MR. SNOW: We will start on the record with a brief comment on the
President's NATO experience on the trip.

This has been a very good trip with productive meetings with the
leaders of Estonia and Latvia. In addition, the President came back
encouraged last night from his working dinner with fellow NATO heads of
state. They talked about the normal retinue of issues, most
importantly, Afghanistan and on coming up with a coordinated way
forward. Again, rather than trying to give you a full readout, I'll
simply give you a characterization of how the meetings have gone so far.

Any other details?

MR. BARTLETT: I would say, having done these NATO dinners, NATO
sessions for some time now, he was particularly pleased about the
interaction, substance and dialogue from last night. As was said, last
night was primarily a discussion about Afghanistan; a lot of today's
talks will be more of the political nature of NATO, new members, things
like that, how open NATO is going to be in the coming years. Those are
the kind of thrusts of the conversations today. But last night,
Afghanistan. There will be a communiqué that will report out about the
way forward with NATO's commitment to Afghanistan. What we heard around
the table was a clear understanding of the stakes in Afghanistan and the
continued commitment of NATO being very consequential for the future of
that country.

If you want a few comments for tomorrow, we can do that.

MR. SNOW: We'll do a little of that, and then we'll go on
background.

Q Can we get a on-the-record comment on the Hadley memo, or do
you think that the memo shows --

MR. SNOW: No, because, again, you're asking us to do a direct
conversation on a classified memo.

Q But just on the reported assessment.

MR. SNOW: What we'll say on the record is, the President has
confidence in Prime Minister Maliki. And also, the administration is
working with the Prime Minister to improve his capabilities in terms of
dealing with the fundamental challenges in Iraq, which are security
concerns, economic growth, political reconciliation, and regional
diplomacy, so that you are going to have an Iraqi government that has
the ability to operate independently, that can sustain, govern and
defend itself, and can serve as an ally in the war on terror.

MR. BARTLETT: And I would just add, as we set up this meeting --
I think Steve had touched on this in some of the other briefings he's
done -- is to recall the last time the President and Prime Minister
Maliki somewhat saw each other in person through the video conference
session they had. The thrust of that conversation, again, was how can
we grow the capability of Prime Minister Maliki, particularly when it
comes to Iraqi security forces and him taking a more direct hand in
dealing with the sectarian violence, whether it be the Sunni-based
insurgent aspect of it, or the illegal militia aspect.

And both leaders tasked key members of their cabinet and their
military to work on a game plan to see how that could happen. And a key
aspect of tonight and tomorrow morning's meeting will be for the two
leaders to get updated on where those are -- where areas that we can
accelerate and expand Prime Minister Maliki's capacity to deal with
these issues. So that will be a dominate subject of today and
tomorrow's meetings.

MR. SNOW: Let me add a couple more notes. We'll obviously be
giving you enough on the record here that we could -- Prime Minister
Maliki also has been very aggressive in recent weeks in taking on some
of the key challenges. You have seen him making changes at the Ministry
of the Interior. He has been taking a good, hard look at police forces
and trying to comb out those who have been involved in acts of violence,
rather than peacekeeping.

You also have the Prime Minister's avowed goal of developing great
security capability, because he understands that ultimately it is going
to be the Iraqi people who have to govern, sustain, and defend
themselves.

The Iraqi people also have been working on a series of steps that
are very important. There was a conversation about de-Baathification;
there are conversations ongoing about the hydrocarbon law that would
permit the sharing of oil and natural gas revenues throughout the
country, providing a very powerful economic incentive for people in all
regions and of all backgrounds to work to sustain the Iraqi state.

You also have the fact that the Iraqi government, through a tough
time, has maintained its unity. And there's another important point,
which is that the Prime Minister and his entire government came into
office really in midstream when it came to the sectarian violence that
was inaugurated by the Samara mosque bombing in February. They have an
enormously complex task in front of them in terms of dealing with
building a political apparatus in a nation that has not had one
previously, that is a free political apparatus. They also have the
difficulty of dealing with long pent-up angers with different factions
within the country. But at the same time, they have demonstrated unity
and determination.

And the Prime Minister, along with the Deputy Prime Minister and
the President, have all been out publicly stating their commitment to
the goals that we've outlined all along, which is building the kind of
strength within Iraq that will enable it, again, to sustain, govern, and
defend itself.

* * * * *

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: With that, we'll go to questions.
And we'll play around with this. If we can keep stuff on the record to
the best of the ability, we will, but there are going to be some areas
where we can't.

Q How does the President make al Maliki feel as though he's
highly regarded by the U.S., say, in the light of this memo?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, he makes -- the way he makes
him feel highly regarded by the United States is that Prime Minister
Maliki is in regular consultation with our Ambassador, with the
President, with General Casey. Furthermore, the two governments have
already been involved in ongoing cooperation, as my colleague mentioned.
And if you take a look at key parts of the memo, including -- key parts
of the memo, you have a constant reiteration of the importance of
strengthening the Maliki government -- "need to work with him to augment
his capabilities." This, in fact, has become the focal point of
U.S.-Iraqi cooperation -- helping develop the capabilities necessary in
unusually and incredibly challenging time for the government of Iraq.

The President's conversations on a regular basis with Prime
Minister Maliki I think have not only provided the personal relationship
that is very important in this case, but also the ability of both men to
talk candidly about the challenges that the Maliki government faces.
And the approach of this government is, how can we help Prime Minister
Maliki? And that continues to be the way in which the President reaches
out to him.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I'd just add that I think a little
bit of getting beyond just the headline of the story and taking it in
complete context and tenor of the memo demonstrates that important
questions and obvious points of assessment are being made by the
administration. But the broad conclusion, as identified in that very
memo is that the big deficiency is capability. That's something that
Prime Minister Maliki has discussed publicly, as well as privately, with
us; it's something that we have acknowledged. One of the central tenets
of this meeting is, how do we increase his capability to turn his good
intentions, as described in this memo, into concrete action.

And everybody recognizes it, and those who understand the command
and control issues, when it comes to Iraqi security forces, they come
under MNFI authority and command. What he is looking for and what he is
hoping to demonstrate is more direct effect on the security situation,
particularly the sectarian violence. He believes he needs greater
autonomy and control over certain aspects of his security forces in
order to accomplish that. A lot of the work that has been done in the
last month is to determine how best to do that, and that's what the two
leaders are going to be spending a lot of time tonight and tomorrow
morning on.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Let me just say that while we're
discussing the memo I want this to be ON BACKGROUND. We can try to sort
out things beyond this.

Q Were those last comments on the record?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, those are background comments.
We said any comments about this was on background.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: If you ask about the memo, it's
going to be on background.

Q What about the troop levels? The memo talks about the
possibility of sending additional troops to Baghdad. Is the President
leaning toward doing that? Will he discuss that with Maliki?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No doubt it's going to come up,
but also, the President has made it clear that he will continue to base
troop assessments on what he hears from generals. The President has
said, as you know, recently that there's a possibility, for instance, as
we continue to embed U.S. forces helping to train Iraqis, that you might
see some of the troop levels go up. But this is -- as Steve Hadley
noted yesterday, we're not going to prejudge either up or down in terms
of troop levels. Those are very practical considerations that are made
on the basis of conditions on the ground.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: And take -- the definition of
troops doesn't necessarily mean U.S. troops. It could be increased
Iraqi troops. You've seen some of the issues of the Baghdad Security
Plan from over the summer, is that some of the Iraqi security forces
that had hoped to materialize and be deployed in Baghdad have been
slower than expected. So some of the deficiencies may be filled with
Iraqi security forces. So don't rule that out when you say troops.

Q Can I get back to something the senior official on the left
said?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Your left, or our left?

Q It makes clear that the deficiency is capability -- my left --
the deficiency is capability, how to turn good intentions into concrete
actions. Doesn't the memo itself say that there is a question about the
Prime Minister's intentions

-- one of three -- whether his intentions are at fault; whether he's
being undermined; whether he simply doesn't have the capability -- isn't
that a question? And two, is this meeting between the President and the
Prime Minister, in fact, a response to the memo? Is Bush going to talk
to the Prime Minister to try and answer this question about whether, in
fact, he does have good intentions and they're simply being undermined?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I'll help you -- even though I'm
on your right and our left, I will take on the latter question, which
is, no, this is not -- the President is convinced of Prime Minister
Maliki's determination and good intentions. Again, you have a series of
questions, which, within the context of the memo, represents a very hard
look, a probing look at the situation in Iraq, and the one thing that
has come up is that we believe that it is a capability problem, and that
the Prime Minister understands a lot of the complexity of the situation
that he faces and is eager to address it.

Many of the joint collaborations that I and my fellow senior
administration official have referred to have taken place subsequent to
the writing of this memo.

Q I'm sorry?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The joint committees that were
formed in the video conference -- that the two agreed to form, those
activities have been ongoing. The bulk of those have occurred since the
writing of the memo.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I'd also add that in many
respects, the administration and the embassy, as well as commanders on
the ground, wouldn't be doing their job if we didn't raise these types
of probing questions and assessments. Anytime you're doing a
fundamental assessment, as we are, you're going to, of course, ask these
questions. But if you read carefully in the memo, based upon some of
the recommendations that the memo suggests, as well as some other --
where it says that reporting shows that he is actually willing to
address his party politics and his issues within his political
constraints

-- I think demonstrates that the assessment we have made is that it is a
capability issue. And that's why that's a bulk of the memo, in the back
discusses about increasing his capability.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: And speaking of which, I know
we're kind of doing a Mutt and Jeff act here, but we'll try to get you
as much as we can. If you take a look at the memo, some of the actions
that are already mentioned and contemplated within the context of the
memo have taken place. For instance, Iraq has supported renewal of the
U.N. MNF mandate, which was renewed yesterday. I've already mentioned
the discussion about de-Baathification. It is clear that Prime Minister
Maliki has begun taking a very hard look at the Ministry of the
Interior, particularly with regard to police forces.

So a number of the action items mentioned in the memo already, for
public consumption, have begun to take place. So keep in mind that when
you have a situation -- when you're in wartime, you're going to ask
tough questions. You're also going to start outlining actions that you
take in response to challenges that are ongoing, and they continue to do
that.

Q How is it anything other than a slap at al-Maliki to say that
there are three possibilities and one of them is that he is ignorant of
what's happening on the streets of his own country?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Because the bulk of the memo
demonstrates that the judgment is that it's a capability issue. Just
because you raise the range of possibilities doesn't mean you're casting
judgment in declaring that one aspect of that range. And the evidence
is contrary to that, when you look at the bulk of the memo and the
assessments we have made very clear, publicly, as well as, as we said,
the itinerary or the key agenda item for this meeting -- is not to say
it's a slap in the face, but it's, how do we grow his capability.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Furthermore, you have to address
questions that have been raised in the public square, and simply because
one says you have to ask the question does not mean that you have
reached the conclusion that it is one of those.

Q He wasn't raising his own questions, he was just echoing those
he --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, no, these are questions that
sometimes are going to be circulated and other people are going to
raise, and that you do need to acknowledge that those are questions that
are -- that people have raised to the President or within the broader
foreign policy community. And then if you go ahead and take a look --
and please do go look through the rest of the memo -- you see that the
emphasis is on capability building.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It's just what it says -- a range
of possibilities. But if you read the whole memo, it clearly gives the
context of the judgment that has been passed, and what we are telling
you it's a capability issue.

Q There's the list of the nine items that -- nine action items
that he should take in there. Do you know, were those shared with him
before today? And do you -- other than the two you mentioned, what else
of that list have there been action on?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, many of the conversations
have centered around the action items. As we've noted, there are some
that he's taking action on. It will be a question about how more
aggressively he can be, how more comprehensive he can be. That will be
a lot of the discussion in which the President will talk about.

As we say in here, he has the proper vision and intent and
understands the issues that have to be dealt with, whether it be issues
of oil, political reconciliation, hydrocarbon law is mentioned in there,
the issue of illegal militias. What will happen in these meetings is an
opportunity for the two leaders to flesh that out in greater detail,
determine the road map to dealing with some of those issues in greater
detail.

So, I'm not going to be -- we're not going to be in a position to
sit here and check off all nine and where -- and give you a grade of
where they are in each one of those. But that is the bulk of the
conversation, to be talking about these areas, because everybody
recognizes the areas that need to be addressed.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Keep in mind, also, that Prime
Minister Maliki comes -- this all seems to be -- I want to caution
against this being one-sided. This is not the President dictating
terms. Prime Minister Maliki is the sovereign head of state. The
President respects that. And there are going to be things that Prime
Minister Maliki thinks are going to be helpful to him, and he is going
to be sharing his thoughts.

Keep in mind that the Iraqis also have clear and practical thoughts
about how to deal with problems that are going on in their own cities
and on their own soil. And this is a very good opportunity for the two
leaders to talk in detail and very candidly about precisely what
challenges they face and how we can be of assistance.

But again, the point to underscore is that the United States
position is in support of Prime Minister Maliki, building capabilities,
and enabling him to put together the proper series of components that
are going to enable him to govern effectively within Iraq and his
governing coalition to govern effectively.

Q Among the steps that the memo says the U.S. should take is
Secretary Rice holding an Iraq-plus-neighbors meeting in the region in
early December. Does Steve anticipate that that would include Iran and
Syria?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Again, I'm not going to go into
any detail about these things. Obviously, if something like that should
take place, we'll let you know.

Q Has Maliki been briefed on the contents of this memo in
advance of the face-to-face meeting?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Don't know.

Q This memo was written on November 8th, the visit occurred on
October 30th. Nearly a month has passed since the visit. Can you tell
us what -- has the administration taken any concrete steps so far as a
result of this Hadley visit and this memo to improve things? We've seen
a deteriorating situation there in the interim.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, no, what you've seen are
attempts to destabilize through acts of violence. But the notion --

Q But what has --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The answer is, we're not going to
tell you specifically simply because you have daily interaction. You
have a situation on the ground where it can be as practical as trying to
figure out how to secure and hold particular neighborhoods within
Baghdad, to security challenges in al Anbar. And quite often -- and
those are tasks that have been assigned by each head of state to their
designees. Again, this goes back to the conversation in the SVTC.

And so in terms of concrete action, you see them taking place each
and every day. It is not as if you simply allow things to sort of go
rolling on by themselves. Each and every day, there are conversations
where the generals on the ground make the adjustments they need, and
obviously there are conversations between the governments.

Q What about the President, though? Has he taken any particular
steps since --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Again, I think the key aspect of
this was the two leaders, in their video conference, tasked key members
of both U.S., as well as the Iraqi government, to work on a way forward
to grow capability, accelerate the handing over of capabilities to Prime
Minister Maliki. The whole purpose -- one of the key purposes of this
meeting with him is to receive an update -- a key update. Hopefully
from that, they will be able to -- there will be some greater consensus
on how to do that.

Q And did those two meetings, the video conference and the
upcoming meeting in Jordan, flow out of this Hadley visit and memo?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I don't think the memo says
anything about a visit.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No. And furthermore, the video
conference, again, took place before the memo was put together.

Look, again, this is -- what you have to realize is that there are
constant efforts to assess what is going on in Iraq and how best to
address the problems that the government of Iraq is facing, and how to
assist the government in doing that. So this is sort of a natural piece
of consultation that would take place.

Q Could you discuss the political element of the memo in this
respect -- regarding the Sadr faction, the memo raises the possibility
of trying to -- I'm looking for the right word -- change the political
base for the Prime Minister away from this heavy reliance on Sadr's
faction and to try to bring more moderate Sunnis and others, and
basically peel them away from that faction. That seems to be the basic
theory behind one possibility where this could go. I was wondering if
you can talk to that specific idea in your talking with the Prime
Minister today?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Again, it's a possibility. And
the purpose -- one of the purposes of this meeting is to gain greater
insight into how Prime Minister Maliki is going to deal with a very
thorny political climate in Baghdad, which is not only one in which
deals with illegal militias from the Shia, but also Sunni inclusion to
marginalize the insurgency. And how you go about doing that, who has
what voice, what leverage, and who sits at the table to make those
decisions, is something that is of great interest to the administration,
obviously. And Prime Minister Maliki put a lot of thought to this, and
that obviously will be a part of their conversations.

Q Do you think that the President would ask Maliki to repudiate
Sadr and basically try to --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, again, I'm not going to
describe with the President may or may not ask of the Prime Minister.
But I will say that we recognize that the Prime Minister has a strategy
to marginalize illegal militias by -- through inclusion, and to isolate
those who are acting outside of the purview of the government and of the
law of the land, and by doing so, believes that it will be the most
effective way to deal with that scenario you just described.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: And let me just add, he has made
public the fact that he's had conversations with al Sadr about this.
Obviously, there are cabinet ministers who are part of al Sadr's party.
But the strategy has been to say, you need to make a choice. The
government itself should have the exclusive authority for bearing arms
and having armed organizations trying to enforce the peace. And they've
made it clear that they do not condone militias. And he's had the
conversations publicly; he's read out conversations with al Sadr about
this.

So a part of this is you're assuming that there's an either/or,
that al Sadr is necessarily in charge of all the militias that may claim
to be part of Mahdi Army. That is one of the things that has to be
determined. But it is also clear that the existence of militias is
unacceptable.

Q If I could have one more follow-up. In terms of the meeting
today, are you guys going to be carrying specific new ideas? You kind
of characterize this as a listening session to kind of glean more
insight into what the Prime Minister thinks about things. But are you
guys going to be carrying your own ideas about what you could do to
augment his capabilities, what you guys could do, specific ideas?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: There's going to be a natural
give-and-take in a conversation. That's how it's been every time
they've met. It's always going to be a sharing of ideas. It's not one
way. But as the senior administration official pointed out, he is the
sovereign leader of a government that controls, in many respects, the
destiny -- future destiny of that country. And it's going to be very
important for us to listen to the specific ideas he has for the way
forward. Obviously, we're going to have our own ideas, and it always
has been a give-and-take process.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: And that gets back to the point we
were saying before about consultation. To get back to Sheryl's
question, in dealing with the situation -- security and otherwise -- in
Iraq, you have to understand that there have to be constant adjustments.
We've made this point over and over.

You also -- it's also important to realize that there's a lot been
going on other than the violence. There have been attempts to build up
economic infrastructure. We've talked about the increased pumping of
oil. There are attempts to deal with reconciliation. The hydrocarbon
statute and de-Baathification are important parts of that. You have
seen public declarations in terms of trying to reduce the levels of
violence, and also to be supportive of the government by people from all
factions within Iraq.

All of those things are taking place, as well. It's important to
realize that Prime Minister Maliki has -- and this is worth emphasizing
-- an enormously complex challenge in a nation that had been living
under the domination and oppression of a brutal and bloodthirsty
dictator, and now you have people who are coming to grips not only with
the history within the country, but also trying to deal with the
challenge of being a new democracy.

And so what we have seen is that Prime Minister Maliki, rather than
shrinking from making decisions, has been embracing the responsibility
of the head of state for taking on responsibility. And we find that not
only encouraging, but necessary, and we're going to do everything we can
to assist.

Q I'm assuming the President is aware that the memo was leaked.
What was his reaction?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I'm sorry?

Q I'm assuming that the President is aware the memo was leaked.
What was his reaction? Was there any concern that it will color the
perception of the talks with Maliki?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Obviously, the substance of the
memo was an obvious part of the agenda, so in that respect, no. But is
the President ever pleased when classified information is handed over to
the public? Obviously not, from that standpoint.

Q Was there any intention to share this with Maliki before their
discussions?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: There's no question there will be
conversations, probably through the embassy, with Prime Minister Maliki,
but they're meeting tonight, a perfect opportunity to talk about the
contents of the strategy. Again, there's nothing --

Q Not the contents of the strategy, but the fact that this memo
was leaked to the press?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, look -- I'm sorry, go ahead.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The two leaders are not going to
spend their time worried about the process of this being leaked to the
press. He will be -- I'm sure the Prime Minister understands the memo
has been leaked. I mean, it's in The New York Times. I'm sure he's
been made aware of that. But the substance of the memo is already a key
part of the agenda.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: And again, if the Prime Minister
is looking through it, you see the constant focus on building
capability, which is precisely what he has been talking about and
emphasizing in his conversations with the President.

Q I'm sorry, can you just clarify, you said that you're sure
that he is aware of the contents --

Q Did I mishear you when you say that Maliki is trying to gain
further control of the security forces?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes, absolutely -- I mean, that's
been a stated objective for a long time. It's been -- I mean, he's --

Q I mean, it's a sovereign nation.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: But as part of the charter, the
U.N. Charter, and the part of the arrangement we have right now, the
multinational force, MNFI, has complete control, command and control
over both all forces on the ground, which include Iraq security forces.

Q There have been indications that he's not feeling very secure.
How can this make him feel more secure in office -- Maliki?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, I think the very substance
of the conversations tonight and the commitment the President has made,
and the President publicly made as early as yesterday, demonstrating his
confidence not only in the government, but the fact that the United
States of America understands the stakes in Iraq and is committed to
success.

Q You know, on one hand, you guys are always saying that the
President has confidence in Maliki. But on the other hand, you know,
Maliki is not doing enough, Maliki doesn't have control, as much control
over the situation as possibly he should, is he capable of turning
things around --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Let me jump in there. I mean,
Toby, the way you frame this is a summary judgment that seems to imply
negligence on the part of the Prime Minister. And again, look, this is
an enormously complicated situation for which there is no cookbook
answer. We have said of ourselves that we're not doing well enough fast
enough. And the fact is -- so I don't want -- it's very important to
make it clear, again, that there is not summary judgment of Prime
Minister Maliki, but instead there is a great deal of respect for the
enormity and complexity of the challenge he faces. And it is worth it,
as you do your work, to think through it, too, because you start putting
together the layout of the country, you take a look at the different
factions, you take a look at the history of the country, you take a look
at the novelty of democracy within it, you talk about the importance of
dealing with neighbors -- you talk about all of those things in a time
where there has been a concerted effort on the part of various
insurgencies to blow up the democracy -- not to vie for authority, not
to come up with a competing ideology, but simply to create a failed
state, and it is obvious that the Prime Minister has an enormous
challenge.

We understand it. We also understand the absolute importance of
succeeding in Iraq by creating -- by helping Prime Minister Maliki
create a government that can defend, sustain and govern itself, that can
be an ally in the war on terror, in many ways simply through the sheer
fact of its existence and stability. So you put all those together. We
understand that more needs to be done. We also understand that it is
going to require the resourcefulness and commitment of both sides, and
both sides are, in fact, fully committed to it.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: One more question on this topic.

Q Can we please go back to something --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Patiently waiting.

Q Yes, the memo, it says at a certain that despite the
reassuring words of Maliki, on the grounds there are reports of
non-delivery of services to Sunni areas, an intervention by the Prime
Minister obvious to stop military action against Shia targets. So how
can you trust him, looking forward, if your own military command show
distrust in him?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, I'll take -- and my
colleague can add to this -- but subsequent to this, you have, in fact,
seen military operations in Shia areas going after militias, and you
have also seen very aggressive activity, again on the part of the
Ministry of Interior, and that would involve police units that
apparently have been involved in collaborative efforts with militias.
So if you want to find out -- if you want to do it, you take a look at
your own news clippings from the last three weeks.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: And I think one important point on
that, when it comes to targeting Shias, there has been high coordination
on going after death squad leaders. There are times when there has been
-- there could have been better communication about certain operations
in which the Prime Minister complained about, but he publicly made clear
later that the people we were going after were very -- it was justified,
because there were pre-cleared discussions about the specific people.
But how and when the operation took place, there could have been better
coordination on, and we've recognized that.

That's part of the conversations we'll be having, we talk about
operational control of security forces, how these issues are dealt with,
because you can't look at a military operation in a vacuum. They have
political consequences. And it's to make sure that the political
strategy and the military strategy are constantly integrated and linked
up. And that's one of the key issues which they'll address, because as
you give greater control and autonomy to Iraqi security forces you have
a lot of complicated issues with regards to that -- embedded U.S.
troops, how they will conduct operations vis-a-vis coalition operations.
There are a lot of details that have to be worked out, and there will be
a lot of time that the two men spend talking about today and tomorrow.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: But even though the focus of that
particular language is Shia militias, let's not lose sight of the fact
that there have been other organizations, including al Qaeda, within the
country that are trying to destabilize, and the Prime Minister also is
committed to going after them, as are we.

Q Does this memo, in any way, diminish the ability of the
President to work with al-Maliki?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No.

Q And does Hadley's statement from a week ago that no big, bold
announcement is forthcoming from these meetings, does that still hold?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, we'll find out.

Q At what point precisely did you go on background?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Everything -- every question with
regards to the memo is on background.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes. I mean, that goes back to
quite awhile ago.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The opening -- the opening remarks
we made before we went to questions, because the questions started on
this topic, we made very clear that answers to these questions about --
specifically about the memo are on background.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: You can either consult the
recording, or transcript.

Q Let's go back to something you said earlier. You talked about
the bulk of the memo being -- addressing how to shore up Maliki's
capabilities. But if you read this, the memo says, "There does seem to
be an aggressive push to consolidate Shia power, influence. It is less
clear whether Maliki is a willing participant." It goes on to say, "His
intentions seem good when he talks with Americans -- the reporting
suggests he's trying to stand up to the Shia hierarchy, but the reality
on the streets suggest Maliki is either ignorant of what's going on,
misrepresenting his intentions, or that his capabilities are not yet
sufficient."

Are you saying that the President is, in effect, rejecting those
first two possibilities in favor of the third, that his capabilities are
not yet sufficient?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think that's evidenced by the
rest of the memo that the judgment being made by us, whether it be Steve
Hadley or other members of the administration, is that the issue is
predominately one of capability. And that's exactly what's going to be
the bulk of the conversations tonight and tomorrow.

Q It seems to fly in the face of what Hadley has written here.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It's a range -- it's like what we
said to Mark -- it's a range of possibilities. It is not a, as you
said, summary judgment.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: And, Sheryl, if you take a look
through the rest -- what you've done is you've read off the beginning,
and then you go back through the steps both sides can take, and those
are all about capability building.

Q It's all in the conditional. If Maliki is willing to move
decisively, this is how we can help him.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, but as we --

Q It suggests a disbelief or a feeling that you're really not
sure who Maliki is and how committed he is.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, I think -- again, if you take
a look at what we've discussed in terms of measures that have been taken
in recent weeks, and furthermore, what you're seeing with Prime Minister
Maliki is somebody who has made it clear that he is eager to assume
greater responsibility in these things. The President has made that
clear in recent conversations, and Steve talked about it as recently as
yesterday.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: But as I previously said, you
would expect us to probe these very issues during an assessment period
that's going on right now. These are important questions that have to
be raised, possibilities have to be entertained. But the judgments that
are being rendered and are being demonstrated and what we're actually
doing we believe concludes that we think this is an issue of capability,
not intent or vision.