To continue the subject of appointments:--Officers, in the
fifth place, may be appointed by the heads of departments
or courts of law. Art. 2. sect. 2. respecting appointments,
goes on--"But congress may by law vest the appointment
of such inferior officers as they think proper in the president
alone, in the courts of law, or in the heads of departments."
The probability is, as the constitution now stands,
that the senate, a branch of the legislature, will be tenacious
of the power of appointment, and much too sparingly
part with a share of it to the courts of law, and heads
of departments. Here again the impropriety appears of
the senate's having, generally, a share in the appointment
of officers. We may fairly presume, that the judges, and
principal officers in the departments, will be able well informed
men in their respective branches of business; that
they will, from experience, be best informed as to proper
persons to fill inferior offices in them; that they will feel
themselves responsible for the execution of their several
branches of business, and for the conduct of the officers
they may appoint therein.--From these, and other considerations,
I think we may infer, that impartial and judicious
appointments of subordinate officers will, generally, be
made by the courts of law, and the heads of departments.
This power of distributing appointments, as circumstances
may require, into several hands, in a well formed disinterested
legislature, might be of essential service, not only in
promoting beneficial appointments, but, also, in preserving
the balance in government: a feeble executive may be
strengthened and supported by placing in its hands more
numerous appointments; an executive too influential may
be reduced within proper bounds, by placing many of the
inferior appointments in the courts of law, and heads of departments;
nor is there much danger that the executive will
be wantonly weakened or strengthened by the legislature,
by thus shifting the appointments of inferior officers, since
all must be done by legislative acts, which cannot be passed
without the consent of the executive, or the consent of two-thirds
of both branches--a good legislature will use this
power to preserve the balance and perpetuate the government.
Here again we are brought to our ultimatum:--is the
legislature so constructed as to deserve our confidence?

6. Officers may be appointed by the state governments.
By art. I. sect. 8. the respective states are authorised exclusively
to appoint the militia-officers. This not only lodges
the appointments in proper places, but it also tends to distribute
and lodge in different executive hands the powers
of appointing to offices, so dangerous when collected into
the hands of one or a few men.

It is a good general rule, that the legislative, executive,
and judicial powers, ought to be kept distinct; but this, like
other general rules, has its exceptions; and without these
exceptions we cannot form a good government, and properly
balance its parts, and we can determine only from reason,
experience, and a critical inspection of the parts of
the government, how far it is proper to intermix those
powers. Appointment, I believe, in all mixed governments,
have been assigned to different hands--some are made by
the executive, some by the legislature, some by the judges
and some by the people. It has been thought adviseable by
the wisest nations, that the legislature should so far exercise
executive and judicial powers as to appoint some officers,
judge of the elections of its members, and impeach
and try officers for misconduct--that the executive should
have a partial share in legislation--that judges should appoint
some subordinate officers, and regulate so far as to
establish rules for their own proceedings. Where the members
of the government, as the house, the senate, the executive,
and judiciary, are strong and complete, each in
itself, the balance is naturally produced, each party may
take the powers congenial to it, and we have less need to
be anxious about checks, and the subdivision of powers.

If after making the deductions, already alluded to, from
the general power to appoint federal officers the residuum
shall be thought to be too large and unsafe, and to place
an undue influence in the hands of the president and
council, a further deduction may be made, with many advantages,
and, perhaps, with but a few inconveniencies;
and that is, by giving the appointment of a few great officers
to the legislature--as of the commissioners of the
treasury--of the comptroller, treasurer, master coiner,
and some of the principal officers in the money department--of
the sheriffs or marshalls of the United States--of
states attornies, secretary of the home department, and
secretary at war, perhaps, of the judges of the supreme
court--of major-generals and admirals. The appointments
of these officers, who may be at the heads of the great
departments of business, in carrying into execution the national
system, involve in them a variety of considerations;
they will not often occur, and the power to make them
ought to remain in safe hands. Officers of the above description
are appointed by the legislatures in some of the
states, and in some not. We may, I believe, presume that
the federal legislature will possess sufficient knowledge
and discernment to make judicious appointments; however,
as these appointments by the legislature tend to increase
a mixture of power, to lessen the advantages of impeachments
and responsibility, I would by no means
contend for them any further than it may be necessary for
reducing the power of the executive within the bounds of
safety. To determine with propriety how extensive power
the executive ought to possess relative to appointments, we
must also examine the forms of it, and its others powers;
and these forms and other powers I shall now proceed
briefly to examine.