The Polar ConnectionHome of Polar Research and Policy Initiative2017-09-21T15:28:39Zhttp://polarconnection.org/feed/atom/http://polarconnection.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/cropped-Logo-circle-2-32x32.pngDannika Menezeshttp://www.polarconnection.orghttp://polarconnection.org/?p=29762017-09-21T10:18:27Z2017-09-21T08:00:42ZWhat is the status of the Joint Arctic Leaders’ Statement? In short, it has been given a hasty burial. To […]

What is the status of the Joint Arctic Leaders’ Statement? In short, it has been given a hasty burial.To review, in March 2016, Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau and United States President Barack Obama announced each of their governments would protect a minimum 10 per cent of North America’s Arctic marine areas by 2020. Then, in December, each announced the ‘United States-Canada Joint Arctic Leaders’ Statement’, a bold plan to ban offshore resource extraction in the North American Arctic,estimated to contain at least 90 billion barrels of oil and even more natural gas spread over millions of square kilometres.It represented some of the most striking government action in Arctic history. Now, in the United States, it is dead. For President Donald Trump, effectively cancelling the statement through executive order is a symbol that environmental protection is not a priority. In Canada, the continued impact of the statement is questionable. What at first appeared to be a landmark policy now seems to change virtually nothing in regional energy production.

United States

One of Donald Trump’s first actions upon taking office was to, in essence, end the Joint Leaders’ Statement. In April, President Trump issued Executive Order 30, titled “Implementing an America-First Offshore Energy Strategy.” Section 3 of the order calls for the reopening of the Arctic to offshore oil development, including leases and sales. It also instructs the Secretary of Commerce to streamline the process to find new oil and gas resources. The Secretary of Commerce, in Section 4 of the order, cannot create protected areas until the Department of Interior has assessed it for resource potential. The order revokes existing protected areas and calls for simplifying of the approval process for energy production leases.

Action to dismantle the Joint Arctic Leaders’ Statement is ongoing. The reviews called for in the executive order are underway, and the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management has begun preparing a new programme for granting resource leases, to begin in 2019 (detailedhere).

This action is part of Donald Trump’s hostility to the environment. It is a signal that Trump’s people believe environmental protection and economic growth are not compatible. By my count, weakening environmental conservation has been the biggest target of executive orders and bills signed by Trump so far.

Do not expect oil and gas production to resume in the Arctic soon. There was no offshore oil or gas production in the United States’ Arctic territory when Obama and Trudeau announced the Joint Arctic Leaders’ Statement. Republicans in the United States might blame onerous regulations for the lack of development, which Executive Order 30 targets. It is possible that there will be some oil and gas extraction in the future. The real significance of the order is symbolic. It signals that Trump’s administration favours job creation above all else, certainly including the environment.

Canada

In Canada, meanwhile, the order remains in effect, but resource extraction offshore is still possible.The Joint Arctic Leaders’ Statementsays, “Canada is designating all Arctic Canadian waters as indefinitely off limits to future offshore Arctic oil and gas licensing, to be reviewed every five years through a climate and marine science-based life-cycle assessment.” The key word is “future”. In February,Nunatsiaq News reportedthat the statement does not affect current exploration projects in the Arctic. There arenearly 100 leases, permits and licensescurrently in effect for Arctic Canada that gives companies the right to look for oil and gas, some of which date back to 1968 and will never expire. The Nunavut Impact Review Boardinitiated a consultationon 10 February 2017 on whether to develop Baffin Bay and the Davis Strait.

Furthermore, the Canadian government is actively seeking to make offshore oil production easier.The Globe and Mailreported on 6 September 2017 that Canada’s Federal government is one-year into the process of lessening regulations on offshore oil and gas. The article says that a draft of the new regulations obtained by environmental groups apparently indicates that it will be up to industry to determine what safety precautions are reasonable for a given project. The program is called theFrontier and Offshore Regulatory Renewal Initiative, which its website says is to “modernise the regulatory framework governing oil and gas activities in Canada’s frontier and offshore oil and gas areas.” Details will not be apparent until the spring.

Conceivably, governments could refuse projects that appear unsafe; however, there is no single standard for what constitutes “safe”. An environmentally conscious government might refuse a project that a more economically aggressive government would approve.

Consultation is again a problem. A major criticism of the Joint Arctic Leaders’ Statement is that Northern governments were not consulted.Nunatsiaq News reportsthat the Canadian government has not included Nunavut Tunngavik Inc., or most major Inuit organisations, in the consultation process for the Frontier and Offshore Regulatory Renewal Initiative either. It is surprising that a Liberal government in Canada, that on numerous occasions have stated the importance of consulting with Indigenous peoples, has twice failed to consult with Indigenous groups about Arctic offshore oil development.

Significance

As I wrote earlier, the Joint Arctic Leaders’ Statement is a key symbol that the future of the Arctic does not lie in oil production, but rather thriving communities. That fact remains unchanged; it is not as if the Joint Arctic Leaders’ Statement called exploration ships back to port or left productive oil platforms dormant. Companies simply could not make Arctic oil work economically. Some leases in Canada are 50 years old and have yet to result in oil production. It is not an ideological issue either. Offshore Arctic production under the Bush Administration was minimal. Under the Canadian Conservative Harper government, it was non-existent.

It is possible that conditions will change. In August, a Russian natural gas tanker traversed the Arctic lacking an icebreaker assist for the first time, leading the New York Times to pen an editorial entitled “Rush to Exploit the Arctic.” Climate change is opening the Arctic, so oil production could become feasible as supplies fall and prices rise.

The key significance of this episode is symbolism. The offshore North American Arctic is not a major oil-producing region, so the Joint Arctic Leaders’ Statement served as a symbol that it was important to prioritise environmental protection in future policy. Canada’s government does not seem particularly committed to this idea. The Joint Arctic Leaders’ Statement is weak enough that widespread oil production in the Canadian Arctic is very much a possibility if an economically feasible supply is found. The latest makes it appear that the Canadian government is actively preparing for that possibility. For the United States, the new action by the Trump Administration is a symbol that environmental protection will not sacrifice short-term economic growth.

Dr Andrew Chater serves as Expert in Arctic Governance and International Decision Making at Polar Research and Policy Initiative. He is also a Professor in Political Science at Brescia University College in London, Ontario. He completed his doctorate at the University of Western Ontario and was previously a graduate resident at the Rotman Institute of Philosophy. He holds a Master’s degree from the University of Waterloo. His research interests include Arctic governance, geopolitics and security, as well as Canadian foreign policy.

]]>0Dannika Menezeshttp://www.polarconnection.orghttp://polarconnection.org/?p=29422017-09-13T12:19:25Z2017-09-06T03:57:13ZLana Ollier, Associate at Polar Research and Policy Initiative, speaks to Dr Ilan Kelman on his recently published book Arcticness: Power and Voice from […]

Whether we are affluent or poor in London or affluent or poor in Delhi, we all face development challenges, sustainability challenges, life challenges and livelihood challenges. My interest is simply helping people who ask for help. If we talk about London or Delhi, there are many mechanisms in place to deal with those challenges, and there are also many people researching them. Hence, I believe there is not a lot that I can contribute. Countries like India and Nigeria have world-class scholars, institutions, and a lot of resources, but island states like Tuvalu or islands like Baffin Island have tiny populations and lack those resources. So that is where I feel like I can make the biggest difference, if these people invite me. This is why I focus on islands. The Arctic is very much part of this, because so many Arctic communities are islands and even those that are not have many similar characteristics. Those characteristics stereotypically are isolation, marginalisation, smallness and their location on the coast. There is a lot of truth in those stereotypes, and there are countless exceptions and counterexamples. Part of my research and work with the communities is to determine whether or not those stereotypes are appropriate and if so why or why not. We then focus on working within those similarities and differences. The aim of the Many Strong Voices program, which I co-direct, is to create a platform for Arctic peoples and peoples from small island developing states to learn, exchange and teach by comparing their similarities and differences.

Who is Arcticness aimed at?

Anyone with an interest in the Arctic. That includes academics and non-academics, peoples from and living in the Arctic, but also those who have never been there. It is supposed to be an introduction for everyone who has an interest in the northern latitudes and provides new angles and viewpoints for those who have many experiences in the Arctic.

Could you explain the concept of Arcticness?

We chose to develop the concept of Arcticness because we felt like it embodied many of the discussions, which are often not fully articulated. It is easy in academia to write 10,000 words of long sentences with difficult words, but the question remains: What does it mean to the peoples and for the peoples? We felt that it is important to recognise and give a voice to those many strongly diverging viewpoints of what the Arctic is and what peoples feel it should be. Different peoples have different perspectives and we felt that by taking an idea like Arcticness and explicitly not rejecting any perspectives, we would be able to move some of the discussions forward. Therefore, the book does not explicitly say we should adopt the concept or reject it, but instead we should explore and examine it and see of what use it is and is not. Arcticness becomes an idea to explore and see what will come from it, which may also be to not move forward with this concept.

What is the conclusion you reached in exploring the concept of Arcticness in your book?

The conclusion from Arcticness is that there is strength in diversity. The Arctic, Arctic peoples, Arctic ideas and Arctic ideals mean so many different things to different peoples. Our conclusion from Arcticness is that this is not necessarily negative. Instead, we can still come together and we can still think about the future or futures of the peoples and communities in this region on their terms, recognising and being sad about some changes, while still being inspired and happy about what we can do about the changes. At the same time, we can also say that the Arctic voices require far more prominence, and we need to be thinking about the Arctic far more from the perspective of the peoples in the Arctic, not just from a perspective of southern-, resource-, extractive-, environmentalist, and scientific interests in the region.

How can Arctic voices become powerful and why is power important?

We find that Arctic peoples, because of the stereotypical characteristics that I mentioned earlier, feel like they are not being heard, are often not deciding for themselves and few listen to them or their interests. They are often very actively disempowered and deliberately bypassed. To a large extent, the country capitals are taking power away from them in making decisions and moving forward without considering what the communities and the peoples want.

By highlighting some of those issues and by providing options and opportunities for those voices to be heard, we let them develop, create and build power. Power is important in this context, because we can hear their voices but power means that we must listen as well.

What can we do in order to promote Arctic voices?

Don’t make assumptions! Talk to the peoples and see the communities with the aim of understanding their different perspectives even if you disagree with them. Do not just hear but listen. And whether you are an environmentalist with Greenpeace, suggesting stopping resource extraction in the Arctic, or whether you are a person with an oil company, saying that resource extraction combined with corporate social responsibility measures will create economic benefits for the communities: Stop, take a deep breath and start talking to the peoples from and in the Arctic.

This remains a challenge. Often, the CEOs of oil and gas companies don’t seem to have a lot of interest in listening to or acknowledging those voices. And while governments in Oslo and Moscow do generally show an interest in engaging, they only hear some of the voices and fail to recognise the diversity of interests. Instead, they tend to just hear the voices that match their preconceived ideas.

How did you select the different contributions to this book to ensure that it has accounted for the diversity of voices?

We tried to develop this book around the idea of collective knowledges. The UCL Global Governance Institute very kindly funded some workshops related to governance issues. I set up a workshop on polar change and put out an open call for everyone to turn up and contribute. In the workshop, we realized that we had to go beyond change and beyond governance and therefore we jointly came up with the concept of Arcticness. So we did not set out to explore this concept, but the concept emerged from the workshop. The contributions were selected by the people who turned up to the workshop and provided information. The contributions were open to everyone and entirely voluntary. This is an example of collective knowledge and the power of bringing voices together.

How does this “Arcticness” fill a gap?

What we hope to do is to add to the voices and to add to the discussions and bring different viewpoints to what people are considering. Therefore, we very deliberately set out for diversity and diversity of the peoples, disciplines and approaches, recognising that no community is homogenous, there is no single solution for a community and there is no one-size-fits-all approach across all communities. So we hope that we have something unique by combining academic chapters with personal reflections and poetry. We hope that we have something unique by having both peoples from the Arctic and from outside of the Arctic. We hope that we have something unique in recognising the multiple peoples and disciplines; recognising law is as important as anthropology and as important as art. Coming up with this framework of Arcticness, we hope that we can make more voices heard and get a discussion going, accepting that there is strength in diversity, even if we radically disagree with each other.

What did you learn in editing this book and what surprised you the most?

The main learning experience was just to gain more knowledge of peoples, places and ideas from the Arctic. Are we really ever expert in any place or any people, even our own? There always remains a lot to learn and to think about. For me, it was such a huge gain in my own understanding of the Arctic.

What was most surprising is that people are able to connect around a concept and push forward an agenda on behalf of the peoples. This was very encouraging and inspiring, showing that, despite the difficulties of the changes we are experiencing and despite the difficulties with many of the elected leaders, we can still come together as academics and practitioners to push forward Arctic-based agendas.

Lana Ollier is an Associate in the Geopolitics and Security Unit at Polar Research and Policy Initiative and leads our interview series ‘Polar Matters’. She is currently completing a MSc in Environmental Policy and Regulation at the London School of Economics. She holds a Bachelor’s degree in Political Science from the Freie Universität of Berlin.

]]>0d.menezeshttp://polarconnection.org/?p=29022017-09-04T11:13:31Z2017-09-04T11:00:06ZThe Arctic Council (AC) offers the Arctic states a forum for discussion and cooperation on an equal footing. This is […]

The Arctic Council (AC) offers the Arctic states a forum for discussion and cooperation on an equal footing. This is remarkable as the largest Arctic Council member state, the US, has roughly a thousand times more inhabitants than its smallest member, Iceland. Traditional approaches of International Relations usually interpret size with concepts of power as the ability to influence global politics. The general assumption is that small equals weak and large equals strong (larger states are often associated with ‘great powers’). But if we look at the Arctic Council, we see that this regional organisation works with the principles of consensus and unanimity. Hence, the small member states are capable of influencing political decision-making.

The major question is: Do the small states of the Arctic have the action capacity to shape future developments of Arctic politics?

Who is small in the High North?

The eight Arctic states differ heavily concerning their territorial size, economic strength as well their inner structure. In contrast to the Antarctic, where legal governance is implemented through the Antarctic Treaty, the foundation of Arctic politics is built by the coastal states.

Regardless of the exact definition, there is a general assumption that Iceland and Denmark are “small states” and Russia and the US are not. Usually, being “small” is considered as a lack of the ability to influence. From that point of view, “smallness” is a comparative concept. The comparison of different categories, i.e. quantitative indicators such as territorial size, population or economic strength (GDP), or more qualitative indicators such as scientific outcome, the ability to influence global agenda setting or the perception of a state’s size, can be used as categories for the size of states. In the past years of academic studies in International Relations, small states were often equated with weak states. But as it turned out, small states can be very successful in using their capabilities which makes them strong and powerful. However, they need to be specialised, i.e. Switzerland in financial issues, the Gulf Emirates in oil or the Nordic States as role models for the welfare state. Anders Wivel concluded that with the formula: “From Small State to Smart State”1.

But we need to find an answer to the question “what makes small states small?” first. To find a proper methodology, you need to find correct indicators and variables to define a state by its size. It is not possible to create a final list of independent variables which explain the nature and behavior of small states in the international system. But it is important to keep the question “why do we categorise states by their size and what is the value of that?” in mind. The reason for defining a state by its size should lead us to a first notion of what a “small state” is. Subsequently, we can ask for its characteristics in comparison to other states. Guiding questions for the study of small states can be: Are there sufficient attributes to distinguish a small state from “non-small” state? Compared to each other, what is the actual difference between them? According to the Icelandic political scientist Baldur Þorhallsson, small states can be defined through a very basic approach of four “traditional” categories:2

Population

Territory

Economy (usually measured through common economic indicators such as GDP)

Military (such as the military expenditure or the size of the armed forces)

Table 1: Size of the coastal states according to quantitative indicators.3

Putting diplomacy into perspective, the size of the population becomes highly relevant.4 As larger states can run a large foreign service, they are able to participate in various institutions and international bodies at the very same time.

However, it may seem to be not very applicable to define a small state only by the size of its population. According to David Vital, the upper limit of a small state is around 10-15 million people for economically advanced and 20-30 million people for developing countries.5Hence, the definition of small states involves an objective as well as a subjective dimension. The subjective dimension is difficult to measure and is more of a puzzle of historical aspects, regional importance, expected defense strength and the self-portrayal of a state.6

To develop a more comprehensive approach towards the definition of a small state, Þorhallsson introduced six variables combining the objective and the subjective dimension:7

Preferential size: Own ambitions and preferences on the international level

Particularly the perceptual as well as the preferential size are related to the national identity and the collective memory.8 Most of the “small states” have a distinctive history related to their states’ size and their resulting location in the international system.

According to Raimo Väyrynen, it is more applicable to distinguish between great and small powers by specific issue areas, for example small economic powers, small political powers (low involvement in international organisations) or small military powers (low military expenditure).9

The economic dimension is highly relevant for the development of a certain national strategy, as small states are generally more endangered to exogenous effects and asymmetric shocks.10 As mentioned, small states need a strategy to become “smart states” and should focus on a special sector. Impressive examples for specific “survival” strategies are Liechtenstein and its banking sector, luxury tourism in the Maldives or international trade in Singapore. Likewise, Iceland established a smart strategy that “enlarged” the state’s size by gaining international perception. With a seat in the UN Security Council and its membership in NATO as well as the Arctic Council, Iceland followed a proactive foreign policy. Regarding Robert Keohane, Iceland works on its own transformation from “system-inaffectual” to “system-affecting”. Due to the consensual decision-making process within the Arctic Council, the small states in the Arctic can be system-affecting through the implementation of regional policies.

Small states in international organisations

Small states are usually more active in international organisations and the further development of international law as they are dependent on the institutional and legal framework of the international system. Especially institutions based on the principle of majority, as the European Parliament or the General Assembly of the United Nations, can be dominated by bigger states. But on the other side of the coin, small states are still able to influence in a certain way. In general, it may be better to have a low voice in an organisation rather than no voice in the international community. Regarding Þórhallsson, small states have a specific approach to negotiate in international as well as in regional fora.11 Because of their limited administrative capabilities (political size), small states must act more targeted and prioritise their work as well, as they need proactive policy approaches in their relevant sectors.12 It is an advantage that small states can be more flexible as they have a limited range of interests. This leads to more informality and flexible decision-making on the international as well as the domestic level. Governments can react more quickly and flexibly on changes on the global or domestic level. Small states should choose and prioritise their interests in specific policy areas as well, as they need to do some “marketing” for their position to maximise their power potential. Due to this flexibility and proactive policy approach, small states can act as norm entrepreneurs for future developments in international law and policy.

The small coastal states and the Arctic Council

Considering the political reality and diplomatic environment, it was a well-considered decision of the small coastal states to get involved in the Arctic Council. With their Arctic strategies, they can prioritise their policies and influence developments in the Arctic by targeted negotiations and actions.

Iceland demonstrates that kind of behavior in quite an evident way. With very limited action capabilities on the global level, Iceland is very conscious about its position in the Arctic and uses its geographical position to promote itself as an Arctic coastal state. As Iceland is an island in the Northwestern Atlantic, it is understandable that Iceland has strong interests in maritime affairs as well as in fisheries.13 Urgent topics such as maritime safety or regulation of fishing in Arctic waters are good opportunities for the Icelandic government to get involved in global decision-making. Regarding Young’s concept of a small state as an “honest broker”. Due to its century-long expertise in the Arctic, Iceland tries to implement itself as a knowledge-based service provider and as a bridge to the Arctic.14 Location, history and the country’s self-perception should draw a picture of a reliable and “honest” broker of Arctic issues. Hence, Iceland follows the “entrepreneur leadership” approach as it provides “salient support” and “innovative ideas” towards external partners.15 According to this concept, Iceland followed the formula “from small state to smart state” in an understandable way. As mentioned, another important indicator for the power potential of small states is the institutional and legal framework. Referring to the case of Iceland and the Arctic Council, we can see that quite clearly. Decision-making in the Arctic Council is based on the principles of unanimity, sovereign equality (“one state, one vote”), and is led by a rotating chairmanship. Every two years another member state gets the chairmanship, and can thus implement national priorities as well as further develop the institutional framework of the Council itself. Currently, Finland holds the chairmanship and will hand it over it to Iceland in 2019. This leads back to the concept of an “honest broker”, as the states can put their own interests and priorities on top of the agenda, but must keep the benefit for the region in mind. Remember, as small states usually do not have the military or economic power to promote their interests, the Arctic Council is a powerful forum for the small states of the Arctic. According to Baldur Þórhallson, every small state needs an ally.16 Even if these allies are in the form of an institution (or the institution itself), the state is improving the possibility to gain action capacity. Even if the small coastal states are lacking in quantitative size, economic power or military capabilities, they can maximise their action capacity and shape Arctic policies by using smart strategies.

1Wivel, Anders: From Small State to Smart State: Devising a Strategy for Influence in the European Union, in: Steinmetz, Robert/Wivel, Anders: Small States in Europe. Challenges and Opportunities, Farnham 2010, p. 15.

2 Þorhallsson, Baldur: The Size of States in the European Union: Theoretical and Conceptual Perspectives, in: European Integration, Vol. 28, N. 1 (2006), p. 7.

10 Þórhallsson, Baldur: The Role of Small States in the European Union, in: Ingebritsen, Christine/Neumann, Iver B./Gstöhl, Sieglinde et al. (Ed.): Small States in International Relations, Washington/Reykjavík 2006, p. 218f.

13 Young, Oran R.: Political leadership and regime formation: on the development of institutions in international society, in: International Organization, Vol. 45, No. 3, 1991, p. 294

14 Ibid.

Vincent-Gregor Schulze serves as Associate, with interests in regime-building and institutional development in the Arctic and Small States. He is currently working on his Ph.D. in European Studies at the University of Leipzig, has a Master’s degree in European Studies awarded by the University of Leipzig as well as a Postgraduate Diploma in Small State Studies from the University of Iceland. He has also studied in Finland, Norway and Denmark to get deeper in various aspects of the Arctic. His main interests in the Arctic are issues of governance, regime building and the Small States in the Arctic, with a particular interest in Northern Europe. Due to his interdisciplinary background, he approaches Arctic Governance from a political, legal and economic perspective.

There has been much written about the motivation of observers to join the Arctic Council, including articles on this website (here andhere).One has to question the role of these actors as there are only a few opportunities for them to participate in the institution. At present, there are 13 accredited observer states, 13 intergovernmental organisations and 13 non-governmental organisations in the Arctic Council. These actors can attend all Council meetings alongside member states and permanent participants.

Consider the meeting documentsavailable on the Council’s websitefrom the United States’ turn as chair (2015-2017). Minutes from Council meetings do not record any comments from observers during general plenary discussions. These observers, according to the minutes, are not providing suggestions about Council projects, contributing scientific research in meetings or engaging actively in the work of the institution. They come to meetings to watch status reports about Council projects and occasionally witness negotiations.

Despite limited opportunities to make comments, there are between 35 and 45 representatives from observer states and organisations at each meeting. In contrast, there are about 60-75 people from member states and permanent participants, not including guests and staff. At most meetings, there are about 25 different observer states and organisations present, in contrast to eight member states and six permanent participants. Observers clearly have enough personnel to contribute to meetings meaningfully.

Further, look at theCouncil’s list of ongoing projects. The only observer that leads any Council project is Nordic Environment Finance Corporation (NEFCO), which is really an extension of the Nordic member states. Observers are not contributing to Council projects in a leadership capacity.

Observers get to participate in special meetings with member states behind closed doors and have access to Arctic policy-makers outside of the formal events at Council meetings. Whether tangible outcomes emerge from these meetings is unclear.

Observers also get to participate in Council working group meetings.Sebastian Knecht’s STATPAC datasetshows that multiple states and organisations participate in these working groups. Yet, overall, their participation is inconsistent, sometimes even erratic.

It is not entirely clear why observers do not contribute to the Council more than they do. Perhaps observer states and organisations are not stepping up; perhaps the Council itself does not allow the opportunities to contribute. Probably, it is both. The Council’sofficial “role of observers”criteria say that observers should “make contributions” and “propose projects.” It states that observers should, “at the discretion of the Chair, make statements.” Clearly, such discretion is not being exercised. There is tension in the Council as to whether it is a club for Arctic states and indigenous peoples’ organisations to discuss issues of mutual importance, or a forum for the entire world to make a mark in the region. There are logistical problems, as well. There has long been concern that too many observers making comments and designing projects could squeeze out the contributions of permanent participants. Allowing every organisation or state to comment on every Council matter would grind the pace of meetings to a crawl. For some observers, having accredited status in the Council is more a badge of honour, or a symbol that they have some interest in the region. In any case, non-Arctic states and organisations are spending large amounts of money to send representatives to far-flung northern locales to gain intangibles.

Dr Andrew Chater serves as Expert in Arctic Governance and International Decision Making. He is also a professor in political science at Brescia University College in London, Ontario. He completed his doctorate at the University of Western Ontario and was previously a graduate resident at the Rotman Institute of Philosophy. He holds a master’s degree from the University of Waterloo. His research interests include Arctic governance, geopolitics and security, as well as Canadian foreign policy. His dissertation, Explaining the Evolution of the Arctic Council, examines reasons for contemporary changes in the role of the Arctic Council. It was completed in 2015. In 2013, he was part of the Arctic Athabaskan Council’s delegation at Arctic Council meetings in Whitehorse, Yukon.

The Arctic Council has been widely accepted as the forum in which Arctic states convene to discuss the region’s high level and working level affairs. The Council consists of the 8 Arctic states, 6 permanent participants, and as of the last ministerial meeting, 39 observers including non-Arctic states, intergovernmental or inter-parliamentary organisations, and non-governmental organisations. The 7 newest observers are: Switzerland, the World Meteorological Organization, the International Council for the Exploration of the Sea, Oceana, the Oslo-Paris Commission, the West Nordic Council, and the National Geographic Society. Although the latest round of accepted observers did not draw nearly as much attention as the batch admitted in 2013, there is still much to be explored about observers to the Arctic Council.

The Arctic Council Observer Manual, published in 2013, serves as a guide for observers and those interested in the position that observers fill within the Arctic Council. Those who become observers must be decided upon with consensus from the Arctic states and it must be established that “the Council determines (the observer) can contribute to its work.” Furthermore, observer status only continues so long as consensus exists among the Council’s ministers, and any observer that acts to violate the provisions set out in the Ottawa Declaration or Rules of Procedure may have their Observer status terminated. Observer states are encouraged to make relevant contributions, particularly within the working groups of the Council. Relevant contributions include participation in working group projects through knowledge sharing or financial support.

If observers play by the above rules, there are many opportunities for each to form lasting partnerships with one another – other Arctic states, permanent participant groups, or even other observers. Some of these partnerships are visible at the working group level of the Arctic Council, where an observer might partner on a project of mutual interest between a member of the Council and itself. For instance, the Protection of the Arctic Marine Environment (PAME) Working Group, highlights many projects within its bi-annual work plan that include partnerships with observers. One of these projects, led by the United States and Aleut International Association, aims to create a framework for enhanced engagement from observers in the Council. The observers on this specific project are Italy and the Republic of Korea.

Another venue for observer contributions encouraged by many within the Arctic Council is the recently established Álgu Fund. This fund is meant to provide a stable source of financial support for the permanent participants of the Council in order to foster greater participation on projects and programmes from their communities. Many observers see this as an opportunity to directly support the needs of indigenous peoples of the Arctic region.

However, the Arctic Council forum is not the only formal avenue for non-Arctic entities with regional interests to engage. Another emerging option is the Arctic Economic Council, initially created by the Arctic Council, which is an independent organisation that aims to foster circumpolar business partnerships. This organisation allows non-Arctic business partners as non-voting members and provides business insight to the Arctic Council’s activities. The information on this type of engagement is fairly limited as the Arctic Economic Council is a young organisation, established only in late 2014.

The biggest question remains: what are the benefits of observer status within the Arctic Council? Perhaps the most obvious is the ability to sit in the back of the room at Arctic Council meetings. Any information gleaned can have an impact on the formulation of one’s own national policies or strategies (if the observer is a state/regional body) or on the type of projects that one should pursue (if the observer is an NGO). Additionally, the access that one has to high-level government officials within the confines of the Council provides a unique opportunity to form relationships that operate outside the auspices of the forum. The majority of air time for observers within the council, however, is at the working group level. It is here that observers can make substantive contributions of intellectual, financial, or otherwise valuable resources to the ongoing work that is formally accepted within the Arctic. This ensures that the observer is a welcome contributor. For many, the Arctic Council’s granting of observer status is a legitimising stamp of approval for one to have Arctic interests, be it a state, IGO, or NGO, and to act on those interests within the norms set by the Arctic community.

In return, what do the Arctic states and permanent participants of the Council gain from increased observer participation? Many gain new partners for achieving the work that needs to be done. This could be anything from scientific research on climate change to regional community development projects. Observers not only provide a fresh perspective, but they also bring critical resources to help complete projects that might otherwise not happen. Likewise, observers often participate in other Arctic programming that benefits the Arctic region based off of their status within the Council. For instance, many observers are also members of the International Arctic Science Committee and the University of the Arctic, both which support critical components of Arctic research and education. In the end, Arctic Council members and observers need one another as the impacts of the Arctic are realised around the globe.

Liz Bowman serves as Associate – Non-Arctic Actors at Polar Research and Policy Initiative. She works as an administrator for the University of Alaska System and is completing an MA in Arctic and Northern Studies in the Arctic Policy concentration at the University of Alaska Fairbanks. Her thesis work focuses on the role of China in Arctic affairs through case study analysis. Liz has a Bachelor’s degree in International Studies from the University of Idaho. Prior to working at the University of Alaska, Liz supported Arctic initiatives professionally within government and the non-profit sectors. She also serves as a Council member for the Association of Polar Early Career Scientists (APECS).

]]>Trump and the Announcement in the Rose Garden | 1 June 2017 (Official White House Photo by Joyce N. Boghosian)

The United States’ intended withdrawal from the Paris climate accord on 1 June 2017 is a decision of monumental planetary significance and geopolitical import, with ramifications for years to come. Conservatives, Republicans and some of those in the fossil fuel sector hailed this as a necessity in liberating the US from a pernicious threat to the economy, restoring American sovereignty and freedom. By contrast, it was also widely condemned by political leaders, liberals, major business executives, and environmentalists around the world as a short-sighted and potentially reckless decision that jeopardises the security and wellbeing of future generations, in exchange for some limited and fleeting economic gain.

At the recent G20 summit on 8 July 2017, America was entirely isolated in its position on climate change, leaving a noticeable rift between the US and other nations. The joint communique noted “the decision of the US to withdraw from the Paris agreement”, but added: “The leaders of the other G20 members state that the Paris agreement is irreversible” and “we reaffirm our strong commitment to clean energy and implementing the Paris agreement”.1 In her closing remarks at the event, Angela Merkel even went further, stating that the US decision to withdraw was ‘extremely regrettable’ and ‘one she deplored’.2

The principal reason for the international concern is that the US is the world’s largest economy and its leadership on the world stage is still important.3 Although America may no longer be the world’s largest polluter, this is a recent change; China only overtook the US in CO2 emissions production in 2007.4 The US accounts for about 30% of global cumulative historical emissions,5 and its role in shaping the zeitgeist over the last century has been profound. From the Cold War to the Space Race, from the Universal Declaration of Human Rights to the advancement of democracy, American leadership has been central in shaping today’s world.

It is, thus, hard to ignore the fact that the US intention to withdraw will weaken the accord and have a chilling effect on efforts to address climate change. Other nations may also choose to follow America’s lead or to waver in their own commitment to the targets, thus imperilling the whole consensus. Given that climate change has the potential to have dramatic and unforeseen consequences for future generations in the form of sea levels rising, coastal flooding, droughts, and generally less stable weather conditions across the globe, this is too significant an issue to ignore or from which to hide. Polar Research and Policy Initiative has always and will always support vital efforts to tackle climate change, to avert lasting man-made damage to the environment and to safeguard both the beauty and stability of the polar regions and the planet for future generations.

The polar regions are experiencing the impacts of climate change already – temperature increases, ice sheet and glacier losses, coastal erosion, species movements and environmental impacts, even regime shifts, changing weather and increased freshwater inflows are all redefining Arctic and Antarctic habitats and communities. Though small in number, residents of the Arctic are citizens of many of the wealthiest and most powerful nations in the world; US abdication of responsibility directly and negatively affects its own Arctic residents and those of other leading nations in the immediate present.

These negative effects will not be isolated to the poles. Teleconnections to the rest of the planet are becoming increasingly well understood; they link atmospheric and oceanic transformations at the poles with changes throughout the globe. These teleconnections can act to amplify and disperse impacts, including severe weather events, in ways that reduce our ability to forecast both short and long run changes and the resulting impacts they will have upon global populations and the infrastructures upon which they depend.

Seemingly isolated environmental changes will result in ripple effects through economic channels; the failure of the Paris Accord and abdication of American leadership will change who it is that wins and loses in these occurrences. For example, the invasions of the Red King and Snow Crabs in the Barents coincide with reproduction challenges to the stock of these crabs in their native North Pacific, transforming individual fishermen’s fortunes, but also whole communities, and market connections to Asian buyers are realigning. The repudiation of the Paris Accord by the current administration increases these impacts directly and indirectly. Directly, the climate changes that are favouring the lucrative crab species in the Barents over the North Pacific will be enhanced. Indirectly, the failure to coordinate and act with transparency on climate change will make it all the more difficult to cooperate on matters concerning stable fisheries supplies, which assists in shifting the terms of trade to favour the Asian buyers further. The interdependence of fisheries profits is already a controversial matter that the highest coordinating body amongst all the Arctic states, the Arctic Council, avoids.6

From a built environment perspective, the US withdrawal is a major setback and a threat to our planet economically as well as environmentally. Forty percent of humanity lives on the coast,7 a number that will also easily exceed 50% within the next two decades. Sixty percent of the world’s 39 largest cities are located less than 100km (60 miles) from the coast, including 12 of the world’s 16 most populous conurbations.8 Within the Arctic Circle itself, 80% of the largest settlements are located directly on coastlines or in adjacent low-lying areas.9

All of these areas are threatened to some extent by sea levels rising, in the form of coastal erosion, loss of land, infrastructure, or in some cases total reclamation by the sea. Losing these areas would be a significant setback for humanity economically and environmentally, not to mention in terms of the damage it could potentially have for science, equality and social progress. Cities and towns are the lifeblood of our modern way of life, and their geography, so close to the coasts, makes them particularly sensitive to rises in global temperature.

There are, however, many genuine grievances within the United States that we should acknowledge, and that did contribute to the decision on 1 June. An uneven distribution of wealth, sluggish economic conditions over the past decade, a generation of people who feel left behind by globalisation, and the nascent economic transition away from carbon, among others, are the concerns leading certain sections of the US to turn inward. The manifestation of the decision to pull the United States out of the Paris Accord, however, will affect and impoverish everyone, and will in fact hurt the poor and most economically vulnerable – those unable to afford resilience and risk mitigation at the individual or community scale – the most. The Paris Accord initially succeeded in garnering universal support where other agreements have failed because it better aligned national and global interests. Most, if not all, countries recognised not only a global common good and responsibility, but also the advantages of cooperation. The US was a leader in this recognition, a position which now seems lost. The decision to withdraw should be seen as a step backwards, not only in global, but also American national, affairs.

The US decision to withdraw from the Paris Accord undermines the foundations of American leadership and signals a potential eclipsing of American power as China positions itself to assume the vacancy and role of leader on climate change. The Chinese government has already pledged to continue to press ahead in meeting its own emissions targets, as well as signing additional climate change agreements with states like California.10

There remains the possibility of the US renegotiating its way back into the deal at a later stage, or of signing a new deal altogether, as mentioned explicitly in the US Presidential statement on 1 June. Speaking alongside French President Macron on 13 July, Trump hinted that the US was open to shifting its position on the Paris Accord. This would admittedly be an incredibly challenging undertaking given global reluctance, as the other parties see the agreements reached in Paris as irreversible.11 Regardless of the rhetoric, however, finding some way of getting policy makers in the US to accept that climate change is real, man-made and a global priority should be actively and materially encouraged in order to shore up the consensus.

The exact rise in global temperatures will also make a significant difference. The Paris Agreement addressed this in committing 195 nations around the world to “holding the rise in global temperatures to well below 2°C above pre-industrial levels”, as well as committing nations “to pursue efforts to limit the increase to 1.5°C ”. This statistical difference in sea levels, between a 1.5 and 2°C increase in temperatures, is not insignificant either. A 1.5°C increase equates to a rise in sea levels of up to 1 metre (3 feet), where a 2°C rise in sea levels leads to a rise of up to 4 metres (13 feet).12 This distinction is important, as it could spell the difference between losing low-lying areas of cities, or losing whole cities. In Europe alone, Amsterdam, Murmansk and Venice would all be flooded by a 4-metre (13 foot) rise. Moreover, the US withdrawal from the accord makes a temperature rise of 3 or 4°C more likely, with further sea level increases. Scientists report that a 2°C spike in temperature would submerge land currently occupied by 280 million people, while an increase of 4°C would cover areas inhabited by more than 600 million.13 Temperature increases at the poles may also be two to three times greater than this,14 something that will compound local and regional impacts significantly. This should be a harrowing prospect for all of humanity and serve as a call to action for the many.

From an Arctic perspective, the decision to withdraw is also a reversal of US policy from even a matter of weeks ago, when US Secretary of State Rex Tillerson signed the Fairbanks Declaration reiterating US commitments to international action on climate change at the start of May, which explicitly references implementation of the Paris Accord.15 Furthermore, Alaskan communities inundated by effects of coastal erosion and sea water ingress caused by climate change are already becoming climate refugees who must decide how and where to rebuild their lives, who now find their concerns and needs at greater odds with their own federal government.

In response to the threats of sea level rise, several countries have already begun making plans to address the consequences that higher sea levels entail. The Netherlands is spending billions of euros upgrading 3,700kms (2,500 miles) of sea and flood defences.16 Meanwhile, Australia has begun planning for an incoming migration of millions of climate refugees fleeing low-lying islands in the Pacific and Indian Oceans.17 The Maldives has already begun purchasing land on high-ground in Australia in preparation for relocating all 350,000 of their people, involving the creation of whole new cities.18

These proposed solutions have a place, but they are knee-jerk reactions that lack a wider vision. They also fail to account for other inevitable consequences like the salination of groundwater, rivers and streams as sea levels rise, rendering many coastal cities uninhabitable and inland areas unsuitable for agriculture. These solutions are also predicated on an acceptance that climate change and dramatic sea level rise are inevitable. While the science for this is well-documented, it doesn’t have to be this way. The world doesn’t have to ‘accept’ the inevitability of climate change; collectively, we do have a choice about the future of the planet.

Acknowledging that humans have an innate capacity for both creativity, innovation and adaptation, as a species on the cusp of a critical moment in our history, humanity can choose instead to take their destiny into their own hands. We need a clear overarching vision and strategy to direct efforts on a variety of scales. The positive response developing from within and beyond the US is taking shape through devolution and the perceived freedom that allows cities, communities and people to implement changes to our way of living in a colourful myriad of national, regional and local ways. Individual US states have already begun this process; on 6 June 2017, California signed an agreement with China pledging to continue to pursue emissions cuts, push for sustainable business development in the green technology sector and, ultimately, to honour the goals of the Paris Accord.19 Meanwhile, the Canadian federal government and provinces are also employing a similar approach, approaching individual American states in a strategy being described as a ‘go around’.20, 21 As a result, Quebec and California have agreed to link their cap-and-trade programmes, with Ontario set to join. Manitoba and Ontario participate in a climate coordination group with Midwestern US states, while the Canadian government has also begun building alliances with Florida, Indiana, Texas, Michigan, New York and other states.22, 23

There is mileage in this approach, provided it empowers businesses, entrepreneurs and communities to explore and implement changes themselves, and that it is not just another agreement exercised only in political circles. The more difficult part of the challenge will be to reshape incentives and profits from the economic activities that improve material well-being so that they align with the overarching vision. Doing this will require transfers of resources that create a stable super-coalition of forward-thinking communities where the net benefits of joining and remaining in the coalition – with or without official treaties – are higher than those of the globally costly status quo.24

This strategy requires three key steps: devolving certain aspects of governance, reforming planning systems and empowering people to shape the markets they use. Taken in combination, these would allow people and communities the freedom to make the necessary changes themselves, and to save humanity from its own failures. We have no greater interest than that.

A philosophy that aligns individual and local actions with a preference for beneficial global outcomes will also be more effective in the long-term than relying on international agreements. With the role of governments like the US taking a step back on tackling climate change, solutions must instead be found in greater local, state, individual, household and community action. Ironically enough, it is also cities and human settlements that are best placed to lead the way. As hotbeds of innovation and enterprise, our built environment can act as the vanguard of a new sustainable revolution. Devolving power and reforming the planning system to encourage more microgeneration of electricity is a natural first-step that stands out as an example. If systems of governance and regulations around the world could be revised to allow and openly encourage more communities to take control of their sources of power, as villages like Wildpolsried in Germany already have, then we could dramatically cut carbon emissions associated with heating and power. Through a mixture of renewables including wind farms, solar panels, hydropower and biomass, the residents of Wildpoldsried generate 500% more power than they consume, selling the surplus and profiting collectively.25, 26 If every community in the United Kingdom were to follow that example, then there would be no need for any coal or gas powered energy, cutting national carbon emissions by 41%.27 There are also the added benefits of eliminating monthly household energy costs and creating an additional household income, raising living standards and reducing inequality.

It is not enough, however, to simply produce surplus renewable energy to guarantee improvement in global well-being. Abundant renewable resource energy in Norway and Iceland, for example, has led to both Arctic nations producing copious renewable energy. Norway has used hydropower for the last 50 years to enable export of North Sea Oil that is consumed with co-production of CO2 emissions globally, though not at home; the political and ethical dimensions of this are becoming increasingly debated in Norwegian society.28 In Iceland, the growing understanding that much of the clean geo-thermal power surplus is being used for aluminium smelting that produces its own damaging emissions is also sparking local dialogue.29 These dialogues are impacting policy; Norwegian citizens are suing to stop increased drilling, for example.30 This combination of innovation and responsibility is necessary to generate meaningful reductions in climate emissions at the global level rather than simply moving them from one location to another.

The approach of places like Wildpoldsried, where it can be developed in a responsible way though, is also more resilient, manageable and less contentious than relying on energy companies and governments to build colossal offshore wind farms or to sequester all coal plant emissions. Not only would a Wildpoldsried-approach dramatically decrease carbon footprints, but it will also create new businesses in installation and maintenance, while it generates new revenue streams. These systems would pay for themselves and create jobs, while eliminating almost half our carbon footprint.

There is another cause for optimism here – the changing energy sector. The energy mix is not only being influenced by policies, but also economics, and it is driving down costs. Renewables are becoming increasingly economically lucrative, and we are already in the midst of a transition of our energy markets.

Diffusion and investment has led to not only significant price reductions in renewable energy prices, but also improved technology. US solar companies like First Solar and SunPower have massively contributed to this development. As studies by the Berkeley Lab have shown, prices for solar energy have been declining steadily since 2010.31 The same is true for wind, where especially off-shore prices are falling fast.32 A study by McKinsey predicts cost competitiveness of European offshore farms without subsidies by 2020.33 Similar scenarios are foreseeable in the US. As compared to endeavours like drilling in the Arctic, where prices and risks are enormously high, renewable power sources are definitely the more cost-effective option.

Investments into renewable energies have also increased steadily and will, with an ongoing demand, continue to rise. Bloomberg New Energy Finance (BNEF) chairman Michael Liebreich was quoted saying that solar and wind weren’t alternative forms of power anymore, but had moved mainstream.34 Xcel Energy shut-down its natural-gas plant in Colorado for two full days in January and let wind fill the gap.35 In Germany, the big energy companies like E.on and RWE made significant losses by failing to use renewables or invest in them, a mistake they are now eager to correct. Remarkably, global investments into renewable energies have increased despite low oil prices.36

Consequently, there is hope that the momentum of renewable energies is charting a new path. If there is a continuous demand for clean energy, we will continue to see steady investments into renewables, and prices will continue to drop, even without overarching agreements.

Thirdly and finally, by demanding better governance, long run perspectives of risk, company policy, sustainable standards and corporate social responsibility, both shareholders and consumers can effectively steer the economy away from carbon-intensive practices, services and products towards a more sustainable future. As the downsides of climate risks are becoming more visible, the profitability of addressing climate change head-on is also becoming more apparent. Changing the market is something that is far more concretely reliable than relying on capricious governments for action. The heartening overall response from American industry opposing the withdrawal from the Paris Accord emphasises that these risks and appropriate response actions are sinking in for American industrial leadership, if not its political leadership.

By way of an example, on 31 May, shareholders at Exxon Mobil, the world’s largest publicly traded oil company, rebelled against the company board and voted in favour of a motion requiring ExxonMobil to assess the risks from climate change in all their business endeavours, a decision with consequences for all future business policy.37 The motion directs the company to address strong global commitment to cap global warming at no more than 2°C above pre-industrial levels, and it passed with the support of 62% of shareholders.38

Accepting that this motion is not going to unilaterally change Exxon’s business model of sourcing and selling fossil fuels, it is a significant and symbolic step towards recognising, addressing and mitigating the problems associated with its operations and business. Exxon had long been seen as the ‘last bastion of opposition’ to action on climate change, and so this ‘change from within’ is a significant milestone, a sign that exit strategies for fossil fuel production and use are becoming part of mainstream industrial policy.

Separately, the brewing firm Carlsberg has also unveiled plans to reduce its brewery carbon emissions to zero, singling out US withdrawal from the Paris climate agreement as a motivating factor. The Danish brewer, whose beers also include Holsten Pils and San Miguel, said it would eliminate brewery emissions and halve its water usage by 2030 as part of a new sustainability drive.39

Their plans also include closing down coal power stations at breweries in China, India and Poland, to replace them with renewable sources. Carlsberg’s resolve to go green was hardened by the US announcing its plans to withdraw from the Paris climate agreement, its chief executive Cees t‘Hart said. “People in Carlsberg are more energised [after the US decision]. We feel we can take responsibility in our own hands and don’t need to depend on politicians.” Carlsberg’s proposals, which include using only renewable energy to brew beer by 2022, are equivalent to taking 160,000 cars off the road.40

This reshaping of the market by both producers and consumers can be incredibly effective, rendering political decisions irrelevant. The momentum is also already starting to shift where businesses are increasingly recognising the value of renewables. Last year alone, renewables attracted almost double the investment of fossil fuel power.41 Against the backdrop of these trends, when taken collectively, producers and consumers have the power to make the world a more sustainable place; we just have to realise that. We need to lobby. To reflect it in our purchases. To act.

Arctic communities are also collectively demonstrating the need, the wherewithal, and ability to take these actions in advance of the global timing for adoption of new behavioural patterns that can generate global gains from remedial action on climate emissions. Though small in overall numbers, Arctic communities present opportunities for outsized learning and impact for the planet in need. At its essence, channelling this ‘change from within’ is what the world needs to do if it wants to tackle the issues of climate change – to protect the environment, safeguard the existence of polar icecaps and guarantee a stable world for future generations. We all have the power, as consumers, community members, citizens, businesses and shareholders, to shape the world around us. It is only through seizing that power, joining together and exercising it that we will be able to shape the more sustainable world that we want to see.

Polar Research and Policy Initiative welcomes any and all effort to tackle this challenge of our time, trusting that this will also lead to a new renaissance of ideas, entrepreneurialism, jobs and prosperity. This approach will also undoubtedly be more effective than waiting for a lasting global consensus to re-emerge. The US decision to withdraw from the Paris Accord, as disappointing and destructive as it is, does not have to be a cause for lost hope. This could instead be a defining moment for humanity, as people realise for the first time their collective power to shape the world in a more sustainable way and for the better.

Thomas Bishop is Unit Lead for the Built Environment Unit at Polar Research and Policy Initiative. Thomas is a creative and independent thinker, built environment professional employed by WilkinsonEyre Architects. For further information, please visit his profile here.

Contributing Authors:

Dr Brooks Kaiser serves as Expert within the Fisheries Unit at Polar Research and Policy Initiative. She is an environmental and resource economist and economic historian. She holds a PhD in economics from Northwestern University and is a Professor at the University of Southern Denmark. She is also a University of Hawaii Economic Research Organization (UHERO) Research Fellow.

Lana Ollier is an Associate in the Geopolitics and Security Unit at Polar Research and Policy Initiative. She is currently completing a MSc in environmental policy and regulation at the London School of Economics. She holds a Bachelor’s degree in political science from the Freie Universität of Berlin.

‘Hyperloop is the definitive 21st century transportation solution, not only for the Baltic region, but for all of Europe.’ – Mårten Fröjdö, CEO of FS-Links,1 the consortium developing Hyperloop proposals in the region.

The traversal of the Arctic tundra and boreal forests is notoriously difficult. Its notoriety is documented so well that successful expeditions across it are often even celebrated. However, travelling across the unforgiving nature of the Arctic Biome is not reserved solely for courageous explorers and scientists; it has long created difficulties for those nations, local communities and people who call it ‘home’, and who look to make a living from the land.

It is also for this reason that several Arctic Council Member States are at the forefront of developing new and revolutionary Hyperloop technology to improve their own economic potential by cutting travel distances and negating the limits of their geography, all while reducing carbon emissions from transport. Most interesting of all is that this technology would also be cheaper and faster at transporting goods than conventional shipping, with the very real potential, in less than two decades, to outcompete the container-based shipping industry.

Put succinctly, Hyperloop is a proposed method of travel that would transport people and cargo at 745mph (1,200km/h) between locations in specially designed, magnetically levitated pods and a partially pressurised tube. The system would use currently existing technology such as maglev (magnetic levitation) to realise this vision. Once realised, however, the infrastructure is predicted to operate at just 50% the cost of high speed rail.2

Hyperloop is currently being marketed as the ‘fifth form’ of transportation – faster than all other forms of transport including high speed rail and, at the correct distance, more practical than a supersonic jet. However, the realities of this technology have not yet been realised.

After a successful public test of the propulsion system in May 2016, the market leader, Hyperloop-One, also announced their plans to establish their first official Hyperloop circuit between Dubai and Abu Dhabi3; the circuit is set to allow travel between the two destinations in approximately 12 minutes. This yields an impressive reduction in travel time by 92%.4

There are already plans to build a full-scale test as soon as December 2017.5 To increase investor confidence in achieving this milestone, the company has also released images of their Nevada test track under construction.

To date, publicly available information suggests that the following Arctic nations are in various stages of talks regarding Hyperloop infrastructure:

Sweden

Finland

Russia

Canada

Sweden & Finland

Significant progress towards Hyperloop has been made in the Baltic region between Sweden and Finland. After the success of the Oresund combined road and rail bridge between Copenhagen (Denmark) and Malmo (Norway), the other Nordic countries have been keen to replicate the same success.

The creation of the Oresund Bridge and its subsequent ‘Super Region’ have generated the following wider economic benefits (WEBS) for Denmark and Sweden:

Reduced journey time between the two countries to just 35 minutes

€7.7 billion in benefits has been generated through reduction of commuting & travelling costs

76,000 jobs were created in the Öresund region in its first decade after opening

Immediately after the opening, the volume of goods transported by rail increased by 33%

A weak Swedish currency compared to that of the Danish has led to Danes shopping and spending more time in Sweden, thus adding directly to the Swedish economy

Labour shortages in Sweden were able to be filled by Danes, and vice versa, allowing for the movement of skilled labour and reducing unemployment, especially amongst the young in Denmark (an economic phenomenon which is notorious for increasing state expenditure if not resolved)

The bridge also increased the viability of goods distribution by connecting Sweden to mainland Europe (via Denmark), which in turn improved and increased Swedish exports, especially for smaller businesses

The bridge is expected to ‘pay for itself’ in 33 years. This year (2017), equity should have been restored, allowing for dividends to be paid to creditors

Research conducted by the Øresund Committee and the Øresund Institute suggests that access to a common housing market has created economic gains for both countries, but more so for the Danes because they gained access to more affordable housing in Sweden whilst housing prices in Denmark were much higher. Many people now commute from Sweden to Denmark for work

This kind of optimism and positivity has driven the city of Salo, Finland, to sign an agreement with Hyperloop One and FS-Links to begin developing the first stage of the circuit, a 50-kilometre route west connecting Salo to the coastal city of Turku.

The benefit of this incremental approach is that it allows for the domestic sections in Sweden and Finland to be constructed separately and for each successive extension to generate revenue before the construction of the more costly connections.

The Canadian Government has not officially expressed any interest in the Hyperloop technology or its utilisation (at the time of writing). However, that hasn’t prevented the Canadian Hyperloop Company, Transpod, from making the case.

Currently, the only connection that Canada has to the Arctic is via infrequent planes travelling to specially designed airports such as Iqaluit. Transpod CEO, Sebastian Gendron believes his company can remedy this.

The CEO stated “Cargo…is one of the first markets we want to get into. The advantage of transporting goods to the Arctic region is that you don’t have the same considerations as you do with passengers; you can go faster and have a higher acceleration.”8

The transport of freight, and later passengers, to and from the Arctic region would create a raft of much needed opportunities for the region, such as tourism or distribution.

Such a circuit would also be a boon for the region ecologically and economically as can be seen in the benefits conferred by the recent Sweden and Denmark Oresund Bridge. Currently, shipping companies – particularly oil shipping companies, are preparing for the moment when enough Arctic ice has melted to allow for new, more direct shipping routes via a new Transpolar Sea Route connecting the East (China) to the West (Europe). Estimators report that it will be at least 10 years until the primacy of the Suez Canal is challenged by a new Northern Sea Route, and when established, this route will approximately be only 40% faster than the Suez Canal9.

However, if a Hyperloop partnership agreement could be created between the Arctic powers to create a Hyperloop circuit, an ever greater time and resource-saving route could feasibly become a reality in as little as 5-7 years, with dramatically less carbon emissions and an improved impact on climate change. Crucially, it would also dramatically reduce the likelihood of environmental damage through pollution and oil spills in the Arctic, which would be disastrous for the region.

“I am confident that in the near future we will radically alter our approach to transport systems…today we are on the threshold of the birth of new types of transport and transportation systems… how a project like Hyperloop will change approaches to development of the Northern Sea routes or railway lines, which provide access to the ports, if technologically and financially it will be implemented in the near future… At the level of Russia, as I see it, we will implement this approach” 10

To ensure its success, Sokolov commissioned a working group for the development of Hyperloop technologies in December 2016. This group is currently being chaired by his Deputy Minister of Transport, Alexey Tsydenov.11

The group is composed of Representatives of the Transport Ministry, the Federal Customs Service of Russia, the Ministry for Far East Development and the Russian Railways. This working group will appraise and develop proposals pertaining to the implementation of the technology as well as the legal framework to support it.

As of now, Hyperloop One and Russian company – the Summa Group, have signed an agreement with the city of Moscow to build a Hyperloop system in Russia’s capital. The proposed circuit will link Moscow and St. Petersburg and has the support of the Kremlin.12

Hyperloop is attractive to Russia for many reasons. Alongside the other wider economic benefits, a Hyperloop system would also make the country less vast, more connected and far more manageable. A transportation system which is impervious to weather and can traverse large swathes of Russian terrain expediently is of obvious benefit to the nation with the world’s largest territory.

If the first link between Moscow and St. Petersburg is successful, it may lay the ground work for lines to its Siberian and Far Eastern cities, as well as establishing another branch of the 21st Century ‘silk road’ already being championed by China, by proving a world-class distribution route from Asia to Europe and through Russia, which has palpable economic, political and poetic benefit.

Current Russian railway infrastructure is considered too inefficient for the movement of large freight, and in certain conditions, can only operate at extremely low speeds. The existing infrastructure is in need of significant improvement, and Hyperloop is another way of reviving this legendary trade route, unlocking incredible economic potential for Russia.

Obstacles

As promising as initial feasibilities suggest, the road to implementation is not certain. Alongside the challenges of realising this technology is one other major obstacle – Legislation.

The hyperloop is a completely new and revolutionary mode of transportation, and as a result, there is no existing legal framework which can be applied to it. To further complicate matters, this legislation will also need to be standardised across the many regions and nations which are seeking to adopt the technology in order for it to be truly effective.

Whilst speaking at Harvard University, Marvin Ammori,13 Hyperloop One’s General legal counsel, suggested one way of tackling the legal question, and it starts with ‘rights of way’.14

To avoid unnecessary controversy and difficulty, the company is investigating the placement of hyperloops above established motorway routes or along disused rail lines. This would allow the company to effectively ‘piggy back’ on these established routes without becoming mired in costly negotiations.15 Once the company finds a route with these conditions and the relevant support, it would develop all necessary components and work with local regulators ‘hand in glove’ to create a ‘cook book,’ which the company could then share with other regions as a set of minimum requirements.16

It seems as if this technology will first find its place in the Baltic region, where not only is there an appetite for the technology, but also the expertise and experience of constructing underwater multinational infrastructure (Oresund), as well as the intellectual capital17 to develop the required hardware and software.

Furthermore, if the current pace of development can be maintained, this technology has the capacity to truly revolutionise travel and commerce, whilst making the world less dependent on slow and polluting transportation, with the potential to render much of the container-based shipping industry obsolete.

9 Journal of Transport Geography 19(4):977-983· July 2011

11 Ibid.

12 Ibid.

13 Before joining Hyperloop One, Marvin Ammori spent over a decade representing top technology giants and start-ups concerning their most important legal issues. He led the pro-net neutrality coalitions. He advised Google in its antitrust investigation, Apple in its disagreement with the FBI over iPhone encryption, and many in the tech community to kill SOPA. Marvin has been named among Politico’s 50 visionaries for 2015, Fast Company’s 100 Most Creative in Business in 2012. – Hyperloop Law: Autonomy, Infrastructure, and Transportation Startups, Harvard University

14 https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2016/10/how-to-build-a-hyperloop/

15 Ibid.

16 Ibid.

17 During the talk, Marvin Ammori also suggested that Hyperlopp One may take advantage of the former Nokia campus and employ all former Nokia software engineers thereby creating a ‘silicon valley’ in Finland, utilising local expertise and developing local talent.

Funsho Parrott is a RIBA Chartered Architect and serves as Associate in the Built Environment Unit at Polar Research and Policy Initiative. He holds a Master’s degree in Architecture from the University of Nottingham and Chartered diploma from the Royal Institute of British Architects. Whilst at Nottingham, he studied sustainable urban development and density, as well as prototypical methods of construction and bioclimatic design. Key projects from his architectural portfolio include London City Island (13 hectares, £600 million), The English National Ballet (£20 million), and the National Memorial Arboretum (60 hectares, £16 million). His research interests include understanding design as a tool for managing polar resources, dealing with population growth and addressing climate change.

]]>0c.milhereshttp://polarconnection.org/?p=26702017-06-28T16:54:00Z2017-06-28T11:06:32ZPresident Vladimir Putin meeting in March 2017 with President of Iceland Guðni Jóhannesson at the International Arctic Forum in Arkhangelsk, Russia. […]

]]>President Vladimir Putin meeting in March 2017 with President of Iceland Guðni Jóhannesson at the International Arctic Forum in Arkhangelsk, Russia. Photo via kremlin.ru.

Russia’s relations with the West are the worst they have been since the end of the Cold War — more than a quarter century — though they are better in the Arctic region. First, there was Russia’s annexation of Crimea in February 2014, which the United Nations General Assembly condemned as a violation of international law, including the 1994 Budapest Memorandum on Security Assurances.[1] Western countries responded with waves of sanctions that damaged Russian banking and its energy industry.[2]Now, there is an ongoing investigation into the extent of Russian interference in the United States 2016 elections, which at the least included hacking into Democratic National Committee computers and planting fake news stories on social media.[3]On top of that, Russia meddled in France’s 2017 presidential election,[4]among others. Outside of the Arctic, Russia is no friend of international harmony.

The rationale for Russia’s actions is unclear. President Vladimir Putin claims the annexation of Crimea was in response to the will of the Crimean people,[5]following a referendum on March 16, 2014 (although the veracity of the results is questionable).[6]Russia’s aggression could be a nationalist re-assertion of its power or a strategic gamble to maintain access to the militarily important Black Sea.[7]Perhaps all this posturing has been to shore up domestic support, as independent polling shows that Putin’s popularity in Russia increased after the Crimea incident, to 80 per cent.[8]Russian election interference could be a means to help candidates more hospitable to Russia’s interests.

Russia’s bad behaviour does not necessairily carry over to the Arctic region. Its government continues to invest in defence, forming a “military group” with 6,000 troops in the northern Murmansk region[9] and opening a new military base on Wrangel Island.[10]Yet, Russia also has pursued co-operation in the region, such as bilateral talks to resolve territorial disputes over its extended continental shelf; further, it has complied perfectly with the voluntary United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.[11]Its government representatives have at least paid lip service to the importance of co-operation on environmental issues and climate change.[12]What does Russia’s Arctic behaviour teach us about its politics overall? Here are three lessons to think about. They are subject to update, as revelations about Russia and the administration of President Donald Trump appear almost daily.

Lesson One: It Has A Strong Incentive To Co-operate

Russia must maintain a relationship with the West, as it represents a key market for its Arctic oil; Western governments should thus continue to engage with the Kremlin. Russia is still the world’s largest oil producer. Arctic Siberia contains the majority of Russia’s 80 billion barrels of discovered oil,[13] or nearly two-thirds of its total production.[14]Revenues from oil and natural gas make up 43 per cent of Russia’s federal government budget.[15]It has the world’s only offshore oil rig in the Arctic Ocean, which is expected to produce more than 125,000 barrels a day by next year.[16] Some have reported that Russia is focusing more on Chinese markets for the future.[17] Yet, 60 per cent of Russia’s oil and 75 per cent of its natural gas are exported to Europe.[18] It is still possible to co-operate with Russia, as it needs European markets for its energy exports.

In September 2014, Exxon and Rosneft – a Russian oil company – discovered 700 million barrels of oil in the Kara Sea, bordering the Arctic Ocean, a project from which Exxon ultimately withdrew due to sanctions.[19]Rosneft said that it planned to exploit the field without Exxon, but so far has not been able to do so.[20]By the end of 2015, Exxon estimated it had lost $1 billion due to sanctions on its Russian investments.[21]An as-of-yet unproven hypothesis is that Russia interfered in the United States’ election in the hope that the Trump Administration would lift sanctions against the oil industry. Trump appointed former Exxon CEO (during time of the Kara discovery) Rex Tillerson as the Secretary of State. If that was Putin’s plan, clearly it has backfired, in fact worsening relations with the United States and possibly inviting yet another round of sanctions. If the gambit had worked, it would have helped the Russian economy; even now, perhaps it will inflate Putin’s popularity, as was the case after the Crimean episode. Despite difficulties, it is worthwhile to work to maintain diplomatic relations with Russia.

Lesson Two: Russia Isn’t Always Hostile And Still Co-operates

This incentive for co-operation has affected Arctic politics. Russia continues to co-operate in the Arctic Council.As I have written elsewhere, the number of comments that Russian delegates make in the Council is comparable to other member countries, as are its delegation sizes and project sponsorships.[22]In fact, the number of projects that it sponsors in the Council continues to increase. Russia’s Foreign Minister, Sergey Lavrov, used the recent Arctic Council meeting in Fairbanks, Alaska, as a chance to visit President Trump and Tillerson at the White House (which has created no end of controversy for the Trump Administration). The Russian government currently sponsors or co-sponsors 19 Arctic Council projects, such as work to collect methane emissions, reduce emissions from fish processing facilities, enhance Arctic search and rescue and provide climate change adaptation for nomadic herders.[23]This represents about one-fifth of its output. The negative relations with the United States have not really spilled into the Council; Russian officials complete work to protect the Arctic environment and respond to climate change. It is possible to co-operate with Russia, even on issues such as climate change, because of its need to maintain its energy industry.

Lesson Three: The Russian Government Is Not a Monolith

It is easy to think of the Russian government as a monolithic oligarchy, with Vladimir Putin as its head. Yet, strong parts of the Russian environmental bureaucracy have long supported democratizing the country, often at odds with Russia’s central government.[24]Russia is home to independent researchers, such as those at the internationally well-regarded National Research University Higher School of Economics.[25]Indigenous peoples in the Russian Arctic support environmental protection, but have to walk a difficult line as they face pressure from the Kremlin to support central government policies.[26] The Russian government is more than Putin.

Russia’s international behaviour is often erratic and threatens international security. Yet, its Arctic record teaches use some lessons. It relies on its Arctic energy industry to fuel its economy, including extensive exports to the West; thus, Russian leaders have an incentive to co-operate with the West. It continues to co-operate in the Arctic Council and sponsors environmental projects regularly; thus, it has not adopted a hostile posture in every aspect of its foreign policy. Russia includes scientists, environmentalists and Indigenous peoples who care about the environment and want to have peaceful relations with the West; thus, the leadership picture in the country is more diverse than it seems. Russia behaves badly, but Arctic politics shows us there is a way forward to work multilaterally with Russia.

Dr Andrew Chater serves as Expert in Arctic Governance and International Decision Making. He is also a professor in political science at Brescia University College in London, Ontario. He completed his doctorate at the University of Western Ontario and was previously a graduate resident at the Rotman Institute of Philosophy. He holds a master’s degree from the University of Waterloo. His research interests include Arctic governance, geopolitics and security, as well as Canadian foreign policy. His dissertation, Explaining the Evolution of the Arctic Council, examines reasons for contemporary changes in the role of the Arctic Council. It was completed in 2015. In 2013, he was part of the Arctic Athabaskan Council’s delegation at Arctic Council meetings in Whitehorse, Yukon.

]]>0c.milhereshttp://polarconnection.org/?p=26812017-06-18T00:28:43Z2017-06-14T21:54:48ZPolar Research and Policy Initiative is an official sponsor of the workshop ‘Regional Security in the North: Emerging Themes and Challenges’ […]

]]>Polar Research and Policy Initiative is an official sponsor of the workshop ‘Regional Security in the North: Emerging Themes and Challenges’ which will take place between June 19 and June 22, 2017 in Whitehorse, Yukon, Canada.

Theme: This workshop will explore borders, security and security management with particular attention to the unique features of the Arctic and Sub-Arctic region in Canada and the United States. It examines how border integrity and regional security are envisioned through the lens of national policy and practice, and asks how well these fit with regional security needs. What is the impact of existing security practice? What works? What does not?

This workshop will examine security issues from various perspectives and agencies and at various scales. It seeks to identify ways in which regional needs can be better identified and met, and where security policies and practices can be better understood in relation to local communities, agencies and governance.

Who Should Attend: The workshop is by invitation only. Participants include government agency representatives, NGOs, local government and community representatives, security experts, scholars, and students.

Workshop Location: The workshop will take place at Yukon College, Whitehorse, with a day-trip to Skagway, Alaska.

]]>Polar Research and Policy Initiative Fellow Nic Craig sat down with Aleksi Härkönen, Finland’s Ambassador for Arctic Affairs, to discuss Finland’s chairmanship of the Arctic Council over the coming two years.

In the offices of the Finnish Foreign Ministry, overlooking the harbour of Helsinki, I am met by Aleksi Härkönen and a pot of strong Finnish coffee. Having recently returned from Alaska and just days into the Finnish chairmanship of the Arctic Council, Aleksi is upbeat about the proceedings in Fairbanks and the coming two years. As the first ever ministerial meeting where the foreign ministers of all eight Arctic states and representatives from all the indigenous peoples’ organisations were present, Aleksi tells me that “in spite of the international tensions that form obstacles to cooperation elsewhere, it’s not particularly felt in the Arctic Council. Here peaceful, constructive cooperation continues.”

The Fairbanks Declaration [link] from the ministers and permanent participants “provides a good basis for further work, containing all the elements we need for continued cooperation” according to Härkönen. As well as referencing the four areas of priority for the Finnish chairmanship (environmental protection, connectivity, education and meteorological cooperation), the declaration also gives emphasis to the Paris Agreement and Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) that Finland is keen to pay special attention to over the course of the chairmanship.

Another primary outcome of the May’s meeting was the Agreement on Enhancing International Arctic Scientific Cooperation [link]. Aleksi tells me that “the idea is to form a legally binding basis for scientific cooperation that is necessary. We will facilitate the exchange of students, researchers, equipment across borders and the transfer of data from country to country and institution to institution.” Addressing the concerns of some observers to the council, Aleksi confirms that the new agreement, far from discriminating against non-Arctic institutions, will actually strengthen cooperation between all parties interested in Arctic research, regardless of geographical location.

Strengthening cooperation

As the chairmanship of the Arctic Council changed hands in May, Finland brings new priorities to the table with its ‘Exploring Common Solutions’ theme. From the outset however, the American and Finnish teams have striven for continuity. As Härkönen puts it, “the best way to strengthen Arctic cooperation is to strengthen the continuity; with only eight countries it should not be a difficult task.” As the telecommunications taskforce set up by the U.S. takes a new guise as ‘connectivity’, close collaboration with the Arctic Economic Council continues and work goes on to improve mental wellness, it is clear to see that themes from previous chairmanships are still being paid attention to. To aid such continuity in the future, Finland hopes to establish a set of commonly agreed long-term strategic goals for the Arctic that take into account the challenges and changes to come. Whilst early in the process, Aleski confirms that this will be on the agenda in the upcoming discussions between Senior Arctic Officials, and that Finland hopes to present a plan by 2019.

One way in which the Finnish chairmanship hopes to strengthen cooperation in the Arctic is to hitch onto the wagon of recent major international achievements of the Paris Climate Agreement and the Agenda 2030 SDGs. Aleksi hopes that the SDGs will provide a useful toolbox for improving cooperation, particularly through the Working Group on Sustainable Development. The Paris Agreement is an obvious area for the Council to work together on given that climate issues have been at the heart of Arctic scientific work for a long time. How to implement the agreement, as well as protecting Arctic biodiversity, will be the main points discussed by Arctic environment ministers in a meeting to be convened by Finland next year. Bringing up the new U.S. administration’s planned withdrawal from the Paris agreement, Härkönen is clear: “Climate work in the Arctic Council will definitely continue…you cannot just close your eyes to the effects that everybody sees”.

It is not breaking news that environmental protection, which has been central to the work of the Council throughout its history, will continue to be a priority going forward. Finland would like to find a way in which Arctic countries can speak with one voice in international climate negotiations to express a joint wish for results. Other areas of focus for the working groups of the council will be biodiversity, ocean acidification, microplastics as well as black carbon and methane emissions. Hydrocarbon extraction in the Arctic can often seem at odds with the goals of environmental protection. On this topic, Aleksi is clear that whilst the Council does not interfere with the energy policy of member states, it can assess the environmental and social impacts of such activities and provide recommendations to reduce such impacts. Härkönen cites the importance of involving observers here and the benefits that can be had from paying special attention to their views by arranging sessions where Arctic states listen to the observers of the Council.

Continuing the work of the U.S. chairmanship on telecommunications, Finland will broaden the focus out to connectivity in its second priority area. Aleksi explains that the issue needs tackling from two angles. First addressing how to connect the Arctic region with the rest of the world, but also how to make life and living conditions better for the inhabitants of the Arctic. With so few taxpayers in the region, Härkönen describes how infrastructure investment is needed from the outside. The role of the Council’s work here, he continues, is to cooperate closely with Arctic Economic Council and assess the needs and technical feasibility of increasing connectivity in the Arctic. Digitisation is sure to play a central role in this theme, as well as the more visible transport links and sea cables that can help to connect the Arctic to the world. Finland, with its technological knowhow that harks back to Nokia’s heydays, is well placed to lead on this issue.

Aside from cold winters and warm saunas, Finland’s international brand is as a world leader on education. As such, Finland is primed to overcome the challenges to accessing education that accompany remote areas and small languages. At the heart of the strategy is involving the local population in the development of the Arctic, as Aleksi tells me “We should guarantee that everyone in the Arctic gets a good basic education and is then able to continue to further education, trade school or whatever other possibilities there are”. The spread of digitised material through improved connectivity will certainly improve access to education, but Härkönen also emphasises the core role of teachers and educators. By working with the University of the Arctic, Finland will look to develop new teaching methods and strengthen the network of education specialists in the region.

The final priority for the Finnish chairmanship is improved meteorological cooperation in the Arctic. Whilst clearly important, meteorology is a less obvious area to focus on, so I ask Aleksi why Finland should take the charge on this, and why now? He quickly draws attention to Finland’s world class meteorological research, observation and services, stating that closer cooperation in this area would bring significant benefits to all stakeholders in the Arctic and strengthen the work of the World Meteorological Organisation. As the Arctic opens up to more tourism, international shipping and air traffic and the need for greater climate understanding becomes more intense, Härkönen says simply “the time is now”.

Local benefits to regional cooperation

Whilst Finland hopes to achieve a great deal in its time at the helm of the Arctic Council, the chairmanship can also benefit Finland and the Saami people. “We would like to strengthen Arctic cooperation to make our own neighbourhood safer in difficult international times and of course we would like to be a credible actor in the Arctic, in Northern Europe and even more widely” Härkönen explains, pointing to the global dimensions in all of the priorities Finland has laid out.

Gesturing out the window to the harbour, Aleksi points out the latest addition to the Finnish icebreaker fleet; a first-of-its-kind ship that runs on LNG, bringing significant environmental benefits. This is an example of the plentiful Finnish cold-climate innovation and knowhow. Härkönen believes the chairmanship provides a perfect example to showcase such products and services to the world, particularly the fields of connectivity and meteorology.

Turning the conversation to the Saami people, Aleksi points out the major benefits that the developing education and connectivity in the Arctic will have. Preventing marginalisation of the Saami will remain of great importance throughout the Finnish chairmanship. Härkönen mentions the strong relationship that the Arctic team has with Finland’s Saami parliament and the Saami council, with both groups closely consulted on Finland’s priorities for the next two years.

As cooperation in the Arctic Council continues to flourish through difficult international times, my chat with Aleksi has proven that Finland is ready to take on the coming challenges at the helm of the organisation. The priorities of the chairmanship will bring focus to both new and old topics in the ever-evolving landscape of Arctic cooperation.

Read more on Finland’s Chairmanship of the Arctic Council in 2017–2019 here. [link]

Nic Craig serves as an Associate in the Energy Unit at Polar Research and Policy Initiative. Nic is currently completing an MSc in Climate Change at the University of Copenhagen. Nic holds a BSc in Geography and German from the University of Exeter, through which he spent a year studying in Helsinki. He has a background in renewables and energy policy and before moving to Copenhagen spent his time working on the Britain Stronger in Europe campaign. Nic is particularly fascinated by the new opportunities that a changing Arctic brings and the interconnectivity of natural, commercial and social factors.