Michel Aoun can cut the Gordian
knot
By Michael Young Daily Star staff
Thursday, March 29, 2007
Lebanon is locked in stalemate as the majority and opposition remain
encamped behind their red lines. But there is a way out, and the solution
lies in the hands of that volatile man in Rabieh. Michel Aoun can break
Lebanon's debilitating impasse, and would gain because of it. Here's how.

For months, Aoun's strategy has been to impose himself as the Maronite no
one can circumvent. Until recently, the general sustained himself thanks to
Christian frustration with the 2005 election law and the subsequent
quadripartite agreement that left Christian politicians and groups either
marginalized or playing a secondary role. That beef was justifiable, but
things began to disintegrate when Aoun found himself in the same camp as
Syria's allies, even as the bombings and assassinations continued. The
events of last January 23, when Aoun's supporters prevented people from
getting to work, was a political disaster, only compounded by the ongoing
fiasco of the Downtown sit-in, which has proven to be a trap for everyone -
opposition and majority alike.

With this in mind, it is plain that Michel Aoun will not be president. He
cannot be elected by Hizbullah alone, though the party will use Aoun until
the last minute as a bargaining chip to slip in someone else. The majority
has no incentive to vote for Aoun because he has spent the past months
alienating its leaders. And there is no prospect that the general - who
distils polarization like no other - will be a compromise candidate, as even
Aoun's own ally Elie Skaff recognized publicly several weeks ago.

However, if Aoun's ambition to be president has been dashed, his ability to
play a leading role in selecting someone else for the job remains stronger
than ever, thanks to the general's control over a sizable parliamentary
bloc. Aoun holds the balance of power allowing him to effectively be the
kingmaker of any new president. Moreover, by distancing himself from the
predominantly Shiite opposition, he would force Hizbullah's leader Sayyed
Hassan Nasrallah and Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri to overhaul their
strategy, as neither man wants the current standoff to appear like it is the
Shiites against the rest. This could even force Berri to open the doors of
Parliament. More importantly, if Aoun joins with Lebanese Forces leader
Samir Geagea and Maronite Patriarch Nasrallah Sfeir, the three could
together ensure that Christians have a leading say in who will be elected,
and what his or her agenda will be.

Aoun and his followers insist that their main objective is to return the
Christian community to its rightful place. If so, the general should bite
the bullet and fight the lesser battle he can win in helping select a
credible successor to President Emile Lahoud, rather than scrape though a
nasty presidential try of his own that Aoun is sure to lose.

Why should this matter? Partly because Aoun's failure to reach Baabda will
have a negative impact on the Christian community, whose interests the
general claims he wants to advance. If Aoun plays all-or-nothing politics,
Christians will react in one of two ways, or a combination thereof: they
will abandon Aoun and blame him for his recklessness; or they will embrace
his loss as their own, and internalize his lament that Christians no longer
have a say in Lebanon. In both cases the result will be that the weight of
the largest Christian bloc in Parliament is wasted, and Christians will lose
any voice they might have on the presidency.

Many Aounists, when you scratch below the surface, are aware that Hizbullah
will never agree to disarm and fully integrate into the political system. By
the same token, Hizbullah has no deep sympathy for Aoun or his aims, which
fundamentally contradict those of the party. Aoun may argue today that
Hizbullah's weapons are defensible, at a time when, as he sees it, there is
a power vacuum at the level of government; but it is doubtful that a
President Aoun could coexist with a party presiding over a state within a
state, defended by an Iranian-funded private army. There are no legs in that
alliance, and for the moment Aoun and Hizbullah are merely using each other.
The thing is, Nasrallah intends to sell Aoun out at the appropriate moment
to get something in exchange on the presidency; but Aoun will get nothing
from Hizbullah. If anything, his partnership with the party has doomed his
presidential chances.

So here's a plan Aoun might want to consider. He should start by holding a
far-reaching dialogue with Geagea under the auspices of the Maronite
patriarch. This would aim to reach a common set or principles that any
future president would have to adhere to - at least if he wants the approval
of his coreligionists. Aoun would have to sacrifice his ambition to be
elected to the highest office himself, but he would also be in the driving
seat to impose a preferred alternative. Geagea's advantage would be that he
could buy himself a wider margin of maneuver in his alliance with Saad
Hariri and the Future movement. This would not imply breaking that
relationship, which remains a foundation for any effort to establish an
independent post-Syrian Lebanese state; but it would enhance the Lebanese
Forces' credibility as a more autonomous organization.

Once that happens, Aoun would formally ditch the Hizbullah alliance, though
he needn't break definitively with the party. On the contrary, he could put
himself forward as the prime mediator with Nasrallah. Aoun would then ask
for an "acceptable" share of portfolios in the government. This could either
reflect his parliamentary weight, or there could be a tradeoff between the
number of ministers and the nature of the ministries offered the Aounists.
This would be a tricky stage, and would require agreement with Geagea and
Sfeir beforehand on Christian representation. In exchange, Aoun would
endorse an early timetable for parliamentary approval of the Hariri
tribunal. He would then announce his decision to abandon the Downtown
protests and fold his tents.

A vital ingredient would be Aoun's formally giving up his demand for early
elections. The general still believes that such elections are his ticket to
the presidency. Because the opposition might get a greater number of seats
in Parliament, he feels, his presidential chances would improve. But Aoun's
calculation is based on the erroneous assumptions that Lebanon is capable of
organizing elections at this divisive time, or even of uniting around an
election law; that the opposition is sure to gain under any new law; and
that the Aounists still retain the popular support they enjoyed in Mount
Lebanon in 2005. Aoun would do better to use his bloc more creatively
instead of gambling on an election that nobody wants, and that Hizbullah is
only setting as a condition for a settlement in order to keep Aoun on board
and obstruct agreement on the tribunal.

With his bloc the swinging vote in Parliament, Aoun would be in a very
powerful position as gatekeeper to the president. And with Geagea and Sfeir
on his side, he could write a good part of the presidential program. More
significantly, Christian unanimity would mean that any new head of state
could not easily ignore Aoun once in office (the obsession of all Lebanese
kingmakers), since this would only isolate him in the Maronite community.
But first, Aoun must take the toughest decision of all: embrace modesty and
accept that Baabda is his paradise lost.
Michael Young is opinion editor of THE DAILY STAR.