Pak meltdown & India

The Manmohan Singh government couldn't have chosen a worse time to withdraw troops from J and K under US pressure, says N.V.Subramanian.

By N.V. Subramanian (18 December 2009)

18 December 2009: The Manmohan Singh government couldn't have chosen a worse time to withdraw thirty thousand troops from Jammu and Kashmir, because Pakistan is facing an unprecedented meltdown situation, and the reflex of the Pakistan army and terrorists is to engage India in hostile action to divert attention from internal crises.

What's the internal crisis this time? The Pakistan Supreme Court, while voiding the NRO (see Commentary, "The Pakistani cooker," 16 November 2009), has permitted prosecution of the country's corrupt politicians belonging to the Asif Zardari / Yousef Raza Geelani government and of the ruling PPP. As Pakistan's president, Zardari is immune from prosecution, but he can hardly enjoy that immunity if PPP ministers and functionaries are targeted for corruption and he escapes. At some point, he will have to resign, whence he becomes the target as well. Sooner or later, the PPP-led Pakistan government has to go, and Zardari would prefer to go down with it and hope to fight another day, than, in trying to save his skin, see the PPP break up.
But the United States' hopes to democratize, de-fundamentalize, de-terrorize and clean Pakistan (via the Kerry-Luger legislation) are ironically linked to the survival of Zardari, the most pro-US Pakistan president to date. If Zardari cannot be saved, the US may opt for Geelani, but that is subject to Zardari's approval, which may not be forthcoming. Gilani has no political base to speak of and his differences with Zardari and growing closeness to the Pakistan army may further disqualify him. Zardari legitimately may fear that once he "blesses" Geelani, Geelani may use the Pakistani army to politically destroy him. If it cannot be Geelani, no other non-Bhutto family nominee appears readily available to lead the country who may be acceptable both to Zardari/ PPP and to the US.
If only to keep the Pakistan army from taking advantage of the looming political vacuum to seize power, Zardari may, on an outside chance, send word that he would prefer a Nawaz Sharief leadership supported by the PPP. Although Sharief has little love lost for Zardari (who tried to keep him disqualified from seeking high office under the terms of Sharief's settlement with the former dictator, Parvez Musharraf), Zardari may still hope that, because of their previous government partnership, Sharief may not prosecute him to political death. This is a risky gamble to take, but Zardari may prefer this to military rule, and so would, in the final reckoning, Sharief.
But the US has issues with Nawaz Sharief. If anything, Sharief will totally ally with the Pakistan army (partly from conviction and partly to shore up his political position) to keep US counterterrorism operations out of Waziristan and Baluchistan. Sharief's closeness to the Saudi ruling dynasty should also worry the US. If Sharief comes to power, the US would not be able to execute the intrusive audits required of by the Kerry-Luger legislation for disbursing democracy-enabling funds to Pakistan. Already, Pakistan's military and intelligence establishment is systematically trying to disrupt the audit by harassing US military attaches and diplomats in Pakistan and Pakistan is refusing to renew visas of key American audit personnel.
What are the chances of a coup if the political crisis deepens? US military commanders who claim closeness to Pakistan's army chief, Ashfaq Parvez Kayani, reject this possibility. It reminds this writer of his own experience with India's Military Intelligence Directorate, which unambiguously ruled out a coup in 1999. This writer, on the other hand, analyzed differently, and went on clearly to anticipate a Musharraf-led coup in a March 1999 piece published in Sunday (the former Calcutta-based) newsmagazine.
The Pakistan army has always acted on the so-called "doctrine of necessity", be it stated or unstated. While Pakistan's Supreme Court has shamefully held up this doctrine in the past, the present chief justice, Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudhry, has claimed to have "buried" it, but sidelining him, as Musharraf once did, and getting a pliant judiciary in place, cannot be ruled out. Already, public opinion has turned against Zardari, called Mr Ten Per Cent, and Nawaz Sharief is making common cause with the Pakistan army against him. General Kayani or his corps commanders may push for a coup, and the worst that will go is the $7.5 billion Kerry-Luger aid package, which the Pakistan army and intelligence establishment may hope to detain by making breakable promises on the "war on terror" to the US like Musharraf earlier did.
In fact, the Pakistan army would be convinced that it needs to seize power both to manage the counterterrorism war in Waziristan/ Baluchistan to suit its interests and to create conditions for a Afghan Taliban/ Al-Qaeda/ Haqqani network takeover of Afghanistan once the US quits the country under president Barack Obama's eighteen-month withdrawal plan. A pre-9/ 11 Afghanistan situation with a smouldering civil war evacuates Pakistan's internal terrorists like the Pakistani/ Punjabi Taliban to that country (assuming a Northern Alliance II situation, which has been explained in a previous commentary, "Northern Alliance II?"), plus it gives Pakistan "strategic depth" against India. Since the US is so dependent on the Pakistan army to fight its war against the Al-Qaeda in Pakistan, the Pakistanis will manufacture enough compelling reasons for the US to continue the Kerry-Luger aid, even though its central purpose to build and strengthen Pakistan's democracy would stand defeated.
Such a scenario appears almost irreversible because the pro-US puppet government of Asif Zardari cannot continue for long, and Pakistan army interests in Pakistan and in Afghanistan won't be served by keeping a democratic government in power. If the United States stretches the life of the Zardari government beyond meaningfulness, compromising Pakistan army and intelligence interests, they would retaliate by sponsoring another 26/ 11-type attack on India, and could even risk a limited war like Kargil 1999. In the circumstances, should the US have compelled India to make the troops withdrawals in J and K, and should the Manmohan Singh government, throwing caution to the wind, have tractably agreed? India has not caused the meltdown in Pakistan, but India pays the price for it again. It is ultimately the price of seeking subservient ties with the US.
N.V.Subramanian is Editor, www.NewsInsight.net, and writes internationally on strategic affairs. He has authored two novels, University of Love (Writers Workshop, Calcutta) and Courtesan of Storms (Har-Anand, Delhi).
Please visit N.V.Subramanian's blog http://courtesanofstorms.blog.com/ and write to him at envysub@gmail.com

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