DAVIS v. CORIZON HEALTHCARE et al

Filing
5

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER, Plaintiff's application for appointment of pro bono counsel, if such was intended, is denied as premature at this juncture; and it is further ORDERED that Plaintiff is hereby issued his first and last warning that fraud on this Court or on the third parties who might make submissions to this Court on Plaintiff's behalf will not be tolerated, etc. Signed by Judge Renee Marie Bumb on 3/19/14. (js)

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
RONNIE DAVIS,
Plaintiff,
v.
CUMBERLAND COUNTY DEPARTMENT
OF CORRECTIONS et al.,
Defendants.
RONNIE DAVIS,
Plaintiff,
v.
WARDEN BALICKI et al.,
Defendants.
RONNIE DAVIS,
Plaintiff,
v.
GENEAN DOYLE,
Defendant.
RONNIE DAVIS,
Plaintiff,
v.
REBECCA HANNAH,
Defendant.
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Civil Action No. 13-3028 (RMB)
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
APPLIES TO ALL ACTIONS
Civil Action No. 13-3791 (RMB)
Civil Action No. 13-3792 (RMB)
Civil Action No. 13-3793 (RMB)
. . . continued
. . . continued
RONNIE DAVIS,
Plaintiff,
v.
JEANNINE WILTSEY,
Defendant.
RONNIE DAVIS,
Plaintiff,
v.
FRANK GREEN et al.,
Defendants.
RONNIE DAVIS,
Plaintiff,
v.
OFFICER ARMSTRONG et al.,
Defendants.
RONNIE DAVIS,
Plaintiff,
v.
SGT. WRONYON et al.,
Defendants.
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Civil Action No. 13-3794 (RMB)
Civil Action No. 13-3795 (RMB)
Civil Action No. 13-3796 (RMB)
Civil Action No. 13-3797 (RMB)
. . . continued
Page 2
. . . continued
RONNIE DAVIS,
Plaintiff,
v.
RICH BROWN,
Defendant.
RONNIE DAVIS,
Plaintiff,
v.
OFFICER MACCORI,
Defendant.
RONNIE DAVIS,
Plaintiff,
v.
MOSSES REOS,
Defendant.
RONNIE DAVIS,
Plaintiff,
v.
SGT. ORTIZ,
Defendants.
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Civil Action No. 13-4233 (RMB)
Civil Action No. 13-4234 (RMB)
Civil Action No. 13-4235 (RMB)
Civil Action No. 13-4236 (RMB)
. . . continued
Page 3
. . . continued
RONNIE DAVIS,
Plaintiff,
v.
OFFICER VOHLAND,
Defendant.
RONNIE DAVIS,
Plaintiff,
v.
CORIZON HEALTHCARE et al.,
Defendants.
RONNIE DAVIS,
Plaintiff,
v.
CORIZON HEALTHCARE et al.,
Defendants.
RONNIE DAVIS,
Plaintiff,
v.
CORIZON HEALTHCARE et al.,
Defendants.
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Civil Action No. 13-4237 (RMB)
Civil Action No. 13-4606 (RMB)
Civil Action No. 13-4610 (RMB)
Civil Action No. 13-5365 (RMB)
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
APPLIES TO ALL ACTIONS
BUMB, District Judge:
Page 4
These matters come before the Court upon the Clerk’s receipt
of Plaintiff’s letter sent to Brett Justin Lean, Esq. (“Mr.
Lean”) of Burns White, LLC, a law firm holding office at 51
Haddonfield Road, Cherry Hill, New Jersey 08002, see Davis v.
Cumberland County Dep’t Corr. (“Cumberland County”), Civ. Action
No. 13-3028, ECF No. 4, and it appearing that:
During the period from April 24, 2013, to September 3, 2013,
Plaintiff commenced the above-captioned sixteen actions in this
District, raising a multitude of claims the bulk of which were
duplicative and facially meritless; however, a handful of these
claims, albeit insufficiently pled, did not warrant dismissal
without leave to amend.
See Cumberland County, ECF Nos. 2 and 3
(detailing the same at length).
Therefore, this Court dismissed
the bulk of Plaintiff’s challenges with prejudice but allowed him
an opportunity to amend those that appeared to be potentially
curable by repleading.
See id.
No statement in the Court’s
Order or accompanying Opinion expressed this Court’s position
that Plaintiff’s challenges were or might eventually prove to be
potentially meritorious or that the appointment of pro bono
counsel was warranted.
See id., ECF Nos. 2 and 3.1
1
In determining whether to grant a litigant’s motion for
appointment of pro bono counsel under Section 1915(e)(1), the
court must consider the following factors: (1) the plaintiff’s
ability to present his or her case; (2) the complexity of the
legal issues involved; (3) whether the claims are likely to
require extensive discovery; and (4) whether the case is likely
to turn on credibility determinations or if expert testimony is
Page 5
However, on October 11, 2013, the Clerk received a letter
Plaintiff sent to Mr. Lean.
See Cumberland County, ECF No. 4.
The letter stated, inter alia, that this Court appointed Mr. Lean
to represent Plaintiff in a certain “civil lawsuit.” See id. at
1.
That statement was made with an unambiguous intent to
necessary. See Tabron v. Grace, 6 F.3d 147 (3d Cir. 1993).
Hence, the district court should give a consideration to
appointing counsel only of it appears that an indigent plaintiff
raises a claim of arguable merit. See Tabron, 6 F.3d at 156
(“[T]he district court must consider as a threshold matter the
merits of the plaintiff's claim. ‘Before the court is justified
in exercising its discretion in favor of appointment, it must
first appear that the claim has some merit in fact and law’”)
(quoting, inter alia, Maclin v. Freake, 650 F.2d 885, 887 (7th
Cir. 1981), which, in turn, quoted Spears v. United States, 266
F. Supp. 22, 25-26 (S.D.W. Va. 1967)).
[T]he presence of a potentially meritorious claim is a
threshold requirement for appointment of counsel. See
Tabron, 6 F.3d at 156; Maclin, 650 F.2d at 887; Spears,
266 F. Supp. at 25-26; accord Parham [v. Johnson], 126
F.3d [454,] 457 [(3d Cir. 1997)] (appointment of
counsel is warranted only if the pleading contains
“some merit in fact and law”). This gateway
requirement is closely intertwined with the prohibition
on appointed counsel’s maintaining frivolous claims.
“Under Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), if
court-appointed ‘counsel finds his case to be wholly
frivolous, after a conscientious examination of it, he
should so advise the court and request permission to
withdraw.’” United States v. Parker, 2012 U.S. App.
LEXIS 14525, at *4 (3d Cir. July 16, 2012) (quoting
Anders, 386 U.S. at 744).
Bacon v. Mandell, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 132231, at *40-41 (D.N.J.
Sept. 14, 2012). Thus, until and unless the court screening a
pleading for sua sponte dismissal finds that the claim is
sufficiently pled to qualify as potentially meritorious,
appointment of pro bono counsel cannot take place.
Page 6
perpetrate a fraud on this Court and on Mr. Lean, in his capacity
as an officer of the court.
See generally, id., ECF No. 4.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 requires that the party
making a submission to the court make a reasonable inquiry into
both the facts and law.2
See Schering Corp. v. Pharmaceuticals,
Inc., 889 F.2d 490, 496 (3d Cir. 1989).
Sanctions under Rule 11
do not even require a showing of bad faith: the party to be
sanctioned need only have engaged in objectively unreasonable
conduct in making the submission at issue.
F.3d 274, 282 (3d Cir. 2011).
See In re Taylor, 655
Needless to say, filings made in
bad faith or for an improper purpose, necessarily violate Rule
11.
See Lony v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 935 F.2d 604, 616
(3d Cir. 1991).
Here, Plaintiff ignored the facts known to him from the
Court’s prior Opinion and Order.
Even worse, Plaintiff
intentionally and affirmatively misrepresented this Court’s
findings and the Court’s Order to Mr. Lean with the goal to
obtain Mr. Lean’s unauthorized submissions to this Court.
2
Specifically, Rule 11(b) provides: “By presenting to the
court a pleading, written motion, or other paper [such as letters
to third parties that might be relied upon by the court] —
whether by signing, filing, submitting, or later advocating it —
an . . . unrepresented party certifies that to the best of [his]
knowledge, information, and belief, formed after an inquiry
reasonable under the circumstances: (1) it is not being presented
for any improper purpose . . . ; [and] (2) the . . . contentions
are warranted by existing law . . . ."
Page 7
Although the Court does not hold Plaintiff, who is
proceeding pro se, to the same standard applicable to an
attorney, the obligations of Rule 11 still apply to him.
See,
e.g., Toll v. American Airlines, Inc., 166 F. App’x 633, 637 (3d
Cir. 2006) (affirming award of monetary sanctions under Rule 11
against a pro se plaintiff).
This Court, therefore, will not
sanction Plaintiff at this juncture.
However, this Court notes
its grave concern with Plaintiff’s actions and, hence, takes this
opportunity to warn Plaintiff that, in the event Plaintiff
misrepresents this Court’s findings to any third party or makes
submissions to this Court (or submissions that might be presented
to this Court by third parties) other than those strictly
complying with the Court’s prior Order issued in the abovecaptioned matters, such action will be addressed by appropriate
sanctions, including dismissal.
IT IS, therefore, on this 19th day of March 2014,
ORDERED that Plaintiff’s application for appointment of pro
bono counsel, if such was intended, is denied as premature at
this juncture; and it is further
ORDERED that Plaintiff is hereby issued his first and last
warning that fraud on this Court or on the third parties who
might make submissions to this Court on Plaintiff’s behalf will
not be tolerated; and it is further
Page 8
ORDERED that, in the event Plaintiff makes any other
fraudulent submissions to this Court or third parties, Plaintiff
may be sanctioned, by, inter alia, having the leave to amend
issued to him withdrawn, and all Plaintiff’s pleadings
conclusively dismissed as meritless; and it is further
ORDERED that the Clerk shall serve this Memorandum Opinion
and Order upon Plaintiff by regular U.S. mail.
s/Renée Marie Bumb
RENÉE MARIE BUMB
United States District Judge
Page 9

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