The Changing Face of Middle Eastern Terrorism

Terrorism is a cancer that has plagued the Middle East for
decades. It is now metastasizing into new and more deadly forms
that pose grave challenges to the United States and the West.
Middle Eastern terrorists are striking outside their home region,
boldly attacking high-profile targets, and killing in a more
indiscriminate manner. Last year the U.S., which had never suffered
a major terrorist attack on its soil by Middle Eastern terrorists,
was rocked by the bombing of the World Trade Center in New York
City, which killed six Americans and wounded over 1,000. This was
the highest casualty toll ever recorded for a single terrorist
incident. A subsequent bombing campaign against targets in New York
City was stopped in its tracks in June 1993 by the Federal Bureau
of Investigation.

The World Trade Center bombing embodies several ominous trends
in Middle Eastern terrorism. It epitomizes the drift toward
large-scale, indiscriminate violence. It also underscores the
degree to which radical Islamic extremists have supplanted radical
nationalists, such as the Palestine Liberation Organization, as the
chief Middle Eastern terrorist threat to the U.S. Moreover, radical
Islamic groups are inciting Sunni (orthodox) Muslims to support
revolutionary terrorism in Egypt and Algeria, just as radical Shia
Muslims were incited by the Iranian revolution. Finally, the
Sudanese connection of several of the bombers demonstrates how
Sudan has become the "new Lebanon" -- a host for a wide variety of
terrorist groups and an important bridge between Shia Iranian
radicals and the new wave of Sunni Arab radicals.

The United States cannot afford to ignore the wake-up calls
presented by the World Trade Center bombing and the foiled Iraqi-
sponsored assassination attempt against former President George
Bush during his April 1993 visit to Kuwait. The taboo against
international terrorist attacks inside the country and against
important national symbols has been broken. Washington must lead a
concerted international effort to make such terrorist attacks more
difficult, more costly to the perpetrators, and more risky for the
states that back them.

The Worldwide Spread of Middle Eastern terrorismThe U.S. is by no means the only country to feel the wrath
of Middle Eastern terrorists in recent months. In July, 117 people
were killed in a series of four bombings in nine days that swept
Argentina, Panama, and Britain. Most, if not all, of this carnage
is believed to be the handiwork of the world's most deadly
terrorist organization -- Hezbollah (Party of God), an
Iranian-sponsored and Syrian-backed terrorist group based in
Lebanon that perpetrated the October 1983 bombing of the U.S.
Marine barracks in Beirut. In August, radical Islamic terrorists
seeking to overthrow the Algerian government killed two Chinese and
five French citizens in Algeria, as part of a terrorist campaign
against foreigners that has claimed 60 lives since September
1993.

Yet, the U.S. and its citizens have been the world's foremost
targets of international terrorism in recent years. The FBI
estimates that 32 percent of terrorist attacks worldwide from 1982
to 1992 were targeted against Americans or American property. (FBI
Terrorist Research and Analytical Center, "Terrorism in the United
States: 1982-1992" (Washington D.C., 1993), p. 11.) Middle Eastern
terrorism remains the greatest terrorist threat to the United
States. Although some 20 percent of all international terrorist
incidents from 1982 to 1992 have been traced to Middle Eastern
quarrels, these incidents have accounted for about 35 percent of
terrorist-related fatalities. (Testimony of terrorism expert Brian
Jenkins before the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Subcommittee on
International Security, International Organizations and Human
Rights, March 12,1993.) Middle Eastern terrorist incidents
repeatedly have drawn the U.S. into international crises.
State-sponsored terrorist attacks against Americans have triggered
U.S. military retaliation against Iran, Iraq, and Libya.

Iran has been the foremost state sponsor of terrorism since the
1979 Iranian revolution. But terrorist attacks against Western
targets dropped off after the 1989 election of President Ali Akbar
Hashemi Rafsanjani, who was more interested in rebuilding Iran with
Western help than in exporting revolution. Now that Rafsanjani is
steadily losing ground to more radical leaders in a bitter internal
power struggle, there could be an escalation of Iranian-sponsored
terrorism. Indeed, this may already have started to happen with
Hezbollah's July bombing campaign.

Despite the growing danger, the Clinton Administration has
failed to mount a credible effort to stem the tide of terrorism.
Although it pays lip service to counterterrorism, the
Administration unwisely remains wedded to a State Department
reorganization plan that would downgrade the Office of
Counterterrorism and signal friends and foes that fighting
terrorism is not a high priority. To more fully protect American
citizens from the scourge of Middle Eastern terrorism, the Clinton
Administration should:

Make counterterrorism a top priority in American foreign
policy.

The Administration should shelve its plan to downgrade the
status of the State Department's Office of Counterterrorism and
make terrorism a top permanent agenda item at the annual G-7
summits.

Tackle international terrorism as a form of
low-intensity warfare.

Treating it as a purely criminal matter does not effectively
address the issue of state-supported terrorism.

Punish state sponsors of terrorism on as many fronts as
possible.

Raise the diplomatic, economic, political, and military costs of
state terrorism to the point where they exceed the expected
benefits.

Mobilize reluctant allies to maximize pressure on
terrorist states and groups.

Washington increasingly should apply public pressure on allied
governments, particularly in Europe, that appease terrorist
states.

Maintain the option to retaliate unilaterally for
terrorist attacks with decisive military force.

The use or threat of force is an essential deterrent to state-
supported terrorism.

Stand firmly behind states threatened by Middle Eastern
terrorism.

Algeria, Egypt, Israel, and Turkey require firm U.S. support and
close cooperation against international terrorism.

Upgrade counterterrorism intelligence.

The FBI, CIA, and other intelligence agencies need to expand
their sources of human intelligence on international terrorism and
consult closely with allies and other concerned states.

Reform immigration laws to improve internal
security.

Deportation proceedings should be streamlined, political asylum
requests should be screened more quickly and decisively and visas
should be denied to members of groups that use, support, or
advocate terrorism. Federal criminal penalties for visa and
passport forgeries should be toughened.

Work to restore order in anarchic areas where
international terrorist groups thrive.

The U.S. should back efforts by the governments of Lebanon and
Afghanistan to roll back the influence of Islamic radicals and
dismantle terrorist training camps.

The Upsurge in Radical Islamic Terrorism Outside the
Middle East

Middle Easterners are the prime suspects in a series of four
terrorist attacks against far-flung Western targets in July. On
July 18 a car bomb destroyed a Jewish community center in Buenos
Aires, killing 96 people and wounding more than 200. The next day a
bomb destroyed a commuter plane in Panama, killing 21, most of them
Jewish businessmen. A car bomb exploded outside the Israeli Embassy
in Lebanon on July 27, wounding 13 people. The next day another car
bomb demolished the London offices of a Jewish charity
organization.

A previously unknown group calling itself Ansarallah (Partisans
of God) claimed responsibility for the Buenos Aires and Panama
bombings. American intelligence specialists believe that the group
is a subsidiary of Hezbollah, the Lebanon-based radical Shiite
terrorist organization. Sheik Sobhi Toufeili, the leader of
Hezbollah's most militant faction, is suspected of being the leader
of the group. (Louise Lief, "Partisans of Terror," U.S. News and
World Report, August 8, 1994, p. 36.) There has been speculation
that the attacks were meant to derail the Arab-Israeli peace
negotiations, because the bombings straddled Jordanian King
Hussein's July trip to Washington to sign a non-belligerency accord
with Israel. A more likely explanation, however, is that this spate
of terrorism was a spillover of the intensifying fighting between
Israel and Hezbollah in southern Lebanon.

Hezbollah undoubtedly was smarting over Israel's capture of one
of its leaders, Mustafa Dirani, in Lebanon on May 21. The radical
Islamic terrorists also may have been angry over Israel's June 2
air strike that killed some 45 of its cadres in Lebanon. Israeli
and American intelligence officials are said to have little doubt
that Iran also was behind the July 18 Buenos Aires bombing.
(Testimony of Steven Emerson, before the House Foreign Affairs
Committee, Subcommittee on International Security, International
Organizations and Human Rights, August 1, 1994.) Up to 20 Iranian
Revolutionary Guards, who train and equip Hezbollah forces,
apparently were killed in the June 2 air strike. (Michael Parks,
"Bombings Underscore World's Vulnerability," The Los Angeles Times,
August 1, 1994, p. A3.) Iran was implicated in a similar terrorist
operation in Argentina that took the lives of 29 people in March
1992. Hezbollah claimed responsibility for that bombing, which
destroyed the Israeli Embassy in Buenos Aires, possibly retaliating
for an earlier Israeli attack that killed its military chief.
Electronic intelligence intercepts and an extensive forensic
investigation revealed that Iranian officials had helped acquire
the plastic explosives used in that 1992 bombing. (Steven Emerson,
"Diplomacy That Can Stop Terrorism," The Wall Street Journal, July
22, 1994, p. A10.) Iran also has been implicated in the July 18
Buenos Aires bombing by an Iranian defector questioned by Argentine
criminal investigators. (Gabriel Escobar, "Iranian Diplomats Said
to Be Suspects in Blast at Argentine Jewish Center," The Washington
Post, July 29, 1994, p. A27.)

The string of bombings in July greatly concerns U.S.
counterterrorism officials. They are worried about the ability of
Hezbollah terrorists to mount a sustained, coordinated, and well-
organized terrorist campaign against targets all over the globe.
(The car bomb used against the Israeli Embassy in London was
delivered by a woman, a fact that has led some experts to doubt
involvement of Hezbollah in that particular attack, because the
organization previously has condemned the use of women in terrorist
actions. Nevertheless, the possibility that a secular terrorist
group carried out that attack does not necessarily let Iran off the
hook, because Tehran has used secular groups such as the Popular
Front for the Liberation of Palestine - General Command.) The
attacks apparently were planned well in advance and utilized local
support networks for reconnaissance and preparation. (Michael
Parks, "Bombings Underscore World's Vulnerability," The Los Angeles
Times, August 1, 1994, p. A3.) The July 19 mid-air bombing of a
Panamanian commuter plane is especially troubling because it may be
the first suicide terrorist attack on an airliner. (British
counterterrorism officials secretly have warned British airlines to
be on guard for suicide bombers. Jamie Dettner, "Airlines Warned of
Suicide Bombers," The Washington Times, August 8, 1994, p.
A15.)

The Continuing Mystery of the World Trade Center
Bombing

The February 26, 1993, bombing of the World Trade Center was a
curious terrorist operation. On the one hand it was well-planned
and professional; the terrorists were able secretly to construct
and deploy a massive truck bomb. On the other hand, it was a
surprisingly amateurish operation. The four terrorists convicted of
the attack took unnecessary risks, such as giving a correct name
and address when renting a vehicle for delivering the bomb.

So far, no foreign state has been found responsible for the
World Trade Center attack. But there are disturbing shreds of
circumstantial evidence that point to possible Iranian or Iraqi
involvement. Sheik Omar Abdul Rahman, the radical Egyptian cleric
who inspired and possibly directed the bombers, long has been on
the Iranian payroll, according to Vincent Cannistraro, the former
head of CIA counterterrorism operations. (Bill Gertz, "Iran Backs
Terrorist Networks in U.S., Canada," The Washington Times, March
17, 1993, p. A7.) Sheik Omar regularly was given large sums of
money by Iran's intelligence service, using Iran's delegation to
the United Nations as a conduit. ("Washington Whispers," U.S. News
and World Report, May 31, 1993, p. 23.) U.S. government
investigators discovered that about $100,000 was transferred to the
suspects before the bombing from banks in foreign countries,
including Iran, but it is not known if this was payment for the
attack or for other activities such as propaganda or recruitment.
(Ralph Blumenthal, "$100,000 Is Linked to Trade Center Suspects,"
The New York Times, April 25, 1993, p. 41.)

Other signs point toward Iraq. For instance, the attack took
place during the second anniversary of the ground offensive against
Iraq in Operation Desert Storm. Terrorist attacks launched on
anniversaries historically have been a common means of seeking
vengeance in the Middle East. Another troubling circumstance is
that Ramzi Yousef, who apparently set the plot in motion, entered
the U.S. in 1992 on an Iraqi passport on a trip that began in Iraq.
Moreover, Abdul Yasin, an Iraqi suspect who cooperated with the FBI
and was released from jail, later flew back to Iraq and is now
believed to be living in Baghdad. Many New York law enforcement
officials reportedly believe that Iraq was involved, although they
can not prove it. (Laurie Mylroie, "World Trade Center Bombing --
The Case of Secret Cyanide," The Wall Street Journal, July 26,
1994, p. A16.)

Iraq also would seem to have more to gain from such a terrorist
operation than Iran. Saddam would have had a strong incentive to
punish the U.S. for its role in Desert Storm. Iraq also may have
wanted to provoke a confrontation between the U.S. and its
arch-rival Iran by casting suspicion on Tehran for the bombing.
This would strengthen Iraq's perceived value in the Middle East as
a bulwark against revolutionary Iran, an argument Iraqi diplomats
have made in attempts to persuade members of the United Nations
Security Council to lift the U.N.-mandated sanctions against Iraq.
(Iraq also had sponsored a similarly deceptive terrorist operation
in June 1982, when it ordered the Abu Nidal Organization, a
renegade Palestinian terrorist group, to shoot the Israeli
Ambassador to Britain, an act which provoked Israel to punish the
Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) by invading Lebanon to
destroy its base camps. The payoff for Iraq was that the Israelis
dealt Iraq's rival Syria a sharp military setback in the course of
the Lebanon War, and precluded Syria from joining its ally Iran in
its 1980-1988 war with Iraq.)

A final disquieting consideration was the nature of the World
Trade Center bomb itself. Not only was the bomb huge, loaded with
1,200 pounds of explosives, but it was customized with compressed
hydrogen to magnify the blast and sodium cyanide to create a
poisonous cloud after the explosion. (The sodium cyanide apparently
burned up completely instead of turning into a gas. See Mylroie,
op. cit., p. A16.) A bomb that big and sophisticated has never
before been detonated by a terrorist group that did not have state
sponsorship or long-standing experience in building explosive
devices.

The New Breedof Radical Islamic
Terrorists

The World Trade Center bombers are a new breed of terrorist.
Unlike the tightly disciplined cells that dominated terrorism in
the past, they functioned in a loosely organized ad hoc manner.
Three of the six charged with the bombing were dedicated followers
of Sheik Omar Abdul Rahman, the fiery spiritual leader of the
Islamic Group, a radical fundamentalist movement that has waged a
terrorist campaign to overthrow the Egyptian government.

At least three of the six bombers had fought in the war in
Afghanistan against Soviet and Afghan communists. The Sheik also
made at least three visits there since 1980 and two of his sons
reportedly fought there. Thousands of Muslims from roughly 40
countries flocked to Afghanistan following the 1979 Soviet
invasion. (Pakistani officials estimated that at least 2800 foreign
Muslims remained in Afghanistan in 1993. Edward Gargan, "Where Arab
Militants Train and Wait," The New York Times, August 11, 1993, p.
A8.) Radicalized veterans from the Afghan war -- called by some
journalists the "University of Jihad"(Holy War) -- have returned
home and have become the spearheads of radical Islamic movements in
Algeria, Azerbaijan, Bosnia, Egypt, Sudan, and many other places
around the world. (Tim Weiner, "Blowback From the Afghan
Battlefield," The New York Times Magazine, March 13, 1994, p. 53.)
Hundreds of these "Afghanis" are being trained by Iranian
Revolutionary Guards in Sudanese training camps.

Radical Islamic movements have mushroomed not only in the Muslim
world, but also among Muslim immigrants in the West. The World
Trade Center bombers were all either recent immigrants or illegal
aliens. Although they may have been drawn to America by economic
opportunities and political freedoms, these terrorists rejected
America's values and what they considered to be its degenerate
culture of materialism and secularism. Rejecting assimilation into
the resented society of their host country, they were susceptible
to incitement by Sheik Omar. What they did mirrors what happened in
several other terrorism cases, such as Hezbollah's 1985-1986
bombing campaign in France and its bombings in Buenos Aires in 1992
and 1994. In all three cases, small portions of local immigrant
communities provided support for the terrorist operations.

Ironically, many radical Islamic movements outlawed in their own
countries have found sanctuary in Western countries. So long as
they are in the West, they cannot be arrested by the police back
home. Like Sheik Omar, leaders of these radical movements lambaste
their host countries while taking advantage of their open political
systems to travel freely, organize politically, raise funds,
recruit new members, support underground opposition movements in
their home countries, and sometimes to direct terrorist activities.
Germany long has been a base for Islamic extremists. (German
intelligence officials estimate that about 700 Arab extremists live
there, along with over 42,000 other foreign extremists. Jim McGee,
"U.S. Pledges Global Pursuit in Bombing," The Washington Post,
March 13, 1993.) The U.S. has become a safe haven for Hezbollah,
the Islamic Group, Algerian fundamentalists, and Palestinian
fundamentalists. Israeli officials claim that Hamas (Islamic
Resistance Movement), the radical Palestinian Islamic group that is
using terrorism to undermine the nascent Palestinian-Israeli peace,
actually is directed from a headquarters in the United States.
(Ehud Yaari, "A Safe Haven for Hamas in America," The New York
Times, January 27, 1993.)

The support networks that these terrorist groups are forming
inside the U.S. for fundraising, recruitment, and propaganda
activities could become the nucleus for terrorist attacks on
American soil. These potential terrorists are dangerous because,
unlike hit teams dispatched from the Middle East, they are now
blending into Western societies where they have established
personal and communal roots. U.S. counterterrorism officials worry
that "sleeper cells" already established inside the U.S. could lie
dormant for many years until activated for specific terrorist
actions. (The FBI discovered a sleeper cell of the Abu Nidal
organization inside the U.S. in 1986 and arrested four Palestinian
members in April 1993 after one member of the group murdered his
daughter. See William Carley, "A Trail of Terror," The Wall Street
Journal, June 16, 1993, p. A1.)

Moreover, the decentralized structure of many of the radical
Islamic movements makes it difficult for host governments to
detect, defend against, or apprehend terrorists lurking within
these movements. The loosely linked informal webs of Islamic
militants, often organized in small groups around a charismatic
cleric, are harder to track and infiltrate than the more rigidly
organized Palestinian terrorist groups that have been a major
threat for decades. The Palestinian groups had a more
straightforward organization and often were corrupt and therefore
susceptible to bribery. They also were easier to penetrate because
infighting between rival organizations led them to provide
information on each other.

The new breed of radical Islamic terrorist is more intractable,
less likely to betray other terrorists, and more unpredictable. In
contrast to long-established Palestinian terrorist groups who had
more predictable targets and objectives, Islamic radicals have more
unclear motives and a wider variety of targets. They not only
attack Israel, secular governments in Muslim countries, and states
that support the secular regimes they oppose, they also target
reporters with whom they disagree, intellectuals they despise (such
as Salman Rushdie, the author of The Satanic Verses), and Western
cultural institutions such as the American University in
Beirut.

Most Palestinian terrorist groups refrained from assaulting
Americans or launching attacks on American soil. The reason: they
wanted to influence American public opinion to change U.S. foreign
policy and to drive a wedge between Israel and America. They made
the cold-blooded political calculation that killing Americans would
hurt, rather than help their political cause.

This self-imposed restraint often is not as strong among Islamic
militants. This new breed of terrorist is hostile not only to
American policies, but to many American values. For example, they
reject secular law and democracy and the separation of church and
state. They view American culture as a threat to Islamic piety and
revile what they perceive to be the degenerate secular and
materialist bias of American society. To Islamic radicals, the U.S.
is the villainous successor of the European colonial empires that
have sought to dominate the Middle East since the time of the
crusades. In their holy war against the West, terrorism is an
acceptable instrument for carrying out the will of God. Because
they are motivated by apocalyptic zeal, and not sober political
calculations, their choice of possible targets is much wider and
more indiscriminate than that of other terrorists. Since they are
less predictable, they can be more dangerous than Palestinian or
other Middle Eastern terrorists.

Islamic radicals also often have a different audience in mind
than Palestinian nationalists. Instead of using terrorism to
influence Western powers to change their policies, they often use
terrorism to punish Western powers and inspire other Muslims to
rise up against the West. This focus on the Muslim audience rather
than an American audience helps explain how the bombers of the
World Trade Center could rationalize their bloody actions. The
bombing was meant to demonstrate the power of Islamic radicals and
the vulnerability of the U.S., not to lead the U.S. to rethink its
Middle East policy.

The Persistent Threat of State-Sponsored
Terrorism

The Middle East is a hotbed of state-sponsored terrorism. Five
of the seven states that have been branded by the U.S. government
as sponsors of international terrorism-- Iran, Iraq, Libya, Sudan,
and Syria--are located in the region. (Cuba and North Korea are the
other two on the State Department's list of states that sponsor
terrorism.) Moreover, 22 of the 41 major international terrorist
groups described in the State Department's annual report on global
terrorism are based in the Middle East. (See U.S. Department of
State, Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1993, April 1994, Appendix B.)
The region not only is infested with more terrorist groups than any
other region, but these groups subscribe to a wider variety of
ideologies and causes, ranging from Marxism to secular Arab,
Armenian, Kurdish, and Palestinian nationalism to radical Islamic
fundamentalism. Each year the Middle East is the world's foremost
exporter of terrorism, with most of the spillover afflicting
Western Europe. (Between 1980 and 1989 over 400 terrorist actions
spilled over from the Middle East to other regions, with 87 percent
of these actions occurring in Western Europe. Paul Wilkinson,
"Terrorism, Iran and the Gulf Region," Jane's Intelligence Review,
May 1992, p. 222.)

Because of the heavy concentration of terrorist states and
terrorist groups, most new trends in terrorism develop in the
Middle East, then spread quickly to other regions. Radical
Palestinian groups such as the Marxist Popular Front for the
Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) pioneered the tactic of airline
hijackings after the 1967 Arab- Israeli war. When improved airport
security measures made hijacking more difficult, Palestinian groups
such as the 15 May organization were in the forefront of the trend
of airline bombings.

Most terrorist groups prior to 1970 were autonomous
organizations of indigenous dissidents that pursued their own
agendas without outside support. (Neil Livingston and Terrell
Arnold, eds., Fighting Back: Winning the War Against Terrorism
(Lexington, Mass: D.C. Heath, 1986) p. 12.) During the 1970s the
Soviet Union and its satellites greatly expanded their support for
terrorist groups. Moscow often used Middle Eastern client states
such as Iraq, Libya, Syria, and the former People's Democratic
Republic of South Yemen as intermediaries to mask Soviet arms,
training, intelligence, and logistical support for a wide variety
of terrorist groups.

The radical Arab states, which regularly used terrorism as a
tool of repression against internal opposition, sought their own
terrorist surrogates to wield as weapons against Israel, Western
powers, and other Middle Eastern states. Libya, Syria, and Iraq
courted Palestinian splinter groups or created their own
Palestinian puppet organizations to buttress their claims to Arab
leadership. These puppets also were used as proxy terrorists who,
if caught, would not bring down retaliation on the head of the
state sponsor.

The 1979 Iranian revolution brought Iran into the forefront of
international terrorism. Iran organized, trained, equipped, and
financed Shiite revolutionary movements such as Hezbollah in
Lebanon and Ad Dawa (The Call) in Iraq and the Gulf States. Under
Iranian supervision, Hezbollah unleashed a lethal terrorist
campaign in 1983 to drive the Western peacekeeping forces out of
Lebanon, bombing the U.S. Embassy in Beirut in April and the Marine
barracks in October. After Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani was elected
President in 1989, Iranian support for international terrorism was
toned down and the Western hostages held by Hezbollah in Lebanon
gradually were released by the end of 1991. But assassinations of
Iranian exile leaders continued at an alarming pace.
Government-sponsored terrorism also was supplemented by terrorism
financed by Iranian so-called charitable foundations, many of which
are controlled by radical clerics opposed to many of Rafsanjani's
policies. One of these, the Fifteenth of Khordad Foundation, has
put a $2 million bounty on the head of Salman Rushdie, condemned to
death as a blasphemer by Ayatollah Khomeini in 1989. (Rushdie's
publishers, translators, and bookstores that sell his books have
been targeted for terrorist attacks. In the last five years 113
people have died in violence related to the Rushdie affair in more
than 20 countries. See Bizhan Torabi, "The West, Iran Deadlocked
Over Rushdie," The Washington Times, February 16, 1994, p.
A13.)

President Rafsanjani's power steadily has been eroded by radical
rivals who have gained dominance over the Iranian parliament. He is
a lame duck, prohibited by the Iranian constitution from running
for re- election for a third term in 1996. As the struggle to
succeed him intensifies, there is a good chance that Iran's support
for terrorism will escalate. The West and the U.S. make convenient
targets for hard- liners in their fight to seize power. In fact,
Iran already has become more aggressive in supporting terrorism. In
addition to suspected Iranian involvement in the July bombings in
Buenos Aires and London, three Iranians await trial in Thailand for
an attempt to bomb the Israeli Embassy in Bangkok in March. In
April, the British government charged that it had clear evidence of
growing contacts between Irish Republican Army terrorists and
Iranian embassies in Europe. (In addition to providing money and
possibly arms to the I.R.A., London charged that Iran also was
building links to the Syria-based Japanese Red Army. Stewart Dalby,
"Iran Accused of Terrorist Links," Financial Times, April 29, 1994,
p. 1.) In May, more than 300 Iranian Revolutionary Guards arrived
in Bosnia to organize Muslim militias and terrorist groups,
according to U.S. intelligence sources. (Bill Gertz, "Iranians Move
into Bosnia to Terrorize Serbs," The Washington Times, June 2,
1994, p. A1.)

Toward a More Effective U.S. Counterterrorism
Policy

The U.S. has an historic opportunity to crack down on Middle
East terrorism. The end of the Cold War and collapse of the Soviet
Empire have deprived Middle Eastern terrorist states of superpower
backing. The embryonic peace agreement between Israel and the PLO
has reduced one source of terrorism, although Palestinian
rejectionists both within and outside the PLO continue their
terrorist war against Israel. Iraq's defeat in the Gulf War and
subsequent isolation has constrained state support from that
quarter, particularly as long as Baghdad moderates its policies in
an effort to wriggle out of U.N.- sponsored economic sanctions.
Iran and Libya are isolated and beset by substantial economic
problems caused in part by low oil prices. Sudan's radical Islamic
regime is drained by a long-running civil war and a grim economic
situation. Syria faces a precarious future as President Hafez
al-Assad, not in the best of health, plots his personal political
endgame.

All of these Middle Eastern regimes, which have exported so much
terrorism-related misery, are simultaneously vulnerable on a number
of different fronts. In the past they have been able to shrug off
Western demands to halt their support of terrorism. But now that
they have lost Soviet backing and have become increasingly
dependent on the West for economic support, that is no longer true.
The West now has more influence and leverage over these states.
Moreover, many of these regimes are threatened by internal
political opposition, or the prospect of such opposition in the
near future. The U.S. and other Western powers, therefore, gain
potential leverage by supporting or threatening to support
opposition groups hostile to terrorist regimes.

While the threat or actual use of force is the ultimate
deterrent to terrorism, experienced terrorist states and groups
often are successful in concealing their responsibility for
terrorist outrages to avoid military reprisals. To deter terrorism,
Washington must convince its allies and other concerned states to
increase the diplomatic, economic, military,and political costs of
state-supported terrorism. A unified Western campaign to curtail
Middle Eastern terrorism now has a greater chance for success than
ever before. Only the U.S. can forge and lead such a coalition. To
build an international consensus to combat terrorism and to follow
through and act on that consensus, the Clinton Administration
should:

Make counterterrorism a top priority in American foreign
policy.

The Clinton Administration must drop its short-sighted plan for
downgrading the State Department's Office of Counterterrorism. This
reorganization plan would fold that office into a new Bureau for
Narcotics, Terrorism and Crime and demote the Coordinator for
Counterterrorism from the current equivalent of an Assistant
Secretary of State to the level of a Deputy Assistant Secretary. L.
Paul Bremer, a former Ambassador-at-Large for Counterterrorism,
noting that the office would be "gutted," charged that: "The
Clinton Administration has neglected the terrorist threat, with our
public officials paying only lip service to the problem." (L. Paul
Bremer, "With Assad, Talk About Terrorism," The Wall Street
Journal, January 14, 1994, p. A10.)

Congress has temporarily blocked the Administration's plans.
Under the leadership of Representative Benjamin Gilman (R-NY), the
House voted on April 18, 1994, to retain an independent Office of
Counterterrorism. But the Administration has not given up on its
reorganization plan, which originated in the Bush Administration as
a cost-cutting measure.

Congress will again have to wrestle with the reorganization plan
after April 30, 1995, when the Gilman amendment expires. At that
time, Congress should consider insisting that the Administration
permanently shelve its plans to downgrade State's counterterrorism
office. This office instead must be given the bureaucratic clout to
champion tough anti-terrorism policies against other bureaus in the
State Department, or in other departments, that have little or no
interest in combating terrorism. Therefore, the Coordinator for
Counterterrorism, who is the U.S. government's senior full-time
counterterrorism official, must have direct access to the Secretary
of State, and not be relegated, as the Administration plans, to the
bottom of a cumbersome reporting chain. To secure the diplomatic
clout that is needed to impress U.S. allies and terrorist nations,
the Coordinator should be restored to the status of
ambassador-at-large, as was the case during the Reagan
Administration.

Washington should aggressively raise the profile of the
counterterrorism issue by injecting it into every multilateral
diplomatic forum and every high-level bilateral meeting with
officials from allied governments or terrorist regimes. The U.S.
should ensure that the issue of terrorism appears automatically on
the agenda at every G-7 summit. The Coordinator for
Counterterrorism should become a permanent fixture at the summits
as the prime mover in a multilateral working group on
counterterrorism.

Tackle international terrorism as a form of
low-intensity warfare.

Terrorism is the most ubiquitous kind of low-intensity conflict.
Yet, it is too often treated primarily as a law enforcement issue.
While bringing the rule of law to bear on terrorists is desirable,
it is not always possible, particularly when terrorists are being
protected by a state sponsor. In cases of state-supported
terrorism, which the CIA estimates comprise up to 80 percent of all
international terrorism, it is not realistic to rely solely on law
enforcement agencies to fight terrorists.

State-supported terrorism is in effect an act of war and should
be approached as a form of surrogate warfare. The U.S. should not
unnecessarily hobble itself in this war against terrorism by
treating state-sponsored foreign terrorists the same as it treats
domestic terrorist groups. Counterterrorist forces should not
require courtroom standards of evidence before they take action.
Adopting a narrow legalistic approach to fighting terrorism would
lead to American paralysis and terrorism would proliferate
unchecked.

The U.S. should make use of the full arsenal of its weapons
against terrorism by relaxing self-imposed restrictions on special
operations. For example, Executive Order No. 11905, signed in 1976,
was designed to prohibit assassinations of foreign leaders, but it
also has been interpreted as prohibiting commando assaults on
terrorist groups. This executive order should be refined to permit
such special operations, particularly against terrorist groups that
have killed Americans in the past, such as Hezbollah or the Abu
Nidal organization. Counterterrorist teams also should be deployed
to apprehend terrorists in anarchic areas such as Lebanon or
Afghanistan, and not just in international waters or airspace.

The U.S. should also make greater use of non-violent covert
actions, such as the dissemination of disinformation to create
dissension inside terrorist groups and psychological warfare to
aggravate the terrorists' sense of vulnerability and to encourage
distrust of their state sponsors. Agents of influence, wherever
they can be inserted, would help to disrupt terrorist operations
and turn terrorists against each other. Sabotage operations also
should be launched against the safehouses, logistics support
networks, and financial assets of terrorist groups.

Punish state sponsors of terrorism on as many fronts as
possible.

Middle Eastern states have relied heavily on state-sponsored
terrorism because it is a cost-effective tool to their foreign
policies. The U.S. should work with its allies and other concerned
states to raise the diplomatic, economic, political, and military
costs of supporting terrorism so high that it outweighs the
strategic benefits.

Diplomatic sanctions.

Countries victimized by terrorism in the past have broken
relations or reduced the size of the diplomatic mission of the
state sponsor. This helps limit the threat of terrorism, because
much of it is directed, supported, and financed by intelligence
personnel operating under diplomatic cover. But diplomatic
sanctions usually have been unilateral, ad hoc responses that have
had little effect on terrorist states. Washington should propose an
agreement among the G-7 and NATO allies that would require all of
them to expel large numbers of diplomats, if not break diplomatic
relations completely, with states that support terrorist attacks.
Moreover, diplomatic personnel of these states should be expelled
for each confirmed terrorist attack by a surrogate terrorist
group.

This measure would raise the public uproar over terrorism and
increase the costs of each attack. This may give pause to some
terrorist states, particularly those such as Iran and Sudan, that
want the West to bail them out of dire economic predicaments. At a
minimum, reducing the diplomatic presence of terrorist states will
make it harder for them to support terrorism out of their
embassies. For example, the expulsion of diplomats greatly
undermined Iraq's ability to export terrorism during the 1991 Gulf
War.

Regardless of whether it can gain G-7 support for such an
agreement, the U.S. should pressure its allies to pare down the
diplomatic presence of Iranian and Sudanese diplomats in their
countries. Diplomats from Iran and Sudan have been implicated in
the July bombing in Buenos Aires and in the 1993 bomb plots in New
York City. The Iranian diplomatic presence particularly should be
cut back in Germany and Venezuela, which are centers for Iran's
intelligence and terrorist networks.

Economic sanctions Washington should persuade its allies to participate in
developing a multilateral version of the State Department's list of
states that support terrorism. Once placed on the list, a terrorist
state should be denied economic assistance, arms sales, and
preferential trade privileges from all participating states.
Further, the allies would be committed to voting against financial
aid for that state in international financial institutions such as
the World Bank. If Western Europe and Japan presented a united
front in threatening to impose sanctions, it could have a sobering
effect on the five Middle Eastern terrorist states. All, with the
possible exception of Libya, will require Western or Japanese
economic assistance, loans or renegotiation of existing loans in
the near future. Iran already is staggering under the financial
burden of its $30 billion foreign debt. Iraq owes foreign creditors
more than $14 billion, Syria owes $16.5 billion, and Sudan's
foreign debt is in excess of $16 billion. Now that the Soviet Union
has dissolved, they have no place else to go. The U.S. should
convince its allies to take advantage of their financial leverage
and elevate counterterrorism to the forefront of economic aid and
loan renegotiation decisions.

Trade sanctions against terrorist states will be more difficult
to extract from the Western Europeans and Japanese since they see
Iran, Iraq, and Libya as potentially lucrative export markets and
important sources of oil supplies. France and other countries
already are impatient to lift the U.N.-sponsored economic sanctions
on Iraq. To block this, Washington should make Iraq a high-priority
test case for Western anti-terrorism cooperation. The U.S. should
stress Iraq's abortive plot to assassinate former President George
Bush during his visit to Kuwait in April 1993 (For more on Iraq's
assassination plot, see James A. Phillips, "Punish Saddam's
Terrorism With Military Action," Heritage Foundation Executive
Memorandum No. 358, June 11, 1993.) and Baghdad's continuing
terrorist attacks on the Kurds and on U.N. personnel in northern
Iraq. To test Baghdad's intentions, Washington should request the
extradition of Abdul Yasin, an Iraqi who participated in the plot
to bomb the World Trade Center, who returned to Iraq. (Yasin was
seen outside his father's house in Baghdad by an ABC News reporter
earlier this year. Mylroie, op. cit.) If Baghdad balks at observing
the terms of the extradition treaty that it signed with the U.S.,
then it clearly will be in violation of U.N. Security Council
Resolution Number 687 (April 1991), which called on Iraq to abandon
its support of terrorism. This violation could become a
justification for maintaining the U.N. sanctions on Iraq.

The Europeans have been more cooperative in imposing economic
sanctions on Libya for its refusal to extradite two suspects in the
1988 Pan Am flight 103 bombing over Lockerbie, Scotland. But these
U.N.-imposed sanctions have fallen short of an embargo on Libyan
oil. The U.S. should expand the sanctions to include Libya's oil
exports. Washington should work through the U.N. Security Council
to impose an oil export regime similar to the one imposed on Iraq:
oil revenues would be funneled into a U.N.-administered escrow
account that could be used to pay reparations to the families of
victims of Libyan terrorism. This could be a model to punish other
terrorist states that block international efforts to apprehend
terrorists.

Another terrorist state that is extremely vulnerable to
concerted international economic sanctions because of its crumbling
economy is Sudan. It already has sought to appease the West by
turning over the notorious Venezuelan-born terrorist Illich Ramirez
Sanchez, alias "Carlos the Jackal," to France on August 15. (Carlos
was a terrorist playboy who had outlived his usefulness to Syria,
which had harbored him until 1991. Carlos's leftist politics did
not endear him to Sudan's radical Islamic regime.)

Iran will be a more difficult case because of the reluctance of
America's allies, particularly Germany and Japan, to sacrifice
their short-term commercial interests in exporting to Iran. Now
that Iran is having difficulty repaying its debts, foreign
creditors may be more willing to consider trade sanctions against
Tehran. In any case, the U.S. could strengthen its case for
economic sanctions against Iran if President Clinton blocks the
proposed $750 million sale of up to 20 Boeing 737 jetliners to Iran
and prohibits U.S. oil companies, the largest purchasers of Iranian
oil, from buying Iran's oil exports. (American oil companies
currently are prohibited from importing Iranian oil into the U.S.
but are allowed to buy it for resale elsewhere. See James Phillips,
"Containing Iran," Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 980, March
9, 1994.)

The U.S. should drive up the prospective political costs of
state-sponsored terrorism. This can be done by supporting
opposition groups in countries that engage in international
terrorism. All Middle Eastern terrorist states have generated
domestic opposition. Washington should provide diplomatic,
economic, and even military support to the most viable opposition
groups in terrorist states. The Kurds in Iraq, the resistance
movements in southern Sudan, pro-Western exile groups and the
increasingly restless Azeris, Baluch, and Kurds in Iran, and Libyan
dissidents all merit increased American and Western support. The
Assad regime in Syria has brutally eliminated most domestic
opposition, but President Assad's persistent health problems and
the recent death of his son and heir apparent, Basil, has increased
uncertainty about the political durability of Syria's minority
Alawite regime. Although there may be no viable opposition inside
Syria in the short run, the U.S. should increase its diplomatic
support for an independent Lebanon free from Syrian domination.

Mobilize reluctant allies to maximize pressure on
terrorist states and groups.

Western Europe has borne the brunt of the spillover of Middle
Eastern terrorism, yet historically has been reluctant to take
determined action against it. Too often, European states have
sought to appease terrorist states and cut separate deals with
them, rather than take a unified stand against terrorism. Last
October, Germany hosted a visit by Iran's Minister of Intelligence
and Security, Ali Fallahiyan, the overseer of much of Iran's
terrorist operations. France appeased Iran last December by
expelling two suspected Iranian terrorists whose extradition had
been sought by Switzerland for the 1990 assassination of an Iranian
opposition leader in Geneva.

The U.S. must drive home to its allies that appeasement of
terrorism is a self-defeating policy that only encourages more
terrorism. France may be ripe for persuasion, now that an upsurge
in terrorist attacks against French citizens in Algeria led Paris
to crack down on exiled Algerian radicals in France in early
August. France now criticizes the U.S. and Germany for allowing
exiled Algerian radicals to continue to operate freely within their
borders. Washington should cooperate with France and closely
monitor the activities of Algerian radicals in the U.S., while
pressing Paris to support greater international cooperation in
isolating terrorist states, particularly Iran.

Germany and Japan, the two biggest exporters to Iran, are the
weak links in Western efforts to isolate Iran. Both states argue
that they aid Iranian "moderates" by maintaining good trade and
diplomatic relations with Iran. This rationale has grown
increasingly threadbare in view of Iran's continued support of
terrorism. Besides, Iran's "moderates" are losing ground to more
radical elements in Tehran who are likely to escalate terrorism
unless confronted with firm international pressures. The U.S.
should strongly warn Germany and Japan, first privately and
increasingly in public, that appeasement only encourages Iran and
other terrorist states to believe that terrorism is cost-free.
Worse, by conducting preferential trade relations with Iran and
granting it foreign aid and loans, Germany and Japan are
subsidizing Iran's terrorism.

Washington also should press its allies to establish a
high-level central office for coordinating counterterrorism
policies. These offices could act as liaisons with allied
counterterrorism agencies. Modeled on the U.S. Office of
Counterterrorism, these offices would help raise the profile of
counterterrorism as an international issue and make international
cooperation more effective and timely. Washington also should lobby
all its allies to adopt stiffer penalties for terrorism, including
longer jail terms and the seizure of the assets of terrorist groups
or states. The Europeans, in particular, should be pressed to stop
releasing terrorists before their sentences have been
completed.

Washington also should press Saudi Arabia to halt the flow of
financial aid to radical Islamic movements. Substantial sums of
money from private Saudi religious foundations and individuals have
bankrolled Sheik Abdul Rahman and other radical fundamentalists.
Riyadh placed restrictions on the flow of these funds outside the
country in 1993 but needs to more carefully control the activities
of the Islamic foundations to prevent them from meddling in the
internal affairs of other Muslim countries.

Maintain the option to retaliate unilaterally for
terrorist attacks with decisive military force.

The use or threat of use of military force is essential for
punishing and deterring state-sponsored terrorism. The military
response should be designed to raise the cost of terrorism above
the price a terrorist state is willing to pay. The U.S. should not
get bogged down in a tit-for-tat exchange by limiting its attacks
merely to terrorist training camps. Instead, it should strike
targets that the terrorist state highly values, such as its
internal security forces and secret police. For example, if Iran or
one of its surrogates, such as Hezbollah, lashes out at an American
target, the U.S. should not content itself with destroying a few
easily replaceable terrorist camps in Lebanon or Iran. Rather, the
U.S. should attack Iran's Revolutionary Guards which train
terrorists and provide internal security, as well as Iran's
Ministry of Intelligence and Security.

A sharp and decisive military reprisal not only can have a
deterrent effect on the terrorist state attacked, it also can have
a strong demonstration effect on other states that support
terrorism. For example, the April 1986 air strikes against Libya
had a significant impact on Syria as well as Libya. According to
the State Department, Libya reduced its involvement in
international terrorism from 19 incidents in 1986 to six in 1987,
while Syrian involvement fell from 34 in 1985 to six in 1986 and to
one in 1987.

Special operations are an important option for fighting
terrorists close to innocent civilians, in hostage rescue
operations, and in efforts to apprehend terrorist leaders. The
Pentagon must make an effort to maintain the strength and readiness
of the Special Operations Command which includes the elite "Delta
Force," Army Special Operations Forces, Navy Seals, Marine
Reconnaissance teams, and a special assault unit from the 101st Air
Assault Division. These forces should be periodically dispatched on
anti-terrorism training exercises in friendly Middle Eastern states
to give them familiarity with the region and experience with desert
warfare.

Stand firmly behind states threatened by Middle Eastern
terrorism.

Middle Eastern terrorists pose much more of a threat to secular
and moderate regimes in the Muslim world than to the West. Islamic
revolutionary movements have used terrorism to undermine and
demoralize ruling governments, polarize societies, and intimidate
secular opposition. Terrorists have become the shock troops of
Islamic revolutionary movements seeking the overthrow of the
governments of Egypt and Algeria. The U.S. has a major stake in
both countries. A radical Islamic revolution in either of them
would send shock waves throughout the Arab world.

Washington should steadfastly support the governments of Egypt
and Algeria in their efforts to reach an accommodation with
political opposition groups while firmly suppressing terrorists.
American diplomats should not meet publicly with radical Islamic
leaders because this could undermine the existing government. Nor
should Washington permit radical Islamic leaders, such as Tunisian
revolutionary Rashid el-Ghanoushi, to visit America unless they
reject terrorism. Nor should it pressure any government to enter
talks with any group that supports terrorism. Whenever possible the
U.S. should share its intelligence on terrorist groups and their
supporters with the governments battling revolutionary
terrorists.

In addition to supporting moderate Arab regimes threatened by
terrorism, the U.S. should cooperate closely with Turkey and Israel
in combating terrorism. Both countries are valuable sources of
intelligence on international terrorism and should be furnished
with American intelligence on terrorist activities in a timely
manner. The U.S. also should maintain relentless pressure on Syria
to halt its support for the Kurdish Workers Party and the Armenian
Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia, two terrorist groups
that have killed scores of Turks. Moreover, Washington should
strongly back Israel's demand that any Syrian-Israeli peace
agreement must include guarantees that Syria will cease its support
for Palestinian terrorists and help end Hezbollah's rein of terror
in Lebanon.

Upgrade counterterrorism intelligence.

Fighting terrorism effectively requires detailed and timely
intelligence about the operations of terrorist groups, their
support networks and their state sponsors. The FBI has made
effective use of intelligence information to pre-empt at least 78
terrorist plots since 1982. (Estimate provided by Kevin Giblin,
Senior Intelligence Officer for Counterterrorism, FBI, in an August
3, 1993 Forum of the U.S. Global Strategy Council entitled
"Terrorism: The Next Phase?") But the new breed of radical Islamic
terrorists, organized in informal amorphous groups, presents a new
challenge for intelligence-gathering. To maintain and expand its
intelligence network, the FBI should make a systematic effort to
recruit Arab-Americans and American Muslims.

The CIA needs to upgrade the volume and quality of its human
intelligence on terrorist groups and states. It must develop a more
extensive network of agents dedicated to counterterrorism
intelligence and infiltrate terrorist groups on a long-term basis.
The CIA should make every effort to recruit American and foreign
personnel with extensive knowledge of and experience in the
cultures and societies of their terrorist adversaries. The CIA's
Counterterrorist Center, created in 1986 by President Reagan after
the hijacking of TWA flight 847, should be expanded and devote more
resources to surveillance of the new breed of radical Islamic
terrorists. The National Security Agency and various defense
intelligence agencies should be directed to give counterterrorism a
higher priority in their intelligence- gathering efforts. The
Defense Department also should consider dedicating more of its
reconnaissance satellites to gathering information on possible
military targets related to terrorism, such as terrorist bases and
training camps in terrorist states and the Syrian- controlled areas
of Lebanon.

In addition, the U.S. should improve its efforts to reward
informants who provide useful information about terrorist
activities. The State Department's International Counterterrorism
reward program provides monetary awards of up to $2 million for
information on terrorist activities against Americans. It has led
to the defection of more than ten terrorist informants and the
prevention of nearly a dozen acts of terrorism against Americans.
This program should be publicized more widely in the Middle East. A
recent report that a valuable informant was treated shabbily by the
U.S. government is disconcerting because it could lead the trickle
of informants to dry up. (See Jill Smolowe, "A Hero's Unwelcome,"
Time, May 9, 1994, p. 50.) Informants who risk their lives to
provide important intelligence should be promptly rewarded for
their efforts.

Reform immigration laws to improve internal
security.

Sheik Abdul Rahman and two of the World Trade Center bombers
entered the country illegally. They eventually were caught but were
allowed to remain in the country pending subsequent legal
proceedings. This situation is intolerable. Congress should reform
the immigration laws to accelerate deportation proceedings and
simplify and consolidate the lengthy procedural hearings and appeal
system that permit illegal and undocumented aliens to evade
immigration controls. Applicants for political asylum should be
screened to weed out and immediately deport those without a
credible basis for asylum.

Tougher penalties should be imposed on the production or use of
fraudulent passports and visas. Nine of the original 35 indictable
counts in the 1993 New York bombing plots involved visa or passport
offenses. The recently passed crime bill contains a measure that
will double the maximum prison terms for such crimes from 5 to 10
years (and increase to 20 years if the documents were used to
facilitate terrorism) and boost fines from $2,000 to $250,000. A
companion measure sponsored by Representative Gilman, which
currently is under consideration by the House Judiciary Committee,
would allow the government to seize the assets of criminals
convicted of creating or using false documents for terrorism or
drug smuggling. If passed, this measure would make it harder for
terrorists to obtain false documents.

Finally, the U.S. government should automatically deny visas to
members of groups that advocate, support, or participate in
terrorism. Unfortunately, the 1990 Immigration and Naturalization
Act killed the provisions of the 1952 McCarran-Walter Immigration
and Nationality Act that allowed the U.S. government to restrict
the entry into the U.S. of members of a group deemed a threat to
U.S. security. The State Department now wrings its hands over
denying visas solely because of membership in a terrorist group.
This loophole, which puts the nation at risk, needs to be closed.
Congress should pass legislation that enables the U.S. government
to deny visas to foreigners because of membership in terrorist
groups rather than requiring proof of personal involvement in
terrorist acts, as is now the case.

Restore order in anarchic areas where international
terrorist groups thrive.

Many of the World Trade Center bombers were supporters of the
radical Afghan group Hezbi Islami (Party of Islam) led by Gulbuddin
Hekmatyar, a virulently anti-Western Islamic militant. Some
reportedly were trained in Hezbi Islami camps and fought in the
Afghan war. The U.S. should drop its short-sighted hands-off policy
in Afghanistan that has led it to remain neutral in the fighting
between Hekmatyar's Islamic zealots and the provisional government
of President Burhanuddin Rabbani. With a limited commitment of
financial aid, the U.S. can greatly strengthen the ability of the
moderate Afghan forces to defeat Hekmatyar's drive to transform
Afghanistan into a revolutionary Islamic state. By bolstering
Rabbani's regime, the U.S. could help end the anarchy that gives
terrorists a foothold in Afghanistan. (See James Phillips, "Winning
the Endgame in Afghanistan," Heritage Foundation Backgrounder
Update No. 181, May 18, 1992.)

In addition, Washington should press Pakistan and Saudi
Arabia to end their support of Hekmatyar.

The U.S. also should revive its efforts to build a stable and
independent Lebanon. Syria has sought to keep the Lebanese weak and
divided to assure its own dominance there. It has vetoed the
efforts of the Lebanese government to extend its control into
southern Lebanon and disarm Hezbollah. The U.S. should insist that
Syria abide by the terms of the 1989 Taif agreement, which require
Syria to withdraw its 40,000 troops to eastern Lebanon and permit
the Beirut government to extend its control over its own territory.
Only then will Lebanon cease to be a staging area for international
terrorism.

Conclusion

Middle Eastern terrorism has become more unpredictable and
audacious. Radical Islamic terrorists inspired by Iranian,
Algerian, and Egyptian revolutionary movements have overshadowed
Palestinian nationalist terrorists as a threat to the West. These
new terrorists often are supported by networks of radical Islamic
activists who live in Muslim communities in the West. Even more
worrisome is the training, arms, financial support, and guidance
which radical Islamic terrorists receive from such states as Iran
and Sudan.

International terrorism is not likely to be eradicated, but it
can be weakened considerably if increased diplomatic, economic,
political, and military pressure is brought to bear on the state
sponsors of terrorism. The U.S. must lead an international campaign
to raise the costs of terrorism. This will require a coordinated,
firm, and relentless international effort. This kind of cooperation
paid off in disarming Iraqi terrorism during the Gulf War, and it
can work again. The U.S. must convince its allies that they now are
involved, whether they want to be or not, in an international war
against terrorism.

To do so, the Clinton Administration must do more to stop
international terrorism. It must shelve its misguided plan to
downgrade the State Department's Office of Counterterrorism,
toughen its approach to terrorist states, and remain vigilantly on
guard against terrorist movements. Only then will its allies
sacrifice their short-term commercial interests to advance the
long-term security interests of the West and other targets of
Middle Eastern terrorists.

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