Archive for the ‘Israel’ Category

I found this over on Digg posted by “VoteRonPaul” a bit ago…they (FOX NEWS) are SO BUSTED. Watch it! Sorry for all the tags…but hey…I want maximum exposure and PLEASE REPOST this FAR AND WIDE. OH YEA, DROP FOX NEWS FROM YOUR CABLE SERVICE…it’s time they pay for this masquerade as a “fair and balanced” news program. I hear their stock is dropping anyhow. Might as well throw some well-deserved salt on an open wound while we’re at it, right?

(This is a repost but in light of the revelations that the CIA withheld evidence from the investigation…obviously this needs to be looked at AGAIN. America deserves the truth.)

Here is a timeline of the farce that was the original 9/11 investigation…it comes from an open source coordinated project, therefore I feel pretty comfortable re-posting it here. Heavily sourced and referenced for your convenience…call or write your Congressman…America deserves better than THIS!!!

Two bipartisan pairs of senators introduce legislation to create independent 9/11 commissions. Senators Joe Lieberman (D) and John McCain (R) propose to create a 14-member, bipartisan commission with subpoena power. At the same time, Robert Torricelli (D) and Charles Grassley (R) propose to create a 12-member board of inquiry with subpoena power. White House spokeswoman Anne Womack is noncommittal about the proposals, saying, “We look forward to reviewing them. Right now, the president is focused on fighting the war on terrorism.” [New York Times. 21 December.’)” onmouseout=”return nd()”>New York Times, 12/21/2001]

Senate Majority Leader Tom Daschle (D) later claims that on this day, Vice President Cheney calls him and urges that no 9/11 inquiry be made. President Bush repeats the request on January 28, and Daschle is repeatedly pressured thereafter. Newsweek summarizes one of these conversations: “Bush administration officials might say they’re too busy running the war on terrorism to show up. Press the issue … and you risk being accused of interfering with the mission.” [Newsweek. 4 February.’)” onmouseout=”return nd()”>Newsweek, 2/4/2002] Cheney later disagrees: “Tom’s wrong. He has, in this case, let’s say a misinterpretation.” [Reuters. 27 May.’)” onmouseout=”return nd()”>Reuters, 5/27/2002]

Internal FBI documents show that Thomas Kelley, in charge of matters relating to the FBI in the 9/11 Congressional Inquiry, blocked an inquiry into the FBI’s role in Waco. For instance, an internal FBI memo from December 2000 states that Kelley “continued to thwart and obstruct” the Waco investigation to the point that a special counsel was forced to send a team to search FBI headquarters for documents Kelley refused to turn over. [Washington Post. 22 June.’)” onmouseout=”return nd()”>Washington Post, 6/22/2002]

A tentative congressional deal to create an independent commission to investigate the 9/11 attacks falls apart hours after the White House objected to the plan (it appears Vice President Cheney called Republican leaders and told them to renege on the agreement [New York Times. 2 November.’)” onmouseout=”return nd()”>New York Times, 11/2/2002] ). Bush had pledged to support such a commission a few weeks earlier (see September 20, 2002), but doubters who questioned his sincerity appear to have been proven correct. Hours after top Republican leaders announced at a press conference that an agreement had been reached, House Republican leaders said they wouldn’t bring the legislation to the full House for a vote unless the commission proposal was changed. There are worries that if the White House can delay the legislation for a few more days until Congress adjourns, it could stop the creation of a commission for months, if not permanently. [New York Times. 11 October.’)” onmouseout=”return nd()”>New York Times, 10/11/2002] Another deal is made a few weeks later (see November 15, 2002) and the commission goes forward.

Congress approves legislation creating an independent commission—the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States—to “examine and report on the facts and causes relating to the September 11th terrorist attacks” and “make a full and complete accounting of the circumstances surrounding the attacks.” President Bush signs it into law November 27, 2002. [Establishing the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks, Public Law 107-306. 107th Cong., 2nd sess.’)” onmouseout=”return nd()”>US Congress, 11/27/2002] Bush originally opposed an independent commission (see May 23, 2002), but he changes his mind over the summer (see September 20, 2002) after political pressure. The Democrats concede several important aspects of the commission (such as subpoena approval) after the White House threatens to create a commission by executive order, over which it would have more control. Bush will appoint the commission chairman and he sets a strict time frame (18 months) for the investigation. [CNN. 15 November.’)” onmouseout=”return nd()”>CNN, 11/15/2002] The commission will only have a $3 million budget. Senator Jon Corzine (D) and others wonder how the commission can accomplish much with such a small budget. [Associated Press. 20 January.’)” onmouseout=”return nd()”>Associated Press, 1/20/2003] The budget is later increased (see March 26, 2003).

George Mitchell. [Source: Public domain]George Mitchell resigns as vice chairman of the recently-created 9/11 investigative commission. Lee Hamilton, an Indiana congressman for more than 30 years and chairman of the committee which investigated the Iran-Contra affair, is named as his replacement. [CNN. 11 December.’)” onmouseout=”return nd()”>CNN, 12/11/2002] Mitchell cites time constraints as his reason for stepping down, but he also does not want to sever ties with his lawyer-lobbying firm, Piper Rudnick, or reveal his list of clients. Recent clients include the governments of Yemen and the United Arab Emirates. [Newsweek. 15 December.’)” onmouseout=”return nd()”>Newsweek, 12/15/2002]

Thomas Kean. [Source: Public domain]President Bush names former New Jersey governor Thomas Kean as the Chairman of the 9/11 Commission after his original choice, Henry Kissinger, resigned (see December 13, 2002). [Washington Post. 17 December.’)” onmouseout=”return nd()”>Washington Post, 12/17/2002] In an appearance on NBC, Kean promises an aggressive investigation. “It’s really a remarkably broad mandate, so I don’t think we’ll have any problem looking under every rock. I’ve got no problems in going as far as we have to in finding out the facts.” [Associated Press. 17 December.’)” onmouseout=”return nd()”>Associated Press, 12/17/2002] However, Kean plans to remain president of Drew University and devote only one day a week to the commission. He also claims he would have no conflicts of interest, stating: “I have no clients except the university.” [Washington Post. 17 December.’)” onmouseout=”return nd()”>Washington Post, 12/17/2002] However, he has a history of such conflicts of interest. Multinational Monitor has previously stated: “Perhaps no individual more clearly illustrates the dangers of university presidents maintaining corporate ties than Thomas Kean,” citing the fact that he is on the Board of Directors of Aramark (which received a large contract with his university after he became president), Bell Atlantic, United Health Care, Beneficial Corporation, Fiduciary Trust Company International, and others. [Multinational Monitor. November.’)” onmouseout=”return nd()”>Multinational Monitor, 11/1997]

After experiencing some problems at its inception due to the resignation of its chair and vice-chair (see December 11, 2002 and December 13, 2002), the 9/11 Commission spends much of the next four months hiring staff, getting security clearances (see March 27, 2003), finding office space, and asking for a budget increase (see March 26, 2003). One of the first employees hired is executive director Philip Zelikow, but disputes within the Commission over who will be general council last until March, when Dan Marcus is hired. The Commission is unable to even have a telephone until February, when it finds an official security facility for its offices. However, then most of the Commission’s staff cannot enter their offices, because they do not have the relevant security clearances yet, even though there are no secret documents actually in the offices at this point. [Without Precedent. New York: Knopf.’)” onmouseout=”return nd()”>Kean and Hamilton, 2006, pp. 34-45]

Time reports that the 9/11 Commission has requested an additional $11 million to add to the $3 million for the commission, and the Bush administration has turned down the request. The request will not be added to a supplemental spending bill. A Republican member of the commission says the decision will make it “look like they have something to hide.” Another commissioner notes that the recent commission on the Columbia shuttle crash will have a $50 million budget. Stephen Push, a leader of the 9/11 victims’ families, says the decision “suggests to me that they see this as a convenient way for allowing the commission to fail. they’ve never wanted the commission and I feel the White House has always been looking for a way to kill it without having their finger on the murder weapon.” The administration has suggested it may grant the money later, but any delay will further slow down the commission’s work. Already, commission members are complaining that scant progress has been made in the four months since the commission started, and they are operating under a deadline. [Time. 26 March.’)” onmouseout=”return nd()”>Time, 3/26/2003] Three days later, it is reported that the Bush administration has agreed to extra funding, but only $9 million, not $11 million. The commission agrees to the reduced amount. [Washington Post. 29 March.’)” onmouseout=”return nd()”>Washington Post, 3/29/2003] The New York Times criticizes such penny-pinching, saying, “Reasonable people might wonder if the White House, having failed in its initial attempt to have Henry Kissinger steer the investigation, may be resorting to budgetary starvation as a tactic to hobble any politically fearless inquiry.” [New York Times. 31 March.’)” onmouseout=”return nd()”>New York Times, 3/31/2003]

It is reported that “most members” of the 9/11 Commission still have not received security clearances. [Washington Post. 27 March.’)” onmouseout=”return nd()”>Washington Post, 3/27/2003] For instance, Slade Gorton, picked in December 2002, is a former senator with a long background in intelligence issues. Fellow commissioner Lee Hamilton says, “It’s kind of astounding that someone like Senator Gorton can’t get immediate clearance. It’s a matter we are concerned about.” The commission is said to be at a “standstill” because of the security clearance issue, and cannot even read the classified findings of the previous 9/11 Congressional Inquiry. [Seattle Times. 12 March.’)” onmouseout=”return nd()”>Seattle Times, 3/12/2003]

An article highlights conflicts of interest amongst the commissioners on the 9/11 Commission. It had been previously reported that many of the commissioners had ties to the airline industry (see December 16, 2002), but a number have other ties. “At least three of the ten commissioners serve as directors of international financial or consulting firms, five work for law firms that represent airlines and three have ties to the US military or defense contractors, according to personal financial disclosures they were required to submit.” Bryan Doyle, project manager for the watchdog group Aviation Integrity Project says, “It is simply a failure on the part of the people making the selections to consider the talented pool of non-conflicted individuals.” Commission chairman Thomas Kean says that members are expected to steer clear of discussions that might present even the appearance of a conflict. [Associated Press. 28 March.’)” onmouseout=”return nd()”>Associated Press, 3/28/2003]

A status report released by the 9/11 Commission shows that various government agencies are not cooperating fully with the investigation. Neither the CIA nor the Justice Department have provided all requested documents. Lack of cooperation on the part of the Department of Defense “[is] becoming particularly serious,” and the commission has received no responses whatsoever to requests related to national air defenses. The FBI, State Department, and Transportation Department receive generally positive reviews. [Associated Press. 9 July.’)” onmouseout=”return nd()”>Associated Press, 7/9/2003] Commissioner Tim Roemer complains, “We’re not getting the kind of cooperation that we should be. We need a steady stream of information coming to us … Instead, We’re getting a trickle.” [Guardian. 10 July.’)” onmouseout=”return nd()”>Guardian, 7/10/2003] Chairman Thomas Kean is also troubled by the Bush administration’s insistence on having a Justice Department official present during interviews with federal officials. [Associated Press. 9 July.’)” onmouseout=”return nd()”>Associated Press, 7/9/2003] The 9/11 Commission is eventually forced to subpoena documents from the Defense Department and FAA (see October-November 2003).

The 9/11 Commission unanimously agrees to subpoena the FAA after it refuses to produce records relating to FAA notification to US air defenses concerning the hijacked planes on 9/11. The panel states, “This disturbing development at one agency has led the commission to reexamine its general policy of relying on document requests rather than subpoenas.” [Associated Press. 15 October.’)” onmouseout=”return nd()”>Associated Press, 10/15/2003] The commission also votes to subpoena the Pentagon for documents related to NORAD’s fighter response on 9/11. The commission says it is “especially dismayed” by incomplete document production on the part of NORAD. The commission explains, “In several cases we were assured that all requested records had been produced, but we then discovered, through investigation, that these assurances were mistaken.” [Associated Press. 7 November.’)” onmouseout=”return nd()”>Associated Press, 11/7/2003]

Several months into its investigation, the 9/11 Commission is already dissatisfied with the Department of Defense (see July 8, 2003). When its staff take a tour of a Northeast Air Defense Sector facility in Rome, New York, which helped coordinate the air defense on the day of 9/11, the staff enter the operations room, which has “more than twenty banks of operators: some weapons controllers and some flight controllers.” The staff find that the operators’ conversations are always tape-recorded, but the tapes for 9/11 have not yet been sent to the commission and, according to Commission Chairman Tom Kean and Vice-Chairman Lee Hamilton, “there were also discrepancies between things NORAD was telling [the commission] about their performance on the morning of September—things that the agency had stated publicly after 9/11—and the story told by the limited tapes and documents the commission had received.” Upon learning of the existence of the tapes, team leader John Farmer immediately suspends the tour and the interviews and flies to meet Kean in New Jersey. The commission subsequently subpoenas NORAD for the tapes (see October-November 2003), but, according to Kean and Hamilton, this means that “the staff had lost so much time that our hearing on the 9/11 story in the skies was postponed for months. Indeed, the delays from NORAD and the FAA made it highly unlikely that the team could complete its work as scheduled.” [Without Precedent. New York: Knopf.’)” onmouseout=”return nd()”>Kean and Hamilton, 2006, pp. 85-88] Chapter 1 of the commission’s final report will draw heavily on the tapes. [Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States.’)” onmouseout=”return nd()”>9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 1-46] However, the commission does not make the same effort with all day of 9/11 recordings. For example, it does not even find out which person(s) from the Department of Defense participated in a White House video conference chaired by counter-terrorism “tsar” Richard Clarke during the attacks. [Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States.’)” onmouseout=”return nd()”>9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 36]

Senators of both parties have been accusing the White House of stonewalling the 9/11 Commission by blocking its demands for documents despite threats of a subpoena. [Associated Press. 2003. “White House Is Said to Ignore 9/11 Panel.” 27 October.’)” onmouseout=”return nd()”>Associated Press, 10/27/2003] On this day, the White House and the 9/11 Commission strike a deal. The main issue is access to the presidential daily briefings given to President Bush. Under the deal, only some of the ten commissioners will be allowed to examine classified intelligence documents, and their notes will be subject to White House review. Some 9/11 victims’ relatives complain that the agreement gives the White House too much power. The Family Steering Committee complains, “All ten commissioners should have full, unfettered, and unrestricted access to all evidence.” It urges the public release of “the full, official, and final written agreement.” [Associated Press. 13 November.’)” onmouseout=”return nd()”>Associated Press, 11/13/2003] Commissioner Max Cleland is unsatisfied with the deal and resigns a short time later (see December 9, 2003).

Bob Kerrey, the former Nebraska senator who also served as the ranking Democrat on the Senate Intelligence Committee, is appointed to the 9/11 Commission, replacing Max Cleland, who leaves the commission to accept a position on the board of the Export-Import Bank. [Washington Post. 10 December.’)” onmouseout=”return nd()”>Washington Post, 12/10/2003] Just before resigning, Cleland called the Bush administration’s attempts to stonewall and “slow walk” the commission a “national scandal.” He criticized the commission for cutting a deal with the White House that compromised their access to information, and said, “I’m not going to be part of looking at information only partially. I’m not going to be part of just coming to quick conclusions. I’m not going to be part of political pressure to do this or not do that. I’m not going to be part of that. This is serious.” [Salon. 21 November.’)” onmouseout=”return nd()”>Salon, 11/21/2003]

The New York Times later reports that in private discussions with the 9/11 Commission in January 2002, National Security Adviser “Rice [is] asked about statements she made in 2001 and 2002 [(see May 16, 2002)] that ‘we could not have imagined’ that terrorists would use aircraft as weapons by piloting them into buildings. She [tells] the commission that she regret[s] those comments, because at the time she was not aware of intelligence, developed in the late 1990s, that some terrorists were thinking of using airplanes as guided missiles. She told the commission in the private session that she should have said, ‘I could not have imagined,’ according to one official familiar with the testimony, making it clear that some in the intelligence community knew about those threats but that she did not.” [New York Times. 6 April.’)” onmouseout=”return nd()”>New York Times, 4/6/2004] However, in a March 22, 2004 op-ed for the Washington Post entitled “For the Record,” she essentially repeats her 2002 comments, claiming, “Despite what some have suggested, we received no intelligence that terrorists were preparing to attack the homeland using airplanes as missiles, though some analysts speculated that terrorists might hijack airplanes to try to free US-held terrorists.” [Washington Post. 22 March.’)” onmouseout=”return nd()”>Washington Post, 3/22/2004]

Rep. Curt Weldon. [Source: House of Representatives]Rep. Curt Weldon (R) is not yet familiar with Able Danger, though he will help bring information about the program to light in 2005. However, he is familiar with the closely related Land Information Warfare Activity (LIWA) program, having had dealings with it before 9/11. He says he is frustrated at the apparent lack of understanding about programs like LIWA based on the lines of questioning at public 9/11 Commission hearings in early 2004, so, “On at least four occasions, I personally tried to brief the 9/11 Commissioners on: NOAH [Weldon’s pre-9/11 suggestion to have a National Operations and Analysis Hub]; integrative data collaboration capabilities; my frustration with intelligence stovepipes; and al-Qaeda analysis. However, I was never able to achieve more than a five-minute telephone conversation with Commissioner Thomas Kean. On March 24, 2004, I also had my Chief of Staff personally hand deliver a document about LIWA, along [with] questions for George Tenet to the Commission, but neither was ever used.” [US Congress. Senate. Committee on Judiciary, 9/21/2005] He says, “The next week, they sent a staffer over to pick up some additional materials about the NIWA, about the concept, and about information I had briefed them on. They never followed up and invited me to come in and meet with them. So they can’t say that I didn’t try.” [Office of Congressman Curt Weldon, 9/17/2005]

Following an October 2003 meeting with three members of the 9/11 Commission’s staff (see October 21, 2003), Lt. Col. Anthony Shaffer tries contacting Philip Zelikow, the commission’s executive director, as requested by Zelikow himself. Shaffer is an Army intelligence officer who worked closely with a military intelligence unit called Able Danger, which identified Mohamed Atta and three other future 9/11 hijackers in early 2000 (see January-February 2000). He phones Zelikow’s number the first week of January 2004. The person who replies tells him, “I will talk to Dr. Zelikow and find out when he wants you to come in.” However, Shaffer receives no call back, so a week later he phones again. This time, the person who answers him says, “Dr. Zelikow tells me that he does not see the need for you to come in. We have all the information on Able Danger.” [Government Security News. September.’)” onmouseout=”return nd()”>Government Security News, 9/2005] Yet the commission doesn’t even receive the Able Danger documentation they had previously requested from the Defense Department until the following month (see February 2004). [Thomas H. Kean and Lee H. Hamilton, 8/12/2005 ]

The Washington Post reports, “A growing number of [9/11 Commission] members [have] concluded that the panel needs more time to prepare a thorough and credible accounting of missteps leading to the terrorist attacks.” As a result, the commission is asking Congress to vote on approving a several month extension to finish their report. “But the White House and leading Republicans have informed the panel that they oppose any delay, which raises the possibility that Sept. 11-related controversies could emerge during the heat of the presidential campaign.” [Washington Post. 19 January.’)” onmouseout=”return nd()”>Washington Post, 1/19/2004] The White House will reverse its stance a month later (see February 5, 2004).

In January 2004, the White House announced that it opposed giving the 9/11 Commission more time to complete its work (see January 19, 2004). But on this day, CNN reports, “After resisting the idea for months, the White House announced … its support for a request from the commission investigating the September 11, 2001 attacks for more time to complete its work.” 9/11 victims’ relatives and some politicians had been pressuring the White House to support the deadline extension. [CNN. 5 February.’)” onmouseout=”return nd()”>CNN, 2/5/2004]

The 9/11 Commission gets greater access to classified intelligence briefings under a new agreement with the White House. The 10-member panel had been barred from reviewing notes concerning the presidential daily briefings taken by three of its own commissioners and the commission’s director in December 2003. The new agreement allows all commission members the opportunity to read White House-edited versions of the summaries. The White House had faced criticisms for allowing only some commissioners to see the notes. Still, only three commissioners are allowed to see the original, unclassified documents. [Associated Press. 10 February.’)” onmouseout=”return nd()”>Associated Press, 2/10/2004]

It is reported the 9/11 Commission now believes that the hijackers used short knives instead of box cutters. The New York Observer comments, “Remember the airlines’ first reports, that the whole job was pulled off with box cutters? In fact, investigators for the commission found that box cutters were reported on only one plane [Flight 77]. In any case, box cutters were considered straight razors and were always illegal. Thus the airlines switched their story and produced a snap-open knife of less than four inches at the hearing. This weapon falls conveniently within the aviation-security guidelines pre-9/11.” [New York Observer. 11 February.’)” onmouseout=”return nd()”>New York Observer, 2/11/2004] It was publicly revealed in late 2002 that box cutters were illegal on 9/11. [Associated Press. 11 November.’)” onmouseout=”return nd()”>Associated Press, 11/11/2002]

Sibel Edmonds testifies before the 9/11 Commission in a specially constructed “bug-proof” secure room for three and a half hours, describing in detail problems she witnessed while working as an FBI linguist (see, e.g., September 20, 2001 and After, (After September 14, 2001-October 2001), Early October 2001, (Late October 2001), (November 2001), and December 2, 2001). A month later, she tells the Independent: “I gave [the commission] details of specific investigation files, the specific dates, specific target information, specific managers in charge of the investigation. I gave them everything so that they could go back and follow up. This is not hearsay. These are things that are documented. These things can be established very easily. … There was general information about the time-frame, about methods to be used but not specifically about how they would be used and about people being in place and who was ordering these sorts of terror attacks. There were other cities that were mentioned. Major cities with skyscrapers (see April 2001).” [Independent. 2 April.’)” onmouseout=”return nd()”>Independent, 4/2/2004] In its final report (see July 22, 2004), the 9/11 Commission will make no mention of the problems Edmonds witnessed with the FBI’s translation unit, save for a single footnote. [Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States.’)” onmouseout=”return nd()”>9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 222; Edmonds, 8/1/2004] One month earlier, a reporter had asked one of the Democratic commissioners about the Edmonds case, and he replied, “It sounds like it’s too deep in the weeds for us to consider, we’re looking at broader issues.” [New York Observer. 22 January.’)” onmouseout=”return nd()”>New York Observer, 1/22/2004]

Philip Zelikow. [Source: Miller Center]The 9-11 Family Steering Committee and 9-11 Citizens Watch demand the resignation of Philip Zelikow, executive director of the 9/11 Commission. The demand comes shortly after former counterterrorism “tsar” Richard Clarke told the New York Times that Zelikow was present when he gave briefings on the threat posed by al-Qaeda to National Security Adviser Rice from December 2000 to January 2001. The Family Steering Committee, a group of 9/11 victims’ relatives, writes, “It is clear that [Zelikow] should never have been permitted to be a member of the commission, since it is the mandate of the commission to identify the source of failures. It is now apparent why there has been so little effort to assign individual culpability. We now can see that trail would lead directly to the staff director himself.” Zelikow has been interviewed by his own commission because of his role during the transition period. But a spokesman for the commission claims that having Zelikow recluse himself from certain topics is enough to avoid any conflicts of interest. [New York Times. 20 March.’)” onmouseout=”return nd()”>New York Times, 3/20/2004; United Press International. 23 March.’)” onmouseout=”return nd()”>United Press International, 3/23/2004] 9/11 Commission Chairman Thomas Kean defends Zelikow, calling him “one of the best experts on terrorism in the whole area of intelligence in the entire country” and “the best possible person we could have found for the job.” [NBC Meet the Press. 4 April.’)” onmouseout=”return nd()”>NBC, 4/4/2004] However, Salon points out that the “long list” of Zelikow’s writings “includes only one article focused on terrorism,” and he appears to have written nothing about al-Qaeda. [Salon. 6 April.’)” onmouseout=”return nd()”>Salon, 4/6/2004]

Richard Clarke sworn in before the 9/11 Commission. [Source: CBC]Just a few days after releasing a new book, former counterterrorism “tsar” Richard Clarke testifies before the 9/11 Commission. His opening statement consists of little more than an apology to the relatives of the 9/11 victims. He says, “Your government failed you, those entrusted with protecting you failed you, and I failed you. For that failure, I would ask … for your understanding and forgiveness.” Under questioning, he praises the Clinton administration, saying, “My impression was that fighting terrorism, in general, and fighting al-Qaeda, in particular, were an extraordinarily high priority in the Clinton administration—certainly no higher priority.” But he’s very critical of the Bush administration, stating, “By invading Iraq … the president of the United States has greatly undermined the war on terrorism.” He says that under Bush before 9/11, terrorism was “an important issue, but not an urgent issue. … [CIA Director] George Tenet and I tried very hard to create a sense of urgency by seeing to it that intelligence reports on the al-Qaeda threat were frequently given to the president and other high-level officials. But although I continue to say it was an urgent problem, I don’t think it was ever treated that way.” He points out that he made proposals to fight al-Qaeda in late January 2001. While the gist of them were implemented after 9/11, he complains, “I didn’t really understand why they couldn’t have been done in February [2001].” He says that with a more robust intelligence and covert action program, “we might have been able to nip [the plot] in the bud.” [Washington Post. 24 March.’)” onmouseout=”return nd()”>Washington Post, 3/24/2004; New York Times. 24 March.’)” onmouseout=”return nd()”>New York Times, 3/24/2004; Wednesday 9/11 Commission Hearings: A Transcript of Today\’s Testimony.’)” onmouseout=”return nd()”>9/11 Commission, 3/24/2004] It soon emerges that President Bush’s top lawyer places a telephone call to at least one of the Republican members of the commission just before Clarke’s testimony. Critics call that an unethical interference in the hearings. [Washington Post. 1 April.’)” onmouseout=”return nd()”>Washington Post, 4/1/2004] Democratic commissioner Bob Kerrey complains, “To call commissioners and coach them on what they ought to say is a terrible mistake.” [New York Daily News. 2 April.’)” onmouseout=”return nd()”>New York Daily News, 4/2/2004]

The Bush administration bows to growing pressure in the wake of former counterterrorism “tsar” Richard Clarke’s testimony before the 9/11 Commission (see March 21, 2004) and agrees to allow National Security Adviser Rice to testify before the commission in public and under oath. However, according to the New York Times, “In exchange for her appearance, the [9/11 Commission] agreed not to seek testimony from other White House aides at public hearings, although it can continue to question them in private.” [New York Times. 31 March.’)” onmouseout=”return nd()”>New York Times, 3/31/2004]

Republicans attack Richard Clarke in the wake of his new book and 9/11 Commission testimony (see March 24, 2004), while Democrats defend him. [New York Times. 25 March.’)” onmouseout=”return nd()”>New York Times, 3/25/2004] Senator John McCain (R) calls the attacks “the most vigorous offensive I’ve ever seen from the administration on any issue.” [Washington Post. 28 March.’)” onmouseout=”return nd()”>Washington Post, 3/28/2004] Republicans on the 9/11 Commission criticize him while Democrats praise him. The White House violates a long-standing confidentiality policy by authorizing Fox News to air remarks favorable to Bush that Clarke had made anonymously at an administration briefing in 2002. National Security Adviser Rice says to the media, “There are two very different stories here. These stories can’t be reconciled.” However, in what the Washington Post calls a “masterful bit of showmanship,” Clarke replies that he emphasized the positives in 2002 because he was asked to, but did not lie. [Fox News. 2004. “Transcript: Clarke Praises Bush Team in \’02.” 24 March.’)” onmouseout=”return nd()”>Fox News, 3/24/2004; Washington Post. 25 March.’)” onmouseout=”return nd()”>Washington Post, 3/25/2004; Washington Post. 26 March.’)” onmouseout=”return nd()”>Washington Post, 3/26/2004] Republican Senate leader Bill Frist asks “If [Clarke] lied under oath to the United States Congress” in closed testimony in 2002. [Washington Post. 27 March.’)” onmouseout=”return nd()”>Washington Post, 3/27/2004] However, a review of declassified citations from Clarke’s 2002 testimony provides no evidence of contradiction, and White House officials familiar with the testimony agree that any differences are matters of emphasis, not fact. [Washington Post. 4 April.’)” onmouseout=”return nd()”>Washington Post, 4/4/2004] Republican leaders threaten to release his 2002 testimony, and Clarke claims he welcomes the release. The testimony remains classified. [Associated Press. 26 March.’)” onmouseout=”return nd()”>Associated Press, 3/26/2004; Associated Press. 2004. “Ex-Bush Aide Calls for Testimony on Terrorism to Be Opened.” 28 March.’)” onmouseout=”return nd()”>Associated Press, 3/28/2004] Clarke also calls on Rice to release all e-mail communications between the two of them before 9/11; this is not released either. [Guardian. 29 March.’)” onmouseout=”return nd()”>Guardian, 3/29/2004] Vice President Cheney calls Clarke “out of the loop” on terrorism. A Slate editorial calls Cheney’s comment “laughably absurd. Clarke wasn’t just in the loop, he was the loop.” [Slate. 23 March.’)” onmouseout=”return nd()”>Slate, 3/23/2004] Even Clarke’s later political opponent Rice says Clarke was very much involved. [New York Times. 25 March.’)” onmouseout=”return nd()”>New York Times, 3/25/2004] Clarke responds by pointing out that he voted Republican in 2000 and he pledges under oath not to seek a post if Senator John Kerry wins the 2004 Presidential election. [Washington Post. 24 March.’)” onmouseout=”return nd()”>Washington Post, 3/24/2004] According to Reuters, a number of political experts conclude, “The White House may have mishandled accusations leveled by their former counterterrorism adviser Richard Clarke by attacking his credibility, keeping the controversy firmly in the headlines into a second week.” [Reuters. 29 March.’)” onmouseout=”return nd()”>Reuters, 3/29/2004]

Condoleezza Rice sworn in before the 9/11 Commission. [Source: Larry Downing/ Reuters]National Security Adviser Rice testifies before the 9/11 Commission under oath and with the threat of perjury. The Bush administration originally opposed her appearance, but relented after great public demand. [Independent. 3 April.’)” onmouseout=”return nd()”>Independent, 4/3/2004] In her statement she repeats her claim that “almost all of the reports [before 9/11] focused on al-Qaeda activities outside the United States. … The information that was specific enough to be actionable referred to terrorists operation overseas.” Moreover, she stresses that the “kind of analysis about the use of airplanes as weapons actually was never briefed to us.” But she concedes, “In fact there were some reports done in ’98 and ’99. I think I was—I was certainly not aware of them…” [Washington Post. 2004. “Transcript: Rice\’s Testimony on 9/11.” 8 April.’)” onmouseout=”return nd()”>Washington Post, 4/8/2004] During heated questioning several subjects are discussed: Why didn’t counterterrorism “tsar” Richard Clarke brief President Bush on al-Qaeda before September 11? Clarke says he had wished to do so, but Rice states, “Clarke never asked me to brief the president on counterterrorism.” [Washington Post. 2004. “Transcript: Rice\’s Testimony on 9/11.” 8 April.’)” onmouseout=”return nd()”>Washington Post, 4/8/2004] What was the content of the briefing President Bush received on August 6, 2001 (see August 6, 2001)? While Rice repeatedly underlines that it was “a historical memo … not threat reporting,” Commissioners Richard Ben-Veniste and Tim Roemer ask her why then it cannot be declassified. [Washington Post. 2004. “Transcript: Rice\’s Testimony on 9/11.” 8 April.’)” onmouseout=”return nd()”>Washington Post, 4/8/2004] Two days later the White House finally publishes it, and it is shown to contain more than just historical information. Did Rice tell Bush of the existence of al-Qaeda cells in the US before August 6, 2001? Rice says that she does not remember whether she “discussed it with the president.” [Washington Post. 2004. “Transcript: Rice\’s Testimony on 9/11.” 8 April.’)” onmouseout=”return nd()”>Washington Post, 4/8/2004] Were warnings properly passed on? Rice points out, “The FBI issued at least three nationwide warnings to federal, state, and law enforcement agencies, and specifically stated that although the vast majority of the information indicated overseas targets, attacks against the homeland could not be ruled out. The FBI tasked all 56 of its US field offices to increase surveillance of known suspected terrorists and to reach out to known informants who might have information on terrorist activities.” But Commissioner Jamie Gorelick remarks, “We have no record of that. The Washington field office international terrorism people say they never heard about the threat, they never heard about the warnings.” [Washington Post. 2004. “Transcript: Rice\’s Testimony on 9/11.” 8 April.’)” onmouseout=”return nd()”>Washington Post, 4/8/2004] Rice does not apologize to the families of the victims, as Clarke did weeks earlier. The Associated Press comments, “The blizzard of words in Condoleezza Rice’s testimony Thursday did not resolve central points about what the government knew, should have known, did and should have done before the September 11 terrorist attacks.” [Associated Press. 8 April.’)” onmouseout=”return nd()”>Associated Press, 4/8/2004] The Washington Post calls “her testimony an ambitious feat of jujitsu: On one hand, she made a case that ‘for more than 20 years, the terrorist threat gathered, and America’s response across several administrations of both parties was insufficient.’ At the same time, she argued that there was nothing in particular the Bush administration itself could have done differently that would have prevented the attacks of September 11, 2001—that there was no absence of vigor in the White House’s response to al-Qaeda during its first 233 days in office. The first thesis is undeniably true; the second both contradictory and implausible.” [Washington Post. 9 April.’)” onmouseout=”return nd()”>Washington Post, 4/9/2004]

The first day of the 9/11 Commission’s eleventh public hearing in New York produces an adverse reaction in the New York press, due to questioning of former city officials by Commissioner John Lehman. The second day is begun by former New York Mayor Rudy Giuliani, whose opening statement draws considerable applause from the audience and who won Time magazine’s Person of the Year award for 2001. [Time. 22 December.’)” onmouseout=”return nd()”>Time, 12/22/2001; Without Precedent. New York: Knopf.’)” onmouseout=”return nd()”>Kean and Hamilton, 2006, pp. 226-228] According to Commission Chairman Thomas Kean and Co-chairman Lee Hamilton, “Each commissioner opens his or her questioning with lavish praise.” For instance, Richard Ben-Veniste: “Your leadership on that day and in the days following gave the rest of the nation, and indeed the world, an unvarnished view of the indomitable spirit and the humanity of this great city, and for that I salute you.” Jim Thompson thanks him for “setting an example to us all.” John Lehman: “There was no question the captain was on the bridge.” Kean: “New York City on that terrible day in a sense was blessed because it had you as a leader.” This draws a mixed reaction from the audience, some of whom support Giuliani and some of whom want “real questions.” Kean and Hamilton will later say that: “The questioning of Mayor Giuliani was a low point in terms of the commission’s questioning of witnesses at our public hearings. We did not ask tough questions, nor did we get all of the information we needed to put on the public record. We were affected by the controversy over Lehman’s comments, and by the excellent quality of the mayor’s presentation.” [Without Precedent. New York: Knopf.’)” onmouseout=”return nd()”>Kean and Hamilton, 2006, pp. 228-231]

Shortly before the 9/11 Commission is due to release its final report (see July 22, 2004), Commission Chairman Thomas Kean says, “We believe. . . . that there were a lot more active contacts, frankly, [between al-Qaeda and] Iran and with Pakistan than there were with Iraq.” [Time. 16 July.’)” onmouseout=”return nd()”>Time, 7/16/2004] The US media immediately runs prominent stories on the Commission’s evidence regarding Iran and nearly completely ignores evidence regarding Pakistan. The Commission’s final report mentions that around ten of the hijackers passed through Iran in late 2000 and early 2001. At least some Iranian officials turned a blind eye to the passage of al-Qaeda agents, but there was no evidence that the Iranian government had any foreknowledge or involvement in the 9/11 plot. [Time. 16 July.’)” onmouseout=”return nd()”>Time, 7/16/2004; Reuters. 2004. “CIA: 9/11 Plotters Transited Iran, Govt Tie Unseen.” 18 July.’)” onmouseout=”return nd()”>Reuters, 7/18/2004] In the wake of these findings, President Bush states of Iran, “As to direct connections with September 11, we’re digging into the facts to determine if there was one.” This puts Bush at odds with his own CIA, which has seen no Iran-9/11 ties. [Los Angeles Times. 20 July.’)” onmouseout=”return nd()”>Los Angeles Times, 7/20/2004] Bush has long considered Iran part of his “axis of evil,” and there has been talk of the US attacking or overthrowing the Iranian government. [Reuters. 2004. “CIA: 9/11 Plotters Transited Iran, Govt Tie Unseen.” 18 July.’)” onmouseout=”return nd()”>Reuters, 7/18/2004] Provocative articles appear, such as one in the Daily Telegraph titled, “Now America Accuses Iran of Complicity in World Trade Center Attack.” [Daily Telegraph. 18 July.’)” onmouseout=”return nd()”>Daily Telegraph, 7/18/2004] Yet, while this information on Iran makes front page news in most major newspapers, evidence of a much stronger connection between Pakistan and 9/11 is nearly completely ignored. For instance, only UPI reports on a document suggesting high-level Pakistani involvement in the 9/11 attacks that is revealed this same week. [United Press International. 22 July.’)” onmouseout=”return nd()”>United Press International, 7/22/2004] Furthermore, the 9/11 Commission’s final report will contain almost nothing on Pakistan’s ties to al-Qaeda, despite evidence given to the Commission that, according to one commissioner speaking to the Los Angeles Times, showed that Pakistan was “up to their eyeballs” in intrigue with al-Qaeda. [Los Angeles Times. 16 July.’)” onmouseout=”return nd()”>Los Angeles Times, 7/16/2004; Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States.’)” onmouseout=”return nd()”>9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004]

Towards the end of its tenure, the ten members of the 9/11 Commission secretly meet to discuss whether military and aviation officials deliberately misled them and the public. For over two years following 9/11, NORAD and the FAA had given information in testimony and media appearances later found to be incorrect. Authorities claimed that America’s air defenses reacted quickly on 9/11, with fighters launched in response to the last two hijackings and ready to shoot down Flight 93 if it threatened Washington, DC. Yet audiotapes from the FAA and NORAD obtained by the commission under subpoena showed that the military never had any of the hijacked airliners in its sights and only became aware of Flight 93 after it crashed. John Farmer, a senior counsel to the commission, says the military’s original story was “a whole different order of magnitude than spin. It simply wasn’t true.” The commissioners debate whether to refer the matter to the Justice Department for criminal investigation, but as a compromise they instead refer it to the inspectors general for the Pentagon and the Transportation Department (which includes the FAA). The Pentagon inspector general’s office will issue a secret report to Congress in May 2005, blaming the inaccuracies partly on “inadequate forensic capabilities,” including poor log keeping at the military air traffic control centers (see May 27, 2005). However, Farmer and other commission staff will later point out that the military had already reviewed the NORAD audiotapes before its officials gave their inaccurate testimonies. The 9/11 Commission’s concerns over whether it was deliberately misled will only come to light in news reports in August 2006. Thomas Kean, its former chairman, will say, “We to this day don’t know why NORAD told us what they told us. It was just so far from the truth.” [Vanity Fair. 1 August.’)” onmouseout=”return nd()”>Vanity Fair, 8/1/2006; Washington Post. 2 August.’)” onmouseout=”return nd()”>Washington Post, 8/2/2006; New York Times. 5 August.’)” onmouseout=”return nd()”>New York Times, 8/5/2006] The Transportation Department’s inspector general’s office will issue its report in response to the commission’s referral in September 2006 (see September 1, 2006).

In a footnote contained in its Final Report, the 9/11 Commission dismissed allegations of insider trading in the days preceding 9/11. According to the Final Report, the put options of the parent companies of United Airlines were placed by a “US-based institutional investor with no conceivable ties to al-Qaeda” “as part of a trading strategy that also included buying 115,000 shares of American on September 10.” With respect to the highly suspicious trading on the parent company of American Airlines, the Commission stated that much of the trades were “traced to a specific US-based options trading newsletter, faxed to its subscribers on Sunday, September 9, which recommended these trades.” According to the Commission, “The SEC and the FBI, aided by other agencies and the securities industry, devoted enormous resources to investigating this issue, including securing the cooperation of many foreign governments. These investigators have found that the apparently suspicious consistently proved innocuous.” [Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States.’)” onmouseout=”return nd()”>9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 499]

Senator Mark Dayton. [Source: Publicity photo]Senator Mark Dayton (D) charges that NORAD and the FAA have covered up “catastrophic failures” that left the nation vulnerable during the 9/11 hijackings. He says, “For almost three years now, NORAD officials and FAA officials have been able to hide their critical failures that left this country defenseless during two of the worst hours in our history.” He notes major discrepancies between various accounts and chronologies given by officials. He says NORAD officials “lied to the American people, they lied to Congress and they lied to your 9/11 Commission to create a false impression of competence, communication and protection of the American people.” He calls the FAA’s and NORAD’s failures “the most gross incompetence and dereliction of responsibility and negligence that I’ve ever, under those extreme circumstances, witnessed in the public sector.” He says that he grew upset about these failures after staying up late and reading the 9/11 Commission’s final report. [Star-Tribune (Minneapolis). 30 July.’)” onmouseout=”return nd()”>Star-Tribune (Minneapolis), 7/30/2004]

The cover of Harper’s Magazine, October 2004, depicting the whitewashing of the 9/11 Commission. [Source: Harper’s Magazine]Bucking the trend of generally positive reviews of the 9/11 Commission’s final report, Harper’s Magazine publishes a cover story harshly criticizing the report. The story opines, “The plain, sad reality … is that The 9/11 Commission Report, despite the vast quantity of labor behind it, is a cheat and a fraud. It stands as a series of evasive maneuvers that infantilize the audience, transform candor into iniquity, and conceal realities that demand immediate inspection and confrontation. … In the course of blaming everybody a little, the Commission blames nobody—blurs the reasons for the actions and hesitations of successive administrations, masks choices that, fearlessly defined, might actually have vitalized our public political discourse.” [Harper\’s. October.’)” onmouseout=”return nd()”>Harper’s, 10/2004]

A report by the 9/11 Commission on the FAA and 9/11 is publicly released. The fact that the report reveals nearly half of all FAA daily briefings between April and early September 2001 mentioned al-Qaeda, bin Laden, or both causes headlines (see April 1, 2001-September 10, 2001). However, the report was actually completed in August 2004 but was held up by the Bush administration. Some speculate that the publication of the report was delayed until after the November 2004 presidential election to help Bush get reelected. For instance, 9/11 victim’s relative Carol Ashley states, “I’m just appalled that this was withheld for five months. That contributes to the idea that the government knew something and didn’t act, it contributes to the conspiracy theories out there.” Representative Henry Waxman (D) asks for a hearing on whether the Bush administration played politics with the report’s release, but the Republican-controlled House of Representatives doesn’t allow such a hearing. [Associated Press. 2005. “9/11 Commission: FAA Had al Qaeda Warnings.” 11 February.’)” onmouseout=”return nd()”>Associated Press, 2/11/2005] Additionally, the released version of this report is heavily censored in some areas. The 9/11 Commission asserts that the whole report should be released, but the Bush administration is blocking their efforts to release the censored portions. Politicians, 9/11 victims’ relatives, open-government advocates, and others call for the release of the entire report, but to no avail. [New York Times. 11 February.’)” onmouseout=”return nd()”>New York Times, 2/11/2005]

It is announced that Philip Zelikow, Executive Director for the 9/11 Commission, has been chosen to serve as a senior adviser for Condoleezza Rice in her new position as Secretary of State. [Richmond Times-Dispatch. 28 February.’)” onmouseout=”return nd()”>Richmond Times-Dispatch, 2/28/2005] 9/11 victims’ relatives groups had demanded Zelikow’s resignation from the 9/11 Commission, claiming conflict of interest, including being too close to Rice (see March 21, 2004).

Former leaders of the 9/11 Commission, Thomas Kean and Lee Hamilton, release a statement saying that panel staff members have found no documents or other witnesses that support allegations that hijacker Mohamed Atta was identified by a secret Pentagon program, known as Able Danger, before the 9/11 attacks. The existence of Able Danger first received wide public attention a few days before by the New York Times (see August 11, 2005). According to the commissioners, “The interviewee had no documentary evidence” to back up his claims and “the Commission staff concluded that the officer’s account was not sufficiently reliable to warrant revision of the report or further investigation.” [Thomas H. Kean and Lee H. Hamilton, 8/12/2005 ; Washington Post. 13 August.’)” onmouseout=”return nd()”>Washington Post, 8/13/2005]

A new version of a report by the 9/11 Commission on the FAA and 9/11, which was completed in August 2004, is publicly released. A heavily censored version of the same report came out in February 2005 (see February 10, 2005). Commission members complained that the deleted material included information crucial to understanding what went wrong on 9/11. The newly released version restores dozens of portions of the report, but numerous references to shortcomings in aviation security remain blacked out. Thomas Kean and Lee Hamilton, the former heads of the 9/11 Commission, state: “While we still believe that the entire document could be made available to the public without damaging national security, we welcome this step forward.” Commission officials say they were perplexed by the White House’s original attempts to black out material that they considered trivial or mundane. [Associated Press. 13 September.’)” onmouseout=”return nd()”>Associated Press, 9/13/2005; New York Times. 14 September.’)” onmouseout=”return nd()”>New York Times, 9/14/2005]

Former members of the 9/11 Commission dismiss recent allegations regarding a secret military intelligence unit called Able Danger, which had been set up in 1999 to bring together information about al-Qaeda. Several former members of the unit have come forward claiming the program identified Mohamed Atta and three other 9/11 hijackers more than a year before the attacks (see August 17, 2005; August 22-September 1, 2005). The 9/11 Commission has been criticized for not mentioning Able Danger in its final report. In response, its former chairman, Thomas Kean, claims there is no evidence that anyone in the government knew about Mohamed Atta before 9/11, and there are no documents that verify the claims made by former members of the unit. However, the Pentagon has recently confirmed that documents associated with Able Danger were destroyed in accordance with regulations about gathering intelligence on people inside the US. Another former commissioner, Slade Gorton, says, “Bluntly, it just didn’t happen and that’s the conclusion of all 10 of us.” But a spokesman for Rep. Curt Weldon (R), who helped bring to light the existence of the program, says that none of the commissioners met with anyone from Able Danger, “yet they choose to speak with some form of certainty without firsthand knowledge.” [Associated Press. 15 September.’)” onmouseout=”return nd()”>Associated Press, 9/15/2005; Fox News. 2005. “Sources: Pentagon Wants \’Able Danger\’ Hearings Closed.” 16 September.’)” onmouseout=”return nd()”>Fox News, 9/16/2005] The commission’s claim that no one in the US knew about Mohamed Atta before 9/11 is further contradicted by reports stating that the CIA had been tracking him while he was still in Germany, early in 2000 (see January-May 2000). And soon after 9/11, Newsweek reported US officials stating that Atta “had been known as [an associate] of Islamic terrorists” well before 9/11. [Newsweek. 20 September.’)” onmouseout=”return nd()”>Newsweek, 9/20/2001]

The 9/11 Commission interviewed presidents Bill Clinton and George W. Bush in 2004 (see April 29, 2004) but the details of what was revealed in these interviews were not included in the commission’s final report (with one exception, see August 6, 2001). On this day, former 9/11 Commission Richard Ben-Veniste says, “I had hoped that we had—we would have made both the Clinton interview and the Bush interview a part of our report, but that was not to be. I was outvoted on that question. … I didn’t have the votes. … I think the question was that there was a degree of confidentiality associated with that and that we would take from that the output that is reflected in the report, but go no further. And that until some five years’ time after our work, we would keep that confidential. I thought we would be better to make all of the information that we had available to the public and make our report as transparent as possible so that the American public could have that.” [CNN. 2006. “Unexpected Extension for US Soldiers; Iraq: Fueling Terror?; NSA Wiretap Bill.” 25 September.’)” onmouseout=”return nd()”>CNN, 9/25/2006]

(Washington, DC) — Judicial Watch, the public interest group that investigates and prosecutes government corruption, today released new documents from the Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”) related to the “expeditious departure” of Saudi nationals, including members of the bin Laden family, from the United States following the 9/11 attacks. According to one of the formerly confidential documents, dated 9/21/2001, terrorist Osama bin Laden may have chartered one of the Saudi flights.

The document states: “ON 9/19/01, A 727 PLANE LEFT LAX, RYAN FLT 441 TO ORLANDO, FL W/ETA (estimated time of arrival) OF 4-5PM. THE PLANE WAS CHARTERED EITHER BY THE SAUDI ARABIAN ROYAL FAMILY OR OSAMA BIN LADEN…THE LA FBI SEARCHED THE PLANE [REDACTED] LUGGAGE, OF WHICH NOTHING UNUSUAL WAS FOUND.” The plane was allowed to depart the United States after making four stops to pick up passengers, ultimately landing in Paris where all passengers disembarked on 9/20/01, according to the document_

Overall, the FBI’s most recent document production includes details of the six flights between 9/14 and 9/24 that evacuated Saudi royals and bin Laden family members. The documents also contain brief interview summaries and occasional notes from intelligence analysts concerning the cursory screening performed prior to the departures. According to the FBI documents, incredibly not a single Saudi national nor any of the bin Laden family members possessed any information of investigative value.

Moreover, the documents contain numerous errors and inconsistencies which call to question the thoroughness of the FBI’s investigation of the Saudi flights. For example, on one document, the FBI claims to have interviewed 20 of 23 passengers on the Ryan International Airlines flight (commonly referred to as the “Bin Laden Family Flight”). On another document, the FBI claims to have interviewed 15 of 22 passengers on the same flight.

“Eight days after the worst terrorist attack in U.S. history, Osama bin Laden possibly charters a flight to whisk his family out of the country, and it’s not worth more than a luggage search and a few brief interviews?” asked Judicial Watch President Tom Fitton. “Clearly these documents prove the FBI conducted a slapdash investigation of these Saudi flights. We’ll never know how many investigative leads were lost due to the FBI’s lack of diligence.”

U.S. District Court Judge Richard W. Roberts ordered the FBI to resubmit “proper disclosures” to the Court and Judicial Watch, having previously criticized the adequacy of redaction descriptions, the validity of exemption claims, and other errors in the FBI’s disclosures. Incredibly, the FBI had previously redacted Osama bin Laden’s name from the records in order “to protect privacy interests.”

The latest version of the FBI documents, obtained under the provisions of the Freedom of Information Act and through ongoing litigation (Judicial Watch v. Department of Homeland Security & Federal Bureau of Investigation, No. 04-1643 (RWR)) is available below.

Click here to view the latest version of the FBI Saudi Flight Documents

Click here to watch Chris Farrell, Judicial Watch Director of Research and Investigations, on FOX News, discussing the documents.

My third day in DC began upon awakening at my new friend’s apartment in Arlington…then a mighty breakfast at a local establishment that helped me to remember fondly the days of truck stop food…you know, the typical greasy spoon stuff. It was awesome.

I wore my new “Arrest Bush” t-shirt for the day of the big march, and I got appreciative looks from nearly everyone I passed. It’s got the Articles of Impeachment on the back.
Pretty nifty…I’ll link you to Laurie’s group on that…if you want to get one. Suggested donations are like ten apiece (but more if you can, less if you can’t)…a pittance for such a fine article of clothing. Here I am pimping mine in DC…showing the DC cops where the real criminal lives…this was from the day of the protest, incidentally.

I think I had my eyes closed but I just pointed to the stench that was emanating from the address at 1600 Pennsylvania…oh yea, there was a HUGE pile of horse shit on the front lawn that day. Not sure why. Anyhow…

When we were trying to find a parking place we drove by the counter-protest assembling under a spotty stream (not sea) of American flags and occasional Vietnam vet bikers…gathering to pump themselves up for what was one of the most lopsided responses to a peace march I think that’s ever been shamefully presented as a “counter” to our massive effort there on 9/15. It seemed pretty corny from a distance, and it got even sillier face to face with those people, believe me.

Lafayette Square was already crowded an hour before the march was scheduled to start…people from all walks of life, all economic backgrounds, all cultural and racial heritages…so many people. Thousands…and all there to promote the cause of peace. I was impressed, to say the least. The largest gathering I’d been to recently that could hold a candle to it was the Rainbow Gathering in Fallsville, Arkansas, right down from my house.

This crowd was a bit more diverse, to be honest…there weren’t just typical “peaceniks and hippies.” There were students, teachers, artists, lawyers, soldiers, veterans, and political figures. Nader was there…so was Sheehan…others whose names I have unfortunately forgotten but who gave very passionate addresses. I continued strolling along with the sea of people along the natural paths, the sidewalks, checking out the different groups represented, the different causes being promoted…everything from vegan living to impeachment (this one was a nearly universal theme) to freeing the Jena Six (that march would happen a week or two after this one) and anything else in between.

There was a young man pogo sticking for peace (said so on his T-shirt, even) an old man dressed as Santa, on stilts, with a sign reading “Troops Home By Xmas”…a group of anarchist cheerleaders…a LARGE contingent from the Georgetown Law School…several hundred, I believe…and many others.

I spent a lot of my time hanging out with “Start Loving” and Patricia (my photographer lady friend I had pizza with the night before, and she had of course remembered to charge my batteries at her hotel room overnight, a BIG HELP) and we talked about how wonderful it was that all of us were able to be witness and participate in such an historic event. We all feel that this is the real beginning of a stronger popular movement towards peace and justice. Time will be the judge on that, of course.

One event that moved me directly to tears was the display of a rolling flag-draped coffin…with a sad looking man leaning on it and a street poet piping up a terrible tale of sorrow and anguish…and rage. The words he spoke chilled me to my soul and I wept throughout the experience. It was very moving for me.

It was during my time with Patricia and Start that i remembered I was to meet Thomas, the man who had begun a 24/7 vigil for peace and nuclear disarmament all the way back in 1981…and I found the courage to make my way over to his vigil site and introduce myself and my point of view. He was pretty receptive, and then instructive, and I found our stories had many similarities, especially as it regarded a walk of faith and the power of belief and the ability to see God’s will at work all around us regardless of where we were physically…and that’s a great place to be sometimes.

I found out he would not be able to join us during our march on the Capitol Building…he can’t leave his protest camp for even five minutes, or the DC park police will tear down his displays, signs, tent and everything else and he’ll never be able to return to his state of grace he operates under now due to being grandfathered in, so to speak, regarding laws on static protests. He and his wife Concepcion have pretty much run the thing for 26 years now, with the help of different volunteers…but it’s mostly their protest, anyone else involved was quick to tell me. They are the heart and soul of it. I will talk about Thomas again in Part 5.

I was also pleased to see a large contingent of 9/11 Truth activists present and waving their signs and being outspoken on bullhorns…I was also happy to see that the majority of folks there in the square didn’t think they were “crazy” or “disruptive” either…I think the VAST MAJORITY of America knows the facts are far from known concerning that terrible day. I’m still amazed at the general apathy and level of brainwashing that has obviously taken place within our collective psyche to keep us from being so outraged (as a society) that we have been lied to about the deaths of 3,000 of our fellow citizens and we haven’t DONE ANYTHING ABOUT IT…anyhow. I digress.

The time for the march was at hand…the student group from Georgetown and the ANSWER coalition got the crowd moving that direction…and then there was some general confusion with the marshals and the participants about the order…mostly just that we needed to let the Iraq Vets Against The War go up front…

and I think that was appropriate….but anyhow off we went down the street towards the Capitol Building…I don’t know how many of us, but there were a bunch. I tried to find places that I could get up to to get a nice bird’s eye view shot of the action, but found my progress impeded by DC cops posted at the stairwells of (normally) public buildings, not allowing access for any purpose, including taking photos. I had to mention this seemed highly irregular to the lady officer who told me I couldn’t go up a public stairwell…she didn’t seem concerned. I asked her if it was routine policy for the DC cops to make up the rules as they went…and I pointed out the police photographer rapidly snapping shots from this same vantage point I wanted access to. Well, by this time a reporter was there and filming so I went the whole nine and asked her how it felt to work for a fascist dictator (all DC capitol police are uniformed Secret Service…) and she REALLY didn’t seem to like that. I felt bad, for about five seconds. I walked on. I finally settled for a giant concrete planter…you know, the kind with flowers and stuff in them along the sidewalk in some of the DC parks. Here’s what I got.

Yes Bush…the man whom God delivers the sneak preview of the coming Armageddon and rapture, the man tasked to bring about the changes in laws and policies to allow for the coming Tim LeHaye styled one-world dictatorship, and Bush had the amazing foresight to ask telecoms to wiretap ordinary Americans without wiretaps several months BEFORE the event that he has since used as his reason for the program. Uncanny…kind of like the BBC reporting that WTC 7 collapsed twenty minutes early. The whole business is just unraveling now, isn’t it?

Gosh…how did Georgie have the AMAZING powers of extra-sensory perception to know that he’d need to circumvent typical procedures and constitutional safeguards in retaliation for an event that hadn’t even HAPPENED YET? Hmm.

Qwest Feared NSA Plan Was Illegal, Filing Says

A former Qwest Communications International executive, appealing a conviction for insider trading, has alleged that the government withdrew opportunities for contracts worth hundreds of millions of dollars after Qwest refused to participate in an unidentified National Security Agency program that the company thought might be illegal.

Former chief executive Joseph P. Nacchio, convicted in April of 19 counts of insider trading, said the NSA approached Qwest more than six months before the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks, according to court documents unsealed in Denver this week.

Details about the alleged NSA program have been redacted from the documents, but Nacchio’s lawyer said last year that the NSA had approached the company about participating in a warrantless surveillance program to gather information about Americans’ phone records.In the court filings disclosed this week, Nacchio suggests that Qwest’s refusal to take part in that program led the government to cancel a separate, lucrative contract with the NSA in retribution. He is using the allegation to try to show why his stock sale should not have been considered improper.

Nacchio was convicted for selling shares of Qwest stock in early 2001, just before financial problems caused the company’s share price to tumble. He has claimed in court papers that he had been optimistic that Qwest would overcome weak sales because of the expected top-secret contract with the government. Nacchio said he was forbidden to mention the specifics during the trial because of secrecy restrictions, but the judge ruled that the issue was irrelevant to the charges against him.

Nacchio’s account, which places the NSA proposal at a meeting on Feb. 27, 2001, suggests that the Bush administration was seeking to enlist telecommunications firms in programs without court oversight before the terrorist attacks on New York and the Pentagon. The Sept. 11 attacks have been cited by the government as the main impetus for its warrantless surveillance efforts.

The allegations could affect the debate on Capitol Hill over whether telecoms sued for disclosing customers’ phone records and other data to the government after the Sept. 11 attacks should be given legal immunity, even if they did not have court authorization to do so.

Spokesmen for the Justice Department, the NSA, the White House and the director of national intelligence declined to comment, citing the ongoing legal case against Nacchio and the classified nature of the NSA’s activities. Federal filings in the appeal have not yet been disclosed.

In May 2006, USA Today reported that the NSA had been secretly collecting the phone-call records of tens of millions of Americans, using data provided by major telecom firms. Qwest, it reported, declined to participate because of fears that the program lacked legal standing.

In a statement released after the story was published, Nacchio attorney Herbert Stern said that in fall 2001, Qwest was approached to give the government access to the private phone records of Qwest customers. At the time, Nacchio was chairman of the president’s National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee.

“Mr. Nacchio made inquiry as to whether a warrant or other legal process had been secured in support of that request,” Stern said. “When he learned that no such authority had been granted and that there was a disinclination on the part of the authorities to use any legal process, including the Special Court which had been established to handle such matters, Mr. Nacchio concluded that these requests violated the privacy requirements of the Telecommunications Act.”

CHATTANOOGA, Tenn. – In an unlikely marriage of desire to secede from the United States, two advocacy groups from opposite political traditions — New England and the South — are sitting down to talk.

Tired of foreign wars and what they consider right-wing courts, the Middlebury Institute wants liberal states like Vermont to be able to secede peacefully.

That sounds just fine to the League of the South, a conservative group that refuses to give up on Southern independence.

“We believe that an independent South, or Hawaii, Alaska, or Vermont would be better able to serve the interest of everybody, regardless of race or ethnicity,” said Michael Hill of Killen, Ala., president of the League of the South.

Separated by hundreds of miles and divergent political philosophies, the Middlebury Institute and the League of the South are hosting a two-day Secessionist Convention starting Wednesday in Chattanooga.

They expect to attract supporters from California, Alaska and Hawaii, inviting anyone who wants to dissolve the Union so states can save themselves from an overbearing federal government.

If allowed to go their own way, New Englanders “probably would allow abortion and have gun control,” Hill said, while Southerners “would probably crack down on illegal immigration harder than it is being now.”

The U.S. Constitution does not explicitly prohibit secession, but few people think it is politically viable.

Vermont, one of the nation’s most liberal states, has become a hotbed for liberal secessionists, a fringe movement that gained new traction because of the Iraq war, rising oil prices and the formation of several pro-secession groups.

Thomas Naylor, the founder of one of those groups, the Second Vermont Republic, said the friendly relationship with the League of the South doesn’t mean everyone shares all the same beliefs.

But Naylor, a retired Duke University professor, said the League of the South shares his group’s opposition to the federal government and the need to pursue secession.

“It doesn’t matter if our next president is Condoleeza (Rice) or Hillary (Clinton), it is going to be grim,” said Naylor, adding that there are secessionist movements in more than 25 states, including Hawaii, Alaska, New Hampshire, South Carolina and Texas.

And not just in principle, but in PRACTICE…A BONAFIDE POLICE STATE NOW…I HAVE SEEN IT MYSELF, brothers. So have you…on the street, in your homes on the TV, and all over the internet. DO you still doubt? Watch the video at the bottom of this post…people are arrested without even being told of a LEGITIMATE CHARGE. This is America today. How do you like it?

The wifey found the scorch patterns to be fascinating…so do I…she also pointed out stuff that one might think SHOULD be burned (trees, etc.) were not. That wouldn’t follow with the types of internal fires or even LONG LASTING fire exposure that “took these buildings down.”

Anyhow, a friend who was there that day in NYC passed this on to me. Not many folks have seen this photo yet, at least I’ve never seen it…but tell me what YOU think, friends, and feel free to “pass it on.”

In a quick wrap…I caught the last few minutes of the game, and I haven’t watched football since the Dallas Cowboys were America’s team…but I was bored and eating pizza and had a few home brews earlier…so it seemed appropriate.

Here it is, in a nutshell.

The EAGLES quarterback went over the line, though only a little most folks might say…but over nonetheless. The touchdown that could have signaled a glimmer of hope was taken off the board…but there was one more crucial down for the team, but Justice failed them by an illegal move while trying to block for the quarterback…and the Empire State was basically able to run down the clock on the City of Brotherly Love…

Oh well…I’m bored with football again…and a shame. I used to LOVE to play…my team in high school went the farthest our town ever has in over 30 years all the way to the “big game” – at War Memorial Stadium in Little Rock.