Category Archives: Principles of Fiqh

It is imperative that we differentiate and explain Bid`ah-e-Hasanah and Bid`ah-e-Sayyiah so as to clarify the issue with those who are unaware of the difference and so that they are not left in trepidation regarding the two.

There are two types of Bid`ah – lexicographic Bid`ah and Shar`i Bid`ah. Lexicographic Bid`ah is the term given to all things which are newly invented, which came into being after the demise of Nabi ﷺ. This includes Ibaadat and Aadat (habitual things). These are divided into five categories: Waajib, Mandoob, Haraam, Makrooh and Mubaah.

Shar`i Bid`ah includes all those innovations which came into being after the three best eras and upon which there is no consent from Nabi ﷺ by way of word, action, clearly or by indication. This is that Bid`ah which is classified under Bid`ah-e-Dhalaalah, Bid`ah-e-Qabeehah and Bid`ah-e-Sayyiah. The Ulama have dilated upon this.

“Bid`ah is of two types: one is a lexicographic Bid`ah and the other is a Shar`i Bid`ah. Lexicographically, Bid`ah is every new invention which includes Ibaadaat and Aadaat. This Bid`ah is further divided into five categories. The second type is that Bid`ah which increases (or decreases) in any revealed Deeni matter after the passing of the three best era. This increase is devoid of consent from Nabi ﷺ. There is no consent from Nabi ﷺ on these actions, neither by way of word, action, explicit or by indication. This is the meaning of Bid`ah-e-Dhalaalat” [Tarweejul Jinaan/Junna page 161]

“The crux of the matter is this that if Bid`ah has an acceptable proof in the Shariah, then it would be classified as a Bid`ah-e-Hasanah. If the Bid`ah has an unacceptable proof then it would be classified as Bid`ah-e-Qabeehah. Otherwise it would be Mubaah. Bid`ah is divided into five categories.” [Fathul Baari, page 219, vol.4]

A similar explanation is given in Allamah Aini’s Umdatul Qaari. Refer to page 356, vol.5.

Now this much remains to be explained, that what is acceptable in the Shariah and what is unacceptable in the Shariah. Hadhrat Imaam Shaafi (rahmatullahi alaihi) states:

“Bid`ah is of two types. That Bid`ah which contradicts the Kitaab (Qur`aan Majeed), Sunnah, Ijma or Athar of a Sahaabi. This is Bid`ah-e-Dhalaalah. That Bid`ah which does not contradict anything of these, this is a Hasan Bid`ah, in accordance to the words of Hadhrat Umar (radhiyallahu anhu):‘This is a good Bid`ah’” [Minhaajus Sunnah, page 128, vol.2]

That action which Nabi ﷺ left out notwithstanding the conditions and ability being in existence during his era and that the Sahaabah-e-Kiraam (radhiyallahu anhum) and Taabieen also left out is undoubtedly a Bid`ah and deviation. This is so because it is in contradiction to the Kitaab, Sunnat, Ijma of the best of eras and Qiyaas. If there exists a little proof for it, then sometimes it may be a good action, whereupon reward is due and sometimes it is merely a permissible action which warrants neither reward nor sin.

The summary of the discussion of Qiyaas in Majaalis-e-Abrar and the above-mentioned texts, results in the definition of Bid`ah-e-Hasanah and Bid`ah-e-Sayyiah is as follows:

Bid`ah-e-Hasanah is that action whose prevention was removed after the demise of Nabi ﷺ. Or its conditions and ability of execution came into existence after Nabi ﷺ. Some proof for its execution can be found in Kitaabullaah, Sunnat, Ijma or Qiyaas. This is known as Bid`ah-e-Hasanah or in other words it is also regarded as lexicographic Bid`ah, which is not rejected or accursed. The texts of Allaamah Ibn Rajab etc. has already been quoted which adds more light on the subject.

As for that action, which could have been executed during the era of Nabi ﷺ but he did not carry it out and the Sahaabah-e-Kiraam, Taabieen and Tabe Taabieen, notwithstanding their extreme love and affection for Nabi ﷺ also did not carry out this action, then such actions are called Bid`ah-e-Qabeeha, Bid`ah-e-Sayyia and Bid`ah-e-Shar`iah. Besides this, the Ijtihaad of a non-Mujtahid, especially in our times, is definitely not classified as Bid`ah-e-Hasanah. In this regard the Fuqahaa-e-Kiraam (rahmatullahi alaihim) have stated:

“It is stated in Nisaabul Fiqh that Bid`ah-e-Hasanah are those actions which the Aimmah-e-Mujtahiddeen have classified as Bid`ah-e-Hasanah. If any person in our era classifies anything as Bid`ah-e-Hasanah then this is contrary to the Haqq, because it is stated in Musaffa that all Bid`ah in our era are deviation.” [Fatawaa Jaamiur Riwaayat and Junna, page 60]

From this text we clearly see that Bid`ah-e-Hasanah is only that which the Aimmah-e-Mujtahiddeen have classified as such. Ijtihaad and Qiyaas are only permissible in those issues and Masaa`il regarding which no Qur`aanic or Ahaadith texts exist, and the conditions and possibility of their execution did not exist during the time of Nabi ﷺ and the best of eras, in fact, it (conditions and possibilities of execution) came into existence only after these eras. If any person in this present age classifies any new action as a Bid`ah-e-Hasanah, then his claim would be totally rejected and discounted.

This is that Bid`ah regarding which Mujaddid Alfe Thaani (rahmatullahi alaihi) stated:

“How can those things which are rejected ever be regarded as Hasan and good?”

Introduction
The notion of “bid‘ah” in Islam is one that is confusing to many. There are a number of reasons for this which are not the concern of this paper, but suffice it to say, there is very little clarity presented on the more nuanced aspects of this concept, and unfortunately there are few works in English, if any, that attempt to tackle the concept of bid‘ah accurately and with serious depth. Fortunately, however, we have an excellent and well-researched work on the subject in Arabic by the eminent pre-modern scholar, Imam Abu Ishaq Ibrahim ibn Musa ibn Muhammad al-Lakhmi al-Shatibi (d. 790 H), called al-I‘tisam.

Abu Ishaq al-Shatibi was a Maliki Ash‘ari jurist and scholar, particularly known for his contributions in the fields of usul al-fiqh (principles of jurisprudence) and fiqh (jurisprudence). He is the author of al-Muwafaqat, an authoritative work on the subject of usul al-fiqh.

This paper is primarily based on Imam al-Shatibi’s definitive study of bid‘ah in his seminal work, al-I‘tisam, but will also draw on other sources to support some of his conclusions. The aim is to present a coherent and satisfactory examination of the concept of bid‘ah, with a treatment of all its important aspects, while keeping it as short and digestible as possible.

A note about methodology: In most cases when bid‘ah is discussed, a taqlidi (imitative) approach is taken, in which scholars are haphazardly quoted with no real effort to reconcile apparent inconsistencies or base the statements on scriptural proofs. Al-Shatibi’s approach is tahqiqi (critical) in which a serious effort is made to appreciate the reality of the concept with integrity and care, and to understand the issue in light of the available evidence and the statements of the authorities with full academic rigour.

There are two aspects to the study of bid‘ah: its usul (principles) and its furu‘ (peripherals). Study of its usul deals with the formulation of a theoretical framework or criteria by which to determine what constitutes bid‘ah and what does not. Study of its furu‘ deals with examples of bid‘ah, determined by the principles from its usul.

Imam al-Shatibi’s book stands out as the only work that takes a serious and in-depth look at the subject of usul al-bid‘ah, of which he was acutely aware. He mentions towards the beginning of al-I‘tisam:

“Rarely has a work been compiled on it [i.e. bid‘ah], and whatever has been compiled on it is inadequate in these areas [i.e. of usul al-bid‘ah].” [al-I’tisam 1:29]

Towards the end of his lengthy work, he mentions two such books, one by Muhammad ibn Waddah (d. 287 H) called al-Bida‘ wa l-Nahy ‘anha and another by Abu Bakr al-Turtushi (d. 520 H), called Kitab al-Hawadith wa l-Bida‘.

He writes: “I saw that the topic of bid‘ah was greatly neglected in the speech of the ‘ulama’, except for brief transmissions as done by Ibn Waddah, or side issues are produced that will not satisfy the thirsty. Rather, complete understanding of it as is required, I did not find, despite my intense search for it, besides what Abu Bakr al-Turtushi wrote about it, but it is meagre in proportion to what is required with respect to it; and besides what the people [i.e. scholars] wrote with respect to the seventy two sects which is [only] one section from the sections of the topic and a part of its parts. Thus, I took up the task myself to pay the attention to it [that it deserves], that perhaps Allah will bring benefit thereby to its writer, its reader, its distributer, its copyist, the one seeking benefit from it and all Muslims.” [Ibid 3:17]

It is hoped the following study of bid‘ah, which aims to tackle the concept primarily from a theoretical perspective, will serve as a useful and comprehensive treatment of this important subject, and will help to bring clarity to readers struggling to understand it. I have attempted to simplify technical discussions as far as possible.

Lexical and Shar‘i Meanings of Bid‘ah
There are many words commonly used by Muslims which were originally designated by the Arabs for a certain meaning and were then, with the advent of Islam and the Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him), appropriated by the Shari‘ah for other meanings, which then became the popular meanings of those words amongst the Muslim scholars and masses. Examples include commonly used words like salah, zakah, sawm, jihad and hajj. For instance, “sawm” in the Arabic language means “restraint” (imsak), but was appropriated by Islam to mean: “avoiding food, drink and conjugal relations from dawn to dusk with the intention of fasting,” and this eventually became its popular and well-known meaning amongst Muslims.

It is important to appreciate this distinction in our discussion on bid‘ah, as bid‘ah too, like many other words employed in the Shari‘ah, has both a lexical meaning – assigned by the Arabs – and a Shar‘i definition – coined by the Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him) and popularised by the early Muslims. Without understanding this distinction, it would be difficult to make sense of the term in its early usage, as will be explained later.

For further clarity on this dual nature of many words used in the Shari‘ah, consider the following illustration:

The word kufr as co-opted and popularised by the Shari‘ah means: “Denial of what the Messenger (Allah bless him and grant him peace) brought,” [Imdad al-Fatawa (6:83)],

and this is borne out by many texts of the Shari‘ah. For example, in a hadith recorded in Sahih Muslim, the Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him) asks Umm Ma‘bad: “Who planted this tree, a Muslim or a Kafir?” She said: “A Muslim.” He said: “No Muslim plants a tree, which a human being or an animal or a bird then eats from, except that it will be charity for him till the Day of Resurrection.” [Sahih Muslim, 2:15]

This hadith shows a person is identified as either a Muslim or a Kafir, the latter being one who does not affirm the message of Islam, and is how most learned and lay Muslims understand the word kufr. Literally, however, kufr can have a number of other meanings, including rejection, ungratefulness and concealment. Thus, in one place of the Qur’an, a derivative of the word kufr is in fact used positively, where Allah says:

Hence, although “kufr” is never used positively in its Shar‘i meaning, when used in its literal sense as in this verse, it can have both positive and negative connotations. It will be shown that the same is the case with bid‘ah.

Imam Ibn Jarir al-Tabari (d. 310 H) explains this as follows: “Meaning, I am not the first of the messengers of Allah which He sent to His creation. Before me there were many messengers from Him sent to nations before you.” [Tafsir al-Tabari, 21:119]

Thus, according to this linguistic definition, anything that came into existence without precedence in the time of the Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him) is bid‘ah in relation to him. Hence, cars, computers, calculators, microphones, spectacles, and so on, are all bid‘ah in the linguistic sense. It is already clear that according to the linguistic meaning, bid‘ah is not necessarily unfavourable and blameworthy.

The Shar‘i Meaning of Bid‘ah According to the Shari‘ah – which is determined by its usage in the recorded sayings of the Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him) and the early Muslims – bid‘ah is best defined as:

“Adopting as religion (deen) that which the Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him) and his companions did not adopt as religion.”

A similar definition given by some scholars is:

“Adding or subtracting from the religion (deen) after the time of the Sahabah.” [Shaykh Muhammad ibn Pir ‘Ali al-Birgivi, al-Tariqat al-Muhammadiyyah, p. 9]

The most important aspect of this definition is that it is restricted to innovations in religion. With this definition, which is its dominant meaning in the usage of the Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him) and the early Muslims, bid‘ah is, in its entirety, reprehensible, blameworthy and sinful, and cannot be described as good under any circumstance. Moreover, as al-Shatibi explains, bid‘ah in its Shar‘i usage includes religious innovations in four different areas: actions (af‘al), omissions (turuk), statements (aqwal) and beliefs (‘aqa’id). [Al-I‘tisam, 1:55]

Before supplying proof for this meaning of bid‘ah, and demonstrating that the distinction between the lexical and Shar‘i meanings of the term is a necessary distinction, I will first elaborate somewhat on the Shar‘i definition.

Two Types of Proscriptions in the Shari‘ah
Imam al-Shatibi explains that those things that are prohibited or discouraged in the Shari‘ah are of two types:

1. Direct violations (mukhalafah khassah): these are actions, beliefs, omissions or statements that violate clear injunctions of the Shari‘ah. These can be either haraam (unlawful) or makruh (undesirable). Examples of haraam are murder and injustice, and an example of makruh is overspending (israf) in decorating masjids. Even if these actions are done in inventive ways, though they may be regarded as “bid‘ah” linguistically, according to the Shari‘ah they will fall under the general prohibition of those acts, and will not necessarily be classed as “bid‘ah.”

2. Opposition to the Shari‘ah by introducing something new into the religion which is not from it. This is what is known customarily and legally as bid‘ah. [Ibid. 1:42]

It is clear from this distinction that bid‘ah is different from direct violations. Thus it may happen that there is no opposition to a clear injunction of the Shari‘ah in a certain matter, but merely because it is something new that is introduced into the religion, it is classed as bid‘ah. Proscriptions of the first category are not necessarily bid‘ah because, as al-Shatibi, says: “Violations – in their capacity as violations – are not instituted by anyone as paths which are permanently adopted in a manner resembling legislation” (Ibid. 1:76) which is the nature of bid‘ah in the Shari‘ah.

However, these two categories are not mutually exclusive. Thus, it may be that something is a direct violation and is also categorised as bid‘ah because it is adopted as religion. An example given by al-Shatibi is the use of chandeliers (thurayya) in masjids, which is regarded as overspending (israf) and thus, makruh. If someone was to purchase a chandelier specifically for the purpose of it being installed in a masjid, believing it to be spending in Allah’s path (infaq fi sabil Allah), this will constitute bid‘ah (as it is akin to believing that spending on a cause detested by Islam is spending in Allah’s path). However, importantly, this is not because of the initial undesirability of this practice, but because of the belief attached to it. [Ibid. 2:418]

Another example is the bid‘ah of the Qadariyyah who rejected Allah’s foreordainment (qadr), as, although this opposes the clear injunctions in the Qur’an and Sunnah which obligate belief in Allah’s foreordainment, since it is adopted as religion, not only is it a direct violation, but also a bid‘ah.

Ritualistic (ta‘abbudi) and Non-Ritualistic (‘adi)Matters
The most important element in the Shar‘i definition of bid‘ah is that it is an innovation “in religion.” In order to understand the definition, therefore, Imam al-Shaibi explores this aspect a little further. His discussion can be summarised in the following points:

☆ There are two types of matters related to the Shari‘ah: umur ta‘abbudiyyah (ritualistic matters) and umur ‘adiyyah (non-ritualistic matters).

☆ In ta‘abbudi (ritualistic) matters, the reason and purpose behind them is not understood (ghayr ma‘qul al-ma‘na) i.e. they are carried out ritualistically; while in ‘adi (non-ritualistic/explicable) matters, the opposite is the case: the purpose and reason are understood (ma‘qul al-ma‘na).

☆ Ta‘abbudi laws dominate in a category of affairs known as ‘ibadiyyat or “religious matters,” that is those things which are essentially part of religion; they generally comprise of ritual acts of worship like prayer, fasting, hajj, etc. and articles of faith, like belief in Allah, the afterlife, and so on.

☆ ‘Adi laws dominate in a category of affairs known as ‘adiyyat or “mundane matters” which are not intrinsically part of religion, but originally part of the world, like marriage, buying and selling, eating and drinking etc. [Al-I‘tisam, 2:401]

The primary distinction between ‘ibadiyyat or “religious matters” and ‘adiyyat or “mundane matters” is that in the latter, even if they are performed in total compliance with the Shari‘ah, unless there is an intention of “complying with the command of Allah” (imtithal li amr Allah), they bring no reward (thawab); whereas, ‘ibadiyyat are intrinsically rewarding. [al-I‘tisam, 2:218]

Although this is a general observation, it is not a hard-and-fast rule. Thus, at times non-ritualistic rules are found in religious matters and ritualistic rules are found in mundane matters. For example, the number of rak‘at of salah, the period of fasting, the number of rounds of tawaf, the value of Zakat and so on are all ta‘abbudi laws within ‘ibadiyyat; the laws of inheritance where specific shares are stipulated for the heirs of the deceased are examples of ta‘abbudi laws within ‘adiyyat. The command to spread Islam, preserve its texts and laws, teach and learn, and so on are examples of ‘adi (non-ritualistic/explicable) laws within ‘ibadiyyat; and the condition of consent in monetary transactions and marriage and the laws of cleaning one’s garments and body are examples of ‘adi laws within ‘adiyyat.

The reason for mentioning this distinction is that bid‘ah only arises in ritualistic or ritualised (ta‘abbudi) matters, as these are what constitutes religious innovations; whereas, innovations in non-ritualistic, mundane or explicable (‘adi) matters, although they may be sinful, they will not be classed as bid‘ah in its Shar‘i usage so long as they are not ritualised (meaning, adopted in a religious way).

Imam al-Shatibi writes:

“As for matters that are ta‘abbudi in nature, their desired objective is pure submission, without any addition or subtraction.”

He also supplies some evidence for this from the Sunnah. Thus, all ta‘abbudi laws must be adhered to as they are without any changes.

In al-I‘tisam, after listing several examples of laws that are ta‘abbudi in acts of worship, al-Shatibi concludes:

“You know from the intention of the Lawgiver that He has not entrusted any ta‘abbudi law to the opinions of [His] slaves, so nothing is left besides stopping at the limit He has set, and adding to it is bid‘ah just as subtracting from it is bid‘ah.” [Al-I‘tisam 3:58]

Thus, in the ta‘abbudi aspects of ‘ibadiyyat – matters intrinsic to religion – any addition or subtraction is inescapably a bid‘ah. Innovations in these matters are therefore bid‘ah in themselves.

In ‘adiyyat and ‘adi aspects of ‘ibadiyyat, however, since these are not originally part of religion or are not ritualistic elements of religion, innovations in them will only be classed as bid‘ah when regarded as religious or when they are ritualised. For example, ‘aqiqah is a celebration established in the religion for expressing joy at the birth of a child. Thus, it is performed for this ‘adi reason, but is also performed ritualistically, as part of religion, since it is established in the Sunnah. If someone decided to express joy by another form of celebration, this would be an innovation in ‘adiyyat. Such an innovation would not, however, be regarded as bid‘ah, for the very reason that this would not be an innovation in religion but in worldly affairs. However, if it is accompanied by the belief that it is part of religion, in just the same way as ‘aqiqah, that is, it is ritualised, it will also be deemed bid‘ah. Thus, al-Shatibi says:

“‘Adiyyat in their capacity as mundane (or non-ritualistic) affairs contain no bid‘ah in them; but bid‘ah enters into them when they are ritualised or assigned a ritualistic function.” [Ibid. 2:461]

This is why, al-Shatibi suggests, the Sahabah would not abolish the customs and cultures of the non-Arab converts to Islam, unless they violated the laws of the Shari‘ah. However, with respect to matters of worship and ritual, they were extremely careful that no innovation infiltrates them. In sum, if something does not have a comprehensible purpose (ghayr ma‘qul al-ma‘na), it cannot be added to, subtracted from or changed in any way. If something has a comprehensible purpose, based on that purpose, there can be developments and changes. For example, the purpose of sadaqah or charity is to alleviate the suffering of needy people, which is a comprehensible objective. Thus, this can be accomplished in a number of different ways that achieve that objective. On the other hand, the purpose of praying two rak‘ahs in Fajr is incomprehensible so to create changes in that, by, for example, changing it to three rak‘at, is an example of bid‘ah.
By “incomprehensible” is meant that a detailed understanding of its purpose is unavailable to us, such that it is not possible to make any deductions or analogies based on it. It is not meant that a general objective or purpose cannot be discerned.

Means or Wasa’il
“Means” or wasa’il only arise in matters which are not ta‘abbudi, as the cause and reason behind something that is adopted as a means is, by definition, understood. Imam al-Shatibi explains this rule, and illustrates it with the following example:

“If there was someone who journeyed towards the obligation of hajj by flying in the air or walking on water, he will not be regarded as a person of bid‘ah by his movement in this way, because the objective is only to arrive at Makkah in order to fulfil the obligation.” [Ibid. 1:331-2]

Thus, the aspect of “travel” in hajj is ‘adi (non-ritualistic/explicable) as it has the objective of arrival at Makkah. Therefore, this can be done in various ways that are used to achieve this underlying goal, and will not be regarded as bid‘ah. Means are, thus, in principle, non-ritualistic. Hence, something that is consciously adopted as a means is not classed as bid‘ah, although depending on its nature and objective, it may be sinful or blameworthy.

An Example
As a simple illustration of bid‘ah in ‘adiyyat, al-Shatibi discusses the following example:

If someone were to avoid a particular lawful food item, it may be for a number of reasons. It may be for medical purposes or due to personal dislike or unavailability; or it may be that there is some doubt over its lawfulness, so out of scrupulousness, the person chooses to avoid it. All of these reasons are valid because they are either worldly – ‘adi – reasons or a legitimate Shar‘i reason.

However, if the person were to avoid it ritualistically or religiously, meaning, for no other reason but because he believed that by avoiding that particular food item, he would draw closer to Allah or it will bring him reward or it will be beneficial for his afterlife and so forth, this will make it bid‘ah. As al-Shatibi says: “If the omission is carried out religiously, that is innovation in religion.” And then he says reiterating the central definition of bid‘ah in the Shari‘ah:

“The one who practises something besides the Sunnah religiously, that is precisely [the definition of] one who practises bid‘ah .” [Al-I‘tisam, 1:54]

The above explanation conveys the basic understanding of bid‘ah. What remain are the proofs for this conception of bid‘ah, and some further details.

Proofs for the Definition of Bid‘ah
Imam al-Shatibi provides extensive textual documentation from the Qur’an, Sunnah and sayings of the early Muslims as evidence of the blameworthy character of this definition of bid‘ah in the second chapter of his book, but I will suffice with a small selection of clear texts in this section to demonstrate that what is described above is indeed the definition of bid‘ah.

Hadith One
In a hadith recorded by both al-Bukhari and Muslim in their Sahihs, the Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him) said:

“Whoever introduces into this matter of ours what is not from it, it is rejected.”

Ibn Rajab al-Hanbali wrote in his commentary of al-Nawawi’s collection of forty hadiths, Jami‘ al-‘Ulum wa l-Hikam, under the explanation of this hadith:

“And in some of its wordings, ‘Whoever introduces into this religion of ours what is not from it, it is rejected.’” [Jami‘ al-‘Ulum wa l-Hikam, p. 155]

Thus, the meaning of “matter” in the narration is “religion.” Worldly innovations, therefore, like new cities, technologies and crafts are excluded, as these are mundane activities (‘adiyyat) which are also essentially part of the world. It is this that the Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him) referred to in his famous statement recorded in the Sahih of Imam Muslim: “You are more learned of the matters of your world”, which, based on the context in which this statement was said, means: in those things that are permissible (mubah) in the religion, which are based on experiment and experience, like medicine, industry, and so forth, you are free to select and innovate your own methods, and are not restricted by my example. [al-Tariqat al-Muhammadiyyah, p. 9]

Also excluded from what this hadith describes are new acts of sin which are in clear violation of the laws prescribed in the Shari‘ah, like theft in a new way (e.g. credit card fraud); as these fall not under “innovations in religion” but direct acts of violation, unless they are consciously adopted as religion. Thus, what this hadith declares as “rejected” is precisely the Shar‘i definition of bid‘ah described earlier.

Hadith Two
In another hadith, narrated with an authentic chain by al-Tirmidhi, Abu Dawud and others, the Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him) said:

“Hold fast to my Sunnah and the Sunnah of the rightly-guided caliphs. Bite onto them with the molar teeth. And beware of newly introduced matters, for verily, every newly introduced matter is bid‘ah and every bid‘ah is misguidance.”

“Matters” in this narration is contrasted with the Sunnah of the Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him) and his successors, Abu Bakr, ‘Umar, ‘Uthman and ‘Ali (may Allah be pleased with them all). “Sunnah” in its Shar‘i usage means “a path adopted in the religion”, in particular, that of the Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him) and his righteous successors, Abu Bakr, ‘Umar, ‘Uthman and ‘Ali (may Allah be pleased with them all). [Mulla Jiwan al-Siddiqi, Nur al-Anwar, 1:474-5]

Hence, in this hadith the Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him) defined bid‘ah as all matters of religion not found in the Sunnah, precisely the Shar‘i definition explained above. Moreover, in this hadith he censured all bid‘ahs, without making any exception.

Statement of Imam Malik
Imam al-Shatibi narrates in his book:

Ibn Habib al-Maliki (d. 238) narrated: Ibn al-Majishun (d. 214) said: I heard [Imam] Malik (d. 179) say: “Whoever innovates into Islam a bid‘ah (innovation), deeming it good , then verily he has claimed that Muhammad (Allah bless him and grant him peace) betrayed the role of Messenger, because Allah says: ‘Today I have completed for you your religion.’ (5:3) Thus, whatever was not religion at that time, is not religion today .” [Al-I‘tisam 1:64]

Ibn Habib and Ibn al-Majishun are both well-known authorities and transmitters of the Maliki school.

In another version of this statement, Imam Malik begins with: “Whoever innovates into this ummah something that its predecessors were not upon…” [Ibid. 2:306 ]

As clear from the context and time in which this was said, “predecessors” refers to the Sahabah. Thus, all religious matters innovated after the Sahabah are, in Malik’s usage, bid‘ah, and none of them can be described as good. Hence, we are provided with a very clear early formulation of the definition of bid‘ah.

Statement of Hudhayfah ibn al-Yaman
It is reported from the Sahabi, Hudhayfah ibn al-Yaman (may Allah be pleased with him):

“Every ritual the companions of the Messenger of Allah (Allah bless him and grant him peace) did not render in worship [to Allah], do not render it in worship [to Allah] – or do not innovate it – for, verily, the early ones did not leave any voice for the latter ones…Adopt the path of those who came before you.” [Ibid. 3:53]

“Follow, and do not innovate, for verily, you have been sufficed.” [Majma‘ al-Zawa’id, 1:434]

In some versions there is the addition, “follow our footsteps” [Al-Bida‘ wa l-Nahy ‘anha, p. 17]

Similar pronouncements can be found in Muhammad ibn Waddah’s al-Bida‘ wa l-Nahy ‘anha and al-Shatibi’s al-I‘tisam.

The rationale behind the latter two statements is the following. The Sahabah superseded the ummah in the acquisition of virtue and reward. Thus, in the words of Ibn Mas‘ud their example is sufficient for us. Furthermore, any accretion would be regarded as bid‘ah as it would be to claim that non-Sahabah are more aware of religious virtue and more desirous of acting upon it than the best of generations, that of the Sahabah. This is why Imam Malik is reported to have said in condemnation of bid‘ah: “Do you think the people today are more desirous of virtue than those who have passed?!” [Al-I‘tisam, 2:276]

The pious ruler, widely regarded as the reviver of the first Islamic century, ‘Umar ibn ‘Abd al-‘Aziz, also said something to this effect in a statement which will be quoted a little later.

Al-Shatibi’s contemporary, Hafiz Ibn Kathir (d. 774), expressed this principle under his explanation of verse 46:11 of his Qur’anic commentary as follows:

“As for the Ahl al-Sunnah wal-Jama‘ah, they say with respect to every action and statement [which is adopted as religion or is ritualised], not established from the Sahabah (may Allah be pleased with them), ‘It is bid‘ah,’ because had it been virtuous, they would have beaten us to it, since they did not leave a trait from the traits of virtue except they hastened towards it.” [Tafsir al-Qur’an al-‘Azim, p. 1703]

There are, thus, a number of clear statements from the Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him), the Sahabah and the early Muslims that any innovation into the religion after the Sahabah equates to bid‘ah, which is precisely the definition of bid‘ah outlined above.

Proofs for the Detestability of Bid‘ah
There are many strong and unequivocal condemnations of bid‘ah found in the hadiths and statements of the Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him) and the early Muslims.

Hadith One
In a hadith recorded by al-Bukhari and Muslim in their Sahihs, the Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him) said:

“Whoever introduces therein an innovation or shelters an innovator, upon him is the curse of Allah, the Angels and all of mankind. Allah will accept neither a compulsory nor a voluntary deed from him on the Day of Resurrection.”

Hadith Two
In a hadith recorded in Sahih Muslim, Jabir (may Allah be pleased with him) narrates that the Prophet (Allah bless him and grant him peace) would say in his sermons:

“The best speech is the Book of Allah and the best example is the example of Muhammad. The worst of affairs are their newly-invented ones, and every bid‘ah is misguidance.”

In imitation of the Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him), Muslim leaders from both early and later times repeat this formula in their sermons.

Statements from the Early Muslims
Al-Lalaka’i, Muhammad ibn Nasr and al-Bayhaqi transmit with an authentic chain from ‘Abd Allah ibn ‘Umar (may Allah be pleased with him):

This shows that in the usage of Ibn ‘Umar there is no situation in which bid‘ah can be good. Hence, whenever it is conclusively proven that a certain matter described as “bid‘ah” is good, this is according to a different usage of the term.

“No people innovate a bid‘ah into their religion, except Allah removes from their sunnahs the like of it, and then He will not return it to them till the Day of Resurrection.”

Note the explicit usage of the phrase “in their religion,” and the absence of any exception, supporting the conclusion that bid‘ah in the Shari‘ah refers exclusively to religious innovations and that they are all blameworthy with no exception.

It is reported from the famous ascetic, Fudayl ibn ‘Iyad (107 – 187):

“Whoever sits with a champion of bid‘ah, he will not be given wisdom.” [Al-I‘tisam 1:149]

It is clear from these statements that bid‘ah was invariably used negatively by the early Muslims, as were its derivatives, “ahl al-bid‘ah,” (people of bid‘ah) “sahib al-bid‘ah” (champion of bid‘ah) and “mubtadi‘” (innovator). Even those Muslims today who mistakenly defend the view that bid‘ah in its conventional and Shar‘i usage can be both praiseworthy and blameworthy do not use these terms positively. This is a clear proof that in the Muslim conscience, bid‘ah has always been thought of as a negative principle and never a positive one, when used in its normal context. Whenever bid‘ah was mentioned by the early Muslims without any qualification, it was the Shar‘i meaning that was intended.

Imam al-Shatibi collected all the negative consequences of bid‘ah documented in the hadiths and statements of the early Muslims with their original references. Some of these consequences are as follows: No worship will be of benefit for the practitioner of bid‘ah; protection is removed from his gatherings; respect for him helps in destroying Islam; he is cursed by the Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him); he grows distant from Allah; it prevents prophetic intercession; it lifts and removes the blessed sunnahs; the innovator incurs the sin of those who imitate him; it is feared that he will be deprived of repentance; he will be disgraced and incur the wrath of Allah; he will be removed from the fountain on the Day of Resurrection; it is feared he will be counted amongst the disbelievers and die a disbeliever; his face will be blackened on the Day of Resurrection and he will be punished in the Fire; the Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him) disassociated himself from him; it is feared he will be punished even in this world, let alone the afterlife. [Ibid. 1:183]

All this – and more – is clear proof that bid‘ah, in its popular, generic, Shar‘i usage, is always blameworthy, and as the statements of Ibn ‘Umar and Imam Malik clearly show, there can be no good in it. Al-Shatibi lists several principles why the condemnations of bid‘ah must be understood as general and inclusive without any exceptions. Some of these principles are as follows:

1. The hadiths condemning bid‘ah in its totality are frequent, explicit and make no exception. When explicit and general texts are recurrent in this manner, a principle of jurisprudence states that it must be accepted at face value and may not be restricted or qualified.

2. The early Muslims invariably used the term negatively, as they did “ahl al-bid‘ah,” “sahib al-bid‘ah” and “mubtadi‘,” which shows that these terms were never conceived in the Muslim conscience as having any goodness in them. In fact, the prominent Maliki scholar, al-Qarafi, related consensus on the condemnation of bid‘ahs, quoting from Ibn Abi Zayd al-Qayranawi and others. [Al-I’tisam 1:313]

Thus, bid‘ah, in its conventional usage, must be blameworthy in totality with no exception.

3. In its conception, bid‘ah is to deem something good in religion which was non-existent in the early period, while goodness and virtue in religion is only determined by revelation to the Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him), and was practised and observed most fervently by his companions, so even on this rational basis alone, no bid‘ah – that is, religious innovation – can possibly be good.

“You must adhere to the Sunnah, because it is a protection for you by the permission of Allah. And know that the people did not innovate a bid‘ah except there has passed before it that which is a proof against it and an admonition therein, for verily, the Sunnah was only instituted by one who knew what is in variation from it of error, slip, stupidity and extremism. So be content for yourself with what the people [i.e. the Sahabah] were content with for themselves, for they are the foremost (Qur’an 9:110)…For, if guidance was what you are upon then you have beaten them to it …Whereas, verily, they are the foremost . Indeed they have spoken on it with what suffices.” [I‘tisam 1:63-4]

Proofs for the Distinction between the Lexical and Shar‘i Meanings of Bid‘ah
One of the reasons for confusion over the concept of bid‘ah is that sometimes bid‘ah was used in its linguistic meaning by the early Muslims. I will present two well-known examples of this, and then demonstrate that these statements must be understood unconventionally and linguistically.

Statement of ‘Umar
Al-Bukhari narrates in his Sahih from ‘Abd al-Rahman ibn ‘Abd al-Qari that he said: “I went out with ‘Umar ibn al-Khattab (Allah be pleased with him) on a night of Ramadan to the mosque, when behold, the people were in isolated groups, one man praying on his own and another leading a group in prayer. So ‘Umar said: ‘I think it would be better if these [separate groups] were gathered under one reciter.’ Then he made a resolve, so he gathered them under Ubayy ibn Ka‘b. Then I came out with him on another night, while their reciter led the people in prayer. ‘Umar said: ‘A blessed bid‘ah this is!’.” [Fath al-Bari 4:317-8]

To understand ‘Umar’s usage of bid‘ah in this sentence, it is necessary to know a little about the history of this prayer. Imam al-Shatibi quotes from Abu Dawud’s Sunan from Abu Dharr (may Allah be pleased with him) that he said: “We fasted with the Messenger of Allah (Allah bless him and grant him peace) during Ramadan, but he did not stand with us [in prayer] in any part of the month until seven [nights] remained. Then he stood with us until a third of the night had passed. When the sixth [remaining night] came, he did not stand with us. When the fifth [remaining night] came, he stood with us until a half of the night passed. So we said, ‘We wish you had led us in supererogatory prayers during the whole of tonight.’ He said, ‘When a man prays with an imam until he leaves, he is reckoned as having spent a whole night in prayer.’ When the fourth [remaining night] came he did not stand with us. When the third [remaining night] came, he gathered his family, his wives, and the people and prayed with us until we were afraid we would miss success (falah) [meaning, the pre-dawn meal or suhur].” [Al-I‘tisam, 1:324]

Al-Shatibi then states: “However, when he (Allah bless him and grant him peace) feared it would become obligatory on the ummah he withheld from it. Thus, in the Sahih [it is narrated] from ‘A’ishah (Allah be pleased with her) that one night Allah’s Messenger (Allah bless him and grant him peace) prayed in the mosque and the people followed him in prayer. The next night he also prayed and the people increased. On the third or fourth night they gathered, but Allah’s Messenger (Allah bless him and grant him peace) did not come out to them. When morning came he said, ‘I saw what you were doing and nothing but the fear that it might be enjoined on you, stopped me from coming.’ And that was in the month of Ramadan.” [Ibid. 1:324-5]

Al-Shatibi goes on to explain that, therefore, the reason the Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him) abstained from the continued practice of this special night prayer in Ramadan was for fear that revelation will make it incumbent on the Muslims if they were to observe it continuously. With the demise of the Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him), this barrier no longer remained as revelation had come to an end. Hence, the original ruling of the desirability of Tarawih throughout the month returned, which was only hampered in the time of the Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him) for a temporary fear that ended with his death. Abu Bakr (may Allah be pleased with him) probably did not attend to reviving this prayer due to his other commitments and the short period of his caliphate. ‘Umar referred to it as bid’ah “by consideration of the apparent situation”, from the perspective that Allah’s Messenger (Allah bless him and grant him peace) eventually left it out and it so happened that it was not revived as a continuous practice in the time of Abu Bakr (may Allah be pleased with him), not that it is bid’ah in the real sense. [Ibid. 1:326-7]

This is therefore an example of bid‘ah being used in its linguistic meaning, not in its Shar‘i meaning of an actual innovation in religion. Furthermore, the practices of the righteous caliphs form part of the Sunnah as explicitly mentioned in hadith, so by definition, it cannot be bid‘ah in its Shar‘i meaning.

“Hafiz Abu Nu‘aym narrated with his chain from Ibrahim ibn Junayd: Harmalah ibn Yahya narrated to us, he said: I heard al-Shafi‘i (Allah have mercy on him) say: ‘Bid‘ah is two bid‘ahs: praiseworthy bid‘ah and blameworthy bid‘ah. Thus, whatever agrees with the Sunnah, it is praiseworthy and whatever conflicts with the Sunnah, it is blameworthy.’ And he adduced as evidence the statement of ‘Umar: ‘What an excellent bid‘ah this is!’” [Jami‘ al-‘Ulum wa l-Hikam, p. 600]

It should, firstly, be noted that this statement of Imam al-Shafi‘i is irreconcilable with Imam Malik’s earlier statement that there can be no good in bid‘ah if we suppose they meant the same thing by the word “bid‘ah.” (Imam Malik was senior to al-Shafi‘i, and amongst his teachers.) It must, therefore, be the case that they used bid‘ah in different ways. Al-Shafi‘i used it linguistically as proven by his citation of the statement of ‘Umar (may Allah be pleased with him). His usage of bid‘ah here was linguistic, and inclusive of religious and worldly innovations; whereas, Malik used it in its Shar‘i usage. It is due to this irreconcilability if a uniform meaning of the word “bid‘ah” is assumed that the distinction between a lexical and Shar‘i definition of bid‘ah is necessary. Without this distinction, it would not be possible to reconcile such apparently conflicting statements.

Moreover, it is clear from al-Shafi‘i’s methodology that he disallows innovation in religion. Thus, bid‘ah in its Shar‘i meaning, i.e. innovations introduced into religion (even if there is no direct opposition to the Sunnah) is unanimously rejected. Ibn Hajar al-‘Asqalani wrote:

“Al-Shafi‘i replied to the statement of the one who says nothing of the House is abandoned [so we ought to salute all four corners of the Ka‘bah] that we do not omit salutation of the two corners in abandonment of the house – and how is it being abandoned when the Tawaf includes them? – but we follow the Sunnah, both in performance and in omission …” [Fath al-Bari, 3:599]

It is clear from this statement that al-Shafi‘i did not allow accretions of a religious nature to what is established in the Sunnah.

Statements of Major Scholars Major pre-modern scholars besides al-Shatibi explained the distinction between the lexical and Shar‘i meanings of bid‘ah. Three of them are quoted below.

Ibn Kathir (d. 774 H) wrote in his commentary of verse 2:117 of the Qur’an:

“Bid‘ah is of two types: sometimes it is Shar‘i bid‘ah, like his (Allah bless him and grant him peace) statement: ‘For indeed every innovation is bid‘ah and every bid‘ah is misguidance,’ and sometimes it is linguistic bid‘ah like the statement of the Commander of the Believers, ‘Umar ibn al-Khattab (may Allah be pleased with him), about his unification of them on the Tarawih prayer and their continuous [practice of it]: ‘An excellent bid‘ah this is!’” [Tafsir al-Qur’an al-‘Azim, p. 191]

Ibn Hajar al-‘Asqalani (d. 852 H) said:

“As for ‘bida‘,’ it is the plural of ‘bid‘ah,’ which is everything that has no precedent that came before [it]. Thus, linguistically, it includes that which is praised and dispraised. And in the convention of the Shari‘ah it is specified to what is dispraised; and if it is used in a praiseworthy matter, that is according to its linguistic meaning.” [Fath al-Bari, 13:340]

Ibn Rajab al-Hanbali (d. 795 H) said:

“Thus, all who innovate something and attribute it to the religion, and it has no basis in the religion to which it is referred, it is misguidance, and the religion is free from it. The matters of belief, actions and outward and inward speech are equal in this. As for what has occurred in the speech of [some of the] Salaf in deeming some ‘bid‘ahs’ good, that is only linguistic bid‘ahs not Shar‘i bid‘ah” [Jami‘ al-‘Ulum wa l-Hikam, p. 597]

Similar statements distinguishing the lexical and Shar‘i meanings of bid‘ah can be found in the writings of Muhammad al-Birgivi (d. 981 H), Ibn Hajar al-Haythami (d. 974 H) and many scholars of the later period. Al-Shatibi’s extensive scholarly treatment of the texts of the Shari‘ah and the usage of the term by the early Muslims conclusively demonstrates the true nature of bid‘ah in the Shari‘ah, so if used otherwise it is either as a metaphor or due to ignorance of the reality of bid‘ah. [Al-I‘tisam, 1:45]

Answering Objections
Some people contend that the condemnation of religious innovations is restricted to those innovations that directly clash with the Shari‘ah. Otherwise, they are not blameworthy, and in fact may be permissible or even recommended. Al-Shatibi answers their doubts in the third chapter of his book. Three of their most commonly used evidences will be presented below followed by their replies:

Hadith of Jarir ibn ‘Abd Allah al-Bajali
The Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him) said as recorded in Sahih Muslim:

“Whoever institutes a good sunnah, he will have its reward and the reward of those who practise it, and that will not decrease from their rewards in the least. And whoever institutes a bad sunnah, he will have its sin and the sins of those who practise it, and that will not decrease from their sins in the least.”

The proponents of the view that innovations in religion need not be blameworthy or discouraged argue that this hadith proves that not only can a new practice that is introduced into religion be good but may also be the cause of an immense amount of reward.

The reply to this argument is that this conclusion is contradicted by the context in which this statement was said. [Ibid. 1:304]

The full context as narrated by Jarir ibn ‘Abd Allah al-Bajali is that a group of people came to the Prophet (Allah bless him and grant him peace) dressed in wool, and they were desperately in need. He, therefore, invited the people to spend in charity, upon which a man emptied a purse of silver and others followed suit. It was then that the Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him) made this statement.

Sadaqah (charity) is established in the Shari‘ah and from the Sunnah, but one particular aspect of it was not being practised. Furthermore, voluntary charity is not restricted to any ritualistic (ta‘abbudi) law, as its purpose – which is to alleviate suffering – is understood and is comprehensible. Hence, the hadith does not refer to inventing something new into the religion, but about applying an ‘adi law to a situation that demanded it. Mufti Taqi Usmani writes in his commentary of this hadith:

“This is with respect to what is established as being good from the Qur’an and Sunnah, but the people have left it or they have not attended to one of its aspects, as has occurred here, since the virtue of charity is established from the Qur’an and Sunnah, but the one who attended to this particular cause and produced charity first, inviting others to it, attained this virtue. As for what is not established as a righteous deed from the Qur’an or the Sunnah, inventing such a deed is innovation that has no connection to this hadith.” [Takmilah Fath al-Mulhim, 5:407]

Furthermore, it should be noted that “sunnah” in this hadith is used in its linguistic meaning of “path,” “way” and “method,” which can be both good and bad as described in the hadith. However, according to its Shar‘i meaning – which is its dominant usage amongst Muslims – it refers to the religious example set for us by the Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him) and his closest companions, and thus can only be positive.

The Innovations of the Early Muslims
The proponents of the view that religious innovations may be good contend, secondly, that the Sahabah and early Muslims introduced many innovations in religion, including the compilation of the Qur’an and writing down knowledge. Thus, they argue, if inventing new practices in religion is for a good purpose, it is praiseworthy.

The answer to this is that these are not bid‘ah, as they are innovations in ‘adi matters. These particular examples fall under what al-Shatibi refers to as al-masalih al-mursalah (unspecified benefits). There are two major differences between these acts introduced by the Sahabah and the early Muslims and what is regarded as bid‘ah in the Shari‘ah:

1. The basis of these innovations is understood and comprehensible. In other words they are ma‘qul al-ma‘na or ‘adi, and are not ta‘abbudi.

2. They are adopted as means and not as ends, based on the principle that “whatever an obligation is not complete without, that itself is obligatory.”

A group of the Sahabah compiled the Qur’an into one volume in the time of Abu Bakr (may Allah be pleased with him) for fear that the Qur’an will be lost if left to oral transmission alone as many of the memorisers of the Qur’an died in battle. Thus, for the purpose of hifz al-shar‘ (preserving the Shari‘ah), the Sahabah undertook this action. Hifz al-shar‘ is something the purpose of which can be comprehended, and it can be practised in a variety of different ways, depending on the situation and on the resources that are available. Furthermore, its basis can also be traced to tabligh al-shar‘ (conveying the Shari‘ah), which is from the established teachings of the Qur’an and Sunnah. This is also a non-ritualistic (‘adi) instruction, as its purpose – that is, to facilitate the message reaching others – is understood. The same reasoning also applies to compiling knowledge. [al-I‘tisam 3:12-7]

In sum, these “innovations” were not in ta‘abbudi matters, and therefore do not fall under the meaning of bid‘ah as intended in the Shari‘ah. A clear indication of this is that they were adopted as means (wasa’il) and not as ends in themselves which is the nature of bid‘ah.

The Scholars’ Division of Bid‘ah into Good and Bad
A third proof presented by the proponents of the view that religious innovation may be good is that certain major scholars divided bid‘ah into the five juridical categories, namely, fard, mustahabb/mandub, mubah, makruh and haram. Al-Shatibi discusses the statements of two prominent scholars: al-Qarafi (d. 684) and his teacher ‘Izz al-Din ibn ‘Abd al-Salam (d. 660), as both were major scholars of usul al-fiqh. He demonstrates that there is clear inconsistency in their exposition of bid‘ah which comes down to a conflation of the literal and Shar‘i meanings of the word. I will summarise some of his conclusions below.

It should be noted that al-Qarafi imitated ‘Izz al-Din ibn ‘Abd al-Salam in this categorisation, and it is clear al-Qarafi did not make any distinction between a literal definition of bid‘ah and a Shar‘i definition. It appears that to him they are both the same.

Both al-Qarafi and al-‘Izz state that the method of identifying the ruling of an innovation (bid‘ah) is to subject it to the laws and principles of the Shari‘ah. [Al-I‘tisam 1:319]

Thus, if the laws prove that an innovation is wajib it is wajib, or if they prove that it is haraam it is haraam and so forth. Al-Shatibi’s first point in response is that if something is proven to be makruh or haraam, they are classed as direct violations and not bid‘ah in religion.

More importantly however, al-Qarafi, one of the major scholars who promoted this view, falls into a contradiction when he says: “The scholars (al-ashab) as far as I have seen are agreed on condemning bid‘ah.” [Al-I‘tisam 1:313]

Quoting Ibn Abi Zayd (d. 386), the prominent Maliki jurist, and others, but then says: “The truth is that it is divided into five types,” [ibid] which if taken literally would imply al-Qarafi is openly violating the consensus he himself transmitted! Al-Shatibi takes al-Qarafi to task for this and states he clearly “violated consensus.” [Ibid. 1:322]

A second inconsistency in al-Qarafi’s discussion on bid‘ah is where he states: “If it [i.e. bid‘ah] is considered in a general sense, in terms of it being an innovation (bid‘ah), and ignoring anything that requires it, it is detested; for verily, all good is in imitation and all evil in innovation ” [Ibid. 1:319]

Al-Shatibi points out that this is incongruent with his earlier exposition as it would imply a combination of two conflicting rulings in some matters, that of detestability and of obligation. However, this difficulty is avoided if we simply make the distinction between the lexical and Shar‘i meanings of bid‘ah as outlined earlier.

In examining ‘Izz al-Din ibn ‘Abd al-Salam’s statement, al-Shatibi observes that the examples of “obligatory” innovations he produced fall under the category of al-masalih al-mursalah explained above, which, he states, al-‘Izz mistook as bid‘ah because of their absence in those specific forms in the earlier period. Al-Shatibi also inspects some of the other examples he uses. I will look at a few representative examples below.

In the examples of mandub, al-‘Izz includes the Tarawih prayer which was examined earlier in the discussion of ‘Umar’s statement, “An excellent bid‘ah this is!”

Al-‘Izz also refers to Islamic schools (madrasahs) as an example of mandub bid‘ahs. The reply to this is that building madrasahs is not based on a ta‘abbudi (ritualistic) rule, and is therefore not bid‘ah. Madrasahs are built with the objective of conveying knowledge, an important injunction of the Shari‘ah. Conveying knowledge has a comprehensible purpose which is to pass on the inherited sciences of the religion to those who are ignorant of them, hence this is an ‘adi ruling. It is known that in order to convey knowledge it is more effective to have the equipments, books, instruction manuals, instructors and students in one place. And since a madrasah facilitates the interaction of all of these things, it follows that it is sensible to build one. Al-Shatibi does however make a caveat, that madrasahs would be bid‘ah in one of two situations:

It would be bid‘ah if transferring knowledge in the time of the Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him) and his illustrious companions was restricted ritualistically to one place. But this is not so, as we find examples in their lifetimes, of knowledge being taught in houses, markets, mosques, during a journey etc.

Secondly, if it is believed madrasahs are the only place where knowledge can be acquired as a religious conviction, and they are ritualistically adopted in this way, that would then make them bid‘ah. However, it is generally the case that people are not susceptible to the misunderstanding that madrasahs are literally something that originates in the example of the early generations, because the reason for constructing them (i.e. the facilitation of instruction) is understood and comprehensible to the general mind. Therefore it is a completely ‘adi – non-ritualistic – matter, and there is little danger of it becoming ta‘abbudi in the minds of some. (The issue of a fear of something being interpreted by the common people as a ta‘abbudi restriction will be discussed later.)

Al-‘Izz also mentioned “every act of kindness without precedent in the first era.” as an example of a bid‘ah that is mandub. Al-Shatibi replies that this example requires making the following distinctions:

1. If the “act of kindness” is limited by a ta‘abbudi restriction, as for example in Zakah and Sadaqat al-Fitr, a change will certainly constitute bid‘ah.

2. If there is no ta‘abbudi restriction in “the act of kindness,” it would fall under the general order in the Qur’an and Sunnah to be good and kind to others. And since “kindness” and “being charitable” is a principle that is comprehensible and explicable, this command can be enacted in unprecedented ways. However, al-Shatibi says, there are two conditions to this: First, the normal rules of the Shari‘ah apply, that the wealth is lawful, the charity is not followed up by injury (adha) and so on; second, that there is no insistence on a specific form that gives the impression that particular form is established from the Sunnah, for example, always giving charity publicly on a particular day with no ‘adi reason. Since this gives the impression of an innovated ta‘abbudi restriction, it would be cautioned against due to imitation of bid‘ah. This will be discussed in more detail below under the section of relative bid‘ah. Of course, if there is an actual belief of a ta‘abbudi restriction, that would fall under the literal definition of bid‘ah. [Al-I‘tisam 1:347-8]

As an example of bid‘ah that is mubah, al-Izz cites handshaking after Fajr and ‘Asr, which was a common practice in his time. Al-Shatibi replies that if handshaking after these two prayers is not done with the intention that there is a religious connection between handshaking and those prayers it will certainly not be a “true bid‘ah” in the way described above. However, with persistence on it will become a type of bid‘ah referred to as “relative bid‘ah,” that is, a practice in which there is a fear that by persistence on it, it will eventually be added to the prayers, the reason being that there is no overtly ‘adi reason for this specific practice. This principle will be discussed below under the section of relative bid‘ah.

Moreover, this is an example of where ‘Izz al-Din ibn ‘Abd al-Salam contradicts himself. When he was asked specifically about this practice, of shaking hands after Fajr and ‘Asr, he said in his Fatawa: “Shaking hands after Fajr and ‘Asr is from the bid‘ahs, except for one who arrives [from a journey at that time]…”. He goes on to explain that this is not from the example of the Prophet (Allah bless him and grant him peace) and “all good is in imitation of the Messenger.” [Kitab al-Fatawa, p. 46-7]

The Nature of the Evidences Furnished by the People of Bid‘ah
People who engage in bid‘ah do not recognise what they do as bid‘ah. On the contrary, by definition, the practitioner of bidah believes what he is engaged in to be praiseworthy and established in the religion. Thus, they will invariably furnish “proofs” for their bid‘ahs from the sources of the Shari‘ah. Al-Shatibi devotes an entire chapter to explaining the kinds of proof presented by the people of bid‘ah. He shows that there is always a progression from personal whim and opinion to seeking out the evidence, as opposed to allowing the evidences to explain themselves based on the understanding of the earlier generations. The primary distinguishing characteristic of the evidences they supply is that they are always unclear (mutashabih). An example he gives is the bid‘ah of the Mu‘tazilah of their belief that the Qur’an is created, as opposed to the belief of the Ahl al-Sunnah that it is uncreated. They quote the verse, “Allah is the Creator of all things,” (39:62) as proof of this claim, which is an unclear form of evidence. [Al-I‘tsam 2:44]

Al-Shatibi explains that on such shaky grounds, anyone can support any conclusion they like from the scriptural texts. For example, a Christian can take support from the verse, “And His word that He cast upon Maryam,” (4:100) as proof that ‘Isa (peace be upon him) is a partner with Allah (Great and Glorious is He). [Al-I‘tsam 2:124]

He further says: “Likewise, it is possible for every person who follows the ambiguous evidences or distorts the applications [of the evidences] or interprets verses in a way they were not understood by the pious Salaf or holds fast to weak hadiths or takes evidences on face value to draw support for every action, statement or belief that agrees with his objective from a verse or hadith that did not intend that at all. The proof for this is that every sect that has become famous for its heresy (bid‘ah) draws support from verses or hadiths.” [Ibid. 2:125]

I will take a look at some of these invalid arguments which are used by the people of bid‘ah in the section on “examples” below.

True Bid‘ah and Relative Bid‘ah
In the fifth chapter of al-I‘tisam, al-Shatibi discusses an important categorisation of bid‘ah which was alluded to earlier. Bid‘ah – in its Shar‘i usage – divides into two types: bid‘ah haqiqiyyah and bid‘ah idafiyyah. Bid‘ah haqiqiyyah (true bid‘ah) is bid‘ah as explained above.

Bid‘ah idafiyyah (relative bid‘ah) is a kind of innovation that was also regarded as “bid‘ah” by the early Muslims. In its basic conception, it is a matter that consists of two elements: one that is established in the Shari‘ah and a second element that is innovation. That is, its specific procedure, conditions, details and times are not proven in the Shari‘ah, though they are required as these specifications are performed in such a way as to give the impression that they are part of religion. This is best demonstrated by means of examples:

Voluntary (nafl) practices like dhikr, optional prayer and optional fasts are recommended and praiseworthy, and these voluntary acts of worship have the inherent property of “flexibility” (tawsi‘ah). If one performs voluntary worship (i.e. recitation of Qur’an, dhikr, supplication, fasting and prayers) with a sequence or number that is not exactly established from the Sunnah, even with continuity (dawam), that individual is acting within the remits of the flexibility allowed for by the voluntary nature of these acts of worship. This is as the Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him) said in a hadith recorded by al-Bukhari and Muslim in their Sahihs: “You should do [voluntary] deeds as much as you are able” which he said specifically in the context of voluntary prayer performed by an individual with continuity. This is of course with the condition that this prayer does not adversely affect one’s self or his responsibilities to others, as explicitly mentioned in the hadiths.

Voluntary worship was originally intended to be performed in isolation, not in public. Thus, the Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him) said: “The best of your prayer is in your homes except the prescribed prayers.” Thus, in the early period, voluntary worship was not done publicly except rarely, unlike wajib and sunnah prayers (e.g. ‘Id and Tarawih prayers). If, however, a particular form of optional worship is done with insistence (iltizam) and continuity (mudawamah) publicly, it will become what is known as “bid‘ah idafiyyah” (relative bid‘ah), even if the person doing it does not have the intention of specifying that act to that form and time. The reason for this is that those acts that are performed in this way – i.e. specific forms of worship done in public – are precisely how the early Muslims would practise sunnah and wajib acts. Thus, an impression may easily be created that the voluntary act is sunnah or wajib, which if in fact believed would make it a “true bid‘ah” (bid‘ah haqiqiyyah); but if only the impression is created and the public are made susceptible to that belief, it would be counted as bid‘ah idafiyyah. [ibid. 2:232-5 ]

This is why the Sahabah left out acts that are originally permissible for fear of it being treated as sunnah. For example, ‘Umar (may Allah be pleased with him) forbade the people from following the traces of the Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him) and searching for places where he prayed, as recorded in the Musannaf of ‘Abd al-Razzaq. [Ibid. 2:236]

However, if one were to do this merely as an expression of love or longing for the Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him), and not as a sunnah act, it would certainly be permissible and not bid‘ah. But ‘Umar forbade it for fear of it being treated as a sunnah. After listing a number of other examples, al-Shatibi states: “And all of this is a path to not treating what is not sunnah as sunnah.” [Ibid. 2:237]

An example from the teachings of the Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him) is the hadith recorded in the Sahihs of al-Bukhari and Muslim:

“None of you should fast one or two days before Ramadan.”

One of the reasons given for this by the commentators is that there is a fear of such voluntary fasts being joined to the obligatory fast, so people may begin to believe that these voluntary fasts are also obligatory.

After explaining a number of examples, al-Shatibi puts down a basic statement defining this principle:

“Every action the basis of which is established in the Shari‘ah but in publicising its practice or maintaining continuity therein is feared that it will be believed that it is sunnah, it is required that it be totally abandoned as a path to blocking the means.” [Ibid. 2:333]

From the definition, it is clear that the principle is subjective, as it is contingent on a “fear.” If what is feared is actualised in some of the common people, there is no doubt the bid‘ah would be true bid‘ah (bid‘ah haqiqiyyah) for those individuals, and bid‘ah idafiyyah for those who persist on it without that belief. Additional specifications in the performance of a voluntary act, like doing so in congregation, out in public, with continuity, and under people who are followed as religious authorities, combine to make a voluntary action bid‘ah idafiyyah, unless there is a very clear ‘adi reason for doing so (As discussed earlier in the example of madrasah).

The reason is that it is easy to see how laypeople will begin to believe what is not sunnah or wajib as being sunnah or wajib. In sum, “bid‘ah idafiyyah” can be understood as behaving in the way a person advocating “true bid‘ah” would behave, as an individual normally will only insist and persist publicly on a non-sunnah act in a very specific way if he believes it to be sunnah.

Proofs
Below I will look at a few examples where bid‘ah idafiyyah was censured by the early Muslims and in the statements of later jurists.

Ibn Waddah narrates from al-Sha‘bi that ‘Umar ibn al-Khattab would beat those who openly fasted the entire month of Rajab. Ibn Waddah explained: “Its purpose is for fear that they would adopt it as a sunnah just like Ramadan.” [Ibn Waddah, p. 51]

If a person fasts the entire month of Rajab as his private practice, that would fall under the general recommendation of optional fasts (unless it adversely affects his other obligations). However, if a group did this publicly, there is an imminent fear of it being treated as sunnah. Since this group fasted the entire month of Rajab openly (and the narration mentions that they were known by the collective title “Rajabiyyun”), ‘Umar (may Allah be pleased with him) forbade them from doing so as it may lead to true bid‘ah.

Ibn Waddah narrates from Khalid al-Ashajj:

“We were in the mosque of Madinah and a storyteller told us tales, and he began to select the verses of prostration from the Qur’an and prostrate and we prostrated with him. Then an old man emerged and he opposed us, saying: ‘If you are on something, verily you are superior to the companions of the Messenger of Allah (Allah bless him and grant him peace).’ We inquired about him, and we said, ‘Who is this old man?’ They said, ‘It is ‘Abd Allah ibn ‘Umar.’” [Ibid. p. 29]

Reading the verses of prostration and prostrating upon doing so is established in the Sunnah. However, specifying them for recitation and then doing that in congregation creates the impression that this procedure is sunnah, even if it is not believed so. Hence, the act is not “true bid‘ah” but “relative bid‘ah” and was condemned by Ibn ‘Umar (may Allah be pleased with him).

Al-Darimi narrates in his Sunan with a good chain that a group of Muslims would perform dhikr in a particular way, with the head of the circle instructing the people to recite certain numbers of different forms of dhikr. Ibn Mas‘ud condemned them, saying:

“These are the companions of your Prophet widely-available…By the One in Whose hand is my soul, indeed you are on a religion which is more guided than the religion of Muhammad or you have opened the door to misguidance [by practising innovation].” [Sunan al-Darimi, 1:287]

Reciting any number of dhikr is to be commended, but when it is done openly and in congregation under the guidance of one who is regarded as a religious authority, that particular number and form may be conceived by the ignorant as being sunnah. Hence, Ibn Mas‘ud condemned it as bid‘ah.
In all of these examples, although it cannot be ascertained with certainty that the people practising these acts did so with the belief that they are specifically part of the Sunnah, but because they imitated or resembled the way a person who does believe this would behave, the Sahabah forbade them from practising them.

The prominent early Hanafi jurist and muhaddith, Abu Bakr al-Jassas al-Razi (305 – 370 H), comments on a ruling transmitted from the founders of the Hanafi madhhab, that it is prohibited to fix a particular chapter of the Qur’an to a particular rak‘ah of prayer. Since his explanation is both lucid and instructive, I will quote its translation:

“Abu Ja‘far [al-Tahawi] said: It is makruh (prohibitively disliked) to adopt a part of the Qur’an for a specific part of the prayers.

“And that is because if that was to be permitted, it would not be assured that with the passage of time people will believe it is sunnah or wajib ; as has occurred today in the understanding of many of the ignorant people in the like of it, so when the recitation of Surat al-Jumu‘ah is left out on the night of Friday, and Alif Lam Mim Tanzil al-Sajdah [is left out] on the day of Friday, they find it strange. Thus, the people of knowledge intended to preserve the religion and protect it from adding to it what is not from it .

“[This is] just as was narrated from some of the Salaf [their] hatred of fasting six days of Shawwal [consecutively, immediately after Ramadan] despite what is narrated in hadith [of its desirability], for fear that persistence on it will be a cause for it being appended to the obligatory [fast of Ramadan].

“[And it is] just as was narrated from the Prophet (Allah bless him and grant him peace) that it is prohibited to fast on Friday, unless [one keeps a fast] the day before it, and unless it coincides with a day one of us used to fast [anyway].” [Sharh Mukhtasar al-Tahawi, 8:525-6]

Imam al-Nawawi was asked about the persistent practice of some people of reading Surat al-An‘am in the last rak‘ah of Tarawih on the seventh night of Ramadan. He replied:

“This is not a sunnah but a detestable bid‘ah and for its detestability are reasons: from them is the impression of it being sunnah …Thus, every worshipper should refrain from this practice and should relay its condemnation, for indeed it is established in authentic hadiths that newly-invented matters are prohibited and that every bid‘ah is misguidance, and this practice has not been transmitted from any of the Salaf .” [Fatawa l-Imam al-Nawawi, 1:25-6]

Examples
In this section, I will take a brief look – in light of the principles of bid‘ah outlined above – at some common practices about which people are unsure whether they constitute bid‘ah or not. I hope that in the course of analysing these examples, further light is shed on some important principles relating to bid‘ah, specifically, and the method of drawing proof from the Shari‘ah, generally. The first two practices are examples that al-Shatibi himself addressed in quite some detail. Although, he briefly makes mention of the third example, he does not elaborate on it as he does the first two.

Example One: Loud Group Dhikr in Unison
Al-Shatibi discusses the practice of “loud group dhikr in unison” which is basically a congregational recital of dhikr in one voice. Some people do this as a specific ritual practice, i.e. in a ta‘abbudi way, to attain reward and closeness to Allah. My purpose here is not to give an unequivocal ruling on this practice but to use it as an example to illustrate faulty, ambiguous (mutashabih), evidences used by people of bid‘ah.

Some argue that this is included in the general evidences recommending dhikr. For example, the Qur’an says:

“O you who believe, make mention of Allah, with excessive dhikr” (33:41)

“And make mention of Allah much so that you are successful.” (8:45)

However, al-Shatibi explains that this is based on the mistaken assumption that the generality of a word implies the permissibility of everything that can be imagined to occur from its meaning. However, this is not the case in matters of ritual. In brief, this form of evidence attempts to put in practice absolute statements (mutlaqat) before examining their restricted application as established from the early Muslims (muqayyidat). [Al-I‘tisam 2:62]

To understand the invalidity of such an argument, consider the following example. A verse of the Qur’an states:

“O you who believe! Bow down in ruku‘ and in prostration and worship your Lord.” (22:77)

Based on the command in this verse to bow down, can one deduce the recommendation or obligation of performing stand-alone ruku‘s outside of Salah, as the verse gives a general command to bow? The answer is that this is precisely the mistaken type of reasoning explained above, as in such ritualistic matters one must take into consideration the restricted application first before applying the generalities. Furthermore, if a stand-alone ruku‘ was a valid interpretation and application of the general command in the verse, would not the Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him) and the Sahabah be the first to have comprehended this meaning and acted upon it? If we were to take this invalid form of argumentation to its extreme, one may just as well deduce from the words “worship your Lord” any form of ritual worship, like yoga, believing that this a fulfilment of this command! But, of course, all Muslims recognise that this is incorrect. The reason is that it is based on this faulty reasoning.

Thus, in ritual acts, it is wrong to approach general evidences to prove specific practices. It is necessary to find specific evidence. Hence, in this case, group dhikr in unison would not be bid‘ah if the Prophet (Allah bless him and grant him peace) and Sahabah performed dhikr in this way.

The above was an analysis of what would not count as proof for the validity of this practice. If it was established that the Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him) and Sahabah did engage in this practice of performing loud group dhikr in unison, that would be a valid support for believing that it is sunnah and not bid‘ah. There are some authentic hadiths which do suggest that groups of Sahabah did dhikr. A hadith in Sahih Muslim for example states that angels convey the news of “gatherings of dhikr” in which the people are saying Allahu akbar and subhan Allah.
However, al-Shatibi argues that this hadith and those like it are ambiguous as they do not clarify whether this was done audibly or quietly, in unison or individually. Thus, it may easily apply to what was known to be a common practice amongst the Sahabah, of gathering in one place while each of them performed individual worship, whether recitation of Qur’an, recitation of dhikr, or optional prayer. [Al-I‘tisam 2:94-5]

However, for lay Muslims it is advisable to follow the most cautious path, based on the prophetic advice:

“Leave that which causes you to doubt for that which does not cause you to doubt.”

There are many forms of dhikr established in the Sunnah, like reciting tahlil, takbir, tasbih, tahmid, hawqalah and other litanies which may be practised privately and inaudibly, and there is no doubt in the sunnah-status of this practice. This accepted sunnah can easily replace the forms of dhikr in which there is doubt. [For a comprehensive collection of dhikrs established from the Sunnah, see al-Adhkar min Kalam Sayyid al-Abrar by Muhyi al-Din al-Nawawi]

Because the flipside of the benefit attained from performing this doubtful form of dhikr is that one would be engaging in bid‘ah haqiqiyyah in the situation that this was in reality not a practice of the Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him) and the Sahabah, the danger in practising it far outweighs the benefits of performing it.

It should be noted that the above discussion applies only to the situation in which loud group dhikr in unison is done ritually (ta‘abbudan), as a formal form of dhikr. However, some Muslim scholars and teachers use it as a means of instruction, as loudly reciting some forms of dhikr together is a useful way to make people learn certain formulae. If done in this way there is no harm as this has a comprehensible purpose (ma‘qul al-ma‘na) and is adopted as a means. Furthermore, many Sufi disciplinarians justify their use of this practice by stating that it is a means to improve concentration in the heart of the spiritual novice, so as to achieve a state of remembrance that came naturally to the Sahabah merely by accompanying the Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him). In order to compensate for the loss of the effect of that companionship, the Sufi teachers prescribe these practices, only as a means. [Tasawwuf kiya hey pp. 17-26]

In this case, too, since it is not performed ritualistically but as a means, it cannot be regarded as bid‘ah.

Example Two: Audible Group Du‘a after Salah
Another practice al-Shatibi discusses is the continuous practice of group du‘a after the obligatory prayers. In the case of group du‘a itself, where one person leads the congregation in du‘a by reciting the supplications audibly and the others say “amin,” we don’t have the immediate problem that we did with audible group dhikr in unison. With the latter there is a question over its very existence in the early period. However, audible group du‘a is established from the Salaf. The Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him) said:

“A group does not congregate, one of them supplicating and the rest of them saying amin, except Allah answers them.” [Majma‘ al-Zawa’id, 10:267]

Al-Shatibi also accepts that group du‘a in general is approved. [Al-I‘tisam 2:313]

The issue here, however, is doing it perpetually after the congregational Salahs, such that an impression is created that it is sunnah at that time and that it is attached to these prayers. The evidence from the example of the Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him) and his companions shows that there is flexibility (tawsi‘ah) in the practice of group du‘a. Thus, if done on some occasions in a manner that does not give the impression of it being restricted to a specific time or place, this would faithfully represent an adherence to the evidence of this flexibility. However, when it is insisted on at one particular time without proof, the general evidence does not support the practice. Rather, the opposite is true because “insisting on matters that are not insisted on in the Shari‘ah, its nature is that legislation will be understood, especially with those taken as authorities [i.e. imams] and in the places where people gather like masjids” [Ibid. 2:59-60]

Thus, drawing on the general proofs encouraging group du‘a for practising it specifically after Salah is a type of faulty evidence which al-Shatibi says is an example “distorting the proofs from their places.” [Ibid]

The general encouragement towards group du‘a has a particular application of flexibility. But if acted upon at a specific time and place, in conjunction with a particular worship, sticking fervently to it so it appears as if a desired goal in the Shari‘ah (maqsud bi al-shar‘), then the general evidence does not support it. This is what al-Shatibi says is known as “two different applications” (ikhtilaf al-manatayn), where the application of the evidence is flexibility, and what the claimant is attempting to prove – i.e. adopting du‘a after Salah audibly for the attendees always just as sunnahs are performed is restricted and specified. Thus, the evidence is invalid. This practice would therefore be an example of “relative bid‘ah.” [Ibid. 2:262]

One person in al-Shatibi’s time who was in favour of perpetual group du‘a after the obligatory prayers argued that there is no prohibition of group du‘a, and there is general encouragement towards it, and the omission of the Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him) and Sahabah of this practice specifically after the prayers is not a proof of its detestability. Al-Shatibi replies that the person is right that there is no prohibition of group du‘a and there is general encouragement towards it, which is why he says if done occasionally after the obligatory prayers there is no problem as this would fall under the general recommendation. But if done perpetually it will give the impression to laypeople that it is a sunnah at that particular time which is a ritualistic (ta‘abbudi) restriction. Thus, it falls under bid‘ah idafiyyah.

Furthermore, with respect to the omission of the early generations, al-Shatibi explains that there is detail to this with respect to ritualistic matters that were omitted by the Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him) and Sahabah. In such scenarios, there are two possibilities:

1. There was no stimulant (ma‘na muqtadi lahu) in the time of the Prophet (peace be upon him) for determining that ritualistic ruling. For example, as was mentioned earlier the shares of inheritance fixed for the heirs of the deceased are ritualistic (ta‘abbudi) in Islam. However, there is a particular scenario in which only the grandfather of the deceased and his brothers remain, which was not addressed by the Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him) because there was no need to address this scenario at the time. Thus, the Sahabah and the later scholars issued a ruling on this scenario based on the general patterns they saw in the rules of inheritance. Such an innovation in ritualistic matters is allowed as it is based on a new circumstance which the Shari‘ah needs to address.

2. The stimulant was present, yet the Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him) and the Sahabah did not endorse it or practise it. This is equivalent to the Shari‘ah purposely choosing to restrict that action within those limits. Thus any change would be bid‘ah. [Al-I‘tisam, 2:263-5]

It is in this vein that al-Shafi‘i said, as mentioned earlier, “we follow the sunnah, both in performance and in omission.” Similarly, Mulla ‘Ali al-Qari said:

“Adherence – just as it is in performance, it is in omission too – so whoever persists [ritualistically] on a practice the lawgiver did not do, he is an innovator.” [Mirqat al-Mafatih Sharh Mishkat al-Masabih, 1:94-5]

For example, some people in the time of al-Shatibi argued that group du‘a is more likely to be accepted as mentioned in hadith, and this can be combined with the general recommendation of du‘a after Salah, and thus it is argued group du‘a should be practised after Salah. It is precisely this thinking in ritualistic matters that makes it bid‘ah as this reason was present in the early period and the Sahabah would be more deserving of comprehending it and being the first to act upon it. [Al-I‘tisam 2, p. 267 & 274]

Example Three: The Annual Mawlid Celebration on Rabi‘ al-Awwal
Al-Shatibi discusses many examples of bid‘ah idafiyyah that he says are close to bid‘ah haqiqiyya, like inventing an Adhan and Iqamah for the ‘Id prayers. He also answers the question of ‘Uthman’s (may Allah be pleased with him) introduction of a second Adhan for Jumu‘ah. The basic reply is that before ‘Uthman’s time, the Adhan was called immediately before the sermon. Although this was sufficient when the Muslims were small in number, as the population grew in ‘Uthman’s time, an earlier call to prayer was required. Thus he patterned Jumu‘ah after the normal prayers where Adhan was called at its start time, and maintained the later Adhan established from the Sunnah. Thus, this was an addition due to changing circumstances that called for a reasoned response. Furthermore, the practices of the early caliphs form part of the Sunnah as explicitly mentioned in hadith, so by definition, it cannot be bid‘ah in its Shar‘i meaning. [Al-I‘tisam 2:305]

Another type of bid‘ah idafiyyah al-Shatibi discusses is what is called taqyid al-mutlaq (restricting the absolute). For example, a person selects a day of the week, say Wednesday, or a date of the month, like the 23rd, which has not been specified in the Shari‘ah, and then begins to always fast on those days, not because the person has more energy (nashat) or free-time (faragh) or due to convenience (wifaq), but only due to resolve, planning and determination (tasmim). This is different from a person who has a daily habit of awrad or optional worship, as this is based on convenience, and not ultimately on determination and planning. Taqyid al-mutlaq is a form of relative bid‘ah. [Ibid. 2:293-4]

Although al-Shatibi does not present it as an example of this particular principle, the annual mawlid celebration performed in the month of Rabi‘ al-Awwal is an example of taqyid al-mutlaq. Remembering the birth of the Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him) just as remembering any aspect of his life is praiseworthy and beneficial, but when it is done permanently on a particular day of the year without any non-ritualistic or comprehensible (‘adi) basis, it very easily creates the impression that that particular day is superior for this practice, but there is no proof for this from the sources of the Shari‘ah or the example of the early generations. Thus, if it is performed in this way without any particular belief attached to it, it would be a relative bid‘ah (bid‘ah idafiyyah). However, in the case of the annual mawlid celebration, the fear of it being ritualised has actually been realised, and many Muslims in fact believe that a particular day or month of the year is religiously superior to any other time for that remembrance. Many Muslims adopt it literally as a formal religious festival or “‘Id,” which is why al-Shatibi included “adopting the day of the prophetic birth as an ‘Id” amongst a number of actions he listed as examples of bid‘ah in al-I‘tisam. [see: al-I‘tisam 1:46]

He also said in his collection of fatwas:

“Establishing the mawlid in the way that is customary amongst the people is an innovated bid‘ah and every bid‘ah is misguidance.” [Al-Mi‘yar al-Mu‘rib, 7:102-3]

The reason he adds “in the way that is customary amongst the people” is that if the restrictions customarily bound to the mawlid celebration, like the date, were removed, and it consisted only of a remembrance of the prophetic biography or the prophetic birth, this would certainly not be an innovation in religion. Many Muslims actually believe that since he was born on a particular day of Rabi‘ al-Awwal, it is better and preferable to do this remembrance on this day of Rabi‘. This would make the act for those Muslims bid‘ah haqiqiyyah as the stimulant for this practice (ma‘na muqtadi lahu) was present in the time of the Sahabah. Thus the implication of this reasoning is that the Sahabah failed to recognise the virtue of that day, and the reward of recollecting the birth on that date, and the later people were able to comprehend that virtue. And this is absurd.

I will end with a quote on this issue from a Maliki contemporary of al-Shatibi, Abu ‘Abd Allah al-Haffar (d. 811 H). As the passage is long, I will avoid quoting the Arabic text. At one point in his statement, al-Haffar errs in his reasoning, which I hope readers will now be able to appreciate. (I will highlight the error in an end-note.) Al-Haffar writes:

“The pious predecessors, and they are the companions of the Messenger of Allah (Allah bless him and grant him peace) and their successors, would not congregate on the night of mawlid for worship, and they would not practise more therein than the rest of the nights of the year because the Prophet (Allah bless him and grant him peace) is not to be venerated except in a way his veneration has been legislated. [This is where al-Haffar slips, as “veneration” or “respect” is a comprehensible (‘adi) matter, and is not ritualistic (ta‘abbudi). People may demonstrate their respect, adoration and love for the Prophet (peace be upon him) in different ways. Yes, if this matter is performed in such a way that a ritualistic restriction is clearly understood or a ritualistic restriction is actually believed, as is the case with the annual mawlid celebration, that is when it is no longer ‘adi and becomes an addition into religion. This is similar to the example of sadaqah discussed earlier. The valid points to take from al-Haffar’s statement are what he continues to say, “The proof that the Salaf…”]

His veneration is from the greatest of nearing acts to Allah, but nearness is sought to Allah (Great is His Majesty) only by what is legislated. The proof that the Salaf would not add therein anything extra to the rest of the nights is that they differed over it [i.e. the date of his birth]. It was said that he (Allah bless him and grant him peace) was born in Ramadan and it was said in Rabi‘, and the day [of Rabi‘] in which he was born has been disputed according to four opinions. Hence, if worship was established in the night of the day in which he was born due to the birth of the best of creation (Allah bless him and grant him peace), that would indeed be known and famous, and no disagreement would arise therein. However, an excess in veneration has not been legislated. Do you not see that Friday is the best day on which the sun rose, and the best that is done on a virtuous day is fasting, yet the Prophet (Allah bless him and grant him peace) forbade fasting on Friday despite its great excellence? This proves that no worship is to be established in a time or place unless it is legislated and what is not legislated is not to be done, since the latter part of this ummah will not bring greater guidance than what the first part of it brought. And if this door was to be opened, a group will indeed come and say the day of his migration to Madinah was a day in which Allah honoured Islam so congregate in it and worship, and others will say the night in which he was taken on a night journey he acquired glory the extent of which cannot be imagined so worship is to be established therein. This will not stop at a limit. All good is in following the pious Salaf, for which Allah chose them. Thus, what they did, we do, and what they left, we leave. Once this is established, it is apparent that to congregate on this night is not required in the Shari‘ah. Rather, one is ordered to leave it.” [Al-Mi‘yar al-Mu‘rib, 7:99-100]

Question:
A senior Mufti says that the 6 Shawwaal Fasts are Makrooh. He cites Imaam Abu Hanifah (Rahmatullah alayh) as proof for this view. Please comment.

Answer (Mujlisul Ulama):
The senior Mufti Sahib is short-sighted. His Ilm is superficial, hence he could muster up the audacity to decry a practice which is entrenched in the Math-hab since fourteen centuries. He did not stop to reflect on the fact that it is the practice of all our Akaabireen and of all Math-habs.

Secondly, every ruling of the Hanafi Math-hab is not necessarily the view of Imaam Abu Hanifah (Rahmatullah alayh). There are many issues on which Imaam Abu Hanifah has a contrary view to the Mufta Bihi version which could be the view of Imaam Abu Yusuf (Rahmatullah alayh) or of Imaam Muhammad (Rahmatullah alayh) or of both. For example, Aqeeqah, according to Imaam Abu Hanifah (Rahmatullah alayh), the Qur’baani has displaced Aqeeqah. However, this is not the Fatwa of the Math-hab.

Thirdly, Imaam Abu Hanifah stated the Makrooh view for the six fasts at a time when it was being considered Waajib.

What is Mufta Bihi??

The literal meaning of Mufta bihi is ‘the view in which fatwaa is given on’.

Basically, in every Madh-hab we have countless Fuqaha. At times, those who reached the status of Ijtihaad within a Madh-hab differ from others. For example, in the Hanafi Madh-hab, we have an elite student of Imam Abu Hanifa (may Allah be pleased with him) – (Imam Muhammad, for example) – differing with him. Since the student too is a Mujtahid, there are times when a Mufti will pass verdict in accordance to the view of that student. That view becomes the Mufta Bihi (the view upon which verdict is given). If the verdict is passed on the view of Imam Abu Hanifa, then that is Mufta Bihi.

On a side note, this proves that a Madh-hab is not the work of one individual, rather it is the combined effort of thousands of scholars.

Frameworks for issuing a ruling in the Hanafi Madh-hab

Question:
The Hanafi Fiqh is mainly based on the masā’il rendered to us by Imam Abu Hanifah and his two students, Imam Abu Yusuf and Imam Muhammad (also known al-sāhibayn). What will the fatwa be based on in masā’il, wherein there is disagreement between Imam Abu Hanifah and his two students (Imam Abu Yusuf and Imam Muhammad)?

Answer:
There are two opinions expressed:

Opinion. 1
The opinion of Imam Abu Hanifah will ALWAYS be given preference over that of his two students. ’Allama Siraj al-Dīn writes in Fatāwa Sirajiyyah:

“The ruling unconditionally is given upon the opinion of Imam Abu Hanifah, then of sāhibayn (when both students have agreed upon something), then of Imam Abu Yusuf, then of Imam Muhammad, then Imam Zufar and then of Hasan bin Ziyad. It has been assumed that if a disagreement is between Imam Abu Hanifah on one side and the two students (together) on the other side, then the Mufti will have an option. HOWEVER, THE FIRST OPINION (of preference to Imam Abu Hanifah) IS MORE CORRECT.

Opinion. 2
The ruling is rendered upon the opinion of any (Imam Abu Hanifah or his students and not necessarily only upon that of Imam Abu Hanifah) as deemed appropriately (following the principles of Fiqh).

Response to the first opinion:

There are several masā’il wherein earlier jurists gave ruling upon the opinion of sāhibayn on the basis of their strong proofs. [Al-Hāwi al-Qudsi].

The fatwa was also sometimes given based on the opinion of the imam who was considered a greater authority than others in that particular area, such as, Imam Abu Yusuf in qadhā and shahadah, Imam Muhammad in inheritance (zawi al-arham) and Imam Zufar in 17 masā’il. [Radd al-Muhtār]

The opinion expressed by sāhibayn is, in fact, one of the opinions narrated by Imam Abu Hanifah himself. (Thus, the opinion of sahibayn does not also in any way contradict the taqleed of Imam Abu Hanifah) [Ibn ‘Abidin]

Question:
There are many fiqhi works which include disagreements in their books but have not clearly stated upon the opinion of whom is the ruling given. In such cases, what principle should be applied to give preference to one opinion over the other?

Answer:
In principle, the fatwa must be given on that which is highlighted as ‘mufta bihi’ position (upon which fatwa is given) by accepted authorities (ashāb al-tarjih).

However, if no such expression is explicitly found in any of the reliable books, then the Mufti will consider many factors before rendering a fatwa on one of the valid opinions in the madh’hab: the difference in stage (tabaqah) among the jurists who may have differed in their preference, customary practice (‘urf), the state of the people, that which falls under the category of ‘need’, that which is the most practical for people, that which is stronger in proofs and other factors [Al-Durr al-Mukhtār].

Whenever we abrogate a verse or cause it to be forgotten, We bring one better than it or one equal to it. Do you not know that Allah is powerful over everything? Do you not know that to Allah alone belongs the kingdom of the heavens and the earth? And, you have none, other than Allah, to protect or help you.

[Surah Baqarah 106-107]

Verse 106 speaks of Allah abrogating certain verses, or making men forget certain others. The first phrase of the verse, thus covers all the possible forms in which a verse of the Qur’an can be abrogated. The Arabic word in the text is Naskh, which has two lexical meanings – (1) to write, and (2) to abolish, to repeal. According to the consensus of all the commentators, the word has been employed in this verse in the second sense — that is, the repeal or abrogation of an injunction. So, in the terminology of the Holy Qur’an and the Hadith, Naskh signifies the promulgation of an injunction in place of another — whether the later injunction merely consists in the repeal of the earlier or, substitutes a new regulation in its place. The other form of Naskh mentioned in this verse is that sometimes Allah made the Holy Prophet and the blessed Companions forget a certain verse altogether. The commentators have cited several instances of this kind of Naskh, and the purpose in such cases has usually been to repeal a certain regulation.

The Kinds of Abrogation

Making laws and repealing them to promulgate new ones in their stead is a regular and well-known practice in human governments and institutions. But in the case of man-made laws abrogation takes place sometimes because the law-makers do not understand the situation properly while making a certain law, and have to change it when they realize their mistakes, and sometimes because when a law is promul- gated, it is in accord with the prevailing situation, but when quite unforeseen changes alter the situation, the law too has to be changed. But these two forms of abrogation are out of the question in the case of divine injunctions.

There is, however, a third form too. The lawmaker makes a law, knowing fully well that the circumstances are going to change in such a way that the law will no longer be suitable for the new situation; so, when the situation changes as he already knew, he changes the law too, and promulgates a new one which he had thought of at the very start. For example, a physician prescribes a medicine for a patient in view of his present conditions, but he knows that when the patient has been using it for two days, his condition will change and require a new medicine — with this realization, he prescribes a medicine suitable for that day, but two days later, when circumstances have changed, he prescribes a new one. The physician can easily give the patient written instructions for the whole course of the treatment, with all the changes in the medicines-duly indicated. But this would be putting too much burden on the already feeble patient, and there would also be the danger of some harm through a possible error or misunderstanding.

This is the only form of abrogation which can occur, and has been occurring in divine injunctions and in divine books. Every new Shari’ah and every new revealed Book has been abrogating many injunctions of the earlier Shari’ah and of the earlier Book. Similarly, within the same Shari’ah, too, it has always happened that a certain law was in force for a time, but Divine Wisdom chose to abrogate it and to promulgate another in its place. A hadith reported by Imam Muslim says: “There has never been a prophethood which did not abrogate some injunctions.” This is a principle which it should not be difficult to understand. It was only some malicious and ignorant Jews who confused the divine abrogation of injunctions with the two forms of the repeal of man-made laws, and began, in their impudence, to taunt the Holy Prophet (sallallaahu alayhi wasallam) in reply to which, as we have said, these two verses were revealed. [Ibn Jarir, Ibn Kathir]

As for the Muslims, it was probably in their desire to avoid giving occasion to the enemies of Islam for such taunts that some from among the Mu’tazilah tried to explain away the whole question of Naskh. Logically speaking, there is a possibility — so ran their argument — of abrogation in the case of divine injunctions, and the possibility cannot be denied on any rational ground, but abrogation has not actually occurred in the Holy Qur’an, and there is no verse in the Holy Book which abrogates another (Nasikh) and no verse which has been abrogated (Mansukh). This view is attributed to Abi Muslim al-Isfahani, but the ‘Ulama’ in general have always rejected this opinion, and refuted the argument. Thus, we read in Ruh al-Ma’ani:

“The people belonging to all the Shari’ahs are unanimous in accepting the validity of abrogation and its actual occurrence both. Only the Jews — with the exception of their ‘Isawiyyah sect have denied the possibility of abrogation, and Abu Muslim al-Isfahani; has denied its occurrence, for he says that it is rationally possible, but has not actually taken place.”

Imam al-Qurtubi says:

“It is essential to understand the question of abrogation, and great benefits flow from such an understanding, which no scholar can dispense with, and no one can deny abrogation except the ignorant and the dull-headed.”

In this connection, al-Qurtubi has related a very illuminating incident. The fourth Khalifah Sayyidina ‘AIi (radhiyallahu anhu) saw a man preaching in the mosque. He asked the people what the man was doing. On being told that he was preaching, the blessed Khalifah said: “He is not doing anything of the sort, but only announcing to the people that he is such and such a man and the son of such and such, and asking them to recognize and remember him.” Calling the man to his side, he asked: “Do you know the injunctions which have been abrogated and those which have abrogated the earlier ones?” When he confessed that he did not, the Khalifah turned him out of the mosque, and ordered him never to preach there.

It is not feasible to cite here all the sayings of the blessed Companions and their immediate Successors (Tabi’in) which affirm the actual occurrence of abrogation in the case of injunctions laid down by the Holy Qur’an and the Hadith. Some of these have been quoted, along with the evidence for the authenticity of the reports, in the commentaries of Ibn Jarir and Ibn Kathir etc. and in Al-Durr al-Manthur. As for the reports less strongly authenticated, they are just innumerable. That is why there has always been a total consensus of the ‘Ulama on the question of Naskh, except for Abu Muslim al-Isfahani and a few others from among the Mu’tazilah who have denied the actual occurrence of abrogation — but Imam Razi has, in his commentary, exposed in detail the hollowness of their opinion.The Terminology of the Naskh

It is also essential to keep in mind a certain distinction in the use of the word Naskh as a technical term of the Shari’ah. The technical sense of the word implies changing an injunction, and replacing one injunction by another. Now, this change may consist in repealing an injunction altogether and replacing it by another (for example, fixing the Ka’bah as the Qiblah — the direction towards which Muslims turn in their prayers — instead of the Baytul-Maqdis); the change may equally consist in retaining an injunction but adding certain condition and provisions to it. The ‘Ulama of the early period of Islam have used the word Naskh in this general and comprehensive sense which includes the total repeal of an injunction as well as a partial change in an injunction with the addition of certain conditions, provisions or exceptions. That is why the ‘Ulama of the earlier period have indicated some five hundred verses of the Holy Qur’an which, according to them, have been abrogated.

But, according to the ‘Ulama of a later period, only that change is to be called a Naskh which cannot in any way be brought into consonance with an earlier injunction. Obviously, this approach greatly reduces the number of abrogated verses. For example, there are, according to al-Suyuti, only twenty such verses. Later on, Shah Waliullah, seeking to bring the abrogated injunctions in consonance with the earlier injunctions, reduced the number of abrogated verses to only five — these being the cases where later injunctions could not be made to correspond with the earlier ones without far-fetched interpretations. This effort is highly commendable, because the basic postulate behind an injunction is its permanence, while abrogation goes against this postulate, and hence it is not proper to posit abrogation in a verse laying down an injunction which can, in some justifiable manner, be shown to be still valid.

But this effort to reduce the number of abrogated verses does not, and cannot in the least imply (as the ‘modernists’ have been all too impatient to believe.) that the presence of abrogation is in any way — may Allah forgive us for reproducing a blasphemy — a shortcoming or defect in the Holy Qur’an or Islam, that the ‘Ulama have for the last fourteen hundred years been trying to remove it, that the ultimate inspiration came to Shah Waliullah whose extraordinary achievement lies in having reduced the number of abrogated verses to five, and that now one may wait for a few geniuses who would bring the number down to zero.

To adopt such an approach towards the question of “Naskh” is no service to Islam or to the Holy Qur’an (to which pretends the whole tribe of self-styled scholars, researchers, “experts in Islamic studies” and “revivificateurs of Islam.”), nor can it obliterate the profound investigations into truth of the matter made by the blessed Companions, their Successors, and the ‘Ulama of the generations that followed them during the last fourteen hundred years, nor can it stop the recriminations of the enemies of Islam. In fact, all it would do is to furnish a weapon to the present-day traducers of Islam and those who wish to rebel against Islam, who would now be saying that what the ‘Ulama of the Islamic Ummah have been maintaining on the subject for the last fourteen hundred years has finally proved to be wrong. May Allah forbid such a thing! If this door is opened, it would let in all kinds of disorders, and all the injunctions of the Shari’ah would come under suspicion. Then, is there any guarantee that the results of this “modernistic” research would not turn out to be wrong tomorrow!

We have come across certain recent writings in which an attempt has been made to revive the argument of Abu Muslim al-Isfahani. Such writers begin with the assumption that the Arabic word ‘Ma’ in verse 106 is not a relative or adverbial pronoun signifying “whenever”, or “whichever” but a conjunction implying ‘if’ that introduces a conditional clause; so, they translate the first phrase of the the verse not as “whichever verse We abrogate”, but as “if We abrogate a verse”, and say that the statement pertains to a supposition or to an imaginary situation as do the phrases beginning with the Arabic word Laww (if) — for example: “If there were in the sky and the earth another god beside Allah” [21:22] “If the, All-Merciful had a son” [43:81]. On this basis, they argue that abrogation is possible, but has never actually occurred. Such writers, we are afraid, do not show an intimate knowledge of Arabic grammar, for there is a great deal of difference between a condition suggested by the word Ma and the imaginary situation introduced by the conjunction Laww. Moreover, it is on the basts of this verse itself that the blessed Companions have affirmed the occurrence of abrogation, and have even cited many instances. So have their Successors and all authentic Commentators. In view of such unanimity, the new-fangled interpretation cannot be acceptable. Even Shah Waliullah, in reducing the number of abrogated verses, has never thought of denying the fact of abrogatim. In short, all the authentic and authoritative ‘Ulama, from the days of the blessed Companions down to our own day, have always affirmed not only the possibility, but also the actual occurrence of abrogation. This has been the position of all the ‘Ulama of Deoband too, without any exception.

When the illustrious Fuqaha-e-Kiraam cite a Hadith as a Mustadal or adduce it in corroboration of the view they expound, then the very citation of the Hadith is the daleel for its saht (authenticity) regardless of any classification of the later Muhadditheen. This is a well-known principle of Fiqh.

Mustadal (plural mustadallaat) is the basis on which the Fuqaha formulate a Shar’i hukm. Qur’aanicverses, Ahaadith, statements and rulings of the Sahaabah and the principles of Shar’i Qiyaas form the Mustadallaat of the Fuqaha. The Fuqaha do not operate beyond the confines of these Qur’aanic principles. Shaikh Yusuf Bin Isma’eel An-Nibhaani says in his Hujjatullaah Alal Aalameen:

“Whoever says that Sunnat is only what is explicitly mentioned in the Ahaadith, has in fact rejected all the Math-habs of the Mujtahideen. He has rejected Ijma’. The evil of his belief is not hidden. We seek protection from Allah Ta’ala (against such deviation).

It is mentioned in Al-Yaaqoot wal Jawaahir, and similarly it is narrated in Al-Mizaanul Khadriyyah (of Imaam Sha’raani) that Shaikhul Islam Zakariyya (among the Shaafi’ Fuqaha) said: ‘Alhamdulillaah, I have searched for the proofs of the Mujtahideen (i.e. for their dalaa-il and mustadallaat). I have not found even a single fara’ (a mas’alah which is not a principle) from among the Furoo’ of their Mathaahib except that it is substantiated by a daleel, either an Aayat from the Qur’aan or a Hadith or an Athar (statement of a Sahaabi) or Saheeh Qiyaas – based on saheeh principles. ….All their statements are derived from the rays of the Noor of the Shariah which is the foundation. It is impossible to find a fara’ (of the Fuqaha) without a basis (in the Qur’aan and Sunnah).”

It should be clear to men of knowledge that when a Muhaddith of the later eras describing a Hadith says: “I do not recognize it.”, “I do not know it.”, “There is no basis for it.”, “It is weak.”, etc., he says so within the limits of his knowledge and investigation based on principles which he or other Muhadditheen have evolved. He never directs such comments against the Mustdallaat of the Fuqaha who were the Asaatizah of the Asaatizah of the Muhadditheen.

On the contrary, it was the practice of the Muhadditheen to set aside their own Saheeh Ahaadith, if there was a conflict with the practice (amal) and ruling of the Fuqaha. Thus, they would say:“The amal of the Ahl-e-Ilm is on this….”, and they would say this even if they had classified the Ahaadith as weak (Dhaeef). Despite the Hadith being Dhaeef according to their classification, the Muhadditheen would mention the amal of the Fuqaha.

Thus the Muhadditheen who had compiled the Hadith books, would practise in accordance with the Ahaadith which they themselves had classified as Dhaeef because these ‘Dhaeef’ narrations constituted the Mustadallaat of the Fuqaha. The principles and rules of Hadith classification which the later Muhadditheen had formulated did not apply to the Shariah’s laws or to the Hadith mustadallaat of the Fuqaha-e-Mutaqaddimeen.

The Muhadditheen were not among the Aimmah Mujtahideen. They followed the Math-habs in their practical life. They did not formulate a different Math-hab for themselves based on their classification of Hadith.

In terms of this well-known principle of Talaqqi bil Qubool a Hadith becomes valid for amal even if its isnaad is dhaeef. In this regard, Hafiz Ibn Hajar writes:

“One of the criteria for acceptance of Hadith is the concurrence of the Ulama on making amal (acting) on the Hadith. Such a Hadith (on which there is the concurrence of the Fuqaha) will be incumbently accepted.”

“Similarly (will a Hadith be accepted) when the Ummah accepts a Dhaeef Hadith. (Ummahin this context does not include the rank and file). According to the authentic view such a Hadith will be acted on. Allaamah Muhaddith Faqeeh Shaikh Husain Bin Muhsin Al-Ansaari Al-Yamani was asked about the statement of Imaam Tirmizi who says in his Jaami’ when he narrates a Dhaeef Hadith: “Amal (practical adoption) on it is according to the Ahl-e-Ilm (the Fuqaha).” …….And it was also asked about the established principle on which there is the consensus of the Muhadditheen that anything other than a Saheeh or Hasan Hadith will not be accepted in the matter of (formulating) ahkaam. But this Hadith (referringto a particular Hadith) is Dhaeef. How is it then permissible for the Ulama to act on it?

The Shaikh said in response: “MayAllah grant us and you taufeeq. A Dhaeef Hadith is one which lacks a condition from among the conditions of acceptance…..As-Suyuti said in Sharh Nazmid Durar (Al-Nahrul lazi Zakhar): Qubool (Acceptance) is:

(1) What the Ulama have accorded Talaqqi bil Qubool i.e. the Fuqaha have accepted a narration even though there is no saheeh isnaad for it. Among the group of Ulama who have narrated this is Ibn Abdul Barr.

(2) Or it (the narration) has become well-known to the Aimmah-e-Hadith. And As-Suyuti has also said after mentioning the Hadith: ‘Tirmizi said: ‘Amal today is on this Hadith according to the Ulama.’ With this statement he indicated that a Hadith is strengthened with the acceptance by the Fuqaha.”

Many authorities have explicitly said that of the evidence for the authenticity of a Hadith is the acceptance by the Ulama even if there is no reliable isnaad for it. As-Suyuti has also said in Tadreebur Raawi: “Some of them (the Authorities) said: ‘Hadith will be accorded authenticity when the People (i.e. the Fuqaha) have accepted it as authentic even if there is no saheeh isnaad for it.” Ibn Abdul Barr said in Al-Istithkaar when it was narrated from Tirmizi that Bukhaari authenticated the Hadith of the Ocean (that its water is pure), while the Muhadditheen do not accredit this type of isnaad. Nevertheless according to me the Hadith is Saheeh because the Ulama have accorded it acceptance.”

It is mentioned in At-Tamheed: ‘Jaabir narrated from Nabi (sallallahu alayhi wasallam):‘A dinaar is twenty four qeeraat.’ About this Hadith, he said: ‘In terms of the statement of the Ulama and their Ijma’ regarding its meaning, it is independent of isnaad (i.e. it is authentic without an isnaad).

Regarding the practice of Talqeen to the mayyit (according to the Hambali Math-hab). “A Dhaeef Hadith is narrated on this issue. At-Tabraani records in his Mu’jam the Hadith of Abu Umaamah..…..This Hadith is not substantiated. However, the continuity of practice in this regard in all the lands and ages without any rejection suffices for its practical adoption.”

The Hanafi Muhaqqiq, Imaam Al-Kamaal Al-Humaam, says in Fathul Qadeer (about the weakness of a Hadith): “Among the factors which authenticate Hadith is the concurrence of the Ulama on its practice.”

Tirmizi said after narrating it: ‘Hadithun Ghareebun’. (This Hadith is Ghareeb). But, notwithstanding this, the amal is on it according to the Ulama among the Sahaabah of Rasulullah (sallallahu alayhi wasallam) and others besides them (i.e. the Taabieen, etc.)’.

Imaam Maalik (rahmatullah alayh) said: “The fame of a Hadith in Madinah makes it independent of a saheeh sanad.”

Haafiz As-Sakhaawi says in Fathul Mugeeth: ‘When the Ummah accepts a Dhaeef Hadith, then according to the authentic view it will be adopted (for amal). So much so, that it will attain the status of Mutawaatir, and it will abrogate Maqtoo’ (Ahaadith). It is for this reason that Imaam Shaafi’ (rahmatullah alayh) said about (the particular) Hadith:“There is no bequest for an heir”, verily, the Muhadditheen have not substantiated it (i.e. it is not authentic in terms of their criteria). Nevertheless, the Ummah has accorded it acceptance for practical adoption. In fact, they (the Fuqaha) have affirmed it to be Naasikh (i.e. it is an abrogater) for the Qur’aanic aayat regarding wasiyyat (bequest).”

Allaamah Saalih Bin Mahdi Al-Muqbeeli said: “Saheeh Hadith in the specific meaning of the Muta-akh-khireen (the later Muhadditheen from about the age of Bukhaari and Muslim), is that which has been narrated by an uprighteous Haafiz who inturn narrates from a similar narrator without a defect. Saheeh Hadith in the general meaning according to the Mutaqaddimeen (the authorities of the early era) among the Muhadditheen, all the Fuqaha and Usooliyyeen, is a narration on which there is practical adoption (ma’mool bihi).” Thus, when a Muhaddith among the Muta-akh-khireen says:‘This Hadith is not Saheeh.’, then while it negates the special and restricted meaning of the term, it does not negate the general meaning of authenticity according to the Mutaqaddimeen, all the Fuqaha and Usooliyyeen. Therefore, at this juncture there is the possibility of a Hadith being of the Hasan or Dhaeef or Ghair Ma’mool category. On account of this possibility, it is incumbent to probe the Hadith. If it is established that it is Hasan or Dhaeef Ma’mool bihi (i.e. it has been practically adopted by the Fuqaha), then it will be accepted. And, if it is Dhaeef Ghair Ma’mool bihi (i.e. it has not been adopted for amal by the Fuqaha), then it will not be accepted.” (End of Maulana Abdul Hayy’s dissertation.)

It is clear that the classified Hadith categories of the later Muhadditheen do not apply to the narrations accepted and adopted by the Fuqaha who went before them. It should be simple to understand that after the demise of Rasulullah (sallallahu alayhi wasallam), Islam did not disappear as Judaism and Christianity had disappeared with the departure of their respective Nabis. Not a single mas’alah of the Shariah was lost after the demise of Nabi-e-Kareem (sallallahu alayhi wasallam).

When the Muhadditheen appeared on the scene two centuries later, they found Islam intact. They followed the Islam into which they were born, and they continued practising the Ahkaam without interpolation, deletion and alteration in the light of their classification of Hadith. The masaa-il of the Shariah which the Sahaabah and their illustrious Students, the Aimmah-e-Mujtahideen had evolved, were all based on the Qur’aan and Sunnah which did not disappear. The Mujtahid Imaams were Muhadditheen of the highest calibre. Only when a Hadith was Saheeh and beyond reproach, would it constitute a valid Mustadal for extrapolation of ahkaam. In the circles of Ilm it is common knowledge that acceptance of a Hadith as a Mustadal by the Fuqaha is the daleel for the authenticity of that Hadith.

Any unbiased person with a little understanding will readily understand that principles formulated two centuries after the age of the Fuqaha-e-Mutaqaddimeen cannot negate the authenticity of the narrations accredited by these illustrious Fuqaha, who flourished in the age of the Sahaabah and in close proximity to their era.

Maulana Abdul Hayy further says: “Shaikh Ibraaheem Ath-Thabrahaiti Maaliki says in Sharhul Arbaeen An-Nawwiyah: ‘The occasion for not adopting Dhaeef Hadith in matters of Ahkaam, is when the Fuqaha have not accepted it. If they have accepted it, then it is confirmed, and it (the Dhaeef narration) becomes a proof which shall be practically adopted in matters of ahkaam, etc. as Imaam Shaafi’ has said….. (This effectively debunks the enemies of Taqleed slandering Hanafi Dalaa’il to be based on weak Ahadith. They are NOT ‘weak’. They are solid GOLD.)

Haafiz Ibn Hajar says in Fathul Baari: “None of the isnaad (of narrations) is devoid of some criticism. But on the whole the Hadith has a basis. In fact, Ash-Shaafi’ has explicitly stated in Al-Umm that the text of this (Dhaeef) Hadith is Mutawaatir….” ……..

(Haafiz Bin Hajar commenting on a certain Hadith said): ‘Bukhaari said: “It is not Saheeh.” The Compilers of the Four Sunan narrated it, and Haakim narrated it from the tareeq of Eesa Bin Yoonus. Tirmizi said: ‘It is Ghareeb.’ We do not recognize it except from the narration of ‘Eesa Bin Yoonus from Hishaam. I (i.e. Imaam Tirmizi) asked Muhammad (i.e. Imaam Bukhaari) about it. He said: ‘’I do not regard it to be secure (i.e. its sanad).’ Ibn Maajah and Haakim have narratedit from the avenue of Hafs Bin Ghiyaath, and also from Hishaam. Tirmizi said: ‘It has been narrated in different ways from Abu Hurairah (radhiyallahu anhu). Its isnaad is not saheeh.’ (However, inspite of all this criticism), the amal of the Ulama is on it. (i.e. they have adopted it and the Ummah is practising accordingly).”

(Be it known that the Shariah as we have it today, was transmitted down the long corridor of more than 14 centuries from the Sahaabah. The Shariah did not reach us from Imaam Bukhaari or from any of the other Muhadditheen who appeared centuries after the Sahaabah. Thus the amal of the Fuqaha-e-Mutaqaddimeen override the Hadith classifications of the Muhadditheen. Even if a Hadith is labelled ‘weak’ by the later Muhadditheen, it has absolutely no effect on a Shar’i hukm which was already Mutawaatir during the age of the Sahaabah and Taabieen.)

Our Ustaadh, Allaamah Shaikh Muhammad Badr-e-Aalam said in the Ta’leeq (Annotation) on the discussion of Imaamul Asr: “I say: …..Verily, the Shaikh does not intend with the aforegoing discussion the abolition of the application of Isnaad. How is this possible? If it was not for Isnaad, anyone would have said whatever he desired. On the contrary, the Shaikh intends to convey that when a Hadith has become authentic by way of indications and it has become obvious, then to discard it merely on the basis of a weak narrator is not correct. How can this be so when continuity of practical adoption of it is a stronger testification for its substantiation according to him?”

And, Shaikh Muhammad Yusuf Binnuri said: “Verily, Shaikh Anwar (Hadhrat Anwar Shah Kashmiri) would say: ‘The purpose of Isnaad is to ensure that something which is not Deen does not creep into the Deen. The purpose of Isnaad is not to expunge from the Deen what has been substantiated of it by the practice (amal) of the Ahl-e-Isnaad (the Ulama whose Isnaad links up with Rasulullah – sallallahu alayhi wasallam)’” – End of Hadhrat Maulana Abdul Hayy’s dissertation

Wakee’ Bin Jarraah, the renowned Muhaddith and expert in the field of examining narrators said: “A Hadith which is in circulation among the Fuqaha is better than a Hadith in circulation among the Shuyookh of Hadith.”

In Shaami it is said: “When the Mujtahid employs a Hadith as a basis for formulation (of masaail), then (his istidlaal with it) is the accredition of that Hadith.”

In Imdaadul Fataawa, it is mentioned: “Is the consensus of the Jamhoor not a sign for the Hadith having a strong basis even if the factor of dhu’f (weakness) has become attached to it by way of the sanad?”

In I’laaus Sunan, it is mentioned: “The fame (shuhrat) of a mas’alah liberates us from (the need) of probing the asaneed.”

Ainul Hidaayah states: “Imaam Shaafi’ has written in his Risaalah that the Taabieen Ulama had accepted it (referring to a particular Hadith with no proven isnaad) in view of the fact that it was confirmed to them that it was the instruction of Rasulullah (sallallahu alayhi wasallam). Ibn Abdul Barr said that this instruction (referring to the Hadith in question) is well-known to the Ulama of history and the Fuqaha, hence due to the resemblance with Mutawaatir, there is no need for its isnaad.”

“The Muhadditheen (i.e. the later Hadith compilers) take into consideration only the state of the isnaad. They do not consider Ta-aamul (uninterrupted practice from generation to generation initiating from the age of the Sahaabah). Hence, many a time a Hadith is authentic on the basis of their criteria. However, they find that there is no amal on that Saheeh Hadith. This bewilders them. In this regard, Tirmizi narrated in his Jaami’ two authentic narrations, valid for practical adoption. Then he commented: ‘Verily, no one has adopted it for amal. Inspite of the authenticity of the Isnaad no one is making amal on it. In the same way the Muhadditheen have classified as Dhaeef a Hadith from the angle of its Isnaad although the Hadith is widely practised on it. (By the Ummah) during their time. (i.e. it was ma’mool bihi). Thus there is a disadvantage from a different angle. It is therefore imperative to consider Ta-aamul along with the isnaad, for verily, the Shariah revolves around Ta-aamul and Tawaaruth.” (i.e. the permanent practice from the time of the Sahaabah.)

Let it be understood that the Muhadditheen also have their ‘math-habs’ in the science of Hadith classification. Different Muhadditheen have their own criteria. A Hadith which is dhaeef to one Muhaddith, may be saheeh according to another one. There is considerable difference of opinion on this issue. While some Muhadditheen have labelled these narrations dhaeef, others have described them as Saheeh.

It is a principle of the science of Hadith that the cumulative effect of a variety of narrations of similar subject matter, but of variant versions in their respective Isnaad, eliminates the dhu’f (technical weakness), and elevates the Hadith to a status of acceptable authenticity.

Added to this, is the acceptance of such weak narrations by the illustrious Fuqaha. This acceptance (Talaqqi bil Qubool) is the strongest evidence for the authenticity of these Ahaadith. The fact that the Fuqaha present Ahaadith as Mustadallaat or as corroboration, testifies that their authenticity stems from the era of the Sahaabah. The immediate Asaatizah of the first wrung of Aimmah-e-Mujtahideen in the Taabieen era. These Aimmah passed on their Knowledge to their successors who are the Leaders of the Math-habs, and from them this knowledge pervaded the successive ranks of Fuqaha. These Fuqaha did not glean these Ahaadith or their Ilm in general from kutub. Thus, this Knowledge of Islam which we have in our kutub of Fiqh in front of us is not secondary and tertiary acquired from book-study. It is the Ilm of Wahi which reached us via the noble Links in an unbroken Golden Chain (Isnaad) which links up with Rasulullah (sallallahu alayhi wasallam).

In ascertaining the saht (authenticity) of Ahaadith which constitute the Mustadallaat of the Ahkaam of Fiqh, we are totally independent of the Hadith Books of Imaam Bukhaari, Imaam Muslim, etc., etc. The presentation of a Hadith by the Fuqaha is the strongest proof of its authenticity. In the face of the accredition of the Fuqaha, the conflicting classification of the Muhadditheen is devoid of substance in the context of the Ahkaam already formulated and finalized during the Khairul Quroon epoch.

In view of the clarity of the exposition of the principle of Talaqqi bil Qubool by the Authorities of the Shariah, the negation of the authenticity of the Ahadith presented by the Fuqaha by the later day scholars is untenable. All attempts made by some Ulama of the later ages to assail the Ahadith & Dalaa’il of the 4 Math-habs are devoid of Shar’i substances. Their personal opinions have to be set aside as fallacious. The only motive underlying these abortive attempts to dislodge the Dalaa’il of the 4 Math-habs is to extract support for their self-opinions with modernists leanings. The Fuqaha-e-Mutaqaddimeen had no such agenda. They stated the unadulterated Haqq to safeguard the pristine purity of the Sunnah.

We are dealing with a Hukm of the Shariah which was concluded by the illustrious Fuqaha long, long before the age of the Muhadditheen. There is, therefore, no need to refer to the later Muhadditheen for ascertainment of the status of a Hadith which the Fuqaha had authenticated by utilizing it as their Mustadal or for corroborating a fatwa which they had issued. In short, these Ahaadith authenticated by the Fuqaha are like GOLD.

Sunnat is not only that which has been established from Nabi (sallallahu alayhi wasallam), in fact Sunnat is the predominant practice of Nabi (sallallahu alayhi wasallam), be it in the form of a (clear) instruction or something which is perceived (from his reactions). For example, Taraaweeh Salaat is classified as Sunnat-e-Muakkadah, and ta’akkud (emphasis) implies perpetuity. It is clear that there was no perpetuity in this act (by Nabi (sallallahu alayhi wasallam), rather it was a special temporary act. [Al-Ifaadhaat, page 355, vol. 8]

A verbal declaration on any matter from Nabi (sallallahu alayhi wasallam) is not sufficient to render it a Sunnat, in fact, that which was his predominant practice is a Sunnat, and not his occasional practices. [Ibid. page 300, vol. 2]

Types of Sunnat

Sunnat (according to its general definition) is that which Nabi (sallallahu alayhi wasallam) carried out as a form of Ibaadat, besides this it would be classified as a sunnan-e-zawaa’id (extra Sunnats). For example the hair-style of Nabi (sallallahu alayhi wasallam) was his personal habit and not any act of Ibaadat, hence there is no doubt that keeping this style of hair is preferable (for the Ummat), but to keep one’s hair in another way would not be classified as contrary to the Sunnat. [Imdaadul Fataawa, page 224]

Sunnat is of two types – Sunnat-e-Ibaadat and Sunnat-e-‘Aadat. The general usage of the word ‘Sunnat’ would include only the first type. Promises of reward and encouragement to practice implies to and refers to this type. Practice on the second type would be a source of blessings and is a demonstration of one’s love for Nabi (sallallahu alayhi wasallam). This second type does not form any essential part of the Deen and if its practice interferes with one’s Deen and beliefs, then one should be stopped therefrom. [Ibid. page 229, vol. 4]

The ruling regarding Sunan-e-Zawaa’id and mustahibbaat

The ruling regarding the ‘extra’ Sunnats (sunan-e-‘aadiya) and the Mustahab acts is that their performance warrants reward and non-performance does not attract sin. When one closely studies the nusoos then it will be noted that this is the ruling of these two deeds before they are performed, but after their commencement, the ruling changes. One ruling will apply to a specific application and another is general, which is not specific to its occasion of application. It is Makrooh to leave out and abandon that Mustahab act which has been made a perpetual habit, which one practices over a period of time. This is borne out by a Hadith in Bukhaari Shareef which is reported by Hadhrat Abdullah Ibn Umar (radhiyallahu anhuma) who reports from Nabi (sallallahu alayhi wasallam) that he said, “O Abdallah, don’t be like so and so, who used to stand up at nights (in Ibaadat) and then he abandoned it.” Nabi (sallallahu alayhi wasallam) had displayed distaste and karaahat at this attitude of this person who used to regularly perform Tahajjud Salaat and then abandoned it. It is clear that after inculcating as a habit a Mustahab act it should not be abandoned. This is Makrooh. [badaa’i, page 150]

The definition of reviving a Sunnat

Shah Abdul Qadir Sahib (rahmatullah alayh) once said to an Aalim (Molvi Ismail Sahib) to stop making rafa’ yadain (lifting hands in various postures of Takbeer in Salaat) because it is a cause for unnecessary fitnah. Molvi Ismail said that if the fitnah of the masses is to be taken into account what then would happen to (the import of) the Hadith, “He who holds fast to my Sunnat at a time of fasaad in the Ummah will receive the reward of 100 martyrs.” Upon hearing this reply, Shah Abdul Qadir (rahmatullah alayh) replied, “We thought that Ismail had become an Aalim, but he does not understand the meaning of even one Hadith. The application of this Hadith is when there is some act which is (being generally practiced) contrary to the Sunnat practice, whereas the topic we are discussing (i.e. not making rafa’ yadain) is not contrary to the Sunnat, in fact it is another Sunnat. Just as rafa’ yadain is a Sunnat, so too is irsaal (not making rafa’ yadain) is a Sunnat.” [Bawaadirun Nawaadir, page 469, vol. 2]

An appropriate and excellent explanation of Sunnat and bid’ah

It should be realised that whatever acts were innovated after the passing of the Khairul Quroon (best of eras) are categorised into two types: one is that whose initiative is new and some ma’moor bihi (essential ordered act of the Shariah) is dependant upon it, where without this (innovation) this faculty of Deen will not function effectively. For example, the compilation and authoring of Deeni subject matter in book-form, the establishment of Madrasahs and khanqahs, etc. These things were not resent during the era of Nabi (sallallahu alayhi wasallam), and their initiative is new, and some essential part of the Deen depends on (the initiation of) these acts.

Everyone is well aware that it is an essential and necessary requirement upon every (Muslim) individual to protect and safeguard the Deen. One should also remember that during the best of eras, such means (as these innovations mentioned above) did not exist, because there was no need for it. That era was permeating with blessings, and the memories of the Sahaabah (radhiyallahu anhum) was so excellent that when they heard or observed Nabi (sallallahu alayhi wasallam) saying or doing anything, it remained embedded and etched in their minds. Their understanding and intellect was also such that there was no need for formal classes wherein prescribed lessons in Deen needed to be taught.

Following those eras, others followed wherein negligence and carelessness (in matters of Deen) became the order of the day, memories were weaker, people of deviated and personal views increased, etc., hence the Ulama discerned the gradual destruction of the edifices of the Deen. The urgent need arose to formulate methods to administrate (and safeguard) the structures of the Deen, together with all its facets. In this regard the Kitaabs of the Deen, Hadith, Usool-e-Hadith, Usool-e-fiqh, Aqaai’d, etc. needed to be compiled. Madrasah were established in order to teach these sciences of the Deen. In similar vein, the mashaa’ikh saw the need to establish khanqahs to revive and nurture the desire for nisbat and self-reformation. Besides these, there was no other means envisaged which would safeguard our Deen.

Hence these are such things whose sabab (reasons and causes) are new, and these sababs were not prevalent during the khairul quroon. These are also such matters upon which the existence and preservation of some essential Deeni matter rests. Hence these things may have the apparent hue and definition of bid’ah, but in reality they are not bid’ahs. In fact, according to the ruling of Muqaddamatul Waajib Waajibun, they are Waajib acts.

The second are category are those things whose reason (sabab) is old. For example, the sabab of meelad, teeja, daswah, etc. are all old. The reason for the establishment of meelad is expression of happiness at the birth of Nabi (sallallahu alayhi wasallam). This very sabab and reason was prevalent and also existent during the era of Nabi (sallallahu alayhi wasallam) and the Sahaabah (radhiyallahu anhum), but it was never celebrated by any of them. Can we claim that, Nauthubillah, the minds of the Sahaabah (radhiyallahu anhum) did not discern this? If the sabab was not present during their eras, then at least we could have said that they had no cause to do it. But since the reason for holding meelad was also prevalent during that time, and neither did Nabi (sallallahu alayhi wasallam) nor his Sahaabah (radhiyallahu anhum) ever hold or encourage such activities, can we safely aver that this is a bid’ah – in word, definition and practically. Since these innovations fall under the scope of the Hadith, “Whosoever innovates anything into our Deen, is not from amongst us.” That is, it is impermissible to participate and hold such gatherings. This is the general ruling to recognise and distinguish between Sunnat and bid’ah. All corollary rulings can be deduced herefrom. [Wa’azus suroor, page 27]

The differences between Sunnat and bid’ah and the method in which to distinguish between the two

1. There is one other extraordinary difference between these two, and that is that the proposers and advancers of the former are (essentially) the elite (Ulama) and the awaam (masses) are not included (as the initiators), whereas the advancers and initiators of the latter are the masses (who are like sheep). And it is also they who always participate and spend therein. The celebrations and initiation of meelad was originated by a king. He was from the awaam and this practice remains perpetuated by the awwaam. [As-suroor, page 27]

2. I will show one way to recognise a bid’ah and that it is if the act is not established from the Qur’aan Majeed, Sunnat, Ijma or Qiyaas, and the participants deem it an act of the Shariah, then know that this is a bid’ah. After noting this definition, observe that urs fatiha, regarding any particular day as blessed and auspicious to make isaal-e-tahwaab, etc., etc. are not established from any source of the Deen. Are these acts not also regarded as part of the Deen? [Wa’az Taqweem, page 29]

3. Another yardstick in recognising that a bid’ah is evil is to observed whether more of its participants are Ulama or the masses. The Bid’ati leader will not spend of his own wealth. Yes he will be present at the meals. Such functions are more frequented by the ignoramuses. There is no prestige and honour of the bid’ah in the hearts of the Bid’atiUlama.

Those things which we hold in esteem and deem desirable, we participate therein, even if it means spending from our wealth, like qurbaani. And then also we should observe the masses (who attend these functions) — how many of them are Deeni-conscious and how many are not? Very few may be pious, but they do little, and the majority are faasiq and faajir (open sinners and transgressors). [Hasnul Azeez, page 330, vol. 2]

Innovations for Deen or innovations in Deen?

The reality of bid’ah is that it is such an act which is done thinking it to be part of the Deen. If it is done thinking it to be a treatment (for some spiritual ailment), then how can it be called a bid’ah? Hence, the one is an innovation for the (benefit of) Deen and the other is an innovation in (to the detriment of) the Deen. The innovation for the Deen would be classified a Sunnat and the innovation in the Deen a bid’ah. [Al-Faadhaat, page 308, vol. 2]

A person levelled an objection saying that the (concept of) times and timetable which we have scheduled and prepared were not practiced during the khairul quroon, hence this will be classified as a bid’ah.

If bid’ah is to be classified as these people understand it that whatever did not exist during the khairul quroon is a bid’ah, then during the khairul quroon he was also not yet in existence, hence he should be classified a bid’ah. These poor souls do not understand the definition of bid’ah.

These time schedules and tables are not part of any belief or ibaadat, hence their being or not being in the khairul quroon does not include it into the category of bid’ah. [Ibid. page 125, vol.2]

The necessity for any act to have been present during the khairul quroon will be when the act is one of Ibaadat. If the act is merely one of administration or regulation, then it will not be a bid’ah (even if it was not existent during the khairul quroon). One such Hadith has been added in Hayatul Muslimeen which was taken from Shamaa’il Tirmidhi, wherein regulation in the daily life of Nabi (sallallahu alayhi wasallam) has been reported. This Hadith appears in the eighth part. [Ibid. page 134, vol. 2]

To exceed the limits in a non-Shar’i or mandoob act, or to make takhsees or ta’yeen would also be included as a bid’ah

It has been narrated by Hadhrat Hasan (radhiyallahu anhu) that Hadhrat Uthman bin Abi ‘Aas (radhiyallahu anhu) was called to the khatna (circumcision) of someone, and he refused the invitation. When asked about it he replied that during the era of Nabi (sallallahu alayhi wasallam) they would not attend a khatna neither were they called to it. This narration appears in Musnad Ahmad.

From this we realise that the Sahaabah (radhiyallahu anhum) disliked the invitations to such occasions which are not established from the Sunnat. They even refused to attend such gatherings.

The secret to this is that an invitation to any occasion places some sort of importance or significance to that which one is invited to, because arrangements are being prepared for it, and to make special arrangements for anything which the Shariah has not, would be classified as an innovation in the Deen. This is the reason why when Hadhrat Ibn Umar (radhiyallahu anhu) saw that the people were gathering in the Musjid to perform their Chaasht(Duhaa) Salaat, he criticised them and labelled this a bid’ah. Based on this, the Fuqahaa have said that it is Makrooh to make Nafl Salaat in congregation. To regard and believe an unimportant matter to be important and place great emphasis upon it, or to become dogmatic and rigidly practice on such matters, such that one regards and accommodates it to the level of Faraa’idh and Waajibaat or even more, and then to censure and criticise those who do not participate therein, are all contemptible acts. Theses are the essences of bid’ah. Allaah Ta’ala has stated that those people who exceed the limits placed by Him are the oppressors.

Hadhrat Abdullah Ibn Mas’ood (radhiyallahu anhu) stated that it is necessary upon every person that he not allocate a part of his Salaat to shaitaan, by always turning to his right side after Fardh Salaat (i.e. deeming this to be necessary). He says that he saw Nabi (sallallahu alayhi wasallam) sometimes turn to his left side. [Bukhaari/Muslim]

Teebi, the commentator of Mishkaat Shareef has stated that it is proven from this Hadith that the person who persists and is dogmatic on a Mustahab act, such that he deems it necessary and binding and never practices to its contrary, then such a person has apportioned a share of his ibaadat to shaitaan (i.e. he has lost the blessings of his ibaadat). What then can be said of that person who persists and rigidly practices on bid’ah, un-Islamic and detestable acts?

The author of Majma’ has stated that it is proven from this Hadith that a mandoob act also becomes Makrooh when there is a fear that it is elevated in rank. This is the reason why the Hanafi Fuqahaa have stated that it is Makrooh to stipulate fixed Surahs for Salaats, regardless of whether this is done believing it to be part of the Shariah or rigidly in practice. [Tareeqah Meelad Shareef, page 7 and 11]

How a Mustahab becomes a bid’ah

I do not say that Mustahab is bid’ah. To regard it as necessary and binding is bid’ah. If anyone regards a Mustahab act as Waajib, then is this not bid’ah? Necessary, obligatory and Waajib all have the same meaning. [Husnul Azeez, page 676, vol.1]

To deem an un-obligatory act as obligatory is a deviated bid’ah. To censure and rebuke those who oppose or do not practice it, merely confirms its bid’ah status. [Imdaadul fataawa, page 340, vol. 5 / page 306, vol. 5]

To regard the distribution of sweetmeats as necessary is a bid’ah. The Fuqahaa have written that if there is fasaad in a Mustahab act, then it becomes necessary to abandon that Mustahab act. [Husnul Azeez, page 676, vol.1]

Is it not a bid’ah to regard a non-Waajib as a Waajib? Does this not fall under the scope of the definition of bid’ah? [Al-Ifaadhaat Yawmia, page 116, vol. 8, part 1]

The four types of bid’ah and Sunnat, and the explanation of bid’ah-e-hasana, bid’ah-e-sayyi’a, haqeeqiya and sooriya

“It is stated in Raddul Muhtaar, ‘The Sunnats of wudhu: That thing upon which Rasulullah (sallallahu alayhi wasallam) and the Khulafa-e-Raashideen, after him, were constant upon are Sunnat, otherwise it is Mandoob. It is reported in Durrul Mukhtaar under the discussion of intention (Niyyat) that verbal statement is Mustahab, that is the preferred opinion, and it is said that this is Sunnat, i.e. the Salaf preferred this or it is a Sunnat of our Ulama, since it is reported from neither Nabi (sallallahu alayhi wasallam), the Sahaabah (radhiyallahu anhum) nor the Tabieen…

“It is reported from Durrul Mukhtaar: The Ahkaam of Imaamat and the Mubtadi’u (person who indulges in bid’ah), that is (the one who) believes contrary to the accepted (rulings) of The Rasool, not in opposition or resistance, rather with a type of doubt…and Mandoob, like innovations similar to Madrasah…’”

From the above excerpts the following matters are clarified:

Firstly, there are numerous implications of Sunnat:

1. That which is reported from Rasulullah (sallallahu alayhi wasallam)

2. That which is reported from Rasulullah (sallallahu alayhi wasallam), the Khulafa-e-Raashideen, as is mentioned in the ibaarat (text): “That thing upon which Rasulullah (sallallahu alayhi wasallam) and the Khulafa-e-Raashideen, after him, were constant upon are Sunnat”

3. That which is reported from Rasulullah (sallallahu alayhi wasallam), the Sahaabah (radhiyallahu anhum) or the Taabieen, as is deduced from the ibaarat: “since it is reported from neither Nabi (sallallahu alayhi wasallam), the Sahaabah (radhiyallahu anhum) nor the Tabieen”

4. That which is reported from the Ulama, as is deduced from the ibaarat: “or it is a Sunnat of our Ulama.”

A few meanings of bid’ah have also been deduced from this texts:

1. That which is not reported from Rasulullah (sallallahu alayhi wasallam)

2. That which is not reported from Rasulullah (sallallahu alayhi wasallam) or his Khulafaa-e-Raashideen

3. That which is not reported from Rasulullah (sallallahu alayhi wasallam), his Sahaabah (radhiyallahu anhum) or the Tabieen

4. That which is not reported from the Ulama. [Bawaadirun Nawaadir, page 778]

In reality there is only type of Sunnat and bid’ah

This multitude is merely on the apparent, otherwise in reality there is only one definition of Sunnat, and that is: It is the practicable path in Deen as stated after the former ibaarat. All these meaning incorporate the definition of Sunnat. The meaning of bid’ah is: Belief in that which is contrary to the accepted (well-known practices of) Rasulullah (sallallahu alayhi wasallam), not in opposition or resistance, rather with a type of doubt. (The practice which opposes the nass, if it is done with doubt and uncertainty (misinformation/ignorance), then it is bid’ah, otherwise it is clearcut fisq and transgression, without any doubt). Or in other words, That which has been innovated contrary to the Haqq which has been established from Rasulullah (sallallahu alayhi wasallam), in respect of knowledge, practice or conditions…As it is stated in Durrul Mukhtaar, and this is the true meaning for bid’ah, as borne out by the statement of Nabi (sallallahu alayhi wasallam), ‘He who innovates anything in our Deen, is not from amongst us.’”

Hence Sunnat-e-Haqeeqi and Bid’ah-e-Haqeeqi cannot be combined or united. However, Bid’ah-e-Sooriya can be coupled with Sunnat-e-Haqeeqi. In this regard, the verbal intention for Salaat is also called a Sunnat. There are some things which may be contrary to the Sunnat, hence they are called bid’ah but regarded as hasan (good/desirable). There are some examples of a clear combination between some types of bid’ah and Sunnat-e-Haqeeqi, and this is borne out by the statement of Hadhrat Umar (radhiyallahu anhu) when he once said, “What a good bid’ah!”

At this juncture we realise also that the bid’ah-e-hasana which some personalities have negated is restricted to just a difference and altercation in words and definitions, because those who have negated it have defined bid’ah in its haqeeqi sense, whereas the claimants (to the validity of bid’ah-e-hasana) have defined it in its general sense.

The limits of sunan-e-‘Aadiyah and sunan-e-‘Ibaadiya

One person once asked if the rearing of sheep/goats is Sunnat or not? The reply was that yes it is a Sunnat, but it is a Sunnat-e-‘Aadiya and not a Sunnat-e-Ibaadiya, and the object of Sunnat is Ibaadat. Nevertheless, the practicing of Sunnat-e-‘Aadiya, if it is executed with love and affection (for Nabi – sallallahu alayhi wasallam), then it is also worthy of rewards. There must not be extremity and excessiveness in sunan-e-‘aadiya, where it is brought to the level of an ibaadat. Some people exhaust all the energies in researching these issues – how big was the ‘asaa (stick) of Nabi (sallallahu alayhi wasallam), how long his turban was, etc., etc. If a true lover of Nabi (sallallahu alayhi wasallam) makes these enquiries and his desire is the result of pure love, then this is one thing, but most people who are involved in these types of issues are such that they neglect the necessary requisites of the Deen and regard this as their main objective and aim. If this type of excessiveness continue then it will result in the destruction of the Deen. Everything should be kept in its proper perspective.

The ruling regarding Sunnat-e-Ibaadat is that if there is a fear of it causing fasaad in the beliefs of the masses, then it becomes Waajib to abandon a Mustahab act. In this regard, it was the blessed habit of Nabi (sallallahu alayhi wasallam) to regularly recite Surahs Alif Laam Meem Sajdah and Dahar for the Fajr on Jumu’ahs, but Imaam Abu Hanifah (rahmatullah alayh) has decreed it Makrooh to recite these two Surahs (every) Friday Jumu’ah. For this reason many ignoramuses have levelled the criticism of Imaam Abu Hanifah (rahmatullah alayh) acting contrary to the Sunnat. [Al-Ifaadaat, page 98, vol. 19]

I ask: whatever food Nabi (sallallahu alayhi wasallam) partook of as a habit, will it be classified as ‘aadatan (a habit) or ibaatatan (an act of ibaabat)? It is clear that it was eaten as ibaatatan. Hence, to imitate the habits of Nabi (sallallahu alayhi wasallam) is not Waajib in the Shariah, neither is leaving them out sinful.

One has the choice of appeasing the taste in matters of habit. Some of the noble habits of Nabi (sallallahu alayhi wasallam) are such that we will never be able to imitate or bear, therefore the Shariah has not made it incumbent to follow the noble habit of Nabi (sallallahu alayhi wasallam). Yes, if someone has the desire and good fortune of being able to inculcate the noble habits of Nabi (sallallahu alayhi wasallam), then undoubtedly there is great virtue in that. However, one does not have the right to rebuke others for not doing so. [At-Tableegh, page 255, vol. 20]

The two types of Uswa’-e-Hasana (models/patterns of Nabi – sallallahu alayhi wasallam) – verbal and practical

It is stated in the Qur’an Majeed, “Indeed there is for you in the (lifestyle of the) Rasool of Allaah, a beautiful model.” Allah Ta’ala is indicating to us that He has placed an excellent example for us to follow in the life of Nabi (sallallahu alayhi wasallam). What is the object of giving a model? So that its likeliness may be prepared. It is a further grace of Allaah Ta’ala that there is no difficulty and inhibition in this model. Two types of model are given – a practical and verbal one. It is a pure mercy of Allaah Ta’ala upon this Ummat that He has granted so much of latitude and not the slightest bit of constriction.

Objection: The examples set for us by Nabi (sallallahu alayhi wasallam) is to be followed to the letter. For example, Nabi (sallallahu alayhi wasallam) mostly partook of barley bread, and he led a life of pure simplicity, where he never procured a home or kept (extra) money, whereas we neither eat like him nor suffer like him. We even don the best of clothing. We have lavish and spacious homes, we save money, etc. Yet the Ulama say that all this is permissible. What is the explanation to our following this example and model of our beloved Nabi (sallallahu alayhi wasallam)?

Reply: The answer to this is that there are two types of models – qowli and fi’lee. Fi’lee is of a particular form and qowli falls within the ambit of the Shariah. It is impermissible to go beyond it. However, there is much latitude within it. We were shown the limits of the deeds of obedience, which should not be exceeded. We have also been granted latitude to manoeuvre as much as is permissibly possible. This is Waajib and obligatory. The ush-shaaq (lovers of Nabi – sallallahu alayhi wasallam), have taken the practical model and noted what Nabi (sallallahu alayhi wasallam) ate, drank, how he led his life, etc., etc. But for people like us there is scope and latitude, that we can fulfil our needs within the ambit of the Shariah. However, we also need to take note of the limits of the Shariah and not exceed them. In every act, we should take note of the limits of the Shariah. As long as one remains within the limits of the Shariah, then it will be deemed as also having followed the model. [Huqooquz Zawjain, page 460]

The laws regarding leaving out the sunan-e-‘aadiyah and sunan-e-ibaadiya and when they become impermissible

The sunan-e-‘aadiya, like simple clothing, barley bread, and all other such habits of Nabi (sallallahu alayhi wasallam), if for any reason due to them the objective is lost (i.e. it interferes with one’s ibaadat), then they should be abandoned, because the sunan-e-‘aadiya are not objectives in themselves.

In fact, there are even occasions where the sunan-e-ibaadat, are to be left out if they are the cause of some harm. For example, the Sunnat of Tahajjud is 8 rakaats, now if a person who gets up with difficulty and performs this eight Rakaats, but sleep overwhelms him such that he falls off to sleep and misses his Fajr Salaat with Jamaat, then to such a person it will be told that he only perform two Rakaats of Tahajjud and sleep away, so that he may awaken for Fajr in time. Since six to eight Rakaats are amongst the sunan-e-ibaadat for Tahajjud Salaat, but if a person exceeds this, then the objective (other more important ibaadat) is lost and it (this excessiveness) should be abandoned.

This is the reason why if it is known regarding the conditions of a certain person, that if he undertakes the journey of Hajj, he will not be able to maintain and be diligent in performing Salaat, then he will be prevented from going for Hajj. If there is an overwhelming fear that even one Fardh Salaat of a person will become Qadha whilst on the journey for a Nafl Hajj, then it will not be permissible for him to undertake that journey. When the Hajj will be a cause for some Deeni harm, where another Fardh duty is neglected, then it is clear that instead of this Hajj bringing one closer to Allah Ta’ala, it takes him further away.

Another example is that if for example a person has to eat barley bread, which may cause his stomach to pain. Then the love which a person has for the Sunnat of Nabi (sallallahu alayhi wasallam) will no longer remain that, rather it may become a dread, and there is a real fear that (a person will think that) by practicing upon an excellent Sunnat causes stomach-ache. Today, it is due to the mutashaddideen (those who adhere doggedly to something), that people have acquired a dislike for and are being distanced from the Sunnat and the Shariah.

In summary, the sunan-e-‘aadiya and ibaadiya are impermissible for that person to whom there may be harm caused to his (more important and primary) Deeni duties. [At-Tableegh, page 74-8]The two ways of following the Sunnat

The actions of Nabi (sallallahu alayhi wasallam) are categorised into two classes – one is his acts of ibaadat and the other is regarding his noble habit (aadat). The former requires following and not necessarily the latter. If anyone does imitate the latter, then it will be a display of affection and love.

There is a soori (in form) and haqeeqi (real) way of obedience. To bring the actual instruction into practice, without considering the illat is ittibaa’ (obedience/following) in soorat and to practice upon it taking the sabab and illat into consideration is ittibaa’ in haqeeqat.

These two ways of ittibaa’ were also found in the Sahaabah (radhyiallahu anhum). During the course of the expedition of the Bani Quraidha, when Nabi (sallallahu alayhi wasallam) was seeing a group of the Sahaabah (radhiyallahu anhum) off, he said to them, “Perform your ‘Asr Salaat when you reach there.” It so happened that after much effort the Sahaabah (radhiyallahu anhum) could not make it to reach their destination before Asr Salaat. The time for Asr entered whilst they were still on their journey. This led to the Sahaabah (radhiyallahu anhum) breaking up into two groups – the one group performed their Salaat on time and said that the object of Nabi’s (sallallahu alayhi wasallam) advice was that they should perform their ‘Asr Salaat at the destination if they reached there on time, and not to perform it (only) there regardless of when they reached. The other group said that they will follow Nabi’s (sallallahu alayhi wasallam) instruction to the letter and only perform their Salaat upon reaching the destination. They therefore performed their Salaat upon reaching their destination and not on the way.

When Nabi (sallallahu alayhi wasallam) was informed of this occurrence, he accepted both views. In this incident, the first group made haqeeqi ittibaa’ and the second soorat ittibaa’.

The definitions of bid’ah-e-hasana and bid’ah-e-sayyi’a

The comprehensive ruling regarding this is that any matter which is neither in part or whole from the Deen, and it is forced onto the Deen based on some flimsy doubt, then it is a bid’ah.

The proof of this is in the authentic Hadith, “He who innovates something into our Deen, which is not part of it, is rejected.” The words (from) and (in) are clear indicatives, and a haqeeqi bid’ah always remain a bid’ah-e-sayyi’a. A bid’ah-e-hasana is a bid’ah in outer form (definition) only. Its reality, owing to some (Shar’i) factor it can be classified a Sunnat. [Imdaadul fataawa, page 285, vol. 5]

Firstly it is essential to reiterate the fact vividly obvious to anyone who studies the works of senior Deobandi scholars. That is, their beliefs and practices conform completely with the teachings of Quran, hadith and hanafi fiqh. Their sulook and tasawwuf is also exactly according to the Sunnah. They are staunch hanafi and high caliber ahle-sunnah. Neither any of their beliefs is against Qur’an and hadith, nor any of their fiqh ruling against Hanafi fiqh.

Deobandiyat is not a separate maslak (route). In our day and age it is synonymous with maslak of Ahlus Sunnah wal jama’ah.

Few guiding principles:

If the following essential principles are kept in mind the Shari’ah ruling regarding all the contemporary bid’at/innovations will be easy to know:

“The defamation of idols (gods) is per se a mubah (permissible) act. However, if it becomes a cause of a prohibited act, that is, denigration of Allah Subhanahu Wa Ta’ala, it will become prohibited (منھی عن) and objectionable (قبیح).

This forms the proof of a fiqh ruling. That is, if a permissible act becomes the cause of a prohibited act that (mubah) act itself becomes haram.

[Bayanul Qur’an volume 1 page 119]

Second Principle

Although, numerous verses of Quran mention tawheed (Oneness of Allah Ta’ala), prophethood, negation of disbelief and polytheism and on various occasions’ infidels (kuffar) mocked at them and denigrated Allah and His Prophet (salallaahu alayhi wasallam). These incidents are well documented in various places. But there is no prohibition of discussing these things.

The reason for this variance is that the discussion of these subjects is essential (wajib) and required by Shariah. If some corruption happens secondary to their discussion even then they will not be abandoned.

This proves the second principle.

Both of these principles are treasure trove of knowledge. Orders and rulings regarding numerous peripheral issues can be found from them. In ‘Ruhul Ma’ani’ this difference has been documented from the answer of Abul-Mansoor (rahimahullah) with Ibn e Sireen (rahimahullahl agreeing to it.

The net result of these two principles is that,

If a permissible act, and similarly mustebbat & Sunan za’idah become contaminated with prohibited acts, then it will be essential (wajib) to abandon that permissible act. In actions that are themselves essential (wajib) and required by Shari’ah if there is any contamination with prohibited acts then even they will not be abandoned. However, it will be necessary to rectify those wrong doings.

This is the very difference which if not kept in mind leads to propagation of innovations.

Third Principle

Allah Ta’ala says:

یاایھاالذین امنوالاتقولوا رعنا

From this order we come to know the ruling that if an individual’s own permissible act becomes a source/excuse for another individual to commit a prohibited action, then that act becomes impermissible for the first person (to start with).

For example, if a scholar’s act is used to justify an ignorant person’s prohibited action, then if that act is non essential it will become impermissible for the scholar also. [Bayanul Qur’an volume 1 page 57]

This is documented in ‘Durr mukhtar’ and its explanation ‘Raddul mukhtar’ under the discussion of “prostration of thankfulness:

It is based on these principles derived from Qur’an, Hadith and ruling of Hanafi jurists, the Deobandi scholars have spoken regarding the contemporary rituals and polemic issues.

[Maqalat e Tirmizi page 216-218, Darul Ishat, Karachi. 1426H]

Applications of these principles

Based on these well established principles they have said that appointing special dates and other specific requirements for rituals like mawlid shareef gatherings, customs of fathiha (esal-e-thawab), third and tenth day (post-death) esal e thawab gatherings, etc. to be bid’at.

By fixing these specification and precise requirements belief of them being necessary was developing. Even if the person performing them had correct beliefs the danger of corrupting the beliefs of less knowledgeable was arising.

It is an established fiqh principle that as important it is to save one’s self from a destruction essentially important is to save others from any loss. That is, as important it to preserve one’s own beliefs equally important is to save others beliefs also.

‘Allamah Shami (Ibn Abideen) rahimahullah has written this principle in the discussion of fixing recitation of particular Surah in Salah. That is, wherever there is possibility of distorting shari’ah rulings or misunderstanding of ignorants. He writes:

The reason to stop the general people is تغیر المشروعand for elite is ایھام الجاھل.

A general principle established is that mubah should not exceed its limits (both in knowledge and practice) and mutlaq must not change from its itlaq, both in knowledge and practice and a muqqiyad must not change similarly. There are many verses and hadith to prove this. As this is an established principle I do not need to mention daleel. Just to remind forgetful I mention,

As Prophet (sallallahu alayhi wasallam) had mention numerous merits of jumu’ah day and salatul jumu’ah there was a possibility that some will decide himself to specially select them for praying and fasting. For this Prophet (sallallahu alayhi wasallam) himself negated this thinking and reiterated that only those things that he had mentioned in this regard are recommendable and a Sunnah. If some one exceeds them then it will not be acceptable.

The most striking thing we see in these days is that a mubah is given so much significance that people will easily ignore a person who does not pray salah or fast or makes ghiyba or lies but if a observant Muslim does not perform mawlid he is chastised, looked down upon and called names.