News and analysis from the project "INTEGRATION POLICIES: WHO BENEFITS?"

The German reform on dual nationality – an incomplete reform?

The German government coalition reached an agreement on dual nationality reform.However, a thorough look at this reform reveals that it does not address the issue in a coherent fashion. Dual nationality will still remain an obstacle to the naturalisation of immigrants who meet all of the other demanding legal requirements to become German citizens.

Any change in Germany’s MIPEX score?

The reform does bring positive change. Coalition partners agreed to remove the dual nationality restriction for German-born children with an immigrant background, thus guaranteeing equal treatment for citizens on the basis of ius soli and ius sanguinis. If assessed today, Germany’s score on access to nationality would increase from 59 to 66 out of the 100-point-MIPEX-scale, becoming ‘slightly favourable for integration’.

However, by failing to recognise dual nationality for all naturalising immigrants, the policy change maintains Germany’s fragmented approach to dual nationality, which allows exemptions for second generation immigrants, EU citizens and immigrants from many other nationalities, such as Afghanistan, Algeria, Eritrea, Iran, Cuba, Lebanon, Morocco, Syria and Tunisia. Refugees, elderly third country nationals (over 60 years old), foreigners facing excessive fees or immigrants from countries that do not recognise the renunciation of citizenship, are among the other beneficiaries of dual citizenship. Yet, many third-country nationals, from Turkey for example, are excluded from this possibility. This represents the main barrier to naturalisation for these immigrants, as reported in the Immigrant Citizens Survey.

According to the MIPEX findings, naturalisation applicants in Germany enjoy improving and secure legal procedures, and one of the more professional ‘citizenship tests’ among MIPEX countries. However, applicants are rejected if not already well integrated economically (as in only 11 other countries) and linguistically (explicitly in 6 other countries).

All of these shortcomings show that the coalition agreement falls short of removing the major obstacles to access to nationality for first generation immigrants.