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Jaegwon Kim famously argues that no form of “non‐reductive physicalism,” including Davidson's anomalism monism, can provide an adequate account of mental causation. His argument depends on a principle he calls “exclusion” that says, in effect, that if an event has a sufficient physical causal explanation then it doesn't also have an “independent” psychological explanation. This chapter counters by arguing that the exclusion principle depends on a metaphysically loaded account of causation. The chapter develops the counterfactual account of causation discussed in earlier chapters to rebut...

Jaegwon Kim famously argues that no form of “non‐reductive physicalism,” including Davidson's anomalism monism, can provide an adequate account of mental causation. His argument depends on a principle he calls “exclusion” that says, in effect, that if an event has a sufficient physical causal explanation then it doesn't also have an “independent” psychological explanation. This chapter counters by arguing that the exclusion principle depends on a metaphysically loaded account of causation. The chapter develops the counterfactual account of causation discussed in earlier chapters to rebut Kim's argument.