THE PEACE PROCESS IN THE MIDDLE EAST:
ISRAELIS AND PALESTINIANS

Rodolfo Ragionieri

1. Introduction

In the Autumn of 1987 there was a widespread perception that conflicts in
the Near East - both the Israeli-Palestinian and Lebanese conflicts - were becoming
less and less relevant, in a certain sense almost marginal to global international
politics. The situation changed dramatically with the outbreak of intifada in
December 1987.1 The uprising changed the self-awareness
of the Palestinians and increased their self-confidence, and forced the Israeli
society and political system, the inter-national public opinion and decision
makers to put the question of the Occupied Territories at the top of the political
agenda. After the outbreak of the intifada, and as the weakening Soviet Union
retreated from Middle Eastern politics, a sequence of dramatic events affected
the region.

From the outbreak of the intifada to the Second Gulf War, the peace process,
the assassination of Itzhak Rabin, a sequence of dramatic - sometimes tragic
- events changed the face of politics and life in this part of the world. The
purpose of this paper is to investigate the influence of different elements
on the peace process in the Middle East, especially focusing on the Palestinian-Israeli
issue. It is clear that several different elements contributed to the unblocking
of the stalemate in the Middle East. First, the international system and the
changes in its structure that occurred since the end of the 1980s; second, a
more restricted "circle" of the "Middle East security complex,"2
i.e., all the Arab states, Israel and Iran; third, the actors directly involved
in the Israeli-Arab peace negotiations which began in Madrid on November 1,
1991; finally, we have the core of the issue, i.e., the Palestinian-Israeli
dyad.

2. The International System and the Middle East

The place of the Middle East in bipolar international politics was quite clear:
it represented a pivot between the European front and the Asian area, a region
with huge resources whose control was perceived as vital by the United States
and other Western powers. This strategic position was obviously dramatically
altered by the change in the international system which took place between 1989
and 1991 (i.e., from the collapse of Soviet rule in Eastern Europe to the dissolution
of the Soviet Union itself), making it difficult to gain a clear picture of
its current position in the inter-national system. Moreover, it is difficult
to distinguish between the effects of the "end of the Cold War," those
of the crisis and war in the Gulf, and those of the eventual splitting up of
the Soviet Union, closely interrelated events that took place in rapid succession.

A further difficulty is provided by the not easily definable structure of the
international system. The hypothesis of unipolarity, which was fashionable during
and immediately after the Second Gulf War, has proven to be of limited meaning
with the decline of the the United States as an economic power even while remaining
the biggest military power. The feared or desired "New World Order"
has not emerged, partly because of the unwillingness of the US to use its ground
forces in crisis situations, and its unwillingness or inability to undertake
the risks which are unavoidable if one wants to lead the governance of the international
system.

Rather, transnational interdependence, different forms of power, and complexity
in the international system make definitions of power and interest, and consequent
forecasts, far less reliable than in the past. One can expect that we will face
a combination of the increasing importance of international institutions together
with an interaction of balances of different types of power, often split into
sub-systems. In this world of differentiated and sometimes fragmented powers,
the conflictual heterogeneity of values, i.e., the so-called "clash of
civilizations," will make the evaluation and forecast of crises and conflicts
even more difficult.

Regionalization of the international system (Buzan, 1994) is a useful hypotehsis
here. Fragmentation with respect to the globalization of security structures
which characterized the Cold War,3 is postulated,
and the appearance of a "central coalition" of states, formed by the
Atlantic Community and Japan, among which there are no threat perceptions. Regional
subsystems such as the Middle East are only partially connected to this central
region: unlike during the Cold War, the security perceptions of the main actors
of the international system do not affect unambiguously the patterns of security
and conflict in peripheral subsystems.

The presence of a single "non-ruling" global power has two consequences.
First, a regional configuration providing stability and security is necessary
both for US economic "vital interests" and for traditional US allies
(Israel first of all, but also the so-called Arab moderate states). Second,
the necessity of steadfast alliances and loyalties is less relevant than in
the era of global bipolar rivalry. While the special relationship between the
US and Israel continues to be a determinant element in Middle East policy, this
factor is nonetheless often overestimated by most Arab analysts.

The decline of the Soviet Union as a global power and its eventual disappearance
had a direct impact on the Middle Eastern arena. This process was made clear
by the marginal role the Soviet foreign minister Kozyrev played in the Madrid
Conference. Actually, Gorbachev had initiated a withdrawal from the Middle East
as early as 1987. However, the Soviet leadership tried to maintain a certain
degree of influence in the area during the last phases of the Iran-Iraq war.
Moreover, during the years 1987-1991, and especially during the Gulf crisis
and war, differences and strains could be observed in the Kremlin on the issue
of Middle East policy.

The marginalization of the Soviet Union in spite of efforts to influence events,
and its de facto withdrawal from the Middle East had - paradoxically - similar
consequences for Israel and Syria. On one hand, Syria could no longer enjoy
the Soviet umbrella, which had certainly been an important component of the
overall deterrent capabilities enjoyed by Damascus: Israeli fear of Soviet countermeasures
(Eban, 1994). Moreover, Syria lost not only its "protector," but also
its main supplier of advanced weaponry. On the other hand, Soviet withdrawal
and the crushing defeat of Iraq in the 1991 war made a steady "strategic
alliance" with Israel more entangling than profitable for the United States.
Thus, in some situations (e.g., the whole affair of the loan guarantees), the
US could put pressure on Israel without jeopardizing its own interests in the
area.

From the regional system perspective, each of the last decades was characterized
by well defined ideological trends (and polarizations), corresponding to power
confrontations between Middle Eastern states. The 1960s were marked by the so-called
"Arab Cold War" between pan-Arabism lead by Nasser on one side, and
Arab "moderate" states on the other. The Six-Day War was the first
blow to pan-Arabism, and the end of the 1960s and the 1970s saw the rise of
radical nationalism (especially Palestinian). At the same time Islamic radicalism
was gaining ground, although it became visible to the Western media (and to
most Western scholars) only later, after the Iranian revolution and President
Sadat's assassination. During the 1980s the polarization in the Arab world was
determined by the Iran-Iraq War, (1980-1988) and by the fear of the extension
of Shia'i radicalism.4 The 1990s, after the
second Gulf War (January - March 1991), have been marked by a further, and perhaps
final, weakening both of pan-Arab ideologies and of state-sponsored nationalism.
This failure was made apparent by the inability of the Arab League to find an
inter-Arab solution to the crisis, and by the massive and decisive foreign (above
all US) military intervention in inter-Arab affairs. Moreover, in the mid-1990s,
Islamic radical movements are a transnational factor of instability and a threat
to all regimes or elites in the Arab Middle East (with the exception of Sudan
and perhaps Libya), but, as yet, they have not consolidated into an ideology
motivating the foreign policy of a state or of a group of states.5
At present, no particular ideology is driving the foreign conduct of Arab states,
and decision makers are more inclined towards policies which can be labelled
as pragmatic realism or as surrender.

The theory of regionalization has to take into consideration two partially
conflicting factors;.6 on one hand, the fact
that local actors are often convinced that the United States is the only significant
power in the international arena, and particularly in the Middle East, gives
some local reality to the "unipolar momentum"; on the other, the interaction
of two kinds of complexities (global and regional) should produce a complexity
of a higher degree.

The fragmentation that characterizes the international system affects the Middle
East as a region as well. While the partial destruction of the Iraqi military
machine in the Second Gulf War brought calm to the Gulf, minor conflicts are
not disappearing - from the short civil war in Yemen to the Erithrea-Yemen friction
regarding the Hanish Islands, to the Egypt-Sudan crisis. Nevertheless, they
do not appear to have the escalatory potential that other conflicts such as
Lebanon, the Iran-Iraq war, and the Israeli-Arab conflict, seemed to have in
the previous decades. No single issue or even main questions define Middle Eastern
politics. The Maghrebi states (and particularly Algeria, which used to play
a significant inter-Arab role) are now looking inward because of their domestic
problems. This means that the precarious process of integration which should
have been institutionalized by means of the Union of the Arab Maghreb is totally
stagnating.

In the East, the total isolation of Iraq and the partial isolation of Syria
have sidelined two of the most important actors among Arab states. Three points
regarding Syria need to be made: First, during and after the Gulf Crisis and
War, the US yielded to Syria virtual protectorate of Lebanon, increasing the
international legitimacy of al-Asad's regime and changing the balance in the
region. Second, President al-Asad playing the tough in the negotiations with
Israel puts him, at least temporarily, outside the game of Middle Eastern diplomacy.
Third, many commentators deem that al-Asad's reluctance to sign a peace treaty
with Israel stems mainly from internal reasons; the internal harshness of the
Syrian regime requires the rationale of the external threat posed by Israel.
Another element of uncertainty in the region is the unclear position of Saudi
Arabia, beset by domestic problems and decreasing oil revenues. Egypt's opportunities
in this environment are certainly increasing. Note, for example, the diplomatic
confrontation with Israel concerning the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the mediation
in the peace process, and different mediations in Arab world conflicts.

The Israeli-Palestinian peace process is the result of a general weakness and
fragmentation of the Arab countries. However, it should not be forgotten that
the Arab states had long requested an international conference as a diplomatic
means for a comprehensive solution to the conflict. Even though the process
itself was half way between a conference and bilateral talks (preferred by Israel),
the possibility to have bilateral talks in a more comprehensive framework could
not be dismissed. The peace process required the participation all the parties
involved. Earlier certain Arab states had tried a separate peace, with differing
degrees of success. Two Arab heads of state had tried to deal alone with the
Zionist movement and/or the state of Israel, the Emir of Transjordan (later
king of Jordan) 'Abdallah, and Egyptian President Anwar as-Sadat, but they paid
for it with their lives.7

The effects of the change in the international and regional systems on the
policies and relevance of the PLO were, at the beginning, devastating. Yasir
Arafat needed political support, and this was declining also because of the
Soviet-Israeli détente.8 The pro-Iraqi
attitude of the leadership (and of most of the Palestinian public opinion) during
the Gulf War seemed to deal the Organization the final blow. However, the effect
of the intifada on the Palestinian and on the international public opinions
were not nullified. On the contrary, they were one reason why the US leadership
intended to establish a peace in the area that was acceptable to all the parties.
The intifada had proved to the Palestinians themselves that it was possible
to organize their own society independently and autonomously with respect to
the occupation. It has also proved to Israeli public opinion that it was not
possible to rule a people against its will, and to the international public
opinion and decision makers that the issue of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict
could not be neglected.

By means of the peace process and of participation in multilateral conferences
and summits, Israel is becoming an actor in the Middle Eastern subsystem. Israel's
increasing role notwithstanding, Arab acceptance of the Jewish state is based
on power and deterrence more than perceived legitimacy: the "Old Middle
East" has already disappeared, but the "New Middle East" is not
yet discernible.

3. The Palestinian Arena

Generally speaking, we have factors of continuity and change in the evolution
of the Palestinian attitude towards Israel (Gresh, 1988). Continuity is to be
found in the increasing focus on Palestinian issues by the PLO, in particular
by the Fateh. Radical nationalist groups, with a more or less pronounced "marxist"
flavor, have - or at least originally had - a distinct inclination towards pan-Arabism.
The mainstream PLO leadership's focus on perceived Palestinian interests has
helped it to accept the existence of Israel as a matter of fact. Nevertheless,
the recognition of Israel was a stepwise and long process, from the 1970s proposal
of a bi-national non-confessional state in Palestine,9
to the Washington ceremony in September 1993. The stalemate in the Madrid process
and the victory of the left-wing coalition in the 1992 Israeli election gave
the PLO, at that time in a crisis of legitimacy and in a situation characterized
by lack of perspective, a window of opportunity.

Radical critics of the peace process have always stressed the existence of
unequal conditions between Israelis and Palestinians negotiators, caused not
only by the unfavorable ratio of forces, but also by the pro-Israeli stance
of the US. The secular opposition (as opposed to radical Islam) does not openly
criticize the process as such: they cannot deny that negotiating is the only
possible option. They can only criticize either the method of decision making,
or acquiescence in negotiations.

A further problem within the nationalist camp is represented by the revision
of the Palestinian National Covenant. In the letter that Arafat wrote before
the singing of the Declaration of Principles, he undertook to amend those parts
of the Palestinian National Covenant calling for the destruction of the state
of Israel, or any reference denying the legitimate right of existence of the
Jewish state. The Oslo 2 Agreements confirmed (XXXI, 9) this pledge, and stated
a two-months term from the inauguration of the Palestinian National Council.
There is no real objection to the change of the Covenant, or to the adoption
of a new covenant, because it is universally acknowledged that the text of the
Covenant, adopted on May 28, 1964, is by and large outdated. Everybody knows
that the declarations adopted by the Palestinian National Council (PNC) in Algiers,
on November 15, 1988, which recognized the terms of the UN Resolution 242, implied
the recognition of Israel and practically superseded the National Covenant.
Thus, the criticism points, as usual, to the lack of democracy and to the fact
that the change is not a result of free intra-Palestinian discussion, but the
outcome of Israeli and American pressures.

The real alternative to Fateh in Palestine is represented by radical Islamic
movements, in particular the Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas10).
The Charter of Hamas says:

The Islamic Resistance Movement believes that the Land
of Palestine is an Islamic Waqf upon all Muslim generations till the day of
Resurrection. It is not right to give up it or any part of it... Any action
taken in contradiction to the Islamic shari`a concerning Palestine is unacceptable
action... There is no solution to the Palestinian problem except by Jihad. The
initiatives, options, and international conferences are a waste of time and
a kind of child's play.11

This approach derives from the general approach to the dar-al-Islam of radical
Islamic groups,12 and is strengthened by the
presence of Jerusalem in Palestine.

Yet, few people really believe that the liberation (seen from an Arab or Islamic
perspective) of the whole Palestine, from the river to the sea, is a politically
sensible objective. On the one hand Hamas has repeatedly launched terrorist
offensives, on the other has put conditions to Israel for a settlement of the
conflict.

Terrorist offensives have taken place in waves, marked by periods of truce
in between. An exceptionally bloody campaign took place after the Palestinian
elections. Some offensives were declared as a retaliation, for example, against
the massacre in Hebron or the killing of Yahiya 'Ayyash. As far as "peace
initiatives" are concerned, Hamas has offered Israel a cease fire as early
as March 23, 1988.13 Other proposals were put
forward in April 1994 (Anon., 1994) and March 1996, after different waves of
suicide bombings. The conditions put forth by Hamas can be synthesized as follows:

Israel should withdraw from all Occupied Territories, including East Jerusalem;

The Territories should be placed under neutral control;

The Palestinians can choose their representatives without Israeli interference
or objections;

The representatives have the right to lay down all the issues, without
any previously decided limitation.

Note that there is no mention of the PLO or the issue of shari`a. Also, neither
the agenda nor the conditions are different from those put forward by both the
PLO and the national leadership in the West Bank and Gaza. The meaning of this
is not clear. Yet, the first aim of Hamas is the disruption of the peace process,
at least in the form it has taken in its first phases. Two hypotheses can be
put forward. The first is that terrorism and "peace initiatives" are
two components of a unique strategy, which aims to force Israel to negotiate
with Hamas. If Hamas used terrorism as a means to force Israel to accept the
movement as a negotiating partner, it would be a dubious strategy: it is highly
improbable that any Israeli government is willing to sit at the negotiating
table with the representatives of the organization directly responsible for
so many massacres. Moreover, according to a poll in March 1996, only 5.3% of
East Jerusalemites supported Hamas' and Jihad's operations, 65% opposed them
outright, and 14.7% opposed them, although they understood the motivation. The
result is that almost 80% of Palestinians in Jerusalem do not agree with Hamas'
strategy.

According to a second - and more realistic - hypothesis, there is a fight within
the movement between the "militarist" wing (organized in the 'Azz
ad-Din al-Qasim and the Yahiya 'Ayyash brigades), and the political wing, which
aims to build a political alternative to Fateh. This hypothesis seems to be
supported by the establishment of the Islamic National Salvation Party on March
21, 1996, in Gaza, and by an initiative signed by representatives of Islamist,
Fateh, and nationalist opposition figures, calling for national dialogue, stopping
of military activities, and pluralism (Kanaana, 1996). The lack of support for
suicide operations and the presumable division within the radical Islamic camp
make it clear that the peace process has gained a strong momentum, and that
it has introduced irreversible14 effects both
in the Palestinian public opinion and in Palestinian political groups.

4. The Israeli Arena

If we analyze the ideological roots of the rightist parties and of the parties
of the center-left government coalition that initiated the second phase of the
peace process (1994-1996), we can see that the differences between the two opposite
groups are not only tactical, but derive from their cultural roots, and from
the different approaches that socialist Zionism, on the one hand, and revisionist
Zionism and later rightist parties, on the other one, have had with respect
to interior and foreign policies.15 "Socialist
Zionism" has been directed at the construction of a Jewish democracy and
a new Jewish society in the Land of Israel, whereas "revisionist Zionism"
and its successors, the rightist parties, have always had as their principal
aim the establishment of a state with Jewish majority on both the East and West
Banks of the river Jordan, through any means deemed necessary to achieve this
purpose. A further position is represented by the religious parties and fundamentalist
groups, whose program has nevertheless much in common - at least tactically
- with Likud's plans.16

There is an evident connection between the issue of an Israeli identity and
the political perspectives of the Jewish state in the Middle East. Socialist
Zionism, and, even before that, cultural Zionism, always put a strong emphasis
on moral values underlying the history of the Jewish people and Zionism itself.
Ahad Ha-Am wrote in the year 1897: "We are driven to the conclusion that
the real and only basis of Zionism is to be found in another problem, the spiritual
one.... The secret of our people's persistence is ... that at a very early period
the Prophets taught it to respect only the power of the spirit and not to worship
material power."17 Starting from these
premises, political objectives cannot be pursued at any cost, without caring
about the morality of the means. Ahad Ha-Am was certainly much more aware of
the Arab problem than other early Zionist thinkers, and was conscious of the
fact that conflict would arise when the number of Jewish settlers would go beyond
a certain tolerable limit.

Freedom and democracy cannot be considered as "optional" in political
and social life in modern Israel.18 This point
has become increasingly important in the debate concerning the future of relations
with the Palestinians. During the intifada, there was an increasing consciousness
in the left of the Israeli political spectrum that the Zionist ideal of a democratic
Jewish nation state was severely affected by the preceding 20-year occupation.
On the one hand, the Palestinians would be the majority between the Jordan and
the Mediterranean Sea by the year 2010, and already in 1987 it was not possible
in that region to think of a purely Jewish state. On the other, rightist solutions
ranging from the "Bantustan system" to actual expulsion (recommended
by extremists of the Gush Emunim), would pose deadly danger to the democratic
character of Israel - not to speak of the extreme solution of extermination,
advocated by Rabbi Israel Hess.19 The Israeli
left increasingly understands that the continuing occupation of territories
inhabited by a people who refused the occupation itself is a seed of corruption
for Israeli democracy (e.g., Rolef, 1991). From this perspective, the exchange
of land for peace appears to be necessary to avoid the evolution of the Israeli
society towards a non-Jewish and/or non-democratic society.

It is interesting to observe that even from a Jewish religious perspective
it is possible to find a relation between one's own and others' freedom, between
enslaving and being enslaved.20 It can be found
in the relation between Joseph's action in Egypt and the successive enslavement
of the Jews. The relation is found by Shlomo Rifkin, chief rabbi of Efrat (a
settlement south of Jerusalem) in the fact that "perhaps the Jews were
enslaved because the Almighty saw the necessity to enforce one of the underlying
and most basic principles of Judaism: no one may enslave another" (Rifkin,
1991). The meaning of Pesah leads many Jewish thinkers to give great importance
to the freedom of those peoples who are still enslaved (e.g., Sonnino, 1995).
Even though these reflections have no direct reference to Israeli-Palestinian
relations, they have at least a bearing on the approach to the problem.

The naive illusion of the Labor party that there was an objective convergence
of interests between the Jewish socialist movement and the Arab workers was
dealt a serious blow as early as 1921, when Arab-Jewish riots erupted after
leaflets were distributed by communist Jews to Palestinian workers. In any case,
the Palestinian national movement was widely misjudged by Zionist leaders, who
thought that Arab masses had no interest in national politics, and intended
only to advance their standard of living.

Most of Zionist leadership, except for a tiny intellectual minority, did not
understand the character of the Palestinian national movement. The idea of a
binational state supported by Brit Shalom and Martin Buber never gained wide
support, since it was in contradiction with the widely shared Zionist aim of
a Jewish state, whatever the conception of Arab-Jewish relations might be.

The difficulties in the relations with the Palestinians induced the Labor leadership
to embrace the Jordanian option. In particular, after the end of the first Israeli-Arab
war, up to the death of king 'Abdallah, there were intensive contacts in order
to stipulate a peace treaty between Israel and Jordan (Shlaim, 1990). After
the 1967 war, the Labor leadership took into consideration a separate peace
with Jordan, based on the principle of giving some land for peace. This principle
was always considered in connection with Jordan, and never with the establishment
of a Palestinian state. Moreover, any direct talk or contact with the PLO was
excluded.

The first important shift took place after the 1992 election, a partial departure
from the typical "pure" Jordan option which had characterized Labor's
policies for decades. (The Labor Party had already shifted from total rejection
of the notion of Palestinian national rights.) Zionist mainstream personalities,
such as former foreign minister Abba Eban, advocated a two-state solution (Eban,
1995; Heller and Nusseibeh, 1991). The option for a Palestinian state was still
taboo for Labor, but the Declaration of Principles and the Oslo accords released
a new possibility for action. Yossi Sarid, Israel's Environment Minister, said
at the end of March 1995 that after the elections of the Palestinian President
and of the Palestinian Council, "a Palestinian state is emerging, at least
a state in the making" (The Jerusalem Post International Edition, 25 March
1995, p. 1), and saw this as a positive development. Even though Itzhak Rabin
disavowed his minister's observations, ambiguously worded acknowledgments were
made of the necessity of a Palestinian "entity" (The Jerusalem Post
International Edition, 1 April 1995, p. 2 and 22 April 1995, p. 9), and Peres
spoke favorably about the idea of a Jordanian-Palestinian confederation (The
Jerusalem Post International Edition, 26 August 1995, p. 8). Finally, after
the decision of the PNC to amend the National Covenant, the Labor Party officially
discarded its rejection of a Palestinian state. There has been an inherent trend
in the peace process which has carried the actors involved far beyond their
original positions and intentions.

However, former Israeli Prime Minister Itzhak Shamir made clear his own and
his government's stance in the speech he held at the peace conference in Madrid.21
He did not accept that the talks could focus on territory, stating that "the
issue is not territory but our existence." Full acknowledgement was requested
for the state of Israel, offering to the Palestinians only the possibility to
discuss an interim agreement based on the Camp David framework. It was of paramount
importance for him to stick to the aims of the revisionist movement: a Jewish
state with a Jewish majority on the largest part of the Land of Israel.

These positions were emphatically confirmed after the Gaza-Jericho agreement
by the leader of the Likud who succeeded Shamir, Benyamin Netanyahu, and by
other even more radical members of the party. In the debate at the Knesset,
Netanyahu charged Peres with abandonment of Zionism. Sharon went further, when
he declared to the Army Radio that a government run by Likud would not honor
the agreement with the PLO. Netanyahu signed a declaration, together with other
leaders of right-wing parties and the former prime minister Itzhak Shamir, which
strongly rejected any policy based on the "land for peace" principle.

Nevertheless, the inherent dynamic of the peace process after Oslo 2 obliged
even Netanyahu and Sharon to cope with new realities. Netanyahu declared he
would refuse to meet Arafat, but he would have government representatives talk
with the Palestinian Authority (PA), if it would comply with minimal conditions
(control of terrorism, change of the PLO Charter, etc.) (The Jerusalem Post
International Edition, 27 January 1996 and 17 February 1996). Sharon, in turn,
acknowledged the impossibility to go back. He proposed to request that the PA
abide by every part of the accord, and not extend the zone controlled by the
Palestinians (The Jerusalem Post International Edition, 6 January 1996).

The attitude towards democracy of some parts of the Likud is clearly shown
by Ariel Sharon's declarations and articles. Sharon (1993) writes: "Our
forefathers and parents did not come here to establish democracy; ... they came
here to create a Jewish state.... When it comes to the fate of Jews in the Land
of Israel, real democracy is only that which promotes political morality and
historic justice in realizing the biblical promise of the Jewish people."
In other words, those Israeli citizens characterized by Arab language and Palestinian
identity, should not be given the right to decide on issues regarding security,
etc. This implies the existence of first and second class citizens.

It is clear that the choice to embrace the road towards some kind of peace
agreement with the Palestinians and neighboring Arab states was not dictated
by some abstractly defined national interest, but the outcome of elections held
in 1992, which were won by the center-left coalition. Will public opinion continue
to support this policy? According to some analysts, the troublesome social situation
in Israel, caused also by the difficulty to absorb the waves of 'olim coming
from the Soviet Union, and after 1991 from CIS-countries, was the main cause
of the success of Labor. The relevance of social factors is important because
they have also significantly affected parts of the traditional Likud electorate,
such as the mizrahim or lower social classes (Chazan, 1991, pp. 18-20). Other
analysts think that the success of Labor and of its allies was intrinsically
related to the different policies vis-a-vis Arab countries and the Palestinian
issue. This attitude can be traced back to the desire - intrinsically related
to the origins of Zionism - to be a normal people living in normal situation,
goy kekal hagoyim. A pre-condition for this is peace with the Palestinians and
the Arab states.

5. Jerusalem

The conflict over Jerusalem is a hotly debated and long-standing issue which
involves not only Israeli-Palestinian relations, but also the relations of the
state of Israel and of Judaism with all the Arab states, Islam, and Christianity.
In the issue of Jerusalem we can find the deepest and fullest articulation of
practical issues, such as borders, housing, construction, religious, historical
and ideological aspects, perceptions, emotions and prejudices. Moreover, the
two official (and widely shared, within the respective communities) positions
are mutually incompatible and seem to exclude any possible compromise: the Palestinians
want East Jerusalem to be the capital of their state, whereas the Israeli official
position is that unified Jerusalem is the eternal capital of the Jewish state.
For this reason it was decided to postpone the discussion of this issue to the
last phase of the peace process.

The walled city of Jerusalem contains the holy places of three religions: al-Haram
ash-Sharif, i.e., the area including the two mosques (the qubbat as-sakhra',
i.e., the Dome of the Rock, and the mosque al-Aqsa); the Western Wall of the
Second Temple; and the Holy Sepulchre. The Via Dolorosa (according to a probably
unreliable tradition the path of Jesus Christ's via crucis) runs from the Gate
of the Lions to the Holy Sepulchre through the Muslim and the Christian Quarters.
Outside the walls of the Old City, the Mount of Olives is sacred both to the
Jewish and the Christian tradition (different parts of the hill are significant
for each). A particular problem is that the First (Solomon's) and the Second
Temple (built after the Babylonian exile) were erected in the area which later
became holy for Islam.

Jerusalem is considered by some Muslims to be the second holy place; the place
where the mi`raj (i.e., the night ascension to the Heavens) took place can be
considered in the sufi tradition even more important than Medina, where the
Prophet lived and was buried. Different opinions can also be found in Judaism
with respect to this area. The traditional orthodox view is that no Jew should
enter the Temple Mount area because he or she could step on the spot of the
Sancta Sanctorum, and it is disputed what are the conditions of purity for a
Jew to be allowed in the area. Moreover, whereas some fundamentalist groups
openly proclaim their intention to destroy the mosques and to build the Third
Temple, the orthodox tradition either poses severe condition for the reconstruction
of the Temple, or even - as did Moshe ben Maimon - states that the Third Temple
shall not be built by human hands, but will come down from Heaven in messianic
times (Wigoder, 1989, pp. 693-696).

A major obstacle for any solution of the Jerusalem problem is the claim by
all the parties - and particularly by Jews and Muslims - that the city belongs
mainly, if not totally, to their particular faith. For example, on the Jewish
side it is argued that the name of Jerusalem appears 821 times in the Tanach,
and never in the Qur'an. Moreover, the role of Jerusalem in the Jewish tradition
is unique compared to its role in other cultures and religions (Rifkin, 1995).
The first argument overlooks the reference to the night journey of the Prophet
in the XVII sura, and the many references to Jerusalem in the Hadith, but the
second argument is undeniable: the city is one with the existence of a Jewish
state, and the theological relevance of the temple and its destructions and
reconstructions have no comparable analogies in other religions. Nevertheless,
Jerusalem is only incidentally quoted in the Torah,22
and even The Encyclopedia of Judaism acknowledges that the importance of the
city in Judaism was due to a political decision of King David (Wigoder, 1989,
pp. 381-383).
The Muslim "sectarian" argument is that the Jewish presence in Jerusalem
has not been long, and that an Arab and mostly Muslim Jerusalem has endured
for the last thirteen centuries, except during the Crusades, 1099-1188 (e.g.,
Bukhari, 1995). This approach totally neglects the continuous presence of Jews
in the quarter of the Old City. Nationalist Muslim arguments stress the Palestinian/Canaanite
origin of Jerusalem/Urusalim/al-Quds, before the Jewish conquest under King
David.

Following the disturbances at the Western Wall during the 1920s, an international
commission composed of Sweden, Switzerland, and Norway dealt with the problem
of the sovereignty of the whole area of the Temple Mount by adjudicating the
whole of it (including the Wall) in 1930 to the Muslims, a decision often quoted
by Palestinians. Actually, the sources of law in Israel, the West Bank and Gaza
are quite confusing, since they are an accumulation of acts from the Ottoman
Empire, the British Mandate, the Jordanian period (1949-67). Moreover, the Israeli
annexation of East Jerusalem (and of the Golan Heights) has not been internationally
acknowledged. Thus, this international arbitrate of 1930 could be considered
as a significant precedent.

It is important to remember that in Israel there is a substantial national
consensus (both in the public opinion and in the political system) regarding
a "unified Jerusalem" as the eternal capital of Israel - a position
continuously confirmed by representatives of the government and of the opposition,
though with different degrees of consideration for the rights of the Palestinians.
Moreover, the policies pursued by both the Labor and Likud parties have aimed
at encircling the Arab city by means of new Jewish quarters, and making the
functioning of Palestinian institutions in Jerusalem, especially the Orient
House, difficult.

The Palestinians, in part independently of any religious consideration, do
not accept the total Israeli control of the city, although there is widespread
pessimism and disillusionment. The perceptions of Jerusalemite Palestinians
are well illustrated by a poll held in August 1995.23
According to this poll 62.8% of the respondents preferred war to continued Israeli
control of East Jerusalem, and only 16% were of the opposite opinion. Moreover,
41.5% wanted East Jerusalem to be the capital of the Palestinian state, 23.3%
preferred an internationalized city, 15.3% Jerusalem as an open city and a capital
of two states. Whereas this poll is hardly surprising, it is interesting that,
in an other poll, Palestinian East Jerusalemites declared themselves, even though
only with a plurality, against the possibility of separating East from West
Jerusalem: 45.2% were against separation, 20.9% in favor of it. Note that East
Jerusalemites could not easily survive if their links to Israel were cut or
even made difficult.

As far as the Israeli-Muslim issue is concerned, a statement issued by the
late Itzhak Rabin seems to hint at a proposed Jordanian co-responsibility in
the control of al-Haram ash-Sharif in Jerusalem. This proposal can only solve
the problem of access and control to the holy places, but does not address the
national question; it does not imply any Israeli willingness to withdraw from
any part of East Jerusalem, or even to share sovereignty and effective control.
The role of the hashemite kingdom in al-Haram ash-Sharif could represent a delicate
issue in future Jordanian-Palestinian relations and in the talks on the final
status of the city between Israel and the PNA.

Specific Christian concerns voiced by the heads of Christian churches to the
Israeli government asserted that "Jerusalem is too precious to be dependent
solely on municipal or national political authorities, whatever they may be"
(Shapiro, 1994). This statement was (correctly) perceived as a challenge to
Israeli sovereignty, and mayor Ehud Olmert, although reiterating his assurances
with respect to the role of the city in the three religions, excluded any international
guarantees, which are traditionally considered necessary by churches, especially
the Catholic church.

Even though Israeli governments and the Jerusalem municipal authorities have
tried to create fait accomplis in the city, developments cast some doubts on
the feasibility of what Palestinians call the process of judaization of the
city, and Israelis call the defense of its Jewish character. In 1995 a group
of city planners reported an increase of the Arab population in municipal Jerusalem
from 1967 to 1995 (from 25.8% up to 28.4%), and forecast an Arab majority in
greater Jerusalem for the year 2010 (Hutman, 1995). In greater Jerusalem the
Jewish population would grow, according to this report, from 500,000 to 740,000,
whereas the Palestinians would gain the majority increasing from 470,000 to
820,000. This growth would make it numerically possible that Jerusalem would
be administered, in the future, by a haredi-Palestinian alliance. Thus the paradox
that the capital of the Zionist state might be governed by a non-Zionist alliance.

The different factors discussed above make it clear that a political solution
for Jerusalem is necessary not only because the political needs of the Arab
Jerusalemites cannot be overlooked, but because of the complexity of the problems
of the city for Israeli authorities. A variety of different proposals on the
future of Jerusalem have been put forward. These proposals, which maintain the
"united city," but solve in various ways the problem of sovereignty,
can be classified into three groups:

The first proposal derives from the 1947 partition plan, and it is unacceptable
for Israel. In the second proposal, the city would not be divided, and its unity
would be guaranteed by an umbrella municipality, whereas neighborhoods would
hold separate elections and have separate administrations (according to the
London or Paris model). The Western part would be under Israeli sovereignty,
the Eastern part outside the walled city under Palestinian sovereignty. The
sovereignty of the old city would be divided (Arab on the Muslim and the Christian
Quarters, Israeli on the Jewish one). A further possible solution is provided
by a combination of these proposals, for example, the sharing of sovereignty
on the part containing holy places, and a partition of less sensitive neighborhoods.
The solution of shared sovereignty, even though it implies a significant change
in Israeli attitudes, may be the only one which could be acceptable for both
parties.

6. Final Reflections

We have highlighted the reasons why the road towards peace, or at least a
settlement of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, seems to be reversible only
at a high cost. In conflict resolution and peace-building, however, perceptions
of the "other side" are often no less important than "facts,"
especially in a situation where contacts and interaction are unavoidable. The
question is, whether the peace process can bring a stable peace. Peace can be
properly called "stable" (which is not always a synonym of "just")
only if the actors involved have no interest in choosing any other feasible
(or perceived as such) strategy. Nevertheless, violent conflict is actually
impossible if it becomes unthinkable, i.e., when violence is outside the realm,
as among the countries belonging to the European Union. The reason lies not
only in decision making procedures or in ideal affinities, but also in the interdependencies
between societies, i.e., in the processes of integration between interacting
democratic societies. This means that the existence of independent civil societies
plays a decisive role in conflict resolution. In our context, an important role
is thus played by the relations between Israeli and Palestinian civil societies.

A seemingly possible way out of this conflict could be zero interaction. A
strategy of deconnection between Israelis and Palestinians does not, however,
look feasible. First, the presence of a growing Palestinian minority in the
state of Israel, would be a permanent stake for the future Palestinian or Jordan/Palestinian
state. Further, no normal economic life in the area is thinkable if it is obstructed
by reciprocal boycotts. A strategy of deconnection by not employing Palestinian
workers has been pursued by the center-left government of Israel, but this is
primarily a political strategy which is not economically or socially viable.

If deconnection is not feasible, then some form of integration is necessary.
The obvious goal is a situation where war is as unthinkable as it is between
Germany and France.24 This cannot be achieved
in the Middle East by any form of threat systems, though an emerging Soviet
threat helped the German-French entente after World War II.

The question is how, after a final peace settlement, can the underlying conflicts
be dealt with, both inside Israel (between Arab/Palestinian and Jewish Israeli
citizens) and between Israelis and Palestinians, and generally Arabs. While
there is a flux of Israeli tourists in Egypt, and Israelis with a second passport
can visit Jordan, very few Egyptians visited Israel or even East Jerusalem and
the West Bank. Moreover, Israeli interest in Egypt or Jordan seems to be purely
touristic. If some form of inter-societal détente is to be achieved,
this lack of mutual interest has to be overcome. The reasons seem to be different
on the two sides, and are not the same for everyone in each "camp."

The Palestinians do not perceive their relationship with Israelis as a relationship
between equals.25 Since the Israeli is at the
same time the occupying soldier and - more rarely - the peace activist, (s)he
will be usually perceived as the occupant. The creation of a Palestinian state
and a period of separation could be basic steps in order to overcome this Palestinian
perception. As far as Israelis are concerned, it appears that there is not -
so far - a wide interest in knowing the Palestinian reality directly. That reality
would confront each individual with the major problems concerning Israel's and
Israelis' identity, and their relations with their neighbors.

Nevertheless, two more optimistic points can be made in conclusion. First,
the hierarchic relations in Israeli society itself between groups originating
from different areas seem to be weakening. The intra-societal integration could
make relations with other groups easier. Second, and more important, the relations
developed during the intifada between Israeli peace groups and parts of the
Palestinian elite could develop into a permanent process of reciprocal understanding
spreading beyond these small but important groups.

Endnotes

1 For a review of the events since the outbreak of the intifada
up to the Madrid peace conference, see The Stone and the Olive Branch. Four
Years of the Intifada from Jabalia to Madrid, Jerusalem Media and Communication
Cemter (JMCC), Jerusalem 1991.

2 The concept of "security complex" was introduced by
Barry Buzan (1991, p. 190): "A security complex is defined as a group of
states whose primary security concerns link together sufficiently closely that
their national securities cannot realistically be considered apart from one
another."

3 It is interesting that the "security structure" would
be going in the direction of fragmentation - according to this hypothesis -
whereas the production, financial, and knowledge structure are undergoing an
increasing process of globalization.

4 In this connection it is important to observe the differences
in ideology between Sunni and Shia'i radicalism, but also their different international
political role: Saudi Arabia, who opposed Iranian-sponsored Shia'i radicalism,
was very active in supporting everywhere (up to the Second Gulf War!) Sunni
radicalism.

5 Sudan is too weak and/or peripheral to be the bulk of an "islamic
block." Lybia is much weaker and prudent than it used to be; moreover,
Qadhafi cannot be considered as a standard Islamicist. Iran cannot be considered
as a part of the Arab system, whereas it is part of the Middle Eastern security
complex and it has an influence on Arab politics.

6 On the Middle East as a region after 1989 see, for example, Salamé,
1992; Karawan, 1994.

7 On King 'Abdallah's foreign policy, see Avi Shlaim (1990).

8 This is the reason why Michail S. Gorbachev is not loved in Palestine,
and why almost everybody was happy in the Occupied Territories when the putsch
in Moscow in August 1991 seemed to be successful.

9 This first step, even though it was played down by Israeli and
pro-Israeli politicians, acknowledged for the first time the right to live in
Palestine to all the Jews who had made 'aliya.

11 Charter of the Islamic Resistance Movement of Palestine, arts.
11 and 14, in Ahmad, 1994, pp. 137-138 and 140-141.

12 In an interview with the French journal Politique Étrangere,
Zaynab al Ghazali, an Egyptian authoratitative representative of the Islamic
women's movement, declared that, as far as former Islamic territories are concerned,
their policies could be syntesized in the slogan "al-Quds wa'l-Andalus"
(Al-Quds is the Arabic name of Jerusalem, and al-Andalus is the Arabic name
of the Islamic Spain). See "Égypte: la longe lutte des integristes
musulmans," Politique Étrangere, no. 13 (Automne 1981), pp. 249-258.

14 It should not be forgotten that the word "irreversible"
does not properly mean "that cannot be reversed or revoked": in classical
thermodynamics a trasformation is irreversible if the backward transformation
is impossible in an isolated system.

15 On the differences on foreign policy and on the Palestinian issue
between the Likud and the Labor Party, see Shlaim, 1994.

16 This is perhaps a relationship analogous, but with a deeper degree
of affinity, to the alliance between Hamas and a part of the Palestinian secular
opposition.

17 "The Jewish State and the Jewish Problem", in Herzberg,
1986. On the life and the thought of Ahad Ha-Am, see Zipperstein, 1993.

18 In this connection, Ahad Ha-Am's skepticism with respect to representative
democracy must be remembered.

19 On the positions of Jewish fundamentalism with respect to the
Palestinian problem, see Sprinzak, 1993, pp. 125-128. It is to be remarked that
Rabbi Hess' proposal has not been supported by anyone; nevertheless the Arabs-Amalekites
comparison has found a certain diffusion in the most extreme part of the Gush
Emunim.

20 See Rifkin, 1991. This article was published in the series "Shabbat
Shalom." These articles comment every week on a passage from the Bible.

21 The full text of Itzhak Shamir's speech in Madrid can be found
in The Jerusalem Post International Edition, 9 September 1991, pp. A and D.

22 It is quoted in connection with Melkisedek, king of Salem, which
is identified with Jerusalem (Genesis, 14, 18-20). Melkisedek is also quoted
in Psalms, 110, 4.

23 It should be taken into consideration that the Oslo 2 agreements
had not yet been concluded, and this fact probably influenced Palestinian attitudes
in a radical direction.

Buzan, Barry. 1994. " The Interdependence of Security
and Economic Issues in the 'New World Order'. In Richard Stubbs and Geoffrey
R.D. Underhill, Political Economy and the Changing Global Order. London: Macmillan,
pp. 89-102.

Chazan, Naomi. 1991. Israel on the Eve of an Election Year.
Some Preliminary Reflections. Jerusalem: PASSIA.