The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.

The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.

The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.

To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.

Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol).
Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #03VATICAN4689.

This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L VATICAN 004689
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR T UNDERSECRETARY BOLTON
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/07/2013
TAGS: IRIZKNPARMPRELVT
SUBJECT: HOLY SEE: UNDERSECRETARY BOLTON REVIEWS U.S.
EFFORTS IN IRAQ, IRAN AND NORTH KOREA
Classified By: Ambassador Jim Nicholson. Reasons 1.5 (b) and (d).
-------
Summary
-------
¶1. (c) Under Secretary Bolton told Vatican Deputy Foreign
Minister Parolin that the U.S. was making steady progress in
Iraq, even though the security situation was not what we
would like it to be. Bolton briefed Parolin on the
President's meeting with Russian President Putin and the
state of play in UNSC deliberations for a new Iraq
resolution, emphasizing the U.S. desire to return power to
the Iraqis as soon as possible. Parolin raised the Holy
See's concerns about religious persecution against Christians
in Iraq, but indicated that they have been encouraged by
inter-religious developments to date. U/S Bolton reviewed
the threat posed by Iranian nuclear development efforts, and
outlined international efforts to address Iran's nuclear
program. On North Korea, Bolton highlighted U.S. willingness
to take North Korean security concerns into account, but
expressed disappointment with the lack of progress at the
last round of talks. In response to Parolin's questions,
Bolton reviewed the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI)
as a means of making better use of national legislation and
law enforcement mechanisms to prevent transfers of WMD.
Parolin emphasized the Holy See's commitment to multilateral
arms control, and conveyed his regret that the U.S. was not
more actively involved in the CTBT. End Summary.
--------------------------
Building a Democratic Iraq
--------------------------
¶2. (c) Under Secretary John Bolton reviewed developments in
Iraq, Iran, and North Korea with Holy See' Deputy Foreign
Minister Pietro Parolin October 1, emphasizing U.S.
determination to address threats to international security
posed by outlaw states' possession of WMD. Bolton told
Parolin that this had been one of the major topics of
discussion between President Bush and President Putin at
their September 27 summit. On Iraq, the Under Secretary
emphasized that the U.S. and Russia had overcome pre-war
disagreements, and agreed on the importance of building a
stable, democratic Iraq that would have a positive influence
on the rest of the region. Bolton told Parolin that there
were many welcome developments in Iraq, such as the opening
of Iraq's refurbished schools with new textbooks and the
training of 50,000 Iraqi police and military. Parolin
indicated that the Vatican's nuncio in Iraq generally shared
this positive perception, despite continuing concerns over
security in some areas. Bolton acknowledged that the
security situation was "not what we would like," largely as a
result of the actions of Saddam holdovers and other terrorist
elements attracted to Iraq.
¶3. (c) Addressing broader international engagement in Iraq,
Bolton conveyed "reasonable confidence" that there would be a
new UNSC resolution. He pointed out that the President had
also met with Chancellor Schroeder and President Chirac, that
the P-5 and G-8 had met, and that there appeared to be a
convergence on how to get a resolution done. Contrary to
perceptions of acting alone, Bolton noted that troops from
over 30 countries were on the ground in Iraq, and that,
although the U.S. role is predominant, there was considerable
international support. Bolton also sought to counter the
misimpression that the U.S. was looking to hold onto power in
Iraq, observing that "nobody will be happier than the U.S. to
return power to the Iraqi people." The worst outcome, he
cautioned, would be a bad transition that resulted in an
unstable and fragmented Iraq.
¶4. (c) Parolin asked Bolton for his assessment of the timing
of a transfer to Iraqi sovereignty and authority. Bolton
recalled the Secretary's recent assessment that it would take
six months to prepare a constitution, but noted that some in
Iraq have insisted it will take at least a year to reach that
stage. This was not a matter of bad faith on their part, but
simply that a whole new political culture had to take root
and big decisions had to be made that would affect Iraqi
society for years to come. The U.S. did not accept that this
would take a year, but we appreciated the importance of
getting it right. In this context, Bolton observed that
France's desire to transfer sovereignty without authority
created a potential for confusion of roles and potential
conflict that was unacceptable.
---------------------------------
Concerns for Religious Minorities
---------------------------------
¶5. (c) Reiterating that the Vatican nuncio's impression of
the situation in Iraq was generally positive, Parolin asked
Bolton for his assessment of the situation for religious
minorities in light of some recent evidence of religious
intolerance in the south. The Under Secretary observed that
cooperation between religious groups has been good, and that
the risk of fragmentation has been greatly reduced. While
there are still elements in the south that would like to see
an Islamic republic under Sharia law, this represents only
about one-third of the Shiites or 20 percent of the total
population. Bolton assured Parolin that the U.S. was
committed to building an Iraq in which freedom of religion
was respected. Parolin observed that some Christian shops
that served alcohol had been burned. Bolton pledged to call
any incidents of suspected intolerance to Washington's
attention, and urged the Holy See's nuncio to relay
information about such incidents to the Coalition Provisional
Authority. Both agreed that it would be better to deal with
these problems early before they became regular occurrences.
Parolin observed that the Holy See had been encouraged by
some statements of a leading Ayatollah in favor of democracy,
but noted that these "are just words, and we need to see what
happens in reality." Bolton noted that some Iranian mullahs
continued to stir up problems in the south.
---------------------
Iran's Nuclear Threat
---------------------
¶6. (c) The greater threat from Iran, Bolton then noted, comes
from Iranian efforts to develop a nuclear capability, which
the President and President Putin had also discussed at Camp
David. Bolton said Russia had agreed not to ship nuclear
fuel to Iran, and that President Putin appreciated the
dangers posed by a nuclear Iran, even while some in the
Russian government and industry continued to cause problems.
Bolton observed that there appeared to be a debate in Iran
about whether to sign the IAEA additional protocol, but,
unfortunately, no debate about whether to have nuclear
weapons. The U.S. view, he told Parolin, was that Iran not
only had to cooperate with IAEA inspections, but also to
refrain from enriching uranium. The looming problem was that
once the new reactor was operational, even if it operated
under IAEA safeguards, it would have enough fuel in its cycle
to make 80 nuclear weapons. It was clear to the U.S. that
Iran's intention was to gain national control over the full
nuclear production cycle.
¶7. (c) In response to Iran's nuclear ambitions and reluctant
cooperation with the IAEA, the U.S. had decided to refer the
issue to the UNSC in order to demonstrate international
concern and seek a UNSC president's Statement urging Iran to
cooperate. Parolin noted that he understood that Iran had
agreed to accept IAEA inspections, but U/S Bolton pointed out
that although Iran says it will cooperate, it continues to
delay and deny access - as occurred recently at an Iranian
electrical facility. Emphasizing that Iran was engaged in "a
campaign of deception," Bolton noted that IAEA Head El
Baradei had warned Iran that if it did not cooperate
immediately, it could not meet the October 31 IAEA deadline.
----------------------------
North Korea: Little Progress
----------------------------
¶8. (c) Turning to the North Korean nuclear threat, U/S Bolton
stressed the U.S. desire to address this threat by diplomatic
means. Unfortunately, the outcome of the recent talks in
Beijing was "not that positive." Parolin recalled that all
parties had agreed that the region should be free of nuclear
weapons, and suggested that this offered a positive point of
departure. U/S Bolton explained that the only real outcome
at the talks had been the agreement to meet again in two
months, but that it now appeared that even this would not
happen on schedule as North Korea had indicated it would not
be ready to meet at that time. He pointed out that a
high-level Chinese visit to North Korea had been canceled out
of concern that the North Koreans would rebuff the Chinese
appeal for cooperation.
¶9. (c) Parolin asked Bolton about the degree of U.S.
willingness to take North Korea's security concerns into
account. Bolton indicated that the U.S. has discussed some
form of security assurances, which could be put in writing,
though not in the form of a treaty. Bolton pointed out that
the U.S. had been prepared to put this on the table and would
be prepared to do so at the appropriate time in the future.
Parolin reiterated the Holy See's desire that this problem be
resolved through dialogue.
---------------------------------
Proliferation Security Initiative
---------------------------------
¶10. (c) Parolin said he had reviewed carefully the
information provided by the Embassy on the Proliferation
Security Initiative (PSI), and queried whether it was being
applied only to North Korea. U/S Bolton observed that North
Korea earns hard currency from its weapons sales, which it
uses to develop its own weapons programs. The U.S., Bolton
said, believes an increase in the level of interdiction of
shipments going in and out of North Korea would enhance
security in regions where they are sold as well as in the
Korean peninsula. Asked to compare the PSI to a naval
blockade, U/S Bolton explained that the initiative was
broader, seeking to build on existing export control
mechanisms aimed at prohibiting exports of weapons-related
materials. President Bush has called on other countries to
criminalize the export of items related to WMD, which up to
now has been a legal gap in many countries domestic
legislation. The goal, he stressed, is to make it harder for
states to participate in such trade. Asked about the
relationship between PSI and broader multilateral arms
control bodies such as the Wassenaar Group and OPCW, Bolton
explained that PSI aimed to fill a gap in these existing
mechanisms by creating some form of enforcement mechanism,
not to supplant them. Noting that there are some areas where
international authorities are unclear, Bolton suggested that
there could be an evolution in international law on the
suppression of unlawful acts at sea through state practice.
-------------------------
Multilateral Arms Control
-------------------------
¶11. (c) As the meeting drew to a close, DFM Parolin expressed
his surprise when he discovered at a recent CTBT conference
in Vienna that the U.S. "was not there." U/S Bolton noted
that the U.S. had been present a low level only, as a result
of our decision not to ratify the CTBT. Nevertheless, Bolton
pointed out, the President's moratorium on nuclear testing
remains in place. In this context, Parolin observed that the
Holy See was "worried" about the problem of international
disarmament and believed that multilateral cooperation was
essential to meet the threat posed by WMD. U/S Bolton
responded that the U.S. recognized the importance of
multilateral arms control, but also recognized that in a
world where North Korea, Iran, Libya and Syria operated
outside of such mechanisms in their pursuit of WMD, other
measures were needed to meet the threat. "People are
watching Iran and North Korea," Bolton cautioned, "and if
they succeed in their pursuit of nuclear weapons, the whole
NPT framework would be at risk." Bolton recalled President
Bush's admonition that the biggest threat to the world today
is the most dangerous weapons in the hands of the most
dangerous people. These are individuals and groups not
susceptible to deterrence or threats of retaliation, and that
is the scenario the U.S. is working to prevent. Parolin
agreed that weapons in irresponsible hands represented a
grave danger and must be prevented.
¶12. (U) Under Secretary Bolton has reviewed this cable.
¶13. (U) Minimize considered.
Nicholson
NNNN
2003VATICA04689 - Classification: CONFIDENTIAL