de Stjepan G Mestrovic, Professor, Department of Sociology

Descripción

This collection of podcasts contains course materials from SOCI 657 - War Crimes. This course analyzes selected aspects of the phenomenon of war crimes from a sociological and more specifically, cultural studies perspective. This course focuses on empirical data primarily through an analysis of trial transcripts regarding torture at Abu Ghraib, the killings at Baghdad Canal, Operation Iron Triangle and genocide in Bosnia.

Introduction to the topic of war crimes and overview of the course. Analysis of my expert witness testimony in sociology at the courts-martial of Sabrina Harman and Javal Davis. The government reports make it clear that the abuse at Abu Ghraib was not caused by the seven convicted soldiers. Yet these government reports were resolutely kept out of their trials by the military judge who ruled that the sociological findings in them are “irrelevant.” We examine the meanings of “relevance” from legal, sociological, as well as common sense points of view. We touch on the topic of command responsibility and how it was not implemented regarding Abu Ghraib. The topics of “poisoned social climate” and “dysfunctional command climate” as they pertain to Abu Ghraib are also examined.

Michael Leahy was a medic in his unit who was awarded the Purple Heart. He was also charged and convicted of premeditated murder by a military court-martial. One of his co-convicted comrades, Joseph Mayo, had also been awarded a Purple Heart. The convicted First Sergeant, John Hatley, was highly decorated. This case stands out historically as an example of highly-decorated, military heroes who were convicted of conspiracy and premeditated murder committed during a mission in Iraq sometime in the Spring of 2009. The exact date of the incident was never determined. These three convicted soldiers apparently shot and killed three insurgents who were firing upon them and had been repeatedly been firing upon them.
We review the CNN documentary about this case, created by Abbie Boudreau and Scott Zamost. They found that the soldiers were frustrated by the catch-and-release program such that known insurgents were released by Iraqi police almost as soon as they were arrested. We deepen and extend the insights in this documentary based upon my participant-observation as an expert witness in Leahy’s trial, and an examination of Leahy’s record of trial (ROT). We focus on two key issues: the use of the Reid Technique to coerce “themes” that incriminated Leahy’s account of what happened, and testimony by the intelligence officer, who cited sleep deprivation, cross-leveling, and rampant confusion in the rules of engagement in the battalion.
Military rules are such that the military panel (jury) may not be told that such a conviction carries a mandatory minimum sentence of life in prison. Several jurors openly wept when they found this out, after convicting him. We will also examine the judge’s decision not to allow an expert witness in the Reid Technique to testify. We return to the use of the Reid Technique against Leahy not only to extract a conviction, but using “themes,” to extract a particular type of confession that would carry the harshest possible sentence.

Harman did not yell at anyone, did not hit anyone, and did not abuse anyone at Abu Ghraib. Like the other “rotten apples,” she was convicted of conspiracy, maltreatment, and dereliction of duty. We discuss the “role of the scapegoat” in attributing responsibility for crimes. We analyze the process of voir dire of the potential jurors, and offer a brief history of the court-martial system. Potential jurors unanimously voiced the opinion that leadership was at fault for Abu Ghraib, yet the trials never put any leaders on trial. The doctrine of command responsibility was not invoked at the trials even though it is frequently invoked in history and in legal treatises.
We review civilian attorney Frank Spinner’s defense of Harman. The prosecutor argued that Harman brought shame upon the Army by her conduct. But her conduct was described by witnesses as those resembling a social worker. She cared for the detainees and helped them. Spinner retored, “Shame on the Army” for putting a young, inexperienced, female soldier into the abusive climate that was Abu Ghraib. We summarize briefly the findings in my book, The Trials of Abu Ghraib based upon my participant observations at three of the courts-martial. We review my testimony as an expert witness at the trial concerning the “poisoned command climate” at Abu Ghraib, and raise questions about who was ultimately responsible for this command climate. We again turn to the theories of Piaget and Fauconnet, and deepen our understanding of the idea of responsibility.
Because I returned from the Article 32 hearing for Jeremy Morlock, a soldier accused of gruesome crimes in Afghanistan that involved allegedly killing civilians for sport, I discuss briefly my observations of that hearing. As in the other cases we have reviewed thusfar, there was no evidence presented that Morlock participated directly in any of the crimes with which he was charged. No physical or forensic evidence of any sort was presented by the government. Instead, the government relied on the catch-all crime of “conspiracy,” which does not require any specified length of time or plan. In fact, in man ways, Morlock emerged as a whistleblower who alerted authorities to the crimes committed by his superior and to the poisoned command climate in his unit.

We return to the war crimes committed during Operation Iron Triangle in Iraq in the year 2006. This week we focus upon the plea-bargain court-martial of William Hunsaker, who was represented by civilian attorney Michael Waddington. Hunsaker, along with Clagett, made a plea-bargain following the arrest of Clagett’s civilian defense attorney, Paul Bergrin. Only the accused soldier Raymond Girouard made a plea of not guilty and opted for a full court-martial. The military panel ruled that indeed, Girouard was not guilty of premeditated murder and conspiracy. Yet many questions are raised by these three courts-martial. We examine the record of Hunsaker’s trial and the definition and use of the crime of “conspiracy,” the use and function of the plea-bargain, and the circumstances that led to Hunsaker’s plea-bargain. We also review the evidence that was not presented at any of the Operation Iron Triangle and the other, unpunished crimes that occurred on the day of the mission, May 9, 2006, in Iraq.
We also focus on the mistreatment that Hunsaker received while in pre-trial custody. He was literally caged, shackled, and isolated for many months prior to his trial while he was technically innocent until proven guilty.

We examine the historical and cultural context of the incident: It occurred during the “surge” phase of the war in Iraq. In practical terms, this meant that soldiers were to make their presence seen in Iraqi neighborhoods. The frustrations for the soldiers: a “catch and release program” of apprehending insurgents, being required to take photographs but not issued cameras, chronic sleep deprivation, the constant threat of IED’s. The perception of Hatley by the soldiers he led as a hero, as “greater than George Washington.” We then turn toward an examination of Joseph Mayo’s plea-bargain in which he pleaded to guilty of premeditated murder and of John Hatley’s trial, in which he pleaded not guilty, but was convicted of premeditated murder.

We begin by examining my expert testimony in the international tribunal of Dario Kordic for ethnic cleansing in Bosnia-Herzegovina in the year 1990s. There are parallels to the other cases we have examined so far in the course. No evidence was presented that Kordic directly ordered or participated in any of the crimes with which he was charged. Instead, the prosecutor invoked the doctrine of command responsibility, which states that a military or civilian leader could or should have known and therefore prevented crimes committed by individuals lower in the chain of command. We examine the doctrine of command responsibility, from the Yamashita case to the present. It appears to be used selectively.
We again turn to Fauconnet’s book on responsibility to make sense of the fact that the doctrine of command responsibility was used at the Hague regarding war crimes in Bosnia but was not invoked by the US in the courts-martial of various low-ranking soldiers who committed war crimes in Iraq and Afghanistan.

VideoWeek 11 Lecture - An overview of war crimes from Bosnia to Afghanistan

We search for parallels and patterns in the depiction, understanding, and prosecution of war crimes from Bosnia in the 1990s to Afghanistan in the present. Is it true that the Nuremberg legacy has been followed (in prosecuting high-ranking officials) even at the Hague regarding war crimes in Bosnia? Could the ethnic cleansing in Bosnia have occurred without the ethnic cleansing of the Yugoslav army occurring prior to the war crimes? What was the responsibility of the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) as they were witnessing the war crimes? Have the crimes at Abu Ghraib been fully understood, depicted, and expiated? For the most part, the findings in the Taguba and other government reports were kept out of the trial records of the handful of low-ranking soldiers who were prosecuted. The role of high-commanding officers in the Operation Iron Triangle killings have not been entered into any trial record other than the Article 32 hearing. It is an open question whether in the ongoing trials of soldiers involved in the Afghanistan hearings will introduce evidence into the trial records of command climate reports and leadership issues.