We study strategic issues in the Gale-Shapley stable marriage model. In the first part

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1 Gale-Shapley Stable Marriage Problem Revisited: Strategic Issues and Applications Chung-Piaw Teo Jay Sethuraman Wee-Peng Tan Department of Decision Sciences, Faculty of Business Administration, National University of Singapore, FBA 1-15 Law Link, Singapore Department of Industrial Engineering and Operations Research, Columbia University, New York, New York Department of Decision Sciences, Faculty of Business Administration, National University of Singapore, FBA 1-15 Law Link, Singapore We study strategic issues in the Gale-Shapley stable marriage model. In the first part of the paper, we derive the optimal cheating strategy and show that it is not always possible for a woman to recover her women-optimal stable partner from the men-optimal stable matching mechanism when she can only cheat by permuting her preferences. In fact, we show, using simulation, that the chances that a woman can benefit from cheating are slim. In the second part of the paper, we consider a two-sided matching market found in Singapore. We study the matching mechanism used by the Ministry of Education (MOE) in the placement of primary six students in secondary schools, and discuss why the current method has limited success in accommodating the preferences of the students, and the specific needs of the schools (in terms of the mix of admitted students). Using insights from the first part of the paper, we show that stable matching mechanisms are more appropriate in this matching market and explain why the strategic behavior of the students need not be a major concern. (Stable Marriage; Strategic Issues; Gale-Shapley Algorithm; Student Posting Exercise) 1. Introduction This paper is motivated by a study of the mechanism used to assign primary school students in Singapore to secondary schools. The current assignment process requires that the primary school students submit a rank-ordered list of six schools to the Ministry of Education. Students are then assigned to secondary schools based on their preferences, with priority given to those with higher examination scores in the Primary School Leaving Examination (PSLE). The current matching mechanism is plagued by several problems. We argue that a satisfactory resolution of these problems necessitates the use of a stable matching mechanism (a complete description appears in 4). In fact, two well-known stable matching mechanisms the students-optimal stable mechanism, and the schools-optimal stable mechanism appear to be natural candidates; however, neither of these mechanisms (nor any other stable matching mechanism) is capable of eliciting truthful participation from all of the participants. Our main purpose is to show that the students have very little room to misrepresent their preferences, under either mechanism. While the strategic issues facing the students under the students-optimal mechanism are well understood, the insights under the schools-optimal mechanism Management Science 2001 INFORMS Vol. 47, No. 9, September 2001 pp /01/4709/1252$ electronic ISSN

2 appear to be new. The most suitable stable matching mechanism for the Singapore Posting Exercise will ultimately be a variant of these two well-known matching mechanisms, as local issues and features have to be incorporated. However, our results on simulation experiments under the students-optimal and schools-optimal mechanisms suggest that, regardless of the choice of the stable matching mechanism, the students have little incentive to misrepresent their preferences. This addresses one of the major concerns of the participants in the Singapore Posting Exercise. A distinguishing feature of our model is that the participants are required to submit complete preference lists. Strategic issues in the stable marriage problem have been explored in settings that allow incomplete preference lists; but, to the best of our knowledge, no systematic study has been made when complete preference lists are required. As we shall see, such a requirement imposes a severe restriction on the strategic choices available to the participants, resulting in substantially reduced incentives to cheat. To study the immunity of the schools-optimal mechanism to cheating by the students, we need to first determine the optimal cheating strategy in the classical stable marriage model where the participants are only allowed to cheat by reversing the true preference order of acceptable partners; They are not allowed to truncate the preference list, as is the case usually considered in the literature. The main result of this paper shows that this problem can be solved in polynomial time, using a simple extension of the classical Gale-Shapley algorithm. Preliminaries. Stable matching problems were first studied by Gale and Shapley (1962). In a stable marriage problem there are two finite sets of participants: the set of men (M) and the set of women (W ). We assume that every member of each sex has strict preferences over the members of the opposite sex. In the model that allows rejection, the preference list of a participant can be truncated in the sense that participants have the option of declaring some others as unacceptable; in this model, we also include the possibility that a participant may be unmatched, i.e., the participant s assigned partner in the matching is himself/herself. In contrast, in the Gale-Shapley model, the preference lists of the participants are required to be complete, and no one is to be declared as unacceptable. A matching is just a one-to-one mapping between the two sexes such that a man m is mapped to a woman w if and only if w is mapped to m, and m and w are acceptable to each other. (In the economics literature, this is defined as an individually rational matching.) A matching is said to be unstable (under either model) if there is a man-woman pair, who both prefer each other to their partners in ; this pair is said to block the matching, and is called a blocking pair for. A stable matching is a matching that is not unstable. The significance of stability is best highlighted by a system where acceptance of the proposed matching is voluntary. In such a setting, an unstable matching cannot be expected to remain intact, as the blocking pair(s) may discover that they could both improve their match by joint action: The man and woman involved in a blocking pair could just divorce their respective partners and elope. In addition to formulating several versions of the stable matching problem, Gale and Shapley (1962) described a simple algorithm that always finds a stable matching for any instance of the stable marriage problem. This elegant result sparked the interest of many researchers, resulting in a thorough investigation of the structural properties of the stable marriage model. A property that is especially relevant to our study is that the set of all stable matchings for an instance of the stable marriage problem forms a lattice, with the extremal elements being the so-called men-optimal and women-optimal stable matchings. In fact, the algorithm of Gale and Shapley (1962) that established the existence of a stable marriage constructs a men-optimal stable matching. This algorithm is commonly known as the men-propose algorithm because it can be expressed as a sequence of proposals from the men to the women. Note that the Gale-Shapley algorithm can be easily adapted to yield a women-optimal stable matching by simply interchanging the roles of men and women; this is commonly called the women-propose algorithm. All of the results in this paper will be stated under the assumption that the men-optimal stable matching mechanism is used; by interchanging the role of men and women, analogous results can be derived for the womenoptimal mechanism. Management Science/Vol. 47, No. 9, September

3 Strategy. Consider a market in which men and women submit their preference lists to a centralized agency that matches the participants by computing the men-optimal stable matching. An important difficulty that arises is that this matching mechanism is manipulable by the women: Some women can intentionally submit false preferences and obtain better partners. Such (strategic) questions have been studied for the stable marriage problem by mathematical economists and game theorists, with the goal of quantifying the potential gains of a deceitful participant. An early result in this direction is due to Roth (1982), who proved that when the men-optimal mechanism is used, none of the men benefits by submitting false preferences, regardless of how the other participants report their preferences. By submitting a false preference list, a man can, at best, obtain his (true) optimum stable partner, which he obtains anyway by submitting his true preference list. In game-theoretic parlance, stating true preferences is a dominant strategy for the men. However, Gale and Sotomayor (1985b) showed that the women can still force the men-optimal mechanism to return the women-optimal solution. The optimal cheating strategy in this case is simple: Each woman w submits a preference list that is the same as her true preference list, except that she declares men who rank below her women-optimal partner as unacceptable. Our main goal in this paper is to study the analogous question in the Gale-Shapley model, in which all the participants are required to submit complete preference lists. We emphasize that we consider only a centralized market that computes the men-optimal matching, and all the men and women can only manipulate the outcome by permuting their preference lists. We do not consider a decentralized market, where manipulation possibilities are richer, nor do we consider other ways of manipulating the outcome. Motivation. The motivation for studying strategic questions in the Gale-Shapley model is the Singapore school admissions problem (referred to hereafter as the MOE (Ministry of Education) problem) briefly described earlier. Currently, the schools are merely seen as resources by the ministry to be allocated to students. Furthermore, for ease of implementation, each student is only allowed to submit six choices, and the ministry pads each list by ranking the remaining schools using location as the only criterion (schools close to the student s home are ranked higher). All assignments are done in a centralized manner, and no student is allowed to approach the schools privately for admission purposes. However, such passive roles for the schools will change in the near future. In preparation for a knowledge-based economy, the ministry has reiterated its intention to shift from the current examination-oriented system to one that focuses on ability-driven education. In line with this goal, the ministry intends to give the schools administrative and professional autonomy. Student assessments will also be reviewed to meet the objective of developing creative independent learners. The new university admissions system to be implemented from 2003 will not rely solely on the GCE A-level exam results, but instead make a holistic evaluation of a student s potential. The current assignment process of students to schools is not consistent with this new focus of the ministry. Furthermore, the design of the current assignment process has also given rise to several operational problems (see 4), and our purpose is to argue that a centralized stable matching mechanism of the type proposed by Gale and Shapley is superior. Our goal, in the end, is to convince the readers that regardless of whether the students-optimal or schools-optimal mechanism is used, there is no significant incentive for the students or the schools to strategize and exploit the system. There is an obvious relation between the MOE problem and the stable marriage problem introduced earlier: In the MOE problem, the students play the role of women and the secondary schools play the role of men. Observe that there is also a crucial difference: In the MOE problem, many women (students) can be assigned to the same man (secondary school), whereas in the stable marriage model we require that the matching be one-to-one. Since the students (schools) in this setting are not allowed to declare any school (student) as unacceptable, the MOE problem can be modeled as a many-to-one matching problem with complete preference lists. The issues of strategic manipulation in the stable marriage model with rejection are well understood (cf. Roth and Sotomayor 1991 and the references 1254 Management Science/Vol. 47, No. 9, September 2001

4 therein). However, little is known in the case of stable marriage models (one-to-one and many-toone) without rejection, which, as we discussed, is a more suitable representation of the MOE problem; a notable exception is the recent work of Tadenuma and Toda (1998), in which they consider the implementation question, and show that no stable matching correspondence can be implemented in Nash equilibrium as long as M = W > 2. (Stronger nonimplementability results hold for the rejection model, see Kara and Sonmez 1996.) Results and Structure of the Paper. To derive insights into the strategic behavior of the participants in the MOE problem, we first consider the one-to-one model, and study the following question: In the stable marriage model with complete preferences, with the men-optimal mechanism, is there an incentive for the women to cheat? If so, what is an optimal cheating strategy for a woman? Can a woman always force the mechanism to return her women-optimal partner? In 2 we present the main result of this paper: An optimal cheating strategy can be constructed in polynomial time. A related issue concerns the robustness of the men-optimal mechanism. In the rejection model, it is well known that the women can easily manipulate the men-optimal mechanism, and, in fact, almost all the women will submit false preferences. In sharp contrast, our results for the Gale-Shapley model in 3 provide evidence that the men-optimal mechanism is fairly robust, and that there is very little incentive for the women to cheat. In particular, restricting the strategic choices of the women drastically reduces their benefits from cheating, thereby reducing the possibility that a woman will cheat. Armed with this theoretical understanding of the Gale-Shapley model, we prescribe some recommendations in 4 to improve the current matching mechanism used in the Singapore MOE Secondary School Posting Exercise. In particular, we argue that a stable matching mechanism is more appropriate for the MOE problem, and that some of the other difficulties inherent in the present system can be effectively addressed by a stable matching mechanism. It is instructive to compare our results to some recent results obtained in a very interesting study by Roth and Rothblum (1999). In a centralized many-toone market (with rejection allowed) operating under the schools-optimal mechanism, Roth and Rothblum consider the strategic issues facing the students. In a low information environment, where preferences of the other participants are not known with certainty, they conclude that stating preferences that reverse the true preference order of two acceptable schools is not beneficial to the students, while submitting a truncation of the true preferences may be. Our simulationbased experimental results in this paper suggest that this observation is valid even in the perfect information setting, i.e., knowing the reported preferences of all the other participants may still not allow one to benefit from cheating, if one is only allowed to reverse the order of the schools, but not allowed to submit a truncated list. Finally, we note that the strategic issues facing the schools, under the schools-optimal mechanism, is a nontrivial problem: Roth (1985) showed that, contrary to the one-to-one case, the schools-optimal matching need not even be weakly-pareto optimal for the schools, and there is no stable matching mechanism that makes it a dominant strategy for all the schools to state their true preferences. We shall see in 4 why this is not an important issue in the MOE problem. 2. Optimal Cheating in the Gale-Shapley Model Our standing assumption in this paper is that woman w is the only deceitful participant and she knows the reported preferences of all the other participants, which remain fixed throughout. We shall show, eventually, that cheating opportunities for woman w are uncommon, in spite of the assumption that she has perfect information. We consider only a centralized market, although the algorithm is phrased as a sequence of proposals from the men to the women. We visualize the deceitful woman as running this algorithm in her head and submitting the optimal cheating strategy thus computed as her preference list to the centralized market. We shall begin by considering the following question: Consider a centralized market in which the menpropose algorithm is literally used to compute the Management Science/Vol. 47, No. 9, September

5 men-optimal matching. Suppose woman w has no knowledge of the preferences of any of the other participants, and that she is the only deceitful participant. Suppose also that she is allowed to reject proposals. Is it possible for her to identify her women-optimal partner by just observing the sequence of proposals she receives? Somewhat surprisingly, the answer is yes! If w simply rejects all the proposals made to her, then the best (according to her true preference list) man among those who propose to her is her women-optimal partner. Our algorithm for finding the optimal cheating strategy in the Gale-Shapley model builds on this insight: Woman w rejects as many proposals as possible, while remaining engaged to some man who proposed earlier in the algorithm. Using a backtracking scheme, she uses the matching mechanism repeatedly to find her optimal cheating strategy. Given our standing assumption that woman w has complete knowledge of the reported preferences of the other participants, and that she is the only agent acting strategically, it is clear what she would do: She would run the algorithm to find her optimal cheating strategy privately and submit this (optimal) preference list to the centralized market Finding Your Optimal Partner We first describe Algorithm OP an algorithm to compute the women-optimal partner for w using the men-propose algorithm. (Recall that we do this under the assumption that woman w is allowed to remain single.) Algorithm OP 1. Run the men-propose algorithm, and reject all proposals made to w. At the end, w and a man, say m, will remain single. 2. Among all the men who proposed to w in Step 1, let the best man (according to w) bem. Theorem 1. m is the women-optimal partner for w. Remark. Gale and Sotomayor (1985b) showed that when each woman declares all the men inferior to her women-optimal partner as unacceptable, then the men-optimal mechanism will be forced to return the women-optimal stable matching. This is because the only stable matching solution for the modified preference lists is the women-optimal solution (with respect to the original preference lists). To prove our result, however, we have to show that when a woman unilaterally declares all the men as unacceptable, this is enough to induce her optimal partner to propose to her in the course of executing the men-propose algorithm. Furthermore, we need to show that no higherranked man on her list will propose to her even after she rejects the proposal from her optimal partner. Proof of Theorem 1. Let w denote the womenoptimal partner for w. We modify w s preference list by inserting the option to remain single in the list, immediately after w. (We declare all men that are inferior to w as unacceptable to w.) Consequently, in the men-propose algorithm, all proposals inferior to w will be rejected. Nevertheless, since there is a stable matching (with respect to the original preferences) with w matched to w, our modification does not destroy this solution, i.e., this solution remains stable with respect to the modified list. It is also well known that in any stable matching instance, the set of people who are single is the same for all stable matchings (cf. Roth and Sotomayor 1990, p. 42). Thus, w must be matched in all stable matchings with respect to the modified preference list. The menoptimal matching for this modified preference list must match w to w, since w is now the worst partner for w with respect to the modified list. In particular, w must have proposed to w during the execution of the men-propose algorithm. Note that until w proposes to w, the men-propose algorithm for the modified list runs exactly in the same manner as in Step 1 of OP. The difference is that Step 1 of OP will reject the proposal from w, while the men-propose algorithm for the modified list will accept the proposal from w, asw prefers w to being single. Hence, clearly w is among those who proposed to w in Step 1 of OP, and so m w w. Suppose m > w w. Consider the modified list in which we place the option of remaining single immediately after m. We run the men-propose algorithm with this modified list. Again, until m proposes to w, the algorithm runs exactly the same as in Step 1 of OP, after which the algorithm returns a stable partner for w who is at least as good as m according to w (under both the original and the modified lists, since 1256 Management Science/Vol. 47, No. 9, September 2001

6 we have not altered the order of the men before m on the list). The matching obtained is thus stable with respect to the original list. This contradicts our earlier assumption that w is the best stable partner for w. Suppose w is allowed to modify her preference list after each run of the men-propose algorithm, and the algorithm is to be repeated until w concludes that she has found her best possible partner. Theorem 1 essentially says that knowing the set of proposals woman w receives is enough to allow her to construct her optimal cheating strategy, if she is allowed to declare certain men as unacceptable; she need not know the preferences of any of the other participants involved, as long as they behave truthfully. In the next section, we shall use this insight to construct an optimal cheating algorithm for w, under the additional restriction that she is not allowed to declare any man as unacceptable Cheating Your Way to a Better Marriage Observe that the procedure of 2.1 only works when woman w is allowed to remain single throughout the matching process. Suppose the central planner does not give the woman an option to declare any man as unacceptable. How do we determine her best attainable partner by manipulation? This is essentially a restatement of our original question: Who is the best stable partner woman w can have when the menoptimal mechanism is used and when she can lie only by permuting her preference list. Note that the preferences of the remaining participants (except woman w) are fixed throughout. A natural extension of Algorithm OP is for woman w to: (i) accept a proposal first, and then reject all future proposals; (ii) from the list of men who proposed to her but were rejected, find her most preferred partner; repeat the men-propose algorithm until the stage when this man proposes to her; (iii) reverse the earlier decision and accept the proposal from this most preferred partner, and continue the men-propose algorithm by rejecting all future proposals; and (iv) repeat (ii) and (iii) until w cannot obtain a better partner from all other proposals. Unfortunately, this simple strategy does not always yield the best stable partner a woman can achieve under the Gale-Shapley model. The reason is that this greedy improvement technique does not allow for the possibility of rejecting the current best partner, in the hope that this rejection will trigger a proposal from a better would-be partner. Our algorithm in this paper, which is described next, does precisely that. An illustrative example appears soon after the description of the algorithm. Let P w = m 1 m 2 m n be the true preference list of woman w, and let P m w be a preference list for w so that the men-propose algorithm will return m as her men-optimal partner. In the case that man m cannot be obtained by w as her men-optimal partner for any preference list, we set P m w to be the null list, as a matter of convention. Our algorithm constructs P m w (if man m is attainable by woman w) or determines whether P m w is the null list (if man m is not attainable by woman w) iteratively, and consists of the following steps: 1. Run the men-propose algorithm with the true preference list P w for woman w. Keep track of all men who propose to w. Let the men-optimal partner for w be m, and let P m w be the true preference list P w. 2. Suppose m j proposed to w in the men-propose algorithm. By moving m j to the front of the list P m w, we obtain a preference list for w such that the new men-optimal partner (after running the menpropose algorithm on this modified list) is m j. Let P m j w be this altered list. We say that m j is a potential partner for w. 3. Repeat Step 2 to obtain a preference list for every man (other than m) who proposed to woman w in the algorithm; after this, we say that we have exhausted man m, the men-optimal partner obtained with the preference list P m w. All potential partners of w that come from running the men-propose algorithm using the list P m w have been found. 4. If a potential partner for w, say man u, has not been exhausted, run the men-propose algorithm with P u w as the preference list of w. Identify new potential partners. Repeat Steps 2 3 with u in place of m. 5. Repeat Step 4 until all potential partners of w are exhausted. Let N denote the set of all potential (and hence exhausted) partners for w. Management Science/Vol. 47, No. 9, September

7 6. Among the men in N let m a be the man woman w prefers most. Then P m a w is an optimal cheating strategy for w. The men in the set N at the end of the algorithm have the following crucial properties: For each man m in N, there is an associated preference list for w such that the men-propose algorithm returns m as the men-optimal partner for w with this list. All other proposals in the course of the menpropose algorithm come from other men in N. (Otherwise, there will be some potential partners who are not exhausted.) With each run of the men-propose algorithm, we exhaust a potential partner, and so this algorithm executes at most n men-propose algorithms before termination. Example 1. Consider the following stable marriage problem: True Preferences of the Men True Preferences of the Women We construct the optimal cheating strategy for Woman 1 using the algorithm described earlier. Step 1 Run the men-propose algorithm with the true preference list for Woman 1; her men-optimal partner is Man 5. Man 4 is the only other man who proposes to her during the men-propose algorithm. So P(Man 5, Woman 1) = Steps 2 3 Man 4 is moved to the head of Woman 1 s preference list; i.e., P(Man 4, Woman 1) = Man 5 is exhausted, and Man 4 is a potential partner. Step 4 As Man 4 is not yet exhausted, we run the men-propose algorithm with P(Man 4, Woman 1) as the preference list for Woman 1. Man 3 is identified as a new possible partner, with P(Man 3, Woman 1) = Man 4 is exhausted after this. Repeat Step 4 As Man 3 is not yet exhausted, we run the men-propose algorithm with P(Man 3, Woman 1) as the preference list for Woman 1. Man 3 will be exhausted after this. No new potential partner is found, and so the algorithm terminates. Remark. Example 1 shows that woman 1 could cheat and get a partner better than her men-optimal partner. However, her women-optimal partner in this case turns out to be Man 1. Hence Example 1 also shows that Woman 1 cannot always assure herself of her women-optimal partner through cheating, in contrast to the case when rejection is allowed in the cheating strategy. We conclude this section by stating and proving the main result. Recall that m a is the best man according to w s true preference list among the men in set N constructed by the algorithm. Theorem 2. = P m a w is an optimal strategy for woman w. Proof (by contradiction). We use the convention that r m = k if man m is the kth man on woman w s true preference list. Let = m p1 m p2 m pn be a preference list that gives w her best stable partner when the men-optimal mechanism is used. Let this man be denoted by m pb, and let woman w strictly prefer m pb to m a (under her true preference list), i.e., r m pb <r m a. Observe that the order of the men who do not propose to woman w is irrelevant and does not affect the outcome of the men-propose algorithm. Furthermore, men of rank higher than r m pb do not get to propose to w, otherwise we can cheat further and improve on the best partner for w, contradicting the optimality of. Thus we can arbitrarily alter the order of these men, without affecting the outcome. Without loss of generality, we may assume that 1 = r m p1 <2 = r m p2 < <b= r m pb. Since r m pb <r m a m a will appear somewhere after m pb in : thus, m a can be any of the men in the list m p b+1 m p b+2 m pn. Now, we modify such that all men who (numerically) rank lower than m a but higher than m pb (under true preferences) are put in order according to their ranks. This is accomplished by moving all these men before m a in. With that alteration, we obtain a new list = m q1 m q2 m qn such that: (i) 1 = r m q1 <2 = r m q2 < <s= r m qs Management Science/Vol. 47, No. 9, September 2001

8 (ii) m q1 = m p1 m qb = m pb, where the position of those men who rank higher than m pb is unchanged. (iii) r m a = s + 1 m a m q s+1 m q s+2 m qn. (iv) The men in the set m q s+1 m q s+2 m qn retain their relative position with respect to one another under. Note that the men-optimal partner of w under cannot come from the set m q s+1 m q s+2 m qn. Otherwise, since the set of men who proposed in the course of the algorithm must come from m q s+1 m q s+2 m qn, and since the preference list retains the relative order of the men in this set, the same partner would be obtained under. This leads to a contradiction as is supposed to return a better partner for w. Hence, we can see that under, we already get a better partner than under. Now, since the preference list returns m a with r m a = s + 1, we may conclude that the set N (obtained from the final stage of the algorithm) does not contain any man of rank lower than s + 1. Thus N m q s+1 m q s+2 m qn. Suppose m q s+1 m q s+2 m qw do not belong to the set N, and m q w+1 is the first man after m qs who belongs to the set N. By construction of N, there exists a permutation ˆ with m q w+1 as the stable partner for w under the men-optimal mechanism. Furthermore, all of those who propose to w in the course of the algorithm are in N, and hence they are no better than m a to w. Furthermore, all proposals come from men in m q w+1 m q w+2 m qn, since N m q s+1, m q s+2 m qn. By altering the order of those who did not propose to w, we may assume that ˆ takes the following form: m q1 m q2 m q s 1 m qs m qw m q w+1, where the first qw + 1 men in the list are identical to those in. But, the men-optimal stable solution obtained using ˆ must also be stable under, since w is match to m q w+1, and the set of men she strictly prefers to m q w+1 is identical in both ˆ and. This is a contradiction as is supposed to return a menoptimal solution better than m a. This implies that does not exist, and so is optimum and m a is the best stable partner w can get by permuting her preference list. 3. Strategic Issues in the Gale-Shapley Problem By requiring the women to submit complete preference lists, we are clearly restricting their strategic options; thus many of the strong structural results known for the rejection model may not hold for the Gale-Shapley model. This is good news, for it reduces the incentive for a woman to cheat. In this section, we present several examples to show that the strategic behavior of the women can be very different under the models with and without rejection The Best Man (Obtained by Cheating) May Not Be Women-Optimal In the two-sided matching model with rejection, it is not difficult to see that the women can always force the men-optimal mechanism to return the womenoptimal solution (for instance, each woman declares as unacceptable those men who are inferior to her true women-optimal partner). In the Gale-Shapley model, which forbids rejection, the influence of the women is far less, even if they collude. A simple example is when each woman is ranked first by exactly one man. In this case, there is no conflict among the men, and in the men-optimal solution, each man is matched to the woman he ranks first. In this case, the algorithm will terminate with the men-optimal matching, regardless of how the women rank the men in their lists. So ruling out the strategic option of remaining single for the women significantly affects their ability to change the outcome of the game by cheating. By repeating the above analysis for all the other women in Example 1, we conclude that, by cheating unilaterally, the best possible partners for Women 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 are, respectively, Men 3, 1, 2, 4, and 3. An interesting observation is that Woman 5 cannot benefit by cheating alone (she can only get her menoptimal partner no matter how she cheats). However, if Woman 1 cheats using the preference list (3, 4, 1, 2, 5), Woman 5 will also benefit by being matched to Man 5, who is first in her list Does Cheating Pay? Roth (1982) shows that under the men-optimal mechanism, the men have no incentive to alter their true preference lists. In the rejection model, however, Gale Management Science/Vol. 47, No. 9, September

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Entry Level College Mathematics: Algebra or Modeling Dan Kalman Dan Kalman is Associate Professor in Mathematics and Statistics at American University. His interests include matrix theory, curriculum development,