The purpose of this study is to apply a stakeholder analysis to the
restructuring of Ontario's non-market housing system from 1990 to
the present. The analysis breaks down the key stakeholders involved in
non-market housing and then looks at the functions each performed in
1990 and at present. This analysis is done for each of Ontario's
four non-market housing models--public; non-profit co-operative; private
non-profit and municipal non-profit. The non-market housing models were
intended to remain distinct, but the findings from our stakeholder
analysis reveal a pattern of shifts in stakeholder responsibilities in
areas of management and administration, a pattern that has greatly
reduced the distinctiveness of these models. This pattern is interpreted
in light of the neoconservative agenda that has led to the downsizing
and decentralization of government functions.

This study argues that for over the past 10 years a shifting in the
various stakeholder responsibilities with respect to the array of
functions associated with the operation of non-market housing has
occurred. These shifts are the result of a process of policy
convergence, initiated by the federal and provincial governments in the
early 1990s, associated with the neo-conservative agenda of reducing
government programs. Our data (based on a representative sample of
non-profit, co-operative and public housing organizations in Ontario)
indicate that the Ontario government's process of policy
convergence has triggered a shifting of the roles of the different
stakeholders involved in the non-market housing system, the outcome of
which has been emerging as a trend towards harmonization into a single
housing model by reducing the distinctiveness of the four non-market
housing models.

This paper applies a stakeholder analysis to assess the impact that
housing policy convergence has had on the delivery of non-market housing
in Ontario. The harmonization of the non-market housing models is not
yet complete, but our findings indicate that this transition is well
advanced. One indication of harmonization is that government policies
increasingly refer to all models of non-market housing as social housing
(Ontario 2000a). A further indication, to be discussed later, is an
experiment in tenant management of an urban public housing project that
may signal an additional shift in the delivery of public housing and the
movement toward a single model of social housing.

A Stakeholder Analysis

The term stakeholder is widely used in corporate analysis (Clarkson
1995; Freeman 1984; Jawahar and McLaughlin 2001), but often a particular
stakeholder lacks defined rights and its use is symbolic (Jordan et al.
1992). Freeman (1984, 46) presents a widely used definition of a
stakeholder: "... any group or individual who can affect or is
affected by the achievement of the organization's objectives."
This definition casts a wide net and is refined by Clarkson (1995) who
subdivides stakeholders into primary and secondary. In his words:
"A primary stakeholder group is one without whose continuing
participation the corporation cannot survive as a going concern"
(Clarkson 1995, 106) whereas, the presence of a secondary stakeholder
group is not integral to the survival of an organization (Clarkson
1995). In a more recent paper, Jawahar and McLaughlin (2001,402) suggest
that among the primary stakeholders "at any given point in time,
some ... will be more important than others." The level of
importance implies that a change can occur within an organization giving
one group the status of primary stakeholder and another lesser status at
different stages of an organization's lifecycle (Jawahar and
McLaughlin 2001).

Our analysis of non-market housing uses the classification of
primary and secondary stakeholders in terms of the role they serve in
the non-market housing system; however, the status of either group can
change according to changes in function. The primary stakeholder groups
include: tenants (users of the service), board of directors,
professional management, non-market housing associations and development
groups, and government housing agencies. The secondary stakeholder
groups include: independent funding organizations or foundations;
community agencies; and community representatives. Their role and
significance may vary by the type of non-market housing model-for
example, for public housing the government appears to be the dominant
stakeholder, with government appointees serving on the board of
directors and professional management serving as the board's
representatives.

While the definition of stakeholder has been refined over time, a
stakeholder analysis is more precise and is used to identify key
stakeholders of a particular business, community or activities (Engel
1997) their significance in the operations and eventual success (Grimble
and Wellard 1996). Stakeholder analysis has been used in different
settings (for example, Grimble and Wellard 1996), and the purpose
usually is to identify commonalities among stakeholders, including their
relative influence. According to MacArthur (1997), the original goal of
a stakeholder analysis was to serve as an assessment tool of the present
state of an organization or program, but a stakeholder analysis is
increasingly being used as a tool to assess changes within an
organization's lifecycle. One limitation of a stakeholder analysis
of corporations is that the organizational culture is built around the
shareholders as the dominant group.

Conducting a stakeholder analysis is a useful way of exploring the
roles of the different stakeholders involved in an organization or
program. A key strength of a stakeholder analysis is that it provides a
systematic approach for assessing the relative importance of particular
stakeholders to the survival of an organization (Grimble and Chan 1994).
Our use of stakeholder analysis adapts the typical approach and explores
changes over time and what is guiding these changes.

With respect to non-market housing, although government, as a
funder, has an important role, arguably it does not dominate to the same
degree as shareholders in the corporate culture; within non-market
housing, the functions of other stakeholders are more clearly defined.
Any changes to the stakeholder's role and interests will have an
impact on the identity of the non-market housing model.

Non-market Housing Policy

In Canada, the private sector's inability to provide
affordable housing for those who either are unable to purchase private
housing or afford the rent in the private rental market has given rise
to an increased role by government in financing affordable housing-that
is, housing that is not purchased in the housing market or sold for a
profit (Drier and Hulchanski 1993; Hulchanski 1990). A major advantage
of non-market housing over private-market rentals is that rents, or
housing charges in housing co-operatives, rise only to meet increased
operating costs.

Public housing was the original non-market housing model aimed at
providing affordable housing to those low-income individuals and
families that cannot afford to pay private market rents (Rose 1980). By
the 1960s, the Canadian government determined that public housing was
not feasible because of the high development and maintenance costs
(Sewell 1994). Additionally, changes occurred because of the pervasive
social problems related to ghettoizing large numbers of low-income
families (Prince 1998; Rose 1980).

The National Housing Act was amended in 1973 to limit the federal
government's role in the direct administration and financing of
current and future non-market housing properties by encouraging the
production of alternative non-market housing models (Van Dyk 1995; Rose
1980). The new models of non-market housing-co-operatives and non-profit
housing-were called social housing and they emerged as partnerships
between the government and various community-based non-profit and
co-operative organizations such as churches, service clubs,
seniors' organizations, unions, and ethno-cultural groups,
cooperative corporations, and municipal governments (Carter 1997). The
nonprofit housing model is subdivided into two forms: municipal
non-profits and private non-profits. The primary distinction is based on
who the sponsoring organization is. Municipal non-profits are part of a
government bureaucracy while the private non-profits are governed by
private organizations, which may or may not include tenant
representatives.

In the original form, social housing diverged from public housing
in a variety of ways. In non-profits and co-operatives, the historical
practice has been for a tenant-selection process to be co-ordinated by
each organization, whereas in public housing the tenants have always
been selected from a centralized waiting list within each housing
authority (Ontario 2000a). The residents, or members in the case of a
co-operative, had a more defined role in decision making under the
partnership model.

Co-operative and non-profits have had a greater income mix among
residents than public housing. They also contrast to public housing in
that the members or residents have security of tenure, such that they
can live in the community for as long as they wish provided that they
adhere to community-established rules or by-laws and pay the
community-established housing charge or rents (Cooperative Housing
Federation of Toronto 2002; Ontario Non-profit Housing Association 2002;
Canada Mortgage and Housing Corporation 1997). In most public housing
projects, the residents are expected to move once they can afford to pay
market rates.

Social housing has successfully overcome the many shortcomings
associated with the public housing model (Canada Mortgage and Housing
Corporation 1997; Dennis and Fish 1972; Hellyer 1969). Social housing
was not only meant to replicate the provision of affordable housing, as
found in public housing but also to establish the means under which a
stable sense of community among a diverse group of people and interests
could exist (Cooper and Rodman 1992; Co-operative Housing Federation of
Canada 2002). For instance, Skelton (2002) states that the co-operative
model was supposed to expand the affordable housing stock, but the
collective ownership found in co-operatives also provides opportunities
for social transformation and relationship building among neighbours.

While there have been similarities in the social housing models,
one of the key differences is their respective system of governance. In
cooperatives, the members elect from among their group, the board of
directors and members participate in related committees. For private
non-profits, the board of directors is normally appointed by the
sponsoring organization and for municipal non-profits by the appropriate
level of government. Therefore, of all models of non-market housing,
co-operatives place the greatest emphasis on member participation.

Until recently, the public housing projects were owned by the
provincial government and managed by autonomous local housing
authorities. The local housing authorities operated as government
agencies and were governed by a single board of directors of government
appointees and were therefore neither independent of the government nor
accountable to the residents. The local housing authorities were
accountable to the provincial government through the Ministry of
Municipal Affairs and Housing. Although tenants of public housing have a
claim to being viewed as a primary stakeholder, the absence of
meaningful resident participation has meant that their influence within
the organization has always been limited to that of the user of a
service. Nevertheless, as will be discussed later, there are indications
that government housing agencies are attempting to enhance the role of
tenants within public housing and decentralize control to a greater
extent.

The four models of non-market housing are the principal means to
deliver affordable housing to low-income earners. As a key funder, the
government has had significant input into the policy directions of the
individuals housing models: however, government housing agencies did not
dominate to the same extent as in public housing. As a result of recent
changes of legislation and practices, there have been distinct changes
in the roles of the stakeholders.

The Changing Housing Policy Context in Ontario

During the 1990s, as part of the neo-conservative agenda,
governments in Canada started to withdraw their support for non-market
housing. In 1993, the federal government downloaded the responsibility
to the provinces (Carroll and Jones 2000). While some larger provinces,
such as Quebec and British Columbia, continued with their housing
development programs, following the 1995 election, the Conservative
government in Ontario-the focus of this study-placed a freeze on
building new non-market housing and even cancelled many contracts. The
impact of Ontario government policies in ending the development of new
nonmarket housing is well documented (Layton 2000), the consequences of
these changes on existing non-market housing are not as evident.

From the mid-1990s, changes to the Ontario government's
housing policy has been based on two broad strategies: first and perhaps
foremost, was to encourage a greater role for the private sector by
providing incentives such as making it easier for landlords to raise
rents (the so-called Tenant Protection Act). The government assumed that
the private sector housing developers and landlords would fill any gaps
for low-income households requiring affordable housing, something that
has not occurred (Statistics Canada 2000). However, undeterred by the
lack of results, in 2000 the Ontario government formalized a second
strategy in the form of new legislation, called the Social Housing
Reform Act, which devolved responsibility to finance and manage social
housing onto 47 reluctant municipal governments. According to the
Ontario government, changing the funding relationships and the reporting
structure was intended to make the non-market housing system more
efficient (Ontario 2000a). The legislation effectively removed the
provincial government from being financially responsible for providing
non-market housing, but the legislation also states that the Provincial
government maintains ultimate regulatory control over polices related to
managing social housing (Ontario 2000b).

In January 2001, devolution became a reality and municipal
governments, referred to as the service manager, have replaced the
federal and provincial governments as the primary funder for non-market
housing. One of the objectives of the Social Housing Reform Act was to
create uniformity in the relationship between all non-market housing
developments and government. As a result the government replaced the
local housing authorities with local housing corporations that operate
as independent agencies of the municipal governments, and called on the
service managers to make the delivery of non-market housing more cost
effective (Ontario 2000b). Furthermore, this legislation outlined a new
funding and reporting relationship between all models of non-market
housing, including non-profits and co-operatives, with the three levels
of government by forcing all non-market housing providers to become
accountable to the municipal government rather than one of the other
levels of government. These changes were undertaken with the belief that
"... social housing is best administered by local governments who
are closest to the people they serve and who best understand the needs
of their communities" (Ontario 2000a, 4).

From a policy perspective the Social Housing Reform Act (Ontario
2000a) was intended to simplify, or converge, the different polices
associated with the non-market housing system. The notion of policy
convergence normally refers to the simplification and merging of state
policies within a changing political system through a process of
consolidation (Bratt 1998; Koebel, Steinberg and Dyck 1998). There
exists a scholarly tradition of researching the rationale guiding policy
convergence (Bennett 1991; Carrol and Jones 2000). However, there has
been a notable absence of research examining the impact of policy
convergence on the different government services. In this paper we
present a stakeholder analysis methodology to understanding the impact
that policy convergence has had on the non-market housing system since
1990 by focusing on the shifts of the role of the primary and secondary
stakeholders.

Method

Procedure and Design

In order to assess the shift in stakeholder functions in non-market
housing over the past ten years, this study undertook the following
steps. First, an in-depth examination of the various housing policies
was conducted to determine whether shifts in government policy are
reflected in changes to current administrative practices. Second, a
taxonomy was developed detailing the different functions required to
manage effectively a non-market housing property. Third, semi-structured
interviews were undertaken with primary and secondary stakeholders in
order to understand the changes since 1990 in the functions integral to
the development, administration, and management of each form of
non-market housing.

The semi-structured interview was designed to determine which
stakeholders controlled particular functions for each of the non-market
housing models in 1990 and at present. The primary stakeholders were
tenants (users of the service), board of directors, professional
management, non-profit housing associations and development groups, and
government housing agencies. The secondary stakeholders were independent
foundations who provide financing and community representatives and
local support agencies.

The interviewees were key informants from each model of non-market
housing (non-profit municipal, non-profit private, co-operative, and
public). The participants did not necessarily hold the same role within
the organization, but all were knowledgeable-for example, property
manager, property co-coordinator, vice-president, and policy analyst.
The interview was focused but lasted up to 90 minutes. The information
collected from the interviews was subsequently checked against a content
analysis of the various policy documents.

Sample Selection

In order to draw a sample of key informants from each housing
model-municipal non-profit, private non-profit, co-operative and public
the sampling frame consisted of all non-market housing organizations
across the province of Ontario. The province was geographically divided
into five regions according to area code: Northern Ontario (807 and
705), Eastern Ontario (613), Western Ontario (519), the Greater Toronto
Area (905), and the Metropolitan Toronto (416). Table 1 presents the
distribution of the four non-market housing models by region. As can be
seen, the distribution by region is uneven, but in selecting a sample it
was decided to choose an equal number per region because of issues could
arise that are particular to a region. Therefore, for each model, one
organization was chosen at random for each region, leading to a total
sample of 20.

Contact information for non-profit housing was obtained from the
2001-02 directory, Ontario Non-profit Housing Association (2002)
containing listings for private non-profits (n=600) and of municipal
non-profits (n=108). These organizations are members of the Ontario
Non-profit Housing Association, which is a member-based organization of
non-profit housing providers from across Ontario. The association is a
second-tier resource organization that provides advocacy and support for
non-profit housing providers.

For co-operatives, the source was a listing of 817 housing
co-operatives in Ontario that was obtained from the Co-operative
Secretariat of Canada (2001). The Co-operative Secretariat of Canada is
a federal agency that coordinates the interaction between the government
and the co-operative sector. For public housing, the source was a
contact list of the 47 municipal local housing corporations in Ontario
obtained from the Ministry of Housing and Municipal Affairs.

In the sampling and data analysis, we differentiated between
private nonprofits (such as those administered by religious
organizations, labour bodies, or Aboriginal groups) and those
administered by municipalities. All non-market housing organizations in
the sample had the same target groups, including families, seniors and
special needs, and their age range was 15 to 30 years. In the
cooperative sample, the number of units ranged from 25 to 150, whereas
in the private non-profit sample the number of units ranged from 25 to
500. In the municipal non-profit sample the number of units ranged from
25 to 28,000 and in the public housing sample the number of units ranged
from 5,000 to 25,000. In it important to note that in the final two
models municipal non-profit and public housing--the count is the
aggregate for the government housing organization and not a single
property.

Measure

The interview protocol was divided into fourteen sections, each
looking at a different function involved in the management of a housing
community, for example: who supervises the staffing; who is involved in
establishing key policies or bylaws; how is the property management
hired; and who establishes capital priorities.

The data were collected whenever possible in a face-to-face
interviews or alternatively by telephone. Although the roles of the key
informants varied, there were two criteria for inclusion in the study:
first, knowledge of the questions; and second, involvement in the
Ontario non-market housing system for at least 10 years.

The interview contained two framing questions that were focused on
the following areas: which stakeholder undertakes the function
currently; and which stakeholder undertook the function in 1990 prior to
the major changes in housing policy associated with the neo-conservative
agenda. Examples of questions include:

* Who was responsible to hire the staff in 1990?

* Who is responsible to hire staff now?

The interviews mapped the functions undertaken by each stakeholder
in different time periods. In other words, the goal was to get a clear
understanding of the specific functions controlled by each stakeholder.
The interview was the same for key informants from each of the four
models of non-market housing.

Data Analysis

There were three primary steps in the data analysis. First, in
order to determine whether there have been any shifts in the
responsibility of undertaking certain functions, the responses of each
organization were summarized according to a particular function. The
second step involved aggregating the responses by non-market housing
model and also by region. The third step was to compare the responses to
existing policy documents.

Results

Since non-market housing organizations rely significantly on
government funding, they are vulnerable to changes in government housing
policy. According to the findings of this study the Social Housing
Reform Act has resulted in a number of significant changes to the
identities of each non-market housing model. The following section
illustrates the changes that have occurred to the various
non-market-housing models. The data show that the changes in how the
non-market housing organizations manage the housing properties are
associated with a change to the stakeholder group responsible for a
particular function.

Five broad categories or themes within the area of administration
and management emerged from the analysis of the data:

* Contracting of services

* Operating and capital revenue

* Centralization of functions

* Establishing market rents

* Resident participation

A discussion of the data relating to each category follows.

Contracting of Services

The escalating costs associated with managing a housing property in
addition to the increased need for affordable housing in Ontario have
made non-market housing organizations look for innovative ways of
dealing with unstable government funding. To reduce costs, a number of
services that were normally handled by staff have been contracted to the
private sector, including property management, minor and major
maintenance of the property, and administrative tasks such as rent
collection.

Contracting out services has been a strategy used by many private
non-profits and co-operatives to reduce costs associated with managing a
property. Until recently, municipal non-profits and public housing have
not widely used contracting out as a cost saving measure. However, since
the devolution of housing to the municipalities, there has been a
noticeable increase in the number of functions contracted out by the
municipal non-profits and public housing to include property management
and security. Therefore, since devolution, all four non-market-housing
models rely heavily on contracting out of services.

The stakeholders that are involved in the hiring of a property
management company vary according to the model of non-market housing.
According to the data, for private and municipal non-profits and
co-operatives, the board of directors makes the decision on who is
hired; though in co-operatives the decision normally involves member
input. In public housing, the administrative staff of the local housing
corporation makes the decision.

Operating and Capital Revenue

The sources of revenue for non-market housing are a combination of
rents, the rent-geared-to-income subsidy and the bridge subsidy. The
private nonprofits and co-operatives still receive the bridge subsidy,
most commonly associated with the federal commitments that have remained
in place until the expiration of the operating agreements. The key
change to the sources of revenue is that the municipality is now the
primary funder for the non-market housing organizations.

For all non-market organizations, there is a lack of support for
capital projects such as major maintenance and rehabilitation. This is a
major concern since many of the properties are over 30 years old.
According to the interviewees with co-operatives and non-profits, the
rent-geared-to-income subsidy is stable and is used for the operating
budget. However, once the current operation agreements expire, the
continuation of the bridge subsidy to support capital projects is
uncertain.

Several of the interviewees suggested that since public housing
organizations access a central fund for capital improvements and
development, there is concern that "co-ops and non-profits may have
to try and access the same source for capital improvements." The
implication is that there will be less money for individual properties
requiring capital improvements. Furthermore, should they have to access
the same fund as the other two models, private non-profits and
co-operatives will lose control over capital planning because the
priorities will be governed by the policies of the central fund.

With the devolution of non-market housing to municipal governments,
all non-market housing organizations have had to adjust their budgeting
and reporting practices in order to continue to receive funding. The
concern is that the tax base of the municipality cannot support the
increased costs of the non-market housing system. The squeeze on capital
expenditures has caused private non-profits and co-operatives to
increase the rents, or housing changes, from non-subsidized units in
order to make up the shortfall of government funding.

The municipal government, through its local housing corporation, is
now the primary stakeholder in establishing financial priorities for
municipal non-profits and public housing. Recently, residents have been
consulted in specific areas of establishing the budget and capital
priorities. In Metro Toronto and in Northern Ontario, in particular,
community-based budgeting practices have been instituted that allow
residents to contribute to deciding the capital priorities.

In co-operatives, the members, through the board of directors that
they elect, remain the primary stakeholders in establishing priorities
for the operating and the capital budgets. However, with the changes to
financing, if public funds are being used government will now have an
increased say in determining the priorities. In effect, the process that
establishes the priorities has become similar to that found in public
housing.

Centralization of Functions

The data show a trend toward increased centralization of services
that are integral to effectively maintaining a non-market housing
organization, and this trend is pronounced in two areas: first the
property management: and, second, the increased centralization of the
tenant selection process. A description of the changes to the property
administration and to the centralized waiting list follows.

Property Administration and Management

In 1990, on-site property management was the common practice for
most non-market housing models. In those cases, an on-site property
manager was directly responsible for processing maintenance requests,
staff supervision, and addressing general tenant issues. As a result of
the centralization over the past ten years of the management and
administrative functions, there has been a decrease in the number of
on-site property managers. According to one interviewee, "a single
individual is now responsible for a portfolio, with at least a dozen
housing communities consisting of thousands of households." This
trend towards centralization was seen primarily in municipal non-profits
and public housing; to date, many co-operatives and private non-profits
still have an onsite management or co-ordinator.

Centralization is also being realized through an increased use of
technology, notably in public housing and both forms of non-profits. For
instance, rent collection in public housing and municipal non-profits is
completed through an automatic deduction from a tenant's bank
account; several private non-profits are starting to use the same
technology. The use of technology for administrative tasks has led to a
reduction in human contact within each housing development. However,
many smaller communities, particularly co-operatives, still maintain
on-site collection of rent.

Centralized Waiting List

A second area of increased centralization is in the process of
tenant selection. In 1996 the provincial government mandated that there
be a central waiting list, referred to as a co-ordinated access list, of
individuals who are eligible to receive a subsidy and live in non-market
housing. The centralized list is now the standard practice across the
province and is commonly associated with the social services division of
the municipality. A central list is not new for public housing and
municipal non-profits, but it represents a major change of practice for
private non-profits and co-operatives with subsidized households. In
order to qualify for the rent-geared-to-income subsidy, they now have to
select residents from the municipal waiting lists rather than making
independent decisions.

On average, private non-profits and co-operatives have a one-to-one
ratio between those who receive rent subsidies and those who do not. By
forcing the private non-profits and the co-operatives to access the
centralized waiting list, the responsibility of tenant selection has
shifted outside of the housing community. With an increased reliance on
a central registry by all four non-market-housing models, there is less
community control over who is eligible to become a tenant and an overall
change in the communities themselves. Co-operatives, in particular, have
toyed with the option of forgoing future subsidies and opting instead
for having only units that pay the market rent. However, it was evident
from the interviews that this option is not affordable and it may
compromise the principles upon which the housing co-operative movement
was founded.

Establishing Market Rents

As stated earlier, public housing projects are 100 percent
low-income and all residents are eligible to receive a
rent-geared-to-income subsidy, thereby making it impossible to have a
mixed income community. One of the changes occurring in public housing
has been the adoption of a rent cap, or maximum rent a household pays,
which is based on equivalent market units. This means that should a
household's income increase over time, the rent will not exceed
market levels. The rent cap is perceived as a strategy to encourage
households that are upwardly mobile to remain in the community. For a
variety of reasons rent caps do not exist in many public housing
organizations outside of Metro Toronto.

The rent cap in public housing is based on an annual rent survey
conducted by the Canada Mortgage and Housing Corporation (CMHC), which
looks at census metropolitan areas that encompasses a larger area than
the immediate neighbourhood. In the past, the other models of non-market
housing have determined rents using the immediate neighbourhood as a
frame of reference. However, several interviewees stated that because of
the dependence on the revenue collected from market units, private
non-profits and co-operatives are making greater use of the CMHC rent
survey as the basis for establishing market rents. The survey is seen as
a way of justifying higher rents or housing charges. According to an
individual associated with the private non-profit housing model:
"The CMHC survey often recommends higher rent levels than we are
comfortable with. We don't normally use the CMHC survey, but our
need for revenue is growing from year to year."

Allowing a greater income mix in public housing represents is a
shift in government policy. Similarly, the inclusion of more low-income
tenants in nonprofits and co-operatives reflects a harmonization of the
models on this issue.

There is also a convergence in the process of establishing rents.
In cooperatives and private and municipal non-profits, the board of
directors normally has established the rents. However, because of the
increased dependence on the money collected from units paying rent
according the market, as defined by the CMHC rent survey, the board of
directors is less influential in determining rents. The increased
reliance on market trends is congruent with the provincial
government's goal of increasing the role of the private sector in
providing affordable housing.

Resident Participation

Resident participation in decision-making can be presented on a
continuum ranging from minimal involvement in municipal non-profits and
public housing to partial involvement for private non-profits, to full
member involvement in cooperatives. The issue of resident involvement
was quite contentious for the various organizations participating in
this study. Many of the interviewees strongly welcomed resident input
and direct involvement, while others believed that resident input is
often uninformed but still welcomed it to a degree.

Resident involvement is one of the strengths of the co-operative
model and a pillar on which the movement was founded. Over the past ten
years, the other models of non-market housing have recognized the
benefits of involving residents in the operations and many of them are
adopting similar approaches to co-operatives.

Establishing operating and capital budget priorities has been one
area where increasing resident participation has been successful.
According to the interviews, prior to devolution the budgets for
non-market housing organizations were created from a provincial list of
predetermined priorities, which had to be adhered in order to maintain
levels of funding. The exception was older housing co-operatives that
received their funding from the federal government. However, since
devolution to the municipalities, it appears that there is greater
resident participation in establishing budget priorities in all models
of non-market housing. The change is particularly notable in public
housing, which historically has not involved tenants in budgetary
decision-making.

According to an interview with a public housing official:

Discussion

Our analysis indicates that changes in the Ontario provincial
government policies have led to a greater harmonization in the
non-market housing models. In all four models, the board of directors
and the government retain the status of primary stakeholder in
decision-making. However, there are other changes in the roles of
particular stakeholders, changes that represent a shift from being a
secondary stakeholder to that of primary. For instance, residents are
more involved in municipal non-profits and public housing and government
has become more involved in the private non-profits and co-operatives.
With the changes to funding regulations for the non-market housing
system, in general, the government maintains a significant role in the
operations of the non-market housing models; however, as the results
demonstrate that the type and level of involvement of the government has
shifted over the past ten years.

One of the key concerns expressed by the individual non-profit and
cooperative organizations is the impact that these changes will have on
the identity of their communities. For instance, by not having a say in
who is eligible to live in the housing property individuals may live
there because of low cost housing as opposed to building a sense of
community. Furthermore, individuals on the waiting lists are more likely
to select the smaller properties because of the stigma attached to
living in public housing. Consequently, public housing may turn out to
be for those individuals who did not want to live there in the first
place.

After reviewing the current configuration of stakeholder
responsibilities, even though there has been a harmonization of the four
models, there are still differences. Public housing, in particular,
still differs from private non-profits and co-operatives. However, there
is a unique experiment underway in downtown Toronto-one of a kind in
Canada-involving the conversion of a public housing project to a tenant
managed co-operative within public housing (the Atkinson Housing
Co-operative) that if replicated would lead to further harmonization of
the non-market housing models.

There have been conversions of public housing in the U.S., Britain,
and Australia, but these have been shifts to either private home
ownership or limited equity co-operatives (Balchin, Isaac and Rhoden
1998; Best 1996; Darcy 1999; Department of Housing and Urban Development
1999; Epp 1996; Hague 1990; Miceli, Sazama and Sirmans 1998; Rohe 1995;
Vale 2002), or the creation of tenant-managed corporations (Hugman and
Sotiri 2001; Koebel and Cavell 1995).

The conversion of Alexandra Park public housing project to Atkinson
Housing Co-operative started when the residents decided over 10 years
ago that they wanted more control over decision-making. Atkinson Housing
Co-operative differs from other housing co-operatives in that it remains
within the public sector, all of its residents receive a housing
subsidy, and its managerial prerogatives are more limited than for
housing co-operatives in general (Atkinson Co-operative 1996). However,
in this community, the tenants elect from their group a board of
directors that forms the legal governance of the organization. This
represents a major departure in the administration of a public housing
project. Atkinson remains unique in Canada, but it is being watched
closely as there are indications that the Ontario government would like
to introduce it more widely. Should this occur, there would be minimal
difference between public housing and the other non-market housing
models.

Even though the Atkinson conversion is unique, it may also be seen
as part of a tradition of conversions from public housing. Atkinson has
many similarities to Resident-management corporations (RMCs) in the
United States, for example negotiating a legal agreement to undertake
management responsibilities with the local government housing agency,
but unlike those organizations, Atkinson also has the potential to
develop in a way that conforms more closely to housing co-operatives and
to increase its distance from government control.

Two significant differences are found in the relationship to the
government and in the system of governance process. In the RMC model a
management agreement is established with a duly elected board of
directors of the corporation. This board does not have to be comprised
of residents, and nor are they directly accountable to the residents. In
this way, an RMC is similar to the non-profit model found in Canada. In
the co-operative housing model the relationship is based on an operating
agreement which outlines responsibilities other than management. The
system of governance in the co-operative model must include residents at
every step. However, the Atkinson model includes non-member directors,
thereby making it similar to the RMC model. In essence, the Atkinson has
features that straddle most developed models of social housing.

Even if the Atkinson experiment is not replicated in other public
housing projects, the pattern toward homogeneity remains
pronounced--government is more tightly regulating the finances of
non-market housing organizations and thereby reducing their degrees of
freedom in decision-making; the budgets are being reduced and thereby
leading to homogenous contracting-out for services, including
management; the income mix is being flattened in co-operatives and
non-profits and being enhanced in public housing, thereby leading to
homogeneity; and tenant consultation is becoming a norm for public
housing and external controls are reducing tenant impact in the other
models.

With the exception of the increased tenant consultation in public
housing, the other changes can be attributed to the neo-conservative
agenda of smaller government with reduced services, less involvement of
government in the direct provision of service, and the targeting of
government expenditure to the neediest members of society rather than
having universal programs. Although tenant consultation can be viewed in
the context of the human resources tradition (Nightingale 1982), in fact
the selling point of the Atkinson conversion to the Ontario government
is that it will reduce costs (Atkinson Co-operative 1996). According to
one source, "by converting into a co-operative the government can
immediately save about 15 percent in administration costs." In
other words, even though this experiment can be interpreted as part of a
tenant rights tradition, it is viewed as creating efficiencies that are
associated with smaller, more efficient government.

Conclusion

In closing, non-market housing is the outcome of partnerships
between government and other stakeholders. The stakeholder analysis
methodology used in this paper has exposed a pronounced pattern shift in
the delivery of non-market housing in Ontario. Should the trend of
increased hamonization continue, the social housing system would be
adopting practices found in managing public housing (such as stricter
government oversight) practices which have been implicated in the
lacklustre condition of public housing projects. The departure from
these practices in 1973 was the raison d'etre of the new social
housing models (Dennis and Fish 1972).

Although it may be too late to change the trend toward
harmonization, non-market housing policy can enhance a sense of
community by building on the successes of the co-operative housing
model, particularly, smaller cooperatives. The building of community
requires augmenting social capital (Putnam 1998, 2000), that is,
encouraging greater social engagement among residents, increasing
reciprocity and trust, as is often found in small cooperatives housing
communities. Future non-market housing policy must encourage greater
resident control in the management of their community, which means
regarding residents as primary stakeholders and not merely users of a
service. In essence, the promotion of social capital should underlie
future policy planning with respect to non-market housing.

As construct social capital has a role in the development of future
housing policy (Keyes, Schwartz, Vidal, and Bratt 1996; Putnam, 1998,
2000) specifically, housing policy must encourage the building of social
capital in low-income housing communities. According to Putnam (2000)
the presence of social capital in a community can be a determinate of an
individual's sense of belonging; in other words, one's sense
of community (Lomas 1998). The Atkinson Housing Cooperative is a prime
example of assimilating co-operative practices into the public housing
model by focusing on the different roles that stakeholders can have on
the management and governance of a housing community.

References

Atkinson Co-operative. 1996. Business Plan. Submitted to the
Ontario Government.

Bratt, R. 1998. Non-profit Developers and Managers: The Evolution
of their Role in U.S. Housing Policy, pp. 139-156. In Shelter and
Society. Theory Research, and Policy for Non-profit Housing, ed. C.
Theodore Koebel. Albany: State University of New York Press.

Canada Mortgage and Housing Corporation. 1997. Cost Effective
Housing: A Comparison of Non-Profit and Market Housing. Report submitted
by Canadian Housing and Renewal Association and Ekos Research Associates
Inc.

Carroll, Barbara, and Ruth Jones. 2000. The Road to Innovation,
Convergence or Inertia: Devolution in Housing Policy in Canada. Canadian
Public Policy 26:277-293.

Koebel, Theodore, and Marilyn Cavell. 1995. Tenant Organizations in
Public Housing Projects: A Report on Senate Resolution No. 347. Prepared
for the Virginia Housing Study Commission by the Virginia Centre for
Housing Research.

Keobel, Theodore, Richard Steinberg, and Robert Dyck. 1998.
Public-Private Partnerships for Affordable Housing: Definitions and
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Theodore Koebel. Albany: State University of New York Press.

Layton, Jack. 2000. Homelessness: The Making and Unmaking of a
Crisis. Toronto, ON: Penguin Books.

Lomas, J. 1998. Social Capital and health: Implications for Public
Health and Epidemiology. Social Science and Medicine 47 (9): 1181-1188.

Vale, Lawrence. 2002. Reclaiming Public Housing: A Half Century of
Struggle in Three Public Neighborhoods. Boston: Harvard University
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Jorge Sousa and Jack Quarter

Ontario Institute for Studies in Education

University of Toronto

The increases in resident involvement over the past ten years
in the public housing and municipal non-profits is a recognition
that local resident involvement is the best way to ensure that
the communities are well maintained and that the needs of the
residents are accounted for. For the public housing residents,
the best way to ensure that their needs are addressed is to
participate in anything available to them.