MR. SNOW: We're going to do just a quick sort of a joint briefing here.
We've got Steve Hadley and Julie Ansley here to talk about the
President's visits today with the President and Prime Minister of
Hungary, and entertain any other questions of consequence that you may
have. Steve, why don't you come up, and you can give a summary of the
morning's meeting.

MR. HADLEY: I'll run through the day, and then talk a little bit about
what was discussed. The President began this morning with an embassy
greeting, meeting with the men and women who support U.S. government
activities here.

He then met with the President of Hungary, went to the Parliament
Building, where he met with the Prime Minister. After a meeting with the
Prime Minister, of course, there was a brief meeting with the press. He
then met with the Speaker of the Parliament, and then had an opportunity
to greet various leaders of the political parties here in Hungary. And
then there was a social lunch where the two leaders and the President --
President and Prime Minister and President Bush made some brief
comments.

The two longest substantive meetings were, of course, the meeting with
the President and the Prime Minister. At both of those meetings, the
subject of democracy and freedom came up, of course. This being the 50th
anniversary of the 1956 uprising, freedom and democracy are very much on
everybody's mind. The President paid tribute to the spirit of the
Hungarian people that despite the events of 1956 stood strong and
ultimately resulted in the freedom that Hungary achieved in 1989.

They talked about Hungary could not only be an example to the world
about the power of freedom, but also, in some sense, Hungary can share
the lessons it has learned from its own transition to freedom and
democracy with other countries not only in the region, but around the
world. All three leaders talked about the responsibility of those who
know freedom to support others in their quest for freedom. There are a
lot of ways in which that support can manifest itself, but they all
agreed that it is the responsibility of those who are free to help those
who would be free.

There was a discussion of issues of the day. President noted and thanked
the Hungarian officials for Hungary's understanding that freedom is also
on the march in Afghanistan and Iraq and the willingness of Hungary to
participate. They have been participating most recently through the NATO
mission in training in Iraq; they are present in Afghanistan, they are
considering a PRT, heading one of the provincial reconstruction teams in
Afghanistan. And the President expressed appreciation for their support
in freedom's cause more generally.

There was a discussion about the Balkans, the important period of moving
towards the question of final status for Kosovo, the importance that any
final status arrangement provide protections for minorities, and
particularly the Serbian minority in Kosovo, and that also it provide a
prospect for the Serbian people to move towards greater affiliations
with Europe and European institutions, so that it sees that as its
vocation and ultimate destination, in terms of close association with
the institutions of Europe.

There was a lot of discussion about energy, about the need for
diversification of sources of energy, about the need to invest in
alternative technologies, the kinds of things we've been talking about
in the past -- clean coal technology, ethanol, hydrogen propulsion for
cars and the like. A lot of interest in the Hungarian government and
cooperation on those items.

There was some discussion about Russia. President Putin had recently
come to Hungary, made some helpful comments about the history of this
period, and particularly the history in 1956, and a discussion about how
we could reassure Russia that promoting democracy and freedom not only
within Russia, but among Russia's neighbors is not some kind of effort
to encircle Russia, but is, in fact, a good thing for Russia, because
democratic states make good and peaceful neighbors.

I think that's the gist of the conversations, really, with both the
President and the Prime Minister. There was also some discussion about
Iran, the desire that we all have to find a resolution of the nuclear
issue through negotiation and diplomacy, the need for solidarity, and
the remarkable degree of solidarity there is between the United States,
Europe, Russia in these conversations, and of course, the next step
there is for the Iranian government to respond to the proposal that they
received here around the first of the month.

And, Tony, I think that's really what transpired by way of substance
over the course of the day.

Q Former Defense Secretary William Perry just called on President Bush
to launch a preemptive strike against the ballistic missiles that North
Korea is said to be about to test. What does the United States think
about that idea?

MR. HADLEY: Well, we've been pretty clear what we think about that idea,
namely about the test.

Q No, I mean --

MR. HADLEY: I'll get to that. I get it. I'm not being cute. Look, we've
been concerned for a long time about North Korea's development of
ballistic missiles and their willingness to sell them. There is, of
course, a missile technology control regime that is out that we are
supportive of, as is most of the international community, that is trying
to stop the trade in longer-range ballistic missiles. So we've been
concerned about the North Korean program for some time. We've expressed
those concerns to the North Koreans.

As you know, they adopted voluntarily a moratorium in 1999, and
reaffirmed it several years later. And our position is that the North
Koreans, as we've all said several times, should not test -- should not
test; they should respect their own moratorium. That is the message we
sent. That is the message the Chinese, Japanese, South Koreans and
everybody else has sent to the North Koreans -- that we are trying to
deal with a broader set of issues with North Korea through the six-party
talks and a test would obviously be disruptive of those talks.

And the solution is for North Korea to decide to respect its own
moratorium, not to test this missile, come back to the six-party talks,
and let's talk about how to implement the agreement for the
denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula that was reached last
September. We think diplomacy is the right answer, and that is what we
are pursuing.

Q Yesterday you said that the -- it was waiting too long for August
22nd, for Iran to submit their response to the offer. What day would you
like for them to respond? Is it by the time of the G8 foreign ministers'
meeting next week, or when?

MR. HADLEY: We saw that report about the 22nd of August. We've also
heard other things from various Iranian sources. So it's not quite clear
what is the message that we're being sent. So what we have said, at the
time that this proposal was made, I think around the -- on or about the
1st of June, that a response ought to come in weeks, not months, and it
ought to come through the same channel through which the offer was made,
that was, to Solana to Larijani, so that we know that it is an
authoritative response, so that we know what is the position of the
Iranian regime. That's what we would like to see. Obviously, we think it
is a good proposal. It has a lot in it for the Iranian people, in terms
of economic assistance and things that will open up the Iranian people
to the world. We don't see why it takes a long time to respond to what
is a very constructive proposal.

So, obviously, we think weeks, not months. We're into weeks. We ought to
get a response soon. And there are a number of meetings that are coming
up where first foreign ministers, and then heads of state and government
of the states involved will be getting together. And, obviously, it
would be helpful to have a response before that set of meetings
associated with the G8 come forward. But what we've said is, weeks, not
months, and we're into weeks. And we think it's a good proposal and the
Iranians ought to come back and provide some indication of acceptance,
so we can start working through the details.

Q When you say you're hearing things from other various Iranian sources,
what are you talking about, the various news accounts of different
people speaking, or what?

MR. HADLEY: We're hearing various people speaking, some of which is
reported in the press, some of which we're hearing outside the press.
And what we need is an authoritative response.

Q Steve, could I just clarify that? You said, hopefully before the
foreign ministers' G8 meeting.

MR. HADLEY: I said that there are a number of meetings, and it would --
obviously, coming up. In association with the G8 there's foreign
ministers, the actual heads of state and government. It would be helpful
and useful if we could get a response and know where the Iranians are
before those meetings, it would advance the negotiating process.

Q So is it fair to say that you're hoping a response before June 29th --
is that fair, one of the seven meetings?

MR. HADLEY: I don't have anything to say more than what I really said --
weeks, not months. We're into weeks: sooner would be better. We don't
see why it should take a lot of time. And, obviously, if it can come
before this sequence of meetings or during this sequence of meetings,
that would be helpful. That's really all I've got.

Q Is this being communicated to the Iranians through an official
channel, or is this being communicated through your words today and the
President's words yesterday?

MR. HADLEY: There have been communications of a more official nature to
the Iranian tongs.

Q You're saying it would be helpful.

MR. HADLEY: Right.

Q You're not willing to set any sort of deadline, it would just be
helpful if it came before this date.

MR. HADLEY: It would be helpful.

Q And is there any outside date? When do we start saying it's months,
instead of weeks? Two months from the 1st of June?

MR. HADLEY: We're going to have to see. It's going to depend largely on
what the Iranians do. If they give us a response in the next couple
days, this is going to be a moot point. If it isn't, we'll have to see
where we are.

Q But no deadline?

MR. HADLEY: We're not trying to do this through an arbitrary set of
deadlines. We're trying to do this in a way that is respectful of the
Iranian people and respectful of the regime, and is most calculated to
get a positive response. That's how we're trying to manage this.

Q I had a question on the trade discussions yesterday at the summit. The
Europeans have said that both sides have agreed to put forward new
agriculture offers in the Doha Round talks. Is that a correct
characterization of what occurred in the summit meetings yesterday?

MR. HADLEY: What we have said, and what the President reaffirmed, is
that we made a very forthcoming proposal with respect to tariffs, and
particularly tariffs in the agricultural area and trade-distorting
agricultural subsidies. It was a very ambitious proposal. The President
did it in order to try and get the negotiations going. But when he made
that proposal, he made it very clear that our kind of boldness needs to
be matched by boldness on the part of the other sides -- that is to say
from Europe and from the G20 on agriculture, but also we need a little
bit of boldness and courage in the areas of services and
non-agricultural products. And our take is we have seen some proposals,
but not of the kind of commensurate scale as the one that we made, and
that's what we need to see. We need to see it from the G20 and from
Europe with respect to agriculture; we need to see it from a variety of
countries on services and non-agricultural products.

So we know that we're in the zone of where we can get what we ought to
have, which is an ambitious Doha Round that gets tariffs down. Because,
remember, the principal beneficiaries of this Doha Round are going to be
developing countries. That's why it's called the Development Round for
Doha. And in order for us to do that and to achieve that kind of result,
and make the most of this opportunity, people have to be ambitious. And
the President has been ambitious, has made a bold opening move, and we
need other parties to make comparable moves of similar boldness, so that
we know that we're really going to try and do this and achieve what is
possible here. Then we can get into the details of negotiation. That's
what we need to see next.

Q So the U.S. has not agreed to put forward another agriculture offer,
then, because that's what the Europeans have said occurred yesterday at
the summit meeting, that Borroso and Bush agreed that both sides would
do offers?

MR. HADLEY: Look, there's going to be a negotiating process, obviously,
to get this done. But where we are now is what the President has made is
a bold proposal and what we're looking for is a bold proposal back.

Q The Italian Foreign Minister D'Alema that you saw last week in
Washington, met yesterday with the Iranian Minister Mottaki -- at the
end of the meetings, D'Alema said there is no reason to have an atomic
weapon in Iran in a close time, and he also said that the risk to repeat
in Iran the mistake was done in Iraq. Do you agree with him?

MR. HADLEY: I don't know what he said. I mean, I know what you said he
said. Look, Iran has said it wants a peaceful nuclear program. That's
what its government has said. What we and other countries have said is
we have no problem with a peaceful nuclear program. Indeed, our
President has been out talking about nuclear power as an important
aspect of energy security and diversification. So we have said the issue
is not whether Iran can have a peaceful nuclear power program.

The problem is that the history of the program that they have been
conducting -- which, over a period of 18 years, large portions of which
were not disclosed to the IAEA, as the Iranian regime was required to do
-- raised questions about Iran's intentions, and therefore, Iran needs
to reassure the international community that it is only interested in a
peaceful civil nuclear program.

And that's what the EU3 -- sorry -- the UK, France, and Germany -- were
negotiating with Iran, a series of assurances that would reassure the
international community that Iran is only pursuing a peaceful program,
rather than what we have reason to believe is a peaceful program as a
cover for a nuclear weapons program. That's what is so troubling. And
that is what we need to do, and that's why we think it starts with a
suspension of the enrichment program, which is the way you get the
fissile material that would allow you to make a nuclear weapon.

A suspension of the enrichment activity, and then a return to
negotiations so we can come up with an arrangement that will ensure the
Iranian people that they will have access to civil nuclear power and
ensure the international community that it will only be a peaceful civil
nuclear program, not a route to nuclear weapons. That's what we need to
do.

Sir.

Q Mr. Hadley, although it's of course been 50 years, the U.S. inaction
in what happened here in Hungary is very much a part of the story and
the history. Will the President acknowledge that publicly in any way,
number one? Number two, could you foresee this administration doing what
the Eisenhower administration did in any similar set of circumstances
today?

MR. HADLEY: The President will have an opportunity to address the
broader question in his speech this afternoon. I think one of the things
that, as I mentioned, came out of the discussions he had today is that
as he and the Prime Minister and the President said, those of us who
enjoy freedom have an obligation to support those who are seeking
freedom. And that's an obligation I think, drawing from the lessons of
history, we all need to take seriously.

Sir.

Q Sir, I had two questions, if I may. The first is, the Iranians seem to
be sending mixed signals through mixed channels. Would a way of
responding to that be to say, definitively, that if they wait until
August to respond they risk, by August, facing U.N. Security Council
action already?

MR. HADLEY: We think we've been pretty clear about what needs to happen
next and when, in some sense, the timing when it needs to happen. And I
think our best judgment is that that's the best way to get -- to
encourage a positive response from the Iranians, and that's what -- from
the Iranian government, and that's what we're trying to do.

Sir.

Q It's been reported in the last week or so that three years ago, right
after the fall of Baghdad, the Iranians made an unsolicited offer to us
to engage in negotiations, and they had held out the possibility of
working to reduce terrorism in Palestine and also trying to resolve the
nuclear concerns. Can you tell us why the United States did not take
that initiative at that time, and why things have now changed that you
would be willing to entertain that, at least, if they're willing to meet
your conditions?

MR. HADLEY: I really don't know what that article was based on, I must
say. And I just -- I don't know what was talked about. What we've said
and where we are is that we have -- our addressing with the EU3, which
we've identified before -- Russia and China -- we're addressing the
issue of Iran's nuclear program. We have made an offer. We've indicated
that if they will suspend their enrichment program, we will join the
negotiations and try to resolve the nuclear issue.

We think that is the place to start. We have, as the President has
indicated, a long set of concerns with Iran: what they are doing in
Iraq, their support for terror, their treatment of their own people in
terms of denial of freedom, and the like. But in terms of negotiations,
we think a good starting point for addressing those issues is an
Iranian-government response to the proposal that was made and a
resumption of the negotiations on the terms that we described.

Those other issues, obviously we would like to see progress on those
issues. And one of the things we've said publicly is if Iran is
interested, for example, in making progress on their activities in Iraq,
one of the things they can do is stop the flow of weaponry and other
materials across the border from Iran into Iraq that are being used to
kill innocent Iraqis and, in some cases, our coalition.

So you don't have to have a negotiation for the Iranian government to
decide that it's in their interest to work constructively with this new
Iraqi government and be a force for stability rather than, of course,
for disruption, and to try to save lives rather than doing things that
are actually putting lives at risk. You don't need a negotiation for
that. That's something that the Iranians can do. And if we can get into
a negotiation framework on the nuclear issues, and can make progress on
those issues, that would be a good start towards addressing a broader
set of issues.

Yes, ma'am.

Q There has been some suggestion, as mentioned before, that the U.S.
should shoot down a test missile should North Korea launch it. Systems
are in place in the United States. Would the U.S. launch a preemptive
missile? Or is there any other way of defusing this diplomatically? The
line has been only that Pyongyang should come back to the table. It's
obviously not going to do that at this moment.

MR. HADLEY: Well, we hope it would come back to the table, and we would
hope that it would be a little sobered by the unanimous message that the
international community has sent, which is that a North Korean missile
test right now would be, again, breach of North Korea's unilateral
undertakings, and our view is in breach of the commitment in the
September agreement under the six-party talks to try and promote
stability in the Korean Peninsula. So it would be a violation of those
understandings and would be disruptive of resolving the broader set of
issues with Korea. So I hope they will get the message. They certainly
are being sent it by all the principal players through every available
channel. And we would hope they would reconsider.

MR. SNOW: We've got about five more minutes, so if you want to continue
pursuing the foreign policy questions, we'll do that, if you want to
entertain other questions, we'll do those, as well. But I know a lot of
you are going to have to preset for the final event on this trip. So I'm
just stepping in and giving you a little time code.

Mike.

Q May I just follow-up on that question, and ask you more generally, the
philosophy of what the missile defense system is, when it might be used
-- there was a Washington Times report that it had been alerted, or
somehow the readiness of it was raised. Could you just talk to us a
little bit about what about that you can describe or what we can know
about it?

MR. HADLEY: Yes, can I consult briefly with my colleague here for a
minute?

MR. SNOW: We're ready now. (Laughter.)

MR. HADLEY: We're ready, but I'm not quite sure what we should say.

Q Tell us everything. (Laughter.)

MR. HADLEY: Where should I begin? No. Look, I've tried in a number of
different ways to make the point that the way out of this is for the
North Koreans to decide not to test this missile. And that is the way
out of it. And, obviously -- and I really need to just stop it right
there. I really need to stop it right there. I'm sorry about it, but
that's really what I need to do.

Q Also on the missile. The South Korean defense minister said that they
don't think the launch is imminent. What's our reading of where they
are?

MR. HADLEY: There's sort of two pieces -- one, there's an issue of
intentions, what the North Koreans are intending to do, and that's sort
of -- you have to kind of read people's minds. The other issues are what
are they prepared to do, or what are they -- do they have the capability
to do. And I think what we've said publicly is we're watching it very
carefully. And preparations are very far along, so you could, from a
capability standpoint, have a launch.

Now, what they intend to do, which is what a lot of people are trying to
read, of course, we don't know. What we hope they will do is give it up
and not launch.

Q Back to Iran and this question about weeks, not months. I'm a little
unclear, because it seems Iran is saying, we are talking about weeks --
eight weeks. And I'm wondering, A, do you think they're doing this in
some way to irritate, and B, what can be done, aside from talk? At some
point you pull the incentive package off the table?

MR. HADLEY: Well, I think what we've done is sort of laid it out pretty
well. I mean, if it's from June 1st -- June, July, August -- that's
three; that begins to sound like months, doesn't it? Now, it's true,
months are made of weeks, so arguably, everything is in weeks.
(Laughter.) But come on. What we've said is, weeks, not months. And what
we've also said is that if Iran does not suspend and does not return to
the talks, we have agreement from our key allies to go forward in New
York. And at some point, at some point, if we do not get the kind of
response we seek in weeks, not months, we have the option of going back
to New York and pursuing a U.N. Security Council resolution.

Now, you could dig all you want; that's all there is, because we are
trying to work this through diplomatic channels in a way I described to
maximize the chance that the Iranians will see it is in their interest
to accept this proposal. That's really all I've got for you.

Q From your talk yesterday, if you had any with Javier Solana, who is
fresh from a visit to Tehran, about the kind of amendments you want to
see in these incentives and what are exactly the issues you have with
the incentives presented to them?

MR. HADLEY: The issue really is we need a response, timely, in weeks,
not months, and there needs to begin with a suspension of enrichment.
That's what we need to see. That, then, opens the door for negotiation.
And we can deal with the issues of the offer that was made.

Q Did he bring any particular demands from Tehran? Did he mention
anything?

MR. HADLEY: What we've really been focusing on is getting a response out
of the Iranian government. That's really what we need -- we need to see
to unlock this.

Q Can I just follow up on North Korea again and just make one more try
at this? I know you don't want to say, go beyond anywhere, but you're
talking about a missile defense system, so one would assume if this
missile were in any way threatening us, that you would want to at least
attempt to shoot it down, as a missile defense. Can you go that far and
say whether that would happen? At least reassure people?

MR. HADLEY: Reassure people that --

Q That if they were to launch, that there would be --

MR. HADLEY: Let me try this. We have a missile defense system, which you
know, that is being what we call a long-range missile defense system
that is basically a research, development, training, test kind of
system. It does, of course, as you know from the press, have some
limited operational capability. And the purpose, of course, of a missile
defense system is to defend -- of that missile defense system is to
defend the territory of the United States from attack.

Anything else? Steve.

Q This document that was unclassified yesterday, Republican lawmakers
released it pointing toward 500 weapons dumps or munitions found in Iraq
since 2003, of some chemical weapons. Do you consider this as a smoking
gun of some sort, proving the WMD charge, or is this old material that
is pre-Gulf War? What do you make of it?

MR. HADLEY: I think really it is what it is. There's a declassified, I
think one-pager, that the intelligence community has cleared. I don't
know whether that's been released to the press.

Q It has, yes, it has.

MR. HADLEY: That's really the story, I think. And I don't have a whole
lot to add. It sort of, it is what it is. And I think -- I read that
statement quickly last night and it's really all we can say about it.
And I think people are going to have to draw their own conclusions.

But the bottom line is, 500 chemical munitions in Iraq, and obviously
we're concerned about the potential threat they pose to Iraqis and to
our forces.

I think I'm done. One more shot?

Q Let me try on North Korea one more time.

MR. HADLEY: You can try.

Q Okay. One question is, you talked a little bit about this before, what
you think the motives are behind North Korea doing what they're doing.
And two is, how confident is the President in the missile defense system
as it is now?

MR. HADLEY: I've described the missile defense system I think
accurately. It is a research development and testing capability that has
some limited operational capability. It's really the best I can do.

In terms of North Korean intentions, you know, this is a very opaque
society and very hard to read. And you know it's very hard -- I can
speculate on intentions. I don't think it would be useful. What we need
to do is look at their capabilities, and that's what we're trying to do.