The Pursuit to the Somme and Antwerp

THE period following the crossing of the Seine witnessed the swiftest advances by
British forces that took place during the entire campaign. No serious resistance was
offered south of the River Somme, save at the fortress of Le Havre. The Allies' worst
anxieties during this phase were not the result of enemy opposition but of the logistical
difficulties caused by the steadily increasing length of their own lines of supply (above,
page 280)
in the absence of any large port close to the front.

The Germans' immediate problem was, first, to save their forces south of the Somme
from encirclement and destruction, and, secondly, to stabilize the front, if possible, on
that river (the first really considerable obstacle north of the Seine). In particular, they had
to save the formations of the now attenuated Fifteenth Army, holding the coastal belt
between the Seine and the East Scheldt, and commanded since 23 August by General
Gustav von Zangen.1
On 24 August Field-Marshal Model indicated pretty clearly that
forces were not available to hold the Seine-Yonne-Dijon line indicated in Hitler's
directive of 20 August (above,
page 285)
and suggested the preparation of successive
positions in rear. The Somme-Marne line was mentioned, but since 30-35 first-line
divisions were indicated as needed to hold it, this too was a
battered hope.2
On 27 August
the High Command concurred in Model's policy in principle, while telling him to cling to
the Seine-Yonne-Dijon line as long as possible to gain
time.3
A serious attempt was
made to form a stop-line on the canalized River Somme. A Seventh Army order dated 29
August4
contains detailed instructions for the preparation of a "Somme-Oise position";
the Seventh Army was to be responsible for the sector from Flixecourt (close to the
Somme between Amiens and Abbeville) through La Fère to Guise on the upper Oise. On,
probably, 28 August, the Fifteenth Army instructed
the 67th Corps, then holding the coast
south of the Somme, to withdraw its two divisions and one regiment and take up a line
along the Somme from the sea to the boundary with Fifth Panzer Army,* whose front
was to be taken over by the Seventh Army on
31 August.5
The movement of the

*General von Zangen recalls his left boundary as being
Picquigny, but the Seventh Army order fixes it at Flixecourt,
some five miles north-west.

--296--

67th Corps seems to have been carried out much according to plan, but farther east things
went wrong.

It is worth observing at this point that during the early days of September the
Germans were still reaping dividends from the fierce resistance offered on the First
Canadian Army front from Pont de l'Arche and Elbeuf to the sea on 25-29 August. Not
only did this delay the beginning of the Army's drive to the north, but the heavy action
along the Seine and the casualties suffered there meant that the Canadian formations (and
particularly the 2nd Infantry Division and the infantry* of the 4th Armoured Division)
were tired and depleted when launched into the next stage of the pursuit. These things
need to be borne in mind in assessing this phase.

We have seen (above,
page 282)
the orders issued by General Montgomery on 26
August for the advance north of the Seine, which prescribed the broad intention of the
21st Army Group as to destroy all enemy forces in the Pas de Calais and Flanders and
capture Antwerp; the Canadian Army's particular tasks being to take Le Havre, secure the
port of Dieppe and proceed to destroy all enemy forces in the coastal belt up to Bruges.
On 29 August an amendment eliminated the portion of this directive which forecast that
the Allied Airborne Army would be dropped to cooperate with the Canadian Army in the
Pas de Calais. Instead, there was now to be an airborne landing in the Tournai area in
advance of the Second Army. This project too was soon cancelled by events.

On 30 August General Crerar issued a new directive7
to his corps commanders,
giving the 2nd Canadian Corps the immediate task of capturing Dieppe, while such
formations of the corps as were not required for this purpose were to continue to thrust
along the main Army axis, Neufchâtel-Abbeville, "as a preliminary to an early crossing
of R. Somme". The 51st (Highland) Division of the 1st British Corps was to cross the
Seine by the bridges at Elbeuf in the 2nd Corps area, and was then to revert to the
command of the 1st British Corps for the operations in the Le Havre peninsula.

Rouen, we have seen, fell to the 2nd Canadian Corps on 30 August. On the morning
of the 31st the corps advanced rapidly north and north-east. The 4th Canadian Armoured
Division occupied Buchy; the 7th Reconnaissance Regiment (17th Duke of York's Royal
Canadian Hussars), leading the advance of the 3rd Canadian Infantry Division, got into
St. Saens; and the 8th Reconnaissance Regiment (14th Canadian Hussars), performing
the same function for the 2nd Division, reached Tôtes, halfway from Rouen to Dieppe.
On the 1st British Corps front the leading troops of the 49th Division moved through
Lillebonne towards Le Havre without encountering opposition. Main Headquarters First
Canadian Army, having moved up from Amblie,† opened near Brionne at midnight of the
30th-31st.9

*General Montgomery's liaison officer at H.Q. 2nd Canadian
Corps reported on 28 August that the 10th Infantry
Brigade was fighting three [rifle] companies to a battalion (i.e. three instead of four).

†This move was preceded, and delayed, by discussions
with Headquarters No. 84 Group R.A.F., which felt in the first
instance that it could not leave the complex of airfields
adjacent to Amblie. While anxious to maintain the closest touch
with the Group, Army H.Q. finally had to move to keep control
of the battle. No. 84 Group followed it on 2 September,
and the two headquarters remained cheek-by-jowl for the
rest of the campaign.8

--297--

Again, as in the advance to the Seine, our columns were receiving a tremendous
welcome from the French population. The heavy pounding from the air which Rouen had
suffered did not prevent its people from greeting us with a warmth which was long
remembered. When the commander of the 9th Infantry Brigade went into the city on 30
August (above, page 293),
his scout car soon "became so bedecked with flowers that it
resembled more closely a float in a May Day parade than a weapon
of war".10
In the
smaller towns and the lovely countryside beyond Rouen the greeting was the same. Nor
did it cease when the leading troops had passed. An officer who drove through Rouen and
on to the north on 2 September tried to put something of the experience on paper for the
benefit of his family in Canada:

I cannot possibly convey the cumulative effect of passing for hours through a liberated countryside,
with the wreckage of the beaten enemy--his tanks and vehicles, his dead horses and the graves of his
dead men--littering the roadside ditches, and the population, free once more, welcoming the oncoming
troops with smiles and flowers and the V-sign. . . .

The scene in a liberated town is quite extraordinary. The place, of course, is festooned with flags.
They always have plenty of tricolours; but the Union Jack
and the Stars and Stripes are in short supply,
and had to be homemade for the occasion. (I even saw
some versions of the Canadian Red Ensign,
which would scarcely have pleased the College of Heralds
but must have pleased a good many
Canadians.) Everyone seems to be in the street,
and no one ever seems to tire of waving to the troops
passing in their vehicles, who likewise never tire of
waving back (particularly at the female population).
The young people wave and laugh and shout; the children yell
and wave flags; the mothers hold up their
babies to see the troops, and wave their little paws too;
the old people stand by the roadside and look
happy; and the Army rolls through. . . .

In the meantime great events had been taking place on the Second British Army front. The
leading troops of the 30th Corps had sped northward from the bridgehead first opened at
Vernon on 25 August; and early on the morning of the 31st the 11th Armoured Division burst
into the Amiens area and disrupted the German plans for the defence of the line of
the Somme.11
At Saleux, a few miles south-west of Amiens, they overran the headquarters of the Fifth Panzer
Army and captured our old friend General Heinrich Eberbach, who had been appointed to
command the reconstituted Seventh Army and was to take over the sector from the Fifth Panzer
Army at noon that day.12
Valuable documents were taken at the same time. Even more useful,
the bridges in Amiens itself were captured intact, although several had been prepared for
demolition;13
and the way was open for a further rush to the north.

On the afternoon of the 31st, General Montgomery conferred with his two army
commanders and issued new orders in the light of the rapidly developing situation.
General Dempsey was reported to be sending the 11th Armoured Division down the
Somme to Pont Remy and Abbeville. The Commander-in-Chief desired General
Crerar to drive on that night so as to take over these places early the following day,
leaving the Second Army free to push on and secure Arras and St. Pol. General
Crerar told Montgomery that he would order the 2nd Canadian Corps to do this,
using the 4th Canadian Armoured Division and following it up with the Polish
Armoured Division, which was now north of the Seine and again becoming available
for action. Crerar immediately flew to General Simonds' headquarters

--298--

Sketch 22.--Advance to the Somme and Antwerp31 August-4 September 1944

and gave him instructions accordingly.14
The main axis, he said, which should
mark the left of the armoured movement, would be the Neufchâtel-Abbeville road; the
4th Division would need to "feel out" well to its right to establish contact with the Second
Army.15

The assumption till now had been that the 4th Canadian Armoured Division would have
"about four days" to rest in the Buchy area.16
The new orders changed all this, and in the small
hours of 1 September the division moved on again, directed upon Abbeville. During the day
difficulties arose when the 7th Armoured Division and the 53rd Division, in the words of the
4th Division's General Staff diarist, "began to filter onto our centre line from the south and
south-west". The 4th Division had in fact "felt out" beyond the Army boundary.* Moreover,

*On 28 August H.Q. 21st Army Group laid down a boundary making Aumale inclusive to First Canadian Army but
Dreuil Hamel (just west of Airaines) exclusive to it. This seems to imply a Canadian advance by secondary roads running
west of Hornoy. However, on 31 August H.Q. 2nd Canadian Corps ordered the 4th Division to advance on an axis passing
through Hornoy to Pont Remy.17
The next day the Canadian and British formations collided in the Hornoy area.

--299--

a pocket of resistance was met at Airaines, an important road-centre, and there was
uncertainty as to whether the Canadians or the 7th Armoured Division should deal with
it. Finally the 4th Canadian Armoured Brigade by-passed Airaines to the west. Before the
end of the day the 18th Armoured Car Regiment (12th Manitoba Dragoons) had reached
the Somme east of Pont Remy and the 10th Infantry Brigade was coming up in rear with
a view to establishing a bridgehead. In the early hours of 2 September the division
reached the outskirts of Abbeville. The farther bank of the Seine was found to be held by
the enemy.18

On 1 September the 2nd Canadian Infantry Division returned to Dieppe, where it had
shed so much of its blood in the famous raid of 19 August 1942. It had been expected that
the enemy would fight for the town, and a detailed plan had been made for an attack in
which heavy bombardment by the navy and the R.A.F. Bomber Command would precede
an assault from the land side. This (Operation "FUSILADE")
proved unnecessary. The
leading vehicles of the 8th Reconnaissance Regiment reached the outskirts of Dieppe
early in the morning of 1 September. They found that the German rear parties had
departed the previous day. Hastily, this information was passed back to enable Bomber
Command's attack to be cancelled, and this was done with just twenty minutes to spare.
In the course of the day the main bodies of the 2nd Division reached the town, receiving a
delirious welcome from the townspeople.19
The Germans had not succeeded in
destroying the port installations completely, and British engineers immediately set to
work to prepare the harbour to receive shipping carrying the supplies so urgently needed
by the advancing divisions. The first vessels entered on 7 September and by the end of
the month the port's daily capacity was between 6000 and
7000 tons.20

The day. after the 2nd Division liquidated its debt of 1942 at Dieppe, the 51st
(Highland) Division took St. Valéry-en-Caux, where the main body of this division had
been encircled and captured in June 1940. There was no opposition. On the same day the
49th Division made contact with the German outposts on the outskirts of Le Havre, and it
seemed apparent that the enemy, as had been expected, held the place in strength and was
determined to defend it.21

The Allies' supply problems became steadily more difficult, as the lines of
communication back to the original bridgehead lengthened. The fleets of trucks which
had carried supplies to the front in the days of the bridgehead were grossly inadequate to
carry them from the Rear Maintenance Area at Bayeux, from which the 21st Army Group
was still being maintained, to a line north of the Somme. As Brigadier Walford, General
Crerar's senior administrative officer, said on 7 September, a 10-ton truck was now worth
more than a Sherman tank.22
The seriousness of the problem was reflected in the fact that
the 8th British Corps had to remain grounded in order that its transport might be used to
maintain the other formations;23
in other words, the Allies' administrative resources were
now insufficient to keep all their forces fighting, and the question of priorities became
urgent and, in view of its international aspects, extremely difficult. Only the possession of
ports close to the battlefront could relieve the situation; and the port that could do most
to support a final offensive against Germany was the great Belgian inland harbour of
Antwerp, on the River Scheldt.

--300--

The Germans Lose Antwerp But Save an Army

Hitler, it will be remembered (above,
page 50),
had long since designated certain
French ports as "fortresses" to be especially protected and defended to the last. Far back
in Brittany, his orders were now being carried out at Brest, where a large American force
was besieging the city* and did not finally capture it until
18 September.25
On the Biscay
coast, Lorient, St. Nazaire, La Rochelle and some other small areas were still in German
hands, contained by limited Allied forces, and were to remain so until the end or nearly
the end of hostilities--a useless waste of German troops, for these ports would have been
of little military value to the Allies. The same was true of the Channel Islands, where a
good German infantry division languished until the end of
the war.26
But in the area north
of the Seine Hitler's fortress policy made sense at this moment, and it was a great
embarrassment to the Allied operations. Le Havre, Boulogne and Dunkirk were all on
Hitler's list of fortresses; and on 4 September he issued a new
directive:27

Because of the breakthrough of enemy tank forces toward Antwerp, it has become very important
for the further progress of the war to hold the fortresses of
Boulogne and Dunkirk, the Calais defense
area, Walcheren Island with Flushing harbor, the bridgehead
at Antwerp, and the Albert Canal position
as far as Maastricht.

a. For this purpose the 15th Army is to bring the
garrisons of Boulogne and Dunkirk and the Calais
defense area up to strength by means of full units.

The defensive strength of the fortresses is to be increased by means of additional ammunition
supplies from the supplies of the 15th Army, especially
anti-tank ammunition, by bringing up provisions
of all kinds from the country, and by evacuating the entire population.

The commanders of the Calais defense area and of Walcheren Island receive the same authority as
a fortress commander. . . .

Had Hitler thought of this aspect of strategy a few days earlier, it is fair to assume that the
port of Dieppe would not have been captured without a fight.

At the moment when Hitler issued this order, catastrophe was already overtaking the
Germans at Antwerp. The British Second Army, meeting "negligible
opposition",28
had driven headlong northward from the Somme. On 3 September (the fifth anniversary of
Britain's declaration of war) the Guards Armoured Division, in the van of the 30th Corps,
entered and captured Brussels. Both the Guards and the 11th Armoured Divisions
advanced some 60 miles this day. On the afternoon of 4 September the 11th Armoured
Division reached Antwerp, and the greatest port in North-West Europe was in Allied
hands. The most extraordinary feature of the situation, and one which reflected the
German disorganization at this stage, was the fact that the dock installations were
captured almost intact.29

Field-Marshal Model had, it is true, striven to prevent this disaster. On the
evening of 30 August he demanded that the Commander Armed Forces in the

*The justification advanced for this operation was, first,
the fact that Brest was a threat to the sea communications
with the proposed base in Quiberon Bay
(above, pages 82,
83),
and secondly, the fear that the large, well-commanded force
in Brest would make serious trouble in the Allies' rear if
not eliminated.24

--301--

Netherlands (above, page 58)
should send south the 719th Infantry Division (a static
coastal division) from about Dordrecht. On 2 September it slowly moved off, directed on
an area east of Brussels. On the morning of the 4th, when it was still north of Antwerp,
Army Group "B" gave orders to rush the bulk of it there to defend the city. At that
moment important parts of the 347th Infantry Division were retiring from north of
Brussels to Antwerp by rail, with a view to detraining there and assisting in the defence
under the command of the 719th. But apparently the 719th had not yet arrived, and the
trains carrying the 347th rolled on to Cappellen, seven miles north of Antwerp. An order
from Army Group "B" at 9:15 a.m. to use civilian vehicles to rush all available naval and
air force fighting men to hold the city was the last desperate, ineffective expedient. The
Germans had acted too slowly and too late, and there was nobody to keep the British out
of this all-important port.30
Nevertheless, it shortly became painfully apparent that though
the Germans had lost Antwerp, the Allies had not gained the use of it. The city is some 50
miles from the sea; and both banks of the Scheldt below it remained in enemy hands.
Fully realizing the vital importance of preventing us from using the port, the Germans
now resolved to hold this area to the last extremity.

The capture of Antwerp gravely imperilled the German Fifteenth Army, which with its
three corps (67th, 86th and 89th) was caught in a cul-de-sac west of the city and south of the
Scheldt. On the day Antwerp fell the German C.-in-C. West's headquarters diary
noted,31

This advance to Antwerp has closed the ring around Fifteenth Army. A thrust to Breda must be
expected. . . .

A "thrust to Breda" would have cut the escape route across the Scheldt by way of
Walcheren and the South Beveland isthmus. But the thrust was not made. The Fifteenth
Army escaped, and its escape was a considerable Allied misfortune.

Just how this came about is not wholly clear. Intelligence summaries indicate that
Allied headquarters saw what was happening.32
At this period Field-Marshal
Montgomery* was deeply involved in strategic controversy with General Eisenhower
(below, pages 306-10) and it may be that his eye, fixed on the distant scene, was not
focussing so well on the immediate foreground. (He issued no formal directive to his
armies between 3 and 14 September, though he did issue individual letters and orders.)
Whatever the reason, no strong attempt was made to push north from Antwerp
immediately after the city fell, when such an advance would probably have succeeded.
Interference with the withdrawal was left to the air forces. The Germans on their side
were feverishly active in extricating the threatened Army. Their first expedient, ordered
by the C.-in-C. West on the evening of 4 September, was an attempt to break out
eastward north of Brussels; but Hitler negatived this, it appears, and the policy adopted
was to hold a bridgehead south of the Scheldt estuary, organize a strong defence of
Walcheren Island, and withdraw the balance of the Fifteenth Army by way of the South
Beveland peninsula.33
This was done. In constant fear that the British would drive
forward from Antwerp and close the exit from South Beveland, the evacuation proceeded

*He was promoted to this rank on 1 September.

--302--

under the direction of the 89th Corps. From Breskens and Terneuzen the troops were
ferried across the West Scheldt to the port of Flushing and South Beveland. Our air forces
harried the movement but could not stop it. By 23 September the operation was complete.
In its final report the 89th Corps computed that from 4 September to that date 86,100
men, 616 guns, 6200 horses and 6200 vehicles had been moved across the Scheldt to
fight again for Hitler.34

On the day on which Antwerp fell the German command in the west was
reorganized. In this desperate hour Hitler turned again to the old field marshal whom he
had dismissed in July, and von Rundstedt resumed the appointment
of Commander-in-Chief West, with headquarters now at Coblenz,
where he arrived on the evening of 5
September. Model remained in command of Army Group "B". Simultaneously the First
Parachute Army, commanded by Colonel-General Kurt Student, which had been slated
for the Nancy area, was ordered instead to take over the Antwerp-Albert Canal sector,
with the Fifteenth Army on its right and the Seventh (commanding the forces formerly
under the Fifth Panzer Army) on its left.35

A Difficulty with the C.-in-C.

At the beginning of September General Crerar had his only serious difficulty during
the campaign with the Commander-in-Chief of the 21st Army Group. Apart from other
circumstances, it is perhaps not surprising that the trouble should have arisen at this
particular moment. Field-Marshal Montgomery had just ceased to be the de facto ground
commander of the Allied forces. He found himself in disagreement both with the new
command organization set up by General Eisenhower and with Eisenhower's conception
of the next phase of operations; and he was accordingly deeply involved in a controversy
with the Supreme Commander which was to go on for several weeks.

The Crerar-Montgomery difficulties began on 2 September. On the morning of the
1st, presumably as a result of his consultation with General Crerar the previous day,
General Simonds gave his divisional commanders a
directive36
for continuance of the
pursuit on the axis Abbeville-St. Omer-Ypres. On reaching the line of the Somme, the
Polish Armoured Division was to advance through Hesdin-St. Omer-Ypres, keeping
in touch with the armoured formations of the Second British Army on its right. The 3rd
Canadian Infantry Division on reaching Le Treport would destroy or capture all enemy in
the triangle Le Treport-St. Valéry-sur-Somme-Abbeville and continue to advance up
the coast on the axis Abbeville-Montreuil-Boulogne-Calais-Dunkirk. The 4th
Canadian Armoured Division was to reorganize east of Abbeville, while the 2nd
Canadian Infantry Division would reorganize in the Dieppe area "ready to pass through 3
Cdn Inf Div when ordered"; both these divisions were thus to have a period of rest.

This arrangement was not acceptable to Montgomery. On the evening of 2 September
he signalled Crerar:37

--303--

PERSONAL for ARMY COMMANDER from C in C.

Second Army are now positioned near the Belgian frontier and will go through towards Brussels
tomorrow. IT IS VERY necessary that your two Armd Divs should push forward with all speed towards
St Omer and beyond. NOT repeat NOT consider this the time for any div to halt for maintenance. Push
on quickly.

General Crerar, evidently considering that a matter of some Canadian importance was at stake,
and perhaps somewhat nettled by the fact that the arrangement by which the British armour was
to move down the Somme to Abbeville (above, page 298) had not been carried out,
replied:38

PERSONAL for C in C from CDN ARMY COMD.

. . . Delighted to learn that Second Army is now positioned near Belgian frontier but would advise
you that until late this afternoon Second Army troops have not been within five miles Abbeville and that
all bridges R Somme NE [?NW] Picquigny blown with enemy in considerable strength holding North
bank. With assistance flank attack 4 Brit Armd Bde from direction Picquigny and Polish Armd Div
attacking Abbeville across R Somme from South Simonds hoped secure crossing tonight.

NOT a case of more divs on line R Somme but of securing at least one main route crossing of river.
In any event 2 Cdn Inf Div bns down to average strength 525 and in my opinion a forty-eight hour halt
quite essential in order it can absorb approx one thousand reinforcements arriving today.

You can be assured that there is no lack of push or of rational speed Cdn Army. St Omer and
beyond will be reached without any avoidable delay.

In these circumstances a relatively small matter the next day led to what may be called a
tiff. It may be best to describe it in some detail.

On 3 September the 2nd Division held ceremonial observances at Dieppe, General
Crerar being present on the invitation of the divisional commander. In the morning
religious services were held in the cemetery where the Canadians who fell in the 1942
raid were buried; and early in the afternoon there was a formal march-past of most of the
Division's formations and units. General Crerar took the salute. On the afternoon of 2
September Crerar had received a message from Montgomery instructing him to meet him
at 1:00 p.m. the next day at the tactical headquarters of the Second Army. As its phrasing
indicated a personal meeting rather than a formal conference, and as no new operational
situation had arisen on the Canadian Army front since his last meeting with the C.-in-C.
on the afternoon of the 1st, Crerar replied as follows:

Unless operational situation requires my arrival Tac Brit Army at 1300 hrs tomorrow would appreciate
if meeting could take place later say 1700 hrs. Have arranged be present formal religious service and
parade elements 2 Cdn Inf Div at Dieppe commencing about noon tomorrow and from Canadian point
of view desirable I should do so. Will however conform your wishes. Advice required.

Early next morning Crerar left his headquarters to meet Simonds to discuss future
operations. There had so far been no message from the C.-in-C. He therefore instructed
his Chief of Staff to communicate to 2nd Corps headquarters by radio telephone, in clear,
the gist of any reply which might be received. In the event of radio being unreliable, the
message would be sent by an aircraft.

Up to the moment of his leaving 2nd Corps by air for Dieppe, Crerar had still
received no reply. He therefore decided to go on with his own arrangements,

--304--

assuming that Montgomery had met his request for a change in the hour of the meeting.
However, at approximately 2:40 p.m., when the troops of the 2nd Division were about to
commence their "march-past" in Dieppe, Crerar was handed a message from his Chief of
Staff originating at 1:30 p.m. to the effect that the C.-in-C. had advised that it was
essential he attend the meeting at 1:00 p.m. As it was no longer possible to comply, he
completed his part in the Dieppe ceremonial and then flew to Tactical Headquarters
Second Army. The meeting was long over. It turned out to have been a formal conference
of the Commanders-in-Chief of the 21st and 12th Army Groups with the commanders of
the First U.S. and Second British Armies, with himself supposed to be present. Crerar
recorded next day that he had learned from General Dempsey that "apart from the breach
in the formality, no operational disadvantages had resulted, as the discussion centered
entirely on questions concerning actions and reactions of First U.S. Army and Second
Brit Army in the immediate and longer-term future". Having seen Dempsey, he drove to
Field-Marshal Montgomery's headquarters a couple of miles away and had an interview
with Montgomery in his caravan, which Crerar recorded as
follows:39

On reaching the caravan, the Field Marshal addressed me abruptly, asking me why I had not turned
up at the meeting, in accordance with his instructions. I kept myself under control and briefly, with
occasional interruptions, gave him the explanation which I have recorded in more detail above. The Cin-C intimated that he was not interested in my explanation-that the Canadian aspect of the Dieppe
ceremonial was of no importance compared to getting on with the war, that he had checked through his
signals and determined that my Tac HQ had received a message from him at 0615 hrs that morning,
instructing me to keep the appointment and that, even if I had not received it, then in default of other
agreed arrangements, I should have made it my business to be present.

I replied to the C-in-C that I could not accept this attitude and judgment on his part. I had carried
out my responsibilities as one of his two Army Comds, and as the Cdn Army Comd, in what I
considered to be a reasonable and intelligent way, in the light of the situation as I knew it, or appreciated
it. I had found him, in the past, reasonable in his treatment of me and I had assumed that this situation
would continue to prevail. The request in my message, for postponement of the hour of our meeting, had
been fully explanatory and, I thought, tactful. I had thought it would have been acceptable to him. I had,
as previously explained, a definite responsibility to my Government and country which, at times, might
run counter to his own wishes. There was a powerful Canadian reason why I should have been present
with 2 Cdn Inf Div at Dieppe that day. In fact, there were 800 reasons-the Canadian dead buried at
Dieppe cemetery. I went on to say that he should realise, by our considerable association, that I was
neither self-opinionated, nor unreasonable, but that, also, I would never consent to be "pushed about" by
anyone, in a manner, or direction, which I knew to be wrong.

The Field Marshal reiterated that I had failed to comply with an instruction issued by him and that
such situation could only result in his decision that our ways must part. I replied that I assumed he would
at once take this up through higher channels and that, I, in turn, would at once report the situation to my
Government.

At this point Montgomery, to Crerar's surprise, said that the incident was now closed.
The Army Commander replied that he did not want it closed and "desired that it be
properly ventilated through official channels". After some further discussion,
Montgomery again said that he wished to consider the matter closed and proceeded
to give Crerar the gist of what had happened at the

--305--

conference, none of which had any direct bearing on the operations previously assigned
to the First Canadian Army. The final paragraph of General Crerar's memorandum of the
affair runs as follows:

In conclusion, I must state that I received the impression, at the commencement of the interview,
that the C-in-C was out to eliminate, forcefully, from my mind that I had any other responsibilities than
to him. The Canadian ceremony at Dieppe was not of his ordering, nor to his liking. It had been the
cause of an interference with an instruction which he had separately issued to me-to meet him at a
certain time and place. As the interview proceeded, and he found that I would not retreat from the stand
I had taken-that I had a responsibility to Canada as well as to the C-in-C-he decided to "consider the
matter closed". It was not a willing decision, nor one that I can assume will be maintained. However,
though our relations have obviously been strained, I trust that the situation is temporary and I shall do
what I can to ease them, though without departing from what I consider it my duty to do, or not to do, in
my capacity as a Canadian.

Montgomery's displeasure was doubtless reflected in a passage in his daily report to the
Chief of the Imperial General Staff sent this day to the effect that the First Canadian
Army's operations since crossing the Seine had been "badly handled and
very slow".40
However, a few days later, when Crerar sent him details of the handling of his message
(indicating that it was not received at Tactical H.Q. First Canadian Army until 10:20 a.m.
on the 3rd and was further delayed by deciphering and being passed on to Main H.Q.
where the Chief of Staff dealt with it), Montgomery wrote him a conciliatory
note:41

I am sorry I was a bit rude the other day, and somewhat out-spoken. I was annoyed that no one
came to a very important conference.
But forget about it-and let us get on with the war.
It was my fault.

There the matter ended, though it seems likely that coolness persisted until General
Crerar's departure for England for medical treatment towards the end of the month
(below, page 373).
There is some reason to believe that at this period Montgomery would
have welcomed a permanent change in the command of the Army. However, when Crerar
returned to his command the affair had apparently been forgotten. Relations between the
two commanders were unruffled thereafter to the end of the campaign.

The Debate on Strategy

It is now necessary to summarize the controversy between Eisenhower and Montgomery
over strategic policy after the crossing of the Seine. This affected many aspects of the
operations, including those of the First Canadian Army, during the autumn; and it is convenient,
even at the expense of some trifling with chronology, to tell at this point the whole story of the
discussions during August and September. Much has already been written about it;* and an
attempt will be made here merely to outline the essentials of the debate.

*It is worth noting that the late Chester Wilmot, the author of
The Struggle for Europe (London, 1952), had the
advantage of some access to the papers of Field-Marshal
Lord Montgomery. Large excerpts from them have since been
published in the Field-Marshal's Memoirs (London, 1958). Forrest C. Pogue,
The Supreme Command,
contains large quotations from General Eisenhower's personal files.

--306--

Lancasters Over Mont Lambert, 17 September 1944
A glimpse from above of the heavy attack made by the R.A.F. Bomber Command
to prepare the way for the assault by the 3rd Canadian Infantry Division
on the defences of Boulogne.

German Prisoners at Boulogne
The 400 Germans captured in the underground passages of the Herqulingue hill
(the "bargain basement") march into Boulogne, 21 September 1944.

A Letter from the C.-in-C.
Field-Marshal Montgomery's letter to General Crerar referring to the
forthcoming Arnhem operation and expressing the hope that First
Canadian Army can open Antwerp and clear the Channel Ports simultaneously.

Montgomery's conception of the operations north of the Seine took shape in his mind,
it would seem, during the final stages of the Battle of Falaise. It is interesting that on 18
August, before broaching the matter to Eisenhower, he referred his ideas to the Chief of
the Imperial General Staff. His proposal was that after crossing the Seine, "12 and 21
Army Groups should keep together as a solid mass of some 40 divisions which would be
so strong that it need fear nothing". (It is a fair assumption that Montgomery meant that it
would "keep together" under his own command.) This force would move northwards
with the 21st Army Group on the left flank, clear the Channel coast, the Pas de Calais and
West Flanders and secure Antwerp. The American armies would move with their right
flank on the Ardennes directed upon Brussels, Aachen and Cologne. The initial object,
apart from destroying the German forces on the coast, would be to establish a powerful
air force in Belgium, while the movement would also serve to get the enemy out of V-1
or V-2 range of England (see below,
pages 354-5). Montgomery had already discussed
this with General Bradley and believed he had his entire agreement. In his notes given to
Bradley he emphasized the importance of being able to "seize the Ruhr quickly"; this
objective does not seem to have been mentioned in the communication to Brooke. The
latter concurred immediately. Montgomery accordingly proceeded to put his plans before
Eisenhower.42

On 3 May, over a month before D Day, Eisenhower's planners at SHAEF had
outlined a plan of operations for the phase which had now been reached.* They
recognized Berlin as the "ultimate goal", but considered it "too far East to be the
objective of a campaign in the West". They set their eyes on the Ruhr, the industrial heart
of Germany, which, as we shall see, Montgomery also considered the essential point.
Fearing however that an advance by a single route would lead to "a head-on collision
with the main enemy forces on a narrow, easily defended front with no room for
manoeuvre and little opportunity for the use of our armour", they recommended "a broad
front both North and South of the Ardennes", "on two mutually supporting axes". The
main advance, they thought, should be along the line Amiens-Maubeuge-Liège-the
Ruhr, with a subsidiary attack far south of the Ruhr on the line
Verdun-Metz.43

In the contention that now took place Eisenhower in general adhered to this policy
proposed by his planners before the invasion. Montgomery, on the other hand, argued
that the circumstances which had now arisen--the Germans' disorganization resulting from
their defeat in Normandy--offered an opportunity for a concentrated attack on a relatively
narrow front. As we have already seen, the administrative situation made it impossible, at
the beginning of September, to attack with all the available Allied forces simultaneously;
there was simply not enough gasoline to be had at the front to move their vehicles. Under
these conditions, Eisenhower was further embarrassed by demands from his American
subordinates that the available resources should be allotted to their areas to enable them
to carry the battle forward into Germany. At the same time, American

*All the signatures on this paper are those of British officers:
Captain P. N. Walter, R.N.; Brigadier K. G. McLean;
and Group Captain H. P. Broad.

--307--

public opinion, as Eisenhower seems to have let Montgomery know, would have made it
difficult for him either to disregard these American demands or to continue the
subordination of Bradley to Montgomery.44
Therefore the argument could scarcely be
settled merely on the military merits of the case.

On 23 August, after the Gap battle ended, Montgomery and Eisenhower had a very
long discussion. That morning, the former tells us, he had flown to Bradley's
headquarters and had been shaken to find that Bradley had changed his mind and no
longer supported his "single thrust" plan. (Bradley says nothing of this in his own book.)
Montgomery, looking ahead to the Ruhr, argued to Eisenhower that in the present state of
supply it was vital to concentrate upon one thrust, delivered by the main mass of the
Allied armies, and put all available resources behind it. Eisenhower, while recognizing
the importance of clearing the Channel coast, establishing air bases in Belgium and
seizing the Ruhr, apparently showed some desire to split the force and attack the Saar
also. Montgomery told him that to sweep through the Pas de Calais to Antwerp he would
need an entire U.S. Army moving on his right flank, and Eisenhower reluctantly agreed.
The question of command was also discussed at this meeting. Montgomery argued for a
continuation of the arrangement by which he functioned as ground commander, and even
offered to serve under Bradley if the Supreme Commander preferred to give the ground
command to the latter. The furthest Eisenhower would go, however, was to agree that
there must be one commander to coordinate and control the left flank
operations into Belgium. The arrangements previously made (above,
page 20) would be carried out; on 1
September Eisenhower would take over direct control of the
ground forces.45

On 24 August Eisenhower wrote Montgomery confirming the previous day's
conversation. This forecast the issuance of a directive giving Montgomery's Army Group
the task of operating north-east, seizing the Pas de Calais and airfields in Belgium, and
"pushing forward to get a secure base at Antwerp"; its eventual mission would be "to
advance eastward on the Ruhr". Bradley's Army Group was to thrust forward on its own
left, its "principal offensive mission" for the moment being to support Montgomery in the
attainment of his objectives. However, Bradley was also "to begin building up, out of the
incoming forces, the necessary strength to advance eastward from Paris towards Metz".
Montgomery was given authority to effect "the necessary operational co-ordination"
between his forces and Bradley's left wing; the details were to be worked out between
Montgomery and Bradley. Eisenhower ended by urging all possible "speed in
execution".46
This letter was the basis of Field-Marshal Montgomery's own directive of
26 August (above, page 282). On 24 August Eisenhower sent the Chief of Staff of the

U.S. Army a letter explaining what he was doing. He said he had temporarily changed his
basic plan for attacking both north-east and east, to help Montgomery seize tremendously
important objectives. He considered this necessary, even though it interfered with his
desire to push eastward through Metz, because the 21st Army Group lacked the strength
for the task.47
On the same day General Eisenhower issued his formal directive on
command.48
This stated that the 21st Army Group was to be redesignated "Northern Group

--308--

of Armies" and the 12th Army Group "Central Group of Armies". (It may be noted that
Montgomery nevertheless continued to refer to his command as the 21st Army Group.)
The essential paragraph was the following:

2. The Commanders-in-Chief, Northern and Central Groups of Armies, will come under the direct
operational command of the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force effective 0200 hours 1
September 1944.

Eisenhower had made an important concession to Montgomery, though his basic
policy was still that recommended by his planners in May, and he was under pressure
from his American subordinates. By 2 September Patton's army was stopped on the
Meuse for want of gasoline. On that day, at a conference with Generals Bradley, Hodges
and Patton, Eisenhower was (according to Patton) "finally persuaded" to approve a plan
for an advance by the Third Army and one corps of the First towards Mannheim,
Frankfurt and Coblenz. He emphasized however that this drive would depend on the
success of the northern thrust, which had priority on
supplies.49
Montgomery heard of the
Frankfurt plan at the meeting on 3 September attended by Bradley, Dempsey and Hodges
which Crerar missed (above, page 305); he disliked it intensely. On 4 September General
Eisenhower issued a directive.50
This defined the task of the Northern Group of Armies
and that part of the Central Group operating north-west of the Ardennes as "to secure
Antwerp, breach the sector of the Siegfried Line covering the Ruhr and then seize the
Ruhr". The mission of the balance of the Central Group was, in part, "To occupy the
sector of the Siegfried Line covering the Saar and then to seize Frankfurt". Eisenhower
added, "It is important that this operation should start as soon as possible, in order to
forestall the enemy in this sector, but troops of Central Group of Armies operating
against the Ruhr north-west of the Ardennes must first be adequately supported."

This was the day Antwerp fell. At 8:55 p.m. that night, when he knew that Antwerp
was in Allied hands* but had not yet received the foregoing directive, Montgomery
signed a strong telegram to the Supreme Commander. He wrote: "I consider we have now
reached a stage where one really powerful and fullblooded thrust towards Berlin is likely
to get there and thus end the German war." There were not enough maintenance resources
for two strong thrusts; that selected must have all the resources it needed "without any
qualification". The thrust likely to give the best and quickest results was the northern one
via the Ruhr. To attempt a compromise solution would "prolong
the war".51

On 5 September Eisenhower replied agreeing with the conception of a powerful drive
towards Berlin, but not "at this moment to the exclusion of all other maneuver". No
"reallocation of existing resources", he said, would be adequate to sustain a thrust to Berlin. He
considered that the success so far gained should be exploited by crossing the Rhine on a wide
front and seizing "the Saar and Ruhr". This he intended to do with all speed. In the meantime
the Allies would be opening the ports of Le Havre and Antwerp, which were essential to
sustain a powerful thrust deep into Germany, and would be available to support either

*It cannot have been clear to Montgomery at this moment that
we were likely to be denied the use of the port for a
long period. But he was obviously not counting on it as an immediate resource.

--309--

a thrust at the Ruhr or one at the Saar. But he was still giving priority to the Ruhr and the
northern line.52

The lines were drawn; the controversy proceeded. Eisenhower still adhered,
essentially, to his staff's "original conception", as indeed he wrote in a memorandum for
record on 5 September. Montgomery complained on the 9th that he could not see that the
northern route was getting priority in practice; the 19th U.S. Corps on the First U.S.
Army's left flank, which was supposed to be cooperating with Montgomery, was in fact
unable to advance properly through lack of
petrol.53
The administrative pinch was now
being very seriously felt, and it was clear that the port of Antwerp was not going to be
immediately available. On 6 September Montgomery's Chief of Staff pointed out to him
that the Germans probably intended to hold the Channel ports as long as they could and
added that the immediate opening of some port north of Dieppe, preferably Boulogne,
was essential for the rapid development of Montgomery's plans, especially as this would
permit of laying a cross-Channel petrol pipeline to the Pas de Calais. He added, "Hope
Crerar realizes urgency of matter. Am taking up through staff channels." At this time
General Dempsey estimated that the maximum force that could be maintained forward of
the line Louvain-Brussels was only one corps of three divisions, plus the airborne
forces, pending the opening of a good port in full working order.

After careful consideration, the British Commander-in-Chief came to the conclusion
that it would be possible to advance to Berlin on the basis of the ports of Dieppe,
Boulogne, Dunkirk and Calais, and in addition 3000 tons of cargo per day through Le
Havre. With "one good Pas de Calais port", 1000 tons per day airlift, and an additional
allotment of motor transport, he calculated that it would be possible to reach the "Münster
triangle", meaning presumably the area Rheine-Osnabrück-Münster. This was on 9
September. It is evident that the Field Marshal now believed that he could support a
thrust to the Ruhr, and even to Berlin, without the use of Antwerp; a note on his
intentions set down this day by his Brigadier General Staff (Operations), which records
the foregoing calculations, assigns to the reduction of the islands blocking the port "last
priority" among the tasks of First Canadian Army.54

The Failure at Arnhem

On 7 and 9 September, Montgomery reported to Eisenhower that even with a Pas de
Calais port working he would be unable to get over the Rhine without additional
administrative assistance. On the 8th, Eisenhower told him again, "we must push up as
soon as possible all along the front".55
On the 10th Eisenhower and Montgomery met for
the first time since 26 August (the Supreme Commander had been immobilized for some
days, at his headquarters back at Granville in Normandy, with a wrenched knee). In
Eisenhower's plane at Brussels airfield the two men again went over the ground as
before--single thrust in the north versus broad front. Accounts of this meeting vary
somewhat. According to one version56
it was somewhat acrimonious.
Although Montgomery does not recall it, the Supreme Commander seems to

--310--

Sketch 23. North-West EuropeThe Front15 September 1944

--311--

have emphasized the importance of opening Antwerp-a project which as we have seen
had at this moment a low priority in Montgomery's mind. Nevertheless Eisenhower
authorized him to defer this in favour of an immediate attempt to seize a bridgehead
across the Rhine.57
Operation "COMET", a plan to get crossings over the Lower Rhine by
dropping an airborne force of one and a half divisions in the Arnhem-Nijmegen area,
was revised and enlarged under the new name
"MARKET-GARDEN". It was now proposed to
use the bulk of the First Allied Airborne Army to lay a "carpet" across the rivers and
canals in the southern Netherlands. Along this corridor the 30th Corps of the Second
Army would advance to secure the crossings seized by the airborne troops, the most
important being those across the Maas at Grave and the two main branches of the Rhine,
the Waal at Nijmegen and the Neder Rijn at Arnhem. If the operation was successful, it
would turn the Siegfried Line and place the Allies in an excellent position to attack the
north side of the Ruhr and advance eastward across the North German Plain.

The target date for the operation was the night of 15-16 September. But on 11
September Montgomery told Eisenhower that, without the priority over other operations
which he had been refused, "MARKET-GARDEN"
could not take place before 23 September at
the earliest and possibly the 26th. This had the desired effect. The Supreme Commander
on 12 September sent his Chief of Staff to see Montgomery and promised him the
priority which he had hitherto sought in vain. He was told that three newly-landed
American divisions would be "grounded" to give extra maintenance to his Army Group;
the main maintenance of the 12th Army Group was to be given to the First U.S. Army on
Montgomery's right; this Army was to cooperate closely with him, and he was to be
allowed to deal direct with General Hodges. Montgomery's elation at these events was
reflected in a letter which he sent to General Crerar on 13 September:

Since last meeting you, we have had a great victory with SHAEF,
and the main weight of maintenance is
now to be diverted to the northward thrust against
the Ruhr.58

"MARKET-GARDEN"
was no doubt in some degree a compromise operation. The Supreme
Commander wrote after the war that it was "merely an incident and extension of our eastward
rush to the line we needed for temporary security". It met Montgomery's demand for a strong
penetrating operation in the north without, presumably, too greatly arousing the ire of Bradley
and Patton.* But at the time Montgomery, as his letter to Crerar shows, expected great things
from it. On the evening of 12 September he signalled the War Office that though he felt
somewhat overcome by the long debate, he hoped that the war would now be won reasonably
quickly. And Eisenhower's quick response to Montgomery's statement that the operation would
have to be postponed unless more resources were made available suggests that the Supreme
Commander himself may have had larger and higher hopes at that moment than he recalled
when writing his reminiscences.59

*Patton in his War as I Knew It states that, apparently
on 17 September, Bradley telephoned him to say that
Montgomery wanted the American troops stopped in order
to favour his own advance. Patton writes, "In order to avoid
such an eventuality, it was evident that the Third Army
should get deeply involved at once, so I asked Bradley not to call
me until after dark on the nineteenth." It was a peculiar
procedure, involving, if Patton's account is accurate, disloyalty to
the Supreme Commander's plans. But there is no evidence
that it had any effect on the Arnhem operation.

--312--

Montgomery's directive of 14 September60
gives the pattern of the operation as he
conceived it. Having made good the corridor to Arnhem, the Second Army would
establish itself in strength in the area between Arnhem and Zwolle, facing east, with
bridgeheads on the east bank of the River Ijssel. Thence it would be prepared to advance
east to the area Rheine-Osnabrück-Hamm-Münster, and direct a strong thrust
"southwards along the eastern face of the Ruhr". The plan envisaged an eastward advance
upon Bonn and Cologne by the First U.S. Army, which would then establish a bridgehead
across the Rhine and advance "eastwards round the south face of the Ruhr" to join hands
with the Second Army.

Leaving aside for the moment the further operations of First Canadian Army, we may
briefly note here the course and fate of Operation
"MARKET-GARDEN". It duly went in on 17
September, but the complete victory for which the Allied commanders were hoping did
not materialize.

In the airborne ("MARKET") phase,
the 1st British Airborne Corps, under Lieut.-General
F. A. M. Browning, was to employ three divisions on 17 September to secure the
vital bridges. The 101st U.S. Airborne Division would seize Eindhoven and canal
crossings to the north; the 82nd U.S. Airborne Division would be directed upon the
bridges across the Maas at Grave and the Waal at Nijmegen; while the 1st British
Airborne Division (with the Polish Parachute Brigade under command) was to capture
the most northerly bridges, those across the Neder Rijn at Arnhem. These operations
were to be carried out under the overall command of Second British Army, which also
supplied the 30th British Corps for the ground ("GARDEN") phase. Lieut.-General
Horrocks' spearhead, the Guards Armoured Division, would lunge north from a small
bridgehead over the Meuse-Escaut Canal which had been obtained on 8 September. It
was to link up successively with the airborne formations along
the road Eindhoven-Arnhem. Field-Marshal Montgomery's directive
ordered that the ground operation would
be "rapid and violent, and without regard to what is happening on the flanks".

The unfortunate result of the operation has led to stories that it was betrayed to the
Germans. If it really was betrayed, the Germans apparently did not believe the traitor or
act upon the information they received from him; for their records do not reflect any
precautionary troop movements immediately before the operation.* The situation is best
summarized in the "experience report" on the operation issued by the German Army
Group "B" on 1 October:62

*Elements of the 2nd and 116th Panzer and the 9th and
10th S.S. Panzer Divisions no longer fit for action were
ordered to the area Venlo-Arnhem-'s-Hertogenbosch,
for rehabilitation, as early as 3 September, and H.Q. 2nd S.S.
Panzer Corps to Eindhoven, to help supervise the
rehabilitation operation, on 5 September.61
According to Lt.-Col. Oreste
Pinto (Spycatcher, ed. London, 1955) the operation
was betrayed to the Germans on 15 September by the treacherous
Resistance leader Christian Lindemans, known as
"KING KONG".
There were no important changes in the German
dispositions on or after 15 September, and none of the
numerous Army Group "B" orders and Intelligence documents
available contain even the remotest indication that an
airborne landing was expected in the "MARKET-GARDEN" area.
Incidentally, Pinto says that "the Canadians" sent
Lindemans through the lines on the mission (to prepare the Resistance to
cooperate in the coming operation) during which he supposedly
warned the enemy. This is untrue. First Canadian Army
had no responsibility for "MARKET-GARDEN"
or (at this time) for the area where it took place. If anybody sent Lindemans
through the lines, it was not "the Canadians".

--313--

The enemy achieved surprise. Preparatory action by the air forces began about three hours before
the landing in the form of bombing attacks against flak positions.
The attacks did not greatly exceed the
normal volume of enemy air activity. Air attacks on flak
at Arnhem were taken as attempts to destroy
bridges. . . .

For airlandings the enemy selects sparsely held sectors.
The 2nd S.S. Panzer Corps' being in
process of rehabilitation [near Arnhem] was a bad surprise
for him. Despite the best contacts with agents
his intelligence service failed him in this case.

The Allied intelligence service seems in fact to have got the necessary information just
too late. Keeping track of enemy formations out of the line was SHAEF's job. A SHAEF
intelligence summary, itself undated but covering the week ending 16 September and
therefore probably issued on the 17th, contains maps showing the 2nd S.S. Panzer and the
9th and 10th S.S. Panzer Divisions as "unlocated",
but its text observes, "9 SS Panzer
Division, and with it presumably 10, has been reported as withdrawing altogether to the
Arnhem area of Holland: there they will probably both collect some new tanks from the
depot reported in the area of Cleves".63
Apparently this report did not reach the airborne
formations before the drop.64
Further pieces of good fortune for the Germans were the
facts that Army Group "B" had its own headquarters on the western outskirts of Arnhem
(which meant that the energetic Field-Marshal Model was on the spot to organize
immediate counter-measures) and that General Student received a captured copy of an
Allied operation order at a very early stage.65

The first drops took place at 1:00 p.m. on the 17th; the Guards Armoured Division
moved at 2:35 p.m. Almost from the beginning the 30th Corps advance was slower than
had been hoped for. Eindhoven fell to the 101st Airborne Division on 18 September, and
on the same day the Guards linked up with them and also with the men of the 82nd
Division who had captured the Grave bridge intact; but the Nijmegen bridges were
captured (likewise intact) by a dashing joint Anglo-American attack only on the 20th. The
Germans were soon attacking the flanks of the narrow corridor along which the 30th
Corps was advancing, and cut it more than once for considerable periods; they also
brought troops into the Nijmegen area to contest the advance to Arnhem. The Guards
Armoured Division was stopped; the 43rd Infantry Division went in on 22 September and
likewise made slow progress.

The epic nine-day struggle at Arnhem itself was watched by the free world in breathless
anxiety. A detachment of the 1st Airborne Division seized the north end of the road bridge
and held out there most gallantly until 21 September. The situation of the main body of the
division west of Arnhem became steadily worse. Bad communications prevented its plight
from being known for a considerable time; bad flying weather hampered the arrival of
reinforcements and re-supply by air, while at the same time reducing the tactical air support
that could be given the division. Most of the Polish Parachute Brigade was finally dropped
on the 21st south of the Neder Rijn opposite the Airborne Division's position. A few Poles
and some men of the 43rd Division crossed the river on the nights of the 23rd-24th and
24th-25th, but no effective contact was made between the 30th Corps and the airborne
troops. On the morning of 25 September Field-Marshal Montgomery

--314--

Sketch 24.--Operation MARKET-GARDEN
17-26 September 1944

--315--

decided to withdraw what was left of the 1st Airborne Division, and this was done that
night under cover of a programme fired by the artillery of the
30th Corps.66

The only Canadian units involved in the Arnhem operation belonged to the First Canadian
Army Troops Engineers. The 20th and 23rd Field Companies R.C.E. joined with the 260th and
553rd Field Companies R.E. in ferrying the airborne troops back across the Neder Rijn on the
night of the 25th-26th. The Canadians used stormboats, the R.E., assault boats.* In dismal
weather (which nevertheless helped to conceal their movements) the sappers brought their craft
forward over difficult routes to the river's edge opposite the British bridgehead. All through the
night the boats shuttled back and forth across the wide stream in driving rain, bringing
exhausted survivors to safety under constant machine-gun and mortar fire.

When daylight came the machine-guns up on the hill above the bridgehead rained a murderous hail of
bullets on those craft which were still operating, but the downward angle of the fire was much less
effective than it would have been had the guns been in position to make more horizontal sweeps. Mortar
and 88 mm fire fell everywhere.67

The 23rd Field Company worked at a site north-east of the village of Driel. Very few
soldiers came down to embark at the point farther west to which the 20th had been
allotted. When the evacuation ended, about 2400 men had been ferried back, most of
them apparently in the stormboats of the 23rd. This company had five killed and three
wounded. Among the men it brought out was Major-General R. E. Urquhart, the G.O.C.
1st Airborne Division. The company commander, Major M. L. Tucker, subsequently
received the D.S.O., mainly for this night's work on the
Neder Rijn.68

Although the bridgehead across the Neder Rijn was not made good,
"MARKET-GARDEN"
secured objectives of considerable value to later operations. The crossings over the Maas and
the Waal were firmly in our hands and, as the Supreme Commander afterwards observed, "the
watershed between the two was to serve as a valuable corridor for a later advance to the Rhine".
But, as it turned out, the only hope of capturing the Ruhr in 1944 was lost with the Arnhem
bridgehead.

While the desperate struggle at Arnhem ran its course, Eisenhower and Montgomery
were continuing their strategic debate. On 15 September the Supreme Commander wrote
his three Army Group Commanders asking their views on the best route or routes to be
pursued into Germany. He now designated Berlin as "the main prize". "There is no doubt
whatsoever, in my mind", he wrote, "that we should concentrate all our energies and
resources on a rapid thrust to Berlin." Montgomery made the reply which might have
been expected: "I consider that the best objective is the Ruhr, and thence on to Berlin by
the northern route." He believed that this advance could be carried out by the 21st Army
Group plus the First U.S. Army of nine divisions; but such a force "must have everything
it needed in the maintenance line; other Armies would do the best they could with what
was left over". General Bradley, on the other hand, argued for the old SHAEF plan, with
eastward drives on two axes. On 20 September General Eisenhower, while

*Stormboats were wooden craft propelled by outboard motors;
assault boats were smaller, had collapsible canvas
sides, and were paddled.

--316--

accepting the Ruhr-Berlin axis for the main offensive into Germany, rejected Montgomery's
proposal for stopping all troops except the 21st Army Group and the First U.S. Army to support,
as he put it, "one single knife-like drive toward Berlin". He wrote: "What I do believe is that we
must marshal our strength up along the western borders of Germany, to the Rhine if possible,
ensure adequate maintenance by getting Antwerp to working at full blast at the earliest possible
moment and then carry out the drive you suggest."

On 21 September Montgomery sent a very strong message again dissenting from this view:

I would say that the right flank of 12 Army Group should be given a very direct order to halt and if this
order is not obeyed we shall get into greater difficulties. The net result of the matter in my opinion is
that if you want to get the Ruhr you will have to put every single thing into the left hook and stop
everything else. It is my opinion that if this is not done you will not get the Ruhr. Your very great friend,
Monty.

On the 22nd Eisenhower replied that though he had not agreed with Montgomery's belief
in the possibility of a single thrust straight through to Berlin, he fully agreed with him
about the immediate objective, the Ruhr. He concluded:

No one is more anxious than I to get to the Ruhr quickly. It is for the campaign from there onward deep
into the heart of Germany for which [sic] I insist all other troops must be in position to support the main
drive. The main drive must logically go by the North. It is because I am anxious to organize that final
drive quickly upon the capture of the Ruhr that I insist upon the importance of Antwerp. As I have told
you I am prepared to give you everything for the capture of the approaches to Antwerp, including all the
air forces and anything else you can support. Warm regard, Ike.

On 22 September, when there was still some hope of holding the Arnhem bridgehead,
General Eisenhower held a conference of his chief subordinates at Versailles. Field-Marshal
Montgomery was not present; he sent his Chief of Staff to represent him. During the
conference Eisenhower asked that all concerned distinguish clearly between the logistical
requirements for the immediate objectives, including seizing the Ruhr and breaching the
Siegfried Line, and those for the final drive on Berlin. He said also that he required "general
acceptance of the fact that the possession of an additional major deep-water port on our north
flank was an indispensable prerequisite for a final drive deep into Germany". The conference
agreed that the main effort of the present phase of operations was the envelopment of the
Ruhr from the north, by the 21st Army Group supported by the First Army. The result was a
halt on General Patton's front during October (below,
page 386). General de Guingand
considered these decisions completely
satisfactory.69
In fact, however, the debate was not yet
over. The failure of the Arnhem operation inevitably involved a reconsideration of plans. The
final phase of the controversy may best be considered in connection with the operations to
open the port of Antwerp (below,
pages 386-90);
but at this point it is worth while to attempt
some commentary upon the issues debated in August and September.

It is interesting to compare the methods followed by Montgomery and Eisenhower.
They reflected differences in the two men as individuals and also differences in the
approach of two national armies to problems of command.

Montgomery was a "lone wolf" and a thinking machine. He lived and worked

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in isolation at a relatively small Tactical Headquarters with his personal staff, including
the team of liaison officers who kept him in touch with the operations of the formations
under his command. His Chief of Staff lived at Main Headquarters farther in rear.
Montgomery considered, and in this he followed the best British pattern, that a
commander should make his own plans. He himself wrote at the end of the
campaign,70

No officer whose daily life is spent in considering details,
or who has not time for quiet thought and
reflection, can make a sound plan of battle on a high level
or conduct large-scale operations efficiently.
It is for this reason that the plan must always be made by the commander and NOT by his staff.

Thus in Montgomery's view it was the most essential function of a high commander to
produce strategic ideas. It was the function of his staff to work out the details when he
had provided them with the outline. He has recently confirmed, what every student of his
methods of command had suspected, that the directives which are quoted in this book
were all of his own writing.71

Eisenhower, it is evident, worked rather differently. He did not isolate himself as
much as Montgomery; nor were his strategic plans personally his own in the same
degree. He was primarily the leader of an efficient team. He appears to have depended on
his staff more than Montgomery did. The manner in which, during the long controversy
that has been described, he stood by a plan produced by the SHAEF planning staff
months before, at a time when the course of the campaign could not be foreseen in detail,
is in striking contrast with the British commander's procedure. Eisenhower once
expressed his admiration for General George C. Marshall's capacity for weighing issues
and arriving at a "rocklike decision"; he felt that in this respect Marshall was superior to
his British "opposite number", Brooke.72
The Americans seem to have felt, in general,
that it was particularly necessary to be "rocklike" in strategic discussions with the British.
Indeed, there is almost a note of apology in the Supreme Commander's letter to Marshall
(above, page 308) explaining that he has temporarily changed his basic plan to serve
Montgomery's needs. If the historian may express a humble personal view, the flexible
and empiric approach favoured by the British seems rather more likely to produce good
military results as a general rule. Yet it by no means follows from the mere fact that the
SHAEF plan had been made so long before that it was necessarily wrong. The issue must
be considered on its merits.

Montgomery's plans for action north of the Seine as he first formulated them,
rather tentatively, in mid-August, would probably have produced victory in 1944 if it
had been possible to put them literally into practice at that moment. He then
envisaged, we have seen, a concentrated drive north-east by a body of some 40
divisions presumably commanded by himself. Such a force, directed by the victor of
the Battle of Normandy, the ablest senior commander and--with the single possible
exception of Patton--the most dynamic senior leader available to the Allies in the
north-western theatre, the Germans could not have hoped to resist successfully with
the forces they possessed at the end of August. But military economics, as
represented in the formidable supply difficulties of this period, and

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military politics, reflected in the demands of American public opinion and of
Eisenhower's strong-minded American subordinates, both made. this conception
impracticable. It was out of the question to maintain 40 divisions simultaneously in
action. In the American view it was equally out of the question to retain Montgomery in
command of the ground forces; and the American view prevailed.

To assess the question of "broad front" versus "full-blooded thrust", in the actual logistical
circumstances of the late summer of 1944, is less easy; and any too-ready tendency to accept
Montgomery's point of view and dismiss Eisenhower's is discouraged by the fact that
Montgomery's very competent Chief of Staff has in this matter espoused Eisenhower's cause as
against his own commander's.73
Obviously, no one can say what would have happened had
certain things been done differently. But the factors involved may be briefly considered.

The force which Montgomery evidently envisaged as conducting the thrust into
Germany which he advocated early in September was about 20 divisions,* or
considerably less than half of the total Allied force in the theatre. The fate of the
enterprise would have depended upon this relatively small group, for the rest of the
Allied Expeditionary Force would have been immobilized, or largely immobilized, by the
diversion of administrative resources, particularly gasoline, to support the thrust.

As for the Germans, we have indicated (above,
page 270) the desperate state of their
forces in the West at the end of the Battle of Normandy. Just what were their capabilities
at the time when Montgomery and the Supreme Commander were engaged in their
debate? Eisenhower's own Intelligence staff thought them not formidable. The SHAEF
intelligence summary for the week ending 9 September estimated the number of German
divisions in the West at that time as, nominally, 48: 14 panzer or panzer grenadier and 34
infantry. These largely shattered formations were assessed in the portion of the summary
dealing with "enemy dispositions" as equivalent in "true strength" to four panzer and 20
infantry divisions; and four of these 20 were isolated in the French coastal fortresses.
Under "enemy capabilities" the German strength was set even lower:
the Commander-in-Chief West might "expect not more than a dozen divisions
within the next two months to come from outside to the rescue", and

To sum up, C-in-C West will soon have available the true equivalent of about fifteen divisions,
including four panzer, for the defence of the West Wall. A further five or six may struggle up in the
course of a month, making a total of about twenty.

The West Wall cannot be held with this amount, even when supplemented by many oddments and
large amounts of flak.

Examination of the German documents now available74
indicates that even the
lower estimate erred if anything on the side of exaggerating the German strength.
(However, so many of the formations were badly reduced, and the amount of debility
they had suffered varied so widely, that it seems impossible to reduce the German
situation to exact statistics.) One thing can be said with considerable

*See above, page 308. In addition to the nine divisions
of First U.S. Army, the Second British Army had eight, and
there were three airborne divisions ready for action in England.
At least part of the strength of First Canadian Army (six
divisions at this time) could not have been spared from
its commitments on the coast from Le Havre to the Scheldt.

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confidence. The German forces had been almost entirely stripped of armour, and this was
particularly true in the northern sector. The German situation map for
2 September75
shows no armoured formation north of the line Mons-Namur-Liège. The only panzer
division still in moderately good condition was the 11th, resisting the Allied advance near
the Swiss border on the extreme southern flank. On 7 September, just after resuming
command in the West, Rundstedt reported to Keitel on the Allies'
superiority:76

. . . In the face of all this Allied strength,
all German forces are committed. They are badly depleted, in some
cases crushed. Artillery and anti-tank weapons are lacking. Reserves worth much do not exist. Army
Group B has about 100 tanks in working order. Considering Allied armoured strength the implications
are clear.

Eight days later Rundstedt sent Jodl the following personal top-priority, top secret
signal:77

During the past week the situation of Army Group B has further deteriorated.
On a front of about 400 kilometres it fights with the strength of about twelve
divisions and, at the moment, 84 tanks, assault
guns and light anti-tank guns on Mark IV chassis,
against a fully mobile enemy with at least 20 divisions
and roughly 1700 tanks fit for commitment. The danger of
new reverses in the area of Army Group B--with possibly
grave consequences--can be removed only by speeding up the dispatch of the reinforcements
that have repeatedly been requested.

I am aware of the reasons that hitherto have prevented a faster and more comprehensive
strengthening of the western front. But 1 must to the full extent
concur in the apprehensions of Field-Marshal Model to the effect that
the forces slated for transfer might come too late.

I suggest therefore examining once more whether it is possible:

to advance the time of arrival of 246 and 363 VGD* as well as of the Projector and GHQ Arty
Bdes;

to withdraw from the eastern front for a short period individual panzer divisions or at least
several assault gun brigades for transfer to the western front.

These presentations by the C.-in-C. West are probably the most authoritative statements
available.

The most critical moment for the Germans was immediately after the fall of Antwerp
on 4 September. At that moment they were badly off balance and had, as we have seen,
virtually no armour in their northern sector and very little anywhere in the West. Had the
Allies been able to cut off the Fifteenth Army by blocking the South Beveland isthmus
while striking simultaneously a heavy blow elsewhere in the northern sector, it would
very probably have been fatal to the Germans. Yet this was also the worst moment of the
Allied supply famine. The lines of communication of the 21st Army Group had just
lengthened enormously; no port was available closer than the original bridgehead except
Dieppe, which was just being opened; and Dieppe was small and itself already far distant
from the Antwerp front. In these circumstances it would certainly have been necessary to
do precisely what Montgomery asked, completely immobilizing all Allied forces other
than his own, in order to make effective action possible on his front. The

*Volksgrenadier Divisions. This designation
("People's Grenadier Division") was given in the autumn of 1944 to
various divisions being re-formed after being destroyed or
badly cut up in the summer battles. These should not be
confused with the Volkssturm, an improvised militia of little military value.

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risks would have been serious, for the Germans' performance at this period, notably in the
Forêt de la Londe and the "MARKET-GARDEN"
operation, reflected a capacity to recover
from disaster and a fierce resolution in action which would certainly have ensured a very
hard battle, however favourable the circumstances were for the Allies.

The point is worth making that Montgomery's administrative calculations turned out
to be unsound, in so far as they were based upon his having "one good Pas de Calais
port" (above, page 310) actually working during the period of opportunity, We shall see
that, thanks to the Germans' obstinate defence and the thoroughness of their demolitions,
the first Pas de Calais port (Boulogne) was not opened until 12 October (below,
page 344).
By that date the crucial battle would presumably have been over.

By the time Operation "MARKET-GARDEN"
was attempted on 17 September, the
Germans had recovered to a slight extent. They had collected a small number of tanks in
the north, and these had considerable influence on the outcome. German armour
contributed to overwhelming the lightly-armed 1st Airborne Division at Arnhem, and
after that division lost control of the road bridge there tanks, moving south across it,
intervened north of Nijmegen with important effect. Nevertheless, German armoured
strength was still small. In a protracted battle, the tanks that fought in
"MARKET-GARDEN"
would soon have been destroyed and could not have been rapidly replaced. A battle in
which one side had a great force of armour and the other virtually none would have been
very unequal-though it is worth remembering that in not wholly dissimilar circumstances
north of Falaise the 2nd Canadian Corps had made slow progress. And the Germans
would still have had little air support to counterbalance the Allies' great strength in this
element; though autumn weather and inadequate forward airfields might have hampered
our air forces. Finally, it may be assumed that Hitler would not have accepted defeat in
the West without withdrawing troops from the Eastern Front in an attempt to stave it off.
It would not have been easy to find the troops; but two or three panzer divisions from the
East, if they arrived in time, might well have turned the scale against an ill-maintained
and tired Allied army group in an autumn battle on the North German Plain. The
available records78
suggest that two panzer divisions might possibly have been found on
the Eastern Front from the 3rd Panzer Corps of the Fourth Panzer Army. But we have
strayed too far from history into the field of the might-have-been.

All in all, if a score of Allied divisions had been able to cross the Rhine in September
1944 they would certainly have had a lethal and uncertain battle to fight; and nobody can
contemplate without some apprehension the thought of these troops, deprived of help from
other Allied ground forces, "slugging it out" with the desperate and determined enemy.
Eisenhower had strong arguments on his side in favouring the conservative and prudent line
rather than the bold one. The "broad front" policy defeated the Germans in the spring of
1945. It is possible that the more daring plan advocated by Montgomery, had it been fully
accepted by Eisenhower at an early date and persevered in, would have defeated them in

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the autumn of 1944. But we must recall that in Operation
"MARKET-GARDEN" the Supreme
Commander went a long way towards Montgomery's policy, putting behind the thrust a
degree of logistical support which the Field Marshal at the time thought "a great victory"
and which gave him good hope of an early end to the war; and the operation failed. There
is obviously no basis for a dogmatic statement.

20.
"Highlights of Administration, First Canadian Army", 24 Sep 44.
The Administrative History of the Operations of 21 Army Group on the Continent of
Europe, 6 June 1944-8 May 1945 (Germany, Nov. 1945), 40.

42.
United Kingdom records.
The Memoirs of Field-Marshal the Viscount Montgomery of Alamein, K.G.
(London, 1958), 266-9.
Wilmot, The Struggle for Europe, 460.
John North, North-West Europe, 1944-5: The Achievement of 21st Army Group
("The Second World War, 1939-1945: A Popular Military History by
Various Authors") (London, 1953), 88.

66.
Normandy to the Baltic, 139-47.
The Supreme Command,284-8.
Capt. The Earl of Rosse and Col. E. R. Hill, The Story of
the Guards Armoured Division (London, 1956), Chap. VI.
The Struggle for Europe, Chap. XXVI.
United Kingdom records.