The move was intended to do
away with the obstacles which had prevented the implementation of the Cairo
accord, concluded in May last year. The accord was to cement the reconciliation
between Fatah and Hamas. The problem is that both agreements are incompatible
with the nature and objectives of the two movements.

Ever since Hamas won
the 2006 general Palestinian elections, these two groups have not been able to
find a common ground in spite of a succession of agreements accompanied by
solemn declarations on the need for unity.

The Fatah movement,
established in 1965, holds a comfortable margin of control in all Palestinian
institutions and is dominant in the Palestine Liberation Organization,
recognized by all Arab states as the only legitimate representative of the
Palestinian people.

However, Abbas, who is also chairman of the PLO, is
finding it harder and harder to fight Hamas encroachments.

Hamas, for its
part, dreams of taking over the Palestinian Authority before implementing its
main objective: destroying the State of Israel and establishing an Islamic
regime on the ruins of what it calls “the Zionist entity.” Its military takeover
of Gaza in 2007 and the expulsion of the representatives of Fatah and of the
Palestinian Authority was a first step.

The organization then launched a
clandestine operation in the West Bank with a view to set up local cells. Now it
hopes to win the next elections to the parliament and to the presidency, which
has led it to tone down its attacks and wait to get the upper hand through the
electoral process.

The Cairo accord was silent on two key issues:
relations with Israel, and the return of Gaza and the placement of its Hamas
security forces under the authority of the central government in Ramallah.
Likewise, the Doha document has nothing to say on these subjects and will not
lead to Palestinian unity or to negotiations with Israel.

Gaza remains a
separate entity. Israel will not enter negotiations with a Palestinian
government containing an organization which proclaims openly its intention to
destroy it.

Theoretically the Doha document does offer a solution to the
problem which had blocked the implementation of the Cairo accord. Abbas wanted
Salam Fayyad, who has done wonders for the economy and is popular among Western
countries which donate huge sums of money to the Palestinian authority, to lead
the joint government.

Hamas objected strenuously, since Fayyad had been
instrumental in fighting its clandestine attempts to infiltrate the West Bank.
Abbas is now supposed to lead the temporary joint government until the
elections, which shall be postponed, probably until the end of the
year.

According to the agreement the PLO will be changed in a way which
will make it possible for Hamas delegates to be part of its leadership; it is
however doubtful that this can be done before the elections to the Palestinian
National Convention. That suits Fatah well enough, since it is not really keen
to see its arch-enemy entering its stronghold.

Not that Hamas is
wholeheartedly behind the agreement either. According to Palestinian media,
Hamas leaders in Gaza – who were not present in Doha – oppose the deal, which
would make the president of the Palestinian Authority, who already heads Fatah
and the PLO, the head of the new government – thus giving him extraordinary
powers. They claim that the nomination of Abbas as head of government would
violate the Fundamental Law of the Palestinian Authority. Which is true enough,
but Hamas’s rule in Gaza is a greater violation of that law. On the other
hand.

Abbas’ mandate as president expired in January 2009 but, having
lost control of Gaza, he prudently postponed the elections. The parliament’s
mandate expired in February 2010 and elections have been postponed because of
the conflict between Ramallah and Gaza.

How then to explain why Fatah and
Hamas signed at Doha? Hamas in Gaza is satisfied with an agreement which leaves
it in charge of the Gaza Strip and of its security forces while letting it
infiltrate the PLO and help it take over the West Bank. It did not bother trying
to hide its real objective, and Ismail Haniyeh, who heads the Hamas regime in
Gaza, hastened to pay a visit to Tehran where he reiterated his intent to
destroy Israel.

What does Abbas gain? It is not clear.

It could be
that he hopes that the European Union and perhaps the United States will accept
the fiction that a true Palestinian unity is being achieved and will put
pressure on Israel to make concessions.

So far reactions have been muted.
The European Union in Brussels declared that it was a purely Palestinian affair,
but added that the EU saw in the agreement an important step toward the creation
of a Palestinian State. A US State Department spokesman also said that it was an
internal affair, but added that the American administration expected that any
Palestinian government would respect first and foremost the recognition of
Israel.

Technically, the American government cannot transfer assistance
to Hamas, which is a terrorist organization, and it is hard to see how Abbas can
circumvent this problem. One possible explanation is that the Palestinian leader
was unable to withstand the pressure of the Emir of Qatar, whose prestige was as
stake – and who is one of the biggest contributors to the Palestinian
Authority.

The composition of the new government is supposed to be
announced on February 18, following discussions between all parties. Abbas has
already declared that he would not be a candidate for the presidency. This could
be the end of the road for a leader who knows that he has failed to establish a
Palestinian state by turning to the United Nations and bypassing
Israel.

It has to be remembered that he had turned down the very fair
proposals made by Ehud Olmert’s government: establishment of a Palestinian state
with east Jerusalem as its capital (As Ehud Barak had offered some years before)
and an exchange of territories.

His refusal to compromise then and the
hardening of his position in negotiating with the Netanyahu government may have
put an end to all hopes of fruitful negotiations between the Palestinian
Authority and Israel in the foreseeable future.

He will leave his
successor a poisonous legacy: the risk of financial ruin, a dubious agreement
with Hamas which if implemented will deal a fatal blow to Fatah and the
Palestinian Authority and no hope of a breakthrough with Israel and.

The
writer is a former ambassador to Egypt and a fellow at the Jerusalem Center for
Public Affairs.