From
the Camp David peace accords in 1978 until
2000 (the latest year for which figures are available), the United
States has subsidized Egypt's armed forces with over $38 billion worth
of aid. Egypt receives about $2 billion annually--$1.3 billion in foreign military financing and
about $815 million in economic support fund
assistance --making it the second largest
regular recipient of conventional U.S. military and economic aid, after Israel. In 1990, the United States also forgave $7.1 billion in past Egyptian military debt in return for Egypt's support of Operation Desert Shield. In addition, Egypt receives excess defense articles worth hundreds of millions of dollars annually from the
Pentagon. The announcement that 23,000 U.S. troops will be based in Egypt
to conduct biannual military training exercises (Operation Bright Star)
may have longer term implications for U.S. aid to the region, as
might Egypt's willingness to support U.S. efforts against the
Taliban.

Though
the 1990s have brought economic improvements, Egypt is still poor, with an
estimated 2000 annual
GDP-per-capita of $3,600. In 1999, Egypt spent 2.7 percent of its gross
national product and $2.508 billion in
constant 1998 U.S. dollars on its military.

Massive U.S. military support of Egypt has coincided with
20 years of rule under Emergency Law, and continues despite regular
reports of serious human rights abuses committed by the Egyptian government.
According to the U.S. State Department's
2000 Human Rights Report,
"The dominant role of the President and the entrenched NDP (National
Democratic Party) control the political scene to such an extent that
citizens do not have a meaningful ability to change their
Government."

The government's abuse of Emergency Law powers
increased dramatically in 1992 in response to a violent campaign launched by
Islamic militants. Yet despite reductions in extremist violence, the Egyptian
government has continued its crackdown, including what the U.S. State Department terms “numerous serious human rights abuses” committed by state
security forces. These abuses include torture, arbitrary arrest, prolonged
pretrial detention, extrajudicial executions, and "disappearances," and are
often committed with impunity.Years
of abuse by national anti-terrorist groups appear to have filtered down to
afflict common citizens; according to Human
Rights Watch's 2000 Report, in 1999 “evidence
continued to mount that local police forces were employing similar torture
techniques against ordinary citizens that elite security forces had used
systematically against suspected armed militants, their families, and
supporters.” In June 2000, the Emergency Law was extended for another three
years. The Human Rights
Watch's 2001 Report details more recent infringements of human rights committed
by Mubarak's government in the run up to elections held in the autumn of
2000. Human Rights Watch reported that, "State security forces continued to commit grave
human rights violations with impunity, including the detention without charge or trial of political detainees and torture, and
political opponents continued to be sentenced after unfair trials."

The United States sells Egypt a large amount of military equipment and
a significant number of small arms; such
weaponry is both likely to be used for internal
security and difficult to track once sold. These two factors could easily enable such
weaponry to find its way into the hands of abusive government security forces. In fact,
during fiscal years 1996-1999, according to the U.S. government’s “Section 655”
reports, the United States delivered $10 million worth of small arms
via the Pentagon’s Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program and authorized export
licenses worth more than $4.8 million through State’s Direct Commercial Sales
(DCS) channel. Small arms delivered or authorized included ammunition and
raw materials for ammunition, grenades, a variety of pistols and rifles, and riot
control equipment.

Arms
sales have consistently outweighed regional balance and human rights issues in
the U.S.-Egyptian relationship. Defense Secretary Cohen, in defending a 1999
decision to sell Egypt sophisticated Patriot air defense missiles, asserted that
the United States had to grant Egyptian requests for high-tech arms because
otherwise Egypt “would take it as an insult” and would “seek another
supplier.” Yet Egyptian military planners still consider Israel, also a major
U.S. weapons customer and aid recipient, to be one of their country’s greatest
military threats.

Also disturbing is the fact that the United States’ second largest beneficiary of military
aid can be found on the CIA's list of known
proliferators, along with Iran, Iraq, and North Korea. According
to the CIA’s most recent report
on proliferation-related acquisition, “Egypt continues its effort to develop and
produce ballistic missiles with the assistance of North Korea. This activity is part
of a long-running program of ballistic missile cooperation between
these two countries.” The range of these weapons is significant; Egypt could feasibly target all
of Israel and beyond. Egypt continues strenuously to deny this allegation,
but concerns about Egyptian cooperation with the North Koreans has resulted in a
U.S. promise to increase and regularize the monitoring of Egypt's weapons
procurement. A 1999 General
Accounting Office investigation found that military technology was sold through
the Pentagon's Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program in violation of the Missile
Technology Control Regime to a unnamed country which has co-produced M1A1 tanks
since 1989--most likely Egypt (Foreign Military Sales: Review Process
for Controlled Missile Technology Needs Improvement, September 1999,
99-231).

In 1999, Egypt received a $3.2 billion grant from the United States to
subsidize a major military moderization program. This grant has resulted
in the sale of 24 top of the line F-16 fighter jets, 200 heavy tanks and 3
Patriot missile system fire units. Congressional approval of the sale of
AMRAAM missiles to Egypt followed in 2000; to appease Israel, the terms of
the sale stipulate that Egypt will not be allowed to deploy these missiles
on their aircraft. High value purchases continue in 2001 with the sales of
helicopters, missile patrol craft, three-dimensional radar systems, 26
MLRS and 50 Stinger Vehicle Universal Launchers. Egypt's coproduction
agreements also allow it to manufacture American weapons, such as the M1A1
Abrams main battle tank, on Egyptian soil.