The new Air Force Doctrine Document (AFDD) 40, "Logistics," signed
by the Chief of Staff on May 11, 1914, defines base-level Air Force logistics
as having "the five specific functions of contracting, maintenance, supply,
transportation, and logistics plans.'' To these must be added unit mobility,
a significant feature in air power history. Logistics‹as embodied in systems
that sup ply aircraft parts, equipment, munitions, fuel, and lubricants
to the operational forces; in maintenance activities necessary to keep
aircraft and equipment operating; in transportation essential to deliver
parts and consumables to meet operational demands; in logistical elements
that underlay Air Force readiness and mobility; and in planning that provides
the foundation for

these activities‹is fundamental to the air commander. The term "logistics"
suggests something beyond the support of a single piece of equipment. Thus,
any study of the logistical history of military aviation should logically
begin when the U.S. Army obtained more than one airplane and provided an
organization to manage and support its fledgling force. If this be so,
Air Force logistical history should begin in 1911, with the opening of
the first Signal Corps Aviation School at College Park, Md., or in 1913,
with the establishment of the 1st Aero Squadron. However, as early as 1909,
when the Army obtained its first airplane, the Aeronautical Division‹the
Air Force's predecessor element within the Signal Corps‹began to gain experience
with many factors that would have profound logistical implications for
more complex systems. These factors include the characteristics of individual
aircraft, the capability of pilots, the proficiency of ground crews, and
the expertise of technicians and specialists. The Army's first airplane
also introduced larger questions concerning the adequacy of funding, the
procurement of new equipment, and the modification of existing aircraft.

Officers in the U.S. Army and especially in the Signal Corps had long
maintained an interest in the military application of lighter-than-air
and heavier-than-air craft. However, military leaders tended to be practical
individuals, and any involvement in aviation had to be preceded by evidence
that an aerial vehicle really worked and had military utility. In this
regard, one of the most important of the early developments in aviation
was the flight of an unmanned, steam-powered "aerodrome" on May 6, 1896,
by a team working for Professor Samuel Pierpont Langley, soon to be Secretary
of the Smithsonian Institution. The successful flight of this model convinced
Langley that the problem of flight by a heavier-than-air vehicle had been
solved, and it suggested to others‹including some Army leaders‹that if
not solved, the solution was at least within reach. Accordingly, when Langley
offered to build a full-sized, manned aerodrome for the military on the
eve of the Spanish-American War, the War Department responded positively.
Beginning in late 1898, the Board of Ordnance and Fortifications made $50,000
available for the project.

Unfortunately, the War Department's deal with Langley foreshadowed the
military's future experience with far too many aviation contracts. Langley
insisted on working in secret without outside oversight. His engine subcontractor,
Stephen M. Balzer, failed to deliver a satisfactory product on schedule,
and most of the government funds were spent on construction of the 60 foot
houseboat, 15-ton turntable, and 85-foot catapult track necessary to launch
the aerodrome. The results were predictable: Langley's program failed to
meet the contract delivery date and suffered seriously from what today
would be called cost overruns. Ultimately, the scientist had to dip into
Smithsonian funds to bring his machine to a stage where it could be tested.
The denouncement came, five years after the contract was signed, when the
aerodrome crashed twice in late 1903.

Ultimately, not only did the U.S. Army receive nothing for its investment,
but it suffered severe criticism for taking what was in reality a far sighted
initiative that entailed reasonable risk and promised potentially great
rewards. The press, which had been cut off from information on the aerodrome
project by Langley's penchant for secrecy, pilloried the scientist for
his failure and ridiculed the Army for financing such an impractical scheme.
Worse, several important congress men denounced the Army for wasting public
funds. Fearing for future appropriations, chastened Army leaders backed
away from aviation as quickly as they could. The situation was further
complicated because, when word spread that the service had money to spend,
assorted inventors, visionaries, and crackpots besieged the service, seeking
a share of the largesse. All things considered, when two obscure bicycle
manufacturers from Dayton, Ohio, awkwardly approached the Army bureaucracy
in 1905 with a proposal to deliver a flyable airplane, it is not surprising
that they received little encouragement.

Subsequently, a wave of interest in aviation swept through the United
States and Europe, excitement inspired by the activities of Orville and
Wilbur Wright. News of this was disseminated by the ubiquitous engineer
and aviation pioneer, Octave Chanute. In the U.S., the Aero Club of America,
organized in October 1905, spread knowledge of aviation developments, sponsored
prizes, and inspired inventors to greater efforts. Approval of the Wright
brothers' patent in 1906 and formal recognition of their success by the
Aero Club also reduced skepticism about their flights. In Europe, the Wrights'
work inspired extraordinary activity which resulted in fervent efforts
by many inventors and the first public flight of an airplane, that of Alberto
Santos Dumont, in the fall of 1906. By 1907, then, it was apparent to many
that the world was on the threshold of practical heavier-than-air flight.
War Department officials turned their attention to the airplane once again.
To coordinate Army efforts, Brig. Gen. James Allen, the Chief Signal Officer,
established an Aeronautical Division on Aug. 1, 1907, making it responsible
for "all matters pertaining to military ballooning, air machines, and all
kindred subjects."

Following an exchange of letters, Wilbur Wright met formally with members
of the Board of Ordnance and Fortifications on Dec. 5, 1907. As a result,
on Dec, 23, the Signal Corps published Specification No. 486 for a heavier-than-air
flying machine. Written by Maj. George O. Squier and based on information
provided by Wright, the document called for a machine able to carry two
men and travel at a minimum speed of forty miles an hour for at least sixty
minutes. An additional specification required that instruction be provided
for two pilots. One must be aware of a certain amount of complicity in
this arrangement. Major Squier wrote the specifications to meet the capabilities
of the Wright aircraft; they were not dictated by any established military
requirement. Furthermore, the Wrights' bid of $25,000 was based partially
on the funds they knew the Army had available, not necessarily on the value
that they set on their machine. To the apparent surprise of all, two individuals
underbid the Wrights, complicating the source selection process. One of
the bidders dropped out quickly. The other, Augustus M. Herring, had a
reputation as an aviation pioneer who had associated with Chanute, Langley,
and, later, with Glenn Curtiss. His bid had to be taken seriously. Apparently,
he had actually planned to underbid the Wrights, and then hire the brothers
to
build and deliver an airplane with which he could earn the Army contract.
When the Wrights ignored his overtures, Herring engaged in a lengthy charade
before finally admitting he could not deliver a fly able airplane to the
Army.

Two points about the December 1907, specifications and the contract
signed with the Wrights on February 10, 1908, are of special interest to
logisticians. First, the Army required aircraft "assembly in about one
hour and quick demount ability for transport in Army wagons." This capability
would not only enable the airplane to be transported around its post, but
it would also pro vide a means for deploying the machine during field operations.
Thus, the modern goals of readiness and mobility were present from the
beginning. Second, the contract failed to provide for the purchase of aircraft
parts or, indeed, for any logistical support at all." This omission probably
reflected the fact that the Army bought the air plane with the use of limited
discretionary funds. War Department officials undoubtedly assumed that
a congressional appropriation for support could be secured later. In this
belief, however, they would be quickly disillusioned.

The Wright airplane met the contract's flight specifications at Fort
Myer, Virginia, outside Washington, D.C., on July 31, 1909. The Army then
moved the airplane to a field at College Park, Md., where the Wrights completed
the final contract specification by training two pilots, Lts. Frank P.
Lahm and Frederic E. Humphreys; both men soloed on Oct. 26. Lt. Benjamin
D. "Bennie" Foulois also received some instruction, but not enough to solo.
The winter weather in Maryland proved unsuitable for flying, and in November
1909, the Signal Corps ordered its airplane temporarily sent to Fort Sam
Houston, near San Antonio, Texas. Lahm and Humphreys, however, did not
accompany the air plane, now designated Signal Corps No. 1. Instead, the
Army placed the aircraft in the hands of the partially trained Foulois.

It was at San Antonio that Lt. Foulois began to address the problems
of supporting the airplane within the constraints of the standard Army
logistical system. Foulois's aviation detachment primarily dealt with three
logistical agencies: the Commissary Department, the Quartermaster Department,
and its own parent organization, the Signal Corps. The Commissary provided
rations. The Quartermaster furnished all supplies and equipment, as well
as transportation. Parts and equipment peculiar to the airplane were the
responsibility of the Signal Corps.

Arriving at Fort Sam Houston in February 1910, Foulois and his detachment
of seven enlist ed men and one civilian built a temporary wooden hangar
at one end of the mounted drill ground with materials furnished by the
post quarter master. The detachment was billeted in the hangar. For rations,
the enlisted men ate with the troops of the 3rd Cavalry until that unit
departed: they then messed with the 22nd Infantry. This change doubled
the distance that they had to walk to and from meals to more than a mile,
and it seriously interfered with Foulois's flying program. Here the cumbersome
nature of the Army logistical system became apparent. When Foulois submitted
a formal request that the men be authorized 75 cents per day to spend for
meals at civilian homes located close to the detachment, the request had
to go all the way to the Secretary of War for approval‹collecting, as it
traveled up and down the chain of command, a total of nineteen endorsements!'

Foulois's major logistical concerns, however, centered on the airplane.
The construction and capability of the Wright machine and the inexperience
of its pilot affected maintenance and supply of the Army's first airplane
in several ways. The Wright machine was fragile, its engine crude and unreliable,
and it was extremely difficult to fly in the shifting, gusting winds common
at Fort Sam Houston. Although Foulois soloed on March 2, 1910, he spent
the first few months at San Antonio literally teaching himself to fly.
By the end of September he had made nearly sixty flights, but rough landings
and minor crack-ups were common. As late as April 1911, he tended to be
"ground shy," that is, during landings he had a proclivity to level off
too high, which often resulted in hard contact with the ground. Taken together,
these conditions meant that Signal Corps No. 1 spent much time being repaired
and it required a large‹perhaps excessive‹amount of parts and material
to keep it flyable.

This initial experience with the first airplane furnishes evidence of
two conditions that would have significant logistical implications for
an air force. First, the characteristics of individual air craft types
would impact logistics. The fragile air craft of the time were susceptible
to damage and thus were difficult to support adequately. Minutes in the
air required hours in the shop. Stronger aircraft could be built, but,
for the time being, they tended to be heavier, and heavier air craft tended
to be underpowered and thus subject to accidents. Beyond these factors,
it would take World War I to teach designers that it was necessary to design
maintainability into an aircraft from the beginning. Second, the quality
of pilots and their level of training also carried a vital price tag, because
inexperienced or poorly trained pilots tended to break airplanes. Either
condition could increase a unit's logistical burden or take it beyond the
point where supply and maintenance had the power to sustain acceptable
operational levels.

Adding to the burden of supporting the Army's first airplane was too
little money. The original contract with the Wrights failed to provide
for the purchase of parts or support of the machine. Army leaders had hoped
to gain the necessary resources from Congress, but in this effort they
were disappointed. The Signal Corps and War Department did their best.
General Allen had requested $200,000 for aeronautics for fiscal year 1908,
and he repeated this request for 1909 and again for 1910. Congress failed
each time to approve any funding. Lack of congressional sup port meant
that money for oil, gasoline, and repairs had to come from a Signal Corps
budget already stretched thin. General Allen provided Foulois with $150
for the 1910 flying season, taken from the $250,000 annual funds dedicated
to the maintenance of Army telephone and telegraph installations.

The money did not last long. Foulois later wrote that "the combination
of my limited experience in landing with a dead engine . . ., the bad bucking
habits of No. 1 in gusty winds, and forced landings because of the erratic
temperament of the engine, kept the machine in shop more days than it was
out." General Allen had ordered him to take plenty of spare parts to Fort
Sam Houston, but none, of course, had been purchased. The lack of spares
on hand meant that if parts available only from the Wrights broke, they
had to be specially ordered, and the machine was grounded until they arrived
from Dayton. In just one case, an exhaust valve on the No. 4 cylinder broke
on April 15, 1910, grounding the aircraft until April 26, while a frustrated
Foulois waited for a replacement cylinder. The numerous accidents took
their toll, and Foulois quickly worked his way through the Signal Corps
money. He then contributed an additional $300 from his own pay to keep
the aircraft operational. The impact that a lack of money could have on
logistics became evident with the first Army airplane. In the future, proper
logistical support would always begin with adequate funding.

Foulois later declared that "midnight requisitions" from the plumbing,
blacksmith, carpentry, and other shops at Fort Sam supplemented the meager
funding, but one suspects that this claim is overstated. Standard procedures
for an Army detachment gave him access to the quartermaster shops, including
those of the painter, carpenter, and blacksmith. Additionally, as a former
enlisted man and a practical, mechanically minded officer, Lieutenant Foulois
undoubtedly befriended the appropriate individuals on the post and secured
supplies and assistance through his informal connections when official
channels failed to suffice. It is easy to imagine that soldiers‹bored by
daily routine‹would have enjoyed assisting a curiosity as interesting as
the Army's only airplane. One way or another, Lieutenant Foulois kept Signal
Corps No. 1 in the air.

The quality of the airplane's crew played significantly in this effort,
and it highlighted the importance of intelligent, proficient maintenance
personnel. Foulois's own background was significant. As a boy he had shown
mechanical aptitude, and as a teenager he had apprenticed with his father,
a plumber. Serving as an enlisted man and then as a young officer, he had
built bridges, roads, and fortifications. His involvement in aviation began
with the Army's first dirigible, where he learned about lighter-than-air
vehicle construction and operation from Samuel Baldwin, a pioneer balloon
and dirigible flier, and about engines from Glenn Curtiss, soon to be the
Wright brothers' main competitor. When the Wrights set up shop at Fort
Myer for the airplane tests in June 1909, Foulois hung around their hangar
tent until Wilbur finally put him to work as a mechanic. Bennie Foulois
earned his way onto the airplane through his willingness to get his hands
dirty, and it is probably fair to consider him as much a mechanic and technician
as a pilot. From his background, his association with the Wrights, and
his experience with Signal Corps No. 1‹as well as a healthy desire for
self preservation‹came his deep conviction that the pilot was ultimately
responsible for the condition of his airplane. Later, when he took command
of the 1st Aero Squadron, Foulois's first move would be to buy overalls
for all of the pilots‹and these were not intended for flying.

With Foulois in San Antonio was a cadre of enlisted men, most from Company
G of the Signal Corps, reportedly selected for their mechanical aptitude
and experience. The majority had joined the Aeronautical Division in 1908
and gained some aviation knowledge working with the Army's lighter-than-air
craft. Their first experience with the airplane came during the trials
of the Wright aircraft at Fort Myer, although this was limited to moving
the aircraft and doing some cleaning and elementary maintenance under the
close supervision of the Wrights and of their mechanic, Charlie Taylor.
As Signal Corps personnel, their educational level and technical aptitude
probably ran high, when compared to the average enlisted men of the period.
Several, including Herbert Marcus, Stephen J. Idzorek, Glenn R. Madole,
and Vernon L. Burge, were highly competent mechanics. Private Madole, for
example, helped design and build the wheels that Foulois added to the Wright
plane in an effort to replace the skid landing gear. Based on Foulois's
recommendation Marcus and Idzorek were soon promoted to sergeant, and Madole
to corporal. When Madole left the service in January 1911, Foulois had
Burge promoted in his place. Several members of the detachment remained
with Army aviation for many years. Some, like Marcus, attained the highest
enlisted rank possible, while others became officers and pilots. Burge
retired years later as a colonel, and Idzorek as a lieutenant colonel.
All in all, maintenance for the Army's first airplane was probably well-served
by the quality of its enlisted crew.

Records for Foulois's detachment are incomplete, since he found no need
to prepare written regulations and gave all orders orally. In all probability,
he applied standard Army organizational practice for a small unit, which
called for prescribed duties for each individual. The senior enlisted man
would be responsible for overall maintenance and preparation of the aircraft
under Foulois's supervision. The other enlisted personnel would be responsible
to the senior enlisted man for individual portions of the air plane, such
as the engine, controls, wing surfaces, and launching track, and one enlisted
man would have also acted as supply sergeant for the detachment. Such an
arrangement prevented confusion, established accountability, and ensured
that nothing necessary would be over looked. This practice was standard
by the time the 1st Aero Squadron was organized in 1913. The written crew
assignments for Signal Corps No. 31, the first Martin airplane, accepted
in July 1914, provide an early illustration. The noncommissioned officer-in-charge
was responsible for all maintenance and care of the machine. He was required
to inspect the machine daily and to keep a daily report which included
the number of flights, flying time, gas and oil consumption, a record of
events, and any unusual activities. Under him, crewman No. 1, the "oiler,"
had charge of the motor compartment. No. 2, the "wiper," filled the fuel
and oil tanks and lubricated all parts of the machine. No. 3 was a "cleaner"
who cared for all controls except for the throttle. Nos. 4 and 5 were "assistant
cleaners": one took charge of all surfaces, and the other tended the fuselage,
landing gear, and cockpit. No. 6 was a "supernumerary" who filled in for
the others when required. He also obtained adequate sup plies of the correct
grades of gasoline and oil from the squadron supply officer and maintained
lists of the supplies, spare parts, cleaning materials, and tools on hand.
In one form or another, this kind of crew organization has remained the
norm to this day. Modern maintenance specialization, based on traditional
military practice, began with the enlisted crew of the first Army airplane.

The practice of hiring technicians and specialists with aviation expertise
also originated with the first Army airplane, although the military had
long used civilian experts in technical areas. Oliver G. Simmons was the
Army's first civilian airplane mechanic. Hired shortly after the Army bought
the Wright machine, he accompanied Foulois to San Antonio. Described as
an "expert machinist" by a San Antonio newspaper, Simmons was apparently
responsible for the engine, and, assisted by Private Madole, did much of
the work designing and constructing the wheeled landing gear that replaced
the standard Wright skid system on Signal Corps No. 1. Simmons remained
with the aviation detachment until mid-1911; he then went to work for Robert
G. Collier, a wealthy sportsman and aviation advocate. Subsequently, Simmons
designed an engine for Collier and reportedly became a private pilot.

Most labor on Signal Corps No. 1 consisted of daily or periodic maintenance
and upkeep of the engine and airframe. Repairs, usually minor but occasionally
serious, were commonplace. Beyond basic maintenance, Foulois and his men
under took some noteworthy additional work. The first involved "field modifications"
to the aircraft. In one case, after consulting with the Wrights, Foulois
and his crew moved one of the elevators from the front to the rear of the
aircraft to curtail the machine's bucking tendency. The second, and better-known
case involved the landing gear. The bottom frame of early Wright aircraft
included a pair of skids for landing. Takeoffs required the crew to lay
a single track pointing into the wind and to erect a small tower and weights
down wind. The aircraft was placed on the track on a wheeled dolly connected
to the weights through a system of pulleys and ropes. When the pilot was
ready to take off, he tripped the weights, causing them to fall and catapulting
the aircraft down the track. This system, however, proved too clumsy and
inflexible for operational use. For example, if the wind switched direction
after Foulois's crew laid the track, the track had to be taken up and repositioned
for a new takeoff. And, if the aircraft landed anywhere but on its own
field, there was no way to get it back into the air. To correct this, Foulois
and his crew designed and built a three wheel landing gear similar to that
used on Curtiss airplanes. They tested it on Aug. 18, 1910. Though successful,
the field-designed modification was not completely satisfactory. The Wrights,
in the meantime, had developed their own system. They used pneumatic tires
attached to the landing skids with elastic cord to absorb the landing shock.
They supplied this system to Foulois as what might today be known as a
"con tractor modification kit," to be installed by the airplane's crew.

Patched, repaired, and altered many times, Signal Corps No. 1 was a
worn, weary aircraft by the winter of 1910. In preparation for the next
flying season, Foulois and his enlisted crew rebuilt the aircraft, modifying
it to the Wright Model B configuration in the process. However, there were
limits to what the evolving skills of the men and the scant resources at
hand could accomplish. Despite Foulois's best efforts, the machine remained
in poor operational condition. The Wright brothers asked for $3,000 to
overhaul the aircraft, but discouraged this measure by pointing out that
a new machine would have many improvements over the existing craft.
Army leaders also preferred a new airplane if the money could be found.
The question of whether to upgrade an existing design or to buy a new aircraft
would become a standard dilemma in aviation procurement. In general, both
military and industry leaders favored the latter approach: progress, defined
as increased performance, justified advanced designs, and real profits
lay in selling new airplanes, not in modifying the old. On March 3, 1911,
Congress appropriated $125,000 for Army aviation and made $25,000 available
to the service immediately. The purchase of five aircraft with these funds
allowed the Army to retire Signal Corps No. 1. In May 1911, the aircraft
was sent to the Wright factory at Dayton, Ohio, for refurbishing and eventual
display at the Smithsonian Institution in Washington, D.C.

Writers have generally concluded that by the time the Army retired Signal
Corps No. 1, the air plane had accomplished its purpose. They have emphasized
the flying portion of the aviation equation: three Army pilots learned
to fly on the aircraft, and the Army itself had its first operational experience
with a heavier-than-air craft. Yet, the logistical lessons learned were
at least as important as the flying portion, and that fact deserves recognition.
Foulois preserved these lessons when he wrote the "Provisional Airplane
Regulations for the Signal Corps, United States Army, 1911." With hands-on
training as his guide, he included information on the care, repair, and
maintenance of an airplane on the ground; a list of inspection duties;
and rules on the assembly and disassembly of the airplane. He also defined
a provisional aero company organization that incorporated the commissioned,
enlisted, and civilian personnel required to repair, maintain, and operate
the assigned aircraft, to obtain airplane materiel, and to provide motor
transport. During 1914 and 1915, when Captain Foulois prepared the 1st
Aero Squadron for field service, he applied the lessons in organization,
maintenance, and supply that he had learned with Signal Corps No. 1. These
thus formed the initial logistical base for what would ultimately become
the U.S. Air Force.

Note: This story was written by Roger G. Miller who is an historian
for hte Air Force History, Bolling AFB, Washington, D.C. It was published
in Air Power History/Fall 1994. It is based on research for "Keep 'Em Flying:
Air Force Logistics from the Mexican Border to the Persian Gulf."