This Robinson R-22 Accident Analysis has been retyped
by Mahdad Koosh by request from the author. This
document has been checked for errors and has been
found to be free of any incorrect information. It
has been double-checked with the original document, and
all figures and statistics are correct.

This document has been retyped to display the
feasibility and safety of such a helicopter, and to
show that just cause this is one of the most
popular helicopters, it should not be placed in
the spotlight for picking at about accidents that
can happen to *ANY* helicopter with a similar setup.

The author is very active in controlling this "problem"
the FAA and NTSB have found. He has been doing
everything he can to correct the name of the
Robinson R-22 Helicopter.

I hope that everyone will benefit from this
information, as it took many hours to retype and many
hours for the author to research and document.

Robinson R-22 Accident Analysis 1979-1994

In this detailed analysis, it can be seen that most
accidents are a result of pilot error (92% vs. 7%), and
that the majority occur during flight training. The
Robinson R-22 Helicopter as been the most popular
training helicopter in the world since the early 1980's
and, like the Cessna 152 and Piper 140, is exposed to
training accidents.

The R-22 was introduced at a time when the helicopter
industry reached a peak (1979), and hundreds of pilots
were attracted to the industry. The relatively low-cost
training and reduced insurance requirements allowed a
new generation of non-military pilots to fulfill their
dream of flying a helicopter. Prior to this time, the
vast majority of helicopter pilots in the U.S., as well
as most other countries, were ex-military.

The high cost of helicopter training and limited job
opportunities kept most potential helicopter pilots
away, and flight schools depend primarily on the G.I.
Bill for students. High operating costs and poor
mechanical reliability kept the personal/business
flying to a minimum in the piston engine market, and
the light single-engine turbines were just beginning to
become popular by the late 1970's. The helicopter
training industry was changed almost overnight as Bell
47's, Hughes 300's, and Enstrom F-28's were replaced
with the sleek new Robinson R-22.

The world had never seen as much helicopter training
outside of the military and this did not come without
some problems. The first few years proved to be the
most difficult as the new aircraft was "field tested"
by flight instructors and pilots. A few mechanical
problems occurred as the aircraft built up flight hours.
Components were re-engineered and retested before being
retro-fitted to aircraft in the field. One by one these
problems were resolved.

Fortunately, the aircraft was introduced with the
Lycoming O-320 engine, which is considered to be
"bulletproof" by most pilots. The industry finally had
a helicopter that would make it to TBO with very few
problems. A "state-of-the-art" piston engine helicopter
had achieved a record for reliability unmatched in the
industry.

Even the NTSB has taken note of the R-22's extremely
low accident rate due to mechanical problems. Will this
American success story survive? Robinson Helicopter Co.
recently announced that it has laid off 71 employees as
a direct result of negative worldwide publicity.
Further layoffs will probably occur in the near future
unless the operators and pilots provide their input to
the FAA and express their opinions on how best to
prevent future accidents in the R-22.

Conversations with R-22 pilots from many countries
reveal that many of them feel that the U.S. suffers
from severe lack of flying discipline. There are fewer
regulations in the U.S. than in most other countries.

The U.S. is still the world leader in the aviation
industry, and more regulations will not solve the
problem. The only solution is "self-regulation". Flight
instructors must demonstrate through their own actions
that safety is an attitude that must be applied to
flying helicopters.

It is interesting to note that in some countries in-
flight breakups have not been a problem. One United
Kingdom flight instructor informed me that England has
had only two similar accidents in 13 years, although
over 250 Robinson R-22's operate there. Japan has not
had a single fatal accident as a result of a rotor
stall or mast bumping incident. Dozens of R-22
Helicopters are used for tuna-spotting in the Pacific
without a single case of in-flight breakup, although
these aircraft fly an average of 110 hours per month in
often severe weather conditions. Australia, which uses
the R-22 extensively for cattle mustering, has had few
problems with this type of accident, but does not have
the same intensive flight training activity found in
the U.S.

A review of NTSB accident briefs clearly demonstrates
that wire strikes are the primary cause of fatal
accidents, followed by blade stall due to low RPM and
continued flight into IMC. These are by far the most
preventable fatal accidents and require intensive
training in avoidance and prevention techniques as well
as pilot judgement training.

An analysis of R-22 accidents by operator and
geographical area indicates that a small percentage of
operators have an unusually high percentage of
accidents in a calendar year. Other operators with
approximately the same amount of flight activity have
very few accidents and will generally average one
accident every 4 to 6 years.

The FAA, in its February 15, 1995 "Flight
Standardization Report", has suggested several changes
to the R-22 Helicopter. A few of these involve
expensive modifications to the cyclic and collective
controls. One of the suggestions involves an improved
rotor speed governor system, although the present
governor system proved to be very expensive to maintain
and is not used by most pilots, especially in a flight
training environment. Most experienced R-22 flight
instructors agree that low RPM problems are a result of
rapid overpitching of the collective, causing an RPM
droop. This is similar to any powered helicopter RPM
droop but, unlike a turbine, the throttle in the R-22
will respond immediately if the pilot is properly
taught how to coordinate the throttle/collective
without relying on the correlator or the governor.

Another suggested change is a redesign of the cyclic
control system to allow increased accessibility to the
controls by each pilot. A modified R-22 cyclic was
developed several years ago. It has not found any
acceptance with any R-22 operators. Apparently the
operators do not feel that this system is a cost
effective improvement over the T-Bar arrangement that
RHC offers. I have personally flown with this new
system and although it did have a heavier feel than the
R-22 cyclic and is more representative of a
conventional cyclic, I feel that there are several
drawbacks to the design. The cyclic is heavier than the
present system in an already weight sensitive aircraft.
The design is extremely bulky and would be prone to
control interference if an object was dropped between
the lateral support tube and the pilot's seat during a
critical flight condition.

Most operators are convinced that the problem is not in
cyclic design and that a new design at this stage will
create other unforseen problems. If a retro-fit were
required, the change may cause problems for low time
pilots due to negative habit transfer. A strong plus in
favor of the RHC system is that it is easy for a flight
instructor to gain unrestricted control of the aircraft
in an emergency by simply pulling down his/her cyclic
thereby lifting the other cyclic up and out of the
hands of the student. A few simple training techniques
that some R-22 flight instructors have been teaching
for years will prevent most training mishaps.

Flight instructors in all helicopters are usually
taught to divide their attention between the outside
and inside of the cockpit when dealing with students.
Most will develop their own scan technique but very
rarely are told what to look for. Instructors should be
advised to maintain constant vigilance of cyclic
movements by directing their attention across the
cockpit and not forward. Peripheral vision will allow
the instructor an outside view of pitch/roll changes ,
but it also allows the instructor to monitor aircraft
instruments and, most importantly, the students control
movements. Instructors, for the most part, are taught
to react to changes in physical sensations and
pitch/roll changes (attitude changes) but are rarely
taught that it is much more important to watch the
students control movements.

Attitude changes will not occur instantly, as a result
of rotor damping effect and aircraft inertia. The
instructor can be taught to make corrections before a
change occurs simply by watching the cyclic movements
that the student is making. Even sudden, large control
movements can be corrected immediately, before the
aircraft can respond. The location of the cyclic on the
R-22 actually makes this easier to observe as the
instructor is not forced to direct his vision downward
to observe these actions. This teaching technique also
allows the student to recognize that he is in full
control of the helicopter and that the instructor is
not "hugging" the cyclic control. When a critical
situation does develop, as when the cyclic is pushed
forward and out of the instructor's reach, the
instructor must be taught to grab the center post or
hinge to gain authority.

Notes

1. The number of Robinson R-22 helicopters has grown
steadily from approximately 35
in 1980 to 745 in 1994 in the U.S.

2. All information was obtained from the NTSB. A few
non-injury accidents go
unreported (i.e. ground damage due to severe weather,
etc.) Most of these are usually not
insured by the owner/operator.

3. Most of these accidents are caused by several related
factors and probable causes may
tend to be misleading (i.e. a roll-over may be caused
by loss of tail rotor effectiveness,
excessive slope or unsuitable terrain, etc.).

4. Mechanical failures are often caused by improper
maintenance procedures or
exceeding limitations (overspeeds, etc.). Approximately
one-half of these appear to be
attributed to this. In many cases, the pilot
misinterpreted or reacted improperly to a minor
problem in flight.

5. Most of the survivable accidents were attributed to
pilots getting behind the power
curve as a result of high density altitude conditions,
downwind approaches, etc. whenever low
RPM is a factor.

6. Approximately 30% of accidents due to autorotative
landings appear to be caused by
carb. ice. In many cases the pilot reported an engine
failure during power recovery on a
practice autorotation or reported a rough engine
followed by failure when power was reduced
for a landing. The NTSB notes that carb. ice conditions
were favorable in many of these and
a post-accident engine run up found no mechanical
problems.

R. Person on Ground Walking into Tail Rotor

Passenger
or passer-by entering or departing aircraft and
striking the tail rotor blade.

The following accident prevention analysis will take a
detailed look at how a typical safety awareness program
can prevent most of these accidents:

A. MECHANICAL/ENGINE FAILURE - Of the 24 accidents in
the category, approximately one-third appear to have
been caused by a manufacturer defect or quality control
problem related to the aircraft. In comparing these
accidents with related service bulletins published by
RHC, it was found that in every case, the manufacturer
corrected the problem with a redesign and a retrofit.
Problems with "bogus" parts have all but been
eliminated with the R-22 as a result of stringent
controls by RHC. The remaining accidents have occurred
as a result of engine failure, unauthorized repairs,
improper maintenance procedures and over stress of a
component due to overspeed, etc. Over one-half of all
reported engine failures appear to have resulted from
carb. ice or pilot misinterpretation. Most cases of
engine failure could not be resolved as the engine ran
normally upon investigation by the FAA/NTSB. In at
least one case, it appears that a newly rated pilot may
have entered an autorotation as a result of
illumination of the clutch light in flight (the pilot
reported a low RPM light but no low RPM warning horn).
Similar situations have occurred. Both the low RPM light
and horn come on simultaneously in the R-22. It is
recommended that RHC initiate a service difficulty
reporting program in order to make operators aware of
even minor problems. Compliance with RHC service
bulletins, 50-100 hours inspections and factory
overhauls will eliminate most, if not all maintenance
problems on the R-22.

B. ROLL-OVER - the highest number of accidents (78) have occurred
as a result of some type of roll-over accident. Most of these can
be attributed to overconfidence on the part of the pilot or Flight
Instructor (or simply inexperience). The R-22 is very responsive to
cyclic inputs and requires extreme vigilance on the part of the
Flight Instructor. Very few of these accidents result in a fatality (only 2
or 3 in the R-22) but the aircraft is usually destroyed or receives
substantial damage to most components. Newly rated Flight Instructors
should receive intensive training in avoiding dynamic roll-over.
Many Instructors have developed certain techniques to avoid this common
accident.

Using a slightly higher altitude than normal when teaching students to
hover, scanning across the cockpit rather than diverting attention forward
and avoiding conditions that are conductive to a roll-over (windy, uneven
terrain, etc.) will reduce these accidents. These accidents occur
quite often when an Instructor becomes confident in the students'
performance and lets his guard down. Students must receive a complete
briefing before solo flight and must not be allowed to solo in winds in
excess of 10 knots until they have become familiar with solo flight
characteristics in the R-22. Restricting students to a smooth, hard surface
on their first few pick-ups to a hover (dual and solo) will eliminate
most typical roll-over accidents at the solo stage.

C. HARD LANDING (AUTOROTATION) - generally this type of accident
occurs frequently when the Flight Instructor doesn't recognize a critical
situation before taking control or allows a student to go too far before
taking the controls. Quite often, the Instructor will justify this by
allowing a student to correct his own mistakes. Although this method is a
required teaching tool, the Instructor must recognize when he is on the
"edge" and must not allow his own over-confidence to interfere with
good instructional techniques. Just as in fixed- wing training, many
pilots prefer not to train in adverse weather conditions and later end
up having to teach students in weather conditions that they are ill-
equipped to handle themselves. This problem is then passed along to new
generations of Flight Instructors and the situation perpetuates.
Autorotations with up to 90-degrees of crosswind must be mastered if
the Instructor is expected to be an effective teacher. Touchdown
Autorotations should be demonstrated and practiced with a highly skilled
R-22 Instructor in all wind conditions (even though most schools
limit autorotations to power recovery in the
Private/Commercial curriculum). CFI training should be conducted with an
experienced R-22 Flight Instructor with at least 1,000 hours as a Flight
Instructor in the R-22. This will dramatically reduce the number of these
accidents in the future. Private owners, rental pilots and solo students
should not be allowed to practice autorotations without an experienced
Instructor but should be required to practice them with an Instructor on
a semi-annual basis to include simulated engine failure. Last,
Instructors must be made aware of conditions that are conductive to
carb. ice or engine stall during practice autorotations.

D. HARD LANDING (OTHER) - of the 42 accidents in this category,
most appear to have been caused when the pilot misjudged speed and
altitude (rate of closure) on an approach or got behind the power curve.
In many cases, the pilot was making an off-airport landing and misjudged
wind speed/direction or density altitude. The most serious accidents have
occurred as a result of operating outside of aircraft performance
limits. Intensive training in engine performance/limitations, area
reconnaissance, and adherence to performance data is necessary to reduce
this type of accident.

E. WIRE STRIKE - contrary to popular belief, most wire strikes occur
in clear weather conditions. This type of wire encounter is most likely to
be fatal since the aircraft is usually operating at a high rate of speed
at the moment of impact. A few mast bumping accidents have also occurred
as a result of the pilot taking an evasive action to avoid a wire.
Restricting pilots to a minimum of 500 ft AGL and requiring
minimum ceiling/visibility for day/night VFR operations will eliminate
most of these accidents. Intensive ground training on wire strike
avoidance is required to avoid this common fatal accident. Flight
schools should require that Instructors practice confined
area/pinnacle operations at only designated areas that have been
inspected for wires, etc. Only experienced pilots should be used for low
level operations such as powerline/pipeline patrols and low-level
photography or surveys.

F. LOW "G" MAST BUMPING - some of the accidents in this category
will probably never be resolved since there were no eyewitnesses on the
ground. It is believed that most were caused by an evasive maneuver, over-
control in turbulence, flight into IMC, etc. There are a number of
incidents that have occurred as a result of pilots intentionally unloading
the rotor system and allowing a snap-roll to occur. Inspection upon
landing revealed severe overload as a result of violent blade flapping.
Intensive training in a simulator and restrictions in severe weather
conditions will reduce this type of accident. In at least two of
these accidents, eyewitnesses reported seeing an airplane within close
proximity of the helicopter moments after an in-flight break up. Pilots
must be taught to avoid a severe maneuver when suddenly surprised by
other aircraft or birds while in cruise flight.

G. LOW RPM/FAILURE TO MAINTAIN RPM - this has always been one of
the most common types of helicopter accidents and is quite often
listed by the NTSB as a contributing cause of a helicopter accident.
It typically occurs to an inexperienced pilot as a result of poor
training or judgement and happens to high time pilots as a result of
overconfidence in ones ability. Most often it occurs as a result of getting
behind the power curve, overpitching the collective, twisting the throttle
in the wrong direction, or exceeding the performance limits of the
aircraft (i.e. operating at high gross weight, attempted takeoff with
limited power, etc.). R-22 pilots must be made aware of the limits to
the aircrafts correlator system, with and without the use of the
governor. Generally, the correlator's effective range is limited to
approximately 13" mp - 23" mp. Below 13" mp, the RPM will tend to slowly
decay and the aircraft will be in a semi- autorotative state, Above
23" mp, RPM will also droop and requires a rapid increase in throttle to
maintain 104% RPM. If the pilot overpitches the collective without
adding throttle immediately, a rapid decay will occur that can not be
corrected without sufficient airspeed or altitude. Usually the helicopter
will settle rapidly to the ground before the pilot can regain control
of the RPM. This will occur when landing with a tail wind, allowing rate
of descent to build on approach (especially below 100' AGL), landing at
a high density altitude site, operating at high gross weights, etc. It can
generally be avoided by checking IGE and OGE performance charts prior to
takeoff, knowing how much power will be available to the pilot ar
a particular pressure altitude, using a high-speed shallow approach
at higher density altitude airports and aborting a takeoff if the aircraft
will not hover momentarily (at least a few inches above the surface).
Student pilots must be taught procedures for safe operation when
operating at other than standard atmospheric conditions.

H. CARB. ICE - although there is a small percentage of accidents
directly attributed to carb. ice, there are many cases of R-22 pilots
reporting rough running engines, power loss during practice autorotations,
etc. in which the NTSB found no evidence of engine malfunction
upon run-up. In many of these cases, carb. ice conditions were favorable
(visible moisture, high humidity, small temp./dewpoint spread). Many
R-22 pilots apparently confuse the difference between RPM and power
setting (especially a fixed-wing pilot without experience with constant-
speed propellers). The R-22 is normally operated in cruise flight
at approximately 70%-80% of rated horsepower and as such is subject to
carb. ice problems in moist air, especially when power is further
reduced for a descent. Pilot should be taught to be vigilant when flying
in overcast, humid conditions or when flying through rain showers, etc.
regardless of indications on the CAT gauge. The application of some
carb. heat in these conditions will have no harmful effect on the
engine and will prevent carb. ice from developing in cruise flight. Some
flight schools teach pilots to keep the CAT-gauge at 10-15 degrees at all
times when operating in conditions conductive to carb. ice regardless of
OAT. The use of full carb. heat will reduce available manifold pressure
by approximately 1-1 1/2 inches. Pilots should remove the carb. heat
when below 75 ft AGL on an approach in order to have full power
available.

I. FUEL EXHAUSTION - there have been very few reports of accidents
caused by fuel exhaustion in the R-22 although we've all heard stories
of fuel mysteriously appearing in the tank after a reported engine
failure (usually a few gallons are added before the FAA/NTSB arrives at
the scene). Students should be warned that the press-to-test switch on the
fuel system only tells him that the light is working but does not verify
that the float is operating correctly. This should be checked during
inspections. There have been several accidents caused by pilots
leaning the mixture in flight or inadvertently pulling up on the
mixture control by mistake. This has all but been eliminated by the
installation of a simple mixture guard but pilots still insist on
leaning in flight. There is no adjustment for leaning the mixture in
the R-22 and it is not recommended. A few accidents have resulted from
passengers (photographers, etc.) accidentally hitting the fuel valve
in flight. Pilots must brief photographers prior to flight, especially
in a doors- off situation concerning hazards of this type. A
warning label near the mixture control should advise pilots not to lean
the mixture in flight.

J. WEATHER/HIGH DENSITY ALTITUDE - a helicopter is allowed to
operate in class G airspace without ceiling or visibility restrictions
provided the pilot operates at an airspeed/altitude that will allow
sufficient time to avoid a collision. Air-taxi pilots are required to
maintain 300 ft AGL except for take-off and landing and maintain at least 1
mile visibility at night. This has always caused pilots to push on in
poor weather conditions causing a high number of accidents,
especially in hilly or unfamiliar terrain. Most pilots will generally
agree that visibility is more critical than ceiling but this logic will put
the pilot down in the wire environment. Even experienced helicopter
pilots sometimes fall prey to this trap. Instrument rated pilots in
IFR aircraft have been killed while scud-running. Low-time pilots trying
to please the boss, private owners meeting scheduled appointments, all
pilots trying to make it home for the night... we are all prone to this
type of accident. Pilots must give themselves alternatives when the
flight does not go as planned, management must allow the pilot to make the
right decision, and pilots must establish personal weather minimums based
on their own experience and familiarity of the area that they are flying.
Students should be given training in Aeronautical Decision Making
and receive ground instruction in common local weather procedures. This
cannot be learned from reading the Aviation Weather Handbook. The
Instructor must be knowledgeable in local weather trends during all
seasons and relate this information to students flying in the same area.
Most of this knowledge can be passed at local seminars sponsored by the
FAA or the flight school.

Some R-22 accidents have occurred as a result of flight in the proximity
of convective activity such as thunderstorms, squall-lines, etc.
The Airman Information Manual and Aviation Weather Handbook both give
guidance to pilots operating around thunderstorms. Pilots must be cautioned
that the R-22 is considered to be a very light aircraft and is subject
to control problems in severe weather conditions. Common sense must be
applied when turbulence is encountered.

High density altitude has been categorized with weather related accidents
as it can occur at even low pressure altitudes. A pressure altitude of 2,
000 ft can easily reach 5,000-6,000 ft density altitude with a high OAT
and high humidity. Pilot operating at sea level can easily become
complacent when operating at higher altitudes in hot weather. Many R-
22 accidents have occurred during ferry flights from RHC in Southern
California to destinations in Texas, Arizona, and New Mexico. Most of
these pilots learned to fly in sea level conditions. Robinson Helicopter
Company placed strict pilot requirements on ferry flights during
summer months but these are difficult or impossible to control once the
pilot leaves the factory. Pilot training in aircraft performance at
high D.A. and adherence to these limitations by pilots would appear to
be a better alternative. Most serious accidents concerning ferry flights
across the Continental Divide have been a result of high gross weight
and high temperature. Operators must screen pilots before sending
them on a flight into high density altitude conditions and insure that
they are briefed by another pilot that has made the trip.

K. UNSUITABLE TERRAIN (LANDING) - landings in unfavorable
conditions/sites is generally a contributing factor in this type
of accident. Quite often the pilot will lose control and settle to the
ground when attempting to abort a landing approach once he determines that
it would be unwise to continue. Other times the pilot will land on a
severe slope, deep snow, tall grass or soft terrain and the aircraft will
roll-over on landing or the subsequent pick-up. Ground instruction on the
types of possible terrain that are unsuitable fro skid-type landing gear
must be given to students and Flight Instructors. Instructors must use
self-control when teaching new students. Demonstrating landings in
extremely hazardous areas has little training value when teaching pilot
judgement.

L. UNDETERMINED - only 4 accidents have been undetermined
during this period in the R-22.

M. CONTROL INTERFERENCE - several accidents have occurred in
this category as a result of loss of control due to interference with the
flight controls. Most of these accidents can be avoided if the pilot
has properly briefed his passengers before starting the engine and has
conducted a good pre-flight inspection. At least one fatal accident occurred
when a high time R- 22 pilot transported a large object in the cockpit.
Loss of control resulted when the object apparently shifted in the
approach to land. Several accidents have occurred when the tail rotor pedals
were not locked into position on the passenger side. The pilot lost control
when the pedals jammed and the rotor pitch control was lost.

N. MID-AIR COLLISION - only one mid-air collision has occurred in
the R-22. During an instrument practical test the aircraft collided
with a light airplane while executing a missed approach during a
practice ILS. Both pilots were probably preoccupied with the missed
approach (the student was probably wearing a hood) even though the pilot
acknowledged a tower report advising of the other aircraft. Several fatal
accidents have occurred possibly as a result of a near-miss and loss of
control (as reported by ground witnesses). The R-22 is very small and
difficult to see by other pilots. Fortunately, the R-22 pilot has
excellent visibility to compensate for this. When operating at an
uncontrolled airport, make your intentions known at all times to keep other
aircraft advised of your position. Always assume that other traffic in the
pattern does not have you in sight, especially when there are
several R-22's in the pattern.

O. OBJECT STRIKING AIRCRAFT - several accidents have occurred when
objects have been blown out of the cockpit. Maps, clipboards,
kneeboards, etc. are most likely to be ejected from the left door
in warm weather. Incidents of fuel caps striking the tail rotor have caused
accidents and most often happen to the same pilots quite frequently. Ground
handling wheels have been left on during flight and fallen from
the aircraft. This type of accident often occurs when the pilot is
careless or is interrupted during a pre-flight inspection. Flying with the
left door removed on a cross-country flight can be extremely
hazardous. A thorough pre-flight and good cockpit management
practices will avoid these mishaps.

P. COLLISION WITH AIRBORNE OBJECT - although it is not always
possible to avoid a birdstrike, balloon/kite strike, etc., training
techniques in-flight and in a simulator can teach the pilot how to
react when a collision is imminent to avoid a catastrophic accident. The U
.S. Navy has demonstrated that simply turning on a landing light when a
high concentration of birds is encountered will greatly reduce the
chances of a bird strike. Many other techniques can be employed and must
be taught to new pilots.

Q. COLLISION WITH GROUND OBJECT - a few accidents have occurred in
the R-22 as a result of operating within close proximity of objects on
the ground or near other helicopters with turning rotor blades. Most of
these accidents occur when a pilot is rushed to refuel or is fatigued
after numerous hours in the cockpit. It may also occur when hot
refueling or when fueling by a truck. Other accidents may occur when
hovering too close to the ground and striking a runway light, ground cable,
bush, etc. Former military pilots are trained to keep a low hover to
minimize power requirements and allow for a safe hovering autorotation in
the even of an engine failure. After years of flying helicopters, I have
found that the odds of striking an object on the ground are much greater
than a hard landing due to engine failure. An altitude of at least 4'
-5' will avoid most object on the ground.

R. PERSON ON GROUND WALKING INTO TAIL ROTOR - there have been
three accidents as a result of this in the R- 22. In at least two of these
cases, a ground handler was not used and a passenger was allowed to exit
the aircraft with the rotor turning. In some cases, even a pilot briefing
is not satisfactory, as people tend to walk where they are headed and
not where the pilot directs them. The use of a ground handler
is recommended whenever passengers are discharged from the aircraft. The
ground handler should position himself between the rear of the helicopter
and the passenger and direct them away from the aircraft. Passengers
should not be allowed to approach the helicopter unless eye contact is
made with the pilot before walking beneath the rotor blades. This will
alert the pilot to control movements.

The Robinson R-22 makes up approximately 7.7% of the total U.S. civil
helicopter fleet (year end 1993). There are approximately 745 Robinson R
-22 Helicopters operating in the U.S. compared to 8,949 other types of
general aviation helicopters.

Of the 745 Robinson R-22's in the U.S. fleet, 34 were involved in
accidents for the calendar year 1992, or approximately 4.5% of the U.S.
fleet. Of these 8,949 other helicopters, 165 were involved in
accidents during this same period, or 1.8% of the U.S. fleet. This
includes helicopters used for such diverse operations as crop
dusting, corporate, off-shore, personal and business, EMS, etc.
Considering the role the R-22 has in the worldwide training and personal
use markets, the R-22 would be expected to have a proportionately
higher number of accidents each year. Enstrom had similar problems back in
the 1970's when F. Lee Bailey spiffed up the F28A and targeted the
businessman market. The accident rate soared as dealers sold executives the
idea of the modern "flying carpet". Unfortunately, despite claims made as
early as 1950, the world is still not ready for a helicopter in
everyone's garage. Even the MD-500, one of the easiest light helicopters
to fly, can be a handful to an inexperienced pilot, a phenomenon that
is not unlike the V-Tail Beech or the Cessna Citation.

Based on accident rates per 100,000 flight hours, the R- 22 falls in line
with the industry averages and actually falls below rates for other
piston helicopters in its class. Considering the fact that 80% of all R-22
Helicopters are used for some type of flight training (which generally
involves numerous takeoffs/landings), the accident rate becomes even
more favorable. According to FAA/NTSB data, the accident rate per
100,000 departures for the U.S. helicopter fleet in 1992 was 2.32
accidents/100,000 departures. Since many helicopter departures are made from
non-prepared sites, this statistic more accurately defines helicopter
safety records, and falls well below general aviation rates. The average
flight instructor in the Robinson R- 22 will perform 16 takeoffs/landings
(including many practice autorotations) during an hour flight lesson.
Other types of usage in the R-22 average approximately 3 takeoffs/landings
per flight hour. This would equate to an accident rate of approximately .46
accidents per 100,000 departures in the Robinson R-22, or
approximately one-fifth of the industry average. Using this information as
a basis, which more clearly defines the higher exposure for
helicopters in the takeoff/landing phases, the Robinson R-22 would
appear to have a truly remarkable low accident rate. To take this analysis
a little further. let's look at the total transportation accident records
in the U.S. as published annually by the NTSB:

A detailed analysis would be necessary in order to assess risk/benefit
in any form of transportation. How often has it been said in the
helicopter industry (since Igor Sikorsky first said it) that a helicopter
is potentially one of the safest forms of transportation. This
statement may very well prove to be true someday.

NOTES: All percentages used to determine flight usage have been obtained
from FAA data dated September 12, 1994. All other statistics have been
obtained from FAA/NTSB/HAI sources. Estimates of annual flight hours flown
in the R-22 are based on a survey of R-22 flight schools, operators and
private owners and may have an error rate of +/- 6%.

Conclusion

This Robinson R-22 Accident analysis has been compiled in the interest of
helicopter safety and can be adapted to any type of helicopter safety
program involving the R-22 helicopter. Flight schools and Instructors
are urged to review this and other R-22 accident data with students to
make them aware of some common mistakes made by R-22 pilots in the U.S.
All helicopter pilots are aware of the inherent risks involved in
aviation, especially the unique risk to helicopter operations. Any type
of flying activity involves certain risk, whether it be in an ultra-
light airplane or a commercial airliner, and as pilots we have accepted
the risk realizing full well the consequences when something goes
wrong.

Despite repeated criticism from the NTSB, the Robinson R-22 helicopter has
proven itself to be one of the safest helicopters ever manufactured. It
was certified under Part 27, the first helicopter to do so under
stringent FAA guidelines. Its' primary markets, training and
personal use, have placed it in a high risk category and not unlike the
Cessna 152, it is exposed to training accidents. It is very likely that
had the R-22 found a market requiring only high-time pilots flying for
small companies, it might easily have achieved the lowest accident rate in
General Aviation history.

The FAA withheld critical information concerning the actual accident
record of the R-22 and released it only through the Freedom of Information
Act. This in-depth 19 page report clearly demonstrates that the accident
record of the R-22 is in line with the rest of the industry and is
much lower than some helicopters in its' class. This, despite the fact
that the aircraft is utilized in one of the highest risk types of operation.

This aircraft and the thousands of pilots that fly it throughout the
world has achieved a remarkable record in helicopter safety. It has given
many the opportunity to own a new helicopter instead of a Korean-war vintage
model. It has trained many of the pilots that will be the industry
leaders twenty years from now. It has opened an export market that
would make even Detroit envious and has brought pilots all over the world
into the U.S. to learn to fly helicopters... and the NTSB wants to
ground it. The FAA, under intense pressure from the NTSB, has conducted
extensive tests, placed operating limitations in the POH and has
initiated a pilot awareness program which most operators have been
conducting for years.

Fortunately, a few "friends of aviation" in the FAA have taken a
realistic approach and have resisted pressure from the NTSB to ground the
aircraft. Many of us, however, are holding our breath, knowing full well
that this intensive awareness training may very well lead to the next
fatal accident. And the industry waits... the manufacturer waits...
the Flight Instructors wait... the FAA waits... and the NTSB waits for
the inevitable to happen. It may not occur in the next few months, or it
may occur in another country first, but it will happen. An R-22 will
crash as a result of low rotor RPM or mast bumping. This accident may
very likely occur in a helicopter other than the R- 22 but that would
probably not receive the same level of attention as an R-22 or R-44
accident.

Many pilots who have been flying the R-22 since it was
certified are aware of some of the mare controversial
accidents in the past 15 years. The Swedish government
grounded the R-22 in Sweden may years ago when a high-
time pilot was killed on one of his first instructional
flights in the R-22. The Instructor had recently
attended the RHC Safety Course but had not received a
favorable review by the pilot that flew with him. Most
of his experience had been in heavy turbines and he had
difficulty flying the R-22. An accident in Switzerland
occurred to a low-time R-22 pilot on a demo-flight.
Winds in the area were forecast to be in excess of 100
kil/hr. (60 mph) although the accident report used
winds reported at the departure airport. A BO-105 had
performed a precautionary landing during the same time
period due to an encounter with extreme turbulence.
Many of us in the Industry are aware of these accidents
but it is rare that the actual circumstances are
revealed.

The very first R-44 accident, despite NTSB, FAA and RHC
findings, will probably never be completely resolved.
NTSB data tends to indicate the probability that the
accident was caused by pilot error. Robinson Helicopter
Co. took no chances even though tests were
contradictory among agencies. The suspect part was
redesigned and retro-fitted to all field aircraft even
before the FAA took any action. The manufacturer acted
responsibly, as it always has in the past, to avoid
future accidents. This is one of the reasons why I
allowed my own son to become an R-22 Instructor. I am
comfortable knowing that with good training and
supervision, he is probably safer in the aircraft than
in the car. Today he is a Flight Instructor in the R-22
and has logged over 1,000 accident free hours. I often
think of how I would react if he was ever involved in a
serious helicopter accident... but I have accepted this
risk and so has he.

This analysis was prepared by an FAA Designated Pilot
Examiner (DPE) with over 12,000 accident free hours in
helicopters and airplanes and over 7,000 hours as a
flight instructor in the R-22. In 15 years of flying
the R-22, the writer has not had a single emergency in
the R-22 and has made only 3 precautionary landings due
to minor problems. He has ferried three Robinson R-22's
from Torrance, CA, to the East Coast without incident
in temperatures ranging from below freezing to ever 115
degrees F. In contrast, he has made over 25 unscheduled
stops in other types of single-engine piston and
turbine helicopters. He is convinced that the Robinson
R-22 is one of the safest helicopters in the world.

Note: Pilots/Flight schools wishing to obtain NTSB
accident briefs may call (202)382-6538. State the type
of aircraft and years desired.

Note from Mahdad Koosh:

This report and it's research has been created by
Northeast Helicopters in Ellington, Connecticut.
Northeast Helicopters has created an organization for
the protection of the Robinson Helicopter Company known
as the R22 & R44 Pilot & Owners Association.

For further information about this organization for the
better protection of the Robinson Helicopter Company
and its helicopters, please contact: