Christine Overall has argued: Overall (1985) argues for the more radical contention that a miracle would count as evidence against the existence of God, on three grounds: (1) if order and harmony are evidence for the existence of God, then a miracle, which entails a breach in the order and harmony of the universe, must count against the existence of God; (2) the inevitable controversies over the identification and authentication of a miracle are an impediment to the growth of scientific knowledge and philosophical comprehension; and (3) an omnipotent God who does intervene in His creation would be obliged, on pain of moral defect, to intervene more often and more evenhandedly than He is supposed to have done in the Christian tradition (See Keller immediately below).

James Keller has argued: Miracles in the sense of divine intervention are immoral because in such acts God would unfairly choose to help the beneficiary of the miracle over others who may be equally in need and just as deserving. Another kind of unfairness relating to miracles that Keller identifies has to do with epistemic privileging, or revealing something to one person rather than another. Why did the first century disciples get to walk and talk with Jesus, but we do not get to do that today? Additionally, miracles that occur out of the blue would be arbitrary and without any detectable pattern.

RESPONSE TO OVERALL:

Tim McGrew writes: Argument (1), besides giving a tendentious characterization of a miracle, exemplifies a fallacy in probabilistic reasoning, assuming that if F entails ~E and E is evidence for H, then F is evidence against H, which is not in general true. Claim (2) is arguably simply false, as such controversies do not appear noticeably to have impeded the progress of science or philosophy. Argument (3) will be effective against a certain sort of theological position, but it is not one that many believers in miracles actually hold. For further discussion of this issue, see the exchanges between Larmer and Overall.

Argument 1: Nothing happens contrary to the eternal and unchangeable order of nature (Argument against the possibility of a miracle).

Since God is the creator of the natural laws in the universe and since everything that God wills is characterized by eternal necessity and truth there must be an eternal necessity about the laws of nature that God has decreed. The laws of nature flow from the being of God by a necessity of his own perfection and divine nature. So, for God to will that something happen contrary to the laws of nature, would be to will contrary his own nature. The laws of nature are necessary expressions of his own unchangeable nature, and therefore everything that happens flows from an eternal necessity of the nature of God that is expressed in the laws of nature.

RESPONSE to 1: Spinoza was a pantheist, he thought that nature and God are identical. But, we must ask whether on a theistic view miracles are possible where God is distinct from the nature. And it seems like there is no reason to think that the laws of nature flow from necessarily and unchangeably from the being of God, indeed, God freely willed their coming into being, and moreover, God could have created an entirely different set of laws in different world, and he could have provided different initial conditions. Given God’s transcendence and sovereignty there is no reason to think that the laws of nature are necessary and eternal, but rather, are contingent upon the will of God which means that it is up to God whether He performs an event which is beyond the productive capacity of nature (Miracles should not be seen as violations of the laws of nature).

Argument 2: Miracles wouldn’t count as evidence against the existence of God; Spinoza attempted to produce all of his conclusions with mathematical certainty. But, if miracles could occur, they would overthrow the laws of nature and then nothing would be certain anymore and therefore we would be reduced to skepticism; far from leading to belief in God, they will undercut the laws of nature by rendering the laws of nature uncertain but the laws of nature are what we use to infer to a designer, and therefore to God.

RESPONSE: This argument has two assumptions which have typically not been held: 1) An argument for God’s existence does not have to demonstrated with mathematical certainty; and 2) God’s existence is inferred from natural laws. The first assumption may have characterized Aquinas and Spinoza, but for the most part this is not the case even for people in Spinoza’s day. As for the second assumption, that might be true of certain kinds of design arguments; but not all design arguments are based on the order of the natural laws? No. There are cosmological, moral, ontological, etc. arguments. In any case, even if this argument were true; would miracles land us in skepticism? No. Spinoza is assuming that miracles are violations of a law of nature, and that the laws of nature are immutable and akin to a glass structure running throughout the universe such that they solid yet brittle so that a violation of the laws on such a definition would overthrow (all) the laws, but if we think of miracles simply as naturally impossible events given the natural causes operative at a specific time and place then a miracle wouldn’t show that the laws of nature no longer operate; on the contrary it would show that God has intervened. In other words, the laws of nature have certain 'all things beings equal' assumptions which are implicit and state what would happen if there are no other natural (or supernatural factors) factors interferring. For example, it is a law of nature that potassium and oxygen combust when they come into contact (and in contact with a flame) , but I have potassium and oxygen in my body and even when I am near a fire, I do not combust; Is my body 'violating' a law of nature. No, but why not? Because the laws of nature state what would happen under the assumption that no other natural or supernatural factors are interferring so that when a stated law does not predict some event, the law is not overthrown, rather, we retain it and identify what the interferring factors were in the event under consideration (either natural or supernatural). Moreover, as Swinburne says; just because a scientific anomaly occurs (something that can’t be explained by the laws of nature) scientists don’t overthrow or abolish the laws of nature, rather, the counter-instance must occur repeatedly whenever the conditions for it are present; if an event were to occur that wasn’t the result of any known natural causes, then we will not simply abandon the natural law at that point, in order to that you would have to have the event occur again and again and again whenever those conditions are present, and of course for a miracle this is not the case. If the original formulation of the law is successful in predicting phenomena and it continues to be successful in the future, then even if a particular even cannot be naturalistically explained the law of nature will not be abandoned. Swinburne writes:

‘We have to some extent good evidence as to what are the laws of nature, and some of them are so well established and account for so many data that any modifications to them which suggest to account for the odd counterexample would be so clumsy and ad hoc as to upset the whole structure of science. In such cases the evidence is strong that if the purported counterinstance occurred it would just be taken as an anomaly (violation of a law) but you wouldn’t overthrow the law.’

Unfortunately Swinburne retains this talk of a miracle as a violation of a law, but if make this adjustment it seems that his point is correct about science won’t be overthrown by a miracle. In fact, Spinoza’s fear that miracles would destroy natural laws is quite unjustified; if you took it seriously, then it would itself be an impediment to the development of science because you never then could discover anything new, anything different from the laws of nature as presently understood ; Spinoza assumes that we have the final formulation of the laws of nature and that they are incapable of revision which is unscientific.

Argument 3: The laws of nature wouldn’t suffice to demonstrate the existence of the theistic God. Maybe some lesser being did it like an angel or demon.

RESPONSE: One could concede the point, but point out that typically, miracles are not seen as proofs for God’s existence, but rather, things like the cosmological, teleological, moral, etc. argument were used whereas miracles would play the role of showing that this God who has already been demonstrated to exist has intervened to speak through these particular revelation s of Himself in history; so it didn’t get you theism, it would get you a specific brand of theism; thus miracles were seen as confirmations of God’s specific revelation.

Moreover, the religio-historical context is what gives us a clue as to its ultimate source. A miracle without a context is inherently ambiguous, and therefore it is only when a miracle takes place in a religio-historical context that is charged with significance that the proper interpretation of the miracle will become clear. The miracles of Jesus are significant in this way because they aren’t anomalous and arbitrary events but rather, they are events that occur as a climax to Jesus’ own unparalleled life, and teachings, and radical personal claims, and the ultimate revelation of God to mankind; the signs he performed were signs of the in-breaking of God’s kingdom and is frought with significance.

Lastly, Spinoza’s concern with lesser beings such as angels and demons would most naturally fit as furniture in a universe that is theistic anyway. It would be a very strange sort of atheism that attributed Jesus’ resurrection to angels and demons.

Argument 4: W hat we call a miracle is an event according to an unknown law of nature. A miracle is a work of nature that is beyond our understanding.

RESPONSE: This is not an objection against the possibility of miracles, but rather, against the identification of a miracle. Most of our doubts to purported miracle stories has to do with this worry. However, we are not hopeless. When miracles occur in a significant religio-historical context, when a miracle occurs at a momentous time, or when the miraculous event doesn’t occur again and again, when the miracles are various (exorcisms, nature miracles, healing, resurrection) then the claim that all of them are the product of natural causes becomes implausible. Lastly, notice that this objection (unlike Hume’s) does not spring from the nature of historical testimony, but rather, it concerns a reliance on the ignorance of the natural processes involved in death; that is, it punts to the hope of present ignorance being vindicated by future knowledge of the natural processes pertaining to death showing us that there is in fact a natural cause that could bring someone back from the dead. However, as they did back then, we have a very good (even better) understanding today of the natural impossibility of a dead person coming back to life, and so in all probability, if such an event occurred, it must be a miracle.

RESPONSE TO KELLER (taken from David McKenzie):

1) Keller's charge of immorality and arbitrariness presupposes the following principle: act only in accordance with that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it become a universal law

While very Kantian, this categorical imperative has received devastating criticisms such as the following:

a)One of the first major challenges to Kant's reasoning came from the French philosopher Benjamin Constant, who asserted that since truth telling must be universal, according to Kant's theories, one must (if asked) tell a known murderer the location of his prey. This challenge occurred while Kant was still alive, and his response was the essay On a Supposed Right to Tell Lies from Benevolent Motives (sometimes translated On a Supposed Right to Lie because of Philanthropic Concerns). In this reply, Kant agreed with Constant's inference, that from Kant's premises one must infer a moral duty not to lie to a murderer.

b)Another objection is the "conscientious Nazi" — imagine a Nazi who wants to kill all Jews, and even says "If I found out I was Jewish I'd kill myself". Does that position violate Kant's categorical imperative? It seems it does not; but if not, then either it is an ethical position, or else there is more to ethics than Kant's principle can possibly capture

c)Rightness, on the standard reading of Kant, is not grounded in the value of outcomes or character, and thus not only doesn't provide the content of our moral duties, but excludes outcomes or consequences in addition to the character of the moral agent in determining whether some action is right or wrong.

So, in light of a) it seems that duties (much like laws of nature) are conditional and assume certain 'all things being equal' clauses which are implicit within the duty itself. Thus, if God has a duty to treat like persons alike we should understand this as a conditional duty that when 'all things are considered' can be broken (as in the case of lying to protect someone's life) if it is the best or only way to secure some outweighing good which in turn them redefines the contents of ones duty. Moreover, since Kant ignores or rejects the outcome or consequences of an action as being morally relevant to deciding what ones moral duty is, it is no wonder that this argument implies that everybody should receive a miraculous benefit at the same time under similar circumstances. However, we can well imagine situations where the consequences outweigh ones conditional moral duty and so the objector would have to show that were God to perform more miracles than He has (whatever that number turns out to be) to bestow some physical benefit upon somebody, that the consequences where God refrains from bestowing a miraculous benefit upon somebody else isn't justified in light of all the consequences such an action would have, but how could the objector possible show this!? So, in light of these criticisms, I think we see that the Kantian assumption underlying this argument is wrong, and must be adjusted since it is neither true that treating similar persons similarly implies that the same benefit be conferred UNCONDITIONALLY on each person nor at the SAME TIME. But then, this is enough to undercut the argument that if God performs a miracle for one person and not another that He is acting immorally. Another assumption of this argument is that a miraculous physical benefit is not equal to a non-miraculous benefit. Or again, God could give different but equal goods to two different people and at two different times where the one good could be miraculous, and the other non-miraculous; the one good received at the present, and the other received in the future and when all things are considered (which would require a God's eye perspective) God is acting fairly, justly, and lovingly when all things are considered. This means that God could treat similar persons similarly and still confer a unique and undeserved benefit to one at a different time than the other, especially when what is given is pure gift in the one instance, and not something needed. So, if God heals one person in this life, the other person could be compensated in the future, or have been compensated already in the present in a non-miraculous manner.

2) Miracles performed by God in the Christian tradition are not primarily purposed to confer a physical benefit on the recipient, but rather, occur within a religio-historical context that infuses the miracle with transcendent meaning that points beyond itself as a confirmation by God of the messenger at hand. This means that miracles are not arbitrarily performed by the Christian God, but have a definite purpose, context, and pattern. Moreover, many of the miracles that are criticized as being trivial or random are often either detached from this greater good, or the critic is assuming the doctrine of inerrancy when in most other contexts they would reject such a doctrine (and with good reason), or they are naivley interpreting some narrative in the Bible according to the standards of modern biographies instead of as what they often really are: mythopoeic, legendary, parabolic enacted parables, midrashic, haggadic, theological narratives, etc. in which case many (most?) alleged miracles (Daniel beign saved from the lions den) should not be interpreted in a literalistic fashion.

3) Moreover, miracles are necessary in order to unmistakably authenticate some revelation. Tim McGrew writes: "This argument was popular during the deist controversy of the early and mid 18th century, and the orthodox response is summed up well by Paley (1859: 12): “[I]n what way can a revelation be made but by miracles? In none which we are able to conceive.” Paley's point is not merely negative; rather, it is that only by setting up a universe with regularities that no mere human can abrogate and then suspending them could God, if there were a God, authenticate a revelation, stamping it with divine approval by an act of sovereignty. If there is a God who wishes to authenticate a communication to man in an unmistakable fashion, then, in Paley's view, an authenticating miracle is inevitable. It is therefore not at all impious to ascribe miracles to God, and they imply no limit either on His knowledge or on His power; they are both a sign of His approval and evidence of His benevolent foresight."

4) Another reason miracles are necessary is due to the fact that Nature, all by itself, is too vague too reveal what God's specific will is for us, William Lane Craig writes: "So I think it’s evident that if a transcendent Creator such as Deists believe in does exist, He could intervene in the sequence of natural causes. Why would He? Well, presumably to communicate to us information that is too specific to be conveyed by His revelation in nature alone. This would be especially necessary if there is some plan of salvation which we need to be aware of and embrace as a remedy for our moral culpability before God."

5) With respect to Keller's point about some people being epistemically privileged over other's, there are two ways that claim can be taken: 1) It is unfair for some people to have a clearer revelation of God compared to another, and 2) It is unfair of God to give better epistemic access to some compared to others.Claim 1) would only be true if God didn't accord salvation to people according to the degree of revelation that they have, and if there were some people who don't, but would believe in God if they were given a clearer revelation. However, God does judge people according to the amount of revelation that they have, and through His middle knowledge, God can so arrange the world so that all who would believe in Him receive sufficient revelation for salvation. Claim 2) begs the question in that it assumes that the only way to know that a miracle occurred is to be an eyewitness, and/or that there are people who would believe in God who don't have sufficient epistemic access to something like the resurrection. However, God has provided a non-evidential way to know that Christianity is true via the Holy Spirit which produces a properly basic belief in the truth of the essentials of the Gospel which are sufficient for salvation. Moreover, God isn't obligated to give people who wouldn't believe in Him 'clearer' epistemic access to some revelation if He knew it wouldn't do any good. What Keller would have to show is that there are people who don't believe in some revelation of god, but who would had they been placed in a different epistemic situation, but how can he possibly show that there are such people. Once again, Keller wrongly assumes that God hasn't provided different but equally effective routes of knowing that some revelation from God is true.

6) This next point is meant to be a reductio of all of Overall and Keller's points for if there arguments are successful, then they would demonstrate that God not only wouldn't do miracles, but that such miracles would count against the existence of God. Therefore, God wouldn't do any miracles. But, if we join Keller and Overall in thinking that God should sit back and do nothing miraculous in the universe, then such a God would be unloving, since ..."on the Christian view, God’s intervention is not simply aimed to communicate more information to us but to actually do something: Christ’s death on the cross is the atoning sacrifice for mankind’s sin, thus making our spiritual and moral restoration possible. Unless God did something, if He just sat back and did nothing, as the Deist imagines, then we should all be doomed." So, it isn't only necessary that God perform at least some miracles to confirm the content of a revelation, but is also necessary for the Christian God to perform at least some miracles to achieve the greatest good of all for us, namely, our salvation (which was accomplished through the incarnation, life, death, and resurrection of Jesus! ) Surely, this is the death knell for Overall and Keller if their arguments lead us to believe that a perfectly loving God wouldn't even be able to love us appropriately.