Introduction

Karen J. Warren

The past few decades have witnessed an enormous interest in both
the women's movement and the ecology (environmental) movement. Many
feminists have argued that the goals of these two movements are
mutually reinforcing; ultimately they involve the development of
worldviews and practices that are not based on male-biased
models of domination. As Rosemary Ruether wrote in 1975 in her book,
New Woman/NewEarth:

Women must see that there can be no liberation for them and no
solution to the ecological crisis within a society whose fundamental
model of relationships continues to be one of domination. They must
unite the demands of the women's movement with those of the
ecological movement to envision a radical reshaping of the basic
socioeconomic relations and the underlying values of this [modern
industrial] society. (204)

Since the early 1970s, many feminists, especially ecological
feminists ("ecofeminists"), have defended Ruether's basic point: the
environment is a feminist issue.

Just what makes the environment (ecology) a feminist issue? What
are some of the alleged connections between the domination of women
and the domination of nature? How and why is recognition of these
connections important to feminism, environmentalism, and
environmental philophy? Answering these questions is largely what
ecofeminism is about.

In this essay I offer an introduction to the literature and issues
of ecofeminism. I begin with a characterization of ecofeminism. Then
I identify eight sorts of connections--what I call
"woman-nature connetions"--that ecofeminists claim link the
twin dominations of women and nature. Discussion of these alleged
connections provides an overview of the scholarly literature in
ecofeminism and the sorts of reasons ecofeminists have given for the
centrality of ecofeminist insights to environmental philosophy and
feminism. It also helps to situate the four essays included in this
section (essays by Merchant, Plumwood, Salleh, and Warren) within
that range of scholarly positions. I conclude by suggesting that the
philosophical significance of ecofeminism is that it challenges
feminism to take environmental issues seriously, environmental
philosophy to take feminism seriously, and philosophy to take both
seriously.

A CHARACTERIZATION OF ECOFEMINISM

Just as there is not one feminism, there is not one ecofeminism.
"Ecological feminism is the name given to a variety of positions that
have roots in different feminist practices and philosophies. These
different perspectives reflect not only different feminist
perspectives (e.g., liberal, traditional Marxist, radical, socialist,
black and Third World), they also reflect different understandings of
the nature of and solution to pressing environmental problems (see
Warren 1987). So, it is an open question how many, which, and on what
grounds any of the various positions in environmental philosophy that
acknowledge feminist concerns or claim to be feminist are properly
identified as ecofeminist positions. What one takes to be a genuine
ecofeminist position will depend largely on how one conceptualizes
both feminism and ecofeminism.

For instance, suppose by "feminism" one means "liberal feminism."
Liberal feminism builds on a Western liberal political and
philosophical framework that idealizes a society in which autonomous
individuals are provided maximal freedom to pursue their own
interests. There are two main ecological indications of liberal
feminism: the first draws the line of moral considerability at
humans, separating humans from nonhumans and basing any claims to
moral consideration of nonhumans either on the alleged rights or
interests of humans, or on the consequences of such consideration for
human well-being. The second extends the line of moral
considerability to qualified nonhumans on the grounds that they are
deserving of moral consideration in their own right: they, too, are
rational, sentient, interest-carriers, right-holders.

Is either liberal feminist ecological implication acceptable from
an ecofeminist perspective? It depends, in part, on what one means by
"ecofeminism." Many ecofeminists have argued that insofar as liberal
feminism keeps intact oppressive and patriarchal ways of
conceptualizing nature, including problematic human-nature
dichotomies of the sort dlscussed by all four authors in this
section, it will be inadequate from an ecofeminist perspective.

Take another construal of feminism: traditional Marxist feminism.
Traditional Marxist feminism views the oppression of women as a kind
of class oppression, a direct result of the institution of class
society and, under capitalism, private property. Since praxis
(i.e., conscious physical labor of humans directed at transforming
the material world to meet human needs) is the distinguishing
characteristic of humans, traditional Marxist feminism, following
traditional Marxism, would seem to suggest that the primary value of
nature is its instrumental value in the production of economic goods
to meet human needs.

Is traditional Marxism fertile soil for ecofeminism? Again, it
depends, in part, on what one means by ecofeminism. If ecofeminism is
a position that recognizes that nature has value in addition to its
use value to humans, or if ecofeminism asserts that more than
gender-sensitive class analyses are needed to explain the
interwoven dominations of women and nature, then traditional Marxist
feminism will be inadequate from an ecofeminist perspective.

Consider one last example. A radical feminist construal of
feminism departs from both liberal feminism and traditional Marxist
feminism by rooting women's oppression in reproductive biology and
sex-gender systems. According to radical feminists, patriarchy
(i.e., the systematic oppression of women by men) subordinates women
in sex-specific ways by defining women as beings whose primary
functions are either to bear and raise children or to satisfy male
sexual desires. The liberation of women requires the dismantaling of
patriarchy, particularly male control of women's bodies.

Is radical feminism ecofeminist? While radical feminists
historically have had the most to say about ecofeminism, sometimes
claiming that "women are closer to nature than men," some
ecofeminists have worried about the extent to which radical feminism
both mystifies women's experiences by locating women closer to nature
than men, and offers ahistorically essentialist accounts of "women's
experiences." Furthermore, some ecofeminists worry that any view that
makes any group of humans closer to nature than any other is
conceptually flawed and methodologically suspect: it maintains just
the sort of value dualistic and hierarchical thinking that is
critiqued by ecofeminism (see Griscom 1981; Roach 1991; Warren 1987).
Hence the extent to which radical feminism is an adequate theoretical
basis for ecofeminism will depend partly on what one takes to be the
defining characteristics of ecofeminism.

What, then, can one say about ecofeminism? What characterizes
ecofeminism as a theoretical position and political movement? Despite
important differences among ecofeminists and the feminisms from which
they gain their inspiration, there is something all ecofeminists
agree about; such agreement provides a minimal condition account of
ecofeminism: there are important connections between the domination
of women and the domination of nature, an understanding of which is
crucial to feminism, environmentalism, and environmental philosophy
(Warren 1987). A main project of ecofeminism is to make visible these
"woman-nature connections" and, where harmful to women and
nature, to dismantle them.

If woman-nature connections are the backbone of
ecofeminism, just what are they? And why is the alleged existence of
these connections claimed to be so significant?

WOMAN-NATURE CONNECTIONS

There are at least eight sorts of connections that ecofeminists
have identified. These alleged connections provide sometimes
competing, sometimes mutually complementary or supportive, analyses
of the nature of the twin dominations of women and nature. A casual,
albeit philosophically uncritical, perusal of these eight alleged
connections helps to identify the range and variety of ecofeminist
positions on woman-nature connections.

1. Historical, Typically Causal, Connections. One alleged
connection between women and nature is historical. When historical
data are used to generate theories concerning the sources of the
dominations of women and nature, it is also causal. So pervasive is
the historical-causal theme in ecofeminist writing that Ariel Salleh
practically defines ecofeminism in terms of it: "Eco-feminism is a
recent development in feminist thought which argues that the current
global environmental crisis is a predictable outcome of patriarchal
culture" (Salleh 1988).

What are these alleged historical-causal connections? Some
ecofeminists (e.g., Spretnak 1990; Eisler 1988, 1990) trace these
connections to prototypical patterns of domination begun with the
invasion of Indo-European societies by nomadic tribes from
Eurasia about 4500 B.C. (see Lahar 1991, 33). Riane Eisler describes
the time before these invasions as a "matrifocal, matrilineal,
peaceful agrarian era." Others (e g., Griffin 1978; Plumwood 1991,
this section; Ruether 1974) trace historical connections to
patriarchal dualisms and conceptions of rationality in classical
Greek philosophy and the rationalist tradition. Still other feminists
(e g., Merchant 1980, this section focus on cultural and scientific
changes that occurred more recently--during the scientific revolution
of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries: it was then that an older
world order characterized by cooperation between humans and nature
was replaced by a reductionist, "mechanistic world view of modern
science," which sanctioned the exploitation of nature, unchecked
commercial and industrial expansion, and the subordination of women.

What prompts and explains these alleged historical and causal
woman-nature connections? What else was in place to
permit and sanction these twin dominations? To answer these
questions, ecofeminists have turned to the conceptual props that they
claim keep these historical dominations in place.

2. Conceptual Connections. Many authors have argued that,
ultimately, historical and causal links between the dominations of
women and nature are located in conceptual structures of domination
that construct women and nature in male-biased ways. Basically
three such conceptual links have been offered.

One account locates a conceptual basis of the twin dominations of
women and nature in valuedualisms, i.e., in
disjunctive pairs in which the disjuncts are seen as oppositional
(rather than as complementary) and as exclusive (rather than as
inclusive), and value hierarchies, i.e., perceptions of
diversity organized by a spatial Up-Down metaphor, which
attributes higher value (status, prestige) to that which is higher
("Up") (see Gray 1981; Griffin 1978, Plumwood 1991, this section;
Ruether 1974). Frequently cited examples of these hierarchically
organized value dualisms include reason/emotion, mind/body,
culture/nature, human/nature, and man/woman dichotomies. These
theorists argue that whatever is historically associated with
emotion, body, nature, and women is regarded as inferior to that
which is (historically) associated with reason, mind, culture, human
(i.e., male) and men.

A second account expands on the first by housing the problematic
value dualisms and value hierarchies in larger, oppressive conceptual
frameworks--ones that are common to all social "isms of domination"
(e.g., sexism, racism, classism, heterosexism as well as "naturism,"
i.e., the unjustified domination of nonhuman nature (see Warren
1987,1988, 1990, this section) A conceptual framework is a socially
constructed set of basic beliefs, values, attitudes and assumptions
that shapes and reflects how one views oneself and others. It is
oppressive when it explains, justifies, and maintains relationships
of domination and subordination. An oppressive conceptual framework
is patriarchal when it explains, justifies, and maintains the
subordination of women by men.

Oppressive and patriarchal conceptual frameworks are characterized
not only by value dualisms and hierarchies but also by "power-over
" conceptions of power and relationships of domination (Warren
1991b) and a logic of domination, i.e., a structure of
argumentation that provides the moral premise thatsuperiority
justifies subordination (Warren 1987, 1990, this section). On this
view, it is oppressive and patriarchal conceptual frameworks, and the
behaviors that they give rise to, that sanction, maintain, and
perpetuate the twin dominations of women and nature.

A third account locates a conceptual basis in sex-gender
differences, particularly in differentiated personality formation or
consciousness (see Cheney 1987; Gray 1981; Salleh, 1984). The claim
is that female bodily experiences (e.g., of reproduction and
childbearing), not female biology per se, situate women
differently with respect to nature than men. This sex-gender
difference is (allegedly) revealed in a different consciousness in
women than men toward nature; lt is rooted conceptually in "paradigms
that are uncritically oriented to the dominant western masculine
forms of experiencing the world: the analytic, non-related,
delightfully called 'objective' or 'scientific' approaches" (Salleh
1988, 130)--just those value dualisms that are claimed to separate
and inferiorize what is historically female-gender identified.
These sociopsychological factors provide a conceptual link insofar as
they are embedded in different conceptualization structures and
strategies ("different ways of knowing"), coping strategies and ways
of relating to nature for women and men. A goal of ecofeminism then,
is to develop gender-sensitive language, theory, and practices
that do not further the exploitative experiences and habits of
dissociated, male-gender identified culture toward women and nature.

One project of ecofeminism is to expose and dismantle the
conceptual structures of domination which have kept various "isms of
domination," particularly the dominations of women and nature, in
place. If ecofeminists who allege various conceptual
woman-nature connections are correct, this will involve
reconceiving those mainstay philosophical notions which rely on them
(e.g., notions of reason and rationality, knowledge, objectivity,
ethics, and the knowing, moral self).

3. Empirical and Experiential Connections. Many
ecofeminists have focused on uncovering empirical evidence linking
women (and children, people of color, the underclass) with
environmental destruction. Some point to various health and risk
factors borne disproportionately by women children, racial minorities
and the poor caused by the presence of low-level radiation,
pesticides, toxics, and other pollutants (e.g., Caldecott and Leland
1983; Salleh 1990, this section; Shiva 1988; Warren 1991a). Others
provide data to show that First World development policies result in
policies and practices regarding food, forest, and water, which
directly contribute to the inability of women to provide adequately
for themselves and their families (e.g., Mies 1986; Shiva 1988;
Warren 1988, 1989 1991a). Feminist animal rights scholars argue that
factory farming, animal experimentation, hunting, and meat eating are
tied to patriarchal concepts and practices (e.g., Adams 1990, 1991;
Kheel 1985; Slicer 1991). Some connect rape and pornography with
male-gender identified abuse of both women and nature (e.g.,
Collard with Contrucci 1988; Griffin 1981). Appeal to such empirical
data is intended both to document the very real, felt, lived
"experiential" connections between the dominations of women and
nature and to motivate the need for joining together feminist
critical analysis and environmental concerns.

Sometimes, however, the empirical and experiential connections
between women and nature are intended to reveal important cultural
and spiritual ties to the earth honored and celebrated by (some)
women and indigenous peoples. This suggests that some
woman-nature connections are features of important symbol
systems.

4. Symbolic Connections. Some ecofeminists have explored
the symbolic association and devaluation of women and nature that
appears in religion, theology, art, and literature. Documenting such
connections and making them integral to the project of ecofeminism is
often heralded as ecofeminism's most promising contribution to the
creation of liberating, life-afffirming, and postpatriarchal
worldviews and earth-based spiritualities or theologies.
Ecofeminism is then presented as offering alternative spiritual
symbols (e.g., Gaia and goddess symbols), spiritualities or
theologies, and even utopian societies (e.g., see Gearhart).
Appreciating such symbolic woman-nature connections involves
understanding "the politics of women's spirituality" (Spretnak 1981).

Some ecofeminist theorists draw on literature, particularly
"nature writing," to unpack the nature of the woman-nature
linguistic symbolic connections (see Bell 1988; Kolodny 1975; Murphy
1988, 1991). Literary criticism of the sort offered by Patrick Murphy
claims that patriarchal conceptions of nature and women have
justified "a two-pronged rape and domination of the earth and
the women who live on it" (Murphy 1988, 87), often using this as
background for developing an ecofeminist literary theory (Murphy
1991).

Some theorists focus on language, particularly the symbolic
connections between sexist and naturist language, i.e., language that
inferiorizes women and nonhuman nature by naturalizing women and
feminizing nature. For example, there are concerns about whether
sex-gendered language used to describe "Mother Nature" is, in
Ynestra King's words, "potentially liberating or simply a rationale
for the continued subordination of women" (Y. King 1981). There are
concerns about connections between the languages used to describe
women, nature, and nuclear weaponry (see Cahn 1989; Strange 1989).
Women are often describe in animal terms (e.g., as cows, foxes,
chicks, serpents, bitches, beavers, old bats, pussycats, cats,
bird-brains, hare-brains). Nature is often described in
female and sexual terms: nature is raped, mastered, conquered,
controlled, mined. Her "secrets" are "penetrated" and her "womb" is
put into the services of the "man of science." "Virgin timber" is
felled, cut down. "Fertile soil" is tilled and land that lies
"fallow" is "barren," useless. The claim is that language that so
feminizes nature and naturalizes women describes, reflects, and
perpetuates the domination and inferiorization of both by failing to
see the extent to which the twin dominations of women and nature
(including animals) are, in fact, culturally (and not merely
figuratively) analogous. The development of theory and praxis in
feminism and environmental philosophy that does not perpetuate such
sexist-naturist language and the power over systems of
domination they reinforce is, therefore, a goal of ecofeminism.

5. Epistemological Connections. The various alleged
historical, causal conceptual, empirical, and symbolic
woman-nature connections (discussed above) have also motivated
the need for new, ecofeminist epistemologies. Typically these
emerging epistemologies build on scholarship currently under way in
feminist philosophy, whigh challenges mainstream views of reason,
rationality, knowledge, and the nature of the knower (see APA
Newsletter on Feminism and Philosophy 1989). AsVal
Plumwood suggests in this section, if one mistakenly construes
environmental philosophy as only or primarily concerned with ethics,
one will neglect "a key aspect of the overall problem, which is
concerned with the definition of the human self as separate from
nature, the connection between this and the instrumental view of
nature, and broader political aspects of the critique of
instrumentalism" (1991, this section). For Plumwood, ecofeminist
epistemologies must critique rationalism in the Western philosophical
tradition and develop views of the ethical, knowing self that do not
maintain and perpetuate harmful value dualisms and hierarchies,
particularly human-nature ones.

Some feminists (e.g., Mills 1987,1991) appeal to the
critical theory of Horkheimer, Adorno, Balbus, and the Frankfurt
circle, claiming that "their epistemology and substantive analysis
both point to a convergence of feminist and ecological concerns,
anticipating the more recent arrival of eco-feminism" (Salleh
1988,131). For these feminists, "critical theory" provides a
critique of the "nature versus culture" dichotomy and an
epistemological structure for critiquing the relationships between
the domination of women and the domination of nature.

6. Political (Praxis) Connections.Francoise
d'Eaubonne introduced the term "ecofeminisme" in 1974 to bring
attention to women's potential for ecological revolution (1974,213-52). Ecofeminism has always been a grassroots
political movement motivated by pressing pragmatic concerns (see
Lahar 1991). These range from issues of women's and environmental
health, to science, development and technology, the treatment of
animals, and peace, antinuclear, antimilitarist activism. The
varieties of ecofeminist perspectives on the environment are properly
seen as an attempt to take seriously such grassroots activism and
political concerns by developing analyses of domination that explain,
clarify, and guide that praxis.

7. Ethical Connections.To date, most of the
philosophical literature on woman-nature connections has
appeared in the area of environmental philosophy known as
"environmental ethics." The claim is that the interconnections among
the conceptualizations and treatment of women, animals, and (the rest
of) nature require a feminist ethical analysis and response.
Minimally, the goal of ecofeminist environmental ethics is to develop
theories and practices concerning humans and the natural environment
that are not male-biased and provide a guide to action in the
prefeminist present (Warren 1990). This may involve developing an
ecofeminist ethic of care and appropriate reciprocity (Cheney 1987,
1989;Curtin 1991, Warren 1988, 1990, this section),
ecofeminist kinship ethics (Plumwood 1991, this section), ecofeminist
animal rights positions (Adams 1991; Slicer 1991), an ecofeminist
social ecology (Y. King 1981,1983,1989, 1990) or ecofeminist
bioregionalism (Plant 1990). As Plumwood and Warren claim in their
essays in this section, mainstream environmental ethics are
inadequate to the extent that they are problematically
anthropocentric or hopelessly androcentric.

8. Theoretical Connections. The varieties of alleged
woman-nature connections discussed above have generated
different, sometimes competing, theoretical positions in all areas of
feminist and environmental philosophy. Nowhere is this more evident
than in the field of environmental ethics. Primarily because of space
limitations, the discussion of "theoretical connections" offered here
is restricted to environmental ethics.

In many respects, contemporary environmental ethics reflects the
range of positions in contemporary philosophical ethics. The latter
includes traditional consequentialist (e.g., ethical egoist,
utilitarian) and nonconsequentialist or deontotogical (e.g., Kantian,
rights-based, virtue-based) positions, as well as challenges
to them by nontraditional (e,g., some feminist, existentialist,
Marxist, Afrocentric, non-Western) approaches. Such is also
the case in environmental ethics. There are consequentialist (e.g.,
ethical egoist, eco-utilitarian, utilitarian-based
animal liberation ethics) and nonconsequentailist (e.g.,
rights-based animal liberation, stewardship ethics) approaches
that extend traditional ethical considerations to include animals and
the nonhuman environment. (Some would argue that these are not
bona fide environmental ethics, since they do not make the
natural environment itself deserving of moral consideration.) There
also are nontraditional approaches (e.g., holistic Leopoldian land
ethics, social ecology, deep ecology, ecological feminism) that raise
considerations underplayed or omitted entirely from mainstream
philosophical ethics. Feminists who address environmental issues can
be found advocating positions within this broad philosophical range.
So where do ecological feminists fit in?

Where one thinks ecological feminists fit in will depend largely
on what one means by "ecological feminism." If ecological feminism is
an umbrella term for any feminism that raises feminist concerns about
the environment, then presumably ecofeminists can be found along the
continuum of feminist-inspired and advocated environmental
ethics (or, environmental philosophy). If, however, the term
"ecological feminism" is used as I am using the term and as it is
used by the authors in this section, viz., as the name for a variety
of positions expressly committed to exploring woman-nature
connections (of the sort identified above) and to developing feminist
and environmental philosophies based on these insights, then
ecological feminism is best viewed as one of several nontraditional
approaches to environmental ethics and philosophy. We are back to
where we began: "ecological feminism" is the name of a variety of
positions that make visible different sorts of woman-nature
connections, claiming that an understanding of these connections is
necessary for any adequate feminism, environmentalism, or
environmental philosophy. Whether the connections alleged and the
arguments advanced in support of them are accepted on feminist and
philosophical grounds is a question the friendly critic must answer.

THE ESSAYS INCLUDED IN THIS SECTION

As review of the literature overview given above reveals, the four
essays included in this section provide only a glimpse of the
positions advocated by ecofeminists. Still, together they raise
issues across all eight categories of woman-nature connections
that were identified above. Their inclusion here provides a sample of
the philosophically relevant contributions ecofeminist historians,
sociologists, and philosophers have made to ecofeminist and
environmental philosophy.

Historian of environmental science Carolyn Merchant published her
highly influential book The Death of Nature: Women, Ecology and
the Scientific Revolution in 1980. In it she argues that prior
to the seventeenth century, nature was conceived on an organic model
as a benevolent female and a nurturing mother; after the scientific
revolution, nature was conceived on a mechanistic model as (mere)
machine, inert, dead. On both models, nature was female. Merchant
argues that the move from the organic to the mechanistic model
permitted the justified exploitation of the (female) earth, by
removing the sorts of barriers to such treatment that the metaphor of
nature as alive previously prevented; the mechanistic worldview of
modern science sanctioned the exploitation of nature, unrestrained
commercial expansion, and socioeconomic conditions that perpetuated
the subordination of women. The Death of Naturewove
together scholarly material from politics, art, literature, physics,
technology, philosophy and popular culture to show how this
mechanistic worldvlew replaced an older, organic worldview, which
provided gendered moral restraints on how one treated nature.

The essay by Merchant which appears in this section, "The Death of
Nature," is culled from The Death of Nature. This essay
represents an edited version of the philosophically significant
aspects of Merchant's main argument in The Death of Nature; it sidesteps some of the more technical, literary, or
scientific specifics that receive extensive attention in the book.
Inclusion of the Merchant essay in this section ensures
representation of an early and classic, although not universally
accepted (see Plumwood 1986), historical ecofeminist position on the
patriarchal source of the domination of nature.

In "Nature, Self, and Gender: Feminism, Environmental Philosophy,
and the Critique of Rationalism," Val Plumwood argues that the key to
woman-nature connections in the Western world is found in
"rationalism," that long-standing philosophical tradition that
affirms the human/nature dichotomy and a network of other related
dualisms (e.g., masculine/femiine, reason/emotion, spirit/body) and
offers an account of the human self as masculine and centered around
rationality to the exclusion of its contrasts (especially
characteristics regarded as feminine, animal, or natural). Plumwood
criticizes both deep ecology and environmental philosophy generally
for missing entirely the ecofeminist critique that "anthropocentrism
and androcentrism are linked." She claims,

The failure to observe such connections is the result
of an inadequate historical analysis and understanding of the way in
which the inferiorization of both women and nature is grounded in
rationalism, and the connections of both to the inferiorizing of the
body, hierarchical concepts of labor, and disembedded and
individualist accounts of the sel£

Plumwood concludes that "the effect of ecofeminism is not to
absorb or sacrifice the critique of anthropocentrism, but to deepen
and enrich it."

In "Working with Nature: Reciprocity or Control?" Ariel Salleh
documents empirically women's involvement in the environmental
movement and argues that it is a "patriachal belief system" that
maintains and justifies both the invisibility of both what women do
and the continued destruction of the natural environment. According
to Salleh, the rationale of the exploitation of women and of nature
"has been uncovered by the ecofeminist analysis of patriarchy." What
is needed, she argues, is that "the unconscious connection between
women and nature needs to be made conscious, and the hierarchical
fallacies of the Great Chain of Being acknowledged, before there can
be any real growth toward a sane, humane, ecological future. "
Feminists, environmentalists, and philosophers must see that
struggles for equality of women and ecological sustainability are
interlinked.

In "The Power and the Promise of Ecological Feminism," Karen J.
Warren, like Plumwood, focuses on the conceptual connections between
the dominations of women and nature. She argues that because the
conceptual connections are located in an oppressive patriarchal
conceptual framework characterized by a logic of domination, first,
the logic of traditional feminism requires the expansion of feminism
to include ecological femimsm, and, second, ecological feminism
provides a distinctively feminist environmental ethic. Appealing to
the argumentative significance of first-person narrative and emerging
ecofeminist ethics of care, kinship, and appropriate reciprocity,
Warren concludes that any feminism, environmentalism, or
environmental philosophy that fails to recognize important
woman-nature connections is simply inadequate.

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF ECOFEMINISM

The preceding account identifies eight sorts of connections
between the domination of women and the domination of nature that
have been defended by ecofeminists. It also indicates both generally
and specifically (in terms of the four essays included in this
section) the nature of the challenges that acceptance of these
connections poses for contemporary feminism, environmentalism, and
environmental philosophy. But if the power and promise of ecological
feminism runs as deep as many ecofeminists suppose, there must be
implications of ecofeminism for mainstream philosophy as well. What
are some of these?

The historical lmks suggest that data from the social sciences on
women, development, and the environment are important undertakings in
many areas of philosophy. For instance, in ethics such data raise
important issues about anthropocentric and androcentric bias. Can
mainstream normative ethical theories generate an environmental ethic
that is not male-biased? In epistemology, data on the
"indigenous technical knowledge" of women m forestry, water
collection, farming and food production (see Warren 1988, 1991a)
raise issues about women's "epistemic privilege" and the need for
"feminist standpoint epistemologies." In metaphysics, data on the
cross-cultural variability of women-nature connections
raise issues about the social constructions of conceptions of both
women and nature and the human-nature dichotomy of at least
dominant Western philosophy (see Warren 1990, this section). In
political philosophy, data on the inferior standards of living of
women globally raise issues about political theories and theorizing:
What roles do unequal distributions of power and privilege play in
the maintainance of systems of domination over both women and nature.
How do they affect the content of political theories and the
methodology of political theorizing? In the history of philosophy,
data on the historical inferiorization of what is both female-gender
and nature identified raise issues about the andthropocentric and
androcentic biases of philosophical theories in any given time
period. In philosophy of science, particularly philosophy of biology,
such data raise issues about the relationships between feminism and
science, particularly ecological science. As Carolyn Merchant asks,
"Is there a set of assumptions basic to the science of ecology that
also holds implications for the status of women? Is there an
ecological ethic that is also a feminist ethic?" (Merchant 1985,
229). Are there important parallels between contemporary ecofeminist
ethics and ecosystem ecology that suggest ways in which the two are
engaged in mutually supportive projects (see Warren and Cheney 1991)?
These are the sorts of questions ecofeminism raises for traditional
fields in mainstream philosophy.

Perhaps the most serious challenges to mainstream philosophy are
at the level of conceptual analysis and theory. Ecofeminism raises
significant issues about the philosophical conceptions of the self,
knowledge and the knower, reason and rationality, objectivity, and a
host of favored dualisms that form the backbone of philosophical
theorizing, even the conception of philosophy itself. These notions
will need to be reexamined for posslble male-gender bias. The
challenge to philosophy is to replace conceptual schemes, theories,
and practices that currently feminize nature and naturalize women to
the mutual detriment of both with ones that do not. That is what
ecofeminists generally, and the authors in this section specifically,
argue is needed from feminism, environmentalism, environmental
philosophy, and philosophy.

Bell, Barbara Currier. 1988. Cable of blue fire: glimpsing a group
identity for humankind, Studies in the Humanities. Special
Issue on Feminism, Ecology, and the Future of the Humanities, ed.
Patrick Murphy. 15(2):90-107.

Salleh, Ariel Kay. 1990. Living with Nature: Reciprocity or
Control? in Ethics of Environment andDevelopment,
eds. R. and J. Engel (Tucson: University of Arizona Press).

------. 1988. Epistemology and the metaphors of production: An
eco-feminist reading of critical theory, in Studies in the
Humanities. Special issue on feminism, ecology, and the future
of the humanities, ed. Patrick Murphy. 15(2):130-39.

Warren, Karen J. 1991a. Taking Empirical Data Seriously: An
Ecofeminist Perspective on Woman-Nature Connections, Working
Paper, presented at the North American Society for Social Philosophy
(Colorado Springs, Colo.: August 10, 1991).

Karen J. Warren is a feminist philosopher who has published essays
on ecofeminism and edited several special issues on ecofeminism for
Hypatia: A Journal of Feminist Philosophy and the American
Philosophical Association Newsletter on Feminism and
Philosophy. Warren is completing three books on ecological
feminism, one co-authored with Jim Cheney and entitled
Ecological Feminism, and two anthologies on ecofeminism.
Warren also conducts workshops on environmental ethics and critical
thinking for elementary and secondary school teachers and students,
and is co-creator of an environmental ethics simulation game.

An earlier version of this essay appeared in the American
Philosophical Association Newsletter on Feminism and Philosophy
(Fall 1991).