Cash by mail is a very important way to trade. It can be voluntarily anonymous (like bitcoin), and can be independently verified by arbitrators through tracking. Also non-reversible. Certainly more non-reversible compared to Quickpay, ClearXChange or Email Money Transfers.

Even tho Manfred didn’t reply, I assume it is because of verification for the sent money by the arbitrator, like I mentioned in the comments on Reddit. I assume tracking number is the number assigned to the package, but there I assume there is no way for the arbitrator to verify the contents of the package.

There is a way that such a system could work in Bisq, as in Alphabay or Dream. For cash by mail there would be an escrow in BTC for buyer something higher than the amount trading in FIAT, in this way the possibility of defrauding would not be an option that would benefit to any part. If any party does not accept the trade, the buyer loses the escrow and the seller his BTC. In the event of a dispute, the arbitrator would simply check that there are only addresses in the address fields, if there is otherwise, the opposite party would be right, in other cases both parties lose.

The seller would then just have an incentive to not report if he doesn’t get the money in mail, otherwise he loses his security deposit as well as his trade amount of BTC. The seller should report it so that the fraudulent buyers can’t keep that up, but he would be doing it at his cost. It is like putting people in situation to either stand up to a criminal and get shot or keep quiet and let the criminals rule. A seller here can not get his deposit back if the other trader is fraudulent and he doesn’t play ball, so sellers will just keep quiet and no fraud will ever get reported.

No. How is fraud in such a system possible? If you send a brick in your package, you lose your deposit (the security deposit value exceeds the amount FIAT sent by mail). You do not win anything if the other party lose

If you receive the money and do not release the BTC, you lose your BTC. Nobody wins if there is no cooperation. The referee is not necessary.

That is assuming that the BTC seller opens a dispute if he gets a brick in the mail. But there is no incentive for him to do that, quite the opposite, he will be better of if he just keeps quiet, otherwise he will simply lose his security deposit as well. Think if you are in the seller’s place and got a brick in the mail. Now what do you do? Open a dispute and lose your security deposit or act like nothing happened and get your security deposit back? Nobody wins if there is no cooperation, but this might just mean that the seller will cooperate with the thief.

That’s not gonna happen. You will never receive a brick from a thief, since the thief would lose his escrow. The seller doesn’t have escrow, doesn’t need it, and if he doesn’t receive the money from the sale, he will not lose more if he refuses to sign.

Thus, you can only receive a brick from a fool who wants to lose money, never from a swindler. But against fools not even gods can fight

When the transaction time ends, if a signature is missing everyone loses. The buyer will always lose something more than the seller, through the appropriate escrow.

You can hardly imagine a way in which a scammer takes advantage of this system.

The arbitrator would only be necessary if one party denounces that in the address fields something different has been written (email, message, etc.)

I love how if someone reads this topic from bottom up would be very confused that we are talking about some thief mailing bricks

That is the thing by the way, the seller loses nothing either way. He either gets the cash in mail or gets the security deposit from the buyer, or both, why not? Doesn’t cost him a thing once he gets the cash to act like he didn’t. You might be confusing that there is no escrow in Bisq, that is why it is decentralized.

Both parties always need to make a security deposit, for the same reason that it is important to use it in other fiat payment methods is the same reason it needs to be used here. Otherwise the buyer is risking his money for nothing, even tho the trade amount in BTC would be already locked in a multisig and the bad seller will lose it if he just ignores to send it himself, he still has no incentive to go with the trade once he gets his money in the mail. He could just shutdown his PC and waste buyers and arbitrators time by making them wait for the max trade period to be over and for them to go with the dispute process. With seller’s deposit the buyer gets a compensation for his time and troubles.

It would make a good plan to make as much as BTC sell offers as possible in hopes that some of them will not open a dispute or something, since it costs him almost nothing to do it (small make offer fee or if he takes these, then take offer fee). And it is enough for one person to make a program to do this in an automatic fashion and this would become almost every case, not just few of them.

The seller can’t risk nothing, no one can in this program, this is the design. They both need to have security deposits for multiple reasons, this is what makes the system safe.

Yes, in the system that I pose, the seller risks and the system does not work exactly as Bisq does.

Once the offer is taken, neither party can cancel and the seller risks the amount of BTC he sells.

The seller’s BTC amount would work as a security deposit. The seller should move the BTC to that type of deposit. At the end of the transaction period if there are no two signatures, the arbitrator takes (automatically) the seller’s BTC and the buyer’s security deposit.

The buyer risks his security deposit and the amount sent by mail.

The only weak point is that the seller does not have, as you said, any incentive to sign the end of the transaction once you have received your money. He could let his BTC pass into the hands of the referees.

However, it does not gain anything from it. Once the reputation system works in Bisq, it would have very clear incentive to sign: keep the reputation of good trader.

So the sale by mail could be authorized to merchants, from a certain reputation. The system would work well and could only fail for two causes of low probability:

1-) Loss of the package
2-) Crazy people wanting to lose their money, sending empty packages

Well, he gains time, he just needs to take the offer or make one and wait for someone to take it. Really no reason for him to bother.

erizo:

Once the reputation system works in Bisq,

That is a whole different story man…for now, reputation isn’t a safety feature. It will take some time to make a decentralized reputation system, it isn’t very clear at the moment how it will be implemented.

Since the arbitrator can’t verify the contents of the package it means that (if the addresses are right, there is no reason for anyone to put a wrong one) he will always take the security deposit and BTC trade amount for himself in case of the dispute. And since seller will never have an incentive to release the BTC, either if he gets the fiat or not, it is safe to assume that he never will and therefor that these trades will almost always end in disputes. And if the trades almost always end in disputes and arbitrator never knows if fiat was sent or not, it means that almost always both security deposit and the BTC trade amount will be taken for the arbitrator. So buyer will almost never see his bitcoins and therefor he should never trade.

In the process where it is required for both parties to work together and one has no incentive to ever work together is a process that can never work.

A sends to B a package with the amount of its purchase. A can not even consider defrauding, because it would lose its deposit.

A can send an empty package here, because B can’t say a thing, if he tries to complain he will lose his security deposit and his BTC trade amount.

You can’t have a system where they have to cooperate, as they can and will play chicken.
“If you don’t confirm the payment, we both go down”
"Oh yeah? Well if you don’t send the payment I will make us both go down."
Not a really reliable system.

And since Bisq has a set amount of interactions between users ( make offer, take offer, confirm payment sent, confirm payment received ) there is always a last interaction where the other party is forced to either accept the demands or loses all of his money. This last interaction is confirming that payment is received, if it isn’t they both lose, so the party that needs to confirm must always confirm. That is why you need arbitrators otherwise disputes can either take forever or one will be forced to make a compromise, just like in person to person disputes. You need an arbitrator. And if he can’t confirm the payment, you don’t have an arbitrator.

After showing you this problem at first, you made a system where the other one doesn’t have anything to lose. But that is just going back and ignoring the other problems for which the security deposits are made in the first place. After bringing back the deposits, you get back your first problem. You can’t avoid it. We can go back and forward like this, but there are only two options: you have security deposits for both traders or you don’t. Either of them have problems if the arbitrator can’t verify and pick the one that was wrong.

It is a very risky strategy, but it is true that it could happen in some case.

There is no limit on how many trades you can start, so if it is profitable, it will be almost every case. And you can’t really count on people sacrificing their money for the greater good. In the end, they start being cynical and say “why would I lose my coins when someone else in my situation will keep his and fund this thief so he can afford losing his deposits with the honest people”, this is how selfishness operates it our world all the time, and is a reason for a lot of evil staying unpunished.

erizo:

Consequently, I maintain the above proposal: the seller does not need a deposit and must be a reputed seller.

Alright, so centralization it is Brace yourself for the long con attacks.

Ok, I don’t understand what is all about?
Propose to send money in an envelope by mail for me sound really risky.
First, because it can simply disappear, today US or Canadian mail service, not like 20 years ago.
I am all the time receive mail delivered to my mailbox with different address on it, mailman all the time mistake street name or house number.
Second, because it is no way to prove that you sent money, no postcard or piece of paper.

I know only one way to verify money was sent.
If money deposited to account.
In this case, if a trader who received money, grant to the arbitrary access to the account by giving hem login\pass to the bank account(or okpay,etc…), arbitrator can see if money deposited or not.

Correct me if I am wrong and you know any other way to truly verify.

I really want to find a way to sale BTC for fiat without compromise my identity but I know only one.
Meeting in person, and I am not liking it very much even I am doing this many times.

I am not even understanding how arbitrary in Bisq can make any decision without assess to the traders bank or other fiat payment system.

People so naive, some think that if they sent mail to some address with name on the envelope, that they know person real name and address…
OK, I can give your name Joe Nemo and address of some abandoned house for sale and just check mailbox of this house every day… Yeasy?

So, please don’t send cash to no one by mail and do not ask to do it other people.
If someone disagrees, just sent money to me, at least you give it to the good man

In case of a dispute for online banking a PageSigner (browser extension) can be used to verify that your bank’s website claims that money was sent without the compromise of your security.
You can see these methods in a quite short and simple document “Bisq arbitration and mediation system” published here https://forum.bisq.io/t/bisq-dao-paper-published/2398

Well, it’s not as crazy an idea as it sounds. Services like Alphabay or LocalBitcoins use it and it works.

It is interesting to reflect a little on this, because it would be good to have a system unbanked to acquire BTC.

Such a system can not be based on arbitrators because there is no possibility of verifying the payment. Precisely the basis of this payment system is your discretion. Consequently, the referees have a very limited role.

In the system that I proposed the buyer must guarantee the operation with a deposit of BTC higher than the amount that it sends by mail. That ensures you do not cheat. And the seller who accepts the offer will lose his BTC if he does not close the deal.

The only weak point of the system is that the seller receives the payment and then does nothing: he does not care if the BTC goes to the arbitrator’s hands than the buyer.

That’s why I proposed that only a seller with a good reputation could accept mail payments, he would rather have the BTC go to the buyer.

This can not work in Bisq, at least now, and involves some centralization, because a reputed and liquid seller is needed, but it is an example of how you could build a payment system by mail.