A multitude of meaning in two words

The phrase "a Palestinian state", coming from the mouth of an American president, has a powerful magic. When President Bush spoke yesterday of such a state being part of America's vision of the Middle East, he crossed an important line.

The administration had maintained a certain ambiguity after Bush took office, but nobody supposed they were adamantly opposed to the concept. Nevertheless, to say the words at this time suggests that the administration is preparing to take on Ariel Sharon, who does not believe in a Palestinian state and has been trying to ensure that one will never come into being. The United States government must know, too, that the Muslim countries whose cooperation it needs will not be satisfied, now that Bush has signalled a change of policy, with a mere shift of emphasis or with a foot-dragging process that leads nowhere.

Bush was responding to a report that before the attacks on September 11 his administration had been planning a Middle Eastern diplomatic initiative, which Colin Powell was to have presented at the UN general assembly. This message that a serious policy change was already in the pipeline could be intended mainly to disarm domestic critics, who might otherwise charge that Israel was being sold down the river only because of America's new fears. Or it could come from elements who have not so far won their battle within the administration on the nature of a new approach to the conflict, and think that publicity will help them to do so.

It may be that Powell's speech, if he had given it and had there been no attacks, would have been seen as not much more than a minimal response to the violence in Israel and the occupied territories. But circumstances have altered, and the planned initiative, and the speech, could be undergoing extensive revision. Either way, expectations that the US will move decisively on the Palestinian issue must increase.

When Sharon pushed his way on to the Temple Mount in Jerusalem just over a year ago at the head of a small army of police and soldiers, he set off a train of dire consequences. His move led to the worst violence between Israelis and Palestinians for a generation, to the collapse of what was still at that moment a rescuable peace process, to his own elevation to the premiership, and to the war of suicide bombs, ambushes, and assassinations that has followed. Of course Sharon did not alone bear responsibility for these tragedies, which had many causes. But he gave the process of disintegration an especially savage downward momentum, one which until last month it seemed impossible to stop, let alone to reverse. The Bush administration, holding to its view that it was not America's business to impose a peace on people who did not want one, intervened only in a limited and ineffective way. President Mubarak of Egypt spoke bitterly of America's "complete and utter bias in Israel's favour". The Europeans were well-meaning but carried little weight. The policy of the outside world amounted, in the words of one commentator, to "leaving the parties alone to kill and be killed".

The American attacks made it imperative that the US government, as a first measure, should use all its weight to reduce the violence and bring about a ceasefire, which it did. But what next? The dilemma remains that the Sharon government does not even want to consider a freeze on settlements, let alone the substantive discussions with the Palestinians that would logically follow. If it was nevertheless forced along that path it might then break up - but with it still being probable that a successor government would be led by Binyamin Netanyahu, not likely to be much less obdurate. It is also possible that if Sharon is pushed too hard, he would order attacks in the territories on a bigger and more damaging scale. Unfortunately, he could at any time be given an excuse by a successful Palestinian suicide attack. The effect on America's efforts to improve its standing in the Middle East while planning or conducting a military campaign in Afghanistan would be disastrous.

Change of some kind in American policy is on the way. The first question, to which there is still no clear answer, is how substantial that change is going to be. The second, on the assumption that the Americans do take a radical line, is how to put it into effect. Israel is not a puppet state. It has its own deep fears, and a history of obstinate defence of what it sees as its interests as well as one of recognising the interests of its indispensable ally. Which would prevail if they came into irreconcilable conflict is hard to know. The best guidance for all sides in a difficult time might be to remember that the last thing Osama bin Laden would wish to see would be a Palestinian state at peace with its Jewish neighbour.