Ronald Zitt and Joshua
Wampler were charged in a multi-count, multidefendant
indictment alleging a heroin conspiracy and
substantive counts of distribution. See 21 U.S.C.
§§ 841(a)(1), 846. Zitt was convicted after a jury trial
of conspiring to distribute, and distributing, heroin.
Wampler pleaded guilty to conspiring to distribute
heroin. Both filed notices of appeal, and we consolidated
their cases.

On appeal Zitt challenges the denial of his motion
for a mistrial. Because the district court properly exercised
its discretion in denying that motion, we affirm
the judgment.

Wampler’s appointed lawyer has concluded that Wampler’s
appeal is frivolous and moves to withdraw under
Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967). Wampler waived
his right to appeal as a condition of his plea agreement.
We therefore grant counsel’s motion to withdraw,
dismiss the appeal, and deny Wampler’s motion for
substitute counsel.

Petitioner Torray Stitts, who
was convicted of murder in Indiana state court and sentenced to sixty years’ imprisonment, appeals from
the district court’s denial of his petition for a writ of
habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Stitts asserts that
his trial counsel was ineffective under Strickland v. Washington,
466 U.S. 668 (1984), because before deciding not
to present an alibi defense, he only interviewed one
alibi witness, Stitts’s father, while unreasonably failing
to investigate whether there might be any more. Without
explicitly determining whether trial counsel in fact
limited his alibi investigation to a single interview, the
state court found that such a limited investigation
would be sufficient under Strickland. We agree with
Stitts that this was an unreasonable application of Strickland.
Given that Stitts’s alibi was that he was at a nightclub,
where there could be any number of potential
alibi witnesses, the failure to explore that possibility is
unreasonable. We also find that the state court unreasonably
applied Strickland when it found no prejudice,
because the prosecution’s case rested entirely on the
shaky testimony of two witnesses which could have
been neutralized by alibi witness testimony.

As the State suggests, however, that does not resolve
the critical factual question concerning the actual extent
of trial counsel’s alibi investigation. We have no state
court finding to which we may defer, and the record
is otherwise ambiguous. So we must remand to the
district court to resolve it. If the district court finds
that trial counsel performed no further investigation
(and there was no other fact that would reasonably
justify that conduct), then the district court should grant
Stitts’s habeas petition. If the district court finds that trial counsel did more, then it must determine de novo
whether that investigation was reasonable under Strickland.
So we reverse and remand.