That, of course, is how to manage the company he leads, Citigroup Inc.

So it’s not surprising that Mr. Corbat is dealing with the latest string of headaches by doing what his predecessors have done. He’s making a pledge.

“I want, and I know shareholders deserve, an industrial-strength, permanent solution that paves the way for sustainable capital return over time,” Mr. Corbat said in a conference call with investors Monday.

Whether or not Mr. Corbat will be able to back up the pledge with real action is yet to be determined. Time will tell. But if it feels as if we’ve been through this cycle before with the nation’s third-biggest banks by assets, it’s because we have.

In fact, in the 16 years since Travelers Group-Citicorp merger was announced, the institution has never gained traction as a global bank with a steady stream of growing earnings as its architects, Sanford “Sandy” Weill and John Reed, pledged.

Here’s a line from the 1998 release announcing the deal: “Mr. Reed and Mr. Weill also said that the companies expect to generate substantial incremental earnings from the significant cross-selling opportunities that will be created as well as cost savings that will be realized.”

For a short time, Citi seemed to be living up to the deal’s promise. It produced a $13.5 billion profit in 2000, a 20% increase over the previous year, even after deducting hundreds of millions in restructuring costs.

Mr. Weill, however, couldn’t seem to shake the dealmaking bug. He bought specialty lender Associates First Capital in 2000. The next year Citi bought Mexican bank Banamex for $12.5 billion. It spun off Travelers.

Citigroup’s constant buying, selling and spinning off made its financials a labyrinth and unpredictable to outsiders and investors. It constantly took merger and restructuring charges. It missed estimates. Citi’s stock peaked to an adjusted $536 a share in Sept. 2000, but then lost 20% before the year ended. By the middle of 2002 Citi stock was down 50%.

So it went until Mr. Weill stepped down in 2003. He was replaced by his long-time confidant, Charles Prince, an attorney who joined Mr. Weill in 1996. Mr. Prince wasn’t viewed as the dealmaker his mentor was, but his tenure was just as uneven. His record included a sovereign debt scandal in Europe, a Japanese private banking fiasco and clashes with regulators.

Things started well for Mr. Prince. Citi recovered most of its lost share value by April 2004. But the bank struggled with costs. They rose faster than revenue. Meanwhile, Citi’s legal liabilities were on the rise and in 2005 the Federal Reserve banned Citi from making any new acquisitions. In 2006, Bank of America Corp.displaced Citigroup as the biggest U.S. bank by market value.

Mr. Prince vowed change. He promised a five-point plan to strengthen “ afoundation of values, priorities and internal controls that are essential for sustained long-term growth. implementation of the plan is our top priority.”

When the Fed ban on deals was lifted a year later, Citi unleashed $16 billion in acquisitions.

By 2007, just before the financial crisis began, Citigroup shares significantly lagged their peers. J.P. Morgan Chase & Co. shares had risen 109% since Mr. Prince had been tapped as CEO. Bank of America shares were up 44%. Citi was up just 39%.

With the severity of the financial crisis becoming clear, Mr. Prince was ousted in November 2007. Vikram Pandit, a hedge fund manager who’s fund was shut down, took over. Then came the bailouts. Then, the creation of Citi Holdings, a bank which held unwanted assets and tried to sell them off usually at deep discounts. Then the lawsuits.

One could say a lot about Mr. Pandit’s tenure, but here’s the most telling assessment. During his four years, Citigroup stock fell 88.5%. Bank of America’s fell 78%. J.P. Morgan’s just 5%. Wells Fargo & Co., though not an exact comparison given its more domestic focus, was up 12.7%.

Again, it’s too early to tell about Mr. Corbat, who is just in the early stages of his second year at the top of the bank. And Citigroup officials declined to comment. Like his predecessors, he’s presided over good news, such as the most recent quarter’s surprisingly strong earnings, and bad news, such as the apparent fraud at Banamex and Citi’s inability to increase dividends.

And like his predecessors, Mr. Corbat is making promises that the sloppy stuff will end. It just may. But if he thinks investors should expect a decade-and-a-half run of inconsistent results to stop, well, he shouldn’t blame them if they don’t.