Nile Bowie is a political analyst and photographer currently residing in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. Bowie grew up in New York City and is the son of two art photographers who established themselves by photographing America’s poor and destitute. Bowie left the United States in his teens to pursue photojournalism and has resettled in South East Asia. As a political analyst, he has explored issues of American foreign policy and its influence on militarism in the Islamic world, China’s emerging role as global power, and inter-Korean stability and security, contributing to outlets such as Russia Today, the New Straits Times, the Asia Times, the Tehran Times, and the Center for Research on Globalization.
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Despite months of effort by diplomats and the international
community, the long-awaited Geneva 2 peace conference is in
disarray. The opposition Syrian National Coalition (SNC) – an
exiled umbrella organization supported by Western and Gulf states
that represents a negligible segment of rebel groups on the
ground – has agreed to attend the talks under heavy pressure from
their backers. Division runs deep for many within the group who
oppose the decision to attend Geneva 2, and the SNC’s presence at
the talks are still in question.

UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon’s decision to extend an
invitation to Iran prompted the SNC to threaten pulling out of
the talks if the UN’s invitation to Tehran is not rescinded. Even
if the peace talks proceed, the unpleasant prospect that nothing
tangible will emerge from them due to irreconcilable differences
between the two sides looks like the most plausible outcome.

One of the key obstacles facing the negotiations is the SNC’s
lack of legitimacy and its capriciousness, and that its members
are mostly exiled Syrian dissidents who are not seen as credible
by the fighters on the ground, primarily among Islamist groups
that dominate the battlefield. The belief that the SNC can
accomplish something meaningful at the negotiating table is cast
deeper into doubt by critical assessments from dissenting former
members of the group.
In a recent letter explaining his resignation, former SNC Secretary-General
Mustafa al-Sabbagh concedes that the organization failed to
extend humanitarian relief efforts and to make any political or
military progress; he describes the SNC as “a body that is
entirely separate from the Syrian domestic arena.” Former
member Mohammad Bassam Imadi’s description is no less critical;
he stated in a recent interview that the SNC “…was only some
expatriates who were living outside Syria, they lost touch with
reality in Syria. They didn't know what was going on… They
thought that within a few months they will become presidents or
ministers so they were not interested in doing anything other
than contacting the foreign powers…”

‘Assad has no place in Syria’s future’

It is against the backdrop of an incapable and divided opposition
coalition that US Secretary of State John Kerry’s demands that
President Assad moves aside as a non-negotiable outcome of the
Geneva 2 talks seem all the more untenable. The US side argues
that President Assad cannot have any part in Syria’s political
future, and that Geneva 2 must serve as a platform to initiate
the Geneva communiqué established in June 2012, which according
to Washington calls for the establishment of a transitional
government tasked with facilitating free and fair elections.
Damascus has agreed to send a delegation of senior diplomats to
the talks, but maintains that certain points in the Geneva
communiqué are in conflict with the legal and political position
of the Syrian state. Syrian Foreign Minister Walid al-Muallem has
ostensibly set conditions for the talks by announcing that
prisoner exchanges and a ceasefire in Aleppo would be on the
table for discussions at Geneva 2.

Muallem claimed that the Aleppo ceasefire could be used as a
blueprint for armistices in other conflict zones if proven
successful, and despite this offer being the most substantive yet
proposed to deescalate the crisis, John Kerry condemned it with
appalling arrogance, stating, “If Assad
is not discussing a transition and if he thinks he's going to be
part of that future, it's not going to happen."

As one of the staunch backers of Syria’s rebels, the United
States has unabashedly taken positions against the Syrian
government based on invalid and fallacious hearsay and false
claims; it has not attempted to obscure that the toppling of
President Assad remains one of its principle foreign policy aims
as the CIA continues its covert programs to bolster rebel
fighters. Washington cannot be seen as a meaningful peace-broker
in the Syrian conflict while at the same time demanding a
pre-emptive surrender of one of the two negotiating parties in
the dialogue, such a notion is completely contrary to the very
premise of negotiation.

Misreading the Geneva communiqué

The formal mandate for the conference was agreed upon in 2012 and
is known as the Geneva communiqué; the Syrian and Iranian
governments have not publically endorsed it.

Washington’s insistence that Assad must step down to facilitate a
transitional government is couched in a misreading of the
communiqué text, which contains no clauses
that stipulate that President Assad or any other government
official must step aside.

The text calls for “the launch of a Syrian-led political
process leading to a transition that meets the legitimate
aspirations of the Syrian people and enables them independently
and democratically to determine their own future,” and a
“future that can be shared by all in Syria.” The
communiqué calls for newly emerging political actors to compete
fairly and equally in multi-party elections, while rejecting
sectarianism and ethnic or religious discrimination. The text
also mandates the creation of a neutral transitional governing
body that would exercise full executive powers, which
specifically could “include members of the present government
and the opposition and other groups and shall be formed on the
basis of mutual consent.”

Furthermore, the documents states, “The process must be fully
inclusive to ensure that the views of all segments of Syrian
society are heard in shaping the political settlement for the
transition.”

A fair interpretation of the text infers that all segments of
Syrian society should shape political outcomes, including
government supporters. It is no secret that President Assad’s
forces have made significant strides on the battlefield and have
the upper hand at the negotiating table. There is still political
division in Syria’s major cities, but the government has made
inroads into rebel strongholds in the north and south. The
government firmly controls the western coastal areas and an
increasing amount of critical supply routes and highways between
Damascus and Aleppo. As long as the opposition consists of
out-of-touch exiled dissidents with dual-citizenship or hardline
Sunni Islamist militias being supported from Gulf countries, the
Syrian government would likely extend its mandate if elections
were held. Elections cannot be “free and fair” if the
candidate most likely to win is excluded.

Negotiations for Syria’s stability

For the vast majority of Syrians who have weathered incredible
hardship and tragedy since this conflict began, restoring some
semblance of security and stability takes precedent over all
else.

It should be considered that even if peace talks between Damascus
and the SNC produce favorable outcomes, many of the most radical
groups would not honor the ceasefire and still continue to fight.
Even in a scenario where Assad steps down, these groups will not
yield and may even push harder if a power vacuum is created. It
would be incredibly difficult to maintain ceasefires in conflict
zones for extended periods of time due to a vast array of groups
opposing the peace talks and opposing each other. Even so, the
SNC and Syrian government should put their differences aside and
attempt to negotiate measures to deescalate the fighting so
humanitarian supplies can be made available to wider segments of
the population where possible.

The Geneva 2 talks will be the first face-to-face meeting between
the representatives of the Syrian government and the opposition
since the country's crisis began in March 2011, and to expect a
transitional government to emerge at this stage is entirely
premature.

The scope of these talks should not be about power politics, but
focused on implementing ceasefires and making available
legitimate humanitarian supplies such as food, clothing and
medicine. No matter the outcome of peace talks, the Syrian
government will have to continue pursuing a military solution to
rid the country of radical militias and terrorist groups, and if
‘moderate’ groups are interested in peace, they should align
themselves with the Syrian Arab Army and assist them in
re-establishing order in the country. Due to the regional nature
of the conflict, players such as Saudi Arabia and Iran should
attend without preconditions to negotiate some kind of compromise
that would reduce and end material support to non-state actors
fighting on both sides in Syria.

The statements, views and opinions expressed in this column are solely those of the author and do not necessarily represent those of RT.