At the request of Dzongsar Khyentse Rinpoche, Alex Trisoglio is offering a contemporary commentary on the Madhyamaka (Middle Way) based on Rinpoche's teachings. These teachings are for you if you want to understand and apply the view of emptiness in your practice and your everyday life. As Rinpoche explained in his first book, the view is the foundation of the Buddhist path, but traditional texts and teachings on the view can sometimes seem difficult, academic, and unrelated to our everyday concerns. Our intention is to respond to this need by offering a fresh presentation of the view following Rinpoche's tradition, one that is simultaneously accessible, practical and relevant, while upholding the authentic wisdom of the lineage.

The course seems to involve a a week of "refuting the Cittamatra School", do any Tibetans view the Cittamatra as a higher view than the Madhamaka or does the Madhyamaka have a "monolpoly" over Tibetan Buddhism? Are there any texts or sources available in English where a Yogacarin refutes the Madhyamaka teachings?

I watched the first webinar yesterday, thumbs up. Ditto for the pre-webinar readings. It looks like a solid course, kudos to them for doing it for free, very generous. I've been working at grokking the Madhyamaka for a few years on my own (oy!) ... good to be in a class on it.

ItsRaining wrote:The course seems to involve a week of "refuting the Cittamatra School", do any Tibetans view the Cittamatra as a higher view than the Madhamaka or does the Madhyamaka have a "monolpoly" over Tibetan Buddhism? Are there any texts or sources available in English where a Yogacarin refutes the Madhyamaka teachings?

It's an introductory course so it's not surprising refuting the Cittamatran school is going to be covered. I can't answer your question directly but you might find one of the recommended course texts interesting:

Punya wrote:
It's an introductory course so it's not surprising refuting the Cittamatran school is going to be covered. I can't answer your question directly but you might find one of the recommended course texts interesting:

Is the Cittamatran view considered so much lower in Tibet that is has be refuted straight away?

Punya wrote:
It's an introductory course so it's not surprising refuting the Cittamatran school is going to be covered. I can't answer your question directly but you might find one of the recommended course texts interesting:

Is the Cittamatran view considered so much lower in Tibet that is has be refuted straight away?

Why don't you sign up and find out. I'm expect Alex would be happy to answer questions.

Ju Mipham Rinpoche in his Adornment of the Middle Way commentary on the Madhyamakalankara says there is only one flaw in Chittamatra--- establishing the mind as real. Once removed, he argues, the Chittamatra is a proper presentation of relative truth and is entirely consistent with Prasangika Madhyamaka.

"The essence of meditation practice is to let go of all your expectations about meditation. All the qualities of your natural mind -- peace, openness, relaxation, and clarity -- are present in your mind just as it is. You don't have to do anything different. You don't have to shift or change your awareness. All you have to do while observing your mind is to recognize the qualities it already has."
--- Yongey Mingyur Rinpoche

Matt J wrote:Ju Mipham Rinpoche in his Adornment of the Middle Way commentary on the Madhyamakalankara says there is only one flaw in Chittamatra--- establishing the mind as real. Once removed, he argues, the Chittamatra is a proper presentation of relative truth and is entirely consistent with Prasangika Madhyamaka.

IIRC in the Madhyamakalamkara commentary Mipham still says that Santarakshita's view is Svatantrika, but that there is nothing wrong with Svatantrika so long as it doesn't separate the two truths. He also states that the Prasangika-Svatantrika divide is a Tibetan invention.

In the Norbu Ketaka he says that accepting the alayavijanana and rang rig is fine for Prasangikas in the manner you state:

In brief, the refutation of rang rig is refutation with respect to ultimate reality, but is not a refutation of the way rang rig is designated conventionally as the opposite of the state of being inanimate. If that were refuted, one would have to accept that one's own mind would be hidden from itself, and there would be no difference in the way one knew the minds of oneself and others [viz., through inference]; the proofs that one's own continuum possesses a mind would be invalid; and finally the convention of knowing things would be eliminated. Thus, there would be harm, just as the Lord of Reason said.

One should know that all the reasonings that negate rang rig, like the reasoning negating the skandhas and so forth, are negations with respect to the ultimate, but are not categorical denials at the conventional level. Although it is said in this [Prasangika] system rang rig and alayavijnana are not accepted, here they are neither refuted nor proven [conventionally], but are simply refuted ultimately. On this some say that if one is a Madhyamika, one should not accept alayavijnana, because it is a system of the Vijnaptimatrins; but this is ill-considered. What harm does it do to the Madhyamika if the alayavijnana is accepted, but not as truly existent?

Things such as permanence that are harmed by conventional valid cognition should not be accepted conventionally; but if everything that is negated ultimately were likewise not accepted conventionally, then the skandhas, ayatanas, and dhatus, would also have to be accepted as totally nonexistent.

Botrul on Mipham's system:

Concerning the manners of asserting the phenomena of self-appearance,
The tradition of Mind-Only (1) posits the mode of appearance as
Cognition and matter that are the category of the imagined nature, and
(2) Accepts the mode of reality, which is the essence of the consummate dependent nature, as mind.

Śāntarakṣita's tradition (1) posits the mere mode of appearance, such as cognition and matter,
As relative phenomena that are [established by their] own characters, and
(2) Accepts as the conventional mode of reality
That all appearances are mind.

Candrakīrti's tradition is that the mode of appearance, all phenomena of self-appearance,
Appear to the mind and are produced by the mind;
Therefore, self-appearances, the great forms of emptiness,
Are alike as illusions.

[...]

When appearances are asserted as mind,
The universal ground and reflexive awareness are indispensable;
In the assertion [of appearances] as merely self-appearance,
No deliberate refutation or affirmation is made.