Whoa, how close is Deutsche Bank to causing ABSOLUTE HAVOC in the eurozone? At a capital ratio of just under 1.68%, DB is leveraged up to 60x and with a derivative exposure of over $72.8 Trillion, Ithink the technical term is “they’re f**ked”.

Finally, if anyone is still confused where the pain is headed next, here is a list from Morgan Stanley of all Euro banks with a Core Tier 1 ratio that is so low, that the banks will soon regret not raising more capital in the period of calm that the ECB’s LTRO bought them.

That’s right – Deutsche Bank was so bad that it wasn’t even allowed to appear on a screen of Europe’s most undercapitalized banks – and we helpfully pointed out its true capital ratio of just under 2%, and an implied leverage of 60x!

A top U.S. banking regulator called Deutsche Bank’s capital levels “horrible” and said it is the worst on a list of global banks based on one measurement of leverage ratios. “It’s horrible, I mean they’re horribly undercapitalized,” said Federal Deposit Insurance Corp Vice Chairman Thomas Hoenig in an interview. “They have no margin of error.” Deutsche’s leverage ratio stood at 1.63 percent, according to Hoenig’s numbers, which are based on European IFRS accounting rules as of the end of 2012.

In other words, the slighest systemic shock in Europe and Deustche Bank gets it. And as Deutsche Bank goes, so does Germany, so does Europe, so does the world.

Immediately confirming Hoenig’s (and Zero Hedge’s) observations, was Deutsche’s prompt repeat that “all is well” and that “these numbers” are not like “those numbers.”

“To say that we are undercapitalized is inaccurate because if you look at the Basel framework, we’re now one of the best capitalized banks in the world after our capital raise,” Deutsche Bank’s Chief Financial Officer Stefan Krause told Reuters in an interview, when asked about Hoenig’s comments. “To suggest that leverage puts us in a position to be a risk to the system is incorrect,” Krause said, calling the gauge a “misleading measure” when used on its own.

Of course, DB’s lies are perfectly expected – after all it is a question of faith. So let’s go back to Hoenig who continues to be one of the few voices of reason among the “very serious people”:

Hoenig pointed to the gain in Deutsche Bank shares in January on the same day it posted a big quarterly loss, because it had improved its Basel III capital ratios by cutting risk-weighted assets.”My other example with poor Deutsche Bank is that they lose $2 billion and raise their capital ratio. It’s – I don’t want to say insane, but it’s ridiculous,” Hoenig said.

A leverage ratio is a better method to show a firm’s ability to absorb sudden losses, Hoenig says, and he has floated a plan to raise the ratio to 10 percent. He said the 3 percent leverage hurdle under Basel was a “pretend number.”

Opponents of using such a ratio say that it ignores the risk in a bank’s loan books, and can make a bank with only healthy borrowers look equally risky as a bank whose clients are less likely to pay back their loans. It also fails to take into account how easily a bank can sell its assets – so-called liquidity – or whether it is hedged against risk.

At this stage very few people have any faith in the EUSSR sorting out the crisis in the eurozone. After agreeing a bank bailout for Spain, there has been a series of downgrades from Spain itself to Dutch banks etc. Coupled with the outcome of the Greece elections the markets are beginning the to see the naked emperor. Just look at Spain and Italy’s bond yields this week.

Deutsche Bank’s is not satisfied with the situation in Spain and have no faith in the recapitalization of its banks. It sees the only solution at this stage as a controlled market crash with a large role to be played by the ECB.

we were somewhat disturbed to read Gilles Moec’s summary this morning, which points out the patently obvious: “Spain recapitalization: it’s not working.” Whether it is that Europe’s brightest minds forgot about the threat of subordination (promptly reminded by Zero Hedge hours after the formal announcement), and that the scars of the Greek cramdown are still fresh in the private sector’s mind, it does not matter: as DB says: “Unfortunately, the market reaction was clearly negative, with Spanish 10 year rate brushing past 7% for the first time since 1996. Two main elements probably explain the market reaction: first, the increase in public debt triggered by the recapitalization whose cost will stay on the sovereign’s balance sheet under the current rules); second the seniority attached to ESM loans, if this scheme is used as the final channel for the EU loan instead of the EFSF.”

Yes, it is “unfortunate” that Spain’s bailout plan was poorly planned, organized and executed. It is not unfortunate that some are still left who can do simple math and call out Europe’s failed plans. Which brings us to the present, where we find that even Deutsche Bank has given up hope for interim solutions, having realized that the market will no longer accept transitory, feeble arrangements. Instead DB is now formally calling for a big bang resolution, one coming from the ECB. Here is the punchline: “ECB has room for manoeuvre, but needs political cover for a ‘big’ policy” or said otherwise, “A shock is required to get a liquidity response.” In other words: Europe’s only real hope for even a stop gap solution… is a wholesale market crash, not surprisingly the very same conclusion that Citi reached on May 19 when they warned that only Crossover (XO) at 1000 bps or wider could push Europe into acting…

So in the case of a market crash, the ECB will loan directly to the banks via vLTRO.

It is possible in the context of more disorderly market scenarios that the ECB pre-empts the BLS to reengage the vLTRO policy which has, in Draghi’s view, already ‘broadly’ worked in similar market conditions.