How Vietnam Benefits From US Strategy in the South China Sea

The Trump administration’s free and open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) strategy is
quickly gaining more definition.

As Washington starts to counter Beijing on multiple fronts — economically,
politically and militarily — the Trump administration’s free and open
Indo-Pacific (FOIP) strategy is quickly gaining more definition. The United
States has struggled to define its FOIP, a regional construct also led by
Australia, India, and Japan, ever since Trump signed on to the concept last
November at the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) CEO Summit held in Da
Nang.

In recent days, however, U.S. officials, including Vice President Mike
Pence, have started to comment publicly on details of the strategy. Another
U.S. official, U.S. Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asian and Pacific
Security Affairs Randall G. Schriver, recently visited Vietnam to speak on what
the U.S. FOIP means for Hanoi. Schriver was making his third visit to Vietnam
as part of the annual Defense Policy Dialogue between the United States and
Vietnam’s Ministry of National Defense, amid growing military ties between the
two former combatants.

In his speech at the American Center in Ho Chi Minh City on October 5,
Schriver began by referring to the Indo-Pacific region as a “priority theater,”
while highlighting some of the more aggressive actions undertaken by China in
the region, particularly in the South China Sea (which Vietnam refers to as the
East Sea). Schriver defined the new U.S. National Defense Strategy as based
upon three pillars: 1) recognition of great power competition, primarily
between China, Russia, and the United States; 2) the development and nurturing
of defense allies and partners; and 3) structural reforms of the U.S. Defense
Department to better undertake its mission.

How Vietnam Benefits From the New U.S. Strategy

One of the ways in which Vietnam can gain from the FOIP strategy is through
freedom of navigation operations (FONOPs) conducted by major players in the
region. These FONOPs are intended to show Beijing and the other littoral
nations of the South China Sea that passage by naval vessels can be free and
open — despite Beijing’s claim to some 90 percent of the waters and its
determination to control rights to passage.

Schriver spoke at some length concerning one such recent U.S. FONOP
involving the near collision between the USS Decatur, an Arleigh Burke-class
destroyer, and the Lanzhou, a Luyang-II class guided-missile destroyer, near
the Gaven Reef in the disputed Spratly Islands (also claimed by Vietnam).
During the FONOP, the Chinese destroyer reportedly passed within some 45 yards
(40 meters) of the U.S. destroyer, causing the U.S. warship to alter its course
in order to avoid a collision. This year, the U.S. has conducted four FONOPs in
the South China Sea so far, compared to four in 2017, three in 2016, and one in
2015.

According to Schriver, the U.S. FONOPs are in response to the construction
of artificial islands by Beijing — built around reefs and rocks to create
“facts on the ground” in an effort to further China’s claims. Some of those
rocks and reefs claimed by China (such as Gaven Reef) are submerged during high
tide. Schriver suggested further action may be taken by the Trump
administration against Chinese companies involved in the construction of these
artificial islands — presumably through the implementation of economic
sanctions.

In the airspace over the disputed waters, Schriver mentioned the FOIP policy
would also resist any existing or new declarations by Beijing of Air Defense
Identification Zones (ADIZ), one of the ways in which China attempts to assert
its sovereignty in the region. Schriver stated that under a free and open
Indo-Pacific “the United States will fly, sail, and operate wherever
international law allows,” consistent with the previous policy of former
Secretary of Defense Ash Carter under the Obama administration “pivot to Asia,”
and revealing implicit support for the territorial claims of littoral states
such as Vietnam.

With a Little Help From My Friends

While the new U.S. National Defense Strategy calls for the development and
nurturing of defense partners such as Vietnam, Hanoi will not get too friendly
thanks to its foreign policy of “Three Nos”: no foreign bases on its territory,
no military alliances, and no involving third parties in its disputes.

While Hanoi does not officially involve third parties in its dispute over
the South China Sea, Vietnam will stand to gain from an increase in FONOPs and
other challenges to Beijing’s assertion of authority under the U.S.
administration’s free and open Indo-Pacific strategy. Some of the naval vessels
conducting FONOPs will continue to make port of call visits at Cam Ranh Bay,
furthering the development and nurturing of defense partnerships between Hanoi,
the United States, and other major naval players in the region, while their
FONOPs will show implicit support for the claims of Vietnam and other littoral
nations.

Finally, with the potential for greater cooperation among the great naval
powers in the region to promote and administer a free and open Indo-Pacific
strategy, in an era of greater economic, military, and political competition
among China, Russia, and the United States, Hanoi may find it easier than ever
to skillfully play all three partners off against each other to maximum
advantage.