Sunday, 30 August 2015

A ten-round shoot at electronic, man-sized targets at a range of 150 metres, with the AK-105 in standing, unsupported position. Each time a target is hit, it goes down... and then comes up again in a couple of seconds.

Saturday, 29 August 2015

The
Khemka’s of the Sun Group will be key arbiters in the billion-dollar decision
on whether Russian Helicopters would partner Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd (HAL),
or Anil Ambani’s Reliance Group, in building 197 Kamov-226T reconnaissance and
observation helicopters in India.

Nand
Khemka, whose Sun Group has done successful business in Russia for
decades is close to Moscow’s power centres, including President Vladimir Putin.
He is a member of the Russian prime minister’s “Foreign Investment Advisory
Council”. His son, Shiv Khemka, is on the board of Russian Helicopters.

Business
Standard learns that Shiv Khemka, who is advising Russian Helicopters on this proposal, has assembled a team of experienced Indian experts
in helicopter manufacture. They are evaluating whether it would be better to go
with HAL’s tried and tested record of working with Russia, or with Ambani’s new
company, Reliance Defence and Aerospace (RDA), which has no experience, but enjoys
the advantages of the private sector.

Contacted
for comments about the role played by Sun Group, Russian Helicopters declined
to comment, but did not deny its involvement.

Recent
media reports in the Economic Times and Times of India have reported that
Russian Helicopters --- an umbrella corporation that includes all Russian helicopter
building companies --- has chosen Anil Ambani’s Reliance Group as its partner.
In fact, no such decision has been taken.

Russian
Helicopters has valid memoranda of understanding (MoUs) with both Indian
entities. The MoU with HAL undertakes to partner the Indian aerospace monopoly
in an earlier Indian enquiry for vendors to build 197 light helicopters in the
“Buy & Make (Indian)” category. This required Indian vendors to bid,
supported by a foreign technology partner.

Simultaneously,
Russian Helicopters signed a generic MoU with Anil Ambani’s Reliance Defence
and Aerospace, under which the Reliance Group is pursuing most of its defence ventures.
This MoU is not directed towards any specific contract, but speaks of
broad-ranging cooperation in helicopter building.

The
Reliance MoU with Russian Helicopters is much like the shipbuilding MoUs that
Anil Ambani’s newly acquired Pipavav Shipyard has signed with Russian
shipbuilders. Defence industry experts point out that, while such MoUs are
useful in generating a speculative media buzz, there is no certainty they would
culminate in actual defence contracts.

Even as
Russian Helicopters evaluates its options, advised by Sun Group experts,
decision-makers in Moscow say New Delhi will have the final word on the Indian
partner. Says Sergey Chemezov, Rostec CEO, who oversees Russia’s
high-technology industry and is a close associate of President Putin: “We expressed
our commitment to work with either of two companies – Reliance of Mr Ambani and
HAL, and it is up to the Indian government to decide who to grant this project,
who they feel is better suited for this. For us this is no different, we could
work with either.”

Vadim
Ligay, the deputy chief of Russian Helicopters says, while the contract is
still being negotiated, “On behalf of Rostec, Russian Helicopters and Russia I
believe we are ready to work with any company that will be chosen by the Indian
side.”

Individuals
close to the Russian evaluation indicate they are inclined towards HAL. They
visualise the Bangalore-based company responsible only for assembly and final
integration of the Kamov-226T, while a range of carefully chosen private sector
Indian companies, identified as Tier-1 and Tier-2 suppliers, would build key
components like the transmission, rotors, and cockpit. HAL would assemble these
into a helicopter.

This would
ease the path for HAL, which is already awash with Indian military orders for
more than 200 indigenous helicopters, including the Dhruv, the Light Combat
Helicopter and the Indian rival to the Kamov-226T, the Light Utility
Helicopter.

Ligay of
Russian Helicopters confirms that the Kamov-226T contract would include a
provision for offsets, in addition to the “Make in India” aspect.

For now,
the Reliance Group is powering ahead with its defence initiative. On Friday,
the Maharashtra government handed over 290 acres for a facility that RDA
intends to build near Nagpur.

The
procurement of 197 light helicopters dates back to the late-2000s and was
cancelled after Eurocopter was selected as winner in circumstances that were
later deemed suspicious. It was re-tendered as a competitive contract, but
then, in December 2014, at an Indo-Russian summit meeting in Delhi, President
Putin asked Prime Minister Narendra Modi, and was granted the contract on an
inter-governmental basis.

In May
2015, the apex Defence Acquisition Council approved the purchase on nomination
of the Kamov-226T.

The
Kamov-226T is a 3.5 tonne, two-pilot, light helicopter that is specially
modified with a new engine for Indian requirements, primarily high-altitude
operations along the Himalayan borders. Like all Kamov helicopters, the
Kamov-226T has contra-rotating rotors --- or two main rotors that rotate in
opposite directions. This does away with the need for a tail rotor, making the
helicopter lighter, and improving manoeuvrability in the mountains.

Even as 197
Kamov-226T helicopters are built, HAL will build 187 Light Utility Helicopters.
The IAF will, thereafter, be managing a two-type fleet of light helicopters, in
addition to the existing Cheetah/Cheetal helicopters until they are phased out
of service.

Friday, 28 August 2015

The T-50 is silhouetted against the sun while performing at MAKS 2015 in Moscow

By Ajai
Shukla

Moscow,
Russia

Business Standard, 28th Aug 2015

The
on-going MAKS 2015 air show in Moscow features an impressive flying display by
the Sukhoi T-50, the fifth-generation prototype fighter’s first public outing
in two years. But even the rousing applause fails to mask the disappointment of
Russian officials at the Indian Air Force’s (IAF’s) foot-dragging in co-developing
the T-50 into a “fifth generation fighter aircraft” (FGFA) that the IAF will
buy.

Well-informed
sources in Moscow say the IAF vice chief has written a letter that effectively blocks
the FGFA project. It criticises 27 different aspects of the FGFA, raising
questions that must be answered before New Delhi and Moscow put $2.5 billion each
into jointly developing the advanced fighter.

Business
Standard also learns the IAF has vetoed a Russian offer to co-develop a
fifth-generation engine for the FGFA. This is baffling to the Russians, given
the Defence R&D Organisation (DRDO) long-standing attempts at joint engine
development in order to end India’s expensive dependency on foreign vendors for
aero engines. An internal DRDO estimation reckons that India will import aero
engines worth Rs 3,50,000 crore over the next decade.

After the
DRDO failed to develop the Kaveri engine to the level where it could power the
indigenous Tejas Light Combat Aircraft (LCA), it strived to persuade French
engine-maker, Snecma, to co-develop an engine. But Snecma declined to share key
technologies, especially those relating to materials that can withstand the
hellish temperatures created in the engine’s combustion chamber.

Nor has
Washington agreed to share these technologies, even after President Barack
Obama agreed during his January visit to New Delhi that a “joint working group”
would explore US-India cooperation in engine technology.

DRDO and
Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd (HAL) officials say the Russian offer of engine
co-development fits well with the FGFA project itself, since the engine will
power the same fighter. Currently, the Sukhoi T-50 is powered by the NPO Saturn
AL-41F1, which only is a souped-up version of the AL-31FP engine that powers
the Sukhoi-30MKI. A brand new, more powerful, engine is needed to let the FGFA
supercruise, or fly at supersonic speeds while cruising without an afterburner.
This is considered essential for a fifth-generation fighter.

Sergey Chemezov, who heads Rostec, the powerful Russian
high-technology agency, downplays India’s delay. “As for the involvement with
India, there is a certain delay, though this is not something that we (Russia)
can be responsible for. On our end we can fully continue the development of the
project as per our commitments,” Chemezov told Business Standard.

But even
the defence ministry is questioning why the IAF is delaying a project it has
earlier championed, and to which India has committed itself with an
Indo-Russian inter-governmental agreement (IGA) and the expenditure of about
$300 million in a “preliminary design phase”.

Critics of
the IAF allege it is scuttling the long-term benefits of co-developing the FGFA
in order to quickly buy the Rafale, preferably in numbers larger than the 36
fighters that the prime minister requested in Paris in April. A defence
ministry official says that, in its eagerness to obtain the Rafale, the IAF has
deliberately placed holds on every other aircraft procurement, including the
FGFA, the Tejas and the plan to extend the Jaguar’s service life by fitting it
with a new engine.

According
to this official, the IAF aims to create the impression of a dangerous shortage
of fighters, so that the government buys the Rafale quickly.

In another
volte-face, the IAF has proposed that the FGFA not be co-developed, but limited
numbers of the T-50 fighter be built in India.

If
implemented, this would take India back to the 1970s and 1980s procurement
model, which involved license-producing fighters like the MiG-21 and Jaguar in
HAL without Indian involvement in designing or developing the aircraft.

In the
1990s and 2000s this was superseded by another procurement model that was first
implemented in the Sukhoi-30MKI. In this, India specified modifications to the
baseline Russian fighter, improving the Sukhoi-30 into the Sukhoi-30MKI through
advanced avionics and a thrust-vectoring engine. The much-improved fighter
continues to be licence-built in HAL Nashik.

However, by
accepting the Sukhoi T-50 without improvements, the IAF would be reverting to
the 1990s.

This would be a volte-face by the IAF. Three years ago, the
IAF has specified 40-45 improvements that it deemed essential for the T-50,
listing these out in a so-called “Tactical Technical Assignment”. This wish list included: 360-degree radar
coverage by adding two sideward-looking radars; and more powerful engines;

The design
and development needed for meeting the IAF’s requirements would constitute
India’s work share of 25-30 per cent. If the IAF now demands the same fighter
as the Russian Air Force, HAL’s work share would fall to zero. And the IAF
would get a fighter designed for the Russian Air Force.

We drive out of
Moscow along the Kutuzovskiy
Prospekt, the city’s grandest avenue, named after the legendary marshal who
halted Napoleon in 1812. Marshal Kutuzov burned down Moscow in a scorched earth
campaign, and then destroyed the formidable French Grande Armee (Grand Army) through
a frozen, 2,000 kilometre retreat back to France. As President Vladimir Putin drives
to work every day from his dacha (country retreat) in Novo-Ogaryovo, 30
kilometres outside Moscow, he passes a Triumphal Arch commemorating Kutuzov’s
victory.

We also pass the
Park Pobedy (Park of Victory) commemorating
the Great Patriotic War against Hitler from 1941-45, in which 27 million
Russians died --- the heaviest price any country paid in World War II. This
blood-soaked history, a part of Russia’s school curriculum, engenders the stubborn
patriotism that has boosted Putin’s foreign policy approval ratings to 85 per
cent after he annexed the Crimea last year, and continues to back ethnic-Russian
separatists in Ukraine’s Donetsk and Luhansk regions.

However, Putin’s
assertiveness has also invited damaging economic sanctions from the United States
and the European Union, supported by allies like Australia. These have squeezed
the important sectors that earn most of Russia’s money --- oil, banking
services and defence exports. Battering the Russian economy further are plummeting
oil prices, which are blocking Putin’s 2010 pledge to spend some 20 trillion
roubles --- about $650 billion then --- to revamp his ageing arsenal.

After years of
defence spending increases, Russia’s 2015 budget has hit a roadwall. Moscow has
scaled back plans for buying 500 new warplanes in the five-year period from
2011-2016, as well as the new Armata tank and a host of warships. Earlier this
year, authoritative Russian think tank, Centre for Analysis of Strategy and Technologies
(CAST), forecast a Russian military spending crisis. “The modern Russian
economy just does not generate enough resources to finance the current
2011-2020 rearmament program,” said the report.

That is why Russia
--- traditionally secretive on matters relating to defence --- has
unprecedentedly invited over 30 journalists (half from China, Vietnam, Thailand
and India; and a similar number from Brazil, Argentina, Chile and Mexico) to tour
its defence facilities. This includes your correspondent and another from one
other Indian newspaper.

Leaving behind
the Kuznetsovskiy Prospekt, we wend our way through scenic clumps of forest to the
Park Patriot, a vast training-cum-exhibition ground outside Moscow. This is being
extensively revamped to hold equipment demonstrations, exhibitions, and exercises
with foreign militaries. With fewer orders from Moscow, the Russian arms
industry must aggressively pursue more foreign orders.

“We plan to hold
an annual military exposition here once the facilities are completed by 2017,” Lieutenant
General Rafael M Timoshev, the Park Patriot deputy director tells the throng of journalists.

Yet, increasing
exports will not be easy for Moscow. The Stockholm International Peace Research
Institute’s 2015 Yearbook, which has studied defence sales trends in the
five-year period from 2010-2014, finds that Russia is already the world’s
second-biggest arms exporter, with 27 per cent of the export market. Only the
United States is ahead with 31 per cent of the market. At third place is China,
with 5 per cent of the market, edging out German and France, which also have the
same figure, followed by the United Kingdom with 4 per cent.

Delegations from
prospective buyer countries are evident at the MAKS 2015 air show, which
President Putin inaugurated on Tuesday at Zhukovsky, a Moscow suburb. This year’s
version of the biennial aerospace exhibition features 156 global and 584
Russian companies, with the host nation’s aerospace design strength on full
display.

Tearing through
the skies is the Sukhoi T-50, the Russian prototype of the Fifth Generation
Fighter Aircraft (FGFA) that Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd (HAL) will co-develop
with Sukhoi when protracted negotiations over the design partnership are
finally concluded. But the T-50 appears to be in growing trouble. Today was the
first public flight of the aircraft since the last MAKS show two years ago. And
both the Russian and Indian air forces are reducing the numbers of aircraft
they are committing to build.

The Indian Air
Force was initially looking to build close to 220 FGFAs. That was reduced to 144,
and uncorroborated media reports have recently indicated that this number could
go down to about 75. That is why Russia needs more foreign buy-in.

Also on display
is the giant Mi-26T2 helicopter, the world’s largest rotary wing machine. This
was developed for the Indian heavy-lift helicopter tender but, after 2012, when
New Delhi chose the American CH-47F Chinook, Russia is seeking alternative
buyers.

Russia’s
traditional reliance on India as a buyer is also evident with the spotlight on
its new, light, multi-role helicopter --- the Kamov-226T --- which has been
developed for the Indian tender for 197 light utility helicopters, first
announced in 2003. Since New Delhi demands that it have the power to operate up
to 6,100 metres, the Kamov-226 features a new, more powerful engine. A pair of
Turbomeca Arrius 2G1 engines, each producing 580 BHP of power, have replaced
the earlier Rolls-Royce Allison 250-C20R/2 engines, which produced only 450
BHP.

So keen is
Moscow that India buy this helicopter that President Putin personally took up
the issue with Prime Minister Narendra Modi during their summit meeting last
year. Russia has proclaimed its willingness for a “Make in India” contract for
this helicopter, but the jury in New Delhi is still out.

[Disclosure: The
correspondent is visiting Russia at the invitation of Rostec, a Russian state
body that promotes the development, manufacture and export of high-tech
industrial products.]

Friday, 21 August 2015

The mourners at the August 16 burial of
former Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) chief, Lt Gen Hamid Gul, included
Pakistan’s current army chief General Raheel Sharif, and his predecessor,
General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani.

Gul has always been influential within
Pakistan’s security establishment. If National Security Advisor (NSA) Sartaj
Aziz appears to hold the trump cards going into his Sunday meeting with his
Indian counterpart, Ajit Doval; Gul and his contemporaries can legitimately
claim credit. As ISI chief from 1987-89, and a member of Pakistan’s “deep
state” for years thereafter, Gul was a pioneer and advocate of developing jihadi
fighters as proxies to create Pakistani leverage in Afghanistan and India.

Even as western and Indian analysts highlighted
the damage to Pakistan’s security fabric caused by “blowback” from a plethora
of jihadi groups, Gul and his ilk --- many of them still in key positions of
power --- continued to manipulate these groups as “strategic assets”, canalising
their violence outwards through judicious “asset management”.

Pakistani analyst, Ayesha Siddiqa, points
out that Gul, like numerous Pakistani generals after him, believed that “religious
militancy could be used, but kept out of cantonments and other strategic
areas”. This school of thought remains alive today.

Sartaj Aziz brings to New Delhi a newfound
Pakistani confidence, stemming from its leverage in Afghanistan. This extends to
the Taliban, other armed radical groups like the Haqqani Network and is also
acknowledged by Afghan president, Ashraf Ghani.

“Both Washington and President Ghani have ceded
a role to the Pakistan Army. But now, even Indian allies like Russia and Iran seem
reconciled to Pakistan’s growing hold over Afghanistan’s future”, laments a
senior Indian foreign ministry official.

This hold is increasingly evident. On July
30, the Taliban announced the death of Mullah Omar, its independent-minded former
chief. Mullah Akhtar Mansour, who the ISI is believed to have influence with, succeeded
Omar next day. Appointed Mansour’s deputy was Sirajuddin Haqqani, a key leader
of the Haqqani Network, which was described in 2011, in Congressional testimony
by Admiral Mike Mullen, then America’s top military commander, as “a veritable
arm of the ISI”.

Pakistan’s growing influence in Afghanistan
reflects Washington’s dependence on Islamabad. Indian foreign ministry
officials see a new Pakistani confidence that makes it indifferent to dialogue
with India. Since last August, when New Delhi cancelled talks after Pakistani
High Commissioner Abdul Basit met separatist leaders from the Hurriyat
Conference, Islamabad has shown no keenness to resume talks.

In fact, New Delhi is going ahead with the
Aziz-Doval meeting, even though Basit says a Hurriyat meeting remains on the
cards. Nor has New Delhi allowed the release by a Pakistani court of a key
accused in the 26/11 Mumbai terror strikes, Zaki-ur-Rehman Lakhvi, derail the
dialogue. Nor have a spate of cease-fire violations on the Line of Control and
the international boundary been allowed to scupper talks.

In February, New Delhi abandoned its hard
line, with Foreign Secretary S Jaishankar visiting Pakistan as part of a “regional
familiarisation” tour, and effectively resuming contacts. In June, on Ramzan, Prime
Minister Narendra Modi called up to greet his counterpart, Nawaz Sharif,
setting the stage for a meeting in July in Ufa, Russia, where the two were
attending a Shanghai Cooperation Organisation summit.

At Ufa, Mr Modi accepted his counterpart’s
invitation to visit Pakistan in 2016 for the summit meeting of the South Asian
Association for Regional Cooperation. The two prime ministers also agreed to
talks on terrorism between their respective NSAs, which will take place on
Sunday.

New Delhi has put a brave face on its
back-pedalling. Diplomats argue that the joint statement at Ufa was an Indian
triumph, with no mention of Kashmir, and with Pakistan accepting talks on
terrorism, a subject it would be defensive on.

Islamabad, however, has taken the
offensive, accusing New Delhi of fomenting terrorism in Baluchistan and, in
cahoots with Afghan intelligence agencies, in the tribal areas of
Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa, along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border.

The Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), which had
been expected to take a firm line with Pakistan, finds itself defensive.
India’s equities in Afghanistan --- a decade of generous humanitarian aid and a
deep pool of goodwill amongst Afghans --- will be manifest only over the long
term. In the short term, this is overshadowed by Pakistan’s hard power leverage
through armed groups.

President Ghani’s administration has begun
protesting Pakistani violations of the Pak-Afghan border, but he remains for
now in thrall of the Pakistan Army. General Raheel Sharif has already made at
least four visits to Kabul.

Even so, analysts who know Afghanistan well
say that Ghani’s reliance on Pakistan cannot be sustained in the face of the
deep-rooted distrust that most Afghans have of their larger, more powerful and historically
meddlesome neighbour. According to this perspective, Ghani, like his
predecessor, Hamid Karzai, will have only a short-lived honeymoon with the
Pakistan Army, after which its influence will wind down fast.

New Delhi’s diplomats also hope that
Washington’s stance will change. The US Congress’ disenchantment with Pakistani
duplicity has grown as the Taliban has killed hundreds of Americans, but the US
State Department has condoned Pakistan’s actions to “keep channels open with
Islamabad”. This however could change as campaigning gets under way for the US
presidential election in November, and American public opinion pushes candidates
to take a hard line against Pakistan.

Tuesday, 18 August 2015

Last week, a navy delegation led by senior Indian
admirals visited the United States (US) on a three-day mission that could eventually
bind together the two navies for decades to come. A newly-formed “Joint Working
Group (JWG) on Aircraft Carrier Cooperation” held its inaugural meeting in
Washington after President Barack Obama and Prime Minister Narendra Modi agreed
to cooperate in this field during the former’s Republic Day visit to India earlier
this year. The JWG discussed how the US Navy --- the world’s most experienced
and technologically advanced aircraft carrier power --- could assist India in
building its own fleet of aircraft carriers. With India looking to build a
“blue water navy”, i.e. one that can project power across thousands of miles of
Indian Ocean, the first indigenous aircraft carrier, INS Vikrant, is already at
an advanced stage of construction.

Indian naval planners have long argued the
need to have three aircraft carriers in service. This would allow two aircraft
carrier battle groups (CBGs) --- each a self-contained flotilla with air, surface
and sub-surface capabilities --- to cover the Arabian Ocean and Bay of Bengal
simultaneously, even whilst the third carrier is undergoing maintenance or
overhaul. Each CBG, which includes a aircraft carrier, escort vessels
(multi-role destroyers and frigates), anti-submarine corvettes, missile boats,
logistics support vessels and submarines, is designed to engage in intense
combat even without support from fighters operating from shore-based airfields.

The three-carrier dream remains elusive,
even with two carriers in operational service today --- INS Viraat and INS
Vikramaditya --- and a third, the INS Vikrant, likely to be completed in Cochin
Shipyard Ltd (CSL) by 2018. INS Viraat, launched in 1953, is already the
world’s oldest serving aircraft carrier and will retire when the Vikrant enters
service. India’s third aircraft carrier, therefore, would only be the Vikrant’s
successor, whenever that is built. Currently on the drawing board and referred
to as INS Vishal (a name the navy has not confirmed) this could be the vessel
that sees US-India high-tech naval cooperation bearing fruit.

Why does India need the US Navy’s help to
build the Vishal, even after designing and building INS Vikrant in CSL?
Because, India has only operated small aircraft carriers that displace less
than 45,000 tonnes. The size of a carrier determines how many aircraft it
embarks, the ballpark calculation being one aircraft for every 1,000 tonnes.
The 45,000-tonne Vikramaditya embarks 36 aircraft --- thirty MiG-29K fighters
and six Kamov helicopters. Yet this is not enough. Ideally, a CBG would like to
field at least 50-55 aircraft when operating far from shore-based air support.
That calls for at least a 65,000-tonne carrier, something that Indian shipyards
have never built.

As important as numbers is the type of
aircraft a carrier embarks. A crucial element of air battle is “airborne early
warning”, delivered by AEW aircraft --- radar-equipped, airborne command posts
that scan airspace for enemy aircraft, and direct friendly fighters towards
developing threats. For this job, US Navy aircraft carriers embark the E-2D
Hawkeye, a large, twin turbo-prop aircraft that could never get airborne from
small carriers like the Vikramaditya or Vikrant. For this, the US Navy has long
operated 100,000-tonne “supercarriers”, which launch aircraft with steam
catapults --- a steam-driven piston that hooks onto the belly of an aircraft
and accelerates it to take-off speed in just 2-3 seconds. The newest American
supercarriers, starting with USS Gerald R Ford, which will join the fleet next
year, feature an “electromagnetic aircraft launch system” (EMALS) that replace
the steam catapult with an electromagnetic system that accelerates aircraft precisely
to take-off speed. EMALS is smaller, lighter, quicker, and more powerful, and
allows the take-off speed to be carefully calibrated for different types of
aircraft, reducing stress and wear on their airframes. The electric power requirements
of an EMALS system are too large for conventional generators to deliver; so nuclear
propulsion is essential for a carrier fitted with EMALS.

This sums up the Indian Navy’s dilemma for
its third aircraft carrier. It must choose between what it already has --- small,
conventionally powered vessels that embark 30-35 combat aircraft that can be
launched only slowly; or, alternatively, a large, nuclear-propelled vessel with
EMALS that embarks 50-55 aircraft of varying types including force multipliers
like AEW aircraft. The benefits of this are attractive, since this greatly
enhances the power that a CBG can project. Even so, some strategists believe
India would be unwise in investing so much money, capability and symbolism into
a single vessel that might be sunk in war. Opponents of the “big carrier school”
argue for greater numbers of smaller vessels like destroyers and frigates,
covered by land-based aircraft (including those operating from archipelagic
bases like the Andaman & Nicobar Islands) with their ranges extended by
air-to-air refuelling.

It will be interesting to see in which
direction the Indian Navy goes --- whether it chooses a conservative, tactical
approach, like the army and the air force, or a bolder doctrine based on sea
control and extended reach, of the kind that the US Navy imbibed from
strategist Alfred Thayer Mahan. Henry L Stimson, US Secretary of War all through
World War II, memorably described “the peculiar psychology of the [US] Navy
Department, which frequently seemed to retire from the realm of logic into a
dim religious world in which Neptune was God, Mahan his prophet and the United
States Navy the only true church.”

Regardless of how doctrine evolves in the
Indian Navy, their American counterparts already regard them as inevitable
long-term allies. Last week, the Indian delegation was taken to the Virginia
shipyard where the USS Gerald Ford is being completed, and introduced to EMALS.
With the Defence Technology and Trade Initiative (DTTI) touted as the vehicle
for easing US restrictions on technology, Defence Secretary Ashton Carter sees
US assistance in aircraft carrier building as the lynchpin, and the two navies
as torchbearers, of a close defence relationship. Strategist Ashley Tellis has
argued that Washington might well assist India with developing a nuclear
reactor for powering INS Vishal and future Indian aircraft carriers. But for
that, a top-level request would be essential (i.e. PM-to-President) along with firmer
assurances of strategic alignment. In the US system, every grant of assistance
must be sponsored by the military service it relates to; and the US Navy will
enthusiastically support the provision of cutting-edge technology to the Indian
Navy if it believes that would bring it clear operational benefits.

Despite New Delhi’s ambivalence on
strategic partnership with America, US vendors are delivering an increasing
share of India’s arms imports, inexorably eating into Russia’s share (see
chart). India has already spent close to $10 billion in outright US purchases;
most of them government-to-government, while co-developing platforms like
aircraft carriers have not gotten off the ground. Last week, America’s
ambassador to India, Richard Verma, told a Delhi audience “I see no reason why
the United States and India cannot build fighter aircraft together, right here
in India.” While that may be a distant dream, New Delhi must work with the
world’s premier aircraft carrier power to retain crucial control over our
regional waters.

Monday, 17 August 2015

Political pundits and the media focused
keenly on Independence Day on whether Prime Minister Narendra Modi would grant “One
Rank, One Pension”, or OROP, to retired soldiers, sailors and airmen. The
defence ministry’s Department of Ex-Servicemen’s Welfare says India has 22,50,000 military pensioners (hereafter referred to as veterans), and there are
another 6,00,000 widows of veterans who are entitled to lifetime pensions.
Assuming conservatively that each pensioner has a family of four, over a crore
voters would directly benefit from OROP. This is a significant political
constituency, especially in Punjab, Haryana, Himachal Pradesh and Uttarakhand.

The money involved is significant too. This
year’s budget allocated Rs 54,500 crore for defence pensions; this would rise
by about 40 per cent with the additional Rs 18-20,000 crore needed to meet all
the veterans’ demands. India does not count military pensions in the defence
budget; even though pensions, like salaries, are a component of manpower costs.
The full grant of OROP would raise military pensions to Rs 75,000 crore, only
slightly less than the salary bill of Rs 93,216 crore.

What exactly does OROP involve? In essence,
it means that all veterans who retired at the same rank should get equal pension,
irrespective of when they retired, because they performed the same functions
whilst in service and must make ends meet in the same economic conditions
today. Currently, each veteran gets a pension that is half the salary he drew
on the date he retired. Since military salaries have steadily risen, as
determined by six successive “pay commissions” (the Seventh Pay Commission is
currently deliberating another increase), veterans who retired earlier get significantly
lower pensions than those who retire today.

The demand for OROP goes back to the Third
Pay Commission in 1973. However, this is the first time the veteran community
has organised itself so publicly. Occupying the emotional high ground --- not
difficult in a country where the military is loved and respected --- veterans
have signed letters in blood, returned gallantry and service medals and staged
public dharnas (sit-ins), including a
few hundred metres from Parliament in New Delhi. Largely siding with the
veterans, the media has lambasted the government for tarrying in making good
its promises. Criticism continues even after Mr Modi assured veterans on
Independence Day that discussions were in their final stages and OROP would be
paid out shortly.

These unprecedented public protests have
their roots in late 2013, when the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), and its chief election
strategist, Amit Shah, targeted the veteran constituency as a vote bank. Addressing
ex-servicemen at a September 2013 rally in Rewari, Mr Modi promised his
government would implement OROP. With the veteran community naturally biased
towards the BJP’s right-wing politics and tough talk on Pakistan and terrorism,
ex-servicemen rallied strongly behind Mr Modi, believing that OROP would be
quickly implemented.

Meanwhile, the United Progressive Alliance
(UPA) government --- staring at electoral defeat --- also promised early
implementation of OROP, even allocating Rs 500 crore in its “vote-on-account”
in February 2014. This, it turns out, was a token sum, as was the Rs 1,000
crore the National Democratic Alliance (NDA) government allocated in its first
budget in July 2014.

The dimensions of the problem became evident
to the NDA government once the defence and finance ministries began doing their
sums. A key question related to when OROP should be implemented from.
Implemented prospectively the payout would be Rs 10,000 crore; implemented from
early 2014, when it was announced, twice that amount would be needed.

Given the fiscal buffer provided to the
government by low oil prices, the financial blow could be absorbed. However,
given the bitter inter-service rivalry between the military and the Indian
Administrative Service (IAS) officials who man key positions in the defence and
finance ministries, officials have raised alarmist questions about the
spill-over effects of OROP, and the prospect of other services, especially “central
armed police forces” (CAPF) like the Border Security Force and the Central
Reserve Policy Force also demanding OROP.

For many veterans, the delay in OROP
reflects a more serious and longer-standing conspiracy between civil servants
and politicians to whittle away the relative status of the armed forces. This
is evident from a letter written by four well-respected former chiefs ---
General SF Rodrigues, Admiral L Ramdas, Admiral Arun Prakash and Admiral
Sureesh Mehta --- who wrote to President Pranab Mukherjee that the scuttling of
OROP is “the culmination of a process by which successive Pay Commissions have
been used to whittle down the financial and protocol status of the military
over the years vis-à-vis their civilian counterparts”.

This grudge will remain even after the full
grant of OROP, which now seems a matter of time. What must be addressed,
however, is the key issue highlighted: the military’s growing manpower costs.
It has been earlier recommended that, instead of recruiting soldiers, sailors
and airmen for 15 years and then paying them pensions for life, recruitment
should be for just 5-7 years, after which trained personnel are laterally
absorbed into CAPFs, where easier service conditions allow them to serve till
the age of 55-60 years. This would make for a younger army, and also reduce the
growing pension liability.

Thursday, 13 August 2015

Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd (HAL) has aimed a
serious blow at the Tejas Mark II Light Combat Aircraft (LCA), with a letter
telling the Indian Air Force (IAF) that it does not have the manpower to work
on developing an improved version of the current Tejas Mark I.

The Bengaluru-based public sector aviation
monolith says its engineers are already stretched with existing projects,
including the Tejas production line, design and prototype manufacture of a
basic trainer aircraft, the Hindustan Turbo Trainer – 40 (HTT-40); and the
testing and production of the Sitara Intermediate Jet Trainer (IJT).

HAL has suggested that, instead of waiting
for the Tejas Mark II the IAF should buy 80 Tejas Mark I-A, an interim fighter
that would be more capable then the Mark I, but less than the Mark II will be.

Business Standard has learned of a heated
debate under way between the user of the Tejas, the IAF; its designer, the
Aeronautical Development Agency (ADA); and its manufacturer, HAL.

The IAF has already committed to buying 40
Tejas Mark I. In addition, the air force has indicated it will buy four-to-five
squadrons (80-100 fighters) of the Tejas Mark II when it is ready.

HAL worries about the future of its production
line after it delivers 40 Mark I fighters by end-2019. It plans to build four
Tejas Mark I by March 2016; another eight by March 2017; and crank up
production to 16 fighters annually by March 2018. After 2019, the production
line would idle till the Tejas Mark II enters production.

Senior HAL and ADA officials agree the
Tejas Mark II is unlikely to enter production till 2023-24. Developing the Mark
II involves fitting in a more powerful engine --- the General Electric
F-414INS6 replacing the current F-404IN --- and upgrading avionics and
weaponry. With prototype development likely to take till 2019, another three to
four years would go in flight-testing the Tejas Mark II and preparing
production drawings.

HAL, therefore, wants the IAF to buy 80
Tejas Mark I-A to keep the production line occupied from 2020 to 2023-24.

The Mark 1-A would be faster and more agile
than the current Mark I. Developing it would involve shaving off 800
kilogrammes from the current fighter, especially from systems like the landing
gear, which are currently “over-engineered”, or built heavy, for safety. HAL also
proposes to remove 300 kg of dead weight distributed across the Mark I to
balance it evenly.

HAL argues that the Mark I’s GE F-404IN
engine, which generates 84 kiloNewtons (kN) of peak thrust, would meet the
IAF’s performance requirements, if one tonne is shaved off the Tejas Mark I’s
empty weight of 6,500 kg. In that case, the GE F-414INS6 engine’s 98 kN of
thrust would be needed only for the naval Tejas, which must take off from the
short runway of an aircraft carrier deck.

The IAF and ADA are taken aback by HAL’s reluctance
to participate in developing the Mark II. Even though the Tejas project is
managed by ADA --- a branch of the Defence R&D Organisation (DRDO) --- HAL has
developed important components. Besides many smaller systems, HAL designed the Tejas
structure, its undercarriage and electrical supply system. It would have to
upgrade these for the Mark II.

“We have completed the preliminary design
of the Tejas Mark II, but now the detailed design will be done. HAL would have
to refine and upgrade the systems it developed for the Tejas”, points out a
senior ADA official.

HAL’s withdrawal stems from its deep-rooted
concern over the Tejas assembly line, which was established at a cost of Rs
1,556 crore, with HAL paying half and the remaining shared between the IAF and
navy. Keeping the line running is essential, so that skilled manpower does not
have to be redistributed; and a steady flow of orders can be placed on
sub-vendors.

HAL sees a four-year gap between the last
Tejas Mark I and the first Tejas Mark II as seriously disruptive. Building 80
Tejas Mark I-A is a way of bridging that gap.

However, the IAF and ADA point to HAL’s
poor record of adhering to manufacturing schedules. They say HAL, which is more
than a year late in building the Tejas Mark I, is unlikely to build and deliver
40 Tejas Mark I by 2019. So far, the Tejas line has built just one fighter.

“We can assure HAL that, if it accelerates
the delivery of fighters to the point where it seems likely to deliver 40 Tejas
Mark I before the Mark II is ready, we will certainly place orders for more
Mark I fighters. The assembly line will not be kept idle. That is our
assurance,” says a senior IAF officer.

To overcome HAL’s difficulties with
building and assembling the Tejas Mark I, ADA proposes to adopt a new
production model for the Mark II. The DRDO’s aerospace chief, K Tamilmani,
tells Business Standard that seven private sector companies will be chosen to
manufacture the fighter’s modules (systems and sub-systems). HAL will be responsible
for integrating them and testing and delivering them to the IAF.

“If we have to accelerate production and
build the Tejas Mark II to the requisite quality and quantity, HAL cannot be
saddled with responsibility for everything. Instead, private companies will
build modules, while HAL will be lead integrator,” says Tamilmani.

Wednesday, 5 August 2015

On
Thursday, July 30, the Afghan government and the Taliban announced the death of
Mullah Mohammed Omar Akhund, the shadowy, fundamentalist cleric who had led the
grouping since it was founded in 1994. Omar’s leadership had seen the Taliban through
six years of power in Kabul and more than a decade of unyielding insurgency
against a powerful US-led international coalition that backed what he called the
“puppet regime” in Kabul.

It
remains unclear how and when the government of Afghanistan became aware of
Mullah Omar’s death. For the past five years, Kabul had repeatedly tried to
initiate a “reconciliation dialogue” with him. Nor did the Taliban explain why
it kept the death of its former leader secret for two years, or why it issued a
statement in Omar’s name before Eid last month, endorsing the peace dialogue
that Pakistan and China brokered between the Taliban and the Kabul government
of President Ashraf Ghani.

Even
more curious is the silence that the government of Pakistan has maintained on
Mullah Omar’s death. This is especially odd, given that the Taliban leader has lived
in Pakistan since 2001, virtually a prisoner of the Inter-Services Intelligence
(ISI). If Mullah Omar had indeed died in hospital in Karachi two years ago,
Islamabad should have known it before anyone else.

Those
who are suspicious of Pakistan’s role in these events believe that Mullah
Omar’s longstanding opposition to reconciliation with the ill-equipped and
shaky Kabul regime may have outlived its use. Mullah Omar now needed to be replaced
by a more pragmatic (read pliant) leader. This ruled out his 26-year-old son,
Mullah Mohammad Yaqoub, who is as hard line as his father.

Instead,
Mullah Akhtar Mansour was declared the Taliban’s new leader on July 30. This
was followed by some surprising developments. Mansour’s first message was a
30-minute audio recording that called for unity within the Taliban. Mansour
distanced himself from the on-going peace talks in Pakistan, terming them
“propaganda campaigns by the enemy”. He declared the Taliban would “continue
our jihad until we bring an Islamic rule in the country”. At the Taliban’s
request, talks scheduled with President Ashraf Ghani’s representatives were
postponed until further notice.

A
possible explanation for Mullah Mansour’s tough position, which replicates that
of Mullah Omar, is that it is mere posturing to win points with hardline
Taliban elements that are not inclined to dialogue. This could give way to Mansour
eventually “coming around” at Islamabad’s persuasion, and officially endorsing
the peace talks.

In an
indicator of the ISI’s hand in the succession, the new Taliban leadership
includes a deputy from the Haqqani network, Sirajuddin Haqqani, son of the
legendary Jalaluddin Haqqani, who reportedly died in April 2013. In 2011,
Admiral Mike Mullen, then America’s top military commander, deposed before the
US senate that the Haqqani Network was a “veritable arm” of the ISI. The
Haqqanis, who operate from North Waziristan, have held themselves aloof from
Mullah Omar’s so-called “Quetta Shura”, which is based in Southern Afghanistan.
Yet, now, in a move that suits the ISI design, Jalaluddin Haqqani has
apparently risen from the dead to post a statement on the Taliban website,
urging factions to unite under Mullah Mansour.

A split house

Even
so, divisions are fast appearing within the once-monolithic Taliban. On Sunday,
Mullah Omar’s brother, Mullah Abdul Manan, issued a statement saying that Mullah
Mansour’s appointment had been carried out in haste and was not acceptable to
many Taliban factions. The fragility of Taliban unity is also evident from reports
that Mullah Omar’s son, Mullah Yaqub had been killed by a rival faction.

While
Mullah Omar’s custodianship of Afghanistan from 1996 to 2001 is remembered for
fundamentalist oppression, the Taliban leader never kowtowed to Pakistan, even
though Islamabad remained a steadfast supporter. Mullah Zaeef, the Taliban’s
trusted ambassador to Pakistan, recounts how Mullah Omar rebuffed Islamabad
when it conveyed Washington’s message to hand over Al Qaeda leader, Osama bin
Laden. Zaeef revealingly describes the Taliban’s fraught relationship with the
ISI, and the nationalist Omar’s determination to act in Afghanistan’s best
interests, not those of the ISI and of Pakistan.

The Taliban
regime’s fate was sealed after the 9/11 strikes on the US. According to legend,
Mullah Omar left Afghanistan in November 2001, travelling on the pillion of a
motorcycle from Kandahar to Quetta. Since that day, when he became a guest of
the ISI, there has been no forensically verifiable evidence of his being alive.
Yet either he, or someone acting on his behalf, directed Taliban fighters
operating from safe havens in Pakistan, bloodying an international coalition of
more than 100,000 soldiers enough to cause it to leave Afghanistan to the
Afghans.

At
this point, the stakes could not be higher for Pakistan, which is translating
its influence with the Taliban into the neutralisation of India’s presence in
Afghanistan. For this, it has struck a deal with President Ashraf Ghani, a
political lightweight who believes that Pakistan’s goodwill is essential for
his political survival. In exchange for bringing the Taliban to the dialogue
table, Ghani has promised Pakistan’s army chief, General Raheel Sharif, that
Indian influence would be minimised in Afghanistan.

Ghani’s
outreach to Pakistan is troubling most Afghans, who regard Pakistani meddling
and ISI’s support to various militias (the Taliban is just one) as the root
cause of security problems in their country. The Afghan public was outraged
when President Ghani, on his visit to Pakistan last November, drove straight
from the airport to the army’s Rawalpindi headquarters and met with General
Raheel Sharif, even before meeting his counterpart, Nawaz Sharif, in Islamabad.

Afghan
sentiment was doubly outraged by the signing, in May, of an agreement between
Afghanistan’s National Directorate of Security (NDS) and ISI to cooperate in
fighting terror.

Even
so, most Afghans recognise there can be no peace without the Taliban. And the
hope for peace through talks continues. With the death of Mullah Omar causing
the Taliban to start splintering, there is less certainty than ever about
Pakistan’s grand scheme to gain influence in Kabul.

Tuesday, 4 August 2015

Incompetence dogs the defence ministry’s
plan to harness Indian defence companies to develop a “future infantry combat
vehicle” (FICV) --- an armoured battle-taxi for the infantry to keep pace with
tanks. The ministry started out well by deciding to buy the FICV in the “Make”
category of the defence procurement procedure, under which Indian companies are
funded to develop “high technology, complex systems”. In this case, two vendors
were to design and develop separate FICVs, with the defence ministry
reimbursing 80 per cent of their costs. The better one would be mass-produced
to replace the army’s 2,600 BMP-2 vehicles that are now obsolescent.

A fine plan, but the ministry has failed
twice in evolving a model for selecting the two “development agencies” (DAs), the
vendor consortia who will compete to build the FICV. In 2012, the defence
ministry cancelled the Expression of Interest (EoI) it had issued two years
earlier to four vendors --- Larsen & Toubro, Tata, Mahindra and the
Ordnance Factory Board (OFB). The reason: after the companies submitted their
strategies and plans, a defence ministry official observed that the EoI had omitted
to specify the methodology for deciding the two winners. Anticipating that the
losing vendors might approach the courts, the ministry scuppered the EoI and
started afresh.

It took another three years to formulate
selection criteria and issue a fresh EoI, but the ministry finally managed it
on July 16. As this newspaper reported (July 17, “After 5-year delay, tender issued in Rs 50,000-cr Future Infantry
Combat Vehicle project”) EoIs were issued to ten Indian companies ---
Mahindra; Bharat Forge; L&T; Punj Lloyd; Tata Power; Tata Motors; Pipavav
Defence; Rolta India; Titagarh Wagons, and the OFB. They have been asked to
build a tracked vehicle that would carry a crew of three and also eight combat-kitted
infantrymen. While the FICV’s weight is not specified, it must be amphibious
and so can be no heavier than 18-20 tonnes. It must be air-portable in the air
force’s IL-76 and C-17 aircraft. Finally, it must fire anti-tank guided
missiles out to ranges beyond 4,000 metres.

While this is not an insurmountable
technological challenge, there remain lacunae in the evaluation methodology
that the EoI lays out for selecting the two DAs. There is insufficient
incentive to indigenise, which should be the primary objective in a “Make”
project. And the ministry’s unfailing urge to support the OFB has resulted in
skewing the evaluation criteria to favour large companies with enormous
installed capacities, rather than lean organisations oriented towards high-tech
innovation.

The EoI specifies that vendor responses will
be graded in four categories, each having a certain weightage. These four
criteria are: commercial assessment (26.08 per cent); technical capability
assessment (34.24 per cent); critical technology assessment (31.37 per cent),
and technical specification assessment (08.31 per cent). To answer the
perfectly legitimate question of how each criterion was allocated such pinpoint
weightage, the ministry declares that these were “arrived at by using a complex
method called the Analytical Hierarchical Process (AHP) model.”

Beyond the jargon, we learn the best vendor
response in each category will be allocated full marks, with the rest scoring
lower in proportion to the merit of their bids. A Business Standard analysis, however,
finds problems in the grading process.

Take the first parameter, the “commercial
assessment”, with a weightage of 26.08 per cent. In this, the defence ministry
has asked for four parameters: the company’s/consortium’s annual turnover,
profit after tax, net worth and fixed assets. There seems little reason to set
so much store by company size, especially since the defence ministry gave this
zero weightage in the “Make” category EoI for the Tactical Communications
System (TCS); and only 10 per cent weightage in the EoI for the Battlefield
Management System (BMS). In the FICV EoI, it might seem as if L&T would score
highest in this segment, but the defence ministry has shielded its wayward
child, the OFB, by mandating that the ministry would mark the OFB in this
segment at its own discretion. Meanwhile, Tata Motors, which should logically
be a strong candidate for building an FICV, will score poorly here due to its large
loss last year. This might make other companies --- including group company,
Tata Power --- reluctant to join a Tata Motors consortium.

The second evaluation criterion is
“technical capability assessment” with 34.24 per cent weightage. This evaluates
the R&D capability of a company/consortium across its entire spectrum of
activity. In the TCS and BMS evaluations, credit was given only for R&D
capabilities in areas directly related to the project. Now, broad-based credit
would allow Tata Motors and Mahindra to benefit from R&D in their small car
projects, even if that has little “carry-over” to building an FICV. Similarly,
L&T would benefit from R&D expenditure in L&T Infotech. Meanwhile
smaller companies with higher R&D spends in percentage terms might lose out
because their absolute R&D spends are lower.

In this same category, the EoI favours
vendors with large fixed capacities in brick-and-mortar manufacturing. It asks
for minute details of bending and cutting machines installed, while no credit is
given for electronics and system integration capabilities. Here again, the OFB
stands to benefit as a vertically integrated organisation with large capacities
installed at taxpayer’s expense. Says a private sector chief executive: “I may
wish to outsource a range of machining activities, while retaining high-tech
design and electronics for myself. Why should an EoI discriminate against such
a business model? In a project that is going into a development phase, why is the
defence ministry looking for production facilities?”

The third evaluation criterion is “critical
technology assessment”, with a weightage of 31.37 per cent. It requires
companies/consortia to offer as many “core technologies” and “critical
technologies” as possible, specifying some 40 technologies, of which almost
half relate to engines and transmissions. Vendors need not develop technology. Credit
can be obtained simply by signing a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with a
foreign technology partner, who undertakes to provide the rights and licences for
manufacturing a specified product in India. Since a foreign vendor can provide
MoUs to multiple Indian companies, theoretically all ten FICV bidders could
submit an MoU from the same foreign vendor.

The fourth and last criterion of “technical
specification assessment” carries a tiny weightage of 8.31 per cent. This
involves proposing specifications for the FICV. With the ministry specifying
some capabilities and demanding certain technologies, this assessment largely
writes itself.

A betting man could make good money on the
outcome of this EoI. It is structured to ensure that the OFB emerges as one DA.
The second will most likely be L&T, with its size, installed capacities and
engineering capability. The gamble really centres on what consortia these two
will assemble. The OFB would probably tie up with Russia’s Kurganmashzavod, which
it has earlier partnered in building the BMP-2 in Medak. Its other likely partner
would be Bharat Forge, which has a tie-up with Israeli electronics firm,
Rafael, which would supply the FICVs missile, night vision and sighting systems
and active protection systems. This consortium’s offer will essentially be
another Russian vehicle with Israeli electronics.

The other likely DA, L&T, could partner
Tata Power (Strategic Engineering Division); a tried and tested consortium that
has emerged tops in the first two “Make” projects. This consortium might also
suck in BAE Systems, which had earlier tied up with Mahindra, a partnership
that came unravelled.

But, first, to make a good choice, the
defence ministry needs to get its evaluation criteria in order.