13 Oct 66, Charles R. Vessel, SFC E-7 and Fedrick H. Lewis, SFC
E-7, USASF, and forty Nungs Commandos of FOB-2, Kontum, Operation
Crimson Tide, KIA (Lewis Smith reports: Fredrick was known as "Huckleberry" due
to the straw hat he wore and both were part of a mission, which is credited as
being the first to attempt to recover an American POW (USAF Captain Carl E.
Jackson), being held by the Viet Cong at one of their R&R center located at Soc
Trang. A SOG size company element was formed and commanded by Captain Frank Jaks,
a Czechoslovakia by birth, and tasked with the rescue mission. Vessel and Lewis
were part of the 3rd Platoon. Their helicopters landed them directly in front of
two heavily armed Viet Cong Battalions and the 306 NVA regiment with an
estimated 1,000 soldiers. The entire 3rd Platoon was annihilated. Filed by
Clyde Sincere: “Operation ‘Crimson Tide’ MACVSOG's first major ‘Bright Light’
mission to attempt the rescue of U.S. POW's in mid-October 1966. All of the SOG
participants were members of FOB-2. Unfortunately, the hastily crafted mission
caused the force to land right in the middle of two (2) well trained VC
battalions. Needless to say, they did not rescue anyone and FOB-2 suffered very
heavy casualties including a couple of U.S. recon personnel. This operation is
covered in a couple of different chapters in Jay Veith's book: CODE NAME: "Bright
Light, The Untold Story of U.S. POW Rescue Efforts During the Vietnam War".

On October 18, 1966 the first official mission to rescue an American
POW was launched. It ended in
disaster, with over 12 killed, 17 missing, two helicopters shot down, and no
prisoners rescued. Largely forgotten, this mission should serve as an excellent
lesson about proper planning of a mission and what should be avoided.

In the Spring of 1966 Colonel Alderholt, a well-respected Air Force Air
Commando, had been tasked to create a recovery operation in SE Asia for the
express purpose of rescuing pilots shot down in Vietnam and Laos. Later called
the JPRC, or Joint Personnel Recovery Center, this group served as part of MACV-SOG
based in Saigon, South Vietnam and was code-named "Bright Light." Originally,
the task force was to be composed of Army Rangers, but the Army refused to give
up control and Chinese Nung Mercenaries lead by Army Special Forces were used
instead. For air Assets the JRPC had to go to 7th Air Force headquarters and
request airlift and air support.

In September of that year a 17 year-old Viet Cong (Guerrillas fighting for
North Vietnam) defected under the Chieu Hoi (Open Arms) Program.
While being debriefed by US intelligence, he stated that he'd seen a black
American in captivity at a POW camp; his description matched that of a Sergeant
that had been captured while serving as an advisor to the S. Vietnamese Army.
Later it was decided that the prisoner might also be Captain Carl Jackson, an
Air Force officer that had been shot down in 1965. The decision was made to
attempt a rescue, but it was felt that more information was needed. While
members of the JPRC began to plan the operation, the Air Force attempted to get
more intelligence on the camp.

RF-4 photo-recon planes attempted for two weeks to gain images of the POW
camp but failed; in some cases shut out due to bad weather and in others they
photographed the wrong areas. Finally in desperation, a member of the JPRC staff
overflew the camp in a light scout plane at a high altitude so that he appeared
to be merely transitioning and not scouting. In the back was a combat
photographer, and the oblique-angled shots he took were shown to the defector
who was able to identify the camp. The JPRC was finally given the official
go-ahead nearly a month nad a half after the defector had seen the American.

The basic plan was to airlift a company-sized force of Nung Mercenaries and
their Special Forces Advisors (Led by Captain Frank Jaks) to a
LZ near the camp, where they would
assemble and raid the camp, freeing the prisoner. They were to be transported
from Kotum to a forward base at Can To via Air Force C-130 and then airlifted to
their LZ's in Army
UH-1 Huey's and supported there by A-1 Skyraiders. Once they had released
any prisoners, the UH-1's would pick them up and fly the force back to Can To.

Things went bad from the start. The C-130 Cargo planes had been diverted at
the last minute for a resupply and were three hours late arriving at Kotum. By
the time the force left for their final destinations in the UH-1 helicopters
they were nearly four hours late. Things went from bad to worse. The weather
started to worsen, with the clouds dropping down lower. The force, told to
expect no opposition within a ten-mile radius of the camp and only 12 guards,
instead landed in the middle of a field populated by a Viet Cong Battalion (around
1,000 soldiers) that was resting. Additionally, due to the bad weather and
small landing zone size, one group of hueys had landed in the wrong area and
part of the force was now separated by a small canal.

One huey was shot down and the American Platoon leader killed. Cut off from
the rest of the force, nearly leaderless, and taking heavy machine gun and
mortar fire, the third Nung Platoon needed help, and the only help that could
save them was close air support. However, 7th Air Force had decided to send
F-100 Sabres instead of A-1 Skyraiders. Jet propelled, they were much faster
than the skyraider, which is great for a fighter but not a desirable
characteristic in an attack aircraft. A later report on the raid called the
F-100's "worse than no air support." Hampered by their high speeds and low cloud
cover, the F-100's released their bombs over the wrong area and bombed the Nungs,
destroying a Huey on the ground and killing more friendly forces than were
killed by the Viet Cong for the duration of the mission.

It was not until the next day that the force could be extracted, and by that
time 2 Americans had been killed, eleven Nungs had also been killed and 17 were
missing in action. Although fighting valiantly, one entire Platoon had been
wiped out and several helicopters had been destroyed. No prisoners were found,
although it is reported that Sergeant Edward Johnson, the man they had been
trying to rescue was released a year later. Captain Carl Jackson, USAF, is still
MIA and presumed dead.

Conclusion
This is a classic example of how centralized control can have negative effects
on special operations units and missions. Special Operations Forces must be able
to operate quickly and with great flexibility; their survival and success
demands it. Efficient control of assets is necessary for any military endeavor,
but as this shows, SOF missions require dedicated resources. Some may argue that
this is a waste of forces, but special operational forces should generate more
impact per person/aircraft/weapon than conventional forces so it is well worth
having an aircraft or boat set aside to support such activities.

By the time the mission was launched it had been over a month and a half
since the initial intelligence information had come into US circles. According
to John Plaster, a retired SOG member, the JPRC had to coordinate between a
major Army command, major Air Force command, and no less than eight different
sections in the MACV headquarters staff. These delays could have caused harm or
death to the prisoner and decreased the changes of his rescue if the element of
surprise was lost.

The difficulties the JPRC faced actually pre-dated the unit; it took Colonel
Alderholt over five months to get the JRPC officially activated; out of assets
that were already in-country. Interservice rivalry between the Air Force and
Army cost precious time as each sought to retain control of their assets and
units. Bureaucratic red tape in Saigon headquarters caused many stalls and
unnecessary waits; in one case the JPRC was left waiting several days for help
after the head of
MACV Intelligence declined to make time for them.

Air Power played a key role in the mission as well. With the succession of
Air Force General Momyer to Deputy Commander for Air Operations in July of 1966
the Air Force had begun a campaign to centrally control all air assets in
Vietnam in order to maximize the efficiency of assets. The cargo aircraft were
late specifically because the central planning office had detoured them to drop
off some cargo, which caused the lateness when the offloading operation was
delayed. In an effort to minimize waste or resources, the Air Force actually
caused waste by over-tasking elements and not allowing for potential problems.

The Seventh Air Force had also changed the aircraft used for
CAS from
A-1E Skyraiders to
F-100
Super Sabres, a supersonic fighter that had been pressed into the attack role,
one for which it had not been designed and was not well suited for. There was no
FAC attached to the force to
help guide the F-100's in and the forces on the ground were probably not very
familiar with the F-100's characteristics.

Had the JPRC been fully set up by the time the information about the US POW
came in, and had the bureaucracy not been such a hinderance it is quite possible
that an American serviceman might have been rescued.