This is a debate for the first round of Bsh1's "Unique Topics" tournament. I would like to thank bsh1 for hosting this tournament and to Amedexyius for agreeing to debate this topic with me.

The resolution is: The United States should arm the Kurds

The definitions are pretty basicshould: "This simply designates that we are engaged in a policy debate, and therefore what should happen. This is distinguished from 'could,' as what we are discussing is whether abolition should or should not happen, rather than whether it could given current impediments in Congress and elsewhere. This also implies a net benefits framework, where we'll be debating the merits of our respective cases." -whiteflame

arm: to strengthen or equip with weapons

the Kurds: an ethnic group in the Middle East, mostly inhabiting a contiguous area spanning adjacent parts of eastern and southeastern Turkey, western Iran, northern Iraq, and northern Syria. (Wikipedia)

The first round of the debate will be acceptance only, no new arguments in the final round (R4).

The abolition of the Islamic State is paramount. Not only to the well-being of the 33 million inhabitants of Iraq, but to the world as well. The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights finds the death toll of ISIL related violence to be 55,047 civilian casualties, 18,802 people killed and 36,245 wounded. The violence has also caused 3,206,736 civilians to become internally displaced in Iraq. This inhibits the ability of over 1 million school age girls and boys access to housing, clean water, or education [1]. Abolition of the Islamic State would end tremendous amounts of suffering as cited above. The question then, is what is the best method in which to end the Islamic State.

That option is the Kurdish people. The Kurds are the fourth largest ethnic group in the Middle East, and are comprised of around 25 to 30 million people [2]. Thus far, the Kurds have been the most effective force fighting ISIL. Time and time again, they have proven that they are able to take ground from the IS, and keep it. They have carved out a 400 km stretch of territory along the Turkish border and advanced to within 30 miles of the ISIL stronghold, Raqqa [2]. Kurds have also taken 17,000 square miles from ISIL [3] and regarded as the most effective fighting force in Iraq and Syria [4].

Their problem, and what's stopping them from becoming a more effective fighting force, and thus eliminating ISIL is their lack of arms and financial support.

One of the main problems is that many Kurds can only fight part-time because of how low their salaries are. As one high-ranking authority says, "If they stay on the front line for a whole month, they can"t even feed their families." [5] Providing financial aid will greatly increase the amount of soldiers in the Kurdish army, and thus increasing their strength and effectiveness. The Kurds also have few decent weapons, most are extremely old, and many soldiers don't have weapons at all [6]. Given how effective the Kurds have already been in their weak state of arms, arming them would lead to a dramatic increase in battlefield effectiveness. Kurdish officials explain that US assistance is *vital* to success against ISIL [8]. Arming the Kurds would help end ISIL, and thus prevent tremendous suffering.

This plan also leads to a net cut of cost for the US. Choosing to arm the Kurds would cost significantly less than fighting ISIL ourselves. The estimated cost of fighting ISIL currently would be 40 billion dollars a year [7]. In contrast, the sufficient funds needed to "equip and enable" Kurdish troops would only be $500 million [9]. The US can obviously increase this amount, maybe even 20 times the amount to ensure that the Kurds can be the absolute most effective fighting force to ever patrol the Middle East, and it would still save the US billions of dollars.

Furthermore, if the US helps arm the Kurds and they defeat ISIL, they will likely be awarded their own state, Kurdistan. The geographical orientation of this new country will ensure that they will have massive amounts of oil [10]. Thus, if the US were to be the one's to have helped the Kurds achieve this state, they will have another world partner. Leading to profitable trade agreements for the US regarding oil.

That"s all I'm gonna bring up for my opening arguments. Peace and Love!

I thank my opponent for providing his argument. I will first start with rebuttals and their counters continuing in to other points of arguments. I will also point out that messaging between Hayd and I reached a conclusion that arming the Kurds would include the primary ethnic region of Syria with branches of Kurdish influence.

Rebuttals and Counter Arguments

My opponent starts off his argument by stating that the elimination of the Islamic State is an absolute necessity. Before I continue further and point out the incompatible simplicity of that statement in this argument, the prior and arguably current primary intention of the United States playing their role in the battleground of Syria is to topple Assad.

I'll provide a little background. The United States has poured billions into Syrian rebels, including the Kurds, highlighting that their purpose of militarization is to oust Assad from power [1]. That move can be directly translated into the fact that the United States isn't just in Syria for ISIS. The Kurds in Syria are being used as an insurgent proxy puppeteered by American interests by the greater goal of countering Russian influence in the region [2]. This purpose of action is synonymous with the Kurd's disagreements with Assad [3], relating to American interests, but not synonymous to the other American backed rebels which either turn on each other, like they do to Kurdistan Forces [4], but also defect to ISIS under the belief that an oppressive Assad is a worse reality than a rising Islamic State [5]. Having explained the background as simply as I could, I'll move on to the actual argument.

I provided hints and details in the background to the problems correlating to the statement of funding the Kurds to the only reason of it being the common enemy of ISIS. I'll start with the fact that Kurdistan is barely politically unified, and much less militarily [6]. There is no central funding that the United States would be able to actually back, it would be a series of divided insurgencies that already have conflicting interests, including whether to join ISIS in the common goal of toppling Assad, or having to defeat Assad before tackling on ISIS. Both of these military forces are serious threats to the dream of an independent Kurdistan, and both are more powerful than the Kurds [7] [8] [9] themselves which makes the funding and arming of Kurdish insurgencies as an evident and yet assumptively dsyfunctional policy if under the pretense of destroying the Islamic State. I will currently pause this argument on ISIS as the theories and possibilities of the actual decision of Kurdistan would now become subjective and I leave the rebuttals to my opponent.

I will not refute the statistics of the displaced and negatively affected people of Kurdistan and Syria, although I will say they have little to no influence on the actual argument of the arming of Kurdistan now that I have restricted your argument being there a lack of unification on strategically attacking a common enemy when the definition of a common enemy varies not only among Syrian rebels, but among Kurdish rebels themselves such as PKK (Kurdistan's Workers Party) Units [10] and Rojava (Refer to Source 3). I will now move on to international consequences.

In geopolitics, there is no action that can be done by a major power that will not result in some consequence. The question will always be, what are they? In the case of arming the Kurds, the consequences are strong enough that they can impact the entire American diplomatic foothold in Turkey, Russia, and the European Union. The Kurds have been a long time rival and enemy of the Republic of Turkey. In Turkey, and also by American federal agencies as well, the most unified and powerful force (that also applies to this debate's mutual agreement of which Kurds should be armed) is the Kurdistan's Worker's Party [11]. The PKK (Kurdistan's Worker's Party) is not only recognized as a terrorist organization by the United States, and by Turkey (a major potential friend in more scales than just geopolitical influence), but also an extreme-left wing organization with a communist-friendly doctrine. Two sore points that the United States is keen on keeping suppressed from the world. The PKK is also a powerful terrorist organization, whose primary goals are more of an independent Kurd region in Turkey, not Syria or Iraq. This is evident as their terror strikes stay in the Eastern Turkish region, where Turkish Kurdistan is mapped. The PKK has been in the news both recently, and in contemporary Turkish history as an insurgency that is condemned by using violent tactics in order to achieve their goals [12].

Different Method to Combat ISIS

While the prime topic of this debate is whether the Kurds should be armed, I would believe it is helpful for me to entertain the topic of the method of insurgent proxies in the form of Kurds as combat against a relatively powerful organization being ISIS. If, which cannot be said for sure, the major interests of the United States in Syria was to eradicate ISIS (Which is also not the reason they started funding the rebels, anyways) then there is a mutually beneficial plan which can help all sides until the common enemy is defeated. This theory would require the United States to halt funding towards Syrian rebels dedicated to toppling Assad creating a fractured Syria and a dangerous power vacuum. As I have said with proof before, the Syrian rebel armies are not unified, and Syria would turn into a nation full of Wahhabist warlords making the country their deadly playground in the hunt for power. Assad is brutal and oppressive but he is secular, he has denied any form of Wahhabism to infiltrate the ranks of his nation and he's the only individual which can stop a power vacuum like the US has caused in Iraq, Libya and Afghanistan [13]. After the Syrian army has wiped out known terrorist rebels [14] in the country, all military force led by an international coalition can eradicate the thriving ISIS threat. When ISIS is, per se, defeated, Assad has made the decision and serious contemplation to step down [15]. The international community, United States, Russia (notably Vladimir Putin) have all seriously considered the plan I have just made aware to the reader and my opponent and Putin has made a public statement which Assad acknowledge being that when the Civil War is stopped and the threat of ISIS removed, the oppression of Syria will go down with it and the power vacuum is prevented.

Con starts off with rebuttals, arguing that the greater American *interest* is in toppling Assad, rather than defeating ISIL, in the end goal of countering Russian influence in the region. But the only actual material rebuttals Con provides is that the Kurds are not militarily or politically unified. Thus it would be difficult to actually back the Kurds, as there is no central funding.

This is a very valid issue, as there are many separate Kurdish fighting forces, such as the YPG, the Peshmerga, the KDP, among others. But as Aliza Marcus and Andrew Apostolou explain perfectly in the NY Times [1], the US can solve this issue by helping Kurdistan develop and train a nonpolitical Kurdish army. They can do this by supporting the Ministry of Peshmerga Affairs program, whose purpose is to unify all Kurdish forces. Supporting the Ministry of Peshmerga Affairs would allow the ministry to enact certain changes that would unify the Kurdish forces, and thus solve this problem and defeat ISIL. The ministry would be able to require that all new Kurdish recruits join the a nonpartisan army as an individual instead of as a political party member, thus eliminating the party influence on the militia. If the US arms these non partisan militias, they can become the heart of the Kurdish front, thus incentivising further recruitment. Support would also allow the ministry to disband private militias of certain groups such as the KDP and PUK units, such as the Zerevani, the Emergency Force, and Units 70 and 80 [2]. The ministry could also cut the inflated salaries of KDP and PUK commanders, and integrate police and intelligence agencies. But most importantly, the US could establish a nonpartisan military academy thus abolishing the separated, politically led academies in Zakho and Qalasholan [2]. Salaries could also be payed through the Ministry of Peshmerga Affairs which would eliminate the ability of commanders to buy support. Furthermore, involvement in the Kurdish army would ensure that the Kurds are focused on fighting ISIL rather than Assad, or any other political agenda.

Having the US support the Ministry of Peshmerga Affairs would make it possible to integrate armies such as the YPG with the already unified KDP and PUK. This would result in the largest unified Kurdish army, and the most effective fighting force against ISIL. Thus, the Con's proposed problem is resolved by directly supporting the Ministry of Peshmerga Affairs.

Con then brings up his own offensive argument against the motion: that arming the Kurds would result in damaged US relations in Turkey, Russia, and the European Union. This would be because arming the Kurds would *have* to result in arming the PKK, or the Kurdistan Workers' Party, which is a labeled terrorist organization and enemy of Turkey. It then follows that arming the PKK would damage relations with Turkey as we would be helping their enemy, as well as other nations and organizations who label them as terrorists (European Union.) The problem with this argument is that it assumes that we *have* to arm the PKK since they are the most unified and powerful Kurdish fighting group, but they aren't, the PKK is a relatively insignificant force. Their current size is 5,000 soldiers [3], compared to the almost 190,000 total Kurdish troops [4]. The PKK also has scarce weapons and badly trained [5]. Thus, the US has no need to arm the PKK, or include them in unifying Kurdish armies. It wouldn't pose a substantial detriment to our goals. Thus the argument is negated.

Con's final contention of a different method to combat ISIL isn't relevant to whether we should arm the Kurds, so I won't respond to it.

My opponent begins his argument stating that there was no material rebuttal on the basis of American interests in Syria. I did label a source in the previous round highlighting that the United States entered Syria with the intention of toppling Assad, and are still doing so now [1]. The United States had even gone to the Security Council in hopes of passing a resolution directly aimed at ousting Assad out of power under the pretense of uncalled measures of austerity [2]. By pretense, as I had mentioned before, the United States had claimed that a reason for toppling Assad was also to counter Russian influence [3].

My opponent then continues in making a plan regarding the Peshmerga by supporting their interior Ministry through financing. The problem with your argument, I'm afraid, is that it is assumptive and that the plan of unifying Peshmerga is has not only been attempted but has been met with resistance [4]. Iraq, with the financial support of the United States, already attempted a unification of Peshmerga [5] but was met with military resistance and cultural, economic and socio-political challenges all that prevent a unified Peshmerga. These armies that fight under the name of Kurdistan, also fight under their own interests and their own agendas, each of which would either differ culturally, economically or politically. There is also the problem that Syria and Iraq do not want to grant Kurdistani forces too much power in order to prevent a possible civil war and separation in the future because there was a careless grant of military power and weapons as history had proven before with Hussein and 1970's Syria [6].

In his argument, my opponent makes the statement "...ministry to disband private militias of certain groups such as the KDP and PUK units, such as the Zerevani, the Emergency Force, and Units 70 and 80". These forces are not under control of the Peshmerga Ministry [7]. I also state, that the Peshmerga Ministry is a political branch of the autonomous and suppressed Kurdistan, heavily limiting the option of powers and actions they can already take under military orders.

I will conclude this rebuttal to my opponent with the simple statement that history has also proven that to unify Peshmerga has been a lethal failure (Refer to Source 4), and an advanced and complex web of religious, cultural, socio-political, and economic regions and units of Kurdistan would not want to unify under Peshmerga. Your method is hypothetical and the proposal of a unified Peshmerga has already gone down.

My opponent then challenges my rebuttals against international consequences for support of military units in Kurdistan by saying that the size of the PKK is insignificant compared to the 190,000 total Kurd infantry. You conveniently skipped over the fact in your own source that these 190,000 troops are not unified and represent a mass amount of groups (Including the PKK) [8]. You manipulated the wording of your source and argument, when in truth these 190,000 troops are divided into more than 500+ [9] units and infantries with little to no intention of being led under the Ministry of Peshmerga.

Pro concludes their argument with the statement that my final method step is not relevant to whether we should arm the Kurds, and it is. You left a strong argument with no rebuttal. The Syrian Forces loyal to Assad would have already eliminated the Syrian insurgencies against Assad backed by the United States (If the US would stop funding them) and Syrian forces would already be able to destroy ISIS [10]. My method highlights that instead of using a bunch of dis-unified groups and waste billions of dollars on their attempted unification to which they have no intention of doing so, anyways, we would actually be able to support a functioning state with an actual unified and secular leader which would allow the United States to prevent a power vacuum and create a stronger area for ISIS to thrive. Syria is an inter-connected web of insurgencies, state oppression, and global powers attempting to advance their interests. Their relevancy is stronger than arming the Kurds. My statement of having Assad step down after the war would allow American interests to get a portion of their own goal achieved, the common goal of ISIS having been eliminated in the majority, and a possible power vacuum to be plugged. No one would want a nation with no government to be fractured by over 500+ groups attempting to dominate the nation [11].

This is my last response of the debate, thus I won't be bringing up any "new arguments," only what has already been said in the debate.

Con argues that the fact that the US's intention in Syria is to topple Assad, in the hopes of countering Russian influence in the region has a material impact. But it doesn't matter what the US's intent or purpose in the region is, because this doesn't have an impact in the debate. As long as it results in defeating ISIL, as it does, my argument still stands. And it doesn't have any impact for Con's side, as it isn't a reason to not arm the Kurds. So whether the US's *intent* is to topple Assad is irrelevant.

Con then argues that my plan to fund the Ministry of Peshmerga Affairs in order to unite the Kurdish forces doesn't work because:

a) unification of peshmerga has been met with resistance

I looked at the source that Con uses to warrant this claim and it does not talk about any peshmerga forces resisting unification. Thus this can be thrown out as a bare assertion.

b) the US already attempted to do this but failed due to economic, political, socio-political, and militaristic factors.

My plan resolves all of these factors because the source I used for my plan is the same source Con uses for the factors. And since the article comes up with actions to resolve all of the factors it finds preventing unification, it inherently proves that my plan will resolve the factors Con brings up.

c) Syria and Iraq do not want to unify Kurdish forces because it might cause a civil war

The source that Con uses to back up his claim does not say that the countries of Iraq and Syria have qualms over the Kurdish forces unifying, the Kurdish forces becoming too powerful, or the US providing aid to Kurdish forces. It doesn't even have the word Syria in it once. The source that Con provides to back up his claim does not actually back up his claim. Thus this argument can be thrown out as a bare assertion.

Next, Con says that the Zerevani, the Emergency Force, and Units 70 and 80 are not under control of the Ministry of Peshmerga Affairs. I agree. When I mentioned these units I said that they were private militias controlled by the KDP and PUK armies. Con also claims that the Ministry of Peshmerga Affairs is a political branch Kurdistan, which makes it limited due to Kurdistan being suppressed. Con does not give evidence or explain how Kurdistan is being suppressed, and if it was how it would affect the Ministry's effectiveness. Since these aren't met, the argument doesn't work.

Con then contests my claim that the PKK are an insignificant force. He does this by pointing out that the total amount of Kurdish forces are spread among many different groups. While this is true, 70% of the total force is controlled by the main two parties, the KDP and PUK [2]. And that's not even including the YPG, which has around 65,000 troops [3]. Where the PKK fits in here is very low on the bottom, and my point is still made. And Con's claim that none of the groups want to unify is a bare assertion, so throw it out.

In Con's last argument, he claims says that if it wasn't for the Syrian insurgencies, that the US supporting them, the Syrian army would be able to focus on and defeat ISIL. Thus, we ought to arm the Syrians in order to defeat ISIL. The problem with this is that Con's source does not say that the Syrian army would be able to defeat ISIL if the insurgencies ceased. This is an unwarranted claim, and can then be thrown out. This alone is enough to negate the argument, but a further point can be made about the dangers of arming Syria, a country run by Assad's regime. Of which is, if not more dangerous than ISIL itself. Arming them would be a bad idea indeed.

Pro continuously states that Assad has no relevancy in this argument. That statement is nearly ridiculous, when Assad and the Kurds have been long time rivals, and are currently fighting each other and ISIS. My statement of the US intent to topple Assad means that the US was previously funding Kurds to topple Assad and still are now [1] [2]. If you don't know, ISIS has territory as far in as Raqqa, Syria, and are on the edge of Syrian Kurdistan's borders. If you need a geographical map to help, here it is.

It is a reason not to arm the Kurds because you could have an actual state with an actual military being able to destroy ISIS instead of using rag-tag insurgencies. I won't be repeating my arguments about Assad, they're in the last 2 rounds, not refuted.

My opponent should have read my source more carefully, since now I have to actually quote the article stating a unification resistance.

"While the Iraqi Kurds have, since around 2001, made efforts to "unify" the Peshmerga, the Peshmerga forces—like the corollary party intelligence services—are unified more on paper than in reality. Take, for example, recent fighting: It was the PUK Peshmerga that seized Kirkuk [From Iraq]" [3].

"During the unification...as the KDP once fought the PUK over resources, much of the antagonism fed to the West about the YPG today traces back to either Turkey or the KDP. " (Refer to Source 3)

It is not a bare assertion. They resisted unification by fighting Iraq and their own Kurdish rivals. As for your source stating that it resolves all obstacles I had listed, it does not. The writers, Aliza Marcus [4] and Andrew Apostolou [5] (The writers of the source you were referring to), are international journalists. Not economists or political analysts, meaning they spent their work writing about what happened in the field. In your own words, they were making "bare assertions". Not to mention, they didn't actually talk about socio-political factors in Kurdistan, they simply listed the problems [6].

My opponent continues with point C, saying that Iraq doesn't want to unify Kurds in worry of a civil war. If my source did not support my claim (Which I doubt), I'll provide another one as there are plenty to go around [7]. Peshmerga has already been given minimal funding by the United States, mostly because Iraq had put a limit considering that Iraqi Kurdistan is an autonomous area (Which is what I meant by suppressed, they aren't a free nation) [8]. This rebuttal disproves the weak labels of Pro stating that my argument was a bare assertion. For the voters, I seriously recommend you look at my sources yourselves, they list what I state.

Pro continues his argument stating that I provided no evidence of the suppression of Kurdistan, which is true. I didn't provide it because I felt it was a fundamental of this argument, so I've provided two here (Refer to Source 8) [9].

The next rebuttal of my opponent states the numbers of the Kurdish rebels. The KDP and PUK aren't as strong as you stated in the previous round, nor do they compose 70% of Kurdish fighting forces [10] [11] [12]. As for the YPG, an extreme left wing organization, and a known instrument of war crimes and humanitarian violations [13], I will not refute their numbers, they are powerful, but they are also questionable.

In the last argument of Pro, he states that I did not provide sources stating that the Syrian Army is able to defeat ISIS. That is a fallacious statement, I did provide sources numbering the power of the Syrian military [14], the 36th strongest nation on Earth, and the statistics of ISIS military strength, only a near 1/3 of the strength of the Syrian military [15]. While, if united, the Kurdish powers would only compose a near equivalent of the power of ISIS (Refer to Source 9 and 12). If my opponent calls my method an unwarranted claim, I could do the same to his simply because his method hasn't (successfully) happened. As for my opponent calling Assad a more dangerous power than ISIS, than my opponent already has the qualities of the Kurdish forces he is vouching for as they defect to ISIS by the hundreds [16]. There is no need to arm Syria, because they are already equipped, secular, functioning, and powerful. Far more than the Kurds would ever be and ISIS will ever reach.

I thank my opponent for this great debate, and I appreciate the chance of being able to debate with one of the most prominent figures here in DDO!

[*Reason for non-removal*] The voter clearly and sufficiently analyzes arguments made by both debaters and comes to a decision based on that analysis.
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True, but the torture debate didn't count in the win/loss record. And, I would have voted for you. Then Tej would have lost agains DP with you. And Amedexyius did a very good job on this debate, tons of claps for him. You would be a hard opponent if I debate you (I am debating in the Unique topics tournament, and not sure if I would win, but still)