Look to Solidarity, Not Sudetenland

What Poland's 1981 Solidarity movement can teach Ukraine—and what Reagan's response teaches us

Among the less helpful historical analogies that have been rolled out by neoconservative publications such as National Review, the New Republic, and the Washington Post since the onset of the Crimean Crisis are comparisons between what is happening now in Ukraine and what occurred three quarters of a century ago during the Munich Crisis. While anyone possessed of even a modicum of education understands that analogies to Munich serve more to obscure rather than clarify, it should hardly need stating that Vladimir Putin, unlike Hitler, is not an unhinged geopolitical revisionist who harbors a desire to re-make Europe to fit some demonic plan. And yet the tenor of the American media’s coverage of the man actually demands that it be said.

There are, thankfully, more apposite events than Munich which we can draw upon; namely the emergence of—and subsequent attempt to stifle—the Polish Solidarity movement in and around 1980-81. Most readers will recall that by the late 1970’s relations between the United States and the USSR were at their lowest point since the Cuban Crisis some twenty years prior. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 signaled to many Americans—none more so than the 1980 Republican nominee for President—that Soviet Russia viewed the Carter administration as weak and indecisive and was taking full advantage of the fact.

Three years before the emergence of the Solidarity movement in Poland, a novel by retired British general Sir John Hackett called The Third World War envisioned a catastrophic chain of events that began with a worker’s strike in Poland, which led to an invasion of Poland by Soviet troops. This, in turn, heightened the anxiety of NATO and Soviet planners, leading to nuclear war.

That scenario had a patina of plausibility at the time, but ended up—thankfully—being rather off the mark as far as predictions go, which begs the question: Why? There are two reasons: the first has to do with the character of the Polish insurgency; the second, with the reactions of Western leaders to the events in Poland.

The events marking the 18 months between the strikes at the Gdansk “Lenin” Shipyard from which the Solidarity movement emerged in August 1980, and the imposition of martial-law by General Wojciech Jaruzelski on December 12, 1981, are marked first and foremost by the character of the opposition movement. Adam Michnik—a leader of the dissident movement—observed at the time that the “maturity of the workers’ demands” manifested itself by demanding “a substantial change in the system of exercising power but stopped just before the limits marked by the Soviet military presence.”

As the movement’s popularity and political potency grew—by some estimates Solidarity had 10 million members or just shy of one-third of the entire Polish population, and the Soviets and their Polish Quislings grew anxious, Jaruzelski declared martial law; Solidarity’s leaders (Michnik among them) were arrested, and nighttime curfews and a ban on assemblies were introduced and enforced by tanks and armed vehicles.

What was not reported at the time, however, was that thanks to a Polish liaison to the Soviet military, Col. Rsyzard Kuklinski, the CIA and Reagan administration were well aware that Jaruzelski was planning to crack down on the dissident movement. Indeed, according to Prof. Patrick Vaughan of Jagiellonian University, Kuklinski, who subsequently defected to the United States, had smuggled out the details of a top-secret meeting on the forthcoming crackdown between Jaruzelski and his military chiefs held on September 15, 1981.

What was the Reagan administration’s response? Contrary to what one might expect in light of 30 years of neoconservative mythologizing, Reagan’s response was marked by an abundance of caution. As Jaruzelski, who assumed Reagan was aware of his plans due to Kuklinski’s defection, noted years later “we took the lack of reaction as a positive signal … do something but don’t upset the stability of Europe.” The Reagan administration responded with little more than some sharp rhetoric from Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger and the suspension of roughly $100 million in economic assistance.

We know how the story ended. By the force of its moral prestige, rather than through the force of arms, the leaders of Solidarity were able to achieve a breakthrough several years later as the Jaruzelski regime—shaken by the example of Gorbachev’s reforms and a wave of labor strikes in August 1988—entered into talks with the opposition. The agreement that resulted from the “Round Table” talks of early 1989 was, according to the historian Jerzy Jedlicki, “a masterpiece of political ethics.” Solidarity was legalized and elections resulting in the ousting of the Communist regime followed in short order.

I believe a recounting of these events is relevant for a couple reasons. First, the nonviolent character of the Solidarity movement throws the character of the Euro-Maidan into stark relief. Solidarity—because it adhered to the principals of nonviolence—occupies a far higher moral plane than that of the Maidan riots which came to be possessed by an almost pornographic violence.

Solidarity’s leaders—perhaps due to be beneficent influence of the Catholic Church—seemed to take to heart St. Paul’s injunction against “doing evil so that good may come.” The so-called heroes of the Euro-Maidan—judging by all evidence—seemed to evince no such compunction.

And finally, the Reagan administration wisely limited its response for fear of provoking a wider conflagration with the world’s other leading nuclear power. U.S. policy towards Eastern Europe in the 1980s points to the wisdom of American engagement that is both cautious and cognizant of the national interests of all concerned. If only we had such a policy in 2014.

James Carden served as an advisor to the U.S.-Russia Bilateral Presidential Commission at the State Department from 2011-2012.

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22 Responses to Look to Solidarity, Not Sudetenland

Well, not quite. The Russian part of Ukraine really is somewhat like Sudetenland. But contrary to politically correct history, the Sudetenland Germans and the historically overlooked Slovakians DID have every right to want to leave Czechoslovakia just as the Russian regions have every right to leave Ukraine. Czechoslovakia was supposed to be like Switzerland where the various ethnic areas have considerable autonomy. But just like Ukraine, the Czechs lorded it over the Germans and Slovakians. But the big difference is, unlike Hitler, Putin has no intention to take over the rest of Ukraine like Hitler did Czechoslovakia. He may want to have influence over Ukraine and keep it in the Russian sphere of influence, but he knows that a forced takeover is folly since the rest of Ukraine doesn’t wish it. He knows it would be nothing but trouble for Russia. He is not the complete megalomaniac Hitler was.

“The Reagan administration responded with little more than some sharp rhetoric from Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger and the suspension of roughly $100 million in economic assistance.” This is simply not true. The covert effort to keep Solidarity alive (conducted in concert, to an extent, with the Vatican) was instrumental in keeping ‘Solidarity’ alive. There’s a reason why Lech Walesa wrote when Reagan died, “When talking about Ronald Reagan, I have to be personal. We in Poland took him so personally. Why? Because we owe him our liberty.”

Not seeing what “advantage” RR got out of his threats or Brezhnev’s fear of him.

The Soviets had their Polish clients/puppets crack down on Solidarity and declare martial law, just as they were planning on doing all along. And the author kinda of elides the “several years” between the crackdown, and the eventual fall of the Polish communist government. And, in any event, the latter occurred as part of a general process that transpired throughout Eastern Europe and the USSR itself. A process which Solidarity had very little to do with it.

All of which calls this:

“The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 signaled to many Americans—none more so than the 1980 Republican nominee for President—that Soviet Russia viewed the Carter administration as weak and indecisive and was taking full advantage of the fact,”

into question. Carter was viewed as “weak and indecisive,” by the Soviet leadership, so that when the Soviet client regime in Afghanistan started to wobble, the Soviet leadership cracked down and applied overwhelming force. As opposed to when Reagan (who the Soviets were supposedly “terrified” of because he talked so tough) was President, so that when the Soviet client regime in Poland started to wobble, the Soviet leadership did…..exactly the same thing! IE cracked down and applied overwhelming force.

And, not only in the predictions, but in the event, “weak and indecisive” Carter reacted to the Afghan crises by actually starting to arm and train the resistance in Afghanistan, as well as lead a Western boycott of the Moscow Olympics, whereas tough guy Reagan responded to the Polish crises by letting one of his aids talk tough and rescinded a few credits (and, perhaps, as stephen knott mentions, gave Solidarity a little covert help).

Don’t get me wrong, I think Reagan acted correctly. But folks can’t have it both ways…Reagan can’t be the tough guy, indeed, the crazy tough guy, and at the same time be the wise, restrained, patient statesman.

And of course Ukrainians had the option of voting Yanukovich out of office, an option the Poles never had. And the Poles knew what would happen to them if they turned violent. Patience can indeed be a virtue.

That is because a plurality of Ukrainians belong to “non-canonical” Orthodox churches (which have the same theology and liturgy as any other Eastern Orthodox church, but are not in full communion with the rest of Orthodoxy because the Moscow Patriarchate opposes the idea of an independent Ukrainian church).

I don’t quite understand why these “non-canonical” Ukrainians don’t just seek out communion with some other see (Oriental Orthodoxy, perhaps, or Canterbury or Rome?) Certainly that’d be preferable to the ecclesial no-man’s-land they currently occupy.

I’m certain Putin will not just grab Crimea but will take the whole of Ukraine but NATO will do nothing about it. The real crunch will come in the Baltic. Having “got away with it” in Ukraine, Putin’s vanity will push him to want to re-conquer the whole of the former Soviet empire. The theree Baltic republics are NATO members. If the US allows him to grab all or any part of any one of them, NATO is discredited and since, post cold-war, the only purpose NATO serves is as part of the US dispositions for the defence of Israel, that country would be the big loser in NATO’s collapse. Ukraine is indeed NATO’s Munich but the Baltic republics will be NATO’s Poland of 1939.

Johann gives the correct correlation between the Sudetenland and the area of Crimea and E. Ukraine; but, the different responses from Hitler and Putin are actually due to the fact that there were no nuclear weapons available (the atomic bomb was first tested and used in the summer of 1945) in 1938. Putin does not want such a cataclysm to ever happen, and that is the reason for not moving against W. Ukraine.

The Russian presence in Crimea is not overwhelming. Russia houses its Black Sea Fleet in the Crimean port of Sevastopol, and has been for generations.

Boy, there is so much wrong with this column and some of the responses here I don’t know where to begin.

For one thing, the EuroMaidan protests were perfectly peaceful until Yanukovich sent in his thugs to beat up the protesters and until paid “titushki” … pro-Russian thugs bussed in from the east … provoked confrontations that ended in violence, which is exactly what the Russian FSB wanted them to do. Then the FSB sent in their snipers to try and sow panic among the demonstrators.

Secondly, Poland was an independent state in name only. For all intents and purposes, they were a province of the Soviet Union and everybody knew it. Ukraine is an independent state that has been invaded by Russia in direct violation of a treaty that they signed in 1994 in exchange for Ukraine giving up its nuclear weapons.

That same agreement obligated the US and NATO to come to Ukraine’s defense if it were ever invaded. Well, Ukraine has now been invaded. If the US does not now follow through on its commitment, what are countries around the world who also have treaties with the US going to think, particularly countries like Poland, Hungary and Latvia?

The idea that all of the Russian speakers in eastern and southern Ukraine really would prefer to be a part of Russia is absolutely absurd. Just because I speak english doesn’t mean that I want to be a citizen of Great Britain. The strong majority of the Russian-speakers in Ukraine see themselves as Ukrainians, not Russians. This makes them different from the Crimeans.

People are needlessly over-complicating this whole situation. This is all about Vladimir Putin and his massive ego. He was humiliated when his paid stooge Viktor Yanukovich was driven forced to flee Ukraine with his tail between his legs, and so now he is acting like a schoolyard bully trying to get his way. Bullies only understand and respect one thing, and that’s a punch in the nose.

I’m all for imposing the toughest economic and diplomatic sanctions possible against Russia. But the only thing that will ensure that Putin’s aggression doesn’t metastasize into eastern and southern Ukraine is NATO air power. I am hoping that there are military preparations going on behind the scenes that haven’t been made public yet, and I’m reasonably sure that there are.

But make no mistake, the only thing that will keep Putin in Crimea is the realization that if he makes a move into Ukraine proper he will get his butt kicked. NATO air power combined with Ukrainian ground forces and reservists would devastate any attempted Russian incursion, and Putin knows it. All that’s needed is the will to use it.

NATO outspends Russia 10-to-1 on defense each year. Russia’s equipment is largely outdated and its troops are primarily poorly-trained conscripts. And yet somehow we’re the ones who are being intimidated?

–The Euro Maidan protests were disorderly from the start. And also included illegal actions (blocking streets, taking over government buildings, destroying public property, refusing to disperse under lawful orders) from the start. Violence followed when the police, feebly and tentatively, attempted to enforce the law. And escalated, on the part of the protestors, to the point where the riot police were huddling behind their shields while being assaulted by wave after wave of protestors in military gear and helmets wielding clubs and brick-bat and Molotov cocktails. We’ve all seen the videos.

–Ukraine is not a member of NATO. NATO, per se, has no obligation to the Ukraine, whatsoever.

–The 1994 Budapest Memorandum (not “treaty”) is pretty clearly non binding, according to the State Department’s guidelines on non binding agreements. Thus there is no “treaty” or other obligation of any kind on the part of any the signatories, including not only the USA and the UK, but Russia as well.

–Russia also has in-place, binding treaty rights with regard to troops in the Crimea. To call Russia’s actions an invasion, given that background, is a bit of a stretch.

–It is wonderful how Ukrainian ethnic nationalists feel as if they have the ability to tell us on this board what their Russian speaking countrymen in Crimea, Southern and Eastern Ukraine think. Amazingly, despite endless polls, regional parliamentary votes, and now plebiscites to the contrary, such folks actually are totally in sync with the Western Ukrainian viewpoint. It turns out, contrary to all evidence, that there are no divisions whatsoever in the territory of the Ukraine. Really, one wonders how the awful rumor got started. Please.

–Leaving aside the rest of the juvenile non sense about Putin as schoolyard bully, and cutting to the chase, “We,” meaning the USA, have not been “intimidated.” We simply have no legal obligation to prevent Putin from doing what he is doing, and, given our dirty hands in the Euro Maidan coup against a constitutional, legal, democratically elected government, plus our dirty hands stemming from Iraq, Kosovo, and elsewhere, we are in no position morally to do much about it either. Finally, while we do have lots of air power, we do not, as a practical and realistic matter, want to risk World War III with ICBM-armed Russia just so that the Ukrainian coup makers can rule over the parts of the Ukraine given to it by Khrushchev back in the day for his own purposes and that, apparently, despite what you say, don’t want desire that result.

According to a 2006 survey by the Razumkov Centre in Ukraine, 62.5 percent of respondents considered themselves nonreligious or didn’t belong to a church. That almost certainly wasn’t the case in 1980s Poland.

The analogy to Poland is inapt. Ukraine is not a “captive nation” under Soviet domination. The choices available to the poles were necessarily different. That the “Euromaidan” protests did not suit the sensibilities of Philly lawyer and others is also irrelevant.

Their is some sense in looking to WWI–when nationalist sentiment (the EuroMaidan) and the miscalculations of experienced state leaders–led inexorably to war. Of course that comparison is hardly “on all fours”, but it illustrates that even experienced “statesman” (as some misguided conservatives impute to Putin) make mistakes. Each choice excludes other choices and myopia can lead one to fail to properly check ones own actions. Putin (with the misguided aid of some in the West including writers here) may well overreach as a result of failing to Tony Montana rule (“never get high on your own supply”). At the same time, checking nationalist sentiment among the Western Ukrainians is essential lest they think they can write a check on our bank account.

This conflict takes much more imagination than the neocons (and sadly apparently the paleocons as well) can muster. Even the realists–as evidenced by Gates and others–seem intellectually exhausted. It appears the default will be that we need to hope that Putin is as “cold, rational, serving national interest, blah blah blah” as Buchanan and Scott McConnell think. But even Putin may make a mistake if there is no check on him (which there isn’t domestically in Russia) and that mistake may be worse in its consequences for everyone.

So, sorry, it’s not as easy as “nonintervention, the Maidan are thugs” etc just as it’s not as simply as “a new Cold War” from the neocons.

“Russia also has in-place, binding treaty rights with regard to troops in the Crimea. To call Russia’s actions an invasion, given that background, is a bit of a stretch.

Russia is treaty-bound not to move troops off its leased base in Sevastopol and around Crimean territory.

“It is wonderful how Ukrainian ethnic nationalists feel as if they have the ability to tell us on this board what their Russian speaking countrymen in Crimea, Southern and Eastern Ukraine think. Amazingly, despite endless polls, regional parliamentary votes, and now plebiscites to the contrary, such folks actually are totally in sync with the Western Ukrainian viewpoint.

Polls show no large-scale desire to unite with Russia, outside Crimea. Polls have consistently shown that more Ukrainians supported the demonstrators than the government (about 40% vs. 22%). There are regional differences but the Western part of the country was much more pro-protesters than the East was pro-government, and the center – Kiev, where the protests mostly occurred – was solidly on the protesters’ vs. the government’s side. Polls have also shown consistently that the Opposition figures whom the protesters supported were much more popular than the ousted president.

The reality is that it was a popular protest against a leader who after his legitimate election illegitimately usurped total power over the state, provoking the people by his misrule. And Russia, taking advantage of the chaos and Ukraine’s weakness, has grabbed a chunk of territory.

“That the “Euromaidan” protests did not suit the sensibilities of Philly lawyer and others is also irrelevant.”

Well, the views of Americans about the perpetrators of a coup SHOULD be relevant to our decisionmakers in DC. One might also think that the making of a coup itself against a legal, constitutional, and democratically elected government should have some bearing in Washington, regardless of my “sensibilities.” The question is what should the USA do about the crises. And, the answer should take into account the entirely illegitimate nature of the junta currently ruling in Kiev. I, for one, don’t think the USA should commit itself to ensuring that that junta has complete control over all Ukrainian territory. YMMV.

On the broader issue…so, in your view, the paleo cons, the neo cons, and the realists all have it wrong, I wonder then, what your proposed solution/course of action is.

AP:

I am not going to quibble with you about particular polls. No doubt, you cherry picked the one most favorable to your POV. The point is that there is a great regional divide in the country, despite the efforts of Ukrainian nationalists and their supporters to claim otherwise. And that, as I stated, is borne out by the totality of the polls, votes in regional parliaments, and now plebicites. As well as, I might add, the 2010 election that put Yanukovych in power in the first place, and most, if not all, previous and subsequent Ukrainian elections.

Nor about treaty provisions…as 25,000 Russian troops are allowed in Crimea under the terms of the treaty. This makes claims of an “invasion” suspect. The claim should more properly be that the troops are doing things they are not supposed to be doing. Much less inflammatory, and much more complicated too.

Philly Lawyer
There’s little evidence to support the claim of a coup. Yanukovich was subject to arrest both for corruption and killings of civilians. An American president would have been subject to removal from office for such actions. Instead yanukovich fled. The speaker of parliament was appointed in his place an he constituted a new government with the approval of parliament. Winning an election does not immunize a politician from the law. The claim of a coup is simply Russian spin.

As for a response, Obama should have moved military assets into Poland and Hungary in conjunction with those nations moving their military to high alert, and the Navy into the Black Sea in consultation with the Turks as well as sent military advisors to Kiev in addition to a concerted diplomatic effort in order to build leverage to permit a quickly negotiated solution with the western Ukrainians, Party of a regions, Russia, EU and NATO.

You can’t negotiate without leverage (which writers and commenters here don’t seem to understand.) Instead, Putin now believes his aggressive action worked without consequence and may well pursue further aggressive actions.

Perhaps not but the difference is we are now relying on Putin making all the right decisions lest he make a mistake that puts us in a much more difficult situation. You may be sanguine about relying completely on Putins judgment. I’m not as it may well lead us into a more severe crisis later if/when he errs and overreaches on a larger scale.

What does solidarity have to do with the Russians taking over the Crimea? I do agree with the fact that escalation and war is not the answer now. The issue as I see it is quite simple and less complex then everyone wants to make it. A sovereign nation’s territory was invaded. Semi-autonomous means just that, key word being semi. They are a part of the Ukraine as much as any other part. For the sake of argument, how would we feel if a stronger Mexico invaded, promoted elections, and then annexed parts of the U.S. This example is not intended to do anything else but give others an example they could better comprehend. Putin decided to act now because the country was in turmoil and his puppet was no longer in control. Anytime you have a change of authority, as what happened in Ukraine so abruptly, it limits a countries ability to respond. Its for this same reason president elects receive the same briefings as the out going president to provide continuity and prevent any gaps in national security during the transition. Putin grabbed the Crimea for one reason and one reason only, the Black Sea Fleet. It wasn’t for any ideological reasons, it was simply to place Russia in a better position militarily. The Black Sea Fleet is stationed in the Crimea, the only warm water ports Russia has that are capable of being home to the fleet. With Ukraine looking to go the way of the EU, Putin decided to invade and annex it while they are weak and divided. Then you don’t have to worry about Ukraine becoming so pro western they no longer allow Russia to use the ports the Black Sea Fleet calls home. Since Russia has annexed the Crimea, it will never be allowed to return to the Ukraine unless there is a complete change of heart by the Russians. So, lets rehash shall we. A sovereign nation is invaded while it is weak during political upheaval. Then elections are held within a few weeks on whether or not to become autonomous, promoted by the same invading country. Within the week the nation of Ukraine finds a part of its nation being annexed by Russia. What would be our response if it were us in their shoes? Let’s be realistic about this shall we. Its not as simple as sanctions and cutting Russia off. So long as Russia remains in control of the Crimea it sets precedent which more then likely our children or grand children will pay the consequence for. To what extent and for good or bad can only be seen in the future. While I doubt Putin is the next Hitler and Russia the next Germany, they both used division and slight of hand to annex territory from another nation with veiled threats of war. They were both able to do this know that the rest of the world were neither united enough or willing enough to stop them. To not even remotely consider, regardless of the possibility, what Russia’s next step might be would then place you even more inline with the Munich crisis. Burying your head in the sand and wishing all were right with the world won’t make everything better. Sanctions would of had a better impact on pre-war Germany then any current sanctions might have on Russia. This is the big picture, not whether or not someone is right in comparing the current crisis to the Munich crisis.