Thursday, May 30, 2013

Amnesty International and the U.S. State Department recently
released their annual reports on human rights around the world. As usual, Iraq
fared badly. Neither organization found any improvements in the situation
within the country. The common charges of mass arrests, arbitrary detentions,
holding suspects without charges and access to lawyers, torture and abuse of
prisoners, holding people that should be released, corruption, intimidation and
harassment of the media, and limiting freedom of speech and assembly were all
heard. These abuses occurred at the hands of both the central and Kurdistan
Regional Government (KRG). The reason why this situation persists is because
there is no due process, and more importantly no accountability within the
government to stop and reform any of these practices. Even when parts of the
government itself find cases of abuse nothing substantive is done about it.
Investigations are always announced for example, but they never lead to
anything. Since these types of report have become the norm for Iraq, there is
nothing different between this year’s and the last few. What Amnesty and the
State Department can provide is specific stories that can humanize the poor
state of human rights within the country.

Iraq suffers from weak rule of law. Suspects are supposed to
have a number of rights until they are found guilty, but that rarely happens.
Two of the most common examples of how the government ignores these protections
are the use of torture, and the public airing of confessions before detainees
go to trial in terrorism cases. What happened to Vice President Tariq
al-Hashemi is a high-profile example. In December 2011, several of the vice
president’s bodyguards were arrested, and then shown on state-run TV confessing to carrying out assassinations for Hashemi. That resulted in several death
sentences for him the next year. Hashemi and others later claimed that his
guards were tortured, and forced to confess. One member of his security detail,
Amir Sarbut Zaidan al-Batawi died in custody three months after his arrest. When his family received his body in March 2012, they said that it showed signs
of abuse and torture. The government denied those charges, and said that he
passed away because of kidney failure. More routine cases were like those of
Nabhan Adel Hamid, Muad Mohammed Abed, Amer Ahmed Kassar, and Shakir Mohammed
Anad who were arrested in Ramadi and Fallujah in March and April 2012. They
were held incommunicado for several weeks, and allegedly tortured. Afterward
their confessions were aired on local television. When they went to trial they
told the court that those confessions were forced out of them due to abuse. The
testimony of other detainees supported their claims, and a medical examination
of one defendant found burn marks and other wounds consistent with torture.
Despite that all four were sentenced to death in December. Under the
constitution torture is outlawed. However, since the Iraqi criminal justice
system is based upon confessions the most common way to obtain one is to beat
it out of people. This is especially true for terrorism cases where the stakes
are much higher. The use of televised confessions also undermines the justice
system, since there’s no way a defendant can receive a fair trial if they have
said they are guilty in public beforehand. Again, since terrorism is such a
pressing concern, the government feels it necessary to continuously air these
suspects before the public to make it look like its security measures are
working.

Sometimes these harsh techniques lead to deaths either
unintentionally or not. Samir Naji Awda al-Bilawi, a pharmacist, and his
13-year old son Mundhir were picked up at a checkpoint in Ramadi. Three days
later the family found out that the father had died in custody. Images released
to the media showed that he had injuries to his head and hands. The son later
said that they had been beaten in a police station, and tortured including the
use of electric shock. In September 2012, Yasin Chafadschi from Qayara, Ninewa
was arrested, tortured, and died as a result. The press received pictures of
the man with bruises, his eyes swollen shut, dried blood on his face, and his
fingernails missing. The police denied they had done anything to him, and
claimed that insurgents had kidnapped and killed him. Ninewa Governor Atheel
Nujafi ordered an investigation into the matter, but nothing came of it. Again,
these cases are common place in Iraq. Since so many prisoners are tortured it
is inevitable that some of them die in custody. Even if there are inquiries
like the one involving Chafadschi nothing ever comes of them. Again, because
there is no political will to change the system, these abuses continue, and the
security forces operate with impunity with no fear that their violations of
people’s rights will ever be punished.

The number of people being picked up by the government, and
facing these conditions is increasing, because of the tactics currently used by
the security forces. The Iraqi army and police no longer carry out
counterinsurgency operations like they did with the Americans. Instead, they
are acting like the U.S. military did from 2003-2006 with similar results. The
most common tactic is mass arrests during security sweeps. Human Rights Watch
for example, reported that Federal Police raided eleven homes in Taji,
Salahaddin on November 3, 2012, and arrested 41 people, including 29 children.
12 women and girls aged 11 to 60 were held for four days without charges at the
headquarters of the police unit. They were all beat and tortured including
electrocuting them, and suffocating them with plastic bags. Again, the main way
information was extracted from prisoners was by force. This case was especially
disturbing, because it did not involve terrorism suspects, but suspected family
members, including children who were treated like their adult family members.
Even if any intelligence were gained from this action the resulting backlash
amongst the community would mean that the government could not rely upon these
people to support their security operations. Instead, they would look at the
Federal Police as a threatening force. That could lead to at least tacit
support for any insurgents in the area, if not open backing.

These acts take place in Iraq’s many detention facilities,
but there are also a number of secret ones run by the central and regional
governments. In 2010, the media found out about one of these operating in the
Green Zone run by security forces under the control of Prime Minister Nouri
al-Maliki that held more than 400 Sunni prisoners. Over 100 of them showed
signs of torture. In March 2011, the government claimed that it had closed the
place. In May 2012 however, Human Rights Watch reported that it was still in
use as late as March 2012. By the end of that year there were still details
emerging that it was in operation. Secret prisons quickly popped up across Iraq
when the Iraqi security forces were put back together. The U.S. knew about many
of these facilities, but did nothing, because the policy was that this was an
Iraqi affair, and they needed to deal with it. Today, there is no reason to
believe that Baghdad or the Kurdistan Regional Government will stop using these
types of prisons to hide those they do not want the judicial system to know
about.

Iraq also lacks due process. The Iraqi constitution states
that prisoners have to see an investigative judge within 24 hours of their
arrest, and that can only be extended for one day. In practice, most are
usually held for 72 hours with some exceptions. Cases involving the death
penalty, which are mostly about terrorism can lead to indefinite detentions.
Prisoners are also supposed to be told their charges, and have access to their
lawyers before they go to trial. That rarely happens. The norm is that people
are often picked up with not knowing why, and some can be held for days to
months to years without seeing a judge, lawyer or court. In December 2011, the
army arrested three lawyers without warrants for attempting to represent their
clients who were charged with terrorism. That led to a sit in by their peers,
resulting in two being released the day they were picked up. The third however,
was held for three months, and was only released after the Supreme Criminal
Court ordered it. Afterward, all three claimed that they were tortured. In
March 2012, during a routine visit to Kirkuk prison one detainee told
inspectors that he had been held for 4 ½ years under terrorism charges without
ever going to trial. That was obviously an extreme example, but shows just how
little respect the security forces, and the various ministries and offices that
run detention facilities have for the law. The Iraqi system is obviously overwhelmed
by cases since it is dealing with an insurgency, but there appears to be little
effort made to follow the constitution or the rules for how an investigation is
to be conducted.

The final piece of this process is the judiciary, which is
supposed to be independent, but in practice comes under the influence of many.
Certain laws, the history of dictatorship, the security situation, and
dependence upon other parts of the government all contribute to make the courts
weak. Threats, tribal groups, insurgents, and gangs often impede the work of
judges on top of that. On June 20, 2012, a judge from the Ninewa Criminal Court
was shot down while driving through Mosul. On July 22, Al Qaeda in Iraq
announced a campaign specifically against the judiciary. In total, eight judges
were killed, and there were another ten attempts last year. Given this pressure
there are many cases that simply get dropped, because judges are afraid that
they will lose their lives. That’s also a reason why the judiciary often overlooks
abuses that happen to detainees before they appear before them, because they
know that the governing elite wants action taken against suspected insurgents
and criminals. They will therefore ignore torture and forced confessions, and
give out guilty sentences even though that is against the constitution, which
outlaws abuse.

Iraq has a large number of media outlets, but their freedom
to do their work is limited by the security and political situation. There are
laws that protect the integrity of the press, but they often say “in accordance
with existing law.” That means restrictive articles from the Baathist period
still apply. The 1968 Publications Law allows imprisonment for seven years for
insulting the government for instance. The media has said that politicians,
government officials, security services, tribes, and businessmen all pressure
them not to publish certain stories, and that they fear reprisals from the
insurgency. That leads to a large amount of self-censorship. Reporters and
media outlets also face direct targeting and intimidation. The Iraqi
Journalists Rights Defense Association recorded 50 cases of harassment against
75 reporters in 2012. That same year, the Metro Center document 132 cases in
Kurdistan, which included 5 death threats, 50 arrests, 21 beatings, and several
lawsuits. Almost all of those incidents involved the independent and opposition
media in the region. In November 2011, Karzan Karim, a former Asayesh officer
and columnist for the Kurdistan Post was arrested after he wrote several
articles about corruption at the Irbil International Airport. He was officially
accused of revealing secrets about his time with Kurdish security, put on trial
for terrorism, and sentenced to two years in prison in October 2012. His family
claimed that he was beaten and tortured, and later received threats from the
authorities after they publicly criticized his detention, and being held
without trial for 11 months. On March 14, 2012, security forces held a TV crew
from Russia Today for three hours when they tried to report about attacks upon
emos and gays in Baghdad. The team had a permit, but the authorities took their
film anyway. On April 11, Kurdish intelligence officers beat two reporters
covering a meeting at a military facility in Zakho, Dohuk. On May 8, Kurdish
security forces attacked two journalists covering a protest in front of the
Kurdish parliament building, and took their equipment. On June 26, police in
Kirkuk arrested a reporter and held him for five hours after he took photos of
police beating child beggars in the city. On November 4, security forces beat
an al-Sumaria cameraman, and then arrested him for filming a bomb site in
Anbar, before releasing him later in the day. On November 18, the body of Samir
al-Sheikh Ali, the editor of Al-Jamaheer newspaper was found dead in Baghdad.
Ali was a human rights activist who pushed for media freedom. He was found shot
three times in the chest. Kurdistan is also known for filing lawsuits against
reporters and media outlets that criticize officials. In October, a Patriotic
Union of Kurdistan (PUK) politburo member and his bodyguard sued Asos Hardi,
the editor of Awene for an article that accused the two of attacking him in
August 2011. The editor of Zang magazine and reporters for Bazaw magazine in
the KRG received fines for around $858 for publishing articles critical of
members of the government. Again, the new Iraq is supposed to protect freedom
of the media, but in practice that does not always happen. Old laws are
applied, which restrict their operations, and other pieces of legislation are
ignored. The security forces have gone after journalists, and in Kurdistan
there’s always the threat of being sued and having to pay fines if they write
about anyone in the regional government. It’s no wonder that many reporters and
their employers sometimes hold back on articles given this environment.

The KRG is also known for limiting freedom of association
and for going after its critics. On March 27, Hussein Hama Ali Tawfiq, a
businessman was arrested and taken to the Asayesh headquarters in Sulaymania
where he was beaten. He was told to testify against others about corruption,
but refused. He was later charged with bribery, and held until acquitted in
November. There was no investigation into his case. On May 17, the Asayesh
detained three Yazidi men in Sinjar, Ninewa for ten days. Their crime was for
going to a conference sponsored by the central government. They were never
charged, and the Asayesh told them not to go to anymore meetings in Baghdad without
official permission from the Kurdish authorities. Kurdistan likes to portray
itself as the “other Iraq” meaning that there is supposed to be more stability,
security, and freedom than in the rest of the country. The above cases show
that there is a limit to what people can do in not only the KRG, but in the
disputed territories it lays claim to.

Kidnappings have been a chronic problem in Iraq since 2003.
People being abducted is an all too common experience for people, and is
usually done for money. On February 4, 2012, the driver, secretary, and brother
of a member of parliament were all taken in Samarra, Salahaddin. The kidnappers
demanded $1.5 million in ransom. That was never paid, and the brother and
secretary were killed, with their bodies dumped five days later. The driver was
later found beaten and unconscious. A man from Baghdad and a woman from Diyala
were arrested over the matter. On August 23, two Yazidi men were kidnapped in
Sinjar, and held for $600,000. On August 30, men dressed as members of the
security forces abducted a Turkmen boy from Kirkuk. He was released on
September 23 after his family paid for his release. Criminal elements or gangs
do most of these, but sometimes the security forces are implicated. In May 30,
a Yazidi man was taken in Kurdistan, and later found dead the next month. His
family blamed the Asayesh. Organized crime grew tremendously during the 1990s,
as the government would often use them to get around sanctions. After the fall
of Saddam, these groups had free reign to grow, and expand into kidnapping.
Many insurgents and armed groups also used the technique to raise money.
Corrupt officials have probably been involved as well. This is a constant
threat to the average Iraqi.

The main reason why Iraq has such a poor human rights record
is that there is no accountability. During 2012, the Human Rights Ministry sent
500 cases involving torture to the courts. The ministry claimed that led to
some arrest warrants being issued, but by the end of the year, nothing had happened
with any of them. The same thing occurred in 2011. On October 21, security
forces beat and wounded four protesters when a demonstration against the lack
of services turned violent. The next day, the governorate council questioned
the governor about the incident, and set up a committee to look into the
matter, but it led to nothing. The use of beatings, torture, forced
confessions, etc. are widely known throughout the country. The fact that the
ruling parties have no problem with them is the reason why they persist. Most
of Iraq’s leaders either grew up in Iraq under Saddam or were in exile in other
authoritarian states like Syria or Iran. Living under those repressive systems
means they have no issue with replicating them in the new Iraq.

Iraq is supposed to be a developing democracy, but with
widespread abuse within the security forces, and the lack of rule of law that
is becoming a precarious enterprise. Until politicians want to get rid of these
practices they will continue, and Iraq will never have the basic freedoms
necessary for a democratic society. Instead it will be a nation with the
trappings of democracy like elected officials and a number of media outlets,
but will suffer from torture, no due process, and the violation of people’s
basic rights.

SOURCES

Amnesty International, “The State of the World’s Human
Rights, Amnesty International Report 2013,” May 2013

Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, “United States
Department of State Country Reports on Human Rights Practices,” United States
Department of State, 2013

Wednesday, May 29, 2013

The most typical comparison made by critics of Prime
Minister Nouri al-Maliki is that he is becoming the next Saddam Hussein. This
can be heard by various politicians from the Sadr bloc (1) to Iyad Allawi (2)
to Deputy Premier Saleh al-Mutlaq to Kurdish Premier Nechirvan Barzani.
This is hyperbole meant to score political points with their constituents
against Maliki since Saddam is an obvious reference point from the recent past
that all of Iraqi society remembers. In terms of historical leaders in the
country however, Maliki might be more like Nuri al-Sa’id (1888-1958) who was the
premier eight times during the British mandate and royalist era of Iraq. Both
Maliki and Sa’id share several characteristics including their authoritarian
style of rule, and the use of personal politics and patronage over
institutions. Below is an interview with historian Phebe Marr about the
similarities and differences between the two Iraqi leaders.

Premier Sa'id on the cover of Time, 1957

1. Many people don’t
remember or don’t know who Nuri al-Sa’id is, so let’s begin with some
background. Sa’id was a product of the Ottoman Empire, which ruled Iraq for
several centuries. What did Sa’id do under the Ottomans, and how did that influence
him?

Nuri al-Sa’id’scareer spanned the last years of the Ottoman Empire before its collapse
during World War I and the establishment and development of the Iraqi state
until 1958. Nuri came from a Baghdad family of modest means; his father was a
middle level Ottoman bureaucrat. In this period, the Ottomans were attempting
to modernizing their state, especially the bureaucracy and the armyand the public education system, which
trained young boys to participate in these institutions. These schools taught a
curriculum which was relatively secular and modern. Teaching was in Turkish,
and allhigher education led to
Istanbul. Nuri entered the military primary school at age 8. He then went to
military secondary school, and on to Istanbul, where he graduated as a military
officer at 18. When Nuri returned to Baghdad in 1906, he was not only
responsible for helping to keep “law and order” in the Iraqi provinces, but
also such tasks as collecting taxes in the countryside, not always easy. This
gave him widespread contact with local tribal leaders and the rural population,
which stood him in good stead in later days. The Ottoman system at the time was
based partly on coercion and centralization of power, but it was weak and hence
had to incorporate different elements of the diverse population it ruled into
the system through benefits, favors, and patronage. Although he joined a secret
Arab society against continued Ottoman rule and later joined the Arab revolt in
the Hijaz, he was no revolutionary. While he had imbibed Western ideas of
nationalism and constitutionalism, he had had no actual experience in
democratic practice. What did Nuri take away from all this?I would say a pattern of governance that
relies on the central government (the army and bureaucracy) especially for law
and order; a desire for modernization—from the top down, andthe proclivity to deal with tribes, religious
leaders and other powerful local forces through “patronage” and personal
relations—not democratic processes and institutions.

2. Sa’id and Maliki
were both deeply influenced by Iraqi nationalism even though their
circumstances were different. Can you explain how Iraqi independence shaped
both of them?

The desire for independence from foreign control is natural,
especially among those trained for leadership, and Iraqis are steeped in this
sentiment. Iraqis do not think Iraq was really “independent” until after the
monarchy and Nuri were overthrown, and British influence ended. Maliki, too,
can lay claim to “independence” only after the U.S. withdrawal in 2011, and
even now many Iraqis question whetherIraq is truly independent from the U.S. or its neighbors. However, Iraqi
nationalism implies something else, a sense of Iraqi identity, a complex
problem that has plagued Iraq from the establishment of the modern state.Nuri, like Maliki, was an Arab and an Iraqi
with specific roots in a locality, Baghdad. But he was also a product of the
rise of Arab nationalism. Like others of his generation, he wanted freedom from
Ottoman influence, but there was, as yet, no Iraqi state with which to
identify. Like others, he had mixed feelings about the division of the Arab
world into smaller states, including Iraq although he had no control over
events. This mixture of Arab and Iraqi identity continues to the present
day.We should remember that Nuri was a
founding member of the Arab League although, as a realist, he gradually shifted
his focus to an “Iraqi- first” identity. And as a realist, by training and experience,
he knew the necessity for outside help, and was an early supporter of the
British tie.

Maliki's grandfather was an Iraqi nationalist involved in the 1920 revolt, which shaped the prime minister's own worldview (AFP)

Maliki has a totally different background. He was born in a
small town near Hillah inpredominantly
tribal and Shi’a territory. Not much is known about his father but his
grandfather, Muhammad Hasan Abu-l-Muhassin, was a well known poet who played a
role in the early Iraqi revolt against the British in 1920, and was briefly a
Minister in 1926 although he resigned over the British Treaty. Maliki has
written a Master’s thesis on his grandfather’s poetry, and knows this
history.Educated in Islamic Studies in
Usul al-Din College in Baghdad, where Arabic language is strong, hejoined the Dawa Party early, reportedly in
1963. An underground movement inspired by a charismatic young reformist cleric,
Mohammed Baqir al-Sadr, father-in-law of Muqtada, the Dawa, a religious party, was
opposed to communism and secularism, and encouraged a return to Iraq’s Islamic
roots; among Shi’a it became the main opposition to the Ba’th after it came to
power in 1968. Maliki paid a high price for his affiliation with the party by
persecution from the regime, followed by exile for almost 25 years, first in
Iran and then Syria, where he continued work as a Dawa leader. The Dawa has traditionally
had two strong strands, a return to Islamic and Shi’a identity, and a sense of
“Iraqi nationalism”. These have both been evident in Maliki, although it is
difficult to make a definitive assessment of his core views, since he is still
new to power and relatively inexperienced compared to Nuri. One of his main
aims, in my view, is to achieve Iraq’s independence, both from the U.S., and
Iran; easier said than done. His ability to maneuver the Status of Forces
Agreement (SOFA) through parliament in 2009 was impressive, and in 2011 he
insisted on the complete withdrawal of U.S. forces. His success in keeping Iran
at bay remains to be seen.

3. Sa’id served as
the Prime Minister of Iraq eight times, beginning in 1930. Iraq at the time
actually had several strong institutions from the Ottomans and British, but
Sa’id instead relied upon family, tribes, and patronage to rule. Can you
explain his style of governing, and how that’s similar to current Premier Nouri
al-Maliki’s?

Nuri’s style of governing developed over a long period, almost
four decades. Nuri was heavy-handed with his opposition inside Iraq; his
ability to cow them, and their opposition to the 1930 treaty with Britain is
what first gave him ascendency in British minds and among Iraqis. Nuri had long
standing personal ties with officers and understood the necessity of
“controlling” the military. And Nuri also had to contend with a new
parliamentary system brought by the British. He was not averse to shutting down
objectionable newspapers, declaring martial law, manipulating elections, and in
the case of Communist Party leaders, arresting, trying and executing them. In
parliament, he relied on a coterie of followers among tribal landlords and
others who, of course, benefited from government patronage and the passage of
legislation that favored their interests. These were time honored methods of
governing under the Ottomans. Nuri also worked through personal relationsand was tireless in developing them; he wore
down most of his opponents and even a younger generation of leaders who might
have gradually taken his place. Maliki has a long way to go to equal Nuri in
political experience, but it should be no surprise that in a situation in which
Iraq’s key institutions, the army, the bureaucracy, have been destroyed, its
educated classbadly eroded, Maliki is
falling back on well known practices, recognizable to those used by Nuri.
Maliki, too, has to work within a new constitutional system that he is manipulating.
He must get elected to gain and maintain power; hence the appeal to his
broadest possible base, the Shi’a. To stay in power and govern, he also relies
on patronage, now greatly enhanced through oil revenues.Of course, he pays attention to the Iraq
Security Forces (ISF) and the personal loyalty of its leaders.But Maliki has more serious problems today
than Nuri faced for most of his tenure, the gradual breakdown of the state, Kurdish,
and now Sunni, separatism; very weak domestic institutions (army, police,
bureaucracy, parliament), rising sectarianism, and a turbulent regional scene,
Syria, already spilling over into Iraq.Unlike Nuri, Maliki can no longer rely on a “treaty” or even a commitment
from the U.S. to back him up in a fix. It is worth noting, that in 1941 during
World War II the pro-British monarchy
and its supporters, Nuri, were almost overthrown in a coup, and were only
restored after British military intervention and occupation until 1946. In
1958, in the face of a restive population, numerous demonstrations and strikes,
and strong opposition to “foreign” alliances, the Baghdad Pact, the opposition
succeeded in overthrowing the monarchy and Nuri permanently when the British
and the U.S., the “international community” declined to get involved. Maliki
knows this history better than Americans.

4. Sa’id and Maliki
both saw oil as a way to develop Iraq’s economy. How did both think that
petroleum would help with their rule of the country?

Nuri and Maliki are functioning under different
circumstances on oil. Oil is now a fact of life in Iraq; it is Iraq’s major
resource. Iraq is dependent on oil for much of its budget, and virtually all of
its development. But this was not true for much of Nuri’s career. Substantial
oil production and export did not really begin until after World War II .
Moreover, Iraq’s oil was then under the control of foreign, Western, oil
companies and the management of Iraq Petroleum Company (IPC) was British. The
main issue Nuri faced in the 1950s was getting a larger share of profits from
oil companies for development. In 1952,a 50-50 split on profits was negotiated resulting in larger revenues for
Iraq. Under foreign influence and advice, a Development Board was established;
it was led by 6 members, two of whom were British and American experts, on how
to spend the money They opted for a strategy of long term growth—especially in
the agricultural sector. dams, flood control, irrigation, and investment in
basic transportation, communication and infrastructure. This paid good
dividends in the long term, but there weretwo problems with it. There was no attempt at social and political
reform in a period of rising maldistribution of wealth. The poorer elements of
the population, especially urban migrants from the south, like those in the
area now called Sadr City, did not see benefits, such as housing, jobs and
education in the short term.And the
agricultural strategy benefited the landed class, supporting the regime in
parliament, not the newly educated urban middle class, the chief opponents of
the regime, who favored land reform, rapid industrialization, and an end to
foreign control of oil. This ultimately played a role in the regime’s overthrow
in 1958.

Maliki is in a different position. Iraq now owns its oil
resources, Saddam nationalized the industry in 1972, and has control over
production and management, but Iraq is now a rentier state, dependent on oil
for its budget and development. Events of the last few decades have greatly
eroded Iraq’scapacity to produce and export;
Iraq’s oil cadre is gone; its infrastructure and technology are badly damaged.
The issue for Maliki is how to repair this damage as quickly as possible, and
to build the long term infrastructure. For this, he needs foreign technology,
expertise and training. The question is how to get this without giving
foreigners ownership, control, and the kind of influence to which his
population has a real aversion, not without justification. But the terms for
foreign oil companies and the domestic situation they face in Iraq, insecurity,
lack of a cadre, corruption, is holding this process back.In addition, Maliki faces a new problem Nuri
did not have, Kurdish separatism. The Kurds want ownership and control over oil
in their territory to give them a separate income stream, resisted by the central
government. To attract foreign investment, Kurds are willing to give foreign
oil companies a better deal than the central government, including“production sharing” agreements, an
arrangement rejected by the central government, and other OPEC countries. This
dispute prevents the passage of a uniform hydrocarbon law, which is slowing oil
development in both areas. However, in general, oil exports are a good news
story for Iraq. They have increased, Iraq’s exports now surpass Iran, and
Maliki has money to spend. However, along with more money has come increased
corruption and rising expectations. As a result, Maliki now faces Nuri’s old
problem of spending the money wisely, and in the short term, fast enough to
keep his population satisfied.

Sa'id at ceremony marking the opening of Iraq's parliament, 1942. Like Maliki, Sa'id was able to manipulate a weak opposition to his rule (Library of Congress)

5. Like Sa’id, Maliki
has benefited from having a weak opposition. What were the political forces
like in Iraq under the British and Royalist period, how was Sa’id able to
manipulate them, and how are they similar to today’s political scene?

In British-Royalist period, the monarch had considerable
power. The King could dismiss the cabinet, and put in another, and Iraq had
revolving cabinets. But similar to today, Iraq had elected parliaments and
relative freedom of the press and assembly. The 1950s were a lively intellectual
period, and several significant opposition parties took shape: A nationalist
party, Istiqlal-independence wanted to get rid of the British treaty, and then
the Baghdad Pact;a Leftist party, National
DemocraticParty concentrated on
domestic reform, freer elections, an end to maldistribution of wealth. More
extreme were underground parties like the Ba’th and the Iraq Communist Party
(ICP). But this opposition had weaknesses; its stronghold was among the urban,
educated intelligentsia. It dominated the media,but had inadequate organization and few roots
in the countryside, which was more conservative and religious. The same is true
today. The urban, liberal, more secular parties are concentrated in Baghdad or
major cities; they function through parliament and the media, but they have
less influence in the rural areas or even among poorer urban migrants like
those in Sadr City, although the Sadrist trend has certainly mobilized the poor
and underprivileged in both urban and rural areas.

But there are several differences with the present
situation. Nuri faced little overt opposition on the ethnic and sectarian front,
all significant parties were secular,and cabinets increasingly included more Shi’a and Kurds as well as
Sunnis. Opposition in the army was the main problem for Nuri; he also had to
deal with labor strikes and public demonstrations, especially among students.
Nuri and others, dealt with organized public unrest through declaring martial
law, arresting key leaders, detaining numerous “perpetrators”, closing down
newspapers, and by “fixing” and manipulating elections in one way or another to
get support in parliament. Many times demonstrators were killed or injured in
clashes with police. The best example of these tactics is the two elections of
1954. The first, controlled by the regent, was relatively free; itbrought a number of opposition leaders,
including Leftists, to parliament. But, the British Treaty was due to expire in
1957, and had to be replaced with some other security arrangement. The result
was the Baghdad Pact. The Regent felt only Nuri could handle the opposition
that would result. Nuri insisted on dismissal of the parliament. A series of
decreeswere then issued which permitted
the Council of Ministers to deport people convicted of communism, anarchism,
and working for a foreign government, and strip them of citizenship. It became
an offense to join movements like the Peace Partisans, the Democratic Youth and
others, the NGOs of today, and professional societies were forbidden to engage
in activities that disturbed public order. A new election was held that was so
“managed”the result was called “the
unopposed parliament”. Thereafter, Iraq settled down to rule by the army and
police. This was a turning point for the regime.

Maliki has a more difficult situation today because the
institutions of state, army, bureaucracy, parliament, are still new and weak,
and he faces a country divided on ethnic and sectarian grounds. There is no
monarch to balance the situation, and President Talabani, who previously acted
as mediator, is seriously ill. But like Nuri, Maliki has an army, an open
press, elections, and parliament to deal with. He is employing similar tactics
with these. He has outmaneuvered his opposition in parliament, undermined
independent institutions, the judicial system, the election commission and
central bank, and of course, put his supporters at the top of the military. He
has used “patronage” and cabinet appointments to split the opposition, and
strong arm tactics where that fails, such as the arrest and trial of Vice
President Tariq al-Hashemi, and the attempted arrest of former Finance Minister
Rafi al-Issawi.

PM Sa'id (left) talks with Crown Prince Abdullah, 1957 (right). Unlike Maliki Sa'id had to deal with some powerful groups within Iraq such as the monarchy

6. You mentioned the
arrest warrants for Hashemi and Issawi. Sa’id used the security forces and
martial law against his opponents as well. You think there’s a difference
between the two however, can you say how, and what you think overall about how
the two ruled Iraq.

There are many similarities between the two, but the
differences are also significant, particularly in their circumstances and
backgrounds. Nuri was a professional army officer who became a civilian
politician. He was never the only prime minister available; by the 1950s, he
was just the most seasoned and experienced. Nuri had counterbalancing forces to
help him, a monarchy with a degree of power to step in; a real strategic
alliance with the West, and stronger and more professional government
institutions. He did not have to rely on sectarian identity for support since
Iraq had developed a greater sense of identity especially by the 1950s, and
secularism was predominant in public life. Maliki faces different circumstances.
The foreign power behind the scenes, the U.S., has virtually no military
presence and diminishing influence; there is no monarch; the military, police
and bureaucracy are new and fragile, and the sense of “Iraqi” identity is rapidly
eroding. Maliki faces a society polarized and divided along ethnic and
sectarian lines and politicians, notably himself, appeal to these communal
identities for votes. He governs through
a cabinet representing not only ethnic and sectarian components, but virtually
all political blocs, who treat their ministries like independent “fiefs”. Another
difference is that Iraq under the monarchy, had not yet lived under a real
police state, as Maliki’s has. After decades of a Stalinesque regime under
Saddam, with multiple intelligence organizations and constant spying on its
population, with brutality as a method of governing, sometimes exercised on a
mass scale, the population has become inured to violence, prone to conspiracy
theories, and has developed an inbred suspicion and distrust of others, as well
as all government authority. Maliki himself is a product of this system. He
spent most of his adult life in an underground party, and in exile in countries
like Iran and Syria, also police states. He now has to function under a much
more open system with a democratic constitution and real elections. Not
surprisingly he has fallen back on what he knows: making sure of military
support; surrounding himself with trusted advisors and party loyalists, his son
Ahmad is one of them; arrests of those he sees as “terrorists” and potential
insurgents; wide-spread detentions and reported use of torture. Moreover, unlike
Nuri, Maliki came to office little known, and has yet to develop a public
persona. He is taciturn and lacks Nuri’s personal touch. However, Maliki is
nothing if not persistent, and has now developed a canny ability to outmaneuver
his rivals in parliament and the political sphere. But he has gone too far in
arresting and issuing arrest warrants for Hashemi and Issawi, and in stonewalling
the Sunni protests in a charged sectarian situation. It is too early to make
any predictions on Maliki, or Iraq’s future, but it is well to remember that
Nuri’s well- known success as Iraq’s longest lasting prime minister, off and
on, was finally swept away by the very army he had nurtured and by widespread
popular support from the new middle class with whom he had refused to share
power and had little rapport.

Tuesday, May 28, 2013

Since December 2012 there have been demonstrations
throughout Anbar, Ninewa, Diyala, Tamim, and Salahaddin provinces over the
perceived marginalization of Sunnis by the central government. Since that time
the protesters have faced many divisions over leadership and tactics. That
continues to the present day with the issue of federalism, being the newest point
of contention within the movement.

Raising the issue of federalism at Friday prayers in Fallujah has led to two clashes in May 2013 (AP)

The issue of whether to make Sunni provinces of Iraq their
own federal regions has become the newest divider amongst the country’s
protesters. During Friday prayers on May 24, 2013, there was a clash in
Fallujah in Anbar over the issue. The committee in charge of the movement there hoisted banners calling for regionalism, which led to some members of the crowd
to start throwing things, leading to a fight breaking out. Afterward, one
participate said that the people opposed making any province its own region,
and that they stood for the unity of Iraq. This was actually the second time
this happened in the city. At the beginning of May, a speaker was talking about how the prime minister should resign or there might be civil war. He went
on to say that the country should be divided, so that Sunnis could rule
themselves. Again, some protesters began throwing water bottles at the stage to
express their opposition to that idea. The talk of forming Sunni regions has
just entered the lexicon of the protest movements in the last several weeks. Some common rhetoric heard is that the government refuses to deal with the
protesters’ demands, and are supporting militias that are killing people, while
the security forces do nothing. (1) Given this situation, Sunni provinces like
Anbar have nothing left to do, but to form their own regions, which would
theoretically give them more local control over their own affairs, and not have
to rely upon a Baghdad, which they hold in deep contempt and suspicion.

The protesters and their leadership are divided over
federalism. Sheikh Mohammed Bijari a member of the Fallujah Clan Council told
the press that there were disagreements on the matter. Some religious
leaders, a spokesman for the Sunni Endowment, the Anbar Tribes Chiefs, and even Sheikh Saadi have all expressed opposition to the idea. On
the other hand, other groups such as the Iraqi Islamic Party have come out in
support of the concept. According to several reports the differences over regionalism
has led to many disputes within the protest leadership. It’s having an affect
upon the regular protesters as well as the events in Fallujah showed. Maliki
has thrown in his hat saying on May 20, that if a province wanted to enact
federalism, they could do so as long as it was done legally and according to the constitution. The premier stopped Salahaddin and other Sunni provinces
from doing just that last year, so his comments were probably just political
rhetoric. Ironically, since 2003 both the premier and the majority of Sunnis
have stood for a strong central government. Many of the former still hold onto
that idea, while others are now embracing it since they have gained little from
their actions over the last five months.

Iraq is going through dramatic changes right now. Sunnis
across northern and western Iraq have been taking to the streets to protest
against what they feel is victimization by the central government. This
movement has continuously been divided over a number of issues, and federalism
is the newest one. Calls for making Anbar, Salahaddin, and other governorates
their own regions has become part of the weekly rhetoric coming out of Friday
prayers. Not all the participants agree about this tactic as the incidents in
Fallujah showed. One legacy of Saddam Hussein upon Iraq is the belief in a
strong central government. Many Iraqis, both Sunnis and Shiites, hold onto this
belief. It’s only been in recent weeks that the protester organizers have been
pushing federalism, seemingly out of frustration. It’s yet to be seen how far
they will push this issue. Becoming a region requires specific steps such as a
referendum according to the constitution, and that has not happened yet. With
the divisions it’s bringing out it’s unclear whether this will ever occur.

FOOTNOTES

1. Dar Addustour, “Clashes with hands and sticks in the yard of
Fallujah because banners demanding a region – protests enter day 154 .. and
preachers six provinces are demanding dialogue,” 5/24/13

Thursday, May 23, 2013

In the wake of arrest warrants being issued for former
Finance Minister Rafi Issawi’s bodyguards in December 2012, protests and an
eventual boycott of the cabinet by several ministers began. The Agricultural
Minister Izz al-Din al-Dawla left in March 2013 after demonstrators were killed
and wounded by security forces in Mosul. Industry Minister Ahmad Nasser
al-Dalli Karbuli, Technology Minister Abdul al-Karim al-Samarraie, and
Education Minister Mohammed Tamim followed suit after the Hawija incident in
April. Tamim is now returning to the council of ministers, while Dawla has also
reportedly attended at least one cabinet session. All four ministers come from
the now defunct Iraqi National Movement (INM), which was one of the prime
minister’s main opponents. The four however, all had friendly relations with
Maliki, and broke with their list several times beforehand. It is no wonder
than that they should eventually return to their jobs, and resume their work.

Education Minister Tamim recently announced that he was
returning to office after a short boycott over the Hawija incident in April
2013 (Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty)

On May 22, 2013, Industry Minister Ahmad Nasser al-Dalli
Karbuli announced that Education Minister Mohammed Tamim was returning to his position. Tamim resigned in April after the security forces attacked
protesters in the town of Hawija. Karbuli, and Technology Minister Abdul
al-Karim al-Samarraie joined him. The month before, Agricultural Minister
Izz al-Din al-Dawla gave up his office after demonstrators were killed and wounded in his hometown of Mosul. Its recently been reported that he has attended at least one cabinet session recently as well. Tamim is from
Deputy Premier Saleh al-Mutlaq’s Iraqi National Dialogue Front, Karbuli is from
the Solution Movement, Samarraie is a member of the Renewal Party, while Dawla
belongs to Speaker Nujafi’s old Iraqiyoon party that is now part of Mutahidun,
the Uniters List. All of them gained office through the Iraqi National Movement
(INM) after the 2010 parliamentary vote. Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki
immediately rejected Tamim’s resignation. That was likely due to their
close relationship beforehand. In fact, all four have consistently broken with
their list to work to stay part of the government.

In December 2011 and March 2013, the INM announced that it
was withdrawing its ministers from the cabinet to protest Maliki’s government,
but neither worked. At the beginning of March, the National Movement stopped going to the council of ministers to support the protesters. In less than a
month, Education Minister Tamim, Industry Minister Karbuli, and Deputy Premier
Mutlaq were all back at meetings, which helped lead to the end of the INM as a coherent list. Before that, at the end of 2011, the INM held another
unsuccessful boycott against the prime minister. Karbuli, Tamim, and
several other National Movement ministers never followed their party. Samarraie, Tamim, and Dawla all eventually met with the premier letting him
know that they wanted to return to their offices, which effectively put an end
to the boycott. In turn, Maliki gave them concessions, such as releasing 43
prisoners directly to Tamim’s protection in February 2012. The conventional
wisdom on Iraq is that the government and country is wracked by sectarianism,
and the divide between Sunnis and Shiites is becoming worse by the day. That’s
how the increasing violence is also explained. This overlooks the fact that
several Sunni ministers such as Karbuli, Tamim, Samarraie, and Dawla have
actually had quite friendly relations with Maliki, and have been more than
willing to work within his government, even when that directly contradicted their
list’s strategy.

Given the protest movements and occasional violence the
government has used against them it was predictable that these ministers would
again step away from the government. At the same time, it was foreseeable that
they would eventually come back to the cabinet as well. They did that the last
two times they were supposed to be boycotting, and all of them will likely do
so again on this occasion. Not only do they not have as many issues with
Premier Maliki as some of their brethren, but they also lose out on the
patronage and power that holding a ministry bestows upon them. That is another
driving force for them to go back to work. If nothing else, the power, money,
and corruption that accompanies holding office is one of the great unifiers
that exists in the country.

SOURCES

AIN, “Urgent….Karbouli: Timim to resume his work as Minister
of Education,” 5/22/13

Wednesday, May 22, 2013

Iraq recently held provincial elections in twelve of its
eighteen provinces. Voting did not take place in Anbar and Ninewa however,
because the government had indefinitely postponed them there. Now a date has
finally been given for those governorates to have their day at the ballot box
in June 2013. Security was the official reason given for the delay, but it was
widely believed that Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki wanted to stop candidates
supported by the protest movements there from gaining power. That move has
likely backfired as the demonstrations are going on as strong as ever, and
security is even worse than before.

Iraq’s government recently said that Ninewa and Anbar would be allowed to vote on June 20, 2013. The cabinet claimed the date came from
the Election Commission. That could be true as last month the news was that the two provinces would cast ballots on July 4 instead. The postponement was originally announced on March 19 with security being the rationale. This came after the Anbar provincial council voted to delay the elections a few days
beforehand. There definitely was violence going on in those two
governorates with 14 candidates haven withdrawn from the city of Mosul for
example in Ninewa due to death threats. (1) Al Qaeda in Iraq has consistently
been against all elections in the country, and Mosul has always been one of
their urban strongholds, so they were likely behind the intimidation there.
That being said, overall security was not much different in March than it had
been the previous months. The real reason for the delay was probably the
protests in major cities such as Ramadi, Fallujah, and Mosul, which started
after Baghdad issued arrest warrants for former Finance Minister Rafi Issawi’s
bodyguards on terrorism charges. These demonstrations quickly focused upon
Sunni victimhood, which they blamed on Prime Minister Maliki. Not wanting to
have these forces be institutionalized through winning seats on the provincial
councils, the premier pushed through a delay in the balloting in those areas.

The move immediately provoked condemnations by political
forces in the two provinces. Speaker Osama Nujafi and his brother the Governor
of Ninewa Atheel Nujafi both attacked the delay. A member of their
Al-Hadbaa Party and a Christian councilman also said that voting should happen on time. In Anbar, the Iraqi Islamic Party accused Maliki of attempting a coup against the political process, while Sheikh Ahmed Abu Risha a leader
of the Awakening Movement and the protests called on the council of ministers to reverse its decision. Anbar Governor Qasim Fahadawi was one of the few
voices that supported the delay. (2) He claimed that with the security forces
deployed to protect the protest sites there would not be enough soldiers and
police to defend the polling areas as well. Speaker Nujafi has become one of
the leading critics of the prime minister, and his base is in Ninewa, so it was
obvious that he could come out against any postponement of voting there. In
Anbar, the criticisms were a bit ironic. Both the Islamic Party and Abu Risha’s
Awakening of Iraq and Independents held a large number of seats on the Anbar
provincial council, which voted overwhelmingly for a delay. Either those
politicians have developed their own base and no longer rely upon their
leadership or there was some secret maneuvering behind the scenes to perhaps
provoke the central government, and give a rallying point for the protests,
which Abu Risha and the Islamic Party are both heavily involved in. Whatever
the case, all of these parties are likely to do quite well when the votes are finally
cast. Nujafi’s Mutahidun, Uniters, emerged as the leading Sunni vote getter in the
provinces that did hold elections in April. Abu Risha and the Islamic Party are
likely to come out with a large number of ballots as well. In fact, after the
Hawija incident, any hope Maliki might have had to change the political
situation with the postponement has now evaporated, and the general public is
even angrier than before at the authorities as shown from the huge increase in
violence across northern and central Iraq in recent weeks.

Delaying the vote in Anbar and Ninewa was always a very
controversial move. The weak institutions in the country meant that there was
nothing to challenge Premier Maliki’s decision. With demonstrations growing in
those two provinces he didn’t want them to put their voices into action through
the ballot box, and was hoping that his allies might be able to gain more
support or the protests might have lessoned or been broken up by now. Instead,
the situation is even more inflamed. If security was the rationale for the
postponement in March, it will be even harder to gain control of the two
governorates in June to ensure the security of the polling stations. The prime
minister’s plans have thus backfired, and whether the demonstrations end
anytime soon or not, they and their political backers will at least be able to
place officials into office that will carry on with their spirit if not demands
for the next several years.

FOOTNOTES

1. Al Rafidayn, “Electoral Commission: the withdrawal of the
14 candidates for the provincial elections in Mosul after receiving threats,”
3/18/13

2. Alsumaria, “Anbar governor attributed the postponement of
the elections for the preoccupation with security forces to protect
protesters,” 3/20/13

Tuesday, May 21, 2013

In May 2013, Jim McCormick the owner
of the company that sold 7,000 fake bomb detectors to Iraq was sentenced to ten years in prison by a British court on three counts of fraud. The fallout in
Baghdad is just beginning to be felt. The government is trying to act like
nothing happened, while two anti-corruption groups are pushing for new
investigations, and implicating Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, and other top
officials. Unfortunately, while committees can look into these matters there is
little likelihood that anything substantive will happen.

A fake bomb detector still being used
at a checkpoint in Baghdad, May 2013 (AFP)

After the news broke in Iraq that Jim
McCormick had been convicted there was little change on the ground. Deputy
Interior Minister Adnan Asadi, who is the de facto head of the ministry told
the press that the bomb detectors would eventually be replaced, but he did not
mention how or when. Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki said that the authorities took care of the bomb detectors a long time ago seemingly blowing
off the McCormick conviction. Later he told a press conference that some of the detectors actually worked. This was despite the fact that the British
court proved that there were no working parts within the so-called detectors. Agence
France Presse quoted a policeman in Baghdad who said that they were under
orders to continue to use the anti-explosive devices even though they knew they
did not work. Only in Dhi Qar did the police announce that they would stop using the detectors, and would be using bomb-sniffing dogs instead. That
province happens to be in the south where there are hardly any attacks, so its
decision would not have a real effect upon security in the country. Baghdad on
the other hand sees the most violence, yet the government is acting like the
McCormick case means nothing. The premier’s statement is a perfect example
since the detectors are still in daily use, so obviously they have not been dealt
with properly.

Parliament and the anti-corruption
Integrity Commission are taking the matter much more seriously. Immediately
after the sentencing of McCormick Iraq’s integrity committee in the legislature
said that officials from the Office of the Commanding General of the Armed
Forces and former Interior Minister Jawad Bolani were involved in buying the fake detectors. Parliamentarian Jawad Shihili stated that both the
inspector general at Interior and the Science Ministry objected to the
purchase, but higher officials insisted upon it. Al-Mada received a memo from
Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s office as commander and chief that okayed buying the devices. That was despite a British officer warning the Interior
Ministry that the detectors did not work. This new evidence led the integrity
committee to form a joint committee with the Interior and Defense Ministries’
inspector generals to investigate the matter. The independent Integrity
Commission went on to issue arrest warrants for five directors of companies
involved with buying the anti-bomb equipment. A further look into the
matter is definitely required as the McCormick trial revealed that at least 15 Iraqi officials received bribes from his company to finalize the deal. So
far only General Jihad Jabiri the former head of the explosives department at
the Interior Ministry and two others have been jailed over the devices in 2011.
That occurred after Minister Bolani was removed from office, because he was
protecting Jabiri and the others from prosecution.

The problem with investigating
corruption in Iraq is that it can only go so far. Bribes and thievery are so imbedded
within the government that it has actually become part of the way of running
the country as pilfering from the state is considered part of the payoff of
holding office, and a way to reward followers. That severely limits the ability
to charge and successfully prosecute people, because the political parties and
their leadership will block it just as Minister Bolani did. New documents can
be uncovered, people can be named, new information revealed about the fake bomb
detectors, and maybe even some company heads might be taken to court, but those
that were truly responsible will never be touched. That would open the door to
everyone involved in the system being charged, and that simply won’t happen in
Iraq right now.

Monday, May 20, 2013

Iraq’s Anbar province is seeing increasing tension. Since
December there have been two large protests going on in Ramadi and Fallujah.
After the government raid upon the Hawija demonstration site in Tamim
governorate in April 2013 there has been an uptick in attacks as well. In May,
things picked up with raids upon the residences of two leaders of the protests,
as well as the kidnapping of several dozen soldiers and police, and the
collapse of an offer to talk with Baghdad. With the way things are going this
could be leading up to a security crackdown in the governorate aimed at not
only clearing out militants, but shutting down the demonstrations as well.

On top of that insurgents are attempting to exploit the anger
in Anbar for their own ends. Gunmen ambushed and kidnapped a number of police
and soldiers in the province on May 18. At first, it was reported that 10 policemen were taken at a fake checkpoint outside of Ramadi. Then a
spokesman for the Defense Ministry said that 35 soldiers had also been abducted. The Anbar Salvation Council later stated that the army launched an operation around Ramadi looking for the missing security force elements. The Council blamed Al Qaeda in Iraq for the incidents. Three people from
Karbala who were travelling through Anbar after visiting Jordan were also said
to have been kidnapped. Immediately afterward, a member of the Anbar Tribal
Chiefs Council Mohammed Alwani condemned the security force members being taken. It also prompted the protest leaders in the province to hold a meeting to
talk about the deteriorating security situation. They told the press they were
trying to keep the demonstrations peaceful despite the worsening situation in
Anbar. In the last couple years Al Qaeda in Iraq and other insurgent groups had
lost most of their standing in the governorate. The Awakening movement started
there, and successfully pushed the militants to the outskirts of Anbar with the
help of the Americans. Now, after Hawija, the insurgency has a new life
exploiting the growing resentment Sunnis have towards Baghdad. It has used
Hawija to claim that the government will ignore their demands, and that the
only alternative then is to fight the authorities, which they claim are
Persians controlled by Iran. As a result, there has been a dramatic increase in
attacks in Anbar and other provinces in the last few weeks.

Spiritual leader of the Anbar protest movement Sheikh Saadi
said he gave up on talks with the government (Al Sharqiya)

Finally, the Ramadi movement has given up on negotiating
with Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki. Sheikh Abdul Malik Saadi who is the
spiritual leader of much of the protest movement in Iraq said that he was ending his initiative to talk with the government. He blamed Baghdad for ignoring
his offer, and warned that there might be “dire consequences” as a result. In
May, Saadi endorsed forming a committee that would meet with the government. He
suggested Samarra in Salahaddin as a suitable site since it is in a
predominately Sunni province, but the city holds a holy Shite shrine. The idea
of talks between the two sides seemed to come about after the efforts of Deputy
Premier Saleh al-Mutlaq to meet with various officials such as Governor Qasim
al Fahadawi, protest organizers, and tribal leaders in Anbar. Afterward, they
agreed to negotiate with Baghdad. Saadi then announced that a committee be
formed. How far any talks would have gone is an open question. The protest
movement has some unrealistic demands such as completely ending
deBaathification and calling for the removal of Premier Maliki. At the same
time, negotiations could have helped the two sides come to some kind of
compromises. Now that option has ended for now.

Anbar has been a hotbed of opposition to the government for
the last several months. When arrest warrants were issued for former Finance
Minister Rafi al-Issawi’s bodyguards in December 2012, Anbar immediately began
organizing protests in support since the minister was from Fallujah. This
eventually became the impetus for similar movements across several other
provinces. Originally, the demonstrators voiced complaints about what they saw
as their victimization by the authorities such as mass arrests, the use of the
anti-terrorism law, and secret informers. Since then the movement has become
more militant and sectarian with constant denouncements of Baghdad being run by
Iran, and some organizers being connected to the insurgency. The recent raids,
kidnappings, and the end of the call for talks with the authorities can only
add to this growing fire. Even if the mainstream protest movement like the one
in Ramadi attempts to remain peaceful, it is apparent that more and more people
in the governorate are at least open to the passive if not active support for
attacks upon the security forces. That is giving new life to the insurgency,
which has been attempting to exploit the demonstrations since they began as an
organizing and rally point for a renewed fight against the government. The
political deadlock in Baghdad is not helping the matter, because parliament is
incapable of passing any legislation right now that might satisfy some of the
demands made by Anbar. This all might be leading to a larger and sustained
security operation in the province to crackdown on the insurgency, and perhaps
end the protest movement at the same time. That would end two problems for the
prime minister with one stone. If that choice is made there’s no telling what
the lasting effects might be. It could simply make the situation worse by
proving the militants’ propaganda correct that the government has no intent of
dealing with the demonstrators, and that violence is the only answer. That
doesn’t mean Iraq is heading for a new civil war, but security is definitely
worsening with no end in sight for the immediate future.

SOURCES

Al-Abdeh, Malik, “Sunnism is Our
Slogan,” The Majalla, 4/30/13

AIN, “AOC assures kidnapping 5 security elements,” 5/18/13

- “Breaking news…Several tribes
form military force in Anbar,” 4/27/13

Iraq History Timeline

About Me

Musings On Iraq was started in 2008 to explain the political, economic, security and cultural situation in Iraq via original articles and interviews. I have written for the Jamestown Foundation, Tom Ricks’ Best Defense at Foreign Policy and the Daily Beast, and was responsible for a chapter in the book Volatile Landscape: Iraq And Its Insurgent Movements. My work has been published in Iraq via NRT, AK News, Al-Mada, Sotaliraq, All Iraq News, and Ur News all in Iraq. I was interviewed on BBC Radio 5, Radio Sputnik, CCTV and TRT World News TV, and have appeared in CNN, the Christian Science Monitor, The National, Columbia Journalism Review, Mother Jones, PBS’ Frontline, the Center for Strategic and International Studies, the Institute for the Study of War, Radio Free Iraq, Rudaw, and others. I have also been cited in Iraq From war To A New Authoritarianism by Toby Dodge, Imagining the Nation Nationalism, Sectarianism and Socio-Political Conflict in Iraq by Harith al-Qarawee, ISIS Inside the Army of Terror by Michael Weiss and Hassan Hassahn, The Rise of the Islamic State by Patrick Cocburn, and others. If you wish to contact me personally my email is: motown67@aol.com