Abu Aardvarkhttp://abuaardvark.typepad.com/abuaardvark/
The battle's done, and we kind of won, so we sound our victory cheer: where do we go from here?
... a blog by Marc Lynchen-US2015-09-15T10:41:26-04:00

Some Newshttp://abuaardvark.typepad.com/abuaardvark/2015/09/rounding-up-some-changes.html
Aardvark hard at work on sabbatical, by Dave Sim and Gerhard I've got a few announcements to make, for those interested: First, I am extremely delighted to be starting a research sabbatical from George Washington University This is my first...<p>&#0160;</p>
<p style="text-align: center;"><a href="http://abuaardvark.typepad.com/.a/6a00d8341c391553ef01b7c7cdd44d970b-pi" style="display: inline;"><img alt="Cerebusnapping" height="248" src="http://abuaardvark.typepad.com/.a/6a00d8341c391553ef01b7c7cdd44d970b-320wi" style="display: block; margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;" title="Cerebusnapping" width="392" /></a><em><strong>Aardvark hard at work on sabbatical, by Dave Sim and Gerhard</strong></em></p>
<p style="text-align: center;">&#0160;</p>
<p>I&#39;ve got a few announcements to make, for those interested:</p>
<p>First, I am extremely delighted to be starting a research sabbatical from George Washington University This is my first sabbatical in a very long time -- in fact, my first since 2001, when my first sabbatical at Williams College was abruptly interrupted in its second week by 9/11. That means I won&#39;t be teaching, doing administrative work, or showing my face much around George Washington University.&#0160; I am staying in the DC area, though, and I will still be fully running the <a href="http://www.pomeps.org" target="_self">Project on Middle East Political Science,</a> working as a contributing editor at the <a href="http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/monkey-cage/" target="_self">Monkey Cage</a> blog, and doing a bunch of other things which may not be what smarter academics would consider &quot;sabbatical.&quot;</p>
<p>My sabbatical does mean that after six incredibly rewarding years, I have stepped down as the director of the Elliott School of International Affairs Middle East Studies Program and the Institute for Middle East Studies. The Institute is now back in the very capable hands of founding director Nathan Brown, ably assisted by Associate Director Shana Marshall.&#0160; If you have any questions about the program, ask them!&#0160;</p>
<p>My primary project for the next few months is finishing <a href="http://www.amazon.com/New-Arab-Wars-Uprisings-Anarchy/dp/161039609X/ref=sr_1_cc_3?s=aps&amp;ie=UTF8&amp;qid=1440014337&amp;sr=1-3-catcorr&amp;keywords=marc+lynch" target="_self"><em>The New Arab Wars: Uprising and Anarchy Across the Middle East</em></a>, my new book set to be published by Public Affairs in the spring. I will have much more to share about this book soon. In the meantime, if I&#39;m not tweeting much, declining media or reviewing invitations, or not attending events, that&#39;s why.</p>
<p>My sabbatical isn&#39;t the only big professional change.&#0160; I am thrilled to announce that I have joined the <a href="http://carnegieendowment.org/" target="_self">Carnegie Endowment for International Peace</a> as a <a href="http://carnegieendowment.org/experts/?fa=1082" target="_self">nonresident senior associate</a>.&#0160; I will be working with the <a href="http://carnegieendowment.org/programs/middleeast/" target="_self">Middle East Program</a> on a broad range of issues related to Arab politics. I couldn&#39;t be more excited about joining the outstanding Carnegie team, or about some of the projects we have in the works.</p>
<p>The only downside to joining Carnegie is that I have had to end my long affiliation with the Center for a New American Security. CNAS has been a fantastic home for many years, and I am deeply grateful to all the great people there for the support and the opportunity to publish substantive reports which hopefully made a difference on policy towards Syria (2012&#39;s <a href="http://www.marclynch.com/2012/02/23/cnas-helping-syria-without-war/" target="_self"><em>Helping Syria Without War</em></a>, 2013&#39;s <a href="http://www.marclynch.com/2013/02/26/cnas-syrias-hard-landing/" target="_self"><em>Syria&#39;s Hard Landing</em></a>, and 2014&#39;s&#0160; <a href="http://www.marclynch.com/2014/10/20/cnas-the-tourniquet/" target="_self"><em>The Tourniquet</em></a>), Iran (2011&#39;s <a href="http://www.marclynch.com/2011/05/19/upheaval-u-s-policy-towards-iran-in-a-changing-middle-east/" target="_self"><em>Upheaval</em></a>), public diplomacy and counter-terrorism (2010&#39;s <a href="http://www.marclynch.com/2010/06/05/rhetoric-and-reality-countering-terrorism-in-the-age-of-obama/" target="_self"><em>Rhetoric and Reality</em></a>, which really should have gone by the Biggie-inspired original title <em>Silence and Violence</em>), and public diplomacy (2009&#39;s <a href="http://www.marclynch.com/2010/05/19/americas-extended-hand-assessing-the-obama-administrations-global-engagement-strategy-with-kristin-lord/" target="_self"><em>America&#39;s Extended Hand</em></a>, with Kristin Lord). A million thanks to all the great scholars, policy practitioners and staff who worked with me over the years at CNAS.&#0160;</p>
<p>By the way, have you noticed my awesome semi-new &quot;To Abu Aardvark From Cerebus the Aardvark&quot; avatar? This is a Dave Sim original commission and I love it.&#0160; Thanks, Dave!</p>
<p><a href="http://abuaardvark.typepad.com/.a/6a00d8341c391553ef01b8d1579d3d970c-pi" style="display: inline;"><img alt="CerebusSketch" src="http://abuaardvark.typepad.com/.a/6a00d8341c391553ef01b8d1579d3d970c-320wi" title="CerebusSketch" /></a></p>
<p>&#0160;</p>
<p>I launched Abu Aardvark as a stand-alone, pseudonymous blog almost exactly thirteen years ago. An awful lot has changed since then, and at this point I barely blog at all. Still, in terms of Dave Sim&#39;s 300 issue, 27 year Cerebus the Aardvark epic, Abu Aardvark is still only somewhere around the <em>Jaka&#39;s Story/Melmoth</em> interlude between the climax of <em>Church and State</em> and the launch of <em>Mothers and Daughters</em>. That&#39;s not a bad place to spend a sabbatical.&#0160;</p>
<p>&#0160;</p>abu aardvark2015-09-15T10:41:26-04:00Yemen's latest crisishttp://abuaardvark.typepad.com/abuaardvark/2015/03/yemens-latest-crisis.html
When the Houthis seized Sanaa last fall, I published a collection of links of useful articles by academics which had thoroughly anticipated the fundamental shortcomings of the National Dialogue process, the fracturing of Yemeni state institutions, and the rising power...<p>When the Houthis seized Sanaa last fall, I published a <a href="http://abuaardvark.typepad.com/abuaardvark/2014/09/whats-up-with-those-houthis-in-yemen.html" target="_self">collection</a> of links of useful articles by academics which had thoroughly anticipated the fundamental shortcomings of the National Dialogue process, the fracturing of Yemeni state institutions, and the rising power of both the Houthi and the southern insurrections. With the Houthi move south, the flight of ex-President Hadi, and the launch of a Saudi-led military campaign, Yemen&#39;s long predicted new crisis has now entered an even more dangerous phase.&#0160;</p>
<p>There were never any illusions in the academic or Yemen policy community about the limitations of the so-called Yemen model, especially the exclusion of youth activists and marginalized communities from the National Dialogue, the Gulf Cooperation Council&#39;s imposition of a top-down, largely anti-democratic transition process, and -- above all -- the immunity granted to former President Ali Abdullah Saleh. Their analysis has been overwhelmingly, depressingly, vindicated by the recent turn of events, and also deeply complicates the popular but simplistic sectarian narratives of Sunni resistance to Iranian expansionism.&#0160; Today, an equally robust consensus has quickly emerged among Yemen analysts that the Saudi-led military campaign is likely to badly backfire, one which is likely to be just as ignored to equally negative effect.</p>
<p>Below is an updated collection of useful links and analysis, which may be useful to those trying to make sense of the current stage of Yemen&#39;s crisis.</p>
<p><a href="http://pomeps.org/2013/03/21/yemens-national-dialogue/" target="_self">POMEPS Briefing #19&#0160; Yemen&#39;s National Dialogue:&#0160;&#0160;</a> collection of essays by leading academics and analysts, including Danya Greenfield, Holger Albrecht, April Alley, Stephen Day, Peter Salisbury, Stacey Philbrick Yadav, Silvana Toska, Adam Baron, Lisa Wedeen and more.</p>
<p>April Alley, &quot;<a href="http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/middle-east-north-africa/iraq-iran-gulf/yemen/154-the-huthis-from-saada-to-sanaa.aspx" target="_self">The Huthis: From Sadaa to Sanaa</a>.&quot; Crisis Group.</p>
<p>Stephen Day, &quot;<a href="http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/monkey-cage/wp/2015/02/23/whats-behind-yemens-recent-political-turmoil/" target="_self">What&#39;s behind Yemen&#39;s recent political turmoil</a>&quot; The Monkey Cage</p>
<p>Stacey Philbrick Yadav and Sheila Carapico, &quot;<a href="http://merip.org/mer/mer273/breakdown-gcc-initiative" target="_self">The Breakdown of the GCC Initiative in Yemen</a>&quot; Middle East Report</p>
<p>Stacey Philbrick Yadav, &quot;<a href="http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/monkey-cage/wp/2014/09/25/the-limits-of-the-sectarian-framing-in-yemen/" target="_self">The limits of the sectarian framing in Yemen.</a>&quot;&#0160; The Monkey Cage.</p>
<p>Silvana Toska, &quot;<a href="http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/monkey-cage/wp/2014/09/26/shifting-balances-of-power-in-yemens-crisis/" target="_self">Shifting balances of power in Yemen&#39;s crisis</a>.&quot;&#0160; The Monkey Cage.</p>
<p>Peter Salisbury, &quot;<a href="http://www.chathamhouse.org/publication/yemen-and-saudi-iranian-cold-war" target="_self">Yemen and the Saudi-Iranian Cold War</a>&quot;, ECFR</p>
<p>Gabriele vom Bruck, &quot;<a href="http://www.merip.org/yemeni-political-dialogue-riyadh" target="_self">Yemeni Political Dialogue in Riyadh</a>&quot; Middle East Report</p>
<p>Susanne Dahlgren, &quot;<a href="http://www.merip.org/mero/mero032015" target="_self">Four Weddings and a Funeral in Yemen</a>&quot; Middle East Report</p>
<p>Adam Baron, &quot;<a href="http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2015/03/yemen-intervention-116396.html#.VRPr8IdH2CQ" target="_self">What we got wrong in Yemen (and why foreign intervention would be the worst course</a>&quot;, Politico</p>
<p>Gregory Johnsen, &quot;<a href="http://www.buzzfeed.com/gregorydjohnsen/yemen-may-be-past-the-point-of-peaceful-return#.kk0aa9EpQ" target="_self">Yemen past the point of peaceful return</a>&quot; Buzzfeed</p>
<p>Stacey Philbrick Yadav, &quot;<a href="http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/monkey-cage/wp/2015/02/02/yemens-houthis-and-islamist-republicanism-under-strain/" target="_self">Yemen&#39;s Houthis and Islamist Republicanism under strain</a>&quot; The Monkey Cage</p>
<p>Charles Shmitz, &quot;<a href="http://www.mei.edu/content/at/huthi-ascent-power" target="_self">The Huthi Ascent to Power</a>.&quot; Middle East Institute.</p>
<p>Iona Craig, &quot;<a href="http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2014/9/25/houthi-yemen-takeover.html" target="_self">What the Huthi takeover of Sanaa reveals about Yemen&#39;s politics</a>&quot; Al-Jazeera America.</p>
<p>Peter Salisbury, &quot;<a href="http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/14094/yemen-s-hawthis-redraw-political-map-upend-transition" target="_self">Yemen&#39;s Huthis redraw political map, upend transition</a>.&quot; World Politics Review.</p>
<p>I&#39;ll update this list as appropriate, with a + to indicate the new ones!</p>
<p><em>&#0160;</em></p>abu aardvark2015-03-26T07:35:53-04:00John Legend in Bahrain: "please know that I stand with you" http://abuaardvark.typepad.com/abuaardvark/2015/03/john-legend-in-bahrain-please-know-that-i-stand-with-you-.html
I was gratified and pleased that John Legend did not ignore the controversy surrounding his performance in Bahrain. He clearly heard and thought about the concerns raised by Bahraini activists, human rights organizations, and (maybe) my open letter. While he...<p><a class="asset-img-link" href="http://abuaardvark.typepad.com/.a/6a00d8341c391553ef01b7c7582241970b-pi" style="display: inline;"><img alt="Legendglory" class="asset asset-image at-xid-6a00d8341c391553ef01b7c7582241970b img-responsive" src="http://abuaardvark.typepad.com/.a/6a00d8341c391553ef01b7c7582241970b-320wi" title="Legendglory" /></a></p>
<p>&#0160;I was gratified and pleased that John Legend did not ignore the controversy surrounding his performance in Bahrain.&#0160; He clearly heard and thought about the <a href="http://thinkprogress.org/world/2015/02/26/3627532/john-legend-bahrain/" target="_self">concerns</a> raised by <a href="http://www.independent.co.uk/news/people/john-legend-criticised-over-bahrain-gig-over-human-rights-concerns-10073547.html" target="_self">Bahraini</a> activists, human rights organizations, and (maybe) <a href="http://abuaardvark.typepad.com/abuaardvark/2015/02/an-open-letter-to-john-legend-on-bahrain.html" target="_self">my open letter</a>. While he did not cancel the appearance, he did <a href="http://globalvoicesonline.org/2015/03/03/john-legend-tells-bahrains-peaceful-protesters-i-stand-with-you/" target="_self">make a point</a> of speaking about <a href="http://abcnews.go.com/Entertainment/wireStory/singer-john-legend-performs-bahrain-sold-crowd-29332149" target="_self">justice and political freedoms</a> during his signature performance of &quot;Glory&quot; and <a href="https://instagram.com/p/zvpMY1ESlz/" target="_self">posting</a> the full text of his remarks via Instagram to make sure that they would be seen and heard by his fans.</p>
<p>Here&#39;s what he <a href="http://showmecampaign.org/news/" target="_self">had to say</a>:</p>
<p style="padding-left: 30px;">When I spoke at the Oscars last week, I quoted one of my favorite artists, American musician Nina Simone. She said that, “It’s an artist’s duty to reflect the times in which we live.” So I feel that it’s part of my job to express myself freely and passionately about issues I care about. I walk in the footsteps of so many great artists who came before me who did just that.</p>
<p style="padding-left: 30px;">...</p>
<p style="padding-left: 30px;">A just society is one built not on fear or repression or vengeance or exclusion, but one built on love. Love for our families. Love for our neighbors. Love for the least among us. Love for those who look different or worship differently. Love for those we don’t even know.</p>
<p style="padding-left: 30px;">We continue to fight in America to move toward this just society and we pray the same for the people of Bahrain. And for those who stand for justice, accountability, freedom of expression, freedom of peaceful assembly, freedom to organize without fear of retribution, please know that I stand with you.</p>
<p>While his comments may have been less direct and forceful than Bahraini activists had hoped, I found them to be a thoughtful and considered response to the situation. Many other artists would have followed the Kim Kardashian playbook and simply ignore the critics. He could have easily delivered the performance and said nothing, but he chose instead to speak to draw explicit connections between the struggle for justice in America and Bahrain.&#0160; It was a meaningful, thoughtful, and courageous gesture which not many had expected him to make. Legend&#39;s comments on stage proved to me that he is no hypocrite on civil rights.&#0160; At least some Bahrain activists seem pleased that <a href="https://twitter.com/MARYAMALKHAWAJA/status/572737519621697536" target="_self">he said</a> <a href="https://twitter.com/MohmdAshoor/status/572654663020879872" target="_self">something</a>. Hopefully he found the time to meet up with some of them before leaving the country. </p>
<p>At the least, the coverage of his visit has helped to turn a desperately needed spotlight back on to Bahrain&#39;s repression, absence of accountability, and political reforms -- many <a href="http://abuaardvark.typepad.com/abuaardvark/2015/02/an-open-letter-to-john-legend-on-bahrain.html" target="_self">thanks</a> for all the journalists, Bahraini activists, and human rights organizations who worked to drive that public conversation. Hopefully John Legend will continue to think and speak about&#0160;the international dimension of the struggles for equality, rights and freedom about which he sings -- and some of his legion of fans will continue to think about Bahrain.&#0160;</p>abu aardvark2015-03-03T10:01:29-05:00An Open Letter to John Legend on Bahrainhttp://abuaardvark.typepad.com/abuaardvark/2015/02/an-open-letter-to-john-legend-on-bahrain.html
Dear John Legend, Like millions of Americans, I was profoundly moved by your Oscar performance of "Glory" with Common and by your principled speech which followed. For years, I have been a great fan of your work, and of your...<p><iframe allowfullscreen="" frameborder="0" height="315" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/25bAn6iAkcc" width="560"></iframe></p>
<p>Dear John Legend,</p>
<p>Like millions of Americans, I was profoundly moved by your Oscar performance of &quot;Glory&quot; with Common and by your principled speech which followed.&#0160; For years, I have been a great fan of your work, and of your willingness and ability to take strong and informed political stands.&#0160; That&#39;s why I was astonished and dismayed to learn today that you were planning to play a <a href="http://www.yallabahrain.com/events/john-legend" target="_self">show in Bahrain</a> on March 2.&#0160; I&#0160; write in the hope that you will apply your strong political convictions at home to a very similar set of problems abroad, and reconsider this performance, or speak out about what you see.</p>
<p>In March 2011, Bahrain carried out an astonishingly brutal crackdown on a peaceful resistance movement.&#0160; Protestors inspired by the Tunisian and Egyptian revolutions took to the streets, occupying Manama&#39;s Pearl Roundabout and demanding constitutional reforms.&#0160; As documented in brutal detail by the <a href="http://www.bici.org.bh/" target="_self">Bahrain Independent Commision of Inquiry</a>, Bahrain&#39;s regime responded with a violent crackdown, including the forceful dispersion of protestors and a sweeping campaign of arrests and torture.&#0160; You would find the images of citizens facing off against armed police amidst clouds of tear gas very familiar. This repression had a sectarian dimension, with Shi&#39;ite citizens singled out and punished for their religious identity.&#0160; Over the last year, prominent non-violent activists such as Nabeel Rajab were imprisoned for their dissent. The <a href="http://www.hrw.org/news/2015/01/29/bahrain-unchecked-repression" target="_self">Human Rights Watch 2015 World Report</a>, released just a few weeks ago, describes Bahrain&#39;s situation as &quot;unchecked repression&quot; in which there has been <a href="http://www.hrw.org/reports/2014/05/28/criminalizing-dissent-entrenching-impunity" target="_self">no accountability</a> for those rampant human rights abuses. <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/countries/middle-east-and-north-africa/bahrain/" target="_self">Amnesty International</a> describes Bahrain in 2014/15 as a country in which the government works</p>
<p style="padding-left: 30px;">&quot;to stifle and punish dissent and to curtail freedoms of expression, association and assembly. Security forces used excessive force to disperse protests, killing at least two people. Opposition activists sentenced after unfair trials in previous years continued to be held, including prisoners of conscience. Torture of detainees continued and a climate of impunity prevailed.&quot;</p>
<p>Can you tell which scene of protestors facing tear gas below is from Ferguson and which from the <a href="http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2014/01/19/bahrain-s-lethal-teargas-war.html" target="_self">streets of Bahrain?</a></p>
<p><a class="asset-img-link" href="http://abuaardvark.typepad.com/.a/6a00d8341c391553ef01b8d0ddaf2e970c-pi" style="display: inline;"><img alt="Rs_1024x759-140814080536-1024.Missouri-Unrest-John-Legend-JR-81414_copy" class="asset asset-image at-xid-6a00d8341c391553ef01b8d0ddaf2e970c img-responsive" src="http://abuaardvark.typepad.com/.a/6a00d8341c391553ef01b8d0ddaf2e970c-320wi" title="Rs_1024x759-140814080536-1024.Missouri-Unrest-John-Legend-JR-81414_copy" /></a><a class="asset-img-link" href="http://abuaardvark.typepad.com/.a/6a00d8341c391553ef01b8d0ddc50a970c-pi" style="display: inline;"><img alt="Image_update_dc82f6cd6d6b9b61_1335034695_9j-4aaqsk" class="asset asset-image at-xid-6a00d8341c391553ef01b8d0ddc50a970c img-responsive" src="http://abuaardvark.typepad.com/.a/6a00d8341c391553ef01b8d0ddc50a970c-320wi" title="Image_update_dc82f6cd6d6b9b61_1335034695_9j-4aaqsk" /></a></p>
<p><em>Source: <a href="http://www.eonline.com/news/569290/ferguson-unrest-spurs-reactions-from-celebs-such-as-john-legend-and-moby-find-out-what-they-said" target="_self">E Online</a></em>; <em>Getty Images</em></p>
<p>&#0160;</p>
<p>&#0160;You have emerged as a voice of conscience in today&#39;s America.&#0160; In your writing, performances and speeches you have proven yourself to be a principled champion of equality who is unafraid to speak out for what is right.&#0160; Last year, <a href="http://www.billboard.com/articles/news/6406005/john-legend-ferguson-eric-garner-blacklivesmatter" target="_self">you wrote</a> that</p>
<p style="padding-left: 30px;">&quot;As I watched the final version of <em>Selma</em>, I did so with the backdrop of the streets of many of our major cities filled with protesters, crying out for justice after yet another unarmed black person&#39;s life was taken by the police with impunity.&quot;</p>
<p>Bahraini lives have been taken by the police with impunity as well, and Bahraini lives do matter. I hope that you will think deeply about the implications of performing in a country like today&#39;s Bahrain, where the violence of an unaccountable police against peaceful protestors mirrors everything against which you have spoken out at home. If you do decide to perform, perhaps you could speak out about the situation there as you have so gracefully done here in America.</p>
<p>&#0160;Yours sincerely,</p>
<p>A fan.</p>
<p>----</p>
<p>UPDATE: John Legend <a href="http://www.independent.co.uk/news/people/john-legend-criticised-over-bahrain-gig-over-human-rights-concerns-10073547.html" target="_self">responds</a>:</p>
<p style="padding-left: 30px;"><em>&quot;Some have recently suggested that, due to documented human rights abuses by the government of Bahrain, I should cancel my upcoming concert there.&#0160; After consulting with human rights experts, I decided to keep my commitment to perform for the people of Bahrain, many of whom I am proud to call my fans, during their annual festival.</em></p>
<p style="padding-left: 30px;"><em>&quot;I have spent quite a bit of time thinking about human rights, civil rights and other issues of justice, both in the United States and abroad. The solution to every human rights concern is not always to boycott.&#0160; Most of the time I will choose to engage with the people of the country rather than ignore or abandon my commitments to perform for them.&#0160;</em></p>
<p style="padding-left: 30px;"><em>&quot;Often, the best way to drive progress is to show up and participate in the conversation. As we move this work forward, I hope to meet the many people who are peacefully struggling for freedom, justice and accountability, regardless of what country they live in, and tell them directly that I stand with them. Part of my mission in life is to spread love and joy to people all over the world.&#0160; I intend to do just that in Bahrain, regardless of my disagreements with some of their governments&#39; policies and actions.&quot;</em></p>
<p>I hope that he follows through on the promise of this response. If, as <a href="https://twitter.com/NickKristof/status/571280410119933954" target="_self">Nick Kristof suggests</a>, he goes out and meets with a wide range of Bahrainis, including those who have suffered under the regime&#39;s repression, and speaks out from the stage about human rights, then he could make a powerful statement.&#0160; If he doesn&#39;t, then it&#39;s Kardashian-Redux, and a profound disappointment. But&#0160; I think that he will deliver.&#0160;</p>
<p>UPDATE 2:&#0160;&#0160; A number of stories have now been written about this, which I collect below and will update when possible. Thanks to all of the authors for the attention to Bahrain:</p>
<p>&#0160; - <a href="http://thinkprogress.org/world/2015/02/26/3627532/john-legend-bahrain/" target="_self">Powerful Open Letter to John Legend Urges Him to Cancel Upcoming Concert</a> -- Beenish Ahmed, Think Progress (2/26)</p>
<p>&#0160; - <a href="http://www.independent.co.uk/news/people/john-legend-criticised-over-bahrain-gig-over-human-rights-concerns-10073547.html" target="_self">John Legend responds to criticism over Bahrain gig among human rights concerns</a> -- Jamie Merrill, The Independent (2/26)</p>
<p>&#0160;- <a href="http://www.indexoncensorship.org/2015/02/bahrainis-are-upset-with-john-legend-heres-why/" target="_self">Bahrainis are upset with John Legend. Here&#39;s why</a>. -&#0160;Milana Knezevic, Index on Censorship (2/26)</p>
<p>&#0160; - <a href="http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/worldviews/wp/2015/02/27/john-legend-took-a-strong-moral-stand-at-the-oscars-now-hes-performing-in-bahrain/?postshare=6731425059743453" target="_self">John Legend took a strong, moral stand at the Oscars. Now he&#39;s performing in Bahrain</a> -- Adam Taylor, Washington Post (2/27)</p>
<p>&#0160; - <a href="http://www.buzzfeed.com/hayesbrown/john-legend-no-not-bahrain-stop#.lsEad2pNW" target="_self">John Legend Got Called Out For Performing in a Country With Massive Human Rights Abuses (</a>but had one of the classiest responses ever) -- Hayes Brown, Buzzfeed (2/27)</p>
<p>&#0160; - <a href="http://www.thestar.com/news/world/2015/02/27/john-legend-says-bahrain-show-will-go-on.html" target="_self">John Legend says Bahrain show will go on</a> -- Jillian Kessler-D&#39;Amours, Toronto Star (2/27)</p>
<p>&#0160;- <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/28/world/middleeast/john-legend-rejects-calls-to-cancel-bahrain-show-over-rights-abuses.html?partner=rss&amp;emc=rss&amp;smid=tw-nytimesworld" target="_self">John Legend rejects calls to cancel show over rights abuses</a> -- Robert Mackey, New York Times (2/28)</p>abu aardvark2015-02-25T14:12:32-05:00303 in 2014http://abuaardvark.typepad.com/abuaardvark/2014/12/2014-a-year-in-numbers.html
With 2014 rattling to an end, I just wanted to use this year's relaunched old school Abu Aardvark blog to highlight a pretty incredible number: 303. That's how many different scholars participated in at least one of the core activities...<p>With 2014 rattling to an end, I just wanted to use this year&#39;s <a href="http://abuaardvark.typepad.com/abuaardvark/2014/09/no-introduction.html" target="_self">relaunched</a> old school Abu Aardvark blog to highlight a pretty incredible number: 303.</p>
<p>That&#39;s how many different scholars participated in at least one of the core activities of the <a href="http://www.pomeps.org/" target="_self">Project on Middle East Political Science</a> during 2014 (not counting the dozens more who joined in our - crowded! - wine receptions at APSA, ISA and/or MESA). That includes more than three dozen mostly junior scholars who received small research and writing grants; six pre-tenure scholars who worked with a dozen discussants at the annual Junior Scholars Book Development Workshop; more than one hundred different scholars whose work we solicited, edited and published in the <a href="http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/monkey-cage/" target="_self"><em>Monkey Cage;</em></a> more than sixty different scholars who participated in six major workshops at four different universities and contributed to five volumes of original essays in the <a href="http://pomeps.org/2014/06/26/pomeps-studies-index/" target="_self">POMEPS Studies series; a</a> <a href="http://pomeps.org/category/multimedia/conversations/pomeps-conversations-index/" target="_self">dozen brave souls who sat down with me for a POMEPS Conversation and </a>two dozen who came to GW to speak at book launches or panel discussions. I&#39;m sure there are some I didn&#39;t count. And looking ahead, 2015 might well make 2014 look like a slow year!</p>
<p>Being able to work with, support, and publicize the work of over 300 different scholars in one year, and to see their work having so much impact and getting so much attention, really does make it all seem worthwhile. It&#39;s a testament to the vibrancy of the much-maligned field of <a href="http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/monkey-cage/wp/2014/08/19/explaining-the-arab-uprisings/" target="_self">Middle East political science</a>.&#0160; It&#39;s also a tribute to the nineteen senior scholars who have served on the POMEPS Steering Committee, from which all the selection committees are formed, and who repeatedly volunteer their scarce time to serve as workshop discussants and readers and hosts. Much of the credit also goes to Mary Casey and Cortni Kerr, the team which makes the whole project run. It is the junior scholars who are at the heart of the initiative though, and I get really excited when I look at their talent, ambition and skills and the work which they are beginning to produce.&#0160;</p>
<p>So let me end this difficult year with a profound expression of gratitude to all of the scholars who have been a part of this POMEPS initiative, to the supportive foundations such as the Carnegie Corporation and the Luce Foundation, to my friends at the Monkey Cage, and to the great POMEPS team. It makes it all worthwhile. I hope, and believe, that it makes a positive difference to the field and to the public&#39;s understanding of the Middle East. So thanks to everyone, and Happy New Year!</p>abu aardvark2014-12-31T16:57:10-05:00Libya, Calvinball, Solidarity: Reflections on Reflectionshttp://abuaardvark.typepad.com/abuaardvark/2014/11/reflections-on-reflections.html
My Monkey Cage essay "Reflections on the Arab Uprisings" has generated a really fascinating set of responses and commentaries over the last two days. I've been collecting the various blog posts and tweets, and wanted to take the opportunity here...<p>My <em>Monkey Cage</em> essay &quot;<a href="http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/monkey-cage/wp/2014/11/17/reflections-on-the-arab-uprisings/" target="_self">Reflections on the Arab Uprisings</a>&quot; has generated a really fascinating set of responses and commentaries over the last two days. I&#39;ve been collecting the various blog posts and tweets, and wanted to take the opportunity here to respond to some of the major comments and themes in the discussion.&#0160;</p>
<p><a href="http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/monkey-cage/wp/2014/11/17/reflections-on-the-arab-uprisings/" target="_self"><em>Reflections</em></a>, for those who haven&#39;t yet seen it, presented an honest self-critique of some key areas where I think my analysis failed during the course of the last few years. It also served to introduce a <a href="http://pomeps.org/2014/11/17/reflections-on-the-arab-uprisings/" target="_self"><em>POMEPS Studies</em></a> collection of essays by colleagues who did the same thing, more or less. My essay summarized and highlighted a whole group of analytical problems which individual authors had identified or which had emerged in our workshop discussions.&#0160; For my own part, I identified four major problem areas: the outcomes of the Libya intervention; the inadequate effort to overcome the pernicious effects of Calvinball; the pathologies overwhelming the promise of the new Arab public sphere; and the struggles to incorporate Islamists into transitional systems.</p>
<p>The purpose of all this was not self-flagellation. It was to try and advance the progress of the field by clearly and frankly assessing errors in order to improve analytical performance going forward. Some of the responses were of the quality you&#39;d expect from the nether regions of Twitter, but many of them were thought-provoking and constructive.&#0160;</p>
<p>Some commentators -- almost all non-academics -- took my piece to be saying that political science utterly failed in explaining the Arab uprisings, or that I should be fired or do the honorable thing and quit my job in shame.&#0160; That&#39;s a terrible way to interpret the argument, but also quite revealing about how different communities think about arguments and errors. Of course the mistakes and problems identified in <em>Reflections</em> don&#39;t mean that the field has failed. On the contrary, overall the field has done a great job engaging with the Arab uprisings, offering an enormous volume of real time commentary, analysis, and thick description of complex events, and now producing a bounty of high quality books and journal articles.&#0160; Just a few months ago, I <a href="http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/monkey-cage/wp/2014/08/19/explaining-the-arab-uprisings/" target="_self">wrote in considerable detail</a> about how the field had done well in anticipating and explaining the uprisings.</p>
<p>I could have gone on at great length about all the things we got right, but that wasn&#39;t the point of this exercise. The point was to model public self-critique. You would think from the state of public discourse that nobody has ever made a mistake about anything. I can assure you that this is not&#0160; the case. <em>Everyone</em>, without exception, has gotten things about the Arab uprisings wrong: .&#0160; Some might not even realize it, which is kind of sad. Quite a few are primarily political animals who really don&#39;t care, as long as their arguments prove useful. Many just see no intellectual, social or professional incentive to admit it. Whatever the reasons, acknowledgement of analytical mistakes in public policy discourse remains about as common as a brigade of pink unicorns. Ken Pollack&#39;s <a href="http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2004/01/spies-lies-and-weapons-what-went-wrong/302878/" target="_self">2004 self-critique</a> of his arguments on Iraq and Dave Weigel&#39;s annual &quot;<a href="http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/politics/2013/12/pundit_audit_2013_what_dave_weigel_got_right_and_wrong_in_political_predictions.html" target="_self">pundit self-audit</a>&quot; still stands as one of the only major examples of such an exercise.</p>
<p>Academics, who thrive on peer review and slashing workshop debate and endless methodological tinkering, should be better than this -- especially senior academics protected by academic freedom and tenure.&#0160; My <em>Reflections</em> shouldn&#39;t be some kind of testament to my exceptional integrity - they shouldn&#39;t be exceptional at all. Self-critique should be as standard to our craft as citing our sources and specifying the boundary conditions of our models. Of course academics should publicly acknowledge analytical mistakes, just as they would during the peer review process and conference circuit. I&#39;d like to see the major think tanks, newspaper columnists, and omniscient Twitter experts do the same, though I&#39;m not expecting it.</p>
<p><strong>Libya</strong>: As I expected, by far the greatest volume of responses has been to my acknowledgement of the failure of the Libya intervention. Most of this has come from <a href="http://www.theamericanconservative.com/larison/revisiting-the-libyan-war/" target="_self">critics of that intervention</a>, naturally, who are delighted that a supporter of the intervention has recanted. There was some confusion over my comment that I didn&#39;t regret my support for the intervention, however, which I tried to explain on Twitter (a special thanks to those critics who responded thoughtfully to those elaborations). Let me try again.</p>
<p>The intervention was never the easy call which its supporters and opponents alike portrayed. My self-critique was motivated by the clearly negative long-term outcome and the failure of key mechanisms (such as the demonstration effect or national reconstruction) to operate. The intervention did save many lives in the immediate term; I don&#39;t believe that there were diplomatic solutions on the horizon or that Qaddafi would have showed mercy. I remain convinced that in the absence of the NATO intervention there would have been a horrific massacre in Benghazi and then throughout rebel-held territories, that the U.S. would have been blamed for its inaction in the face of these atrocities, and that Libya would be beset by horrific, if different, problems.&#0160;</p>
<p>My point is that these were extremely difficult calls, with risks associated with every course of action, but that to me it also simply isn&#39;t acceptable to refuse to reassess those decisions in light of later developments. I believe that it is simply intellectually irresponsible to not weigh the overwhelmingly negative outcomes in Libya when thinking about intervention. I really don&#39;t understand how Libya&#39;s experience of state failure, civil war and regional destabilization can be ignored when arguing in favor of new interventions, in Syria or elsewhere. That does not mean that the arguments for the Libya intervention were weak or dishonest or manufactured for ulterior motives. It does mean taking these lessons into account for future analysis.</p>
<p><strong>Solidarity</strong>:&#0160; My argument that the field tended to over-identify with activists and their passions prompted some intriguing responses, mostly in private, which very much deserve careful thought.&#0160; Several of my colleagues objected forcefully to this critique, not because they disagreed about the observation about our identification with activists but because they placed greater value on that solidarity.&#0160; For these colleagues, scholarship and public engagement <em>should</em> to a large degree be about giving voice to those in the region, offering support to their revolutionary struggles, and amplifying their hopes, aspirations, and analyses. Analytical distancing in the name of methodological rigor would be a betrayal of these normative commitments. The field, in their view, needs more solidarity and identification with activist communities, not less.&#0160; These discussions go to the heart of deep, long-running arguments about the purpose of scholarship and the value of different methods.&#0160; That&#39;s a conversation which of course will, and should, continue, and I would love to see more public writing on the subject.</p>
<p><strong>Calvinball</strong>: Jay Ulfelder offered one of the most <a href="http://dartthrowingchimp.wordpress.com/2014/11/18/reactions-to-reflections-on-the-arab-uprisings/" target="_self">thoughtful commentaries</a> on a specific point by suggesting that the problem of transitional uncertainty might simply be unresolvable. Decades of theory and practice on transitions, he argues, suggests that &quot;the real problem is that transitional periods are irreducibly fraught with the uncertainties Marc rightly&#0160;spotlighted, and there simply are no deus-ex-machina resolutions to them.&quot; This, he concludes, &quot;is&#0160;one of those things social science can help us understand but not “fix.”&quot;&#0160;</p>
<p>I tend to think that Jay&#39;s right about this. At the same time, I think that there&#39;s call for a deeper look at how these deep uncertainties shape identities, strategies, and outcomes.&#0160; It seems to go deeper than what I&#39;ve seen in the literature on the shadow of the future and incomplete information.&#0160; As I&#39;ve argued elsewhere, for instance, Egypt&#39;s Muslim Brotherhood was profoundly shaped at every level -- organization, ideology, identity, strategy -- by its clear understanding that taking power was not an option. Removing that constraint proved more radically destabilizing than might have been rationally expected. Similarly, the intensity of the Tunisian and Egyptian responses to Constitutional battles highlights the extent to which the stakes went to the core of identity, and were not just distributional arguments over institutional design. At any rate, I&#39;ve been working on an academic paper on this for a while, which I really need to finish, and would welcome more thoughts!</p>
<p>Thanks for all the commentaries and feedback on the <a href="http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/monkey-cage/wp/2014/11/17/reflections-on-the-arab-uprisings/" target="_self"><em>Reflections</em></a>, and I&#39;ll be happy to continue the discussion as needed.&#0160;</p>abu aardvark2014-11-19T09:37:28-05:00Domination and Tunisian Politicshttp://abuaardvark.typepad.com/abuaardvark/2014/11/domination-and-tunisian-politics.html
I recently returned from a short trip to Tunis, where I had the chance to check in with a variety of folks about the current political scene. I met with senior members of both Nedaa Tounis and the Ennahda movement...<p><a class="asset-img-link" href="http://abuaardvark.typepad.com/.a/6a00d8341c391553ef01bb07ac8329970d-pi" style="display: inline;"><img alt="Tunisiamultiplechoice" class="asset asset-image at-xid-6a00d8341c391553ef01bb07ac8329970d img-responsive" src="http://abuaardvark.typepad.com/.a/6a00d8341c391553ef01bb07ac8329970d-320wi" title="Tunisiamultiplechoice" /></a></p>
<p>I recently returned from a short trip to Tunis, where I had the chance to check in with a variety of folks about the current political scene.&#0160; I met with senior members of both Nedaa Tounis and the Ennahda movement (including Rached Ghannouchi), along with a variety of journalists and civil society activists.&#0160; I was particularly interested in exploring the role of the media in post-uprising Tunisia, for a paper I&#39;ll be circulating soon (spoiler: like in Egypt, it&#39;s played an extremely negative role).</p>
<p>But I was also keen to look for answers to a question which has been nagging at me ever since last month&#39;s Nedaa Tounes <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-29828706" target="_self">victory</a> in the Parliamentary elections: why doesn&#39;t anyone seem to be as worried by the prospect of Nedaa Tounes &quot;dominating&quot; Tunisan politics as they were by the prospect of Ennahda &quot;domination&quot;? Or is that only for Islamists? Should Nedaa be looking to form an inclusive coalition rather than governing from one side of a polarized public?&#0160; Should Ennahda be worried that&#0160; an explicitly anti-Islamist government would try to crush it Ben Ali or Sisi-style?&#0160; </p>
<p>After years of the world&#39;s agonizing over the prospects of its domination, Ennahda chose to not field a candidate in the upcoming Presidential election (if only Egypt&#39;s Muslim Brotherhood had <a href="http://www.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2012/04/01/the_muslim_brotherhoods_presidential_gambit" target="_self">done the same</a>), and surrendered the Prime Minister position in the face of an intense political crisis earlier this year. But Nedaa has done nothing of the sort. After winning the Parliamentary election, its candidate <a href="http://www.economist.com/news/middle-east-and-africa/21630798-leading-presidential-candidate-looks-lot-tunisias-founding-father-shade-bourguiba" target="_self">Beji Caid el-Sibsi is a shaky frontrunner to win</a> the November 23 Presidential election. His victory would give Nedaa control over both the legislative and executive branches, with likely support for any sort of anti-Islamist agenda forthcoming from the unreformed judiciary.&#0160; Shouldn&#39;t everyone be worried about one side of a polarized political arena poised to potentially dominate all branches of government in a fragile democratic transition?&#0160; </p>
<p>The most common answer I heard in my conversations was that nobody believed that Nedaa could hold itself together long enough to actually dominate.&#0160; They pointed to the tensions between different parts of the Nedaa coalition, which includes both fervently anti-Islamist leftists and a neoliberal capitalist elites.&#0160; Nedaa won only a narrow Parliamentary victory, and will have to form a coalition of some kind to govern. With only Sebsi and hatred of Ennahda holding Nedaa together, there would be no ideological consensus to impose upon Tunisia and numerous opportunities for the new party to fragment and turn upon itself.&#0160; With Ennahda defeated, or if Sebsi passes from the scene, most seem to believe that the Nedaa coalition will fall apart and normal politics will ensue.</p>
<p><a class="asset-img-link" href="http://abuaardvark.typepad.com/.a/6a00d8341c391553ef01bb07ac84cc970d-pi" style="display: inline;"><img alt="Withghanouchi" class="asset asset-image at-xid-6a00d8341c391553ef01bb07ac84cc970d img-responsive" src="http://abuaardvark.typepad.com/.a/6a00d8341c391553ef01bb07ac84cc970d-320wi" title="Withghanouchi" /></a></p>
<p>Ghannouchi, and the other Ennahda leaders with whom I spoke, seemed remarkably sanguine about the developments.&#0160; They focused relentlessly on the underlying unity of Tunisian society and the irreversibility of the changes wrought by the 2011 revolution, and sought to position themselves as the defenders of the democratic process and the gains of the revolution. They explained their electoral losses as the inevitable result of bearing the blame for failing to meet the sky-high expectations of the post-uprising Tunisian public.&#0160; They worried about polarization, and some spoke with shock about last year&#39;s intense public antipathy, but seemed to believe that the worst of that moment had passed since the January transfer of power to a technocratic government. They emphasized their efforts to stop the polarization, and pointed with pride to the new constitution which they believe ended the ideological and identity component of Tunisia&#39;s political battles.</p>
<p>So should we be worried about Nedaa domination of Tunisian politics? I heard people on both sides pointing to the mutual recognition of the reality of a political balance of power in the country, which forces both sides to recognize their inability to ignore or destroy the other.&#0160; Many <a href="http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/monkey-cage/wp/2014/10/29/the-richness-of-tunisias-new-politics/" target="_self">reject the reduction</a> of Tunisian politics to the Islamist/anti-Islamist framing, pointing to a much broader range of local and national issues driving the agenda. A lot of Tunisians seem to be quite relieved that they escaped Egypt&#39;s fate; &quot;n<a href="http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/monkey-cage/wp/2014/10/27/tunisian-elections-bring-hope-in-uncertain-times/" target="_self">ormal politics</a>&quot; might not be such a terrible thing, given how things have gone elsewhere.&#0160; Ghannouchi and Sebsi seem to have a decent level of personal respect and trust, which might or might not be shared more widely in their respective parties. And on all sides I heard&#0160;frequent arguments that Tunisia&#39;s people and civil society would never allow a return to a one-party state.</p>
<p>Let&#39;s hope that they are right. Because the region&#39;s history is full of &quot;temporary&quot; leaders with shaky coalitions who managed to secure their position atop the machinery of the state and last a lot longer than expected. Manufactured hatred of Islamism might go a long way in the current regional environment, and there&#39;s certainly plenty of regional support (and Gulf cash) out there right now for leaders willing to take on the job of repressing Islamists. Tunisia was (mis-)ruled for decades as one the fiercest anti-Islamist authoritarian regimes around, so there&#39;s a precedent. Tunisia&#39;s revolution deserves better than that, and I sure hope they get it.</p>abu aardvark2014-11-15T20:01:06-05:00Burkina Faso vs the Arab Uprisinghttp://abuaardvark.typepad.com/abuaardvark/2014/10/burkina-faso-vs-the-arab-uprising.html
I've been fascinated by the escalating protests in Burkina Faso which seem to have brought down President Blaise Compaore after 27 years. I don't know much about the country, but after years immersed in studying the Arab uprisings this seems...<p>I've been fascinated by the escalating protests in Burkina Faso which seem to have brought down President Blaise Compaore after 27 years. I don't know much about the country, but after years immersed in studying the Arab uprisings this seems ripe for comparative inquiry. What sparked this level of popular mobilization now? Why did the military behave as it did? Is there a social media or political information dimension? How will its neighbors and supporters of the old regime respond?</p>
<p>This tweet is what really grabbed my attention, though:</p>
<blockquote class="twitter-tweet" lang="en">
<p>If the people of <a href="https://twitter.com/hashtag/BurkinaFaso?src=hash">#BurkinaFaso</a> can fight against corrupt leaders, Ghana can also do same! SayNoToCorruptLeaders.</p>
<p><a class="asset-img-link" style="display: inline;" href="http://abuaardvark.typepad.com/.a/6a00d8341c391553ef01b7c6fd4745970b-pi"><img class="asset asset-image at-xid-6a00d8341c391553ef01b7c6fd4745970b img-responsive" title="B1Lu5EOCEAAqaZG" src="http://abuaardvark.typepad.com/.a/6a00d8341c391553ef01b7c6fd4745970b-320wi" alt="B1Lu5EOCEAAqaZG" /></a></p>
— Mac-Jordan (@MacJordaN) <a href="https://twitter.com/MacJordaN/status/527746782198239232">October 30, 2014</a></blockquote>
<script charset="utf-8" type="text/javascript" src="//platform.twitter.com/widgets.js"></script>
<p><em>Could</em> the Burkina Faso uprising spread to Ghana or other African countries the way that Tunisia's uprising spread to Egypt and then out to most of the Arab world?&nbsp; Should other African Presidents be worried, as <a href="http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/monkey-cage/wp/2014/10/28/as-thousands-protest-against-term-limit-extension-in-burkina-faso-will-other-african-presidents-take-note/" target="_self">Ken Opalo asks</a> in his recent <em>Monkey Cage</em> piece?</p>
<p>In <a href="http://www.amazon.com/gp/product/B00B3M3WNQ?btkr=1" target="_self"><em>The Arab Uprising</em></a>, I emphasize the causal importance of transnational Arab media, including both satellite television such as al-Jazeera and social media. I argue that this integrated Arab public sphere allowed for the articulation of a shared narrative which bound together a wide variety of very different protest movements in the first few months of 2011. It facilitated the adoption in very different contexts of highly similar, modular forms of protest, whether the seizing of a central public space or mimicking slogans like "the people want the overthrow of the regime." Arabs as far away as Yemen watched the overthrow of President Ben Ali and suddenly contemplated the possibility of change through popular protest, while the fall of Hosni Mubarak made many believe that such change was inevitable. That level of interconnectedness didn't last, of course, but it was extremely important during those feverish months of a genuinely regionwide mobilization.</p>
<p>I'm very curious, therefore, whether or not Africa experts are seeing the same kinds of dynamics which mattered so much in the Arab context a few years ago.&nbsp; Is there a common public sphere in which a collective narrative of popular uprising could be articulated?&nbsp; Are there meaningful efforts to translate Mac-Jordan's sentiments into reality in Ghana or elsewhere, or networks of activists sharing information, ideas and strategies?&nbsp; Are citizens in other countries revising their beliefs about the possibility of successful protest in light of Burkina Faso's uprising?&nbsp;</p>
<p>Consider this an open call for comparative insights - thanks!</p>
<p>__</p>
<p>Update #1:&nbsp; Most of the feedback from Africa specialists thus far has been discouraging. The Burkina Faso uprising, they point out quite convincingly, was sparked by <a href="https://twitter.com/sahelblog/status/527856574165839872" target="_self">local causes</a> (the change to term limits), protests had been building for quite a while, and contagion is unlikely:</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<blockquote class="twitter-tweet" lang="en">
<p><a href="https://twitter.com/abuaardvark">@abuaardvark</a> Also, there was more potential for an "African Spring" in 2011-2012 with Walk to Work, Burkina mutinies, Mauritania, Sudan, etc</p>
— Alex Thurston (@sahelblog) <a href="https://twitter.com/sahelblog/status/527857250530906112">October 30, 2014</a></blockquote>
<script charset="utf-8" type="text/javascript" src="//platform.twitter.com/widgets.js"></script>
<blockquote class="twitter-tweet" data-partner="tweetdeck">
<p><a href="https://twitter.com/sahelblog">@sahelblog</a> <a href="https://twitter.com/abuaardvark">@abuaardvark</a> There have been protests popping up in BF for a couple of yrs over this &amp; other issues. Lots of signs of discontent</p>
— Laura Seay (@texasinafrica) <a href="https://twitter.com/texasinafrica/status/527857301290745856">October 30, 2014</a></blockquote>
<script charset="utf-8" type="text/javascript" src="//platform.twitter.com/widgets.js"></script>
<p>I find all of this convincing, and yet... I can't help but remember a piece I wrote on January 26, 2011, addressing the exact same objections about whether Tunisia's uprising would spread to Egypt or other Arab countries (<a href="https://www.academia.edu/9030322/Will_the_Arab_revolutions_spread" target="_self">link to the free PDF here</a>). After running through all of the very compelling reasons that it would not, I argued:</p>
<p style="padding-left: 30px;">There are plenty of reasons to see Tunisia as a one-off.</p>
<p style="padding-left: 30px;">And yet… it doesn't feel that way. The scenes in Cairo yesterday stand as a sharp rebuke to any analytical certainty. The Egyptian regime was fully prepared, its security forces on alert and deployed, the internet disrupted and al-Jazeera largely off the table… and yet tens of thousands of people still poured into the streets and put together one of the largest demonstrations in contemporary Egyptian history.</p>
<p style="padding-left: 30px;">Tunisia has manifestly inspired people across the region and galvanized their willingness to take risks to push for change, even without any clear leadership from political parties, Islamist movements, or even civil society. The Tunisian example has offered the possibility of success, and models for sustained action by a decentralized network, after a long and dispiriting period of authoritarian retrenchment. Al-Jazeera and the new media have played their role in reshaping political opportunities and narratives, but it is people who have seized those opportunities. And the core weaknesses of these Arab states --- fierce but feeble, as Nazih Ayubi might have said -- have been exposed. They have massively failed to meet the needs of their people, with awesome problems of unemployment, inflation, youth frustration and inequality combined with the near-complete absence of viable formal political institutions.</p>
<p>It's very likely that the diffusion of the Arab uprisings really was unique to that moment&nbsp; and that there are no lessons for African regional protest diffusion. It would probably be better for my argument about the importance of the Arab media for the diffusion of protest if the Burkina Faso uprising does <em><span style="text-decoration: underline;">not</span></em> spread. But I want to hear a bit more about how the uprising has been received in other African countries, whether it is being linked to a collective political narrative, whether modular forms of protest begin to be adopted, and that sort of thing before I give up the inquiry.</p>abu aardvark2014-10-30T12:04:49-04:00ISIS, Syria, Iraq and All That http://abuaardvark.typepad.com/abuaardvark/2014/10/the-tourniquet.html
I'm delighted to see that The Tourniquet, my long-gestating new CNAS report outlining a strategy for dealing with ISIS in Syria and Iraq, has now been released. It tries to lay out a viable political roadmap for the region which...<p>I&#39;m delighted to see that <a href="http://www.cnas.org/saving-syria-and-iraq#.VEAUD-eCVe8" target="_self"><em>The Tourniquet</em></a>, my long-gestating new CNAS report outlining a strategy for dealing with ISIS in Syria and Iraq, has now been released. It tries to lay out a viable political roadmap for the region which could deflect the already overwhelming pressures to escalate and expand the mission.</p>
<p>&#0160;</p>
<p><a class="asset-img-link" href="http://abuaardvark.typepad.com/.a/6a00d8341c391553ef01b8d07ec4e2970c-pi" style="display: inline;"><img alt="Tourniquetcover" class="asset asset-image at-xid-6a00d8341c391553ef01b8d07ec4e2970c img-responsive" src="http://abuaardvark.typepad.com/.a/6a00d8341c391553ef01b8d07ec4e2970c-320wi" title="Tourniquetcover" /></a></p>
<p>You can <a href="http://www.cnas.org/saving-syria-and-iraq#.VEAUD-eCVe8" target="_self">download the report for free</a> here.&#0160;</p>
<p>The report covers a lot of ground. It looks closely at Iraq and Syria, of course, but also at the broader regional environment which has empowered ISIS, including the proxy war in Syria and the shifting Islamist political landscape.&#0160; For Iraq, it argues for close support conditioned upon a commitment by Iraqi leaders to implement long-needed political reforms and by Kurdish leaders to remain within the Iraqi state. Regionally, it outlines the importance of pulling back from debilitating proxy wars and warns against subordinating human rights and political reforms to the exigencies of a new war on terror. That, fairly clearly, is not the direction of current U.S. policy - which is going to come back to bite.</p>
<p>For Syria, the report argues for a &quot;strategic pause&quot; to allow the building of viable alternative governance in rebel-controlled parts of Syria. It rejects the idea of partnering with the Asad regime against ISIS as both unrealistic and undesirable. It also fairly bluntly highlights the reality that&#0160; a viable Syrian opposition doesn&#39;t exist, even if everyone thinks such a creature is essential. The strategy takes a longer-term view towards the de-escalation of the conflict and political transition.</p>
<p>It lays out an outside-in strategy which tries to take advantage of an unusual regional accord which isn&#39;t going to last very long. While the fear of ISIS has temporarily brought together a wide range of regional actors, it&#0160; should be painfully obvious that they don&#39;t actually agree on the strategy, the objectives, or even the primary enemy. The more that the strategy succeeds in blunting the immediate threat from ISIS, of course, the less incentive this fractious group will have to cooperate.&#0160; And that&#39;s not even getting in to the urgent question of Iran&#39;s role, especially with the impending deadline for a nuclear agreement.</p>
<p><a href="http://www.cnas.org/saving-syria-and-iraq#.VEAUD-eCVe8" target="_self">The full report is available here</a>. Based on past experience, it won&#39;t please everyone (or anyone) but I hope that it makes a constructive contribution to the emerging debate.</p>
<p>&#0160;</p>abu aardvark2014-10-16T15:24:01-04:00The Spring Fails, Againhttp://abuaardvark.typepad.com/abuaardvark/2014/10/the-spring-fails-again.html
There was a time, not too long ago, when it looked like real change was possible. Exciting new faces took center stage, traditional powers were on the ropes, and the transition to something fundamentally new seemed not only possible but...<p>&#0160;There was a time, not too long ago, when it looked like real change was possible. Exciting new faces took center stage, traditional powers were on the ropes, and the transition to something fundamentally new seemed not only possible but even inevitable.&#0160; And then, as the struggle ground on, it all fell apart. The rising forces for change could not sustain themselves, while the old guard absorbed the early blows and slowly, inexorably crushed the life out of their challengers. By the end, all that was left was a choice between equally unpalatable pillars of the old status quo.. and the tattered dreams of what might have been.</p>
<p>Yeah, the National League&#39;s wildly entertaining 2014 has ended with nothing to show for it but the St Louis Cardinals and the San Francisco Giants. The National League will be represented in the World Series by a team which has won the pennant two of the last four years.</p>
<p><a class="asset-img-link" href="http://abuaardvark.typepad.com/.a/6a00d8341c391553ef01b8d0798d07970c-pi" style="display: inline;"><img alt="Holliday" class="asset asset-image at-xid-6a00d8341c391553ef01b8d0798d07970c img-responsive" src="http://abuaardvark.typepad.com/.a/6a00d8341c391553ef01b8d0798d07970c-320wi" title="Holliday" /></a></p>
<p>It didn&#39;t have to be like this. We could all be cheering on my beloved, unexpected, thrilling, overachieving Milwaukee Brewers: the redemption of Ryan Braun, the unpredictability of Carlos Gomez, the steady brilliance of Jonathan Lucroy, the exasperating closing of K-Rod.&#0160; But there&#39;s no overcoming losing 13 out of 14 games in the stretch drive, or the Cardinals. We could be anticipating a Beltway series with the Washington Nationals: that wonderful starting rotation, Bryce Harper, Jayson Werth, and all that.&#0160; But there&#39;s no overcoming the manager&#39;s decision to pull Jordan Zimmerman in Game 2 or the offense&#39;s collective October nap.&#0160; Heck, everyone would have jumped on a bandwagon for the brilliant Andrew McCutcheon and the once-hot Pirates.&#0160; But no, all that excitement, and nothing changes.&#0160;</p>
<p>At least the junior circuit did better, with the despicable payroll monstrosities in New York and Boston long since put out to pasture. But what does it say when the hopes for meaningful change are literally being placed in a team called &quot;the Royals&quot;?</p>
<p>Any resemblance between baseball&#39;s failed hopes and the failures of the Arab Uprisings are purely coincidental. What do you think this is, a Foreign Policy column?</p>abu aardvark2014-10-08T08:51:58-04:00