Collective Action within Poor Farming Communities in Western Ghana

Attempts to improve rural livelihoods tend to
emphasise private sector and informal economic arrangements or social
protection mechanisms, in the hope that these would spur local self-help
initiatives among the poor. Underlying such thinking is the assumption that
success in these initiatives would mobilise the rural poor towards the solution
of larger collective action problems. However, preliminary findings from our
study of five oil palm producing communities in Ghana’s Western Region lead us
to question the optimism of this perspective.

Our study

The study involved a mapping of the key actors
in the oil palm economy. We interviewed and conducted focus group discussions with
farmers and their dependents, farm workers, small-scale processors, agents, large
oil processing companies, local authorities in the communities and district
agricultural officers. However, the complexities we observed defy the easy
classifications of the above categories, indicating rich interconnections,
multiple allegiances and unstable alliances. In this context, strong ties did
not always translate into social capital.

Some farmers sell their produce directly to
the oil palm companies (OPCs), but many also do so through purchasing agents. Over
time, relations between farmers and OPCs have become distant and formal. On the
other hand, agents try to forge very close relations with the farmers who
supply them with palm fruits; employing strategies that include giving small
gifts to the farmers, pre-financing harvesting for cash-strapped farmers, or
even joining the harvesting gangs themselves.

However, there are limits to the cordiality of
such informal relations. Mistrust prevails amongst the key actors in the
industry. Take the pricing of fruits, for example; prices are determined by the
OPCs; agents, who are the largest suppliers of fruits to the OPCs, are seen to
be capturing most of the value of this price. The agents determine the farm-gate
price after deducting the costs of labour and transportation, then mark it up
from what is offered by the OPCs. This arrangement results in suspicion among
dissatisfied farmers, who accuse agents of unfairly lowering farmers’ prices.
Their suspicion is further exacerbated by the agents’ practice of rigging their
scales.

A well-run farmers’ organisation can help
overcome many of these problems, for instance, by collectively bargaining the
price of fruits with the OPCs or investing in palm oil processing, which could
fetch them higher prices than what they get selling raw palm fruits. However,
the diversity of interests among farmers, many of which being incompatible,
undercuts the ability of these communities to engage in sustained collective
action. The short-term costs of collective action are unevenly shared among
group members and poorer farmers are likely to bear the brunt. Thus, without
some form of inducement or safety net, the short-term material costs may prove
too prohibitive for them. On the other hand, wealthier farmers, who can absorb
higher costs, do not have the motivation to join these kinds of actions as they
are not affected to the same degree as less resourced farmers, or they can find
alternative solutions.

In addition,
farmers’ associations are also burdened with serious internal problems. There
is as much suspicion among the farmers who belong to these associations as
there is between farmers and the other actors in the industry. Members accuse
association leaders of incompetence, non-responsiveness, and malfeasance. Farmers
recounted an instance where an association leader colluded with an agricultural
extension officer to misappropriate resources the association had received from
government; and, when this was discovered and an investigation was launched,
the official committed suicide.

Our
preliminary findings, therefore, point to the need to re-examine livelihood
improvement schemes which place undue faith in informal or self-help
arrangements. Self-help schemes may place heavy burdens on the poorest or most
vulnerable. The implication is that a certain welfare threshold needs to have
already been crossed before the poor can meaningfully participate in such
collective self-help schemes.

About Future Agricultures

The Future Agricultures Consortium is an Africa-based alliance of research organisations seeking to provide timely, high-quality and independent information and advice to improve agricultural policy and practice in Africa.