Professor Miguel Fonseca

Associate Professor of Economics

Dr Miguel Fonseca joined the Business School in September 2007 from Columbia University, where he had spent the previous two years as a post-doctoral researcher. Miguel’s current research interests are on tacit and explicit collusion; social identity and its effect on public good provision and bargaining. Dr Fonseca has obtained research support from the ESRC, the British Academy and the Nuffield Foundation.

Miguel‘s post-doctoral work related to water management issues in Northeast Brazil. In particular, he conducted field experiments to study the ability of market mechanisms to coordinate investment decisions when there is uncertainty about the availability of water. Prior to that, he studied for his PhD at Royal Holloway, University of London. His research focused on endogenous leadership formation in markets.

Nationality: Portuguese

Qualifications

BSc, MSc, PhD, Royal Holloway, University of London

Links

Research clusters

Research interests

Experimental economics

Industrial organisation

Public economics

Dr Fonseca‘s research focuses on using experimental methods to study behaviour in microeconomic models. He is interested specifically in issues relating to industrial economics, public economics, game theory and the effect of group membership on individual behaviour.

Abstract:A fine is a more effective financial deterrent when framed retributively and extracted publicly

Introducing monetary fines to decrease an undesired behavior can sometimes have the counterintuitive effect of increasing the prevalence of the behavior being targeted. Such findings raise important social psychological questions in relation to both the way in which financial penalties are framed and the social contexts in which they are administered. In a field experiment (Study 1), we informed participants who had signed up for an experiment that they would be fined if they arrived late. This fine was presented as either compensatory or retributive in nature and as being administered either privately or publicly. We then observed participants’ subsequent arrival time. In accordance with our hypotheses, participants’ punctuality was only improved (relative to a no-fine control) in response to retributive rather than compensatory fines and when told that fines would be administered publicly rather than privately. In Study 2 we used a scenario method to demonstrate that the greater efficacy of retributively framed fines can be attributed to their presence being less likely to undermine the perceived immorality of transgression than is the case for compensatory fines. We propose a material promotion-moral prevention (MPMP) theory to account for our findings and consider its practical implications for the use of financial disincentives to encourage cooperative behavior through public policy in domains such as climate change.

Abstract:A fine is a more effective financial deterrent when framed retributively and extracted publicly

Introducing monetary fines to decrease an undesired behavior can sometimes have the counterintuitive effect of increasing the prevalence of the behavior being targeted. Such findings raise important social psychological questions in relation to both the way in which financial penalties are framed and the social contexts in which they are administered. In a field experiment (Study 1), we informed participants who had signed up for an experiment that they would be fined if they arrived late. This fine was presented as either compensatory or retributive in nature and as being administered either privately or publicly. We then observed participants’ subsequent arrival time. In accordance with our hypotheses, participants’ punctuality was only improved (relative to a no-fine control) in response to retributive rather than compensatory fines and when told that fines would be administered publicly rather than privately. In Study 2 we used a scenario method to demonstrate that the greater efficacy of retributively framed fines can be attributed to their presence being less likely to undermine the perceived immorality of transgression than is the case for compensatory fines. We propose a material promotion-moral prevention (MPMP) theory to account for our findings and consider its practical implications for the use of financial disincentives to encourage cooperative behavior through public policy in domains such as climate change.

Peters K, Haslam SA, Ryan MK, Fonseca M (2013). Working with Subgroup Identities to Build Organizational Identification and Support for Organizational Strategy: a Test of the ASPIRe Model. Group and Organization Management, 38(1), 128-144.

Abstract:Working with Subgroup Identities to Build Organizational Identification and Support for Organizational Strategy: a Test of the ASPIRe Model

2014

Abstract:A fine is a more effective financial deterrent when framed retributively and extracted publicly

Introducing monetary fines to decrease an undesired behavior can sometimes have the counterintuitive effect of increasing the prevalence of the behavior being targeted. Such findings raise important social psychological questions in relation to both the way in which financial penalties are framed and the social contexts in which they are administered. In a field experiment (Study 1), we informed participants who had signed up for an experiment that they would be fined if they arrived late. This fine was presented as either compensatory or retributive in nature and as being administered either privately or publicly. We then observed participants’ subsequent arrival time. In accordance with our hypotheses, participants’ punctuality was only improved (relative to a no-fine control) in response to retributive rather than compensatory fines and when told that fines would be administered publicly rather than privately. In Study 2 we used a scenario method to demonstrate that the greater efficacy of retributively framed fines can be attributed to their presence being less likely to undermine the perceived immorality of transgression than is the case for compensatory fines. We propose a material promotion-moral prevention (MPMP) theory to account for our findings and consider its practical implications for the use of financial disincentives to encourage cooperative behavior through public policy in domains such as climate change.

Peters K, Haslam SA, Ryan MK, Fonseca M (2013). Working with Subgroup Identities to Build Organizational Identification and Support for Organizational Strategy: a Test of the ASPIRe Model. Group and Organization Management, 38(1), 128-144.

Abstract:Working with Subgroup Identities to Build Organizational Identification and Support for Organizational Strategy: a Test of the ASPIRe Model