The Hobbesian Notion
of
Self-Preservation Concerning
Human Behavior during
an Insurgency

RAYMOND MILLEN

From Parameters, Winter 2006-07, pp. 4-13.

Scholars generally reference Thomas Hobbess Leviathan for theories in
international politics. Specifically, scholars subscribe to the concept of international
anarchy and the pursuit of survival to explain state behavior. Since Hobbes lived through
the English Civil War (1642-1651), his observations arguably could be a reflection of
insurgency warfare rather than interstate conflict.1 In
fact, the relevant passages in Leviathan to which this article refers connote a
concern with domestic conflict vice external threats. With this frame of reference, this
article will focus on the effect of insurgency on human behavior.

According to Hobbes,
fear of violent death and desirous peace are the compelling reasons man forms
a society.2 In making this a priori argument, Hobbes advances the idea
that individual self-preservation is the primary motivating factor behind the formation of
society and not, as Aristotle contends, because man by nature is a social animal. This
motivational factor also has tremendous implications for individuals suffering through an
insurgency. If the population is the centerpiece of any insurgency and counterinsurgency
struggle, as prominent scholars on insurgency contend, then Hobbess insights are
crucial to understanding how individuals caught up in an insurgency behave. This article
will address the following questions:

Why do subsequent generations accept the
covenant rather than returning to the state of nature?

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Why do some individuals reject the
covenant?

How do insurgencies take root?

What are the cascading effects when the
covenant is broken?

Why do citizens fail to assist the
government upon liberation from the insurgents?

The answers to these
questions will help explain why Hobbess notion of self-preservation compels the
general population to remain noncommittal to either side during an insurgency. Naturally,
human behavior is not the only variable in an insurgency, but it is an important variable;
and it is one often underappreciated by governments conducting a counterinsurgency.

The General
Acceptance of the Covenant
by Subsequent Generations

Hobbes argues that
the social contract promises to protect the individual from the threat of oppression,
death, and injury prevalent in the state of nature. Released from the need for constant
vigilance against threats, the individual can pursue private interests and happiness that
benefit him and society.3 Hobbess analytical framework for the formation of society is
logical, but it does not address why subsequent generations accept the covenant. Born into
an established society, the individual makes no conscious decision to renew the social
contract. Never having experienced political anarchy, he might even take security for
granted. As the individual matures to adulthood, one could say his behavior is derived
more from social norms than a conscious rational choice. Because security under a common
power is nonexclusive, everyone enjoys the collective good automatically whether cognizant
of its benefits or not. It could be argued that the individual becomes so accustomed to
the order brought by the common power that he does nothing when rebel activity begins,
expecting the government will resolve the matter.

When Hobbes speaks
of acceptance, he is alluding to the majority of the population. The essential tendency of
the citizenry is to accept some re-

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strictions on
liberty in exchange for the benefits. Nonetheless, Hobbes makes the case for a common
power precisely because not all citizens will accept the covenant, and these individuals
represent the greatest danger to society.

The Rejection
of the Covenant by the Few

Hobbes recognizes
that a small sector of society will never be satisfied under a sovereignty in which they
are not in charge. Hobbes contends that the pursuit of power is part of human nature, a
second aspect of self-interest: I put for a general inclination of all mankind, a
perpetual and restless desire of power after power, that ceaseth only in death.4 The
pursuit of power would seem incompatible with his central premise of self-preservation
since it often entails great risks and peril for the instigator.

Hobbes qualifies his
statement, however, by explaining that only a distinctive group of individuals embarks on
gaining power through sedition: Needy men, and hardy, not contented with their
present condition, as also all men that are ambitious of military command, are inclined to
continue the causes of war, and to stir up trouble and sedition; for there is no honour
military but by war, nor any such hope to mend an ill game as by causing a new
shuffle.5 These conspirators are more inclined to
gaining power and influence through armed conflict rather than working through the
political process. And in sedition, Hobbes stresses, men being always in
the precincts of battle, to hold together and use all advantages of force is a better
stratagem than any that can proceed from subtlety and wit.6
Although Hobbes does not state it, one can assume these rebels possess the organizational
skills and experience to conduct a protracted insurgency.

How
Insurgencies Take Root

If seditious
conspirators are always waiting in the wings, does citizen discontent with the government
present them with an opportunity to start an insurgency? Contrary to Hobbess
contention that citizens should remain satisfied with the benefits of established peace
under a common power, the historical record of insurrections and uprisings prior to
Hobbess time suggests

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a different
conclusion.7 Even in Hobbess civilized England,
government corruption, inequitable socioeconomic and political programs, as well as
perceived injustices were likely to lead to grievances, which conspirators could exploit.
Hobbess Leviathan actually neutralizes this threat by placing a higher
premium on order rather than on perceived injustices. Uprisings may erupt, but society
would expect the government to respond with exigent force to establish order once again.
Hobbes submits that the common power possesses the requisite force to keep all men
in awe, and that this power is justified: Covenants without the sword
are but words, and of no strength to secure a man at all.8
Having made a covenant with the government, the individual expects the government to
respond to lawlessness quickly and effectively.

For an insurgency to
take root, extraordinary circumstances must exist for the government to lose its authority
over some or all of its sovereign territory. Either the state is collapsing or has already
collapsed. Collapse could result from a defeat in a war, especially if the loss leads to
the fall of the government. In this case, the government is in such disarray that it lacks
the capability to respond to challenges to its authority. The fall of Saddam
Husseins regime is not the only illustration of an insurgency erupting as a result
of a war and regime change. Weimar Germany and post-Tsarist Russia were beset by
revolutions and civil wars following World War I. The American War Between the States
(1861-1865) escalated rapidly into a full-fledged civil war because the federal government
lacked sufficient forces to quell the rebellion. Equally unhelpful was the fact that many
professional officers betrayed the Union by joining the Confederacy.9 The
anti-colonial insurgencies in the Cold War era are less an illustration of grievances
against imperialism, albeit that was certainly a motivation; rather, they erupted because
the colonial powers were weakened by World War II and the insurgents saw an opportunity to
seize power. Lastly, Afghanistan suffered from two decades of various insurgencies
following the Soviet invasion in December 1979. Naturally, there are cases in which the
government totally alienates its base, such as occurred under Somoza in Nicaragua and
Batista in Cuba, but even here, the implosion of the government represented a loss of
authority. Hence, the cabal of conspirators cannot hope to initiate an insurgency until
the authority of the government has diminished over a portion of territory.

One wonders how a
small group of rebels can hope to turn the insurgency into a popular uprising. As Hobbes
points out, it cannot, but it can give the illusion of one, and this illusion has a
profound influence on the individuals perception of government impotence. From the
beginning, the cabal attempts to portray the insurgency as a mass movement by committing
as many attacks as possible. Men cannot distinguish, without study and great
understanding, between the action of many men and many actions of one multi-

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tude, says
Hobbes; and therefore [they] are disposed to take for the action of the people that
which is a multitude of actions done by a multitude of men, led perhaps by the persuasion
of one.10 This observation contains two
implications once insurgents have seized control of an area: first, the majority of the
citizenry will remain as spectators, trying to ascertain who is winning the conflict;
second, and conversely, the insurgents will use force against a portion of the population
as a means to control the whole. Under these circumstances, the insurgents initially
appear omnipresent and omnipotent, while the government seems to have disappeared.11

The Effect the
Breach of the Covenant has on Citizen Behavior

The
governments loss of authority, even if temporary, has profound effects on the
citizens psyche. Whether the citizen recognizes it or not, the loss of authority
represents a breach of the covenant. In making his argument for the establishment of the Leviathan,
Hobbes provides insights on human behavior in the state of nature. Logically, this
behavior would emerge again in the absence of the covenant. Paradoxically, this breach of
the covenant may become the insurgents most powerful weapon during the course of the
conflict, as this article will explore more fully.

It would appear by
their actions that insurgents have an intuitive understanding of human behavior in peril.
Thrusting the local population into the state of nature is effectively achieved by
eliminating the vestiges of government authority. As insurgents are not initially powerful
enough to seize power outright, they often resort to terrorist acts to eliminate local
authorities (political figures, policemen, teachers, and key bureaucrats). Terrorism
effectively intimidates the vast majority into passivity. Some extraordinary citizens will
emerge to resist the insurgents, but the insurgents, better organized and postured to
react, will neutralize them. It is important to note that terrorist acts, such as
assassination, murder, intimidation, and kidnappings, have the correlative effect of
controlling the local inhabitants. Within a short time, the individual discovers his life
and property are no longer safeguarded. He is placed in the state of nature, which,
according to Hobbes, is a state of war.12 But what is this state of nature,
exactly?

According to Hobbes,
in nature all men are equal. Any physical advantages possessed can be offset by intrigues
or alliances with others. Intellectual advantages are actually vain illusions. Experience
becomes the essential element, which all men acquire over time. Hobbes asserts that
conflict arises whenever men desire the same object (e.g., property) and cannot share it.
They become enemies, and in the pursuit of this objective they will endeavor to subdue or
kill the other. The matter is never settled, because other

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challengers will
continually vie for the object as well. Under these conditions, mans position is
never secure. He must continually remain vigilant to threats from every quarter.13

Hobbes believes that
the state of nature is a state of war because no common power exists to keep mans
tendency for conflict in check. Hobbes makes the point that battles and actual fighting do
not define war; rather, it is the environment of insecurity in which every man is
enemy to every man. Under these conditions, all normal activities of commerce,
social and cultural progress, and the pursuits of the arts and sciences cease. Stability
is replaced by continual fear and danger of violent death, and the life of man,
solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short.14 The system of law and order no longer has any meaning. Where
there is no common power, there is no law; where no law, no injustice. Force and fraud are
in war the two cardinal virtues. Justice and injustice are none of the faculties neither
of the body, nor mind.15 In short, traditional norms and institutions no longer have their
predictive influence on citizen behavior.

In accordance with
Hobbess state of nature, a remarkable dynamic takes place in insurgent-controlled
areas. The former citizen is isolated physically and psychologically with no hope of
finding succor from the central government; observing the fate of earlier government
loyalists and believing the insurgency to be so pervasive, he trusts no one, especially in
terms of organizing resistance. He may view the insurgents with hostility, but as long as
they control the area, he must comply. The individual and his family must also live. They
require sustenance and a livelihood. This overarching need makes him susceptible to anyone
who will ameliorate his predicament. Once all government bonds are broken, the insurgents
fill the vacuum quickly to administer the local population. That the insurgents forcibly
establish a covenant with the population becomes irrelevant. It is important to note that
once the insurgents have gained control of the population, the continued use of terrorism
ceases, because it might drive the population into desperate resistance rather than
resigned compliance.16

Government
Misperceptions of Citizen Loyalty

Governments
experiencing an insurgency often erroneously conclude that the citizens will resist the
insurgents because the latter are evil. Without taking the individuals drive for
self-preservation into consideration, the government also assumes its citizens have
choices regarding their loyalty. Whether the individual considers the insurgency evil or
not is immaterial, because he is not in a position to refuse the new common power. Hobbes
reasons that the individual is caught in a war in which nothing can be unjust. The
no-

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tions of right and
wrong, justice and injustice, have there no place.17 For
Hobbess citizen, a common power, even if harsh, is better than the state of nature.
The primary goal of self preservation compels individuals to accept the new conditions.

The real tragedy for
the individual is that the ensuing power struggle between insurgents and counterinsurgents
will involve him intimately. The counterinsurgency begins once the established government
takes countermeasures, usually and predominantly through military force. The individual is
once again caught in the middle, thrust into the state of war, and embroiled in the worst
of all situations.

After experiencing
generations of citizen allegiance to its rule, the government might make the mistake of
assuming loyal citizens will resist the insurgents or at least assist the
counterinsurgency. However, the citizens options are limited. As previously
mentioned, the citizen could assist the local government in combating the insurgents once
the threat is recognized. This action is not very effective against insurgents that have
formed an extensive political network over many months or even years. The historical
experience suggests that insurgents will have an ensconced network of cells throughout the
area before initiating hostilities. Since many of the insurgents are native to the area,
the insurgents enjoy immediate and accurate intelligence. In turn, insurgents will likely
learn of the citizens assistance to the government and target him or his family
quickly. One can assume that the insurgents will announce their acts of retribution to
serve as a warning for the rest. Obviously, fear is not the only incentive for
cooperation. Ideological indoctrination will create a loyal base of adherents, as Mao
patiently instructed, but for the rest, intimidation is critical.18

The citizen also can
flee his home and become a refugee. This seems an illogical option for anyone not directly
targeted or expelled by the insurgents, because the citizen thus thrusts himself into the
state of nature. As a refugee, the citizen becomes a direct burden to the state, which
must provide emergency necessities. Overburdened by the need to fight a counterinsurgency
and care for refugees, the state must establish temporary refugee camps administered with
insufficient resources. Unless the camp is very well administered, life there can resemble
the state of nature. Additionally, families

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are wont to abandon
their homes to looters and vandals. Hence, most are likely to remain in their familiar,
established community.

The citizen also can
join the government counterinsurgency forces in the hope of liberating his community
eventually. Only a minority can choose this option, however, in view of the age and
physical fitness requirements. The prospective citizen-soldier would naturally worry about
the fate of his family as well. The probability that the insurgents would punish the
family members of soldiers would likely prove a powerful disincentive against joining the
government military forces. The young males will thus either go into hiding, try to keep a
low profile, or become impressed into service with the insurgents. As a result, the
community will comprise women, children, and old men.

Another option is
that the citizen can join the insurgency. A few volunteers are likely to exercise this
option out of a sense of adventure, ideology, or grievances against the government. This
is a dangerous option, because the citizen has committed himself to the insurgency. If the
insurgency fails, his life may be forfeited. Even if the government offers amnesty, the
stigma of treachery would likely remain on him and his family. But given the
individuals overriding goal of self-preservation, he may provide some assistance to
the insurgents in the hope of placating them. He can expect no quarter from the insurgents
for aiding the government, but he can at least hope for leniency from the government
should it succeed. If impressed into service by the insurgents, he can at least use that
as an excuse if captured. Under these difficult conditions, the option of limited
assistance to the insurgency provides his best chance of survival.

The most likely
option for the majority is to remain neutral and wait to see which side wins the struggle.
Neither the insurgents nor the government authorities will be satisfied with this stance
and will attempt to draw the citizen to their side. Insurgency recruitment patterns
suggest a process of drawing the citizen into the conspiracy by requesting assistance
(e.g., providing aid to a wounded insurgent), demanding menial tasks (hiding munitions,
delivering explosives, or providing intelligence), and using force or threats to gain the
active support of the citizen. By drawing him into the conspiracy, the insurgents turn the
citizen into an outlaw, subject to punishment by the government. Counterinsurgency forces
sweeping through the area are likely to view all local citizens with suspicion, especially
if they are of fighting age. The counterinsurgency forces will expect citizen loyalty and
demand intelligence related to insurgent forces. Unless the counterinsurgency forces
establish a strong, permanent presence in the area (unlikely in view of limited military
resources), the citizens are likely to offer minimal assistance, knowing the insurgents
will return once the counterinsurgency forces move on. It does not take too many cases of
insurgent retribution against traitors to instill in the population the belief
that impartiality is the safest course for self-preservation.

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The
counterinsurgency government will likely experience extreme difficulties regaining the
allegiance of the individual once he has come under the power of the insurgency. The
government likely takes it for granted that the affected population will willingly
proclaim its loyalty and assist the government in destroying the insurgents. Generally,
this does not happen, and the breach of Hobbess covenant may provide a powerful
explanation for this passivity. If the governments primary responsibility of
security is so easily forfeited to a group of insurgents, why should it expect loyalty
from its citizens? The government has betrayed its citizens by failing to fulfill its
obligations under the covenant. It should be no surprise that once government forces
reestablish control of a former insurgent enclave, the individual might not display any
gratitude.

Another facet of the
interaction between the individual and the government concerns the use of force. The
government has the power to regulate the amount of force to retake an insurgent-controlled
area. When it uses force indiscriminately, resulting in high civilian casualties and
property damage, it represents a double betrayal. The first betrayal is not providing
adequate force to stop the insurgents from taking control. The second betrayal is not
valuing the life and property of the individual sufficiently to use minimum force when
retaking an insurgent enclave. The individual can reason that insurgents resort to
terrorist acts because they lack the means to fight the government forces conventionally.
When the government displays seemingly wanton disregard for the individuals safety,
what good is the covenant? It is no small wonder that insurgent recruitment increases in
the aftermath of major counterinsurgency operations that result in significant
noncombatant casualties and damage. It is only logical that some individuals will join the
insurgent cause because of this betrayal in the belief that the insurgents will create a
better society. Thus, rather than being greeted with cheers and gratitude, the government
forces may often experience sullen stares and even hostility among the liberated
population.

Often the government
compounds its earlier errors by not fully appreciating the role self-preservation plays
among the citizenry. If the provision of security is the central tenant of the covenant,
then anything short of that is a waste of government energy and resources. The concept of
winning hearts and minds without first providing security thus rings hollow. If the
struggle was simply over gaining the affections of the populace by providing
reconstruction projects, health services, humanitarian relief, and so forth, insurgencies
would quickly collapse. The citizens may appreciate the influx of aid, but it does not
solve their plight. Hobbes clearly states that the individual initially seeks membership
in the society for security. Once that need is met, then he is able to pursue other
interests and pleasures for a more complete and happier life. Hence,

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winning hearts and
minds begins with providing security, and once that need is met unequivocally, then the
other initiatives can begin.

In conclusion,
gaining control over the population is the centerpiece of both the insurgency and the
counterinsurgency. Hobbes suggests that the primary bond which holds society together is
the promise of security. Once this is broken, the individual is thrust into a state of
nature, which is mitigated only by the establishment of a common power. The struggle
between the insurgency and counterinsurgency thus revolves around which side can provide
uncontested security. A discussion on counterinsurgency strategy and tactics in attainment
of that end is beyond the scope of this article. However, by focusing on individuals
plight and motivation for self preservation, the government can produce a framework
strategy. It is remarkable that Hobbess behavioral variable has such profound
implications for an insurgency, and yet is so often ignored by governments when conducting
a counterinsurgency. In this sense, Hobbes remains relevant to the study and resolution of
modern insurgencies and not just as realist theory.

NOTES

1. A civil war is
the last stage of an insurgency, in which the insurgents are strong enough to challenge
government forces in conventional combat. In the initial stages of an insurgency, the
rebels will conduct guerrilla warfare because they are too weak for a direct
confrontation. For an insurgency to be characterized as a civil war, the rebels require
secured territory and a trained fighting force.

2. John H. Hallowell
and Jene M. Porter, Political Philosophy: The Search for Humanity and Order
(Ontario: Prentice Hall Canada, 1997), p. 312; The passions that incline men to
peace are fear of death, desire of such things as are necessary to commodious living, and
a hope by their industry to obtain them. Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, ed. Edwin
Curley (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1994), p. 78.

3. Hobbes, pp.
58-59.

4. Ibid., p. 58.

5. Ibid.

6. Ibid., p. 59.

7. Ibid., pp.
109-13.

8. Ibid., pp. 76,
106.

9. Two hundred
ninety-six graduates of the US Military Academy joined the Confederate forces; 800
remained loyal to the Union. Bugle Notes (West Point, N.Y.: US Military Academy,
1978), p. 260.

10. Hobbes, p. 61.

11. Roger Trinquier
embraced Hobbess insight regarding the control of the population: The sine
qua non of victory in modern warfare is the unconditional support of a
population. . . . If it [popular support] does not exist, it must be secured by every
possible means, the most effective of which is terrorism. Roger Trinquier, Modern
Warfare, trans. by Daniel Lee (New York: Praeger, 1964), p. 8.

12. Hallowell and
Porter, p. 311.

13. Hobbes seems to
make an overstatement regarding experience, since not all gain from experience equally.
Hobbes, pp. 74-75.

14. Ibid., p. 76.

15. Ibid., p. 78.

16. David Galula is
one of the few modern writers on insurgency who recognizes the motivation of
self-preservation among the population in counterinsurgency. David Galula, Counterinsurgency
Warfare: Theory and Practice (New York: Praeger, 1964), p. 60.

Lieutenant Colonel Raymond A.
Millen is the Political Military Cell Chief in Combined Forces Command-Afghanistan until
August 2007, where upon he will return to his assignment as the Director of European
Security Studies at the Strategic Studies Institute, in Carlisle, Pa. He previously served
in Kabul from July through November 2003 on the staff of the Office of Military
Cooperation-Afghanistan. He has published articles in several scholarly and professional
journals and is the author of Command Legacy (Brasseys, 2002). Lieutenant Colonel
Millen is a graduate of the US Military Academy and the US Army Command and General Staff
College, holds M.A. degrees in national security studies from Georgetown University and in
politics from Catholic University of America, and he has completed the coursework for his
Ph.D. in world politics at Catholic University of America.