The German Classics of the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries, Volume 10 eBook

influence that it has the power to call armies into
the field merely to protect its interests. Mexico
and Egypt have been swamped with European armies simply
to satisfy the demands of the haute finance.
Today the question, “Is a nation strong enough
to make war?” is of less importance than that,
“Is its Government powerful enough to prevent
war?” Thus, united Germany has, up to now, used
her strength only to maintain European peace; a weak
Government at the head of our neighboring State must,
on the other hand, be regarded in the light of a standing
menace to peace.

The war of 1870-71 arose from just such relations.
A Napoleon on the throne of France was bound to establish
his rights by political and military success.
Only for a time did the victories won by French arms
in distant countries give general satisfaction; the
triumphs of the Prussian armies excited jealousy,
they were regarded as arrogant, as a challenge; and
the French demanded revenge for Sadowa. The liberal
spirit of the epoch was opposed to the autocratic Government
of the Emperor; he was forced to make concessions,
his civil authority was weakened, and one fine day
the nation was informed by its representatives that
it desired war with Germany.

PREPARATIONS FOR THE WAR

The wars carried on by France on the other side of
the ocean, simply for financial ends, had consumed
immense sums and had undermined the discipline of
the army. The French were by no means archiprets
for a great war, but the Spanish succession to the
throne, nevertheless, had to serve as a pretext to
declare it. The French Reserves were called to
arms July 15th, and only four days later the French
declaration of war was handed in at Berlin, as though
this were an opportunity not to be lost.

[Illustration: KING WILLIAM AT THE MAUSOLEUM
OF HIS PARENTS ON THE DAY OF THE FRENCH DECLARATION
OF WAR ANTON VON WERNER]

One Division was ordered to the Spanish frontier as
a corps of observation; only such troops as were absolutely
necessary were left in Algiers and in Civita Vecchia;
Paris and Lyons were sufficiently garrisoned.
The entire remainder of the army: 332 battalions,
220 squadrons, 924 cannon, in all about 300,000 men,
formed the army of the Rhine. This was divided
into eight Corps, which, at any rate in the first
instance, were to be directed by one central head,
without any kind of intervention. The Imperator
himself was the only person to assume this difficult
task; Marshal Bazaine was to command the army as it
assembled, until the Emperor’s arrival.

It is very probable that the French were counting
on the old dissensions of the German races. True,
they dared not look upon the South Germans as allies,
but they hoped to reduce them to inactivity by an
early victory, or even to win them over to their side.
Prussia was a powerful antagonist even when isolated,
and her army more numerous than that of the French,
but this advantage might be counterbalanced by rapidity
of action.