Quote:OK, I am sure that there are a dozen reasons why what I am about to suggest is a horrible idea,

We all know that different objects can be deployed from the aircraft in-flight. RAT, landing gear ect.

Most of the concern centers on "battery fire while x hours from possible landing". presumably over open ocean or artic landscape.

While this is not an 'easy' fix, what about having the batteries in future designs be in a belly location where they can be jettisoned? The most contained battery fire is the one that is 30K below and 10 miles back. This would require breakaway connectors and some additional seams on the exterior surface....

Bessides the fact the FAA has a really really bad aversion to parts coming off aircraft especially over inhabited areas... no one wants a 50+ pound object coming through the roof of their house.

the fault tree for the jettison system would have to preclude a jettison failure from causing its own incident especially if it failed during takeoff/landing or during an engine failure etc where the battery was required to provide standby power to continue safe flight...

adding a bunch more complexity to a system is rarely a good way to mitigate risk

"The fact that such electrical system-related incidents would occur consecutively, purely from my perspective, could not have been expected. We are finding it difficult trying to figure out what kind of investigative stance we should take."

The investigation has also renewed scrutiny on the FAA's 2007 decision to let Boeing use a highly flammable battery technology on the 787. A U.S. Senate committee will hold a hearing in coming weeks to examine aviation safety oversight and the FAA's decision, a congressional aide said on Tuesday.

"I can't really say anything about the timeframe of the investigation. The NTSB is really the only authorized authority in the U.S. to talk about this investigation and they made some recent statements, but I can't speculate on timeframe," Sinnett said Wednesday in recorded remarks supplied to Reuters.

FAA Administrator Michael Huerta, appearing at the same event, said the review was looking at the 787's certification, manufacturing and assembly processes, and that he could not speculate on an end date.

For at least one Chinese customer, the uncertainty about the Dreamliner's production and delivery schedule has meant delays in launching new routes.

"Frankly, it's a little disappointing the aircraft has been delayed so many times," said Chen Feng, chairman of Hainan Airlines Co Ltd parent HNA Group, in an interview at the World Economic Forum in Davos. "We still think it's a good aircraft, but this has had some effect on our planning."

Just checked Boeing's stock price and was pleasantly surprised to see that it has help up pretty well through the grounding so far. Looks to be above their 6-month average, and has actually been trending up through the day today. So the market hasn't lost much confidence yet.

Quote:Many of the people that share this attitude are shameless fans of BA, engineers or designers

Quote: The incompetence and infallibility complex of pilots are what have caused most noteworthy crashes of commercial airliners in the last 50 years.

.

Enough of this confrontational BS !! Please !

You people make it sound like engineers and pilots are in a permanent war against each other. That's not true, they are the two sides to the same coin.
The primary job of the engineer is to design and build an airplane that will not put the pilot in a precarious situation
The pilot's primary job is to not bring his airplane into a dangerous position.

But both groups are made of fallible human beings. BOTH OF THEM.

So the engineers have to also design the plane to continue to work in case of a failure. Either introduced in the design & manufacturing, or by the pilot.
And pilots have to be able to keep their arcraft out of a mess even if they make a mistake or if the plane is not functioning nominally.

IOW the pilots and the engineers have to work TOGETHER. And when they fail, when the dreaded accident happens, then they fail TOGETHER. Point me to one single accident which involves only the design, or only the pilots ; I don't know one.

Pilots and engineers have been complementing each other, have been for a hundred years, and will continue to be so. And the result is that we have thousands of aircraft flying all around the globe, transporting each day the equivalent of the population of London, with a very good level of safety. Please keep that in mind before you start another "it's his fault" - "no, it's his fault" argument worthy of a 3 year old. Or before you start accusing people of being incompetant morons, or corrupt greedy bags of s**t.

Both pilots and engineers have highly complicated decisions to make, in their respective areas of competence. Both use an advanced set of knowledge & skills. But in the end both are working to make aviation as economical as possible while maintaining a high level of safety. And as I said, so far the results are rather good.

It is normal to not understand the complex situations they study, and the resulting choices they make. And it is your right to choose not to try to understand.
But if you so choose, please refrain from confontation and mud throwing against those who prefer to understand and solve the problem

"The fact that such electrical system-related incidents would occur consecutively, purely from my perspective, could not have been expected. We are finding it difficult trying to figure out what kind of investigative stance we should take."

is not this....

Quoting flyingcello (Reply 2):What about a very brief overview of the current position to start the new thread off?

Keep reading...

Quoting airmagnac (Reply 5):You people make it sound like engineers and pilots are in a permanent war against each other.

Boy - I'm in trouble. I'm both a pilot and an engineer. And I have a number of engineer friends who are pilots. On top of that I'm a fire fighter who deals with failures of both pilots and engineers. Boy - I must by skitzo.

Quoting flyingcello (Reply 2):What about a very brief overview of the current position to start the new thread off?

The current position - of the investigation, not the a.net flame fest.

After 2 incidents involving Li-Ion battery failures on Boeing 787's in 9 days, the FAA issued an order grounding 787 flights while investigation into the cause and effect of the failures is being conducted.

The JAL incident involved the APU battery and occurred while the aircraft was parked in Boston. The battery, for reasons unknown, failed and apparently went into a thermal runaway condition that caused it to burn within its containment vessel. The battery was removed and extinguished by fire fighters.

In the ANA incident the aircraft was in flight and pilots received a warning of a failure in the main "ship" backup battery and detected an unusual order. The pilots made an emergency landing and the a/c was evacuated. Investigation showed the ship battery, again for unknown reasons, had failed in a mode that caused it to burn in it's containment structure. I'm unaware of any action taken by fire crews in the ANA case. In the ANA case, electrolyte from the battery escaped the containment - though it is unclear from public information the extent of that (lots of statements, not much data).

The two batteries are identical, but located in different parts of the a/c. The APU battery is used only to start the APU when other sources are not available. The ship battery is used for backup when other sources fail. It is not used in normal flight operations.

The batteries consist of 8 Li-Ion cells manufactured by Yuasa and packaged by Thales to Boeing's specification - including a containment structure. The containment system also includes a smoke evacuation system for the two bays where the batteries are located to prevent smoke from getting into the cabin during flight. That system operated by causing air flow from the cabins through the bays and out of the a/c via outflow valves. In the case smoke is detected in either bay - the system is re-configured to increase that flow rate. That reconfiguration will not occur automatically in the in the presence of smell (a bad odor will not cause it), but it can be configured that way by pilots.

At the current point - the investigation continues. Data from DFDR on the ships indicate neither battery was overcharged. leading to some speculation that the cause was a defect in the batteries themselves. However, no findings have been released and we really don't know the detail that the FAA or other agencies are looking at.

------
Believe it or not - that is about it. We had 2 battery fires. Neither appeared to have endangered the a/c - however, concern about the battery, charging system, containment, etc. is such that the FAA is concerned and grounded the aircraft until the incidents can be fully understood and it can be ascertained that there is or is not a flight safety issue. The grounding obviously presumes there is and is the safe course of action. At such point as analysis reveals what happened and the potential impact of the incidents becomes clear, such action as is deemed needed will be ordered by way of AD, completed and the a/c will, presumably, return to flight.

Neither I - nor anybody on this forum, or probably the FAA/Boeing/NTSB yet know the cause/effect or actions required.

It is hard to believe the actual facts that lie behind 5 threads is that brief. The vast majority of discussion here is in the form of people expressing various opinions and adding their bit of knowledge about systems and actions.

Quoting alfablue (Reply 3):The investigation has also renewed scrutiny on the FAA's 2007 decision to let Boeing use a highly flammable battery technology on the 787. A U.S. Senate committee will hold a hearing in coming weeks to examine aviation safety oversight and the FAA's decision, a congressional aide said on Tuesday.

And yet, no one has come forward showing where there has been significant fire damage to anything beyond the battery itself, except for smoke residue on the belly of the NH bird (which many speculated was actually battery electrolyte?). I know the investigation is still young, and we're being spoon fed pictures. I will reiterate what I said in the (now locked) #4 thread, the picture of the battery box before it was opened looks very similar to what I saw when a coworker destroyed a lead acid battery once in a GA plane, by charging a 12 volt battery with 28 volts DC. In that instance, battery acid boiled out and even dripped down out of the engine cowling. Since no one turned on the master switch in the hapless plane, the mechanic was able to put a new battery and battery box in the same day, and clean up all the battery acid, and had the plane flying again the same day.

It is looking, at this point, like the problem is in the battery itself. I'm guessing a long term solution is going to be more monitoring circuits to monitor the health of the individual cells in the LiIon batery, especially since in both incidents, the safety boards (NTSB + Japanese counterpart) are now saying no overvoltage occurred during charging.

Quoting PITingres (Reply 252):While I don't dispute your statement as such, the fact does remain that up until the grounding event, the dispatch reliability for the 787 fleet was reported as being on par with other new type introductions, specifically the 777 numbers. Are you suggesting that those 787 numbers were false / incorrect? or is this just an "I told you so"? (which might be immodest but there's no rule against it!)

Keep in mind the claimed DR applies to the 787 fleet worldwide, whereas mcdu was specifically referring to UA. Having tracked UA's fleet for the past 40 days or so, I don't see how they could have attained a DR rate of over 93% during the time, if that. I imagine the folks at UA cringe whenever Boeing touts their DR figures.

Quoting rcair1 (Reply 6):Believe it or not - that is about it. We had 2 battery fires. Neither appeared to have endangered the a/c - however, concern about the battery, charging system, containment, etc. is such that the FAA is concerned and grounded the aircraft until the incidents can be fully understood and it can be ascertained that there is or is not a flight safety issue. The grounding obviously presumes there is and is the safe course of action. At such point as analysis reveals what happened and the potential impact of the incidents becomes clear, such action as is deemed needed will be ordered by way of AD, completed and the a/c will, presumably, return to flight.

This is where I don't agree with your analysis.

The FAA only grounded the aircraft AFTER the JAA did so. It was not out of concern, but out of CYA. There is no other answer I can see, because despite the two incidents happening within 2 weeks, they were very different, and neither contributed to a "safety of flight" situation that anyone can prove. One wasn't even flying for goodness sake.

But the FAA is not going to be upstaged by the JAA, plain and simple. And the JAA will not take the risk of failing to act after the nuclear regulatory agency in Japan was shown to be a miserable failure of an agency, and considering the public black-eyes regarding safety concerning automobiles (including battery fires) and aircraft seats from Japan over the last few years.

It is my belief that had the JAA not grounded the 787, the FAA would not have and 787s would be flying safely today. They would have continued with their already announced investigation WITHOUT grounding the aircraft, possibly recommending the testing of all batteries.

But now what? The FAA can't say "we checked things out and will allow the aircraft to fly while XYZ happens" because they haven't defined what they need to do so they have no idea how they will know it's finished.

I believe Boeing will have to sue the FAA to get the 787 back in the air, with a federal judge enjoining the FAA to prove imminent threat to life to keep the grounding alive, or to lift the grounding. After all, if it's simply a maintenance nightmare and not a threat to life, that's between Boeing and the airlines. We don't ground other hanger queens simply because they go tech more often.

But then, would any other agency around the world follow if the ban were lifted by the courts? Surely not the EU, as the damage this will do to Boeing is in the best interest of the EU. Maybe the JAA as they will feel pressure from ANA and JAL to lift the ban anyway.

Maybe the FAA can say "replace the main backup batteries with tested good batteries and remove all APU batteries" until things are better understood. This action alone would cut the risk of battery fire by some factor greater than 2, and since there is no evidence a battery fire would cause anything but a diversion, the risk is already low, so it would be over twice as low as before.

But there are egos involved, and a lot of CYA still to occur, so it could be a long grounding.

I just wanted to say, thank you for the recap of the situation. I've been wanting to know what's been going on, but with the flame wars through over two hundred posts per thread in four threads now, it was all but impossible to get the information without spending hours I don't have sifting through the wars to try and get the info, and I didn't want to start another thread to ask. So, thank you sir.

I was being dramatic/sarcastic to illustrate how ridiculous his statement was. It is absurd to denigrate engineers and designers with very little reason. I work with engineers and pilots and find his statements a bit rich.

Given all the rhetoric, I fully expect Boeing and its partners will come up with a solution. However, I also suspect given the positions of some people, those same people will never be satisfied that ANY Li-ion battery can EVER be safe on an aircraft.

Absolutely safe life only exists in fantasy - reality always has risks. If it weren't for the willingness of the technologically innovative to take life-threatening risks there would be no such thing as an aircraft today.

Quoting Pygmalion (Reply 10):Boeing quotes are fleetwide dispatch reliability and would include all 50 airplanes including UA

Yes, that's my point - their figures represent the average for all 50 frames. But UA and ANA aren't operating their fleets with similar DR rates. They're nowhere close. ANA's numbers are driving up the worldwide average considerably.

Quoting StressedOut (Reply 13):I was being dramatic/sarcastic to illustrate how rediculous his statement was.

If so, you have my apologies. I was a little violent there.
But I wasn't aiming at anyone in particular ; I removed the names of the posters in the quotes because this is a general observation. I just couldn't hold it in after reading through the entire part 4 thread in one go. So I stand by my post

Quoting rcair1 (Reply 6):
Boy - I'm in trouble. I'm both a pilot and an engineer

Same here

Quoting rcair1 (Reply 6): On top of that I'm a fire fighter who deals with failures of both pilots and engineers. Boy - I must by skitzo.

Wow, you really must be totally nuts !
But as crazy as you may be, your posts are full of sense, and are highly appreciated.

Quoting flood (Reply 15):Yes, that's my point - their figures represent the average for all 50 frames. But UA and ANA aren't operating their fleets with similar DR rates. They're nowhere close. ANA's numbers are driving up the worldwide average considerably.

not surprising since ANA has a third of the existing 787 fleet and has operated it the longest.

UA didn't start service until Nov 2012. They didnt even get half their fleet until late Dec. Not to worry, they will catch up.

From Stitch in the other thread: "Well if they believe it's the battery, and not the 787's charging system, then I don't see why the 787 needs to remain grounded once "known good" batteries can be identified and procedures can be put into place to test them to ensure that they remain "known good".

While the 787 did have two battery incidents in about as many weeks, many seem to forget that the fleet had over 100,000 hours of revenue flying without a battery incident. JA804A - the NH plane - had flown for a full year without a battery incident. Three other NH planes had flown for over a year without a battery incident. And JL had two or three planes with nine months of service without a battery incident."

Well at this point en Boeing needs to contact Yuasa and rigorously test the good batch, get them installed, and proceed with their lives.

At the same time though: has anyone else confirmed or denied if the batteries were just from one faulty batch?

Quoting PHX787 (Reply 18):
Well at this point en Boeing needs to contact Yuasa and rigorously test the good batch, get them installed, and proceed with their lives.

At the same time though: has anyone else confirmed or denied if the batteries were just from one faulty batch?

We don't have any firm information that the batteries involved were from the same production run or "batch." NTSB did say the JL incident was not an "overcharging" incident. We are getting only dribbles of information and some of that information isn't exactly phrased so its open to interpretation which means we don't know squat yet.

Investigations are ongoing on three continents at the moment. Some media "sources" implied Boeing had some extra procedures/checks/inspection routines ready and I'm sure has dozens of engineers working around the clock to solve the issues.

As I've stated before, the FAA won't lift its order until the cause of the battery "thermal events" are known and there are fixes in place from a manufacturing or design standpoint plus testing whatever fixes or additional checks are recommended.

I thought I read in the early days after the grounding that the FAA was also going to review the certification process for the electrical system. Has that been dropped, or were these statements made by uninformed officials who wanted to look like they knew something?

Other than that question, thanks for the summary. I am learning more about batteries than I thought I ever would, and it actually has some relevance for my work as it turns out, even though the only thing I send flying is paper airplanes.

Quoting ikramerica (Reply 11):This is where I don't agree with your analysis.
The FAA only grounded the aircraft AFTER the JAA did so. It was not out of concern, but out of CYA. There is no other answer I can see, because despite the two incidents happening within 2 weeks, they were very different, and neither contributed to a "safety of flight" situation that anyone can prove. One wasn't even flying for goodness sake.

JCAB (not JAA - there is no JAA) issued the ground order after the FAA issued it's emergency AD.
ANA did voluntarily ground it's fleet - but I can't even tell if that was before the FAA official order.
The FAA was the first to issue the order - other national agencies followed.

Quoting blueflyer (Reply 22):I thought I read in the early days after the grounding that the FAA was also going to review the certification process for the electrical system. Has that been dropped, or were these statements made by uninformed officials who wanted to look like they knew something?

It could be. Certainly the news about Congress/Senate holding hearings mentions that. BTW - have we ever seen anything meaningful come out of congressional hearings of this type?

Quoting ikramerica (Reply 11):The FAA only grounded the aircraft AFTER the JAA did so. It was not out of concern, but out of CYA.

How's it CYA when they did it first? JCAB acted to comply with the FAA emergency AD *after* it was issued.

Quoting ikramerica (Reply 11):I believe Boeing will have to sue the FAA to get the 787 back in the air

I'll eat my hat if that happens. This is a bad enough PR mess already...can you imagine the outcry if Boeing *sued* the US federal government to make an airplane fly that the FAA didn't want flying?

Quoting ikramerica (Reply 11):After all, if it's simply a maintenance nightmare and not a threat to life, that's between Boeing and the airlines.

There's a very wide gulf between "maintenance nightmare" and "everyone's going to die". This battery issue lies somewhere in between. It's tough to describe this problem as merely economic (which is what "maintenance nightmare" implies to me).

Quoting robsaw (Reply 14):However, I also suspect given the positions of some people, those same people will never be satisfied that ANY Li-ion battery can EVER be safe on an aircraft.

True. This despite that fact that your average commercial aircraft contains a few hundred Li-ion batteries, the vast majority of which have no certification or containment.

Quoting PHX787 (Reply 18):At the same time though: has anyone else confirmed or denied if the batteries were just from one faulty batch?

There's lots of rumour running around but I haven't seen any hard data yet. The problem is compounded by the fact that the cells may be from different production runs...it's unlikely that consecutive cells ended up in consecutive batteries.

Quoting SonomaFlyer (Reply 20):Investigations are ongoing on three continents at the moment. Some media "sources" implied Boeing had some extra procedures/checks/inspection routines ready and I'm sure has dozens of engineers working around the clock to solve the issues.

I'd suspect more like hundreds of engineers...plus techs and flight crews.

It's not surprising that ANA is driving up the average and I have no doubt UA will catch up sooner or later. Point remains, UA shouldn't have to be catching up from this far behind to begin with - and mcdu's claim that their 787s are "unreliable" reflects what I've seen in their daily operations. Their decision to position not just one, but two spare aircraft to LAX for the NRT inaugural says it all about their confidence in the aircraft.

For what it's worth, I think the problems UA has been experiencing also played a big part in the FAA's decision to launch the review.

Quoting jreuschl (Reply 23):It is believed that the two bad batteries were 3 serial numbers apart

If I recall, it was said to be 30.

Quoting PHX787 (Reply 18):many seem to forget that the fleet had over 100,000 hours of revenue flying without a battery incident.

Quoting aeroblogger (Reply 19): Your obsession with Yuasa is tiring. It is too early to launch a probe, "rigorously test," or throw the book at Yuasa.

Well they are the battery maker remember. besides the occasional windshield issues I don't see anything else holding back the 787.
And about the Yuasa thing- Keep in mind I have a lot of interest in Japanese businesses. I haven't seen any other company reported so much about the 787 in Japanese media. Sure it could be hype but a lot of it is relevant information. And again with your comment about my obsession please note that I don't snip at you for your fields of interest.
Just an inb4: note that windshields of any aircraft are always subject to cracking due to temperature differences.

Quoting SonomaFlyer (Reply 20): We don't have any firm information that the batteries involved were from the same production run or "batch." NTSB did say the JL incident was not an "overcharging" incident. We are getting only dribbles of information and some of that information isn't exactly phrased so its open to interpretation which means we don't know squat yet.

Quoting jreuschl (Reply 23): It is believed that the two bad batteries were 3 serial numbers apart, since the battery in the ANA incident was recently replaced, and the JAL airplane was less than a month old.

Quoting tdscanuck (Reply 27):There's lots of rumour running around but I haven't seen any hard data yet. The problem is compounded by the fact that the cells may be from different production runs...it's unlikely that consecutive cells ended up in consecutive batteries.

I see, thanks for the answer. NH was also not an overcharging incident per most sources.

Quoting mcdu (Reply 29):Quoting PHX787 (Reply 18):
many seem to forget that the fleet had over 100,000 hours of revenue flying without a battery incident

And how many hours between the two battery failure incidents?

Note I was quoting user Stitch and wasn't making much of a reference to that particular line:
But for the sake of it, the hours apart were about 48 hours apart.

If we want to draw connections back to the "serial numbers" speculation, we would have to see when both of those were first manufactured and installed. Thats when we can draw similarities at this point, judging by what you all have said.

Quoting ikramerica (Reply 11):I believe Boeing will have to sue the FAA to get the 787 back in the air, with a federal judge enjoining the FAA to prove imminent threat to life to keep the grounding alive, or to lift the grounding.

Worst idea ever! Think of the liability that Boeing would assume, would insurers even be willing to cover this risk? Plus are Boeing going to sue EASA and Japanese Transport Ministry next..

Quoting PHX787 (Reply 18):From Stitch in the other thread: "Well if they believe it's the battery, and not the 787's charging system, then I don't see why the 787 needs to remain grounded once "known good" batteries can be identified and procedures can be put into place to test them to ensure that they remain "known good".

Even assuming that the problem is exclusively that of failing batteries how long does it take a 'known good' battery to turn bad, 1 month, 1 week, 1 charge?

Also the problem of not meeting the special conditions, the FAA would be put in the position of defending waving its certification safety standards.

I noticed especially on page #13 the line: "Specific venting outside the battery/aircraft when relevant"

I also read in a Reuters press report that Airbus has developed a special titanium pressure valve for a Li-Ion thermal runaway incident.

The "outside battery/aircraft" thing, and this pressure valve, could indicate that Airbus has chosen a somewhat more conservative containment design approach to fulfill the FAA/EASA special requirements.

Quoting SonomaFlyer (Reply 34):Q:
Out of curiosity, what happens to the 787 pilots during the grounding? Are they still being paid etc?

A: most if not all 787 pilots are still certified 777 or 767 aircraft. They have seniority and will fly those ac.

I can only reply as to the United Pilots, but yes, they are still getting paid. Pilots have a monthly minimum gurantee which at United is 70 hours/month.

United would have to "displace" the current 787 pilots out of their seats, at which point they could bid anywhere their seniority could hold. They would then have to be retrained for their new seats (they don't have to bid back to what they held previously). When United decided they were needed again, United would have to put out a new bid and then the pilots could return to flying the 787. Problem is, the same pilots might not bid back to the 787...or other more senior piots may decide to bid the 787, creating yet more training. Since every full training cycle costs 30k on average, for practical purposes, unless it is looking like it is going to be closer to months instead of weeks, then the United 787 pilots will be at home, waiting.

For those looking for official news, the next NTSB update regarding the JAL 787 Boston investigation will be at a press conference scheduled for 2:30pm EST on Thursday, Jan 24. Photography will be allowed during the lab tour where the battery is being examined.

Quoting rcair1 (Reply 24):JCAB (not JAA - there is no JAA) issued the ground order after the FAA issued it's emergency AD.
ANA did voluntarily ground it's fleet - but I can't even tell if that was before the FAA official order.
The FAA was the first to issue the order - other national agencies followed.

NH and JL voluntarily grounded their planes and the FAA then followed. There was never a Japanese government edict to ground prior to the airlines doing it on their own.

Today's seattle times has this report. Looks like the plane worked as designed. However, the electrolyte getting splayed inside the electronics bay is an issue, and the fact that Boeing didn't expect that many incidents to happen.

Quote:...
People familiar with the investigation so far confirm that electrolytes sprayed out of the battery in the ANA jet, leaving a dark sooty residue across the electronics bay. Photos show the insides of the battery burned out and blackened.
...
...
In its 2007 comments, the pilots union initially asked that the FAA require “means for extinguishing fires” caused by the lithium-ion batteries.

However, in a subsequent email to the FAA later that year, the union switched gears and asked that the focus be “preventing a fire and not reacting to one.”

To completely rule out any catastrophic high-energy fire or explosion that could result from overcharging a battery, Sinnett said, Boeing designed four independent systems to monitor and control the battery charge.

However, he conceded that if an internal cell shorts and overheats, “the electrolyte can catch on fire and that can self-sustain.”

“Something like that is very difficult to put out,” Sinnett said. “Because the electrolyte contains an oxidizer, fire suppressants just won’t work.”

Boeing’s design solution is to contain that outcome until the combusting battery cell or cells burn out.

“You have to assume it’s not going to go out,” Sinnett explained. “You have to assume that it’s going to go and that it’s going to expend all of its energy.

“You have to be good with the amount of heat and smoke that’s generated from that event,” he added.

Sinnett pointed out that the air flow in the electronics bay will be redirected when smoke is detected, so that the smoke is vented overboard, not into the passenger cabin or cockpit.

Nance, the veteran pilot, said he assumes Boeing’s engineers have got that right — in which case, it’s possible the incident on board the ANA jet played out as they intended.

But still, he said, Boeing “may not have adequately planned for the number of potential incidents” that might occur during a jet’s lifetime.
...
...

Quick question, and apologies if it has been answered already in the 5 threads on this topic: Besides the 787 and A380, are there any other commercial airliners that use Lithium Ion batteries in major applications?

Quoting neutronstar73 (Reply 41):I don't remember a thread being this long over any other aircraft issue. FIVE PARTS!?!? Over batteries?!? Jeez Louise....

The thread is about the grounding of the 787 by the FAA, now in its second week. This is the first FAA grounding since 1979, so it's a big deal. And in 1979 there was no a.net, so no long thread about the DC10 back then...

Quoting trex8 (Reply 38):NH and JL voluntarily grounded their planes and the FAA then followed. There was never a Japanese government edict to ground prior to the airlines doing it on their own.

The FAA grounding 'followed' ANA and JAL voluntary action in the temporal sense. I think the FAA made their own decision.

Quoting sankaps (Reply 40):Quick question, and apologies if it has been answered already in the 5 threads on this topic: Besides the 787 and A380, are there any other commercial airliners that use Lithium Ion batteries in major applications?

Many commercial airliners use multiple Li-Ion batteries - but these are small batteries used for things like exit signs. The only aircraft in service that uses Li-Ion of the size and capacity of what we are talking about is the 787. The A350 will use them in this manner - there will be 4, all co-located in one bay.. I can't tell for sure, midst all the ranting, conspiracy theories and garbage in this thread if the capacity of the A350 batteries is larger or smaller individually or in total capacity. There are people claiming both.

Quoting rcair1 (Reply 25):It could be. Certainly the news about Congress/Senate holding hearings mentions that. BTW - have we ever seen anything meaningful come out of congressional hearings of this type?

As I recall hearings on these sorts of things tend to be an official briefing. There is no intention on finding new things. Legislatures likely ask if current regulation and enforcement are adequate, and if not does congress need to change anything. Legislators may ask for terms to be explained in more common language. There likely will be some explanations of risk management statistics, and attempted translations in lay terms.

'The two batteries are identical, but located in different parts of the a/c. The APU battery is used only to start the APU when other sources are not available. The ship battery is used for backup when other sources fail. It is not used in normal flight operations.'

If the batteries only purpose in life is as described, a less radical option would be inflight monitoring of the battery container temperature, and say weekly out of aircraft testing, with pre-tested batteries re-fitted to minimise time on the ground.

Could charging also be turned off inflight?

I'm not minimising the task each battery set is designed to perform, but does it perhaps suggest from the authorities reaction, that they may perform additional purposes, either routinely or in emergencies?

Quoting trex8 (Reply 47):An explosion in a lithium battery under development for use in the Boeing 787 Dreamliner resulted in a fire that destroyed the Tucson, Ariz., facility of manufacturer Securaplane in 2006"

This event has been discussed widely - and there are a number of things you need to look at to fully understand the issue. For instance, reports that when the event occurred, the cell monitoring system on the battery being charged was not connected. Certainly it was in a lab situation, not a production or commercial situation.

"The aircraft is a terrific aircraft, and customers love the aircraft, and I have no doubt that customers will flock back to that airplane once we're able to get it back up again," said Jeff Smisek, CEO of United Continental .

...

But when a reporter asked Smisek if either pilots or customers would be reluctant to fly the Dreamliner once it was allowed back in service, he said he didn't believe so. He said he was confident that the FAA would not give an OK to the plane until a fix had been found, and that both pilots and customers would be satisfied with that fix."

I came in on the Q&A part of the NTSB event, but the spokeswoman did note that the JL APU battery had entered thermal runaway and there were short-circuits inside the battery.

Per The Chicago Sun-Times, examination of all eight cells in the JL APU battery showed thermal damage in each.

The NTSB continues to not rule anything out. They are concerned that two events happened within nine days of each other.

The NTSB is not currently considering the NH battery a "fire event", instead classifying it as a "smoke event", so maybe we can finally put that particular argument to rest. The JL battery is currently considered a "fire event". The NTSB is still trying to determine if both batteries from the same event.

This is precisely why there is no "quick fix" to this problem; NTSB, Boeing and its suppliers do not yet know why the incidents occurred. The FAA will need to be satisfied the problem(s) is/are accurately identified and the proposed fix/modification/redesign will correct the problem(s).

Having watched most of the press conference, I have to agree with that quote. The gist of it for me was that barring anything leaping off the page at them as a definitive cause, the NTSB intends to methodically go through everything from design to certification to implementation with a fine-toothed comb. It came across more as a "don't get your hopes up" message for a return to service anytime soon.

Quoting Stitch (Reply 59):I do not believe the NTSB has yet determined that. All they know is that a fire should not have happened, but did, so something didn't work as designed (be it with the 787 or the battery).

IIRC, though, the battery box and E&E bays are designed to contain the fire if the battery catches fire. But some stuff (like electrolyte) might still spew out. The E&E bays will safely ventilate the combustion byproducts overboard (via holes in the belly-like on the NH bird) in the event of a fire...but sitting on the ramp might be an edge case. There are no pressure differentials like there would be if the aircraft were in flight.

Quoting ComeAndGo (Reply 60):Apparently they used a lithium ion battery of older design. Lithium cobalt oxide which is more prone to thermal runaway.

That is correct. Boeing evidently did add manganese to the mixture to greatly improve the useful life of the battery. If they also add nickel, that would improve the stability and lower the chances of thermal runway.

That is correct. Boeing evidently did add manganese to the mixture to greatly improve the useful life of the battery. If they also add nickel, that would improve the stability and lower the chances of thermal runway.

That raises an interesting question if adding nickel (for example) to improve the stability of the battery, would they they have to completely redo the cert for the battery/system or would the change plus a new set of statistical analysis based on the new formulation [and some in flight testing] be enough?

Quoting planesmart (Reply 46):If the batteries only purpose in life is as described, a less radical option would be inflight monitoring of the battery container temperature, and say weekly out of aircraft testing, with pre-tested batteries re-fitted to minimise time on the ground.

Inflight monitoring of the container temperature won't help you much...once you see the temperature signature of thermal runaway of the battery it's too late. Testing the batteries presupposes that they know what to test for; based on the NTSB press conference they still don't know what that test would be.

It could, but not without impacting a huge number of other failure modes in the fault trees. All the others systems assume that the batteries are charged back up by the airplane starting as soon as the generators come online.

Quoting planesmart (Reply 46):I'm not minimising the task each battery set is designed to perform, but does it perhaps suggest from the authorities reaction, that they may perform additional purposes, either routinely or in emergencies?

The batteries do perform several emergency functions.

Quoting AeroWesty (Reply 56): the NTSB intends to methodically go through everything from design to certification to implementation with a fine-toothed comb.

The NTSB has no particular interest in certification...their mission is to find what happened and identify what changes would prevent it from happening. They look at it purely from the technical side...did the as-built conform to design, was the design adequate, etc. FAA owns the certification process and will decide which NTSB recommendations will be implemented.

Quoting SonomaFlyer (Reply 63):That raises an interesting question if adding nickel (for example) to improve the stability of the battery, would they they have to completely redo the cert for the battery/system or would the change plus a new set of statistical analysis based on the new formulation [and some in flight testing] be enough?

Almost nothing would drive "completely redo" the cert. They would have to show that regulations might be impacted by the change and then show how that they're still in compliance with those regulations. That could be any combination of analysis and test.

The FT also has an article on the NTSB press conference (ft.com - subscription website).

This is my take, based on the press reports:

- The NTSB considers the B787 battery problems a "very serious safety concern" (the term "very serious" was apparently used multiple times)
- It is not close to determining the cause, and not far advanced in eliminating possible causes
- The prevention and containment mechanisms did not work as envisaged, and it is not clear why this is the case
- The NTSB cannot tell how long its investigation will take. There is no deadline or target completion date
- It is not yet known whether the two failed batteries are from the same batch

The implications:

- We are likely looking at a lengthy investigation
- There is no chance that the B787 will be restored to service before the investigation is completed and/or the regulators are satisfied that they fully understand what went wrong
- Based on their findings, the regulators may require modifications to any or all of (i) the battery, (ii) the battery management system, and (iii) the battery fire containment system
- The possibility that the B787 might be returned to service only on the basis of identifying faulty and non-faulty batteries seems remote, given the breadth of the NTSB's concerns.
- We may not be able to fly on a B787 for a long time to come: the cumulative time needed for a lengthy investigation, designing possibly comprehensive solutions, getting those solutions certified, and modifying already produced airframes, ...
- Airbus will face very skeptical regulators when it tries to get the A350's batteries certified... At the very least, it faces significant uncertainty about what certification criteria will be applied.

Quoting Scipio (Reply 67):Airbus will face very skeptical regulators when it tries to get the A350's batteries certified... At the very least, it faces significant uncertainty about what certification criteria will be applied.

Does the A350 have a similar battery setup?

At least Airbus will be able to learn from what mistakes were made here.

The NTSB typically takes one year to make a determination in an accident or incident. It was the FAA that grounded the 787 with the AD -- not the NTSB. The NTSB can only make safety recommendations to the FAA but it is the FAA that will decide on the acceptance of any solutions that comply with the AD.

My read of what caused the FAA the most heartburn was the ejection of flammable material from the ANA battery into the E/E compartment. That event apparently violated their FAR special conditions for Li-ion batteries. Once Boeing can show the FAA they have a viable solution to this problem, they should be in compliance of the AD.

Some years ago I watched an aircraft Ni-Cad battery have a similar problem. Batteries are not full proof and therefore the FAA requires a solution to mitigate any adverse effects that put safety of flight at risk.

Quoting UALWN (Reply 42):Quoting neutronstar73 (Reply 41):
I don't remember a thread being this long over any other aircraft issue. FIVE PARTS!?!? Over batteries?!? Jeez Louise....

The thread is about the grounding of the 787 by the FAA, now in its second week. This is the first FAA grounding since 1979, so it's a big deal. And in 1979 there was no a.net, so no long thread about the DC10 back then...

And if A.net had been around in 1947/48 when the DC-6 was grounded for 4 months about 6 months after it went into service, there probably would have been a long thread.

Quoting Humanitarian (Reply 70):My read of what caused the FAA the most heartburn was the ejection of flammable material from the ANA battery into the E/E compartment. That event apparently violated their FAR special conditions for Li-ion batteries. Once Boeing can show the FAA they have a viable solution to this problem, they should be in compliance of the AD.

Quoting KELPkid (Reply 58):Quoting Stitch (Reply 54):
Despite multiple redundant safety features built into the system by Boeing, “those systems did not work as intended,” NTSB chair Deborah Hersman said.

Any details as to what did not work as intended, and why?

The Reuters link above gives more of what she is thinking of:

Quote:
"We do not expect to see fire events onboard aircraft. This is a very serious air safety concern," Deborah Hersman told a news conference in Washington.

Quoting AeroWesty (Reply 56):the NTSB intends to methodically go through everything from design to certification to implementation with a fine-toothed comb. It came across more as a "don't get your hopes up" message for a return to service anytime soon.

The NTSB mandate, it has always been thus, their only concern is safety.

Quoting Humanitarian (Reply 70):The NTSB typically takes one year to make a determination in an accident or incident. It was the FAA that grounded the 787 with the AD -- not the NTSB. The NTSB can only make safety recommendations to the FAA but it is the FAA that will decide on the acceptance of any solutions that comply with the AD.

There may well come a time when the FAA looks at the NTSB and advises them that while they continue to investigate the cause of the issues, a temporary fix which would allow safe flight is required, the NTSB, Boeing and the other OEM's involved will then have to sit at a table and draft rules and procedures even hardware adjustments to implement to allow return to service. The industry will need some sort of time frame on the return to service so that planning can commence on how to alleviate the shortage of a/c.

Quoting Stitch (Reply 78):I guess in theory when they run out of parking room, but they may be able to get permission to fly completed airframes to storage fields.

From a logistical viewpoint, this is correct. From an economic perspective, at some (earlier) point it no longer makes sense to build airplanes without knowing if and when you will be able to deliver them. It eats up a hell of a lot of money to build planes only to put them into storage...

I suspect that the question of delaying the production ramp-up will arise fairly soon.

At this point, if I were Boeing I would hedge the risk and start looking at a plan B involving good old lead-acid batteries and at STCeing it, with limitations (ie no Etops, special procedures, emergency power training, etc...). That is something that can be done in a matter of a few months at minimal cost.

Quoting Scipio (Reply 79): It eats up a hell of a lot of money to build planes only to put them into storage...

Well, it will also take up a hell of a lot of money to have suppliers and partners stop production and lay off workers, pay additinal and new penatlies to airlines to delay their deliveries even further. If they continue to build a/c, if and when the cause is identified and a full or partial fix allowed, it will be much quicker to modify a/c already built versus modify the a/c while building.
This is the economic situation that the FAA will ultimately have to adress if it does not appear as if the cause can be identified in a month or two, its not just Boeing and its suppliers / partners who are involved, but airlines all over the world and their customers. The Japanese carriers who have the bulk of the a/c in service will have the largest burden.

Quoting Scipio (Reply 67):Airbus will face very skeptical regulators when it tries to get the A350's batteries certified... At the very least, it faces significant uncertainty about what certification criteria will be applied.

It shouldn't, certification criteria are agreed between the OEM and certifying authority before the test campaign begins, the aircraft is built to be in conformation with these agreed criteria. If the certifying authority was to keep shifting the goalposts it would be impossible to certify an aircraft.

"Good old" in this case would be Ni-Cad. The A380 still uses Ni_Cad for it's main batteries, which surprises me, I would have thought Ni-Mh would be better. The newer ones have great performance in consumer goods. Perhaps technology is moving too fast for the designers to keep up, consider the long lead/certification times required.

Quoting ComeAndGo (Reply 76):No it's not. The ATR 72 was grounded in the 90's for their icing issues that crashed one plane and almost crashed another one.

Quoting UALWN (Reply 80):Correct. I should have specified "jet." In any case, no a.net in 1994 either...

Quoting prebennorholm (Reply 82):Correct. The FAA grounded ATR-72 following the American Eagle accident in 1994. And demanded improved anti icing boots before re-certification by the FAA.

I did a little searching and from what I found the ATR was not grounded. It was banned from flying in icing conditions. Some airlines chose to not use it at all, but others moved their planes to the southern US.

Quoting Scipio (Reply 79):From a logistical viewpoint, this is correct. From an economic perspective, at some (earlier) point it no longer makes sense to build airplanes without knowing if and when you will be able to deliver them. It eats up a hell of a lot of money to build planes only to put them into storage...

I suspect that the question of delaying the production ramp-up will arise fairly soon.

I guess it depends on how far along the subs are with their own production ramps. They're not going to want to cut back on their own shipsets because that would impact their own downstream suppliers.

This also assumes that the 787 remains grounded for an extended period of time (6 months or longer). The FAA restored the DC-10's Type Certificate after a month once they determined that the engine separation was due to improper procedures used by AA and other airlines. At the time of the restoration, I believe the DC-10 still lacked a locking mechanism to maintain the position of the leading-edge slats and that critical wiring remained in the leading edge of the wing (when the engine and pylon went over the wing, it damaged the leading edge and cut the wires).

Quoting Scipio (Reply 67):Airbus will face very skeptical regulators when it tries to get the A350's batteries certified... At the very least, it faces significant uncertainty about what certification criteria will be applied.

Quoting BoeingVista (Reply 85):It shouldn't, certification criteria are agreed between the OEM and certifying authority before the test campaign begins, the aircraft is built to be in conformation with these agreed criteria. If the certifying authority was to keep shifting the goalposts it would be impossible to certify an aircraft.

The FAA and Boeing agreed on certification criteria for the 787 in terms of the Lithium-Ion batteries and the 787 was certified to that criteria. Now the FAA is worried that certification criteria was not sufficiently robust and has grounded the plane.

I would not be surprised if EASA now wants to review their own criteria already agreed with Airbus based on the issues with the 787 to ensure that they are sufficient to contain a battery fire and a battery leaking electrolytes.

Quoting par13del (Reply 84):This is the economic situation that the FAA will ultimately have to adress if it does not appear as if the cause can be identified in a month or two, its not just Boeing and its suppliers / partners who are involved, but airlines all over the world and their customers. The Japanese carriers who have the bulk of the a/c in service will have the largest burden.

The FAA will want to ensure that the 787 will not crash if the battery catches fire and burns for whatever length it's fuel supply will allow, as well as preventing electrolyte from being able to spray around the EE bay and catch fire. Once they have those assurances, I would expect them to lift the grounding.

Even if the issue is identified as being solely with the two batteries, I do not expect the FAA to say "Good to go!" and lift the grounding while leaving the 787 unchanged. I am sure they will put into place new policies and procedures to protect against a repeat while working on stronger containment systems and perhaps new battery formulations. But those will be ADs that will still allow the 787 to fly in commercial passenger service. The FAA did this with the DC-10 in 1979 - the plane still had flaws, but they were allowed to be returned to service while McD worked to correct them via AD.

Of course, if they find multiple causes, that will increase the amount of work needed to be done to sufficiently prove the protection systems are up to the task.

Quoting alfablue (Reply 3):A U.S. Senate committee will hold a hearing in coming weeks to examine aviation safety oversight and the FAA's decision, a congressional aide said on Tuesday

Oh, fantastic. The politicians are here! Everything will be OK now!

Quoting Wisdom (Reply 83):At this point, if I were Boeing I would hedge the risk and start looking at a plan B involving good old lead-acid batteries and at STCeing it, with limitations (ie no Etops, special procedures, emergency power training, etc...). That is something that can be done in a matter of a few months at minimal cost.

Without at least ETOPS 120, the 787 is worthless for the vast majority of routes it flies.

Quoting Scipio (Reply 79):From a logistical viewpoint, this is correct. From an economic perspective, at some (earlier) point it no longer makes sense to build airplanes without knowing if and when you will be able to deliver them. It eats up a hell of a lot of money to build planes only to put them into storage...

I suspect that the question of delaying the production ramp-up will arise fairly soon.

When (there is no "if") the aircraft is returned to service, they can do the repairs on completed frames and do a spate of deliveries all at once. That will mean no delay on downstream frames. There is plenty of room at both plants and storage arrangements can be made.

If they delay the production ramp-up, it will take years to recover from the delay.

I wonder if airframe manufacturers should not have cooperated on battery/charging, controlling and had at least two different systems. Cooperative effort would have spread the cost. And if the fore and aft batteries were themselves different and able to use either system this would not have been so big an event.

Quoting Scipio (Reply 67):- The prevention and containment mechanisms did not work as envisaged, and it is not clear why this is the case

What that "It's not clear why the containment did not work as envisaged" or "It's not clear from the NTSB statement why they don't think the containment worked as envisaged"?

I think we can all agree the prevention mechanisms didn't work as envisaged.

Quoting Scipio (Reply 67):- There is no chance that the B787 will be restored to service before the investigation is completed and/or the regulators are satisfied that they fully understand what went wrong

Technically the investigation isn't complete until the report is out. However, that lags significantly behind them figuring out what the problem is. The grounding can be lifted when the FAA (not NTSB) is satisfied that they understand what caused it and are satisfied that the problem is mitigated...the NTSB investigation will likely continue for some time after that.

The technology is roughly similar, although the A350 uses more batteries all together in a single space with a somewhat different containment concept. The cert criteria will almost certainly be equal or more stringent than what the 787 went through but Airbus may demonstrate compliance differently.

Quoting AeroWesty (Reply 69):"Another critical part of the investigation is considering the certification process for the 787 batteries."

NTSB is absolutely interested in how the system got certified since that informs why the design is what it is...they can't actually change the certification criteria though, that's the FAA.

Quoting macc (Reply 77):How will the grounding implicate production? At what time will Boeing be forced to stop assembly?

I'd expect them to keep running even for a pessimistically long grounding. At some point they'll have to get ferry permits and move the aircraft off Paine Field, but there's a lot of room at Victorville, Moses Lake, or San Antonio. San Antonio would be a great spot, since they're already set up to do 787 rework.

Quoting Scipio (Reply 79):From a logistical viewpoint, this is correct. From an economic perspective, at some (earlier) point it no longer makes sense to build airplanes without knowing if and when you will be able to deliver them. It eats up a hell of a lot of money to build planes only to put them into storage...

This needs to be balanced against the cost of stopping and (especially) starting the supply chain. That's an almost mind-bogglingly large number...that's why they kept building all through the production and flight test delays. And I really can't see this grounding going on that long.

Quoting BoeingVista (Reply 85):It shouldn't, certification criteria are agreed between the OEM and certifying authority before the test campaign begins, the aircraft is built to be in conformation with these agreed criteria.

Although this is true, the regulator always reserves the right to update the criteria as the certification effort progresses based on the data and experience gathered. I've never heard of any major cert program that went end-to-end without some modified criteria from the regulators. They can also cover pretty much anything they want under FAR 25.1301, so they've got a blanket authority to ask for more testing to prove compliance.

The FAA doesn't care about the economic health of individual airlines or OEMs, but they are responsible for maintaining a safe and efficient air transport system primarily because of the economic impact that system has. They are acutely concerned with keeping that system viable.

Quoting Wisdom (Reply 83):if I were Boeing I would hedge the risk and start looking at a plan B involving good old lead-acid batteries and at STCeing it, with limitations (ie no Etops, special procedures, emergency power training, etc...).

I'm pretty sure some of those hundreds of engineers Tom mentioned are certainly looking at such a Plan B as well as C, D, and so on. There's too much at risk to not be doing it.

Quoting DocLightning (Reply 91):Without at least ETOPS 120, the 787 is worthless for the vast majority of routes it flies.

Right, but there are certainly things some customers could be doing with the planes short term w/o ETOPS 120. Of course it makes one wonder if they'd accept the plane w/o the root cause found and fixed because while Boeing owns it, it's Boeing's burden to deliver a fully certificated plane fully up to spec.

Ahh, beam me back to the days of old where all we had to worry about was when Boeing would be patching up all those out of rev planes lying all around KPAE!

Quoting tdscanuck (Reply 95):NTSB is absolutely interested in how the system got certified since that informs why the design is what it is...they can't actually change the certification criteria though, that's the FAA.

Then I don't see what the issue was that you brought up with the following post of mine:

Quoting AeroWesty (Reply 56):The gist of it for me was that barring anything leaping off the page at them as a definitive cause, the NTSB intends to methodically go through everything from design to certification to implementation with a fine-toothed comb.

Quoting Revelation (Reply 96):Right, but there are certainly things some customers could be doing with the planes short term w/o ETOPS 120. Of course it makes one wonder if they'd accept the plane w/o the root cause found and fixed because while Boeing owns it, it's Boeing's burden to deliver a fully certificated plane fully up to spec.

If I were a customer, I would under no circumstances accept a frame that would not do what it said it would do in its contract without a major revision to the contract.

Quoting Scipio (Reply 67):- We may not be able to fly on a B787 for a long time to come: the cumulative time needed for a lengthy investigation, designing possibly comprehensive solutions, getting those solutions certified, and modifying already produced airframes, ...

Which is a real drag.... I may get to go to Japan this summery - and DEN-NRT on a 787 is high on my list....

Quoting Scipio (Reply 67):- Airbus will face very skeptical regulators when it tries to get the A350's batteries certified... At the very least, it faces significant uncertainty about what certification criteria will be applied.

At the same time, because much of the analysis and fixes are public knowledge by law - Airbus is benefiting from a lot of free RnD....

Quoting Humanitarian (Reply 70):My read of what caused the FAA the most heartburn was the ejection of flammable material from the ANA battery into the E/E compartment. That event apparently violated their FAR special conditions for Li-ion batteries. Once Boeing can show the FAA they have a viable solution to this problem, they should be in compliance of the AD.

I'll agree with is if we make sure to focus on the word "apparently" - because it is clearly a case of "could" not "must" or "did" cause damage. The special condition does not say the battery cannot eject gas/electrolyte. It says, something like, it cannot do it in a manner that causes critical damage or makes the situation worse. It is unclear, at this time, that the 'spewed' electrolyte actually did that. - no actually, it is clear it did NOT do that. The question is COULD it do that. And - yes - the FAA special condition is quoted all over these strings - and no - I can't find it right now.

Quoting AeroWesty (Reply 97):Quoting tdscanuck (Reply 95):
NTSB is absolutely interested in how the system got certified since that informs why the design is what it is...they can't actually change the certification criteria though, that's the FAA.

Then I don't see what the issue was that you brought up with the following post of mine:

Quoting AeroWesty (Reply 56):
The gist of it for me was that barring anything leaping off the page at them as a definitive cause, the NTSB intends to methodically go through everything from design to certification to implementation with a fine-toothed comb.

It's the idea that the NTSB will "methodically go through...certification...with a fine-toothed comb". Although the 787 certification process is being reviewed as a separate effort, that's not under NTSB.

Quoting Stitch (Reply 88):This also assumes that the 787 remains grounded for an extended period of time (6 months or longer). The FAA restored the DC-10's Type Certificate after a month once they determined that the engine separation was due to improper procedures used by AA and other airlines. At the time of the restoration, I believe the DC-10 still lacked a locking mechanism to maintain the position of the leading-edge slats and that critical wiring remained in the leading edge of the wing (when the engine and pylon went over the wing, it damaged the leading edge and cut the wires).

I do not expect the 1979 scenario to be repeated, for several reasons:

- nothing points in the direction of an easy-to-fix maintenance or handling problem. The plausible explanations at this stage all point toward manufacturing and/or design issues.
- the flying public and the safety authorities are a lot more risk averse now than they were in 1979. They are not willing to settle for 1979 safety levels, having gotten used to 2012 safety levels. Fatal crashes were still a fairly common occurrence back then... (The ACRO registered 320 accidents with 2,531 fatalities in 1979, against 117 accidents with 794 fatalities in 2012, this despite the explosive growth of air travel between 1979 and 2012)
- the message brought by the NTSB today was a very firm one -- strong vocabulary ("an unprecedented event", "a very serious air safety concern", “the expectation in aviation is to never experience a fire on board an aircraft”, ...) and a quite explicit warning (motivated on the basis of several reasons) that no quick fixes should be expected

After the NTSB press conference, I think that the grounding is much more likely to last for more than 6 months than to be lifted within 3 months or less.

Quoting RickNRoll (Reply 86):"Good old" in this case would be Ni-Cad. The A380 still uses Ni_Cad for it's main batteries, which surprises me, I would have thought Ni-Mh would be better. The newer ones have great performance in consumer goods. Perhaps technology is moving too fast for the designers to keep up, consider the long lead/certification times required.

Ni-Cad is good technology too, but it's easier, cheaper and faster to tailor-design a lead-acid.
This is also likely to be an interim solution, so it would be a larger waste of money to invest in Ni-cad.

As for operating without ETOPS it's not that bad, as you still have the 60 minutes rule.

For domestic Japan (NH/JL) and domestic U.S. (UA), this should be acceptable as it will allow the operators to shuffle the aircraft around, but still operate them in a useful manner. I'm sure that AI, QR and LO could use them in that way too, because new crews need to build experience on them too, pending more deliveries after the resolution of the crisis.

ET would probably not be able to operate (efficiently) due to lack of diversion airports in all directions. At best, they would have to fly around the Sahara desert to Europe.

Maybe. Airbus has said very little about this whole Li-Ion issue, (I would guess that they want to talk as little as possible). But here is what one Airbus spokesman has told in a Reuters interview:

"Airbus expects that their containment design on the A350 is so much more robust that it will be certified as is. Anyway they are following the investigations as closely as possible, and should revised certification criteria be decided by the FAA (or EASA or both), then the systems will be re-designed accordingly. It could potentially delay the A350 EIS slightly".

That fits only if we assume that the FAA continue to stand by the current "spacial conditions" criteria, AND they regard the 787 situation as a violation of those criteria.

My personal guess would be that FAA ends up with ammended special conditions. And whatever happens, Airbus will of course work according to them since they will never ever attempt to sell a plane anywhere in the world with no FAA certification. They may even try to blame an otherwise unavoidable delay on new battery rules, who knows...

Quoting Scipio (Reply 101):nothing points in the direction of an easy-to-fix maintenance or handling problem. The plausible explanations at this stage all point toward manufacturing and/or design issues.

The containment system failed to contain the electrolytes, but that should be fixable with either a larger containment vessel and/or a better venting option (perhaps directly to the atmosphere as the A350 looks to do). I don't expect that to take Boeing a year to develop.

The batteries short-circuited, but not due to overcharging. So the evidence currently suggests that the 787's charging system is sound - it provides the proper voltage to the pack and the individual cells. So that suggests a manufacturing defect with the batteries, not a design issue with the 787's charging system. So the battery manufacturer needs to improve their quality control and testing - something unlikely to take a year.

Quoting Scipio (Reply 101):the message brought by the NTSB today was a very firm one -- strong vocabulary ("an unprecedented event", "a very serious air safety concern", “the expectation in aviation is to never experience a fire on board an aircraft”, ...) and a quite explicit warning (motivated on the basis of several reasons) that no quick fixes should be expected

The NTSB has no authority in regards to the grounding. There may indeed be no quick fixes for everything, but everything does not need to be fixed to lift the grounding.

Quoting tdscanuck (Reply 95):What that "It's not clear why the containment did not work as envisaged" or "It's not clear from the NTSB statement why they don't think the containment worked as envisaged"?

"She said the battery had spewed out very hot, molten electrolytes, despite the presence of numerous systems meant to prevent such an event."

"We have to understand why this battery resulted in a fire when there is so many protections designed into this system," she adds.

"These events should not happen as far as design of the airplane," Hersman says. "There are multiple systems to prevent a battery event like this. Those systems did not work. We need to understand why."

It is clear to me from these quoted statements that the NTSB likes neither the fact that the battery "events" occurred nor what their consequences were. I.e., prevention and containment systems are both implicated.

I would expect the grounding to be in the range of 1-2 months, perhaps 3 months; based on the following:

I work in the Nuclear Power Industry and am a Trained Root Cause Investigator at the same level of what the NTSB investigations are (we actually use the same training materials and hire the same Root Cause vendor when we need help). I have been the technical lead on several Root Cause Investigations related to Nuclear plant issues (and its my name and signature on the cover page that goes to the NRC).

The comments by the NTSB after 1 week are totally consistent with the normal state of any Root Cause investigation after 1 week. You may have ruled a few obvious things out - but the main focus so far has been listing all of the possible questions.

By 2-3 weeks the Investigation Team will likely have a good idea of where the issue is - and where it is not.

Typically at 3-5 weeks you understand what the issue is - and start developing concepts on how to resolve the issue. Specific additional testing may be needed to fully flesh out something (some of which can take time).

Typically 4-6 weeks a workable solution is known. Getting it tested and accepted by the regulator may take more time (and even in the nuclear world Nuclear Regulatory Commission approval of Tech Spec or other Design Basis changes may take months). However, in most cases at least a temporary solution can be implemented within a few weeks.

I would not even think that there would be a very long grounding until I hear what the NTSB says at the 3 week stage.

Quoting Stitch (Reply 104):The batteries short-circuited, but not due to overcharging. [snip] So that suggests a manufacturing defect with the batteries, not a design issue with the 787's charging system. So the battery manufacturer needs to improve their quality control and testing - something unlikely to take a year.

It's not that clear to me that it's a QC/testing issue: what if there is a currently unknown failure mode that occurs after the device leaves the factory that cannot be detected at the factory? It seems to me to be one of the possibilities, given that we believe there is a lot of testing for the known failure modes, or at least I do. Of course, it could just be a fault that should have been found at the factory, but one has to wonder if that can be determined to be the case after the device has largely destroyed itself. I suppose some such faults can and others can't, but I'm not an expert in this space.

Quoting Stitch (Reply 104):The batteries short-circuited, but not due to overcharging. So the evidence currently suggests that the 787's charging system is sound - it provides the proper voltage to the pack and the individual cells.

Thats not what the NTSB said, while they did say that the battery overall was not overcharged they specifically said that they did not know if it was possible that one or more cells were overcharged.

Which brings up questions of monitoring of the individual cells; why are the NTSB still not able to determine the charge of individual cells? If they have not pulled the data on this by now we have to assume that the data does not exist.

So either:

1) Individual cell charge data is not being collected and analysed in which case knowing known LI-ion failure paths the design is unsafe and should not have been certified.

or

2) The data may have been destroyed in the meltdowns, which points to a bad design, you should never lose the data relating to the state of equipment before failure in the failure event because it makes determining the root cause unnecessarily difficult, possibly impossible to troubleshoot.

Quoting Stitch (Reply 104):The batteries short-circuited, but not due to overcharging. So the evidence currently suggests that the 787's charging system is sound - it provides the proper voltage to the pack and the individual cells.

The NTSB explicitly said today that they could not yet rule out overcharging (especially of a single cell) as a possible cause.

Quoting Stitch (Reply 104):The NTSB has no authority in regards to the grounding.

It has no formal authority, but it has a lot of moral authority. After today's NTSB press conference, I do not think that any FAA official will be willing to sign off on a resumption of B787 commercial service until the NTSB is much further down the road in its investigations. Keep in mind that the NTSB is looking into the certification process as well, as is the US Senate, so the FAA is already under fire for being too lenient and/or insufficiently competent ...

Heads would roll at the FAA if it cleared the B787 for flight and another battery incident would happen shortly afterwards...

Quoting Revelation (Reply 108):It's not that clear to me that it's a QC/testing issue: what if there is a currently unknown failure mode that occurs after the device leaves the factory that cannot be detected at the factory?

That we had over 50,000 hours and over a year of airline service before these two incidents, such a failure mode seems even more likely tied to a QC issue with a specific production run of batteries.

To those that suggest this a/c should stick to a non ETOPS or 60 minute rule, that won't fly with the airlines that bought the plane. This plane was designed and sold as a long range/transcontinental aircraft. It was marketed with 180 as the standard with 330 as the goal. Does anyone think QR would stand for such a restriction?

People need to get away from the notion of a short term fix. We don't even know why these incidents occurred. Until we know why the incidents occurred, we are no where.

At this rate, I think it would be silly to suggest this ac could be back to revenue service before the Spring and that assumes they ascertain the cause quickly. I have no dog in the A versus B fight but I'm bummed this plane is grounded. I am also shocked that these kinds of issues were not caught at the testing phase or QA with the battery mfr.

With regards to Boeing's plan B's, C's, etc.; here's my view on what kind of plan it's going to take to get the 787 back into the air.

(1) the most concern seems to be around leaking electrolyte. Boeing will need to come up with a better containment vessel which demonstrably prevents electrolyte leakage.

(2) at least one "smoking gun" of why the batteries failed will need to be found and demonstrably corrected.

My opinion is that this would convince FAA/NTSB etc. that they have greatly reduced the risk of another failure, and if they DO have another failure, the risk to the aircraft (whatever you may believe that risk or isn't) is also greatly reduced.

I believe this will be done with the current cell technology.

In the long run (4+ years out) they will probably switch to a different lithium chemistry after research, testing, re-certification, etc.

You are so right here----there will be no rush to judgement on this. This is very different than the DC-10 grounding which had a profound impact on air travel and I was there to see it----it would be like grounding the 737 now. But in this case the 787 are relatively low in numbers, can be substituted with other a/c and have been long delayed to begin with. We are in for many weeks of (and perhaps months) of no 787's.

The latter is given in amps. It is the maximum amps a battery can deliver continuously during 30 seconds at -18 deg C (zero deg. F) while maintaining a voltage drop under that load at no more than 40% below nominal voltage (that will be 7.2 volt on our 12 volt car battery.

There are different standards or test methods applied for non-lead-acid batteries. But when measuring Ni-Cd and Ni-MH to the same standard, then Ni-MH will always come out vastly superior in capacity, while Ni-Cd will come out vastly superior in cold cranking performance.

When the Toyota Prius first appeared, and winter came to Alaska, then customers complained that the Ni-MH battery didn't work. It worked perfectly well according to specs, but at extreme winter temperature it didn't deliver the expected fuel saving. Quite the opposite because it had mostly become a heavy ballast to drag along.

Li-Ion also degrades cranking performance with reduced temperature, but at a favourably low rate. Then it has other limitations. For instance it won't even take an abuse like the test method specified for lead-acid. It would be considered a short which might create a thermal runaway. Li-Ion is specified with a maximum discharge rate. It could be 10C, which means that maximum discharge rate in amps is 10 times the capacity in amps/hour, meaning that a full, continuous discharge must last at least 6 minutes. Earlier this figure was a rather limiting number, but today special lithium batteries may be specified 25C or 30C, or even double of that for bursts of less than one second.

Quoting SonomaFlyer (Reply 114):To those that suggest this a/c should stick to a non ETOPS or 60 minute rule, that won't fly with the airlines that bought the plane. This plane was designed and sold as a long range/transcontinental aircraft. It was marketed with 180 as the standard with 330 as the goal. Does anyone think QR would stand for such a restriction?

Well, the existing a/c is overweight, the engines do not meet the specs that both OEM's promised the airlines, so there is some precedent for accepting and flying a/c that do not meet OEM specifications.

Quoting SonomaFlyer (Reply 114):I am also shocked that these kinds of issues were not caught at the testing phase or QA with the battery mfr.

Why, the a/c has been flying for over a year with no problems, in addition to those conducting test flights, the one battery issue was traced to FOD.
Now if they never have to change a part on the a/c QA would never be an issue, but parts do wear out and some are mandated to be changed after a set period of time, so something that was no problem a year ago could become one when it or items around it are replaced, it does not have to be the battery.QA on a/c is ongoing, it is not static.

I think they will be changing to NICd batteries because they are proven to be safe, because they are available and already in use with most planes. This actually be good PR and a way out for Boeing an also to the FAA to allow the plane to get back in the air.

They will continue researching Li ion and maybe incorporate it later on in the 787-9/10 but it would be a safer chemistry (no Li Cobalt) if used at all.

I expect from 3-6 months before this plane takes up in the air, they might have some tests flights allowed until they sort out the details.

BTW researching the news I came to this interview with Vince Weldon, former Boeing engineer that was unceremoniously given the boot for doubting the viability of composites in serious crashes, show dates back to 2006; I liked because it makes you see that some things were rushed into this project.

Quoting Revelation (Reply 108):
It's not that clear to me that it's a QC/testing issue: what if there is a currently unknown failure mode that occurs after the device leaves the factory that cannot be detected at the factory?

That we had over 50,000 hours and over a year of airline service before these two incidents, such a failure mode seems even more likely tied to a QC issue with a specific production run of batteries.

************

I'd like to believe that but the information we got is these batteries failed in different ways. If it is a failure, they still don't know how the failure occurred much less why. I agree there were 50k operating hours racked up but that doesn't foreclose the possibility of causes other than a battery QC issue.

How hard would it be for Boeing to redesign the container and vent so that electrolyte won't leak, and smoke and gasses are vented out? I think Boeing will go for that, as that might be faster compared to trying to find the root cause for battery catching fire.

Quoting blrsea (Reply 122):How hard would it be for Boeing to redesign the container and vent so that electrolyte won't leak, and smoke and gasses are vented out? I think Boeing will go for that, as that might be faster compared to trying to find the root cause for battery catching fire.

I'll bet that Boeing actually has engineers and designers working on that in addition to the other teams who are working along with the NTSB to identify the root cause of the problem, both are not mutually exclusive.
The a/c was certified with that type of containment in mind, that it failed does not mean that the principle is flawed - which is open to NTSB and FAA change of mind - but that the implementation was flawed.

Quoting blrsea (Reply 122):How hard would it be for Boeing to redesign the container and vent so that electrolyte won't leak, and smoke and gasses are vented out? I think Boeing will go for that, as that might be faster compared to trying to find the root cause for battery catching fire.

Except that I don't think that the FAA will allow the Dreamliners to fly untilthe root cause has been found.

Quoting Scipio (Reply 110):After today's NTSB press conference, I do not think that any FAA official will be willing to sign off on a resumption of B787 commercial service until the NTSB is much further down the road in its investigations.

The FAA has ignored NTSB recommendations many, many times in the past, including with regard to high profile accidents that have cost hundreds of lives. For example, there was no real fix for the problem that caused TWA 800 for 12 years after that accident occurred, and the 747 continued flying throughout: http://www.ainonline.com/aviation-ne...-explains-more-about-twa-800-crash

Half of the FAA's mission is to promote an efficient aviation network. That can put them at odds with the NTSB, whose *only* mission is to make safety recommendations. If the only solution to a safety problem would bankrupt every airline and airplane manufacturer, the NTSB would still make that recommendation. That's their job. The FAA's job is to weigh that safety recommendation against the overall efficiency of the network. That's why this grounding is so unusual, despite it *not* being the first case since 1979 to warrant it for safety reasons. The FAA has known about pre-existing design and maintenance safety issues with individual aircraft and airlines several times since then, and has not grounded those airlines and airplanes because of the potential economic consequences to the industry. Their job boils down to risk management.

Quoting Stitch (Reply 112):That we had over 50,000 hours and over a year of airline service before these two incidents, such a failure mode seems even more likely tied to a QC issue with a specific production run of batteries.

It's *less* likely to be that answer with every press conference and public statement that we have like this. The NTSB aren't stupid - they're the pre-eminent aviation investigative body in the world. They have some of the top engineers in many different fields, and they do these kinds of high profile investigations for a living. So for them to come out at this stage and basically say "we don't know what's going on" suggests to me that it is not any of these simple solutions that some people have been hoping for. A "QC issue" would have been one of the first things they would have looked at, and we know Yaesu has been "probed" (meaning they've taken part in the investigation). That's how these investigations go - you first rule out the simple answers, then you move on to the more complex possibilities.

Anything is still possible, but the longer things go the less likely any of the simple answers is the right one. The fact also that the NTSB specifically brought up containment failures also suggests to me that there's a lot more going on from their perspective than a simple battery problem.

From my managerial perspective, I don't really see how it makes sense to continue flogging the lithium ion horse right now. Switch to something else temporarily to get these planes flying again, and work on a retrofit in the meantime to fix the lithium ion system for the future.

Quoting blrsea (Reply 122):How hard would it be for Boeing to redesign the container and vent so that electrolyte won't leak, and smoke and gasses are vented out? I think Boeing will go for that, as that might be faster compared to trying to find the root cause for battery catching fire.

That is correct. Boeing evidently did add manganese to the mixture to greatly improve the useful life of the battery. If they also add nickel, that would improve the stability and lower the chances of thermal runway.

They're going to add nickel to the battery chemistry and make it more stable. That given mixture is touted as the next gen Li-Ion automotive battery.

Quoting prebennorholm (Reply 118):Li-Ion also degrades cranking performance with reduced temperature, but at a favourably low rate. Then it has other limitations. For instance it won't even take an abuse like the test method specified for lead-acid. It would be considered a short which might create a thermal runaway. Li-Ion is specified with a maximum discharge rate. It could be 10C, which means that maximum discharge rate in amps is 10 times the capacity in amps/hour, meaning that a full, continuous discharge must last at least 6 minutes. Earlier this figure was a rather limiting number, but today special lithium batteries may be specified 25C or 30C, or even double of that for bursts of less than one second.

Is that the same thing as the power figures in watts I see mentioned for Li-Ion batteries ?

I'm also informing myself on lead-acid batteries since it's below 0C here and my car battery is not liking it at all, from what I found the original one has been replaced by one with twice the capacity (in Ah) to overcome such problems but it's not enough, or alternatively it's dead.

According to the notice of the charger I bought a car battery lasts for about 1000 cycles, so it's no better than Lithium-Ion in that regard.

Thought some folks here might make use of this data. From the looks of it, Boeing rushed this thing into service.

Those chargers and batteries are apparently not used in the 787.

"Boeing spokesman Marc Birtel said the 2006 fire resulted from “an improper test set up, not the design of the battery.” FAA spokeswoman Laura Brown said the agency “investigated Mr. Leon's complaints in 2008 and 2009. The investigation determined that the battery charging units in the complaints were prototypes, and none are installed in Boeing 787 aircraft. "

"Boeing’s Birtel said the batteries referenced in the correspondence between Securaplane and the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration are not “the specific battery type currently under NTSB investigation or subject of the FAA emergency airworthiness directive.”"

Quoting par13del (Reply 119):Well, the existing a/c is overweight, the engines do not meet the specs that both OEM's promised the airlines, so there is some precedent for accepting and flying a/c that do not meet OEM specifications.

Not to the degree that was suggested which is essentially eliminating ETOPS for this a/c. Do the math regarding how much longer point to point routes would be without ETOPS. It would mean this a/c would essentially be restricted to continental operations. The airlines won't accept that nor should they.

L/N 90 onwards is on spec weight wise and the engines are within 1% or so of spec. That is a far cry from telling JL and NH that their routing between Japan and North America must operate within 60 minutes of a suitable diversion airport.

Quoting ComeAndGo (Reply 129):it depends on how you charge the battery. If you go from 30% capacity to 80% capacity a Li-Ion can handle 100,000 cycles. If you charge it to 100% and use it down to 20% the cycles become very few.

I don't think that's true. A cycle is defined as the equivalent to 100%->0%->100%, if you do 80->30->80 that's half a cycle, do it twice and it's a cycle.

I havent read every post in the 5 threads so sorry if my question is repeated.

When that cargo 747 crashed full of Li - Ion batteries, you would think Boeing would say ok that battery is a bad idea. But the other thought i had was they are probably wondering why our cameras dont blow up on each flight? Unless thankfully our camera batteries are too small or somehow not affected. If so why not have the battery places in a mega scale canon battery support structure? Unless thats too overweight.

I think this is the reason why new planes are delayed, stop pressuring them into delivering a plane i'd rather it years late and fully safe and servicable than rushed and things like this get forgotten.

Alternatively i would build a plane in secret, test all of it then announce a new plane instead but i wonder if theres a reason why they dont do that?

All batteries can have a thermal runaway but it's more likely to happen during charging or significant discharging. In the case of cameras most aren't using Li-Ion batteries at all, but high end ones do, I would contend that they're very lightly stressed during use however. Now laptop batteries that's another story and there have been incidents, although not in planes as far as I know.

Quoting Flyingfox27 (Reply 134):Alternatively i would build a plane in secret, test all of it then announce a new plane instead but i wonder if theres a reason why they dont do that?

Because it costs so many billions to develop a new plane that you can't get your financing if you don't have a clear plan and customers lining up.

Quoting Aesma (Reply 133):Quoting ComeAndGo (Reply 129):
it depends on how you charge the battery. If you go from 30% capacity to 80% capacity a Li-Ion can handle 100,000 cycles. If you charge it to 100% and use it down to 20% the cycles become very few.

I don't think that's true. A cycle is defined as the equivalent to 100%->0%->100%, if you do 80->30->80 that's half a cycle, do it twice and it's a cycle.

It's all semantics. You can rate the cell in different ways and get vastly different lifespans out of it.

Let's say you have a lithium cell that is rated at 10Ah, absolute maximum voltage of 4.2v, and a minimum voltage of 3.2v. If you cycle that cell for all it's worth (4.2v to 3.2v and back) it might last a few hundred cycles.

But now take the same exact cell, rate it with a 4.0v max voltage and 3.6v minimum voltage, and you might only get 8Ah out of it. But now it will last several thousand cycles, which means a lot less maintenance expense to the aircraft owner/operator.

Taking lithium cells to the limits of the chemistry is hard on them, very hard. The economics are better if you use slightly larger cells (to make up for the lost capacity) and don't use them to the extremes of what the chemistry can do.

Quoting Flyingfox27 (Reply 134):I havent read every post in the 5 threads so sorry if my question is repeated.

When that cargo 747 crashed full of Li - Ion batteries, you would think Boeing would say ok that battery is a bad idea. But the other thought i had was they are probably wondering why our cameras dont blow up on each flight? Unless thankfully our camera batteries are too small or somehow not affected. If so why not have the battery places in a mega scale canon battery support structure? Unless thats too overweight.

There are plenty reports of laptop, smartphone or camera batteries having a thermal rundown, there are even specialized bags on the planes to contain those events. However the stored energy is way lower than the one stored in the 787 batteries, so the potential danger is lower. Even some emergency flashlights vented in the past, due to the small size of the batteries without causing many problems.

For me the easiest solution is to reduce the number of cells in a battery. Worst case they need to put just 1 cell into one battery, so that every cell has its own containment and charger. I think this could be tried within weeks, so the grounding could be short.

So did they identify the root cause of the problem, was that a fix of the root cause or just a temporary fix to allow the a/c to continue in operation?
Is that any different from the faulty pitot tubes or the engine starvation on the 777, here's a question, are those pitot tubes still in operation on some a/c even after they had some input into the AF disaster, remember that the notices about them was that they should be changed during routine maintenance cycles, in the interim improved pilot procedures were implemented when air speed became suspect. How about the RR engines on the 777, have all of them now had the engine fix to prevent fuel starvation, that is another incident where a temporary fix was put in place while the engineers and safety regulators identified the root cause and a permanent fix.

The principle of putting in place temporary measures to allow an a/c to return or stay in service while final corrective measures are implemented is well documented, I see no reason why the 787 will be any different. If it takes a year to identify the root cause, does anyone really believe that the 787 will be grounded the entire time, how long would it take Boeing to switch batteries and the FAA certify the a/c with new batteries, that is also an option. In any event, we are talking about a hit to the aviation industry of millions if not billions, Boeing, suppliers and yes us customers who will have to pay higher fares, after all, replacement a/c are not sitting down unbuilt waiting for operators.
700+ backlog of a/c, even if all are cancelled today, how much money will be returned to the buyer, what is their source of replacement, and what premiums will either OEM charge for these new a/c, or do we believe that they will take pity on the airlines and offer up huge discounts as compensation, Boeing might why would Airbus?

"The Boeing 787 battery involved in the Japan Airlines incident on 7 January reveal signs of a short-circuit in one cell and thermal runaway that led to a fire, says the US National Transportation Safety Board. "

It was, but it's a good pointer to the state of play at this point in time.

Quoting art (Reply 140):"The Boeing 787 battery involved in the Japan Airlines incident on 7 January reveal signs of a short-circuit in one cell and thermal runaway that led to a fire, says the US National Transportation Safety Board. "

Kind of ambiguous, but I imagine the actual short circuit would/could become an open circuit during/after the fire.

The article also says:

Quote:"We have to understand why this battery resulted in a fire when there is so many protections designed into this system," she adds.

Yet we know everyone from the 787 Chief Engineer on down has said fire was allowed for in the design, the design is focused on containing the (statistically likely) fire.

Seems the state of play known to the public is:
A) Understand how the short circuit developed in the JAL fire event and see if its cause can be minimized/prevented
B) Determine the root cause of the ANA not-fire event and see if its cause can be minimized/prevented

SInce it's taken over two weeks to disclose the JAL issue and they events were 9 days apart, in theory we could know more (publicly) about the ANA not-fire event the end of next week.

This must be painfully slow to Boeing employees and shareholders, and will be very frustrating if the NTSB final report ends up looking like:

Quoting Aesma (Reply 135):Now laptop batteries that's another story and there have been incidents, although not in planes as far as I know.

As of October, 2012, the FAA has documented 132 incidents of venting/smouldering/fire involving consumer electronic device batteries in cabins, baggage and cargo - mostly Li-Ion. And that's just incidents within the FAA's jurisdiction.

Quoting Revelation (Reply 141):Yet we know everyone from the 787 Chief Engineer on down has said fire was allowed for in the design, the design is focused on containing the (statistically likely) fire.

The following is pure imagination and was sparked by above comment:

Boeing: Hey we want to build a plane with dangerous batteries

FAA: But those catch fire

Boeing: Oh we just built a container around

FAA: cool - we give you special conditions

Pilot Unions: We don't want fires on board!

JAL: Hey Boeing, we had a fire!

FAA: Shit - I told you guys - what shall we do? -- ok lets do a safety review!

ANA: Hey guys, we had another fire - this time while flying and we needed to evacuate - turn on the TV - there is some nice footage around!

Airlines/FAA: Damn - We better ground the aircraft now!

Media: Shit-storm

Public: Outcry

I could add and subtract to that imaginary conversation. Some people will acuse me of starting a war, being polemic even outright insult me. What happened when the FAA said it would do a safety review is that the 787 was moved into the spotlight. The batterie is deeply integrated into the system and you cant just pull out a fist class seat and screw another type of batterie into its place as an intermediate fix.

If the 787 has any other incident with whatever system (its a new aircraft and will have teething problems) and leads to an emergency (will happen - we have emergencies almost every day) while the safety review is still under its way and the NTSB is still investigating it will not let Boeing, authorities or operating airlines look good.

As of Friday morning, the reports are that the circuit board which controls the battery was too far 'fried' to get useful data from it. (I didn't see this mentioned here - apologies if it was). We could indeed be in for a long investigation, unless there are other means of gathering data.

Today's Seattle Times has some additional info about how the NTSB is investigating the issue. Interesting read. Also official confirmation that for the last fire incident in Japan, the aircraft's battery was indeed replaced in October.

In a fluorescent-lit room on the fifth floor holding a half-dozen investigators, reporters Thursday paraded by the burned battery from the Dreamliner.

The battery’s cobalt-blue casing sat splayed atop a wheeled cart. One of the battery’s eight cells was left inside for display. Investigators are focusing most on cells five, six and seven, the most damaged.

On an adjacent long table, two strips of 33-foot-long foil windings made of copper and aluminum — the innards of the battery cells — lay unspooled for examination. One of the windings was more heavily damaged, much of it charred and blackened.

The NTSB is working its investigators in two daily shifts in Washington, with more staff deployed to Japan, where the battery is made, and to Tucson, Ariz., where the battery charger is made.
...
...
Two electronic devices that recorded maintenance data on the JAL plane are being downloaded at Boeing in Seattle to obtain information recorded after the airplane’s electrical power was interrupted.

In addition to the detailed forensic examination of the plane’s electrical system, Hersman said the NTSB is reviewing manufacturing records and gathering information collected in supplier audits at battery maker GS Yuasa in Japan and the maker of the charging system, Securaplane Technologies. in Tucson.

It is also examining whether the FAA’s certification standards were adhered to and if those standards were adequate, Hersman said.
...
...
This main battery is “the final power source, should all other electrical generation fail,” Hersman said.

No fire was found, but again hot chemicals had sprayed out of the battery, leaving a trail of dark residue across the compartment.

Although the aircraft was an older jet, delivered to ANA a year earlier, the battery had been installed as a replacement in late October.

How long might the NTSB investigation take to come to a conclusion on the cause of the Boston fire?

“It’s really very hard to tell at this point,” Hersman said. “We have all hands on deck.”
...
...

In Japan travel delays and cancellations are usually treated very seriously. A Shinkansen train has less than a minute average delay per year it seems the grounding may prove futile for ANA. Are there any backup plans in a situation like this. Can a major airline find backup aircraft to cover for grounded type and what about the financial impact - these cancellations seem very expensive.

People need to realize that short term fixes are the norm for significant AD's. The short term fix gets you back to your intended level of safety so that operations can resume, usually at the cost of significant maintenance and/or operational burden. The long term fix gets rid of the maintenance/operational burden. This is how the vast majority of AD's get handled.

Quoting SonomaFlyer (Reply 114): I am also shocked that these kinds of issues were not caught at the testing phase or QA with the battery mfr.

They can only get caught if the defect responsible was present during testing or manufacturing QA...without knowing the cause, we don't know if that's true.

Quoting nm2582 (Reply 115):(1) the most concern seems to be around leaking electrolyte. Boeing will need to come up with a better containment vessel which demonstrably prevents electrolyte leakage.

Or demonstrate that leaking electrolyte poses no threat to the other systems. There's nothing in the special condition that requires the electrolyte itself be contained, only that the damage be contained.

Quoting par13del (Reply 119):Well, the existing a/c is overweight, the engines do not meet the specs that both OEM's promised the airlines, so there is some precedent for accepting and flying a/c that do not meet OEM specifications.

It's important to distinguish between specifications and contractual guarantees. There is always a gap in between. OEM's are responsible to meet contract guarantees, not specs. Airlines are free to forego delivery of aircraft that don't meet contractual guarantees, they have no legal basis to refuse delivery of aircraft that don't meet spec.

Quoting par13del (Reply 119):Why, the a/c has been flying for over a year with no problems, in addition to those conducting test flights, the one battery issue was traced to FOD.

The FOD issue during test had nothing to do with the batteries. These battery issues are a completely post-certification phenomenon.

Quoting iahmark (Reply 120):I think they will be changing to NICd batteries because they are proven to be safe

NiCd batteries can have thermal runaway too. They're not "proven safe", they're "proven unsafe" by most of the logic deployed in this thread. Their failure *probability* is different though.

Quoting iahmark (Reply 120):BTW researching the news I came to this interview with Vince Weldon, former Boeing engineer that was unceremoniously given the boot for doubting the viability of composites in serious crashes

He wasn't given the boot for doubting the viability of composites in serious crashes. He did doubt the viability of composites in serious crashes (which was proven incorrect by doing composite crash testing), and he was also given the boot. Don't confuse correlation with causation.

Quoting blrsea (Reply 122):How hard would it be for Boeing to redesign the container and vent so that electrolyte won't leak, and smoke and gasses are vented out?

Relatively easy, if that's all it took. But from the NTSB's latest press release I'm not sure they'd accept that. FAA might though.

Quoting Flyingfox27 (Reply 134):When that cargo 747 crashed full of Li - Ion batteries, you would think Boeing would say ok that battery is a bad idea.

I can crush an aluminum can with my bare hands...this does not mean it's a bad idea to build airplanes out of aluminum. It's extremely unlikely that the basic battery chemistry is the problem here.

Quoting Flyingfox27 (Reply 134):Alternatively i would build a plane in secret, test all of it then announce a new plane instead but i wonder if theres a reason why they dont do that?

Because you can't afford to. The risk is too high that you'd build something the customers don't want.

This should really be rephrased as:
Boeing: He, we want to build a plane with batteries.
FAA: But batteries can catch fire...

All batteries *can* cause damage because they're all energy storage devices. All airplanes have to be designed assuming that the battery fails in the most spectacular possible manner, regardless of which battery chemistry you choose. The containment methods may differ from chemistry to chemistry but the FAA is *always* going to say "What are you going to do if this thing catches fire/shorts/leaks/etc.?"

Quoting tdscanuck (Reply 152): All airplanes have to be designed assuming that the battery fails in the most spectacular possible manner, regardless of which battery chemistry you choose. The containment methods may differ from chemistry to chemistry but the FAA is *always* going to say "What are you going to do if this thing catches fire/shorts/leaks/etc.?"

Looking at the lead-acid batteries used on earlier 747 models and the NiCad batteries used on the 777, their containment system looks to be similar to that used by the Li-Ion system - a metal box with a removable lid.

(Both batteries are supplied by Securaplane Technologies, who are the suppliers of the batteries for the 787.)

I am a long time member but rarely post. I cannot keep quite any longer. I have followed the 787 very closely since its inception.

This plane should NEVER have been grounded and taken out of service. I have seen nothing to suggest the 787 is unsafe. This is nothing more than a teething issue all new aircraft have. The plane has not caused any accidents or injuries.

I can cite example after example of design issues with all types of aircraft with far worse ramifications than a battery scenario that has been planned for by the engineers and the FAA since day one.

The uncommanded rudder issue with the 737 is just one example that led to (2) planes drilling holes in the ground (USAir @ Philly and United @ Colorado Springs) and there was no grounding of the plane. Athe AF Airbus accident ect.....

Here we have a scenerio that was planned for, everyone conceded it was a possibility and safety measures were designed into the aircraft to contain the situation and those safety measures worked and yet we have a grounded plane.

Politics!!! Lets not forget that Boeing fought w the Obama Admin over a new non-union manufacturing facility.

No plane has ever been put under as much scrutiny as the 787.

The grounding of this plane will forever mare its reputation, is costing airlines and Boeing millions and millions of dollars, will create uneasyness with the traveling public and will cost J*O*B*S here in the USA.

This is much ado about nothing! I would galdy fly on the 787 between any two points on the globe. I cannot believe this plane has been grounded!!!

Quoting tdscanuck (Reply 152):
Quoting SonomaFlyer (Reply 114):
People need to get away from the notion of a short term fix.

People need to realize that short term fixes are the norm for significant AD's. The short term fix gets you back to your intended level of safety so that operations can resume, usually at the cost of significant maintenance and/or operational burden. The long term fix gets rid of the maintenance/operational burden. This is how the vast majority of AD's get handled.

This I understand but we can't have any fix until the cause is determined for both events. I should've been more clear in my statement though and linked the determination of cause coupled with an appropriate fix. I'm just not seeing these a/c getting into the air quickly given the issues involved. I hope to be proven wrong as this a/c is badly needed by the airlines - not to mention Boeing.

Quoting tdscanuck (Reply 152):People need to realize that short term fixes are the norm for significant AD's. The short term fix gets you back to your intended level of safety so that operations can resume, usually at the cost of significant maintenance and/or operational burden.

Good luck convincing them. We have a different safety culture now than we had during the DC-10 era and that's just fine and appreciated. Anyways you need to realize that those AD's you refer to usually concern frames with millions of hours and usually are not about fires. and to quote the NTSB:

Quoting tdscanuck (Reply 152):Or demonstrate that leaking electrolyte poses no threat to the other systems. There's nothing in the special condition that requires the electrolyte itself be contained, only that the damage be contained.

I have a different opinion. I think the special conditions aim was that there is no pressure built up (vents) and those vented gases have to poses no threat but the leakage of electrolytes in either the forward or aft E&E compartment was not allowed. That's just not imaginable. Anyways I have found some interesting reads:

Quoting Revelation (Reply 155):Unfortunately for Boeing, the NTSB Chairwoman says: “We do not expect to see fire events on board aircraft” so I don't think she's on board with your statement.

I think you are mis-interpreting. A fire event is only one of lots of things that the NTSB "does not expect to see". That doesn't mean that you don't design for them to happen anyway! Remember:

Quoting tdscanuck (Reply 152):the FAA is *always* going to say "What are you going to do if this thing catches fire/shorts/leaks/etc.?"

and the FAA is the certifying authority, not the NTSB. The NTSB's charter is actually quite a narrow one: to investigate things that go wrong, identify a probable cause and contributing factors, and make safety recommendations to the relevant authority (FAA in this case). The NTSB does not need to concern themselves with practicality, and the FAA is free to ignore any recommendation.

Quoting tdscanuck (Reply 152):NiCd batteries can have thermal runaway too. They're not "proven safe", they're "proven unsafe" by most of the logic deployed in this thread. Their failure *probability* is different though.

This is the key. There is no way to prove something safe. It only can meet a safety threshold. And there is yet to be presented evidence that the battery containment did not meet that threshold. There is no presented evidence that the electrolyte DID pose a threat, nor is there evidence that containment failed on the JAL flight before the Fire Department smashed it open.

It's very possible that the solution is to test the batteries more thoroughly and install a splatter shield, a "sneeze guard" as it were.

Yet we have the FAA taking the unprecedented step of grounding a type without evidence of threat to safety, only the idea that it "might" be a threat. If someone can point to another incident where this step was immediately taken, even after a hull loss, I'd like to know. Why wasn't the 747 grounded after TWA800? The A330 after the Air France accident? The A380 after the engine explosion that very nearly crashed the aircraft? The 777 after the crash in London regarding frozen fuel and clogged lines? After all, we "didn't know" what caused them the next day nor if they could happen again (and in the case of the pitot tubes and frozen fuel, they had happened BEFORE), so shouldn't we err on the side of caution?

Again, is it irresponsible of the FAA to choose a temporary AD rather than a grounding? One that orders APU batteries be removed entirely and main backups be tested daily and/or possibly replaced with new batteries from a different lot? But then again, how could the FAA do that when the JAA was already grounding the fleet and the French looked to be close behind? Wouldn't they look weak? Or like "home team" apologists?

What if railroads or automobiles or trucks or buses were held to this same standard? Prove everything safe, no acceptable failure of systems no matter if they cause a threat to safety or not? Could we assure everyone that trains would never derail? Or that a car tire would never blow out at highway speeds and cause an accident? Or bus tire? Or that there was no condition that would lead a truck to jackknife? And what if each time an incident happened on those other modes of transport the entire type was "grounded" until the problem solved, even if the problem wasn't life threatening? Who would find that acceptable?

But now we have the NTSB making false PR statements regarding fires, in general, on any aircraft, even as evidence points to the most likely culprit from the beginning: internal shorts in a bad batch of batteries.

It's a huge CYA operation at this point. So the idea that a temporary fix will pass muster isn't as likely as in past ADs, no matter how much more serious they were.

Quoting alfablue (Reply 157):I have a different opinion. I think the special conditions aim was that there is no pressure built up (vents) and those vented gases have to poses no threat but the leakage of electrolytes in either the forward or aft E&E compartment was not allowed.

The special conditions are a legal document and mean exactly what they say (using appropriate definitions, not necessarily common-use definitions). So regardless of what you or anyone might imagine as their aim, the fact remains that the restriction is NOT on the condition (electrolyte leakage), but on the result (no damage caused that affects safe operation). As long as no damage to safe operation results you can fill the compartment to the brim with the stuff and the design is still certifiable and presumably safe.

Now, if the regulators decide that they didn't get it right, and want to change the condition to "no damage" or "no leakage", that's fine, but then they have to say that in the special condition.

Li-ion is a relatively safe battery composition, if designed and handled correctly.

Quoting alfablue (Reply 157):no threat but the leakage of electrolytes in either the forward or aft E&E compartment was not allowed. That's just not imaginable. Anyways I have found some interesting reads:

In an airplane controlled by fly-by-wire controls, the last thing that you want is some electrolytes spewing out on the flight control management computers (whatever they're called on the 787) and shorting them out.

However, a battery fire is in itself a safety risk.
It's an acceptable thing to have 1 such event every so many millions of flight hours, it's another thing to get 2 events 1 week apart on a small fleet of 50 aircraft that's barely in service.

I really think that if the issue can not be reproduced in the laboratory, one has to look at the possibility that the current fed to the batteries on the aircraft is not as pure as the current used in laboratory tests. Depending on the generator and battery configurations, they could be creating very short undetectable peak currents (momentary short-circuits) that the stabilisation system can't smoothen up and the monitoring systems can't detect. However, the battery closest to the peak current would get the full load of it and ignite like when struck by lightning.

The best way to find out is to take the ANA frame that had the fire and take it for a few engine runs and monitor the power fed to the battery using high precision measuring equipment.

We hear that the battery on the NH 787 was once replaced. What was the reason of such replacement so early in the aircraft's life? Maybe that could provide an answer?

Quoting ikramerica (Reply 160): Why wasn't the 747 grounded after TWA800? The A330 after the Air France accident? The A380 after the engine explosion that very nearly crashed the aircraft? The 777 after the crash in London regarding frozen fuel and clogged lines?

Maybe because another 747 did not blow up 9 days later.
Maybe because another A330 didn't vanish in the ocean 9 days later.
Maybe because another A380 engine didn't blow up 9 days later.
Maybe because another 777 didn't pancake on a runway 9 days later.

The federal agencies are probably worried that two similar events occurred in quick succession.

Quoting CF-CPI (Reply 144):As of Friday morning, the reports are that the circuit board which controls the battery was too far 'fried' to get useful data from it.

That's from the JAL incident, which is the one the NTSB has direct access to. Apparently the board in the ANA incident is not in such a state, and the JTSB has access to that. They'll be sharing their findings with the NTSB.

So your claim is that you are both smarter and in possession of more data than the FAA and NTSB? Let's see it, then.

Because the NTSB quite clearly stated multiple times yesterday that this is a safety issue. The FAA stated as much in their AD as well, however some people still want to try to twist their words. It should be obvious by now what they meant.

There is a link literally just a couple of posts above yours in which the NTSB says flat out that the JAL incident "is a very serious air-safety event." They further went on to say the safety systems Boeing had put in place "did not work as intended. ... We need to understand why." Even if you were to argue that the JAL fire was a one-off battery event, the fact that the safety systems did not work as intended indicates a systemic problem. As many have said, every type of battery can experience thermal runaway. The biggest problem the NTSB seems to have is that the systems designed to contain this did not work. That points to a design problem.

To say you have seen "nothing to suggest" this is a safety issue would have to mean you're willfully ignoring updates to the situation at this point.

Quoting ttailsteve (Reply 154):The uncommanded rudder issue with the 737 is just one example that led to (2) planes drilling holes in the ground (USAir @ Philly and United @ Colorado Springs) and there was no grounding of the plane.

Two wrongs wouldn't make a right. The 737 should have been grounded at that point too. There was almost a third accident after those first two that it seems you don't even know about - an Eastwind flight experienced the same rudder hard over at 4,000 feet in 1996 but managed to correct it and land safely, because the pilot knew about the earlier accidents. He immediately took corrective action and managed to stop the roll before the plane inverted... twice. (It's worth noting that the pilots of the two accident airplanes took corrective action too, so it was literally just by the skin of their teeth that the Eastwind flight managed to stay up.) A Continental flight in 1994 experienced the same thing but they were at 37,000 feet and at that point (this was prior to the second accident and Eastwind incident), the NTSB and FAA took no action.

By 1996, this was definitely a known flaw in the 737 rudder system and that plane should not have been flying until the flaw was definitively found and fixed. Ditto for the 787. Planes shouldn't be flying around with a known mystery on board that can affect flight safety and has in fact been demonstrated to do so. At the very least, we need to identify the problem to know a) how serious it is, b) whether it's something that really needs fixing fleet-wide (e.g. is it systemic, and/or a design issue), and c) how to fix it. We already pretty well know the answers to a and b, but we're a ways off from c.

Quoting Stitch (Reply 117):And the building burned down where the 787 did not. Maybe Securaplane should have put a containment vessel on the battery when testing it in the lab...

Quoting LTC8K6 (Reply 131):"Boeing’s Birtel said the batteries referenced in the correspondence between Securaplane and the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration are not “the specific battery type currently under NTSB investigation or subject of the FAA emergency airworthiness directive.”"

Even if they are only similar (Li-Ion and hold roughly the same amount of energy) rather than the same 'specific battery type', the outcome of that accident is worrying.

Quoting PITingres (Reply 161):The special conditions are a legal document and mean exactly what they say (using appropriate definitions, not necessarily common-use definitions). So regardless of what you or anyone might imagine as their aim, the fact remains that the restriction is NOT on the condition (electrolyte leakage)

So you are suggesting that the condition of electrolyte leakage was taken into account? When the battery containment spills electrolytes and the aircraft hits moderate turbulence those highly corrosive, hot and flammable material could end up anywhere in the E&E compartment. So the Boeing engineers designed two locations where all cables, connectors, cooling vents, circuit breakers are protected? WOW - the 787 is advanced beyond my wildest dreams or maybe you just don't know how an E&E compartment looks from the inside...

Is that not how the airline industry operates, we do not wait for tires to go flat but change then when inspections reveal a problem, other components have a set number of cycles before they must be replaced, usually if that is not done we have a spectacular failure, just saying.

One point, the problem with the pitot tubes was occuring on a/c before the AF accident which resulted in an AD requiring replacement in addition to increased training for pilots on how to handle incorrect speed issues. Indeed, if not for the AF crash, the casual observer would never have known that a/c were flying around with known faulty equipment, go figure.

One thing is to talk to the airlines ensuring that you offer a product that your customers want. It is an entirely different matter to make your product under development a story in the press as Boeing did (calling it "The Dreamliner" as if it was created by Dreamworks in Hollywood just says it all. That is raw meat for the general public rather than the airlines). Getting the attention of the press might be difficult. And Boeing must have spend quite a few bugs getting there (the problematic 7-8-7 roll out just to mention one thing). The problem is that when you have become a story it is impossible to get out of the attention again. Invite them to your wedding and they will come for your divorce.

Quoting alfablue (Reply 167):So you are suggesting that the condition of electrolyte leakage was taken into account?

Of course it was taken into account. It wouldn't be a certifiable design if it hadn't been taken into account. It was pointed out (by Tom, perhaps?) that at least in the aft EE bay you also have to take a environmental system coolant leak into account which is just as conductive, if perhaps not as corrosive.

Whether they got it right, I don't know and you don't either. As I said earlier, it doesn't matter how much gunk splashes around, it matters that the results don't impact safety of flight. But it was absolutely taken into account, or both certifiers and engineers made a huge error of omission. GIven the focus on the battery to the extent of writing a special condition, I hardly think that that happened.

Quoting Revelation (Reply 155):Unfortunately for Boeing, the NTSB Chairwoman says: “We do not expect to see fire events on board aircraft” so I don't think she's on board with your statement.

Someone should present her with a flying pig As long as there are planes, and planes have electronics and fuel and other combustible materials on board, there will always be some degree of onboard fires happening... and failure modes that the designers never envisioned will continue to happen as long as the second law of thermodynamics remains in effect.

I think the fire in the JAL bird would actually have been much less worse as far as damage goes if the plane had been in the air when it happened. The smoke and fire containment features of the E&E bay are designed to work in the flight environment, not sitting on the ramp...

Quoting ikramerica (Reply 160):But then again, how could the FAA do that when the JAA was already grounding the fleet and the French looked to be close behind?

Again, as already pointed out by others, the japanese airlines voluntarily grounded the 787s, there was no japanese governmental edict to ground when the NH and JL planes were grounded, the FAA then issued their grounding which was then followed by various overseas authorities as is normal practice.

Quoting spacecadet (Reply 165): Planes shouldn't be flying around with a known mystery on board that can affect flight safety and has in fact been demonstrated to do so.

The A380 RR was grounded, and when it was released to fly, very frequent inspections had to be made. QANTAS had a lot of trouble due to the incident. The plane itself was not the problem, the problem was clearly the engine, and the reason for the explosion was quickly determined to be a fire from oil inside the engine.

Working out what happened with these batteries is a much harder task. Once it is determined, there is still the management of the electrolyte to be addressed. The electrolyte is flammable. That is the issue the NTSB has. When it is released, with all that heat, it can catch fire in those bays, and cause havoc.

Quoting par13del (Reply 168):Why, the pitot tube incident and the 777 crash was recent history, long after the DC-10, or are you saying that attitudes have changed since the 777 and A330 accidents?

The pitot tube freezing up causes a standard case that pilots are supposed to know how to deal with, Unreliable Airspeed Indication. There is a standard way to deal with it, the pilot in AF447 didn't do that, and due to a dysfunctional CRM, he was not corrected. Other planes suffered the same problem and all those pilots dealt with it correctly. With these batteries, there is nothing a pilot can do other than land ASAP. When you are over the Pacific, that is problematic.

Quoting trex8 (Reply 175):Quoting ikramerica (Reply 160):
But then again, how could the FAA do that when the JAA was already grounding the fleet and the French looked to be close behind?

Again, as already pointed out by others, the japanese airlines voluntarily grounded the 787s, there was no japanese governmental edict to ground when the NH and JL planes were grounded, the FAA then issued their grounding which was then followed by various overseas authorities as is normal practice.

I think you are wasting your energy and time. It is clear from this rant of his, that he has not bothered to read the responses to his previous rant. He keeps on repeating the same factual errors that several posters have already exposed, and keeps on making a flawed case on the basis of these factual errors. There is no such thing as a JAA, for starters... (there was one, but it has been succeeded by EASA, and it was based in Europe rather than in Japan).

Expect yet another rant based on the same factual errors within the next 24-48 hours...

As the conversation is starting to run in circles, ie the Boeing guys on airliners.net continuing to make us believe that the short-term fall of the stock price is a bigger issue than a 787 falling from the sky, versus all the rest of us who have concerns about the aircraft, some entering discussions and trying to redefine safety as a compromise between cash and human lives, I will share a bit of my experience regarding work with batteries on aircraft.

Batteries need to be able to be physically disconnected in the event of a crash primarily, but also in case of a battery malfunction.

Typically, the battery cables are attached to the battery with quick-disconnect fixtures and locked in place by thin copper wire, in order to enable a physical disconnect in the event of a crash (sparks from any electrical source can lit a fire), but also in case of a battery malfunction such as internal short-circuits.

Despite the data in the AMM's and standard practices of the industry regarding the use of copper safety wires, I have seen hundreds of batteries locked with .032 lock wire (steel) and frequently got confronted with the situation that the MRO had non in stock. So I always kept my own stash.

Lead-acid batteries would have vent tubes attached to nipples on the top of the casing in order to remove acid gasses inside the battery and take them out to a pot/jar filled with a neutralising solution (often bicarbonate of soda) from where it's released off the aircraft.

Quoting Viscount724 (Reply 180):How many can they park at PAE as they come off the line with nowhere to go? I assume ramp space isn't unlimited and weren't quite a few already parked awaiting modifications prior to the grounding?

I don't know. Dozens, I imagine. Perhaps scores.

If it proves necessary, Boeing will be able to secure Ferry Permits to fly completed frames down to VCV or other storage areas.

I think about 30ish of the 787 went through their rework facility last year and were delivered.. so there should be some room since they haven't been sending any new ones through there since mid last year.

If irrc there are only a dozen or so left to bring up to delivery configuration.

It's a standard in civil aviation.
I've seen manuals that explicitly asked to install copper and not steel safety wire, other manuals of other aircraft types where you can either install copper whenever possible or not install anything at all.

I have never seen a manual asking for steel safety wire.

On a note, hoping that they are reading this, aircraft manufacturers need to start integrating the AMM and the IPC into one. According to the aircraft type, they would mention the copper safety wire in the AMM, but you would often not find any gauge information neither in the IPC or the AMM. This is a very typical problem.
A lot of times, the information or illustrations on the AMM don't match the ones in the IPC and so on and this leads to maintenance error on a daily basis. Please fix this.

That happens everywhere. Our maintenance job guides often times for installation of hardware on components that directly contradicts what the IPB calls for. When we find these situations the standard practice is to use the hardware configuration stated in the job guide and not the IPB.

Another problem is the use of old part numbers (AN) that don't correlate directly to a modern equivalent (MS) and having to do a lot of time consuming research to find what we hope is a correct suitable sub.

As far as the safety wire goes, there are many places on our jets that require copper safety wire but people sub .020 steel wire. It eventually damages components because people have to apply excessive force to operate a knob/switch and the steel wire tears up the hole it's going through.

Sorry Stitch but you misread my original post what I said was correct.

So to recap in the tight area that is the aft electronics bay there was a 40 inches (101.6 cm) wide zone of structural and component damage according to the NTSB, nearly 9 sq feet, over 1 sq meters.

Quoting alfablue (Reply 157):Quoting tdscanuck (Reply 152):
Or demonstrate that leaking electrolyte poses no threat to the other systems. There's nothing in the special condition that requires the electrolyte itself be contained, only that the damage be contained.

I have a different opinion. I think the special conditions aim was that there is no pressure built up (vents) and those vented gases have to poses no threat but the leakage of electrolytes in either the forward or aft E&E compartment was not allowed.

Quoting Stitch (Reply 174):The NTSB also does not consider JA804A to be, in their words, "a fire incident".

Both incidents were thermal runaways. Li-Ion thermal runaways have the potential to catch fire. It is not so interesting whether none or all, or as is the case, half of them actually did catch fire. They have the potential to catch fire.

Li-Ion runaways expel flammable electrolyte and gasses, while creating temperature around 700 deg. C (1200 deg. F). If we for a moment have the approximately right oxygen mix in contact with the red hot hardware - not too lean, not too rich - then they catch fire, otherwise not.

The Japanese put the JA804A battery on a scale - it had lost 4 kg (9 lbs) liquids and gasses.

Quoting ikramerica (Reply 160):
What if railroads or automobiles or trucks or buses were held to this same standard?

Are they capable of falling out of the sky? No. Do they journey into the middle of the pacific and suddenly have nowhere to land? No.

The fundamental difference between an aircraft and any surface conveyence is that if the aircraft stops working, it crashes. If a surface conveyance stops working it...stops.

Quoting sofianec (Reply 148):
United says it's no longer showing the pre-flight video touting the 787 Dreamliner as the "future of aviation."

This is becoming a massive PR disaster for Boeing and all airlines operating the aircraft.

I wonder what legal action airlines might start to take against Boeing. For example, it could be argued that a non-flyable aircraft is at the very least a breach of contract.

At this point, I find it hard to believe that the 787 program will turn a profit any time within a decade. Between a 3+ year delay to EIS with multiple individual issues and now this, the number of frames that must be sold to break even has to be more than the number of orders on the books.

This Associated Press article on the website from my 'home area' daily newspaper, discusses the series of problems of the 'Dreamliner', and suggesting there was a rush to develop it, to stay #1 over Airbus in total frame sales, and to offer major fuel savings to airlines, among other issues that hurt it's development and even led to its current problems:

Quoting sofianec (Reply 148):This is becoming a massive PR disaster for Boeing and all airlines operating the aircraft.

Becoming? It's already the worst PR disaster in the history of commercial travel since Comet or Habshiem.

Quoting ttailsteve (Reply 154):This plane should NEVER have been grounded and taken out of service. I have seen nothing to suggest the 787 is unsafe.

I agree that, so far, nothing has demonstrated it to be unsafe. However, that's not exactly how the FAA thinks. The current events make it as least highly possible that one of the probabilities in the fault tree (the probability of a battery fire) is a lot different in reality than the design assumed. That means that the probability of the high level catstrophic event (loss of the aircraft) is at least uncertain...since that's how the FAA defined "safe" in the first place, they're not comfortable enough that they know it's safe *enough*.

Quoting ttailsteve (Reply 154):This is nothing more than a teething issue all new aircraft have.

Having what are supposed to be very remote events happen twice in rapid succession isn't normal, teething or not.

Quoting ttailsteve (Reply 154):The uncommanded rudder issue with the 737 is just one example that led to (2) planes drilling holes in the ground (USAir @ Philly and United @ Colorado Springs) and there was no grounding of the plane.

A big factor there is that they had no idea that they even had a common issue. The NTSB's best conclusion on Colorado Springs was that it was a weather event (a rotor). If they'd known at the time that both those crashes were a result of uncommanded rudder hardovers, the response would have been different.

Quoting Revelation (Reply 155):Quoting tdscanuck (Reply 152):
All airplanes have to be designed assuming that the battery fails in the most spectacular possible manner, regardless of which battery chemistry you choose.

Unfortunately for Boeing, the NTSB Chairwoman says: “We do not expect to see fire events on board aircraft” so I don't think she's on board with your statement.

I think she's completely onboard with the idea that you should design the aircraft to be safe even if there's a battery fire...the NTSB is not ignorant of fail-safe systems design. That's completely compatible with not expecting to see fire events onboard aircraft. If the NTSB really believed that it was acceptable to just design fires out, they'd let Boeing remove the battery containment. And that ain't gonna happen.

Quoting alfablue (Reply 157):Anyways you need to realize that those AD's you refer to usually concern frames with millions of hours and usually are not about fires.

I used to work on the SFAR88 AD's...they're all about fires. And most of them had both short term fixes and long term corrective actions. The 737's flew around for years with a minimum center tank fuel quantity (causing a direct hit to payload at range) until the center tank fuel pump SB was released.

Quoting Wisdom (Reply 162):In an airplane controlled by fly-by-wire controls, the last thing that you want is some electrolytes spewing out on the flight control management computers (whatever they're called on the 787) and shorting them out.

Let's keep in mind that aircraft designers aren't idiots. Unforseen things do happen but obvious threats are well covered...the 787 has three flight control computers that are physically separated throughout the aircraft, fully redundant, and a 787 doesn't actually need any of the flight control computers to fly safely. It's physically impossible to have one battery event kill the FBW system.

Quoting Wisdom (Reply 162):Depending on the generator and battery configurations, they could be creating very short undetectable peak currents (momentary short-circuits) that the stabilisation system can't smoothen up and the monitoring systems can't detect.

Again, aircraft designers aren't idiots...this would have shown up in testing years ago.

Quoting Wisdom (Reply 162):The best way to find out is to take the ANA frame that had the fire and take it for a few engine runs and monitor the power fed to the battery using high precision measuring equipment.

Both the full fidelity electrical system iron-bird and at least two flight test aircraft had this exact system for years. If there was a design issue in the power supplied to the battery it would have shown up then.

Quoting alfablue (Reply 167):When the battery containment spills electrolytes and the aircraft hits moderate turbulence those highly corrosive, hot and flammable material could end up anywhere in the E&E compartment. So the Boeing engineers designed two locations where all cables, connectors, cooling vents, circuit breakers are protected?

Basically, yes. Even if you totally ignore the specific chemistry of the electrolyte, you can't assume that the bilge is ever dry. It *will* contain moisture and scuz that makes it conductive therefore you have to protect yourself from that.

Quoting alfablue (Reply 167):WOW - the 787 is advanced beyond my wildest dreams or maybe you just don't know how an E&E compartment looks from the inside...

Apparently, you haven't heard of conformal coating. It's standard procedure for most avionics. There's a reason the airplane doesn't crash if you spill your coffee on the aisle stand.

Quoting PITingres (Reply 170): It was pointed out (by Tom, perhaps?) that at least in the aft EE bay you also have to take a environmental system coolant leak into account which is just as conductive, if perhaps not as corrosive.

Yes, that was me. The PECS coolant shouldn't be as corrosive as battery electrolyte but it could certainly be conductive and there's *gallons* of it...far more than any battery would contain.

Quoting Wisdom (Reply 185):On a note, hoping that they are reading this, aircraft manufacturers need to start integrating the AMM and the IPC into one.

Start? That effort's been going on for several years. They're probably never going to be one and the same document but they've been crosslinked in the all the modern manuals I've seen. Airbus has been ahead on this for a while.

Quoting alfablue (Reply 157):I have a different opinion. I think the special conditions aim was that there is no pressure built up (vents) and those vented gases have to poses no threat but the leakage of electrolytes in either the forward or aft E&E compartment was not allowed.

The words of the FAA:
"No corrosive fluids or gases that may escape from any lithium
battery may damage surrounding structure or any adjacent systems,
equipment, or electrical wiring of the airplane in such a way as to
cause a major or more-severe failure condition, as determined in
accordance with 14 CFR 25.1309(b)."

That statement makes no sense if you preclude electrolyte leakage, as you're claiming they intended.

Yes, *they* do. *We* don't have to. *We* are the ones flying around in these things. *We* should not be putting economic concerns over our own safety. *We* should not be arguing that a plane with a known safety concern should remain flying.

If Boeing 100% goes out of business, it is not going to affect my life in the slightest, except that I will be flying on different planes in the future. If a 787 crashes with me on it, however, it will affect my life in that it will probably end it.

You will never see me in any thread on this site arguing in favor of economic concerns over safety, and I do not understand why any other person would either. I would wager that even people who *work* for the FAA would argue differently in private than what their official positions have to be for economic reasons. The people who work for the FAA don't gain financially as individuals when planes keep flying, and neither does anyone here... with the possible exception of those who work for Boeing.

Actually, unless you don't use commercial air travel at all, you do. The industry is driven, in the extreme, by price. That goes directly to (among other things) the capital cost of the aircraft and the labour cost of the crews...those both have obvious economic impacts that are directly tied to safety. You can cut crew duty cycles down to 4 hours and greatly decrease the chance of a crew ever being exhausted or sleep...but you'll have to spend twice as much on crews and the flying public refuses to do that.

Quoting spacecadet (Reply 192):*We* should not be putting economic concerns over our own safety.

Most people don't put them *over* safety, but they do put a value on it, whether you're conscious of that or not. If you're willing to spend twice as much on each ticket I'm pretty confident the airplane could be made at least 10% safer...any takers?

Quoting spacecadet (Reply 192):You will never see me in any thread on this site arguing in favor of economic concerns over safety, and I do not understand why any other person would either.

Nobody argues for economic concerns *over* safety. What people do, correctly, argue for is the balance. You cannot spend arbitrarily large amounts of money for arbitrarily small increases in safety. Safety has an economic cost and it has to be justified. This drives most people outside the industry bonkers but that's how *all* safety industries work.

Quoting spacecadet (Reply 192):The people who work for the FAA don't gain financially as individuals when planes keep flying, and neither does anyone here... with the possible exception of those who work for Boeing.

Boeing doesn't gain either...grounding planes takes money out of the OEM's pocket faster than anyone else's. And if there's a crash, the OEM is the first one the survivors' families sue. Although all the OEM's go for safety because it's the right thing to do so, even if you went fully cynical and assumed it was about the money, it would *still* be a bad idea to let an unsafe aircraft fly.

"In addition to the detailed forensic examination of the plane’s electrical system, Hersman said the NTSB is reviewing manufacturing records and gathering information collected in supplier audits at battery maker GS Yuasa in Japan and the maker of the charging system, Securaplane Technologies. in Tucson.

It is also examining whether the FAA’s certification standards were adhered to and if those standards were adequate, Hersman said."

If, big IF, the "riddle" isn't solved within a month after all the available additional data has been downloaded and studied I think the reasons behind these two events may never be determined. For some things there never is an answer. Boeing will go to plan "previously certified off the shelf parts", integrate them with the present electrical system, get them certified on the '87 and call it good.

In Swedish media, "the dreamliners batteries can explode", sad times we live in really with all these journalists writing about stuff they know nothing about, only trying to cash in on sensationalism..

Quoting ikramerica (Reply 160):Why wasn't the 747 grounded after TWA800? The A330 after the Air France accident? The A380 after the engine explosion that very nearly crashed the aircraft? The 777 after the crash in London regarding frozen fuel and clogged lines? After all, we "didn't know" what caused them the next day nor if they could happen again (and in the case of the pitot tubes and frozen fuel, they had happened BEFORE), so shouldn't we err on the side of caution?

You keep repeating this. Despite the fact your argument has been refuted as being specious by posts like the one below?

Quoting WingedMigrator (Reply 163):Maybe because another 747 did not blow up 9 days later.
Maybe because another A330 didn't vanish in the ocean 9 days later.
Maybe because another A380 engine didn't blow up 9 days later.
Maybe because another 777 didn't pancake on a runway 9 days later.

The federal agencies are probably worried that two similar events occurred in quick succession.

Not only happened in quick succession, but happened on a new aircraft type using new technologies, without the installed base and proven record over millions of hours of flying of the 777 and A330.

Quoting KELPkid (Reply 171):Someone should present her with a flying pig As long as there are planes, and planes have electronics and fuel and other combustible materials on board, there will always be some degree of onboard fires happening...

Any onboard fire the occurs as a result of a malfunction of an integral part of the aircraft (as opposed to a passenger lighting a stove) is to be taken seriously.

If a galley oven caught fire, it would be replaced. If two ovens of the same model caught fire and within days of each other and over a tiny installed base, the model would be pulled and replaced until proven safe. The FAA and NTSB has essentially pulled the batteries out of service. As there is no alternative to these batteries at the current time, the aircraft is grounded. Why is that so difficult to understand?

Quoting prebennorholm (Reply 188):Both incidents were thermal runaways. Li-Ion thermal runaways have the potential to catch fire. It is not so interesting whether none or all, or as is the case, half of them actually did catch fire. They have the potential to catch fire.

Exactly.

Quoting DocLightning (Reply 189):The fundamental difference between an aircraft and any surface conveyence is that if the aircraft stops working, it crashes. If a surface conveyance stops working it...stops.

Precisely!

Quoting tdscanuck (Reply 191):Having what are supposed to be very remote events happen twice in rapid succession isn't normal, teething or not.

Quoting tdscanuck (Reply 193): Although all the OEM's go for safety because it's the right thing to do so, even if you went fully cynical and assumed it was about the money, it would *still* be a bad idea to let an unsafe aircraft fly.

I think that "Atlas Shrugged" should be required reading (or watching, for those who don't like to read) for all high-school students. They would never read a newspaper the same way again, and some of these concepts would at least be familiar to them (i.e. self-interest, properly-understood, can/should lead to producing a good, safe product).

Quoting wjcandee (Reply 199):I think that "Atlas Shrugged" should be required reading (or watching, for those who don't like to read) for all high-school students. They would never read a newspaper the same way again, and some of these concepts would at least be familiar to them (i.e. self-interest, properly-understood, can/should lead to producing a good, safe product).

Bullshit and wrong forum for your promotion of neoliberal ideology. The same could be said about "Mein Kampf" or any other form of facist lampoons. They are all misanthropic!

The big thing about the 2 events is that the first event was pretty normal. The battery failed, but the containment did work acceptable. Surely there was some damage around the battery, but that would have required some modifications, but nothing to ground the plane. The big event was the second in which the containment started to leak, because this leakage means that the design criteria and design safety devices failed.

It like an industrial plant using hazardous materials. If they have an event in which something happens, but the built in safety containment features work, no authority would shut the down the plant. But if you have an event, even with a way less hazardous material, which demonstrates a failure of the containment design, any public authority responsible for the safety of the operation must shut down the whole plant. The batteries are not the key, the containment box is. Boeing must understand how the leakage happened and come-up with a design that fixes this problem and then demonstrate the fix to the authorities. The discussion about the battery types and if this types failure rate might be too high for the application or the failure modes are to risky for the application are a another discussion. But this discussion could be had, with the planes flying.

According to article at www.orf.at ANA is cancelling 787 flights from February 1 to 18. Thats another 379 flights and brings total flights cancelled to 838.

I guess there are some penalties involved for Boeing, though I dont think they are reflecting the actual losses for the airlines. But still, can anyone estimate the losses Boeing and airlines are facing?
Is there any leasing done yet for replacement aircrafts?

Quoting SonomaFlyer (Reply 34):most if not all 787 pilots are still certified 777 or 767 aircraft. They have seniority and will fly those ac.

With the NTSB saying we're looking at months of grounding, not weeks (1), I'm wondering whether time in the simulator is enough for 787 pilots to remain current, or are they not required to fly "real hours" at some point?

Quoting seahawk (Reply 201):The big thing about the 2 events is that the first event was pretty normal

No, the big thing is that the Media and Ignorance is driving events more than Facts and Reason.

You can see it in 5 threads of people insisting a range of events from Boeing tried to MURDER 600 people, to the more sane but still wrong "the 787's nearly burned to the ground" types.

As others have stated this is a pretty exceptional grounding, largely driven by media pressure. One would note that the 787 operators outside of Japan were plenty happy to keep flying 787 even after both events.

Quoting XT6Wagon (Reply 204):No, the big thing is that the Media and Ignorance is driving events more than Facts and Reason.

You can see it in 5 threads of people insisting a range of events from Boeing tried to MURDER 600 people, to the more sane but still wrong "the 787's nearly burned to the ground" types.

As others have stated this is a pretty exceptional grounding, largely driven by media pressure. One would note that the 787 operators outside of Japan were plenty happy to keep flying 787 even after both events.

That is your point of view, and some may have shared this point of view up until the point the NTSB released its detailed statement. The NTSB does not have any hidden agenda or conflict of interest, and certainly is not reactive to media pressure. In fact the NTSB and the FAA have often been at odds for this very reason. However with the NTSB statement now fully known, it is mind-boggling to think there are still those who think this grounding is an over-reaction, rather than a necessary precaution. I guess for them no grounding is justified until something calamitous occurs.

Quoting sankaps (Reply 205):it is mind-boggling to think there are still those who think this ground is an over-reaction, rather than a necessary precaution. I guess for them no grounding is justified until something calamitous occurs.

That's what it is. We don't know that the plane is safe, with the current battery system, with the required level of confidence.

Quoting from the previous link.

Jim Hall, a former head of the NTSB, concurred: “I think you are looking at months, not weeks.”

Hersman said that although Boeing built multiple and redundant safety features into the battery system, “those systems did not work as intended. ... We need to understand why.”

Note that he is not criticising Boeing, he says that Boeing did attempt to build an adequate degree of protection into the system.

To those who think the plane shouldn't have been grounded, what would it take in you opinion to ground it ? Would a third similar incident this year have convinced you ? Do note that people in the industry were calling for a grounding, airlines did ground it before any official reaction (aside from the launch of an inquiry). Pilots would have started talking about how they don't want to fly it anymore, you can bet (that would have left an even worse stink on the plane in my opinion).

In fact to check on a poster info I was looking at the FAA actions after the ATR72 crash due to icing, and there was outrage that for a time no action was taken, you can still find the articles almost 20 years later ! Since the cause was icing, the eventual decision was to ban FIKI ops, pretty logic. You can't fly a 787 without the batteries, though.

I dont know if the last post was sarcasm, but in fact one manual I read for those batteries states "if you suspect a thermal event put the battery on a metal fire container and if it goes on for more than 2 minutes, call the firemen. Leave the area and ventilate the leakage zone as much as possible"

For those who think grounding is over-reacting, think about a middle of pacific missing plane scenario ... I would be the end of the 787 after all this media circus.

Quoting RickNRoll (Reply 206):That's what it is. We don't know that the plane is safe, with the current battery system, with the required level of confidence.

No, we don't know that the plane's batteries won't catch on fire or leak. It seems, from the evidence we have, that the plane itself is perfectly safe and can safely continue to the nearest available runway if one of these issues occurs.

Quoting macc (Reply 202):I guess there are some penalties involved for Boeing, though I dont think they are reflecting the actual losses for the airlines. But still, can anyone estimate the losses Boeing and airlines are facing?

I wonder if Boeing can invoke the force majeure clause of their contracts with the airlines since the grounding was beyond Boeing's control. NH and JL also voluntarily grounded their planes at first (though I expect once the FAA grounded UA, the Japanese Civil Aviation Authorities did the same).

Dominic Gates of The Seattle Times was on a local Seattle talk-radio show yesterday and while he didn't state force majeure by name, he did seem to be implying that Boeing would not necessarily be liable for compensation due to being unable to deliver planes during the grounding.

Quoting seahawk (Reply 201):The big event was the second in which the containment started to leak, because this leakage means that the design criteria and design safety devices failed.

The big event was the second event because there was a second event. The first event also released electrolyte and gases.

The design criteria and FAA special conditions did *not* require containment of the gases or fluids generated during a runaway. The requirement was that the released material couldn't damage other systems (within defined probabilities). Note that Airbus is using the same design principle (different detailed implementation) on the A350...nobody currently attempts to contain all the thermal runaway products within the battery container because it would be heavier and *more* dangerous.

This mismatch is between the intended frequency of a thermal runaway and the actual.

Quoting sankaps (Reply 205): The NTSB does not have any hidden agenda or conflict of interest,

Not exactly...I agree they have no hidden agenda, but there's a huge conflict of interest between the NTSB, the FAA, and the industry (by design).

Quoting sankaps (Reply 205):In fact the NTSB and the FAA have often been at odds for this very reason.

They're at odds because the NTSB's mandate is *only* safety while the FAA's is to run a safe and efficient air transportation system. It's set up this way on purpose, and overall it's a very good thing.

Quoting sankaps (Reply 205):However with the NTSB statement now fully known, it is mind-boggling to think there are still those who think this grounding is an over-reaction, rather than a necessary precaution.

I don't think anyone disputes that something funny is going on...battery fires aren't supposed to happen this frequently. What's still not clear to me is what the failure chain they're afraid of is. The battery fire, by itself, isn't enough to bring down the aircraft. That's the whole point of the containment design. The FAA and NTSB are clearly concerned that there is some compound failure that's possibly too likely but they haven't articulated what that is yet.

Quoting Aesma (Reply 207):To those who think the plane shouldn't have been grounded, what would it take in you opinion to ground it ?

Some plausible scenario where a battery fire would result in a catastrophic event.

Quoting Aesma (Reply 207):Would a third similar incident this year have convinced you ?

We already know the battery failure rate is out of whack...a third event with the same consequences would just confirm that 1) the failure rate is out of whack and 2) the fires don't cause a catastrophic event. A third event with new consequences would be something different, therefore provide new insight to the problem.

Quoting Aesma (Reply 207):Do note that people in the industry were calling for a grounding, airlines did ground it before any official reaction

Do note that the two airlines that self-grounded are among the most conservative on the planet and that at least two other airlines, equally well respected and capable, continued to fly.

Quoting Aesma (Reply 207): Pilots would have started talking about how they don't want to fly it anymore, you can bet

A whole lot more pilot talked about not flying the A320 than ever talked about not flying the 787.

This is part of my confusion about what the FAA/NTSB believes the failure chain is that would result in the loss of life. On the one case (the batteries) we have a potential fire source that weights tens of kg in a containment system that has to handle a known energy and goes through a rigorous qualification and certification process. On the other case (passenger batteries) we have tens or hundreds of potential fire sources with no inspection, documentation, or certification, some embedded in thousands of kg of flammable material with unknown energy content, and a suppression system that must remain active and capable for long enough for the airplane to reach safety from the worst possible location. The latter we're totally fine with, the former we ground a fleet for.

Quoting TheRedBaron (Reply 208):For those who think grounding is over-reacting, think about a middle of pacific missing plane scenario ... I would be the end of the 787 after all this media circus.

How would this battery fire result in the loss of the airplane mid-Pacific?

Quoting TheRedBaron (Reply 208):For those who think grounding is over-reacting, think about a middle of pacific missing plane scenario ... I would be the end of the 787 after all this media circus.

Quoting tdscanuck (Reply 212):How would this battery fire result in the loss of the airplane mid-Pacific?

The impression I get is the belief that lithium-ion is to the 787 what hydrogen was to the Hindenberg: a massive amount of massively flammable material with minimal containment that when breached allows that massive amount of massively flammable material free-reign within the entire structure to consume the entire structure in short order.

Quoting Antoniemey (Reply 210):Quoting RickNRoll (Reply 206):
That's what it is. We don't know that the plane is safe, with the current battery system, with the required level of confidence.

No, we don't know that the plane's batteries won't catch on fire or leak. It seems, from the evidence we have, that the plane itself is perfectly safe and can safely continue to the nearest available runway if one of these issues occurs.

They key part is Antoniemey's last words, "with the required level of confidence."

The regulators require numerical thresholds on the probability of compound failures. I agree with you, based on available evidence, both the aircraft that experienced battery events had continued safe flight and landing capability. However, there is a non-zero probability that some combination of simultaneous failures, along with the battery events, could bring down the aircraft. If the probability of a battery fire is suspect, as it appears to be, then the probability of the compound events also could be wrong. If we assume the battery failure rate is really high (the FAA is probably assuming 1 at the moment), it's possible that the probability of some compound catastrophic failure rises above the required level of 1e-9.

I would really love to see the fault tree's involved because I haven't been able to come up with a foreseeable compound failure in my head, but this is not my area of expertise either.

Quoting Stitch (Reply 211):I wonder if Boeing can invoke the force majeure clause of their contracts with the airlines since the grounding was beyond Boeing's control.

I really doubt that force majeure will fly here as the FAA / NTSB are investigating design elements that were fully in Boeing's control. Besides any attempt to invoke it will destroy customer good will.

Quoting tdscanuck (Reply 212):On the one case (the batteries) we have a potential fire source that weights tens of kg in a containment system that has to handle a known energy and goes through a rigorous qualification and certification process.

Is there any information on the particulars of this qualification and certification process?

Many have expressed the fear that the battery will burn for an extended period of time and that this will result in containment breach and flames engulfing the EE bay and then the plane.

As part of the qualification and certification process, do we know if a battery was induced to enter thermal runaway and catch fire inside the containment vessel and allowed to burn until fuel exhaustion? If so, do we know what was the result?

If this test was done, do we know if it was done only in isolation or was it also performed with the battery in it's location in the EE bays with the other equipment around them? Do we know if it was performed with active venting of the EE bay or just with the standard air-flow (as in the pilots did not detect smoke and activate the additional air-flow venting).

Quoting BoeingVista (Reply 215):I really doubt that force majeure will fly here as the FAA / NTSB are investigating design elements that were fully in Boeing's control. Besides any attempt to invoke it will destroy customer good will.

They're investigating everything since by their own admission they have no idea of the incident chain.

And Boeing invokes the clause when their workers and engineers go on strike. And yet that doesn't seem to destroy customer good will.

Once the planes are back in service, does anyone have any info on United routes? Will they immediately jump back to where they left off? Or possibly go back to temporary domestic routes for a period of time? Any insight?

Well from what has been said there are procedures for dealing with a battery runaway in the cabin. Now checked luggage, that's another story.

Also I disagree that we know for sure the battery incidents wouldn't cause damage eventually. The first fire was on the ground so not representative, and it was put out by firemen. The second incident led to an emergency landing (with the crew smelling something, BTW, not good in the middle of the Pacific regardless of mechanical consequences), we don't know what would have happened if the aircraft had continued flying for several hours.

Quoting Antoniemey (Reply 210): It seems, from the evidence we have, that the plane itself is perfectly safe and can safely continue to the nearest available runway if one of these issues occurs.

What evidence are you referring to? You should share it with the NTSB, because they don't seem convinced this is the case.

Quoting tdscanuck (Reply 212):Not exactly...I agree they have no hidden agenda, but there's a huge conflict of interest between the NTSB, the FAA, and the industry (by design).

I agree. My point is the NTSB has no conflict of interest with regards to where to draw the line at safety like perhaps the FAA may have, in that the FAA is meant to promote and regulate commercial aviation at the same time.

Quoting tdscanuck (Reply 212):They're at odds because the NTSB's mandate is *only* safety while the FAA's is to run a safe and efficient air transportation system. It's set up this way on purpose, and overall it's a very good thing.

I don't disagree with that. The fact however that both the FAA and the NTSB are on the same side on this issue is what makes one believe that there are genuine safety concerns over allowing this kind of battery failure and aftermath to continue.

Quoting tdscanuck (Reply 212):Do note that the two airlines that self-grounded are among the most conservative on the planet and that at least two other airlines, equally well respected and capable, continued to fly.

The two airlines that self-grounded are also the two that had the battery failures and were closest to the events. Perhaps if the others had the failure on their aircraft, they may not have continued to fly.

Quoting tdscanuck (Reply 214):The regulators require numerical thresholds on the probability of compound failures. I agree with you, based on available evidence, both the aircraft that experienced battery events had continued safe flight and landing capability. However, there is a non-zero probability that some combination of simultaneous failures, along with the battery events, could bring down the aircraft.

This to me is the key...in isolation, a battery failure may well be contained, and allow a flight to land safely. However, we all know that air crashes are nearly always the result of a number of failures happening together...all the holes in the cheese lining up.
Now that there is clearly an issue with these batteries, a fix has to be developed. Without it, the 787 is left (however slight) more vulnerable to some (perhaps unforseeable) chain of events which might bring a flight down.
I've been mulling possible causes that might be easily resolved:-
- manufacturing defect (affecting all or some of the fleet)
- operating regime
- life expiration (do these batteries siply need replaced much earlier than expected?)
However, beyond these, this could be a long fix for Boeing...I suspect these aircraft will not fly for some time.

I agree we don't know for sure, in the sense that that implies 100% certainty. But a battery is a finite energy source...it only has enough reactants to liberate a fixed quantity of energy (in several forms...chemical, thermal, pressure). Pressure seems to be a non-event because it's vented. Thermal seems to be what most people are concerned about but there's only so much in there that can burn. It can't burn forever and it's not that big. If it burns slow it burns cooler, if it burns fast it burns hotter but for less time. This is a relatively tractable containment problem. The battery is physically in a steel box inside a ventilated compartment with an air gap around it. Chemical is the most interesting, since we don't know much about the electrolyte or byproducts but we do know that the aft EE bay is hardened against a much larger volume of conductive liquids (i.e. shorts should be very low risk) so the remaining major threat seems to be chemical damage. But the battery is at the bottom of the EE bay so there aren't many systems it can reach without pulling negative g or some severe turbulence and there's no other single component whose failure would be catastrophic so it would have to get multiple components. That, right there, seems to be a pretty remote combination.

None of this is to say it can't cause damage eventually (nor is there any requirement that it never cause damage), but I can't see the forseeable chain that the FAA/NTSB must see. I'd love to know what it is.

One photo (p.6) shows the extent of the 20" radius "charring" - it looks minimal. Most of the "mess" (it looks like escaped electrolyte) is on the floor of the bay, and at this stage we don't know if it was a result of the battery venting (sideways), or occurred after the firefighters started hacking it out.

'Hersman said that although Boeing built multiple and redundant safety features into the battery system, "those systems did not work as intended. ... We need to understand why."'

I don't know exactly what this refers to, but, apparently, the NTSB is concerned not only about the battery "fires," but also about how the safety features dealt with them. So, if there are (much) more frequent than expected battery "fires,", and there are problems with the safety features designed to deal with them, it follows that there might well be a potential for a catastrophic event. Hence the grounding.

It would be the best outcome that there was some faulty batteries in this whole mess, but it uncovered some problems with the containment.

Fix the battery manufacturing problems and fix the containment, good to go. The 787 is a technological marvel as I see it, despite all problems and it will probably be one of those programs that made a huge difference with time.

Quoting Rocker (Reply 217):Once the planes are back in service, does anyone have any info on United routes? Will they immediately jump back to where they left off? Or possibly go back to temporary domestic routes for a period of time? Any insight?

It all depends on when the a/c is returned to service. If it is fairly quickly, the NRT-LAX route should start back up quickly. The DEN to NRT route could start on time at the end of March.

Quoting flyingcello (Reply 221):Now that there is clearly an issue with these batteries, a fix has to be developed. Without it, the 787 is left (however slight) more vulnerable to some (perhaps unforseeable) chain of events which might bring a flight down.

From a PR standpoint, they have to do something. It's not clear to me, yet, that there's actually a regulatory justification. If the slightly more vulnerable probability is still below the extremely remote threshold, they're still in compliance with regulations (at least those in place at the time the certification basis was set). I'd say it's pretty likely that, in lieu of these events, the FAA will alter the special conditions and/or regulations around these batteries.

Now HERE is a very disturbing article--- not for the story, but for the journalism. This article is saying that it's Japan to blame for Boeing's shortcomings.

Quote:Although every informed Tokyo-based economic observer has understood all along that Boeing’s deal with Japan was a Faustian bargain, such observers have understood that it was unhelpful for their careers to say so (Tokyo has never been a free-speech zone, least of all in recent years when it has become so easy for authoritarian governments to marginalize “troublemakers”)

Wow. Just wow. That journalist needs to read a book on how Japanese society operates.

First- Japan has little, if any, restrictions on censorship. However, Japanese society, in order to maintain harmony, largely self-censors itself in order to preserve a reputation, or prevent unrelated negative consequences.

Second- Japanese industry is among the most efficient, professionalized, and safe in the world. Every aspect of Japanese business is about keeping an operating machine operating efficiently, while keeping employees happy and their jobs secure. The last 20 years with the economy has been trying, but never has Japan ever sunk into an "authoritarian state." This author is NOT informed, as he seems to be claiming.

Quoting tdscanuck (Reply 212):We already know the battery failure rate is out of whack...a third event with the same consequences would just confirm that 1) the failure rate is out of whack and 2) the fires don't cause a catastrophic event. A third event with new consequences would be something different, therefore provide new insight to the problem.

The containment is not controlled. When the batteries overheat, flammable, hot material bubbles out and spatters out in random directions, through cracks it forces at the top of the lid where it is screwed on. I see a real potential for fire that affects other flight systems. From what I have read, the A350 batteries have a controlled release of hot, flammable material through external vents. It cannot spatter randomly around the bays on other equipment.

Quoting RickNRoll (Reply 234):The containment is not controlled. When the batteries overheat, flammable, hot material bubbles out and spatters out in random directions, through cracks it forces at the top of the lid where it is screwed on.

What you describe sounds like a "Rain Bird™ sprinkler effect" where a stream of electrolyte is sprayed out in a 360° pattern, coating the walls of the EE bay. Based on what few pictures have been released, that does not appear to have been what happened. Instead, it appears that electrolyte leaked out the top and down the sides, then drop to the floor and was vented outside of the plane via the outflow valve.

Quoting RickNRoll (Reply 234): From what I have read, the A350 batteries have a controlled release of hot, flammable material through external vents. It cannot spatter randomly around the bays on other equipment.

Based on the general tone of these threads on what should be proven and done before the 787 is allowed back into revenue service, we probably should not take Airbus at their word that their containment system will work as designed. Therefore, the A350 should probably not be allowed to be certified until Airbus proves that they have developed a Li-Ion formulation that cannot enter thermal overload and catch fire. If they cannot, then we probably should force them to change to a different battery chemistry (NiCad or lead acid) before we allow the A350 to be certified and delivered to customers.

Quoting tdscanuck (Reply 212):The big event was the second event because there was a second event. The first event also released electrolyte and gases.

Mind you that the Boston fire dept put out the fire in the first event. But if you are flying at FL410 3 hours from the nearest suitable airport, the Boston fire dept in not around, and apparently the NTSB is a little concerned about what could have happened if the battery would have burned out so to speak.

Quoting UALWN (Reply 228):I don't know exactly what this refers to, but, apparently, the NTSB is concerned not only about the battery "fires," but also about how the safety features dealt with them. So, if there are (much) more frequent than expected battery "fires,", and there are problems with the safety features designed to deal with them, it follows that there might well be a potential for a catastrophic event. Hence the grounding.

The system is designed to be fail safe. It means that the goal in not to prevent battery fire or explosion, but to contain the failure if and when it happens in that way it will not pose a danger to the aircraft.

The problem is according to NTSB the system did not work as intended, meaning that the 787 did not contain the battery fire adequately, or according to certification standards.

Quoting tdscanuck (Reply 222):But the battery is at the bottom of the EE bay so there aren't many systems it can reach without pulling negative g or some severe turbulence and there's no other single component whose failure would be catastrophic so it would have to get multiple components.

You make it look like that there is plenty of space to go around in the E/E bay but in reality it is not, it is really cramped and apparently according to NTSB the system did not work as intended and the battery fire posed a threat to other systems.

Quoting Stitch (Reply 235):Based on the general tone of these threads on what should be proven and done before the 787 is allowed back into revenue service, we probably should not take Airbus at their word that their containment system will work as designed. Therefore, the A350 should probably not be allowed to be certified until Airbus proves that they have developed a Li-Ion formulation that cannot enter thermal overload and catch fire. If they cannot, then we probably should force them to change to a different battery chemistry (NiCad or lead acid) before we allow the A350 to be certified and delivered to customers.

I think it is safe to assume there have been urgent emails being fired off around the Airbus organisation preparing an urgent review of their battery configuration.

Quoting KELPkid (Reply 171):Someone should present her with a flying pig As long as there are planes, and planes have electronics and fuel and other combustible materials on board, there will always be some degree of onboard fires happening... and failure modes that the designers never envisioned will continue to happen as long as the second law of thermodynamics remains in effect.

Indeed.

Quoting tdscanuck (Reply 191):I think she's completely onboard with the idea that you should design the aircraft to be safe even if there's a battery fire...the NTSB is not ignorant of fail-safe systems design. That's completely compatible with not expecting to see fire events onboard aircraft.

I think her statement was pretty incomplete then.

Quoting tdscanuck (Reply 191):It's already the worst PR disaster in the history of commercial travel since Comet or Habshiem.

No manufacturer would like to see a CNN report like this on its product:

Quoting tdscanuck (Reply 212):
I don't think anyone disputes that something funny is going on...battery fires aren't supposed to happen this frequently. What's still not clear to me is what the failure chain they're afraid of is. The battery fire, by itself, isn't enough to bring down the aircraft. That's the whole point of the containment design. The FAA and NTSB are clearly concerned that there is some compound failure that's possibly too likely but they haven't articulated what that is yet.

I don't think anyone has said what the expected rate of battery fires was determined to be, have they?

Interestingly enough, the same battery vendor just got a contract to make Li-Ion batteries for the International Space Station.

Quoting Kaiarahi (Reply 229):There's also a new NTSB twitter update: "The battery charging unit passed all significant tests and no anomalies were detected."

Not sure if this refers to the JAL inscident aircraft, the ANA incident aircraft, or both. When we see a NTSB report are we supposed to presume it's just the JAL aircraft since that incident happened in the USA?

He keeps harping that B is lying about its certification documentation, that FAA is sloppy etc Then buys the claimed A information straight off the internet.

I have read a lot of claims from a lot of armchair experts the last week, one eyed judgements all over. Right out slander and trollposts. I believe no OEM will ever fail their goal on building a safe product. Somehow many here think only A is the honest producer of airframes.

Quoting packsonflight (Reply 236):The system is designed to be fail safe. It means that the goal in not to prevent battery fire or explosion, but to contain the failure if and when it happens in that way it will not pose a danger to the aircraft.

The problem is according to NTSB the system did not work as intended, meaning that the 787 did not contain the battery fire adequately, or according to certification standards.

It would be helpful if they would explain how the systems failed to adequately contain the fire on the JL airframe and the electrolyte on the NH airframe. They must have a solid idea, otherwise how can they make the claim?

And I'd really like to know what testing Boeing and their suppliers did on this containment system. The NTSB states that all these safeguards did not work as intended, but they don't say why. I cannot believe the FAA allowed Boeing to merely propose safeguards and then sign off on them without any testing or verification.

What testing / verification was done for fire containment? What was the standard for said containment? We have to assume the containment met that standard, or it would not have been certified. Did it just meet it, or did it exceed it?

What was the standard for electrolyte leakage? We know the unit is not hermetically sealed (to prevent the possibility of explosion), so that would allow possible paths for electrolyte or vapors/smoke to leak out. What criteria were used for the testing? Was it all done with the assumption of level flight, or were there tests done at various pitch and bank angles to see how the electrolyte would flow both inside and outside the containment system?

Quoting RickNRoll (Reply 237):I think it is safe to assume there have been urgent emails being fired off around the Airbus organisation preparing an urgent review of their battery configuration.

Airbus themselves have said they're closely watching the results. As they are already starting to assemble airframes, if they are required to modify the design or even change it out completely, that could have a not-insignificant impact on the progress of the program.

Quoting Stitch (Reply 213):The impression I get is the belief that lithium-ion is to the 787 what hydrogen was to the Hindenberg: a massive amount of massively flammable material with minimal containment that when breached allows that massive amount of massively flammable material free-reign within the entire structure to consume the entire structure in short order.

Well, look at the other Li-Ion burn cases: burned cars, burned buildings, burned computers. The iPod left on the passenger seat of a parked car in the Netherlands resulted in a pile of burned rubble. An overheating battery surrounded by highly flammable seat cushion. Three foot high flames shooting out of laptops. An overheating battery surrounded by combustable material cramped into tight spaces. It's doom all the way.

Quoting Stitch (Reply 242):It would be helpful if they would explain how the systems failed to adequately contain the fire on the JL airframe and the electrolyte on the NH airframe. They must have a solid idea, otherwise how can they make the claim?

this is from the NTSB press release on the 24.

"The investigation will include an evaluation of how a fault that resulted in a battery fire could have defeated the safeguards in place to guard against that,"

This is from the FAA press release from the 16.

"These conditions, if not corrected, could result in damage to critical systems and structures, and the potential for fire in the electrical compartment."

I would think they have a solid idea, and I am sure that they are not playing games.

Quoting sankaps (Reply 220):What evidence are lyou referring to? You should share it with the NTSB, because they don't seem convinced this is the case.

It's hard to say how much is perception and how much is actually unsafe here. Certainly the public scrutiny of all things 787, magnifies incidents in the public eye and hence regulatory agencies need to show response in the same public eye,

Quoting tdscanuck (Reply 222):Chemical is the most interesting, since we don't know much about the electrolyte or byproducts but we do know that the aft EE bay is hardened against a much larger volume of conductive liquids (i.e. shorts should be very low risk) so the remaining major threat seems to be chemical damage. But the battery is at the bottom of the EE bay so there aren't many systems it can reach without pulling negative g or some severe turbulence and there's no other single component whose failure would be catastrophic so it would have to get multiple components. That, right there, seems to be a pretty remote combination.

This again shows to me that neither battery incident in and of itself invalidated the certified design.

The frequency of the failure is a question of course and what that implies. To me, the biggest concern is simultaneous failures of two batteries in flight that impacts redundancy and over dependence on the RAM air turbine (which had to be deployed in the past).

That is what I question about the NTSB focusing on fire as the concern. That seems to be for the public eye, not engineering analysis. Certainly in light of the concerns with the Airplane's electrical trouble history, there needs to be examination, but from a redundancy standpoint. Even a lightweight secondary housing for electrolyte containment seems easy enough to do and certify (what would be the big deal ?).

Loss of redundancy beyond anticipated rates, much more of a concern to me.

Quoting Stitch (Reply 242):The NTSB states that all these safeguards did not work as intended, but they don't say why.

I think they've stated that they don't know why the safeguards didn't work as intended, but they haven't said exactly which safeguards aren't working as intended, nor have they said exactly which intentions are not being satisfied, other than saying that they didn't expect to see a fire event.

Quoting packsonflight (Reply 236):You make it look like that there is plenty of space to go around in the E/E bay but in reality it is not, it is really cramped

Nobody's going to dance the waltz in there, that's true, but we're talking about a battery that's about a cubic foot and most of the contents is fixed in place. The volume of electrolyte relative to the available things to hit in the EE bay is pretty small. Given that most of the EE bay components have metal cases, it would have to be a "magic bullet" kind of spray to even get into another component to where it could do damage. That's not to say it can't happen but it's not like a sprinkler in a phone booth.

Quoting packsonflight (Reply 236):apparently according to NTSB the system did not work as intended and the battery fire posed a threat to other systems.

I agree that's what they said; what I can't tell from what they've released is how it posed a threat to other systems...they've obviously got some idea, they're just not talking details yet (as would be expected at this point in an investigation).

Quoting Revelation (Reply 240):I don't think anyone has said what the expected rate of battery fires was determined to be, have they?

I don't believe so but, given that the design was supposed to preclude fire in the first place, something is likely to be up.

Quoting Revelation (Reply 240):Interestingly enough, the same battery vendor just got a contract to make Li-Ion batteries for the International Space Station.

The Society Of Flight Test Engineers has been having a field day with that topic for about a week now. You think a fire on an airplane is bad, try one on a space station.

"These conditions, if not corrected, could result in damage to critical systems and structures, and the potential for fire in the electrical compartment."

I would think they have a solid idea, and I am sure that they are not playing games.

I agree they're not playing games. The wierd part is that, in order to meet the special condition in the first place, Boeing had to have convinced the FAA that, even if a fire took place, the probability of damage to critical systems and structures (which would include a fire in the electrical compartment) was extremely remote. So the FAA already looked at this, in depth, at least once. Either they feel they missed something or the containment design did something that it wasn't supposed to have done. The latter seems more likely, reading between the lines of various press releases, but they're not saying what.

Quoting justloveplanes (Reply 245):To me, the biggest concern is simultaneous failures of two batteries in flight that impacts redundancy and over dependence on the RAM air turbine (which had to be deployed in the past).

Neither battery does anything useful in normal flight; in order to have loss of the batteries have a system level effect, you'd have to lose all six generators and the RAT. I don't think that's ever happened in the history of ETOPS aircraft.

Quoting justloveplanes (Reply 245):Even a lightweight secondary housing for electrolyte containment seems easy enough to do and certify (what would be the big deal ?).

That does seem awfully straightforward...even if you could just shunt it to a dedicated drain that would seem to simplify things. The fact that that hasn't come up is part of why I think whatever the FAA/NTSB are concerned about must be more complicated than that.

Quoting Stitch (Reply 242):It would be helpful if they would explain how the systems failed to adequately contain the fire on the JL airframe and the electrolyte on the NH airframe. They must have a solid idea, otherwise how can they make the claim?

I would assume that the NTSB must have a clear idea of what they mean when they say that the systems failed to adequately deal with the "fires." I would assume that they have explained this is detail to Boeing. I would also assume that explaining it to the general public (or even to the a.net experts and "experts") is not particularly high in their agenda, at least until they know why the systems failed, and what's the solution.

Quoting RickNRoll (Reply 237):I think it is safe to assume there have been urgent emails being fired off around the Airbus organisation preparing an urgent review of their battery configuration.

Do not think that anyone at TLS is in any way amused by what is happening to Boeing. Perhaps they are relieved that it's not them (this time), but I promise you that they are watching this investigation very carefully and they are re-examining their own A350's systems very thoroughly.

No quotation marks. These were fires. That word has a very specific meaning. It was first used by the fire chief at Boston and has been used by the NTSB and FAA. All of these people and agencies are professionally required to be able to recognize a fire. I thought we'd gotten past this, but apparently some people are still reluctant to use that word.

Quoting UALWN (Reply 248):I would assume that the NTSB must have a clear idea of what they mean when they say that the systems failed to adequately deal with the "fires."

And I would assume that in order to get the systems certified in the first place, they would have had to show they could adequately deal with fires.

A major issue, IMO, is that nobody seems to know how these special conditions were tested, nor what the results were and how the complied with the special conditions.

Was the system only certified to adequately deal with a fire in flight, with the outflow valve open and airflow in the bay? If so, then should it be called a failure because the plane was on the ground, the outflow valve was closed and there was no airflow in the bay?

I am reminded of the parable of the blind men and the elephant: while each of our subjective experiences are true, each may not be the totality of truth.

Quote:
"We're working as hard as we can to identify what the failure mode is here and what corrective actions need to be taken."

Given that statement in its context and others I've seen by her during various tv clips of her press conference, it seems she feels they really don't have the kind of "solid idea", yet, that you suggest they might. At least that's the impression I got from watching the various clips I've seen.

That's not to say they aren't narrowing down the possibilities etc, but still, it seems no clear indication has been found yet.

Quoting Stitch (Reply 235):What you describe sounds like a "Rain Bird™ sprinkler effect" where a stream of electrolyte is sprayed out in a 360° pattern, coating the walls of the EE bay. Based on what few pictures have been released, that does not appear to have been what happened. Instead, it appears that electrolyte leaked out the top and down the sides, then drop to the floor and was vented outside of the plane via the outflow valve.

So perhaps you can describe the mechanism that a high-visocity fluid that is bubbling out of the top of the container can "spatter out in random directions". For based on the photographic evidence, it appears to flow down the side of the container and onto the floor.

Quoting tdscanuck (Reply 212):Do note that the two airlines that self-grounded are among the most conservative on the planet and that at least two other airlines, equally well respected and capable, continued to fly.

Tom, whilst you provide educational and insightful posts that, no pun intended, literally light up this thread, I have to take issue with this point. As I understand, NH and JL were amongst the last international carriers to ban smoking in aircraft. It could be described as a sort of conservatism, to not rock the boat of Japanese culture, however many others here will see the foolhardiness (if such a word exists) of such late actions. My view, is that the self-groundings of the 787 fleets is linked to the controversy surrounding the tsunami almost two years ago.

Quoting tdscanuck (Reply 247):That does seem awfully straightforward...even if you could just shunt it to a dedicated drain that would seem to simplify things. The fact that that hasn't come up is part of why I think whatever the FAA/NTSB are concerned about must be more complicated than that.

Here's the first time I've stepped into the technical side, and my experience (not expertise) is in another industry- see my profile to gain more information.

I've spent at least one working year performing pressure relief calculations in the chemical industry. It's a complex matter and for my application to attain Chartered Engineer status, I admitted that these were the only calculations that were ever studied in any detail- checked and approved by independent persons. To put it another way, my calculations on asset capacity weren't looked at in any detail. That's like saying here my fuel burn calculations weren't heavily scrutinised, though my pressure relief ones were.

I joined a.net because, in part 3 of this thread, someone said the electrolyte "wasn't a liquid, it was a paste". What an absolutely ill-informed post if there ever was one. Anyway, the physical properties of the material to be vented will play a vital part of the safe handling of the release. Some examples of physical properties are density, viscosity, possibly solids content and so on.

Down a pipeline, as exists in the chemical industry, flow can "choke" if it reaches sonic speed. Two-phase systems are much more likely to choke than single phase (liquid or vapour). Here, potentially, there are three phases- vapour, liquid and solid. Whether there could be choked flow in this system, I just do not know, as I know nothing of the design system or physical properties of what can be vented. I doubt it, though.

In the chemical industry, you can install pressure relief valves and busting discs to protect your downstream equipment. That's not what is happening here. Here, you are deliberately letting your downstream equipment, the battery, be destroyed. In my industry, I can select the set pressure of relief, and calculate relief rates and back-pressure using the physical properties at that set pressure. In this example, the relief pressure is more variable, say from 0.1 bar to 2.0 bar, maybe. Certainly beyond 10.0 bar we are edging towards explosion/bomb territory. So, has testing taken place at a range of relief pressures, and if so, how have these been structured? Just random failures of the battery, and 'wait and see', or deliberately imposing a staggered set of relief pressures to the test?

Where I am heading with this? Just that pressure relief, which in this thread, may be linked to venting and containment, is a complex subject. Also, certain substances do not have linear physical properties, so the behaviour of any released fluids may not be so predictable. Given the "normal" relationship between liquid density and temperature, why does ice float on water.....?

Just throwing some ideas about for others to develop with their knowledge of the aircraft systems and battery decomposition physical properties. I'd prefer to post something positive, than criticise others ludicrous posts, and to be fair, there have been fewer of these in the last week or so!

Quoting ComeAndGo (Reply 254):The Lithium Cobalt Oxide battery chemistry used in this battery produces it's own oxygen. Great for fires.

It is correct that a Li-Ion thermal runaway also expels oxygen. But the quantity is small and insignificant compared to the oxygen in the atmosphere. Whether the oxygen contents in the EE bay is 21% or 21.1% won't change any NTSB recommendations or future FAA rulings.

Quoting Stitch (Reply 235):Therefore, the A350 should probably not be allowed to be certified until Airbus proves that they have developed a Li-Ion formulation that cannot enter thermal overload and catch fire. If they cannot, then we probably should force them to change to a different battery chemistry (NiCad or lead acid) before we allow the A350 to be certified and delivered to customers.

Why so bitter? Thanks to Boeing, every li-ion equipped system will be put under scrutiny, don't worry.

Quoting tdscanuck (Reply 247):Nobody's going to dance the waltz in there, that's true, but we're talking about a battery that's about a cubic foot and most of the contents is fixed in place. The volume of electrolyte relative to the available things to hit in the EE bay is pretty small. Given that most of the EE bay components have metal cases, it would have to be a "magic bullet" kind of spray to even get into another component to where it could do damage. That's not to say it can't happen but it's not like a sprinkler in a phone booth.

To me this indicates that you have never held a LRU in your hands.

LRU's have metal cases that are not meant to be watertight. Like any computers, they need cooling.
Any liquid can infiltrate those casings.
Let's add to it. To prevent damage to the sensitive PCB's; its components and other computer components, the metal casings are electrically bonded with the components inside one way or the other. The LRU's are therefore always transported and stored in anti-static bags and engineers are supposed to take all precautions to avoid any static electricity generation during removal/installation.

I don't need to stress that any energised electrolyte should never come in contact with those LRU's, ever.

Really? Even if you only understand 10% of my recent post (was #263, may change post thread tidy-up), do you really believe this? Care to share with us some calculations, drawings, risk/hazard assessments, estimated event frequencies etc in order to back this up?

I'd like contributions to these threads to be as meaningful as possible, else we're going to see people such as CM, Tom and stich do other things with their private time, and this place will be much worse because of this.....

Quoting ttailsteve (Reply 261):The plane has not injured or killed anyone. What has happened was completely planned and engineered for. When has the NTSB or FAA ever been proactive?

So, its Obama's fault that the plane is grounded.... this follows people suggesting that Airbus sabotage could be to blame as the most stupid post of 2013.

No American government would attempt to kill the golden goose of US exports that is Boeing. I cannot imagine even Fox news being so idiotic as to suggest the Obama Administration is getting back at Boeing.

Quoting Stitch (Reply 257):So perhaps you can describe the mechanism that a high-visocity fluid that is bubbling out of the top of the container can "spatter out in random directions". For based on the photographic evidence, it appears to flow down the side of the container and onto the floor.

Well, if there is a fire, it would be quite hot and it could spatter. If there is, say, severe turbulence, it could navigate around the compartment that way. It wouldn't be like spraying the liquefied stuff around like a lawn sprinkler, but you do need to be sure that not one drop could possibly get inside something important.

Quoting tdscanuck (Reply 191):Becoming? It's already the worst PR disaster in the history of commercial travel since Comet or Habshiem.

I don't agree. The DC-10 was worse. At least nobody died or even was in serious danger with these two events. It's just that the entire program has been a bit of a Jonah and... now this.

Quoting Kaiarahi (Reply 260):Frankly, you're becoming more and more tiresome. Not to mention totally predictable.. My 10 year old could probably figure out what you're going to post next and write it for you.