various social networks among military personnel (Rosbalt, October 4). According to Murakhovsky, the legislation will significantly improve information security in the Russian Armed Forces.

A source within the Russian security services told the media outlet Vedomosti that personal information shared online by Russian soldiers “is being used by pro-Ukraine activists and special services as proof of Russian presence in the Donbas region.” The source also pointed to the fact that “there have been cases when the Bundeswehr [the German Armed Forces] and terrorist organizations have contacted Russian contract soldiers to extract information” (Vedomosti, October 4).

Indeed, with the help of various social networks (VKontakte and Odnoklassniki, in particular) international investigative reporters have collected and published data persuasively proving that Russia is sending military forces to Crimea and Donbas (RBC, October 2, 2014). In one well-known instance, the international investigative group B​​ellingcat unearthed a post by Donbas separatist commander Igor Strelkov made on Vkontakte, along with related materials, including mapping data and photos uploaded online. And based on this evidence, the organization concluded Malaysia Airlines Flight 17 (downed in July 2014, in an area of intensive fighting between Ukrainian armed forces and separatists) was a victim of a Russian Buk missile system (number 332) (Bellingcat.com, June 5, 2017).

However, Ukraine is not the only area where social networks have helped to shine a light on Russia’s presence: Syria is yet another telling example. Thanks to photos published on the Internet by a Russian soldier in November 2015, for instance, the Russian investigative group Conflict Intelligence Team (CIT) managed to trace his location (100 kilometers from Homs) and direction of movement, as well as identify the weapons he was equipped with (Citeam.org, November 7, 2015). Moreover, a recent “crowd-sourced” examination of Russian soldiers’ social media accounts have shown that, during August–October 2017, at least nine members of Russian private military companies were killed in Syria (In24.org, October 17, 2017).

The government’s proposed changes to the law “On the status of military personnel” have yet another, probably even more crucial aspect. Namely, the October 4 proposal explicitly prohibits the use of social networks not only by Russians, but by “foreign citizens who intend to serve in the Russian army as contract soldiers” as well. Undoubtedly, “foreign citizens” is meant to refer to nationals from the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO)—the alliance of post-Soviet countries led by Moscow. Arguably, this could mean Russia intends to use “foreign” contract soldiers in its military operations abroad (most likely, in Syria) (see EDM July 10). Incidentally, a recently published government document explicitly allows for this (Rosbalt, October 9). Finally, given frequent rumors about an upcoming Russian withdrawal from Syria (see EDM, October 17, 19), it would seem likely that the role of private military companies (see EDM, October 12) and “foreign personnel” will increase.

]]>Russian Karelia: Further Repressions Instead of European Integration?https://jamestown.org/russian-karelia-further-repressions-instead-of-european-integration/
Thu, 28 Sep 2017 16:46:08 +0000https://jamestown.org/?p=77875In Russian Karelia, there had been no election for the office of head of the republic since 2002. This year (September 10), such an election was finally held; and on September 25, Arthur Parfenchikov was officially inaugurated to the position. He had been serving as “temporary acting governor” since February, when Russian President Vladimir Putin appointed him to the post. …

In Russian Karelia, there had been no election for the office of head of the republic since 2002. This year (September 10), such an election was finally held; and on September 25, Arthur Parfenchikov was officially inaugurated to the position. He had been serving as “temporary acting governor” since February,when Russian President Vladimir Putin appointed him to the post.

The turnout for the September 10 local election in Karelia was low compared to other regions of Russia, which also held a vote on this day. Only 29 percent of citizens with the right to vote came to the polling stations, and of those only 61 percent voted for Parfenchikov. Simple algebra shows then Parfenchikov was elected by minority of the republic’s population, while the overwhelming majority simply ignored these elections. Nevertheless, under current Russian law, he became the legitimate head of the republic. The residents of Karelia were perfectly aware who the victor would be, given the lack of multi-party competition in modern-day Russia.

“Political technologists” (a post-Soviet term roughly analogous to Western campaign advisors, PR specialists and/or political analysts) for Parfenchikov’s election campaign assumed that he would win support as a “local native,” unlike the previous Kremlin appointee.But local Karelians were not so easily fooled. The Karelian poet and publicist Andrei Tuomirejected official claims of Parfenchikovas a “native Karelian,” since the latter man comes from the Ladoga village of Kurkijoki: “This territory is occupied, annexed, seized—until 1940, it belonged to a completely different state” (After Empire, August 29).

Moroever, Arthur Parfenchikov had not lived in Karelia at all for the past ten years, but instead headed the Federal Bailiffs Service, headquartered in Moscow. It seems hard to believe that he would have voluntarily agreed to leave this high post and move to Karelia—which, through the efforts of previous Kremlin appointees, had beenreduced to the level of a depressed “province.”

The Kremlin felt it was time to select a new Karelian leader because the previous head, Alexander Khudilainen, who controlledthe republic in 2012–2017, pushed Karelia into an acute economic crisis,triggeringmassive protests by the local population (Svoboda.org, April 9, 2015). Khudilainen—the governor “with the Finnish name”—showed even greater indifference to the local conditions of Karelia than former Russian governors. Under Khudilainen, the Petrozavodsk University closed the department of Baltic-Finnish philology and culture, which was the only such department in the Russian University system (Vesti.ru, March 18, 2013).

In fact, Khudilainen somewhat resembled the Kremlin appointee to head Karelia during the Soviet era, Otto Kuusinen, under whom the republic became associated primarily with the first Gulag camps, such as Belomorkanal and others.Under Khudilainen’s rule,Karelia once again became associated with massive violations of civil liberties. It should be remembered that Mikhail

Khodorkovsky served the final years of his prison term in Karelia. Vasiliy Popov, the leader of the Karelian branch of the Yabloko party, was forced to apply for political asylum in Finland under threat of criminal prosecution (Svoboda.org, February 17, 2017). And in further similarity to the Soviet era, in 2016 YuryDmitriev, a well-known historian and researcher of Stalinist-era terror, was detained in Karelia (Svoboda.org, June 1, 2017). Furthermore the republic’s “Center for Combating Extremism” routinely pursues bloggers simply for “likes” and reposts in social networks.

Modern Karelia could have had a completely different image. The republic is unique among all other regions in Russia in that it has the longest border with a European Union state, Finland,measuring about 1,000 kilometers. Even in the midst of political repression, cross-border Finnish-Karelian economic and cultural ties in the post-Soviet period were highly developed. In 2000,the project “Euroregion Karelia” united the Russian republic with three Finnish regions and sought to promote sustainable economic and social development. However, with the establishment of the further centralization of power in Russian politics and the curtailment of republican self-government, this project was abandoned (Mustoi.ru, February 25, 2016).

Today in Karelia, European integration programs have been completely forgotten. It is very indicative of future trends that the new governor is appointing“people in uniform” (his former colleagues from the Federal Bailiffs Service) for economic posts in the republican government (Mustoi.ru, September 21). These new appointees will certainly not have the right mindset for continued development of cross-border economic cooperation. Given the new leadership, it is possible that ordinary private trips of Karelian residents to neighboring Finland (for study, work or leisure) will now also come under suspicion. After all, these trips show to Russian citizens that the Russian propaganda claims of a “continuous crisis” in Europe are truly false.

]]>Why Does Kyrgyzstan Want a Second Russian Military Base?https://jamestown.org/why-does-kyrgyzstan-want-a-second-russian-military-base/
Thu, 03 Aug 2017 14:09:44 +0000https://jamestown.org/?p=77467Kyrgyzstan has had a Russian military base on its territory since handing over the Kant airfield to Moscow in 2003. And now it wants a second one. The Kyrgyz Republic’s president, Almazbek Atambayev, says that he would not be disturbed by having one and has even asked Russia to consider the matter, but he has not yet received an indication that …

]]>Kyrgyzstan has had a Russian military base on its territory since handing over the Kant airfield to Moscow in 2003. And now it wants a second one. The Kyrgyz Republic’s president, Almazbek Atambayev, says that he would not be disturbed by having one and has even asked Russia to consider the matter, but he has not yet received an indication that the Kremlin is interested (Centrasia.ru, July 25; Nezavisimaya Gazeta, July 24).

Other former Soviet republics, even those that enjoy good relations with Moscow, have been unwilling to even consider such a possibility. Indeed, most that have bases have worked hard to limit the size of the Russian military footprint in their countries, viewing it as a diminution of their sovereignty and independence. But Kyrgyzstan is different, and there are at least three reasons that have compelled Bishkek to consider this unusual possibility.

First, Kyrgyzstan finds itself the object of intense interest by the People’s Republic of China, its enormously powerful neighbor that is increasing its presence in the Kyrgyzstani economy and society (see EDM, November 7, 2012; February 13, 2014). A second Russian base on its territory would be a powerful signal to Beijing that there are real limits to the expansion of Chinese power in this direction.

Second, Kyrgyzstan has anything but warm relations with its two larger Central Asian neighbors, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. Its ties with the former are limited by economic competition, but its relations with the latter are fraught with difficulties. Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan have not agreed on the demarcation of their common border (see EDM, August 1, 2014), they have an ongoing dispute about water (Kyrgyzstan has a water surplus and Uzbekistan has a water shortage) (see EDM, September 13, 2016), and the sizeable ethnic-Uzbek population in the southern part of Kyrgyzstan has been in revolt against Bishkek on and off for the last two decades (see EDM, June 18, 2012).

And third, Kyrgyzstan fears it is threatened by Islamist violence and that Moscow is paying far more attention to its neighbors that adjoin Afghanistan—Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. If the Russians were to open a second base on Kyrgyzstan’s territory, many in Bishkek believe, it would pay more attention to the threat there and Kyrgyzstan would thus be more secure.

Given Vladimir Putin’s interest in restoring a Moscow-dominated imperial space across the former Soviet Union, why is the Russian government not rushing to say “yes” to Bishkek’s almost plaintive request? The answer is simple: money. While the Russian government would very much like to have more bases in Central Asia in general and in Kyrgyzstan in particular, it simply cannot afford taking that step now.

Moscow’s failure to respond positively to Bishkek on this issue is one of the best indications of just how overstretched the Russian military budget currently is as a result of Moscow’s actions in Ukraine and Syria and President Vladimir Putin’s commitment to rebuilding the navy—an expensive and probably unattainable goal (see EDM, August 1, 2017).

]]>Kaliningrad Separatism Again on the Risehttps://jamestown.org/kaliningrad-separatism-again-on-the-rise/
Wed, 02 Aug 2017 15:03:31 +0000https://jamestown.org/?p=77429Kaliningrad oblast, the non-contiguous part of the Russian Federation that Joseph Stalin formed after annexing much of German East Prussia at the end of World War II, has often been a hotbed of separatism since the end of the Soviet Union. In part, this is because the exclave is separated from Russia proper by Lithuania and Belarus. Moreover, Kaliningrad’s population …

]]>Kaliningrad oblast, the non-contiguous part of the Russian Federation that Joseph Stalin formed after annexing much of German East Prussia at the end of World War II, has often been a hotbed of separatism since the end of the Soviet Union. In part, this is because the exclave is separated from Russia proper by Lithuania and Belarus. Moreover, Kaliningrad’s population more often travels to Poland than to Moscow. Finally, its people, the descendants of peasants from Russia, Ukraine and Belarus, are without strong ethnic attachments and have commonly styled themselves as “the people of Koenigsberg”—a reference to the pre-Soviet name of the oblast’s capital city.

In the early 1990s, there was a powerful drive among many residents to become “the fourth Baltic republic,” but Moscow cracked down hard on that sentiment because of the importance of the oblast as a base for the Russian Baltic Fleet, which could no longer use ports in the Baltic countries. But in the last three years, worsening economic conditions in the oblast, cutbacks in Moscow’s subsidies to its government (Ecfr.eu, November 7, 2016), and the contrast between life in this Russian exclave and life in Lithuania and Poland has increased separatist sentiment once again, not only among ordinary people but also, importantly, among the oblast’s intellectual elite.

This development, which has so far attracted relatively little attention outside the oblast, came to its latest peak at a meeting of the Kaliningrad branch of the Academy of Geopolitical Problems. Its members discussed the course developed by scholars at the Kant Baltic Federal University and called on Moscow to remove it and all supporting materials from school programs there. According to the participants, this course has been promoting “pro-German” and thus “anti-Russian” attitudes, which is the way separatism is typically discussed in Kaliningrad (Kaliningrad.glavny.tv, July 15).

The meeting further called on the Russian authorities to dismiss Andrey Klemeshev, the rector of Kant University and the author of the lead article of this course. The Academy members accused Klemeshev of promoting “academic separatism” and treason and seeking to split “the self-consciousness of Kaliningrad’s young people from Great Russia.”

Father Georgy Biryukov, the pastor of the Holy Spirit Orthodox Church in the oblast and a participant in the roundtable, told the local media that “for a long time already we have seen the return to Kaliningrad oblast of separatism and anti-Russian attitudes.” In addition to the Klemeshev case, the Orthodox priest pointed to the Federal Security Service’s (FSB) arrest of a member of the pseudo-nationalist BARS organization, which in fact is promoting pro-German attitudes, and to the increasing interest in Kaliningrad’s population in erecting monuments to “German residents of Eastern Prussia […] who killed our soldiers on the Eastern Front.” Though all these may seem like relatively insignificant developments on their own, together they point to a potential growing trend bubbling just beneath the surface in Russia’s most “exposed” region.

]]>Armenia’s Hands Are Tied Regarding Russian Arms Sales to Azerbaijanhttps://jamestown.org/armenias-hands-are-tied-regarding-russian-arms-sales-to-azerbaijan/
Thu, 27 Jul 2017 01:48:41 +0000https://jamestown.org/?p=77380The Azerbaijani Ministry of Defense reported, on July 10, on a new batch of military equipment and ammunition purchased from Russia (Mod.gov.az, July 10). The projectiles, rockets and other military equipment are being shipped to Azerbaijan under the bilateral agreement on military-technical cooperation. Initially, Russia transferred the S-300 PMU2 Favorit air defense system to Azerbaijan, which had been intended for Iran. …

]]>The Azerbaijani Ministry of Defense reported, on July 10, on a new batch of military equipment and ammunition purchased from Russia (Mod.gov.az, July 10). The projectiles, rockets and other military equipment are being shipped to Azerbaijan under the bilateral agreement on military-technical cooperation.

Initially, Russia transferred the S-300 PMU2 Favorit air defense system to Azerbaijan, which had been intended for Iran. After that, according to the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms, Moscow supplied not less than 110 units of BTR-82A and BMP-3 infantry fighting vehicles, 100 units of T-90S battle tanks, 12 units of 9K123-1 Khrizantema-S anti-tank missile systems, BM-30 Smerch multiple-launch rocket systems and 6 units of TOC-1A Solntsepek heavy flame thrower systems to Baku (Unroca.org, accessed July 24). Officially, the detailed information on this arms contract has not been disclosed by either the Russian Federation or Azerbaijan.

Yerevan, Moscow’s closest ally in the region, had repeatedly expressed dissatisfaction with Russian arms sales to Baku, especially after the outbreak of fighting along the Line of Contact in Karabakh, in April 2016 (see EDM, May 18, 2016). Thus, Minister of Defense Vigen Sargsyan responded negatively to the latest reported arms shipment (Radio Azatutyun, June 26). Subsequently, Armenian President Serzh Sargsyan noted that the Russian arms sales to Baku are the most problematic issue of the Armenian-Russian relationship (Armeniasputnik.am, July 17).

Armenia is a member of the Russian-led Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) and, according to Moscow’s assurances, remains Russia’s strategic partner (Armeniasputnik.am, March 3). Therefore, it is unclear why Yerevan, aware of actively developing military cooperation between Moscow and Baku, has not retaliated in any meaningful way. After all, Russia’s assurances that the weapons sold to Azerbaijan would not be used against Armenia and the Armenian people have not been fulfilled. Every new batch of weapons to Baku increases the risk of military escalation along the Line of Contact (for example, in April 2016 and July 2017). Some Russian experts and officials, including Alexander Timofeev and Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev (Sluzhuotechestvu.info, July 1, 2013; Vesti.ru, April 9, 2016), believe that arms sales are an element of political leverage over Baku. Russian Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Rogozin has even suggested Moscow’s arms sales are necessary to maintain the military balance in the region (RIA Novosti, April 4, 2016). Other analysts, including Grant Mikaelyan, Konstantin Makienko and Ali Gadzhizade, focus on the revenue it brings to the Russian federal budget (Moscow-baku.ru, July 5, 2017; Iarex.ru, June 20, 2013)

Nevertheless, Yerevan continues to adhere to its “proven” approach. President Sargsyan has stated that Armenia should consider such measures carried out by Russia as part of Moscow’s long-term political activity to stabilize the situation in the region (Panorama.am, July 17). This passive position may be explained by several factors:

First, 60–80 percent of Armenia’s energy sector (power distribution, power generation and gas distribution) is concentrated in the hands of Russian public corporations, according to various estimates (see EDM, June 27).

Second, the active expansion of Russian banks into the Armenian financial sector has significantly increased (they now make up around a 60 percent share of the foreign capital).

Third, Yerevan still largely depends on Moscow militarily. In terms of the country’s defense posture, Armenian is closely connected to Russia’s 102nd military base, near Gyumri. Under the bilateral treaty covering the base, any external threat to Armenia will be treated in Moscow as a threat to Russia. Moreover, Moscow and Yerevan ratified a treaty on the operation of a joint Russian-Armenian air defense system, in June 2016. Additionally, Russia still remains the key supplier of armaments and ammunition to Armenia (see EDM, November 30, 2016; September 26, 2016).

Thus, despite its growing dissatisfaction with Russian arms sales to Baku, Yerevan has no other choice but to act with an eye toward Moscow. In other words, under the current circumstances, Armenian security issues trump all other economic, social or political considerations.

]]>Navalny-Strelkov Debate Inadvertently Highlights Key Similarities Between Alexei Navalny and Vladimir Putinhttps://jamestown.org/navalny-strelkov-debate-inadvertently-highlights-key-similarities-between-alexei-navalny-and-vladimir-putin/
Mon, 24 Jul 2017 21:09:22 +0000https://jamestown.org/?p=77345On Thursday, July 17, at 12:00 p.m., Alexei Navalny, the leader of the opposition to Vladimir Putin and a prospective candidate in the 2018 presidential election, sat down for a debate with Igor Stelkov, the leader of the “Novorossiya” (“New Russia”) social movement and part of the “January 25” committee. The debate, which took place in the studio of Navalny’s …

]]>On Thursday, July 17, at 12:00 p.m., Alexei Navalny, the leader of the opposition to Vladimir Putin and a prospective candidate in the 2018 presidential election, sat down for a debate with Igor Stelkov, the leader of the “Novorossiya” (“New Russia”) social movement and part of the “January 25” committee. The debate, which took place in the studio of Navalny’s Fund Against Corruption organization, was broadcast on the Internet through Navalny’s YouTube channel, NavalnyLIVE, as well as a broadcaster aligned with Strelkov (YouTube, July 17). The independent Russian TV station Dozhd and even the news agency Reuters also broadcast this event. Strelkov had challenged Navalny to this debate, and, at the beginning of the video, Navalny declares, “I am on the side of an open political discussion; of course, I am not afraid of a debate.” Journalist Mikhail Tsigarem served as the moderator.

Before the start, each speaker posed three questions to the other. Stelkov’s questions to Navalny were: 1) How does Navalny plan to fight against corruption? 2) What can be done about relations with the West? and 3) What should be done about the situation in Donbas? Navalny’s questions to Strelkov were: 1) Why did Strelkov give a press conference condemning corruption under a portrait of Vladimir Putin, who Navalny called “the godfather of Russian corruption,” and why did Strelkov support the Russian president or refer to him as “the guarantor of freedom and independence of the country?” (2) Why did Strelkov repeat Kremlin anti-Western propaganda? and (3) Why have you, “a [military] officer with an understanding of honor,” been silent about who downed the Boeing 777 (a reference to Malaysian Airlines Flight 17, from Amsterdam to Kuala Lumpur, which was shot down, on June 17, 2014, by a Russian surface-to-air missile, over eastern Ukraine, killing all aboard)?

Strelkov responded to Navalny’s first question by saying that he had not supported Putin for a long time, as he disagreed with the latter’s actions in Chechnya. But when the Kremlin “reunited” Russia with Crimea they “crossed the Rubicon” and he was sure that the next step would be “cleaning up our own [corrupt] environment.” When that failed to happen, his support for Putin declined. Strelkov followed up by charging that Navalny only wanted to make “cosmetic” changes to the oligarchic system established in the 1990s and that he would not change the “base” of the oligarchic system. For his part, Navalny answered that “free courts and honest elections are not cosmetic changes” and that he saw himself as a sincere patriot.

To answer the second question about repeating anti-Western propaganda, Strelkov gave a potted history of how the West had always opposed Russia and was “categorically against the unification of the Russian people [a reference to Crimea].” He went on to state that the boundaries of the “great Russian people” extended to Russia, Little Russia (Ukraine), and Belorussia (Belarus). Perhaps the most interesting part of the debate came in the third round, when Strelkov asked Navalny whether the boundaries of the Russian state were those of the Russian nation. Navalny’s simple answer in the negative led to his defense of his nationalist credentials, which came close to repeating some of the neo-imperialist thinking coming out of the Kremlin. Navalny said the war in Donbas was not (currently) “profitable” and this—not disagreement with its aims—was the reason for his opposition (Newsland.com, July 20).

Overall, the debate was rather tame but highlighted the amount of agreement between the opposition and the government on issues of ethnicity and statehood. More than anything else, it is this agreement and well-established nationalist views that suggest a Navalny government would likely share some key features of the current regime.