Historian Helena P. Schrader discusses ancient Spartan society and culture, seeking to rectify a number of common misconceptions. She also provides excerpts from her biographical novels about Leonidas and reviews of books on ancient Sparta. For more, visit her website at: http://spartareconsidered.com

Ancient Hoplites

Sunday, March 1, 2015

Modern histories of Sparta
tend to brush over the Messenian War(s) in considerable haste and without
providing a great deal of detail. The
reason is obvious. As Paul Cartledge stresses in Sparta and Lakonia: A Regional History 1300 to 362 BC (one of the
few general histories of Sparta to focus seriously on the early history), the
literary evidence is almost nil and the archeological evidence ambiguous.
Indeed, he describes Tyrtaios, a poet whose works have been handed down to us
only in fragments, as the only "reliable" [sic!] literary source, while pointing out
that the ancient sources Herodotus and Thucydides refer to only one war.

Yet, arguably, nothing was
more important to the evolution of Sparta into a city-state with a radically
unique constitution than the Spartan conquest of Messenia. W.G. Forrest argues, for example, that the
conquest of its agriculturally rich neighbor reduced the need for distant
colonies and so the interest in the wider world, while the agricultural basis
of Spartan wealth reduced Sparta’s interest in industry and trade. Others argue
that the conquest of such a vast territory and the subjugation of an entire
people resulted in permanent fear of revolt that in turn created the need for a
militaristic state. Sparta as we know it – with its unique institutions from
the agoge to citizens permanently under arms – is a function of its conflict
with Messenia.

The facts of conquest which
are undisputed are quickly summarized: Sparta controlled Messenia completely by
the start of the 6th century BC. Sometime in the 7th
Century, during the life of the poet Tyrtaios, Sparta was engaged in a bitter
struggle with the Messenians, a struggle that Tyrtaios clearly describes as one
involving pitched battles between hoplites (though not phalanxes). Tyrtaios furthermore
refers in his poems to the great deeds of “our father’s fathers,” which is
usually interpreted to mean that the initial conquest of Messenia occurred two
generations earlier. Tyrtaios also speaks of a struggle that lasts 20 years.
Both the references, however, may be purely poetical; the first may mean little
more than “our forefathers,” and the latter be a literary device to stress that
it was “a long struggle” by making the fight in Messenia exactly twice as long
as the conquest of Troy.
Archeologically, we can trace a gradual expansion of Laconian influence
into Messenia starting in the late 8th Century.

We also know that in the first
quarter of the 7th century BC, Sparta adopted a new constitution attributed to
Lycurgus. (I know there has been scholarly debate about the exact dating of the
Spartan constitution, but I find W.G. Forrest’s arguments dating the Spartan
revolution to the period between 700 and 670 cogent and convincing. See A History of Sparta, 950-192 BC, pp.
55-58.) Furthermore, we know that
Sparta’s only colony was established at the turn or very end of the 8th
Century BC, traditionally in 706 BC. Both the introduction of a radical, new
constitution sanctioned explicitly by Delphi and the establishment of a colony
are attributed by ancient sources to internal unrest in Sparta.

Conventionally, these facts
are woven together as follows: Sparta invaded and conquered Messenia in the
late 8th Century, subjugating the local Messenian population. This
conquest was allegedly followed by a period of intense internal unrest that
led, first, to the founding of Sparta’s only colony, and second to the Lycurgan
reforms. The later, however, are usually seen as contemporary with Tyrataios
and were, therefore, implemented during a second period of conflict with
Messenia, usually described as “the Second” Messenian war. If one presumes that
Sparta won the initial conflict with Messenia, this can only be explained by a
revolt of some kind. So the allegedly brutally oppressed Messenians were within just two generations capable of financing hoards of hoplites and
fielding entire hoplite armies.

This taxes my imagination.
Periods of intense domestic unrest rarely follow victorious wars – particularly not wars of conquest that have
greatly increased the wealth of a state. Likewise, slave revolts do not involve
pitched battles between hoplite armies and don’t take two decades to defeat.

The history of modern
revolutions shows that revolutions most commonly occur during economic crises
or after military defeats. Classical revolution theory says that revolutions
occur when a period of rising living standards and expectations ends abruptly
in a crisis that threatens recent gains.
If we apply this to the Spartan revolution we get some interesting
hypotheses – that square remarkably well with the (scanty) historical record.

What if,
following a period of growing prosperity, productivity and population, Sparta’s
kings/leadership decided to conquer neighboring Messenia, invaded – and then
got bogged down in a terrible war that they failed to win? What if, to
obtain/retain support, Sparta’s kings and aristocratic elite promised the
poorer and lower classes land in Messenia? What if they then couldn’t deliver
on that promise? What if, as the war
dragged on, casualties mounted, and popular support for a lost war waned? What
if, the Messenians became increasingly successful and aggressive, bringing the
war to Laconia?

Such a situation would have
produced all the features of mid-seventh century Sparta that we know existed: the
domestic unrest, the calls for a redistribution of land, impetus for the
founding of an external colony, and finally readiness to accept a new,
revolutionary constitution and lifestyle – as well as the continuing conflict
with organized, well-armed Messenian forces.

Furthermore, if Sparta lost the First Messenian War (at least
in the sense that it did not obtain its objectives) and it took three
generations to subdue the Messenians, then we have a better explanation of why
Sparta became a militarized society. Only sustained conflict and perpetual
threat could force a society to adapt a system of government that is so
singularly focused on ensuring military preparedness at all times.

The paranoid excesses of late
classical Sparta (krypteia, mass executions, etc.) followed the Helot Revolt of
465, but they probably took the disproportionate form they did because there was
still popular memory of the first lost war. A first lost war that traumatized
Sparta would explain why Sparta responded with unparalleled harshness toward
the rebellious Messenians two hundred years later. We need only consider how
memories of past wars still shape, for example, British-Irish, or Russian-Polish
relations today. I believe it was more likely the trauma of a lost war than an
unbroken series of victories by an invincible army sparked the revolution that made Sparta the unique society it was.