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UNCLAS LAGOS 000476
REGIONAL BUREAU COLLECTIVE
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR CA/FPP, DHS FOR CIS/FDNS
DEPT PASS TO KCC WILLIAMSBURG KY
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: KFRDCVISCPASCMGTASECNI
SUBJECT: FRAUD SUMMARY - LAGOS
REF: 08 STATE 74840, 09 STATE 57623
------------------
COUNTRY CONDITIONS
------------------
¶1. (SBU) Background: Nigeria covers 356,669 sq miles and has a
population of approximately 145 million. The major languages are
English (official), Yoruba, Igbo, and Hausa. Approximately 60% of
the population is below the poverty line for Nigeria. The current
GDP/person is 1,500 dollars, and the inflation rate is 8.2%. This
high poverty rate, coupled with the population pressures, induces
large-scale migration. Post's adjusted refusal rate for NIVs is
31.25%, for IVs it is 44% (including adoption and DV cases, which
make up 1/3 of post's IV workload).
¶2. (U) Nigeria has all of the high risk factors for passport and
visa fraud, including lax identity document control; poor or
nonexistent records for feeder documents such as birth certificates;
powerful pull factors such as poverty and a large expatriate
diaspora that encourage emigration; and endemic fraud and corruption
at all levels of society.
The lack of controls and a high incidence of bribery that permeates
every level of society create an environment where anything and
everything is available and for sale. With enormous hunger for
visas as an escape route, documents that cannot be trusted, and
internal security conditions that make post anti-fraud investigative
travel expensive and difficult, Lagos is a high-fraud Post.
---------
NIV FRAUD
---------
¶3. (U) The NIV Unit continues to see a wide variety of fraudulent
documents submitted to create the impression of an established
travel history as well as financial and familial stability.
¶4. (SBU) The most common fraud is simple document fraud. Fake
employment letters, bank statements, conference registrations and
educational certificates are found on a daily, almost hourly basis
on the NIV line. The suspicious documents button could be selected
for most applicants. Effectively the Conoff will elicit
inconsistent and unconvincing statements and applicants are refused
at the window. Only 2% of Lagos FPU cases are referred by NIV.
¶5. (U) Post continues to aggressively pursue a program for
discovery and prosecution (arrest referral) of applicants holding
fraudulent third country visas and fake entry stamps. By collecting
and disseminating detection points and equipment (loops and UV
lights) to line officers, Post has discovered cases of third country
visa fraud. Working in tandem with RSO, these cases have ended in
the arrest of the applicants by the Special Fraud Unit of the
Nigerian Police. All face prosecution under local fraud statutes.
¶6. (U) These fake third country visas run the gamut of
counterfeiting tactics and print sophistication. In some of these
cases the applicant was able to travel to the target country using
the fraudulent document. Genuine civil and identity documents are
relatively easy to acquire by fraudulent means in Nigeria, but
falsifying a record of foreign travel remains more difficult. As
such, these TCN visas remain one of the most consistently reliable
mechanisms for detecting fraudulent applicants and applications.
¶7. (SBU) Chinese, Australian, Indian, Malaysian, Turkish, Kenyan,
Equatorial Guinean, and Brazilian fake visas have all also been
discovered at Post, and most of these on multiple occasions. In
many cases, applicants admit in secondary interviews with FPU to
having paid substantial sums, in one case several thousand U.S.
dollars, for the visas. In other cases, applicants contend the
visas were provided in exchange for favors, to be determined upon
issuance.
¶8. (U) Post maintains a fairly extensive exemplar library of these
finds, scanned and ready to share with other missions and agencies
on request. Post continues to strengthen ties to other Missions in
the community in order to verify suspicious documents.
¶9. (SBU) F1 Fraud: Student visas remain a popular target for those
seeking entry to the U.S. Counterfeit West African Examination
Council (WAEC) certificates (WAEC is roughly equivalent to the SAT,
and is the main basis for demonstrating educational qualification
for a DV, for example) continue to be a tactic for fraudulent
students looking to establish their bona fides. Typically someone
else will take the exam under the applicant's name. Questioning the
applicant remains the primary means of exposing the imposter test
taker. Post also continues to verify WAEC scores online.
¶10. (U) This reporting period, Post saw one U.S. SAT imposter. The
applicant confessed and the SAT agent exposed. The case was
referred to the Nigerian Special Fraud Unit for further action.
¶11. (U) In another student visa case, an applicant posed as a
government employee on scholarship. Documents purportedly from
Local Government Authorities were confirmed fraudulent by FPU. The
Local Government Council confirmed that the applicant was not and
has never been an employee, as claimed.
¶12. (SBU) During the reporting period, Diplomatic Security and ICE
investigated a marriage fraud/smuggling ring operating out of the
U.S. The applicants applied for B-1/B-2 visas to attend a
conference with Allied Consulting and Educational Partnership in
conjunction with the Globe Program. When the applicants obtained
visas and arrived in the U.S., they were matched up with Aerican
wives and filed to adjust status. Thy successfully did this for 21
applicants last year, none of whom returned to Nigeria. The subject
in the U.S. is affiliated with the University of North Texas. Post
has compiled a list of course participants and samples of the
invitation letters and placed a lookout in CLASS. ARSO-I interviews
revealed that most of the applicants are low level government
employees who claimed a higher position or more skills than they
actually have. Five applicants confessed and were arrested by the
Nigerian Police; the police investigation continues. Applicants
admitted paying upwards of $5,300 for the document package and
services.
--------------------
NIV VALIDATION STUDY
--------------------
¶13. (SBU) In early 2009, Lagos FPU conducted a validation study of
B1/B2 visas. The study looked at over 1000 randomly selected cases
dating from 2005. Of those cases, 90% returned, 5% overstayed and
1.4% adjusted status. The remaining cases were inconclusive or
unused visas.
¶14. (SBU) The percentage of B1/B2s that returned in the study was
higher than expected, suggesting that Post may need to refine
NIV-related interviewing and anti-fraud training to focus on
narrower categories of greater-risk applicants. Post's overall NIV
refusal rate remains at approximately 30%, due to a continuing high
level of document fraud and large numbers of weak F-1 applicants.
This was the first validation study post conducted in four years.
Post plans an aggressive schedule of NIV validation studies over the
coming year to help us refine our NIV adjudications.
¶15. Post has compiled the information for these studies using the
methodology standardized by CA/FPP and the reporting functions of
CCD and the AdHoc system to generate the appropriate reports. The
reports have been submitted to the ADIS/USVISIT system through the
appropriate channels.
---------
ACS FRAUD
---------
¶16. (U) Financial scams - known as '419' scams, after the section
of the Nigerian penal code relating to financial crime - continue to
be an issue for ACS and a major burden to the correspondence unit at
Post. The ACS Unit receives a daily average of 13 inquiries through
e-mail and telephone from American citizens as well as citizens from
other countries who have been defrauded by Nigerians posing as
romantic interests, Americans in distress, or lawyers trying to
disburse a settlement or inheritance. Some of these American
citizens have sent large sums of money to Nigeria. Post has
developed FAQs and a script to help duty officers and others handle
419 calls and has shared these with OCS. We provide resources for
419 victims on our website and track 419 calls using the Crisis
application.
¶17. (U) U.S. passport fraud continues to be a moderate risk. The
great majority of DS-11 applicants are dual-national minors.
Typical profiles are first-time applicants born in Nigeria;
U.S.-born first-time applicants in their late teens or early
twenties, who have never been issued a U.S. passport; and U.S.-born
renewals whose only passport was issued when they were an infant.
For such applications post requests original birth certificates,
photos of the applicant showing age progression, and questions
applicants and parents separately.
¶18. (U) A German consular attach at the Lagos airport caught a
Nigerian woman attempting to use a U.S. passport to board a
Germany-bound flight. Upon questioning, the woman was not able to
describe the passport application process, her life in the United
States, the lengths of the flights to and from Germany or the U.S.,
or other details. The official seized the passport and turned it
over to the ConGen Lagos. The true passport holder, reached in the
U.S., later confirmed that her passport had been stolen a few weeks
previously, and seemed shocked that her passport had turned up in
Nigeria; the Germans, noting the resemblance between the fraudulent
bearer and the photograph, suspected the true bearer had lent it to
a relative. Unfortunately the impostor fled the airport and no
picture or identity was obtained from her.
¶19. (U) The majority of CRBA applications are for children with one
American citizen parent, often who is resident in the United States,
not present to apply, and who has minimal evidence of a relationship
with the mother. Post encountered no instances of outright CRBA
fraud, but unreliable local vital records documents and the fact
that the Amcit parent is rarely available for interview make this a
continuing risk for post.
--------
IV FRAUD
--------
¶20. (U) Marriage into the large Nigerian-American community in the
U.S. has been by far the most common path to American residency for
Nigerians seeking legal and illegal emigration. An overwhelming
percentage of post's petition-based IVs are marriage-based (IR-1 and
K-1s especially. Nigerian law and custom recognizes three types of
marriage - traditional, religious and civil - all of which are valid
for immigration purposes and which involve different customs,
procedures and participants. These factors, in addition to poor
civil records, corrupt courts that issue divorce decrees, and
Nigerian naming conventions that permit applicants to add or drop
names easily, make such cases extremely susceptible to fraud.
¶21. (SBU) Post's IV referred a total of 480 IV cases (3 %) in FY09.
As such, Post recommends 1.5% of IV cases referred to FPU for
revocation. Cases reported fraudulent are refused under section
212(a)(6)(c).
¶22. (U) Marriage fraud can involve entire communities. Family
members are informed of the pending application and collaborate to
deceive consular investigators. To elicit facts, investigators
employ courtesy and easily blend in with communities. The questions
asked by investigators must constantly change. Therefore,
investigators cannot rely on the same formula for every case.
¶23. Investigators are creative in finding evidence of a hidden
marital relationship at the applicant's true residence. For
example, in a CR1 case, the investigator found a Bible in the
applicant's home inscribed "Mr. and Mrs. (and the family name)"
inside. Further evidence included other books with her listed as
Mrs., she wore a wedding ring and men's clothing in the closet.
¶24. So that investigators can more easily blend into the
communities where they work, FPU consciously recruits investigators
with regional linguistic skills. Interviews are mostly conducted in
English; however, confessions and stories are often obtained in
another language.
¶25. Document fraud, especially divorce decrees, is a significant
element in IV marriage fraud, ref cable 09 Lagos 000169. FPU
continues to verify divorce decrees when it is a determining factor
for a relationship.
¶26. (U) In the reporting period, FPU assisted DOJ with a pending
naturalization case in Pennsylvania. Through several visits to
sites throughout Lagos, FPU was confirmed that the divorce documents
provided by the subject at the court hearing were not genuine, and
that the subject was still married in Nigeria. With this
information DOJ was able to deny the naturalization and the subject
faces deportation.
--------
DV FRAUD
--------
¶27. (SBU) Nigeria is one of the top diversity visa (DV) countries
worldwide. In FY08, Lagos adjudicated 5,678 DVs, over 1/3 of post's
IV workload. In DVs as in other IVs, relationship fraud is the
chief vulnerability. In particular, Lagos line officers are
confronted with many "clip-on" spouses: sudden "marriages" which
occur after an applicant is notified that they have won the DV
lottery. From March to August, Post found 108 DV applicants
ineligible under 212(a)(6)(e) for claiming fraudulent spouses on
their DV applications.
¶28. (SBU) FPU has developed several techniques to uncover fraudulent
DV marriages and the facilitators behind them. Before the
interview, line officers examine the forms. Fraud indicators to
watch are a "care of" address - which is often that of the visa
fixer -- the mailing address, the contact address in the U.S., and
the handwriting. Late night calls to the applicant's home often
prove to be an effective investigation technique, as the "married"
couple often lives separately.
¶29. (U) Another highly successful investigative tool is Lagos FPU's
collection of wedding albums filled with staged wedding photographs
submitted by applicants. By spotting the actors repeatedly posing
as guests and family members at supposedly unrelated marriage
ceremonies, FPU has been able to identify several DV fraud
facilitator cells. Post had adopted a pre-interview "album check"
so adjudicating officers have the benefit of this intelligence
before the applicants were called to the IV window. Unfortunately,
the facilitators quickly adapted and have largely moved away from
staged photos, so the mandatory check was dropped, though suspicious
photos may still be compared to the album library.
¶30. (U) Where do clip-on spouses come from? From touts or
middlemen operating out of internet cafes and other parts of the
well-established local DV assistance service industry. As internet
penetration is still relatively low in Nigeria and costs are high,
the gap has been filled by a proliferation of commercial cyber
cafs. Cyber cafs advertise for people, usually single, to pay to
have an agent assist them to submit a DV entry. An agent will then
submit his/her own address instead of the applicant's true return
address on entry form. If the entrant wins, he/she is contacted by
the agent, who matches them with a spouse.
¶31. (U) The touts collude with the cyber cafes and even advertisers
and the media to vary computers to ensure certain IP addresses are
not overly used, to attract new customers, and ward off competition.
For example, post recorded a podcast on how to apply for the DV
program, stressing that applicants did not need to hire agents to
apply and warning against fraud in DV applications. We hoped to get
it run as a public service announcement on Nigerian radio. The
radio stations turned it down, however, because its message
conflicted with the paid advertising from the touts and cyber
cafes.
¶32. Post is constantly on alert for the little details that can
expose a fraudulent case. A backdated marriage certificate was
proven fraudulent by examining photographic evidence of the
ceremony. DV1 was interviewed separately in FPU, claiming a bona
fide marriage to DV2. In examining her wedding album, the
investigator observed with the aid of a magnifying glass that her
traditional marriage pictures were taken with a 2009 calendar in the
background disproving her claim that the couple married in April
¶2008.
¶33. The FPU daily conducts split interviews with the principal
applicant and the derivatives, and the results are remarkable. This
allows a more in-depth analysis of the claimed relationship, while
at the same time freeing up time for the IV officers to handle more
cases. Short of a field investigation, the split interview
technique continues to provide the most facts regarding applicants'
claimed relationships.
¶34. Post made administrative changes in scheduling FPU split
interviews. As there is a heavier caseload at the end of the DV
year, Lagos now schedules immediate interviews until space is
filled, instead of having applicants return at a later date. The
FPM also added the responsibility of interviewing to the analyst
position thereby increasing staff availability. These changes
ensured timely adjudication throughout the DV year. In FY09 49% of
IV cases referred to FPU were found fraudulent. Conoffs continue to
be effective in their decisions of which cases to refer.
--------------
ADOPTION FRAUD
--------------
¶35. (SBU) Since March, Lagos has conducted 70 Nigerian IR-3
adoption field investigations. Almost half were in the
Igbo-speaking eastern region. This is the home region of the
majority of Nigerian-Americans and, as a predominantly Christian
area, state authorities tend to be more amenable to adoption than in
Muslim-dominated states. Travel to the entire region is dangerous
and expensive, and requires COM approval for three of the states.
Given the number of cases and priority post places on adoption
investigations, we hope to arrange trips at least twice per year.
Although in the past it has been a restricted area, FPU will also
accept cases from security level four states. This period, 20
adoption cases were closed out from this region, in some cases after
pending as much as two years.
¶36. (SBU) FPU's adoption-related caseload has fluctuated in recent
years: 33 cases in FY 07, 148 in FY 08, 109 in FY09. There are
several reasons: an overall rise in adoption case numbers in
Nigeria; in early 2008, post made it a priority to clear out a
backlog of pending I-604 investigations; and post streamlined
procedures for line officers to refer cases to FPU. Security
restrictions highlighted in the Nigeria Travel Warning make travel
to Nigeria's eastern states is expensive: a September 2009 trip to
do ACS outreach and adoption-related fraud investigations for four
days cost post over USD 14,000. Post strives to plan quarterly
trips to the region, but these are not always possible for
logistical or budgetary reasons. Post has designated two line
officers and an FPU investigator to specialize in Nigerian adoption
procedures in an effort to resolve those cases that can be done
without a full field investigation.
¶37. (U) In June, an FPU Investigator traveled to four eastern
Nigeria states to conclude 30 adoption cases; he found fraud in 11
of them.
¶38. (U) The adoption fraud seen at post generally does not involve
falsified documents or outright baby selling. Typical cases involve
relatives attempting to adopt a well cared for nephew, niece or
sibling who would not meet the INA orphan definition. We do
occasionally encounter more egregious cases.
¶39. (U) In one case, the guardians of two legitimately adopted
children added their own child to the adoption orders. The
investigator visited the guardians' home and discovered the
guardians lived with the two adoptive children and one child of
their own. The neighbor corroborated that the guardians intended to
send their own daughter to the U.S.
¶40. (U) In another case, post confirmed that local authorizes
improperly issued genuine adoption orders. The court registrar
verified the papers. The issue of whether it is permissible for an
unmarried person to adopt children of the opposite sex was put to
the registrar. She stated that such an adoption is not allowed by
law and suggested that the girls are his blood relatives and he is
adopting them for immigration purposes. There is also the issue of
the Petitioner being a Catholic Reverend Father. It is inconsistent
with the status of a Reverend Father to purport to be a parent by
way of adoption. Further, Abia State Law says that it is
unacceptable for an unmarried man to adopt girls. In conclusion,
the adoption is not valid and the applicants are ineligible for a
visa. This request for investigation came from the Department of
Homeland Security.
-----------
DNA TESTING
-----------
¶41. DNA testing has proven an invaluable tool in the deterrence of
fraud. There are many instances where the evidence of relationship
that would allow officers to make their decisions is unreliable,
destroyed, or simply not available. Family photography, aside from
the occasional posed studio portrait, did not become widespread
until the late 1970s and early 1980s, and birth certificates have no
security features to speak of and can be obtained easily. During
this reporting period, the buccal swab samples were collected by an
IV LES at the clinic where the required visa medical examinations
were conducted. This duty rotated around the section. The
Consulate sent the samples to the laboratory and the notarized
results were returned directly to the Consulate via courier. Over a
six month period in 2008, DNA testing was suggested for roughly
1,004 visa applicants. In the last year, less than 10 negative DNA
results came in. Post does not anticipate a significant change in
DNA testing results due to the new guidelines. The only changes
that will impact the applicants are the location and the payment
procedure. Payments for DNA are now made through banks as opposed
to clinics.
¶42. The need for DNA testing is illustrated in this example. A DV
applicant brought in a clip on spouse and new baby. The line
officer requested DNA testing for mother and baby. While at the
clinic to pick up the results, an LES happened to see another woman
breastfeeding the baby. The DNA results were confirmed negative for
both the DV1 and DV2. The applicant confessed and was found
ineligible under 212(a)(6)(E) for attempting to smuggle a DV3.
¶43. DNA testing has been especially useful in IRs/CRs and F4 cases
and less useful in IR5 cases. Few if any IR5s returned with
negative DNA or unfinished testing. The section is currently
undergoing a statistical analysis of DNA findings. A tracking
spreadsheet has been created and is being updated to show the
processing of each case in the first half of 2008 in which DNA is
requested. As a result of this study, we hope to produce accurate
statistics to show how many applicants do not proceed with DNA and
also the percentage of negative DNA results. We hope to have this
study finished in the next few months. Applicants who know their
relationship is not bona fide, in general, do not follow through
with the DNA testing. Post has encountered several recent cases
where a principal applicant was asked to do a DNA test with a
derivative child, only for the principal applicant to return to the
Consulate and say that they changed their mind - they don't want the
child to travel after all. As the principal applicant (PA) has by
this point executed a visa application for the derivative, the PA is
told there will be no visa issuance until the requested DNA testing
is completed. In some cases, the principal applicant acquiesces and
the DNA results are negative, resulting in a 6E finding. Other
principal applicants attempt to remove the problematic child by
'killing them off' on paper - bringing in a fraudulent death
certificate. FPU investigation into these documents reveals the
fraud, and the end result is still a 6E.
---------
DHS FRAUD
---------
¶44. DHS Transportation Letter requests now average about 10 per
month. Previously, most applicants presented letters stating that
they were robbed or lost them. Lately, they commonly claim to have
left their Green Cards in the U.S. Three applicants who were issued
Transportation Letters this summer applied for new Transportation
letters at post in September. They traveled to the U.S., returned
to Nigeria without obtaining new Green Cards, but all presented
documentation that they applied for replacements. Post enjoys a
good relationship with DHS in Accra and receives quick responses to
LPR status inquiries.
¶45. FPU receives and processes investigation requests from USCIS
District Adjudicating Officers to verify documents, mostly divorce
decrees, submitted for many different types of petitions in the
United States. Lagos closed 112 DHS cases this period. Forty-five
percent of these resulted in a report of fraud.
-------------------------------
ALIEN SMUGGLING AND TRAFFICKING
-------------------------------
¶46. In both the IV and NIV section we see frequent attempts at
alien smuggling, whether through a sham marriage or the addition of
an extra child to an existing visa application. In some cases it is
merely a member of the extended family who does not have a legal
claim to the immigration benefit. However, in some cases, such as
the frequent DV "clip-ons", there is a financial motivation; someone
has agreed to pay in order to have that person added to an
otherwise-legitimate application. From March to August, 108
applicants were found 6e.
-----------------
DS INVESTIGATIONS
-----------------
¶47. The consular section in general and the FPU in particular work
closely with the ARSO-I assigned to Lagos. Unfortunately, the
reporting period saw a gap between the departure of the outgoing
ARSO-I in early June and the arrival of the current ARSO-I in late
August. ARSO-I Cases are referred to the ARSO-I from the IV, NIV,
and ACS units, with the referral documented in the notes for the
case. The ARSO-I has aided us in pursuing marriage fraud rings
stateside through his U.S.-based DS contacts, and here in Lagos he
has been pursuing the vendors of the fraudulent documents presented
in interviews. His close working relationship with the Special
Fraud Unit and the Special Intelligence Branch of the Nigerian
federal police has resulted in the arrest of a number of fraudulent
applicants. Through spot reports he keeps the consular section
informed of the outcomes of the referred cases. The ARSO-I also
takes referrals from the FPU in cases requiring complex
investigations, those with a criminal nexus in the U.S., or cases
requiring liaison with local law enforcement. The ARSO-I and the
FPM have a strong working relationship and often collaborate on
interviews, investigations and training. The ARSO-I and the FPM
also benefit from the strong support of the Consular Chief and the
Regional Security Officer. During the reporting period, Diplomatic
Security authorized and post approved the creation of a new
FSN-Investigator position to be filled in FY2010. The new FSN-I
will work exclusively for the ARSO-I. This addition, along with the
new consular investigator discussed below, will greatly enhance the
investigative capabilities of the ARSO-I and, by extension, the
FPU.
----------------------
HOST COUNTRY DOCUMENTS
----------------------
¶48. While Nigeria has recently updated its passport design to
incorporate a microchip in accordance with the international
e-passport standards, the older design remains valid and in
circulation. It consists of a biodata page encased in plastic,
UV-reactant features, and the passport number punched into the top
edge of the inside pages.
¶49. The new e-passport incorporates other security features in
addition to the microchip. It includes holographic and UV-reactant
features and each visa page in the booklet has the passport number
punched into the outside edge. It is important to note that, while
the document itself may appear more secure, the underlying process
in order to obtain the passport remains highly flawed. Applicants
for a Nigerian passport must submit a national identification card
or a birth certificate, fraudulent versions of which are easily
obtained locally. Applicants must also submit an affidavit from a
'guarantor' who will attest to their good character. Attempts by
Nigerian immigration to use biometrics collection to enhance
passport security are hampered by the absence of a networked
database to allow comparison between passport offices. Even with
the additional security features, the Nigerian passport remains
highly susceptible to fraud.
¶50. The Nigerian passport numbers are often reused. A high number
of legitimate Nigerian passports seen on the line have been
previously reported lost/stolen by the Nigerian authorities. Lagos
sees a dozen or more of these cases on a weekly basis in NIV. There
are no fraud indicators, and often, applicants who have prior good
travel on a previous passport have received one of these passports.
Each case usually returns a Lost/Stolen PPT hit in CLASS due to the
passport number.
¶51. Nigerian civil documents have essentially no modern security
features. Marriage certificates vary widely in appearance between
issuing jurisdictions. Marriage certificates and birth certificates
are both printed on plain paper with biographic information added by
hand. Such documents are quite easy to counterfeit, and frequently
are. In addition, controls and oversight in government offices are
such that for sufficient payment a person can fraudulently obtain
authentic versions of virtually any government document. For
example, FPU research has shown that authentic divorce decrees
signed by a particular registrar are almost invariably obtained
fraudulently. In light of the prevalence and ease of civil document
forgery in Nigeria, local documents are largely discounted in the
visa adjudication process unless they are authenticated at the
source and supported with ample personal evidence in an interview.
¶52. Post has found numerous cases in which the new E series
passports have serious quality control issues, i.e. lack of laminate
on the biodata page. Each case is referred for verification to the
Nigerian Immigration Service and in cases involving legitimate
quality control problems applicants are required to obtain a new E
series passport. An updated dossier on E series detection points is
available from Post on request.
¶53. As a result of these continuing problems with Nigerian passport
security, Post continues to review all passports using the AssureID
document checker.
---------------------------------
COOPERATION WITH HOST GOVERNMENT
---------------------------------
¶54. The FPU has enjoyed a strong relationship with the Nigerian
Police Department for many years, referring cases to them where
Nigerian laws have been broken. The Special Fraud Unit has aided in
the arrest of applicants who have presented fraudulent documents, as
well as tracking down the document vendors.
¶55. The FPU has also enjoyed years of support from local
governments, schools and marriage registries in our verifications of
documents. Lately, however, FPU investigators have been harassed by
the National Population Commission to provide money for
verifications, usually 10,000 Naira, the equivalent of about 70 U.S.
dollars. This is apparently a revenue collecting scheme on the part
of the National Population Commission. In some cases, the working
relationship between the investigator and the official, with whom
they have dealt before, has meant the registrar could be persuaded
to waive the fee; many of these government officials, however, are
becoming more hard-line on this fee, making document verification a
costly prospect.
¶56. As a result of this, Lagos now requires applicants to get
certain documents verified themselves. This is a new practice; we
do not yet have enough data and experience to say how reliable or
effective it is. Some letters of verification have turned out to be
fraudulent.
---------------------
STAFFING AND TRAINING
---------------------
¶57. (U) The Lagos FPU consists of a Fraud Prevention Manager, two
LES Fraud Investigators, an LES Fraud Analyst, and an ELO part-time
fraud assistant. This includes one newly hired full-time LES
Consular Investigator. The new investigator has been an invaluable
addition, particularly in conducting split interviews for the DV
program. Post has recently developed an FPU Travel Plan for FY2010
to establish a schedule for investigations to be conducted by the
Consular Investigators. The fraud analyst has completed the on-line
writing lab course and will apply for the March fraud prevention
training at FSI. Also, Lagos welcomed a new ARSO-I at the end of
August. The new ARSO-I will continue the training efforts of his
predecessor, who departed post in June.
¶58. From March to September, a Lagos investigator conducted a field
investigation each month; twice an ELO investigated by proxy.
During that time, 160 cases were investigated outside of Lagos.
¶59. Despite a staffing shortage, the Lagos FPU's caseload for Lagos
area investigations has been drastically reduced. From March to
September the unit closed out approximately 230 Lagos cases with the
help of ELOs. Post currently has about 35 Lagos cases pending and
hopes to further reduce cases to those aged one week or less.
Locations require a motorpool driver and vehicle, and traffic delays
prolong trips. Terrible road and weather conditions constantly
challenge investigations. Measures are now in place to prevent such
a backlog.
¶60. The unit continues to brief incoming line officers. In June,
FPU held a training session for the Consular Section. Training
covered the entire spectrum of work relating to fraud prevention and
its management. Also, in September Lagos hosted the Abuja Fraud
Prevention Manager and an LES from Cape Town for fraud training.
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LIAISON and OUTREACH
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¶61. (SBU) Post has also made significant progress in establishing
relationships with host government agencies and other
missions in order to further our fraud prevention initiatives. In
May, the German Consulate hosted the local fraud group. Meetings
are every six months and are an especially effective vessel for
meeting counterparts and sharing techniques to deter fraud.
¶62. Post continues to pursue an aggressive policy of referring
confirmed cases of sophisticated identity and document fraud
(particularly TCN visas and passports) to the local detachment of
Nigeria's Special Fraud Unit (SFU), an agency of the national police
force. While the SFU has been particularly responsive in
apprehending fraudulent applicants, police have offered little
information or evidence regarding these cases Post-arrest.
¶63. There appears little evidence that SFU has coordinated these
investigations in aims of finding and prosecuting the purveyors of
the counterfeit visas and passports. In a few cases, Post has
reason to suspect that despite definitive evidence of fraud, charges
were never filed, the implication being that bribes had been paid to
resolve the matter. SFU has made no efforts to raise the profile of
these arrests in the media, further clouding the utility of arrest
referrals is discouraging the use of fake visas and passports by the
general population. In tandem with Abuja's RSO and the ARSO-I in
Lagos, Post continues to monitor and review the arrest program. On
a very positive note, Post has noticed a reduction in the number of
applicants who present fake TCN visas, a fact that Post has
attributed to the inception of this cooperation with SFU.
¶64. Post has one example in which an applicant applied for a Swiss
visa using a passport containing a fake visa from Equatorial Guinea.
The Swiss confiscated the passport and returned it to the MFA.
This same applicant has now applied for a US visa using the same
confiscated passport, evidenced by the Swiss stamp in the passport.
The Swiss Embassy has confirmed the facts of this case. While this
case does not involve the SFU, it raises concerns about the lack of
seriousness with which the use of fraudulent documents in general is
viewed by Nigerian authorities.
BLAIR