The quick and costless conflict in Iraq, predicted by the Bush
administration, is nowhere to be seen and the actual costs of the war in
Iraq far exceeds the estimates developed by the then administration
before going to war. This is the central message of The Trillion Dollar
War by Joseph Stiglitz and Linda Blimes.

The authors argue that the cost of the military operation in Iraq
has exceeded the cost incurred on the 12-year war in Vietnam and is more
than two times the cost incurred on Korean War. They show that the per
troop cost of the Second World War was less than $100,000, in real
terms, while the cost of war in Iraq is around $ 400,000 (in 2007
dollars). The authors lament that the war in Iraq has been financed from
borrowings rather than taxes. They argue that recognition of the cost of
war cannot be put off for long and cannot be transferred to the coming
generations without risking adverse consequences for the economy.

The authors argue that the estimates of war expenditure were
nothing but fallacious. Larry Lindsey (Bush's economic advisor) had
put the estimate of the total expenditure on war at $200 billion as the
war began. This figure was cut down to an unbelievable $60 billion by
Mitch Daniels, secretary to Donald Rumsfeld, the then Defense Secretary.
The fallacy of these estimates was exposed when the U.S. Congress
approved $845 billion for 2008 alone, for military actions and war
supplemental requisites, in Iraq and Afghanistan. Only the running
expenditure on military operations cost the U.S. exchequer $12.5 billion
per month in 2008. This does not cover the $500 billion per year
expenditures of the U.S. Defense Department and other hidden costs.

Human life, though priceless, must be priced to arrive at some
reasonable estimate of the expenditures on wars, and this is what the
book does to account for the U.S. casualties in the war. Putting the
price tag of $7 million on human life--the monetary value typically
assigned by the U.S. government to a young man killed in a car accident,
the authors put the cost of 4000 casualties of American soldiers at $28
billion. If the casualties like, 'killed in night-time vehicle
accident', which the government terms as non-combat incidents, are
also accounted for, then the cost of human tragedies shores up
significantly. Arguing in this manner the authors arrive at an estimate
of $3 trillion as the cost of Iraq War, to the United States alone, add
to it the explicit and implicit, expenditures incurred by rest of the
world and the estimates balloon.

United Kingdom--The second major player in the Iraq War has also
paid heavily for the war. The book establishes an estimate of the cost
of the war for United Kingdom as well. The estimates show that by the
end of 2007 the estimated direct monetary cost to UK had reached to 7
billion [pounds sterling]. With thousands of soldiers becoming disable
and many family members sacrificing jobs to care for their wounded
relatives, the social costs to UK was no different than that incurred by
the U.S. The authors expect that the long term macroeconomic costs for
UK might be lesser than what the U.S. would have to assume. The reason,
the book argues, lies in the tight fiscal policy maintained by the UK.
However despite the reduction in troops and the corresponding cut in
personnel cost, the aggregate cost of war in Iraq will increase by 2
percent for the United Kingdom. Based on these assumptions the total
cost to UK of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan exceed 20 billion [pounds
sterling] in 2010, if the social cost is included.

To conclude, the book induces the reader to ponder, whether the war
planners themselves believed in the estimates and what benefits they had
in mind to justify the costs and whether the benefits will outweigh the
costs. The book is highly recommended for those with interest in
political economy.