The key questions for Mid-East stability

How would an American attack on Iraq affect the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, Palestinian politics, and Arab-Israeli issues? With a probable US offensive looming, it is important to examine the alternatives. Here are some key questions with speculations on what might happen this year:

Iraqi President Saddam Hussein is Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat's favorite Arab ruler. Arafat recently condemned a US attack on Iraq as being an imperialist venture like the World War I Sykes-Picot agreement that divided up the Arab world between Britain and France.

Will he become outspokenly pro-Saddam and enrage the Americans even further? This would temporarily raise Arafat's popularity among Palestinians but could create major future diplomatic problems for him, especially after Saddam loses the war.

The great majority of Palestinians are likely to portray a US war on Iraq as an imperialist-Zionist drive to dominate the Arab world. As happened during the 1991 war over Kuwait, demonstrations, extremist rhetoric and anti-American, anti-Western displays are likely. The result would likely be the continuation of a radical Palestinian political line, making impossible any progress in negotiations or even a ceasefire, at least as long as Arafat is alive.

Will Iraq attack Israel? This is possible but far from inevitable. Iraq has no effective air force, nuclear weapons, or easily deliverable chemical or biol-ogical arms. It has few missiles left and any attempt to set up launchers could bring a quick US attack or might only be tried a few days before US forces take Baghdad.");document.write("

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Moreover, by using the weapons it claims not to have, Iraq would lose any rationale for avoiding an American offensive or for keeping Western backing. Iraqi-sponsored terrorism against Israel is probably the greatest threat, but would likely not represent much worse than Israel has been facing for two years.

Would Saddam's defeat and replacement by a moderate regime prompt Palestinian political change? Perhaps, once Iraq was defeated, Palestinians might conclude that the US is too strong to ignore, democracy is the wave of the future for the Middle East, and the time has come to get rid of Arafat and make the best deal possible before their bargaining position worsens further.

How would the intifada be affected? This could go either way. Enraged Palestinians mistakenly believing their struggle would raise the whole Arab world against the West would want to fight on, sinking ever deeper into defeat. Yet Iraq's transformation might also give Arafat a chance, if he wanted one, to change sides as he did in 1991 and demand he be rewarded as an integral part of the anti-terror coalition.

Will a new post-Saddam era coincide with Arafat's demise? Arafat is now 73, and showing signs of psychological breakdown. He will certainly be the Palestinians' leader as long as he lives but how long will he live or be able to function? If his passing coincides with Saddam's downfall and the reconstruction of Iraq under US patronage, this might influence his successors to pursue a more moderate path. Yet even if they were pragmatic they might also be more constrained by a militant Palestinian public opinion that they are far less able to shape than is Arafat.

Would defeating Saddam change US perceptions of what a good solution to the... conflict would be?

How would a US victory affect Palestinian attitudes toward US mediation? Would they see the United States as a country of proven power which they feared antagonising or will a conquest of Iraq feed their ideological preconceptions about its inevitable hostility? Again, either trend is possible.

Would a US victory prompt a US drive for negotiations? Would a post-Saddam US policy be like the American response after the Kuwait victory that now it must make the Arab states happy by pressing Israel for concessions? This is possible. Or maybe the United States would want to accelerate these efforts, believing this to be a way to prove its friendliness to Arab interests as a way to balance the conquest of Iraq.

But the post-September 11 mood makes the US leadership less eager to appease Arab states, while the far lower level of Arab assistance in 2003 would also reduce the American obligation in this regard.

How would an Iraq war affect the US view of a solution? Would defeating Saddam change US perceptions of what a good solution to the Israel-Palestinian conflict would be? Perhaps, for example, the US, having defeated one dictator, would be more demanding of the Palestinians to reform their politics.

What effect would a moderate Iraq have on other Arab states? While a post-Saddam government would avoid taking the lead in backing an Arab-Israel peace process, it would also represent a shift in the regional balance of power. Might this encourage a more conciliatory Arab stance toward Israel? Probably not, but it would be possible.

Unfortunately, Arab states are now tied into the Saudi peace plan, which is nominally moderate but actually makes Arafat's maximal demands the minimum conditions of the whole Arab world. In addition, moderate Arab states might be cautious, putting the priority on calming a public opinion angry about their support for the US attack.

It is impossible to predict how these factors would develop but some of these possibilities will soon be the mainstream of Middle East thinking and activity.

Barry Rubin is director of the Global Research in International Affairs Centre of the Interdisciplinary University and editor of the Middle East Review of International Affairs journal.