Orthodoxy by Gilbert K. Chesterton

VIII--The Romance of Orthodoxy

IT is customary to complain of the bustle and strenuousness of our epoch. But
in truth the chief mark of our epoch is a profound laziness and fatigue; and
the fact is that the real laziness is the cause of the apparent bustle. Take
one quite external case; the streets are noisy with taxicabs and motorcars; but
this is not due to human activity but to human repose. There would be less
bustle if there were more activity, if people were simply walking about. Our
world would be more silent if it were more strenuous. And this which is true of
the apparent physical bustle is true also of the apparent bustle of the
intellect. Most of the machinery of modern language is labour-saving machinery;
and it saves mental labour very much more than it ought. Scientific phrases are
used like scientific wheels and piston-rods to make swifter and smoother yet
the path of the comfortable. Long words go rattling by us like long railway
trains. We know they are carrying thousands who are too tired or too indolent
to walk and think for themselves. It is a good exercise to try for once in a
way to express any opinion one holds in words of one syllable. If you say "The
social utility of the indeterminate sentence is recognized by all
criminologists as a part of our sociological evolution towards a more humane
and scientific view of punishment," you can go on talking like that for hours
with hardly a movement of the gray matter inside your skull. But if you begin
"I wish Jones to go to gaol and Brown to say when Jones shall come out," you
will discover, with a thrill of horror, that you are obliged to think. The long
words are not the hard words, it is the short words that are hard. There is
much more metaphysical subtlety in the word "damn" than in the word
"degeneration."

But these long comfortable words that save modern people the toil of reasoning
have one particular aspect in which they are especially ruinous and confusing.
This difficulty occurs when the same long word is used in different connections
to mean quite different things. Thus, to take a well-known instance, the word
"idealist" has one meaning as a piece of philosophy and quite another as a
piece of moral rhetoric. In the same way the scientific materialists have had
just reason to complain of people mixing up "materialist" as a term of
cosmology with "materialist" as a moral taunt. So, to take a cheaper instance,
the man who hates "progressives" in London always calls himself a "progressive"
in South Africa.

A confusion quite as unmeaning as this has arisen in connection with the word
"liberal" as applied to religion and as applied to politics and society. It is
often suggested that all Liberals ought to be freethinkers, because they ought
to love everything that is free. You might just as well say that all idealists
ought to be High Churchmen, because they ought to love everything that is high.
You might as well say that Low Churchmen ought to like Low Mass, or that Broad
Churchmen ought to like broad jokes. The thing is a mere accident of words. In
actual modern Europe a freethinker does not mean a man who thinks for himself.
It means a man who, having thought for himself, has come to one particular
class of conclusions, the material origin of phenomena, the impossibility of
miracles, the improbability of personal immortality and so on. And none of
these ideas are particularly liberal. Nay, indeed almost all these ideas are
definitely illiberal, as it is the purpose of this chapter to show.

In the few following pages I propose to point out as rapidly as possible that
on every single one of the matters most strongly insisted on by liberalisers of
theology their effect upon social practice would be definitely illiberal.
Almost every contemporary proposal to bring freedom into the church is simply a
proposal to bring tyranny into the world. For freeing the church now does not
even mean freeing it in all directions. It means freeing that peculiar set of
dogmas loosely called scientific, dogmas of monism, of pantheism, or of
Arianism, or of necessity. And every one of these (and we will take them one by
one) can be shown to be the natural ally of oppression. In fact, it is a
remarkable circumstance (indeed not so very remarkable when one comes to think
of it) that most things are the allies of oppression. There is only one thing
that can never go past a certain point in its alliance with oppression -- and
that is orthodoxy. I may, it is true, twist orthodoxy so as partly to justify a
tyrant. But I can easily make up a German philosophy to justify him entirely.

Now let us take in order the innovations that are the notes of the new theology
or the modernist church. We concluded the last chapter with the discovery of
one of them. The very doctrine which is called the most old-fashioned was found
to be the only safeguard of the new democracies of the earth. The doctrine
seemingly most unpopular was found to be the only strength of the people. In
short, we found that the only logical negation of oligarchy was in the
affirmation of original sin. So it is, I maintain, in all the other cases.

I take the most obvious instance first, the case of miracles. For some
extraordinary reason, there is a fixed notion that it is more liberal to
disbelieve in miracles than to believe in them. Why, I cannot imagine, nor can
anybody tell me. For some inconceivable cause a "broad" or "liberal" clergyman
always means a man who wishes at least to diminish the number of miracles; it
never means a man who wishes to increase that number. It always means a man who
is free to disbelieve that Christ came out of His grave; it never means a man
who is free to believe that his own aunt came out of her grave. It is common to
find trouble in a parish because the parish priest cannot admit that St. Peter
walked on water; yet how rarely do we find trouble in a parish because the
clergyman says that his father walked on the Serpentine? And this is not
because (as the swift secularist debater would immediately retort) miracles
cannot be believed in our experience. It is not because "miracles do not
happen," as in the dogma which Matthew Arnold recited with simple faith. More
supernatural things are alleged to have happened in our time than would
have been possible eighty years ago. Men of science believe in such marvels
much more than they did: the most perplexing, and even horrible, prodigies of
mind and spirit are always being unveiled in modern psychology. Things that the
old science at least would frankly have rejected as miracles are hourly being
asserted by the new science. The only thing which is still old-fashioned enough
to reject miracles is the New Theology. But in truth this notion that it is
"free" to deny miracles has nothing to do with the evidence for or against
them. It is a lifeless verbal prejudice of which the original life and
beginning was not in the freedom of thought, but simply in the dogma, of
materialism. The man of the nineteenth century did not disbelieve in the
Resurrection because his liberal Christianity allowed him to doubt it. He
disbelieved in it because his very strict materialism did not allow him to
believe it. Tennyson, a very typical nineteenth century man, uttered one of the
instinctive truisms of his contemporaries when he said that there was faith in
their honest doubt. There was indeed. Those words have a profound and even a
horrible truth. In their doubt of miracles there was a faith in a fixed and
godless fate; a deep and sincere faith in the incurable routine of the cosmos.
The doubts of the agnostic were only the dogmas of the monist.

Of the fact and evidence of the supernatural I will speak afterwards. Here we
are only concerned with this clear point; that in so far as the liberal idea of
freedom can be said to be on either side in the discussion about miracles, it
is obviously on the side of miracles. Reform or (in the only tolerable sense)
progress means simply the gradual control of matter by mind. A miracle simply
means the swift control of matter by mind. If you wish to feed the people, you
may think that feeding them miraculously in the wilderness is impossible -- but
you cannot think it illiberal. If you really want poor children to go to the
seaside, you cannot think it illiberal that they should go there on flying
dragons; you can only think it unlikely. A holiday, like Liberalism, only means
the liberty of man. A miracle only means the liberty of God. You may
conscientiously deny either of them, but you cannot call your denial a triumph
of the liberal idea. The Catholic Church believed that man and God both had a
sort of spiritual freedom. Calvinism took away the freedom from man, but left
it to God. Scientific materialism binds the Creator Himself; it chains up God
as the Apocalypse chained the devil. It leaves nothing free in the universe.
And those who assist this process are called the "liberal theologians."

This, as I say, is the lightest and most evident case. The assumption that
there is something in the doubt of miracles akin to liberality or reform is
literally the opposite of the truth. If a man cannot believe in miracles there
is an end of the matter; he is not particularly liberal, but he is perfectly
honourable and logical, which are much better things. But if he can believe in
miracles, he is certainly the more liberal for doing so; because they mean
first, the freedom of the soul, and secondly, its control over the tyranny of
circumstance. Sometimes this truth is ignored in a singularly naïve way,
even by the ablest men. For instance, Mr. Bernard Shaw speaks with hearty
old-fashioned contempt for the idea of miracles, as if they were a sort of
breach of faith on the part of nature: he seems strangely unconscious that
miracles are only the final flowers of his own favourite tree, the doctrine of
the omnipotence of will. Just in the same way he calls the desire for
immortality a paltry selfishness, forgetting that he has just called the desire
for life a healthy and heroic selfishness. How can it be noble to wish to make
one's life infinite and yet mean to wish to make it immortal? No, if it is
desirable that man should triumph over the cruelty of nature or custom, then
miracles are certainly desirable; we will discuss afterwards whether they are
possible.

But I must pass on to the larger cases of this curious error; the notion that
the "liberalising" of religion in some way helps the liberation of the world.
The second example of it can be found in the question of pantheism -- or rather
of a certain modern attitude which is often called immanentism, and which often
is Buddhism. But this is so much more difficult a matter that I must approach
it with rather more preparation.

The things said most confidently by advanced persons to crowded audiences are
generally those quite opposite to the fact; it is actually our truisms that are
untrue. Here is a case. There is a phrase of facile liberality uttered again
and again at ethical societies and parliaments of religion: "the religions of
the earth differ in rites and forms, but they are the same in what they teach."
It is false; it is the opposite of the fact. The religions of the earth do not
greatly differ in rites and forms; they do greatly differ in what they teach.
It is as if a man were to say, "Do not be misled by the fact that the Church
Times and the Freethinker look utterly different, that one is
painted on vellum and the other carved on marble, that one is triangular and
the other hectagonal; read them and you will see that they say the same thing."
The truth is, of course, that they are alike in everything except in the fact
that they don't say the same thing. An atheist stockbroker in Surbiton looks
exactly like a Swedenborgian stockbroker in Wimbledon. You may walk round and
round them and subject them to the most personal and offensive study without
seeing anything Swedenborgian in the hat or anything particularly godless in
the umbrella. It is exactly in their souls that they are divided. So the truth
is that the difficulty of all the creeds of the earth is not as alleged in this
cheap maxim: that they agree in meaning, but differ in machinery. It is exactly
the opposite. They agree in machinery; almost every great religion on earth
works with the same external methods, with priests, scriptures, altars, sworn
brotherhoods, special feasts. They agree in the mode of teaching; what they
differ about is the thing to be taught. Pagan optimists and Eastern pessimists
would both have temples, just as Liberals and Tories would both have
newspapers. Creeds that exist to destroy each other both have scriptures, just
as armies that exist to destroy each other both have guns.

The great example of this alleged identity of all human religions is the
alleged spiritual identity of Buddhism and Christianity. Those who adopt this
theory generally avoid the ethics of most other creeds, except, indeed,
Confucianism, which they like because it is not a creed. But they are cautious
in their praises of Mahommedanism, generally confining themselves to imposing
its morality only upon the refreshment of the lower classes. They seldom
suggest the Mahommedan view of marriage (for which there is a great deal to be
said), and towards Thugs and fetish worshippers their attitude may even be
called cold. But in the case of the great religion of Gautama they feel
sincerely a similarity.

Students of popular science, like Mr. Blatchford, are always insisting that
Christianity and Buddhism are very much alike, especially Buddhism. This is
generally believed, and I believed it myself until I read a book giving the
reasons for it. The reasons were of two kinds: resemblances that meant nothing
because they were common to all humanity, and resemblances which were not
resemblances at all. The author solemnly explained that the two creeds were
alike in things in which all creeds are alike, or else he described them as
alike in some point in which they are quite obviously different. Thus, as a
case of the first class, he said that both Christ and Buddha were called by the
divine voice coming out of the sky, as if you would expect the divine voice to
come out of the coal-cellar. Or, again, it was gravely urged that these two
Eastern teachers, by a singular coincidence, both had to do with the washing of
feet. You might as well say that it was a remarkable coincidence that they both
had feet to wash. And the other class of similarities were those which simply
were not similar. Thus this reconciler of the two religions draws earnest
attention to the fact that at certain religious feasts the robe of the Lama is
rent in pieces out of respect, and the remnants highly valued. But this is the
reverse of a resemblance, for the garments of Christ were not rent in pieces
out of respect, but out of derision; and the remnants were not highly valued
except for what they would fetch in the rag shops. It is rather like alluding
to the obvious connection between the two ceremonies of the sword: when it taps
a man's shoulder, and when it cuts off his head. It is not at all similar for
the man. These scraps of puerile pedantry would indeed matter little if it were
not also true that the alleged philosophical resemblances are also of these two
kinds, either proving too much or not proving anything. That Buddhism approves
of mercy or of self-restraint is not to say that it is specially like
Christianity; it is only to say that it is not utterly unlike all human
existence. Buddhists disapprove in theory of cruelty or excess because all sane
human beings disapprove in theory of cruelty or excess. But to say that
Buddhism and Christianity give the same philosophy of these things is simply
false. All humanity does agree that we are in a net of sin. Most of humanity
agrees that there is some way out. But as to what is the way out, I do not
think that there are two institutions in the universe which contradict each
other so flatly as Buddhism and Christianity.

Even when I thought, with most other well-informed, though unscholarly, people,
that Buddhism and Christianity were alike, there was one thing about them that
always perplexed me; I mean the startling difference in their type of religious
art. I do not mean in its technical style of representation, but in the things
that it was manifestly meant to represent. No two ideals could be more opposite
than a Christian saint in a Gothic cathedral and a Buddhist saint in a Chinese
temple. The opposition exists at every point; but perhaps the shortest
statement of it is that the Buddhist saint always has his eyes shut, while the
Christian saint always has them very wide open. The Buddhist saint has a sleek
and harmonious body, but his eyes are heavy and sealed with sleep. The
mediaeval saint's body is wasted to its crazy bones, but his eyes are
frightfully alive. There cannot be any real community of spirit between forces
that produced symbols so different as that. Granted that both images are
extravagances, are perversions of the pure creed, it must be a real divergence
which could produce such opposite extravagances. The Buddhist is looking with a
peculiar intentness inwards. The Christian is staring with a frantic intentness
outwards. If we follow that clue steadily we shall find some interesting
things.

A short time ago Mrs. Besant, in an interesting essay, announced that there was
only one religion in the world, that all faiths were only versions or
perversions of it, and that she was quite prepared to say what it was.
According to Mrs. Besant this universal Church is simply the universal self. It
is the doctrine that we are really all one person; that there are no real walls
of individuality between man and man. If I may put it so, she does not tell us
to love our neighbours; she tells us to be our neighbours. That is Mrs.
Besant's thoughtful and suggestive description of the religion in which all men
must find themselves in agreement. And I never heard of any suggestion in my
life with which I more violently disagree. I want to love my neighbour not
because he is I, but precisely because he is not I. I want to adore the world,
not as one likes a looking-glass, because it is one's self, but as one loves a
woman, because she is entirely different. If souls are separate love is
possible. If souls are united love is obviously impossible. A man may be said
loosely to love himself, but he can hardly fall in love with himself, or, if he
does, it must be a monotonous courtship. If the world is full of real selves,
they can be really unselfish selves. But upon Mrs. Besant's principle the whole
cosmos is only one enormously selfish person.

It is just here that Buddhism is on the side of modern pantheism and immanence.
And it is just here that Christianity is on the side of humanity and liberty
and love. Love desires personality; therefore love desires division. It is the
instinct of Christianity to be glad that God has broken the universe into
little pieces, because they are living pieces. It is her instinct to say
"little children love one another" rather than to tell one large person to love
himself. This is the intellectual abyss between Buddhism and Christianity; that
for the Buddhist or Theosophist personality is the fall of man, for the
Christian it is the purpose of God, the whole point of his cosmic idea. The
world-soul of the Theosophists asks man to love it only in order that man may
throw himself into it. But the divine centre of Christianity actually threw man
out of it in order that he might love it. The oriental deity is like a giant
who should have lost his leg or hand and be always seeking to find it; but the
Christian power is like some giant who in a strange generosity should cut off
his right hand, so that it might of its own accord shake hands with him. We
come back to the same tireless note touching the nature of Christianity; all
modern philosophies are chains which connect and fetter; Christianity is a
sword which separates and sets free. No other philosophy makes God actually
rejoice in the separation of the universe into living souls. But according to
orthodox Christianity this separation between God and man is sacred, because
this is eternal. That a man may love God it is necessary that there should be
not only a God to be loved, but a man to love him. All those vague theosophical
minds for whom the universe is an immense melting-pot are exactly the minds
which shrink instinctively from that earthquake saying of our Gospels, which
declare that the Son of God came not with peace but with a sundering sword. The
saying rings entirely true even considered as what it obviously is; the
statement that any man who preaches real love is bound to beget hate. It is as
true of democratic fraternity as a divine love; sham love ends in compromise
and common philosophy; but real love has always ended in bloodshed. Yet there
is another and yet more awful truth behind the obvious meaning of this
utterance of our Lord. According to Himself the Son was a sword separating
brother and brother that they should for an aeon hate each other. But the
Father also was a sword, which in the black beginning separated brother and
brother, so that they should love each other at last.

This is the meaning of that almost insane happiness in the eyes of the
mediaeval saint in the picture. This is the meaning of the sealed eyes of the
superb Buddhist image. The Christian saint is happy because he has verily been
cut off from the world; he is separate from things and is staring at them in
astonishment. But why should the Buddhist saint be astonished at things? --
since there is really only one thing, and that being impersonal can hardly be
astonished at itself. There have been many pantheist poems suggesting wonder,
but no really successful ones. The pantheist cannot wonder, for he cannot
praise God or praise anything as really distinct from himself. Our immediate
business here, however, is with the effect of this Christian admiration (which
strikes outwards, towards a deity distinct from the worshipper) upon the
general need for ethical activity and social reform. And surely its effect is
sufficiently obvious. There is no real possibility of getting out of pantheism,
any special impulse to moral action. For pantheism implies in its nature that
one thing is as good as another; whereas action implies in its nature that one
thing is greatly preferable to another. Swinburne in the high summer of his
scepticism tried in vain to wrestle with this difficulty. In "Songs before
Sunrise," written under the inspiration of Garibaldi and the revolt of Italy he
proclaimed the newer religion and the purer God which should wither up all the
priests of the world:

Of which the immediate and evident deduction is that tyrants are as much the
sons of God as Garibaldis; and that King Bomba of Naples having, with the
utmost success, "found himself" is identical with the ultimate good in all
things. The truth is that the western energy that dethrones tyrants has been
directly due to the western theology that says "I am I, thou art thou." The
same spiritual separation which looked up and saw a good king in the universe
looked up and saw a bad king in Naples. The worshippers of Bomba's god
dethroned Bomba. The worshippers of Swinburne's god have covered Asia for
centuries and have never dethroned a tyrant. The Indian saint may reasonably
shut his eyes because he is looking at that which is I and Thou and We and They
and It. It is a rational occupation: but it is not true in theory and not true
in fact that it helps the Indian to keep an eye on Lord Curzon. That external
vigilance which has always been the mark of Christianity (the command that we
should watch and pray) has expressed itself both in typical western
orthodoxy and in typical western politics: but both depend on the idea of a
divinity transcendent, different from ourselves, a deity that disappears.
Certainly the most sagacious creeds may suggest that we should pursue God into
deeper and deeper rings of the labyrinth of our own ego. But only we of
Christendom have said that we should hunt God like an eagle upon the mountains:
and we have killed all monsters in the chase.

Here again, therefore, we find that in so far as we value democracy and the
self-renewing energies of the west, we are much more likely to find them in the
old theology than the new. If we want reform, we must adhere to orthodoxy:
especially in this matter (so much disputed in the counsels of Mr. R. J.
Campbell), the matter of insisting on the immanent or the transcendent deity.
By insisting specially on the immanence of God we get introspection,
self-isolation, quietism, social indifference -- Tibet. By insisting specially
on the transcendence of God we get wonder, curiosity, moral and political
adventure, righteous indignation -- Christendom. Insisting that God is inside
man, man is always inside himself. By insisting that God transcends man, man
has transcended himself.

If we take any other doctrine that has been called old-fashioned we shall find
the case the same. It is the same, for instance, in the deep matter of the
Trinity. Unitarians (a sect never to be mentioned without a special respect for
their distinguished intellectual dignity and high intellectual honour) are
often reformers by the accident that throws so many small sects into such an
attitude. But there is nothing in the least liberal or akin to reform in the
substitution of pure monotheism for the Trinity. The complex God of the
Athanasian Creed may be an enigma for the intellect; but He is far less likely
to gather the mystery and cruelty of a Sultan than the lonely god of Omar or
Mahomet. The god who is a mere awful unity is not only a king but an Eastern
king. The heart of humanity, especially of European humanity, is
certainly much more satisfied by the strange hints and symbols that gather
round the Trinitarian idea, the image of a council at which mercy pleads as
well as justice, the conception of a sort of liberty and variety existing even
in the inmost chamber of the world. For Western religion has always felt keenly
the idea "it is not well for man to be alone." The social instinct asserted
itself everywhere as when the Eastern idea of hermits was practically expelled
by the Western idea of monks. So even asceticism became brotherly; and the
Trappists were sociable even when they were silent. If this love of a living
complexity be our test, it is certainly healthier to have the Trinitarian
religion than the Unitarian. For to us Trinitarians (if I may say it with
reverence) -- to us God Himself is a society. It is indeed a fathomless mystery
of theology, and even if I were theologian enough to deal with it directly, it
would not be relevant to do so here. Suffice it to say here that this triple
enigma is as comforting as wine and open as an English fireside; that this
thing that bewilders the intellect utterly quiets the heart: but out of the
desert, from the dry places and, the dreadful suns, come the cruel children of
the lonely God; the real Unitarians who with scimitar in hand have laid waste
the world. For it is not well for God to be alone.

Again, the same is true of that difficult matter of the danger of the soul,
which has unsettled so many just minds. To hope for all souls is imperative;
and it is quite tenable that their salvation is inevitable. It is tenable, but
it is not specially favourable to activity or progress. Our fighting and
creative society ought rather to insist on the danger of everybody, on the fact
that every man is hanging by a thread or clinging to a precipice. To say that
all will be well anyhow is a comprehensible remark: but it cannot be called the
blast of a trumpet. Europe ought rather to emphasize possible perdition; and
Europe always has emphasized it. Here its highest religion is at one with all
its cheapest romances. To the Buddhist or the eastern fatalist existence is a
science or a plan, which must end up in a certain way. But to a Christian
existence is a story, which may end up in any way. In a thrilling novel
(that purely Christian product) the hero is not eaten by cannibals; but it is
essential to the existence of the thrill that he might be eaten by
cannibals. The hero must (so to speak) be an eatable hero. So Christian morals
have always said to the man, not that he would lose his soul, but that he must
take care that he didn't. In Christian morals, in short, it is wicked to call a
man "damned": but it is strictly religious and philosophic to call him
damnable.

All Christianity concentrates on the man at the cross-roads. The vast and
shallow philosophies, the huge syntheses of humbug, all talk about ages and
evolution and ultimate developments. The true philosophy is concerned with the
instant. Will a man take this road or that? -- that is the only thing to think
about, if you enjoy thinking. The aeons are easy enough to think about, any one
can think about them. The instant is really awful: and it is because our
religion has intensely felt the instant, that it has in literature dealt much
with battle and in theology dealt much with hell. It is full of danger,
like a boy's book: it is at an immortal crisis. There is a great deal of real
similarity between popular fiction and the religion of the western people. If
you say that popular fiction is vulgar and tawdry, you only say what the dreary
and well-informed say also about the images in the Catholic churches. Life
(according to the faith) is very like a serial story in a magazine: life ends
with the promise (or menace) "to be continued in our next." Also, with a noble
vulgarity, life imitates the serial and leaves off at the exciting moment. For
death is distinctly an exciting moment.

But the point is that a story is exciting because it has in it so strong an
element of will, of what theology calls free-will. You cannot finish a sum how
you like. But you can finish a story how you like. When somebody discovered the
Differential Calculus there was only one Differential Calculus he could
discover. But when Shakespeare killed Romeo he might have married him to
Juliet's old nurse if he had felt inclined. And Christendom has excelled in the
narrative romance exactly because it has insisted on the theological free-will.
It is a large matter and too much to one side of the road to be discussed
adequately here; but this is the real objection to that torrent of modern talk
about treating crime as disease, about making a prison merely a hygienic
environment like a hospital, of healing sin by slow scientific methods. The
fallacy of the whole thing is that evil is a matter of active choice whereas
disease is not. If you say that you are going to cure a profligate as you cure
an asthmatic, my cheap and obvious answer is, "Produce the people who want to
be asthmatics as many people want to be profligates." A man may lie still and
be cured of a malady. But he must not lie still if he wants to be cured of a
sin; on the contrary, he must get up and jump about violently. The whole point
indeed is perfectly expressed in the very word which we use for a man in
hospital; "patient" is in the passive mood; "sinner" is in the active. If a man
is to be saved from influenza, he may be a patient. But if he is to be saved
from forging, he must be not a patient but an impatient. He must be
personally impatient with forgery. All moral reform must start in the active
not the passive will.

Here again we reach the same substantial conclusion. In so far as we desire the
definite reconstructions and the dangerous revolutions which have distinguished
European civilization, we shall not discourage the thought of possible ruin; we
shall rather encourage it. If we want, like the Eastern saints, merely to
contemplate how right things are, of course we shall only say that they must go
right. But if we particularly want to make them go right, we must insist
that they may go wrong.

Lastly, this truth is yet again true in the case of the common modern attempts
to diminish or to explain away the divinity of Christ. The thing may be true or
not; that I shall deal with before I end. But if the divinity is true it is
certainly terribly revolutionary. That a good man may have his back to the wall
is no more than we knew already; but that God could have his back to the wall
is a boast for all insurgents for ever. Christianity is the only religion on
earth that has felt that omnipotence made God incomplete. Christianity alone
has felt that God, to be wholly God, must have been a rebel as well as a king.
Alone of all creeds, Christianity has added courage to the virtues of the
Creator. For the only courage worth calling courage must necessarily mean that
the soul passes a breaking point and does not break. In this indeed I approach
a matter more dark and awful than it is easy to discuss; and I apologise in
advance if any of my phrases fall wrong or seem irreverent touching a matter
which the greatest saints and thinkers have justly feared to approach. But in
that terrific tale of the Passion there is a distinct emotional suggestion that
the author of all things (in some unthinkable way) went not only through agony,
but through doubt. It is written, "Thou shalt not tempt the Lord thy God." No;
but the Lord thy God may tempt Himself; and it seems as if this was what
happened in Gethsemane. In a garden Satan tempted man: and in a garden God
tempted God. He passed in some superhuman manner through our human horror of
pessimism. When the world shook and the sun was wiped out of heaven, it was not
at the crucifixion, but at the cry from the cross: the cry which confessed that
God was forsaken of God. And now let the revolutionists choose a creed from all
the creeds and a god from all the gods of the world, carefully weighing all the
gods of inevitable recurrence and of unalterable power. They will not find
another god who has himself been in revolt. Nay, (the matter grows too
difficult for human speech,) but let the atheists themselves choose a god. They
will find only one divinity who ever uttered their isolation; only one religion
in which God seemed for an instant to be an atheist.

These can be called the essentials of the old orthodoxy, of which the chief
merit is that it is the natural fountain of revolution and reform; and of which
the chief defect is that it is obviously only an abstract assertion. Its main
advantage is that it is the most adventurous and manly of all theologies. Its
chief disadvantage is simply that it is a theology. It can always be urged
against it that it is in its nature arbitrary and in the air. But it is not so
high in the air but that great archers spend their whole lives in shooting
arrows at it -- yes, and their last arrows; there are men who will ruin
themselves and ruin their civilization if they may ruin also this old fantastic
tale. This is the last and most astounding fact about this faith; that its
enemies will use any weapon against it, the swords that cut their own fingers,
and the firebrands that burn their own homes. Men who begin to fight the Church
for the sake of freedom and humanity end by flinging away freedom and humanity
if only they may fight the Church. This is no exaggeration; I could fill a book
with the instances of it. Mr. Blatchford set out, as an ordinary Bible-smasher,
to prove that Adam was guiltless of sin against God; in manoeuvring so as to
maintain this he admitted, as a mere side issue, that all the tyrants, from
Nero to King Leopold, were guiltless of any sin against humanity. I know a man
who has such a passion for proving that he will have no personal existence
after death that he falls back on the position that he has no personal
existence now. He invokes Buddhism and says that all souls fade into each
other; in order to prove that he cannot go to heaven he proves that he cannot
go to Hartle-pool. I have known people who protested against religious
education with arguments against any education, saying that the child's mind
must grow freely or that the old must not teach the young. I have known people
who showed that there could be no divine judgment by showing that there can be
no human judgment, even for practical purposes. They burned their own corn to
set fire to the church; they smashed their own tools to smash it; any stick was
good enough to beat it with, though it were the last stick of their own
dismembered furniture. We do not admire, we hardly excuse, the fanatic who
wrecks this world for love of the other. But what are we to say of the fanatic
who wrecks this world out of hatred of the other? He sacrifices the very
existence of humanity to the non-existence of God. He offers his victims not to
the altar, but merely to assert the idleness of the altar and the emptiness of
the throne. He is ready to ruin even that primary ethic by which all things
live, for his strange and eternal vengeance upon some one who never lived at
all.

And yet the thing hangs in the heavens unhurt. Its opponents only succeed in
destroying all that they themselves justly hold dear. They do not destroy
orthodoxy; they only destroy political and common courage sense. They do not
prove that Adam was not responsible to God; how could they prove it? They only
prove (from their premises) that the Czar is not responsible to Russia. They do
not prove that Adam should not have been punished by God; they only prove that
the nearest sweater should not be punished by men. With their oriental doubts
about personality they do not make certain that we shall have no personal life
hereafter; they only make certain that we shall not have a very jolly or
complete one here. With their paralysing hints of all conclusions coming out
wrong they do not tear the book of the Recording Angel; they only make it a
little harder to keep the books of Marshall & Snelgrove. Not only is the
faith the mother of all worldly energies, but its foes are the fathers of all
worldly confusion. The secularists have not wrecked divine things; but the
secularists have wrecked secular things, if that is any comfort to them. The
Titans did not scale heaven; but they laid waste the world.