Category: contribution

‘The Commercial Court (Andrew Baker J) has given judgment in favour of the Claimants in their action for damages against Credit Suisse under s.138D of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (FSMA).’

‘The claimants were a group of companies. The first and second defendants had been, respectively, the chairman of the board and the chief executive officer of the first and second claimants. The third defendant had been the finance director of the second claimant. The claimants issued proceedings alleging, inter alia, that the defendants had dishonestly caused the claimant companies to enter into transactions in which large sums of money were paid to entities owned or controlled by the defendants and which had caused the claimants to incur substantial financial losses. All three defendants served defences denying fraud and dishonesty or that they had personally benefitted from the transactions. Subsequently, the first defendant reached a settlement of the claim against him with the claimants. The second and third defendants applied for permission pursuant to CPR r 20.6(2)(b) to bring a contribution claim against the first defendant, no such claim having been filed and served when they served their defence. The second defendant further sought a worldwide freezing order against the first defendant. The judge refused the applications, holding that (i) the claim for contribution was bound to fail because the draft contribution notice sought to be relied upon by the second and third defendants did not advance a case of actual fraud or wrongdoing by the first defendant and, following the their settlement agreement with the first defendant, no such case was being advanced by the claimants which the second and third defendants could adopt as an alternative to their primary position that they had acted honestly; and (ii) the court could only grant a freezing injunction once the applicant had an accrued cause of action, which, in the context of a claim for contribution, was once the contribution notice had been filed and served under CPR r 20.6(2).’

‘Six months ago I discussed at some length the issues arising from the decision of the Supreme Court in Jackson v Murray [2015] PIQR P249. More recently in Sabir v Osei-Kwabena [2016] PIQR Q56, the problem cropped up again, this time in the Court of Appeal.’

‘The claimant suffered a head injury and was taken to a hospital managed by the defendant. A CT scan was performed some six hours after his admission and he was transferred to another hospital where he underwent surgery. He was left with cognitive and neuropsychological deficits. He claimed damages in negligence against the defendant contending, inter alia, that the defendant’s negligent delay in undertaking the CT scan had resulted in a period of raised intra-cranial pressure which had caused or materially contributed to his brain damage. The defendant contended that only if the claimant could establish that damaging raised intra-cranial pressure caused by the defendant’s negligence had caused his brain injury that, applying the classic “but for” test of causation, he could recover as against the defendant, and that it was insufficient to establish “material contribution”.’

‘Applications for wrongful trading under s 214 of the Insolvency Act 1986 are notoriously difficult. In Brooks v Armstrong [2015] EWHC 2289 (Ch), Registrar Jones ordered the former directors of Robin Hood Centre plc (the “Directors”) (the “Company”) to make a contribution to the Company’s assets under s 214. But the relatively small award serves as a cautionary reminder of the risks of s 214 applications for liquidators and directors alike.’

‘Jackson-v-Murray, which has been recently reported at [2005] PIQRP 249 deals directly or indirectly with three important issues: (1) the extent to which a higher court can interfere with an assessment of contributory negligence by the trial judge or by an appeal court; (2) the assessment of contributory negligence of children; (3) the assessment of the proportions of liability of drivers of vehicles and pedestrians with whom they come into collision.’

‘On the true construction of the final proviso in section 1(4) of the Civil Liability (Contribution) Act 1978 Part 20 the defendants in contribution proceedings were precluded from relying on a limitation defence pleaded against the claimants in the main proceedings.’

“Parents who fail to secure their children in appropriate child passenger seats can be found to be contributory negligent for any injuries that may be suffered by the child as a result of a road traffic accident, as confirmed by the recent Court of Appeal case Williams v Estate of Dayne Joshua Williams 2013.”

“In a hearing of potential landmark significance, the Court of Appeal has given permission to the defendant in Probert v Moore [2012] EWHC 2324 (QB) to appeal against a finding that a 13 year old girl was not guilty of contributory negligence when struck by a car on an unlit country lane.”

“The employment tribunal had not erred in law when, on a complaint of victimisation, it made an award of compensation against an employer which was much larger than an award it had already made against the employer’s employee at an earlier remedy hearing in which the employer had not taken part.”

“Article 4 of Council Directive 79/7/EEC of 19 December 1978 on the progressive implementation of the principle of equal treatment for men and women in matters of social security precluded legislation of a member state which required a proportionally greater contribution period from part-time workers, the vast majority of whom were women, than from full-time workers for the former to qualify, if appropriate, for a contributory retirement pension in an amount reduced in proportion to the part-time nature of their work.”

“Liabilities arising from the financial support direction (‘FSD’) regime created by the Pensions Act 2004 upon companies in administration or liquidation were payable as a liquidation or administration expense.”

“The ‘damages’ awarded in respect of ‘the damage in question’ from which reduction was made pursuant to s 2(3)(b) of the Civil Liability (Contribution) Act 1978 in the event of contributory negligence on the part of the person who suffered the damage, had the same meaning as ‘the same damage’ and ‘damage in question’ in s 1(1) of the 1978 Act and s 2(1) of the 1978 Act. The reduction in respect of contributory negligence was therefore applied as a cap on the contributors’ liability after the court had first assessed the total loss for which both the contributors were liable.”

“Where proceedings had been taken to the point of judgment against a person who had not been the correct defendant, that person might recover under the Civil Liability (Contribution) Act 1978 against the person who should have been the defendant.”