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S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 05 ANKARA 000331
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/27/2016
TAGS: MARRMASSMOPSPRELPGOVTUIZAFRU
SUBJECT: SCENE-SETTER FOR THE VISIT OF MARINE CORPS
COMMANDANT GENERAL HAGEE
REF: DCD PROFILER6 JAN. 19 EMAIL TO MAJOR CRAIG MILLER
Classified By: Ambassador Ross Wilson, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
¶1. (S) SUMMARY: Your visit to Turkey comes at an important
time. The tone of the relationship has been improving since
PM Erdogan,s visit to Washington last June, but Iraq
continues to dominate our agenda, including Turkey,s
concerns regarding the PKK, the Iraqi Kurds, independence
aspirations, and the fortunes of Ankara,s perceived
constituents, the Iraqi Turkmen. While the Nov. 9-10 High
Level Defense Group (HLDG) meetings in Ankara ) the first in
two years ) helped move our defense dialogue away from "all
Iraq all the time,8 the issues have not gone away. You will
want to acknowledge Turkey,s contribution to the war in Iraq
and the overall Global War on Terrorism (GWOT): the logistics
hub at Incirlik, the Habur Gate GLOC, Turkey,s military and
reconstruction contributions to Afghanistan and engendering
regional cooperation in the Black Sea. It will be important
to respond to complaints about US inaction against the PKK in
Iraq by pointing to what we are doing to help Turkey to
combat the PKK elsewhere and in other areas of the GWOT.
Your visit also provides an opportunity to foster an
atmosphere of increased engagement and cooperation in the
near future. END SUMMARY.
¶2. (S) We aren't out of the woods yet, but our bilateral
relationship is on the upswing from the trough that deepened
in fall 2004 with MNF-I operations in Tal Afar and Fallujah,
repeated Turkish truck driver abductions and killings, and
factually incorrect and biased Turkish press coverage which
Turkish officials failed to refute and in some cases abetted.
Despite the continued unpopularity of the war in Iraq (over
95% of the population opposes the war) this no longer
dominates the news. Then DCHOD GEN Basbug took the first
step toward improving relations in a January 26, 2005
nationally-televised press conference, in which he
underscored the importance of the bilateral relationship.
Following US and Turkish media stories in February 2005 about
deteriorating bilateral relations, NSC Sec Gen Alpogan, FM
Gul and others scrambled to match GEN Basbug's words. In an
April speech to the Istanbul War Academy, CHOD GEN Ozkok
called the bilateral relationship &too broad and important
to be defined by one issue.8 With the visits of PM Erdogan,
FM Gul and DCHOD Basbug to Washington in early June, the
Sept. 8-9 visit of GEN Jones and then-CENTCOM Deputy
Commander LTG Smith, the Sept. 24 visit to Ankara of APNSA
Hadley, the December visits to Ankara of FBI Chief Mueller
and CIA Director Goss, and most recently the Jan. 17 visit of
EUCOM Deputy Commander GEN Wald, both sides have demonstrated
our commitment to rebuild our historically strong ties
through concrete actions and by improving the tone of our
public statements.
PKK -- GETTING CREDIT WHERE CREDIT IS DUE
-----------------------------------------
¶3. (S) TGS Deputy Chief GEN Kosaner did not raise the PKK
with EUCOM DCDR GEN Wald on January 17 and may not with you.
However, the PKK was one of the themes of TLFC Commander GEN
Buyukanit's counterpart visit to the US in December, and he
may raise the terrorist group's presence in Northern Iraq
with you. Your response should point to what we have done
and what we have offered to do to address the PKK problem
more widely. During the September visit of Generals Jones
and Smith, TGS rejected EUCOM's offer of aerial surveillance
inside Turkey, but welcomed CENTCOM's offer to continue
aerial overflights of PKK camps on the Iraqi side of border;
CF now carry out flights every two weeks. Turkey accepted
EUCOM's offer of Information Operations (IO) support; EUCOM
staff is developing an interagency proposal that will assist
TGS/MFA in developing a more effective IO program. TGS also
welcomed an enhanced intelligence-sharing program on an
intermittent basis tied to specific Turkish operations.
Indications are the intelligence provided was beneficial to
GOT. CENTCOM offered to expand the list of PKK HVI on the
CENTRIX system and to facilitate TU/IZ mil-mil contacts,
which may include joint border patrols. These offers remain
under discussion, but will likely not bear fruit in the short
term.
¶4. (C) The interagency initiative to partner with Turkey and
the Europeans to pursue law enforcement cases against the PKK
is continuing. A CIA/DIA/FBI/DOJ/Treasury team visited
Ankara in December; they and the Turks identified two PKK
operatives in Europe to pursue together. Your interlocutors
may complain about the absence of kinetic action against the
PKK, but we have a good story to tell and we should tell it.
¶5. (S) Despite our efforts, with PKK attacks continuing to
cause casualties among Turkish military personnel, the
Turkish public and the political class continue to clamor for
US military action in Iraq against the PKK, or for a Turkish
cross-border operation. There is widespread public belief
that lack of US action against the PKK is "punishment" for
Turkey's March 2003 failure to give permission for US forces
to transit Turkey en route to Iraq.
SPECIAL FORCES RE-ENGAGEMENT
----------------------------
¶6. (S) One of the casualties of the Iraq war was the
relationship between our Special Forces (SF). The July 4,
2003 Suleymaniyah incident in which US forces hooded and
handcuffed Turkish SF officers remains a wound in Turkey's
military and national pride and with the Turkish public that
will possibly take a generation to fully heal. We welcomed
the Joint Staff invitation to Turkish Special Forces for a
Washington Sept. 19-27 visit to begin to restore that once
close relationship, and we continue to support a
SOCEUR-initiated SF JCET originally scheduled for March 2006,
though budgetary constraints may force a postponement.
Additionally, Turkish Land Forces Commander GEN Yasar
Buyukanit has just returned from the first Counterpart Visit
(CPV) with the U.S. Army Chief of Staff in nine years. GEN
Buyukanit was accorded full military honors and had a
substantive program as well. We believe that visit will
contribute greatly to restoring post-OIF army to army
relations.
BEHIND THE SCENES INVOLVEMENT IN IRAQ
-------------------------------------
¶7. (SBU) Despite the unpopularity of the Iraq war, Turkey has
provided significant logistical support to both Operation
Iraqi Freedom and to OEF in Afghanistan. Turkey has approved
multiple requests for the use of Incirlik Air Base,
including: a tanker refueling operation which has delivered
over 28 million gallons since operations began in 2003 and
flown over 2,600 sorties; the transit of 8,500 US troops on
rotation from Iraq from January through April 2004; and the
establishment in May 2005 of a logistics hub which allows 6
US military C-17 aircraft to move the amount of cargo it took
9-10 military aircraft to move from Germany. This hub has
facilitated the movement of 41,339 tons of supplies since its
inception; flown 1280 C-17 sorties; received 577 wide-bodies
cargo aircraft; and houses 150 TDY support personnel. Turkey
also approved the use of hub flights for the emergency
evacuation of US soldiers from Iraq.
¶8. (SBU) The Habur Gate, the only border crossing from Turkey
into Iraq, provides 25% of fuel shipments to Coalition forces
in Iraq and two-thirds of gasoline and diesel fuel shipments
for the Iraqi people. Significant shipments of food and
water for coalition forces also pass over the border.
¶9. (SBU) The Turkish government has also demonstrated its
support through its public announcements of support for the
recent elections; its plans to re-open its consulate in Mosul
in early 2006; provision of training in Turkey for Iraqi
diplomats, political parties, and (as part of the NATO
training mission) Iraqi Security Forces; hosting a conference
for Iraqi constitution drafters in July, and a meeting of
Iraqi Sunni leaders with Ambassador Khalilzad in Istanbul in
December.
¶10. (C) Turkey currently maintains approximately 1300 of its
own forces in Northern Iraq in camps established prior to
OEF. These forces contain elements of armor, mechanized
infantry, commando, and Special Forces units commanded by the
Turkish Special Forces Brigade HQ located in Silopi, Turkey.
This HQ also provides Turkish LNO teams to Coalition HQs in
Kirkuk, Mosul, and Tal Afar while hosting a US Liaison
officer and NCO at the HQ in Silopi.
PARTNER IN GWOT
---------------
¶11. (S/NF) Beyond its support for Iraq, Turkey has provided
valuable assistance and cooperation to the GWOT. On Aug. 8,
Turkey completed its second International Security Assistance
Force (ISAF) command (II and VII) in Afghanistan, which it
held for six months and during which time it contributed over
1,600 troops. Turkey, France and Italy have agreed on an
eight month rotating command of the ISAF Kabul Regional
Command starting the second half of 2006. The GOT permits
OEF detainees (Operation Fundamental Justice Flights) to
transit Incirlik AB. Turkey also contributes to
reconstruction and training efforts in Afghanistan. It is
involved in the reconstruction of schools and is exploring
counter-narcotics training programs for Afghan police and
alternative livelihood options for poppy farmers. Following
PM Erdogan's May 2005 visit to Afghanistan, the GOT increased
its reconstruction budget for Afghanistan ten-fold, to $100
million. Turkey continues to provide significant personnel
and assets for Operation Active Endeavor, KFOR, and Operation
Althea.
¶12. (U) Together with the US, Turkey coordinates military
assistance to Georgia and Azerbaijan, improving their
abilities to protect key energy transport routes. Turkey
subscribes to every security arrangement it is eligible to
join, including the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI).
It will host the first PSI combined air, land and sea
exercise (ANATOLIAN DEER) in May 2006 and the US is committed
to participate in both the Command Post Exercise and the Live
Exercise.
¶13. (C) Turkey continues to resist significant cooperation on
Black Sea maritime security outside the context of
BLACKSEAFOR and Operation BLACK SEA HARMONY (OBSH). The
Turks argue that an active U.S./NATO role would be
threatening to the Russians, who might respond negatively.
That said, they raise no objection to our naval engagement in
the region provided we abide by the Montreux Convention which
imposes restrictions on Bosporus Straits passage.
¶14. (C) While U.S. Navy ship visits to Turkey fell
drastically in 2004 and 2005, with only four port visits each
year, 2006 looks more promising. CVN 71 Theodore Roosevelt
and CG 56 San Jacinto are conducting a port visit in Marmaris
during February with another port call proposed for DDG 51
USS Burke later in the month. The July 2005 visit of the LPD
USS Nashville to the port of Aksaz included the embarkation
of 30 Turkish Naval Infantry for training while continued use
of Mersin port by coalition fuel tankers are essential for
fuels flowing into Iraq.
IRAN AND SYRIA
--------------------------------------------- ---
¶15. (S) Turkey's watchword for both Syria and Iran is
"engagement." While the military and Ministry of Foreign
Affairs are concerned about the dangers of the Iranian
nuclear program, PM Erdogan's pro-Islam Justice and
Development Party (AKP) government is not yet convinced. PM
Erdogan told EU Ambassadors on January 20 that he does not
believe Iran intends to develop nuclear weapons; one of his
advisors had indicated the same sentiment one day prior.
Part of the Turkish government's motivation is a desire not
to jeopardize its nascent trade development opportunities,
including energy, or its renewed intelligence exchange with
Iran on the PKK. Some AKP elements even admire Iran's
efforts to obtain nuclear weapons. According to TGS, Turkey
and Iran began sharing intelligence this summer on the PKK,
holding regular meetings at the border. As of September,
Iran had turned over 40 suspected PKK members or
sympathizers. Turkey touts its support for the EU-3 dialogue
and multilateral efforts through the IAEA. Turkish officials
stress to us the need to maintain dialogue and to identify a
diplomatic solution. The tepid Turkish response to Iranian
President Ahmedinejad's initial statement about wiping Israel
off the map have been followed equally weak statements
against the re-start of Iran's uranium enrichment program.
However, recent equivocation on whether or not Turkey is
planning for a visit by Ahmedinejad demonstrates that Turkey
is trying to walk both sides of the line on Iran. Turkey's
tack toward Syria is much the same. They and others in the
government regularly urge US engagement and stress the need
to deal directly with, and support Asad ) whom they see as
reform minded - against the hardline Ba,athists in the
regime who seek to undermine him.
DEFENSE INDUSTRY COOPERATION WEAK
---------------------------------
¶16. (SBU) Historically the strongest area of our bilateral
relationship, security cooperation, is significantly
declining. Under Turkey's current policy, the emphasis is
on Direct Commercial Sales at the expense of Foreign Military
Sales and American companies are having difficulty competing.
The last significant commercial tender won by a U.S. firm
was the 2002 win by Boeing for an Air Early Warning and
Control (AEW&C) system. In early 2004, SSM (the Defense
Industries Undersecretariat ) Turkey,s major procurement
agency) cancelled three tenders (UAVs, Main Battle Tanks and
attack helicopters) all of which had American companies in
contention. General Atomics (UAVs) and General Defense
(tanks) have both pulled out of Turkey.
¶17. (SBU) The revised ATAK Helicopter tender was issued in
February 2005 and was the first to contain new standard
(i.e., non-negotiable) terms and conditions (T&Cs). (Note:
The first tender was issued in 1995 and won by Bell Textron.
SSM cancelled it over technology transfer issues. End Note.)
The three US firms that took the tender (Bell, Boeing,
Sikorsky) found the new T&Cs so onerous that they were unable
to justify participation.
¶18. (SBU) The GOT,s goal is to develop an indigenous defense
industry that can supply a significant portion of the Turkish
military,s requirements, and has outlined an aggressive
timetable to do so. To meet that schedule, SSM recently
began requiring companies to confirm at the time of bid
submission the host government's willingness to allow
transfer of the required technology. Although SSM
understands the USG will not guarantee approval of technology
transfer before a contract is signed, SSM has refused to
revise the tender to remove that requirement. MND and SSM
are requiring similar T&Cs on other tenders and American
companies are frustrated. We have raised our concerns about
the negative impact of the SSM program on US participation in
the Turkish defense market with FM Gul, CHOD Ozkok, MND
Gonul, the service chiefs and others. Across the board, the
military pledged their preference for US equipment but
professed an inability to influence the process.
AIRSPACE MANAGEMENT
-------------------
¶19. (SBU) We are currently working with the GOT on some
airspace management issues in northern Iraq. Over a 60 day
period this fall, the TGS noted 17 incidents where, they
claim, CF aircraft flew very close to the TU-IZ border.
These incidents result in alerting of TU aircraft and other
intensive actions, including scrambling F16s. After
discussing this issue with TGS, as a short term solution we
have coordinated to have the relevant information passed from
CENTAF to the Turkish Air Force. We believe the long term
solution is for the TGS/TUAF to use CENTRIX to obtain the
daily Air Tasking Order and determine if CF flights may
approach the Turkish border. At present, the Turkish
military can access CENTRIX through its LNOs located with
Coalition Forces, in Baghdad, Mosul, Kirkuk, and Tal Afar;
There is also a CENTRIX terminal at the ODC in Ankara. TGS
has yet to agree to the expense (about $35,000) to have us
install a CENTRIX terminal at TGS HQ, allowing them to have
full access to CENTRIX right here in Ankara.
WILSON