Although most scholars were quick to puncture the Soviet Union's sham claims to democracy, too many accepted at face value its claim to be a federal state. The shifting debates about federalism in ...
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Although most scholars were quick to puncture the Soviet Union's sham claims to democracy, too many accepted at face value its claim to be a federal state. The shifting debates about federalism in Bolshevik doctrine and communist theory are explored. The formation, systematization, and stagnation of the so‐called ‘Soviet federalism’ is examined and debunked through analysis of the constitutions and political realities that existed under Lenin, Stalin, and Brezhnev.Less

Soviet ‘Federalism’

Jeffrey Kahn

Published in print: 2002-06-13

Although most scholars were quick to puncture the Soviet Union's sham claims to democracy, too many accepted at face value its claim to be a federal state. The shifting debates about federalism in Bolshevik doctrine and communist theory are explored. The formation, systematization, and stagnation of the so‐called ‘Soviet federalism’ is examined and debunked through analysis of the constitutions and political realities that existed under Lenin, Stalin, and Brezhnev.

When Gorbachev moved to Moscow in November 1978, he became – at the age of 47 – the youngest member of the predominantly elderly Soviet top leadership team. He received rapid promotion, becoming a ...
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When Gorbachev moved to Moscow in November 1978, he became – at the age of 47 – the youngest member of the predominantly elderly Soviet top leadership team. He received rapid promotion, becoming a candidate member of the Politburo in 1979 and a full member in 1980, while retaining the Secretaryship of the Central Committee he had been accorded in 1978. It was only after the death of Leonid Brezhnev in November 1982, however, and the choice of Andropov to succeed him, that Gorbachev entered the inner circle of the leadership. He was unusual for a Politburo member in consulting widely among social scientists and in taking full advantage of Moscow's cultural life. Andropov, when he was dying, tried to elevate Gorbachev above Konstantin Chernenko and make him his heir apparent, but the old guard in the Soviet leadership prevented this. There was also an attempt to prevent Gorbachev becoming de facto ‘second secretary’ after Chernenko succeeded Andropov in March 1984, but Gorbachev eventually became the clear number two within the party hierarchy and the obvious, and in the end unanimous, choice to succeed Chernenko as General Secretary when the latter died in March 1985. Meantime, Gorbachev had begun to show that he was a potential leader of a different kind by impressing Margaret Thatcher and the British public on a visit to the UK in December 1984 and, in the same month, making a speech in Moscow which castigated Soviet stereotypical thinking and introduced some of the new ideas that were to become so important during his years as General Secretary.Less

In the Portals of Power

Archie Brown

Published in print: 1997-08-07

When Gorbachev moved to Moscow in November 1978, he became – at the age of 47 – the youngest member of the predominantly elderly Soviet top leadership team. He received rapid promotion, becoming a candidate member of the Politburo in 1979 and a full member in 1980, while retaining the Secretaryship of the Central Committee he had been accorded in 1978. It was only after the death of Leonid Brezhnev in November 1982, however, and the choice of Andropov to succeed him, that Gorbachev entered the inner circle of the leadership. He was unusual for a Politburo member in consulting widely among social scientists and in taking full advantage of Moscow's cultural life. Andropov, when he was dying, tried to elevate Gorbachev above Konstantin Chernenko and make him his heir apparent, but the old guard in the Soviet leadership prevented this. There was also an attempt to prevent Gorbachev becoming de facto ‘second secretary’ after Chernenko succeeded Andropov in March 1984, but Gorbachev eventually became the clear number two within the party hierarchy and the obvious, and in the end unanimous, choice to succeed Chernenko as General Secretary when the latter died in March 1985. Meantime, Gorbachev had begun to show that he was a potential leader of a different kind by impressing Margaret Thatcher and the British public on a visit to the UK in December 1984 and, in the same month, making a speech in Moscow which castigated Soviet stereotypical thinking and introduced some of the new ideas that were to become so important during his years as General Secretary.

Drawing on newly available materials from the Soviet archives, this book offers an innovative account of de-Stalinization in the Soviet Union during the Khrushchev and early Brezhnev eras. The book ...
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Drawing on newly available materials from the Soviet archives, this book offers an innovative account of de-Stalinization in the Soviet Union during the Khrushchev and early Brezhnev eras. The book traces the authorities' initiation and management of the de-Stalinization process and explores a wide range of popular reactions to the new narratives of Stalinism in party statements and in Soviet literature and historiography. Engaging with the dynamic field of memory studies, this book represents the first sustained comparison of this process with other countries' attempts to rethink their own difficult pasts, and with later Soviet and post-Soviet approaches to Stalinism.Less

Polly Jones

Published in print: 2013-08-27

Drawing on newly available materials from the Soviet archives, this book offers an innovative account of de-Stalinization in the Soviet Union during the Khrushchev and early Brezhnev eras. The book traces the authorities' initiation and management of the de-Stalinization process and explores a wide range of popular reactions to the new narratives of Stalinism in party statements and in Soviet literature and historiography. Engaging with the dynamic field of memory studies, this book represents the first sustained comparison of this process with other countries' attempts to rethink their own difficult pasts, and with later Soviet and post-Soviet approaches to Stalinism.

This concluding chapter summarizes the preceding discussions, covering the Gulag's emergence as a mass social phenomenon in the 1920s to its collapse by the end of the 1950s. The system took a ...
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This concluding chapter summarizes the preceding discussions, covering the Gulag's emergence as a mass social phenomenon in the 1920s to its collapse by the end of the 1950s. The system took a terrible toll on Soviet society, with victims numbering into the millions, and even those who survived often crushed by the experience. After Stalin, the Soviet state decisively moved away from the use of mass terror as a normal, permanent feature of the political system. However, it also engaged in numerous incidents of violence and political repression in its final thirty-five years, from the bloody suppression of uprisings within its borders and the countries of the Warsaw Pact, to the use of labor camps and psychoprisons to devastate the small but vocal human rights dissident movements of the Brezhnev years. Nonetheless, the Gulag never reemerged as the mammoth complex of its heyday.Less

Conclusion

Steven A. Barnes

Published in print: 2011-04-24

This concluding chapter summarizes the preceding discussions, covering the Gulag's emergence as a mass social phenomenon in the 1920s to its collapse by the end of the 1950s. The system took a terrible toll on Soviet society, with victims numbering into the millions, and even those who survived often crushed by the experience. After Stalin, the Soviet state decisively moved away from the use of mass terror as a normal, permanent feature of the political system. However, it also engaged in numerous incidents of violence and political repression in its final thirty-five years, from the bloody suppression of uprisings within its borders and the countries of the Warsaw Pact, to the use of labor camps and psychoprisons to devastate the small but vocal human rights dissident movements of the Brezhnev years. Nonetheless, the Gulag never reemerged as the mammoth complex of its heyday.

This chapter focuses on the macro level economic environment within which the enterprise operates. It is divided into six sections. Following a brief introduction, the second section outlines the ...
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This chapter focuses on the macro level economic environment within which the enterprise operates. It is divided into six sections. Following a brief introduction, the second section outlines the socialist economic situation at the end of the 1980s, a period of decline following the ‘era of stagnation’ under Brezhnev. The third section summarizes trends in the macroeconomy after 1989, covering GDP, inflation, state budgets, international trade flows, and balance of payments. The fourth section discusses labour market trends — employment, unemployment, earnings, and labour productivity. The fifth section discusses the development of macroeconomic policies in the region after 1989. The concluding sixth section provides a brief summary.Less

Economic transformation : Collapse and recovery

Roderick Martin

Published in print: 1999-11-25

This chapter focuses on the macro level economic environment within which the enterprise operates. It is divided into six sections. Following a brief introduction, the second section outlines the socialist economic situation at the end of the 1980s, a period of decline following the ‘era of stagnation’ under Brezhnev. The third section summarizes trends in the macroeconomy after 1989, covering GDP, inflation, state budgets, international trade flows, and balance of payments. The fourth section discusses labour market trends — employment, unemployment, earnings, and labour productivity. The fifth section discusses the development of macroeconomic policies in the region after 1989. The concluding sixth section provides a brief summary.

The changing international environment of the 1960s made it possible to attain détente, a relaxation of tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union. Back-channel diplomacy—confidential ...
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The changing international environment of the 1960s made it possible to attain détente, a relaxation of tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union. Back-channel diplomacy—confidential contacts between the White House and the Kremlin, mainly between National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger and the Soviet ambassador to the United States, Anatoly Dobrynin—transformed that possibility into reality. This book argues that although back-channel diplomacy was useful in improving U.S.-Soviet relations in the short term by acting as a safety valve and giving policy-actors a personal stake in improved relations, it provided a weak foundation for long-term détente.
This book traces the evolution of confidential channels during the Nixon administration and examines certain flashpoints in U.S.-Soviet relations, such as the 1970 Cienfuegos crisis, Sino-American rapprochement, and the Indo-Pakistani War in 1971. The U.S. involvement in Vietnam and Moscow’s support for Hanoi remained constant irritants in U.S.-Soviet relations. The back-channel relationships allowed both sides to agree to disagree and paved the way for the Moscow Summit of May 1972.
This focused examination of U.S.-Soviet back-channel diplomacy mitigates some of criticisms levied against Nixon and Kissinger in their secretive conduct of diplomacy by showing that back channels were both necessary and an effective instrument of policy. However, back channels worked best when they supplemented rather than replaced more traditional diplomacy.Less

Nixon's Back Channel to Moscow : Confidential Diplomacy and Détente

Richard A. Moss

Published in print: 2017-02-28

The changing international environment of the 1960s made it possible to attain détente, a relaxation of tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union. Back-channel diplomacy—confidential contacts between the White House and the Kremlin, mainly between National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger and the Soviet ambassador to the United States, Anatoly Dobrynin—transformed that possibility into reality. This book argues that although back-channel diplomacy was useful in improving U.S.-Soviet relations in the short term by acting as a safety valve and giving policy-actors a personal stake in improved relations, it provided a weak foundation for long-term détente.
This book traces the evolution of confidential channels during the Nixon administration and examines certain flashpoints in U.S.-Soviet relations, such as the 1970 Cienfuegos crisis, Sino-American rapprochement, and the Indo-Pakistani War in 1971. The U.S. involvement in Vietnam and Moscow’s support for Hanoi remained constant irritants in U.S.-Soviet relations. The back-channel relationships allowed both sides to agree to disagree and paved the way for the Moscow Summit of May 1972.
This focused examination of U.S.-Soviet back-channel diplomacy mitigates some of criticisms levied against Nixon and Kissinger in their secretive conduct of diplomacy by showing that back channels were both necessary and an effective instrument of policy. However, back channels worked best when they supplemented rather than replaced more traditional diplomacy.

This book—the first full-length study of Soviet Central Television to draw extensively on archival sources, interviews, and television recordings—challenges the idea that mass culture in the Soviet ...
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This book—the first full-length study of Soviet Central Television to draw extensively on archival sources, interviews, and television recordings—challenges the idea that mass culture in the Soviet Union during the Brezhnev era was dull and formulaic. The book follows the history of Central Television in the Soviet Union from the mid-1960s through the late 1970s and early 1980s. Tracing the emergence of play, conflict, and competition on Soviet news programs, serial films, and variety and game shows, the book shows that Central Television's most popular shows were experimental and creative, laying the groundwork for Mikhail Gorbachev's reforms and the post-Soviet media system. It shows that the highly televisual Putin era represents the culmination of a long Soviet—now Russian—“era of television” that began in the late 1950s.Less

Between Truth and Time : A History of Soviet Central Television

Christine E. Evans

Published in print: 2016-08-23

This book—the first full-length study of Soviet Central Television to draw extensively on archival sources, interviews, and television recordings—challenges the idea that mass culture in the Soviet Union during the Brezhnev era was dull and formulaic. The book follows the history of Central Television in the Soviet Union from the mid-1960s through the late 1970s and early 1980s. Tracing the emergence of play, conflict, and competition on Soviet news programs, serial films, and variety and game shows, the book shows that Central Television's most popular shows were experimental and creative, laying the groundwork for Mikhail Gorbachev's reforms and the post-Soviet media system. It shows that the highly televisual Putin era represents the culmination of a long Soviet—now Russian—“era of television” that began in the late 1950s.

The 1950s established patterns for Soviet tourism, many of which lasted until the fall of the Soviet Union. Some of these patterns were positive ones. Others reflected bureaucratic inertia and ...
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The 1950s established patterns for Soviet tourism, many of which lasted until the fall of the Soviet Union. Some of these patterns were positive ones. Others reflected bureaucratic inertia and persistent anxiety. Tourism abroad became even more of a status symbol for the Soviet privileged classes, something different, presumably, than what Khrushchev had in mind with his promise to reform Communism and provide a more equitable alternative to capitalism. Ironically, Khrushchev's democratizing of knowledge about the rest of the world set up a comparison with the capitalist West which contributed to consumer disappointment under Brezhnev. In the Khrushchev era, however, the experience of travel abroad did not inevitably lead to anti-Soviet opinions, even as it did offer the possibility for personal as well as political alternatives. All this is Your World enrichs our understanding of the vital, and increasingly universal, relationship between experiencing the elsewhere, and finding one's own place at homeLess

Epilogue

Anne E. Gorsuch

Published in print: 2011-08-01

The 1950s established patterns for Soviet tourism, many of which lasted until the fall of the Soviet Union. Some of these patterns were positive ones. Others reflected bureaucratic inertia and persistent anxiety. Tourism abroad became even more of a status symbol for the Soviet privileged classes, something different, presumably, than what Khrushchev had in mind with his promise to reform Communism and provide a more equitable alternative to capitalism. Ironically, Khrushchev's democratizing of knowledge about the rest of the world set up a comparison with the capitalist West which contributed to consumer disappointment under Brezhnev. In the Khrushchev era, however, the experience of travel abroad did not inevitably lead to anti-Soviet opinions, even as it did offer the possibility for personal as well as political alternatives. All this is Your World enrichs our understanding of the vital, and increasingly universal, relationship between experiencing the elsewhere, and finding one's own place at home

This chapter describes events in the history of Soviet theater and arts from 1917 to 1919. The period known as Stagnation—owing to the smug, stolid, and increasingly arteriosclerotic leadership of ...
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This chapter describes events in the history of Soviet theater and arts from 1917 to 1919. The period known as Stagnation—owing to the smug, stolid, and increasingly arteriosclerotic leadership of Leonid Brezhnev—also saw the most exciting upsurge in theatrical creativity since the 1920s. Audiences flocked the theater to hear messages they could not hear anywhere else. Often veiled in “Aesopic language” or scenic metaphors, antiestablishment attitudes could be conveyed from the stage. Turning away from the mediocre repertoire, many directors adapted prose and played the classics: Éfros staged Gogol's Wedlock and The Cherry Orchard in 1975; Chekhov's Ivanov was seen as a forecast of the current mood and enjoyed multiple revivals.Less

Innovation Within Stagnation, 1964–1984

Laurence SenelickSergei Ostrovsky

Published in print: 2014-06-24

This chapter describes events in the history of Soviet theater and arts from 1917 to 1919. The period known as Stagnation—owing to the smug, stolid, and increasingly arteriosclerotic leadership of Leonid Brezhnev—also saw the most exciting upsurge in theatrical creativity since the 1920s. Audiences flocked the theater to hear messages they could not hear anywhere else. Often veiled in “Aesopic language” or scenic metaphors, antiestablishment attitudes could be conveyed from the stage. Turning away from the mediocre repertoire, many directors adapted prose and played the classics: Éfros staged Gogol's Wedlock and The Cherry Orchard in 1975; Chekhov's Ivanov was seen as a forecast of the current mood and enjoyed multiple revivals.

This chapter examines the Brezhnev era and the unanticipated problems which the ‘single family apartment’ had spawned in the course of a generation. The housing shortage continued to have a negative ...
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This chapter examines the Brezhnev era and the unanticipated problems which the ‘single family apartment’ had spawned in the course of a generation. The housing shortage continued to have a negative impact on byt and other aspects of personal life, particularly those relating to gender. A greater encouragement of housing construction cooperatives and convoluted process of exchanging apartments were major features of the Brezhnev housing programme. One of the major types of apartment exchange was to replace a relatively large apartment for two small ones so that adult offspring could enjoy a private family life. The new byt involved an attempt to ensure that the privatisation of the family was combined with a sense of social responsibility. The increased privatisation of family life had some negative aspects.Less

The Brezhnev years

Lynne Attwood

Published in print: 2010-03-01

This chapter examines the Brezhnev era and the unanticipated problems which the ‘single family apartment’ had spawned in the course of a generation. The housing shortage continued to have a negative impact on byt and other aspects of personal life, particularly those relating to gender. A greater encouragement of housing construction cooperatives and convoluted process of exchanging apartments were major features of the Brezhnev housing programme. One of the major types of apartment exchange was to replace a relatively large apartment for two small ones so that adult offspring could enjoy a private family life. The new byt involved an attempt to ensure that the privatisation of the family was combined with a sense of social responsibility. The increased privatisation of family life had some negative aspects.