On 2nd January, 1997 the Nakhodka broke up in heavy seas,
about 55 nautical miles off the north coast of Japan,
spilling some 6,000 tonnes of its fuel oil cargo.
The stern section sank with an estimated 10,000 tonnes of cargo onboard,
whereas the upturned bow section continued to drift towards the coast leaking oil at a slow rate.
Five days later it stranded on rocks 200 metres from the shore,
resulting in a substantial quantity of oil being released
and causing heavy contamination of the adjacent coast.

A proportion of the oil that was lost when the ship broke up dispersed naturally at sea.
Efforts to collect oil in the open sea were greatly hampered by severe winter weather and sea conditions,
and by the wide distribution and fragmentation of the oil.
As a result it proved impossible to prevent or reduce shoreline pollution to any significant extent
and several hundreds of tonnes of highly persistent water-in-oil emulsion
eventually stranded on the Japanese coastline at various locations over a distance of more than 1,000 km.
The length of contamination was exceptional compared to the relatively small quantity of pollutant
and this posed great problems for the authorities.
Nevertheless, shoreline clean-up was effectively organised, primarily using manual methods.
Around 10,000 people were involved, and most of the oil stranded on the shoreline was removed by mid-February.

Despite the wide geographical extent of the spill,
the income of traditional fishermen was only marginally affected.
The most important reason for this is the widespread practice of involving the fishing community
in the nearshore and shoreline clean-up operation,
thereby securing an alternative source of income
during the critical period when fishing activity was prevented by the presence of oil.

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IOPC

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On January 1997, the Russian tanker Nakhodka carrying 19000 tons
of medium fuel oil broke intwo some 100 km NE of the Oki Islands (Japan),
resulting in a spill of some 6200 tons of oil.
The stern section sank soon after the incident.
The upturned bow section, containing uo to 2800 tons
of cargo, drifted toward the coast and grounded on rocks some 200 m
from the shore.
Following the grounding, a substantial quantity of oil was released
heavily contaminating more than 1000 km of the adjacent shoreline.
The IOPC Funds brought legal actions in a Japanese Court
against Prisco Traffic ltd (the owner of the Nakhodka),
agaisnt Primorsk Shipping Corp,
and against the Russian Maritime Register of Shipping
to recover the amounts paid by the Funds in compensation.
Legal actions was also brought against the shipowner's insurer, the UK Club,

source

Analysis of the accident of the MV Nakhodka, Journal of Marine Science and Technology, 1998, vol 3 pages 171-193

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This is the English translation of the Japanese research on this casualty.
It is an excellent piece of work.
From the loading pattern and wave height data from a nearly data buoy,
the Japanese were able to estimate that the bending moment reached 1,087,800 kN-m
at Frame 153 which is where the collapse took place.
This was comfortably below the Rule allowable bending moment of 1,531,000 kN-m.
The bow came ashore so the Japanese were able to measure the corrosion.
They found that the average loss in the 20 mm deck plate was 7.5 mm.
The average wastage in the 14 mm deck stiffeners webs was 5.5 mm.
The 20 mm bottom plate was on average down 6 mm.
These kind of average numbers means
that the maximum wastage was much worse.
The Japanese were nearly certain that some of the underdeck
stiffeners had been detached from the deck prior to failure;
but, since the bow had been pounded as it came ashore,
they could not say for sure.
The Japanese estimated the corroded strength at Frame 153
at half the original strength which was less than the
worst moment the ship experienced,
despite the fact that the Master (who was lost)
had done the right thing and hove to
with the bow into the storm.
The Japanese concluded that the deck buckled at frame 153,
and then the ship broke in two.

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CTX

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The only problem CTX has with the Japanese report
is that they criticized the crew for using a loading pattern
which had more sagging moment than the normal full load
loading pattern in the Trim and Stability booklet.
But they admit the loading pattern the crew used was
perfectly legal.
The crew has every right to expect that,
if a loading pattern is legal, they can use it.

The cause of this structural failure is
clearly horrific corrosion about which the
ship's owners and the ship's classification society,
the Russian Marine Registry of Shipping (RS),
did nothing.

Japanese sources puts spill at 6240KL of heavy fuel Oil,
Says Enroute to Petropavlosk from Shanghai,
the ship loaded with 19,000 KL of Heavy Fuel oil C
was on a voyage in the Sea of Japan
when the bow was broken and the stern sank.
The bow was drifted by the tide and the wind,
and was wrecked on a reef near Ando Promontory
at Mikuni-cho in Fukui prefecture
at 1400 on January 7.
Maritime weather at the time:
Northwest winds 20 m/s,
waves 6 m and swell 4 m or more.
Clains for compensation totalled 192 million pounds,
but the IOPC funds had only 120 MM available.
The claims ended up being settled at 144 million pounds.

Dead was master.
One source says two elderly volunteers died
of heart attacks during clean-up.