Press Briefing by Secretary of State Colin Powell to the Traveling Press Pool
Aboard Air Force One En Route Paris, France

1:49 P.M. (Local)

SECRETARY POWELL: I just got off the phone with Ambassador
Negroponte, getting an update on how things are going with respect to
the U.N. resolution. So I'll brief you on that. But let me kind of
lead up to it by giving you the history over the last couple of weeks.

We began thinking and working on a resolution a long time ago, and
we first broached it with our key partners as to what we thought should
be in such a resolution when I had the G8 ministerial meeting in
Washington on the 14th of May. At that time, with all of the G8
foreign ministers there, in a one-on-one session with them, we talked
about the resolution, what we thought was needed -- full sovereignty,
making sure that the world understood that the CPA was going away. We
made it clear that we wanted the resolution to invite other nations to
participate in the reconstruction effort, or the effort to help the
Iraqi people move forward, whether it's with debt relief or additional
financial assistance, reconstruction assistance, or additional troops.

There was quite a discussion on the military relationship between
the forces that are remaining behind without the CPA, the coalition
forces, and the new sovereign government. We took into account
everything we heard from the G8 ministers and, the Monday before last,
we tabled the first draft of a resolution that accommodated all of the
suggestions that were made.

Over the last almost -- it will be two weeks Monday, we had other
comments come in. We've gone to the usual resolution drafting process,
and as of this morning, we are very, very close to completing the
work. An essential part that came into the puzzle today, a piece of
the puzzle was we now have, heading to New York, a letter from Prime
Minister Allawi, interim Prime Minister Allawi, setting out the terms
and circumstances under which he would like to see the coalition forces
present in the country and how they would work with the interim Iraqi
government. His letter lays out a series of committee -- a committee
structure where there would be political-to-political, and
political-to-military dialogue about the strategy that would be
followed, the broad policy on the use of forces, and how we would deal
with any sensitive -- the policy on sensitive offensive operations that
might be contemplated, so that everybody would have a common
understanding of what we are doing.

Not only would he have this committee at the senior level of
government to work with the Coalition Provisional Authority military
component -- no longer CPA, but the coalition forces -- he intends to
have this kind of committee structure going all the way down throughout
the country, so that throughout the country, Iraqi authorities would be
in contact with the coalition military authorities present to make sure
there is full coordination and understanding of the operations that are
being planned.

At all times, Iraqi forces remain under the overall command of the
Iraqi sovereign government, the interim government. Obviously, they
can permit those forces to work with our coalition forces for
particular operations, but every nation always retains command
sovereignty over its own forces. We do' the Brits do; the Ukrainians
do; the Romanians do; and the Iraqis do. These Iraqi forces work for
their generals under their Ministry of Defense, or if they're police
forces, under their Ministry of Interior, or other relevant bodies.

So Mr. Allawi has sent that letter now. I don't know if it's
actually signed, but it's on the way to New York. I will respond to
that letter on behalf of the coalition, acknowledging his letter and
responding in a positive vein. So there will be an exchange of
letters. These two letters are important in that it will show the
Security Council members what the military arrangement is. And as you
know, Ambassador Negroponte is at a retreat with Kofi Annan, their
annual retreat of Permanent Representatives. And with these letters
available to the, I think they'll have pretty good discussions today,
and remaining issues in the resolution proper I expect to be resolved
in the next couple of days.

Q So I understand that these letters -- is this all outside the
language of the resolution, or would the resolution specify this
arrangement between the interim government and the coalition?

SECRETARY POWELL: The resolution will -- in the resolution you'll
find a reference to these letters. And the letters -- here is the
technical detail -- the letters will need to be annexes to the
resolution, or in some diplomatic way, whatever the U.N. procedure is,
they'll be made a part of the resolution understanding. Some -- either
incorporated by reference -- certainly incorporated by reference,
because there is a reference, or maybe even annexes. I'll let the
parliamentarians figure that out. But you will find that the letters
are totally consistent with the intent, purpose and language of the
resolution, and it is not something that is outside the bounds of the
resolution.

Q Just to make this really simple -- so these letters set down
in writing the agreement between the Iraqi government and the
coalition, which says, we want you to maintain troops here; we want you
to assure security, and we're going to put that in writing, so we
invite you to be here; and then through these letters we're setting up
a process where we coordinate, so if there's an offensive -- if there's
an issue, we have a process in place to work through any issues we may
have.

SECRETARY POWELL: Right. And it says that any policy issues with
respect to sensitive offensive operations will be discussed with these
entities that are being created. Now, if there's disagreement, then,
obviously, you can take it up to higher levels. But we have put in
place a coordinating mechanism so that everybody knows what our policy
is, what our strategy is going to be.

And, frankly, we have been doing this on the ground. I mean, what
we did in Fallujah reflects an understanding not only of the military
problem we were facing, but the political context in which we were
dealing with that military problem.

Same thing in the south now. Najaf is starting to improve. We've
gotten some interesting reports today that maybe weapons are starting
to be turned in in the south. So patience, understanding the political
context in which you're using military forces -- gee, this sounds
vaguely familiar but -- understanding the political context in which
you're using military forces, that's all contained in this letter.
It's an invitation, it's a welcoming, it's a recognition that they
can't provide for their own security yet. It says clearly they want to
build up their forces as quickly as possible, so they can do it for
themselves. But they expressed appreciation for what we are doing,
thankfulness, and then the letter goes on to describe in specificity
the mechanisms that will be created and what these mechanisms are for.

Q Do we know what the French attitude is? I'm sorry, do we know
what the French attitude is towards this?

SECRETARY POWELL: The French have not yet seen the letter.
They'll see it in the course of the day. But I think they will find it
very responsive. We have been in very close touch with the French
recently. And I have been in regular touch with Foreign Minister
Barnier. And I think we have dealt with almost all of the issues that
have been raised through a good series of dialogue and discussion in
New York with Jack Straw, the other co-sponsoring nation Foreign
Secretary talking to his colleagues, me talking to the same guys. And
we're getting there. It's only been 10 days; not bad.

Q How do you resolve the French concern, because it still seems
to me --

SECRETARY POWELL: What French concern?

Q That they would like the interim government to, in effect,
have a final say over military operations, which you and others have
ruled out publicly. What you seem to be saying is, this will
ameliorate the situation, because the Iraqis are saying, hey, this is
okay with us, we've got a lot of coordination here --

SECRETARY POWELL: Sovereignty means sovereignty. And this is an
arrangement between this sovereign government and the coalition forces
that are there at the invitation of that sovereign government. So if
the arrangement is acceptable to the sovereign government, and to the
coalition forces --

Q Does the letter give the United States final say?

SECRETARY POWELL: The letter is as I have described it. And we
all know that every government ultimately has sovereignty over its own
forces. The Iraqis have sovereignty over theirs. So we're setting up
a strawman problem that I don't think is going to exist. The French,
when they look at this, I think they will see that the Iraqis are
pleased that we are there, are pleased that we are willing to
participate in these instrumentalities of coordination and
consultation. And they already have seen in a practical sense how
these sorts of things will work in Fallujah and in the south. And so
if the new sovereign government is satisfied, it would seem to me that
should satisfy all of my colleagues in the Security Council. And the
work that we have been doing on the resolution suggests they have a
pretty good understanding of what we're working out with the Iraqis on
the ground. But I have to wait and see what they might say after they
actually read the letters today.

Q Does the resolution spell out -- will the resolution spell out
the specific command structure of exactly who is in charge and what
authority each government has over its own forces?

SECRETARY POWELL: The resolution won't go into that level of
detail, because that really is something for the sovereign government,
the Iraqi interim government, to work out with the coalition. And the
resolution will say that such arrangements have been made in these
letters, which are incorporated by reference or an annex, so everybody
can see what that sovereign has arranged with coalition authorities.
And what the U.N. is voting for when they vote for this resolution, and
when they know that there is a reference in this resolution to these
letters -- they will have seen the letters, but you don't need to put
all that exquisite detail from the letter into the resolution.

Q -- you expect approval in the next few days, or -- did you say
you expected approval?

SECRETARY POWELL: Yes. The Security Council, I think, is moving
well. The number of outstanding issues has been declining every day.
We're getting into exquisite technical issues now. And so I'm
confident within a few days we'll be there. We are in end game.

Q When did the letters go --

SECRETARY POWELL: The letters -- Mr. Allawi, Prime Minister
Allawi looked them over -- looked at them again overnight, and
communicated to Ambassador Bremer today, this morning, that he is
satisfied with the letter. And the letter is now -- has now been
communicated back to us. I've got a copy and there's a copy now
available to Ambassador Negroponte for his use. Ambassador Negroponte
also has access to the return letter, the letter I send back, which
really, technically, will go through the President of the Security
Council, the Filipino Foreign Minister.

Q As he pointed out, it's 10 days, which is, I think, very fast
for the Security Council.

SECRETARY POWELL: Fourteen days on -- Monday will make the 14th
day since we tabled the first version.

Q And do you think the difference this time, perhaps compared to
the last round's Security resolution for Iraq is that there was just
more willingness to move on the other side, or you had more latitude to
meet the concerns raised by other Security Council members?

SECRETARY POWELL: We wanted to meet the concerns raised by all of
our colleagues in the Security Council, as long as they were reasonable
concerns. We were looking for a good resolution that accomplished the
purpose we set out to accomplish -- full sovereignty, but a clear
understanding of the relationship between the military and the new
sovereign government. And everybody wanted to be forthcoming. There
was never -- in the last three weeks, since I met with the G8 ministers
on the 14th of May, and all through the three drafts that we tabled,
never a suggestion that anybody wanted a veto. I did not have a single
veto threat out there. The only question was, can we get it
unanimous. You know, we won't know that until they vote. But I'm very
encouraged. And the four resolutions we've taken to a vote have all
been unanimous. I leave aside the resolution we didn't take to a
vote.

Q There was talk about a fixed date for withdrawal, the French,
the Russians, the Chinese wanted. Have you beaten that back?

SECRETARY POWELL: We have arrived at a language that deals with
this. And it picks up from the earlier Resolution 1511 that
essentially says the mandate will be reviewed in a year, or earlier,
and it is anticipated that the mandate will go through the end of 2005,
which is the end of the political process. And that picks up from
1511.

Needless to say, a sovereign government can choose to say, we're
fine, we've got all of our own troops up now, thank you very much,
would you think about leaving now, or, hey, look, we need you to stay
longer, in which case, we can consider that. But the political
process, as we know it, in terms of 1511, is through the end of 2005.
And at that point, we expect decisions to be made. But it's a
sovereign government, so we want to leave it in their sovereign hands
as to whether they will continue to need help, or not. But I think the
language you come up with should satisfy what my permanent members --
colleagues were asking for.

Q I wonder if on the Tenet resignation, in your judgment, do you
think he did the right thing in stepping down, given the apparent
intelligence lapses of his tenure, particularly on Iraq?

SECRETARY POWELL: George stepped down for personal reasons. I
think he did a tremendous job over a long period of time. He's a close
colleague. I will miss working with him. He will always be a close
friend. And he stepped down for personal reasons, and I have no reason
to believe anything other than that.

Q Do you think the CIA needed a change in leadership about now?

SECRETARY POWELL: I think if George had decided to stay on, it
would have certainly been the President's desire, and I would have
enjoyed continuing to work with him.

Q But you do think there needs to be some accountability for
what are apparent intelligence lapses? You've, I think, said that
publicly.

SECRETARY POWELL: I think Director Tenet believes that we should
find out what lapses existed. He had launched inquiries. And as you
know, the President has launched an inquiry with Mr. Silberman and Mr.
Robb. So we should always find out where we didn't get it right, where
there were weaknesses, not overlooking all the times we do get it right
and all the successes that we do have from time to time.

But in the case of Mr. Tenet, the President would be pleased if he
had continued to serve, and I know I can say that in the President's
name because he said it. And I would have liked to see George stay.

Q Back to the resolution, was there any single event that caused
everything to fall into place, or was it just simply a lot of hard work
that eventually --

SECRETARY POWELL: There was a lot of hard work, and what you have
to do with one of these resolutions is you throw out a version, you put
out a version, knowing that it will be modified as you go along. And
then you seek to gain from that first draft what the points of
disagreement are or what the needs are from others for more. And you
try to narrow it down to some key issues.

And we were able to do that within a few days. We knew that they
wanted a firm date of the end of December, 2005, and not just -- not
touching on that. So we knew that had to be dealt with. We knew that
there would be a desire to make sure there was no confusion about full
sovereignty. And we thought we had dealt with that, but there were
others who wanted stronger language, and we put that in.

It's always presented as concessions given, but really, it is the
process of negotiating a resolution. I've been through a number of
them now and they all tend to follow this pattern. Sometimes they're
very hard, like 1441, which took seven-and-a-half weeks. Sometimes
they're very easy, like 1483, 1500 -- 1511 took a bit of time. And
this one -- it isn't passed yet, but I expect that it will -- it will
pass in the not too distant future.

Q Do you know anything about --

Q -- recently reported -- I think it was The Post -- that you
had requested an intelligence review particular to the information you
used in your U.N. presentation. Have you gotten answers back on that
yet?

SECRETARY POWELL: I think it was the New York Times, and I don't
know what they're referring to. I didn't ask for that. I don't know.
It was a New York Times story, if I'm not mistaken.

Q And you didn't ask for any review of the information --

SECRETARY POWELL: I know -- I know that the information is being
reviewed by Director Tenet's own investigatory committees, and I know
that Mr. Silberman and Senator Robb are conducting an inquiry. But I
did not ask for a specific inquiry. Of course, I am constantly
interested and curious as to what we might have done better. But I did
not ask, as the reporter said -- I think it was a New York Times story
-- I did not ask for a specific inquiry, and -- even though that's what
the reporter wrote.

Q Do you know any -- do you know anything about President
Reagan's condition?

SECRETARY POWELL: No, I do not. I just hear the rumors that
everybody hears. But I don't know anything and I have nothing to say.

Q One last process thing. So do you expect, if the headline out
of today, from your point of view, is about the Allawi letters coming
in, you really think that this is the final push to get the resolution,
should resolve the outstanding --

SECRETARY POWELL: I would say that with the receipt of the Allawi
letter, this pushes us much closer to the finish line with respect to
the resolution. But with a resolution, like with a football game, it's
-- or basketball game, it's not over until the buzzer goes and we watch
the last ball --

Q -- it's come up, will the President deal with this, you think,
in this level of detail, about the letter? Will he confer with
President Chirac about this this afternoon, do you think?

SECRETARY POWELL: I'm sure it will be a subject of discussion, but
I wouldn't expect them --

Q You wouldn't expect it to be definitive, you'll wait for the
--

Q They're not going to negotiate, in other words?

SECRETARY POWELL: No, no, no, the letter's finished. There's
nothing to be negotiated. It's the letter from a sovereign prime
minister. And I'm sure Foreign Minister Barnier might have some
opportunity to discuss it. But I'm sure the two Presidents will
certainly note it. It's a major step forward toward getting the
resolution. I'm sure they'll welcome it warmly. And I sense the
French are anxious to bring this to -- anxious to bring this to a
closure.

Q You view this as a real opportunity to put U.S.-French
relations back on a more consistent and friendly course?

SECRETARY POWELL: We had a big disappointment last year on the
Iraqi matter, but I think things have been improving once we came
together after the war and realized that we had a common obligation to
work together to help the Iraqi people. So I think relations have been
improving. The President indicated such when he gave an interview last
week that you all have seen. And I'm sure that today's meetings, as
well as the -- just the pageantry of Normandy tomorrow, will remind
everybody of the shared values we have with our European friends,
especially our French friends, one of our oldest friends in the world,
and the first friend we had in the world, that came to our help. So
there are ups and down in relationships, but we have shared values, and
now we have a common interest to help the people of Iraq.