Cite as Galioto v. Department of Treasury, 602 F.Supp. 682 (D.N.J.
1985)
Anthony J. Galioto, Plaintiff,
v.
The Department of the Treasury, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and
Firearms, Defendant.
No. Civ. A. 84-2045.
United States District Court, D. New Jersey.
Feb. 7, 1985.
Bianchi & Casale by Michael A. Casale, Nutley, N.J., for
plaintiff.
W. Hunt Dumont, U.S. Atty. by Peter R. Ginsberg, Asst. U.S.
Atty., Newark, N.J., for defendant.
OPINION
SAROKIN, District Judge.
INTRODUCTION
In a society which persists and insists in permitting its
citizens to own and possess weapons, it becomes necessary to
determine who may and who may not acquire them. At issue in this
matter is a statute reminiscent of the Dark Ages, which permits a
person convicted of a crime to purchase a gun under certain
circumstances, but denies that same right to a person once
committed for mental illness no matter what the circumstances.
Apparently one who has been convicted of a crime can be relieved of
the stigma arising from such a conviction, but a commitment for
mental illness renders one permanently disqualified. The statute
thus implies that mental illness is incurable, and that those
persons with a history of mental illness who have never committed
a crime are deemed more likely to commit one in the future than
those persons who have actually done so in the past. If persons
with criminal records are permitted to purchase and possess weapons
after meeting certain standards, certainly persons who have
conquered past mental illness are entitled to the same
consideration and rights. To impose a perpetual and permanent ban
against anyone who has ever been committed for mental illness, no
matter how ancient the commitment or how complete the cure. is to
elevate superstition over science and unsupported fear over equal
protection, and due process. Accordingly, the court finds this
provision of the subject statute to be unconstitutional.
The instant motion has been brought by defendant to dismiss
plaintiff's complaint or, in the alterative, for summary judgment.
A party moving for summary judgment cannot prevail unless there
exists no genuine issue of material fact and the party is entitled
to judgment as a matter of law. Sunshine Books, Ltd. v. Temple
University, 697 F.2d 90, 95 (3d Cir. 1982). When the court has
determined upon undisputed facts that the non-moving party, rather
than the movant, is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, "it is
well within the district court's discretion to enter summary
judgment for the non-moving party." Selected Risks Ins. Co. v.
Bruno, 555 F.Supp. 590 (M.D.Pa. 1982) rev'd on other grounds, 718
F.2d 67 (3d Cir. 1983); see also 6 Moore's Federal Practice, n 56.
12 (2d ed. 1984). Such is the case here. The defendant Bureau of
Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms (Bureau), asks the court to grant
summary judgment in its favor on the grounds that the plaintiff has
no entitlement to relief under 18 U.S.C. section 925(c), pursuant
to which the plaintiff sues. Instead, the court finds that section
925(c) and the related statutory provisions in 18 U.S.C. section
921 et seq, are invalid as infringements upon the plaintiffs right
to due process as guaranteed by the fifth amendment to the United
States Constitution.
FACTS
Plaintiff Anthony Galioto is a 57-year-old longstanding
resident of West Orange, New Jersey. Galioto, served in the Armed
Forces from 1951 to 1953, was honorably discharged, and has since
held a position as an engineer with the New York and New Jersey
Port Authority. Plaintiffs Memorandum of Law, Exh. D. In 1971,
having had no prior history of mental illness, Galioto suffered an
acute mental breakdown and voluntarily entered Fair Oaks Hospital
in Summit, New Jersey. Plaintiff's Mem., Exh. B. He was diagnosed
as having suffered an acute schizophrenic episode with paranoid
features. Galioto remained hospitalized for twenty-three days from
May 11 to June 4, 1971.
During Galioto's hospital stay, when Galioto expressed his
intention to leave, his physician, Dr. R.G. Alvarez, sought to have
him committed. On May 31, 1971, the Essex County Juvenile and
Domestic Relations Court entered a final order of commitment.
Galioto was released five days later, after Dr. Alvarez determined
that Galioto's condition had improved. There is no evidence that
Galioto was ever again hospitalized for mental illness.
Ten years after this hospitalization, Galioto applied to the
Superior Court of New Jersey, Essex County, Law Division, for an
order granting him a firearms purchase identification card pursuant
to New Jersey Statute Annotated 2C:58-3(b), which order was granted
on April 27, 1981. Thereafter, in October, 1982, plaintiff
attempted to purchase a firearm at Ray's Sport Shop in North
Plainfield, New Jersey. Ray's Sport Shop refused to sell any
firearm to plaintiff when he responded "yes" to a question on a
standard Bureau questionnaire asking: "Have you ever been
adjudicated mentally defective or have you ever been committed to
a mental institution?" 18 U.S.C. section 922(d)(4) makes it
unlawful for a licensed dealer in firearms "to sell ... any firearm
... to any person knowing or having reasonable cause to believe
that such person ... has been adjudicated as a mental defective or
has been committed to any mental institution." [footnote 1]
A few days after said refusal, Galioto applied to the
defendant Bureau in Washington, D.C., for a release from firearms
disability pursuant to 18 U.S.C. section 925(c). Papers submitted
by plaintiff included a certification from Dr. Alvarez, the
physician who had sought Galioto's commitment in 1971, to the
effect that Galioto was no longer suffering from any mental
disability that would interfere with his handling of firearms.
Section 925(c), under which Galioto sought relief from his firearm
disability, provides in pertinent part:
A person who has been convicted of a crime punishable for a
term exceeding one year (other than a crime involving the use
of a firearm or other weapon or a violation of this chapter or
of the National Firearms Act) may make application to the
Secretary for relief from the disabilities imposed by Federal
laws with respect to the acquisition ... of firearms and
incurred by reason of such conviction, and the Secretary may
grant such relief if it is established to his satisfaction
that the circumstances regarding such conviction, and the
applicant's record and reputation, are such that the applicant
will not be likely to act in a manner dangerous to public
safety and that the granting of the relief would not be
contrary to the public interest. [footnote 2]
There is no equivalent provision establishing a mechanism by which
a former mental patient can seek relief from the firearms
disabilities imposed upon him by federal law. By letter dated April
13, 1984, the Director of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and
Firearms, Stephen E. Higgins, denied plaintiff's application for
relief from firearms disability, asserting that Galioto was
"subject to Federal firearms disability because of his commitment."
Exhibit A to Complaint.
The Bureau argues in support of its motion that it was
powerless to release Galioto from disability under section 925(c),
because that section allows for a release from disability only for
those disabled due to criminal convictions, not those disabled as
a result of past commitment to a mental institution. Sections
922(d)(4) and (h)(4), according to the Bureau, create a permanent
and irreversible disability for anyone ever committed to a mental
institution, without regard to the length of the commitment, the
length of the interval between the commitment and the proposed
firearms purchase, the source or severity of the original illness,
the improvement of the person subject to the disability, the
evolution of medical knowledge about the illness for which the
former patient was committed, or the propriety and correctness of
the commitment in the first instance. [footnote 3]
DISCUSSION
I. Issues of Fact
Plaintiff has contended, in defense of this motion, that there
remains a disputed issue of fact which ought to preclude summary
judgment. He argues that the Director's decision to deny plaintiff
relief rested on two factual determinations: "(1) that plaintiff
had been committed to a mental institution and (2) that plaintiff
was discharged on a determination other than a finding that he was
competent." Plaintiff's Mem. at 3; also Exh. A to Complaint.
Plaintiff argues that the Director would or should have released
plaintiff from his disability had he found that plaintiff's
commitment was "factually erroneous," that is, that plaintiff "was
not mentally ill at the time of his commitment or alternatively
that he was subsequently discharged based on a finding of mental
competence." Plaintiff's Mem. at 5. Plaintiff does not argue that
his commitment was, in fact, "erroneous," but notes that it was of
short duration. The Bureau maintains, on the other hand, that the
fact of plaintiff's commitment alone is enough to disable him
permanently, whether or not that commitment was erroneous. It notes
in any event that plaintiff was prescribed medication upon his
discharge, indicating that he was not wholly "competent" at that
time.
The court finds no issue of fact raised here that should
preclude summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff. The Bureau has
taken the position that it is powerless under sections 922 and 925
to release plaintiff from his disability even if it were shown as
a matter of fact that plaintiff's commitment was indeed erroneous,
or for any other reason. This interpretation is entitled to some,
albeit limited, deference as an indication of the intended
"meaning" of the statute. Columbia Gas Transmission Corp. v.
F.P.C., 530 F.2d 1056, 1059 (D.C.Cir. 1976) (deference given to
agency's determination of meaning of statute in light of agency
expertise); Erickson Air Crane Co. of Washington, Inc. v. United
States, 731 F.2d 810, 814 (Fed.Cir. 1984) ("legal interpretations
by tribunals having expertise are helpful [to reviewing court]").
Moreover, the Bureau presents a plausible argument that the statute
is to be read literally, relying on Dickerson v. New Banner
Institute, 460 U.S. 103, 103 S.Ct 986, 74 L.Ed.2d 845 (1983) (state
expunction of conviction did not relieve plaintiff of firearms
disability under literal terms of 18 U.S.C. sections 921 et seq.,
imposing disability based on fact of conviction), and that section
925 simply does not give it authority to relieve plaintiff of his
disability, whatever the circumstances surrounding his commitment
or thereafter. In general, a court should avoid reaching a
constitutional question when an issue can be resolved as a matter
of statutory interpretation. See, e.g., United States v. Security
Industrial Bank, 459 U.S. 70, 103 S.Ct. 407, 411, 74 L.Ed.2d 235
(1982); Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman, 312 U.S. 496, 61 S.Ct 643, 85
L.Ed. 971 (1941). Here, however, where the statutory interpretation
of the agency is well-founded and where the plaintiff has not
submitted evidence to demonstrate that he comes within the
exception to the statute which he urges, it is not necessary to
prolong these proceedings in anticipation of further proofs in
order to avoid confronting the patent constitutional defect in
section 921, et seq. The purpose of summary judgment is "to
eliminate a trial in cases in which it is unnecessary and would
only cause delay and expense." Goodman v. Mead Johnson & Co., 534
F.2d 566, 573 (3d Cir. 1976), cert, denied, 429 U.S. 1038, 97 S.Ct
732, 50 L.Ed.2d 748 (1977).
2. Issues of Law-The Statute's Infirmity Under the Fifth
Amendment
It is well settled that the due process clause of the fifth
amendment includes an equal protection component. See, e.g., Nat'l
Black Police Ass'n, Inc. v. Velde, 712 F.2d 569, 580 (D.C.Cir.
1983), cert. denied, -- U.S. --, 104 S.Ct. 2180, 80 L.Ed.2d 562
(1984). Federal government action violates the equal protection
component of the due process clause when it treats similarly
situated groups differently without a substantial or compelling
government interest, if the groups are suspect or "quasi-suspect"
classes entitled to enhanced scrutiny, or a fundamental right is
involved, or if it acts without a rational basis, where the groups
are not suspect classes and no fundamental right is implicated.
Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216-18, 102 S.Ct 2382, 2394-95, 72
L.Ed.2d 786 (1982). A legislative classification is treated as
"suspect" when it is
more likely than others to reflect deep-seated prejudice
rather than legislative rationality in pursuit of some
legitimate objective. Legislation predicated on such prejudice
is easily recognized as incompatible with the constitutional
understanding that each person is to be judged individually
and is entitled to equal justice under the law.
Id. at 216-17 n. 14, 102 S.Ct at 2394 n. 14. Certain groups,
although not "suspect," are deserving of a higher level of scrutiny
than is accorded most legislative classifications. Differential
treatment of these groups must be justified by a "substantial"
state interest, because the groups have been historically
"subjected to unique disabilities on the basis of stereotyped
characteristics not truly corresponding to the at tributes of
[their] members." J. W. v. City of Tacoma, Wash., 720 F.2d 1126,
1129 (9th Cir. 1983). The Supreme Court has extended such enhanced
scrutiny thus far to classifications by sex, Craig v. Boren, 429
U.S. 190, 97 S.Ct. 451, 50 L.Ed.2d 397 (1976), by legitimacy of
birth, Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259, 99 S.Ct. 518, 58 L.Ed.2d 503
(1978), and by lawfulness of presence within the United States,
Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 102 S.Ct. 2382, 72 L.Ed.2d 786 (1982).
See also United States v. Cohen, 733 F.2d 128 (D.C.Cir. 1984).
This court concludes that persons with histories of mental
illness are a quasi-suspect class deserving of intensified
"intermediate" scrutiny; that is, any statute treating them
differentially must be related to a "substantial" governmental
interest. Even if persons with histories of mental illness are not
a quasi-suspect class deserving of heightened scrutiny, the
provisions of 18 U.S.C. section 921 et seg. are simply not rational
to the extent that they treat former mental patients differently
vis a vis convicted criminals, in that they permanently deprive
former mental patients of the opportunity to demonstrate changed
circumstances which warrant the removal of the disqualification.
The court determines that they violate not only plaintiff's right
to equal protection, but his right to substantive due process as
well.
A. Former Mental Patients as a Quasi-Suspect Class
The Supreme Court has expressly reserved judgment on the
question of whether or not the mentally ill are deserving of
heightened scrutiny. Schweiker v. Wilson, 450 U.S. 221, 229, 231 n.
13, 101 S.Ct. 1074, 1080, 1081 n. 13, 67 L.Ed.2d 186 (1981).
[footnote 4] The Ninth Circuit has found former mental patients to
be a "quasi-suspect" class entitled to "intermediate" scrutiny,
however. J. W. v. City of Tacoma, 720 F.2d 1126 (9th Cir. 1983). In
City of Tacoma, the Ninth Circuit recognized that "constitutional
concerns are heightened by any classification scheme singling out
former mental patients for differential treatment because of the
possibility that the scheme will implement "inaccurate and
stereotypic fears" about former mental patients. Id. at 1130-31.
The Third Circuit has not spoken directly on this issue. In
its recent decision, Cospito v. Heckler, 742 F.2d 72 (3d Cir.
1984), the court applied a "rational basis" test in analyzing the
claims of a group of mental patients who had lost certain federal
benefits when the psychiatric hospital in which they were being
treated lost its accreditation. The patients contended that
"psychiatric hospitals will lose federal benefits more readily than
a general hospital if deaccredited by JCAH [an accrediting agency],
since such accreditation apparently does not affect in any way a
general hospital's participation in Medicare or Medicaid . . .
whereas a psychiatric hospital must either be JCAH accredited, or
else certified under the 'distinct part' survey in order to
qualify," and that this amounted to discrimination against the
mentally ill. Id at 83. In applying only minimal scrutiny, the
Third Circuit carefully noted the Supreme Court's reservation of
"the question of whether legislation expressly classifying mental
patients as a discrete group must be examined under any enhanced
standard of scrutiny," Id. n. 19 (emphasis supplied), however. This
court concludes from this note that the Third Circuit, like the
Supreme Court, has reserved judgment on the question of what level
of scrutiny to apply to legislation that explicitly singles out
mental patients or those with a history of psychiatric
hospitalizations for differential treatment. In the opinion of this
court, the Third Circuit would not automatically apply a rational
basis test if presented with these facts, particularly in light of
the Ninth Circuit's holding in Tacoma, supra (striking down zoning
regulation that treated group homes for former mental patients
differently than other group homes). [footnote 5] This court is
persuaded by the Ninth Circuit's holding that former mental
patients do constitute a quasi-suspect class for fourteenth
amendment purposes, but the court does not rest its decision on
that ground.
B. Application of the Rational Basis Test
The question of whether or not persons with a history of
mental illness should be afforded enhanced scrutiny when singled
out for differential treatment is not critical in this
constitutional challenge to 18 U.S.C. section 921 et seg., because,
even under a rational basis test, this statute is defective under
both equal protection and substantive due process theories.
[footnote 6]
The court first notes its agreement with plaintiff's
observation that the Supreme Court has not already decided this
question in the dicta from Dickerson v. New Banner Institute, Inc.,
460 U.S. 103, 103 S.Ct 986, 74 L.Ed.2d 845 (1983), which is
emphasized by defendant. In that case, holding that a state court's
expunction of a criminal conviction would not automatically release
a convict of his firearm disability under 18 U.S.C. section 921 et
seq., the Court stated that
[t]he imposition, by sections 922(g)(4) and (h)(4), of
continuing disability on a person who "has been" adjudicated
a mental defective or committed to a mental institution is
particularly instructive. A person adjudicated as a mental
defective may later be adjudged competent, and a person
committed to a mental institution may later be deemed cured
and released. Yet Congress made no exception for subsequent
curative events. The past adjudication or commitment
disqualifies. Congress obviously felt that such a person,
though unfortunate, was too much of a risk to be allowed
firearms privileges.... In the face of this fact, we cannot
believe that Congress intended to have a person convicted of
a firearms felony under state law become eligible for firearms
automatically because of a state expunction for whatever
reason.
Id. 103 S.Ct. at 993. in this passage, the Court referred to
section 922's explicit treatment of persons with histories of
psychiatric commitments simply in order to support its statutory
interpretation of the import of an expunction under section 921 et
seq. Possible constitutional infirmities in collateral clauses of
the statute were not the focus of the Court. Significantly, as
plaintiff has noted, the Court took special notice of the fact that
"Congress carefully crafted a procedure for removing ...
disabilities [of convicts] in appropriate cases," id. 103 S.Ct at
995, and cited section 925(c), the very relief statute which the
plaintiff has tried unsuccessfully to have applied to him.
Arguably, the Court felt free to dwell solely on questions of
statutory interpretation because of this "escape clause" in the
statutory sections with which it was concerned. It is the absence
of this procedure for escape from disability for former mental
patients, particularly in light of its availability for convicts,
that creates the constitutional infirmity with which we are
concerned here. [footnote 7]
The failure of the statute to provide former mental patients
with the opportunity to contest their firearm disability is
irrational in two ways that offend the due process and equal
protection components of the fifth amendment. First, the statute
offends the equal protection rights of former mental patients by
treating them differently than others similarly situated, viz,
ex-convicts, without any logical justification for doing so.
Second, the statute offends the due process rights of these
individuals because it deprives them permanently and without any
rational basis of the opportunity to demonstrate that they are no
longer, or never were, incapable of handling firearms safely.
1. Equal Protection
Sub-sections (d)(4) and (h)(4) prohibit sales of firearms to,
or purchases of firearms by, any person
(1) who is under indictment for, or who has been convicted in
any court of, a crime punishable for a term exceeding one
year;
(2) who is a fugitive from justice;
(3) who is an unlawful user of or addicted to marijuana or any
depressant or stimulant drug ... or narcotic drug; or
(4) who has been adjudicated as a mental defective or who has
been committed to any mental institution.
Of these, only ex-convicts and former psychiatric patients are
classed according to a past occurrence in their lives which might
raise a presumption that they would be incapable of handling
firearms safely in the future. All of the other classes of
individuals are subject to present infirmities which are obviously
direct indications that they might not be trustworthy with weapons.
The statutory scheme allows the subject of a past conviction to
show his reformation, in section 925, but does not allow the same
opportunity to the subjects of a past commitment proceeding. Thus,
out of all of the categories of individuals disabled from
purchasing firearms, only the former mental patients are
permanently disabled on the basis of a past event that may or may
not be an indicator of their present ability to handle firearms,
with no opportunity to establish that, in fact, they are now
capable of safe handling. [footnote 8]
There is no rational basis for thus singling out mental
patients for permanent disabled status, particularly as compared to
convicts. While, as noted below, this court objects to
presumptively barring any individual based on a past event from the
opportunity to prove that he or she should be released from
disability, rational analysis suggests that, if anything, the bar
would be more logically applied to convicts than to former mental
patients, rather than vice versa. First, the bar has a punitive
aspect which may be appropriate for one who has been duly convicted
of a crime, but not for an innocent former mental patient. See
Plyler v. Doe, supra, 457 U.S. at 220, 102 S.Ct at 2396 ("legal
burdens should bear some relationship to individual responsibility
or wrongdoing"). Second, individuals who are convicts have
demonstrated that they are capable of criminal activity by actually
committing the crime for which they were convicted, c.f., Jones v.
United States, 463 U.S. 354, 103 S.Ct. 3043, 3049, 77 L.Ed.2d 694
(1983) ("[t]he fact that a person has been found, beyond a
reasonable doubt, to have committed a criminal act certainly
indicates dangerousness"); former mental patients have not, by
virtue of that status, indicated anything more than that they at
one time were adjudged to have a propensity for disruptive
activity. [footnote 9] Third, the committed patient who is
released, as was Galioto, shortly after his commitment, may not
have the same incentive to appeal the commitment as a convicted
felon, so the propriety of the initial commitment may never be
fully explored. The initial commitment proceeding is likely to be
much more emergent than a criminal proceeding as well, if the
proceeding is begun only upon a patient's seventy-two hour notice
of intention to leave, pursuant to New Jersey Statute Annotated
30:4-46 (hospital must discharge voluntarily admitted patient
within seventy-two hours of request to leave absent commitment).
More over, the commitment proceeding is likely to have fewer
procedural safeguards (e.g., no right to a jury, N.J.Stat.Ann.
30:4-42; "clear and convincing" burden of proof rather than "beyond
a reasonable doubt"). This last point is particularly disturbing
in light of the studies cited by plaintiff, Mem. at 12, to the
effect that commitment proceedings are replete with erroneous
factual findings.
In sum, permanent disability is more appropriately accorded to
convicts, if anyone, than to former mental patients. The only
"rational" reason for failing to provide persons with psychiatric
histories the opportunity to contest their disability must be based
on some "archaic and stereotypic notions", Tacoma, 720 F.2d at
1129, citing Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718,
723, 102 S.Ct. 3331, 3335, 73 L.Ed.2d 1090 (1982), that mental
illness is always, in every instance, permanent and incurable. This
ignores expanding knowledge about the causes of mental illnesses,
their reversibility and treatment.
2. Substantive Due Process
The statute is unconstitutional not only because it treats
former mental patients differently from and inferior to convicts,
but also because it presumptively denies former mental patients the
opportunity to establish that they no longer present the danger
against which the statute was intended to guard. The statute in
effect creates an irrebuttable presumption that one who has been
committed, no matter the circumstances, is forever mentally ill and
dangerous. An irrebuttable presumption violates the due process
rights of the individual against whom it is applied unless it is
"at least rationally related to a legitimate state objective."
Maimed v. Thornburgh, 621 F.2d 565, 575, 578 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 955, 101 S.Ct. 361, 66 L.Ed.2d 219 (1980); see
also Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 92 S.Ct. 1208, 31 L.Ed.2d
551 (1972) (unconstitutional to presume that all unwed fathers are
unfit as parents); Gumtankin v. Costanzo, 556 F.2d 184 (3d Cir.
1977) (unconstitutional to presume blind teacher not competent to
teach English in public schools). This court does not question that
the regulation of purchases and sales of firearms for the safety of
the public is a legitimate, indeed substantial, state objective.
But the application of an irrebuttable presumption against
ownership of firearms by former mental patients is not a rational
means of achieving that objective. Cf. Hetherton v. Sears, Roebuck
& Co., 652 F.2d 1152 (3d Cir. 1981) ("[w]hile it may be true that
[the state] could ban the sale of all deadly weapons, it does not
follow that the state, having abrogated its power to effect a total
ban," can regulate sale of weapons in an irrational manner).
The statute in question is irrational because, without any
good faith extrinsic justification, such as administrative cost, it
relies on psychiatric evidence introduced in one proceeding to
impose a burden on an individual, and then refuses to accept the
same evidence when the individual seeks to have the burden removed.
At the outset, the court notes that the government has never
questioned in this litigation the feasibility of affording relief
proceedings to former mental patients. Indeed, given that the
statutory scheme under examination here allows for relief from
disability in cases involving convicts, the government cannot in
good faith contend that its refusal to allow relief in the case of
former mental patients is based on a concern over the expense of
the relief procedure or its administrative feasibility. Neither
does the relief procedure contemplated here implicate the concerns
of repose and economy underlying the judicial principles of res
judicata and collateral estoppel. The relief proceeding is not
aimed at relitigating the issues litigated at the previous
commitment hearing, but focuses on present circumstances, and on an
ongoing civil disability independent of the original commitment.
Absent any rationale of economy or efficiency, the court can
find no rationale for the statute but an archaic, stigmatizing,
unreasoning fear of the mentally ill. As noted previously,
"[l]egislation predicated on such prejudice is easily recognized as
incompatible with the constitutional understanding that each person
is to be judged individually." Plyler, 457 U.S. at 216 n. 14, 102
S.Ct. at 2394 n. 14. In plaintiff Galioto's case, the very
physician who certified he should be committed, Dr. Alvarez, has
now certified that Galioto is competent to handle a firearm.
Indeed, the state courts that committed Galioto have now issued him
a firearm identification card. Even if these events should not
automatically relieve Galioto of his disability, cf. Dickerson,
supra, they indicate that Congress' concerns in creating the
disability for certain higher risk firearm purchasers no longer
obtain in Galioto's case. The statute, however, permanently
forecloses Galioto from challenging that disability.
Even the very evidence, namely, psychiatric opinion, which was
responsible for the stigmatic label in the first instance, cannot
erase this mark. The court appreciates the "fallibility of
psychiatric diagnosis", Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 429, 99
S.Ct. 1804, 1811, 60 L.Ed.2d 323 (1979), and the fact that "some in
the psychiatric community are of the view that clinical predictions
as to whether a person would or would not commit violent acts in
the future are 'fundamentally of very low reliability' and that
psychiatrists possess no special qualifications for making such
forecasts.' " Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 472, 101 S.Ct. 1866,
1878, 68 L.Ed.2d 359 (1981) (citations omitted). But the
shortcomings of psychiatry cannot excuse the failure to afford a
former mental patient a hearing on his current mental competence
for the purpose of overcoming a civil disability, where the
government has been satisfied to rely on psychiatric evidence in
imposing the disability in the first instance. That failure amounts
to a denial of due process.
CONCLUSION
The court does not today find it irrational to prohibit former
mental patients generally from the purchase of firearms. The court
finds rather that such a general prohibition is irrational and
unconstitutional, if it does not include some provision for the
granting of relief from disability to former mental patients in
appropriate cases. As the defendant has noted, this court does not
have the power to "create a review procedure for people in
plaintiff's category," Defendant's Reply Mem. at 9, because "[t]hat
would be a legislative function." The court can only declare those
provisions of 18 U.S.C. section 921 et seq. which have been used to
deprive plaintiff of his ability to purchase a firearm, without
affording him any opportunity to contest that disability, to be
void as violative of the fifth amendment of the United States
Constitution.
The court does not mean to suggest by this opinion that all
former sufferers of mental illness should be permitted to own
firearms. But, rather, if Congress has determined that there are
circumstances under which former criminals can own and possess
weapons and a means is provided to establish such entitlement,
former mental patients are entitled to no less. To hold otherwise
is to implicitly declare that mental illness is incurable and that
all those who have once suffered from it forever remain a danger to
society. Such a conclusion is repugnant to our principles and is
contradicted by the multitude of such persons who now live among us
without incident. The anguish caused by mental illness is great
enough without the imprimatur of a lifetime stigma embossed by
congressional action.
Because the holding of the court in this matter will create a
void in an area which clearly requires governmental control and
regulation, the court, on its own motion, will stay the effective
date of its order for a period of 120 days, so as to afford to
Congress an opportunity to correct the constitutional infirmities
found to exist in the present legislation and to accord to former
mental patients the rights, dignity and due process to which they
are entitled.
FOOTNOTES
1. Another subsection of section 922, section 922(h)(4), makes it
unlawful For "any person ... who has been adjudicated as a mental
defective or who has been committed to any mental institution ...
to receive any firearm ... which has been shipped or transported in
interstate or foreign commerce."
2. Firearm disabilities equivalent to those imposed on persons who
have been adjudicated mentally defective or committed to a mental
institution are imposed on persons who have "been convicted in any
court of ... a crime punishable by imprisonment For a term
exceeding one year." sections 922(d)(1) and 922(h)(1).
3. The court has serious doubt whether an applicant could
collaterally attack such a commitment in this type of a proceeding,
even if appropriate means were provided to seek relief.
4. The Court has recently granted certiorari on the question of
whether the mentally retarded are a "quasi-suspect" class entitled
to enhanced scrutiny. City of Cleburne v. Clebume Living Center, --
U.S. --, 105 S.Ct. 427, 83 L.Ed.2d 354 (1984); see also "Subject
Matter Summary of Cases Recently Filed." 53 U.S.L.W. 3343-44 (Nov.
6, 1984).
5. Prior to Schweiker, in which the Supreme Court expressly
reserved judgment on the standard of review for classifications of
the mentally ill as a discrete group, the Third Circuit applied a
rational basis test in evaluating the constitutionality of a state
statute setting differential time limits for benefits for
hospitalization in mental as opposed to general hospitals. See Doe
v. Colaurri, 592 F.2d 704 (3d Cir. 1979). The court relied on the
Supreme Court's summary affirmance in Legion v. Weinberger, 414
U.S. 1058, 94 S.Ct. 564. 38 L.Ed.2d 465 (1973), aff'g Legion v.
Richardson, 354 F.Supp. 456 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (three-judge court), in
which the court below employed a rational basis test to uphold a
limitation on the number of days of Medicaid and Medicare coverage
for psychiatric as opposed to general hospitalizations for patients
over 65. The explicit reservation of judgment in Schweiker, noted
in Cospito, indicates that none of these cases supports the
proposition that express classifications of individuals according
to their history of psychiatric treatment are inevitably subject
only to a rational basis analysis.
6. The parties have applied only a rational basis analysis.
7. Defendant also cites a 1983 decision from the District of South
Carolina as having considered this issue. United States v. Jones,
569 F.Supp. 395 (D.S.C. 1983). Again, this court must note its
agreement with the plaintiff that the Jones court did not address
the procedural infirmity this court finds in the statute. In Jones,
the defendant, a former mental patient, was not seeking to have her
disability removed so that she could purchase a firearm; she was
instead under indictment for having purchased a firearm without any
release from the statutory disability, a purchase she had
accomplished by falsifying information about her prior
hospitalizations. Presented with those facts, the Jones court found
that it was not irrational "to prohibit persons within the category
of 18 U.S.C. section 922(d)(4) from purchasing and/or receiving
firearms." 569 F.Supp. at 399. This court does not disagree with
that conclusion. But to conclude that it is rational to prohibit
former mental patients in general from purchasing or receiving
firearms is not to conclude that it is rational to deny individual
former mental patients the opportunity to seek relief from this
general disability with a showing that they are responsible enough
to handle a firearm safely and legally, particularly when such an
opportunity is afforded ex-convicts.
8. Section 925(c) does exclude convicts whose past convictions were
for firearms-related offenses from its relief provisions, but such
past convictions might rationally be considered good indicators of
a potential for future firearms abuse, in contrast to a mere
general finding of mental illness in the past.
9. An individual may be committed in New Jersey if "there is
believed to exist in the patient a diagnosed mental illness of such
degree and character that the person, if discharged, will probably
imperil life, person, or property." N.J. Stat.Ann. 30:4-48. Thus,
one without violent tendencies toward people may be committed on
the belief that he will likely "imperil ... property."