Deposits could aid ailing Afghanistan

Recent news stories cause great concern: “Karzai Is Said to Doubt West Can Defeat Taliban.” “U.S. Intelligence Puts New Focus on Afghan Graft.” “Kandahar Offensive Not on Schedule.” Meanwhile, U.S. casualties increase even as troop numbers and costs escalate. And President Hamid Karzai recently sacked two of the West’s favorite Afghan reformers, Interior Minister Mohammad Hanif Atmar and the head of the National Security Directorate, Amrullah Saleh. There is much to be concerned about in Afghanistan. The war is far from won — whatever that means.

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Indeed, it is not clear that we can achieve even the modest goals needed for a reasonable exit: some semblance of stability and an Afghan state strong enough to prevent the insurgency from taking over as we leave.

But there is more reason for hope than these headlines would suggest.

Two stories stand out. The first focuses on a trip Karzai took with Gen. Stanley McChrystal to Kandahar on Sunday. The second is a new Defense Department report that Afghanistan may hold more than $1 trillion in mineral wealth — not entirely new information but a more careful analysis than was previously available.

They do not add up to a major turn of the tide in Afghanistan. Critics on the left are correct to point out that mineral wealth cannot substitute for battlefield progress or for greater legitimacy and effectiveness of the Afghan government. But these realities still should, at least, help balance much of the negative news of late.

First, Karzai’s trip: His June 13 visit was a sharp contrast from the one earlier this spring. On that trip, Karzai displayed ambivalence about McChrystal’s plans for a major military buildup around that crucial southern city, where the Sept. 11 attacks were planned.

Karzai effectively gave local leaders a veto over any major operation.

But Sunday, Karzai asked local leaders for assistance on the tough road ahead. “This operation requires sacrifice,” Karzai pleaded with the crowd, “and without sacrifice you cannot restore peace to Kandahar.”

“Will you help me?” he asked. Many in the 400-strong throng stood and expressed support. He played the role of commander in chief as well as Washington could have hoped. His rhetoric was fully in tune with the challenges to be faced in coming months — in security terms as well as governance terms.

The U.S. and NATO military commands have also helped, emphasizing more clearly that the core of the Kandahar operation will not be a major military offensive but what McChrystal calls a “rising tide” of security and governance. It is planned to take months, not days or weeks.

To be sure, actions speak louder than words. And we are sure to need Karzai’s help in Kandahar to counter corruption — including from his own powerful half-brother — and ensure adequate Afghan contributions to the operation.