This
matter is before the court with the Report and Recommendation
of United States Magistrate Judge Shiva V. Hodges made in
accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Local Civil
Rule 73.02 of the District of South Carolina.[1] Kelvin Sharod
Addison (“Addison”), a state prisoner proceeding
pro se, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleges
defamation, negligence, and violations of his constitutional
rights. In her Report and Recommendation, Magistrate Judge
Hodges recommends granting the Defendants' motion for
summary judgment.

Addison
alleges that Moore testified at Addison's SCDC
disciplinary hearing on September 10, 2013, and that Moore
stated “he wasn't lookin[g] to smell urine . . . he
was very upset.” (Id. Ex. 1 (State Ct. Docs
2), ECF No. 1-1.) Addison alleges that Lippe also testified
at the disciplinary hearing that she was five feet behind
Moore and “by the time she got anywhere close to smell
anything all she could smell was mace.” (Id.
Ex. 1 (State Ct. Docs. 2), ECF No. 1-1.)

Summary
judgment is appropriate only “if the movant shows that
there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). In deciding whether a genuine issue of
material fact exists, the evidence of the non-moving party is
to be believed and all justifiable inferences must be drawn
in his favor. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,
477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). However, “[o]nly disputes
over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under
the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary
judgment. Factual disputes that are irrelevant or unnecessary
will not be counted.” Id. at 248.

A
litigant “cannot create a genuine issue of material
fact through mere speculation or the building of one
inference upon another.” Beale v. Hardy, 769
F.2d 213, 214 (4th Cir. 1985). “Where the record taken
as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find
for the non-moving party, disposition by summary judgment is
appropriate.” Monahan v. Cty. of Chesterfield,
95 F.3d 1263, 1265 (4th Cir. 1996). “[T]he mere
existence of some alleged factual dispute between
the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported
motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that there be
no genuine issue of material fact.”
Ballenger v. N.C. Agric. Extension Serv., 815 F.2d
1001, 1005 (4th Cir. 1987).

B.
Objections

Addison
filed objections to the Report and Recommendation. Objections
to the Report and Recommendation must be specific. Failure to
file specific objections constitutes a waiver of a
party's right to further judicial review, including
appellate review, if the recommendation is accepted by the
district judge. See United States v. Schronce, 727
F.2d 91, 94 & n.4 (4th Cir. 1984). In the absence of
specific objections to the Report and Recommendation
of the magistrate judge, this court is not required to give
any explanation for adopting the recommendation. See
Camby v. Davis, 718 F.2d 198, 199 (4th Cir. 1983). Upon
review, the court finds that many of Addison's objections
are non-specific, unrelated to the dispositive portions of
the magistrate judge's Report and Recommendation, or
merely restate his claims. However, the court was able to
glean three specific objections.

First,
Addison objects that the magistrate judge erred in finding
that he failed to provide sufficient facts to demonstrate
that Catoe intentionally lied or recklessly made material
omissions to obtain the arrest warrant, or that Catoe
believed he lacked probable cause for the arrest warrant.
(Objs. 2, ECF No. 39.) Addison argues that Moore and
Lippe's testimony and statements demonstrate that
probable cause did not exist for the September 4, 2013,
arrest warrant. (Id., ECF No. 39.)

&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&ldquo;To
state a claim for false arrest or imprisonment under &sect;
1983, a plaintiff must demonstrate that he was arrested
without probable cause.&rdquo; Sower v. City of
Charlotte, 659 Fed. App&#39;x 738, 739 (4th Cir. 2016)
(per curiam). Specifically, Addison must allege that the
defendants: &ldquo;(1) caused (2) a seizure of the plaintiff
pursuant to legal process unsupported by probable cause, and
(3) criminal proceedings terminated in plaintiff&#39;s
favor.&rdquo; Id. (quoting Evans v.
Chalmers, 703 F.3d 636, 646 (4th Cir. 2012). The
existence of probable cause is determined at the time of
arrest. Id. When Catoe sought the arrest warrant,
there was a reasonable basis to believe probable cause
existed because both Moore and Lippe had stated that they
were sure Addison had thrown urine on Moore. (Mot. Summ. J.
Ex 2 (Lippe Aff. ¶ 4), ECF No. 25-3; Ex. 7, (Moore Aff.
¶ 4), ECF No. 25-8.) Addison argues the court should
consider Lippe and Moore's subsequent statements. (Objs.
2, ECF No. 39.) However, the statements have no bearing on
whether Catoe knowingly lied, omitted material information,
or believed probable cause did not exist at the ...

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