Reductionism

What I’m going to say is going to be unpopular, but I cannot reconcile my own well-being without giving you an answer to this problem from my perspective.

My only reason for reluctantly writing this, knowing what kind of reaction I could receive is, because I abhor that some of the best minds on our planet are occupying themselves with this problem. It pains me to no end to see humanity squandering its power for a problem that, as it is currently framed, is unanswerable. It goes further than this though. There will come a time when questions such as this one will be cast upon the junk heap of humanity’s growth throughout history. It will take its rightful place along such ideas as phrenology.

Here’s why I say this:

The problem is firmly and completely embedded in Functional Reductionism. I say this, because the problem’s framing requires us to peel away the contextual embedding of the problems for which it is supposed to clarify.

This is just one of its problems. Here’s another:

Since the data for this problem (and those like it) are themselves algorithms, they are compelled to be functionally reduced versions of mind problem solving (varying types of heuristics and decision problems) which reduces the problem’s causal domain and its universe of discourse even further. How can a specification based upon functionally reduced data be again used as data for the problem’s solution in the first place?

That means that this problem has no independent existence nor causal efficacy. Everywhere I have looked at this problem, the definitions of NP-Hard and NP-Complete do not lead to proving anything useful. We cannot ‘generalise’ the mind by reducing it to some metric of complexity. Complexity is also not how the universe works as Occam’s Razor[1] shows.

I am prepared to defend my position should someone have the metal to test me on this. Another thing: I wish I could have left this alone, but we all need to wake up to this nonsense.

They are wonderful tools to explain much of our world, but lack ‘The Right Stuff’ to handle the metaphysical underpinnings of anything near a Philosophy of Mind, Philosophy of Language , or a Philosophy of Learning.

This is, because Category Theory specialises on roughly half of the Noosphere. It does a wonderful job on exteriority, but cannot sufficiently describe nor comprehensively access interiority.

Therefore, as is the case with Semiotics, has limited metaphysical value with respect to philosophy in general.

For example:philosophies of mind, language, or learning are not possible using only category theoretical tools and/or semiotics.

“The ultimate purpose of the visualisation process is to gain Knowledge of the original System. When this succeeds (when the diagram commutes) then the result is a ‘truth’ relationship between the Knowledge and the System. When this process breaks down and we fail to deduce correct conclusions then the diagram does not commute.”

I want to also comment on Figure 3 (which also exposes missing or false premises in the paper), but I will wait until I have discussed the assertions in the quote above which the authors of this paper reference, accept, and wish to justify/confirm.

1) The purpose of a representation is NOT to gain knowledge; rather, to express knowledge. Also, truth has nothing to do with knowledge except when that value is imposed upon it for some purpose. Truth value is a value that knowledge may or not ‘attend’ (participate in).

1a) The ‘truth value’ of the System (‘system’ is a false paradigm [later, perhaps] and a term that I also vehemently disagree with) does not always enter into the ‘dialogue’ between any knowledge that is represented and the observer interpreting that knowledge.

2) The interpretation of a representation is not to “deduce correct conclusions”; rather, to understand the meaning (semantics and epistemology) of what is represented. ‘Correct’ understanding is not exclusive to understanding nor is it necessary or sufficient for understanding a representation, because that understanding finds expression in the observer.

2a) ‘Correct’, as used in this paragraph, is coming from the outside (via the choice of which data [see Fig. 3] is represented to the observer) and may have no correspondence (hence may never ever commute) whatever to what that term means for the observer.

The authors are only talking about ontologies. That is a contrived and provincial look at the subject they are supposing to examine.

There may (and usually are) artefacts inherent in any collection and collation of data. The observer is forced to make ‘right’ (‘correct’) conclusions from that data which those who collected it have ‘seeded’ (tainted) with their own volition.

‘System’ (systematising) anything is Reductionism. This disqualifies the procedure at its outset.

They are proving essentially that manipulation leads to a ‘correct’ (their chosen version) representation of a ‘truth’ value.

I could tie my shoelaces into some kind of knot and think it were a ‘correct’ way to do so if the arrows indicate this. This is why paying too much attention to a navigation system can have one finding themselves at the bottom of a river!

The paper contains assumptions that are overlooked and terms that are never adequately defined! How can you name variables without defining their meaning? They then serve no purpose and must be removed from domain of discourse.

Categorical structures are highly portable, but they can describe/express only part of what is there. There are structure, dynamics, and resonance that ontology and functionalism completely turns a blind eye to.

The qualities of Truth, Goodness, Beauty, Clarity,… (even Falsehood, Badness, Ugliness, Obscurity,…) can be defined and identified within a knowledge representation if the representation is not restricted to ontology alone.

In order to express these qualities in semiotics and category theory, they must first be ontologised funtionally (reduced). Trying to grasp them with tools restricted to semiotics and category theory is like grasping into thin air.

That is actually the point I’m trying to make. Category Theory, and even Semiotics, each have their utility, but they are no match for the challenge of a complete representation of knowledge.