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Nation-Building Elevated

The Pentagon yesterday announced a landmark change in the use of combat troops, elevating "stability missions" -- commonly called nation-building -- to an equal status with major combat operations.

The evolution in war-planning priorities underscores how the September 11, 2001, attacks on the United States by the al Qaeda terror network continue to fundamentally reshape how U.S. military commanders deploy the armed forces.

Not only are U.S. forces becoming more mobile to better counter Islamic terrorists, but the chain of command now will be trained in how to "build" nations by creating indigenous security forces, democratic institutions and free markets...

More, From DoD...

Stability operations are now a major priority for the Defense Department, on par with combat operations, and will receive more planning and funding, two DoD officials said here today.

The officials were explaining DoD Directive 3000.05, which was signed Nov. 28. The directive provides guidance on stability operations and assigns responsibility for planning, training and preparing to conduct and support stability operations.

The origins of the directive come from the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, said Jeffrey Nadaner, deputy assistant secretary of defense for stability operations. Before Sept. 11, many people within DoD thought of stability operations as optional, Nadaner said, but after the terrorist attacks, they were seen as a necessity.

The ability of the United States and its partners to conduct stability operations can prevent failed and failing states from becoming havens for terrorists and criminals, and can ensure the U.S. is safe at home and successful in its military missions, he said.

Stability operations are defined operations other than combat operations that involve violence or the threat of violence and can come in various sizes and forms, Nadaner said. Examples of stability operations are rebuilding institutions such as security forces, correctional facilities and judicial systems; reviving or building the private sector, including encouraging citizen-driven economic activity and building necessary infrastructure; and developing representative governmental institutions, according to the directive.

The directive lays out important policies, Nadaner said. Among those are that stability operations are a core military mission and shall be given priority comparable to combat missions, and that although stability operations are best performed by indigenous, foreign or U.S. civilian professionals, U.S. military forces will be prepared to perform all tasks required to maintain order when civilians cannot do so, he explained.

One of the key requirements in all stability operations is the need for indigenous security forces to be established quickly, Nadaner said. This is a lesson learned from the war in Iraq that will be incorporated into future operations, he said.

The directive includes a requirement that the stability operations portions of war plans are fully completed by the U.S. military, Nadaner said. The secretary of defense will receive periodic reports about these plans so his level of information about stability operations is equal with that of combat operations, he added.

Another important aspect of the directive is that it encourages different government agencies to participate in stability operations, Nadaner said. "The directive has a flavor throughout that's very inter-agency, because we recognize that stability operations are inherently and intensely inter-agency," he said.

DoD wants to help other government agencies develop their own capabilities for stability operations, Nadaner said. One plan is to develop civilian-military teams, much like the provincial reconstruction teams in Afghanistan, to be ready to deploy to stability operations, he said.

The State Department and DoD already work together and even share money when it comes to stability operations, Nadaner said. State Department officials participate in DoD exercises, and DoD is seeking authority from Congress to transfer $200 million to the State Department to prepare for a potential stability crisis, he said.

To implement the requirements of this directive will require a series of efforts within DoD and other government agencies, Nadaner said. Some of the initiatives are going to be difficult, he said, so all the changes won't be visible right away, but DoD is at a good starting point.

"We're looking to see the changes done right, and we think we have a good framework to do so," he said.

This directive should be considered initial guidance and will evolve over time, said Air Force Col. J. Scott Norwood, deputy director for international negotiations and multilateral affairs, strategic plans and policy directorate, the Joint Staff.

Norwood's office will oversee the implementation of the initiatives, he said, which will involve a range of activities. DoD will have to reassess its doctrine, training structure and processes, educational programs and war plans, he said. Also, officials will need to incorporate lessons learned from Iraq and Afghanistan, he noted.

Norwood warned against interpreting the directive to mean stability operations are the goal in themselves, Norwood said. The United States works hard to develop weak states and prevent failed states, he pointed out, so stability operations are not necessary. But measures need to be in place if that doesn't work, he said.

"We recognize those strategies may not work, and when we have to conduct stability operations, we don't want it to be a pick-up game; we want varsity capabilities from the onset," he said.

More from CSM

With little fanfare during the past few weeks, the Pentagon has rolled out one of the most significant changes to military doctrine since the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks.

The policy directive recently signed by Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld declares that the job of planning and training to win the peace after a war is now virtually as important to the military as the conflict itself.

The document marks a sea change from the ideals of the past, when the military was loath to take on any responsibility beyond waging and winning wars. Indeed, it suggests that the Pentagon increasingly sees Iraq and Afghanistan as templates for wars of the future, with success hinging not only on military superiority, but also on the ability to reconstruct failed states...

Beginning with the post–World War II occupations of Germany and Japan, the United States has undertaken eight significant nationbuilding operations over the past 60 years. The planning for postwar nation-building in Germany and Japan began under President Franklin D. Roosevelt and was carried out under President Harry S. Truman.

Subsequent operations during the post–Cold War era were initiated and conducted by President George H. W. Bush and President William J. Clinton, respectively. The United States has subsequently taken the lead in post–September 11, 2001, nation-building under President George W. Bush in Afghanistan and Iraq. In each of the eight cases presented here, presidential decisionmaking and administrative structure have, at times, worked in favor of the nation-building goals of the U.S. government and military and those of its coalition partners and allies. In other cases, these elements have hindered the achievement of these goals or have had negative effects on nation-building outcomes.

This monograph assesses the ways in which the management styles and structures of the administrations in power prior to and during nation-building operations affect the goals and outcomes of such operations. It also evaluates the nature of the society being reformed and of the conflict being terminated. The findings presented here should be of interest to policymakers and others interested in the history of U.S. nation-building, lessons learned from these operations, and the outcomes of U.S. involvement in rebuilding various types of societies......

....This volume contains the full range of intellectual theorizing, historical examinations, and practical engagement challenges which were so richly presented by the attendees of the colloquium held as a result of the Strategic Studies Institute’s collaboration with Austin Peay State University. In addition, the appendices contain not only the final principles, policies, and procedures determined by the plenary, but also the full list of nominated principles with which the attendees worked. The Strategic Studies Institute and Austin Peay State University are pleased to offer this important compilation of knowledge on the most immediate challenge facing our forces in Iraq and Afghanistan today.....

Traditionally there has been some confusion between the use of the term nation-building and that of state-building (the terms are sometimes used interchangeably in North America). Both have fairly narrow and different definitions in political science, the former referring to national identity, the latter to the institutions of the state.

Nation-building refers to the process of constructing or structuring a national identity using the power of the state. This process aims at the unification of the people or peoples within the state so that it remains politically stable and viable in the long run. Nation-building can involve the use of propaganda or major infrastructure development to foster social harmony and economic growth.

There are two main theoretical approaches to definitions of state-building. Firstly state-building is seen by some theorists as an activity undertaken by external actors (foreign countries) attempting to build, or re-build, the institutions of a weaker, post-conflict or failing state. This is a view of state-building as the activity of one country in relation to another, usually following some form of intervention (such as a UN peacekeeping operation).

Approach #2

This work has tended to draw heavily on political science. It has produced definitions that view state-building as an indigenous, national process driven by state-society relations. This view believes that countries cannot do state-building outside their own borders, they can only influence, support or hinder such processes.

Since the end of the Cold War, the United States, NATO, the United Nations, and a range of other states and nongovernmental organizations have become increasingly involved in nation-building operations. Nation-building involves the use of armed force as part of a broader effort to promote political and economic reforms, with the objective of transforming a society emerging from conflict into one at peace with itself and its neighbors. This guidebook is a practical “how-to” manual on the conduct of effective nation-building. It is organized around the constituent elements that make up any nation-building mission: military, police, rule of law, humanitarian relief, governance, economic stabilization, democratization, and development. The chapters describe how each of these components should be organized and employed, how much of each is likely to be needed, and the likely cost. The lessons are drawn principally from 16 U.S.- and UN-led nation-building operations since World War II and from a forthcoming study on European-led missions. In short, this guidebook presents a comprehensive history of best practices in nation-building and serves as an indispensable reference for the preplanning of future interventions and for contingency planning on the ground.

Sweat equity is a term used to describe the contribution made to a project by people who contribute their time and effort. It can be contrasted with financial equity which is the money contributed towards the project. It is used to refer to a form of compensation by businesses to their owners or employees. The term is sometimes used in partnership agreements where one or more of the partners contributes no financial capital. In the case of a business startup, employees might, upon incorporation, receive stock or stock options in return for working for below-market salaries (or in some cases no salary at all).

In a successful model used by Habitat for Humanity, families who would otherwise be unable to purchase their own home (because their income level does not allow them to save for a down payment or qualify for an interest-bearing mortgage offered by a financial institution) contribute up to 500 hours of sweat equity to the construction of their own home, the homes of other Habitat for Humanity partner families or by volunteering to assist the organization in other ways. Once moved into their new home, the family makes monthly, interest-free mortgage payments into a revolving "Fund for Humanity" which provides capital to build homes for other partner families.

This reminds me of how much I dislike the term "nation-building", and why.

[rant]

You can't build a nation, any more than you can build a tree. These are not things that are built, these are things that grow. It's a semantic distinction, but semantic distinctions do influence perception, discourse, and eventually policy. The idea that a nation can be built is what leads us to the absurdity of nominally rational adults talking about "installing" a democracy, as if it were a light bulb or spare tire, and we have a warehouse full of neatly stacked crates labeled "democracy, functioning, one" just waiting to be screwed into place.

Treating nations and states as growing entities that need to be cultivated rather than engineering challenges awaiting the correct blueprint is not going to solve the problems, but it might provide a more effective foundation for developing solutions.

We have to accept that the growth of nations is an inherently disorderly process and that conflict is usually going to be part of it. Our own nation undertook one of history's great genocides and fought one of history's great civil wars before defining itself as a nation. Western Europeans see themselves at the pinnacle of human civilization, but the warring tribes of western Europe went through many centuries of gory and destructive conflict before they could even figure out where one nation ended and others began. When we look with horror on the wars and abuses of Africa, South Asia, and the Middle East we would do well to reflect that all they are doing is settling their business in exactly the same way we once settled ours. Colonial powers may have suspended the process by imposing order at the expense of stability, but when they left the process continued.

None of this means we have to simply sit back and accept whatever happens. It means we have to accept that we can only manage situations to the greatest extent possible (which may at times be a very minimal extent), not control them. We have to accept that the needed process of growth may not always be compatible with our perceived self-interest. We have to accept that borders left behind by retreating colonists do not necessarily constitute "nations", and that at a certain point people may have to work out for themselves what "nations" actually make sense, and that this process will involve a certain amount of disorder. We have to accept that creating or recognizing a government does not necessarily endow it with the capacity to govern.

We cannot build nations, or states. We may be able to help cultivate them, if we recognize that an organic growth process is involved and start working with it instead of trying to control it to achieve our own immediate goals.

What he said...

As Ken has noted your preceding post is indeed an excellent one and there is much wisdom in it, however, let's examine it further (And Ken, to echo one of your earlier posts today…what you think is of interest... metrics! That should do it )

Originally Posted by Dayuhan

This reminds me of how much I dislike the term "nation-building", and why.

The term sets up a number of expectations on all sides of the process and does not fully help, as much as we might like, to bridge the gap between the on the ground realities we find and the desired outcomes-oftentimes developed in places far away. Nonetheless, I do not yet have a better term (the term nation cultivation will not survive the testosterone laden DoD marketplace of terms and acronyms); perhaps we can find something better if we get a chance to read works from all of the development authors/theorists/contributors mentioned by M.A. Lagrange in his posts - or if he chimes in and helps out

You can't build a nation, any more than you can build a tree. These are not things that are built, these are things that grow. It's a semantic distinction, but semantic distinctions do influence perception, discourse, and eventually policy.

There are many truths here, and I like the tree analogy because it helps one to think about the types of consistent conditions, which are needed for growth, as well as why one must pair realistic time-spans/schedules with achievable results. The disconnect between wishing for/planning for/advertising a cash crop before an orchard can physically produce it is something that does not require a grounding in nation building, state building, or development work to understand.

Originally Posted by Dayuhan

The idea that a nation can be built is what leads us to the absurdity of nominally rational adults talking about "installing" a democracy, as if it were a light bulb or spare tire, and we have a warehouse full of neatly stacked crates labeled "democracy, functioning, one" just waiting to be screwed into place.

Following our tree analogy, there are some places that will most certainly require additional water and soil additives in order to grow a ‘democracy tree’ and even with additional long-term care there are some environments that may not be able to support that particular type of tree. IMHO economics, in particular some form of capitalism, help to set the conditions for sustainable growth and are a more realistic place to focus efforts upon before planting a 'democracy tree'.

Originally Posted by Dayuhan

Treating nations and states as growing entities that need to be cultivated rather than engineering challenges awaiting the correct blueprint is not going to solve the problems, but it might provide a more effective foundation for developing solutions.

A too literal application of the engineering method/attitude is certainly something to be guarded against. One could argue that favoring an interdisciplinary approach, perhaps having/seeking a grounding in biology, business, and engineering, or engaging in kayaking or surfing are potential pathways to develop/increase/reinforce one’s awareness of the need to seek balance in all things.

Originally Posted by Dayuhan

We have to accept that the growth of nations is an inherently disorderly process and that conflict is usually going to be part of it. Our own nation undertook one of history's great genocides and fought one of history's great civil wars before defining itself as a nation. Western Europeans see themselves at the pinnacle of human civilization, but the warring tribes of western Europe went through many centuries of gory and destructive conflict before they could even figure out where one nation ended and others began. When we look with horror on the wars and abuses of Africa, South Asia, and the Middle East we would do well to reflect that all they are doing is settling their business in exactly the same way we once settled ours. Colonial powers may have suspended the process by imposing order at the expense of stability, but when they left the process continued.

Having spent some time studying Germanic and Roman history & culture I would tend to agree with many of your points. As an observational aside, have you been following the current political machinations with respect to the IHEC decision in Iraq? I wonder how these events are/will impact the Sunni component of the military and militias; Dr. Charles Tripp’s descriptions of the influence the military had upon the political landscape in Iraq during July 1958 and February 1963 make for interesting reading and comparison.

Originally Posted by Dayuhan

None of this means we have to simply sit back and accept whatever happens. It means we have to accept that we can only manage situations to the greatest extent possible (which may at times be a very minimal extent), not control them.

A successful balanced approach might indeed include an engineering approach/methodology and business approach/methodology component in the response. (apparently I am outta my allotment of wry smiles, nonetheless one has been placed here due to the one dimensional commo method we use)

Originally Posted by Dayuhan

We cannot build nations, or states. We may be able to help cultivate them, if we recognize that an organic growth process is involved and start working with it instead of trying to control it to achieve our own immediate goals.

Although I agree with your much of your concept, it will need a stronger term or acronym in order to both survive and generate interest in the testosterone laden DoD marketplace of ideas. The myriad aspects of the commonly heard phrase ‘carnivore vs. herbivore thinking’ both make me smile and think about how to find needed balance.

The term sets up a number of expectations on all sides of the process and does not fully help, as much as we might like, to bridge the gap between the on the ground realities we find and the desired outcomes-oftentimes developed in places far away. Nonetheless, I do not yet have a better term (the term nation cultivation will not survive the testosterone laden DoD marketplace of terms and acronyms)

This is true, and is one more reason why expecting DoD to effectively promote the development of states, nations, or economies makes about as much sense as expecting development professionals to fight a war.

Originally Posted by Surferbeetle

perhaps we can find something better if we get a chance to read works from all of the development authors/theorists/contributors mentioned by M.A. Lagrange in his posts - or if he chimes in and helps out

Perhaps indeed, though it's a fair haul from development theory to effective practice.

Originally Posted by Surferbeetle

I like the tree analogy because it helps one to think about the types of consistent conditions, which are needed for growth, as well as why one must pair realistic time-spans/schedules with achievable results. The disconnect between wishing for/planning for/advertising a cash crop before an orchard can physically produce it is something that does not require a grounding in nation building, state building, or development work to understand.

I like the analogy because most of us understand viscerally and intellectually, that you have to have a sapling before you have a tree. We're too often inclined to think of building national institutions before we have a nation, or building democracy before we have a government, or of trying to put a fully functioning government in place all at once instead of trying to plant a seed and give irt space to grow.

Originally Posted by Surferbeetle

IMHO economics, in particular some form of capitalism, help to set the conditions for sustainable growth and are a more realistic place to focus efforts upon before planting a 'democracy tree'.

The economic side is certainly important, but very difficult to bring beyond a rudimentary level without some basic framework of at least local governance. Even on the most minimal level it's hard to justify investing capital or sweat when it's only going to make you a target for people who want a piece of whatever you've got.

Originally Posted by Surferbeetle

One could argue that favoring an interdisciplinary approach, perhaps having/seeking a grounding in biology, business, and engineering, or engaging in kayaking or surfing are potential pathways to develop/increase/reinforce one’s awareness of the need to seek balance in all things.

Kayaking and surfing are not a bad place to start: you learn the importance of balance and you learn to work with the prevailing forces of nature instead of trying to control them... aside from being just cooler than everybody else.

To me we need to choose our battles better and choose our entry points better. There are environments and times when all the art and science, craft and resources we can apply are not going to achieve the desired goal... sometimes the only available response to a request for directions is on the order of "Caint git thar from here, best go back where y'all started from and try agin".

Originally Posted by Surferbeetle

Although I agree with your much of your concept, it will need a stronger term or acronym in order to both survive and generate interest in the testosterone laden DoD marketplace of ideas. The myriad aspects of the commonly heard phrase ‘carnivore vs. herbivore thinking’ both make me smile and think about how to find needed balance.

Omnivore thinking?

On a large scale, yes, omnivore thinking. Also it pays to send your carnivores when there's hunting to be done, to send in your herbivores when there's crops to be nuruered, and to remember which is which. Above all, whether it's meat or veg, don't bite off what you can't chew, because if you do you can choke on it. Of course now that's exactly the position we're in: we took way too big a bite, we can't chew it, we can't swallow it, and we can't spit it out. I wish I had something to suggest beyond pointing out that we might have thought twice before biting it off in the first place, but I'm afraid I don't.

Building Nations, State or what ever: back to the basics

I fully agree with Dayuhan, building a Nation is a myth. But building a State apparatus is possible. This does not mean it would be a success according to Western standards.
This being said, let’s look at the roots of the tree before commenting how the tree grows:

Let’s drop the Fukuyama and other Marxist theories on what are State and their capitalistic predatory ambitions.
We need here first to agree on what we are talking about: State apparatus.
What is a State, what are the basements and what are the role of administrations into it.

First, I will take the Clausewitz trinity of our beloved brother Wilf:
People, Leadership and Armed Force

A group of people, with a leader and the capacity to be organised to use violence to defend their land: a Cite (in Greek in the text).
Here lay the roots of a country, a state, a nation….
On this, I would recommend Aristotle, Hobbes and Locke… To end up with Rousseau.

Now, this leads us to what are the various kind of civil societies (knowing the fact that by this term we include military dictatorship, kingdoms… All kinds of societies which are not lead by civilians).

1) the societies without State (Stateless societies, Non State societies):
The most well known example are the Nuer from Sudan. Cf: E. E. Evans-Pritchard

In those kinds of societies, social hierarchy is low, power is not centralized and not structured through a centralized administration or proto administration. Authority is hold by family chiefs or elders or religious leaders.
Moral and religion are used as law or legal referent to sanction deviances, non respects of Tabou…
Such societies are centered on survival of the group.
Actual good example is Somalia. It is also the type of organization to which de regulated, and dismantled societies tend to go back in failed states during civil wars or more generally when the State (as an administration) is absent.
Such societies are seen by Hobbes as the Human Nature: the war of all against all. It’s the western imaginary “savage society”. (by the way, to me it’s much closer to Locke than Hobbes).
What in western politic has long been assimilated to anarchy (See Anarchy ) but is not, especially in traditional societies (See all theanthropoly in Africa, Oceania, South America…).

2) the societies with State:

The societies with Sate, at least the modern ones are based on Max Weber definition of the State.
Weber unveils the definition of the state that has become so pivotal to Western social thought: that the state is that entity which possesses a monopoly on the legitimate use of physical force
Weber distinguished three pure types of political leadership, domination and authority:
1. charismatic domination (familial and religious),
2. traditional domination (patriarchs, patrimonalism, feudalism), and
3. legal domination (modern law and state, bureaucracy).[56]
In his view, every historical relation between rulers and ruled contained such elements and they can be analysed on the basis of this tripartite distinction.[57] He also notes that the instability of charismatic authority inevitably forces it to "routinize" into a more structured form of authority. Likewise he notes that in a pure type of traditional rule, sufficient resistance to a master can lead to a "traditional revolution". Thus he alludes to an inevitable move towards a rational-legal structure of authority, utilising a bureaucratic structure.[58] Thus this theory can be sometimes viewed as part of the social evolutionism theory. This ties to his broader concept of rationalisation by suggesting the inevitability of a move in this direction.http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Max_Weber

So State building is building legal domination according to Weber classification.
This is the base of JMM99 three areas schema you can access here (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...ead.php?t=7610).
The actual model of this are the USA, all European countries, Asian, South American countries… All modern states. But there is sometimes a difference between those Nations. The “orthodox” Rule of Law State build Nation being USA. Mainy European countries are based on a social contract that is declined into rule of law… (slice difference but makes all the difference in fact).

This is entirely based on western societies, by the way. And this is what State Building is willing to achieve. But may be this should be called Administration Building. But this is also where the bias is.
Several challenges are to be faced. The following list is not exhaustive, far from it.

For this, I will use first a Kilcullen article published in SWJ (New Paradigms for 21st Century Conflicts http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/200...-21st-century/).
Similarly, we traditionally conduct state-based diplomacy through engagement with elites of other societies: governments, intelligentsia, and business leaders, among others. The theory is that problems can be resolved when elites agree, cooler heads prevail, and governments negotiate and then enforce agreements. Notions of sovereignty, the nation-state, treaty regimes, and international institutions all build on this paradigm.

What he points out is the fact that to build a new partner, we need to have an Elite to discuss with. We need to replace an Elite by another. So State building is not just administration building but it’s also elite capacity building.
The problematic often face is then that you have a competition on legitimacy, at field level, between Non State Elites and formal State Elites. Especially when State building aim is to build a “Nation” ex nihilo.

Secondly, I will use the very recent work of Atlani-Duault on former USSR countries and culture. Basically, her work is based on the idea that to counter USSR authoritarian regime, West has been developing the concept of civil society and culture. The main idea is that during Cold war culture has been used to build civil society and a new Elite that would fight the communists. Now days, this has become an habit in State Building to look for civil society and create, even sometimes ex nihilo, a civilian Elite that would challenge the military/political power in failed States. The UN came even with the concept of non educated intellectuals….

The bias it creates is that we are looking to create spontaneous generation of Elites. In many Stabilization or State building manuals this has became: empowering local authorities. Hopefully, several of those manual are pointing the limits of the exercise.

So State building is creating a body we can talk with because it looks like us.
Nation Building is creating an Administration body that can think by herself. That does take time, especially as we do not always this to happen.

What Sufferedbeetle is referring to in previous post is the end or the aim of the administration and more precisely Governance. We tend too much to mix Governance and State building.
The role of democracy in modern State Building is central as several attempts of non democratic States have been made in the past, with various results.
The 70th werethe golden years of enlightened dictatorships. This had a very good result in Asia in the 80th. Unfortunately, as the democratic transition was too quick, brutal or simply too late, this is the roots causes of the radicalisation of religious opposition in many of those countries.
I Africa, this was a complete disaster since the beginning.

Nowadays, we try to dress it with the apparence of democracy in conducting elections giving choice to the people only to a panel of Elites coming from the civil society we (the West) have created or supported. We will see the result in Iraq, Afghanistan, South Sudan… The previous results in DRC are not so much encouraging, I would say.
Then comes the problematic of integrating armed groups into a civilian structure… South America has been an interesting laboratory on this. The main tool being amnesty laws and elections…. With various results once again.
And finally how to fund a State admnistration or how countries do fund they develpment.

As JMM pointed out, for practical reasons, we tend to prefer to have a week dictatorship that would resist to insurgencies than a strong democracy that is too difficult to build, too time costly and weak against armed opposition.

But this just means that Nation Building needs to be rethought not that Nation Building has to be thrown away. (by the way, I have probably 8 to 12 hours difference with you guys. So do not expect me to be too much at the page immediatly ) )

Building Nations, State or what ever: back to the basics

I fully agree with Dayuhan, building a Nation is a myth. But building a State apparatus is possible. This does not mean it would be a success according to Western standards.
This being said, let’s look at the roots of the tree before commenting how the tree grows:

Let’s drop the Fukuyama and other Marxist theories on what are State and their capitalistic predatory ambitions.
We need here first to agree on what we are talking about: State apparatus.
What is a State, what are the basements and what are the role of administrations into it.

First, I will take the Clausewitz trinity of our beloved brother Wilf:
People, Leadership and Armed Force

A group of people, with a leader and the capacity to be organised to use violence to defend their land: a Cite (in Greek in the text).
Here lay the roots of a country, a state, a nation….
On this, I would recommend Aristotle, Hobbes and Locke… To end up with Rousseau.

Now, this leads us to what are the various kind of civil societies (knowing the fact that by this term we include military dictatorship, kingdoms… All kinds of societies which are not lead by civilians).

1) the societies without State (Stateless societies, Non State societies):
The most well known example are the Nuer from Sudan. Cf: E. E. Evans-Pritchard

In those kinds of societies, social hierarchy is low, power is not centralized and not structured through a centralized administration or proto administration. Authority is hold by family chiefs or elders or religious leaders.
Moral and religion are used as law or legal referent to sanction deviances, non respects of Tabou…
Such societies are centered on survival of the group.
Actual good example is Somalia. It is also the type of organization to which de regulated, and dismantled societies tend to go back in failed states during civil wars or more generally when the State (as an administration) is absent.
Such societies are seen by Hobbes as the Human Nature: the war of all against all. It’s the western imaginary “savage society”. (by the way, to me it’s much closer to Locke than Hobbes).
What in western politic has long been assimilated to anarchy (See Anarchy ) but is not, especially in traditional societies (See all theanthropoly in Africa, Oceania, South America…).

2) the societies with State:

The societies with Sate, at least the modern ones are based on Max Weber definition of the State.
Weber unveils the definition of the state that has become so pivotal to Western social thought: that the state is that entity which possesses a monopoly on the legitimate use of physical force
Weber distinguished three pure types of political leadership, domination and authority:
1. charismatic domination (familial and religious),
2. traditional domination (patriarchs, patrimonalism, feudalism), and
3. legal domination (modern law and state, bureaucracy).[56]
In his view, every historical relation between rulers and ruled contained such elements and they can be analysed on the basis of this tripartite distinction.[57] He also notes that the instability of charismatic authority inevitably forces it to "routinize" into a more structured form of authority. Likewise he notes that in a pure type of traditional rule, sufficient resistance to a master can lead to a "traditional revolution". Thus he alludes to an inevitable move towards a rational-legal structure of authority, utilising a bureaucratic structure.[58] Thus this theory can be sometimes viewed as part of the social evolutionism theory. This ties to his broader concept of rationalisation by suggesting the inevitability of a move in this direction.http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Max_Weber

So State building is building legal domination according to Weber classification.
This is the base of JMM99 three areas schema you can access here (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...ead.php?t=7610).
The actual model of this are the USA, all European countries, Asian, South American countries… All modern states. But there is sometimes a difference between those Nations. The “orthodox” Rule of Law State build Nation being USA. Mainy European countries are based on a social contract that is declined into rule of law… (slice difference but makes all the difference in fact).

This is entirely based on western societies, by the way. And this is what State Building is willing to achieve. But may be this should be called Administration Building. But this is also where the bias is.
Several challenges are to be faced. The following list is not exhaustive, far from it.

For this, I will use first a Kilcullen article published in SWJ (New Paradigms for 21st Century Conflicts http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/200...-21st-century/).
Similarly, we traditionally conduct state-based diplomacy through engagement with elites of other societies: governments, intelligentsia, and business leaders, among others. The theory is that problems can be resolved when elites agree, cooler heads prevail, and governments negotiate and then enforce agreements. Notions of sovereignty, the nation-state, treaty regimes, and international institutions all build on this paradigm.

What he points out is the fact that to build a new partner, we need to have an Elite to discuss with. We need to replace an Elite by another. So State building is not just administration building but it’s also elite capacity building.
The problematic often face is then that you have a competition on legitimacy, at field level, between Non State Elites and formal State Elites. Especially when State building aim is to build a “Nation” ex nihilo.

Secondly, I will use the very recent work of Atlani-Duault on former USSR countries and culture. Basically, her work is based on the idea that to counter USSR authoritarian regime, West has been developing the concept of civil society and culture. The main idea is that during Cold war culture has been used to build civil society and a new Elite that would fight the communists. Now days, this has become an habit in State Building to look for civil society and create, even sometimes ex nihilo, a civilian Elite that would challenge the military/political power in failed States. The UN came even with the concept of non educated intellectuals….

The bias it creates is that we are looking to create spontaneous generation of Elites. In many Stabilization or State building manuals this has became: empowering local authorities. Hopefully, several of those manual are pointing the limits of the exercise.

So State building is creating a body we can talk with because it looks like us.
Nation Building is creating an Administration body that can think by herself. That does take time, especially as we do not always this to happen.

What Sufferedbeetle is referring to in previous post is the end or the aim of the administration and more precisely Governance. We tend too much to mix Governance and State building.
The role of democracy in modern State Building is central as several attempts of non democratic States have been made in the past, with various results.
The 70th werethe golden years of enlightened dictatorships. This had a very good result in Asia in the 80th. Unfortunately, as the democratic transition was too quick, brutal or simply too late, this is the roots causes of the radicalisation of religious opposition in many of those countries.
I Africa, this was a complete disaster since the beginning.

Nowadays, we try to dress it with the apparence of democracy in conducting elections giving choice to the people only to a panel of Elites coming from the civil society we (the West) have created or supported. We will see the result in Iraq, Afghanistan, South Sudan… The previous results in DRC are not so much encouraging, I would say.
Then comes the problematic of integrating armed groups into a civilian structure… South America has been an interesting laboratory on this. The main tool being amnesty laws and elections…. With various results once again.
And finally how to fund a State admnistration or how countries do fund they develpment.

As JMM pointed out, for practical reasons, we tend to prefer to have a week dictatorship that would resist to insurgencies than a strong democracy that is too difficult to build, too time costly and weak against armed opposition.

But this just means that Nation Building needs to be rethought not that Nation Building has to be thrown away. (by the way, I have probably 8 to 12 hours difference with you guys. So do not expect me to be too much at the page immediatly ) )

To me, the biggest factor in all of this is time. You can't really make a tree grow faster than it naturally does and I think the same goes for nations. We're always trying to engineer things to be faster, but it doesn't really work b/c it is against the nature of the thing.

Ukraine just had another election and the same old characters are there. Having Hilary as a pen pal didn't help Yulia. Nothing much will change. Over time, these people will move on (shuffle on quickly please) and a new generation will take control and they will be a bit more evolved than the last (we hope) and so on....eventually, there will be a critical mass of political evolution and things will change. But it takes time to dig out from the soviet legacy.

Building Nation, State or whatever… Back to the basic (2)

Now let’s look at the economical theories of development and how they link up with politic development.

First of all Nation Building has for aim not to bring development but to build the mechanisms that fund a State and its administration.

Secondly because I am lazy, I will just take the two main theories of economical development:
- Rostow and linear development (Capitalist theory)
- Samir Hamin and centre and periphery (Socialist theory)

Rostow theory is based on a Western centred historical approach of development.

You start with the prehistoric period to end up in a 7/11 like mall. The basic idea is being that with several stages of economical development (and technological development) comes political development.
1) Stone Age: No technology, no economy: no State
2) Antiquity: basic technology, basic trade economy self centred: the concept of Cite (in Greek in the text).
3) Middle age: limited technology, proto capitalist economy: kingdoms
4) Renaissance: birth of modern technology, birth of capitalism: kingdoms with centred administration.
5) Modern times: limited modern technology, take off period: birth of democracy
6) Contemporaneous times: full modern technology, full capitalist economy: democracy.
(It’s a resume)
The main idea of Rostow is that economy and governance are linked. His approach and assumption is that if a country becomes rich then it will become a democracy.
Rostow basically putted on paper the general gut feeling of what is development in West.
Unfortunately, China has proven he was partially wrong: having a capitalist economy does not imply that you get a democracy. China has even proven the inverse: a strong capitalist economy can lead to a strong dictatorial regime.

But were Rostow is right is on take off period. You need a healthy economy to support a strong State apparatus. That’s the move Chinese made in the early 80 when they started to drop communist economy for capitalist economy. (And what led USSR to its end). Unfortunately, State apparatus and State economy nature are not linked.

Samir Amin theory is the critic of Rostow and is middle East centred (He wanted it third world centred but took Egypt as model…).
It is also an historical based theory of development.
1) Self centred development: you exploit your own resources to build your economy.
2) Predatory development: you exploit neighbours resources to build you economy. Actual example is Rwanda development strategy.
3) Mercantile: you impose to your neighbours to trade with you to develop your economy. Basic example is the colonisation.
4) Centre and periphery: you have economical centres which are in advance and which pull up peripheral areas. Capitalism.

To make it simple: it’s the base of the drop oil theory.
The good thing in Samir Amin is that he completely separates political evolution from economical development.
Personally, I have a tendency to prefer Samir Amin to Rostow. In fact, Rwanda and Uganda are applying Samir Amin theory and it works well.
But the 4 dragons of Asia did apply Rostow (Germany and Japan also in some extends) and it worked out also. But in fact, the 4 Dragons had a mix between Samir Amin and Rostow.
Politically, economic wealth did lead to democracy. But economically, those countries had to 2 policies:
- auto centred heavy industry development (pure Rostow: initiate take off through internal employment and sector 1 development)
- center and periphery industry development for export: they developed economical niches to generate strong external trade to attract hard currencies. (A little like Colbert)

On that, I would recommend Arghiri Emmanuel, David Ricardo and the economic theory of underdevelopment. (basically to know what to not do! Like Haliburton in Iraq...)

Now, let’s look at what we are talking about: Nation Building.

Nation Building is aimed to build a State apparatus in order to create an interlocutor for Weberian modern Nations (China included).
The economical component of it is aimed to:
- fund the State apparatus
- stabilize a country by establishing a strong economy that will reduce the use of violence to survive by ordinary people.

Funding the State apparatus is simple (?): you impose taxes. That requires a strong administration that can collect transparently taxes and a strong legal base to legitimate taxations.
Already we do have a problem:
- Strong administration means qualified and dedicated people.
- Strong legal base means that the State does not act predatorily but on legal base.
In most of failed States and post conflicts context, you are missing both.

Secondly you need to have something to tax! In most failed states, you have a predominance of the informal economy. So there is no legally formal body to tax. And then you have a majority of the population living with such low revenues that you just cannot tax them.

So you need to have development programs to build an economy that will support the State apparatus that you are building.

But as the economy is weak, the State remains weak and then it is an open door to corruption, black economy and so on… Also, the new Elite you have promoted are making much more money in a failed State than in a fully installed modern State ran by Rule of Law (Cf Iraq and Afghanistan). So they do not work hard to establish a formal State. As the State is weak and corrupted, it looses its legitimacy in the eyes of everyday people. So you promote insurgencies which weaken the State… And so on and so on.

Fortunately, there is a solution. (to be found if you listen to me)
The actual model of development used is Canada and the natural resources based development to build a strong Democratic State.
Just 2 critics (not really elaborated):
- Natural resources centred development is basically neo colonialism with a new clown costume. Samir Amin theory.
- Canada as a model is just believing that because you have a democratic model all other countries following that model will be democratic. Rostow theory.

Result: nothing new since 1970!
It’s time for a change!
By the way, Fukuyama is a nice guy who use complex words to reinvent the wheel and explain with capitalist vocabulary what the Marxist economical theorist of development have already said.

Thanks...

M.A.,

Greatly appreciate your tour de force posts on nation and state building; your explanations are very instructive and have shed some light on things for me.

In support of the digital SWC library I ran down some Google Books links for some of the authors you cite. One doesn’t need to cart around a desktop/laptop/netbook to read these or take notes anymore…an iTouch will get it done…. I used to use a library card and a typewriter back in the day…just amazing....well it looks like my reading list has grown

During OIF1 in Iraq it was my observation that the dying limbs of the Iraqi state tree were triaged and kept viable with external IV’s and tech support. As a result of necessity a local shadow economy grew, flourished, and appeared to come to dominate much of the state’s economic system. Mass privatization via shock therapy methods combined with the simultaneous disintegration and attempted reformation of the political system (formal institutions and informal network structures) resulted in a Hobbesonian environment which made me question what I know about Locke’s thesis regarding the orderliness of man’s nature. Rostow’s construct (more familiar to me as engineering/business approaches), although reminiscent of the underpants gnome's business model in some respects, was in my opinion the way to go for the public works and utilities area in which I worked. My unit, lead by an amazing general, was able to provide security while using a balanced approach and as a result our oil spot/province experienced some level of stability during our time there….overall it was an invaluable on-the-job-training (OJT) experience.

A final touch?

Thanks and sorry for the bad English and spelling… (Have a ####ty computer at work. Luckily, I also suffer from insomnia and a recent computer at "home").

Now let's make the last move: the link between State building and war: COIN.

There again, I'll come back to CvC. What is the aim of war? To impose a political dictate to an opponent disagreeing with you (Sorry Wilf, I do not have the book with me).
How do you achieve it? By imposing either a policy to an enemy or by imposing a government favorable to your views.
This drives us back to the article at the beginning of the threat: "winning peace".

Basically the new paradigm of war is that for modern armies, the technological, the firepower, manpower and training difference is so huge that the conventional confrontation phase (Shock) is no more a problem. Cf Iraq, Afghanistan…
What are the new strategic phases are the "hold" phase and the "build" phase.
Hold should be the imposition of a monopole of violence by a new actor creating the condition to build a Weberian State. That's basically what nobody is good at. Especially when you face two main oppositions:
- First, one or several bodies not willing to let you be the new owner of the monopoly of violence. Cf Iraq and the "insurgency" led by Sadam Husen in a first time then the civil war that followed when there were no traces of the former State apparatus. All the Shia/Sunny conflict in Iraq is based on that competition between the US and each communities/cite (in Greek in the text) to have the monopoly of violence on a limited piece of land. In addition to that, you had the Al Quada threat which was willing to challenge the US on its capacity to be the external owner of the monopole of violence. (It's a resume).
- Secondly a context/cultural opposition (mainly Afghanistan) based on the opposition of Stateless societies to State society. Basically the tribes/warlords/druglords being opposed to any kind of centralized State.
In some extend Radical religious ideology can be more or less assimilated to Stateless actors (that's what they what to make us believe). But as JMM demonstrated in fact, the Caliphate or what ever else form of Religious Government is a Sate based society.
This is where State and Nation building enter in the game.

The confrontation is no more based on military legitimacy but on people legitimacy. War among the people is not only a war taking place among the people as a theatre of operation but the battle for the domination of the people as define in CvC trinity.
Some simplistic minds take it as reversing CvC: the use of force to establish/legitimate leadership on people.
The problem is unfortunately more complex as the CvC trinity is not dissociable, works in both senses (there is always a looser) and is the root of the cite.
So you have to challenge the previous cite by a new cite model.
This is where my personal obsession for Foucault comes from. (The critic of elections as a technical tool to build democracy like Weberian State).

The main challenge of Nation building is to build this responsibility to protect while State building is to build the State Apparatus that will allow to develop/impose (pick up the one you like) an economy that will support it.

PS: you also made me touch the very limits of my underground culture. I love South Park but was much unaware of the underpants gnomes business model. Too much time in field I believe and not enough in front of TV.

Interesting thread, so far ....

What I glean is that the discourse hinges on the concepts of the "nation-state", the "nation" and the "state". The Wiki Nation state (no "bible") tosses out some concepts and issues.

I suppose that the questions revolve about the whether and how of building, assisting, supporting: (1) a nation-state; (2) a nation; or (3) a state. Like most high-flying questions, the amount of theories and perceived "best practices" abound - often conflict, but are interesting.

Still, all of that flies far above (but the results will surely affect) the village I'm currently thinking about. That is a place with a guy, his kid and wife with their two donkeys; and the former spearchuckers clustered with their cattle at the watering point (AKs and RPGs may or may not be left hidden in the underbrush). Then we have the village: umbrella huts surrounded by a prickly brush barrier - juxtaposed to adjacent steel structures of indifferent repair. So, my village is certainly a collage - and, perhaps, a mallage.

I do, however, have some doubt as to whether the theory and practice of the Westphalian nation-state will enter into that village's Narrative and become one of its Motivating Causes (borrowing from another thread, which is closely linked to this one).

The nation-state - the 500m target; the village - the 25m target. I'm still plinking, but enjoying the discussion.

To me, the biggest factor in all of this is time. You can't really make a tree grow faster than it naturally does and I think the same goes for nations. We're always trying to engineer things to be faster, but it doesn't really work b/c it is against the nature of the thing.

Very true. I was just saying this on another thread, but it fits as well here... one of the problems in the current American interventions is that American leaders are more concerned with legitimizing their actions to their own populaces and the international audience than they are with looking for a realistic solution to the problem. Of course the American people want to hear that we are going to be out of there in a few years and leave a nice functioning American-style democracy behind. It just ain't gonna happen... continuing the tree analogy, it's like announcing that you're gonna plant an acorn today and have a big ol' oak tree by Christmas.

The Wealth of Nations

Well....

Probably just icing on Dahayun's cake, but I come out of two edu-theories of nations and national structure/wealth.

Without dispute, a nation that soaks itself dry, which produces nothing, adds nothing to a civic path, is, if not failed, failing. Plenty of examples of nations lost in their own issues, and going nowhere.

The goal in US nation-building is, in most cases, to supplant indigenous leadership, and initiate a substantive (and secular) change in a place that, already by self-selection, is a problem child, if not a basket case.

But our military and foreign policy objectives are not grounded in basic history of the emergence and vitality of successful places/regions or nations, and the routine transformative local or regional drivers, or unique comparative resource, locational or economic advantages that differentiate a failing area from a prospering one.

In Iraq, as I met many of the senior technocrats, they were proud of their role in twice rebuilding their country after major wars, even against the restraints of embargos, and arbitrary dictatorial government. Might not be paradise to us, but they were proud of what they had done, and on many levels, antagonistic to US civ/mil efforts that kept them from their duties/pride in rebuilding their country themselves. VP Mahdi was in Washington yesterday, and unambiguous about their self-determination, and getting the US forces out---to fly, they need us to get out of the way.

As MG Caslan (MND-North) said last month on his public post-tour debrief, he was skeptical of turning things over to Iraqis, but Gen Odierno impressed on him how important it was for the Iraqis, and the zeal they had for self-rule and independence (even with risks of instability).

Smoke and mirrors aside, Iraq has substantial resource, locational and cultural elements that, if they don't tear it apart, will drive it forward---with or without us.

But Afghanistan is a different problem all together. Current Afghans are born into economic, geographic, logistical and resource limitations, despite that it may have been prosperous once. But our strategy does not succeed by helping them to tread water----they have to grow, change, reinvent themselves in remarkable ways to meet our objectives---and it is not happening.

I don't believe that it is not happening because of them, but because of US. We are back to the same old top-down, project and program thing that drove so much of the criminality and corruption---no effective focus, synchronization of actions,or measuarble and sustainable goals.

Our operational focus is not to transform Afghanistan, but to deliver projects and programs already sold somewhere else. Right now,our deliverable is "boots on the ground", and dollars deployed, but we have no realistic transformative strategy or plan that can create 1+1>2 dynamics. Right now, we are still struggling to make 1+1=1, and that isn't going to achieve what we need.

In economic geography, we learn that resources, linkages, transporation and trade patterns, nodality, populations, all create and shape the economic bones of a place, and the collection and connection of those places creates the hierarchy that is a nation, and the reason to bound and defend it as a nation distinct from the "other" places.

Similarly, but from a different perspective, is Jane Jacobs, whose epic tome, Cities and the Wealth of Nations, derives from the shopkeeper, sidewalk interactions, and local associations,interactions and businesses that builds the framework for a city (not to exclude modern suburban distributed city forms), and the city drives the region, which adds up to the wealth and connectivity of nation.

Last April, I had the opportunity to talk with John Adams, em. prof of econ geography at UMinn about US military/foreign policy strategies for building nations in the top-down, just add water approach. It simply defies history, reality and functional evidence. You have to first find and develop some unique economic value, or hope for one, in a place to set that place in motion, and the rest of the places have to raise to a level that regional interactions can become transformative drivers (1+1>2).

If we want to see Afghanistan become something other than what it is, we need to get smart and focused, and become very Afghan-oriented. Maybe, but who will drive and deliver that?

Long ago, I learned that knowledge is transferable, but wisdom is not.

But, this business of implementing unstructured and unfocused projects and programs, for the last decade in Afghanistan and Iraq has shown that 1+1<2 if poorly conceived, unsynchronized to any viable local attributes.

The more I watch the logistic dog collar pulling back on our limits in Afghanistan, the more sure I am that, unlike Iraq,

I fully agree with Dayuhan, building a Nation is a myth. But building a State apparatus is possible.

Under some circumstances, I agree. I'm not convinced that those circumstances are universally present.

Originally Posted by M-A Lagrange

A group of people, with a leader and the capacity to be organised to use violence to defend their land: a Cite (in Greek in the text).
Here lay the roots of a country, a state, a nation….

Ok, stop right there and ask about these roots. Is the capacity to organize present, or is it obstructed by internal conflict? When we talk about "their land", who are "they". Already we are assuming a perception of unity, a consensus that the people of whatever territory we're discussing perceive themselves themselves as a discrete entity. This condition is in many cases simply not present.

Originally Posted by M-A Lagrange

Now, this leads us to what are the various kind of civil societies (knowing the fact that by this term we include military dictatorship, kingdoms… All kinds of societies which are not lead by civilians).

1) the societies without State (Stateless societies, Non State societies):
The most well known example are the Nuer from Sudan. Cf: E. E. Evans-Pritchard

In those kinds of societies, social hierarchy is low, power is not centralized and not structured through a centralized administration or proto administration. Authority is hold by family chiefs or elders or religious leaders.
Moral and religion are used as law or legal referent to sanction deviances, non respects of Tabou…
Such societies are centered on survival of the group.
Actual good example is Somalia. It is also the type of organization to which de regulated, and dismantled societies tend to go back in failed states during civil wars or more generally when the State (as an administration) is absent.
Such societies are seen by Hobbes as the Human Nature: the war of all against all. It’s the western imaginary “savage society”. (by the way, to me it’s much closer to Locke than Hobbes).
What in western politic has long been assimilated to anarchy (See Anarchy ) but is not, especially in traditional societies (See all theanthropoly in Africa, Oceania, South America…).

2) the societies with State:

The societies with Sate, at least the modern ones are based on Max Weber definition of the State.
Weber unveils the definition of the state that has become so pivotal to Western social thought: that the state is that entity which possesses a monopoly on the legitimate use of physical force
Weber distinguished three pure types of political leadership, domination and authority:
1. charismatic domination (familial and religious),
2. traditional domination (patriarchs, patrimonalism, feudalism), and
3. legal domination (modern law and state, bureaucracy).[56]
In his view, every historical relation between rulers and ruled contained such elements and they can be analysed on the basis of this tripartite distinction.[57] He also notes that the instability of charismatic authority inevitably forces it to "routinize" into a more structured form of authority. Likewise he notes that in a pure type of traditional rule, sufficient resistance to a master can lead to a "traditional revolution". Thus he alludes to an inevitable move towards a rational-legal structure of authority, utilising a bureaucratic structure.[58] Thus this theory can be sometimes viewed as part of the social evolutionism theory. This ties to his broader concept of rationalisation by suggesting the inevitability of a move in this direction.http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Max_Weber

Look at it from the other direction. What if the state we want to build contains multiple societies? What if these multiple societies are traditional rivals? What if they distrust each other, or loathe each other? These conditions are going to have a very real impact on the capacity to build a state, a nation, or an economy.

This is the key obstacle to... ok, call it what you will, nation building, state building, development, whatever in much of the post-colonial world. We're left with abstract lines drawn on maps by retreating colonists. We're inclined to assume that the people who live within these lines constitute a nation and possess the perception of unity that is required before building or growth can begin.

If we're talking about growing a nation, that perception of "us" is the seed, if we're talking about building a nation that's the raw material. Without it there are going to be pretty serious problems. Before we talk about a nation we have to ask whether the people in the territory in question see themselves as a nation. Is there an "us" there? Do the people who live within this arbitrary set of lines on a map see themselves as a discrete entity? Do they want to be a single nation? If the answer to those questions is "no", it's going to be pretty difficult to build a functional nation there.

Ultimately this question has to be sorted out by the people in question, and unfortunately human beings have generally gone through a fair bit of violence before coming up with an answer.

Originally Posted by M-A Lagrange

But this just means that Nation Building needs to be rethought not that Nation Building has to be thrown away. (by the way, I have probably 8 to 12 hours difference with you guys. So do not expect me to be too much at the page immediatly ) )

I also wouldn't suggest throwing the whole concept away, but I would certainly suggest that we need to ask in any given case whether the prerequisites for statehood exist before trying to apply our theories.

I'm also in a minority time zone; it all sorts out, not necessarily in any coherent fashion!