Great Britain and the American Civil War eBook

The remaining steps in the negotiation have already
been narrated[310]. Russell informed Adams of
the requirement of a similar French convention, Adams
secured action by Dayton, and in spite of continued
French reluctance and suspicion[311] all was ready
in mid-August for the affixing of signatures, when
Russell, in execution of his previous promise, and
evidently now impressed with the need of an explicit
understanding, gave notice of his intended declaration
in writing to be attached to the convention[312].
On August 20 both Adams and Dayton refused to sign,
the former taking the ground, and with evident sincerity,
that the “exception” gave evidence of a
British suspicion that was insulting to his country,
while Dayton had “hardly concealed” from
Thouvenel that this same “exception” was
the very object of the Convention[313]. While
preparing his rejoinder to Adams’ complaint
Russell wrote in a note to Palmerston “it all
looks as if a trap had been prepared[314].”
He, too, at last, was forced to a conclusion long
since reached by every other diplomat, save Adams,
engaged in this negotiation.

But in reviewing the details of the entire affair
it would appear that in its initiation by Seward there
is no proof that he then thought of any definite “trap”.
April 24 antedated any knowledge by Seward of British
or French policy on neutrality, and he was engaged
in attempting to secure a friendly attitude by foreign
Powers. One means of doing this was by giving
assurances on maritime law in time of war. True
he probably foresaw an advantage through expected
aid in repressing privateering, but primarily he hoped
to persuade the maritime Powers not to recognize Southern
belligerency. It was in fact this question of
belligerency that determined all his policy throughout
the first six months of the American conflict.
He was obstinately determined to maintain that no
such status existed, and throughout the whole war he
returned again and again to pressure on foreign Powers
to recall their proclamations of neutrality.
Refusing to recognize foreign neutrality as final
Seward persisted in this negotiation in the hope that
if completed it would place Great Britain and France
in a position where they would be forced to reconsider
their declared policy. A demand upon them to aid
in suppressing privateering might indeed then be used
as an argument, but the object was not privateering
in itself; that object was the recall of the recognition
of Southern belligerency. In the end he simply
could not agree to the limiting declaration for it
would have constituted an acknowledgment by the United
States itself of the existence of a state of war.

In all of this Adams, seemingly, had no share.
He acted on the simple and straightforward theory
that the United States, pursuing a conciliatory policy,
was now offering to adhere to international rules
advocated by all the maritime powers. As a result
he felt both personally and patriotically aggrieved
that suspicion was directed toward the American overtures[315].
For him the failure of the negotiation had temporarily,
at least, an unfortunate result: “So far
as the assumed friendliness of Earl Russell to the
United States was concerned, the scales had fallen
from his eyes. His faith in the straightforwardness
of any portion of the Palmerston-Russell Ministry
was gone[316].”