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State of Arizona
Office
of the
Auditor General
PERFORMANCE AUDIT
Report to the Arizona Legislature
By Debra K. Davenport
Auditor General
December 2000
Report No. 00-20
ARIZONA
DEPARTMENT OF
CORRECTIONS
SECURITY OPERATIONS
The Auditor General is appointed by the Joint Legislative Audit Committee, a bipartisan committee
composed of five senators and five representatives. Her mission is to provide independent and impar-tial
information and specific recommendations to improve the operations of state and local government
entities. To this end, she provides financial audits and accounting services to the state and political
subdivisions and performance audits of state agencies and the programs they administer.
The Joint Legislative Audit Committee
Representative Roberta L. Voss, Chairman
Senator Tom Smith, Vice-Chairman
Representative Robert Burns Senator Keith Bee
Representative Ken Cheuvront Senator Herb Guenther
Representative Andy Nichols Senator Darden Hamilton
Representative Barry Wong Senator Pete Rios
Representative Jeff Groscost Senator Brenda Burns
(ex-officio) (ex-officio)
Audit Staff
Shan Hays—Manager
and Contact Person (602) 553-0333
Lisa Eddy—Team Leader
Mark Haldane—Team Member
Pam Eck—Team Member
JoAnne Dukeshire—Team Member
Copies of the Auditor General’s reports are free.
You may request them by contacting us at:
Office of the Auditor General
2910 N. 44th Street, Suite 410
Phoenix, AZ 85018
(602) 553-0333
Additionally, many of our reports can be found in electronic format at:
www.auditorgen.state.az.us
2910 NORTH 44th STREET • SUITE 410 • PHOENIX, ARIZONA 85018 • (602) 553-0333 • FAX (602) 553-0051
DEBRA K. DAVENPORT, CPA
AUDITOR GENERAL
STATE OF ARIZONA
OFFICE OF THE
AUDITOR GENERAL
December 22, 2000
Members of the Arizona Legislature
The Honorable Jane Dee Hull, Governor
Mr. Terry L. Stewart, Director
Arizona Department of Corrections
Transmitted herewith is a report of the Auditor General, A Performance Audit of the
Arizona Department of Corrections—Security Operations. This report is in response to
a June 16, 1999, resolution of the Joint Legislative Audit Committee. The performance
audit was conducted as part of the Sunset review set forth in A.R.S. §41-2951 et seq. I am
also transmitting with this report a copy of the Report Highlights for this audit to
provide a quick summary for your convenience.
This is the first in a series of reports to be issued on the Department of Corrections.
As outlined in its response, the agency agrees with all of the findings and recommendations.
My staff and I will be pleased to discuss or clarify items in the report.
This report will be released to the public on December 26, 2000.
Sincerely,
Debbie Davenport
Auditor General
Enclosure
OFFICE OF THE AUDITOR GENERAL
Program Fact Sheet
Department of Corrections
Security Operations
Services: Security Operations is one of the five subprograms under the Prison Operations
program in the Department of Corrections. Its mission is to efficiently operate and maintain
safe and secure prisons. Security Operations performs a wide range of services within the
system:
n Inmate management, classification, transportation, employment, safety, and discipline;
n Essential services such as food, clothing, housing, education, and health care;
n Security systems, communications, and facilities; and
n Security staff training, allocation, and management.
Program Revenue:
Approximately $232 million
(fiscal year 2000)
100,000,000
200,000,000
300,000,000
1999 2000
General Fund Other
Personnel: 7,517 full-time staff
(fiscal year 2000)
Facilities: 10 Complexes, 54 Units
Winslow
u
u Phoenix
Perryville
u
Lewis u
Yuma
u
u
Tucson
u
Safford
Douglas
u
uu
Eyman and
Florence
Program Goals:
Although Security Operations is charged with
providing oversight for a large number of
areas, its five program goals represent a small
number of security-related functions:
1. Prevent escapes from secure institutions
and work crews.
2. Reduce staff assaults.
3. Reduce inmate assaults.
4. Prohibit the introduction of drugs into
secure institutions.
5. Proactively minimize disturbances
through staff training.
n Wardens/Deputy Wardens = 100 FTEs
n Programs/Administrative = 142 FTEs
n Clerical/Support = 38 FTEs
n Technical = 37 FTEs
Total 317 FTEs
Security Staffing = 7,200 FTEs
OFFICE OF THE AUDITOR GENERAL
Weapons—A total of
2,415 weapons, includ-ing
Remington 870
shotguns, Colt AR 15
rifles, Glock 9 mm
semiautomatic hand-guns,
sniper rifles, and
riot control weapons.
Vehicles—A total of
1,992 vehicles, includ-ing
93 buses, 468
automobiles, 547 vans,
and 884 trucks. Of
these, 321 are alterna-tive-
fuel vehicles.
Hand-held radios—
6,166.
Equipment: The Department has pur-chased
many items used by Security Op-erations.
Adequacy of Goals and Performance
Measures: The goals and performance meas-ures
appear to be appropriate for Security Op-erations’
mission. For example, the performance
measures regarding the number of inmate ran-dom
positive drug tests, number of escapes,
and number of disturbances, appear to be ap-propriate
measures to indicate outcomes of
security measures. However, some improve-ments
could be made:
n Some security-related goals are included in
other programs’ goals. For example, a goal
regarding effective custody and control
over inmates appears in another subpro-gram
of Prison Operations, Criminal and
Administrative Investigations.
n The Department could redefine some out-put
measures to better assess the results of
improved procedures. For example, current
measures on quarterly unit searches do not
indicate the percentage of searches that
yield contraband.
i
OFFICE OF THE AUDITOR GENERAL
SUMMARY
The Office of the Auditor General has conducted a performance
audit of Security Operations at the Arizona Department of Cor-rections,
in response to a June 16, 1999, resolution of the Joint
Legislative Audit Committee. This performance audit was con-ducted
under the authority vested in the Auditor General by
Arizona Revised Statutes §§41-1279 and 41-2951 et seq. The audit
is the first in a series of six audits of the Department of Correc-tions.
The remaining audits will focus on Support Services, Hu-man
Resources, Agency Infrastructure, Private Prisons, and Ari-zona
Correctional Industries.
The Department operates ten prison complexes statewide: Ey-man
and Florence (both located in Florence), Douglas, Lewis
(located in Buckeye), Perryville (located in Goodyear), Phoenix,
Safford, Tucson, Winslow, and Yuma. In addition, the Depart-ment
contracts with two private firms to operate three prisons.
Correctional Services Corporation operates prisons in Florence
and Phoenix and Management Training Corporation operates
one prison in Marana.
Some Prison Facilities’ Designs
Continue to Pose Security
and Safety Problems
(See pages 13 through 25)
Although the Department generally operates a secure prison
system, some prison facilities have design, maintenance, or other
problems that diminish inmate and staff safety. The Department
has made significant improvements to its facilities since 1991,
when the last Auditor General Report was issued. Most impor-tantly,
the number of escapes from the Department’s prisons fell
from 56 between January 1984 and May 1985 to 12 in 1990, and
then to 0 in 1997 and 6 in 1998. In addition, consultants hired for
this audit to assess security at six of the prisons found significant
improvement in almost all areas, including security around the
prisons’ perimeters, newly established policies to control the
The number of escapes has
decreased.
Summary
ii
OFFICE OF THE AUDITOR GENERAL
introduction of contraband, and the Department’s inmate classi-fication
system. Additionally, the Department’s newest complex,
Arizona State Prison Complex (ASPC) Lewis, includes some
excellent design features, such as smaller, more manageable
recreation yards to better facilitate officers’ observation of in-mates.
However, the design of some older prison facilities negatively
impacts staff and inmate safety. For example, they may not give
security officers adequate lines of sight so that inmates can be
adequately monitored. The Department also assigns inmates to
many temporary structures such as tents, Quonset huts, and
modular buildings, as well as converted hotels. Since these build-ings
were not designed to house inmates, proper control and
surveillance are difficult. Converted hotels, which are used at
ASPC-Phoenix and ASPC-Douglas, also require significant
maintenance because of their age. In addition to the buildings
themselves, some sally ports (entrances for vehicles) have design
and operations problems that create significant potential for
escapes or contraband smuggling.
Inmate population growth in the face of resource limitations and
staffing shortages is a key factor contributing to the Depart-ment’s
facility-related problems. Inmate population growth from
8,000 in 1985 to over 26,000 in 2000 has required the Depart-ment’s
use of lower-cost temporary structures as well as its con-tinued
reliance on older, poorly designed structures. In addition,
a staff vacancy rate of over 50 percent at ASPC-Lewis, the De-partment’s
newest facility, has resulted in the Department post-poning
the opening of two new units there as of November 2000.
Although replacement of some old facilities is not cost-effective,
the Department should improve some inmate housing to ensure
a safe environment for staff and inmates. First, it should continue
to make efforts to fully staff the unopened units at ASPC-Lewis.
By opening the new units at ASPC-Lewis, the Department could
reduce its use of temporary structures such as tents to house
inmates. Second, the Department should discontinue its use of
tents and other temporary structures and move inmates into
more secure living units. The Department should also eventually
The design of some De-partment
facilities reduces
staff and inmate safety.
Between 1985 and 2000,
inmate population grew
from 8,000 to 26,000.
Summary
iii
OFFICE OF THE AUDITOR GENERAL
replace those buildings where security procedures cannot be
adequately followed, such as those at certain units at ASPC-Phoenix
and ASPC-Tucson.
The Department Should Continue to
Improve Inmate Management
(See pages 27 through 36)
Although the Department has implemented many effective poli-cies
and practices designed to manage inmates, some further
improvements are still needed. The Department has generally
effective policies for such things as monitoring inmates’ move-ment
within units and reducing the introduction of contraband
items. However, staff sometimes fail to consistently apply the
Department’s policies and practices, which can significantly
compromise security. For example, the Department’s internal
audits reveal that officers have at times failed to properly con-duct
strip searches of inmates. Another problem is that the De-partment
lacks systemwide policies in two areas—controlled
movement and activity pass procedures. Finally, there are too
few staff at some posts that involve monitoring inmates and
conducting searches. As a result, officers are unable to ade-quately
observe inmate activity or locate contraband.
Most Other Security Practices
Are Sound, But Some Can
Be Improved
(See pages 37 through 44)
The Department should continue to improve some of its security
practices besides those that relate directly to inmate manage-ment.
The Department has made considerable strides in improv-ing
these other practices, which cover such areas as inspecting
facilities and controlling access to potentially dangerous tools.
However, Auditor General consultants who assessed security at
six prisons found that, among other concerns, the Department
does not (1) routinely test the adequacy of its keys used to obtain
access to prison units during an emergency, (2) regularly con-duct
security challenges at the prisons to identify weaknesses in
security systems, or (3) follow consistent practices regarding the
dispensing of prescriptions. Some prisons give inmates injectable
The Department has made
considerable improvements.
Summary
iv
OFFICE OF THE AUDITOR GENERAL
medications, which does not allow inmates to hoard or not take
their medication, while other prisons dispense as much as one
week’s worth of medications to inmates.
Other Pertinent Information
(See pages 45 through 50)
The audit also presents information about the Department’s
policies for managing prison gangs, called security threat groups,
or STGs. Both nationwide and in Arizona, STGs represent a
growing disruption to prison operations, because gang members
often smuggle drugs and other contraband into the prisons and
commit assaults against staff and other inmates. Arizona’s ap-proach,
begun in 1997, isolates gang members and severely re-stricts
their recreation, work, and inmate store privileges in order
to disrupt and deter gang activity. Inmates who have been veri-fied
as gang members are incarcerated in single-bunk cells in a
restrictive maximum-security unit for the remainder of their
sentence. The only method inmates may use to transfer out of the
restrictive unit and increase their privileges is to renounce their
gang affiliation and inform the Department about their gang’s
activity.
Gang members are isolated
in maximum-security
units.
v
OFFICE OF THE AUDITOR GENERAL
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
Introduction and Background....................... 1
Finding I: Some Prison Facilities’
Designs Continue to Pose Security
and Safety Problems................................. 13
The Department Operates a
Secure Prison System ...................................................... 13
Department Continues to Operate
Inadequate Facilities........................................................ 16
Several Factors Force the
Department to Operate
Deficient Prisons............................................................... 20
Department Facilities
Can Be Improved............................................................. 22
Recommendations........................................................... 25
Finding II: The Department Should
Continue to Improve
Inmate Management.................................. 27
The Department Has
Implemented Many
Effective Inmate Management
Policies and Practices....................................................... 27
Analysis of Prison Incidents Points
to Need for Continuous Improvement....................... 31
Improvements to Inmate
Management Practices Can
Be Made in Several Areas .............................................. 32
Recommendations........................................................... 36
Table of Contents
vi
OFFICE OF THE AUDITOR GENERAL
TABLE OF CONTENTS (Cont’d)
Page
Finding III: Most Other Security
Practices Are Sound,
But Some Can Be Improved..................... 37
Other Policies and Procedures
Enhance Security.............................................................. 37
Department Has Made Substantial
Improvements Since Previous Audits........................ 37
Department Could Make
Some Further Improvements........................................ 41
Recommendations........................................................... 44
Other Pertinent Information .......................... 45
Gangs Formally Identified
Through Certification Process ...................................... 45
Gang Members, Once
Identified, Are
Housed Separately........................................................... 47
Department and University
Studying STG Policy Effectiveness.............................. 50
Agency Response
Figures
Figure 1 Arizona Department of Corrections–
Security Operations
Chain of Command........................................ 7
Figure 2 Arizona Department of Corrections—
Security Operations ......................................
Security Threat Group Validation Statistics
As of August 2000........................................... 46
Table of Contents
vii
OFFICE OF THE AUDITOR GENERAL
TABLE OF CONTENTS (Concl’d)
Page
Photos
Photo 1 Lower-Security Housing Unit...................... 3
Photo 2 Higher-Security Housing Unit .................... 3
Photo 3 Lewis Complex, Morey Unit........................ 14
Photo 4 Unsafe Dormitories ........................................ 17
Photo 5 Temporary Structure...................................... 18
Photo 6 Tents Used for Housing Inmates ................ 19
Photo 7 Tool Storage...................................................... 40
Photo 8 Inmate Cell at Special Management
Unit II ................................................................. 48
Tables
Table 1 Department of Corrections—
Security Operations
Prison Complexes by Location, Complex,
Unit, Security Level, and
Inmate Counts
As of June 30, 2000....................................... 5
Table 2 Department of Corrections—
Security Operations
Statement of Revenues, Expenditures, and
Other Financing Uses
Years Ended or Ending
June 30, 1999, 2000, and 2001
(Unaudited)................................................... 9
viii
OFFICE OF THE AUDITOR GENERAL
(This Page Intentionally Left Blank)
1
OFFICE OF THE AUDITOR GENERAL
INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND
The Office of the Auditor General has conducted a performance
audit of Security Operations at the Arizona Department of Cor-rections,
in response to a June 16, 1999, resolution of the Joint
Legislative Audit Committee. This performance audit was con-ducted
under the authority vested in the Auditor General by
Arizona Revised Statutes (A.R.S.) §41-1279 and as part of the
Sunset review set forth in A.R.S. §§41-2951 et seq. The audit is the
first in a series of six audits of the Department of Corrections.
The remaining audits will focus on Support Services, Human
Resources, Agency Infrastructure, Private Prisons, and Arizona
Correctional Industries.
Security Operations
Integral to Overall
Department Mission
The Arizona Department of Corrections’ mission is to serve and
protect Arizona’s citizens by imprisoning offenders legally
committed to the Department and by providing community-based
supervision for those conditionally released. Security Op-erations,
a subprogram of the Prison Operations program, plays
a key role in carrying out the Department’s mission. It has four
major areas of responsibility:
n Providing oversight for inmate management, classification,
transportation, employment, safety, and discipline;
n Ensuring delivery of essential services for inmates such as
food, clothing, housing, mail and property, education, and
health care;
n Maintaining security systems, communications, and facilities;
and
n Providing training, allocation, and management of security
staff.
Security Operations plays a
key role in carrying out the
Department’s mission.
Introduction and Background
2
OFFICE OF THE AUDITOR GENERAL
Security Operations’ goals are to prevent escapes from prisons
and work crews, reduce the numbers of assaults on staff and
inmates, prohibit the introduction of drugs into the prisons, and
minimize disturbances.
Arizona Has Experienced
Rapid Growth in Prison System
The growth in Arizona’s prison population is a challenge for
Security Operations. According to the Department’s statistics, the
inmate population of the Arizona correctional system has grown
by almost 76 percent since the last Auditor General audit in
1991—from almost 15,000 inmates to more than 26,000 as of July
2000. Since 1991, the Department has opened two new prison
complexes, raising the number of state-operated facilities to ten,
and has entered into contracts to incarcerate inmates in three
privately operated prisons.
As in other states, changing criminal codes have contributed to
Arizona’s prison growth over the last several years. Compared
to past years, inmates’ incarcerations are longer because of laws
such as mandatory minimum sentences, which require judges to
commit inmates for longer terms, and other laws requiring in-mates
to serve a greater percentage of their court sentences. Such
Truth in Sentencing laws in Arizona and 27 other states require
individuals convicted of violent crimes to serve at least 85 per-cent
of their sentences. In addition, the Department now houses
minors adjudicated as adults. According to corrections officials,
this inmate population growth is likely to continue. Ninety-five
percent of state and county correctional agencies in a 1999 na-tional
survey responded that they believed their inmate popula-tion
would increase over the next five years.
Inmate Classification System
Important to Prisons’
Safe Operation
One of the Department’s most important tools for inmate man-agement
and staff safety is its classification system, which as-
Inmate population has grown
significantly in recent years.
Introduction and Background
3
OFFICE OF THE AUDITOR GENERAL
signs inmates to appropriate housing units. Each prison complex
contains three or more housing units differentiated by security
levels ranging from 2 (lowest security) to 5 (highest secu-
Photo 1: Lower-Security Housing Unit
Lower-security housing units, such as this one in Florence South
Unit, typically house inmates in dormitories and other commu-nal
settings.
rity). Higher-security housing units, such as the Special Man-agement
Unit II at the Eyman Prison Complex, are distinguished
by features such as reinforced steel doors, electronic locking and
monitoring devices, microwave motion detectors, and single or
Photo 2: Higher-Security Housing Unit
Higher-security housing units, such as this one at Eyman Complex,
Rynning Unit, have steel doors and single or double cells for in-mates.
Introduction and Background
4
OFFICE OF THE AUDITOR GENERAL
double cells for inmates. Lower-security housing units typically
house inmates in dormitories, ten-person tents, or prefabricated
housing units with communal restrooms, group activity rooms,
and outdoor recreation areas. Table 1 (see page 5) displays in-formation
on each facility by location, units, security levels, and
number of inmates.
Upon an inmate’s entrance to the prison system, a team of offi-cers
assigns inmates to their housing units based on two primary
classification scores: the inmate’s risk to the public, or P score,
and the inmate’s institutional risk to staff and other inmates, or I
score. Officers score inmates based on rankings from 1 (lowest
risk) to 5 (highest risk).1 The nature of the offense the inmate
committed is the principal basis for his or her public risk score.
For example, officers assign an inmate who represents a signifi-cant
risk to the public because of his use of a lethal weapon dur-ing
a crime a high P score. Officers initially assign an inmate’s
institutional risk score based upon the inmate’s behavior while in
jail or during a previous incarceration. For instance, an inmate
with the highest I score is considered dangerous and likely poses
a high security risk to staff and other inmates. The Department
reassesses each inmate’s classification scores every six months
based on the inmate’s behavior while in prison.
In addition to determining where an inmate will be housed, clas-sification
scores determine the amounts and types of allowable
inmate property, movement around the prison, and the extent of
visitation by family or friends. For example, officers usually as-sign
inmates with the highest public and institutional risk scores
to an individual cell, ensure that at least one staff member escort
them any time they leave their cells, and allow them no physical
contact with friends and family. In addition, high-risk inmates
are allowed only a few types of personal property, such as
1 Some inmates can lower their risk score to 1 through their behavior
while incarcerated. Officers may assign such inmates to security level 2
housing units.
Introduction and Background
5
OFFICE OF THE AUDITOR GENERAL
Table 1
Department of Corrections—Security Operations
Prison Complexes by Location, Complex, Unit, Security Level, and Inmate Counts1
As of June 30, 2000
Complex and Unit Security
Level
Inmate
Count
Douglas
Gila 2 659
Maricopa 2 222
Papago (DUI) 2 297
Mohave 3 938
Complex Detention2 74
Total 2,190
Eyman (Florence, AZ)
Cook 3 929
Meadows 3 991
Rynning 4 858
Special Management Unit I 5 886
Special Management Unit II 5 627
Special Management Unit II
Minors (juveniles) 5 15
Total 4,306
Florence
North 2 960
Picacho 2 195
East 3 715
South 3 388
Health Unit 5 13
Central 5 922
Housing Unit 8 5 32
Cell Block 6 (detention) 5 202
Total 3,417
Lewis (Buckeye, AZ)
Bachman 2 628
Barchey 3 389
Stiner 3 731
Morey 4 403
Buckley, not open as of 6/20005 4 800
Rast, not open as of 6/20005 4 350
Total 2,151
Perryville (Goodyear, AZ)3
San Pedro 2 362
Lumley (females)6 3 0
Santa Cruz (females) 3 751
Santa Maria (females) 4 348
Santa Maria (female juveniles) 4 2
(continued in next column)
Complex and Unit Security
Level
Inmate
Count
Perryville (Goodyear, AZ) concl’d)
Santa Maria Reception 5 68
Complex Detention 33
Total 1,564
Phoenix
Arizona Center for Women4 2 453
Globe 2 260
Inmate Workers 2 40
Aspen 3 116
Flamenco 4 96
Baker Ward 5 27
Alhambra Reception 5 333
Total 1,325
Safford
Fort Grant 2 747
Graham 2 711
Tonto 3 381
Total 1,839
Tucson
Echo 2 454
Southern Arizona Correctional
Release Center (females) 2 177
Manzanita 3 389
Santa Rita 3 878
Winchester 3 545
Rincon 4 641
Rincon Minor (juveniles) 4 135
Cimarron 4 777
Complex Detention 67
St. Mary’s Hospital 4 12
Total 4,075
Winslow
Apache 2 363
Coronado 2 577
Kaibab 4 794
Complex Detention 34
Total 1,768
Yuma
Cocopah 2 349
Cheyenne 3 1,012
Dakota 4 880
Total 2,241
1 Inmate totals do not include 1,411 inmates housed in 5 privately operated prisons.
2 Five of the 10 prison facilities operate detention units to house inmates pending placement in protective segregation or those who com-mit
disciplinary infractions. The other 5 facilities without specific detention units house these inmates in cells within the units.
3 Perryville is undergoing modification in 2000 to be used as a primarily female facility.
4 Arizona Center for Women is expected to close in late 2000.
5 Inmate counts for these units reflect the units’ inmate capacities. Another 800 beds were unopened in other units at Lewis.
6 As of June 30, 2000, no inmates were housed in this unit since the Department transferred the male inmates to another unit and were
preparing to move female inmates into the unit.
Source: Auditor General staff analysis of prison complexes’ information provided by the Arizona Department of Corrections as of June 30,
2000.
Introduction and Background
6
OFFICE OF THE AUDITOR GENERAL
hygiene items; in contrast to lower-risk inmates, who are allowed
craft supplies and the ability to purchase a greater variety of food
items from the inmate store.
Security Operations: Overview
of Staffing and Budget
The Security Operations program is organized with reporting
responsibilities at the department, regional, prison complex, and
prison unit level. As shown in Figure 1 (see page 7), the Deputy
Director for Prison Operations reports directly to the Department
Director. The Deputy Director supervises two regional opera-tions
directors who each oversee five prison complex wardens in
the Southern and Northern regions of Arizona.
Each complex warden functions as a prison’s chief executive
officer, and a deputy warden, assisted by an associate deputy
warden, is responsible for administering each prison unit. Fur-ther,
each unit is assigned a number of security staff: captain
(chief of security), lieutenants, sergeants, and correctional offi-cers.
As of August 4, 2000, Security Operations had a total of
7,517 full-time equivalent (FTE) positions, including 7,200 secu-rity
staffing positions.
The Department also manages an extensive inventory of vehicles
and security equipment. It maintains a fleet of over 1,990 vehi-cles,
including 93 buses for group transport and 321 alternative-fuel
vehicles. Although correctional officers in the units
do not carry any weapons other than pepper spray, the Depart-ment
maintains a firearm inventory of 2,415 weapons, including
shotguns, rifles, handguns, and riot control gas guns. These
weapons are used for perimeter patrol, main gate security,
transportation, and, when necessary, to quell disturbances. Other
security devices carried by correctional officers include hand-held
radios and handcuffs.
Department equipment in-cludes
vehicles, firearms,
hand-held radios, and hand-cuffs.
Introduction and Background
7
OFFICE OF THE AUDITOR GENERAL
Figure 1
Arizona Department of Corrections—Security Operations
Chain of Command
Department
Director
Deputy Director
Prison Operations
Southern Regional
Operations Director
(SROD)
Oversees 5 prison complexes
n Douglas
n Lewis
n Safford
n Tucson
n Yuma
Northern Regional
Operations Director
(NROD)
Oversees 5 prison complexes
n Eyman
n Florence
n Perryville
n Phoenix
n Winslow
For Each Complex
Complex
Warden
For Each Unit
within
Each Complex
Deputy
Warden
Associate
Deputy
Warden1
Chief of Security
(Captain)
Lieutenants
Sergeants
Officers
1 Some units, such as Globe and Picacho, do not have an Associate Deputy Warden.
Source: Auditor General staff analysis of Department of Corrections organization charts.
Regional
Operations Director
Introduction and Background
8
OFFICE OF THE AUDITOR GENERAL
For fiscal year 2000, as illustrated in Table 2 (see page 9), Security
Operations received approximately $230 million in State General
Fund appropriations. Nearly all the program’s funding is de-rived
from these appropriations. Most of the program’s expendi-tures
are for personnel costs.
Substantial Improvements
Since Previous Audits
The Auditor General’s Office reviewed security issues within the
Department in 1985 and 1991. Both audits identified numerous
serious problems, but the current audit found significant im-provement.
n 1985 report (Auditor General Report No. 85-12)—This
audit reported that the Department did not provide adequate
security at some of the prisons. For example, some prisons,
such as Florence, Tucson, and Perryville, lacked adequate pe-rimeter
security such as razor wire, inner fences secured in
cement, and adequate electronic detection systems. These se-curity
inadequacies created opportunities for escapes, with
over 50 inmates escaping through the perimeters of the vari-ous
prisons during a 16-month period. Further, deficiencies
within the facilities created unnecessary risks for inmates and
staff. For example, at the ASPC-Florence Central Unit, the
locking mechanism in Cellblock 2 was broken, so that to
open one cell door on a tier, staff had to open all 26 cells at
once.
The audit also found that the Department did not adequately
control contraband. Visits between inmates and family
members were inadequately monitored by staff, inmates’ liv-ing
areas were not frequently searched, and medical and
pharmaceutical supplies were not adequately monitored. Fi-nally,
the audit found that the Department’s inmate classifi-cation
process was subjective and often classified inmates at
inappropriately low security levels.
Introduction and Background
9
OFFICE OF THE AUDITOR GENERAL
Table 2
Arizona Department of Corrections—
Security Operations
Statement of Revenues, Expenditures, and Other Financing Uses
Years Ended or Ending June 30, 1999, 2000, and 2001
(Unaudited)
1999 2000 2001
(Actual) (Actual) (Estimated)
Revenues:
Appropriations:
State General Fund $206,082,000 $230,341,300 1 $260,783,800 3
Penitentiary Land Fund 2 1,000,000 1,375,000 1,375,000
State Charitable, Penal, and Reformaties Land Earnings Fund 270,000
Sales and charges for goods and services 10,204 13,153 13,200
Fines and forfeits 1,588 911 1,000
Other 36,343 34,171 35,000
Total revenues 207,130,135 231,764,535 262,478,000
Expenditures:
Personal services 168,895,889 191,080,110 1 180,376,700 3
Employee related 31,747,140 34,469,724 53,316,000 3
Professional and outside services 2 2,254,350 1,213,352 3,058,700 3
Travel, in-state 30,515 15,963 15,600
Travel, out-of-state 1,591 55,000
Aid to individuals 97,100
Other operating 3,998,597 4,447,019 24,008,300 3
Buildings and equipment 303,348 94,541 1,501,400 3
Total expenditures 207,231,430 231,320,709 262,428,800
Excess of revenues over (under) expenditures (101,295) 443,826 49,200
Other financing sources (uses):
Net operating transfers in 143,720 2,650
Reversions to the Penitentiary Land Fund 2 (127) (408,931)
Remittances to the State General Fund (47,189) (37,905) (38,000)
Total other financing sources (uses) 96,404 (444,186) (38,000)
Excess of revenues and other sources over expenditures and other
uses $ (4,891) $ (360) $ 11,200
1 State General Fund appropriations increased significantly in 2000. Approximately $14.3 million of that increase was to imple-ment
a new correctional officer pay plan.
2 Monies from fees on lands granted to the State of Arizona and interest earned on the investment of the permanent Penitentiary
Land Fund are appropriated to the Department. The Department allocated these monies to the Security Operations Program to
reimburse county jails for the time they hold prisoners. The expenditures are reported as professional and outside services in
the Statement and fluctuate yearly based on the time counties hold prisoners. Any unexpended monies at year-end are subject
to Legislative authorization in future years; consequently, the unexpended monies are presented as a reversion to the Peniten-tiary
Land Fund. The 2000 reversion does not account for any payments to counties for services performed prior to June 30,
2000, but not yet billed. Those costs will ultimately reduce the reversion; however, the amount owed was not known at the time
of this report.
3 The 2001 State General Fund appropriations and certain noted expenditure line items increased significantly due to the Depart-ment
realigning costs and their related funding source. In addition, overtime pay expenditures are excluded from personal ser-vices
because they are budgeted in another program.
Source: The Arizona Financial Information System (AFIS) Accounting Event Extract File for the years ended June 30, 1999 and 2000.
The Department of Corrections provided estimates for the year ended June 30, 2001.
Introduction and Background
10
OFFICE OF THE AUDITOR GENERAL
n 1991 report (Auditor General Report No. 91-4)—This au-dit
found that although the Department had taken signifi-cant
steps to improve security at the prisons, deficiencies
remained. For example, the Department increased the use of
razor wire on perimeter fences and replaced or refurbished
broken locking systems at inmate housing units. However,
the audit also found that the Department’s procedures gov-erning
tool control were still deficient. For example, con-sultants
hired by the Auditor General observed unsecured
hacksaws, cutting tools, and portable welding equipment.
They also determined that the Department needed to revise
policies and procedures for inmate counts, post orders, and
controls for keys and tool access. Additionally, the consult-ants
found that the Department still housed inmates in
Quonset huts and other structures not designed to provide
adequate observation of inmates.
This audit found that the Department has substantially im-proved
security in almost all areas. Most importantly, the num-ber
of escapes from the Department’s prisons fell from 56 be-tween
January 1984 and May 1985 to 12 in 1990, and then to 0 in
1997 and 6 in 1998. In 1998, only four states had fewer escapes
per inmates incarcerated. In addition, consultants hired for this
audit to assess security at six of the prisons found significant im-provement
in virtually all areas. They found that the Department
“. . . is making highly commendable and largely effective efforts to pro-vide
a safe and secure environment.” For example,
n Perimeter security—The consultants determined that the
Department used appropriate measures to secure its perime-ters,
including adequate fences and sophisticated electronic
detection systems.
n Controls against contraband—The consultants believed
that newly established policies and procedures to limit in-mate
property will help to significantly deter the introduction
of contraband.
n Inmate classification—The consultants saw no evidence,
such as a high number of escapes and assaults, that the De-partment
classifies inmates at inappropriate security levels.
Security has been signifi-cantly
improved.
Introduction and Background
11
OFFICE OF THE AUDITOR GENERAL
Scope and Methodology
This audit focused on the Department’s ability to provide ade-quate
security to staff and inmates and to effectively manage
inmates. The audit was conducted at the Department’s central
office and the ten prisons operated by the Department. The three
private prisons were not included in the audit because they will
be the focus of a future audit.
The primary method auditors used to assess security features
and practices was a review by two security consultants at six
prison complexes. One consultant is an attorney with over 20
years of experience examining prison systems and serving as a
special master overseeing several court orders that resulted from
inmate lawsuits. The second consultant is a former corrections
administrator with 22 years of experience managing and operat-ing
a large, high-security prison that incarcerated over 2,200
high-security inmates. In addition, he has also examined several
other prison systems to assess their security. The consultants
conducted an extensive review of security practices and technol-ogy
at selected units in the Douglas, Eyman, Florence, Lewis,
Phoenix, and Tucson complexes.1 The consultants assessed staff-ing
patterns, security procedures, and adequacy of security
hardware such as lighting, unit layout, and fencing. The consult-ants
reported that “. . . given the drawbacks relating to the poor design
of several older prisons and the very difficult staffing issues the Depart-ment
faces, wardens and deputy wardens are achieving more than they
could reasonably be expected to . . .” The consultants’ detailed report
is available upon request or may be accessed on the Auditor
General’s Web site:
www.auditorgen.state.az.us.
1 Prison complexes were selected, in consultation with the Department,
based on several characteristics to ensure that all types of complexes
were reviewed. Characteristics considered included custody and security
levels, inmate capacity, proximity to an urban area, staff vacancy rates,
age of facilities, and other unique attributes. Auditors selected the com-plexes
to provide comparisons of factors that could influence the nature
of information and incident management system reports and overall
prison security. For example, auditors selected complexes both near and
outside metropolitan areas. Additionally, auditors selected old and new
complexes.
Introduction and Background
12
OFFICE OF THE AUDITOR GENERAL
In addition, a variety of other methods was used to conduct the
audit and document evidence, including:
n Reviews of Department reports including internal audits,
intelligence documents, significant incident reports, escape
reports, and prison security posting assignments. Auditors
also reviewed 43 reports submitted by wardens and deputy
wardens upon their initial assessments of unit conditions.
n Interviews with staff of other states’ departments of correc-tions
relating to their security practices and inmate manage-ment.
1 Auditors also interviewed experts from associations
such as the American Correctional Association and the Na-tional
Institute of Corrections in the Department of Justice to
identify best practices in prison security.
The audit includes findings and recommendations in the follow-ing
areas:
n Improvements needed in prison facilities,
n Improvements needed in inmate management policies and
practices, and
n Improvements in other types of security practices.
In addition to recommendations for these areas, the audit also
provides Other Pertinent Information (see pages 45 through 50)
concerning the Department’s practices managing Security Threat
Groups (prison gangs).
This audit was conducted in accordance with government audit-ing
standards.
The Auditor General and staff express appreciation to the Direc-tor
of the Department of Corrections and Corrections staff for
their cooperation and assistance throughout the audit.
1 The seven states contacted were Colorado, Florida, Nevada, Oregon,
South Carolina, Utah, and Washington. They were selected based on dis-cussions
with the Department, the American Correctional Association,
and the National Institute of Corrections as demonstrating good inmate
management practices.
Introduction and Background
13
OFFICE OF THE AUDITOR GENERAL
13
OFFICE OF THE AUDITOR GENERAL
FINDING I SOME PRISON FACILITIES’
DESIGNS CONTINUE TO
POSE SECURITY AND
SAFETY PROBLEMS
Although the Department generally operates a secure prison
system, some prison facilities have design, maintenance, or other
problems that diminish inmate and staff safety. The Department
has enhanced its facilities through new construction and im-provements
to existing prisons. However, the Department must
still rely on tents, converted hotels, and other facilities that are
inadequate for the correctional purpose they serve. The Depart-ment
has had to use such facilities for several reasons—the steep
growth in inmate population, staffing shortages that make it im-possible
to use certain facilities that require more staff, and lim-ited
resources for new construction. Although it would not be
cost-effective to replace some of these facilities, several steps can
be taken to improve some inmate housing, thereby providing a
safer environment for staff and inmates.
The Department Operates a
Secure Prison System
Compared to conditions a few years ago, the Department has
greatly improved facility security. One reason is that the De-partment
has enhanced its facilities by constructing new prisons
and improving existing facilities. For example, ASPC-Lewis, the
newest of the Department’s ten complexes, has excellent design
and security features. In addition, the Department has made
maintenance and design upgrades to existing facilities that also
enhance safety and security. Since the Auditor General’s previ-ous
audits, the escape and assault rates in the State’s correctional
facilities have declined substantially.
New construction designed for optimum security—The Depart-ment
has incorporated some excellent design and security fea-tures
at its newest complex in the Arizona prison system,
Finding I
14
OFFICE OF THE AUDITOR GENERAL
ASPC-Lewis in Buckeye. The prison consists of 6 units (three
level 4, two level 3, and one level 2) and has a capacity of 4,150
Photo 3: Lewis Complex, Morey Unit
View of Lewis Complex, Morey Unit recreation yard from
observation tower.
inmates. The Department ensured that all 6 units included
smaller, more manageable yards that better facilitate officers’
observation and supervision of inmates and decrease their re-sponse
time in the event of a disturbance. For example, the level
4 Morey Unit’s control center overlooks the recreation yard. In
addition, the unit has a tall observation tower and a fenced run-way
separating the yard’s North and South sections. According
to Auditor General consultants, these features allow good obser-vation
of the entire yard and permit staff to move rapidly
through the complex. Moreover, the control centers have com-puter
monitors with “touch-screen” technology, which allows
the officer assigned to the post to quickly open and close doors,
and to monitor sally ports, perimeter fences, doors, and other
locations, and control water and lights in each cell from a central
location.1
Similarly, at ASPC-Eyman, the control centers in Special Man-agement
Unit II (SMU II), a super-maximum security unit which
opened in 1996, are designed with security features that allow a
1 A sally port is a secured entrance/exit area, between two doors or gates,
in which pedestrians or vehicles can be detained and searched before
they enter or leave a facility.
The Department’s newest
prison, ASPC-Lewis, in-corporates
many security
features.
Finding I
15
OFFICE OF THE AUDITOR GENERAL
single officer to monitor 60 inmates in cells. Each control center is
centrally located, and provides officers with excellent visibility
into the three 6- to 10-cell pods it monitors. Officers can control
doors and utilities and monitor sound from within the control
center. Auditor General consultants reported that these control
centers could serve as a model for maximum-security architec-ture.
Improvements to existing facilities—The Department has made
maintenance and design upgrades to existing facilities that en-hance
safety and security. At ASPC-Douglas, cubicle walls in the
Mohave Unit living areas have been reduced in height to en-hance
security, visibility, and staff safety. Additionally, the ex-pansion
and renovation of the prison ward at Tucson’s St.
Mary’s Hospital added 14 beds and centralized the new control
center to provide excellent security and control of inmates at
every classification level requiring inpatient hospital care. Fur-thermore,
the Department has moved a perimeter fence at Wins-low
to fully contain an administration building that was previ-ously
part of the perimeter. An inmate had escaped by climbing
onto the building and crossing its roof.
Escape and assault rates have declined—Escape rates have con-tinued
to decline since the mid-1980’s, when an Auditor Gen-eral’s
performance audit report on institutional security and
staffing (Report No. 85-12) pointed out major security problems.
The number of escapes from the Department’s prisons fell from
56 between January 1984 and May 1985 to 12 in 1990, and then to
0 in 1997 and 6 in 1998. In 1998, only four states had fewer es-capes
per inmates incarcerated. Similarly, assault rates have de-clined
from 49.1 per 1,000 inmates in 1995-97 to 30.6 in 1998-99.
In addition, the consultants reviewing Department operations
for the current audit found that the Department had substan-tially
improved security in almost all areas.
The Department has made
many upgrades to existing
facilities.
Finding I
16
OFFICE OF THE AUDITOR GENERAL
Department Continues to Operate
Inadequate Facilities
Despite these improvements, some Department facilities are in-adequate
for the correctional purpose they serve. The inadequa-cies
take several forms. Some inmate living units are configured
in ways that restrict surveillance and diminish staff and inmate
safety. In other cases, the Department houses many inmates in
tents, Quonset huts, and other buildings that make proper in-mate
surveillance and control nearly impossible. Moreover,
some units that were not originally designed as adult prisons,
including converted hotels, have unique maintenance and secu-rity
problems. In addition to the buildings themselves, some
sally ports (prison entrances) have design and operations prob-lems
that create potential security breaches.
Some structures have unsafe design—Several inmate living units
are configured in ways that restrict surveillance and diminish
staff and inmate safety. For example:
n H-shaped dormitories with high partitions—According to
Auditor General consultants, dormitories at ASPC-Florence’s
South Unit remain among the Department’s most dangerous
housing units due to their design. The South Unit, a level 3,
medium-security prison, was singled out in previous Audi-tor
General reports in 1985 and 1991 for poor design features.
Each dormitory consists of four wings connected by a single
corridor, forming the shape of an H. In some of the dormito-ries,
inmates’ beds are separated by partitions 43 and 1/2
inches high, which impair officers’ visibility. The Department
has lowered similar partitions at some units but has not low-ered
them in this unit. Further, one officer is assigned to
monitor four wings in each dormitory building. According to
Auditor General consultants, the “H”-shaped building leaves
the housing unit officer dangerously isolated during rounds
and inmate counts. Additionally, while outside doors elec-tronically
lock, the dormitories’ inside doors have only key
locks that require manual operation. Although Department
officials have attempted to mitigate the unit’s problems by
assigning less troublesome inmates to these dormitories,
Auditor General consultants described South Unit dormito-ries
as among the most dangerous they have ever seen. De-partment
officials recently instructed Regional Operations
Some dormitories have
unsafe design.
Finding I
17
OFFICE OF THE AUDITOR GENERAL
Directors to submit a plan for lowering the remaining tall
partitions in all units to 36 inches.
Photo 4: Unsafe Dormitories
Inmate beds separated by high partitions at Florence Complex,
South Unit.
n Mental health units—Chronically mentally ill inmates at
ASPC-Phoenix’s Flamenco Unit are housed in two- to six-person
rooms along dark hallways that do not lend them-selves
to direct, continuous surveillance. Staff must make
rounds and conduct inmate counts virtually without the
backup of officers who can see or hear them. According to
Auditor General consultants, this is particularly dangerous
with these less stable inmates. Similarly, inmates in the Aspen
Unit at ASPC-Phoenix, who because of cognitive or emotional
conditions are unable to function in the general prison popula-tion,
live in dormitories whose layout does not permit staff to
observe all inmates from a single location.
n Control centers with inadequate sight lines—Several units’
control centers have restricted lines of sight that create blind
spots for control room officers. For example, control rooms at
the ASPC-Tucson Santa Rita Unit and the Lumley, San Pedro,
Santa Maria, and Santa Cruz units at ASPC-Perryville are built
so one tier of cells is above the control center level and the
other cells are below the control center level. However, accord-ing
to Auditor General consultants, this design restricts
backup surveillance for housing unit officers and potentially
allows inmates to engage in prohibited behavior without de-tection.
Although Department officials note that cameras have
Finding I
18
OFFICE OF THE AUDITOR GENERAL
been installed to assist control room officers in monitoring
these blind spots, the basic design problem remains. Further-more,
these control rooms have no sally ports or double doors,
increasing the risk that someone could make a forced entry
when the single door is opened.
Temporary structures and tents in long-term use—In addition to
permanent structures that do not permit adequate surveillance,
the Department uses numerous tents, Quonset huts, and other
prefabricated buildings that make proper inmate surveillance
and control nearly impossible. Approximately 1,000 inmates
statewide live in approximately 100 ten-bed canvas tents, located
at 5 of the 10 prison complexes. In addition, up to 732 inmates
are housed in prefabricated 9- to 11-bed Quonset huts at the East
and North Units at ASPC-Florence. Other inmates live in a vari-ety
of portable buildings, including several that had been used
on the Alaska pipeline.
Photo 5: Temporary Structure
Portable building, formerly used to house Alaska pipeline construction
workers, now used to house inmates at Tucson Complex, Echo Unit.
However, none of these temporary structures permit officers to
have adequate surveillance and inmate control. Correctional offi-cers
can look in only one structure at a time, so most inmates are
not under direct observation. Moreover, inmates cannot be
locked into their rooms during disturbances because toilets and
showers are in separate buildings. In two separate 1999 inci-dents,
female inmates at ASPC-Perryville refused orders to “lock
down” (return to and stay in their tents). Since tents have canvas
Finding I
19
OFFICE OF THE AUDITOR GENERAL
walls and a wooden door, staff had difficulty enforcing the or-ders.
Photo 6: Tents Used for Housing Inmates
Tents at Tucson Complex, Echo Unit. Each tent houses 10 inmates.
Old hotels require significant maintenance—Units that were not
originally designed as adult prisons, including converted hotels,
have unique maintenance and security problems. For instance,
the Arizona Center for Women at ASPC-Phoenix (ACW) opened
in 1954 as the Phoenix International Hotel/Resort.1 Likewise, the
ASPC Douglas Papago Unit was also converted from 1950’s-era
hotels. These prisons are located on busy city streets, and sur-rounded
by a wall and fencing. Their proximity to civilian traffic
increases opportunities for contraband to be thrown over the
walls. These old structures were not designed as secure housing
for the inmate population and require significant maintenance,
such as room renovations, flood abatement, and upgrades to the
fire alarm system, fence and razor wire, and visitation area.
Perimeter sally ports potentially vulnerable—In addition to
building design issues, sally port design creates potential secu-rity
breaches at two facilities. Vehicle sally ports, through which
vehicles enter a unit or complex, should be tightly controlled
because they can become a focal point for escapes and the in-troduction
of contraband. However, the main vehicle sally port
1 ACW is scheduled to close later this year, when its female population is
moved to ASPC-Perryville.
Finding I
20
OFFICE OF THE AUDITOR GENERAL
at ASPC-Tucson can hold up to four vehicles, which increases
the opportunity for an escaping inmate to move from a vehicle
that has not been searched to one that has been searched. Addi-tionally,
one officer reported that because of traffic volume and
the size of some trucks, not every entering vehicle is thoroughly
searched, which enhances the likelihood of contraband being
smuggled into the prison. Traffic volume is particularly high at
this sally port because the warehouse and motor pool are lo-cated
inside the complex perimeter. Later prison designs, such
as ASPC-Lewis, have wisely placed warehouses and motor
pool buildings outside the perimeter fences in order to reduce
vehicle traffic into the prisons.
The prison at Fort Grant, part of the Safford complex, has a dif-ferent
type of sally port design problem. Numerous vehicles also
enter the Fort Grant Unit at ASPC-Safford. However, the size of
some trucks requires that both sally port gates be simultaneously
open to allow entry to and egress from the unit.
Several Factors Force
the Department to Operate
Deficient Prisons
Inmate population growth, staffing shortages, and limited re-sources
for new construction all contribute to the Department’s
facility-related problems. Inmate population growth has out-stripped
the State’s construction of permanent facilities making it
necessary to add temporary structures, such as tents, to the De-partment’s
housing inventory. Additionally, staff shortages have
delayed the opening of new units that would reduce the use of
temporary beds. Furthermore, it would not be cost-effective for
the Department to correct all facility deficiencies.
Prison growth contributes to the Department’s use of tempo-rary
structures—Rapid prison growth has required the De-partment
to use temporary structures and continue to use un-satisfactory
permanent structures. Between 1985 and 1991, Ari-zona’s
inmate population grew by 66 percent, and since 1991, the
population has grown almost 76 percent. This growth, from
about 8,000 inmates in 1985 to over 26,000 inmates in 2000, has
not permitted the Department to permanently remove unsatis-factory
beds from service. In 1991, the Auditor General reported
Arizona’s inmate population
has grown by almost 76% since
1991.
Finding I
21
OFFICE OF THE AUDITOR GENERAL
that the Department had discontinued the use of tents (Auditor
General Report No. 91-4), but growth has made it necessary to
reintroduce them. Inmate population growth has also contrib-uted
to the use of other temporary structures, double occupancy
in detention cells and mental health units, and the continued use
of older, poorly designed facilities.
Limited resources have resulted in temporary beds for inmates—
Tents and other temporary structures can be added to the system
in less time and at a fraction of permanent prison construction
cost. For instance, in 1998, the Department added 800 level 4
double-bunk cell beds and 800 level 3 dormitory beds to its in-ventory
at a total cost of approximately $60.7 million. The aver-age
cost for each of these permanent beds was $37,958. That
same year, 400 tent beds were constructed at ASPC-Florence for
$2,450,000. The cost per bed was $6,125. Although tents have
many deficiencies, they have provided an economical, stopgap
solution to a quickly expanding prison population. Furthermore,
while a new prison may take two years or more to construct,
tents and modular buildings can be erected to meet immediate
needs.
Staffing shortages prevent opening some permanent beds—Like
other law enforcement and correctional agencies, the Depart-ment
experiences difficulty recruiting and retaining security
staff. For example, during fiscal year 2000, the loss rate for correc-tional
officers averaged about 25 percent. One effect has been
that some facilities that would provide better security have been
unable to open. The Lewis complex’s 51.5 percent staff vacancy
rate has prevented the Department from activating two units.1 In
November 2000, there were two unoccupied units at ASPC-Lewis
with 1,150 total beds, and unopened beds in other units
brought the total to 1,550 beds not opened due to staff vacancies.
Chronic staffing shortages exacerbate the effects of using some of
the Department’s least appropriate facilities. For example, one
high-security unit at ASPC-Florence consistently operates with
fewer staff than it needs at the most restricted level, according to
1 The Department has high vacancy rates throughout the system, although
none so high as ASPC-Lewis. A forthcoming audit of the Department’s
Human Resources program, to be issued in 2001, will examine this mat-ter
in more detail.
Finding I
22
OFFICE OF THE AUDITOR GENERAL
the Department’s own policy. These inadequate staffing levels
create numerous security issues. Further, although additional
officers could increase surveillance of inmates in tents and other
units that have limited supervision, it would be cost-prohibitive
to hire the number of officers needed for proper supervision. For
tents, Quonset huts, and some dormitories, direct surveillance
would require at least one officer for each structure—a far too
expensive approach. The Department has acknowledged these
deficiencies and generally assigns its lowest custody inmates to
these inadequate structures.
Replacement of some facilities is not cost-effective—Construction
of new, modern facilities to correct all the facility-related defi-ciencies
in Department prisons would not be cost-effective.
While construction of new facilities would eliminate some prob-lems,
it is doubtful that it would improve the success or security
of some institutions. For example, although the converted hotel
rooms at ASPC-Douglas Papago Unit are unsatisfactory for sev-eral
reasons, there have been no escapes and few significant inci-dents
in the past year. According to Auditor General consultants,
replacing the Papago Unit with a new prison would cost tens of
millions of dollars, but, considering its effectiveness, public, staff,
and inmate safety could not improve significantly. Furthermore,
according to Auditor General consultants, Department managers
maintain and make productive use of facilities that would be
unusable in most states’ correctional systems. For example, the
consultants stated that correctional officers are unable to provide
ongoing surveillance of inmates housed in the Quonset huts at
the East Unit at ASPC-Florence. However, when the consultants
toured them, the Quonset huts were well-maintained, clean, and
appeared to be at least marginally adequate for inmates with low
institutional risk scores.
Department Facilities
Can Be Improved
Although replacement of some old facilities is not cost-effective,
the Department should improve some inmate housing to ade-quately
provide a safer environment for staff and inmates. First,
it should continue its efforts to add new beds to its inventory by
opening the remaining units at ASPC-Lewis as soon as it has the
Good management allows the
use of some facilities that
would be unusable in other
states’ correctional systems.
Finding I
23
OFFICE OF THE AUDITOR GENERAL
staff to do so. Additionally, the Department should eliminate the
use of tents. Finally, it should develop plans to replace and mod-ify
buildings and structures where appropriate and feasible.
The Department should continue its efforts to open all units at
ASPC-Lewis—The Department should continue its efforts to
add new beds to its inventory by opening the remaining units at
ASPC-Lewis as soon as it has the staff to do so. The Department
is making efforts, such as providing wage stipends and van
pools, to staff units at ASPC-Lewis, where approximately 1,550
beds remain vacant.
The Department should eliminate the use of tents—As perma-nent
beds become available, the Department should move in-mates
living in tents into secure living units. The Department has
taken steps toward this end. Recently, the Department reduced
its tent bed inventory at Perryville by moving female inmates to
permanent structures formerly occupied by male inmates.
However, 400 tent beds at ASPC-Florence were designated by
the Legislature in 1995 as permanent beds. While this designa-tion
allows the Department to obtain authorization for staff to
oversee inmates in these tents, tent beds should not be included
in the Department’s permanent bed inventory, and the Depart-ment
should develop a plan to eliminate all tent beds.
Eventually, the Department should replace and modify buildings
and structures that hamper security—The Department should
develop plans to eventually replace and modify some buildings
and other facilities.
n The Department should develop a plan to replace the mental
health units in the Flamenco and Aspen Units at
ASPC-Phoenix that have design problems that inhibit direct
inmate surveillance.
n The Department should take immediate steps to lower Flor-ence’s
South Unit dormitory partitions to enhance visibility.
If temporary housing was available to inmates housed in
these dormitories, the cinderblock partitions could be low-ered
at a minimal cost with inmate labor. Additionally, ac-cording
to Auditor General consultants, one correctional offi-cer
should be added to each dormitory building. Absent the
The Department should lower
the partitions in some dormi-tories.
Finding I
24
OFFICE OF THE AUDITOR GENERAL
ability to provide additional staffing, these dormitories
should be replaced.
n While less critical, the Department should develop a plan for
the eventual replacement of its Quonset huts. Likewise, the
Department should begin planning for the future replace-ment
of the modular housing units at ASPC-Tucson’s Echo
Unit. Although these structures are marginally adequate for
their current populations, they pose security risks and main-tenance
requirements that argue for their replacement.
Additionally, the Department should identify options to recon-figure
vehicle sally ports at ASPC-Safford and ASPC-Tucson and
explore options to improve sight lines for control rooms at
ASPC-Tucson and ASPC-Perryville. According to Auditor Gen-eral
consultants, installing a barrier to restrict vehicles from exit-ing
the sally port until they are properly inspected by officers
would increase security, as would permitting only one vehicle at
a time to enter the sally port. Additionally, they recommend re-locating
the complex warehouse outside the vehicle entrance so
that the high amount of vehicle traffic would not need to enter
the sally port. Finally, the Department should explore methods
to improve the control room sight lines at ASPC-Tucson and
ASPC-Perryville. For example, the Department could consider
modifications to the control rooms to allow more unobstructed
inmate monitoring.
Finding I
25
OFFICE OF THE AUDITOR GENERAL
Recommendations
The Department should:
1. Open the remaining units at ASPC-Lewis as soon as staff is
available to do so.
2. Cease using tents at all complexes as soon as the inmate
population can be transferred to other housing units. Because
some of the tents have been designated as part of the De-partment’s
permanent bed inventory, the Department should
develop a plan (which would require legislative approval) to
eliminate them.
3. Develop plans for closing the Alhambra/Flamenco and As-pen
Units at ASPC-Phoenix and replace those units.
4. Take immediate steps to lower the partitions in Florence’s
South Unit dormitories to enhance visibility.
5. Add one correctional officer to each ASPC-Florence South
Unit dormitory building. Absent the ability to provide addi-tional
staffing, these dormitories should be replaced.
6. Develop a plan for the future replacement of Quonset huts
and modular housing units.
7. Relocate the ASPC-Tucson warehouse outside the vehicle
entrance and allow only one vehicle at a time to enter the
sally port, and correct the sally port design problem at ASPC-Safford’s
Fort Grant unit that currently requires both gates to
be open simultaneously for trucks to enter or exit the unit.
8. Explore options to modify sight lines at control rooms at
ASPC-Tucson and ASPC-Perryville to enhance inmate sur-veillance.
26
OFFICE OF THE AUDITOR GENERAL
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27
OFFICE OF THE AUDITOR GENERAL
FINDING II THE DEPARTMENT SHOULD
CONTINUE TO IMPROVE
INMATE MANAGEMENT
The Department should continue to improve some practices it
uses to manage inmates. Effective inmate management policies
and practices allow staff to monitor inmates’ location and con-trol
their behavior, and are essential for preventing incidents
involving assaults, contraband, and escape. The Department
has already developed many effective policies and procedures
designed to effectively manage inmates. However, improve-ments
can be made in three areas: following existing practices
more consistently and thoroughly, developing management
policies for controlled movement of inmates and for activity
passes, and assigning an appropriate number of staff to some
critical areas within prison units.
The Department Has
Implemented Many
Effective Inmate Management
Policies and Practices
Arizona’s Department of Corrections, similar to other depart-ments
across the country, has implemented a variety of policies
and practices designed to effectively manage inmates. Some
policies address how inmates are to be monitored and tracked,
while others are intended to reduce the introduction of contra-band.
Moreover, the Department has developed specialized
inmate housing units to promote safety.
Some practices monitor and track inmates—The Department
has developed several policies and practices that monitor in-mates’
location and movement:
n Counts—Required by Department policy, correctional offi-cers
conduct several counts of inmates throughout each day
Finding II
28
OFFICE OF THE AUDITOR GENERAL
to ensure that inmates are at an allowable location. During a
count, inmate movement throughout the unit is usually not
permitted and, with the exception of work crew inmates, all
other inmates remain in their housing unit until the count is
determined to be correct.
n Activity passes and surveillance—Correctional officers
track lower-custody inmates’ locations by issuing inmates
activity passes, scheduling inmate activities on a master
pass form, and by using visual and radio surveillance. For
example, officers use visual surveillance to monitor inmates
as they move from one location to another. Additionally, of-ficers
issue inmates a color-coded activity pass specifying a
location they are allowed to visit, such as the inmate store.
Further, officers use radio communication to notify other of-ficers
that an inmate is moving to, or has arrived at, a loca-tion
within the unit. Moreover, inmates in the highest cus-tody
levels must be escorted by at least one correctional offi-cer
when moving to areas within a unit.
n New program to monitor inmates—The Department is
piloting its Inmate Program Plan at five prison units. This
new program is designed to monitor inmate movement
with electronic bracelets worn by inmates at the Cook Unit
at ASPC-Eyman. In addition, this program schedules each
inmate’s day according to four time-blocks (morning, after-noon,
evening, and night), and tracks his or her location
throughout the day. According to Department manage-ment,
in addition to tracking inmate movement, the pro-gram
is intended to provide each inmate with appropriate
programs, such as substance abuse and religious programs,
and education programs, such as literacy classes. The pro-gram
also assigns each inmate to work programs that corre-spond
to his or her vocational skills.
n Controlled movement—Recently, the Department further
restricted inmate movement in most of its medium-security
(level three and four) units by implementing “controlled
movement” procedures. Instead of allowing all inmates liv-ing
in a dormitory or cellblock to disperse on their own to
attend activities and programs, controlled movement pro-cedures
require inmates to move in small groups to and
from activities such as meals, recreation, and religious ser-
Finding II
29
OFFICE OF THE AUDITOR GENERAL
vices during specified intervals. According to Department
management, controlled movement helps ensure the safety
of staff as well as inmates because it limits the number of
inmates in one place. In addition, according to one Regional
Operations Director, if an assault is committed, officers of-ten
find it easier to determine an assailant’s identity because
fewer inmates are at a particular location.
Some practices intended to prevent introduction of contra-band—
The Department has implemented several policies and
practices designed to prevent inmates from introducing contra-band
into the prisons:
n Rules for visits with family and friends—The Depart-ment’s
policies and procedures regarding inmates’ visits
with family and friends in person and on the telephone are
intended to reduce the introduction of contraband. Inmates
are allowed to receive visits from no more than ten persons
who must first be approved by Department staff through a
screening process. Inmates in maximum-security units are
not allowed to have any physical contact with their visitors
and are limited to communicating with them through a
glass barrier, while many lower-custody inmates may sit at
a table with their visitors and kiss them at the beginning
and end of the visit. In addition, the Department monitors
inmates’ telephone calls with recording equipment to iden-tify
potential security risks, such as discussions of escape
plans or drug smuggling.
n Searches of inmates and their living areas—The De-partment
has developed policies and procedures for search-ing
inmates and their living areas. According to Department
policy, searches are intended to reduce incidents involving
contraband, including drugs and weapons. For example, of-ficers
conduct strip-searches of inmates before they return to
the prison from attending a work crew and after visiting
with a family member or friend. Additionally, correctional
officers conduct quarterly searches of all inmates’ living ar-eas.
n New policy to reduce property—In an attempt to further
reduce contraband items at the prisons, the Department en-acted
Department Order 909 in October 1999. This policy re-
Controlled movement lim-its
the number of inmates
in one place.
Finding II
30
OFFICE OF THE AUDITOR GENERAL
stricts the property inmates are allowed to possess. It pro-hibits
inmates from receiving incoming packages through
the mail. In addition, it requires inmates to purchase all
property, such as radios and televisions, through the inmate
store. In the past, inmates received contraband through
packages sent by mail.
Specialized units developed to promote safety—To promote
safety, the Department has segregated certain groups of in-mates
from the general population and houses them together to
prevent security problems such as assaults. For example, the
Department has designated four prison units (Cook, Meadows,
Rynning, and South Units at ASPC-Eyman and Florence) to
house only sex offenders to protect them from general popula-tion
inmates who often prey on these inmates. Moreover, the
Department has placed inmates requiring protection from other
inmates into its protective segregation program. In addition, the
Department developed a new policy to collect and document
information on Security Threat Groups (prison gangs) that of-ten
disrupt the prisons’ orderly operations. If the Department
collects enough intelligence information to demonstrate that an
inmate belongs to a Security Threat Group, the inmate is segre-gated
from the general population and moved to the restrictive
maximum-security Special Management Unit II at ASPC-Eyman.
For additional information relating to the Department’s
Security Threat Group policies, see Other Pertinent Informa-tion,
pages 45 through 50.
Finally, the Department is in the process of transferring all fe-male
inmates to ASPC-Perryville. Prior to this move, minimum-and
medium-security-level female inmates were housed at the
Manzanita Unit and the Southern Arizona Correctional Release
Center at ASPC-Tucson and the Arizona Center for Women at
ASPC-Phoenix, while female inmates of every security level
were housed at the Santa Maria Unit at ASPC-Perryville. The
decision to move these inmates to ASPC-Perryville is intended
to improve safety and security by reducing inmate movement
between prison complexes.
The Department houses
certain types of inmates
together.
Finding II
31
OFFICE OF THE AUDITOR GENERAL
Analysis of Prison Incidents Points
to Need for Continuous Improvement
Although the Department has implemented many policies and
practices to effectively manage inmates, many incidents involv-ing
assaults, contraband, and disturbances occur. The Depart-ment
documents prison incidents through a variety of reports,
depending on an incident’s severity and the level of response
required to manage it. For example, officers compile an infor-mation
report when they find contraband while searching an
inmate’s cell or locate a security device, such as a hand-held
radio, that is not working properly. They document more seri-ous
incidents, such as fights, in an incident management system
report. These reports show that while the majority of the inci-dents
involve routine matters, such as broken light fixtures,
other incidents are more serious and involve assaults, distur-bances,
and contraband:
n Assaults and disturbances—Inmates often commit as-saults
and occasionally create disturbances that can cause
significant security problems. For example, monthly reports
the Department compiled reveal that inmates caused 7 ma-jor
and 30 minor disturbances from July through December
1999.1 Disturbances create security problems and are costly
to the Department. For example, during a recent major dis-turbance
at the Ft. Grant Unit in Safford, inmates took over
the unit’s yard office and destroyed the building by setting
it on fire.
n Drugs and other contraband items—While conducting
searches of inmates and their living areas, officers often find
drugs and other contraband that can compromise security.
For example, according to the Department’s monthly statis-
1 Arizona Department of Corrections policy defines a major disturbance as
any collective action by three or more inmates that constitutes an attempt
to gain control of the prison or any part of that prison and requires
prison complex level, rather than unit level, or external, response. Major
disturbances can include incidents of damages greater than $1,000, seri-ous
injuries, or staff being assaulted and forced to flee or being taken
hostage. A minor disturbance is defined as an inmate grouping, alterca-tion,
or disruptive incident involving three or more inmates that is con-tained
by the unit’s on-duty staff, with damages less than $1,000 and no
medical emergencies resulting.
Finding II
32
OFFICE OF THE AUDITOR GENERAL
tical report for fiscal year 2000, there were 686 inmates who
tested positive for drugs during October, November, and
December 1999, indicating that the inmates had used these
substances while in prison. In addition, auditors’ analysis of
information reports indicated that drug-related contraband
was found primarily at lower-level custody units, suggest-ing
that given their greater freedom of movement, and
lower levels of supervision, lower-custody inmates are able
to obtain contraband more easily.
Information Reports also document other types of contraband
found during searches. For example, one Information Report
from the Papago Unit at Douglas documents the objects an offi-cer
confiscated from an inmate’s living area, including pliers,
drill bits, razor blades, hacksaw blades, wire, and other danger-ous
contraband.
Improvements to Inmate
Management Practices Can
Be Made in Several Areas
The consultants and Auditor General staff identified several
areas in which inmate management practices can be improved.
They include following existing procedures more consistently
and thoroughly, developing policies for controlled movement
procedures and activity passes, and ensuring that enough staff
are in place to fill critical posts.
Greater consistency and thoroughness needed in following De-partment
policies—Officers sometimes fail to consistently ap-ply
procedures to supervise inmates, which can compromise
security. According to two Department officials, assaults in
high-security units can occur because officers fail to follow
rules, such as prohibiting inmates to have access to each other.
For example, two serious incidents, a murder and an assault,
have occurred under such circumstances at Special Manage-ment
Unit II since it opened in 1996. In addition, a 1999 internal
audit of ASPC-Douglas reported that two units’ staff did not
conduct strip searches of inmates properly. These searches are
particularly important because contraband is often smuggled
into the units by inmates returning from work sites.
Officers do not always
follow Department proce-dures.
Finding II
33
OFFICE OF THE AUDITOR GENERAL
Officers also sometimes fail to thoroughly monitor inmates’
locations. For example, the lack of appropriate tracking proce-dures
at the ASPC-Perryville’s Santa Maria unit contributed to
an escape in October 1999. In that incident, a high-security fe-male
inmate had received an activity pass to visit the resource
library, but when she did not appear at the library, staff did not
immediately follow up to locate her. In addition to increasing
the risk of escape, failure to monitor inmate locations can give
inmates opportunities to commit assaults or engage in other
prohibited activities, and can also create confusion when offi-cers
conduct counts. According to four officers interviewed
during the audit, count sheets sometimes contain incorrect in-formation,
such as showing an inmate as part of a work crew
when he is actually in his cell due to illness.
Some clarification to existing policies may be needed to ensure
they do not allow inmates to engage in activities that may com-promise
security objectives. At two units, Auditor General con-sultants
observed inappropriate duties assigned to inmates that
increase the potential for inmates to engage in activities prohib-ited
by Department policy. First, inmates at ASPC-Florence
were observed delivering inmate store items to other inmates.
However, theft, introduction of contraband, and other prohib-ited
actions could be more likely when inmates are used to de-liver
store items. Moreover, at ASPC-Tucson, an inmate was
observed in a tool room helping conduct an inventory of re-turned
tools. According to the consultants, inmates should
never help conduct an inventory of tools.
The Department should ensure that all policies and procedures
are carried out consistently at the prisons. According to De-partment
management, it has improved consistency across all
prison complexes by creating the Northern and Southern Re-gional
Operations Director positions. These positions directly
supervise five prison wardens each, and are intended to facili-tate
consistencies in following procedures.
Department lacks policies in two areas—Although the De-partment
has developed many effective inmate management
policies, it lacks policies governing two inmate management
practices. First, the Department lacks a policy to guide con-trolled
movement procedures systemwide. According to one
Department official, officers use the policies written specifically
Finding II
34
OFFICE OF THE AUDITOR GENERAL
to address inmate movement procedures in the Lumley Unit at
ASPC-Perryville. These policies were developed and imple-mented
in response to the 1997 murder of an officer assigned to
that unit. However, interviews with staff indicate that instead
of using these policies to guide inmate movement at their units,
officers rely primarily on post orders (requirements for each
type of post) that have been established for their unit.
Second, the Department lacks consistent policies for its activity
pass system, which tracks the movement of medium-custody
inmates. The Department uses activity passes to track inmates
attending education programs or going to the inmate store. At
some units, such as the Santa Maria Unit at ASPC-Perryville,
officers issue inmates an activity pass. Other officers monitoring
the unit ensure that the inmate moves to the assigned activity.
At other units, such as the Cimarron Unit at ASPC-Tucson and
the Kaibab Unit at ASPC-Winslow, officers use a master pass
list, which contains a listing of all inmates pre-approved to at-tend
an activity.
The Department should develop policies to carry out controlled
movement and activity passes. According to Department man-agement,
these policies are being drafted. However, the De-partment
should consider development of these policies a key
priority and ensure they are developed by the end of 2000.
Too few staff in certain areas—The Department has too few
staff in certain areas where inmate monitoring is important. In
many units, a single correctional officer is often responsible for
supervising multiple housing areas. For example, while the
Graham Unit at ASPC-Safford houses 715 low-custody inmates,
only 5 correctional officers operate the unit at a “restricted level
of operations.” In addition, the Echo Unit at ASPC-Tucson has
only 4 officers during the graveyard shift supervising 456 in-mates
and providing the unit with a minimal level of services.
According to management from this unit, another correctional
officer is needed to adequately supervise the inmates living in
this unit’s trailers and tents. According to Auditor General con-sultants,
some critical areas are understaffed. For example, just
1 officer is responsible for monitoring an inmate dormitory and
7 Quonset huts in the South and East Units, respectively, at
ASPC-Florence.
The Department lacks poli-cies
for controlled move-ment
and activity passes.
Finding II
35
OFFICE OF THE AUDITOR GENERAL
In addition to having too few staff in particular areas, the De-partment
also has too few staff to adequately search inmates’
cells and living areas. According to Department policy, searches
of inmates’ living areas are supposed to be part of the prisons’
daily operations. Additionally, according to our consultants, the
Department should conduct frequent and random cell searches
in addition to the quarterly searches conducted by the prisons’
Tactical Support Units and by other correctional officers. How-ever,
most officers interviewed by the consultants claimed that
although they conducted some random and targeted cell
searches, they were not able to search as many cells as they felt
would be desirable. The consultants also entered four randomly
selected cells at the Central Unit at ASPC-Florence and found
nuisance contraband in plain sight in all four cells. According to
the consultants, the number of searches appeared to be insuffi-cient.
According to one Department official, the Department
does not have enough staff to adequately conduct cell searches.
The Auditor General will address staffing issues in greater
depth in a future audit of the Department’s Human Resources
Management, to be issued in 2001.
Although the Department evaluated its need for posts in 1996,
it has not recently reassessed the number of posts needed in
some critical areas. The Department should regularly reassess
its staffing needs for critical areas by conducting a zero-based
staffing analysis. This analysis should be comprehensive
enough to identify the number of officers needed to thoroughly
monitor the number of inmates housed at particular units.
Finding II
36
OFFICE OF THE AUDITOR GENERAL
Recommendations
1. The Department should develop and implement policies for
controlled movement and activity pass systems.
2. The Department should continue to ensure that staff at all
prisons consistently follow inmate management practices.
3. The Department should analyze and determine the appro-priate
number of staff needed to adequately monitor inmate
movement and activity.
4. Once this analysis is complete, the Department should as-sign
staff appropriately to critical posts and, if necessary, re-quest
authorization to increase its complement of FTEs.
37
OFFICE OF THE AUDITOR GENERAL
FINDING III MOST OTHER SECURITY
PRACTICES ARE SOUND,
BUT SOME CAN BE IMPROVED
In addition to security practices related to inmate management,
the Department should continue to improve some of its other
security practices. The Department has made considerable
strides in improving these other practices, which cover such
areas as inspecting facilities and controlling access to potentially
dangerous tools. Prior audits had found serious procedural diffi-culties,
which the Department has largely corrected. However,
the Department needs to develop or improve policies in such
areas as dispensing prescription drugs, conducting certain secu-rity
tests, and controlling tools.
Other Policies and Procedures
Enhance Security
In addition to secure facilities and appropriate inmate manage-ment
practices, prisons require other effective security practices
in order to protect the public, staff, and inmates. Such practices
include inspecting fences and security devices, controlling access
to keys and potentially dangerous tools, examining mailed items
for drugs and other contraband, and maintaining written in-structions
for every security post. Corrections departments gain
further assurance of safe prison operation by conducting regular
internal audits of each prison’s adherence to policies. Without
sound security practices, a prison can develop a violent atmos-phere
that is unsafe for inmates as well as staff and the public.
Department Has Made
Substantial Improvements
Since Previous Audits
While prior audits revealed many serious deficiencies, the De-partment
has improved its policies and procedures and ad-
Finding III
38
OFFICE OF THE AUDITOR GENERAL
dressed those deficiencies. Inspection policies, post orders, and
key and tool control have all improved, as have policies regard-ing
weapons, transportation, and mail and property.
Prior audits found several procedural deficiencies—Both the
Auditor General’s 1985 and 1991 reports noted numerous proce-dural
deficiencies at Department prisons. For example, the 1991
audit noted that staff did not adhere to security inspection poli-cies.
Security inspections were not being carried out in a consis-tent,
complete, well-defined manner at most Department facili-ties.
Additionally, the nature and quality of post orders, which
are procedures specific to individual positions or “posts” to
which officers are assigned, varied from institution to institution.
Furthermore, few facilities had established comprehensive key
control systems and tool control was an ongoing problem at
many prisons. Finally, the Department was not issuing body
alarms, which are designed to alert the control center when an
officer is in trouble.
Current audit found Department follows many excellent prac-tices—
The Department has improved its policies and procedures
and addressed most of the deficiencies identified in prior audits.
It has developed uniform standards, many modeled after those
in use at the Federal Bureau of Prisons, for prison complexes
throughout the system to follow. According to Auditor General
consultants, the Department’s policies are equal to or exceed
accepted standards, and could serve as models for other states to
follow. In addition, the consultants found that, to a great extent,
the policies had been effectively implemented throughout the six
prison complexes they reviewed. Annual security audits of each
prison complex help ensure consistent implementation of these
policies.
Auditor General consultants reviewed security practices at six
prison complexes and commended the Department on their
policies and practices in the following areas:
n Inspections—Officers make regular checks of outdoor fenc-ing,
gates, locks, wire, and other security hardware. Broken
or deficient items are quickly repaired. In addition, the De-partment
has implemented the practice of painting retaining
The Department’s policies
equal or exceed accepted
standards.
Finding III
39
OFFICE OF THE AUDITOR GENERAL
wires and brackets red or bright yellow where they attach to
the fencing so that officers can immediately spot any tamper-ing.
n Post orders—Each security post has complete, relevant post
orders. Correctional officers assigned to a post review and
sign these orders to indicate their understanding of the post’s
responsibilities and emergency procedures. The consultants
considered many of the Department’s post orders to be
among the best they had encountered.
n Key control—The Department maintains good key account-ability.
In contrast to the 1991 audit, consultants found the
Department has secure key centers, keeps keys in locked
cabinets, marks both keys and key locations for identification,
and keeps a record of all keys issued.
n Tool control—The Department also has good procedures for
controlling tools, including kitchen implements, yard work
tools, and cleaning chemicals, to ensure inmates cannot steal
them to use as weapons. Each tool storage area has shadow
boards for quick identification of absent items, and all poten-tially
dangerous tools remain in secure storage areas except
when signed out for use.1 Staff maintain accurate inventory
records and make frequent checks to ensure inmates who
have been assigned tools have them in their possession.
1 Shadow boards are boards, usually peg-board, with hooks on which tools,
utensils, and other implements are hung. Each item’s silhouette is outlined
on the board for easy identification of items in use or not in their assigned
location on the board.
Finding III
40
OFFICE OF THE AUDITOR GENERAL
Photo 7: Tool Storage
Tools stored on a shadow board for quick identification of absent items.
n Weapons—Each prison complex maintains a secure armory
containing safe, reliable weapons for use in perimeter patrol,
transportation, or when an incident requires an armed re-sponse.
Officers carry weapons qualifications cards and,
when questioned by the consultants, could articulate weapon
and use-of-force policies.
n Inmate transportation—To reduce risks incurred when
transferring inmates between prison complexes, the De-partment
has developed a system to shorten time spent
in transit, and follow other well-designed practices dur-ing
transport. For example, inmates travel in restraints
and bright orange clothing, and transportation officers
carry information about each inmate to more quickly ap-prehend
them in case of escape.
n Mail and property—The Department follows sound proce-dures
for inspecting incoming items to prevent introduction
of drugs and other contraband. Additionally, it has recently
implemented a new policy to reduce opportunities for bring-ing
inappropriate items into the prisons and cut the time offi-cers
must spend inspecting inmate property. This new policy
prohibits inmates from receiving any packages, and instead
requires them to purchase standardized televisions, snack
Finding III
41
OFFICE OF THE AUDITOR GENERAL
foods, personal care items, and other property through the
inmate store.
The Department enforces its policies and procedures through
annual audits conducted by teams comprised of a team leader
from the Department’s Inspections Bureau and members from
various Department divisions. Every prison complex is in-spected
each year to determine its compliance level with critical
Department standards set forth in Department Orders and other
policies. These audits promote standard implementation of poli-cies
throughout the prison system. The Department’s audit prac-tices
are among the Arizona correctional system’s greatest
strengths.
Department Could Make
Some Further Improvements
Although the Department has excellent policies in a number of
areas and generally follows them consistently, it should develop
some additional policies and address a tool control deficiency
found at one prison complex. These new policies would enhance
security and reduce certain risks. The Department is currently
exploring one of these new policies, which had been recom-mended
in the 1991 audit but not implemented due to technol-ogy
limitations at the time. Chronic staff shortages and financial
constraints may have discouraged the Department from adopt-ing
the remaining policies; nevertheless, the Department should
exercise its best efforts to develop and follow them. Specifically,
the Department lacks appropriate policies regarding the follow-ing:
n Simulated emergency key runs—The Department does not
have a policy requiring staff to attempt to move throughout
the prison complexes using only keys. In an emergency when
power is interrupted, such as during a fire or a riot, officers
would need to access every area of a prison without delay.
An officer’s inability to obtain and use emergency keys when
a power failure disables electronic locks could result in addi-tional
property damage, injury, or death. However, when
consultants asked officers at three complexes to conduct a
simulated emergency key run, the officers could not carry out
the exercise quickly, and had difficulty finding the correct
Finding III
42
OFFICE OF THE AUDITOR GENERAL
keys and opening doors. Further, some units did not use a
color-coded system to match keys with doors. Routine exer-cises
of this type are necessary to ensure staff can use keys in
an emergency situation.
n Security challenges—Another practice not consistently
conducted by all prison complexes is security challenges. Se-curity
challenges, which are conducted at some complexes,
periodically test their security practices by having a person
attempt to enter a facility without proper identification or
bring unauthorized items through a security post. Security
challenges increase staff vigilance and identify potential
weaknesses that could lead to contraband entering a prison
or inmates escaping.
n Prescription dispensing—While the control of needles and
other dangerous instruments in medical areas is excellent,
some of the Department’s inconsistent drug-dispensing prac-tices
increase the possibility of inmates hoarding and selling
narcotic or psychotropic drugs. The liquid-form use of nar-cotic
and psychotropic drugs varies between complexes. For
instance, ASPC-Eyman maintains some of these medications
only in liquid form, while liquid narcotics and psychotropic
drugs are used at ASPC-Phoenix only if ordered by a physi-cian.
However, no liquid psychotropic drugs are available at
ASPC-Florence or ASPC-Lewis. Furthermore, seven-day
supplies of certain psychotropic medications are issued at
ASPC-Lewis. This practice is even more problematic because
staff reported that they could not effectively watch inmates
ingest their medications (a “watch/swallow” regimen), thus
increasing the chance that an inmate could hide the pill for
later use or sale. The Department should develop and im-plement
uniform policies requiring medical staff to use a liq-uid
form of narcotics and psychotropic drugs whenever pos-sible,
as well as dispense unit doses and apply a
“watch/swallow” regimen in connection with all such medi-cations.
n Body alarms—The Department does not issue body alarms
to all its correctional officers, although it is currently testing
such alarms at one complex. Body alarms range in sophistica-tion
from a tone-alert model that emits a loud sound to alert
nearby staff, to those with limited voice capability linking
The Department does not
consistently conduct security
challenges.
Finding III
43
OFFICE OF THE AUDITOR GENERAL
them to the control center. Some body alarms are activated
by pressing a shielded button, while others have a “man-down”
feature that triggers an alarm after the device is in a
non-vertical position for a set period of time. The quality and
cost of these systems vary widely. While the cost of a trans-mitter
carried by an employee is generally under $200, the in-stalled
equipment ranges from about $70,000 to more than
$500,000. Correctional officers carry hand-held radios for
communication, but body alarms could more quickly alert
other staff of any emergency. Such alarms are particularly
important at facilities where officers cannot maintain visual
contact with each other, a common problem in many of the
Department’s units. The Auditor General’s 1991 report rec-ommended
that the Department provide body alarms for
certain correctional officers.
In addition to these policy deficiencies, Auditor General consult-ants
observed some poor tool control activities at the Tucson
prison complex. At this unit, tool room doors were unlocked and
an inmate was inside helping to conduct an inventory.
Recently, after reviewing the Auditor General consultants’ re-port,
the Department began requiring simulated emergency key
runs and evaluating its policies in the other three areas. The De-partment
had not previously made this a priority. In addition,
problems with false alarms using older body alarm technology
discouraged the Department from widely adopting such alarms
in the past; but, as noted above, the Department is currently
evaluating body alarms for possible use throughout its prisons.
Finding III
44
OFFICE OF THE AUDITOR GENERAL
Recommendations
1. The Department should adopt a policy requiring every unit
and complex to conduct simulated emergency key runs in-volving
all staff to enable management to ascertain if keys
will function for each of them and they can achieve timely ac-cess
to all areas of the facility.
2. The Department should adopt a policy requiring every unit
and complex to conduct security challenges, such as having
someone use another employee’s identification card to gain
entrance to a facility.
3. The Department should develop and implement uniform
policies requiring medical staff to use a liquid form of narcot-ics
and psychotropic drugs whenever possible, as well as
dispense unit doses and apply a “watch/swallow” regimen
in connection with all such medications.
4. The Department should cease the practice of permitting in-mates
to enter any tool room except to perform housekeep-ing
duties under direct staff supervision. Furthermore, in-mates
should never be allowed to help conduct tool invento-ries.
The Department should monitor this through its internal
audits.
5. The Department should continue its pilot program of body
alarms at ASPC-Eyman and, if successfully implemented
there and determined to be cost-effective, adopt their use for
all appropriate security staff.
45
OFFICE OF THE AUDITOR GENERAL
OTHER PERTINENT INFORMATION
During the audit, auditors developed information about the De-partment’s
policies for managing prison gangs, or Security
Threat Groups (STGs). STGs have become more common and
dangerous in the nation’s prisons, where they introduce drugs
and weapons, and where they use or threaten violence to gain
power. In addition to operating within the prisons, STGs also
recruit members and conduct their activities on the streets. State
prison systems have attempted to address gang problems in dif-ferent
ways. Some states have implemented policies to manage
prison gangs, while other states try to appease gangs or work
with them. In contrast to both of these approaches, the Arizona
Department of Corrections’ approach isolates gang members
and restricts their privileges to deter gang activity.
The Department’s policy was implemented in September 1997.
According to the Department, the policy’s purpose is “to mini-mize
the threat that inmate gang or gang like activity poses to the
safe, secure and efficient operation of institutions...” The De-partment
believes that isolating gang members and restricting
their privileges effectively deters gang activity. The Department’s
policy involves:
n Identifying possible STGs and determining if they should be
formally identified (certified) as an STG;
n Identifying individual inmates who are gang members; and
n Placing them into facilities that are separate from other in-mates.
Gangs Formally Identified
Through Certification Process
The Department’s STG management process begins with correc-tional
officers making observations and gathering enough in-formation
to demonstrate whether a particular group should
Other Pertinent Information
46
OFFICE OF THE AUDITOR GENERAL
Figure 2
Arizona Department of Corrections—
Security Operations
Security Threat Group Validation Statistics1
As of August 2000
Grandels (83)
Border
Brothers (198)
Aryan
Brotherhood (90)
Old Mexican
Mafia (23)
Mau-Mau (20)
New Mexican
Mafia (69)
1 The Department has certified Surenos as its seventh Security Threat Group; however, no individual
members of this group have been validated.
Source: Auditor General staff summary of statistics provided by the Arizona Department of Corrections
report, Security Threat Group Activity Reflective of Department Order #806 (Effective 9/2/97) Current
Validation and Appeal Activity by STG as of 8/4/00.
be certified as an STG. The group’s threat to the Department’s
operations must be proven through documented reports and
other information, and the group must have displayed or threat-ened
violence within the prison. If the Department gathers suffi-cient
evidence to ascertain that the group is a gang, the Depart-ment’s
STG Validation Committee makes a recommendation to
the Director, who then decides whether to certify the group as an
STG.
As of August 2000, the Department had certified seven STGs (see
Figure 2). The Department is currently gathering evidence to
determine whether other groups should be certified. There are
other gangs represented by inmates, but the Department is
Other Pertinent Information
47
OFFICE OF THE AUDITOR GENERAL
primarily interested in certifying those groups who display
gang-like activity within the Department and a propensity for
violence.
Gang Members, Once
Identified, Are
Housed Separately
The rest of the Department’s process involves screening inmates,
identifying and validating those who are members of STGs, and
housing them in separate units.
Identification process—Inmates are screened to determine if
they are members of an STG, both upon reception to the prison
system and throughout their prison sentence. Characteristics that
flag incoming inmates as potential STG members include having
gang-related tattoos, gang-related literature, and information
from other criminal justice agencies. Once in prison, evidence of
possible STG affiliation comes from phone conversations, letters,
and prison staff’s observations. Although prison staff monitor
inmates’ activities and telephone calls, their ability to monitor
inmates’ incoming mail is hampered by a court decision that
does not allow staff to read any incoming mail.
If an inmate is suspected of being an STG member, a staff mem-ber
conducts a formal investigation. If the staff member finds
sufficient evidence to believe the inmate is an STG member, he or
she develops a validation packet containing all information
about the inmate and his/her gang relations. All validation
packets include a point sheet that helps the Department deter-mine
whether suspected STG members will be validated. The
point system was created to lend objectivity to the validation
process and assigns points to inmates for gang-related tattoos,
court testimony, documents relating to gang affiliation, pictures
taken with known gang members, and any other evidence of
gang affiliation. An inmate must receive 10 points out of at least
2 of the 14 criteria to receive further consideration as an STG
member.
The Department’s STG Hearing Committee reviews validation
packets, holds validation hearings, and then renders decisions on
an inmate’s STG status. The Committee is composed of three
The Department identifies
inmates who may be mem-bers
of a gang.
Other Pertinent Information
48
OFFICE OF THE AUDITOR GENERAL
Deputy Wardens and Associate Deputy Wardens. At a hearing,
the accused inmate will be present and the Committee may call
staff or other inmates as witnesses. The Committee may also ac-cept
written questions for witnesses from the inmate. After the
hearing the Committee decides if the inmate should be validated
as an STG member or if the evidence does not support valida-tion.
Department has appeal process—Inmates validated by the STG
Hearing Committee as gang members may appeal this decision
within five days. As of August 4, 2000, according to Department
statistics, about 5 percent of appeals (9 of 197) have been upheld
by the Validation Committee. The STG Validation Committee
hears the appeal and makes a decision. All decisions made by
this committee are final and no further appeals may be made.
STG members housed in special units—The Department has
dedicated specific units at the Eyman Prison to house validated
gang members. Validated STG members are sent to the Special
Photo 8: Inmate Cell at Special Management Unit II
Inmate cell at Eyman Complex, Special Management Unit II. Validated
gang members are restricted to such cells 24 hours a day.
Management Unit II (SMU II) at ASPC-Eyman to serve the re-mainder
of their sentences. Inmates validated as gang members
and housed at SMU II face severe reductions in their privileges.
For example, all validated inmates are considered maximum-security
inmates and are restricted to their single-bunk cells 24
A Hearing Committee
determines validation as an
STG member.
Other Pertinent Information
49
OFFICE OF THE AUDITOR GENERAL
hours a day, with only 3 hours of exercise each week. Addition-ally,
these inmates have fewer inmate store privileges, cannot
earn more than 20 cents per hour from working, and cannot earn
time credits that would lead to an earlier release date.
High-profile gang members and leaders may be sent to other
states to finish their prison sentences. Department management
believes that this strategy reduces communication among gang
members and weakens the gang. Moreover, Arizona accepts
some inmates from other states.
Inmates can renounce gang affiliation—Inmates who wish to
leave SMU II and have their STG status changed may do so only
if they successfully renounce their gang affiliation and debrief
(inform) the Department about any gang activity they are aware
of. This information may include gang structure, plans, or mem-bership.
According to Department statistics, as of August 2000,
58 inmates have successfully renounced their gang membership.
For an inmate to successfully renounce gang membership, the
Department must be convinced that the inmate is serious about
severing all gang affiliations and is not simply trying to leave the
restrictive SMU II. Also, the Department must be convinced that
the inmate has provided sufficient and credible information. If an
inmate renounces but does not successfully debrief, he or she
will not be allowed to leave SMU II and will retain validation
status.
Although debriefing is difficult, inmates have several incentives
to do so. First, inmates who successfully debrief are moved to the
Special Management I Unit at the Eyman complex or to the
Stiner and Morey Units at the Lewis Prison, and are usually
housed in double-bunk rather than single-bunk cells. Addition-ally,
these inmates may have their classification score lowered,
which will allow them more benefits, such as increased tele-phone
privileges. Further, the inmates can earn good-time cred-its,
which may allow for an earlier release. In addition, the in-mates
receive increased recreation time. Finally, the inmates will
receive increased inmate store privileges.
Inmates may leave the re-strictive
environment if
they successfully renounce
their gang affiliation.
Other Pertinent Information
50
OFFICE OF THE AUDITOR GENERAL
Department and
University Studying
STG Policy Effectiveness
The Department, along with faculty from Arizona State Univer-sity,
is studying the Department’s STG policies to measure their
effectiveness. The National Institute of Justice provided a grant
of about $183,000 to the Department and the professor to study
the effectiveness of ADC’s practices regarding prison gangs. For
example, the research will determine if assaults have decreased
due to the new policies. The study is important because the re-searchers
are not aware of any conclusive study done on the sub-ject.
The report will offer recommendations to improve the pro-gram
and is expected to be released in late 2001.
OFFICE OF THE AUDITOR GENERAL
(This Page Intentionally Left Blank)
Debra Davenport
November 28, 2000
Page 1
November 28, 2000
Debra Davenport, CPA
Auditor General
Office of the Auditor General
2910 North 44th Street, Suite 410
Phoenix, Arizona 85018
Re: AUDITOR GENERAL’S PERFORMANCE AUDIT
SECURITY OPERATIONS FINAL REPORT RESPONSE
Dear Ms. Davenport:
The mission of the Arizona Department of Corrections (ADC) is to serve and protect the citizens of Arizona
by imprisoning offenders legally committed to ADC and by providing community based supervision for
those conditionally released. Security Operations plays a key role in carrying out this mission. We believe
we operate one of the most efficient and secure prison systems in the United States. However, the
additional perspectives provided by members of your staff and the security consultants have enhanced our
ability to strengthen the operations of the Arizona Department of Corrections.
Of primary concern, both from an audit and an operational standpoint, are the security staffing patterns of
our institutions. The Department is constrained by authorized and appropriated resources, as well as the
inability to attract corrections officers during this booming economy given the salary levels currently
authorized for corrections officers. Additionally, neither the Auditor General staff nor the security
consultants were prepared to articulate the necessary level of staffing without having first accomplished a
zero-based staffing study. As a result, the Department is currently preparing a Request for Proposal for a
contractor to conduct a zero-based staffing analysis to better enable us to identify issues, better allocate
existing positions, and support requests for additional staffing.
We have reviewed your November 20, 2000, report for your performance audit of the ADC’s Security
Operations. Below please find our written response which also identifies any issues or concerns we have
with the audit findings.
Debra Davenport
November 28, 2000
Page 2
FINDING I
Recommendation 1:
Open the remaining units at ASPC-Lewis as soon as staff is available to do so.
RESPONSE:
1. The Department concurs in t his finding and the audit recommendation will be implemented.
Comment: At the time that ASPC-Lewis was being sited by the Legislature, the Department
recommended against the location because we recognized the difficulty that the Buckeye location
would have in attracting staff. Unfortunately, the Department’s advice was disregarded and as a
result, today we face the consequence. Since opening Lewis, the Department has requested and
received authority to pay a 10% stipend in addition to the normal salary for corrections officers.
We have developed and implemented van pools to assist in the commute to the Buckeye site. We
have worked with developers to develop housing in the Buckeye area and we have now proposed
a hiring bonus for corrections officers who agree to work at ASPC-Lewis for a period of two
years. In spite of these incentives, we still have been unable to attract the necessary staff to fully
staff ASPC-Lewis..
Since August 14, 1998, 1,422 job offers have been made for the Lewis Complex. Unfortunately,
during the last 12-month period, the resignation rate has been 23.4%, and the loss rate has been
31.6%. This percentage is considerably higher than the statewide goal and average of 25.5%. It is
believed that the pending proposal regarding signing bonuses will positively affect these figures, both
in terms of job offers and retention rates.
Recommendation 2:
Cease using tents at all complexes as soon as the inmate population can be transferred to other
housing units. Because some of the tents have been designated as part of the Department’s
permanent bed inventory, the Department should develop a plan (which would request legislative
approval) to eliminate them.
RESPONSE:
1. The Department concurs in this finding and the audit recommendation will be implemented.
Debra Davenport
November 28, 2000
Page 3
Comment: The Department concurs that the utilization of tents presents security and operational
concerns. However, the impact of the elimination of tent beds would have the below indicated
impact in the Southern Region:
Complex Unit Number of Tents Number of Beds
Douglas Maricopa 10 100
Safford Graham 10 100
Safford Tonto 10 100
Tucson Echo 20 200
Tucson Manzanita 4 40
Tucson Santa Rita 10 100
Yuma Cocopah 5 50
TOTAL 690
The security concerns raised by the tents are obviously of greater concern at the higher level units,
therefore, it is proposed that if the tents are reduced in number the Department begin with the Level
3 units first.
Please be advised that the legislature approved funding for the 400 North Unit beds, thus
the elimination of these beds is highly unlikely. The 400 tent beds located in the North Unit at
ASPC-Florence were sited and appropriated by the Legislature. As a result, the Department will
need to seek statutory authority and funding to eliminate these tents. Since other recommendations
in this audit also recommend the elimination of modular and Quonset units, the recommended plan
to eliminate the 400 tent beds will be integrated into the overall plan.
Recommendation 3:
Develop plans for closing the Alhambra/Flamenco and Aspen Units at ASPC-Phoenix and replace
those units.
Debra Davenport
November 28, 2000
Page 4
RESPONSE:
1. The Department concurs in this finding and the audit recommendation will be
implemented.
Comment: The Department has already requested the State Legislature to consider funding for a
new Reception/ Diagnostic and mental health facility. Timing for the replacement of the
Reception/Diagnostic Center is contingent on a final decision by the Executive and Legislature
regarding the speed with which the proposed Tucson II complex will be built. A final
recommendation from the Department with regard to building out Tucson II will be driven by actual
and estimated inmate growth.
Recommendation 4:
Take immediate steps to lower the partitions in Florence’s South Unit dormitories to enhance
visibility.
RESPONSE:
1. The Department concurs in this finding and the audit recommendation will be
implemented.
Comment: Several years ago, the Department of Corrections identified the officer safety hazard
present in privacy partitions in previously constructed dormitories. During the last several years the
Department has not only modified design of future prisons, but we have systematically retrofitted
prison units with high partitions. It has been our intent to modify all partitions which create a
visibility hazard, irrespective of their material of construction, i.e., masonry, wood or metal.
However, the Department has only been able to devote limited resources to the modification of
partitions. Consequently, petitions remain which need to be modified. The South Unit is one such
example.
The Department is currently developing a plan to lower the partitions in the ASPC-Florence South
Unit dormitory. The projected completion date is March 1, 2001. The Department is reviewing
partitions in all units to determine if others need to be modified.
Debra Davenport
November 28, 2000
Page 5
Recommendation 5:
Add one correctional officer to each South Unit dormitory building. Absent the ability to provide
additional staffing, these dormitories should be replaced.
RESPONSE:
1. The Department concurs in this finding and a different method of dealing with the finding
will be implemented.
Comment: As stated previously, the Department is currently preparing a Request for Purchase to
contract with an outside consultant to conduct a complete Prison Operations staffing study and post
analysis to determine if existing staff resources can be feasibly reallocated to address this
recommendation. If we find that a reallocation is not possible and an additional appropriation not
forthcoming then we will recommend replacement of the dormitories as part of the Department’s
bed plan.
Recommendation 6:
Develop a plan for the future replacement of Quonset huts and modular housing units.
RESPONSE:
1. The Department concurs in this finding and the audit recommendation will be
implemented.
Comment: While the use of Quonset huts and modular buildings presents an array of challenges
ranging from officer safety to issues of maintenance, livability and sanitation, the Department has
been able to meet these challenges without incurring the significant additional capital cost to replace
them. Nevertheless, the Department recognizes the wisdom for developing a plan to request
appropriations from the Legislature to replace these units. While we are somewhat pessimistic that
such recommendations will be approved, we will in fact develop a plan for the replacement of these
units. The plan will be integrated into our capital replacement budget and bed plan.
This recommendation is somewhat difficult for the Department. If funding were available in the
magnitude necessary to replace 1,134 beds, those resources may be more effectively utilized in
providing pay benefits to corrections officers rather than replacing beds which are only marginal but
functional at this time.
Debra Davenport
November 28, 2000
Page 6
Complex Unit Type of Housing
Number of
Buildings
Number of
Beds
Douglas Gila Modular 9 662
Douglas Maricopa Modular 1 14
Safford Graham Quonset Huts 10 202
Tucson Echo Modular 4 256
TOTAL 20 1134
Recommendation 7:
Relocate the ASPC-Tucson warehouse outside the vehicle entrance and allow only one vehicle at a
time to enter the sally port, and correct the sally port design problem at ASPC-Safford’s Fort Grant
Unit that currently requires both gates to be open simultaneously for trucks to enter or exit the unit.
RESPONSE:
1. The Department concurs in this finding and a different method of dealing with the finding
will be implemented.
Comment: The proposed solution to this problem can be approached in several different ways,
dependent upon some issues that are outside the purview of the Department of Corrections. The
design of the Tucson II Complex included a plan to have the warehouse capability for the existing
complex to be handled by the new facility. This places all warehouse activity outside the secure
perimeter. However, in the event the construction of Tucson II is delayed or eliminated altogether,
Warden Parin at ASPC-Tucson will submit a proposal to redesign the perimeter of the complex
including deactivating the main sally port and securing the CDU sally port during business hours,
placing the warehouses outside the perimeter. This will also eliminate the medium security crews
working in the warehouses. The necessity of allowing more than one vehicle in the sally port will be
diminished due to the reduction in traffic.
At ASPC-Safford’s Fort Grant Unit, plans have been developed and funded to relocate the control
room area an construct an adjacent new sally port that will eliminate this problem.
Debra Davenport
November 28, 2000
Page 7
Recommendation 8:
Explore options to modify sight lines at control rooms at ASPC-Tucson and ASPC-Perryville to
enhance inmate surveillance.
RESPONSE:
1. The Department concurs in this finding and the audit recommendation will be
implemented.
Comment: Although this recommendation affects ASPC-Tucson to a much smaller degree than
the Perryville Complex, the recommendations to explore options to modify sight lines cannot be
argued. It may be possible to use technology such as remotely operated cameras to improve site
lines from the control room. If this option is not feasible, a modification of the control room to
locate it either within the kitchen area or on top of the kitchen area to provide observation would be
a consideration. This modification should only be undertaken with architectural, security and
financial considerations in mind.
FINDING II
Recommendation 1:
The Department should develop and implement policies for controlled movement and activity pass
systems.
RESPONSE:
1. The Department concurs in this finding and the audit recommendation will be implemented.
Comment: Controlled movement and an activity pass system are part of the new Inmate Program
Plan (IPP) process currently being phased in within Prison Operations.
Recommendation 2:
The Department should continue to ensure that staff at all prisons consistently follow inmate
management practices.
Debra Davenport
November 28, 2000
Page 8
RESPONSE:
2. The finding of the Auditor General is agreed to and the audit recommendation will be
implemented.
Comment: For more than a decade the Department has utilized an internal inspections program to
determine whether or not the operating units consistently follow all policies related to operational
readiness. This program will continue. However, a greater emphasis will be placed on ensuring that
the units consistently follow inmate management practices. We will continue to expand and improve
our current internal audit process to ensure consistent, sound and safe correctional management
practices are in place.
Recommendation 3:
The Department should analyze and determine, and assign an appropriate number of staff needed to
adequately fill critical posts that monitor inmate movement and activity.
RESPONSE:
1. The finding of the Auditor General is agreed to and the audit recommendation will be
implemented.
Comment: As previously stated, the Department is preparing a Request for Proposal for a
contractor to conduct a zero-based staffing analysis to better enable us to identify issues, allocate
existing positions, and support requests for additional staffing. The Department will continually
assess resource allocation and assignments.
Recommendation 4:
Once this analysis is complete, the Department should assign staff appropriately to critical posts and,
if necessary, request authorization to increase its complement of FTE’s.
RESPONSE:
Debra Davenport
November 28, 2000
Page 9
1. The finding of the Auditor General is agreed to and the audit recommendation will be
implemented.
Comment: The Department will utilize the results of the consultant’s zero-based analysis to allocate
existing resources and request additional FTE’s where appropriate once it is completed.
FINDING III
Recommendation 1:
The Department should adopt a policy requiring every unit and complex to conduct simulated
emergency key runs involving all staff to enable management to ascertain if keys will function for each
of them and they can achieve timely access to all areas of the facility.
RESPONSE:
1. The Department concurs in this finding and a different method of dealing with the finding
will be implemented
Comment: A standardized procedure will be developed to address emergency key systems and
their testing.
Recommendation 2:
The Department should adopt a policy requiring every unit and complex to conduct security
challenges, such as having someone use another employee’s identification card to gain entrance to a
facility.
RESPONSE:
1. The Department concurs in this finding and the audit recommendation will be implemented.
Comment: These types of challenges have fallen out of favor in recent years due to inappropriate
utilization and ill-conceived scenarios. A menu of possible challenges which do not compromise
safety will be developed for utilization at all locations, and will be monitored through the audit
process.
Debra Davenport
November 28, 2000
Page 10
Recommendation 3:
The Department should develop and implement uniform policies requiring medical staff to use a liquid
form of narcotics and psychotropic drugs whenever possible, as well as dispense unit doses and
apply a “watch/swallow” regimen in connection with all such medication.
RESPONSE:
1. The Department concurs i

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State of Arizona
Office
of the
Auditor General
PERFORMANCE AUDIT
Report to the Arizona Legislature
By Debra K. Davenport
Auditor General
December 2000
Report No. 00-20
ARIZONA
DEPARTMENT OF
CORRECTIONS
SECURITY OPERATIONS
The Auditor General is appointed by the Joint Legislative Audit Committee, a bipartisan committee
composed of five senators and five representatives. Her mission is to provide independent and impar-tial
information and specific recommendations to improve the operations of state and local government
entities. To this end, she provides financial audits and accounting services to the state and political
subdivisions and performance audits of state agencies and the programs they administer.
The Joint Legislative Audit Committee
Representative Roberta L. Voss, Chairman
Senator Tom Smith, Vice-Chairman
Representative Robert Burns Senator Keith Bee
Representative Ken Cheuvront Senator Herb Guenther
Representative Andy Nichols Senator Darden Hamilton
Representative Barry Wong Senator Pete Rios
Representative Jeff Groscost Senator Brenda Burns
(ex-officio) (ex-officio)
Audit Staff
Shan Hays—Manager
and Contact Person (602) 553-0333
Lisa Eddy—Team Leader
Mark Haldane—Team Member
Pam Eck—Team Member
JoAnne Dukeshire—Team Member
Copies of the Auditor General’s reports are free.
You may request them by contacting us at:
Office of the Auditor General
2910 N. 44th Street, Suite 410
Phoenix, AZ 85018
(602) 553-0333
Additionally, many of our reports can be found in electronic format at:
www.auditorgen.state.az.us
2910 NORTH 44th STREET • SUITE 410 • PHOENIX, ARIZONA 85018 • (602) 553-0333 • FAX (602) 553-0051
DEBRA K. DAVENPORT, CPA
AUDITOR GENERAL
STATE OF ARIZONA
OFFICE OF THE
AUDITOR GENERAL
December 22, 2000
Members of the Arizona Legislature
The Honorable Jane Dee Hull, Governor
Mr. Terry L. Stewart, Director
Arizona Department of Corrections
Transmitted herewith is a report of the Auditor General, A Performance Audit of the
Arizona Department of Corrections—Security Operations. This report is in response to
a June 16, 1999, resolution of the Joint Legislative Audit Committee. The performance
audit was conducted as part of the Sunset review set forth in A.R.S. §41-2951 et seq. I am
also transmitting with this report a copy of the Report Highlights for this audit to
provide a quick summary for your convenience.
This is the first in a series of reports to be issued on the Department of Corrections.
As outlined in its response, the agency agrees with all of the findings and recommendations.
My staff and I will be pleased to discuss or clarify items in the report.
This report will be released to the public on December 26, 2000.
Sincerely,
Debbie Davenport
Auditor General
Enclosure
OFFICE OF THE AUDITOR GENERAL
Program Fact Sheet
Department of Corrections
Security Operations
Services: Security Operations is one of the five subprograms under the Prison Operations
program in the Department of Corrections. Its mission is to efficiently operate and maintain
safe and secure prisons. Security Operations performs a wide range of services within the
system:
n Inmate management, classification, transportation, employment, safety, and discipline;
n Essential services such as food, clothing, housing, education, and health care;
n Security systems, communications, and facilities; and
n Security staff training, allocation, and management.
Program Revenue:
Approximately $232 million
(fiscal year 2000)
100,000,000
200,000,000
300,000,000
1999 2000
General Fund Other
Personnel: 7,517 full-time staff
(fiscal year 2000)
Facilities: 10 Complexes, 54 Units
Winslow
u
u Phoenix
Perryville
u
Lewis u
Yuma
u
u
Tucson
u
Safford
Douglas
u
uu
Eyman and
Florence
Program Goals:
Although Security Operations is charged with
providing oversight for a large number of
areas, its five program goals represent a small
number of security-related functions:
1. Prevent escapes from secure institutions
and work crews.
2. Reduce staff assaults.
3. Reduce inmate assaults.
4. Prohibit the introduction of drugs into
secure institutions.
5. Proactively minimize disturbances
through staff training.
n Wardens/Deputy Wardens = 100 FTEs
n Programs/Administrative = 142 FTEs
n Clerical/Support = 38 FTEs
n Technical = 37 FTEs
Total 317 FTEs
Security Staffing = 7,200 FTEs
OFFICE OF THE AUDITOR GENERAL
Weapons—A total of
2,415 weapons, includ-ing
Remington 870
shotguns, Colt AR 15
rifles, Glock 9 mm
semiautomatic hand-guns,
sniper rifles, and
riot control weapons.
Vehicles—A total of
1,992 vehicles, includ-ing
93 buses, 468
automobiles, 547 vans,
and 884 trucks. Of
these, 321 are alterna-tive-
fuel vehicles.
Hand-held radios—
6,166.
Equipment: The Department has pur-chased
many items used by Security Op-erations.
Adequacy of Goals and Performance
Measures: The goals and performance meas-ures
appear to be appropriate for Security Op-erations’
mission. For example, the performance
measures regarding the number of inmate ran-dom
positive drug tests, number of escapes,
and number of disturbances, appear to be ap-propriate
measures to indicate outcomes of
security measures. However, some improve-ments
could be made:
n Some security-related goals are included in
other programs’ goals. For example, a goal
regarding effective custody and control
over inmates appears in another subpro-gram
of Prison Operations, Criminal and
Administrative Investigations.
n The Department could redefine some out-put
measures to better assess the results of
improved procedures. For example, current
measures on quarterly unit searches do not
indicate the percentage of searches that
yield contraband.
i
OFFICE OF THE AUDITOR GENERAL
SUMMARY
The Office of the Auditor General has conducted a performance
audit of Security Operations at the Arizona Department of Cor-rections,
in response to a June 16, 1999, resolution of the Joint
Legislative Audit Committee. This performance audit was con-ducted
under the authority vested in the Auditor General by
Arizona Revised Statutes §§41-1279 and 41-2951 et seq. The audit
is the first in a series of six audits of the Department of Correc-tions.
The remaining audits will focus on Support Services, Hu-man
Resources, Agency Infrastructure, Private Prisons, and Ari-zona
Correctional Industries.
The Department operates ten prison complexes statewide: Ey-man
and Florence (both located in Florence), Douglas, Lewis
(located in Buckeye), Perryville (located in Goodyear), Phoenix,
Safford, Tucson, Winslow, and Yuma. In addition, the Depart-ment
contracts with two private firms to operate three prisons.
Correctional Services Corporation operates prisons in Florence
and Phoenix and Management Training Corporation operates
one prison in Marana.
Some Prison Facilities’ Designs
Continue to Pose Security
and Safety Problems
(See pages 13 through 25)
Although the Department generally operates a secure prison
system, some prison facilities have design, maintenance, or other
problems that diminish inmate and staff safety. The Department
has made significant improvements to its facilities since 1991,
when the last Auditor General Report was issued. Most impor-tantly,
the number of escapes from the Department’s prisons fell
from 56 between January 1984 and May 1985 to 12 in 1990, and
then to 0 in 1997 and 6 in 1998. In addition, consultants hired for
this audit to assess security at six of the prisons found significant
improvement in almost all areas, including security around the
prisons’ perimeters, newly established policies to control the
The number of escapes has
decreased.
Summary
ii
OFFICE OF THE AUDITOR GENERAL
introduction of contraband, and the Department’s inmate classi-fication
system. Additionally, the Department’s newest complex,
Arizona State Prison Complex (ASPC) Lewis, includes some
excellent design features, such as smaller, more manageable
recreation yards to better facilitate officers’ observation of in-mates.
However, the design of some older prison facilities negatively
impacts staff and inmate safety. For example, they may not give
security officers adequate lines of sight so that inmates can be
adequately monitored. The Department also assigns inmates to
many temporary structures such as tents, Quonset huts, and
modular buildings, as well as converted hotels. Since these build-ings
were not designed to house inmates, proper control and
surveillance are difficult. Converted hotels, which are used at
ASPC-Phoenix and ASPC-Douglas, also require significant
maintenance because of their age. In addition to the buildings
themselves, some sally ports (entrances for vehicles) have design
and operations problems that create significant potential for
escapes or contraband smuggling.
Inmate population growth in the face of resource limitations and
staffing shortages is a key factor contributing to the Depart-ment’s
facility-related problems. Inmate population growth from
8,000 in 1985 to over 26,000 in 2000 has required the Depart-ment’s
use of lower-cost temporary structures as well as its con-tinued
reliance on older, poorly designed structures. In addition,
a staff vacancy rate of over 50 percent at ASPC-Lewis, the De-partment’s
newest facility, has resulted in the Department post-poning
the opening of two new units there as of November 2000.
Although replacement of some old facilities is not cost-effective,
the Department should improve some inmate housing to ensure
a safe environment for staff and inmates. First, it should continue
to make efforts to fully staff the unopened units at ASPC-Lewis.
By opening the new units at ASPC-Lewis, the Department could
reduce its use of temporary structures such as tents to house
inmates. Second, the Department should discontinue its use of
tents and other temporary structures and move inmates into
more secure living units. The Department should also eventually
The design of some De-partment
facilities reduces
staff and inmate safety.
Between 1985 and 2000,
inmate population grew
from 8,000 to 26,000.
Summary
iii
OFFICE OF THE AUDITOR GENERAL
replace those buildings where security procedures cannot be
adequately followed, such as those at certain units at ASPC-Phoenix
and ASPC-Tucson.
The Department Should Continue to
Improve Inmate Management
(See pages 27 through 36)
Although the Department has implemented many effective poli-cies
and practices designed to manage inmates, some further
improvements are still needed. The Department has generally
effective policies for such things as monitoring inmates’ move-ment
within units and reducing the introduction of contraband
items. However, staff sometimes fail to consistently apply the
Department’s policies and practices, which can significantly
compromise security. For example, the Department’s internal
audits reveal that officers have at times failed to properly con-duct
strip searches of inmates. Another problem is that the De-partment
lacks systemwide policies in two areas—controlled
movement and activity pass procedures. Finally, there are too
few staff at some posts that involve monitoring inmates and
conducting searches. As a result, officers are unable to ade-quately
observe inmate activity or locate contraband.
Most Other Security Practices
Are Sound, But Some Can
Be Improved
(See pages 37 through 44)
The Department should continue to improve some of its security
practices besides those that relate directly to inmate manage-ment.
The Department has made considerable strides in improv-ing
these other practices, which cover such areas as inspecting
facilities and controlling access to potentially dangerous tools.
However, Auditor General consultants who assessed security at
six prisons found that, among other concerns, the Department
does not (1) routinely test the adequacy of its keys used to obtain
access to prison units during an emergency, (2) regularly con-duct
security challenges at the prisons to identify weaknesses in
security systems, or (3) follow consistent practices regarding the
dispensing of prescriptions. Some prisons give inmates injectable
The Department has made
considerable improvements.
Summary
iv
OFFICE OF THE AUDITOR GENERAL
medications, which does not allow inmates to hoard or not take
their medication, while other prisons dispense as much as one
week’s worth of medications to inmates.
Other Pertinent Information
(See pages 45 through 50)
The audit also presents information about the Department’s
policies for managing prison gangs, called security threat groups,
or STGs. Both nationwide and in Arizona, STGs represent a
growing disruption to prison operations, because gang members
often smuggle drugs and other contraband into the prisons and
commit assaults against staff and other inmates. Arizona’s ap-proach,
begun in 1997, isolates gang members and severely re-stricts
their recreation, work, and inmate store privileges in order
to disrupt and deter gang activity. Inmates who have been veri-fied
as gang members are incarcerated in single-bunk cells in a
restrictive maximum-security unit for the remainder of their
sentence. The only method inmates may use to transfer out of the
restrictive unit and increase their privileges is to renounce their
gang affiliation and inform the Department about their gang’s
activity.
Gang members are isolated
in maximum-security
units.
v
OFFICE OF THE AUDITOR GENERAL
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
Introduction and Background....................... 1
Finding I: Some Prison Facilities’
Designs Continue to Pose Security
and Safety Problems................................. 13
The Department Operates a
Secure Prison System ...................................................... 13
Department Continues to Operate
Inadequate Facilities........................................................ 16
Several Factors Force the
Department to Operate
Deficient Prisons............................................................... 20
Department Facilities
Can Be Improved............................................................. 22
Recommendations........................................................... 25
Finding II: The Department Should
Continue to Improve
Inmate Management.................................. 27
The Department Has
Implemented Many
Effective Inmate Management
Policies and Practices....................................................... 27
Analysis of Prison Incidents Points
to Need for Continuous Improvement....................... 31
Improvements to Inmate
Management Practices Can
Be Made in Several Areas .............................................. 32
Recommendations........................................................... 36
Table of Contents
vi
OFFICE OF THE AUDITOR GENERAL
TABLE OF CONTENTS (Cont’d)
Page
Finding III: Most Other Security
Practices Are Sound,
But Some Can Be Improved..................... 37
Other Policies and Procedures
Enhance Security.............................................................. 37
Department Has Made Substantial
Improvements Since Previous Audits........................ 37
Department Could Make
Some Further Improvements........................................ 41
Recommendations........................................................... 44
Other Pertinent Information .......................... 45
Gangs Formally Identified
Through Certification Process ...................................... 45
Gang Members, Once
Identified, Are
Housed Separately........................................................... 47
Department and University
Studying STG Policy Effectiveness.............................. 50
Agency Response
Figures
Figure 1 Arizona Department of Corrections–
Security Operations
Chain of Command........................................ 7
Figure 2 Arizona Department of Corrections—
Security Operations ......................................
Security Threat Group Validation Statistics
As of August 2000........................................... 46
Table of Contents
vii
OFFICE OF THE AUDITOR GENERAL
TABLE OF CONTENTS (Concl’d)
Page
Photos
Photo 1 Lower-Security Housing Unit...................... 3
Photo 2 Higher-Security Housing Unit .................... 3
Photo 3 Lewis Complex, Morey Unit........................ 14
Photo 4 Unsafe Dormitories ........................................ 17
Photo 5 Temporary Structure...................................... 18
Photo 6 Tents Used for Housing Inmates ................ 19
Photo 7 Tool Storage...................................................... 40
Photo 8 Inmate Cell at Special Management
Unit II ................................................................. 48
Tables
Table 1 Department of Corrections—
Security Operations
Prison Complexes by Location, Complex,
Unit, Security Level, and
Inmate Counts
As of June 30, 2000....................................... 5
Table 2 Department of Corrections—
Security Operations
Statement of Revenues, Expenditures, and
Other Financing Uses
Years Ended or Ending
June 30, 1999, 2000, and 2001
(Unaudited)................................................... 9
viii
OFFICE OF THE AUDITOR GENERAL
(This Page Intentionally Left Blank)
1
OFFICE OF THE AUDITOR GENERAL
INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND
The Office of the Auditor General has conducted a performance
audit of Security Operations at the Arizona Department of Cor-rections,
in response to a June 16, 1999, resolution of the Joint
Legislative Audit Committee. This performance audit was con-ducted
under the authority vested in the Auditor General by
Arizona Revised Statutes (A.R.S.) §41-1279 and as part of the
Sunset review set forth in A.R.S. §§41-2951 et seq. The audit is the
first in a series of six audits of the Department of Corrections.
The remaining audits will focus on Support Services, Human
Resources, Agency Infrastructure, Private Prisons, and Arizona
Correctional Industries.
Security Operations
Integral to Overall
Department Mission
The Arizona Department of Corrections’ mission is to serve and
protect Arizona’s citizens by imprisoning offenders legally
committed to the Department and by providing community-based
supervision for those conditionally released. Security Op-erations,
a subprogram of the Prison Operations program, plays
a key role in carrying out the Department’s mission. It has four
major areas of responsibility:
n Providing oversight for inmate management, classification,
transportation, employment, safety, and discipline;
n Ensuring delivery of essential services for inmates such as
food, clothing, housing, mail and property, education, and
health care;
n Maintaining security systems, communications, and facilities;
and
n Providing training, allocation, and management of security
staff.
Security Operations plays a
key role in carrying out the
Department’s mission.
Introduction and Background
2
OFFICE OF THE AUDITOR GENERAL
Security Operations’ goals are to prevent escapes from prisons
and work crews, reduce the numbers of assaults on staff and
inmates, prohibit the introduction of drugs into the prisons, and
minimize disturbances.
Arizona Has Experienced
Rapid Growth in Prison System
The growth in Arizona’s prison population is a challenge for
Security Operations. According to the Department’s statistics, the
inmate population of the Arizona correctional system has grown
by almost 76 percent since the last Auditor General audit in
1991—from almost 15,000 inmates to more than 26,000 as of July
2000. Since 1991, the Department has opened two new prison
complexes, raising the number of state-operated facilities to ten,
and has entered into contracts to incarcerate inmates in three
privately operated prisons.
As in other states, changing criminal codes have contributed to
Arizona’s prison growth over the last several years. Compared
to past years, inmates’ incarcerations are longer because of laws
such as mandatory minimum sentences, which require judges to
commit inmates for longer terms, and other laws requiring in-mates
to serve a greater percentage of their court sentences. Such
Truth in Sentencing laws in Arizona and 27 other states require
individuals convicted of violent crimes to serve at least 85 per-cent
of their sentences. In addition, the Department now houses
minors adjudicated as adults. According to corrections officials,
this inmate population growth is likely to continue. Ninety-five
percent of state and county correctional agencies in a 1999 na-tional
survey responded that they believed their inmate popula-tion
would increase over the next five years.
Inmate Classification System
Important to Prisons’
Safe Operation
One of the Department’s most important tools for inmate man-agement
and staff safety is its classification system, which as-
Inmate population has grown
significantly in recent years.
Introduction and Background
3
OFFICE OF THE AUDITOR GENERAL
signs inmates to appropriate housing units. Each prison complex
contains three or more housing units differentiated by security
levels ranging from 2 (lowest security) to 5 (highest secu-
Photo 1: Lower-Security Housing Unit
Lower-security housing units, such as this one in Florence South
Unit, typically house inmates in dormitories and other commu-nal
settings.
rity). Higher-security housing units, such as the Special Man-agement
Unit II at the Eyman Prison Complex, are distinguished
by features such as reinforced steel doors, electronic locking and
monitoring devices, microwave motion detectors, and single or
Photo 2: Higher-Security Housing Unit
Higher-security housing units, such as this one at Eyman Complex,
Rynning Unit, have steel doors and single or double cells for in-mates.
Introduction and Background
4
OFFICE OF THE AUDITOR GENERAL
double cells for inmates. Lower-security housing units typically
house inmates in dormitories, ten-person tents, or prefabricated
housing units with communal restrooms, group activity rooms,
and outdoor recreation areas. Table 1 (see page 5) displays in-formation
on each facility by location, units, security levels, and
number of inmates.
Upon an inmate’s entrance to the prison system, a team of offi-cers
assigns inmates to their housing units based on two primary
classification scores: the inmate’s risk to the public, or P score,
and the inmate’s institutional risk to staff and other inmates, or I
score. Officers score inmates based on rankings from 1 (lowest
risk) to 5 (highest risk).1 The nature of the offense the inmate
committed is the principal basis for his or her public risk score.
For example, officers assign an inmate who represents a signifi-cant
risk to the public because of his use of a lethal weapon dur-ing
a crime a high P score. Officers initially assign an inmate’s
institutional risk score based upon the inmate’s behavior while in
jail or during a previous incarceration. For instance, an inmate
with the highest I score is considered dangerous and likely poses
a high security risk to staff and other inmates. The Department
reassesses each inmate’s classification scores every six months
based on the inmate’s behavior while in prison.
In addition to determining where an inmate will be housed, clas-sification
scores determine the amounts and types of allowable
inmate property, movement around the prison, and the extent of
visitation by family or friends. For example, officers usually as-sign
inmates with the highest public and institutional risk scores
to an individual cell, ensure that at least one staff member escort
them any time they leave their cells, and allow them no physical
contact with friends and family. In addition, high-risk inmates
are allowed only a few types of personal property, such as
1 Some inmates can lower their risk score to 1 through their behavior
while incarcerated. Officers may assign such inmates to security level 2
housing units.
Introduction and Background
5
OFFICE OF THE AUDITOR GENERAL
Table 1
Department of Corrections—Security Operations
Prison Complexes by Location, Complex, Unit, Security Level, and Inmate Counts1
As of June 30, 2000
Complex and Unit Security
Level
Inmate
Count
Douglas
Gila 2 659
Maricopa 2 222
Papago (DUI) 2 297
Mohave 3 938
Complex Detention2 74
Total 2,190
Eyman (Florence, AZ)
Cook 3 929
Meadows 3 991
Rynning 4 858
Special Management Unit I 5 886
Special Management Unit II 5 627
Special Management Unit II
Minors (juveniles) 5 15
Total 4,306
Florence
North 2 960
Picacho 2 195
East 3 715
South 3 388
Health Unit 5 13
Central 5 922
Housing Unit 8 5 32
Cell Block 6 (detention) 5 202
Total 3,417
Lewis (Buckeye, AZ)
Bachman 2 628
Barchey 3 389
Stiner 3 731
Morey 4 403
Buckley, not open as of 6/20005 4 800
Rast, not open as of 6/20005 4 350
Total 2,151
Perryville (Goodyear, AZ)3
San Pedro 2 362
Lumley (females)6 3 0
Santa Cruz (females) 3 751
Santa Maria (females) 4 348
Santa Maria (female juveniles) 4 2
(continued in next column)
Complex and Unit Security
Level
Inmate
Count
Perryville (Goodyear, AZ) concl’d)
Santa Maria Reception 5 68
Complex Detention 33
Total 1,564
Phoenix
Arizona Center for Women4 2 453
Globe 2 260
Inmate Workers 2 40
Aspen 3 116
Flamenco 4 96
Baker Ward 5 27
Alhambra Reception 5 333
Total 1,325
Safford
Fort Grant 2 747
Graham 2 711
Tonto 3 381
Total 1,839
Tucson
Echo 2 454
Southern Arizona Correctional
Release Center (females) 2 177
Manzanita 3 389
Santa Rita 3 878
Winchester 3 545
Rincon 4 641
Rincon Minor (juveniles) 4 135
Cimarron 4 777
Complex Detention 67
St. Mary’s Hospital 4 12
Total 4,075
Winslow
Apache 2 363
Coronado 2 577
Kaibab 4 794
Complex Detention 34
Total 1,768
Yuma
Cocopah 2 349
Cheyenne 3 1,012
Dakota 4 880
Total 2,241
1 Inmate totals do not include 1,411 inmates housed in 5 privately operated prisons.
2 Five of the 10 prison facilities operate detention units to house inmates pending placement in protective segregation or those who com-mit
disciplinary infractions. The other 5 facilities without specific detention units house these inmates in cells within the units.
3 Perryville is undergoing modification in 2000 to be used as a primarily female facility.
4 Arizona Center for Women is expected to close in late 2000.
5 Inmate counts for these units reflect the units’ inmate capacities. Another 800 beds were unopened in other units at Lewis.
6 As of June 30, 2000, no inmates were housed in this unit since the Department transferred the male inmates to another unit and were
preparing to move female inmates into the unit.
Source: Auditor General staff analysis of prison complexes’ information provided by the Arizona Department of Corrections as of June 30,
2000.
Introduction and Background
6
OFFICE OF THE AUDITOR GENERAL
hygiene items; in contrast to lower-risk inmates, who are allowed
craft supplies and the ability to purchase a greater variety of food
items from the inmate store.
Security Operations: Overview
of Staffing and Budget
The Security Operations program is organized with reporting
responsibilities at the department, regional, prison complex, and
prison unit level. As shown in Figure 1 (see page 7), the Deputy
Director for Prison Operations reports directly to the Department
Director. The Deputy Director supervises two regional opera-tions
directors who each oversee five prison complex wardens in
the Southern and Northern regions of Arizona.
Each complex warden functions as a prison’s chief executive
officer, and a deputy warden, assisted by an associate deputy
warden, is responsible for administering each prison unit. Fur-ther,
each unit is assigned a number of security staff: captain
(chief of security), lieutenants, sergeants, and correctional offi-cers.
As of August 4, 2000, Security Operations had a total of
7,517 full-time equivalent (FTE) positions, including 7,200 secu-rity
staffing positions.
The Department also manages an extensive inventory of vehicles
and security equipment. It maintains a fleet of over 1,990 vehi-cles,
including 93 buses for group transport and 321 alternative-fuel
vehicles. Although correctional officers in the units
do not carry any weapons other than pepper spray, the Depart-ment
maintains a firearm inventory of 2,415 weapons, including
shotguns, rifles, handguns, and riot control gas guns. These
weapons are used for perimeter patrol, main gate security,
transportation, and, when necessary, to quell disturbances. Other
security devices carried by correctional officers include hand-held
radios and handcuffs.
Department equipment in-cludes
vehicles, firearms,
hand-held radios, and hand-cuffs.
Introduction and Background
7
OFFICE OF THE AUDITOR GENERAL
Figure 1
Arizona Department of Corrections—Security Operations
Chain of Command
Department
Director
Deputy Director
Prison Operations
Southern Regional
Operations Director
(SROD)
Oversees 5 prison complexes
n Douglas
n Lewis
n Safford
n Tucson
n Yuma
Northern Regional
Operations Director
(NROD)
Oversees 5 prison complexes
n Eyman
n Florence
n Perryville
n Phoenix
n Winslow
For Each Complex
Complex
Warden
For Each Unit
within
Each Complex
Deputy
Warden
Associate
Deputy
Warden1
Chief of Security
(Captain)
Lieutenants
Sergeants
Officers
1 Some units, such as Globe and Picacho, do not have an Associate Deputy Warden.
Source: Auditor General staff analysis of Department of Corrections organization charts.
Regional
Operations Director
Introduction and Background
8
OFFICE OF THE AUDITOR GENERAL
For fiscal year 2000, as illustrated in Table 2 (see page 9), Security
Operations received approximately $230 million in State General
Fund appropriations. Nearly all the program’s funding is de-rived
from these appropriations. Most of the program’s expendi-tures
are for personnel costs.
Substantial Improvements
Since Previous Audits
The Auditor General’s Office reviewed security issues within the
Department in 1985 and 1991. Both audits identified numerous
serious problems, but the current audit found significant im-provement.
n 1985 report (Auditor General Report No. 85-12)—This
audit reported that the Department did not provide adequate
security at some of the prisons. For example, some prisons,
such as Florence, Tucson, and Perryville, lacked adequate pe-rimeter
security such as razor wire, inner fences secured in
cement, and adequate electronic detection systems. These se-curity
inadequacies created opportunities for escapes, with
over 50 inmates escaping through the perimeters of the vari-ous
prisons during a 16-month period. Further, deficiencies
within the facilities created unnecessary risks for inmates and
staff. For example, at the ASPC-Florence Central Unit, the
locking mechanism in Cellblock 2 was broken, so that to
open one cell door on a tier, staff had to open all 26 cells at
once.
The audit also found that the Department did not adequately
control contraband. Visits between inmates and family
members were inadequately monitored by staff, inmates’ liv-ing
areas were not frequently searched, and medical and
pharmaceutical supplies were not adequately monitored. Fi-nally,
the audit found that the Department’s inmate classifi-cation
process was subjective and often classified inmates at
inappropriately low security levels.
Introduction and Background
9
OFFICE OF THE AUDITOR GENERAL
Table 2
Arizona Department of Corrections—
Security Operations
Statement of Revenues, Expenditures, and Other Financing Uses
Years Ended or Ending June 30, 1999, 2000, and 2001
(Unaudited)
1999 2000 2001
(Actual) (Actual) (Estimated)
Revenues:
Appropriations:
State General Fund $206,082,000 $230,341,300 1 $260,783,800 3
Penitentiary Land Fund 2 1,000,000 1,375,000 1,375,000
State Charitable, Penal, and Reformaties Land Earnings Fund 270,000
Sales and charges for goods and services 10,204 13,153 13,200
Fines and forfeits 1,588 911 1,000
Other 36,343 34,171 35,000
Total revenues 207,130,135 231,764,535 262,478,000
Expenditures:
Personal services 168,895,889 191,080,110 1 180,376,700 3
Employee related 31,747,140 34,469,724 53,316,000 3
Professional and outside services 2 2,254,350 1,213,352 3,058,700 3
Travel, in-state 30,515 15,963 15,600
Travel, out-of-state 1,591 55,000
Aid to individuals 97,100
Other operating 3,998,597 4,447,019 24,008,300 3
Buildings and equipment 303,348 94,541 1,501,400 3
Total expenditures 207,231,430 231,320,709 262,428,800
Excess of revenues over (under) expenditures (101,295) 443,826 49,200
Other financing sources (uses):
Net operating transfers in 143,720 2,650
Reversions to the Penitentiary Land Fund 2 (127) (408,931)
Remittances to the State General Fund (47,189) (37,905) (38,000)
Total other financing sources (uses) 96,404 (444,186) (38,000)
Excess of revenues and other sources over expenditures and other
uses $ (4,891) $ (360) $ 11,200
1 State General Fund appropriations increased significantly in 2000. Approximately $14.3 million of that increase was to imple-ment
a new correctional officer pay plan.
2 Monies from fees on lands granted to the State of Arizona and interest earned on the investment of the permanent Penitentiary
Land Fund are appropriated to the Department. The Department allocated these monies to the Security Operations Program to
reimburse county jails for the time they hold prisoners. The expenditures are reported as professional and outside services in
the Statement and fluctuate yearly based on the time counties hold prisoners. Any unexpended monies at year-end are subject
to Legislative authorization in future years; consequently, the unexpended monies are presented as a reversion to the Peniten-tiary
Land Fund. The 2000 reversion does not account for any payments to counties for services performed prior to June 30,
2000, but not yet billed. Those costs will ultimately reduce the reversion; however, the amount owed was not known at the time
of this report.
3 The 2001 State General Fund appropriations and certain noted expenditure line items increased significantly due to the Depart-ment
realigning costs and their related funding source. In addition, overtime pay expenditures are excluded from personal ser-vices
because they are budgeted in another program.
Source: The Arizona Financial Information System (AFIS) Accounting Event Extract File for the years ended June 30, 1999 and 2000.
The Department of Corrections provided estimates for the year ended June 30, 2001.
Introduction and Background
10
OFFICE OF THE AUDITOR GENERAL
n 1991 report (Auditor General Report No. 91-4)—This au-dit
found that although the Department had taken signifi-cant
steps to improve security at the prisons, deficiencies
remained. For example, the Department increased the use of
razor wire on perimeter fences and replaced or refurbished
broken locking systems at inmate housing units. However,
the audit also found that the Department’s procedures gov-erning
tool control were still deficient. For example, con-sultants
hired by the Auditor General observed unsecured
hacksaws, cutting tools, and portable welding equipment.
They also determined that the Department needed to revise
policies and procedures for inmate counts, post orders, and
controls for keys and tool access. Additionally, the consult-ants
found that the Department still housed inmates in
Quonset huts and other structures not designed to provide
adequate observation of inmates.
This audit found that the Department has substantially im-proved
security in almost all areas. Most importantly, the num-ber
of escapes from the Department’s prisons fell from 56 be-tween
January 1984 and May 1985 to 12 in 1990, and then to 0 in
1997 and 6 in 1998. In 1998, only four states had fewer escapes
per inmates incarcerated. In addition, consultants hired for this
audit to assess security at six of the prisons found significant im-provement
in virtually all areas. They found that the Department
“. . . is making highly commendable and largely effective efforts to pro-vide
a safe and secure environment.” For example,
n Perimeter security—The consultants determined that the
Department used appropriate measures to secure its perime-ters,
including adequate fences and sophisticated electronic
detection systems.
n Controls against contraband—The consultants believed
that newly established policies and procedures to limit in-mate
property will help to significantly deter the introduction
of contraband.
n Inmate classification—The consultants saw no evidence,
such as a high number of escapes and assaults, that the De-partment
classifies inmates at inappropriate security levels.
Security has been signifi-cantly
improved.
Introduction and Background
11
OFFICE OF THE AUDITOR GENERAL
Scope and Methodology
This audit focused on the Department’s ability to provide ade-quate
security to staff and inmates and to effectively manage
inmates. The audit was conducted at the Department’s central
office and the ten prisons operated by the Department. The three
private prisons were not included in the audit because they will
be the focus of a future audit.
The primary method auditors used to assess security features
and practices was a review by two security consultants at six
prison complexes. One consultant is an attorney with over 20
years of experience examining prison systems and serving as a
special master overseeing several court orders that resulted from
inmate lawsuits. The second consultant is a former corrections
administrator with 22 years of experience managing and operat-ing
a large, high-security prison that incarcerated over 2,200
high-security inmates. In addition, he has also examined several
other prison systems to assess their security. The consultants
conducted an extensive review of security practices and technol-ogy
at selected units in the Douglas, Eyman, Florence, Lewis,
Phoenix, and Tucson complexes.1 The consultants assessed staff-ing
patterns, security procedures, and adequacy of security
hardware such as lighting, unit layout, and fencing. The consult-ants
reported that “. . . given the drawbacks relating to the poor design
of several older prisons and the very difficult staffing issues the Depart-ment
faces, wardens and deputy wardens are achieving more than they
could reasonably be expected to . . .” The consultants’ detailed report
is available upon request or may be accessed on the Auditor
General’s Web site:
www.auditorgen.state.az.us.
1 Prison complexes were selected, in consultation with the Department,
based on several characteristics to ensure that all types of complexes
were reviewed. Characteristics considered included custody and security
levels, inmate capacity, proximity to an urban area, staff vacancy rates,
age of facilities, and other unique attributes. Auditors selected the com-plexes
to provide comparisons of factors that could influence the nature
of information and incident management system reports and overall
prison security. For example, auditors selected complexes both near and
outside metropolitan areas. Additionally, auditors selected old and new
complexes.
Introduction and Background
12
OFFICE OF THE AUDITOR GENERAL
In addition, a variety of other methods was used to conduct the
audit and document evidence, including:
n Reviews of Department reports including internal audits,
intelligence documents, significant incident reports, escape
reports, and prison security posting assignments. Auditors
also reviewed 43 reports submitted by wardens and deputy
wardens upon their initial assessments of unit conditions.
n Interviews with staff of other states’ departments of correc-tions
relating to their security practices and inmate manage-ment.
1 Auditors also interviewed experts from associations
such as the American Correctional Association and the Na-tional
Institute of Corrections in the Department of Justice to
identify best practices in prison security.
The audit includes findings and recommendations in the follow-ing
areas:
n Improvements needed in prison facilities,
n Improvements needed in inmate management policies and
practices, and
n Improvements in other types of security practices.
In addition to recommendations for these areas, the audit also
provides Other Pertinent Information (see pages 45 through 50)
concerning the Department’s practices managing Security Threat
Groups (prison gangs).
This audit was conducted in accordance with government audit-ing
standards.
The Auditor General and staff express appreciation to the Direc-tor
of the Department of Corrections and Corrections staff for
their cooperation and assistance throughout the audit.
1 The seven states contacted were Colorado, Florida, Nevada, Oregon,
South Carolina, Utah, and Washington. They were selected based on dis-cussions
with the Department, the American Correctional Association,
and the National Institute of Corrections as demonstrating good inmate
management practices.
Introduction and Background
13
OFFICE OF THE AUDITOR GENERAL
13
OFFICE OF THE AUDITOR GENERAL
FINDING I SOME PRISON FACILITIES’
DESIGNS CONTINUE TO
POSE SECURITY AND
SAFETY PROBLEMS
Although the Department generally operates a secure prison
system, some prison facilities have design, maintenance, or other
problems that diminish inmate and staff safety. The Department
has enhanced its facilities through new construction and im-provements
to existing prisons. However, the Department must
still rely on tents, converted hotels, and other facilities that are
inadequate for the correctional purpose they serve. The Depart-ment
has had to use such facilities for several reasons—the steep
growth in inmate population, staffing shortages that make it im-possible
to use certain facilities that require more staff, and lim-ited
resources for new construction. Although it would not be
cost-effective to replace some of these facilities, several steps can
be taken to improve some inmate housing, thereby providing a
safer environment for staff and inmates.
The Department Operates a
Secure Prison System
Compared to conditions a few years ago, the Department has
greatly improved facility security. One reason is that the De-partment
has enhanced its facilities by constructing new prisons
and improving existing facilities. For example, ASPC-Lewis, the
newest of the Department’s ten complexes, has excellent design
and security features. In addition, the Department has made
maintenance and design upgrades to existing facilities that also
enhance safety and security. Since the Auditor General’s previ-ous
audits, the escape and assault rates in the State’s correctional
facilities have declined substantially.
New construction designed for optimum security—The Depart-ment
has incorporated some excellent design and security fea-tures
at its newest complex in the Arizona prison system,
Finding I
14
OFFICE OF THE AUDITOR GENERAL
ASPC-Lewis in Buckeye. The prison consists of 6 units (three
level 4, two level 3, and one level 2) and has a capacity of 4,150
Photo 3: Lewis Complex, Morey Unit
View of Lewis Complex, Morey Unit recreation yard from
observation tower.
inmates. The Department ensured that all 6 units included
smaller, more manageable yards that better facilitate officers’
observation and supervision of inmates and decrease their re-sponse
time in the event of a disturbance. For example, the level
4 Morey Unit’s control center overlooks the recreation yard. In
addition, the unit has a tall observation tower and a fenced run-way
separating the yard’s North and South sections. According
to Auditor General consultants, these features allow good obser-vation
of the entire yard and permit staff to move rapidly
through the complex. Moreover, the control centers have com-puter
monitors with “touch-screen” technology, which allows
the officer assigned to the post to quickly open and close doors,
and to monitor sally ports, perimeter fences, doors, and other
locations, and control water and lights in each cell from a central
location.1
Similarly, at ASPC-Eyman, the control centers in Special Man-agement
Unit II (SMU II), a super-maximum security unit which
opened in 1996, are designed with security features that allow a
1 A sally port is a secured entrance/exit area, between two doors or gates,
in which pedestrians or vehicles can be detained and searched before
they enter or leave a facility.
The Department’s newest
prison, ASPC-Lewis, in-corporates
many security
features.
Finding I
15
OFFICE OF THE AUDITOR GENERAL
single officer to monitor 60 inmates in cells. Each control center is
centrally located, and provides officers with excellent visibility
into the three 6- to 10-cell pods it monitors. Officers can control
doors and utilities and monitor sound from within the control
center. Auditor General consultants reported that these control
centers could serve as a model for maximum-security architec-ture.
Improvements to existing facilities—The Department has made
maintenance and design upgrades to existing facilities that en-hance
safety and security. At ASPC-Douglas, cubicle walls in the
Mohave Unit living areas have been reduced in height to en-hance
security, visibility, and staff safety. Additionally, the ex-pansion
and renovation of the prison ward at Tucson’s St.
Mary’s Hospital added 14 beds and centralized the new control
center to provide excellent security and control of inmates at
every classification level requiring inpatient hospital care. Fur-thermore,
the Department has moved a perimeter fence at Wins-low
to fully contain an administration building that was previ-ously
part of the perimeter. An inmate had escaped by climbing
onto the building and crossing its roof.
Escape and assault rates have declined—Escape rates have con-tinued
to decline since the mid-1980’s, when an Auditor Gen-eral’s
performance audit report on institutional security and
staffing (Report No. 85-12) pointed out major security problems.
The number of escapes from the Department’s prisons fell from
56 between January 1984 and May 1985 to 12 in 1990, and then to
0 in 1997 and 6 in 1998. In 1998, only four states had fewer es-capes
per inmates incarcerated. Similarly, assault rates have de-clined
from 49.1 per 1,000 inmates in 1995-97 to 30.6 in 1998-99.
In addition, the consultants reviewing Department operations
for the current audit found that the Department had substan-tially
improved security in almost all areas.
The Department has made
many upgrades to existing
facilities.
Finding I
16
OFFICE OF THE AUDITOR GENERAL
Department Continues to Operate
Inadequate Facilities
Despite these improvements, some Department facilities are in-adequate
for the correctional purpose they serve. The inadequa-cies
take several forms. Some inmate living units are configured
in ways that restrict surveillance and diminish staff and inmate
safety. In other cases, the Department houses many inmates in
tents, Quonset huts, and other buildings that make proper in-mate
surveillance and control nearly impossible. Moreover,
some units that were not originally designed as adult prisons,
including converted hotels, have unique maintenance and secu-rity
problems. In addition to the buildings themselves, some
sally ports (prison entrances) have design and operations prob-lems
that create potential security breaches.
Some structures have unsafe design—Several inmate living units
are configured in ways that restrict surveillance and diminish
staff and inmate safety. For example:
n H-shaped dormitories with high partitions—According to
Auditor General consultants, dormitories at ASPC-Florence’s
South Unit remain among the Department’s most dangerous
housing units due to their design. The South Unit, a level 3,
medium-security prison, was singled out in previous Audi-tor
General reports in 1985 and 1991 for poor design features.
Each dormitory consists of four wings connected by a single
corridor, forming the shape of an H. In some of the dormito-ries,
inmates’ beds are separated by partitions 43 and 1/2
inches high, which impair officers’ visibility. The Department
has lowered similar partitions at some units but has not low-ered
them in this unit. Further, one officer is assigned to
monitor four wings in each dormitory building. According to
Auditor General consultants, the “H”-shaped building leaves
the housing unit officer dangerously isolated during rounds
and inmate counts. Additionally, while outside doors elec-tronically
lock, the dormitories’ inside doors have only key
locks that require manual operation. Although Department
officials have attempted to mitigate the unit’s problems by
assigning less troublesome inmates to these dormitories,
Auditor General consultants described South Unit dormito-ries
as among the most dangerous they have ever seen. De-partment
officials recently instructed Regional Operations
Some dormitories have
unsafe design.
Finding I
17
OFFICE OF THE AUDITOR GENERAL
Directors to submit a plan for lowering the remaining tall
partitions in all units to 36 inches.
Photo 4: Unsafe Dormitories
Inmate beds separated by high partitions at Florence Complex,
South Unit.
n Mental health units—Chronically mentally ill inmates at
ASPC-Phoenix’s Flamenco Unit are housed in two- to six-person
rooms along dark hallways that do not lend them-selves
to direct, continuous surveillance. Staff must make
rounds and conduct inmate counts virtually without the
backup of officers who can see or hear them. According to
Auditor General consultants, this is particularly dangerous
with these less stable inmates. Similarly, inmates in the Aspen
Unit at ASPC-Phoenix, who because of cognitive or emotional
conditions are unable to function in the general prison popula-tion,
live in dormitories whose layout does not permit staff to
observe all inmates from a single location.
n Control centers with inadequate sight lines—Several units’
control centers have restricted lines of sight that create blind
spots for control room officers. For example, control rooms at
the ASPC-Tucson Santa Rita Unit and the Lumley, San Pedro,
Santa Maria, and Santa Cruz units at ASPC-Perryville are built
so one tier of cells is above the control center level and the
other cells are below the control center level. However, accord-ing
to Auditor General consultants, this design restricts
backup surveillance for housing unit officers and potentially
allows inmates to engage in prohibited behavior without de-tection.
Although Department officials note that cameras have
Finding I
18
OFFICE OF THE AUDITOR GENERAL
been installed to assist control room officers in monitoring
these blind spots, the basic design problem remains. Further-more,
these control rooms have no sally ports or double doors,
increasing the risk that someone could make a forced entry
when the single door is opened.
Temporary structures and tents in long-term use—In addition to
permanent structures that do not permit adequate surveillance,
the Department uses numerous tents, Quonset huts, and other
prefabricated buildings that make proper inmate surveillance
and control nearly impossible. Approximately 1,000 inmates
statewide live in approximately 100 ten-bed canvas tents, located
at 5 of the 10 prison complexes. In addition, up to 732 inmates
are housed in prefabricated 9- to 11-bed Quonset huts at the East
and North Units at ASPC-Florence. Other inmates live in a vari-ety
of portable buildings, including several that had been used
on the Alaska pipeline.
Photo 5: Temporary Structure
Portable building, formerly used to house Alaska pipeline construction
workers, now used to house inmates at Tucson Complex, Echo Unit.
However, none of these temporary structures permit officers to
have adequate surveillance and inmate control. Correctional offi-cers
can look in only one structure at a time, so most inmates are
not under direct observation. Moreover, inmates cannot be
locked into their rooms during disturbances because toilets and
showers are in separate buildings. In two separate 1999 inci-dents,
female inmates at ASPC-Perryville refused orders to “lock
down” (return to and stay in their tents). Since tents have canvas
Finding I
19
OFFICE OF THE AUDITOR GENERAL
walls and a wooden door, staff had difficulty enforcing the or-ders.
Photo 6: Tents Used for Housing Inmates
Tents at Tucson Complex, Echo Unit. Each tent houses 10 inmates.
Old hotels require significant maintenance—Units that were not
originally designed as adult prisons, including converted hotels,
have unique maintenance and security problems. For instance,
the Arizona Center for Women at ASPC-Phoenix (ACW) opened
in 1954 as the Phoenix International Hotel/Resort.1 Likewise, the
ASPC Douglas Papago Unit was also converted from 1950’s-era
hotels. These prisons are located on busy city streets, and sur-rounded
by a wall and fencing. Their proximity to civilian traffic
increases opportunities for contraband to be thrown over the
walls. These old structures were not designed as secure housing
for the inmate population and require significant maintenance,
such as room renovations, flood abatement, and upgrades to the
fire alarm system, fence and razor wire, and visitation area.
Perimeter sally ports potentially vulnerable—In addition to
building design issues, sally port design creates potential secu-rity
breaches at two facilities. Vehicle sally ports, through which
vehicles enter a unit or complex, should be tightly controlled
because they can become a focal point for escapes and the in-troduction
of contraband. However, the main vehicle sally port
1 ACW is scheduled to close later this year, when its female population is
moved to ASPC-Perryville.
Finding I
20
OFFICE OF THE AUDITOR GENERAL
at ASPC-Tucson can hold up to four vehicles, which increases
the opportunity for an escaping inmate to move from a vehicle
that has not been searched to one that has been searched. Addi-tionally,
one officer reported that because of traffic volume and
the size of some trucks, not every entering vehicle is thoroughly
searched, which enhances the likelihood of contraband being
smuggled into the prison. Traffic volume is particularly high at
this sally port because the warehouse and motor pool are lo-cated
inside the complex perimeter. Later prison designs, such
as ASPC-Lewis, have wisely placed warehouses and motor
pool buildings outside the perimeter fences in order to reduce
vehicle traffic into the prisons.
The prison at Fort Grant, part of the Safford complex, has a dif-ferent
type of sally port design problem. Numerous vehicles also
enter the Fort Grant Unit at ASPC-Safford. However, the size of
some trucks requires that both sally port gates be simultaneously
open to allow entry to and egress from the unit.
Several Factors Force
the Department to Operate
Deficient Prisons
Inmate population growth, staffing shortages, and limited re-sources
for new construction all contribute to the Department’s
facility-related problems. Inmate population growth has out-stripped
the State’s construction of permanent facilities making it
necessary to add temporary structures, such as tents, to the De-partment’s
housing inventory. Additionally, staff shortages have
delayed the opening of new units that would reduce the use of
temporary beds. Furthermore, it would not be cost-effective for
the Department to correct all facility deficiencies.
Prison growth contributes to the Department’s use of tempo-rary
structures—Rapid prison growth has required the De-partment
to use temporary structures and continue to use un-satisfactory
permanent structures. Between 1985 and 1991, Ari-zona’s
inmate population grew by 66 percent, and since 1991, the
population has grown almost 76 percent. This growth, from
about 8,000 inmates in 1985 to over 26,000 inmates in 2000, has
not permitted the Department to permanently remove unsatis-factory
beds from service. In 1991, the Auditor General reported
Arizona’s inmate population
has grown by almost 76% since
1991.
Finding I
21
OFFICE OF THE AUDITOR GENERAL
that the Department had discontinued the use of tents (Auditor
General Report No. 91-4), but growth has made it necessary to
reintroduce them. Inmate population growth has also contrib-uted
to the use of other temporary structures, double occupancy
in detention cells and mental health units, and the continued use
of older, poorly designed facilities.
Limited resources have resulted in temporary beds for inmates—
Tents and other temporary structures can be added to the system
in less time and at a fraction of permanent prison construction
cost. For instance, in 1998, the Department added 800 level 4
double-bunk cell beds and 800 level 3 dormitory beds to its in-ventory
at a total cost of approximately $60.7 million. The aver-age
cost for each of these permanent beds was $37,958. That
same year, 400 tent beds were constructed at ASPC-Florence for
$2,450,000. The cost per bed was $6,125. Although tents have
many deficiencies, they have provided an economical, stopgap
solution to a quickly expanding prison population. Furthermore,
while a new prison may take two years or more to construct,
tents and modular buildings can be erected to meet immediate
needs.
Staffing shortages prevent opening some permanent beds—Like
other law enforcement and correctional agencies, the Depart-ment
experiences difficulty recruiting and retaining security
staff. For example, during fiscal year 2000, the loss rate for correc-tional
officers averaged about 25 percent. One effect has been
that some facilities that would provide better security have been
unable to open. The Lewis complex’s 51.5 percent staff vacancy
rate has prevented the Department from activating two units.1 In
November 2000, there were two unoccupied units at ASPC-Lewis
with 1,150 total beds, and unopened beds in other units
brought the total to 1,550 beds not opened due to staff vacancies.
Chronic staffing shortages exacerbate the effects of using some of
the Department’s least appropriate facilities. For example, one
high-security unit at ASPC-Florence consistently operates with
fewer staff than it needs at the most restricted level, according to
1 The Department has high vacancy rates throughout the system, although
none so high as ASPC-Lewis. A forthcoming audit of the Department’s
Human Resources program, to be issued in 2001, will examine this mat-ter
in more detail.
Finding I
22
OFFICE OF THE AUDITOR GENERAL
the Department’s own policy. These inadequate staffing levels
create numerous security issues. Further, although additional
officers could increase surveillance of inmates in tents and other
units that have limited supervision, it would be cost-prohibitive
to hire the number of officers needed for proper supervision. For
tents, Quonset huts, and some dormitories, direct surveillance
would require at least one officer for each structure—a far too
expensive approach. The Department has acknowledged these
deficiencies and generally assigns its lowest custody inmates to
these inadequate structures.
Replacement of some facilities is not cost-effective—Construction
of new, modern facilities to correct all the facility-related defi-ciencies
in Department prisons would not be cost-effective.
While construction of new facilities would eliminate some prob-lems,
it is doubtful that it would improve the success or security
of some institutions. For example, although the converted hotel
rooms at ASPC-Douglas Papago Unit are unsatisfactory for sev-eral
reasons, there have been no escapes and few significant inci-dents
in the past year. According to Auditor General consultants,
replacing the Papago Unit with a new prison would cost tens of
millions of dollars, but, considering its effectiveness, public, staff,
and inmate safety could not improve significantly. Furthermore,
according to Auditor General consultants, Department managers
maintain and make productive use of facilities that would be
unusable in most states’ correctional systems. For example, the
consultants stated that correctional officers are unable to provide
ongoing surveillance of inmates housed in the Quonset huts at
the East Unit at ASPC-Florence. However, when the consultants
toured them, the Quonset huts were well-maintained, clean, and
appeared to be at least marginally adequate for inmates with low
institutional risk scores.
Department Facilities
Can Be Improved
Although replacement of some old facilities is not cost-effective,
the Department should improve some inmate housing to ade-quately
provide a safer environment for staff and inmates. First,
it should continue its efforts to add new beds to its inventory by
opening the remaining units at ASPC-Lewis as soon as it has the
Good management allows the
use of some facilities that
would be unusable in other
states’ correctional systems.
Finding I
23
OFFICE OF THE AUDITOR GENERAL
staff to do so. Additionally, the Department should eliminate the
use of tents. Finally, it should develop plans to replace and mod-ify
buildings and structures where appropriate and feasible.
The Department should continue its efforts to open all units at
ASPC-Lewis—The Department should continue its efforts to
add new beds to its inventory by opening the remaining units at
ASPC-Lewis as soon as it has the staff to do so. The Department
is making efforts, such as providing wage stipends and van
pools, to staff units at ASPC-Lewis, where approximately 1,550
beds remain vacant.
The Department should eliminate the use of tents—As perma-nent
beds become available, the Department should move in-mates
living in tents into secure living units. The Department has
taken steps toward this end. Recently, the Department reduced
its tent bed inventory at Perryville by moving female inmates to
permanent structures formerly occupied by male inmates.
However, 400 tent beds at ASPC-Florence were designated by
the Legislature in 1995 as permanent beds. While this designa-tion
allows the Department to obtain authorization for staff to
oversee inmates in these tents, tent beds should not be included
in the Department’s permanent bed inventory, and the Depart-ment
should develop a plan to eliminate all tent beds.
Eventually, the Department should replace and modify buildings
and structures that hamper security—The Department should
develop plans to eventually replace and modify some buildings
and other facilities.
n The Department should develop a plan to replace the mental
health units in the Flamenco and Aspen Units at
ASPC-Phoenix that have design problems that inhibit direct
inmate surveillance.
n The Department should take immediate steps to lower Flor-ence’s
South Unit dormitory partitions to enhance visibility.
If temporary housing was available to inmates housed in
these dormitories, the cinderblock partitions could be low-ered
at a minimal cost with inmate labor. Additionally, ac-cording
to Auditor General consultants, one correctional offi-cer
should be added to each dormitory building. Absent the
The Department should lower
the partitions in some dormi-tories.
Finding I
24
OFFICE OF THE AUDITOR GENERAL
ability to provide additional staffing, these dormitories
should be replaced.
n While less critical, the Department should develop a plan for
the eventual replacement of its Quonset huts. Likewise, the
Department should begin planning for the future replace-ment
of the modular housing units at ASPC-Tucson’s Echo
Unit. Although these structures are marginally adequate for
their current populations, they pose security risks and main-tenance
requirements that argue for their replacement.
Additionally, the Department should identify options to recon-figure
vehicle sally ports at ASPC-Safford and ASPC-Tucson and
explore options to improve sight lines for control rooms at
ASPC-Tucson and ASPC-Perryville. According to Auditor Gen-eral
consultants, installing a barrier to restrict vehicles from exit-ing
the sally port until they are properly inspected by officers
would increase security, as would permitting only one vehicle at
a time to enter the sally port. Additionally, they recommend re-locating
the complex warehouse outside the vehicle entrance so
that the high amount of vehicle traffic would not need to enter
the sally port. Finally, the Department should explore methods
to improve the control room sight lines at ASPC-Tucson and
ASPC-Perryville. For example, the Department could consider
modifications to the control rooms to allow more unobstructed
inmate monitoring.
Finding I
25
OFFICE OF THE AUDITOR GENERAL
Recommendations
The Department should:
1. Open the remaining units at ASPC-Lewis as soon as staff is
available to do so.
2. Cease using tents at all complexes as soon as the inmate
population can be transferred to other housing units. Because
some of the tents have been designated as part of the De-partment’s
permanent bed inventory, the Department should
develop a plan (which would require legislative approval) to
eliminate them.
3. Develop plans for closing the Alhambra/Flamenco and As-pen
Units at ASPC-Phoenix and replace those units.
4. Take immediate steps to lower the partitions in Florence’s
South Unit dormitories to enhance visibility.
5. Add one correctional officer to each ASPC-Florence South
Unit dormitory building. Absent the ability to provide addi-tional
staffing, these dormitories should be replaced.
6. Develop a plan for the future replacement of Quonset huts
and modular housing units.
7. Relocate the ASPC-Tucson warehouse outside the vehicle
entrance and allow only one vehicle at a time to enter the
sally port, and correct the sally port design problem at ASPC-Safford’s
Fort Grant unit that currently requires both gates to
be open simultaneously for trucks to enter or exit the unit.
8. Explore options to modify sight lines at control rooms at
ASPC-Tucson and ASPC-Perryville to enhance inmate sur-veillance.
26
OFFICE OF THE AUDITOR GENERAL
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27
OFFICE OF THE AUDITOR GENERAL
FINDING II THE DEPARTMENT SHOULD
CONTINUE TO IMPROVE
INMATE MANAGEMENT
The Department should continue to improve some practices it
uses to manage inmates. Effective inmate management policies
and practices allow staff to monitor inmates’ location and con-trol
their behavior, and are essential for preventing incidents
involving assaults, contraband, and escape. The Department
has already developed many effective policies and procedures
designed to effectively manage inmates. However, improve-ments
can be made in three areas: following existing practices
more consistently and thoroughly, developing management
policies for controlled movement of inmates and for activity
passes, and assigning an appropriate number of staff to some
critical areas within prison units.
The Department Has
Implemented Many
Effective Inmate Management
Policies and Practices
Arizona’s Department of Corrections, similar to other depart-ments
across the country, has implemented a variety of policies
and practices designed to effectively manage inmates. Some
policies address how inmates are to be monitored and tracked,
while others are intended to reduce the introduction of contra-band.
Moreover, the Department has developed specialized
inmate housing units to promote safety.
Some practices monitor and track inmates—The Department
has developed several policies and practices that monitor in-mates’
location and movement:
n Counts—Required by Department policy, correctional offi-cers
conduct several counts of inmates throughout each day
Finding II
28
OFFICE OF THE AUDITOR GENERAL
to ensure that inmates are at an allowable location. During a
count, inmate movement throughout the unit is usually not
permitted and, with the exception of work crew inmates, all
other inmates remain in their housing unit until the count is
determined to be correct.
n Activity passes and surveillance—Correctional officers
track lower-custody inmates’ locations by issuing inmates
activity passes, scheduling inmate activities on a master
pass form, and by using visual and radio surveillance. For
example, officers use visual surveillance to monitor inmates
as they move from one location to another. Additionally, of-ficers
issue inmates a color-coded activity pass specifying a
location they are allowed to visit, such as the inmate store.
Further, officers use radio communication to notify other of-ficers
that an inmate is moving to, or has arrived at, a loca-tion
within the unit. Moreover, inmates in the highest cus-tody
levels must be escorted by at least one correctional offi-cer
when moving to areas within a unit.
n New program to monitor inmates—The Department is
piloting its Inmate Program Plan at five prison units. This
new program is designed to monitor inmate movement
with electronic bracelets worn by inmates at the Cook Unit
at ASPC-Eyman. In addition, this program schedules each
inmate’s day according to four time-blocks (morning, after-noon,
evening, and night), and tracks his or her location
throughout the day. According to Department manage-ment,
in addition to tracking inmate movement, the pro-gram
is intended to provide each inmate with appropriate
programs, such as substance abuse and religious programs,
and education programs, such as literacy classes. The pro-gram
also assigns each inmate to work programs that corre-spond
to his or her vocational skills.
n Controlled movement—Recently, the Department further
restricted inmate movement in most of its medium-security
(level three and four) units by implementing “controlled
movement” procedures. Instead of allowing all inmates liv-ing
in a dormitory or cellblock to disperse on their own to
attend activities and programs, controlled movement pro-cedures
require inmates to move in small groups to and
from activities such as meals, recreation, and religious ser-
Finding II
29
OFFICE OF THE AUDITOR GENERAL
vices during specified intervals. According to Department
management, controlled movement helps ensure the safety
of staff as well as inmates because it limits the number of
inmates in one place. In addition, according to one Regional
Operations Director, if an assault is committed, officers of-ten
find it easier to determine an assailant’s identity because
fewer inmates are at a particular location.
Some practices intended to prevent introduction of contra-band—
The Department has implemented several policies and
practices designed to prevent inmates from introducing contra-band
into the prisons:
n Rules for visits with family and friends—The Depart-ment’s
policies and procedures regarding inmates’ visits
with family and friends in person and on the telephone are
intended to reduce the introduction of contraband. Inmates
are allowed to receive visits from no more than ten persons
who must first be approved by Department staff through a
screening process. Inmates in maximum-security units are
not allowed to have any physical contact with their visitors
and are limited to communicating with them through a
glass barrier, while many lower-custody inmates may sit at
a table with their visitors and kiss them at the beginning
and end of the visit. In addition, the Department monitors
inmates’ telephone calls with recording equipment to iden-tify
potential security risks, such as discussions of escape
plans or drug smuggling.
n Searches of inmates and their living areas—The De-partment
has developed policies and procedures for search-ing
inmates and their living areas. According to Department
policy, searches are intended to reduce incidents involving
contraband, including drugs and weapons. For example, of-ficers
conduct strip-searches of inmates before they return to
the prison from attending a work crew and after visiting
with a family member or friend. Additionally, correctional
officers conduct quarterly searches of all inmates’ living ar-eas.
n New policy to reduce property—In an attempt to further
reduce contraband items at the prisons, the Department en-acted
Department Order 909 in October 1999. This policy re-
Controlled movement lim-its
the number of inmates
in one place.
Finding II
30
OFFICE OF THE AUDITOR GENERAL
stricts the property inmates are allowed to possess. It pro-hibits
inmates from receiving incoming packages through
the mail. In addition, it requires inmates to purchase all
property, such as radios and televisions, through the inmate
store. In the past, inmates received contraband through
packages sent by mail.
Specialized units developed to promote safety—To promote
safety, the Department has segregated certain groups of in-mates
from the general population and houses them together to
prevent security problems such as assaults. For example, the
Department has designated four prison units (Cook, Meadows,
Rynning, and South Units at ASPC-Eyman and Florence) to
house only sex offenders to protect them from general popula-tion
inmates who often prey on these inmates. Moreover, the
Department has placed inmates requiring protection from other
inmates into its protective segregation program. In addition, the
Department developed a new policy to collect and document
information on Security Threat Groups (prison gangs) that of-ten
disrupt the prisons’ orderly operations. If the Department
collects enough intelligence information to demonstrate that an
inmate belongs to a Security Threat Group, the inmate is segre-gated
from the general population and moved to the restrictive
maximum-security Special Management Unit II at ASPC-Eyman.
For additional information relating to the Department’s
Security Threat Group policies, see Other Pertinent Informa-tion,
pages 45 through 50.
Finally, the Department is in the process of transferring all fe-male
inmates to ASPC-Perryville. Prior to this move, minimum-and
medium-security-level female inmates were housed at the
Manzanita Unit and the Southern Arizona Correctional Release
Center at ASPC-Tucson and the Arizona Center for Women at
ASPC-Phoenix, while female inmates of every security level
were housed at the Santa Maria Unit at ASPC-Perryville. The
decision to move these inmates to ASPC-Perryville is intended
to improve safety and security by reducing inmate movement
between prison complexes.
The Department houses
certain types of inmates
together.
Finding II
31
OFFICE OF THE AUDITOR GENERAL
Analysis of Prison Incidents Points
to Need for Continuous Improvement
Although the Department has implemented many policies and
practices to effectively manage inmates, many incidents involv-ing
assaults, contraband, and disturbances occur. The Depart-ment
documents prison incidents through a variety of reports,
depending on an incident’s severity and the level of response
required to manage it. For example, officers compile an infor-mation
report when they find contraband while searching an
inmate’s cell or locate a security device, such as a hand-held
radio, that is not working properly. They document more seri-ous
incidents, such as fights, in an incident management system
report. These reports show that while the majority of the inci-dents
involve routine matters, such as broken light fixtures,
other incidents are more serious and involve assaults, distur-bances,
and contraband:
n Assaults and disturbances—Inmates often commit as-saults
and occasionally create disturbances that can cause
significant security problems. For example, monthly reports
the Department compiled reveal that inmates caused 7 ma-jor
and 30 minor disturbances from July through December
1999.1 Disturbances create security problems and are costly
to the Department. For example, during a recent major dis-turbance
at the Ft. Grant Unit in Safford, inmates took over
the unit’s yard office and destroyed the building by setting
it on fire.
n Drugs and other contraband items—While conducting
searches of inmates and their living areas, officers often find
drugs and other contraband that can compromise security.
For example, according to the Department’s monthly statis-
1 Arizona Department of Corrections policy defines a major disturbance as
any collective action by three or more inmates that constitutes an attempt
to gain control of the prison or any part of that prison and requires
prison complex level, rather than unit level, or external, response. Major
disturbances can include incidents of damages greater than $1,000, seri-ous
injuries, or staff being assaulted and forced to flee or being taken
hostage. A minor disturbance is defined as an inmate grouping, alterca-tion,
or disruptive incident involving three or more inmates that is con-tained
by the unit’s on-duty staff, with damages less than $1,000 and no
medical emergencies resulting.
Finding II
32
OFFICE OF THE AUDITOR GENERAL
tical report for fiscal year 2000, there were 686 inmates who
tested positive for drugs during October, November, and
December 1999, indicating that the inmates had used these
substances while in prison. In addition, auditors’ analysis of
information reports indicated that drug-related contraband
was found primarily at lower-level custody units, suggest-ing
that given their greater freedom of movement, and
lower levels of supervision, lower-custody inmates are able
to obtain contraband more easily.
Information Reports also document other types of contraband
found during searches. For example, one Information Report
from the Papago Unit at Douglas documents the objects an offi-cer
confiscated from an inmate’s living area, including pliers,
drill bits, razor blades, hacksaw blades, wire, and other danger-ous
contraband.
Improvements to Inmate
Management Practices Can
Be Made in Several Areas
The consultants and Auditor General staff identified several
areas in which inmate management practices can be improved.
They include following existing procedures more consistently
and thoroughly, developing policies for controlled movement
procedures and activity passes, and ensuring that enough staff
are in place to fill critical posts.
Greater consistency and thoroughness needed in following De-partment
policies—Officers sometimes fail to consistently ap-ply
procedures to supervise inmates, which can compromise
security. According to two Department officials, assaults in
high-security units can occur because officers fail to follow
rules, such as prohibiting inmates to have access to each other.
For example, two serious incidents, a murder and an assault,
have occurred under such circumstances at Special Manage-ment
Unit II since it opened in 1996. In addition, a 1999 internal
audit of ASPC-Douglas reported that two units’ staff did not
conduct strip searches of inmates properly. These searches are
particularly important because contraband is often smuggled
into the units by inmates returning from work sites.
Officers do not always
follow Department proce-dures.
Finding II
33
OFFICE OF THE AUDITOR GENERAL
Officers also sometimes fail to thoroughly monitor inmates’
locations. For example, the lack of appropriate tracking proce-dures
at the ASPC-Perryville’s Santa Maria unit contributed to
an escape in October 1999. In that incident, a high-security fe-male
inmate had received an activity pass to visit the resource
library, but when she did not appear at the library, staff did not
immediately follow up to locate her. In addition to increasing
the risk of escape, failure to monitor inmate locations can give
inmates opportunities to commit assaults or engage in other
prohibited activities, and can also create confusion when offi-cers
conduct counts. According to four officers interviewed
during the audit, count sheets sometimes contain incorrect in-formation,
such as showing an inmate as part of a work crew
when he is actually in his cell due to illness.
Some clarification to existing policies may be needed to ensure
they do not allow inmates to engage in activities that may com-promise
security objectives. At two units, Auditor General con-sultants
observed inappropriate duties assigned to inmates that
increase the potential for inmates to engage in activities prohib-ited
by Department policy. First, inmates at ASPC-Florence
were observed delivering inmate store items to other inmates.
However, theft, introduction of contraband, and other prohib-ited
actions could be more likely when inmates are used to de-liver
store items. Moreover, at ASPC-Tucson, an inmate was
observed in a tool room helping conduct an inventory of re-turned
tools. According to the consultants, inmates should
never help conduct an inventory of tools.
The Department should ensure that all policies and procedures
are carried out consistently at the prisons. According to De-partment
management, it has improved consistency across all
prison complexes by creating the Northern and Southern Re-gional
Operations Director positions. These positions directly
supervise five prison wardens each, and are intended to facili-tate
consistencies in following procedures.
Department lacks policies in two areas—Although the De-partment
has developed many effective inmate management
policies, it lacks policies governing two inmate management
practices. First, the Department lacks a policy to guide con-trolled
movement procedures systemwide. According to one
Department official, officers use the policies written specifically
Finding II
34
OFFICE OF THE AUDITOR GENERAL
to address inmate movement procedures in the Lumley Unit at
ASPC-Perryville. These policies were developed and imple-mented
in response to the 1997 murder of an officer assigned to
that unit. However, interviews with staff indicate that instead
of using these policies to guide inmate movement at their units,
officers rely primarily on post orders (requirements for each
type of post) that have been established for their unit.
Second, the Department lacks consistent policies for its activity
pass system, which tracks the movement of medium-custody
inmates. The Department uses activity passes to track inmates
attending education programs or going to the inmate store. At
some units, such as the Santa Maria Unit at ASPC-Perryville,
officers issue inmates an activity pass. Other officers monitoring
the unit ensure that the inmate moves to the assigned activity.
At other units, such as the Cimarron Unit at ASPC-Tucson and
the Kaibab Unit at ASPC-Winslow, officers use a master pass
list, which contains a listing of all inmates pre-approved to at-tend
an activity.
The Department should develop policies to carry out controlled
movement and activity passes. According to Department man-agement,
these policies are being drafted. However, the De-partment
should consider development of these policies a key
priority and ensure they are developed by the end of 2000.
Too few staff in certain areas—The Department has too few
staff in certain areas where inmate monitoring is important. In
many units, a single correctional officer is often responsible for
supervising multiple housing areas. For example, while the
Graham Unit at ASPC-Safford houses 715 low-custody inmates,
only 5 correctional officers operate the unit at a “restricted level
of operations.” In addition, the Echo Unit at ASPC-Tucson has
only 4 officers during the graveyard shift supervising 456 in-mates
and providing the unit with a minimal level of services.
According to management from this unit, another correctional
officer is needed to adequately supervise the inmates living in
this unit’s trailers and tents. According to Auditor General con-sultants,
some critical areas are understaffed. For example, just
1 officer is responsible for monitoring an inmate dormitory and
7 Quonset huts in the South and East Units, respectively, at
ASPC-Florence.
The Department lacks poli-cies
for controlled move-ment
and activity passes.
Finding II
35
OFFICE OF THE AUDITOR GENERAL
In addition to having too few staff in particular areas, the De-partment
also has too few staff to adequately search inmates’
cells and living areas. According to Department policy, searches
of inmates’ living areas are supposed to be part of the prisons’
daily operations. Additionally, according to our consultants, the
Department should conduct frequent and random cell searches
in addition to the quarterly searches conducted by the prisons’
Tactical Support Units and by other correctional officers. How-ever,
most officers interviewed by the consultants claimed that
although they conducted some random and targeted cell
searches, they were not able to search as many cells as they felt
would be desirable. The consultants also entered four randomly
selected cells at the Central Unit at ASPC-Florence and found
nuisance contraband in plain sight in all four cells. According to
the consultants, the number of searches appeared to be insuffi-cient.
According to one Department official, the Department
does not have enough staff to adequately conduct cell searches.
The Auditor General will address staffing issues in greater
depth in a future audit of the Department’s Human Resources
Management, to be issued in 2001.
Although the Department evaluated its need for posts in 1996,
it has not recently reassessed the number of posts needed in
some critical areas. The Department should regularly reassess
its staffing needs for critical areas by conducting a zero-based
staffing analysis. This analysis should be comprehensive
enough to identify the number of officers needed to thoroughly
monitor the number of inmates housed at particular units.
Finding II
36
OFFICE OF THE AUDITOR GENERAL
Recommendations
1. The Department should develop and implement policies for
controlled movement and activity pass systems.
2. The Department should continue to ensure that staff at all
prisons consistently follow inmate management practices.
3. The Department should analyze and determine the appro-priate
number of staff needed to adequately monitor inmate
movement and activity.
4. Once this analysis is complete, the Department should as-sign
staff appropriately to critical posts and, if necessary, re-quest
authorization to increase its complement of FTEs.
37
OFFICE OF THE AUDITOR GENERAL
FINDING III MOST OTHER SECURITY
PRACTICES ARE SOUND,
BUT SOME CAN BE IMPROVED
In addition to security practices related to inmate management,
the Department should continue to improve some of its other
security practices. The Department has made considerable
strides in improving these other practices, which cover such
areas as inspecting facilities and controlling access to potentially
dangerous tools. Prior audits had found serious procedural diffi-culties,
which the Department has largely corrected. However,
the Department needs to develop or improve policies in such
areas as dispensing prescription drugs, conducting certain secu-rity
tests, and controlling tools.
Other Policies and Procedures
Enhance Security
In addition to secure facilities and appropriate inmate manage-ment
practices, prisons require other effective security practices
in order to protect the public, staff, and inmates. Such practices
include inspecting fences and security devices, controlling access
to keys and potentially dangerous tools, examining mailed items
for drugs and other contraband, and maintaining written in-structions
for every security post. Corrections departments gain
further assurance of safe prison operation by conducting regular
internal audits of each prison’s adherence to policies. Without
sound security practices, a prison can develop a violent atmos-phere
that is unsafe for inmates as well as staff and the public.
Department Has Made
Substantial Improvements
Since Previous Audits
While prior audits revealed many serious deficiencies, the De-partment
has improved its policies and procedures and ad-
Finding III
38
OFFICE OF THE AUDITOR GENERAL
dressed those deficiencies. Inspection policies, post orders, and
key and tool control have all improved, as have policies regard-ing
weapons, transportation, and mail and property.
Prior audits found several procedural deficiencies—Both the
Auditor General’s 1985 and 1991 reports noted numerous proce-dural
deficiencies at Department prisons. For example, the 1991
audit noted that staff did not adhere to security inspection poli-cies.
Security inspections were not being carried out in a consis-tent,
complete, well-defined manner at most Department facili-ties.
Additionally, the nature and quality of post orders, which
are procedures specific to individual positions or “posts” to
which officers are assigned, varied from institution to institution.
Furthermore, few facilities had established comprehensive key
control systems and tool control was an ongoing problem at
many prisons. Finally, the Department was not issuing body
alarms, which are designed to alert the control center when an
officer is in trouble.
Current audit found Department follows many excellent prac-tices—
The Department has improved its policies and procedures
and addressed most of the deficiencies identified in prior audits.
It has developed uniform standards, many modeled after those
in use at the Federal Bureau of Prisons, for prison complexes
throughout the system to follow. According to Auditor General
consultants, the Department’s policies are equal to or exceed
accepted standards, and could serve as models for other states to
follow. In addition, the consultants found that, to a great extent,
the policies had been effectively implemented throughout the six
prison complexes they reviewed. Annual security audits of each
prison complex help ensure consistent implementation of these
policies.
Auditor General consultants reviewed security practices at six
prison complexes and commended the Department on their
policies and practices in the following areas:
n Inspections—Officers make regular checks of outdoor fenc-ing,
gates, locks, wire, and other security hardware. Broken
or deficient items are quickly repaired. In addition, the De-partment
has implemented the practice of painting retaining
The Department’s policies
equal or exceed accepted
standards.
Finding III
39
OFFICE OF THE AUDITOR GENERAL
wires and brackets red or bright yellow where they attach to
the fencing so that officers can immediately spot any tamper-ing.
n Post orders—Each security post has complete, relevant post
orders. Correctional officers assigned to a post review and
sign these orders to indicate their understanding of the post’s
responsibilities and emergency procedures. The consultants
considered many of the Department’s post orders to be
among the best they had encountered.
n Key control—The Department maintains good key account-ability.
In contrast to the 1991 audit, consultants found the
Department has secure key centers, keeps keys in locked
cabinets, marks both keys and key locations for identification,
and keeps a record of all keys issued.
n Tool control—The Department also has good procedures for
controlling tools, including kitchen implements, yard work
tools, and cleaning chemicals, to ensure inmates cannot steal
them to use as weapons. Each tool storage area has shadow
boards for quick identification of absent items, and all poten-tially
dangerous tools remain in secure storage areas except
when signed out for use.1 Staff maintain accurate inventory
records and make frequent checks to ensure inmates who
have been assigned tools have them in their possession.
1 Shadow boards are boards, usually peg-board, with hooks on which tools,
utensils, and other implements are hung. Each item’s silhouette is outlined
on the board for easy identification of items in use or not in their assigned
location on the board.
Finding III
40
OFFICE OF THE AUDITOR GENERAL
Photo 7: Tool Storage
Tools stored on a shadow board for quick identification of absent items.
n Weapons—Each prison complex maintains a secure armory
containing safe, reliable weapons for use in perimeter patrol,
transportation, or when an incident requires an armed re-sponse.
Officers carry weapons qualifications cards and,
when questioned by the consultants, could articulate weapon
and use-of-force policies.
n Inmate transportation—To reduce risks incurred when
transferring inmates between prison complexes, the De-partment
has developed a system to shorten time spent
in transit, and follow other well-designed practices dur-ing
transport. For example, inmates travel in restraints
and bright orange clothing, and transportation officers
carry information about each inmate to more quickly ap-prehend
them in case of escape.
n Mail and property—The Department follows sound proce-dures
for inspecting incoming items to prevent introduction
of drugs and other contraband. Additionally, it has recently
implemented a new policy to reduce opportunities for bring-ing
inappropriate items into the prisons and cut the time offi-cers
must spend inspecting inmate property. This new policy
prohibits inmates from receiving any packages, and instead
requires them to purchase standardized televisions, snack
Finding III
41
OFFICE OF THE AUDITOR GENERAL
foods, personal care items, and other property through the
inmate store.
The Department enforces its policies and procedures through
annual audits conducted by teams comprised of a team leader
from the Department’s Inspections Bureau and members from
various Department divisions. Every prison complex is in-spected
each year to determine its compliance level with critical
Department standards set forth in Department Orders and other
policies. These audits promote standard implementation of poli-cies
throughout the prison system. The Department’s audit prac-tices
are among the Arizona correctional system’s greatest
strengths.
Department Could Make
Some Further Improvements
Although the Department has excellent policies in a number of
areas and generally follows them consistently, it should develop
some additional policies and address a tool control deficiency
found at one prison complex. These new policies would enhance
security and reduce certain risks. The Department is currently
exploring one of these new policies, which had been recom-mended
in the 1991 audit but not implemented due to technol-ogy
limitations at the time. Chronic staff shortages and financial
constraints may have discouraged the Department from adopt-ing
the remaining policies; nevertheless, the Department should
exercise its best efforts to develop and follow them. Specifically,
the Department lacks appropriate policies regarding the follow-ing:
n Simulated emergency key runs—The Department does not
have a policy requiring staff to attempt to move throughout
the prison complexes using only keys. In an emergency when
power is interrupted, such as during a fire or a riot, officers
would need to access every area of a prison without delay.
An officer’s inability to obtain and use emergency keys when
a power failure disables electronic locks could result in addi-tional
property damage, injury, or death. However, when
consultants asked officers at three complexes to conduct a
simulated emergency key run, the officers could not carry out
the exercise quickly, and had difficulty finding the correct
Finding III
42
OFFICE OF THE AUDITOR GENERAL
keys and opening doors. Further, some units did not use a
color-coded system to match keys with doors. Routine exer-cises
of this type are necessary to ensure staff can use keys in
an emergency situation.
n Security challenges—Another practice not consistently
conducted by all prison complexes is security challenges. Se-curity
challenges, which are conducted at some complexes,
periodically test their security practices by having a person
attempt to enter a facility without proper identification or
bring unauthorized items through a security post. Security
challenges increase staff vigilance and identify potential
weaknesses that could lead to contraband entering a prison
or inmates escaping.
n Prescription dispensing—While the control of needles and
other dangerous instruments in medical areas is excellent,
some of the Department’s inconsistent drug-dispensing prac-tices
increase the possibility of inmates hoarding and selling
narcotic or psychotropic drugs. The liquid-form use of nar-cotic
and psychotropic drugs varies between complexes. For
instance, ASPC-Eyman maintains some of these medications
only in liquid form, while liquid narcotics and psychotropic
drugs are used at ASPC-Phoenix only if ordered by a physi-cian.
However, no liquid psychotropic drugs are available at
ASPC-Florence or ASPC-Lewis. Furthermore, seven-day
supplies of certain psychotropic medications are issued at
ASPC-Lewis. This practice is even more problematic because
staff reported that they could not effectively watch inmates
ingest their medications (a “watch/swallow” regimen), thus
increasing the chance that an inmate could hide the pill for
later use or sale. The Department should develop and im-plement
uniform policies requiring medical staff to use a liq-uid
form of narcotics and psychotropic drugs whenever pos-sible,
as well as dispense unit doses and apply a
“watch/swallow” regimen in connection with all such medi-cations.
n Body alarms—The Department does not issue body alarms
to all its correctional officers, although it is currently testing
such alarms at one complex. Body alarms range in sophistica-tion
from a tone-alert model that emits a loud sound to alert
nearby staff, to those with limited voice capability linking
The Department does not
consistently conduct security
challenges.
Finding III
43
OFFICE OF THE AUDITOR GENERAL
them to the control center. Some body alarms are activated
by pressing a shielded button, while others have a “man-down”
feature that triggers an alarm after the device is in a
non-vertical position for a set period of time. The quality and
cost of these systems vary widely. While the cost of a trans-mitter
carried by an employee is generally under $200, the in-stalled
equipment ranges from about $70,000 to more than
$500,000. Correctional officers carry hand-held radios for
communication, but body alarms could more quickly alert
other staff of any emergency. Such alarms are particularly
important at facilities where officers cannot maintain visual
contact with each other, a common problem in many of the
Department’s units. The Auditor General’s 1991 report rec-ommended
that the Department provide body alarms for
certain correctional officers.
In addition to these policy deficiencies, Auditor General consult-ants
observed some poor tool control activities at the Tucson
prison complex. At this unit, tool room doors were unlocked and
an inmate was inside helping to conduct an inventory.
Recently, after reviewing the Auditor General consultants’ re-port,
the Department began requiring simulated emergency key
runs and evaluating its policies in the other three areas. The De-partment
had not previously made this a priority. In addition,
problems with false alarms using older body alarm technology
discouraged the Department from widely adopting such alarms
in the past; but, as noted above, the Department is currently
evaluating body alarms for possible use throughout its prisons.
Finding III
44
OFFICE OF THE AUDITOR GENERAL
Recommendations
1. The Department should adopt a policy requiring every unit
and complex to conduct simulated emergency key runs in-volving
all staff to enable management to ascertain if keys
will function for each of them and they can achieve timely ac-cess
to all areas of the facility.
2. The Department should adopt a policy requiring every unit
and complex to conduct security challenges, such as having
someone use another employee’s identification card to gain
entrance to a facility.
3. The Department should develop and implement uniform
policies requiring medical staff to use a liquid form of narcot-ics
and psychotropic drugs whenever possible, as well as
dispense unit doses and apply a “watch/swallow” regimen
in connection with all such medications.
4. The Department should cease the practice of permitting in-mates
to enter any tool room except to perform housekeep-ing
duties under direct staff supervision. Furthermore, in-mates
should never be allowed to help conduct tool invento-ries.
The Department should monitor this through its internal
audits.
5. The Department should continue its pilot program of body
alarms at ASPC-Eyman and, if successfully implemented
there and determined to be cost-effective, adopt their use for
all appropriate security staff.
45
OFFICE OF THE AUDITOR GENERAL
OTHER PERTINENT INFORMATION
During the audit, auditors developed information about the De-partment’s
policies for managing prison gangs, or Security
Threat Groups (STGs). STGs have become more common and
dangerous in the nation’s prisons, where they introduce drugs
and weapons, and where they use or threaten violence to gain
power. In addition to operating within the prisons, STGs also
recruit members and conduct their activities on the streets. State
prison systems have attempted to address gang problems in dif-ferent
ways. Some states have implemented policies to manage
prison gangs, while other states try to appease gangs or work
with them. In contrast to both of these approaches, the Arizona
Department of Corrections’ approach isolates gang members
and restricts their privileges to deter gang activity.
The Department’s policy was implemented in September 1997.
According to the Department, the policy’s purpose is “to mini-mize
the threat that inmate gang or gang like activity poses to the
safe, secure and efficient operation of institutions...” The De-partment
believes that isolating gang members and restricting
their privileges effectively deters gang activity. The Department’s
policy involves:
n Identifying possible STGs and determining if they should be
formally identified (certified) as an STG;
n Identifying individual inmates who are gang members; and
n Placing them into facilities that are separate from other in-mates.
Gangs Formally Identified
Through Certification Process
The Department’s STG management process begins with correc-tional
officers making observations and gathering enough in-formation
to demonstrate whether a particular group should
Other Pertinent Information
46
OFFICE OF THE AUDITOR GENERAL
Figure 2
Arizona Department of Corrections—
Security Operations
Security Threat Group Validation Statistics1
As of August 2000
Grandels (83)
Border
Brothers (198)
Aryan
Brotherhood (90)
Old Mexican
Mafia (23)
Mau-Mau (20)
New Mexican
Mafia (69)
1 The Department has certified Surenos as its seventh Security Threat Group; however, no individual
members of this group have been validated.
Source: Auditor General staff summary of statistics provided by the Arizona Department of Corrections
report, Security Threat Group Activity Reflective of Department Order #806 (Effective 9/2/97) Current
Validation and Appeal Activity by STG as of 8/4/00.
be certified as an STG. The group’s threat to the Department’s
operations must be proven through documented reports and
other information, and the group must have displayed or threat-ened
violence within the prison. If the Department gathers suffi-cient
evidence to ascertain that the group is a gang, the Depart-ment’s
STG Validation Committee makes a recommendation to
the Director, who then decides whether to certify the group as an
STG.
As of August 2000, the Department had certified seven STGs (see
Figure 2). The Department is currently gathering evidence to
determine whether other groups should be certified. There are
other gangs represented by inmates, but the Department is
Other Pertinent Information
47
OFFICE OF THE AUDITOR GENERAL
primarily interested in certifying those groups who display
gang-like activity within the Department and a propensity for
violence.
Gang Members, Once
Identified, Are
Housed Separately
The rest of the Department’s process involves screening inmates,
identifying and validating those who are members of STGs, and
housing them in separate units.
Identification process—Inmates are screened to determine if
they are members of an STG, both upon reception to the prison
system and throughout their prison sentence. Characteristics that
flag incoming inmates as potential STG members include having
gang-related tattoos, gang-related literature, and information
from other criminal justice agencies. Once in prison, evidence of
possible STG affiliation comes from phone conversations, letters,
and prison staff’s observations. Although prison staff monitor
inmates’ activities and telephone calls, their ability to monitor
inmates’ incoming mail is hampered by a court decision that
does not allow staff to read any incoming mail.
If an inmate is suspected of being an STG member, a staff mem-ber
conducts a formal investigation. If the staff member finds
sufficient evidence to believe the inmate is an STG member, he or
she develops a validation packet containing all information
about the inmate and his/her gang relations. All validation
packets include a point sheet that helps the Department deter-mine
whether suspected STG members will be validated. The
point system was created to lend objectivity to the validation
process and assigns points to inmates for gang-related tattoos,
court testimony, documents relating to gang affiliation, pictures
taken with known gang members, and any other evidence of
gang affiliation. An inmate must receive 10 points out of at least
2 of the 14 criteria to receive further consideration as an STG
member.
The Department’s STG Hearing Committee reviews validation
packets, holds validation hearings, and then renders decisions on
an inmate’s STG status. The Committee is composed of three
The Department identifies
inmates who may be mem-bers
of a gang.
Other Pertinent Information
48
OFFICE OF THE AUDITOR GENERAL
Deputy Wardens and Associate Deputy Wardens. At a hearing,
the accused inmate will be present and the Committee may call
staff or other inmates as witnesses. The Committee may also ac-cept
written questions for witnesses from the inmate. After the
hearing the Committee decides if the inmate should be validated
as an STG member or if the evidence does not support valida-tion.
Department has appeal process—Inmates validated by the STG
Hearing Committee as gang members may appeal this decision
within five days. As of August 4, 2000, according to Department
statistics, about 5 percent of appeals (9 of 197) have been upheld
by the Validation Committee. The STG Validation Committee
hears the appeal and makes a decision. All decisions made by
this committee are final and no further appeals may be made.
STG members housed in special units—The Department has
dedicated specific units at the Eyman Prison to house validated
gang members. Validated STG members are sent to the Special
Photo 8: Inmate Cell at Special Management Unit II
Inmate cell at Eyman Complex, Special Management Unit II. Validated
gang members are restricted to such cells 24 hours a day.
Management Unit II (SMU II) at ASPC-Eyman to serve the re-mainder
of their sentences. Inmates validated as gang members
and housed at SMU II face severe reductions in their privileges.
For example, all validated inmates are considered maximum-security
inmates and are restricted to their single-bunk cells 24
A Hearing Committee
determines validation as an
STG member.
Other Pertinent Information
49
OFFICE OF THE AUDITOR GENERAL
hours a day, with only 3 hours of exercise each week. Addition-ally,
these inmates have fewer inmate store privileges, cannot
earn more than 20 cents per hour from working, and cannot earn
time credits that would lead to an earlier release date.
High-profile gang members and leaders may be sent to other
states to finish their prison sentences. Department management
believes that this strategy reduces communication among gang
members and weakens the gang. Moreover, Arizona accepts
some inmates from other states.
Inmates can renounce gang affiliation—Inmates who wish to
leave SMU II and have their STG status changed may do so only
if they successfully renounce their gang affiliation and debrief
(inform) the Department about any gang activity they are aware
of. This information may include gang structure, plans, or mem-bership.
According to Department statistics, as of August 2000,
58 inmates have successfully renounced their gang membership.
For an inmate to successfully renounce gang membership, the
Department must be convinced that the inmate is serious about
severing all gang affiliations and is not simply trying to leave the
restrictive SMU II. Also, the Department must be convinced that
the inmate has provided sufficient and credible information. If an
inmate renounces but does not successfully debrief, he or she
will not be allowed to leave SMU II and will retain validation
status.
Although debriefing is difficult, inmates have several incentives
to do so. First, inmates who successfully debrief are moved to the
Special Management I Unit at the Eyman complex or to the
Stiner and Morey Units at the Lewis Prison, and are usually
housed in double-bunk rather than single-bunk cells. Addition-ally,
these inmates may have their classification score lowered,
which will allow them more benefits, such as increased tele-phone
privileges. Further, the inmates can earn good-time cred-its,
which may allow for an earlier release. In addition, the in-mates
receive increased recreation time. Finally, the inmates will
receive increased inmate store privileges.
Inmates may leave the re-strictive
environment if
they successfully renounce
their gang affiliation.
Other Pertinent Information
50
OFFICE OF THE AUDITOR GENERAL
Department and
University Studying
STG Policy Effectiveness
The Department, along with faculty from Arizona State Univer-sity,
is studying the Department’s STG policies to measure their
effectiveness. The National Institute of Justice provided a grant
of about $183,000 to the Department and the professor to study
the effectiveness of ADC’s practices regarding prison gangs. For
example, the research will determine if assaults have decreased
due to the new policies. The study is important because the re-searchers
are not aware of any conclusive study done on the sub-ject.
The report will offer recommendations to improve the pro-gram
and is expected to be released in late 2001.
OFFICE OF THE AUDITOR GENERAL
(This Page Intentionally Left Blank)
Debra Davenport
November 28, 2000
Page 1
November 28, 2000
Debra Davenport, CPA
Auditor General
Office of the Auditor General
2910 North 44th Street, Suite 410
Phoenix, Arizona 85018
Re: AUDITOR GENERAL’S PERFORMANCE AUDIT
SECURITY OPERATIONS FINAL REPORT RESPONSE
Dear Ms. Davenport:
The mission of the Arizona Department of Corrections (ADC) is to serve and protect the citizens of Arizona
by imprisoning offenders legally committed to ADC and by providing community based supervision for
those conditionally released. Security Operations plays a key role in carrying out this mission. We believe
we operate one of the most efficient and secure prison systems in the United States. However, the
additional perspectives provided by members of your staff and the security consultants have enhanced our
ability to strengthen the operations of the Arizona Department of Corrections.
Of primary concern, both from an audit and an operational standpoint, are the security staffing patterns of
our institutions. The Department is constrained by authorized and appropriated resources, as well as the
inability to attract corrections officers during this booming economy given the salary levels currently
authorized for corrections officers. Additionally, neither the Auditor General staff nor the security
consultants were prepared to articulate the necessary level of staffing without having first accomplished a
zero-based staffing study. As a result, the Department is currently preparing a Request for Proposal for a
contractor to conduct a zero-based staffing analysis to better enable us to identify issues, better allocate
existing positions, and support requests for additional staffing.
We have reviewed your November 20, 2000, report for your performance audit of the ADC’s Security
Operations. Below please find our written response which also identifies any issues or concerns we have
with the audit findings.
Debra Davenport
November 28, 2000
Page 2
FINDING I
Recommendation 1:
Open the remaining units at ASPC-Lewis as soon as staff is available to do so.
RESPONSE:
1. The Department concurs in t his finding and the audit recommendation will be implemented.
Comment: At the time that ASPC-Lewis was being sited by the Legislature, the Department
recommended against the location because we recognized the difficulty that the Buckeye location
would have in attracting staff. Unfortunately, the Department’s advice was disregarded and as a
result, today we face the consequence. Since opening Lewis, the Department has requested and
received authority to pay a 10% stipend in addition to the normal salary for corrections officers.
We have developed and implemented van pools to assist in the commute to the Buckeye site. We
have worked with developers to develop housing in the Buckeye area and we have now proposed
a hiring bonus for corrections officers who agree to work at ASPC-Lewis for a period of two
years. In spite of these incentives, we still have been unable to attract the necessary staff to fully
staff ASPC-Lewis..
Since August 14, 1998, 1,422 job offers have been made for the Lewis Complex. Unfortunately,
during the last 12-month period, the resignation rate has been 23.4%, and the loss rate has been
31.6%. This percentage is considerably higher than the statewide goal and average of 25.5%. It is
believed that the pending proposal regarding signing bonuses will positively affect these figures, both
in terms of job offers and retention rates.
Recommendation 2:
Cease using tents at all complexes as soon as the inmate population can be transferred to other
housing units. Because some of the tents have been designated as part of the Department’s
permanent bed inventory, the Department should develop a plan (which would request legislative
approval) to eliminate them.
RESPONSE:
1. The Department concurs in this finding and the audit recommendation will be implemented.
Debra Davenport
November 28, 2000
Page 3
Comment: The Department concurs that the utilization of tents presents security and operational
concerns. However, the impact of the elimination of tent beds would have the below indicated
impact in the Southern Region:
Complex Unit Number of Tents Number of Beds
Douglas Maricopa 10 100
Safford Graham 10 100
Safford Tonto 10 100
Tucson Echo 20 200
Tucson Manzanita 4 40
Tucson Santa Rita 10 100
Yuma Cocopah 5 50
TOTAL 690
The security concerns raised by the tents are obviously of greater concern at the higher level units,
therefore, it is proposed that if the tents are reduced in number the Department begin with the Level
3 units first.
Please be advised that the legislature approved funding for the 400 North Unit beds, thus
the elimination of these beds is highly unlikely. The 400 tent beds located in the North Unit at
ASPC-Florence were sited and appropriated by the Legislature. As a result, the Department will
need to seek statutory authority and funding to eliminate these tents. Since other recommendations
in this audit also recommend the elimination of modular and Quonset units, the recommended plan
to eliminate the 400 tent beds will be integrated into the overall plan.
Recommendation 3:
Develop plans for closing the Alhambra/Flamenco and Aspen Units at ASPC-Phoenix and replace
those units.
Debra Davenport
November 28, 2000
Page 4
RESPONSE:
1. The Department concurs in this finding and the audit recommendation will be
implemented.
Comment: The Department has already requested the State Legislature to consider funding for a
new Reception/ Diagnostic and mental health facility. Timing for the replacement of the
Reception/Diagnostic Center is contingent on a final decision by the Executive and Legislature
regarding the speed with which the proposed Tucson II complex will be built. A final
recommendation from the Department with regard to building out Tucson II will be driven by actual
and estimated inmate growth.
Recommendation 4:
Take immediate steps to lower the partitions in Florence’s South Unit dormitories to enhance
visibility.
RESPONSE:
1. The Department concurs in this finding and the audit recommendation will be
implemented.
Comment: Several years ago, the Department of Corrections identified the officer safety hazard
present in privacy partitions in previously constructed dormitories. During the last several years the
Department has not only modified design of future prisons, but we have systematically retrofitted
prison units with high partitions. It has been our intent to modify all partitions which create a
visibility hazard, irrespective of their material of construction, i.e., masonry, wood or metal.
However, the Department has only been able to devote limited resources to the modification of
partitions. Consequently, petitions remain which need to be modified. The South Unit is one such
example.
The Department is currently developing a plan to lower the partitions in the ASPC-Florence South
Unit dormitory. The projected completion date is March 1, 2001. The Department is reviewing
partitions in all units to determine if others need to be modified.
Debra Davenport
November 28, 2000
Page 5
Recommendation 5:
Add one correctional officer to each South Unit dormitory building. Absent the ability to provide
additional staffing, these dormitories should be replaced.
RESPONSE:
1. The Department concurs in this finding and a different method of dealing with the finding
will be implemented.
Comment: As stated previously, the Department is currently preparing a Request for Purchase to
contract with an outside consultant to conduct a complete Prison Operations staffing study and post
analysis to determine if existing staff resources can be feasibly reallocated to address this
recommendation. If we find that a reallocation is not possible and an additional appropriation not
forthcoming then we will recommend replacement of the dormitories as part of the Department’s
bed plan.
Recommendation 6:
Develop a plan for the future replacement of Quonset huts and modular housing units.
RESPONSE:
1. The Department concurs in this finding and the audit recommendation will be
implemented.
Comment: While the use of Quonset huts and modular buildings presents an array of challenges
ranging from officer safety to issues of maintenance, livability and sanitation, the Department has
been able to meet these challenges without incurring the significant additional capital cost to replace
them. Nevertheless, the Department recognizes the wisdom for developing a plan to request
appropriations from the Legislature to replace these units. While we are somewhat pessimistic that
such recommendations will be approved, we will in fact develop a plan for the replacement of these
units. The plan will be integrated into our capital replacement budget and bed plan.
This recommendation is somewhat difficult for the Department. If funding were available in the
magnitude necessary to replace 1,134 beds, those resources may be more effectively utilized in
providing pay benefits to corrections officers rather than replacing beds which are only marginal but
functional at this time.
Debra Davenport
November 28, 2000
Page 6
Complex Unit Type of Housing
Number of
Buildings
Number of
Beds
Douglas Gila Modular 9 662
Douglas Maricopa Modular 1 14
Safford Graham Quonset Huts 10 202
Tucson Echo Modular 4 256
TOTAL 20 1134
Recommendation 7:
Relocate the ASPC-Tucson warehouse outside the vehicle entrance and allow only one vehicle at a
time to enter the sally port, and correct the sally port design problem at ASPC-Safford’s Fort Grant
Unit that currently requires both gates to be open simultaneously for trucks to enter or exit the unit.
RESPONSE:
1. The Department concurs in this finding and a different method of dealing with the finding
will be implemented.
Comment: The proposed solution to this problem can be approached in several different ways,
dependent upon some issues that are outside the purview of the Department of Corrections. The
design of the Tucson II Complex included a plan to have the warehouse capability for the existing
complex to be handled by the new facility. This places all warehouse activity outside the secure
perimeter. However, in the event the construction of Tucson II is delayed or eliminated altogether,
Warden Parin at ASPC-Tucson will submit a proposal to redesign the perimeter of the complex
including deactivating the main sally port and securing the CDU sally port during business hours,
placing the warehouses outside the perimeter. This will also eliminate the medium security crews
working in the warehouses. The necessity of allowing more than one vehicle in the sally port will be
diminished due to the reduction in traffic.
At ASPC-Safford’s Fort Grant Unit, plans have been developed and funded to relocate the control
room area an construct an adjacent new sally port that will eliminate this problem.
Debra Davenport
November 28, 2000
Page 7
Recommendation 8:
Explore options to modify sight lines at control rooms at ASPC-Tucson and ASPC-Perryville to
enhance inmate surveillance.
RESPONSE:
1. The Department concurs in this finding and the audit recommendation will be
implemented.
Comment: Although this recommendation affects ASPC-Tucson to a much smaller degree than
the Perryville Complex, the recommendations to explore options to modify sight lines cannot be
argued. It may be possible to use technology such as remotely operated cameras to improve site
lines from the control room. If this option is not feasible, a modification of the control room to
locate it either within the kitchen area or on top of the kitchen area to provide observation would be
a consideration. This modification should only be undertaken with architectural, security and
financial considerations in mind.
FINDING II
Recommendation 1:
The Department should develop and implement policies for controlled movement and activity pass
systems.
RESPONSE:
1. The Department concurs in this finding and the audit recommendation will be implemented.
Comment: Controlled movement and an activity pass system are part of the new Inmate Program
Plan (IPP) process currently being phased in within Prison Operations.
Recommendation 2:
The Department should continue to ensure that staff at all prisons consistently follow inmate
management practices.
Debra Davenport
November 28, 2000
Page 8
RESPONSE:
2. The finding of the Auditor General is agreed to and the audit recommendation will be
implemented.
Comment: For more than a decade the Department has utilized an internal inspections program to
determine whether or not the operating units consistently follow all policies related to operational
readiness. This program will continue. However, a greater emphasis will be placed on ensuring that
the units consistently follow inmate management practices. We will continue to expand and improve
our current internal audit process to ensure consistent, sound and safe correctional management
practices are in place.
Recommendation 3:
The Department should analyze and determine, and assign an appropriate number of staff needed to
adequately fill critical posts that monitor inmate movement and activity.
RESPONSE:
1. The finding of the Auditor General is agreed to and the audit recommendation will be
implemented.
Comment: As previously stated, the Department is preparing a Request for Proposal for a
contractor to conduct a zero-based staffing analysis to better enable us to identify issues, allocate
existing positions, and support requests for additional staffing. The Department will continually
assess resource allocation and assignments.
Recommendation 4:
Once this analysis is complete, the Department should assign staff appropriately to critical posts and,
if necessary, request authorization to increase its complement of FTE’s.
RESPONSE:
Debra Davenport
November 28, 2000
Page 9
1. The finding of the Auditor General is agreed to and the audit recommendation will be
implemented.
Comment: The Department will utilize the results of the consultant’s zero-based analysis to allocate
existing resources and request additional FTE’s where appropriate once it is completed.
FINDING III
Recommendation 1:
The Department should adopt a policy requiring every unit and complex to conduct simulated
emergency key runs involving all staff to enable management to ascertain if keys will function for each
of them and they can achieve timely access to all areas of the facility.
RESPONSE:
1. The Department concurs in this finding and a different method of dealing with the finding
will be implemented
Comment: A standardized procedure will be developed to address emergency key systems and
their testing.
Recommendation 2:
The Department should adopt a policy requiring every unit and complex to conduct security
challenges, such as having someone use another employee’s identification card to gain entrance to a
facility.
RESPONSE:
1. The Department concurs in this finding and the audit recommendation will be implemented.
Comment: These types of challenges have fallen out of favor in recent years due to inappropriate
utilization and ill-conceived scenarios. A menu of possible challenges which do not compromise
safety will be developed for utilization at all locations, and will be monitored through the audit
process.
Debra Davenport
November 28, 2000
Page 10
Recommendation 3:
The Department should develop and implement uniform policies requiring medical staff to use a liquid
form of narcotics and psychotropic drugs whenever possible, as well as dispense unit doses and
apply a “watch/swallow” regimen in connection with all such medication.
RESPONSE:
1. The Department concurs i