CONTENTS

Comrades, after Kamenev's comprehensive report
there is little left for me to say. I shall therefore confine myself to
exposing certain legends that are being spread by Trotsky and his supporters
about the October uprising, about Trotsky's role in the uprising, about
the Party and the preparation for October, and so forth. I shall also touch
upon Trotskyism as a peculiar ideology that is incompatible with Leninism,
and upon the Party's tasks in connection with Trotsky's latest literary
pronouncements.

I. THE FACTS ABOUT THE OCTOBER UPRISING

First of all about the October uprising. Rumours
are being vigorously spread among members of the Party that the Central
Committee as a whole was opposed to an uprising in October 1917. The usual
story is that on October 10, when the Central Committee adopted the decision
to organise the uprising, the majority of the Central Committee at first
spoke against an uprising, but, so the story runs, at that moment a worker
burst in on the meeting of the Central Committee and said:

"You are deciding against an uprising, but I tell you that
there will be an uprising all the same, in spite of everything." And so,
after that threat, the story runs, the Central Committee, which is alleged
to have become frightened, raised the question of an uprising afresh and
adopted a decision to organise it.

This is not merely a rumour, comrades. It is related by the
well-known John Reed in his book Ten Days. Reed was remote from
our Party and, of course, could not know the history of our secret meeting
on October 10, and, consequently, he was taken in by the gossip spread
by people like Sukhanov. This story was later passed round and repeated
in a number of pamphlets written by Trotskyites, including one of the latest
pamphlets on October written by Syrkin. These rumours have been strongly
supported in Trotsky's latest literary pronouncements.

It scarcely needs proof that all these and similar "Arabian
Nights" fairy tales are not in accordance with the truth, that in fact
nothing of the kind happened, nor could have happened, at the meeting of
the Central Committee. Consequently, we could ignore these absurd rumours;
after all, lots of rumours are fabricated in the office rooms of the oppositionists
or those who are remote from the Party. Indeed, we have ignored them till
now; for example, we paid no attention to John Reed's mistakes and did
not take the trouble to rectify them. After Trotsky's latest pronouncements,
however, it is no longer possible to ignore such legends, for attempts
are being made now to bring up our young people on them and, unfortunately,
some results have already been achieved in this respect. In view of this,
I must counter these absurd rumours with the actual facts.

I take the minutes of the meeting of the Central Committee
of our Party on October 10 (23), 1917. Present Lenin, Zinoviev, Kamenev,
Stalin, Trotsky, Sverdlov, Uritsky, Dzerzhinsky, Kollontai, Bubnov, Sokolnikov,
Lomov. The question of the current situation and the uprising was discussed.
After the discussion, Comrade Lenin's resolution on the uprising was put
to the vote. The resolution was adopted by a majority of 10 against 2.
Clear, one would think: by a majority of 10 against 2, the Central Committee
decided to proceed with the immediate, practical work of organising the
uprising. At this very same meeting the Central Committee elected a political
centre to direct the uprising; this centre, called the Political Bureau,
consisted of Lenin, Zinoviev, Stalin, Kamenev, Trotsky, Sokolnikov and
Bubnov.

Such are the facts.

These minutes at one stroke destroy several legends. They
destroy the legend that the majority on the Central Committee was opposed
to an uprising. They also destroy the legend that on the question of the
uprising the Central Committee was on the verge of a split. It is clear
from the minutes that the opponents of an immediate uprising -- Kamenev
and Zinoviev -- were elected to the body that was to exercise political
direction of the uprising on a par with those who were in favour of an
uprising. There was no question of a split, nor could there be.

Trotsky asserts that in October our Party had a Right wing
in the persons of Kamenev and Zinoviev, who, he says, were almost Social-Democrats.
What one cannot understand then is how, under those circumstances, it could
happen that the Party avoided a split; how it could happen that the disagreements
with Kamenev and Zinoviev lasted only a few days; how it could happen that,
in spite of those disagreements, the Party appointed these comrades to
highly important posts, elected them to the political centre of the uprising,
and so forth. Lenin's implacable attitude towards Social-Democrats is sufficiently
well-known in the Party; the Party knows that Lenin would not for a single
moment have agreed to have Social-Democratically-minded comrades in the
Party, let alone in highly important posts. How, then, are we to explain
the fact that the Party avoided a split? The explanation is that in spite
of the disagreements, these comrades were old Bolsheviks who stood on the
common ground of Bolshevism. What was that common ground? Unity of views
on the fundamental questions: the character of the Russian revolution,
the driving forces of the revolution, the role of the peasantry, the principles
of Party leadership, and so forth. Had there not been this common ground,
a split would have been inevitable. There was no split, and the disagreements
lasted only a few days, because, and only because, Kamenev and Zinoviev
were Leninists, Bolsheviks.

Let us now pass to the legend about Trotsky's special role
in the October uprising. The Trotskyites are vigorously spreading rumours
that Trotsky inspired and was the sole leader of the October uprising.
These rumours are being spread with exceptional zeal by the so-called editor
of Trotsky's works, Lentsner. Trotsky himself, by consistently avoiding
mention of the Party, the Central Committee and the Petrograd Committee
of the Party, by saying nothing about the leading role of these organisation,
in the uprising and vigorously pushing himself forward as the central figure
in the October uprising, voluntarily or involuntarily helps to spread the
rumours about the special role he is supposed to have played in the uprising.
I am far from denying Trotsky's undoubtedly important role in the uprising.
I must say, however, that Trotsky did not play any special role in the
October uprising, nor could he do so; being chairman of the Petrograd Soviet,
he merely carried out the will of the appropriate Party bodies, which directed
every step that Trotsky took. To philistines like Sukhanov, all this may
seem strange, but the facts, the true facts, wholly and fully confirm what
I say.

Let us take the minutes of the next meeting of the Central
Committee, the one held on October 16 (29), 1917. Present: the members
of the Central Committee, plus representatives of the Petrograd Committee,
plus representatives of the military organisation, factory committees,
trade unions and the railwaymen. Among those present, besides the members
of the Central Committee, were: Krylenko, Shotman, Kalinin, Volodarsky,
Shlyapnikov, Lacis, and others, twenty-five in all. The question of the
uprising was discussed from the purely practical-organisational aspect.
Lenin's resolution on the uprising was adopted by a majority of 20 against
2, three abstaining. A practical centre was elected for the organisational
leadership of the uprising. Who was elected to this centre? The following
five: Sverdlov, Stalin, Dzerzhinsky, Bubnov, Uritsky. The functions of
the practical centre: to direct all the practical organs of the uprising
in conformity with the directives of the Central Committee. Thus, as you
see, something "terrible" happened at this meeting of the Central Committee,
i.e., "strange to relate," the "inspirer," the "chief figure," the "sole
leader" of the uprising, Trotsky, was not elected to the practical centre,
which was called upon to direct the uprising. How is this to be reconciled
with the current opinion about Trotsky's special role? Is not all this
somewhat "strange," as Sukhanov, or the Trotskyites, would say? And yet,
strictly speaking, there is nothing strange about it, for neither in the
Party, nor in the October uprising, did Trotsky play any special
role, nor could he do so, for he was a relatively new man in our Party
in the period of October. He, like all the responsible workers, merely
carried out the will of the Central Committee and of its organs. Whoever
is familiar with the mechanics of Bolshevik Party leadership will have
no difficulty in understanding that it could not be otherwise: it would
have been enough for Trotsky to have gone against the will of the Central
Committee to have been deprived of influence on the course of events. This
talk about Trotsky's special role is a legend that is being spread by obliging
"Party" gossips.

This, of course, does not mean that the October uprising
did not have its inspirer. It did have its inspirer and leader, but this
was Lenin, and none other than Lenin, that same Lenin whose resolutions
the Central Committee adopted when deciding the question of the uprising,
that same Lenin who, in spite of what Trotsky says, was not prevented by
being in hiding from being the actual inspirer of the uprising. It is foolish
and ridiculous to attempt now, by gossip about Lenin having been in hiding,
to obscure the indubitable fact that the inspirer of the uprising was the
leader of the Party, V. I. Lenin.

Such are the facts.

Granted, we are told, but it cannot be denied that Trotsky
fought well in the period of October. Yes, that is true, Trotsky did, indeed,
fight well in October; but Trotsky was not the only one who fought well
in the period of October. Even people like the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries,
who then stood side by side with the Bolsheviks, also fought well. In general,
I must say that in the period of a victorious uprising, when the enemy
is isolated and the uprising is growing, it is not difficult to fight well.
At such moments even backward people become heroes.

The proletarian struggle is not, however, an uninterrupted
advance, an unbroken chain of victories. The proletarian struggle also
has its trials, its defeats. The genuine revolutionary is not one who displays
courage in the period of a victorious uprising, but one who, while fighting
well during the victorious advance of the revolution, also displays courage
when the revolution is in retreat, when the proletariat suffers defeat;
who does not lose his head and does not funk when the revolution suffers
reverses, when the enemy achieves success; who does not become panic-stricken
or give way to despair when the revolution is in a period of retreat. The
Left Socialist-Revolutionaries did not fight badly in the period of October,
and they supported the Bolsheviks. But who does not know that those "brave"
fighters became panic-stricken in the period of Brest, when the advance
of German imperialism drove them to despair and hysteria. It is a very
sad but indubitable fact that Trotsky, who fought well in the period of
October, did not, in the period of Brest, in the period when the revolution
suffered temporary reverses, possess the courage to display sufficient
staunchness at that difficult moment and to refrain from following in the
footsteps of the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries. Beyond question, that
moment was a difficult one; one had to display exceptional courage and
imperturbable coolness not to be dismayed, to retreat in good time, to
accept peace in good time, to withdraw the proletarian army out of range
of the blows of German imperialism, to preserve the peasant reserves and,
after obtaining a respite in this way, to strike at the enemy with renewed
force. Unfortunately, Trotsky was found to lack this courage and revolutionary
staunchness at that difficult moment.

In Trotsky's opinion, the principal lesson of the proletarian
revolution is "not to funk" during October. That is wrong, for Trotsky's
assertion contains only a particle of the truth about the lessons
of the revolution. The whole truth about the lessons of the proletarian
revolution is "not to funk" not only when the revolution is advancing,
but also when it is in retreat, when the enemy is gaining the upper hand
and the revolution is suffering reverses. The revolution did not end with
October. October was only the beginning of the proletarian revolution.
It is bad to funk when the tide of insurrection is rising; but it is worse
to funk when the revolution is passing through severe trials after power
has been captured. To retain power on the morrow of the revolution is no
less important than to capture power. If Trotsky funked during the period
of Brest, when our revolution was passing through severe trials, when it
was almost a matter of "surrendering" power, he ought to know that the
mistakes committed by Kamenev and Zinoviev in October are quite irrelevant
here.

That is how matters stand with the legends about the October
uprising.

II. THE PARTY AND THE PREPARATION
FOR OCTOBER

Let us now pass to the question of the preparation
for October.

Listening to Trotsky, one might think that during the whole
of the period of preparation, from March to October, the Bolshevik Party
did nothing but mark time; that it was being corroded by internal contradictions
and hindered Lenin in every way; that, had it not been for Trotsky, nobody
knows how the October Revolution would have ended. It is rather amusing
to hear this strange talk about the Party from Trotsky, who declares in
this same "preface" to Volume III that "the chief instrument of the proletarian
revolution is the Party," that "without the Party, apart from the Party,
by-passing the Party, with a substitute for the Party, the proletarian
revolution cannot be victorious." Allah himself would not understand how
our revolution could have succeeded if "its chief instrument" proved to
be useless, while success was impossible, as it appears, "by-passing the
Party." But this is not the first time that Trotsky treats us to oddities.
It must be supposed that this amusing talk about our Party is one of Trotsky's
usual oddities.

Let us briefly review the history of the preparation for
October according to periods.

1) The period of the Party's new orientation (March-April).
The major facts of this period:

a) the overthrow of tsarism;

b) the formation of the Provisional Government (dictatorship
of the bourgeoisie);

c) the appearance of Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers'
Deputies (dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry);

d) dual power;

e) the April demonstration;

f) the first crisis of power.

The characteristic feature of this period is the fact that there
existed together, side by side and simultaneously, both the dictatorship
of the bourgeoisie and the dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry;
the latter trusts the former, believes that it is striving for peace, voluntarily
surrenders power to the bourgeoisie and thereby becomes an appendage of
the bourgeoisie. There are as yet no serious conflicts between the two
dictatorships. On the other hand, there is the "Contact Committee." [1]

This was the greatest turning point in the history of Russia
and an unprecedented turning point in the history of our Party. The old,
pre-revolutionary platform of direct overthrow of the government was clear
and definite, but it was no longer suitable for the new conditions of the
struggle. It was now no longer possible to go straight out for the overthrow
of the government, for the latter was connected with the Soviets, then
under the influence of the defencists, and the Party would have had to
wage war against both the government and the Soviets, a war that would
have been beyond its strength. Nor was it possible to pursue a policy of
supporting the Provisional Government, for it was the government of imperialism.
Under the new conditions of the struggle, the Party had to adopt a new
orientation. The Party (its majority) groped its way towards this new orientation.
It adopted the policy of pressure on the Provisional Government through
the Soviets on the question of peace and did not venture to step forward
at once from the old slogan of the dictatorship of the proletariat and
peasantry to the new slogan of power to the Soviets. The aim of this halfway
policy was to enable the Soviets to discern the actual imperialist nature
of the Provisional Government on the basis of the concrete questions of
peace, and in this way to wrest the Soviets from the Provisional Government.
But this was a profoundly mistaken position, for it gave rise to pacifist
illusions, brought grist to the mill of defencism and hindered the revolutionary
education of the masses. At that time I shared this mistaken position with
other Party comrades and fully abandoned it only in the middle of April,
when I associated myself with Lenin's theses. A new orientation was needed.
This new orientation was given to the Party by Lenin, in his celebrated
April Theses. [2] I shall not deal with these theses,
for they are known to everybody. Were there any disagreements between the
Party and Lenin at that time? Yes, there were. How long did these disagreements
last? Not more than two weeks. The City Conference of the Petrograd organisation
[3] (in the latter half of April), which adopted Lenin's
theses, marked a turning point in our Party's development. The All-Russian
April Conference [4] (at the end of April) merely completed
on an all-Russian scale the work of the Petrograd Conference, rallying
nine-tenths of the Party around this united Party position.

Now, seven years later, Trotsky gloats maliciously over the
past disagreements among the Bolsheviks and depicts them as a struggle
waged as if there were almost two parties within Bolshevism. But, firstly,
Trotsky disgracefully exaggerates and inflates the matter, for the Bolshevik
Party lived through these disagreements without the slightest shock. Secondly,
our Party would be a caste and not a revolutionary party if it did not
permit different shades of opinion in its ranks. Moreover, it is well known
that there were disagreements among us even before that, for example, in
the period of the Third Duma, but they did not shake the unity of our Party.
Thirdly, it will not be out of place to ask what was then the position
of Trotsky himself, who is now gloating so eagerly over the past
disagreements among the Bolsheviks. Lentsner, the so-called editor of Trotsky's
works, assures us that Trotsky's letters from America (March) "wholly anticipated"
Lenin's Letters From Afar[5] (March), which served
as the basis of Lenin's April Theses. That is what he says: "wholly anticipated."
Trotsky does not object to this analogy; apparently, he accepts it with
thanks. But, firstly, Trotsky's letters "do not in the least resemble"
Lenin's letters either in spirit or in conclusions, for they wholly and
entirely reflect Trotsky's anti-Bolshevik slogan of "no tsar, but a workers'
government," a slogan which implies a revolution without the peasantry.
It is enough to glance through these two series of letters to be convinced
of this. Secondly, if what Lentener says is true, how are we to explain
the fact that Lenin on the very next day after his arrival from abroad
considered it necessary to dissociate himself from Trotsky? Who does not
know of Lenin's repeated statements that Trotsky's slogan: "no tsar,
but a workers' government" was an attempt "to skip the still unexhausted
peasant movement," that this slogan meant "playing at the seizure of power
by a workers' government"? *

What can there be in common between Lenin's Bolshevik theses
and Trotsky's anti-Bolshevik scheme with its "playing at the seizure of
power"? And what prompts this passion that some people display for comparing
a wretched hovel with Mont Blanc? For what purpose did Lentsner find it
necessary to make this risky addition to the heap of old legends about
our revolution of still another legend, about Trotsky's letters from America
"anticipating" Lenin's well-known Letters From Afar? **

No wonder it is said that an obliging fool is more dangerous
than an enemy.

2) The period of the revolutionary mobilisation of
the masses (May-August). The major facts of this period:

a) the April demonstration in Petrograd and the formation
of the coalition government with the participation of "Socialists";

b) the May Day demonstrations in the principal centres
of Russia with the slogan of "a democratic peace";

c) the June demonstration in Petrograd with the principal
slogan: "Down with the capitalist ministers!";

d) the June offensive at the front and the reverses
of the Russian army;

e) the July armed demonstration in Petrograd; the
Cadet ministers resign from the government;

>f) counter-revolutionary troops are called in from
the front; the editorial offices of Pravda are wrecked; the counter-revolution
launches a struggle against the Soviets and a new coalition government
is formed, headed by Kerensky;

g) the Sixth Congress of our Party, which issues the
slogan to prepare for an armed uprising;

h) the counter-revolutionary Conference of State and
the general strike in Moscow;

i) Kornilov's unsuccessful march on Petrograd, the
revitalising of the Soviets; the Cadets resign and a "Directory" is formed.

The characteristic feature of this period is the intensification
of the crisis and the upsetting of the unstable equilibrium between the
Soviets and the Provisional Government which, for good or evil, had existed
in the preceding period. Dual power has become intolerable for both sides.
The fragile edifice of the "Contact Committee" is tottering. "Crisis of
power" and "ministerial re-shuffle" are the most fashionable catchwords
of the day. The crisis at the front and the disruption in the rear are
doing their work, strengthening the extreme flanks and squeezing the defencist
compromisers from both sides. The revolution is mobilising, causing the
mobilisation of the counter-revolution. The counter-revolution, in its
turn, is spurring on the revolution, stirring up new waves of the revolutionary
tide. The question of transferring power to the new class becomes the immediate
question of the day.

Were there disagreements in our Party then? Yes, there were.
They were, however, of a purely practical character, despite the assertions
of Trotsky, who is trying to discover a "Right" and a "Left" wing in the
Party. That is to say, they were such disagreements as are inevitable where
there is vigorous Party life and real Party activity.

Trotsky is wrong in asserting that the April demonstration
in Petrograd gave rise to disagreements in the Central Committee. The Central
Committee was absolutely united on this question and condemned the attempt
of a group of comrades to arrest the Provisional Government at a time when
the Bolsheviks were in a minority both in the Soviets and in the army.
Had Trotsky written the "history" of October not according to Sukhanov,
but according to authentic documents, he would easily have convinced himself
of the error of his assertion.

Trotsky is absolutely wrong in asserting that the attempt,
"on Lenin's initiative," to arrange a demonstration on June 10 was described
as "adventurism" by the "Rightwing" members of the Central Committee. Had
Trotsky not written according to Sukhanov he would surely have known that
the June 10 demonstration was postponed with the full agreement of Lenin,
and that he urged the necessity of postponing it in a big speech he delivered
at the well-known meeting of the Petrograd Committee (see minutes of the
Petrograd Committee [6]).

Trotsky is absolutely wrong in speaking about "tragic" disagreements
in the Central Committee in connection with the July armed demonstration.
Trotsky is simply inventing in asserting that some members of the leading
group in the Central. Committee "could not but regard the July episode
as a harmful adventure." Trotsky, who was then not yet a member of our
Central Committee and was merely our Soviet parliamentary, might, of course,
not have known that the Central Committee regarded the July demonstration
only as a means of sounding the enemy, that the Central Committee (and
Lenin) did not want to convert, did not even think of converting, the demonstration
into an uprising at a time when the Soviets in the capitals still supported
the defencists. It is quite possible that some Bolsheviks did whimper over
the July defeat. I know, for example, that some of the Bolsheviks who were
arrested at the time were even prepared to desert our ranks. But to draw
inferences from this against certain alleged "Rights," alleged to be members
of the Central Committee, is a shameful distortion of history.

Trotsky is wrong in declaring that during the Kornilov days
a section of the Party leaders inclined towards the formation of a bloc
with the defencists, towards supporting the Provisional Government. He,
of course, is referring to those same alleged "Rights" who keep him awake
at night. Trotsky is wrong, for there exist documents, such as the Central
Organ of the Party of that time, which refute his statements. Trotsky refers
to Lenin's letter to the Central Committee warning against supporting Kerensky;
but Trotsky fails to understand Lenin's letters, their significance, their
purpose. In his letters, Lenin sometimes deliberately ran ahead, pushing
into the forefront mistakes that might possibly be committed, and
criticising them in advance with the object of warning the Party and of
safeguarding it against mistakes. Sometimes he would even magnify a "trifle"
and "make a mountain out of a molehill" for the same pedagogical purpose.
The leader of the party, especially if he is in hiding, cannot act otherwise,
for he must see further than his comrades-in-arms, he must sound the alarm
over every possible mistake, even over "trifles." But to infer from such
letters of Lenin's (and he wrote quite a number of such letters) the existence
of "tragic" disagreements and to trumpet them forth means not to understand
Lenin's letters, means not to know Lenin. This, probably, explains why
Trotsky sometimes is wide of the mark. In short: there were no disagreements
in the Central Committee during the Kornilov revolt, absolutely none.

After the July defeat, disagreement did indeed arise between
the Central Committee and Lenin on the question of the future of the Soviets.
It is known that Lenin, wishing to concentrate the Party's attention on
the task of preparing the uprising outside the Soviets, warned against
any infatuation with the latter, for he was of the opinion that, having
been defiled by the defencists, they had become useless. The Central Committee
and the Sixth Party Congress took a more cautious line and decided that
there were no grounds for excluding the possibility that the Soviets would
revive. The Kornilov revolt showed that this decision was correct. This
disagreement, however, was of no great consequence for the Party. Later,
Lenin admitted that the line taken by the Sixth Congress had been correct.
It is interesting that Trotsky has not clutched at this disagreement and
has not magnified it to "monstrous" proportions.

A united and solid party, the hub of the revolutionary mobilisation
of the masses -- such was the picture presented by our Party in that period.

3) The period of organisation of the assault (September-October).
The major facts of this period:

a) the convocation of the Democratic Conference and the
collapse of the idea of a bloc with the Cadets;

b) the Moscow and Petrograd Soviets go over to the
side of the Bolsheviks;

c) the Congress of Soviets of the Northern Region
[7]; the Petrograd Soviet decides against the withdrawal
of the troops;

d) the decision of the Central Committee on the uprising
and the formation of the Revolutionary Military Committee of the Petrograd
Soviet;

e) the Petrograd garrison decides to render the Petrograd
Soviet armed support; a network of commissars of the Revolutionary Military
Committee is organised;

f) the Bolshevik armed forces go into action; the
members of the Provisional Government are arrested;

g) the Revolutionary Military Committee of the Petrograd
Soviet takes power; the Second Congress of Soviets sets up the Council
of People's Commissars.

The characteristic feature of this period is the rapid growth of
the crisis, the utter consternation reigning among the ruling circles,
the isolation of the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks, and the
mass flight of the vacillating elements to the side of the Bolsheviks.
A peculiar feature of the tactics of the revolution in this period must
be noted, namely, that the revolution strove to take every, or nearly every,
step in its attack in the guise of defence. Undoubtedly, the refusal to
allow the troops to be withdrawn from Petrograd was an important step in
the revolution's attack; nevertheless, this attack was carried out under
the slogan of protecting Petrograd from possible attack by the external
enemy. Undoubtedly, the formation of the Revolutionary Military Committee
was a still more important step in the attack upon the Provisional Government;
nevertheless, it was carried out under the slogan of organising Soviet
control over the actions of the Headquarters of the Military Area. Undoubtedly,
the open transition of the garrison to the side of the Revolutionary Military
Committee and the organisation of a network of Soviet Commissars marked
the beginning of the uprising; nevertheless, the revolution took these
steps under the slogan of protecting the Petrograd Soviet from possible
action by the counterrevolution. The revolution, as it were, masked its
actions in attack under the cloak of defence in order the more easily to
draw the irresolute, vacillating elements into its orbit. This, no doubt,
explains the outwardly defensive character of the speeches, articles and
slogans of that period, the inner content of which, none the less, was
of a profoundly attacking nature.

Were there disagreements in the Central Committee in that
period? Yes, there were, and fairly important ones at that. I have already
spoken about the disagreements over the uprising. They are fully reflected
in the minutes of the meetings of the Central Committee of October 10 and
16. I shall, therefore, not repeat what I have already said. Three questions
must now be dealt with: participation in the Pre-parliament, the role of
the Soviets in the uprising, and the date of the uprising. This is all
the more necessary because Trotsky, in his zeal to push himself into a
prominent place, has "inadvertently" misrepresented the stand Lenin took
on the last two questions.

Undoubtedly, the disagreements on the question of the Pre-parliament
were of a serious nature. What was, so to speak, the aim of the Pre-parliament?
It was: to help the bourgeoisie to push the Soviets into the background
and to lay the foundations of bourgeois parliamentarism. Whether the Pre-parliament
could have accomplished this task in the revolutionary situation that had
arisen is another matter. Events showed that this aim could not be realised,
and the Pre-parliament itself was a Kornilovite abortion. There can be
no doubt, however, that it was precisely this aim that the Mensheviks and
Socialist-Revolutionaries pursued in setting up the Pre-parliament. What
could the Bolsheviks' participation in the Pre-parliament mean under those
circumstances? Nothing but deceiving the proletarian masses about the true
nature of the Pre-parliament. This is the chief explanation for the passion
with which Lenin, in his letters, scourged those who were in favour of
taking part in the Pre-parliament. There can be no doubt that it was a
grave mistake to have taken part in the Pre-parliament.

It would be a mistake, however, to think, as Trotsky does,
that those who were in favour of taking part in the Pre-parliament went
into it for the purpose of constructive work, for the purpose of "directing
the working-class movement" "into the channel of Social-Democracy." That
is not at all the case. It is not true. Had that been the case, the Party
would not have been able to rectify this mistake "in two ticks" by demonstratively
walking out of the Pre-parliament. Incidentally, the swift rectification
of this mistake was an expression of our Party's vitality and revolutionary
might.

And now, permit me to correct a slight inaccuracy that has
crept into the report of Lentsner, the "editor" of Trotsky's works, about
the meeting of the Bolshevik group at which a decision on the question
of the Pre-parliament was taken. Lentsner says that there were two reporters
at this meeting, Kamenev and Trotsky. That is not true. Actually, there
were four reporters: two in favour of boycotting the Pre-parliament (Trotsky
and Stalin), and two in favour of participation (Kamenev and Nogin).

Trotsky is in a still worse position when dealing with the
stand Lenin took on the question of the form of the uprising. According
to Trotsky, it appears that Lenin's view was that the Party should take
power in October "independently of and behind the back of the Soviet."
Later on, criticising this nonsense, which he ascribes to Lenin, Trotsky
"cuts capers" and finally delivers the following condescending utterance:

"That would have been a mistake." Trotsky is here uttering
a falsehood about Lenin, he is misrepresenting Lenin's views on the role
of the Soviets in the uprising. A pile of documents can be cited, showing
that Lenin proposed that power be taken through the Soviets, either
the Petrograd or the Moscow Soviet, and not behind the back of the
Soviets. Why did Trotsky have to invent this more than strange legend about
Lenin?

Nor is Trotsky in a better position when he "analyses" the
stand taken by the Central Committee and Lenin on the question of the date
of the uprising. Reporting the famous meeting of the Central Committee
of October 10, Trotsky asserts that at that meeting "a resolution was carried
to the effect that the uprising should take place not later than October
15." From this it appears that the Central Committee fixed October 15 as
the date of the uprising and then itself violated that decision by postponing
the date of the uprising to October 25. Is that true? No, it is not. During
that period the Central Committee passed only two resolutions on the uprising
-- one on October 10 and the other on October 16. Let us read these resolutions.

The Central Committee's resolution of October 10:

"The Central Committee recognises that the international position
of the Russian revolution (the mutiny in the German navy, which is an extreme
manifestation of the growth throughout Europe of the world socialist revolution,
and the threat of peace *** between the imperialists
with the object of strangling the revolution in Russia) as well as the
military situation (the indubitable decision of the Russian bourgeoisie
and Kerensky and Co. to surrender Petrograd to the Germans), and the fact
that the proletarian party has gained a majority in the Soviets -- all
this, taken in conjunction with the peasant revolt and the swing of popular
confidence towards our Party (the elections in Moscow), and, finally, the
obvious preparations being made for a second Kornilov affair (the withdrawal
of troops from Petrograd, the dispatch of Cossacks to Petrograd, the surrounding
of Minsk by Cossacks, etc.) -- all this places an armed uprising on the
order of the day.

"Considering, therefore, that an armed uprising is inevitable,
and that the time for it is fully ripe, the Central Committee instructs
all Party organisations to be guided accordingly, and to discuss and decide
all practical questions (the Congress of Soviets of the Northern Region,
the withdrawal of troops from Petrograd, the actions of the people in Moscow
and Minsk, etc.) from this point of view." [8]

The resolution adopted by the conference of the Central Committee
with responsible workers on October 16:

"This meeting fully welcomes and wholly supports the Central Committee's
resolution, calls upon all organisations and all workers and soldiers to
make thorough and most intense preparations for an armed uprising and for
support of the centre set up by the Central Committee for this purpose,
and expresses complete confidence that the Central Committee and the Soviet
will in good time indicate the favourable moment and the suitable means
for launching the attack." [9]

You see that Trotsky's memory betrayed him about the date of the
uprising and the Central Committee's resolution on the uprising.

Trotsky is absolutely wrong in asserting that Lenin underrated
Soviet legality, that Lenin failed to appreciate the great importance of
the All-Russian Congress of Soviets taking power on October 25, and that
this was the reason why he insisted that power be taken before October
25. That is not true. Lenin proposed that power be taken before October
25 for two reasons. Firstly, because the counter-revolutionaries might
have surrendered Petrograd at any moment, which would have drained the
blood of the developing uprising, and so every day was precious. Secondly,
because the mistake made by the Petrograd Soviet in openly fixing
and announcing the day of the uprising (October 25) could not be rectified
in any other way than by actually launching the uprising before
the legal date set for it. The fact of the matter is that Lenin regarded
insurrection as an art, and he could not help knowing that the enemy, informed
about the date of the uprising (owing to the carelessness of the Petrograd
Soviet) would certainly try to prepare for that day. Consequently, it was
necessary to forestall the enemy, i.e., without fail to launch the uprising
before the legal date. This is the chief explanation for the passion
with which Lenin in his letters scourged those who made a fetish of the
date -- October 25. Events showed that Lenin was absolutely right. It is
well known that the uprising was launched prior to the All-Russian Congress
of Soviets. It is well known that power was actually taken before the opening
of the All-Russian Congress of Soviets, and it was taken not by the Congress
of Soviets, but by the Petrograd Soviet, by the Revolutionary Military
Committee. The Congress of Soviets merely took over power from the
Petrograd Soviet. That is why Trotsky's lengthy arguments about the importance
of Soviet legality are quite beside the point.

A virile and mighty party standing at the head of the revolutionary
masses who were storming and overthrowing bourgeois rule -- such was the
state of our Party in that period.

That is how matters stand with the legends about the preparation
for October.

III. TROTSKYISM OR LENINISM?

We have dealt above with the legends directed
against the Party and those about Lenin spread by Trotsky and his supporters
in connection with October and the preparation for it. We have exposed
and refuted these legends. But the question arises: For what purpose did
Trotsky need all these legends about October and the preparation for October,
about Lenin and the Party of Lenin? What is the purpose of Trotsky's new
literary pronouncements against the Party? What is the sense, the purpose,
the aim of these pronouncements now, when the Party does not want a discussion,
when the Party is busy with a host of urgent tasks, when the Party needs
united efforts to restore our economy and not a new struggle around old
questions? For what purpose does Trotsky need to drag the Party back, to
new discussions?

Trotsky asserts that all this is needed for the purpose of
"studying" October. But is it not possible to study October without giving
another kick at the Party and its leader Lenin? What sort of a "history"
of October is it that begins and ends with attempts to discredit the chief
leader of the October uprising, to discredit the Party, which organised
and carried through the uprising? No, it is not a matter here of studying
October. That is not the way to study October. That is not
the way to write the history of October. Obviously, there is a different
"design" here, and everything goes to show that this "design" is that Trotsky
by his literary pronouncements is making another (yet another!) attempt
to create the conditions for substituting Trotskyism for Leninism. Trotsky
needs "desperately" to discredit the Party, and its cadres who carried
through the uprising, in order, after discrediting the Party, to proceed
to discredit Leninism. And it is necessary for him to discredit Leninism
in order to drag in Trotskyism as the "sole" "proletarian" (don't laugh!)
ideology. All this, of course (oh, of course!) under the flag of Leninism,
so that the dragging operation may be performed "as painlessly as possible.
"

That is the essence of Trotsky's latest literary pronouncements.

That is why those literary pronouncements of Trotsky's sharply
raise the question of Trotskyism.

And so, what is Trotskyism?

Trotskyism possesses three specific features which bring
it into irreconcilable contradiction with Leninism.

What are these features?

Firstly. Trotskyism is the theory of "permanent"
(uninterrupted) revolution. But what is permanent revolution in its Trotskyist
interpretation? It is revolution that fails to take the poor peasantry
into account as a revolutionary force. Trotsky's "permanent" revolution
is, as Lenin said, "skipping" the peasant movement, "playing at the seizure
of power." Why is it dangerous? Because such a revolution, if an attempt
had been made to bring it about, would inevitably have ended in failure,
for it would have divorced from the Russian proletariat its ally, the poor
peasantry. This explains the struggle that Leninism has been waging against
Trotskyism ever since 1905.

How does Trotsky appraise Leninism from the standpoint of
this struggle? He regards it as a theory that possesses "anti-revolutionary
features." What is this indignant opinion about Leninism based on? On the
fact that, at the proper time, Leninism advocated and upheld the idea of
the dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry.

But Trotsky does not confine himself to this indignant opinion.
He goes further and asserts: "The entire edifice of Leninism at the present
time is built on lies and falsification and bears within itself the poisonous
elements of its own decay" (see Trotsky's letter to Chkheidze, 1913). As
you see, we have before us two opposite lines.

Secondly. Trotskyism is distrust of the Bolshevik
Party principle, of the monolithic character of the Party, of its hostility
towards opportunist elements. In the sphere of organisation, Trotskyism
is the theory that revolutionaries and opportunists can co-exist and form
groups and coteries within a single party. You are, no doubt, familiar
with the history of Trotsky's August bloc, in which the Martovites and
Otzovists, the Liquidators and Trotskyites, happily co-operated, pretending
that they were a "real" party. It is well known that this patchwork "party"
pursued the aim of destroying the Bolshevik Party. What was the nature
of "our disagreements" at that time? It was that Leninism regarded the
destruction of the August bloc as a guarantee of the development of the
proletarian party, whereas Trotskyism regarded that bloc as the basis for
building a "real" party.

Again, as you see, we have two opposite lines.

Thirdly. Trotskyism is distrust of the leaders
of Bolshevism, an attempt to discredit, to defame them. I do not know of
a single trend in the Party that could compare with Trotskyism in the matter
of discrediting the leaders of Leninism or the central institutions of
the Party. For example, what should be said of Trotsky's "polite" opinion
of Lenin, whom he described as "a professional exploiter of every kind
of backwardness in the Russian working-class movement"? (ibid.)
And this is far from being the most "polite" of the "polite" opinions Trotsky
has expressed.

How could it happen that Trotsky, who carried such a nasty
stock-in-trade on his back, found himself, after all, in the ranks of the
Bolsheviks during the October movement? It happened because at that time
Trotsky abandoned (actually did abandon) that stock-in-trade; he hid it
in the cupboard. Had he not performed that "operation," real co-operation
with him would have been impossible. The theory of the August bloc, i.e.,
the theory of unity with the Mensheviks, had already been shattered and
thrown overboard by the revolution, for how could there be any talk about
unity when an armed struggle was raging between the Bolsheviks and the
Mensheviks? Trotsky had no alternative but to admit that this theory was
useless.

The same misadventure "happened" to the theory of permanent
revolution, for not a single Bolshevik contemplated the immediate seizure
of power on the morrow of the February Revolution, and Trotsky could not
help knowing that the Bolsheviks would not allow him, in the words of Lenin,
"to play at the seizure of power." Trotsky had no alternative but recognise
the Bolsheviks' policy of fighting for influence in the Soviets, of fighting
to win over the peasantry. As regards the third specific feature of Trotskyism
(distrust of the Bolshevik leaders), it naturally had to retire into the
background owing to the obvious failure of the first two features.

Under those circumstances, could Trotsky do anything else
but hide his stock-in-trade in the cupboard and follow the Bolsheviks,
considering that he had no group of his own of any significance, and that
he came to the Bolsheviks as a political individual, without an army? Of
course, he could not!

What is the lesson to be learnt from this? Only one: that
prolonged collaboration between the Leninists and Trotsky is possible only
if the latter completely abandons his old stock-in-trade, only if he completely
accepts Leninism. Trotsky writes about the lessons of October, but he forgets
that, in addition to all the other lessons, there is one more lesson of
October, the one I have just mentioned, which is of prime importance for
Trotskyism. Trotskyism ought to learn that lesson of October too.

It is evident, however, that Trotskyism has not learnt that
lesson. The fact of the matter is that the old stock-in-trade of Trotskyism
that was hidden in the cupboard in the period of the October movement is
now being dragged into the light again in the hope that a market will be
found for it, seeing that the market in our country is expanding. Undoubtedly,
Trotsky's new literary pronouncements are an attempt to revert to Trotskyism,
to "overcome" Leninism, to drag in, implant, all the specific features
of Trotskyism. The new Trotskyism is not a mere repetition of the old Trotskyism;
its feathers have been plucked and it is rather bedraggled; it is incomparably
milder in spirit and more moderate in form than the old Trotskyism; but,
in essence, it undoubtedly retains all the specific features of the old
Trotskyism. The new Trotskyism does not dare to come out as a militant
force against Leninism; it prefers to operate under the common flag of
Leninism, under the slogan of interpreting, improving Leninism. That is
because it is weak. It cannot be regarded as an accident that the appearance
of the new Trotskyism coincided with Lenin's departure. In Lenin's lifetime
it would not have dared to take this risky step.

What are the characteristic features of the new Trotskyism?

1) On the question of "permanent" revolution.
The new Trotskyism does not deem it necessary openly to uphold the theory
of "permanent" revolution. It "simply" asserts that the October Revolution
fully confirmed the idea of "permanent" revolution. From this it draws
the following conclusion: the important and acceptable part of Leninism
is the part that came after the war, in the period of the October Revolution;
on the other hand, the part of Leninism that existed before the war, before
the October Revolution, is wrong and unacceptable. Hence, the Trotskyites'
theory of the division of Leninism into two parts: pre-war Leninism, the
"old," "useless" Leninism with its idea of the dictatorship of the proletariat
and peasantry, and the new, post-war, October Leninism, which they count
on adapting to the requirements of Trotskyism. Trotskyism needs this theory
of the division of Leninism as a first, more or less "acceptable" step
that is necessary to facilitate further steps in its struggle against Leninism.

But Leninism is not an eclectic theory stuck together out
of diverse elements and capable of being cut into parts. Leninism is an
integral theory, which arose in 1903, has passed the test of three revolutions,
and is now being carried forward as the battle-flag of the world proletariat.

"Bolshevism," Lenin said, "as a trend of political thought and
as a political party, has existed since 1903. Only the history of Bolshevism
during the whole period of its existence can satisfactorily explain
why it was able to build up and to maintain under most difficult conditions
the iron discipline needed for the victory of the proletariat" (see Vol.
XXV, p. 174).

Bolshevism and Leninism are one. They are two names for one and
the same thing. Hence, the theory of the division of Leninism into two
parts is a theory intended to destroy Leninism, to substitute Trotskyism
for Leninism.

Needless to say, the Party cannot reconcile itself to this
grotesque theory.

2) On the question of the Party principle.
The old Trotskyism tried to undermine the Bolshevik Party principle by
means of the theory (and practice) of unity with the Mensheviks. But that
theory has suffered such disgrace that nobody now even wants to mention
it. To undermine the Party principle, present-day Trotskyism has invented
the new, less odious and almost "democratic" theory of contrasting the
old cadres to the younger Party element. According to Trotskyism, our Party
has not a single and integral history. Trotskyism divides the history of
our Party into two parts of unequal importance: pre-October and post-October.
The pre-October part of the history of our Party is, properly speaking,
not history, but "pre-history," the unimportant or, at all events, not
very important preparatory period of our Party. The post-October part of
the history of our Party, however, is real, genuine history. In the former,
there are the "old," "pre-historic," unimportant cadres of our Party. In
the latter there is the new, real, "historic" Party. It scarcely needs
proof that this singular scheme of the history of the Party is a scheme
to disrupt the unity between the old and the new cadres of our Party, a
scheme to destroy the Bolshevik Party principle.

Needless to say, the Party cannot reconcile itself to this
grotesque scheme.

3) On the question of the leaders of Bolshevism.
The old Trotskyism tried to discredit Lenin more or less openly, without
fearing the consequences. The new Trotskyism is more cautious. It tries
to achieve the purpose of the old Trotskyism by pretending to praise, to
exalt Lenin. I think it is worth while quoting a few examples.

The Party knows that Lenin was a relentless revolutionary;
but it knows also that he was cautious, that he disliked reckless people
and often, with a firm hand, restrained those who were infatuated with
terrorism, including Trotsky himself. Trotsky touches on this subject in
his book On Lenin, but from his portrayal of Lenin one might think
that all Lenin did was "at every opportunity to din into people's minds
the idea that terrorism was inevitable." The impression is created that
Lenin was the most bloodthirsty of all the bloodthirsty Bolsheviks.

For what purpose did Trotsky need this uncalled for and totally
unjustified exaggeration?

The Party knows that Lenin was an exemplary Party man, who
did not like to settle questions alone, without the leading collective
body, on the spur of the moment, without careful investigation and verification.
Trotsky touches upon this aspect, too, in his book. But the portrait he
paints is not that of Lenin, but of a sort of Chinese mandarin, who settles
important questions in the quiet of his study, by intuition.

Do you want to know how our Party settled the question of
dispersing the Constituent Assembly? Listen to Trotsky:

"'Of course, the Constituent Assembly will have to be dispersed,'
said Lenin, 'but what about the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries?'

"But our apprehensions were greatly allayed by old Natanson.
He came in to 'take counsel' with us, and after the first few words he
said:

"'We shall probably have to disperse the Constituent Assembly
by force.'

"'Bravo!' exclaimed Lenin. 'What is true is true! But will
your people agree to it?'

"'Some of our people are wavering, but I think that in the
end they will agree,' answered Natanson."

That is how history is written.

Do you want to know how the Party settled the question about
the Supreme Military Council? Listen to Trotsky:

"'Unless we have serious and experienced military experts we shall
never extricate ourselves from this chaos,' I said to Vladimir Ilyich after
every visit to the Staff.

"'That is evidently true, but they might betray us....'

"'Let us attach a commissar to each of them.'

"'Two would be better," exclaimed Lenin, 'and strong-handed
ones. There surely must be strong-handed Communists in our ranks.'

"That is how the structure of the Supreme Military Council
arose."

That is how Trotsky writes history.

Why did Trotsky need these "Arabian Nights" stories derogatory
to Lenin? Was it to exalt V. I. Lenin, the leader of the Party? It doesn't
look like it.

The Party knows that Lenin was the greatest Marxist of our
times, a profound theoretician and a most experienced revolutionary, to
whom any trace of Blanquism was alien. Trotsky touches upon this aspect,
too, in his book. But the portrait he paints is not that of the giant Lenin,
but of a dwarf-like Blanquist who, in the October days, advises the Party
"to take power by its own hand, independently of and behind the back of
the Soviet." I have already said, however, that there is not a scrap of
truth in this description.

Why did Trotsky need this flagrant ... inaccuracy? Is this
not an attempt to discredit Lenin "just a little"?

Such are the characteristic features of the new Trotskyism.

What is the danger of this new Trotskyism? It is that Trotskyism,
owing to its entire inner content, stands every chance of becoming the
centre and rallying point of the non-proletarian elements who are striving
to weaken, to disintegrate the proletarian dictatorship.

You will ask: what is to be done now? What are the Party's
immediate tasks in connection with Trotsky's new literary pronouncements?

Trotskyism is taking action now in order to discredit Bolshevism
and to undermine its foundations. It is the duty of the Party to bury
Trotskyism as an ideological trend.

There is talk about repressive measures against the opposition
and about the possibility of a split. That is nonsense, comrades. Our Party
is strong and mighty. It will not allow any splits. As regards repressive
measures, I am emphatically opposed to them. What we need now is not repressive
measures, but an extensive ideological struggle against renascent Trotskyism.

We did not want and did not strive for this literary discussion.
Trotskyism is forcing it upon us by its anti-Leninist pronouncements. Well,
we are ready, comrades.

NOTESBy J. V. Stalin

[*] See Lenin's Works, Vol. XX,
p. 104. See also the reports made at the Petrograd City Conference and
at the All-Russian Conference of the R.S.D.L.P.(B.) (middle and end of
April, 1917).

[**] Among these legends must be
included also the very widespread story that Trotsky was the "sole" or
"chief organiser" of the victories on the fronts of the civil war. I must
declare, comrades, in the interest of truth, that this version is quite
out of accord with the facts. I am far from denying that Trotsky played
an important role in the civil war. But I must emphatically declare that
the high honour of being the organiser of our victories belongs not to
individuals, but to the great collective body of advanced workers in our
country, the Russian Communist Party. Perhaps it will not be out of place
to quote a few examples. You know that Kolchak and Denikin were regarded
as the principal enemies of the Soviet Republic. You know that our country
breathed freely only after those enemies were defeated. Well, history shows
that both those enemies, i.e., Kolchak and Denikin, were routed by our
troops in spite of Trotsky's plans.

Judge for yourselves.

1) Kolchak. This is in the summer of 1919. Our troops are
advancing against Kolchak and are operating near Ufa. A meeting of the
Central Committee is held. Trotsky proposes that the advance be halted
along the line of the River Belaya (near Ufa), leaving the Urals in the
hands of Kolchak, and that part of the troops be withdrawn from the Eastern
Front and transferred to the Southern Front. A heated debate takes place.
The Central Committee disagrees with Trotsky, being of the opinion that
the Urals, with its factories and railway network, must not be left in
the hands of Kolchak, for the latter could easily recuperate there organise
a strong force and reach the Volga again; Kolchak must first be driven
beyond the Ural range into the Siberian steppes, and only after that has
been done should forces be transferred to the South The Central Committee
rejects Trotsky's plan. Trotsky hands in his resignation. The Central Committee
refuses to accept it. Commander-in-Chief Vatsetis, who supported Trotsky's
plan, resigns. His place is taken by a new Commander-in-Chief, Kamenev.
From that moment Trotsky ceases to take a direct part in the affairs of
the Eastern Front.

2) Denikin. This is in the autumn of 1919. The offensive
against Denikin is not proceeding successfully. The "steel ring" around
Mamontov (Mamontov's raid) is obviously collapsing. Denikin captures Kursk.
Denikin is approaching Orel. Trotsky is summoned from the Southern Front
to attend a meeting of the Central Committee. The Central Committee regards
the situation as alarming and decides to send new military leaders to the
Southern Front and to withdraw Trotsky. The new military leaders demand
"no intervention" by Trotsky in the affairs of the Southern Front. Trotsky
ceases to take a direct part in the affairs of the Southern Front.. Operations
on the Southern Front, right up to the capture of Rostov-on-Don and Odessa
by our troops, proceed without Trotsky.

Let anybody try to refute these facts.

[***] Obviously, this should be
"a separate peace." -- J. St.

NOTESFrom SW

[1] The "Contact Committee," consisting
of Chkheidze, Steklov, Sukhanov, Filippovsky and Skobelev (and later Chernov
and Tsereteli), was set up by the Menshevik and SocialistRevolutionary
Executive Committee of the Petrograd Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies
on March 7, 1917, for the purpose of establishing contact with the Provisional
Government, of "influencing" it and "controlling" its activities. Actually,
the "Contact Committee" helped to carry out the bourgeois policy of the
Provisional Government and restrained the masses of the workers from waging
an active revolutionary struggle to transfer all power to the Soviets.
The "Contact Committee" existed until May 1917, when representatives of
the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries entered the provisional Government.

[2] See V. I. Lenin, Works,
4th Russ. ea., Vol. 24, pp. 1-7.

[3] The Petrograd City Conference
of the R.S.D.L.P.(B.) took place from April 27 to May 5 (April 14-22),
1917, with 57 delegates present. V. I. Lenin and J. V. Stalin took part
in the proceedings. V. I. Lenin delivered a report on the current situation
based on his April Theses. J. V. Stalin was elected to the commission for
drafting the resolution on V. I. Lenin's report.

[4] Concerning the Seventh AllRussian April
Conference of the Bolshevik Party see the History of the C.P.S.U.(B.),
Short Course, Moscow 1952, pp. 291-96.

[5] See V. I. Lenin, Works,
4th Russ. ea., Vol. 23, pp. 289-333.

[6] See "Speech by V. I. Lenin at
the Meeting of the Petrograd Committee of the R.S.D.L.P.(B.), June 24 (11),
1917, Concerning the Cancelling of the Demonstration" (Works, 4th
Russ. ea., Vol. 25, pp. 62-63).

[7] The Congress of Soviets of Workers'
and Soldiers' Deputies of the Northern Region took place in Petrograd on
October 24-26 (11-13), 1917, under the direction of the Bolsheviks. Representatives
were present from Petrograd, Moscow, Kronstadt, Novgorod, Reval, Helsingfors,
Vyborg and other cities. In all there were 94 delegates, of whom 51 were
Bolsheviks. The congress adopted a resolution on the need for immediate
transference of all power to the Soviets, central and local. It called
upon the peasants to support the struggle for the transference of power
to the Soviets and urged the Soviets themselves to commence active operations
and to set up Revolutionary Military Committees for organising the military
defence of the revolution. The congress set up a Northern Regional Committee
and instructed it to prepare for the convocation of the Second All-Russian
Congress of Soviets and to co-ordinate the activities of all the Regional
Soviets.