On August 13, 2014, our firm had the privilege of filing its 75th amicus curiae brief
in the U.S. Supreme Court, in the case of Rudy v. Lee.
In addition, we have made 12 other types of filings in the U.S. Supreme Court (for a total of 87 filings),
such as: Petition for Certiorari, Jurisdictional Statement, Appellants' Brief, Reply Brief, and Brief for Intervenor-Respondents.

In addition to statutory issues, these briefs have addressed a wide variety of
Constitutional issues:

Our first Supreme Court filing was October 16, 1981, supporting the legality of President Reagan's
action against striking air traffic controllers. Of course, we have also filed many other briefs in various U.S. District Court, U.S. Courts of Appeals, State Supreme
Courts, etc. All of these filings since the late 1990's and some earlier briefs are available on this website, and we are working to post the older filings as well.

"[G]overnment is not the solution to our problem;government is the problem."

Today, our firm filed an amicus brief in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, in support of a challenge to California's 10-day
waiting period for firearm purchases. One of the most draconian states when it comes to Second Amendment rights, California forces its
residents to wait 10 days after a purchase before a lawful buyer may acquire a lawful firearm.

First, our brief dispelled the notion that California's waiting period is "presumptively lawful" under Heller as a "condition on commercial
sales of arms." Second, our brief showed that waiting periods for firearm purchases do not fall within any of Heller's "presumptively lawful"
categories of regulations. Finally, our brief argued that, while the district court below correctly determined that the waiting period is
unconstitutional, it did so for the wrong reasons. The district court based its decision not on the text and context of the Second Amendment,
but on the same type of judicially-devised interest balancing test that the Supreme Court rejected in Heller.

Today, the American Thinker published our article entitled "Journalist Shield Laws: A Constitutional Conundrum." The article was
prepared at the request of the United States Justice Foundation in connection with a
Symposium it is co-sponsoring on the First Amendment which is taking place later today at the National Press Club in Washington, D.C. At
the Symposium, more than a dozen journalists will assemble, each of whom at one point in his career has chosen to spend time in jail rather
than divulge the identify of a source.

To address the problem of government efforts to force the disclosure of sources, members of Congress over the years have introduced several
variations of a federal "shield law" designed to protect persons considered to be "journalists." However, there is a thorny Constitutional
problem as to who qualifies as a "journalist." In the case Branzburg v. Hayes, the Supreme Court refused to recognize a "reporters' privilege,"
for several reasons, including its concern that it could not grant special First Amendment press protections to a limited class of persons that
was denied to everyone else.

Indeed, every Supreme Court case that had addressed the scope of the First Amendment's protection of "the press" makes clear that it applies to
everyone - not just members of the institutional media.

Our article stressed the flaw in a federal shield law which protects only the institutional media and then leaves it up to federal judges to
decide on a case-by-case basis when free press principles will be applied and when they will be ignored.

Today, our firm filed an amicus brief in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, supporting the challenge by State of Texas
and 25 other states to the Obama Administration's misuse of "executive action" ("DAPA") to implement provisions of the DREAM Act that Congress
refused to enact.

Our brief was filed on behalf of Citizens United, Citizens United Foundation, English First Foundation, English First, TREA Senior Citizens
League, U.S. Justice Foundation, The Lincoln Institute for Research and Education, Abraham Lincoln Foundation for Public Policy Research, Inc.,
U.S. Border Control Foundation, Policy Analysis Center, Institute on the Constitution, and Conservative Legal Defense and Education Fund.

Today our firm filed a brief supporting the right to "bear" arms in California. A panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
previously handed down an opinion striking down San Diego County's policy under which "self-defense" was not considered to be a "good cause"
allowing the issuance of a concealed carry permit. Now, the Ninth Circuit decided to re-hear the case en banc. The Peruta case was consolidated
with another case, Richards v. County of Yolo, which challenged Yolo County's "good cause" policy. Our brief addressed issues in both cases.

California almost completely prevents ordinary persons from carrying firearms in public. Permits are issued by sheriffs or police chiefs under a
discretionary "may issue" system, whereby local heads of law enforcement have great latitude to issue permits to the rich and politically
powerful, but to deny them to ordinary Californians who want a firearm for self-defense. Although neither set of Plaintiffs challenged the
entire "may issue" system, whereby the government gets to decide who may exercise their rights, both sets of Plaintiffs asked the
Court to modify the current system.

We argued that the Second Amendment explains when and how it applies, and comes with its own standard of review - "shall not be infringed." Here,
the Plaintiffs are members of "the People," their weapons are protected "arms," and they wish to "bear" those arms for what the Supreme Court has
confirmed is a "legitimate" and constitutional purpose - self defense. California's permitting system clearly "infringes" on the exercise of that
right. One district court judge even believed that even after she found the county procedure "infringed" the Second Amendment - a right that
"shall not be infringed" - it could be sustained under a balancing test.

We also argued against the use of any judicial "balancing test," or judicial evaluation of "burden" on gun owners, or judicial consideration of
how important California thinks its law is - the plain text of the Second Amendment requires that the law be struck down.

Our brief was filed on behalf of Gun Owners of America, Inc., Gun Owners Foundation, U.S. Justice Foundation, The Lincoln Institute for Research
and Education, The Abraham Lincoln Foundation for Public Policy Research, Inc., Policy Analysis Center, Institute on the Constitution, and
Conservative Legal Defense and Education Fund.

Today, as the U.S. Supreme Court was concluding oral argument in the four same sex marriage cases, Bill Olson briefed pastors and others on the
National Emergency Coalition Conference Call sponsored by S.T.A.N.D. The briefing included discussion of the
brief filed in the
U.S. Supreme Court by our firm on April 3, 2015.

Today we filed an amicus brief in support of the Independence Institute in their challenge to the Federal Election Commission's regulations requiring the
names and addresses of donors to nonprofits doing issue ads, which technically meet the criteria of Independent Expenditures, to be disclosed. Our
brief explains the motivation of Congress for wanting this information.

Today, for Alabama Chief Justice Roy Moore, we joined in filing a response to Plaintiffs' Motion to Dismiss seeking dismissal of the case against him with prejudice.

Hedgepath v. Bentley

March 17, 2015

Today, representing Alabama Supreme Court Chief Justice Roy Moore, our firm joined with Alabama local counsel Douglas McElvy in filing a
Motion to Dismiss a suit filed against
certain Alabama state officials seeking to penalize their opposition to same sex marriage.
A Brief in Support of the Motion
was also filed.

On March12, 2015, our firm joined with co-counsel with Barry K. Arrington, Esquire
of Centennial, Colorado, and filed in the Colorado Court of Appeals a brief challenging the constitutionality of the recent 2013 Colorado laws
banning so-called "large capacity" magazines and requiring criminal background checks for all private transfers of firearms.

In 2013, representing the National Association for Gun Rights and Rocky Mountain Gun Owners, our firm challenged Colorado's recent gun control
laws in a Denver court. This suit was based exclusively on violations of the Colorado State Constitution. Interestingly, the Colorado
Constitution is stronger even than the U.S. Constitution in defending gun rights. In two recent cases, Colorado courts had upheld gun rights
that have been denied in the federal courts. Nevertheless, the district court dismissed the case without a hearing, not allowing us to present
evidence of the flaws in the statue, nor the state's rich history of promoting and protecting gun rights. We took an appeal to the Colorado Court
of Appeals.

Among other arguments, we attacked the Colorado ban on magazines "designed to be readily converted" to hold over 15 rounds arguing that it applies
to almost all magazines. The district court interpreted the statute according to an opinion issued by the Colorado Attorney General, whose office
also was defending the Governor in the litigation, claiming the law applies only to magazines intentionally designed to be converted - an
interpretation which applies to no known magazines.

We also argued that the background check requirement unconstitutionally delegates both executive and legislative powers to Federal Firearms
Licensees, who must perform a background check before a firearm can be transferred between private parties. In order to sell a firearm to your
next door neighbor, you must convince a firearms dealer to do a background check, which exposes the FFL to potential federal criminal liability --
in exchange for a maximum fee of $10 -- far less than FFLs actually charge to perform that service.

Today, on behalf of the Free Speech Coalition, Inc., the Free Speech Defense and Education Fund, Inc., and U.S. Justice Foundation Jeremiah Morgan of
our firm testified before the Federal Election Commission at its Hearings on the McCutcheon v. FEC Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking.
(His testimony appears at 5:19:51 of the video.)

Herb's topic was the reemergence of the private property principle in the Fourth Amendment, as reflected in two recent decisions of the U.S. Supreme
Court. In United States v. Jones and Jardines v. Florida, the Court ruled that the rights protected by the ban on unreasonable searches and seizures
is foremost a protection against trespass against property interests in one's person, house, paper and effect without regard for the property owner's
expectation of privacy, reasonable or otherwise.

In his presentation, Herb emphasized the importance of the common law predicate underpinning the First through the Fifth Amendments of the federal bill
of rights, and urged attorneys practicing in the of eminent domain to consider augmenting a "takings" claim with a Fourth Amendment search or seizure
claim where appropriate.

A group of Los Angeles hotel owners challenged a Los Angeles city ordinance which authorizes police to search through the hotels’ guest registers without a warrant. The City claimed that hotel owners have no expectation of privacy in a business record that they are
required to keep by the City. And the City claimed it has a significant interest in fighting crimes committed in and around the hotel property.
Thus, the City asserted that, in such a highly regulated industry, there is no need for probable cause, much less a warrant. In short, Los Angeles
argued that the Fourth Amendment does not apply.

We point out in our brief that business records located in commercial establishments and personal papers located in a private residence are both
private property, and that both are equally protected by the Fourth Amendment. Indeed, the very roots of the Fourth Amendment can be traced
directly to James Otis’ 1761 opposition to the Crown’s use of writs of assistance against merchants — allegedly to deter smuggling and other crimes.

Bob Unruh discusses the legal issues involved in our Petition for Certiorari: "They argued a law requiring the secretary of state to
put the names of ineligible candidates on the ballot would be unconstitutional. But the California judges shrugged, more or less
said "So what?" and dismissed the case."

SCOTUSblog published a preview of the oral argument in Rodriguez v. United States, and discussed our amicus brief:
"One amicus brief was filed in support of each side. While the parties avoid the question whether a dog sniff is a “search,” the U.S. Justice
Foundation argues in support of Rodriguez that the Jardines and Jones decisions should call Caballes into question on this point, and that a dog
sniff of one’s car should not be allowed without independent Fourth Amendment justification. Pitching a portion of its argument, apparently, at
common-law enthusiasts such as Justice Scalia and Justice Clarence Thomas, this amicus brief cites political philosopher John Locke from 1690
(about property rights, not cars, of course)."

Today, our firm filed an amicus brief in the U.S. Supreme Court in support of a challenge to San Francisco's gun storage and ammunition
ordinances.

This decision comes as the latest in a long string of decisions wherein the lower federal courts simply have refused to implement the decision
of the U.S. Supreme Court in Heller. As our amicus brief explains, the lower federal courts are in a state of open rebellion in the lower
courts against Heller. Our amicus brief documents the lawless behavior of the lower federal courts, and urges the U.S. Supreme Court to grant
certiorari.

Our brief argues that at each and every opportunity, the Ninth Circuit did exactly what the Supreme Court in Heller specifically told federal
courts they could not do. In this case, the Ninth Circuit has gone even further than other courts, upholding an ordinance nearly identical to
the one struck down in Heller. Our brief argues that the Supreme Court must step in and quash the lower courts' uprising against Heller so
that constitutional rights are uniform across the country.

Our brief concludes by arguing that the U.S. Supreme Court's "intervention is necessary in this case to remind the Ninth Circuit that it is,
indeed, an 'inferior' court - under the authority of the U.S. Constitution - and not a law unto itself."

Today our firm filed a Petition for Writ of Certiorari seeking U.S. Supreme Court Review of two decisions of the California Courts which held that
the California Secretary of State had no duty to determine whether a candidate for President of the United States is eligible to serve, if elected,
before placing his name on the official state election ballot.

Our Petition explains that Article II, Section 1 of the U.S. Constitution vests in state legislatures the responsibility to determine how electors
are selected and who is eligible to serve as president. In the early days of our Republic, as permitted by the U.S. Constitution, state legislatures
in several states simply chose the electors directly without any popular vote. Now that electors are selected in every state by popular vote, state
legislatures have the duty to ensure that voters are given a choice only between persons eligible to serve.

The petition was filed on behalf of John Dummett and Edward Noonan, who were candidates for President of the United States in 2012.

Today, our firm filed an amicus brief in the U.S. Supreme Court in opposition the Obamacare healthcare "exchanges" created by the federal
government contrary to the plain language of the statute.

The Affordable Care Act ("ACA") authorized tax credits only for taxpayers who purchase qualified health insurance through an "Exchange" which
was established by a state. However, after ACA was enacted, state legislatures reflected popular opposition to Obamacare, and only 16 states
created such Exchanges, despite being offered federal bribes to do so.

The ACA authorized the Department of Health and Human Services to create Exchanges in those States where the States declined to create them;
however, no tax credits could be given to taxpayers in those States refusing to take the federal carrot. Despite this clear statutory plan, a
highly-politicized IRS determined that the tax credits should be made available to everyone who purchased health insurance from any exchange -
regardless of whether it was established by a State or established by HHS for a State.

The Government views this case as simply a difference of opinions about statutory construction - as to whether an Exchange established by the
federal government for a state is the same as an Exchange established by a State. In truth, the statute is so clear, the question really is:
Shall the statutory text President Obama wanted in 2010 be applied as written, or instead disregarded to conform to what President Obama wants
now?

Our amicus brief explained the history of Obamacare to provide the Court a context for the King case. Birthed and enacted into law by a process
of political intrigue and deception, the Obama Administration has adopted a lawless strategy of ACA implementation, unilaterally waiving or
delaying various statutory requirements under the guise of presidential discretion. Contrary to his claim of discretion under his constitutional
duty to take care that the law be faithfully executed, the President has instead exercised an unconstitutional prerogative power, dispensing with
explicit, congressionally imposed deadlines, in violation of the separation of powers principles and ministerial practices contemplated by the
Constitution.

The ACA provision in question should be interpreted according to the plain meaning of the statutory text, rather than according to the Humpty-Dumpty
approach "words mean what I want them to mean" urged by the Government.

Tony Henderson was convicted in federal court of a felony drug crime. Before conviction, he had voluntarily turned over his firearms to the
FBI. After conviction, knowing that, as a felon, he could no longer legally possess firearms under 18 U.S.C. Section 922(g)(1), Henderson sold
his firearms to a third party. Henderson then asked the FBI to transfer his firearms to that eligible third party buyer. The FBI refused,
arguing that to do so would put Henderson into temporary "constructive possession" of the firearms.

Even though Henderson's firearms were in no way related to the crime for which he was convicted, the government has argued that, at the moment
of conviction, Henderson lost his entire property interest in the firearms.

On the contrary, our brief argued, the concept of "constructive possession" applies only in cases where it is necessary to deem a person in
actual physical possession of an item, such as when a person who exercises "dominion" over a residence is deemed to constructively possess the
objects inside.

Our brief argued that the purpose of the Gun Control Act of 1968 was to prevent crime by keeping felons from physically possessing firearms.
Clearly, public safety is not served by disabling Henderson from transfering his firearms to an eligible gun owner.

Next, our brief argued that permitting the government to act in this manner to seize firearms allows the government to effectively circumvent
the rules and procedures for civil forfeiture proceedings.

Finally, our brief argued that the government's seizure of Henderson's firearms violated his Second Amendment rights. We point out that the
felon prohibition was enacted at a time when the prevailing view was that the Second Amendment protected collective rather than individual
rights. By permitting the government to eliminate the property rights of anyone convicted of a felony - about 1.2 million per year - the
constitutionally-protected market for firearms is harmed.

Today, in an article in The Wall Street Journal entitled "A Monetary Gadfly in an Age of Fiat Money," Seth Lipsky discusses the amicus briefs we filed
for GATA in the government's case against Bernard vonNotHaus.

"These matters were considered by Judge Voorhees, who has been presiding in the von NotHaus case. They were raised most pointedly in an amicus brief by
the Gold Anti-Trust Action Committee, a charity that fights for a constitutional view of money.

That brief argued that Congress lacks the power to prohibit private coinage of money. It argued that the Constitution’s grant of the coinage power to
Congress isn’t exclusive. If it were, the Constitution wouldn’t have had separately to deny coinage power to the states.

The fact that the Founders specifically denied coinage power to the states but not to the people means, the line of argument suggests, that private
coinage ends up as a right reserved to the people. In fact, private coinage existed long into the 19th century, particularly, but not exclusively, in the West."

Today, our firm filed an amicus curiae brief in the U.S. Supreme Court, urging that the Fourth Amendment be applied to all searches and
seizures of automobiles. We asked the Court to leave no latitude for judges to compromise away the constitutionally-protected civil liberties
of Americans to serve the "needs" of law enforcement.

In Rodriguez, a police officer in Nebraska stopped a Mercury Mountaineer occupied by two men that allegedly swerved onto the shoulder and then
back onto the road. He wrote them a warning, and returned their licenses and other paperwork, ending the traffic stop. He then asked if they
minded if he ran his drug dog around the car. The driver objected, but instead of letting them go, the officer detained them again, ordering
them not to move until backup arrived. The drug dog "alerted" on the vehicle and the police found drugs.

Both the district court and the court of appeals determined that, even when the police had no suspicion of wrongdoing, officers are entitled
to a detain an automobile sufficiently long to allow a search of the exterior by a drug-sniffing dog. This invasion of the Fourth Amendment's
protections were viewed by these courts as a "de minimis" privacy intrusion, and thus "reasonable."

Our brief seeks to have the Court expand upon its recent decisions in U.S. v. Jones in 2012 and Florida v. Jardines in 2013, which confirmed
that property principles - rather than privacy considerations - are the fundamental basis of the Fourth Amendment. Under the approach we
advocate, judges would not have the power to determine that violations of a person's property right to his "persons, houses, papers, and
effects" is permissible if a judge concludes that a person has no "legitimate expectation of privacy," or if the government's violation of
that privacy was insignificant. Rather, under property principles, any violation - however small - of a person's property interests in his
person, house, papers, or effects is prohibited.

Pursuant to those principles, our brief argued that an unjustified detention of a person - no matter how brief or "de minimis" - violates his
property rights in his person, even if he had already been detained, and even though a brief period of continued detention is no great privacy
intrusion.

Ever since the U.S. Supreme Court determined that the Second Amendment protected every citizen’s right to “keep and bear arms” in its 2008 Heller
decision, lower federal courts have sought to evade the application of that rule. That pattern is now continuing in Maryland where a district
judge has upheld the Maryland 2013 Firearms Safety Act (“Act”) which bans (i) so-called “assault weapons” and (ii) so-called “large-capacity
magazines” that hold more than 10 rounds of ammunition.

Our firm filed an amicus curiae brief in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, in support of a challenge to that ruling.

This case is truly remarkable because the district judge first acknowledged that the Maryland Act was an “infringement” on Second Amendment rights,
but upheld the law anyway, in utter disregard of the Second Amendment text commanding that those rights “shall not be infringed.”

Our brief first attacked the many factual errors in the district judge’s opinion which formed the basis for her flawed legal analysis. Judge Blake
sought to demonize the regulated firearms and magazines, relying on demonstrably false claims that revealed animus towards firearms.

In Heller, the Supreme Court had held the District of Columbia could not ban weapons that are “in common use ... for lawful purposes.” Somehow, the
district judge came to the conclusion that so-called “assault rifles” like the AR-15 and AK-47 — likely the most popular rifles in the United
States — are not in common use. Our brief noted that the judge’s claim that “assault” rifles are not commonly used because they represent only a
small percentage of total firearms is like saying Honda Accords are not commonly used because they represent only a small percentage of total cars.
Meanwhile, the district judge conveniently failed to address whether so-called “large-capacity magazines,” are in common use, as the government had
not even bothered to contest that fact.

Judge Blake then applied “intermediate scrutiny” to the Maryland law, but our brief argued that Second Amendment rights are not to be subject to
judicial interest balancing, as Heller teaches.

Finally, our brief demonstrated why the Maryland law’s numerous exemptions, such as those for police and military, must fail. It does not matter if
these groups receive special training that ordinary people do not have. Indeed, Heller stated clearly that Second Amendment rights belong to all
the People, not just “members of a [government] fighting force.” Permitting certain groups to have these weapons “within the scope of official
business” does not lessen the Second Amendment breach; rather it exacerbates it by creating an imbalance of power that threatens the people’s
readiness to resist tyranny, the overriding Second Amendment purpose as recognized by the Supreme Court in Heller.

Today we filed comments in response to the Federal Election Commission notice in considering a petition for rulemaking. This petition asks the
FEC to expand the definition of "federal office" to include a delegate to a constitutional convention for proposing amendments to the U.S.
Constitution.

We explained that the FEC has no authority to expand the definition of "federal office" --- as this term is clearly defined in statute.
Moreover, we explain that the manner by which delegates would be selected to serve at a so-called "Convention of the States" under Article V
would be governed by state, not federal law.

These comments were filed on behalf of the Free Speech Coalition, the Free Speech Defense and Education Fund, and the U.S. Justice Foundation.

Today, our firm filed an amicus brief in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, supporting another challenge by the legendary Dick Heller
to the District of Columbia’s onerous firearm registration and licensing requirements. This is our firm’s third amicus brief supporting Heller’s challenges to
these DC gun regulations. In 2008, the Supreme Court adopted the type of analysis recommended by our first
amicus brief.

After its 2008 loss in the U.S. Supreme Court in the first Heller case, the DC City Council crafted new registration and licensing regulations which technically
permit possession of handguns in the home, but are so onerous as to effectively make the process so difficult and expensive that few can ever obtain a firearm.

This new regulatory scheme was challenged, winding up in the DC Circuit, where we filed our second
amicus brief in Heller II.
The DC Circuit disregarded the Supreme Court’s instructions in Heller I to apply the text, history, and tradition of the Second Amendment to the DC gun control scheme.
Instead, the DC Circuit sent the case back to the district court with orders to apply “intermediate scrutiny” — the very “judge-empowering” interest-balancing test the
Supreme Court had rejected in Heller I.

Freed to “balance the interests” in whatever way he saw fit, the district court judge placed DC’s alleged interests in police and public safety above Americans’
constitutional rights.

Next, our brief argued that DC’s registration scheme is so riddled with exceptions that it violates the primary purpose of the Second Amendment — to ensure that all
of “the people” are able to defend themselves and resist tyranny. Instead, the DC laws make it only so that government agents and members of the wealthy and powerful
elite classes in the District have easy access to firearms.

Next, our brief deconstructed the district court’s argument that gun laws are more easily justified in densely-populated, urban centers such as DC. The Supreme Court
in Heller I rejected just such an argument, noting that the protections of the Second Amendment are uniformly applicable coast-to-coast. If federal constitutional rights
are to be the same in Washington, D.C. as they are in Cheyenne, Wyoming, federal courts must reject special pleading by big city mayors and their police chiefs who want to
deprive their citizens of their rights as citizens under the U.S. Constitution.

Finally, our brief points out the absurdity of the district court’s decision that one handgun per month is “more than enough” for District residents. It is not up to federal
judges to decide which or how many constitutional rights a person gets to exercise.

Our brief was filed on behalf of Gun Owners of America, Inc., Gun Owners Foundation, Gun Owners of California, U.S. Justice Foundation, The Lincoln Institute for Research and
Education, The Abraham Lincoln Foundation for Public Policy Research, Institute on the Constitution, Conservative Legal Defense and Education Fund, Policy Analysis Center,
Downsize DC Foundation, and DownsizeDC.org.

Today, our firm filed a friend-of-the-court brief in the U.S. Supreme Court, supporting a patent attorney’s claim that a law mandating an increase in patent
application fees was invalid because it was signed into law by President Obama who does not meet the constitutional requirement to be a “natural born citizen.” The lower
courts in the case ruled that the question of President Obama’s citizenship is a “political question” and thus an issue for Congress — not the courts — to decide.

Until now, the question of President Obama’s qualifications as a “natural born citizen” has been dodged by the judiciary because those challenging his eligibility had not
suffered any personal injury compensable by a court — and thus lacked “legal” standing. There is no such barrier in this case because the patent attorney suffered an
out-of-pocket loss of $90.00 because of the new law signed by President Obama.

Also, until now, no one has questioned the validity of a law signed by the President. Rather, previous cases have sought the removal of President Obama from the presidential
ballot or from office altogether. In this case, however, the complaining patent attorney is not seeking President Obama’s removal from office, but simply a refund of his
$90.00 and a declaration that, unless he is a “natural born citizen,” President Obama does not have the constitutional authority to sign a bill into law. Yet, the courts
are attempting to avoid declaring what the law is based on the judge-made expedient of labeling the issue a “political question.”

In addition to possessing the standing that prior challengers lacked, Mr. Rudy’s case comes at an opportune time — just two months after the U.S. Supreme Court unanimously
held in National Labor Relations Board v. Canning that an
Order of the NLRB was invalid because three members of the board were constitutionally ineligible to serve.

Our amicus brief in Rudy argued that if the U.S. Supreme Court can decide whether members of the NLRB meet the constitutional requirements of their office, it can also decide
whether the President of the United States meets the constitutional requirements of his office.

Further, as our brief demonstrated, the requirement that a President be a “natural born citizen” is a fixed legal principle prescribed by the Constitution, with the purpose
to insulate the office from foreign influences that would compromise the President’s sworn oath to “defend, preserve, and protect” the Constitution of the United States.

Many object to any challenge to the eligibility of a president, or presidential aspirant, but if the law is to apply equally to every person, Presidents cannot be deemed to
be above the law based on vague tests such as whether the case presents “political question.” Indeed, demonstrating that the term “natural born citizen” is a constitutional
requirement that has continuing political significance which needs resolution are questions not just about President Obama, but also about Republicans Marco Rubio, Rick
Santorum, Ted Cruz, and others.

Our brief was filed on behalf of U.S. Justice Foundation, Lincoln Institute for Research and Education, Abraham Lincoln Foundation, U.S. Border Control, U.S. Border Control
Foundation, Institute on the Constitution, Policy Analysis Center, and Conservative Legal Defense and Education Fund.

For the second time in as many months, our firm filed comments on behalf of Gun Owners of America, Inc. and Gun Owners Foundation, expressing opposition to the ATF’s
continuing effort to require federally licensed firearms dealers (FFL’s) to report to ATF information regarding the sale of multiple rifles.

Purportedly concerned about firearms being trafficked to Mexican drug cartels, three years ago ATF snuck past the courts a requirement that all FFLs located in the four
southwest border states (California, Arizona, New Mexico, and Texas) must report to the ATF any sale to a single person of two or more rifles within a five day period.

Then, in April, in a brazen move under cover of the 1995 Paperwork Reduction Act, ATF announced that it would extend its multiple rifle reporting requirement to every FFL
in the country, and to all multiple sales regardless of whether they were sold to the same person.

Our firm filed comments with ATF on behalf of
GOA and GOF, contending that there was absolutely no justification for such a universal requirement. ATF has never alleged that its claim concerning arms trafficking involves
virtually every FFL in the country. Indeed, our comments charge that ATF’s expansion of the multiple rifle sales reporting
requirement is a significant step towards the creation of a national gun registry prohibited by federal law.

Within days of our initial comments, ATF backed off, withdrawing its initial notice and replacing it with an amended notice, limiting its requirement to the same four border
states and sales made to the same person.

An article by GOA Executive Director Larry Pratt
in the American Thinker explains what happened.

In response, our firm filed a second set of comments
with ATF, this time pointing out the illegality of ATF’s action under the Firearms Owners Protection Act of 1986 which expressly limited the reporting of multiple firearm sales
only to handguns. Additionally, our comments pointed out that, in 1986, ATF acknowledged the handgun limitation in a letter, submitted to the Senate Judiciary, opposing the Act.
Finally, we recited Congress’s list of findings, including the Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms, upon which the Senate and the House were basing the Act’s design —
in order to impose significant limits on ATF’s law enforcement powers.

Whether this second effort will pay dividends, as did the first, we don’t know yet. In any event we will continue to combat the ATF and the Obama administration’s persistent
efforts to undermine our Second Amendment rights.

Today, our firm filed a brief to uphold gun rights in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, in support of a Petition for
Rehearing En Banc, in the case Jackson v. San Francisco, No. 12-17803.

San Francisco ordinances prohibit the possession of a handgun within the home unless it is (i) being worn on the person or (ii) locked away. San Francisco also
prohibits the purchase of hollowpoint ammunition within city limits. A panel of three judges from the Ninth Circuit had upheld the ordinances on the ground that
they “limit but do not destroy Second Amendment rights,” standing in stark contrast to the text of the Second Amendment which states clearly that the right “shall
not be infringed.”

The panel defended the ordinances relying on First Amendment case law that permits government to regulate the “time, place, and manner” of certain speech. Our brief
argued that First Amendment precedents have no application in Second Amendment cases, and in any event, “time, place, and manner” cases apply to speech in public places,
while the San Francisco ordinances regulate conduct inside the home. Then, our brief explained why the Supreme Court’s decisions in Heller and McDonald did not sanction
judicial use of First Amendment balancing tests, but indeed rejected their use in Second Amendment cases.

Next, our brief explained the proper judicial review in Second Amendment cases. If (i) a person is part of “the People,” (ii) his weapon is a protected “arm” and (iii)
the activity is to “keep” or “bear,” then his right is absolute — not subject to any judicial balancing in light of the government’s desire to infringe the right. It is
not up to the government to decide the permitted ways of “keeping” arms, or the types of ammunition that a person may use any more than it is up to the government to decide
what types of books can be read. The Second Amendment prohibits all infringements — not just ones that Courts believe go too far.

The Ninth Circuit panel, in upholding the San Francisco ordinances, treated the Heller decision as if the right to keep and bear arms protects only a limited right to possess
a handgun for self-defense in the home.

The panel, which ruled in favor of San Francisco, was forced to admit that San Francisco’s regulations on handguns within the home burden “core” Second Amendment rights.
Yet, in disregard for the text of the Second Amendment, the panel applied a “standard of review” so absurdly deferential that its decision amounts to little less than a
judicial rubber stamp.

The panel blindly adopted the City’s baseless assertions that the burden was “indirect” and thus insubstantial. The panel next blindly adopted the City’s baseless assertions
that it had an important governmental interest in “public safety” which permitted it to regulate firearms and ammunition.

In short, while claiming to exercise judicial review, the panel left it entirely up to the City of San Francisco to decide the outcome of the challenge to its ordinance. All
the City was required to do was make the assertions the court wanted — and if it did, then there would be no way it could lose. That is clearly not what the Second Amendment
requires.

Our brief was filed on behalf of Gun Owners of America, Inc., Gun Owners Foundation, U.S. Justice Foundation, The Lincoln Institute for Research and Education, The Abraham
Lincoln Foundation for Public Policy Research, Institute on the Constitution, Conservative Legal Defense and Education Fund, and Policy Analysis Center.

Nevertheless, yesterday, on July 17, 2014, the Ninth Circuit denied the petition for rehearing. The only silver lining is that the Ninth Circuit is also considering a petition
for rehearing in another case -- Peruta v. San Diego -- where the Ninth Circuit sided with the challengers to an anti-gun law, and it may be that the Peruta case would be a good
vehicle for the en banc Ninth Circuit to rule on gun rights.

The Petitioner, Johnson had been convicted of being a felon in possession of a firearm. Ordinarily, the trial judge would have had
discretion to sentence Johnson up to 10 years in prison. However, the judge determined that Johnson met the definition of an "armed
career criminal" under federal law, and thus subjecting him to a mandatory minimum sentence of 15 years.

An "armed career criminal" is a person who, among other things, has previously been convicted of three or more "violent felonies."
One of Johnson's past felonies, was nothing more than simple "possession" of a short-barreled shotgun - which the Eighth Circuit ruled
to be a violent felony.

Our amicus brief argued first that, as a threshold matter, possession of a short-barreled shotgun does not require proof of
"conduct." The shotgun at issue had simply been found in the car in which Johnson was a passenger. "Possession" of a shotgun can
involve either "actual possession" - such as holding the shotgun - or, as in Johnson's case, "constructive possession" - which
requires only knowledge of the whereabouts of the shotgun plus the ability to control it.

Johnson's constructive possession did not require any "act" or physical contact with the shotgun and, thus, he did not engage in any
"conduct" according to that word's ordinary usage. Every other crime that has been found to fit under the statute in question has
involved clear conduct on the part of the defendant, such as attempted burglary, escape, vehicle flight, etc.

Bureau of National Affairs Criminal Law ReporterAbramski v. United States

June 17, 2014

The BNA Criminal Law Reporter's article on the Abramski decision, "Straw Man for Lawful Firearm Purchaser Made Material False Statement on ATF Form," by Alisa
Johnson, used some of our comments on the decision:

William J. Olson, Vienna, Va., who also participated in amicus briefs, characterized “the essence of the majority opinion” as, “if the Supreme Court thinks that
interpreting federal law the way it is actually written would defeat Congress' intent, the court may usurp the legislative power to edit the statute to fulfill its true
intent.”

Olson also accused Kagan of adopting a statutory meaning “that was fully consistent with her anti-gun ideology.”

Today, our firm filed an amicus curiae brief in the U.S. Supreme Court in support of a North Carolina man who challenged the constitutionality of his traffic stop.
A police officer pulled Heien over because his car’s right rear brake light was not functioning properly. However, North Carolina law requires only one working rear
“lamp.”

The Supreme Court of North Carolina had ruled that the Fourth Amendment requires only that the police act “reasonably,” based on a judicial evaluation of the “totality
of the circumstances.” Applying a type of freestanding balancing test derived from past Supreme Court cases, the court decided that it believed the police officer’s
alleged mistake of law was a reasonable one. Thus, the old maxim has been revised to “ignorance of the law is no excuse — unless you are the one enforcing the law.”

According to this view of the Fourth Amendment, the Constitution protects only a “right to privacy,” which is balanced against the government’s interest in violating the
right. Ordinarily, the privacy intrusion is deemed insignificant, and the governmental interests are deemed “compelling.” Here, the government’s interest was “traffic
safety.”

However, in two recent cases, U.S. v. Jones and Florida v. Jardines, the Supreme Court has begun to return Fourth Amendment jurisprudence to its original property basis,
and our brief urges the Court to continue that trend in this case.

Our brief argues that the Fourth Amendment be understood to protect property rights, not some judge’s view of a “reasonable expectation of privacy.” Applying this property
basis, if the government does not have a superior property right to the person or thing to be searched or seized, then the search or
seizure is per se unreasonable. Judges do not have the authority to decide that traffic safety is more important than property rights.

Since Heien was violating no law when he was stopped, the state objectively had no property interest in his person or in his car. For that reason alone, the stop violated
the Fourth Amendment, regardless of how “reasonable” some North Carolina judges subjectively believed the police had acted.

Our firm filed in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit an amicus brief in support of Connecticut gun owners who challenged Connecticut’s ban of so-called
“assault weapons” and “large capacity magazines.”

The law being challenged was passed by anti-gun Connecticut legislators and signed by an anti-gun Governor, riding a wave of hysteria following the December 2012 mass
murder of elementary school children in Newtown, Connecticut. Those supporting the law claimed that to stop the violence “military style” weapons must be banned.

On the same day that we filed our brief, in Santa Barbara, California — the state which proudly claims to have the strictest anti-gun laws in the nation — another mentally
deranged young male demonstrated that the problem is not guns. Indeed, in Santa Barbara, the shootings took place over a 10-minute period, during which there were no
armed civilians who could take action to stop the shooter. The only gun problem is laws keeping guns from law abiding citizens.

In court, Connecticut made the old, tired arguments that the ban is necessary to protect the police and further public safety. The district judge agreed. Despite finding
that the ban “substantially burdened” the Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms, he felt the burden was not unreasonable in light of the competing public interest. Even
though rejected by the U.S. Supreme Court in the Heller case, the
district court used a judge-empowering “balancing test” to justify the ban. Under this “test” barred access to semiautomatic weapons that even the trial judge admitted were
constitutionally protected arms.

Our brief argued that the judicial standard of review for Second Amendment cases is the amendment’s text itself — “shall not be infringed.” If (i) a person is part of
“the people,” (ii) a firearm is an “arm,” and (iii) the activity involves “keeping” or “bearing” — then the right is absolute, not subject to balancing against the interests
the government has in violating the right. Since it is abundantly clear that these requirements are met in this case, the Connecticut ban must be struck down. It does not
matter if the state provides “alternate access to similar firearms.” It is up to the American people, not the government, to choose which weapons "secure" a "free state"
against tyrants — the stated purpose of the Second Amendment.

Our brief also argued that the Connecticut ban, by exempting favored government employees and those “persons” who submitted to the state’s registration system, creates
unconstitutional “titles of nobility” for the state’s favored few. The Supreme Court has said that the Second Amendment is a right that belongs to “all Americans,” not just
“an unspecified subset.”

Bill Olson was interviewed by Steve Malzberg today on NewsmaxTV about the U.S. Supreme Court's denial of the petition for certiorari filed in Hedges v. Obama.
Our firm filed three amicus briefs in the Hedges case, one in district court, one in the court of appeals, and one in the U.S. Supreme Court. The Supreme Court's
refusal to review the Second Circuit's opinion leaves standing Section 1021 of the National Defense Authorization Act of 2012 authorizing the U.S. Military to
arrest and indefinitely detain American Citizens without charges, without an attorney, and without trial. (Note: Newsmax used the wrong photo on screen for the
interview.)

Interestingly, this critical "non-decision" by the U.S. Supreme Court received almost no attention from the mainstream media. This tragic court order denying review
is not neutral, leaving in place much of the groundwork for a totalitarian state. This important story was better covered by
RT (formerly, Russia Today).

From the opposite side of the political spectrum, we stand with Chris Hedges who, anticipating this denial of the petition, declared: “If we fail, if this law stands,
if in the years ahead the military starts to randomly seize and disappear people, if dissidents and activists become subject to indefinite and secret detention in military
gulags, we will at least be able to look back on this moment and know we fought back.”

Herb Titus speaks on Search and Seizure Law

May 2, 2014

Herb Titus was a featured speaker on May 2, 2014 at the 8th Annual Conference on Eminent Domain held at Tides Inn, Irvington, Virginia on May 1 and 2. Consistent with the
theme of this year's conference – Charting New Territory -- Herb's topic was "Can a 4th Amendment Search and Seizure Become a 5th Amendment Taking?"

Drawing on the work of the firm ­ featuring its amicus brief in United States v.
Jones decided by the Supreme Court in 2012 ­ Titus called attention to the recent resurgence
of the original property principles undergirding the 4th Amendment. Since Jones, the Supreme Court has given notice that Fourth Amendment claims are no longer to be balanced
away by judges under the relativistic test of a reasonable expectation of privacy. Rather, the right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures will be governed by
fixed principles of property, the government being required to demonstrate a superior interest in the property at stake. Reviewing two recent cases in which innocent persons
were being deprived of exclusive possession of their property, Titus charted a path whereby property owners would receive more complete protection of their property rights only
by invocation of both a property-based 4th Amendment and the private property takings clause of the 5th Amendment.

Bob Unruh's article discusses the tragedy of the U.S. Supreme Court denial of Chris Hedges' petition for certiorari challenging the constitutionality of National Defense
Authorization Act of 2012. NDAA 2012 allows the U.S. military to arrest and detain, without charges, counsel, or trial, anyone thought by the government to be a threat
based on vague standards.

Attempting to deflect public wrath, those Republicans and Democrats in Congress who passed the law, and the Obama Administration which wanted it, have changed their public
position repeatedly as to how the law would apply to American citizens. Of course, when legislators want to make a law clear, they know how to do it. When they try to
make it murky, that too is on purpose.

By the morning after this article was posted, it generated 457 comments, showing the depth of the opposition to this terrible law.

The article mentions only the most recent of our amicus briefs challenging NDAA, but we actually filed three such briefs against this dangerous law.
4/16/12 we filed the only amicus brief in support of the injunction in U.S.
District Court.
12/17/12 We filed a brief in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit.
1/23/14 We filed a brief supporting the petition for
certiorari in the U.S. Supreme Court.

This morning, the American Thinker published an article by Robert Olson, Herb Titus, and Bill Olson about the property rights basis of the Fourth
Amendment and how it bears on the U.S. Supreme Court's consideration of warrantless searches of cell phones. We previously filed an
amicus brief
in the case addressing this issue -- United States v. Wurie.

On April 9, 2014, we filed an amicus curiae brief in the case of United States v. Wurie. The issue before the court is whether
arresting officers can search the cell phone of a person arrested without a warrant. However, the underlying issue in Wurie and
its companion case, Riley v. California, is whether the Court will continue to apply its evolving reasonable expectation of privacy
test birthed in Katz v. United States to searches incident to arrest, or instead continue with its restoration of property principles
begun in United States v. Jones and Florida v. Jardines.

President Obama announced that his Administration would do all in its power to stop gun violence. By that he seems to have meant reducing
private ownership of firearms. Now, it turns out that he is not just doing things within his presidential power to achieve that objective –
he is usurping legislative power to amend statutes unilaterally.

On January 7, 2014, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives (“ATF”), issued Proposed Rules designed to vastly
increase the number of Americans prohibited from owning firearms, including many U.S. Veterans, by changing the meaning of words
contained in laws passed by Congress.

Federal law prohibits persons who have been “adjudicated as a mental defective” from owning firearms. ATF claims that the terminology
Congress used in the statute is “outdated,” purporting to “clarify” the term, ATF instead
wants to rewrite the statute, greatly expanding its scope.

ATF alleges that Congress intended the law to apply “broadly” to “unstable” and “irresponsible” people, and has defined the term as including
people who suffer from a “mental illness, incompetency, condition, or disease.” But that is not what the statute says. A “mental defective”
is a person of “marked subnormal intelligence” or “gross ignorance or imbecility.” Congress never intended the law to apply to
combat veterans suffering from PTSD, but that is one of the groups that have been targeted for disarmament.

Federal law also prohibits persons who have been “committed to a mental institution” from owning firearms. ATF wants to change the meaning
of that phrase to apply to “both inpatient and outpatient commitments.” Those are, of course, very different matters. Inpatient commitment
is generally used when a person is unable to function in society and needs to be forcibly confined for treatment in order to protect him
and/or the public. Outpatient treatment, however, is for less significant problems, and may require a person only to take medication or
follow some other course of prescribed treatment.

Finally, our comments noted that ATF never considered the Second Amendment when proposing its new definitions. After Heller, though,
the government can no longer assume it may deprive people of their firearms rights at will. Instead of requiring a formal adjudication by a court before
a person’s rights are taken from him, ATF has permitted unelected, unaccountable bureaucrats, such as those at the Veterans Administration, to
decide willy-nilly who may and may not own guns.

This sort of lawless activity may be what Americans are accustomed to from this rogue agency, but it is not what they deserve. Government
officials are the servants of the people, not their overlords.

Herb Titus was quoted in a Bloomberg Bureau of National Affairs (“BNA”) Criminal
Law Reporter article entitled “Aiding and Abetting Use of Firearm Requires Advance
Knowledge of Gun.” The article involves the case Rosemond v. United States, in
which our firm filed an amicus brief on August 9, 2013.

Herb was quoted as saying that “bare knowledge of the presence of a firearm is sufficient
reason to impose an additional mandatory minimum consecutive sentence of five years....
The ruling has the effect of taking from the jury the key question of defendant’s guilt—his
intent concerning the use of a firearm [and] upholds the power of prosecutors, not judges,
to determine sentences given to thousands of defendants ... Prosecutors will continue to
have power de facto to impose mandatory minimum sentences — the very sort of sentences that
Attorney General Eric Holder claims to oppose.”

Our firm filed comments for U.S. Justice Foundation with the U.S. Department of Health
and Human Services (“HHS”) opposing its Proposed Rule designed to decrease the number of
Americans who may possess firearms, particular adversely affecting Veterans.

Our comments explain that the HIPAA Privacy Rules have been perverted from their original
purpose to enhance patient confidences. Especially, with the new proposed amendments,
these rules are now better understood as not involving privacy, but providing a
justification for the federal government to have access to all of your private medical
information.

Moreover, the HHS proposed regulations are likely to have an adverse effect on veterans.
It has been widely reported that veterans who may need help filling out complicated
benefits paperwork are being administratively categorized (not “adjudicated” as required
by statute) by unqualified persons wholly without due process of law. They are being
placed on the NICS list, unconstitutionally depriving them of their Second Amendment
rights.

The Veterans Administration apparently considers a veteran who has been issued a fully
automatic weapon to help defend the country against overseas threats, but who needs help
to navigate its considerable bureaucracy, to be mentally incompetent and disqualified
from owning a semi-automatic weapon upon his return to this country. Such
classifications are insufficient as a matter of law because they do not constitute a
finding, and are not based on findings, that meet the statutory standard of “adjudicated
as a mental defective or who has been committed to a mental institution.” Once so
categorized, the veteran must navigate yet another bureaucracy to undo the damage
that its claims processors do, only to discover that there is there is essentially
little veterans can do to regain their Second Amendment rights.

Our firm filed comments for Gun Owners Foundation with the U.S. Department of Health and Human
Services (“HHS”) opposing its Proposed Rule designed to decrease the number of Americans who may
possess firearms, even for self defense in the home.

The HHS Proposed Rule (“PR”) is one of the
“23 executive actions” announced by the Obama Administration allegedly in response to the Newtown,
Connecticut mass shooting. It proposes changes in the Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act of 1996 (“HIPAA”) regulations which were designed to establish national
standards to protect the privacy of healthcare records. This PR would authorize health care
providers to provide information to the National Instant Criminal Background Check System (“NICS”).

Under 18 U.S.C. Section 922(g)(4), Congress banned from firearms posession only persons “adjudicated”
mentally defective or “committed” to a mental institution — both of which require a formal, judicial
process. ATF, however, has unilaterally expanded the law through its regulations to bar ownership of
firearms by anyone who has been informally “found” or “determined” to lack the capacity to manage his
affairs on account of mental “incompetence.” This expanded definition potentially includes Veterans
Administration bureaucrats to bar tens of thousands of veterans who seek post-combat treatment for
PTSD, or even older vets seeking a guardian to help with his finances, from owning firearms.

The HHS regulations make the illegal ATF regulations even worse by waiving the privacy rights we have
in our own medical records, and allow all sorts of new entities to decide we are dangerous, and
report us to NICS.

HHS claims its PR is necessary to remove a “perceived barrier” for reporting to
NICS. Our comments noted that HHS appears to be operating under a misconception that states are not
reporting to NICS solely because they misunderstand HIPAA. HHS never stops to consider that states
may decline to report to NICS about persons who they do not believe meet the statutory definition.

HHS wants to make an end run around state entities that have been designated to report to NICS. Our
comments reminded HHS that, under our federal system, it is for the states — not an unelected federal
bureaucrat — to designate who reports to NICS. We also explained that its PR would make it much
harder to get erroneous information removed from NICS. Finally, our comments criticized HHS for
usurping the role of the Department of Justice, by authorizing health care providers to submit
even more private medical information than NICS requests.

Taking a page out of Orwell’s novel 1984, the Ohio Elections Commission operates as a modern
“Ministry of Truth’ — with the power to “determine” and “proclaim” the truth or falsity of
every statement made during an Ohio political campaign. Our firm filed an amicus curiae brief
in the U.S. Supreme Court, contending that the government has no legitimate role whatsoever to
play in guiding Americans as to how to vote.

Here is what happened. Two political committees sought to defeat Congressman Steve Driehaus
during the 2012 election cycle by claiming he supported taxpayer-funded abortion when he voted
in favor of Obamacare.

Driehaus complained that the claim was false, and filed a complaint with the Ohio Election
Commission. A committee of Commission members agreed, finding probable cause that the SBA
List knew the charge was false. Because of this, the billboard company refused to erect their
billboards containing the anti-Driehaus message. Before the full Commission could act,
Driehaus lost the election, and withdrew his charge.

The political committees, however, took the matter to federal court, contending that the action
taken by the Commission “chilled” their political speech protected by the First Amendment.
The district court dismissed the case, not on the merits, but on the ground that the First
Amendment claim was not yet “ripe” for decision. The Sixth Circuit agreed, as both courts
opined that since neither organization had been prosecuted, and neither organization could
produce any evidence that they would be chilled in any future campaign, their First Amendment
complaint had not yet matured into a an actual case or controversy.

We urged the Supreme Court to find that the groups had, in fact, presented a First Amendment
claim that is ready for judicial decision on the merits. We point out that the claim was not
based upon whether the Ohio law, in fact, keeps protected speech out of the political
marketplace of ideas, but whether, as a matter of law, Ohio has any jurisdiction whatsoever
to enter the political marketplace of ideas to ferret out truth from alleged falsehood.

In America — where the people, not the government, are sovereign — it is for the people, not
bureaucrats, to decide who, in the heat of a political campaign, is telling the truth and who
is allegedly telling lies. As Thomas Jefferson proclaimed in 1779, “the opinions of men are
not the object of civil government, nor under its jurisdiction,” therefore leaving no room for
a government Ministry of Truth.

In New Jersey, it is a crime to possess a firearm unless you can prove that you fit within one or more tightly-drawn statutory exemptions. One exemption allows a person to have a handgun on his own property, but he may not step one foot beyond unless the gun is fully disabled and he is heading to an approved destination.

New Jersey carry permits are like honest politicians — they are rumored to exist, but few have ever actually seen one. As one State legislator observed: “It is virtually never done.” An ordinary person may be granted a permit only if he can prove to the satisfaction of a judge that his life is in grave danger. Certain members of the privileged class of government workers are permitted to carry firearms; they need only prove that they are currently or were formerly employed in law enforcement.

Today, our firm filed an amicus brief in the U.S. Supreme Court, in support of John M. Drake and several other ordinary New Jersey citizens who applied for but were denied permits to carry their handguns in public, because they could not prove that their lives were in imminent danger. Our brief makes three arguments.

First, the federal judges below simply refused to analyze the New Jersey gun control scheme according to the original meaning of the Second Amendment and established constitutional norms. Instead, judges in both courts substituted their own ideas about gun control in disregard of America’s founders.

Second, New Jersey’s ban on carrying a firearm rests upon the premise that firearms are a privilege granted by the state rather than an inherent, individual right, as held by the U.S. Supreme Court in the 2010 McDonald decision.

Third, the right to keep and bear arms belongs to “all Americans,” as the U.S. Supreme Court recognized in the 2008 Heller decision. That is because, as the Second Amendment states, the right is “necessary to the security of a free State.” New Jersey, on the other hand, grants the privilege only to current and former government law enforcement, purportedly to ensure a “safe” State.

We hope that the Supreme Court will grant the petition for certiorari in this case in order to restore the Second Amendment right to carry a firearm for self defense.

Herb explained that while the concept of using Article VI to address erroneous judicial decisions might seem tempting, it was fraught with risk. Unlike the process by which Congress may submit to the State legislatures specific written amendments, the convention process for proposing amendments is open-ended with no control of the number, scope, or subject matters of the amendments and no rules governing the number or selection of the delegates.

A story discussing the important role played by Delegate Bob Marshall (R-Prince William) in explaining to the Delegates the problems associated with the problems appeared in the Richmond Times Dispatch.

The story is told of a grizzled Master Sargent who, reflecting on his years of service, said: “When I joined up, homosexuality was prohibited; now it’s tolerated; and I darn sure am getting out before it’s mandatory.” So it is with respect to homosexual and abortion rights. First, the goal is said to be tolerance. Then, governmental approval and support. Lastly, any pretense of tolerance disappears, and the coercive force of government is used to eliminate any vestige of opposition. The Obamacare contraception/abortion mandate demonstrates that our nation is at the end of phase two, moving into phase three.

On January 28, 2014, our firm filed in the U.S. Supreme Court an amicus brief in support of Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp., a Mennonite family-owned business located in Lancaster County, Pennsylvania. The company has been ordered by the Secretary of Health and Human Services to purchase health insurance to cover their employees that pays for contraceptive services, including “the full-range of FDA-approved contraceptive methods and patient education and counseling for women with reproductive capacity.”

While Obamacare uses the term contraceptive, that term has undergone a dramatic shift in meaning over the past 50 years. In the array of what are called “contraceptives” are true abortifacients — drugs and devices that induce a miscarriage or an abortion, and the death of an embryo.

Objecting on the ground that the mandate forces them to buy insurance that permits and facilitates abortion to which they object on religious grounds, the Hahn family who own Conestoga, sought injunctive relief in a federal district court, claiming that the mandate violated their rights under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (“RFRA”) and the First Amendment guarantee of the free exercise of religion.

The district court denied relief, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court granted the Hahn family’s petition for review, and the case is pending with a decision expected by the end of June, 2014.

In an introductory Statement our brief reminds the Court that the contraceptive mandate does not appear in the Affordable Care Act enacted by Congress and signed by the President. The mandate was not even developed by the Department of Heath and Human Services, or any other agency responsible to he President. Instead, it is the product of a Committee of 16 experts appointed by the Institute of Medicine, a nongovernment agency that is not accountable to the people or their elected representatives.

In the opinion of this Committee of experts, the contraceptive mandate is required because a woman’s “well-being” consists of a life of recreational sexual activity without risk of an unplanned pregnancy, and it is this opinion that HHS has made into law.

Our brief supports the Hahn family claim that the mandate violates their rights under the free exercise clause of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution. Unlike the Hahn family brief which relies upon court precedents supporting religious tolerance, our brief rests upon the original First Amendment text that secures freedom of religion. According to the cases that apply the religious tolerance doctrine, a person’s conscience may be overridden by laws that serve a compelling government interest. Under the First Amendment freedom of religion a person’s conscience cannot be violated no matter how “compelling” the government’s interest may be.

The original understanding of “religion,” as it appears in the First Amendment, appeared earlier in the 1776 Virginia Declaration of Rights. Unlike the First Amendment the Virginia Declaration expressly defines religion as a duty owed to the Creator which is enforceable only by reason, not by force. In a statute passed in 1785 by the Virginia General Assembly, the preamble declared that it would be a violation of the free exercise of religion if a law compelled a person to promote an opinion with which he disagreed. Our brief applies this principle to the contraceptive services mandate which compels the Hahn family business to promote a government program of education and counseling encouraging women to use abortion-inducing contraceptives to reduce the risk of “unwanted pregnancies.”

The Obamacare law is based upon an unproved presumption that a woman’s “well-being” depends upon having as wide an array of contraceptive methods, including abortifacients, as is made available by the FDA, so that she can be sexually active without risking an unplanned pregnancy. The Hahn family, however, does not share the Government’s materialistic view of womanhood, and that the Government has no jurisdiction to define what it means to be a healthy woman.

Finally our brief reminds the Court that forbearance is a Christian virtue and that the contraceptive services mandate prevents the Hahn family from practicing that virtue by mandating complicity in what they believe to be the sin of abortion in violation of the Hahn family’s statement of faith in the sanctity of human life, supporting that position with quotations from the Holy Bible.

In summary our brief maintains that according to the original meaning of the free exercise of religion, the federal government is prohibited from enforce the contraceptive mandate because it prohibits the Hahn family from performing their duties to their Creator according to the dictates of conscience.

This amicus brief was our fourth amicus curiae brief filed thus far against Obamacare in its various manifestations.

Every day we read about SWAT teams serving arrest warrants
or search warrants at people’s homes, using no-knock raids
in the middle of the night. Many of these police home
invasions go wrong, with innocent people being shot, and
sometimes killed, just because they were trying to defend
themselves. Even criminals have learned to claim that they are the police while breaking into homes,
to discourage resistance.

John Quinn was asleep in his bed when Texas police broke
down his door in the middle of the night, and shot him when
he reached for a weapon, thinking his home was being
invaded. The police were there to serve a search warrant for
his son, Brian, who they suspected of dealing drugs.

The only justification for the no-knock raid that police
gave was that John Quinn owned a firearm. The police claimed
that firearms ownership was enough to present a danger to
law enforcement, even though they knew John Quinn had a
concealed carry permit — meaning the state of Texas had
pronounced him to be a safe, law-abiding citizen.

It
is a foundational Fourth Amendment principle that, when
executing a warrant, the police must knock and announce
their presence and purpose, and allow a homeowner the time
to let them in. This principle is designed to preserve a
person’s life (so he is not accidentally shot), his property
(his front door), and his dignity (if, for example, he is in
the shower). Only if the police have “exigent circumstances”
has the Supreme Court permitted entry without knocking.

Our amicus brief pointed out that the police dispensed
with the Fourth Amendment and executed a no-knock raid for
the sole reason that Quinn had chosen to exercise his Second
Amendment rights to keep a firearm in his home for self
defense.

The Texas court
held that it did not matter if the police violated Quinn’s
rights with the no knock raid, since they would have searched his home and found
drugs anyway. Our brief answers that in doing so, the Texas court essentially
created a per se rule that, any time the police have a
warrant, they can dispense with the Fourth Amendment,
knowing that a court will later rule they “would have found
it anyway.”

Finally, our brief noted the Court’s
recent holding in U.S. v.
Jones (a 2012 Supreme Court case
in which we filed two briefs), where the Court returned to
the private property roots of the Fourth Amendment, instead
of the atextual “reasonable expectation of privacy” tests
that had been invented in the 1960's. The brief argued that,
after Jones, the Court needs to re-examine no-knock raids
from a property — rather than a privacy — perspective.

Our society is one where no-knock raids — supposedly the
exception — have become the rule, due to aggressive,
militaristic policing, and permissive courts. Often,
innocent people, and even family pets defending their homes
are caught up in the crossfire when police make mistakes.
Having a rule where the police can break down a person’s
front door simply because he may keep a firearm inside is
simply intolerable.

Today our firm has filed our third amicus brief in support of Chris Hedges and the other journalists and political activists who are challenging Section 1021 of the National Defense Authorization Act of 2012 (http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-112hr1540enr/pdf/BILLS-112hr1540enr.pdf), and its authorization of the military detention of civilians based on vague standards of providing "support" for an adversary of the United States.

These NDAA standards were so vague that when asked, the U.S. Justice Department refused to say that Chris Hedges and the other plaintiffs could not be arrested by the military, e.g., for their reporting on middle eastern affairs, which includes interviews with, and even embeds with, foreign organizations.

This brief was filed in the U.S. Supreme Court, urging that it grant certiorari and review the decision of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. The Second Circuit determined that the plaintiffs did not have standing to challenge detention, as the NDAA statute did not really say what it appeared to say, and that it was a nullity as to American Citizens. The Second Circuit left unaddressed whether American citizens could be detained by the military under the Authorization for the Use of Military Force (https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/107/sjres23) passed hurriedly after the events of September 11, 2001.

Our brief explained why the Court needs to address the issue of military detention of civilians. It explained that NDAA 2012 was fundamentally different from the AUMF. It explains that laws are often written in an ambiguous manner to give politicians deniability when called to account by their constituents. And it discussed how why NDAA 2012 eliminated the protections of the U.S. Constitution's treason clause.

Our brief states:"If this Court does not grant the petition, there is no reason to believe that U.S. Presidents would cease to assert "the right to place certain individuals [including American citizens] in military detention, without trial." Id. There would continue to be no statutory constraint on an arrest being authorized by a military officer of unspecified rank. There would be no protection provided by the requirement of a Grand Jury indictment. There would be no requirement of an arrest warrant issued by an Article III judge, supported by a sworn affidavit showing probable cause of the commission of a specific crime. Neither would there be any protection against use of compelled testimony, or against any violation of due process of law. There would be no civilian proceedings whatsoever against the person detained. Indeed, there is no requirement that the individual being detained has committed any federal crime, and military detentions could be used to circumvent the protections afforded American citizens by the Treason Clause of the U.S. Constitution."

Our brief concluded: "Ninety years ago, Franz Kafka gave the world a glimpse into the terror faced by individuals required to prove their innocence against unspecified charges in a world devoid of the rule of law. See F. Kafka, The Trial (1925). No American citizen should be subject to secret arrest and indefinite detention by the military, exempt from the protections of the Bill of Rights, and made even more terrifying by the threat of rendition to a foreign country for purposes that could include torture that is illegal in the United States."

We began working against this dangerous bill with organizations such as DownsizeDC.org and Gun Owners of America as soon as word circulated about its detention provisions during Thanksgiving weekend 2011.

Then, on April 16, 2012, we filed an amicus brief in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York -- the only amicus brief filed in that case supporting the granting of an injunction against the federal government. http://lawandfreedom.com/site/constitutional/Hedges_Amicus.pdfDistrict Judge Kathleen Forrest issued first a preliminary, then a permanent injunction against NDAA detentions.

Today the New York Times ran an article by its Chief Washington Correspondent Carl Hulse which discussed our brief in the NLRB v. Canning case being argued Monday. The article, entitled "Role Reversals Emerge in Dispute Over Obama's Recess Appointments," discussed Bill Olson's recess appointment by President Reagan in 1981 to be Chairman of the Board of the Legal Services Corporation.

The article does not mention that President Reagan's appointments of Bill and the other directors were challenged in U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia by the board members appointed by President Carter, including one of Bill's predecessor as Board Chairman -- Hillary Rodham, then First Lady of Arkansas. There, the 1982 challenge was on a different basis than the Canning case. In 1982, the contention was that LSC Board Members were not "Officers of the United States" within the meaning of Article II, section 2, clause 2 of the U.S. Constitution. The Rodham challenge was rejected by District Judge Norma Holloway Johnson, who pointed out the irony that four of the former directors filing the challenge had been appointed by President Carter, using the same recess appointment power which those plaintiffs were challenging.http://lawandfreedom.com/site/special/LegalServCorpvOlson_MemOpin.PDF

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