Disarmament Diplomacy

National Missile Defence: Developing Disaster
By Charles D. Ferguson and John E. Pike

"President Clinton faces a [missile defence] deployment decision
later this year. Before making that decision, he will assess the
threat, technological feasibility, affordability, and overall
strategic environment, including arms control objectives. He will
weigh the views of our allies, as well as Russia's willingness to
modify the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty." Secretary of
Defense William S. Cohen, The Times, March 1, 2000.

Introduction

Within a few weeks of Cohen's article in The Times, the
United States (US) National Missile Defence (NMD) programme
suffered another setback - a two-month delay in the next intercept
test. This delay has pushed back the Deployment Readiness Review
(DRR) that was originally scheduled to begin in June. Although
presidential election year considerations will presumably influence
President Clinton's decision, the four relevant criteria are:

Does the missile threat to the US justify deployment?

Has the development effort readied the technology?

How will deployment affect progress in arms control, including
revisions to the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty?

Can the US afford the financial burden?

United States NMD plans call for an initial deployment by 2005 to
protect all 50 states against limited attacks from long-range
ballistic missiles. Such attacks could consist of a handful of
warheads supported by simple penetration aids. To counter such
threats, this NMD system would include 100 ground-based
interceptors based in Alaska with site construction starting in
2001.

Both space-based and ground-based sensors would provide
detection and tracking of incoming warheads. In particular, the
Space-Based Infrared (SBIRS)-High satellite network would detect
missile launches. To perform the much more technically demanding
discrimination between countermeasures and warheads, this NMD
system would require the SBIRS-Low satellite network. Enhanced
versions of five existing ballistic missile early warning radars
and an X-Band phased array radar at Shemya in Alaska would track
the warheads.

In addition, the NMD programme appears to reserve the option of
an interim deployment by 2003. Such deployment would employ 20
interceptors and prototype hardware. By 2010, ensuing deployments
would include an additional site, bringing the total number of
interceptors up to as many as 250, along with more radars to
counter a few tens of warheads accompanied by complex penetration
aids.

Cost projections for these systems, including associated
space-based sensors, are tens of billions of dollars - a small
fraction of the astronomical costs associated with the Reagan-era
Star Wars system. The expenditures for limited NMD, therefore, have
not aroused as much apprehension over whether or not these are wise
investments from the public purse. More attention has focussed on
the other more troublesome deployment criteria.

The Missile Threat

Given the implausibility of a massive nuclear exchange with
Russia, American concerns over ballistic missile attack have
centred on the "rogue" nations of North Korea, Iran, and Iraq,
although concern also exists about the possibility of a small
accidental launch from Russia. Moreover, many Republican leaders
have called for missile defence against China. Though the "rogue"
nations have had ballistic missile programmes for several years,
none of them has developed a reliable long-range missile that can
strike the United States.

The renewed impetus for NMD began with the release of the
November 1995 National Intelligence Estimate Emerging Missile
Threats to North America During the Next 15 Years. It determined
that "No country other than the major declared nuclear powers, will
develop or otherwise acquire a ballistic missile in the next 15
years that could threaten the contiguous 48 states and Canada." NMD
proponents found this judgment wanting and clamoured for subsequent
assessments. These advocates received what they requested with the
July 1998 report of the Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile
Threat, headed by former Defence Secretary Donald Rumsfeld.

The Rumsfeld report sounded an alarming view of the missile
threat and the intelligence community's inability to predict the
emergence of this threat. Although the latter point was somewhat
justified, it missed the mark because the intelligence community is
more notorious for predicting a faster threat development than
accords with reality. For instance, estimates of when North Korea
would flight-test its long-range Taepo Dong missiles have been out
by several years. In 1994, the intelligence community predicted
that the Taepo Dong-1 could be tested that year and deployed as
soon as 1996. It estimated that the Taepo Dong-2 would be
flight-tested in the mid to late 1990s. However, the Taepo Dong-1
has experienced only one flight test, which was in late 1998, and
is still not deployed. The Taepo Dong-2 is still untested.

Significantly, the Rumsfeld report operated under premises which
were different to those used for other intelligence estimates. In
particular, it assessed the possibility rather than the probability
of missile threat development. Without considering the intentions
of potential adversaries, this report has distorted the perception
of missile threats and magnified them out of proportion to more
pressing security concerns.

Many US government officials now believe that traditional
deterrence no longer applies to the "rogue" nations. In Cohen's
March 1 article in The Times, he elaborated, "[O]ur ability to
launch a devastating counter-strike against any country ... may not
deter rogue states whose leaders are indifferent to their people's
welfare." These officials have yet to explain convincingly how
"rogue" nations would be undeterred. Although history reveals
deterrence failures, these are failures to seek deterrence rather
than to achieve deterrence.

Technological Readiness

Despite the perception in recent years that there is a conflict
between the White House and Congress over the desirability of NMD,
the conflict, in actuality, has occurred between the Pentagon and
Congress over the feasibility of NMD. The Pentagon wants to ensure
that all components of any new weapons system, especially something
as complex as NMD, are thoroughly tested before deployment. In
contrast, congressional Republicans have pushed for early
deployment.

The Pentagon recently lowered the testing standard to one
successful intercept to justify an affirmative deployment decision.
Previously, the putative criteria were that two successful
intercept tests should occur and one should happen during an
integrated system test. Of the two intercept tests that have
occurred, the one conducted in October 1999 was a dubious success
because the decoy reportedly helped the interceptor to hit the
warhead, while the one conducted in January this year failed. This
failure contributed to postponing the next intercept test, an
integrated test - originally planned for late April - to late
June.

Nonetheless, a successful intercept in June will say little
about the readiness of actual NMD hardware. The tests before the
DRR will have involved surrogate hardware. Importantly, the actual
booster for the kill vehicle and the exo-atmospheric kill vehicle
itself will not be tested for several years.

Faced with a paucity of data pertaining to prototypical
equipment, the DRR will have two choices: decide to purchase long
lead items to support deploying a system by 2003 or wait until the
tests of actual components before making a deployment decision.
Such tests are scheduled for early fiscal year 2001 for the booster
and early fiscal year 2003 for the kill vehicle's final
configuration.

Recognizing the rushed nature of the DRR schedule, the NMD
Review Group, led by retired Air Force General Larry Welch,
released a November 1999 report that recommended the DRR be recast
as a deployment feasibility review and should be focussed on a
subsequent readiness assessment. Regardless of the depiction of the
DRR, any political determination to deploy must be supplemented by
subsequent evaluations considering the performance of actual system
components.

The ABM Treaty remains a cornerstone underlying strategic arms
reductions between the US and Russia. Since 1972, it has
facilitated strategic arms control by enshrining the principle of
strategic deterrence. It placed strict limits on the ability of one
side to construct defences to counter the other side's ballistic
missiles.

During the Cold War, the ABM Treaty ratified the equality of the
two superpowers. Although the demise of the Cold War has negated
their geopolitical equality, the ABM Treaty still serves to engage
the US and Russia in arms control and to foster co-operative threat
reduction measures.

The Russian Duma has linked preservation of the ABM Treaty to
ratification of START II. Therefore, severe modification or
abrogation of this treaty threatens to stymie further strategic
arms reductions.

US deployment of NMD demands both revision of the premise of the
ABM Treaty and considerable alterations to the Treaty. An initial
deployment would require elimination of the Article I ban on
nationwide defences and revision of the Article III limitations on
allowed deployment areas to permit interceptors in Alaska. A
Protocol to the Treaty, which entered into force in 1976, allowed
defence of either each Parties' capital city or an intercontinental
ballistic missile base, which for the US was in North Dakota, the
second site in the current NMD plans. Moreover, stationing large
phased array X-band radars in Alaska would require alteration of
Article III, which stipulates that such radars must be co-located
with interceptors. Deployment of such radars at Thule in Greenland
and RAF Fylingdales in Britain would require amendment of the
Article IX ban on deployment of ABM elements in other nations.
Further, the SBIRS network would require relief from the Article V
ban on space-based ABM components and the Article VI ban on
providing non-ABM systems with capabilities to oppose strategic
ballistic missiles or their components during flight.

So far, Russia and the US are publicly sticking to their ABM and
START III positions and do not yet appear ready to bargain. Russia
rules out changes to the ABM Treaty and seeks to lower the START
III strategic arms level to 1,500 or fewer warheads. In contrast,
the US wants changes in the ABM Treaty to allow deployment of a
limited NMD system and holds to the 1997 Helsinki Protocol on START
III that set a level of 2,000 to 2,500 strategic warheads. It has
approached the Russians on a take-it-or-leave-it basis to ensure
that the American position is not subject to further "improvement."
Nonetheless, future NMD deployments and improvements would likely
require additional changes in the ABM Treaty, leading Russia to
perceive a long and drawn out erosion of the Treaty.

Without treaty modification, knowing when the US would be in
material breach of the treaty is somewhat unclear. However,
groundbreaking for the interceptor site is slated for April 2001 in
Alaska, and a material breach would probably follow soon
thereafter. Six months before this time the US either has to secure
agreement from Russia to amend the treaty or give notice of treaty
withdrawal. Because this time is squarely during the Clinton
Administration's watch, the onus is on President Clinton to make a
responsible decision.

Having suffered a defeat late last year over ratification of the
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), Clinton is concerned about
his legacy in arms control. He is, therefore, unlikely to further
damage his legacy by being the first president to withdraw from an
arms control treaty.

Conclusion

Clinton could heed the call of influential people as disparate
as former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, former President
Jimmy Carter, Republican Senator Chuck Hagel, and Democratic
Senator Joseph Biden who have recently argued for delay. Of course,
there are two different messages from this crowd. Hoping that the
next president will be Governor George W. Bush, the Republicans
want him to make the decision and get the NMD system they want. The
Democrats want to buy more time. However, a United States
government led by Al Gore will still most likely have to contend
with a Republican controlled Congress. Therefore, a decision to
delay would certainly buy time but would delay the inevitable.

Nevertheless, either a Republican or Democratic executive branch
is required by law to perform a defence review in 2001. Such a
review would include an evaluation of missile defence.

Clinton could also be persuaded that the polls show that public
support for missile defence is weak and shallow. According to a
poll by the Mellman Group, "Few [17 percent] of those who support
missile defence will vote against a candidate who opposes spending
money to deploy such a system." He should recall that during the
1996 presidential campaign Bob Dole, the Republican candidate,
utterly failed in making NMD a campaign issue.

If Clinton makes a political commitment for NMD later this year,
he need not place it on a collision course with the ABM Treaty. As
long as the US does not intend to abrogate it, the US and Russia
could find a way to reconcile the Treaty with any NMD developments
through subsequent negotiations.

Charles Ferguson is the director of the Nuclear Policy
Project at the Federation of American Scientists (FAS) in
Washington, DC. John Pike is the director of the Space Policy
Project at FAS.