The period of
counter-revolution in Russia brought not only "thunder and
lightning" in its train, but also disillusionment in the
movement and lack of faith in common forces. As long as people
believed in "a bright future," they fought side by side
irrespective of nationality -- common questions first and foremost!
But when doubt crept into people's hearts, they began to depart, each
to his own national tent -- let every man count only upon himself!
The "national question" first and foremost!

At the same time a profound upheaval
was taking place in the economic life of the country. The year 1905
had not been in vain: one more blow had been struck at the survivals
of serfdom in the countryside. The series of good harvests which
succeeded the famine years, and the industrial boom which followed,
furthered the progress of capitalism. Class differentiation in the
countryside, the growth of the towns, the development of trade and
means of communication all took a big stride forward. This applied
particularly to the border regions. And it could not but hasten the
process of economic consolidation of the nationalities of Russia.
They were bound to be stirred into movement.

The "constitutional regime"
established at that time also acted in the same direction of
awakening the nationalities. The spread of newspapers and of
literature generally, a certain freedom of the press and cultural
institutions, an increase in the number of national theatres, and so
forth, all unquestionably helped to strengthen "national
sentiments." The Duma, with its election campaign and political
groups, gave fresh opportunities for greater activity of the nations
and provided a new and wide arena for their mobilization.

And the mounting wave of militant
nationalism above and the series of repressive measures taken by the
"powers that be" in vengeance on the border regions for
their "love of freedom," evoked an answering wave of
nationalism below, which at times took the form of crude chauvinism.
The spread of Zionism [1]
among the Jews, the increase of chauvinism in Poland, Pan-Islamism
among the Tatars, the spread of nationalism among the Armenians,
Georgians and Ukrainians, the general swing of the philistine towards
anti-Semitism -- all these are generally known facts.

The wave of nationalism swept onwards
with increasing force, threatening to engulf the mass of the workers.
And the more the movement for emancipation declined, the more
plentifully nationalism pushed forth its blossoms.

At this difficult time
Social-Democracy had a high mission -- to resist nationalism and to
protect the masses from the general "epidemic." For
Social-Democracy, and Social-Democracy alone, could do this, by
countering nationalism with the tried weapon of internationalism,
with the unity and indivisibility of the class struggle. And the more
powerfully the wave of nationalism advanced, the louder had to be the
call of Social-Democracy for fraternity and unity among the
proletarians of all the nationalities of Russia. And in this
connection particular firmness was demanded of the Social-Democrats
of the border regions, who came into direct contact with the
nationalist movement.

But not all Social-Democrats proved
equal to the task -- and this applies particularly to the
Social-Democrats of the border regions. The Bund, which had
previously laid stress on the common tasks, now began to give
prominence to its own specific, purely nationalist aims: it went to
the length of declaring "observance of the Sabbath" and
"recognition of Yiddish" a fighting issue in its election
campaign. [2]
The Bund was followed by the Caucasus; one section of the Caucasian
Social-Democrats, which, like the rest of the Caucasian
Social-Democrats, had formerly rejected "cultural-national
autonomy," are now making it an immediate demand. [3]
This is without mentioning the conference of the Liquidators, which
in a diplomatic way gave its sanction to nationalist vacillations.
[4]

But from this it follows that the
views of Russian Social-Democracy on the national question are not
yet clear to all Social-Democrats.

It is evident that a serious and
comprehensive discussion of the national question is required.
Consistent Social-Democrats must work solidly and indefatigably
against the fog of nationalism, no matter from what quarter it
proceeds.

I.THE NATION

What is a nation?

A nation is primarily a community, a
definite community of people.

This community is not racial, nor is
it tribal. The modern Italian nation was formed from Romans, Teutons,
Etruscans, Greeks, Arabs, and so forth. The French nation was formed
from Gauls, Romans, Britons, Teutons, and so on. The same must be
said of the British, the Germans and others, who were formed into
nations from people of diverse races and tribes.

Thus, a nation is not a racial or
tribal, but a historically constituted community of people.

On the other hand, it is
unquestionable that the great empires of Cyrus and Alexander could
not be called nations, although they came to be constituted
historically and were formed out of different tribes and races. They
were not nations, but casual and loosely-connected conglomerations of
groups, which fell apart or joined together according to the
victories or defeats of this or that conqueror.

Thus, a nation is not a casual or
ephemeral conglomeration, but a stable community of people.

But not every stable community
constitutes a nation. Austria and Russia are also stable communities,
but nobody calls them nations. What distinguishes a national
community from a state community? The fact, among others, that a
national community is inconceivable without a common language, while
a state need not have a common language. The Czech nation in Austria
and the Polish in Russia would be impossible if each did not have a
common language, whereas the integrity of Russia and Austria is not
affected by the fact that there are a number of different languages
within their borders. We are referring, of course, to the spoken
languages of the people and not to the official governmental
languages.

Thus, a common language is one
of the characteristic features of a nation.

This, of course, does not mean that
different nations always and everywhere speak different languages, or
that all who speak one language necessarily constitute one nation. A
common language for every nation, but not necessarily
different languages for different nations! There is no nation which
at one and the same time speaks several languages, but this does not
mean that there cannot be two nations speaking the same language!
Englishmen and Americans speak one language, but they do not
constitute one nation. The same is true of the Norwegians and the
Danes, the English and the Irish.

But why, for instance, do the English
and the Americans not constitute one nation in spite of their common
language?

Firstly, because they do not live
together, but inhabit different territories. A nation is formed only
as a result of lengthy and systematic intercourse, as a result of
people living together generation after generation.

But people cannot live together, for
lengthy periods unless they have a common territory. Englishmen and
Americans originally inhabited the same territory, England, and
constituted one nation. Later, one section of the English emigrated
from England to a new territory, America, and there, in the new
territory, in the course of time, came to form the new American
nation. Difference of. territory led to the formation of different
nations.

Thus, a common territory is
one of the characteristic features of a nation.

But this is not all. Common territory
does not by itself create a nation. This requires, in addition, an
internal economic bond to weld the various parts of the nation into a
single whole. There is no such bond between England and America, and
so they constitute two different nations. But the Americans
themselves would not deserve to be called a nation were not the
different parts of America bound together into an economic whole, as
a result of division of labour between them, the development of means
of communication, and so forth.

Take the Georgians, for instance. The
Georgians before the Reform inhabited a common territory and spoke
one language. Nevertheless, they did not, strictly speaking,
constitute one nation, for, being split up into a number of
disconnected principalities, they could not share a common economic
life; for centuries they waged war against each other and pillaged
each other, each inciting the Persians and Turks against the other.
The ephemeral and casual union of the principalities which some
successful king sometimes managed to bring about embraced at best a
superficial administrative sphere, and rapidly disintegrated owing to
the caprices of the princes and the indifference of the peasants. Nor
could it be otherwise in economically disunited Georgia ... Georgia
came on the scene as a nation only in the latter half of the
nineteenth century, when the fall of serfdom and the growth of the
economic life of the country, the development of means of
communication and the rise of capitalism, introduced division of
labour between the various districts of Georgia, completely shattered
the economic isolation of the principalities and bound them together
into a single whole.

The same must be said of the other
nations which have passed through the stage of feudalism and have
developed capitalism.

Thus, a common economic life,
economic cohesion, is one of the characteristic features of a
nation.

But even this is not all. Apart from
the foregoing, one must take into consideration the specific
spiritual complexion of the people constituting a nation. Nations
differ not only in their conditions of life, but also in spiritual
complexion, which manifests itself in peculiarities of national
culture. If England, America and Ireland, which speak one language,
nevertheless constitute three distinct nations, it is in no small
measure due to the peculiar psychological make-up which they
developed from generation to generation as a result of dissimilar
conditions of existence.

Of course, by itself, psychological
make-up or, as it is otherwise called, "national character,"
is something intangible for the observer, but in so far as it
manifests itself in a distinctive culture common to the nation it is
something tangible and cannot be ignored.

Needless to say, "national
character" is not a thing that is fixed once and for all, but is
modified by changes in the conditions of life; but since it exists at
every given moment, it leaves its impress on the physiognomy of the
nation.

Thus, a common psychological
make-up, which manifests itself in a common culture, is one of
the characteristic features of a nation.

We have now exhausted the
characteristic features of a nation.

A nation is a historically
constituted, stable community of people, formed on the basis of a
common language, territory, economic life, and psychological make-up
manifested in a common culture.

It goes without saying that a nation,
like every historical phenomenon, is subject to the law of change,
has its history, its beginning and end.

It must be emphasized that none of
the above characteristics taken separately is sufficient to define a
nation. More than that, it is sufficient for a single one of these
characteristics to be lacking and the nation ceases to be a nation.

It is possible to conceive of people
possessing a common "national character" who, nevertheless,
cannot be said to constitute a single nation if they are economically
disunited, inhabit different territories, speak different languages,
and so forth. Such, for instance, are the Russian, Galician,
American, Georgian and Caucasian Highland Jews, who, in our
opinion, do not constitute a single nation.

It is possible to conceive of people
with a common territory and economic life who nevertheless would not
constitute a single nation because they have no common language and
no common "national character." Such, for instance, are the
Germans and Letts in the Baltic region.

Finally, the Norwegians and the Danes
speak one language, but they do not constitute a single nation owing
to the absence of the other characteristics.

It is only when all these
characteristics are present together that we have a nation.

It might appear that "national
character" is not one of the characteristics but the sole
essential characteristic of a nation, and that all the other
characteristics are, properly speaking, only conditions for
the development of a nation, rather than its characteristics. Such,
for instance, is the view held by R. Springer, and more particularly
by O. Bauer, who are Social-Democratic theoreticians on the national
question well known in Austria.

Let us examine their theory of the
nation.

According to Springer, "a
nation is a union of similarly thinking and similarly speaking
persons." It is "a cultural community of modern people no
longer tied to the 'soil.'"[5]
(our italics).

Thus, a "union" of
similarly thinking and similarly speaking people, no matter how
disconnected they may be, no matter where they live, is a nation.

Bauer goes even further.

"What is a nation?" he
asks. "Is it a common language which makes people a nation? But
the English and the Irish ... speak the same language without,
however, being one people; the Jews have no common language and yet
are a nation." [6]

What, then, is a nation?

"A nation is a relative
community of character."

But what is character, in this case
national character?

National character is "the sum
total of characteristics which distinguish the people of one
nationality from the people of another nationality -- the complex of
physical and spiritual characteristics which distinguish one nation
from another."

Bauer knows, of course, that national
character does not drop from the skies, and he therefore adds:

"The character of people is
determined by nothing so much as by their destiny.... A nation is
nothing but a community with a common destiny" which, in turn,
is determined "by the conditions under which people produce
their means of subsistence and distribute the products of their
labour."

We thus arrive at the most
"complete," as Bauer calls it, definition of a nation:

"A nation is an aggregate of
people bound into a community of character by a common destiny."

We thus have common national
character based on a common destiny, but not necessarily connected
with a common territory, language or economic life.

But what in that case remains of the
nation? What common nationality can there be among people who are
economically disconnected, inhabit different territories and from
generation to generation speak different languages?

Bauer speaks of the Jews as a nation,
although they "have no common language"; but what "common
destiny" and national cohesion is there, for instance, between
the Georgian, Daghestanian, Russian and American Jews, who are
completely separated from one another, inhabit different territories
and speak different languages?

The above-mentioned Jews undoubtedly
lead their economic and political life in common with the Georgians,
Daghestanians, Russians and Americans respectively, and they live in
the same cultural atmosphere as these; this is bound to leave a
definite impress on their national character; if there is anything
common to them left, it is their religion, their common origin and
certain relics of the national character. All this is beyond
question. But how can it be seriously maintained that petrified
religious rites and fading psychological relics affect the "destiny"
of these Jews more powerfully than the living social, economic and
cultural environment that surrounds them? And it is only on this
assumption that it is possible to speak of the Jews as a single
nation at all.

What, then, distinguishes Bauer's
nation from the mystical and self-sufficient "national spirit"
of the spiritualists?

Bauer sets up an impassable barrier
between the "distinctive feature" of nations (national
character) and the "conditions" of their life, divorcing
the one from the other. But what is national character if not a
reflection of the conditions of life, a coagulation of impressions
derived from environment? How can one limit the matter to national
character alone, isolating and divorcing it from the soil that gave
rise to it?

Further, what indeed distinguished
the English nation from the American nation at the end of the
eighteenth and the beginning of the nineteenth centuries, when
America was still known as New England? Not national character, of
course; for the Americans had originated from England and had brought
with them to America not only the English language, but also the
English national character, which, of course, they could not lose so
soon; although, under the influence of the new conditions, they would
naturally be developing their own specific character. Yet, despite
their more or less common character, they at that time already
constituted a nation distinct from England! Obviously, New England as
a nation differed then from England as a nation not by its specific
national character, or not so much by its national character, as by
its environment and conditions of life, which were distinct from
those of England.

It is therefore clear that there is
in fact no single distinguishing characteristic of a nation.
There is only a sum total of characteristics, of which, when nations
are compared, sometimes one characteristic (national character),
sometimes another (language), or sometimes a third (territory,
economic conditions), stands out in sharper relief. A nation
constitutes the combination of all these characteristics taken
together.

Bauer's point of view, which
identifies a nation with its national character, divorces the nation
from its soil and converts it into an invisible, self-contained
force. The result is not a living and active nation, but something
mystical, intangible and supernatural. For, I repeat, what sort of
nation, for instance, is a Jewish nation which consists of Georgian,
Daghestanian, Russian, American and other Jews, the members of which
do not understand each other (since they speak different languages),
inhabit different parts of the globe, will never see each other, and
will never act together, whether in time of peace or in time of war?!

No, it is not for such paper
"nations" that Social-Democracy draws up its national
programme. It can reckon only with real nations, which act and move,
and therefore insist on being reckoned with.

Bauer is obviously confusing nation,
which is a historical category, with tribe, which is an
ethnographical category.

However, Bauer himself apparently
feels the weakness of his position. While in the beginning of his
book he definitely declares the Jews to be a nation, he corrects
himself at the end of the book and states that "in general
capitalist society makes it impossible for them (the Jews) to
continue as a nation," by causing them to assimilate with other
nations. The reason, it appears, is that "the Jews have no
closed territory of settlement," whereas the Czechs, for
instance, have such a territory and, according to Bauer, will survive
as a nation. In short, the reason lies in the absence of a territory.

By arguing thus, Bauer wanted to
prove that the Jewish workers cannot demand national autonomy, but he
thereby inadvertently refuted his own theory, which denies that a
common territory is one of the characteristics of a nation.

But Bauer goes further. In the
beginning of his book he definitely declares that "the Jews have
no common language, and yet are a nation." But hardly has
he reached p. 130 than he effects a change of front and just as
definitely declares that "unquestionably, no nation is
possible without a common language" (our italics).

Bauer wanted to prove that "language
is the most important instrument of human intercourse," but at
the same time he inadvertently proved something he did not mean to
prove, namely, the unsoundness of his own theory of nations, which
denies the significance of a common language.

Thus this theory, stitched together
by idealistic threads, refutes itself.

II.THE NATIONAL
MOVEMENT

A nation is not merely a historical
category but a historical category belonging to a definite epoch, the
epoch of rising capitalism. The process of elimination of feudalism
and development of capitalism is at the same time a process of the
constitution of people into nations. Such, for instance, was the case
in Western Europe. The British, French, Germans, Italians and others
were formed into nations at the time of the victorious advance of
capitalism and its triumph over feudal disunity.

But the formation of nations in those
instances at the same time signified their conversion into
independent national states. The British, French and other nations
are at the same time British, etc., states. Ireland, which did not
participate in this process, does not alter the general picture.

Matters proceeded somewhat
differently in Eastern Europe. Whereas in the West nations developed
into states, in the East multi-national states were formed, states
consisting of several nationalities. Such are Austria-Hungary and
Russia. In Austria, the Germans proved to be politically the most
developed, and they took it upon themselves to unite the Austrian
nationalities into a state. In Hungary, the most adapted for state
organization were the Magyars -- the core of the Hungarian
nationalities -- and it was they who united Hungary. In Russia, the
uniting of the nationalities was undertaken by the Great Russians,
who were headed by a historically formed, powerful and well-organized
aristocratic military bureaucracy.

That was how matters proceeded in the
East.

This special method of formation of
states could take place only where feudalism had not yet been
eliminated, where capitalism was feebly' developed, where the
nationalities which had been forced into the background had not yet
been able to consolidate themselves economically into integral
nations.

But capitalism also began to develop
in the Eastern states. Trade and means of communication were
developing. Large towns were springing up. The nations were becoming
economically consolidated. Capitalism, erupting into the tranquil
life of the nationalities which had been pushed into the background,
was arousing them and stirring them into action. The development of
the press and the theatre, the activity of the Reichsrat (Austria)
and of the Duma (Russia) were helping to strengthen "national
sentiments." The intelligentsia that had arisen was being imbued
with "the national idea" and was acting in the same
direction....

But the nations which had been pushed
into the background and had now awakened to independent life, could
no longer form themselves into independent national states; they
encountered on their -path the very powerful resistance of the ruling
strata of the dominant nations, which had long ago assumed the
control of the state. They were too late!...

In this way the Czechs, Poles, etc.,
formed themselves into nations in Austria; the Croats, etc., in
Hungary; the Letts, Lithuanians, Ukrainians, Georgians, Armenians,
etc., in Russia. What had been an exception in Western Europe
(Ireland) became the rule in the East.

In the West, Ireland responded to its
exceptional position by a national movement. In the East, the
awakened nations were bound to respond in the same fashion.

Thus arose the circumstances which
impelled the young nations of Eastern Europe on to the path of
struggle.

The struggle began and flared up, to
be sure, not between nations as a whole, but between the ruling
classes of the dominant nations and of those that had been pushed
into the background. The struggle is usually conducted by the urban
petty bourgeoisie of the oppressed nation against the big bourgeoisie
of the dominant nation (Czechs and Germans), or by the rural
bourgeoisie of the oppressed nation against the landlords of the
dominant nation (Ukrainians in Poland), or by the whole "national"
bourgeoisie of the oppressed nations against the ruling nobility of
the dominant nation (Poland, Lithuania and the Ukraine in Russia).

The bourgeoisie plays the leading
role.

The chief problem for the young
bourgeoisie is the problem of the market. Its aim is to sell its
goods and to emerge victorious from competition with the bourgeoisie
of a different nationality. Hence its desire to secure its "own,"
its "home" market. The market is the first school in which
the bourgeoisie learns its nationalism.

But matters are usually not confined
to the market. The semi-feudal, semi-bourgeois bureaucracy of the
dominant nation intervenes in the struggle with its own methods of
"arresting and preventing." The bourgeoisie -- whether big
or small -- of the dominant nation is able to deal more "swiftly"
and "decisively" with its competitor. "Forces"
are united and a series of restrictive measures is put into operation
against the "alien" bourgeoisie, measures passing into acts
of repression. The struggle spreads from the economic sphere to the
political sphere. Restriction of freedom of movement, repression of
language, restriction of franchise, closing of schools, religious
restrictions, and so on, are piled upon the head of the "competitor."
Of course, such measures are designed not only in the interest of the
bourgeois classes of the dominant nation, but also in furtherance of
the specifically caste aims, so to speak, of the ruling bureaucracy.

But from the point of view of the
results achieved this is quite immaterial; the bourgeois classes and
the bureaucracy in this matter go hand in hand -- whether it be in
Austria-Hungary or in Russia.

The bourgeoisie of the oppressed
nation, repressed on every hand, is naturally stirred into movement.
It appeals to its "native folk" and begins to shout about
the "fatherland,'; claiming that its own cause is the cause of
the nation as a whole. It recruits itself an army from among its
"countrymen" in the interests of ... the "fatherland."
Nor do the "folk" always remain unresponsive to its
appeals; they rally around its banner: the repression from above
affects them too and provokes their discontent.

Thus the national movement begins.

The strength of the national movement
is determined by the degree to which the wide strata of the nation,
the proletariat and peasantry, participate in it.

Whether the proletariat rallies to
the banner of bourgeois nationalism depends on the degree of
development of class antagonisms, on the class consciousness and
degree of organization of the proletariat. The class-conscious
proletariat has its own tried banner, and has no need to rally to the
banner of the bourgeoisie.

As far as the peasants are concerned,
their participation in the national movement depends primarily on the
character of the repressions. If the repressions affect the "land,"
as was the case in Ireland, then the mass of the peasants immediately
rally to the banner of the national movement.

On the other hand, if, for example,
there is no serious anti-Russian nationalism in Georgia, it is
primarily because there are neither Russian landlords nor a Russian
big bourgeoisie there to supply the fuel for such nationalism among
the masses. In Georgia there is anti-Armenian nationalism; but
this is because there is still an Armenian big bourgeoisie there
which, by getting the better of the small and still unconsolidated
Georgian bourgeoisie, drives the latter to anti-Armenian nationalism.
.

Depending on these factors, the
national movement either assumes a mass character and steadily grows
(as in Ireland and Galicia), or is converted into a series of petty
collisions, degenerating into squabbles and "fights" over
signboards (as in some of the small towns of Bohemia).

The content of the national movement,
of course, cannot everywhere be the same: it is wholly determined by
the diverse demands made by the movement. In Ireland the movement
bears an agrarian character; in Bohemia it bears a "language"
character; in one place the demand is for civil equality and
religious freedom, in another for the nation's "own"
officials, or its own Diet. The diversity of demands not infrequently
reveals the diverse features which characterize a nation in general
(language, territory, etc.). It is worthy of note that we never meet
with a demand based on Bauer's all-embracing "national
character." And this is natural: "national character"
in itself is something intangible, and, as was correctly
remarked by J. Strasser, "a politician can't do anything with
it." [7]

Such, in general, are the forms and
character of the national movement.

From what has been said it will be
clear that the national struggle under the conditions of rising
capitalism is a struggle of the bourgeois classes among themselves.
Sometimes the bourgeoisie succeeds in drawing the proletariat into
the national movement, and then the national struggle externally
assumes a "nation-wide" character. But this is so only
externally. In its essence it is always a bourgeois struggle,
one that is to the advantage and profit mainly of the bourgeoisie.

But it does not by any means follow
that the proletariat should not put up a fight against the policy of
national oppression.

Restriction of freedom of movement,
disfranchisement, repression of language, closing of schools, and
other forms of persecution affect the workers no less, if not more,
than the bourgeoisie. Such a state of affairs can only serve to
retard the free development of the intellectual forces of the
proletariat of subject nations. One cannot speak seriously of a full
development of the intellectual faculties of the Tatar or Jewish
worker if he is not allowed to use his native language at meetings
and lectures, and if his schools are closed down.

But the policy of nationalist
persecution is dangerous to the cause of the proletariat also on
another account. It diverts the attention of large strata from social
questions, questions of the class struggle, to national questions,
questions "common" to the proletariat and the bourgeoisie.
And this creates a favourable soil for lying propaganda about
"harmony of interests," for glossing over the class
interests of the proletariat and for the intellectual enslavement of
the workers.

This creates a serious obstacle to
the cause of uniting the workers of all nationalities. If a
considerable proportion of the Polish workers are still in
intellectual bondage to the bourgeois nationalists, if they still
stand aloof from the international labour movement, it is chiefly
because the age-old anti-Polish policy of the "powers that be"
creates the soil for this bondage and hinders the emancipation of the
workers from it.

But the policy of persecution does
not stop there. It not infrequently passes from a "system"
of oppression to a "system" of inciting
nations against each other, to a "system" of massacres and
pogroms. Of course, the latter system is not everywhere and always
possible, but where it is possible -- in the absence of elementary
civil rights -- it frequently assumes horrifying proportions and
threatens to drown the cause of unity of the workers in blood and
tears. The Caucasus and south Russia furnish numerous examples.
"Divide and rule" -- such is the purpose of the policy of
incitement. And where such a policy succeeds, it is a tremendous evil
for the proletariat and a serious obstacle to the cause of uniting
the workers of all the nationalities in the state.

But the workers are interested in the
complete amalgamation of all their fellow-workers into a single
international army, in their speedy and final emancipation from
intellectual bondage to the bourgeoisie, and in the full and free
development of the intellectual forces of their brothers, whatever
nation they may belong to.

The workers therefore combat and will
continue to combat the policy of national oppression in all its
forms, from the most subtle to the most crude, as well as the policy
of inciting nations against each other in all its forms

Social-Democracy in all countries
therefore proclaims the right of nations to self-determination.

The right of self-determination means
that only the nation itself has the right to determine its destiny,
that no one has the right forcibly to interfere in the life of
the nation, to destroy its schools and other institutions, to
violate its habits and customs, to repress its
language, or curtail its rights.

This, of course, does not mean that
Social-Democracy will support every custom and institution of a
nation. While combating the coercion of any nation, it will uphold
only the right of the nation itself to determine its own
destiny, at the same time agitating against harmful customs and
institutions of that nation in order to enable the toiling strata of
the nation to emancipate themselves from them.

The right of self-determination means
that a nation may arrange its life in the way it wishes. It has the
right to arrange its life on the basis of autonomy. It has the right
to enter into federal relations with other nations. It has the right
to complete secession. Nations are sovereign, and all nations have
equal rights.

This, of course, does not mean that
Social-Democracy will support every demand of a nation. A nation has
the right even to return to the old order of things; but this does
not mean that Social-Democracy will subscribe to such a decision if
taken by some institution of a particular nation. The obligations of
Social-Democracy, which defends the interests of the proletariat, and
the rights of a nation, which consists of various classes, are two
different things.

In fighting for the right of nations
to self-determination, the aim of Social-Democracy is to put an end
to the policy of national oppression, to render it impossible, and
thereby to remove the grounds of strife between nations, to take the
edge off that strife and reduce it to a minimum.

This is what essentially
distinguishes the policy of the class-conscious proletariat from the
policy of the bourgeoisie, which attempts to aggravate and fan the
national struggle and to prolong and sharpen the national movement.

And that is why the class-conscious
proletariat cannot rally under the "national" flag of the
bourgeoisie.

That is why the so-called
"evolutionary national" policy advocated by Bauer cannot
become the policy of the proletariat. Bauer's attempt to identify his
"evolutionary national" policy with the policy of the
"modern working class" is an attempt to adapt the class
struggle of the workers to the struggle of the nations.

The fate of a national movement,
which is essentially a bourgeois movement, is naturally bound up with
the fate of the bourgeoisie. The -final disappearance of a national
movement is possible only with the downfall of the bourgeoisie. Only
under the reign of socialism can peace be fully established. But even
within the framework of capitalism it is possible to reduce the
national struggle to a minimum, to undermine it at the root, to
render it as harmless as possible to the proletariat. This is borne
out, for example, by Switzerland and America. It requires that the
country should be democratized and the nations be given the
opportunity of free development.

III.PRESENTATION
OF THE QUESTION

A nation has the right freely to
determine its own destiny. It has the right to arrange its life as it
sees fit, without, of course, trampling on the rights of other
nations. That is beyond dispute.

But how exactly should it
arrange its own life, what forms should its future
constitution take, if the interests of the majority of the nation
and, above all, of the proletariat are to be borne in mind?

A nation has the right to arrange its
life on autonomous lines. It even has the right to secede. But this
does not mean that it should do so under all circumstances, that
autonomy, or separation, will everywhere and always be advantageous
for a nation, i.e., for its majority, i.e., for the toiling strata.
The Transcaucasian Tatars as a nation may assemble, let us say, in
their Diet and, succumbing to the influence of their beys and
mullahs, decide to restore the old order of things and to secede from
the state. According to the meaning of the clause on
self-determination they are fully entitled to do so. But will this be
in the interest of the toiling strata of the Tatar nation? Can
Social-Democracy look on indifferently when the beys and mullahs
assume the leadership of the masses in the solution of the national
question?

Should not Social-Democracy interfere
in the matter and influence the will of the nation in a definite way?
Should it not come forward with a definite plan for the solution of
the question, a plan which would be most advantageous for the Tatar
masses?

But what solution would be most
compatible with the interests of the toiling masses? Autonomy,
federation or separation?

All these are problems the solution
of which will depend on the concrete historical conditions in which
the given nation finds itself.

More than that; conditions, like
everything else, change, and a decision which is correct at one
particular time may prove to be entirely unsuitable at another.

In the middle of the nineteenth
century Marx was in favour of the secession of Russian Poland; and he
was right, for it was then a question of emancipating a higher
culture from a lower culture that was destroying it. And the question
at that time was not only a theoretical one, an academic question,
but a practical one, a question of actual reality....

At the end of the nineteenth century
the Polish Marxists were already declaring against the secession of
Poland; and they too were right, for during the fifty years that had
elapsed profound changes had taken place, bringing Russia and Poland
closer economically and culturally. Moreover, during that period the
question of secession had been converted from a practical matter into
a matter of academic dispute, which excited nobody except perhaps
intellectuals abroad.

This, of course, by no means
precludes the possibility that certain internal and external
conditions may arise in which the question of the secession of Poland
may again come on the order of the day.

The solution of the national question
is possible only in connection with the historical conditions taken
in their development.

The economic, political and cultural
conditions of a given nation constitute the only key to the question
how a particular nation ought to arrange its life and what
forms its future constitution ought to take. It is possible that
a specific solution of the question will be required for each nation.
If the dialectical approach to a question is required anywhere it is
required here, in the national question.

In view of this we must declare our
decided opposition to a certain very widespread, but very summary
manner of "solving" the national question, which owes its
inception to the Bund. We have in mind the easy method of referring
to Austrian and South-Slav [8]
Social-Democracy, which has supposedly already solved the national
question and whose solution the Russian Social-Democrats should
simply borrow. It is assumed that whatever, say, is right for Austria
is also right for Russia. The most important and decisive factor is
lost sight of here, namely, the concrete historical conditions in
Russia as a whole and in the life of each of the nations inhabiting
Russia in particular.

Listen, for example, to what the
well-known Bundist, V. Kossovsky, says:

"When at the Fourth Congress of
the Bund the principles of the question (i.e., the national question
-- J. St.) were discussed, the proposal made by one of the
members of the congress to settle the question in the spirit of the
resolution of the South-Slav Social-Democratic Party met with
general approval." [9]

And the result was that "the
congress unanimously adopted" ... national autonomy.

And that was all! No analysis of the
actual conditions in Russia, no investigation of the condition of the
Jews in Russia. They first borrowed the solution of the South-Slav
Social-Democratic Party, then they "approved" it, and
finally they "unanimously adopted" it! This is the way the
Bundists present and "solve" the national question in
Russia....

As a matter of fact, Austria and
Russia represent entirely different conditions. This explains why the
Social-Democrats in Austria, when they adopted their national
programme at Brünn (1899) [10]
in the spirit of the resolution of the South-Slav Social-Democratic
Party (with certain insignificant amendments, it is true), approached
the question in an entirely non-Russian way, so to speak, and, of
course, solved it in a non-Russian way.

First, as to the presentation of the
question. How is the question presented by the Austrian theoreticians
of cultural-national autonomy, the interpreters of the Brünn
national programme and the resolution of the South-Slav
Social-Democratic Party, Springer and Bauer?

"Whether a multi-national state
is possible," says Springer, "and whether, in particular,
the Austrian nationalities are obliged to form a single political
entity, is a question we shall not answer here but shall assume to
be settled. For anyone who will not concede this possibility and
necessity, our investigation will, of course, be purposeless. Our
theme is as follows: inasmuch as these nations are obliged to
live together, what legal forms will enable them to live
together in the best possible way?" (Springer's italics).
[11]

Thus, the starting point is the state
integrity of Austria.

Bauer says the same thing:

"We therefore start from the
assumption that the Austrian nations will remain in the same state
union in which they exist at present and inquire how the nations
within this union will arrange their relations among themselves and
to the state."

Here again the first thing is the
integrity of Austria.

Can Russian Social-Democracy present
the question in this way? No, it cannot. And it cannot because
from the very outset it holds the view of the right of nations to
self-determination, by virtue of which a nation has the right of
secession.

Even the Bundist Goldblatt admitted
at the Second Congress of Russian Social-Democracy that the latter
could not abandon the standpoint of self-determination. Here is what
Goldblatt said on that occasion:

"Nothing can be said against
the right of self-determination. If any nation is striving for
independence, we must not oppose it. If Poland does not wish to
enter into lawful wedlock with Russia, it is not for us to interfere
with her."

All this is true. But it follows that
the starting points of the Austrian and Russian Social-Democrats, far
from being identical, are diametrically opposite. After this, can
there be any question of borrowing the national programme of the
Austrians?

Furthermore, the Austrians hope to
achieve the "freedom of nationalities" by means of petty
reforms, by slow steps. While they propose cultural-national autonomy
as a practical measure, they do not count on any radical change, on a
democratic movement for liberation, which they do not even
contemplate. The Russian Marxists, on the other hand, associate the
"freedom of nationalities" with a probable radical change,
with a democratic movement for liberation, having no grounds for
counting on reforms. And this essentially alters matters in regard to
the probable fate of the nations of Russia.

"Of course," says Bauer,
"there is little probability that national autonomy will be the
result of a great decision, of a bold action. Austria will develop
towards national autonomy step by step, by a slow process of
development, in the course of a severe struggle, as a consequence of
which legislation and administration will be in a state of chronic
paralysis. The new constitution will not be created by a great
legislative act, but by a multitude of separate enactments for
individual provinces and individual communities."

Springer says the same thing.

"I am very well aware," he
writes, "that institutions of this kind (i.e., organs of
national autonomy -- J. St.) are not created in a single year
or a single decade. The reorganization of the Prussian
administration alone took considerable time.... It took the
Prussians two decades finally to establish their basic
administrative institutions. Let nobody think that I harbour any
illusions as to the time required and the difficulties to be
overcome in Austria."

All this is very definite. But can
the Russian Marxists avoid associating the national question with
"bold actions"? Can they count on partial reforms, on "a
multitude of separate enactments" as a means for achieving the
"freedom of nationalities"? But if they cannot and must not
do so, is it not clear that the methods of struggle of the Austrians
and the Russians and their prospects must be entirely different? How
in such a state of affairs can they confine themselves to the
one-sided, milk-and-water cultural-national autonomy of the
Austrians? One or the other: either those who are in favour of
borrowing do not count on "bold actions" in Russia, or they
do count on such actions but "know not what they do."

Finally, the immediate tasks facing
Russia and Austria are entirely different and consequently dictate
different methods of solving the national question. In Austria
parliamentarism prevails, and under present conditions no development
in Austria is possible without parliament. But parliamentary life and
legislation in Austria are frequently brought to a complete
standstill by severe conflicts between the national parties. That
explains the chronic political crisis from which Austria has for a
long time been suffering. Hence, in Austria the national question is
the very hub of political life; it is the vital question. It is
therefore not surprising that the Austrian Social-Democratic
politicians should first of all try in one way or another to find a
solution for the national conflicts -- of course on the basis of the
existing parliamentary system, by parliamentary methods....

Not so with Russia. In the first
place, in Russia "there is no parliament, thank God." [13]
In the second place -- and this is the main point -- the hub of the
political life of Russia is not the national but the agrarian
question. Consequently, the fate of the Russian problem, and,
accordingly, the "liberation" of the nations too, is bound
up in Russia with the solution of the agrarian question, i.e., with
the destruction of the relics of feudalism, i.e., with the
democratization of the country. That explains why in Russia the
national question is not an independent and decisive one, but a part
of the general and more important question of the emancipation of the
country.

"The barrenness of the Austrian
parliament," writes Springer, "is due precisely to the
fact that every reform gives rise to antagonisms within the national
parties which may affect their unity. The leaders of the parties,
therefore, avoid everything that smacks of reform. Progress in
Austria is generally conceivable only if the nations are granted
indefeasible legal rights which will relieve them of the necessity
of constantly maintaining national militant groups in parliament and
will enable them to turn their attention to the solution of economic
and social problems."

Bauer says the same thing.

"National peace is
indispensable first of all for the state. The state cannot permit
legislation to be brought to a standstill by the very stupid
question of language or by every quarrel between excited people on a
linguistic frontier, or over every new school."

All this is clear. But it is no less
clear that the national question in Russia is on an entirely
different plane. It is not the national, but the agrarian question ,
that decides the fate of progress in Russia. The national question is
a subordinate one.

And so we have different
presentations of the question, different prospects and methods of
struggle, different immediate tasks. Is it not clear that, such being
the state of affairs, only pedants who "solve" the national
question without reference to space and time can think of adopting
examples from Austria and of borrowing a programme?

To repeat: the concrete historical
conditions as the starting point, and the dialectical presentation of
the question as the only correct way of presenting it -- such is the
key to solving the national question.

IV.CULTURAL-NATIONAL
AUTONOMY

We spoke above of the formal aspect
of the Austrian national programme and of the methodological grounds
which make it impossible for the Russian Marxists simply to adopt the
example of Austrian Social-Democracy and make the latter's programme
their own.

Let us now examine the essence of the
programme itself

What then is the national programme
of the Austrian Social-Democrats?

It is expressed in two words:
cultural-national autonomy.

This means, firstly, that autonomy
would be granted, let us say, not to Bohemia or Poland, which are
inhabited mainly by Czechs and Poles, but to Czechs and Poles
generally, irrespective of territory, no matter what part of Austria
they inhabit.

That is why this autonomy is called
national and not territorial.

It means, secondly, that the Czechs,
Poles, Germans, and so on, scattered over the various parts of
Austria, taken personally, as individuals, are to be organized into
integral nations, and are as such to form part of the Austrian state.
In this way Austria would represent not a union of autonomous
regions, but a union of autonomous nationalities, constituted
irrespective of territory.

It means, thirdly, that the national
institutions which are to be created for this purpose for the Poles,
Czechs, and so forth, are to have jurisdiction only over "cultural,"
not "political" questions. Specifically political questions
would be reserved for the Austrian parliament (the Reichsrat).

That is why this autonomy is also
called cultural, cultural-national autonomy.

And here is the text of the programme
adopted by the Austrian Social-Democratic Party at the Brünn
Congress in 1899. [14]

Having referred to the fact that
"national dissension in Austria is hindering political
progress," that "the final solution of the national
question... is primarily a cultural necessity," and that "the
solution is possible only in a genuinely democratic society,
constructed on the basis of universal, direct and equal suffrage,"
the programme goes on to say:

"The preservation and
development of the national peculiarities[15]
of the peoples of Austria is possible only on the basis of equal
rights and by avoiding all oppression. Hence, all bureaucratic state
centralism and the feudal privileges of individual provinces must
first of all be rejected.

"Under these conditions, and
only under these conditions, will it be possible to establish
national order in Austria in place of national dissension, namely,
on the following principles:

"1. Austria must be transformed
into a democratic state federation of nationalities.

"2. The historical crown
provinces must be replaced by nationally delimited self-governing
corporations, in each of which legislation and administration shall
be entrusted to national parliaments elected on the basis of
universal, direct and equal suffrage.

"3. All the self-governing
regions of one and the same nation must jointly form a single
national union, which shall manage its national affairs on an
absolutely autonomous basis.

"4. The rights of national
minorities must be guaranteed by a special law passed by the
Imperial Parliament."

The programme ends with an appeal for
the solidarity of all the nations of Austria. [16]

It is not difficult to see that this
programme retains certain traces of "territorialism," but
that in general it gives a formulation of national autonomy. It is
not without good reason that Springer, the first agitator on behalf
of cultural-national autonomy, greets it with enthusiasm; Bauer also
supports this programme, calling it a "theoretical victory"
for national autonomy; only, in the interests of greater clarity, he
proposes that Point 4 be replaced by a more definite formulation,
which would declare the necessity of "constituting the national
minority within each self-governing region into a public corporation"
for the management of educational and other cultural affairs.

Such is the national programme of
Austrian Social-Democracy.

Let us examine its scientific
foundations.

Let us see how the Austrian
Social-Democratic Party justifies the cultural-national autonomy it
advocates.

Let us turn to the theoreticians of
cultural-national autonomy, Springer and Bauer.

The starting point of national
autonomy is the conception of a nation as a union of individuals
without regard to a definite territory.

"Nationality," according
to Springer, "is not essentially connected with territory";
nations are "autonomous unions of persons."

Bauer also speaks of a nation as a
"community of persons" which does not enjoy "exclusive
sovereignty in any particular region."

But the persons constituting a nation
do not always live in one compact mass; they are frequently divided
into groups, and in that form are interspersed among alien national
organisms. It is capitalism which drives them into various regions
and cities in search of a livelihood. But when they enter foreign
national territories and there form minorities, these groups are made
to suffer by the local national majorities in the way of restrictions
on their language, schools, etc. Hence national conflicts. Hence the
"unsuitability" of territorial autonomy. The only solution
to such a situation, according to Springer and Bauer, is to organize
the minorities of the given nationality dispersed over various parts
of the state into a single, general, inter-class national union. Such
a union alone, in their opinion, can protect the cultural interests
of national minorities, and it alone is capable of putting an end to
national discord.

"Hence the necessity,"
says Springer, "to organize the nationalities, to invest them
with rights and responsibilities...." Of course, "a law is
easily drafted, but will it be effective? "... "If one
wants to make a law for nations, one must first create the
nations..." "Unless the nationalities are constituted it
is impossible to create national rights and eliminate national
dissension."

Bauer expressed himself in the same
spirit when he proposed, as "a demand of the working class,"
that "the minorities should be constituted into public
corporations based on the personal principle."

But how is a nation to be organized?
How is one to determine to what nation any given individual belongs?

"Nationality," says
Springer, "will be determined by certificates; every individual
domiciled in a given region must declare his affiliation to one of
the nationalities of that region."

"The personal principle,"
says Bauer, "presumes that the population will be divided into
nationalities.... On the basis of the free declaration of the adult
citizens national registers must be drawn up."

Further.

"All the Germans in nationally
homogeneous districts," says Bauer, "and all the Germans
entered in the national registers in the dual districts will
constitute the German nation and elect a National Council."

The same applies to the Czechs,
Poles, and so on.

"The National Council,"
according to Springer, "is the cultural parliament of the
nation, empowered to establish the principles and to grant funds,
thereby assuming guardianship over national education, national
literature, art and science, the formation of academies, museums,
galleries, theatres," etc.

Such will be the organization of a
nation and its central institution.

According to Bauer, the Austrian
Social-Democratic Party is striving, by the creation of these
inter-class institutions "to make national culture ... the
possession of the whole people and thereby unite all the members
of the nation into a national-cultural community." (our
italics).

One might think that all this
concerns Austria alone. But Bauer does not agree. He emphatically
declares that national autonomy is essential also for other states
which, like Austria, consist of several nationalities.

"In the multi-national state,"
according to Bauer, "the working class of all the nations
opposes the national power policy of the propertied classes with the
demand for national autonomy."

Then, imperceptibly substituting
national autonomy for the self-determination of nations, he
continues:

"Thus, national autonomy, the
self-determination of nations, will necessarily become the
constitutional programme of the proletariat of all the nations in a
multi-national state."

But he goes still further. He
profoundly believes that the inter-class "national unions"
"constituted" by him and Springer will serve as a sort of
prototype of the future socialist society. For he knows that "the
socialist system of society... will divide humanity into nationally
delimited communities"; that under socialism there will take
place "a grouping of humanity into autonomous national
communities," that thus, "socialist society will
undoubtedly present a checkered picture of national unions of persons
and territorial corporations, and that accordingly "the
socialist principle of nationality is a higher synthesis of the
national principle and national autonomy."

Enough, it would seem..

These are the arguments for
cultural-national autonomy as given in the works of Bauer and
Springer.

The first thing that strikes the eye
is the entirely inexplicable and absolutely unjustifiable
substitution of national autonomy for self-determination of nations.
One or the other: either Bauer failed to understand the meaning of
self-determination, or he did understand it but for some reason or
other deliberately narrowed its meaning. For there is no doubt a)
that cultural-national autonomy presupposes the integrity of the
multi-national state, whereas self-determination goes outside the
framework of this integrity, and b) that self-determination endows a
nation with complete rights, whereas national autonomy endows it only
with "cultural" rights. That in the first place.

In the second place, a combination of
internal and external conditions is fully possible at some future
time by virtue of which one or another of the nationalities may
decide to secede from a multi-national state, say from Austria. Did
not the Ruthenian Social-Democrats at the Brünn Party Congress
announce their readiness to unite the "two parts" of their
people into one whole? [17]
What, in such a case, becomes of national autonomy, which is
"inevitable for the proletariat of all the nations"?
What sort of "solution" of the problem is it that
mechanically squeezes nations into the Procrustean bed of an integral
state?

Further: National autonomy is
contrary to the whole course of development of nations. It calls for
the organization of nations; but can they be artificially welded
together if life, if economic development tears whole groups from
them and disperses these groups over various regions? There is no
doubt that in the early stages of capitalism nations become welded
together. But there is also no doubt that in the higher stages of
capitalism a process of dispersion of nations sets in, a process
whereby a whole number of groups separate off from the nations, going
off in search of a livelihood and subsequently settling permanently
in other regions of the state; in the course of this these settlers
lose their old connections and acquire new ones in their new
domicile, and from generation to generation acquire new habits and
new tastes, and possibly a new language. The question arises: is it
possible to unite into a single national union groups that have grown
so distinct? Where are the magic links to unite what cannot be
united? Is it conceivable that, for instance, the Germans of the
Baltic Provinces and the Germans of Transcaucasia can be "united
into a single nation"? But if it is not conceivable and not
possible, wherein does national autonomy differ from the utopia of
the old nationalists, who endeavoured to turn back the wheel of
history?

But the unity of a nation diminishes
not only as a result of migration. It diminishes also from internal
causes, owing to the growing acuteness of the class struggle. In the
early stages of capitalism one can still speak of a "common
culture" of the proletariat and the bourgeoisie. But as
large-scale industry develops and the class struggle becomes more and
more acute, this "common culture" begins to melt away. One
cannot seriously speak of the "common culture" of a nation
when employers and workers of one and the same nation cease to
understand each other. What "common destiny" can there be
when the bourgeoisie thirsts for war, and the proletariat declares
"war on war"? Can a single inter-class national union be
formed from such opposed elements? And, after this, can one speak of
the "union of all the members of the nation into a
national-cultural community"? Is it not obvious that national
autonomy is contrary to the whole course of the class struggle?

But let us assume for a moment that
the slogan "organize the nation" is practicable. One might
understand bourgeois-nationalist parliamentarians endeavouring to
"organize" a nation for the purpose of securing additional
votes. But since when have Social-Democrats begun to occupy
themselves with "organizing" nations, "constituting"
nations, "creating" nations?

What sort of Social-Democrats are
they who in the epoch of extreme intensification of the class
struggle organize inter-class national unions? Until now the
Austrian, as well as every other, Social-Democratic party, had one
task before it: namely, to organize the proletariat. That task has
apparently become "antiquated." Springer and Bauer are now
setting a "new" task, a more absorbing task, namely, to
"create," to "organize" a nation.

However, logic has its obligations:
he who adopts national autonomy must also adopt this "new"
task;

but to adopt the latter means to
abandon the class position and to take the path of nationalism.

Springer's and Bauer's
cultural-national autonomy is a subtle form of nationalism.

And it is by no means fortuitous that
the national programme of the Austrian Social-Democrats enjoins a
concern for the "preservation and development of
the national peculiarities of the peoples." Just think: to
"preserve" such "national peculiarities" of the
Transcaucasian Tatars as self-flagellation at the festival of
Shakhsei-Vakhsei; or to "develop" such "national
peculiarities" of the Georgians as the vendetta! ...

A demand of this character is in
place in an outright bourgeois nationalist programme; and if it
appears in the programme of the Austrian Social-Democrats it is
because national autonomy tolerates such demands, it does not
contradict them.

But if national autonomy is
unsuitable now, it will be still more unsuitable in the future,
socialist society.

Bauer's prophecy regarding the
"division of humanity into nationally delimited communities"
is refuted by the whole course of development of modern human
society. National barriers are being demolished and are falling,
rather than becoming firmer. As early as the 'forties Marx declared
that "national differences and antagonisms between peoples are
daily more and more vanishing" and that "the supremacy of
the proletariat will cause them to vanish still faster." [18]
The subsequent development of mankind, accompanied as it was by the
colossal growth of capitalist production, the reshuffling of
nationalities and the union of people within ever larger territories,
emphatically confirms Marx's thought.

Bauer's desire to represent socialist
society as a "checkered picture of national unions of persons
and territorial corporations" is a timid attempt to substitute
for Marx's conception of socialism a revised version of Bakunin's
conception. The history of socialism proves that every such attempt
contains the elements of inevitable failure.

There is no need to mention the kind
of "socialist principle of nationality" glorified by Bauer,
which, in our opinion, substitutes for the socialist principle of the
class struggle the bourgeois "principle of
nationality." If national autonomy is based on such a
dubious principle, it must be admitted that it can only cause harm to
the working-class movement.

True, such nationalism is not so
transparent, for it is skilfully masked by socialist phrases, but it
is all the more harmful to the proletariat for that reason. We can
always cope with open nationalism, for it can easily be discerned. It
is much more difficult to combat nationalism when it is masked and
unrecognizable beneath its mask. Protected by the armour of
socialism, it is less vulnerable and more tenacious. Implanted among
the workers, it poisons the atmosphere and spreads harmful ideas of
mutual distrust and segregation among the workers of the different
nationalities.

But this does not exhaust the harm
caused by national autonomy. It prepares the ground not only for the
segregation of nations, but also for breaking up the united labour
movement. The idea of national autonomy creates the psychological
conditions for the division of the united workers' party into
separate parties built on national lines. The breakup of the party is
followed by the breakup of the trade unions, and complete segregation
is the result. In this way the united class movement is broken up
into separate national rivulets.

Austria, the home of "national
autonomy," provides the most deplorable examples of this. As
early as 1897 (the Wimberg Party Congress [19])
the once united Austrian Social-Democratic Party began to break up
into separate parties. The breakup became still more marked after the
Brünn Party Congress (1899), which adopted national autonomy.
Matters have finally come to such a pass that in place of a united
international party there are now six national parties, of which the
Czech Social-Democratic Party will not even have anything to do with
the German Social-Democratic Party.

But with the parties are associated
the trade unions. In Austria, both in the parties and in the trade
unions, the main brunt of the work is borne by the same
Social-Democratic workers. There was therefore reason to fear that
separatism in the party would lead to separatism in the trade unions
and that the trade unions would also break up. That, in fact, is what
happened: the trade unions have also divided according to
nationality. Now things frequently go so far that the Czech workers
will even break a strike of German workers, or will unite at
municipal elections with the Czech bourgeois against the German
workers.

It will be seen from the foregoing
that cultural-national autonomy is no solution of the national
question. Not only that, it serves to aggravate and confuse the
question by creating a situation which favours the destruction of the
unity of the labour movement, fosters the segregation of the workers
according to nationality and intensifies friction among them.

Such is the harvest of national
autonomy.

V.THE BUND, ITS
NATIONALISM,ITS SEPARATISM

We said above that Bauer, while
granting the necessity of national autonomy for the Czechs, Poles,
and so on, nevertheless opposes similar autonomy for the Jews. In
answer to the question, "Should the working class demand
autonomy for the Jewish people?" Bauer says that "national
autonomy cannot be demanded by the Jewish workers." According to
Bauer, the reason is that "capitalist society makes it
impossible for them (the Jews -- J. St.) to continue as a
nation."

In brief, the Jewish nation is coming
to an end, and hence there is nobody to demand national autonomy for.
The Jews are being assimilated.

This view of the fate of the Jews as
a nation is not a new one. It was expressed by Marx as early as the
'forties, [20][21]
in reference chiefly to the German Jews. It was repeated by Kautsky
in 1903, [22]
in reference to the Russian Jews. It is now being repeated by Bauer
in reference to the Austrian Jews, with the difference, however, that
he denies not the present but the future of the Jewish nation.

Bauer explains the impossibility of
preserving the existence of the Jews as a nation by the fact that
"the Jews have no closed territory of settlement." This
explanation, in the main a correct one, does not however express the
whole truth. The fact of the matter is primarily that among the Jews
there is no large and stable stratum connected with the land, which
would naturally rivet the nation together, serving not only as its
framework but also as a "national" market. Of the five or
six million Russian Jews, only three to four per cent are connected
with agriculture in any way. The remaining ninety-six per cent are
employed in trade, industry, in urban institutions, and in general
are town dwellers; moreover, they are spread all over Russia and do
not constitute a majority in a single gubernia.

Thus, interspersed as national
minorities in areas inhabited by other nationalities, the Jews as a
rule serve "foreign" nations as manufacturers and traders
and as members of the liberal professions, naturally adapting
themselves to the "foreign nations" in respect to language
and so forth. All this, taken together with the increasing
re-shuffling of nationalities characteristic of developed forms of
capitalism, leads to the assimilation of the Jews. The abolition of
the "Pale of Settlement" would only serve to hasten this
process of assimilation.

The question of national autonomy for
the Russian Jews consequently assumes a somewhat curious character:
autonomy is being proposed for a nation whose future is denied and
whose existence has still to be proved!

Nevertheless, this was the curious
and shaky position taken up by the Bund when at its Sixth Congress
(1905) it adopted a "national programme" on the fines of
national autonomy.

Two circumstances impelled the Bund
to take this step.

The first circumstance is the
existence of the Bund as an organization of Jewish, and only Jewish,
Social-Democratic workers. Even before 1897 the Social-Democratic
groups active among the Jewish workers set themselves the aim of
creating "a special Jewish workers' organization." [23]
They founded such an organization in 1897 by uniting to form the
Bund. That was at a time when Russian Social-Democracy as an integral
body virtually did not yet exist. The Bund steadily grew and spread,
and stood out more and more vividly against the background of the
bleak days of Russian Social-Democracy.... Then came the 1900's. A
mass labour movement came into being. Polish Social-Democracy
grew and drew the Jewish workers into the mass struggle. Russian
Social-Democracy grew and attracted the "Bund" workers.
Lacking a territorial basis, the national framework of the Bund
became too restrictive. The Bund was faced with the problem of either
merging with the general international tide, or of upholding its
independent existence as an extra-territorial organization. The Bund
chose the latter course.

Thus grew up the "theory"
that the Bund is "the sole representative of the Jewish
proletariat."

But to justify this strange "theory"
in any "simple" way became impossible. Some kind of
foundation "on principle," some justification "on
principle," was needed. Cultural-national autonomy provided such
a foundation. The Bund seized upon it, borrowing it from the Austrian
Social-Democrats. If the Austrians had not had such a programme the
Bund would have invented it in order to justify its independent
existence "on principle."

Thus, after a timid attempt in 1901
(the Fourth Congress), the Bund definitely adopted a "national
programme" in 1905 (the Sixth Congress).

The second circumstance is the
peculiar position of the Jews as separate national minorities within
compact majorities of other nationalities in integral regions. We
have already said that this position is undermining the existence of
the Jews as a nation and puts them on the road to assimilation. But
this is an objective process. Subjectively, in the minds of the Jews,
it provokes a reaction and gives rise to the demand for a guarantee
of the rights of a national minority, for a guarantee against
assimilation. Preaching as it does the vitality of the Jewish
"nationality," the Bund could not avoid being in favour of
a "guarantee." And, having taken up this position, it could
not but accept national autonomy. For if the Bund could seize upon
any autonomy at all, it could only be national autonomy, i.e.,
cultural-national autonomy; there could be no question of
territorial-political autonomy for the Jews, since the Jews have no
definite integral territory.

It is noteworthy that the Bund from
the outset stressed the character of national autonomy as a guarantee
of the rights of national minorities, as a guarantee of the "free
development" of nations. Nor was it fortuitous that the
representative of the Bund at the Second Congress of the Russian
Social-Democratic Party, Goldblatt, defined national autonomy as
"institutions which guarantee them (i.e., nations -- J.
St.) complete freedom of cultural development." [24]
A similar proposal was made by supporters of the ideas of the Bund to
the Social-Democratic group in the Fourth Duma....

In this way the Bund adopted the
curious position of national autonomy for the Jews.

We have examined above national
autonomy in general. The examination showed that national autonomy
leads to nationalism. We shall see later that the Bund has arrived at
the same end point. But the Bund also regards national autonomy from
a special aspect, namely, from the aspect of guarantees of the
rights of national minorities. Let us also examine the question from
this special aspect. It is all the more necessary since the problem
of national minorities -- and not of the Jewish minorities alone --
is one of serious moment for Social-Democracy.

And so, it is a question of
"institutions which guarantee" nations "complete
freedom of cultural development" (our italics -- J. St.).

But what are these "institutions
which guarantee," etc.?

They are primarily the "National
Council" of Springer and Bauer, something in the nature of a
Diet for cultural affairs.

But can these institutions guarantee
a nation "complete freedom of cultural development"? Can a
Diet for cultural affairs guarantee a nation against nationalist
persecution?

The Bund believes it can.

But history proves the contrary.

At one time a Diet existed in Russian
Poland. It was a political Diet and, of course, endeavoured to
guarantee freedom of "cultural development" for the Poles.
But, far from succeeding in doing so, it itself succumbed in the
unequal struggle against the political conditions generally
prevailing in Russia.

A Diet has been in existence for a
long time in Finland, and it too endeavours to protect the Finnish
nationality from "encroachments," but how far it succeeds
in doing so everybody can see.

Of course, there are Diets and Diets,
and it is not so easy to cope with the democratically organized
Finnish Diet as it was with the aristocratic Polish Diet. But the
decisive factor, nevertheless, is not the Diet, but the
general regime in Russia. If such a grossly Asiatic social and
political regime existed in Russia now as in the past, at the time
the Polish Diet was abolished, things would go much harder with the
Finnish Diet. Moreover, the policy of "encroachments" upon
Finland is growing, and it cannot be said that it has met with
defeat....

If such is the case with old,
historically evolved institutions -- political Diets -- still less
will young Diets, young institutions, especially such feeble
institutions as "cultural" Diets, be able to guarantee the
free development of nations.

Obviously, it is not a question of
"institutions," but of the general regime prevailing in the
country. If there is no democracy in the country there can be no
guarantees of "complete freedom for cultural development"
of nationalities. One may say with certainty that the more democratic
a country is the fewer are the "encroachments" made on the
"freedom of nationalities," and the greater are the
guarantees against such "encroachments."

Russia is a semi-Asiatic country, and
therefore in Russia the policy of "encroachments" not
infrequently assumes the grossest form, the form of pogroms. It need
hardly be said that in Russia "guarantees" have been
reduced to the very minimum.

Germany is, however, European, and
she enjoys a measure of political freedom. It is not surprising that
the policy of "encroachments" there never takes the form of
pogroms.

In France, of course, there are still
more "guarantees," for France is more democratic than
Germany.

There is no need to mention
Switzerland, where, thanks to her highly developed, although
bourgeois democracy, nationalities live in freedom, whether they are
a minority or a majority.

Thus the Bund adopts a false position
when it asserts that "institutions" by themselves are able
to guarantee complete cultural development for nationalities.

It may be said that the Bund itself
regards the establishment of democracy in Russia as a preliminary
condition for the "creation of institutions" and guarantees
of freedom. But this is not the case. From the report of the Eighth
Conference of the Bund [25]
it will be seen that the Bund thinks it can secure "institutions"
on the basis of the present system in Russia, by "reforming"
the Jewish community.

"The community," one of
the leaders of the Bund said at this conference, "may become
the nucleus of future cultural-national autonomy. Cultural-national
autonomy is a form of self-service on the part of nations, a form of
satisfying national needs. The community form conceals within itself
a similar content. They are links in the same chain, stages in the
same evolution." [26]

On this basis, the conference decided
that it was necessary to strive "for reforming the Jewish
community and transforming it by legislative means into a
secular institution," democratically organized (our italics --
J. St.).

It is evident that the Bund considers
as the condition and guarantee not the democratization of Russia, but
some future "secular institution" of the Jews, obtained by
"reforming the Jewish community," so to speak, by
"legislative" means, through the Duma:

But we have already seen that
"institutions" in themselves cannot serve as "guarantees"
if the regime in the state generally is not a democratic one.

But what, it may be asked, will be -
the position under a future democratic system? Will not special
"cultural institutions which guarantee," etc., be required
even under democracy? What is the position in this respect in
democratic Switzerland, for example? Are there special cultural
institutions in Switzerland on the pattern of Springer's "National
Council"? No, there are not. But do not the cultural
interests of, for instance, the Italians, who constitute a minority
there, suffer for that reason? One does not seem to hear that they
do. And that is quite natural: in Switzerland all special cultural
"institutions," which supposedly "guarantee,"
etc., are rendered superfluous by democracy.

And so, impotent in the present and
superfluous in the future -- such are the institutions of
cultural-national autonomy, and such is national autonomy.

But it becomes still more harmful
when it is thrust upon a "nation" whose existence and
future are open to doubt. In such cases the advocates of national
autonomy are obliged to protect and preserve all the peculiar
features of the "nation," the bad as well as the good, just
for the sake of "saving the nation" from assimilation, just
for the sake of "preserving" it.

That the Bund should take this
dangerous path was inevitable. And it did take it. We are referring
to the resolutions of recent conferences of the Bund on the question
of the "Sabbath," "Yiddish," etc.

Social-Democracy strives to secure
for all nations the right to use their own language. But that
does not satisfy the Bund; it demands that "the rights of the
Jewish language" (our italics -- J. St.) be
championed with "exceptional persistence," and the Bund
itself in the elections to the Fourth Duma declared that it would
give "preference to those of them (i.e., electors) who undertake
to defend the rights of the Jewish language."

Not the general right of all
nations to use their own language, but the particular right of
the Jewish language, Yiddish! Let the workers of the various
nationalities fight primarily for their own language: the Jews
for Jewish, the Georgians for Georgian, and so forth. The struggle
for the general right of all nations is a secondary matter. You do
not have to recognize the right of all oppressed nationalities to use
their own language; but if you have recognized the right of Yiddish,
know that the Bund will vote for you, the Bund will "prefer"
you.

But in what way then does the Bund
differ from the bourgeois nationalists?

Social-Democracy strives to secure
the establishment of a compulsory weekly rest day. But that does not
satisfy the Bund; it demands that "by legislative means"
"the Jewish proletariat should be guaranteed the right to
observe their Sabbath and be relieved of the obligation to observe
another day. "*

It is to be expected that the Bund
will take another "step forward" and demand the right to
observe all the ancient Hebrew holidays. And if, to the misfortune of
the Bund, the Jewish workers have discarded religious prejudices and
do not want to observe these holidays, the Bund with its agitation
for "the right to the Sabbath," will remind them of the
Sabbath, it will, so to speak, cultivate among them "the
Sabbatarian spirit. "...

Quite comprehensible, therefore, are
the "passionate speeches" delivered at the Eighth
Conference of the Bund demanding "Jewish hospitals," a
demand that was based on the argument that "a patient feels more
at home among his own people," that "the Jewish worker will
not feel at ease among Polish workers, but will feel at ease among
Jewish shopkeepers."

Preservation of everything Jewish,
conservation of all the national peculiarities of the Jews,
even those that are patently harmful to the proletariat, isolation of
the Jews from everything non-Jewish, even the establishment of
special hospitals -- that is the level to which the Bund has sunk!

Comrade Plekhanov was right a
thousand times over when he said that the Bund "is adapting
socialism to nationalism." Of course, V. Kossovsky and Bundists
like him may denounce Plekhanov as a "demagogue" [27][28]
-- paper. will put up with anything that is written on it -- but
those who are familiar with the activities of the Bund will easily
realize that these brave fellows are simply afraid to tell the truth
about themselves and are hiding behind strong language about
"demagogy. "...

But since it holds such a position on
the national question, the Bund was naturally obliged, in the matter
of organization also, to take the path of segregating the Jewish
workers, the path of formation of national curiae within
Social-Democracy. Such is the logic of national autonomy!

And, in fact, the Bund did pass from
the theory of "sole representation" to the theory of
"national demarcation" of workers. The Bund demands that
Russian Social-Democracy should "in its organizational structure
introduce demarcation according to nationalities." From
"demarcation" it made a "step forward" to the
theory of "segregation." It is not for nothing that
speeches were made at the Eighth Conference of the Bund declaring
that "national existence lies in segregation."

Organizational federalism harbours
the elements of disintegration and separatism. The Bund is heading
for separatism.

And, indeed, there is nothing else it
can head for. Its very existence as an extra-territorial organization
drives it to separatism. The Bund does not possess a definite
integral territory; it operates on "foreign" territories,
whereas the neighbouring Polish, Lettish and Russian
Social-Democracies are international territorial collective bodies.
But the result is that every extension of these collective bodies
means a "loss" to the Bund and a restriction of its field
of action. There are two alternatives: either Russian
Social-Democracy as a whole must be reconstructed on the basis of
national federalism -- which will enable the Bund to "secure"
the Jewish proletariat for itself; or the territorial-international
principle of these collective bodies remains in force -- in which
case the Bund must be reconstructed on the basis of internationalism,
as is the case with the Polish and Lettish Social-Democracies.

This explains why the Bund from the
very beginning demanded "the reorganization of Russian
Social-Democracy on a federal basis." [29]

In 1906, yielding to the pressure
from below in favour of unity, the Bund chose a middle path and
joined Russian Social-Democracy. But how did it join? Whereas the
Polish and Lettish Social-Democracies joined for the purpose of
peaceable joint action, the Bund joined for the purpose of waging war
for a federation. That is exactly what Medem, the leader of the
Bundists, said at the time:

"We are joining not for the
sake of an idyll, but in order to fight. There is no idyll, and only
Manilovs could hope for one in the near future. The Bund must join
the Party armed from head to foot." [30]

It would be wrong to regard this as
an expression of evil intent on Medem's part. It is not a matter of
evil intent, but of the peculiar position of the Bund, which compels
it to fight Russian Social-Democracy, which is built on the basis of
internationalism. And in fighting it the Bund naturally violated the
interests of unity. Finally, matters went so far that the Bund
formally broke with Russian Social-Democracy, violating its statutes,
and in the elections to the Fourth Duma joining forces with the
Polish nationalists against the Polish Social-Democrats.

The Bund has apparently found that a
rupture is the best guarantee for independent activity.

And so the "principle" of
organizational "demarcation" led to separatism and to a
complete rupture.

In a controversy with the old Iskra[31]
on the question of federalism, the Bund once wrote:

"Iskra wants to assure
us that federal relations between the Bund and Russian
Social-Democracy are bound to weaken the ties between them. We
cannot refute this opinion by referring to practice in Russia, for
the simple reason that Russian Social-Democracy does not exist as a
federal body. But we can refer to the extremely instructive
experience of Social-Democracy in Austria, which assumed a federal
character by virtue of the decision of the Party Congress of 1897."

That was written in 1902.

But we are now in the year 1913. We
now have both Russian "practice" and the "experience
of Social-Democracy in Austria."

What do they tell us?

Let us begin with "the extremely
instructive experience of Social-Democracy in Austria." Up to
1896 there was a united Social-Democratic Party in Austria. In that
year the Czechs at the International Congress in London for the first
time demanded separate representation, and were given it. In 1897, at
the Vienna (Wimberg) Party Congress, the united party was formally
Liquidated and in its place a federal league of six national
"Social-Democratic groups" was set up. Subsequently these
"groups" were converted into independent parties, which
gradually severed contact with one another. Following the parties,
the parliamentary group broke up -- national "clubs" were
formed. Next came the trade unions, which also split according to
nationalities. Even the co-operative societies were affected, the
Czech separatists calling upon the workers to split them up. [32]
We will not dwell on the fact that separatist agitation weakens the
workers' sense of solidarity and frequently drives them to
strike-breaking.

Thus "the extremely instructive
experience of Social-Democracy in Austria" speaks against
the Bund and for the old Iskra. Federalism in the Austrian
party has led to the most outrageous separatism, to the destruction
of the unity of the labour movement.

We have seen above that "practical
experience in Russia" also bears this out. Like the Czech
separatists, the Bundist separatists have broken with the general
Russian Social-Democratic Party. As for the trade unions, the Bundist
trade unions, from the outset they were organized on national lines,
that is to say, they were cut off from the workers of other
nationalities.

Complete segregation and complete
rupture -- that is what is revealed by the "Russian practical
experience" of federalism.

It is not surprising that the effect
of this state of affairs upon the workers is to weaken their sense of
solidarity and to demoralize them; and the latter process is also
penetrating the Bund. We are referring to the increasing collisions
between Jewish and Polish workers in connection with unemployment.
Here is the kind of speech that was made on this subject at the Ninth
Conference of the Bund:

"... We regard the Polish
workers, who are ousting us, as pogromists, as scabs; we do not
support their strikes, we break them. Secondly, we reply to being
ousted by ousting in our turn: we reply to Jewish workers not being
allowed into the factories by not allowing Polish workers near the
benches.... If we do not take this matter into our own hands the
workers will follow others" (our italics -- J. St.)

That is the way they talk about
solidarity at a Bundist conference.

You cannot go further than that in
the way of "demarcation" and "segregation." The
Bund has achieved its aim: it is carrying its demarcation between the
workers of different nationalities to the point of conflicts and
strike-breaking. And there is no other course: "If we do not
take this matter into our own hands the workers will follow
others...."

Disorganization of the labour
movement, demoralization of the Social-Democratic ranks -- that is
what the federalism of the Bund leads to.

Thus the idea of cultural-national
autonomy, the atmosphere it creates, has proved to be even more
harmful in Russia than in Austria.

VI.THE
CAUCASIANS,THE CONFERENCE OF THE LIQUIDATORS

We spoke above of the waverings of
one section of the Caucasian Social-Democrats who were unable to
withstand the nationalist "epidemic." These waverings were
revealed in the fact that, strange as it may seem, the
above-mentioned Social-Democrats followed in the footsteps of the
Bund and proclaimed cultural-national autonomy.

Regional autonomy for the Caucasus as
a whole and cultural-national autonomy for the nations forming the
Caucasus -- that is the way these Social-Democrats, who,
incidentally, are linked with the Russian Liquidators, formulate
their demand.

Listen to their acknowledged leader,
the not unknown N.

"Everybody knows that the
Caucasus differs profoundly from the central gubernias, both as
regards the racial composition of its population and as regards its
territory and agricultural development. The exploitation and
material development of such a region require local workers
acquainted with local peculiarities and accustomed to the local
climate and culture. All laws designed to further the exploitation
of the local territory should be issued locally and put into effect
by local forces. Consequently, the jurisdiction of the central organ
of Caucasian self-government should extend to legislation on local
questions.... Hence, the functions of the Caucasian centre should
consist in the passing of laws designed to further the economic
exploitation of the local territory and the material prosperity of
the region." [33]

Thus -- regional autonomy for the
Caucasus.

If we abstract ourselves from the
rather confused and incoherent arguments of N., it must be
admitted that his conclusion is correct. Regional autonomy for the
Caucasus, within the framework of a general state constitution, which
N. does not deny, is indeed essential because of the
peculiarities of its composition and its conditions of life. This was
also acknowledged by the Russian Social-Democratic Party, which at
its Second Congress proclaimed "regional self-government for
those border regions which in respect of their conditions of life and
the composition of their population differ from the regions of Russia
proper."

When Martov submitted this point for
discussion at the Second Congress, he justified it on the grounds
that "the vast extent of Russia and the experience of our
centralized administration point to the necessity and expediency of
regional self-government for such large units as Finland, Poland,
Lithuania and the Caucasus."

But it follows that regional
self-government is to be interpreted as regional autonomy.

But N. goes further. According
to him, regional autonomy for the Caucasus covers "only one
aspect of the question."

"So far we have spoken only of
the material development of local life. But the economic development
of a region is facilitated not only by economic activity but also by
spiritual, cultural activity."... "A culturally strong
nation is strong also in the economic sphere. "... "But
the cultural development of nations is possible only in the national
languages."... "Consequently, all questions connected with
the native language are questions of national culture. Such are the
questions of education! the judicature, the church, literature, art,
science, the theatre, etc. If the material development of a region
unites nations, matters of national culture disunite them and place
each in a separate sphere. Activities of the former kind are
associated with a definite territory."... "This is not the
case with matters of national culture. These are associated not with
a definite territory but with the existence of a definite nation.
The fate of the Georgian language interests a Georgian, no matter
where he lives. It would be a sign of profound ignorance to say that
Georgian culture concerns only the Georgians who live in Georgia.
Take, for instance, the Armenian church. Armenians of various
localities and states take part in the administration of its
affairs. Territory plays no part here. Or, for instance, the
creation of a Georgian museum interests not only the Georgians of
Tiflis, but also the Georgians of Baku, Kutais, St. Petersburg, etc.
Hence, the administration and control of all affairs of national
culture must be left to the nations concerned. we proclaim in favour
of cultural-national autonomy for the Caucasian nationalities."
[34]

In short, since culture is not
territory, and territory is not culture, cultural-national autonomy
is required. That is all N. can say in the latter's favour.

We shall not stop to discuss again
national-cultural autonomy in general; we have already spoken of its
objectionable character. We should like to point out only that, while
being unsuitable in general, cultural-national autonomy is also
meaningless and nonsensical in relation to Caucasian conditions.

And for the following reason:

Cultural-national autonomy presumes
more or less developed nationalities, with a developed culture and
literature. Failing these conditions, autonomy loses all sense and
becomes an absurdity. But in the Caucasus there are a number of
nationalities each possessing a primitive culture, a separate
language, but without its own literature; nationalities, moreover,
which are in a state of transition, partly becoming assimilated and
partly continuing to develop. How is cultural-national autonomy to be
applied to them? What is to be done with such nationalities? How are
they to be "organized" into separate cultural-national
unions, as is undoubtedly implied by cultural-national autonomy?

What is to be done with the
Mingrelians, the Abkhasians, the Adjarians, the Svanetians, the
Lesghians, and so on, who speak different languages but do not
possess a literature of their own? To what nations are they to be
attached? Can they be "organized" into national unions?
Around what "cultural affairs" are they to be "organized"?

What is to be done with the
Ossetians, of whom the Transcaucasian Ossetians are becoming
assimilated (but are as yet by no means wholly assimilated) by the
Georgians, while the Cis-Caucasian Ossetians are partly being
assimilated by the Russians and partly continuing to develop and are
creating their own literature? How are they to be "organized"
into a single national union?

To what national union should one
attach the Adjarians, who speak the Georgian language, but whose
culture is Turkish and who profess the religion of Islam? Shall they
be "organized" separately from the Georgians with regard
to religious affairs and together with the Georgians with
regard to other cultural affairs? And what about the Kobuletians,
the Ingushes, the Inghilois?

What kind of autonomy is that which
excludes a whole number of nationalities from the list?

No, that is not a solution of the
national question, but the fruit of idle fancy.

But let us grant the impossible and
assume that our N.'s national-cultural autonomy has been put
into effect. Where would it lead to, what would be its results? Take,
for instance, the Transcaucasian Tatars, with their minimum
percentage of literates, their schools controlled by the omnipotent
mullahs and their culture permeated by the religious spirit.... It is
not difficult to understand that to "organize" them into a
cultural national union would mean to place them under the control of
the mullahs, to deliver them over to the tender mercies of the
reactionary mullahs, to create a new stronghold of spiritual
enslavement of the Tatar masses to their worst enemy.

But since when have Social-Democrats
made it a practice to bring grist to the mill of the reactionaries?

Could the Caucasian Liquidators
really find nothing better to "proclaim" than the isolation
of the Transcaucasian Tatars within a cultural-national union which
would place the masses under the thraldom of vicious reactionaries?

No, that is no solution of the
national question.

The national question in the Caucasus
can be solved only by drawing the belated nations and
nationalities into the common stream of a higher culture. It is
the only progressive solution and the only solution acceptable to
Social-Democracy. Regional autonomy in the Caucasus is acceptable
because it would draw the belated nations into the common cultural
development; it would help them to cast off the shell of small nation
insularity; it would impel them forward and facilitate access to the
benefits of higher culture. Cultural-national autonomy, however, acts
in a diametrically opposite direction, because it shuts up the
nations within their old shells, binds them to the lower stages of
cultural development and prevents them from rising to the higher
stages of culture.

In this way national autonomy
counteracts the beneficial aspects of regional autonomy and nullifies
it.

That is why the mixed type of
autonomy which combines national-cultural autonomy and regional
autonomy as proposed by N. is also unsuitable. This unnatural
combination does not improve matters but makes them worse, because in
addition to retarding the development of the belated nations it
transforms regional autonomy into an arena of conflict between the
nations organized in the national unions.

Thus cultural-national autonomy,
which is unsuitable generally, would be a senseless, reactionary
undertaking in the Caucasus.

So much for the cultural-national
autonomy of N. and his Caucasian fellow-thinkers.

Whether the Caucasian Liquidators
will take "a step forward" and follow in the footsteps of
the Bund on the question of organization also, the future will show.
So far, in the history of Social-Democracy federalism in organization
always preceded national autonomy in programme. The Austrian
Social-Democrats introduced organizational federalism as far back as
1897, and it was only two years later (1899) that they adopted
national autonomy. The Bundists spoke distinctly of national autonomy
for the first time in 1901, whereas organizational federalism had
been practiced by them since 1897.

The Caucasian Liquidators have begun
from the end, from national autonomy. If they continue to follow in
the footsteps of the Bund they will first have to demolish the whole
existing organizational edifice, which was erected at the end of the
'nineties on the basis of internationalism.

But, easy though it was to adopt
national autonomy, which is still not understood by the workers, it
will be difficult to demolish an edifice which it has taken years to
build and which has been raised and cherished by the workers of all
the nationalities of the Caucasus. This Herostratian undertaking has
only to be begun and the eyes of the workers will be opened to the
nationalist character of cultural-national autonomy.

* * *

While the Caucasians are settling the
national question in the usual manner, by means of verbal and written
discussion, the All-Russian Conference of the Liquidators has
invented a most unusual method. It is a simple and easy method.
Listen to this:

"Having heard the communication
of the Caucasian delegation to the effect that... it is necessary to
demand national-cultural autonomy, this conference, while expressing
no opinion on the merits of this demand, declares that such an
interpretation of the clause of the programme which recognizes the
right of every nationality to self-determination does not contradict
the precise meaning of the programme."

Thus, first of all they "express
no opinion on the merits" of the question, and then they
"declare." An original method....

And what does this original
conference "declare"?

That the "demand" for
national-cultural autonomy "does not contradict the precise
meaning "of the programme, which recognizes the right of nations
to self-determination.

Let us examine this proposition.

The clause on self-determination
speaks of the rights of nations. According to this clause, nations
have the right not only of autonomy but also of secession. It is a
question of political self-determination. Whom did the
Liquidators want to fool when they endeavoured to misinterpret this
right of nations to political self-determination, which has long been
recognized by the whole of international Social-Democracy?

Or perhaps the Liquidators will try
to wriggle out of the situation and defend themselves by the sophism
that cultural-national autonomy "does not contradict" the
rights of nations? That is to say, if all the nations in a given
state agree to arrange their affairs on the basis of
cultural-national autonomy, they, the given sum of nations, are fully
entitled to do so and nobody may forcibly impose a different
form of political life on them. This is both new and clever. Should
it not be added that, speaking generally, a nation has the right to
abolish its own constitution, replace it by a system of tyranny and
revert to the old order on the grounds that the nation, and the
nation alone, has the right to determine its own destiny? We repeat:
in this sense, neither cultural-national autonomy nor any other kind
of nationalist reaction "contradicts" the rights of
nations.

Is that what the esteemed conference
wanted to say?

No, not that. It specifically says
that cultural-national autonomy "does not contradict," not
the rights of nations, but "the precise meaning" of the
programme. The point here is the programme and not the rights of
nations.

And that is quite understandable. If
it were some nation that addressed itself to the conference of
Liquidators, the conference might have directly declared that the
nation has a right to cultural-national autonomy. But it was not a
nation that addressed itself to the conference, but a "delegation"
of Caucasian Social-Democrats -- bad Social-Democrats, it is true,
but Social-Democrats nevertheless. And they inquired not about the
rights of nations, but whether cultural-national autonomy
contradicted the principles of Social-Democracy, whether it
did not "contradict" "the precise meaning" of
the programme of Social-Democracy.

Thus, the rights of nations and
"the precise meaning" of the programme of Social-Democracy
are not one and the same thing.

Evidently, there are demands which,
while they do not contradict the rights of nations, may yet
contradict "the precise meaning" of the programme.

For example. The programme of the
Social-Democrats contains a clause on freedom of religion. According
to this clause any group of persons have the right to profess
any religion they please: Catholicism, the religion of the Orthodox
Church, etc. Social-Democrats will combat all forms of religious
persecution, be it of members of the Orthodox Church, Catholics or
Protestants. Does this mean that Catholicism, Protestantism, etc.,
"do not contradict the precise meaning" of the programme?
No, it does not. Social-Democrats will always protest against
persecution of Catholicism or Protestantism; they will always defend
the right of nations to profess any religion they please; but at the
same time, on the basis of a correct understanding of the interests
of the proletariat, they will carry on agitation against Catholicism,
Protestantism and the religion of the Orthodox Church in order to
achieve the triumph of the socialist world outlook.

And they will do so just because
there is no doubt that Protestantism, Catholicism, the religion of
the Orthodox Church, etc., "contradict the precise meaning"
of the programme, i.e., the correctly understood interests of the
proletariat.

The same must be said of
self-determination. Nations have a right to arrange their affairs as
they please; they have a right to preserve any of their national
institutions, whether beneficial or harmful -- nobody can (nobody has
a right to!) forcibly interfere in the life of a nation. But
that does not mean that Social-Democracy will not combat and agitate
against the harmful institutions of nations and against the
inexpedient demands of nations. On the contrary, it is the duty of
Social-Democracy to conduct such agitation and to endeavour to
influence the will of nations so that the nations may arrange their
affairs in the way that will best correspond to the interests of the
proletariat. For this reason Social-Democracy, while fighting for the
right of nations to self-determination, will at the same time
agitate, for instance, against the secession of the Tatars, or
against cultural-national autonomy for the Caucasian nations; for
both, while not contradicting the rights of these nations, do
contradict "the precise meaning" of the programme,
i.e., the interests of the Caucasian proletariat.

Obviously, "the rights of
nations" and the "precise meaning" of the programme
are on two entirely different planes. Whereas the "precise
meaning" of the programme expresses the interests of the
proletariat, as scientifically formulated in the programme of the
latter, the rights of nations may express the interests of any class
-- bourgeoisie, aristocracy, clergy, etc. -- depending on the
strength and influence of these classes. On the one hand are the
duties of Marxists, on the other the rights of nations,
which consist of various classes. The rights of nations and the
principles of Social-Democracy may or may not "contradict"
each other, just as, say, the pyramid of Cheops may or may not
contradict the famous conference of the Liquidators. They are simply
not comparable.

But it follows that the esteemed
conference most unpardonably muddled two entirely different things.
The result obtained was not a solution of the national question but
an absurdity, according to which the rights of nations and the
principles of Social-Democracy "do not contradict" each
other, and, consequently; every demand of a nation may be made
compatible with the interests of the proletariat; consequently, no
demand of a nation which is striving for self-determination will
"contradict the precise meaning" of the programme!

They pay no heed to logic....

It was this absurdity that gave rise
to the now famous resolution of the conference of the Liquidators
which declares that the demand for national-cultural autonomy "does
not contradict the precise meaning" of the programme.

But it was not only the laws of logic
that were violated by the conference of the Liquidators.

By sanctioning cultural-national
autonomy it also violated its duty to Russian Social-Democracy. It
most definitely did violate "the precise meaning" of the
programme, for it is well known that the Second Congress, which
adopted the programme, emphatically repudiated
cultural-national autonomy. Here is what was said at the congress in
this connection:

"Goldblatt (Bundist):
...1 deem it necessary that special institutions be set up to
protect the freedom of cultural development of nationalities, and I
therefore propose that the following words be added to § 8:
'and the creation of institutions which will guarantee them
complete freedom of cultural development.'" (This, as we
know, is the Bund's definition of cultural-national autonomy. -- J.
St.)

"Martynov pointed out
that general institutions must be so constituted as to protect
particular interests also. It is impossible to create a special
institution to guarantee freedom for cultural development of the
nationalities.

"Yegorov: On the
question of nationality we can adopt only negative proposals, i.e.,
we are opposed to all restrictions upon nationality. But we, as
Social-Democrats, are not concerned with whether any particular
nationality will develop as such. That is a spontaneous process.

"Koltsov: The delegates
from the Bund are always offended when their nationalism is referred
to. Yet the amendment proposed by the delegate from the Bund is of a
purely nationalist character. We are asked to take purely offensive
measures in order to support even nationalities that are dying out."

In the end "Goldblatt's
amendment was rejected by the majority, only three votes being cast
for it."

Thus it is clear that the conference
of the Liquidators did "contradict the precise meaning" of
the programme. It violated the programme.

The Liquidators are now trying to
justify themselves by referring to the Stockholm Congress, which they
allege sanctioned cultural-national autonomy. Thus, V. Kossovsky
writes:

"As we know, according to the
agreement adopted by the Stockholm Congress, the Bund was allowed to
preserve its national programme (pending a decision on the national
question by a general Party congress). This congress recorded that
national-cultural autonomy at any rate does not contradict the
general Party programme." [35]

But the efforts of the Liquidators
are in vain. The Stockholm Congress never thought of sanctioning the
programme of the Bund -- it merely agreed to leave the question open
for the time being. The brave Kossovsky did not have enough courage
to tell the whole truth. But the facts speak for themselves. Here
they are:

"An amendment was moved by
Galin: 'The question of the national programme is left open in
view of the fact that it is not being examined by the congress.'
(For -- 50 votes, against -- 32.)

"Voice: What does that
mean -- open?

"Chairman: When we say
that the national question is left open, it means that the Bund may
maintain its decision on this question until the next congress"
[36]
(our italics. -- J. St.).

As you see, the congress even did
"not examine" the question of the national programme of the
Bund -- it simply left it "open," leaving the Bund itself
to decide the fate of its programme until the next general congress
met. In other words, the Stockholm Congress avoided the question,
expressing no opinion on cultural-national autonomy one way or
another.

The conference of the Liquidators,
however, most definitely undertakes to give an opinion on the matter,
declares cultural-national autonomy to be acceptable, and endorses it
in the name of the Party programme.

The difference is only too evident.

Thus, in spite of all its artifices,
the conference of the Liquidators did not advance the national
question a single step.

All it could do was to squirm before
the Bund and the Caucasian national-Liquidators.

VII.THE
NATIONAL QUESTION IN RUSSIA

It remains for us to suggest a
positive solution of the national question.

We take as our starting point that
the question can be solved only in intimate connection with the
present situation in Russia.

Russia is in a transitional period,
when "normal," "constitutional" life has not yet
been established and when the political crisis has not yet been
settled. Days of storm and "complications" are ahead. And
this gives rise to the movement, the present and the future movement,
the aim of which is to achieve complete democratization.

It is in connection with this
movement that the national question must be examined.

Thus the complete democratization of
the country is the basis and condition for the solution of the
national question.

When seeking a solution of the
question we must take into account not only the situation at home but
also the situation abroad. Russia is situated between Europe and
Asia, between Austria and China. The growth of democracy in Asia is
inevitable. The growth of imperialism in Europe is not fortuitous. In
Europe, capital is beginning to feel cramped, and it is reaching out
towards foreign countries in search of new markets, cheap labour and
new fields of investment. But this leads to external complications
and to war. No one can assert that the Balkan War [37]
is the end and not the beginning of the complications. It is quite
possible, therefore, that a combination of internal and external
conditions may arise in which one or another nationality in Russia
may find it necessary to raise and settle the question of its
independence. And, of course, it is not for Marxists to create
obstacles in such cases.

But it follows that Russian Marxists
cannot dispense with the right of nations to self-determination.

Thus, the right of
self-determination is an essential element in the solution of the
national question.

Further. What must be our attitude
towards nations which for one reason or another will prefer to remain
within the framework of the whole?

We have seen that cultural-national
autonomy is unsuitable. Firstly, it is artificial and impracticable,
for it proposes artificially to draw into a single nation people whom
the march of events, real events, is disuniting and dispersing to
every corner of the country. Secondly, it stimulates nationalism,
because it leads to the viewpoint in favour of the "demarcation"
of people according to national curiae, the "organization"
of nations, the "preservation" and cultivation of "national
peculiarities" -- all of which are entirely incompatible with
Social-Democracy. It is not fortuitous that the Moravian separatists
in the Reichsrat, having severed themselves from the German
Social-Democratic deputies, have united with the Moravian bourgeois
deputies to form a single, so to speak, Moravian "kolo."
Nor is it fortuitous that the separatists of the Bund have got
themselves involved in nationalism by acclaiming the "Sabbath"
and "Yiddish." There are no Bundist deputies yet in the
Duma, but in the Bund area there is a clerical-reactionary Jewish
community, in the "controlling institutions" of which the
Bund is arranging, for a beginning, a "get-together" of the
Jewish workers and bourgeois. Such is the logic of cultural-national
autonomy.

Thus, national autonomy does
not solve the problem.

What, then, is the way out?

The only correct solution is regional
autonomy, autonomy for such crystallized units as Poland, Lithuania,
the Ukraine, the Caucasus, etc.

The advantage of regional autonomy
consists, first of all, in the fact that it does not deal with a
fiction bereft of territory, but with a definite population
inhabiting a definite territory. Next, it does not divide people
according to nations, it does not strengthen national barriers; on
the contrary, it breaks down these barriers and unites the population
in such a manner as to open the way for division of a different kind,
division according to classes. Finally; it makes it possible to
utilize the natural wealth of the region and to develop its
productive forces in the best possible way without awaiting the
decisions of a common centre -- functions which are not inherent
features of cultural-national autonomy.

Thus, regional autonomy is an
essential element in the solution of the national question.

Of course, not one of the regions
constitutes a compact, homogeneous nation, for each is interspersed
with national minorities. Such are the Jews in Poland, the Letts in
Lithuania, the Russians in the Caucasus, the Poles in the Ukraine,
and so on. It may be feared, therefore, that the minorities will be
oppressed by the national majorities. But there will be grounds for
fear only if the old order continues to prevail in the country. Give
the country complete democracy and all grounds for fear will vanish.

It is proposed to bind the dispersed
minorities into a single national union. But what the minorities want
is not an artificial union, but real rights in the localities they
inhabit. What can such a union give them without complete
democratization? On the other hand, what need is there for a national
union when there is complete democratization?

What is it that particularly agitates
a national minority?

A minority is discontented not
because there is no national union but because it does not enjoy the
right to use its native language. Permit it to use its native
language and the discontent will pass of itself.

A minority is discontented not
because there is no artificial union but because it does not possess
its own schools. Give it its own schools and all grounds for
discontent will disappear.

A minority is discontented not
because there is no national union, but because it does not enjoy
liberty of conscience (religious liberty), liberty of movement, etc.
Give it these liberties and it will cease to be discontented.

Thus, equal rights of nations in
all forms (language, schools, etc.) is an essential element in
the solution of the national question. Consequently, a state law
based on complete democratization of the country is required,
prohibiting all national privileges without exception and every kind
of disability or restriction on the rights of national minorities.

That, and that alone, is the real,
not a paper guarantee of the rights of a minority.

One may or may not dispute the
existence of a logical connection between organizational federalism
and cultural-national autonomy. But one cannot dispute the fact that
the latter creates an atmosphere favouring unlimited federalism,
developing into complete rupture, into separatism. If the Czechs in
Austria and the Bundists in Russia began with autonomy, passed to
federation and ended in separatism, there can be no doubt that an
important part in this was played by the nationalist atmosphere that
is naturally generated by cultural-national autonomy. It is not
fortuitous that national autonomy and organizational federalism go
hand in hand. It is quite. understandable. Both demand demarcation
according to nationalities. Both presume organization according to
nationalities. The similarity is beyond question. The only difference
is that in one case the population as a whole is divided, while in
the other it is the Social-Democratic workers who are divided.

We know where the demarcation of
workers according to nationalities leads to. The disintegration of a
united workers' party, the splitting of trade unions according to
nationalities, aggravation of national friction, national
strikebreaking, complete demoralization within the ranks of
Social-Democracy -- such are the results of organizational
federalism. This is eloquently borne out by the history of
Social-Democracy in Austria and the activities of the Bund in Russia.

The only cure for 'this is
organization on the basis of internationalism.

To unite locally the workers of all
nationalities of Russia into single, integral collective
bodies, to unite these collective bodies into a single party
-- such is the task.

It goes without saying that a party
structure of this kind does not preclude, but on the contrary
presumes, wide autonomy for the regions within the single
integral party.

The experience of the Caucasus proves
the expediency of this type of organization. If the Caucasians have
succeeded in overcoming the national friction between the Armenian
and Tatar workers; if they have succeeded in safeguarding the
population against the possibility of massacres and shooting affrays;
if in Baku, that kaleidoscope of national groups, national conflicts
are now no longer possible, and if it has been possible to draw the
workers there into the single current of a powerful movement, then
the international structure of the Caucasian Social-Democracy was not
the least factor in bringing this about.

The type of organization influences
not only practical work. It stamps an indelible impress on the whole
mental life of the worker. The worker lives the life of his
organization, which stimulates his intellectual growth and educates
him. And thus, acting within his organization and continually meeting
there comrades from other nationalities, and side by side with them
waging a common struggle under the leadership of a common collective
body, he becomes deeply imbued with the idea that workers are
primarily members of one class family, members of the united
army of socialism. And this cannot but have a tremendous educational
value for large sections of the working class.

Therefore, the international type of
organization serves as a school of fraternal sentiments and is a
tremendous agitational factor on behalf of internationalism.

But this is not the case with an
organization on the basis of nationalities. When the workers are
organized according to nationality they isolate themselves within
their national shells, fenced off from each other by organizational
barriers. The stress is laid not on what is common to the
workers but on what distinguishes them from each other. In this type
of organization the worker is primarily a member of his
nation: a Jew, a Pole, and so on. It is not surprising that national
federalism in organization inculcates in the workers a spirit of
national seclusion.

Therefore, the national type of
organization is a school of national narrow-mindedness and
stagnation.

Thus we are confronted by two
fundamentally different types of organization: the type based
on international solidarity and the type based on the organizational
"demarcation" of the workers according to nationalities.

Attempts to reconcile these two types
have so far been vain. The compromise rules of the Austrian
Social-Democratic Party drawn up in Wimberg in 1897 were left hanging
in the air. The Austrian party fell to pieces and dragged the trade
unions with it. "Compromise" proved to be not only utopian,
but harmful. Strasser is right when he says that "separatism
achieved its first triumph at the Wimberg Party Congress." [38]
The same is true in Russia. The "compromise" with the
federalism of the Bund which took place at the Stockholm Congress
ended in a complete fiasco. The Bund violated the Stockholm
compromise. Ever since the Stockholm Congress the Bund has been an
obstacle in the way of union of the workers locally in a single
organization, which would include workers of all nationalities. And
the Bund has obstinately persisted in its separatist tactics in spite
of the fact that in 1907 and in 1908 Russian Social-Democracy
repeatedly demanded that unity should at last be established. from
below among the workers of all nationalities. [39]
The Bund, which began with organizational national autonomy, in fact
passed to federalism, only to end in complete rupture, separatism.
And by breaking with the Russian Social-Democratic Party it caused
disharmony and disorganization in the ranks of the latter. Let us
recall the Jagiello affair, [40]
for instance.

The path of "compromise"
must therefore be discarded as utopian and harmful.

One thing or the other: either
the federalism of the Bund, in which case the Russian
Social-Democratic Party must re-form itself on a basis of
"demarcation" of the workers according to nationalities; or
an international type of organization, in which case the Bund must
reform itself on a basis of territorial autonomy after the pattern of
the Caucasian, Lettish and Polish Social-Democracies, and thus make
possible the direct union of the Jewish workers with the workers of
the other nationalities of Russia.

There is no middle course: principles
triumph, they do not "compromise."

Thus, the principle of
international solidarity of the workers is an essential element
in the solution of the national question.

Vienna,January 1913

K. Stalin

NOTES

[1] Zionism -- A reactionary
nationalist trend of the Jewish bourgeoisie, which had followers
along the intellectuals and the more backward sections of the Jewish
workers. The Zionists endeavoured to isolate the Jewish working-class
masses from the general struggle of the proletariat.

[6] See O. Bauer, The National
Question and Social-Democracy, Serp Publishing House, 1909.

[7] See his Der Arbeiter und die
Nation, 1912.

[8] South-Slav Social-Democracy
operates in the Southern part of Austria.

[9] See V. Kossovsky, Problems of
Nationality, 1907.

[10] The Brünn Parteitag, or
Congress, of the Austrian Social-Democratic Party was held on
September 24-29, 1899. The resolution on the national question
adopted by this congress is quoted by J. V. Stalin in the chapter IV,
"Cultural-National Autonomy."

[11] See Springer, The National
Problem.

[12] See Bauer, The National
Question and Social-Democracy.

[13] "Thank God we have no
parliament here" -- the words uttered by V. Kokovtsev, tsarist
Minister of Finance (later Prime Minister), in the State Duma on
April 24 1908.

[14] The representatives of the
South-Slav Social-Democratic Party also voted for it. See Discussion
of the National Question at the Brünn Congress, 1906.

[15] In M. Panin's Russian
translation (see his translation of Bauer's book), "national
individualities" is given in place of "national
peculiarities." Panin translated this passage incorrectly. The
word "individuality" is not in the German text, which
speaks of nationalen Eigenart, i.e., peculiarities,
which is far from being the same thing.

[16] Verhandlungen des
Gesamtparteitages in Brünn, 1899.

[17] See Proceedings of the Brünn
Social-Democratic Party Congress.

[18] See Chapter II of the Manifesto
of the Communist Party by Karl Marx and Frederick Engels.

[19] The Vienna Congress (or Wimberg
Congress -- after the name of the hotel in which it met) of the
Austrian Social-Democratic Party was held June 6-12 1897.

[20] See K. Marx, "The Jewish
Question," 1906.

[21] The reference is to an article
by Karl Marx entitled "Zur Judenfrage" ("The Jewish
Question"), published in 1844 in the Deutsch-Französische
Jahrbücher.

[22] See K. Kautsky, "The
Kishinev Pogrom and the Jewish Question," 1903.

[23] See Forms of the National
Movement, etc., edited by Kastelyansky.

[24] See Minutes of the Second
Congress.

[25] The Eighth Congress of the Bund
was held in September 1910 in Lvov.

[26] Report of the Eighth
Conference of the Bund, 1911, p. 62.

[27] See Nasha Zarya, No.
9-10, 1912, p. 120.

[28] In an article entitled "Another
Splitters' Conference," published in the newspaper Za
Partiyu, October 2 (15) 1912, G. V. Plekhanov condemned the
"August" Conference of the Liquidators and described the
stand of the Bundists and Caucasian Social-Democrats as an adaptation
of socialism to nationalism. Kossovsky, leader of the Bundists,
criticized Plekhanov in a letter to the Liquidators' magazine Nasha
Zarya.

[29] See Concerning National
Autonomy and the Reorganizatzon of Russian Social-Democracy on a
Federal Basis, 1902, published by the Bund.

[30] Nashe Slovo, No. 3,
Vilno, 1906, p. 24.

[31] Iskra (The Spark) -- The
first all-Russian illegal Marxist newspaper founded by V. I. Lenin in
1900.

[32] See the words quoted from a
brochure by Karl Vanek in Dokumente des Separatismus, p. 29.
Karl Vanek was a Czech Social-Democrat who took an openly chauvinist
and separatist stand.

[33] See the Georgian newspaper
Chveni Tskhovreba (Our Life), No. 12, 1912. Chveni
Tskhovreba was a daily paper published by the Georgian Mensheviks
in Kutais from July 1 to 22 1912.

[34] See the Georgian newspaper
Chveni Tskhovreba, No. 12, 1912.

[35] Nasha Zarya, No. 9-10,
1912, p. 120.

[36] See Nashe SIovo, No. 8,
1906, p. 53.

[37] The reference is to the first
Balkan War, which broke out in October 1912 between Bulgaria, Serbia,
Greece and Montenegro on the one hand, and Turkey on the other.

[38] See his Der Arbeiter und die
Nation, 1912.

[39] See the resolutions of the
Fourth (the "Third All-Russian") Conference of the
R.S.D.L.P., held November 5-12 1907, and of the Fifth (the
"All-Russian 1908") Conference of the R.S.D.L.P., held
December 21-27 1908 (January 3-9 1909). (See Resolutions and
Decisions of the C.P.S.U.(B.) Congresses, Conferences and Central
Committee Plenums, Vol. 1, 6th Russ. ed., 1940, pp. 118-31.)

[40] E. J. Jagiello -- A member of
the Polish Socialist Party (P.P.S.) was elected to the Fourth State
Duma for Warsaw as a result of a bloc formed by the Bund, the Polish
Socialist Party and the bourgeois nationalists against the Polish
Social-Democrats. By a vote of the seven Menshevik Liquidators
against the six Bolsheviks, the Social-Democratic group in the Duma
adopted a resolution that Jagiello be accepted as a member of the
group.