From indoctrination's foul rope
Suspend all reason, all hope
Until with swollen tongue
Morality herself is hung.

IntroductionEducation in Pakistan, from schools to universities, is being fundamentally redefined.
This development is expected to have profound implications for the future of the
country's society and politics. Most changes are traceable to factors related to
the stability of the present government, but there are also others which cannot be
analysed as a mere response to immediate threats. A new concept of education now
prevails, the full impact of which will probably be felt by the turn of the century,
when the present generation of school children attains maturity.

Having pledged to divorce education from liberal and secular ideals, Pakistani rulers
view education as an important means of creating an Islamised society and as an instrument
for forging a new national identity based on the 'Ideology of Pakistan'. Important
steps have already been taken in this direction: enforcement of chadar in
educational institutions; organisation of congregational zuhr (afternoon)
prayers during school hours; compulsory teaching of Arabic as a second language from
sixth class onwards; introduction of nazara Qur'an (reading of Qur'an) as
a matriculation requirement; alteration of the definition of literacy to include
religious knowledge; elevation of maktab schools to the status of regular
schools and the recognition of maktab certificates as being equivalent to
master's degrees; creation of an Islamic university in Islamabad; introduction of
religious knowledge as a criterion for selecting teachers of all categories and all
levels; and the revision of conventional subjects to emphasise Islamic values.

It is not the intent of this chapter to analyse in its totality the restructuring
of education under the present martial law regime. We focus, instead, on a relatively
narrow area - the revised history of Pakistan as currently taught to college students
at the intermediate and degree levels. To this end, all officially prescribed Pakistan
studies textbooks have, been examined, together with books recommended at different
institutions. In addition, material has also been included from a number of other
books dealing with the history of Pakistan which were written after 1977 and which
have discernible official approval. We have discovered that, apart from relatively
minor variations in emphasis and style, all present-day textbooks are essentially
identical in content. Thus this chapter accurately represents the currently taught
version of Pakistani history.

The task of rewriting history books started in earnest in 1981, when General Zia
ul Haq declared compulsory the teaching of Pakistan studies to all degree students,
including those at engineering and medical colleges. Shortly thereafter, the University
Grants Commission issued a directive to prospective textbook authors specifying that
the objective of the new course is to 'induce pride for the nation's past, enthusiasm
for the present, and unshakeable faith in the stability and longevity of Pakistan'
[1]. To eliminate possible ambiguities of approach, authors were given the following
directives:

To demonstrate that the basis of Pakistan is not to be founded in racial, linguistic,
or geographical factors, but, rather, in the shared experience of a common religion.
To get students to know and appreciate the Ideology of Pakistan, and to popularize
it with slogans. To guide students towards the ultimate goal of Pakistan - the creation
of a completely Islamised State. [2]

In fulfillment of this directive, modern texts of Pakistani history are centred
around the following themes:

1. The 'Ideology of Pakistan', both as a historical force which motivated the
movement for Pakistan as well as its raison d'etre2. The depiction of Jinnah as a man of orthodox religious views who sought the
creation of a theocratic state
3. A move to establish the ulama as genuine heroes of the Pakistan Movement
4. An emphasis on ritualistic Islam, together with a rejection of liberal interpretations
of the religion and generation of communal antagonism

In the remainder of this chapter, each of the above has been examined in turn.

Genesis of the 'Ideology of Pakistan'The 'Ideology of Pakistan' occupies a position of central importance in all post-1977
Pakistani history textbooks. This ubiquitous phrase permeates all discussion, serves
as the reference point for all debate, and makes its appearance at the very outset
in all textbooks: 'As citizens of an, ideological state÷ it is necessary to first
know the basis upon which Pakistan was founded, the ideology of Pakistan.' [3] A
virtually identical beginning is found in another book: 'Pakistan is an ideological
state÷ the Ideology of Pakistan was the inspiration and the basis of the Movement
for Pakistan.' [4] General Zia ul Haq considers the 'Ideology of Pakistan' to be
of crucial importance. In one of his speeches he stressed that 'the armed forces
bear the sacred responsibility for safeguarding Pakistan's ideological frontiers'.
[5]

The 'Ideology of Pakistan' is defined in a number of ways. For example, one source
states that 'the Ideology of Pakistan is Islam'.[6] In another textbook, the 'Ideology
of Pakistan' is more explicitly defined as:

. . . that guiding principle which has been accepted by the Muslims of the majority
regions of the South Asian subcontinent and which allows them to lead their lives
individually and collectively, according to the principles of Islam. [7]

The above definitions do not limit the 'Ideology of Pakistan' to the boundaries
of Pakistan. All Muslim majority areas of the subcontinent, including Bangladesh,
are covered. Moreover, the manner in which Muslims ought to lead their collective
lives in the modern world is assumed to be well defined and beyond controversy. The
underlying belief is that there exists a unique definition of an Islamic state.

In stark contrast to modern textbooks, no textbook written prior to 1977 contains
mention of the 'Ideology of Pakistan'. Indeed, this phrase was not a part of the
political parlance then. Although its precise genealogy is hard to ascertain, ex-Chief
Justice Mohammad Munir claims that it has relatively recent origins. In his monograph
From Jinnah to Zia he writes:

The Quaid-i-Azam never used the words 'Ideology of Pakistan' ÷ For fifteen years
after the establishment of Pakistan, the Ideology of Pakistan was not known to anybody
until in 1962 a solitary member of the Jamaat-i--Islami used these words for
the first time when the Political Parties Bill was being discussed. On this, Chaudhry
Fazal Elahi, who has recently retired as President of Pakistan, rose from his seat
and objected that the 'Ideology of Pakistan' shall have to be defined. The member
who had proposed the original amendment replied that the 'Ideology of Pakistan was
Islam', but nobody asked him the further question 'What is Islam?' The amendment
to the bill was therefore passed. [8]

While this event may or may not be the first significant use of the term 'Ideology
of Pakistan', it does hint at the involvement of the politico--religious party, the
Jamaat-i--Islami, in the propagation - and perhaps creation - of the phrase
in question. Therefore, with the aim of arriving at a better understanding of this
important phrase, we turn to a brief discussion of the Jamaat and its political
programme.

Founded by the late Maulana Abul Ala Maudoodi, the Jamaat-i--Islami is a fundamentalist
party which categorically asserts the superiority of the Islamic Shariah over
all other principles and forms of political and social organisation. Much of the
Jamaat's appeal derives from rhetorical denunciation of Western civilisation
and Western democracy. It has also evolved a version of an Islamic state - the same
view currently being popularised by modern textbooks in Pakistan.

The Jamaat's view of an Islamic state is that of an Islamic theocratic state
- a state governed according to divinely revealed principles wherein the head of
state, elected or otherwise, interprets such principles and translates them into
practical matters of the state. Although Maudoodi, in his Islamic Law and Constitution,
states that 'Islam vests all the Muslim citizens of an Islamic state with popular
vice-gerency', he is quick to point out that all vice-gerents need not be of equal
consequence. He demands that constitution makers:

evolve such a system of elections as would ensure the appointment of only those
who are trustworthy and pious÷ They should also devise effective measures to defeat
the designs and machinations of those who scramble for posts of trust and are consequently
hated and cursed by the people in spite of their so-called 'victories' in the elections.
[9]

In this 'state without borders' any Muslim anywhere can be a citizen. It will
be the best governed not only because its leaders are pious but also because only
those will vote who are themselves pious.

With characteristic sternness, the Manifesto of theJamaat-i--Islami
(formulated in January 1951, reapproved by its Majlis-i-Shoora in December
1969) requires all political activity in Pakistan to obey the following code of ethics
(note occurrence of 'Ideology of Pakistan' below):

Nobody should indulge in anything repugnant to the Ideology of Pakistan
[emphasis added] ÷ Any effort directed towards turning this country into a secular
state or implanting herein any foreign ideology amounts to an attack on the very
existence of Pakistan.

Notwithstanding occasional sparring, there exists a confluence of basic interests
and perceptions of the Jamaat and Pakistani rulers. It is highly significant
that, with no essential change in meaning, the phrase 'Ideology of Pakistan' has
been elevated from the relative obscurity of the Manifesto of theJamaat-i--Islami
into legally unchallengeable national dogma.

Religious Ideology and the Movement for PakistanIndependent of precisely when and where the phrase 'Ideology of Pakistan' was
first used, it is incontrovertibly true that its common use, both by national leaders
and in textbooks, is a post-1977 development. In contrast, the 'Two-Nation Theory'
- the basis of Pakistan - has genuine historical roots almost a century old. It was
Mohammad Ali Jinnah who, for the first time, proclaimed that India was inhabited
by two distinct nations - Hindus and Muslims - who could not live together in one
state. In his presidential address to the Muslim League session at Lahore in 1940,
he argued that 'Hindus and Muslims belong to two different religions, philosophies,
social customs, literatures'.[10] Jinnah expounded his views with such eloquence
and force that most Muslims, and even some Hindus, came to believe in them. The Muslim
League demand for Pakistan was rooted in this theory, and India was eventually partitioned
on the premise that Muslims constitute a distinct entity. Modern textbooks state
that this Two-Nation Theory was the predecessor of the 'Ideology of Pakistan':

This righteous demand (for a separate homeland) was given the temporary name of
'Two-Nation Theory'. Now that right has been achieved, the same theory in this land
is called the Ideology of Pakistan. [11]

In post-1977 Pakistan, the 'Ideology of Pakistan' is invariably equated to the
'Two-Nation Theory'. This raises the following questions: prior to 1947, what was
the new state envisaged to be? In what sense, and to what extent, was the demand
for a theocratic Islamic state the driving force behind the movement for Pakistan?
We now turn to a consideration of these questions.

From all historical accounts it appears that in the heat of the struggle for Pakistan
the structure of the new state - theocratic, democratic, or whatever - received no
serious thought. Although they made their case on the assumption of a distinct Islamic
identity, the Muslim League leadership was generally liberal in religious matters,
and there had been no sudden revival of faith among them. For Jinnah the matter was
particularly clear: he wanted a homeland for the Muslims, not an Islamic state. But
there was a definite conflict between this secular constitutional way of thinking
and that of the more religious young Muslim Leaguers, who had responded wholeheartedly
to the League's call. There was, in fact, a long difference of opinion between Jinnah
and the Raja of Mahmudabad, the youngest member of the League's working committee.

Because it throws into sharp focus the issues of the times, it is extremely instructive
to study the Raja's memoirs, particularly with reference to the difference in opinion
between Jinnah and himself on the nature of the future state:

I was one of the founder members of the Islamic Jamaat. We advocated that
Pakistan should be an Islamic state. I must confess that I was very enthusiastic
about it and in my speeches I constantly propagated my ideas. My advocacy of an Islamic
state brought me into conflict with Jinnah. He thoroughly disapproved of my ideas
and dissuaded me from expressing them publicly from the League platform lest the
people might be led to believe that Jinnah shared my view and that he was asking
me to convey such ideas to the public. As I was convinced that I was right and did
not want to compromise Jinnah's position, I decided to cut myself away and for nearly
two years kept my distance from him, apart from seeing him during working committee
meetings and other formal occasions. It was not easy to take this decision as my
associations with Jinnah had been very close in the past. Now that I look back I
realize how wrong I had been. [12]

According to the Raja - and this is also a view shared by many scholars - three
principal factors, in descending order of priority, transformed the Muslim League
from the position of a feeble political minority in 1937 into a great mass movement
less than a decade later:

One was the Congress attitude of indifference and, at times, hostility. Another
was the leadership which, under Jinnah, broke new ground and fashioned new political
strategy. Still another was the part played by religious appeal in the heightening
of this consciousness. The leadership at the top was generally secular-minded and
trained in modern political methods, but on the lower levels and especially among
the field workers propaganda on religious lines was the general practice. [13]

To understand correctly Jinnah's concept of Pakistan, it is necessary to examine
his position in greater detail.

Jinnah's Mind: Secular or Communal?It is frequently said that without Jinnah there would have been no Pakistan,
and Jinnah is himself known to have remarked that it was he, with the help of his
secretary and typewriter, who won Pakistan for the Muslims.[14] Irrespective of the
extent to which this is true, it is certainly the case that Jinnah is revered in
Pakistan to an extent which no other political personality approaches even remotely.
His speeches and writings, therefore, often serve as a reference point for debates
on the nature of the Pakistani state and its future.

Modern textbooks invariably portray Jinnah as the architect of an Islamic ideological
state:

The All-India Muslim League, and even the Quaid-i-Azam himself, said in the clearest
possible terms that Pakistan would be an ideological state, the basis of whose laws
would be the Quran and Sunnah, and whose ultimate destiny would be to provide
a society in which Muslims could individually and collectively live according to
the laws of Islam. [15]

Paradoxically, Jinnah began his political career as an exponent of Hindu-Muslim
unity and as the leader of the liberal left wing of the Congress. His efforts culminated
in the Lucknow Pact of 1916 between the Congress and the League. But when he again
led the League almost twenty years later, the call was no longer for unity but for
Hindu-Muslim separation. Khalid bin Sayeed, one of his more respected biographers,
gives convincing evidence that in the period 1929-1935 the Congress' intransigence
was a major factor that changed him from an 'idealist' into a 'realist' who saw no
future for Muslims in a united India. [16]

In his personal life, Jinnah was liberal and Westernised. Overcoming the taboos of
cross-communal relations, he married a Parsi lady in the face of her parents' opposition
- a marriage destined to end in tragic separation and the premature death of his
wife. Jinnah maintained his inner secularism even in the seething cauldron of communal
hatred following Partition, as is evident from the fact that he appointed Joginder
Nath Mandal, a Hindu, to serve in Pakistan's first cabinet. His famous 11 August
1947 speech before the nation is the clearest possible exposition of a secular state
in which religion and state are separate from each other:

We are starting with the fundamental principle that we are all citizens and equal
citizens of one State. . . Now I think that we should keep that in front of us as
our ideal, and you will find that in due course of time Hindus would cease to be
Hindus and Muslims would cease to be Muslims, not in the religious sense, because
that is the personal faith of each individual but in the political sense as citizens
of the state. ÷ You may belong to any religion or caste or creed - that has nothing
to do with the business of the State.[17]

In an interview to Doon Campbell, Reuter's correspondent in New Delhi in 1946,
Jinnah made it perfectly clear that it was Western-style democracy that he wanted
for Pakistan:

The new state would be a modern democratic state with sovereignty resting in the
people and the members of the new nation having equal rights of citizenship regardless
of their religion, caste or creed. [18]

Note the highly significant phrase 'sovereignty resting in the people'. In contrast,
in Maulana Maudoodi's Islamic state, 'sovereignty rests with Allah'. Thus, Jinnah
rejects the basis for a theocratic state. This is stated even more explicitly in
his 1946 speech before the Muslim League convention in Delhi: 'What are we fighting
for? What are we aiming at? It is not theocracy, nor a theocratic state.' [19] The
historian K.K. Aziz has remarked that 'on the record of their writings and speeches,
Jinnah comes out to be far more liberal and secular than Gandhi'. [20]

All of Jinnah's speeches were not so unequivocal about the nature of the future state.
In the 1945 elections, the Muslim League was aided by a number of influential ulama.
It is in this period that we find in Jinnah's speeches the greatest number of references
to Islam and society. For example, in November 1945 he said that 'Muslims are demanding
Pakistan so that they may live according to their code of life and traditions, and
so that they may govern themselves according to the rules of Islam'. [21] How does
one interpret this speech of Jinnah's, together with others of essentially similar
nature, with the outright secular declarations quoted earlier? At least two interesting
possibilities suggest themselves.

Jinnah may have made a compromise with the ulama in the interest of achieving
unity on the primary goal - the attainment of a homeland for the Muslims. On the
other hand, it is possible that he saw Islam in such liberal terms that he saw no
essential conflict between it and his desire for a modern, democratic state along
Western lines. Here one might add that Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, a venerated religious
authority whose understanding of the Quran was no less deep than that of his contem-porary,
Maulana Abul Ala Maudoodi, nevertheless interpreted the political message of Islam
in a totally different way from the latter. It is evident that Jinnah also did not
accept the fundamentalist interpretation of Islam and the Islamic state.

The Role of the Religious PartiesAll history bears evidence that religion has been a powerful nexus between individuals
and groups, a potent instrument which has often welded a heterogeneous group into
a distinct nationality. Through appeal to supernatural authority, religion promotes
national unity as a divine command. When coupled with appropriate social and economic
forces, it can forge a powerful and irresistible nationalism. Contemporary history
is replete with examples: the Greek church as a source for Greek nationalism, the
Catholic church as a factor in Irish separatism, Judaism and the state of Israel,
Islam and Pakistan.

Since the movement for Pakistan was rooted in the social, cultural, and religious
distinctions between Muslims and Hindus, one might logically expect that Muslim religious
parties would have played a major, if not a leading, role in mobilising the Muslim
masses. Paradoxically, aside from exceptions of no great importance, these parties
had bitterly opposed Jinnah and the demand for Pakistan. Indeed, the exponents of
Muslim nationalism were forced to battle on three formidable fronts. First, they
had to persuade the British of their separate identity. Second, it was necessary
to convince Congress of their determination to live as two separate nations. And
third, the efforts of the ulama, who opposed Pakistan on grounds that nationalism
was antithetical to Islam, had to be nullified.

The pre-Partition position of the politico-religious parties on the Pakistan question
contrasts oddly with their present enthusiasm for religious nationalism. Maulana
Maudoodi and the Jamaat-i-Islami had rejected nationalism because it 'led
to selfishness, prejudice, and pride'. Till 1947 Maudoodi maintained that he would
not fight for Pakistan, that he did not believe in Pakistan, and that the demand
for it was un-Islamic. Some ten years before Partition he had maintained that 'Muslim
nationalism is as contradictory a term as "chaste prostitute" '. [22] Jamaat
literature would sometimes use the derogatory word Na-Pakistan for the proposed
state. There were frequent indictments of Jinnah as lacking 'an Islamic mentality
or Islamic habits of thoughts'. [23]

The Jamaat-i-Islami was not alone in its opposition to Pakistan. The Majlis-i-Ahrar,
another politico-religious party, took a similar position. However, unlike the Jamaat,
it was aligned with the Congress. Ahrar leaders termed Jinnah the Kafir-i-Azam
(the great infidel) as a rebuttal to the title Quaid-i-Azam (the great leader)
conferred upon him by the Muslim League. Allama Mashriqi's Khaksar party went
a step further and once sought to assassinate Jinnah, albeit unsuccessfully. Signifi-cantly,
Jamaat-i-Islami, Jamiat-ul-ulama-i-Hind, Majlis-i-Ahrar, and
Khaksar were absent at Jinnah's funeral. A rather curious situation arose
after Pakistan became a reality in 1947 since most political-religious parties were
confronted with the dilemma of being in a country whose creation they had opposed.
Political expediency caused many leaders to abruptly volte-face. For example, Mian
Tufail Mohammad, now amir of the Jamaat-i-Islami, who had once denounced
as 'sinners' all those who supported or joined Jinnah's government, stated on television
recently that, in fact, there had existed an understanding between Jinnah and the
Jamaat that both would work separately towards the same goal. It has also
become usual for many modern textbooks to refer to Maudoodi as one of the intellectual
founders of the Pakistan Movement. This startling fact suggests that the influence
of the Jamaat-i-Islami on national education may be deeper than is normally
assumed.

Those politico-religious parties which had resisted the creation of Pakistan may
well have made good the political damage. Their allegiance to an Islamic state now
entitles them to rewards which go beyond mere forgiveness: 'the services rendered
by the ulama and mashaikh to the cause of the Pakistan Movement are
worthy of writing in golden letters'. [24] One textbook devotes an entire chapter
to their role, claiming that 'when Allama Iqbal and the Quaid-i-Azam presented their
programme for an Islamic state, it met with the enthusiastic support of the ulama
and mashaikh'. [25]

1947 -77: The Gulf of SilenceNations which can rationally analyse their past, and particularly their defeats
and periods of collective suffering, are far more likely to survive and prosper than
those in which absence of free expression forbids truthful self-examination. Japan
and Germany after World War II, Argentina after the Falklands War - historical examples
abound in which positive shifts in national policy, domestic and foreign, occurred
as a result of decisive defeat. Indeed, there were expectations of a critical assessment
of the role of elites and readjustment of regional policies within Pakistan following
the 1971 civil war and the subsequent Indian invasion. In this war, tens of thousands
died, millions were displaced, and the country was rent asunder. Thirteen years later,
this optimism has proven to be unfounded.

From the year 1947, the establishment of Pakistan, through the year 1977, the start
of the Nizam-i-Mustafa Movement, all recent Pakistan studies texts maintain
total, or almost total, silence on political events of this period. The most detailed
account of history until 1968 to be found in any of these books is reproduced in
full here: 'In October 1958, General Ayub Khan imposed martial law and thus saved
the country from chaos'. [26] Of the few books which mention the Bangladesh episode,
one has the following to say:

As a result of the 1970 elections, the political differences between East and
West Pakistan grew and led to their separation. The cause of Islamic unity received
a setback, but one should not interpret this as a rejection of Islamic Ideology by
the people. Indeed, unless Islam is presented as a whole, and not as just worship
and prayers, it remains incomplete. The forces of atheism and worldliness, in this
case, can influence the minds of people through modern education and public media.
[27]

This strict economy of words is in striking contrast to the extensive coverage
given to Islamisation after 1977. Nevertheless, this small paragraph invites more
than just cursory reading.

There is little doubt that the painful separation of Bangladesh from Pakistan strikes
at the very roots of Pan-Islamism - the belief that Muslims all over the world belong
to one nation and that differences among them are insignificant. Modern textbooks,
therefore, are reluc-tant to discuss the issue in any detail. It should also be observed
that the above quoted paragraph attributes the separation of East and West squarely
to the fact that elections were held in Pakistan. This serves to create the fear
that if elections and democracy broke up Pakistan in 1971, then Pakistan may again
be mortally endangered if elections and democracy are restored at some point in the
future. Finally, note that the last lines of the paragraph implicitly acknowledge
the lack of success of the Islamic parties in the 1970 elections. However, students
are instructed to disregard this because 'modern education' encouraged 'atheism and
worldliness' and was the reason for defeat.

The 1947-77 gap in textbooks makes it difficult to develop an adequate background
for the Nizam-i-Mustafa Movement, which culminated in General Zia ul Haq's
government's accession to power. Restrictions, whether self-imposed or otherwise,
do not allow explicit mention of the names of key national figures. This constraint
occasionally leads to awkward situations. For example, all textbooks give 'rigging
of elections' as a motivation for the Nizam-i-Mustafa Movement, but none can
explicitly state that these were rigged by Bhutto. Curiously, we were unable to discover
any mention of the PNA (Pakistan National Alliance), which spearheaded the movement
against Bhutto.

Subtle propaganda is not a sin of which our textbook writers are guilty.

Islamisation in TextbooksIslamisation is the central concern of all modern Pakistan studies textbooks.
After Partition, only three subsequent events are discussed in detail. First, they
treat the Objectives Resolution of 1949, which gave the sovereignty over the state
of Pakistan to Allah and which separated Muslims from non-Muslims as having different
rights of citizenship. Secondly, they harp on the presentation to the government
of a twenty-two point programme framed by thirty-one prominent ulama in 1951.
This programme later became part of the Manifesto of the Jamaat-i-Islami,
acknowledged on the front cover of this document. The third event, which forms the
bulk of post-Partition history, is the implementa-tion of Islamic principles by General
Zia ul Haq.

Modern textbooks heavily stress the formal and ritualistic aspects of Islam, as against
those which emphasise social justice. Science and secular knowledge are held in deep
suspicion. Modern education, according to one book, should be shunned because it
leads to atheism and worldliness. Another book describes an utopian society, one
which supposedly existed at the time of Hazrat Nizam-ud-Din, as one in which ritual
was meticulously adhered to:

Young and old, small and great, everyone had become regular at prayers. Apart
from the five prayers, people enthusiastically said supplementary prayers of ishraq,
chasht, zawal, and awabin. People used to ask each other of
the verses to be read, or how many times to recite drud-sharif after prayers÷
they kept supplementary fasts even after the month of Ramazan. [28]

The emphasis on ritualistic Islam in modern textbooks is accompanied by a conscious
promotion of sentiment against certain non-Muslim communities, particularly Hindus
and Qadianis. This is not something new, one may legitimately argue, nor is the exacerbation
of communal antagonism limited to Pakistan alone. India, which claims to be secular
rather than Hindu, is nevertheless regularly ravaged by communal riots with the majority
of victims being Muslims. Hindu chauvinism is a powerful factor in Indian politics
and expresses itself through a variety of newspapers and magazines, even though propaganda
through school texts is officially forbidden. However, in Pakistan, because of the
adoption of an exclusivist national ideology, there are no constraints on the free
expression of communal hatred. Thus, the Hindu is portrayed as monolithically cunning
and treacherous, obsessively seeking to settle old scores with his erstwhile masters.
This Hindu is responsible for the break-up of Pakistan:

The same Bengali Hindu was responsible for the backwardness of East Pakistan.
But, hiding the story of his two-century old sins, atrocities, and pillage, he used
'Bengali nationalism' to punish innocent West Pakistanis for sins they had not committed.
[29]

Justice Shameem Hussain Kadri, ex-chief justice of the Lahore High Court, writes
of the 'diabolical Hindus' and 'Hindu conspiracies' in his officially circulated
book.[30] There are countless similar examples.

In part, the existence of anti-Hindu sentiment is a consequence of the wholesale
communal massacres during Partition, which left around half a million dead on each
side. Even under the best conditions the scars would need many decades to heal. But
the explanation for the revival of communalist sentiment is not to be found wholly
in the tragedies of 1947. An examination of history texts written soon after Partition
- a time when the grief of shattered families was at its peak - shows them to be
incomparably more liberal. The history of the subcontinent was taken to start with
the ancient Indus valley civilisations rather than with the conquest of India by
the first Muslim invader, Mohammad bin Qasim, in 712. In contrast to present-day
books, these books contained discussions of the empires of Ashoka and the Mauryas.
The movement for Pakistan was presented as a defence against Hindu domination, not
as a movement for religious revival.

The deliberate revival of communal antagonism over 30 years after Partition suggests
that political expediency, rather than religious factors, has asserted a dominant
influence in this matter. The permanent militarisation of society requires a permanent
enemy. For many reasons, Pakistan's other neighbours are unsuitable for this purpose.
On the other hand, rulers in both India and Pakistan have long found mutual hostility
and tension indispensable political tools.

Conclusion The change in character of Pakistani education, and the rewriting of Pakistan's
history, coincide with the change in nature of the ruling elites and altered needs.
The Westernised liberal elite, which had inherited political power from the British,
had given to education a basically secular and modern character which might have
eventually created a modern, secular-minded citizenry. But the self-seeking and opportunistic
nature of this elite forced it progressively to abandon liberal values in the face
of exigencies, political and economic. Discriminatory laws against non-Muslim minorities
were passed, the feudal structure of rural society was left intact, and quality education
was limited to a tiny minority. The ambient corruption in society gradually diffused
into institutions which could have transformed and modernized Pakistani society.
By the time of the 1977 army coup, liberalism was already moribund.

The recasting of Pakistani history is an attempt to fundamentally redefine Pakistan
and Pakistani society and to endow the nation with a historic destiny. Islam is the
integrative ideology, its enforcement a divine duty. Viewed from this angle, it becomes
essential to project the movement for Pakistan as the movement for an Islamic state,
the creation of which became a historic inevitability with the first Muslim invasion
of the subcontinent. The revised history of Pakistan uses much the same idiom, and
the same concepts of Islamic state and of politics in Islam, as the Jamaat-i-Islami.
Its wholesale dissemination through educational institutions demonstrates both the
influence of the Jamaat on education as well as the confluence of interests
and philosophy of military rulers and the Jamaat.