An earthquake’s intensity is determined by observing its effects at a particular place on the Earth’s surface. Intensity depends on the earthquake’s magnitude, the distance from the epicenter, and local geology. These scales are based on reports of people awakening, felt movements, sounds, and visible effects on structures and landscapes. The most commonly used scale in the United States is the Modified Mercalli Intensity Scale, and its values are usually reported in Roman numerals to distinguish them from magnitudes.

Past damage in New Jersey

New Jersey doesn’t get many earthquakes, but it does get some. Fortunately most are small. A few New Jersey earthquakes, as well as a few originating outside the state, have produced enough damage to warrant the concern of planners and emergency managers.

Damage in New Jersey from earthquakes has been minor: items knocked off shelves, cracked plaster and masonry, and fallen chimneys. Perhaps because no one was standing under a chimney when it fell, there are no recorded earthquake–related deaths in New Jersey. We will probably not be so fortunate in the future.

More recently, in the 1970’s and early 1980’s, earthquake risk along the Ramapo Fault received attention because of its proximity to the Indian Point, New York, Nuclear Power Generating Station. East of the Rocky Mountains (including New Jersey), earthquakes do not break the ground surface. Their focuses lie at least a few miles below the Earth’s surface, and their locations are determined by interpreting seismographic records. Geologic fault lines seen on the surface today are evidence of ancient events. The presence or absence of mapped faults (fault lines) does not denote either a seismic hazard or the lack of one, and earthquakes can occur anywhere in New Jersey.

Frequency of Damaging Earthquakes in New Jersey

Records for the New York City area, which have been kept for 300 years, provide good information

for estimating the frequency of earthquakes in New Jersey.

Earthquakes with a maximum intensity of VII (see table DamagingEarthquakes Felt in New Jersey )have occurred in the New York City area in 1737, 1783, and 1884. One intensity VI, four intensity V’s, and at least three intensity III shocks have also occurred in the New York area over the last 300 years.

The 1995 earthquake in Kobe, Japan, is an example of what might happen in New Jersey in a similar quake. It registered a magnitude 7.2 on the Richter scale and produced widespread destruction. But it was the age of construction, soil and foundation condition, proximity to the fault, and type of structure that were the major determining factors in the performance of each building. Newer structures, built to the latest construction standards, appeared to perform relatively well, generally ensuring the life safety of occupants.

Structures have collapsed in New Jersey without earthquakes; an earthquake would trigger many more. Building and housing codes need to be updated and strictly enforced to properly prepare for inevitable future earthquakes.

A military aide carrying the “football” — a briefcase with contents for the president to authorize a nuclear strike — was blocked by Chinese security officials at Beijing’s Great Hall of the People in November 2017, according to the report, which cited five sources “familiar with the events.”

The briefcase is supposed to be close to the president at all times. Chief of Staff John Kelly, after hearing about the incident, rushed over and told U.S. officials to keep walking, Axios said. That resulted in a commotion between the Americans and the Chinese.

“A Chinese security official grabbed Kelly, and Kelly shoved the man’s hand off of his body. Then a U.S. Secret Service agent grabbed the Chinese security official and tackled him to the ground,” according to the report.

The news outlet reported the scuffle was over “in a flash” and the Chinese never touched the briefcase. The chief of the Beijing security detail apologized, Axios said.

The White House did not immediately respond to a request for comment sent outside of normal business hours.

According to al-Jubeir, Saudi Arabia is discussing the plans with “roughly 10 countries or so around the world, and we have not made a decision yet with regards to which path we will take and which country we will be focusing on more.”

The plan, he says, aims “to produce energy so that we can save the oil and export it in order to generate revenue.”

“Our objective is we want to have the same rights as other countries,” he added.

The country, which has its own uranium deposits, is currently seeking a contractor for its first nuclear power project, which will include two nuclear reactors.

According to Yonhap, South Korea’s Energy Ministry said the country would work to submit a proposal for the deal, and has met with both state utility companies to design an effective strategy. Saudi Arabia is scheduled to select a contractor by the end of 2018.

The latest iteration of the Trump administration’s security doctrine is the Nuclear Posture Review (NPR). It follows the National Defense Strategy that was released in January and the National Security Strategy that was released in December. What immediately stands out in the NPR is the now consistent Department of Defense (DoD) theme of a return to great power competition.

The American political scientist Francis Fukuyama wrote, in his famous 1989 article for the National Interest, “The End of History,” that great power states would by and large drift towards Western liberal democracy in the 21st century — because the foremost rival model of governance, socialism, proved to be a dud.

To be sure, Fukuyama accurately predicted that “terrorism and wars of national liberation will continue to be an important item on the international agenda.” In hindsight, one might say that this was a clear-eyed warning about what was to emerge as the predominant US foreign policy concern a little over a decade later.

But the most important, and therefore best-publicized, argument Fukuyama made was that “large-scale conflict must involve large states still caught in the grip of history, and they are what appear to be passing from the scene.” Thus there would be no World War III, nor any return of the great power conflicts that were a fixture of the 18th and 19th centuries.

Fukuyama wrote at great length about the advantages of this post-history world. Political stability would allow, indeed encourage, nations to economically compete and therefore prosper. His prime example of that phenomenon was Japan’s remarkable transformation from defeated imperial aggressor in 1945 to the world’s second-largest economy in 1989.

Fukuyama’s most serious concern was, in fact, the “boredom” that might accompany the end of history. He described this boredom as “the endless solving of technical problems, environmental concerns, and the satisfaction of sophisticated consumer demands.”

America was supposed to be the clearest winner of this new post-history world. Its inherent sense of exceptionalism, seemingly proven correct with the fall of the Soviet Union, would be a force of restraint in global security and a model for aspiring democracies. Decades of costly foreign intervention since the end of World War II would likely become a distant memory, reinterpreted as the ultimate sacrifice leading to the next generation of global (i.e., post-history) governance.

The nation that defeated Hitler, he predicted, would no longer be called forth to defend the world order against rival idealism by would-be revisionist aggressors. Indeed, it was clear in the 1990s that the Cold War world was giving way to a unipolar world, in which the US had the moral compass and strategic capability to make sure that developing nations (e.g., Kosovo) could securely make the transition to democracy.

Of course, the attacks of September 11, 2001 and the coinciding years of an evolving Islamist assault on global security, shattered the comparative tranquility of the decade preceding it. Nevertheless, while history was busy re-manifesting itself in its newest iteration, the Obama administration adopted an approach to security policy that — in many ways — reflected the most extreme form of Fukuyama’s idea of post-history “boredom.”

In short, President Obama asserted that there was an “arc” to history and that it ultimately bent towards justice in the world. Therefore, he believed that America need no longer concern itself with international security. This was the driving rationale behind eight years of foreign policy that favored rapprochement with revisionist world powers rather than strategic maneuvering.

That the Obama administration believed history (and therefore the luxury of time) was ultimately on America’s side is illustrated in his 2009 NPR: “But fundamental changes in the international security environment in recent years – including the growth of unrivaled US conventional military capabilities, major improvements in missile defenses, and the easing of Cold War rivalries – enable us to fulfill those objectives at significantly lower nuclear force levels and reduced reliance on nuclear weapons.”

In other words, boredom led to strategic complacency.

There is nothing wrong with wanting to reduce nuclear weapons in the world. Obama was hardly the first president to aspire to that lofty goal. But his administration’s emphasis on the “complete elimination of nuclear weapons” was painfully out of touch with the realities of Russia and China’s parallel advancements — not to mention the major strides to nuclearization made by North Korean and Iran.

By contrast, the new NPR explicitly asserts that America is at a vital crossroads that will determine its future world standing: “This review comes at a critical moment in our nation’s history, for America confronts an international security situation that is more complex and demanding than any since the end of the Cold War. In this environment, it is not possible to delay modernization of our nuclear forces.”

The basis for this assertion is that America’s nuclear capabilities have declined as China’s and Russia’s have advanced. The latter is singled out for having increased its “warhead delivery capacity.” The problem with that, as the NPR states, is that “despite our best efforts to sustain a positive relationship, Russia now perceives the United States and NATO as its principal opponent and impediment to realizing its destabilizing geopolitical goals.”

What is the main reason for the DoD’s concern with modernizing America’s nuclear doctrine? Evidently, it’s “the return to the frequent Great Power warfare of past centuries.”

In the absence of American concern with great power competition, “Russia and China … have moved in the opposite direction.” The surest sign of the DoD’s new focus on world order strategy is the fact that the words “great power” come up no fewer than 14 times in the new NPR — whereas in the 2009 NPR, the phrase is entirely absent. Thus the NPR represents a complete repudiation of the world model that Fukuyama theorized.

Nevertheless, Fukuyama was right about one thing: he unwittingly predicted the election of President Trump. His final words in the “End of History” were: “Perhaps this very prospect of centuries[!] of boredom at the end of history will serve to get history started once again.”

Without a doubt, Trump is the most polarizing American president of recent history, if not all time. And his election at the hands of working class Americans in rural areas like Pennsylvania, who until recently overwhelmingly supported Democratic presidential candidates, mirrors the rise to power of other world leaders who have managed to tap into similar populist sentiments in their countries. To be sure, this new class of sometime populists represents a rejection of the fruits of post-history boredom (e.g., the European Union, NAFTA, TPP, etc.). Therefore, their response seemingly captures what Fukuyama was describing as a possible return of history.

Of course, Fukuyama was off in his timing. History, if it ever really went away, returned in a matter of decades, not centuries. But perhaps we can take comfort in his most recent prediction, which he reluctantly made at a talk at Stanford University: that Western liberal democracy will survive well into the future.

Indeed, the US Department of Defense has made the survival of the current world order the most important aspect of its new mission. And like it or not, the cornerstone of that new mission depends on America’s continued nuclear dominance, without which, claims the DoD, America and its allies will be woefully unprepared to meet the challenges of an emerging post-boredom world order.

Gabriel Glickman is a nonresident associate fellow at the Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies.

BESA Center Perspectives Papers, such as this one, are published through the generosity of the Greg Rosshandler Family.

The opinions presented by Algemeiner bloggers are solely theirs and do not represent those of The Algemeiner, its publishers or editors. If you would like to share your views with a blog post on The Algemeiner, please be in touch through our Contact page.

As he has done frequently since leaving office, Kerry used the opportunity of the Munich Security Conference to defend, at length, the Obama administration’s 2015 nuclear deal which President Trump has threatened to abandon.

Kerry said that the U.S. recognized that the agreement being negotiated was not dealing with other problematic issues, including human rights abuses, missiles, arms shipments, support for Hezbollah, and its interference in Iraq and Yemen.

Although those were legitimate concerns, he said, the decision to leave them off the agenda was taken “not as a concession, but as a matter of strategic thinking.”

Kerry characterized that thinking as arising from a realization that the George W. Bush administration’s approach – demanding that Iran stop all uranium-enrichment – had gone “nowhere,” and a recognition that the problem could not be resolved through a military option.

He said when he sat down with his Iranian counterpart, Javad Zarif, in the fall of 2013 – the first time such a meeting had taken place in decades – Iran had already mastered the nuclear fuel cycle and several intelligence services assessed it was just two months away from nuclear “breakout.”

“I can’t tell you how much we were resisting, the prime minister [Israel’s Binyamin Netanyahu] himself, King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia – who said it to me personally – [Egyptian] President [Hosni] Mubarak, who said it to me personally: the only thing you can do with Iran is bomb them.”

He predicted that if the nuclear deal known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) “goes away,” calls to bomb will quickly resume.

“I guarantee you, if this deal goes away, you know the pressures you’re going to hear, coming from certain quarters, ‘Wow, we’re right back where we were. You may have to bomb them,’ because they’re now free to go back to what we had [under the JCPOA] restricted them from doing.”

At the same venue earlier in the day, Netanyahu warned that as a result of the JCPOA Iran would be on its way to having a nuclear weapons arsenal “in little more than a decade.”

Kerry called the statement “fundamentally not accurate.”

He said the JCPOA limits Iran to a 300 kilogram stockpile of enriched uranium for 15 years, “which is why, when I hear ‘nuclear arsenal in ten years,’ it is physically impossible to make a bomb with 300 kilograms of enriched uranium.”

Kerry insisted that the agreement is being thoroughly monitored to ensure Iran’s compliance, with inspectors examining facilities “on a daily basis.”

He said he believes “it is absolutely critical for Europe, for the world, to make sure that we hold onto this agreement, because to go backwards – we know what the world looks like without the Iran nuclear agreement. It’s not a better place.”

‘Disastrous flaws’

Last month President Trump waived sanctions against Iran for another 120 days, for what he indicated could be the last time.

“Either fix the deal’s disastrous flaws,” he said in a message directed at European allies and the U.S. Congress, “or the United States will withdraw.”

The JCPOA sets down procedures under which the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) can request access to suspect sites, involving consultation and ultimately a vote by the parties to the deal – the U.S., Britain, France, Russia, China, Germany and Iran.

The process can take 24 days from the time the IAEA first raises concerns to the time Iran allows inspectors in, however. “A lot of things can disappear” in 24 days, a senior French official observed at the time.

In the event, Iran has repeatedly rejected the notion that the JCPOA requires it to allow inspection of military facilities, saying such a step would violate its sovereignty.

Kerry said Sunday the notion that Iran’s military sites cannot be inspected is “just absolutely wrong.”

He outlined the 21-day process, and noted that in the event of the issue coming up for a vote, the U.S., Britain, Germany and France would have a one-vote advantage over Iran, Russia and China.

For its part, however, the IAEA has not pushed for access to military sites, and so the Iranians’ rhetoric, the 21-day process, and the broad credibility of the inspection regime, have not been put to the test.

President Obama in 2015 declared that the JCPOA incorporates “the most robust and intrusive inspections and transparency regime ever negotiated for any nuclear program in history.”