What implications will the ongoing developments in artificial intelligence and robotics have for remote warfare in the future?

Forward – Vernon Coaker MP former Shadow Secretary of State for
Defence

The increasing use of robotics by our armed forces is inevitable in all areas. The key question
for the military but also the public is how do we ensure that the artificial intelligence that goes
with it will act according to an acceptable moral compass. This will also be a challenge for the
military operators of such technology and for political oversight. In particular how do the
existing rules of war with the various conventions apply to cyber attack. For example, does
Article 5 of NATO apply to an attack on the computers which control water or electricity supply.
These are just some of the questions which arise as well as many more, but it is ever more
important that this discussion takes place with the wider public as well as the senior military
and politicians. A failure to do so will undermine the technological advances in warfare which
are both inevitable and necessary.

Executive
Summary

The character of warfare changed with the onset of the 21st century. The decade prior to this saw warfare predominantly characterised by intra-state conflict drawn across ethnic lines, often resulting in humanitarian crises. This led to the development of western military forces being utilised for stability operations (Aoi 2011); ranging in nature from peace enforcement in Somalia in 1993, peacekeeping in Bosnia in 1995, to humanitarian assistance in Kosovo in 1999. The events of 9/11 changed this, ushering in the United States (US)-led Global War on Terror (GWoT). What started as an initially limited intervention in Afghanistan to dismantle the Al-Qaeda training camps and topple the rogue Taliban regime in Kabul, soon developed into the 2003 invasion of Iraq, with subsequent interventions across the Middle East and Africa (Libya 2011 (1), Mali 2013 {2), Nigeria 2015 (3), and Cameroon 2015 (4) amongst others). Often framed under the narrative of countering international Islamic terrorism and the GWoT, these long and costly counterinsurgencies across the wider Middle East and Sub-Saharan Africa, and in particular the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq (Bankoff 2003), fundamentally altered the character of war, heralding an era of remote warfare (RW), defined by western governments which are politically averse to military risk when pursuing strategic objectives.

his paper will explore how the
nature of RW has evolved over the last twenty years since 9/11, moderately
steady in some areas yet alarmingly high in others. By deconstructing precisely
what is meant by RW its respective component parts can be subsequently
scrutinised individually as part of RW’s evolutionary nature. Once these
component parts of RW have been established, it will be necessary to place this
within current operational theatres to give a wider understanding of how RW is
changing the nature of war. In addition, the United Kingdom’s (UK) approach to
RW will need to be explored, and in that context to investigate the UK
military’s current policies towards artificial intelligence (AI) and robotics;
arguably the area of RW which is currently seeing the most rapid developments
with the emergence of robotics technology and more advanced AI platforms being
pressed into service. Once this approach has been established within the
current international environment, it will be possible to elucidate further the
implications for the future of RW when considering the ongoing developments in
both AI and robotics.

The evolving
characteristics of Remote Warfare

Remote warfare, as both a concept
and as a continuously evolving character of (predominantly) westernised
warfare, has seen relatively little debate, both in terms of policy
implementation and subsequent delivery5, and also little within the wider academic discourse. Rather,
the individual component parts which constitute RW as a means by which a state
can achieve military success have received much wider scrutiny, both
contextually (Smith 2015) and operationally (Gross 2015). RW constitutes a
strategy of countering military threats at a geographical distance, negating
the requirement for a traditional deployment of a potentially large military
force. In a political climate whereby both cost-effective policies combined
with reduced military risk often equates to the preferred policy options, there
is a case to be made that a political precedent was set during the NATO
campaign in Kosovo regarding the utility of RW. Much of the decision to use
air power during Kosovo was due to risk aversion across NATO and specifically
from then-US president Clinton when Tony Blair and others believed that a
ground force was a good option. Constraints placed on air operations,
specifically missions conducted at high altitude to avoid Surface to Air
missile threats, reflected these concerns and a culture of risk aversion.
Arguably air power represents lower risk and political commitment than ground
troops; RW is a further evolution of this. Specific RW policies have already
altered, remarkably so, in the time period between the emergence of the GWoT
and the contemporary international environment. In order for a contextual
appreciation of where AI and robotics lie within the conceptional space of
modern warfare, the various segments which make up RW must first be established
and analysed. These methods, discussed below briefly, include the use of
unmanned ariel vehicles (UAVs), train and equip programmes of foreign
militaries, the increased propensity to rely on Special Operations Forces (SOF),
and the amplified expectation of host nations in a conflict to undertake the
majority of the ground close combat.

The use of UAVs in the conflicts
since the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq serves a direct requirement for the
ability to project force remotely and reduce the risk to both pilots and human
controllers, who are often not in the conflict zone itself, and their ground
crew and

support, who are often in another
country entirely, far removed from any physical threat. The development of UAV
technology and subsequent operational use by the UK and in particular the US
has grown exponentially over the last decade. While there were a total of
nine strikes from UAVs between 2004 and 2007, figures released by the USAF and
the RAF showed that there had been over 1,400 UAV airstrikes in Afghanistan
between 2008-13, with armed UAVs carrying out a quarter of all air combat air sorties
within Afghanistan towards the end of the combat phase of the conflict6. By 2013 the US had over 240 armed
UAVs in operation7, and was
known to have operated in at least six countries; Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan,
Yemen, Somalia and Libya. More recently, in current operations in Iraq and
Syria against Islamic State (IS) the UK has conducted more than
1,925 UAV sorties resulting in 4,100 strikes8. This represents an increased utility over a similar period
during the height of the conflict in Afghanistan. The evolving character of
remote warfare in this instance is highlighted by the recent announcement that
UK military personnel involved in the fight against IS in Iraq and Syria who
were not physically in the countries will for the first time be eligible for
the campaign medal; specifically, UAV pilots and support personnel who are
often based either at RAF Akrotiri in Cyprus or RAF Waddington, Lincolnshire.
This highlights the increased capability of UAV technology in finding,
identifying, fixing, and striking enemy combatants remotely, using AI. UK
Defence Secretary Gavin Williamson stated that; “The
expanded medal criteria means that those personnel who have played a vital role
in defeating Daesh but have been based outside the conventional area of operations
will receive the recognition they deserve”, and that this; “reflects
the changing character of warfare”9.

The UK witnessed a shift in
strategy from the post-Cold War period to the emergence of the GWoT with
regards to train and equip programmes. Whilst committed in overseas
interventions between 1991 – 2001, notably the first Gulf War, Bosnia, Kosovo,
Macedonia and East Timor, the military never really developed train and equip
programmes during these conflicts for their respective militaries. However,
this changed significantly with both Afghanistan and Iraq. The Iraqi Army (IA),
once rebuilt in the wake of the Coalition Provincial Authority’s disarming, was
trained and equipped by both the US and the UK militaries10. Indeed, the priority for the British
Army towards the end of the campaign, and a central pillar of its strategy
throughout, was to train the IA to an operationally sufficient standard so as
to take the lead in security operations across southern Iraq. This was achieved
by 2008 with the

IA-led operation Charge of the
Knights11 in Basra.
Small pockets of platoon-sized units, known as Military Transition Training
teams (MiTTs) remained embedded within IA battalion-sized locations throughout
Basra city until the end of the British campaign in 2009, in addition to the
Naval Training Teams (NaTTs) based out of Um Qasr, training and equipping the
Iraqi naval forces12. The
same is true of the Afghan National Army (ANA) in the immediate aftermath of the
Taliban’s fall from power in 200113. Indeed, scaling up and developing operationally a host
nation’s own military has been a fundamental objective in western campaigns
since 9/11. A metric by which this is deemed either successful or not is both
the quantitative increase in the troops trained, in addition to their relative
qualitative operational output. Once the UK had completed its combat operations
in Afghanistan by 2014, the emphasis for the remaining military commitment
returned to training the ANA; this time around its officers and leadership
class in Kabul. By 2017, UK military trainers had trained and equipped 3,000
ANA officers14. The
train and equip programmes run by the UK have to a large extent been
successful, producing well trained professional soldiers and officers in both
Afghanistan and Iraq.

Whilst just as central to these
campaigns, state specific train and equip programmes have been utilised
extensively by the US since first authorised under the 2006 Defense Bill to
conduct limited military action overseas in the name of fighting international
terrorism15. Whilst
the initial figure for these programmes was US$200 million in 200616, this rose significantly to
US$2.5 billion for the fiscal years 2016/1717. Despite such a steep increase in available resources, the
train and equip programmes have recently received internal scrutiny
highlighting concern over structural issues. In 2017, the US Department of
Defense Inspector General conducted a thorough appraisal of the US train and
equip programmes, finding a lack of overall strategy in implementation of the
policy, in addition to failing to adequately staff these programmes to match
the generous budgetary increases18, leading to operational shortcomings and waste. Certainly,
whilst the doctrine of train and equip makes robust policy sense from a RW
approach, a higher degree of external validity and oversight would ensure for
greater success in the future of RW. This becomes especially evident when
combining the train and equip programmes with enabling host nations to conduct
the majority of the ground close combat, discussed further below.

A further characteristic of RW is
the often-heavy reliance on SOF personnel. The ability for a military to dispatch
highly specialised SOF units into a low or medium level intensity conflict area
often negates the requirement for sending in much higher numbers of
conventional armed forces. This policy option has proved highly popular in the
west, particularly the US. Whilst the battles and combat in Iraq and
Afghanistan were arguably won by the infantry, the period of the GWoT was again
the defining moment in modern history whereby the capabilities of the SOF were
dramatically increased, both in manpower and resources. The US and the UK both
have long histories of utilising SOF units in their numerous military campaigns
throughout the twentieth century. However, this was primarily in a
counter-insurgency role (Malaya, Oman, Vietnam, Central America). The first shift
in SOF utility occurred towards the end of the twentieth century, with two
major international state-based conflicts; the British Falklands campaign in
1982, and the US-led Gulf War in 1990/91. During these campaigns, small units
of men, often deployed far behind enemy lines, were used to augment the
infantry on the frontline against a relatively professional army (defined by
paid volunteers / conscripts; the wearing of a recognisable military uniform to
differentiate from civilians; and bound by some extent to the international
laws of armed conflict). These were the last great state-based conflicts in
modern times. The warfare of the Global War on Terror a decade on from the Gulf
War was characterised by a return to counter-insurgency; in the wake of the
collapse of both the Afghan and Iraqi military and police establishments, this
necessitated the defence of the population against insurgent groups determined
to bring about a change in government not by the ballot but by violence. With
such a change in warfare and the return to counter- insurgency, another shift
in the utility of SOF capabilities and deployments was witnessed.

Understandably the nature of SOF
operations warrants a certain degree of discretion in order to protect
operational security. Therefore, the availability of data for the purpose of
analysis is often delayed. In 2016, US SOF units had deployed to 138 states,
roughly three quarters of the globe19, with approximately 8,000 SOF personnel deployed. This figure
has more than doubled since 2001, when the number of deployed personnel was
2,90020. The
presidency of Barack Obama oversaw this operational shift; reducing
conventional forces in conflict zones from 150,000 in 2008 to 14,000 in 201621, yet SOF forces remained
consistent. Their budget increased also, from US$9.3 billon to US$10.4 billion,
a significant 10% increase, in addition to 15,000 further personnel. This
development of SOF capability increased further still under President Trump;
soon after taking office he authorised an increased remit for personnel

operating in Yemen, with at least
92 strikes conducted in the first half of 201722. Data from casualty figures can
illustrate further the expanding roles of SOF personnel. Despite accounting for
5% of US forces, since 2016 SOF personnel have accounted for more casualties
than have conventional personnel. This change was reinforced in 2017 by the
deaths of SOF personnel in Yemen, Somalia and Niger. The deaths of four
personnel in a single incident in Niger highlighted the strategic significance
that the US (and, to an equal extent, both the UK and France) place upon
Africa. In 2006, only 1% of SOF personnel were operating in Africa. By 2017,
that figure had climbed to 17%23, representing the policy challenges for politicians eager to
engage in intervention yet all too aware of the political risks that
conventional forces pose. The degree to which SOF operations have increased
over the last decade in particular has been highly significant as an example of
how not only RW has evolved throughout the period, but also of the extent to
which it has become the preferred policy for politicians wishing to engage in
small to medium level intensity conflicts, as opposed to the deployment of
conventional military forces.

The increased reliance on SOF
personnel to undertake operations, in addition to their role in train and equip
programmes, is key to RW as a concept, enabling intervening nations to limit
their direct involvement whilst still achieving a strategic effect. Central to
this approach is the operational shift from intervening nations’ military
forces to host nations’ forces involved in most of the combat, incorporating
both the increased utility of SOF personnel with the train and equip programmes
discussed above. In contemporary conflicts this has been the case across the
Middle East in the fight against IS; US-led forces have trained both the Iraqi
Army and the Iraqi Peshmerga, and the Syrian Democratic Forces in Syria, to
identify the two most significant training and advisory missions in recent
times, whereby the host nations have conducted the majority of the fighting. To
indicate the scale of these missions, in Iraq, as of December 2016, there were
approximately 15,000 US forces alone, two thirds of which were directly
involved in training Iraqi security forces. 65,000 of the latter were
calculated to have benefited from this program24. In Syria, US equipped and
trained allies the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), and their majority component
the People’s Protection Units (YPG), have been involved in the majority of
offensive military operations to retake territory claimed by IS across northern
and eastern Syria. Despite maintaining no fewer than 2,000 military personnel
in Syria involved in training Syrian opposition groups, and potentially up to
at least double that25,

the US has left the majority of
the fighting to the SDF and others. This is highlighted by the respective
casualty figures for ground close combat against IS in Syria in 2017; the SDF
suffered 955 fatalities26, whilst
the US suffered zero casualties that year. However, weeks after President
Trump’s announcement of a US withdrawal from Syria in December 2018, four US
personnel were killed in action in a single incident in Manbij, northern Syria27; previously there had only been
two combat-related fatalities for US forces in Syria since 2015.

Despite the clear advantages to
policy makers in having a host nation conduct the majority of the combat, in
addition to employing SOF personnel to conduct the train and equip programs,
serious questions remain as to the feasibility of not only maintaining this
current trend in future conflicts, but also the significant upward trajectory
of its utility as policy. The issues arise largely as a result of choosing who
the local actor will be, along with any issues or discrepancies with their
operational integrity. Problems which come to develop here, for instance, will
be seized upon as evidence of poor prior strategic insight. In Syria, though
the YPG have performed well on the battlefield against IS and other Islamist
forces, there have been recurring issues relating to war crimes and human
rights abuses suspected to have been committed throughout their actions in the
conflict (Federici 2015). Often local actors, even host nation militaries
operating in developing regions, are either unwilling or unbound by the same
international laws of armed conflict which western professional militaries are.
In addition, local actors may become either too powerful, or have questionable
allies or motives themselves. For instance in Syria, a proportion of US-trained
rebels in the early stages of the conflict handed over their weapons to Jabhat
al-Nusra, an Islamist terrorist organisation linked to al- Qaeda (AQ)28. Further still, the YPG are
viewed by Turkey as terrorists29, and indeed share the same ideology, command structure and
financing as the PKK, a proscribed terrorist organisation by the US, UK and EU.
This all leaves the question of sustainability once the mission is completed.
In the aftermath of the previously announced US withdrawal from Syria, likely
to be completed largely by the end of 2019, what fate will befall their Kurdish
allies, and how will they react with other actors to the ensuing power vacuum?
In the wake of the US forces’ withdrawal, Turkey has already made clear its
intent to take the northern city of Manbij, seen as a trouble-spot for Kurdish
separatist and terrorist movements inside Turkey. This could likely result in
NATO’s second largest military being occupied with fighting a counter-
insurgency directly on Europe’s and NATO’s southern boundary, tying up both
Turkish

resources and manpower away from
other NATO tasks. Highly significant long-term impacts can have a highly
destabilising local and regional effect if the utility of local actors is not
managed to a high degree, not just during the campaign, but crucially also
afterwards, resources and practicalities permitting.

The rise of
AI & Robotics within Remote Warfare

In addition to the increased use of train and equip programs, of SOF personnel, and in host nations taking the dominant role in ground close combat, RW as a concept also covers the very broad and often multi-dimensional use of AI software and robotics technology in military equipment. This is a further progression by policy makers seeking to limit both loss of human life whilst conducting conventional warfare in addition to, it is hoped, long-term cost saving by increasingly incorporating technology to assist in and, in certain circumstances, relieve human action. Whilst the incorporation of AI and robotics into militarised technology is not a recent phenomenon, the pace of recent development combined with the speed to market of these increasingly emerging technologies does certainly require pause for consideration. The militaries of the US, China, Russia, Iran and increasingly the UK are seeking to devote considerable sums to upgrade their current AI and robotics platforms whilst seeking additional large investments to develop the next generation of AI capability. As part of the 2018 Defence Modernisation Programme, the UK Ministry of Defence announced £160 million for the Defence Transformation Fund, investing in new concepts and technologies aimed at improving AI technologies30, which will potentially rise to £500 million later this year. Also in 2018 the Pentagon established the Joint Artificial Intelligence Centre (JAIC), set to coordinate all 600 AI projects within the US Department of Defense, with a budget of $US1.7 billion31. Then-US Deputy Secretary of Defence Shanahan stated that this restructuring was a departmental priority, emphasising the requirement for a swift conclusion32. This investment in new technology is replicated globally; total global spending on robotics (including unmanned aerial vehicles) will likely total US$115.7 billion in 2019, a 17.6% increase over 2018 spending. This figure is expected to reach US$210.3 billion by 202233, representing a substantial increase in both AI and robotics which will impact significantly the short-term future and evolving nature of RW as it becomes further integrated.

At the base scientific and
technology level, advances in machine autonomy derive primarily from research
efforts in three disciplines: artificial intelligence (AI), robotics, and
control theory. The US is the country that has demonstrated the most visible,
comprehensive and perhaps successful military research and development
(R&D) efforts on autonomy. China and the majority of the nine other largest
arms-producing countries have identified AI and robotics as important R&D
areas. Several of these countries are tentatively following in the US’
footsteps and looking to conduct R&D projects focused on autonomy, in particular
China, Russia, Iran and the UK. Civilian industry leads innovation in
autonomous technologies; as expected, Silicone Valley as the tech capital of
world pioneers some of the most advanced R&D, particularly Google. Other
influential players are major information technology companies such as Alphabet
(Google), Amazon and Baidu, and large automotive manufacturers including Toyota
that have moved into the self-driving car business. This civilian-developed
technology is being utilised increasingly for military purposes, the Pentagon
stating in 2018 that the military will acquire driverless vehicles before the
public34. In
addition, traditional arms producers are certainly involved in the development
of autonomous technologies, but the amount of resources that these companies
can allocate to R&D is far less than that mobilised by large commercial
entities in the civilian sector. However, the role of defence companies remains
crucial, because commercial autonomous technologies can rarely be adopted by
the military without modifications and companies in the civilian sector often
have little interest in pursuing military contracts.

In order to analyse the future
implications for increased and sustained use of AI and robotics, it will be
necessary to determine the current roles AI is utilised in and its recent
developments. Due to US AI programmes often having far larger resources made
available to them, this will be from a US perspective in addition to a UK
approach, in order to assist with determining where AI is heading within the
military. There are three classifications of AI technology; narrow, general and
super. Artificial Narrow Intelligence (ANI) is technology which has tightly
controlled parameters for operating and is within a specific context. This technology
is already in use for example Siri by Apple and RankBrain by Google. Artificial
General Intelligence (AGI) is where a system can operate at the same level as
that of a human. Most experts believe that this may be possible, but that it is
still a considerable way off, potentially as far as at least204035. Artificial Super Intelligence (ASI) is whereby platforms can supersede both human intelligence and control, believed to be at least a century away from achievement36.

Currently, no military in the
world is capable of developing existing platforms beyond ANI, and those already
in use are set restrictive operating parameters. As an example of how machine
learning can be implemented with ANI to save on human resources, particularly
when undertaking mundane tasks, the Pentagon’s Algorithmic Warfare
Cross-Functional Team, known as Project Maven, helps process surveillance data
in order to prioritise potential targets for future offensive action, capable
of doing so far quicker than even the most highly trained human analysts37. The system itself operates on a
highly controlled and narrow platform, dependent on human control. This is the
dominant direction in which western models of weaponised AI are moving. Such
ANI technology is also being incorporated by the UK defence industry. The
latest technology is currently being developed by the Defence Science and
Technology Laboratory (DSTL) and the Ministry of Defence to develop a platform,
known as SAPIENT, which can autonomously identify potential threats to soldiers
on the battlefield, and send that data to the troops remotely38. This has the potential to
reduce human error and relieve human resources required to monitor video footage.
Now funded exclusively by DSTL, SAPIENT, standing for Sensors for Asset
Protection using Integrated Electronic Network Technology, uses automation and
ANI to ensure that the military user is presented with the information which
they need at the time that they need it. This includes unusual or suspicious
activity including people near a checkpoint or changes in behaviour. SAPIENT
was trialled in 2018 in Canada as part of the Contested Urban Environment
experiment (CUE 18); bringing together the Five Eyes allied nations to put the
very latest ANI technology in the hands of soldiers on the ground. This
included a range of unmanned aerial and ground vehicles, whilst technologies
were also used to relay information to an operations centre for analysis by
scientists and military personnel, in addition to planes sending autonomously
refined information back to human operators below39. Combining all of these
technologies from across the different nations, it was possible to generate
information that could be fed to soldiers and military commanders –
significantly enhancing their situational awareness.

The UK’s AI
policy

A June 2018 Lord’s Select Committee
set out its recommendations regarding the UK’s AI policy. The emphasis of the
report was to develop an ethical approach to AI which would benefit UK and
global society, whilst simultaneously ensuring that the UK remains a market
leader in the field40. The UK
must seek to actively shape AI’s development and utilisation, or risk passively
acquiescing to its many likely consequences. By establishing an ethical AI
policy, the UK can lead by example in the international community. The report
recommends that the Government convene a global summit of governments, academia
and industry to establish international norms for the design, development,
regulation and deployment of artificial intelligence. Furthermore,
the UK contains internationally leading AI companies, in addition to a dynamic
academic and research culture, and so is in a position of strength to be among
the world leaders in AI’s development. Given that UK law is used as a legal
model for business the world over, this could lead to issues surrounding ethics
and privacy in AI receiving closer attention and broader international
agreement, hence further strengthening the UK’s position. Artificial
intelligence, handled carefully, could be a great opportunity for the UK
economy. However, the requirement to protect society from potential threats and
risks remains paramount; central to this is an ethical approach, guided by
shared principles.

What is the
state of autonomy in weapon systems?

Within the broader discussion of
RW, the rise of technology and autonomy was identified as a rising phenomenon
back in 201741; in
particular the need for addressing how autonomous weapons will change the
landscape of military engagement. The rest of this paper seeks to address this
concern.

In 2018 the Chief of the General
Staff, General Mark Carleton-Smith, described how warfare is
increasingly moving into non-traditional spaces, in areas such as cyber,
artificial intelligence and, crucially, autonomous technology42. Central to developing ANI
capability further, autonomous technology is at the heart of AI and robotics
development. Autonomy has many definitions and interpretations but is generally
understood to be the ability of a machine to perform an intended task without
human intervention, using interaction of its sensors and

computer programming with the
environment43. The
feasibility of autonomy depends on (a) the ability of software developers to
formulate an intended task in terms of a mathematical problem and a solution;
and (b) the possibility of mapping or modelling the operating environment in
advance. The use of machine learning in weapon systems is still experimental,
as it continues to pose fundamental problems regarding predictability. Autonomy
is already used to support various capabilities in weapon systems, including
mobility, targeting, intelligence, interoperability and health management.
Automated target recognition (ATR) systems, the technology that enables weapon
systems to acquire targets autonomously, has existed since the 1970s. ATR
systems still have limited perceptual and decision-making intelligence however.
Their performance rapidly deteriorates as operating environments become more
cluttered and weather conditions deteriorate, one of their current inherent
weaknesses. This ‘complexity of context’ adds a challenge. Does a local
national carrying an AK represent a target or just a farmer protecting himself?
The software for the algorithms are still yet to fully develop to mitigate
against this. This reinforces that the ability of humans to discern targets is
still significantly greater than that of electronic processing algorithms44. Existing weapon systems that can
acquire and engage targets autonomously are mostly defensive systems. These are
operated under human supervision and are intended to fire autonomously only in
situations where the time of engagement is deemed too short for humans to be
able to respond. These have seen great success in current operations where wide
area search analysis can be conducted by ATR systems much more effectively than
by human control45.

Loitering weapons are the only ‘offensive’ type of weapon system that is known to be capable of acquiring and engaging targets autonomously. The loitering time and geographical areas of deployment, as well as the category of targets they can attack, are determined in advance by humans, who retain overall command and control, thereby restricting the degree of autonomy in these platforms. First developed by Israeli firm IAI in 2005, the Harop can cruise within a six-hour timeframe and deliver a precision strike 15 kg warhead. This technology has since been developed and sold by other states, including the US, China, Iran, Turkey and other smaller Eurasian states including Ukraine, Belarus and Azerbaijan. The US field the SwitchBlade, a drone killer missile system which has been utilised in both Afghanistan and Syria by SOF personnel46. The proliferation of both drone technology and autonomous platforms has led directly to a sharp increase in non-state actors utilising loitering weapons, including their use by IS.

What are
the drivers of, and obstacles to, the development of autonomy in weapon
systems?

The three main drivers to the
continued development of autonomy in weapon systems are; strategic,
operational, and economic. The US recently cited autonomy as a cornerstone
of its strategic capability calculations, in addition to developing AI and
robotics, in a bid to modernise defence plans in arenas it believes crucial to
potential future military environments47. This seems to have triggered reactions from other major military
powers, notably China who are keen to maintain certain geopolitical advantages
over the US in the South China Sea. The second driver is operational. Military
planners believe that autonomy enables weapon systems to achieve greater speed,
accuracy, persistence, reach and coordination on the battlefield. In essence,
aiding lethality in order to maintain combat effectiveness. Finally, the
economic benefits are driving development also. Autonomy is believed to provide
opportunities for reducing the operating costs of various weapon systems and
weaponised UAV technology, specifically through a more efficient use of
manpower.

However, there are also numerous
challenges to developing autonomy in weapon systems which require careful
consideration. The first is technological. Autonomous systems need to be more
adaptive to operate safely and reliably in complex, dynamic and adversarial
environments; new validation and verification procedures must be developed for
systems that are adaptive or capable of learning. Secondly, institutional
resistance. Military personnel often lack trust in the safety and reliability
of autonomous systems; some military professionals see the development of
certain autonomous capabilities as a direct threat to their professional ethos
or incompatible with the operational paradigms that they are used to. This
structural obstacle is being mitigated by two factors; top-down education in
the military in the form of a high strategic imperative which developing AI,
robotics and weapon autonomy requires in order for western militaries to remain
competitive. This can be evidenced in both the 2018 US National Defense
Strategy48 and in the
2018 UK Modernising Defence Programme, where in

the latter the Secretary of State
for Defence states that the UK military is “pursuing modernisation in areas
like artificial intelligence, machine-learning, man-machine teaming and
automation to deliver the disruptive effects we need in this regard”49. Secondly, by incorporating the
latest technology with the military on rigorous testing and training exercises
it enables the end user to develop confidence in the equipment, thus removing
this institutional distrust of autonomy.

A significant obstacle is presented
by the legal ramification. International law includes a number of obligations
which restrict the use of autonomous targeting capabilities. It also requires
military command to maintain, in most circumstances, some form of human control
or oversight over the weapon system’s behaviour. This restricts the utility of
such platforms, though at this early stage whereby ANI is being utilised, this
will assist in trust being developed between the public and the technology.
Tying in with this are the normative considerations. There are increasing
pressures from civil society against the use of autonomy for targeting
decisions, which makes the development of autonomous weapon systems a
potentially politically sensitive issue for militaries and governments. Lastly,
there remain pertinent economic obstacles. There are limits to what costs can
be afforded by national armed forces, particularly among western states in
NATO, the majority of whom consistently fail to meet the mandated 2% of GDP
spending on defence. In addition, the defence acquisition systems in most
arms-producing countries remain ill-suited to the development of autonomy.

The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute’s report, Mapping the Development of Autonomy in Weapon Systems, highlighted some thought-provoking and practical recommendations for the continued development of autonomy in weapon systems50. A central theme in pioneering further autonomy is the notion of ‘autonomy in weapon systems’, rather than autonomous weapon systems. Shifting the focus away from ‘full’ autonomy and exploring instead how autonomy transforms human control, will likely lead to a more productive debate. Even further, allowing the scope of investigation to be opened beyond the issue of targeting and acquisition, to take into consideration the use of autonomy for collaborative operations and intelligence processing, will serve the military necessity of freeing up personnel to perform other tasks. Finally, there is a need to investigate the options for preventing the risk of weaponisation of civilian technologies by non-state actors. This is highlighted by the documented instances of IS, amongst other terrorist and criminal organisations, managing to achieve a tactical effect on the battlefield due to the ease and accessibility of civilian drone technology combined with the increased availability of autonomous platforms. This is an area in which NGOs could have great utility, assisting in shaping the ongoing debate surrounding AI and autonomy in RW further.

Future role
of UGVs in remote warfare: vision and developments

The UK’s current vision for the
future role of Unmanned Ground Vehicles (UGVs) originates from the British
Army’s “Strike Brigade” concept, as outlined in the Strategic Defence
Security Review 201551. This review proposed that British ground forces should be
capable of self- deployment and self-sustainment at long distances, potentially
global in scope. By 2025, the UK should be able to deploy “a war-fighting
division optimised for high intensity combat operations”; indeed, “the division
will draw on two armoured infantry brigades and two new Strike Brigades to
deliver a deployed division of three brigades.” Both Strike Brigades should be
able to operate simultaneously in different parts of the world, and by
incorporating the next generation autonomous technology currently being
trialled by the British Army, will remain combat effective post-Army 2020.

The ability for land forces of this
size to self-sustain at long range places an increased demand on logistics and
the resupply chain of the British Army, which has been shown to have been
overburdened in recent conflicts. This is likely to increase due to the
evolving nature of warfare and of the environments in which conflicts are
likely to occur, specifically densely populated urban areas. These environments
are likely to become more cluttered, congested and contested than ever before.
Therefore, a more agile and flexible logistics and resupply system, able to
conduct resupply in a more dynamic environment and over greater distances, is required
to meet the challenges of warfare from the mid-2020s and beyond.

This will represent something of a
shift in the UK’s vision for UGV technology, having previously been utilised
almost exclusively for Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) and Countering-Improvised
Explosive Devices (C-IED) for both the military and the police, as opposed to
being truly a force-multiplier developing the logistics and resupply chains.
EOD and C-IED UGVs have been used by the UK since 1972 with the Wheelbarrow Mk
8B remote- controlled EOD robots, which are to be replaced by the US
manufactured Harris T7 unmanned ground vehicle, due to enter service in 202052.

The MOD’s DSTL is developing this
vision further, currently leading a three-year research and development
programme entitled Autonomous Last Mile Resupply System (ALMRS)53. This research is being undertaken
to demonstrate system solutions which aim to reduce the logistical burden on
the Armed Forces, in addition to providing new operational capability and to
reduce operational casualties. Drawing on both commercial technology as well as
conceptual academic ideas – ranging from online delivery systems to unmanned
vehicles – more than 140 organisations from small and medium-sized enterprises,
to large military- industrial corporations, submitted entries.

The first phase of this programme
challenged industry and academia to design pioneering technology to deliver
vital supplies and support to soldiers on the front line, working with research
teams across the UK and internationally. This highlights the current direction
with which the British vision is orientated regarding UGVs, i.e., support-based
roles. Meanwhile, the second phase of the ALMRS programme started in July 2018
and is due to last for approximately twelve months. It included ‘Autonomous
Warrior’, the Army Warfighting Experiment 18 (AWE18), a 1 Armoured Infantry
Brigade battlegroup-level live fire exercise, which took place on Salisbury
Plain in November 2018. This saw each of the five remaining projects left in
the ALMRS programme demonstrate their autonomous capabilities in combined
exercises with the British Armed Forces, the end user. This provided DSTL with
user feedback, crucial to enable subsequent development; identifying how the
Army can exploit developments in robotics and autonomous systems technology
through capability integration.

Among the final five projects
short-listed for the second phase of ALMRS and AWE18 was a UGV multi-purpose
platform called TITAN, developed by British military technology company
QinetiQ, in partnership with MILREM Robotics, an Estonian military technology
company. Developing its Tracked Hybrid Modular Infantry System (THeMIS), the
QinetiQ-led programme impressed in the AWE18.

The THeMIS platform is designed to
provide support for dismounted troops by serving as a transport platform, a
remote weapon station, an Improvised Explosive Device (IED) detection and
disposal unit, and surveillance and targeting acquisition system designed to
enhance a battlefield commander’s situational awareness. THeMIS is an open
architecture platform, with subsequent models based around a specific purpose
or operational capability.

THeMIS Transport is designed to
manoeuvre equipment around the battlefield to lighten the burden of soldiers,
with a maximum payload weight of 750 kilograms. This would be adequate to
resupply a platoon’s worth of ammunition, water, rations and medical supplies
and to sustain it at 200% operating capacity – in essence, two resupplies in
one. In addition, when utilised in battery mode it is near-silent and can
travel for up to ninety minutes. When operating on the front-line, this proves
far more effective than a quad bike and trailer, which are presently in use
with the British Army to achieve the same effect. This is often overseen by the
Platoon Sergeant, the platoon’s Senior Non-Commissioned Officer and most
experienced soldier. Relieving this individual of such a burden would create an
additional force multiplier during land operations.

THeMIS can also be fitted to act as
a Remote Weapons System (RWS), with the ADDER version equipped with a .51
calibre Heavy Machine Gun (HMG), outfitted with both day and night optics.
Additional THeMIS models include the PROTECTOR RWS, which integrates Javelin
anti-tank missile capability. Meanwhile, more conventional THeMIS models
include GroundEye, an EOD UGV, and the ELIX-XL and KK-4 LE, which are
surveillance platforms that allow for the incorporation of remote drone
technology.

How UGVs
will influence the capabilities and tactics of small infantry units in a remote
warfare capability

In order to comprehend how UGVs will influence the capabilities and tactics of small infantry units, it is important to first understand the different types of infantry units. There are currently 33 regular British Army infantry battalions, roughly comprising 400-500 personnel each, with each one specialising in one of the following roles; light-role, mechanised or armoured warfare. The break-down of these are; 22 light-role battalions, six armoured battalions, and five mechanised battalions54. Light-role battalions primarily do not have access to vehicles, though this often changes on operations, and are trained to move and fight primarily on foot. Mechanised battalions have access to vehicle-born weapons platforms, either Jackal 2 or Foxhound, which provide a moderate troop transporting capacity. Armoured battalions have access to armoured personnel carriers, the British Warrior, heavily armed and armoured and capable of delivering the infantry dismounts inside into the heart of modern battle, ensuring that they arrive safely and have a strong fire-support base from which to launch their attack. It is worth noting that in both the mechanised and armoured roles, infantry battalions are relatively self-sufficient in the manner of both direct and indirect fire support, and of logistics and resupply, the two areas where UGVs have the most utility for an infantry battalion.

There is far greater potential for
the development of UGVs within a light-role infantry battalion, due to the very
fact that the majority of what organic fire support and resupply they have
available to them is man-portable and so can limit the effect that they wish to
achieve, unless reliant on external units for support, such as transport.
Therefore, this analysis will seek to determine how UGVs can influence the
capabilities and tactics of light-role infantry units. In analysing UGV
influence on light-role infantry battalions’ tactics, it is necessary to
determine what their roles on the battlefield are. Infantry battalions have two
overall roles in battle; offensive, and defensive. These can be further broken
down into more mission-specific roles, as required, though for the most part
they do fall into these two operational capabilities. By analysing each in
turn, it is possible to further elucidate how UGVs can influence
the capabilities and tactics of light-role infantry battalions.

In an offensive environment, UGV
capability can be utilised in two dominant roles. First will be the further
consideration of RWS and direct fire-support, and second in a support role
within the transport and resupply chain. Whilst there remains much room for
discussion surrounding the ethical implications and employment of RWS in
today’s conflicts, there is certainly a requirement for this capability, and it
comes down almost exclusively to manning. During a deliberate attack on a
fortified enemy position, an RWS platform, such as the THeMIS ADDER with a
Heavy Machine Gun (HMG), can provide the direct fire-support which would take
either a mechanised platform such as Jackal 2 or MASTIFF, or a 2 – 3-man HMG
crew, with accompanying quad bike and trailer. In a light-role configuration, clearly
the mechanised platform is inappropriate, leaving the only viable option for
such a battlefield effect requiring a 3-man team plus vehicle. This situation
is replicated with other light-role infantry weapon systems, including the 40mm
Grenade Machine Gun (GMG) and even the 81mm mortar. If UGV technology can be
utilised to fulfil these additional direct and indirect fire roles, then this
would significantly free up manpower. There is a further advantage of utilising
UGVs in this role. During an offensive operation, whenever the battle moves
forward, then so does the fire support. If this is coming from a static 3-man
fire support team, then the team will have to cease activity whilst dismantling
the weapon system, moving forwards to a new position, and setting it back up
again. This is not only time consuming but will leave large periods where there
is no fire support being provided and thus leaving the ground troops
vulnerable. Clearly, UGV platforms in this capacity, from a purely operational
perspective, would provide great utility and cut down considerably on manning
requirements, freeing up other ground troops to other parts of the battlefield.

The transport and resupply chain
can also be enhanced during offensive operations. During this phase of
operations, there are often many offensive actions coordinated simultaneously,
stretching the resupply chain to its limit. Again, this comes down to manning
and equipment; often there are simply too few personnel available, with limited
transport capacity, to facilitate a light-role infantry battalions’
requirements. This can result in a variety of scenarios ranging from time
wastage to sub-unit combat ineffectiveness. The THeMIS transport platform can
transport small numbers of personnel around the battlefield, at a
much-increased pace than by foot, serving several key objectives. This is ideal
for extracting casualties back to receive treatment, which in battle is
conducted by a four-man team per casualty, and then by a battlefield ambulance
operated by a minimum of two personnel. In an incident involving two casualties
requiring extraction ten personnel will be utilised. Removing personnel from
the battle is a labour-intensive, often during critical moments. A THeMIS
transport platform can be set remotely for pre-designated waypoints, can carry
at least two casualties, and at a much- increased speed of extraction than by
foot. Not only does this potentially result in a casualty receiving much
quicker treatment, it additionally frees up vital manpower during the battle.

In defensive operations, Infantry
battalions may be required to hold key terrain for a prolonged period of time.
This has a limiting effect on other capabilities which commanders may seek
concurrently. For instance, the ability to hold a piece of key terrain or
ground would require a surveillance capability in addition to the ability to
defend the ground through weapons considerations. In order to achieve this,
these tasks require manpower which cannot be used in other battlefield roles
whilst conducting defence, such as patrols conducted by sub-units on foot.
Therefore, UGV technology could be utilised as a surveillance asset at certain
pieces of key terrain, in addition to a RWS to guard that piece of terrain
against enemy attacks, with large-scale area denial achieved by emplacement of
interlocking weapon systems (THeMIS ADDER with mounted GMG and HMG with ranges
of 2 kilometres plus). The combination of a THeMIS ELIX-XL with an ADDER RWS
could provide this capability and thus reduce manpower at critical points on
the ground whilst conducting defensive operations, the ELIX- XL drone having
the capability to be autonomously launched and recovered by the UGV Drone Nest55. This ability also reduces the
need to launch standing patrols between the enemy’s defences and friendly
forces defences; a key Infantry task whilst operating in defence. The ELIX-XL
surveillance platform incorporates a real time video from two on-board cameras
and an on-board video recorder. In addition, it provides a fully autonomous
flight control system and an autonomous mission execution control system, with
the ability to select active waypoints and change the coordinates in flight.

Weather and optics dependent, this
battlefield asset would be able to achieve highly comparable results with a
small reconnaissance patrol. These patrols, encompassing eight individuals, are
often launched in sequence, comprising three separate patrols at a time. The
ELIX-XL has the ability to switch drone batteries, minimising the time between
flights. This surveillance capability would therefore be able to theoretically
conduct the same workload as a platoon of Infantry (30 men) whilst operating
standing patrols during a defensive phase of operations, further freeing up
manpower across the Infantry battalion to conduct other mission- specific
tasks.

The main
challenges with introducing UGVs in combat functions

If Britain is to maintain the
momentum which it has so far developed in pioneering the utility of UGVs, it
should take seriously the following challenges. Moreover, it should see each
one as a possibility for strengthening its global role in this field by seeking
to convert these challenges into opportunities for constant refinement. The
main challenges introducing UGVs further within the military can be broadly
based around four key areas; operational, institutional, financial and legal.
Whilst the challenges surrounding these range in difficulty to address, each
provide potential for doing so.

Whilst the proposed merits of utilising UGVs in combat functions by Infantry units have been discussed above, it is only through extensive operational trials of UGVs within ground close combat units that a more accurate and reliable assessment can be made regarding the fulfilment of this hopeful utility. Seeking to build on the success of the Royal Navy-led Unmanned Warrior exercise in 2016, the DTSL and British Army-led Army Warfighting Experiment, Armoured Warrior, sought to push the existing boundaries of technology and military capability in the land environment during the extensive month-long exercise with 1 Armoured Infantry Brigade in November 2018. This allowed time for the operationalising of the various capabilities of the UGV being trialled. Crucially, as previously discussed, this enabled the technology to be run by the desired end-user, the British Infantry, and provided critical operational information allowing for further integration of UGVs further into Army 2020 and beyond. Armoured Warrior assisted significantly in reducing the operational challenges faced by the military, which require timing and resources in order to mitigate complex operational compatibility with the end-user.It can often take time for policy to transition from the strategic space to the operational space, and institutional barriers can elongate this process further still. However, in his first major speech as the Chief of the General Staff, General Mark Carleton-Smith stated how “the nature of warfare is broadening beyond the traditional physical domains”56, adding that the 21st Century battlefield requires non-traditional skills in an effort to retain lethality. This clearly demonstrates how the nature of warfare and its constant evolution is being understood by the highest military levels, offsetting the potential for institutional delays in bringing the latest technology to the battlefield.

Moreover, General Carleton-Smith
stated the need to place “some big bets on those technologies that we judge
may offer exponential advantage because given the pace of the race, to fall
behind today is to cede an almost unquantifiable advantage from which it might
be impossible to recover.”57 The challenge therefore is the need to
implement this strategic outlook right down the military chain, to the
end-user; Infantry battalion commanders. Through continued integration of UGVs
into brigade-level and below training exercises, the exposure this will give to
these sub-unit commanders will significantly reduce the institutional gaps
between strategic doctrine and operational delivery.

UGV technology is expensive to
fund, though there are multiple avenues for research and development. On 16
September 2016 the Defence Secretary launched the Defence Innovation Initiative
(DII)58. This is
an £800 million fund designed to increase the pace of development of various
defence projects, aimed at the private sector in addition to academia and
research institutions. Autonomous Warrior and the UGV technology pioneered
through the programme is funded by the DII and seen as integral to the future
development of both British defence and industry. In addition, the 2018
Modernising Defence Programme set aside £160 million for the Defence
Transformation Fund to invest in new concepts and technology aimed at improving
autonomous capability59. This figure
is expected to rise to £500 million as part of the 2019 Spending Review.

The discussion on legality, ethics and meaningful human control with the reality of weapon systems development and weapon use needs further exploration and is almost certainly the weakest theoretical and subsequently operational component of further UGV integration into the military. To begin with, refocussing of the legality discussion to one of the development of ‘autonomy in weapon systems’ rather than autonomous weapons or LAWS as a general category, would enable the debate to progress rather than regress. In addition, by shifting the focus away from ‘full’ autonomy and exploring instead how autonomy transforms human control, greater engagement will be seen from various stakeholders likely to raise issues of legality regarding full autonomy. Furthermore, every effort should be made by the UK government to engage with the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) regarding the development of UGV technology and the legal implications of autonomy in weapon systems on the battlefield. By seeking to actively engage with the CCW on these matters, Britain can ensure that it maintains its global role further in the continued development of UGV and RWS technology, in their subsequent implementation and operationalisation.

Concluding
remarks

By seeking to understand further
the roles within the British military both AI and robotics currently have, in
addition to what drives these roles and what challenges them, it is possible to
gauge the continued evolution of RW with the emergence of such technologies.
Specifically, UGVs and RWS’ which were trialled extensively in 2018 by the
British Army. Based around research conducted on these recent trials, combined
with current up-to-date in-theatre applications of such technology, it is
assessed that the use of such equipment will expediate the rise of RW as the
preferred method of war by western policy makers in future low to medium level
intensity conflicts seeking to minimise the physical risks to military
personnel in addition to engaging in conflict more financially viable.

Acknowledgments

I am gratitude for advice,
comments, and discussions with Vivian Barlow, Kyle Orton, and Rob Spalton. I am
also grateful to those who contributed in some manner, but who must remain
unnamed. All mistakes remain exclusively the authors.