The 2014 ROC "9 in 1" 2018 elections were a disaster for the KMT at the Mayor/County magistrate level although the KMT collapse was more muted at the City/County assembly and Zone/village heads level.

The DPP Tsai administration is very unpopular and in theory it should be a chance for the KMT to storm back to power at the Mayor/County magistrate level. Unfortunately the DPP at the Mayor/County magistrate seems to be fairly popular and mostly have insulated themselves from the Tsai DPP regime's unpopularity. The KMT should be able to make some gains but not a a lot and should be able to recover some ground in City/County assembly and Zone/village heads level where it used to be supreme (and still have the upper hand today.)

pro-DPP ind. Ko(柯文哲) mostly has broken away from DPP and if anything taken a pro-CCP position which is ironic given Ko's radical pro-Taiwan Independence background. DPP is trapped between running a candidate and coming in third and throwing the race to the KMT to no running and looking like a fool. KMT might run Wayne Chiang(蔣萬安), great grandson of the famous Chiang Kai-Shek who can turn out the KMT base but might also turn out the DPP base. Another possible KMT candidate is Cheng (鄭麗文) who is famously known as "Trump girl." She was a rising DPP star but had a falling out with DPP Prez Chen and then joined the KMT and served as MP as well as Spokesperson of the PM office and turned political commentator after 2014. She famously predicted in late 2015 that Trump will win the GOP nomination and then go on to beat Clinton in the general election. She never wavered 2015 and 2016 in that projection. Most likely Chiang will be nominated since he is seen as most likely to win. The X-factor is will DPP run a candidate or not. So if DPP does not run the race is lean Ko. If the DPP runs the race is lean KMT.

New Taipei City (新北市) (PVI Blue +2)KMT 50.06%DPP 48.78%

KMT incumbent Eric Chu (朱立倫) who was also the KMT candidate of the losing 2016 Prez campaign will be term limited out. The KMT will most likely run Hou (侯友宜) who is quite popular. Unless the DPP runs a political superstar, like current PM and ex-Tainan mayor Lai, the KMT seem to be able to sweep this swing City with ease. Most likely solid KMT.

Taoyuan City (桃園市) (PVI Blue +5)DPP 51.00%KMT 47.97%

The DPP incumbent Cheng (鄭文燦) who won an unexpected race in this KMT stronghold in 2014 is very popular and seems to be insulated from the poor ratings of the DPP Tsai regime. The KMT might run the old KMT mayor John Wu (吳志揚) that Cheng defeated for a re-match. This race leans DPP. The fundementals favor KMT but Cheng is a popular incumbent. If Tsai's national ratings take a further hit then Cheng might be vulnerable. Lean DPP.

Taichung City(臺中市) (PVI Blue +0)DPP 57.06%KMT 42.94%

DPP incumbent Lin (林佳龍) is fairly popular in this swing city and should have the upper hand. The KMT has a few Taichung MPs that are looking to run but most likely they will not unseat Lin but more about setting themselves up for 2022. Lean to Solid DPP.

Tainan City (臺南市) (PVI Green +11)DPP 72.90%KMT 27.10%

The DPP mayor Lai was made PM in late 2017 and was term-limited out anyway. The main battle is the DPP primary as it is unlikely the KMT can beat the DPP in DPP stronghold Tainan even in a bad DPP year. The KMT will for sure close the losing margin by a lot since this is an open seat but not win. If Tsai win reelection and has support meltdown then perhaps the KMT has a chance in 2022 but not 2018. Solid DPP.

kaoshiung City (高雄市) (PVI Green +7)DPP 68.09%KMT 30.89%

The DPP incumbent is term-limited out so this is an open seat. Like Tainan City the main battle is the DPP primary as the KMT does not have a real shot of winning. Perhaps in 2022 if DPP is facing double incumbency at the national level in 2022 but not 2018. Solid DPP.

One major reason for the quick drop in Tsai/DPP support is various flip flops on populist measures that Tsai promised in 2016 campaign. The labor law reforms flip flops are especially hurtful and most likely will drive a wedge between DPP and NPP which is taking the radical populist line against DPP.

The DPP flip-flop is structural. Political conflict revolve around identity. As a result both the KMT and DPP are big tent parties on social and economic issues. KMT leans right on social issues but the most socially conservative elements on ROC are in the DPP which also has a progressive wing. Big capital are for KMT since they benefit from economic integration with PRC while regional small capital which fears economic competition with PRC backs DPP. DPP in theory has a strong student and labor wing but the regional small capital is the donor class of the DPP. Tsai ran in 2016 on a pro-labor set of labor laws. Once in power it had to bow to the DPP donor class of small regional capital and is coming out with a much more pro-capital set of labor laws. NPP which is trying to capture the radical progressive and labor activist win of the DPP is leading the charge against the Tsai and DPP.

When politics becomes about identity the policies tend to shift right. There is no viable Left on ROC. Both KMT and DPP are in many ways Right parties despite both (especially DPP) paying lip services to some Left principles (mostly when they are in opposition). NPP, by breaking with DPP and trying to turn itself into a alternative (and anti-DPP) Left-Progressive party, is now a major x-factor if it runs a full slate of candidate in the 2018 local elections and reject electoral cooperation with DPP and could do real damage to the DPP. I doubt NPP will go anyway on the long run but could damage the DPP along the way.

I was just watched the Tainan City (臺南市) DPP Primary debates. Since the winner of the DPP primary is likely to win the general election the debate was vicious as expected with all 6 candidates going all out to attack each other and especially the front runner DPP MP Huang (黃偉哲).

What struck me was that the debate pretty much represents the total victory of Chinese Mandarin. Almost the entire debate was in Chinese Mandarin with very few cases where the candidates used the Hoklo dialect. For a DPP primary debate in the most pro-DPP city to be held in Chinese Mandarin would be unheard off back in the 1990s.

Under the KMT authoritarian regime of 1950s-1980s, in order to promote Greater Chinese nationalism and suppress Taiwan regionalism the KMT regime promoted Chinese Mandarin and discouraged the use of the Hoklo (or Minnan which is a Fujian and Taiwan Province dialect) or Hakka dialects in public space. The rise of proto-DPP in the 1970s used the assertion of the use of Hoklo to help foster and create a Taiwan based regional identity. Proto-DPP and DPP rallies in the 1970s to 2000s were mostly in Hoklo. This did solidify Hoklos support for DPP even a the same time it drove the Mainlander Hakka and Aborigine votes toward KMT.

Once the DPP first came into power in 2000 once of its main goals is try promote the teaching and use of the Hoklo dialect in elementary and middle school. It mostly went nowhere. It was clear by the 2000s that there was no money in knowing Hoklo and there was plenty of money in knowing Chinese Mandarin which is used on the PRC and of course English. Most students went through the motions of learning Hoklo but in a reverse logic of the 1950s-1980s, once the ruling regime did not see to suppresses Hoklo but instead seek to promote it, Hoklo went into decline is usage across the board.

Tsai, who is Hakka, and barely knows any Hakka nor Hoklo is all Chinese Mandarin as far as speech is concerned. The Tsai 2012 campaign was mostly in Chinese Mandarin and partly Hoklo and the Tsai 2016 campaign is pretty much all in Chinese Mandarin. So over time the unifying factor behind the Taiwan Independence movement became less about cultural factors like dialect (Hoklo vs Chinese Mandarin) but more about political system and economics. Watching the Tainan City (臺南市) DPP Primary debates tells me that this process is mostly complete.

Hoklo, on the long run will become a dialect for elderly rural Hoklo and the Hoklo I hear the youth from Taiwan Province use is so corrupted by Chinese Mandarin I do not consider it the real Hoklo dialect. While I embrace this victory of Greater Chinese nationalism I do hope that Hoklo dialect, which is one of the most ancient of Chinese dialects somehow can be preserved. I endlessly point out to my relatives that would listen to me that when we watch various Chinese historical mini-series from, say the Jin Dynasty or Han Dynasty, when they speak Chinese Mandarin it is historically inaccurate. The speech they spoke back then was the closest to what Hoklo dialect is today. All those shows should really use Hoklo dialect to preserve historical accuracy.

While we are talking about primaries it might be useful to talk about ROC "primaries."

The reality is that in the ROC political scene there are no primaries like anything they have in the USA. The KMT is a Leninist party in structure since Sun took USSR advisers on to help him revamp the KMT in the early 1920s. The DPP merely copied the KMT organization structure when it was formed in 1986. So in paper for both the KMT and DPP the leadership decides on the candidates. There was some attempts back in the 1990s for KMT DPP and other parties to try to use USA style primaries but all of them ended in disaster with fake party members, bogus voting and mass cheating.

These days "primaries" are just party sponsored polls which the party leadership take the average and advises on who to nominate. In most cases both the KMT and DPP will just renominate the incumbent if term-limits are not an issue. If it is an open seat the the KMT and DPP will sponsor polls. There are 3 types of polls that could take place.

Type 1 - Respondents are asked which party they support then asked to see if they support candidate A B or C. The poll result only considers the response of the those that support the party. This is like a "closed primary."

Type 2 - Respondents are asked which candidate they support (A B or C) regardless of party support. This is like an "open primary."

Type 3 - Respondents are asked if it was A vs opponent who do you back, B vs opponent who do you back, and C vs opponent who do you back. This poll tends to test for how winnable a candidate would be which is really meant to block out candidates that are too radical but could potentially win a closed primary. I guess the GOP wish they had something like this for the 2010 DE or 2012 MO Senate primaries.

The KMT tends to use Type 1 and Type 2 more while the DPP tend to use Type 3 more but it always depends on the race. And since the party decides no matter what the result of the polls are not binding although it is very rare if ever the party goes against what the polls come back with.

Understand that under type 3 we have have all sorts of bizarre results. Since the voting population knows that such a poll will be held during the "primary period", supporters of the opposite party might "spike" the results by claiming to support the most unwinnable of the the opposing party versus their own party candidate. Or more likely they could just claim to support the candidate of the opposing party they happen to like the most versus their own party's candidate. An for partisans of a primary candidate their supporter might claim to the pollster they will support the opposite party candidate over a rival primary candidate. In all cases this is no how they will really will vote in the general election.

The 2012 DPP Prez "primary" was a famous case where Type 3 was used. It was Tsai vs her rival Su vs Hsu (who leads the tiny pro-unification (or at least anti-independence) faction of the DPP). The average polling result was Tsai 42.50% vs Ma 35.04%, Su 41.15% vs Ma 33.79%, Ma 51.45% Hsu 12.21%. So Tsai won by a tiny margin and went on to be beaten by Ma in the general election 51.60% vs 45.63% with KMT rebel party PFP Sung getting 2.77%. It is clear that many KMT supporters "supported" Tsai or Su in this poll to show they support for one or the other. What was also controversial was that there was an active Tsai campaign to tell their supporters to say, if they are asked by a pollster, that they backed Tsai over Ma but backed Ma over Su when reality they was not the case. The Su camp was very angry about his but accepted the result. As a result Su only have half-hearted support to Tsai which must have contributed to Tsai under-performing expectation in Pingdong County where both Tsai and Su are from but Su has strong links to the local DPP machine.

A KMT incumbent that was charged for corruption running as a KMT rebel was part of a perfect storm for the DPP to win this very pro-KMT city. The KMT in Keelong City continue to be divided after the election. In 2018 the DPP incumbent Lin (林右昌) seems fairly popular and unless the KMT can unify quickly most likely the DPP incumbent will win re-election. Lean to Solid DPP.

Yilan County(宜蘭縣) (PVI Green +6)DPP 63.95%KMT 36.05%

The DPP incumbent is term limited and was tapped for Secretary of Agriculture of the DPP regime at the center last year. His replacement has not been able to unify the DPP and it is not clear who the DPP candidate would be except for the fact that the DPP will go into the election in this pro-DPP county in bad shape. KMT will most likely go with rising superstar Lin(林姿妙) and it is expected that she will pull of a win and perhaps by a large margin. Lean KMT.

Hsinchu County politics has been dominated by battles between two KMT kingpins Chiu(邱鏡淳) and Cheng(鄭永金) since the mid 1990s. In 2014 Cheng went over to the DPP and was narrowly defeated by KMT's Cheng. In 2018 both are mostly moving into the background. Problem for DPP is that the Cheng machine would vote KMT unless Cheng is personally running. In 2018 KMT splinter MKT Hsu(徐欣瑩) who ran on KMT splinter PFP Soong 2016 ticket as vice president could end up running. If she does she could potentially beat the likely KMT candidate and Chiu ally Lin(林為洲) who is currently the KMT MP (and DPP MP back in the early 2000s). Most likely DPP will not have a shot and could end up in third place. Solid to landslide KMT if MKT does not run. Lean KMT if MKT does run.

The DPP victory in 2014 was a shock in this fairly pro-KMT city. It seems that the DPP rebel who was DPP mayor back in the 1990s actually captured a good part of the KMT vote and threw the election to the DPP. The DPP incumbent Lin(林智堅) seems fairly popular in this city where a good section of pro-KMT independents could vote DPP based on the candidate. Of course if the KMT can run in 2018 as a unified party there is a chance that the KMT could win. Lean DPP.

DPP incumbent Wei(魏明谷) will be running for election in this slightly lean DPP county. KMT will run fairly popular MP Wang(王惠美). Wei's popularity is mediocre but given the power of incumbency in theory the DPP should have the upper hand but the last two times the DPP incumbent in Changhua County tried to run for re-election (1993 and 2005) both were unexpectedly defeated. History may repeat itself. Tossup.

Nanto County(南投縣) (PVI Blue +3)KMT 50.96%DPP 49.04%

In 2014 it was near death experience for the KMT but managed to pull out a win in this lean pro-KMT county. KMT incumbent Lin(林明溱) is fairly popular in this home county of current KMT Chairman Wu. Solid KMT.

Yunlin County(雲林縣) (PVI Green +8)DPP 56.98%KMT 43.02%

This county is fairly pro-DPP but at the local level the powerful KMT Chang faction is much stronger than the national KMT. DPP incumbent Li(李進勇) is running for re-election seems fairly popular but the 2014 KMT candidate Chang(張麗善) whose father is the leader of the Chang faction and former county magistrate during the 2000s has powerful roots and could pull and upset. Lean DPP.

Jaiyi County(嘉義縣) (PVI Green +10)DPP 63.09%KMT 34.09%

DPP incumbent Chang(張花冠) is term limited but her predecessor DPP's Chen (陳明文) and her are fighting a proxy battle on whose protege will become the DPP candidate. Both Chang and Chen were in the KMT in the 1990s but both defected to DPP bring the KMT Lin faction with them turning this pro-KMT county into a solid pro-DPP county. If the DPP can unify then it should win fairly easily. If not then the KMT has a shot. Solid DPP if no DPP split lean DPP if DPP split.

Jiayi City(嘉義市) (PVI Green +3)DPP 51.41%KMT 45.50%Minor Left 1.89%

DPP incumbent Twu(塗醒哲) is not in good shape and has had a pretty bad term so far in this slightly lean Green city. The KMT has several strong candidates and it is likely that Twu will lose re-election. Lean KMT.

Pingdong County(屏東縣) (Green +8)DPP 62.93%KMT 37.07%

DPP incumbent Pan(潘孟安) seems fairly popular in this pro-DPP county (as well as DPP Prez Tsai's home county.) Should be easy DPP win. Solid DPP.

Taidong County(臺東縣) (PVI Blue +18)KMT 54.41%DPP 45.59%

KMT incumbent is term limited. This county is very pro-KMT but at the local level the DPP are far more competitive than the national DPP. KMT will most likely nominate Rao(饒慶鈴) daughter of a powerful KMT politician in Taidong. DPP will nominate MP Liu(劉櫂豪) who has power roots in Taidoing. Still the KMT should win this one as the KMT which seemed to have been divided before is rallying around Rao. Solid KMT.

Hualian County(花蓮縣) (PVI Blue +20)KMT rebel 56.53%KMT 27.62%KMT rebel 3.45% (wife of KMT incumbent rebel running to make sure if her husband is taken off the ballot all his supporters can vote for her)

In 2014 the DPP did not bother running in his very pro-KMT county. KMT rebel incumbent Fu(傅崐萁) is term limited. And he has most made peace with the Hualian KMT. His wife Hsu(徐榛蔚) will run for the KMT. Most likely DPP will run a token candidate but the KMT will win. KMT landslide.

Penghu County(澎湖縣) (PVI Blue +4)DPP 55.34%KMT 44.66%

The DPP incumbent Chen(陳光復) has mediocre ratings in this somewhat pro-KMT county. Battles over a casino in this island county has hurt Chen's ratings. The power of incumbency should still see the DPP through but if the KMT could present a unified front it could pull off an upset. Lean DPP.

Fuijan Province

Both Kinmen County(金門縣) (PVI Blue +41) and Lienchiang County(連江縣) (PVI Blue +41) have massive KMT leans so DPP will most likely not run candidates. Elections here are always KMT vs KMT or KMT vs KMT rebel. The result will be a pro-KMT winner no matter what.

DPP ex-Prez Chen told a bunch of DPP Kaoshiung City (高雄市) legislators that 2018 will be a pretty bad year for the DPP.

He predicted that the DPP will lose Jiayi City(嘉義市) (I have it has lean KMT), Yilan County(宜蘭縣) (I have it as lean KMT), Penghu County(澎湖縣)(I have it has lean DPP) and Changhua County(彰化縣)(I have it as tossup.) He also predicted that if Tsai does not turn things around soon DPP will also most likely lose Taichung City(臺中市) (I have it as lean to solid DPP), Yunlin County(雲林縣) (I have it as lean DPP), and Hsinchu City(新竹市)(I have it as lean DPP). He also said that DPP will still win kaoshiung City (高雄市) but with a much smaller margin (this is obvious since 2014 was a popular DPP incumbant running for re-election in a DPP wave year and 2018 is an open seat in a bad to possibly really bad DPP year.) He also indicated that in the Kaoshiung City (高雄市) city council the DPP will take a bunch of losses and it is even money that the KMT and allies will recapture majority in the city council from DPP and allies.

I guess Chen is much more negative on DPP changes in Taichung City(臺中市) then I am. On the flip side he views Taoyuan City (桃園市) as fairly safe for DPP where as I see a chance for KMT. I guess I focus more on PVI lean and he focuses more on the personal popularity of the DPP incumbent. I also guess he views the DPP civil war in Jaiyi County(嘉義縣) as a tempest in a teapot and will blow over and no risk of the KMT making a comeback taking advantage of a possible DPP split. The rest he and I seem to agree where the DPP will take losses and where they are vulnerable for losses.

Pro-DPP (but no necessary pro-Tsai) New Taiwan national policy think tank came out with a poll which sets the basis of a possible DPP primary challenge to Tsai in 2020 in case the 2018 elections goes badly for DPP.

Historically pro-DPP pollster have been wildly off in overestimating DPP support and underestimating KMT support. Chu and Lai does well in these polls exactly because they are both unlikely (for now) to be the KMT and DPP candidates (like the Bernie Sanders effect).

In many ways because KMT's Wu is so unpopular there are thoughts in certain DPP factions that if Tsai does poorly in 2018 and beyond then there should just be a primary challenge from Lai. If the KMT has recovered from 2016 then a primary challenge to Tsai in 2020 is meaningless since a DPP civil war would just add to the landslide defeat of the DPP in 2020 regardless of who the DPP nominates. But if the KMT is struggling but is only relevant because Tsai is doing badly then getting rid of Tsai, even at the cost of a DPP civil war, could potentially turn a narrow 2020 defeat into a narrow victory.

For municipality or county assembly, the Pan Blues tend to over-perform. Most districts are multi-member districts which makes it easy for local factional leaders to compete. Historically local faction leaders tend to align with the KMT, although that has changed in some counties and cities (like Yilan County(宜蘭縣) and Jaiyi County(嘉義縣)) where DPP local rule has shifted some of the local factions over to be pro-DPP. But overall the Pan-Blue camp tends to over-perform in these very personalized and localized elections.

The pro-DPP Independent Ko surge lead to a record result for pan-DPP camp for assembly elections although the pan-Blue still retain a narrow majority. With the Ko wave gone the KMT is looking to recapture absolute majority by itself without allies in 2018.

Over-nomination by the KMT lead to the pan-Greens fight the pan-Blues to a draw despite the KMT incumbent mayor Chu (who went on to run on the KMT 2016 Prez ticket in a landslide defeat) winning a surprising narrow victory. This time around a solid KMT win should give the KMT the coattails to regain majority status.

This result seems in line with what a bad KMT election night might look like in this fairly pro-KMT City and in 2018 one would expect the pan-Blue bloc to regain ground. On the other hand the DPP surprisingly won in an upset in the mayor race and the DPP incumbent made good progress in luring some pro-KMT independents into the pro-DPP camp so the local factions leaders will not be as pro-KMT was it was in 2014. If so the pan-Blue camp might be lucky to replicate the 2014 results and maintain control as opposed to expanding it.

The DPP won the mayor's race in a landslide in this swing city and these results seems inline with that given the KMT domination with the local factions. The DPP incumbent is fairly popular but could be vulnerable in a bad DPP year and did not make that much progress in winning over local factional leaders. If so one would expect the pan-Blues to make gains in 2018.

The DPP has been in charge of this pro-DPP city for several election cycles that a lot of the local factional leaders have gone over to the DPP although the pan-Blue camp still punches above its weight in assembly elections. If the KMT can run a competitive candidate for mayor in this open race I expect the Pan-Blue to regain some ground but with Pan-Greens still with a majority.

Just like Tainan City (臺南市) the DPP has been in charge for a while and some of the local faction leaders have gone over to the DPP while the Pan-Blue still punch above its weight in assembly elections. And with the mayor race an open seat, if the KMT can run a credible candidate the pan-Blues could fight the Pan-Greens into a near tie in the assembly in 2018.

DPP won the mayor's race in 2014 over a divided KMT hampered by corruption scandals. Of course in the assembly election the Blue advantage continues. The DPP mayor running for re-election will be able to push up Pan-Green support at the assembly level and most likely could counteract the decline of Pan-Green fortunes overall relative to 2014.

Pan-Greens have ruled Yilan at the county magistrate level since 1981 with only a 4 year exception. As a result a good part (but not all) of the local factions have gone over to the DPP. The net result is the Blue and Greens are near parity at the assembly level. The DPP rule last 4 years in Yilan has been fairly negative and with the KMT candidate being a rising superstar will most likely win in a way that pushes the Blues to majority status in the assembly.

The DPP brand is fairly poor here so many DPP candidates run as pro-DPP independents. The political status of Hsinchu County at the assembly is similar what most rural ROC counties looked like before the 1980s, total domination by Blue forces. With the upcoming county magistrate election potentially turning into a KMT vs MKT battle with the DPP candidate marginalized this will continue.

In Hsinchu City due to a Pan-Blue civil war almost two decades ago, a good part of the local factions actually gone over to the DPP even though the city itself still leans KMT. As a result the city assembly tends to be evenly matched between KMT and anti-KMT forces. The DPP mayor who won in a narrow 3 way race will be running for re-election and may be able to add a boast to the anti-KMT forces to counteract the overall decline of DPP since 2014.

Changhua County has become a swing county starting in the 1990s an as a result a small part of the local factions has gone over to the DPP to counteract the total Blue domination of the assembly. The DPP county magistrate incumbent will be running for re-election in a county not friendly to DPP incumbants and with a mediocre record. If the KMT ends up winning back the county magistrate seat the coattails might work to counteract some expected minor gains the Green camp have made since 2014 to getting some local factions to go with the Greens.

Yunlin County has swung hard toward Greens since the late 1990s and the KMT brand has declined a lot since. Many KMT candidates run as pro-KMT independents. DPP has been in change at the county magistrate level since 2005 and there is not sign that will change. Over that period the DPP has been chipping away at the local factions to come over the DPP and that trend most likely will continue even though the dominate Chang faction seems to sticking with KMT. There might be a brewing civil war in the DPP over the open seat in the county magistrate and if the KMT comes up with a good candidate this trend could potentially be delayed but all things equal the Blues will lose a bit of ground in the assembly.

Jaiyi County has been competitive between DPP and KMT since the 1980s but with the defection of the Lin faction to DPP it has turned into a DPP stronghold. Since the way the DPP has captured power was via local factions the Greens also gained the advantage in the assembly and should continue to gain ground. Main problem is the Lin faction seems to be entering into a civil war which is turning into a DPP civil war in a battle for the county magistrate position. While this will not lead the DPP to lose the county magistrate position to the KMT the Blues could blunt this election the long term drift of the assembly toward the Greens.

The Pan-Greens have controlled Jiayi City at the mayor level since 1981 with the KMT making a comeback in 2005. As a result lots of the local factions have drifted toward the DPP over the decades to a point where the two camps are near parity. The DPP incumbent mayor is fairly unpopular and it seems the KMT will recapture the mayor position in 2018. If so this could help the Blues to expand their narrow lead in the assembly.

Pingdong County became competitive in the 1980s and has drifted toward DPP control by the early 1990s. As a result the Greens has been chipping away at the Blue domination. With a popular DPP country magistrate running for re-election it seems that trend will continue. Greens might even flip control of the assembly over to the Greens this time.

Like the other rural counties there is complete Blue domination with a weak DPP brand. The KMT rebel county magistrate is term limited and his wife will run on the KMT ticket so the DPP will most likely run a candidate. This does given the Greens a chance make some gains since the last decade the DPP has been marginalized at the local level by the KMT civil war which has since ended after 2014.

Penghu County has been competitive at the national and even at the country magistrate for a while now but has the Greens in a weak position in the assembly level due to the power of pro-Blue NPB in assembly elections. The DPP county magistrate incumbent could pull in some extra votes for the Green camp in his bid for re-election but his record seems mediocre and his seat could flip. If so that could limit or even nullify Green gains.

Fujian Province

Both Kinmen County(金門縣) (PVI Blue +41) and Lienchiang County(連江縣) (PVI Blue +41) assemblies are dominated by Pan-Blue politicians of different stripes or those who are non-aligned. There are no Green presence in assembly elections.

While in the Mayor and County magistrate elections when one added in various rebels to the correct political color you get

Pan-Blue 43.54%Pan-Green 55.86%

So the Pan-Blues over-perform at the assembly level with a key role that the various Light Blue local faction candidates are effective at attracting lean Green voters. Of course this also makes them hard to control as allies and vulnerable to poaching by the Greens. Some of such Light Blue candidates from 2014 have since defected to become pro-Green or joined the DPP mainly in DPP ruled areas. It is not clear that these defectors could actually capture any pan-Blue votes. Another factor is now the NPP has broken with DPP it will run candidates pretty much in all of the multi-member districts which might push up the Pan-Green vote share but could be a disaster for the DPP in terms of seats.

The KMT primary in Keelong City (基隆市) is turning into a fiasco and is risking its chances at taking back one of the more pro-KMT cities that it lost in 2014.

Back in 2014 the KMT nominated Huang (黃景泰) who was the speaker of the assembly but after several corruption scandals came out related to Huang stripped him of his nomination and instead nominated Hsieh (謝立功) who has a police/military background. Huang ran as an independent and the bad press of Huang's corruption scandals drove down the KMT image as well as splitting what is left of the KMT vote giving the DPP an easy victory.

For 2018 both Hsieh (謝立功), the new speaker of the assembly Soong (宋瑋莉), and diplomat Jie(介文汲) are fighting for the KMT nomination. As mentioned before, on ROC party leadership have the final say on nominations and "primaries" are really party requested polls being done to establish which one of its candidates has the most support. In this case the KMT asked 3 pollsters to poll both KMT candidates against each other as well as against the DPP incumbent and calculated a weight average. The initial result had Hsieh beating out Soong by 1% with Jie far behind. Then after around 6 hours it turned out one of the 3 pollsters indicated they mis-mapped some numbers and had to re-state its poll results. That change shifted the average of the 3 polls to a Soong victory over Hsieh by 1.5%. Hsieh cried fraud and now the KMT leadership has decided to hold off nominating Soong but conduct an investigation of this mess.

The Lin faction has been pro-KMT on local issues but on issues at the county and national level tends to be more neutral and sometime even anti-KMT and could even have partial defections to the DPP especially if a rival Huang faction candidate is in the fray.

The 1993 Jaiyi County magistrate election is an example where the KMT could not get the Huang and Lin factions to form a common front and allowed each faction to run a candidate on its own

In 1997 the KMT got the Lin faction to back the Hunag faction winner from 1993 but there were clear defections from the Lin faction vote due to hostility to the Huang faction and some Lin faction voters sympathizes with the DPP

In 2001 Chen Ming-wen (陳明文), leader of the Lin faction, tired of playing second fiddle to the Huang faction, lead his Lin faction into the DPP now that the DPP were in charge at the ROC central government. ()

He took with him Lin faction ally KMT MP Zheng(曾振農) and his wife Helen Chang (張花冠) into the DPP as well. ()

Zheng soon retired from politics with his wife taking his place and then the Lin faction-DPP alliance dominated Jaiyi County politics from then on since DPP-Lin faction can capture around 60% of the vote over KMT-Huang faction 40%. Chen and Chang then went on to serve as county magistrates for 4 terms (2001-2009 for Chen, 2009 to 2018 for Chang.)

Now with Chang leaving office this great political duo are having a falling out turning on who will take over from here a Lin faction civil war into a DPP civil war.

Chen is close to DPP Prez Tsai and has control of the Jaiyi County DPP organization. His vision is to merge the Lin faction organization into the DPP with him in charge. Chang who wants to to be kingpin of Jaiyi County politics is forming an alliance of various factional forces in the Lin faction with some implicit support from the KMT and the Huang faction to from an anti-Chen alliance.

Both Chen and Chang have their separate proxy candidates in the DPP Jaiyi County magistrate primary. Chen's candidate Ong (翁章梁) is a DPP party man while Chang's candidate Chang (張明達) is the assembly speaker and has local Lin faction background. It seems that Ong is ahead in the polls by a small margin. The Chang bloc's anti-Chen alliance clearly involves various Huang faction and KMT forces. The KMT has not really come up with a candidate yet and part of the reason why must be if Ong wins the primary then Chang might blot from the DPP and run on the KMT ticket or as a KMT backed independent. In such a race then it would be DPP-half of Lin faction vs Other half of Lin faction-KMT-Huang faction

It took DPP until after 2012 for this to take place (over 4 years after the DPP lost the 2008 elections.) KMT took only around 2 years to get to this point. So the DPP drop in support is faster than the KMT drop in support post-2008. Of course KMT won re-election in 2012 and despite these bad numbers I would still rate Tsai as the slight favorite to win re-election.

In Taipei City assembly 5th district we might end up with an ex-wife running against her ex-husband. Taipei 5th district historically has been a more lean-DPP district. In both 2010 and 2014 KMT and DPP split the 8 seats 4-4. One of the 4 DPP winners is one Tong (童仲彥) who has been in the assembly for 3 terms.()

His wife Li (李秀環) has been his political partner as well()

The in 2017 it came out that he has been beating his wife and his marriage came to a close as the DPP expelled him from the party.

The DPP for 2018 plans to nominate 4 candidates. With Tong being out several newcomers are running in the DPP "primary" to try to get the last seat. Li announced that she will run in the DPP primary to get nominated for her ex-husband's old seat. Tong will also run as DPP rebel with the support of mayor Ko. Tong running will threaten DPP's position to win 4 seats. On the other hand if Li wins the DPP primary then the publicity of an ex-husband ex-wife running against each other might push the DPP to win 4 seats plus Tong winning as well. On the other hand there will likely be a swing away from DPP so 2018 results might look more like 2010 than 2014.

If 2018 ends up being more like 2010 than 2014 then having Tong in the race with 4 DPP candidates risks NP coming in and taking one of the pan-Green seats turning the Blue-Green 4-4 balance into a 5-3 Blue advantage.

With Tsai's ratings low with no clear way out and while the KMT has mostly closed the gap with the DPP but very little people are crediting KMT chairman Wu for it, the winner out of all this is former KMT Prez Ma a year and a half after leaving who was enemy number one for the Pan-Green bloc and abandoned by Deep Blue and Light Blue alike. Now Ma's popularity is surging. One way one can tell are the popularity of Ma Chinese New Year Decorations which are put up on the doors of households and are usually written words of good fortune.

Historically the New Year Decorations written by the current ROC President are the most popular (kinds of like Gallup's poll of most admired Man is usually headed the sitting President.) Last year Prez Ma's office gave out around 50K of such decorations. This year given the massive demand for Ma Chinese New Year Decorations 250K has already been printed and sold out and another batch is several hundred thousand are now being frantically being printed. The Tsai Chinese New Year Decorations has printed 250K or so and that seems to be meeting demand.

Ma Chinese New Year Decorations - Ma holding his own decoration - the words allude to the passing of the Year of Chicken and the coming of the Year of the Dog()()

Tsai Chinese New Year Decorations - Prez speaker holding the decoration - words allude to good fortune for all()()

One way to get a sense the relative popularity of Ma and Tsai is that the Ma Chinese New Year Decorations are being re-sold on the internet for $12 (mostly due to lack of supply that the Ma Office is frantically trying to produce more) while Tsai Chinese New Year Decorations are being sold on the internet mostly at sticker price of $2.

All this means that the Deep Blue vote which went missing in 2014 and 2016 could come back if Ma were to campaign for the KMT.

Has announced that she is dropping out of the KMT primary to run as an independent.

This is mostly because former KMT mayor Huang(黃敏惠) has announced that she will run in the KMT primary.()

Huang has ambitions to become the leader of the KMT in the future and running for her old seat is a way of prolong her political life so she can make a bid for the leadership of the KMT in the future. Of course this is deja vu. Hsiao in 2014 also bolted from the KMT to run as an independent against the KMT candidate but halfway through was convinced to withdraw by various KMT elders and ran for the city assembly instead and upon winning took over as the Speaker of the Assembly. It is clear that Huang is more popular than Hsiao overall and that Huang would win any "primary" and as a result Hsiao decided to run as an independent.

The DPP incumbent Twu(塗醒哲) is fairly unpopular and seems set for defeat in his bid for re-election until Huang threw her hat into the race. ()

My view is that most likely KMT wills still capture the seat despite the split. The record of ROC races for executive spots is that a party splits tend to harm the party in an open seat race or if an incumbent is running for election an a party rebel also runs. If an opposition party is running against the incumbent and the opposition party splits usually that does not stop the opposition from winning if it was a seat the opposition was meant to win. Most ROC executive role races with an incumbent often tends into a referendum election versus a choice election. Meaning if Huang was going to defeat Tsu 1-on-1 then most likely with Hsiao in the race Huang would still win as Hsiao will most likely pull in marginal KMT and DPP voters and leave Huang to win. And if in such a 3 way race Twu ends up winning then Huang was going to lose anyway 1-on-1 vs Twu.

Net result: This seat is still lean KMT in my view even though the KMT camp are now in a panic over the prospect of losing this seat they thought was in the bag.

The KMT primary in Keelong City (基隆市) is turning into a fiasco and is risking its chances at taking back one of the more pro-KMT cities that it lost in 2014.

Back in 2014 the KMT nominated Huang (黃景泰) who was the speaker of the assembly but after several corruption scandals came out related to Huang stripped him of his nomination and instead nominated Hsieh (謝立功) who has a police/military background. Huang ran as an independent and the bad press of Huang's corruption scandals drove down the KMT image as well as splitting what is left of the KMT vote giving the DPP an easy victory.

For 2018 both Hsieh (謝立功), the new speaker of the assembly Soong (宋瑋莉), and diplomat Jie(介文汲) are fighting for the KMT nomination. As mentioned before, on ROC party leadership have the final say on nominations and "primaries" are really party requested polls being done to establish which one of its candidates has the most support. In this case the KMT asked 3 pollsters to poll both KMT candidates against each other as well as against the DPP incumbent and calculated a weight average. The initial result had Hsieh beating out Soong by 1% with Jie far behind. Then after around 6 hours it turned out one of the 3 pollsters indicated they mis-mapped some numbers and had to re-state its poll results. That change shifted the average of the 3 polls to a Soong victory over Hsieh by 1.5%. Hsieh cried fraud and now the KMT leadership has decided to hold off nominating Soong but conduct an investigation of this mess.

KMT high command worked out a deal where Hsieh (謝立功) will run even in theory he lost the "primary." It does seem to have the full support of Soong (宋瑋莉). I am sure the KMT promised Soong that she can continue as Speaker of the Assembly post 2018 elections. Most likely KMT high command went with Hsieh due to his youth appeal that a need to appeal to independents who might be turned off my Soong's factional image. ()

TVBS poll on approval ratings of mayors/county magistrates for 19 counties/cities (Fujian Province Lienchiang County(連江縣) excluded since it is too small, Tainan City (臺南市) and Yilan County(宜蘭縣) excluded since the DPP incumbents were recently moved into the cabinet and replaced with a stand-in until elections later this year.)

Tainan City (臺南市) (PVI Green +11) will be solid DPP for sure.Yilan County(宜蘭縣) (PVI Green +6) will have a very strong KMT candidate and with DPP in disarray will will be lean KMT even though there is a KMT rebel in the fray.

If they get lucky an all out DPP civil war in Jaiyi County(嘉義縣) (PVI Green +10) might throw the KMT in or a KMT backed DPP rebel.

The DPP will go after New Taipei City (新北市) (PVI Blue +2) but it seems they have to come up with a superstar candidate (which now seem less and less likely) or hope for the strong KMT candidate to implode in a KMT civil war.

DPP is actually lucky that they have fairly popular incumbents in Hsinchu City(新竹市) (PVI Blue +5), Taoyuan City (桃園市) (PVI Blue +5), and Keelong City (基隆市) (PVI Blue +8) or else these cities will fall to the KMT as well. Unless the KMT wave become a tidal wave which seems unlikely the DPP incumbents should pull through. Hsinchu City(新竹市) would be the most dangerous for DPP since the old KMT mayor is running to his old seat back. In all 3 most likely the KMT will have to wait for 2022 to recapture these cities and that is assuming Tsai wins re-election in 2020 so the KMT can take advantage of DPP double incumbency at the national level.

Developments in Taoyuan City (桃園市) is actually quite ominous for KMT as the popular DPP incumbent seems fairly successful in changing the lean of the city. I suspect in the future even after Tsai has passed on Taoyuan City (桃園市) might not vote for the KMT in the same margins as before even if the KMT might recapture Taoyuan City (桃園市) in 2022.

The current situation in Taipei city mayor election is an entire mess and risks throwing the election to the incumbent Ko despite a functionally disastrous, although not from a popularity point of view, term so far.

Back in 2014 Deep Green supporter and famous doctor but political novice Ko (柯文哲) defeated the KMT candidate in a landslide as a pro-DPP independent after the KMT won Taipei City 4 elections in a row. Ko appealed to the youth vote with his anti-establishment image and style and won in a low KMT turnout election. ()

For a while Ko got along well with the DPP and was instrumental in the 2016 DPP landslide victory in the Prez and legislative race. Ko's own turn as mayor after a few month showed that he was great on style but in terms of substance was poor in delivery as he was shown up as a poor administrator. Once Tsai got into office and the burden of incumbency began to weigh down the DPP Ko saw that 2018 would a difficult race for him to win if the pan-Blue vote consolidated around the KMT. Ko also has national ambitions and calculated that a weak KMT and a unpopular DPP might mean a chance for him to run in 2020 or 2024 as a third party candidate and perhaps win.

Ko's next step even as his administration of Taipei city continue to be in shambles and started losing support of the DPP in the city assembly, was to turn toward a pro-Beijing position while claiming to be an ally of Tsai/DPP to attract attacks from pan-Green camp which would set him up to try to capture some of the pan-Blue vote as well as insulate him from the fall in DPP popularity. Ko's maverick style continue to attract him you support and a successful 2017 Summer Universiade also worked to drive up Ko's ratings.

On the DPP side the anger is building up in core DPP circles in Taipei over Ko's pro-Beijing positions and has been putting pressures on DPP high command to run a candidate in Taipei City in 2018. The DPP Taipei City branch was especially concerned that the DPP city assembly candidates could have to run in 2018 as an enemy of Ko but without a DPP mayor candidate to lead them which in turn will lower DPP turnout throwing the city assembly election toward the KMT. The main concern from Tsai point of view, is that a DPP candidate would split the anti-KMT vote and throw the election toward the KMT. That would setup the KMT as a strong contender in 2020 and an angry Ko would run in 2020 taking the Youth vote away from Tsai. Here the long term interest of Tsai and DPP diverges. Tsai want to delay confronting Ko until after 2020 while doing so only weakens DPP in Taipei City.

On the KMT side the front runner to recapture Taipei City was Chiang(蔣萬安) who is the great grandson of ROC Prez and KMT leader Chiang Kai-Shek. In Jan 2018 Chiang declined to run mostly on the calculation that Tsai would eventually run Ko and at best it is a tossup between him and Ko. If so he rather conserve his political capital and run in 2022 when he would most likely win in a landslide if Ko wins re-election. In this situation the likely winner of the KMT "primary" would be Ding (丁守中) who is a fairly bland candidate that can keep the KMT vote but would find it hard to win independents from Ko in a 1-on-1 race.()

Given that if Ding ran for KMT and DPP backs Ko the race is at best tossup for KMT, there continues to be pressure on the KMT side to draft Eric Chu(朱立倫), incumbent New Taipei City mayor, failed 2016 KMT Prez candidate and possible 2020 KMT Prez candidate. ()

Chu is term limited for New Taipei City and the draft Chu camp in KMT is making the argument that if Chu can recapture Taipei City for KMT in 2018 it sets him up well in 2024 for Prez if Tsai wins re-election which at worst is even money.

The prospect of Ding running for the KMT increases the chance that Ko will win re-election and this is pushing up the anger within the Taipei DPP both in terms of a) a strong DPP candidate could win against Ko and a bland KMT Ding in a 3 way race and b) backing Ko in 2018 would harm the DPP city assembly candidate chances and c) DPP has to put up with Ko for another 4 year and d) there is no reason why Ko, up winning, re-election, would not run in 2020 anyway and e) DPP just look like a coward in face of Ko outright attacks on DPP while at the same time claiming to be an "ally" of the DPP.

Taipei City DPP MP Yao(姚文智) is pushing the DPP high command to nominate him. Yao wanted to run in 2014 but was waved off by the DPP high command to let Ko run with DPP support to ensure a defeat of the KMT.()

Yao is seen as a lightweight and DPP high command view him as merely a spoiler for Ko throwing the race to the KMT if Yao were to run. Then a few days ago with DPP core base anger of Tsai's accommodation of Ko boiling over, ex-DPP ROC Vice Prez Lu (呂秀蓮) threw her hat into the race.()

It seems Lu is running just to force Tsai's hand to run a DPP candidate no matter what to take away the argument that DPP could not come up with someone with stature to take on Ko and the KMT in Taipei City. The idea is that Lu's position as ROC Vice President 2000-2008 should be be stature enough. Of course Lu is fairly polarizing and would never really be the DPP candidate. But her coming out to run shows what the DPP grassroots are thinking which more and more leaning toward: We rather the KMT win then a traitor like Ko win. If we run an lose at least we lose with our heads held high.

My best guess right now for Taipai City mayor election for the different scenarios would be

Ko vs Ding (really 50/50 as the DPP turnout would fall a lot taking away from the anti-KMT vote, I think Ding is underestimated in a 1-on-1 race against Ko given the DPP base's negativity toward Ko)Ko(ind) 51%Ding(KMT) 49%

Ko vs Ding vs YaoKo(ind) 35%Ding(KMT) 40%Yao(DPP) 25%

If KMT ran Chu then he would pretty much win under any scenario. Really comes down to if Chu is willing to run and give up a chance to run in 2020 as Prez candidate for KMT and instead target 2024.

SET News(三立) which is a Deep Green outfit cane out with a poll on Taipei City with Ko vs Yao vs Chu

Ko(ind) 40.3%Chu(KMT) 35.0%Yao(DPP) 14.3%

Ko(ind) 39.8%Ding(KMT) 30.3%Yao(DPP) 13.9%

Ko(ind) 40.1%Ding(KMT) 31.6%Lu(DPP) 12.2%

Ko(ind) 34.9%Ding(KMT) 29.7%Chen(DPP) 21.9% (Chen is Current DPP Kaoshing Mayor and talked about as a DPP draft candidate)

Ko(ind) 47.6%Chu(KMT) 40.0%

Ko(ind) 47.0%Ding(KMT) 39.1%

Of course SET News polls have a large negative house effect on the KMT vote AND neither Chu/Ding nor Yao/Lu/Chen have been nominated yet. Still this poll gives the dynamics of the race correctly that Yao will most likely be a spoiler for Ko which is exactly what Tsai and DPP high command is worried about.

If is also interesting that Chu is not doing that much better than Ding.

Why has the Tsai administration cratered in popularity so much? Is it a bad economy, corruption scandals, aloofness?

Mostly over-promising in the 2016 campaign and then under-delivering after coming into the office. Tsai made all sorts of "have it both ways" promises on pension reform, labor reform, mainland China relationship, energy policy etc etc and after coming into office all these issues blew up in her face because it then became obvious she could not have it both ways.

What is funny was that she was such a shoe in for 2016 that there was no need to make the promises she made. She would have won even without making them.

Pan-Blue held the upper hand throughout until the 2014-2016 re-alignment where now Pan-Greens had the upper hand in a series of elections with very low Pan-Blue turnout. I reckon the Pan-Blue/Pan-Green balance is now around 50/50 so turnout will define win/loss going forward.

For Municipal elections Pan-Greens tends to historically over-perform but that might be a function of Pan-Blue having the upper hand in national elections. With the playing field now more 50/50 it would be interesting to see what the vote share would be in the 2018.

In Hualian County(花蓮縣) (PVI Blue +20) KMT will nominate Shu (徐榛蔚) wife (or really ex-wife) of the current pro-KMT independent incumbent Fu. On why Shu is the ex-wife but not the wife of Fu see by 2014 writeup on this couple.

What is funny about the picture below of Fu and Shu in a rally together is the jacket Shu was wearing literally says "Wife of the County Magistrate" even though in theory they got divorced and the were currently fighting a case of fraudulent divorce by the prosecution office.

I would like to write the funny story of Hualian County magistrate Fu Kun-chi (傅崐萁) who just won re-election as a way for me to deal with my depression over the KMT rout.

Fu Kun-chi (傅崐萁)()

Fu was a member of the KMT which has dominated Hualian County politics for decades. In the 2004 County magistrate elections Fu failed to get the KMT nomination and switched over to the KMT splinter PFP and ran. He was defeated by the official KMT candidate. In 2009 he rejoined the KMT and worked to get the KMT nomination, but due to outstanding charges of corruption the KMT refused to nominate him. So he ran as an independent and beat the official KMT candidate with 56% of the vote.

But even as he was being sworn in in December 2009, the progress continued into investigations into Fu's past for corruption. To hedge himself, six days before he took office he divorced his wife Shu Chin-wei (徐榛蔚) citing irreconcilable differences.

Shu Chin-wei (徐榛蔚)()

And then right before taking office he announced that he will appoint his ex-wife Shu lieutenant county magistrate so she would be in line to take over as county magistrate if he is charged and removed from office. ROC law says that one cannot appoint a relative to such an office but nothing stops someone from appointing his ex-wife. What is funny about this "divorce" is that after the divorce is that Shu "moved out" of Fu's house, just to move right next door. As Fu was taking office after divorcing his wife six days earlier, they held hands and kissed several times during the entire ceremony. After Fu took office, day in an day out Fu and his ex-wife lieutenant county magistrate pretty much spent all their time in office together including going to work and coming home at the same time. During the 2012 ROC Prez elections, Fu endorsed the KMT candidate Ma, and both Fu and Shu campaigned for Ma together in various campaign events which also included them holding hands. The Hualian County prosecution office also charged Fu and Shu with false divorce but Fu claimed he is being falsely charged.

Now, fast forward to the 2014 elections where Fu is running for re-election. It was Fu running as an independent against the offocial KMT candidate. There has been more progress in the investigations of Fu and his corruption charges. There was a risk that during the campaign Fu might be stripped from the right to even run for office. To hedge against this risk, Fu's ex-wife and current lieutenant county magistrate Shu also announced that she was running for the office of Hualian County magistrate as well. The idea is that if Fu stopped from running and name taken off the ballot, then his political machine can push his vote to be shifted his ex-wife Shu who then will be elected.

This leads the the spectacle of Fu and Shu running at the same time against each other but showing up in campaign rallies as two rival candidates on paper but taking part in the same event.()

There are even campaign posters with both candidates and names of both candidates on the poster.()The idea of the poster is although it is not said explicitly: Please vote for Fu, but if Fu is charged and name taken off the ballot please vote Shu.

As it is Fu was allowed to run and won with 56% of the vote. Shu actually captured 3% of the vote. Maybe some supporters of Fu did not get the memo that Fu was not being charged, yet, so he is eligible to take office if he wins.

TVBS does annual and sometimes semi-annual survey by county/city on mayor/county magistrate approval ratings. It also polls on party ID. I used that data from Dec 2016, Jul 2016, Dec 2017 surveys to construct a pan-Green vs pan-Blue balance vs the 2016 Prez results.

No Dec 2017 data for Tainan City and Yilan County since both DPP incumbents were drafted into the cabinet but I suspect Dec 2017 numbers will look similar to Dec 2016 numbers with prehaps it is a bit worse for the Pan-Greens.

In Blue areas the net loss for Pan-Green margin are around 9% with, as I pointed out before, the net Pan-Green loss in Taoyuan City, Hsintsu City, and Keelong City being smaller due to popular DPP incumbents. As I have warned about the net Green loss in Taoyuan City is only 4% from the 2016 Tsai landslide has to be ominous for the KMT as the DPP mayor is doing an effective job shifting the lean of the city.

In Green areas the net loss for Pan-Green margins are more around 17%. I suspect the net loss will be a less than that as some polled neutral voters are really pan-Green voters even though when I modeled I took that into account.

In marginal areas the net loss for Pan-Green margins are around 11%.

I think net net this means the loss of Pan-Green margins overall will be around 12% and since in 2016 the Pan-Greens won 56/44 that gives us a 50/50 Blue/Green balance today which is what I roughed guess where we are.

Looking ahead to 2020 Legislative elections, one can use the same PVI logic on ROC districts to see what would be generic results of the ROC legislative races given a particular Blue-Green lean. ROC Legislature is made up of 73 FPTP seats, 6 Aborigine seats, and 34 PR seats. Overall the 73 FPTP seats are fairly symmetrical in terms of seat distribution given a particular lean. The 6 Aborigine seats lean heavily toward Blue camp while the 34 PR seats lean toward the Green camp since the NP has a floor of 3% but is unlikely to cross the 5% threshold while other smaller Pan-Green either are tiny or, like NPP, will pass the 5% threshold for sure.

For 2020 I think the most likely scenario right now is a narrow Tsai re-election with a Green+1 election and a very narrow Pan-Green legislative majority. In such a case the DPP regime will need the support of Pan-Green "ally" NPP to pass laws.

The 6 Aborigine seats are divided up into 2 3- multi-member seats (3 for Plains Tribal and 3 for Mountain Tribal.) For the DPP to win a seat in either one their vote share has to go up to around 18% or higher which is possible to likely for Plains Tribal constituency in an even environment and possible to likely for Mountain Tribal constituency in a Green+8 constituency.

Most Aborigines are concentrated in Taidong County(臺東縣) (PVI Blue +18) and Hualian County(花蓮縣) (PVI Blue +20. There are some Han-ized Aborigines in urban areas that still identify as Aborigines mostly to get various affirmative action goodies (there are bonus points for Taiwan Aborigines in various entrance exams of all kinds (and for Tibetans and Mongolians but there are not that many of them on ROC controlled territories these days.) And yes, there is no real pro-Green Aborigine area.

Growing up in Greater Taipei I really did not know any Aborigines although my nanny during ages of 2-5 was an Aborigine and I have some vague memories of her.

To my understanding, patronage networks, mainly. Plus there is some history of anti-Aborigine racism by certain of the pro-independence Taiwanese.

Mostly this. Although on the long run I think both factors will decline over the years and the Aborigine vote will trend Green. The DPP Taiwan independence agenda is these days more about political and economic differences with the PRC vs Hoklo regionalism which has turned off Hakka Aborigine and Mainlander votes. Tsai being Hakka herself is a good part of this. The KMT counterattack has to be increase the salience of issues like Gay Marriage to split the DPP Northern Progressive branch and the socially conservative Southern rural DPP branch (and with it the Aborigines) whereas the KMT base overall is a lot less split on Gay Marriage.

Speaking of Gay marriage that is still the big hidden ticking time bomb issue that could come out and blow up the DPP. While political cleavage is centered around the Unification-Independence debate the DPP is safe but if the salience of the Unification-Independence debate were to decline then social issues like Gay marriage could create significant issues for the DPP and the Pan-Greens as a whole.

The reason is shown in a chart drawn up by former DPP MP and now political commentator Sheng Fu-Shiung

The X axis is Conservative-Progressive axis with Progressive on the Right. The Y axis is the unification-independence axis with independence at the top. DPP core is to the Upper Left side of chart while NGO youth activist bloc is the Upper Right side of the chart.()

The basic idea is the Green bubble is where the DPP MPs are at. But the White Bubble on the Upper Left box is where the DPP core vote is. The DPP activist base in Northern Taiwan is the small bubble on the Upper Right corner. The Blue bubble is where the KMT MPs which also overlaps with the KMT vote base.

The problem is clear for the DPP. Its core vote base Southern Taiwan are made up of Bubbas and Billy Bobs yet its activist based in the North are made up of Progressive activist youth and the DPP MPs somewhere in the middle. While the KMT is all-powerful and political cleavage mostly about unification-independence the Pan-Green coalition can hold together. But if political debate shifts to cultural issues like Gay Marriage DPP risk losing its Northern activist based to NPP and losing its socially conservative vote base in Southern Taiwan to the old KMT factional leaders who themselves are fairly socially conservative.

It is clear for the reason Tsai (who personally clearly for Gay marriage) is petrified of the Gay Marriage issue and pretty much done everything possible to push it to the courts and trying to take it out of the political zone of debate.

If the Unification-Independence issue does loses salience (which seems unlikely for the next couple of years) I can see a realignment which actually reverse the previous large realignment of 1990-2004. In the 1980s the KMT was dominant in the rural and low educated areas while the DPP was seen as a liberal-progressive urban force even as among economic elites the KMT still dominated. As the Unification-Independence issue gained salience this pattern reversed during the 1990-2004 where the KMT became much stronger in the cities which tended to benefit from economic integration with Mainland China while DPP became much stronger in rural areas where they tend to suffer from economic integration with Mainland China. If the Unification-Independence become less salient we might revert to a political pattern more like the 1980s. To some extent the Tsai 2016 campaign which focused on her appeal to the urban progressive youth is already a step in that direction as her relative swings where much stronger in urban areas in 2016. The next step is for the KMT to use Gay Marriage as a wedge issue to split the DPP coalition.

It was clear a while ago that Huang was ahead so every other DPP candidates started to gang up on him. It seems this poll shows that these attacks are having an effect although mostly to the benefit of Chen.

Huang is also famous because his own sister Huang Tse-Siang (黃智賢) is a famous pro-KMT and pro-unification commentator and political talk show host. The Huang family has very strong pro-Green traditions but Huang's sister broke from her family to take a Deep Blue and sometimes pro-CCP position and is famous for her blistering attacks on Tsai and the DPP.()

Recent developments. In New Taipei City (新北市) (PVI Blue +2), current Lieutenant mayor Ho (侯友宜) has thrown his hat into the ring for the KMT primary. Ho has a police background and has cross-party appeal.()

He will be up against former Taipei County (what New Taipei City used to be called) Magistrate (2005-2010) Zhou(周錫瑋) who is considered more mainstream KMT.()

Ho is very popular within the KMT as well as with the generic public and is expected to win the KMT primary and then win the general election. As long as Zhou does not split the KMT in the general election Ho is expected to win even if the DPP in desperation runs Su (蘇貞昌) who himself is also a former Taipei County Magistrate (1997-2005), a DPP Vice Presidential candidate, and a former DPP Chairman.()

Su is a rival of Tsai within the DPP and it is not clear that Su would even want to run given his hostility toward Tsai as well as the risk that he will most likely lose to Ho.

In Taipei City (臺北市) (PVI Blue +6) it seems Su (蘇煥智) who is a former Tainan County magistrate (2001-2010) has withdrew his membership in the DPP to run as an independent. ()

I guess Su is figuring that in the end Tsai would be too chicken to run a candidate in Taipei City and that by running he could then potentially pick up the DPP vote and perhaps even win in a close 3 way race. Of course if the DPP does run a candidate we will have the situation where Ho, Su and the DPP candidate will split the DPP vote and unless Ho (and perhaps also Su) can also capture a good part of the KMT vote it will be a KMT victory.

Over this last week on Taiwan Province ROC there has been a crisis of toilet paper shortage and panic buying. It seems rumors came out that due to the surge of international paper prices that various toilet paper suppliers will be raising prices significantly soon. The DPP regime Department of consumer protection (whose price control function should really just be abolished) bungled this by saying that there are no plans to allow retailers to raise prices until at least March and the level of price increases will be no more than 30%. The message that prices will stay the same for now but will surge soon triggered consumer panic buying of toilet paper especially given the low trust in government institutions and current regime at this moment.

I guess the good news is that over the next few weeks this will die down and for the DPP hopefully not a big issue in the elections in late 2018.

In Jaiyi County(嘉義縣) (PVI Green +10) the DPP "primary" kicks off today where a series of polls will be done to determine if Chang (張明達) who is the proxy candidate of current DPP county magistrate Helen Chang (張花冠) ()

Chang (張明達) represents the pro-DPP Lin faction and has de facto support of various KMT Hunag faction leaders while Ong (翁章梁) more represents the DPP organization in Jaiyi County(嘉義縣). Ong (翁章梁) is considered slightly ahead but there has been persistent rumors that the KMT back Chang (張明達) and in case Chang (張明達) loses might back him to run against Ong (翁章梁).

As soon as the primary kicked off it seems supports of both candidates have been complaining that they have been getting constant calls on their phones which clearly represents fake pollsters with the main target of taking up the phone line so the real pollster could not get through.

With Tsai's ratings low with no clear way out and while the KMT has mostly closed the gap with the DPP but very little people are crediting KMT chairman Wu for it, the winner out of all this is former KMT Prez Ma a year and a half after leaving who was enemy number one for the Pan-Green bloc and abandoned by Deep Blue and Light Blue alike. Now Ma's popularity is surging. One way one can tell are the popularity of Ma Chinese New Year Decorations which are put up on the doors of households and are usually written words of good fortune.

Historically the New Year Decorations written by the current ROC President are the most popular (kinds of like Gallup's poll of most admired Man is usually headed the sitting President.) Last year Prez Ma's office gave out around 50K of such decorations. This year given the massive demand for Ma Chinese New Year Decorations 250K has already been printed and sold out and another batch is several hundred thousand are now being frantically being printed. The Tsai Chinese New Year Decorations has printed 250K or so and that seems to be meeting demand.

One inevitably wonders if the ROC constitution allows for non-consecutive re-election. Or perhaps Eric Chu will give it another go. Interestingly he was a doctoral student of a colleague of my father's.

The problem is clear for the DPP. Its core vote base Southern Taiwan are made up of Bubbas and Billy Bobs yet its activist based in the North are made up of Progressive activist youth and the DPP MPs somewhere in the middle.

Jaiyi County(嘉義縣) (PVI Green +10) the DPP "primary" Ong (翁章梁) who is the proxy candidate of previous DPP county magistrate Chen (陳明文) beating Chang (張明達) who is the proxy candidate of current DPP county magistrate Helen Chang (張花冠) 43%-35%. It seems that Chang does not seem to accept this result stating cheating by the Ong camp. Not clear what his next steps are which might including running as an independent potentially with KMT support or turn the election into a 3 way race.

With Tsai's ratings low with no clear way out and while the KMT has mostly closed the gap with the DPP but very little people are crediting KMT chairman Wu for it, the winner out of all this is former KMT Prez Ma a year and a half after leaving who was enemy number one for the Pan-Green bloc and abandoned by Deep Blue and Light Blue alike. Now Ma's popularity is surging. One way one can tell are the popularity of Ma Chinese New Year Decorations which are put up on the doors of households and are usually written words of good fortune.

Historically the New Year Decorations written by the current ROC President are the most popular (kinds of like Gallup's poll of most admired Man is usually headed the sitting President.) Last year Prez Ma's office gave out around 50K of such decorations. This year given the massive demand for Ma Chinese New Year Decorations 250K has already been printed and sold out and another batch is several hundred thousand are now being frantically being printed. The Tsai Chinese New Year Decorations has printed 250K or so and that seems to be meeting demand.

One inevitably wonders if the ROC constitution allows for non-consecutive re-election. Or perhaps Eric Chu will give it another go. Interestingly he was a doctoral student of a colleague of my father's.

Ma can run again in 2020 if he so wishes. I do not think he will do that well. He is popular now because Tsai clearly over-promised and under-delivered and Ma is no longer in partisan politics. If he tries to run for office in 2020 memories of the 2014-2016 fiasco will come back.

Eric Chu would be the strongest candidate in 2020 but most likely he will wait for 2024. Chances are that Tsai is even money for re-election and if Eric were to fight Wu for the nomination the KMT would be so split that it is unlikely he can win in the general election. More likely he would just back Wu to run in 2020 and lose and he can come in the lead the KMT after 2020 and get ready to win in 2024.

As for knowing someone in ROC politics, I have several family friends that are in the radical pro-independence camp. I also knew Jiang Yi-huah(江宜樺) who was the KMT Premier in 2013-2014. He was a PHD student at Yale back in the early 1990s which overlapped my time there as an undergraduate. I did not know him that well but we did have lunch several times and had lots of chats about politics of Greater China. He was and I believe still is a moderate Chinese nationalist. I was and still am a radical Chinese nationalist, of course.

Jaiyi County(嘉義縣) (PVI Green +10) the DPP "primary" loser Chang (張明達) is claiming fraud and hundreds of his supporters are rallying demanding that he run a an Independent. Chang claims that hundreds of his supporters received prank calls constantly during the polling period which had the effect of holding up their phone lines so they could not get polled. He also claims that there are signs of vote buying by his opponent Ong (翁章梁). The way "vote buying" would work in a ROC "primary" is the person whose vote got "bought" would hand over his/her cell phone to the "vote buyer" during the polling period. That way if pollster were to call the "vote buyer' can "vote" the right way.

There are some KMT factions pushing for KMT to form an alliance with Chang (who himself was a KMT member back in the late 1990s but went over to the DPP along with the Lin faction defection from KMT to DPP.) Most likely this will not take place and there will be a 3 way race if Chang runs as an Independent.

Tainan City (臺南市) (PVI Green +11) DPP "primary" results are out. It is Huang(黃偉哲) 42% Chen(陳亭妃) 28%. It was a very vicious campaign (most because the KMT is so weak in Tainan that the DPP candidate is almost certain to win. Chen is crying foul and saying that the poll was manipulated.

Just like in Jaiyi County(嘉義縣) (PVI Green +10) there is now talk that Chen might bolt from the DPP to run in the general as an independent. Chen represents the more radical pro-independence bloc while Huang tends to be more moderate. The pro-independence factions in Tainan City (臺南市) (PVI Green +11) are egging Chen on to run as an independent.

In kaoshiung City (高雄市) (PVI Green +7) DPP "primary" it is Chen(陳其邁) 36% over a very large and crowed field ()

Chen who is a MP was the son of a KMT MP who defected to the DPP back in 1993 taking his son who was a college political activist with him over to the DPP. Chen was actually the front runner for the DPP primary for the 2006 kaoshiung City (高雄市) Mayor race but had to drop out when his father who was close to DPP President Chen was arrested for corruption. This primary victory was the culmination of a long political comeback. While the KMT might keep the race close Chen is certain to win the general election.

Unknown pollster 民調大社會(Survey Society) came out with a Taipei city mayor election.

If it is Ko (柯文哲) (independent) vs Ding (丁守中) (KMT) vs Yao(姚文智) (DDP) then it is

Ko (柯文哲) (independent) 42.4Ding (丁守中) (KMT) 30.9Yao(姚文智) (DDP) 13.5

()

Breakout by Pan Blue voters, Pan Green Voters, and neutral voters has Ko (柯文哲) winning 50.4% of the Pan-Green vote and 36.4% of the pan-Blue vote.()

If DPP steps aside to back Ko and it becomes Ko (柯文哲) (independent) vs Ding (丁守中) (KMT) then it is

Ko (柯文哲) (independent) 47.5Ding (丁守中) (KMT) 40.7()

Where some of the anti-Ko Pan-Green voters actually vote Ding to stop Ko.

Poll has Ko approval/disapproval at 47.5/45.5

Ding (丁守中) has not been nominated by the KMT yet so his ratings, along with Yao(姚文智) are underrated. Still it seems Ko (柯文哲) is in trouble when DPP nominates a strong candidate that can consolidate the Pan-Green vote. A weak DPP candidate actually works to the advantage of Ko (柯文哲) in a 3 way race since Ko (柯文哲) still wins a lot of the Pan-Green vote and holds on to a lot of the Pan-Blue vote since then Ko (柯文哲) would not be consider the Pan-Green candidate.

The question is: "Do you approve of Mainland China leader Xi Jiping's leadership style?" The result is approval/disapproval 53.1/38.6

That's one way to get to Chinese reunification. Have Xi run for ROC President in 2020 and win. With Xi holding the titles to PRC President and ROC President we will get reunification a-la Austro-Hungary Dual Monarchy method.

Another poll question

()

Is "As Mainland China becomes the number one economic power in the world would you support unification, independence or status quo"

Fallout from the controversial Jaiyi County(嘉義縣) (PVI Green +10) the DPP "primary" continue to widen and is involving Temple politics in this very Conservative and tradtionalist county. The loser Chang (張明達) and team is coming out with a demand that Ong (翁章梁) and allies sign a oath to presented to a local temple where the deities will witness this oath.

()

The Oath pretty much says "I did nothing during this primary campaign to alter the opinion polling process for this primary. If I did then may I end in a tragic death, the sprites of my ancestors find not rest and the fortunes of my decedents be cursed."

The Oath has Chang (張明達) and team's signatures and asks Ong (翁章梁) and team to publicly sign.

In Jaiyi County(嘉義縣) (PVI Green +10) the DPP pretty much decided to nominate Ong (翁章梁). Chang (張明達) indicates that the DPP high command did not take his complaints to irregularities seriously and is mulling an independent run. Several key KMT Huang faction leaders who are on very friendly terms with Chang (張明達) are the main drivers to egg him on to run as an independent. The same KMT Huang faction leaders are also pushing KMT high command to form an alliance with Chang (張明達) in case he runs. If these KMT Huang faction leaders have their way the general election could be DPP-Lin faction vs KMT-Huang faction-Dissident Lin faction.

Magazine Global Research came out with a poll that shows support for Unification at a 10 year high reaching 14.8% while support for independence falls to a 10 year low of 21.1%. 17% are for status quo forever which is a proxy for "soft" independence while 38.6% are for status quo and decide later which is a proxy for "will accept unification if the terms of good enough" ()

The shift among the youth is the most striking. For 20-29 year olds support for Unification have surged from 5.2% to 13.1 from early 2016 while support for Independence fell from 36.8% to 27.4% during the same period. The Youth used to be the most pro-Independence age group. That generational gap has mostly disappeared under poor economic environment and greater economic opportunities on Mainland China. ()

A slightly more recent poll by the same magazine had 61.8% of 18-29 year old willing to move to Mainland China to enhance their economic prospects.()

Lee(李錫錕) who is a professor of political science in NTU will also run in Taipei City (臺北市) (PVI Blue +6) mayor elections. Lee was the KMT candidate for Taipei County (now New Taipei City) magistrate back in 1989 and narrowly lost. He has been mostly out of politics for a couple of decades but does have a significant following among the non-partisan youth. He will most likely eat into Ko (柯文哲) and KMT vote equally.()

There is also talk that Freddy Lim(林昶佐), former music star and now NPP MP, will also to look to run. Lim is concerned about Ko (柯文哲) recent shifts toward a pro-Beijing stance and sees an opening for him if DPP does not nominate a candidate.()

If Lim gets into the race there might be a point where there is no point for DPP to nominate a candidate. With both ex-DPP Tainan County magistrate Su(蘇煥智) and now NPP MP Lim(林昶佐) in the race there is not much space left for a DPP candidate would would most likely just eat more into the pan-Green vote for Ko (柯文哲) and throw the race to the KMT with DPP having no chance at victory.

It seem what is going on is a good part of DPP base is fairly angry at Ko (柯文哲) and want Tsai to put forward a DPP candidate. Tsai knows that doing that most likely means throwing the race to the KMT and makes her 2020 KMT opponent stronger and also could provoke Ko (柯文哲) to run in 2020. So Tsai strategy is delay, wait for other Pan-Green candidates to get into the race (Like Su(蘇煥智) and now perhaps Lim(林昶佐)) and then say to the anti-Ko(柯文哲) faction of the DPP "there is no point in putting a DPP candidate that cannot win anyway." Of course if I am right then Tsai here is guilty of gutting the Taipei DPP to ensure her 2020 reelection.

In Maioli County (苗栗縣) (PVI Blue +11), DPP will not nominate a candidate but will back a pro-DPP independent and currently a mayor medium sized city in Maioli County Hsu(徐定禎.) Given the fact that in a partisan election where the KMT is not split the DPP has no chance, DPP might as well make the race less partisan. KMT incumbent is going to win no matter what. ()

In Tainan City (臺南市) (PVI Green +11), the KMT still have not selected a candidate yet. But right after Huang(黃偉哲) won the DPP "primary" it emerged that ex-TSU MP Hsu(許忠信) will most likely run as an independent. ()

There are already rumors from the DPP that supporter of Chen(陳亭妃) who was Huang(黃偉哲)'s opponent in the DPP "primary" might shift over to back Hsu(許忠信). Most likely DPP will still win but this Pan-Green splinter candidate might work to narrow the DPP-KMT margin.

No. The ROC Constitution has clauses that indicate "before National reunification the sovereign territories of Republic of China will be divided into ROC controlled territories (aka Free ROC regions) and non-ROC controlled regions." And then indicate that those living outside of ROC controlled regions have different sets of political rights including running for office.

In New Taipei City (新北市) (PVI Blue +2) the KMT "primary" is over and as expected Lieutenant mayor Ho (侯友宜)() won over former Taipei County (what New Taipei City used to be called) Magistrate (2005-2010) Zhou(周錫瑋).

The margin was something like Ho 56% to Zhou 34% which was decisive enough for Zhou to fall in line and support Ho in the general election.()

With no KMT split there does not seem much to stop the KMT from winning New Taipei City (新北市) (PVI Blue +2) with ease.

The DPP in response is trying to get Su (蘇貞昌) who himself is also a former Taipei County Magistrate (1997-2005), a DPP Vice Presidential candidate, and a former DPP Chairman to run. DPP high command does not expect Su to win but to keep it close so the KMT will be forced to use resources in New Taipei City (新北市) so they cannot be used in other races. Prez Tsai and Su are long time rivals but if Tsai insists I suspect Su will fall in line.

Latest Apple Daily poll has Su far behind losing to Ho 61-28. But that is Su not formally in the race. and if Su does enter I suspect the race will be decided by a margin less than 5% with Ho most likely still winning. ()

In many way Ho might be the future of the KMT. I suspect Ho might end up on the KMT ticket in 2024 or 2028.

Su (蘇貞昌) is in the race to be the DPP candidate for New Taipei City (新北市) (PVI Blue +2). A couple of new polls came out

TVBS has

Ho (侯友宜) (KMT) 40%Su (蘇貞昌) (DPP) 32%()

ETtoday has Ho way ahead

Ho (侯友宜) (KMT) 46.4%Su (蘇貞昌) (DPP) 22.7%()

The TVBS poll was done on the same day Su announced he was joining the race so it most likely have exaggerated Su's support. I think Su is most likely around 10%-15% behind but will close the gap one the DPP election machine gets going.

Two pro-KMT media polls has Ho (侯友宜) (KMT) well ahead of old two time DPP Taipei County magistrate, former DPP PM, twice DPP Chairman, and 2008 DPP Vice Prez candidate Su (蘇貞昌) in New Taipei City (新北市) (PVI Blue +2).

UDN has it

Ho (侯友宜) (KMT) 45%Su (蘇貞昌) (DPP) 26%()

While Chinatimes has it at

Ho (侯友宜) (KMT) 50.6%Su (蘇貞昌) (DPP) 27.1%()

Usually UDN and Chinatimes has the pan-Blue support right but underestimate the pan-Green candidate by 5%-10%. So the race is most likely something like Ho 47 Su 35. Still a surprising large lead for Ho given the stature of Su.

In Taipei City (臺北市) (PVI Blue +6) Ding (丁守中) wins the KMT "primary" in a crowed field of second tier candidates by a large margin and will be the KMT candidate. Now the DPP will have to make a call to figure out if they should nominate their own candidate, most likely Yao(姚文智) setting up a 3 way race or back Ko (柯文哲).

At this stage it is a lose-lose situation for DPP. The DPP Light Green and youth base has now mostly go over to Ko but the core DPP vote is fairly anti-Ko at this stage given Ko's recent pro-Beijing position. DPP now faces a split now matter what it does. Worse the split might extend into other counties and cities where the 2016 DPP vote has fractured along pro-Ko and anti-Ko positions.

DPP high command led by DPP Prez Tsai really want to back Ko to avoid a Ko 3rd party run in 2020 but need Ko to renounce some if not all of his more pro-Beijing rhetoric as well as his fairly recent criticisms of the DPP regime, especially those of the DPP New Tide faction. To some extent the recent Ko vs DPP battle is really a Ko vs DPP New Tide faction battle.

The next few days will be fun to watch to on how the DPP will avoid a civil war. Given DPP's track record of unity before a general election I am sure they will find some way to patch things up.

Most recent Taipei City (臺北市) (PVI Blue +6) polls are all over the place.

Left Independence SDP Chairperson and family friend Fan(范雲) will also now run for mayor of Taipei City (臺北市) (PVI Blue +6) adding more pressure on Ko (柯文哲) by threatening to peal off more pro-DPP voters. Fan was a key player of the anti-KMT collage campus movement back in the late 1980s and was a key member of the DPP before bolting in 2006 over DPP Prez Chen's corruption scandals.

()

She is a long time friend of the pro-independence branch of my family and is fairly close to my cousin. I meet her a few times on my various trips to ROC. She also attended Yale as a graduate student when my cousin was attending there as well and I got to chat with her at length a few times when I went back to Yale to visit my cousin. We had a series of headed debates given her Left Pro-Independence Feminist position and my extreme Right Chinese nationalist ultra-capitalism position. Still I have strong respect for the faith of her convictions and her tolerance of, from her point of view, of my abhorrent ideas. I wish her the best of luck even as I will of course back the KMT's Ding (丁守中). I wonder if the pro-Independence (and fairly wealthy) branch of my family is funding her campaign. I have to ask them about that next I get to talk to them on the phone.

If DPP PM and former Tainan Mayor Lai (賴清德) and considered the strongest DPP candidate if they are determinted to win is nominated by the DPP it is an embarrassing

KMT Ding 40.0%Ind. Ko 32.0%DPP Lai 13.2%

()

Not sure what 3 dimensional chess DPP Prez Tsai is playing but her delay on making a decision on weather to back Ko or go with a DPP candidate merely served to divide the Taipei DPP into pro- and anti- Ko factions. What is worse is that the same is taking place in other counties and cities. The DPP hope that somehow Ko could capture some marginal KMT voters seem to have limited impact, as least as indicated in this poll. To be fair to adjust for the pan-Blue house effect I would still view Ding and Ko as neck-to-neck in a 1-to-1 race.

At this stage DPP's only course of action might be to back Ko since a 3 way race could end up with the DPP in a distant third and Ko will might very well run against DPP candidates in other counties/cities as well as potentially run against Tsai in 2020.

In Taipei City (臺北市) (PVI Blue +6) DPP has decide to nominate their own candidate. Mostly due to the surge of KMT's Ding where then DPP feels that backing Ko does not guaranteed victory but instead risks a meltdown of the DPP core vote.

It seems if we take this poll at face value then a lot of undecided in a Ding vs Ko race are DPP supporters. If so then DPP getting into the race will be devastating for Ko. But not getting into the race would be devastating for DPP in Taipei City assembly elections as well as races in other counties/cities.

For Kaoshiung City (高雄市) (PVI Green +7) it will be Han(韓國瑜) who is actually from the Deep Blue branch of the KMT but due to his fairly high charisma could make the race competitive even thought the KMT has a fairly low chance of winning. ()

For Tainan City (臺南市) (PVI Green +11) the KMT will nominate Kao(高思博) who is a son of a former KMT Tainan Mayor as well as the brother-in-law of current New Taipei City Mayor and 2016 KMT Prez candidate Zhu. Kao will have to rely on his family roots in Tainan politics to make the race competitive.()

What should help Kao is former TSU MP Shu(許忠信) will also run and split the Pan-Green vote. Worse former DPP Prez Chen seems to be coming out to back Shu. Chen's angle is to create trouble for DPP Prez Tsai to the point where she has not choice but to grant Chen a parden as he is in theory still on medical parole. ()

What hurts Kao is that Pro-Bue former Tainan chief of police Chen(陳子敬) is also looking to run. Chen seems open to holding a second round "primary" between Chen and Kao to determine a United Front Pan-Blue candidate. KMT talks with Chen are in progress. But if Chen runs then there is zero chance of the race in Tainan City (臺南市) (PVI Green +11) being competitive which is the most the KMT can hope for. ()

KMT has other problems in Hsinchu County (新竹縣) (PVI Blue +14) where there are multiple KMT candidates and KMT high command has to figure out how to run a "primary" that all parties see as fair and not bolt. In addition KMT spliter MKT will be running MKT leader and founder Shu (徐欣瑩) will be running and will take a large chunk of the KMT vote.

In Maioli County (苗栗縣) (PVI Blue +11) where the KMT incumbent seems set to win a landslide victory against a pro-DPP independent is now facing a potential KMT rebel in the form of his KMT predecessor Liu(劉政鴻) who is threatening to run based on based changes the KMT incumbent made to various budget priorities Liu set when he was the county magistrate.

These problems in safe KMT counties highlight the unprecedented environment KMT now has to operate in where it lost control of both the Executive and Legislative branches and lack the resources to settle these conflicts offline. Dealing with these rebellions without resources are part of the process of the KMT shift toward an election machine party versus a clientelist organization at the local level.

It is not official yet but it is said that a "primary" was held between DDP MP Yao(姚文智) and Former DPP VP Lu(呂秀蓮) in Taipei City (臺北市) (PVI Blue +6) and that Yao won. This seems to pave the way for DPP to nominate Yao.

()

This seems, for now, the worst outcome for DPP. Ideally DPP forms an alliance with Ko backs Ko against KMT's Ding or brings in someone so strong (like Former Tainan Mayor and now PM Lai(賴清德) or former Kaoshiung Mayor Chen (陳菊)) where in a polarized race Ko would be the victim of pan-Green tactical voting.

Now the DPP will have to run in third place and its only chance is to hammer Ko down so the Pan-Green vote shifts to Yao. If DPP fails in this which is likely then the chances are high that Ding would win with Ko coming out of the election blaming DPP for his defeat. And along they way as DPP goes after Ko the pro-Ko DPP youth vote in Northern Taiwan Province might turnout lower for DPP candidates. Alternatively toward the end of the campaign DPP mostly drops Yao and tactically vote for Ko to make it a Ding/Ko 50/50 race. But in that case the DPP Taipei City assembly races would see significant impact.

If it is Yao is the DPP candidate, then on proxy would be the 27 DPP city assembly candidates. If they start to run away from Yao and starts aligning with Ko you can tell DPP high command has given up on Yao and is a mode to back Ko against Ding.

Tainan City (臺南市) (PVI Green +11).. ETToday (mostly neutral but I guess a slight pro-Blue lean) poll has it at

DPP 31.2%KMT 18.5%Pro-Blue Ind. 4.5%Ind. 2.9%

()

Which is a fairly poor poll for DPP when radical pro-independence pan-Green Shu(許忠信) who is in the race was not included.

Taichung City(臺中市) (PVI Blue +0). Pro-Blue UDN poll has it

SupportKMT 39DPP 32

Who is likely to winDPP 39KMT 25

()

Which implies a neck-to-neck race given the UDN house effects. On the other hand DPP candidate Lin is the incumbent so he so be polling better this. So overall this is a fairly poor poll for DPP as well.

Clearly it can as there will always be a need for a Center-Right mainstream party in ROC. The question is can KMT play that role and survive while keeping some vestiges of its pre-2000 era. Namely can the KMT remain the main Center-Right party of ROC WHILE being A party of Chinese nationalism (in the pre-1970s era the KMT was THE party of Chinese nationalism.)

The answer was fairly cloudy in the 2014-2017 period but by 2018 it is clear that pro-unification sentiment on ROC is recovering due to the problematic tenure of the DPP regime. KMT Chairman Wu(吳敦義) has historically came from the non-unification branch of the KMT and him winning power as the head of the KMT was seen as a trend toward KMT as a Taiwan regionism force (think a DPP clone but more willing to do business with PRC) versus a Chinese nationalist force.

But recently Wu came out strongly for unification in a critique of DPP Prez Tsai saying that the ROC Constitution states clearly that reunification with the Mainland is the goal and that if Tsai claims that she is carrying out her role under the ROC Constitution then she should not pursue any policies that is toward Taiwan Independence. Of course Wu said this under the clear recent trend in public opinion toward unification. In the latest poll by the ROC Mainland Affairs Council the Unification vs Independence support was 17.1% vs 19.3% when in the 2004-2016 period it was mostly in the 11% vs 24% region. This is the most pro-unification sentiment since 2002.

Of course for the KMT to survive it has to make a comeback in Southern Taiwan Province. Here something took place recently in the Kaoshiung City (高雄市) (PVI Green +7) mayor race points to the way how that might be done. What took place was a large bloc of the Kaoshiung Presbyterian Church decided to break with its anti-KMT tradition which stretches back to the 1960s and come out to back the KMT candidate. Same with some Buddhist and Taoist organizations which defected to the DPP 10-15 years ago. What drove them to do this was their objection to recent policies of the DPP regime at the center that added a more sympathetic view of LGBT and non-traditional family lifestyles in public school curriculum. This is exactly what I predicted might take place as the DPP made progress in urban areas last couple of election cycles based on progressive values that appeals to the urban youth and urban middle class. The KMT counterattack has to be its own tradtional values based "Operation Dixie" in the South and it seems to be taking places on its own.

It just shows there are no permanent majorities and a coalition of everyone will not last long.

Speaking of Gay marriage that is still the big hidden ticking time bomb issue that could come out and blow up the DPP. While political cleavage is centered around the Unification-Independence debate the DPP is safe but if the salience of the Unification-Independence debate were to decline then social issues like Gay marriage could create significant issues for the DPP and the Pan-Greens as a whole.

The reason is shown in a chart drawn up by former DPP MP and now political commentator Sheng Fu-Shiung

The X axis is Conservative-Progressive axis with Progressive on the Right. The Y axis is the unification-independence axis with independence at the top. DPP core is to the Upper Left side of chart while NGO youth activist bloc is the Upper Right side of the chart.()

The basic idea is the Green bubble is where the DPP MPs are at. But the White Bubble on the Upper Left box is where the DPP core vote is. The DPP activist base in Northern Taiwan is the small bubble on the Upper Right corner. The Blue bubble is where the KMT MPs which also overlaps with the KMT vote base.

The problem is clear for the DPP. Its core vote base Southern Taiwan are made up of Bubbas and Billy Bobs yet its activist based in the North are made up of Progressive activist youth and the DPP MPs somewhere in the middle. While the KMT is all-powerful and political cleavage mostly about unification-independence the Pan-Green coalition can hold together. But if political debate shifts to cultural issues like Gay Marriage DPP risk losing its Northern activist based to NPP and losing its socially conservative vote base in Southern Taiwan to the old KMT factional leaders who themselves are fairly socially conservative.

It is clear for the reason Tsai (who personally clearly for Gay marriage) is petrified of the Gay Marriage issue and pretty much done everything possible to push it to the courts and trying to take it out of the political zone of debate.

If the Unification-Independence issue does loses salience (which seems unlikely for the next couple of years) I can see a realignment which actually reverse the previous large realignment of 1990-2004. In the 1980s the KMT was dominant in the rural and low educated areas while the DPP was seen as a liberal-progressive urban force even as among economic elites the KMT still dominated. As the Unification-Independence issue gained salience this pattern reversed during the 1990-2004 where the KMT became much stronger in the cities which tended to benefit from economic integration with Mainland China while DPP became much stronger in rural areas where they tend to suffer from economic integration with Mainland China. If the Unification-Independence become less salient we might revert to a political pattern more like the 1980s. To some extent the Tsai 2016 campaign which focused on her appeal to the urban progressive youth is already a step in that direction as her relative swings where much stronger in urban areas in 2016. The next step is for the KMT to use Gay Marriage as a wedge issue to split the DPP coalition.

Latest Apple Daily poll (tend to be anti-KMT and slightly pro-Ko) for Taipei City (臺北市) (PVI Blue +6)has a virtual tie between Ding and Ko

KMT Ding(丁守中) 29.1%pro-DPP Ko(柯文哲) 29.0%DPP Yao(姚文智) 13.5%

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What should worry Ko is with Pan-Blue voters it is Ding 75% Ko 18%. But with Pan-Green voters it is Yao 60% Ko 34%. So if Yao is able to get campaign and focus on consolidating the pan-Green vote Ko will fall behind Ding.

It's interesting how Chinese identification declines when the KMT is in power, and resurges when the DPP is in power.

Correct. That is a function of feasibility concerns. Before the 1990s unification support was high but that was because a) pro-independence position was technically illegal (which was one of the reasons why I was pro-independence in the 1980s as it was more of an issue of free speech) and b) unification was seen as a fusion of two equal entities and not a PRC takeover and mostly c) unification was not realistic so it was easy to back something that was not realistic.

Independence support surged in the 1990s due to the rise of the PRC and a PRC takeover became more possible. By the same token the DPP 2000 victory meant that independence became more realistic and as a result pro-unification position surged in the 2000-2002 period.

DPP Prez Chen did move the needle and pushed for a referendum law and pushed hard on Taiwanese identity in 2002 ironically because his administration was running into trouble and it was clear that he was not going to win over pan-Blue voters. So DPP Prez Chen pushed to consolidate the pro-Independence bloc even at the expense of losing out on the even larger anti-Independence bloc.

Pro-unification KMT Ma's election in 2008 made independence out of the question but made unification more likely given a remote but possible deal between KMT and CCP. As result pro-independence position surged. As Ma's administration ran into problems starting in 2013 that merely added to the pro-independence position.

Now that DPP's Tsai is in charge the roles are reversed and with her administration going badly it is reasonable that pro-unification position that surged to a 2002 high.

What one can draw from this is the ROC voting population just want status qua to go on forever. Unfortunately that might not be sustainable over the next couple of decades.

Clearly it can as there will always be a need for a Center-Right mainstream party in ROC. The question is can KMT play that role and survive while keeping some vestiges of its pre-2000 era. Namely can the KMT remain the main Center-Right party of ROC WHILE being A party of Chinese nationalism (in the pre-1970s era the KMT was THE party of Chinese nationalism.)

The answer was fairly cloudy in the 2014-2017 period but by 2018 it is clear that pro-unification sentiment on ROC is recovering due to the problematic tenure of the DPP regime. KMT Chairman Wu(吳敦義) has historically came from the non-unification branch of the KMT and him winning power as the head of the KMT was seen as a trend toward KMT as a Taiwan regionism force (think a DPP clone but more willing to do business with PRC) versus a Chinese nationalist force.

But recently Wu came out strongly for unification in a critique of DPP Prez Tsai saying that the ROC Constitution states clearly that reunification with the Mainland is the goal and that if Tsai claims that she is carrying out her role under the ROC Constitution then she should not pursue any policies that is toward Taiwan Independence. Of course Wu said this under the clear recent trend in public opinion toward unification. In the latest poll by the ROC Mainland Affairs Council the Unification vs Independence support was 17.1% vs 19.3% when in the 2004-2016 period it was mostly in the 11% vs 24% region. This is the most pro-unification sentiment since 2002.

Of course for the KMT to survive it has to make a comeback in Southern Taiwan Province. Here something took place recently in the Kaoshiung City (高雄市) (PVI Green +7) mayor race points to the way how that might be done. What took place was a large bloc of the Kaoshiung Presbyterian Church decided to break with its anti-KMT tradition which stretches back to the 1960s and come out to back the KMT candidate. Same with some Buddhist and Taoist organizations which defected to the DPP 10-15 years ago. What drove them to do this was their objection to recent policies of the DPP regime at the center that added a more sympathetic view of LGBT and non-traditional family lifestyles in public school curriculum. This is exactly what I predicted might take place as the DPP made progress in urban areas last couple of election cycles based on progressive values that appeals to the urban youth and urban middle class. The KMT counterattack has to be its own tradtional values based "Operation Dixie" in the South and it seems to be taking places on its own.

It just shows there are no permanent majorities and a coalition of everyone will not last long.

Interesting, pretty much everything in the Western media (my Chinese isn't good enough yet to follow what either Beijing or Taipei are saying) says that the Kuomintang is collapsing. They claim that Chinese identification will continue to decline in the future and that internal struggles are tearing the party apart. It's great to hear a different view.

Now, this is just the view of an American Sinophile, who has only been to the mainland. But I don't quite understand the long term goal of the modern KMT. Obviously from the 1920s to 1949 it was to defeat the warlords and Communists while protecting the nation from Imperial Japan. From 1949 until at least 1970 it was to provide an alternative model for China's development and prepare for the eventual reconquest of the mainland. But what is the goal today? I mean, I heard they don't even call for reunification anymore. But even if they did support reunification, that opens up another can of worms. The old KMT did so much to keep the PRC out of Taiwan and Kinmen. I just don't understand why the group that fought a bloody, protracted war against Communism decide to join with the PRC. I can't see a political party with such a long, proud history subordinate itself to the CPC. But on the other hand, if they don't support reunification, what is their purpose?

Nevertheless, I'm wishing all the luck on the Kuomintang in November and hoping they take back power in 2020. I have a huge affinity for the party for historical reasons and from what I've seen Tsai Ing-wen does not seem like a great president.

Also, what exactly is the point of the Qinmindang? I don't get why their voters support them over the KMT, which is very similar.

It is fairly clear what DPP's high command strategy for 2018 election is, which is all about securing DPP Tsai's re-election in 2020. The minimum goal is to win Taichung City(臺中市) (PVI Blue +0). If DPP loses Taichung City(臺中市) (PVI Blue +0) then I would rate Tsai's chances of re-election at below 40%. If DPP can hold Taichung City(臺中市) (PVI Blue +0) then I would say Tsai's reelection chances are above 50%. If DPP can somehow keep Taichung City(臺中市) (PVI Blue +0) and get a compliant Ko to keep Taipei City (臺北市) (PVI Blue +6) then Tsai's chances surges to 80%.

The main DPP strategy to keep Taichung City(臺中市) (PVI Blue +0) is one of diversion. If the DPP can keep New Taipei City (新北市) (PVI Blue +2) competitive (within 5%)then the KMT will have to focus on New Taipei City (新北市) (PVI Blue +2) to avoid a disastrous defeat. This is why Tsai went hat in hand to get her rival Su(蘇貞昌) to run in New Taipei City (新北市) (PVI Blue +2). So far this leg is not working as Su now finds himself behind in the polls by at least 10% if not more.

The other leg of the DPP strategy is find a way to back Ko to take on the KMT 1-on-1 and yet get the DPP base accept this since Ko's renegade style has pealed off DPP youth base over to him but the old pro-independence DPP are hostile to Ko. The DPP strategy is to keep on threatening Ko with a DPP candidate and pumping up the DPP's base anger against Ko to get Ko to grovel to Tsai and DPP. Main problem is Ko called the DPP bluff on the premise that no tier one DPP candidate will be willing to run in a election where they are likely to come in third. Worse the anger DPP pumped up against Ko which was suppose to be for show became real to the point that DPP had to nominate someone to avoid a split in the party. So in the end a tier two candidate like s Yao(姚文智) had to be nominated. If seems that DPP's strategy going forward is to try to push up s Yao(姚文智) support to a point where Ko will have to come begging for a deal with the DPP or face certain defeat.

The KMT strategy in Taipei City (臺北市) (PVI Blue +6) is to project Yao as a dummy candidate and Ko as the true Pan-Green candidate. This is because KMT in many ways is sitting pretty. Assuming KMT keeps its ~43% vote base and the large number of Blue and Green Independents take around 7%, DPP has to collapse to single digits for KMT to have a risk of losing. For now the KMT will assume that Tsai and DPP high command will not accept such an outcome. So the main risk for the KMT is for Yao(姚文智) to catch fire and become "The Green candidate" which opens up Ko to capture votes from the Blue vote base eating into KMT Ding's ~43%. So no matter what KMT needs to keep Ko away from its core vote and labeling Ko as the Green candidate is the way to do it. Ideally for the KMT Yao's support should be around 15%-20% which means Ko would be seen as KMT's main opponent and makes it easier to label Ko as the Green candidate which would ensure a easy KMT victory. Later in the campaign if Yao's support falls below 15% there will be a risk for the KMT that DPP high command might throw in the towel and work to shift DPP votes toward Ko to block Ding. KMT is figuring that would not take place due to a) such a result will be a major humiliation of DPP high command and Prez Tsai b) this would provoke outrage from the DPP core vote in other counties and cities.

The DPP-Ko breakup is already hurting DPP in other elections. In Changhua County(彰化縣) (PVI Green +1) an ex-TSU MP who ran in 2014 as well is running again. Ko will be backing her and could shift a bunch of youth vote toward her. But this is the same youth vote the DPP is counting on to try to keep this seat from a stronger KMT challenger.

In a shock, as soon as DPP nominated Yao(姚文智) Taipei City (臺北市) (PVI Blue +6), DPP ex-VP Lu (呂秀蓮) was as also working for the DPP nomination announced that she will quit DPP. I guess soon after that she will be running as an independent. This is a death blow to DPP and accelerate the marginalization of Yao(姚文智). This is sort of neutral to Ko. One the one hand it makes it more likely that anti-Ding DPP vote swill flow to him. On the other hand there is another candidate to split the anti-Ding vote.

So for the Taipei City (臺北市) (PVI Blue +6) we have a crowed field. My guesstimate of the result would be

Interesting, pretty much everything in the Western media (my Chinese isn't good enough yet to follow what either Beijing or Taipei are saying) says that the Kuomintang is collapsing. They claim that Chinese identification will continue to decline in the future and that internal struggles are tearing the party apart. It's great to hear a different view.

Now, this is just the view of an American Sinophile, who has only been to the mainland. But I don't quite understand the long term goal of the modern KMT. Obviously from the 1920s to 1949 it was to defeat the warlords and Communists while protecting the nation from Imperial Japan. From 1949 until at least 1970 it was to provide an alternative model for China's development and prepare for the eventual reconquest of the mainland. But what is the goal today? I mean, I heard they don't even call for reunification anymore. But even if they did support reunification, that opens up another can of worms. The old KMT did so much to keep the PRC out of Taiwan and Kinmen. I just don't understand why the group that fought a bloody, protracted war against Communism decide to join with the PRC. I can't see a political party with such a long, proud history subordinate itself to the CPC. But on the other hand, if they don't support reunification, what is their purpose?

Nevertheless, I'm wishing all the luck on the Kuomintang in November and hoping they take back power in 2020. I have a huge affinity for the party for historical reasons and from what I've seen Tsai Ing-wen does not seem like a great president.

Also, what exactly is the point of the Qinmindang? I don't get why their voters support them over the KMT, which is very similar.

I think the 2016-2017 period the narrative of the KMT in terminal decline is quite apt. Even as DPP was stumbling when it took over the KMT did not seem to benefit and if anything outsiders like Ko were gaining support as the alternative to the DPP. The KMT was mired in civil war between its pro-unification vs non-unification factions in an environment where the general population was hostile to unification but a KMT without the banner of Chinese nationalism would lack a central vision. Furthermore KMT without resources of being the incumbent party at both the Pres and Legislative level mean that the old KMT way of running elections was in danger of breaking down due to lack of resources.

Nome of that stopping being true but as 2018 came around the nature of the election campaign self-organized the KMT into a more viable and continued incompetence of the DPP regime drove support to the KMT as the only real viable alternative as well as pushed up support for unification. In many ways this is a replay of 2008-2010 when after the 2008 KMT landslide election it was thought that it would take the DPP at least 4 election cycles to come back after the disastrous corruption scandals of DPP Prez Chen. The very nature of KMT stumbling, especially in the 2013-2014 period, make the DPP comeback only take 8 year and in 2016 DPP won with an unprecedented majority. The way things are going the KMT has a 50/50 shot at winning in 2020 and is very likely to win in 2024.

As for PFP(親民黨) it is a KMT splinter and personality party of James Soong(宋楚瑜) who was an up and coming KMT superstar destined to lead the KMT. But a diasterous KMT civil war between Soong and his rival Lien Chan(連戰) lead to a KMT defeat of 2000 and crated the PFP. The party mostly exist for KMT rebels to run to and most likely will come to an end when Soong retires. In 2016 James Soong's PFP did fairly well as pro-KMT voters that wanted to teach the KMT a lesson voted PFP. At this stage given the disastrous nature of the DPP regime most of them have gone back to backing the KMT again even if the KMT is led by a fairly listless leadership.

Just to show how much the youth vote has abandoned the DPP in Taipei City (臺北市) (PVI Blue +6) and perhaps other areas, the number of people that watches a daily live-stream called "Watch Mayor Ko Eat Lunch" which is, well, basically Ko eating a normal lunch must be 50 times higher than the recent internet only live-stream of a live interview of DPP Prez Tsai.

A lead of this sort by an incumbent is actually somewhat problematic for DPP given that it is the incumbent running. Of course the KMT candidate Chang(張麗善) also ran in 2014 and is the sister of former KMT county magistrate and leader of the still powerful Chang faction. She did not really want to run again but the KMT put in a lot of effort to get her to run. She will not win but it seems the race will be closer than 2014 by some margin.

If it is clear that Yao cannot win and will end up third then it will be

KMT Ding(丁守中) 43.7% Pro-DPP Ind. Ko(柯文哲) 38.5% DPP Yao(姚文智) 6.8%

Which seems to show that there is an solid anti-Ko bloc of pro-DPP voters that would even vote Ding to avoid Ko from winning.

What is disastrous for DPP is the generic vote for City assembly which is

KMT 39.4％DPP 16.6％NPP 2.8%

which reflects ths vertical split of the Taipei DPP between pro-KO and anti-KO factions. With, for now, DPP going on the warpath on Ko the pro-Ko bloc of the DPP are holding back their support of DPP assembly candidate. Most likely the DPP will fall to below Ma 2002 landslide levels most because unlike 2002 the pan-Blue vote will be consolidated behind KMT when in 2002 the pan-Blue were split between KMT and PFP.

This is the most pro-KMT county on Taiwan Province. I suspect if Liu(劉政鴻) does run his vote share is underestimated. Pro-DPP independent is most likely underestimated as well as the pro-DPP vote should be at least 30% if Liu(劉政鴻) does not run.

Obviously underestimates DPP. But the gap highlights Lin(林姿妙) strength and the fact that is is the heavy favorite to win in this traditionally DPP county (back in 1980s Yilan County(宜蘭縣) (PVI Green +6) was the most anti-KMT county). Lin(林姿妙) could be a future KMT superstar if her tenure as Yilan County(宜蘭縣) (PVI Green +6) county magistrate goes well. I can see her being on the KMT national ticket beyond 2024.

Hualian County(花蓮縣) (PVI Blue +20) is one of the most pro-Blue counties although recently DPP have been gaining ground here, especially with the non-Aborigine vote. Shu(徐榛蔚) is the wife of the pro-KMT independent incumbent and seems set to win.

New TVBS (pro-KMT) poll for New Taipei City (新北市) (PVI Blue +2) has KMT Ho opening up a 17 point lead over DPP Kingpin Su.

KMT Ho (侯友宜) 48(+8)DPP Su (蘇貞昌) 31(-1)

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The DPP spent a lot time this last month on the attack against Ho in hopes of keeping New Taipei City (新北市) (PVI Blue +2) close and preventing the KMT from using Ho to campaign in other races. It seems things are not working out for DPP.

Are the KMT basically their version of the GOP or Conservative Party as a pro-business, free marketist party (I understand this is highly simplified and that every country has its nuances)? And their DPP is basically their Democratic Party?

In respect to policy, I understand while their health care model on paper looks efficient, I understand the system is overburdened, does Taiwan need to raise its taxes by a moderate amount to upgrade their health care system and make it less overwhelmed? Additionally, other than relations with the mainland, what are some other pressing issues for Taiwan?

Jaichind, who would you support and are there any policies you would like to be introduced, implemented or revamped?

I don't really know much about Taiwanese politics so I probably shouldn' comment on this but I always have the impression Asian right-wing parties are much more 'pro-industrial strategy'/pro-dirigisme (don't know how to call it) than most of their Western counterparts. So they're pro-business but not really pro-market. I believe Ha-Joon Chang said he'd actually support the right in South Korea even though he wrote books very critical of neoliberalism. Is this also true for the KMT?

Are the KMT basically their version of the GOP or Conservative Party as a pro-business, free marketist party (I understand this is highly simplified and that every country has its nuances)? And their DPP is basically their Democratic Party?

In respect to policy, I understand while their health care model on paper looks efficient, I understand the system is overburdened, does Taiwan need to raise its taxes by a moderate amount to upgrade their health care system and make it less overwhelmed? Additionally, other than relations with the mainland, what are some other pressing issues for Taiwan?

Jaichind, who would you support and are there any policies you would like to be introduced, implemented or revamped?

The real difference between KMT and DPP are about the issue of identify. KMT represents the Chinese identify and the DPP the Taiwanese identity. Both mouth populist slogans, especially when in opposition but in reality KMT represents service and advanced industrial economic interests while the DPP represents the older industrial interests and landed class in rural areas. This is not a coincidence. The service and advanced industrial economic interests tend to benefit from economic integration with Mainland China while older industrial interests and landed class in rural areas tend to to be hurt by economic integration with Mainland China.

Both KMT and DPP have done their share to expand the welfare state as part of populist schemes to win votes. Of course both have worked on reform plans to cut costs of the welfare state given the overall aversion of Chinese societies to government debt. The KMT is strong with the educated class tend to have a lot of support in public service workers which in turn triggers DPP to focus on public sector pension reform. The DPP has a lot of support with rural farmers which triggers KMT to work on reform welfare payments to those sections.

Given the aversion to government debt the current system of national healthcare is in economic crisis and the current DPP regime is working on plans to reform the system and try to cut costs and increase premiums. Understand that ROC also spends fairly low levels on defense given the PRC threat (and is really a free rider on USA's defense spending) and even then the fairly minimal welfare state it has built is not sustainable given the fairly low taxes and large size of the informal economy.

As for what policies I want. I am a strong Chinese nationalist so I am for Chinese reunification for identity reasons in addition to sound economic reasons. To be far back in the 1980s I was a lukewarm supporter of Taiwan independence but that was more about my opposition to KMT laws that banned the expression of support for the Taiwanese identify. Once those laws were removed I mostly reverted to my true Chinese ultra-nationalist self.

The current poor economic climate on ROC today stems from the fact that most wealth made by ROC business are routed abroad and not used to spur the domestic economy. The reason for this are two fold. First uncertainly over relationship with PRC and possible PRC invasion means that local wealth will find its way abroad. Second the policy of promoting export which worked so well for the KMT in the 1960s-1990s period now holding the economy back with the Central Bank always looking to push down the currency to promote export but give wealth very little reason to try to stay. As a result the local cost of living is fairly low but the consumer economy is not taking off as it should leaving a good section of the population in a lower middle class income trap.

The solution should be unification talks with the PRC. We should be trading de jure unification for de facto autonomy. A reasonable deal should be: a) Union between Mainland China and Taiwan to form Federal Republic of Chinab) Current situation on Taiwan Province stays EXACTLY the same as today except for any official usage of the word ROC (Republic of China) we instead use Federal Republic of China Taiwan Regional Government including keeping its armed forces.

I think the PRC would take this deal since economic problems would not lead to the overthrow of the CCP. But if the PRC loses Taiwan and allows for a formal Taiwan Independence the CCP will over overthrown. CCP knows that and putting to bed something that can lead to its overthrow and in fact pushing up defense spending would be a good deal for PRC.

Of course doing this deal would lead to the destruction of DPP because that would pretty much blow up their entire reason for DPP to exist which is to protect an independent Taiwanese identity.

for a long writeup on the history of Hsinchu County (新竹縣) (PVI Blue +14) politics since the 1990s.

With KMT incumbent Chiu (邱鏡淳) leaving office after two terms the election was headed to a 3 way race. The DPP nominates Cheng(鄭朝方) who the son of Chiu's long time KMT rival Cheng(鄭永金). KMT splinter MKT leader Shu (徐欣瑩) who used to be a KMT MP is also running. Former DPP MP and now KMT MP and whip Lin (林為洲) who beat Cheng(鄭永金) who ran for DPP in 2016 for MP was the front runner for the KMT and was expected to win the KMT "primary."

But it seems last minute KMT Chairman Wu decided not to go with a "primary" and that the KMT will draft a candidate. Wu then went with Yang(楊文科). It seems that Lin (林為洲) might not accept this and might run as an independent threatening to split the Pan-Blue vote 3 ways and could throw the race to DPP's Cheng(鄭朝方) just like in 1997 when KMT was split (KMT Chiu (邱鏡淳) and KMT Cheng(鄭永金) ran against each other) and lost to DPP.

There are several theories on why Wu did this. One is Lin (林為洲) coming from a DPP background was not acceptable to various pro-Blue local factions. Worse Lin (林為洲) is not a Hakka in a county that is mostly Hakka. It is also said that Wu went with Yang(楊文科) who he can control so he can use Yang(楊文科) as a bargaining chip with Shu (徐欣瑩) to work for a MKT merger back into KMT and for Shu (徐欣瑩) to run for KMT.

Anyway it is not clear that Lin (林為洲) will actually bolt from KMT to run as an independent since it is unlikely without the KMT label he would win and risk losing is promising career as the KMT Parliamentary Whip. Also even it comes to a 3 way split of the Pan-Blue vote Shu (徐欣瑩) has a lot of appeal to Pan-Green voters and the election might turn into a Yang(楊文科) vs Shu (徐欣瑩) battle with both Cheng(鄭朝方) and Lin (林為洲), if he runs, being marginalized. The main problem with Cheng(鄭朝方) is that he does not have the same appeal and connections his father has with local Pan-Blue factions and given his KMT background he might not appeal to the DPP vote in Hsinchu County (新竹縣) (PVI Blue +14).

One way or another the DPP better not win Hsinchu County (新竹縣) (PVI Blue +14) or Wu will have a huge egg on his face and risks losing his job if the KMT has a mediocre election night in Nov 2018.

I think it's clear that any genuinely equitable political solution has long gone, if only because of the sheer disparity in economic and military strength. If there is a peaceful political solution, it will be on Beijing's terms with a few token concessions that give Taiwan slightly more autonomy than the ex-European colonies.

I think it's clear that any genuinely equitable political solution has long gone, if only because of the sheer disparity in economic and military strength. If there is a peaceful political solution, it will be on Beijing's terms with a few token concessions that give Taiwan slightly more autonomy than the ex-European colonies.

In theory yes. Of course some unique factors in the KMT and DPP would make the ROC punch above its weight when it comes down to reunification talks. The KMT is viewed as the "older brother" of the CCP which gives it a physiological edge when it unification talks with the CCP. The DPP with with pro-Independence fringe could end up paying the "mad dog" role (like if you push us to far we will just ignore the USA get nuclear weapons) in to apply pressure on the CCP to compromise. If the DPP does not exist the KMT will almost have to invent the DPP as the bad cop.

None of this would stop the process of unification on the long run as long as the PRC holds together but will give us on the ROC a negotiation edge beyond what is justified given our economic-military strength.

It seems if this poll is believed that KMT splinter MKT leader Hsu(徐欣瑩) has mostly capture pan-Green support as the anti-KMT alternative. At this stage with Yang(楊文科) not having starting his campaign his level of support is mostly under-estimated, especially with the Hakka majority. But it seems that this election might end with DPP's Cheng(鄭朝方) marginalization and MKT's Hsu(徐欣瑩) becoming the de facto Green candidate.

BTW, note the MKT's party symbol is nearly identical to the KMT's symbol.

Sorts of reminds me of the 2010 FL Senate race where GOP rebel Charlie Crist toward the end became the de facto Dem candidate as the main challenger to GOP's Rubio.

Is Hsu a devoted MKT person or using the party as an opportunistic vehicle? It's just weird to imagine the MKT winning everything although it's certainly a welcome surprise.

Well, Hsu(徐欣瑩) is the founder and leader of the MKT. MKT is only really relevant Hsinchu County (新竹縣) (PVI Blue +14). In 2008 Hsu(徐欣瑩) left the KMT and ran with DPP support against the official KMT candidate Chiu (邱鏡淳) (current KMT county magistrate) in the Hsinchu County (新竹縣) (PVI Blue +14) legislative seat. She failed in a very strong KMT year. She later rejoined the KMT and won the 2012 Hsinchu County (新竹縣) (PVI Blue +14) legislative race as the KMT candidate. In 2015 she broke from the KMT again and formed the MKT. She was going to run for her legislative seat as the MKT candidate but was picked by KMT splinter PFP's Soong as his VP candidate in the 2016 Prez election.

MKT is really a Hsinchu County (新竹縣) (PVI Blue +14) local party. There are always all sorts of talks about Hsu(徐欣瑩) being in talks with the KMT to return to the KMT as the leader of the Hsinchu County (新竹縣) (PVI Blue +14) KMT. But that seems to have the opposition of a lot of the KMT local factions. But in the meantime given the weakness of the DPP Hsu(徐欣瑩) seems to have eaten into the DPP vote as an alternative to the KMT in Hsinchu County (新竹縣) (PVI Blue +14).

<The Chinese language does not have the concept of "Ms", only "Miss" or "Mrs". In theory there is which is 女士 but it is rarely used and only there because the rise of the usage of "Ms" in the English speaking world>

My comment is: "Guess who is the Communist?"The comment on the picture is "Times have changed, Communist Bandits do not look like Communist Bandits anymore, and Those who are not Communist Bandits now look like Communist Bandits"

In Hsinchu County (新竹縣) (PVI Blue +14), it seems KMT MP Lin(林為洲) will bolt from the KMT and run as an independent making it a 4 way race. He also has the support of former DPP county magistrate Lin(林光華) mostly based on the Lin Clan loyalty. So both Lin(林為洲) and MKT's Hsu(徐欣瑩) will appeal to both pan-Blue and pan-Green voters. With Lin(林為洲) in the race to further split the KMT vote I suspect MKT's Hsu(徐欣瑩) is now the front runner although I think all 4 candidates (MKT Hsu(徐欣瑩), KMT rebel Lin(林為洲), KMT Yang(楊文科),DPP Cheng(鄭朝方)) will get at least (or close to it) 20% of the vote. This will be a fun 4 way race.

DPP incumbent Cheng(鄭文燦) has a pretty positive record and will cruise to re-election. Chen's name ID is fairly low and given the KMT base the race will be a lot closer than this poll would suggest especially when ROC polls tend to, in a non-polarized election, overestimate the incumbent running for re-election which is correlated to overestimation of the candidate with greater name recognition.

DPP Incumbent Lin in a tight race. Given the incumbent is behind in the polls this does not look good for Lin. Lu's main problem is that in rural Taichung where the KMT Black and Red factions still have some influence she is having a hard time getting these KMT factions to be actively backing her. Lin could still get these KMT local factions to back him with the right incentives.

Gao has fairly low name recognition so once the election campaign picks up he will gain more support. If Chen and Shu are polling 4 and 3 at this stage then they will most likely end up with less than 2$ of the vote each. Huang looks set to win by a wide margin although Su is a threat to take a bunch of pan-Green votes and reduce the DPP winning margin.

The "markers" for the 2020 Prez election front-runners in this election are the following:

1) For the KMT ifa) KMT only wins New Taipei City (新北市) (PVI Blue +2) then Wu is out as KMT chairman ASAP and Chu becomes the KMT chairman and the KMT candidate in 2020 especially if KMT does well in Chu's New Taipei City(新北市) (PVI Blue +2) election.b) KMT wins one of Taipei City (臺北市) (PVI Blue +6) or Taichung City(臺中市) (PVI Blue +0). Wu stays on as KMT chairman but the 2020 KMT nomination will become a Wu vs Chu fight where it is a tossup since Wu has the party machinery and Chu is more popular with the KMT grassroots. c) KMT wins both Taipei City (臺北市) (PVI Blue +6) and Taichung City(臺中市) (PVI Blue +0). Wu becomes the KMT Prez candidate in 2020

Of course there is the issue of Ma. Ex-KMT Prez Ma has been indicted for a 2005 (when Ma was KMT Chairman) sale of KMT owned media companies. The prosecution claims that Ma sold those assets below market value "to benefit others." But main issue here is there are no proof or evidence that Ma personally got a dime out of this deal. So there is a perception, especially among KMT voters, that this is a political motivated trumped up charge. This sympathy factor means that if Ma were to choose to run in the KMT "primary" for 2020 there is not much Wu or Chu can do to stop him.

2) For DPP Taipei City (臺北市) (PVI Blue +6) is clearly lost and could end up being a catastrophic result. If DPP holds Taichung City(臺中市) (PVI Blue +0) then Tsai will avoid a "Primary" challenge even, as expected, the DPP will lose a few counties. If DPP loses Taichung City(臺中市) (PVI Blue +0) then there will be internal pressure in the DPP to dump Tsai. Most likely she can suppress this rebellion since the main alternative to Tsai is PM Lai of the New Tide faction which inside the Tsai camp as her PM.

Tsai has to balance several factors. She has to a) Make sure she avoids an internal "Primary" challenge b) Try to avoid a Ko run in 2020 c) Make sure the KMT candidate is Wu who poll the worst among the possible KMT candidate. Problem is these goals are contradictory.

If DPP does "too well" then Wu is out as KMT and Tsai will get Chu which is a tougher challenger in 2020. If DPP does too poorly then Tsai faces a DPP "primary challenge." If Tsai helps Ko win in Taipei City (臺北市) (PVI Blue +6) to avoid a Ko 2020 run then KMT defeat in Taipei City (臺北市) (PVI Blue +6) could mean Wu is out and Tsai get Chu.

It seems Tsai's strategy was to de facto back Ko in Taipei City (臺北市) (PVI Blue +6) so he wins and does not run in 2020 while having Su run in New Taipei City (新北市) (PVI Blue +2) to keep it close so the KMT could not focus on Taichung City(臺中市) (PVI Blue +0). DPP power-brokers rejected this forced Tsai to nominate a DPP candidate which increased the chances of a Ko run. At this stage the best game theory result for Tsai is for KMT to win in Taipei City (臺北市) (PVI Blue +6) and Ko to get a poor result while DPP holds Taichung City(臺中市) (PVI Blue +0) so she will avoid any "Primary" challenge. Not sure things will work out that way.

The good news for Tsai is while it is hard for her to achieve all 3 goals simultaneously it is unlikely she will fail on all 3. Meaning I cannot see a way for here to a) face a internal "primary" challenge and b) have Ko run in 2020 and c) KMT run someone other than Wu.

3) With the DPP fielding a candidate in Taipei City (臺北市) (PVI Blue +6) Ko is likely to run for Prez in 2020 if he gets above 40% of the vote regardless if he wins or not. Talk of a Ko run in 2020 actually helps him in the Taipei City (臺北市) (PVI Blue +6) election since it keeps the media attention on him and sucking the media air out of KMT Ding(丁守中) and DPP Yao(姚文智). The Taipei City (臺北市) (PVI Blue +6) result will most likely be either be

Ko 40%KMT 35%DPP 20%Others 5%

Where DPP revives and recaptures some of the DPP base but Ko then is able to attract Blue voters since Ko is THE GREEN candidate

OR

KMT 45%Ko 40%DPP 10%Others 5%

Where DPP falls apart which makes Ko THE GREEN candidate and the Blue vote consolidates around KMT's Ding as a result.

Either way Ko is likely to be above 40% and then likely to run in 2020. The way to stop Ko from running is a ultra-strong DPP comeback

KMT 40%DPP 30%Ko 25%Others 5%

Where DPP take back almost all of its core base leaving Ko with just the independent vote. Tsai/DPP was hoping for this when they nominated a candidate. This seems unlikely at this stage.

The CW seems to be that the weaker DPP is the better it is for Ko. Up to a point that is true as the way to kill off Ko is for DPP to do very well. But my take is that if DPP does poorly then Ko will be viewed as the de facto DPP candidate and the larger Pan-Blue vote in Taipei City (臺北市) (PVI Blue +6) will consolidate around KMT's Ding. I guess if DPP then falls to 5% or less that will help Ko in last minute tactical voting but even then a outright Green vs Blue showdown in Taipei City (臺北市) (PVI Blue +6) in a neutral or slightly pro-Blue should end with a KMT victory.

I don't really know much about Taiwanese politics so I probably shouldn' comment on this but I always have the impression Asian right-wing parties are much more 'pro-industrial strategy'/pro-dirigisme (don't know how to call it) than most of their Western counterparts. So they're pro-business but not really pro-market. I believe Ha-Joon Chang said he'd actually support the right in South Korea even though he wrote books very critical of neoliberalism. Is this also true for the KMT?

One salient fact: we had a full blown Maoist join Atlas once, and he agreed with jaichind (pretty much an outrageous stereotype of a rich capitalist) to the letter in regards to Taiwan.

I don't really know much about Taiwanese politics so I probably shouldn' comment on this but I always have the impression Asian right-wing parties are much more 'pro-industrial strategy'/pro-dirigisme (don't know how to call it) than most of their Western counterparts. So they're pro-business but not really pro-market. I believe Ha-Joon Chang said he'd actually support the right in South Korea even though he wrote books very critical of neoliberalism. Is this also true for the KMT?

One salient fact: we had a full blown Maoist join Atlas once, and he agreed with jaichind (pretty much an outrageous stereotype of a rich capitalist) to the letter in regards to Taiwan.

With both Hsu and Lin pulling in DPP votes. I think in the end DPP Cheng(鄭朝方) should get at least 20% of the vote and most likely end up third or even second place. MKT Hsu(徐欣瑩) seems in a good position to win.

This seems to indicate that while Lai is still easily the strongest of DPP candidates his star has waned while Ko's level of support has surged. Ma not polling so well and Chu is clearly KMT's best shot. It is unlikely that Lai would be the DPP candidate. For DPP to swap out Tsai and put in Lai is to admit that the DPP regime was a failure.

Where Tsai is strong among lower educated population which makes up the KMT base. Ma is stronger in higher educated population but ties Tsai with college educated voters. Tsai does have unique appeal to the progressive liberal urban college educated voters beyond the DPP based whom have voted mostly KMT since 2000.

The most recent Formosa (pro-DPP but somewhat negative on Tsai) poll has all sorts of interesting data.

It has Tsai approval/disapproval 26.1(+0.3)/61.7(-0.6) [change from June]

It also has "If Mainland China makes the condition that we accept One China Principle [There is One China and Taiwan is part of that One China even if both sides might disagree who represents that One China] should we do so" Yes/No 43.3/36.7. In 2017 it was Yes/No 36.2/47.2 so there has been a shift toward more compromise with PRC in order to start talks.()

It also asks "Who is more responsible for bad relationship between Mainland and Taiwan": Taiwan 35.0 Mainland China 29.3. In 2017 it was Taiwan 33.4 Mainland 31.3. So there has been a sift toward more negativity toward the Tsai regime for bad current Mainland-Taiwan conflict.()

It also asks about "Do you trust Prez Tsai" which has it at Yes/No 30.6/52.2()Tsai falling to 30s consistently by early 2018

The poll points out that the same poll (or its ancestor pollsters) for Prez Ma in the 2004 to 2018 period.()Around the time of Ma's reelection in early 2012 he was even on this question Ma only got to the 30s in terms of trust in his 5th year of his Presidency in late 2012. 2013-2016 period was a disaster for the Ma KMT administration and trust in Ma fell to 20s by 2013-2016 and only got to 30s as he left office. Now he is back to even.

DPP Prez Chen had the same pattern although the poll only started in 2004 which is the start of his second term()Around the time of Chen reelection in 2004 it was even on this question. Chen got to 30s (in fact 20s) in terms of trust only in 2005 which is 5th year of his term. It stayed in the 20s until he left office and fell to 5.9 in late 2008 right after he left office when he was indicted and then convicted for corruption. As time passed on even Chen is now back in the low 20s despite still being out on medical parole and in theory still serving his prison term of his conviction.

Tsai fell to 30s in terms of trust in her second year (early 2018) which is a record.

The poll asks for approval of KMT and DPP and then based on that it constructed a specturm of Blue abd Green voters. ()

G1 G2 G3 are pro-KMT voters with G1 being most pro-Blue. G7 G8 G9 are pro-DPP voters with G9 being the most pro-Green. It has the Blue/Green split being 31.5/24.7.G4 voters seem to approve of both Blue and Greens, G5 does not seem engaged and most likely are non voters with G6 being against both Blues and Greens.

A map of how each tranche of voters trust several key politicians has()

The map is not a surprise. Blue voters trust Chen and Ma and not Tsai Lai and Chen and vice versa with Green voters. The map clearly shows Chu is more popular than Ma while Lai is more popular than Tsai. Despite being a convicted criminal for corruption the Deep Green still back and trust Chen.

Ko seems to enjoy trust with Light Blue and Light Green as well independents that are hostile to both Blue and Green blocs. This is this the power of Ko that he can appeal to all 3 camps.

Main message is the same. KMT should nominate Chen in 2020 while DPP ideally should have Lai run but that might be hard given Tsai is the incumbent. For Ko 2020 is his chance and most likely he will take it.

I suspect 2020 will be similar to USA 1992 with Bush vs Clinton vs Perot with Ko playing the role of Perot without that episode of Perot dropping out and then coming back. If it was not for that Perot had a chance to go above 30% of the vote and made a real 3 way race.

Support for Ko to run for Prez in 2020 if he were to win re-election as mayor of Taipei Support/Do not Support 37.7/35.7

3 way race (Chinatimes is so negative on Wu they are not bothering polling him) Ind(Ko) 31.5KMT(Chu) 26.9DPP (Tsai) 12.1

Ind(Ko) 32.0KMT(Chu) 26.7DPP(Lai) 15.4

Where Lai does not do that much better than Tsai.

The Ko phenomenon is mostly a function of the fact that the Tsai DPP regime is imploding (to be fair only to be confirmed in the 2018 elections) 2 years into their administration. Chen DPP regime only started to implode in 2005 and Ma KMT regime only started to implode in 2013 both in the 5th year of their administration. Lee KMT regime started its meltdown in 1997 (although Lee and KMT made a short term comeback in the 1998 election cycle) which is its 7th since Lee was elected on his own in 1990. In all those other cases the mainstream opposition party (DPP or KMT) was in a position to pick up support lost by the discredited ruling regime. Problem for KMT is the DPP implosion came too quickly and the voter population's poor memories of 2013-2016 are still fresh. Also having a fairly unpopular leader such was Wu (who to be fair is a good backroom operator) means that support lost by DPP will not flow to the KMT. Instead it seems to have flowed to Ko.

The risk for Ko is that he gets labeled by the KMT as the "de facto" Green candidate to consolidate the Blue vote behind the KMT even as Ko needs to gobble up the Green vote to have a chance in 2018 Taipei mayor race as well as a hypothetical 2020 Prez race. So Ko's ground war is about getting pro-DPP grassroots organizations to come over to him and Ko's air war is mostly about attacking the DPP Tsai regime to present himself as NOT GREEN so he can scoop up some Light Blue vote. We will see later this year if this conflicting strategies causes problems for Ko.

KMT rating of Yunlin County(雲林縣) (PVI Green +8) of "Tossup" is interesting. In theory they are not realistic since the DPP clearly has the edge. On the other hand there are all sort of rumors large scale DPP infighting in Yunlin County(雲林縣) (PVI Green +8) which could make the race a lot closer.

DPP claim that Yilan County(宜蘭縣) (PVI Green +6) is a "Tossup" is not realistic but I agree part of the reason is because of DPP infighting which if they can settle could make the race a lot closer.

Taidong County(臺東縣) (PVI Blue +18) is very close this year with the DPP running a very strong candidate and even the KMT acknowledge the threat.

DPP rating Jiayi City(嘉義市) (PVI Green +3) as "Tossup" is not realistic but I guess they are gambling the KMT rebel taking more KMT votes than expected.

One 黃偉展 (Huang) who is a DPP candidate in a multi-member district for City council of Tainan City (臺南市) (PVI Green +11) had to drop out over a sex scandal with some very funny details.

黃偉展 (Huang) who is currently a Zone head and a member of the New Tide faction campaign ad with DPP ex-mayor of Kaoshiung City (高雄市) (PVI Green +7) New Tide leader Chen Ju.()

The sex scandal blew up when a women who is on 黃偉展 (Huang) 's campaign staff and claims to be 黃偉展 (Huang)'s "Mistress #5" came out to expose 黃偉展 (Huang) slimy campaign tactics after a falling out.()

"MIstriss #5" said that 黃偉展 (Huang) wanted her to 1) start an affair with another DPP rival candidate in the same district and then go public with the affiar2) get into a car accident with another women DPP rival candidate who is known drunk driver in order to force the police to charge the rival DPP candidate with drunk driving in the aftermath of the accident

"Mistress #5" also said that 黃偉展 (Huang) pressured "Mistress #4" to have an abortion in order to not hurt his political career.

"Mistress #5" also said that 黃偉展 (Huang) indicated that he is running for City Council only to further his business operations on Mainland China and he indicated that a lot of DPP City Council members have large and significant business operations on Mainland China based on the need of the local CCP to "buy influence" with the DPP at the local level for political mileage for the CCP in the future.

"Mistress #5" also came out with a public announcement that she has no intention of committing suicide and that if anything were to happen to her it is the result of foul play.

At first 黃偉展 (Huang) held a press conference with his wife where he did not deny the allegations of "Mistress #5" but said his statements to her were "taken out of context" but does admit to having several affairs. At the press conference his wife forgave him and backed him continuing him staying in the race.()

After this pressure from DPP high command finally forced 黃偉展 (Huang) to drop out of the race.

This sort of stuff is fairly standard in multi-member district races where both the KMT and DPP have several candidates and all of them have good reason to back-stab each other since their intra-party rival's votes are transferable to then. Candidates of both DPP and KMT have been known for all sorts of dirty tricks against their so called comrades in these sort of races, especially at the local level.

The deadline to register was a couple of days ago. The KMT managed to convince a bunch of rebels not to contest (Taipei City (臺北市) (PVI Blue +6), Tainan City (臺南市) (PVI Green +11), Hsinchu County (新竹縣) (PVI Blue +14)) but gained new rebels (Taidong County(臺東縣) (PVI Blue +18)). Both the KMT and DPP will have some time to convince some of their rebels to drop out. Based on the current list of candidates my most recent projections are:

The latest government Mainland Affairs Council poll has Unification-Independence split at 17.1%-17.7% which is the smallest pro-Independence lead over Unification since 2002. Once you allocate people that are open to unification (decided on unification-independence later) and would de facto support independence (status quo on a permanent basis) you get the most pro-unification result since 2007.

This is not that big of a surprise. During KMT rule pro-independence support usually surges and during DPP rule pro-unification support surges.

2 Months before the election TVBS (pro-Blue) came out with its latest polls in the 6 special municipalities. Most of the polls are converging toward results similar to what I am predicting and also toward fundamentals assuming that it is a slight anti-DPP wave.

Taipei City (臺北市) (PVI Blue +6) Ko's lead down to 5% as KMT's Ding gains ground as I expected. I expect this race to be neck-to-neck by election day with Ding with a slight edge.()

New Taipei City (新北市) (PVI Blue +2)DPP's Su gains a bit of ground and should gain more ground but not enough to stop a solid KMT victory()

Taoyuan City (桃園市) (PVI Blue +5)DPP's Cheng with a solid lead. The KMT rebel Yang at 6% and mostly at the expense of KMT's lackluster Chen. The pro-KMT fundamentals, although weakening, of this race should mean what Cheng polls at this stage is going to be his vote share, which is around 53%. Rest goes to the pan-Blue bloc. Still a solid victory in such a historically strong KMT area.()

Taichung City(臺中市) (PVI Blue +0)DPP's Lin gains a bit of ground. This election was always going to be neck-to-neck with KMT with a tiny edge only because of the anti-DPP tide()

kaoshiung City (高雄市) (PVI Green +7)KMT's Han is running a strong race in this open seat against DPP's Chen (who is also suppose to be a strong candidate). But the DPP lead is down to 4% and election night could deliver a shocking victory to KMT's Han or at least a very narrow defeat. ()

Tainan City (臺南市) (PVI Green +11)DPP's Huang is losing ground as are the two pan-Green rebels (Su and Shu which fell to 6% and 3% respectively). Pro-KMT independent Chen dropped out of the race and most of his support went to the other pro-KMT independent Lin who surged to 13% from 7% two months ago. KMT's Gao has a shot making this a close race if he could get Lin's vote to come over to him. I suspect that is most likely going to be the case but Gao is running out of time to make this happen in time to make him a viable candidate to make this a close race despite clear pan-Green and DPP weakness. ()

The cross-tabls in the TVBS poll in Taipei City (臺北市) (PVI Blue +6) highlights KMT Ding's strategic dilemma. If we look at the TVBS poll cross-tabs for May July and Sept by DPP supporters, KMT supporters, NPP supporters, Independents, Minor Parties (PFP, NP, NPB TSU, GP, plus refuse to answer) we have

Ko's main strength is that he pretty much captured half of DPP support plus almost all the pan-Green rebels. Ko is also able to get a slice of the KMT vote plus a solid chunk of the non-KMT pan-Blue vote. Of course Ko also have a good part of the non-aligned vote which we can see as his core. DPP's Yao is reduced to just half of the DPP base and almost non of the non-DPP pan-Green vote. KMT's Ding has most but not all of the KMT vote and a good chunk of the non-KMT Pan-Blue vote.

So Ding's dilemma is IF Ko is going to continue his strength in the Pan-Green vote which pretty much means Yao is consigned to single digit or low double digit overall support then Ding should go on the attack against Ko painting Ko AS THE PAN-GREEN CANDIDATE to consolidate the entire Pan-Blue vote. That tends to lead to something like Ding 45 Ko 40 Yao 15. The risk of this strategy is that the pro-Ko Pan-Blue vote might be committed and will not swing back to Ding and an attack on Ko as the Pan-Green candidate will prevent the migration of the Pan-Green vote from Ko to Yao then the result will be Ding 40 Ko 45 Yao 15. Of course Ding could gamble that Yao will recapture some of the DPP and other Pan-Green votes and as a result Ko takes a more neutral position on the Blue-Green axis. In which case Ding would mostly attack Yao as the pan-Green candidate but attack Ko mostly on policy execution issues than an ideological onslaught. If successful the result will be Ding 40 Ko 35 Yao 25. The main risk is that such an Ding attack pattern would be unsuccessful and a strong Yao campaign could draw non-KMT Pan-Blue or even KMT voters to back Ko in as Ko gains a non-Green image in which case it would be Ding 35 Ko 40 Yao 25.

The basic idea is Ding would have to guess how the Pan-Green vote will flow and what sort of Blue-Green position Ko will take in the last 2 months of the campaign. Ko's strength with non-DPP Green vote is very powerful has he could get a good part of the pan-Green vote without the baggage of being aligned with the DPP. Ko being a political Chameleon and opportunist makes Ding's guess difficult to get right and the wrong bet could throw the election to Ko when Ding has a solid shot of winning if he plays his cards right.

Both roughly matches TVBS results and if anything are closer to what the race will most likely converge to (KMT's Ding and DPP's Su most likely will gain ground in their respective races in ling with underlying fundamentals).

With the Unification-Independence gap the smallest in the 2000s. The absolute level of support for Unification is the highest since 1996. While support for Independence peaked at 51.6 in mid 2016 and have since collapsed to 36.2.

The Kaoshiung City (高雄市) (PVI Green +7) poll results are a shock and shows how KMT's Han(韓國瑜) non-orthodox style of campaign is breaking new ground for the KMT. I think KMT's projections are assuming a surge in DPP turnout and adjust for TVBS's house effects.

Given that we are seeing a small anti-Green wave I think TVBS's projections are mostly to generous to DPP. On these poll results I think KMT should win Jiayi City(嘉義市) (PVI Green +3) especially given tactical voting by KMT voters that support the KMT rebel.

If DPP loses Jiayi City(嘉義市) (PVI Green +3), Kaoshiung City (高雄市) (PVI Green +7) and Taichung City(臺中市) (PVI Blue +0) in addition to Yilan County(宜蘭縣) (PVI Green +6), Penghu County(澎湖縣) (PVI Blue +4), and Changhua County(彰化縣) (PVI Green +1) and compounded by being blown out in New Taipei City (新北市) (PVI Blue +2) and aipei City (臺北市) (PVI Blue +6) [ it would be a complete disaster. In such a case Tsai will most likely lose her 2020 re-election campaign.

It all comes down to Kaoshiung City (高雄市) (PVI Green +7) and Taichung City(臺中市) (PVI Blue +0) now. DPP has to pull out wins in at least one of these 2 cities.

How DPP high command plays this in the end will depend on their evaluation on the following set of questions:1) If Ko (柯文哲) were to run in the 2020 Prez race will it harm DPP or KMT more? Most likely the answer is it will hurt DPP more since Ko (柯文哲) will appeal to the youth which used to be the DPP core vote.2) If Ko (柯文哲) more likely to run in 2020 if he wins narrowly or lose narrowly? The general view is that Ko (柯文哲) is more likely to run in 2020 if he narrowly lose since he will blame DPP for his defeat and will be looking for revenge in 2020.3) If Ko (柯文哲) were to run in 2020 will he be stronger if he won the 2018 Taipei City (臺北市) (PVI Blue +6) mayoral race narrowly or loses the race narrowly? The general view is that Ko (柯文哲) will be stronger if he wins his race for re-election.4) If DPP Yao(姚文智) were to collapse to low double digits or even single digits and the DPP City Council assembly election candidates gets crushed how much will that hurt Tsai's reelection effort in 2020? The view is a lot.

So the DPP High command is stuck. Their goal is clearly to avoid a Ko run and if he runs then somehow make sure he is a weak candidate. Ideally for DPP, DPP Yao(姚文智) gets vote share in the high teens so the DPP Taipei City assembly election results avoid a collapse and Ko (柯文哲) narrowly wins which in turn decides not to run in 2020. Of course it is hard to micromanage DPP Yao(姚文智)'s vote share that precisely. So in the home stretch the DPP high command will have a lot of decisions to make on how much to invest in DPP Yao(姚文智) clearly failing campaign.

A bit about the Taidong County(臺東縣) (PVI Blue +18) County magistrate race. It will be KMT's Rao(饒慶鈴) ()

vs DPP's Liu (劉櫂豪)()

vs KMT rebel Kuang(鄺麗貞)()

The KMT rebel Kuang(鄺麗貞) is actually a former KMT County magistrate and the wife of a former KMT County magistrate Wu (吳俊立)

Taidong County(臺東縣) (PVI Blue +18) at the national level is very pro-Blue due to the high concentration of pro-KMT aborigines. But at the local level the county could be quite competitive. For legislative elections the Aborigines vote in a separate Aborigine slate which reduces the KMT lead over DPP. For county magistrate races the power of local clans and factions comes into play and gives DPP opportunities.

The Taidong County(臺東縣) (PVI Blue +18) KMT is dominated by 3 families. One of the 3 families is the Rao(饒) clan who is led by former KMT Vice Speaker of the Legislature Rao(饒穎奇) who is the father of the current KMT candidate and current speaker of the County legislature Rao(饒慶鈴). Rao the Elder(饒穎奇) was MP for a long time before retiring 1998 but still has great influence in county politics. The second of the 3 families is the Huang(黃) clan led by the sitting County magistrate Huang(黃健庭) whose father was a county magistrate back in the 1960s and was a MP from 2001-2009 before becoming county magistrate. The last of the 3 families is the Wu(吳) clan led by Wu(吳俊立) was elected County magistrate in 2005. Then due to corruption charges stemming when Wu(吳俊立) was speaker of the county assembly had to resign. His wife Kuang(鄺麗貞) was appointed by him to take over from his role in 2006.

On the DPP side Liu(劉櫂豪) and Lai(賴坤成) are their kingpins of county politics. Both came from second tier KMT political families and went over the the DPP due the the domination of the top 3 KMT families.

The recent history of Taidong County(臺東縣) (PVI Blue +18) elections leading up to 2018 is quite interesting.

We first had the 2001 County Magistrate election which ended up with KMT splinter PFP winningPFP Shu(徐慶元) 44.3%KMT Wu(吳俊立) 36.9%DPP Lai(賴坤成) 17.3%

Shu(徐慶元) was a rival of Wu(吳俊立) in the KMT and ran in the 1997 county magisrate election as a KMT rebel in a losing cause and went over to the PFP and took advantage of the PFP surge in 2000-2001 to win.

In the 2001 Legislative race it was KMT Huang(黃健庭) 42.5%DPP 30.7%PFP 23.4%TSU 2.7%

Shu(徐慶元) knew he was going to be in trouble for his 2005 re-election and took on as his vice-magistrate DPP's Liu(劉櫂豪) hoping to form a Shu(徐慶元)-DPP alliance for 2005 but then decided to back DPP's Liu(劉櫂豪) to run in 2005 against Wu(吳俊立), The result of the 2005 county magistrate election wasKMT Wu(吳俊立) 59.2%DPP Liu(劉櫂豪) 38.2%

But Wu(吳俊立) had to step down due to corruption charges so he divorced his wife Kuang(鄺麗貞) who he appointed to the role of county magistrate. She ran in a by-election against DPP's Liu(劉櫂豪) and won in 2006. The DPP side was contested with both Liu(劉櫂豪) and Lai(賴坤成) wanting to run but DPP went with Liu(劉櫂豪) and Lai(賴坤成) running as a rebel.KMT Kuang(鄺麗貞) 63.0%DPP's Liu(劉櫂豪) 24.5%DPP rebel Lai(賴坤成) 7.1%

In the 2009 county magistrate election due to the poor performance of Kuang(鄺麗貞) the KMT led by Rao the Elder(饒穎奇) pushed her off the ticket and nominated MP Huang(黃健庭) instead who won against DPP's Liu(劉櫂豪) who came much closer to winning due to anti-incumbency against the KMT at the center. The DPP had convinced Lai(賴坤成) that he will be nominated in the by-election for KMT Huang(黃健庭) seat if Huang(黃健庭) were to win which he didKMT Huang(黃健庭) 52.6%DPP's Liu(劉櫂豪) 47.4%

The 2010 legislative by-election saw the KMT lose for the first time. With Wu(吳俊立) angry that his wife was pushed off the ticket insisted that his wife Kuang(鄺麗貞) be nominated as the KMT candidate in the legislative by-election. Fearing that Wu(吳俊立) might split the KMT the KMT went along with this and due to lack of support from the Rao(饒) clan Kuang(鄺麗貞) lostKMT Kuang(鄺麗貞) 45.3%DPP Lai(賴坤成) 49.5%

In the 2012 legislative election Liu(劉櫂豪) insisted on running and the DPP convinced Lai(賴坤成) to switch over to run in Hualian County(花蓮縣) (PVI Blue +20) next door. On the KMT side they nominated Rao(饒慶鈴) but with Wu(吳俊立) angry on what happen to his wife in 2009-2010 ran as a KMT rebel and threw the race to Liu(劉櫂豪).KMT Rao(饒慶鈴) 29.6%DPP Liu(劉櫂豪) 45.6%KMT rebel Wu(吳俊立) 25.0%

In 2014 country magistrate election DPP MP Liu(劉櫂豪) challanged KMT Huang(黃健庭) one more time and lost despite the national anti-KMT wave.KMT Huang(黃健庭) 54.4%DPP's Liu(劉櫂豪) 45.6%

In the 2016 legislative election with the KMT still splintered and a clear anti-KMT wave nationally and Rao(饒慶鈴) refusing to run Liu(劉櫂豪) won re-election against a second tier KMT candidate.KMT 35.8%DPP's Liu(劉櫂豪) 64.2%

For the 2018 county magistrate election the KMT knew that the reason why they lost the 2012 and 2016 legislative races was due to infighting by the 3 main KMT clans. So the KMT worked with get all three clans united around Rao(饒慶鈴)'s candidacy. Wu(吳俊立) also made his peace with the KMT and agreed to be Rao(饒慶鈴)'s campaign manager. The KMT also agreed to support Wu(吳俊立)'s sister to become the new speaker of the county legislative after the elections. Then in early Sept a bombshell took place. Wu(吳俊立)'s wife and former county magistrate Kuang(鄺麗貞) registered as a candidate. The total shock displayed by her husband Wu(吳俊立) seems to indicate he had now knowledge of her actions. Multiple attempts by Wu(吳俊立) to try to get his wife to withdraw has failed.

So now we will have the spectacle of the husband of a candidate being the campaign manager of a rival candidate. There are conspiracy theories abound that this good cop - bad cop routine by Wu(吳俊立) who is still bend on getting revenge for 2009-2012.

DPP's Liu(劉櫂豪) is a strong candidate that runs well ahead of the DPP and the KMT split now gives him a chance. In the end most like he will come up short but will give the KMT quite a scare due to Kuang(鄺麗貞) running as a KMT rebel.

Cross-tabs are interesting For Men it is 40-37-8 for Ko (柯文哲) For Women it is 35-34-6 for Ko (柯文哲) (Gender gap on ROC is women are more center-Right)

The age differences are huge20-39 it is 62-19-5 for Ko (柯文哲) 60+ it is 44-15-8 for Ding (丁守中)

Pan Blue favor Ding (丁守中) 66-26-1Pan Greens favor Ko (柯文哲) 49-34-6

It seems given the age and partisan cross-tabs, the entire DPP youth vote has pretty much gone over to Ko (柯文哲). It is also interesting and sad that with the older DPP base left DPP Yao(姚文智) is down to 8%. I would agree with DPP analysts here and say "this cannot be" and assume that election day other older DPP supporters will come out and push DPP Yao(姚文智)'s vote share to 15% at least. If course sometimes if our only argument is "this cannot be" the result might end up being "it is."

The danger for Ko (柯文哲) is that he is very reliant on a large youth turnout which clearly came out in 2014 in an anti-KMT wave. This year it seems it will be a small to medium anti-DPP wave. I tend to think in such a scenario the DPP youth will most likely just not turn out. If they did they would vote Ko (柯文哲) but more likely than they will not.

Where the KMT approval surged. The main narrative for a minor anti-DPP wave is that KMT support is still tepid and the anti-DPP feelings are mostly pro-Ko and made up of partly the 2014-2016 DPP coalition that is going over to Ko but still anti-KMT. With KMT support going up this will become a lot bigger problem for DPP.

Shows that on the trust/distrust Tsai is already at around Ma May 2013 levels which is the 5th year of the Ma Presidency. Tsai got there in 2 years.

Pro-Blue UDN poll for New Taipei City (新北市) (PVI Blue +2)

Has it at KMT 54 DPP 26 with DPP getting destroyed in the youth vote as well. ()In many ways the DPP reaction to these polls are "this cannot be !!" DPP Su(蘇貞昌) being behind by 28 points would be like Jeb Bush going back to FL to run as governor again and behind behind the Dem candidate by 28 point. The fact that he can lose is obvious but he will at least keep it close. Part of the problem is that the Ko vote outside Taipei City (臺北市) (PVI Blue +6) seems to be drifting toward the KMT which is really bad news for DPP.

Pro-Blue China times poll Kaoshiung City (高雄市) (PVI Green +7) now has it at KMT 43.5 DPP 36.2. ()

And cleaning up on the youth vote which is a shock()

All these pollsters have house effects but are all golden standard pollsters in addition to TVBS. All of them had a good track record for filtering out their House effect

The most recent DPP collapse most likely has to do with KMT's Han(韓國瑜) in Kaoshiung City (高雄市) (PVI Green +7) where his surge has brought in the Youth vote and is bring in the pro-Ko vote along with him to back KMT.

The structure of the race seems similar to Taipei City (臺北市) (PVI Blue +6) where Ko is winning around 50% of the DPP vote and around 20% of the KMT vote. Here Ko's ally and KMT splinter MKT MKT Shu(徐欣瑩) has 50% of the Pan-Green vote while getting around 33% of the Pan-Blue vote. There will be a consolidation of the Pan-Blue vote around KMT Yang(楊文科) right before the election so this election will become neck-to-neck.

As mentioned before, as of 2012 all 3 candidates were members of the KMT. This is truly a KMT vs KMT vs KMT race.

New TVBS poll for Kaoshiung City (高雄市) (PVI Green +7) which is pretty much one of the last ones before the poll publishing dark period behinds. It has the KMT surge continuing and now projects a KMT win. poll projectionKMT 48 (+6) 52DPP 38 (+3) 47KMT rebel 1 1KMT rebel 0.3 (-0.7) 0.3

The party ID of this poll is even more favorable to the DPP than the one a month ago with DPP party ID going from 21 to 27 while KMT party ID goes from 17 to 18 and NPP Party ID goes from 6 to 7. But KMT's Han(韓國瑜) seems to just grow among independents to put him even further ahead.

As the poll embargo is approaching in a couple of days various media outfits are coming out with polls while they are still allowed to. Most of them seem to build the narrative that the anti-DPP wave is building.

A UDN (pro-Blue) poll swing county Changhua County(彰化縣) (PVI Green +1) has the KMT taking a strong lead

KMT 41(+7)DPP 24(--)()

UDN also has a poll in another battle ground Taichung City(臺中市) (PVI Blue +0) also showing the KMT taking a large lead

KMT 43 (+9)DPP 30 (-3)()

A Formosa Daily (pro-Green) poll for Taichung City(臺中市) (PVI Blue +0) also has a KMT lead but smallerKMT 35.7%DPP 28.7％

The KMT rebel seems to be hurting the KMT candidate ability to win Pan-Green voters while the Pan-Green rebels are eating into the once solid Pan-Green vote for DPP. Main danger for DPP is that in an anti-DPP wave election many of the undecided independents might break for KMT.

There are more signs that in Taipei City (臺北市) (PVI Blue +6), Ko is beginning to feel the heat of the KMT resurgence and is beginning to form de facto alliances with various local DPP machines to try to beat back the KMT. Ko reads KMT's Han(韓國瑜) surge in Kaoshiung City (高雄市) (PVI Green +7) as sucking up the internet oxygen and he has to beat back the KMT across the board to regain the initiative. This might have blowback for Ko as the anti-DPP vote might then consolidate around the KMT.

Given the pro-Blue nature of UDN polls I would say in theory the DPP incumbent should have the edge. But I do think the KMT candidate will win since as the election day approaches the KMT rebel will lose steam and last minute tactical voting will favor the KMT candidate.()()

Apple Daily (pro-Green) poll on Taipei City (臺北市) (PVI Blue +6) has it close to neck-to-neck

Ko 34.1 (-0.8 )KMT 31.4 (+0.6) DPP 7.1 (-3.3)KMT rebel 1.4 (-0.5)

In theory KMT-DPP polarization in the last couple weeks of the election should give KMT's Ding the edge. In practice the main danger this poll shows is that while Ding has a viable and perhaps solid chance of winning the DPP candidate collapse might signal DPP->Ko tactical voting to stop KMT. Of course that might trigger pro-KO pan-Blue voter to switch back to KMT.()

Ettoday (which is neutral but not that high quality pollster) came out with a poll for Taichung City(臺中市) (PVI Blue +0)

KMT 42.6 (+7.0)DPP 31.8 (+0.8 )

Not sure if I buy the gap being what it is given the lower quality reputation of Ettoday but the trneds are clear.()

Another round of polls in which will now come in fast since the poll blackout will begin in a day or two. These polls seems to indicate that the anti-DPP wave continues to build.

The shock of day was the pro-Blue UDN poll has the KMT's Han moving into a massive lead in Kaoshiung City (高雄市) (PVI Green +7)

KMT 49(+17)DPP 32(-2)PFP rebel 2(+1)ex-NP 1(-1)Most likely this poll exaggerates the KMT Han's surge but it seems that the DPP is clearly at risk of losing Kaoshiung City (高雄市) (PVI Green +7) by a significant margin which would be a shock.()()

KMT's Ding got a large swing from Ko in his Pan-blue vote base. What seems to have taken place was that the KMT Han's surge in Kaoshiung City (高雄市) (PVI Green +7) has also pushed up KMT support across the board, especially with the youth vote. That threatened Ko the most as that is his base so he started to strike at Han. But that merely polarized the Pan-Blue vote behind KMT's Ding in response. ()

Chinatimes also had a poll for Hsinchu County (新竹縣) (PVI Blue +14)KMT 28.7%MKT 26.3% (KMT splinter, pro-Ko)DPP 10.5%KMT now moves into the lead over MKT.()

TVBS also came out with a poll for Taichung City(臺中市) (PVI Blue +0)KMT 41(-3) DPP 39(+3) Taichung just had a fairly successful Expo which pushed up the DPP incumbents numbers. Still he is behind his KMT opponent if terms of personal approval and his overall job approval went slightly down from prev poll. TVBS, I guess, feels the race is to close to call to make a vote share projection.

Pro-Green Formosa Daily poll on Taipei City (臺北市) (PVI Blue +6) has Ko's led cut but still substantial

KO 38.6 (-4.5)KMT 27.1 (+2.3)DPP 8.3 (-3.1)

This poll also picked up on the Pan-Blue consolidation behind KMT's Ding but also saw a counter-consolidation of independents behind Ko which limited the closing of the gap. ()

Ettoday which is mostly neutral and more of a second tier pollster came out with poll results of the 6 special municipalities

New Taipei City (新北市) (PVI Blue +2)KMT 39.9 DPP 34.0Seems to have it much closer than most pro-Blue pollsters and line up more with various third tier pro-Green pollsters (most of whom I view as more as DPP operatives than real pollsters)

Taoyuan City (桃園市) (PVI Blue +5)DPP 45.9KMT 27.6DPP is for sure ahead. This type of lead seems beyond what the fundamentals justify

Taichung City(臺中市) (PVI Blue +0)KMT 45.4DPP 31.7KMT most likely is ahead. Again, this type of lead seems beyond what the fundamentals justify

Tainan City (臺南市) (PVI Green +11)DPP 36.6KMT 19.7pro-KMT indy 17.6Pro-KMT independent seems much too strong as other polls seems to show his support falling and shifting toward the KMT candidate.

kaoshiung City (高雄市) (PVI Green +7)KMT 42.6DPP 36.6Seems to confirm most other pro-Blue polls with KMT taking a lead, and perhaps strong one.()

which seems to fancy itself as a ROC 538 has a running prediction model based on poll aggregation, fundamental information, prediction markets, and google search. There model seems to focus less on fundamental data than I would. Also they often leave out key third party candidate in their vote share projections. One thing I live about 538 is that they really try to take into account of minor candidates. Anyway what they have is:

Taipei City (臺北市) (PVI Blue +6) Ko 48% (In theory pro-Green)KMT 39%DPP 14%This projection seems to overweight non-Blue polls that has Ko 10% ahead and does not take into account of a minor KMT rebel which I have to assume takes votes away from the KMT candidate. My projection which is more KMT friendly focuses more on fundamentals.

Tainan City (臺南市) (PVI Green +11)DPP 49%KMT 34%pro-KMT ind. 13%I guess the remaining 4% goes to remaining DPP and TSU rebels. This projection seems to high for the pro-KMT ind. and too low for the various DPP and TSU rebels. But we will see.

Kaoshiung City (高雄市) (PVI Green +7)KMT 52%DPP 48%This projection leaves out the PFP rebel and ex-NP candidate which most likely will pull in support from the KMT vote. But overall matches my projection.

Keelong City (基隆市) (PVI Blue +8)DPP 54%KMT 46%Matches my projection exactly which is a more fundamental based projection.

Hsinchu County (新竹縣) (PVI Blue +14)MKT 44%KMT 40%DPP 16%This projection double downs the DPP collapse while my projection has DPP base still voting for DPP in large numbers. In the DPP collapse scenario MKT will benefit more and then win.

Hsinchu City(新竹市) (PVI Blue +5)DPP 51%KMT 38%I guess the other 11% will go to pro-Ko Pro-Green independent. Overall this is more negative for the KMT than fundamentals would suggest but this projection is more poll focused on this one.

Maioli County (苗栗縣) (PVI Blue +11)KMT 65% pro-DPP Ind 35%This projection is leaving out KMT and DPP rebels which I guess will take some support from KMT and DPP separately.

Changhua County(彰化縣) (PVI Green +1)KMT 52%DPP 48%This projection missed the TSU rebel pro-Ko candidate which I suspect will win as much as 4%. I guess that will come out of the DPP vote share which would make this race a bigger KMT win that most, including me, would expect given fundamentals.

Nanto County(南投縣) (PVI Blue +3)KMT 58%DPP 42%Sounds about right and matches CW although more pro-KMT than my projection.

Yunlin County(雲林縣) (PVI Green +8)DPP 54%KMT 46%This projection is missing a DPP rebel which will come out of the DPP vote share. Sort of matches my projection that this race will be a lot closer than CW projections of a easy DPP win.

Jaiyi County(嘉義縣) (PVI Green +10)DPP 58%KMT 42%This projection leaves out a very significant DPP rebel (he is the current DPP vice magistrate and has de facto support of the DPP incumbent.) If this DPP rebel vote share of comes out of the DPP vote share then this projection would match my projection.

Taidong County(臺東縣) (PVI Blue +18)KMT 56%DPP 44%This projection leaves out a key KMT rebel (who is the wife of an previous KMT county magistrate and was a county magistrate herself.) If you take her vote share out of the KMT projection then this would match my projection pretty well.

Penghu County(澎湖縣) (PVI Blue +4)KMT 54%DPP 46%Does not take into account a couple KMT rebels. If we take those vote share for KMT rebels from the KMT candidate then this will match my projection.

So overall this blog projection mostly matches my. Only real difference is Taipei City (臺北市) (PVI Blue +6) where I focus on fundamentals with the large KMT base and this blog double downs on non-Blue polls showing Ko with a 10% vote share lead.

On election day 11/24 there will also be a bunch of referendums some of which now has a realistic chance of passing. The old standard was that over 50% of registered voters have to vote for a proposal. Now a simple majority plus total vote greater than 25% of registered voters is necessary. There high profile ones are

1) Pan-Green/DPP proposal: <The ROC team which participates in the Olympics be renamed from "Chinese Taipei" to "Taiwan."> Polls indicate Yes 67% No 24%. Main problem here is if it passes this sets up the ROC government on a collision course with IOC which stipulated that ROC can only participate under "Chinese Taipei" and not "Taiwan" The Pan-Green forces want to use this referendum as a way to sooth its pro-independence base with some red meat showing that there is "progress" on independence. This will clearly pass but IOC saying that ROC cannot participate in Olympics will force the DPP regime and its supporters face the basic international reality of PRC power.

2) Pan-Blue/KMT proposal: <All products from Japan from prefectures affected by the 2011 nuclear accident (which is mostly Fukushima prefecture> are banned from being imported to ROC> Polls indicate Yes 61 No 28. This is a KMT scheme to undermine DPP regime's attempt us ally with Japan to counter PRC's power. The DPP wants Japan's help to deal with PRC and one of Japan's conditions is that the ROC lift its ban on Japanese food products from Fukushima and other ares affected by the 2011 nuclear crisis. The KMT knows this is not popular and want to hammer corner DPP on this issue. This one will most likely pass as well.

3) Religious conservative/traditionalist proposal: <ROC marriages law should explicitly state that marriage is between a man and a women>. Polls indicate Yes 67 No 17. A grand alliance of various religious organizations which includes the usually deep Green Presbyterian Church and various pro-KMT Buddhist/Taoist organizations seems on track to pass this anti-Gay marriage measure by a wide margin. KMT tactically support this as a way to splinter the DPP alliance of Southern Taiwan conservatives and Northern Taiwan liberal progressive youth activists.

4) Possessive activist pro-LBGT proposal: <ROC marriage laws to allow for Gay marriage>. Polls indicate Yes 26 No 65. This has the youth activist faction DPP as well as NPP support. Will go down in defeat it seems.

A NPP poll asked which proposal people most support. The Gay marriage issue clearly is the most polarizing. 26.7% most want to vote for the Anti-Gay marriage measure and 13.1% most want to vote for the Gay marriage measure.()

Same NPP has1) <The ROC team which participates in the Olympics be renamed from "Chinese Taipei" to "Taiwan."> Yes 66.7 No 23.92) <All products from Japan from prefectures affected by the 2011 nuclear accident (which is mostly Fukushima prefecture> are banned from being imported to ROC> Yes 60.7 No 23.93) <ROC marriages law should explicitly state that marriage is between a man and a women>. Yes 71 No 174) <ROC marriage laws to allow for Gay marriage> Yes 25.6 No 65.0()

With polls showing a medium size anti-DPP wave, the DPP response has been to say they are behind because of a) Fake News/Fake pollsb) PRC interventionism in favor of KMT

Sounds like a exact mapping of Dem claims of Russia collusion after 2016. Maybe DPP can borrow Robert Mueller after the elections to investigate PRC intervention and collusion with the KMT in this election. OF course what is wrong with this logic is the PRC was for the KMT in 2014 and 2016 as well and failed to stop a landslide defeat of the KMT in both elections. I think the power of the PRC to affect ROC election is clearly overstated.

Pro-Green Taiwan Public Opinion Fund poll on party affiliation has KMT making a huge surge since Aug to 36.0 vs DPP at 23.5. Back in May 2016 when Tsai took office it was DPP 49.3 KMT 16.6. The Tsai regime has been an utter disaster for DPP party support.()

Same poll also has a generic vote for Mayor/County magistrateKMT 33.9DPP 24.2Ind. 14.9 (Ko and various rebels, could also include MKT)()

The generic vote for City/County council KMT 29.2DPP 18.5Minors 2.8Ind. 19.5 (most of them will be various Pan-Blue candidates running as Ind.)()

The DPP rally cry is pretty much "Stop the PRC takeover via its KMT proxies"

The KMT rally cry is "1124 Destroy Eastern Depot". Some context in Chinese history is needed to understand this rallying cry. What took place in 2016 when DPP won power in all branches is they really sent after the KMT by creating a series of institutions to freeze KMT assets and also a "Truth and Reconciliation Commission" like South Africa to look into KMT excesses during the KMT authoritarian era of 1950-1987. The KMT views these moves as just political vendetta. Freezing KMT assets means that in 2018 is the first election ever that the DPP has a clear money advantage over KMT. Then recently a leaked tape was released where members of "Truth and Reconciliation Commission" said in a private meeting that they are just like the 東廠(Eastern Depot). The Eastern Depot was the feared secret police of the Late Ming dynasty that was absolutely loyal to the Imperial interests and ruthless in its tactics to suppress dissent (think KBG under Stalin.) When this tape came out a couple of months ago it set of a firestorm as it seems to support the KMT narrative of the "Truth and Reconciliation Commission" as just another arm of the DPP.

So the KMT then came out with the rallying cry 1124滅東廠(1124 Destroy Eastern Depot) on a play on the Mid-Autumn Festival traditions in September. The Mid-Autumn Festival is often call the Moon cake Festival because back in the late Mongol based Yuan dynasty the an uprising was planned to be right after the Mid-Autumn Festival and rebels gave out moon cakes to everyone as gifts and embedded in the cake is a note "August 15th we will kill the Mongols" as a signal of when the date of the uprising will be.()()

The KMT ad and cry then took both the Moon Cake Festival tradition and the common animus toward Eastern Depot into "1124 Destroy Eastern Depot" meaning on election day this DPP tyranny will be destroyed.()

In Kaoshiung City (高雄市) (PVI Green +7) it seems that even the DPP camp is admitting that DPP's Chen(陳其邁) is trouble. First DPP City council candidates are replacing their posters which had their picture with Chen taken down and replaced with just their own picture.

()()()()

Also the Chen campaign, seeing that DPP Prez Tsai is not popular even in DPP territory Kaoshiung City (高雄市) (PVI Green +7) has pretty much cut Tsai out of all campaign rallies and events in the week before the election.

This race is reaching a crisis point of DPP. For DPP to lose the combined city of Kaoshiung City (高雄市) (PVI Green +7) would be like GOP losing TX or Dems losing NY or CA.

The Taipei City (臺北市) (PVI Blue +6) continues to be unclear heading into the final week of the election. The dynamics of a 3 way makes it extra uncertain and fun.DPP's Yao realistically is now realistically looking for an honorable but third place finish. His main theme is that both Ko and KNT's Ding are puppets of Beijing and to beat back a PRC takeover. In other words Yao is looking to consolidate the core Deep Green vote.Ko seems to be flipping back and forth between Blue and Green but recently having identified the KMT's Han for the Kaoshiung City (高雄市) (PVI Green +7) seat as the the person that is helping the KMT win the social media war have mostly turned against the KMT since the KMT base seems to be consolidating around KMT's Ding and Ko's path to victory is DPP tactical voting for Ko.Ding has been running on "A vote for Ko is a vote to reelection DPP Prez Tsai" claiming that Ko Yao, and Tsai are all in the same league trying so scam their way to victory despite the fact that DPP is deeply unpopular in Taipei City (臺北市) (PVI Blue +6). Ding's slogan is trying to kill 3 birds with one stone. It will provoke Light Blue voters to come home to Ding to vote against Tsai. By attacking Tsai Ding hopes to provoke a Deep Green reaction to actually vote Yao. By linking Ko to Tsai, Ding is hoping that anti-Tsai pro-Ko Pan-green youth voters which would not vote Ding anyway would be confused enough to then just not turnout.

The election result will most likely a Pan-Blue consolidation with Pan-Green partly holding up for Yao which would make it KMT Ding 43Ko 41DPP Yao 15

to a complete collapse of Yao outside the most anti-Ko part of the DPP followed by a Pan-Blue counter-consolidation which would fall just shortKo 46KMT Ding 45DPP Yao 8

Ding's job is to pain Ko as the Pan-Green candidate but make sure that the core Deep Green vote stay with Yao while Ko want to prevent this Pan-Blue consolidation but if he sees it taking place would then go all out to trigger anti-Ding tactical voting by the entire DPP bloc.

I can even see Tsai 2 days before the election coming out to call on all DPP voters to vote Ko once it is clear that Yao would be crushed and Tsai would be then blamed. If she asked for DPP supporters to vote Ko she can at least then try to claim credit for a Ko victory over KMT's Ding.

The election season I think the most creative (although it ended up backfiring) ad was DPP's

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bE7yp30TTBw

()

Where it took a play on the word 黨(party) of 國民黨(KMT) to make it its homonym 擋(block) and accuse the KMT of blocking needed DPP reforms. The song is quite catchy and I stiil sing it to myself from time to time. Of course politically it was not effective as the KMT was not able to block any of the measure the ad talked about about and almost all of those measures are unpopular and part of the reason why the DPP is in trouble. I guess this ad can rally Deep Green voters behind the DPP but actually drives away light green (including pro-Ko), independent and light blue voters. So despite its creatively should be seen as a failure. DPP mostly accepted it as much as they took down the ad after a few days of being mocked on the internet on for the ad.

25% of the voting population would have to vote for an initiate to pass. Turnout will most likely be 60%-65%. Of course you have to vote for the referendum initiates separately

Step 2 and 3 are for the vote for public office and Step 4 to 6 are the vote for the referendum()

Pro-Green groups are really pushing the "ROC attend Tokyo Olympics as Taiwan and not Chinese Tapei" while the KMT are really pushing for the pro-nuclear (anti-coal) energy as well as the anti-Japan food product from 2011 nuclear disaster areas initiatives. None of them seems to have really caught fire. I say that out of all of them the "ROC attend Tokyo Olympics as Taiwan and not Chinese Tapei" will barely pass but it will be a Pyrrhic victory as the IOC already stated that ROC will be banned from IOC if it tries to attend any Olympic event under "Taiwan." I would say the DPP lost as much votes as it gained for its candidates as a result of this.

The ones that is most likely to pass are the anti-gay marriage initiatives backed by religious conservatives with tacit support from KMT. DPP knows this is a wedge issue are trying to run away from this topic as much as possible. The ROC supreme court already ruled that Gay marriage must be legalized. But how that takes place can greatly influenced by this referendum. What the anti-gay marriage initiative is really pushing for is a "Separate and unequal" law that legalizes Gay marriage but makes it clear that Gay marriage is not the same as traditional marriage even as it is legal. This position is backed by most KMT and frankly DPP voters outside urban areas and liberal progress youth who are clearly in the minority here. The supreme court ruling, if anything, by taking no law that legalizing Gay marriage off the table, actually help consolidate the anti-Gay marriage and the "Legal but Separate and unequal" center ground into one massive bloc and will crush the pro-Gay marriage vote election day.

I am personally for, for civic purposes, putting Gay marriage on truly equal ground as traditional marriage. So if I could vote I will mostly back the pro-Gary marriage initiatives which will get crushed. But I back the anti-Gay marriage campaign as a way to break the DPP coalition. Whatever it takes to take down DPP and Tsai I guess.

The trends the last few days after the poll blackout shows a clear sign of Blue-Green polarization which I think mostly works to the benefit of DPP and hurts Ko. The KMT Han surge in Kaoshiung City (高雄市) (PVI Green +7) pretty much freaked out the DPP high command into throwing everything they have into the campaign. An ill advised attack by KMT chairman Wu against Prez Tsai COS and former Kaoshiung City (高雄市) (PVI Green +7) Mayor Chen by calling her a "pig" and then later apologized for clearly mobilized the DPP base. Many pro-DPP cities and counties which were beginning to lean KMT are now back at tossup. Of course this Green mobilization provoked a Blue consolidation as well.

Ko is the main loser out of this as his Green base could shift back to DPP's Yao in Taipei City (臺北市) (PVI Blue +6) and let in KMT's Ding. DPP's main issue here is to how to deal with Ko and its candidate Yao. Yao is going all out to attack Ko and DPP high command fear that this would drive pro-DPP pro-Ko vote outside of Taipei City (臺北市) (PVI Blue +6) away from the DPP candidate. But failure to back Yao would demoralize the Deep Green anti-Ko vote who might not turn out.

On the pro-Green but also pro-Ko PTT discussion board they had a prediction contest similar to the Atlas. Out of over 600 predictions for mayor/county magistrate races the Medium guess was DPP 8 Seats KMT 12 seats Others 2 seats even though the Mode is DPP 7 seats KMT 13 Seats and Others 2.

Looking at the Others at 2 and assuming that Kinmen County(金門縣) (PVI Blue +41) race will go to the KMT rebel over the official KMT candidate, that means the medium guess is that both Taipei City (臺北市) (PVI Blue +6) (Ko vs KMT) and Hsinchu County (新竹縣) (PVI Blue +14) (Pro-KO MKT vs KMT) are both 50/50 with the KMT winning one of them but losing the other. KMT clearly perfers to win Taipei City (臺北市) (PVI Blue +6) but KMT chairman Wu would insisted on handpicking the KMT candidate might privately prefer that KMT wins Hsinchu County (新竹縣) (PVI Blue +14) instead.

Looking at DPP at 8 for the medium guess. 7 seats are lean or solid DPP so let give that to them. Out of the 3 tossups Taichung City(臺中市) (PVI Blue +0), Kaoshiung City (高雄市) (PVI Green +7), Jiayi City(嘉義市) (PVI Green +3) the medium guess seems to have the DPP at a slight disadvantage in all of them with DPP emerging with one of them. DPP high command will surely prefer that the one they win is Kaoshiung City (高雄市) (PVI Green +7) since losing there would be a major blow. Of course the Mode guess is for the DPP to win 7 which means all three tossup goes KMT.

My current guess is still DPP 7 KMT 14 Other 1. I think in a anti-DPP year all the tossups will go KMT.

It seems for Taipei City (臺北市) (PVI Blue +6) DPP high command has decided to go all out to destroy Ko to stop him from being a force in 2020. What to do about Ko has been a strategic dilemma for DPP high command since early this year. One approach is to help him win re-election and then he will be a de facto ally for DPP in 2020. Another approach is to have him beaten so badly in his campaign for re-election that he will know he will have no chance in 2020 and instead submit to backing DPP. It seems DPP high command/Prez Tsai has decided on the first approach. It seems that Prez Tsai has concluded a) Ko cannot be trusted so it is better to take him out nowb) With Blue-Green polarization in the final weeks of the campaign, an all out attack on Ko means that Ko's supporters outside of Taipei City (臺北市) (PVI Blue +6) are less likely to vote KMT or abstainc) An approach of abandoning DPP's Yao would crushed DPP already poor chances in the Taipei City (臺北市) (PVI Blue +6) city council election and a crushing defeat there along with a poor Yao finish could lead to a domino effect in 2020 where either Ko or KMT will take out DPP

DPP Prez Tsai/PM Lai has campaigned hard for DPP's Yao and doubled down on pushing up Yao's vote. What the DPP high command at this stage is hoping for is something like

KMT's Ding 40Ko 34DPP's Yao 25

where the KMT base is pushed down to its core 40% and Ko beaten by more than 5% and a clear signal to him that he has no chance in 2020 if he were to run for Prez.

You do have to give credit to DPP Prez Tsai for finally making a choice. Dithering on exactly what her endgame is in Taipei City (臺北市) (PVI Blue +6) I think threw away a good hand in early 2018 and by both wanting an alliance with Ko but not wanting to offend that anti-KO Deep Green faction in the DPP.

The main risk to this approach is that if Ko's youth supporters outside of Taipei City (臺北市) (PVI Blue +6) see the main reason why Ko was defeated was because of a last minute DPP stab then in 2020 the pro-Ko vote might sit it out in revenge and give the edge to the KMT.

Campaigning over. Voting is tomorrow. The biggest focus of both KMT and DPP seems to be still Kaoshiung City (高雄市) (PVI Green +7). Both KMT's Han and DPP's Chen held massive rallies of size above 100K people each.

Likely impact on key leadership in the DPP, KMT and Ko blocs from different results:

DPP camp: a) If DPP holds both Kaoshiung City (高雄市) (PVI Green +7) and Taichung City(臺中市) (PVI Blue +0) then Tsai will keep her role as DPP leader and will not face an internal challenge ahead of 2020 and should have a better than 50/50 shot at reelection.b) If DPP loses one of Kaoshiung City (高雄市) (PVI Green +7) and Taichung City(臺中市) (PVI Blue +0) then there will be pressure for Tsai to step down as DPP leader as well as a possible challenge to Tsai for 2020. She will be wounded but should be the DPP candidate and her chances at re-election would depend on if Ko runs and who the KMT candidate it.c) If DPP loses both Kaoshiung City (高雄市) (PVI Green +7) and Taichung City(臺中市) (PVI Blue +0) then Tsai has to give up DPP leadership for sure and she will face strong DPP pressure to step down for 2020. I think DPP either way faces a difficult race in 2020 regardless if it is Tsai or Lai unless KMT nominates Wu.

KMT camp:a) If the results are a major KMT victory sweeping all tossups with KMT doing well in Hsinchu County (新竹縣) (PVI Blue +14) and Jiayi City(嘉義市) (PVI Green +3) where Wu is micromanaging the race. Wu gets to stay on as KMT chairman and has a shot at being nominated as the KMT candidate for 2020 even tough Chu and Han are in the race as well.b) If the results are a minor victory or even setback for for the KMT then Wu is out for sure and he can kiss any chance at being nominated for 2020 good buy. As to who will succeed him it would depend on 1) If KMT does well in New Taipei City (新北市) (PVI Blue +2) then Chu will most likely become KMT leader and become the KMT candidate in 2020 leading to a Tsai vs Chu rematch. 2) If KMT loses Kaoshiung City (高雄市) (PVI Green +7) narrowly but does better than exepcted in Southern Taiwan counties, especially Yunlin County(雲林縣) (PVI Green +8), then Han could become KMT leader since he would have been proven to be able to challenge DPP's hold on the South.

Ko Camp:a) If Ko wins or loses narrowly and with DPP vote share being low then most likely he will not run in 2020 since Ko will have shown not to be able to attract KMT votes. b) If Ko loses narrowly but with a high DPP vote share then Ko will run in 2020 since he has shown that he can win KMT votes and will be out for revenge for DPP taking him downc) If Ko loses by a large margin then he is out of 2020 for sure.

So a game theory view of these calculations, what result does Tsai want? Well, she wants to avoid an internal DPP challenge AND make sure that Wu has as high of a chance being the KMT candidate AND wants Ko out of the picture. If so then she would want to make surea) Ko loses badly so he is out of 2020b) She actually would not mind if Han wins in Kaoshiung City (高雄市) (PVI Green +7) since Han will not run as the KMT candidate in 2020 and Wu's chances of running as the KMT candidate has gone up.c) DPP does will in New Taipei City (新北市) (PVI Blue +2) and keeps it close so Chu would not be a strong contender in the KMT leadership battle.

So where does Tsai campaign last two days of the campaign season? Why Taipei City (臺北市) (PVI Blue +6) [to take out Ko] and New Taipei City (新北市) (PVI Blue +2) [to do damage to Chu] of course. So a game theory view of Tsai's balance of risks and rewards seems to correct in practice.

The poll blackout does not hold true for referendum items. There was a last minute poll for the KMT backed pro-nuclear power proposal of increasing the use nuclear as a stepping stone toward more clean power. The poll had 81.9% of voters willing to vote in the referendum and 51.7% of voters would vote for it. So if turnout is 65% then a pessimistic calculation would be (0.65)*(0.819)*(.517) = 27.5% which would put it above the 25% threshold to pass.

Frankly this KMT victory is undeserved. They pretty much did nothing these last 2 years with no resources and tons of infighting. It was DPP's self-destruction plus Han coming out of nowhere to lead the KMT campaign that led to this. Assuming Han wins how he does as mayor of Kaoshiung City (高雄市) (PVI Green +7) will determine if this KMT revival is real or a dead cat bounce.

This election seems to be the return of the KMT local factions. The places where KMT over-performed: Taichung City(臺中市) (PVI Blue +0), Yilan County(宜蘭縣) (PVI Green +6), Changhua County(彰化縣) (PVI Green +1), Yunlin County(雲林縣) (PVI Green +8), Kaoshiung City (高雄市) (PVI Green +7) etc etc all have historically strong KMT local factions. They drifted away from the KMT for elections outside of local government after Ma tried to cut them off. Now they see the peril of the DPP onslaught and swung back beyond the KMT candidates.

Jaiyi County(嘉義縣) (PVI Green +10) it is DPP 51.6 KMT 29.6 DPP rebel 16.1. It was said that the local KMT Yellow factions was going to back the DPP rebel as the KMT candidate was an outsider. It seems that played out. DPP did a good job of keeping its base together.

In Hsinchu County (新竹縣) (PVI Blue +14) it is KMT 38.5 MKT 31.7 DPP 27.9. Reading the various political analysts I was one of the few people that go the dynamics of this race correctly. I projected that the Han surge and DPP counterattack would polarize the Blue-Green cleavage which would shift votes from Light Green votes from MKT to DPP giving the KMT a victory even though most polls had it neck-to-neck.

Taipei City (臺北市) (PVI Blue +6) KMT takes the lead KMT 41.2 Ko 41.1 DPP 16.9. If KMT wins then this is the worst outcome for DPP Prez Tsai. She launch a strike to take out Ko with the hope he loses by a large margin and be out of politics. If he loses narrowly then Ko and all his mostly pro-Green supporters will be out for revenge. Even if Ko does not run in 2020 Ko's supporters might not turn out in 2020 or even vote KMT.

If KMT ends up winning Taipei City (臺北市) (PVI Blue +6) then I would have called every raae correctly except for Yunlin County(雲林縣) (PVI Green +8) correctly. Even there I correctly felt that it would be close. In the end KMT won Yunlin County(雲林縣) (PVI Green +8) in a landslide KMT 54.0 DPP 41.6 DPP rebel 2.8.

Jiayi City(嘉義市) (PVI Green +3) call for KMT. KMT 41.1 DPP 39.6 KMT rebel 18.0. Fits my narrative that in ROC elections rebels tends not to hurt the challenging party to lose a seat they should have won but will hurt the ruling party to lose a seat they should have won without the rebel.

KMT's Ding will most likely sue to claim a flawed election. Because of the unrepresented nature of an election with 10 referendum items the voting time was much longer and there were massive lives across the board including Taipei City (臺北市) (PVI Blue +6). The law is that as long as the voter was in line to vote by the 4PM deadline he or she could vote. In Taipei City (臺北市) (PVI Blue +6) the lines were so long that some voters did not vote until 7pm or even 8pm. But the rules also said counting could begin at 4pm. So we had the situation in Taipei City (臺北市) (PVI Blue +6) where a large amount of voters were voting AFTER a good chunk of the results were being declared. In a 3 way race this is very problematic and the basis of KMT Ding's likely lawsuit to rule the election null and void It is clear if Ko lost or lost the recount he would do the same. This is a complete mess there are already conspiracy theories in both Ko and Deep Blue camps about this was the doing of the DPP. .

Referendum result (For Yes to pass it has to win AND cross 25% of voting population)

1) Reduce coal power (really a KMT push toward nuclear power): Yes won 79.0% and since Yes was 40.3% of the voting population this passes.

2) Block construction of new coal plants (really a KMT push for nuclear power): Yes won 76.4% and since Yes was 38.5% of the voting population this passes

3) Ban food products from areas of Japan affected by the 2011 nuclear disaster (really a KMT push to wreck DPP relationship with Japan): Yes won 77.7% since Yes was 39.4% of the voting population this passes

4) Marriage law should state that marriage is between a Man and a Women (coalition of religious conservatives with tacit support of KMT): Yes won 72.5% and since Yes was 38.8% of voting population this passes

5) LGBT topics should not appear in sex education classes (coalition of religious conservatives with tactic support of KMT): Yes won 67.4% and since Yes was 35.9% of voting population it passes

6) If gay partnerships has to be protected by law then let there be a separate law outside the Marriage Law to allowed for this (coalition of religious conservatives wanting to create a "Separate and Unequal" law for gay marriage): Yes won 61.1% and since Yes was 32.4% of voting population this passes

7) Let toe ROC Olympic team be named "Taiwan" vs "Chinese Taeipei" (pushed by Pan-Green activists as a proxy vote for Taiwan Independence): Yes won 45.2% and is defeated.

8) Let the marriage law be changed to allow for Gay marriage (pushed by LGBT activists): Yes won 32.7% and is defeated.

9) Let LGBT lifestyles be part of school sex ed classes (pushed by LGBT activists): Yes won 34.0% and is defeated.

10) Allow for greater growth of nuclear power as a part of a transition to green energy (pushed by nuclear power camp with tacit support by KMT): Yes won 59.5% and since Yes was 29.4% of the voting population this passes.

Main takeaways:1) Everything the KMT is for explicitly or tacitly passed and everything the KMT is opposed explicitly or tactility was defeated.2) We had the first every de facto proxy vote for Taiwan Independence and it went down to defeat even though it was worded and structured in the most "safe" way. Long Live ROC !! Long Live Chinese Reunification !! 3) The anti-gay marriage grand coalition was awesome to behold. It included various Buddhist, Taoist, Chinese traditionalist, Catholic, Presbyterian and Islamic and cross both Blue and Green political coalitions. It was a massive gang up of everyone vs urban middle class progressives and the progressives got smashed. A great example of how to form a grand coalition.

3) The anti-gay marriage grand coalition was awesome to behold. It included various Buddhist, Taoist, Chinese traditionalist, Catholic, Presbyterian and Islamic and cross both Blue and Green political coalitions. It was a massive gang up of everyone vs urban middle class progressives and the progressives got smashed. A great example of how to form a grand coalition.

Not surprising, theres a let and let live attitude ONLY because parents know they cant do anything about their LGBT kids that move out. But society was always not as accepting as it seems especially since its in Asia where old people still have this "natalist" belief about their kids giving them grandkids. Also globally people tend to underestimate how much of the working class is homophobic considering from the results, higher income places still voted No but not as large of a margin in rural and working class districts in Taiwan.

Looking down ballot at the city and county assembly elections it seems that the DPP did not do that badly in urban areas. It was expected that in urban areas the DPP would do poorly due to the swing against the DPP plus NPP running to split the DPP vote. It turned out that why the defeats were bad they were not much worse what was feared by the DPP. It was in rural areas where the DPP did not expect a large swing that the DPP crackup took place. Part of it was the DPP was ambushed since they over-nominated candidates but part of it was just a large swing of vote against DPP in rural areas.

If you look at the mayoral and county magistrate elections the KMT clearly over-performed in rural areas aside from a couple of places where the local KMT faction decided to back DPP rebels and performed "Meh" in urban areas. I think this is part of a greater trend away from what I call "Party System of 2000"

In the 1980s and 1990s the KMT was strong in rural areas and DPP stronger with urban middle class. The rise of PRC low tech industry posed a threat ROC rural industry while urban ROC saw that its high tech service oriented economy could be a strong partner with PRC. As a result in the 1990s there was a realignment with urban areas drifting KMT and rural areas drifting DPP culminating in the election of 2000 where was was cemented. In 2008 with KMT's Ma coming to power he accelerated this trend by trying to turn the KMT into a pure urban middle class liberal party by throwing aside the rural KMT local factions. During this period PRC's economy moved quickly upstream and became a competitive threat to the ROC urban economic sectors as well. After 2012 DPP's Tsai was able to capture urban progress youth and bank the DPP gains in rural areas to gain smashing victories in 2014 and 2016. But now post 2016 with Ma out of the way and fall of agriculture prices meaning the PRC market for ROC agriculture product more decisive the rural vote is shifting back toward the KMT. Another key factor is the gay marriage topic which drove a wedge between the DPP rural base and its new urban progressive supporters. It seems the "Party System of 2000" is slowing being reversed.

The Changhua County(彰化縣) (PVI Green +1) first district results is an extreme example of the DPP meltdown in rural county assembly elections as a part of a swing AND over-nomination. 22 candidates fighting for 13 spots

Referendum result (For Yes to pass it has to win AND cross 25% of voting population)

8) Let the marriage law be changed to allow for Gay marriage (pushed by LGBT activists): Yes won 32.7% and is defeated.

3) The anti-gay marriage grand coalition was awesome to behold. It included various Buddhist, Taoist, Chinese traditionalist, Catholic, Presbyterian and Islamic and cross both Blue and Green political coalitions. It was a massive gang up of everyone vs urban middle class progressives and the progressives got smashed. A great example of how to form a grand coalition.

Rather than say something that might get me kicked off the board, all I can say is that I'll never understand the kind of person that takes that kind of joy in other people's heartbreak.

Then again, I'm sure in November 2008 plenty of "Yes on 8" types were no doubt congratulating themselves on the "awesomeness" of THEIR grand coalition too...

ROC cabinet begins process to pass a gay marriage law as per Supreme Court ruling last year. Not clear will it be to amend the Marriage Law or a "separate and unequal" law that the referendum clearly indicated. One way or another the DPP will be trapped between its Northern progressive wing and its Southern conservative base.

The election night was a disaster for the ROC election comission especially in Taipei City (臺北市) (PVI Blue +6) where KMT's Ding narrowly lost to Ko. It seems that there were massive delays and lines in voting especially in Taipei City (臺北市) (PVI Blue +6) where voters were voting up until 7pm even though polls closed at 4pm and counting started.

Turnout in Taipei City (臺北市) (PVI Blue +6) ended up being 65% vs 70% back in 2014 even though turnout in Kaoshiung City (高雄市) (PVI Green +7) surged. It is clear that turnout was suppressed by the long lines. The Ding camp claims foul that the long lines deterred their elderly base from psychically being in a line for 3-4 hours. The Ko camp claims that its youth base lack patience and did not turn out. Of course the worst is possible and likely DPP Yao->Ko tactical voting by DPP voters as they watched the election returns on their mobile phones at 5pm 6pm or even 7pm which showed Yao way behind. The ballot boxes which were counted the latest clearly had Yao with lower level of support even though the Ko camp could also claim that some of them were Yao->Ding tactical voting.

All this is made worse by the facts that: Most media outfits make up vote totals from 4pm-7pm in their broadcast. You heard it right. Most of the vote count numbers are mostly made up based on very low level of sample counts from key precincts. This history of why this is the case stem from an earlier era in the 1980s and early 1990s when the KMT had a huge party worker organization which fed live count numbers to KMT headquarters which is a lot further ahead than the official election commission numbers. The KMT then feed these numbers to KMT owned CTV which had a huge edge in TV viewership election night. Rival TV channels to compete pretty much took what they saw on CTV and added numbers on top of that to fit their own gut feeling on how the race will go and as the election commission numbers caught up converged their guesses to the official numbers by around 7pm-8pm. These TV channels also bias their "projected" votes to fit the needs of their viewers. Pro-Green TV channels would push up the DPP vote total during the 4pm-7pm period to keep their Green supporters engaged a eyeballs on their channel. Same with pr-Blue TV channels. In 2004 in fact there was a fiasco where many channels had their numbers overrun to final vote count and had to have their vote count GO DOWN.

So we have the issue of voters being influenced by real vote count totals which are not even the real vote counts but what the said TV channel THINKS the vote count should be during the 4pm-7pm period.

Depite talk of a massive KMT victory in the 2018 local elections the Pan-Blue vs Pan-Green vote share victory was much more muted. I did my Blue vs Green vote share count and came up with (I also have the numbers for the 1993/4 1997/8 2001/2 2005/6 2009/10 2014 number as well)

You can argue that the Pan-Green vote share of 47.57% is deceptive since Pan-Green rebels in Taipei City (臺北市) (PVI Blue +6), Jaiyi County(嘉義縣) (PVI Green +10), and Hsinchu City(新竹市) (PVI Blue +5) over-performed and clearly pulled in Pan-Blue votes. On the other hand KMT rebels in Yilan County(宜蘭縣) (PVI Green +6), Hsinchu County (新竹縣) (PVI Blue +14), Penghu County(澎湖縣) (PVI Blue +4) over-performed and clearly pulled in Pan-Green votes. It is true that in absolute terms the impact of Ko in Taipei City (臺北市) (PVI Blue +6) is much larger.

It is true that KMT reached unprecedented levels of support in Kaoshiung City (高雄市) (PVI Green +7) but the results for the KMT in Taipei City (臺北市) (PVI Blue +6) is very problematic as this is the second election in the role that the Pan-Blue camp was reduced to the low 40s in terms of vote share. Ko is eroding the once massive Pan-Blue lead in Taipei City (臺北市) (PVI Blue +6). Also Pan-Greens reached unprecedented levels of support in Taoyuan City (桃園市) (PVI Blue +5) and nearly matched their unprecedented levels of support in Keelong City (基隆市) (PVI Blue +8).

All things equal the Pan-Blue/KMT performance looks more like 2001/2 and 2009/2010 than its 2005/6 landslide victory. The shock of DPP loses in Kaoshiung City (高雄市) (PVI Green +7) tends to take attention away from true DPP over-performance in Taoyuan City (桃園市) (PVI Blue +5) and Keelong City (基隆市) (PVI Blue +8).

To some extent the large number of Pan-Green rebels in Tainan City (臺南市) (PVI Green +11) actually prevented a larger KMT surge there, It is clear that the DPP is wearing out its welcome in Tainan City (臺南市) (PVI Green +11) but did not trust KMT yet. The Pan-Green rebel over-performance in Tainan City (臺南市) (PVI Green +11) were clearly a way to show that desire.

2018 was also the year of the KMT women. The KMT nominated 7 women candidates out of the 22 mayor/county magistrate races. 1 was lean DPP, 3 were tossups, 2 was lean KMT, 1 was solid KMT. All 7 won. Two of them benefited from a key relative being arrested a couple of months before the election. In Yunlin County(雲林縣) (PVI Green +8), KMT's Chang's brother was the KMT county magistrate back in 1997-2005. He was arrested a couple of month for corruption. The sympathy factor plus the rural anti-DPP pushed her to an unexpected victory. In Hualian County(花蓮縣) (PVI Blue +20) KMT's Hsu had her husband and current county magistrate was arrested a couple of month before the election. She was sure to win but the arrested created a sympathy wave which pushed her to a massive 71.5% to 25.9% victory over the DPP.

Referendum result (For Yes to pass it has to win AND cross 25% of voting population)

8) Let the marriage law be changed to allow for Gay marriage (pushed by LGBT activists): Yes won 32.7% and is defeated.

3) The anti-gay marriage grand coalition was awesome to behold. It included various Buddhist, Taoist, Chinese traditionalist, Catholic, Presbyterian and Islamic and cross both Blue and Green political coalitions. It was a massive gang up of everyone vs urban middle class progressives and the progressives got smashed. A great example of how to form a grand coalition.

Rather than say something that might get me kicked off the board, all I can say is that I'll never understand the kind of person that takes that kind of joy in other people's heartbreak.

Then again, I'm sure in November 2008 plenty of "Yes on 8" types were no doubt congratulating themselves on the "awesomeness" of THEIR grand coalition too...

Just to be clear. I actually back gay marriage. I think the anti-gay marriage crowd got it all wrong. They should focus on the right of free association in social and economic spheres so the mainstream majority, if it choose to, can socially ostracizes the gay lifestyle they so much oppose.

I back the ROC anti-marriage campaign even if I were given the vote I would vote for gay marriage because it is a useful tool to create a wedge between the DPP progressive Northern urban bridgehead and the DPP Southern Conservative core. While I am very hostile to Mao I do buy into some parts of Mao Zedong Thought: "We should support whatever the enemy opposes and oppose whatever the enemy supports. - Mao 1939"

This talk of KMT year of the women made me realize one thing. 5 out of the 7 women KMT winners were flips of a DPP seat. Han's Kaoshiung City (高雄市) (PVI Green +7) and island county Penghu County(澎湖縣) (PVI Blue +4) were the only male KMT flips.

In fact it seem what the KMT should have done is to nominate an all women slate plus Han. Given of these trends they could have won a 22-0 sweep if they did that :)

Given the gender gap in favor of the Right/KMT on ROC I would be fine for election laws to be changed on ROC so only women had the vote.

I am on a business trip to Tokyo and HK this week But next couple of weeks when I get back to USA I plan to do more in depth analysis on how the city/county assembly vote swings went. I want to verify my theory that the KMT surge was focused on rural areas and wanted to see if I can get better statistical evidence for that by looking at the city/county assembly results.

I looked at the results for Case 14 and as expected theres zero precints that voted Yes.

http://referendum.2018.nat.gov.tw

Taipei City - 38%New Taipei City - 34.9%Hsinchu City - 34.2%Keelung City - 33.9%Yilan County - 33.1%Tainan City - 33%Kaohsiung City - 32.5%Chiayi City - 32.1%Taoyuan City - 31.8%Taichung City - 31.2%Pingtung County - 30.6%Hsinchu county -30.4%Yunlin county - 29.7%Chiayi County - 29.6%Changhua County - 29%Penghu county - 28.9%Miaoli county - 28%Nantou County - 27%Hualien County - 26.4%Taitung County - 25.8%Lienchang county - 25.4%Kinmen County - 24.3%

Within Taipei.

Neihu District - 39.1%Datong District - 38.9%Zhongshan District - 38.6%Shilin District - 38.1%Da’an District - 37.8%Beitou District - 37.7%Songshan District - 37.5%Nangang District - 37.5%Wanhua District - 37.2%Xinyi District - 36.7%Zhongzheng District - 36.1%Wenshan District - 36.1%

https://web.cw.com.tw/election2018/electorate/index.html?county=63000

Using this map the reason for Neihu being higher(despite it still being pretty low...) is the higher number of young voters there.

Only three districts in Taipei were the vote against marriage being one male and one female reached 40%.

Dahuli, Neihu 40.9% (In the referendum to allow same sex marriage it was 43.2%, god bless those inconsistent 2.3% of voters)Zhongyuanli, Zhongshan District 41.3%Tianshouli, Shilin District 40.1%

Then in the vote to allow same sex marriage there were a few ironic districts that voted Yes to Marriage being one man and one woman AND at the same time to allow same sex marriage

Bojiali, Wenshan 65.3% to first / 45.3%

Considering Bojiali also has a higher number of elderly voters it could just be a lot of elderly voters either voted Yes to everything because they didnt like referendums OR didnt read clearly the one to allow same sex marriage.

Zhongshali, Zhongzheng voted 71.9% FOR marriage being one man and one woman AND 54% to allow same sex marriage.

Theres a few more where this ironically happened.

Renaili, Zhongli, Taoyuan. Agree 50.6% to same sex marriage. 72% agree to marriage being one man and one woman.

Given that in more dense areas like in Taichung where the city areas had less support for marriage being one man and one woman AND at the same time voting in low numbers against a proposal to allow gay marriage while a handful of rural areas voted Yes on both questions it does seem to be a few districts were people just grossed over and voted yes to every question including Case 14 than an actual stance of support for gay marriage.

All the media outfits are claiming that the DPP have no chance in 2020 and that most likely Tsai would not run. I disagree with that. I agree if DPP swap out Tsai then they are agreeing with the KMT narrative of a failed presidency and for sure will lose. I think Tsai will still run for re-election and given a protracted primary will destroy her chances unless Lai can launch a palace coup very quickly to take over Tsai is more likely than not to still get the DPP nomination. If Tsai runs in 2020 I think she has a 35/65 shot at winning, especially if the KMT primary is protracted or if KMT nominates Wu. She can still run on an anti-unification platform and I think that sort of campaign could still have legs. In fact KMT losing Taipei City could be a blessing a disguise. With a strong pro-unification Ding as KMT mayor of Tapei City creates a convenient foil for the DPP.

On the KMT side realistically it is a Chu vs Wu race. Ex PM Chang would jump in as a dark house but Chang is not member of the KMT. Chang might get the nod if it seems KMT have low chances of winning in 2020. But under the current circumstances Wu can claim that he deserves a shot at the nomination given his management of the successful 2018 campaign. On the other hand Chu is just much more popular than Wu and is more likely to get the KMT nomination even if Wu is still in the running.

Zhongshali, Zhongzheng voted 71.9% FOR marriage being one man and one woman AND 54% to allow same sex marriage.

Theres a few more where this ironically happened.

Renaili, Zhongli, Taoyuan. Agree 50.6% to same sex marriage. 72% agree to marriage being one man and one woman.

Given that in more dense areas like in Taichung where the city areas had less support for marriage being one man and one woman AND at the same time voting in low numbers against a proposal to allow gay marriage while a handful of rural areas voted Yes on both questions it does seem to be a few districts were people just grossed over and voted yes to every question including Case 14 than an actual stance of support for gay marriage.

Understand that another election commission mess up was that they insisted on rewording the referendum items to be so filled with legalese that for many voters it was impossible to figure out which in term lead to very long voting times as they tried to read and re-read the description and led to plenty of inconsistent voting behavior.

Being in the North seems to give the KMT a slight boost relative the Unification-Independence lean. Given the Independence vote lean Yilan County(宜蘭縣) (PVI Green +6) should have a Green lean of +8 and not +6 but being in the North lead to more relative votes for KMT. Same for New Taipei City (新北市) (PVI Blue +2) where given its Independence vote lean it should be Green+1 but instead it is Blue +2. Being in the North helps the KMT vote there as well.

Here is an example of what I talked about with TV channels just making up vote count. A blog that complained about this took snapshots of what the vote count looks like at various TV channels at 7pm. The problematic one in question is Deep Green SET which had for Tainan City (臺南市) (PVI Green +11) DPP ~332K to KMT 256K()

But everyone else had a much narrower lead at DPP ~207K KMT ~173K at 7pm()()()()()()

This is more about the decision desk at SET "feels" that the DPP should have a much bigger lead then what the KMT cadre rand various stringers are reporting. In the end SET ended up being wrong and the real result was a much closer race at DPP ~367K KMT ~313K

Also note for some other races SET had higher vote counts as well. They are most likely made up as well but in terms of vote percentages they ended not be that far off. The key point is that all TV channels just make up numbers. It is just SET this election night seems the most aggressive in order to make sure that more eyeballs are tuned in.

There is almost no correlation between Blue/Green PVI and the pro-nuclear power vote even though DPP is clearly against nuclear power and the KMT is clearly open to backing nuclear power. In super pro-DPP cities like Tainan City (臺南市) (PVI Green +11) there is lesser support for nuclear power, sane with some super Blue counties for nuclear power.

The anti-gay marriage vote clearly is correlated with level of urbanization. Correlation with Blue/Green PVI also seem non-existent. Although some of the places the KMT under-performed did have lower rates of support for the anti-gay marriage position like Taipei City (臺北市) (PVI Blue +6) and Hsinchu City(新竹市) (PVI Blue +5) despite an anti-KMT lean. Likewise some of the places the KMT over-performed have high rates of anti-gay marriage support like Changhua County(彰化縣) (PVI Green +1) and Yilan County(宜蘭縣) (PVI Green +6) despite an anti-KMT lean.

They were really not ever gone. Sure, every time the DPP takes over there are a few hundred statutes removed but there are over 1000+ more around in various places. Also the Chiang Kai-Shek memorial is still there despite various plans by DPP to come up with an excuse to remove it. When it comes down to it the Chiang Kai-Shek memorial due to tourist value, especially for Mainland China tourists. The way Chiang is viewed on mainland China today, even for dire-hard CCP supporters, is getting much more positive than 15 years ago and for sure a lot more positive than 30 years ago. Also for people on the Mainland who are always being pounded by pro-CCP propaganda looking at anti-CCP propaganda but not treasonous ones (so pro-Taiwan Independence or HK independence stuff is out) would be a relief. Pro-Chiang ones fits to bill.

So seeing signs the below from the 1950s-1980s period of KMT propaganda (Unite China Under Tree Peoples Principles) actually offers psychological relieve and good curiosity for Mainland China tourists()

There is almost no correlation between Blue/Green PVI and the pro-nuclear power vote even though DPP is clearly against nuclear power and the KMT is clearly open to backing nuclear power. In super pro-DPP cities like Tainan City (臺南市) (PVI Green +11) there is lesser support for nuclear power, sane with some super Blue counties for nuclear power.

The anti-gay marriage vote clearly is correlated with level of urbanization. Correlation with Blue/Green PVI also seem non-existent. Although some of the places the KMT under-performed did have lower rates of support for the anti-gay marriage position like Taipei City (臺北市) (PVI Blue +6) and Hsinchu City(新竹市) (PVI Blue +5) despite an anti-KMT lean. Likewise some of the places the KMT over-performed have high rates of anti-gay marriage support like Changhua County(彰化縣) (PVI Green +1) and Yilan County(宜蘭縣) (PVI Green +6) despite an anti-KMT lean.

What about comparing the vote against same sex marriage and the vote for competing in the Tokyo Olympics as Taiwan not Chinese taipei.

From a city/county assembly point of view. The KMT and allies flipped Kaoshiung City (高雄市) (PVI Green +7), moved to total control of New Taipei City (新北市) (PVI Blue +2) vs power sharing with DPP, closed the gap in DPP controlled Tainan City (臺南市) (PVI Green +11) and Jaiyi County(嘉義縣) (PVI Green +10), have a shot at ending power sharing with DPP in Pingdong County(屏東縣) (Green +8) and Yilan County(宜蘭縣) (PVI Green +6) to KMT control and most likely flipped Hsinchu City(新竹市) (PVI Blue +5) to KMT control from a DPP alliance with a pro-DPP ex-KMT local faction bloc.

If the KMT plays it alliance politics well gets various pro-KMT independents to back the KMT the DPP and allies will be reduced to only controlling Tainan City (臺南市) (PVI Green +11) and Jaiyi County(嘉義縣) with the KMT and allies controlling all other city/county assemblies. That would mostly restore a pre-2009 world in terms of city/county assembly control.

The independent candidates tends to lean Blue. I have to do a candidate by candidate analysis of independents to calculate the true Blue Green balance which I will do next couple of weeks. Overall Greens historically have been very weak at the City.County assembly elections and over the last couple of decades have been having their vote share slowing converging to their national vote share. 2018 is a clear reversal for Greens but the Green vote share is still greater than 2009-10 cycle which is a more neutral year. So despite the clear Pan-Green setback the convergence continues.

I think if issues like Gay marriage plays a greater salience relative to the unification-independence issue then Central Taiwan Province will trend KMT while Northern Taiwan Province will trend to DPP. If so then this is back to the future as it will be the return to the 1980s.

It seems new KMT Kaoshiung mayor Han will soon lead a delegation of the 15 KMT mayors/county magistrates to visit PRC. The plans seems to be for the 15 KMT mayors/county magistrates to announce that they back the 1992 Consensus (There is only One China with both sides agreeing to disagree on which of the Chinas (ROC or PRC) is this that One China). The basic idea is that the PRC drastically pushed down Mainland Chinese tourism after the Tsai regime came to power. Now that the KMT rule a large part of the ROC at the local level the PRC in return might support buying more products from these 15 cities/counties and design a vacation package for Mainland Chinese tourists that only visit these 15 cities/counties. If will be seen then if Ko tries to jump on board or have Taipei City lose out on these economic deals. If this takes place then this another victory for the PRC economic warfare on DPP.

DPP ex-Prez Chen told a bunch of DPP Kaoshiung City (高雄市) legislators that 2018 will be a pretty bad year for the DPP.

He predicted that the DPP will lose Jiayi City(嘉義市) (I have it has lean KMT), Yilan County(宜蘭縣) (I have it as lean KMT), Penghu County(澎湖縣)(I have it has lean DPP) and Changhua County(彰化縣)(I have it as tossup.) He also predicted that if Tsai does not turn things around soon DPP will also most likely lose Taichung City(臺中市) (I have it as lean to solid DPP), Yunlin County(雲林縣) (I have it as lean DPP), and Hsinchu City(新竹市)(I have it as lean DPP). He also said that DPP will still win kaoshiung City (高雄市) but with a much smaller margin (this is obvious since 2014 was a popular DPP incumbant running for re-election in a DPP wave year and 2018 is an open seat in a bad to possibly really bad DPP year.) He also indicated that in the Kaoshiung City (高雄市) city council the DPP will take a bunch of losses and it is even money that the KMT and allies will recapture majority in the city council from DPP and allies.

I guess Chen is much more negative on DPP changes in Taichung City(臺中市) then I am. On the flip side he views Taoyuan City (桃園市) as fairly safe for DPP where as I see a chance for KMT. I guess I focus more on PVI lean and he focuses more on the personal popularity of the DPP incumbent. I also guess he views the DPP civil war in Jaiyi County(嘉義縣) as a tempest in a teapot and will blow over and no risk of the KMT making a comeback taking advantage of a possible DPP split. The rest he and I seem to agree where the DPP will take losses and where they are vulnerable for losses.

Ex DPP Prez Chen and now convicted for corruption but out on parole for health reasons saw thia coming almost a year ago.

The pro-Nuclear power vote had some interesting results in certain key places. In the 4 townships where the 4 nuclear power plans are located the Pro-nuclear power vote for nuclear power were 58.1%, 56.7%, 57.0%, and 49.6%. And the vote in the one township where the nuclear wasted is deposited the vote for nuclear power 43.7%. These are amazing levels of support for the population most at risk from any safety problems.

What took place was the DPP over promised on energy policy. The DPP claimed that ROC can get rid of nuclear power by 2025 without prices increases, with power shortages, and without more pollution by pushing up green energy It is clear that this could not take place and after some power shortages the DPP regime has racketed up coal power plants which increased pollution by quite a bit. I think on energy policy the population had enough and now wants nuclear power at least on the medium basis until a realistic plan can be executed to have enough green energy at reasonable cost.

Looking back at previous elections, in Kaohsiung the combined Pan-Blue vote in Kaohsiung including both the county and the city was about in the 700,000s range in 2004-2012. And even in the 2000 Taiwan election while a lot of Soong voters later became Soft or hard Pan-Green voters the combined Pan-Blue vote was 847,000 just 45,000 short of his vote total, so while it was a uphill battle for Han Kuo yu it wasnt an impossible task for him to win if he could turn out those people who previously voted for Soong in 2000.

They were really not ever gone. Sure, every time the DPP takes over there are a few hundred statutes removed but there are over 1000+ more around in various places. Also the Chiang Kai-Shek memorial is still there despite various plans by DPP to come up with an excuse to remove it. When it comes down to it the Chiang Kai-Shek memorial due to tourist value, especially for Mainland China tourists. The way Chiang is viewed on mainland China today, even for dire-hard CCP supporters, is getting much more positive than 15 years ago and for sure a lot more positive than 30 years ago. Also for people on the Mainland who are always being pounded by pro-CCP propaganda looking at anti-CCP propaganda but not treasonous ones (so pro-Taiwan Independence or HK independence stuff is out) would be a relief. Pro-Chiang ones fits to bill.

So seeing signs the below from the 1950s-1980s period of KMT propaganda (Unite China Under Tree Peoples Principles) actually offers psychological relieve and good curiosity for Mainland China tourists

I'm planning on visiting Taiwan next year (I live in Dongbei), so I'll have to check it out!

Looking back at previous elections, in Kaohsiung the combined Pan-Blue vote in Kaohsiung including both the county and the city was about in the 700,000s range in 2004-2012. And even in the 2000 Taiwan election while a lot of Soong voters later became Soft or hard Pan-Green voters the combined Pan-Blue vote was 847,000 just 45,000 short of his vote total, so while it was a uphill battle for Han Kuo yu it wasnt an impossible task for him to win if he could turn out those people who previously voted for Soong in 2000.

Basically concur. Kaoshiung was always within reach of the KMT as long as it was a good KMT year in the pre-2014 world. The unprecedented nature of the KMT defeats in 2014-2016 obscured the fact that the KMT is starting at a very lose base of comparison relative to 2014. Of course that the KMT can win in Kaoshing shows that the 2014-2016 realignment is mostly ephemeral. In 2000 the Pan-Green vote was 46.8% (CHen + Shu) while this election the Blue-Green balance is 55.2/44.8 in Kaoshiung. This means that DPP did worse in 2018 than in 2000 even though in 2000 the Pan-Green vote nationally was 40%. You have go back to the 1980s and 1990s for KMT performance in Greater Kaoshiung to be as good as what we saw in Han's election. Even Ma's 2008 landslide victory saw Ma's vote share at around 50% in Greater Kaoshiung. This sort of plays into my narrative of this election being the year of the return of Central and Southern local KMT faction coming back after moving away from the national KMT under the "Party system of 2000."

Just like Ko was the hero that led the DPP landslide of the 2014 local elections, KMT's Han is the hero that produced a larger than expected KMT victory. How Han became the KMT candidate of Kaoshiung has to be incredible story of a DPP self-goal.

Han was a KMT MP in Taipei city in the 1990s that appealed to the Right nationalist wing of the KMT base He even had several physical altercation with fellow DPP MP Chen Shui-Bien who later became DPP mayor of Taipei and then ROC Prez. His wife is from rural Yunlin County where she was a member of the KMT county assembly. By the early 2000s Han's political career seems to be over as his brash personality had made him enough enemies in the KMT Taipei establishment. After 2001 he left politics and settled in Yunln County with his wife who also retired from politics and started a bilingual school. The Yunlin County magistrate was then KMT's Chang(張榮味) (also brother of KMT Yunlin County magistrate elect) who had deep roots in agriculture. Chang became good friends with Han due to Han's past life as a politician.

When Han's bilingual school was not doing that well, Chang helped Han get a job as a CEO the fairly small Taipei Agriculture Wholesaler Corp. Taipei Agriculture Wholesaler Corp had shareholders including City of Taipei, ROC government, and Agriculture associations (Controlled by Chang and his Chang faction) so given Han's political past Chang was able to convince the various shareholders to give the role to Han. Han was able to become an expert on how to manage and sell agriculture produce in this role but was really a person with not much influence since no one really cared about his company. Then in 2014 Ko was elected to become mayor of Taipei City. Ko took a real liking to Han and expanded Han's company role in the distribution of agriculture products in Taipei City. Then the DPP came into power in 2016 and soon after that due to the withdraw of PRC purchases of ROC agricultural products the prices of farm products that ROC farmers were able to fetch fell. The DPP regime decided to blame their old enemy Han and his company for hording and corruption as the cause of the fall in farm product prices. After set of political battles the DPP was able to capture various Agriculture associations from Chang and forced Ko to go along with firing Han from his job. This set of political battles made Han a more well known figure in the media.

Han then decided to run for KMT Chairman in 2017 and despite massive level of support on the internet who took a liking to his tell it like it is personality lost to Wu winning less than 5% of the KMT member vote (as Han's internet supporters are not voting members of the KMT nor any other party.) When the 2018 local elections came around, Wu could not find anyone to run for the KMT in Kaoshiung since the consensus was the DPP was going to win in a landslide there. Wu convinced Han to run even though Han wanted to run in Taipei but agreed to take on this role "for the good of the party." Then the 2018 election turned into an anti-Establishment election which fit Han's style PLUS the election became about agriculture prices in rural Southern Taiwan Province. Han's background in agriculture wholesaling became an unexpected asset. In the end he became a bigger internet sensation then his old benefactor Ko and became a key asset for campaigning for KMT across the board except for Taipei (to avoid campaigning against his friend and benefactor Ko). The result was a large win for Han in Kaohsiung and unexpected KMT victory in Yunlin.

If the DPP just left Han alone in late 2016 they could have avoided a lot of this and Han would still be a minor CEO of a small farm product wholesaler semi-public company.

Referendum result (For Yes to pass it has to win AND cross 25% of voting population)

8) Let the marriage law be changed to allow for Gay marriage (pushed by LGBT activists): Yes won 32.7% and is defeated.

3) The anti-gay marriage grand coalition was awesome to behold. It included various Buddhist, Taoist, Chinese traditionalist, Catholic, Presbyterian and Islamic and cross both Blue and Green political coalitions. It was a massive gang up of everyone vs urban middle class progressives and the progressives got smashed. A great example of how to form a grand coalition.

Rather than say something that might get me kicked off the board, all I can say is that I'll never understand the kind of person that takes that kind of joy in other people's heartbreak.

Then again, I'm sure in November 2008 plenty of "Yes on 8" types were no doubt congratulating themselves on the "awesomeness" of THEIR grand coalition too...

Recount on the way for Taipei City (臺北市) (PVI Blue +6) mayor race. Ko admits that in the last week before the election his internals showed that he was behind and that only a massive GOTV effort saved him from defeat.

I think based on Ko's narrative and other polling data we can sort of work out how the Taipei City (臺北市) (PVI Blue +6) mayor race evolved.

In late summer the race most likely looked likeKo 50KMT Ding 38 DPP Yao 11where Ko was able to capture half the Pan-Green vote and a good chunk of the Pan-Blue vote.

Then given the KMT Han surge in Kaoshiung City (高雄市) (PVI Green +7) which provoked pro-DPP elements of the Ko campaign to come out against Han. This drove some Pan-Blue votes away from Ko to make itKo 47KMT Ding 41DPP Yao 11

Then the DPP, desperate to keep Han from winning, was able to successfully increase the Blue-Green polarization around the Unification-Independence issue which drove Pan-Blue and Pan-Greens voters home to make itKo 43KMT Ding 43DPP Yao 13 Which was where most polls had it before the poll blackout (neck-to-neck)

Then after the poll blackout Tsai went on an offensive against Ko to drive more Pan-Green voters away from Ko and toward Yao in an effort to destroy Ko and take him out of the 2020 equation. Tsai was only partially effective to getting the DPP base to back YaoKo 39KMT Ding 43DPP Yao 17

In the last couple of days before the election it was clear that Ko was in trouble. Pro-Green but also pro-Ko commentators were saying that DPP Yao has consolidated the DPP vote and that Ko was going to lose. It seems that doing so was a ruse to send the signal to Light Blue anti-DPP but also anti-Ding voters that it was safe to vote Ko because DPP Yao is now once again "The DPP candidate" which swung some votes toward Ko from Ding to make itKO 41KMT Ding 41DPP Yao 17

The DPP vote fell dramatically as vote shifted to pro-Ko candidates in the Light Green and Light Blue camps. The KMT and Deep Greens also gained ground as part of a disastrous result for DPP. The pro-Ko candidates spread across Light Blue and Light Green blocs won 13.42% (9.42% from Light Blue and 3.99% from Light Green) and 9 seats (6 from Light Blue and 3 from Light Green). KMT-NP has a near majority on its own and it is unlikely that the pro-Ko Light Blue winners would back and alliance of pro-Ko bloc with the DPP and NPP.

Large swing away from DPP to KMT which flips the city assembly to KMT control as DPP lost ground to both Deep Green and Light Green candidates. Pan-Blue bloc's conservative nomination strategy paid off.

Mayor electionKMT 57.15%DPP 42.85%

The KMT candidate ran ahead of the Pan-Blue bloc and clearly had strong personal appeal against a veteran DPP candidate seen as from the past generation.

The assembly size was grown from 60 to 63. The DPP candidate for mayor had good cross-partisan appeal and it was expected that the Pan-Green bloc would make gains in the city assembly elections. In the end the Pan-Blue camp made small gains in a anti-DPP wave election and the results ended up being a status quo election with the KMT keeping its comfortable majority.

The number of seats went up from 63 to 65. Despite a swing away from the Pan-Green camp better vote distribution limited the relative seat losses for the Pan-Green camp.

MayorKMT 56.57%DPP 42.35%KMT rebel 1.09%

The DPP vote for mayor mostly matched that of the Pan-Green city assembly vote. Historically the local KMT factions that made up a good part of the Light Blue vote often vote DPP at the city and national level especially when the DPP incumbent should be able to use municipal resources to lock in these KMT factional leaders behind him. This time around they swung behind the KMT candidate giving the KMT candidate a clear win over the DPP incumbent.

DPP has been in charge for long enough that a lot of the old local factions has gone over to the Pan-Green camp so the city assembly election results tend to more reflect the true partisan balance. DPP lost ground to the Pan-Blue camp as well to other Pan-Green forces. The shift in seats were significant although DPP continues to keep control of the city assembly with a smaller majority as the DPP was hit with a bloc of DPP rebels.

The mayor vote was splintered. The DPP candidate is fairly moderate while the KMT candidate has local roots but seen as ineffective. The national swing toward the KMT clearly eroded the DPP vote. At lot of the voting here are personal. The Pro-Blue Ind. is actually close personally to the DPP candidate which must have driven some pan-Blue voters away from him while the Pan-Green Ind. is quite hostile to the local DPP administration which must have help it capture some Pan-Blue votes.

The Han wave clearly carried the Pan-Blue camp to a majority on a fairly large swing. Before 2014 the KMT always had control of the city assembly but a majority of this scale you have to go back to 2006.

MayorKMT 53.87%DPP 44.80% KMT rebel 0.85%ex-NP 0.48%

KMT's Han clearly exceeded the Pan-Blue city assembly voting bloc and captured some Pan-Green votes en route to a unexpectedly large victory.

With the 2014-2016 election defeat hurting the KMT brand name and with MKT running a strong campaign in the county magistrate a lot of KMT candidates ran as pro-KMT independents. The result was a status quo election in the county assembly election. The 2014 DPP wave did not make its mark in the county assembly election so when the wave went the other way there is also no net change.

County magistrate race

KMT 38.20% MKT 32.29%DPP 27.68%Ind. 1.83%

All 3 major candidates have KMT backgrounds including the DPP candidate. A part of the County assembly Pan-Blue vote are pro-Green at the county and national level so it is not surprising and expected that the DPP candidate gets Pan-Blue county assembly votes, especially a DPP candidate that used to be in the KMT (his father was the head of a large KMT faction in the county that have since had a falling out with the national KMT and then allied with the DPP.)

Mostly a status quo election. A good part of the KMT candidates ran as independents given the knock on KMT popularity in the 2014-2016 elections but the net result is around the same.

County magistrate race

KMT 57.74%Ind(DPP) 37.03%Ind 2.97%DPP rebel 2.26%

A good part of the county assembly Pan-Blue vote votes DPP at the county and national level so it is not a surprise that the Ind(DPP) exceeded the county assembly Pan-Green vote especially when the DPP backed an independent that can attract Pan-Blue votes knowing how weak it was in the county.

Due to the 2014-2016 defeats some KMT candidates ran as pro-KMT independents but the swing toward the KMT was so strong the KMT candidates gained vote share despite running less candidates. Over-nomination plus a swing against the DPP led to a catastrophic result as the KMT bloc adds to its majority.

The KMT candidate was able to push the DPP incumbent to levels close to the Pan-Green county assembly vote which is easily enough for a clear victory. The TSU rebel with Ko support must have ate into the Pan-Blue county assembly vote. In this race the KMT local faction vote which often vote DPP at the county and national level went for the KMT leading to a landslide victory.

Several KMT candidates decided to run as pro-KMT independents due to the impact of the KMT brand from the 2014-2016 anti-KMT wave. The 2014 wave mostly left Nanto County(南投縣) (PVI Blue +3) untouched at the county assembly election level so the the tide turned against the DPP in 2018 the net impact is nil with the result being a mostly status quo election.

County magistrate race

KMT 66.72%DPP 33.28%

Part of the county assembly Pan-Blue vote goes DPP at the county and national level so the fact that the DPP ran ahead of the Pan-Green county assembly vote is expected. The KMT incumbent is fairly popular and did very well in a KMT year.

Due to the anti-KMT wave in 2014-2016 a bunch of KMT members ran as pro-KMT independents. But due to the large number of KMT rebels in the county magistrate race the county assembly also saw a large number of KMT rebels which pushed up the Pan-Blue county assembly vote share but lost seats to the DPP even as the DPP incumbent was defeated in the county magistrate race.

Part of the Pan-Blue county assembly vote usually goes DPP at the county and national level. There was a clear swing against the DPP in 2014 and the explosion of KMT rebels mean that the vote would get splintered between the KMT candidate and various KMT rebels and independents.

Due to defeat in 2014-2016 defeats some of the KMT candidates ran as independents which resulted in a status quo election in terms of vote share balance between the blocs. The Pan-Green camp over-nominated and lost a couple of seats. This vote share distribution seems reasonable. Before 2001 the pro-KMT Huang faction had around 35% of the vote, pro-KMT Lin party had around 30% of the vote and the DPP had around 35% of the vote. After the Lin faction went over the the DPP and to some extent too over the DPP the balance should be around 65-35 at the local level between the Pan-Green and Pan-Blue blocs.

The DPP rebel stems from a civil war within the pro-DPP Lin faction which led to a very continuous DPP primary. Some of the pro-KMT Huang faction also stepped in to help the Lin rebel faction. In the end the KMT candidate was seen as an outsider so some of the Huang faction county assembly vote went over to back the DPP Lin faction rebel.

Similar stories as other rural counties. Some KMT candidates decided to run as independents due to the negative image of the KMT brand from 2014-2016 while over-nomination by the Pan-Green camp lost them a bunch of seats.

County magistrate raceDPP 55.90%KMT 42.91%KMT rebel 2.09%

The KMT local factions for county assembly in this Deep Green county (also Tsai home county) usually vote DPP at the county and national level. What took place here seem at par and the anti-DPP wave seems to have mostly passed over this county given the popularity of the DPP incumbent.

Again, some KMT candidates ran as independents due to the negative perception of the KMT brand after 2014-2016 and at the same time Pan-Greens over-nominated leading to a large loss of seats for the Pan-Green camp even though the vote share balance shifted in the Green direction. As a result the KMT will now flip control of the county assembly. The DPP (or proto-DPP) has ruled Yilan most of the time since 1981 so a good part of the local KMT factions have moved over to the Pan-Green camp over time.

Just like other rural counties, the some KMT candidates choose to run as independents due to the decline of the KMT brand from the 2014-2016 elections. Overall the Pan-Greens lost ground relative to a very good performance in 2014 and lost a couple of seats.

County magistrate raceKMT 71.52% DPP 25.87%Ind. 2.61%

Like many other rural counties where the KMT local factions are still aligned with the KMT some of the county assembly Pan-Blue vote does vote DPP at the county and national level. The arrest of the current county magistrate and husband of the KMT candidate merely created a sympathy wave and pushed KMT to win by a large majority.

Due to the stepping down of a popular KMT county magistrate the various KMT factions battled and provoked large number of KMT rebels which threw away seats gains from the tiny Pan-Green bloc even as the vote share for the Pan-Blue surged upward in response to the large number of Pan-Blue candidates.

The DPP candidate is the current MP and clearly has the ability to win a good chunk of the county assembly Pan-Blue vote. The KMT is split due to the transition of the retirement of a popular KMT county magistrate as various factions fight for power in the county assembly. An KMT ex-county magistrate ran as a KMT rebel made the race close. In the end the anti-DPP wave led to the consolidation of the KMT vote to a simple and large victory for the KMT candidate.

Just like other mostly rural counties, some KMT candidates ran as pro-KMT independents and the Pan-Green camp nominated more candidates but lost seats when their vote share failed to rise despite a popular DPP incumbent mayor running for re-election.

Mayor raceDPP 54.14%KMT 45.86%

The DPP incumbent is popular and has cross partisan appeal and it is not a surprise he won and did it carrying a solid chunk of the city assembly Pan-Blue vote. He did fail to push up the Pan-Green vote in the city assembly vote though.

Overall the city assembly gained a seat from 2014. Back in the 1990s there was a massive KMT civil war where key local KMT factions formed proto-NPA which formed an alliance with the DPP to capture power in the city assembly which continued into 2014 local elections. This time around the leader of NPA decided to run for mayor as an independent with support from Ko. This led to an all out war between the DPP and NPA. The result is NPA and DPP both lost a bunch of seats and seems to have flipped the city assembly to the Pan-Blue camp even as the DPP mayor candidate won with ease.

The DPP-NPA war actually worked against the KMT in the mayor race as the city assembly Pan-Blue vote splintered and shirted to the popular DPP incumbent and the NPA which posed itself as the real alternative to the DPP.

The city assembly lost a seat from 2014 due to redistricting. Here historically politics at the city assembly level has been about the battle between the pro-KMT Hsiao faction and the KMT anti-Hsiao faction forces with the Pan-Green MLAs also split taking sides between the two Pan-Blue blocs. After 2014 the Hsiao faction forces took control of the city council. This time the leader of the Hsiao faction ran as a KMT rebel in the mayor election. The KMT and Hsiao faction then fought each other at the city assembly election and the result KMT anti-Hsiao faction forces lost a seat even as the KMT candidate won the mayor election over the DPP incumbent and the Hsiao faction KMT rebel. Now control of the city assembly is up in the air. The Hsiao faction, the KMT anti-Hsiao bloc and the DPP are all looking to capture control. Not clear who will win. Most likely Hsiao faction will win out again.

The election of a KMT rebel as the county magistrate in 2014 and an attempt this year by the KMT to retake the county led to a Pan-Blue civil war which led to a large number of KMT candidates running as rebels or independents. The DPP at the county assembly level imploded which actually helped the Pan-Green cause which led to various social activists to be ab to run without the burden of the DPP and made large gains in terms of vote share in this Deep Blue county

The KMT recapture the county magistrate seat from the KMT rebel. The KMT rebel ran on a broad alliance of KMT rebels, Light Blue factions and Pan-Green social activists and even though he went down in defeat indirectly helped the Light Green forces in the County assembly race.

The county assembly elections are all Pan-Blue affairs with the KMT nominating a bunch of candidates and those left out running as pro-KMT candidates. And like Japan where it is "if you win you are LDP" here is "if you win you are KMT" the KMT then nominate such pro-KMT independent winners in the next election as the KMT candidate.

The Pan-Green candidates actually won over 17% of the vote here which is unprecedented and even exceeded Tsai's 2016 performance. Not having a formal DPP candidate helped since the DPP party lebel is still pretty toxic.

It was clear that 2014 was going to be a DPP year. The Pan-Blue camp nominated less candidates as the Pan-Green camp nominated more candidates. DPP made gains in 2009/2010 cycle as the city.county assembly vote share results slowly converge to the national vote balance. As a result a lot of pro-DPP independents or DPP rebels ran on the DPP ticket in 2014.

As the 2018 cycle began it looked lit it will be a neutral cycle where the KMT band did not recover from 2014-2016 but the DPP also losing support. As a result a good number of KMT candidates ran as pro-KMT independents or KMT rebels. On the Pan-Green camp, non-DPP pan-Green parties ran more candidates to try to cash in on the decline of DPP popularity and DPP itself buoyed by the 2014-2016 results increased the number of it candidates. The result was an anti-DPP wave where DPP lost support to the Pan-Blues and ther Pan-Green parties. Over-nomination by the Pan-Green camp lost them seats where they ended up with less seats than the 2009/2010 cycle even as the Pan-Greens ended up with a vote share ~1.5% higher than the 2009/2010 cycle.

The 2018 result "solved" one of the mysteries of the 2014 local elections. Just like the 2012 USA election triggered the question of the "missing White voters" which was solved in 2016 when the missing white voters showed up, the 2014 local election had the mystery of "the Light Blue ticket spliters" which can be shown in this chart.

The mystery was the unusual large gap between the 2014 Pan-Blue mayor/county executive race and the Pan-Blue city/county assembly race. The basic idea is that since the 1990s the Pan-Green camp has been growing at the city/county assembly level to coverage toward its true national level of support. So one would expect the gap between these two vote share to converging. But in 2014 it diverged which says at least 3% of the Pan-Blue city/county assembly voter which SHOULD have voted for the Pan-Blue camp candidate for the mayor/county magistrate failed to do so. This mystery was solved when the gap swung back to a level even smaller than 2009/2010 levels.

What seems to have taken place was that the KMT civil war of 2013-2014 which was about KMT Prez Ma vs KMT Speaker of the House Wang was a war by Ma to weaken the KMT local faction bloc led by Wang so the KMT can transform into an urban based middle class party. A good chunk of the KMT local faction vote in anger voted for the local KMT faction candidates in the city/county assembly races but voted for Pan-Greens in the mayor/county magistrate to protest against the national KMT led by Ma in 2014.

In 2018 with Ma out of the way and the DPP at the helm in the center being a threat to their power and influence the local KMT factions flipped back to backing the national KMT in the mayor/county executive race. So the mystery of the 2014 "light Blue vote spliters" if now solved. They came home in 2018 which added to the anti-DPP wave swing from 2014.

Big and shocking realignment in the Hsinchu City(新竹市) (PVI Blue +5) city assembly. Old KMT rebel faction NPA which has been in the Pan-Green camp for a couple of decades decided to merge into the KMT, ending, for now the mega Pan-Blue civil war that started in the 1990s that led to the creation of proto-NPA.

NPA shot its bolt this election by having its leader run in the mayor election with Ko's support to try to capture power which took a bunch of Pan-Blue votes but failed to defeat DPP. In the city assembly race the NPA-DPP war merely gave the Pan-Blue bloc a majority on its own. NPA working with DPP last couple of decades was always about getting control of the city assembly for itself. Now that is gone the NPA decided to close shop and merge back into the KMT.

It is ironic now that the KMT will be in the strongest position in the city assembly since the 1990s right after its worse ever defeat in the mayor race ever.

Overall the city assembly gained a seat from 2014. Back in the 1990s there was a massive KMT civil war where key local KMT factions formed proto-NPA which formed an alliance with the DPP to capture power in the city assembly which continued into 2014 local elections. This time around the leader of NPA decided to run for mayor as an independent with support from Ko. This led to an all out war between the DPP and NPA. The result is NPA and DPP both lost a bunch of seats and seems to have flipped the city assembly to the Pan-Blue camp even as the DPP mayor candidate won with ease.

The DPP-NPA war actually worked against the KMT in the mayor race as the city assembly Pan-Blue vote splintered and shirted to the popular DPP incumbent and the NPA which posed itself as the real alternative to the DPP.

I think Chu vs Lai represents where the race will be in a generic KMT vs DPP race which is neck-to-neck. If Lai does remove Tsai in the DPP primary the damage to the DPP brand will be so bad that he will lose anyway. What the DPP has to do is to transfer Lai's support to Tsai to give Tsai a chance.

Wu is clearly the worst candidate for the KMT and Chu the best. Chu is more likely to win but in case Wu is nominated his support will converge to Chu's levels of support especially if Tsai is on the DPP side.

In Taipei City (臺北市) (PVI Blue +6) there will be a by-election for a Congressional seat which will be critical to what might take place in 2020. DPP candidate for mayor Yao resigned his Taipei City 2nd Congressional seat which is fairly pro-Green in the 2018 race. The seat is PVI Green+7 which makes it like Kaoshiung City (高雄市) (PVI Green +7) or Yilan County(宜蘭縣) (PVI Green +6).

The DPP is eager to retain this seat after a big setback in the 2018 elections. But Ko also will run a candidate to test the waters to see if he can run a viable 2020 race for Prez. Setting up a 3 way race of KMT vs DPP vs Ko.

In the Mayor race the vote split for this district was

Ko 43%KMT 33%DPP 24%

Main issue for Ko is that a pro-Ko candidate is not the same thing as Ko and a by-election will have lower youth turnout. On paper this race is lean Ko but depending how Light Green and Light Blue voters that voted Ko vote I would say this election might be a close 3 way race.

Of course if the pro-Ko candidate wins then chances are high and getting higher that Ko will run in 2020. The DPP is thrown into the same strategic dilemma as the 2018 Taipei City mayor race earlier this year An out all assault by DPP to retain the seat must mean open warfare against the pro-Ko candidate. But if they do not that the pro-Ko candidate wins or loses narrowly then Ko will have more reason to get revenge on DPP in 2020 and make the pro-KO and Deep Green base even more hostile to each other. If the DPP sees that the race is not going their way and tactically backs the pro-Ko candidate then the Deep Green vote will turn on Tsai and might not turnout in 2020. The DPP is stuck.

I say the DPP should go all out. Ko respects power and will not no mercy for the weak. If the DPP shows itself to be weak that will be more reasons for Ko to run in 2020 and win outright by taking over the Pan-Green vote. DPP has to show Ko that Ko cannot win in 2020 and will be at beat a spoiler. The way to show that is to run a strong campaign and go all out for a win. Not sure Tsai is taking that approach. Tsai asked for a public meeting with Ko to in theory discuss development of Taipei city but it was clear it was Tsai trying to make nice with Ko. This is the wrong strategy. Making yourself look weak and hope your rival have sympathy for you and then back down or even back you in 2020 is a foolish strategy. That is now how you deal with bullies which is what Ko really is now.

A look a the "Use Taiwan as opposed to Chinese Taipei" referendum results which I view as a proxy vote for a "safe Taiwan independence vote" (a real one will not take place and will get a lot less support due to the real chance of a massive military strike from PLA if it passes) shows the Blue-Green balance has moved fairly far toward the 1990s patterns. If you break down the 319 townships into (urban, suburban, and rural) and then look at the Pan-Blue vote since 1994 you get

2000 Prez electionMore clear Pan-Blue strength in urban areas and weakness in rural areas. This pattern I call "the system of 2000" since it was in the 2000 election this trend became more clear. Pan-Blue vote Pan-Blue PVITotal 60.07% Urban 61.08% +1.01%Suburban 59.85% -0.22%Rural 57.87% -2.20%

2012 Prez electionKMT's Ma won re-election but disappointment in KMT led to some drop off in KMT turnout and some DPP turnout came back. As a result the Blue urban Green rural pattern increased a bit. Pan-Blue vote Pan-Blue PVITotal 54.37% Urban 56.37% +2.00%Suburban 53.58% -0.79%Rural 49.90% -4.47%

2016 Prez electionDPP landslide victory. Part of DPP Tsai strategy was to appeal to urban progressives to hit KMT where is is strong which seems to have worked as the relative Blue edge in urban areas fell. Deep Blue voters clearly did not turnout which added to the erosion of the "system of 2000." Pan-Blue vote Pan-Blue PVITotal 43.88% Urban 45.13% +1.25%Suburban 43.58% -0.30%Rural 40.97% -2.91%

So we are getting close to "back to the future" where the 1990s patterns are reemerging. One reason has to do with the quick shift by PRC on the economic scale. Back in the 1990s PRC was mostly competing with rural ROC low tech industry so PRC-ROC economic integration tend to hurt rural areas more so they go with DPP. Now advanced provinces on the PRC are mostly economically at par with ROC urban areas so PRC-ROC economic integration now are more likely to hurt urban areas especially when PRC is emerging as a major buyer of ROC agriculture products.

Part of the reason has also to do with gay marriage. A look at the "Marriage should be defined as between a man and a women" vote by urbanization has it at

Yes VoteTotal 72.48%Urban 70.51%Suburban 75.33%Rural 75.87%

So rural and suburban areas are stronger (not unexpectedly) against gay marriage. This cuts across partisan lines. If we look at the "Use Taiwan as opposed to Chinese Taipei" referendum results and divide townships into "Blue" (above average oppose) and "Green"(above average support) and then look at gay marriage referendum results across urbanization and Blue Green you get

Blue Rural areas include districts which are heavy Aborigines who are mostly Christian and even more likely to vote against gay marriage. Other then that Blue vs Green by urbanization has exact same results.

In fact if you just look at the gay marriage vote by "Blue" townships vs "Green" townships you get

Yes VoteBlue 72.08%Green 72.81%

So the typical "Green" township is MORE anti-gay marriage than the typical "Blue" township.

So we are back to the same DPP dilemma as I pointed out earlier where the DPP push for gay marriage to capture the urban progressive vote risks losing its much larger South rural conservative bloc.()

For 2020 NPP and part of the DPP Progressive wing might continue to try to hammer away at the gay marriage issue. KMT's response should be "Excellent, Bring it On !!!"

More data on how Blue-Green split maps on the the Gay marriage referendum which sort of reinforces my point. If you break up the "Use Taiwan as opposed to Chinese Taipei" referendum results by quarters into Deep Blue, Light Blue, Light Green and Deep Green townships and then look at the Gay marriage referendum (Marriage is between a Man and a Women) you get

One good news for the Pan-Green camp on the "Use Taiwan as opposed to Chinese Taipei" referendum is that it seems the in heavy Aborigine townships the vote against is lower than what their PVI vote lean would suggest. This implies that as long political cleavage on ROC continues to be the Unification-Independence debate the Blue-Green 90/10 split of Aborigines should over time shift to something like 65/35. Of course for this to occur the DPP must not make gay marriage a key issue as the same townships had massive anti-gay marriage votes.

The 2018 "Use Taiwan as opposed to Chinese Taipei" referendum realignment movement back to the 1990s story works on a regional basis as well. If you take the larger counties/cities and use traditional grouping you have

北北基(Taipei Taipei Keelong) - Taipei City (臺北市) (PVI Blue +6) New Taipei City (新北市) (PVI Blue +2) Keelong City (基隆市) (PVI Blue +8) Yilan County(宜蘭縣) (PVI Green +6) -> Urbanized service oriented North (Yilan County(宜蘭縣) (PVI Green +6) being add to this more recently as it is becoming much more urbanized and is part o the Greater Taipei media market.)

So Heavy urbanized North 北北基 used to be an area of KMT weakness in the 1990s have shifted to a pro-KMT area in the 2000s is now shifting toward the 1990s pattern again. Hakka North 桃竹苗 was a key KMT area which got stronger for KMT in the 2000s but now shifting back. Central 中彰投 use to lean KMT but became battleground zone in the 2000s is now shifting back to a lean KMT area.Rural South 雲嘉南 was a key DPP area but then became a DPP stronghold in the 2000s is shifting back to a pro-DPP are but the KMT cutting down the DPP edge.Deep Semi-urban South 高高屏 used to be lean DPP but became very strong for DPP in the 2000s is shifting back toward a lean DPP area.

KMT made relative gains in regions that voted above average for Traditional marriage.

53.7% support "92 Consensus" (There is only One China but both sides (ROC and PRC) get to define what that One China is for them). Back in Jan 2018 it was 47.5 PRC is pretty much saying any economic cooperation with ROC must have the current regime on ROC at least accept "92 Consensus" something which DPP rejects.()

For there it was able to construct the shift between KMT and DPP and non-voters between 2014 and 2014 for Kaoshiung City (高雄市) (PVI Green +7). The basic story was that in Kaoshiung City (高雄市) (PVI Green +7 the inactive KMT base came out and pushed KMT's Han to victory with fairly lower levels of DPP defection to KMT.()

and Taichung City(臺中市) (PVI Blue +0) with the story of a good chunk of the 2014 DPP vote not turning out and others defecting to KMT while the KMT picked up only some votes from non-voters.()

Overall DPP KMT NP PFP NPP Ind. Minor DKDPP Tsai 41.4(-4.8 ) 82.8 10.0 13.0 42.8 66.3 30.9 76.1 27.1KMT Wu 29.4(-1.4) 12.0 66.6 71.7 17.8 9.8 9.9 16.0 23.8Wu loses the Independents and a good part of the KMT vote and completely loses PFP to Tsai which is symbolic of the negatively of the Pan-Blue base against Wu. In reality if Wu is the candidate they will come around and make the race close.

Overall DPP KMT NP PFP NPP Ind. Minor DKDPP Tsai 27.8(-5.8 ) 67.5 3.6 9.7 16.0 41.9 16.6 76.1 17.0KMT Chu 53.6(-8.5) 22.6 90.2 85.3 77.7 40.2 41.6 21.0 43.7Tsai loses indepednents and a good part of the DPP base and ties Chu in NPP is symbolic of the rejection of her by the Pan-Greens. Real result will be a lot closer as the Pan-Greens will consolidate around Tsai if she is the DPP candidate.

Overall DPP KMT NP PFP NPP Ind. Minor DKDPP Tsai 17.2(-8.1) 54.9 0.6 9.7 4.1 17.2 9.8 33.7 3.5KMT Chu 32.5(+1.2) 8.6 69.4 56.7 26.6 10.6 23.7 13.1 13.1Ko 41.1(+8.7) 30.2 26.6 33.6 69.3 63.3 48.8 42.4 52.5KO still sweeps PFP and NPP vote. We should start viewing NPP and PFP as Ko partiesi despite clear ideological disagreements between NPP and Ko. NPP should really be seen as a Pan-Green protest vote party just like PFP should be seen as the Pan-Blue protest vote party. In reality Chu and Tsai will consolidate their bases a bit more to make it a neck-to-neck race between Chu and ko. These number should scare Tsai. They look just like Ko vs Ding vs Yao back in the late summer of 2018 for the Taipei mayor race where Ko is now "the Pan-Green candidate."

According to this poll Ko for sure gain ground in the Prez race despite only winning narrowly. I think if it is Tsai vs Wu vs Ko then Ko will actually win. Else he will do well but will mostly be a spoiler for KMT or DPP, most likely DPP.

1/27/2019 will see 5 Legislative by-elections which are the result of the 2018 local elections. 5 MPs resigned from their seat as a result of these 2018 elections.

In Kinmen County(金門縣) (PVI Blue +38) KMT's Yang won the County magistrate race In Tainan City (臺南市) 2nd district (PVI Green +16) DPP Huang won the Mayor race In Changhua County(彰化縣) 1st district (PVI Green +1) KMT Wang won the County magistrate raceIn Taichung City(臺中市) 5th district (PVI Blue +1) KMT Lu won the mayor In Taipei City (臺北市) 2nd district (PVI Green +7) DPP Yao resigned from his seat right before his losing bid for the mayor seat to try to trigger a wave in his favor.

Except for the Taipei City (臺北市) 2nd district the incumbent party should win. In Taipei City (臺北市) 2nd district it is turning into a close 3 way race between the DPP, KMT and a pro-Ko candidate. In the mayor race this district voted Ko 43 KMT 33 DPP 24 but the pro-KO candidate for sure will not have the same pull as Ko and the DPP candidate is stronger than Yao. I say the race right now is almost 33 vs 33 vs 33 with perhaps a slight edge for the DPP candidate. Ko post election has been shifting Pro-Blue in his positions in preparation for a 2020 Prez run and if anything is helping the DPP candidate and hurting the KMT candidate. The result will be up in the air until election day I suspect.

Today is inauguration day for those elected in local elections of 11/24. It is also a day where the various city and count assembly speaker and vice-speakers are elected. Overall it was another disastrous day for the DPP. The KMT captured 19 out of 22 speakers, DPP 1, 1 independent speaker was elected with DPP support, 1 independent speaker was elected with KMT support. The various KMT MLAs and KMT allies held firm in backing the KMT slate of candidates in a show of anti-DPP unity that should have DPP concerned about 2020.

City and county assembly speaker election results()

In Taipei City (臺北市) (PVI Blue +6), DPP was hoping for help from Deep Green and pro-Ko MLAs in a last ditched attempt to stop the KMT. It seems the pro-Ko forces where neutral and if anything backed the KMT in a sign that there is not much hope for a Ko-DPP alliance in the future, for now.

KMT flipped Kaoshiung City (高雄市) (PVI Green +7), a well as ended power sharing in Pingdong County(屏東縣) (Green +8), Yilan County(宜蘭縣) and (PVI Green +6), and New Taipei City (新北市) (PVI Blue +2) as expected as the various Light Blue pro-KMT independents held firm in backing the KMT slate of candidates. Hsinchu City(新竹市) (PVI Blue +5) also flipped as the pro-Green KMT splinter faction NPA merged into KMT making that a foregone conclusion.

The only relative success for the pan-DPP forces was in Jiayi City(嘉義市) (PVI Green +3) where the KMT choose not to support the a pro-KMT Hsiao faction candidate for speaker and allowed a bloc of pro-DPP independents to capture the speaker seat with outside DPP support.

The main shock of the day was in Tainan City (臺南市) (PVI Green +11) where DPP was facing internal rebellion which finally blew up into the open. A bloc of DPP rebel MLAs broke from the DPP, formed an alliance with the pro-KMT NPB MLAs and with outside support of the KMT was able to capture the speaker and vice-speaker position. It seems toward the end the DPP leadership in Tainan City (臺南市) (PVI Green +11) realized what was about to take place and there were rumors that the DPP even tried to open channel of talks to the KMT to form a DPP-KMT aliance to stop the DPP rebel faction which was spurned by the KMT. It seems in Tainan City (臺南市) (PVI Green +11) the DPP is getting what I call "the KMT disease" where a ruling party has been so dominate with strong local roots that the various internal factions started to put its factional interests above the party since the opposition is relatively weak and not a threat. The ruling party internal factions would view the opposition as more as a stepping stone to beat up on its ruling party rivals. This is exactly the same way the KMT lost power in Hsinchu City(新竹市) (PVI Blue +5) city assembly back in the 1990s.

So after a disastrous day the DPP can only achieve trifecta only in Jiayi County(嘉義縣) (PVI Green +10).

I have been looking over the various ROC media coverage election night of the count. My conclusion is that almost all of them are making up the vote count to get market share of eyeballs.

Historically the KMT have party workers at each polling precinct that report back the status of the unofficial count. The Election commission published numbers are certified numbers which are far behind the real count. The KMT used to feed these numbers of KMT owned 中視(CTV) which gave it an edge as far as viewership election night. Other TV channels then counter with their own quick count based on what they claim are their own stringers that provide them current count numbers. The competition between these media houses was so intense that these numbers usually ran father ahead of the KMT count.

In the meantime KMT sold off 中視(CTV) so it started to provide its data to 公視(PTS) which is really public television like PBS instead but it does not matter that much since all other other media counts are way faster than the KMT count.

Looking at the history of each channels count for the 6 spherical municipalities it is clear what the "vote count" algorithms is.

a) Compute an internal made up count by looking at the KMT numbers, look at key precinct results as report by the election commission where it exists and combine it with exit polls to derive what the count SHOULD be. b) For each city first determine if the result is a foregone conclusion. If so just ride the KMT wave and report the 公視(PTS) numbers. But if your rivals are running ahead of the KMT count then do the same and show the internal computed count.b) For each city see if our core viewers would be interested in the result (for Pan-Blue channels it would be Taipei City (臺北市) (PVI Blue +6), Taichung City(臺中市) (PVI Blue +0), and Kaoshiung City (高雄市) (PVI Green +7) while for Pan-Green channels it would be Taipei City (臺北市) (PVI Blue +6), Tainan City (臺南市) (PVI Green +11) and Kaoshiung City (高雄市) (PVI Green +7))

For Taipei City (臺北市) (PVI Blue +6), it is clear all channels ran well ahead of the KMT count but by 6:30PM it was clear that Election commission number are coming in much slower than expected and there was a risk that the TV channels will run so far ahead that it could not converge to the right result when they came in. So around 6:45PM all of them pretty much slowed the report of Taipei City (臺北市) (PVI Blue +6) number to a trickle and by 9PM most of them switched over to the KMT numbers. The state controlled 華視(CTS) was very bad as it internal model had DPP Yao doing much better than how he ended up. So its count at 7:15PM was Ko 425,305 KMT Ding 418,256 DPP Yao 274,099 when the KMT count at the same time was Ko 206,917 KMT Ding 206,274 DPP Yao 84,919. But the final result ended being Ko 580,663 KMT Ding 577,096 DPP Yao 244,342. So 華視(CTS) actually report number for Yao at 7:15PM that ended up higher that what he eventually go. 華視(CTS) realized its mistake soon after that as more results were coming in so it slowed just stopped reporting Yao's numbers since they were embarrassments.

New Taipei City (新北市) (PVI Blue +2) was a foregone conclusion so every channel obeyed a truce and just reported the KMT numbers.

For Taoyuan City (桃園市) (PVI Blue +5) the official count was especially slow so after racing ahead all media channels just pretty much stopped updating their own fake numbers starting around 6:00PM and as the KMT numbers caught up just started using the KMT number starting around 7:15PM in a coordinated truce. This mostly worked because the internal projections mostly matched the real result.

For Taichung City(臺中市) (PVI Blue +0) all the channels race ahead but by 8:15PM just switched over to the KMT numbers as it caught up with its own fake numbers. This mostly worked because the internal projections mostly matched the real result.

Tainan City (臺南市) (PVI Green +11) was a real fiasco. Since it is a foregone conclusion and the Pan-Blue voters in the North do not care, the pro-Blue channels just showed the KMT numbers. The Pan-Green channels need to compete so they all raced ahead with their made up numbers. Problem is that their model was off and projected a much higher vote share for the DPP and KMT candidates they what they really got. Lets take 台視(TTV). At 7:15PM it had KMT 285,691(34.65%) DPP 366,214 (44.42%). But the real result at the end was KMT 32.37% DPP 38.02%. Around that time it realized their mistake so they stopped updating the KMT and DPP vote and kept on updating the others vote so by 9:45PM it was KMT 285,691(31.28%) DPP 366,214 (40.03%). So for 2 hours the DPP and KMT vote count did not move at all but all the others did to adjust for the mistake of the initial projections. Other Pan-Green channels were a similar story.

For Kaoshiung City (高雄市) (PVI Green +7) all channels raced ahead since it was a high profile race. The internal models of all channels projected a much closer race than it really was and after racing ahead they had to adjust to the real result. Pan-Green 三立(SET) numbers show this. At 8PM it had KMT 540,832 DPP 528,320 but the KMT numbers are already showing the KMT candidate pulling well ahead. So the 三立(SET) numbers by 8:45PM it was KMT 594,508 DPP 529,824. So the KMT vote count increase by 54K in 45 minutes but the DPP vote count went up around 1K. Clearly a sign that they knew they messed up and had to correct.

Looking at the data we can conclude that all these media channels have no real infrastructure for any informal vote count but are just making up numbers based on what they THINK the result will be.

I think all these poll for now underestimate Tsai and Wu and overestimate Ko.

Main problem for Tsai is that despite that fact her best shot at winning reelection would to face off against KMT's Wu. But if it Tsai vs Wu then Ko would have a reason to get into the race. Just like in 2016 USA it it was Trump vs Sanders then that would give Mike Bloomberg a chance to get into the race. I think Ko has a real shot at winning the whole thing if it is Ko vs Tsai vs Wu even if Ko is overestimated and Tsai/Wu are underestimated.

It seems the upheaval leading to the DPP loss of the Tainan City (臺南市) (PVI Green +11) city assembly speakership has its roots in the vicious DPP mayor primary earlier in the year.

The DPP primary for mayor came down to two front-runners. Huang(黃偉哲) who was backed by the powerful New Tide faction (Huang is a former member of the faction and considered a "friend of the faction" and the winner of the primary and went on to win in the general election for mayor()

and Chen(陳亭妃) who was the leader of the anti-New Tide faction()

A key surrogate of Huang(黃偉哲) is city assembly MLA Chiu(邱莉莉) and is the leader of the New Tide faction in the city assembly()

While a key surrogate of Chen(陳亭妃) is the current vice-speaker of the city assembly MLA Guo(郭信良) who is the leader of the anti-New Tide bloc in the city assembly. Guo(郭信良) is so close to the unmarried Chen(陳亭妃) that their political enemies in the DPP and KMT have spread rumors that they are having an affair ()

So in the end Huang(黃偉哲) went on the win the DPP primary and the general election. The DPP lost ground in the city assembly as well in the general election but the balance of power shifted in favor of the New Tide faction even as the DPP and pro-DPP independents seems to have maintained a majority. Guo(郭信良) had hoped to become speaker and if not at least retain his role as vice-speaker. The New Tide faction seems to have made a call to capture both the speaker and vice-speaker of the city assembly for itself and railroaded Chiu(邱莉莉) as the DPP nominee for city assembly speaker.

The New Tide calculation was that it is in theory possible for the DPP anti-New Tide faction led by Guo(郭信良) to try to form an alliance with the KMT and its allies. But in practice the KMT leader of the city assembly Hsieh(謝龍介) was on very bad terms with Chen(陳亭妃) and Guo(郭信良) where there is still and outsanding lawsuit of slander between them when Hsieh(謝龍介) publicly claimed that Chen(陳亭妃) and Guo(郭信良) were a couple. ()

The New Tide faction was further relieved when in a meeting of the KMT caucus Hsieh(謝龍介) denounced Guo(郭信良) as a crook and that the KMT and its allies would have no truck with them. But it seems that was for show. In reality Hsieh(謝龍介) made a call to work with Guo(郭信良)'s bloc in order to defeat the DPP. Guo(郭信良) was willing to give the KMT the vice-speaker position but Hsieh(謝龍介) turned it down and said it should go to the bloc of KMT allies to make sure they do not defect.

The signal that the grand alliance is on is when as the vote for speaker began and to DPP's shock Guo(郭信良) declared that he his leaving the DPP. Then to the New Tide faction's shock the KMT and allies voted en mass for Guo(郭信良) along with 3 other pro-Guo(郭信良) DPP MLAs who also quit the party allowing for the grand alliance to defeat Chiu(邱莉莉). One of the rebel DPP is actually Chen(陳亭妃)'s sister. A Guo(郭信良)-Hsieh(謝龍介) alliance would be if the Congressional Black Caucus rebelled and joined forces with a Tea Party controlled GOP to defeat the mainstream Democratic party candidate to Speaker of the House. It was unthinkable until it actually happen. Guo(郭信良) and Hsieh(謝龍介) who had contact but never face to face to avoid the DPP high command or New Tide faction from figuring out what was going on. It was a true victory of spy vs spy tactics.

I think Lai + Tsai represents the core DPP base (22.31%) while those that KMT ex-Speaker Wang and KMT leader Wu could defect to Ko or DPP if Chu is the candidate. Still overall Chu is looking pretty strong.

DPP PM Lai(賴清德) resigns after the budget was passed to take responsibly for the DPP defeat. It is possible he might challange DPP Prez Tsai in the DPP primary in the Spring.()

Ironically the new Cabinet will be a "cabinet of losers" with the loser of the New Taipei City (新北市) (PVI Blue +2) race Su(蘇貞昌) (who is a former head of DPP and former PM) as the new PM()

The new DPM will be Chen(陳其邁) who was the loser of the Kaoshiung City (高雄市) (PVI Green +7) race.()

It also seems former mayor of Taichung City(臺中市) (PVI Blue +0) and loser of his bid for re-election Lin(林佳龍) will be the new Secretary of Transportation ()

Prez Tsai and PM Su are long time rivals in the DPP and have a open history of personal animosity. That she will accept Su as PM seems to indicate that she is determined to win the DPP primary and go on to win re-election. In many ways people like Su, Chen and Lin are top political talent in the DPP so they coming into the cabinet does make sense even as the optics of "cabinet of losers" seems negative.

I looked over the methods on the ROC political bloghttps://whogovernstw.org/2018/12/25/yuchenchang4/that used Ecological Inference on the precinct data between 2014 and 2018 elections for mayors/county magistrates that computes implied vote flows

()

The main problem with the analysis is that it treats most 3rd party candidates in the same bucket as Non-voters since its main goal is try to estimate the Blue-Green direct swing between 2014 and 2018. I took the raw data and refined it to take into account of all third party votes to get a more clear picture and gives a good idea of how significant 3rd party candidates got their votes. I will present most of them one county and city at a time.

The KMT had dominated this county historically but lost it to proto-DPP in 1981 in a shocking defeat. After that the local factions had drifted to DPP and the KMT only won once since (in 2005.) 2014 was a DPP wave year just like 2018 is a KMT wave year. Here the 2014 DPP vote had huge defections to the KMT(10.9) and KMT rebel(2.1) and another 6.4 became non-voters. Only the flit side the 2014 KMT vote was is core vote and very little of it defected to the DPP (0.7) or became non-voters (0.6) but some went to the KMT rebel (2.2). One would also have expected that marginal KMT voters would have not turned out in 2014 but would turn out in 2018. It seems most of that increased turnout went to the KMT rebel.

So the KMT rebel hurt the KMT in the sense that the marginal KMT voter who still must harbor some dissatisfaction with KMT high command came out to vote mostly for the KMT rebel. Separately had the KMT rebel not run most of the 2014 DPP voter that voted for the KMT rebel (2.1) most likely would have not voted or perhaps voted KMT.

What killed the DPP was mostly the massive net defection to the KMT (10.9-.7 = 10.2) and a large chunk just choose not to vote (6.4). This seems to be the reason why the KMT won by a large margin despite the KMT rebel splitting the KMT vote and capturing a good part of the marginal KMT voter that failed to vote in 2014.

As for what this means for 2020, it was an open seat and the the DPP was very divided in 2018 with the burden of anti-incumbency while the KMT candidate was very popular and has cross partisan appeal. The KMT could perhaps count on the 2014 DPP vote that failed to vote (6.4) not coming out in 2020 either but a good part of the 2014 DPP vote that defected to the KMT (10.9) most likely will swing back to DPP. Assuming most of the 2018 KMT rebel vote flow back to KMT in 2020 it seems that the KMT and DPP should be evenly matched in 2020 in Yilan County(宜蘭縣) (PVI Green +6).

The KMT has historically dominated this deep Blue county and had only lost the county magistrate seat once in 1968 before the the 1980s when the DPP was able to win 3 times in a row as it was able to eat into the KMT Hakka base as well as take advantage of KMT local factional splits. The KMT by the 2000s had restored order but the factional battle continued. In 2014 a key KMT factional leader (and ex-county magistrate) ran as a DPP backed independent and took a good part of the KMT base with him to lose narrowly to the KMT candidate who is his old rival. In 2018 The DPP ran the KMT factional leader's on who clearly does not have the same pull on the KMT base as his father while the KMT incumbent retired on a 2 term limit making this an open seat. KMT splinter MKT also ran and seem to be the favorite to win before KMT pulled it out

The Ko backed MKT candidate had cross partisan appeal and looked to pick up a large bloc of the 2014 DPP vote. In the end the 2014 DPP vote had defections to the KMT (4.3) and MKT (6.5) and lost some to become non-voters (2.6) but kept almost half of its 2014 vote (15.8 ). It kept enough of the 2014 DPP vote to prevent MKT from winning. The KMT ran a fairly unknown lightweight as a compromise candidate to balance between different local factions and lost a bunch of votes to MKT (8.5). Marginal KMT voters that failed to vote in 2014 in the DPP wave did not come out that strongly and mostly went to MKT(3.5). But the KMT strategy worked. By keeping the KMT camp outside of MKT unified, losses to MKT was made up by the fact that 2014 DPP defection to MKT was lower than expected.

As for 2020 it is clear that it really depends on if Ko will run. If Ko runs then part of the MKT vote could go Ko especially the part that came from the 2014 DPP vote (6.5). If not most of that will go back to the DPP but the rest will all go KMT. Just like every election Hsinchu County (新竹縣) (PVI Blue +14) will be very strong for KMT at the national level.

The DPP incumbent had cross-partisan appeal and governed as a moderate. The KMT candidate was the same as the losing KMT candidate in 2014. As a result even though most of the 2014 KMT rebels vote went back to the KMT candidate (9.4) but the marginal KMT voter that did not turn out in 2014 only showed up to vote for the KMT candidate in small numbers (2.1). The popular DPP incumbent also suffered little net defection to the KMT candidate (1.1 vs 0.6) and even picked up some of the 2014 KMT rebel vote (1.6). And lastly despite the poor national environment for the DPP a small amount of the 2014 DPP vote became non-voters(2.9).

2014 and 2018 were the first time the KMT lost 2 elections in a row since the early 1960s and this seems to indicate that the dominance of the KMT here is not what it used to be and 2020 lead for the Pan-Blue forces here will be less than what one would normally expect. It is true the the popular DPP incumbent has a lot to do with it and the strong KMT performance in city assembly elections bode well for the KMT in 2020. Still these trends show that this city clearly is trending DPP unless the 2020 KMT national campaign can do something to get the marginal KMT voter that did not show in 2014 and 2018 to turn out.

All numbers are in % of eligible electorate (DPPR18 are the 2018 DPP/TSU rebels and IND14 are the two Independent candidates (one with a pan-Blue background and one with a pan-Green background which I grouped together since the pan-Blue background independent ran a fairly moderate campaign while the pan-Green background independent ran a fairly strong anti-DPP campaign.)

The DPP candidate is a moderate and have a pretty good image but had to go through a vicious DPP primary in this open seat. The 2014 election was DPP wave election with a DPP superstar Lai (who later became PM) as its candidate so the DPP was always going to lose ground regardless. The KMT candidate is the son of a former Tainan County magistrate but is seen as a lightweight without real local roots. The DPP candidate achieved almost no direct net swing to the KMT (0.6 vs 0.5) but lost a lot of ground to the DPP rebels (5.1) and the two independents (10.0) while a good chunk of the 2014 DPP surge dissipated into non-voters(10.4). The KMT candidate got medium size boost from marginal KMT voters that did not vote in 2014 (3.9) but so did the DPP candidate from from what is most likely non-New Tide DPP voters (2.3) as 2014 DPP candidate Lai was in the New Tide faction. The key in this race was how much of the anti-DPP energy was absorbed by the two independent candidates one of which (ironic the one with the pan-Green background one) ran on a very strong anti-DPP platform.

These numbers show that had KMT ran a stronger candidate or campaign AND the two independents did not run then enough of the anti-DPP vote that went to the independents might have gone KMT and given them a victory, as improbable as that seems when the election season started. The mass defections of the 2014 DPP vote to DPP rebels, independents and non-voters shows the depth latent anti-DPP anti-incumbency feeling as well as the wound of the viscous DPP primary campaign. DPP's loss of the city county speaker seat in Dec is another sign of the ongoing DPP civil war between the New Tide and anti-New Tide factions. All of this bodes ill for DPP in 2020 which could unexpectedly lose a lot of ground to a KMT that can get its act together (which of course is a big if.)

All numbers are in % of eligible electorate (DPPR14 is the 2014 DPP rebel, KMTR14 i the 2014 KMT rebel, IND14 is the 2014 independent while NPA18 is the 2018 NPA candidate, KO18 is the pro-Ko independent and IND18 is the 2018 independent)

The DPP incumbent defeated the sitting KMT mayor in 2014 in a shock DPP wave victory where the DPP rebel candidate seems to have also eaten into the KMT vote. He went on to govern as a moderate and was able to build bridges to the KMT base. This time around the KMT ran its 2014 sitting mayor which failed to create a new image for the KMT. Making it worse for the KMT splinter faction and DPP ally NPA broke with the DPP and ran its leader as well. The DPP candidate actually had a net gain from the KMT relative to 2014 (1.6 vs 0.7). The KMT failed to pick up marginal KMT voters that failed to vote in 2014 (0.2) and any such marginal KMT voter actually went to the NPA candidate (1.6). Part of the 2014 DPP rebel vote went back to the DPP (7.0) but the part that was the Pan-Blue vote that voted the 2014 DPP rebel actually mostly went to NPA (4.2) vs KMT (0.7). The national tide against the DPP did not lead to the loss of the 2014 DPP vote to the non-voters in large numbers (0.6) due to the popularity of the DPP incumbent. As a result the DPP incumbent won nearly 50% of the vote and decisively defeated the KMT as the anti-DPP vote was split between the KMT and NPA. This is the worst ever defeat of the KMT every in the mayor race here.

As for 2020, after the elections NPA merged back into the KMT so in theory the KMT can turn the tables on the DPP. Still the KMT allowing the DPP candidate to win almost 50% of the vote here in a 3 way race shows that this city is trending DPP and unless the KMT can come up with a slate of candidates to appeal to this urban liberal progressive fairly high tech city the trend toward the DPP might continue despite historical KMT strength here.

In the 2014 DPP wave the DPP candidate unexpectedly defeated the sitting KMT mayor in a shock upset. Since taking DPP incumbent was able to build bridges with various local KMT voting blocs and was in a strong position to win re-election. The KMT high command tried to get its 2014 candidate to re-run for his seat but he declined seeing the race as unwinnable. The KMT can a second tier candidate which merely provoked his primary opponent to run as a KMT rebel. The DPP incumbent was able to achieve a large net swing from the KMT relative to 2014 (4.3 vs 0.4) but due to the poor national environment dd lose a good chunk of the 2014 DPP vote to non-voters. The relative weakness KMT candidate mean that a fairly small section of the marginal KMT voter that did not vote in 2014 can out for the KMT candidate (1.3) while the DPP candidate made similar gains with 2014 non-voters (1.4). Still looking at these results the 2014 KMT sitting mayor must be kicking himself for not running give how large of the 2014 DPP vote became non-voters. Had he run he could have potentially limited the net swing relative to 2014 to the DPP and if the KMT rebel not run he could have fought the DPP incumbent to a neck to neck race.

As for 2020 the KMT did fairly well in the city assembly which seems to imply the DPP incumbent's victory is more personal. If the KMT slate of candidates in 2020 are from the first tier one should expect that they can claw back some of the 2014 KMT vote that went DPP this time and assuming the 2014 DPP surge which went back to non-voters stay that way the city might trend somewhat to the DPP but the KMT should have a distinct edge. This is a good deal better of what the KMT feared earlier in 2018 when it looked like the DPP was going to win in a landslide.

Historically the KMT dominated this county as the power Huang and Lin factions are aligned with KMT. The KMT only lost the county magistrate seats in 1954 but after that was able to dominate with its alliance with local factions. By the mid 1990s the DPP had grown to a point to make the county competitive and in 2001 the Lin faction defected to DPP and the Lin faction pretty much took over the DPP and making this county one of the most pro-DPP county. In 2014 in a DPP wave election the DPP Lin faction based incumbent defeated her Huang faction KMT candidate by a large margin.

In 2018 this seat was a open seat and the DPP primary was pretty vicious where one bloc of the Lin faction mostly subsumed itself into DPP and backed a DPP candidate without a Lin faction background. A rebel Lin faction was defeated in the DPP primary but ran a DPP rebel candidate with tactic support from the Lin faction DPP incumbent. The KMT with their main Huang faction leaders mostly giving up on winning at the county level ran a tier two candidate without a Huang faction background. As a result there were talks that the some of the Huang faction vote would defect to the DPP rebel in a Huang-Rebel Lin alliance to deal with the now powerful DPP while most of the Lin faction vote stayed loyal to DPP. When the DPP candidate won by a large margin with the KMT candidate doing poorly it seems that narrative we true. But looking at the swings it seems the story is a good deal more complex.

It seems a good part of the 2014 DPP vote were Lin faction voters that defected to the DPP Lin faction rebel(8.3). Some of the Lin faction vote also became non-voters in a anti-DPP year where a large amount of the 2014 DPP vote became non-voters(11.5). At the same time the 2014 KMT vote which in large part is the Huang faction vote also split. The DPP achieved large net swing against the KMT relative to 2014 (6.4 vs 1.2) mostly because the anti-Lin Huang faction vote who are put off by the second tier and non-Huang faction KMT candidate defected to the DPP. Some of the 2014 KMT vote did defect to the DPP Lin faction rebel that it was less then what one would think it is (2.8.) The KMT did win some marginal KMT voters (most non-Huang) from 2014 Non-voters (4.6) but the DPP candidate without Lin faction background also gained from marginal anti-Lin DPP voters that now turned out from 2014 non-voters(3.3). There large number of shifts created a DPP majority despite a strong DPP rebel performance that ate into the 2014 DPP vote.

As for 2020, this set of churn gives the KMT a chance to over-perform. These shifts show that the DPP is vulnerable to losing a large chunk of the Lin faction vote. The Lin rebel bloc seems open to working with the KMT. The losing DPP rebel Lin faction candidate actually joined the KMT administration in Kaohsiung City. If the KMT can get the Huang faction to mobilize for the KMT (the results in the county assembly vote showed that the Huang faction vote still loyally voted KMT at the county assembly level even as some defected to DPP) and somehow get the Lin rebel faction to ally with the KMT then the KMT could challenge the DPP domination here.

All numbers are in % of eligible electorate(KMTR18 is the 2018 KMT rebel from Hsiao faction, IND18 is the 2018 independent, DPPR14 is the 2014 DPP rebel, LEFT14 is the 2014 Leftist candidate, and IND14 is the 2014 independent candidate.)

The 2014 DPP winner of an open seat was not a very strong candidate and the 2014 KMT loser was actually very strong but the DPP won because it was a wave year. The DPP incumbent was not popular and was expected to lose re-election especially after the KMT decided to bring back their ex-mayor that was term limited out in 2014 as their candidate. Then things went sideways for the KMT. The KMT ex-mayor candidate was fairly hostile to the pro-KMT Hsaio faction. The prospect of an anti-Hsaio faction mayor drove the Hsiao faction leader to run as a KMT rebel. Due to the anti-DPP wave the DPP candidate clearly lost a bunch of 2014 DPP votes to non-voters(6.0). Due to the KMT rebel the net DPP to KMT swing was tinty (1.2 vs 0.9) as the KMT rebel took in a lot of the 2014 DPP vote that was negative on the DPP (4.9). Also the KMT rebel also took in some marginal KMT voters that did not vote in 2014 (2.8 ) which was more that that turned out for the KMT candidate (0.9). The KMT candidate also lost some of the 2014 KMT vote to the KMT rebel (5.0). The DPP still lost despite this because the DPP losses to the KMT rebel and non-voters were larger than on would expect given the 2014 DPP wave was not as strong here due to the relative weakness of the DPP candidate.

As for prospects for 2020 the KMT needs to figure out how to reconcile the Hsiao faction and get them to unite behind the KMT effort here in 2020. The anti-Hsiao faction part of the KMT stood aside and let a pro-DPP speaker to be elected in the city assembly rather than the Hsiao faction bloc getting the speaker seat. So the split in the KMT here is quite large and unless they can unite the KMT will still be at a disadvantage here in 2020 since at the national level this city tend to lean DPP anyway.

In the 2014 DPP wave election the DPP won by an unexpected large margin in the race for an open seat. The wave in 2018 was clearly for the KMT as the large number of retired public sector workers here are very steamed at the DPP for public sector pension reform. The KMT can its old incumbent that was term limited out in 2014. The prospect of the DPP being beaten and most likely badly and the KMT high command bring back the old country magistrate which blocks the progress of emerging KMT politicians provoked a massive KMT rebellion with 3 separate KMT rebels plus 2 other independents to all try cash in on the anti-DPP wave. As a result the net KMT swing from DPP relative to 2014 was small (3.7 vs 2.1) but the DPP lost a large bloc of votes to the KMT rebels (4.6) and of course to non-voters (9.9) as angry 2014 DPP voters stayed home or defected mostly to KMT rebels. The KMT candidate did benefit from marginal KMT voters that did not vote in 2014 to come out for him (3.4). All in all even though the KMT candidate lost a large chunk of the 2014 KMT vote to KMT rebels (9.1) the massive defections from the 2014 DPP vote to the KMT candidate, KMT rebels and non-voters was able to carry the KMT candidate to victory.

As for 2020 it seems that as long as the KMT could unite the various KMT factions who opportunistically defied KMT high command to try to cash in on the anti-DPP wave separately then the KMT could do very well in this county which in the last couple of cycles were trending KMT anyway as the anti-DPP anger does not seem will dissipate anywhere close to enough to make this county competitive for DPP in 2020.

With Tsai determined to run re-election I doubt that Lai would run so there is not much point in polling him but with Lai as DPP candidate it would be which I think is useful as how Lai polls today will most likely how Tsai will poll once she formally gets re-nominated.

Ko 33Chu(KMT) 29 Lai(DPP) 21

It seems for now if Ko runs then it will be very close between Ko and Chu. One has to assume that in such a race the DPP will pull out all the cards at the end of the campaign to get the DPP base to come back and the KMT will do the same and the race will look something like

Ko 30Chu(KMT) 31Tsai(DPP) 25

I get the felling that without an organization around Ko he will end up doing worse than this. Ko seems to be playing his cards close to his chest on if he will run and most likely decided in June. He has to be sure that his lead is so large that it can overcome the lack of a party organization for GOTV operations.

2014 saw a pro-DPP wave and both the KMT incumbent and DPP candidate were pretty strong candidates in a narrow (for a deep blue county) victory for KMT. This time around it is an open seat and the KMT candidate faced a rival KMT faction challenge in the form of a KMT rebel. But this time the KMT wave was pretty strong here and the DPP candidate could avoid losing a significant swing to the KMT candidate relative to 2014 (4.8 to 1.1) even as the strong nature of the DPP candidate limited the loss of the 2014 DPP vote to non-voters(2.9.) All in all the KMT lost fairly small part of 2014 KMT vote to the KMT rebel (1.4) which ensured an unexpectedly large KMT victory. The DPP candidate should still get a lot of credit to making the county magistrate race competitive in 2009 and 2014. The last time the proto-DPP was competitive here was for a couple of cycles in the 1960s and beyond that it is always KMT by a landslide.

As for 2020 it seems the the KMT factions were able to put aside their differences and did not vote in any significant numbers for the KMT rebel in 2018 which means this should be a strong KMT county in 2020.

Taipei City (新北市) 2nd district was a disastrous result for the pro-Ko forces as the pro-Ko candidate did poorly which shows the pro-Ko vote is not transferable. The DPP ran a strong candidate to ensure they do not lose this seat while the KMT and pro-KO candidate are second tier candidates.

DPP 47.76%KMT 39.03%pro-Ko 11.99%pro-NPP 1.11%Ind. 0.11%

Looking at precinct results it seems that the Green vote consolidated around the DPP candidate this time and the pro-KO candidate if anything took more votes from the KMT candidate. Assuming the pro-Ko candidate took equally from both Pan-Blue and Pan-Green camps the Green-Blue gap is around 10% which in Green+7 district implies a national Blue-Green split of 52/48.

Taichung City(臺中市) 5th district saw the KMT run a solid candidate while the DPP candidate was a second tier candidate. The result was

KMT 57.78%DPP 38.62%Pro-PFP 3.42%Ind. 0.18%

The Blue-Green lead was over 22% which in a Blue+4 district implies a national Blue/Green split of 57/43.

I think given the differences in candidate quality and the fact that Central Taiwan Province is drifting Blue last election while Northern Urban Taiwan Province is drifting Green the true Blue/Green national split is somewhere in the middle, something like 55/45 which would be consistent with recently polling.

The fact that the DPP was able to win Taipei City (新北市) 2nd district by a significant margin implies that DPP has not collapsed as a result of the 2018 local election anti-DPP wave and that Tsai for sure will certainly be the DPP candidate for Prez in 2020.

All numbers are in % of eligible electorate(KMTR14 was the 2014 KMT rebel, TSU14 was the 2014 ex-TSU independent, DPPR18 was the 2018 DPP rebel, KMTR18 was the 2018 KMT rebel, and TSU18 was the same 2014 ex-TSU independent running again with support from Ko.)

In 2014 DPP won by a larger than expected margin in an open seat election in a pro-DPP wave election. The 2014 DPP winner and incumbent went on to have a mediocre administration and was vulnerable in a 2018 election that has any sign of an anti-DPP wave. It turned out that 2018 saw a large anti-DPP wave and the KMT candidate won a large net swing from the DPP relative to 2014 (7.9 vs 1.4). The DPP also lost a good chunk of its 2014 vote to non-voters (5.3). In addition marginal KMT voters that did not vote in 2014 came out to vote in 2018 for the KMT candidate (4.4) to add up to larger than expected KMT victory over the DPP incumbent.

As for 2020 the large scale of DPP defection to the KMT and non-voters plus the return of marginal KMT voters are a fairly bad sign for the DPP. This county historically has been fairly elastic at the local level but somewhat less elastic at the national level. That is about the only saving grace for DPP which for sure will face a significant swing against it here but perhaps a smaller scale than these numbers suggest.

Pingdong County(屏東縣) (Green +8) is similar to Yilan County(宜蘭縣) (PVI Green +6) in the sense that it was always dominated by the KMT but suddenly in 1981 both counties flipped to the opposition and since then the DPP or proto-DPP has dominated the county. The KMT have not won a county magistrate race here since 1993 in a controversial election with heavy KMT negative campaigning against the DPP incumbent Su (and now PM as well as and long time rival of Tsai). Both Prez Tsai and PM Su are from this county which adds to the DPP strength here.

In 2014 as a part of the DPP wave the DPP won the open seat here in a landslide. The DPP winner went on to have a fairly strong administration and seems that it will win easily against a fairly lackluster KMT candidate. The result involved a lot of vote swaps between the 2014 KMT and 2014 DPP vote with a slight net advantage to the KMT (5.6 to 4.7). The 2014 DPP vote shift to KMT is clear (5.6) as part of the anti-DPP wave. The 2014 KMT vote shift to DPP (4.7) is less clear. Most likely they are local KMT factional voters that shifted to the DPP incumbent as part of deals made between the DPP and the local KMT factions especially given the fact the fairly lackluster KMT candidate was not expected to win. The strong Pan-Blue bloc performance in the county assembly seems to imply this sort of ticket splitting. The 2014 DPP vote clearly lost at lot of ground to non-voters (6.7) as the 2014 DPP wave shifts to an anti-DPP wave in 2018. The KMT in 2018 closed the gap but mostly did not come close to dislodging the DPP due partly to the KMT rebel that split the vote and the fact that it failed to mobilize KMT marginal votes that did not vote to come out to vote in 2018(only 2.2).

As for 2020 it is clear that DPP will lose a lot of its edge here but it being Tsai's come county the DPP lead here should still be significant.

This rural county has historically been dominated by the KMT but the DPP started being competitive here at the national level in the 1990s. The powerful pro-KMT Chang faction still kept the KMT in charge and was only overthrown in 2005 when the KMT lost the county magistrate seat for the first time ever. In 2014 the KMT ran the sister of the Chang faction leader who was a very strong candidate but she was defeated in the 2014 DPP wave in the race for an open seat. The DPP winner went on to alienate certain DPP factions but was expected to win re-election.

The KMT ran the same strong candidate as 2014 and she kept the race close. In the end she won by a large margin as the 2014 DPP vote splintered with a very large bloc (9.3) going to non-voters in a anti-DPP wave year. The KMT candidate also got a solid net swing relative to the 2014 DPP vote (3.4 vs 0.7) and gained some marginal KMT voters that did not vote in the 2014 DPP wave year but came out to vote this time (4.3) The DPP rebel did not help but the scale of the KMT victory made it irreverent to the result.

As for 2020 it is not clear that the power of the pro-KMT Chang faction will be out in force. Some of the DPP demobilization relative to 2014 was not part of the anti-DPP wave but anger by local DPP factions against the DPP incumbent. Most likely some of the 2014 DPP vote that went to non-voters(9.3) will come back in 2020 for DPP. If the KMT Chang faction goes all out in 2020 then the KMT could potentially fight the DPP to a draw. If not the DPP should have a small edge here now the the DPP incumbent has been moved from the scene.

This battleground city has been historically dominated by the KMT until the urban parts of it it became competitive in the late 1960s and the rural parts became competitive in the late 1990s. The local pro-KMT Red and Black factions had been powerful but have declined over the years. The 2014 DPP wave saw the DPP win by a large margin as the local KMT faction vote defected.

The DPP incumbent was seen as effective and should have been a strong candidate for re-election. The KMT put forward a long time MP that is strong in the urban parts of the city but was able to united the rural KMT factions behind her campaign. The anti-DPP wave saw the 2014 DPP vote lose a large numbers to non-voters (7.5) and the KMT was able to generate large net swing vs the 2014 DPP vote (5.6 vs 0.4). Some marginal KMT voters that did not vote in 2014 turned out to vote for the KMT (2.5) but not by massive numbers. It seems that pattern indicates that the large scale KMT defeat in 2014 was due to massive ticket splitting by KMT local faction voters most of whom came back this year. It also shows that the DPP incumbent being fairly popular did prevent a even larger surge by marginal KMT candidates to come out to vote.

As for 2020 the 2014 votes lost most likely will be hard to recover. If the KMT national candidate and consolidate the KMT urban vote here as well as the local factional vote in rural areas the KMT should have a district advantage. An extra bonus for the KMT is if they can fuel the anti-DPP anger at the national level to get more marginal KMT voters that failed to vote in 2014 and 2018 to come out.

Tsai is determined to run for re-election so it makes no sense to look at polls where the DPP candidate is former PM Lai.

The KMT is now in a dilemma. The KMT candidates like Chu Wang and perhaps Wu all tends to run behind Ko if Ko runs but will defeat DPP Tsai easily especially if KMT front-runner Chu runs and Ko does not. Ko will decide in June if he will run. Newly elected but popular Kaohsiung mayor Han does not want to run but might be drafted by the KMT to stop Ko but that will make a mockery of the KMT primary process that will run in April to June.

If it ends up being KMT Han vs DPP Tsai vs Ko it will be a battle of generations. Looking at the age breakdown of the TVBS poll is interesting

The next trial of strength would be the 3/16 legislative by-elections. 3 out of the 4 by-elections are because sitting MPs were elected to country magistrate/mayor positions back in Nov 2018. They are Jinmen County(金門縣) (Blue +38), Changhua County(彰化縣) 1st District (Green +1), and Tainan City (臺南市) 2nd District (Green +16). The last one is New Taipei City (新北市) 3rd District (Green +7) where the sitting DPP MP was convinced of corruption and removed.

The Jinmen County(金門縣) (Blue +38) race will be KMT vs KMT rebel which most likely will go KMT. In Changhua County(彰化縣) 1st District (Green +1) it seems the KMT will win with ease. The other two are the interesting ones.

Even though New Taipei City (新北市) 3rd District (Green +7) is a DPP stronghold (it went DPP narrowly even in the 2008 KMT landslide) the DPP felt that they are in danger of losing so they put in an DPP ex-MP of this district Yu(余天) who is a well known singer in the entertainment world. ()

The KMT candidate is not well known but due to the KMT Han wave and the anti-DPP tide it seems that the KMT has a narrow edge here and could very well win.

In Tainan City (臺南市) 2nd District (Green +16) the KMT ran its superstar of the city Hsieh(謝龍介) who is the leader of the KMT city assembly caucus. Hsieh is an expert in the Minnan dialect and has strong appeal to the traditionalist (but not radical independence) DPP voter base. ()

The DPP also ran a city council member but is seen as not as charismatic as Hsieh. The main DPP problem here is the DPP candidate is from the New Tide faction. This provoked a DPP rebel candidate Chen(陳筱諭) who is the daughter of a pro-DPP ex-city assembly member. Chen has youth and beauty appeal and is close to the ex-DPP Prez Chen and is expected to pull in the DPP anti-New Tide vote.()

The net effect of a KMT superstar candidate and an anti-New Tide candidate now risk the DPP losing a district which has the largest pro-Green lean on the entire Taiwan Province. If anything the chance of the DPP losing ainan City (臺南市) 2nd District (Green +16) might be greater than New Taipei City (新北市) 3rd District (Green +7).

If the DPP loses both by-elections I can see a second wind of the anti-Tsai rebellion with DPP. In Jan 2019 Tsai was mostly able to quell a rising anti-Tsai rebellion in the DPP by provoking a war of words with PRC Prez Xi. But it might start again if the DPP loses both by-elections.

After the 3/16 by-elections can we consider the ROC 2018 local elections "over" and the 2020 ROC Prez/Legislative race to start.

And that is with the DPP candidate Yu(余天) being the former MP from this district and have very high name recognition due to him being an entertainment superstar. Given both TVBS's pro-Blue bias plus Yu(余天) out sized name recognition this will be neck-to-neck with a slight KMT edge.()

In Tainan City (臺南市) 2nd District (Green +16) the TVBS poll is a shock

KMT 38DPP 26 (New Tide)DPP rebel 13 (anti-New Tide)

Note that back in 2016 Tsai won 78.1% of the vote in this district which made it her strongest district. The DPP MP candidate Huang who was just elected Tainan City mayor back in Nov 2018 won 76.5% of the vote (with a minor radical pro-Taiwan independence party winning 2.4% of the vote.) Even in the KMT landslide of 2008 Huang won here 59.2% to KMT backed NPB 40.8%.

The good news for the DPP is that a lot of undecided must be pro-Ex-Prez Chen Deep Green voters that are still deciding between the DPP candidate and the anti-New Tide DPP rebel. The bad news is that it seems ex-DPP Prez Chen and Ko both which are out for blood against the New Tid faction are implicitly backing the DPP rebel so the DPP rebel vote would not collapse last minute. Most likely this will end up neck-to-neck with a slight KMT edge.

And that is with the DPP candidate Yu(余天) being the former MP from this district and have very high name recognition due to him being an entertainment superstar. Given both TVBS's pro-Blue bias plus Yu(余天) out sized name recognition this will be neck-to-neck with a slight KMT edge.()

In Tainan City (臺南市) 2nd District (Green +16) the TVBS poll is a shock

KMT 38DPP 26 (New Tide)DPP rebel 13 (anti-New Tide)

Note that back in 2016 Tsai won 78.1% of the vote in this district which made it her strongest district. The DPP MP candidate Huang who was just elected Tainan City mayor back in Nov 2018 won 76.5% of the vote (with a minor radical pro-Taiwan independence party winning 2.4% of the vote.) Even in the KMT landslide of 2008 Huang won here 59.2% to KMT backed NPB 40.8%.

The good news for the DPP is that a lot of undecided must be pro-Ex-Prez Chen Deep Green voters that are still deciding between the DPP candidate and the anti-New Tide DPP rebel. The bad news is that it seems ex-DPP Prez Chen and Ko both which are out for blood against the New Tid faction are implicitly backing the DPP rebel so the DPP rebel vote would not collapse last minute. Most likely this will end up neck-to-neck with a slight KMT edge.

Well after the 2018 election defeat Tsai is an underdog for re-election but I think her chances are underestimated. Firstly she has refused to step aside (a la Hollande 2017) and insist on running for re-election. I think this is a smart move. Stepping side is basically telling your supporters that the KMT is right and you have failed so 2020 would see DPP perhaps even implode to minor party status. Tsai insisting on running for re-election also prevents any other DPP challenger because a wounded Tsai or overthrow of Tsai would also mean a meltdown of DPP in 2020. So Tsai meet the first criteria which is most likely she will lead a weakened but united DPP in 2020.

A lot will depend on what will take place in the 3/16 by-election. Lets assume DPP loses both New Taipei City (新北市) 3rd District (Green +7) and Tainan City (臺南市) 2nd District (Green +16) narrowly which would be bad but most likely survivable. One theoretical hope for Tsai would be if the KMT gets into a bitter primary season would lead to a rebel Pan-Blue candidate. This is unlikely. The Pan-Blue always split when they are in power (1996 2000 2012 2016 elections) but are always united when they are out of power (2004 2008). I think it is reasonable to assume the KMT will united the Pan-Blue behind a strong candidate (Chu or Han.)

Another factor is if Ko will run. The danger for Tsai is Ko runs is that he might drive Tsai and DPP to a humiliating weak third (like what happen to Yao in Taipei City 2018) but a Ko run could be what it takes to give Tsai a narrow path to victory.

If it ends up being DPP Tsai vs KMT Chu it would most likely be

KMT Chu 55DPP Tsai 45

If somewhat KMT drafts Han (very unlikely if Ko does not run) it would most likely be

KMT Han 57DPP Tsai 43

Now if Ko gets into the race with KMT running Chu I think it will be

KMT Chu 36Ko 34DPP Tsai 30

And if Ko somehow has a partial implosion on the Pan-Green flank Tsai could pull of an astounding victory

If Ko gets into the race and Chu falls behind Ko in the polls the KMT could draft Han where I think it will be

KMT Han 40Ko 32DPP Tsai 28

Where Han would win by a solid margin.

A lot of this decisions will become circular. Ko will run if he is sure the KMT will not run Han and the KMT will not draft Han unless Ko runs and is ahead of Chu in the polls. So it might end up being a game of chicken between Ko and KMT on who shows their hand last. All these maneuvers could give Tsai the space to consolidate the Pan-Green came to stage a comeback.

The bad news for Tsai is that she loses support when Chu is running since part of the anti-Chu DPP base switches to Ko relative to if Han ran for KMT. This seems to indicate that even the core DPP vote accepts that Tsai will be 3rd. Chu only polls 1% less than Han which is an excellent result for him.

On ROC's somewhat lean Green but mostly youth political discussion board PTT the prediction contest on the New Taipei City (新北市) 3rd District (Green +7) and Tainan City (臺南市) 2nd District (Green +16) 3/16 by-election results are

By-election results over. DPP seems to have done better than some fairly disastrous expectations and pulled out some wins in its heartland. The DPP pushed heavily the narrative that if it was crushed in these by-elections then KMT with a massive majority in 2020 would pave the way for unification and a PRC takeover of Taiwan. It seems to have worked.

In New Taipei City (新北市) 3rd District (Green +7) it wasDPP 52.0%KMT 46.8%pro-KMT 1.2% which implies a Blue +5 environment

In Tainan City (臺南市) 2nd District (Green +16) it wasDPP 47.2% (New Tide)KMT 44.4%DPP rebel 7.8% (anti-New Tide and backed by Ko)Minor 0.4%Minor 0.2%which implies a Blue +10.5 environment. In many ways given this vote share the KMT should have won but last minute unification of the various DPP factions plus the support of the DPP ex-Prez Chen undercut the pro-DPP ex-Prez Chen DPP rebel and triggered last minute tactical voting for the DPP. The DPP rebel was expected to get at least 12% of the vote which should have thrown the race to the KMT.

In Jinmen County(金門縣) (Blue +38) it was a massive free-for-all with KMT fight several KMT rebels and in a close race one of the KMT rebels won.

Overall the DPP had high quality candidates in New Taipei City (新北市) 3rd District (Green +7) and Changhua County(彰化縣) 1st District (Green +1) while the KMT had the candidate quality edge in Tainan City (臺南市) 2nd District (Green +16). Most likely these by-election results seems to indicate something like a Blue +6 environment which is consistent with recent polling.

The net political effect of this area) DPP Tsai for sure is safe as the DPP candidate and there will be no Tsai meltdown or a DPP primary challenge. Tsai might be an underdog for re-election but she is in the game and in a good position to win based on mistakes that the KMT and/or Ko will make in the future.b) KMT's Han threw a lot into this by-election and has been shown that he is not able to capture cross partisan appeal in deep Green districts. The force behind a draft Han movement will now weaken and give KMT Chu a chance to win the KMT primary, do reasonably well against Ko in the polls and the pro-Han bloc might have to accept that in the KMT national convention as long as Chu polls fairly well against Ko and Tsai.

In a shock DPP ex-PM Lai filed his papers to enter into the DPP primary to challenge DPP Prez Tsai. One assumption of Tsai's relative poll recovery and DPP avoidance of a catastrophic 3/16 by-election was that Tsai should have a clear path toward getting the DPP nomination a primary challenge. Lai entering into the primary race throws all those assumptions out the window. Perhaps DPP's non-catastrophic performance in the 3/16 by-election convinced Lai that DPP could have a chance in 2020 and he figured that if he takes out Tsai he could lead DPP to victory in 2020. Of course this could backfire and destroy DPP ahead of time. I think this move increases the chance of a Ko 3rd party run and increase the chances of a draft Han movement in the KMT.

With Lai getting into the DPP primary it seems Prez Tsai is not backing down so we will have a contested DPP primary. Everyone seems to think Lai will win easily. It does not look that way to me.

The pro-Lai pro-Independence think-tank Taiwan Braintruest just came out with a poll which was done before Lai announced. These numbers are pretty much as good as it is going to get for Lai and as bad it is going to get for the KMT.

So even the most pro-DPP pro-Lai poll has Lai ahead of Tsai in DPP voters 48.1 vs 43.1. Even in trial heats Lai does a bit better than Tsai. This means if Tsai really hits back against Lai over the next month this small gap could be close I can see Tsai winning this "primary." She might end up being damaged but in March April Tsai and Lai primary campaign would push up media coverage of the DPP race and if Tsai manages to defeat Lai it might even enhance her position relative to Ko and Chu in the general election. Granted a sitting incumbent facing a primary challenge is not good but Tsai is already in a dire situation and any reshuffling of the cards is a chance for her to improve her position.

One way or another it does not see like a slam dunk that Lai will defeat Tsai in the DPP "primary." A lot will depend on the rules. Will it be Lai vs Tsai series pf polls ? Will such polls filter out only DPP supporters? Will the polls be more Prez trial heats? Either way Tsai is withing striking distance of Lai even in a pro-Lai poll.

With Lai getting into the DPP primary it seems Prez Tsai is not backing down so we will have a contested DPP primary. Everyone seems to think Lai will win easily. It does not look that way to me.

The pro-Lai pro-Independence think-tank Taiwan Braintruest just came out with a poll which was done before Lai announced. These numbers are pretty much as good as it is going to get for Lai and as bad it is going to get for the KMT.

So even the most pro-DPP pro-Lai poll has Lai ahead of Tsai in DPP voters 48.1 vs 43.1. Even in trial heats Lai does a bit better than Tsai. This means if Tsai really hits back against Lai over the next month this small gap could be close I can see Tsai winning this "primary." She might end up being damaged but in March April Tsai and Lai primary campaign would push up media coverage of the DPP race and if Tsai manages to defeat Lai it might even enhance her position relative to Ko and Chu in the general election. Granted a sitting incumbent facing a primary challenge is not good but Tsai is already in a dire situation and any reshuffling of the cards is a chance for her to improve her position.

One way or another it does not see like a slam dunk that Lai will defeat Tsai in the DPP "primary." A lot will depend on the rules. Will it be Lai vs Tsai series pf polls ? Will such polls filter out only DPP supporters? Will the polls be more Prez trial heats? Either way Tsai is withing striking distance of Lai even in a pro-Lai poll.

Is the DPP in big trouble if Tsai loses the Primary ? I know some anti-Tsai people want the KMT back in control of the Presidential Office Building.

Is the DPP in big trouble if Tsai loses the Primary ? I know some anti-Tsai people want the KMT back in control of the Presidential Office Building.

I have a new thread for the ROC Prez election

https://uselectionatlas.org/FORUM/index.php?topic=316096.0

But to answer your question, I would say DPP is in trouble one way or another. I think if it ends up being KMT Chu vs DPP Tsai then chances are Tsai will lose. If Ko gets into the race Tsai has a chance but it is just as likely she ends up in a humiliating and weak third pace dragging down the DPP with her. Lai winning the DPP primary at least reshuffles the deck. The DPP hand could get worse but since they are the underdog you always rather a shuffle of the deck. Ideally it becomes DPP Lai vs Ko vs KMT Chu. Lai I think could get to a strong second place and perhaps win if he can provoke the PRC into doing something stupid during the general election campaign.