Jacques Attali, founding president of the European bank for reconstruction
and development, was the top aide to François Mitterand during
the first 10 years of his tenure as France's president. Attali recently
prepared a study on trafficking in nuclear materials and expertise for
the United Nations renewal conference of the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPQ).
His most recent book in English is Millennium (Times Books, 1993). The
memoirs of Attali's years at the Elysée, Verbatim, were just published
in France.

PARIS -The recent conference at the United Nations
that was convened to renew the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) Conference
provided an opportunity to reflect on the nature of the trade that takes
place in the nuclear sector- trade that is illegal on a military level
and broadly legal on a civilian level. Since the fall of the Berlin Wall,
trafficking in nuclear materials and expertise has been growing at an
alarming rate. This is true of all three factors of production in the
armaments industry: the experts, the technology and the materials themselves.

This trafficking cannot be viewed separately from proliferation:
It is illegal trade, and proliferation is the illegal production of the
elements needed to make nuclear weapons. This form of trade is the instrument
of proliferation, and proliferation is the object of this trade. The fight
against proliferation means attacking the very roots of this trade. And
the reverse is also true, That is why the extension of the NPT was so
urgent and important,

Where do things stand now?

In spite of the NPT, about 20 countries already have
nuclear weapons capability-or soon will have. Either they are able to
make their own weapons and have decided to hold back, or they want this
capability and are not far off because they have the necessary technology.

In spite of the NPT, the use of such arms is more likely
today than it ever was: Fanatics do not fear death; drug cartels have
no territory to defend. And for them, the conventional principles of nuclear
deterrence, which presuppose the fear of reprisals, no longer have any
meaning.

In spite of the NPT, technology continues to develop,
and a rudimentary nuclear weapon is now within easy reach of any group
that has a few hundred million dollars to spend. This is all the more
true for tomorrow's most dangerous weapon -the "radioactive"
weapon-which calls only for a few hundred grams of fissile materials.
The shortest way to access fissile products is through trafficking, which
is thus more of a temptation than ever.

Where can the products and the necessary know-how for
proliferation be found? In the former Soviet Union. Fear has taken the
place of the rule of law there, and the control of nuclear installations
is further deteriorating each day, especially in the civilian sector,
making it easier for those involved in trafficking. Because of lack of
funding and inadequate international support, the situation is rapidly
getting out of hand.

So far, the number of serious cases of trafficking that
have been identified is small -and no foreign country has been caught
flagrantly trying to buy. However, this trade is now falling into the
hands of the organized Mafia It has been estimated that, to date, about
30 kilograms of fissile material has been stolen -enough in theory to
make at least two or three nuclear bombs.

Furthermore, all countries are being encouraged to develop
nuclear power plants and so, indirectly, to produce plutonium for reprocessing.
Plutonium, a byproduct of nuclear fission, is one of the most toxic substances
that man has ever produced - it is the supreme instrument of sovereignty
and an object of fascination to scientists and politicians alike. Although
today it is still viewed in a different category from radioactive fuel
and dismantled weapons, its only current use is to make weapons because
it can only be used to produce energy under conditions that make no economic
sense and which would spell ecological disaster.

The international community has not yet found any scientific
way to use this plutonium, nor to destroy it, nor even to destroy radioactive
fuels - nor even to manage them in the long-term. This is clearly a major
scandal in which the politicians have been misled by scientists.

In light of these threats, the international instruments
created during the Cold War to contain trade and proliferation are now
quite inadequate.

The NPT, signed in 1968 by 172 countries, has worked
only because the two superpowers were absolutely determined to prevent
proliferation. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is the body
whose task it is to inspect nuclear installations, but it can inspect
only those states that agree to inspection, and only then during times
when they are willing. The IAEA has practically no resources of its own
to conduct inquiries and to monitor, not even in the spheres of its own
competence. Its budget is highly inadequate. It cannot uncover clandestine
activity. It never carries out spot inspections, and it has no powers
to sanction. Reprocessing radioactive fuel, movements of experts, non-fissile
radioactive material and industrial activities that turn fissile material
into a bomb are not controlled - or barely.

HELPING RUSSIA
Since 1992, the former Soviet Union has needed international support,
but such help is still highly inadequate, even though the United States
has contributed considerable resources to this end. There is no way for
the Security Council to be certain that a clandestine program is not being
developed somewhere, or that the international community will have the
means to intervene if such a program is uncovered.

The worst-case scenario is right there before us: If
nothing is done, in 10 years nuclear weapons and radioactive weapons will
have become common currency.

To impede this, the two sacrosanct and mythological principles
of international relations must be abandoned: equality of treatment for
all countries and nonintervention in the domestic affairs of a country.
The fight must rank countries in terms of proliferation and trafficking
in nuclear materials and expertise. This fight must also consider that
certain radioactive materials, both before and after irradiation, represent
a danger to mankind and should not be left for individual countries to
manage alone.

To reduce both supply of and demand for these different
factors, it is important to go much further than this and attack the root
of the evil: Sanctions against the protagonists in this illegal trade
should be stepped up, and, in particular, dealers and experts working
as mercenaries in countries that are producing weapons should be extradited.
It is also important to control the development of what in the civilian
nuclear sector accelerates proliferation-enrichment and reprocessing.

In order to accomplish this, the IAEA must have more
means of control and verification that would enable it to carry out special
inspections on a routine basis and to control the process of military
production. Greater agency resources could be generated by a worldwide
tax imposed on nuclear energy.

But the last and most important thing is to reduce the
quantity of nuclear materials that could be used for military purposes
by halting the production of any new plutonium, whether for military or
civilian purposes, and by eliminating any surplus plutonium. All surplus
nuclear materials in the former Soviet Union must be purchased and the
republics paid in the form of partial forgiveness of their public debt.
The construction of any new reprocessing plants must be prohibited and
the use of existing plants slowed down in any country considered to be
unsafe.

Therefore, beyond the extension of the NPT we need the
negotiation of a real Civilian Nuclear NPT. Its comprehensive implementation
and control would be exercised exclusively by countries whose nuclear
scenario is safe-in other words, the democracies. Jointly, they would
share the heavy responsibility of managing global stocks of nuclear waste.