Monday, June 9, 2014

Board Finds Assessor with Burden Failed to Support Property's Assessed Value with Comparable Sales or Building Permit

Excerpts of the Board's Determination follow:

17. The parties agreed the Respondent has the burden of
proof because the 2012 assessment increased by more than 5%.

Analysis

18. The Respondent did not make a prima facie case that the
2012 assessed value is correct. The Board reached this decision for the
following reasons:

…

b. The Respondent described the procedures in the Guidelines
that were followed in computing the effective age, condition, and depreciation.
But as the Indiana Tax Court has explained, strictly applying the Guidelines
does not prove the assessed value is correct in an assessment appeal. See
Eckerling v. Wayne Twp. Assessor, 841 N.E.2d 674, 678 (Ind. Tax Ct. 2006)
(holding that taxpayers failed to make a case by simply focusing on the
assessor’s methodology rather than offering market value-in-use evidence).

c. The Respondent’s reliance on the sales/assessment ratio
study (and the market adjustment factor derived from it) is misplaced. While
the DLGF approved the ratio study, the Respondent offered no authority for
using a ratio study to prove an individual property’s market value-in-use. In
fact, the IAAO’s Standard on Ratio Studies, which 50 IAC 27-1-4 incorporates by
reference, prohibits using ratio studies for that purpose:

Assessors, appeal boards, taxpayers, and taxing authorities
can use ratio studies to evaluate the fairness of funding distributions, the merits
of class action claims, or the degree of discrimination. . . However, ratio
study statistics cannot be used to judge the level of appraisal of an
individual parcel.

d. Comparable sales or comparable assessments can be used to
help prove the correct value of the subject property. Conclusory statements
that a property is “similar” or “comparable” to another property, however, do
not constitute probative evidence of comparability. Long v. Wayne Township
Assessor, 821 N.E.2d 466, 470 (Ind. Tax Ct. 2005). Instead, the party seeking
to establish comparability must identify the characteristics of the subject
property and explain how those characteristics compare to the characteristics
of the purportedly comparable properties. See Id. at 470-71. When seeking to
establish comparability between parcels of land, the relevant characteristics
to compare include things such as location, accessibility, topography. See
Blackbird Farms Apts., LP v. Dep’t of Local Gov’t Fin., 765 N.E.2d 711, 715
(Ind. Tax Ct. 2002) (holding that taxpayer failed to establish comparability of
parcels of land where, among other things, taxpayer did not compare the
topography and accessibility of parcels). The party seeking to establish
comparability between properties also must explain how any significant
differences between the properties affect their relative values. See Long, 821
N.E.2d at 470-71.

e. The Respondent identified two properties as comparables,
one located in Mooresville and the other in Plainfield. But the Respondent made
only a minimal comparison of the properties with photographs and the front page
of the property record card of the Mooresville property owned by Mac’s
Convenience Stores LLC. Without a meaningful explanation and analysis, such
evidence is conclusory. This part of the Respondent’s presentation was
insufficient to support any legitimate conclusion about the relative values of
the properties.

f. The Respondent presented a building permit for the
Mooresville property that purportedly shows $60,000 was spent on remodeling/updating
the Mac’s Convenience Stores property in 2011. Actual construction costs can be
probative of market value-in-use, but here no explanation was offered to
explain how this evidence might help establish the true tax value of the
subject property. Although the properties may have similar exterior views, a
far more detailed comparison of the characteristics of the properties would be
required to make this evidence probative. For example, the Respondent failed to
address the notation on the building permit that it was for “interior remodel”
on a building with more than twice the square footage as the subject property.
This building permit does not help to prove an accurate value for the subject
property.

g. The Respondent also introduced evidence relating to an
agreement that settled the Mac’s Convenience Stores’ 2012 appeal of its
Mooresville property. According to Ms. Brummett, the agreed valuation in that
settlement was $145.49 per square foot and the disputed assessment on the
subject property is only $124.03 per square foot: “The subject property is
currently assessed at $124.03 per square foot, which is $21.46 per square foot
less than what the Petitioner agreed to on the very like building that’s in
Mooresville.” Although her testimony is not entirely clear on the point, it
appears that Ms. Brummett was stating that the Petitioner was the same in both
cases. Perhaps this confusion results from the fact that Mr. Smith was the
taxpayer representative in both cases, but he is not the Petitioner in either
case. The Respondent presented no probative evidence or cogent argument to
support her assertion that this settlement somehow shows the disputed value on the
subject property is correct.

…

20. In other cases where the Respondent had the burden to
prove the assessment is correct and the Respondent failed to carry that burden,
the Board has ordered that the assessment be returned to the assessed value of
the year before. Therefore, the assessment will be changed to that value, which
was $194,300.

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