I was at a shiur this morning where the magid shiur digressed onto whom
to ask shailas to (he recounted a story of some rav who told a woman,
without a shred of halachic evidence, to throw out a full set of dishes
for reasons related to the material we're learning. She called him up
afterwards (dehaynu, after she tossed them) to see what he thought and
he, this being 20 years ago and he being young and brash, told her to
throw out the rav instead).
The MS suggested that one must look for a rav appropriately learned to
ask shailos to, and not be satisfied with the LOR unless you're sure he
fits the bill. (even if HE thinks he fits the bill) (some crosstalk
related to Moshe Rabbenu and Yisro's advice)
Kal vachomer not to take pesak on yourself unless you're up to it. While
a sufficiently learned person, with experience in pesak (IOW, as opposed
to most people with a standard yeshivish/lomdish background, including
many roshei yeshivos) might do well with Chana's program, it's simply not
practical in the vast majority of shailos, let alone those requiring
shimush. As such, it's also, IMHO, not wise.
Gershon
gershon.dubin@juno.com

R'RW wrote: <<Tefilas call peh {Chabad and Ari and edot mizrach}
Tefilas kal peh amcha yisrael... {nusach Sfarad} Tefilas amcha yisrael
{Ashkenaz}>>
A minor correction: Tefilat kol peh is the Sefaradi version as well
as Chabad. The Ashkenaz version is tefilat am'kha Yisrael. The version
mentioned of kol peh am'kha Yisrael is the double talk version combining
both together. First the printers added the alternative in parentheses
and then later printers removed the parentheses. So it is the incorrect
nusach invented by the "bocher hazetzer"
RRW also wrote:<<We DO know that the older version of the last bracha
[of shmoneh esrei] is actualy oseh hashalom and NOT hamevareich es amo
yisrael bashalom>>
IIRC, oseh shalom is the Eretz Israel nusach while hamevareikh et 'amo
Yisrael is the nusach of Bavel. What is the source or basis of oseh
hasholom being older. This brakha was the subject of many posting on
the list in the past, including one where I remember mentioning that
there is evidence that oseh hashalom had been known or used in Bavel as
well. This is not really proof os it being older.
k't,
David

RAM wrote:
> If for some reason Beis Shammai and Beis Hillel
> were forced to sit together with Tzadukim to adjudicate religious issues,
> and there was a three-way vote such that none of the three had a majority,
> why would the Baraisa consider this to be an *unresolved* machlokes? Beis
> Shammai and Beis Hillel could have taught their students that "None of
> the three had a majority, but the Tzadukim don't count and therefore
> Beis Ploni had a clear majority and so the Halacha is like them."
> Why didn't they do that?
Because Sanhedrin requires an absolute majority, meaning, out of 71?
Arie

"Shinnar, Meir" wrote:
> With regard to the substance - the rambam does not allow to accept money
> for learning in any way - he does not have Yissachar zevulun, and would
> clearly assur what you are describing.
While you have described the Rambam's ideal position, I'm not sure this
is true of what he paskened halacha l'maaseh. See Tshuvoth HaRambam,
ed. Blau, #210 (admittedly not a perfect proof, but at least a strong
indication).
David Riceman

R' Chaim Markowitz wrote <<< in this case there is a chiyuv lifnim
mishuras hadin >>>
R' Gil Student wrote <<< According to Mar Shmuel the finder must give it
back as a "lifnim mi-shuras ha-din". >>>
I don't understand the terminology here. I thought that "lifnim mishuras
hadin" means that the action is a good idea but *not* required. Isn't a
"chiyuv lifnim mishuras hadin" a contradiction in terms?
Akiva Miller

R. Hirsch's commentary on Mishpatim contains an unusually apposite example
of his overall way of thinking. Those who have followed several recent
or recurring threads on the roles of mesorah vs. hiddush in the oral law,
on the role of human rights in the halakhic system, and the similarities
and differences between Hirsch and Mendelsohn will find much to ponder in
his comment on Exodus 21:2. As a service to those without easy access
to his commentary, herewith the text of his comment on ki tiqneh eved
ivri from the English translation.
To the unprejudiced mind, nothing can show so stikingly the truth of
the traditional oral-law as the first two paragraphs, v. 2-6 and 7-11,
with which the "Mosaic Lawgiving" starts. The civil and criminal
laws of the Nation are to be given, the fundamental basis and the
ordinances of justice and humaneness are to be laid down, which are to
govern the relationship and behaviour of man to his fellow-man in the
state; the first matter to be dealt with, quite naturally deals with
the RIGHTS OF MAN [my emphasis], and this STARTS WITH THE SENTENCES:
"WHEN A MAN SELLS ANOTHER MAN", AND "WHEN A MAN SELLS HIS DAUGHTER1"
[emphasis in original] What an unthinkable enormity if actually this
"written word" of the "book of Law of the Jewish Nation" should really
be the one and only sole source of the Jew conception of "RIGHTS" [my
emphasis]. What a mass of laws and principles of jurisprudence have
been said and fixed, considered, laid down and explained, before the
Book of Law could reach these, or even speak of these, which, after all,
are only quite exceptional cases. And it is with these sentences, the
contents of which deny and limit the VERY HOLIEST PERSONAL RIGHT OF MAN,
THE RIGHT TO PERSONAL FREEDOM [my emphasis], that the Law BEGINS [emphasis
in original]. But it is quite a different matter if the written word,
the "Book" is NOT [emphasis in original] the real source of the JEWISH
CONCEPTION OF RIGHTS [my emphsais], if this source is the traditional law,
which was entrusted to the living word to which this "book" is only to
be an aid to memory and reference, when doubts arise; if, as indeed is
stated in the "book" itself, the total and complete Law had been given
over to the people in its complete form, and had been impressed upon
them, and explained to them and lived by them for full forty years,
before Moses, just before his death, was to hand them this written book.
Then we can well understand that it is just the exceptional cases which
principally come to be described, so that just from them, the NORMAL
GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF JUSTICE AND HUMANITY [my emphasis] may be realised.
Then we can understand how it is that GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF JUSTICE
[my emphasis] are altogether not so much given in this "book", but
preferably single concrete cases, and these are described in the "book"
in such an instructive manner that the principles which underly them,
and which had been entrusted to the living minds and living practice of
the people, can easily be seen from them. Then we can understand how
the language used in this "book" is so skillfully chosen that often by
the use of a striking expression, an unusual or alterred word, a letter
etc., a whole train of ideas of justice and HUMAN RIGHTS [my emphasis]
is indicated. AFTER ALL, IT WAS NOT OUT OF THIS BOOK THAT THE LAW WAS
TO HAVE BEEN ACQUIRED [emphasis in original]. This book was to be given
into the hands of those who were already well informed in the Law, simply
as a means of retaining and of reviving ever afresh this knowledge which
had been entrusted to their memories; and also to their teachers of Law
as a means of teaching to which the students can go for references to
the traditional actual laws, so that the written sentences lying before
them would make it easy for them to recall ot their minds the knowledge
they had received orally.
My admiration for the philsophical outlook that motivated this
extraordinary comment is boundless. It shows how greatly dedicated
Hirsch was to the great Enlightenment ideals of human freedom and human
rights and how mightily he, just like the German reformers, strove to
reconcile those principles with the Jewish tradition, except that whereas
the reformers maintained that the Jewish tradition had to be reformed
in order to be brought into line with those ideals, Hirsch believed
that those ideals were the underpinning of the whole Jewish tradition.
What would Hirsch's reaction be to all those in our community who
take it as an article of faith that human rights and human freedom are
antithetical to the Jewish faith and the Jewish tradition? Unfortunately,
I find Hirsch's conception of the Oral Law less praiseworthy, and so I
will make no comment on it other than to say that the Dor Revi'i, who
shared Hirsch's libertarian sentiments, had a much different conception
of the Oral Law.
David Glasner
dglasner@ftc.gov

In Avodah V10 #96, DEidensohn noted:
> It wasn't until I found a footnote in an article by Prof Larry Kaplan
that the
mystery was solved. BDD #5 summer 1997 "Torah U Madda in the thought of
R Samson Raphael Hirsch" note 25 Ma'amar ha Rav Hirsch al Aggado Hazal
[Hamaayan 17:2 1976 pp 1-16]....Published in Light Magazine Numbers 191-195
Volume XIV:1-5) in 1978 as translated by Yehoshua Leiman <
According to the Light Magazine prologue, "[t]he letters were written [in
1876] in Hebrew to Rabbi Pinchos Wechsler, and copies were preserved within
Rabbi Hirsch's family. The noted scholar, Moredechai Breuer, a descendant
of Rabbi Hirsch, published these letters in 1976 in the Jerusalem journal,
Hama'yan." The Leiman translations were recently republished by Neve
Yerushalayim College.
All the best from
Michael Poppers * Elizabeth, NJ

> In Dov Katz's book on tnuat hamussar, he describes that r blauser's
> shitta of mussar was based on the concept that in our times, we are not
> ready for yirat haromemut, and we need to focus first on yirat haonesh,
> with which he focused on with great detail...The initial aim was
> indeed to produce someone who was " hunched over, quaking in fear" -
> and once this was produced, then it could be refined.
Yirat haonesh is not meant to be a source of anxiety and fear. Rather,
it is an awareness that our every action has consequences that effect
us personally.
motya

An issue we have discussed often.... The questioner is a doctor and
homeopath here in Yerushalayim.
-- Carl
------- Forwarded message follows -------
Date sent: Wed, 29 Jan 2003 19:17:07 +0200
From: Mordecai Kornfeld <kornfeld@netvision.co.il>
Subject: Nidah 031: The positions of the fetus
To: Rabbi Joseph Pearlman:
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Nidah 031: The positions of the fetus
h.j. bueno de mesquita <bdmesq@yahoo.com> asked:
(b) According to the Gemara, the girl turns round as it is being born,
whereas a boy does not, and it is that which causes the excessive pain
at childbirth.
(c) A girl turns round, because she needs to face upwards (as we shall
see later in the Sugya), and during the pregnancy she is facing downwards
like a boy.
Dear rabi,
could one explain[or have any idea about this idea],what the talmud means
with the above mentioned answer? [quoted from your questions and answer
on the daf] what is known now adays,is that there is no difference of
the position of the foetus,being it a boy or girl. I would appreciate
any suggestion you would have. also,now adays ,according to the general
opinion [chogmat gojiem??]the birth of a boy is more complicated or
difficult,but this is not my main concern.
toda raba ,
h.j. bueno de mesquita, jerusalem,israel
----------------------------------------------
Rav Joseph Pearlman replies:
On the simplest level this is just another example of "Nishtanu
ha'Tevi'im." We find many cases of this such as the inability to conceive
from Bi'ah Rishonah, the Ben Shemonah Chadashim who is not a Bar Kayama,
the size of a k'Zayis, etc.
It is quite clear that the Gemara assumes a different position for a
female fetus than that of a male. So too in Midrash Rabah Bereishis 17:8:
"They asked Rebbi Yehoshua, 'Why does the male emerge with his face
downward and the female with her face upwards?'"
The commentary of Midrash Rabah ha'Mevu'ar writes, "This was the nature
of the thing in their days. The nature has changed such that both a son
and a daughter emerge sometimes this way and sometimes that way."
In this instance it is not Halachically relevant but the Acharonim
have had to grapple with this concept in many other instances. To take
just one example, see Chazon Ish YD 155:4 and EH 115:4 in regard to the
eight-month fetus: "And it appears that now the nature has changed, and
according to the expertise of the doctors, it is possible that their (the
fetuses') completion occurred after the seventh month and is completed
in the eighth."
On a deeper level, however, it is possible that Chazal spoke in code
language in Aggadic passages and did not necessarily mean it actually
happened that way physically. It could be conceptually so. Here is what
the Ramchal writes in his Ma'amar Al ha'Agados:
"Furthermore, you must know that many matters of fundamental secrets were
hinted at by Chazal in discussions of matters of the natural world...,
and they used the studies that were taught to them in those generations
by men of wisdom of the natural world. However, their main intention is
not the particular issue of nature that they discussed, but rather the
secret that they wanted to allude to in it. Therefore, whether or not
the outer garb of allegory in which they clothed the secret is accurate
does add or detract to the truth of that which is alluded to in it. This
is because the intention was to clothe the secret in information that
was well-known in those generations among the wise men, and that matter
could have been clothed in a different garb according to the information
that was well-known in other generations. Indeed, that is how the Sage
himself would have disguised his teaching had he said it in a different
generation.
So in this case it could also be nothing more than a Mashal; for example,
that a girl fetus experiences such movement mean that there are more
problems involved with bringing a girl into the world than a boy (for a
girl needs to be looked after and protected from abuse, it costs quite a
lot to marry her off, and there is none of the kudos attached to having
a boy, as per the end of Kidushin). And although here we are talking
of Tza'ar Leidah, nonetheless the amount of pain one actually suffers
must of necessity be related to the beneficial consequences which will
subsequently flow from it.
Kol Tuv,
Joseph Pearlman
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rms wrote
> The rambam is not talking about supporting oneself, but about the value of
> physical labor to support oneself - that working being valuable doesn't
> merely refer to a "clean" profession such as a merchant, but also to
> dirty physical labor - this was a well known issue - and the rambam is
> coming down on the side that physical labor is ennobling. This is also
> a reply to those who argue that it debases a talmid chacham to work in
> physical labor.
I enjoyed the creative interpretation of ma'ase yadav in t.t.3 :11 as
physical labor; however, see Igros Moshe helek 8, YD 36:4 who supports
my reading of the Rambam. Furthermore, see ibid regarding Rav Moshe's
interpretation of the Rambam based on other sources in Yad. Essentially,
Rav Moshe proves that when the Rambam criticezed a person who relies on
tzedaka, he was not refering to someone whose learning would suffer
qualitatively by diverting time to making a living. If his learning
would suffer, the Rambam would also agree that he should accept tzedaka.
motya

On Fri, Jan 24, 2003 at 02:25:48PM -0500, Brown, Charles.F wrote:
: As to the kashe of what to do with the gem that ain malachim omrim shira
: l'ma'alah ad shyisrael omrim shira l'matah, maybe you could be mechalek
: based on R' Hai Gaon's shita (discussed by Brisker Rav) that there are 2
: types of shirah/hallel...
: Perhaps the "regular" cycle of daily shira as commemoration
: must be initiated by BN"Y - since no new break from teva occurred, man
: must initiate the movement toward greater ruchniyus. However, by shira
: on a nes as it occurs, by definition there already has been an impetus
: to break teva, so this would bring malachim to sing as well.
Are you suggesting that one is IdT, the other IdE?
(See <http://www.aishdas.org/avodah/vol07/v07n004.shtml#18> for an
explanation of the rashei teivos.)
-mi

On Sun, Jan 19, 2003 at 09:16:20AM +0000, Eli Turkel wrote:
: I would distinguish this from reform "rabbis" sitting on a kashrut board
: when they don't believe in kashrut. This is different that Sefard and
: ashkenaz rabbis who have different standards of kashrut.
I think it's closer to O and C rabis sitting on the same board.
C and Tzeduqim both have a concept of "kashrus". However, neither
use the same halachic system, the same rules of pesaq, for
forming that definition.
Ash and Seph both follow the halachic process, even if we reach different
conclusions. Eilu va'eilu would apply. C does not follow the same process
we do. So, while both believe in something called kashrus, it wouldn't
be O to say that we and they are an eilu va'eilu situation. Would someone
sit on a halachic panel with C rabbis?
WRT piskei halachah, why would the tzeduqi religious leaders' votes
count? If the Sanhedrin didn't consists of 71 shomrei halakhah, then
it what sense was it a beis din hagadol with all the halachic authority
inherited from the 70 zeqeinim? And if it did have 70 zeqeinim amongst
its total membership, wouldn't the halachah follow rov of the rabbanim,
regardless of who belonged to the political entity?
If the Sanhedrin wasn't serving as a halachic organ, why would its
existance have any significance in the scheme of halachic authority?
-mi
--
Micha Berger "The most prevalent illness of our generation is
micha@aishdas.org excessive anxiety.... Emunah decreases anxiety:
http://www.aishdas.org 'The Almighty is my source of salvation; I will
Fax: (413) 403-9905 trust and not be afraid.'" (Isa 12) -Shalhevesya

On Reb Micha Berger <micha@aishdas.org> wrote:
> On Sun, Jan 12, 2003 at 08:21:02PM -0500, Arie Folger wrote:
> : There is really no difference lehalakhah in the context of sotah
> : (although there may be differences elsewhere, where the drashah exists
> : only according to one of these tannaim). If so, why this ma'hloqet?
>
> Eilu va'eilu?
That what? What is the substance of the disagreement exactly about, that you
may raise EvE?
> : 1) If the drashah is a key to understanding the Biblical text, a
> : key that anyone could use, assuming he is indeed in the know, then I
> : understand this to be a fundamental disagreement with farreaching
> : consequences.
>
> How? Since we know the conclusion that each of those "in the know" were
> able to reach, what other consequences are open?
In this case. But in other cases, there may be halakhic differences. IOW, I am
asking whether this mishnah prompts us to consider drash methods standard, to
the point that, were we to know the rules well enough, we wouldn't need the
Talmud to tell us anything but gezeirot, taqanot and halakhot leMosheh
miSinai, and a thorough review of the different opinions WRT the methods of
drash; the rest would follow from a thorough investigation of the Biblical
text.
> (I ask since my own assumptions were closest to this #1.)
So where mine, until, upon investigating a few too many drashot, I became
convinced otherwise. At any rate, I am on the lookout for this kind of
material, to further our understanding of the matter at hand.
--
If an important person, out of humility, does not want to rely on [the Law, as
applicable to his case], let him behave as an ascetic. However, permission
was not granted to record this in a book, to rule this way for the future
generations, and to be stringent out of one's own accord, unless he shall
bring clear proofs from the Talmud [to support his argument].
paraphrase of Rabbi Asher ben Ye'hiel, as quoted by Rabby Yoel
Sirkis, Ba'h, Yoreh De'ah 187:9, s.v. Umah shekatav.

On Wed, Jan 29, 2003 at 09:22:14PM -0500, Arie Folger wrote:
:> There is really no difference lehalakhah in the context of sotah
:>: (although there may be differences elsewhere, where the drashah exists
:> : only according to one of these tannaim). If so, why this ma'hloqet?
:> Eilu va'eilu?
: That what? What is the substance of the disagreement exactly about, that you
: may raise EvE?
: ... I am
: asking whether this mishnah prompts us to consider drash methods standard, to
: the point that, were we to know the rules well enough, we wouldn't need the
: Talmud to tell us anything but gezeirot, taqanot and halakhot leMosheh
: miSinai, and a thorough review of the different opinions WRT the methods of
: drash; the rest would follow from a thorough investigation of the Biblical
: text.
The Malbim, in the intro to Vayiqra, says as much. That given TSBK and
613 rules of sevrah and derashah, all of TSBP could be reconstructed.
(Interestingly, I do not recall his excluding halachos leMosheh miSinai
from this. I don't know what to make of that.)
The difference in our perspectives, I think, is that I'm including the
laws of derashah amongst the rest of the laws of TSBP. Which is why I
invoked EvE. Yes, a machloqes in methodology will have further-reaching
consequences. But lema'aseh we know that that machloqes exists, that
there are basic differences in the rules of ribui umi'ut vs those of
klal uperat. And those consequences proved managable.
Which would mean that HQBH's Torah contains an EvE of standard
methodologies, each of which produce an EvE of results -- all of
which are TSBP.
-mi
--
Micha Berger "The most prevalent illness of our generation is
micha@aishdas.org excessive anxiety.... Emunah decreases anxiety:
http://www.aishdas.org 'The Almighty is my source of salvation; I will
Fax: (413) 403-9905 trust and not be afraid.'" (Isa 12) -Shalhevesya

The Virtue of Hate by R' Meir Yaakov Soloveichik
http://www.firstthings.com/ftissues/ft0302/articles/soloveichik.html
There is so much on which to comment in this essay that I can't even
begin. But I like the author so much that I thought I would share this
essay with everyone. For those who miss the statement (at the very end)
about the author's grandfather, he was R' Ahron Soloveitchik.
Gil Student

Gil Student <gil@aishdas.org> wrote:
> The Virtue of Hate by R' Meir Yaakov Soloveichik
> http://www.firstthings.com/ftissues/ft0302/articles/soloveichik.html
Meir Yaakov is a personal friend of mine whom I got to know quite well
especially during his years in YU where he became very close with my
son-in-law, and daughter. He is R. Eliyahu Soloveichik's oldest son and
quite brilliant. Many tout him as the next RYBS.
The concept of "hate" as a positive value in Judaism is one which is not
often discussed and RMYS does a great job in contrasting Christianity
with Judaism and their respective views on the concept of forgiveness
and its relationship to hate. However, I thought it was a bit lengthy
and could have made the point quite well in about half its length.
While Christian theology eschews emotions like hate (as in... turning the
other cheek), most Christians are quite familiar with the emotion. One
of the first essays I read after 9/11 was one by "Time" columnist Lance
Morrow where he promoted the concept as the correct response to the
events of 9/11. IIRC he said that "hate" is exactly what we needed to
fuel a proper response to those who perpetrated the terror and their
sympathizers. I beleive that Mr. Morrow is a Christian but he had a
decidedly Jewish response to evil. It cannot be forgiven and hatred
was appropriate.
HM

From Halachic Man, p 76 (in ish hahalacha p. 69, but this saves me from
having to translate)
In all truth and fairness it should be emphasized that when the Musar
movement reached a state of maturity in the Yeshiva Knesset Israel
under the directorship of R Nathan Zvi Finkel and in the Mir Yeshiva
under the spiritual guidance of R Yeruham Lebovitz, it assumed an
entirely different form and aproached the world perspective of the
great halachic men. The fear, the terror, the melancholy evaporated,
and their place was taken by a powerful sense of the holiness and
joy of life. The act of cognition in accordance with the Halakhah,
new original halachic insights, spiritual creation all replaced that
exaggerated sensitivity and impressionability and that despairing
perspective that had at first taken hold of the world of the Musar
movement.
my addendum - in rav haim's original response to r blazer, he rejects
the school of Kelm (unlike my original post). REED was (IIRC) from the
school of Kelm (his father was very closely involved with the school),
(although there was close cross fertilization between all the different
schools,)which may have affected RYBS's reaction to the Michtav Meeliyahu.
Meir Shinnar

Last week I asked how one would define the whole concept of Lifnim
Mishuras HAdin. Is it strictly a mussar idea or does it have elements
of halacha associated to it. The nafka minah would be a situation of
Hashavas Aveidah where lifnim mishuras hadin does not apply. Does this
mean as Gil wanted to say that this totally absolves one from returning
the object-there is not even a ma'aleh mitzad mussar to return it or
maybe like I wanted to argue there is an element of mussar involved
that would tell a Ba'al Mussar to return the object.
I believe I have a ra'yah to my side.
The Shut Beis Halevi discusses a machlokes between the Tur and Rama
whether lifnim mishuras hadin applies bythe case of Zuto Shel Yam. Tur-no
and Rama- yes. The Beis HaLevi brings a rayah to the Rama from Rashi in
Shabbos 120a. The gemara there discusses a case of someone who has a fire
in his house on Shabbos and is only allowed to save what he needs. The
Gemara says he should call out to people to save things for themselves
and then these people can make a cheshbon with the original owner after
Shabbos. The Gemara concludes that even though everything was hefker and
acc to halacha these people don't need to pay the original owner anything,
we are talking about Yirei Shamayim.
There is a machlokes Rashi and teh Ran over why the people can keep the
items. Rashi holds the items are hefker and therefore whoever picks
them up owns them and teh Ran learns that it is similar to a case of
Zuto shel Yam and therefor there is no chiyuv to return the items.
The Beis HaLevi says that the machlokes Rashi and the Ran is over whether
"lifnim mishuras hadin" applies to the case of Zuto Shel Yam. Rashi holds
that it does apply and therefore Rahsi did not learn like the Ran because
if the Ran was correct the Gemara should have said the people picking
up the items had to return them not because they were Yirei Shamayim but
because of lifnim mishuras hadin. The Ran holds "lifnim mishuras hadin"
does not apply to the case of Zuto Shel and therefor the gemara used
the reason of Yirei Shamayim.
Ad kan Beis HaLevi.
Al kol panim what you see from here is that both Rashi and Ran agree that
in a situation where lifnim mishuras hadin does not apply there is still
an additional element of being a Yarei Shamayim that would motivate a
person to return an object.
I believe I have other raya'os butthis in my opinion is the most clear.
Interestingly is the way the Rambam talks about lifnim mishuras hadinin
Hilchos Aveidah and in Hil Yesodei hatorah when discussing chilul
hashem and in Hil Deos when talking about choosing themiddle road. ayin
sham. Seems there are diff aspects of lifnim mishuras hadin.

RJR wrote:
> Can a ben ashkenaz be yotzeh lchatchilah (or bdeieved) kriat hatorah
> from a sefardi sefer? Can he get an aliyah and make a bracha?
Let me add to the confusion. Can a Jew who holds by what we called shteshe
zan (a.k.a. Geonim) zman accept an 'aliyah in a 'hassidische minyan,
holding by Rabbenu Tam's zman, at Shabbat min'hah, when according to
this individual's widespread shittah it is already night, perfect time
for havdalah, while the 'hassiedim there is still about 20 minutes for
min'hah lekhat'hillah?
Arie Folger

(b) According to the Gemara, the girl turns round as it is being born,
whereas a boy does not, and it is that which causes the excessive pain
at childbirth.
(c) A girl turns round, because she needs to face upwards (as we shall
see later in the Sugya), and during the pregnancy she is facing downwards
like a boy.
The easiest way to explain it in derech aggada is that idea that women
are more spiritual. Therefore, a girl comes out looking upwards while
a boy comes out looking downward.
M. levin

R' Moshe Feinstein has a teshuvah on this that was published in one of
the more recent volumes regarding an Ashkenazi using Sephardi tefillin
and mezuzos. He says that an Ashkenazi can be yotzei with Sephardi
writing but should (I think lechatchilah) try to get Ashkenazi writing.
This is, however, a matter of debate because of the way yuds are written.
According to Ashkenazi pesak, Sephardi yuds are passul. RMF's chiddush
is that an Ashkenazi can be yotzei with writing that Sephardim hold
is kosher.
Gil Student