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Abstract

I intend to defend the following as a necessary condition of a belief S being epistemically justified for a subject:Awareness Requirement: S is justified in believing that P only if i) there is something, X, that contributes to the justification of B; and ii) S is aware (or potentially aware) of X.This will be shown through drawing attention to our considered judgments about cases. That will then lay the groundwork for giving an account of the nature of this awareness in the second half of this paper. In doing so I will examine and respond to an argument against the awareness requirement that we might call Bergmann‟s Dilemma. My solution invokes what I call “non-doxastic strong awareness” in a way that avoids the regresses that Bergmann advances.

Comments

At the time of this conference Brent J C Madison was affiliated with University College London.

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