The Best Player Available Draft Strategy

Fans loveto look at a team’s needs and try to determine who should be picked in thedraft.

But should team needs be a factor? Or should a team pick solely ontalent and character, not on position?

But onthe eve of the draft, it’s worthwhile looking at the age-old debate how todetermine the appropriate name to call. Does the team take a long look at theirorganizational depth chart and determine who will better fit their needs severalyears down the road? Or do they scrap the organizational depth chart and simplytry to form a consensus on the best player available (BPA)?

Thisarticle looks at why, at least on the first day of the draft, a team should burntheir depth chart and not even think about what a potential future need may be. It uses the Ottawa Senators as an example of why teams should always draft thebest player available.

Whilethis might rain on the parade of most draft prognosticators – who justify mockdraft picks by team needs – the reality is a team may need anything andeverything down the road. And while the later rounds allow a team to stray fromthis approach in creating organizational balance, here’s a close look at howthe Senators have utilized the BPA strategy effectively over the last 10 years.Three particular instances are outlined where it seemed like an exception to theBPA strategy was in order – but ultimately, was not.

1994Bonk vs. Storr

In thespring of 1994, the Senators had a pair of franchise centermen every expansionteam coveted in Alexei Yashin and Alexandre Daigle. Both were coming offimpressive rookie seasons and seemed like the cream of their respective draftclasses. But questions were already arising over who would be better and how tofind proper ice time for the two down the road. And he stated repeatedly that Yashin and Daigle were the first twopieces of the puzzle.

Leadingup to the draft, the Senators were expected to nab either Ed Jovanovski or OlegTverdovsky with their third overall pick to start shoring up the defense. LasVegas Thunder centerman Radek Bonk was anticipated to go with one of the firsttwo picks to either Florida or Anaheim, the latest two expansion teams. Thatseemingly left the door open for the Senators to land one of their targetedblue-liners.

But whenJovo-Cop and Tverdovsky were surprisingly taken number one and two, it wasclear the Senators had a difficult choice to make. Take Bonk, coming off anunprecedented year of professional hockey as a 17-year old in the IHL – andregarded as the top player in the draft by many publications including theCentral Scouting Bureau? Or take Jamie Storr, the highest rated goalie to comealong since Tom Barrasso?

Potentialice-time, team need and Sexton’s blueprint all suggested Storr was the logicalchoice. Neither Yashin, Daigle nor Bonk played the wing, and it seemed nocombination of these three players could be assembled to put some of them on thesame line. The entire Senators depth chart was screaming for top-end talent atevery position — every position other than that of a scoring line center.

Lookingback, the Senators selection of Bonk as the best player available – blue printbe damned – was clearly the right long-term move, albeit not withoutshort-term growing pains. Bonk struggled considerably in his first five NHLseasons, partly due to the limited icetime of being behind Daigle and Yashin,partly due to several injuries, and partly due to his atrocious linemates on oneof the worst teams in NHL history.

But fastforward another five years and the two centers the Senators planned to buildaround are long gone. Bonk has now been the Senators top pivot for severalseasons. Storr has watched the Los Angeles Kings bring in several new number onegoalies in his time in the NHL and has yet to establish himself as anything morethan a competent back-up.

–AdvantageBPA strategy

1999Havlat and co.

When the1999 draft came along, the Senators were a much different team coming off afranchise record 105 point season and their first division title. But after anembarrassing 4-0 sweep at the hands of the Buffalo Sabres, the team was facingits first pointed criticism for team make-up. They were considered too soft and,above all, too “European” to succeed in the post-season.

Lookingat the team’s depth chart going into the draft, it seemed the last thing theSenators needed was another skilled center or right winger. Yashin was clearlythe team’s number one center with Andreas Dackell his permanent right-wingercoming off a 50-point season. Bonk and Vaclav Prospal were established as thenext two players up the middle and had two more skilled Europeans on their rightsides in Daniel Alfredsson and Marian Hossa. Andreas Johansson was yet anothertalented right winger, coming off a career high 21 goals in 2000-2001.

None ofthese players were over 25 either so the franchise seemed set at both positions.If anything, it looked like there wasn’t enough room for all of them and someof these skilled Europeans would have to be exchanged for gritty playoffwarriors.

Meanwhilethe left side was not nearly as strong. There was no long-term answer in goaland the defense, while respectable, was filled with overachievers. So drafting aplayer like Martin Havlat made no sense. He was known for being a soft, yetskilled offensive center who could also play the right side.

Most“pick for need” observers felt the Sens should have snagged goalie AriAhonen, big defenseman Kristian Kudroc, or better yet, Ottawa 67’s standoutLuke Sellars. All seemed more logical when projecting a fit within the team’sdepth chart. These were more logical picks except Senators scouts believedHavlat would be the better player.

One couldargue – and some have – the Sens still don’t have room for Havlat, giventhe team’s current embarrassment of riches on its right side. But it was stillunquestionably the best pick. If the Sens really want to fill a need now or inthe future, they have the luxury of offering up one of Alfredsson, Hossa orHavlat via trade: a potential trade worthy of a monster return compared tooffering up the likes of Kudroc, Sellars or even Ahonen.

—Advantage BPA strategy

The BPA Exception?Goaltenders

Somebelieve there is an exception to the BPA philosophy – the goalie exception. Thisexception says don’t draft a goalie in the early rounds when your system isalready stocked at the position.

The logicis that goalies are less predictable, so a team shouldn’t waste high picks onthem. It takes even longer to determine a goalie’s potential in theminors, which leads to an ice time issue.Ateam has very little ice time for young goalies in their system – and theyneed as much as possible to develop.

Finding room for another defenseman or forward in the minors is much easier,even if you’re already flush.

And whilethis exception is not without merit or consideration, looking at the 2001 draft,the Senators have seemingly once again proven the drafting for position theorywrong.

2001Ray Emery

At theend of the 2000-2001 season, the Senators were stacked with goalies. In the NHL,Patrick Lalime had established himself as the Senators first true no. 1 goalie,but had been pushed that season by Jani Hurme. Both were young and just enteringtheir prime, and it was clear any young goalie in the system would be hardpressed to unseat either one for quite some time.

A logjamin the Senators minor-league system was brewing as well. Three highly thought ofyoung goaltenders were biding their time in the minors.

In thefour drafts leading up to 2001, the Senators had used a total of five relativelyearly draft picks on four goalies. Mathieu Chouinard (two picks), SimonLajeunesse and Martin Prusek all looked like they had a bright future, but werefighting each other to properly develop.

TheSenators seemed set for several years in net and already had a problem findingall three of their young goalies enough starts in the coming season (Lajeunesseended up playing most of that season in the ECHL).

Headinginto the 2001 draft, the Senators had five picks within the first 100 and thelast thing Sens fans expected was their team to use one of these picks on agoalie. And then the Senators promptly selected goalie Ray Emery.

Onlytwo years later, and both Hurme and Lajeunesse are Florida property via tradeswhile Chouinard is set to be cast adrift by the organization. Ray Emerymeanwhile has emerged as the best goalie prospect the Senators franchise hasever drafted.

–AdvantageBPA strategy

Summary

Clearly,and in the early rounds especially, you take the best player available or youwill be doing your team a major disservice in the long-term. If you’re draftingfor need, it means you’re typically “reaching” for a player who fits acertain profile and could be inferior. When it’s close between a coupleplayers, need may win out in arguments. But it should only be a tie-breaker.

If a teamcreates an abundance of assets at a particular position, it allows them to tradefrom that position of strength. This type of philosophy allowed the Senators totrade the likes of Tim Gleason and Jakub Klepis this year – Senators firstrounders – to strengthen the team for its most successful playoff run to date.The avoidance of ‘Need Drafting” is justified when you consider it typicallytakes five years or more for a drafted prospect to be ready to make a trueimpact in the NHL, and the fact is, no team really knows with any degree ofcertainty what their team is going to look like in five years.

Thisbest player available approach is why the Ottawa Senators have consistently beenone of the richest teams in the league when it comes to cashing in at the NHLEntry Draft.