DM-theorists frequently assert that "contradictions" (in nature or
society) may be understood as the inter-relationship between "opposing forces".
These forces condition one another, and, according to some, they operate either in equilibrium or in
disequilibrium, depending on circumstances -- but, only as revealed by careful scientific
analysis, tested in practice.1

Citations like those
listed in Note 1 -- that make the same point -- can be multiplied
almost indefinitely. To be sure, such passages are often accompanied by
extensive qualifications, depending on context, but the overall message is
reasonably clear.2

Nevertheless, my concern here is not so much with whether these passages are
consistent with one another, or even whether any attempt has (ever) been
made to substantiate the sweeping statements they contain with adequate evidence --
or any at all --, but with
whether the idea that forces can model contradictions itself makes any
sense.3

As we will see, the identification of forces with contradictions
is highly dubious, at best.4
There are several obvious initial difficulties with the whole idea. For example,
if the forces in a system are in 'conflict' -- and are hence 'contradictory' --
there would clearly have to be at least two forces present, operational and
oppositional for that to be the case. But when we consider one of the most important
and general types of motion found in the universe -- the orbital trajectory
of bodies in a gravitational field -- we find that in classical Physics, at
least, this sort of motion is governed by the operation of at most one
force, which deflects the otherwise (assumed) rectilinear path of the body in
question toward the
centre of mass of the system. So, if classical Physics is correct, it is
not easy to see how such forces could be viewed as 'contradictions'.5

Even post-classical Physics offers little comfort for
DM-theorists; here such motion is either a function of the topology of
Spacetime (gravitational 'force' having been edited out of the picture), or it
is the result of a body being situated in a
tensor,
vector and/or
scalar field, in as
many dimensions of
phase space as are deemed necessary.6

"[The eliminability of force]...is not confined
to the force of gravitation. The question of whether forces of any kind
do exist, or do not and are only conventions, ha[s] become the subject of heated
debates....

"In quantum chromodynamics, gauge theories, and
the so-called Standard Model the notion of 'force' is treated only as an
exchange of momentum and therefore replaced by the ontologically less demanding
concept of 'interaction' between particles, which manifests itself by the
exchange of different particles that mediate this interaction...." [Jammer
(1999), p.v.]6a

Even comrades Woods and Grant acknowledge this fact:

"Gravity is not a 'force,' but a relation between real
objects. To a man falling off a high building, it seems that the ground is
'rushing towards him.' From the standpoint of relativity, that observation is
not wrong. Only if we adopt the mechanistic and one-sided concept of 'force' do
we view this process as the earth's gravity pulling the man downwards, instead
of seeing that it is precisely the interaction of two bodies upon each other."
[Woods and Grant (1995), p.156.]

However, and despite what these two say, a mere "relation"
between two bodies would be incapable of making one or both of them move, unless there was a force there (or
something else consequent on that relation -- such as a time-based
trajectory along a "world-line",
perhaps?) to bring this about.

Unfortunately, this now means that most (if not all) of the
bulk
motion in the universe cannot be accounted for by DM (that is, if it is viewed as the result of
'contradictions', which are then interpreted as opposing forces). Plainly, if there is only one
force present (or perhaps none at all), there could be no dialectical
'contradictions'. Hence, it would seem that DM can't explain much -- if any -- of the
movement found in nature.

[DM = Dialectical Materialism.]

Admittedly, Engels made a weak attempt to solve the orbital 'problem' by
inventing a repulsive force, which he implausibly identified with "heat";
this fanciful notion is discussed in Note 7.7

In view of the above, it might be wise to interpret "opposing
forces" as figurative 'contradictions' -- or, maybe, the other way
round, interpreting 'contradictions' as figurative "forces". Either or both
of these could
then form part of an analogical or perhaps metaphorical (but non-literal)
depiction of nature. Alternatively, forces could be described as
'contradictions' as a part of a sort of shorthand, which would then enable the modelling
of different types of accelerated motion. Naturally, that approach would allow the word "force" to be
edited out of the picture as a physical entity in its own right. Indeed, Engels
seems to have had this in mind in the quotation below,
where he argues that attraction and repulsion should not be regarded as
forces, but as simple forms of motion. This retreat was perhaps
recommended to him by his admission that the concept "force" was derived from
ancient animistic/mystical views of nature, hence its use in DM could
smack of anthropomorphism:8

"All motion is bound up with some change of
place…. The whole of nature accessible to us forms a system, an interconnected
totality of bodies…. [These] react one on another, and it is precisely this
mutual reaction that constitutes motion…. When two bodies act on each other…they
either attract each other or they repel each other…in short, the old polar
opposites of attraction and repulsion…. It is expressly to be
noted that attraction and repulsion are not regarded here as so-called
'forces', but as simple forms of motion.... [Engels (1954), pp.70-71.
Bold emphasis added.]

"All natural processes are two-sided, they are
based on the relation of at least two operative parts, action and reaction.
The notion of force, however, owing to its origin from the action of the human
organism on the external world…implies that only one part is active, the
other part being passive…[and appearing] as a resistance." [Ibid.,
p.82.
Bold emphasis added.]

However, this revision has two untoward consequences
Engels appears not to have noticed:

(1) It makes his version of DM look even more positivistic
that it already seems (at least in DN). If the appeal to forces in nature is no
more than a shorthand for the relative motion of bodies, then forces will have
no real counterparts in nature. The whole idea would then be little more than a
"useful fiction", invented to account for the phenomena
instrumentally. This would make the identification of forces with contradictions
even more problematic (as will be
demonstrated below); plainly, and once again: if there are no forces, there can be no
DM-'contradictions'.

(2) Given this re-write of the word "force", the contradictory
relationship between bodies would become little more than a re-description of their relative
motion. [Woods and Grant seem to be thinking along these lines, as we saw
earlier.]

Unfortunately, in that case, there would be no
interconnection between such bodies -- which is an essential factor, required by other DM-theses.
This seems to mean that causal interactions of this sort would now be externally-motivated, and not mediated by forces,
or be internally-driven. On this account, the 'unity-in-opposition' between antagonistic elements in
the Totality would have been sundered; the thesis that change is the result of 'internal
contradictions' would then be left without any sort of internal or mediating source.

Even the relative motion between bodies travelling in opposite
directions could not supply a credible dialectical
connection here, should such bodies interact, Clearly, this would fail to capture the "internal relations" that
DM-theorists claim exist between such bodies. Objects behaving like this would
not be internally interrelated (as part/parts of a UO), since the connection
(mediation) between bodies in motion would be missing. Hence, any
subsequent interaction would be difficult to account for philosophically, which
would not be good news for dialecticians.9

As already noted, with events and processes
sealed-off from each other in this way DM would begin to resemble
CAR and/or 'crude materialism'
all the more.
Of course, even if Engels's version of DM could account for motion
occurring along a certainline of action -- but in diametrically opposed
directions --, it would be of little help because most of the bulk motion in the
universe is not of this sort; it is either orbital or motion along a
geodesic
(depending on which version of modern Physics one attends to). In fact, as we
will see, matter in general moves in complex ways which are difficult if not
impossible to depict in oppositional terms.

Like it or not, DM-theorists needreal material forces
to act between
bodies so that their Totality has the holistic/mediated integrity it requires; a
theoretical fiction would be no use at all. Forces must exist, and reference
to them as 'contradictions', 'internally-related' to one another, must be
literal.10

Anyway, the figurative reading of forces as
'contradictions' runs counter to the claim advanced by dialecticians that they
are offering a literal and 'objective' account of nature. It is not at all easy
to see how figurative language can fill in the physical gaps in an explanation,
any more than, say, the following can account for Juliet's beauty:

"But, soft! what light through yonder window breaks?
It is the east, and Juliet is the sun."

Or, at least, any more than would describing a man as a "pig"
imply he has a curly tail and is a potential source of bacon.

Despite this, in view of the above difficulties -- in addition to those
retailed below --, interpreting forces
figuratively might prove to be the only viable way that contradictions could
be regarded as 'forces', even if this compromises DM's avowedly 'objective' picture
of reality.11

Of course, if this view of the nature of forces were adopted by
dialecticians, it would be difficult to distinguish
their theory either
from
Instrumentalism or from
Conventionalism.

However, and once again, it is not easy to see how
'figurative forces' could account for anything; what sort of explanation would
it be to say that contradictions -- already themselves suspiciously figurative
-- were modelled by forces, which were figures of speech, too? Describing a man as, say, a "pig" might
perhaps account for his crude behaviour (but not on the basis of his anatomy or
physiology as a literal pig), but the utility of this metaphor would be virtually nil if it were
now admitted that the word "man" was figurative too. Unlike
iterated negations, multiple
tropes do not cancel.

Nevertheless, even if this proves to be an acceptable resolution
of Engels's problem, it would still not provide DM-theorists with a
viable way
out of their difficulties. Taken literally or figuratively, the equation
of DM-'contradictions' with forces cannot work -- whether this applies to events in
nature or society. This is so for several reasons.

The first of these is connected with the way that forces are
already represented in mathematics, for example --, which does not appear to be even remotely appropriate
for exportation and use in depicting contradictions as literal forces. Consider the
following:

(A) Forces often operate according to an
inverse square law.
It is not easy to see how the same could be true of contradictions. Presumably, two objects, states of affairs or processes
contradict each other in nature or society or they do not.12Not much sense can be made, one presumes(!), of the idea that a contradiction could
operate with, say, only 25% of its former intensity (or whatever the
appropriate descriptor is here) if the distance between its oppositional elements is doubled. Do bosses
really become more conciliatory if workers walk away from them? Does wealth
cause less conflict if the rich move their money to the Cayman Islands? Do
appearances contradict reality any the more if someone uses a microscope, or
presses his/her face against a desk?13

Indeed, little sense could be given to the idea that there
is a literalseparation distance between such elements -- for
instance, that there is, or could be, one such between Capital and Labour, or that
there might be one between the "forces and relations of production",
or that there is another between a body and itself as it
moved along in a 'contradictory' sort of way. What could it possibly mean to
suggest, for example, that the "contradiction between use value and exchange
value" changes if the two are further apart? Clearly, these two
'entities' cannot be separated (except perhaps in thought), but even if they
could, they would still be just as contradictory as they were before (one
presumes?). And yet, no force in nature has its local or remote strength unaffected
by such changes.

Sure, dialecticians speak about the "contradictions" in the
capitalist system "intensifying", but this is not because the 'separation
distance' between the classes has decreased. Whatever DM-theorists in fact mean
by "intensification" here (which seems be that the alleged "contradictions"
become more obvious, intractable or crisis-ridden), they certainly do not mean
it in the same way that physicists mean it when they talk about, say, the
strength of a force field intensifying. Nor is there any mathematics involved.
Indeed, while a technician might be dispatched to measure the intensity of a force
field in genuine scientific research, no one ever seems to have been asked to do
the same with these
"intensifying" 'dialectical contradictions'. They (or at least their
'strength') appear to be permanently locked in subjective space, stubbornly impervious to scientific investigation.

Odd that...

(B) Forces in nature can be represented by
vectors,
the use of which is
governed by
well-understood rules. As such,
for example, they may be inclined at various angles to one another, added,
subtracted and multiplied (to give
inner,
vector or
scalar triple products, and
the like) -- and by means of which, diverse quantities, such as areas, volumes, field densities,
boundary flux (etc.), may be calculated. In addition, vectors may be parallel
or orthogonal,
to one another, or to previously defined axes, just as they may be decomposed into their components and
projected
onto a given direction, plane or surface. They can be used to identify and
classify the mathematical properties of
manifolds. Unit vectors can be defined
in a given vector space, providing it with a base and
spanning set.
Modulii can be
ascertained for any given vector, and so-called "Eigenvectors" can be
calculated. Furthermore,
matrices can be employed to represent vectors more
efficiently, their
determinants
and
inverses thus calculated. The ordinary and
partial derivatives
of vectors may be derived --
and, finally, they can be integrated (as part of
line,
surface or
volume
integrals), and so on.

It is difficult to see how any of the above (and a many
others) could be true of a single DM-'contradiction' interpreted (literally or
metaphorically) as a force. What, for example, is the angle between the
'contradictions' mentioned on the opening pages of TAR:

"[S]ince the Second World War there have been 149
wars which have left more than 23 million dead…. On an average yearly basis, the
numbers killed in wars during this period have been more than double the deaths
in the nineteenth century and seven times greater than in the eighteenth
century…. Regression, by any criterion. Yet it is the very same development of
human productivity that gives rise both to the possibility of life and to its
destruction….

"Everywhere we look another paradox appears. How
can it be, for instance, that in the richest capitalist society in the world,
the United States, real weekly incomes have fallen steadily since 1973?… How is
it that in Britain, where the economy, despite the ravages of recession,
produces more than it has ever done…a full quarter of the population live below
the poverty line?

"The contradictions are no less striking if we shift our gaze
from economics to politics. The introduction of the market to Russia and Eastern
Europe was supposed to bring stability and prosperity but has actually produced
the opposite." [Rees (1998), pp.1-2.]

And what is the
cross
product between these found in Socialist Worker:

"Elvis's career illuminated a contradiction at the heart of capitalism.
Capitalism needs to generate profits in order to survive. But to suck profit out
of workers it also needs an ideology to ensure that workers know their place in
society...." [Ian Birchall,
Socialist Worker, 14/08/07.]

"However, there are contradictions in the role of prison officers.

"It is summed up by Cardiff prisoners chanting "you're breaking the law" to
the strikers....

"Prison officers' work, upholding law and order, frequently pushes them to
accept the most right wing ideas and actions of the system. One of their main
jobs is to control prisoners –- and throughout the prison system, many officers
have a proven record of racism and violence.

"Some of the contradictions can be seen in the strike. In Liverpool the POA
shop steward Steve Baines responded to the high court injunction by telling
fellow strikers, "Tell them to shove it up their arse, we're sitting it out."

"Yet when prisoners in the jail protested against their treatment, the POA
members rushed back in to control the situation and end a roof top protest." [Simon Basketter,
Socialist Worker, 30/08/07.]13a

Is it possible to find the inner
product of the 'contradiction' between freedom and necessity? Is there an
eigenvector applicable to the 'contradiction' between appearance and underlying
essence? Is there any way of specifying the extent to which bosses and workers -- Capital and Labour --
contradict one another, individually or as classes? If so, what is the modulus
of the 'contradiction' between boss NN and worker MM (or that between the
classes to which they belong)? Is the 'contradiction' between ice and water
orthogonal to…, well what?

But, what of the
div, curl and grad of the
'contradiction' between a grain of barley and the plant that grows from it? Can
we ascertain the
Jacobian for the contradictory relationship between wealth and poverty? Is
the 'contradiction', between "John" and his "manhood" normal to a given
direction or manifold?

In her otherwise excellent book, Lindsey German says the following:

"The Working class has to have a party to
overcome the contradiction between its potential revolutionary role and its
actual situation. To overcome this contradiction requires a conscious struggle
by an organised minority…." [German (1996), p.87.]

But, if contradictions were literal forces, we would be able to
ascertain, say, the i, j and k components of "the contradiction between [the] potential
revolutionary role [of the working-class] and its actual situation",
differentiate them, and find out how quickly the said link was changing, and in
what direction.14
The fact that we can't
do this -- and no sane Marxist has ever even so much as attempted to do it (nor
yet even theorised about doing this) -- suggests perhaps that
in practice not even DM-fans think this analogy is at all apt, or,
indeed, all
that literal.

Hence, if 'contradictions' could be interpreted literally
as forces, it would be possible to construct a vector algebra depicting them in nature and as part of the class struggle. Do we possess such a
'Vector Algebra of
Revolution'? Has anyone ever bothered to construct one? Given the title of his
book, the author of TAR
was strangely silent on this issue.

The second reason why this is an inappropriate way to depict
'contradictions' arises from a consideration of the sort of response that could
be made to the objections outlined above; it could be claimed that it's the
inter-relationship between contradictory forces that explains change, and
hence that it is only within a network of forces situated in a Totality
of some sort that the contradictory inter-play between them becomes clear. Indeed, it could
be argued that the above interpretation of contradictions (which pictures them as seemingly
isolated entities) completely misconstrues both their role in DM and their
operation in nature and society.

This volunteered objection was in fact considered in
Part One
of this Essay -- but from a slightly different angle -- where it was pointed out
that there is a serious ambiguity in DM/'Materialist Dialectics' on this issue.
That is because
DM-theorists are hopelessly unclear whether 'contradictions' are (1) internal to objects
and processes (causing them to change as a result of an internal dynamic), or
whether they (2) merely arise externally between objects (as they
form part of a mediated system, group of systems or processes), or (3) if it is just our
description of objects and processes which is 'contradictory' (this
resulting from our partial knowledge of reality, etc.), or (4) if it is a
combination of all three -- or indeed whether something else is true of
these elusive DM-'contradictions'.

And as we also
saw in
Part One of this Essay, while each of these options faces serious difficulties
of its own,
they all fail to explain change since they merely re-describe
it in an inappropriate and obscure form. Worse still, they become incoherent when
examined closely (as we will soon see is also the case with respect to forces and
'contradictions').

In response to this, it could be argued that the problem with the
sort of analysis of dialectical systems presented here is that it
attempts to 'objectify' contradictions (i.e., make objects out of them).
Hence, it could be pointed out that in Materialist Dialectics it is not 'objects' that are
subject to contradictions -- or contain them, or which are them --, but
systems/totalities in change that reveal their inner contradictions, the latter
of which in turn drive change along. In that case, it could be maintained that
contradictions are properties of systems/totalities in the process of change and
development, but not of objects as such.

In reply to these volunteered DM-responses it is worth asking where
this leaves forces if contradictions are no longer to be viewed as objects or as
object-like. Forces presumably have a physical form of some sort; they are not just
relations, are they?

But, even if they were, it is far from easy to see what
it is that could possibly physically relate objects and processes in nature and society,
that is, over and above a
few Hegelian 'concepts' of dubious provenance and even more
dubious content.

Indeed, in all this it seems that the idea that objects change because of an
'inner dynamic' has been lost again. If objects change only because of a set of
external forces -- albeit internal to a "Totality", mediated or not by the obscure 'influence' of that
"Totality" --, this can only mean that
"external" has now become the new "internal". In that case,
"internal contradictions" are in effect those which an object merely experiences in
its external relations with other objects and processes in a given "Totality". But, once more: what is the point of arguing that change is
"internally-motivated" if external mediation is the only show in town, and
forces are merely "relations"?

[As we will see in Essay Three Part Three, these "relations" are
'logical' anyway, and no less bogus for all that.]

In addition, the proffered DM-response outlined a few paragraphs back fails to
resolve the problems mentioned earlier. First of all, as we will also see in Essay
Eleven Part One, there is good reason to question the nature of the nebulous DM-"Totality"
-- or, to be more honest, there would be if we knew what 'it' was (and there
was some sign that dialecticians themselves knew what 'it' was!). Its re-appearance here
can only cloud the issues, therefore.

Secondly, even if
a clear account of the "Totality" were forthcoming, this way of depicting
forces would still not work. If contradictions are properties of
totalities -- and not of their parts -- then the parts could not change,
since, on this account, contradictions would not belong to them, but to the
whole, taken as a whole. In that case, while the whole might change, it would do
so only as a
result of the rearrangement of its changeless parts. [This was argued in
detail in Part One
of this Essay.] Given this way of thinking,
the "Totality" (or, indeed, any sub-totality) would be composed of infinitely small
changeless elementary particles, or it (they) would be
composed of infinitely complex further sub-systems, themselves enjoying no interconnections.
[The reader is referred back to Part One
for more details.]

Again, it could be objected that a Totality is constituted by its
own internal contradictory processes; that is precisely what a Totality is
--
a contradictory, differentiated unity. The account given above seems to want to
separate the parts from the whole.

However, this reply will still not do, for on that account
it would now seem that it is both part and whole which is contradictory
(and in a manner that is still unclear). And yet, such parts can't be
contradictory in the same way that wholes are. This is because, on this account, parts mutually condition one another; this,
presumably, is the nature of their mediated unity in contradiction. However, the
"Totality" is
related to nothing else that could condition it (since the 'it' is not separable from
its parts). So, if the "Totality" is a contradictory whole, then it would
have to be such in a new and as yet unspecified sense.

In fact, as
seems obvious from what little DM-theorists themselves have told anyone about their
"Totality", it looks like
'it' must be an unconditioned Absolute. It certainly cannot be conditioned from the
'outside', otherwise
it would not be the Whole. Of course, if on the other hand, it were
conditioned from the 'outside', an infinite 'exgress' (inflation) would be
implied, for, plainly, we should want to know how this 'other thing' (about which we know
even less) was conditioned, and by what -- and so on. But we have been
here already.

It seems
that these
observations must apply otherwise,
for the "Totality" to be contradictory, it would have to 'contradict' its
parts. Ex hypothesi it would have to do this anyway, since there is nothing else
for it to condition. Moreover these parts must then
contradict each other in turn in the same way, after all. [The opposite
supposition will be considered presently.]

And yet, if the "Totality"
is composed solely of its parts (unless it is more than its parts -- that particular
dead end is revealed for what it is in Essay Eleven
Part Two), the contradiction between
the "Totality" and its parts must (1) be the same as the contradiction between each of
the aforementioned
parts. In that case, it seems that the "Totality" could drop out of the picture as
a shorthand for the sum total of parts in contradictory change. It, too, would
become a mere fiction -- only this time a useless one.15

On the other hand, (2) if the "Totality" were more than the sum
of its parts (as all dialecticians seem to believe),16we would then be owed an explanation of the alleged 'contradiction' between
this 'more' and that 'less' -- that is, between this 'more-of-a-"Totality"' and its lesser
parts.
But, as things stand, we have no idea whether this new 'contradictory' relation between whole
and part is the same as that which operates between the parts, or if it is
different.

[Anyone impatient with this nit-picking should re-direct their
complaints to their local Dialectical Magus; this enforced
pedantry is necessary because, even now,
after 140+ years, dialecticians have yet to tell us
what these 'forces' are, how they can possibly 'contradict' one another, and
what their mysterious "Totality"
actually is.]

However, independently of a resolution to the last series of
problems ever
being attempted, this 'theory' still faces other serious difficulties. If the
'contradiction' between the whole and its parts is the same as (and no more
than) that which exists between the parts, then manifestly the whole would
not then be more than the sum of the parts (in at least this respect), since the whole would in that
case be the entire 'contradictory' whole, all of whose elements (whole and part)
operate alike. But, this would be contrary to the DM-hypothesis that
wholes (whether these are wholes made of 'contradictory' parts or not) are more
than the sum of their parts, whose natures (including the nature of their
"internal
contradictions") are said to be determined entirely by (while not reducible
to) the nature of their
parts, and their interconnections. Conversely, if the 'contradiction' between the whole and its parts were
not the same as that between the parts themselves, then we would still have
an unexplained type of 'contradiction': that which exists between a whole that
is more than the sum of the parts and those parts.17

Anyway, the idea that the whole 'contradicts' the parts in the
same way that the parts do one another does not appear to be a viable option for
DM-theorists. The parts relate to each other by "mediation, apparently; but how
can the part-whole relation be one of mediation? The mutually 'contradictory'
nature of the parts in development constitutes the whole; if now the whole has
its own 'contradictory' relation with the parts over and above this (if it is
more than the sum of the parts), then this new 'contradictory' relation cannot
be one of part on part. But, if it is not this, then what is it?

Hence, as noted in
Part One of this Essay, it seems that a literal
interpretation of 'contradictions' as forces lapses either into some form of CAR,
or expands into HEX/AIDS. Conversely, if the identification of forces with
contradictions is figurative, then DM would be indistinguishable from,
say, metaphysical poetry; and a rather prolix version, at that.

However, in order to examine this issue more thoroughly, let us assume that the above objections are totally misguided in some as yet
unspecified way. In addition, let us further suppose that some sort of solution to all
the above 'difficulties' can be found -- by someone at some point, somehow.

Even then the analogy between forces and contradictions would
not work

The substantiation of this latest claim brings this discussion to
the third reason for questioning the connection between forces and
'contradictions'.

In a physical system there may be several different combinations
of interacting attractive and/or repulsive forces. If we abbreviate "attractive"
and "repulsive" to "A" and "R", respectively, there appear to be only three
types of combinations of just two of these: "AA-", "AR-" and "RR-forces".18

Many of the quotations given in
Note
1
seem to imply that only AR-forces are 'contradictory'. This sort of combination
will be examined later. However, AA- and RR-forces were not explicitly ruled
out, and in a thoroughgoing analysis of every conceivable option
available to DM-theorists, these clearly need to be considered. Hence, it is to
these that we now turn.

Unfortunately, it is difficult to see how AA-forces could be
interpreted as unities of opposites -- let alone as 'contradictory'. They
are the same, so they can hardly be opposites. But, such
forces abound in nature. For example, as noted earlier, the centre of gravity of
any conglomeration of matter in the universe is the result of countless such
AA-forces; in systems like this,
kinematic
(or rather
dynamic) changes are caused by non-opposites.
So, when, say, a planet is in the process of formation, particles begin to gravitate together
under the operation of forces of mutual attraction --, i.e., these
aforementioned non-opposites.19

Similarly, it is not easy to see how RR-forces could be
interpreted as 'contradictory' -- or even as opposites -- and yet these
are also found throughout nature. For example, intra-atomic forces of repulsion
prevent nuclei from approaching one another.20

One objection to above immediately springs to mind: this analysis
ignores the fact that such forces operate as they do because they work in
opposition to one another -- that is, they do so in ways that bring
them into, or out of equilibrium. However, this response clearly pictures forces as
AR-couples, which option will be examined later. It cannot therefore assist us
in our attempt to analyse AA- and RR-forces.

Despite this, even on that interpretation a problem still persists.
If
it were true that A-forces are the opposites of each other, then in
order for them still to be regarded as 'contradictory' they could not also
be regarded as the opposite of R-forces, unless, that is, A-forces are
now permitted to have two sorts of "opposites": other A- and
other R-forces. But, in that case, this would make a mockery of the notion that
there are "polar opposites" at work in natural systems of forces (implicated in
change, equilibria and in 'contradictions'):

"All motion is bound up with some change of
place…. The whole of nature accessible to us forms a system, an interconnected
totality of bodies…. [These] react one on another, and it is precisely this
mutual reaction that constitutes motion…. When two bodies act on each other…they
either attract each other or they repel each other…in short, the old polar
opposites of attraction and repulsion…." [Engels (1954),
pp.70-71. Bold emphasis added.]

It is difficult to see how a particular A-force could be the
"polar opposite" of another A-force while at the same time being the polar
opposite of an R-force -- i.e., how A- and R-forces could have two
"polar opposites" without altering the meaning of the phrase "polar opposite".
Even then, if the meaning of "polar opposite" were adapted to neutralise this
'difficulty', it would succeed in doing that only because
of an ad hoc
subjective and conventionalised linguistic adjustment. In that case, any
'truths' that sprang into existence as a result would plainly be a by-product of
yet another piece of terminological juggling, not because of the way the world
happened to be (and which would mean that dialectics had been
read into nature).21

However, there are dialecticians who claim that objects and
processes possess many "opposites"; for example Gollobin (1986), p.122
(but
even
he says these are "paired").

Of course, this whole metaphysic originated in the twisted
'logic' that one finds in Hegel, who posited a unique opposite (an "other") for each
and every changing item, in order to forestall the criticism that if anything
could change into 'what-it-is-not' (its 'opposite'), then since everything else in
the universe is 'what-it-is-not' to any given object or process, any object or process could and would change into that
anything-else-whatsoever.

In which case, instead of growing into barley plants, seeds, for
example, would turn into volcanoes, unexploded bombs, Stalin's moustache or your
left buttock -- and much else besides.

[In Note 67 we will
see that even Hegel had to abandon the odd idea that objects and processes were
somehow linked to a logical(?) and unique 'opposite'/"other".

As
Essay
Seven also showed, this is just one of the fatal consequences of the sloppy
use of language found in DM/'Materialist Dialectics', as dialecticians try to depict the changes they
tell us are initiated by UOs
(as part of
Engels's second 'Law').]

But, if objects and processes are allowed to have many (and
possibly an infinite number of)
'opposites' -- all of which they could change into --, that would demolish even
this crumbling Hegelian wall (i.e., that each object/process has its own unique
"other"). Naturally, if true,
that would mean that any minute now you could expect to change into, say, a
T Rex, and
the Pacific Ocean could morph into you (and a host of other things, into the
bargain). Since this sort of thing does not happen, so far as we know, then we
must conclude:

(1) Hegel was right that objects and processes really do have
only one unique 'other', which is either (a) (logically?) internal to that object or
process (meaning that that object or process cannot turn into this 'other',
since it already exists!), or,
(b) external to that object or process (meaning that the cause of change cannot
be internal to that object or process), or (c) external to that object or
process, which object or process turns into that 'other', and thus creates it
the process of change (meaning that change cannot have been caused by that 'other',
which means that the whole point of this 'logical' exercise would disappear);
and thus that:

Nevertheless, it could be argued that
the word "opposite" really means "oppositional" in this context. This change of emphasis now
underlines the active inter-relation that exists between forces rather
than their passive connection, which is something the above discussion seems to
have ignored. Hence, it might be natural to
speak of RR- or AA-forces as contradictory in this sense --, i.e., in the sense that all and only those
forces that are oppositional (which engage in, or are part of, some sort
of "struggle") should be classed as contradictory.

However, this latest revision seems to be inconsistent with the
claims made in several of the passages quoted in
Note
1. These appear to suggest that only certain forces were to be regarded as
inseparable from matter; others indicated that forces were merely the
consequence of the complex inter-play between quanta of energy (or of motion).
For example, Engels claimed that:

"The whole of nature accessible to us forms a
system, an interconnected totality of bodies…. [These] react one on another, and
it is precisely this mutual reaction that constitutes motion…. When two bodies
act on each other…they either attract each other or they repel each other…in
short, the old polar opposites of attraction and repulsion…. It
is expressly to be noted that attraction and repulsion are not regarded here as
so-called 'forces', but as simple forms of motion." [Engels (1954),
pp.70-71. Bold emphasis added.]

Once again, this qualification seems
to lose sight of internally-connected
oppositionality. In this
passage, Engels appears to edit out of the picture the dialectical interrelation
between forces, replacing it/them with mere "forms of motion".

Now, "forms of motion" are not in any obvious
way interconnected if the relevant forces are left out. But, DM requires
bodies in motion to be inter-related; that is why intermediary forces
seem to be essential. 'Contradictions' were
clearly supposed to assume just such a role --, i.e., as part of the
'connective tissue' of reality (as it were).
If they are now to be re-classified as little more than 'useful fictions' -- as relative
"forms of motion" --, there
would seem to be nothing physical left in nature to act as either the bearer,
or the mediator, of such DM-interconnections.
Without a material substrate,
'contradictions' could only operate on bodies or processes magically, or,
perhapssupernaturally, it would seem.

Ignoring for the present this serious difficulty, perhaps DM-theorists mean
something like the
following:

F1: All and only those forces that are
oppositional -- or are implicated in struggle -- are contradictory.

But, if F1 were true, motion itself could not be regarded as
a product of 'contradictory forces' -- unless we confine our attention solely to
accelerated motion -- since, ex hypothesi, no net forces operate in cases
where there is no acceleration (in post-Aristotelian Physics, that is). Even
then, accelerated motion (under
gravity, say) is subject to only one force (or, rather, one resultant
force) in classical Physics, and none at all in relativistic Physics.

At
best, therefore, taking a classical view, most of the accelerated motion in the universe
(which covers, as far as we know, all of the bulk, non-rectilinear movement in
nature) is
the product of only one force. Given F1, it is not easy to see how
such motion could be viewed as part of a 'contradictory' Totality, if the 'classical
view' is correct. If it is correct, most
(perhaps all) of the motion in nature could not have been induced, caused,
changed or sustained by 'contradictions'. With that observation, much of classical DM collapses.22

It could be objected to this that as a matter of fact all
motion in the universe is the result of a disequilibrium between oppositional
forces; that is precisely what a resultant force is. In that case,
therefore, bodies would move (or their state of motion would change) because of
just such an imbalance between forces. Hence, for example, the planets -- which
move in apparently steady orbits around the Sun --
actually have their trajectories determined by resultant forces internal to the
Solar System, the Galaxy and beyond, all of which are induced by complex inter-relating systems of forces.
Or so it could be argued.

This objection will be considered in more detail
later, but for now it suffices to
point out that it is difficult to see how such forces could be regarded
as oppositional. Presumably, these forces do not affect each other;
they simply change whatever motion is present in the system, or in certain
bodies. At best, such forces could only oppose the impressed motion
already present -- which motion would itself have been the result of still
other forces in the system. This can be seen from the fact that if the moving
bodies in question had not been in the said 'force field', the said forces would
have had nothing on which they could act; hence, in 'empty space', we would see no new motion,
clearly.23
Forces without bodies to operate on do not interfere with each other, as
far as we know -- unless they are themselves regarded as particulate (or are
carried by particles), and would then, of course, not be forces but bodies, to
begin with.24

Classically, forces seem to work only on bodies by altering their motion.
In which case, the supposed opposition is not between bodies, nor is it between
bodies and forces, nor even between forces and forces -- it is
between forces and the already impressed motion of bodies. But, this
picture is difficult to square with the idea that there is a UO at work in such
systems -- nor does it seem to tally with the claim that dialectically polar opposites
ultimately induce all motion and change. This is because (once more) forces do
not oppose each other; they oppose or augment whatever motion is
already present in the system, however that was caused.

In short, on this 'revised' view, the term "contradiction" would
not apply to opposing forces (i.e., to forces that oppose one another), nor
to bodies; on the contrary, 'contradictions' would connect forces with
movement. But, as yet, no DM-theorist has given any clear sense to the idea
that a force could 'contradict' the impressed motion in a system. And quite
right too; there are no opposites here for a DM-'contradiction' to latch
onto. How could a force be the 'opposite' of a change of place?

It could be objected that as a matter of fact
forces in nature oppose (in the sense of change) motion. Indeed, it could be
argued that dialecticians examine
forces as they actually operate in nature (as opposed to those abstracted
from it); such opposites objectively exist and cannot be analysed away. Or,
so it could be maintained, once more.

This much will not be disputed here (even if its wording might).
But, in what way can this set-up be said to involve the interconnection of
opposites? And, what sense can be given to the idea that motion in
one direction is the opposite of a force that affects it? Certainly they
are not unified opposites (i.e., opposites on the same type, so
they are not logically connected, in the Hegelian sense of this word).

At best,
the force concerned might tend to produce an opposite motion (or change
in movement perhaps) to that
which has already been impressed (or none at all). But to describe force and motion as
"opposites" would appear to make about as much sense as claiming that "left" was
the opposite of "television set", even if as a matter of fact someone
moved a television to the left. Their actual linkage in reality has
nothing to do with whether it is sensible to describe such items as unified opposites,
or even as oppositional. These terms are categorically different -- as
are "force" and "motion". Hence, it is not a question of whether DM-theorists
are dealing with 'objective' facts, or not; it is one of asking why this
proffered objection can only be made to work by
mis-describing things.25

Only those who feel confident that they can provide a clear sense
to the idea that forces and motion are opposites may reject the above objection with
anything more than a wave of the hand.26

However, even if this could be done, it would still be bad
news for DM. This is because any other allegedly oppositional force in the
system could not then also be the opposite of the original duet between
this force and that motion. And that would then mean that systems of opposing
forces could not function in DM as is currently supposed. In that case, it would
not be forces that opposed one another (as had originally been claimed);
in such a set-up, forces would oppose impressed motion (not other forces), and the idea that change
was the result of systematically inter-related forces would have to be
abandoned.

Indeed, each item in a complex ensemble of this sort would
have to be viewed as the opposite of every other. Given such an arrangement, any
moving body would have countless 'opposites' (i.e., any other forces and/or
moving bodies in the system).27
This would put a strain on the meaning of the word "opposite", once more,
which would remain until the meaning of that word had been altered accordingly, so
that several things could be regarded as the "opposite" of any one or more
items. Under such circumstances, as we have already seen, the notion of a polar
opposite would lose its key role in DM; indeed, it would clearly become meaningless if
everything possessed innumerable "polar opposites". Not only that, as we have
also seen several times, given such adhoc linguistic tinkering,
dialectics would apply to nature and society only because of a new and
subjectively applied linguistic convention.

Unfortunately, this jellyfish-of-a-theory cannot be squeezed
anywhere without some of it slipping through our fingers somewhere else. What
had been touted all along as a grand theory that could explain change as a
consequence of the 'contradictory' nature of reality -- or, as the result of the
connection between opposite forces -- now seems to amount to little more
than a few vague ideas about the relation between a force and the impressed
motion in a system, fatally linked to the admission that the DM-Totality is a
mediated system of forces only if the definition of a "polar opposite" is
'adjusted' to order. If this is what DM-theorists mean when they asserted their
impressive sounding 'dialectical' theses then it seems that their theory can only be rescued
by making reality Ideal -- i.e., making its 'truth' sensitive to ad
hoc linguistic 'enhancement'.

However, even if the above is misguided in some way, in
DM-terms, none of it makes any sense, for such opposites (force and
motion) would not turn into one another, as the DM-classics say they should:

"The law of the interpenetration of opposites.... [M]utual penetration of polar
opposites and transformation into each other when carried to extremes...."
[Engels (1954), pp.17, 62. Bold emphasis added.]

"Already in Rousseau, therefore, we find not only
a line of thought which corresponds exactly to the one developed in Marx's
Capital, but also, in details, a whole series of the same dialectical turns
of speech as Marx used: processes which in their nature are antagonistic,
contain a contradiction; transformation of one extreme into its opposite;
and finally, as the kernel of the whole thing, the negation of the negation.
[Engels (1976)
p.179. Bold emphasis added.]

"Hegel brilliantly divined the dialectics of things (phenomena, the world,
nature) in the dialectics of concepts…. This aphorism should be expressed more
popularly, without the word dialectics: approximately as follows: In the
alternation, reciprocal dependence of all notions, in the identity of their
opposites, in the transitions of one notion into another, in the eternal change,
movement of notions, Hegel brilliantly divined precisely this relation of things
to nature…. [W]hat constitutes dialectics?…. [M]utual dependence of notions all
without exception…. Every notion occurs in a certain relation, in a certain
connection with all the others." [Lenin (1961), pp.196-97. Bold emphasis
added.]

"[Among the elements of dialectics are the following:] [I]nternally
contradictory tendencies…in [a thing]…as the sum and unity of opposites…. [This
involves] not only the unity of opposites, but the transitions of every
determination, quality, feature, side, property into every other [into its
opposite?]…. [Ibid., pp.221-22. Last set of parentheses in the original;
bold emphasis added.]

"And so every phenomenon, by the action of those same forces which condition its
existence, sooner or later, but inevitably, is transformed into its own
opposite…." [Plekhanov (1956), p.77.]

"Why is it that '...the human mind should take these opposites not as dead,
rigid, but as living, conditional, mobile, transforming themselves into one
another'? Because that is just how things are in objective reality. The fact is
that the unity or identity of opposites in objective things is not dead or
rigid, but is living, conditional, mobile, temporary and relative; in given
conditions, every contradictory aspect transforms itself into its opposite....

"In speaking of the identity of opposites in given conditions, what we are
referring to is real and concrete opposites and the real and concrete
transformations of opposites into one another....

"All processes have a beginning and an end, all processes transform themselves
into their opposites. The constancy of all processes is relative, but the
mutability manifested in the transformation of one process into another is
absolute." [Mao (1937), pp.340-42. Bold emphases added.]

Force does not change into movement, nor does movement change
into force.

Someone could object that indeed they do change into one another
(perhaps via an exchange of energy, or as part of an equal and opposite
reaction, etc.). But, if that were so, another problem would immediately assert
itself. If force F were to turn into new movement M, then the one
would follow upon the other: F would create M at a later instant
in time, otherwise it could not turn into it. Plainly, if M
already exists, Fcould not turn into it. Unfortunately, in
that case, F and M cannot 'struggle' with one another, for the two
would not exist simultaneously in order for that to happen. If, on the other
hand, F were to change as a result of some as yet unspecified factor, say
F*, then F* would have to be the opposite of F, and F
would turn into F*, not into M. Howsoever we try to re-package this
badly wrapped 'theory', none of it makes any sense.

[This is just a particular example of a general, but fatal defect
that lies right at the heart of the DM-'theory' of change, described in much
more detail
here.
Nevertheless, this point can be generalised, as it will be
below, to show that no two (or
more) forces could 'contradict' one another in the way that dialecticians
imagine.]

Perhaps, then the following re-write might succeed in repairing
this part of DM, which re-write also, in the event, tries to avoid undermining the
thesis that UOs operate
everywhere in nature:

F2: A UO involves the opposition between a
force P1
and the impressed motion that another set of forces Q has produced (or
would have produced) in a body B (had P1
never existed). The resultant motion of B is the final outcome of this
struggle.

F2 appears to link the operation of one force (P1)
with that of another set of forces (Q). However, it is difficult to
distinguish what F2 says about these two from the vector resultant of two forces
if we subjected this system to the usual mathematical analysis. If so, the word
"struggle" would amount to little more than an anthropomorphic re-write of the
functional relations that exist within the vector calculus, only now applied to
just one force, the resultant. In that case, if and when P1
and Q interact, they will produce just one resultant force R, which
would alone induce the recorded change in motion.28

But,
if this is so, a contradiction between
forces cannot arise: if there is only one force operating in the
system, no contradiction seems possible. In that case, F2 threatens to introduce
another fatal implication for the
entire 'theory', by killing it for want of forces.29

This failure suggests we should reconsider an option left
unexplored earlier; i.e., the one which argued that forces are the only legitimate
candidates to be placed in such oppositional matrices, not the motion they change/induce -- contrary
to what Engels seems to have believed (when he tried to replace forces with
relative motion).

On this view, forces are
'contradictory' only of other forces, and not of bodies or of impressed motion. The
following might, therefore, bring out this new slant slightly better:

F3: Given a body B, and a system of
forces P, comprising n vectors p1-pn
operating on B, a resultant force vector R represents the outcome
of the struggle between these n contradictory vectors. In this, R itself
need not be fixed, but could itself be subject to countless changes as body B
moves under the influence of P, which would also change accordingly.

One immediate problem with this is that the specification of the
forces belonging to P depends on the choice of co-ordinate system and
inertial frame.30
This indicates that the representation of forces as 'contradictions' is perhaps
more convention-sensitive that it is reality-driven -- making such
'contradictions' no more 'objective' than, say, latitude and longitude are.

However, even if this latest problem is put to one side, it is
still worth
asking whether any sense can be made of F3.

As noted above, F3 seems to bring us
back full circle to the idea that forces -- not bodies, or the motion of bodies
-- are 'contradictory' of each other. And yet, as we have just seen, it is not
possible to depict AA- and RR-forces as 'contradictory', unless their effects
are involved in some way.

Unfortunately, and once again, if "force" is just a
convenient shorthand for relative motion, it would mean that at least this
part of DM was consistent with a CAR-like account of reality -- in that elements
of the "Totality" would now be seen as externally- (not internally-) related
to one another.

To repeat: it is not easy to see how the motion of one body
could be internally-related to that of others without re-introducing the idea
that bodies exercise an effect on one another independently of how they are
moving (which, to be sure, may subsequently affect their motion, but which would not itself
internally-link such bodies in motion). But this issue is precisely the
difficulty that
exercised traditional Philosophers, as part of the classical metaphysical problem
of the nature of forces; DM has merely reproduced it in
an obscure form.31

Perhaps the slide into CAR may be prevented by the following
re-wording of F3:

F4: Given a system of forces P,
comprising n vectors p1-pn,
a resultant force vector R represents the outcome of the struggle between
these n vectors.

F5: This ensemble is only contradictory within a
Totality of inter-related processes that mutually condition one another.

F5 is clearly dependent on the idea that the whole determines the
nature of its parts, the latter of which in turn feed back into, and determine the
nature of the whole. Hence, F4 and F5 appear to restore the dialectical unity
that earlier paragraphs seem to have ignored.

Unfortunately, this brings us back in yet another full circle to
a consideration of the relationship between the "Totality" and its parts. This is
because F5 introduces its own pernicious version of
HEX, for it seems
impossible (on this account) to determine whether anything is 'contradictory' (or not)
unless we ascertained the nature of the whole. But, since the latter is
always changing, no element in this 'cosmic wild-goose chase' will ever be
hunted down and trapped. We encountered this dilemma in several forms in other
Essays at this site; on this see, for example,
here and
here.32

The most relevant aspect of this latest quandary centres on the
idea (voiced by some
dialecticians) that as scientific understanding grows, the 'contradictions' that now
plague our knowledge of the world ought to diminish. Presumably, this must mean
that at the limit (i.e., in an ideal state where human beings possess (in
theory) the Absolute Truth about everything), there would be no
contradictions anywhere. In its turn, this appears to mean that even if
humanity never actually reaches this blessed state, we can in the here-and-now make that
very inference: the Absolute truth is that not only is the world not
contradictory,the motion of bodies and the operation of forces isn't
either. In fact, this proposition must be true now, for if it were not now true
that there were no 'contradictions' in the ultimate future state of our
knowledge of the "Totality" then either the DM-view of the limit of knowledge (as
ideally contradiction-free) must be wrong, or the DM-belief that
humanity is converging on that limit is incorrect, since there is no such limit.33

Again, if this is what dialecticians mean by 'contradictory
forces',34
then nothing may be so described until everything has been so described.
But, this reverses the dialectical picture, for, as we have just seen,
some DM-theorists appear to believe that things only look 'contradictory'
because we do not possess the 'Big Picture', and that if ever we were to
attain to such a universal overview of things, 'contradictions' would disappear (or largely disappear -- the
story gets a little vague on this point). Here, in contrast, the idea seems to be that we may
only depict forces in nature as 'contradictory' after the dialectical
bell on judgement day has finally tolled -- that is, we may do so only at the
end of time, when all (or most) 'contradictions' will have been resolved,
meaning that 'objectively' they do exist and 'objectively' that they do not
(or we do not know whether either of both are the case)!

So, one horn of this dilemma suggests 'dialectical
contradictions' do not exist, and if they don't, they
cannot induce change. The other suggests we cannot now assert that they do exist
(since we are not in possession of Absolute Knowledge), so we cannot know
whether they cause change.35

At any rate, if AA-, and RR-forces are oppositional to each
other, or even to themselves, change would still be caused by a
resultant force, which it is just as easy to interpret as 'tautological', rather
than as 'contradictory' -- that is, if we insist on viewing nature in such
anthropological/animistic terms.

Of course, if we resist primitivism of this
sort, then both descriptors (i.e., "contradictory" and "tautological") should be
fed effortlessly into the bogus concept-shredder of history. [More on that
here.]

Perhaps, then, it would be wise to draw a veil over this self-imposed
dialectical impasse, and turn to a more likely source of 'contradictions':
AR-forces.

In the previous section, it became clear that little sense could be made
of AA- or RR-forces serving as models for 'contradictions', and this turned out
to have nothing to do with the difficulty of seeing whether such 'dynamic duos'
contained opposites or not -- which they manifestly don't. An A-force is not the
opposite of another A-force; the same can be said for R-forces.

However, a primafacie case could be made for
regarding AR-force couples as apt exemplars of the polar
opposites DM-theorists require (in order to depict 'contradictions' in DM and
HM).

Unfortunately, as we will see, this slender straw once clutched
soon turns into a millstone, drowning this already sinking 'theory'. Quite apart from the
considerations outlined above, no clear sense can be made of the idea that
AR-forces can model 'contradictions', anywhere, anyhow.36

An initial serious difficulty with this whole idea is that
AR-couples do not appear to operate in nature in quite the manner this handy
prefix seems to suggest: i.e., as AR-forces.

Consider a straightforward case involving, say, the accumulation of
matter that formed the stars, planets and their moons (etc.). Here, R-forces
(operating at the nuclear level) apparently prevent (for a time) the
catastrophic collapse of these growing masses into 'singularities' by
balancing-out the A-forces that presumably set the whole thing in motion. The
problem with these R-forces is that, while they look as though they
oppose any other A-forces in the system, they are not their polar opposites
(in the way that, say, the North and South poles of a magnet are said to be) --
that is, they are not opposite manifestations of the sameforce type.
So, the inter-atomic forces preventing this collapse are not of the same type
of force as the gravitational forces that initiated the process.37
While a case might be made for depicting North and South poles of a magnet as
polar opposite magnetic forces (or as 'creating' them -- but on this see below), gravitational and nuclear
forces are not opposites of the same type, and so cannot, it seems,
'contradict' each other.

However, even that description is prejudicial, for, as noted
above, these forces change the motion of bodies; they do not directly
confront each other asopposing forces. Admittedly, they can be
represented in a vector calculus, but we have already seen that this translation
is of little assistance to DM -- this is because the relevant forces would disappear, to be replaced by a single resultant force,
which causes all the action.

Perhaps these initial difficulties could be defused if emphasis
were once more placed on the oppositional nature of AR-forces as a way of
explaining change?

Unfortunately, this detour is no more successful here than it
was when it was considered above in relation to AA- and RR-forces.

Even if this further difficulty is shelved, it would still
be difficult to see how AR-forces could be interpreted literally (or
figuratively) as 'contradictions' (especially in HM). This is because of they
way in which they can combine and augment one another.

For example, consider, two forces operating in diametrically opposite
directions tangentially placed around a rotating body. These two forces --
although 'opposites' at their point of action -- exercise a combined and
augmented effect on the angular acceleration of that body, thus ceasing to be
oppositional.38

This is a familiar feature of force vectors. In some instances,
they seem to 'oppose' -- in others they appear to 'augment' -- one another,
while in still others they look like they do both at once.39

Cases like these illustrate that forces are not rigidly fixed as
permanent opposites, nor are they always oppositional, even when they are
supposedly opposites. Hence, it is difficult to see how a DM-picture of forces
operating (in nature) only as polar oppositional pairs could accommodate
this property of natural forces.40
But in that case this is unwelcome news, for little sense can be given in DM to the idea
that opposites can switch in this way.41

It could be objected here is a gross distortion since the
above phenomena are actually consistent with DM. Dialecticians themselves
reject the idea that there are fixed and unchanging forces in
nature. Hence, the recognition that forces can change and operate in 'opposite
directions' is one of DM's strengths, not one of its weaknesses. Or so it
could be maintained.

However, this volunteered reply does achieve one thing: it helps
focus on what has been a recurring problem throughout these Essays: DM is so vague and equivocal that it is impossible to say what its
consequences are, or even if it has any. The claim that 'contradictions' in
nature must be understood as opposing forces has under close examination turned
out to mean that such forces might not actually oppose each other --
indeed, according to
Engels, the
concept of a force could simply be a convenient shorthand for the complex
relative motion of bodies. Now, it seems that even this is incorrect, for
oppositional forces may actually augment one another, but only if they are
not now viewed as shorthand for the relative motion of bodies.

It is thus impossible to decide which DM-type forces are or were genuine opposites (or,
indeed, which are or were polar opposites, if any are or were), or distinguish
those that are from those that aren't. But, if all forces can work in any manner
whatsoever, then it becomes deeply mysterious why only some are depicted as opposites.
And anyway, what has become of the AR-typology Engels regarded as fundamental?

Given such slippery terminology, little meaning may be given to a
single DM-concept in this area; still less to the idea that DM force
'laws' operate anywhere in nature.

Imagine a Chemist, say, who identified an element as having just
so many protons in its nucleus, except it didn't really have this number, and
these alleged protons weren't really protons, and the element rarely if ever had a
nucleus, and anyway it wasn't an element in the first place. Suppose further
that this chemist claimed that he knew what he was talking about (even if no
one else did) because he was an expert player of the 'Nixon
Card', and skilled in the art of "grasping contradictions",
which unfortunate lack of 'flexibility' prevented his critics from seeing the
truth as he saw it.

Few, I think, would take him seriously.

Naturally, such discursive and theoretical 'contradictions' are
grist to the DM-mill, but this
is not something about which dialecticians should feel the least bit proud. For if
Capitalists, say, (as a social force) can indeed operate in such a contradictory
manner, who is to say whether a revolution is necessary to overthrow
them? Perhaps -- as result of a 'dialectical inversion' -- the class
enemy could become the strongest ally of the working class? In such a topsy-turvy world
anything might happen. Capitalism might end by being reformed away,
Imperialists could assist in the abolition of injustice, the Nazi's might one day help create
'racial' harmony, and the Ku Klux Klan could advance the struggle for Black Liberation. Who
knows? The Bosses might even overthrow themselves!42

If it is a central postulate of the theory that 'contradictions'
are oppositional forces, and that these can change in
'contradictory' ways to become 'non-oppositional', then reformism, centrism,
class collaboration (and the prospect of having the Fascists (etc.) as allies)
cannot be ruled out. On the other hand, if these possibilities are to be
rejected (as surely they must), then the importation of such 'contradictory'
DM-ideas into HM contexts must be resisted equally forcefully.

Of course, it could be pointed out that forces operate in history
in more complex ways than those that work in nature, so the analogy with natural
forces (and the KKK, etc.) is inapt -- especially if it is applied in the "crude" manner
illustrated above.
Unfortunately, if this attempted rebuttal were itself correct then it would be misleading to describe
natural and social forces as 'contradictory', for if the analogy between forces
and 'contradictions' is inapt, it is
inapt. Of course, that admission would amount to the abandonment of this unhelpful
analogy in its entirety: that 'contradictions' may be depicted as oppositional forces.43

Nevertheless, even if all of the above points turn out to be incorrect in some way, there are other, more fundamental
reasons for ruling-out the identification of opposing forces with 'contradictions'.

Many of the above remarks were aimed at demonstrating that the
analogy between forces and 'contradictions' might not be at all apt.
However, it could be argued that this does not affect the view that the
identification of forces with 'contradictions' is in fact literal, not
figurative.

However, the truly remarkable thing is that despite its centrally-important role in DM, as far as can be ascertained, the precise details of the
literal connection between forces and 'contradictions' have never been
worked-out by dialecticians. One reason for this might be that they consider this identification to be so obvious
that the specifics either do not matter or they are deemed trivial.

On the other hand, it could
turn out that nothing could have been said in this direction by anyone desirous of
defending this aspect of
DM, which would more obviously explain the deafening silence. As seems
apparent, and as will presently be advanced beyond the mere 'seeming' stage, the
latter option is indeed correct: this omission is not the least bit
surprising, for the imagined connection between forces and 'contradictions'
turns out to be entirely illusory.

In order to substantiate this claim, it might help if we
back-track a little. Part of the argument in favour of the identification of
forces and contradictions appears to depend on an initial analogy: that drawn
between literal contradictions and conflict (which, as we will see in Essay
Twelve, is a throw-back to an animistic confusion -- a conflation of various forms of social
conflict with the imputed activities of ancient 'gods'/personified forces
at work in nature -- perpetrated by (Greek) ruling-class theorists; summary
here).

Mere contradictions are
ostensively verbal wrangles, which themselves look oppositional;
when one person asserts "p" and another person denies it (or asserts "not p",
where "p" stands for a proposition
token),
at the level of discourse at least some sort of opposition seems to be implied
(but on that, see here).
So, analogously, a 'contradiction' in nature might appear to signify the existence of
a real
material opposition (but, alas, only to those who are happy to
fetishise
social relations as if they were, or which represented, real relations in the non-social world).

Clearly, DM-theorists view material
'contradictions' as their primary concern, compared to the secondary instances found in merely
verbal wrangles --, since matter precedes mind (etc.). Even so, the
argument in general is clearly analogical, for we were certainly aware of
the latter well before the former. In that case, the argument must have
proceeded from the human case to the natural -- which is indeed
what the history of the subject reveals: materialist dialecticians did not exist
in pre-historic times, but people have been arguing for tens of thousands of
years.

Hence, DM-theorists must (at least initially) have relied on an analogy
drawn between the way human beings argue (and/or fight) and the way conflict appears in the
natural world. Unfortunately, this makes the literal
interpretation of forces as 'contradictions' still dependent on the use of
analogical and figurative language, but, with no clue as to what that literal meaning
could possibly be; we still lack the material grounding that DM-theorists
require.

Now we certainly have a very clear way of explicating
contradictions in language and logic, but we have none at all for
those that allegedly occur in nature -- save we continually use a
typographically identical word (i.e., "contradiction") and equate it (in the absence of any
justification, save perhaps on Hegel's say-so) with forces.

Nevertheless, this would at least account for the figurative way
that contradictions are continually used in DM (and overused in HM), and why
dialecticians regularly conflate social with material forms.44

Even if we ignore this latest problem, one thing is
clear: for DM-theorists verbal contradictions represent perhaps the
least significant type of opposition. Changes in nature and society are (for
them) the
result of much more fundamental 'contradictions' than those occasioned by the
mere gainsaying of another person's words. As noted above, in many cases anyway,
discursive contradictions might turn out be the 'reflection' of more basic
conflicts in the real world, and it is the latter that are of interest to
DM-theorists.

However, once this superficially 'neat picture' is examined a little more closely
much of it disintegrates.

As has already been noted, DM-theorists have as yet failed to
provide a clear account of the precise nature of the connection between
'contradictions' and opposing forces. In that case, once again, one will have to
be supplied for them.45

Presumably, when DM-theorists claim that 'contradictions' are
represented in nature by opposing forces they have something like the following
in mind (if they but knew it):

F6: Let force P1
oppose force P2
in configuration C1
in nature.

F7: Here, opposition amounts to the
following: the normal effects produced by P1
in C1 (had
P2 not been
present) are the opposite of the effects P2
would have produced in C1
(had P1similarly not been operative).

F8: Let P1's
normal effects in C1
be elements of an event set E1,
and those of P2
be elements of E2.
For the purposes of simplicity let E1
and E2 be
disjoint.

[Here, the content of C1
could include any other ambient forces and processes operating in the system;
alternatively, the forces themselves may even be 'edited out' on the lines envisaged by
Engels (as a sort of shorthand for relative motion, etc.). In addition, all the internal
mediations between these forces and/or events in the Totality (T) may
also be incorporated into the picture. Other 'dialectical' caveats could, of
course, be stirred into the mix, as seems necessary and/or appropriate.]

It is worth emphasising at this point that P1
or P2 must
operate 'independently' in C1.47
This seems to be an essential assumption to make so that sets E1
and E2 may
be determinate themselves.

[Anyway, this 'independence' need not suggest a
CAR-like scenario since it could form part of the 'dialectical development' of
new forces and processes as C1
and the rest of T develop. Naturally, this simplifying assumption could
be modified at a later stage, as the need arises.]

The first problem with the above account centres on the term
"opposites", in F9. Something a little more precise than merely an "opposite"
seems to be required here in order for
DL to surpassFL in its ability to
account for change, etc.48

Unfortunately, the difficulty here is seeing whether even this
minimal condition is actually implied by F6-F9, and whether the rather weak
concept of an "opposite" is capable of bearing all the weight that is usually put on it.

However, quite independently of these annoying opening niggles,
far more problematic is the fact that given F6-F9, it would be impossible to
say what the 'contradictory' state-of-affairs here is meant to be.

This is
because F6-F9 imply that E1
and E2 do
not in fact obtain together, for if just one of P1
or P2 is
in fact operative, then just one of E1
or E2 will
be instantiated.

Clearly, in such circumstances there could be no
'contradiction' -- even given the loose DM-notion of one -- since, at
least one 'half' of the alleged contradiction would not actually
exist for it to contradict anything else, it having beenprevented
from occurringby the operation of either one of P1
or P2!49

Anyway, I shall examine later the question whether E1
and E2,
even though 'opposites', can legitimately be said to be 'contradictory'. In what
follows, I shall simply assume that they are.50

Despite this, it could be claimed that the following propositions
are all that DM really requires:

F10: P1
prevents E2,
and P2
prevents E1.

F11: Anything that prevents something else
happening contradicts it.

F12: Therefore, P1
and P2
contradict each other's effects.

If this is so, then plainly P1
and P2 do
not actually contradict each other, just each other's effects. In
that case,
it is not too clear whether or not DM-theorists -- keen to maintain the orthodox view that
forces contradict each other -- will want to embrace F10-F12.

In
addition, it has already been conceded (for the purposes of the argument) that
E1 and E2
are 'contradictories'. But, it now appears from the above, and from F10-F12,
that not only does E1
'contradict' E2,
but also that P1
'contradicts' E2,
and P2
'contradicts' E1,
as well. I shall return to consider these added complications,
later.

However, there appears to be no good reason for accepting F11,
and every reason for rejecting it. Consider the following scenario -- aimed at
illustrating why F11 is unacceptable (even given the truth of other DM-theses):

The problem here lies not so much with the non-standard use of
language these sentences contain, but with the fact that if a drowning (or if
anything) is prevented from happening then it never actually took place.
In that case, if the said incident did not happen it could not have been
'contradicted' by any of the forces or events doing the preventing, since there
would be no 'it' for anything to contradict. Unless we are prepared to
envisage forces 'contradicting' things that do not exist, or we allow them to
'contradict' unrealised possibilities -- or even ideas (perhaps those in
the mind of NN above) --, the word "contradiction" can gain no grip
here, even
in DM-terms.

Of course, it could be objected that this hypothetical action did indeed
contradict the said drowning by stopping it from happening. But, to repeat,
since the said drowning had been prevented, it did not take place, so it never existed
to be contradicted.

One obvious fall-back position for dialecticians to occupy would
be to argue that the actions mentioned above halted a series of events that
would have led to the said drowning. In that sense, those actions contradicted
that series of events. This objection will be looked at more closely
later, and below.

However, just in case this latest counter-example is considered
prejudicial, or contentious (in that it does not deal with real forces,
or with the sort of forces DM-theorists are interested in), then perhaps the
following considerations might prove more acceptable. Let us begin with this obvious sentence:

F16: Any process that is prevented from occurring does not exist
(or take place).51

It is clear that while
F16 is a truism, it seems to ignore events and processes that have an extended
life, so it might not in fact be
acceptable as a clarification of the processes that are of interest to DM-theorists.
Consider, then, the following emendations:

F17: Event E consists of a set of
inter-connected sub-events E1-En.

F18: Events E1-En
form complexes of material interactions (of a sufficiently mediated and
contradictory nature) within T, if ever they occur.

F19: Let P2
prevent some or all of E1-Enfrom taking place.

F20: Therefore, some or all of E do not
exist (or will never exist), or do not take place.

It is quite plain from this that because of
the operation of
P2,
certain events failed to manifest themselves. But that simply generalises the point made in
the drowning example above. Even if it is assumed that the vague notion
of a 'contradiction' employed by DM-theorists is viable, it is difficult to see
how something could 'contradict' something else if the latter does not exist/take
place
(and perhaps never will).

This objection appears to be fatal to DM; if forces are genuinely
oppositional then they actuallyprevent'contradictions' from
arising, and so cannot be equated with what they thwart. So, far from being
DM-friendly, forces/'contradictions' seem to be its worst enemies.

In that case, if this serious
difficulty is to be neutralised, a new and more conducive account of the
relationship between 'contradictions' and forces must be found.52

In order to construct a
more viable account,
we need to return to a difficulty we met earlier, which was put to one side
temporarily: the claim that it's forces (not forces and effects, or simply
effects) that are directly contradictory to one another. Consider then the following:

F21: P1 contradicts P2 in
so far as it prevents P2 acting, and vice versa.

Again, this perhaps puts too much
weight on the term "prevent"; it could prompt F21 to self-destruct just as fast
as F17-20 did, for if one of these forces fails to operate, no 'contradiction'
would ensue.

However, perhaps this conclusion is a little too hasty.
For example, both of
the above forces could still exist even if one ceased to operate in an F21-style
scenario, and no problem need arise because no appeal would have been made to the non-existent effects of
one of them in this case.

This means that even
though either one of P1
or P2
might have been prevented from acting, they could
both still exist in some form or other. If so, F21 might appear to be the viable
option that dialecticians require. One further advantage would be that F21 connects forces
directly with 'contradictions', rather than linking 'contradictions' to the
effects of forces. Could this be the lifeline that DM requires?

Alas, upon closer examination, this lifeline soon
turns into a noose.

The fatal consequences
this option creates for DM become apparent when we attempt to unravel what it
means for a force to be 'prevented' from operating.

Despite disclaimers, it
seems that if a force no longer operates, it no longer exists. Perhaps the
problem lies not so much with the precise physical form that forces take (which is mysterious in itself,
even to this day), but with the fact that the word "operate" is ambiguous. Consider the
following examples of forces that are capable of being rendered inoperative:

F22: The electromagnetic force ceased to operate once worker
NN threw the switch.

F23: An aerofoil produces the lift necessary to keep an
aeroplane in the air provided that there is sufficient relative velocity
between that aerofoil and the ambient medium to prevent the force of gravity from operating
normally, pulling the aircraft to the ground.

In F22, the relevant force simply ceased to exist (or it was
converted back into another force, 'potential' force, or form of energy, etc.)
once the switch had been thrown. But, in F23, a second force (lift) 'cancels
out' the effects of the first force (gravity) -- which, of course, still exists
(perhaps as part of the resultant force in this system).

Could F21 now be interpreted along lines
similar to those suggested in F23? This way of viewing the relation between
P1
and P2
would see them both as still existing, even while they counterbalanced each other. In which
case, it might prove helpful to re-write F21 in the following manner:

[F21: P1 contradicts P2 in
so far as it prevents P2 acting, and vice versa.]

Now, F24 does not seem to face any of the existential problems
that F21 encountered since the relevant forces actually co-exist,
counterbalancing each other. Perhaps, at last, we have a clear statement of what
DM-theorists require?

Alas not.

A new difficulty arises once we ask why only
counterbalancing forces should be considered 'contradictory'. This is
relevant since F24 simply restricts our attention to situations where there is
an equilibrium between forces, and ignores dis-equilibria.54
But surely, it is largely as a result of the latter that change occurs -- meaning
that 'contradictions' should be connected with these rather than with
equilibria. If so, F24 must be re-written in the following way:

F25: P1 contradicts P2
whether it counterbalances P2or not.

Unfortunately, F25 cannot now provide the clarity that was missing from
previous attempts to explicate this part of DM. This is because F25 fails to
distinguish between equilibria and disequilibria. F24 seemed to express a clear definition of 'contradictory' forces, but in order to make it
applicable to the real world, F25 had to be recruited in support, completely
undermining F24. This is because F25 informs us that forces are 'contradictory' whether F24
is true or not. Worse still, F25 could be true even when F24 is false:

F24:
P1 contradicts
P2
only if it counterbalances P2.

F25: P1 contradicts P2
whether it counterbalances P2or not.

Hence, if the following were true:

F26:
P1 contradicts
P2
even though it does not counterbalance P2.

[F25 would be true, but
F24 would be false (or vice versa).]

Now, anyone reading these three sentences (and taking them for an
accurate exposition of this part of DM) would rightly complain that nothing had
actually been explained, since there is nothing about the relationship between
the forces mentioned that indicates what the overall theory is committed to.

In response, others could
argue that this latest problem is spurious and is solely the result of the
phrase "only if" occurring in F24. Perhaps its removal would eliminate the
difficulty? Unfortunately, the removal of the "only if" in F24 would plunge the
theory back into all the existential problems it had been introduced to
eradicate. This can be seen if we try to re-word F24 in the following manner:

F27: P1 contradicts P2
if it counterbalances P2.

Although F27 might look
acceptable, it is merely a sufficient
condition; hence, it does not rule out the following:

F28: P1 contradicts P2 in
so far as it prevents P2 acting, and vice versa.54a

[F21: P1 contradicts P2 in
so far as it prevents P2 acting, and vice versa.]

But, F28 is just a
resurrected version of F21, which we found did not rule
out F22, and non-existent forces. What was required here instead was a
description of 'contradictory' forces that does not imply that one of the forces operating
ceased to exist as a result of the action of any other forces in the system. And we
also required an account that does not rely on forces merely 'contradicting' effects
--
because of the serious difficulties that alternative encountered earlier.

This is why an appeal had to be made to forces that
counterbalance each other, since (clearly) they must exist to do this -- hence the
introduction of the "only if", making this a
necessary condition. But,
as we then discovered,
this more restricted version ruled out forces that did not counterbalance one another,
which DM seems to need; reintroducing these at a later stage ruined this neat
picture.

Unfortunately, F24 and F26 seem to divorce 'contradictions' from
equilibria, since the presence or absence of the latter is in no way affected by
the former.

F24:
P1 contradicts
P2
only if it counterbalances P2.

F26:
P1 contradicts
P2
even though it does not counterbalance P2.

This means that if F24 and F26 reflect the real nature of things,
then 'contradictions' are in fact unrelated to the balancing effects of forces.
As paradoxical as this might seem, DM-theorists must deny the truth of the
conjunction of F24 and F26 if they want to maintain their belief that there is a
connection between forces, equilibria and disequilibria. But, alas, in order to account
for the 'contradictory' nature of reality, DM-theorists can't afford to do this.
For, as soon as F24 and F26 are adopted, DM ceases to be explanatory; but the minute
these two are rejected, this attempt to understand the nature of DM-forces collapses.

Nevertheless, this
annoying conclusion might appear to some to be a little too hasty -- or, for
that matter, contrived.
And yet, with so little in the writings of DM-theorists to guide us, how would
it be possible for anyone to decide if this is the case? Indeed, how could dialecticians
themselves arrive at a decision here, without some form of theoretical
(shock, horror!) innovation, an option that has so far been complete anathema to the
'orthodox'?

Nevertheless, if we adhere to the
requirement that 'contradictions' explain change -- when pictured as
opposing forces (that is, if we give 'contradictions' some sort of material bite)
--, then the theory must self-destruct, by the above argument. This is because the
theory maintains that forces are 'contradictory' whether what its theorists claim about
them is true or not (if this is indeed what they might claim!).

Naturally, all this is
independent of the far more fundamental worry whether the idea that
contradictory forces are capable of counterbalancing each other can itself be
explicated without referring to those 'prevented'/non-existent effects we met
earlier. If it can't then this latest detour would prove to be another dead end,
since 'prevented' effects do not exist to be contradicted. On the other hand, if
this can be explained
without referring to such effects, then it would be difficult to say what
material impact such a scenario might have on the physical world. How could such
forces be described as "material" if they had no effect on anything material --,
that is, except on those seemingly insubstantial 'non-existent' effects?

Well, this is another
dialectical hole DM-fans can dig themselves out of. I am merely content to remind them that
it is a hole, and not part of a viable theory, as they fondly imagine.

To that end, it might help to
re-examine a passage from Cornforth, quoted in Part One of this Essay:

"The unity of opposites in a
contradiction is characterised by a definite relation of
superiority-inferiority, or of domination, between the opposites. For example,
in a physical unity of attraction and repulsion, certain elements of attraction
or repulsion may be dominant in relation to others. The unity is such that one
side dominates the other -- or, in certain cases, they may be equal.

"Any qualitative state of a
process corresponds to a definite relation of domination. Thus, the solid,
liquid and gaseous states of bodies correspond to different
domination-relationships in the unity of attraction and repulsion characteristic
of the molecules of bodies....

"Domination relationships are
obviously, by their very nature, impermanent and apt to change, even though in
some cases they remain unchanged for a long time. If the relationship takes the
form of equality or balance, such balance is by nature unstable, for their is a
struggle of opposites within it which is apt to lead to the domination of one
over the other....

"The outcome of the working
out of contradictions is, then, a change in the domination relation
characteristic of the initial unity of opposites. Such a change constitutes a
change in the nature of a thing, a change from one state to another, a change
from one thing to another, a change entailing not merely some external
alteration but a change in the internal character and laws of motion of a
thing." [Cornforth (1976), pp.97-98.]

Now, the above argument might
appear to work when applied to human social systems, where agents
(individually or in groups) can 'upset' any number of 'balanced' situations, and
which do not need too much in the way of external motivation to do so (although,
in order to be able to say even this much with any clarity, the reader will note that Cornforth
found he did not need to
use any of the obscure jargon invented by Hegel). However, when it is applied to
nature as a whole it cannot work. Consider the following:

F29: Let FDbe a set of force 'elements' in a 'dominant'
relation to FS, which is 'submissive' accordingly (i.e., FD>FS),
and let both operate in system S, however defined.

F30: Now, for this relation to change so that a qualitative transformation
occurs in the overall system S, one or both of FD
and FS will
have to change first.

F31: If the change occurs in FD
it will have to do so because of the latter's own 'internal contradictions', otherwise the
theory must fail at least here. [The same applies to FS,
or indeed to both taken severally or together.]

F32: But, if that is so, then the same analysis will apply one more level down,
as it were: whatever causes FD
to change will have to be the result of further dominance/submissive relations
inside/internal toFD itself.
In turn, the pre-conditions noted in F31 will also apply at, or to, these lower level relations;
they must change because of their own 'internal contradictions'.

F33: This
must continue forever, or it will halt at some point.

F34: If
it halts at some point, then there must be fundamental units that do not change
through 'internal contradictions', and so the theory fails. [These fundamental units
can have no effect on each other, for reasons spelt-out in detail in
Part One of this
Essay.]

F35: If
this process continues forever, then there would be nothing to condition
anything internal to anything else, just more and more layers, tailing off to
infinity (i.e., to "who knows where?"). DM would thus have its own "bad
infinity". [We saw that this was a non-viable option in Part One, too.]

F36: All this is independent of whether or not an external cause (or causes) initiated
these
internal changes in FD
or FS. While the latter may be influenced by external causes (according to
Cornforth), external causes cannot bring about the internal qualitative changes
required (again, according to Cornforth). The latter must be
internally-generated in the last analysis.

It looks, therefore, like there is no way of rescuing this 'theory' along
these particular lines.

Howsoever we try, there seems to be no way out
for this self-destructing theory -- killed-off by its own internal obscurities.

In short: if a force prevents something from happening it cannot contradict it;
once
prevented, the latter does not exist.55

On the other hand, if forces affect one another externally (as
they seem to do), then change cannot be the result of 'internal contradictions'.
Alternatively, if they have internal effects on one another (in some as yet
unspecified way), and they change as
a result of their own 'internal contradictions', then either they are composed of
simple units that do not change, or they are infinitely complex, and nothing
internal to them can condition anything else internally, for there would be no
such things.

It could be objected that the above results have been
deliberately tailored to fit the desired end -- by the choice of, say, F24. A much better way,
therefore, of representing this aspect of oppositional forces might be
the following:

F37: Contradictory forces are those that enter into
opposition in such a way that they (dialectically) partially or totally cancel
each other out.

[F24:
P1 contradicts
P2
only if it counterbalances P2.]

This means that the 'contradictory' relation between two or more
forces would operate along a sort of continuum -- as it were -- with no fixed
relation between them. The account given earlier clearly makes the link between
'contradictory' forces an "either-or", all-or-nothing, sort of affair --
or so the
counter-argument could go.56

At this point, an example from mechanics might
help illustrate the complex relationship that is intended here: un-damped
simple harmonic
motion. [This particular link requires JAVA -- or try
here if you have no JAVA installed.]

Consider a particle set in motion under the operation of two
forces, such that its acceleration is proportional to its displacement from the
point of equilibrium, and directed toward that point. Since the acceleration of
such a
particle changes in proportion to its position, the net force operating on it
must also change accordingly. This is due to the fact that the resultant force
in this system is the vector sum of these two distinct but changing forces, which at the
equilibrium point counterbalance one another, but at other points they either augment or
partially cancel each other out, depending on the physics of the situation. Because
these two forces work in opposite directions and cause the impressed
acceleration (achieving this by their 'dialectical interaction', let us say for
now) we appear to
have here an example of F37-type motion.

In this highly simplified picture of just one type of motion, the
forces present in the system appear to 'contradict' one another in complex but
changing ways, as DM seems to require. But, if this scenario actually does
illustrate F24- (or F37-) type 'contradictions' then several untoward
consequences follow:

(1) This analogy would mean that 'contradictions' (like forces)
operate on a continuum. Hence, at any point along the path of the above particle
the net force operating is unequal to that at another point (in one cycle). This
means that given a certain displacement, the modulus of the net force might
be, say, only 1% of its maximum, at another it would be, say, 99% of it -- while
at a symmetrical location past the point of equilibrium, the same would be true
but in an opposite sense. However, it is not easy to see how such a picture may
be fitted seamlessly into the DM-view of 'contradictions', and as we saw above,
such a model would have unacceptable consequences in HM (involving, for example,
the Nazis fighting racism!).

(2) This trope depends on forces being viewed as basic
units of reality, as opposed to the product of the relations between bodies in
motion.

[Recall that the latter option appears to have been one that Engels himself
preferred when he spoke of relative velocities replacing forces. However, if
the term "force" is just a shorthand for relative motion (or if it depends on
the presence of a "field"), then, as we have also seen above, the
'dialectical' unity of nature
would be thrown into question. On that basis, the links between bodies and processes
would be external, whereas DM seems to require the existence of forces to
provide the 'connective tissue' of reality. If now forces themselves depend on
bodies in relative motion, then reality must be discrete, not continuous.]

But, DM-theorists have yet to say what the physical nature of a
force is. Physicists themselves have ceased to use this word (except as a
sort of shorthand, as noted above). If forces have no physical nature, can they be part of material
reality?

(3) This neat picture,
tailor-made for F37, obscures the complexity that occurs in nature. Even so, it
is not easy to see how such a tidy model could cope with systems of forces,
which, given this view, indicate that several things must be 'contradicted' all
at once by countless others, or, indeed, which suggest that bodies and/or
processes could have innumerable 'contradictories'. That would, of course,
divorce DM-type 'contradictions' completely from FL-contradictions and
from Hegelian 'contradictions'. While this might not be a totally unacceptable
outcome, it would mean that the former would be even more tenuously linked to
the latter (or even with contradictions that appear in everyday discourse), and in that case the meaning of the word "contradiction"
used in DM would be even
more indeterminate than it already is. In addition, it would imply that any
object or process in nature had more than one opposite at any point in time. The
word "opposite" would cease to have any clear meaning. But, we have been here already.

Despite these niggling problems, it might be felt that F37 suitably modified could still capture essential features of the
'contradictory' nature of forces.

In order to investigate this alternative more closely, let
us imagine that the two forces operating in the above scenario are aligned so
that the angle between them is 180°, once more.57

F38: Let the first force be F1,
and the second, F2.

F39: At t1, let F1
+ F2 < 0.

F40: At t2, let F1
+ F2 = 0.

F41: At t3, let F1
+ F2 > 0.

[F24:
P1 contradicts
P2
only if it counterbalances P2.

F37: Contradictory forces are those that enter into
opposition in such a way that they (dialectically) partially or totally cancel
each other out.]

F39 and F41 imply that there is a net force operating in the
system in either direction; F40 expresses the background condition to F24, where
no net force exists.

But, as we saw earlier, we face immediate problems with
this way of depicting forces -- difficulties encountered above in relation to the
inappropriate analogy drawn between 'contradictions' and mathematical objects --
such as, forces represented by vectors.

Ignoring this 'problem' too, it is worth pointing out again that F40
in fact implies that
there are no forces operating in the system (unless we regard the zero
vector as a force by default), and F39 and F41 both mean that there is only
one force -- the resultant -- at work. On that basis, F37 would collapse for want of forces. No contradiction
seems possible if only one (resultant) force is present;
still less if no forces are (as in F40).

It could be objected here that in the above, both of the
original forces (F1 and F2) still exist,
since it is they that create the zero vector and/or any resultant force(s) in
the system (as they do in F39 and F41).

The problem with this reply is that
it is not easy to see how the two original forces may also be said to
exist alongside this third force -- the resultant --, whether the latter is
zero or not. If they do exist in this way, we would plainly have three
forces in the system, not one, or two.

To be sure, as part of our way of calculating resultants, we
apply some mathematics to the relevant components, but that does not mean that
nature does the same -- if it did, that would clearly imply nature was
mind! No one, it is to be hoped, thinks that in nature there are three forces
where once there were only two. And yet, it is this third force that does all
the work.

Now, if an F37-type model is in fact applicable in HM, we ought to
conclude that the 'contradiction' between Capital and Labour (or that between
the forces and relations of production), say, produces a resultant third
social force, the nature of which has to this day remained completely obscure. Since, on
this model, all motion in the Capitalist system is produced by this "third
force", its identification by revolutionaries is, to say the least, of the
utmost urgency!59

Moreover, on this view, forces are 'contradictory' when and only
when they produce a third resultant force. This might provide DM-fans
with a certain amount of aesthetic satisfaction (in that this picture is
triadic), but it would in fact sink the theory faster than a lead-lined
diving suit sinks a diver. This is because change would then be a result not of
contradictory forces, but of resultant forces.

And, as we have seem already, it is just as easy to depict this
set-up as 'tautologious' as it is to describe it as 'contradictory' -- even
though both descriptors rightly belong in the mystical concept-crusher as
hopelessly
anthropomorphic.

Howsoever we twist and turn, the equation of forces with
'contradictions' seems to be as misconceived as anything could be. When
interpreted metaphorically it turns out to be inappropriate (if not
paradoxical and animistic); when interpreted literally it crumbles into incoherence and
inconsistency.

So, in order to avoid all these difficulties, we need to return
to an alternative that was considered briefly, earlier -- one that could provide
DM-theorists with a successful way of interpreting forces as 'contradictions'.
However, before this alternative is aired, it is necessary to counter an objection that
should by now have occurred to the reader: this whole analysis is abstract
andfails to consider "real material forces".59a

As noted above, considerations like these would stretch the
patience of most dialecticians; indeed, they would probably be the first to point out that this
Essay fails to consider real material and empirically verifiable
contradictions. When they say things like this they generally (but not exclusively) mean those
'contradictions' that
appear in HM, and which help account for the dynamic we see in class society.

However, and in response, it is worth pointing out that many of the examples
considered earlier were eminently concrete, and undeniably material!

Nevertheless, if no sense can be made of 'contradictory forces' in nature (as
we have seen), then that automatically throws into question their
appearance in HM.

Now, as is easy to demonstrate, revolutionaries seriously overuse the
word "contradiction" in their endeavour to depict not just capitalism,
but the class war in general. In fact, comrades
seldom bother to justify their almost neurotically profligate application of this word to everything
and anything they attempt to
analyse.59b
Indeed, it seems to operate almost as a sort of code word that serves merely to
identify them to others as one of like mind, or as
belonging to
the same 'speech
community' (with its
own jargon,
which defines an 'in-group'
and excludes those of the 'out-group'),
rather than acting as a concept which genuinely applies in every case, or in any case --
or, indeed, which actually means anything at all.

[We
shall see why they do this in Essay Nine
Part Two and Essay Fourteen part
Two.]

But, perhaps this is unfair? In order to substantiate the above
allegations, it would be wise,
therefore, to consider examples of the "real material contradictions" which
supposedly underpin and drive social development.60

TAR, for example, opens with several apposite and well-observed
illustrations of the irrational and destructive nature of Capitalism. As John
Rees correctly points out, while life expectancy, for instance, has increased
dramatically over the last century or so (even in the poorest regions of the
planet), forces have grown alongside this that tend to cancel such advances:

"[S]ince the Second World War there have been 149
wars which have left more than 23 million dead…. On an average yearly basis, the
numbers killed in wars during this period have been more than double the deaths
in the nineteenth century and seven times greater than in the eighteenth
century…. Regression, by any criterion. Yet it is the very same development of
human productivity that gives rise both to the possibility of life and to its
destruction….

"Everywhere we look another paradox appears. How
can it be, for instance, that in the richest capitalist society in the world,
the United States, real weekly incomes have fallen steadily since 1973?… How is
it that in Britain, where the economy, despite the ravages of recession,
produces more than it has ever done…a full quarter of the population live below
the poverty line?

"The contradictions are no less striking if we
shift our gaze from economics to politics. The introduction of the market to
Russia and Eastern Europe was supposed to bring stability and prosperity but has
actually produced the opposite." [Rees (1998), pp.1-2.]

First of all it needs emphasising that in what follows the
validity of the above comparisons will not be questioned -- nor will the
explanation given by Rees for these and other intolerable features of
Capitalism. The sole aim here is to ascertain what if anything he (or any one
else, for that matter) means by calling these irrationalities "contradictions", and why he and
other dialecticians insist on linking the latter term with material forces in
nature and society.

Of course, the trite and impertinent answer would be that DM-theorists do this simply
because it is part of the 'Marxist tradition' to do so (and hence it helps define
an 'in
group', noted earlier). As seems plain from the record, the use of this word is part of
Materialist Dialectics solely because of contingent events in the lives of Marx and
Engels (i.e., those that are related to when and where they were born, in which
class they found themselves, and how they were educated). And, as fate would
have it, their view of the world would likewise have been conditioned by their own "social
being" -- to use Marx's term.

In fact, had Hegel died of Cholera 45 years earlier than he did,
does anyone think we would be using this term?

[The effect on dialecticians in general of this sort of background will be examined in more detail in Essay Nine
Part Two.]

However, because of the towering
authority of Marx and Engels, all subsequent dialecticians
have been constrained to think and reason along similar lines. They have to
use the same vocabularyor risk being be accused of
'Revisionism', branded 'anti-Marxist', and perhaps suffer expulsion,
political
isolation, or worse. [Or, of course, the sort of ignorant abuse I
constantly receive.]

In short, it is quite clear that revolutionaries like Rees use
such obscure Hegelian terms derived because prominent comrades did so, and they are merely
aping them.

Naturally, the impertinent nature of this 'trite' explanation
will not win over many dialecticians (but since a less impertinent one stands
no chance
either, there is little to lose from advancing one such here).

In that case, there is a pressing need to try to find a better
reason why hard-headed materialists should want to anthropomorphise nature and
society in this manner, using terms drawn from mystical theology.

Unfortunately, as we will soon find out, there isn't in fact a
better explanation as to why such hard-boiled materialists allowed themselves to
be conned into accepting and using
Hermetic
jargon like this (and then
employing it quite indiscriminately).

We have already seen how every attempt to render viable the analogy between forces and
'contradictions' fail, hence, it should come as no surprise to see the very
same thing happen in HM.

To spoil the ending: the result of all this will be that the impertinent reason is the only
one
left standing.

[The ideological background to all this will, of course, be elaborated upon and extended considerably
in Essay Nine Part Two, and more
generally in Essay Twelve.]

The underlying cause of the many absurdities found in Capitalism
is -- as TAR rightly points out -- the complex and changing interplay
between the "material productive forces of society" and the ambient "relations
of production". [Ibid., p.2, quoting Marx.]

That account of the driving force of capitalism (but, interpreted
humanistically in terms of the class struggle), I fully accept.

However, this brings us no closer to understanding what it is about
opposing (social) forces that merits calling them "contradictions". Why
turn a clear deployment of an ordinary word, drawn from the vernacular
(with a few easily explained technical terms thrown in) into an obscure doctrine
peppered with impenetrable jargon
lifted from mystical Idealism (i.e., in this case, "determinate negation",
"identity of opposites", "negation of the
negation", "mediate", and the like)?

In HM, we can certainly make sense of the term "force"
-- and even
of "opposing" and "struggle" --; but what is there to gain by calling one
and
all
"contradictory"?61

Some might regard it as a harmless use of this word, but, as we
will see in Essay Twelve (summary
here), in this instance there is no such thing, just as there is no such
thing as a neutral use of the word "oppression". And, as we will also see in Essay
Nine Part Two, this particular word allows,
and has allowed, assorted
Dialectical Gurus to impose contradictory policies,
strategies and theses on the faithful, and to 'justify' class collaboration,
murder, splits and
expulsions (and more) on this basis: if reality is contradictory, the Party
must be so too. [An excellent example
of which is the
way that Trotsky used dialectics to justify the revolutionary defence of the former
USSR (on the basis of its contradictory nature), and thus also the heinous invasion
of Finland. Another, is the way that Ted Grant, for instance, used 'Materialist
Dialectics' to construct his
confused theory of 'Proletarian
Bonapartism' (sic), which allowed him to rationalise the substitution of the
Maoist ruling-class for the Chinese working class -- a topic I have debated
here.]

F45: Hence, Capitalism actually delivers a mixture of
development and retreat.

For Rees, the "contradiction" appears to be based on the fact that
Capitalism holds out certain possibilities, which it either cannot fully deliver,
or cannot provide at all; almost invariably the opposite of what it
promises actually unfolds.

Rees clearly believes that the involvement of
opposites is important here: instead of peace we find war; in the
place of prosperity we find poverty (where it need not be); the growth in human
need is not catered for by the incessant search for profit; the waste of human
potential conflicts with the increased capacity society has for augmenting and
satisfying its members needs, and so on. "Contradictions" seem to arise either from
the incongruity that exists between what might be expected of Capitalism (by
those who do not understand its nature, presumably) and what it actually
delivers --, or from the yawning gap that exists between its potential to satisfy
human need and its
obvious inability to do so. In that case, forces that seem capable of freeing
humanity from want seem to be inextricable combined with others that merely
intensify it.

However, these by now familiar observations leave the import of
the alleged equation between forces and 'contradictions' still rather vague. In
order to clarify Rees's point we perhaps need to consider various plausible
interpretations of what he might have meant.

There appear to be several distinct possibilities here:

F46: Capitalism offers A, but delivers only
not A.

F47: Capitalism offers A, but delivers both A
and not A.

F48: Capitalism offers A, but delivers only B, where A and B
are opposites.

F49: Capitalism offers A, but delivers A and B, where A and B
are opposites.

F51: Capitalism offers A, but delivers A and not A as well as
B and C.

Doubtless there are many other combinations that could be
imagined along similar lines, but they would, I think, be elaborations on these
six possibilities. I propose, therefore, to examine each of these in turn, beginning,
naturally, with the first.

But, F46 presents us with a scenario we have seen before; it
resembles several earlier unsuccessful attempts to solve this overall problem.
As we discovered above, whatever forces there are in the system that actually produce
"not A", no contradiction can arise between "A" and "not A" because "A" itself
does not exist, since only "not A" will have been actualised in place of "A". Nor can
any forces which are at work in the system contradict what they themselves
actually produce (viz., "not A" in this case) --, especially if
whatever they 'offer' does not exist.

F46 is of no use, therefore, in our search
to find a viable way of equating forces and
'contradictions' in HM.

This seems to be a little more promising since "A and not A"
certainly looks like a genuine contradiction. However, because F48 appears
to depict contradictory outcomes it cannot illuminate the alleged
contradictory connection between forces in society and nature that exist
prior to their emergence. This is because F48 is manifestly not about the
forces themselves, but about their results.

So, even here, we do not seem to have contradictory forces.

Nevertheless, this section is aimed at considering the last few
remaining options left open to DM-theorists to make their ideas comprehensible, so
F48 will not be abandoned just yet.

In fact, F48 corresponds to a relation depicted abstractly in an
earlier section (i.e., that between E1 and E2,
in F6 to F9, above, reproduced below) -- but interpreted here concretely (if schematically).
Hence, it looks like we might at last have found a genuine interpretation of E1
and E2 that is undeniably
'contradictory'.

F6: Let force P1
oppose force P2
in configuration C1
in nature.

F7: Here, opposition amounts to the
following: the normal effects produced by P1
in C1 (had
P2 not been
present) are the opposite of the effects P2
would have produced in C1
(had P1similarly not been operative).

F8: Let P1's
normal effects in C1
be elements of an event set E1,
and those of P2
be elements of E2.
For the purposes of simplicity let E1
and E2 be
disjoint.

F9: By F7, E1
and E2
contain only opposites.

Unfortunately, this appearance is illusory since the conjunction
of "A" and "not A" cannot be considered contradictory until it is clear what
interpretation is to be given to each schematic letter "A".

It is worth recalling that we are looking for a
literal interpretation of the term "contradiction" which will allow DM to
surpass FL -- not a metaphorical or analogical sense of the word -- still less one that
possesses a secondary or derivative sense (or even the 'special' DM-sense
that has yet to be explained). As should be obvious, this search is of the
utmost importance if we are to rescue from oblivion the idea that forces and
'contradictions' may be equated objectively -- and not poetically.

Clearly, there are several different ways of reading the
expression "A and not A"; some of these will be contradictions, others not.

In what follows, I shall employ a further example
taken from TAR (quoted above), which seems to many DM-theorists to be a genuine
contradiction (i.e., between wealth and poverty). In that case, this involves interpreting "A" as "wealth", and "not A" as "not
wealth" (it clearly cannot be "not poverty"!). In that case, "A and not A" would cash out as "wealth and not wealth".62

Unfortunately, the problem with this way of taking "A
and not A" is that it actually creates a phrase and not a clause,
indicative sentence or proposition.63 As such, it cannot be aliteral
contradiction.

[Most DM-fans miss this point since their knowledge of logic
rivals that of George W Bush. That, of course, does not stop them
pontificating
on the subject.]

The only apparent way to situate this phrasal conjunction in
a propositional context would be to interpret it a little more loosely --
perhaps along the following lines:

F53a: Capitalism produces wealth for some and Capitalism
produces not wealth for others.

None of these look at all promising; they are not just stylistic
monstrosities, their import is rather unclear. Anyway, F53 and F53a are not
contradictory -- that is, no more than, say, a bottle would be contradictory if
it supplied drink for some but not for others, or any more than the claim that
"forces are contradictory" would itself be 'contradictory' if it convinced some
but not others. No one would think they had been contradicted if they asserted
that a certain factory, say, produced a few batches of defective Widgets, and
someone else clamed it also produced some that were non-defective.66

Anyway, F52a is far too vague as it stands -- it is certainly no
more of a 'contradiction' than F53 and F53a are, and probably for the same reason.
If sentences like these have no clear meaning they cannot possibly assist in a
clarification of DM. Hence, a further widening of the interpretation of "A and
not A" is called for if we are to gain a clear view of the implications of F47.

F54: Capitalism produces Capitalists who are wealthy and
workers who are not wealthy.

As was the case with F53 and F53a, F54 is not even a
contradiction. Again, anyone asserting the first
clause of F54 who was then confronted with the second would not feel that they
had been contradicted -- this is because the first clause is about Capitalists,
while the second is about workers. To be contradictory F55 would have to
be written as:

F55: Capitalism produces worker W1 (or
Capitalist C1), who is both wealthy and not wealthy at the same
time and in the same respect.

But, quite apart from the fact that no one would assent to, or
even think to assert F55, it possesses no clear sense. The situation would be no better
if it were re-written as:

F55a: Capitalism produces a set of workers W (or
Capitalists C), who are both wealthy and not wealthy at the same time and
in the same respect.

It is reasonably certain that Rees meant neither F55 nor F55a. On
the other hand, if he had intended either, it would be
unclear what he could possibly have meant by one or both. At best, F55
and F55a might be re-interpreted in a comparative sort of way, as follows:

F55b: Capitalism produces a set of workers W that is
both wealthy (in comparison to a set of peasants P) and not wealthy (in
comparison to a set of Capitalists C), at the same time and in the same
respect.

But, F55b is no more contradictory than, say, a proposition about
the length of a copy of TAR would be if it were compared with another
proposition about the length of a copy of The New York Times
(i.e., that the first is longer than the second) and then with another
proposition about the length of a copy
of Das
Kapital (i.e., that the first is shorter than the third). Hence, the observation
that TAR is both long compared to The New York Times and short compared to
Das Kapital is not, one imagines, what most DM-theorists mean by "contradiction". If it were, their theory would be based on
linguistic naivety, and little else. That, of course, is the whole point of
the phrase "and in the same respect", tacked on the end of several of the above
propositions. Consequently, it rather looks like F47 cannot be squeezed into
this particular
dialectical boot after all.

More problematic: is either of
these options going to turn into the other?

In the above example, is W going to turn into C,
and C into W? Indeed, is wealth going to turn into poverty? But,
if these were 'genuine' 'dialectical opposites/contradictions', they most surely
should.

Further attempts to interpret "A and not A" can be
extended almost indefinitely. DM-enthusiasts are welcome to play around with
them as much as they like, the end result will be no different. There are no
literally true contradictions that can be manufactured out of "A and not A"
in this context. This is because, if a contradiction were true, it would cease to
be a literal contradiction. As indicated in
Essay Five, if and
when such 'contradictions' were encountered, they would normally be viewed as
either figurative or the result of an ambiguity of some sort. There is no way
around this convention this side of altering the meaning of the word
"contradiction". And, even this would be a little help to DM-enthusiasts since
that would 'solve' the problem by means of yet more subjective ad hoc linguistic reform.67

F48: Capitalism offers A, but delivers only B, where A and B
are opposites.

Unfortunately, as we have seen several times already, since A
does not exist -- Capitalism not having delivered it --, it cannot 'contradict'
B. This means that F48 is not a viable reading of TAR's intentions, either.
Even if B 'contradicted' forces and/or processes which were already present,
that would just return us to where we were when we considered several examples earlier, such as
this:

F6: Let force P1
oppose force P2
in configuration C1
in nature.

F7: Here, opposition amounts to the
following: the normal effects produced by P1
in C1 (had
P2 not been
present) are the opposite of the effects P2
would have produced in C1
(had P1similarly not been operative).

F8: Let P1's
normal effects in C1
be elements of an event set E1,
and those of P2
be elements of E2.
For the purposes of simplicity let E1
and E2 be
disjoint.

F9: By F7, E1
and E2
contain only opposites.

Another dialectical dead-end, I fear, for here we have yet more
non-existents being 'contradicted' by existents.

F49: Capitalism offers A, but delivers A and B, where A and B
are opposites.

If we now read "A" as "wealth" and "B" as "poverty" once more, we
would have the following:

F63: Capitalism offers wealth, but delivers wealth and
poverty, where wealth and poverty are opposites.68

However, there are several problems with this paraphrase. One of
these concerns the supposition that capitalism actually does offer
wealth. Admittedly, for propaganda purposes, its ideologues often claim that it
does -- but who believesthem? Certainly, blatant lies like this cannot
serve as part of a socialist analysis of capitalism.69

Perhaps then we should re-interpret F56 in the following manner?

F57: Capitalism develops productive forces
capable of delivering wealth to all, but it actually delivers wealth to
a minority, and poverty to most of the rest, where wealth and poverty are opposites.

However, in F57 we are confronted with a subtle change in the
way that the "A" of F49 has been interpreted in the opening clause: it now
stands for something like the system's capacity to "develop productive forces
capable of delivering wealth". But in the last clause it simply stands for
"wealth", as before. Hence, F57 is actually equivalent to the following:

F49a: Capitalism develops D, but actually delivers B and C,
where B and C are opposites.

Or perhaps:

F49b: Capitalism develops D (which has the
potential to produce B), but actually delivers B and C,
where B and C are opposites.

Here, the 'contradiction' would seem to be that between either (1)
Capitalism's capacity to deliver wealth and its actual deliverance of
poverty, or (2) the wealth it delivers to some and the poverty it delivers to
the rest.

In the first case, clearly we don't have a
contradiction. This is because, a capacity is an unrealised potentiality,
and as such it cannot contradict something which does exist -- no
more than, say, a woman's un-actualised capacity to play the flute contradicts
her actualised skill with the piano, or even her actualised state of living
without a flute -- or, indeed, of not being able to play the flute while she has to make do with
that piano.

The second option is no contradiction either, however much it
offends our sensibilities. It is no more a contradiction than, say, £10,000
($20,000) in
one pocket contradicts £0.01 ($0.02) in another, or no more than a £5 ($10) note in a
millionaire's wallet (assuming this is all she has on her at the time)
contradicts the £1000 ($2000) in a worker's pocket (who has just won a compensation
claim, say) -- even if these two are sat next to each other at a UK New Labour
rally. To call these "contradictions" would be bizarre -- even on
DM-terms. [Are they struggling? Do these turn into one another?]70

As we saw earlier, anyone who thought otherwise would be openly advertising
their own linguistic naivety, if not perversity, but not advancing the cause of
science.

In any case, there can be no literal contradiction between
something that does not exist (i.e., the prospect of wealth under
Capitalism, where this is meant to be wealth for all) and something that does exist (i.e., the mixed fortunes of the
people who have to endure conditions as they are).

Despite this, it might still be felt that the situation is not as
bad as the above makes out; the emphasis in F49 is on what
Capitalism actually delivers, not on what it genuinely (or otherwise)
offers. If "wealth" and "poverty" are real opposites,
F49 could still
serve in the way DM-theorists intend -- or so it might seem.

Again, this desperate alternative diverts attention once more away from
allegedly
contradictory forces and onto their effects. In that case, the nature of the
direct relation between whatever forces produced these effects is still obscure,
and not the least bit contradictory.

Nevertheless, even when we consider these effects, a nagging question
remains: just what is so
contradictory about wealth and poverty existing side by side? Admittedly, to
any socialist, this state of affairs is as intolerable as it is indefensible, but
there still does not seem to be a literal contradiction involved here.
True, this state of affairs may be paradoxical (but not to a Marxist);
however, the presence of one of these alleged opposites does not entail that an
assertion that the other opposite also obtains is false, as it would have
to do if a literal contradiction were intended.71

If, on the other hand, we wish to re-define the word
"contradiction" so that it becomes the equivalent of "paradox", "unjust", "something contrary to expectations",
"deplorable" (and so on), all well and good. But then that would concede the
point being made here that social reality is only 'contradictory' because of linguistictinkering to that effect, and the claim that DM-'contradictions' (in HM) are
literal would have to be
abandoned. Seen in this way, DM-'contradictions' would either be figurative,
or they would depend on the use of a word ("contradiction") that has been
'redefined' in order to produce the right result.72

On the other hand,
if the word "contradiction" possesses a special, literal
DM-sense, which allows for its legitimate use here, then DM-theorists have yet to say what
that is.

It might be volunteered here that one such sense is that
"contradiction" implies opposition and tension. But, even though "wealth" and "poverty" are opposites in the ordinary sense, they do not seem to
oppose each other in an active way, as one would expect they should if they
genuinely illustrated the validity of the equation of 'contradictions' with forces.
Admittedly, poverty acts as brake on development of the productive forces at
certain points in history (warping the development of those who have to endure
it, etc.), it stokes up resentment, class hatred and foments struggle. But, over and above the influence these
states of affairs have on human agents, these lifeless concepts appear to
have no active connection with one another. Sure enough, the material situations they
express
might indeed create tension in those who have to endure them, but none of the
latter would describe what they feel by using the word "contradiction", unless, of
course, a fast-talking and allegedly materialist disciple of Hegel had sold them on the idea. In ordinary
language, the word cannot be given such a meaning without altering the sense it
already has.73

Furthermore, if this set of consequences is meant to be taken as
a new gloss on F56 (by way of illustrating the alleged 'contradiction' between
E1- and E2-type events discussed earlier)
then it would soon collapse into the claim that it is the effects of effects
that are 'contradictory', and not the original effects themselves. Down this
road there lies, I fear, yet another "bad infinity" --, which
ends "who knows where?"

The second difficulty with this reading is that
although wealth and poverty are genuine opposites (again, in the ordinary
sense), they do not appear to be classic examples of dialectical-UOs (even
if we knew what those were!). To be sure, under
Capitalism the wealth of one class is connected with the poverty of others, but
this is a familiar causal connection. They are not internally-, or
logically-, related in reality, despite claims to the contrary. That this is so
can be seen from that fact that were this not the case, we would find we
could not agree (with Engels) that under Capitalism poverty exists "where it
need not be".

If there were a 'dialectical' (or "internal") "unity
in difference" connecting poverty and wealth (like that which dialecticians
allege between, say, the north and
south poles of a magnet, or that between Capitalist and Worker (as classes),
then we would not be able to argue that socialism will eliminate one without abolishing the
other. But, the whole point of a socialist society is that all should
become as wealthy as the productive forces will allow. If there were a
logical link between these two states (poverty and wealth) then they would
be inseparable in all modes of production and we would have to temper our
slogans somewhat. We might then have to point out that in eradicating poverty,
workers would be eradicating wealth, too. That we do not so argue -- we
actually claim the opposite that socialism can produce wealth for all --
indicates that the relation between wealth and poverty is not a logical (or
internal) connection, but is causal.

Of course, it could be argued that there is an internal/logical
link between "wealth and poverty under
capitalism" and "wealth under socialism"? This objection will be dealt with
below, and in Note 74.74

The basic problem here, of course, derives from the
anthropomorphism implicit in the idea that concepts can enter into
struggle with one another. This mystification appears as part of the belief that
because wealth and poverty are opposites they are actively oppositional
and cause struggles, of themselves. On this account, it is the opposite
nature of concepts that creates struggle, whereas in reality it is
clearly material conditions that cause it. Only by confusing a causal
connection with a conceptual one does DM get off the ground here, as
elsewhere (if this is what dialecticians mean, of course!). But, as we have seen, this is just one more consequence of LIE and
the RRT (defined in Essay Twelve -- and which was a conclusion of Part One
of this Essay).75

[LIE = Linguistic Idealism; RRT = Reverse
Reflection Theory.]

The animated DM-contrast that is imagined to exist
between dead concepts like these seems plausible only because they are
viewed as the idealised equivalents of the real relations between human
beings, reified in an inappropriate metaphysical/linguistic form. Human beings
give life to the concepts they use, but under circumstances not always of their
own choosing, and they do so as a result of their practical activity, modified
by ambient class relations. The reverse does not happen; 'concepts' do not give
life to human relations, although their use by human agents might affect the roles
that such concepts can play in material life (and they certainly could modify the ideas that
individuals from antagonistic classes form of their oppositional connections and
their own material interests, etc.). Unless we suppose concepts to be agents (in a sort of inverted
Hegelian form, wherein perhaps they walk the earth in place of human beings),
they cannot 'reflect' things that human beings haven't sanctioned for them, by
means of the above constraints. History is after all the result of the class war,
not a consequence of the struggle between concepts.

As should seem obvious, the above comments are based on
theoretical considerations drawn from HM, but this is precisely where that
scientific theory
can provide the interpretative sophistication that DM and/or 'Materialist
Dialectics' lack, obscure and invert
in an idealised/fetishised form.76

This shows, once again, that the inversion DM-theorists say
they have inflicted on Hegel was merely formal; their system can only 'work' in his
Ideal universe.

We have thus seen that concepts drawn from
Hermetic Philosophy (and deployed
in DM) fail badly when an attempt is made to apply them to, or connect them
with, the forces operating in nature and
society. In that case, the impertinent answer (to the question why hard-boiled
revolutionaries use such mystical terms in HM) offered above is the only one left in
the ring: dialecticians use mystical jargon like this simply because it
is traditional to
do so.

This means that this part of DM (already under intensive care in the Emergency Resuscitation ward) is ready to be measured for
its pine overcoat and lowered 6 feet closer to the Earth's core.

A Last Desperate Attempt

However, before we call for a Hermetic High Priest to read DM its last
mystical rites,
we should make one last desperate bid to resuscitate this moribund 'theory'. In fact, we are now
in a position to return to several earlier abandoned alternatives in a vain
attempt to rescue this part of DM from its long overdue
burial.

Here, I present an interpretation based upon the one expressed in
F6-F9, above:

F6: Let force P1 oppose force
P2 in configuration C1 in nature.

F7: Here, opposition amounts to the following: the normal
effects produced by P1 in C1 (had P2
not been present) are the opposite of the effects P2 would
have produced in C1 (had P1similarly not
been operative).

F8: Let P1's normal effects in C1
be elements of an event set E1, and those of P2
be elements of E2. For the purposes of simplicity, let E1
and E2 be disjoint.

F9: By F7, E1 and E2
contain only opposites.

To these we need to add the following:

F58: Force P1 contradicts P2
in so far as some or all of E1 and E2
are contradictory (internally, or to one another).

Unfortunately, this latest re-interpretation cannot work, either.
This is because if one or both of E1 and E2
do not exist (as a result of the operation of P1 and P2)
there can be no contradiction; as we have seen several times already, F58 would
imply a 'contradiction' between sets of events that do not co-exist.77

It looks, therefore, like this particular interpretative seam has been
thoroughly worked-out. There is no gold left, only slag -- indeed what little gold
there was that had been
mined by Hegel & Co., unfortunately turned
out to be nothing but Iron
Pyrites.

We need to find a new approach to save this rapidly fading 'theory'
from being sent to the morgue.

The only avenue of escape for DM-theorists seems to rely on yet
another interpretation which was postponed from earlier, wherein
'contradictions' were said to exist between the effects of forces (or
between forces and the effects of other forces), rather than between forces themselves. One alternative involved
Engels's suggestion that forces should be edited out of the picture,
leaving behind just the relative motion between bodies to give some content to
the idea that 'contradictions' cause change.

However, the first of these options had to be abandoned because
it meant that forces 'contradicted' prevented effects, implicating this
part of the theory with the idea that forces could 'contradict' non-existent
entities. The second option appeared to undermine the dialectical unity of
nature.

Nevertheless, I now propose to examine a re-vamped version of the
first of these alternatives, one aimed at circumventing the difficulties noted
above. The good news is that this new interpretation solves the problem created
by the second option; the bad news is that it introduces far worse difficulties of its own.

This earlier attempt was based on the following:

F17: Event E consists of a set of
inter-connected sub-events E1-En.

F18: Events E1-En form
complexes of material interactions (of a sufficiently mediated and contradictory
nature) within T, if ever they occur.

F19: Let P1 prevent some or all of E1-En
from taking place.

F20: Therefore, some or all of E do not exist (or will
never exist), or take place.

As we saw above, an existing force P1
appears to 'contradict' a non-existent event (or series of events), which
rendered this interpretation useless. The following re-vamped version of these
sentences now aims to fix this bug:

F59: Event E consists of a set of
inter-connected sub-events E1-En.

F60: Events E1-En form
complexes of material interactions (of a sufficiently mediated and contradictory
nature) within T, if ever they occur.

F61: Let P1 prevent some or all of E1-En
from taking place.

F62: Therefore, some or all of E do not exist (or will
never exist), or take place.

F63: Hence, propositions that express the fact that one or more of E1-En
have been prevented from
taking place contradict propositions that express an expectation that they will occur.

Since, an expectation can exist alongside a realisation that it has
been thwarted (in some cases), this might appear to solve the problem.

However, F63 is clearly of little assistance since, not only would
be inapplicable throughout the
Universe at all times, it does not even record a contradiction. [The propositions
it expresses to are of the form 'p and q', not 'p and not p', as required.]

F64: Propositions that express
the prevention of one or more of E1-En
taking place contradict propositions that depict the dispositional properties of Pn,
the set of forces that would have produced all of E1-En,
but for the presence of P1.

One immediate problem with F64 is that it is not at all clear
what the "dispositional properties" of forces are. Objects certainly have
dispositional properties as a result of their microstructure and of their
relationship with other bodies -- if, that is, the term "dispositional" is not
read anthropomorphically, as it usually is.

Even so, since forces are not
obviously bodies (although they can apparently be carried by them -- if we
accept certain parts of modern Physics --, but even then this is apparently cashed
out in terms of transferred momentum, i.e., along neo-Engelsian lines),78
the ascription of dispositions to forces themselves amounts perhaps to a
disguised reference to the affect forces have on such bodies. In that case, we
would have here an explanation
of contradictions that appealed to the effect of effects, yet again.

[Anyway,
F64 does not even record a contradiction since the propositions it
expresses to are of the form 'p and q', not 'p and not p',
once more.]

Nevertheless, perhaps F64 can be re-jigged -- maybe along the
following lines:

F65: Propositions that express
the prevention of one or more of E1-En
taking place contradict propositions that depict the normal operation of Pn, the set
of forces that would have produced all of E1-En,
but for the presence of P1.

Unfortunately, not only does F65 fail to record a contradiction
(since, yet again, the propositions it expresses to are of the form 'p and q', not 'p
and not p'), what it says brings us back once more to a consideration
of the inter-relationship between forces as a way of understanding
'contradictions', as opposed to the present model, which sought to interpret
'contradictions' as the relationship between forces and the effects of other
forces.

Anyway, F65 is of little use: if the normal operation of
Pn is disturbed (so that it does not take place) there would be
nothing for P1 to
'contradict'. This annoying but
recurring fact is precisely what required the current consideration of the
actual effects of forces, since they do exist -- as opposed to the
prevented effects of forces, or even forces which cease to operate, which don't.

It now seems that unless we can specify how the
effects of forces can 'contradict' other forces (or other effects), this
part of DM will be as good as dead, but not yet buried. Maybe the following
option will help revive it:

F66: Propositions that express the prevention of
one or more of E1-En
taking place contradict
propositions that express the operation ofPn, in that the presence of E1
(the effect of P1) excludes some or all of E2-En.

However, this is no use, either, since it matters not how effectively
some or all of E2-En
are excluded; E1
may only 'contradict' that which exists, and, ex hypothesi, once
excluded, effects E2-En would no longer be
around to be 'contradicted'.

The next suggestion constitutes, in my view, the
only way to keep this critically ill part of DM alive:

F67: The prevention of one or more of E1-En
taking place contradicts the aims of Pn, the set of forces
that would have produced all of E1-En but
for the presence of P1.

[F67 will need to be re-written in a
'propositional' form, but since that would make this example even more
unwieldy than it already is, that has not been attempted here.]

Since aims can exist where results and effects do not, we seem at
last to have a genuine 'contradiction' (even if it is still figurative!).

The bad news is that this
apparent tonic soon turns into yet another dose of
strychnine. This is because, of course, not only
does F67 not record a contradiction (for reasons given several times already), we
cannot attribute aims to forces unless we wish to introduce teleology
back into nature. F67 can only therefore apply to forces under the control of
human agents, or to their animistically projected counterparts in
reality --, that is, if we genuinely want to go down the latter route and regard nature in
this ancient/mystical manner.

It is no coincidence then that the only interpretation
that appears to render this part of DM viable is one that reveals the
anthropomorphism implicit in its concepts.

Alternatively, it is equally unsurprising that this is the
one option that underlines the only reading that
works in HM, one that puts forces under human control (all the
while clearly distinguishing them from literal contradictions).79

Unfortunately, this now means that F67 cannot help
revive the DM-corpse.

It was noted earlier that there is a general
problem afflicting the identification of forces with 'contradictions' -- i.e.,
if these are viewed as dialectically-united 'opposites'. In connection with
that, we also saw that DM-classicists
argued that such opposites all turn into one another. But is it even plausible
to suppose forces can do this? Is it credible that a gravitational force, say,
can turn into a
magnetic force, or into an electrical force? Do all R-type forces turn into
A-type forces? Where in Physics is it postulated that gravity can become a
repulsive force?

Undoubtedly, electricity and magnetism are
inter-linked on modern Physics (and are in fact manifestations of one of the
four fundamental forces in nature, in
electromagnetism), but they do not struggle with one another, and neither do
the particles on which they depend. Such forces, so we are told, are created by
exchange particles, but they are not an expression of a 'struggle'
between particles.

To be sure, magnetic fields are
reversible, as are electrical fields, but this is not true of all fields
(even though all four forces can change in many different ways), but it is far
from clear that this is because of any 'struggle' going on between them, either.
For example, the
origin of the reversal of the Earth's magnetic field may lie deep inside the core,
or, perhaps, inside the crust --, or it may even be external (with one set of theories
blaming meteor impact); scientists are not sure. But not one geophysicist, to my
knowledge, is investigating the 'contradiction' between North and South to find
its cause.

If that is so, then even if all of the objections
voiced in this Essay are misguided in some way, the 'dialectical' equation of
forces and contradictions does not work
even in its own terms!

Do the Relations of Production really turn
into the Forces of Production?

Since there appears to be no way that DM-'contradictions' can be
given a literal or figurative interpretation as forces which
survives a moment's scrutiny -- when applied in nature or society, in
abstract or concrete form --, this part of DM can at last be given a decent
burial. Indeed, we can even call its time of death:
August 27th,
1770.

"Motion is the mode of existence of matter….
All rest, all equilibrium, is only relative, only has meaning in relation to one
or another form of motion…. Matter without motion is just as inconceivable as
motion without matter…. Each separate movement strives toward equilibrium, and
the total motion puts an end to the equilibrium.... [Engels (1976), pp.74-77.]

"So long as we consider things at rest and
lifeless, each one by itself…we do not run up against any contradictions in
them…. But the position is quite different as soon as we consider things in
their motion, their change, their life, their reciprocal influence. Then we
immediately become involved in contradictions. Motion itself is a
contradiction…. [T]here is a contradiction objectively present in things and
processes themselves, a contradiction is moreover an actual force.... [Ibid.,
pp.152-53.]

"Processes which in their nature are
antagonistic, contain internal contradiction; transformation of one extreme into
its opposite…. [This is] the negation of the negation…. [which is a] law of
development of nature, history and thought; a law which…holds good in the animal
and the vegetable kingdoms, in geology, in mathematics, in history and in
philosophy…. [D]ialectics is nothing more than the science of the general laws
of motion and development of nature, human society and thought." [Ibid.,
pp.179-80.]

"The great basic thought that the world is not to
be comprehended as a complex of ready-made things, but as a complex of
processes, in which the things apparently stable…go through an uninterrupted
change of coming into being and passing away…. [T]he transformation of energy,
which has demonstrated to us that all the so-called forces operative in the
first instance in inorganic nature -- mechanical force and its complement,
so-called potential energy, heat, radiation (light, or radiant heat),
electricity, magnetism and chemical energy -- are different forms of
manifestation of universal motion…. [W]e have now arrived at the point where we
can demonstrate the interconnection between the processes in nature not only in
particular spheres but also the interconnection of these particular spheres on
the whole…by means of the facts provided by empirical natural science itself."
[Engels (1888), pp.609-11.]

"All
motion is bound up with some change of
place…. The whole of nature accessible to us forms a system, an interconnected
totality of bodies…. [These] react one on another, and it is precisely this
mutual reaction that constitutes motion…. When two bodies act on each other…they
either attract each other or they repel each other…in short, the old polar
opposites of attraction and repulsion…. It is expressly to be
noted that attraction and repulsion are not regarded here as so-called
'forces', but as simple forms of motion.... [Engels (1954), pp.70-71.]

"All motion consists in the interplay of
attraction and repulsion. Motion, however, is only possible when each individual
attraction is compensated by a corresponding repulsion somewhere else…. Hence,
all attraction and all repulsions in the universe must mutually balance one
another…. Dialectics has proved from the results of our experience of nature so
far that all polar opposites in general are determined by the mutual action of
the two opposite poles on each other, that the separation and opposition of
these poles exist only within their mutual connection and union.... [Ibid.,
p.72.]

"All natural processes are two-sided, they are
based on the relation of at least two operative parts, action and reaction. The
notion of force, however, owing to its origin from the action of the human
organism on the external world…implies that only one part is active, the other
part being passive…[and appearing] as a resistance.... [Ibid.,
p.82.]

"Dialectics…prevails throughout nature…. [T]he
motion through opposites which asserts itself everywhere in nature, and which by
the continual conflict of the opposites…determines the life of nature....
[Ibid.,
p.211.]

"[A]ttraction is a necessary property of matter,
but not repulsion. But attraction and repulsion are as inseparable as positive
and negative, and hence from dialectics itself it can already be predicted that
the true theory of matter must assign a place to repulsion as to attraction, and
that a theory of matter based on mere attraction is false…. Equilibrium is
inseparable from motion…. All equilibrium is only relative and
temporary…. Motion of the heavenly bodies [is an] approximate equilibrium of
attraction and repulsion in motion." [Ibid.,
pp.243-46.]

This is how Bukharin put things:

"[T]he world consists of
forces, acting many ways, opposing each other. These forces are balanced for a
moment in exceptional cases only. We then have a state of 'rest', i.e., their
actual 'conflict' is concealed. But if we change only one of these forces,
immediately the ‘internal contradictions’ will be revealed, equilibrium will be
disturbed, and if a new equilibrium is again established, it will be on a new
basis, i.e., with a new combination of forces, etc. It follows that the
'conflict,' the 'contradiction,' i.e., the antagonism of forces acting in
various directions, determines the motion of the system…." [Bukharin (1925),
p.74.]

And here are Lenin's thoughts:

"The identity of opposites…is the recognition…of
the contradictory, mutually exclusive, opposite tendencies in all
phenomena and processes of nature…. Development is the 'struggle' of opposites."
[Lenin (1961), pp.357-58.]

Comrade Cornforth argued as follows:

"If we consider the real, complex movements and
interconnections of real complex things, then we find that contradictory
tendencies can and do exist in them. For example, if the forces operating in a
body combine tendencies of attraction and of repulsion, that is a real
contradiction…. [C]ontradiction is the driving force of change…. [O]nly the
presence of contradictions in a process…provides the internal conditions making
change necessary…. The real universe is…full of contradictions –- the
contradictions of attraction and repulsion studied by physics…." [Cornforth
(1976), pp.92-95.]

The author of TAR had this to say:

"The conservatism of Hegel's system is thus
buried in his notion of contradiction. Contradictions in Hegel are merely
intellectual contradictions to be resolved by merely intellectual methods…. The
dialectic is therefore only a pseudo-dialectic; its contradictions are never
those of opposed material forces capable of doing real damage or of effecting
real progress…. Marx was, however, obliged to transform completely the terms of
the dialectic when he altered its starting point from abstract concepts to real
material forces…. The contradictions are no longer simply between concepts but
between real, material forces…. Marx and Engels's dialectic is utterly different
from Hegel's. It starts from real, material, empirically verifiable
contradictions." [Rees (1998), pp.67-69, 83.]

Woods and Grant put things thus:

"Dialectics explains that
change and motion involve contradiction and can only take place through
contradictions.... Dialectics is the logic of contradiction....

"So fundamental is this idea
to dialectics that Marx and Engels considered motion to be the most basic
characteristic of matter.... [Referring to a quote from Aristotle] [t]his is not
the mechanical conception of motion as something imparted to an inert mass by an
external 'force' but an entirely different notion of matter as self-moving....

"The essential point of
dialectical thought is not that it is based on the idea of change and motion but
that it views motion and change as phenomena based on contradiction....
Contradiction is an essential feature of all being. It lies at the heart of
matter itself. It is the source of all motion, change, life and development. The
dialectical law which expresses this idea is the unity and interpenetration of
opposites....

"The universal phenomena of
the unity of opposites is, in reality, the motor-force of all motion and
development in nature. It is the reason why it is not necessary to introduce
the concept of external impulse to explain movement and change -- the
fundamental weakness of all mechanistic theories. Movement, which itself
involves a contradiction, is only possible as a result of the conflicting
tendencies and inner tensions which lie at the heart of all forms of matter....

"The opposing tendencies can exist in a state of
uneasy equilibrium for long periods of time, until some change, even a small
quantitative change, destroys the equilibrium and gives rise to a critical state
which can produce a qualitative transformation. In 1936, Bohr compared the
structure of the nucleus to a drop of liquid, for example, a raindrop hanging
from a leaf. Here the force of gravity struggles with that of surface
tension striving to keep the water molecules together. The addition of just a
few more molecules to the liquid renders it unstable. The enlarged droplet
begins to shudder, the surface tension is no longer able to hold the mass to the
leaf and the whole thing falls.

"Attraction
and Repulsion

"This is an extension of the law of the unity and
interpenetration of opposites. It is a law which permeates the whole of nature,
from the smallest phenomena to the largest. At the base of the atom are immense
forces of attraction and repulsion....

"Engels points out the universal role of
attraction and repulsion:

"'All motion consists in the interplay of
attraction and repulsion. Motion, however, is only possible when each individual
attraction is compensated by a corresponding repulsion somewhere else. Otherwise
in time one side would get the preponderance over the other and then motion
would finally cease. Hence all attractions and all repulsions in the universe
must mutually balance one another. Thus the law of the indestructibility and
uncreatability of motion is expressed in the form that each movement of
attraction in the universe must have as its complement an equivalent movement of
repulsion and vice versa; or, as ancient philosophy—long before the
natural-scientific formulation of the law of conservation of force or
energy—expressed it: the sum of all attractions in the universe is equal to the
sum of all repulsions.'

"In Engels' day, the prevailing idea of motion
was derived from classical mechanics, where motion is imparted from an external
force which overcomes the force of inertia. Engels was quite scathing about the
very expression 'force,' which he considered one-sided and insufficient to
describe the real processes of nature. 'All natural processes,' he wrote, 'are
two-sided, they are based on the relation of at least two operative parts,
action and reaction. The notion of force, however, owing to its origin from the
action of the human organism on the external world, and further from terrestrial
mechanics, implies that only one part is active, operative, the other part being
passive, receptive.' (38)

Engels was far in advance of his time in being
highly critical of this notion, which had already been attacked by Hegel. In his
History of Philosophy, Hegel remarks that 'It is better (to say) that a
magnet has a soul (as Thales expresses it) than that it has an attractive force;
force is a kind of property that, separate from matter, is put forward as a kind
of predicate -- while soul, on the other hand, is this movement itself,
identical with the nature of matter.' This remark of Hegel, approvingly quoted
by Engels, contains a profound idea -- that motion and energy are inherent to
matter. Matter is self-moving and self-organising."
[Woods and Grant (1995), pp.43-45, 47, 68, 71-72. Their reference (38) is to
Engels (1955), pp.95-96, 110. Formatting altered to conform to the conventions
adopted here. Bold emphases added.]

It is interesting to note that Woods and Grant blithely record
Engels's approving reference to Hegel's depiction of magnets as having 'souls'
while failing to notice its mystical implications. How could this notion --
i.e., 'having a soul' --
be given a 'materialist spin', aimed at putting it back on its feet/'the right
way up'? Presumably a soul is a
soul, upside down or not.

In addition, we have already noted that an on-line
dictionary 'defines'
contradiction in somewhat similar terms, but since that is has already been
commented upon, no more will be said about it here.

However, several comrades have tried to argue that there are indeed 'true
contradictions' in reality. By far and away the most sophisticated of these
is Graham
Priest. But, it is far from clear whether the contradictions he
considers are dialectical, that is, should we ever be told what a 'dialectical
contradiction' is. Priest's work will be considered in more detail in an
Additional Essay, to be posted at this site in the next year or so.

Despite this, Cornforth himself made an attempt in this direction
when he aired an argument intended to show that contradictions actually 'exist'
in the world -- contrary to the view endorsed here that a contradiction (in
logic, and in its simplest form) is merely a certain sort of truth-functional
relation between a proposition and its negation:

"The contradiction in things is a very
familiar state of affairs. There is nothing in the least abstruse about it, and
it is often referred to in everyday conversations. For example, we speak of a
man as having a 'contradictory' character, or as being 'a mass of
contradictions'…." [Cornforth
(1976), pp.92-93.]

In which case, presumably, when we describe someone as a "bit of
a puzzle" Cornforth thinks we mean that he or she (or parts of them, at least)
may be purchased in a magic shop or toy store, and then solved with some difficulty
-- or that when we read this:

we should all try and remember our lines, and make sure the
audience (what?) can hear us.

Clearly, Cornforth has never heard of metaphor. [Why this is not
a literal use of "contradiction"/"contradictory" is considered below.]

Now, even Cornforth admits that describing people as
"contradictory" in fact involves a reference to their dispositions (or
"tendencies"):

"This means that [they evince] opposed tendencies
in [their] behaviour, such as gentleness and brutality, recklessness and
cowardice, selfishness and self-sacrifice." [Ibid., p.93.]

If this concession is meant to commit his theory to a
dispositional account of contradictions, then much of classic DM would
become obsolete. The fact that someone might have a disposition to be, say,
brave in certain circumstances, and cowardly in others, in no way suggests they
are both at once. What is in doubt is whether the joint
actualisation of these dispositions (in certain states or performances) may
be expressed by means of true propositions (without ambiguity), and in the same
respect.

Hence, the fact that an iron bar could be red hot at one end
and icy cold at the other is not a contradiction (even though an iron bar is at
any time disposed to be both). Asserting that the entire bar
is both of these (at the same time) might be thought by some to be contradictory (but, that will depend on the
circumstances); and yet even that would merely be an inconsistency (for
both descriptions could be false if the said bar was merely warm).

[It is worth recalling here that two contradictory propositions
cannot both be true, and cannot both be false, at once. Dialecticians in
general appear not to be aware of the latter condition (possibly because Hegel
appears not to have been, either!).]

Anyway, as noted above, such contrary ascriptions would merely be
inconsistencies. For example, if NN is said to be both angry and calm (i.e., not
angry) all at once, that would only be a contradiction if it could not be
false to assert NN was both. But, it could be false to assert this if NN
were slightly agitated (in which state NN would neither be angry nor not angry),
say. Now, if NN could be described (without ambiguity) as follows:

N1: NN is both angry and not angry in the same
respect and at the same time, and with respect to the same object of that anger,

we might have a genuine contradiction here. But, it is unlikely
that Cornforth meant what he said to be taken in this way --, and it is even more doubtful
whether he would have been able to say under what conditions he or anyone else
would/could hold N1 true -- or attribute to NN such an odd disposition/actualisation.

For example:

N2: At time t, NN is both angry with MM for lying
to her, and not angry with MM for lying to her.

Someone could object and argue that it is possible to have
mixed emotions at one and the same time. Perhaps, then, they would mean this:

N3: At time t, NN is both angry with MM for lying
to her (because it is a violation of trust), and not angry with MM for lying to
her (because she understands the pressures on MM at the time he lied).

In that case, N3 is really this:

N4: At time t, NN is both angry with MM for
φ-ing, and not angry with MM for ψ-ing.

Here we in effect have two different objects of NN's emotions:
anger at MM lying because it is a violation of trust (i.e., "φ-ing"), and lack of anger at MM lying because
of extenuating circumstances (i.e., "ψ-ing"). Which is, of course, why caveat N1 was
included earlier:

N1: NN is both angry and not angry in the same
respect and at the same time, and with respect to the same object of that
anger.

To be sure, some might still object, but they will (like
Cornforth) find it hard to say what the content of that objection amounts to
without editing out of the picture some object or other of the said anger.

In fact, by his use of the word "tendencies", Cornforth himself seems
half ready to concede this point, anyway. But, not even he would want to describe
the same action (performed by the same person) as, say,
literally both gentle and brutal at the same time (and without
equivocation). While it is possible to ascribe contrary properties to the same
object (e.g., one part of the aforementioned iron bar being hot while another part is cold), a
'contradiction' may only be extracted from such familiar facts by someone who has
never heard of ambiguity.

And once more, any description saying of the same action that it
was literally both gentle and brutal at the same time (and
without equivocation) would merely be an inconsistency -- since both
alternatives could be false if the said act was neutral (i.e., if it was neither
gentle nor brutal).

[Just as both parts of the assertion that NN as angry and not
angry could be false at once, and in the same respect, if NN was only
slightly miffed.]

However, in the end, the concrete Communist Block finally caught up with
Cornforth; in one of his last works [Cornforth (1980)] he systematically
retracted most of the theses he had declared were cornerstones of the "world
view of the proletariat".

[To be sure, the entire proletariat sent him billions of cards
expressing their thanks for his changing their minds for them. (More on
'contradictory' emotions below.)]

"I can contradict someone's statements. Can I also
have contrary interests to yours? Could it reasonably be said that someone's
behaviour was contradictory? Or that someone's interests were contradictory (in
relationship perhaps to some goal they had)? Or that my interests contradicted
yours? Certainly some data might appear contradictory in relationship to some
enquiry we have about it.

Does this not suggest that the notion of a contradiction is not exhausted by
what might go on inside a proposition? In ordinary usage?"

Of
course, contraries are not contradictions. As indicated earlier, concerning two contrary
propositions, both cannot be true (i.e., in this case, they are merely inconsistent with one
another), but they could both be false.

For example, these contraries, "All swans are white" and "No
swan is white", cannot both be true (in a non-empty domain), but they could both
be false -- for instance, if 'Some swan is not white' or "Some swan is white",
respectively, were themselves true. But, two contradictory propositions cannot both
be true and they cannot both be false, at once. Dialecticians invariably
ignore such "pedantic" details.

Now, the above comrade vainly tried to defend the employment of this obscure notion (i.e.,
"dialectical contradiction") by appealing to an everyday use of "contradiction": in connection with contradictory
behaviour. But, what does he mean by this? Perhaps someone who
stands and sits all at once? Or maybe someone who strikes and refuses to strike
at the same time?

In relation to the
August 2007 UK
Prison Officers' strike, he seems to
have meant workers who support the state one
minute, but act against it the next (or who hold odd beliefs about one or both). In
fact, there is a rather good example of this sort of
confusion in Simon Basketter's recent article in Socialist Worker:

"However, there are contradictions in the role of prison officers.

"It is summed up by Cardiff prisoners chanting 'you're breaking the law' to
the strikers....

"Prison officers' work, upholding law and order, frequently pushes them to
accept the most right wing ideas and actions of the system. One of their main
jobs is to control prisoners –- and throughout the prison system, many officers
have a proven record of racism and violence.

"Some of the contradictions can be seen in the strike. In Liverpool the POA
shop steward Steve Baines responded to the high court injunction by telling
fellow strikers, 'Tell them to shove it up their arse, we're sitting it out.'

"Yet when prisoners in the jail protested against their treatment, the POA
members rushed back in to control the situation and end a roof top protest."

Once more, what is the 'contradiction' here? Maybe, it has something to do
with the following:

P1: Prison officers uphold the law.

P2: This either results from, or leads them into,
holding right-wing ideas.

P3: But, this strike has forced some to defy
and/or disrespect the law.

P4: However, later, when some prisoners
protested, the same officers rushed back to work to control them.

Now, I have already commented on the
loose and indeterminate
way that dialecticians like to use the offending word (i.e., "contradiction"),
but even given this conceptual morass what precisely is the contradiction here?

Let us try again (using "NN" this time to stand for the name of any randomly chosen prison
guard who thinks and acts along the above lines):

P5: NN upholds the law.

P6: NN has adopted a number of right-wing ideas.

P7: One day, as a result of the strike, NN says
"Screw law L1!"

P8: Later that day he acts in support of a
totally different law.

Once more, where is the contradiction?

Now, if NN had said, "Screw all laws!" we might be able to cobble-together an
inconsistency here (such as "Screw all laws!" and "No laws ought to be
screwed!"), but not even that is implied by the above story.

In fact, a contradiction in this case would be something like: "All laws should be
screwed" and "There is at least one law that should not be screwed."
Or, perhaps: "No laws should be screwed" and "There is at least one law that
should be screwed."

To
be sure, people say all manner of odd things, and it is relatively easy to
utter contradictions. Who has ever denied that! Look, I have just posted
two in the previous paragraph. The question is, can both be held true, or false (or in this case, advocated
and repudiated as a
moral or political code), at the same time? Well, did anyone from Socialist
Worker try to ascertain from the aforementioned prison guards if any of them
would have assented to and rejected either of these at the same time: "All laws should
be screwed" and "There is at least one law that should not be screwed", "No laws
should be screwed" and "There is at least one law that should be screwed"?
Apparently not.

Indeed, if NN in fact assented to "No laws should be screwed", then we could
safely infer from his later strike action that he no longer held it true, for by
his actions he
must have advocated this in its place: "There is at least one law (namely,
law L1)
that should be screwed". [And this could be the case even if tomorrow NN went back to
believing the former again. Dialecticians, least of all, should need
reminding that people and things change!]

Unless, that is, we actually think NN holds to this odd idea: "I do not believe
that there is at least one law that should be screwed and I also believe there
is at least one law that should be screwed." Or, perhaps "Screw
law L1
and do
not screw it!" Even so, it is reasonably clear that we could only attribute
schizoid beliefs like this to NN if he were about to go insane. We certainly
could not rely on such a confused character to help win a strike -- nor report
his genuine beliefs to us with any accuracy.

But, let us examine what the above benighted comrade had to say, to see if anything useful can
be extracted from it. Is it possible, therefore, for an individual to have contradictory
interests in a
relationship, say? Perhaps this comrade meant the following:

B1: NN has interest (A in relationship R).

B2: It is not the case that NN has interest (A in
relationship R).

[The brackets have been inserted to ensure the same scope is operating here for
the negative particle -- another "pedantic"
detail our superfine 'dialectical logicians' also ignore.]

Now, this seems to be is a genuine contradiction (if the two are conjoined). Did he mean this?

But, if we are talking about literal contradictions here (and not those unexplained 'dialectical contradictions')
then A and B (in relationship R) can only contradict one another if they are expressed in
propositions (or, at the very least, in clauses), as B5-B7 below indicate.

Hence, A and B (in relationship R) would contradict each other if they were
expressed in something like this form (if, in B5a, we ignore for the moment the
"pedantic" detail included above):

B5a: Interest A contradicts interest B.

B6: "A" stands for "I must love my partner".

B7: "B stands for "It is not the case that I must
love my partner".

Can anyone assent to such beliefs all at once? Well, as we saw with NN above, people
can hold all manner of
odd ideas in their heads, so there is nothing to suggest that B6 and B7 could
not form the content of someone's overall belief system/emotional make-up. But, and unfortunately, this just tells us that contradictions in ordinary language and in
logic are built around the content of propositions, and the logical links we
hold between them -- thus, destroying this particular comrade's point.

The question now is, has anyone ever held the quoted propositions in B6 and B7 both true
and both false at the same time? Or anything like them? Perhaps they have (who
can say?), but how that shows that there are in fact 'true
contradictions' in nature and society is still somewhat unclear. [As should seem
obvious, the fact that some individuals believe something does not make it
true!]

However, it could be argued that the fact that NN holds, say, the quoted propositions
in B6 and B7 both true, when
coupled with the fact that NN is an individual who exists in the real world
(should we actually find a genuine NN-type person somewhere), shows that it is
at least possible to assert the existence of true contradictions. Once
such a possibility has been admitted, the objections set out in this Essay can be seen for
what they are: empty rhetoric. Or, so it might be claimed.

An argument somewhat like this was indeed put forward by
Roy Edgley a few years back:

"Since thought and theory are also part of
reality and thus real objects that can be thought about, contradictions in
thought, thought not true of reality, certainly exist in reality;
and it is only because they do exist in reality that they can be the object of
criticism -- criticism for failing to be true of reality. Moreover, it is
because two contradictory theories cannot both be true that each bears a
critical relation to the other: instantiated in actual thought this relation of
logical opposition is in fact a critical relation of real opposition, Kant
notwithstanding. It is no less logical opposition and no more simply natural
'conflict of forces' for taking the form of real historical and social
struggle." [Edgley (1979), pp.24-25. Italic emphases in the original.]

The following would presumably be one such contradiction (although Edgley
himself was interested in more overtly scientific propositions), and one such
existential claim:

B8: Let "p" be "I must love my partner and it is not the case that I must
love my partner".

B9: In so far as "p" exists, contradictions exist
in reality.

As
Edgley admits, while a proposition like "p" could not actually be true, but it would still exist, and
hence contradictions certainly exist (at this minimal level). Now, it is an
entirely different matter whether "p" is true; I will return to this later.
But, what
about the claim that the above shows that contradictions at least exist? Well
certainly those words exit, but this is no more illuminating than the following
would be:

B10: Let "G" = "God"

B11 In so far as "G" exists, "God" exists in
reality.

The question would still remain as to whether there is a 'God' or not.

[As those who know their logic will also know, Edgley has confused a
propositional sign with a proposition. B10 and B11 partially bring this out.]

Furthermore, no one has questioned the existence of inscriptions of
contradictions (indeed, these Essays contain scores of them), but that sheds no
light at all on the DM-claim that there are 'real contradictions' in nature and
society. If the mere thought of a contradiction, or its actual inscription
on the page (or screen), were enough to show that DM-contradictions exist in the
real world, then we should have to admit that there were 'real tautologies', too.
But worse, we should have to accept LIE, that is, the doctrine that from
thought alone, or from words, ontological conclusions may be drawn. [More on
that in Essay Twelve.]

[LIE = Linguistic Idealism; FL = Formal Logic.]

But signs and inscriptions do not have such existential implications; plainly, if they
did we should all have to believe in
Bigfoot.

Edgley goes on to argue:

"Though a system of thought that is contradictory
cannot be true of its real object, this isomorphic relation between the
structure of a society's thought and the structure of its material life thus
gives sense to the idea that such thought is true to that material life:
in being contradictory it 'reflects', and so discloses, though its content does
not explicitly assert, the contradictory structure of the material life of that
society." [Ibid., p.25. Italic emphasis in the original.]

But, one may wonder how Edgley knows this is indeed an "isomorphism" if none of
his contradictions are true of capitalism. And his claim that this theory is
"true to" capitalism is far from clear; how something can be "true to", but not
"true of", a social system is something Edgley failed to explain.

Now, Edgley asserts that these linguistic contradictions (or at least the
more theoretical examples to which he refers) are a "reflection" of "real
oppositions" in society. That claim is partly defused below, and will be further
laid to rest throughout this Essay, and in an Additional Essay on the nature of
science to be published at this site in the next few years. [See also
here.]

Independently of all that, Edgley makes a serious mistake (one that seems to be
as endemic in, as it is ubiquitous among, dialecticians): that of confusing
contradictions in FL with what might or might not exist. FL makes no
existential claims. To be sure, logicians as individuals may make such claims,
but logic itself is neutral in this regard. Moreover, certain logical systems
might need an
ontology (or even a
model)
in order to work, but that is not so in general. Anyway, even there, contradictions do
not make existential claims. The 'ontology' does that.

To
repeat: in its simplest form, a contradiction in logic is merely the conjunction
of a proposition with its negation, such that they cannot both be true and
cannot both be false, at once. So, the fact that inscriptions of contradictions exist
has no bearing on that logical principle. Furthermore, FL does not rule out the
existence of contradictions (for it is not a science), it is merely
concerned with the truth-functional connection between a proposition and its
negation. [The fact that there are many different and varied definitions of
"contradiction" in logic will be discussed in a later Essay. In the
meantime, one need only reflect on the fact that none of these alternative
definitions of contradiction make existential claims, either.]

In
that case, contradictions cannot "reflect" anything, for they represent one form
of the disintegration of the expressive power of language.

But, wait! The earlier comrade has a powerful ally: none other than that
outright charlatan Freud:

"Perhaps someone is in the midst of an unhappy love affair and says
'I love him
but I also hate him'. Its not just the statement but the feeling which is a
contradiction surely? If Freud is held to describe the human individual not as a
unified subject but a bundle of contradictory drives and desires, might one not
imagine contradictory drives (if not desires) in a particular social system?

"Can I not have contradictory emotions about a subject, situation or person (I
know I do about all sorts of things!)."

Thus, on the back of some egregious pseudo-science, this comrade has
built his 'case'.

But, is there anything in such fraudulent Freudian
fancies anyway (even if we put
to one side all the lies, deceit, client abuse, intellectual bullying,
cocaine addiction, paranoia, and fabrication of evidence that marked Freud's career)?

Well, once more, can people have contradictory emotions? Perhaps these examples will
suffice:

B12: NN hates Blair.

B13: It is not the case that NN hates Blair.

However, I rather think that the aforementioned comrade did not mean a
contradiction like this. Perhaps he intended then the
following?

B14: NN both hates and loves Blair.

This is entirely possible, if unusual. However, it is worth noting that love and
hate are not contradictory (when put in a propositional context) unless, say,
hating someone implies not loving them; but, as the above quotation concedes, it
does not imply this here.

Nevertheless, (1) the reader will need to re-read
the caveats posted earlier,
and (2) note that in order to give content to this idea (if it is what
was
meant, or if these ideas mean anything at all), we had to use a proposition
once more. This rather makes a mess
then of the following rash assertion:

I'm just very puzzled about what it means to restrict the meaning of the term
contradiction to a rule of formal logic. Its always been the least compelling of
your arguments it seems to me. I don't understand the linguistic scandal that is
supposed to be involved in talking about the human subject as a 'bundle of
contradictory drives and desires' or talking about the capitalist system as
encompassing contradictory tendencies (how TRPF [the tendency of the rate of
profit to fall -- RL] is held to operate inside a concrete capitalist social
formation for example)....

"I don't see how there can be anything ipso facto absurd or meaningless about
such statements to anyone familiar with ordinary language." [Bold emphasis
added.]

No
"scandal"; this comrade's badly thought-out examples themselves imply the above
conclusions -- that is, if we are to make sense of them.

[The alleged 'contradictions' in capitalism will be dealt with
here, and
here.]

Now, it could be argued that certain brain states and/or underlying
psychological or social forces are what lie behind these contradictory emotions, and it is
here that the contradiction lies.

Unfortunately, the thesis that there are such things as 'contradictory forces'
has been laid
to rest in this Essay, but the overall
idea is susceptible to the next series of objections, anyway.

[The argument below also applies to the claim that there might be certain
brain states/process and/or psychological and social forces at work, of which we are as yet
unaware, that constitute such 'material contradictions'.]

Let us, therefore, call
"F*" the brain state/process and/or psychological and social force that
results in, or from which "emerges", the following:

B15: NN loves Tony Blair,

and label that which 'opposes' or "mediates" the
following
"F**":

B16: NN hates Tony Blair.

So"F*" stands for the social force (etc.) that mediates,
or from which "emerges", "NN
loves Tony Blair" and
"F**" stands for that which mediates (etc.) "NN hates Tony
Blair".

Let us further assume that F* 'contradicts' F**, i.e., that they are
'dialectically-united opposites'. Now, given these assumptions, even this will not
work.

[Of course, if they are not 'dialectically-united opposites', then the above
comrade's objection falls by default.]

According to the DM-classics, where
we are told that all things change into their opposites, and because of their
opposites, F* must change into F**.
But,
F* cannot
itself change intoF**
since F** already exists! If it didn't already exist, according to this
theory, F* could not change, for there would be no opposite to make it do
so!

And, once more, it is no good propelling F** into the future so that it now
becomes what
F*will change into, since F* will do no such thing unless
F** is already there to make it happen!

Now, it could be objected that love can turn into hate, and vice versa;
sure enough, but the whole point of introducing
F* and F** was to show that if and when this happens, dialectics
cannot account for it!

[For those interested, this argument is developed in greater
detail here (where
'social contradictions' are also considered).]

Finally, at least here, the following section
contains an exchange between myself and a far more reasonable comrade
(whose name has been omitted):

Comrade M (commenting on the dialectical use of
the word "contradiction"):

"I mean what most people mean -- conflict, inner tension..."

Rosa:

Do they really? Give me one sentence drawn from ordinary language (the vehicle
most people do in fact use, so what you say should appear there, somewhere)
where such an interpretation could be put on the word "contradiction"
-- i.e.,
one not infected with the sort of idealist guff you read in Hegel. An idealist
will have no problem with asserting such things; if reality is mind it can argue
with itself. Not so a materialist who bases his science on the material language
of ordinary workers (ordinary language).

But, even so, why call such things "contradictions"? What link does this use
have with the "gain-saying" of someone, which is what the word usually means?
How is a conflict in society a contradiction?

Sure, you can re-define the word to mean what you like, but if we all did that
we could re-define anything to mean anything, and we'd lose touch with meaning
altogether.

Apart from that, you'd be forcing a view
onto reality (contrary
to what 'dialecticians' always claim they do) not reading one from it.
Linguistic Idealism -- as I asserted in those parts of my work I sent you --
would then automatically have raised its ideal head. Society would be
'contradictory', not because it really was so, but because we merely re-defined
it to be so. A linguistic dodge would have created a few empirical 'truths';
science on the cheap...

Comrade M:

Rosa said:

"Give me one sentence..."

Okay, what about "don't you contradict me you little bastard!" Or "that's a
contradiction in terms".

Suppose someone says 'military intelligence' is a contradiction in terms. What
they mean is that there is a conflict or a tension between the first and the
second word, thus conjugated.

At any rate, you are berating a new convert. I can't be expected to know
everything at once, much less know it as wisely as the central committee (you).

Rosa:

First, the phrase "contradiction in terms" is
either a misnomer or a rhetorical device (i.e., it is, say, metaphorical). Why?
Well, since contradiction has to do with truth and falsehood as much as it has
to do with "gain-saying", and since one term on its own cannot be true or false
(only sentences and clauses can be), no term can contradict another.

In that case, "contradiction
in terms" means something like "incompatible phrase(s)", as in "round square".
However, "AB is round and it is square" would be a contradiction if "AB is
round" were taken to mean "AB is not square", but then you would not now have a
contradiction in terms, just a plain contradiction with no "conflict (or) inner
tension". [There can be no "conflict" here, since words cannot "conflict" (they
are not agents -- except, of course, to idealists they are), and there can be no
"tension", for the same reason.]

And, if the above were rejected (for some
reason), you still would not have a 'contradiction in terms' that was itself
indicative of "conflict (or) inner tension", since, once more, words cannot
conflict (or be tense, or be in tension), because they are not agents.
Moreover, anyone who uttered a 'contradiction in terms' would not necessarily be in
"conflict (or) inner tension", just confused. And even if they weren't confused,
the 'contradiction in terms' they uttered would not of itself indicate "conflict
(or) inner tension"; it could be a sign of all manner of things (ranging from
lack of clarity to playfulness).

As to the idea that such a phrase could
indicate the presence of "conflict (or) inner tension" I have no doubt, but if a
'contradiction in terms' meant that a "conflict (or) inner tension" had to be
present, it would mean this, not merely could mean this, just as the truth of
"not p" would mean the falsehood of "p" (as opposed to merely "not p" could
mean the falsehood of "p"). So they cannot be synonymous, as you allege.

[Apologies for the prolixity of this paragraph,
but logic is a pain in the dictionary!]

But even if this were not so, "contradiction"
here would not mean "conflict (or) inner tension", merely "gainsaying oneself",
which could be true without an inner conflict being implied. It might be a joke,
an attempt to puzzle, a game, a mistake… The possibilities are endless. The
attempt to squeeze this into an idealist mould can only succeed if the almost
endless possibilities allowed for by ordinary language are ignored.

As to "Don't you contradict me you little
bastard!", the term "contradiction" in this command (it's not in
fact a proposition, so
it cannot itself be a contradiction, literally speaking -- not that you suggested
it was) clearly means "gain-say". No quibble. But, if it meant "conflict, inner
tension", you would have:

"Don't you conflict/inner tension me you little
bastard!", which is meaningless.

Even if we were to edit this to: "Don't you
conflict with me you little bastard!" it would not mean the same as "Don't you
contradict me you little bastard!"

One can conflict
with someone without contradicting them, and vice versa (e.g., two friends could
contradict each other (out of fun) without conflicting with each other, say).
Hence these cannot mean the same.

However "Don't
you inner tension with me you little bastard!" cannot be beaten into shape at
all.

2. Engels,
for example, went to great lengths to qualify what he meant by
"force".
Cf., Engels (1954), pp.69-86.

Nevertheless, as we saw
there, assertions like those given in Note
1 function as "forms of
representation", not as summaries of the available evidence. In many
cases, such broad generalisations are made on the basis of littleor
no evidence at all. For example:

"Dialectics…prevails
throughout nature…. [T]he motion through opposites which asserts itself
everywhere in nature, and which by the continual conflict of the
opposites…determines the life of nature." [Engels (1954). p.211.]

"Processes which in
their nature are antagonistic, contain internal contradiction; transformation of
one extreme into its opposite…[is] the negation of the negation…. [This is a]
law of development of nature, history and thought; a law which…holds good in the
animal and the vegetable kingdoms, in geology, in mathematics, in history and in
philosophy…. [D]ialectics is nothing more than the science of the general laws
of motion and development of nature, human society and thought." [Engels (1976)
pp.179-80.]

Now, Engels is quite
happy to call this sketchy, half-formed sub-hypothesis, a "law" even
though it was based solely on a superficial examination of a limited range of
examples -- all specially selected and highly simplified --, drawn from
the science of his day. And, even then, they are often badly-described or misconstrued.

Their role as a "form of representation" is outlined in the section dealing with
the RRT, in Essay Twelve.

[RRT = Reverse Reflection
Theory.]

[The
phrase "form of representation" is taken from Wittgenstein; a brief outline of
its meaning can be found in Glock, pp.129-35. We will see Engels use one such in Note 7 below.

4. However, in one of these
quotations, Engels seems to qualify this identification away:

"All motion is bound
up with some change of place…. The whole of nature accessible to us forms a
system, an interconnected totality of bodies…. [These] react one on another, and
it is precisely this mutual reaction that constitutes motion…. When two bodies
act on each other…they either attract each other or they repel each other…in
short, the old polar opposites of attraction and repulsion…. It
is expressly to be noted that attraction and repulsion are not regarded here as
so-called 'forces', but as simple forms of motion." [Engels (1954),
pp.70-71. Bold emphasis added.]

[Engels elaborated on this theme in the
succeeding pages of DN.]

[DN = Dialectics of Nature;
i.e., Engels (1954).]

Nevertheless, this re-interpretation of
the term "force" as a sort of shorthand for "simple forms of motion" has serious
consequences for DM that Engels appears not to have noticed. Several of these
are examined in the main body of this Essay, and below in
Note 25. I consider some of
his other, more important comments, in greater detail in
Essay
Seven.

5.
Admittedly, this is a highly simplified picture, for even in such circumstances
there could be several forces operating on an orbiting body -- the resultant
motion will therefore be a function of the vector sum of all the forces acting
in the system. The point at issue here is that relative to the centre of mass of the
orbiting body, motion is not the result of two different sorts of forces
-- those of attraction and repulsion -- but the consequence
of just one resultant force. In that case, orbital motion is produced by the action of
one force only (i.e., in Classical Physics).

Furthermore, any
secondary motion (resulting from the effect of other forces operating in the
system), which happens to be superimposed on the primary action, only complicates
the picture, it does not alter it. This extra activity might also be the result
of other attractive -- but, not repulsive -- forces (in Classical Physics,
once more), which admittedly affect the said resultant; while they might change it,
they do not turn it into two or more resultants. [This topic and these and
several other options are examined again in more detail
here.]

Nevertheless, it could be argued that the motion of such a body
around another is determined by
the operation of the two forces of attraction that pass between them:
body A attracts body B, and vice versa.

Even so, it is difficult to see how two attractive forces could be
regarded as opposites or as 'contradictories'. Anyway, Engels himself
argues that oppositional forces are those of attraction and repulsion,
despite the fact that with respect to the vast amount of the bulk motion in nature these seem to
have little or no part to play. Not only that, but the motion of, say, planet A around, say, star
B, is caused by forces originating in B, notA. While, the forces originating in
A may affect B, they do not affect A itself, or its motion around
B.

It could be argued once
more
that the interconnected and reciprocal 'effect chain', as it were, in play between A and
B
shows that such forces are dialectically-linked. Hence, on this view, B would affect A's
motion while A reciprocates; this in turn alters B's own motion which must then
affect A's and so on. But even here, these attractive forces do not
confront each other as oppositional or as contradictory.
At best, such forces
affect the motion of the two bodies in tandem, which motion in turn then affects any
forces in play, and so on. In fact they appear to augment each other. On
that basis, should we not (and with more justification) say that such forces are
--,
not contradictory --, but tautological? [On this see
Note 38, below.]

And, once more, these forces do not turn into one another, which
either means that they are not opposites, or the
DM-classics were wrong.

6. Again this simplifies the picture considerably, but the point is still valid.
Even if it could be shown that gravity is a property either of matter (as a result,
perhaps, of the activities of the by now legendary "graviton"), of
Spacetime, or of
something else, 'motion' through that latter would still not be a function of
attractive and repulsive forces. [On this, see
Jammer (1999), pp.iv-vi. This has been
challenged in Wilson (2007). More on that
below.]

[In the
previous paragraph, the word "motion" is in 'scare' quotes, since it is a moot
point whether anything actually moves in
four-dimensional Spacetime.]

6a. This, of course, is
not how things are pictured in school or college Physics, where "force" is still
used for heuristic purposes. But, as Jammer notes, in
higher Physics, "force" has been edited out, replaced by
exchange particles.

"The paradox deepens when we consider force from
the perspective of modern physics. In fact, the concept of force is
conspicuously absent from our most advanced formulations of the basic laws. It
doesn't appear in
Schrödinger's equation, or in any reasonable formulation of
quantum field theory, or in the foundations of
general relativity. Astute
observers commented on this trend to eliminate force even before the emergence
of relativity and quantum mechanics.

"'In all methods and systems which involve the
idea of force there is a leaven of artificiality...there is no necessity for the
introduction of the word 'force' nor of the sense−suggested ideas on which it
was originally based.'" [Quoted from
here.]

[The above now appears in Wilczek (2006), pp.37-38.]

This view has been criticised quite effectively in
Wilson (2007). More details
on this will be added here at a future date.

Nevertheless, it is not
at all clear what Engels was driving at in these passages. If he meant to say
that heat operates as a repulsive force then that would have been a desperate
and unconvincing move. Not only do cold bodies have satellites (e.g., Neptune),
hot bodies swallow matter up all the time. It is possible that Engels simply
copied this idea from theorists of the previous century. [Hesse (1961), Williams
(1980).]

Admittedly,
Engels did consider other repulsive forces that could operate in a planetary
system, but his ideas were speculative, fanciful and clearly ad hoc. I
can find no evidence that anyone else (DM-fan or otherwise) has followed-up on
-- or developed -- any of these ideas in any way in the intervening years.

For example,
Engels appeals to the original repulsive properties of the "individual particles
of the gaseous sphere" from which the Solar System was formed (as a result of
"contraction"), to account for its origin by means of an "interplay of
attraction and repulsion." [Engels (1954), pp.73-74.]

It would be difficult to
find a better example than this of how the dialectical method has been
imposed on nature -- and not deduced from the phenomena. And we can say this with
some confidence; even if this 'theory' weren't so obviously fanciful, it certainly could not
have been deduced from the phenomena since the alleged incidents took
place billions of years ago. Admittedly, there were theoretical
considerations that recommended this 'hypothesis' to Engels as a tentative 'explanation'
of how the solar system might have been formed -- although even that is questionable
since Engels explicitly based his ideas on the old
Kant-Laplace model, itself
nearly 100 years old at the time --, but even granted all this, Engels's
account is superficial, impressionistic and lacks both mathematical and evidential
support. It was clearly motivated by his desire to find some force -- anyforce -- to counterbalance gravity just because DM requires it,
not because the phenomena dictate it. This is a classic example of Engels
using the ideas he inherited from Hegel as a
"form of representation".

To be sure,
such formal devices are used all the time in science; Engels however turned this one into a
metaphysical thesis.

[The difference between Metaphysics and
science will be outlined in a later Essay. On Metaphysics and DM, see Essay
Twelve Part One.]

Indeed,
Einstein himself was not above inventing forces to suit his needs (as, indeed,
was Newton), introducing "the cosmological constant" to account for the fact
that the Universe has not collapsed in on itself. Cf., Lerner (1992),
pp.131-32. There are countless examples of this sort of move in the history of science.
Kuhn calls these "paradigms" (a none-too-happy term). On this see Kuhn (1970,
1996), and Sharrock and Read (2002).

Incidentally, an appeal to so-called
'centrifugal
forces' (a bogus notion found in
Classical Physics) will not save Engels's theory either -- such
forces do not
'exist'. If anything they are the result of a misleading shorthand for the
way that rectilinear motion would tend to be re-asserted if forces responsible
for centripetal acceleration cease to operate, subjectively experienced in certain
rotating systems.

8. In that case, for
once, Engels's views would seem to be consistent with modern Physics (as
indicated by Jammer)!

Engels also noted the
anthropomorphic origin of this concept (something Woods and Grant, for example,
failed to spot -- even though they quoted this passage!):

"All natural
processes are two-sided, they are based on the relation of at least two
operative parts, action and reaction. The notion of force, however, owing to
its origin from the action of the human organism on the external world…implies
that only one part is active, the other part being passive…[and appearing] as a
resistance." [Engels (1954), p.82. Bold emphasis added.]

On the animistic/anthropomorphic origin of the
concept of force, see Hesse (1961), Jammer (1999), and
Agassi (1968),
who references Bacon's Novum Organum (Book
One: Aphorisms; Aphorisms XXXVII-LXVIII)
as a locus classicus of this avenue of criticism.

DM-theorists are not
alone in finding their theses embarrassed by the use of anthropomorphic
concepts; the ideas of metaphysically-motivated Philosophers and scientists have
been similarly compromised. The material and ideological source of this phenomenon
is discussed
in Essays Twelve and Fourteen (summaries here,
and here).

9. Classical problems
associated with the ontology of interaction will be posted here at a future
date. However, there is an outline of these issues inNote 24. See alsoNote 6a.

10.
It could be argued that forces are 'abstractions' constructed to assist in the
scientific study of nature. However, once again, when viewed this way, the
concept "force" becomes little more than a "useful fiction", only now situated
in a metaphorical universe of its own, located somewhere between genuine fictions
(such as apparitions) and mathematical fictions (like the centre of mass of the
huge galactic system to which our galaxy belongs, the
Virgo
Supercluster). In that case, naturally, the 'objective' status of forces
would be fatally compromised. They would have no physical
counterpart, and the real material correlates of DM-'contradictions' (which was
the whole point of this Part of Essay Eight to investigate and perhaps locate) would be non-existent.

11.Once more, this is not a problem
confined to DM-circles; scientific theories are shot-through with metaphor, and
scientists use analogical reasoning all the time. On the nature and use of metaphor
and analogy in the sciences, cf., Baake (2003), Brown (2003), Benjamin,
et al (1987), Guttenplan (2005), Hesse (1966), Ortony (1993),
and White (1996). [Several of these base their ideas on those of
Max Black,
whose theory is
destructively criticised in White (1996).]

However, there
is as yet no satisfactory treatment of the import, role and significance of the
use of figurative language in science anywhere
in the literature. Naturally, given the ubiquity of such language, the precise
nature of scientific knowledge is poorly understood. [I hope to say more on this
in an Essay on science to be published in 2008 or 2009.]

12. This might be one
particular use of the LEM that DM-fans would be wise not
to question. If objects, states of affairs and processes were held to be
both non-contradictory and contradictory at the same time, little
sense could be made of the theory even before it was examined.

[LEM = Law of Excluded
Middle.]

Nevertheless, as with any application of the 'laws' of
FL to complex situations, some sensitivity is
required. In that case, it could be argued that DM is only committed to the view
that parts of one system/process 'contradict' parts of another, while
still others do not.

To be perfectly honest, it is impossible to give a clear answer to
this volunteered response since DM is far too imprecise and sketchy for anyone
(supporter or opponent) to
decide whether or not this is a legitimate reading. Perhaps it is both and neither
at the same time?

However, dialecticians do in fact speak about contradictions growing and
intensifying, or even lessening and being "resolved"; but this is clearly qualitative
speech since they supply
us with no units by which they can be measured, and no data to support their
contention; nor
do they attempt to quantify them in any way (which, on its own, is a rather odd
thing for an alleged science to omit).

If DM-apologists decided to invent a unit here, we might make some progress. May I suggest, therefore, the 'Neg'?

So, one Neg could be defined as that strength/level/intensity
of contradiction necessary to make either a stick (of arbitrary size) look bent
in water, an object (again of arbitrary dimensions) look smaller as it
recedes from the viewer, or maybe even that required to make at least one capitalist/employer look fair.

In that case, a Nanoneg would be enough to make an electron move,
and a Piconeg would allow it to be a wave and a particle all at once. Further: a
Millineg would be strong enough to move a
millipede. [The reader can decide
for herself what a Centineg would be capable of setting in motion.] A Decineg would be
sufficient to depict a formal contradiction in logic, while a Decaneg (colloquially,
"A Blair")
would be enough to spin a pack of capitalist lies (about the affordability of,
say,
pensions) or write at least one 'dodgy'
Iraq dossier.

Perhaps then, a Hecto(r)neg would set off a factional dispute
in yet another dialectically-distracted Trotskyist sect, while the class war
itself would need a Kiloneg to initiate a strike, a Meganeg to motivate a
huge anti-war movement, and a Giganeg to prompt an insurrection. Moving up the
scale, a Teraneg would be needed to keep the Earth in orbit around the Sun, and,
of course, a Yottaneg
to kick-start the 'Big Bang' (if the latter actually happened).

We could even introduce a special unit to measure the
contradictory stench created in the nostrils of most working-class people by the
sectarian in-fighting, oppression, mass murder and counter-revolutionary
activity this misbegotten theory has helped inflict on Marxism: the
Rottaneg.

All we would need then is an intrepid dialectician (i.e.,
one of those who claim to be able to discover fundamental scientific truths in
thought alone, by simply juggling with obscure Hegelian jargon) to invent a Negometer (and they could do this
if they saved time by not writing yet another identical version of
DM/'Materialist Dialectics' by just cutting and pasting large sections from the
'classics') to measure these super-scientific 'dialectical contradictions'. That
done, andMystical Marxism might at least begin to look precise
for a change.

[To be honest, I would have suggested the 'Con' here as a suitable unit
with which to measure the strength of DM-'contradictions', but
when I typed "Megacon" into an earlier version of the above, that seemed to me to
be a little too obvious -- and a mite too facetious.

Compare the above comments with the suggestions made about dialectical "nodes"/"leaps",
here.]

13. This, of course, assumes that
'contradictions' have metaphorical 'geometric
centres' and possess figurative 'separation radii'. Well, maybe they can be
photographed, weighed and given new paint job?

Cheap debating points?
Perhaps so; but if
all parts of nature (animate and inanimate, macroscopic or microscopic) behave as if they can argue
over the metaphysical garden fence, as it were -- which is how things are
depicted in DM, picturing them as 'contradicting' themselves and one another,
bickering all the time (that is, if the word "contradict" is taken literally)
--, the cheap shot above is hardly worth mentioning in comparison. DM takes the
piss out of itself; it needs little help from me.

Unfortunately, the same always seems to happen whenever I ask
other dialecticians to explain why these are 'contradictions'. [On the best
response ever given to this question, but not as asked by me, see
here.]

Several more examples of this DM-tendency to label anything and
everything as "contradictory" can be found
here, and in Note 14.

14. We might also want to know how
something actually existing (i.e., the current state of the working class) can
'contradict', in a dialectical sense (involving forces), something that does not
(i.e., the latter's potential revolutionary role). As we have seen,
dialecticians are won't to use the word "contradiction" in
inappropriate circumstances to depict things that are quirky, odd, contrary to
expectations, and so on -- as the mood takes them, it seems. [See, for
instance, here.]

However, what Lindsey might have had in mind
in the quoted passage is that
there is a seeming contradiction in revolutionary theory, which on the
one hand depicts the proletariat as the revolutionary class, while on the other, they are often quiescent (or relatively so) for long periods. But this is no more a
contradiction here than it would be in Physics if, say, an unsupported heavy object
near to the surface of the earth does not actually fall toward the ground. As soon as we
learn that the heavy object is maintained in place by magnets, for example, the phenomenon
puzzles us no more. To be sure, this stretches the meaning of "unsupported"
almost to breaking point, but as that word has no strict definition, it will
probably survive that particular semantic trauma.

The moral here (if there is one) seems to be that no law
in physics is 'true' on its own, and all are hedged about by all manner of ceteris
paribus (i.e., "all things being equal") clauses. On this, see
Cartwright (1983).
[However, there is a forceful rebuttal to this way of seeing things
here. Naturally, it would be out of place to pursue this topic in this Essay. See
also, Earman et al (2002). ]

Hence, as soon we know what is holding the
working class back, this puzzle also disappears.

In that case, Lindsey's worry about overcoming this
'contradiction' can now be shelved: there isn't one to overcome.

That does not mean that socialists
must just let
things drift, and fail to intervene, or wait for workers to organise themselves,
but since this is to stray into areas covered by HM, no more will be said about
this topic here.

15.
It may be felt that this completely misconstrues the relation between parts and
wholes as it is interpreted in DM-circles (wherein "the whole is more than
the sum of the parts", etc.). However, this dialectical doctrine is examined in extensive detail in Essay Eleven
Part Two, where it is exposed
as no less confused than other DM-theses are.

17. Of course, it could be argued that this objectifies the Totality,
once more, thereby
distorting it. But, if the Totality is not a kind of object (even if it is a
changing 'object'), how can 'it' have
any relation to 'its' parts, and how could 'contradictions' be properties of
'it'?

It could be objected that the Totality
is a process, and hence it could be an 'it' (or a sort
of 'it') in that sense. Naturally, the answer to these (and
other) questions about this mysterious entity/process (the "Totality") will have
to be put to one side until DM-advocates tell us (if ever) what (if anything) they think 'it' is.

[They might find a few useful ideas (consistent with much else in
DM)
here.]

Despite this, it
could be further objected that abstract reasoning like this demonstrates nothing
since DM is concerned with verifiable, concrete material contradictions,
which occur in the real world. That option is examined
here, and
here.

18.
Naturally, this assumes that these relations are symmetrical -- that is, that AR
= RA, which seems reasonable enough. Another simplifying assumption is that
these forces are part of binary systems -- that is, the discussion in the text
concentrates exclusively on force-couples. It is clear, I take
it, that this contraction does not materially affect the conclusions drawn.
Anyway, further complications will be introduced and examined later.

In addition, most of the
comments in this part of the Essay have been deliberately
restricted to the use of DM-terminology, the employment of which does not imply I
either accept its validity or that it makes any sort of sense.

Naturally, a
comprehensive scientific account of the concept of force would have to include
modern ideas about
gravity, the strong
nuclear,
weak
and electroweak forces, etc.
[As I noted earlier, this concept is now
explicated by the use of exchange particles.]

However, it is possible that as
science develops reference to forces (even in school Physics) will progressively disappear; cf., Jammer
(1999), pp.iv-vi (quoted earlier). In
that eventuality, if DM-theorists maintain their adherence to the doctrine that
forces give 'contradictions' a material grounding of some sort, their theory
would become 'unscientific' by default. Either that, or they will have to abandon talk about the 'objective' nature of forces
and join with Engels in regarding them as shorthand for relative motion. Of
course, forces would then not just be "useful fictions", they'd be entirely fictitious.

Should this scientific
development fail to materialise (i.e., the editing out of all forces from nature), it
would be interesting to see how DM-theorists would try to harmonise their
'attraction-repulsion' scenario with successful attempts to unify the
four fundamental forces in a
Grand Unification Theory
(or even in Superstring/M Theory,
etc.). It might finally kill-off informed talk in DM-circles about the existence
of 'contradictory' forces in nature. Clearly, if there is only one force, it can hardly 'contradict' itself, one
supposes.

[However, no
inference should be drawn from this to the present author's views concerning the
'ontological' status of forces. As noted elsewhere, this terminology is
only being used here as a way of exposing the confusions that abound in DM. It
is up to scientists to tell us what the world contains, not Philosophers --,
and definitely not RL.]

Nevertheless, with
respect to the comments in the text, it is assumed that R-forces prevent the
collapse of accumulated matter into 'singularities' under the action of ambient
AA-force couples. Clearly, this simply complicates the point, without altering
it, once again. In such a scenario, we would have an ARA-system-of-forces, which would be even
more difficult to interpret as 'contradictory'. As pointed out in the text, the
meaning of the word "opposite" would have to be altered so that systems of three
or more forces could then have any number of their constituent parts considered as
'opposites' of any (or all) the rest. If so, such 'contradictions' would be
artefacts of an arbitrary choice of words, not 'objective' realities.

Moreover,
and once again, given the
classical picture, motion itself is altered by the operation of a single
resultant force. This is even more difficult to square with the idea that forces
are 'contradictions'. [More on this later, too.]

20. This simple picture is, of course, ruined by the complexities found in nature.
However, the more complications there are, the less applicable DM-concepts
seem to be. In this case, we find that we would have an RARA-system-of-forces.
Again, a choice would now have to be made whether we should widen the meaning of the
word "opposite" to accommodate DM, or change DM in order to accommodate reality.
[To date, DM-theorists have generally preferred the former over the latter alternative.]

Since AR-forces are discussed below, I
will postpone comment on them until then.

21.
This need not be as serious a problem as is indicated in the text. As
pointed out elsewhere in this Essay, scientists do this sort of thing all the
time. Unfortunately, this is bad news for DM since it confirms the view
that science is a conventionalised social practice, and further substantiates
the claim made here that metaphysical theses merely result from a misconstrual of conventionalised
grammatical forms (the latter of which gain their sense from material practices),
as if they represent fundamental aspects of reality. In short, the conventions we use to
represent the world are confused with material truths about it.

This is as crass an error
as, say, assuming that reality itself must have an edge to it simply because
every photograph has one.

(3) This way of looking at the world is really quite as
loopy as it looks.

[This topic is examined more thoroughly later on in the
present Essay.]

22. It might be felt that this
Essay is so heavily biased against any way of interpreting forces as
'contradictions' that scientific facts and theories have constantly been prejudicially
twisted/slanted
-- this latest allegation being
an excellent example of this tactic. Surely -- it could be argued -- accelerated motion
in the real world is the result of several forces operating on a body; the
ensuing motion simply follows as their oppositional effect.

However, this
volunteered response will be examined presently in the main body of the Essay.

23.
Once more, it could be objected that there is no such thing as "empty space". But even if
this were so, and the bodies referred to in the text were not in the said
force field, any forces present would not operate on each other, but only on the
bodies in that system (if there were any). Hence, forces seem to affect bodies
not each other.

24. It could be
pointed out here that force fields do in fact interact, and they certainly alter one another. This
will be examined presently.

This, of course, is the
source of the classical ontological problem concerning the exact nature of
forces, and it is
partly why it is so difficult to understand their nature. Indeed,
their detection seems to depend only on the effects they have on bodies, or on
instruments (or, rather, a 'force' seems to be little more than the way scientists depict certain
relationships between bodies, as Engels, in a more
sober mood, actually put
it; on
this, see Note 4), or on other
fields.

However, if
forces are viewed as particulate (that is, if certain particles are viewed as
the 'bearers' of forces), the problem would simply reappear at a new level, and
we would be no further forward -- a fact Leibniz was, I think, among the first to point out.

Hence, this sort of confrontation between forces could only take place if they were
particulate in some way -- that is, if they registered some sort of
resistance to one another. If, on the other hand, they were not
particulate, it would be hard to see how they could interact in
any way, let alone
'contradict' each other. Continuous media have no rigidity and no
impenetrability to exert forces of any sort (except, of course, as part of a
figurative extension to particulate interaction). [This has
been questioned in Smith (2007). More on that presently.]

But, there are well-known classical problems
associated with the idea that forces are particulate (referenced
here) -- not the least of
which is the observation that if forces were particulate then they could only interact if they
exerted still other forces (contact forces, cohesive forces, forces of
reaction, and so on, which held them together), so that they could act on other
particulates (and thus not disintegrate), initiating an infinite regress. That is, in
order to account for the ability of particles to resist one another, we would
need to appeal to forces internal to bodies to stop, say, one body penetrating
the other, or to prevent distortions tearing that body apart, etc. But, if the
forces internal to bodies are particulate too (as it seems they must be), we
would thus need further forces to account for the internal coherence of these
new (and smaller) 'force-particles', and so on. Alternatively, if
these 'internal forces' are continuous (or non-particulate), they would not be
able to generate inner coherence (since they have no rigidity).

In the end nothing would be accounted for
since at each level there would be
nothing to provide the required resistance/coherence.

So,
reducing the interaction between forces to that between bodies means that
particles could not 'contradict' one another without exerting non-particulate
forces on their operands -- which would once again mean that such entities were
incapable of exerting forces, having no rigidity to do so, etc., etc.

Unfortunately, even the exchange of particles (in
QM) would succeed in exerting forces only if there were reaction forces internal
to bodies, which were themselves the result of rigidity, cohesion, contact, etc,
to stop the force carrier particle passing right through the target particle.
Of course, Physicists these days appeal to fields, energy gradients and the like
(and reject such mechanistic notions), but if
these are continuous, too, the above problems will simply re-emerge at a new level.
On the other hand, if they are
particulate, after all, this merry-go-round would merely take another spin around the
metaphysical dance floor.

[QM = Quantum Mechanics.]

Of course, it could be objected that the
above adopts an out-dated mechanistic view of interaction, and hence is
completely misguided. However, the 'modern' mathematical approach surrenders the
possibility of giving a causal, or physical account of forces -- or, at least, one
that does not itself depend on a figurative use of the sorts of verbs we
employ in everyday life to give a material account of why things happen in the macro-world.

So, if a particle is seen as a 'carrier'
of a force, and that 'force' can be given no physical content, but is still
regarded as being capable of 'making' things happen, 'forcing' particles to
'divert' from their line of action (etc.), then those very words must themselves lose contact with
seemingly identical everyday words
like "make", "force", "divert", as and when the
latter are used to depict macro-phenomena.

Now
there is no problem with this; but then such an account would thereby become merely
descriptive (or even metaphorical), not explanatory. Differential equations
and vectors cannot make things move, or alter the path of a single
particle. To be sure, we can describe such things with these mathematical forms, and guarantee thereby that
the 'books' of nature balance; but the downside to this is that such models cannot
explain
why anything actually happens in the physical world. [For more
recent qualms on this, see Note 30.]

Perhaps, this helps
explain Engels's own suspicion of forces; ontologically, they appear to be
deeply mysterious, if not animistic. He is not alone. [Other relevant aspects of the nature of
forces are discussed here.]

Clued-in physicists seem
already to be aware of this (i.e., that it is a problem of language). Here is
David Peat:

"IT HASN'T been a great couple of years for theoretical
physics. Books such as
Lee Smolin'sThe Trouble with Physics and
Peter Woit'sNot Even Wrong embody the frustration felt across the field that
string
theory, the brightest hope for formulating a theory that would explain the
universe in one beautiful equation, has been getting nowhere. It's quite a
comedown from the late 1980s and 1990s, when a grand unified theory seemed just
around the corner and physicists believed they would soon, to use
Stephen
Hawking's words, 'know the mind of God'. New Scientist even ran an
article called 'The end of physics'.

"So what went wrong? Why are physicists finding it so hard
to make that final step? I believe part of the answer was hinted at by the great
physicist
Niels Bohr, when he wrote: 'It is wrong to think that the task of physics is
to find out about nature. Physics concerns what we can say about nature.'

"At first sight that seems strange. What has language
got to do with it? After all, we see physics as about solving equations
relating to facts about the world -- predicting a comet's path, or working out
how fast heat flows along an iron bar. The language we choose to convey question
or answer is not supposed to fundamentally affect the nature of the result.

"Nonetheless, that assumption started to unravel one night
in the spring of 1925, when the young
Werner
Heisenberg worked out the basic equations of what became known as quantum
mechanics. One of the immediate consequences of these equations was that they
did not permit us to know with total accuracy both the position and the velocity
of an electron: there would always be a degree of irreducible uncertainty in
these two values.

"Heisenberg needed an explanation for this. He reasoned
thus: suppose a very delicate (hypothetical) microscope is used to observe the
electron, one so refined that it uses only a single photon of energy to make its
measurement. First it measures the electron's position, then it uses a second
photon to measure the speed, or velocity. But in making this latter observation,
the second photon has imparted a little kick to the electron and in the process
has shifted its position. Try to measure the position again and we disturb the
velocity. Uncertainty arises, Heisenberg argued, because every time we observe
the universe we disturb its intrinsic properties.

"However, when Heisenberg showed his results to Bohr, his
mentor, he had the ground cut from under his feet. Bohr argued that Heisenberg
had made the unwarranted assumption that an electron is like a billiard ball in
that it has a 'position' and possesses a 'speed'. These are classical notions,
said Bohr, and do not make sense at the quantum level. The electron does not
necessarily have an intrinsic position or speed, or even a particular path.
Rather, when we try to make measurements, quantum nature replies in a way we
interpret using these familiar concepts.

"This is where language comes in. While Heisenberg
argued that 'the meaning of quantum theory is in the equations', Bohr pointed
out that physicists still have to stand around the blackboard and discuss them
in German, French or English. Whatever the language, it contains deep
assumptions about space, time and causality -- assumptions that do not apply to
the quantum world. Hence, wrote Bohr, 'we are suspended in language such
that we don't know what is up and what is down'. Trying to talk about
quantum reality generates only confusion and paradox.

"Unfortunately Bohr's arguments are often put aside today
as some physicists discuss ever more elaborate mathematics, believing their
theories to truly reflect subatomic reality. I remember a conversation with
string theorist
Michael Green a few years after he and
John
Schwartz published a paper in 1984 that was instrumental in making string
theory mainstream. Green remarked that when
Einstein
was formulating the theory of relativity he had thought deeply about the
philosophical problems involved, such as the nature of the categories of space
and time. Many of the great physicists of Einstein's generation read deeply
in philosophy.

"In contrast, Green felt, string theorists had come up
with a mathematical formulation that did not have the same deep underpinning and
philosophical inevitability. Although superstrings were for a time an exciting
new approach, they did not break conceptual boundaries in the way that the
findings of Bohr, Heisenberg and Einstein had done.

"The American quantum theorist David Bohm
embraced Bohr's views on language, believing that at the root of Green's
problem is the structure of the languages we speak. European languages, he
noted, perfectly mirror the classical world of
Newtonian physics. When we say 'the cat chases the mouse' we are dealing
with well-defined objects (nouns), which are connected via verbs. Likewise,
classical physics deals with objects that are well located in space and time,
which interact via forces and fields. But if the world doesn't work the way our
language does, advances are inevitably hindered.

"Bohm pointed out that quantum effects are much more
process-based, so to describe them accurately requires a process-based language
rich in verbs, and in which nouns play only a secondary role....

"Physics as we know it is about equations and quantitative
measurement. But what these numbers and symbols really mean is a different,
more subtle matter. In interpreting the equations we must remember the
limitations language places on how we can think about the world...." [Peat
(2008), pp.41-43. Bold emphases added; quotation marks altered to
conform to the conventions adopted here.]

Now, I do not want to
suggest for one moment that I agree with the above comments about the nature of
language (or even of scientific language), but they certainly indicate that
scientists themselves are aware of the problem.

[To be sure, Peat follows
Bohm and suggests we need to learn from native American languages, which seem to
have rather odd grammars; but it is to be doubted whether a culture that has
produced no science or technology of any note has anything to teach one that
has.]

25. Admittedly, when viewed as vectors, velocities, accelerations and forces can, in
some circumstances, be represented as 'opposites', but this is given within
vector algebra and follows from certain definitions. However, unless we are
prepared to admit all the absurdities outlined earlier, this approach cannot
lend any support to DM. In addition, it is argued
below that
mathematics can in no way be regarded as an abstraction from reality.

[Issues related to this will be examined in
Essay Thirteen, and in an Additional
Essay.
However, this topic is
intimately connected with the idea that motion is caused by resultant forces,
which is discussed in more detail here.]

To be sure,
when forces are represented as vectors they can produce accelerations that
appear to 'oppose' impressed motion in the system. Ignoring for the present the
fact that the use of such language is arguably anthropomorphic, in such cases we
would be linking items drawn from the same category (i.e., vectors connected
with movement), which clearly makes sense. In this way, any force could be
replaced by relative acceleration (by means of
Newton's Second Law, etc.). But,
even here, an acceleration in an opposite direction does not oppose the
original velocity; an acceleration (in vector algebra, which is what we are
speaking of here!) just is a description of that changing velocity. Even
in reality, accelerations are not disembodied beings that haunt the material
world, throwing their weight about, bullying velocities to do their bidding.
They are just
changing velocities --, no more, no less.

However, in vector algebra no sense can be made of the addition (or subtraction)
of force and velocity vectors unless this is mediated by the Second Law (etc.),
once more. Even then, the relation between acceleration and velocity vectors has
to be established by well-known equations. The various physical quantities
represented by these equations can only be linked by means of translations like
these, which set up analogies between categorically different items (but in a
dimensionally consistent fashion). That is one reason why no sense can be
given to 'equations' such as the following:

(1) F
= -v

(2) a
= kv

Equations like these
would be regarded as
dimensionally incoherent (unless further dimensions were built into the
constant "k", for example). Compare these with the next batch:

(3) s
= ut + ½at2

(4) a
= -w2s

(5) F
= -mw2s

By means of translational/analogical
equations like these (or, to make the same point more clearly, by the use of
algebraic rules that sanction the inferences we make about physical quantities,
in which forces appear as part of a "norm of representation"), we can convert
forces into accelerations, compare physical quantities, and account for the
motion of bodies (etc.).

Unfortunately, this is
of
little help to DM-theorists since the translation of forces into relative
accelerations would mean that forces are indeed "useful fictions" once more, which
would re-introduce all the difficulties noted earlier.

[This is not a problem
for the account presented here, for reasons hinted at in the previous
paragraph but one.]

However, even if the above were rejected for some reason, this
would still lend no support to DM, for such representations are not
oppositional; they do not slug it out on the page or the blackboard. And,
manifestly, they do not turn into one another (as we are told they should by
DM-classicists).

Hence, if two ('opposite') forces in equilibrium (inclined at θo
to the x axis, say) are resolved (into their i components), and then
equated as follows:

F cosθ - G cosθ = 0

no one would suppose that these symbols are locked in a
life-or-death conflict, and will one day change into each other.

Naturally, the above conclusions are not affected in any way of
these forces are not in equilibrium:

F cosθ - G cosθ > 0

F cosθ - G cosθ < 0

And it would be little use arguing that while it is true that the
above representations may be lifeless (and thus incapable of struggling, and
turning into one another), what they actually represent in the real world most
certainly can, and does. This is because, the above considerations were
expressly aimed at forestalling the claim that the vector calculus is
'dialectical' (and no more). The allegedly dialectical nature of forces in
reality is an entirely separate issue, which is demolished throughout the rest
of this Part of Essay Eight (and
here).
[However, on the Calculus in general, see
here.]

Readers may be puzzled by
the use of the word "analogical" in an earlier paragraph. The use of this word
is connected with the history of the development of mathematical terminology in
this area, and with the way we make sense of such equations. More particularly,
it originated in the reservations expressed by ancient Greek mathematicians over
the relationship between so-called
"incommensurables" (physical quantities from different qualitative
categories, which could find no common noun/predicate to 'co-measure' them) and
how these reservations were resolved by European mathematicians in the High
Middle Ages. Conceptual barriers
between disparate categories were beginning to be broken down by the introduction of
concepts (and thus new grammars) at this time, which followed (and were based) on the development of market economies in Feudal society.

So,
in earlier times, categorical differences were believed to hold
between certain physical terms, which meant they could not be linked
mathematically. In that case, whole new grammars had to be introduced
by the above mathematicians before incommensurable quantities could be
compared analogically (so their exchange values could be calculated). Innovations like these permitted theorists to move beyond
earlier 'commonsense' approaches to motion encapsulated in Aristotelian Physics,
enabling them to lay the foundations of modern
kinematics.

This emphasis on the analogical nature of modern
algebraic forms depicting motion follows from an approach to mathematical
development that sees the latter as dependent on contingent Historico-economic factors, and which
thus bases it firmly and exclusively on human practice and thus on material relations.
This view of mathematical development also helps undermine the idea that mathematics is concerned with the
study of
'abstractions', and is thus about the Ideal. Hence, it also
neutralises yet another core DM-thesis: that scientific development is
predicated on the ability of theorists to abstract concepts into existence.
[This doctrine has already been picked apart
here.]

There is a detailed
discussion of these issues in Hadden (1988, 1994), upon which many of the above
comments are based. Hadden's pioneering work is
only prevented from being Marxist classic by the absence of a clear account of
the nature and role of language and of the logic of analogical reasoning.

[However, in view of the fact that the logic of analogy has not advanced much
since Aristotle's day, this is hardly Hadden's fault.]

Hadden's conclusions are
themselves a development of ideas found in Borkenau (1987), Fleck (1979) and
Grossmann (1987). Cf., also Sohn-Rethel
(1978).

Clagett (1959) contains many of the original medieval sources. See also
Zilsel (2000), and Kaye (1998).

In that
case, the admission that forces can be edited out of the picture (so that
relative acceleration and motion may be regarded as opposites) might succeed in winning this
particular battle, but only at the cost of losing the war. Once again, this is because it
would imply that the universe was much more CAR-like than DM-theorists are
prepared to admit. On this account, any reference to a DM-UO would be little
more than a confusing way of referring to relative acceleration/velocity. The
connection between events could then only be explicated in one of two ways:

(2) By means of a
detailed analysis of the vector and scalar fields in which the said processes
were taking place.

In either case, the
connection between natural events would not be governed by any sort of physical
mediation between elements of the Totality in the process of change -- as DM
requires -- since, on this view, moving bodies (with or without opposite
velocities (or accelerations)) would have no internal connection
with other bodies in motion.

At least an appeal to forces has the merit of
appearing to supply a vaguely mediational link between bodies in motion/change,
which DM requires;
forces seem to connect the latter in dialectical union -- but only because
a literalist interpretation of forces like this depends on a
prior endorsement of an animistic view of nature.

So, any
attempt to edit forces out of the picture would result in the disappearance of
the dialectical 'connective-tissue' of reality (as it were); and with that DM would become
indistinguishable from the mechanical materialism (i.e., CAR) it sought to
replace.

[AIDS = Absolute Idealism;
DN = Dialectics of
Nature.]

As noted in the text, DM-theorists require
forces to be part of the ontological fabric of the universe (which is why they
become rather defensive, if not emotive, when the existence of forces is
questioned -- except they tend to ignore Engels when he
did just this!). Their theory needs a
world suffused with anthropomorphic concepts like these -- those that are
themselves the result of the fetishisation of the products of social interaction
as if they were real objects/processes in nature; which is just another
poisonous spin-off of the much touted 'inversion' of Hegelian AIDS.

Hence, whether DM-fans
like it or not, the language of dialectics suggests that objects/processes in
nature are quasi-intelligent, and
engaged in what can
only be described as some sort of mystical conversation/shouting match with other objects/processes, as
they 'contradict' and 'negate' one another.

As has already been
pointed out, in parts of
DN, Engels pictured motion in dynamic terms, portraying it as simply the
transfer of energy. [Engels (1954), pp.69-102.] This seems to connect his
comments with more recent theories of motion, depicted by the use of vector
and/or scalar fields, or with the laws of
Thermodynamics -- or even with concepts derived from
non-EuclideanSpacetime (where talk
is no longer of forces) --, constructed a generation or so after he died. But, once
again, such a re-write of DM would mean that familiar DM-concepts (such as
"contradiction", "polar opposite", "UO" etc.) would
become just as obsolete as
"natural place", "substantial form", "accident" and "substance"
are now --, notions that were once used in ancient scientific theories.

Indeed, it is difficult to imagine how, say, an energy
gradient (depicted as a
scalar field) could be interpreted as 'contradictory', even
though these often feature in modern accounts of motion.
Well, no more perhaps than, say, a ladder should be regarded as contradictory if
someone fell off of it.

Far worse:
it is even more difficult to regard states of affairs involving vector and
scalar fields, the
geodesics of Spacetime -- or even the strings of Superstring
Theory -- as part of a material universe. If everything in nature is
just a complex array of energy gradients, vector fields and differential
curvatures in Spacetime -- spruced up with a few probability density functions
-- there would seem to be no place left for anything that even looks remotely material. Given
this 'modern' mathematical account of reality, matter itself would simply
become a "useless fiction", explanatory of nothing at all. Small wonder then
that Lenin was highly suspicious of the Idealism implicit in the Physics of his
day (even if he had no answer to it). [On this, see
Essay Thirteen Part One (summary
here).]

Quite apart from
all this, the 'ontological status' of 'energy' itself is highly obscure -- and
this situation is unlikely ever to change. Energetics is thus no friend of
'Materialist Dialectics'.

Of course,
in DM-writings, a clear definition of "matter" is about as easy to find as
is an honest UK Prime Minister (as we will also see in Essay Thirteen Part One).

26.Those who still think that forces can oppose
motion, and therefore, contradict it, should consult the
arguments constructed in
Note 25above, and presently in the main body of this Essay, where this
idea is finally laid to rest.

However, it is worth
pointing out to such individuals that if they were correct, then the idea that forces are
oppositional to one another will have gone out of the non-dialectical window, for if forces oppose
motion,
they cannot oppose each other.

27.
In which case, it might be wondered whether only those bodies that approach each
other along the same
line of action (wherein the angle between their
trajectories is 180°), or which operate in a force field (where the lines of
action of that field are similarly orientated at 180°) are to be counted as
opposites.

If not, will any angle (other than 90°) do? In that case, clearly, since forces
and velocities are vectors, they can be resolved to get around this difficulty.

Even so, any solution
sought along these lines would clearly be conventional, since the components of vectors do
not exist in nature in any meaningful sense; they are just calculating devices
that help make sense of motion. On this see
Notes 24and25 above,
and Note 30, below.

28.Anyone who thinks that the vector calculus is a description
of reality would be suffering from the same sort of confusion as someone who
thought that the weather, say, is just the wavy lines and/or tangent fields on a map because
the weather forecast on TV uses them. [On this see Notes 25, above and 40, below.]

29. This section of the Essay might be dismissed as just
one more unsympathetic
reading of yet another artificially-manufactured set of DM-theses. Perhaps so, but the
reader will find that dialecticians themselves consistently fail to examine their
own theory in anything like the detail attempted here,
despite the fact that DM/'Materialist Dialectics' is supposed to represent the best, if
not the very epitome of scientific thought. The present Essay, in contrast,
has endeavoured to set-out in more detail than has ever been attempted before the implications of this particular DM-thesis; as such, it ventures
into entirely unexplored territory. Hence, it is impossible to say whether it
misrepresents DM or not -- indeed, DM-theorists would be hard-pressed to
decide among themselves whether this is so. For one thing, they cannot even decide what
matter is! [As Essay Thirteen seeks to show, their 'materialism' is a rather
like, say, Hamlet without the Prince.]

In addition, it is worth
pointing out yet again that F2 was motivated by the idea
that forces contradict impressed motion. Unfortunately, since
change in motion is the consequence of just one resultant force (if considered
classically), the alleged 'contradiction' between two forces disappears.

F2: A UO involves the opposition between a
force P1
and the impressed motion that another set of forces Q has produced (or
would have produced) in a body B (had P1
never existed). The resultant motion of B is the final outcome of this
struggle.

It would take an
especially alert and eagle-eyed dialectician, therefore, to spot 'contradictory'
forces when there is only one force responsible for the said change
in motion!

Worse
still, F2 postulates a 'contradiction' between a force and the motion that is
(or might be) produced as the counterfactual result of the action of other
forces, but since some or all of the latter's effects won't have been actualised (having been
prevented from occurring by P1), the alleged
'contradiction'
here contains only one real term.

Even the most avid
DM-fan might find it difficult to visualise (let alone explain) a
'contradiction' between something that is real and something that is unreal (in
that it never existed): i.e., the motion that would have occurred if the
impeding force P1
above had not acted.

30.
Admittedly, some vectors are invariant under certain transformations, but the
physical interpretation of the operation of forces is not a given; it is set
by convention.

On this topic, cf., Ellis (1963, 1965, 1976).

[Ellis (1976) was
written in response to Hunt and Suchting (1969). See also Hanson (1965a, 1965b),
and Jammer (1999).]

Mysteriously, however, Ellis has backtracked on his earlier
views (for what appear to be instrumentalistreasons); cf., Bigelow,
Ellis and Pargetter (1988), and the response to this in Jammer (1999), pp.iv-vi.

The difficulty with finding a physical analogue for a vector space (worse:
for any tensor extension to it) is examined in Cartwright (1983), pp.54-73; see
also Hesse (1961). A recent challenge has been mounted to this way of seeing
forces, in Jones (2007); on this see Note
6a.

Either this (i.e., that there is no limit toward which knowledge
is converging), or it must be the case that as knowledge advances,
external reality alters accordingly!

However, that can't be so. We are not to suppose that our knowledge of the world alters the
'objective contradictions' that allegedly power it along, so that as the former grows
the latter slowly disappears. But
if not, it must now be true that absolute knowledge of the world
(even if we never attain to it) implies that nature is not
contradictory. [However, on this see
here.]

Of course, it may be
incorrect to assume that dialecticians believe that as science advances all
contradictions will be resolved, but it is not easy to see how they can deny
this.
Faced with yet another contradiction -- and committed to the view that science can
only advance if it overcomes/resolves contradictions in knowledge --, with respect to this
new contradiction,
dialecticians must believe it can be resolved. Otherwise they will have to admit that
science cannot advance beyond a certain point. But this they deny, too. So unless
they hold both of these true (that is, they believe that there is no limit to scientific advance, and
that there is a limit (i.e., because there are irresolvable contradictions
in nature) --, which in itself would represent a contradiction in their own
theory, so DM can only advance if this is resolved!), they must hold that all
contradictions are resolvable, and hence none are 'objectively' true.

Thus,
in terms of DM's own theses, it would
seem that nature cannot be fundamentally contradictory.

Again, the only apparent way
of avoiding this dilemma (that is, in the form in which it appears here, at
least) is to deny either that (1) science advances by resolving all
contradictions, or that (2) Absolute Truth 'exists'.

(1) The denial of this option would mean that there is a
non-Absolute limit to knowledge, after all;
in which case the DM-thesis that human knowledge is unlimited would have to be
abandoned. It would also leave dialecticians with no way of knowing which of the
allegedly irresolvable contradictions their theory throws up is an 'objective'
feature of reality or merely a by-product of their own imperfect theory.

(2) Unfortunately, this
tactic would introduce other intractable problems for dialecticians since it would remove
the limit toward which they suppose human knowledge is progressing, and with that would go the idea that there is an
'objective' reality (out there) for us to know (even if we never fully attain to
it).

Naturally,
these observations take into account the fact that the universe might be
'infinite' (a view held true by only some DM-theorists) and constantly
changing. None of these factors affect the idea that there must now be a set of
truths (possibly infinite) about reality toward which human knowledge is
asymptotically converging (even if that set itself somehow grows over time), if
Engels were correct when he said:

"'Fundamentally, we
can know only the infinite.' In fact all real exhaustive knowledge
consists solely in raising the individual thing in thought from individuality
into particularity and from this into universality, in seeking and establishing
the infinite in the finite, the eternal in the transitory…. All true knowledge
of nature is knowledge of the eternal, the infinite, and essentially absolute….
The cognition of the infinite…can only take place in an infinite asymptotic
progress." [Engels (1954), pp.234-35.]

"The identity of
thinking and being, to use Hegelian language, everywhere coincides with your
example of the circle and the polygon. Or the two of them (sic), the concept of
a thing and its reality, run side by side like two asymptotes, always
approaching each other but never meeting. This difference between the two is the
very difference which prevents the concept from being directly and immediately
reality and reality from being immediately its own concept. Because a concept
has the essential nature of the concept (sic) and does not therefore prima
facie directly coincide with reality, from which it had to be abstracted in
the first place, it is nevertheless more than a fiction, unless you declare that
all the results of thought are fictions because reality corresponds to them only
very circuitously, and even then approaching it only asymptotically." [Engels to
Schmidt (12/3/1895), in Marx and Engels (1975b), p.457.]

Of course, if there is no such set, then Engels's metaphor is
defective.

However, in this regard, Woods and Grant quote a revealing passage from
Engels's DN:

"The fact that our subjective thought and the
objective world are subject to the same laws, and that consequently too in the
final analysis they cannot be in contradiction to one another in their results,
but must coincide, governs absolutely our whole theoretical thought. It is the
unconscious and unconditional premise for theoretical thought." [Woods and Grant
(1995), p.349; quoting
this source.]

To be sure, the above passage was not included in the 'official'
version of AD, but it certainly shows that Engels believed that the 'objective'
world should be free from contradictions (or at least free from contradiction
with/in subjective thought --, which view, it must be admitted, is impossible to
distinguish from the former).

So, if any randomly-selected dialectician were to think that, say,
motion is 'contradictory' then that subjective thought cannot be in
contradiction with 'objective' reality (and thus with 'objective' thought, one
presumes, even if this blesses state is never attained).

Naturally, that does not commit
Engels to the view that reality is in the limit a contradiction-free
zone, but if science can only advance by resolving contradictions in subjective
theory (so that it becomes progressively more 'objective'), the conclusion
(given above) seems inescapable: that in the limit, human knowledge of the world must
see nature as totally free from contradictions.

However, in the absence of any clear
indication from Engels that he believed this, little more can be asserted here with
any confidence.

One suspects that because the DM-classics are silent on this,
modern-day dialecticians themselves would not be able to decide anything here
without being called 'Revisionists', sparking perhaps yet another dialectical split.

[In the limit, perhaps, this might mean that future
dialectically-knobbled Marxist parties should have a maximum of one member each.
At that ideal point, the splits and expulsions will stop, one supposes --
unless, of course, that other DM-thesis (that everything is a
UO) induces each
lonely comrade to expel herself! Maybe this is the real
cunning of reason?]

[AD = Anti-Dühring; UO = Unity of
Opposites.]

34.As noted above, it is entirely possible that this is not
what DM-fans really mean by "contradictory" forces; but then again it is equally
doubtful whether they have ever subjected their own theory to this level of scrutiny, so that
they could confirm or deny this fact. Hence, it would probably be
pointless asking a DM-adept for an answer to this question, as things now
stand.

35.It is worth repeating
here that these assertions are aimed neither at affirming nor
denying the truth of DM-theorists' claims about the Totality, or its
supposedly 'contradictory' parts, since both options are metaphysical. [The
reasons for saying this will take up most of Essay Twelve
Part One, Essay Eleven
Part One and
Two.] As was
pointed out earlier, the intention here is simply to make patent the latent
non-sense they contain.

Moreover, an appeal to 'relative knowledge' would
be of little help, either; surprising as this might seem, that notion was torpedoed by Lenin. On this, see
here.

36.As we saw
earlier, these relate to questions about whether it's a force's effects, or the
relative motion between objects, or the interrelationship between
bodies, which are 'contradictory'.

37.
This is so on Hegelian/Aristotelian grounds (although, here, as with other
things, one would be well-advised to stick to the latter's
account, since the former seems to have committed his 'thoughts' to paper in
a dialect not of this planet -, or while permanently drunk).

So, even though male and female, hot and
cold are 'opposites', a male dog is not the opposite of a female flower, and a
hot forehead is not the opposite of a cold furnace (indeed, they
could both be at 39oC).
Such contrasts can only work as opposites if they have the same substantival term to
back them up. Hence, a male dog is the opposite of a female dog, a
hot furnace the opposite of a cold one, and so on. On substantivals, see
here.

Naturally, this undermines much of what dialecticians themselves
say about UOs; but since this ground was covered in
Essay
Seven, no more will be said about it here.

38. Here we appear to have
another ironic "dialectical inversion"; in this case, the said forces would
not 'contradict', they'd augment, one another -- even though they are still
'opposites'. Perhaps then we should call such ensembles "dialectical
tautologies"?

On this basis, therefore, we
might be able to construct a whole
(and it must be said, wholly insincere) theory of universal
harmony, using the fact that forces naturally
combine to form resultants and opposites more often than not attract (on
this, see Note 40), both of which in turn 'encourage' motion and change. As a result of
such an 'inversion' -- putting DM back on its heels, as it were -- change could
then be
seen as an expression of cooperation,
not conflict. And we could even
re-introduce the idea of an 'imminent deity' (a suitable -- but equally obscure
-- analogue of the
DM-'Totality') to give this novel theory the unity it needs, claiming all
the while that these ideas have not been imposed on nature, merely read from it.

Since this 'theory' is based on a more realistic appraisal of the interplay
between forces, who could object? We could even call this 'theory' "Anihalectics"
(since it eliminates dialectics). Subsequent 'contradictions' implied by this 'theory' could, of
course, be Nixoned away, in
classic DM-fashion.

[We could even declare,
with equal pomposity, that anyone who disagrees does not "understand"
Anihalectics, ending all discussion.]

On the positive side,
this 'theory' enjoys much more evidential support than the average
DM-thesis does (given that resultant forces govern every example of change in motion in
nature).

On the negative side,
however, this 'theory' means that class
collaboration/harmony will usher in the 'revolution' (we saw that that was an
implication of DM, anyway;
here and here), since it is not needed anyway (in such a harmonious world...).

Anyone critical of the above (wholly insincere and fancifully)
dotty 'theory', should now take an equally sceptical view of the consistent
(but less scientifically-accurate) dottiness of 'Materialist Dialectics'.

39.
Even so, and once again, howsoever it is that forces actually do manage to combine, change is not initiated by
contradictory forces, but by those annoyingly 'harmonious' resultants.

40.Engels himself regarded the
two poles of a magnet as an example of the unity of
AR-opposites in nature (something else he lifted from Hegel, and which has been
parroted down the ages by countless uninventive DM-authors). [Cf., Engels
(1954), p.72. Hegel for example,
here.]

The alleged 'unity' in this case appears to revolve around the fact that the north and south
poles of a magnet cannot exist independently of each other, and their 'opposite'
nature is shown by the effect they have on bodies and upon each other.

However, upon closer
examination it is clear that the poles of a
magnet are in fact examples of AA-
or RR-, and not AR-opposites. This is because in this case it is
non-opposites that repel each other (i.e., two norths or two souths); hence,
like polesrepel. On the other hand, opposites attract (i.e.,
a north and a south). Consequently, in the way that their poles inter-relate,
magnets are in fact AA- or RR-forces. A moment's thought will further confirm
this -- since when do magnets attract and repel one another, at the same
time?

So, it now turns out that the magnet is
hardly a paradigm example of an AR-force -- united in opposition --, as
DM-lore would have us believe.

Mysteriously, DM-theoristsen massehave failed to notice this serious flaw in one of their key examples. So
much for the claim that DM-theses have been read from -- but not projected
onto -- the facts.

[Incidentally, the same
comments apply to electrical and thus sub-atomic phenomena. This means that much
of the dialectical guff in, say, Woods and Grant (1995) is gloriously wrong.
More on this in Essay Seven, Part Two (when it is published).]

It could be objected to this
that, while it might be true that two unlike poles are examples of an AA-force
type, their continued motion toward one another will be prevented at some point
by structural forces within the magnets themselves, and these force
couples
would operate in an AR-manner. In that case, R-forces operating between
approaching nuclei of the material from which the magnets are made will prevent
opposite poles closing in on one another, counteracting the A-forces that had
brought them together. This therefore
implies that the relation between the poles of a magnet is indeed that of an
AR-couple -- or so an objector might claim.

Even so, this means that, as magnetic opposites, these poles would still
not be AR-UOs. To be sure, other forces might come into play, but that does not affect
that salient point. In that case, they would not be opposites of the same
Aristotelian/Hegelian type (as noted above).

Despite this, the above
objection would reduce
the oppositional relationship between the forces originating in these magnets to
the effect that these poles had on motion (since the latter manifestly do not
affect each other, only the relative motion of the matter in each magnet). Hence, the two poles would not be inter-related directly to
each other as opposite AR-forces; they would just oppose any motion that either
or both of them
had induced in the system. We have already had occasion to dismiss this view as
inimical to DM.

In which case, the
inter-atomic forces governing the operation of AA-, RR-, or even AR-couples,
actually oppose or limit whatever motion is already present in the system
-- or they restrict the freedom of bodies to move once set in motion. But,
they still do not seem to oppose each other as force upon force.
Again, this is probably one reason why
Engels toyed with a positivistic
re-interpretation of forces (in DN, as pointed out above in Note 4), since no physical
sense can be given to any such relation between forces (as also noted
earlier) -- that is, over and above
seeing it as an obscure way of depicting relative motion between bodies.

Of course, it could be argued that the force field of each pole
does in fact affect that of the other; so the above claims are incorrect. But
these force fields are merely the expression of the motion of, or that induced
in, instruments (or, indeed, in scattered iron filings) placed near the said poles, so the
above claims are not incorrect. Such forces are, as Engels said, a shorthand for
relative motion.

On the other hand, if by "force fields" we mean the mathematical
objects of theory, they cannot affect one another, for they are not material.
[This was discussed in more detail in Note
25, and will be in even more, below.]

Anyway, the
nature of the UO here clearly depends on what is meant by the terms "opposite"
and "unity". North and South poles are not united in the sense that they are
one (as DM-theorists would be the first to point out), they are connected in
the sense that they 'depend' on each other. But, this 'dependence' is causal
not logical; magnetic properties are the result of the vector configuration of
the 'motion' and 'spin' of certain electrons. There is nothing in nature that
logically forces this interrelation on these poles. Indeed, the idea that such a configuration
represents a UO is empty, since the 'forces' involved are the consequence of a
vector field. And, as we have already seen, it is not easy to see how
vectors can be regarded as 'contradictions' (or as UOs).

Indeed, in
ferromagnetic substances, the magnetic field is built up by the cooperative
alignment of individual magnetic moments (perhaps illustrating the fundamentally
cooperative nature of reality again, created by those helpful 'dialectical tautologies' we
met earlier(!)).

Certainly, given Engels's use
of the term "force" (whether interpreted realistically, or positivistically as a
"useful fiction"), this is a rather poor example of a UO, anyway; it is
consequent upon a particular sort of mathematical analysis (i.e., it is
based on the alignment of electrons, which orient the vector field that
determines the direction of the
magnetic field). Calling this
a UO would be to substitute an obscure metaphor for a clear mathematical
description for no extra explanatory gain.

[Of course, there is no UO here
anyway,
since the field in question is the result of
one sort of
particle, the
electron,
which is a single charged elementary object (or wave?) that is not itself a UO. This has
already been commented upon
here.]

Naturally, this deflationary approach
will satisfy few DM-fans since it depends on a non-standard view of the nature
of mathematical 'objects' (such as, vectors, matrices, manifolds, dimensions,
abstract spaces, etc.). In opposition to this, it could be argued that
mathematics in fact represents what is really out there in the world,
since it has been abstracted from nature by human beings as part of their
practical activity. This means that mathematics presents us with an
'abstract' reflection of reality.

[Chapter 16 of
Woods and Grant (1995) contains
a classic (but nonetheless confused) version of this idea. Because if its
influence, I will be devoting a special Essay to this book, which will be posted
at this site (as Essay Seven Part Two) in the next year or so.]

However, this interpretation of
mathematics is badly mistaken. Mathematics cannot be a description of the
world (nor an 'abstraction' from it) for reasons rehearsed in Essay Three Parts
One and
Two, and in Essay Thirteen. Mathematics is based on systems of concepts that
are not causally linked. Nor do the concepts that mathematicians
construct exercise any sort of causal influence on material bodies (nor do they
'correspond' to anything in reality that could conceivably so behave) --
unlike other material bodies. [On that, see
here, and
here.]

Mathematical propositions and theorems yield neither an abstract nor a concrete
picture of reality. This is because they express rules for the manipulation of
symbols that licence inferences we make about objects and processes in nature.
At best, they set up complex analogies that assist in our understanding of
objects, events and processes in the material world.

The
development of
Field Theory since
Maxwell's day does not alter this picture
in any way.
Vector and scalar fields are mathematical structures that not only enable
scientists to model nature, they assist in the derivation and interpretation of
the empirical consequences of their hypotheses. To imagine otherwise (i.e., to suppose that
mathematics is an abstract description of the world) would reduce its
structures to absurdity. For example, it would imply that, say, a vector field
--
in re -- is actually composed of a set of infinitelythinand infinitely strong wire-like curves, or curve segments (of mysterious
composition and provenance). Or, that a scalar field is actually an
invisible array of real numbers 'floating' in (abstract?) space -- or, worse still,
that it is an infinite n-dimensional set of dimensionless connected,
dense but
disjoint points --, and so on.

On Maxwell, cf., Buchwald (1985); on
mathematics as it features in Physics, see Morrison (2000),
pp.62-108. In addition, the last chapter of Harré and Madden (1976) is relevant
here.

Other literature on this
topic was listed here.
More will be said about the nature of mathematics in later Essays (for example,
here).

41.This could
be regarded as a serious interpretive error -- given the fact that change is
central to DM. But, the point being made in the text is specifically targeted at
the DM-notion that all change is a consequence of the interplay between
polar opposites. Clearly, if these allegedly polar opposites can combine in
some way to augment one another, the term "opposite" can't fail to lose most of
its dialectical bite. If change can occur as a result of 'opposites' that do
not really work as 'opposites' (still less as "polar" opposites) then this
particular dialectical 'law' stands in some danger of violating the dialectical
equivalent of Metaphysical
Trades Description Act.

If this
picture is now extended to take in HM, and if, for example, we consider the operation of
"opposing" forces in the class struggle, it is not easy to see how,
say, one social force could switch around in the way that forces in nature can.
Is it possible, therefore, for Capitalists to swap sides in the class struggle
(as a class force -- and not as individuals) to augment workers' battles in
the latter's interests and on their terms? Admittedly, the detailed
structure of -- and processes within -- the class war are complex; elements from
each side may detach themselves (or be detached), and can work against their own
(misperceived) class interests (on a temporary or even semi-permanent basis), but that is not
something revolutionaries can or should rely on -- still less ought they to trust in its
outcome. If they did, it would clearly encourage reformism and centrism (let
alone court defeat). Even at the margin (where whole class forces are not
involved), switches are sporadic.

But, such things occur all the time in nature.
Hence, this crude analogy relating opposite forces to 'contradictions' lifted
from DM is useless, at best, when applied in HM.

42.It is worth recalling here how Stalinists used to justify the frequent changes
in tactics in the 1930's on the basis that this was a 'dialectical' requirement
(nay, virtue). Hence, a 'dialectical' pact with Hitler made eminent good
sense. Not only that, but anyone who disagreed with this randomly applied,
chaotic logic clearly showed they "did not understand dialectics". The treaty so
forged was as good an example of a UO as one could wish to find. Who could
complain -- except those with "bourgeois" prejudices motivated by an antiquated
reliance on FL?

[Well, perhaps only those without an excessive "tenderness" against pacts with Nazis!]

Moreover, this theory is
so contradictory, it can sanction any conclusion whatsoever, no matter how
contradictory.
Hence, it is of great use to opportunists and sectarians alike. [Details can be
found in Essay Nine Part
Two and Essay Ten Part One.]

44. This insurmountable obstacle
indeed blocks the path of all forms of Metaphysical
Realism; it is not just a problem for DM-theorists. More on this in Essay
Twelve (summary here).

45.Admittedly, this could be a
complete distortion of DM, but, as we have seen on numerous
occasions already, over the last hundred years or so, DM-theorists have been so
preoccupied with the simple repetition (and almost word-for-word) of the theses that have been handed down
to them that they have neglected to think about their import with any
obvious care, or with any clarity whatsoever. There is in fact very little in DM-texts to help prevent
distortion -- or even to assist dialecticians in its detection.

Once again, DM-apologists are welcome to produce their own clear
account of this part of their 'theory' -- making the 'Materialist Dialectics' of forces perspicuous for the
very first time in history.

46. Of course, this attempt is unclear itself. We should normally want to
distinguish the opposition between force P1 and P2
from that between events E1 and E2, or
indeed any combination of all four. These sorts of complications will be
examined in what follows (in fact, some of them were analysed earlier).

47.Admittedly, this qualification runs foul of the idea that everything in the
Totality is interrelated, but we can avoid that by modifying the stated condition to
"relative independence". Naturally, this would mean that several other comments
in the text (originally aimed at trying to make this part of dialectics clear) would become even
vaguer by default. However, as will readily be appreciated, a 'theory' like this
-- beset as it is by an internally generated fog, aggravated further by
its supporters who insist on lobbing yet more metaphysical smoke bombs at it -- will always resist attempts to dispel the
Stygian gloom that permanently engulfs it.

48.It is worth recalling, once again, that in
FL two contradictory propositions
cannot both be true and cannot both be false at once. One
implication of this is that the claim that two allegedly contradictory states of
affairs could both exist at the same time (expressed by two supposedly
true contradictory propositions) must rest either on a mis-description of
reality, or on an un-discharged ambiguity --, and, indeed, on the projection of logical categories onto
nature. This was analysed in more detail
in an earlier section, in Essay
Five, and will be examined again in
Note
67, below.

49.
However, it could be claimed that the disjunction of
the effects of P1 and P2 (as in "E1 or E2")
distorts the picture somewhat. Indeed, it could be argued that what is missing here is an account of howP2
interacts with E1,
which interaction could be dialectical. [One variation of this theme will be considered
presently in the main body of this Essay, others later on (for example, in
Note 55).]

But, plainly, what has not been taken account
is the fact that the
alterations induced in E1
mean that this theory (i.e., that change comes about through contradictions
modelled by material forces) could still succeed in gaining some sort of grip.

Hence, it could be argued that the contradiction between P1 and P2 alters E1 so that it becomes, say,
E1a. In that case,
we would have here real terms for the 'contradiction' to model, and thus we would
have a concrete example of change through 'internal contradiction'. Or, so it
could be maintained.

But, plainly, this would
only be so because these
forces have already been described as
"contradictory", when it has not yet been established yet whether or
not this is an accurate, or even an appropriate, way to depict the relationship between
them.

Nevertheless,
and ignoring even this point, as has been underlined already, what actually happens here is that the resultant of
these two forces produces the said change. In that case, and on the contrary, calling this a change
motivated by a 'dialectical tautology' would be more accurate. [This option and
others are considered again below.]

Moreover, even if the objection
volunteered above was
correct in some way -- wherein
P1 and P2
alter E1
so that it becomes
E1a --, it would be of little use to
dialecticians, for in
this caseE1 itself will have been altered externally,
and so change in this case would not have been the result of its own 'internal
contradictions'.

Worse still, if this is to be the model for all DM-change, then no
change at all could be 'internally-generated'.

We saw this problem recur throughout
Part
One of this Essay, where no matter how we tried to slice things up,
the result was always the same: if all things are "self-moving", then the
universe is populated either by eternally changeless 'particles' or by
non-interacting systems. On the other hand, if systems of forces change the
objects in that system, then those objects cannot be "self-moving". The
volunteered response above simply reproduces this very problem in a more
abstract form.

Anyway, this 'difficulty' will be tackled presently in the main
body of this Essay, and in more detail below (once again, in
Note 55).

50.It could be objected that forces actually make things happen, as opposed to
preventing them. But even then, such things would happen because one force 'wins
out': the resultant. And making something happen is even less easy to
interpret as a 'contradiction' than opposing or preventing something would
be. In
that case, once more, calling this a "tautology" would be more appropriate.

51.The terminology used here is not what I should prefer, but tinkering with it will
not make the conclusion any clearer. The following is, perhaps, a little more 'correct':

F16a: Anything that is
prevented from occurring does not happen.

But, F16a is just a discursive tautology (although I should prefer to call it
a "grammatical remark", since it expresses a
linguistic convention).

52.
It needs pointing out (once again!) that this 'new' account of the connection
between forces and contradictions (given in the text) is only offered tentatively
since DM-theorists are hopelessly unclear in this area.

53.
The phrasing of F24 might be considered prejudicial -- F24a perhaps being preferable:

F24: P1 contradicts
P2 only if it counterbalancesP2.

F24a: P1
contradicts P2 if it counterbalancesP2.

This option will be considered presently,
in the text (as F27).

54.We saw in the passages listed at the beginning of this Essay that
several DM-authors regard disequilibria
in nature and society as important as
corresponding equilibria, and in
need of explanation.

S2: NN will win the chess game over MM in so far
as she employs the PQR opening.

Since there are many different ways to win a
chess game -- even though none of them might be necessary, but all could be
sufficient --, none of them are uniquely so.

55.
However, some may still object and claim that if a force prevents something coming into being/happening,
it must have contradicted it.

Let us say, therefore, that:

T1: if event Ei
at time t (and belonging to process A), is prevented from becoming Ei'
at t' by force P (where t' > t), then Ei
at will have been contradicted by P.

Hence, it could be argued that in
this sense it is clear that forces prevent the effects of other forces
from being realised by
contradicting certain events, stopping them from occurring.

But, even here, forces do not
'contradict' one
another (as force on force), they merely affect the events 'controlled' by other forces. So this cannot help us
understand how forces can be said to contradict each other.

Nevertheless, let us
examine this objection in more detail, so that every possibility is catered for.

Consider then the
following:

T2:
Let there be an event set E, consisting of sub-events E1-En,
which would all take place, or would all have taken place, had force P not
stopped things at the Ei
stage.

T3: Had
these events carried on as 'normal', Ei
would have led into Ei+1,
but as things turned out, Ei+1
failed to occur because P prevented it.

T3: Hence, P contradicted Ei+1.

However, since Ei+1
never existed, it could not have been contradicted by P (unless, once
more, we assume that forces
can contradict non-existent objects, events and processes).

We thus hit the same brick wall.

Even if we now try to argue as follows:

T4: P contradicted Ei
by stopping it producing Ei+1,

this will do no good.

This is because events are not like eggs which
produce things; so they can hardly be prevented from producing other
events if they don't produce them in the first place.

In that case, perhaps the following revision will do:

T4: P contradicted Ei
by stopping Ei+1
from following on from Ei.

But, yet again, the alleged 'contradiction' amounts to the
prevention of something that does not now exist. If forces can only be
'contradicted' by preventing non-existent objects/process/events from taking
place, then all the above problems re-emerge.

At this point it could be objected that this entire approach to 'events'
and 'forces' atomises them, and puts them in rigid categories,
compartmentalising reality. Dialectics, in comparison, deals with the unity and
fluid nature of
reality, and thus it depicts such interactions in a totally different, albeit contradictory, light.
Hence the above analyses are completely wrong-headed.

But, unless and until DM-apologists tell us what they intend -- or
what, for example, the 'fluid' nature of reality is (or worse, what this odd
metaphor could possibly mean) --, then that objection is itself devoid
of content (since it contains several empty phrases). Anyway, this objection is neutralised
here.

Once again, there is a simple solution staring us in the face
here: dialecticians should
tell us what, if anything, they mean by their odd use of (such Hermetic) language.

56.This is, once more, to use
dialectical-terminology (of dubious content, and even more suspect provenance); it does
not imply I accept that any of it makes the slightest bit of sense.

57.
Of course, in
an analysis of situations where the smallest angle between these two forces
lies between 0° and 90°, or between 90° and 180°, the components of these
forces would be put into the required relation.

Unfortunately, the
prospects for a realist/metaphysical account of forces (given such an analysis)
do not look at all promising. Hence, it is worth asking: Are the components of such forces in
effect merely 'shadow forces', mathematical fictions, or are they
genuine forces, or what? And how could we tell these apart? [This was discussed in
more detail in
Notes 24,
25,
27, and 30.]

58. Hegelians might not
object too much at this point, since they are by now somewhat used to Word Magic -- their master having created 'Nothing' out
of 'Being', and then 'Becoming' out of both (i.e., miraculously out of a reified verb)
--,
but genuine materialists might want to pause here, and see this
'derivation' for what it is: empty word-juggling.

Even so, this latest twist
brings into question the 'ontological' status of forces, and whether 'resultant
forces' actually exist. On this, see the comments and links in Note 57 above.

59.
How did revolutionaries manage to miss this third force for so long?

It might, however, be
felt that this view of forces is overly simplistic; in HM,
social forces are far too complex to be represented as vectors, which means that
the criticisms aired here are once again completely misguided.

In response to this, it
is worth recalling that the analysis in the main body of this Essay was forced
upon us (forgive the unintended pun) because DM-theorists have so far failed to say what they
mean (if anything) when they try to explain the nature of 'dialectical
contradictions' (in nature or society) by an appeal to forces.

Nevertheless, dialecticians, in abeyance of such an account (and thus
acting almost totally in the
dark), are themselves quite happy to declare that such
'contradictory' forces occur everywhere in HM (and, indeed, throughout the universe). Is
this not yet another case of foisting dialectics on the facts?

[It is worth reminding the reader
here
that the existence of forces in HM is not being questioned by the
present author (nor will it be), just the
assumption that they are 'contradictory'; but see
Note 61, below.]

Clearly, DM-theorists employ the phrase "contradictory forces" in order to provide their theory with a scientific-looking
façade, linking it in with Physics, perhaps. Otherwise, why use it?

If this allegation is
correct, it would be disingenuous of DM-supporters to complain that the analogy
given in the text does not apply to social forces. If the word "force" wasn't
meant to be taken in its usual scientific sense as a vector, such an
analysis would, it is true, be inapt -- but in that case the import of this word (i.e.,
"force" as it is used in DM)
would be unclear, too. If it is not being employed in DM in a way that can be modelled by
the use of vectors, what other scientific way is there of doing it?

Anyway, as
far as the complexity issue is concerned, this counter-argument itself
fails to address the problem of the identification of forces with
'contradictions' in nature and society. If it is impossible to give a clear sense
to an avowedly simplified picture of them (i.e., as they operate in nature), a more
complex one stands no chance.

As has been
pointed on many occasions in this study, if DM-advocates object to any of the
comments made in this Essay, there is a simple remedy: they should say
clearlyfor the first time ever what it is they mean when they try to
link forces with 'contradictions'.

59a.
Anyway, we have been considering real material forces since the
beginning of this Essay. After all, what are gravity, magnetism and other fundamental forces
if not real and material? [What we haven't done fully yet (but see
here) is consider forces
at work in class society, but that is all.]

59b. Here are a few
examples;
1,
2,
3,
4,
5; with a particularly crass list of alleged instances,
here
(which link will take the reader to a site called "Dialectics
For Kids" (poor sods), so it can be forgiven somewhat). Several more were given
earlier.

Here is another recent example:

"The current debate over stem cells provides a
very good illustration of the contradictions inherent within capitalism. On the
one hand it is capable of generating amazing new technologies.

"However, the amount of money flowing into stem
cell research is still miniscule compared to that being used for developing new
ways to kill people.

"A recent report concluded that while stem cell
research was pioneered in this country, lack of funding was compromising the
ability of British scientists to keep things moving forward in this area.

"Meanwhile, as the leader of the richest country
on earth talks about the sanctity of a ball of cells, in Iraq the most
sophisticated weapon systems are being used to murder real, living human
beings." [Parrington
(2007), p.9.]

On the contrary, this illustrates the fact that dialecticians
(like John here) regularly confuse 'contradictions' with paradoxical, irrational
or unexpected events, as I alleged in
Essay Five.

Even in DM-terms, this makes no sense. Does either 'half' of the
above 'contradiction' struggle against the other? Does the one turn into the
other (which they should do, according to the
dialectical classics)? Is George W Bush and/or the rest of his class about to morph into a bunch of under-funded scientists/new
equipment?

If not, where is the 'dialectical contradiction'?

60.Several more examples of alleged 'real
material forces' and/or 'contradictions' (such as those between the forces and relations of
production, and between use and exchange value) will be considered below, in Note 70.

61. If
this notion is to assume a viable role in HM, it must be understood
analogically. The details of my own interpretation of such a key concept within
HM will have to wait on another occasion.

In the main body of this Essay, however, I am simply
questioning the literal and metaphorical application of the word "contradiction" to situations
that occur in HM and DM.

62.The negation of
"wealth" might appear to be "poverty", but this is so in only a
loose or figurative sort of sense. Recall that something could fail to be
"wealth" without automatically becoming a cause of, or being identical with,
"poverty". Naturally, this is because the two words have a complex set of
application conditions. So, for example, £10,000 ($20,000) does not constitute "wealth" in
and of itself, and the lack of it does not automatically amount to "poverty",
either. Both options obviously depend on the surrounding circumstances
(historical and social). Of
course, in Marxist economic theory, wealth is associated with "use-values". This
is not being denied here. [Nevertheless, it is unclear whether the introduction
of this technicality would alter things in any noticeable way. On this, see Note 70.]

Some might want to
interject that the contradiction is between the forces that create wealth and
those that produce poverty -- or, perhaps, the contradiction inherent in the
processes that do this. Furthermore, these social forces are inextricably
inter-linked, and work in opposite directions.

But, why call these
"contradictions"? The only reason seems to be that this word has been imported from
Hegel, who in turn based his use of this word on some highly dubious 'logic'.
[More on that
below.]

63. We encountered similar problems over the simplistic interpretation of schematic
letters (such as "A" and "not A") earlier, in connection with Trotsky's criticism of
the LOI (i.e., in Essay Six),
and in an extended analysis of DL and FL (in Essay
Four).
There, it is demonstrated that the logic of even these apparently
simple-looking schematic letters can be rather complex.

It is also worth adding
that it is only the sloppy way these letters have been used by dialecticians
(beginning with Hegel) that has allowed dialectics to get off the ground. More
on that here.

[LOI = Law of Identity; DL = Dialectical
Logic; FL = Formal Logic.]

64.Unfortunately, F52 requires the use of
somewhat stilted language if it is to remain
literal. The "poverty" reading will, anyway, be adopted presently in connection
with F56.

A detailed analysis of the alleged 'contradiction' between
use-value and exchange-value can be found in Note 70, below. See also here.

65. F52a has to be interpreted this way
otherwise it might suggest that
Capitalism had in fact made the very same person (or groups of people)
wealthy and not wealthy at the same time.

66.
Someone might object that these are rather trite examples, and not the sort of
contradictions with which dialecticians are concerned. Maybe so, but since the
nature of
the 'contradictions' they study is left terminally vague, they will have to
do until they manage to say what on earth they mean.

67.This would
be of no help to DM-apologists, anyway. That is because (once more)
linguistic tinkering of this sort simply creates 'contradictions' by fiat when
what is required was an example of a real materialcontradiction --
not a reified linguistic expression for one, hastily cobbled-together
just to save the theory.

Nevertheless, the claim
advanced in the main body of this Essay might seem rather bold (i.e., that
contradictions would normally be regarded as figurative or ambiguous, if held
'true'), but it is based on
how we would respond
now when faced with a contradiction
in ordinary material language.

[There is a partial
explanation of the background to this approach (derived from Wittgenstein)
here.]

Naturally, this means that the
observation in the text is not just the result of the present author having been 'corrupted'
by Analytic Philosophy; on the contrary it is occasioned by the way workers
themselves speak, and how anyone not suffering from 'dialectics' talks when
operating in the material world. Indeed, it is based on the way DM-theorists
actually have to speak to make themselves understood in every day life.

Nevertheless, the following comments will test the patience of any
dialecticians who have made it this far; they will no doubt regard the examples
of contradictions given below as discursive, but not dialectical,
contradictions. That worry will be allayed
presently, when examples of just such
'contradictions' (advanced by DM-theorists themselves) will be considered.

In that case, in order to illustrate how we would handle such
'contradictions' now, consider,
how worker
NN would respond if she has been faced with the following:

C1: Boss:
"NN, you are being paid £7.50 an hour and not being paid £7.50
an hour."

[Of course, no one
speaks like this, but it is not easy to find examples where ordinary human
beings use 'true contradictions'; not even bosses do anything so crass!]

At first sight, C1 would (possibly) be
interpreted as a joke of some sort, a slip of the tongue, or a mistake. If the
boss insisted that none of these were the case, then the only way to proceed
would be to ask what on earth C1 meant.

In that
event, the explication of C1 might involve interpreting the word "paid"
in one of three ways; it could:

(1) indicate
what NN was going to earn, regardless of whether he or she will ever
receive the money. Hence, in a round-about sort of way, C1 could be referring to
the effect of taxation and other deductions on NN's pay. It could even refer to
the boss's intention to pay the worker in 'kind';

(2) mean
that although the money had been earned, it would not actually be paid
to NN for some reason. It might be being withheld as a part of the boss's
attempt to victimise her for helping to lead a successful strike, for example;

(3) mean that although NN will be paid at the stated rate, the true
value of her contribution to production could not be measured in cash terms.
Hence, it might suggest that the boss intends to reward NN with more than mere money
(or maybe with none at all) -- but, with his/her 'highest esteem', etc. A clue to
this way of viewing C1 would be the inflection in the boss's voice -- a note of
sarcasm, perhaps.

However,
'contradictions' like these would never be regarded as literally true,
for as soon as NN here was actually paid the said money the second half of C1 would
become false (a fact which all ordinary workers are well aware of in advance of
being paid). Hence, such a conjunction of a falsehood with a truth could never become
literally true (short of altering the meaning of the words used to assert
that it was true -- or, of course, without altering the meaning of "literal"). We
would not be able to make sense of anyone who thought that this sort of
eventuality could arise (save in the ways indicated above, etc.). Certainly,
without the alternatives outlined here (and perhaps others), no worker (or
anyone else) would be able to understand C1.

This brings
us back to a difficulty DM-theorists must always face if they persist in
regarding "contradictions" as true, or they continue to use the word
"contradiction" in the loose way they have done for generations (where
they sort of half mean the word in its ordinary (or even its FL) sense, half
with
its new and unexplained DL connotations). When we bring
this word back to its ordinary (material) sense, any propositions
containing this word -- if they are still regarded as true -- could only ever be
understood in a non-standard way, and then disambiguated.

If, on the other hand,
the word "contradiction" is meant to be taken in a special or technical (but as yet unspecified) sense, then DM-theorists risk
being misunderstood at every turn (or their ideas will fail to communicate
anything determinate) -- especially if they hope to depict the sorts of
situations in material reality familiar to ordinary people/workers. And that
risk will remain until
DM-apologists make it clear (and for the first time ever) what they mean by their use of
this word in such non-standard contexts.

This means that in practice,
when faced with sentences like C1, DM-theorists would also interpret the alleged
"contradictions" they contain in the standard way, in line with the
vast majority of ordinary human beings (and hence paraphrase them away). Thus,
and despite dialectics,
few DM-fans would understand the words attributed to the fictional boss in C1 (above) as
literally true. In fact, only the most useless trade union rep. in history
would allow such a boss to get away with the nonsense reported in C1. Representing
and/or defending the material interests of the working-class certainly does not mean
that we let bosses off the hook by adopting ways of speaking that were invented by Idealists --
supporters and members of the boss-class itself.

However, socialists who
are normally alert to the dangers of class collaboration when they surface
elsewhere seem only too willing to allow material language to suffer from class
contamination of this sort when it comes to Philosophy.

Even if the word
"contradiction" were intended to be taken literally, DM-theorists
themselves would not be able to say what in nature or society a 'true
contradiction' could depict (without helping themselves to yet more figurative
language). If (per impossible) this could be done, then the
word "literal" would have to be taken non-literally!

In Essay
Five, we saw attempts to
eliminate the confusions that plague Engels's account of motion continually fail.
It turned out that it was impossible to understand what Engels could conceivably have meant by what he actually said if
his words were
taken literally.

So, it is small wonder
then that DM-theorists have remained unclear and equivocal about core DM-theses (like this one) for over a hundred years -- there is in fact
nothing that anyone could say, or could have said, to make the
incomprehensible comprehensible. Like the mysteries of
transubstantiation, DM-theses resist all attempts at materialist explication.

At this point,
DM-apologists might be tempted to complain about the continual use of
contradictions drawn from FL to make points against the use of "dialectical
contradictions" in DM. The obvious response to this is (once again) to request a
clear explanation of what a "dialectical contradiction" itself amounts to so that those
making this complaint could themselves convince sceptics that dialecticians actually
meansomething (anything?) by the phrase "dialectical contradiction",
as opposed to their having used an empty phrase generation upon generation.

Until then, the above
volunteered objection would itself be devoid of meaning since it contains a
senseless phrase -- i.e., "dialectical contradiction".

The claim that there
are literally true contradictions (advanced by philosophers like Graham
Priest) will be examined in a later Essay. [However, it is a moot point whether
the paradoxes he considers are, or ever could be, dialectical.]

However, easily the best account of 'dialectical contradictions' I have come across in my trawl
through the wastelands of 'dialectical logic' is to be found in Lawler (1982).
Having said that, I should immediately qualify it by adding that Lawler's essay
is the best of the worst, for his analysis of this terminally
obscure piece of Hegelian jargon is no better than was his analysis of Bertrand
Russell's criticism of Hegel for confusing the "is" of identity with that of
predication, discussed in Essay
Three Part One.

In fact, there are so many logical errors in Lawler's article that any conclusions
he draws are not really worth the paper they were printed on. [Anyone wanting to
by-pass this long and detailed preamble, can skip to the main part,
here.]

First of all, running through the entire article is the Hegelian confusion of
logic with the 'science of thought', which Lawler nowhere tries to defend, and
upon which he does not even comment. Indeed, he quotes Engels in support of this very
idea:

"Modern materialism is essentially
dialectical.... What independently survives of all former philosophy is the
science of thought and its laws -- formal logic and dialectics." [Engels
(1976), p.31, quoted in Lawler (1982), p.14; Lawler's added italic emphasis
here.]

Lawler then adds:

"In view of this passage, in which the
distinction between formal logic and dialectics could hardly have been made more
clearly, it is difficult to see how Marx and Engels could have confused
elsewhere undoubtedly, formal logic with dialectics or, more seriously, rejected
formal logic altogether." [Lawler (1982), p.14.]

However, the passage from Engels seems to identify formal and
dialectical logic (indeed, he lumps them together as "the
science of thought and its laws -- formal logic and dialectics").
In that case, far from making the said distinction so plain that it could not
have been clearer, had Engels actually
said they were distinct, that would have been clearer.

Hence, it is obvious from the beginning that Lawler's aim is to defend a view
consonant with tradition, rather than read even Engels with
any accuracy.

As noted in Essay Two, when it
comes to Philosophy, dialecticians are as studiously traditional as they are
demonstrably conservative. Indeed, they are happy to recapitulate all the errors
committed by aristocratic Greek (and now
modern-day Hermetic) thinkers, and spin their a priori webs of
Jabberwocky-lore
with obscure jargon they struggle even now to explain to the rest
of us.

[How they do this is the subject of Essay Three Parts
One and
Two, and Essay Twelve
Part One. Why they do it
is outlined in Essay Nine Part Two
and Essay Fourteen (summary here).]

Sure, we have no evidence that Marx himself was similarly confused
about the nature of logic, but there is enough in Engels's writing to indicate that
he was no clearer than Hegel -- indeed, Hegel was less clear than
Aristotle
(who tended to confuse logical with psychological and ontological issues far
less than did this modern-day, Hermetically-confused 'genius') --, which makes
the logical views of both these dialecticians totally worthless.

And, as we have already seen (in
Essay Four), Logic
cannot be counted as a
science of thought,
for if it were, logicians would perform brain scans, psychometric testing and surveys
(etc.), and not waste their time with all those useless definitions, rules of inference and proofs.

Nevertheless, we should not let these relatively minor errors detract from the worse ones to
come.

Lawler now tackles this topic with a consideration of Hegel's criticism of the
LOI, which he regards as central to understanding the nature of 'dialectical
contradictions'. But, as we have seen (and will see
later), Hegel's criticism of the LOI is
worthless, since he confused
predication with the relation of identity, which then 'allowed' him to
conjure his Ideal universe out of a reconfiguration of the diminutive verb "to
be", a stunning trick even
David Blaine
could not match.

[LOI = Law of Identity, which Lawler calls "the
principle of Identity".]

[Lawler's own misguided attempt to have the charges of logical ineptitude
against Hegel dropped were ruled out of court in Essay Three
Part One.]

We
have also seen that Trotsky's attack on the LOI was even more inept, and while
Hegel cannot be implicated with the latter's misconceptions, these two shared
enough confusion in this area to make it difficult for us to tell which one of these
two jokers was the Stan Laurel and which the Oliver Hardy of
Logic.

[However, since Hegel got us into this mess, I reckon he's Stan.]

Be that as it may,
if we turn to more substantive issues, we find Lawler is just as slip-shod in
his use of 'logical' terms as other dialecticians are. Indeed, this is the
only way he and they can make Hegel's 'logic' seem to work.

First of all, as we have already seen with respect to other
DM-fans,
Lawler is decidedly
unclear about the denotation of the letter "A"s he uses.

For example, on pages 18-19, in reference to Hegel's discussion of Identity, Lawler has this to say:

"Hegel's
critique of formal-logical principles begins with consideration of the principle
of identity, A = A, or a thing or a concept is itself." [Ibid., pp.18-19.
Italic emphasis in the original.]

We have already shown that
this is a thoroughly inadequate way to characterise identity (either in logic or
in ordinary language), but the point at issue here is the fact that Lawler views
these "A"s as the names of objects and concepts, or perhaps even as those
entities themselves, three different kinds of 'things'.

[LEM = Law of Excluded Middle.]

But then in the very same
paragraph he goes on to say:

"The
other principles follow from this basic one. The principle of noncontradiction,
Hegel argues, is the principle [of Identity, RL] stated negatively. 'A is
A' implies 'A cannot at the same time be A and not be A,'
or one cannot assert something to be true and at the same time, and in the same
respect, assert it to be false. The principle of excluded middle is that
something must either be A or not be A: there is no third
possibility. By extension, the law of noncontradiction implies that 'A
cannot be non-A', where 'non-A' is something that is not A,
or some part or property of A." [Ibid., p.19. Italic emphasis in
the original; quotation marks in all the passages taken from Lawler have been altered to conform to the conventions adopted
here. The middle set of quotation marks here (around the LEM) are missing in the original.]

As we will soon see, the
principle of identity does not imply what Hegel says it does (or even what
Lawler himself says it does -- since he nowhere
corrects Hegel), but that is not of immediate concern here. However,
when Lawler qualifies what he takes Hegel to mean, he clearly views these "A"s
as propositions:

"'A
cannot at the same time be A and not be A,' or one cannot assert
something to be true and at the same time, and in the same respect, assert it to
be false." [Ibid.]

So, they are no longer
the names of objects or concepts, they are (the names of, or proxy letters for) propositions.
That's now four different
'kinds' of things.

Of course it could be
argued that Lawler is merely saying that such things cannot be asserted (etc.)
of A, making A an object, or perhaps its name (but that is hardly likely;
Lawler and/or Hegel were not bothered to discover alleged truths about names,
one supposes). But even if this were so, in the above passage, "A" itself would
be an object and what can be asserted of an object (i.e., a predicate
expression, say). So, this response would be at once to defend Lawler and
convict him.

Despite that, his wording
does not support this contention. Lawler pointedly says:

"…one
cannot assert something to be true and at the same time, and in the same
respect, assert it to be false." [Ibid.]

As opposed to:

"…one
cannot assert something to be true ofA and at the same time, and
in the same respect, assert it to be false ofA."

If Lawler had meant his
"A"s to be named objects, say, then he would have used the latter phrasing.

[Anyway, as we shall soon
see, later on in Lawler's Essay these accommodating letters are unambiguously propositions.]

In addition, as pointed out above, it is worth noting that these "A"s (or at least, these
"not-A"s) appear to be properties, or predicates (perhaps?);
that's now six different 'kinds' of things:

"The
principle of excluded middle is that something must either be A or not be
A: there is no third possibility. By extension, the law of
noncontradiction implies that 'A cannot be non-A', where 'non-A'
is something that is not A, or some part or property of A."
[Ibid.]

Of course, it could be
that Lawler is merely adopting a tradition in ancient/early modern logic
that treats all logical
expressions equally sloppily (which, as it turns out, is the tradition that
presided over the creation of the bowdlerised version of AFL that Hegel
was taught at University (the kind of sloppy 'formalism' one finds in Kant's Logic, for
example), and which he then put to no good), which seems to be the most likely
explanation for Lawler's confusion here, given the other things we are about to discover (and to which we
have already drawn attention, in Essay Three
Part One, and Essay
Four).

[AFL = Aristotelian Formal Logic.]

Nevertheless, it is this
slip-shod
approach to logic that 'allowed' Hegel (and now Lawler) to construct some
rather 'innovative' metaphysics. Indeed, as Bertrand Russell noted:

"This illustrates an important truth, namely,
that the worse your logic, the more interesting the consequences to which it
gives rise." [Russell (1961), p.715.]

And this is somewhat reminiscent of the sort of word-juggling
which allowed, say,
St
Anselm to concoct his famous 'proof' of the existence of 'God'.

[For more on
Hegel's confused logic, the reader should consult Rosenthal (1998), pp.111-36,
and Rosenthal (2001).]

This is all so
quintessentially
traditional as it is thoroughly confused.

But, after another flip, on page 21, Lawler
now says:

"Putting
the concept of identity into practical application, as it is interpreted by
abstract understanding. We are compelled to say that a cow is a cow, a man is a
man, white is white, spirit is spirit, etc. In attempting to express the
principle of identity according to the spirit of abstract understanding, we end
up paradoxically speaking of an endless number of different things."
[Ibid., p21. Italic emphasis in the original.]

Although Lawler does not
mention those "A"s here, they have now clearly become "things" once again.
However, on page 22, they quickly transmogrify into "entities":

"'A
is A' implies that A is not some other entity which is not-A."
[Ibid., p.22. Italic emphases in the original.]

And, in the same
paragraph, they soon morph into "beings":

"…in
the abstract, undialectical understanding of identity, the relation of A
to not-A (beings that are not A as well as A's own nonbeing) seems
to 'vanish.'" [Ibid., p.22. Italic emphasis in the original.]

Here, not only has one of
these "A"s been confused with a "being", "not-A" becomes its "non-being" (in fact,
and to be more precise, it
seems that these "A"s might also be predicates, once more, or even the subjects to which
"being" is attributed; who can say?). At any
rate, so far this makes the letters eight different kinds of 'things'.

[The reader should now
convince herself that if someone says "Bush is not Bush" or even "Blair is not
Bush", this does not imply Bush no longer exists. Anti-imperialists would surely
have consigned one or both of these war-mongers and mass murderers to 'non-being' had their sticky
end been
quite so easy to engineer. To be sure, in the quirky world of Hermetic
Hegelianism, negation might indeed be the same as 'non-being', but in the
material world, one has to do much more to one's enemies than merely wish
them away -- or simply glue a "non" or a "not" onto their names.]

On page 24, these
chameleonic "A"s now change into "terms", and perhaps even propositions again:

"The
point we have argued is that Hegel is attempting to establish identity,
not destroy it. A term 'to be itself,' requires a negative relation to another
term…. Does Colletti [an Italian Marxist, who Lawler is criticising in this
article, RL] deny Hegel's point that asserting 'A' is equivalent to
saying 'not-not-A'" [Ibid., p.24. Italic emphases in the original.]

If something is capable
of being asserted, it must be an indicative sentence, or a clause, at the very
least (and thus perhaps a proposition). To be sure, predicates can be asserted
of named individuals (etc.) -- or perhaps better: true or false sentences can be
formed if predicative expressions are completed with names, or with other
singular terms (or indeed with the linguistic equivalents of the bound variables
of quantifiers). As should seem obvious to any language-user, it is not possible
just to assert a bald "term", predicate or concept. Uttering "ξ is
a cat" (or
"...is a cat", or even "is a cat") is to assert nothing (i.e., it is to make no
assertion) -- and the same is true of merely uttering the word "cat".

Of course, one can point
at an animal and utter this word, but that is the equivalent of saying "That is
a cat". Without the pointing gesture, the use of that word would be to assert
nothing. And one can utter the phrase "a cat" in answer to a question, such as,
say, "What
animal seems to know more logic than Hegel?"

To be sure, Hegel appears to think that objects/'concepts' can be true:

"In common life the terms truth and
correctness are often treated as synonymous: we speak of the truth of a
content, when we are only thinking of its correctness. Correctness, generally
speaking, concerns only the formal coincidence between our conception and its
content, whatever the constitution of this content may be. Truth, on the
contrary, lies in the coincidence of the object with itself, that is, with its
notion. That a person is sick, or that some one has committed a theft, may
certainly be correct. But the content is untrue. A sick body is not in harmony
with the notion of body, and there is a want of congruity between theft and the
notion of human conduct. These instances may show that an immediate judgment in
which an abstract quality is predicated of an immediately individual thing,
however correct it may be, cannot contain truth. The subject and predicate of it
do not stand to each other in the relation of reality and notion." [Hegel
(1975), p.237, §172.]

Unfortunately, detailed consideration of the above will take us into areas that
will be discussed in Essay Twelve
(when it is finally published);
suffice it to say here that Hegel's confusions on this score have clearly arisen out of his
conflation of predicate expressions with singular terms, compounded by the
adoption of the Medieval Identity Theory of Predication. [More on thathere.]

The conflation of "terms"
with "things", and then with linguistic expressions that can be
asserted of named individuals (or once again perhaps better: the formation of
true or false sentences by the completion of predicative expressions with names,
or with other singular terms (or indeed with the linguistic equivalents of the
bound variables of quantifiers, etc., etc.)), 'allows' Lawler (just as it 'allowed'
Hegel) to derive the sort of "interesting" results we have come to know and loathe.

So, that is nine sorts of things that these "A"s are.

On page 26, these
impressively Heraclitean (if not worryingly
Cratylean) letter "A"s now morph into relations (as far as
can be ascertained, that is), or perhaps named relational expressions(!):

"Hegel's main
objective is to show an integral connection between A and not-A,
or, in categorical terms, between 'identity' and what is supposed to be the
contradictory of identity, 'difference.'" [Ibid., p.20.]

"In
view of the criticisms made of Hegel, it is quite significant that Hegel
recognises the force of logical contradiction as a weapon of criticism of his
philosophical opponents. First they say, Hegel maintains, that identity has
nothing to do with difference. Then they say that identity is different. They
assert 'A' and then 'not A'" [Ibid., p.26.]

The only way to
understand these passages is to read the "A" above as standing for "identity" and
the "not-A" for "difference" (i.e., "not-identity", one presumes). Of course,
this could be to misread what Lawler says --, but then he simply invites it.

That
is now ten, or possibly eleven, different denotations for these
semantically-dithering letters.

And it will not do to say
that Lawler is merely reporting what Hegel's opponents might say, since he
nowhere tries to pull these miscreants up for their syntactical sins.

At the very least these
morphoholic letter "A"s now stand for propositions again, since here
Lawler says they can be asserted once more. This interpretation is
confirmed in the next-but-one paragraph:

"The
contradiction is not any kind of contradiction. For example, first they [the
said critics, RL] affirm that all swans are white and then they deny that all
swans are white." [Ibid., p.26.]

Well, if two hundred
years ago Hegel was indeed
faced with such simple-minded opponents, then no wonder he got away
with so many logical howlers. But even so: What is so
contradictory about someone changing his/her mind (if that is what one of these
'simpletons' did)?

[In
fact, this is the only way to read this example that does not treat Hegel's opponents as
sub-literate morons.]

Nevertheless, Lawler's
"A"s
have been transmuted once more into either propositions or predicates -- or perhaps
even into properties(?) --, or maybe all three(?).

On
the very next page (but in the same paragraph), it becomes a little clearer that these
plastic "A"s are indeed relations, or nominalised relational expressions
(or maybe nominalised relational phrases(?)); in fact it is quite plain
that this is indeed what
they are:

"The
law of noncontradiction holds, for if 'identity held aloof from difference' (A)
is false, then the contradictory 'not identity held aloof from difference' (not-A)
is true." [Ibid., p.27. Italic emphases in the original.]

Since phrases can neither
be true nor false, Lawler's reasoning is, shall we say, 'innovative'.
Nevertheless, these busy little "A"s have plainly had yet
another denotational make-over, and now stand for "identity held aloof
from difference".

[The phrase "identity
held aloof from difference" might appear to make sense to some, but that is only
because they too have become inured to this odd way of talking -- perhaps as a
result of reading far more Hegel, or "systematic dialectics", than is good for any
denizen of this planet --, a use
which pretends that relational expressions can be named
and still remain relational. (This ancient ploy was exposed for what it is in Essay Three Part
One.)]

The mercurial career of
these infamous "A"s continues apace; on page 28 they metamorphose into indexical
or token-reflexive
terms(!):

"Hegel's
statement is made in response to Zeno's famous paradox. Zeno's paradox,
according to Hegel, is that since motion involves both A and not-A,
and since this violates the principle of noncontradiction, it follows that
motion is impossible. What should probably be called 'Hegel's paradox' is the
assertion that since motion occurs, there must in some sense both
the A and not-A of Zeno's position. It is clear that this
assertion cannot be taken in the sense of a strict contradiction. Not-A
in a purely formal sense means only the denial of A, and is compatible
with saying that the object is both 'here' and 'anywhere else,' perhaps also on
the moon. Not-A can also mean the simple denial of 'here' -– an assertion
that clearly leaves us nowhere….

"…Hegel's
line of thought here is similar to his approach to the problem of 'abstract
identity' or 'identity held aloof from difference.' The paradox arises if we
begin with an abstract notion of place, a 'here' which is totally discrete and
unrelated to any other place. The common-sense definition of motion as 'change
of place' or as a passage of an object through a succession of places runs into
insuperable intellectual difficulties if 'place' is understood in this manner.
For one thing 'place' is defined as 'fixed place,' i.e., as motionless place.
Can motion be explained in terms of a concept which excluded motion? On the
other hand, it does not seem possible to eliminate some notion of definite place
from our concept of motion, but such a notion must be that of a 'relative
place,' a place which is both 'here' and 'there' or, paradoxically, 'here' and
'not-here." [Ibid., pp.28-29. Italic emphases in the original.]

In this passage, Lawler's
"A"s and "not-A"s now plainly stand for "here" and "not-here", respectively.
A change of identity perhaps, but no less an example of lamentably poor logic
for all that.

That is now at
least thirteen different identities for these impressively fluid letters!

However, we saw in Essay Five
that the above 'analysis' of motion had more holes in it than a lorry load of
Polo Mints. There is no 'common sense definition' of the items Lawler
mentions; ordinary
language (let alone 'common sense') easily allows for the sorts of motion in
the material world that Idealists like Hegel ignored --, and both of these
(i.e., the vernacular and 'common sense') do this with
relative ease,
too.

Nevertheless, on page 32,
these change-oholic "A"s go into morphological hyper-drive as they become parts
(or perhaps 'reflected' parts) of one another:

"One
might readily grant that the definition of A includes A's relating
to something that is not A (some non-A which is not-A).
This does not mean that non-A or what is not-A is a part of A
or part of A's identity….

"It
is necessary to ask, first of all, whether and in what sense the fact that A
necessarily relates to what is not-A permits us to insert not-A in
A….

"…it
seems reasonable to look for some 'imprint' of this 'other' in A, so that
in some sense not-A is internally constitutive of A." [Ibid.,
p.32. Italic emphases in the original.]

These
denotationally-profligate letter "A"s, it seems, can take on any form
whatsoever
in order to make this Hermetic Hodgepodge seem to work. I have been able to identify at
least fourteen different denotations for them in this article. This means
that Lawler is a verbal-trickmeister to rank with some of the best.

"For
over two thousand years traditional Philosophers have been playing on themselves
and their audiences what can only be described as a series of complex verbal
tricks. Since Greek times, metaphysicians have occupied themselves with deriving
a priori theses solely from the meaning of a few specially chosen
(and suitably doctored) words. These philosophical gems have then been peddled
to the rest of humanity, dressed-up as profound truths about fundamental aspects
of reality, peremptorily imposed on nature -- often without the benefit of a
single supporting experiment….

"Even
before the first dialecticians put pen to misuse, they found themselves
surrounded on all sides by ideas drawn from this ancient tradition. Clearly,
they faced a serious problem: if they imposed their ideas on nature in
like manner, they could easily be accused of constructing a comparable form of
Idealism. On the other hand, if they didn't do this, they wouldn't have a
'philosophical' theory of their own to lend weight to, and provide a bedrock
for, their claim to lead the revolution. Confronted thus by traditional
styles-of-thought (which they had no hand in creating, but which they were only
too happy to appropriate), DM-theorists found there was no easy way out of this
traditional minefield -- or at least none that managed to keep their theory the
right side of immaterialism.

"Their
solution was simple and effective: ignore the problem.

"This
is not to deny that dialecticians are aware of the Idealism implicit in
traditional thought; on the contrary, but their excuse for ignoring its
pernicious influence on their own ideas is that the materialist flip they
allegedly inflicted on Hegel was capable of changing such theoretical dirt into
philosophical gold. However, flip or no flip, their own thought is still
thoroughly traditional in style: it is dogmatic, a priori, and couched in
jargon lifted straight from the Philosophers' Phrase Book. Even though few
DM-theorists deny that traditional Philosophy is largely Idealist, not a single
one has avoided copying its conservative approach to a priori knowledge.

"So,
despite the fact that dialecticians constantly claim that DM has not been
forced on nature -- for that would surely brand their theory "Idealist" -- they
all invariably end up doing exactly that, imposing their theory on
reality. In so doing, they merely underline the fact that traditional thought
has found a new batch of converts among erstwhile radicals."

We
are now (partly) in a position to see why this was asserted quite so forcefully back then. Lawler's defence of Hegel depends
solely on such a sloppy use of words, where predicate expressions are
turned into names, objects, terms, indexicals and possibly relations themselves
--
and which can thus stand in some relation to other similarly deformed linguistic
expressions, or suitably processed objects.

Indeed, this is the only way that those spooky Hegelian
"internal relations" can be generated (as Bertrand Russell correctly noted), which
"relations"
to this day still defy scientific detection. [Not that anyone in the dialectical
fraternity (or beyond) is searching for
them with much urgency.]

But, without this 'innovative'
use of language, Lawler's explanation of 'dialectical contradictions' falls completely flat,
as we will see.

Now it could be argued that these syntactical niggles are not
really all
that important; after all, it is quite clear what Hegel and Lawler meant. Anyway, it might
prove possible to repair both accounts so that they pass such 'pedantic' hurdles with ease.

That, of course, remains to be seen. But since Lawler's article
is by far and away the best defence of this incomprehensible Hegelian notion (i.e.,
'dialectical
contradiction') I have so far seen, this should indicate to the reader just how
bad things are in this back-water of traditional myth-making. In that case, a dialectical
rescue is highly unlikely from this wing of Idealism. Even academic dialecticians regularly make
serious errors of this sort, and worse -- and they all fail to notice
them, let alone acknowledge them, even after they have been exposed. That is how
logically purblind this ruling-class gobbledygook
has rendered them.

[This was the outcome with respect to
Rosenthal (1998, 2001), which also fell upon deaf dialectical ears. The above allegations,
however, will be substantiated in Essay
Twelve, where Hegel's work in this area (along with that of his 'Marxist'
groupies) will be taken apart.]

Naturally, I exclude Graham
Priest's work from these impertinent indictments
since it is far from clear whether the 'contradictions' he considers are
'dialectical' to begin with (even if we could tell!), or even
contradictions to at all -- and
he is generally very careful with his syntax. Nevertheless, as far as I am aware, he
has not yet noticed the logical blunders I have exposed in this Essay.

However, to those who think that this sort
"pedantry" can be ignored it is worth pointing out that that would be the only way they
could excuse their own sloppy
thinking, and the only way they could make their ideas appear to work.

This
sort of attitude would not be tolerated for one second in the sciences, or in any other
branch of genuine knowledge. Can you imagine the fuss if someone were to argue
that it does not matter
what the
Magna Carta said, or when the
Battle
of the Nile was fought, or what the
Declaration of Independence actually contained, or what the exact wording of
Newton's Second Law was, or whether "G", the
Gravitational Constant, was 6.6742 x 10-11or 6.7642 x 10-11
Mm2kg-2,
or indeed something else? Would we accept this sort of excuse from someone who
said it did not matter what the precise wording of a contract in law
happened to be? Or, that
it did not really matter what Marx meant by "variable
capital", or that he "pedantically" distinguished use-value
from
exchange-value -- or more pointedly, the "relative
form" from the "equivalent
form" of value --, we should be able to make do with anyone's guess? And how would we react if someone said, "Who cares if there
are serious mistakes in that policeman's
evidence against those strikers"? Or if someone else retorted "Big
deal if there are a few
errors in this or that e-mail address/web page
URL, or in that mathematical proof! And who cares whether there is a difference
between rest
mass and
inertial
mass in Physics! What are you, some kind of pedant?"

You can be sure such
'anti-pedants' will be examining these Essays with well-focussed magnifying
glasses,
nit-picking with the best, having turned their selectively pedantic eyes
on all I have written in order to locate the tiniest of assumed errors --, all the while refusing to examine anything in the DM-Grimoire
with a tiny fraction of such attention to detail. [In fact, they already
have.]

With such a
sloppy regard for
logic and fondness for
Mickey Mouse Science,
is it any wonder that genuine ruling-class theorists regard Dialectical Marxists with
undisguised contempt, and workers in their billions ignore Marxism?

Nevertheless, in order to
consider every option open to Dialectical Mystics to say what they mean
by 'dialectical contradictions', Lawler's argument will be considered on its
own merits, and his syntactical sins will be put to one side for now -- that is, where they can.

"Hegel's
critique of formal-logical principles begins with consideration of the principle
of identity, A = A, or a thing or a concept is itself." [Ibid., pp.18-19.
Italic emphasis in the original.]

"A thing or concept is
itself"? Is this meant to be serious!? Not only is it a caricature of the
LOI, it ropes in "concepts" which are not objects, and so cannot be related to
themselves. We saw the difficulties traditional thinkers got themselves into over precisely this in
Essay Three Part One, and
Essay Four.

[LOI = Law of Identity; FL = Formal Logic.]

To be sure, Hegel was
writing at a time when little work had been done on this 'law', but Lawler isn't.
And yet he refers his readers to no modern work in this area; had he done so
Hegel's 'definition' would have been seen for the mystical joke that it is. [On this, see
here, and
here.]

Again, putting this to
one side, Lawler now goes on to argue as follows:

"The
other principles follow from this basic one. The principle of noncontradiction,
Hegel argues, is the principle [of Identity, RL] stated negatively. 'A is
A' implies 'A cannot at the same time be A and not be A,'
or one cannot assert something to be true and at the same time, and in the same
respect, assert it to be false. The principle of excluded middle is that
something must either be A or not be A: there is no third
possibility. By extension, the law of noncontradiction implies that 'A
cannot be non-A', where 'non-A' is something that is not A,
or some part or property of A." [Ibid., p.19. Italic emphasis in
the original; middle set of quotation marks (around the LEM) missing in the original.]

This is so full of
errors
it is difficult to know where to begin. Lawler (following Hegel) tells us that
the other principles of FL follow from the LOI, or rather from it being
stated "negatively". The latter
principles comprise the LOC and the LEM –- but notice once again the
common error dialecticians make (exposed in
Essay Four) of thinking that FL has
just three
fundamental principles.

It seems in this regard
therefore that academic Marxists (HCDs)
are just as benighted as their more lowly
LCD
brethren were shown to be (here).
Naturally this sorry state of affairs is itself not unconnected with the fact
that both wings of Dialectical Darkness think that, to a greater or lesser
extent, sane and sober sections of humanity can learn something useful from Hegel.

[LOC = Law of
Noncontradiction; LEM = Law of Excluded Middle; HCD = High Church Dialectician;
LCD = Low Church Dialectician. MFL = Modern Formal Logic.]

Hegel (and now Lawler)
offers no proof of this 'inference', nor could he (they). The LOI concerns the
relation that is supposed to hold between an object and itself (or perhaps
between its names, depending on how one reads this 'law');
it is not about the
truth-functional properties of propositions, which is
what concerns these other 'laws'.

Lawler thus reports the
following:

"The
principle of noncontradiction, Hegel argues, is the principle [of Identity, RL]
stated negatively. 'A is A' implies 'A cannot at the same
time be A and not be A,' or one cannot assert something to be true
and at the same time, and in the same respect, assert it to be false."
[Ibid.]

But this 'derivation'
only works because of the aforementioned confusion over the denotation of these letter
"A"s
(which explains why I went into all that 'pedantic'
detail making this very point!).

Now, in relation to the LOC, if these letters refer to propositions,
no problem. The above would at least be a passable 'definition' of the LOC; but under
no stretch of the imagination can these letters refer to propositions when they
appear in the LOI. That 'law' is not about the identity of a proposition with
itself (which means that, with respect to propositions, the LOI is not a
tautology), but even if it were, that would have no implications for the LOC. The LOC
does not rule out propositions being non-identical (but see below), since it
doesn't concern the identity of propositions to begin with. So, it neither
rules them in nor rules them out. Indeed, if a proposition lacked identity it would not be
a proposition in the first place. And if it possessed identity it would be an object, not a proposition.

To be sure, we can speak
about two propositions saying the same thing, but that would not be to relate
them, but to predicate something of one or both. Any attempt to go further than this stands in
danger of confusing a propositional sign (i.e., the physical marks on the page, or
the sounds
involved when it is spoken) with what a proposition expresses. [On this, see
below.]

We have already seen (here,
here and
here) that the
LOI cannot be about the alleged identity between concepts, or even between predicates
(since if it were, the latter would be objects too, and cease to be
predicative), so the LOI can only apply to objects (or perhaps to their names),
if it applies anywhere. This means that identity statements are at best
'necessary truths' (although I should want to call them "grammatical
propositions"), not
tautologies.

This is partly because they are not molecular --, that is, they
relate objects to themselves, and so they do not contain sub-clauses, or simpler
propositions. (On this, see Glock (1996), pp.164-69.) And even in predicative
sentences, tautologies (at a discursive level) merely "say the same thing", or
involve the use of synonyms. They do not involve identity statements,
since the latter are not predicative, but relational. At best, a proposition expressing identity
contains a relational expression which is both symmetrical and reflexive (among
other things).

In short, identity statements cannot be tautological (in the
sense of "saying the same thing") because both halves do not "say the same
thing" (since they do not say anything at all). "A", "A", in "A = A", if it
is a name, or other singular term, does not say the same thing as since
"A", if it is a name (etc.), says nothing. Only clauses, propositions or sentences can be used to do
that. And if "A" is a proposition, or clause, it cannot be put into a relation
with itself, since it is not an object.

Discursively, an example of a tautology would be something like "A vixen is
a female fox", which expresses a rule of language, and so cannot be true or
false (this was argued at length in Essay Twelve
Part One). On the other hand, "A
vixen is a vixen" is not a rule of language. However, if it is taken
predicatively, "ξ
is a vixen" cannot be saying the same thing as "A vixen", for the latter is
plainly not of the form "ξ
is a vixen". Moreover "A vixen" is not saying anything determinate, so "A
vixen is a vixen" cannot be saying 'the same thing'. And ""ξ
is a vixen" is a vixen" is not a tautology.

Of course, it could be objected here that the above would mean
that "A vixen is a female fox" is not a tautology since "A vixen" and "ξ
is a female fox" are not 'saying the same thing' (in the strict sense meant in
the previous paragraph), which is absurd.

Indeed, and that is why this sentence was called a rule, since it
expresses a pattern for replacing synonymous terms in English, so that anyone
who used "a vixen" in a sentence" would be saying the same as anyone using "a
female fox" (in
non-opaque contexts).

It could be argued that an identity statement is predicative, or
could be put into predicative form; for example "ξ
is identical with ξ",
which always gives the value true for any substitution instance. Maybe so, and
in that sense, it would be a tautology in MFL (if that is defined as any wff
that always maps onto the true). But this is not a necessary adjunct to logic,
as Wittgenstein showed. In a properly constructed formal language, identity
would be
expressed by the use of the same sign, so we do not in fact need this formal
relation. [More on this,
here.]

And it is certainly not what Hegel and Lawler
were talking about.

Anyway, even as predicative propositions, they would still not be
tautologies in the discursive sense Lawler and Hegel need (i.e., in the sense of
"saying the same thing"). This is because the predicate here would be
a two-place linguistic function "ζ
is identical with ξ"
(it cannot be "ξ
is identical with ξ",
for that prejudges the substitutional instances allowed), which is in no way
tautological. [Once more, "...is identical with ξ"
does not "say the same thing" as "ζ
is identical with...".]

[The term "linguistic function" is explained in Geach (1961).
Basically, such functions are analogous to
mathematical functions, except in this case, they map linguistic expressions
(of a certain sort) onto linguistic expressions (of another sort) -- although,
in Frege's
sense, they map such expressions onto the "True" or the "False". (The latter
sense is not intended here.)]

But, even if the predicate were "ξ
is identical with ξ",
this would be no use, either, for "...is identical with ξ"
does not "say the same thing" as "ξ
is identical with...".

[where "∀(ξ)" is the
universal quantifier, and "F(ξ)" a one-place,
first-level predicate
expression], neither of these
would have any bearing on the relation they are supposed to have with their alleged
negative/'opposite', as might be the case with the following:

L2:
p cannot at the same time be p and not be p.

Nor
would either have anything to do with so-called "assertibility
conditions":

L3: One
cannot assert that p is true and at the same time, and in the same respect,
assert that p is false.

This is
because there are
no rules for deriving either L2 or L3 from L1a or L1b (or from the less formal
versions of these two), or indeed from anything
analogous. And it is not hard to see why. [More on this presently.]

[Of course,
L3 could itself be correct (I will pass no opinion on it here), but L2 and L3 certainly do
not follow from L1a or L1b, or from their alleged negative versiosn (or from the
less formal versions of these two).]

Now, if L2
had been:

L2a:
p cannot at the same time be identical with p and not be identical with p,

the problems associated with Hegel's
'derivation' would have been a little easier to see. Quantifying across propositions (if
that were
possible, and if we could make sense of the use of an "=" sign between propositional
variables/tokens), we might be able to obtain this:

Even if we did have
such rules, in order to
obtain L7, the alleged LOI (i.e., "p =
p") had to be combined with its supposed
Hegelian 'other' (i.e., "¬(p
=
p)")
[or is it "(p ≠
p)"?]), and then with its double negation (i.e.,
"¬(p ≠
p)") in a conditional. But, as we have seen, it is not too clear how L7 can be
derived from "p =
p" on its own, or even
from its alleged negative form.

However, it is worth
pointing out again that if a proposition
is not 'identical with itself', it cannot be a proposition (at least, not one with
a determinate content). In that case, nothing could follow from it. And if
it is 'identical with itself', it would be an object -- and, plainly, nothing follows from
an object.

there is an unambiguous
identity sign between propositions, or at least between their signs. So
the earlier claims cannot be correct.

But,
logicians who use either the equal or the equivalence sign between propositional
tokens do not imagine that these physical objects on the page are identical.
They do have eyes! They variously interpret them as expressing a truth-functional
relationship between the results of applying F(ξ), for example, to names or
to objects
(depending on the philosophy of logic to which they adhere), yielding an
identity (or as expressing an equivalence relation) of some sort between abstract objects (i.e., sets, courses of values, graphs,
ranges, classes, and the like), or between the truth values of the interpreted
sentences that finally emerge as a result, and so on.

So, these signs in effect
express rules that are applicable to other signs/symbols; they do not express an
identity between lifeless marks on the page, or between propositions that exist
in an ethereal realm somewhere.

[To be sure, some
philosophers have held this view, but they too confused propositions with
objects.]

Indeed, the second of the
above (L10) shows that this is so by implicitly interpreting the equivalence sign
as one expressing an identity between objects of some sort. In that case, stencils
like L9 and L10 do not contradict what was maintained earlier, which was that where
the sign for identity (etc.) is used, it expresses a relation between objects
(or an object and itself -- or between its names), not between concepts,
predicates or propositions.

Moreover, in L10, the "="
sign appears between quantified variables (the interpretation of which will
depend on the domain of quantification, so this might not even be an example of
the use of that sign between propositional tokens).

Now, whether
this employment of signs captures the full range of meanings available in
scientific contexts, or
even in ordinary language, I will leave to one side for the present (but,
it is worth adding here that
Essay Six delivers a negative
judgement in this regard).

[Of course, in stencils like L9, the "=" sign would be replaced
by an "º",
that is, by a biconditional sign. This is because "=" is a sign for two-place
predicate/linguistic function (i.e., "ξ=ζ"), which can only take names or singular terms as arguments.]

Nevertheless, one thing
is clear: MFL and ordinary language succeed in capturing the full range of words we have for
identity (etc.) far better than the syntactical mess we find in DL. In fact,
as Essays Three through Seven show, DL cannot handle the simplest of
ideas/objects (such as a bag of sugar!), let alone anything more complicated.

[DL = Dialectical
Logic.]

Hence, once more, the
suggested Hegelian 'derivation' of the LOC (i.e., the one expounded by Lawler)
cannot work if these "A"s are read as objects (since objects cannot be true or
false), nor, indeed, if propositions are viewed as objects (and, for the same
reason).

This is why it is so
important to be clear about the denotation of these letters, and (once more!) why such a fuss
was made earlier.

Alas, there is
not much that can be done with this:

"The
principle of excluded middle is that something must either be A or not be
A: there is no third possibility. By extension, the law of
noncontradiction implies that 'A cannot be non-A', where 'non-A'
is something that is not A, or some part or property of A."
[Ibid.]

Here, the
letter "A"
oscillates between predicative and naming roles (it seems), and if so, the LEM as stated above cannot be
correct. [Even Aristotle saw through that one!]

[Nevertheless, as with most topics in
logic, things are not quite so simple. We need to distinguish between sentential
negation (i.e., "not p"), predicate negation (i.e., "not F") and
predicate-term negation (i.e., "not-F" or "non-F"). It is unclear which
form Lawler intends to use in the above passage (but his indiscriminate
employment of "not A" and "not-A" suggests he is either unaware of this
distinction, or he considers it unimportant -- the same unfortunately seems to
be true of Hegel and his many groupies), so I have not dwelt on this difference
in this Essay (nor on its alleged double negated form --, as in
"non-non-F"). This topic will, however, loom large in Essay Twelve, where the
deleterious effects of suicidally sloppy syntax like this will be exposed.

More details on this distinction can be found in Horn (1989) and Wansing
(2001).]

This
(new) third version of the LOC (repeated below) fares
no better. What exactly this 'law'has
to do with what an object can or cannot be is entirely unclear, since that
'law'
(in its simplest form)
merely concerns the truth-functional connection between a proposition and its
negation.

If the "A"
in the above passage were a predicate expression or property token (as the latter part of the last sentence
in the quoted passage reproduced below clearly indicates) this version of the LOC could only be interpreted,
for example, as "…is
red" cannot be "…is
non-red" (if viewed traditionally --, but as "ξ is
red" cannot be "ξ
is non-red", otherwise).

"The
principle of excluded middle is that something must either be A or not be
A: there is no third possibility. By extension, the law of
noncontradiction implies that 'A cannot be non-A', where 'non-A'
is something that is not A, or some part or property of A."
[Ibid. Bold emphasis added.]

As we saw earlier, this would only be
'true'
if these expressions were interpreted as names (or objects?), and not as
predicate expressions or properties -- or, perhaps, as the names of whatever
predicates allegedly designate.

And in
that case, Lawler's "A cannot be non-A" would yield "C
cannot be D". This is because Lawler
clearly sees these "A"s here as the names of properties (and if these are
expressed as predicate expressions, then the latter will become names once
more). So using "C" for the name of
whatever "...is red" is supposed to stand for, and "D" for
whatever "...is non-red" is supposed to designate, we obtain "C
cannot be D". And that is because,
"...is red" must name something different from "...is non-red".

Of course, this will be so unless "…is
red" is viewed as the same name (say "E")
as "…is non-red"
(also "E").
If so, Lawler's 'definition' would become "E
cannot be E"!

Either way, we hit yet
another brick wall, hence
it is impossible to make sense of what Lawler is trying to say here.

[This is because Lawler's 'definition' tried to relate a term to
its negated 'other', but his own (sloppy) syntax prevents this. The reader will note that at the beginning of
this passage, "A" is a predicate letter, but by the end it has become a name!
That is clear from Lawler's own paraphrase: "where
'non-A'
is something that is not A, or some part or property of A."This is the confusion I have tried to highlight above.]

Now, there
might be a way of reading these predicate expressions that allows them to be
grafted into the LEM in the way Lawler imagines; I cannot say since he does not
say. [And no one else has.]

Moreover, when Lawler says that "non-A is something that is not
A", it is unclear what he means. It seems it might be either:

P1: Non-A is not A,

or:

P2: Non-A is B which is not A.

Where B is the "something" that is not A. But Lawler immediately
qualifies this by saying that "non-A" is "something that is not A, or some
part or property of A". In which case he might mean:

P3: Non-A is not some part or property of A,

or perhaps:

P4: Non-A is some part or property of A.

It is impossible to decide which of these represents his view.
And this lack of clarity is, once again, a direct result of the impoverished
conceptual and logical tools Hegel passed on to the unfortunates who look to him
for inspiration.

So, as
things stand, this 'logical'
sow's ear cannot be
made even into a plastic purse, whatever is done with it.

Now Lawler
moves on to consider several other dark sayings he rescued from Hegel's
Manichean
Mausoleum:

"Recognition
that the principle of noncontradiction is the principle of identity stated
negatively, or is implied in the principle of identity, is central to Hegel's
dialectical analysis." [Ibid., p.19.]

If so,
Hegel's
analysis is a non-starter, since it can only 'work' if propositions, predicates
and objects are confused one with another, as we have seen. This means that we can only make
sense of 'dialectical
contradictions' if we
pretend that the denotation of words and letters does not matter. In which case,
we should openly remove the word "logic" from its already precarious presence in
Hegel's corpus, and rename it perhaps "Dialectical
Licence".

However,
Lawler continues:

"Hegel's main
objective is to show an integral connection between A and not-A,
or, in categorical terms, between 'identity' and what is supposed to be the
contradictory of identity, 'difference.' Hegel approaches this objective by
considering the claim that 'identity' is 'held aloof from difference.' This is
the claim that 'identity' is a concept that stands by itself and does not
require its opposite or contradictory, 'difference,' in order to acquire its
meaning." [Ibid., p.20. Italic emphases in the original.]

But why do
we need to refer to "difference"
in order to speak of, or give meaning to, "identity"?
More to the point, why do we have to nominalise relational expressions in
the first place?

As we saw in Essay Three
Part One, this was an
inept trick the ancient Greeks tried to pull: nominalise anything and everything
in sight. In fact, they had to do this to try to make their a priori'theories'
work (and this in turn was prosecuted for ideological reasons, explored in Essay Twelve (summary
here)).

The problem is that this move
changes propositions into lists, which destroys their capacity to say anything at all.
[Why that is so is demonstrated
here.] Any 'contradiction',
or, indeed, conclusion that 'follows' from this Stone Age segue is thus entirely
bogus, since nothing can legitimately follow from a named abstract object like "identity".
[Conclusions can only follow from propositions, or clauses.]

Well,
perhaps Hegel meant that the practice of referring to identity statements
tended to exclude those that expressed difference; in other words, he was merely
speaking elliptically about one or both.

If so, this
still
won't work since there is no such
thing as Identity (i.e., it is not an object,
but a relation), and yet it is
quite
plain that both Hegel and Lawler need this 'abstraction'
to be an object so that it can serve as the denotation of those
annoyingly plastic letter
"A"s
we met earlier.
However, if identity isn't an object
(abstract or otherwise), then neither of these two can
extract a contradiction from eventheir idiosyncratic version of the
LOI:

"Hegel's main
objective is to show an integral connection between A and not-A,
or, in categorical terms, between 'identity' and what is supposed to be the
contradictory of identity, 'difference.'" [Ibid.]

Here,
plainly, "A"
stands for "identity"
and "not-A"
for
"difference".
But, once again, we see that it is only sloppy syntax that allows this argument
to gain even so much as a pretend toehold. If so, and without it, no contradiction can follow, as we
have seen.

The
problems this now creates for Lawler's
interpretation of Hegel become clearer if we consider the latter half of the
passage quoted earlier, along with what follows:

"Hegel
approaches this objective by considering the claim that 'identity' is 'held
aloof from difference.'
This is the claim that 'identity' is a concept that stands by itself and does
not require its opposite or contradictory, 'difference,' in order to acquire its
meaning. This is also the claim that the identity of something can be determined
without contrast to something that is not the thing we wish to define." [Ibid,
p.20.]

Here
identity is many things all at once: a property (as in "identity
of something"), a concept (as in "'identity'
is a concept"), a word (as in "in
order to acquire its meaning") as well as an
object (as in "'identity'
is 'held aloof…'").
So it is no wonder that Hegel can derive all sorts of 'interesting' results from
logical goulash of this (in)consistency. But there is more:

"According to
this 'philosophy of abstract identity,' meanings and objects (including
processes, relations, etc.) are independently identifiable, standing on their
own, atomistically. Against this claim, Hegel argues that it is impossible to
say what one means by identity without bringing into the definition what it as
supposed to exclude, namely difference." [Ibid., p.20.]

However, if
this is correct, and if Hegel were the genius we have been led to believe, he
should have pointed out what seems obvious to his straw opponents: 'abstract
identity' can only be
conjured into existence if relational expressions are changed into names (in a
way that is analogous to the linguistic atomism found in the theories of those
he was criticising).

How could he possibly have missed this obvious response?

[Hint: Hegel
was a logical incompetent.]

Insults
aside, can any sense be made of this?

Not much, it seems, since the whole topic
(indeed, the whole of Hegel's work) is a direct result of a crass misuse of language,
on a grand scale, and nothing less.

And, of
course, it is possible to identify something (in the sense of the LOI) without
having to involve "difference". Consider the following:

Of course, someone could argue
that all four of the above nonetheless involve "difference", but that would be to misread what they
actually say.

[1] says: "Any two objects are identical if and only if
they share the same properties", -- or, "…whatever is true of one is true of the
other". No mention, or hint, of "difference" (and what they say is
hypothetical): it sets conditions on objects being the same, not different. The
same applies to the others (they were all translated
here).

Moreover,
it is worth noting that here Hegel (and perhaps Lawler) slides between two uses of
the
word "identity/identify" -- that is, between (1) this word when it is used to provide an empty
(or perhaps significant)
identity statement for any given object, and (2) when it is used in relation the
capacity most of us have of being able to identify (in the
sense of being able to pick out, or to recognise perhaps) a person,
property, process or
object.

If, say,
squaddie NN is asked whether or not he can identify Osama bin Laden in a line-up,
and he replies, "Osama
is identical to Osama", he would risk being
put on a charge. On the other hand, if he pointed to one of the suspects and
said, "That's
him!", he would not.

Naturally, the latter use
could in some circumstances involve the capacity to
differentiate among objects, but this is not necessarily so in every case (as was pointed out
here).

By
conflating these two senses, Hegel demonstrated he was even more confused than this dim squaddie. Lawler might
well be advised,
therefore,
to resign as his defence counsel.

[Admittedly, there are three uses of this word (indeed, in ordinary language,
there are countless -- on this see
here), the third
being found in more 'philosophical' contexts, connected with an attempt
to provide a comprehensive description
of a substance, a là
Leibniz.]

Of course,
to do the former (i.e., (1) above) we do not need to refer,
or
allude to --, or even so much as vaguely hint at --, 'difference'.
However, in order to do the latter (i.e., (2) above), an ability to tell one object/human
being from another clearly helps. But
the two skills (if such they may be called) are not at all the same (irony
intended).

So, it
looks like this Hegelian wild-goose chase can only get started if we are
prepared to become
linguistic philistines, or if we confuse our capacity to construct empty (or
significant) identity statements
with our ability to identify friends, relatives and/or suspects.

Surely this is philosophy for absolute idiots, not just Idealists!

Lawler now
inflicts more of the same on his readers:

"In fact,
Hegel replies, when we want to identify something we assert in the predicate
something different from what is in the subject. The subject of a proposition is
in itself something (relatively) undifferentiated or unspecific and real
thinking does not consist in simply repeating this." [Ibid., p.20.
Italic emphasis in the original.]

We have
already seen that since 'subjects'
(I assume Lawler means names here, or some other singular designating expression)
assert nothing (and neither can we assert anything merely with a name, or
other singular
term), then the use of predicates can assert nothing different from the use of
names (or other singular terms).There can be no difference in
assertibility protocols if only one of these is capable of asserting anything,
or of being used in this way. [All this was argued in detail in Essay Three
Part One.]

Of course, and by default, it
could be argued that this does in fact represent a 'difference': one of these
can be used to assert something while the other cannot -- so, there is a difference.

This is undeniable, but
it is not Hegel's argument. And even if it were, it would have nothing to do
with the alleged identity between a predicate and a subject term. The latter was
based on the identity and difference that supposedly exists between the two
halves of a proposition ('subject' and 'predicate'), which are said both to assert the same thing
and also something different from each other. But, since, only one is capable of
asserting anything, we cannot even derive an 'identity' here, never mind a
'difference'.

It is hard to credit this to a leading Philosopher (one whom many
regard as among the greatest ever), but if Hegel's argument did indeed depend on the supposed physical or
phenomenological differences between subject and predicate terms, it would
plainly have been based on the rather crass confusion noted above -- in that it would have run
together identity with being able to identify, and difference (i.e., lack
of identity) and difference (being distinguishable from). These are not at all
the same, and do not always depend upon each other, as noted above. [More on
this in
Essay Six.]

We also saw
earlier, that
predicates need not be physically different from 'subjects' (nor even temporally
divorced from them); so this 'argument'
is hopeless from beginning to end.

Once again,
it is quite clear that it is only by blurring the distinction between subject
and predicate expressions that this slip-shod logic is allowed even to limp
badly along.

"Moreover,
the defense of the theory of abstract unrelated identity leads proponents of
such a theory unwittingly to assert the contrary of their original position.
They must say that identity and difference are…different. Or, Hegel
dialectically goads his opponents: identity is different…from difference. In
this proposition identity has been 'identified' with difference, or difference
is regarded as a property of identity. So much for 'identity held aloof from
difference,' Hegel concludes." [Ibid., p.20.]

But, Lawler
should have pointed out that this dialectically-benighted Hegelian riposte only works if the identity relation is nominalised, and turned into the name of
an abstract particular (and the alleged contrast (or comparison) with "difference"
is modelled on that which might or might not exist between two objects).

Now, even
though Lawler (and as far as I can determine, Hegel) did not identify (no irony
intended) the 'simpletons' criticised here, it is quite easy to see
what 'they'
should have said in return, to prove they were more than a match for both:

"Mock all you
like, Herr Hegel/Lawler, your 'argument' only works because you talk as if you think identity is not a
relation, but an object, or a name of an object. Now, this is about as crass as
thinking that if someone were to say, '99 is nearly the same as 100' and '999,
999 is nearly the same as 1,000, 000', and that since 'nearly the same' names the
same object in both cases (i.e., 'nearly the sameness', or perhaps 'approximate identity') '99 is
thus nearly the same as 1,000, 000'. If the relational term 'nearly the same' names
the same abstract entity each time (as it must, given your crazy 'theory'),
then we would be able to argue that any two numbers you care to mention (no matter how far apart they
were on the number line) are nearly the same!"

As seems plain, this
dialectically-annoying riposte is effective only because it makes hay of Hegel's dim-witted confusion of
relational terms with singular designating expressions, or, indeed, with
abstract particulars, and/or the names thereof --, a trick, of course, he learnt from
Ancient
Greek mystics.

In fact,
this manoeuvre does not just relate to, but helped create the empty
Idealist flap over 'Subject/Object identity', which was the main problematic of
German Idealism.
In that case, if names and predicates are both objects (or they designate them), then their
identity (or lack of it) naturally becomes a 'problem'. But, if it is only names
that actually name
things --, whereas predicates merely describe the objects so named --, then
the many centuries devoted to solving this bogus 'problem' can be seen for what they are:
a
monumental waste of time. Naturally, this consigns several thousand works (and
tens of thousands of commentaries on such works) to the dustbin of history'; and
good riddance, too.

Indeed, we will see later (in Essay Twelve Part
Six) that this doctrine originated in ancient Greek ideas concerning
'non-propositional' thought (in Aristotle and
Plotinus,
for example), and the relation of the mystical knower to the Hermetic unknown.
It is this ancient doctrine that lies behind all the nominalisations we have
seen, and the
Identity Theory of Predication Hegel was taught and which he
neededto make his 'theory' work.

[On the Greek end of this sorry tale, see the
Owen (1966) -- particularly, pp.207-11 (i.e., of the 1986 version) --, Sorabji (2005), pp.90-93, Sorabji
(1982), and
Alfino (1988). On the Identity Theory of Predication, see
here.]

[A deep
and wide puddle of Metaphysics condensed
from a cloudy use of grammar, to
paraphrase Wittgenstein.]

In that
case, Marx did not go far enough: ruling ideas do not just rule such minds, they
ruin them.

Hence,
Lawler's
conclusion:

"Irrespective
of the validity of this argument (sic), it is clear that Hegel maintains that
the defenders of the concept of abstract identity, or identity unrelated to
difference, become prey to a logical self-contradiction, by affirming
difference of identity, while at the same time trying to deny this." [Ibid.,
p.20. Italic emphasis in the original.]

is so wide of
the mark it is lodged in the next star system.

Now, Hegel
(or one of his groupies) can
maintain the above doctrines until the cows evolve, for all the good it will do him
(them). Only those
stupid enough to fall for the systematic nominalisation of relational expressions will
be embarrassed by the 'simpleton's' response,
recorded earlier.

This sorry
tale continues:

"Hegel points
to another inconsistency to which defenders of the position of abstract identity
are subject. Putting the concept of identity into practical application, as it
is interpreted by abstract understanding, we are compelled to say that a cow is
a cow, a man is man, white is white, spirit is spirit, etc. In attempting to
express the principle of identity according to the spirit of abstract
understanding, we end up paradoxically speaking of an endless number of
different things. The category of difference asserts its right to exist despite
the intent to banish it -- which Hegel attributes to his opponents -- and the
two categories appear in a peculiar relationship in the cognate category of
'diversity.'" [Ibid., pp.20-21. Italic emphasis in the original.]

This is no
better; if anything, it is worse. Exactly who would want to
"banish"
difference is unclear (how they would manage to pull this trick off is even less
obvious -- take out a court order, perhaps?).

Nevertheless, such
conveniently fictional characters need not bother us for now.
What is more worrying is the uncritical way in which Lawler accepts this lamentable
'argument'.
Quite apart from the odd examples of identity Lawler quotes (for instance, his "white is white" can
only work once more by nominalising the predicate "ξ
is white", so that "white" is treated as
the name of an
abstract particular), the alleged diversity involved is no argument for
the existence of the other nominalised entity in this mutant couplet, "difference"
--,
which is a creature of Hegel's own fevered
imagination.

The
most that can be concluded from this latest example of devilishly Diabolical Logic is that the five
examples given above are all different from one another. How "difference"
(i.e., this abstract particular) can be conjured out of that banal observation,
Lawler (and still less Hegel) neglected to say.

[As noted in
Essay Six (more specifically
here) it looks like modern
logicians are at last taking a hard look at the complexities in our use of words like
"diverse", "same but distinct", "identical but not the same".
(Examples of these
were given in that Essay). On this see Sanford (2005). One thing is reasonably
clear, few, if any, will be consulting Hegel's badly misnamed books on this subject in
order to learn anything in this regard -- except, perhaps, how not to
approach the entire subject.]

But, let us
assume that an abstract 'entity'
--
named by the word
"difference"
--,
does indeed exist. If so, it must be a particular of some sort, which
means that the
word in question cannot be a
general term, but a singular designating expression. In that case, it can tell us nothing about the many and diverse relations
that exist in the material world. So, even if Hegel were right, we would not need
to appeal to this 'entity' (indeed, we would be wise to ignore it) in
order to understand how to make identity statements, if ever we do.

So, we hit
the same annoying, material/syntactical brick wall every time. Once particularised
(a
là traditional logic/metaphysics), words like "Identity"
and "Difference"
lose all contact with their original meanings, and thus cease to have a meaning
(since they no longer function as relational expressions).

From here,
Lawler's
attempt to clarify the meaning of the fog-bound phrase 'dialectical
contradictions' only
succeeds in lobbing a few more smoke bombs at it:

"'A is
A' implies that A is not some other entity which is not-A.
Thus a peculiar negative relation to not-A is implicitly asserted in the
principle of identity and in the expression 'A is A.' It is easy
enough to say that this is only a negative relation and to interpret the concept
of negative relation as meaning no relation at all. If, however, it is a
relation without which it it (sic; "is"? RL) impossible to establish the identity of A
(any definite being or concept at all), then it cannot be 'nothing at all.'
'Abstract understanding' does not probe seriously into this problem, and in the
abstract, undialectical understanding of identity, the relation of A to not-A
(beings that are not A as well as A's own nonbeing) seems to 'vanish.'" [Ibid.
p.22. Italic emphases in the original.]

As we have
seen, if this is an implication, then the required relation can only be
forged out of it if the propositions involved it are nominalised. But,
once
that is done, no
inference is possible; objects do not and cannot imply other objects, and
neither can nominalised expressions.

But, is it really the case that "'A is
A' implies that A is not some other entity which is not-A"
as Lawler says? Well, "A is A" does not in fact imply that A not also not-A;
hence it could be the case that even while "A is A", A could also be B (which is
not-A).

Taking
an example of Lawler's: while it is true that "a cow is a cow" -- "A is A" -- ii
is also true that "a cow is brown" -- "A is B" --, even while it is also true
that "brown is not a cow" -- "B is not-A".

Now, it is little use dialecticians objecting to
the syntactic 'looseness' of this counter-example, for the "A"s they use are
subject to no little dialectical double-dealing of their own. Hence,
dialecticians have no more right to complain about sloppy syntax when it used
against them that George W Bush has a right to moan about "terrism".
Consequently, if this counter-example is to be ruled out on syntactic grounds,
then much of Lawler's (and hence Hegel's) argument must go with it.

In that
case, if it
is indeed true that "abstract understanding"
ignores this 'problem',
it would be well-advised to continue doing so -- for there isn't
one.

"Looking one
step further into this matter, Hegel suggests that the relation of A to
not-A is doubly negative. Identity is established (not immediately given)
through a negative relation to not-A. A is itself in not being
not-A. But this negative relation to not-A is itself negated. That
is, the identity of A does not consist solely in its being not-A,
there is a 'return' to A again -- which Hegel calls 'reflection.' Thus 'A
is A' is not a tautologous (sic) repetition of A (as 'abstract
understanding' would have it) but an affirmation that has been made possible
only through a doubly negative movement, a 'negation of the negation.'" [Ibid.,
p.22. Italic emphases in the original.]

Once more,
these 'inferences'
only work if they are expressed propositionally, whereas the relations
they express only
apply if they are not.

However, as we have just seen, there is no
"negative relation" of A to not-A, and that means that it is not the case that
"A is itself in not being
not-A".
The whole passage is thus about a genuine as one of
George Brown's smiles.

In that case, the NON
here is just as fabulous a beast as the
Jabberwocky ever was.
Hence, if
the NON works, it
cannot apply to negation, and if it applies to negation, it cannot work.

We are now
in a position to see just how Lawler employs the results of thee above examples of reconstructive
linguistic-surgery, as he
turns to Hegel's
use of contradictions, beginning with a consideration of
Zeno's
paradox of motion:

"Hegel's
statement is made in response to Zeno's famous paradox. Zeno's paradox,
according to Hegel, is that since motion involves both A and not-A,
and since this violates the principle of noncontradiction, it follows that
motion is impossible. What should probably be called 'Hegel's paradox' is the
assertion that since motion occurs, there must in some sense both
the A and not-A of Zeno's position. It is clear that this
assertion cannot be taken in the sense of a strict contradiction. Not-A in a
purely formal sense means only the denial of A, and is compatible with
saying that the object is both 'here' and 'anywhere else,' perhaps also on the
moon. Not-A can also mean the simple denial of 'here' -– an assertion
that clearly leaves us nowhere….

"…Hegel's
line of thought here is similar to his approach to the problem of 'abstract
identity' or 'identity held aloof from difference.' The paradox arises if we
begin with an abstract notion of place, a 'here' which is totally discrete and
unrelated to any other place. The common-sense definition of motion as 'change
of place' or as a passage of an object through a succession of places runs into
insuperable intellectual difficulties if 'place' is understood in this manner.
For one thing 'place' is defined as 'fixed place,' i.e., as motionless place.
Can motion be explained in terms of a concept which excluded motion? On the
other hand, it does not seem possible to eliminate some notion of definite place
from our concept of motion, but such a notion must be that of a 'relative
place,' a place which is both 'here' and 'there' or, paradoxically, 'here' and
'not-here.'" [Ibid., pp.28-29. Italic emphases in the original.]

But, this is of no use at
all in
helping anyone understand the term "dialectical contradiction" since Zeno's
'paradox' is no paradox, as we saw in Essay Five (or, rather, it is only a
paradox for those Idealists who are determined to think and speak like linguistic Philistines).

Perhaps
this is too hasty?

"The solution
to the paradox, which is expressed in the form of a logical contradiction, is
the 'dialectical contradiction.' Thus in the case of motion the logical
contradiction arises for the 'natural' mode of thought, based on common sense…,
that argues 'either continuity or discontinuity.' Since place is classified as
an instance of discontinuity, while movement implies continuity, the notion of
motion as 'change of place' leads to a logical contradiction and to Zeno's
paradox. The dialectical solution involves the recognition of the relative
nature of the basic categories involved in thinking about motion as 'change of
place.' Motion must be understood as involving a 'unity of opposites,'
'discontinuity' which is relative to 'continuity' (or, perhaps, space that is
relative to time)." [Ibid., p.29.]

Here, the
terminally unclear (i.e., "dialectical
contradiction") is explained by means of the
hopelessly obscure (i.e., "unity of opposites").

Nevertheless, at the risk of further annoying those who are
even now content to stumble about in
this Hermetic
Haze, this alleged 'unity' can only be cobbled-together if the predicates "ξ
is continuous" and "ξ
is discontinuous" are nominalised once
more
into "continuity"
and "discontinuity".
Only then can these abstract particulars be put in any sort of relation with one
another. But as soon as that is done, these 'terms'
either
cease to be predicates, or they are no longer general (depending, of
course, on how this Hegelian fairy tale is finally unwound -- that is, whether it is interpreted as applying to 'things'
or to the names of 'things').

[It is worth pointing out here that I am not
arguing that nothing should be nominalised, only that once this has been done, the
logic of such terms changes dramatically. Traditional theorists in general
ignored this glaringly obvious fact.]

As we noted
in Essay Three Part
One, this remarkable a priori'truth' is such solely because Hegel's system depends on a
methodology derived from an ancient
ruling-class tradition, one which mangles ordinary material language in order to
concoct such 'interesting' results. [On this, see
here.]

Lawler then
notes that Hegel's
analysis of
'dialectical contradictions'
begins from the 'commonsense'
view of motion and place, and proceeds from there. He adds that it is not
relevant to argue that modern definitions of motion are more precise --
or rather, that this would be an effective response if it could be shown that:

"(1)…there
was no valid use of the common-sense categories of place and motion from which
the paradox arises; and (2) that no new paradoxes arise from the categories
involved in more advanced mathematical interpretations of motion." [Ibid.,
p.30.]

But, (1) above
does not apply, since ordinary language does not collapse into paradox -– that
is, not unless it is twisted out of shape, a là Hegel, or a là
Zeno -- as we saw was the case in
Essay Five. And (2) only applies if
the terminology that mathematicians use is twisted in like manner, and
functional expressions are
transmogrified, for example, into the names of 'categories',
i.e., abstract particulars once more.

Now, as we
approach the seemingly impossible goal -- that of trying to find some sense in
the phrase "dialectical contradiction"
-- Lawler confronts those who think that Hegel:

"…illicitly
passed from the fact that an object relates to some other object, and the
consequent need to include this relation to another object in either the
definition or the description of the first object, to a theory that the being
of the first object includes the being of the second. And if the second
is something that is not-A, the definition of the relating being should
be expressed in the logically contradictory form, 'A and not-A.'"
[Ibid., p.32. Italic emphases in the original.]

Well, how
does Lawler answer the query about this non-contradiction?

[Indeed, that is
what
"A
and not-A" is -- a non-contradiction --, unless,
that is, "A"
is no longer an object, or name of an object, but a proposition, and as such is
in no relation to anything, since propositions are not objects, nor yet the
names of objects.]

He does so as follows:

"One might
readily grant that the definition of A includes A's relating to
something that is not A (some non-A which is not-A). This
does not mean that non-A or what is not-A is a part of A or
part of A's identity. Such a position would lead to regarding all
interacting beings as constituting essentially one being. Only the relation of
non-A (not-A) seems to be a property of A -- not non-A
or not-A itself. Hegel clearly wants to claim more than this…. Despite
Hegel's detailed critique of this category, critics commonly persist in
interpreting dialectical contradiction as the assertion of the undialectical
identity of A and not-A." [Ibid., p.32. Italic
emphases in the original.]

We note once again that
none of this works without the Hegelian/traditional confusion of relations, properties,
names, predicates and propositions.

[And, while we are at it,
what exactly is the difference between "not A" and "not-A"
(or even "non-A")? If the first "not"
is (or stands for) a sentence forming operator (which maps a sentence onto its
'negation'), we are surely on firmer ground. But, that cannot be the case with
"not-A", which Lawler clearly sees as an object of some sort --, an
"entity" --, but which "entity" he also regards somehow as the same as "not A".
This
unfortunately now means that the latter "not"
cannot be a sentence forming operator as was supposed. In fact, and to be
honest, one suspects that Lawler has confused a sentential use of these letter
"A"s with a
phrasal (or predicate term) operator -- or worse, he sees no problem with sliding effortlessly between the two.
However, on this see here.]

Now, Lawler rejects the
open insertion of "not-A" for "A" (which, if correct, as we saw in Essay Four
(here), would in fact be bad
news for Diabolical Logicians) with an obscure quotation from Hegel that seems
devoid of earthly sense (omitted here, to help
conserve the reader's sanity), but he then goes on to
say:

"If we grant
that A's identity involves its necessary relation to what is not-A,
and that this not-A is 'its own other' -- a definite other being and not
any being whatsoever -- and that this relation to some definite other is
necessary for the existence of A or is essential to the constitution of A
(A's identity) it seems reasonable to look for some 'imprint' of this
'other' in A, so that in some sense not-A is internally constitutive
of A. The internal structure of an entity should be investigated, according
to this schema, not as something that stands alone, in isolation, but as
'reflecting' in various forms its necessary relations to its environment. In
other words, to understand the internal nature of A it is necessary to
study the determinate not-A not only as a necessary external condition
but as 'reflected' in A. This is not to say that one should expect to
find in A some direct or immediate duplication of not-A. The
direct identity of A and not-A would constitute the annihilation
of the beings involved. Short of this 'abstract identity.' However, the
dialectical theory of the unity of identity and difference suggests a different
general schema for understanding things in their necessary relations. A
is not to be conceived of as already formed, but as coming into being through
its relation to not-A. The necessary relation of A to not-A
is thus 'internal' to the constitution of A and should be regarded as
necessarily reflected in A's identity." [Ibid., pp.32-33. Italic
emphases in the original.]

Even so,
is there any evidence that nature itself sees things this way? Lawler thinks there
is:

"...At any
rate, it seems obvious that living beings, which are normally contrasted with
nonliving beings, are nevertheless internally composed of non-living elements,
transform nonliving sources of energy into living forms and break down
ultimately into nonliving components." [Ibid., p.33.]

Now, as we saw in Essay
Seven,
this example of homespun neo-Romantic pseudo-science won't work; there is no
intrinsic difference between living and non-living matter, so the alleged
contrast is bogus. In fact, the above is more an expression of the obscure ideas
found in mystical
vitalism
(which was current in Hegel's day) than it is an
accurate reflection of living things themselves.

And what should we say of
lifeless matter as it was before life evolved? Then there was nothing with which it
could be 'contrasted'. Did that mean lifeless matter had no 'identity'? Did it gain
an 'identity' only when the first living things evolved?
In that case, was life
bound to evolve, just to help identify, or provide an 'identity' for, non-living things?
Indeed, does this classic example of
a priori superscience mean that life in the universe cannot (logically
cannot) ever cease --, otherwise lifeless matter will once again lose its
'identity'?

Taking this a step further,
should we not now postulate the existence of non-material beings
(spirits) to help identify material beings? Surely, on this view, 'spirit
matter' must
exist somewhere if all things, including matter, are to have an
'identity' only in and because of an "other"? Have we not now found a perfect argument
for the existence of 'God'?

And we had better not ask
what the "other" of the universe is. [To be sure, Hegel thought he had an answer to
this, but the hot air will be let out of that metaphysical balloon in Essay Twelve.]

Perhaps we need to
understand 'dialectical negation' a little better, so that the above materialist
impertinences can be ruled out? Lawler is ready to help:

"The crucial
issue does not seem to be how necessary relations to specific entities involve
some form of 'reflection' of the 'other' in the relating entity. It is the
problem of understanding this necessary relation and internal constituting
activity as one involving negativity. This is the respect in which 'interaction'
becomes 'contradiction.'" [Ibid. p.35.]

At last we are beginning
to see a little less darkness at the end of the
stygian tunnel, for now we are
in a position to
understand how "negativity" and "interaction" relate to those elusive
'dialectical contradictions':

"It is one
thing to say that to understand organic processes one must understand their
systematic connection with and 'internalization' of inorganic processes, and
another thing to argue that this relationship involves opposition or
'contradiction.' Starting with a picture of the world as consisting of
'diversity' -- the juxtaposition of A and indifferent non-A's --
Hegel attempts to arrive at a view of interconnecting beings in which the
negativity reflected in our mental distinctions, contrasts and comparisons is
regarded as a real feature of the entities themselves." [Ibid., p.35.
Italic emphases in the original.]

Maybe so, but it would
have been an even better idea if Hegel had made a more concerted attempt to
review how we
actually speak about medium sized dry goods and the like (indeed, as he himself must have spoken
about them in
his day-to-day affairs), instead of imposing on 'thought' a form which is really only
of interest to members of the ruling-class and their hangers-on.

Well, maybe not Hegel, but certainly
Lawler should.

Except, had Hegel
done this he would not have been able to spin any of his notoriously convoluted dialectical fairy
tales, since
ordinary speakers do not confuse predicate expressions with 'beings', sentences
with objects, objects with relations, and "not" with 'negativity', in
their everyday use of language.

And even if
they did (but on this see
here), that would have ontological implications only for Idealists.

"In the first
place, negation cannot be understood in the formal sense, according to which the
existence of some entity implies the nonexistence, pure and simple, of another."
[Ibid., p.35.]

The ripe
old fun we had at the expense of assorted LCDs (in Essay
Four) was perhaps too hard only on
them, for here we see an HCD like Lawler make all the same old
sophomoric
errors.

What the dialectics has
"formal" negation got to do with any of this? Precisely
which non-existence of what entities does the following imply: "Blair owns a copy of
Hegel's Logic" and "Blair does not own a copy of Hegel's Logic"?

Would that it were that it was that easy to consign Hegel's confused book to logical limbo!

And even if
two contradictory sentences could be found that did imply that something or other did not exist, what
would that have to do with
formal negation in general, as opposed to a particular instance of it?

Of course, actual negation is very complex -- on this see
Horn (1989) -- but formal negation is the result either of the use of a
sentence-forming or
phrase-forming operator. That is it! Anything else ain't formal negation,
howsoever much this 'anything else' might seem to allow this virulent strain of
Hermetic Herpes to
grow further in size.

Lawler
continues:

"And yet
intuitively we recognize in real life some entities do destroy others, or less
radically, they 'clash,' collide or struggle. It is common to regard such
practical negativity as external or accidental to the nature of the entity or
entities involved.... To place negativity within the framework of necessarily
related beings, however, it is necessary to conceptualise negativity differently
and paradoxically. It is necessary to say that the negative or destructive
tendency is not extrinsic to the connections that positively constitute the
beings involved, but are (also) intrinsic to that constitution. The negativity
is not an unfortunate by-product, which one might possible eliminate, of the
positive relations necessary for the things development. It is intrinsic to that
positive connection." [Ibid., pp.35-36.]

There are so many things
here that Lawler just takes for granted he stands in danger of being indicted on
a conceptual robbery charge.

What has a "clash" got to do with 'negativity', or even
with negation? And what has 'intuition' got to do with recognising the destructive
aspects of nature? And why do we have to agree that the latter aren't
external (extrinsic), but are internal (intrinsic)? All are given here
(by Lawler) are a few
manufactured terms-of-art that he (following Hegel) says mean that
objects are related to their significant "others" in a quirky sort of way. On
examination, all this turns out to be based on a motley collection of transmogrified words with an
ill-defined "not" attached to them, and nothing more. So, apart from an appeal to yet more sloppy logic, there is nothing to indicate that 'internal relations' are any
more real than
gryphons and harpies.

Perhaps because he
recognises the bogus nature of this alleged 'necessity', Lawler now retreats
into the subjunctive mood:

"However,
such dialectical negation may nevertheless be real and the dialectical
negativity characteristic of certain thought processes may also characterise
extra-mental processes." [Ibid., p.36.]

But, the "dialectical
negativity" of "certain thought processes" is a genuine as a thirteen dollar
bill. So, unless the physical world is itself as logically-challenged as
this passage clearly is,
'innovative' reasoning of this sort will find no correlate in nature. [Perhaps
Lawler has access to the missing
container-loads of
data (that went 'walk-about' soon after Lenin made similar, but even more grandiose
claims several generations ago) which 'support' such hyper-bold claims?]

Well, here it is;
here is the missing 'evidence' -- and, surprise, surprise, it is just as
watery-thin as the 'data' produced in support of the Mickey
Mouse dialectical superscience we met in Essay Seven, scraped-together
by the aforementioned, conceptually-benighted LCDs:

"Thus
we intuit a negative side to the relation of living beings to he non-living
environment. Gravitational, electromagnetic, geological, meteorological, solar,
etc. forces constitute obstacles to the development of life as well as necessary
conditions. The fact that certain optimal conditions of inorganic processes are
required for life to evolve does not mean that the negative forces which
otherwise would have prevented the appearance of life have simply ceased to
exist. Rather, the optimal conditions permit them to be 'surmounted' or
'overcome,' but not eliminated. Moreover, this 'surmounting' of the negative
life-destroying forces of the environment is intrinsic to the development of
life. Life can only develop by 'repelling' the negative forces of its
environment -- by 'negating its negation.'" [Ibid., p.36.]

We have already seen in
this Essay that this way of depicting forces does not work, howsoever
they are sliced, diced or re-heated. But, flowery languageaside, the forces at
work here are all manifestly external; there are no internal relations (except,
of course, those conjured into existence by Hegelian
Hocus Pocus, once more).

And,
like it or not, life arose because of the operation of material/causal factors at
work in nature, not
logical principles inherent in Hegel's concepts.

But what, we might ask,
has become of all that earlier talk about those eternally-plastic letter "A"s, which
were said to have one and only one "other"?

"A's
identity involves its necessary relation to what is not-A, and that this
not-A is 'its own other' -- a definite other being and not any being
whatsoever -- and that this relation to some definite other is necessary for the
existence of A or is essential to the constitution of A (A's
identity)…." [Ibid. p.32. Italic emphases in the original.]

But, here we are confronted by "forces" (plural) that oppose life. So life, it seems, is exempt from that
earlier Hegelian caveat in that it appears to have hundreds, if not thousands
of "others". Of course, this depends on how we count forces. [Is, for example,
each molecule of, say, Carbon Monoxide, or Ozone an opposing force? Or do they
work in gangs? (Perhaps they have a Union?)]

We must not expect answers to such
questions; this is Mickey
Mousea priori superscience, after all.

But, Lawler has an
answer:

"For
the same reasons that we argued for the 'imprint' of the 'other' in an entity
chosen for study, we should expect to find an imprint within the entity of this
opposition that exists between entities. For example, the internal process of
growth is opposed by excessive heat -- a physical or inorganic force. Growth
must surmount this force which tends to inhibit or suppress growth.
Extreme temperatures would prevent life altogether. At the same time, growth is
dependent upon heat. Systems of temperature self-regulation develop whereby the
negative effects of heat are, within limits, negated while the positive effects
are absorbed." [Ibid. p.36.]

And yet, what has happened to
those 'imprints' we met earlier? Where is heat itself (not its regulation)
'imprinted' in a cell?
And, where are cells 'imprinted' in heat? Or does the 'imprinting' only
work one way?
And where is the 'cell regulation force' inside heat? And what happened to
heat's own "other": cold?

Of course, heat is not a
force; it is in such contexts merely a shorthand for the energy with which
certain molecules have been accredited. Hence, it is even more difficult to see
how the vibrational
energy of, say, a Carbon-Carbon bond could be the "other" of anything at all.

However, cells have
to regulate more than just heat; homeostasis
is maintained inside cells by a variety of processes. In that case, we are
forced to ask: Do cells
have several (countless?) significant "others"? How might we tell?

Despite this,
the processes Lawler describes are all causal; there are once again no
Hegelian concepts here for
Biophysicists to study.

Nevertheless, this might be to
miss the point; indeed, perhaps it is:

"The
expression 'tends to' has been used advisedly, since 'full' realisation of a
dialectical negation would amount to the destruction of both external and
internal conditions of existence, and hence total self-suppression. Dialectical
negation is not abstract or formal negation of the 'other,' but is 'mediated' by
the other itself." [Ibid., p.37.]

[There then follows a few
hundred words of fluent Martian I have not the heart to inflict on the reader --
she has suffered enough.]

"...[E]ach determination implies its
opposite. Father is the other of son, and the son the other of father, and each
only is as this other of the other; and at the same time, the one
determination only is, in relation to the other; their being is a single
subsistence. The father also has an existence of his own apart from the
son-relationship; but then he is not father but simply man; just as above and
below, right and left, are each also a reflection-into-self and are something
apart from their relationship, but then only places in general." [Hegel (1999),
p.441;
§960.]

This paragraph brings out Hegel's warped and
prejudicial thinking quite nicely. This is neatly summed up by Rosenthal:

"...[D]espite Hegel's obvious preference
for patrilineal forms of descent -- 'father is the other of son,' he writes,
'and son the other of father, and each only is as this other of the other'... --
reality...is burdened with two biological sexes. Clearly, a father can still be
a father, even if his 'other' happens to be a daughter, and a son cannot be a
son without another 'other' besides his father." [Rosenthal (1998), p.218.]

And if a man were to reproduce with his
daughter (surely a common occurrence, at least among royalty), then her son will
also be her brother (and the child's mother will be his sister), as well as
being son and grandson all at one go to the father.

Of course, the situation is even worse than
this, for Hegel seemed to be fixated only on alleged binary relations. What
about tripartite relations (like speed, distance and time, or mass, density and
volume)? Or multivariate relations like the points on a compass?

Figure One: Hegel Loses His
Bearings

And if this example is regarded as 'abstract'
(those who think so should check out the next 'abstract compass' they use on a walk
in the mountains, say, and it should
seem pretty material), think of the same figure, but now representing
people sat around a circular table. Each individual will be sat next to at least
two contingent 'others' (who could change from time to time), and sat opposite
many 'others'. And, worse still, none of these will 'pass over' into any of its
'others' (as Hegel imagined). If we now move into three dimensions, and consider
objects placed around a globe, Hegel's 'logic' will begin to look even more
ridiculous. [Of course, these can all be translated into
Relational Algebra, so this is an apposite counter-example. This might be
regarded as unfair, since the latter was invented after Hegel's day -- but that
just shows once more what hopelessly limited the 'logic' Hegel used.]

And do not even begin to think about large
finite relationships, such as "the millionth woman to give birth to a child", or
"the ten thousandth man to visit the USA", who are only such because of the
ordering relations we have among our numbers; each is only what he or she is
because of the 999,999 or the 9999 individuals/'others' they are related to respectively
as their predecessors.

And Hegel's other examples are no less bogus.
Sure, in two dimensions, something can be to the right only if some 'other' is
to the left, but what about a third object between the two? It would be between
here because it has at least two 'others'. And if we move into three dimensions once
more, something can be both to the right and left of an 'other', if it is on a
globe.

As Wittgenstein noted, Metaphysics is a
disease of the intellect brought on by an unbalanced diet of too few examples.

Before we reach the final
part of this guided tour through Hegel's Hermetic House of Horrors, Lawler summarises the story
so far:

"But
perhaps it would be better to say that logical negation or the law of
noncontradiction is an abstract representation of a certain limit of dialectical
negations in reality. The ontological significance of the law of
noncontradiction would be found in the nature of dialectical contradiction, with
the impossibility of fully realising relative negations without the suppression
of the entity that negates." [Ibid., p.37.]

Earlier we had this:

"…in
the abstract, undialectical understanding of identity, the relation of A
to not-A (beings that are not A as well as A's own nonbeing) seems
to 'vanish.'" [Ibid., p.22. Italic emphasis in the original.]

And yet, while we are
clear about the nature of contradictions (in FL at least), we are still in the
dark as to what 'dialectical contradictions' are --, other than their
merely being the products of Hegel's insecure grasp of the logic of his day, and
(at least in his theoretical deliberations) of ordinary
language -- balanced, of course, by its own "other":
an all too
secure grasp of mysticism.

Unfortunately for Lawler, and for Hegel, the
LOC has no ontological
implications (it is not about "non-being"): all it says (once more!), and in its simplest form, is that a
proposition and its negation cannot both be true and cannot both be false. [This
characterisation can even be found in
Aristotle's
famous "Square
of Opposition".]
Nothing here about what must or must not exist, or about "non-being". Admittedly, some of the
LOC's propositional instances might be
'about' existence, or what does or does not exist, but that is a separate matter.

However, even that is controversial. For
example:

C1: Tony Blair exists and Tony Blair does not
exist.

In many systems of logic, if Tony Blair does not exist, then "Tony
Blair does not exist" is truth-valueless. On the other hand, "Tony Blair exists"
would be a logical truth if he does exist! In such systems, C1 is not even a
contradiction, since the first half lacks a truth value. In that case,
even this 'contradiction' is not about "non-being", since it is not a
contradiction. And even if it were a contradiction, as noted above, it would
have no implications for the LOC in general.[More about this
in Essay Twelve. Until then, see Williams (1981), and
Miller
(2002).]

To be sure, in certain
forms of traditional logic, a non-empty universe must be assumed. But even
there, the LOC is not about what exists, or about "non-being".

Now, it is true that
there are many different characterisations of contradictions in
MFL. For example,
Grimm [in Grimm (2004), pp.51-55] lists 19 different definitions, and when he
combines these with other factors, he tells us that there are at least 240
different ways of depicting contradictions [p.55]!

It is worth pointing out,
however, that not only are most of the above definitions virtually
indistinguishable, in many of them it is quite clear that their
originators have confused contradictions with inconsistencies. Indeed, in his
opening sentence, Grimm commits that very error himself!

Out
of these, only a handful are described by Grimm as 'ontological':

"On an ontological outline, a contradiction would be
neither a single statement nor a pair of statements, neither a proposition nor a
pair of propositions, but a state of affairs. A contradictory state of affairs
would be one in which something had a particular property and also an
incompatible property, or in which something both had a particular property and
lacked that property."

Even so, the only modern logicians Grimm references for this
definition are
Arthur Prior
and the two Routleys (p.52) -- i.e., the late Richard and Val Routley, who later
changed their names to
Richard
Sylvan and
Val Plumwood.
Their definition is as follows:

"A contradictory situation is one where both B and ¬B (it is not the case that B) hold for some B". [Quoted
from Grimm (2004), p.52. I have used a different sign for negation here.]

This is not a happy definition, since it seems to treat the
letter "B" as a substantival term/variable (i.e., capable of being quantified: in "some B"),
and not as a proposition. Of course, if "B" is a predicate letter, then this
definition relies on
second
order logic, and is thus controversial. [I won't try to defend or justify that
assertion here.]

Putting this to one side, we would need to know what these two
mean by "situation" before we could decide if this is indeed "ontological". For
example, if "situation" means "formulae in the context of a theory", then it
would not be "ontological". Unfortunately, the original article in which this
appears was published in an obscure Colombian mathematics journal (Revista
Colombiana de matemáticas) to which I do not have access, so I can't say
much more. Anyway, even this unfortunate definition is not about "non-being".

However, the two Routleys were both radical activists, and Sylvan
himself was also a
Paraconsistent logician who collaborated with
Graham
Priest. In that case, it is not difficult to believe that Hegel's baleful
influence lies behind their definition. This is indeed confirmed by Routley and
Meyer (1976).

[On this, see Graham Priest and Dominic
Hyde's brief biography of Sylvan in Hyde and Priest (2000), pp.1-3, (indeed,
in Hyde and Priest (p.13), Sylvan pointedly recommends
'dialethic logic' (often spelt "dialetheic logic"), a family of
non-standard logics which is heavily dependent on Hegel), and the many essays in Priest, Routley and Norman (1989). Background
material can be found in Franklin (2003).]

Prior's 'ontological' definition goes as follows:

"The law of contradiction asserts that a statement and its
direct denial cannot be true together ('not both p and not-p') or, as applied to
terms, that nothing can both be and not be the same thing at the same time
('Nothing is at once A and not-A')" [Prior (1967). I have relied on the
quotation found in Grimm, here --, p.50.]

This is an appallingly bad definition from a top logician
(on a par with the lamentably poor 'dialectical definitions' we met in Essay
Four Part One)!
I will not try to defend it. Even so, there is nothing here about what must
exist, or about "non-being", and Prior's 'definition' does not seem to conform to Grimm typology, anyway.

Now, I suspect Prior would have paraphrased this definition (maybe in a longer article) in terms
of modern
quantification, thus removing the apparent existential implications it seems
to have. Indeed, this guess is partially confirmed by the other definition Grimm
quotes from Prior (1967) (on p.51), which is far superior, and much closer to
the one adopted here.

"For a principle which every one must have who understands
anything that is, is not a hypothesis; and that which every one must know who
knows anything, he must already have when he comes to a special study. Evidently
then such a principle is the most certain of all; which principle this is, let
us proceed to say. It is, that the same attribute cannot at the same time
belong and not belong to the same subject and in the same respect; we must
presuppose, to guard against dialectical objections, any further qualifications
which might be added. This, then, is the most certain of all principles, since
it answers to the definition given above. For it is impossible for any one to
believe the same thing to be and not to be, as some think Heraclitus says.
For what a man says, he does not necessarily believe; and if it is impossible
that contrary attributes should belong at the same time to the same subject (the
usual qualifications must be presupposed in this premiss too), and if an opinion
which contradicts another is contrary to it, obviously it is impossible for
the same man at the same time to believe the same thing to be and not to be;
for if a man were mistaken on this point he would have contrary opinions at the
same time. It is for this reason that all who are carrying out a demonstration
reduce it to this as an ultimate belief; for this is naturally the
starting-point even for all the other axioms." [Aristotle
(1984b), p.1588. In the internet version, this can be found in Book IV, at
the end of section 3. Bold emphases added.]

This is not much better than Prior's attempt, and will not be
defended here, either. The only thing that can be said in Aristotle's defence is
that he was writing 2400 years ago, and attempting to create logic almost from
scratch. The same excuses cannot be extended to Hegel and his many dialectical
dupes. Even so, Aristotle's 'definition' does not mention "non-being", either.
To be sure, Aristotle says: "For it is impossible for any one to
believe the same thing to be and not to be", but this is far too vague to
co-opt to Hegel's defence -- since Aristotle might have meant: "For it is impossible
for any one to believe the same thing to be and not to be true/a man/a
number...". This interpretation is confirmed by the next sentence in the above
passage:

"For what a man says, he does not necessarily believe; and
if it is impossible that contrary attributes should belong at the same time to
the same subject...." [Ibid]

In that case, even if it were clear
what 'dialectical contradictions' are,
FL would need neither
this notion
nor dialectics to help
explicate, or apply, the LOC.

After all, does Astronomy need Astrology?

At last we
are nearing the dialectical denouement:

"For
our purposes, this illustration is sufficient to show that while the term
'contradiction' as used here does not have the seemingly 'full' sense of logical
contradiction, nevertheless it is not reducible to some 'clash' of externally
related 'positives.' Nor is it equivalent to some 'tranquil' association of
mutually exclusive logical contraries, such as odd and even numbers, male and
female persons, or north and south poles of a magnet -- unless these are in fact
understood dialectically…. It is necessary to understand the mutual relation and
opposition that constitutes the inner dynamic of the terms in opposition. This
opposition may contain the possibility of developing into 'full' contradiction,
i.e., into real destruction. However, the real potentiality for the development
of dialectical contradiction is not to be seen in this possibility of
destruction, but in a potentiality for transformation where only the 'immediate
forms' of opposing phenomena are suppressed -- while other, often more developed
forms are realised through essential 'internal' interconnections." [Ibid.,
pp.37-38.]

All this a priorijargon is standard fare in
HCD
texts, but that doesn't imply that it means anything. Indeed, it is a sure sign of the opposite.

But why is "full contradiction"
equated with "real destruction"? Now,
the LOC was (and still is) connected with all manner of things in the bad old
logic (Lawler himself seems to think it has something to do with "cancelling
out" -- although he does not use those words, as far as I can tell, but he
does speak of negatives in mathematics cancelling; see below --, or as
"self-nullifying", as he puts it on page 16). As we will see in Essay Twelve
(and here),
card-carrying HCDs do likewise.

However, neither the contradictions of FL
nor
those of ordinary language have anything to do with "cancelling out", or "nullifying". If
a proposition "p" is true, its contradictory "not p" is false, not
"cancelled
out".

Look, it is still there on the page/screen, unharmed!

This odd idea is
connected with the equally bizarre belief that 'negative' propositions are all
false (or 'defective' in some other way). But, 'negative' propositions can be,
and often are, true. For example, "Blair is not a socialist" is true, as is
"Anyone who reads the Daily Mail,
and doesn't reject much of what it says, is no Marxist."

And, not even the content
of "not p" is
"cancelled", for whatever "not p" says is still up for consideration, it is just false
if "p" is true, true if "p" is false. Nor is it
"nullified", for (once more) "not p" could one day become true and "p" itself false,
or vice versa. For example,
"Blair has
not resigned" is the contradictory of "Blair has resigned"; the first is false,
but hopefully it will become true one day -- it could not do that if it had been
"cancelled", or "nullified". [Needless to say, this was written before Blair
finally went!]

Moreover, every proposition is
paired/pairable with its negation; does that mean that all propositions have been
"cancelled"?

Anyway, what would count as
the "nullification" of "Blair has not resigned"? One could try to
nullify Blair's actual resignation (or its effects), but what could one do to
nullify "Blair has not resigned"? Prevent this message getting out?
Silence whoever might want to utter it? [If it is false, what it says has not
happened, so nothing can nullify it, surely?] Even so, that proposition is still there,
on your screen, annoyingly mocking any attempt to "nullify" it.

Those who talk this way
have clearly confused FL-contradictions with contradictory orders or
instructions, like "Open the door!" and "Close the door!", which, if acted
upon, undo each other, etc. But the propositions of FL and ordinary
language are neither instructions
nor orders.

Lawler does, however, try to illustrate this sort of negation by
appealing to negatives in mathematics (a common ploy used by, among others,
Engels):

"From the thoughtless viewpoint of abstract
understanding, A is conceived of as simply given, and the implicit
relation to not-A does not get the trouble of a serious consideration.
Just as in mathematics two negatives make a positive, in which they are thought
of as cancelling out, here abstract understanding makes the journey from A
to not-A and back again without noticing that any movement has taken
place." [Ibid., p.22. Italic emphases in the original.]

For sure, Lawler sort of rejects this view (or, rather, heaims to
transcend this formalist approach), but he does not repudiate the idea that it is correct to
regard formal negation as a sort of "cancelling-out". He then uses this
'analysis -- beloved of the "abstract understanding" -- to develop a dialectical
account of negation; so for Lawler, the latter is not just "cancelling-out", it
has moved beyond it.

However, if formal negation is not and never has been a
"cancelling-out", then the dialectical moves that allegedly follow from
(or seek
to transcend) this ploy cannot use it as a launch pad for this pointless 'logical' journey
to nowhere.

Well, not even in mathematics -- if we adopt for the moment this
primitive way of talking -- is it always true that two negatives give a
positive. For example: -1 + -2 = -3. [No "cancelling-out" here!]

Exactly why Lawler considers only multiplication (or
perhaps division) as a valid
option to
illustrate this obscure point is somewhat
unclear, but even there the results are not always as he imagines: -i x -i = i =
(-1)1/2which is still
negative!

Of course, it could be objected that (-1)1/2
is not negative (even though it contains a negative sign!), but what about -(i1/2)/-i
= i-1/2; is that
negative? Maybe so, maybe not. Well then what about -(a-b) x -1 = (b-a), where
b>a? Or -a x -a = a, where a<0? Or, (x2- 3x -1) x -1 = 1 + 3x - x2. Are
any of these negative?

In that case, it seems
clear that this quasi-Hegelian 'rule' is far too crude to
use even in lower school mathematics. But, when we come to more complex areas
(such as matrices and their inverses, groups or infinite series), the whole idea
becomes ridiculous.

Anyway, negatives in mathematics do not "cancel-out"; what happens is
that certain functions take negative numbers as arguments and yield positives as images
(but, the domain set of negatives still exists -- it has not been "cancelled-out", or even
"nullified").

In that case, there is no
good reason to connect the "full" contradictions of FL with "destruction".

And that is it! A
plain "must" after this long detour through this pre-Aristotelian wasteland.

The rest of the article
is merely window-dressing. We are left with this counterfeit "must" here,
backed neither by logic nor by fact. So why we "must" see these obscure creations of
Hegel's Hermetic Hallucinations in this way is entirely mysterious.

To be sure, there is no problem
with the phrase "real opposition". But, the phrase "dialectical
contradiction" is still lost in the same dense fog Hegel left it in 200
years ago. Exactly why the word "contradiction" has to be super-glued to this
other term is a mystery -- except that Lawler might
have wanted some of the clarity of the former to rub off onto the latter.

"Neither
in heaven nor in earth, neither in the world of mind nor nature, is there
anywhere an abstract 'either-or' as the understanding maintains. Whatever exists
is concrete, with difference and opposition in itself. The finitude of things
with then lie in the want of correspondence between their immediate being and
what they essentially are. Thus, in inorganic nature, the acid is implicitly at
the same time the base: in other words its only being consists in its relation
to its other. Hence the acid persists quietly in the contrast: it is always in
effort to realize what it potentially is. Contradiction is the very moving
principle of the world." [Ibid., p.38; quoting Hegel (1975), p.174. I have
used a different edition from Lawler.]

If we consider this
famous quotation from Hegel: either he wrote
it or he did not. If either (but not both) of these is the case, then Hegel was wrong
to say that there was nowhere just such an "either-or" --,
for here there
would be one.

Worse: in heaven,
hell or high water, there is an "either-or" or there isn't. So, if Hegel was
right (and there wasn't), he was wrong, since there would be (i.e., here!). And if he was wrong, then he was wrong
anyway. Either way, he was
wrong.

The rest of what he says should now be
consigned to one of
Hume's bonfires. I'll get the can of petrol...

How did Lawler miss this
obvious inference? Has the bad old logic "nullified" his brain? Has
Hermetic Hype "cancelled" his ability to use/understand a simple "or"?

The acid example is none-too-clever either. Lawler comments on it as follows:

"…the
acid is only an acid through its implicit relation to what negates it…." [Ibid.,
p.38.]

But acids burn the skin
not because a base exists (which negates nothing, since it is not a sentential/phrasal
operator) -- which would counteract it if they came into contact --, but because
of its corrosive properties.
And, if there were no bases anywhere in existence, acids would still do what
acids do.

Of
course,
modern definitions
of acids do not mention bases. The Brønsted-Lowry
definition says that acids are proton donators, while the
Lewisian definition
tells us that an acid is an electron-pair acceptor. To be sure, bases are
still defined as the 'opposite' of each of these, but acids and alkali's are no
longer
defined in terms of each other, but in terms of a third item (or a third
and a fourth, if we lump the lot together).

So, it seems that Chemistry has taken a decidedly reactionary turn
since Hegel attempted to pontificate on the subject.

But, this is a
specially-chosen example. It won't work in cases that DM-fans conveniently ignore.
Many of these were listed in
Essay
Seven, some have been above.
Here are several new examples: voltage, current and resistance are all
interlinked, but no single one has
its 'being' defined in terms of any one "other" (but two "others"); and this is
true also of pressure, volume and temperature in an
ideal gas, just as it is true of the items found in the
traditional
square of opposition (where implications, contraries, subcontraries and
contradictories are interdefined among four "others"). Lest these be rejected as 'abstract' (a
fine accusation to have levelled at one by a Hegel-Honcho!) consider this: in
the Periodic Table, none
of the Halides
(Chlorine, Bromine, Fluorine, Iodine, etc.,) is defined in terms of a significant
"other", and neither are
salts,
proteins,
enzymes,
catalysts,
alcohols,
Aldehydes…

And what are we to say of "buffer
solutions", which can be both acid and alkaline?

Furthermore,
this entire topic is mixed up with Hegel's mystical fugue on "finitude" and
"infinity"; Lawler quotes him thus:

"Thus
essentially relative to another, [something -- Lawler's addition, RL] is virtually
against it: and since what is passed into is quite the same as what passes over,
since both have one and the same attribute, viz., to be another, it follows that
something in its passage into other only joins with itself. To be thus
self-related in the passage, in the other, is the genuine Infinity." [Ibid.,
p.39, quoting Hegel (1975), p.139; Lawler's italics.
Here,
I have referenced a different edition from that used by Lawler.]

Well, that
certainly clears
things up!

But, how is self-relation "the genuine Infinity"? Lawler just accepts
this mystical missive, and does not explain it -- except he expands on it with
yet more
jargon:

"…in
speaking of the chemical relation of an acid and an alkali, where he notes that
'the negation of the negation is not a neutralization: the infinite is the
affirmative, and it is only the finite that is absorbed' (quoting Hegel
here).
The 'absorption' of finite objects consists in the transition implicit in the
'want of correspondence between their immediate being and what they essentially
are,' which leads to the realization of that essential being of to the 'genuine
Infinite' which Hegel calls being 'self-related in the passage' into the other.
In other words, since the other is essential to the original being, there is a
form of relating to that other which is not a relation to something 'alien' but
a 'self-relation' -- a relation in which the being, at first seemingly
self-sufficient, finds its 'self' in and through the other (its other,
some definite other)." [Ibid., p.39.]

I think I have
made enough derogatory remarks about verbal bindweed like this, but what is
a materialist like Lawler (I am assuming, of course, that he is one!) doing
assisting the spread of this Idealist
pest, as if it helps resolve a
single thing?

We seem,
therefore, to be going backwards in our "passage" away from the clarity
found in FL (and, potentially, in ordinary language), but toward infinite nonsense.

However, we now
get a flash of sense (or do we?); for Engels relates this 'infinity' to "law":

"In
fact all real exhaustive knowledge consists solely in raising the individual
thing in thought from individuality into particularity and from this into
universality, in seeking and establishing the infinite in the finite, the
eternal in the transitory. The form of universality is the form of completeness,
hence of the infinite. We know that chlorine and hydrogen, within certain limits
of temperature and pressure and under the influence of light, combine with an
explosion to form hydrochloric acid gas, and as soon as we know this, we know
also that this takes place everywhere and at all times where the
above conditions are present....The form of universality in nature is law." [Engels (1954), pp.234;
quoted in Lawler, p.39-40. Italic emphases in the original.]

Lawler comments
on this as follows:

"While
rejecting Hegel's ultimately idealist interpretation of 'self-relation' or
'reflection' in the other as 'ideality,' Engels' treatment of 'infinite' as
law-governed process, 'absorbing' finite moments into itself, is faithful to
Hegel." [Lawler (1982), p.40.]

At the risk of
repeating myself, how is it possible to translate the word "infinite" as
"law-governed process"? Are the rest of us using the wrong
Gobbledygook to English dictionary?

Now Engels tries to equate these two, but,
for those still in command of their reason,
neither an
"always" nor an "at all times" is an "infinite".

[In a later
Essay, we will see that this view of scientific law is a carry-over from ancient
animistic ideas about nature, and so it is no surprise to find this doctrine
re-surface here, in such Hermetically hobbled company. On this see
here and
here;
the first is Swartz (2006), the second Swartz (2003).]

As noted in
Essay Three Part One, from
simple sentences like "John is a man" (and now in Lawler's case "Socrates
is mortal") we could -- if we were so minded, and with just enough
Hegel-hubris --, 'derive' the thesis that the world is a law-governed "Totality", and that
knowledge is an infinite asymptotic journey
into oblivion. As
Lawler now explains:

"It
is clear from these passages that 'ideality' is not derived by Hegel from the
simple suppression of distinct phenomena but from the interaction and
dialectically negative interpenetrations which result in their law-governed
transformations. The explosive combination of hydrogen and chlorine is more than
the 'clash' of two externally related beings. It is the negation of their
'immediate' form as self-subsistent 'free' entities, and the realization of
their inner or essential connectedness with each other (under the necessary
conditions). The result is not their mutual annihilation, but their
transformation." [Ibid., p.40.]

But, this poetic
description of a chemical reaction is far from being even metaphorically 'true'.
Since when has Chlorine been a 'free' being? At the very least, as a gas, under
normal temperature and pressure, it exists as a diatomic
molecule, and nowhere in nature does it subsist as a
'pure' element -- so far as we know.

And, we note
once more that the semi-religious typology of the "other" has now been dropped,
since Chlorine reacts with practically everything. In fact, it has more "others" than
Blair has excuses.

By way of contrast, if we choose a
far less
'dialectically-accommodating' element -- say one of the 'Noble
gases' (Helium, Neon, Krypton, etc.) which seem in comparison to be rather stand-offish, loners, as it
were, with no "others" to speak of -- the above comments become all the more
apposite.
This is because, except under the most extreme conditions, these gases react with
nothing at all, and have to be dragged, kicking and screaming down the "passage".
So, this 'logical' object, this "other", has to be forced into adopting its
designated Hermetic
role, in this
case.

But even if
this dialectical fairytale about the formation of
HCL
were correct, how this is an internally-driven process is somewhat
unclear. Surely, Chlorine is not to be regarded as not-Hydrogen? If it were, then
everything in the universe that is not Hydrogen (or not-Hydrogen) would be Chlorine!
Or, conversely, everything that is not-Chlorine would be Hydrogen. [In which
case, dear reader, you are Hydrogen!]

Of course, that
is why the significant "other" myth was spun earlier (to block this very
objection), but as we noted above, Chlorine reacts with so many things we would
have to use a veritable via
negativa to 'identify' it (e.g., Chlorine is not-this, not- that, not-...); indeed, in
the limit, it would be not-anything.
In this Hermetic Hell-hole, Chlorine should disappear like the
Cheshire
Cat's smile!

And, as we saw
in Essay Eight Part One, these
'internal relations' turn out to be 'external relations', only mis-described. It is thus no wonder
that we
need Super-duper logic -- courtesy of Hegel -- to assist us here; ordinary
language, FL, and good old-fashioned matter are most uncooperative.

And now we encounter this:

"However, if
their identity is narrowly or abstractly defined by the superficial features of
their original phenomenal form, the result appears to be annihilation. And this
annihilation seems to 'realize' a formal contradiction: for example, 'hydrogen
exists independently of chlorine' and 'hydrogen does not exist independently of
chlorine.' Following the law of noncontradiction, both of these statements can
only be true if we distinguish the 'different respects' in which independence of
chlorine can be asserted and then denied of hydrogen. Thus, in the original free
state hydrogen is independent of chlorine, while in the chemical reaction or in
the hydrochloric acid gas it is not. The logical contradiction in the original
crude statements seems to be resolved by qualification of the different respects
or conditions in which the seemingly contradictory assertions hold." [Ibid.,
p.40.]

Well,
Lawler's 'contradiction' isn't one if the word "exist" is a quantifier, and the
first (i.e., "Hydrogen exists independently of chlorine") is of the form:

L11:
E(x)E(y)[(Hx &
Cy) &
Fxy].

Or perhaps:

L12: ∀(x)∀(y)[(Hx
&
Cy) ®
Fxy].

L13: ∀(x)E(y)[(Hx
&
Cy) ®
Fxy].

[Where "E" is the
existential quantifier, "∀"
is the universal quantifier; "®"
is the implication arrow; "H(ξ)" and "C(ξ)"
are one-place, first level predicate expressions, standing for "ξ is Hydrogen"
and "ξ is Chlorine", respectively; and "F(ξζ)" is a first level, two-place
predicate (in this case, a binary relation), standing for "ξ is independent of
ζ"; "x" and "y" are
bound variables,
ranging over elements, in these examples.]

L11 roughly reads: "There
are two elements, Hydrogen and Chlorine, which are independent of each other".
In that event, its contradictory would be: "No two elements, which are Hydrogen and
Chlorine, are independent of each other". L12 translates out approximately as:
"Take any two elements, if they are Hydrogen and Chlorine, then they are
independent of each other". If so, the contradictory would be something
like: "For any element there is some other element, which, if the first is Hydrogen
and the second is Chlorine, then there is at least one example where the latter
is not independent of the former." L13 is roughly "For any element, if the
first is Hydrogen, and there is a second which is Chlorine, then they are
independent of each other". The contradictory here would be something like: "For
any element there is no other element, which, if the first is Hydrogen and the
second is Chlorine, the latter is independent of the former."

If, on the other, hand Lawler's example were of the following form:

L14:
E(x)E(y)[(Hx &
Cy) &
Fxy].

where
"F(ξζ)" is
a first-level two-place predicate, standing for "ξ exists independently of
ζ", not
much would be different.

Of course, this method of
analysing propositions could be rejected; there is nothing that forces us
to adopt this way of looking at language, or logic, or both (except perhaps the fact that it prevents this sort of a priori
Idealism and superscience from establishing even a slender toe-hold in our brains, as was
pointed out in Essay Three
Part One,
here and here). Anyway,
if this 'modern method' is rejected, then Lawler's example would be a contradiction only if
someone asserted both conjuncts, and held both to be true at once, and who
denied both could be false at once. But who would
want to do that?

[In all that
talk about "respects", I suspect Lawler realised this, but seemed to want to
ignore it.]

"We should
first of all note that the above reformulation of the apparent contradiction
implicitly depends on the general proposition, formulated according to the law
of noncontradiction, that something, at any one time or in one respect, is
either independent or not independent (dependent). But for something which is
independent to become dependent, it must have within it the potential to become
dependent. It was therefore relatively, not absolutely independent. The
potentiality for the chemical reaction was present in the hydrogen in its free
state. To follow Hegel's form of expression, in its free state hydrogen was all
the while 'repelling' or negating possible reactions with other elements with
which it was nevertheless related. Its 'independence' was maintained in its
state of interdependence under certain conditions where this was possible."
[Ibid., pp.40-41.]

There are
several highly dubious moves in the above argument. The original claim that
"Hydrogen is independent of Chlorine" has now morphed into "Hydrogen is
independent, period" -- that is, it is independent of everything.
Moreover, the meaning of
the word "independent" has altered, too. From "independent"
implying "not linked
to" (or "isolated from"), it has become "does not depend on", and
this is what allows the potential for the one to depend on the other to
be smuggled in while no one is looking.

But, it is
surely possible for Hydrogen to exist totally isolated from Chlorine (this is
in the first sense of "independent"), but still for it to be capable of
reacting with it if and when this state is altered.

Indeed,
scientists invent new compounds all the time (about which they might know
very little), that are in fact isolated from other compounds (some of which they will
never encounter), but with which they would react if given the chance (and if we but knew it).

Let us
assume, therefore, that one day a group of scientists create a new compound called "Hegelase" (a
new form of poison -- apparently it blocks the 'passages', and cripples its
victim's
powers of reason, before brain death finally sets in), which they keep
isolated from everything as best they can -- for obvious reasons. However, let us imagine that some
of it escapes and kills a dialectician (who, for the sake of mischief, we will
call "Lawless").

Now, did
Hegelase have the potential to kill Lawless before it
reached him? Was this poor schmuck Hegelase's significant "other"? Well, in the sense that
this poison will kill him if it reaches him, it most
certainly has this potential. That is why it had to be isolated (but not just from
Lawless). On the
other hand, in the 'logical' sense
that Lawler (not Lawless) needs, the answer must be, no it does not. If it did, then
we must argue that Hegelase has over 6 billion "others" out there, who it has
the potential to kill 'programmed' into it. And if we now assume that Hegelase is able to kill
all
living things, then that 6 billion "others" would amount to a mere blip
in comparison.

Does this one chemical have
so much 'programmed' into it? So many significant "others"?

To
those who look upon "potentialities" as "actualities" in disguise
--, or, at least,
as very well hidden "actualities" --, the above example presents serious problems. Every time a new life
comes into the world, Hegelase will gain a new "potentiality", for free, without
moving a muscle. Such unearned income should be taxed, one feels.

Let us now say
that a new strain of bacterium comes into existence (which, for the sake of
further mischief, we will christen "Grantococcus
WoodsoniiB#2", or "GWB2", for short), by
whatever means such cells have of reproducing/evolving. Let us further suppose that Hegelase can (i.e., has the potential to) kill GWB2. When GWB2 comes
into existence, Hegelase will thus gain a new potential to kill GWB2 (say, "PGWB2", for short). But, to do so
it must have had the potential to develop this potential (or it would not have happened,
given this traditional way of looking at things). So, before PGWB2 came into existence,
Hegelase must have had a potential to develop PGWB2, say, "PPGWB2". But, once more, in
order to develop that it must have had a further potential to develop PPGWB2, say
"PPPGWB2". Well,
it does not take very much Diabolical Logic to see where this is going if we
insist on regarding potentialities as the disguised properties of bodies (governed by ill-defined
'negations'), and not just our way of
making sense of what they do, or can do.

We have to
say this, or imagine that Hegelase has an (actual?) potential to kill things that
do not exist. But what kind of 'potential' is that? How is it able to kill things
that do not exist?

But, even
if this is rejected for some reason (perhaps, by the use of a complex
counterfactual), what is all this "repelling" that Hegel thinks things
engage in?

"To follow
Hegel's form of expression, in its free state hydrogen was all the while
'repelling' or negating possible reactions with other elements with which it was
nevertheless related. Its 'independence' was maintained in its state of
interdependence under certain conditions where this was possible." [Ibid.]

It is worth noting that in the highlighted
sentence Lawler implicitly admits that Hydrogen, for example, has no significant
'other'. With that Hegel's account of change "repels" even his own logic, and
collapses under the weight of its own 'internal contradictions'. A rather
fitting fate for such a useless 'theory'

But,
despite this, is Hydrogen
that intelligent and focussed? Can it "repel" each and every "possible" reaction --
even those on the far side of the universe? [This powerful atom is clearly
master of all it cannot survey.] But, apart from sounding profound, what sense can
be made of any of this?

Perhaps
this:

"Within this
analysis, the concept of independence and nonindependence as mutually exclusive
states applies primarily or most adequately to the surface distinction between
the phenomenal states of hydrogen (classification of phenomena) but does not
apply, at least with the same ease, to the law of hydrogen's development and its
internal structure. In this deeper analysis it is necessary to see
'independence' as a form of interdependence ('nonindependence'). The conception
of the categories 'independence' and 'dependence' as mutually exclusive and so
not applicable to the same thing -- in the same respect -- is more difficult to
defend." [Ibid., p.41.]

But, this
only works because of the ambiguous way that the words "independence" and
"dependence" have been used (as noted above: one minute the first is understood
to mean "isolated", or "free and unconnected", the next it means "not dependent
on").

Lawler then
goes on to discuss more technical notions connected with "form" and "essence",
which add little to the above -- except, perhaps, this:

"Although
'essence' and 'form' are mutually exclusive categories there is no possibility
of adequately separating the phenomenal 'respect' from the essential
'respect' -- so as to permit one to say, unproblematically, that hydrogen in its
phenomenal form is independent while in its essential properties it is not
independent. Such a distinction of respects superficially applies to the two
phenomenal states of hydrogen ('superficially' in the sense that it is necessary
to go on from the distinction to understanding the law relating to the phases of
hydrogen's transformations). But in understanding the essential nature of
hydrogen there can be no comparable distinguishing of 'respects' -- except as an
abstract or formal approximation of the dialectical unity of opposites." [Ibid.,
pp.41-42. Italic emphasis in the original.]

What exactly the "unity of
opposites" amounts to here is left tantalisingly vague, and so the whole passage is as clear
as dialectical mud.

Mercifully, we
are near the end; Lawler now tries to draw several disconnected threads
together:

"Thus the
process of chemical reaction demonstrates the inner connectedness as well as
relative opposition of hydrogen and chlorine which must be taken into account
and explained in a scientific theory of the law of chemical reactions and in an
understanding of the particular properties of these elements. The 'finitude'
that is suppressed is the particular state of the element as 'free.' as existing
(relatively) independently of other elements while being essentially related to
them." [Ibid., p.42.]

However, all that Lawler
has done here is connect these elements (Hydrogen and Chlorine) with talk about potentialities,
those that
cannot be regarded as physically real, but perhaps can be thought of as a poetical sort of way of
depicting their capacity to react. And all of this is based on the earlier
word-juggling of a few letter "A"s, themselves of a somewhat
'mercurial' disposition (or, indeed, "potential").

As far as the laws governing nature are
concerned, these cannot be seen as decrees written into matter, which all
things have to obey (as it seems this line of thought implies). For sure, Hegel
could accept such
an animistic idea, but no materialist should -- unless,
that is, they subscribe to the non-materialist doctrine that the universe is
governed by a cosmic will of some sort. [Again, on this see
here and
here.] Lawler almost admits as much in his
final paragraph:

"It seems
that the main reason why Hegel terms the essential relatedness of one element to
another and their lawful connectedness as their 'ideality' is that Hegel regards
matter as inherently incapable of such relations and transformations. Matter is
conceived of as the embodiment of the principles of abstract understanding. In
other words, Hegel accepts the mechanistic or atomistic theory of matter, and so
any discovery nonmechanistic, nonatomistic properties of reality is interpreted
as evidence of the operation of a nonmaterial force -- the Idea." [Ibid., p.42.]

And there we have it in a
nutshell; Hegel's Idealism prevented him from seeing the material world as it
is, sufficient to itself, and capable of doing all the things Idealists deny it
is capable of doing unaided (since that would not be 'rational'). This alone explains all the desperate word-magic
and symbol-juggling, aimed at re-enchanting
nature in order to make it in effect the development of Idea, since
plain, common-or-garden, boring old matter is not good enough on its own.

But, how does
Lawler square all this with Marxist materialism?

"But the fact
that Hegel sees in natural laws a manifestation of this Idea makes possible
materialistic interpretations which reverse this scheme -- interpreting the
'idea' as the subjective image of the material law. This reinterpretation
requires a rejection of the mechanistic form of materialism and the development
of a more advanced theory of matter." [Ibid., p.42.]

And yet, how can this work if
the belief that there are laws in nature is itself based on an Ideal view
of reality? We have seen how the quirky logic Hegel used helped conjure these
mythical beasts (these "laws") into existence; merely reversing our perspective
in no way changes these bogus moves into a valid alternative. If it did, we
should have to start believing that the Brothers Grimm were first-rate
scientists. Without an Ideal backdrop, these allegedly materialist 'laws' would
have no ontological basis, except perhaps, in a more deflationary sense, as
part of the way we
make sense of nature -- a materialist sort of
Positivism.

[This (i.e., Hegel's) anthropomorphic
way at looking at nature is traced back to its roots (as part of 'Divine'/ruling-class law, etc.) in Essay
Twelve (summary here).]

That is it! This
is the best defence I have read in over 25 years of researching the logical
ruins in this
Dialectical Disaster Area!

Read it again dear reader
and scratch your rather 'inadequate' material head.

WTF is a 'dialectical contradiction'?

Are you any the
wiser? If you are, please help me out, for I am, if anything, even more in the
dark!

Now, in many places
throughout this work I have advanced the claim that the slur that dialectical
mystics often throw in the faces of genuine materialists (i.e., that they "do not understand dialectics") also
applies in reverse to those very mystics, since they clearly do not understand
it, and have been quite incapable of explaining a single dialectical concept in
over 150 years of not trying very hard.

Perhaps readers can
now see why I have been saying this.

Finally: reading through
papers and books (like Lawler's essay), written by Marxists who still think we
can learn anything from Hegel, one is struck by the similarity between
their approach to truth and that adopted by, say, Roman Catholic
Philosophers
who nearly a thousand years ago began the process of trying to make Aristotle consistent with Christianity, and then
later with
science -- and who are
still endeavouring to do it --, or who even now attempt to defend
Papal Infallibility in the face of the countless Pontifical screw-ups we have
witnessed over the centuries.

The 'logical' contortions
these comrades have to inflict on language is somewhat similar to the
linguistic gyrations perfected by the above theologians and
casuists. Indeed,
the somersaults these
comrades perform
(in this area) merit some sort of International Gymnastics award. Dialectically double-jointed comrades
should, in my view, receive Gold every time.

Lawler is no exception. In order to make Hegel's jargon work, he
has to twist language way beyond even the knotted
pretzel
stage, just like the aforementioned RC contortionists.

Now, I do not expect dialecticians to accept the above criticisms
since they
are still wedded to the ancient idea that human discourse, at some level,
contains within the key to the inner secrets of 'Being'. Given that view of language, all
that these
philosophical alchemists have to do is find the right
formula -- the right key --, and linguistic dirt can be turned into theoretical Gold,
the whole transformation achievable without having to leave one's
non-dialectical armchair.

Such theorists are indeed the philosophical equivalent of those
whom Marx called
revolutionary alchemists; only here the right verbal formula is capable of unlocking
the mysteries of 'Being', allowing these dialectical magi to invent an the ideal world to suite
themselves. Up
to now they have plainly not transformed the class structure of this world, but they
have made up for that by withdrawing into an Ideal world, where they can juggle
with 'reality' to their class-compromised heart's content, and ignore all
criticism and political failure.

And this is partly why they
cling to this mystical theory for dear
life -- and resist all attempts to prize their fingers loose. Indeed, they do so for reasons
Feuerbach
exposed 160 years ago. This theory allows them to see the world as the opposite
of what it really is, which fact explains the powerful hold it has on these
dialectical dupes -- consolation from convolution.

There is no arguing with faith like this. Changing the
material
conditions that gave rise to such alienated thought-forms is the only thing that
will finally bring Dialectical Day-Dreaming
to an end. RL stands no chance!

Dialectical mystics are just going to have to rely on the
material force of the working class to save them from themselves and from this virus of the mind.

[More on this in Essay Nine
Part Two. My comments on Lawler's
other significant contributions to this topic were posted
here, and
here.]

68.But,
are opposites always contradictory? At this moment I am sat in front of my
computer looking at the house opposite. Is my house therefore in some sort of
'struggle' with that house? Or, indeed, am I in struggle with it?

Unfair?
Perhaps so. Dialecticians will be the first to point out that the sorts of
opposites they regard as contradictory are those that are involved in a
dialectical union of some sort (as
UOs). Since my house and that opposite are
not so linked (and neither am I), they are not therefore in 'struggle'.

Well, how do we know?
Clearly we do not. Nature often surprises us. [And isn't everything
interconnected in DM, anyway?]

See the previous Note on this.

However, consider the
opposite sides of a polygon (one that have been drawn on paper, so this is not
an abstract example). An equilateral triangle has two opposite sides; are they
both battling against the third side, and/or with one another? Here, these sides
are physically and logically linked; but this won't suffice since they are not
dialectically-logically linked.

It
seems then that only certain logical connections in reality are allowed to be,
or the create, DM-UOs, which means that objects and processes that are merely
empirically- or formally-connected,
cannot be so categorised.

Perhaps too: since no
house has yet been observed to be engaged in a life-and-death struggle with
another across the way, they can be ruled-out as UOs? Who can say? But who has ever actually
witnessed a posse of use values slugging it out with a gang of exchange values? So, such empirical niceties
cannot be crucially important here. We are thus still in the dark.

In that case, it seems
that only certain sorts of opposites are implicated, here. [But Hegelian
opposites look pretty banal, anyway, and
do not work, even on their
own
terms.]

Oddly enough,
and by sheer coincidence, I am sure, these 'opposites' turn out to be (by-and-large) the kind
of 'opposites' dreamt-up by Idealist Philosophers thousands of years ago. Now, since this doctrine is central to Hermeticism, that would seem to malign it sufficiently
enough in
the eyes of anyone who is at all concerned to remain consistent with atheistical materialism.
[That is won't do so in the eyes of dialectical mystics confirms much of what I
allege about them in Essay Nine Part
Two.]

To test this claim,
readers should now try to spot the difference (that is, beyond a few superficial details)
between these:

"CHAPTER X POLARITY
Everything is dual; everything has poles; everything has its pair of opposites;
like and unlike are the same; opposites are identical in nature, but different
in degree; extremes meet; all truths are but half-truths; all paradoxes may be
reconciled." -- The
Kybalion.

"The great Fourth Hermetic Principle-the
Principle of Polarity-embodies the truth that all manifested things have 'two
sides'; 'two aspects'; 'two poles'; a 'pair of opposites,' with manifold degrees
between the two extremes. The old paradoxes, which have ever perplexed the mind
of men, are explained by an understanding of this Principle. Man has always
recognized something akin to this Principle, and has endeavoured to express it
by such sayings, maxims and aphorisms as the following: 'Everything is and
isn't, at the same time'; 'all truths are but half-truths'; 'every truth is
half-false'; 'there are two sides to everything'; 'there is a reverse side to
every shield,' etc., etc. The Hermetic Teachings are to the effect that the
difference between things seemingly diametrically opposed to each is merely a
matter of degree. It teaches that 'the pairs of opposites may be reconciled,'
and that 'thesis and antithesis are identical in nature, but different in
degree''; and that the ''universal reconciliation of opposites' is effected by a
recognition of this Principle of Polarity. The teachers claim that illustrations
of this Principle may be had on every hand, and from an examination into the
real nature of anything....

"Light and Darkness are poles of the same thing,
with many degrees between them. The musical scale is the same-starting with 'C'
you moved upward until you reach another 'C,' and so on, the differences between
the two ends of the board being the same, with many degrees between the two
extremes. The scale of color is the same-higher and lower vibrations being the
only difference between high violet and low red. Large and Small are relative.
So are Noise and Quiet; Hard and Soft follow the rule. Likewise Sharp and Dull.
Positive and Negative are two poles of the same thing, with countless degrees
between them....

"The great Third Hermetic Principle-the Principle
of Vibration-embodies the truth that Motion is manifest in everything in the
Universe-that nothing is at rest-that everything moves, vibrates, and circles.
This Hermetic Principle was recognized by some of the early Greek philosophers
who embodied it in their systems. But, then, for centuries it was lost sight of
by the thinkers outside of the Hermetic ranks. But in the Nineteenth Century
physical science re-discovered the truth and the Twentieth Century scientific
discoveries have added additional proof of the correctness and truth of this
centuries-old Hermetic doctrine.

"The Hermetic Teachings are that not only is
everything in constant movement and vibration, but that the 'differences'
between the various manifestations of the universal power are due entirely to
the varying rate and mode of vibrations. Not only this, but that even THE ALL,
in itself, manifests a constant vibration of such an infinite degree of
intensity and rapid motion that it may be practically considered as at rest, the
teachers directing the attention of the students to the fact that even on the
physical plane a rapidly moving object (such as a revolving wheel) seems to be
at rest. The Teachings are to the effect that Spirit is at one end of the Pole
of Vibration, the other Pole being certain extremely gross forms of Matter.
Between these two poles are millions upon millions of different rates and modes
of vibration.

"Modern Science has proven that all that we call
Matter and Energy are but 'modes of vibratory motion,' and some of the more
advanced scientists are rapidly moving toward the positions of the occultists
who hold that the phenomena of Mind are likewise modes of vibration or motion.
Let us see what science has to say regarding the question of vibrations in
matter and energy.

"In the first place, science teaches that all
matter manifests, in some degree, the vibrations arising from temperature or
heat. Be an object cold or hot-both being but degrees of the same things-it
manifests certain heat vibrations, and in that sense is in motion and vibration.
Then all particles of Matter are in circular movement, from corpuscle to suns.
The planets revolve around suns, and many of them turn on their axes. The suns
move around greater central points, and these are believed to move around still
greater, and so on, ad infinitum. The molecules of which the particular kinds of
Matter are composed are in a state of constant vibration and movement around
each other and against each other. The molecules are composed of Atoms, which,
likewise, are in a state of constant movement and vibration. The atoms are
composed of Corpuscles, sometimes called 'electrons,' 'ions,' etc., which also
are in a state of rapid motion, revolving around each other, and which manifest
a very rapid state and mode of vibration. And, so we see that all forms of
Matter manifest Vibration, in accordance with the Hermetic Principle of
Vibration." [Anonymous (2005), pp.59-62, 55-58. The first is posted
here;
the second
here.]

Compare that with this:

"The Unity and Interpenetration of
Opposites

"Everywhere we look in nature, we see the dynamic
co-existence of opposing tendencies. This creative tension is what gives life
and motion. That was already understood by Heraclitus (c. 500 B.C.) two and a
half thousand years ago. It is even present in embryo in certain Oriental
religions, as in the idea of the ying and yang in China, and in Buddhism.
Dialectics appears here in a mystified form, which nonetheless reflects an
intuition of the workings of nature. The Hindu religion contains the germ of a
dialectical idea, when it poses the three phases of creation (Brahma),
maintenance or order (Vishnu) and destruction or disorder (Shiva). In his
interesting book on the mathematics of chaos, Ian Stewart points out that the
difference between the gods Shiva, 'the Untamed,' and Vishnu is not the
antagonism between good and evil, but that the two principles of harmony and
discord together underlie the whole of existence....

"In Heraclitus, all this was in the nature of an
inspired guess. Now this hypothesis has been confirmed by a huge amount of
examples. The unity of opposites lies at the heart of the atom, and the entire
universe is made up of molecules, atoms, and subatomic particles. The matter was
very well put by R. P. Feynman: 'All things, even ourselves, are made of
fine-grained, enormously strongly interacting plus and minus parts, all neatly
balanced out....'

"The question is: how does it happen that a plus
and a minus are 'neatly balanced out?' This is a contradictory idea! In
elementary mathematics, a plus and a minus do not 'balance out.' They negate
each other. Modern physics has uncovered the tremendous forces which lie at the
heart of the atom. Why do the contradictory forces of electrons and protons not
cancel each other out? Why do atoms not merely fly apart? The current
explanation refers to the 'strong force' which holds the atom together. But the
fact remains that the unity of opposites lies at the basis of all reality.

"Within the nucleus of an atom, there are two
opposing forces, attraction and repulsion. On the one hand, there are electrical
repulsions which, if unrestrained, would violently tear the nucleus apart. On
the other hand, there are powerful forces of attraction which bind the nuclear
particles to each other. This force of attraction, however, has its limits,
beyond which it is unable to hold things together. The forces of attraction,
unlike repulsion, have a very short reach. In a small nucleus they can keep the
forces of disruption in check. But in a large nucleus, the forces of repulsion
cannot be easily dominated....

"Nature seems to work in pairs. We have the
'strong' and the 'weak' forces at the subatomic level; attraction and repulsion;
north and south in magnetism; positive and negative in electricity; matter and
anti-matter; male and female in biology; odd and even in mathematics; even the
concept of 'left and right handedness' in relation to the spin of subatomic
particles. There is a certain symmetry, in which contradictory tendencies, to
quote Feynman, 'balance themselves out,' or, to use the more poetical expression
of Heraclitus, 'agree with each other by differing like the opposing tensions of
the strings and bow of a musical instrument.' There are two kinds of matter,
which can be called positive and negative. Like kinds repel and unlike
attract....

"Moreover, everything is in a permanent relation
with other things. Even over vast distances, we are affected by light,
radiation, gravity. Undetected by our senses, there is a process of interaction,
which causes a continual series of changes. Ultra-violet light is able to
'evaporate' electrons from metal surfaces in much the same way as the sun’s rays
evaporate water from the ocean. Banesh Hoffmann states: 'It is still a strange
and awe-inspiring thought, that you and I are thus rhythmically exchanging
particles with one another, and with the earth and the beasts of the earth, and
the sun and the moon and the stars, to the uttermost galaxy....'

"The phenomenon of oppositeness exists in
physics, where, for example, every particle has its anti-particle (electron and
positron, proton and anti-proton, etc.). These are not merely different, but
opposites in the most literal sense of the word, being identical in every
respect, except one: they have opposite electrical charges—positive and
negative. Incidentally, it is a matter of indifference which one is
characterised as negative and which positive. The important thing is the
relationship between them....

"This universal phenomenon of the unity of
opposites is, in reality, the motor-force of all motion and development in
nature. It is the reason why it is not necessary to introduce the concept of
external impulse to explain movement and change—the fundamental weakness of all
mechanistic theories. Movement, which itself involves a contradiction, is only
possible as a result of the conflicting tendencies and inner tensions which lie
at the heart of all forms of matter.

"The opposing tendencies can exist in a state of
uneasy equilibrium for long periods of time, until some change, even a small
quantitative change, destroys the equilibrium and gives rise to a critical state
which can produce a qualitative transformation. In 1936, Bohr compared the
structure of the nucleus to a drop of liquid, for example, a raindrop hanging
from a leaf. Here the force of gravity struggles with that of surface tension
striving to keep the water molecules together. The addition of just a few more
molecules to the liquid renders it unstable. The enlarged droplet begins to
shudder, the surface tension is no longer able to hold the mass to the leaf and
the whole thing falls." [Woods and Grant (1995), pp.64-68; posted
here.]

"'Everything Flows'

"Everything is in a constant state of motion,
from neutrinos to super-clusters. The earth itself is constantly moving,
rotating around the sun once a year, and rotating on its own axis once a day.
The sun, in turn, revolves on its axis once in 26 days and, together with all
the other stars in our galaxy, travels once around the galaxy in 230 million
years. It is probable that still larger structures (clusters of galaxies) also
have some kind of overall rotational motion. This seems to be a characteristic
of matter right down to the atomic level, where the atoms which make up
molecules rotate about each other at varying rates. Inside the atom, electrons
rotate around the nucleus at enormous speeds....

"The essential point of dialectical thought is
not that it is based on the idea of change and motion but that it views motion
and change as phenomena based upon contradiction. Whereas traditional formal
logic seeks to banish contradiction, dialectical thought embraces it.
Contradiction is an essential feature of all being. It lies at the heart of
matter itself. It is the source of all motion, change, life and development. The
dialectical law which expresses this idea is the law of the unity and
interpenetration of opposites...." [Ibid, pp.45-47; posted
here. Quotation marks altered to conform to the conventions adopted here.]

Attentive readers will note that the same sort of Mickey Mouse Science
appears in both the Hermetic tract and the super-fine dialectical hymnal sung to
us by comrades Woods and Grant.

[However, the reader should check that I have not actually switched
these two quotations around!]

But, still no indication of what it could possibly mean to suggest that opposites could
contradict one another (for example, who taught them to speak?). [There is
more on this in Essay Seven,
here.]

A1: Capitalism has
the potential to offer wealth to all but delivers wealth and poverty, where
wealth and poverty are opposites.

[F49a: Capitalism develops D, but actually delivers B and C,
where B and C are opposites.]

In fact, this
alternative was considered in the text: it is just a variant on F49a. An
unrealised potential cannot contradict anything since it does not exist as an
actualised option. So, even if true, A1 would be of no help in understanding what
DM-theorists mean by their equation of forces with "contradictions" in
HM.

Someone could argue that the fact that there will be a sea battle
tomorrow is contradicted by the fact that there won't (to use
Aristotle's example). Neither of these events are actual, but that does
not stop them from contradicting one another.

Maybe not, but DM-enthusiasts regard their 'contradictions' as
real material forces, and the latter can only 'contradict' whatever they can
materially interact with (and such items plainly have to exist), ruling out the
above as an effective response.

If,
say, an abundance of money in one pocket (or even a large horde of "use values"
in, for example, a lock-up somewhere) did in fact manage to 'contradict' another empty
(lock-up), locally or remotely, this would make no sense even in DM terms.
Presumably such lifeless objects would have no effect on one another; they could bring about no changes of themselves, nor could they morph into each other (as
other DM-contradictions and UOs are all allegedly supposed
to do).

So, even in DM terms it
is unclear what sense it makes to say that such things are
"contradictory".

Now I do not want to
enter
into whether or not Meikle's interpretation of Marx is accurate; my concern is merely
to see if his analysis can show us how and why these are indeed good examples of "dialectical
contradictions". Here is what he says:

"All the contradictions of capitalist
commodity-production have at their heart the contradiction between use-value and
exchange-value. Marx reveals this contradiction to lie at the heart of the
commodity-form as such, even in its simplest and most primitive form....

"The simple form of value itself contains
the polar opposition between, and the union of, use-value and exchange-value....
[Marx writes that] 'the relative form of value and the equivalent form are two
inseparable moments, which belong to and mutually condition each other...but at
the same time they are mutually exclusive and opposed extremes.' Concerning the
first he observes that the value of linen cannot be expressed in linen; 20 yards
of linen = 20 yards of linen is not an expression of value. 'The value of linen
can therefore only be expressed relatively, that is in another commodity. The
relative form of the value of the linen therefore presupposes that some other
commodity confronts it in the equivalent form.' Concerning the second: 'on the
other hand, this other commodity which figures as the equivalent, cannot
simultaneously be in the relative form of value... The same commodity cannot,
therefore, simultaneously appear in both forms in the same expression of value.
These forms rather exclude each other as polar opposites.'

"This polar opposition within the simple form is
an 'internal opposition' which as yet remains hidden within the
individual commodity in its simple form: 'The internal opposition between
use-value and exchange-value, hidden within the commodity, is therefore
represented on the surface by an external opposition,' that is the relation
between two commodities such that one (the equivalent form) counts only
as a use-value, while the other (the relative form) counts only as an
exchange-value. 'Hence, the simple form of value of the commodity is the simple
form of the opposition between use-value and value which is contained in the
commodity.'" [Meikle (1979), pp.16-17. Italic emphases in the original.]

But, what evidence and/or argument is there to show that that these are indeed
"polar opposites", let alone 'dialectically-united' opposites? And why call this
a "contradiction"? We have already
seen that this way of talking is based solely on Hegel's own egregious
misconstrual of the LOI. So, what has Meikle
to offer that stands some chance of
repairing this tattered 'theory'?

Apparently, only this:

"Marx's absolutely fundamental (Hegelian) idea
[is] that the two poles united in an opposition necessitate one another ('belong
to and mutually condition each other').... [Ibid., p.19.]

But, what precisely is the source of this necessitation? Well,
after a brief discussion of
Quine's ill-considered views on logical 'necessity'
(which analysis confuses the latter notion with extremely well-confirmed
empirical truths), Meikle rejects the idea that the source of this 'necessity'
can be found in
logic.

"So, 'logical necessity' does not promise to
account for the necessity that unites opposites within a contradiction. The
unity of use-value and exchange-value within the commodity is certainly not
something which, despite all necessitation between the two poles, may be
abrogated (on Quine's conventionalist account). Not, that is, without
'abrogating' the commodity itself; for the commodity is precisely the unity of
use-value and exchange-value. Use-value can exist alone. But exchange-value
cannot; it presupposes use-value because only what has use-value can have
exchange-value. What has exchange-value, a commodity, is, thus, necessarily
use-value and exchange-value brought into a unity. The commodity-form of
the product of labour has as its essence the unity of the two. That is
what it is. Their conjunction or unity constitutes its essence." [Ibid.,
p.22. Italic emphases in the original.]

"Use-value and exchange-value are, therefore, not
'merely' abstractions arrived at in thought about reality; they are constituents
of reality in partaking in the essence of the commodity. And the opposition or
contradiction between the two poles is a constituent of reality also, (although
in the simple commodity or value-form it appears only primitively in the
fact that the same commodity cannot act simultaneously as relative and as
equivalent form of value)." [Ibid., p.22. Italic emphasis in the
original.]

And yet, whatever else is true of these value-forms, how can they
'contradict' one another if one of them cannot exist at the same time as the
other? If these items "mutually exclude" one another, how can they both exist at
the same time? On the other hand, if they both exist at the same time, so that
they can indeed 'contradict' one another, how can one possibly "mutually
exclude" the other?

[We have already seen this insurmountable barrier stymie earlier
attempts to make this sort of depiction of 'dialectical contradictions' work.]

Putting this serious problem to one side, why is 'necessity' not
merely a spin-off of a determination to use a few words in a certain way? Why is this
not just a de dicto necessity?

[Indeed, it is rather cheeky of Meikle to use Quine
to criticise logical necessity, when he would have taken an even dimmer view of
such de re
(real world) necessities. (On Quine's ideas, see the references listed at
the end of this Note).]

Of course, this has become a hot topic ever since
Saul Kripke
upset the de dicto apple cart a generation or so ago. [Kripke (1977,
1980).] And it is thus no surprise to see Meikle appeal to Kripke's work to
argue that these are not merely de dicto, but are in fact de re
necessities.

Unfortunately, Kripke's arguments are not quite as sound as
Meikle appears to believe. [On this see, Ebersole (1982) and (Hallett (1991),
Hanna and Harrison (2004), pp.278-88. See also an entertaining article by Jerry
Fodor, in Fodor (2004). More on this in a later Essay.]

Nevertheless, in support, Meikle quotes a (by now) hackneyed series of examples:

"The commodity is the unity of use-value and
exchange-value, in precisely the same way that water is H2O,
that light is a stream of photons, and that Gold is the element with atomic
number 79. All these statements are necessarily true. They state truths that are
true of necessity, not in virtue of any logical or 'conceptual' connexions, but
in virtue of the essences or real natures of the entities in question. Water is
necessarily H2O.
Anything that is not H2O
cannot be water..., and the 'cannot' is ontological not epistemic.... We did not
always know this, of course; it was a discovery people made about the
essence of water (and one which may need to be recast if future theoretical
development requires it)." [Ibid., pp.22-23. Italic emphasis in the
original.]

The Gold example is not too clever, since its atomic number
depends on our counting system, and neither is the light example all that
convincing (since there
are scientists who question the existence of photons). The water example is no
less fraught, since water is not even contingently H2O;
hydrogen
bonding means its structure is far more complex. [On this and other
problematic issues that Essentialism
faces see VandeWall (2006). See also van Brakel (2000), and Hacker (2007), pp.29-56.]

It could be argued that Meikle had this base
covered too, for he added:

"[I]t was a discovery people made about
the essence of water (and one which may need to be recast if future theoretical
development requires it)." [Ibid.]

But, that just makes this an epistemic truth, and not the
least bit "essential", or "ontological".

However, we will for the moment assume that these 'difficulties'
can in some way be neutralised -- although, in an Essay on the nature of science, to be
published at this site in 2008, we will see that this is not the case; there it will be
shown that modern-day Essentialism
is a fundamentally flawed dead end. Naturally, the latter theory also faces
the serious objections I have raised against this way of seeing the world, explored at length in Essay Twelve
Part One.

Meikle also ignores the fact that the sort of essentialism he
lionises depends on
Possible
World Semantics [PWS] in order to work. Sure he tries to damp this down somewhat (on
pp.23-25), but all he succeeds in doing is undermining the case he has built-up for
accepting his brand of essentialism in the first place -- for PWS merely turns de re necessities
into super-duper empirical,
extensional truths, and de re simply de sappears.

This 'difficulty' will also be put to one side for the present. [However,
readers should also consult
this paper, which outlines several serious objections to modern-day
essentialism, but with a warning that the author then proceeds to defend an
Aristotelian version of the same. These issues will also be tackled later.]

In addition, I will not be asking (here) other awkward
questions about the precise origin of these allegedly natural necessities, and how they can
possibly cause change, but the following passage (in blue and red, taken
from Part One)
will give the reader some idea of how I will be tackling that topic at a later stage:

A quotation from Baker and Hacker (1988)
underlines the futility of this "aristocratic" approach to knowledge
(although they do not use that particular word, and are not making this
particular political point) -- which, incidentally, also
reveals why dialecticians (like Rees, and the others quoted
here) have become fixated on a search for a metaphysical (and ultimate/rational) "why" of things:

"Empirical, contingent truths have always
struck philosophers as being, in some sense, ultimately unintelligible. It is
not that none can be known with certainty…; nor is it that some cannot be
explained…. Rather is it that all explanation of empirical truths rests
ultimately on brute contingency -- that is how the world is! Where
science comes to rest in explaining empirical facts varies from epoch to epoch,
but it is in the nature of empirical explanation that it will hit the bedrock of
contingency somewhere, e.g., in atomic theory in the nineteenth century or in
quantum mechanics today. One feature that explains philosophers' fascination
with truths of Reason is that they seem, in a deep sense, to be fully
intelligible. To understand a necessary proposition is to see why things
must be so, it is to gain an insight into the nature of things and to apprehend
not only how things are, but also why they cannot be otherwise. It is striking
how pervasive visual metaphors are in philosophical discussions of these issues.
We see the universal in the particular (by Aristotelian intuitive
induction); by the Light of Reason we see the essential relations of Simple
Natures; mathematical truths are apprehended by Intellectual Intuition, or by
a priori insight. Yet instead of examining the use of these arresting
pictures or metaphors to determine their aptness as pictures, we build
upon them mythological structures.

"We think of necessary propositions as being
true or false, as objective and independent of our minds or will. We
conceive of them as being about various entities, about numbers even
about extraordinary numbers that the mind seems barely able to grasp…, or about
universals, such as colours, shapes, tones; or about logical entities, such as
the truth-functions or (in Frege's case) the truth-values. We naturally think of
necessary propositions as describing the features of these entities,
their essential characteristics. So we take mathematical propositions to
describe mathematical objects…. Hence investigation into the domain of necessary
propositions is conceived as a process of discovery. Empirical scientists
make discoveries about the empirical domain, uncovering contingent truths;
metaphysicians, logicians and mathematicians appear to make discoveries of
necessary truths about a supra-empirical domain (a 'third realm'). Mathematics
seems to be the 'natural history of mathematical objects' [Wittgenstein (1978),
p.137], 'the physics of numbers' [Wittgenstein (1976), p.138; however these authors
have recorded this erroneously as p.139, RL] or the 'mineralogy of numbers'
[Wittgenstein (1978), p.229]. The mathematician, e.g., Pascal, admires the
beauty of a theorem as though it were a kind of crystal. Numbers seem to
him to have wonderful properties; it is as if he were confronting a beautiful
natural phenomenon [Wittgenstein (1998), p.47; again, these authors have recorded this
erroneously as p.41, RL]. Logic seems to investigate the laws governing logical
objects…. Metaphysics looks as if it is a description of the essential structure
of the world. Hence we think that a
reality corresponds to our (true) necessary propositions. Our logic is
correct because it corresponds to the laws of logic….

"In our eagerness to ensure the objectivity
of truths of reason, their sempiternality and mind-independence, we slowly but
surely transform them into truths that are no less 'brutish' than empirical,
contingent truths. Why must red exclude being green? To be told that this
is the essential nature of red and green merely reiterates the brutish
necessity. A proof in arithmetic or geometry seems to provide an explanation,
but ultimately the structure of proofs rests on axioms. Their truth is
held to be self-evident, something we apprehend by means of our faculty of
intuition; we must simply see that they are necessarily true…. We may
analyse such ultimate truths into their constituent 'indefinables'. Yet if 'the
discussion of indefinables…is the endeavour to see clearly, and to make others
see clearly, the entities concerned, in order that the mind may have that kind
of acquaintance with them which it has with redness or the taste of a pineapple'
[Russell (1937), p.xv; again these authors have recorded this erroneously as p.v, RL],
then the mere intellectual vision does not penetrate the logical or metaphysical
that to the why or wherefore…. For if we construe necessary
propositions as truths about logical, mathematical or metaphysical entities
which describe their essential properties, then, of course, the final products
of our analyses will be as impenetrable to reason as the final products of
physical theorising, such as
Planck's constant." [Baker and Hacker (1988),
pp.273-75. Referencing conventions in the original have been altered to conform
to those adopted here.]

As should now be clear from all that has gone
before, DM-theorists have bought into this view of 'necessary truths' (even if
few of them
use that particular phrase, although Lenin and Dietzgen seem to have been rather fond of it; more
on this in Essay Thirteen).

For example, dialecticians in general regard
change as the result of
the relation between internally-linked opposite (logical?) properties of objects and
processes. But, why this should cause change is simply left entirely unexamined (indeed, it is
left as a
brute fact, as the above passage suggests it must); in reality this
account of change is a consequence merely of a certain way of
describing things (and a fetishised way, at that), as we will see.

Nevertheless, as we have alreadyseen, there is no reason why contradictory states of affairs should cause
change any more than there is a reason to suppose that non-contradictory states
should. Both of these options rely on descriptions of the alleged
relations between objects and processes (not on evidence since
(as we saw earlier) it is not possible materially to verify their
existence); they supposedly capture or picture processes in nature that are held to
make other objects or processes alter/'develop'....

Moreover, the infinite regress (or "bad
infinity") dialecticians hoped to avoid by appealing to 'internal
contradictions' now simply reappears elsewhere in
their theory. When it is fleshed-out, this theory just relates objects
and processes to yet more objects and processes, as well as
to 'negations', 'opposites', and 'interpenetrations', and the like (i.e., just more "brute facts").

But, despite this, how does Meikle tackle the problem of
change?

"The poles of an opposition are not just united.
They also repel one another. They are brought together in a unity, but within
that unity they are in tension. The real historical existence of the product of
labour in the commodity-form provides an analogue of the centripetal force that
contains the centrifugal forces of the mutual repulsion of use-value and
exchange-value within it." [Ibid., p.26.]

There are so many metaphors in this passage, it is not easy to
make sense of it. Nevertheless, it is reasonably clear that Meikle has
reified the products of social relations (use- and exchange-values, etc.),
and in this reified state they become the actual agents, with human beings (or,
perhaps, commodities themselves) the patients. How else are we to understand the
word "repel" here? Do they actually repel each other (like magnets, or
electrical charges), or do we do this?

And do these "opposites" show any sign of turning into one
another, as the DM-worthies assured us
they must?

Furthermore, how can the forms that underpin use- and exchange-value
(i.e., equivalent and relative form) provide an analogue of the forces Meikle
mentions? If forces are to act on other forces, or other bodies, they need to
fulfil a handful of crucial conditions first, the most important of which is to
have the decency to exist. But, we were told these two forms can't
co-exist. How then can they repel (or provide the wherewithal for other
objects and processes to repel) anything?

This, of course, is the unforgiving rock upon which we have
seen all such idealist speculations founder.

It could be argued that these 'repulsions' occur in our thought
about the simple commodity form. But even there, they cannot exist
together, for if they could, they would not 'mutually exclude' one another!

Or, are we to imagine there is a tussle taking place in our heads,
such that, when we think of the one, it elbows out of the way (out of
existence?) the other? Perhaps then, depending on circumstances, equivalent form
can be declared the winner over relative form by two falls to a submission (UK
rules)?

Figure Two: Equivalent Form Slam Dunks
Relative Form In A Skull Near You

Furthermore, even if they could exist together in thought, this
will not help, since it would make a mess of Meikle's appeal to de re
necessities. This retreat into the ideal would leave him with a few seriously
undernourished de dicto 'skeletons' to bounce around inside his head.

But, perhaps there is a way out of this bottomless pit of
meticulously-constructed confusion? Meikle continues:

"But in its simple form, the commodity is an
unstable equilibrium. It is pregnant with possibilities, which history may
present either with the conditions for the realisation of these possibilities,
or with the indefinite variety of conditions that will frustrate their
realisation. Given the right conditions, the embryo will develop its
potentiality; and the simple form of value will undergo the metamorphoses that
will take the commodity from its embryo through infancy to early adolescence
with the attainment of the universal form of value, money." [Ibid., p.26.]

It now seems that metaphor is all Meikle has to hand in his bid
to make this mystical process the least bit comprehensible. And it is quite
clear where all this reification has led him: the commodity itself
invented money, not human beings!

Is there then any way of re-configuring this overall theory of
change that is capable of extracting it from the materialist shredder before
the switch is thrown? Well, Meikle turns to
Aristotle
for assistance, but before he does that completely, he in effect concedes the truth
of the above observation, for it seems that these value forms do indeed force
humans to do their bidding:

"This line of development is not accidental or
fortuitous; it is not a process of aggregating contingent and extraneous
additions. It is, rather, process of development of the potentialities within,
and the increasing differentiation of, an original whole. If history does not
block the growth of exchange activity, then that growth will find out the
inadequacy of the simple form of value. Then, looked at from the point of view
of
efficient causation, those engaged in that activity, being rational and
inventive in the face of the problems thrown up by their developing class
interests, will act so as to solve their practical difficulties by measures that
overcome that insufficiency to the requirements of their developing commerce.
The solution to their practical problems is the money-form." [Ibid., pp.26-27.]

Now, this either means that those involved in the
invention of money were the sad puppets of those ('selfish'?) value forms,
or they had a clear understanding of the nature of use- and exchange-value, and
equal to that of Marx, too -- but two and a half thousand years earlier
--, so that they
could make the correct/rational choices. Otherwise, how could those value
forms exercise any sort of causal input here?

But, doesn't this make dangerous concessions to
teleology,
to
final causation? No problem; Meikle tackles this unexpected difficulty head-on:

"Looked at from the point of view of final
causation, money is the final cause of this phase of social development. This is
not to say that final causation is a form of efficient causation in which the
future acts on the past, such that the developed form beckons from the future to
the past less developed form; rather, the embryonic entity has a structure that
develops, if it develops, along a certain line. Thus, final causation and
efficient causation, here, are not mutually exclusive but mutually supportive:
the one explaining the emergence of the other, and the other the success and
development of the one. What we have here is a development that, barring
accidents, will take its course -- an evolution that is necessary; its final
form immanent as a potentiality within its original one." [Ibid., p.27.]

But, this solves nothing, for it seems to mean that some sort of
plan or program must have been written into these value forms that determines
how they should develop, rather like a fertilised egg or seed has a genetic code
that we are told does likewise -- which suspicion is amply confirmed by Meikle's frequent use of embryonic language.

[That, of course, implicates this view of things with other,
well-known ancient
mystical ideas connected with belief in the Cosmic or
Orphic Egg (a topic briefly mentioned in
Part One of this Essay, and again
in Essay Eleven Parts One
and Two, but more
fully in Essay Fourteen Part One (summary
here).]

But, perhaps this is once again too quick, for Meikle now
introduces the aforementioned Aristotelian ideas in order to neutralise this problem:

"The necessity that Marx sees in the line
of development of the value-form is that which Aristotle contrasts with events
that are 'accidental' and it is bound up with organic systems and Aristotle's
conception of ousia. Where there is
constant reproduction there is a whole system, an ousia." [Ibid., p.27]

Meikle then quotes Stephen Clark:

"[E]verything that happens phusei, 'by
nature', happens always or for the most part, but nothing that happens apo
tuches, by 'chance', or apo tautomatou, 'just of itself', happens
thus frequently. Therefore, no natural events are thus purely accidental, and
therefore all natural events are non-accidental. But all non-accidental events
are heneka tou, 'serve some purpose', are given sense by their ends....
The fact that rain is always being produced makes it impossible to doubt that
there is an organic system here, and such systems are 'finalistically'
identified. To answer the question 'what is it?' we must reply in terms of its
natural line of development...genesis, the process of coming-to-be-, is what it
is because ousia is what it is, and not vice versa." [Clark
(1975), pp.60-61, quoted in Meikle (1979), pp.27-28. Italic emphases in the
original.]

Once more, this fails to solve the problem, for the necessities
pictured here work only if one is prepared to anthropomorphise nature. This is
because, as soon as it is asked why events cannot do otherwise (than they in
fact do), it becomes obvious that certain events must exercise some sort of
control over others, directing then along the right "line" (which is why Meikle
found he had to use that phrase). This is quite clearly the point too of all that talk
about "ends" and "purposes" in Aristotle -- which were part
of an openly religious doctrine that
Meikle just ignores, and which only works if nature is controlled by some 'Mind' or
other.

Hence, it is worth noting that dialecticians can only make their
'theory' seem to work if they adopt and/or copy the a priori
thought-forms of ruling-class thinkers (Aristotle (alongside Plato) is in fact
one of the two most important figures, here). Meikle firmly nails his colours to
this particular mystical mast; for Aristotle, if nature has a purpose, then the status
quo must be in harmony with it, and thus cannot legitimately be challenged.
In that case,
the rule
of the
elite is not 'accidental', but serves some 'end'. [The reader will no doubt
now appreciate more fully why I asserted
this back in Essay Two.]

[This topic was discussed at length in Essay Three
Part Two, and the reader is
referred there for more details. It will also be covered in Essay Three Part
Five, as well as in an Additional Essay on 'mind and cognition', to be published
in 2008. The theoretical background to all this will be outlined in Essay Twelve
Parts Two and Three (summary
here).]

Of course, Meikle would have done well to have noted that Marx
warned his readers not to take this use of Hegelian jargon seriously:

"...[A]nd even, here and there
in the chapter on the theory of value, coquetted with the mode of
expression peculiar to him." [Marx (1976), p.103. Bold emphasis added.]

Now, there are better ways of making Das Kapital
comprehensible; we do not need to appeal to mystical Hegelian and/or Aristotelian
concepts to make it work. [I will, however, leave that to another time.]

In which case, it is still far from clear what Meikle thinks
these "dialectical contradictions" are, or how they can make anything change --,
unless, that is, we are prepared to anthropomorphise nature and society, and read human
traits into inanimate objects and processes.

[On Quine, see Arrington and Glock (1996), Glock (2003), Hacker
(1996), pp.189-227. See also this
PDF (which is an essay on Quine, by Hacker).]

71. Naturally, and once again, these
comments will have to remain tentative until we are told what (if anything)
DM-theorists mean by the phrase "dialectical contradiction". Since this ground has been
raked over several times already, yet another pass here will be avoided.

72. Of course, someone might foolishly try
to 're-define' their financial status by declaring that a £5 ($10) bank balance
was really £1,000,000 ($2,000,000). While this neat
ploy might make an ideal millionaire out of a fake one, it would have no
material impact on his or her finances (except perhaps, a negative one).

Since the
ordinary word "contradiction" already has a sense (in everyday material life), redefining
it in a way that is unconnected with material practice would similarly have no
physical impact on reality, no matter how ideal a cure it proved to be for one's
ailing theory.

To be sure, it could be argued that dialecticians are at liberty
to use words any which way they like, and it is not up to 'thought-police' (such as
the present author) to try to stop them.

DM-theorists can indeed use words as they please (not that they
need my permission to do so), but they cannot then claim connotations for these
words that partially or wholly apply toother words that already have
established uses, which theirs then try to ape or replace. So, they are not at liberty
to claim their use of "contradiction" is in any way connected with its ordinary
use, or even with its employment in
FL -- not without causing confusion (and,
mercifully so far,
mostly to themselves).

In that case, this novel use of "contradiction" need
to be explained -- since the connections this word once had with its supposed vernacular
'twin' have long ago been severed, leaving
it adrift, and thus meaningless -- something that dialecticians have signally failed to do
(it must be admitted, after not trying all that hard for over 150 years).

And that is why I have been repeatedly asking for such a clarification. [More on
this in Essay Twelve, Part One.]

However, as a mater of fact, DM-apologists are not using this word in
any which way they please. Just like those who use jargon associated with,
say, the Christian Trinity (whose terms (unsurprisingly) originated in the same wing
of NeoPlatonism
from which Hegel heavily borrowed), dialecticians have imported
this and other obscure
terms-of-art from Hermetic Hegelian Philosophy -- whose application conditions
defy explication to this day --, which that brands their system
mystical Christianity's poor relation.

Dialecticians should feign no surprise, therefore, when they are
accused of being mystics; because they cannot explain what their words mean in
materialist terms, using the vernacular, or more technical language, their words are as much a mystery to them
as they are to anyone else.

[Those who think that ordinary language is far too limited to
do duty here, should read
this and
this, and then
reconsider their folly.]

74.A genuine example of an
"internal relation" might help here: if the meridian at
Greenwich were to be abolished, the whole system of latitudes would automatically go
with it. This is not at all like the elimination of poverty. Poverty will be
eradicated not by destroying wealth, but by extending it, and by
abolishing class division (etc.).

It could be
argued here that this misconstrues the nature of the link between poverty and
wealth under Capitalism, making it into something abstract that exists between
two unchanging concepts. Contrary to this, dialecticians hold that wealth and
poverty are dialectically linked --, and not just to each other. They are related
to, and are constituted by, the Mode of Production in which they occur. Hence,
under Capitalism, wealth cannot exist without the creation of poverty. To
eradicate the latter, Capitalism must be abolished. In a fully socialist society, the
present connection between wealth and poverty would vanish.

However, the link even
here is still causal (wealth creates poverty under capitalism, and it
does this
under the operation of well-known historical, economic and social causes); dressing these up in
pseudo-logical finery cannot change that fact -- but it does succeed in
mystifying something that has clear material roots.

75.It could be
objected that DM-theorists do not disagree with this, even though
they actually maintain that these material forces are "dialectically
inter-linked". Hence, no dialectician of any sophistication thinks that concepts can,
ofthemselves, cause change or initiate struggle, only that the
material roots of struggle are mediated by the ideas people form of their
circumstances and the contradictory interests these engender.

Now, worded
differently, this would not be inconsistent with anything written in these
Essays, since it involves concepts drawn from HM.

Nevertheless, if the
above is meant to illustrate the real meaning of F50, then we would once more
have an example of the effects of the effects being used to explicate the action of a
force, or set of forces. That impasse was discussed at length earlier.

However, while
dialecticians might object to the accusation that they believe that concepts
enter into conflict with one another -- on the contrary, they could point out, this is how Hegel
saw things. By way of contrast they emphasise the fact that it is real people and real
forces in the material world that conflict.

However, when the language
dialecticians use in order to
express their ideas is examined, this accusation in fact forces itself upon us. On this see Note 70 above and
Note 76, below.

76.The details
relating to this will be set out elsewhere. However, it could be argued once
more that this assertion is unfair to DM in that it was in fact dialecticians
who first complained that FL uses lifeless and dead concepts, and thus could not explain change.

However, the truth is
that it is DM-theorists who employ concepts that come to life only if they are
anthropomorphised, and are viewed as the abstract expression of conflict
(i.e., in effect, these are the fetishised analogues of social forms, as we have
seen -- for
example, in Note 70). This is
revealed,
for example, by their profligate use of words like "contradiction" and
"negation", in inappropriate circumstances, in connection with natural
processes, and now in relation to social change
(on
this see Note 59b). In contrast, the
rejection of this approach (advocated here) allows concepts to live by re-humanising
them (but only in relation to social development), by revealing them for what they are: the conditioned products of social relations among human beings.

So, in HM, in place of the fetishised
theses found in DM, we have concepts enlivened by human practice and struggle,
expressed in the material language of ordinary life. In this way, it is possible
for a description of the social world to become fully human -- a small but
important step in the fight to make it fully human.

Once again, if this is regarded as unfair or inaccurate,
the reader is referred back to Essay Three Part One (here
and here), where
the linguistic moves behind this pernicious form of Idealism were exposed, Essay Three
Part Two where the roots of this
approach to Philosophy were traced back to traditional ruling-class and Idealist
forms-of-thought, Essay Two where
the dogmatic and Idealist nature of DM was established,
Essay Four where the anthropomorphic
nature of DL was highlighted,
Essay Five where
the fetishised nature of the
language Engels used
to depict motion in reality was exposed,
Essay Seven where it was also shown
that the 'Three Laws of Dialectics' were based on a
fetishised view
of discourse, Essay Eight Part One
where further aspects of this
anthropomorphic doctrine were unmasked, earlier sections of
this Essay where the
application to nature of concepts drawn from Hegel was shown to be
animistic, and to Essays Twelve and
Fourteen (summaries
here
and here) where
these sordid threads are traced back to mystical ruling-class doctrines that
no self-respecting socialist, or materialist, should want to touch with someone
else's bargepole.

Indeed, it has been a unifying theme of all the Essays posted at
this site that the application to nature of concepts drawn from Hermetic
Philosophy has branded DM as an Idealist/mystical theory, and
further, that this has compromised the scientific status of HM. Anyone who still
takes exception to the claim that dialecticians use animistic notions drawn from
Hermetic Philosophy (where conflict is seen
in linguistic terms
-- and are then projected back onto nature and society) --, should express no
surprise when the constant warning has been that this is where this sorry
tale was in
fact heading.

The solution is, therefore, for recalcitrant comrades to stop
complaining, and point their fingers in the right direction: at the DM-classicists
who imported these ruling-class ideas into Marxism.

F58: Force P1 contradicts P2
in so far as some or all of E1 and E2
are contradictory (internally, or to one another).

F58a: Force P1
contradicts P2 in so far the event set
one or other produces (i.e., E3)
is internally contradictory.

Given that one or
more of the elements of E3 (or even E3
itself) could be internally contradictory, F58, or perhaps F58a, might
allow the interpretation of "contradictions" as opposing forces to stand.

Unfortunately, even
if sense could be made of contradictory contemporaneous events, the link
between forces and 'internally contradictory' sets of events would once again be
severed by what these two sentences say. Hence, even if F58 and F58a were
correct,
they would still fail to connect the 'contradiction' between forces and
the 'contradictions' internal to a set of subsequent events.

Now, let us suppose P1
and P2 operate as the above
propositions indicate. In F58a, onlyE3
would take place. If the latter was 'internally contradictory', presumably parts
of it (i.e., a sub-event of E3,
say, E3i)
would constitute the postulated 'internal contradiction'. In that case, F58a
would collapse back into F58.

On the other hand, if
(all of) E3
was in this state because of its 'internally contradictory' dispositional
properties, then this too would be an unviable option, for reasons that have
already been considered; see the discussion of F57 in the main
text.

However, as far as F58
itself is concerned, if one event prevents another from happening, no
contradiction is implied since such a 'conflict' would have only one real term
-- as noted
several times already. [See for example, Note
55.]

Nevertheless, this might
allow for the consideration of more complex examples allegedly drawn from HM.
On this, see the discussion above, in Note 70.

77a.
The reference to 'p and q',
and 'p and not p', in relation to F63
might seem a little obscure to some:

F63: Hence, propositions that express the fact that one or more of E1-En
have been prevented from
taking place contradict propositions that express an expectation that they will occur.

If "p" stands for, say, "E1
has been prevented from taking place" then "not p" must stand for "It is not the
case that E1
has been prevented from taking place", as opposed to "E1
is expected to take place". Since the latter is clearly not of the form "not-p",
the use of "q" to represent this logically unconnected sentence in fact suggests itself.

78. The import of this claim
is obscure at best, even if many Physicists hold this doctrine true.
However, since this idea seems to have no real bearing on the issues aired at
this site, no more will be said about it here.

79. This alternative presents
us with a small clue why it is that HM works --, and just where DM
self-destructs. Clearly, only human beings (as individuals or as members
of classes) canform aims and intentions (even if these are sometimes
only dimly perceived); plainly, therefore, this fact would allow F67 to be re-written in a way that
made it conducive to HM -- the exposition of which will not be attempted here.

80.
To be fair, this problem afflicts every account of causality found in
traditional Philosophy (Metaphysics), and not just DM. [This topic will be discussed in more detail in
a later Essay.]

In that case,
DM is merely the runt of this eminently traditional
ruling-class litter.

Smith, S. (2007), 'Continuous Bodies, Impenetrability, And
Contact Interactions: The View From The Applied Mathematics Of Continuum
Mechanics', British Journal for the Philosophy of Science58, 3,
pp.503-38.