Marshall Green, Assistant
Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs

Francis J. Galbraith, Ambassador
to Indonesia

Robert W. Barnett, Deputy
Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs

John Holdridge, White House Staff

Edward E. Masters, Country
Director for Indonesian Affairs

PRESIDENT SUHARTO’S WASHINGTON
VISIT—CONCURRENT WHITE HOUSE TALKS

After welcoming Foreign Minister Malik
and his colleagues to Washington and conveying Secretary Rogers’ regret that a long standing
commitment to attend a NATO conference had
prevented his being present, Mr. Richardson asked Mr. Green to provide a brief survey of the situation in East
Asia.

Mr. Green outlined the principles which
underlie the Nixon Doctrine and noted
that, while the Cambodian situation has injected a new element into
Southeast Asia, our policy there is completely consistent with these
principles. The President’s action in sending troops into Cambodia, Mr.
Green pointed out, is designed to
protect and advance the policy of Vietnamization and increase prospects for
Cambodia’s stability and friendly cooperation with its neighbors. Referring
to a Harris poll the previous day which showed that a majority of the
American people support the President on this issue, Mr. Green stated that the success of our action
in Cambodia would increase this popular support.

Mr. Richardson noted that the
Nixon Doctrine does not mean that
we are in the process of disengaging or running out on our commitments but
represents an adjustment of U.S. policy to actual conditions. It reflects
increased Asian capability for and interest in regional cooperation, the
declining influence of ideology and the fact neither super power is in a
position to push others around. For these and other reasons, Mr. Richardson explained, the President has
decided that we should adjust, but not abandon, our role in Asia.

Mr. Richardson emphasized that the
U.S. does not seek a military victory in Southeast Asia and noted that we
have placed definite restraints on our actions regarding North Vietnam. The
U.S. believes that it will have discharged its obligation to the people of
South Vietnam if they are given freedom to choose their own course.

The United States recognizes the importance of Indonesia as a nonaligned
country, Mr. Richardson said, and can
envisage as a possible solution of the conflict a situation in which all of
Indochina might be non-aligned, if this is what these nations want. The U.S.
commitment to the people of South Vietnam is to help them attain a position
in which they can reach their own solutions rather than be forced to accept
those dictated by others.

Malik said he wished to make clear
that Indonesia has no misapprehensions regarding the Nixon Doctrine but, in fact, believes that
it is time for some rethinking along these lines by the U.S. Indonesia
hopes, however, that under this new doctrine the U.S., as a super power, [Page 637]will not equate all problems of
Southeast Asia. The Indonesian Government understands the domestic problems
which the U.S. faces but nonetheless believes it important that the U.S.
stress and even increase its commitments as far as certain problems are
concerned.

Malik perceived two distinct facets of
communists’ strategic approach, the more moderate public line of the Soviet
Union and the militant position of Communist China. This divergence in the
communist camp has an impact on world opinion and on domestic opinion.
Indonesia would like to expose the communists’ views so that they are not
able to play both sides of the street.

Until now, Malik continued, the
impression has been created through communist propaganda that the communists
are all right and the U.S. is all wrong. Demonstrators aiming at ending U.S.
support for Vietnam’s struggle forget that the communists have been
attempting to subvert South Vietnam for a long time. The Djakarta Conference
was designed, among other things, to open the eyes of the world to the true
state of affairs, Malik explained.

Source: National Archives, RG 59,
Central Files 1970–73, POL 7 INDON.
Secret. Drafted by Masters and
Paul Gardner (EA/MS) and approved by John
D. Stempel (D) Documents 297 and 298. The meeting
was held in the Cabinet Room at the White House.↩