Alibrandi alleged that in a January 27 2000 letter seeking payment of a debt he owed to First Union National Bank Financial Outsourcing did not include the warnings and declarations of debtor rights that the Act requires to be included in correspondence from debt collectors.

The district court found that because First Union and Financial Outsourcing deemed Alibrandi’s debts not to be in default when Financial Outsourcing wrote to him Financial Outsourcing was not a “debt collector” and the FDCPA did not require the January 27 2000 letter to contain the statutory warnings. Accordingly the court granted Financial Outsourcing’s motion for summary judgment and dismissed the case. Alibrandi appealed. We hold that if First Union retained North Shore Agency Inc. and by reason of a letter that North Shore as its agent sent to Alibrandi in effect declared Alibrandi’s debt to be in default before First Union referred his account to Financial Outsourcing the January 27 2000 letter was required to include the warnings. Because it does not appear at this point that Alibrandi’s contentions as to First Union’s retention of North Shore and North Shore’s communication with him are undisputed we vacate the judgment and remand for further proceedings.

Defendant appeals as of right from an order granting plaintiff’s motion for summary disposition in this debt collection action. We affirm in part and remand.

Defendant first contends that plaintiff did not have standing to bring this suit under the Michigan Collection Practices Act (MCPA) based on the following provisions: Defendant maintains that plaintiff is a collection agency under the Act and has thus violated the above provisions. Plaintiff on the other hand contends that it is not a collection agency and purchased the debt in question outright and is not acting on behalf of a creditor.

In the instant case defendant purchased the vehicle from Repo Depo West Inc. Repo Depo West Inc. immediately sold defendant’s account to Guardian National Acceptance Corporation. On June 27 1997 plaintiff purchased defendant’s account from GNA. The purchase agreement states that GNA conveyed all of its interests in the accounts to plaintiff for value.

This Court holds that plaintiff is not a collection agency as defined by the Act. The purchase agreement states that GNA conveyed all of its interest in defendant’s account for valuable consideration.

Defendant also argues that under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act 15 USC 1692 et seq. (FDCPA) plaintiff is a debt collector and is prohibited from suing on accounts it purchased after the debt was in default. Plaintiff concedes that it is a debt collector under the FDCPA. Defendant relies on the following provisions to support his argument:

In the instant case plaintiff concedes and we agree that it is a debt collector under the Act. However defendant does not allege how if at all plaintiff has violated any of the protective provisions of the Act.

Can a person licensed to practice law be in violation of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) 15 U.S.C. sec. 1692 et seq. for sending dunning collection letters that purport to be from an "at torney"? This is one of two interesting questions we ad- dress today in this case involving Raul Avila (and a class of similarly situated persons) the Van Ru Credit Corporation and Albert G. Rubin an attorney-at-law from Skokie Illinois. As Joe Friday would say let's get to the facts. We will but unlike Sergeant Friday it won't be "just the facts" as we'll mix in some observations and findings along the way.

Avila is a student loan debtor living in Connecticut. Van Ru Credit Corporation is a collection agency in Skokie Illinois. Rubin is an Illinois attorney. Although we were told at oral argument that Rubin and the Van Ru agency are separate they actually seem to be as closely inter- twined as lovers during an embrace. Here's the situation from which we think that conclusion is justified.

To be specific the appellants -- several former Chapter 7 debtors seeking to represent a putative class -- maintain that the principal defendant Sears Roebuck &amp; Company (1) habitually violated the Bankruptcy Code by the manner in which it essayed to enforce security liens in household goods and other personal property. Their claim has two subparts. First they allege that redemption agreements between lienholders and debtors entered into after the granting of a discharge in bankruptcy invariably violate the prohibitions of the bankruptcy discharge injunction codified in 11 U.S.C. § 524. Second they allege that in all events such agreements require bankruptcy court approval (which was never obtained).

The district court wrote a thoughtful opinion in which it answered both the bankruptcy and the FDCPA questions adversely to the appellants. Arruda v. Sears Roebuck &amp; Co. 273 B.R. 332 (D.R.I. 2002). It thereupon dismissed their complaints. Id. at 351. For the reasons that follow we affirm the district court's order.

A credit-card company hired lawyer John Heibl the defendant in this case to collect a consumer credit-card debt of some $1 700 from Curtis Bartlett the plaintiff. Heibl sent Bartlett a letter which Bartlett received but did not read in which Heibl told him that "if you wish to resolve this matter before legal action is commenced you must do one of two things within one week of the date of this letter": pay $316 toward the satisfaction of the debt or get in touch with Micard (the creditor) "and make suitable arrangements for payment. If you do neither it will be assumed that legal action will be necessary."

The letter is said to violate the statute by stating the required information about the debtor's rights in a confusing fashion. Finding nothing confusing about the letter the district court rendered judgment for the defendant after a bench trial. The plaintiff contends that this finding is clearly erroneous. The defendant disagrees of course but also contends that even if the letter is confusing this is of no moment because Bartlett didn't read it. That would be a telling point if Bartlett were seeking actual damages for example as a consequence of being misled by the letter into surrendering a legal defense against the credit-card company. He can't have suffered such damages as a result of the statutory violation because he didn't read the letter. But he is not seeking actual damages. He is seeking only statutory damages a penalty that does not depend on proof that the recipient of the letter was misled. E.g. Tolentino v. Friedman 46 F.3d 645 651 (7th Cir. 1995); Harper v. Better Business Services Inc. 961 F.2d 1561 1563 (11th Cir. 1992); Clomon v. Jackson 988 F.2d 1314 1322 (2d Cir. 1993); Baker v. G.C. Services Corp. 677 F.2d 775 780-81 (9th Cir. 1982). All that is required is proof that the statute was violated although even then it is within the district court's discretion to decide whether and if so how much to award up to the $1 000 ceiling. E.g. Tolentino v. Friedman supra 46 F.3d at 651; Clomon v. Jackson supra 988 F.2d at 1322.

This case presents the novel question of whether the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act ("FDCPA" or "the Act") 15 U.S.C. sec. 1692 et seq. applies to third-party efforts to collect payment from consumers who use a dishonored check for the purchase of goods or services. The answer turns on whether the payment obligation that arises from a dishonored check constitutes a "debt" as defined in the Act. On cross-motions for partial summary judgment the district court answered in the affirmative holding that (1) the Act applies to third- party collectors of dishonored checks and (2) the defendants' collection practices violated the Act. On appeal the defendants challenge only the former holding arguing that the Act applies only to those debts arising from an offer or extension of credit. We now affirm.

Appeal from summary judgment entered in the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut (Covello J.) the district court having dismissed plaintiff's complaint after finding that debt collection letters sent by defendant to plaintiff were not misleading or deceptive within the intendment of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act. Reversed and remanded.

The Act forbids a debt collector which Wexler is conceded to be to "use any false deceptive or misleading representation or means in connection with the collection of any debt " 15 U.S.C. sec. 1692e including "the false representation or implication that any individual is an attorney or that any communication is from an attorney." 15 U.S.C. sec. 1692e(3). A lawyer who merely rents his letterhead to a collection agency violates the Act 15 U.S.C. sec. 1692j(a); Taylor v. Perrin Landry deLaunay &amp; Durand 103 F.3d 1232 1235-38 (5th Cir. 1997); cf. White v. Goodman 200 F.3d 1016 1018 (7th Cir. 2000) for in such a case the lawyer is allowing the collection agency to impersonate him.

The significance of such impersonation is that a debtor who receives a dunning letter signed by a lawyer will think that a lawyer reviewed the claim and determined that it had at least colorable merit; so if no lawyer did review the claim the debtor will have been deceived and the purpose of the Act therefore thwarted. Similarly a lawyer who like Wexler is a debt collector violates section 1692e(3) (and also section 1692e(10) which forbids "the use of any false representation or deceptive means to collect or attempt to collect any debt") if he sends a dunning letter that he has not reviewed since his lawyer's letterhead then falsely implies that he has reviewed the creditor's claim.

Plaintiff William H. Brady ("Brady") filed this action against defendant The Credit Recovery Company ("CRC" or "defendant") and its president and clerk Leslie A. Clark ("Clark" or "defendant") to redress alleged violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (the "FDCPA") 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692-1692o and of related state law obligations.

The district court dismissed Brady's FDCPA claim for failure to state a claim pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) and dismissed the remaining state law claims without prejudice for lack of jurisdiction. In its memorandum and order the district court recited the standard governing 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss but relied in part on materials outside of the pleadings. We therefore treat the motion as one for summary judgment. See Dominique v. Weld 73 F.3d 1156 1158 (1st Cir. 1996). We review a grant of summary judgment de novo viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmovant plaintiff see id. and conclude that the order of dismissal/grant of summary judgment must be reversed. Accordingly we remand this case for action consistent with this opinion.

This appeal presents the issue of whether unpaid administrative and other fees charged under the rental agreement by an automobile and truck rental company in the event of an accident constitute "debt" under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act. We hold that such fees fall within the ambit of the Act and remand for further proceedings.

This case presents an issue of first impression in this circuit: whether a third-party debt collector's efforts to collect a dishonored check are governed by the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act ("FDCPA" or "the Act") 15 U.S.C. SS 1692- 1692o. The district court ruled that the FDCPA does not apply to efforts to collect a dishonored check because a dishonored check is not a "debt" under the FDCPA.

The only federal court of appeals that has considered this question is the Seventh Circuit. In a well-reasoned and persuasive opinion that court recently held that a dishonored check is a "debt" under the FDCPA. Bass v. Stolper Koritzinsky Brewster &amp; Neider S.C. 111 F.3d 1322 (7th Cir. 1997).

We agree with its conclusion that because "an offer or extension of credit is not required for a payment obligation to constitute a `debt' under the FDCPA " id. at 1326 the FDCPA governs the collection of dishonored checks. We therefore reverse.

Plaintiffs Mohammad and Diana Chaudhry filed the present action against Defendants Michael Gallerizzo and his law firm Gebhardt &amp; Smith in the United States District Court for the District of Maryland alleging various violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act ("FDCPA") 15 U.S.C.A. § 1692a et seq. (West 1998). The district court granted a motion for judgment as a matter of law in favor of Defendants on all counts. In addition the district court levied sanctions against Plaintiffs and their attorney for filing frivolous claims. We affirm.

Plaintiff Carl Chauncey sued defendant JDR Recovery Corporation alleging violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (15 U.S.C. sec.sec. 1692-1692o) ("FDCPA"). The defendant is a professional debt collection agency and wrote plaintiff on December 10 1994 a letter seeking to collect a $1 541.28 debt allegedly owed to Bridgestone/Firestone. On December 8 of the following year plaintiff sued defendant alleging two violations of 15 U.S.C. sec. 1629g(a). The suit sought statutory damages costs and reasonable attorney's fees under 15 U.S.C. sec. 1692k. On June 14 1996 the district court handed down an opinion finding defendant liable on one claim of plaintiff and finding it unnecessary to rule on plaintiff's second claim because a single violation of the FDCPA is sufficient to entitle plaintiff to an award of statutory damages. However the order did not determine the amount of statutory damages and attorney's fees but permitted the parties to put in evidence on those amounts. 1

The question before us is whether the dunning letter sent by defendant demanding payment within the 30-day debt validation period violates the FDCPA.

Plaintiff brought action under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act alleging that debt collector's letter violated the terms of the Act. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York (Mishler J.) dismissed the action for failure to state a claim on which relief can be granted and plaintiff appealed. The Court of Appeals Leval J. vacates and remands holding that plaintiff's complaint states claim that debt collector's letter contradicted or confused the message required to be given by the Act.

Plaintiff appeals from the judgment of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York (Jacob Mishler Senior District Judge) dismissing claims under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act 15 U.S.C. § 1692 et seq. ("the Act") for failure to state a claim on which relief can be granted. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). We vacate and remand.

In early April 1993 Bell South Mobility retained the law firm of Richard S. Derbes A Professional Law Corporation to collect delinquent telephone bills from certain customers. Over the next nine months Richard S. Derbes on behalf of the law firm mailed approximately 639 demand letters to individual customers of Bell South. Daniel Garrett received one of these demand letters and then filed an action against Derbes and his law firm (jointly "Derbes") alleging several violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act 15 U.S.C. § 1692 et seq.

Petitioner Heintz is a lawyer representing a bank that sued respondent Jenkins to recover the balance due on her defaulted car loan. After a letter from Heintz listed the amount Jenkins owed as including the cost of insurance bought by the bank when she reneged on her promise to insure the car Jenkins brought this suit against Heintz and his law firm under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act which forbids "debt collector" to make false or misleading representations and to engage in various abusive and unfair practices. The District Court dismissed the suit holding that the Act does not apply to lawyers engaging in litigation. The Court of Appeals disagreed and reversed.

Held: The Act must be read to apply to lawyers engaged in consumer debt collection litigation for two rather strong reasons. First a lawyer who regularly tries to obtain payment of consumer debts through legal proceedings meets the Act's definition of "debt collector": one who "regularly collects or attempts to collect directly or indirectly [consumer] debts owed . . . another " 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6). Second although an earlier version of that definition expressly excluded "any attorney at law collecting a debt as an attorney on behalf of and in the name of a client " Congress repealed this exemption in 1986 without creating a narrower litigation related exemption to fill the void. Heintz's arguments for nonetheless inferring the latter type of exemption--(1) that many of the Act's requirements if applied directly to litigation activities will create harmfully anomalous results that Congress could not have intended; (2) that a postenactment statement by one of the 1986 repeal's sponsors demonstrates that despite the removal of the earlier blanket exemption the Act still does not apply to lawyers' litigating activities; and (3) that a nonbinding "Commentary" by the Federal Trade Commission's staff establishes that attorneys engaged in sending dunning letters and other traditional debt collection activities are covered by the Act while those whose practice is limited to legal activities are not--are unconvincing. Pp. 3-8. 25 F. 3d 536 affirmed.

CAROLYN HERBERT v. MONTEREY FINANCIAL SERVICES

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