Summary Process; Notice to Quit; Whether Plaintiffs were Required to Serve
a New Notice to Quit Before Proceeding on a Second Complaint, Where they Withdrew
Their First Complaint due to a Late Return; Whether Notice to Quit was
Defective Under General Statutes § 47a-23. The plaintiffs initiated a
summary process action against the defendants by serving a notice to quit
possession or occupancy, which specified the following reasons: (1) "by
reason of any expressed stipulation therein," and (2) "nonpayment of
rent when due for commercial property." Pursuant to General Statutes §
47a-23 (a) (1), a notice to quit may be given "when a rental agreement or
lease of such property . . . terminates for any of the following reasons: . . .
(B) by reason of any expressed stipulation therein; . . . (E) nonpayment of
rent when due for commercial property. . . . " When the defendants failed
to vacate the premises within the time provided, the plaintiffs issued a
summary process complaint, which was served upon the defendants. The marshal
made a late return of the complaint to the court, however, and the defendants
moved to dismiss the action. Subsequently, the plaintiffs voluntarily withdrew
the complaint. They then issued a new complaint without issuing a new notice
to quit. The defendants moved to dismiss the second complaint based on the
plaintiffs' failure to serve a new notice to quit. In the alternative, they
asserted that the notice to quit was defective under § 47a-23 because they were
not provided with proper notice of the reasons why they should quit possession
or occupancy of the premises. The court dismissed the complaint. In doing so,
it determined that the withdrawal of the first complaint returned the parties
to the status quo that had existed prior to the service of the notice to quit.
It thus found that the withdrawal of the complaint revived the written lease and,
therefore, that the plaintiffs were required to serve a new notice to quit
before proceeding on a second complaint. In addition, the court agreed that
the notice to quit was defective. It determined that although the language in
the notice to quit "tracked" the statutory language, the first reason
provided no notice to the defendants as to why they should quit possession and
the second reason failed to provide adequate notice to them because "it
d[id] not specify what [was] due, such as base rent or additional rent." It
further found that the second complaint was at variance with the terms stated
in the notice to quit. On appeal, the plaintiffs argue that since there had
been no determination in the prior action that the initial notice to quit was
defective, that notice remained valid to terminate the lease, and, because they
never intended to revive the lease and never withdrew the notice to quit, they properly
brought a second summary process action on the same notice to quit. Further,
they assert that the court improperly determined that the notice to quit was
defective.