Our house is on fire. Join the resistance: Do no harm/take no shit. My idiosyncratic and confluent bricolage of progressive politics, the collaborative commons, next generation cognitive neuroscience, American pragmatism, de/reconstruction, dynamic systems, embodied realism, postmetaphysics, psychodynamics, aesthetics. It ain't much but it's not nothing.

"What
qualifies a neural representation for a role in subjective experience?
Previous evidence suggests that the duration and intensity of the neural
response to a sensory stimulus are factors. We introduce another
attribute—the reproducibility of a pattern of neural activity across
different episodes—that predicts specific and measurable differences
between conscious
and nonconscious neural representations indepedently of duration and
intensity. We found that conscious neural activation patterns are
relatively reproducible when compared with nonconscious neural
activation patterns corresponding to the same perceptual content. This
is not adequately explained by a difference in signal-to-noise ratio."

* Recall this paper concluded: "We propose that the neural decision to move
coincides in time with average subjective estimates of the time of awareness of
intention to move (9, 11) and that the brain produces a reasonably accurate
estimate of the time of its movement-causing decision events.” (My emphasis. Does "awareness of intention" mean some form of consciousness?) Also recall the New Scientist article that made us aware of this new research. Schurger was quoted as saying
the following, but I don't know the source, since it is not in the
referenced paper: "If we are correct, then the Libet experiment does not count as evidence
against the possibility of conscious will," says Schurger.

Therefore I'd say that his earlier article above obviously assumes a conscious neural decision, since it has properties different from nonconscious neural representations.