This book confronts the coldest period of the Cold War—the moment in which personality, American political culture, public opinion, and high politics came together to define the Eisenhower ...
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This book confronts the coldest period of the Cold War—the moment in which personality, American political culture, public opinion, and high politics came together to define the Eisenhower administration's policy toward China. It convincingly portrays Dwight D. Eisenhower's private belief that close relations between the United States and the People's Republic of China (PRC) were inevitable and that careful consideration of the PRC should constitute a critical part of American diplomacy. The book argues that the Eisenhower administration's hostile rhetoric and tough actions toward China obscure the president's actual views. Behind the scenes, Eisenhower and his Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, pursued a more nuanced approach, one better suited to China's specific challenges and the stabilization of the global community. It explores the contradictions between Eisenhower and his advisors' public and private positions. The most powerful chapter centers on Eisenhower's recognition that rigid trade prohibitions would undermine the global postwar economic recovery and push China into a closer relationship with the Soviet Union. Ultimately, the book finds that Eisenhower's strategic thinking on Europe and his fear of toxic, anticommunist domestic politics constrained his leadership, making a fundamental shift in U.S. policy toward China difficult if not impossible. Consequently, the president was unable to engage Congress and the public effectively on China, ultimately failing to realize his own high standards as a leader.Less

The China Threat : Memories, Myths, and Realities in the 1950s

Nancy Bernkopf Tucker

Published in print: 2012-05-01

This book confronts the coldest period of the Cold War—the moment in which personality, American political culture, public opinion, and high politics came together to define the Eisenhower administration's policy toward China. It convincingly portrays Dwight D. Eisenhower's private belief that close relations between the United States and the People's Republic of China (PRC) were inevitable and that careful consideration of the PRC should constitute a critical part of American diplomacy. The book argues that the Eisenhower administration's hostile rhetoric and tough actions toward China obscure the president's actual views. Behind the scenes, Eisenhower and his Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, pursued a more nuanced approach, one better suited to China's specific challenges and the stabilization of the global community. It explores the contradictions between Eisenhower and his advisors' public and private positions. The most powerful chapter centers on Eisenhower's recognition that rigid trade prohibitions would undermine the global postwar economic recovery and push China into a closer relationship with the Soviet Union. Ultimately, the book finds that Eisenhower's strategic thinking on Europe and his fear of toxic, anticommunist domestic politics constrained his leadership, making a fundamental shift in U.S. policy toward China difficult if not impossible. Consequently, the president was unable to engage Congress and the public effectively on China, ultimately failing to realize his own high standards as a leader.

This chapter chronicles Washington’s dealings with Cuba during the Eisenhower administration, in particular the diplomatic attempts to bridge the gap between the two countries. It documents the ...
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This chapter chronicles Washington’s dealings with Cuba during the Eisenhower administration, in particular the diplomatic attempts to bridge the gap between the two countries. It documents the political friction underlying the U.S.-Cuba relationship as well as the series of events that would culminate in an official breach of relations in 1961. This breach would leave Cuba and the United States in a state of undeclared war, with little means or inclination on either side to address their differences. The chapter shows how Cold War confrontations, Havana’s revolutionary ideology, and Washington’s hegemonic arrogance had all conspired against attempts to bridge the deep divide between the two countries.Less

Eisenhower : Patience and Forbearance

William M. LeoGrandePeter Kornbluh

Published in print: 2015-11-01

This chapter chronicles Washington’s dealings with Cuba during the Eisenhower administration, in particular the diplomatic attempts to bridge the gap between the two countries. It documents the political friction underlying the U.S.-Cuba relationship as well as the series of events that would culminate in an official breach of relations in 1961. This breach would leave Cuba and the United States in a state of undeclared war, with little means or inclination on either side to address their differences. The chapter shows how Cold War confrontations, Havana’s revolutionary ideology, and Washington’s hegemonic arrogance had all conspired against attempts to bridge the deep divide between the two countries.

This chapter analyzes the activities of the Truman and Eisenhower administrations with regard to the expansion of African American rights. The importance of both domestic and international influences ...
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This chapter analyzes the activities of the Truman and Eisenhower administrations with regard to the expansion of African American rights. The importance of both domestic and international influences on the civil rights positions of these two administrations, with a special focus on their judicial policies, is evaluated. Due to the importance of the ideological confrontation of the cold war in pressuring these administrations to advocate an end to Plessy, a scholarly debate was organized. Also, the precedent set by the Roosevelt administration affected the participation of the Truman and Eisenhower Justice Departments in NAACP-sponsored school segregation cases before the Supreme Court was considered.Less

Published in print: 2003-12-10

This chapter analyzes the activities of the Truman and Eisenhower administrations with regard to the expansion of African American rights. The importance of both domestic and international influences on the civil rights positions of these two administrations, with a special focus on their judicial policies, is evaluated. Due to the importance of the ideological confrontation of the cold war in pressuring these administrations to advocate an end to Plessy, a scholarly debate was organized. Also, the precedent set by the Roosevelt administration affected the participation of the Truman and Eisenhower Justice Departments in NAACP-sponsored school segregation cases before the Supreme Court was considered.

This chapter discusses the Diem Experiment. It began on July 7, 1954, when Ngo Dinh Diem, the Prime Minister of South Vietnam, took control of the South Vietnamese government. During the initial ...
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This chapter discusses the Diem Experiment. It began on July 7, 1954, when Ngo Dinh Diem, the Prime Minister of South Vietnam, took control of the South Vietnamese government. During the initial stages, Diem inspired little confidence in the South Vietnamese, Americans, and French, but the Eisenhower administration welcomed Diem's rise to power. The Mendès France government did not, however, since it saw Diem as a risky experiment. The discussion looks at Diem's appointment and the events that unfolded during the course of the Diem experiment.Less

The Diem Experiment

Kathryn C. Statler

Published in print: 2007-06-22

This chapter discusses the Diem Experiment. It began on July 7, 1954, when Ngo Dinh Diem, the Prime Minister of South Vietnam, took control of the South Vietnamese government. During the initial stages, Diem inspired little confidence in the South Vietnamese, Americans, and French, but the Eisenhower administration welcomed Diem's rise to power. The Mendès France government did not, however, since it saw Diem as a risky experiment. The discussion looks at Diem's appointment and the events that unfolded during the course of the Diem experiment.

On 27 July 1953, after more than three years of fighting, an armistice was finally signed in Korea. The end of the Korean conflict, however, did not mean an end to foreign policy crises for the ...
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On 27 July 1953, after more than three years of fighting, an armistice was finally signed in Korea. The end of the Korean conflict, however, did not mean an end to foreign policy crises for the Eisenhower administration. Because the nature of the functioning of the Chief of Naval Operations and OPNAV, and that of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, can be highlighted in a discussion of how they interacted to affect Eisenhower's national security policy during times of crisis, this chapter provides an analysis of the Dien Bien Phu incident.Less

A Crisis Abroad and a CNO's Departure

Published in print: 2009-01-12

On 27 July 1953, after more than three years of fighting, an armistice was finally signed in Korea. The end of the Korean conflict, however, did not mean an end to foreign policy crises for the Eisenhower administration. Because the nature of the functioning of the Chief of Naval Operations and OPNAV, and that of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, can be highlighted in a discussion of how they interacted to affect Eisenhower's national security policy during times of crisis, this chapter provides an analysis of the Dien Bien Phu incident.

This chapter explores President Eisenhower's and President Kennedy's widespread use of symbolic gestures in the realm of civil rights—including the extensive use of African Americans as cultural ...
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This chapter explores President Eisenhower's and President Kennedy's widespread use of symbolic gestures in the realm of civil rights—including the extensive use of African Americans as cultural ambassadors. It argues that both administrations waged an unsuccessful battle to alter international perceptions of U.S. race relations. To illustrate this point, this chapter focuses on the goodwill tours of Mal Whitfield and Rafer Johnson, both of whom were abroad touring in close proximity to the unrest in Little Rock, Arkansas, that was sparked by efforts to desegregate Central High School in 1957. By juxtaposing international coverage of Little Rock with the reception of Whitfield's and Johnson's tours, this chapter suggests that the propaganda campaigns were not able to drastically alter international perceptions of U.S. race relations.Less

“The Good Negroes” : Propaganda and the Racial Crisis

Damion L. Thomas

Published in print: 2012-09-15

This chapter explores President Eisenhower's and President Kennedy's widespread use of symbolic gestures in the realm of civil rights—including the extensive use of African Americans as cultural ambassadors. It argues that both administrations waged an unsuccessful battle to alter international perceptions of U.S. race relations. To illustrate this point, this chapter focuses on the goodwill tours of Mal Whitfield and Rafer Johnson, both of whom were abroad touring in close proximity to the unrest in Little Rock, Arkansas, that was sparked by efforts to desegregate Central High School in 1957. By juxtaposing international coverage of Little Rock with the reception of Whitfield's and Johnson's tours, this chapter suggests that the propaganda campaigns were not able to drastically alter international perceptions of U.S. race relations.

This chapter examines the chain of events that culminated in the battle for Vientiane when Washington tried to reverse the results of the May 1958 supplementary elections—which saw left-wing ...
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This chapter examines the chain of events that culminated in the battle for Vientiane when Washington tried to reverse the results of the May 1958 supplementary elections—which saw left-wing candidates win most of the contested seats in the Lao Assembly. Anxious to prevent future disasters at the polls, American policymakers took a number of steps that violated Lao sovereignty. First, they created their own party to compete in local politics, then they used this party to undermine Prince Souvanna Phouma to make way for a premier who excluded the Pathet Lao from ministerial posts. After the new premier wielded plenary powers for a year, the Eisenhower administration underwrote a coup that resulted in an even more right-wing government, and when the Royal Lao Government (RLG) held its next round of nationwide elections, the CIA and the PEO helped manipulate the country to ensure success for conservative candidates.Less

“ Foreigners Who Want to Enslave the Country” : American Neocolonialism, Lao Defiance

Seth Jacobs

Published in print: 2012-04-20

This chapter examines the chain of events that culminated in the battle for Vientiane when Washington tried to reverse the results of the May 1958 supplementary elections—which saw left-wing candidates win most of the contested seats in the Lao Assembly. Anxious to prevent future disasters at the polls, American policymakers took a number of steps that violated Lao sovereignty. First, they created their own party to compete in local politics, then they used this party to undermine Prince Souvanna Phouma to make way for a premier who excluded the Pathet Lao from ministerial posts. After the new premier wielded plenary powers for a year, the Eisenhower administration underwrote a coup that resulted in an even more right-wing government, and when the Royal Lao Government (RLG) held its next round of nationwide elections, the CIA and the PEO helped manipulate the country to ensure success for conservative candidates.

This chapter discusses how the Eisenhower administration reacted to the recognition of Laos and Cambodia as independent nations. After the defeat of France in the Franco-Viet Minh War, a ...
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This chapter discusses how the Eisenhower administration reacted to the recognition of Laos and Cambodia as independent nations. After the defeat of France in the Franco-Viet Minh War, a multinational conference of communist and noncommunist powers in Geneva worked out the details of what would be known as the Geneva Accords: recognition of Laos and Cambodia as independent nations, withdrawal of all foreign troops from Lao and Cambodian territory, and partition of Vietnam until elections could be held to unify the country in 1956. President Eisenhower declared at his weekly press conference that the accords contained “features which we do not like.” Nevertheless, after years of either ignoring Laos and Cambodia or conceptually conflating them with Vietnam, U.S. geopoliticians began to consider their merits as cold war battlefields.Less

“ A Long Country Inhabited by Lotus Eaters” : Washington Encounters Laos

Seth Jacobs

Published in print: 2012-04-20

This chapter discusses how the Eisenhower administration reacted to the recognition of Laos and Cambodia as independent nations. After the defeat of France in the Franco-Viet Minh War, a multinational conference of communist and noncommunist powers in Geneva worked out the details of what would be known as the Geneva Accords: recognition of Laos and Cambodia as independent nations, withdrawal of all foreign troops from Lao and Cambodian territory, and partition of Vietnam until elections could be held to unify the country in 1956. President Eisenhower declared at his weekly press conference that the accords contained “features which we do not like.” Nevertheless, after years of either ignoring Laos and Cambodia or conceptually conflating them with Vietnam, U.S. geopoliticians began to consider their merits as cold war battlefields.

This chapter discusses the efforts of the U.S. agencies to modernize and Westernize South Vietnam and imprint American values and culture on the Vietnamese people. At the same time, the Eisenhower ...
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This chapter discusses the efforts of the U.S. agencies to modernize and Westernize South Vietnam and imprint American values and culture on the Vietnamese people. At the same time, the Eisenhower administration had replaced the French colonial presence in South Vietnam with an American neocolonial one. It is noted that the Americans mostly stepped into places the French had vacated as they attempted to build South Vietnam on an American rather than a French model.Less

Building a Colony

Kathryn C. Statler

Published in print: 2007-06-22

This chapter discusses the efforts of the U.S. agencies to modernize and Westernize South Vietnam and imprint American values and culture on the Vietnamese people. At the same time, the Eisenhower administration had replaced the French colonial presence in South Vietnam with an American neocolonial one. It is noted that the Americans mostly stepped into places the French had vacated as they attempted to build South Vietnam on an American rather than a French model.

During the Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations, Laos was positioned to become a major front in the Cold War. Yet American policymakers chose to resist communism in neighboring South Vietnam ...
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During the Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations, Laos was positioned to become a major front in the Cold War. Yet American policymakers chose to resist communism in neighboring South Vietnam instead. Two generations of historians have explained this decision by citing logistical considerations: Laos’s landlocked, mountainous terrain made the kingdom an unpropitious place to fight, while South Vietnam better accommodated America’s military forces. This book is a reinterpretation of U.S.-Lao relations in the years leading up to the Vietnam War. It argues that Laos boasted several advantages over South Vietnam as a battlefield, notably its thousand-mile border with Thailand and the fact that the Thai premier was willing to allow Washington to use his nation as a base from which to attack the communist Pathet Lao. More significant in determining U.S. policy in Southeast Asia than strategic appraisals of the Lao landscape were cultural perceptions of the Lao people. The book contends that U.S. policy toward Laos under Eisenhower and Kennedy cannot be understood apart from the traits Americans ascribed to their Lao allies. Drawing on diplomatic correspondence, contemporary press coverage, and the work of iconic figures like “celebrity saint” Tom Dooley, the book finds that the characteristics American statesmen and the American media attributed to the Lao—laziness, immaturity, ignorance, imbecility, and cowardice—differed from traits assigned the South Vietnamese and made Lao chances of withstanding communist aggression appear dubious. The book provides a new perspective on how prejudice can shape policy decisions and even the course of history.Less

The Universe Unraveling : American Foreign Policy in Cold War Laos

Seth Jacobs

Published in print: 2012-04-20

During the Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations, Laos was positioned to become a major front in the Cold War. Yet American policymakers chose to resist communism in neighboring South Vietnam instead. Two generations of historians have explained this decision by citing logistical considerations: Laos’s landlocked, mountainous terrain made the kingdom an unpropitious place to fight, while South Vietnam better accommodated America’s military forces. This book is a reinterpretation of U.S.-Lao relations in the years leading up to the Vietnam War. It argues that Laos boasted several advantages over South Vietnam as a battlefield, notably its thousand-mile border with Thailand and the fact that the Thai premier was willing to allow Washington to use his nation as a base from which to attack the communist Pathet Lao. More significant in determining U.S. policy in Southeast Asia than strategic appraisals of the Lao landscape were cultural perceptions of the Lao people. The book contends that U.S. policy toward Laos under Eisenhower and Kennedy cannot be understood apart from the traits Americans ascribed to their Lao allies. Drawing on diplomatic correspondence, contemporary press coverage, and the work of iconic figures like “celebrity saint” Tom Dooley, the book finds that the characteristics American statesmen and the American media attributed to the Lao—laziness, immaturity, ignorance, imbecility, and cowardice—differed from traits assigned the South Vietnamese and made Lao chances of withstanding communist aggression appear dubious. The book provides a new perspective on how prejudice can shape policy decisions and even the course of history.