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The interesting "missing 28 pages" might in fact be about Saudi back channel funding BUT a far more critical aspect that is not being discussed here and CrowBat brought it up as did the IRGC Commander with his comment he is training for war with the US.

A well known ME analyst type has kept pounding away that there is far more Iranian involvement with IS/AQ than the Obama WH and his NSC truly wants us to understand.

AND it dates BEFORE 9/11........

Kyle W. Orton ‏@KyleWOrton
"Iran never paid a price for [killing our soldiers in #Iraq], any more than it did for waging a global terrorist war against the West".

Appears in the Obama WH drive to implement the Iran Deal even Obama overlooked the simple fact that one of the most deadliest IEDs...the EFPs were manufactured and then smuggled into Iraq from Iran......notice not a single attempt by the Obama WH to punish Iran for this...instead Obama hopes for "moderates" and passes IRGC and Khamenei 150B USDs.

Tim Flynn writes Al Qaeda Worked on WMD in Iran

A short, pre-book publication story that starts:

Al Qaeda operatives based in Iran worked on chemical and biological weapons, according to a letter written to Osama bin Laden that is described in a new book by a top former U.S. intelligence official. The letter was captured by a U.S. military sensitive site exploitation team during the raid on bin Laden's Abbottabad headquarters in May 2011. It is described in Field of Fight, out Tuesday from Lieutenant General Michael Flynn, the former head of the Defense Intelligence Agency, and Michael Ledeen of the Foundation for Defense of Democracies.

The official White House response has a bitter tone IMHO:

Mike Flynn, in true Kremlin form, has been peddling these baseless conspiracy theories for years. Anyone who thinks Iran was or is in bed with al Qaeda doesn't know much about either.

The Islamic Republic of Iran released five senior al-Qaeda terrorists in March, ostensibly as part of a prisoner exchange for an Iranian diplomat kidnapped in Yemen by al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). But the murky circumstances in which al-Qaeda’s leaders were “held” in Iran and other inconsistencies cast some doubt on this version of events, and draw attention to some old questions about Iran’s support for al-Qaeda and its affiliates and offshoots.

According to a September 14 report by Sky News, the five al-Qaeda leaders were freed—and will soon be allowed to leave Iran—in exchange for Nour Ahmad Nikbakht, an Iranian diplomat kidnapped by AQAP in July 2013 who landed in Tehran on March 5. Even on this version of events it means that the Iranian State media reports at the time, that Nikbakht was freed as the result of “intelligence operation,” were false.

Who Has Been Released?

The most important al-Qaeda leader freed by Iran is Sayf al-Adel. Regarded as al-Qaeda’s number three, al-Adel is one of al-Qaeda’s most capable military leaders. Beginning his career in the Egyptian military, before moving into Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ), then led by Ayman az-Zawahiri, al-Adel was one of the masterminds behind the conspiracy that assassinated President Anwar al-Sadat in 1981. By 1988, al-Adel was in Afghanistan and remained after the Soviets left.

Iran has long had friendly relations with Egypt’s Sunni Islamists and the alliance with EIJ was further strengthened via Hassan al-Turabi in the early 1990s, after which Zawahiri was the poster-boy for Iran’s policy of ecumenical support for anti-American Islamic radicalism. Al-Adel was among those trained by Iran through the Hizballah in Lebanon in the early 1990s, going on to serve on al-Qaeda’s Shura Council and as al-Qaeda’s security chief. Al-Adel is believed to have been involved in the 1998 Embassy bombings and the butchery of Wall Street Journal reporter Daniel Pearl, though, interestingly, al-Adel seems to have opposed to the 9/11 massacre.

Al-Adel was key in convincing Osama bin Laden to maintain relations with Abu Musab az-Zarqawi, despite Zarqawi and Bin Laden having a stormy initial meeting and retaining deep difference over the “far enemy” question. Zarqawi had extensive contacts in the Levant, al-Adel argued, and this “rolodex pragmatism” would carry the day—and quickly: al-Qaeda put Zarqawi’s contacts to use for the Jordanian end of the Millennium Plot in December 1999.

EIJ had operated quite freely in Iran in the 1990s and after the NATO invasion of Afghanistan in 2001 al-Qaeda members and associates, al-Adel and Zarqawi among them, took shelter in Tehran and Mashhad, where Zarqawi was even reportedly trained by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corp (IRGC).

Zarqawi moved from Iran to an area of Iraq controlled by Ansar al-Islam, which was led by Zarqawi loyalists and received assistance from both al-Qaeda and Saddam Hussein’s Iraq, in April 2002. The next month, Zarqawi moved to Baghdad with two-dozen senior al-Qaeda associates, including his successor Abu Ayyub al-Masri and Abu Hammam as-Suri, the head of the military for Jabhat an-Nusra (al-Qaeda in Syria), at least until he was supposedly killed in March. Zarqawi was allowed free movement in and out of Baghdad, and he conducted a tour of the Levant to set up the “ratlines” that brought foreign holy warriors into Iraq during the American regency. By November 2002, Zarqawi had taken direct charge of Ansar in northern Iraq.

Zarqawi and three-hundred jihadists were allowed to move back into Iran during the Iraq invasion, before being permitted to cross the border again later in 2003 to make war against constitutional government in Iraq. Once back in Iraq, Ansar would reassert its autonomy from Zarqawi, albeit remaining in coordination with him, and Zarqawi and his associates from the Herat camp in Afghanistan rebranded their group from Jund a-Sham to at-Tawhid wal-Jihad, which later became al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) and eventually the Islamic State (ISIS). An al-Qaeda network maintained on Iranian soil, of which al-Adel was a senior member, was an important logistics and supply base for AQI.

From Iran, in collusion with Zarqawi, al-Adel organized the bombing of Riyadh in May 2003, after which the Iranian theocracy ostensibly placed al-Adel under some form of arrest, the terms of which were never made clear. Al-Adel was reported to have been released in a previous prisoner swap in 2010. After Bin Laden was struck down, it is said that al-Adel was the interim leader of al-Qaeda—which couldn’t have happened if al-Adel was truly detained. Several reports in the summer of 2011 said Tehran had allowed al-Adel to travel between Iran and Pakistan.

The other four al-Qaeda leaders set free by Iran are:
1.Abu Khayr al-Masri: An Egyptian member of al-Qaeda’s Shura Council, Abu Khayr was as a member of the Black Guard, the elite bodyguard unit, connected directly to Bin Laden and Zawahiri. Abu Khayr was al-Qaeda’s chief of foreign relations and the principal conduit to the Taliban. Abu Khayr is one of the most-wanted men in his native Saudi Arabia. Reported to have travelled from Iran to Pakistan in 2010 with Saad bin Laden, Osama’s son, it is not clear how or why Abu Khayr ended up back in Iran and what exactly were the arrangements of his captivity.
2.Abu Muhammad al-Masri: One of the most important operational planners in al-Qaeda, Abu Muhammad is another Egyptian member of the Shura Council, and a close associate of al-Adel’s. Abu Muhammad is under U.S. indictment for the African Embassy bombings.
3.Khaled al-Aruri (a.k.a. Abu al-Qassam): A Jordanian national of Palestinian descent, al-Aruri was with Zarqawi in his formative period: they travelled together to Afghanistan in the late 1980s, were imprisoned together in Jordan in 1994 with Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi, and went back to Taliban Afghanistan together in 1999. Al-Aruri then moved with Zarqawi to Iran to Iraq back to Iran and then into Iraq again. Al-Aruri remained a deputy commander of AQI and one of Zarqawi’s closest companions until Zarqawi was killed in 2006.
4.Sari Shibab: A Jordanian al-Qaeda member of whom little is publicly known.

A History of Duplicity

Perhaps Iran really has been strong-armed into releasing these men—when al-Adel was last reported released in 2010, it is said that al-Qaeda had kidnapped an IRGC officer disguised as a diplomat in Pakistan to hasten a release process that was already in motion. But without clarity on whether al-Adel was released in 2010—or if he was, whether, when, how, and why he was rearrested—this raises more questions than it answers. And whatever the case might be, none of the confusion conceals the fact that Iran’s holding senior al-Qaeda leaders under “house arrest” is a sham.

"Remember Iran’s Role in 9/11"Forgetful officials should not be rewarding Tehran for its deadly actions with gifts like sanctions relief.

By
Joseph I. Lieberman

Sept. 7, 2016 7:21 p.m. ET

‘Never forget” is the commitment the American people made after Sept. 11, 2001. Yet sometimes our leaders seem to have forgotten Iran’s role in that worst terror attack on American soil, and Iran’s continuing assistance to terror organizations and operations around the world.

Last edited by davidbfpo; 09-08-2016 at 04:59 PM.
Reason: Moved here from the Syria thread.

US ODNI has released another batch of UBL/AQ compound documents.....and it supports a number of articles written by Orten about the connections between AQ and Iran and even Russia.....

THAT apparently has been overlooked by Trump and his surrogates when stating "he is going to eradicate IS from the face of the earth"....does that mean along the way Iran and Russia who have been supporting both????

Last edited by davidbfpo; 01-24-2017 at 07:23 PM.
Reason: Moved from Syria thread.

Iran has expelled nearly all of them?

A curious paragraph in The Soufan Group's commentary on the recent Executive Order on restricting immigration, with my emphasis:

However, Iran is materially different from the other countries named in the executive order. The restriction is primarily intended to prevent terrorists linked to the so-called Islamic State and al-Qaeda from entering the U.S. Iran has identified both groups as threats to Iranian national security and has provided military support to the governments of Iraq and Syria to battle them and related Sunni jihadist organizations. Though it did allow some aides to Usama bin Ladin to take refuge in Iran after the September 11 attacks—possibly as leverage against Saudi Arabia,its main regional adversary—Iran kept them under virtual house arrest and eventually expelled nearly all of them.

Abu Khayr al-Masri: guest in Iran 2001-2015

More of a historical note from The Soufan Group's IntelBrief today, following a drone strike that killed him in Syria:

After the September 11 attacks, al-Masri fled Afghanistan and went to Iran. Along with one of bin Ladin’s sons and Saif al-Adl—another top member of al-Qaeda—al-Masri was effectively placed on house arrest while in Iran. This arrangement was reflective of al-Qaeda and Iran’s long and complicated relationship, in which Tehran has essentially sheltered terrorists such as al-Adl and al-Masri, but limited their movements and activities. While the exact date is publicly uncertain, by late 2015 Iran had released al-Masri (along with al-Adl and others) in exchange for an Iranian diplomat held hostage by al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). In July 2016, a Syrian al-Qaeda media outlet released an audio recording of al-Masri, showing that when he left Iran he went to Syria...

Iran's motives and actions

Within a longer article Hamid Hussain (on the thread for the Pakistani-Arab relationship) has this passage on this issue:

Now looking at the time line after Bin Ladin’s killing, it is clear that in 2010 Iran exchanged Bin Ladin’s family members for its intelligence operative Heshmatollah Atterzadeh. He was working under the cover of commercial attaché at Iranian consulate in Peshawar from where he was abducted by al-Qaeda operatives and kept in Pakistan’s tribal areas. Tehran didn’t bother to inform Pakistanis even after the exchange was done. Leader of Taliban Mullah Akhtar Mansur was travelling on a Pakistani passport with an Iranian visa and coming from Iran when a drone sent him packing back to his creator. He was surely not going for a holiday trip to Iran.

A tactical partnership with hiccups

From CTC a lengthy article on this 'marriage of convenience'; which ends with:

...cooperation is simply too valuable for these partners to be abandoned.

The Abstract:

The relationship between Iran and al-Qa`ida goes back at least a quarter of a century, but it remains one of the most understudied and poorly understood chapters in the history and evolution of the jihadi organization founded by Usama bin Ladin. Recently declassified letters seized in 2011 from bin Ladin’s Abbottabad hideout and U.S. government and court documents, however, have shed some additional light on their partnership. The existing information suggests that the relationship is best understood as a “tactical cooperation”—one that, despite the intervention of Iran and its proxies in opposition to al-Qa`ida in the Syrian civil war, is likely to continue for as long as the parties perceive the benefits of cooperation to exceed the costs.

Hospitality or a "living cemetery"?

A lengthy article 'Osama bin Laden’s family on the run: ‘I never stopped praying our lives might return to normal’, based on a new book by Cathy Scott-Clark and Adrian Levy’s book 'The Exile: The Flight Of Osama Bin Laden' is published on 23 May by Bloomsbury (London)' and it has several passages on how Iran treated their guests.

First time I have seen mention of the role of General Qassem Suleimani:

In January 2002, George Bush included Tehran in his “axis of evil”. After this, Iran’s secretive Quds force, a clandestine division of the country’s Revolutionary Guard, led by Major General Qassem Suleimani, went out of their way to assist al-Qaida. They set up a refugee camp in the no man’s land just beyond the Iranian border with Afghanistan.

Mr Soufan is at his most interesting in describing in detail the ambiguous role of Iran in the arrest, and then the release, of senior al-Qaeda figures fleeing Afghanistan—including Hamza bin Laden, Osama’s son—to be used “either as leverage or as attack dogs”.

Second review of 'The Exile' by Bruce Hoffman

Hat tip to WoTR - a review by Bruce Hoffman of the book by Cathy Scott-Clark and Adrian Levy’s book 'The Exile: The Flight Of Osama Bin Laden'. It deals with the Iranian and Pakistani links. The first was Post 51.

Here are two passages:

Gen. Qassem Suleimani, the commander of Iranian and Shia forces deployed against ISIL in Syria and Iraq today, was Gul’s Iranian doppelgänger. As commander of the elite Quds Force of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corp’s (IRGC), Suleimani was similarly responsible for the safekeeping of bin Laden’s family and the al-Qaeda leaders and their families who had fled from Afghanistan as a result of the American invasion. Reverentially referred to as “Hajji Qassem” by bin Laden’s sons, Suleimani provided accommodation for them, their siblings, and mothers as well as their father’s closest confidants and their families at a clandestine Quds Force training headquarters in Tehran.
This tale of Iranian connivance provides additional evidence debunking the popular misconception that extremists do not cooperate across sectarian lines. Rather, it demonstrates how when interests overlap, they have repeatedly shown a remarkable ability to cast aside their otherwise rigid differences to work together. The ancient proverb that “the enemy of my enemy is my friend” has long characterized the shifting and sometimes inexplicable alliances formed across the Middle East, North Africa, and South Asia since the war on terrorism commenced 16 years ago. In this instance, the intensity of the shared enmity between Salafi-Jihadi Sunnis and Shia militants against the United States can never be prudently forgotten.

What do the Bin Laden files reveal then?

Taken from an article by FDD's Long War Journal, on the documents released today by the CIA, from the Abbottabad raid on Bin Laden's villa:

One never-before-seen 19-page document contains a senior jihadist’s assessment of the group’s relationship with Iran. The author explains that Iran offered some “Saudi brothers” in al Qaeda “everything they needed,” including “money, arms” and “training in Hezbollah camps in Lebanon, in exchange for striking American interests in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf.” Iranian intelligence facilitated the travel of some operatives with visas, while sheltering others. Abu Hafs al-Mauritani, an influential ideologue prior to 9/11, helped negotiate a safe haven for his jihadi comrades inside Iran. But the author of the file, who is clearly well-connected, indicates that al Qaeda’s men violated the terms of the agreement and Iran eventually cracked down on the Sunni jihadists’ network, detaining some personnel. Still, the author explains that al Qaeda is not at war with Iran and some of their “interests intersect,” especially when it comes to being an “enemy of America.” Bin Laden’s files show the two sides have had heated disagreements. There has been hostility between the two. Al Qaeda even penned a letter to Ayatollah Khamenei demanding the release of family members held in Iranian custody. Other files show that al Qaeda kidnapped an Iranian diplomat to exchange for its men and women. Bin Laden himself considered plans to counter Iran’s influence throughout the Middle East, which he viewed as pernicious.
However, bin Laden urged caution when it came to threatening Iran. In a previously released letter, bin Laden described Iran as al Qaeda’s “main artery for funds, personnel, and communication.” And despite their differences, Iran continued to provide crucial support for al Qaeda’s operations.
In a series of designations and other official statements issued since July 2011, the US Treasury and State Departments have repeatedly targeted al Qaeda’s “core facilitation pipeline” inside Iran. Sources familiar with the intelligence used to justify those designations say they are based, in part, on the Abbottabad files. It is likely that still more revelations concerning al Qaeda’s relationship with Iran remain to be found in the cache made available today.