1. Mr. Polk stated that he had been unable to
come to an agreement with the naval experts as to the questions raised
by paragraph 2 of the British proposal (See H. D. 101, Appendix
“A”);1 he would therefore have to
refer the matter to Washington. Distribution of Enemy
Surface War ships

Sir Eyre Crowe asked if this meant referring
the whole question.

M. Clemenceau explained that the points raised
in paragraph 2 of the British proposal were alone meant.

Mr. Polk agreed.

Sir Eyre Crowe wished to know what the United
States’ proposal was.

Mr. Polk explained that they had been unable to
come to an agreement as to figures. The amount of national effort, as a
basis of distribution, which had been proposed in Committee by the
American representatives, had now been abandoned. Captain Fuller had
proposed certain figures which were arbitrary, inasmuch as they were not
based on exact data, and which the American representatives could not
accept without referring the question to Washington.

Sir Eyre Crowe wished to know what basis of
distribution was desired. If the United States had abandoned the idea of
having national effort the basis of distribution, what other basis could
be adopted except the clear one of losses. He wished to know if the
United States desired a still different basis. He did not see how the
principle of distribution according to percentage of losses sustained in
the war could be combined with another principle, for example, that of
national effort.

Mr. Polk pointed out that the basis proposed
was a distribution of 70% to Great Britain, 10% to France, 10% to Italy,
8% to Japan and 2% to the United States. He felt that the effort of the
United States had been larger than was reflected in such a distribution.
The United States had had eight super-dreadnaughts with the Grand Fleet
and, he thought, more destroyers than any other Power. The United States
did not desire to keep the ships in question but considered it was a
question of principle which affected the national feeling. The question
was one of satisfying public opinion. The United States might have
over-estimated the effort it had made, but did not feel that a 2%
distribution correctly estimated or reflected its effort. He wished,
further, to point out that the basis of loss suffered took into account
ships which had been lost not necessarily in action; a great many had
been lost in harbor and it was not sure whether or not they had been
lost as a result of enemy action. For instance, some of the losses might
have been the result of boiler explosions and similar accidents.

Admiral Cagni stated that the large Italian
ships which had been lost in harbor had clearly been destroyed by enemy
action, and that this was susceptible of proof by documents in his
possession.

Sir Eyre Crowe said that his sole desire was to
arrive at clearness. The discussion still left obscure the position as
regards the principal issue. He would like to know if the United States
wished to eliminate from the basis of losses suffered, ships not sunk at
sea by enemy action.

Mr. Polk said that this was not what he had in
mind. The figures then under discussion of losses suffered were
arbitrary. No hard and fast rule had been adopted for determining these
losses; for instance, it seemed to him that the 10% of losses as given
for France and Italy did not correspond exactly with the losses
suffered. He wished again to point out that some of the ships lost might
or might not have been lost as a result of enemy action.

M. de Martino said he wished to disagree
formally with that last point of Mr. Polk’s. Italian losses had not been
arbitrarily calculated. The vessels lost in port had been lost as a
result of enemy machinations. The result was just the same if a ship
were lost in this way as if it had been sunk at sea. He therefore
maintained his point of view that ships lost in that manner must enter
into the calculations of losses suffered.

Mr. Polk thought that M. de Martino was putting
up a man of straw to be knocked down. He, himself, was not questioning
the right to include such losses in the calculation of losses suffered,
nor was he questioning the fact that some Italian ships might have been
sunk in port by enemy action. If it could be proved that such was the
case, then there could be no question as to its being proper to include
such losses in the calculation of losses suffered. All he had said was
that, as a general matter, some of the ships included in the
calculations of losses might well not have been lost as a result of
enemy action.

Sir Eyre Crowe said that he unfortunately had a
passion for clearness but he still remained confused. He would like
again to ask what the standard was. He appreciated Mr. Polk’s
difficulties relative to American public opinion but it seemed to him
that the easiest way to satisfy fair public opinion in every country was
to state a clear principle of distribution and nothing could be clearer
than actual losses suffered. If it was decided to give a certain
percentage of enemy ships to certain countries without such distribution
being based on a clear and logical principle it would be necessary to
explain to the satisfaction of public opinion in all countries why
different nations were given an arbitrary percentage of ships. A
distribution of 2% to the United States was not unfair for he thought
that the United States losses had been so small as not to reach in fact
the percentage of 2%.

Mr. Polk agreed that the losses had indeed been
small. He agreed with Sir Eyre Crowe’s point of view but the difficulty
he felt was that the proposed percentage of distribution was arbitrary.
It was true of course that no United States ships had been lost in port
but he still felt that it was arbitrary to include all ships lost in
port irrespective of the cause.

Sir Eyre Crowe observed that the calculation
was not arbitrary and was based on the principle of losses suffered.

Mr. Polk reiterated that he thought the figures
of 70–10–and 10 percent must be arbitrary. He thought it inconceivable
that the French and Italian losses were exactly the same. In any event
he had certain instructions and at the present stage of the discussion
he would have to refer the matter to his Government.

Captain Fuller stated that by actual
calculations the French and Italian losses were almost identical: 10.70%
for the French and 11.45% for the Italians.

Sir Eyre Crowe proposed the following solution:
to accept as the standard the percentage of warships sunk by definitely
proved action of the enemy whether at sea or in port.

Admiral Cagni pointed out that in the event of
such a solution being adopted it would be necessary to institute an
inquiry for each ship lost. In many cases losses were due to collisions
resulting from war navigating conditions. Such losses were as fully
entitled to be included as losses resulting more directly from enemy
action. Certainly the most long drawn out inquiries in each case would
have to be expected.

M. Clemenceau declared that he was ready to
accept Sir Eyre Crowe’s proposal.

Mr. Polk again pointed out that he would have
to get instructions from his Government.

M. de Martino inquired whether Sir Eyre Crowe’s
proposal would eliminate such collisions as those mentioned by Admiral
Cagni and also losses resulting from mines?

Sir Eyre Crowe replied that to meet M. de
Martino’s suggestion he would propose that the standard of distribution
might be all ships sunk at open sea and all ships sunk elsewhere through
definitely proved enemy action.

Mr. Polk said that he would cable his
Government.

M. Clemenceau approved this new proposal in
principle.

Admiral Cagni thought it would be well to
definitely approve the other points raised by the British proposal.

Mr. Polk said that he had accepted those points
in principle subject to changes of phraseology to be arrived at between
Admiral McCully and Captain Fuller. He had no objection to France and
Italy receiving the ships specified in paragraph 5 of the British
proposal.

Sir Eyre Crowe understood that it had been
decided that Greece, Roumania and Portugal should each receive as
compensation a ship corresponding to the one lost by each of these
Powers, as specified in paragraph 2 of the British proposal.

(This was agreed to).

Admiral McCully suggested that in the final
clause of paragraph 1 it be provided that the surface warships
surrendered by the enemy Powers should be either sunk or broken up. It
might well be more expensive at times to break up the ships than to sink
them.

M. Clemenceau took it as understood that the
Power receiving the enemy warships would have the option of sinking or
breaking them up.

(This was agreed to).

Admiral McCully in discussing paragraph 3 of
the British proposal relative to the allocation of enemy tonnage to be
broken up by the Inter-Allied Naval Commission proposed that the
breaking up or sinking be begun immediately and be completed within one
year and furthermore that none of the sunken vessels and no parts or
portions of them were to be incorporated in the naval forces of any
Power.

M. Clemenceau said that he was utterly unable
to agree with this proposal. It seemed to him an impossible
procedure.

Sir Eyre Crowe said that he would put an
extreme case which would test the proposed principle; was it meant that
if a vessel had been broken up, none of the steel from such vessels
should ever find a place in another ship?

M. Clemenceau felt that each Power should be
enabled to sink or break up the vessels allocated to it in such manner
as it should see fit.

Mr. Polk pointed out that it would then be
possible for all the necessary parts, such as engines, guns, etc., to be
taken off an enemy warship and put onto a ship belonging to the Power to
which such vessel had been allocated.

M. Clemenceau felt that the proposal in
question implied a mutual distrust, and he considered such a condition
would be almost humiliating.

M. Leygues thought that a condition of this
kind was one which could only logically be proposed by the Germans. If
such a solution were adopted it would be equivalent to the Allies
imposing upon themselves conditions which were more difficult than those
they were imposing upon the enemy.

Mr. Polk said that he would like to know
frankly what was intended. If it were intended to use this material in
the manner which had just been suggested, he thought it would be better
to say so clearly. His idea was that the principle had already been
accepted that the enemy [Page 364]warships were to be destroyed. If it were now intended to save certain
parts thereof, he felt that that was an extreme departure from the
principle of destruction.

M. Leygues pointed out that as a result of the
enormous losses suffered by certain nations, public opinion in those
nations would simply not be able to comprehend why boilers and other
similar useful parts of enemy warships could not be used.

Mr. Polk replied that that was exactly what he
meant. If it were not intended to destroy the ships completely, he
thought it should be so stated. He merely wanted to know what the
intentions were.

Sir Eyre Crowe said it had been agreed to
destroy them as ships but not to demolish them.

M. Clemenceau did not understand the proposal
advanced by Admiral McCully. He did not see why it was necessary to
pulverize the enemy warships. To his mind, destruction meant the
destruction of enemy warships but not the destruction of their component
parts. When artillery material had been taken from the Germans there had
been no objection to using the same. England was at the present time
building a warship costing several millions of pounds; this showed that
there was no contemplation of adopting the principle of total
disarmament. The idea of building ships out of enemy material had been
made a matter of reproach. For his part, he could not see any harm in
taking for instance a boiler from an enemy warship and putting it into a
warship to be built two years later. France had reduced her armies to
the minimum and might have done so too soon. England had not demobilized
her navy, and certainly he was far from reproaching her therewith. It
should not be forgotten that France’s financial situation made it
impossible for her to build up a powerful navy, and consequently there
was nothing to fear from her in that respect.

Mr. Polk repeated that it was merely a question
of so saying unequivocally if it was desired to use material from the
enemy warships in the manner which had just been discussed; the original
idea had been to destroy all enemy warships.

Sir Eyre Crowe pointed out that the words
“breaking up” had always been used instead of the word “destroying”.
Consequently, it had been contemplated that parts of these enemy
warships were to be put to some use. He instanced the operations of
breaking up of ships: when a ship was no longer useful they did not
pulverize it but broke it up and made use of the parts. If it had been
contemplated that the ships were to be completely demolished there would
have been no use calculating their distribution so carefully.

Mr. Polk said that he did not wish to hold the
matter up, but he must go on record as saying that the United States
Government did [Page 365]not consider
that the procedure proposed carried out the principle that had been
decided upon. He felt that when the enemy ships were taken to the yards
the greater part of them would doubtless be devoted to war purposes.

M. Clemenceau asked if the words actually used
were “breaking up” or “destroying”.

Captain Fuller replied that “breaking up” was
the actual text.

Mr. Polk said that the American idea had always
been that the enemy warships would be destroyed so that there would be
that much less naval war material in the world.

M. Leygues replied that Admiral Benson had
repeatedly expressed this view, but that the French and Italian
representatives had never agreed thereto and that the question had never
been formally voted upon.

Sir Eyre Crowe thought that the question of the
time within which enemy warships were to be sunk or broken up should be
settled. The British suggestion had been two years and the United States
had thought one year sufficient.

Mr. Polk said he would not make any
difficulties on this point.

M. Leygues thought the delay should be even
greater. The breaking up of ships was a long and costly operation as the
English had discovered in their inquiry relative to Scapa Flow. It might
be almost impossible to get the necessary workmen or appliances within a
shorter period.

M. Clemenceau suggested a three year
period.

Mr. Polk wished to go on record as considering
this entirely too long a delay. However, he did not intend to prevent a
decision being reached.

It was decided:

(1)

that any Power receiving enemy warships not to be incorporated
for use with its fleet, should have the choice of sinking or
breaking up said enemy warships;

(2)

that any Power receiving enemy warships to be sunk or broken
up should effect said breaking up or sinking within a period of
three years after the arrival of said vessels in one of its own
ports;

(3)

that Greece, Roumania and Portugal each receive as
compensation one enemy warship corresponding to the warship lost
by each of these Powers, for use with its fleet or any other
purpose that it might desire;

(4)

that Mr. Polk should refer to his Government the question of
the percentage of distribution among the Principal Allied and
Associated Powers of enemy warships and of the proceeds accruing
from the breaking up thereof;

(5)

that except as modified by the foregoing paragraphs,
paragraphs 1, 3, 4, 5 and 6 of the British proposal (See
Appendix “A” H. D. 101) be adopted unchanged.

2. Captain Fuller read a summary on the
situation relative to the surrendered enemy submarines, dated November
28th, (See Appendix “A”). The question now was what view France
took.

M. Leygues stated that France had always been
opposed to breaking up the surrendered enemy submarines inasmuch as she
had always felt that this question was tied up with the question of
future submarine warfare. If, however, the question of prohibiting
future submarine warfare were now brought up, he would be prepared to
discuss it. Distribution of Enemy
Submarines

Sir Eyre Crowe reminded the Council that this
question had been put within the competence of the League of
Nations.

M. Clemenceau observed that submarine warfare
could consequently not now be discussed. The question remained whether
enemy submarines were all to be destroyed or to be submitted to the same
treatment as enemy surface warships. He then read to the Council a
French proposal relative to the distribution of enemy submarines (See
Appendix “B”), and a statement relative to the number of submarines in
each navy (See Appendix “C”). He asked if the former might be accepted
as a basis of discussion.

M. Matsui pointed out that when the question of
the distribution of submarine motors had arisen a different proportion
had been adopted than was then proposed. Japan desired that the two
should be similar.

M. Clemenceau explained that this French
proposal was merely to serve as a basis of discussion and that therefore
M. Matsui’s objection was not immediately involved.

Mr. Polk took it as understood that in
discussing this proposal the question of principle as to whether or not
the submarines were to be destroyed, was still before the Council.

Sir Eyre Crowe pointed out, with reference to
the first paragraph of the French proposal, that France had hitherto
opposed the destruction of submarines. In the proposal then submitted by
her she had made a large concession which should influence the other
members of the Council in reaching a decision.

Mr. Polk announced that he agreed with the
first paragraph of this proposal, with the exception that he would like
an eventual explanation as to the small number of submarines therein
referred to.

M. Matsui said that he could not give any
decision on the matter until the following Monday, as he had just
received this proposal.

Sir Eyre Crowe suggested that the discussion be
continued without necessarily reaching a decision on that date.

Mr. Polk, with reference to the second
paragraph, said that although he had no present objection to the figures
in question, he wished to inquire if the distribution was to be made for
the purpose of eventually breaking up the submarines.

M. Leygues replied that that was so. With
reference to the third paragraph of the French proposal, he read and
commented upon the figures presented in Appendix “C”. He pointed out the
heavy losses suffered by France and the fact that she alone had not been
able to indulge in any naval construction, all the resources of her
shipyards having been devoted to production of land war material for
herself and her Allies.

M. de Martino agreed with M. Leygues in what he
had said with respect to the French situation. Although Italy was not in
exactly a similar position, she occupied a position intermediate between
that of England and of France. Italy had likewise been greatly
handicapped by having to stop her naval construction on account of
having to devote such resources to the production of land war material.
If France, by way of compensation for such a situation, was to receive a
certain number of submarines, Italy likewise should have some. He did
not have exact figures at hand, but would refer to Admiral Cagni for
such figures; he thought that this matter might be further examined
into.

Sir Eyre Crowe said that he was quite ready, as
far as France was concerned, to agree to the same principle with respect
to submarines as had been determined upon with respect to surface ships.
His Government would be glad if the ten submarines to be allotted to the
French might be selected from among such as had not disgraced the flag.
His Government would be glad of this for sentimental reasons.

M. Clemenceau inquired if there were ten such
submarines available.

Sir Eyre Crowe replied that there were more
than ten in French ports.

M. Leygues agreed with the British proposition,
provided that ten submarines of that kind could be found available for
delivery to France. If they could not, the French would have to fill up
their quota from other enemy submarines.

Sir Eyre Crowe accepted M. Leygues reservation.
He did not feel quite sure that M. De Martino was entirely correct in
saying that Italy occupied a position intermediate between that of
France and England. He was of course not entirely familiar with the
figures that had just been furnished but they seemed to show that in
Italy new construction had been relatively greater and losses relatively
less than in other countries, and he felt that from that point of view
it was really England that was in the intermediate position.

Mr. Polk felt that in this respect France
occupied a unique situation. He would recommend the acceptance of the
French proposal to his Government, but with respect to the proportions
suggested for distribution of enemy submarines he would likewise have to
refer the question to his Government. President Wilson when in France
had [Page 368]taken a strong position
with respect to total destruction of enemy submarines.

M. Matsui said that he would make the same
recommendation to his Government as did Mr. Polk.

Admiral Cagni remarked that the French figures
(Appendix “C”) did not give an exact idea of the situation as far as
Italy was concerned. It was true that Italy had constructed submarines
during the war but the majority of them were very small submarines for
work in the northern Adriatic and could scarcely be used for any other
purpose. The Italian Admiralty was quite ready to recognize the special
situation of the French Navy to which it extended its sympathy.

(Further discussion of this question was provisionally adjourned).

3. M. Kammerer informed the Council that the
Committee of New States had been unanimous in agreeing to expunge from
the preamble of the proposed Minorities Treaty with Roumania all
reference to Roumanian independence (paragraphs 2 and 3 of the preamble
to the proposed Minorities Treaty). The United States alone had not been
in favor of expunging the last paragraph of the preamble and of
eliminating all reference to the Treaty of Berlin.2 The
majority felt that as the text in question favored Roumania it might
well be eliminated upon the request of Roumania. The United States
Delegation had proposed to substitute for the last three lines, the
following: “recognize that Roumania is definitely discharged from the
obligations undertaken by article 44 of the Treaty of Berlin.” As the
other Delegations had not agreed to this the American Delegation had
reserved its judgment giving as its reason the fact that no written
observations had been received from the Roumanian Delegation which would
show whether or not its request was well founded. Roumania had desired a
clause inserted showing that the terms of the Treaty were finally agreed
upon after consultation with the Roumanians. It had been unanimously
decided that there was no objection to the insertion, as a new paragraph
in the preamble, of the following clause: “And after discussion and
agreement with the Principal Allied and Associated Powers.” The
Committee had then discussed the request of the Roumanians for the
suppression of articles 10 and 11 granting special protection to the
Jews. The majority were in favor of the elimination of both articles;
the American Delegation alone reserved judgment on this point again
stating that since the Roumanians had submitted no formal observations
the Principal Allied and Associated Powers should not be put in the
position of prejudicing the question of the protection of the Jews as a
result only of informal conversation [Page 369]with M. Antonescu—this question of the protection of
Jews having been insisted upon in the case of Poland. Since the majority
of the Committee had been in favor of the suppression of these articles,
and since it had been necessary to reach some conclusion which could be
presented to the Supreme Council on the following day, it had been
decided to present the views both of the majority and of the minority
and to leave it to the Supreme Council to settle the question. On this
understanding it had been proposed that the following paragraph should
be inserted in the preamble as a new paragraph, the American Delegation
accepting this proposition only in case its view was overruled by the
Supreme Council and the two Jewish clauses were eliminated. “Whereas
Roumania has declared its intention of recognizing as Roumanian
nationals ipso-facto and without the requirement
of any formality the Jews inhabiting all the territories of Roumania”.
Modification of Roumanian Minorities
Treaty

M. Clemenceau suggested that further discussion
of this question be adjourned until the receipt of the Roumanian answer.
The nature of that answer might well change his opinion.

Mr. Polk said that that was the point that he
had always been trying to make.

M. Clemenceau said that he was ready to make
concessions if the Roumanian signature could certainly be obtained
thereby but otherwise there was no point in making such concessions.

Sir Eyre Crowe was entirely of the President’s
opinion provided the Roumanians gave proof immediately of deserving the
concessions proposed.

It was decided:

that further discussion on this subject be adjourned until the
receipt of the answer to the last note sent by the Council to
the Roumanian Government.3

4. M. Clemenceau informed the Council that the
King of Roumania had addressed a letter to President Poincaré. This
letter was certainly a most unfortunate one, and was evidently prepared
under the influence of M. Bratiano. It was in substance one long series
of complaints. It appealed to President Poincaré to intervene with the
Supreme Council, and this could certainly not be tolerated. Letter From the King of Roumania

M. Berthelot read the letter from the King of
Roumania to President Poincaré. (See Appendix “D”.)

Sir Eyre Crowe observed that this constituted a
good commentary on General Coanda’s activities.

M. Clemenceau said that he had not yet seen
President Poincaré. He suggested that a joint answer be prepared by
France, England and Italy. He understood that the letter had not been
sent to President Wilson or to the Emperor of Japan. This constituted a
most serious act of discourtesy.

Sir Eyre Crowe informed the Council that he had
also had bad news from the British representative at Bucharest. M. Maniu
had stated that the Roumanians did not intend to retire away from the
Theiss prior to the signature of the Treaty of Peace with Hungary. He
felt that the time had come to publish the last note of the Council to
the Roumanian Government. Perfect ignorance still existed in Roumania
with respect to the attitude of the Supreme Council.

Mr. Polk agreed that the Roumanian press was
full of misstatements relative to the attitude of the Allies.

M. de Martino agreed with M. Clemenceau’s
suggestion as to a joint answer. He thought that it was a matter to be
arranged between the Governments concerned.

It was decided:

to publish in the morning press of Sunday, November 30th, the
text of the last note of the Supreme Council to the Roumanian
Government.

5. (The Council had before it the draft of an additional protocol to the
Treaty concluded at Versailles between the Principal Allied and
Associated Powers and Poland, June 28th, 1919 (See Appendix “E”).)4Treaty Regarding Eastern Frontiers of
Poland

M. Cambon in commenting upon this draft
protocol pointed out that in the absence of a regularly constituted
Russian Government it had hitherto seemed impossible to assign definite
eastern frontiers to Poland. Nevertheless it had been recognized that in
order to enable Poland to administer the territory occupied by her it
was necessary to establish at least a provisional eastern frontier
comprising territories which were indisputably Polish. By a decision of
the Supreme Council (H. D. 60)5 the Drafting Committee had
been charged with examining the formulation of such an agreement and it
had been unanimous in presenting the present protocol. The frontier line
having already been laid down by the Council the labors of the Drafting
Committee were limited to matters of form.

Mr. Polk pointed out that in the first article
the full and complete sovereignty of Poland was formally recognized by
the Principal Allied and Associated Powers. He wondered whether this did
not [Page 371]constitute a final gift on
the part of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers and whether it
did not mean shutting the door to any future negotiations with
Russia.

M. Cambon explained that all the territories in
question were in-contestably Polish. When part of the Russian Empire
they had been described as forming a part of the Kingdom of Poland.

Mr. Polk said his only doubt was whether it
were wise to give this recognition in so formal a way as by signing a
protocol of this nature. He thought it possible that Poland might
receive this communication in some other form.

M. Laroche pointed out that the protocol only
bound the signatories thereto.

Mr. Polk said that nothing, however, could more
formally bind the five Principal Allied and Associated Powers.

Sir Eyre Crowe observed that this question had
come up previously and that it had been agreed that the Drafting
Committee should determine the necessary formula. The Council would
recall the famous declaration of Kerensky relative to all territories
bona-fide inhabited by Poles. Furthermore this was not in contradiction
with the Council’s note to Admiral Koltchak.6

Mr. Polk observed that the Drafting Committee
had been asked to find a formula for communicating to Poland the
Council’s decision relative to Poland’s eastern frontiers. It seemed to
him that this was more than a communication. He was prepared to cable
his Government but under his present instructions he could not sign such
a protocol.

M. Cambon thought the question was covered by
previous decisions of the Council.

Sir Eyre Crowe asked if it were necessary to
retain the word “Polish” in the first paragraph of Article 1. He thought
that if this word was omitted the substance would be retained and only a
cause of irritation removed.

Mr. Polk said that he would get instructions
from his Government.

(Further discussion on this question was adjourned until an early meeting
of the Council.)

6. (The Council had before it two notes relative to the expenses
occasioned by the maintenance of Russian prisoners of war and refugees
in Germany (See Appendices “F” and “G”).)

General Weygand read and commented upon these
two notes. He called attention to the unanimous conclusions of the
Financial Sub-Commission (See Page 6, Appendix “F”). Russian Prisoners of War and Refugees in Germany

Sir Eyre Crowe observed that the Italian
representative had made a reservation with respect to the expenses
concerning refugees from Kiev (See page 2, Appendix “F”), and wished to
associate himself with that reservation. The German Government had
stated that the Allied and Associated Powers had assumed the
responsibility for the maintenance of these refugees, but no evidence
had been adduced to show that the German Government was telling the
truth. The Inter-Allied Commission at Berlin had apparently not gone
into that question. He thought that it should be further examined and
that the Commission at Berlin should be charged with the duty of
verifying the truth of the statement of the German Government.

General Weygand agreed. He had thought that as
General Malcolm had presented the matter in that manner, the question
had already been examined. He called attention to the proposed
resolution contained in the second note (See Appendix “G”). It was his
personal opinion that that point had already been settled by the
Council’s decision of November [October]
11th.7 General Malcolm might be
informed to that effect, but certainly the German Government knew that
already. A further question remained to be examined. He had been
informed that the expenses of the Commission at Berlin amounted to
twenty thousand marks per month. He further pointed out that the Germans
had said that their delegate would not be named until the Allies had
indicated that they were willing to cooperate in the sense of assuming
their share of the expenses. He thought that the Germans could now be
notified that they were to assume all the expenses connected with the
maintenance of those Russian prisoners and refugees.

Sir Eyre Crowe inquired whether it was
contemplated that the Allied and Associated Powers should pay the twenty
thousand marks referred to or that the Germans should do so.

General Weygand thought that the Allied and
Associated Powers were to pay it.

Sir Eyre Crowe observed that the Allied and
Associated Powers had washed their hands of these prisoners and
refugees. It was not to their interest to maintain that Commission. If
the Germans were told that they had to assume all the expenses they
would wish to eliminate that Commission, and for his part, he was
willing that this Commission be abolished. There could be no objection
to having an officer on the spot exercise some control, but he
considered the continuation of that Commission unnecessary.

General Weygand thought that humanitarian, as
well as political reasons, made it advisable that the Allied and
Associated Powers [Page 373]should
continue to interest themselves in the lot of these prisoners. He
proposed to prepare a draft letter to General Malcolm.

Mr. Polk pointed out that the position of the
United States was that it had no money for that Commission. As the
United States Government has already contributed over half the expenses
of this work in Germany, it considered that it was in no way obligated
to participate in the payment of outstanding indebtedness, nor was it
directly interested in the method adopted for the payment of those
outstanding bills. He thought that even if General Malcolm recommended
it, his Government was in doubt as to whether any basis of right existed
for creating or maintaining a Commission not provided for in the Treaty.
His Government considered rather that this was a suitable time to
withdraw.

General Weygand agreed that the coming into
force of the Treaty offered a good chance to withdraw if this were
considered advisable; but the question was whether political
considerations with respect to Russia would not render it expedient to
continue this work.

Mr. Polk observed that the Commission would be
without power or money. They might take decisions, but would have no way
of enforcing them. He thought that that meant putting the officers on
that Commission in a most difficult situation.

Sir Eyre Crowe thought that the Germans should
be told that they must meet the expenses of the Commission. The Germans
would then refuse and the Commission would cease to exist.

M. de Martino pointed out that the Italian
representative had made an additional reservation with respect to the
basis of distribution of the expenses of maintenance of the Russian
prisoners (See page 2, Appendix “F”); he wished to maintain that
reservation.

M. Clemenceau suggested that the German
Government be informed that it would have to meet all expenses until
such time as the Treaty went into force.

Mr. Polk said that he felt most strongly that
after the Treaty came into force such a Commission had no place in
Germany.

Sir Eyre Crowe suggested that it be decided
that when the Treaty went into effect the Commission would cease to
exist.

M. de Martino agreed.

Mr. Polk agreed also, but wished to put on
record the remarks he had previously made as to the attitude of the
American Delegation in view of the discussion which had taken place.

It was decided:

(1)

that the International Commission at Berlin be charged with
the duty of verifying the statement of the German Government
that the Allied and Associated Powers had assumed the
responsibility for maintaining the refugees from Kiev;

(2)

that General Weygand prepare a draft letter to General
Malcolm, for submission to the Council, taking into account the
views expressed at that meeting.

(The meeting then adjourned).

Hotel de Crillon, Paris, November 29,
1919.

Appendix A to HD–102

Surrendered Enemy Submarines

Summary of Situation, 28th November, 1919

1. At a meeting of the Admirals on 27th June 1919, all except the
French were in favor of the destruction of all surrendered enemy
submarines.

2. After the surrender of the submarines, it was agreed that a
certain number should be broken up, but when fifty-four had been
sold for breaking up, it was agreed by the Supreme Council that no
more should be broken up pending a decision on the whole question of
the disposal of the enemy fleets. The proceeds of the fifty-four
which have been broken up are being held in trust for the Allies in
the same way as the submarines themselves.

3. A certain number of submarines have been supplied to France,
Italy, U. S. A., Japan and Belgium for propaganda purposes, viz.

Great Britain

5

France

15

Italy

10

U. S. A.

6

Japan

7

Total

43

and Belgium has been loaned one for a few weeks.

4. The present situation of enemy submarines including those for
propaganda purposes is as follows:

5. The losses of the Allies in submarines during the war are as
follows:

Country

Number

Approximate percentage of each
nation’s submarine losses to total Allied losses in
submarines

Great Britain

55

70

France

14

18

Italy

8

10

U. S. A.

1

2

Total

78

100

Appendix B to HD–102

French Proposals Concerning Enemy
Submarines

All the sub-marines turned over by the enemy powers, with the
exception of the small number indicated in Par. 3 below, shall be
demolished under the supervision of an Interallied Naval
Commission.

2nd The distribution of the sub-marines
between the Allied and Associated Powers shall be operated
proportionally to the losses suffered by them in sub-marines
(percentage already established concerning the distribution of their
motors already turned over by their owners.)

Great Britain

70%

France

18

Italy

10

United States

2

3rd France, alone among all the Allied Navies
as not having constructed sub-marines during the war, shall receive
10 German submarines in good condition as a compensation.

Appendix D to HD–102

Bucarest, November 24, 1919.

[King Ferdinand of Rumania to the
President of the French Republic (Poincaré)]

To: His Excellency, President
of the French Republic.

During the long trials undergone by my people and myself, the
manifestations of friendship which I received from Your Excellency,
as well as the words, never to be forgotten by Rumania, which you
uttered at the opening of the Conference,8 lead me
to think that it is not necessary to again set forth the nature of
the Rumanian actions during the war, and to insist on the loyalty,
devotion and efficacy of the assistance lent by Rumania to her great
Allies, at the cost of the most bloody and heavy sacrifices.

In spite of the fact that, from the beginning of the operations of
the Conference, the Council of Four alone made all the decisions,
Rumania, in order to prove her fidelity and solidarity, has,
however, submitted to the stipulations which were decided upon,
unknown to her and against her interests, until she was put in such
a position that she could only sign at the cost of her dignity and
independence. However, the Supreme Council which proved, and is
still proving, such great magnanimity in the questions not yet
settled, or the solution of which seems difficult to obtain, treats
Rumania with a violence inconsistent with our friendly relations and
the principles of justice.

This policy of the Allied Governments, in contradiction with our
actions and feelings, can but have the worst consequences on the
role of order and peace which Rumania should have in this part of
Europe.

It is believed that I am creating difficulties, while I only defend a
just cause, and the fact that my appeals are not listened to is
indirectly favoring the danger which threatens every nation for, the
encouragement given to the elements of disorder by the attitude of
the Supreme Council, has a tendency to lessen the authority of my
Government, who are only guilty of defending the order, honor and
independence of their country.

However, it would be natural that the great Allies, whose
responsibilities are in proportion with their power, support what
represents the best guarantee of order against invading anarchy, as
was recently proved in Hungary and on the Dniester.

In the name of these principles, I deem it my duty to appeal to you
in order to bring the Government of the Republic to a more friendly
and just attitude toward us.

I apply, for the same purpose, to His Majesty, the King of England,
and His Majesty, the King of Italy.

Ferdinand

Appendix E to HD–102

Additional Protocol to the Treaty
Concluded at Versailles Between the Principal Allied and
Associated Powers and Poland, June, 28, 1919

The United States of America, British Empire,
France, Italy, and Japan, the
Principal Allied and Associated Powers and Poland,

Recognizing, by common agreement, that it is important as soon as
possible to put a stop to the existing conditions of political
uncertainty, in which the Polish nation is placed and to make it
possible for the Polish Government to proceed, according to the
conditions previously provided by the Treaty with Poland of June 28,
1919,9 to organize a regular
administration of the territories so far regarded as Polish.

The undersigned duly authorised by their respective Governments have
agreed to the following provisions.

Article 1

Without prejudging the provisions which must in the future define the
eastern frontiers of Poland, the Principal Allied and Associated
Powers hereby declare that they recognize the full and complete
sovereignty of Poland over the Polish territories of the former
Russian Empire situated to the West of the line described below:

From the point where the old frontier between Russia and
Austria-Hungary meets the river Bug to the point where it is cut by
the administrative boundary between the districts of Byelsk and
Brest-Litowsk,

the course of the Bug downstream;

thence northwards this administrative boundary to where it forms an
acute angle about 9 kilometres north-east of Melnik;

thence north-eastwards to a point on the course of the Lesna Prawa
where the latter is cut by the forest running from south to north
which passes about 2 kilometres west of Skupowo,

a line to be fixed on the ground leaving in Poland the villages of
Weirpole, Stolbce, Piesczatka and Wolka, cutting the railway
Byelsk-Brest-Litovsk at the point where it crosses the road from
Visoko-Litovsk to Kleshcheli;

thence northwards to a point where the Narev-Narevka road cuts the
Gainowka-Svisloch railway,

a line to be fixed on the ground along the forest road mentioned
above;

thence north-eastwards to a point on the river Svisloch 4 kilometres
to the north of Yalowka where it is joined by the river passing this
town,

a line to be fixed on the ground;

thence the course of the Svisloch downstream, then the course of the
Laszanka upstream, then the course of the Likowka upstream to a
point about 1½ kilometres west of Baranowo;

thence north-north-westwards to a point on the Grodna-Kuznitsa
railway about 500 metres north-east of the bifurcation of
Kielbasin,

a line to be fixed on the ground;

thence north-westwards to a point on the course of the Lososna about
2½ kilometres south-west of its confluence with the Nyeman,

a line to be fixed on the ground;

thence the course of the Lososna downstream, then the course of the
Nyeman downstream, then the course of the river Igorka, which passes
Warwischki, upstream to its source;

thence west-south-westwards to a point on the course of the
Cherno-hanja (Marycha) near Sztudjanka,

a line to be fixed on the ground following a left bank tributary;

thence upstream the course of the Chernohanja to a point about 2½
kilometres to the east of Zelwa;

thence northwards to a point on the Berzniki-Kopciowa road about 2
kilometres south-east of Berzniki,

a line to be fixed on the ground;

thence north-westwards to the most southerly point of the reentrant
of the northern administrative boundary of the district of Suvalki
(about 7 kilometres to the north-west of Punsk),

a line to be fixed on the ground, proceeding generally parallel to
the line of the small lakes between Berzniki and Zegary and about 2
kilometres to the east of these lakes, turning west to reach a point
of Lake Galadusya about 2 kilometres north of Zegary, crossing this
lake to its north-western point and leaving Punsk in Poland;

thence northwards the administrative boundary of Suvalki to its
junction with the old frontier between Russia and East Prussia,

The rights that Poland may be able to establish over the territories
situated to the East of the said line are expressly reserved.

Article 2

The proportion and nature of the financial or other charges of the
former Empire of Russia which Poland will have to bear by reason of
the placing of the territories of this former Empire under her
sovereignty shall be fixed in conformity with the stipulations of
Article 21 of the Treaty concluded with Poland on June 28, 1919.

Future conventions shall regulate all other questions which may arise
from the recognition of the sovereignty of Poland over the
territories described in Article 1.

Done at Paris, the . . . . . 1919 in a single copy which will remain
deposited in the archives of the Government of the French Republic;
and of which authenticated copies will be transmitted to each of the
Signatory Powers.

Appendix F to HD–102

Note to the Supreme Council

The Special Paris Commission which is entrusted with the questions
concerning the Russian prisoners of war in Germany, examined the
following points communicated by the Supreme Council:

1st)

—Reimbursement of the flour advanced by the German
Government until August 23rd, 1919.

2nd)

—Liquidation of the liabilities of the Inter-Allied
Commission, namely, 400,000 marks.

3rd)

—Reimbursement to the German Government of the expenses
incurred for the Kiev refugees.

4th)

—Employment of the Russian money which remained in the
hands of the German Government (20 million roubles).

According to the reports emanating from the International Commission
in Berlin, the following obligations will be incumbent upon the
Allied and Associated Governments:

Due the German Government:

For provisioning of the Kiev refugees . . . . . . 2, 000, 000
marks

Value c. i. f.(?) German ports (?) 2400 tons of wheat flour or of
2700 tons of rye flour, supplied to the Russian prisoners of war,
and the reimbursement of which is requested in kind. 7,680,000
marks.

Due the British Red Cross:

Advances made by the British Red Cross, to be reimbursed in francs or
in pounds sterling . . . . . . . 400, 000

10, 080, 000 marks

After having examined the data given by the International Commission
in Berlin, the Paris Commission expressed the opinion that the above
account only deals with correct and legitimate expenses, and that
the principle of their settlement can be admitted. The Italian
Delegate, however, makes reservation with respect to the views of
his Government concerning the provisioning of the Kiev refugees for
two million marks, until an investigation has been conducted on the
conditions under which the corresponding agreement was made.

In the sharing of the liabilities in question, between the United
States, Great Britain, France and Italy, the Commission took as a
basis the following decision of the Supreme Council of supplies,
under date of February 1st, 1919.

Russian, Serbian and Rumanian
Prisoners in Germany

“The Council approves the decision made by the permanent
committee in its meeting of January 28th.

“The French Government is entrusted, in the name of the four
Associated Governments, with the provisioning of the Russian,
Serbian and Rumanian prisoners in Germany.

“The distribution and the supervision of this provisioning in
Germany will be exercised by the Inter-Allied Military Committee
at Berlin, under the presidency of General Dupont, in
co-operation with the Red Cross organizations of the various
nations. The sums necessary will be temporarily advanced by
France. The distribution of the expenses between the four
Associated Governments is to be ulteriorly regulated.”

This basis of distribution being admitted, with the reservation made
by the Italian Delegate with respect to the approval of his
Government, each Delegate gave the elements of the following account
which totals the supplies so far furnished by their respective
Governments.

This amount comprises 1,727,800 dollars
representing the supplies furnished by the American Red
Cross, by virtue of a special agreement with the Government
of the United States.

Italy

Account

Total

85,806,000

In order to determine the share of each of the four Powers and the
total cost of the upkeep of the Russian prisoners of war, and of the
Kiev refugees, it was decided that the present amount of the debt to
be paid, would be added to the cost of the supplies previously [Page 381]furnished, and that this
general total would be divided into four, the quotient representing
the share of each Power:

Present debt

10,080.000

Amount of previous

85,806.000

Total

95,886.000

Share of each of the four Powers:

23,971.000 marks

From the above data, it appears that France and the United States
have given more than their share to this common operation of the
Allies. On the other hand, Italy and Great Britain did not assume
their share of the liabilities. Consequently, it is incumbent upon
them to assume the present debt, according to the following
distribution:

Great Britain:

1,500.000

Italy:

8,580.000

10,080.000

The Commission suggested that, in this distribution, the Government
of Great Britain should assume, as a contribution to the total
reimbursement to be effected, the 400,000 marks advanced by the
British Red Cross; the balance of the English debt, and the total
amount due by Italy shall, if the Supreme Council approves this
proposal, and through the intermediary of the Separations
Commission, and under reserve of approval by the Italian Government,
be applied to the credit of Germany, through the debit of the
reparations account of Great Britain and Italy.

The French and American Delegates declared that, if these proposals
were adopted by the various Allied and Associated Governments, they
think that their respective Governments, except in case their
parliaments should not approve, would very likely not insist, that
the surplus of their share in this common operation be reimbursed to
them.

With respect to the proposal that a part of the twenty million
roubles temporarily in the hands of the German Government should be
used for the regulation of the pending accounts, the Commission is
of the opinion that this sum should not be deducted in any way, on
account of the important questions mixed up with the disposition of
the funds in question.

Concerning the request that the cereals supplied by Germany should be
reimbursed in kind, the Commission thinks that, as Germany did not
comply with the demand made by the Supreme Council to withdraw the
German troops from the Baltic provinces, it is neither advisable,
nor necessary, at the present time, to effect a reimbursement in
kind, but that a sufficient satisfaction would be given to [Page 382]Germany, by crediting her
with a sum representing the reparations account. The especial
situation of the American Delegate is pointed out to the Supreme
Council. In fact, he is instructed to make officially known that the
American Government is obliged to refuse all financial assistance,
which would aim to continue the provisioning of the Russian
prisoners of war, or of the Kiev refugees, at present in Germany.
That is why the American Delegate informed the Commission that it
must be understood that no representative or agent of the Government
of the United States has the authority to make any financial
agreement in the name of his Government, with respect to the affair
in question, and declared that the figures given in the present
note, relative to the debts to be paid, represent the exact balance
at present payable.

The British, French, Italian and Japanese Delegates declared that,
although they have no instructions to make any official statement in
the name of their Governments, however, they are of the opinion that
their treasuries would consider the matter from the same point of
view as the American treasury; consequently, the Commission asks
that the International Commission in Berlin be informed, that
according to the decision of principle already made by the Supreme
Council, it has no authority to make any financial agreement in the
name of the Five Powers collectively.

Therefore, if the above proposals are approved by the Supreme
Council, the points submitted to the Special Commission in Paris
would be settled as follows:

The 400,000 marks due the British Red Cross (Question No. 2) will be
reimbursed to the latter by the British Government;

The flour advanced by the German Government (Question No. 1) will be
reimbursed, not in kind, but in currency, that is to say, 7,680,000
marks; this amount will be added to the 2,000,000 marks due for the
upkeep of the Kiev refugees (Question No. 3) and the payment of the
sum of 9,680,000 marks would be effected by applying an equal sum to
the credit of Germany, in the reparations account; 1,100.000 marks
being charged to the English account and 8,580,000 marks to the
Italian account. The employment of the 200,000,000 Russian roubles
retained by the German Government (Question No. 4) will be postponed
until the settlement of similar questions of a larger extent.

Appendix G to HD–102

Note to the Supreme Council

The Special Commission in Paris, entrusted with the question
concerning the Russian prisoners of war in Germany has taken note:
[Page 383]On one hand, of the
answer of the German Government to the resolution of the Supreme
Council under date of October 11th,11 and, on
the other hand, of Marshal Foch’s remarks, relative to the German
Note.

The Delegates unanimously decided to submit to the Supreme Council
the following recommendation.

“The Special Commission has the honor to request that the two
following points be specified in the reply which will be made to
the German note:

“1st.—The Allied and Associated Powers have decided to
incur no more expenses for the Russian prisoners of war
in Germany, except those necessary for the upkeep of
their representative to the International Commission in
Berlin;

“2d.—The International Commission in Berlin will be a
control commission only.”

The Commission, having no data on
the dates on which the supplies mentioned above were
made, took as a basis, for the conversion into marks,
the rate of exchange of August 25. Therefore, the above
figures should be examined before being definitely
admitted. In fact, each Delegate has expressly reserved
for his Government the right to modify the total of the
sums representing its contribution to the provisioning
if, ulteriorly, other items of expense were to be
comprised in it. [Footnote in the
original.]↩