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Al Qaeda’s Big Year

Any way you measure it, 2013 was a good year for al Qaeda. It wasn’t supposed to be. Shortly after the United States killed the group’s charismatic leader, Osama bin Laden, a couple of years ago, Obama administration officials openly proclaimed that his death, coupled with targeted strikes that eliminated other senior jihadist leaders, had just about put al Qaeda out of business. Leon Panetta, then the defense secretary, stated in July 2011 that the United States was “within reach” of “strategically defeating” al Qaeda if it killed or captured 10 to 20 of its remaining leaders.

But as this year ends, the jihadist group’s regional affiliates have dramatically reasserted themselves in multiple countries, carrying out spectacular attacks and inflicting increasing levels of carnage. Though it’s hard to come by reliable estimates of the deaths they caused, the number is certainly in the thousands, and more than half a dozen countries now view these affiliates, or foreigners who have joined their ranks, as their top national security concern. The affiliates’ regeneration became so apparent over the course of this year that President Barack Obama was forced to clarify that his administration’s various claims of al Qaeda’s decimation were limited to the core leadership in Pakistan alone.

The year began with France spearheading a military intervention to push back jihadist groups that had seized territory in northern Mali, an impoverished country in the bone-dry Sahel region of Africa. France’s operation achieved some success, but a brigade led by Mokhtar Belmokhtar—who has pledged his loyalty directly to al Qaeda’s senior leaders—seized more than 800 hostages in a retaliatory operation at Algeria’s In Amenas gas complex. At least 39 foreign hostages were killed during the operation.

France’s war in Mali also showed how deteriorating conditions in Libya, where the new government has never been able to assert its authority, help the jihadist cause. Some of the In Amenas attackers reportedly trained in southern Libya (where camps prepare militants for suicide missions, among other things), and used the country as a staging ground for the hostage-taking operation. And as France advanced on the battlefield, many jihadist fighters fled to southwest Libya, where they evaded pursuit by “blending with local militant groups,” according to the Wall Street Journal.

The In Amenas siege began on Jan. 16. The following day, Iraq experienced its first double-digit casualty terrorist attack of the year, as a series of bombs targeting buses and their passengers struck in predominantly Shia areas. The bombings killed 19 and injured more than 100 people.

Iraq’s death toll mounted throughout the year, driven by al Qaeda’s blossoming capabilities. By the end of 2013, more than 6,000 Iraqis had died in violence, the highest level of fatalities since 2007, the peak year of Iraq’s bloody civil war. As U.S. forces withdrew from Iraq two years ago, American and Iraqi officials expressed concern that al Qaeda was “poised for a deadly resurgence.” Rather than proving alarmist, these warnings likely understated the speed and magnitude of the organization’s rebound in Iraq.

Another al Qaeda franchise surged this year. The Somali militant group al-Shabaab, which once controlled more territory in southern Somalia than did the country’s U.N.-recognized government, had lost its last major urban stronghold of Kismayo to advancing African Union forces in October 2012.

But Shabaab remained lethal. On Sept. 21, terrorists associated with the group launched a spectacular assault on Nairobi’s Westgate Mall. The attack dragged on for four days, killing 67 and injuring at least 175. But even before that, there were signs that a complex operation like Westgate was possible, as Shabaab carried out increasingly sophisticated attacks throughout the year. These included an attack on a Mogadishu courthouse that killed 29, and a twin suicide bombing at Mogadishu’s U.N. compound that claimed 22 lives.

In Syria, jihadists built on the gains they had made in 2012. Extremist groups like Jabhat al-Nusra and the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) have proven to be some of the country’s most effective rebel factions. As 2013 ends, jihadists have been able to gain full control over such cities and towns as Raqqa and Shadadi in the north. ISIS has become adept at the targeted use of violence against Raqqa’s citizens, for the purposes of dominating and intimidating them as it implements a harsh version of Islamic law.

Further compounding concerns stemming from the Syria conflict, a recent study published by the International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation found that up to 11,000 foreign fighters have flocked to the battlefield to fight Bashar Assad’s government, of whom around 2,000 are from Western Europe. This has sparked fears in their countries of origin that the fighters could pose a security threat if they return both radicalized and battle-hardened.

Daveed Gartenstein-Ross is a senior fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies and an adjunct assistant professor in Georgetown University’s security studies program. He is the author or volume editor of 12 books and monographs, including Bin Laden’s Legacy.