A Background to Terrorism

By Ralph McGehee, CIABASE, 25 August 1998

Afghanistan, Pakistan, Egypt, 80-96 Blowback of CIA ops. CIA spent
more than $3 billion dollars in 80s to train and fund the Afghan
resistance—most venomously anti-Western—they form core of
an international net of Islamic militants. CIA weaponry went to
fundamentalist Gulbaddin Hekmatyar, one of the most anti-western
leaders and until recently president of Afghanistan. His allies
included Sheikh Omar Abdel Rahman, serving life in the U.S. for urban
terrorism. Rami Ahmed Yousef, man accused of planning the bombing of
the World Trade Center was trained in Afghanistan. The terrorist net
has targeted Washington's most pivotal Islamic
allies—claiming responsibility for the first terrorist attack in
Saudi Arabia and some of the worst attacks in Pakistan. Christian
Science Monitor 11/1/96 18

Middle East, Afghanistan, Pakistan, 81-92 Support for Afghan members
of, Ikhwan, a frequently violent Muslim brotherhood. Saddam Hussein of
Iraq and Khadafi of Libya also supported more fanatic factions of
Afghan Mujahaddin—but largest contributor of Gulbaddin Hekmatyar
came from CIA. Huge amounts of U.S. aid also to Ahmed Shah Masood of
Rabbani's Jamiat-I-Islami, both longtime advocates of pan-Islam.
Lohbeck, K. (1993). Holy War, Unholy Victory 171

Afghanistan, Pakistan, 80-93 U.S. created a monster by supporting a
rebellion based on religious zealotry. Several of those involved in
World Trade Center bombing or plans to attack other targets
participated in the Afghan rebellion as recruiters, trainers, or
fighters. Abdel Rahman was reportedly a prolific recruiter per reports
from Cairo. An Afghan link extends as well to a number of accused
terrorists in Egypt, Algeria, and other Arab countries. Through
Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence organization (ISI), CIA provided
weapons, money and training for Afghan insurgents. Dispute over giving
Stinger missiles. Morton Abramowitz, Director of the State
Department's INR, now president of the Carneige Endowment for
International Peace, was the leading advocate for supplying
Stingers. CIA now seeking $55 million to purchase missiles that
showing up on black market. Pakistan's ISI favored
Hekmatyar—Pakistan agent for years—he now is prime
minister of Afghanistan. Peshawar was center for
insurgency/extremists and now they looking for new targets—such
as the pro-West government in Egypt. Washington Times 7/26/93 a1,13

Afghanistan, Pakistan, 80-94 Covert CIA program to buy back U.S.
Stinger missiles distributed to rebel forces in 80s plagued by
failures, miscalculations and wasted money. Congress authorized more
than $65 million for op over last 3 years. Despite the millions, CIA
has recovered only a fraction and does not know who controls remaining
weapons. Missiles supplied by CIA have turned up in Iran, Qatar and
North Korea. Op turned into a fish market “CIA unable to recover
most of the missiles.” One effort failed when Pakistani
officials stormed into Afghanistan and seized the
missiles—Afghan rebel chief so incensed his men kidnapped 2
(Chinese) engineers working with the Pakistani government and holds
them for ransom. Foul-ups legendary in intelligence circles in
Pakistan and tribal leaders in Afghanistan. Washington Post 3/7/94
a1,14

Afghanistan, Pakistan, 86 In March 86 U.S. began giving Stinger
missiles to the Mujaheddin. Shift occurred after activists in
Pentagon, and CIA backed by conservative senators, overcame
opposition. Opponents argued that introducing U.S.-made arms into
third world conflicts would escalate into U.S.-USSR conflicts and
there no guarantee advanced weapons would not fall into terrorist
hands. British Blowpipes also used. Washington Post 7/23/86 a1,12

Afghanistan, Pakistan 80-90 Two part article based on information from
intelligence officials: Pakistani General Mohammed Yousaf who wrote
book “The Bear Trap;” and more than a dozen senior western
officials. Three training camps near Afghan border where Mujaheddin
fire heavy weapons and learn to make bombs with CIA-supplied plastic
explosives. DCI Casey in 84, during visit convinced Pakistanis to ship
propaganda through Afghanistan to USSR Muslim southern republics. CIA
supplied thousands of Korans, as well as books on USSR
atrocities. U.S. “chickened-out” on taking Afghan war
into Soviet soil but Casey ruthless. Intel coup triggered decision to
escalate. U.S. received highly specific, sensitive info re USSR war
plans in Afghanistan. 3/85 NSDD 166, sharply escalated U.S. op by
providing high technology military expertise. In 85 CIA gave extensive
satellite reconnaissance data, plans for military ops based on
satellite intelligence, intercepts of USSR communications, nets for
rebels, delayed timing devices for tons of plastic explosives for
urban sabotage, long-range sniper rifles, a targeting device for
mortars linked to U.S. navy satellite, wire-guided anti-tank missiles,
and Stinger missiles, etc. Washington Post 7/19/92 a1,6

Afghanistan, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, China, USSR, 80-90 first years of
the Reagan Administration, covert Afghan war handled out of (DCI)
Casey's back pocket. By 85 U.S. increase in U.S. arms
supplies—rose to 65,000 tons annually by 87 as well as a
ceaseless stream of CIA and P Pentagon specialists to ISI Headquarters
near Rawalpindi who helped plan ops by as many as 11 ISI teams trained
and supplied by CIA who accompanied Mujaheddin across border. Teams
attacked airports, railroads, fuel depots, electricity pylons, bridges
and roads. Washington Post 7/19/92 a1,6

Afghanistan, Germany, 86 A Kuwaitian is trained in explosives, gets
false Afghanistan papers made by the CIA in the Frankfurt Headquarters
(Dept. of Army Detachment), is flown to Pakistan, goes from there to
Afghanistan. Der Speigel 10/6/86.

Afghanistan, 79-90 Mujaheddin commanders inside Afghanistan control
huge fields of opium poppies and reap harvest of as much as four
million pounds of opium a year. By 89 Afghanistan and Pakistan
produced as much heroin as rest of world combined. Weiner,
T. (1990). Blank Check: The Pentagon's Black Budget 151-152

Afghanistan, 82 Sales of opium fund Afghan rebels. The DEA said 52% of
the heroin brought into the U.S. last year is believed to have come
from the area of Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iran. U.S. policy
contradictory it wants to fight the drug traffic and to drive the USSR
out of Afghanistan. 250 to 300 tons opium were produced in Afghanistan
in 1981 . That quantity could be converted into 25 to 30 tons of
heroin. Processing done in Pakistan. Drug traffickers in U.S. import 4
to 4 1/2 tons of heroin a year. Washington Post 12/17/83

Afghanistan, 86 a Department of State report describes Afghanistan and
the bordering tribal areas of Pakistan as “the world's
leading source of illicit heroin exports to the US and Europe. The
sale of this opium plays an important part in the finances of the
CIA-backed Afghan rebels. New York Times 6/20/86 from Intel
Parapolitics 9/86 p7

Afghanistan, 89 The Administration is dickering over how best to arm
the Mujahedeen. Areas controlled by them include some of the most
fertile centers of opium production. DOS report circa 3/89 said
Afghanistan produced 700 to 800 metric tons of opium 88, most from
territory held by rebels. Representative Bill McCollum hit CIA over
handling of mujahedeen and working through Pakistan's intelligence
service. The Nation 10/16/89 412

Afghanistan, Iran, Pakistan. (Golden Crescent) accounts for 75% all
heroin in U.S. In 1983 4.5 tons heroin came to the U.S. from the
Golden Crescent. Covert Action Information Bulletin (now Covert
Action Quarterly) Summer 87 11

Afghanistan, Pakistan, 80-90 17 DEA agents assigned to the U.S.
embassy in Islamabad. DEA reports identified 40 significant narcotics
syndicates in Pakistan. Despite high quality of DEA intelligence, not
a major syndicate investigated by Pakistani police in a
decade. Hekmatyar himself controlled six heroin refineries. Without
fear of arrest heroin dealers began exporting product to Europe and
America, capturing more than 50% of both markets. When Pakistani
police picked up Hamid Hasnain, V.P. of gvt's Habib bank, they
found in his briefcase the personal records of president Zia. Blatant
official corruption continued until General Zia's death in an air
crash. Typical of misinformation that blocked any U.S. action against
Pakistan's heroin trade, the State Department's semi-annual
narcotics review in September called General Zia a strong supporter of
anti-narcotics activities in Pakistan. McCoy, A.W. (1991). The
Politics Of Heroin: CIA Complicity in the Global Drug Traffic 456

Afghanistan, Pakistan, 85-90 U.S. government avoids investigating drug
trade run by Afghan resistance movement. Government has info re heroin
deals Gulbaddin Hekmatjar, leader of mujaheddin but takes no action.
Barnett Rubin of Yale based on Washington Post story: “people
attempting research this connection receive hardly any support. Our
relationship with Pakistani military is centerpiece our strategic
presence in Southern Asia and even in the Persian Gulf.” Article
outlines movement of weapons and drugs via Pakistani ISI and the
National Logistic Cell (NLC) entirely owned by Pakistani army. top
secret s/a-90 17-18

From about 48-91 CIA involved in drug traffic at 3 levels: 1)
coincidental Complicity through covert alliances with groups actively
engaged in drugs; 2) support of traffic by covering up for drug lord
allies; 3) active engagement in transport of opium and heroin. From
Burma's opium traffic in 50s and growth of golden triangle in sea
in 60s and 70s U.S. role a catalyst. in 5/80 Dr. David Musto,
angry. In late 77 he was on Carter's White House Strategy Council
on Drug Abuse. Next two years CIA and other intelligence agencies
denied Council access to all classified info on drug traffic. CIA lied
about dollar role of drugs. Dr. Joyce Lowinson another Council member
in New York Times op-ed criticized policy. Both Musto and Lowinson
worried about drugs in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Drug Enforcement
Agency investigated surge of drugs from southern Asia. Drug traffic in
U.S. in large part due to failure Drug Enforcement Agency's
interdiction and CIA's covert ops. CIA ops transformed southern
Asia to major supplier of world heroin. By 1988 there an estimated 100
to 200 heroin refineries in the Kyber district alone. Trucks from
Pakistani army's logistics with CIA arms often returned loaded
with heroin—protected with papers from Pakistan's ISI. Drug
Enforcement Agency said there were 40 significant narcotics syndicates
in Pakistan. Annual earnings $8 to 10 billion. Progressive 7/91
20-26. From Alfred McCoy's book, Politics Of Heroin: CIA
Complicity in Global drug trade, a revised edition to be published in
July 1991

Drug Enforcement Agency December 83 says Afghanistan rebels are
financing their battle at least partially through sale opium, some of
which comes to U.S. in form of heroin. David Melodic, Drug Enforcement
Agency's congressional liaison said 52% of heroin brought into
U.S. last year believed to have come from area of Afghanistan,
Pakistan and Iran. American interests Afghanistan contradictory over
fighting drug traffic and political goals. Washington Post 12/17/83

Pakistan, Afghanistan, 79-89 The Mujahedden rebels keep their cause
going through the sale of opium. Drug Enforcement Agency spokesman
said “no less than half of all U.S. heroin came from that area
of the world.” Gulbaddin Hekmatyar is responsible for murdering
hundreds of dedicated resistance fighters, political workers, and
intellectuals. He reportedly was a leading figure in the heroin
trade. Details of corruption emerged from U.S. sources only after the
Soviets began pulling out of Afghanistan. By 1989, Pakistan had no
fewer than 100 heroin labs near the border of Afghanistan. CIA had
used a Lebanese-controlled currency firm in Zurich, Shakarchi Trading
to channel aid to the Afghan rebels. Marshall, j. (1991). drug Wars
49-52

Pakistan-Afghanistan border and Iran, 81 the Golden Crescent area
where most heroin coming into U.S. in book “Weltmacht
Droge” Austrian journalist Hans Georg Behr shows the connection
between aid provided by Western intelligence agencies and increased
heroin shipping to West. He spent two weeks with Afghan rebels who
smuggling opium to Pakistan. Money exchanged for arms. Counterspy
10/81 29-30

Pakistan, Afghanistan, 84 Bush meets with the leader of Pakistan's
Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate and Bush agreed for 3.2
billion in new US aid over and above the 2 billion allocated to the
Afghan op. Yet by 1984, according to European police sources,
Pakistan was furnishing 70% of the world's supply of high-grade
heroin. CIA's arms pipeline to Afghan mujahedeen is organized and
coordinated by Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence. The main
carrier is the national logistic cell, owned by the Pakistan army, it
is the largest transport org in the country. US has 17 officers in
Pakistan who work exclusively on narcotics. The DEA contingent
includes several CIA officers. CIA has gathered intelligence on
narcotics since 75. European police who work with DEA claim that US
agents have identified 40 significant narcotics syndicates in Pakistan
yet none have been broken up in past ten years. Nation article gives a
background paragraph on the history of CIA ops and drug traffic. The
Nation 11/14/88 477,492,94-6

Afghanistan, Pakistan, 86-87 CIA supplying counterfeit Afghan money
for several years. It acquired an excellent set of plates without a
blemish. CIA bills arrive in Pakistan and are sold for full value in
Peshawar and Quetta. Jack Anderson, Washington Post 5/4/87

81-92 Afghanistan, Pakistan, 81-92 Because of relationship between DCI
Casey and General Acktar, CIA became advisor and supplier of aid to
Mujahaddin. CIA personnel in Pakistan, were notoriously unlearned in
culture and political atmosphere of Afghans. CIA supported Gulbaddin
and Ahmed Ahah Masood at the expense of other Afghans who had a much
broader-based constituency. Lohbeck, K. (1993). Holy War, Unholy
Victory 163

Afghanistan, 76-89 A criticism of the CIA's handling of the op in
Afghanistan by Bill McCollum, Republican congressman from Florida and
chairman of a GOP task force on terrorism and unconventional warfare.
After 10 years and nearly $2 billion in American aid culminating in a
monumentally incompetent program of arms procurement and distribution.
Hekmatyar's party—recipient of much of much of the
aid—implicated in dozens of disappearances and outright murders
of rival commanders and Afghan intellectuals. Hekmatyar loyal to
Pakistan's ISI that acts as a proxy for CIA. Washington Post
9/10/89 c-1,4

USSR, Pakistan, Afghanistan, 82-87 DCI Casey renewed acquaintance with
General Acktar Abdul Rahman Khan. During tenure Casey made 6 trips to
coordinate with Acktar. Casey considered himself commander-in-chief
against USSR in Afghan. Within 2 years after 1st visit, CIA station in
Islamabad became largest in world outside of Langley Headquarters.
Lohbeck, K. (1993). Holy War, Unholy Victory 52

Afghanistan, Pakistan, 81-92 Reed Irvine of Committee for a Free
Afghanistan, and Andy Eiva, started a letterhead org called
Afghan-American Federation. Federation helpful in finding doctors and
hospitals that would take severely wounded. Committee also hired
people to advise the Mujahaddin military. One was Ted Mataksis who
also advised re Central America and Cambodian rebels. Lohbeck,
K. (1993). Holy War, Unholy Victory

Afghanistan, Pakistan, USSR, 60-90 ISI's Headquarters in a large
camp of 70-80 acres north of Rawalpindi, 12 kilometers from Islamabad.
Inside high walls were offices, transit warehouse through which passed
70 percent of all arms and ammo for the Mujahideen, at least 300
vehicles, several acres of training area, a psywar unit, barracks,
messhalls and the Stinger training school. This called Ojhri camp.
General Akhtar set up another organization for the provision of
clothing and rations purchased in huge quantities throughout Pakistan,
with CIA money. Major contribution from CIA to Afghan war was
satellite intelligence through photographs. Mohammad Yousai &
Adkin, M. (1992). the Bear Trap: Afghanistan's Untold Story
27,29, 93

Afghanistan, Pakistan, USSR, 80-90 There were seven Afghan resistance
parties formed into an alliance. Political heads of each party called
a leader to distinguish from the Mujahideen military
commanders. Alliance established after 83. until the Quetta incident,
commanders usually received supplies directly from ISI. Supplies then
channeled through the parties. Gulbadin Hekmatyar is the youngest and
toughest of alliance leaders. Mohammad Yousai & Adkin,
M. (1992). the Bear Trap: Afghanistan's Untold Story 40-1

Afghanistan, Pakistan, 85-92 Islamic fundamentalist Gulbaddin
Hekmatyar per General Yousaf by 87 received only about 20% of annual
allocations of money and weapons. All 4 fundamentalist parties
combined received 75%, leaving small amounts for the three moderate
parties. U.S. covert program in Afghanistan effectively ended
1/1/92. Program a success. Washington Post 7/20/92 a1,12

Afghanistan, Pakistan, USSR, 80-90 A discussion of the weapons and
equipment pipeline. It in three distinct parts with the CIA owning the
first part, the purchase and transport of weapons to Pakistan. Second
part ISI's responsibility—getting everything carried across
Pakistan, allocated to, and handed over to the parties at their
Headquarters near Peshawar and Quetta. The third leg was the parties
allocated weapons to their commanders and distributed inside
Afghanistan. On 1987 the broad percentages allocated to the parties
were Hekmatyar 18-20 percent, Rabbani 18-19 per cent, Sayaf 17-18 per
cent, Khalis 13-15 percent, Nabi 13-15 percent, Gailani 10-11 percent,
and Mujaddadi 3-5 percent. Fundamentalists received a total of 67-73
percent. Mohammad Yousai & Adkin, M. (1992). The Bear Trap:
Afghanistan's Untold Story 97, 105