Staying at Savatthi. Then Ven. Bhumija, arising from his seclusion in the late afternoon, went to Ven. Sariputta. On arrival, he exchanged courteous greetings with him. After an exchange of friendly greetings & courtesies, he sat to one side. As he was sitting there, he said to Ven. Sariputta, "Friend Sariputta, there are some brahmans & contemplatives, teachers of kamma, who declare that pleasure & pain are self-made. There are other brahmans & contemplatives, teachers of kamma, who declare that pleasure & pain are other-made. Then there are other brahmans & contemplatives, teachers of kamma, who declare that pleasure & pain are self-made & other-made. And then there are still other brahmans & contemplatives, teachers of kamma, who declare that pleasure & pain are neither self-made nor other-made, but arise spontaneously. In this case, friend Sariputta, what is the Blessed One's doctrine? What does he teach? Answering in what way will I speak in line with what the Blessed One has said, not misrepresent the Blessed One with what is unfactual, and answer in line with the Dhamma so that no one whose thinking is in line with the Dhamma will have grounds for criticism?"

"The Blessed One, my friend, has said that pleasure & pain are dependently co-arisen. Dependent on what? Dependent on contact. One speaking in this way would be speaking in line with what the Blessed One has said, would not be misrepresenting the Blessed One with what is unfactual, and would be answering in line with the Dhamma so that no one whose thinking is in line with the Dhamma would have grounds for criticism.

"Whatever brahmans & contemplatives, teachers of kamma, who declare that pleasure & pain are self-made, even that is dependent on contact. Whatever brahmans & contemplatives, teachers of kamma, who declare that pleasure & pain are other-made, even that is dependent on contact. Whatever brahmans & contemplatives, teachers of kamma, who declare that pleasure & pain are self-made & other-made, even that is dependent on contact. Whatever brahmans & contemplatives, teachers of kamma, who declare that pleasure & pain are neither self-made nor other-made, but arise spontaneously, even that is dependent on contact.

"That any brahmans & contemplatives — teachers of kamma who declare that pleasure & pain are self-made — would be sensitive to pleasure & pain otherwise than through contact: that isn't possible. That any brahmans & contemplatives — teachers of kamma who declare that pleasure & pain are other-made... self-made & other-made... who declare that pleasure & pain are neither self-made nor other-made, but arise spontaneously — would be sensitive to pleasure & pain otherwise than through contact: that isn't possible."

Now it so happened that Ven. Ananda overheard this conversation between Ven. Sariputta & Ven. Bhumija. Then he went to the Blessed One and, on arrival, having bowed down to him, sat to one side. As he was sitting there he reported the entire conversation to the Blessed One.

"I have said, Ananda, that pleasure & pain are dependently co-arisen. Dependent on what? Dependent on contact. One speaking in this way would be speaking in line with what I have said, would not be misrepresenting me with what is unfactual, and would be answering in line with the Dhamma so that no one whose thinking is in line with the Dhamma would have grounds for criticism.

"Whatever brahmans & contemplatives, teachers of kamma, who declare that pleasure & pain are self-made, even that is dependent on contact. Whatever brahmans & contemplatives, teachers of kamma, who declare that pleasure & pain are other-made... self-made & other-made... neither self-made nor other-made, but arise spontaneously, even that is dependent on contact.

"That any brahmans & contemplatives — teachers of kamma who declare that pleasure & pain are self-made — would be sensitive to pleasure & pain otherwise than through contact: that isn't possible. That any brahmans & contemplatives — teachers of kamma who declare that pleasure & pain are other-made... self-made & other-made... neither self-made nor other-made, but arise spontaneously — would be sensitive to pleasure & pain otherwise than through contact: that isn't possible.

"When there is a body, pleasure & pain arise internally with bodily intention as the cause; or when there is speech, pleasure & pain arise internally with verbal intention as the cause; or when there is intellect, pleasure & pain arise internally with intellectual intention as the cause.

"From ignorance as a requisite condition, then either of one's own accord one fabricates bodily fabrication on account of which that pleasure & pain arise internally, or because of others one fabricates bodily fabrication on account of which that pleasure & pain arise internally. Either alert one fabricates bodily fabrication on account of which that pleasure & pain arise internally, or unalert one fabricates bodily fabrication on account of which that pleasure & pain arise internally. (Similarly with verbal & intellectual fabrications.)

"Now, ignorance is bound up in these things. From the remainderless fading & cessation of that very ignorance, there no longer exists [the sense of] the body on account of which that pleasure & pain internally arise. There no longer exists the speech... the intellect on account of which that pleasure & pain internally arise. There no longer exists the field, the site, the dimension, or the issue on account of which that pleasure & pain internally arise."

I wonder what kamma they teach, if they hold that pleasure and pain arise spontaneously rather than being caused by human agency? The must presumably believe in the reality of human agency, but would seem to be restricted as to what the results of that agency could be. It can't be pleasant, and it can't be painful.

2) The Buddha endorses Sariputta's view that whatever persons and activities are the occasion for the arising of the pleasant or painful feelings, the required condition is contact. But he then appears to favour the first set of brahmans and contemplatives:

one fabricates bodily fabrication on account of which that pleasure & pain arise internally,

This is the case whether one does it of one's own accord; or on account of others; alert; or unalert. In each case, one fabricates. One also fabricates verbally and intellectually. To the extent that fabrications are under one's control (and the active form of "one fabricates" implies that one could in principle do otherwise) then the pain is "self-made".

I think the only way out of this is if "sankhara" or fabrication is in this case (as per Nanavira's reading) merely "determinations". Nothing here to do with human agency.

When this was said, Makkhali Gosala said to me, 'Great king, there is no cause, no requisite condition, for the defilement of beings. Beings are defiled without cause, without requisite condition. There is no cause, no requisite condition, for the purification of beings. Beings are purified without cause, without requisite condition. There is nothing self-caused, nothing other-caused, nothing human-caused. There is no strength, no effort, no human energy, no human endeavor. All living beings, all life, all beings, all souls are powerless, devoid of strength, devoid of effort. Subject to the changes of fate, serendipity, and nature, they are sensitive to pleasure and pain in the six great classes of birth.

Yes, this and similar views are expressed in several places in the Suttas. I suppose it is something like nihilism, and something like it is still around today. It is perplexing, though, not as a view in itself, but rather because it is taught by those who have a view on kamma. It seems to be more a denial of kamma and the efficacy of intentionality, than a view as to what it is.

Perhaps the list was constructed with a pattern that didn't quite make sense for all the entries of the list. I think that happens in other places, but I can't recall an example right now.

We could rationalize by saying that the view seems to be something like "actions have no consequences, things just happen spontaneously", whereas the Buddha teaches that actions do have consequences.

Bhikkhu Bodhi shares you perplexity:

“Friend Sāriputta, some ascetics and brahmins, proponents of kamma, maintain that pleasure and pain are created by oneself; some ascetics and brahmins, proponents of kamma, maintain that pleasure and pain are created by another; some ascetics and brahmins, proponents of kamma, maintain that pleasure and pain are created both by oneself and by another; some ascetics and brahmins, proponents of kamma, maintain that pleasure and pain have arisen fortuitously, being created neither by oneself nor by another.

BB: It is difficult to understand how these ascetics could be “proponents of kamma” (kammavādā) when they hold that pleasure and pain arise fortuitously. Neither Spk nor Spkpṭ offers any clarification.

BB: Venerable Bhūmij gives his name to the Bhūmija Sutta (MN No. 126), where he answers some questions of Prince Jayasena and then engages in conversation with the Buddha. The first part of the present sutta repeats the first part of the preceding one except that there it is phrased in terms of “suffering.”

Thanissaro wrote:Does the desire for Awakening get in the way of Awakening? According to this discourse, the question of desiring or not desiring is irrelevant as long as one develops the appropriate qualities that constitute the path to Awakening. The discourse is also very clear on the point that there are right and wrong paths of practice: as a geographer might say, not every river flows to the sea

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... any brahmans or contemplatives endowed with right view, right resolve, right speech, right action, right livelihood, right effort, right mindfulness, & right concentration: If they follow the holy life even when having made a wish, they are capable of obtaining results. If they follow the holy life even when having made no wish, they are capable of obtaining results. If they follow the holy life even when both having made a wish and having made no wish, they are capable of obtaining results. If they follow the holy life even when neither having made a wish nor having made no wish, they are capable of obtaining results. Why is that? Because it is an appropriate way of obtaining results.

The Buddha deals in several places with the relationship between the wish for release, and the practice for release. A really nice example is the Nava Sutta with its analogy of the chicks being hatched.

“Good, good, Ānanda! Anyone answering rightly would answer just as Sāriputta has done. I have said, Ānanda, that pleasure and pain are dependently arisen. Dependent on what? Dependent on contact. If one were to speak thus one would be stating what has been said by me and would not misrepresent me with what is contrary to fact; one would explain in accordance with the Dhamma, and no reasonable consequence of one’s assertion would give ground for criticism.

“Therein, Ānanda, in the case of those ascetics and brahmins, proponents of kamma, who maintain that pleasure and pain are created by oneself ... and those who maintain that pleasure and pain have arisen fortuitously … in each case that is conditioned by contact.

“Therein, Ānanda, in the case of those ascetics and brahmins, proponents of kamma, who maintain that pleasure and pain are created by oneself ... and those who maintain that pleasure and pain have arisen fortuitously … in each case it is impossible that they will experience [anything] without contact.

“Ānanda, when there is the body, because of bodily volition pleasure and pain arise internally; when there is speech, because of verbal volition pleasure and pain arise internally; when there is the mind, because of mental volition pleasure and pain arise internally—and with ignorance as condition.

Bhikkhus, internal pleasant and unpleasant feelings arise on account of ignorance, either when mindfull of the body and bodily intentions, mindfull of words and verbal intentions or when mindfull of thoughts and intentions.[I think "mindful" may be a poor choice of translation there...]

Spk says that the Buddha added this section to show that pleasure and pain do not arise with contact alone as condition, but with other conditions as well. In this case the bodily, verbal, and mental volitions (kāya-, vacī-, manosañcetanā) are the kammically effective volitions that function as conditions for the resultant pleasure and pain (vipākasukhadukkha).

“Either on one’s own initiative, Ᾱnanda one generates that bodily volitional formation conditioned by which pleasure and pain arise internally; or prompted by others one generates that bodily volitional formation conditioned by which pleasure and pain arise internally. Either deliberately, Ānanda, one generates that bodily volitional formation conditioned by which pleasure and pain arise internally; or undeliberately one generates that bodily volitional formation conditioned by which pleasure and pain arise internally."

BB: Spk identifies the three volitional formations—kāyasaṅkhāra, vacīsaṅkhāra, manosaṅkhāra—with the three types of volition mentioned just above. One generates them “on one’s own initiative” (sāmaṅ) when one acts without inducement by others, with an unprompted mind (asaṅkhārikacitta); one generates them “prompted by others” when one acts with a prompted mind (sasaṅkhārikacitta). One acts deliberately (sampajāno) when one acts with knowledge of kamma and its fruit; undeliberately (asampajāno), when one acts without such knowledge.

Spk says that the Buddha added this section to show that pleasure and pain do not arise with contact alone as condition, but with other conditions as well. In this case the bodily, verbal, and mental volitions (kāya-, vacī-, manosañcetanā) are the kammically effective volitions that function as conditions for the resultant pleasure and pain (vipākasukhadukkha)

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To the extent that they are "volitions" in any meaningful sense of the term (as opposed to, say, conditions or determinations) then we are agreeing with those

Do you think this was the intention behind this sutta? The structure seems to suggest otherwise, and therefore is at apparent odds with the translation here. But BB says it is cetana rather than sankhara, so I am perplexed...

"Master Gotama, is stress self-made?""Don't say that, Kassapa.""Then is it other-made?""Don't say that, Kassapa.""Then is it both self-made and other-made?""Don't say that, Kassapa.""Then is it the case that stress, being neither self-made nor other-made, arises spontaneously?""Don't say that, Kassapa."

"'The one who acts is the one who experiences [the result of the act]' amounts to the eternalist statement, 'Existing from the very beginning, stress is self-made.' 'The one who acts is someone other than the one who experiences' amounts to the annihilationist statement, 'For one existing harassed by feeling, stress is other-made.' Avoiding these two extremes, the Tathagata teaches the Dhamma via the middle: ...

“Either on one’s own initiative, Ānanda, one generates that mental volitional formation[*] conditioned by which pleasure and pain arise internally; or prompted by others one generates that mental volitional formation conditioned by which pleasure and pain arise internally. Either deliberately, Ānanda, one generates that mental volitional formation conditioned by which pleasure and pain arise internally; or undeliberately one generates that mental volitional formation conditioned by which pleasure and pain arise internally.

Is is the same distinction as this in SN 12.17? viewtopic.php?f=25&t=11403

Maybe, if the distinction is between the two meanings of sankhara. In Bhikkhu Bodhi's earlier quote,

In this case the bodily, verbal, and mental volitions (kāya-, vacī-, manosañcetanā) are the kammically effective volitions that function as conditions for the resultant pleasure and pain (vipākasukhadukkha).

he is talking about intentions. I had not seen kaya-, vaci-, and mano- applied to cetana before; but doing so would mean that the pleasure and suffering one feels are created by oneself.

In the later quote, in your 9.57 am post,

The term used here is manosaṅkhāra

which can have the less volitional meaning of "determination" or "fabrication". This is more my understanding in that the vedana is obviously dependently arisen and determined, but is less obviously dependent upon the existence of an intention.

Any thoughts as to

the bodily, verbal, and mental volitions (kāya-, vacī-, manosañcetanā) are the kammically effective volitions that function as conditions for the resultant pleasure and pain (vipākasukhadukkha).

The Commentary is using various Abhidhamma terms, which may or may not be useful to you. The Comprehensive Manual of Abhidhamma is useful in figuring out what Bhikkhu Bodhi is referring to. I gave a link above somewhere.

Regarding the self/other thing, what I meant by quoting the other sutta here: viewtopic.php?f=25&t=11836&p=179893#p179893 was that I think that the error has to do with the concept of "self". Actions have consequences but there is no "self" and "other".

I am having some trouble understanding the concept of "bodily intention" and how it would lead to bodily fabrications and then through the chain to pleasure and pain. Might someone be able to offer an illustrative example?

"When there is a body, pleasure & pain arise internally with bodily intention as the cause; or when there is speech, pleasure & pain arise internally with verbal intention as the cause; or when there is intellect, pleasure & pain arise internally with intellectual intention as the cause.

"From ignorance as a requisite condition, then either of one's own accord one fabricates bodily fabrication on account of which that pleasure & pain arise internally, or because of others one fabricates bodily fabrication on account of which that pleasure & pain arise internally. Either alert one fabricates bodily fabrication on account of which that pleasure & pain arise internally, or unalert one fabricates bodily fabrication on account of which that pleasure & pain arise internally. (Similarly with verbal & intellectual fabrications.)

I am having some trouble understanding the concept of "bodily intention" and how it would lead to bodily fabrications and then through the chain to pleasure and pain. Might someone be able to offer an illustrative example?

Me too. Kayasankhara I think I understand. But Kayasancetana is a new one for me, and the Abidhamma commentary is not too helpful in terms of what it would look or feel like. Other than the aim or object of the intention being physical (e.g. my intention is to do something with or to the body) intentions seem to be mental.

Spk: Ignorance is included among these states under the heading of decisive support (upanissaya); for they are all comprehended under this phrase, “With ignorance as condition, volitional formations.”

BB: On the interpretation of paṭicca-samuppāda by way of the twenty-four conditional relations of the Paṭṭhāna, see Visudhimagga, chap. 17, concisely explained in Nyanatiloka Thera, Guide through the Abhidhamma Piṭaka, pp. 159-73.

But with the remainderless fading away and cessation of ignorance that body does not exist conditioned by which that pleasure and pain arise internally; that speech does not exist conditioned by which that pleasure and pain arise internally; that mind does not exist conditioned by which that pleasure and pain arise internally.

Spk: That body does not exist which, if it existed, would enable pleasure and pain to arise conditioned by bodily volition; the same method of explanation applies to speech and mind. (Query:) But an arahant acts, speaks, and thinks, so how is it that his body, etc., do not exist? (Reply:) In the sense that they do not generate kammic results. For the deeds done by an arahant are neither wholesome nor unwholesome kamma, but merely functional (kiriyamatta); thus for him it is said, “that body, etc., do not exist.”

BB: On the functional consciousness of the arahant, see CMA 1:15. An alternative explanation might be simply that with the elimination of ignorance there will be no further arising of the five aggregates, the basis of all experience, and thus no further experiencing of pleasure and pain.

That field does not exist, that site does not exist, that base does not exist, that foundation does not exist conditioned by which that pleasure and pain arise internally.”

Spk: There is no field (khetta) in the sense of a place of growth; no site (vatthu) in the sense of a support; no base (āyatana) in the sense of a condition; no foundation (adhikaraṇa) in the sense of a cause.