LETTER XXXV.

ANCIENT DEMOCRATICAL REPUBLICS.

CARTHAGE.

My dear Sir,

IN order to shew the theory of
Socrates, as reported by Plato, in a clearer light; and to be convinced, that
he has not exaggerated in his description of the mutability in the characters
of men, and the forms of government; we should look into the history of those
ancient republics, from whence he drew his observations and reasonings.
Although it is probable that Greece was his principal theatre, yet we may
reasonably suppose that Carthage, and a multitude of other republics in Italy,
besides that of Rome, were not unknown to him.

The history of Greece should be to our countrymen, what is called in many
families on the continent a boudoir; an octagonal apartment in a house, with a
full-length mirror on every side, and another in the ceiling. The use of it is,
when any of the young ladies, or young gentlemen if you will, are at any time a
little out of humour, they may retire to a place where, in whatever direction
they turn their eyes, they see their own faces and figures multiplied without
end. By thus beholding their own beautiful persons, and seeing at the same time
the deformity brought upon them by their anger, they may recover their tempers
and their charms together. A few short sketches of the ancient republics will
serve to shew, not only that the orders we defend were common to all of
them; that the prosperity and duration of each was in proportion to the care
taken to balance them; and that they all were indebted, for their
frequent seditions, the rise and progress of corruption, and their decline and
fall, to the imperfection of their orders, and their defects in the balance.

As there are extant no writings of any Carthaginian philosopher, statesman,
or historian, we have no exact information concerning the form of their
commonwealth, but what appears in a few hints of Greek and Roman authors. Their
commerce and riches, their empire of the sea, and extensive dominion of two
thousand miles on the sea-coast, their obstinate military contests with Rome,
and the long duration of their government, prove both that their population and
power were very great, and their constitution good; especially as, for the
space of five hundred years, their tranquillity was never interrupted by
sedition, nor their liberties attempted by the ambition of any of their
citizens.

The national character was military, as well as commercial; and, although
they were avaricious, they were not effeminate.

The monarchical power was in two suffetes, the aristocratical in the senate,
and the democratical was held by the people in a body. These are said to have
been nicely balanced, but we know not in what manner. The chief magistrates
were annually elected by the people. The senators were elected too, and,
although it is not certain, it is most probable, by the people; but it appears,
that three qualifications were indispensable in every senator — birth,
merit, and wealth: this last requisite rendered commerce honourable, even in
the first of the patricians and senators themselves, and animated the
commercial genius of the nation. This government thus far resembles those of
the United States of America more than any other of the ancient republics,
perhaps more than any of the modern: but when we enquire for the balance, it is
not to be found. The suffetes had not more authority than Roman consuls; they
had but a part of the executive power and none of the legislative: much of the
executive, and all the legislative, was in the senate and people. — The
balance then could only be between these two. Now it is impossible to balance
two assemblies, without introducing a third power; one or other will be most
powerful, and, whichever it is, it will continually scramble till it gets the
whole: in fact, the people here had the whole, as much as in any of our states;
so that while the citizens were uncorrupted, and gave their votes honestly for
suffetes and senators, all went well: and it is extremely remarkable, that with
all their acknowledged eagerness for money, this people were so many centuries
untainted with luxury and venality; and preserved their primitive frugality of
manners, and integrity in elections. As to the Roman accusations of
insincerity, there is no more reason to believe them, than there would be to
believe a Carthaginian who should retort the reproach. This, as well as other
instances, may lead us to doubt the universality of the doctrine, that commerce
corrupts manners. There was another remarkable institution that the senate
should always be unanimous; and if any one senator insisted upon his own
opinion, against all the rest, there could be no decision, but by an appeal to
the people.

— This again gave a strong democratical cast to the constitution. Such
a tendency could only be balanced by the laws, which, requiring a large fortune
for every senator and public officer, in order to support his dignity, and
secure him against the temptations to corruption, confined the choice to the
first families and abilities united.

— This was liable to great objection; because great abilities might
often be possessed by men of obscurer original, and smaller property, who were
thereby excluded. To this law, nevertheless, may be ascribed the duration of
the republic.

Another remarkable check, which was perhaps the original model from whence
the Venetian inquisition was copied, was a committee of one hundred and four
members of the senate, appointed to watch the ambition of the great families.
To this body all their admirals and generals were required to render an account
of their conduct at the end of every year.

Out of this body were elected a sub-committee of five, who had very great
power: their office was for life; and they filled up their own vacancies out of
the one hundred and four, and all the vacancies, even in the one hundred and
four, out of the senate; they had the supreme tribunal of criminal
jurisdiction. This power must have been terrible to all; to the people, senate,
and suffetes; yet it was the check which preserved the state from sedition and
convulsions.

It grew unpopular; and the law which at last made it annual and elective,
probably laid the foundation of the ruin of the commonwealth, by changing the
balance, and introducing the dominatio plebis. The balances in this, the
most democratical republic of antiquity, contrived by the people themselves to
temper their own power, are extremely remarkable: the suffetes represented,
like the consuls at Rome, the majesty of the commonwealth, and had a share of
executive authority; the council of five had criminal jurisdiction, and
inquisitorial power; the one hundred and four were a body chosen out of the
senate, by the five, for their support; then comes the senate at large; and,
last of all, the people at large. Here are five orders completely distinct,
besides the necessary legal qualification of great wealth: yet all these
checks, although they preserved the state five hundred years, could not prolong
its period above seven hundred; because, after all, the balance was not
natural, nor effectual. The executive power was not separated from the
legislative; nor the different parts of the legislature properly divided or
balanced: the executive power and judicial were both chiefly in legislative
hands.

The noble families, thus secured in possession both of legislative and
executive power, could not be restrained by all the ligaments which had been
contrived to preserve the equipoise between them and the people: they divided
into two factions, with the family of Hanno at the head of one, and that of
Barcas of the other; first attacked the council of five, whose power was
unpopular, as well as odious to the nobles; easily procured a law to make that
annually elective, or, in other words, an instrument always in the hands of the
prevailing faction, as such a small body, so changeable, must ever be; and
overturned the constitution. The Romans had all the advantage of these
dissensions in the war, by which they finally destroyed their rival power so
effectually, that scarce a trace of it remains to be seen, even in ruins. Their
virtues were not extinguished to the last, and some of the greatest examples of
patriotism and heroism were exhibited even in their expiring agonies.