Percentage Point Distribution of the Answers Regarding December 1989 (Romania, 1999) Descriptive Statistics for the Variables Included in the Analysis of Beliefs about December 1989 Events Coefficients from the Multinomial Logistic Regression Analysis of Believing That It Was a Coup d’état or That Something Else Happened in December 1989 versus Believing That It Was a Revolution Fragmentation in Parliament Volatility of Electoral Preferences between Elections Romanian Parties Represented in Parliament Assembly of Deputies Parliamentary Groups 1990 Number of Parliamentary Laws and Presidential Decrees House of Deputies Parliamentary Groups, 1992 Senate Parliamentary Groups, 1992 House of Deputies Parliamentary Groups, 1996 Senate Parliamentary Groups, 1996 House of Deputies Parliamentary Groups, 2000 Senate Parliamentary Groups, 2000 Percentage of Voters According to Significant Factors Frequencies of Participation beyond Voting in Percentages Percent of Respondents Who Have Participated in Civil Society Membership Logistic Regression Model of Romanian Participation

107 110

111 143 148 151 162 163 166 168 171 171 174 175 183 185 189 194

ix

x

Tables

13.1. Estimates of Romania’s Roma Population 13.2. What Is Most Important in Life to Succeed? 20.1. Macroeconomic Indicators, 1990–2002

256 258 413

Foreword

The sudden downfall of Communism in Eastern Europe did not lead, as many had hoped, to an equally sudden transition to a democratic and prosperous society. In both the East and the West, the disappointment is obvious. Freedom has once again proven to be more complex and delicate than force, as Thomas Mann once observed. It suffices, however, to recall similar historic events in order to realize that our perplexity at the perceived lack of progress in Romania is just a form of naiveté, if not arrogance. France in the aftermath of the French Revolution, and even Germany and France in the transitional period after World War II are the first examples that come to mind. The rough transition from a Communist police state to the civil society of the current capitalist system naturally involves drastic dislocations and difficulties. After the failed bloody experiment to abolish the “exploitation of man by fellow man,” a traumatic new experience challenges the survivors: the transition from state ownership of evil to private ownership of good and evil. In the first decade of the post-Communist era, Eastern Europe went forward and backward, simultaneously. The “forward” movement reflected the contract with the future, the adaptation to the economic and social requirements of the capitalist world, and the pursuit of international recognition. The “backward” movement reflected the pressing burden of having to reevaluate the country’s history both before and during Communism—a history that was manipulated and falsified by the ideology and interests of a single party that dominated the totalitarian state. This transitional tension within Romania, between the movement forward and the movement backward, is

xi

“An elite which didn’t assume this country as it is. Byzantine nationalistsocialist system. some of the contradictions that have defined this Carpathian–Danube territory.” poised “between good and evil” where “nothing is incompatible. however. Modernization has kept on traveling through these places without ever truly reaching its destination. which make it a fascinating anthropological case for study and research. Similarly. postmodern era.” Those who study the current Romanian situation may find it even more interesting to scrutinize such notions as authority and hi-
. Not only is it a Latin island with Western aspirations in the middle of a vast Slav territory. in fact. After the execution of the dictator. it is also the religious frontier toward the “East” of Eastern Europe. Despite some obvious signs of evolution. From a small political faction of around a thousand members in 1944. corruption cooperates with apathy and demagogy (dominated by the rhetoric of “self-sufficient greatness. stated in one of her articles in 22.” Communism has enhanced the paradox of unfinished transition. hedonism and melancholy. Frustration and fanfare. fatalism and humor. a “phenomenon of the third world. anti-Soviet dissidence of Communist Romania. “If only our administration and politics were on the same level as the arts. with all its overwhelming influences and implications for Romanian society.xii
Foreword
further complicated by the international context in which it is taking place— in a “global. did not lead to a lasting approach to the West.” as Mariana Celac. The constant disassociation of the elite from the masses has remained. initiated by the Party in the 1960s.” which some of the studies in this volume introduce) to retard the progress of the country.” computerized.” Romania is said to be a “sad country full of laughter” and a “Dada country. corruption and lyricism have all gradually cooperated to create a strategy of survival through prevarication. the Romanian Communist Party had grown by 1989 to almost 4 million members. rather than through efficiency. but gradually evolved toward a disastrous. As if these factors were not enough. The peculiar way Romanians define their predicament could elucidate. It is a country with Latin roots and a Latin language. we would be one of the happiest countries on earth. The unexpected. most of the opportunists who had carried the Red Party ID became fervent anti-Communists (one might say “Bolshevik antiCommunists”). who have always claimed an important role in the social and political arena. Romania adds a picturesque set of paradoxes and profound disjunctures. the musician Georges Enesco once remarked.” Yet. a distinguished intellectual and architect. The Romanian is said to be a “born poet. Paradoxes are also not few among the intellectual elite. the violent overthrow of the “sultan-like” style of Romanian Communism in 1989 has not yet led to a revolutionary social restructuring. sitting at a crossroad of ethnicities and influences which are in perpetual transit. which did not help the reconciliation and reconstruction of the country. and yet with a predominantly Christian Orthodox religion. among whom one could hardly find 1.000 true Communists.

and solidarity are not to be found very often. One literary monthly compared the Stalinists of the 1950s. the convoluted controversies concerning some of the right-wing intellectuals before and during World War II (Nae Ionescu. Another prestigious literary weekly denounced a French court’s decision to ban a Roger Garaudy book. in disguise.” Last but not least. and often even nostalgic about their own evanesced prestige and authority. which Romanians rank in public opinion polls as their country’s most important values. Intellectuals espousing democratic rhetoric have proven confused by the complications of a controversial democratic reality. the “vulgar” taste of the majority may prove significant for the social-political landscape of transitional Romania. etc. as evidence of a plot by a certain “lobby” that did not want to lose its “monopoly of suffering. and superior to. Their
. leading members of the cultural elite also claim authority and hierarchy for their own legitimization. and between old habits and new aspirations (as well as those paradoxes and contradictions already mentioned) lead to moral dilemmas that define the general state of the nation. This theme is discussed in several chapters of this volume. masked by a superficial democratic language and legitimized by a pretentious. This has been evident in recent years in the public debates concerning the rehabilitation of General Antonescu (the military dictator of Romania during the alliance with Hitler). It is hard to believe. we cannot ignore. Emil Cioran. in the current national debates. dogmatic way of thinking can be found even in cultural publications. in this often confusing and sad socialpolitical landscape.). Not rarely. but what has sometimes resurfaced in the post-Communist era are the old clichés. and have revealed much more about the current state of Romanian culture and society than the well-known xenophobic and anti-Western slogans of vulgar political tabloids like România Mare (Great Romania). between rhetoric and real belief. Self-criticism. the debates about the disclosure of secret police files. honest scrutiny of facts. the “Holocaust versus Gulag” polemic. compassion. Mircea Eliade. Surprisingly or not. The differences and similarities between the preferences of the popular culture and those of intellectuals who claim to be separate from. the legitimacy of NATO’s intervention in Kosovo. in the country’s cultural life. as well as lucidity. intangible elitism. unfortunately. such concepts reappear. Contradictions between the public and private realm. and Romania’s ongoing attempts to integrate itself with NATO and the EU. and its potential for social-political conflict and/or social-political change. acknowledgment of past and present errors.Foreword
xiii
erarchy. who facilitated Romania’s subordination to the Soviet Union. These controversial “hot subjects” have brought to the surface some disturbing memories of the past. which diminished the scope and proportion of the Holocaust. to present-day “modernists” who struggle to assimilate Romania with the rest of Europe. the great potential that lay in the intellectual and moral commitment of a brave minority of eminent believers in a civil society. This inherited.

the words of F. in fact. The exacting critical analysis of this anthology seems one of the preliminary. Complicated and provocative situations sometimes call for the redefining of criteria and evaluative strategies: in this case. various and valuable contributions to the evaluation of the post-Communist transition in Romania. as F. . difficult. finally. and which make it a difficult and challenging case for social-political research. both Romanian and foreign. bring. the very ones that so often have ill-fated effects in the daily life of Romanians. This long postponed goal deserves. Watts emphasizes the always “positive” role of the Romanian military and the mostly “negative” role of the current civilian leaders. However. . These are only some of the many premises that justify interest in Romania’s Sonderweg. in the end. Peter Wagner in this anthology:
Modernity and modernization are not anymore. nonproblematic notions. however slow and painful the transition discussed in this volume proves to be. and the secret police seems to me oversimplified in the chapter entitled “Civil–Military Relations: Continuity or Exceptionalism?” The author. they themselves have become highly problematic. titled Romanian Cassandra. . in this anthology. but also from the actual state of modernization toward the uncertainties of future metamorphoses. and courageous struggle with the prejudices and habits of the present social environment and. the topic of “transition” needs to be redefined—the transition not only from Communism to capitalism. certainly. Larry L. civil administration. Romania’s integration into a common Europe represents its best chance to fully develop its potential and to find. with their own errors and misunderstandings. As it may lead to a better understanding of these paradoxes—and possible solutions to them—this intellectual enterprise remains useful and praiseworthy. Western scholarship has found in Romania an exemplary test-case for the analysis of the development of underdevelopment. Peter Wagner refers to it in this volume. from inside and out. the complex problem of the relation between the armed forces. selfunderstood. It would be appropriate probably to emphasize. Watts. or the development of a periphery. the center of concern and investigation. Norman Manea New York April 2000
. right steps in this direction. its stable place in the modern. If enough attention is paid to the social-political reality of Romania. deserves respect and support. support. In his contribution to this volume. A number of authors.
The paradoxes that have stimulated the investigations of the authors are. if they ever truly were. we may finally see a promise of hope. civilized world. has also authored a controversial and disturbing book about Hitler’s Romanian ally during World War II.xiv
Foreword
iconoclastic. General Ion Antonescu. occasionally.

Closer now to European and global integration. toward new tensions and a new balance. of course. Romania was pushed and is pushing herself toward more visible progress.Foreword
xv
P. still struggling with the old and new difficulties mentioned in my text. the “lack of progress” and the “great potential” were evolving. Since this brief introduction was written. Norman Manea December 2003
.S.

.

For comparativists. scholars of Eastern Europe often studied several countries at once. there remains the scholarly need to generalize. closely resembled the standard Stalinist model. the simple study of Stalinism. In this often-chaotic process. synthesize. one that will hopefully be useful for singular and comparative efforts at understanding this phenomena. and bureaucratic politics. a project that requires study of the new complexities of both internal and international variables. particularly in the late 1940s and 1950s. Romania in the 1980s (1981) and Romania after Tyranny (1992). If Sorin Antohi’s chapter is correct in arguing that few Romania-based Romanians publish in the “global academic press. this book attempts to elucidate the key aspects of a country undergoing a profound transformation from a repressive totalitarianism to an as yet unreached and undefined democratic future. which. Following the format of the two country studies edited by Daniel Nelson.
xvii
. perhaps because there were few crucial differences between the different states. parliamentary. and they have contributed to the increasing variation one finds among the countries of the former “East Bloc.” The variations among these countries have also been magnified by the vagaries of electoral. or personal autocracy will no longer suffice to explain the varying political situations in all the countries of Eastern Europe. Now that they are experiencing the dynamic process of the transition to democracy and the free market. This book represents an effort to collect data and to conduct the concomitant analysis and synthesis of the complex problems of Romania’s transition. judicial. and theorize about the countries and the region. the influence of international factors has been confusing and contradictory. as well as the ongoing institutionalization of democratic processes and values.Preface
During the Communist period. oligarchy. with six such authors included.” then this book.

however. Birnir on the party system. Hall and Sellin emphasize the importance of the cultural–institutional nexus and the continuity in patterns developed under Communism. Clearly. We also have seen two assaults. “Because we are unique. with miles still to go to eliminate the danger of polarization and breakdown. legitimates antidemocratic elements. rather than exchange and compromise based on common liberal principles. anti-Hungarian agitators become not atypical national legislators. students of Romania face a number of puzzles. both in the nature of its development and about the democratization process. for example. achievement of the Revolution. Open debate becomes an occasion for hateful dissemination of lies. its special path. In its post-Communist era. Romania has traveled the proverbial miles. So. and Holocaust deniers. Thus. The different contributors to this volume offer different reasons for studying Romania. Daniel Nelson focuses on the security policies of transitional Romania. if not the outstanding. democratic stability is threatened. That these actions were two of the main pieces of legislation during the Constantinescu presidency only illustrates that bipartisan agreement is deeper for authoritarianism than democracy. and Wagner. Such individuals lack the moral credibility to condemn fascistic elements whose collaboration under Communism was no worse than the country’s typical politicians—leaders and followers alike. Romania’s leaders have had choices to make. all refer to the specificity of Romania’s transition. however preliminary. With no more guarantees of an independent press and judiciary. justified in terms of Romanian relativism. Manea. or Sonderweg. utterly lacking in former anti-Communists under the age of sixty. as antiWestern and illiberal discourse. Romania’s elites lack a consensus of where they want the country to head and a track record or sense of how to pact agreements to avoid going where they might agree that the country needs to avoid. Some of these puzzles are merely curious and not important. even though human rights protection has been an outstanding. What makes human rights still precarious is the perpetuation of political class as the new political society. Too often. Tism˘ aneanu. But why study Romania? Romanians often say. it is possibly the most comprehensive study of Romanian politics ever published abroad. More generally and immodestly. the signs are ominous. the vigilance needed to stop tyranny is ebbing. Roper on parliament. they have made the wrong ones or failed to make any. when the Greater Romania Party becomes the leading opposition party in the 2000 elections. Others.” And unique they are—though no more or less than any other country’s Gestalt. hagiographers of the Iron Guard and Marshal Ion Antonescu. Others focus on the institutional aspects of transitional Romania—Bush on unions. and Ramet on the Church. comprise the crux of both crucial problems: the large distance Romania has come from
.xviii
Preface
is a major new contribution. on the lynchpins of liberty during the Constantinescu presidency: the Justice Minister’s assumption of direct supervision of judges and the legalized arrest of journalists. and anti-Semitic.

or the very high rates of pediatric AIDS cases. for the most part. sui generis. of course. street children. or incoherent and amorphous? • Why has Romanian aversion. prevented a choice for Roma parents for parallel. high rates of abortion. neither of which really constitute NGOs by standard definitions? • Why are two of the worst problems harming Romania’s democratization and its chances of entering the EU by 2007. I leave to the reader to decide which of the questions that follow are crucial. help the election of Ion Iliescu to the presidency and the PDSR as the plurality party in parliament. and which merely get headlines: • Why do such topics as Brigitte Bardot and the Mayor of Bucharest clashing over the latter’s attempts to slaughter stray dogs. national Communism and the fierce dangers of steady erosion that lie ahead. even if most of them are for-profit companies or collaborationist NGOs with the government. even if those prerogatives are the main cause of its stagnating economy? • Why. were there no dissidents and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) in Romania before 1989? And now. liberal/Western. kleptocratic. the equally high numbers of homeless. but no effective access? • Can the unequal bargaining power in the founding moments be compensated with additional negotiations from NGO or opposition party representatives? • Did the Romanian government’s support for NATO’s humanitarian intervention in 1999. ethnocentric. to reverse the ethnic cleansing in Kosovo. racial discrimination against Roma and especially judicial interference. even to limited ethnic autonomy. but Roma segregated schools or Romanian majority schools lacking bilingual language)? Why is there such a large gap between official Roma access to health and education. with the public discourse identifying the problem as with the Roma and not with the larger society as well? Why are Roma refugees from Romania automatically deemed to be fleeing for economic motives rather than from persecution? • Notwithstanding its inherent insecurity. and. Eastern corporatist. why does Romania have the most NGOs in Eastern Europe. rarely mentioned in the Romanian press. East European countries. particularly over the economy. most explain why Romania has enjoyed more political stability than most post-Communist. Roma-managed schools with bilingual education (as opposed to Romanian-managed. eclectic. Dracula seem to get most or all of the foreign press coverage of Romania? • Do the authoritarian prerogatives enjoyed by the former Communists. as well as the second place finishes of Vadim Tudor for president and his Great Romania Party as opposition?
.Preface
xix
sultanistic. what identity is being constructed for the Romanian state.

leaving precious few. as Romania’s class structure remains related to state power and the “new” oligarchy reflects direct personal connections to that power? • Why does the restoration of several large Brancus ¸i monuments and statues in Romania occur with massive charges of corruption? • Why has Romania more genocide denial than any East European country other than the former Yugoslavia?
. honest politicians in the country.xx
Preface
• Why do public discourses impose treasonous guilt by association for anyone. the author of the law that created the Council. a complicated political game. such as then-SRI Director Radu Timofte. bearing no stigma or imposing no costs? • Why have the battles among ex-Securitate personnel and their allies in and out of the intelligence services not been covered in the press? • Why is the council reviewing Securitate records (CNSAS) controlled by or at the mercy of the SRI intelligence agency. What consequences would ensue if Romania’s candidacy is rejected by the EU by 2007 if states like Slovakia and Slovenia. democratic opposition did a much better job in office during the same period as Constantinescu’s presidency. or Machiavellian brilliance? • Why does blatant official corruption. ethnic Hungarian university to be so important. not scandalize or induce prosecutions? • Why does sultanism continue under democratization. while someone having joined the Communist Party led by Nicolae Ceaus ¸escu. as well as the EU ending visa restrictions for Bulgarians. or even the Baltic states or Bulgaria. and does that make any difference? • Why ethnic Hungarians and ethnic Romanians consider the issue of a state-supported. had originally intended? • Why Bulgaria’s Western-oriented. are admitted? • Has Romania really accepted NATO and EU conditionality. if any. but not for Romanians? • Why the symbolic appeal of the NATO and EU membership is so enormous compared with their intrinsic value. is tantamount to a “union card” for eligibility in post-Communist political society. which resulted in Bulgaria having a clear policy direction and Romania unsure of its future. the opposite of what Senator Ticu Dumitrescu. and why can the two sides not agree to set up such a university without first debating the history of who settled Transylvania first? • Has President Iliescu’s dance between East and West reflected genuine confusion. or does it merely implicitly accept the stipulations for entry in public statements and permit others to undermine those commitments? • Was the historic rapprochement between Hungary and Romania motivated by insincere promises and understandings on minority rights. for alleged links to Gorbachev’s KGB or for having been a Securitate activist.

but also of being organized well enough to achieve these conspiracy feats? • Why there were no scandals when politicians like Petre Roman declared their personal property. in addition to intimidation through surveillance and vote rigging. SRI intelligence agency. compared with the SRI and other intelligence agencies that emerged from the organizational map of the former Securitate? • Whether the army’s increased role in politics will lead to articulated military contestation and vetoes. required under new laws. which supported a largely non-Securitate coalition in the December 1989 overthrow of Iliescu. but without revealing their enormous holdings? • Why the army. acceded to a weak position in the new regime. or whether the army will gradually yield its new authoritarian prerogatives and democratize to Western models of civilian supremacy? • How Iliescu has been able to keep his disparate coalition more or less united over the past dozen years?
. Virgil Ma telligence activities with great wealth and access to intelligence files of other politicians. why has Romanian civil society remained largely deferential to the ruling oligarchy? • Why do analysts presume that the illiberal aspects of Romanian democratization do not result from the “mere trappings of procedural democracy.” which are assumed erroneously to exist? • Why did Iliescu join Vatra ˘ Româneasca ˘ . while imprisoned heroes like Iuliu Maniu and Corneliu Coposu. subsequently retired from inwhy the first SRI leader. do not receive equivalent support (except by a few intellectuals led by Ana Blandiana in Sighet¸)? • Why Romania permitted the dominant. rather than just concentrate on information gathering? And ˇgureanu. and why this does not produce friction with legitimate intelligence and defense agency officials who do not mix business with intelligence gathering? • Why do analysts of Romania accuse Romanian officials and organized crime of corruption. who let various Legionari escape to Nazi Germany after 23 August 1944.Preface
xxi
• Why do so few analysts see the direct relationship between Romania’s electoral and official corruption? • Since democracy supposedly changes how people relate to authority. as he revealed in 1999? • Do voters support Iliescu more for his quasi-Western political liberalism or for his antieconomic neoliberalism? • Why does Romania glorify criminals who did wrong. like Marshal Ion Antonescu or a traitor like General Gheorghe Avramescu. while operating with impunity? • Why is there no scandal about official intelligence gathering whose chief purpose is for conducting businesses linked to the former Securitate. to operate businesses.

S. and his wife Helène. My parents visited in 1980 when my father was one of two public members of a U. and will its proclamations of legitimacy follow the pattern of the former Legionnaire and Socialist parties that had made similar declarations. which included John and Gina’s 1993 marriage at the Sinaia peles ¸. My scholarly interest in Romania is almost entirely attributable to the encouragement from.” etc. along with the rest of the family. accept the 1992 parliamentary electoral fraud (or was in denial about it)? • Why did the IRI representative not get his contract renewed after writing a report on the stolen 1992 elections. charisma. or disloyal party.. He met Dumitru Mazilu. John Florescu and his wife Gina. Delegation to discuss whether the Romanian Government should receive Most Favored Nation status on tariffs during some future period. why do genocide denial and Nazi revival in the cult of Antonescu. rural proletariat really have some misgivings about joining the West. his brother Radu Jr. Pas ¸cu “went with Iliescu.. Embassy. traditional deference to authority. and their father Radu Sr. this book is dedicated to all the Florescu’s. My paternal grandparents lived in Bucharest when my grandfather was the Third Secretary of the U. only to become antidemocratic? • Given the need to please the United States.. have any resonance in mainstream Romania? • Do large sectors in the Romanian peasantry and urbanized. They have immeasurably enriched my life and my understanding of Romanian history and culture. and twodecade-plus friendships with. as of the publication of this book. which was real-
. admirably the only state to ratify COP-III of the Kyoto Protocol to reduce Greenhouse Gases? My family has had connections with Romania for three generations.)? • Why did the U. Of the Trocadero Group. and the interwar and postwar democratic breakdowns have greater impact on legitimation than elections and the rule of law? • Is the Greater Romania Party a loyal. Severin went “with Roman”. Mazilu’s report was an early sign of efforts to undermine Ceaus ¸escu. semiloyal. In gratitude. who eight years later was a colleague on the UN Human Rights Subcommission.S.xxii
Preface
• Why neopatrimonialism/sultanism remains so entrenched behind individual leaders (e. Because of their influence. a report that IRI circulated? • Why do elections. who declared war on the U.S.S. and collective memory of Communism. I was one of the few applicants to the Civic Education Project to state a preference for Romania. My father attempted to help Mazilu after he was placed under house arrest after reporting on the abuse of Romanian youth to the Subcommission.g. which it may fear after its experience under Hungarian domination? • Why was Romania.

Szabo’s. To this day. In the early stages. where I met so many wonderful people. Dragos ¸ Munteanu. Steve Roper. as well as posthumously to the late Alexandru Dut ¸u. Vladimir Tisma ˘neanu’s initial commitment to the project helped to make recruiting contributors easier. Steven Sampson. Gabor Vermes. Aurelian Craiut ¸u. Sandra Pralong. I have had the benefit of one of the strongest sets of collaborators I have ever worked with. Both Mihnea and Kit have contributed articles to this volume as well. errors. Ilie Ba ˘descu. As always. the S ¸ tefanescu’s. Michal Shafir. John-Henry. Vladimir Tisma ˘neanu. I also greatly appreciate the help of several Georgia State graduate students. the late Pavel Câmpeanu. and have endeavored to produce as thorough and as helpful a volume as possible. I still cannot believe she is not really a marathon runner. Her incredible experience and wisdom has helped me to hopefully produce a volume that meets her standards. I am immeasurably grateful to my parents and my three siblings for their lifelong love. Mihnea Na ˘stase provided exemplary research assistance. Kris Kristof. Five other families made my pleasant stay in Bucharest. tireless copyediting. Though we have never actually met in person. or opinions expressed in this book. persistently. Sorin Antohi. Muntean’s. Carey Atlanta. I would like to thank particularly Dinu Giurescu. Larry Watts. including the especially kind friends. I can never properly and fully acknowledge his contribution. guidance. Dumitru Sandu. Liliana Pop. and Miho for the inestimable joy and patience they bring to my life. and patience. Radu Munteanu. Frank Sellin. Christopher Eisterhold picked up the ball in 2000 and contributed painstaking editing and constant effort. and expert diacritics checking. Rades ¸’s. as part of my doctoral fieldwork. and Dimitriu’s—thanks for all the warm ciorbeas and hugs. None of them are responsible for the infelicities. I have been very fortunate to have been guided and inspired by many students of Romania in small and large ways.Preface
xxiii
ized from 1992 to 1994. Dorel Abraham. Gail Kligman has kindly advised me as if we had. Mark Temple. While I am grateful to all whom I do not name. Henry F. as well as their patience with my work habits. David Kideckel. and to Faye. volunteering enormous hours to the project after the budget expired. Georgia March 2003
. Coen Hilbrink. Daniel Nelson. and indefatigably—by Sabrina Ramet. and especially Richard Hall. And I have been guided throughout the course of this project—deeply.

.

its provisions have often been ignored. many Romanians regarded it as such. as the perpetuation of economic exigencies. From the spontaneous uprising in Timis ¸oara. it released a profound sense of euphoria. Such symbolic. While there is a constitution. the Romanian revolution was arguably the most dramatic. and the courts have not enforced them. and long promised.” to use Michnik’s phrase. a feeling that the hour of liberation from national Communism to capitalism. along with the dreams and aspirations that it had temporarily let loose in the Romanian people. only to be shocked by French President Chirac three months later. when he asserted that Romania (and Bulgaria) had harmed their chances of entering into the European Union (EU) by publicly siding with the U. was not as distressing to the struggling masses. This “velvet restoration. Many of the hoped for. and in those heady days of December 1989. have not overshadowed the issues of everyday struggle. and violent revolution. democratic reforms have yet to be completed. foreign issues of huge import. it most closely resembled an uncontrollable. That the direct descendants of the elites installed by the Soviets remained in power was a matter of great disappointment to many intellectuals and middle-class urbanites. and democracy had come. and the chanting of the crowds “Ceaus ¸escu dictatorul!” in the Palace Square. and while the public has voted in
1
. At the time.S. however. A democratic civil society has yet to take root. or even initiated.Introduction
Henry F. to the gun battles in the streets of Bucharest. freedom. Some faith was restored in November 2002 with Romania’s invitation into NATO. Carey and Christopher Eisterhold
Of all the revolutions of the annus mirabilis 1989. most of the euphoria has evaporated. more than fourteen years after the revolution. passionate. Today. rooted in uncertainty as well as Ceaus ¸escu’s austerity. over whether to go to war in Iraq.

though it was a regime change from totalitarianism to authoritarianism. as Richard Hall has argued. The sultanistic totalitarian regime. Yet. from within the Communist regime. The Byzantine assortment of intelligence services have been spawned from the institutional remains of the Securitate. Legitimacy in Romania has not inspired protest of stolen elections but in protest to Ceaus ¸escu’s version of socialism. preferably by consensus in the political bureaus. The nomenklatura’s contempt for civil society in Romania meant there was little chance for a revolution as in East Central Europe. all four legislative elections and two constitutional plebiscites since 1990 have been delegitimated by inordinate rates of spoiled ballots and other irregularities. could have survived. let alone to a parallel intellectual culture. By the criteria of Skocpol and Moore. with control over of ownership of the state—from the factories. The Romanian civil–military revolt could ignore the claims of the people that had initiated the process. Iliescu’s new regime. and obligated to an oligarchy of elites drawn primarily from the former nomenklatura. from sultanistic totalitarianism to post-totalitarianism. what others call national Stalinism. This does not mean any orders or even plans emerged from the Kremlin. the causes came from the international system. Much debate has transpired. connotes the staging of combat by forces loyal to Iliescu. driven by clientelism and patrimonialism. When the events began as a protest in Timis ¸oara and then a rebellion from society. but not much light has been shed on the events of 1989. While many would have asserted
. and the party structure remains fragmented. where the Communist state was conquered by civil society on the basis of prestige and alternative leadership. The parliament remains a relatively weak institution. When the Praetorian Guard split. and utilities. but has implications politically. regime elements were crucial. or from abroad is not only worth documenting. clearly. was not amenable even to intraparty pluralism. among those with guns. who continue many of the functions of that dreaded institution.2 either or both of which were behind the attacks on civilians after 22 December. Second. banks. presumably from the army and not the Securitate. The word “coup” in Romania. the signal from Gorbachev for a Bulgarian succession could be inferred. Were it not for the country’s patent cultural desire to integrate with the West and for economic normality. violence resulted to decide whom.1 this was not a social revolution. Whether the impetus came from civil society. but without any Soviet intervention. would gain the upper hand. to the personal fortune of the Ceaus ¸escus— remaining close to where it was before December 1989. Whether or not it was a revolution or a coup is an important question in order to understand the motives and consequences. Gorbachev’s desire for reforms and noninterventionist tactics except to signal approval for reformers to assume power.2
Henry F. staffed with an alarming percentage of ex-Securitate personnel. Iliescu was one of the few conceivable alternatives to Ceaus ¸escu because he had advocated something other than Stalinism. Carey and Christopher Eisterhold
meaningful numbers.

The losers in this battle among the Communist aparat denigrated the events as a coup because the alternative term—revolution—connoted December 1989 in Romania as a positive change. crime.
. conspiracies. such a scenario could become plausible. where no peaceful alternative is perceived. something dialectically determined. or Communist Youth. the regime change on 22 December 1989 was a dramatic political revolution since it initially introduced perestroika and glasnost. just as the Philippine and Haitian armies “stole” their 1986 revolutions. With the perspective of almost fifteen years. the reason that the Philippines had an alternative to Marcos. could not fill. would not have succeeded without Gorbachev and the prior events in East Central Europe of the previous five months. and 1949. cabals. Socialized in the compromising norms of the UTC. Many have complained that Iliescu “stole” the revolution. but neither have all the details of the revolutions of 1776. rather than a source of pride.Introduction
3
that the velvet restoration was a fraud. There is little doubt that Iliescu did not intend a revolution either. but the reason why Haiti and Romania did not have a democratic alternative to Ceaus ¸escu. which began as a palace coup in response to a civil uprising. Romania’s revolution. politicians have easily ignored the claims to moral authority of writers and journalists who also had sold out to the system of connections. and to reform the economy. 1789. is likely to be staged and generally accepted. as well. which Romanian intellectuals. is that their civil societies had been flattened by sultanism and low economic development. establish judicial independence and professionalism. On the other hand.” Nor have the anti-Communist parties been drawn from longstanding anti-Communists. Romania’s revolution was just as iffy as the Bolshevik one. The “truth” of the revolution has not been told. 1918. Public cynicism about “democracy” has grown. and corruption.” in Linz’s formulation. the government is not so ineffective. The legitimation of a large. Most of intellectual society had made its peace with Communism and lacked the moral authority and civil society following to “speak truth to power. maybe even a majority of civil society. The Russian surrender in World War I and the Japanese invasion of China in World War II permitted two of those revolutions. and/or perceived as so illegitimate that a blatantly unconstitutional and supposedly temporary seizure of power. which resulted in violence around the country for a few more days. we can refer to the events of December 1989 as an unintended revolution in effects. In fact. As they passed from the scene. For many peasants and marginal workers. However. the former political prisoners and the surviving interwar political leaders were threatening to many. most of political society drew from former Communist aspirants or activists. It is not the “only game in town. corrupt. lacking an ongoing samizdat press. many more would have continued to give him credit for effecting the revolution. Iliescu exploited the vacuum of political leadership in civil society. However. if decisions are not taken in the next few years to reduce official corruption.

civil. As in Russia. Romania is now faced with what we would characterize as a quintuple transition. So far. rather than the promise. Like so many other transitional democracies. consisting of different factions of the same class of Communist activists. regardless of the price. and all the while constraining these aforementioned areas through the development of the rule of law and an independent judicial system to enforce the equal rights of Romania’s citizenry. As a result. whose rules would be enforced by a brown-shirted. of attempting too much. too soon. Romania’s transition to democracy is in trouble. Petre Roman. rather than accommodating the forces behind his first prime minister. the country had been ruled by a regime that combined the attributes of the two worst nondemocratic regime types of the four originally formulated by Linz and Stephan: totalitarianism. and doing all of it
.4
Henry F. as well as its low levels of political participation and economic productivity. The specter of conduca ˘ tor Vadim Tudor leading an authoritarian regime. a “new class” of oligarchs.” to borrow the phrase of Alvin Toffler. one still has to sell to the highest bidder. Some have even argued that Romania has become a “special case. is quite conceivable after more economic decline during the third term of Ion Iliescu. Astonishingly. and sultanism. of the transition to democracy and the free market. so long as the forms of democracy mimic the caricature that can only emerge in a state without courts giving democratic meaning to the rules. “exemplary and indicative of the problems.”3 Romania’s current predicaments should not have been surprising. It risks. develop an autonomous—yet accountable—state bureaucracy. The latter president had let the Tudor genie out of the autocratic bottle to make peace with him after the September 1991 miners’ attacks and as a coconspirator in the 1992 electoral fraud. miner militia. Romania has shared in the region’s propensity for incomplete state-building (the lack of territorial control) and nation-building (the lack of a unified national identity). Many have begun to express skepticism about the “Western” model of development. democratic political learning has consisted largely of elites learning that to get ahead. Carey and Christopher Eisterhold
antisystem party and leader as the second leading forces in the 2000 elections only reinforces evidence of public gullibility for demagoguery in the self-serving name of public virtue. excepting Albania. a “directocracy” set above the formal institutions of democracy. Romania faces the universal dilemma of having to confront more than one of these five challenges concurrently. has risen from the ashes of the Communist regime. Aggravating these circumstance for decades prior to 1989. as it must build from scratch political. with state domination of civil society. This led to the flattening of almost all autonomy and structural differentiation within civil society to a far greater degree than what had occurred in other countries of Eastern Europe. with unrestrained personal rulership. Clearly. the “future shock. given that its conditions in 1990 were less propitious for democratic stability than those of any other state in southeast Europe. as they all do.” a worst-case scenario even. and economic societies. polls have revealed that a majority of Romanians now believe that they were better off under Ceaus ¸escu.

and programmatically deceptive. they provide the reader with a comprehensive picture of the state of Romania since 1989. and economic development. Byzantine world of Romanian politics. Ample predictions and normative conclusions are also generated about public policies and future directions. Tisma ˘neanu emphasizes the informal aspects of decision-making. Part 4 analyzes economic issues. fiscal and monetary policy. provides a cultural-theoretical background to the arcane. and military alliances. by Vladimir Tisma ˘neanu. cliquish. The first is an introductory section. The contributors provide empirical contributions to theoretical debates on democratic transitions. foreign relations. the authors vary widely in methodology. Yet. and orality and informality continue as the politico-cultural expectation of elites under “democracy.” As orality and informality were the modus operandi of the Ceaus ¸escu regime. and descriptions of policies— Tisma ˘neanu argues that personalities arbitrarily determine decision processes and outcomes.” In the absence of formal information—meaningful statistics. in toto. and minority rights. intended to provide the reader with a sense of Romanian political history and culture. the politics of postponing some of these tasks is wrought with perverse incentives for corruption. The second section not only concerns state institutions. theoretical approaches. including internal security. given the absence of any consensus among the polarized elites who lack any tradition or knowledge about the methods. Part 3 analyzes civil society and its components like women’s. This book attempts to provide the reader with an understanding of the problems facing contemporary Romania in its painful transition to democracy. and assessment of the relative progress Romania has made toward democracy.Introduction
5
badly. little formal institutional memory exists.
. including labor relations. and issues of political economy. While he largely analyzes the politics of the Ceaus ¸escu era. or even the benefits. each covering a different aspect of contemporary Romania. and impersonal procedural systems of democratic polities. Inevitably. Furthermore. “secretive.
PART 1: INTRODUCTION
The first chapter.” the “exact opposite of the presumably transparent. transcripts of conversations among government officials. political culture. The fifth and final section deals with security issues. It is divided into five sections. of cooperation. and church–state relations. but also how they interact with the larger political culture as well. The following is a brief summary of the chapters. it is not a mere historical primer. consensual. such as the parliament and the political parties. but an interpretive framework of “Ceaus ¸escuism” in contemporary Romanian politics. gay. as well as of the circumstances that led to the revolution of 1989 and the legacy it has left the Romanian people.

he questions the developmental model. and contrivance. Romania has been liberated from Communism. In their place. Thus. Wagner contends that the failure of Romania’s transition to follow this developmental model “challenges some fundamental assumptions in the field of transition studies” and renders problematic the categories by which Romania has been constructed and analyzed. loyal only to the ruling family. Ceaus ¸escuism has survived in “widespread network of vested interests. was dominated by personalities belonging to the “second and third echelon” of the deposed regime. which posited a relatively linear transition from Communism to the Western model of a liberal democratic state and a capitalist market economy. from the show trial of the Ceaus ¸escu’s to the alleged terrorists. he asks us to move beyond the conceptualizations that animate current debates. as under Communism. Peter Wagner directly questions the modernization perspective that has animated much contemporary discussion on Romania and Eastern Europe.” which is the very “idea of a transition”—the linear movement from one fixed point (a stage A) to another (a stage B). connections. and the ongoing legitimacy crises of successive postCommunist governments. and more often than not. those groups susceptible to extremism
. he argues. Ion Iliescu’s PDSR. and Membership: Romanian Utilitarian Anti-Semitism and Marshal Antonescu. Memorials. informality. “Memory. to gain domestic authority and international recognition based on a contrived nationalist heritage and Stalinist controls. Rather than a reasonable degree of shame and commitment toward future improvement. who have accepted their salvation on these terms. including. Wagner presents an alternative transitional framework based on the concept of a “double syncronicity”—denoting attempted integration of these states into a “Western” order which is itself undergoing a profound transformation. while the Ceaus ¸escu regime collapsed. Specifically. Wagner argues that the case of Romania “challenges the basic idea behind transition studies.6
Henry F. fear of change. This explains why interpretations of the events of December 1989 also result from orality. to the salvation role of the army and the Front (as detailed later in the Ely and Stoica chapter). Carey and Christopher Eisterhold
Ceaus ¸ escuism represented the attempt by a beleaguered and barely legitimate sultanistic elite. protections. but not only Jews. but not from its Communist elites and the indigence of the masses. The problem of Romania’s uniqueness is applied to the issue of collective historical memory in Michael Shafir’s. The party that ruled until the November 1996 elections. They should instead be taught the truth.” In “Sonderweg Romania?” F.” He argues that Romanian socialization has reinforced extremist attitudes. Noting that “stage B” (the Western model to which the former Eastern European states are supposed to be making the transition) is itself undergoing a profound transformation. The manipulation of collective memory. especially anti-Semitism among marginalized social groups with a proclivity to scapegoat. breeds false resentments and induces recidivism against the innocent.

obliterated deeply entrenched. Ely and Ca ˘ta ˘lin Augustin Stoica remind us that “history” can be manipulated to affect the present. who also seek political benefits from support for radical nationalism and anti-Semitism. the symbols of xenophobia can be cherished again. In “Re-Membering Romania.Introduction
7
induce “clashes of collective memories. In the end. Shafir’s chapter reminds the reader of the dangers that hero models of intolerance pose to historical memory in various national contexts. as society’s understanding of history helps form its collective identity and memory.’” They examine a specific historical event and ask whether the “revolution” of 1989 could provide a sense of solidarity and identity to the Romanian people. he sees a public display of cognitive dissonance or dissimulation to buy time until the scrutiny of NATO cosmopolitan forces are looking elsewhere. nor any motivation for collective action to realize it.. Some believe it was a revolution.S. and other earmarks of Confederacy heritage throughout the U. thereby influencing the potential for and the direction of collective action in a democratic or authoritarian direction. Of course.4 as well as a blissful ignorance of its genocide of Native Americans. the lack of a shared past retards the progress of Romanian society in its transition to a democratic future.g. superseding any hope that a shared ‘revolution’ myth would offer a common identity and a clear break with the ‘old. distrust of the public sphere. monuments. the old pathologies (e. “As the euphoria of those cathartic days died away. proliferation of alternative ‘legitimate’ narratives) reemerged. Rather. anti-Semites. Then. Romania’s quest for NATO membership resulted in a “clash of historic memories. In this manner. as parties purse their interests
. ten years after the fall of the Ceaus ¸escu regime. Of course.” The apparent official renunciation of the Antonescu cult. in fact. reveals the lack of a minimal consensus as to what really occurred in December 1989. in submission to NATO edicts. there are also the ideologically committed. Shafir argues. Romania is not unique in this regard.” which describes the use and misuse of anti-Semitic discourse and its historical memory-loaded values by politicians and intellectual elites who are not. flags. they conclude that. The outcome has not. South. there is still no “collective memory” on which to build Romania’s identity as a truly democratic nation. blatant exponents of the Antonescu cult. while many others believe it was a coup. with the United States maintaining its own welter of streets. hyper-nationalist values and anti-Semitism.” John F. Their analysis. has constrained the continued socialization and the teaching of historical lies. In his chapter “Democratization in the Shadows. drawn from a survey carried out by the Center for Urban and Regional Sociology (CURS) in October 1999. lack of a legitimate ‘legitimate’ narrative.” Frank Sellin discusses the legacy of how the patrimonial political culture of the Ceaus ¸escu era complicates and obstructs political and economic reform.” The post-Communist cult of Romania’s wartime leader Marshal Ion Antonescu exploits what Shafir terms “utilitarian anti-Semitism.

The patrimonial style of party politics resurrected former Communist networks. This solidifies existing parties at the expense of smaller but potentially strong ones.8
Henry F.” she writes. Roper examines the interwar and Communist legacies which have influenced contemporary parliamentary development. rather than the primacy of party ideology and policies. This suggests some difficulty transcending clientelism. he concludes. She finds some progress in both. short of a significant exogenous shock. 1992. thereby eliminating weak or disorganized ones. leadership qualities. due to the complicated “algorithms” for the dispensation of patronage necessary to hold together the fractious “coalition of coalitions. analyzes the im-
. their hold on power since the turbulent aftermath of the “revolution” of 1989 “contributed heavily to the fusion of political and economic power” and condemned the subordinated and nominally democratic institutions to “extraconstitutional dominance of a personal and partisan nature. which directed state resources to the still powerful vested interests of the old party-state. and increasingly restrictive party registration requirements.” to use Michael Shafir’s phrase. As a result. and retrospective and prospective governing records. do make the analysis more difficult. anticorruption and other reform measures have become difficult to carry out. While still developing. given the persistent voting irregularities and political disequilibrium generated by the spasmodic process of democratization and reform. which is a rather large number. however. In fact. political fragmentation and stagnation will continue for the foreseeable future. patrimonial politics have made Romania ungovernable since the opposition coalition took power in 1996. In the end. and 1996. thus eliminating small parties. Jóhanna Kristín Birnir discusses the electoral and party laws. particularly those that have been passed to reduce its fragmentation and volatility and to institutionalize a stable party system. personalism. Success in reducing both fragmentation and volatility over the first decade and a half of democratization results partly from recent changes in electoral legislation—particularly increasing entry thresholds to enter parliament. as they may contribute to either consolidation or volatility of the party system.
PART 2: THE STATE AND POLITICS
In her chapter. the institutionalization of the party system is progressing about as rapidly as can be expected. and corruption as a basis for party competition. The irregularities in the legislative elections of 1990. Sellin contends. “Romanian institutions have established a system of around six parties and coalitions. which structure the party system in Romania. Steven D. Carey and Christopher Eisterhold
through patronage and favoritism in public policy.” Because of this.

he warns. This question is left to other authors in this book. to participate in the political process in a meaningful way. They do not evaluate how to strengthen civil society. Unfortunately. patrimonial aspects of Romanian political culture continue to thwart attempts to build a viable civil society. Western governments and organizations have been largely unsuccessful in professionalizing the parliament.” They attribute this. patronage-driven politics. and participation rates reflect discrepancies across corresponding social categories.” Instead of legislating. it was hoped that the public would be able. “Charges of corruption and inactivity plagued the first parliament. Until the parliament begins to exert its authority over the government. they find that. With the establishment of at least formal democratic institutions in Romania. but the governing coalition proved fragile. Roper notes that. hopefully. The third parliament was supposed to overcome these problems and focus on economic reform and privatization. that “strengthening civil society will overcome these discrepancies. and explores the development of the parliament and its relationship with the presidency. with the exception of voting.
. In their chapter. in part. aggregate levels of Romanian political participation are low. to take advantage of that opportunity. and joining legal protests to determine the extent to which the contemporary Romanian public actually participates in the political process. for the first time. almost since its conception in 1990. Romania’s legislative power vacuum is one of the main obstacles to reform. the stifling patrimonialism and ideological polarization have led both Iliescu and Constantinescu to rely on executive decrees and to hope that the legislature would not allow the government to fall. Sum and Gabriel Ba ˘descu answer the question of whether the Romanian public has actually been able. Specifically. “With the exception of voting.. but write. the post-Communist parliament has been the least trusted and most ridiculed institution in Romania. especially in rural areas. political campaign activity. which have heretofore governed the state and help establish a truly functioning democracy.” If strengthening civil society could induce more Romanians to participate politically. Frank Sellin or Richard Hall) suggest that the traditional. Romania will continue to fall further behind other East European countries in marketization and democratization. the parliament today is held in the same disrepute as it was during the mid1990s. it would hold out the hope that a mobilized public might counter the patrimonial. or willing.Introduction
9
pact of post-Communist institutional choices on policy debates. Paul E. relatively few Romanians actually involve themselves in politics. coalitional instability stymied legislative efforts during the second. to the limited extent of “organized group activity” in Romania. they evaluate six forms of political participation including voting. some of whom (viz. As a result.

for the most part. He argues that many of the broader features of political culture in the Communist era—the passive attitudes of a “mass society. supposedly a liberal. readers can obtain some important information. mechanisms of change by virtue of the new ideas. but it is often biased. Instead. The mobilization of media resources from elitist and ethnic political configurations to express their political opinions has brought to the fore new issues. “media are expressions of extant political culture. but they are also. leaders. Romanian media inform their audiences without fact-based journalism because of politicization and partisanship. Gross concludes that the media are sufficiently pluralist and that the open-minded reader can obtain a general sense of Romania’s politics by reading several newspapers—something that few readers can or will do. and the continuing preference of the Romanian citizenry for informal networks of pile. Carey and Christopher Eisterhold
Peter Gross directly addresses the extent to which an independent media is necessary to establish democracy in transitional states.” Were it not for the subsequent uproar. Its coverage of contemporary political events continues to be highly partisan and ideologically driven. concurrently. the rent-seeking behavior of bureaucrats. parties. Yet. and reinforces of this culture. propaganda. and opportunities they present to the public. Their owners see to it that they serve functions of manipulation.10
Henry F. and mobilization because various partisan and outside interests politicize reporting. prosecutors obtained convictions of journalists. s ¸i relat ¸ii in their everyday personal and political matters—have persisted and have undermined democratic political development in the entire postCommunist era. The retention of Communist political culture is also reflected in the apparent unwillingness of the Romanian citizenry to participate directly in politics and in civil society and to form long-term partisan commitments. Yet. cunos ¸tiint ¸e.” Richard Andrew Hall analyzes cultural constraints on democratization. after Justice Minister Valeriu Stoica. the ordinance would not have been rescinded. In addition. “For the present. It remains. politically and economically subordinate to various interests.’ and which gave the impression that high monetary penalties would be mandatory.” the use of patronage in politics. an ominous development on top of the media’s already convoluted posturing and intelligence agency interference.” Gross writes. the Constantinescu presidency was marked by the selective arrests of journalists. which does function (more or less) consistently with contemporary theories of democratization. These cultural traits have contributed to the volatility of post-Communist elections
. which are not too stringent in their prerequisites. He notes that. Yet. issued “an ordinance which would have made it even easier to drag the media into court under the existing definitions of damage to ‘honor and dignity. a truly professional and independent media has yet to establish itself. debates. and ideas. in the case of Romania.

which are self-funded and bottom-up in motive. the Czech Republic. NGOs initially sprang up more or less in response to available Western funding. or Hungary. Some have pointed to the growing number of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs).”
PART 3: CIVIL SOCIETY AND SOCIAL ISSUES
Whereas Sum and Ba ˘descu assume that strengthening civil society would contribute to the process of democratization.” Unlike in Poland. the corrupt officials. as transnational flows. Romania’s voluntary associations belong. “While the legacy of Communist political culture will not inevitably foreclose on the process of democratization. in fact. or simple common concerns.Introduction
11
and the failure to form and maintain stable democratic governing coalitions. it remains a substantial impediment. whether of business interests. especially of a healthy civil society as most people would conceptualize it. What does it represent? Instead of localized cooperation among free and equal. as indicative of a vigorous and growing civil society. while some 62
. The NGOs that do exist to articulate the interests of their members. as envisioned by Hegel.000 in one count. She warns us against automatically equating quantity with quality. are often utterly dependent on foreign funding and direction. though not deterministic cultural influence. not grassroots organizations. Since Communism.” which has facilitated the emergence of an NGO sector. Romania has lacked the resources and the traditions of philanthropy. international assistance. Pralong argues. He concludes. Its workers have received higher wages. as envisioned by Alexis de Tocqueville. they have the capacity to shape the operation and outcomes of these new formal institutions. virtually no organized civil society existed in Romania prior to 1989. political causes. Hall concludes that Romania’s amoral familialism is a distorting. to a subsegment of the market rather than to the sphere of civil society proper. market-oriented associations have emerged among the nonforeign dependent NGOs. she notes. Sandra Pralong directly addresses the quality and traits needed to develop civil society in Romania. Older facets of political culture often prove stronger. which bolsters the private sector. Formal NGOs staffed by salaried workers remain the backbone of Romania’s “civil society.” Less than 16 percent of Romanian NGOs actually work with volunteers. and more adaptable than the prophets of change have predicted. Pralong finds positive signs in this large NGO growth. and generous tax loopholes for forprofit companies have helped create a “market. in place. civic-minded persons and groups working together to discuss and possibly resolve public issues. more flexible. Moreover. “Tocqueville’s view is not (yet) an appropriate framework for post-Communist Romania. Most of these NGOs counted are quasi-companies or for-profit concerns. some 17. Yet. but leaves the bureaucratic “dead wood” or worse.

only reinforced by a postmodernity without much in the way of competing dogmas or religious inspiration. mono-lingual Hungarian University at Cluj. associative sector idealized by Hegel may evolve into the democratic civil society of Tocqueville. where various ethnic groups are more insular. many NGOs are mere fronts for thriving black-market businesses. East European interethnic relations are better characterized by “inter” culturalism. rather than the “multicultural” system of the United States. In “Multiculturalism and Ethnic Relations in Transylvania. She hopes that. Otherwise. In fact. to condemn it to its disappearance. at the same time. Carey and Christopher Eisterhold
percent employ salaried workers. “To try to treat [ethnic identity] through multiculturalism is. the market-oriented. separate and distinct. not “multi” culturalism. the NGO sector has relatively more salaried employees than many traditional sectors of the economy. Some of the most progressive social causes would not have been put on the political agenda without NGO dissemination of information on issues like women’s and children’s rights.12
Henry F. He examines contemporary interethnic rela-
.” Claude Karnoouh examines Hungarian–Romanian interethnic relations in the context of the controversial proposal to create an independent. Karnoouh questions its appropriateness in Eastern Europe. with the Latin prefix inter denoting the symbiotic interaction between cultures which remain. Karnoouh argues that the blind obeisance of Romanian intellectual toward Western cultural mores and norms reflects their unquestioned faith that pluralism can adapt to the uncertain transitions in intercultural societies where ethnicity is close to an unalterable identity. consumer protection. Romanian and Hungarian ethnic groups need their separate spheres guaranteed by rights protected by the state. “Romani Marginality and Politics. as ownership spreads and enlightened self-interest becomes legitimate and pervasive in civil society. with its emphasis on individual rights and a common culture based on conformity to a market-based identity.” The most positive role of the NGO sector has been as social “leapfrogging” agents. or produce a violent backlash against assimilation. That is. and environmental safety. profiting from tax deductions granted to for-profit NGOs.” analyzes the mixed socioeconomic and political progress which the Romanian Roma—the most marginalized ethnic minority in Romania—have made since the fall of Communism. Karnoouh warns. they will be assimilated by Western or Romanian culture. and nationalistic. at a minimum. Noting that the concept of “multiculturalism” is derived from countries where immigration has founded the society (such as the United States).” He endorses the group rights of ethnic groups as communities. The chapter by Zoltan Barany. including radio and telecommunications as well as oil and gas processing. Furthermore. historically rooted. Still others constitute what Pralong calls “political frauds.

culture. the Romanian Orthodox Church. and secularization of democratic political development.500 church buildings owned by the Greek-Rite Catholic Church to the Romanian Orthodox Church. He notes. a universal human right that Romania is legally bound to honor under both European and United Nations human rights conventions. the process of Romani political mobilization. While Romanian law currently provides for one guaranteed seat in parliament for the Roma. history. discrimination. in exchange for supporting the regime and collaborating with the Securitate. “There is hardly any media discussion of Romani culture. As the self-professed bearer of Romanian national identity. and accomplishments. the Romanian Orthodox Church in-
. based in part on public opinion’s high confidence in the Church. and random violence. Educational levels remain low and poverty high.” Romanian politicians have not recognized that successful European integration requires resources for improved state–minority relations.” Considerable interethnic tensions between Roma on the one hand and Hungarians and Romanians on the other remain in persistent patterns of social and residential segregation. Institutions like the Department of Protection National Minorities and the National Office for Roma remain understaffed and without the resources to significantly aid the Roma in overcoming their marginalization within Romanian society. and policies toward the Roma. Ramet evaluates church–state relations. differentiation. its political participation is very low.Introduction
13
tions in postsocialist Romania. During post-Communism. benefited from the suppression of rival faiths and the transfer of 2. Romanian Orthodox Church. to impede efforts by less privileged denominations to obtain compensation for confiscated properties or guarantees of rights of proselytization. and tradition. This lack of separation of church and state has inhibited the autonomy. including ignoring demands of Eastern-Rite Catholics for the return of properties confiscated from them by Communist authorities and other tensions between the Greek-Rite Catholic Church and the Orthodox Church. although the lack of financial resources has meant that only minimal substantive changes could occur in the Roma’s condition. Some current religious problems stem from the legacy of this collaboration. especially regarding the dominant. religious intolerance within Romanian society. and nearly every media portrayal of them is a negative one. and in the refusal to enact a law protecting freedom of religious association. the church has embraced the coalition and president in power—first with Iliescu and his appointed government and then with Constantinescu and his—and has used its considerable new political clout. which was thoroughly co-opted by the state during the Ceaus ¸escu era and has gained a relatively privileged position in the politics of post-Communist Romania. second only to the army as highest of all. Sabrina P. During the Ceaus ¸escu era. “The government has clearly become more aware of the Roma’s intensifying problems.

according to Ramet. “the problem of human rights is just a city business they hear of on television.” Even women-oriented NGOs have internalized these traditional values. remains the “great absent” from the landscape. “The hierarchy of the Romanian Orthodox Church [is] acting in a way injurious to the development of a stable and functioning liberal democracy in Romania. which has thus far stalled in Romania. to an abortion—were achieved under Communism. Ramet concludes. which forbid gender preference discrimination. Carey and Christopher Eisterhold
hibits liberalization and has fanned religious.” Miroiu and Popescu note. they focus on family charity and support for women in traditional roles. and are driven by a “survivor mentality” without much political participation and gender equality. and other “tools of Satan. largely discredited with Communism. along with the larger feminist project. They argue that a feminist movement along Western lines is unlikely to develop because women share the bias of Romanian society toward accepting paternalist protection of authoritarian institutions. Because they were preached from the top-down. feminist values have never really been acknowledged and internalized by citizens. rather than emancipating them. which had criminalized homosexual behavior.
. As one of the five pillars of liberalism.” Next. rural patriarchical values in the aftermath of Communism. The political push and pull within the Romanian parliament reflects the conflicting agendas of the Romanian Orthodox Church and some other churches and other traditional. tolerance needs to be promoted instead of being suppressed because it is antithetical to the social thought of the Orthodox Church. Any feminist movement that might tentatively take root will ultimately share the same fate of the larger liberal project. in “Gay and Lesbian Rights. Instead of gender awareness. The most important feminist demands—the rights to vote. Mihaela Miroiu and Liliana Popescu’s “Post-Totalitarian Pre-Feminism” argues that the primary obstacle to women’s equality in Romania is the revival of traditional. The larger liberal dimension. suppressing Protestant evangelism. rather than asserting their rights and liberties in democratic ones. the Orthodox Church extended an invitation to Pope John Paul II in 1998. the Church has weighed in on social concerns like opposing decriminalizing homosexuality. rather than stemming from a grassroots feminist movement proceeding from and supported by civil society. However.” Thus. agricultural sector. “For these women. Nevertheless. resulting in the first visit of a Roman Catholic leader to an Orthodox country for fifteen centuries. focusing on the disparity between current Romanian laws and policies. as they put it.14
Henry F. Mihnea Ion Na ˘stase. Women make up a disproportionate number of “unpaid family workers” in the largely low-wage.” explores the legal issues of homosexuality. sexual. and ethnic intolerance. to equal pay for equal work. and the international laws monitored by human rights NGOs and the Council of Europe. and thus were.

and pollsters. Romania was the only state seeking entry into the EU with a law that criminalized consensual gay activity. and the large distance to “join Europe” institutionally. In recent years.” Finally. has illuminated the fault line between the liberal culture of Western Europe and the more traditional Orthodox culture. in “Higher Education and the Post-Communist Generation of Students. “By stating that the law. other than Ovidiu Tra ˘snea. on the other. the government straddled the metaphorical fence. and socially. with letters of recommendation and job interviews increasingly resembling Western models. but the legislature did not enact it. political consultants. with the new Iliescu presidency and a small liberal opposition. which used to criminalize homosexual behavior. though threats of gay persecution continue. posed a problem for Romania’s candidacy for entry to the EU. This ongoing controversy. and Pavel Ca ˘mpeanu of Bucharest University. human rights groups abroad and in Romania. as well as its current good standing within the Council of Europe. is not actually enforced. When an author does publish in influential media abroad. Internally. Résumés are replacing party or cadre files. which atrophied under forty-five years of Communist purges and politicization of research. For academic institutions and processes.” analyzes contemporary Romanian academia. and the West European states. Romaniabased authors are usually preferred in the more nationalistic. where the new law is not accepted in practice. He notes that. Academics must get by on less than $100 per month in wages. however. and the advocacy of more progressive elements such as liberal politicians. though the more enterprising individuals can moonlight by teaching extra courses in private universities and by working as commentators. which maintain that Romania is misunderstood by foreigners who perpetuate Romania’s poor image—as if Romanians did not often harbor that same negative view of themselves. which was largely segregated in nonuniversity institutes. Na ˘ stase specifically evaluates how Article 200 of the criminal code. culturally. Romania is almost exclusively represented. Antohi notes the recent progress that has been made in revitalizing the academic scene. including many Christian Democrats and other parties on the one hand. the repeal of Article 200 finally occurred. academic circles. when dozens of gays were imprisoned. except for the lucky few with TEMPUS and USIA grants. then deep criticism of his work may be mobilized when he is unread or unnoticed at home. funding and investment is insufficient. Romania-based authors were then still nearly absent from global academic debates. and interpreted abroad by their Western counterparts.
. there has been less persecution in practice than before. in the 1990s. Sorin Antohi. Na ˘ stase concludes. However. while remaining ‘formally’ on the books.Introduction
15
anti-homosexual constituents. The Constantinescu presidency recommended legislative reform. analyzed. former vice president of the International Political Science Association.

” Anneli Ute Gabanyi refutes the illusion fostered at the time that the “revolution” of 1989 replaced the Communist hierarchy in Romania. first under Communism and continuing today. she contends. They have transformed the political domination of the old nomenklatura into the economic domination of an oligarchy vis-à-vis society. though sometimes also benefiting from import controls. privatization has been occurring like the proverbial fire sales. over the polity by bankrolling a variety of political parties of all ideologies. He fails to realize that he is the victim of an ingrained nationalist pride which has obliterated all ethnic influences. it has been under the vanguard of the proletariat. As he laments. Some new high-technology firms utilize Romania’s highly skilled electrical and software engineers. state firms managed for the benefit of the parties placed on its boards and officers. as well as heterogeneous and fragmented. Though not quite a dictatorship. to privatize their personal control over the economy and. This could change. ethnocratic discourses in Romanian letters and social sciences persist. especially Securitate businesses and overseas bank accounts. given Antohi’s experience with Romania’s talented young students.16
Henry F. If ever there were a ruling class and a proletariat. Networks of interlocking political and economic interests support state enterprises and newly privatized industries (usually small and medium sized). the oligarchy has mastered state domination for personal advantage without respect to law. The group cohesion and quality of higher education suffer.”
PART 4: ECONOMICS AND ENVIRONMENT
In “The New Business Elite: From Nomenklatura to Oligarchy. Despite changes in government personnel. passive but effective resistance to the anticorruption measures inside the bureaucracy and within the governing coalitions has been pervasive. Because the new oligarchy is entrepreneurial. One consequence is that primitive. Unfortunately. “Today’s Romanian citizen sees her or himself as the victim of ethnic minority threats. the ideas and research of the latter often go unchallenged. As many talented Romanian academics cannot be bothered to debate those espousing ethnic intolerance. is the primary impediment to reform. increasingly. but even in any Romanian field. and control over state resources. Carey and Christopher Eisterhold
among various entrepreneurial distractions from research and collegial activities. for prices that render public assets as private patrimony. Most members of this elite have used their insider knowledge. many paying Western salaries (along with
. Oligarchic domination. not only in academia. most do not see a future for themselves. A few of the large state enterprises have state-of-the-art technology. Reform stalls in the Romanian mix of corrupt privatization sales. On the downside. the gap between the dominant class and society is larger today than it was under Communism. political power.

rather than under law. but desperate for privileged positions. They. and the dire needs of many employees who would be laid off. or an issue for the economy in the narrow sense. with Justice Ministers like Valeriu Soica refusing to process extradition requests for fugitives overseas. at worst.” evaluates the relative progress made in micro-privatization and the delays in macro. centralized. Bacon concludes by noting that public opinion is showing the strain. Bacon describes a “vicious circle” whereby the privatization of banking is problematic due to high ratios of nonperforming loans. which result from failed privatizations and growing inter-enterprise arrears in larger state-owned or formerly state-owned businesses. has not been accompanied by stricter control of uneconomic subsidies to white elephant state enterprises. the financially and politically weak post-Communist governments have rarely been willing or able to privatize state firms. accumulate or.” Aside from the oligarchy’s rule by law. cannot be liquidated due to the political considerations of the ruling class.. rather than competing in the private sector. while funds have been embezzled. at best. Stalinist economic policies have left Romania in a worse position than most Eastern European countries. Gabanyi predicts that the oligarchy will steadily impoverish the masses while enriching itself. She ends by quoting Stelian Ta ˘nase: “The liquidation of this mafia is not only a judicial or moral issue. run by Sorin Vântul and other ex-Securitate capitalists cum political insiders from all parties and interests). or swindles involving “investment” Ponzi schemes. to say nothing of credits that show no signs of productive investment and no repayment from the cash flow generated. subsidized credits and extortion and protection schemes creates a crony capitalism without a sultan to oversee the careful distribution of insider access. Inc. This gridlock is broken only by the occasional intervention of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. which periodically withhold loan and credit tranches on which the Romanian economy is dependent. except in the most venal way. A CURS poll found that “Eighty-two percent of those
. Saddled with enormous. it is especially a political issue—and therefore of vital importance for the process of democratization of the Romanian society. “Economic Reform. and the concomitant large number of employees and vested interests threatened by their closures. a formula for political extremism. The transparency and the public accountability which the EU will demand for Romania’s entry in 2007 is nowhere evident. The stranglehold through misdirected. Monetization of Romania’s leu results directly from such nonrecurring loans and banks without any oversight. disappear without a trace. The seeming inability of all post-Communist governments to make any substantial headway in large-scale privatization. in turn. and insolvent large-state enterprises. This makes the oligarchy even more advantaged. Wally Bacon’s study. Inter-enterprise arrears.Introduction
17
insider companies like Gelsor. which the government pretends to back.

economic struggle for higher wages. and trade unions like Cartel Alfa. job security. particularly relating to privatization and wage liberalization. advocates of privatization. The first trade confederations broke completely from the Communist stooge unions of the Ceaus ¸escu era and have emerged as the most militant social movement in the country. “Unless financial discipline is imposed on the budget process. Carey and Christopher Eisterhold
polled thought the privatization process was dishonest. and their effect on policy. The recurring credit crises over which successive governments have presided will elicit more pressure from international creditors. Political pressures have generated massive fiscal and monetary deficits. This will also proliferate into wide-ranging rent-seeking and demand for cheap credit. With the assistance and monitoring of union internationals. alleviate illiquidity. in addition to state ownership of public utilities. the pressure on the central bank. The first collective bargaining contracts were effected nationally in 1992. their political interaction with successive governments. Da ˘ianu suggests that this “shell game” cannot go on forever. and open organizing. Fra ˘t ¸ia. who have used massive violence and never seem to renounce its use explicitly. up to now. the Iliescu presidency has been remarkably tolerant of their rapid growth and demands. leading to inflation and delayed economic liberalization. The mainstream unions are in stark contrast—Bush predicts one that will be finished. and setbacks and inconsistencies in the painful transition to free market economics. While they have been. Significantly. corporatist model. boom and bust cycles. the leaderships of these confederations will now have to respond increasingly to the concerns of their members who face job losses as the huge state enterprises are liquidated or sold in the ongoing privation efforts. Here one sees the combination of the pressure exerted by those who cannot pay at the new relative prices with that of those who do not wish to pay for ‘it pays not to pay’ (the moral hazard issue). He admonishes. and on the banking sector in general.” Larry S. majorities also endorsed state control of prices and wages. and Confederat ¸ia Nat ¸ionala a Sindicatelor Libere din România (CNSLR) have been robust ever since on behalf of their members. The formal unions have been models of nonviolent. by the coal miners. will become a constant feature of the way the system functions. Bush recapitulates the cleavages among trade unions.18
Henry F.” Daniel Da ˘ianu’s chapter on “Fiscal and Monetary Policies” argues that the strain which current liberalization efforts have had on unprivatized or underdeveloped institutions explains the stop–go policies. He calls for greater and transparent privatization and rational fiscal and monetary policies. A key element of future union negotiations and a possible brake on
. and halt monetization. Bush’s chapter on “Trade Unions and Labor Relations” reviews the progress made since 1989 toward establishing a viable labor movement and the nascent structures for tripartite negotiations on the Central European. which will hopefully attract foreign capital.

S. After the fall of Communism. as well as the legislation passed and the institutional changes made to ameliorate these problems. decentralized regulation may be desirable. employer. the start of a departmental reorganization based on function rather than media. and labor administrative tribunals were developed in the last two years of the Constantinescu presidency. the formal mechanisms for tripartite decision making have not yet been transformed into stable. Romania established a network of environmental protection agencies in 1990 and the Ministry of Water. the gigantic Stalinist enterprises. which are already under financial strain from some transitional restructuring and which shirk environmental standards to minimize costs. This effort. He concludes by noting. cooperative relationships among union. “Only time will tell whether Romania’s trade unions will follow the pattern of many of their Western [European] counterparts and remain strong only in the public sector.” Because of the diffuse sources of air. Underfunding of regulatory enforcement has encouraged noncompliance by firms. In the first of two subsequent phases of environmental policy making following Communism. and the development of a sustainable financing mechanism for the environmental protection agencies. Completion of the project will be one of the various requirements for EU admission. The Romanian form of “corporatism. the government under international donor pressure took steps to try to rectify these problems. its effects on people. livestock. Zinnes reports.S. However. Zinnes. which formed the backbone of the Romanian economy. and Environmental Protection in 1992. but neither were analogous efforts in the U. Plans for a labor code. and toxic pollutants. water. a third phase of potentially radical shifts in environmental protection included “a reduction in the number of river basin units. or whether they will develop the capacity to unionize workplaces in the private sector” as historically in the U. was not successful. a pension scheme. Forests. was one of Constantinescu’s best achievements. On
. So far. marketization incentives were designed to permit local input into environmental investments and projects with environmental impacts. Since 1998. legislation and follow-up regulation have occurred without sufficient public and NGO participation. “The Environment in Transition” by Clifford F. if minimum national standards of pollution reduction are not threatened.Introduction
19
its past support for privatization are union fears that concessions in the short run will not lead to better management leading to higher wages in the long run. at the risk that local input might undermine national standards. He examines the sources of pollution. and the environment. Like much of Eastern Europe.” which was endorsed by Iliescu and which emerged under the Constantinescu presidency in 1997 and the Economic and Social Council. evaluates the limited environmental protection during postCommunism. were constructed with little regard for the environment. The final chapter in Part 4. and government representatives.

which would distract from institution-building and foster more centralized decisions. “Absent robust. could have abused the weak regulatory environment. As Nelson warns.” If privatization proceeds with enforcement of environmental standards. collective security organizations with which to abate threats.”
. Now is the time for Romanians to reduce such threats.20
Henry F. the entry into NATO has reduced the chance that rightist politicians could advocate autarchy and anti-Western positions. and toxic problems are more likely to be alleviated because firms best able to control pollution will be the most competitive. as well as encourage domestic democratization that could reduce internal instability. Nelson suggests that Romanian foreign policy has been historically based on avoiding isolation. the manifest desire of all Romanians to join NATO. as well as alleviate Romania’s isolation and foster territorial control from external threats. Still. Nelson argues. Carey and Christopher Eisterhold
a more optimistic note. Enlargement of both invariably will be sought by states in an insecure world. Part of the chapter is devoted Romania’s initial failure to gain firstround entry into NATO—the strategies employed. and that these firms have proven themselves to be more environmentally friendly than the state enterprises which preceded them. domination by Russia/USSR. with or without NATO. water. Zinnes finds that “though privatized firms. democratization is imperiled if the country finds itself looking for internal and external threats. reliance on the capacities of states and their alliances remains the primary method of ensuring security.
PART 5: SECURITY AND CONCLUSION
Leading the final section. in seeking profits. its treaty with Hungary. Because of factors like Romania’s improved participation in the economic embargo of the countries in the former Yugoslavia. and its geopolitical advantages. and ensuring its internal and external territorial integrity. rather than Euro-Atlantic integration. its offering NATO the use of its airspace in spring 1999. Romania’s foreign (and much of domestic) policy during the first decade of the post-Communist era focused primarily on NATO admission. partial renationalization of Romanian foreign and defense policy may be a troublesome scenario with which to contend over the next decade. new evidence suggests that cost minimization and waste reduction incentives have had a dominating effect. NATO membership would deter Russian power in the region. Nelson’s chapter on “Romanian Security” analyzes Romania’s struggle to formulate a new security policy since Communism. Romania’s air. the new policies engendered. Thus. Romania deserved its invitation in November 2002 to join NATO within two years. and the implications for future policy formulation. Daniel N. Aside from the euphoria and stabilization of Romania’s strategic and democratic developments.

such as the “Open Skies” agreement concluded in 1991. in “Romanian Bilateral Relations with Russia and Hungary: 1989–2002. which led them to conclude a basic treaty in 1996. was that Romania’s initial candidacy for NATO membership was rejected. propelled by the desire on the part of both countries to join NATO. Weiner discusses the somewhat thorny issue of ethnic relations in the context of the treaty. Though Russia opposes NATO expansion and still considers the Balkans as part of its sphere of influence. while Hungary’s was accepted. which required that potential members resolve any outstanding differences they may have with their neighbors by treaty prior to admission. the NATO intervention offered an unsettling precedent for resolution of a potential conflict in Transylvania for Romanians worried that the ethnic Hungarian minority in the Serb province of Vojvodina might also seek secession to join Hungary. Most disturbing. and the unprecedented decision by the Romanian government to allow Hungarian troops to cross its territory to reach Kosovo during the eleven-week war in the spring of 1999. the creation of a joint peacekeeping battalion in 1998. Romania has deferred to Russian security and economic interests in Transcaucasia. the unresolved demands for revision of the Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact of 1939. of course. because
.” reviews Romania’s foreign relations with two erstwhile enemies: Russia and Hungary. such as Romanian fears of legitimation of the collective rights of its Hungarian minority. implicitly tolerating the suppression of rebels in Dagestan and Chechnya. which could be used to justify demands for territorial autonomy in Transylvania. so that Russia can maintain its boundaries and secure a route for oil and gas pipelines from the Caspian basin. By the same token. Weiner warns that. Weiner notes that many of Romania’s cooperative efforts with Hungary were the result of its desire to join NATO and pressure from the West. even though Romanian public opinion has no stomach for a war to resolve these matters. the secessionist conflict in Transnistria. and the return of some of the territories taken during World War II in Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina. This did not renew the rift between the two powers. However. This issue was put in abeyance after West European countries themselves were frightened by demands for autonomy in their own countries. Romania’s lack of a basic treaty could have contributed to the delay of Romania’s admission to NATO. Romania’s failure to conclude a new basic treaty with Russia in the aftermath of the 1991 treaty with the USSR and its subsequent collapse resulted in part from issues like reparations demanded for the alleged Romanian treasure stolen by the Russians during World War II. Unlike those with Russia. Romania’s relations with Hungary have improved somewhat over the past decade.Introduction
21
Robert Weiner. with its myriad outstanding (and potential) conflicts of interest with Russia. Weiner also details Romanian–Hungarian progress in security. Moscow has not opposed Romania’s entry into NATO or the EU at present. Nationalist opposition in the Romanian parliament stokes these issues.

but mostly integrated into the new. “It is now up to the Romanian parliament to use the legislation at its disposal to enforce that accountability. the most important of which has been its legacy of nonintervention
.” He then rhetorically asks. Carey and Christopher Eisterhold
Romania did not stray from its NATO-oriented foreign policy. as well as spying. many have become “intelligence industries. He presents the array of security services which have succeeded the Securitate and other agencies. was partly purged.5 million. Many of these services. and SPP. Deletant notes that the files and dossiers left over from the former Securitate leave a constant threat of political blackmail hanging over the politicians in the parliament. or an analogous Communist-era intelligence agency. Watts argues that Romanian government relations with the army during Iliescu’s first two terms ought to be emulated by most post-Communist states. were formed around the nucleus of a former Securitate directorate or unit. like presidential protection and foreign intelligence. actually larger than its trade with Russia. The reason is that the army was trained to be independent of foreign powers under Communism after Soviet troops withdrew in the 1960s. who are expected to enforce democratic accountability under a new security regime. far from having been eliminated by the Revolution of 1989. in “The Security Services since 1989: Turning over a New Leaf.22
Henry F. and the attempts by parliament to bring them under its control. their membership in the new agencies. the true litmus test of Romania’s commitment to break with its Communist past. As under Communism. “commercial trade between Romania and Hungary was about $704. Dennis Deletant. He attributes this to characteristics embedded in the military from the Communist era. as occurred between Roman and Iliescu in the early 1990s and has continued under current Prime Minister Adrian Na ˘stase. such as SRI. “Will it have the political will to do this effectively? Or will the skeletons in the closet of many of its members make them wary of monitoring these new state security bodies?” Unfortunately his answer is “no” to the first and “yes” to the second.” Next.” engaging in commerce. the lack of a credible system of judicial supervision. By 1998. evolving system of government and effectively legitimized. Particularly interesting is his description of the use of the security services for politically partisan purposes. “Civil-Military Relations: Continuity or Exceptionalism?” Larry L.” evaluates the extent to which democratic accountability has been introduced to the Romanian security services. as opposed to focusing on the analysis of real security threats at home and abroad. and briefly surveys the degree of accountability introduced to their heirs. In the final chapter on security. He discusses the lack of prosecution of former Securitate officers. The Securitate. Deletant finds. UM 0215. Deletant observes. The Romanian military is exceptional in the degree to which it has managed to steer clear of politics during the democratic transition. Functional relations with Hungary made cooperation the preferred course. some of the abuses of power they have committed.

this pattern was partly reversed under the Constantinescu presidency. had experienced. which he insists does not take into account the exceptionalism of Romania’s case. but still has a long way to go before democracy is consolidated. the newly elected governments. refrained from shooting civilians. “The military has proven remarkably sophisticated in knowing when to hold back. Unfortunately. Ironically. Watts argues that the effort of the Constantinescu administration to eliminate all military involvement in policy making (in line with Western advice) was premature. which created a situation in which the military was not viewed as a threat by the general population.” Carey argues that Romania has reached the beginning of the completion of its democratic transition. this was the very crime which the army later found so threatening. or the various opposition parties. which would deny the military a transitional role in security policy making. and where the army was mobilized to stop an economic crisis involving the miners in January 1999. where promotions were made for lower-ranking officers on political criteria. relatively smooth civil-military relations and the gradual reduction of authoritarian military prerogatives. He attacks Western demands that Romania impose its version of military reform.” In the “Conclusion. according to Watts. The army. after the December 1989 killings in Timis ¸oara. Watts argues that Constantinesu did not understand that the norms of a “civil army” do not include its use against domestic political factions. a misunderstanding which creates the potential for future conflict between the civilian leadership and the military in coming years. Watts concludes.Introduction
23
against the domestic population. He also introduced strains in civil-military relations through the trial of former Defense Minister Victor Sta ˘nculescu for killing civilians in December 1989. However. a charge that the military and many civilians regarded as blatantly political. after the miners had attacked police in January 1999. in establishing itself as a reliable partner in Romania’s new democracy. He attributes this success in part to the establishment of a military science academy. prior to the Constantinescu administration. by contrast. in our view. when Defense Minister Victor Babiuc managed the army as part of his political intrigues. Romania. He outlines the areas that will require im-
. He observes that. which have insisted on civilian supremacy. have suffered civil-military tensions. violated human rights norms against shooting civilians. the army hierarchy was always consulted so that the assumption of civilian supremacy was not rushed until civilians had developed the capability to develop strategy. wants it both ways. During the first six years of post-Communism under President Iliescu. whereas countries like Poland and the Czech Republic. even though Sta ˘nculescu ordered the killings. and when to push. This became evident when the army. Watts also criticizes the Western “cookie-cutter” model of military reform in the region. where dozens of important officials and legislators have learned how militaries operate.

and legal as well as electoral institutions to ensure accountability and due process. 501–42. Barrington Moore Jr. Martin’s Press. economic. but rather the way to wealth. suffice to bring about the implementation of what only Romanians can do for themselves. 2. even though EU entry requirements are clear. See for example. 1996). A Lynching in the Heartland: Race and Memory in America (New York: Palgrave/St. The most likely scenario is that the country will remain a semidemocracy for many years to come. Russia and China (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.. 1995). Madison.” in East European Politics and Societies 13. Moreover. There has been less democratic learning than that needed for compromise for the sake of the liberal project and the country. The patrimonial culture has hardly been altered as politics continue to represent. He notes that the country has yet to establish a consensus among elites about what the goals of the democratic transition are and how to proceed. because of geopolitical concerns. and Theda Skocpol. 2002). 4. Romania after Ceaus ¸escu: The Politics of Intolerance (Edinburgh. “The Uses of Absurdity: The Staged War Theory and the Romanian Revolution of December 1989. 1998). 1990). its international “limbo” status may be expected to continue in the near future though the West. Nationalism and Communism in Romania: The Rise and Fall of Ceaus ¸escu’s Personal Dictatorship (Boulder. UK: Edinburgh University Press. and military reforms will continue. not the art of the possible. Trond Gilberg. This means that outside pressure for democratic. however. pp. Carey and Christopher Eisterhold
provement before the liberal project is to be completed and a truly democratic society will establish itself. Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World (Boston: Beacon Press. it will not.
NOTES
1. Tom Gallagher. 3. Romania lacks accountable and integrated political parties. Carey’s assessment suggests that it will take many decades to consolidate democracy in Romania.24
Henry F.
. for many. Richard Andrew Hall. 1988). no matter what is required of them for NATO and the EU membership. 3 (Fall 1999). may embrace a country without the political will to assure the minority rights of Roma and Hungarians. States and Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of France. CO: Westview Press. and Anneli Ute Gabanyi. no. Systemwechsel in Rumänien: Von der Revolution zur Transformation (München: Oldenbourg. James H. Romania will not be totally irrelevant to the West either.

I
ROMANIAN EXCEPTIONALISM?
.

.

the political profiles of successive elites. protections. —Nicolae Ceaus ¸escu. This chapter explores the sources of Romania’s different path. We will refer to the birth of the Romanian Communist Party (RCP) from the previous socialist movement. overblown. the Leninist heritage in Romania has turned out to be more persistent and resilient than in the other countries in Eastern Europe. antitotalitarian rhetoric of its paragons. of course. While the self-described. connections. intrigue. postCommunists are still peripheral in Romania. Furthermore. August 1989
Of all the revolutions that took place during the annus mirabilis 1989. long since exhausted. and vindictiveness that left their imprint on
27
. Ion Iliescu’s Partidul Democrat ¸iei Sociale [The Party of Social Democracy ]. only the Romanian one was violent. more often than not. and the co-mingling of Leninist and Byzantine traditions in a uniquely cynical and manipulative political formation. —Joseph Stalin My personal hobby is the building of socialism in Romania. remains dominated by personalities belonging to the “second and third echelon” of the deposed regime. fear of change. what remains is a widespread network of vested interests. its failure to develop and expand a powerful mass base during the interwar period. sectarianism. the extraordinary vitality of the authoritarian mentalities and practices in that country. the party that ruled until the November 1996 elections.1
Understanding National Stalinism: Legacies of Ceaus ¸escu’s Socialism
Vladimir Tisma ˘ neanu
There is no fortress we Bolsheviks cannot storm. The ideological fervor is. and. despite its ostensible radicalism and the strong-worded. the enduring patterns of conspiracy.

They despaired over Ceaus ¸ escu’s follies of grandeur. and despotism that for a period of time coexisted with an aggressive and arrogant Narcissism.1
Needless to say. Gorbachevite) attempt to attribute the main errors of the Communist regime to the vagaries of an individual like Stalin rather than to the very system that permitted Ceaus ¸ escu’s erratic policies. Instead. overgrown vanity. perhaps the largest party. Be that as it may. In his memoirs.2 At best. in the world—disappeared almost overnight on 22 December 1989. the RCP—which was. in the late 1970s. but not over the system’s inherent and insurmountable irrationality. the very existence of which guaranteed his whole political career? In other words. admits that by the end of the dictatorship. Romania’s former president. The most significant among them was Vasile Patilinet ¸. Iliescu admits. and for many years a member of the top party elite under Nicolae Ceaus ¸ escu. a tool for satisfying Ceaus ¸ escu’s endless hubris:
Political obtuseness. Iliescu’s self-serving critique of his predecessor sounds more like a neo-Khrushchevite (or better said. While they were bitter critics of the personal dictatorship. But then. there were private conversations in which individuals were deploring certain “exaggerations” and “distortions” of the regime. the personalization of power within an increasingly corrupt oligarchy. Ceaus ¸escu
. reform-oriented faction within the RCP. arbitrariness. The chants of “ole. ole. with its almost 4 million members. oversized party was nothing but a propaganda fiction. how could Iliescu engage in an overall demystification of the political ideology and system. transformed the monopersonal leadership into an immense parody and the source of monumental errors. ignorance and even stupidity. together with the dogmas and the practices of a system that had already shown its limits. in proportional terms. the RCP had ceased to perform any of the traditional roles of a Leninist regime: mobilization. and later. was fully supporting Ceaus ¸ escu’s obsessions. and the transformation of the party elite into a mafia-style clique dominated by a paranoid despot and his immediate family. orientation.28
Vladimir Tisma ˘ neanu
the mindset of various bureaucratic generations. a former Central Committee secretary in charge of the Securitate and the army (between 1965 and 1970). the ambassador to Turkey (where he died in a suspicious car accident in the early 1980s). certain important figures were considering different options (including political murder) to get rid of the increasingly obnoxious tyrant. and promotion. This is not to say that every member of the party elite.3 Neither Patilinet ¸ nor the later authors of the “Letter of the Six” (March 1989) ever considered a fundamental overthrow of the existing system as their preferred path of action. Iliescu’s claims to a dissident past notwithstanding. there was no liberal. That this latter statement is far from hyperbole is born out by Ion Iliescu’s analysis of the degeneration of the RCP under Ceaus ¸ escu. There was no group of individuals whose belief-system and aspirations were informed by the logic of Marxist revisionism. they never questioned the legitimacy of the party’s monopoly on power. We know for sure that. especially in the 1970s. the gargantuan.

Legacies of Ceaus ¸escu’s Socialism
29
nu mai e” marked not only the end of the bicephalous dictatorship.. and the neverconsummated hatred. Secretive. Even somebody like Dumitru Popescu. nonrecordability) characterized this power system. their personal connections with Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej and members of Dej’s entourage. and vendettas between shifting coalitions that explain the continuation of Stalinist patterns of domination for so many years. My thesis is that the focus of a political history of any Leninist regime should be on the interaction between biographies. as A. envies. cliquish. leaders discussed very little of substance.e. There was very little accessible. factious struggles. too little will be understood of the origins of the Securitate. institutions. Important decisions were frequently made by two or three individuals walking in the woods on a weekend. . For instance. At Politburo meetings. as a general rule. and Iosif Chis ¸inevschi. including since 1989.5 Likewise. as well as its perpetuation. This chapter tries to capture the saga of Romanian Communism: its metamorphoses and whereabouts. The leaders brought to the top during Ceaus ¸ escu’s last decade in power knew almost nothing about Dej. we visit certain telltale biographies and examine the political careers of certain individuals whose role in the establishment of the Communist regime. When Nicolae and Elena Ceaus ¸ escu fled the Central Committee building by helicopter and the enraged masses stormed the party headquarters. what would be the meaning of any political analysis of Romanian Communism? Furthermore. and programmatically deceptive. . and impersonal procedural systems of democratic polities. James McAdams poignantly noted about the interviews with former German Democratic Republic (GDR) potentates:
.6
. Herein. institutional memory and far too many conflicting personal views of what the past had been about. actually knew about the most important events and controversies of the East German past. it seemed that a whole chapter of history was over and that Romanians would eventually get out of the asphyxiating totalitarian order in which they had been living for more than four decades. was paramount. and the endless struggle for power. one of the most interesting findings is how little most policy-makers. its vicious. if one does not grasp the role of political thugs and Soviet spies like Pintilie Bodnarenko (Pantius ¸a) and Alexandru Nikolsk.4 Without comprehending of the Securitate’s role. orality and informality (i. and expertise rarely played a major role. Ana Pauker. the chief ideologue of the RCP during the 1970s. and their contribution to the exercise of political terror in Romania. is extremely vague in his memoirs in trying to define the nature of interpersonal relations in Dej’s Politburo. consensual. the decision-making process in this type of organization is the exact opposite of the presumably transparent. including many members of the SED’s (Socialist Unity Party) highest circles. factions. Politically significant information was restricted to very few people. but also the irresistible and irrevocable demise of the seventy-eight-year-old RCP.

First. As a matter of fact. corruption. style. and even former Foreign Minister S ¸tefan Andrei—men who were hardly the equivalent of a Petar Mladenov. Second. and universal fear. and with it the whole Communist institutional infrastructure. reform-oriented groups and/or individuals among the top elite. What characteristics of political values.30
Vladimir Tisma ˘ neanu
MESSIANIC PRETENSE AND PARIAH COMMUNISM
The sudden and violent collapse of the Ceaus ¸ escu regime. of course. Ceaus ¸ escu surrounded himself with sycophants. and slavishly obsequious individuals who were unable to envision.8 We need to explain how and why this unique experiment in dynastic Communism was possible. which included Prime Minister Constantin Da ˘sca ˘lescu. A Bulgarian-style. However. A widespread atmosphere of fin-de-règne was imbued with a sense of hopelessness. could have been anticipated. nipping in the bud any form of dissent and resistance. it seemed that Ceaus ¸ escu managed to keep strict control over the country in general. His cult was unique in its absurdity and shallowness. and even challenging. the impact of the Soviet changes during the pereistroika period were experienced less powerfully in increasingly isolated Romania than in traditionally Soviet-echoing Bulgaria. the Russians. whereas Bulgarian Communist elites had always derived their legitimacy from their unflinching solidarity with Moscow. Todor Zhivkov’s successor as Bulgarian Communist Party leader. the Romanians (especially after the 1964 “divorce” from the Kremlin) founded their domestic and international prestige on being different from. which indicated anxiety and panic within its ranks rather than the coalescence of potential successor groups. and the ultimately grotesque outgrowths of what Belu Zilber. intraparty coup resulting in the nonviolent ouster of the lider maximo was thus unthinkable in Romania. catastrophic in Romania at the end of the Ceaus ¸ escu regime. Dedicated to an experiment in dynastic socialism. In other words. there was an absence of even minimally credible. even applying the term elite would be too generous a compliment to bestow upon a group of scared. There were also signs of discontent within the elite. many of whom were recruited from his own extended family. let alone to undertake. while discontent was rampant. an extremely controversial
. They had all participated in the cultic pageants. and mentalities within the Romanian Communist elite made possible Ceaus ¸ escu’s absolutism and his pharaoh-like cult of personality. any action against the ruling clan. there was the uniqueness of Ceaus ¸ escu’s monopolization of political authority and power. This “familialization of socialism” (a term coined by Ken Jowitt in his pathbreaking analyses of “neo-traditionalism”) speeded up during the 1980s. Some authors detected the increased chasm between the ruling clique and the party rank-and-file. and endorsed his vagaries. The reasons for this situation were threefold. his predecessor Ilie Verdet¸.7 Third. The economic and social conditions were. praised Ceaus ¸ escu to the sky. humiliated.

with repressive features that allowed many Romania-watchers to reach the most pessimistic conclusions about her future. and obsessed with the need to establish a perfectly “homogenous” ethnic community. According to the Chartists:
Just as peace and freedom in Europe are the common and indivisible cause of all Europeans. his rhetoric was unabashedly chauvinistic. as Karl Marx noted. was “nothing but the personal caprice of a single individual. and the historical competition with the capitalist West. called “the monarchy of dialectical right. The model in this case is. Just as he who is indifferent to the lack of freedom of his neighbor and fellow citizen can only enjoy doubtful freedom himself. On the other. an attempt was undertaken to establish a sui generis form of Asiatic despotism. asserting its willingness to abide by a strange vision of socialism that blended Stalinist tenets and romantic-nativist. Poland. We should. and ponder the less manifest psychological components of a given political culture. Their action was a response to an appeal issued one month earlier by the Czechoslovak human rights group. In this case.Legacies of Ceaus ¸escu’s Socialism
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survivor of the Pa ˛tra ˛s ¸canu show trial. Ceaus ¸ escu’s system had displayed an unprecedented contempt for its own subjects. anti-Hungarian. On the one hand. and styles in the making of Romania’s Communist power elite. thus. independent activists from Czechoslovakia. the need to preserve collective property over the means of production.”11 The plight of the Romanians under Ceaus ¸ escu’s dictatorship was acknowledged and deplored in both East and West. Ceaus ¸ escu emphasized the party’s monopoly on power. It seemed that. so must his feeling of warmth and his sense of light remain doubtful if he combines them with indifference to the cold and darkness in which his less fortunate neighbors are consigned to live. ethnocentric nostalgias in a uniquely Baroque construct. The conduca ˘ tor and his underlings had succeeded in erecting a self-styled version of socialism.10 At a time when other Soviet-style regimes had embarked on more or less radical reforms. Hungary. focus on certain emblematic biographies that highlight the main tensions in the political history of the RCP: the clash between home-Communists and Muscovites. especially during the last stage of Ceaus ¸ escuism. the elimination of any Marxist revisionism. the Romanian regime behaved in an eccentric way. and the GDR demonstrated in solidarity with the victims of Ceaus ¸ escu’s tyranny. one has to look beyond visible sociological structures.”9 To understand these dynamics. of course. we will have to search for the interplay of Leninist and Byzantine symbols. on 1 February 1988. so is what goes on in Romania the common concern of us all. in the heart of Europe. Robert C.12
. Charter 77. where the political state. the enduring persecution of the intellectuals. Programmatically self-enclosed and suspicious of domestic liberalization. values. and the combination of crypto-fascist and Stalinist beliefs. Tucker’s masterful studies on Stalin and on Leninist political culture. For instance. and when the politics of glasnost proclaimed by Mikhail Gorbachev had threatened to contaminate and destabilize the long slumbering East European elites.

cautious. he had made a successful-enough career within the Communist bureaucracy to succeed one of Eastern Europe’s most skillful Communist maneuverers. commenting on Ceaus ¸ escu’s mania for grandiose buildings.15 Before being selected as general secretary in March 1965.13
In a similar vein. and initially unthreatening behavior. however. Insult this vanity—by vocal condemnation and ridicule at the United Nations and other international gatherings—and Western countries might just prevent a lot of senseless destruction in Romania. However. Daniel Chirot predicted that the huge edifices erected to please the conducator’s Mussolini-like. pseudo-modesty. Romania’s dictator does have one exploitable weakness: huge vanity. architectural taste would remain as “a monument to the catastrophe that one unconstrained mad-man can inflict on society. and he frequently visited China. North Korea. After all. and Yugoslavia.16 It is important to note. settling of accounts. with a bit of luck. . hopes.32
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Several months later. the Epoch of Ceaus ¸ escu. Noisy protests could slow down systematization (the razing of half of Romania’s 15. His prospects were presciently observed by Ghit ¸a ˘
. as well). . Ceaus ¸ escu had the most palpably Leninist credentials to aspire to inherit Dej’s mantle. When he succeeded Dej in 1965. He longs for flattery in the big wide world. and self-effacing. It is important.’”14 There is a growing tendency nowadays to dismiss the Romanian experiment in autocracy as an historical anomaly. not only with its own memories. therefore. that these interviews and memoirs are impregnated with nostalgia for Dej’s times. the truth is that Ceaus ¸ escu did nothing but exacerbate and carry to the utmost extremes certain characteristics of the Stalinist political culture within the peculiar conditions of Romania. later he witnessed Khrushchev’s virulent anti-Stalin speeches at the 22nd CPSU Congress (1961). but it is also true that among all his Politburo colleagues. It is true that Dej did not expect his demise to come so soon and so fast. Nicolae Ceaus ¸ escu was part and parcel of a political family. and frustrations. he had studied in Moscow.000 villages—VT) until. A number of books have come out in Romania in which Ceaus ¸ escu’s former Politburo colleagues and rivals admit his unique capacity for dissembling. the death of Romania’s seventyyear-old sick despot made the whole idea a dismal and surreal memory. irrelevant to the general development of Soviet-style regimes. but also with romantic dreams. and expectations. and rarely reveal any repentance or remorse (including for Silviu Brucan’s memoirs. the often restrained Economist published an editorial urging the West to treat Ceaus ¸ escu as a pariah of the international community:
. Ceaus ¸ escu was not a greenhorn in the world of Communist stabs-in-the-back and merciless intrigues: In the late 1940s. to go beyond the mere blaming of the late leader and try to fathom the inner logic of Romanian Communist history. Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej. obedient. a living reminder of the ‘Epoch of Gold. He was disciplined.

Thus. anti-Soviet outbursts associated with Dej’s last years and Ceaus ¸ escu’s twenty-four-year rule have to be analyzed against the history of the Soviet domination of Romanian Communism. to stir responsive chords within Romania’s urban proletariat or radical intelligentsia (who were overwhelmingly attracted by the extreme right). In any other East Central European Communist Party. the Romanian Communist political culture could never fully overcome its pariah genealogy: during the clandestine times. For People’s Democracy. With the exception of Enver Hoxha’s Albania. the secretary in charge of cadres in 1964 (one year before Dej’s death). he was the symbol of the apparatus and the guarantor of the group’s chances to enjoy accelerated social mobility by getting rid of party old-timers. the Romanians had been the host country for the COMINFORM and its weekly journal. the party elite had little understanding of the predominant. portrayed Romania as a “multinational imperialist country. As Jowitt has shown. This patronizing behavior on the part of Moscow further enhanced its pariah psychology and the excruciating inferiority complex of the cadres. For a Lasting Peace. Romania was the only country in Eastern Europe to have shunned the shockwaves of Khrushchev’s denunciation of Stalin’s cult19 at the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Romanian national values and aspirations. The party championed ideas and slogans with minimal impact on the class it claimed to represent. predetermined.
ANTI-SOVIET STALINISTS
Ceaus ¸ escu’s success within the Romanian Communist elite.Legacies of Ceaus ¸escu’s Socialism
33
Ionescu. This is particularly symptomatic if we consider that between 1948 and 1956. the RCP was treated in a most humiliating way by the COMINTERN.18 Without a mass base. The RCP endorsed Russian territorial claims on Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina and failed.
. Generations of Romanian Communists had treated their nation as a maneuvering mass. it would have been much more difficult for Ceaus ¸ escu to amass the same amount of absolute power. authority. Like Stalin during 1923–1924. prior to World War II.17 My thesis is that Ceaus ¸ escu and his cult were less of an aberration than they appeared to external observers. who identified Ceaus ¸ escu as the most likely successor to Dej. dominated by foreign cadres. fractured and pathetically impotent.” and advocated the dismemberment of the Romanian nation-state as it had been formed after the Versailles and Trianon treaties of 1919–20. was foreshadowed. therefore. The phenomenon has to be analyzed in the light of such concepts as power. and his victory in the political struggles with his rivals that followed Gheorghiu-Dej’s death in March 1965. and legitimacy. and facilitated by the party’s history of unmitigated commitment to the exclusive logic of Stalinism.

20 In Khrushchev’s mind this was a gesture of goodwill sent to the West. but also. and to impose its hegemony. Far from emulating the Soviets in their limited relaxation. This subservience to Moscow. the underground RCP was a dramatically peripheral formation. but they used the specter of the “revisionist” danger in order to wage a massive witch-hunt within their own party during 1957–1958. unlike Hungary or Poland. the Soviets. when. the leaders of the Romanian Communists further tightened their grip over society. Yes. not only did Dej and his Politburo warmly endorse.22 Unlike the Bulgarian. For instance.” In June 1958. and to initiate new purges of the intelligentsia. at a more general scale.34
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Khrushchev had presumably tested the trustworthiness of the Romanians in the turbulent fall of 1956.21 The reprehensible features of the last stage of Ceaus ¸ escu’s rule should not obscure the cultural and institutional underpinnings of that regime and its structural relationship to the totalitarian traditions of a political formation beset by an overwhelming inferiority complex. and its deep distrust of anything smacking of democratization or liberalization. The Romanian Communists were 100 percent on the Soviet side only on those occasions when Moscow was restoring Stalinist practices. its long-held subservience to the Kremlin. Dej had persuaded the Soviet leaders that Romania was immune to any “bourgeois” or “revisionist virus. It managed to achieve national prominence. Hungarian. the Soviet army units left Romania. meant to appease those outraged by the news coming from Budapest about the execution of Imre Nagy and other leaders of Hungary’s revolutionary government. Romania was spared any significant mass movement for liberalization (this is not to deny or gloss over the significance of student unrest in Bucharest. there a paranoid style in Romanian Leninist politics. based on complex arrangements between the Romanians. First in Dej’s and then in Ceaus ¸ escu’s personalities (different as they certainly were). one could discover all the characteristics of a political culture obsessed with its questionable heredity. its problematic national credentials. to the endless fixation on national identity and historical predestination among the non. and Yugoslav Leninist parties. and Timis ¸oara). the Soviet crushing of the Budapest uprising in 1956. But Khrushchev’s calculations went wrong. and in fact offered logistic support for. entirely dominated by the COMINTERN apparatus. This pariah syndrome is perhaps the main key for grasping the hidden meaning of the otherwise wayward conduct of Ceaus ¸ escu during the last decade of his reign.and often anti-Communist intelligentsia. Moreover. only with the direct support of the Soviet Army after the country’s occupation in August 1944. Cluj. but its foundations lay in the underdog mentality of the party elite. and the worshipping of the Kremlin as the ultimate Mecca of proletarian internationalism. This statement is valid not only in regard to the inordinate concern with Romanian authenticity within the RCP culture. and the Yugoslavs. resulted in a complete annihilation of the criti-
. Polish.

both in theory and in practice. identified themselves with the autonomist promises of the first stage of Ceaus ¸ escuism. and Ilie Verdet ¸. has always been questionable. extremely rigid.” Hence. large social segments found themselves stirred and exhilarated by what they saw as Romania’s prospects for grandeur. as Ceaus ¸ escu realized that they were aiming to initiate semi-reformist and potentially destabilizing policies. as in the case of the notorious scandal in 1982 against members of an alleged “Transcendental Meditation Sect. Of the many Western observers interested in Romania’s Sonderweg.25 This is not to say that Ceaus ¸ escu had always been unanimously hated or despised. exercise in authority-building by an elite bereft of any political legitimacy. Whatever resembled competence. or intellectual dignity had to be attacked and humiliated. rational analysis. Ion Iliescu. and generally successful. therefore. How this capital was squandered. and few thought that his pledge to enhance collective leadership was more than a temporary device used to get rid of the veteran Stalinists. the conduca ˘ tor’s defiance of the Soviet controls. Ion Ionit ¸a ˘. Later.Legacies of Ceaus ¸escu’s Socialism
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cal faculties of both top elites and rank-and-file party members. Ion Sta ˘nescu. Vasile Patilinet ¸. and the rapprochement with Yugoslavia and the West. he did an about-face and restored a superannuated. Suffice it to compare the RCP’s international status in July 1965 at the Ninth Congress (the first to confirm Ceaus ¸ escu’s supremacy at the top). Ceaus ¸ escuism was a desperate attempt by a beleaguered elite to gain domestic authority and international recognition by emphasizing precisely the quality it had most conspicuously lacked for most of its history: national prestige and influence. the emigré historian Georges Haupt suggested that the best interpretation of the break with Khrushchev was that of an inventive. Paul Niculescu-Mizil. and participated eagerly in the consolidation of the general secretary’s personal power. Many of them had worked in the 1950s and early 1960s under his guidance. and the abysmal
. even after General Secretary Gheorghiu-Dej decided to simulate born-again Romanianism during 1963–64. modernity. Gheorghe Pana ˘.23 The party’s claim to legitimacy. There were exceptions. sometimes under the most bizarre pretexts.24 Combined with limited domestic liberalization from above. and how their commander-in-chief politically emasculated the elite remains a fascinating topic to be further explored. Many of these party and government bureaucrats such as Maxim Berghianu. Janos Fazekas ¸. The elimination of the Stalinist Old Guard offered them long-expected opportunities for upward political mobility. Ceaus ¸ escu’s supporters and protégés during the late 1960s were middle-aged apparatchiks who took themselves seriously as exponents of a national managerial class in statu nascendi. this distancing from Moscow constituted the ideological mainstay of an increasingly self-confident new wave of party bureaucrats. Cornel Onescu. ideologically dominated leadership pattern. Far from it: During the 1960s and early 1970s. Provocations were organized to manufacture ideological heresies. but they were swiftly marginalized and silenced.

mattered little. the Romanian Communist political class would dress itself in nationalist clothes. He was ready to sacrifice principles and loyalties. Together with Dej. By the end of his life. and its leaders postured as champions of national values. Boycotted by the Warsaw Pact “brotherly” countries. The true value for him. without any reticence.26
DECREPIT TYRANNY
The xenophobic outbursts of the conduca ˘ tor. and an embarrassment to the Western Marxist parties. there are persuasive arguments for both explanations. the RCP Congress could count only on the solidarity of North Korea and certain third world radical movements.”27 With his spasmodic gestures and flaming harangues. For the Communist doctrinaires. and even an ignorance of the basic notions of Romanian history. would swear by the tricolor flag. this patriotic travesty would ensure a gigantic manipulation. Whether he became a true Romanian nationalist or was merely a pragmatic opportunist is still to be assessed. The same people who had unswervingly served Soviet interests were the very ones who deplored the loss of national identity. As in the case of Serbia’s Slobodan Milos ˇevic ´. it is enough to look through party documents dating from its clandestine period as well as those from the period when it remained a bulwark of Stalinism: they were marked by a complete rejection of Romanian national values. then even stronger with Ceaus ¸ escu. in order to preserve it. all had deeper sources than Ceaus ¸ escu’s personal psychology: they originated in the RCP’s problematic relationship with Romanian cultural traditions and patterns. He tried to combine a residual attachment to Leninist faith with a newly discovered sense of the usefulness of nationalist symbols and demagoguery. such problems as the country’s coming to terms with modernization. when the RCP rewrote its own history. however. a deep distrust of the intelligentsia. the fascination with organic corporatism. A vulgar materialist interpretation of history was used to demonstrate that Romanians were eager to espouse the cause of the world proletarian revolution. was personal power.36
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international isolation of both party and leader when the Fourteenth Congress convened in November 1989. Later. Ceaus ¸ escu had noth-
. and the rehabilitation of both militaristic and volkisch symbols. his romanticization of Romania’s archaic past. Ceaus ¸ escu became the embodiment of this impossible change of persona. They had their universal recipes borrowed from the COMINTERN’s arsenal and did not hesitate to impose them on Romania. his passionate identification with mythological ThracianDacian chieftains and power-thirsty feudal princes. and the adoption of Western institutional models. and would sing patriotic anthems to show its commitment to the values of “sovereignty and independence. To understand this.

and one of Elena Ceaus ¸ escu’s dear protégés. What remained was a series of ill-concocted legends and huge gatherings of robot-like individuals mechanically applauding an entranced dictator. a popular uprising would annihilate the much-acclaimed “multilaterally developed socialist society. This was understood by unrepentant but lucid Leninists like Ion Iliescu and Silviu Brucan. Later. But one may think that it was during those moments that he. including Bucharest. but these were pathetic attempts to revive a political corpse. the RCP was already extinct. Zhivkov had been eliminated by the Mladenov-Dzhurov conspiracy. who would form a successor party which pretended to break with all totalitarian traditions: the National Salvation Front. already a political ghost. the organization that made possible Ceaus ¸ escu’s ascent to absolute power. One can only speculate about Sta ˘nculescu’s real thoughts during the long minutes of thunderous applauds and rhythmic chants: “Ceaus ¸escu s ¸i poporul” (“Ceaus ¸ escu and the people”). Indeed. In this they enjoyed the help and knowhow of a group of younger Marxist political scientists and sociologists. They may have understood that. most of whom had been active in the “S ¸tefan Gheorghiu” Party Academy and the Center for Military History.Legacies of Ceaus ¸escu’s Socialism
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ing to deliver but his hollow rhetoric and hysterical calls for more repression.” Yet. Think of the 14th RCP Congress in November 1989: the Berlin Wall had been broken down. nonviolent rebellion that eventually became contagious and spread to other cities. together with other party and government bureaucrats (including perhaps Securitate chief Lt. or at least they seemed loyal. his party. once Ceaus ¸ escu was executed. Therefore. under the Ministry of Defense (for many years
. disappeared.28 The RCP was finished. It was perhaps the only true thing in the ocean of mendacity that had flooded the everyday life of the Romanians. For all practical purposes. the writing was on the wall for the Romanian leader and his party. because among the delegates to the Congress and among the elected members of the last Central Committee figured a man who one month later would be one of the main architects of Ceaus ¸ escu’s execution: General Victor Atanasie Sta ˘nculescu. the RCP and Ceaus ¸ escu were identical.” But nothing was undertaken. Ceaus ¸ escu single-mindedly believed in the pageants skillfully engineered by his devoted cheerleaders. by the end of the 1980s. unless something radical was done. A strînge rîndurile. First Deputy Minister of Armed Forces. and Milos Jakes and his team of Soviet-backed puppets had been ousted by the “Velvet Revolution. was challenged by a plebeian. General Iulian Vlad). closing the ranks around the conduca ˘ tor became the leitmotif of the propaganda warfare against the Romanian population. realized that Ceaus ¸ escu and his clan had no future. As the propaganda had proclaimed. The RCP. some died-in-the-wool ex-cadres and sycophants tried to resurrect it and promote the legend of Ceaus ¸ escu’s heroism. and the spontaneous revolt came like a bolt of lightning in Timis ¸oara in midDecember 1989. by this time. both as an ideological movement and as a mobilizational bureaucracy.

Hence. I use this term in the sense proposed in Sidney Verba’s classical 1965 definition and developed by Robert C. as well as irreducible divergences. Ion Dinca ˘. General Ilie Ceaus ¸ escu. and affinities. It carried with it the memories and loyalties that allowed it to stick together in the ensuing confrontations. both Dej’s and Ceaus ¸ escu’s rules are regarded here as persistent efforts to circumvent the evolution of the Romanian Communist political culture into a post-totalitarian. In other words. It is more important that we look into the behavioral and intellectual patterns of various generations of Communist and post-Communist elites. there was a relative continuity in terms of political elites. who became a powerful figure as head of the Romanian Service of Information (SRI). the conduca ˘ tor’s brother). underneath the apparent cleavage and the ostentatious hiatus that separated the demise of the RCP and the rise of the NSF. Rather.” mobilizational ethos. The conduca ˘ tor and his execrated wife were conveniently executed. This demonstrates that. My interpretive paradigm for the extremely personalistic and clientelist dictatorial model embodied by Nicolae Ceaus ¸ escu is rooted in political culture: a set of mentalities. But the new power elite did not emerge out of nowhere. Stalinist vision of socialism. attitudes. Manea Ma ˘nescu.
. we need to perceive the unsaid and unavowable strata underneath the self-serving discourse of various Romanian Communist personalities in order to explain their commitment to an extremely dogmatic. more permissive configuration in which the party’s monopolistic hold on power (the constitutionally enshrined “leading role”) would be significantly limited by the orchestrated rise of semi-official and unofficial groups and associations. were to discover the dangers of political caudillismo in the absence of an institutional base.30 Within this cultural framework. Ioan Talpes ¸. I underscore the interplay of the often obscure and subliminal motives of the actors with the motivational networks that stabilized political constellations. and discover the continuities. symbols. Others served in significant executive advisory positions at various stages of the post-Ceaus ¸ escu era. The most compromised figures of the ancien regime (Emil Bobu. Certain relative newcomers. values. the causal structure of the insecure Romanian Communist regime. Paul Dobrescu. and its inferiority complex. which existed among them.29 But it is not my objective here to explore the current Romanian situation. and Constantin Da ˘sca ˘lescu) had been sent to prison. clashes. Cornel Codit ¸a ˘.38
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headed by Lt. Tucker in his enlightening contributions on the Bolshevik political culture. The most influential among them was Virgil Ma ˘gureanu (an old acquaintance of Iliescu’s according to the latter’s memoir). can be depicted. and aspirations that define the political profile of a given group or subgroup at a certain historical moment. “heroic-militant. fatalistic determinism that obscures the impact of personalities on events. such as Vasile Seca ˘res ¸. like Petre Roman. I eschew a rigid. It was only after the Democratic Convention’s electoral victory in 1996 that Ma ˘gureanu was finally dismissed (in the spring of 1997). where the principles of expertise would supplant the increasingly obsolete. beliefs. and Ioan Mircea Pas ¸cu.

social. Nicolae Ceaus ¸ escu emerged in the second half of the 1980s as the champion of an updated version of militant Stalinism. such as Linz and Stepan. and institutions questioned by the proponents of “socialism with a human face”—from Imre Nagy and Alexander Dubc ˇek to Mikhail Gorbachev. for about fifteen years. Ceaus ¸ escu lamented the very impulse to rethink the Marxist-Leninist experience. Herbert Marcuse. comprised a coherent alternative to the development strategies pursued by other state-socialist regimes in Eastern Europe. Mikel Dufrenne. and Louis Althusser were authorized. and who had seemed inclined to favor the Euro-Communist search for an alternative Marxism.31
Starting in the late 1950s and evolving in a convoluted and sometimes perplexing way. The truth is that. After 1971. had admitted the obsolescence of the notion of the dictatorship of the proletariat. and economic policies which. symbols. a line of neo-Stalinist. But they did not exhaust the nature of the Ceaus ¸ escu regime. Georg Lukacs. however. In a bizarre fashion. Ceaus ¸ escu pursued a policy of constant rejection of any genuine reforms. during 1968–69. between 1964 and 1980. Paradoxically. collections of jewels. who portray “Ceaus ¸ escuism” as more than an excessive variant of personal dictatorship in the mold of Idi Amin Dada or Jean Bedel Bokassa. There were. It was in that period that translations into Romanian of Antonio Gramsci. autarchic retrenchment that included elements of nepotism. as the Soviet Union launched dramatic reforms. Romania enjoyed the sympathy of both Western governments and democratic socialists. As one of the most vocal critics of Gorbachevism. Milos ˇ Jakes ˇ. and corruption characteristic of Brezhnevite “neo-traditionalism”:
[Ceaus ¸escuism] was. Roger Garaudy. increasingly self-centered and self-enclosed.33
.Legacies of Ceaus ¸escu’s Socialism
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I agree with those authors. Ceaus ¸ escu condemned the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia and seemed to encourage innovative Marxist approaches. kleptocracy. of course. rather. imperial pageants. hunting parties. an expression of a complex of political. but he was viscerally opposed to any doubt regarding the ultimate infallibility of the Marxist-Leninist dogma. taken together. Romanian domesticism turned out to be a “conservative” (almost “reactionary”) political strategy devised to preserve and enhance precisely those values. and other elements of megalomania hardly reconcilable with the Stalinist ascetic tenets. The same individual who. in 1974. he seemed intent on reneging on his own advocacy of “creative Marxism” and single-mindedly returning to Stalin’s catechistic definitions from Questions of Leninism. He could question the supremacy of Moscow. he excoriated Gorbachevism as a dangerous “right-wing deviation” within world Communism and proclaimed the vital need to reassert uniformity. To an even greater extent than Erich Honecker. As we shall see. or Todor Zhivkov.32 In the late 1980s. was now calling for the reinforcement of repressive institutions and denouncing the transition to pluralism as the restoration of capitalism. following Dej’s obstinate anti-Khrushchevism. Ceaus ¸ escu renounced this orientation to embark on a path of radical re-Stalinization.

However. and rigid ideological orthodoxy. almost mythical structure of his belief system that made him basically immune to self-doubt or opening to other views.40
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Indeed. he lambasted the attempts to revise the Marxist-Leninist tenets of what Czeslaw Milosz once called “the New Faith. Ceaus ¸ escu urged other likeminded leaders within international Communism to close ranks and withstand the dangerous attempts at de-Stalinization and democratization:
We must bear in mind that there are a number of theoretical and practical deviations. Among Warsaw Pact leaders. . but it was precisely this rudimentary and archaic. It questioned the dogma of the dictatorship of the proletariat and stated that reform. national Communism included a relatively open-minded and progressive component. For some time after his return to power in 1956.” At the same time. in terms of “developing socialist democracy. both on the right and on the left. Alexander Dubc ˇek. Imre Nagy.S. Ceaus ¸ escu carried to an extreme the logic of national Stalinism.R. which completely tore down the Stalinist institutional system. . both of them are equally dangerous. The most important exponents of national Communism were Josip Broz Tito and his closest associate Edvard Kardelj. and Santiago Carrillo. flexible. including the idea of a genuine multiparty system. Palmiro Togliatti. Enrico Berlinguer. Polish Communist leader Wladyslaw Gomulka appeared as a proponent of this direction. was inevitable.36
. he emphasized Romania’s alleged priority to the U. Ceaus ¸ escu engaged in the most virulent attack on Gorbachev’s reformist program. national Communists generally favored revisionist (both moderate and radical) alternatives to the enshrined Stalinist model. Speaking in April 1988.”34 That his Marxism was a primitive and amazingly anachronistic one is beyond any doubt. For instance. it broke with the monotheistic vision of the party’s predestined historical role and accepted the principles of political pluralism. Of course. it is my opinion that the main danger today comes from the rightist deviations. national Communism was the starting point for the Hungarian Revolution of 1956. Interestingly enough. . hegemonic designs. Rejecting the Soviet tutelage.S.35
NATIONAL COMMUNISM AND NATIONAL STALINISM
There is a significant distinction that has to be made between national Communism and national Stalinism. In its most advanced forms. revisionist offensive. National Communism encouraged intellectual creativity and theoretical heresies. By repudiating universal recipes and theoretical ossification by maintaining the right of each party to pursue its own strategy regardless of the Soviet interests. and tolerant of political relaxation. in his opposition to Gorbachev’s semi-Menshevik. peace and mankind’s overall progress. which can seriously harm the socialist construction and the struggle for disarmament. including party reform. The former appeared as a critical reaction to Soviet imperialism. It was relatively innovative.

and one leader can be at some times a national Communist while at another time he can move toward national Stalinism (for reasons linked to his personal preferences. he knew how to simulate one as long as he was in a subordinate position). In brief. . The goal of national Stalinism was the achievement of the Leninist utopia.Legacies of Ceaus ¸escu’s Socialism
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In contrast. and panic. the Serbian strongman. and the GDR. tribalistic.
. North Korea. To attain his goals. national Stalinism was a symptom of degeneration. It voiced political anguishes and played on sentiments of national isolation. who were able to lead their country toward a pluralist polity. he lacks the docility and devotion to routine that a true man of the apparat should possess. National Stalinism clung to a number of presumably universal laws concerning socialist revolution and treated any “deviation” from these as a betrayal of class principles. even if the price was generalized poverty. national Communism was the opposite of national Stalinism. and is permanently busy appointing and dismissing members of the central committee. National Stalinism was narcissistic and anachronistic. and mixed situations have occurred more often than not. (w)hile undoubtedly a product of the Yugoslav communist political machine. he needs a totally dedicated following made up of people unreservedly loyal to him. In more than one respect. national Stalinism systematically opposed any form of liberalization. Reactionary and self-centered. It adhered to a militaristic vision of both domestic and international settings. with Castroism and Maoism being the most significant cases. a leader of some revolutionary conspiracy who works in secret. let alone democratization. It frequently tempted Leninist elites in countries where the pre-Stalinist radical left had been weak or totally nonexistent and/or where the regime’s legitimacy had been derived from an external source: Romania. He resembles. . He is indeed possessed by the myth of his own predestined mission as a national redeemer. Milos ˇevic ´ is more than a gray apparatchik (of course.37
This contrasts sharply with the Slovene national Communists. Czechoslovakia after 1968. these are descriptions of two ideal types. surrounded by mystery. While national Communism promised regeneration. Albania. and intolerant. Here. it valued uniformity and exploited tribalistic resentment and allegiances. The denouement of national Communism could be a post-Communist order. If we take the case of the former Yugoslavia. rather. we are dealing with theoretical archetypes: national Communism and national Stalinism can thus “dialectically” coexist. it valued autarky and exclusiveness. Like Ceaus ¸ escu. but also to international and domestic constraints and challenges). we see that Slobodan Milos ˇevic ´. collectivistic. embarked on an unequivocally national Stalinist platform. it was reminiscent of Ceaus ¸ escu’s nationalist frenzy: militaristic. humiliation. As I said. In the words of Aleksa Djilas:
. National Communism valued diversity and was potentially pluralistic.

the legacy of radical Stalinism was never thoroughly questioned—and could therefore not be abandoned.42
Vladimir Tisma ˘ neanu
In introducing this dichotomy. cult of hierarchy and authority. Nicolae Ceaus ¸ escu. attitudes. although half-hearted and often inconsistent. and scorn for parliamentary democracy and constitutionalism. I am less interested in chronologies and description of policies than in the role of values. radicalism. I am aware of the risks of idealizing national Communism as a “benign” alternative to the Stalinist model. although Romania’s intelligentsia was one of the most sophisticated in Eastern Europe. can be considered “progressive” within the framework of one-party regimes. modifying it at some critical points. The apparent uniqueness and outrageous eccentricity of the Romanian experiment. I want to make clear a very important point: This chapter does not offer a conventional historical perspective. did indeed imprint his differentia specifica on this tradition. together with its striking contrast to other Communist regimes. what is most important is that the principal features of Romania’s Stalinist political culture were not decisively changed by Ceaus ¸ escu. Within the same political paradigm. the distinction between “socialism with a human face” and national Stalinism presents more than historical interest: the path to democracy from national Stalinism is much more tortuous. fractures. if not unbridgeable in the short run. the transition to pluralism was stimulated by reformist initiatives from within the ruling elites under national Communism. To be sure. in a similar vein. sectarianism. My goal is to offer a rational interpretation of Ceaus ¸ escu’s political doctrine and praxis as part and parcel of the Romanian Communist tradition. whether under Gheorghiu-Dej or Ceaus ¸ escu. Think of the role of factious struggles between the Natolinian and the Pulawska groups within the fragmentation of the Polish orthodoxy in 1956. it was never contaminated with
. And yet. historically. the role played by Imre Nagy and his associates in catalyzing the revolt of the mind in Hungary. However. beliefs. The leading assumption of my approach that in Romania. should not obfuscate the preservation of values. This explains the pathetic irrelevance of Alexander Dubc ˇek’s originally heretic political views once the Czechs and Slovaks had the chance to exit from the straitjacket of self-limited reforms. and turning points. and definitely one of the most intimately influenced by French literary and academic standards. but rather a theoretical-cultural one. and interests (individual and social) in shaping political strategies.” Once this paradigm is abolished and the free competition of political forces gathers momentum. and options adopted at the party’s founding congress in May 1921 and maintained ever since: political voluntarism. a man of immense will and ambition. National Communist options. numerous additional attributes were developed and expanded over the years: cleavages within the party’s identity and self-definition. national Stalinism appears as “reactionary. Or.38 It is symptomatic that.

the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Romania. Even the student movement that developed in 1956 was primarily committed to the slogans of national awakening rather than to the ones of a free and democratic polity. which was demonstrated by their peculiarly Stalinist hostility to any form of private property and their decision to complete the collectivization of agriculture against all odds. and. the power-sharing arrangements between Pauker and Luca (the Muscovites) and Dej’s domestic center (Center of the Prisons). Survival and success within the Communist elite was not the result of dedication to truth and honesty. its goals coincided with certain points of the emerging nationalist line: the elimination of mandatory Russian language in schools.
CAN THE HISTORY OF COMMUNISM BE WRITTEN?
Hegel once wrote that the problem of history is the history of the problem.
. no memory is infallible. the renunciation of some of the most egregious industrial investments by the regime. A political history of Romanian Communism has therefore to go beyond the mere description of the stages in the rise and fall of this party movement: We have to grasp the why’s. and Ceaus ¸ escu’s rise to power. as we know so well. The student and intellectual unrest in Romania in the summer and fall of 1956 was of a different nature than the humanisticsocialist onslaught on Stalinism in Hungary and Poland. and this is especially true when we listen to people whose whole life had been plagued by a denial of their most humane sentiments. However. We have to grasp the deep causalities that explain such occurrences as Lucret ¸iu Pa ˘tra ˘s ¸canu’s trial and execution in 1954. In this latter action. In the absence of a social group espousing an egalitarian creed. and ultimately suicidal choices that led to his fatal experiment in dynastic socialism. But the Romanian leaders were not just nationalists. Ceaus ¸ escu distinguished himself through cruelty. Stalin’s role in both Dej’s ascent. and the later. Especially in the field of Communist studies. Even those who may now repent are still interested in presenting their past as one less sadistic and despicable than that of their erstwhile accomplices. the rehabilitation of major figures of the national culture. no less significant. and without a powerful tradition of working class activism. in de-legitimizing Ana Pauker’s grip on the party elite. intransigence. Intellectual history cannot be separated from sociological and psychological approaches. biographies. and memoirs matter as much as the official documents. They were first foremost Stalinists. there was little source of autonomous revisionist initiatives. In many respects. the reconsideration of the status of the Hungarian minority.Legacies of Ceaus ¸escu’s Socialism
43
the French passion for leftist values. interviews. and an almost total lack of scruples. his first attempts at de-Stalinization. erratic. and the launching of a strong “homogenizing” strategy.

On the other hand. the Danube–Black Sea canal initiated by Dej and eventually completed as one of Ceaus ¸ escu’s megalomaniacal projects. but rather to seek its political and intellectual roots. 1993). the extermination of the whole political class. Reforma ˘ s ¸i revolut ¸ie (Bucharest: Redact ¸ia publicat ¸iilor pentru stra ˘inatate. for analyses of the turbulent Romanian exit from Communism. See for instance my article.” Problems of Communism (January–March 1985). 9. Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe. primarily Ken Jowitt. Linz and Alfred Stepan. “Ceaus ¸escu’s Socialism. One has to insist on the Romanian Gulag. The names of such prisons as Sighet. such a political history cannot be oblivious of the price paid by the Romanians for their Communist utopian experiment. see Ion Iliescu. and the persecution of the intelligentsia. and Poarta Alba ˘ are so many testimonials to the extent of the terror in that country. and consequences of Romanian Communism are no less emblematic for twentieth century radicalism than Yugoslav. and to disclose the unavowed continuities that made it a unique political construct. Czech. from the moment of its inception in May 1921 to its inglorious demise in December 1989. Gherla. see the chapter “The Effects of Totalitarianism-cum-Sultanism on Democratic Transition: Romania. tribulations.44
Vladimir Tisma ˘ neanu
The whereabouts. Daniel Chirot. An earlier version of this essay was originally published in volume 32 of Communist and Post-Communist Studies and is reprinted with permission. to reveal the interplay of national and international variables. p. Jilava. These points had long since been made by Western analysts. Contemporary developments in that country would look irretrievably nonsensical without such an effort at historical comprehension. In other words. the destruction of national values. one which refuses the anecdotal and event-oriented schemes and which insists on the psycho-biography of the principal actors involved in this murderous drama that came to an end in the carnage of Timis ¸oara and Bucharest in December 1989. Hence. What I propose here is a less traditional version of political history. we have not attained a heuristic vision and fatally condemn our discourse to the level of moral outrage. Romanian Communists acted ruthlessly. Aiud. and this author.” Saying this. There were enough blameworthy features in Ceaus ¸ escu’s absurd attempt to build a “multilaterally developed socialist society. In order to understand Ion Iliescu’s attachment to his Communist youth ideals.
NOTES
1. and Post-Communist Europe (Baltimore and London: Johns
. On this point. One has to mention that. South America.” in Juan J. it is important to grant Romanian Communism the thorough and unbiased treatment it deserves. in order to fulfill their Leninist blueprints. the most daunting task is not to deplore the path of Romanian Communism. we have to know what those ideals consisted of and why so many people found them so appealing. or Hungarian ones.

1 Yet. Although Romania is the second largest and second most populated country of the former “Eastern Europe. But before going at this point any further. I argue that the task confronting the former socialist countries of Eastern Europe is to integrate themselves into an international (global) and regional (European) order which is undergoing a profound transformation.” and thus asks us to move beyond the conceptualizations that animate the present discussion.” it actually lacks in extensive scholarly coverage. I have recast as a question what in Wagner’s account is presented as a statement of fact. As will become clear in the following. Romania has always attracted considerable scholarly and public attention. In response. This seeming paradox between the lack of general coverage and the attention that the case
49
. however.
ROMANIA AS A CHALLENGE IN TRANSITION STUDIES
Romania is one of the least known and least studied cases of the new democratic European Southeast. let me return to the key question at hand: the question of a Romanian Sonderweg. I will present an alternative framework based on the general thesis of a double syncronicity. the question of a Romanian Sonderweg (special path of development) puts into sharp relief some fundamental problems in the present discussion about the transition of/in “Eastern Europe. after the fall of the Ceaus ¸escu regime.2 At the same time.2
Sonderweg Romania?
F. Peter Wagner
The title of this chapter pays homage to the title of a book by the BanatGerman writer Richard Wagner on Romania’s political and social conditions. and their historical sources and possible trajectories.

it was a transition that has been characterized by the reconstitution of old elites. “Sultanism.”6 The bloody downfall of the dictatorship and the problematic transition are therefore but the consequences of this particular regime subtype. a term borrowed from Max Weber. is used in this context to describe a totalitarian regime which relies solely on the personality and the discretionary power of one ruler. Peter Wagner
of Romania has attracted points to the peculiarities that define the historical. Romania’s position within transition studies is best articulated in Linz and Stepan’s synthesizing study on democratic transitions and consolidations. “never became less totalitarian. the case of Romania has attracted considerable attention due to the problematic transition that ensued following the bloody collapse of the Ceaus ¸escu dictatorship. but it did become increasingly sultanistic.. Romania has become a “special case. indeed.e. and societal space in question.” their focus is on the transformation that Romanian totalitarianism underwent during Ceaus ¸escu’s almost twenty-five-year reign. Also. such as in the East Central European cases). and which exhibits “a strong tendency toward familial power and dynastic succession without any rationalized impersonal ideological foundation. in comparison to all other East European countries.”5 Although Linz and Stepan occasionally hint at a possibly larger historical context and deeper-seated political-cultural roots of Romanian “Sultanism. Especially in the field of transition studies. brought about by the closing tendencies and severity of sultanism.4 Linz and Stepan make use of a special regime subcategory. totalitarianism) and its particularly detrimental effects on the country’s democratic transition. Sultanism. political. broadly understood.” a kind of worst case even—exemplary and indicative of the problems of the transition. more or less violent ethnic conflict. and the rise of nationalist political parties and intellectual currents. if not pessimistic: as long as the past continues to rule the present. incapacity. Romania’s transition will remain stunted and incomplete. the lack of reform skills and knowledge in both the economic and the political spheres appears to be an ongoing consequence of sultanism’s utter refusal.8 The “numerous distinctions” of the case of Romania that have been noted in the literature can be systematized by using the three main points of discussion in the field of transition studies:
.50
F.7 The contemporary literature on Romania after the fall of the Ceaus ¸escu regime only substantiates Linz and Stepan’s critical analysis. especially haunts the current Romanian transition. to have engaged in any reform. The total absence of even the vestiges of a civil society (a dissident culture. Romania. Linz and Stepan’s conclusions for the case of Romania are therefore rather cautious. the case of Romania has acquired heightened scholarly importance and even considerable public notoriety.3 With the fall of the Communist regimes across Eastern Europe in 1989.” to deal with Romania’s version of state socialism (i.

which makes evaluations as to path and progress of a particular transition possible. Both beginning and endpoint are known and clearly defined. the field’s Achilles heal. These epistemological-methodological features have in fact provided transition studies with considerable strength in argumentative and scientific status. the “Romanian way of post-Communism” (pardon the pun) challenges the basic idea behind transition studies: the idea of a transition.” I think. First and foremost. The importance of civil society. it comes as no surprise that the Banat-German writer Richard Wagner chose the term Sonderweg (special path) for the title of his book about Romania. the term certainly captures Romania’s special position within the field of transition studies by synthesizing the structural and the historical properties of the case into one eye-catching and highly evocative formulation. and reformwilling and capable political leaders are therefore central and exemplary points of discussion in this case.Sonderweg Romania?
51
• State Socialism: In transition studies. What was supposed to happen in the
. the events unfolded in a manner that was actually closer to what might have been expected—the collapse was violent and bloody. reform-oriented political parties. market-capitalist development).e.. are a sign that the course of Romania’s post-Communist development challenges some fundamental assumptions in the field of transition studies. Ceaus ¸escu’s regime presented an anomaly even in the context of Eastern Europe because it developed during a period in which. In the first place. Second. As opposed to “transformation” or “change. yet presented the exception to the norm of the “velvet revolutions. the Ceaus ¸escu regime is considered to have been one of Eastern Europe’s most brutal state socialist regimes. reforms were either already being undertaken or there existed significant pressure from below for reform. The neatness of the conceptualization is also. • Revolution: Characteristic but surprising was the peaceful implosion of the Communist regimes across Eastern Europe. the heritage of the prior regime type is considered vital for the kind and course of the transition and the process of consolidation. The case of Romania doubly supports this point. Thus. In Romania. in other countries of the region.” the term transition explicitly refers to a stage A that turns or is turned into a stage B. however. it does not necessarily lead to liberal-democratic. determined by an extreme form of the cult of personality. Barring a kind of hyperbole. Yet is Romania’s special position truly warranted? Or are the categories by which the case of Romania has been constructed and analyzed thus far themselves problematic? Romania’s “numerous distinctions.” • Institutionalization/Consolidation: Romanian post-Communism illustrates fundamentally that a change in regime (Regimewechsel) as such does not guarantee a specific trajectory of reform (i.

11 And if the problematic economic and social development is not a figment of some (Western) scholar’s imagination. can not be grasped. post-Communist European. The reader should keep the first. Peter Wagner
countries of the former Eastern Europe was. that is. Thus. “problem cases” may be indicative of problems in theory building. asking us. upholds an East/West divide. it cannot actually grasp the differentiated development of underdevelopment in the countries of the former Eastern Europe. and continues to be. ideational-political point and connect it in my discussion to the third point.9 Before any misunderstandings might arise.52
F. the perspective of a “transition” can not adequately grasp the process of development as a process of the creation of inequalities. the transition framework refuses to reflect upon its own categories. and global context(s).
TRANSFORMATION OF SOCIETY AND THE QUESTION OF SOCIETAL IDENTITY
The common explanations for the peculiarities of Romanian post-Communist politics have revolved around the marshalling of the legacy of the past. to integrate the what into our analysis. The point I wish to make is threefold and concerns the adequacy and efficacy of the transition framework for the study of post-Communist societies in general. neither is the problematic political development that has characterized Romania in the past years. in fact. But as is the case in the field of comparative politics in general. within transition studies. (3) last but not least. I wish to emphasize that the “numerous distinctions” that the field of transition studies has identified in the case of Romania are not simply matters of a discursive construction of “otherness. I will concentrate on the second. thereby sketching. the entire indigenous. the standard indicators of economic and social development have demonstrated the precarious nature of Romania’s development after the fall of the Ceaus ¸escu regime. however briefly. and problem cases such as Romania in particular: (1) as a normative framework. especially if that process does not fully reproduce the expected. and is therefore unable to integrate the former East into the new. what I suggest to call the “double syncronicity” of the Eastern process of transformation. there has developed a neat division of labor.”10 On the contrary: the problems are real. even intractable. Time and again. in sustaining “the West” as a model of development. not in doubt—only the how has proven to be somewhat more complicated. (2) furthermore. international. including the role of indigenous conceptualizations and leitmotifs. between countries that are considered reformers and countries that are considered problem cases.
. so to speak. socioeconomic point in mind as an integral part of the general argument. Emphasis has been placed on a continuity of nationalism from Romanian national state–building to the national Communism of the Ceaus ¸escu regime. internal dynamic (Eigendynamik) of the political process.

and who subsequently used that power to reign in and stop the revolution. Neglected in such historical explanations are the conditions and the dynamics of the present context itself.Sonderweg Romania?
53
and especially on the impact that the latter has had on Romanian society. Since that time.12 Yet while history may provide a guide to the “peculiarities” of Romanian politics— its leitmotifs and cognitive determinants—it cannot offer an explanation for their persistence and efficacy. in fact. and legitimized themselves as. recognized and analyzed Romanian politics as a struggle between the “opposition” (opozit ¸ia) and the “power” (puterea). quickly entered and surpassed the first in importance: the question of Romania’s identity and future. not to mention the Democratic Convention and its supporters. however.16 Standing quite apart from both those paradigmatic interpretations is the argument that the nationalistic groups have put forth. After four years of the former opposition in government.”13 As a first step. have actually acted against Romania’s national interest. those who thought the Romanian people had. For them. attempted to reign in the democratic process. beginning with the “assassination” of the Ceaus ¸escus.” They contended that.15 The latter. it is necessary to engage the present context of what has been termed a “transition. How the events of December 1989 came to be interpreted is already an integral part of post-Communist Romania’s history in the making. the PDSR.17 The change in government as a result of the Parliamentary and Presidential elections of 1996 brought the division between “power” and “opposition” to a close. inheritors of a revolution. To grasp and analyze why certain leitmotifs and cognitive determinants guide political development.and crypto-Communism. At first. implicitly accepted the political-moral claim mounted by the forces inside and sympathetic to the Democratic Convention and battled for its own version of the division between “power” and “opposition. and those who saw that revolution betrayed by exactly those people who came to power (or even usurped power). “power” and “opposition” were not meaningful categories anymore—not in the least
. What do they know? And how do they know it? In the case of Romania. that is. I suggest that one needs to clarify the situational horizon of the political actors. now PSD) around Ion Iliescu and Petre Roman. with the consolidation of the National Salvation Front into a “Communist successor” organization (later the Party of Social Democracy of Romania [PDSR]. two determinants can be identified. both in Europe and in the international and global system(s). not only was the revolution successful—leading to an elected. the political development stood under the impression of those fateful days in December 1989 when the Ceaus ¸escu regime fell. legitimate government—but the success of the revolution was actually endangered by radical forces who. even the FSN/PDSR. A second determinant.14 a divide developed between those who claimed to be. lost by January 1990 what they had gained in those December days. From the beginning. and thereby even risked the stability of the entire country. in the name of battling neo.

What is important to realize about this turn. and the issue of integration into the developing structures of the European Union. and Romanian politicians. rhetorical. Romania’s position within Europe. Thus.18 Yet. “Westerners” struggled against “Easterners. the Romanian voters were simply disappointed with the former “opposition’s” governmental record.19 The return of the classic debate as a reference point in Romanian postCommunist politics alerts us to the openness and contingency that defines the condition of post-Communism. and experts have quickly resorted to known ideational. and its position compared to the other countries of the former Eastern Europe have also come to the fore. With the persistent economic and social problems of Romania.54
F. is that it draws on the motifs and arguments of the debate about modernization that took place in Romania from the nineteenth to the early twentieth century. but the lines of the classic debate are still present. In the language of the times. since December 1989. and discoursive devices to stake out the reopened terrain and craft their own positions. and the “West” has once again become a fixture of political-strategic identification. Peter Wagner
because the former opposition failed to produce its long promised developmental miracle.” Although the former opposition around the Democratic Convention had attempted in the electoral campaign to revive the moral-political division of “power” and “opposition” again. can be interpreted as a “triumph of reality. the model of the perceived forerunners—mainly France and Germany (or “the West” as this model came to be referred to).” integrationists against autochthonists. While the “East” has been discredited as a viable point of political-strategic reference for development. the Parliamentary and Presidential elections of the year 2000. however. the entire problematic of modernization and development has opened up again. a careless destruction of all that was genuine and worthy in Romania. “autochthonism” (the vision of a Romanian selfsufficient greatness) has been revived as an anti-Western stance. or opposition to. which proved to be a political disaster for the 1996 government coalition and resulted in the return of the PDSR (now PSD) and Iliescu at the helm of government. Obviously the terms of reference have somewhat changed. With the fall of the Ceaus ¸escu regime. Europe has become a key reference point in Romanian political discourse. more fundamental considerations about the course of Romanian development. the champions of the bourgeoisie and industrial society against those of the peasantry and the village community.
. the turn in Romanian political discourse toward issues of development is hardly surprising. development was defined by allegiance. In this classic debate. or at worst. and the imitationists against their critics. intellectuals. The debate pitted those who wanted to pursue a course of development modeled after those forerunners (state-induced and state-led industrialization) against those who saw in the wholesale acceptance of that model at best a kind of mirage unfit for the conditions of their own country.

everything between the two extremes of an outright.. uncompromising liberalism). one finds both liberal and national elements.22
. in general. willy-nilly. as rather problematic because they apparently imply rights for all kinds of minorities and special interests (not only ethnic. one finds a common concern about the reconstruction of “Romania” as a national project. the Party of Romanian National Unity. the processing unit (Durchlauferhitzer) of post-Communist politics and policies.” or “reform/antireform.20 On the other side of the spectrum. Western values are perceived. Rather. the classic debate presents an intellectual and cultural resource that charts a future by making the uncertain present of the post-Communist condition intelligible to the political actors involved.e. and experts.” just as the above explained bifurcation of “opposition” and “power” wishes to suggest. and PDSR (now PSD). organizationally represented by the National Liberal Party. and both Romanian “right” and Romanian “left” politics and policies. as well as a common ground and language for their communication with the (ethnic) Romanian populace. but also sexual). to name only some of the most important ones. Organizational delineations such as political party identifications. While a shared cultural-historical horizon makes this criss-crossing of political-discoursive lines possible in the first place. the Alliance for Romania.” or even “new system/old system. Whatever the programmatic differences. and experts. They champion minority rights and. In this middle ground. the actual criss-crossing itself is brought about by an equally shared context in the present. and would like to see as much foreign direct investment as possible. uncompromising nationalism and an outright. see the future of Romania only in Western integration. the National Peasant Party. and even policy orientations. intellectuals. the national has become. to name the most important ones) are fighting rapid and wholesale privatization on the grounds that it is tantamount to selling the country to foreign interests. the Democratic Party. The nationalist political parties (the Greater Romania Party. For Romanian politicians. the national presents a common ground and provides a common language for Romanian politicians.21 The trouble with such a neat bifurcation of Romanian post-Communist politics sets in when one has to consider the “middle” of the political spectrum (i. For the radical margins of Romanian politics such a bifurcation does have explanatory merits.Sonderweg Romania?
55
It would certainly be tempting at this point to divide Romanian postCommunist politics along the lines of “Western/Anti-Western. In the context of post-Communism. are not enough to come to terms with this “middle” ground. It is the condition of post-Communist development that has prompted the reliance on the above-delineated classic debate. at best. intellectuals. radical liberal parties such as the Civic Alliance Party (dissolved and absorbed by the National Liberal Party in March 1998) are for absolute and rapid privatization. and the Socialist Party of Labor.

at the same time. and in the present by Eastern ideals.56
F. let alone some vision of the “common good. The above considerations lead us to an integrative approach toward the problems of Romanian development based on a reevaluation of the notion of “transition”—replacing it. in effect. with the notion of transformation or. The Ceaus ¸escu regime had left Romania in a severe state of economic and social stagnation. Of course. and that of an outpost and defender of the West compromised in the past by Eastern realities. for that matter. defined at the crossroads of several developmental spaces and visions: that of a self-sufficient greatness compromised in the past by Eastern. center” have “strange and elusive meanings under post-Communism.23 Yet the point remains: neither the European. if anything?”25 As I have tried to show. the even more general and open “change.” Vladimir Tisma ˘neanu once pointed out that the notions of “left. ideals. domestic reception they receive. that Romanian political leaders have faced since December 1989. Romanian politics and political discourse do support Tisma ˘neanu’s claim. for example. What the reconstruction tried to achieve was to trace the indigenous conceptions of politics. it is more complicated to assess the reality of choices. and the room for maneuvering. a developmental miracle would hardly have been likely. Even under the best of circumstances. The vision of a united “Europe” and the demands of the European Union (EU) and the Council of Europe appear to be working in this regard. However. they are dependent on the indigenous. The mist that surrounds the political divisions in the case of Romania begins to clear when one realizes that the political divisions have a common center. the objective problems of development are not in question. and in the present by Western. nor. At the center of Romanian post-Communist politics and political discourse stands the problematic of Romania’s societal identity. they cannot be understood without reference to the “Western
. Whether such a common ground and a common language beyond the national might not be created. of the problems and perspectives of Romanian postCommunist development. and the country’s geographical middle position in Southeastern Europe is not very enticing to foreign investors. in turn. it is the absence of such a common ground and language that presents the central problem. still remains to be seen. Peter Wagner
For minority representatives.”24 Again. right. the international and global context(s) work in a vacuum. that they share a common problematic and a common language. perhaps.” Yet does this mean that “using interpretive Western paradigms would simply create false analogies and would explain little. by reevaluating the past from the standpoint of a multicultural vision. Aggravating the situation is the fact that the old entrepratchiks and the new Lumpen businessmen that are governing the economy are not concerned about Romania’s political standing.

At issue in this particular Romanian case is not only the division of Europe as a space of development into a “Western” and an “Eastern” half. Dahrendorf saw the historical events of 1989 as something of a
. prestructured by the already existing—formerly “Western”— institutions (most prominently the EU) and by a reinvigoration of the historical “East/West” borderline of development. been cast aside by the division into “East” and “West” inaugurated by the Bolshevik Revolution. Yet the Romanian political debate relies on the developmental split between East and West as its fundamental point of reference. As the German sociologist Klaus Müller has noted in reaction to the demise of state socialism. Here. modernization theory has experienced a virtual “renaissance. J. but also the further regional differentiation of the latter into a “Southeastern.”28 Already.” “North” and “South” became the spatial representations of the question of development.26 Romania’s special position within transition studies also reflects this general situation of development after the fall of Communism.” in fact. What had been a question of development cast in terms of modernity and modernization came to stand for a fundamental difference in “systems. The persistence and ubiquity of the national question in Romanian politics and the contemporary relevance of the terms of the classic debate on development are expressions of the attempt to come to terms with the condition of post-Communism. Europe has again opened up as a space of development.” In the next section.27 Romanian politics reflects this context of development in its indigenous.” “East Central” and strictly “Eastern” part. domestic form. in fact. “the East has become the South. only articulates the irony of the collapse of what had once been considered the organizational alternative to the Western model of development.
INTEGRATING THE PROBLEMATIC OF DEVELOPMENT
With the demise of state socialism. I will make the argument that it is quite necessary in a definite sense to use Western political notions in the explication of Eastern political realities—because today Western notions cannot help but reflect the struggle with “the West” and with the idea of development itself.Sonderweg Romania?
57
paradigm” of “development. while the “East” came to be known as the “Second World.” and the significant difference between “East” and “West” came to be considered as a political one. Przeworski’s famous dictum. the Romanian debate and the scholarly debate in the West find themselves on common ground. This fundamental historical differentiation had. Yet therein also lies the crux of the matter: it is a prestructured space. Habermas and R. The countries of the former Eastern Europe have returned to their status before the advent of state socialism: they are once again Western Europe’s original periphery.

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F. Peter Wagner

“recuperation” or a “catching-up.” Adam Przeworski, and especially Claus Offe, have developed the vision of a “revolution of recuperation” into a powerful framework for the analysis of the problems and perspectives of the Eastern transition. In their footsteps, the vision of the synchronicity of political and economic reforms, predicated on the integration of the countries of the former Eastern Europe into the existing western political and economic structures, has become quite accepted by political and social scientists, no matter what their respective political allegiances. It is from this modernization perspective that the transition in Eastern Europe has come to be understood: as a transition from state socialism (or Communism) to the Western model of a liberal-democratic polity and a capitalist market economy. However, this renaissance of modernization theory is actually oblivious to the history and development of the theory itself. Since the late 1960s, political and social science research in the (former) West has successively come to abandon a universalistic and unilinear conception of modernity and modernization.29 The seeming failure of the Western model of development, the persistence of underdevelopment in the Third World, and the special case of Japan and the rise of the Southeast Asian “little tigers” cast doubt on the standard developmental model. These “anomalies” demonstrated that development could not be conceived of in terms of a linear, ready-made catching-up with the Western model by way of a standardized and unified process of “diffusion” and “acceptance.” The relationship between capitalist development, prosperity, and democracy has proven to be especially problematic. Thus, the idea of a golden path of development and of a “grand theory” to account for its failure and/or success has been virtually abandoned in the literature. Instead, a differentiated view of development has been called for that, although still aware of the global North–South divide, emphasizes the internal, indigenous conditions for development. To this one needs to add yet another—global—dimension brought about by the realization that the Western path of development, predicated as it is on economic growth, creates severe ecological problems. At the same time, the modernization of modern (i.e., “Western”) societies has become a central theme in political and social science research.30 The process of transformation that is being debated, in this case, ranges from changes in the industrial-economic organization of these societies, to changes in the political system and the large social structure as well. Regardless of whether these changes are summed up as “reflexive modernization,” as “consequences of modernity” or a “second modernity,” as postmodernization, or even as a new phase in the process of “globalization,” the issue is a process that changes the foundational structures of the Western societies themselves, and thereby tears open the teleological self-understanding (Endzeitverständnis) of modernity, pace Fukuyama,31 from within its very center. Modernity and modernization are no longer, if they ever truly

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were, self-understood, nonproblematic notions; they themselves have become highly problematic, the center of concern and investigation.32 The lessons to be drawn for our present purposes from the contours of a new modernization theory based on “multiple modernities” (S. N. Eisenstadt) are twofold. First, the integration of the former “Eastern Europe” into the former “West” is not a one-way process—meaning the alignment of one system “East” to the other system “West”—but rather concerns both sides. The countries of the former East have to integrate themselves into an international and regional context that is undergoing a profound change itself. Thus, the very model that they are being asked to emulate in their reform course is something of an anachronism and cannot help but remain a rather elusive goal. To put it bluntly, there simply is no catching-up with an imaginary nineteenth century, however hard one is willing to try. Second, what the countries of the former Eastern Europe are facing internally is best described as another “great transformation” (K. Polanyi), a process akin to the transformation from an agrarian to an industrial society, and one that affects all aspects and elements associated with the organizational patterns and capacities of the society itself. Therein lies what one can call the double synchronicity of the eastern transformation. The process commonly referred to as a “transition” characterizes nothing less than a total overhaul at the level of society itself.33 Thus, the politics of reform, the very complex of policy making, amounts to a societal project. To formulate this differently: reform in the East European context is a matter of Ordnungs- and Gesellschaftspolitik.34 This, of course, also distinguishes policy making in the East European transformation process from policy making in the West, where “political steering” has come to be considered only “a particular social process (Teilprozeß) that interacts with many other social processes and thus contributes to social change without being able to steer it.”35 In the case of the East European process of transformation, the “political steering of society” (the politically initiated and controlled makeover of society) animates the entire process.36 Politics, thus, do come first. Yet by the same token, politics cannot be reduced to the creation of institutions in the narrow sense of the term,37 or to the implementation of a particular set of economic measures, exclusively labeled “reform,” and set to make up “the transition.”38 The consequences of the historical-structural, international, and regional context of “post-state socialism” therefore present, in each case, an Eigendynamik grounded in the challenge to conceive and construct a new societal identity. In the case of Romania, as noted, this Eigendynamik is commonly held to be rather “special.” What makes the Romanian development “special,” however, lies in the expectations of a normal course of development: the vision of a transition to “liberal democracy” and “market capitalism” posited by the assumptions of a classical modernization theory which lies at

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the heart of contemporary transition studies. It is against the expectations of such a normality that the Romanian development is set apart and thus considered “special.” Well into the second decade of post-Communist development, however, “differentiation” and “variation” have already been acknowledged by some as new key terms in the study of the former Eastern Europe. The transition framework, one might say, has become part of history itself and thus, by extension, anachronistic in the present context of analysis. One way of coming to terms with the problem of being confronted with too many problems in development has been to assert the uniqueness of each case—every case a “special case,” so to speak. At the most radical, namely the previous quote by Tisma ˘neanu, the Western paradigm has been questioned in its explicatory value. The idea of an Eigendynamik grounded in the process, or rather the challenge, of societal transformation, helps us not only to come to terms with the specificities of a case, but also to put those specificities into a larger context, thereby normalizing, even demystifying them. While this in no way implies the absolution of political foolishness and/or political-moral bankruptcy, it does lead us to understand the political process of a problem case like Romania better; perhaps thereby aiding us at last in accepting “development” as a common question after the demise of state socialism.

CONCLUDING REMARKS
I have tried to show that the conclusions reached about the process of transformation in Eastern Europe in general, and the Romanian case in particular, depend heavily, all too heavily, on the expectations that the Western path of development has engendered. The alternative framework elaborated in response rests on two foundations: accepting that the fall of state socialism as a political geographic borderline means that “East” and “West” are not selfevident categories anymore and, at the same time, accepting the consequences of the “Western” debates about modernity and modernization for the Eastern transformation. The Ordnungspolitik and Gesellschaftspolitik in the new Eastern great transformation are determined by two contexts. On the one hand, there is the indigenous context of an “imagined community,” which is having to reimagine itself, in part by appropriating its “history” in the light of the demise of state socialism. On the other hand, there is also the creation of something like a new national strategy of development that cannot be seen as divorced from a particular model of socioeconomic and political order. This strategy, namely the pursuit of a liberal-democratic polity and a capitalist market economy, is part of the internal longing and is also the basis of the international and regional demands placed upon the Eastern transformation. Yet, at the same time, the model of a liberal-democratic

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polity and a capitalist market economy is itself undergoing a profound transformation at the international (global) and regional (European) level. And therein lies what I suggest to call the double synchronicity of the Eastern transformation: the countries of the former Eastern Europe have no choice but to integrate themselves into a regional (European) and international (global) order which are themselves undergoing a profound transformation. Thus, the domestic, indigenous transformation, itself a national-societal challenge and project, is also part of another “great transformation” (Polanyi). At the time of this writing, the suggested framework of a “double syncronicity” has been powerfully supported by the unfolding events. On the one hand, Romania continues to struggle with “Europe” as a rather ambiguous term of sociocultural identification and political strategy. The 1999 meeting of the European Council in Helsinki appeared to signal a radical breakthrough in this regard because Romania was admitted as one of the candidates for future membership in the EU. Almost two years later, in November 2001, the European Commission concluded that Romania, together with Bulgaria, will not be among the countries for the upcoming round of EU enlargement, a decision that was only confirmed by the European Commission and accepted by the European Council (Copenhagen Summit) in the fall/winter of 2002. Thus, as a result, nothing fundamental has really changed in Romania–EU relations. The ball continues to lie in Romania’s court as the European Commission maintains that Romania is not yet ready for integration. That there is some, arguably a lot of, hypocrisy at work in the EU’s standard setting and pressure for compliance,is true, but also beside the point. For all of Romania’s claims to belong to Europe, the EU is not “Europe.” The EU presents an institutionalized cooperation between its member-states and those who are already in set the standards for all those who wish to join, like in all associations and private clubs around the world. If the existing EU programs and the “stabilization pact” that has been initiated in the aftermath of the Kosovo war will constitute a real impetus to the reconstruction of the entire Southeast European region, including the other Balkans—Romania and Bulgaria—still remains to be seen. In the meantime, on the other hand, Romania’s bid for NATO membership has finally been successful. NATO’s Prague Summit in November 2002 included Romania as one of the former East European countries to join no later than in May 2004. Undoubtedly, Romania’s military reforms have contributed significantly to the decision to include Romania in this, NATO’s second and largest round of enlargement. But the decisive factor has been political, indeed geopolitical. The context of the post–September 11 war on terrorism and the U.S. government’s continuing pressure in this context for allied action made NATO’s final Eastern enlargement all but inevitable. The present Romanian government in fact read this context quite well. After September 11, Romania has given its unconditional support to the war on terrorism and

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has even signed a separate agreement with the United States on the exemption of U.S. citizens from possible charges brought against them in the new International Criminal Court. This has certainly pleased the U.S. government, as the official visit of President Bush to Bucharest immediately after NATO’s Prague Summit amply demonstrated. The risk to alienate EU-Europe in the process, even if perhaps not planned, was well worth taking, one might say, given the rather negative news that was to be expected from the European Commission anyway. The drifting apart of the European (EU) process of integration and the Euro-Atlantic (NATO) process of integration and the fate of Romania in both processes only underlines the fact that the process of post-Communist transformation cannot be seen as divorced from regional (European) and international (global) developments. The reconstruction of a new European identity and the reconstruction of a new transatlantic (security) identity after the fall of Communism determine, to a large extent, the problems and opportunities that Romania and all other countries of the former Eastern Europe see themselves confronted with. To be sure, given already existing closing tendencies and a new differentiation into center-periphery relations, both the new Europe and the new international, global order may not hold much hope for Romania, in particular, and the southeastern part of Europe, in general. I should therefore stress again that the indigenous, domestic context matters: how Romania—better yet, all Romanian citizens—come to terms with those problems and opportunities, including the role that material and ideational sources and resources play in this process, presents the “transformer” in the process of transformation. In this double (dialectical) sense, the case of Romania only reflects the question of “development” after the demise of Communism.

NOTES
1. Richard Wagner, Sonderweg Rumänien: Bericht aus einem Entwicklungsland (Berlin: Rotbuch, 1991). Wagner (no relation to the present author) was one of the founders of the Aktionsgruppe Banat, a circle of writers (William Totok, Herta Müller, and others) in the 1970s who came into conflict with the Ceaus ¸escu regime. Wagner left (as ethnic Germans were “allowed” to leave by the authorities) in the early 1980s and now lives in Berlin. His short book is still the only general assessment of Romanian politics and society in light of the fall of the Ceaus ¸escu regime available in the German language, hence the importance that the present author attributes to the book. 2. As in other areas and disciplines of the political and social sciences, as well as in the political and social sciences in general, there are significant national differences. In the United States, political and social science scholarship on Romania and on Southeastern Europe, in general, has fared somewhat better than in Germany, due for the most part to the existence of an “area studies” tradition. In Germany, by con-

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trast, Romania and Southeastern Europe have traditionally been covered by historians, and German Ostforschung has had a strong (and problematic) tradition in the field of history. In the pages of Osteuropa, the journal of the German Association for East European Studies, a highly interesting, soul-searching debate about the future of East European Studies after “1989” has and continues to take place. On German Ostforschung and as an introduction to the debate, see: Thomas Bremer, Wim van Meurs, and Klaus Müller, “Vorwärts in die Vergangenheit? Zur Zukunft der Osteuropaforschung,” Osteuropa, vol. 48, 4 (April 1998), pp. 408–16. 3. Western scholarship has found in Romania an exemplary test case for the analysis of the development of underdevelopment, or the development of a periphery in Europe in general and the articulation of that development in Southeastern Europe in particular. Especially the influences of Habsburg and Ottoman domination, Romania’s specific national state formation, and the struggle between agrarian and industrial forces and interests have attracted attention. For anthropologists, ethnologists, and agrarian sociologists, Romania became a field-laboratory of the relationship between the traditional and the modern. The Communist takeover and the bolshevist modernization of Romanian society have attracted considerable attention as well. See for example: Henry L. Roberts, Rumania: Political Problems of an Agrarian State (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1951); Daniel Chirot, Social Change in a Peripheral Society: The Creation of a Balkan Colony (New York: Academic Press, 1976); Kenneth Jowitt, Revolutionary Breakthroughs and National Development: The Case of Romania, 1944–1965. (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press); Katherine Verdery, Transylvanian Villagers: Three Centuries of Political, Economic, and Ethnic Change (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1983); Claude Karnoouh, L’Invention du Peuple: Chroniques de Roumanie (Paris: Arcantère, 1990). 4. Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996). 5. Linz and Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation, p. 52. 6. Linz and Stepan, Problems, p. 349. 7. Linz and Stepan, Problems, pp. 362–65. 8 Trond Gilberg, Nationalism and Communism in Romania: The Rise and Fall of Ceaus ¸escu’s Personal Dictatorship (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1990); Tom Gallagher, Romania after Ceaus ¸escu: The Politics of Intolerance (Edinburgh, UK: Edinburgh University Press, 1995); Anneli Ute Gabanyi, Systemwechsel in Rumänien: Von der Revolution zur Transformation (München: Oldenbourg, 1998). 9. For comparative politics in general, see Ali Kazancigil, “The Deviant Case in Comparative Analysis: High Stateness in a Muslim Society: The Case of Turkey,” in Mattei Dogan and Ali Kazancigil, eds., Comparing Nations: Concepts, Strategies, Substance (Oxford, UK and Cambridge, MA: Blackwell, 1994), pp. 213–38, also pp. 11–12. 10. Maria Todorova, Imagining the Balkans (New York: Oxford, University Press 1997); Larry Wolff, Inventing Eastern Europe: The Map of Civilization on the Mind of the Enlightenment (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1994). 11. After a period of positive GDP growth rates from 1993 to 1996, negative growth resumed in 1997 with a slump of –6.7 per cent compared to the previous year; for the entire period of 1990–99, the annual growth rate of GDP was –0.5 percent. Although since 1999 (–3.2), some recovery has set in, it is still a precarious development

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with GDP per capita in purchasing power parity at 5,533 USD in the year 2000—still down compared to 1996 (6,595 USD, highest after 1989), and nowhere near pre-1989 levels (problematic, but in 1986: 8,822 USD). Unemployment continues to be a major problem: the national registration for most years is above 10 percent (2000: 10.5) with rates according to International Labor Organization methodology (in Romania: the Labor Force Survey in Households, AMIGO) above 6 percent for most years (1994–2000, in 2000: 6.8). Furthermore, poverty and income inequality continue to be major problems and have hampered the development of a middle class: according to a national study, in 1998, 6.8 percent of the Romanian population lived at or below the poverty threshold of 2 USD per day and 44.5 percent lived at or below the poverty threshold of 4 USD per day. Data taken from United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), National Human Development Report Romania 2001–2002: A Decade Later—Understanding the Transition Process in Romania (Bucharest: UNDP, 2002); Cornelia Mihaela Tes ¸liuc, Lucian Pop, and Emil Daniel Tes ¸liuc, Sa ˘ ra ˘ cia s ¸i Sistemul de Protect ¸ie Sociala ˘ (Ias ¸ i: Editura Polirom, 2001), pp. 23–24. 12. Compare Irina Livezeanu, Cultural Politics in Greater Romania: Regionalism, Nation Building, and Ethnic Struggle, 1918–1930 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1995) and Katherine Verdery, National Ideology under Socialism: Identity and Cultural Politics in Ceauses ¸cu’s Romania (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1991) with the explanation provided by Linz and Stepan, Problems (see note 4). 13. For my general position: A (historical) context cannot be explained historically. 14. The term “successor-party” for a political party that developed out of the Communist party of a country is here used in a neutral sense; Dieter Segert, “Geschichte des Spätsozialismus als Schlüssel zum Verständnis ‘postkommunistischer’ Parteiensysteme,” in Dieter Segert, ed., Spätsozialismus und Parteienbildung in Osteuropa nach 1989 (Berlin: Berliner Debatte Wissenschaftsverlag, 1996), pp. 11–30. 15. Vladimir Pasti, Mihaela Miroiu, Cornel Codit ¸a, România—Starea de Fapt, Vol. 1: Societatea (Bucharest: Editura Nemira, 1997), p. 134—yet this is something that actually needs no “authoritative backup.” 16. The argument is best presented in Ion Iliescu, Revolut ¸ie si Reforma ˆ (Bucharest: Editura Enciclopedica ˘, 1994), esp. pp. 122–34. 17. Again and again, the leader of the Great Romania Party, Corneliu Vadim Tudor, has raised such charges and also presented charges of corruption against the Romanian political leadership: one such incident can be found reported in Domnit ¸a S ¸tefa ˘nescu, Doi Anii din Istoria României: o cronologie a evenimentelor ianuarie 1995–ianuarie 1997 (Bucharest: Editura Mas ¸ina de scris, 1998), pp. 134–35. This, needless to say, has not prevented the Great Romania Party to be a member of the governing coalition in 1995. 18. Almost needless to say, the election results, including the extremely strong showing of the nationalist Great Romania Party and its leader, Corneliu Vadim Tudor, in the first round of the Presidential elections, have elicited some strong reactions among Romanian and foreign analysts: Alina Mungiu-Pippidi, “The Return of Populism: The 2000 Romanian Elections,” Government and Opposition, vol. 36, no. 2 (2001), pp. 230–52; Dorothée de Nève, “Wahlen in Rumänien: Eine ganz normale Katastrophe?,” Osteuropa, vol. 51, no. 3 (2001), pp. 281–98. Compare: F. Peter Wagner, Die rumänischen Parlaments- und Präsidentschaftswahlen im Jahre 2000: Zurück in die Zukunft? Politikinformationen Osteuropa 88 (Bonn: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, 2001).

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19. See on this the contributions in Kenneth Jowitt (ed.), Social Change in Romania, 1860–1940: A Debate on Development in a European Nation (Berkeley, CA: Institute of International Studies, 1978) and Lucian Boia, Istorie s ¸i Mit în Cons ¸tiint ¸a Româneasca (Bucharest: Humanitas, 1997), pp. 27–64. 20. Interview with Ioan Ta ˘ nase, Great Romania Party, representative from Cluj in the Chamber of Deputies (1992–1996), December 1993. 21. Partidul Aliant ¸ei Civice, De la Communism spre Libertate: Istoric, Declarat ¸ie de Principii, Programul, Statutul (Mimeo, no date). 22. This explains why the influence of the nationalistic political parties goes well beyond their institutional participation in the political system proper. 23. György Frunda (Hungarian Democratic Federation of Romania and member of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe) is stressing the European component in his speeches and activities: Drept Minoritar, Spaime Nat ¸ionale: György Frunda în dialog cu Elena S ¸tefoi (Bucharest: Editura Kriterion, 1997); clearly, the conflict between Romania and Hungary over the status and treatment of the Hungarian minority in Romania (and by implication the status of Transylvania) has not taken place—we remember, it was one of the conflicts high on the list immediately after the events of 1989, see F. Stephen Larrabee, “Long Memories and Short Fuses: Change and Instability in the Balkans,” International Security, vol. 15, no. 3 (Winter 1990/91). 24. Katherine Verdery, What Was Socialism, and What Comes Next? (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996), p. 33. As a reminder: one also needs to consider the material aspect—development does not necessarily mean development for all or that a country in its entirety flourishes. Some in Romania have profited and continue to profit from the conditions as they are. 25. Vladimir Tisma ˘neanu, “The Leninist Debris or Waiting for Perón,” East European Politics and Societies, vol. 10, no. 3, Fall 1996, pp. 504–35, quote p. 504. 26. Iván T. Berend, Central and Eastern Europe, 1944–1993: Detour from the Periphery to the Periphery (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1996). 27. F. Peter Wagner, “Beyond ‘East’ and ‘West’: On the European and Global Dimensions of the Fall of Communism” in Gerhard Preyer and Mathias Bös, eds., Borderlines in a Globalized World: New Perspectives in a Sociology of the World System (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2002), pp. 189–215. 28. Klaus Müller, “Nachholende Modernisierung? Die Konjunkturen der Modernisierungstheorie und ihre Anwendung auf die Transformation der osteuropäischen Gesellschaften,” Leviathan, vol. 19, no. 2 (1991), pp. 261–91, Klaus Müller, “‘Modernising’ Eastern Europe: Theoretical Problems and Political Dilemmas,” European Journal of Sociology, vol. 33 (1992), pp. 109–50. 29. Compare for this: Cyril E. Black, The Dynamics of Modernization (New York: Harper and Row, 1966) and S. N. Eisenstadt, Tradition, Wandel und Modernität. Übers. von Suzanne Heintz (Frankfurt/M.: Suhrkamp, 1979). 30. Wolfgang Zapf, “Modernisierung und Modernisierungstheorien,” in Wolfgang Zapf, ed., Die Modernisierung moderner Gesellschaften. Verhandlungen des 25. Deutschen Soziologentages in Frankfurt am Main (Frankfurt/M. and New York: Campus Verlag, 1990), pp. 23–39. 31. Francis Fukuyama, “The End of History?” The National Interest, vol. 16 (Summer 1989), pp. 3–18.

There can be little doubt that memory and memorials are interconnected. “Memorials” are etymologically linked to “memory,” that is to say to that function defined by the Concise Oxford Dictionary as a “faculty by which things are recalled to or kept in the mind.” The link between either of the two notions and “membership” is less apparent at first sight. Yet from the same dictionary one learns that memorials, that is to say man-created objects or events “serving to commemorate,” are implicitly fulfilling a social function. The dictionary mentions as exemplification memorials statues, festivals, buildings, and religious services. It is hard to imagine either of these being inaugurated or held in the presence of a single individual. Those who unveil statues, launch festivals, build memorials, or conduct a religious service have in mind other human beings. Whether “memory” is singularly social, as Maurice Halbwachs argued,1 is, of course, debatable. There can be no doubt, however, that at least one of memory’s functions is both socially induced and socializing—in other words linked to group-membership.2

MEMORY, MEMORIALS,AND MEMBERSHIP IN A POST-COMMUNIST SETTING
People belong to multiple social groups and associations. Compatibility among them is not always smooth. What is more, people aspire to belong to groups or associations other than those in which they were born, raised or professionalized. Collectively, each of these groups may have not only different “memories,” but those memories may clash with one another and even more so with the collective memory of the associations of which one
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aspires to become a member. In a world about to become one large village, aspirations to membership necessarily translate into a multiplication of those clashes. How many different “memories” are involved in, say, the Liberal International? What sort of common “memory” can a Socialist International made up by both traditional social democratic parties and Communist successor parties have? Which is to “impose” its memory on the other, for what reasons, and how? Finally, can a NATO enlarged to include both former World War II allies and former Axis powers have a joint “memory?” It is quite obvious it can, since Germany and Italy have long been part of the Atlantic Alliance. But the forging of the collective NATO memory only became possible after one side “imposed” its memory on the other. At the end of World War II it was clear who the losers and who the winners were. It is less blatantly clear who the losers are at the end of the Cold War, though the winners may be indisputable. The “losing” side at the turn of the twenty-first century can—and does—claim victory as well. The argument of “return to one’s own self” may not be very convincing to foreign audiences, but is very persuasive for domestic ones. Where, then, is the new collective memory to start from? Whatever the “Global Village” is or will become we might be uncertain of, but one thing is inevitable: it is (and will remain) one huge festival of Festingerian “cognitive dissonance.”3 The literature on “memory” is by now so vast that one would need a huge, well, memory and a correspondingly enormous footnote to just mention the most prominent names associated with it in the last decades. Suffice it to mention that Paul Ricoeur traces preoccupation with what “memory” is all about to the ancient Greek philosophers, Augustin, John Locke, Freud, Halbwachs, Yersushalmi, and Pierre Nora (to mention but a few) before he produces his own theory.4 Nora’s name, of course, is above all linked to that aspect of memory that is focused on memorials. The immense success of Nora’s seven-volume Les Lieux de mémoire, the first of which was published in 1997,5 is, as Jean-Charles Szurek would eventually observe, both emblematic and paradoxical. What started as an enterprise aimed at “saving national memory” ended up in concluding that there was nothing to save; on the contrary, we are living in the age of a “tyranny of memory.”6 Whence the obsession? Numerous explanations have been provided. Despite their multiple differences, historians, sociologists, anthropologists and political scientists converge on one point: memory is about the present. If the “tyranny of memory” cannot be escaped, this is because no one has yet devised the time machine for escaping from the present. In other words, there is no way to deal with the “then” without telescoping it from the “here and now.” As Martin Malia wrote after citing Benedetto Croce’s famous remark that “all history is contemporary history,” we “invariably read the past through the prism of the present with all its political, cultural, and ethical passions.”7 Memory, memorials and commemorations are all about legitima-

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tion processes, be this the personal legitimation of politicians and the politics they are supposed to represent, or the collective legitimation of a society’s perceptions of itself. Anthropologists, such as Katherine Verdery, may strive to “think of legitimation in less rationalistic and more suitable “cosmic” terms, showing it as rich, complex and disputatious processes of political meaning-creation,” indeed even to formulate theories on the space–time axis proceeding from introspecting what happens with the movement of anonymous, reinterred dead bodies in the former Yugoslavia. But there is nothing “cosmic” about legitimation processes. Politicians and historical figures can be legitimized (or delegitimized, or relegitimized) only for the purpose of the present. Legitimacy will not thereby descend on the past, nor is there any guarantee that it would survive as such in the future. But Verdery, I believe, is quite correct in appreciating legitimation as “a process that employs symbols.”8 Much as they diverge in their approach, Verdery converges on this point with Romanian historian Andrei Pippidi. For better or worse, Pippidi’s views are also closer to mine than those of Verdery. Pippidi speaks of the need to develop a “theory of symbolic history” for the purpose of comprehending the handling (or mishandling) of memory as a social phenomenon.9 Symbols for what? For configuring or reconfiguring the present, of course. One can, as George Schöpflin does when he analyzes “commemoration,” see in it a “ritualized” recalling of what societies stand for. “A society without memory is blind to its own present and future, because it lacks a moral framework into which to place its experiences.”10 There is, on face, little to argue against that perception. No polity can function without— to use Benedict Anderson’s terminology—a positive, “imagined community” to which reference can be made.11 For, as Romanian historian Lucian Boia put it, “The past means legitimation and justification. Without having a past, we can be certain of nothing.”12 The symbolic aspect of memorials and commemorations is even more pronounced in societies where the national identity is fragile and whose future is uncertain. The distortion (but not obliteration!) of national symbols in East Central Europe under the Communist regimes and the search for either new or renewed “symbols” in the wake of regime change made Jacques Rupnik observe in the early 1990s that “demolition of [communist] statues, restoration of former denomination to streets, are but the exterior aspects of the search for a “usable past,” whose force is proportional to the fragility of national identity and uncertainty in face of the future.”13 But one cannot ignore the other side of the coin, and that side is particularly strong in societies that left behind one past but are uncertain of what they should replace it with and who should be chosen to symbolize it. Which past is deemed as worthy to be “used” or “re-used?” What Pippidi calls the “macabre comedy of posthumous rehabilitations all over Eastern Europe after 1989” demonstrated that the past was undergoing a process of being reshaped “by partisan passions, with

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each political family introducing in the national pantheon those historic figures in whom it can recognize itself or whom it abusively claims [as its own].” One must ask, we are told by Pippidi, “Who Is On the Way Out? Who Is on the Way In?” all while bearing in mind that “[At] a time when all Central East European Countries reject the Soviet model, searching for an own (old or new) national identity, historians and politicians compete for the reinterpretation of the past.”14 One of the main reasons for the emergence of this situation rests in what elsewhere I called the double dilemma of Vergangenheitsbewältigung: Is it possible to overcome the Communist past without leaning on what preceded it and is it possible to overcome the authoritarian past that antedated Communism without idealizing that past beyond recognition?15 Memory can be, and memory is, used for the purpose of manipulation, precisely because it has little in common with the past and is all about the present and future. Choosing between different “memories,” Pippidi writes, is also a choice on different options for the future.16 This is exactly what Ricoeur has in mind when he writes that “the same events may mean glory for some, humiliation for others. One side’s celebration is the other side’s hatred.”17 Schöpflin seems to choose an apparently irreproachably democratic, but reproachably impractical way out of the dilemma. “It is very difficult,” he writes, “for one community to look with nothing worse than indifference at the commemoration pursued by another. Yet if we are all to survive in the European tradition that I believe is our heritage, living in diversity is a sine qua non.” This, he adds, is difficult at moments, but “If we have the confidence in ourselves, in our values, then the commemorations of the others need not be seen as offensive.” His advice is particularly directed at minorities, which are told that “Majorities have the same rights to cultural reproduction as minorities and those rights should be respected.” That Schöpflin is aware of the “clash of memories” mentioned above there can be no doubt. What is, however, debatable is whether his rejection of a “multiculturalism that seeks to impose particular restrictions on majorities” is taking into account that cultural reproduction entrenched on the commemoration of those who denied reproduction from others may be off the line of “European tradition.”18 It may rather be related to what Ricoeur terms as “manipulated memory,” and may have little in common with democratic attitudes. On the contrary, that manipulation may reflect what Ricoeur describes as the “ideological” aspect of manipulated memory, and it is not by chance that he cites at this stage Tzvetan Todorov’s Abuses of Memory, taking distance from the “contemporary frenzy of commemorations, with their convoys of rites and meetings.” Furthermore, it is not by chance that Ricoeur cites the Bulgarian-French historian’s warning that the monopolization of memory is by no means singularly restricted to totalitarian regimes. It is, we are told, shared by all those who seek glory.19 In other words, when we speak of the symbolic aspects of “memory,” the question of “symbols for what?” must never leave aside the no less relevant accompanying questions of “which symbols?” and of “symbols for whom?”

First. And the purpose is simply the liquidation of Romania’s incipient democracy. . but at the same time its partial success was imbedded in the strong roots of Romanian national Communism. finally. or PSD) leadership had also played an important. the drive to rehabilitate the wartime Hitler ally had included:
those in whose eyes the rehabilitation is mainly perceived in utilitarian terms: if it serves the political needs of the hour.”21
I was pointing out in that article that the Communist mishandling of history is partly explaining the facility with which Antonescu had been transformed into a “hero-model. defended himself at his trial with the claim that he had sought to protect his country from the Soviet Union. As described in that article. being inspired and (up to a certain point) instrumentalized by personalities with strong links with Nicolae Ceaus ¸escu’s Communist secret police. Marshal Antonescu. as the “Cui bono” part of the article’s title illustrates. He is now being rewritten into Romanian popular history as a hero. that the rehabilitation process was mainly aimed at undermining the nascent Romanian democracy. contributing . . the:
mismemory of communism is . I am inclined to label as “the Forces of Old. . and.” I mean that Romanian version of the “extended family” that is the “extended Securitate. if somewhat self-defeating. Evidence shows that this is precisely the case of the PDSR. tracing developments since its publication in 1997. then Party of Social Democracy in Romania. Memorials. . “Utilitarian anti-Semitism” refers to the occasional exploitation of anti-Semitic prejudice for the needs of the hour by politicians who. are probably not anti-Semitic. Antonescu’s figure is not merely an instrument (though it is that too) but a “legitimation model. that the “utilitarian anti-Semitism” of the country’s “successor party” (first called the Front of National Salvation. as of 16 June 2000 Social Democratic Party. the wartime Romanian leader who was executed in June 1945 [sic].” In other words. then Democratic Front of National Salvation. At that point in time. right-wing partisans
. however. . or PDSR. by and large. expecting to deal with its unwelcome implications at a later stage. . second.22 As Tony Judt would put it in 2000. The members of this group have one thing in common: some direct or mediated link to what . and Hungary. There were three main points that the previous article made. Anticommunist clerics throughout the region.20 This study is a sequel to that article. nationalists who fought alongside the Nazis in Estonia. that the Greater Romania Party (PRM) led by Corneliu Vadim Tudor was the main venue through which the process was pursued. role in that process. I was not sufficiently aware of parallels elsewhere in the region. and Membership
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It was precisely these questions that I posed in a previous article on Marshal Ion Antonescu’s process of rehabilitation in post-Communist Romania.Memory. Lithuania.” Yet the study also insisted on the attraction Antonescu could exert as an anti-Communist symbol. the Marshal is not only a means but also a purpose. and. which I eventually came to “dissect” in my subsequent research. For a second group. these forces are ready to “close an eye” to it. to a mismemory of anticommunism. his part in the massacre of Jews and others in wartime Romania weighing little in the balance against his anti-Russian credentials.

and liberals in the vicious score settling of the immediate postwar years before the communists took effective control are all candidates for rehabilitation as men of laudable convictions. It concludes by posing a few questions pertaining to “constrained memory. participated in this horrible crime. in a message addressed to the Federation of Jewish Communities in Romania on 4 May 1997. seeking to inquire whether official or officially related attitudes displayed toward the legacy of the Conduca ˘ tor underwent any significant change in that period. is the obloquy heaped upon them by the former regime. whose activity “in the service of the marshal” (the title of an apologetic book on Antonescu that does not deserve citation) and its own deriving self-serving political purposes hardly underwent any change in the years that elapsed since the completion of Cui bono. their strongest suit.” As if to illustrate that the hope was well-founded. It then returns to scrutinize utilitarian anti-Semitic attitudes in the old-new regime. there was hope that the age of utilitarian anti-Semitism had come to an end. returned to power by the electorate in the year 2000. what for the last seven years had been described by the generic term of “the democratic opposition.72
Michael Shafir who indiscriminately murdered Jews. the present study first surveys developments in the four-year time span that Romania was governed by a coalition of center-right parties and by President Emil Constantinescu. of course. for the first time acknowledged Romania’s collective responsibility for the perpetration of the Holocaust.”
BETWEEN ONE GOVERNANCE AND THE NEXT
When President Emil Constantinescu replaced his predecessor. as well as on an analysis of that ordinance’s saga. this sequel will not concentrate its attention on the PRM. In the message that marked Holocaust Day. in implementing the Nazi project of the “final solution. in the third part. Instead. The new governing coalition was no longer leaning on extremist parties. which forbade the cult of Antonescu and introduced penalties for Holocaust denial. the head of state told his Jewish conationals that while the Holocaust was not “planned by Romanians” and while some Romanians risked their life to save Jews.” Romania’s wartime authorities more than once attempted to oppose the Nazi demand for the full liquidation of the Jewish population. blinded by criminal furor. Ion Iliescu.23
Unlike the earlier article. in 1996. the country’s new head of state. communists. The study concentrates its attention. on the reasons that prompted the issuance of Emergency Ordinance 31.
We are also aware that other Romanians. organized the immi-
. It encompassed a broad spectrum of center-right parties and the ethnic Hungarian Democratic Federation of Romania—in other words.

no matter how painful it may be. when he claimed Constantinescu had not even bothered to reflect on his suggestions “with any [sense of] profundity. nor forgotten.
. to be the guarantor of that memory. The sacrifice of hundreds of thousands of Jews from all over Romania is a burden on our heart. but only admittance of collective responsibility can attest to a will to overcome the burdens of the past. the president was for the first admitting that the individual guilt of leaders and their followers can translate into the collective responsibility of future generations. in fact.Memory. and Membership gration of groups of Jews to Palestine. Holocaust Memorial Museum in Washington on 18 July 1998. no one has the right to deny the tragic fate of Jews who lost their life and their beloved ones in Bessarabia and Bukovina.25 It was. Memorials. But the same authorities organized deportations and promoted a racial legislation. the assurance that nothing will be forgotten—no deed and no name. Unfortunately. nor undone. It is the weapon that helps us over decades and generations. This is precisely what Vergangenheitsbewältigung is all about. Constantinescu once more employed an inverse chronology in his speech. Our common memory is their posthumous victory. Only individual guilt can be subject to criminal prosecution. writer Nicolae Balota ˘ was making public a letter he had written to Constantinescu in 1997 in which he urged the president to do precisely what Constantinescu did when he addressed the Jewish community. but at the same time the president remarked that
Despite these [commendable acts] no one has the right to ignore that the Holocaust tragedy did not shun Romania. even openly protected some personalities of the Jewish community in Romania.S. as president of all Romanian citizens.” Even if Constantinescu was intentionally getting his chronology upside-down (whatever steps were taken by the Antonescu regime to remedy the plight of Jews followed Stalingrad and were aimed at sending a signal to the Allied powers. It is my duty as president of Romania. speaking first about the saving of Jews rather than start with the persecution that preceded it. it is my duty to keep alive the memory of Jews who fell victim of the genocide. to no avail.24
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The president was certainly taking a position his predecessor had never taken. all Romanians remember every single Jewish fellow-citizen who perished without any guilt more than five decades ago. Constantinescu’s statement was largely ignored in Romania. to struggle against the temptation of not feeling guilty for our own past. but never spoke of any Romanian contribution to the implementation of the “final solution. not the other way around as presented in the message). for Iliescu had condemned the atrocities committed by the Iron Guard and the anti-Semitic policies of the Antonescu regime.”26 During a visit of the U. You are therefore not alone at this commemoration. Today we accept responsibility for this dramatic inconsistency. The death of innocents can neither be forgiven. on all Romanians. through me. ignored to such extent that at the end of 2000. Balota ˘ was wrongly persuaded three years on. It is our duty to offer the victims of the Holocaust time and time again our memory.

Prosecutor General Sorin Moisescu launched procedure for the official rehabilitation of eight members of the Antonescu government. . In a decree signed on 7 March 1941.”31 As Minister of Culture in Romania’s first short-lived (December 1937–February 1938) anti-Semitic government of Octavian Goga and Alexandru C. General Radu Rosetti. The procedure.000 Romanian Jews of their citizenship.74
Michael Shafir in Transnistria.28 Moisescu explained that the Romanian Penal Code does not provide for “collective responsibility” and that by suspending the constitution. Petrovici was again Minister of Culture and Cults in the Antonescu government between December 1941 and 1944. Even if Nazi Germany’s direct or indirect involvement was not negligible either.30 The claim was quite thin.32 Moisescu’s decision to launch the rehabilitations triggered the protests of US Helsinki Committee co-chairmen Senator Alfonse D’Amato and Representative Christopher Smith. and assuming full personal power. .29 While on a visit to Berlin on 7 November.27
Between the two declarations. Antonescu had by implication also abolished the principle of collective ministerial responsibility. On 22 October 1997. Constantinescu told Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty correspondent William Totok that he was aware of the “delicate international implications” the rehabilitation might raise but that the officials involved had been “outstanding Romanian cultural figures” who were not associated with any of the “negative aspects” of Antonescu’s rule. “The ethnicity of our nation must be shielded from mixing with Jewish blood. dissolving the parliament. among other things. Cults and the Arts (January–December 1941). It was neither the first nor the last such protest from the two prominent congressmen. in Ias ¸i.33 In a letter to President Constantinescu. facts were not quite matching words. organizing.” Their rehabilitation “would
. responsibility for those Romanian citizens who were persecuted rather than being protected by the Romanian state cannot be and must not be eluded. an intergovernmental agency that coordinated the deportation of Jewish converts.” but their alleged noninvolvement was more than questionable. Antonescu’s first Minister of Culture. for instance. long demanded by the PRM and other ultranationalists in Romania. Cuza.000 Romanian and Ukrainian Jews. however. called recurs în anulare or “extraordinary appeal. philosopher Ion Petrovici was personally responsible for the introduction of a numerus clausus in schools and collectively responsible for the government’s decision to deprive some 200. Most ministers involved had indeed been “cultural figures. they said the officials whose rehabilitation was sought had been “cabinet members in a government that was responsible for the persecution of the entire Romanian Jewish community and the deportation and murder of at least 250. stated.” would have clearly opened the path toward Antonescu’s own posthumous judicial rehabilitation. the persecutions and the humiliation to which they were subjected during the Legionary governance and the [Antonescu] governance that followed it. Bucharest or Dorohoi .

in an article published in Aldine—an ultranationalist. The only exception was to be made for Toma Petre Ghit ¸ulescu. compliance followed. NATO and.. such as “socially discriminatory measures taken against some Jews on 30 June 1941” (a euphemism for the Ias ¸i pogrom) and the waging of war on the Soviet Union in November 1941. By 1997.” now that it had taken over power. these had been considered to be “crimes against peace” by the tribunal that had sentenced the eight in 1949. Ghit ¸ulescu was rehabilitated by the Supreme Court on 26 October 1998. the EU as well). fundamentalist Orthodoxist and anti-Semitic supplement of the “democratic” daily România libera ˘— La ˘za ˘rescu was defending Moisescu’s rehabilitation initiative and was writing that the Romanian people “cannot comprehend the absurd pretensions of
. and the occasion proved that apprehensions that the “extraordinary appeal” launched by Moisescu could be but the first step toward Antonescu’s own rehabilitation had not been exaggerated: Ghit ¸ulescu’s family asked the court to rehabilitate the entire Antonescu cabinet. The most emphatic spokesman for this cause among parliamentarians representing the party was Dan Amadeo La ˘za ˘rescu. however. apply to in all but one of the eight cases.37 In “Marshal Antonescu’s Post-Communist Rehabilitation: Cui Bono? ” I examined closely the rehabilitation process used and abused by the Communistsuccessor parties and the extremist ultranationalist formations.34 “Memory” was thus for the first time being unambiguously linked to “membership. Moisescu had attempted to explain why he deemed it proper to rehabilitate the eight officials. could not be absolved of the “political responsibility” they carried for “military.36 On 17 January 2000 the same court also rehabilitated Netta Gheron (not included on the list submitted by Moisescu).e.Memory. has established that “collective ministerial responsibility” did. according to the same statement. The National Liberal Party (PNL) has a particularly long post-1989 record on support of Antonescu’s rehabilitation drive. after all. and Membership
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call into question the sincerity of Romania’s commitment to the West’s most fundamental shared values and is likely to trigger a reassessment of support for Romania’s candidacy for membership in our economic and security institutions” (i.35 Following the Nuremberg trials model. Closer examination.” Only one day earlier. The other seven ministers. who also claims to be a historian. who served as Finance Minister at the twilight of the Antonescu cabinet between 1 April and 23 August 1944. It is not insignificant to scrutinize reactions to the rehabilitation attempts among the former “democratic opposition. it was now said. was dismissed. including the Conduca ˘ tor. who had only briefly (5 April–26 May 1941) served as Undersecretary of State in the National Economy Minister and resigned prior to 30 June 1941. On 22 November. Memorials. presumably. In the first (1990–1992) legislature he spoke in parliament several times in praise of Antonescu and seemed to have never changed his mind. economic and social decisions” taken by the cabinet they had been members of. The plea.

monstrous thing.”40 Câmpeanu had also been suspected in some circles of having collaborated with the Securitate during his Parisian exile. however. was a staunch defender of Antonescu and a “Holocaust negationist. whether Antonescu’s cabinet members knew about those massacres and approved of them. even PNL’s first post-Communist party chairman.76
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some [Jewish or Jewish-supporting] circles over the ocean to except [Antonescu and his cabinet ministers] from the noble principle of rehabilitation and restitution of property confiscated by a regime eager to liquidate by all means Romania’s political. however.41 should not be suspected of “serving the Cause” when he rushed to Antonescu’s defense. the Senator added. killing or starving to death of some Jews through mishandling is a horrible. since they were nothing but the “trial of the vanquished by the victors. “Could they possibly have resigned from the cabinet?” Paleologu added. one of the few to have openly admitted to have been recruited by the Securitate as an informer while in prison but to have never actually informed. apparently unaware that he was contradicting his own statement on the regime being merely an “authoritarian” one. Paleologu is apparently unaware how oblivious he is to Jewish suffering (which he never claims to have opposed) under the marshal.” He would not deny that “the massacre.43 It was consequently hardly unusual to find Paleologu denouncing Marshal Antonescu’s perception as a fascist. But PNL Senator Alexandru Paleologu. he nonetheless insists on ignoring historic evidence and on considering Romania’s nationalism as a “benign” and “necessary” form of identitysearching. Largely considered to be a liberal spirit—though somewhat of a maverick— he belongs to that category of Romanian intellectuals who are simply unable to take a critical look at the country’s contemporary history.
. military and social elites.” The question remained open.”44 As for some of his cabinet members whose rehabilitation Moisescu had just initiated. Radu Câmpeanu. he wrote.”38 La ˘za ˘rescu eventually turned out to have been a Securitate informer.42 hence often finding himself on the same barricades with Romania’s ultranationalists whom he otherwise opposes—perhaps to his own surprise. Paleologu wrote that he had personally known them and could vouch for their being “people of integrity and a strong character. the suspicion has never been confirmed. was “at most” one that can be qualified as “a national regime with authoritarian features. In his case. Not an extreme nationalist. but opinions “cannot be put on trial.45 Never missing an occasion whenever he writes on Antonescu to point out that he had been a staunch opponent of the marshal after Antonescu decided to continue the war beyond its scope of retaking the Soviet-annexed territories.39 His opinions on Antonescu were certainly reflecting those of the “Forces of Old.” Even the Nuremberg trials should never have taken place. from which he had returned in 1989.” As William Totok showed. And even if they did.” Some of them might have been anti-Semites. Antonescu’s rule.

historians asked to react to Moisescu’s initiative tended to be explicitly or implicitly supportive. who as early as December 1995 was writing in an editorial in the weekly România literara ˘ that Jewish historians should finally comprehend that Antonescu cannot be judged solely from the perspectives of the crimes he had committed against their brethren. among those expressing such indirect or direct support there were some who by no means belonged to the category of Holocaust deniers—for example. In 1999. the town’s local council. Manolescu would go as far as to come out in defense of the 2002 governmental ordinance (see below) forbidding the cult of the same man about whom he wrote only a few years earlier that he must be evaluated less unilaterally than Jewish historians are in the habit of doing. and even if they were. Memorials. PNT ¸ CD politicians were in fact more active than their PNL peers in pursing Antonescu’s judicial rehabilitation. Although less present in the media.”52 There were also drives to rehabilitate Antonescu emerging “from below. With Pippidi’s remarkable exception. PNT ¸CD Senator Ion Moisin demanded that the house pass a resolution rehabilitating Antonescu. and that his ministers should not have been put on trial because Antonescu’s views may not have been their own.Memory.” which. What is more. and it will not benefit anyone (least of all Manolescu) to tell his saga all over again. however. was Florin Constantiniu.” in civic society. and Membership
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In a nutshell. after the change of regime Manolescu became involved in politics but applied to it the same “impressionistic” approach that guides his literary output. Paleologu was arguing that Antonescu should never have been tried because victors must not administer justice onto the vanquished.50 His most inspired political step appears to have been his 2001 decision to leave politics behind and return to what he does best. six Timis ¸oara-based NGOs initiated a “rehabilitation trial.51 The largest party in the now-ruling coalition was the National Peasant Party Christian Democratic (PNT ¸CD)—the PNL’s main partner in the umbrella organization of the Democratic Convention of Romania (CDR). literary critic Nicolae Manolescu. named a street in the marshal’s honor. Just as he sees nothing wrong with contradicting himself when he writes about literature. Giurescu and Alexandru Zub.48 he would contradict himself—including on Antonescu—time and time again.49 Indeed. Dinu C. they could not be held responsible for overseeing that these views were translated into deeds. describing the marshal as “a great Romanian patriot. who fought for his country till his death. on which the ruling CDR had a majority.54 The most emphatic. On 14 June 1999. Another prominent PNL defender of Antonescu was the party’s then National Council Chairman (and thus practically the second man in the PNL hierarchy).46 I have extensively dealt with his case elsewhere.”53 Earlier. expectedly ended in Antonescu’s exoneration by a “moral jury.
.47 But his undoubtedly is a sad case. A brilliant literary critic and an opponent of the Ceaus ¸escu national-Communist policies.

The refusal of Vergangenheitsbewältigung.” as the title of his editorial in the daily Nat ¸ional had them depicted on 25 November 1997.01 percent) cast a ballot for Romania’s extreme nationalist party. Corneliu Vadim Tudor.S.78
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who in what would become with him a recurrent favorite theme. was not limited to the opportunists and the ultranationalists. The PRM garnered nearly 20 percent of the vote for the Chamber of Deputies and more than one voter in five (21. one that had transformed the party into Romania’s second-largest parliamentary formation. was the main factor behind the PRM’s electoral performance. after World War II. more specifically. or extreme-nationalism in general.S. The question with which I ended an article on extremism in Romania up to the 1996 elections (“But what about the year 2000. prove time and again to be very sensitive to the crimes of fascism. and was the more unacceptable as this censorship attempt stemmed from those who had abandoned Eastern Europe to the U. or 2008. forced Iliescu into a runoff in which he obtained 33. for many Romanians the anti-Semitic and xenophobic attitudes of the PRM were not reason enough to refrain from supporting that party. but are oblivious to those of communism.R. the two U. For journalist Ion Cristoiu. According to the historian.58
. NATO. for that matter?”) had been prophetically more accurate than I wished it would be.S.
UTILITARIAN ANTI-SEMITISM REVISITED
The outcome of the 2000 parliamentary and presidential elections in Romania should have taught the PDSR (or its successor.55 Many allegedly democratic media outlets echoed the same line.” Constantiniu presented the d’Amato–Smith protest letter as an attempt to censor healthy historical debate in Romania.56 Even if their motivations were different.57 The vote was above all a protest vote triggered by the dismal governance performance of the center-right government that was voted out of power. the party’s leader.S. as Alexandra Laignel-Lavastine showed in 1999.17 percent of the vote. The four years of CDR in power. Moreover. Today Washington. the “choice of memory” had remained problematic. In an article suggestively entitled “Yesterday Moscow. which increased its parliamentary representation nearly fourfold from the previous elections. opinion leaders in Romanian society were contemplating the past from a perspective that was obviously different from that of the group they all wished to become members of the Western democracies and. pressures to annul the rehabilitation drive with the Sovietization of Romania. had demonstrated that with a few notable exceptions. It would be inaccurate to claim that anti-Semitism. he wrote. Even so. in sum. the PSD) a hard lesson in the dangers inherent in the ambivalence of courting the extreme nationalist electorate and its representatives. congressmen were “Two Bolsheviks from the American Congress. the letter was tantamount to an act of censorship. The same people. when the next elections are due? Or 2004. compared U.

On the eve of his renewed mandate. While stopping short of exonerating Antonescu.61 Estimates for Jews exterminated during the war in the territories under Romanian rule. Yet as he kicked off his campaign to regain the office he had lost to Emil Constantinescu in 1996. who had quashed the Iron Guard rebellion in early 1941. Iliescu said. In October 2000. For instance. Iliescu was keen to tell the electorate that he had always valiantly defended Romania’s historical record. not to mention the fact that he “had the merit of liberating the territory occupied by the Soviets. had kept Finnish democracy in place. on the other hand. It was Antonescu. he was “leaving judgment” to historians. no one in the audience had either the knowledge or the audacity to point out that (despite his personal responsibility for antiJewish legislation and the death of enforced labor Jews in 1941 or those massacred as “alien Jews” in and around Novi Sad in 1942) Horthy was a strange anti-Semite who.Memory. no one had remarked the difference between himself and Polish President Lech Wal⁄ e ˛sa. His detractors— among whom Tudor had been orchestra conductor. while the fact that Marshal Philippe Pétain in France is being venerated by some followers is overlooked. he told an audience at a Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty briefing in Washington that Marshal Ion Antonescu “had some merits” too. Unlike the latter. Iliescu was thus striking one more note of utilitarian anti-Semitism. and that a total of seven Finnish Jews had perished in the Holocaust—indeed that at least 300 members of the tiny (2.000-strong) Jewish community in that country had fought in Finish uniform alongside the German army for their country’s liberation.000 and 410. up to the country’s invasion by Germany in March 1944. as indeed is the fact that Marshal Carl Gustaf Mannerheim is considered a national hero in Finland? Unfortunately. in an interview with the daily Adeva ˘ rul.60 And there was no one in the audience to tell Iliescu that Mannerheim.62
. he said.59 Instead of telling his critics that time has come to assume collective responsibility (which is by no means tantamount to collective culpability). Memorials. had in many ways protected Hungarian Jews from a worse fate. are double standards applied: Why is Romania being singled out for attempts by some people to rehabilitate Antonescu. one should add—were insisting on unimportant gestures (Iliescu had covered his head during visits paid to the Choral Temple in Bucharest and to the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum in Washington in 1993) but were overlooking significant content. was one that still required elucidation by historians. Iliescu emphasized. he added. and “Antonescu had proved more tolerance” toward the Jews than did Admiral Miklós Horthy’s Hungary. was not guilty of any war crimes.000. range between 102. The issue. when visiting the Israeli Knesset Iliescu had refrained from apologizing for his countrymen’s participation in the Holocaust.” And why. while a Hitler ally because of the Soviet’s invasion of Finland. quite different notes were being played on the electoral score. he asked. and Membership
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Much of Ion Iliescu’s campaign between the runoffs was geared toward emphasizing his rival’s extremist postures and the dangers involved in them for Romania’s international image.

present at the ceremony were also PRM leader Corneliu Vadim Tudor. with the bust being displayed in the courtyard of the Saints Constantin and Elena church. Iliescu had lost the electoral “excuse” for employing utilitarian anti-Semitism. Still. Iliescu was discovering it. a scandal of major proportion had shattered the Romanian military. Chelaru had the briefest term a postCommunist chief of staff ever had: from 15 February 2000 to 31 October. including by Iliescu himself. or rather.” In other words. the president added. according to Iliescu. and had then been largely ignored.” Romania’s distorted image. and Iliescu’s “unique aberration” of 1941 grew slightly larger. With Romania banging on NATO’s doors and against the protests in the U.”64 But what he called “international public opinion” had spoken out before. Furthermore. that brief “delirium” excepted. which Antonescu had founded in 1943. and Israel triggered by the Antonescu cult in Romania. The event took place on the fifty-fifth anniversary of the marshal’s execution. and with it the public at large. and Marshal Antonescu League honorary chairman Iosif Constantin Dra ˘gan. attempts were made to misinform those protesting the Antonescu cult. his deputy and Senate Deputy Chairman. he was not telling his countrymen that they must change their minds about Antonescu (no matter what we think)—only that they must change their discourses about him—an option with which Romanians were certainly not unfamiliar with after nearly half a century of Communism. Iliescu attended a ceremony marking the Ias ¸i pogrom where he felt compelled to declare that “no matter what we may think. historian Gheorghe Buzatu. rather than Jewish) historians will tackle the subject. In that period.e.” However.S. he said the Iron Guardist “aberration” had been a “delirium of intolerance and antiSemitism. there had been no “Antonescu episode” in the history of Romanian Jews. he hastened to add.” The alley was to host the busts of Romania’s two other marshals—Marshal Constantin Prezan and Mar-
. it was “unjustified to attribute to Romania an artificially inflated number of Jewish victims for the sake of media impact. he presided over an attempt to unveil an Antonescu statue in Ias ¸i. on what was planned to be a “Marshals’ Alley. Yet he was showing no sign of renouncing it. there has been no Romanian contribution to “the long European history” of persecution of the Jews. former chief of staff of the Romanian Army. attended in Bucharest on 1 June the ceremony of the unveiling of a bust of Antonescu.80
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Having regained the presidency.67 Known for his extreme nationalist postures. was likely to be corrected when “Romanian (i.. and it was “significant” that there was “no Romanian word for pogrom. General Mircea Chelaru.65 Suddenly. international public opinion considers Antonescu to have been a war criminal. however. In a speech at the Choral Temple in Bucharest marking the sixtieth anniversary of the Iron Guard pogrom in Bucharest on 21 January 2001.66 At the beginning of the same month.”63 Hardly six months had passed. Alongside Chelaru.

. and the struggle against crime.” Since the group infringed on military statutes. According to media reports. particularly at a time when politics are vital for Romania in its relations with NATO and its members” ahead of the planned November 2002 summit in Prague. According to a U. anti-social and anti-national acts. he had been confronted with the “bad impression” the pro-Antonescu cult created there and has been questioned on the matter by his counterparts. “It is regrettable. should have been aware of the “bad marks” detrimental for
. Chelaru should have “taken into account these sensibilities. allegedly under Bulgarian inspiration. Memorials. the exercise of democratic control over the armed forces” by NATO.S. from the U. it was not recognized by the Defense Ministry and was forced to disband. where the organization’s enlargement figured on its agenda.69 The general became chief of the army’s Institute of Strategic Studies upon his resignation as chief of staff. there had been pressure to renounce the project from abroad as well. Following protests of the town’s Jewish community. and Israel are “disturbed” by the continued Antonescu cult in Romania. Iliescu added. The suspicion arose that Chelaru might be contemplating some form of military takeover. telling a forum of his party that “at least two countries. President Constantinescu had argued against Chelaru’s resignation. His participation in the bust-unveiling ceremony was to lead to his departure from the Army itself. to join NATO and the Eu˘stase intervened personally in the ropean Union.S. .” the U. and that suspicion was perhaps confirmed by his joining a group calling itself the National Association of Military Personnel upon his dismissal.68 Chelaru was forced to resign as chief of staff after having displayed what appeared to be Bonapartist postures: he warned publicly against alleged dangers to the country’s territorial integrity by “enclaves” being formed not only in Transylvania—under Hungarian inspiration—but also in the southern parts of the country. . said that each time Chelaru had visited the U. but the Supreme Defense Council decided to impose it “to avoid any misinterpretation [on] . and Membership
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shal Alexandru Averescu.S. and the bust representing Antonescu was removed to the nearby Let ¸cani cemetery. in other words. in turn. A man in Chelaru’s position. the planned Antonescu bust was replaced by one of King Ferdinand. As a “representative of the Army.71 President Iliescu.S. intelligence report. Under obvious pressure from NATO circles—as could be read between the lines of a press release of the Defense Ministry— the general was charged with having infringed on military regulations forbidding participation in manifestations of political character.Memory.” the premier added. The group comprised active and retired soldiers who purported to represent an effort to “prevent corruption.”70 Prime Minister Adrian Na affair. that “individual gestures that are connected to a person who has been condemned by the international community [risk to] overshadow the collective efforts of the Army . . which was named on the occasion in Antonescu’s honor. as chief of staff.” the press release said.

The introduction. whose “co-ordinator. Utilitarian anti-Semitism had thus reached a crossroads. was Antonescu-apologist Colonel Dr. On one hand. On the other hand. took the opposite position. The ordinance came into force on 28 March. Before submitting his resignation. Perhaps nothing illustrates this better than a volume produced by military historians from the Institute for Defense Political and Military History Studies in 2000. he told Mediafax.72 Rather than face being court-martialed. Chelaru retired from the army.82
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the country’s present efforts to improve its image abroad. however.”73 In an interview with the Romanian Radio about one month after his departure from the ranks. what was once a bastion of the marshal’s rehabilitation—the Army itself—was beginning to get rid of some of the cult’s most ardent supporters. he took the decision to go into retirement and “regenerate” himself. Alexandru Dut¸u. who became the new head of the institute in August 2000.” Earlier. so spit. As for “regeneration. “We are being ordered to spit [on everything that is dear to Romanian collective memory]. there could be no doubt that there was both resistance and rejection of the drive within the ranks of the military. The body of the volume.76 Which of the two sides would now get the ear of Romania’s hitherto utilitarian anti-Semites?
AN ORDINANCE IMPOSED FROM AFAR
On 13 March 2002. the Monitorul
. he said. the Romanian government issued an emergency ordinance banning the cult of Marshal Ion Antonescu. while everybody can scoff at and mock our own sensibilities.” As a result. Chelaru stated on Romanian television that he was “wondering why we should take into account the sensibilities of others. brothers. was a continuation of what Romanian military historians had produced ever since the institute was still called the Center for Military History and Theory and headed by presidential brother Ilie Ceaus ¸escu. Christopher Smith was professing to be “encouraged by the swift and unequivocal response by the Romanian government to the inexcusable participation of General Mircea Chelaru” in the bust-unveiling ceremony of “Romania’s wartime dictator. Chelaru emphasized that his decision to leave the Army had been determined by the inner conflict (Festinger would have called it “dissonance”) he was confronting as a result of an “arbitrary cosmopolitan act” toward a “high-ranking officer” committed by that very organization that should be the “guardian of the nation’s symbolic values.” that is to say editor.74 On the other side of the Atlantic. with its publication in the official gazette.” Chelaru reemerged in 2002 as the newly elected chairman of the extraparliamentary extreme nationalist Party of Romanian National Unity. spit.”75 The “clash of memories” could not be more blatant. It carried the telling title “A Futile Saga” and was authored by General Mihail Ionescu.

a Romanian-born historian and author of several books on anti-Semitism and the Holocaust in Romania. Premier Na ˘stase was fulfilling a pledge made during an October 2001 visit to the Holocaust Memorial Museum and at a meeting with U. For unclear reasons. Jackson did not mince words: “Give me a
.77 Not without reason (see below). Bush for a previously unscheduled meeting had probably little to do with the way the Holocaust was treated in his country. the first syllabus for high-ranking officials on the Holocaust in Romania was launched. As mentioned.81 To make that statement at the heart of one of the Antonescu cult cradles—the Army—showed no little measure of self-confidence (as well as some chutzpa). and perceptions in Bucharest about who can influence a positive decision had been unmistakably displayed during a visit paid by Na ˘stase to Israel in July that year. on a visit to Bucharest some three weeks earlier. NATO Committee Chairman Bruce Jackson. It was apparently hoped that the impact of the announcement on the ordinance would be enhanced by Ioanid’s presence at the inauguration of the syllabus—and its echoes on the Hill would not be missed.80 In interviews granted on the occasion. Indeed.79 rather.S. The most likely explanation for the briefly kept secrecy should probably be sought in a concerted public relations campaign targeting foreign. the issuance of the document was kept a secret for five days. congressmen and Jewish American organizations that time and again protested against the transformation of the country’s wartime leader into an object of semiofficially sanctioned cult. and despite praising the progress made by Romania in military reforms toward NATO accession. when he sought to enlist the support of the country’s two chief rabbis for Romania’s membership of NATO. For it was also on 18 March that. and Membership
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oficial. the man who was behind alerting U. Teaching the first course was Dr.Memory. That the Romanian premier was also received on the occasion of that visit by U. Jewish leaders in New York. Ioanid was viewed by many in Romania as some sort of “chief monitor” of the thriving Antonescu cult. President George W.S. at the National Defense College in Bucharest. But the signal was being beamed at a time when Romania was intensifying its efforts to be accepted as a member of NATO at the alliance’s November summit in Prague. the Romanian military and the college that was launching the syllabus had been long among the main promoters of the cult. rather than domestic audiences. he said.” To become a member of the alliance. Ioanid bluntly told his hosts that Romania “cannot enter NATO with Antonescu on its banners.S. its contents emerging only on 18 March. Radu Ioanid of the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum in Washington. it was a “friendly signal” for the premier of a country that had rallied behind Washington more than others in East Central Europe did after the terrorist attack on New York and Washington on 11 September 2001. But Ioanid was drawing attention to recent statements by U.78 By issuing the ordinance. Romania must also become a member in the family that shares its values. Memorials.S.

” On the one hand. Russian. Na ˘stase was emphasizing that he was opposed to attempts to “indict the Romanian people for the Holocaust. any yet nobody tried to indict the German. or the American peoples. racist. adding that adherence to democratic values includes facing one’s historical past and is “not negotiable” in the accession process. who always protest against what they claim are attempts to “indict the Romanian people” for the purpose of squeezing out from the country fabulous amounts of compensation. it provided penalties ranging from fines to fifteen years in prison for those infringing its regulations or denying the Holocaust. racist. and xenophobic character” that promote ideas “on ethnic. Exceptions were to be made only for museums.82 The ordinance prohibited the display of “racist or fascist symbols.” the erection of statues or commemorative plaques for those condemned in Romania or abroad for “crimes against peace” and for “crimes against humanity.83 In other words. For the purpose of domestic consumption and in what may have been an attempt to sweeten the pill of the foreign-prescribed medicine.S. And Jackson had made it crystal clear that the latter “memory” coincided with the collective “memory” of the organization Romania was striving to join. there was the “memory” of those promoting the Antonescu cult and of those who acquiesced to that promotion out of utilitarian motivations. there was the “memory” of Antonescu as chief perpetrator of the Romanian Holocaust reflected in Jewish and (more rarely) Romany commemorations of his victims. on the other hand. or religious grounds” and extended this prohibition to both registered and unregistered foundations or any other form of organization consisting of three persons or more.” It also outlawed organizations of “fascist. Finally. the ordinance reflected the response to a situation in which the country’s ruling political elite had been told it can no longer procrastinate.” he said. For what Jackson had told his hosts in February was that an option has to be made between two clashing “memories. and on them alone. President Iliescu was reiterating—though in a slightly modified formulation—his deflection of negative perceptions of Antonescu onto foreigners. Addressing a seminar organized in Bucharest under the auspices of U. where such statues could be displayed for the purpose of “scientific activity” carried out outside “public space.” Na ˘stase was thereby legitimizing the jargon of Romanian Holocaust deniers. Last but by no means least.”84 and that responsibility for its perpetration “squarely falls on the leaders and the government of the times.84
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bulldozer and I shall immediately destroy all Antonescu statues. the country’s leadership seemed to employ an idiom different from that employed for outside usage even after the ordinance’s issuance. Iliescu said that Antonescu is considered “by the
. On 22 March.” as well as the naming of streets and other places after those personalities. the premier was also indulging in the “comparative trivialization” of the Holocaust85 when he claimed that “history has encountered situations that were a lot more grievous. Jewish organizations.” In turn.

” saying that the bust was on the grounds of the Marshal Ion Antonescu League and thus untouchable.”92 The mayor of Ca ˘la ˘ras ¸i denied that the statue in his town was displayed on “public space.” is perceived there as being “in defiance of the international community attached to democratic ideals and values. but was ordered to be “covered. Piatra-Neamt ¸ and Târgovis ¸te. near Ias ¸i. An additional signal for internal consumption came when the government. Two busts—in Bucharest and in Sa ˘rmas ¸ (Mures ¸ County) were on church grounds. Jilava. Slobozia.” and thus within the restrictions of the ordinance.89 One could just as well have argued that the official seat of the government was the very center of “public space. decided to display at its official seat the portraits of all Romanian premiers. whose unveiling had been attended by Chelaru. “no matter how one tries to justify it.” According to the Federation of Jewish Communities in Romania. of course.”86 The encoded messages of the country’s two highest officials thus read: You can rest assured that we shall not force you into facing collective responsibility and you must understand that we do not necessarily identify with what is being imposed on us. The gallery.91 Two more statues—in Sa ˘rmas ¸ and Ca ˘la ˘ras ¸i—were mentioned in the U. the one in the capital being in the courtyard of the church built by the dictator.Memory.88 As for the governmental portrait gallery. had claimed on 27 May that all Antonescu statues—except a bust displayed in Bucharest in the courtyard of the church built by him—had been dismantled. Memorials. Theodorescu explained that the exhibit was outside “public space. without any public announcement having been made on it.93 That left in fact three statues undoubtedly erected on “public space”: the one in Let ¸cani. however.94 Finally.S. in an obvious contradiction to its own ordinance. in a military cemetery—”Heroes’ Cemetery Ion Antonescu!” in Slobozia. and Membership
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states who fought in World War II for democracy and against Hitler” to be a war criminal and that consequently “any manifestation of an Antonescu cult” in Romania. Ias ¸i. the Jilava prison grounds are arguably “public space. objecting to both that step and to procrastination in removing the Antonescu statues. procedures were launched in early August
.S. since 1993 six statues had been erected in the memory of the marshal—in Bucharest. Helsinki Committee protest letter. a cross (not a statue) had been erected on the spot of Antonescu’s execution sometime in the early 1990s.87 Culture Minister Ra ˘zvan Theodorescu. on the other hand.” but it seems that the cross is still on its place. counted only four statues. included the marshal’s portrait. Were these monuments on “public space?” The Bucharest statue was not dismantled.90 The proAntonescu forces. At Jilava. Being administered by the Justice Ministry. Helsinki Commission. which triggered a letter of protest by the U. These were all dismantled. and in Piatra-Neamt¸ (the statue in Târgovis ¸te apparently does not exist). Which of these belonged to the category of “public space” and would thus have to be dismantled according to the ordinance’s stipulation was not quite clear.

one of the town’s largest avenues) has rejected the government’s ordinance because “it is unclear whether the marshal was a war criminal or not. Botos ¸ani municipal council followed in its footsteps. with several councilors representing the ruling party joining those of the PRM in opposing the ordinance. who had displayed several blueprints for a planned statue in the town’s city hall and had refused to dismantle them. in the Defense Commission representatives of the PNL (among them former party chairman Mircea Ionescu-Quintus) joined those of the PRM in demanding that the text be amended. racist.” In other words.86
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against PRM Cluj Mayor Gheorghe Funar. but had to change the decision after receiving a stern dissolution threat from Bucharest.” The commission also reduced the maximum penalty for setting up organizations of a “fascist. Far more important. by definition there has been no Holocaust in Romania.99 Although the PNL leadership distanced itself from its representatives on the commission. fourteen out of the twenty-five streets named after Antonescu had been renamed and the rest were to soon follow.”96 According to Premier Na ˘stase. this commission agreed on 5 June to an amended text. Debates in commissions had shown that this was by no means to be taken for granted.101 The definition is perfectly in line with Buzatu and his associates’ peculiar “selective negationism. but must eventually be approved by the parliament in order to become laws.100 their position was partly embraced by the same chamber’s Judicial Commission. Buzatu had proposed that the Holocaust be defined as “the systematic massive extermination of the Jewish population in Europe. After twice postponing approval. Oradea Mayor Petru Filip announced that the municipal council (located on Ion Antonescu street. or xenophobe” character from fifteen to five years in prison. “Street signs can be replaced as one political regime chases out its predecessor. It was claimed that the Holocaust was a diffuse concept that needed clarification. is the renaming of a street. and it was also claimed that the article in the ordinance prohibiting Holocaust denial infringes on the human rights in general and on the right of freedom of expression in particular. since the extermination of Jews there had not been “organized by the Nazi authorities.95 The cheapest statue. the fate of the ordinance itself was becoming unclear. Pippidi writes.98 Other local councils simply ignored the ordinance without bothering to react at all. based on the proposal made by Senator Gheorghe Buzatu. by 31 July.” which does not deny the Holocaust as having taken place elsewhere but excludes any participation of members of one’s own na-
. organized by the Nazi authorities during the Second World War.97 But there was also clearly local resistance.” He eventually gave in. a PRM deputy chairman and a historian specializing in Holocaust denial. Emergency ordinances become effective upon their issuance. While the Senate’s Human Rights Commission approved the ordinance’s text without amendments on 9 April.

102 Should the plenum of the Senate approve the amendments proposed by the two commissions—and should the Chamber of Deputies. had been perpetrated on non-German territory. The efforts by Theodorescu to preempt this situation. and Membership
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tion in its perpetration. rather than emotional. the Romanian leadership’s ambivalence in presenting the necessity of having the ordinance approved was telling a different story to domestic ears than the tune played for international listenership. How secure that victory can be considered to be is. however.” Medieval prince Vlad the Impaler—for many. whose commissions have not yet debated the ordinance—also heed them. Pas ¸cu said. that very legitimacy on whose grounds many Romanians rejected any parallel between the two countries’ wartime acts.105 thus hinting that he agrees that Antonescu’s condemnation was quite
. “Holocaust-like” policies were implemented by the Antonescu regime on territories under “temporary Romanian occupation. a different matter. the pressures extended by the Alliance Israélite Universelle via the Western powers was much resented. the government’s emergency ordinance would be emptied of relevance.” Second. The 1923 extension of full citizenship rights to Romanian Jews was also achieved under considerable Western pressure over a long period of time. Like then. while apparently prompted by an attempt to overcome resistance. First. and in the end the 1923 “achievement” proved short-lived.”103 The Nazis could almost make the same claim. they could contend. the acceptance of the Buzatu version of the “definition” of the Holocaust speaks miles of the Romanian attempt to “have the cake and eat it too. In defending the ordinance. Most Holocaust atrocities. Besides.Memory.
IN LIEU OF CONCLUSION: CONSTRAINED MEMORY AND ITS DISCONTENTS
The “clash of memories” has expectedly resulted in the victory of the stronger. Memorials. Historical experience advocates caution. He proposed—as he would do at a special session of the Academy called to debate the issue of the Holocaust and Romania’s role in it— that it be specified that while no Holocaust had taken place in Romania. Defense Minister Ioan Mircea Pas ¸cu went as far as urging young PSD members to be “rational. in fact.104 Reactions to the ordinance confirm that a word of caution is in order. dating as far back as the 1866 constitution. to consider Bessarabia and northern Bukovina “occupied territories” called in to question the legitimacy of Antonescu’s joining of the war launched by Hitler against the Soviet Union—in other words. rendered a sense of the tragicomic. a national hero—would have been condemned for “crimes against humanity.” had he been put on trial at Nuremberg.

Former Iliescu critic regarding Antonescu and his positions on the Holocaust. Andrei Pippidi. Public perceptions of Antonescu. Dan Berindei. The most militant on the rejectionist side was. the country had only been “a wing of the phenomenon.” In the ensuing debates. independent from the West and from the East. of course. This was similarly the case of the head of the Academy’s Historical Section.”111 Florin Constantiniu. because “there has been no Holocaust in Romania. precisely what historians failed to do. former party-subservient but nationalist-minded historians would seize the occasion to make clear their opposition.”108 Indeed. but also that history’s final judgment may produce a different verdict. and third.106 Nor was Pa ˘unescu alone within the PSD ranks in his resistance. by and large. This was hardly surprising. This. political scientist Alina Mungiu-Pippidi.107 Positions displayed by Romania’s historians in the ensuing debate were not a surprise either. said that he thought the days when the Communist regime was interfering with historical research had been left behind. The only ethnic Romanian historian to come out clearly in favor of the ordinance was.” she said. [Romania] was a anteroom of the Holocaust. was a national policy. for example.” and for this purpose he had used them. but not [the place of the] Holocaust. she said. it is the duty of liberal intellectuals to say that they have another opinion of Romania’s past. and a large majority of over 75 percent held the opposite opinion. was the case of university professor Mihail Retegan.88
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unfair.59 percent) were of the opinion that Antonescu had been a war criminal. “From now on. there was obvious reluctance within the ranks of the ruling party itself to the government-initiated measures. who stated that Romania needed no legislation against Holocaust denial. He was joined. there were good reasons to suspect this would be so.”110 Or. the debate at the Romanian Academy was prompted by Pa ˘unescu’s insistence that “history must be left to historians”—which was also one of the main antiordinance postures displayed by the PRM—and not only by it. as the PSD has always willingly included in its own ranks nationalists and extreme nationalists. will change only if the legislation is followed by a more critical debate of what the marshal actually did. however. “Ceaus ¸escu. “but Ceaus ¸escu is now dead and the groups are still here. a correspondent
. had needed these intellectuals to “show that his policy. There have been some deportation to Transnistria. In fact. for example. and as Mungiu-Pippidi hinted in the same interview. Moreover. a public opinion poll carried by the daily Ziua among its readers in 2001 showed that less than one in four (24. His spouse. who (as if he had ever raised his voice against the party under the previous regime). pointed out that the ordinance was in itself insufficient.109 This is. Adrian Pa ˘unescu was now a PSD Senator and he did not hesitate to wage war on his own party’s position. as Berindei would put it at the debate of the Romanian Academy. by PSD Cultural Commission Deputy Chairman Grigore Zanc. that touched Romania as well. Buzatu. again unsurprisingly.

Giurescu was thus vindicating his peer Andrei Pippidi. which issued a position paper on the ordinance. he claimed. or his announced intention to unveil a bust in Bras ¸ov of assassinated Israeli Prime Minister Yizthak Rabin.” which. There were good grounds to do so. rather than in the public space. Dinu C. into which ceremony he unsuccessfully tried to lure U. in other words. put on his habitual performance of “objectivity:” on one hand. Gabriel Andreescu.Memory.”113 Membership considerations. Nothing the PRM said or did in connection with ordinance was in any way surprising or unexpected.” Antonescu’s statues should be displayed in the private. Though obviously driven by radically different motivations. Constantiniu’s criticism was common to several anti-ordinance postures. the PRM or S ¸erban Suru. while on the other hand deeming his policies toward the Jews as “more than a crime—a mistake!” At a symposium at the Bucharest Institute for Defense Political and Military History Studies on 1 July. Without knowing it. he added. the Wilson and
. Memorials.” The reader should note that the PRM has been left out of this study’s focus. on the other hand. as indeed was his unveiling in Cluj of a bust of U.S. the historian complained. which I had the honor to attend. leader of the neo-Iron Guard in Romania. and Membership
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member of the Academy.S. who in the interview with Reuters observed that “those defending Antonescu feel .114 At most. . emphasized in that position paper that the Emergency Ordinance 31 lacked any “emergency” except for bowing to pressure from the West. may prevail over monuments. Giurescu said that “because of geostrategic. would find its clarification and solution in due time. on the other hand. not because of historical reasons.112 I must admit that at the symposium I was unable to refrain from asking Constantiniu whether having waited for twelve years—the time that has passed since the fall of the Communist regime—was actually “hasty. the admission of his role in the Holocaust would be humiliating for Romania. a prominent defender of human rights in his country. he praised Antonescu for being “the only politician in Romania’s history” who attempted to restore the country’s territorial integrity. Ambassador Michael Guest. and politicians in general display such “haste” toward Romania’s “Antonescu problem. about attempts to impose “political correctness” and dictates from abroad.” But historians habitually perceived to have been on the other side of the national-Communist Ceaus ¸escu fence did not display any eagerness to support the ordinance either. President Woodrow Wilson. but whether they can prevail over memory is another matter. . the time will come when “that statue’s merits and responsibilities will be reconsidered. Interviewed on Romanian Radio on 19 April. political scientists. and wondered why do historians. That Tudor declared that he was ready to place in the “private space” of his courtyard an Antonescu bust was part of his habitual provocative postures. found themselves sharing the same boat with the Romanian Association for the Defense of Human Rights-Helsinki Committee. However.

NOTES
*The Scientific Research Center of the Slovenian Academy of Sciences and Arts. See Maurice Halbwachs. in early 2002 the ruling PSD accepted among its members two defectors from the ranks of the PRM parliamentarians. One of them was a former member of the Communist secret police. the other. but also Pippidi. particularly pp.] But I also urge him or her to remember that repeated adoption of identical or similar positions cannot be mere accidents—and that is precisely the case of Andreescu whenever the “Jewish problem” is brought up. 167–89. even if for the wrong reasons! I only urge the reader to remember that non est idem. The author of these lines has already expressed his position over this contentious issue116 and cannot but reiterate it in the briefest possible form: the PRM is right. at best. was the former editor-in-chief of Romania’s post-Communist most anti-Semitic weekly (typically called no less than Europa!) and a deputy chairman of the Marshal Antonescu League. At worst. And that can hardly be said of memberships. 1. Ilie Neacs ¸u. Translated and with an Introduction by Lewis A. Ljubljana. Slovenia. I said on that occasion. Remarkably.117 Nothing perhaps demonstrates better this simulative aspect than an event registered almost parallel with the saga of Ordinance 31/2002. On Collective Memory (Edited. it will resist. biding its time—an asset that collective memories are never lacking. 1992). But what about utilitarian anti-Semitism’s prospects? I fear that this study’s conclusion must be that precious little has changed in elite political culture in Romania in the twelve years that have passed since the overthrow of the former regime. historic and collective memory.118 Memory. can be constrained. in the interview with Reuters. But a constrained memory might.” The linguistic war had thus been extended over the war waged over public space. What I had termed as “simulated change” remains just as prominent a feature of that political culture as was under the previous regime. In an attempt to demonstrate to the Western world that extremism is on the wane. has granted permission to publish this article. my thoughts were recently (1 July 2002) presented at a seminar in Bucharest: Memory. Coser) (Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 2. I am not qualified to elucidate the link between individual. the PRM also drew attention to the absence of similar legislation directed against Communist symbols and the denial of the Communist genocide. it seems. “is not only about
. si duo dicunt idem! [It is not necessarily the same thing if two say the same thing. For what they are worth. had also done so. display either cognitive dissonance or indulge into simulation.115 Not only Andreescu.90
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Rabin busts could be viewed as an extension of the negationist counteroffensive hitherto limited to making use of Holocaust terminology to refute the “enemy’s argument.

.Memory. See Leon Festinger. istoria.” Michael Shafir. 2000). The trouble is that memory in general. It is. We know that we mourn in order to remember. 7. uitarea. pp. 5–6 (2002). Memoria. so is forgetting. If we were to spend our lives in bemoaning personal. Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origins and Spread of Nationalism (London: Verso. Lucian Boia. “The Holocaust-Gulag Post-Communist ‘Competition:’An Insurmountable Obstacle to Mutual Reconciliation?” published in Revista de istorie militara ˘ . 4. 98–127. 1999). 1957). “Judging Nazism and Communism. “Revolut ¸ie-restaurat ¸ie” [Revolution-Restoration]. and above all collective traumas. It is also about the present and about the future. Mourning. . Nations. directed at understanding what happened to ourselves or our kin. p. surse. 4. NY: Row Peterson. Pierre Nora. See Paul Ricoeur. including collective mourning. It is hard to establish with certainty where the line between remembering and forgetting must be drawn. in Lettre internationale (Romanian edition). Even when we are forced by evidence to recognize our guilt. But memory is not only about the past. 1991). 11. and collective memory in particular. and Membership
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remembering. 6. 9. Memoria. . 53–54. Martin Malia. Identity. Jocul cu trecutul: Istoria între adeva ˘r s ¸i fict ¸iune [The Game with the Past: History between Truth and Fiction] (Bucharest: Humanitas. 8. pp. 13. 7. p. would put its hand in the flame again and again. we would become just as dysfunctional as human beings as we would be as walking tabulae rasae.” The National Interest (Fall 2002). 3. Memorials. But just as memory is instinctive. Ricoeur. is also selective. it is no less true that we cannot function if experience becomes obsessive. “Pentru o memorie democratica ˘ a trecuturilor traumatizante” [For a Democratic Memory of Traumatizing Pasts]. l’oubli (Paris: Éditions du Seuil. we tend to deflect responsibility unto others. respectively. Despre statui s ¸i morminte: Pentru o teorie a istoriei simbolice [On Statues and Tombs: Toward a Theory of Historic Symbols] (Ias ¸i: Polirom. See Andrei Pippidi. 1997). uitarea (Timis ¸oara: Editura Amarcord. 5. A child who does not remember that fire burns. in Colegiul Noua Europa ˘. nos. what we wish it did not happen. 500–611. no. but also in order to be able to forget. 2000). We instinctively remember the past in order to be able to function at present and in order to be able to cope with the future. translated from the original La mémoire. metode (Bucures ¸ ti: Lucra ˘ rile simpozionului internat ¸ional organizat de Colegiul Noua Europa ˘. 2000). l’histoire. 1998). 2001). 12. 69. Katherine Verdery. A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance (White Plains. We ‘forget’ what we do not like to remember. we eliminate from our psyche. thus has a double healing function. particularly pp. p. 7–8 aprilie 2000). George Schöpflin. Jean-Charles Szurek.
. p. Jacques Rupnik. including the collective psyche. Emphasis in original. 5–10. on one hand. To remember is to recall the past. Memory is instinctive. 52 and pp. The Political Lives of Dead Bodies: Reburial and Postsocialist Change (New York: Columbia University Press. Power (London: Hurst and Company. 10. but at the same time it is directed toward enabling ourselves to survive. Istoria recenta ˘ în Europa: Obiecte de studiu. 74. 4 (Winter 1992/1993). Les lieux de mémoire (Paris: Gallimard. istoria. Benedict Anderson. If we could not function without learning from experience. p.

pp.” p.. 66. Mediafax and AP (1 June 2001).” as we learn from Istaván Deák. vol. 74. except perhaps Romania. “A Fatal Compromise? The Debate over Collaboration and Resistance in Hungary. See the article in the daily Azi (3 April 2000). it is also one that largely ignores my own pioneering work on this important aspect of Romanian political culture. Adeva ˘ rul (12 October 2000).” 69. 265. 62. The Politics of the Extreme Right: From the Margins to the Mainstream (London: Pinter.
. 64. “Between Denial and ‘Comparative Trivialization’. The Politics of Duplicity: Controlling Reproduction in Ceausescu’s Romania (Berkeley: University of California Press. 68. Smith declaration in the House of Representatives (27 July 2002). 59. 2000). Despre statui s ¸i morminte.” Orbis. Politica dupa ˘ comunism [Politics after Communism] (Bucharest: Humanitas. 71. “Marginalization or Mainstream? The Extreme Right in PostCommunist Romania. He claimed to have been a lifelong anti-Semite. See Mihail Ionescu. but he was not a humanitarian either. 73. 91–126. 393–421. not the least important resting in the fact that there has never been a Hungarian “Transnistria. Horthy no doubt shares many traits with Antonescu. Dea ´k.. Intellectual Dissent and Intellectual Consent: The Case of Romania. vol. 73n. Gross. 13–18. 60. p. There is a good discussion of “duplicity” in Gail Kligman. Channel 1 (5 June 2001). more Jews survived the Nazi terror. RFE/RL Newsline (22 January 2001). 70. AP (3 June 2001) and Mediafax (4 June 2001).” in Paul Hainsworth. no. Channel 1 (4 June 2001) and Mediafax (4 June 2001). 55–56. “The Greater Romania Party and the 2000 Elections in Romania: How Obvious Is the Obvious?” in The Romanian Journal of Society and Politics. “A Fatal Compromise?” p.” in Golgota Estului (iulie 1942–martie 1944) [The Golgota of the East (July 1942–March 1944)]. 1998). See Pippidi. One should also mention that Horthy briefly halted deportations to Auschwitz in July 1944. 35–36. 72. no. under his reign and despite the deportations. he was a complex figure perhaps best described by Deák: “He was neither a fascist nor a liberal. Colonel Dr. See also Alina Mungiu-Pippidi. pp. eds.” pp. in sheer numbers. 2 (Summer 1983). 37–41 and passim. Horthy and his wife “survived thanks mostly to the generosity of some Jewish friends. Romanian Television. Shafir. pp. Romanian Radio (6 July 2001). “Antonescu’s Rehabilitation. 126–31. still. Emphasis added. 67. Coordinator. 58. than in any other country within Hitler’s Europe. pp. Romanian Radio and Mediafax (4 June 2001). 2 (2001). Ibid (26 June 2001). he was not a monster. Unfortunately. ed. 357. While none of these clears Horthy of responsibility. “Political Culture. Romanian Television. antedating all other works mentioned in Kligman’s impressive study. See RFE/RL Newsline (1 and 2 November 2001). 27. 61. For a discussion of the 2000 electoral outcome see Michael Shafir. 75. pp. which was highly critical of the Army’s having allegedly failed to “defend its dignity and honor. 241–42. Michael Shafir. 2002). 1.” in Deák. See Michael Shafir. See Shafir.94
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57. and Judt. “O epopee inutila ˘.” István Deák. 63. 76. 65. The Politics of Retribution.” This may or may not explain the fact that in his Portugese exile. but there are certainly also important differences. pp.

see România mare. Mediafax (1 August 2002). Their leaderships were silent on the “bargain” and only Péter Eckstein Kovács. 3 April 2000). The two were leaders of the National Peasant Party and the PNL. no. Ibid (18 March 2002). Romanian Radio (22 and 23 March 2002). no. 36. 85. and Membership
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Alexandru Dut ¸u (Bucharest: Editura Fundat ¸iei Culturale Române. 1940–1944 (Chicago: Ivan R. For a photo of the covered Antonescu bust. Monitorul oficial al României (28 March 2002). no. Cotidianul (19 March 2002). and their successor formations were the two main parties of the CDR. 1990). For the “combined announcement” see Mediafax (18 March 2002). and The Holocaust in Romania: The Destruction of Jews and Gypsies under the Antonescu Regime. see Shafir. 86. Bra ˘ tianu as well. in 1999 Funar managed to do so by “bribing” municipal councilors belonging to the opposition CDR to let his pet project come through in exchange of erecting statues to Iuliu Maniu and Ion C. For a discussion of the “Comparative Trivialization” notion. The Antonescu statue saga in Cluj is in itself remarkable. Mediafax (29 June 2002). 84. who represented the Hungarian Democratic Federation of Romania in the then-ruling coalition government. Mediafax (29 June 2002). “Between Denial and ‘Comparative Trivialization’. Prime Minister Adrian Na ˘stase announced an “intention” to approve the ordinance. 91. 2 November 2001). România libera ˘ (27 February 2002). 80. 14–20. 87. For an expanded version see Mihail Ionescu. Jurnalul nat ¸ional (2 July 2002). Magazin istoric. 2002). pp. After several failed attempts to have the town council (on which he does not have a majority) approve the statue. 5–11 July 2002).” pp. respectively. Adeva ˘ rul (26 March 2002). See RFE/RL Newsline (31 October. 77.Memory. Mediafax (29 March and 15 April. Ibid (29–30 June 2002). Memorials. 60–75. România mare. Emphasis added. vol. “Ion Antonescu în fat ¸a ra ˘zboiului asimetric: Gres ¸eli de neiertat” [Ion Antonescu Faced with the Asymmetric War: Unforgivable Mistakes]. The Sword of the Archangel (Boulder. 94. no. 83. 81. where they were still pending when the ordinance was issued (Ibid. 5–12. 612 (5 April 2002). 82. pp. Romanian Television (17 July 2001). Cotidianul (28 May 2002). 90. 2000). “Cazul Antonescu” [The Antonescu Case]. 88. Mediafax (18 March 2002). 93. Dee. 79. Cotidianul and Curentul (5 November 2001). România mare. William Totok. no. protested the council’s decision (see RFE/RL Newsline [1 and 8 November 1999]). 89. 628 (26 July 2002). as did Culture and Cults Minister Ra ˘zvan Theodorescu. 632 (23 August 2002) (transcript of interview with PRM leader Tudor and Funar on the extreme nationalist television channel OTV). 6 (423) (June 2002). 27 (Timis ¸oara. Focus Vest. 92.
. The decision was appealed by the local prefect and after many subsequent developments. 95. 2000). CO: East European Monographs. Although the ordinance had been approved five days earlier. RFE/RL Newsline (19 March 2002). 78. See Radu Ioanid. the hearings on prefect’s complaint were transferred to a Ias ¸ i tribunal.

the people .”) and a motivation for collective action (“Remember the Alamo!!!”). It seems we don’t feel secure until we cry doubt about everything—having for a half century only false certainties.
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.” as the Venetian Italians say. For us. and the transition of power) have led to the creation of fragmented narratives. In this chapter. . Romanians not only had to confront how they would deal with their uncertain future. the Ceaus ¸ escus’ trial and execution. As we will discuss. .4
Re-Membering Romania
John F. the popular uprisings. they also had to confront how they would deal with their contested past. the events of 1989 (i. We will also employ survey data from 1999 to show that the “Revolution” of December 1989 is still a divisive issue. left empty after the statues of the “great” Communists were torn down during the tumult of 1989. we will address the making of this historical event by looking at the tenuous relationship between collective memories and the public sphere in Romania. “History” is an important factor in the cohesion of any society. history is no longer “terra firma. After having been manipulated by the Communist regime for over fifty years. could “history” foster identity and bring solidarity to Romanians? This can be a difficult thing to measure. as a metaphor for the importance of understanding history. Ely and Ca ˘ ta ˘ lin Augustin Stoica
Empty pedestals represent the unfinished Eastern European drama.e. for it can provide both a collective identity (“We. but one place to start would be an analysis of an event that would seem to be particularly suited to providing Romanians with solidarity through shared experience: the “Revolution” of December 1989.. rather than causing cohesion. After the euphoria of the events of 1989 died down. and statues we silently detested Octavian Paler1
The Romanian writer Octavian Paler uses the pedestals.

Fearful that he would be replaced with one of Khrushchev’s favorites. and which exists in a social space that is independent of the self interests and private lives of the citizenry. collective memories can cultivate a shared identity.
. Aside from pro-Soviet propaganda.2
According to Osiel. negotiated.4 He argues that with the rise of the modern bourgeois state and civil society comes the rise of a cultural manifestation of the state. and activated. the public).7 Romanian Communists under Gheorghiu-Dej were so successful in cloning the Soviet model that in 1958 the Soviet troops pulled out of the country.6 Along with nationalizing policies. the abolition of the multiparty system. for instance.98
John F. this has led to a “ghetto” political culture in Romania in which there is an antagonistic relationship between public and private spheres.e. and provide legitimacy for. “History” and the “Public Sphere” before Ceaus ¸escu Historically. Even the country’s name was changed from the Latin România to the more Slavic Romînia. coercive institutional isomorphic change. revolutions.”3 Collective memory is found in what Jürgen Habermas defines as the public sphere. words themselves were changed to play down Romania’s Latin roots and emphasize its Slavic influences. and genocides. It is in this public sphere that collective memories are fostered. deeming it “safe. Ely and Ca ˘ ta ˘ lin Augustin Stoica
COLLECTIVE MEMORY IN ROMANIA
Collective Memory and the Public Sphere We will draw on Mark Osiel for a working definition of collective memory. They can be used as a tool by. one that is shared by all (i. the allegedly positive role that Russia had played in Romania’s past. and the beginning of a rapid industrialization. large-scale riots. the imprisonment of a large number of the pre–World War II intellectual and political elites. the “history” of Romania was also revised to show. the state in that they can be “later invoked to help define what such people have in common to guide them in collective action. According to Ken Jowitt. the events that most profoundly affect the lives of its members and most arouse their passions for long periods. the first ten years of Communism were marked by a deep.5 This distrust of the public sphere by Romanians was only exacerbated by the imposition of Stalinist practices. This category includes wars. In Romania. He writes that collective memory:
consists of the stories a society tells about the momentous events in its history.”8 This era of copycat Stalinism would partially come to an end with Stalin’s death.. economic depressions. which came with the rise to power of the Communists in 1948. Romania has been the victim of many incursions by many empires.

” “the Helmsman Who Guides.”11 An interesting example of
. often referred to as the “Golden Years. the Leader). Ceaus ¸escu’s Manipulation of History Ceaus ¸ escu moved away from the more purely coercive. “iron fist” of Stalinism. the official history was rewritten.e.10 Unfortunately. he continued Dej’s moves toward independence from Moscow. allowance of small private firms. and his criticism of. For instance.” and sentiments.. some intellectual figures who had been barred from the public sphere for their perceived nationalism were rehabilitated. “collective memories. while visiting China and North Korea. he presented himself as the savior of Romania. Also. culminated in the summer of 1968 with Ceaus ¸ escu’s refusal to join.Re-Membering Romania
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Gheorghiu-Dej refused to follow the de-Stalinization path preached by Moscow and started to mobilize resources within the field of cultural production to impose a Romanian (i. This initial phase. under his strict supervision. Writings of Marx which had been previously banned because they talked of Russia’s imperialistic tendencies toward Romania were published. In addition to having himself referred to as “Genius of the Carpathians. Yet this time. economic decentralization. the Golden Years came to an end in 1971 when. Ceaus ¸ escu became enamored of Mao’s and Kim Il Sung’s models of Communism and their near-total control over every institution.” and “The First Thinker of This Earth. but also expanded. This positive collective memory of the Golden Years was also influenced by general improvements in living standards and by short-term (and timid) economic reforms (i. As time went on. the “enemy of empirical reality. This independent stance..” mass rallies were held and televised that showed thousands of people “genuinely” and “spontaneously” expressing their “boundless love and gratitude” for “the Conduca ˘ tor” (i.. and increased power to middle level professionals in decision making).” “The Thinking Polar Star. although he criticized Dej in a de-Stalinizing manner.e. and the internal support it brought.” “Romania’s Most Beloved Son. national) road to socialism.” was also marked by a lessening of the top-down control of cultural production that had marked his predecessor’s reign. as Gail Kligman writes. to a subtler mode of domination through the manipulation of national symbols. manipulation of discourse within the public sphere became more and more defined by ideological ends and increasingly. rather than limiting himself to anti-Soviet manipulations. the Warsaw pact’s invasion of Czechoslovakia.9 This policy of impregnating an externally imposed Communist model with nationalism was not only continued by the person who succeeded Dej after his death in 1965. especially those in the field of cultural production. Once again.e. Censorship was loosened and intellectuals were able to gain access to information and ideas that had been forbidden due to their “subversive” Western origins.” a “Luminous Beacon.

real or perceived. it would be detected and lead to grave repercussions. according to Shibutani—rumors became even more widespread.”14 This “way” often took the form of “improvised news” or rumors. along with the state’s increasing intrusions into the private sphere.” wherein academics could gain favor and support from the government if they produced works that showed that touted Western discoveries (from Communism to the airplane) were actually Romanian in origin.12 Considering Romanians’ traditional aversion toward the public sphere. but only to break. inducing societal alienation:
As in the past and as in a ghetto.100
John F. As the daily lives of Romanians became more and more problematic in the 1980s—another cause of rumor proliferation. Ely and Ca ˘ ta ˘ lin Augustin Stoica
this was “protochronism. under the dictatorship of the proletariat. by the end of 1989. Shibutani writes that there is a direct relationship between the formation of rumors and the “intensity of collective excitement.13
In addition to the practices of propaganda and the personality cult. such practices. rising economic hardship. were doomed to fail and could not bring legitimacy to the official sphere. This prevented the rise of such shared alternative meaning systems as those found with the dissident movements of Czechoslovakia (the Charter 1977) and Poland (Solidarity). and the events going on throughout Eastern Europe. Ceaus ¸ escu’s regime had no ability to bend. that if one talked counter to the party line. Jowitt explains how the Romanian state was perceived as threatening. With an illegitimate collective narrative. Following Tamotsu Shibutani’s analogy. the momentous events of that period only lead to further balkanization of meaning. the regime or official sphere represented “trouble. All these things taken together led to a delegitimized “legitimate” narrative and a fragmented system of rumors that people used to make sense of their day-to-day lives.
TURBULENCE AND TRIAL
The “December Events”: Fact versus Fiction Romanians’ use of rumor and fragmented narratives to make sense of their day-to-day lives is nowhere more evident than in their interpretation of the “revolution” of December 1989. this perception of the public sphere as “trouble” was heightened by the threat.”15 It is difficult to imagine a society more marked by collective excitement than
. Romanian citizens were “like a driver who cannot see through his rain-obscured windshield [but] must still find his way. With a political culture that was already ghettoized.” being identified as the locus of demands and sanctions rather than of political support or recognition.

There is much disagreement on what happened at this rally and why. once the Ceaus ¸ escus had fled. On 15 December. Romanians all over the country witnessed various groups vie to fill the political void. The above account addresses only a few of the undisputed facts about the events of December 1989. we offer a brief description of some of the few undisputed facts. As protesters forced their way into the television station. The Army was called in and forty people were killed in the following melee. The Ceaus ¸ escus. but what the camera showed. the most widely shared understanding for Romanians was that of a “revolution. One of these groups.Re-Membering Romania
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Romania in December 1989. Even though there is a great deal of confusion over what actually happened. Despite such distorted accounts. was Ceaus ¸ escu paralyzed by fear and confusion as people yelled.”16 In the first days after the Romanian uprisings. which eventually became known as the NSF.000 (where the actual number ended up being less than 1. and for the citizens to be aware of
. a former high-ranking member of the Romanian Communist Party who. “Timis ¸oara! Timis ¸oara!” Despite the violent efforts to repress them. During all this. They were soon arrested and taken to an army base. On 22 December. These were greatly outnumbered by the various representations or myths about what “really happened.” were left by the side of the road to try to hitchhike to safety. Ceaus ¸ escu stated in a news bulletin that General Vasile Milea.200). had criticized Ceaus ¸ escu for his growing extremism. which estimated the fatalities at 60. before quickly cutting away. The helicopter pilot feigned technical problems and told them that they would be forced to land. foreign media did play a significant role in informing Romanians about the events in Timis ¸oara. fighting between revolutionaries and alleged Ceaus ¸ escu’s loyalists continued in Bucharest. On their television screens. the army switched sides and joined the antigovernment forces. and their coverage helped to mobilize the people in Bucharest on the morning of 22 December. This group was led by Ion Iliescu. Yet. They were kept there until their trial and execution on 25 December. and a coalition known as the National Salvation Front (NSF) began governing the country. in the 1970s. such as those of the Yugoslav news agency Tanjug. people in Timis ¸oara rallied around an outspoken Hungarian priest who was about to be exiled by the Securitate. Ceaus ¸ escu and his wife fled from Bucharest by helicopter. the “Father and Mother of Romania. the head of the Romanian army. the major mediums of myth-making were the Romanian state radio and television. won the support of the revolutionaries who had taken over the television station. After this. had betrayed the country and committed suicide. On 21 December. the demonstrators continued to protest throughout the night. the NSF began broadcasting that they had taken over as the new governing body. In the morning. Ceaus ¸ escu organized a televised rally in the Palace Square to show the Romanian people that he still held power.” Some of the most exaggerated representations of this “revolution” were offered by the foreign media.

at best. Tales of such a plot. Despite their official story.” According to these new narratives. However. led by Ion Iliescu. Ceaus ¸ escu’s supporters were presented as children taken from orphanages to be raised and trained to be loyal to him and his close family. were also alluded to by others. and other places in the city. Also feeding the conspiracy-minded people were the declarations of some of the new top officials. and by their decision to change their role from care takers of a transitional government to candidates in the coming elections. some of these doubts were also being echoed by Romania’s few former dissidents. In a video made during the constitution of the new government. television headquarters. Breaking “news” was continuously reported.102
John F. saying that this Front—of which he claimed to be a member—was allegedly formed months before the overthrow of Ceaus ¸ escu. In the initial days following the “revolution” and “trial. most Romanians did believe that they were witnesses of a genuine. a popular revolt that was later “stolen” by members of the former regime. such as a “stolen revolution” or “coup d’état. including Silviu Brucan. and the imminent march upon Bucharest by Securitate troops still loyal to Ceaus ¸ escu. seeing the events unfolding throughout Eastern Europe. and Ion Iliescu holds to it to this day. an NSF top official. wanted to make sure they did not fall with “the great Conduca ˘ tor.”
. For instance. General Nicolae Militaru insisted on naming the new authority the NSF. The twenty-four-hour-a-day broadcasts that followed showed images of street fighting in the Palace Square. which was perceived as a “show trial. some members of the National Salvation Front fed into Romanians’ “plot” mind-set by refusing to share their new power with the reestablished political parties. and Nicolae Radu. who were upset at seeing too many former Communists among the ranks of the NSF.” and the execution of the Ceaus ¸ escu had been broadcast across the globe. There were also “news” reports about the poisoning of water systems. Ely and Ca ˘ ta ˘ lin Augustin Stoica
dangerous factions of Securitate—“fanatical terrorists” as they called them— who still supported Ceaus ¸ escu. the new authorities stuck with the initial version of a genuine revolution. The first challenges to this version came from the international media after the trial. At this time.17 Soon. what happened in December 1989 was.” many Romanians (who were unaccustomed to Western standards of meting out justice) were surprised by the West’s criticism of the trial and the doubts that were expressed about the credibility of the revolution. the story of the “revolution” began to compete with other narratives. Iliescu’s former friend. glorious revolution of “us” (the people) versus “them” (the Ceaus ¸ escus and their few but fanatical supporters). Still. the revolution was a purely scripted affair produced by second-tier nomenklatura who. and its content often had an Orwellian tone. At worst. planned terrorist bombings of water reservoirs.

and the Free Masons. which sentiments are called for. accompanied by public discussion about the trial and its result. but has failed to do so.
A traumatized society that is deeply divided about its recent past can greatly benefit from the collective representations of that past. the CIA. neo-Communist newspapers. “revolution” versus “coup” description offered by Hall and others. Why is there no minimal consensus as to what happened in 1989? The Communist legacy can partially explain this. However. It should be mentioned that in the extremist publications. and independent intellectuals. However. For example.21
. the KGB. Mark Osiel writes. The “Trial” as Failed Myth-Making Historically. but not limited to. Richard Hall points out that versions of the coup story have also been vigorously supported by former Securitate officers. former dissidents who left the NSF. In the following section. the Securitate was a victim of a “staged war” which hid the backstage power struggles between the Army and other forces by turning the Securitate into a scapegoat. Rather. As David Garland writes.18 The central theme of their story is that the Securitate did not stay loyal to Ceaus ¸ escu and were not among the “terrorists” shooting in the streets. nationalistic. such revisionist accounts of December 1989 are more varied and more seasoned with flavors of an international plot against Romania than the bifurcated. we look at the Ceaus ¸ escus’ trial as a failed attempt to accomplish this. created and cultivated by a process of prosecution and judgment.”20 Beyond prompting value commitments for the community through criminal justice. trials are also employed for consolidating public sentiments for much broader trans-historical cases. there were many interpretations that saw the December 1989 events as the result of various covert. trials are put forth as ways of repairing tears in the public fabric and organizing the emotions of the community. Hall emphasizes that the opposition press and independent media also gave these advocates the opportunity to popularize their views. Although these interpretations were mostly published in extremist. external forces. such challenges to the official story of the “revolution” were not limited to the opposition. how to react. the Hungarians.” of its recent past. we argue that postsocialist Romania had opportunities to create a shared understanding. which were masterminded by. through manipulation of emotion.Re-Membering Romania
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The major proponents of these interpretations were the small opposition parties that had formed in early 1990.
Ritual—including rituals of criminal justice—are ceremonies which.19
Through this “didactic theater the onlooker is taught what to feel. or “collective memory. prompt particular value commitments on the part of the participants and the audience and thus act as a kind of sentimental education.

The myriad of narratives that occupied the newly enlarged public sphere ran the gamut from an authentic. . it is almost impossible to find out what actually happened during this tumultuous time. the trial can appear absurd. the following is a statement by Ceaus ¸ escu’s own defense attorney: “I will not add anything to the indictment that has already been made . When viewed by Westerners.104
John F. we feel that textual analysis of the trial allows us to hypothesize that a third interpretation (besides “authentic versus Machiavellian”) can be put forth: the trial can be seen as a clumsy attempt at myth-making by people caught between two mutually exclusive narratives.” it is impossible to know what was actually going on backstage. Linz and Stepan. with no larger impersonal goals. These mutually exclusive narratives to which we refer in the following analysis are “Rule of Law” and “Wooden Language.22 This being said. there is a strong tendency toward familial power and dynastic succession. for the crimes committed. For example.” Unfortunately. totalitarian governments such as Ceaus ¸ escu’s carry total power over the practices of the state. Ely and Ca ˘ ta ˘ lin Augustin Stoica
Considering the historical distrust of the public sphere among Romanians and the confusion and trauma that accompanied the “December Events. impersonal ideology the ruler acts only according to his on unchecked discretion.” An important reason for this perceived absurdity is based on different understandings of rule of law. categorize.23
. By definition. use his idealtype of sultanism to describe the political and legal practices in such a regime:
In sultanism the private and the public are fused. there is lack of rational. spontaneous “revolution” to a cynical.” by which Romania could confront. it must be recognized that it is only “front stage” behavior and thus. Furthering this fragmentation of narratives regarding the trial is the lack of any evidence that can be trusted to not be the product of disinformation. everyone must receive punishment. like much of the “December Events. Machiavellian production. As already discussed. ranging from an authentic expression of public justice to a staged production that was meant to offer both a distraction from the coup and an excuse to kill the Ceaus ¸ escus before they could name the plotters. there is no distinction between a state career and personal service to the ruler. inspired by Weber.” The New: Rule of Law. It is this videotape that we will briefly analyze in the context of “revolution” myth-making. Even with the “hard” evidence of the videotape. A similar gamut of explanations arose for interpreting the trial of Nicolae and Elena Ceaus ¸ escu.” a public trial could have offered an opportunity to formulate a “collective representation. and move beyond its past by constructing a “collective memory. . One of the few hard pieces of available data to survive the “December Events” is the videotape of the Ceaus ¸ escus’ trial and execution that was broadcast to the country the morning of 26 December. this did not come to pass.

it was feigned by drawing on positive but fragmented symbols from the West in an attempt to weave a “revolution” myth favorable to the new power.24 This illustrates that “rule of law. judge. Beyond the Ceaus ¸ escus being degraded by their own attorneys and the general catharsis that marked the proceedings. the political discourse moved further and further toward what Romanians refer to as limba de lemn or wooden language. In place of this. at the same time. in the end. the greatest evidence that this was not a real “trial” by Western standards is the fact the prosecutor was given only one hour for the proceedings.” etc. and defense attorneys) repeatedly made statements that would seem to denote that a rule-bound trial was in process (e.). It represents a deeply ingrained institutional system that is self-referential and understood without question.Re-Membering Romania
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Under Ceaus ¸ escu there was little distinction between statutory criminals and political criminals.” “We are offering you a legal defense as stipulated by law. Anybody familiar with political discourse is familiar with wooden language to some degree. by both the court and the defendants. mask the reality of the situation. the prevalence of wooden language is self-evident. As previously discussed. official propaganda became increasingly severed from empirical reality. not of men. The Old: Wooden Language..” without the institutional foundation to understand them.” As Max Weber sees it.” was not being employed.”
. is their use and abuse of the term “the people. yet. Still it is hard to convey the extent to which Ceaus ¸ escu politically lived by wooden language.g. The most striking example of the use of wooden language. This is why the invoking of the rule of law by the court actors in this trial can seem so absurd to Westerners: the actors in the trial only incorporate fragmented symbols of “rule of law. All the major players in the trial (prosecutor. Anyone from a “rule-bound” nation is familiar with such clichés as “No one is above the law” and “A government of laws. we argue that old symbols were also employed in “revolution” myth-making in the form of wooden language. consists of empty words that are used to “lift the human spirit” and.” with its understanding of “means over ends. Rather. “This court is legally constituted. Imagine the following statement being made by a defense attorney in a Western court of law: “But [Ceaus ¸ escu’s] most horrid crime was to shackle the Romanian spirit. The means of the legal system were always secondary to the ends of the state. under the Ceaus ¸ escu regime. historical form of authority called legal-rational authority. the soul of his people!” There are numerous examples of such empty discourse. the rule of law is characteristic of a broader. When viewing the trial. Beyond drawing on new models that were desired but not understood. Wooden language is flowery and grandiose. Phrases such as “Romania’s Brightest and Luminous Future!” still ring in the ears of many Romanians today.

in derision he mocked these people!
It is hard to imagine that. When caught between the fall of an old order and the uncertainty of the new. in referring to the line “We.106
John F. Yet the extent to which “the people” were abused by. . the people . the performers had to reach for whatever was available. Throughout the trial. One of his campaign promises was to investigate what “really happened” in December 1989. In his speeches. Even though in the early 1990s Iliescu won two presidential elections (1990 and 1992). this was how power acted. from within Romania. Ely and Ca ˘ ta ˘ lin Augustin Stoica
The symbolic use of “the people” is not unique to Ceaus ¸ escu’s discourse.25 It is only by invoking “the people” that we create their identity. the court actors invoked “the people” thirty-seven times. in weaving a myth of legitimacy. rather than the trial effectively shaping a collective memory of “revolution. Hannah Arendt. For Romanians. head of the opposition coalition. those in power use whatever symbolic tools are at hand to construct a myth of legitimacy. Emil Constantinescu. writings. yet do not have the experience to understand (rule of law). declarations. more numerous. . .” Challenges to the “trial” and the “revolution” arose in the years that followed.” these contradictions only reflected. Eventually.” in the Declaration of Independence. Yet. legally constituted!
The following is an example of the court invoking the “the people” to mock Ceaus ¸ escu’s use of “the people”:
Judge: He refuses to have a dialogue with the people.
. won the presidential election of 1996. and represented a failed break between “old” and “new. Here is an example of the Judge’s attempts to bring legitimacy to the newly formed government by using Ceaus ¸ escu’s own phraseology (in italics):
Judge: The Grand National Assembly [the Communist parliament] has been dissolved by the unshaken will of the people! We have another body of power: the Council of the Front of National Salvation . increasingly. . and then against. and slogans “the people” were referred to ad nauseam. These came initially from the West and then. Being consumers of Ceaus ¸ escu’s stilted rhetoric for many years. and those that they idealize. in trying to gain legitimacy for a new authority. This leads to a contradictory situation in which the tools that are employed are both those that the people have grown to know. revealed. . writes that these words are a performative act. even though he has spoken in the name of the people as the most beloved son of the people . in time. they respond to a normative discourse of power. He failed to follow through on this promise and Iliescu was reelected in 2000. yet hate (wooden language). Ceaus ¸ escu is extreme. As the actual events faded. one would want to repeat the same abusive practices of the old. these challenges became increasingly vocal and. .

Although the “revolution” version was the dominant interpretation of those interviewed (40 percent).1 shows the percentage point distribution for the answers to “What happened in December 1989?” The lack of an agreed upon collective memory regarding what happened in 1989 is self-evident. the list of our independent variables is by no means exhaustive. .019 people is representative of Romania’s adult population. Second. The section of the questionnaire upon which our analysis relies included questions that address the “1989 Events. at the request of the Open Society Foundation-Romania. 36 percent of the sample still believed it was a “coup d’état. In this section. The data we use comes from a survey that was conducted by the Center for Urban and Regional Sociology (CURS) in October 1999. 1999 (Nϭ2. both our analysis and its results are only of an exploratory character. First. and on some of the sociodemographic factors that influence these beliefs. Some readers might feel a certain dissatisfaction with such speculations built upon speculations and rightfully ask: “But what of Romanians themselves? What do they think about these events?” We are fortunate enough to be able to offer at least a partial answer to these questions by drawing on survey data from Romania. This is why we have avoided formulating a series of formal hypotheses. ages eighteen years and over.
. . on sources within the Romanian and international media.” Our sample of 2. we must offer a few caveats.” Only 5 percent saw the events of 1989 as “something else.” October. and on our own Romanian experiences. Table 4.1. A revolution A coup d’état Something else Don’t know/no answer 40 36 5 19 percent percent percent percent
Source: “Human and Social Resources of the Romanian Transition. 1999) In your opinion.019).Re-Membering Romania
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“TRANS(M)ITION”
Up to this point. Also. what happened in December 1989 was . Before this.”26 It should be noted that almost one-fifth of the total sample
Table 4. Percentage Point Distribution of the Answers Regarding December 1989 (Romania. the causal structure of beliefs about the Romanian revolution is more complex than the one we can depict here. we present the results of a causal-type analysis. most of our discussion has relied upon scholarly and nonscholarly accounts of these events. on the videotape of the trial. which throws some light on what people believe “really happened” in December 1989.

it can be argued that. who or what force(s) contributed the most to the downfall of Ceaus ¸ escu?” This was an open-ended question and the array of answers is impressive. the revolution succeeded in some aspects and failed in others).” “American Imperialism..”[!]28 to the “Mafia. more stable) economic situation. The data we rely on were collected in late October 1999. Ely and Ca ˘ ta ˘ lin Augustin Stoica
(i. a revolution) decrease. the chances of believing that it was a radical rupture with the past (i. Thus.” while 16 percent deemed it as “an external plot. the most common answers were “the People” (19 percent). Those who believe it was a revolution were asked a supplementary question regarding the success or failure of the revolution. One might think that this group would be made up of those interviewees who were too young to have strong opinions about the “December Events.. while 27 percent believe that it failed. varying from “members of the [present day] parliament. and subject to modification in the light of disparate new “facts” that have emerged in the Romanian public sphere. Furthermore. the understandings of 1989 would become more diverse.” “Jacques Chirac.e. in general. the proportion of those who viewed December 1989 as a radical rupture with the past (i.27 His national survey in December 1994 found that 51 percent of Romanians saw December 1989 as a “revolution. “Ion Iliescu” (7 percent). one can speculate that. blurred. 19 percent) either did not answer or did not know what to answer to this question. These economic and social hardships culminated with a governmental crisis in December 1999.” Even though the formulation of the question was different in the survey from 1999. as dissatisfaction with the current economic. social. at least. we can speculate that as time goes by. results of bivariate analysis show that. Almost two thirds of those who believe it was a revolution also think it succeeded (62 percent). More evidence for the lack of a shared understanding within Romania’s collective memory of the December Events comes from the answers to the question: “In your opinion.” “Elena Ceaus ¸ escu.” Noting that one-third of the respondents in the sample did not answer this question.” Yet.. The passage of time can also alter perceptions about the 1989 events.e.” and “The Russians and the Hungarians. and the “Army” (4 percent).g. the temporal context in which a survey is conducted can influence its results. those who did not answer or did not know what to answer come not from the youngest.” Another 30 percent of those interviewed in 1994 thought that it was an “internal plot. and 8 percent chose “other situation” (e. This hypothesis tends to be supported by the findings reported by Pavel Câmpeanu. against the background of a perceived economic and social crisis that had been attributed by many to the inability of the Democratic Convention (which had taken power in 1996) to live up to the hopes it generated in the electoral campaign of 1996. a revolution) is significantly higher than in the 1999 survey (i. 3 percent did not answer or could not make a choice.108
John F.. but from the oldest people in the sample. 51 percent versus 40 percent). against the background of a somewhat better (or. in 1994.e. ages sixty-six and higher.e..
. For instance. and political situation increases.

Emil Constantinescu. (See table 4. Through these variables. urban areas).e. The respondents who did not answer this question (NA) or who could not make a choice (DK) were recorded in a separate category. The survey asked respondents what they believe happened in December 1989. we attempt to partially account for the effects of spatial proximity on beliefs about the 1989 December events. such as Bucharest. leaving the more rural areas (such as the historical region of Moldova. often challenged Iliescu’s “revolution” narrative. A more complex hypothesis would state that.e. For instance. and are excluded from this analysis. One could hypothesize that the closer one was to a site of violent confrontation (i..” Unfortunately.) Independent variables. We included in the list of the independent variables the respondent’s voting preference for presidential candidates. and resident of Moldova (1ϭyes). In terms of spatial location. the experience of a revolution had only a mediated character (i. There are different possible hypotheses for understanding how one’s residence would influence her interpretation of December 1989. where there are fewer sources for alternative information. the higher the chances that she will believe that it was a revolution versus something else. what candidate would you vote for?” We selected the preferences for the two most important candidates. Sibiu. 3ϭsomething else.Re-Membering Romania
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Measures. residents of these areas are more likely to believe the official story of a “revolution. In this analysis.” Being the head of the neo-Communist government. For most residents in these rural areas. in Northeast Romania) relatively unaffected. the dependent variable is “Beliefs about December 1989” and is coded as follows: 1ϭrevolution. Cluj. the candidate for the oppositional Democratic Convention. television and radio). But this hypothesis ignores the fact that alternative or independent media sources (which questioned the “revolution” and conveyed many of the counter narratives) are more readily available in large urban centers. incomplete revolution as long as Iliescu remained in power. actual street fighting occurred in only a few large urban centers of Romania. Our measures of “spatial proximity” are only approximations as our survey recorded only a respondent’s residence in 1999. During his 1996 electoral campaign..
. In his view. The source-item asked: “Should presidential elections be held next Sunday. This version was also sustained by Constantinescu’s supporters. Timis ¸oara. “voting for Ion Iliescu (1ϭyes)” and “voting for Emil Constantinescu (1ϭyes). it would remain only a partial. all other factors being equal. Most of the independent variables we employ in this analysis are self-explanatory. we consider two dummy variables: resident of Bucharest (1ϭyes). our data does not allow us to test this hypothesis. even if a revolution did take place in December 1989. but some need further clarification. Iliescu has been one of the major advocates of a genuine revolution story.2. or Bras ¸ov. 2ϭcoup d’état.

00 46. That is. The dependent variable.51 17. Descriptive Statistics for the Variables Included in the Analysis of Beliefs about December 1989 Events Variables Dependent Revolutiona Coup d’état Something else Independent Age (in years) Femaleb Education University graduateb Secondary schoolb Vocational educationb General educationa Spatial Location Resident in Bucharestb Resident in Moldovab Life satisfaction (1–4) Voting preference Vote for: Emil Constantinescub Ion Iliescub Median Mean . Estimation model. Nϭ2.” “something else. the features of the socioeconomic context can influence a respondent’s beliefs and opinions about December 1989.019 2.37
2.00
.019.09 .626 1. Ely and Ca ˘ ta ˘ lin Augustin Stoica
Table 4.110
John F.019
.44
1.45 .” “coup d’état.019
2.019 1. ranging from extremely satisfied (4) to extremely dissatisfied (1).019 2.2.72
2.986
. bDummy variables.” October 1999.” is nominal with the following categories: “revolution.05 47.
As we have previously suggested. We maintain that the lower an individual’s life satisfaction.019 2.20 .626 1.” “(belief in) revolution” is the reference category in our analysis.D.626 2. and the list of the so-called independent variables is by no means exhaustive.75 .50 .” an ordinal variable on a four-point scale.04 S. The causal structure of the opinions about December 1989 is far more complex than the one we propose here.176 1.019 2. we estimate the
.32 . we would like to reiterate that it has only an exploratory character.21 1.176
Notes: aReference category. the lower the chances that she will believe in a radical rupture with the past (a revolution).019 2.17 . “Beliefs about December 1989. We attempt to account for these influences by employing “life satisfaction.78
. Before turning to the results of our analysis.11 . Valid N 1. We account for the determinants of the various interpretations of the December 1989 events by a multinomial logistic regression. Source: “Human and Social Resources of the Romanian Transition.

119
.585
. As age increases.
.367 . ** ϭ p Ͻ .184*
. a Revolution) a .71***
Notes: aThe reference category is “Belief in Revolution.612 Ϫ3.) Belief in a Coup d’état (vs.10.3 presents the coefficients from our multinomial logistic regression analysis. (Nϭ2.340* 1.617*** 1.” That is. education has no statistically significant effects on the chances of embracing the “coup d’état” story (versus the “revolution” story). †ϭp Ͻ . *** ϭ p Ͻ .015 Ϫ.654†
1.f. With respect to sociodemographic variables.320 .” October 1999.186 .” bDummy variables.019) Source: “Human and Social Resources of the Romanian Transition.29 Table 4.063* . a respondent’s age has a significant.Re-Membering Romania
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chances of believing that it was a “Coup d’état” or “something else” versus (believing that it was a) “revolution. negative effect on the likelihood of believing that it was a coup d’état rather than revolution.108 Ϫ. the chances of believing that it was a coup d’état decrease. None of the “spatial location” variables has any significant effect on viewing the December events as a coup d’état.614
. a multinomial logistic regression simultaneously estimates all the logits. significant effects on the chances of viewing the December events as a “coup d’état.736* .872 Ϫ. Women are less likely to believe that it was a coup d’état rather than a revolution.01. as life
Table 4. Coefficients from the Multinomial Logistic Regression Analysis of Believing That It Was a Coup d’état or That Something Else Happened in December 1989 versus Believing That It Was a Revolution Independent Variables Variables Age (in years) Femaleb Education University graduateb Secondary schoolb Vocational educationb Spatial Location Resident in Bucharestb Resident in Moldovab Life satisfaction (1–4) Voting preference Vote for Emil Constantinescub Vote for Ion Iliescub INTERCEPT Likelihood Ratio Chi-Square (20 d. An individual’s life satisfaction has negative.092 .766
79.026 Belief that Something Else Happened (vs.001. a Revolution) a Ϫ. * ϭ p Ͻ .05. Coup d’état.3.” In comparison with binary logit models.153 Ϫ.021*** Ϫ349** Ϫ.

place of residence. University graduates are three times as likely as individuals with ten (or less) years of schooling to view the December Events as “something else” rather than as a revolution. the chances of believing that it was a “coup d’état” decrease. to reaffirm the “revolution” myth can also be understood through this failed break with the “old. rather.. residents of Moldova are more likely to believe that what happened was neither a “revolution” nor a “coup d’état” but. the old pathologies (e. Yet. and life satisfaction.” The inability of the trial.
CONCLUSIONS
Even though distrust of the public sphere and the Machiavellian manipulation of collective memory preceded Ceaus ¸ escu. a regime that caused so much trauma to Romanians. he took it to new heights.” Various interpretations of the events of December 1989 are influenced by factors such as age. as the euphoria of those cathartic days died away. there is still no collective memory or a shared understanding regarding what “really happened” in 1989. it should come as no surprise that Romanians were ecstatic about the “revolution” of 1989. Voting preferences and life satisfaction do not make any statistical difference on the chances of believing that “something else happened in 1989. Something else happened. Controlling for other factors. Given this. consonant with our initial expectations. and proliferation of alternative “legitimate” narratives) reemerged.” This finding runs counter to our initial expectations: ten years after.
. a traditional forum for creating shared memories. lack of a legitimate. Ely and Ca ˘ ta ˘ lin Augustin Stoica
satisfaction increases. This variance in beliefs is important: Ten years after the fall of the Ceaus ¸ escu regime. legitimating narrative.” Between this “old” and “new. distrust of the public sphere. Throughout the 1980s. Secondary school graduates join university graduates in their suspicion of a definite answer. the supporters of the former president Ion Iliescu are less likely to believe in the coup d’état thesis versus the revolution thesis. This finding supports our initial expectations: the more satisfied one is with her current situation. the higher the chances of perceiving the present as a radical rupture (“revolution”) with the past.” a hole still remains in Romania’s collective memory of the December Events. As we expected. highly educated individuals tend to be less willing to embrace the official story of a pure revolution. Also.112
John F. voting preferences. superseding any hope that a shared “revolution” myth would offer a common identity and a clear break with the “old. education. residents of Moldova—a former stronghold of Iliescu’s party and the place where the revolution was mainly a mediated event—seem to be less prone to believe in either the revolution or the coup d’état versions.g. these machinations became only more absurd when seen against the background of growing economic hardship. “something else.

These are people who are trying to ignore a wound that never healed. and see parents visiting their children.” He talked about an honest state prosecutor who. Then there’s the man on the train who was on the streets of Bucharest during those chaotic days. had told him “We have the facts but we can’t publish them. lies the majority of Romania. in the in mid 1990s. and those. is a sixty-eight-year-old pensioner who has visited his son’s grave every Sunday since the “Events. “Oh.” He said that the survivors of those killed in the December Events have wanted answers since 1989. Reed concluded that the church used the myth as a way to collect money from peasants to perform
. bloodied and maimed by bullets. We have heard many stories. in 1990. he responds. “there are too many people in high positions who were involved in what went on in 1989 and they don’t want the truth to come out. “Don’t believe him.. it was a true revolution that my son gave his life to!” While walking away from the grave a middle-age woman comes up and says. strong emotions come to the surface. can screw us again?!?!” In John Reed’s travelogue War in Eastern Europe: Travels through the Balkans in 1915. had to drag himself to the train station to flee the city. who struggle for clarity. that was so long ago!” or “Questions about the revolution? What questions are left?” But as the discussion deepens. but no truth. It was a coup d’état!” Declining to give any details about herself. C.” When asked what happened during those turbulent days. one confronts a common scenario: When asked about the revolution. C.Re-Membering Romania
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Fourteen years after the events of 1989. she was soon in tears while recalling a family friend who. a seventy-eight-year-old pensioner who had lost his only son to the revolution and. and he could potentially become a vampire. he would not reach heaven. “Don’t believe what others say about a coup. V. one can walk through Heroes’ Cemetery. He also initially dismissed questions about his experience as merely “history. and that one of the main goals of Association is “to learn the truth. people will usually say. all she will say is that she is visiting her nephew’s grave and that “He gave his life and for what? For nothing!” Further on is E. After initially dismissing questions about the revolution.” Somewhere between those who have benefited from the events of December 1989. he said. but recoil whenever something bumps into it. many beautiful words. Dana is an articulate twenty-nineyear-old sociologist who is trying to get funding to study in the West. formed “The Association for Honoring the Martyred Heroes of the Revolution of 1989. the journalist wrote about the Romanian peasants’ belief that if a person did not die properly (with a candle in his hand). where Bucharest’s martyred demonstrators are buried. like the parents of the martyrs.” When asked why. who prefer that a true picture of “the events” never emerge. with a sense of annoyance.” but by the end of the conversation he is angrily shaking his clenched fist and yelling: “We put our lives on the line and for what? So the same people who screwed us before. In contemporary Romania.

5
Democratization in the Shadows: Post-Communist Patrimonialism
Frank Sellin1
Patrimonialism has long been a hallmark of largely agrarian societies grappling with increasingly powerful and intrusive modern states. and the habits of. Viewed from the bottom up. Not surprisingly. in Weber’s view. “Patrimonialism. This.2 Viewed from the top down. claims to their position and perquisites in what he termed estate-type domination.” wrote Weber. sultanism tend to arise whenever traditional domination develops an administration and a military force which are purely personal instruments of the master. often aided and abetted by his extended familial relations. often authoritarian or semi-authoritarian regimes. “sultanism” (following the Weberian nomenclature). patronclient networks are frequently the vehicle by which seemingly powerless. and where many people still retain links to. masters an entire state and society with near-total control—a form of control which is of an extremely
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. which penetrate society less through the means of formal representative institutions—if any exist—than through patron–client relationships.4 Recent works on patrimonialism have explored its extreme form. within the framework of a patrimonial system. and thus decentralization. wherein a dictator. where most countries have only recently approached or crossed the divide from rural to urban under Communism.”3 Weber also recognized that the ruler’s staff could themselves develop bases of support. observers of patrimonial systems see heavily personalized. “and. in the extreme case. and eventually substantial. and/or to cut through immense bureaucratic obstacles to obtain access to state resources. a rural social environment. even hereditary. atomized individuals attempt to neutralize or minimize the costs associated with coercive. Such is the case with Romania. would contribute to a process of growing competition. interventionist states. contemporary patrimonialism has a strong heritage in the Balkans.

the sustained progressive movements that brought civil service reform to the U. but otherwise ideologically weak. The modern. Tacho and Tachito Somoza’s Nicaragua. political and economic reform through a symbiotic relationship that protects powerful elite interests in the status quo. which both illuminates the troubles afflicting democratization and identifies a need to train the spotlight on the relationship of patrimonialism to democratization. The question becomes all the more urgent now that we have a decade of post-Communist experience. is largely responsible for slowly producing. in large part. and between private and state action. the political effects of what I call post-Communist patrimonialism in Romania since 1989. contingent elements of post-Communist patrimonialism extend the ideal type with: (e) the need to administer a huge state bureaucracy. (b) a leader who retains and funds a staff beholden to him alone (appointed on the basis of personal loyalty from among relatives. I prefer to avoid any narrowness or other ambiguity about the term. and even obstructs. though it started out as very centralized.S. The analysis will survey. in very broad and brief terms. authoritarianism. by addressing the case of Romania.118
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personalized. and post-totalitarianism). power. and as the concept itself seems to demand.g.6 While there has been a fair amount of literature on the subject. and to some extent perpetuating.7 I will argue that ten years of post-Communist patrimonialism. and Western Europe). democracy. Post-Communist patrimonialism consists of (a) a leader unequivocally acknowledged (though not necessarily unchallenged) as the top political authority. (c) creating a regime where the line between public and private property. an increasingly fractured and semidecentralized political system at the level of state institutions and especially political parties. This chapter is intended to fill part of that lacuna.. along similar patron-client lines in the competition for state resources. Papa Doc and Baby Doc’s Haiti. and prestige. have been rare. Here. classifying it as one of five major regime types (along with totalitarianism. and instead apply the term “patrimonial” to a broader cross section of regimes. I further contend that post-Communist patrimonialism complicates. such that (d) much of society responds by organizing itself. nature. Change in this system would probably require a significant exogenous shock (e.5 Sultanistic regimes. friends. in the Weberian sense. often collectively inefficient and divided among competing patron-client
. historically limited to the reign of the family dictatorship in question: such as Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il’s North Korea. is blurred in favor of the ruler and his clients. Alfred Stepan and Juan Linz seem to construe sultanism more broadly than Weber. scholarly analysis has rarely addressed the question of what happens to post-sultanistic societies likely to join the larger class of patrimonial regimes. and clients) as well as a coercive apparatus beholden to him personally (and not controlled by civilian authorities in a rational-legal bureaucracy). and Nicolae Ceaus ¸escu’s Romania.

both in opposition as well as within the regime).. Cornel Onescu. as well as spread the wealth among prospective clients. such as Mart ¸ian Dan. as he implemented the so-called rotation principle10 (a strategy frequently seen in other sultanistic regimes). Both Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej and his protégé and successor Nicolae Ceaus ¸escu (who served the former as party secretary in charge of organization and cadres) displayed considerable worries about factions or potential rivals in the party. Post-Communist patrimonial politics is thus manifested in the battle for control of cadres with personalized loyalties across multiple institutional and policy channels. Romania’s first post-Communist president. Ion Iliescu. had either been long-time close associates of Iliescu. and both leaders consequently spent considerable effort cultivating loyal supporters in the party. under the famous nomenklatura system. and rotating cadres loyal to key patrons at the top. such as General Nicolae Militaru. was a Ceaus ¸escu loyalist. and in the events of 22–28 December 1989. The idea was to isolate potential rivals from their power bases. Here I focus on the effects of post-Communist patrimonialism on democratic development.8 One illustrative example of how the game was played was Ceaus ¸escu’s politicking among colleagues on the post-Dej politburo. and even reached the political executive committee.11
. if ever. I especially focus on the role of parties and the state as agents of patronage disbursement.9 Moreover. as Minister of Internal Affairs (where he was head of most of the state security apparatus) on 24 July 1965. or targets of persistent cultivation by Iliescu.” as I prefer to think of patrimonalism as one approach to state-building and the (re)organization of a political system after the fall of Communism—one that does not depend on popular confirmation in its initial stages. Dra ˘ghici’s replacement. cults of personality. not sur¸escu prisingly.
THE COMMUNIST PATRIMONIAL INHERITANCE
Close observers of Romanian politics would note the many continuities with the practices of Communist-era regimes. Ceaus was even more intent than Gheorghiu-Dej on “clearing the decks” of potential rivals.g. control of the media. benefited from Ceaus ¸escu’s favoritism. rather than as agents engaged in the aggregation of public preferences and rational public policy formulation. all with the understanding that everyone save the conduca ˘ tor was vulnerable to arbitrary dismissal at any time. promoting. I also reorient the concept away from Weber’s notions of “legitimacy” and “authority. Alexandru Dra ˘ghici. particularly the emphasis given to identifying. ultimately aimed at sacking and replacing his main rival and fellow Dej protégé. until his demotion in 1971.Post-Communist Patrimonialism
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chains and (f) the promotion of charismatic elements from Communist days (e. Some of the central figures in the initial National Salvation Front (FSN) leadership.

. Instead. they had to co-opt vested and still powerful interests within the ruins of the old party-state. but also spread to local party
. even genetic. it was also fundamentally a battle for power and patronage that quickly dragged in the “bosses. the FSN could not deploy direct coercion on a large scale against a long-victimized population—though it could apply “selective” violence against anti-regime demonstrators.14 While the initial split was. Iliescu and the FSN had to reconstruct the essential attributes of a badly weakened state in a very short time. this meant convincing multiple splinter groups from the former Securitate and the army to accede to the FSN leadership in the rough-and-tumble bargaining that followed the collapse of the Ceaus ¸escu regime in 1989. the FSN resurrected old Communist networks. ministerial portfolios) to cultivate opposition leaders and contribute to their disunity. with personal connections and loyalties to Iliescu traceable to promotion in the early days of the FSN and the Provisional National Council of Unity (CPUN). both Iliescu and Prime Minister Petre Roman had developed their own separate entourages. The intense struggle (prior to the formal split in the spring of 1992) targeted not only the central apparatus. At the same time. over the pace of reform.120
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If Romania’s patrimonial pedigree is a logical. followed shortly thereafter by General Mihai Chit ¸ac and Gelu Voican Voiculescu in the aftermath of the miners’ June 1990 rampage.15 Roman’s support lay with many of his former ministers and part of the central party apparatus. visible in the numerous local FSN councils that sprang up almost overnight in workplaces and villages throughout Romania in January 1990. From early on. exemplified the casualties of the turbulent struggle of prospective patrons. opposition political parties. which backed Iliescu. violent collapse of sultanism explains why Iliescu’s FSN rebuilt a neo-patrimonial state. Still. Iliescu’s came primarily from the FSN parliamentary delegation.g.” and politicized institutions ranging from the Roman cabinet to the new Romanian Information Service (SRI). aided by control of the state media and state patronage. particularly senators. particularly among liberal splinters.12 The bitter departures of leaders like Dumitru Mazilu and Silviu Brucan in early 1990. such turbulence did not prevent the FSN from quickly asserting its hold. In rebuilding the state. Such patrimonial co-optation was followed by the distribution of mayoral positions and agricultural resources “down to the village level. to some degree. Primarily.”13 During 1990–91. the sudden. and ethnic Hungarians.
PATRIMONIALISM UNDER ILIESCU
The wedge that split the FSN hierarchy during 1991–92 took unmistakably patrimonial form. the FSN used patrimonial incentives (e. outcome of Ceaus ¸escu’s sultanism.

many political “barons” competed to establish their own clientelist fiefdoms.. This is not to say that Iliescu regularly exercised his political supremacy: Romanian political observers have routinely commented on his trademark hesitation. including its own media. Miron Mitrea (a former trade union leader co-opted as a PDSR vice-president). and his willingness to let subordinates engage in their own prolonged schemes and conflicts. Iliescu was unquestionably the dominant political patron. price hikes) were decided by the PDSR leadership and Iliescu. before the scheduled FSN congress. obtaining more access to state posts and resources in the bargain. whose support had to be bought. and a hard left/”Ceaus ¸ist” party. However. There was a sense that while the government handled day-to-day state management and dispensation of resources. and Viorel Hrebenciuc (secretary general of the government). and the Party of Romanian National Unity (PUNR).g. and certainly to his own staff at Cotroceni. able to command (or veto) appointments. The split’s coda highlighted the symbiosis between the personalized party and the state: Iliescu’s FDSN inherited its new headquarters from the SRI (the most significant heir to the Securitate) and mobilized other state resources.Post-Communist Patrimonialism
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branches as well. All put increasing pressure on PDSR for state offices and other perquisites in return. These included figures such as Adrian Na ˘stase (PDSR first vice-president and president of the Chamber of Deputies). the minority Va ˘ca ˘roiu government depended for support on allies. PRM. PUNR and PSM—all abetted at their inception during 1990–91 by the then FSN regime—leveraged their formal entry into a pseudo-coalition government. in order to establish itself in the few scant months prior to the September 1992 elections.17 With the ouster of Roman in September 1991 (after the fourth miners’ intervention) and the installation of a new government under Nicolae Va ˘ca ˘roiu following the September 1992 elections. the Socialist Labor Party (PSM). metamorphosed into the Party of Social Democracy (PDSR) a year later. despite PDSR reluctance. despite some continuing chaos. even screened. and then passed down to the government itself. ranging from the PDSR leadership to all levels of the government (including the prime-minister and his cabinet). the Democratic National Salvation Front (FDSN). This is not to argue that Iliescu and the PDSR enjoyed absolute hegemony. the most important issues (e. namely radical nationalist parties such as the Greater Romania Party (PRM). Starting in 1992. and largely did not
. the lines of patrimonial authority to Iliescu were simplified. By 1994. and Roman’s FSN was eventually renamed the Democratic Party (PD).16 Iliescu’s new party. state television. Thus. these posts were usually outside the “power” ministries and/or at the sub-ministerial level. while the PDSR leadership and the government itself would frequently consult the president—barred by the Constitution from partisan affiliation—and would keep one eye over their shoulders in case of Iliescu’s veto or intervention. where it won a plurality.

Still. Yet despite the thundering of PRM. the leadership of SRI and other semi-secret services. declining poll ratings) to leave the coalition and reestablish party identities. There were other limitations on patrimonial power. the junior partners (PRM. and appeared to be waging war with some of his own nominal subordinates. PSM. such as defense. is largely subject to executive and partisan preferences. the disastrous standard of living. while nominally independent. and PUNR) were successively kicked out of the governing coalition for increasingly criticizing the government in which they participated. internal affairs. Patrimonial rewards could thus triumph at least temporarily over electoral incentives (namely. the same body (chosen by the legislature) that proposes candidates to the president for appointment. the latter two parties clung tenaciously to their central and provincial offices. Though SRI director Virgil Ma ˘gureanu was reputed to be the second most powerful man in the regime (after Iliescu. patrimonialism under Iliescu and the PDSR predictably resulted in a system that blurred the separation of powers. as well as promotion and transfer by the Supreme Council of Magistrates.21 and this pattern of judicial vulnerability continues under the second Iliescu regime (2000–present).122
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supplant the control of Iliescu and the PDSR over key areas. Parliament. judges are still subject to disciplinary action. at least this was the case until the PDSR itself began to move toward expulsion of its former partners. which Article 58 of the constitution declares to be “the supreme representative of the people. Certainly the post-Communist Romanian judiciary has never had a reputation for independence from the executive. subordinating the legislative and judicial branches of government to an extra-constitutional dominance of a personal and partisan nature. and the betrayal of Romania to foreign interests. and on the local level by independent media in districts controlled by the opposition since 1992. The real levers of state power thus remained comfortably with PDSR. until 1996. however. Rule by governmental decree has in-
. mostly involving competition within the regime itself. despite the efforts of individual judges and prosecutors. While they are appointed for life. Starting in late 1995. Iliescu and the PDSR found their assets in state media to be weakened by the granting of national access to semi-independent TV stations such as PRO TV and Antena 1. delaying the final break with PDSR for months. and some even argued the reverse).” can and does vote to give the government the power to emit ordinances. and it produced de facto executive rule.19 Similarly.18 He did. PSM. and PUNR about corruption. The “Iliescu constitution” approved by referendum on 9 December 1991 (mostly over the objections of the opposition) did much to enhance presidential rule in a quasi-French-type system. finance. he did not have total control over that institution. or state television. outlast even Iliescu as the only two surviving members of the original FSN Council.20 The judiciary.

. the regime engaged in limited liberalization but did little to encourage a stable investment climate for businesses—especially foreign investors— expected to make payoffs throughout the central and local state structure. the joint session vote on the law was 280 in favor to ten against—with 194 abstentions. Appointments of lawmakers or their clients to various positions in the elephantine bureaucracy of the State Privatization Fund (the agency charged with overseeing the valuation and privatization of stateowned enterprises and other assets. are not expressly forbidden by the constitution from sitting on boards (consiliile administrative. and passing legislation. In short. etc. offices.e. reconciling. reflects the interests of a lot of people—parties and party leaders above all—such that the status quo would be heavily defended against those who might insist on reforming big government. Romania’s disproportionate supply of parliamentary seats (with their attendant access to legislative resources—posts in the chamber leaderships. and especially after.24 Parliamentarians. Although the Constitution forbids government ministers from serving on “bodies with commercial purpose” (Article 104). before. as it currently exists. Second. we should keep in mind that Romania’s parliamentary elections operate by proportional representation. Patrimonialism has contributed heavily to the fusion of political and economic power. They had to confront precisely such conflicts of economic interest during 1995–96 with a proposed law forbidding parliamentarians’ membership on CAs and AGAs in companies with state capital (i. the institutional system. 1996. Petre Cris ¸an. or CA) and stockholder assemblies (aduna ˘ riile generale ale act ¸ionarilor. with lists of names controlled. by the central apparatus of most parties (where parliamentarians frequently sit on ruling bodies). divided into two chambers which exercise nearly identical powers. and which have very murky procedures in proposing.22 Despite intermittent calls for reform. considering that the Romanian parliament has 484 seats. The ruling PDSR was renowned for its intense efforts at coopting directors of state enterprises. by and large. or AGA). After all the public posturing against the conflict of interest. however.Post-Communist Patrimonialism
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creasingly become a more prolific way to govern the country. This is not surprising.25 That has hardly plugged the demand for other means of access to state resources. the most publicized case being the Va ˘ca ˘roiu government’s minister of commerce. presumably thereby obtaining a measure of political control over votes as well as hefty contributions to the party coffers.) is a welcome mainstay in the pool of state-sponsored assets available for patrimonial distribution. foreign travel. the proposed law said nothing about ownership or decision-making by lawmakers in purely privately owned corporations. those at the heart of privatization efforts). in return for access to state subsidies. some unquestionably did.23 Moreover. separated into regional jurisdictions)
. and less regulation. Conspicuous through omission. licenses.

Similar experiences were recorded in the more “traditional” underworld. the largest shareholder in the “Dacia Felix” Bank and reported to be in virtual exile abroad. voting 32
. Iliescu and his followers drove the Hungarian Democratic Union (UDMR)—and thereby 7 percent of the electorate—into implacable opposition. Columna Bank. The PDSR encountered slippage among peasants. Trying to present themselves as the “real” social democrats. namely workers and peasants. and drug smuggling kingpins (e. the split with Petre Roman and the latter’s renamed Democratic Party (PD) sent a hefty portion of former Communists into rancorous opposition. which had exited the opposition Democratic Convention of Romania in 1995). both before and after the 1996 fall of the Iliescu regime. while some of the foregoing criminals are now serving jail sentences.124
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were. Regarding the private sector’s criminal relationship to the public authorities under Iliescu. perhaps billions. and considered to be one of the richest men in Romania. but especially among workers. one of three brothers at the head of a vast financial empire. of dollars. and continue to be. Some. where dubious loan practices led to the disappearance of hundreds of millions. eluded investigation and arrest by the post-1996 Romanian authorities by remaining in the U. many others are not. they allied themselves with the small. Iliescu and the PDSR—seen increasingly as a corrupt “directocracy” more interested in recruiting famous names and factory directors. highly sought by parliamentarians of all parties. who. Known tobacco. Hungarians voted for their own presidential candidate in the first round. was alleged to be bankrolling the tiny Socialist Party (a splinter from the already small PSM). while presiding over half-hearted reforms and a catastrophic decline in the standard of living—lost a chunk of their traditional electorate. “historical” Social Democratic Party of Sergiu Cunescu (PSDR. Beginning with the FSN’s decision to co-opt xenophobic interests strongly linked to portions of the former Securitate and PCR elites. and overwhelmingly backed Constantinescu in the second. Most decisively.27 Additionally. The fall of Iliescu and the PDSR in November 1996 was largely attributable to structural consequences of patrimonial dynamics. were frequently photographed by the press while having clandestine meetings with Iliescu and other PDSR luminaries. or postponed. Suspects were either rarely found or subject to suspiciously prolonged. while they had heavily backed the FDSN in 1992. and the ensuing ethnic violence in Tîrgu Mures ¸ in March of 1990. alcohol. a few well-publicized examples will suffice. Roman’s supporters split in the presidential elections in favor of Constantinescu. switched to the CDR in 1996. George Constantin Pa ˘unescu.S. reputedly the venture of ex-Securitate members. One was the prevalence of numerous banking scandals under the Iliescu regime.26 Lastly. Zaher Iskanderani and Gheorghe “Gigi Kent” Vasile) perennially evaded capture— in some cases.g.. such as Sever Mures ¸an. were even granted protection—by corrupt police and customs officials. investigations and trials.

Valerian Stan. as a dominant party was replaced with a “coalition of coalitions” in government.29 Perhaps the most striking example of patrimonial politics in the post-1996 system was the intra-party warfare that brought down two PNT ¸CD prime ministers. after PD threatened to withdraw its parliamentary support if Stan continued with his anti-corruption agenda. Corruption and nepotism flourished since the appointed secretary general. extremely office-conscious “algorithm” which governed the partisan distribution of almost every possible post in the government. The blackmail games that combine the dictates of the algorithm with threats to withdraw support in parliament have made Romania almost ungovernable since the CDR-USDUDMR coalition took over from 1996 to 2000. the strongest attacks on prime ministers have come from rival factions in their own party (though other coalition partners are often happy to help). from the prime minister down to the middle management of every ministry. The effect of this “coalition of coalitions” on institutions since 1996 has been dramatic. the governing coalition set up an incredibly complicated. It changed some elements of the patrimonial system. and fifteen percent backed Constantinescu.28 However. More important. if insufficient. often contradictory “Contract for Romania. though a key player capable of significant intervention and pressure. but hardly eliminated it. Vasile. Romanian patrimonialism decentralized somewhat. On the contrary. thanks to the blackmail games being played by the parties in his governing coalition. Twenty percent of those who had supported Iliescu in 1992 switched to Roman in the first round of 1996. President Constantinescu.” as a vote against the Iliescu regime. surfaced with media reports of local “PDSR-ists” applying to join the PNT ¸CD.Post-Communist Patrimonialism
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percent for the latter as opposed to 21 percent for the former. Victor Ciorbea and Radu Vasile. Opportunism. Here. Indeed. the prime mover behind the CDR coalition. was sacked in 1997 by then prime minister Victor Ciorbea. the 1996 vote was not so much a vote of confidence in the CDR and its vague. taking advantage of
.
PATRIMONIALISM AFTER ILIESCU
The change of regime in 1996 marked a momentous step for Romania and a necessary. he was increasingly ridiculed for having promised serious economic reform and a “war on corruption”—a war which he was largely unable to produce. could not dictate to the PNT ¸CD or the government in the manner of Iliescu and the former PDSR. and the temporary disruption of existing patron–client chains. The power to form governments thus shifted from one to multiple ruling parties. condition for progress toward democratization. and even Roman’s PD.

undermined the latter—his party’s own prime minister—with the help of the faction he led in the PNT ¸CD. presumably to mitigate partisan attacks.32 Some of these larger splits were essentially fallout from the electoral loss in 1996 (although it should be noted that individual “leap-frog” defections from party to party are almost a monthly routine in Romania. was the former head of the national bank since Iliescu’s time. was hoisted by his own petard. damaging splits. Thus. new parties keep forming and old ones keep splintering in Romania. PUNR underwent a massive split between the camps around Valeriu Taba ˘ra ˘ (former minister of agriculture) and president Gheorghe Funar (who took his wing into Corneliu Vadim Tudor’s PRM).30 His successor as prime minister. whose compositional stability ultimately depended on Iliescu’s arbitration. and his arrogant refusals to heed policy directives and warnings from PNT ¸CD president Ion Diaconescu and the rest of the party leadership. But most of the larger. The ambitious Vasile was quickly propelled into Ciorbea’s place. The game of ultimatums eventually resulted in Vasile’s resignation. Granted. and they are dealing with volatile electorates. and so far have been relatively inconsequential affairs. but not before he had humiliated his own party and President Constantinescu by refusing to step down until Constantinescu withdrew his constitutionally dubious announcement that Vasile was fired. most newly formed parties are small. His closeness to the PD. factional affairs led by charismatic personalities. this time led by octogenarian Gabriel T ¸epelea and the much younger Remus Opris ¸. The postscript to the Vasile affair illustrates another key point about patrimonial effects on the party system. ambitious personalities. despite some disappearances. over time.126
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PD’s signals that it could not work with a moralistic. largely in tow behind well-known. and was accepted as an independent. presumably more entrenched parties have undergone serious. Most notably. such as former SRI chief Ma ˘gureanu’s Romanian National Party (PNR).31 The fact is that most parties in Romania—and in many other countries in Eastern Europe—are still patron-driven. provoked another factional revolt in December 1999. with a strong reputation in foreign financial circles. are still quite low. Political scientists typically expected that elections and political “learning” would. Vasile. It also contrasted with the days of the Va ˘ca ˘roiu government. and heat up when party lists are being drafted in preparation for elections). The costs of defections or splits. “winnow out” the explosion of parties and the fragmentation of party systems in new democracies by marrying the (over)supply of parties to the limited “demand” of voters. however. Iliescu’s PDSR gave birth to the Alliance for Ro-
. even after four national elections in the case of Romania. Mugur Isa ˘rescu. The incident underlined how leading political figures in the country are increasingly open targets for the plentiful ranks of hungry officeseekers. unbending Ciorbea (including direct challenges by PD ministers to Ciorbea’s authority).

the unfortunate reality was that economic reform made only token headway. before he and his right-hand man Sorin Leps ¸a ended up in PD.Post-Communist Patrimonialism
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mania (ApR).36
. and instead moved them behind closed doors to be handled by party leaderships frequently seen as sweeping corruption under the rug. failed to cross the increased electoral threshold to enter parliament. PDSR. inculcation of social attitudes favoring the rule of law was even further impeded by the presence of the algorithm used by the CDR-USD-UDMR coalition. Notions of the rule of law and justice were and are perhaps the greatest casualties of corruption. revamped as the CDR 2000 after the departure of PNL earlier that year. by the conflicts that surround governance and weakened party cohesion. Likewise. but especially PNT ¸CD. led by former foreign minister Teodor Meles ¸canu and assisted by Iliescu’s former campaign manager. like Victor Surdu’s Democratic Agrarian Party (PDAR) and the former National Liberal Party (PNL) faction under Mircea Ionescu-Quintus.33 The future of most factions may seem bleak. but we must remember that many of them are sustained by the presence of parliamentary members and/or other offices at the local and provincial levels. kickbacks. Accusations of nepotism. particularly in the privatization process where party leaders in PNT ¸CD were implicated at the highest levels. such factors helped to nourish small parties. during the long political winter between national elections in 1992 and 1996. and other forms of corruption surrounded almost all ruling parties. weakened even farther than its predecessor. Most disturbingly. where they normally belong. Despite the hopes surrounding the change of regime. Radu Vasile briefly formed the Popular Party with his faction of followers excluded from PNT ¸CD. a phenomenon enhanced because of the somewhat greater transparency to the press. largely composed of ex-PNT ¸CD members) upon exiting the PNT ¸CD (and reentering after the 2000 election debacle). privatization rigging. as parties constantly sought to undercut each others’ initiatives. On the “winners’” side. but the patrimonial underpinnings of the system remained and remain very much alive. the algorithm effectively took cases of abuse of public office out of the justice ministry and the courts.35 The politics of the 2000 elections and their aftermath are a continuing case in point despite the protest vote itself. Because so many offices were and are dependent on partisan affiliation. After four years of increasing mismanagement and corruption. both outgoing PNT ¸CD premiers have formed their own parties. Victor Ciorbea created his National Alliance of Christian Democrats (ANCD. with a smattering of state enterprises having been privatized or closed down. the CDR. Earlier. Iosif Boda.34
CONCLUSION: PROSPECTS OF A PATRIMONIAL FUTURE
Democratization made a major stride in Romania in 1996.

with the stalemate resolved only when former premier and presidential candidate Theodor Stolojan agreed to step in and serve as president. and propelling Vadim Tudor into the second-round runoff where he was eventually defeated by PDSR president Ion Iliescu. and Viorel Catarama ˘. merging with Alexandru Athanasiu’s tiny Social Democratic Party (PSDR). one of the top three positions in the party and which is responsible for cadres. PRM. And. some of which. have produced patrimonial solutions that some-
. was the major electoral success story of 2000. Among the radical nationalists. PUNR had been disintegrating into two parts since its 1996 electoral disappointment. hotly contested by leading figures. former first vice-president Valeriu Stoica’s leadership and influence has been firm but still. managed to accomplish the unthinkable—liberal unification—but only by co-opting former party presidents of splinter liberal parties (Dinu Patriciu. the flamboyant PUNR president and mayor of Cluj Gheorghe Funar took his supporters into Corneliu Vadim Tudor’s PRM. such as former finance minister Decebal Traian Remes ¸. With the retirement of Mircea Ionescu-Quintus. who promptly abandoned his party. Niculae Cerveni) as vice-presidents. now that the latter’s former president and vehement Iliescu critic Sergiu Cunescu had retired upstairs to an honorary party presidency. but only after a significant protest vote in the first round. Stoica’s PNL also merged on 17 January 2002 with Teodor Meles ¸canu’s Alliance for Romania (ApR. Still. Stoica’s tenure as president. Bucharest mayor and PD heavyweight Traian Ba ˘sescu mounted one of the rare successful ouster attempts against PD president Petre Roman. however. as the icing on the cake. among other firms).128
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PNT ¸CD itself spiraled downward for the better part of the next year in an increasingly nasty fight between rival party leaderships for command of the party. only lasted until 2002. Iliescu’s PDSR also accomplished in 2001 what used to be unthinkable throughout the 1990s. When faced with another rare ouster by Valeriu Taba ˘ra ˘’s wing. it appears. again with office rewards for the ApR’s top leaders: Meles ¸canu became PNL first vice-president. a splinter from Iliescu’s party). on the other hand. have departed the party even before the elections owing to rivalries with Stoica. Taba ˘ra ˘’s wing of PUNR failed dismally in the 2000 elections in an alliance with former SRI chief Virgil Ma ˘gureanu’s Romanian National Party. coming under fire as he did from PNL vice-president and businessman Dinu Patriciu (the largest shareholder of Rompetrol. who once held that very office in PNL. taking a fifth of the vote and a quarter of the parliamentary seats. In the spring of 2001. where Funar himself obtained the post of general secretary. Nicolae Manolescu. has returned as a vice-president. which succeeded in entering the parliament. PNL. Institutional obstacles and election defeats. or perhaps as a result. and thus creating the renamed Party of Social Democracy (PSD).

Octav Cozmânca ˘. Why is this baronization occurring? I hypothesize that at least two factors are relevant. In essence. there is increasing turnover in the generation of party presidents who achieved some remarkable longevity in the first post-Communist decade despite occasionally disappointing electoral results. at least in Romania there appears to be a dynamic shift—at least in the party system—toward what I would call more decentralized patrimonialism. are rare in the attempt and rarer in their success.38 With the impending resignation or retirement of the old “father figure. Hrebenciuc. Miron Mitrea.37 Patrimonialism should not be seen as a purely static descriptor of Romania or any other post-Communist political system. once the “spiritual father” of the ruling PSD’s earlier incarnations. nonetheless has informal favors to pay off and is somewhat less immune to challenges than his predecessor. Party presidents thus can expect to encounter more resistance to their initiatives. the barons of heaviest weight in the PSD could be seen in the team interviewing prospective prefects for the provinces: Na ˘stase. On the contrary. These backroom leadership fights. although he still wields tremendous power by statute. leading party figures. whether in relation to certain economic reforms or simply “cleaning house” within the party itself. First. but they obviously can occur. Ion Solcanu. Western-derived political science categories. requiring the same politicking. a clash only partly reminiscent of the earlier Roman-Iliescu struggle.Post-Communist Patrimonialism
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what simplify Romania’s fluid party system. appear over the last decade to be gaining at least some limited power vis-à-vis party presidents. does not appear to retain the veto he once had over PSD appointees to the government.” competition among the second “tier” ensues. but without changing the basic operating principles. Solcanu.42 But Na ˘stase himself does not have the same authority as his predecessor. such as that of Ba ˘sescu over Roman.39 Internal party ousters.
.40 Iliescu.43 Na ˘stase dared to lock horns with Iliescu over early elections. and parliamentary leader Viorel Hrebenciuc allegedly managed to push through their candidate for the director of the customs agency over Iliescu’s “vehement” objections. or what could be termed the “baronization” of political parties. are more or less normal and are reflected in the literature at least as far back as Duverger. but eventually had to retreat on the question. having to contend with the entrenched regional party leaders who formally confirmed him as president alongside the rest of the central party leadership on 19 January 2001. Adrian Na ˘stase. and Doru Ioan Ta ˘ra ˘cila ˘—one of whom. typically parliamentarians with well-entrenched local power bases where they themselves are the undisputed local bosses. even if patrimonial parties in post-Communist circumstances do not fall neatly into traditional. to cite one example. PSD’s new president. deals have to be made. of course. and the new party president. as much as admitted that Iliescu had effectively given up real power in the party to Na ˘stase.41 Indeed.

there appears to be very little difference once any patrimonial party gains control of the state. and that negotiations were underway to see if that figure could be reduced.44 Campaign finance is generally exceedingly murky such that no party likes to discuss it. but even the prime minister and party leader of the ruling PSD cannot possibly have sufficient resources to do the same for several hundred other large enterprises and simultaneously accomplish a great number of other governing tasks.000 each. growing in power in direct proportion to their concentrated wealth. The obvious implication is that structural economic reforms and legalinstitutional reforms that threaten business interests will run into great difficulty where relevant businessmen can control party agendas as well as parliamentary votes. such as that involved with NATO and EU admission. Reform is not impossible. but also make substantial personal contributions to strengthen their claim to be new party patrons with some force and weight in internal party decision making. Dan Voiculescu. despite some observers’ initial expectations of a supposedly reformed PSD coming to power in 2000 with a stronger commitment to meaningful structural reform. That is. However. Western pressure. Business figures appear to be increasingly easing out less-important parliamentarians from the 1990s. whether nomenklatura in origin or not. clients and even kin of leaders from all parties are frequently found on the managing boards of the regional state agencies responsible for managing privatization. are.45 whether the PSD president’s protests will produce any change in behavior at all remains to be seen. announced in 2002 that several unnamed parliamentarians had approached his party. not surprisingly. willing to sell their services for the rough equivalent of USD $67. and more structurally grounded. Moreover. as well as
. Na ˘stase has even gone so far as to hold a meeting where he criticized presidents of the party’s county organizations for the perceived image in the press of “local barons” in the PSD and the disservice being done to the party by parliamentarians occupied by office seeking and dubious business undertakings. new businessmen with party cards possess not just a parliamentary seat or other party function. as Adrian Na ˘stase recently demonstrated in helping to force through the 2001 privatization of the enormous and loss-making steel combine SIDEX.130
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Second. let alone adopt or implement laws with teeth on the subject. thereby threatening to put the party in the same bad light as that of 1992–96. Indeed. This of course is a post-Communist phenomenon hardly limited to Romania. can empower reformist projects over entrenched interest group opposition. Simply as a case example. a media magnate widely suspected of past connections with the former Securitate and also the president of a tiny party (Romanian Humanist Party. members of the new business class. or PUR) allied to the ruling PSD. there are reports of Romanian businessmen effectively buying either slots on parties’ electoral lists for parliament or even parliamentarians themselves.

231.46 And the PSD president of the Senate (and former premier) Nicolae Va ˘ca ˘roiu only grudgingly gave up. no. (July 1968). On patrimonial development and parties. Romania’s roughly 5 percent GDP growth in 2001 and 2002 and PRM’s slight dip in interim polls are mildly encouraging. and gladly claim sole responsibility for any errors of fact and interpretation.” Comparative Studies in Society and History. Carey for their comments and suggestions on earlier drafts. and Henry F. 3.47 Predicting a country’s political future is a highly ambivalent undertaking at best. 411–425.
NOTES
1. to which former premier (once from PNT ¸CD. especially if a world recession were to take hold. and Political Parties. Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology. pp. 329–48. and Nicos Mouzelis. pp. If parties remain responsible for dispensing public justice to politicians and their lieutenants at the helm of the state. Short of a social explosion or other exogenous shock. p. But should conditions head south. and now member of PD) Radu Vasile used to belong as well. Max Weber. vol. PRM’s stunning second-place finish in 2000 is a dramatic reminder of how frustrated the population is with the behavior of its politicians and parties. Allen Lynch. I thank Paul Shoup. pp. but a worrisome caution is called for. 1. “Patrons. See John Duncan Powell.” American Political Science Review. 377–400. Patronage.
. as were Western-prompted moves toward anti-corruption measures and President Iliescu’s personal involvement in the process. vol. 3 (1985). edited by Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich (Berkeley: University of California Press.” Politics & Society. no. see Alex Weingrod. 4. possibly up to the level of Na ˘stase himself. “On the Concept of Populism: Populist and Clientelist Modes of Incorporation in Semiperipheral Polities. vol. Premier Na ˘stase’s sister reputedly sits on the board of SIF Muntenia. no. vol. then the failure of political parties to clean house and restore citizen confidence in institutions will likely boomerang in spades in the next general elections. his seat as the head of a bank deeply connected both to the regional privatization agencies and also to one Sorin Ovidiu Vântu. 10. and in the worst case would mean an authoritarian takeover by the military or radical nationalists—democratic patrimonialism can count on plenty of interests to uphold it. “Peasant Society and Clientelist Politics. 1978). 64. 14. the collapse of whose mutual fund continued through 2002 to implicate in public debate political figures across all parties. after repeated front-page press criticism for failing to admit the conflict of interest. however—which in the best case would lead to some kind of progressive movement demanding civil service and other anti-corruption reforms.Post-Communist Patrimonialism
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other corporations. 2. 2 (June 1970). the long-term stability of current democratic accomplishments remains open to question.

9. 51–56. On the accommodation of large parts of a fragmented ex-Securitate apparatus with the Iliescu regime. Here. PDSR President Oliviu Gherman asserted that Iliescu was covertly networking in February 1989 (before the famous “Letter of the Six” signed by high-ranking. 25 July 1996). p. Frank Sellin. 1985). pp. 69. 93. 1998). pp. 104. Munck. and 362–65. pp. 1990). E. MD: Johns Hopkins University Press. especially pp. 240–41. “The Uses of Absurdity: The Staged War Theory and the Romanian Revolution of December 1989. 3–81 (chapters by Chehabi and Linz. Chehabi and Juan J. Romania after Tyranny (Boulder: Westview Press. 8. Nelson. Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation (Baltimore. 1995).” both in Daniel N. party systems and regime change in the Balkans is the doctoral dissertation of the author. Watts. Iliescu apparently had been sounding out anti-Ceaus ¸escu sentiment since at least the mid-1980s. pp. Romania after Ceaus ¸escu: The Politics of Intolerance (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. Michael Shafir. 12. No. 22–23 and p.” East European Politics and Societies. For details on the rotation principle and centralization. p. but use the word sultanism as both one of five regime types as well as an adjective depicting extreme patrimonialism under totalitarianism. p. “Bringing Post-Communist Societies into Democratization Studies. see Richard Andrew Hall. E. forthcoming in 2002. 72. 11. 6. Linz and Stepan. eds. 56. 1992). As Watts shows. Iliescu sounded out Gherman himself on his political and social opinions after ushering him into in an empty room in the state publishing house where Iliescu was director of Editura Tehnica ˘. Linz and Alfred Stepan. Romania: Politics. see Tom Gallagher. Economics and Society Political Stagnation and Simulated Change (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers. but out-of-favor. see Gerardo L. 1996). pp. 10.132
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4. 542–50. cross-country treatment of patrimonialism. pp.” in Linz and Stepan. ed. vol. A broader and more in-depth. 83–89. For a critique of Linz and Stepan’s more “theoretical” framework.
. 1995). see Juan J. Gallagher. p. no. 68–73. Author’s interview with Gherman (Bucharest.” Slavic Review. pp. 1965–1989 (Armonk. 232. Matei Ca ˘ linescu and Vladimir Tisma ˘ neanu.. Sharpe.” and Larry L. NY: M. “The 1989 Revolution and Romania’s Future. Romania after Ceaus ¸escu. Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation. “The Romanian Army in the December Revolution and Beyond. 80–81. On Romanian sultanism and the consequences for the Romanian transition. 358–60. “The Effects of Totalitarianism-cum-Sultanism on Democratic Transition: Romania. Ceaus ¸escu and the Securitate. 514–16. Sultanistic Regimes (Baltimore. Weber. 232. pp. 13. Linz. MD: Johns Hopkins University Press. Dennis Deletant. vol. 13. Ceaus ¸escu and the Securitate: Coercion and Dissent in Romania. On sultanism generally. Deletant. party officials criticizing Ceaus ¸escu’s development strategies).. Nationalism and Communism in Romania: The Rise and Fall of Ceaus ¸escu’s Personal Dictatorship (Boulder: Westview Press. see Trond Gilberg. I analyze patrimonialism as a state type. Linz and Stepan quote Weber on sultanism. see Part One of H. 7. See his comments on patrimonial limitations on capitalist development. On the bargains of the FSN for provincial penetration and recognition of the center by former RCP cadres. 5. and by Richard Snyder). in return for pursuit of local nationalist agendas. respectively. 3 (Fall 1999). 3 (Fall 1997). the period of his political disgrace.

noted the latter’s willingness to conceal material from his own prime minister. pp. Two other SRI officers were charged with taking out. “Romania’s Ruling Party Splits after Congress. 16. pp 24–28. Despite persistent rumors that he would resurface at the head of PUNR. Ma ˘gureanu resigned as SRI director in May 1997. no. 50–55. and the other. See also Dennis Deletant. 15 May 1996. See Evenimentul zilei (20 June 1996. copying and distributing Ma ˘gureanu’s Securitate dossier (forcing Ma ˘gureanu’s own publication of a fragment of it). who had been identified by the SRI press office as Tudor’s source. “Another Front for Romania’s Salvation. Ma ˘gureanu was under sustained attack by PRM’s Corneliu Vadim Tudor. 22–33.” RFE/RL Research Report (3 April 1992). “The Securitate Legacy in Romania: Who Is in Control?” Problems of Post-Communism. Iosif Boda. Constantin Bucur. 8. 15–22. 17. emit decrees (some of which have to be signed by the prime minister) and appoint judges proposed by the Superior Magistrate Council (a body of judges elected by a joint session of parliament). Starting in 1994. See Curierul nat ¸ional (1 April 1996). see Michael Shafir.” RFE/RL Research Report (17 April 1992).” p. both showed up with Tudor at a press conference which presented another officer. call referendums after consultation with parliament. “ See Evenimentul zilei. Ionescu.” RFE/RL Research Report (24 January 1992). Col. Ma ˘gureanu subsequently fired his deputy. pp.Post-Communist Patrimonialism
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14. “Romania’s New Institutions: The Draft Constitution. head councils on national security. pp 8–12. who played excerpts of taped conversations of politicians and journalists. The president has the right to appoint prime ministers. 26. describing his early work for Iliescu. Shafir. Roman proved equally suspicious of Iliescu’s staff. pp. allegedly made “on orders. who had access to disgruntled SRI officers. Ionescu. In a stunning move. At least one other SRI officer. Ilie Merce. pp 31–36. “War of the Roses in Romania’s National Salvation Front. Col.
. his first ever request to testify before parliament. and Ionescu. Cinci ani la Cotroceni (Bucharest: Editura Evenimentul Românesc. 19. 27. 42. For the split in the FSN. 71–73. see Constitut ¸ia României (Bucharest: Regia Autonoma ˘ “Monitorul Oficial.” p. 18. See also the reporting and analyses by Michael Shafir. 26 June–2 July 1996). Petru Pele. “Infighting Shakes Romania’s Ruling Party. One was the retired head of the SRI branch in Timis ¸. and 22. Dan Ionescu.” RFE/RL Research Report (10 January 1992) pp. Ion Adamescu. 17–23. and “Romania: Constitution Approved in Referendum. p.” Report on Eastern Europe (20 September 1991) pp. Victor Marcu. 20. fill vacant ministries at the proposal of the prime minister. Ma ˘gureanu apparently had the greatest problems with the “group” around General Diaconescu [no first name given] and Col.” 1992). Capt. judging from the reports of his comments to the parliamentary commission (that allegedly oversees the SRI. See Evenimentul zilei (23 April 1996). 6 (November/December 1995). 19. 15. preside over meetings of the cabinet if he participates. he is the key leader of the tiny Romanian National Party (PNR). was soon transferred to reserve duty. Ma ˘gureanu went on state television on 15 January 1996 to complain that the biggest problem facing SRI was information leaks to Tudor by SRI officers. Col. dissolve parliament if it does not honor a request for a vote of confidence in the government in a 60 day period. vol. “Romania: Investigation into Government Corruption. For these and other powers. Ionescu.” RFE/RL Research Report (21 August 1992). if not the reverse) on 19 June. “Another Front for Romania’s Salvation. 1999). See Iosif Boda. Dumitru Cristea was fired along with Marcu. “Infighting Shakes Romania’s Ruling Party.” RFE/RL Research Report (21 February 1992).

326. 154). see also Domnit ¸a S ¸ tefa ˘nescu. See William Crowther and Steven D. “Petre Ninosu s ¸i Tragedia Regelui Lear. and 11 and 12 December 1996). 1999) pp. what happens if Iliescu gets angry with me? He might again someday be president!’” See Monica Macovei. See also Elena Stefoi-Sava. Even in the post-Iliescu era.” East European Constitutional Review (Spring 1995). Romania’s 471 parliamentarians represent a population of about 23 million. Although most Romanian parliamentarians consider the legislature to be “somewhat efficient. OR: Frank Cass. 24. or roughly one representative for every 485. He made no mention of constitutional Article 104. paid representation in the body of organizations with commercial purpose [emphasis added. 23. 22. Cris ¸an claimed that the parliamentary oversight committee had reviewed all his information on commercial functions. including allegations of disgruntled party members against Columna Bank. The United States has 535 representatives for a population of 260 million.134
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21.” Evenimentul zilei 9 March 1994. p. seats in the county legislatures. Romania has 38 judet ¸e or “counties” and two special regions (Bucharest and Ilfov). By comparison.
. it [the function of member of the Government] is incompatible with the exercise of a function of professional. Roper. and had determined that he had not broken any laws. It is also a function of improving the supply of patrimonial resources. 8.sfos. and 27 November 1996). p. Gallagher.000 people. 79. The cause célèbre of executive meddling in the judiciary was the demotion of the president of the Bucharest municipal court. such that one parliamentarian represents roughly every 50. as reprinted in Ion Cristoiu. “Organizing Legislative Impotence: Romania.” as documented by Crowther and Roper in 1992 (Table 13 on p. More districts assist the inflation of parliamentary seats and provincial posts like prefectures. The judge refused to provide a copy of the testimony to the Alliance’s lawyer. for the fallout in the PS. Cinci ani din istoria României (Bucharest: Editura Mas ¸ina de scris. 1994) p. for going on record that a hypothetical Iliescu victory in 1996 would be an unconstitutional third term. 324. Singur împotriva tuturor (Bucharest: Editura Evenimentul românesc. Olson and Philip Norton.” in David M. He was demoted on 15 June 1996 by then minister of justice and Iliescu loyalist. 90–91. brought by the watchdog group Civic Alliance. translation mine]. Adeva ˘ rul (27 June 1996). 26. 78–83. at http://www. Petre Ninosu. Parliament routinely ranks at the bottom of polls of respect for institutions. Romanian legal culture seemed to contradict judicial independence.” 25.). Part of that is a direct function of districting.” East European Constitutional Review (Winter 1998) p. 26. which reads: “(1)…Likewise. The New Parliaments of Central and Eastern Europe (Portland. See Adeva ˘ rul (25 and 29 November. “A Comparative Analysis of Institutional Development in the Romanian and Moldovan Legislatures. with the excuse: “‘I don’t want to lose my job. 27. See Ion Cristoiu’s editorial. One anecdote recounts how a judge complicated a slander suit against Iliescu for inaccurate testimony.000 people (ignoring bicameral overlap of districts). no one else does. Corneliu Turianu. “Legal Culture in Romania. (eds. Adeva ˘ rul (11 December 1995). 1996) p. 140. see also Curierul nat ¸ional (25. etc. only the government ranks lower. ro/pob/. pp. A database of such polls can be found at the Soros Foundation for an Open Society.

he briefly joined former SRI chief Ma ˘gureanu’s PNR. 30. and then became a leading figure in Teodor Meles ¸canu’s Alliance for Romania (a 1997 splinter from Iliescu’s PDSR after the 1996 elections). The scandal. Splits have also affected smaller parties such as Tudor Mohora’s Socialist Party. but coalitions faced an additional one percent for each party in the coalition. and the Moldavians’ Party (PM)). including Petre Roman. 148. Ibid. 154. resulted from press investigations into parliamentarians who live. See Adeva ˘ rul (29 January 2000). the Federation of Ecologists (FER). For a recount of the events surrounding Vasile’s dismissal.04 percent of the vote for the House of Deputies and 5. In the CDR 2000’s specific case. no. See the chapter on parties and party systems in the author’s forthcoming (2002) dissertation. 39. As noted earlier (note 20).revistapresei. most likely illegally. “Romania’s Road to ‘Normalcy. and Nicolae Manolescu’s Civic Alliance Party (PAC). 36. 38. a splinter from the PNT ¸CD). the Union of Rightist Forces (UFD). Thus CDR had to cross a 10 percent total threshold. and obtained quietly through personal connections. under increased attention in an electoral year. the president has the explicit power to appoint the prime minister. that alliance contained five parties (PNT ¸CD. see 22 (4–10 January 2000). Although he has consistently denied any connection to the former Securitate (a frequent accusation because of his work in the Ministry of Foreign Commerce in the 1980s. in the 1995–96 “Apartment” scandal that threatened to rock parliament. 29. 40. Elvila.Post-Communist Patrimonialism
135
28. “Substance and Process in the Development of Party Systems in East Central Europe. and because of his role in complicating CDR tensions and liberal unification). considering that the building that housed PNL’s central Bucharest headquarters belonged to Catarama ˘’s furniture firm. and including other big names such as Radu Berceanu and Adrian Vila ˘u (the latter resigned after revelations of his collaboration with the former Securitate) were named. pp.’” Journal of Democracy. in houses nationalized during Communism. which it failed to do with 5.ro. See the author’s forthcoming (2002) doctoral dissertation for more data on party president longevity in Romania. 33. Curentul. 2 (April 1997). vol. including alleged involvement in the SAFI investment scandal. pp. 37. 35. no. Catarama ˘ eventually left PNL under pressure. but nothing in the constitution suggests that the former has the power to remove the latter. the support of businessmen such as Viorel Catarama ˘—also former first vice president of PNL—helped as well. By governmental ordinance on 28 June 2000. the electoral threshold to enter parliament was increased to a nominal five percent for a single party. 152. but then was quietly abandoned. See Jack Bielasiak. 23–44. 18 January 2002. the Christian Democrat National Alliance (ANCD. 32. 8. along with prominent PDSR leaders. I thank Mark Temple for posing this issue in conversation. as reported by www. still subsidized or owned by the state. 31. Many of PD’s luminaries. 34. 1 (1997). which is also a good review of the literature on Eastern European party systems. The data in the foregoing paragraph are presented in Michael Shafir. vol.29 percent for the Senate.” Communist and Post-Communist Studies. For PNL.
. 30.

it should be noted. 11 September 2001. See Monitorul. Na ˘stase’s right hand man in the party. Voiculescu. Adeva ˘ rul. Cozmin Gus ¸a ˘. 10 January 2001. as reported at www. to be nominated and elected PDSR (now PSD) secretary general.
. and the broader power disputes in the relationships between the central government and regional party leaders. 17 January 2002. where he insisted his connection to Vântu was normal and unconnected to FNI. Adeva ˘ rul. Adeva ˘ rul. Ibid. see the lead editorial in Adeva ˘ rul. România libera ˘. 10 September 2001. 47. see România libera ˘ . Adeva ˘ rul. 10 September 2001. 17 January 2001. see also RFE/RL Newsline. Nicolae Mis ¸chie. Adeva ˘ rul. 42. that is.136
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41. 43. 9 January 2001. Cotidianul. “ Na ˘ stase’s alleged connections to Vântu have been a hot topic of debate in January 2002. see Adeva ˘ rul. but some of its details have been previously alleged in other papers such as Adeva ˘ rul. 21 September 2001. Gus ¸˘ a’s appointment came as a total surprise to PDSR leaders. and that the conflict of interest was not at all illegal. but only on a “moral plane. 45.ro. 7 September 2001. 25 September 2001. as well as the same site’s coverage on 21 January 2002. 9 January 2001. 46. For an amusing anecdote of barely disguised and vulgar insults at Na ˘stase’s expense by the PDSR leader of Gorj county.revistapresei. For an example of Va ˘ ca ˘ roiu’s previous protests about giving up his private business positions. succeeded in getting a member of his tiny party. 16 and 17 January 2002. in events surrounding the arrest of two individuals alleged to have published anonymously on the Internet a report called “Armageddon II” attacking Na ˘ stase for corruption and other activities. The Armageddon report itself is unsubstantiated. 44. For Solcanu’s comments.

II
THE STATE AND POLITICS
.

.

Tóka.6
Institutionalizing the Party System
Jóhanna Kristín Birnir
While scholars commonly accept the general characterization of East European parties as personalistic. Furthermore.2 politicians are strategic. will not develop stable party identifications for quite some time. East European party systems show considerable evidence of consolidation. Crowther4 also identifies historical cleavages and argues that people are voting along similar politically salient cleavages that formed early during the post-Communist transition in Romania. believes that the high volatility of electoral preferences demonstrate a lack of institutionalization. Others are even more skeptical.6 and are therefore the focal point of this chapter. such as the emerging relationships between parties and voters. Romanian voter alignment is open to further study and debate.
139
. some argue that Romanian. the debate over consolidation in Romania has important implications. and intensity of political competition suggest that there are as yet significant obstacles in the way of East European party system consolidation. however. and voters have not developed significant party loyalties. while Crowther and Roper describe the Romanian party system as fluid and fragmented. and more generally Eastern European voters. however. much of this consolidation.”3 Nonetheless. the fractiousness of the political class. but will remain “informed skeptics.1 The debate among scholars who study Romania parallels the above. the extent of systemic consolidation is still hotly debated. may only be evaluated over time. Mair argues that the underdeveloped character of civil society. catch-all parties.5 Consequently. be assessed immediately. According to Datculescu. Influential political scientists have concluded that stable political parties are instrumental to the functioning of democracy. Institutional hallmarks of consolidation can. Unfortunately. According to Kitchelt. While this is a plausible argument.

and the dominant role [is played] by party leaders. As Western societies industrialized. extension of the suffrage in Western Europe led to the creation of mass parties. and their income is. While there is some scholarly consensus as to the types of parties in Eastern Europe. the chapter emphasizes the effects of an increasing threshold and an increasingly restrictive party registration law. the chapter discusses the electoral and party laws. Finally. the methodological problems which may contribute to the appearance of a highly volatile system are discusses. whereas ideology had previously been the foundation of the party. it remains quite fluid. According to Przeworski. one can add that “a relatively unimportant role is played by the party membership. which structure the party system.”9 Thus. and compliance with. democratic consolidation entails. These parties have a weak membership structure. Mainwaring and Scully add the condition of stability in the rules and
. given the recent redemocratization. However.8 In contemporary East European systems. and beliefs that there are feasible alternatives to democracy must vanish. The monopoly of coercion must be under democratic control. Together these have barred the entrance of small parties and independents. at a minimum. The process of institutionalizing the Romanian party system since 1989 has reduced fragmentation7 and reinforced the principal existing parties while electoral volatility remains high. and the alleged voting irregularities. to a greater extent. as the Romanian party system is still developing. Third. it increasingly became a tool used to attract voters.140
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First. it appears that East European parties have omitted the mass party stage10 and developed directly into personalistic. and later Kitschelt. the ensuing reforms. the chapter considers the effects of alleged voting irregularities in the first two national elections and the rise of antisystem parties in the second two. Second. electorally driven. dependent on the state than on members. while allowing for minority representation in parliament. the chapter briefly mentions economic and societal factors that contribute to real volatility. constitutional rules of conduct. which were characterized by strong mass membership. According to Kirchheimer. Furthermore. the extent of the systemic consolidation is still debated. In particular. membership fees. the nature of the party systems changed. The conclusion of this chapter is that. the institutional framework selected in 1989. catch-all parties. a procedural consensus about. as well as geographically concentrated parties.
DEMOCRATIC CONSOLIDATION
As Duverger explains. the new emerging parties were “catch-all” parties. are hierarchically organized. institutionalization of the party system is progressing as rapidly as one could expect. and relative organizational decentralization.

FRAGMENTATION. However. Romania’s military and security apparatus have been under civilian control. Second. political actors must accord legitimacy to the electoral process through peaceful transfers of power. party organizations must acquire value of their own. electoral rules have been demonstrated to be closely correlated with party system development both theoretically and empirically. rather than being subordinated to the wills of their respective leaders. as these are mainly achieved through a process of signaling between parties and voters. and that the existence of individual parties be fairly stable. for instance. the more permissive the rules. particularly in developing systems such as Romania.11 Since 1989. and elections. or stipulating whether parties or voters are in charge of nominations. as well as add to the restrictions of what constitutes a party and how that party shall be run. Early on alleged electoral fraud caused concern about compliance with the rules of constitutional conduct. restricting the number of candidates who may run.13 Generally. Such signaling processes include. Party law may further restrict or increase the power of the party elite. international election observers consider many of those problems resolved. major parties must also have somewhat stable roots in society. Procedural consensus about constitutional rules has also been apparent. Third. and more recently in Eastern Europe. the greater the fragmentation. there is reason to expect that electoral rules may affect electoral volatility. AND INSTITUTIONALIZATION
The last condition for consolidation. activities of interest groups and social movements. we should be able to observe the same electoral volatility in the most fragmented and the least fragmented system. Electoral law mechanically affects the outcome of elections by. long-term public appeals. Unlike the more intangible relationship between parties and voters. policy positions revealed in legislative votes and executive party coalitions. Finally. Furthermore. the institutional effects here are immediately discernible. but in the wake of the most recent elections. opinion polls.12
VOLATILITY. and most people have favored democracy. the short time since re-democratization prevents parties from having established stable strong roots and party autonomy. either theoretically or empirically. Notwithstanding this.14 A similar correlation has not been established in the literature for electoral volatility. increasingly permissive electoral rules may also promote increased electoral volatility for
. depends to some extent on the institutional structures of the system. Theoretically.Institutionalizing the Party System
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nature of interparty competition. In Western Europe. for instance. stability in the rules and nature of interparty competition and party existence. determining a minimum amount of votes that a candidate must obtain.

District Magnitude District magnitude (how many representatives are elected in a district) varies from one in a majoritarian system. All else being equal. the greater the district magnitude the higher the overall number of parties in parliament. in addition to thirteen seats allotted to national minorities. the average magnitude was reduced from 9.17 Before the 2000 election two seats were added bringing the total to 345. is likely to split off from a larger party. due to the electoral rules. Table 6. and form a new one between elections. and give it to the smaller party between elections. on the principle of proportional representation.
ELECTORAL AND PARTY LAW
Divergent electoral rules. An additional nine seats were reserved for national minorities.1 demonstrates that fragmentation in parliament has decreased significantly. Along the same lines of reasoning. Romanian deputies have been elected in county constituencies by closed list system or independent candidature. then the party law. he is likely to withdraw his voting support from the larger coalition. If the voter determines that the politician better represents his interests after she split off from the larger coalition. and finally the interaction of these two types of legislation. Furthermore. the more likely such splits become. the size of the parliament was reduced to 328 members. where the average magnitude is 1. her prospects for reelection are better if she runs as a representative of a smaller party.4.18
. whether they make the rules more permissive or more restrictive. Consequently. Compared to the baseline of the 1989/90 party and electoral law. As a result. while reinforcing larger parties and minority representation.6. the number of counties was increased to 42. This section first discusses the components of the Romanian electoral law. voters seek representation. threshold. is related to electoral volatility.8.142
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the following reason: politicians seek reelection.15 A politician who determines that. Since the first election in 1990. to all seats contested in a system of proportional representation. such as Hungary. the party law of 1996. it is to be expected that Romania will generally have a higher number of parties in parliament than countries where the magnitude is lower. Consequently. The more permissive the electoral rules. An average magnitude of 7. and district magnitude most significantly affect party fragmentation. the Hare formula.4 to 7. In 1992. the electoral law of 1992.8 is relatively high. and the electoral amendment of 1999 have contributed to this development. the number of elected representatives was 387 and the average district magnitude in the 41 counties was 9. and the higher the electoral volatility. Reduced fragmentation has occurred mainly at the expense of small parties and independent candidates. any change in electoral rules.16 In 1990.

1 percent of the vote respectively in the election preceding the adoption of the amendment. and subsequently to six in the 1996 election. the Chamber of deputies raised the electoral hurdle from 3 to 5 percent. Given the high magnitude it is. 1990 Party FSN19 PSDR22 PNL MER PNT-CD PER 8 UDMR AUR24 PSD (1) PDAR GDC PDM PLS PRNR PTLDR ULB NM25 Fragmentation in Parliament 1990 Seats 263 5 29 12 12 29 9 2 9 2 1 1 1 1 1 11 1992 Party FDSN20 PD-FSN21 CDR23 1992 Seats 117 43 82 1996 Party PDSR USD CDR 1996 Seats 91 53 122 2000 Party PSD (2) PD 31 PNL
143
2000 Seats 155
30
UDMR PUNR
27 30
UDMR PUNR
25 18
UDMR
27
13 PSM 13 PRM Seats Parties 16 341 7 PRM Seats Parties
15 19 343 6 PRM Seats Parties
18 84 345 5
Seats Parties
396 16
Sources: Datculescu and Liepelt.
.26 No threshold was applied in the 1990 election. which had proposed that an alliance would have to obtain an additional 5 percent for each member. therefore.Institutionalizing the Party System
Table 6. various issues. with an additional 1 percent for each member of a coalition up to 8 percent. 9 percent for those with three members and 10 percent for those with four or more members. eds. On 31 May 1999. The PDSR and the CDR received 21. (1991). electoral alliances including two members were required to obtain 8 percent of the vote.1. The PUNR. Moreover. not surprising that as many as sixteen political parties and organizations were represented in the parliament. Consequently. It refers to the minimum share a party must get in elections before obtaining seats in parliament.5 and 30.27 In 1992. This amendment is the result of a compromise reached by the PDSR. and Monitorul Official. the number of parties and coalitions represented in parliament after the 1992 election dropped to seven.
Threshold Vote threshold is another important constraint on fragmentation. a 3 percent national vote threshold was instituted.

4 percent.144
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which had received 4. all seats are taken into account. compensatory seats will further increase fragmentation. It then subtracts the seats already won in the basic districts and compensates the parties for the difference. opposed the amendment. The first party legislation passed in Romania after the Revolution was extremely permissive. which influences fragmentation. the more parties one would expect to see competing in a political system.29 Previously. after the change it is likely that. The party legislation also affects what types of parties will develop. the more permissive the party legislation is. regulates supplementary seats. on the other hand. what type of organization constitutes a party and how many members parties must register and where. a small party’s unused vote share will not suffice to receive an additional seat when competing with the number of unused votes received by large national parties. small parties receiving a sizable share of the vote in a district were compensated with a seat. The only real restrictions were the ban on fascist parties and the requirement that a party have 251 registered members. the Romanian upper tier became that of a nationwide.
PARTY LAW
Just as electoral law affects electoral competition. The former is basically an additional district. party law regulates the electoral participation of parties by stipulating. The two types of supplementary seats are additional and compensatory seats. Calculation of representation in that district is done according to D’Hondt. For instance. multimember compensatory district. personalistic. Romanian electoral law stipulated that compensatory seats were to be allotted on a territorial-administrative basis. catch-all parties are most likely to prosper where parties are not made to rely on voters through registration requirements or for finances.30 When one
.3 percent of the vote. for instance.28 Following adoption of the new electoral law before the election in 1992. which had received 4. as did the PRM. If fragmentation is expected to increase with increased proportionality. In 1990. All things being equal. correcting deviations from proportionality. for which the allocation of seats does not take primary district seat allocation into account. Compensatory Seats Another electoral rule. even though sizable. However. In the allocation of compensatory seats. The largest parties in each region were allotted additional seats in proportion to the number of unused votes they had received. The procedure calculates the seat shares of the parties based on their votes nationwide (or in the regions).

we must again consider its implications in conjunction with the electoral institutions. and the geographical restrictions on the location of founding members. restricted by both. no less than 300 from each county. organizations of citizens belonging to national minorities which fail to obtain 5 percent of the vote have the right to one deputy seat each. preventing regionally concentrated parties from achieving representation through coalitions in regions where they are not popular. Furthermore. Independent candidates and regionally concentrated parties are. one should bear in mind that 10.05 percent of registered voters in Romania. and independents contested the first election. relaxed by the electoral law when the group is a minority organization. According to the 1991 Constitution. as well as geographically concentrated parties. These founding members must be drawn from at least 15 counties. is nonetheless allowed to contest elections. According to this new legislation. The last piece of the Romanian electoral law that significantly affects the electoral strategies of parties and party system fragmentation is one which
.35 In addition. half a year before the election. alliances. a slightly more restrictive and a much more detailed version of the party law was passed. however. Romanian political parties must now submit a list of 10. In all seventy-three different parties.000 founding members to the Electoral Tribunal. as long as the party had received a sufficient number of votes to be awarded even one seat and independents were allowed to run for office without restrictions. more restrictive party law. the Hungarian Alliance.Institutionalizing the Party System
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considers that the electoral law imposed no minimum vote threshold on party representation in the legislature. these new laws weed out very small parties. While this requirement may appear significant. Given the increased number of founding members.36 Increased member and geographical restrictions of the party law are. while running alone in regions where they are. however. the extreme fragmentation in the first election is not surprising. the electoral law designates that organizations of national minorities participating in the elections shall be considered judicially equivalent to political parties.000 members represent only . thus.32 In order to determine the effect of this new.31
CHANGING PARTY AND ELECTORAL LAW
In 1996. unions. At the same time. electoral coalitions can only be formed at the national level.”34 and which is geographically very concentrated.33 Consequently. which does not define itself as a political party but as an “alliance of associated members. the electoral law stipulates that an independent candidate is only allowed to run if she can demonstrate that she is supported by at least 5 percent of the registered voters in the constituency where she has put up her candidature.

Other questionable practices were also observed. as the number of votes declared invalid rose to 13 percent. Scholars were therefore understandably concerned about intimidation and fraud. Foreign observers also witnessed various voting irregularities on polling day.
EFFECTS OF VOTING IRREGULARITIES AND ANTISYSTEM PARTIES
Unless accompanied by the compliance of political actors with constitutional rules. according to international observers procedures in that election. shall also receive subsidies. won the election in 1996 and. As the party leadership must approve and sign all nomination lists. to include parties beginning with the 1992 elections. parties which are not represented. a retroactive application of this law.38 Scholars agree that the fraud in 1990 and 1992 generally hurt the opposition CDR and the PNL.” Similarly. this provision strengthens the party leadership. represented a “discernable improvement in election administration.37 While the amounts in question may not suffice to make or break a party. constituting 10 percent of the cast ballots. international election observers agree that polls in 2000 demonstrated that
. The 1990 election campaign was characterized by the widespread intimidation of parties who opposed the FSN. however. the subsidies indisputably favor established parties.146
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appoints parties as the sole nominators of lists. Such allocation of funds to the party as an organization is likely to be managed by the leadership. In 1996. In addition. and the number of invalid votes. The law also stipulates that parties. or other groups. as opposed to open nomination processes where politicians rely on voters rather than the party leadership to be placed on a list.9 million to 17. were put on “special lists. Likewise. For instance.” which may have circumvented normal registration procedures. An unusually high number of people. which marked the first two sets of Romanian elections. at 7. shall receive subsidies from the government budget in proportion to their respective mandates. two of which had not been represented in parliament.5 percent. and many more were alleged.2 million shortly before the election. was abnormally high. Restrictive rules regarding the filing of complaints and the unavailability of electoral data below the county level compounded the problematic lack of accountability. which are represented in parliament. institutional consolidation is undermined. the number of eligible voters was increased from 15. thereby strengthening its position vis-à-vis the rank and file. translated into financial support for fifteen parties and organizations. The party organizations and leadership are further strengthened by the increased regulation of the finances of parties covered in the new party law. The opposition. but which received at least 2 percent of the popular vote. fraud was widely claimed after the 1992 elections. including both acceptable origins and amounts of donations.

led by Ion Iliescu. is that the FSN won 66 percent in the first parliamentary election. however. yet it “subsequently split. however. the FSN would still have gained at least a plurality in the 1990 elections. the popularity of the PRM can be interpreted as an economic protest vote while. The reason. free. Furthermore. despite some minor problems the assessment is that in general Romania’s current “legal and administrative framework promote an election process that is accountable. but in its absence the successor party.Institutionalizing the Party System
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“democratic elections are firmly entrenched in Romania. and equal. a much larger faction of the original FSN.2 shows.” Furthermore. one must worry about increasing xenophobia. the remnant of that coalition took only 10 percent of the vote at the second election. fair. total volatility increases by only 4 percent while party system fragmentation is reduced greatly. one author argues that Romania’s volatility between the 1990 and 1992 elections was 63 percent (meaning that 63 percent of those who voted changed their party allegiance). the measure has presented certain problems. as the last row in table 6. For instance. Iliescu’s faction won a plurality in the second
. more pessimistically. particularly the PRM. However. and all 13 percent to the CDR in the second. vote figures from the first two elections have to be taken with a grain of salt. FDSN. where party systems are established. which kept a part of the name in the second election. scholars are currently more worried about the popularity of antisystem41 parties. however.
APPARENT OR REAL VOLATILITY?
While the evidence above indicates that Romanian political parties are institutionalizing. Optimistically. scholars worry that Romanian voters are still unusually volatile in their electoral preferences. does not change the fact that the institutions discussed above are mechanically reducing fragmentation of the Romanian party system.42 The greater the volatility. also competed in the second and the third elections. which won 19. In Eastern Europe. the more voters switch between parties from one election to the next. Despite the fraud.5 percent of the vote in the 2000 national election. changing names and leaders. The application of the volatility measure is fairly straightforward in Western democracies. even if we attribute all the invalid votes to the PNT-CD (the principal party in the CDR) and the PNL in the first election.”39 Unfortunately. might have lost the 1992 parliamentary elections. This. transparent.40 While the political consequences of fraud are serious. he posits. and scholars can simply trace the names of political parties back from one election to the next. where parties are merging and splitting. due to the alleged fraud.”43 However the article does not explain that the “remnant” discussed is Petre Roman’s faction.

The PD ran alone while the PSDR joined the PDSR in a new party called the PDS..g. the coalition platform is usually some mixture of the older parties’ platforms. Thus. any vote that the former opposition parties in the new PDS were able to attract as a result of voters dissatisfaction with the rule of the CDR does constitute volatility. Similarly. the electoral victory of the CDR was not quite as impressive as it might otherwise have appeared. there can also be some defection of voters who do not like the coalition partners of “their” party. according to Crowther. a voter selecting a party according to its platform is likely to vote for the coalition in the absence of her old party. the new votes the PRM was able to attract due to voter dissatisfaction with the governing parties does indeed constitute volatility. For the sake of party survival and for party patronage. parties in a coalition usually make sure to distinguish themselves within the coalition.53 However. and the electoral volatility not quite as high. we cannot count new coalition votes as votes for new parties. and came in second in the third election. be offset by voters who did not like any of the coalition parties in previous elections. Thus. was not a new party but a coalition of parties that have competed in every election since 1989. Indeed. Likewise many of the shifts and changes in the Romanian political spectrum before the 2000 election did not constitute volatility (e.
. Of course. Consequently. however. He contends that the discord is aimed at distinguishing the parties from one another on dimensions other than issue-related politics. The vote that the PSDR brought to the PDS as a result of the split and merger is not a new vote and does not constitute volatility. in order to appeal to specific parts of the electorate. The original FSN voters simply split between Roman’s party and Iliescu’s party in the second election. the USD coalition split). or as a part of a larger party. one cannot argue that the PDSR’s vote share in the second election is a vote share for a new party. the Democratic Convention. In short. However. but who did like the coalition formation enough to vote for it. the winner of the 1996 parliamentary elections in Romania. whether in a coalition. This defection may. Consequently. Similarly.Institutionalizing the Party System
149
election. All of this is common knowledge in Romania.52 continued inter-elite attacks and divisions in Romanian politics can be traced to intra-group competition among ideologically similar parties. any additional vote that the PRM got in the 2000 election as a result of giving the personalistic PUNR’s former leader Funar a leading party position is not volatility. volatility of electoral preferences does not occur unless the voter changes her vote between elections to another party which previously was not associated with the party for which she originally voted. Furthermore.

4 percent. He posits that. Between the third and fourth election. where actual volatility54 measured 25. it is institutionalizing at a pace consistent with other newly democratizing countries. volatility of electoral preferences increased again to 19. on the other hand. such as the economic performance of the incumbent government. the electoral volatility should decrease. less viable parties and independent candidates have been augmented. In the newly formed party systems of Japan. the level of Romanian volatility is caused by factors that would cause voters to switch parties in any system. the political forces in Romania had “consolidated into two broad groupings” in terms of attitudes toward economics and minorities. particularly increasing thresholds and the more restrictive party law. however. As the number of elections increases.15 percent. Crowther. the barriers to the entry of smaller. current Romanian electoral volatility is not unusually high. This is. there may be an adjustment period as the public and politicians “learn” to play according to the new rules. average volatility during 1948–1959 was over 20 percent. or become more programmatic with increasingly strong roots in society is. have contributed to the solidification of the existing viable parties. Whether the individual parties will continue their development as clientelistic catch-all parties led by charismatic leaders. Rather. disagrees. as early as before the 1992 elections. as well as minority organizations.150
Jóhanna Kristín Birnir
ACTUAL VOLATILITY OF ELECTORAL PREFERENCES
In any system where new electoral rules are being implemented. still up for debate. the case in Romania. length of time since redemocratization. and a change in the institutions that govern elections as discussed previously. Kitschelt argues that with the exception of Albania. and if we account for fraud. in fact. West Germany. Moreover. and Italy. he maintains that these key dimensions are “associated with historical divi-
. and French volatility during that time was 21 percent. It is therefore safe to say that while the Romanian party system is still quite fluid.37 percent between the first and second elections. to just over 8 percent. Meanwhile. Compared to those party systems. Romania is less likely than any of the other East European countries to develop a party system based on programmatic competition.
CONCLUSION
The considerable reduction in both the fragmentation and the volatility of the Romanian party system demonstrates that recent changes in electoral legislation. however. Between the second and third election volatility had dropped to 11.

1997).” in Electoral Studies. 2. pp. Giovanni Sartori.” in K. 3.
. 1999). 1997). University of Strathclyde. and Romania (Westport. and Tóka. eds. Huntington. and Stefano Bartolini and Peter Mair. These are fragmentation and volatility. Samuel P. 5. 6. is the institutionalization of the party system. Poland. Scully. no. 7. M. Keith Crawford. “Romania” in Handbook of Political Change in Eastern Europe (forthcoming). Maurice Duverger. Seymour M. Hungary. Petre Datculescu. Parties and Voters: Studies from Bulgaria. 1954). CT: Praeger.. 1996). 1967). see chapter 8 in this volume by Paul Sum and Gabriel Ba ˘descu. The focus of this chapter. despite the establishment of a democratic institutional framework. 1989). Shugart. eds. 1998). Party Systems and Voter Alignments: Cross-National Perspectives (New York: Free Press. Parties and Party Systems: A Framework for Analysis (New York: Cambridge University Press. “a civic commitment to the values and institutions of the emerging democracy” is missing in Romania. 5. Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven: Yale University Press. et al. 1995). University of Strathclyde. p. however. The New Parliaments of Central and Eastern Europe (London: Frank Cass. Cleavages. Olson and P. What Is Different about Post-Communist Party Systems? (Glasgow: Centre for the Study of Public Policy. CT: Yale University Press. 1990).. Political Parties: Their Organization and Activity in the Modern State (New York: Wiley. University of Strathclyde.. 17. Seats and Votes: The Effects and Determinants of Electoral Systems (New Haven. “Negative and Positive Party Identification in Post-Communist Countries. William Crowther and Steven Roper. For further discussion of measuring fragmentation. “How the Voters Respond.. “A Comparative Analysis of Institutional Development in the Romanian and Moldovan Legislatures. Norton. Making Votes Count: Strategic Coordination in the World’s Electoral Systems (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. DC: National Council For Eurasian and East European Research. and William Crowther. 1996). Lipset and Stein Rokkan. According to Vladimir Tisma ˘neanu. Gábor Tóka. 1996). For a further analysis of Romanian attitudes toward democratic values and practices. The measures of consolidation I use are commonly employed in the literature to gauge institutionalization of the party system.152
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NOTES
1. and Electoral Availability: The Stabilisation of European Electorates 1885–1985 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Cox. Communism and Post-Communism in Romania: Challenges to Democratic Transition (Washington.” in D. Richard Rose and William Mishler. Party Systems in East Central Europe Consolidation or Fluidity (Glasgow: Centre for the Study of Public Policy. eds. Gary W. Scott Mainwaring and Timothy R. East Central European Politics Today: From Chaos to Stability? (Manchester: Manchester University Press. 217–34. 4. vol. 1968). Herbert Kitschelt. and Peter Mair. Lawson. Competition. 2 (June 1988). Building Democratic Institutions: Party Systems in Latin America (Stanford: Stanford University Press. 1995). Political Parties and Democratic Consolidation in East Central Europe (Glasgow: Centre for the Study of Public Policy. 1976). See Rein Taagepera and Matthew S. the Czech Republic. and it does not address the existence or absence of civic commitment to that system. Identity. Political Parties.

pp. 1971). Electoral Laws and Their Political Consequences. 69. 1994). Otto Kirchheimer. vol. vol. 8. Bernard Grofman and Arend Lijphart. 1984). 1986). Building the Institutional Framework: Electoral
. Electoral Laws. Shugart and John M.. fragmentation thus refers to fragmentation in parliament. Duverger. 27 (February 1995). According to Przeworski the formal definition is: 1 2 ͉⌬Vi(t)͉ ⌺ iϭ1
K
where t denotes the election and K that all parties that obtained votes in either election are counted. 515–34. 9. Grofman and Lijphart. 5. the higher the institutionalization of the party system.” in Lijphart and Grofman. 1948–1977. Electoral Laws and Their Political Consequences (New York: Agathon Press. Presidents and Assemblies: Constitutional Design and Electoral Dynamics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Shugart. no. 1945–1990 (Oxford: Oxford University Press. “The Transformation of West European Party Systems.. 1966). Carey. pp.. “Developing Party Organizations in East-Central Europe. Taagepera and Shugart. eds. The standard measure is Adam Przeworski’s “Institutionalization of Voting Patterns. vol. or Is Mobilization the Source of Decay?” in American Political Science Review. pp. Parties and Party Systems. “Changing Patterns of Electoral Volatility in European Systems. Rae. NJ: Princeton University Press. Herbert Kitschelt et al. 143–60. In this chapter. 1992). 49–67. 13. Rein Taagepera. Petr Kopecky. 1. Seats and Votes. Arend Lijphart. “Duverger’s Law Revisited. Matthew S. 3–27. NJ: Princeton University Press. Duverger. and Mainwaring and Scully. vol. Realignment or De-alignment? (Princeton. eds. Political Parties.. no. 10. 1991). This measure is also attributed to Mogens Pedersen.Institutionalizing the Party System
153
see Sartori. Kitschelt. Douglas W.” in Hans Daalder and Peter Mair. 4 (1995).” Party Politics. Electoral Change in Advanced Industrial Democracies. Russell J.” in Joseph LaPalombara and Myron Weiner (eds. “Effective Number of Parties: A Measure with Application to West Europe. Political Parties and Political Development (Princeton. I count as viable parties only those that have achieved representation in parliament. pp. CT: Yale University Press. “The Structure of the Vote in Post Communist Party Systems: The Bulgarian Example. Building Democratic Institutions. vol. 1 (April 1979). William H. Adam Przeworski. Riker. 12. Electoral Systems and Party Systems: A Study of Twenty-Seven Democracies. no. Electoral volatility denotes the percentage of votes gained by any one party and lost by any other party in each election. “Book Review of Arter’s Parties and Democracy in the Post Soviet Republics.” Party Politics. 12. Markku Laakso and Rein Taagepera. 2 (1999). the lower the electoral volatility. 1984). pp. CA: Sage. According to Przeworski. Western European Party Systems: Continuity and Change (Thousand Oaks. no.” Comparative Political Studies.” European Journal of Political Research. 253–54. Choosing an Electoral System: Issues and Alternatives (New York: Praeger. Arend Lijphart and Bernard Grofman. The Political Consequences of Electoral Laws (New Haven.). Dalton et al. Matthew S.. eds. 1 (March 1975). Democracy and the Market: Political and Economic Reforms in Eastern Europe and Latin America (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 11. 1983). Party Systems. Political Parties.

CT: Yale University Press. and Mures ¸. Vîlcea. the opposite should have been expected. and the PER. The coalition includes the merger of the PDSR and the PSDR into Partidul Social Democrat and the PUR. 23. exceptions to this expectation. no. In the 1992 elections. 16. theoretically. 239–74. Gorj. 21. Hungary uses a “mixed” (proportional and majoritarian) electoral system and 176 of the primary districts are single member districts. Teleorman. 113. AUR Changed to PUNR before the 1992 election. and Neamt ¸. however. David R. 11 in Baca ˘u. In 1992. 17. 2 (July 1995). “Making Votes Count: Strategic Coordination in the World’s Electoral Systems. Cluj. Congress: The Electoral Connection (New Haven.. Sibiu. Sa ˘laj. Crowther and Roper. “A Comparative Perspective on the Leninist Legacy in Eastern Europe. and remaining seats are given to the parties with the largest remainders of votes. In 1992. 1994). and Olga Shvetsova. Galat ¸i. The ADM in the remaining 20 PR districts is 7. See Cox. and Dolj. the CDR included the PSDR. The agricultural sector Ilfov was not considered a separate county in the 1990 elections. 25. Satu Mare. Iliescu’s faction ran as FDSN. 2 (Spring 1994). In the 1992 elections.154
Jóhanna Kristín Birnir
Systems. no. Harghita. 19. There are. the general concern before the 1992 elections in Romania was that electoral rule changes would increase fragmentation. fragmentation actually did decrease. 24. Before the 1996 election the party split from the CDR. 724–25. In 2000 the PNL split from the CDR and ran alone. and Timis ¸. Olt. Ialomit ¸a. Cox. Caras ¸-Severin. 7 in Arad. Party Systems. Making Votes Count. 1974). Current magnitudes per county are 4 in Covasna. no. 28. Elena Stefoi-Sava. 15. which in the first elec-
. 5 in Bistrit ¸a-Na ˘sa ˘ud. et al. Bras ¸ov. 12 in Iasi. 9 in Bihor. Ca ˘la ˘ras ¸i. and Presidents (Berkeley: University of California Press. and. PNT-CD. For a list of acronyms and full party names in both Romanian and English. FDGR—Forumul Democratic al Germanilor din România and UDRR—Uniunea Democratica ˘ al Romilor din România are minority organizations. According to Crowther and Roper (“A Comparative Analysis”). and Vrancea. Mayhew. 4 (Winter 1998). and Vaslui. The parties are given as many seats as they have won quotas.” East European Constitutional Review. The FSN split in March 1992. Alegerile Parlamentare Si Prezidentiale—Texte Legale Comentate. no. divides the total number of valid votes cast by the district magnitude. 8 in Dîmbovit ¸a. PNL. and empirically. vol. see table 6. 29 in Bucures ¸ti.3. vol. 14. finally. and Barbara Geddes. “Permissive and restrictive” refers to the extent to which the electoral parameters resist entry of parties into a system. pp. Girgiu. According to Lijphart (Electoral Systems).” Comparative Political Studies. and ran in the USD coalition along with the PD-FSN. Botos ¸ani. MER. 18. Constant ¸a. In the 1996 elections. In the 1996 elections the FDSN changed its name to PDSR. Tulcea. and Prahova. The largest remainder system. “A Comparative Analysis”. the PSDR joined the CDR. the Hare quota is impartial as between large and small parties and tends to yield close to proportional results. 10 in Arges ¸. Mihai Constantinescu. In 2000 the PD ran alone again. and the agricultural sector Ilfov. Bra ˘ila. vol. “Electoral Law in Eastern Europe: Romania. Making Votes Count. 6 in Alba. As I show in this chapter.” Political Science Quarterly. 4. In 2000 PDSR stands for Polul-Democrat Social din România.6. Monitorul Oficial. Hunedoara. and Mehedint ¸i. Petre Roman’s faction ran as PD-FSN. 22. pp. 164 (1992). Maramures ¸. Buza ˘u. which uses Hare quota. 20. Suceava. due to a dispute between Iliescu and Roman. the PD-FSN joined the USD coalition along with the PSDR.

the PNL ran as a part of the CDR. PNL. however. 43.4 to 11. The volatility is the difference between the CDR vote share in 1992. Linz and Alfred Stepan. The PSDR 1990 share is included so as not to count switching of coalitions as volatility. and the combined vote share of the coalition partners of the PSDR. these parties would still only have received 38 and 23 seats respectively to the FSN’s 262 seats. and PER in 1990. as there are generally up to 2 percent of invalid votes in paper-ballot system (according to Carey.” Party Politics. 44. In 1992. the ratio of votes to seats for the three largest parties was around 122 percent. MD: Johns Hopkins University Press. The volatility is a measure of the difference between the vote share of the FSN in 1990. My calculations are not biased toward obtaining a lower volatility number when compared to Rose’s calculations. Rose’s count. 46. it is also unusual that as much as 10 percent of votes are cast on special lists. It is. MER. 47. If we assume that all 13 percent of invalid votes were cast for the CDR. and parties other than the CDR might have been beneficiaries of some of the lost vote. however. Richard Rose. eds. Antisystem parties undermine the legitimacy of the regime. either in lost votes or reduced gain of votes. According to Przeworski’s index. Mobilizing. possible that some of that vote can be attributed to fraud as well. since there was no threshold in the 1990 elections. 126 is divided by half. 42. In 1992 and 1996. still includes all parties that obtained above 1 percent of the vote. 41. An alternative measure does not account for the 1990 PSDR vote share. 26. However. 49. Rose includes all parties that received over 1 percent as well as “others. Even if all of the invalid votes were attributed to fraud and divided between the PNL and the PNT-CD. 26–27. no. 4 (October 1995). 45. Nonetheless. Rose. vol. 1978).
. therefore. because I count as volatility loss of votes from parties that in the second election did not pass the 3 percent threshold or merge with other parties. p. unlikely that the difference is quite that large. and the vote of the PSDR in the 1990 election because PSDR was a part of the CDR coalition in 1992. often with serious consequences. which might further change the above results. pp. only increases USD’s volatility to 2.9. The volatility for the USD after the 1996 election is the difference between the USD vote in 1996.7. Since the PSDR switched coalitions between elections the volatility of the PSD is the difference between the combined vote of the USD and the PDSR in 1996 and the combined vote of the PSD and PD in 2000. The volatility of the PNL is the difference between the vote of the CDR in 1996 and the combined vote share of the PNL and the 5 percent that the CDR received in the 2000 election. This. It is.156
Jóhanna Kristín Birnir
40. The ratio of official votes to seats was proportional in 1990. the party would have received approximately 140 seats to the FDSN’s 115 seats. PNT-CDM..” My volatility calculations include only parties with seats. Juan J. I include parties that received well below 1 percent of the vote share. out of a maximum of 200 percent. however. which increases the overall volatility from 11. and the combined vote share of the FDSN and PD-FSN in 1992. and the combined vote of the PD-FSN in the previous election. According to Rose. The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes (Baltimore. “Irregularities or Rigging”). 48. “Mobilizing Demobilized Voters in Post-Communist Societies. 1. The vote loss of the CDR is accounted for automatically. the sum of changes in the vote for parties amounted to 126 percent.

that 13 percent are added to the vote of the CDR in 1992. but the PUNR was never subsumed and ran in the 2000 election in a separate coalition called the Partidul Aliant ¸a Nat ¸ionala with the PNR (Romanian National Party) whose leader Magureanu is the former head of the Securitate. The volatility of the PRM is the difference between the combined vote of the PUNR and the PRM in 1996 and the vote of the PRM in 2000.5 percent are added to the vote of the CDR in 1996. For parties that joined coalitions. 52. Tudor announced plans to merge the PRM and PUNR. 55.” I measure the change in the “offspring” vote separately. pp. Crowther.25 percent gets added to vote percentage of the PLN and the PNTS-CD in 1990. This calculation assumes that 3. Handbook. 51. the PUNR was built around its leader Funar who joined the PRM before the 2000 election. I measure the difference between the aggregate vote for the individual parties in the election before the coalition was formed and the aggregate vote for the coalition.Institutionalizing the Party System
157
50. For parties that split between elections. For the second election after the coalition was formed. Calculating volatility. 53. Crowther. In the second election after a split from a “mother party. I measure the change in vote for the coalition between elections. and 6. 301–2. I trace the origin of all the parties and coalitions competing in each election. The reason the PUNR vote gets counted with the PRM vote is that even though the PUNR was not subsumed by the PRM. Funar was subsequently chosen as the general secretary of the PRM. On 16 November 1998. I measure the aggregate change in the “offspring” vote in the first election after the split compared to the vote for the “mother party” in the previous election. 54. Handbook.
.

.

and while the parliament passed thousands of laws. Parliamentary oversight of the executive was minimal. Roper
Throughout the 1990s. and the president had avoided since 1990. the government. the Union of Social Democracy (USD). While parliamentary activity has increased. economic. The 1996 elections finally provided the country with an opportunity to address issues that the parliament. legislative activity in crucial areas. Romania and its parliament face significant obstacles. and help reassert parliamentary control over the legislative process. there have been many defections from parliamentary groups. the Romanian parliament confronts the concomitant problem of developing as an institution to meet twenty-first-century challenges while dealing with the political. The formation of a parliamentary coalition between the Democratic Convention of Romania (CDR). and as a consequence. and the Hungarian Democratic Union of Romania (UDMR) was supposed to increase executive and legislative cooperation. the promise and optimism of 1996 has faded. Public opinion polls showed that the parliament was the least respected state institution. However. or more specifically. such as industrial privatization and land reform. a premier-presidential regime1 fashioned on the French Fifth Republic in which President Ion Iliescu wielded dominant power and heavily influenced the composition and agenda of the country’s first three governments.7
Parliamentary Development
Steven D. Entering the new millennium. Fighting within the parliamentary coalition thwarted necessary reforms. was virtually nonexistent. and the institution continues to be held in low repute. the Romanian parliament was considered a weak and ineffective institution. Parliamentary development during the Communist period was severely limited. The country adopted a semipresidential.
159
.

and 1937). and Transylvania into “Greater Romania. Next. I examine the historical antecedents of the current parliament. and the parliament increasingly came under the control of King Carol II. The subordination of the parliament to other political bodies intensified during the Communist period. Unlike other Communist-era parliaments.160
Steven D. according to Mary Ellen Fischer. especially in regard to the presidency. and scandal racked the parliament. 1928. The bicameral structure of the post-Communist parliament is based on the arrangement first adopted in the 1866 constitution. and observe how the interwar and Communist legacies have had a significant influence on the current process of parliamentary development.
HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS
Given Romanian parliamentary history over the past 130 years. corruption. it is not surprising that the post-Communist parliaments have been so poorly developed. During the interwar period. Following World War I and the incorporation of Bessarabia.5
. the parliament never successfully developed autonomy.” several necessary political and economic reforms were enacted.3 The 1938 constitution granted the king considerable power. I analyze the parliament’s institutional structure and the impact of postCommunist institutional choices on policy debates. politics were dominated by personalities such as King Carol I and Dimitrie Sturdza. which further undermined the parliament’s authority. During this period. suffrage was extremely limited. Romania had only three fair elections (1919. he abolished all parties. Finally. and that they have allowed the president and the government to usurp legislative power.4 Even after several parliamentary reforms enacted in the mid-1970s. the initial promise of democracy soon gave way to authoritarianism. the Central Committee remained the superior body. I explore the development of the parliament and its relationship with the government. factionalism. First. She notes an extremely high turnover rate in the Assembly. Roper
and social legacies of the Communist past. and there was significant cabinet instability. Leading up to World War I. Furthermore.2 During the interwar period. Bukovina. Keith Hitchens observed that while there was a belief in the early 1920s that parliamentary democracy would finally be instituted in Romania. This chapter examines the factors that have influenced Romanian parliamentary development since 1990. and this parliamentary culture established a pattern that continues today. and less than a month after the adoption of the constitution. the Romanian Communist parliament (Grand National Assembly) never developed autonomy from the Central Committee or Politburo.

7 the flexibility of that system and the fact that voters directly elect the president have had the consequence that France has effectively functioned as a presidential regime for most of the Fifth Republic. the constitution provides the president far more influence over the parliament than does the Romanian constitution. only five parties had the number of deputies required to constitute a parliamentary group. Structure of the First Post-Communist Parliament Immediately after the May 1990 national elections. Several FSN members of parliament (MPs) used the drafting of the constitution to avoid addressing economic reforms. and its second established the structure and the responsibilities of the FSN Council.6 From the beginning. it is understandable why Iliescu was also able to influence the legislative process. the Assembly passed standing orders establishing parliamentary groups as the parliament’s working bodies. The Permanent Bureau consisted of a chair (who was also the chair of the Assembly of Deputies). In the electoral law for the 1990 national elections. Given Romania’s affinity for French culture. in the case of the Fifth Republic. However.8 With the French experience in mind. there were eight parliamentary groups in the first session of the Assembly (see table 7. this decision was not surprising. Of the eighteen parties that won contested seats. Both chambers were organized based on these groups. Although the French president has few institutional means to directly influence legislation.1) and three in the Senate. and other leadership positions. Romania adopted a premier-presidential system. four secretaries. Even though the parliament was a constituent assembly. the parliament was referred to as a constituent assembly. the Assembly of Deputies and the Senate drafted standing orders. In June 1990. with Iliescu as president. it still had to organize itself and behave as a legislative institution. the permanent commissions. and two quaestors. and they were responsible for selecting MPs for assignment to the Permanent Bureau. The provisional government’s first decree named Petre Roman prime minister.9 Article 2 of the standing orders mandated that a parliamentary group had to consist of at least ten deputies who were on election lists. four vice chairs. Article 2 also stated that MPs who were members of parties or political formulations that did not meet the ten-member requirement could form a parliamentary group or join an already existing group. As a consequence. The primary task of the new parliament was to draft a constitution.Parliamentary Development
161
THE FIRST POST-COMMUNIST PARLIAMENT (1990–1992)
A few critical choices made in late 1989 and early 1990 regarding the National Salvation Front (FSN) and the provisional government strongly influenced the development of the parliament.
.

For example. Arrangement of Territory. proposals. and Town Planning. the 1990 Senate was one-third the size of the Assembly. and mediation commissions. the FSN held most of the leadership positions in the two chambers. The Assembly allotted a certain number of Permanent Bureau seats to each parliamentary group. Therefore. For example. Like its U. While FSN MPs held only 54 percent of the seats on the Commission for the Ecological Equilibrium and Protection of the Environment.S. and reports from commissions.
Steven D. 2–14. The Permanent Bureau was responsible for legislative and organizational matters of the Assembly when it convened ordinary sessions. while the FSN held almost 68 percent of the Assembly’s seats. counterpart.1. and held key portfo-
.
The configuration of the Permanent Bureau reflected the proportional representation of parties.10 Legislative History (1990–1992) Although there were eight legislative groups in the parliament. 89 (1 July 1990). and received and distributed bills. The FSN parliamentary group was underrepresented on commissions because it enjoyed an absolute majority in parliament. Roper
Assembly of Deputies Parliamentary Groups 1990
Agrarian and Socialist Democratic Group Ecological and Social-Democratic Group Hungarian Democratic Union of Romania Group National Salvation Front Group National Minorities Group National Liberal Party Group National Peasants Party-Christian Democratic Group Romanian National Union Group
Source: Monitorul Oficial al României. Election to the permanent commissions was to be based on proportional representation. the Assembly had permanent. pp. Even though the party possessed an absolute majority in the parliament.162
Table 7. no. no Senate seats were allocated to ethnic minority parties. they held over 73 percent of the seats on the Commission for Central and Local Administration. joint. The presidents of both the Assembly and the Senate were FSN members. However. the Romanian Senate exercised legislative power equivalent to the lower house. this principle has been repeatedly violated. The distribution of permanent commission seats indicated the importance that the FSN leadership attached to different legislative issues. though there were differences. FSN MPs held just over 60 percent of the permanent commission seats. this group offered additional seats to some of the other parliamentary groups with which it was affiliated. inquiry. special. In contrast with the practice in the lower house. with a total of 119 seats. Unlike in other European parliaments.

Table 7. As the parliament debated economic legislation. however. In order to mollify them. MPs became divided over the pace and substance of reform. However. that he had accepted the resignation of the entire cabinet and named Finance Minister Theodor Stolojan prime minister. Number of Parliamentary Laws and Presidential Decrees Parliamentary Laws 42 82 130 95 146 139 142 220 261 Presidential Decrees 27 80 155 190 287 390 593 572 476
Year Decrees 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
Source: Monitorul Oficial al României.11 its leaders. despite the fact that Iliescu had not consulted the parliament on Roman’s resignation and had thereby effectively usurped parliamentary authority.2 shows that during 1990 and 1991.12 However. The parliament took no action against the president’s decision. Compiled by the author. it was clear that the FSN coalition had fragmented around the issue of economic reform. At that time. Roman and Iliescu. This is just one of the reasons why the legislative output during the first post-Communist parliament was so low. finding consensus on economic matters proved to be difficult. In September 1991. Jonathan Eyal argues that the inherent weakness of first post-Communist parliament provided Iliescu an opportunity to repeatedly subvert parliamentary power.2. Roman protested that he had not resigned but nevertheless handed in his mandate. and two separate factions developed around Iliescu and Roman. Because the FSN was a catch-all party.Parliamentary Development
163
lios in the government. Not until early 1991 did the parliament began to address privatization and other aspects of economic reform.
. a move which he evidently felt did not include himself. The privatization law passed in August 1991 became the basis of the first mass privatization program. held different views on the pace of economic reform. miners from the Jiu Valley descended on Bucharest to protest their declining living standards. only 124 laws were passed. President Iliescu announced. The debate was managed and largely kept within the party until the end of 1991. Roman wanted more reform and privatization than Iliescu. by the time the parliament acted. This was the lowest legislative activity during the entire decade. it was unnecessary for him to subvert the parliament because it had already delegated
Table 7. Prime Minister Petre Roman offered to reshuffle the cabinet.

but the president has few legislative powers. Following the adoption of the constitution by national referendum on 8 December 1991. At the end of the second day.
DRAFTING THE 1991 CONSTITUTION
The membership of the constitution drafting committee reflected the parties’ parliamentary strength. Although the FDSN held no government portfolios. most of them left the convention. the parliament maintained the French practice whereby members could not hold government portfolios. The FDSN used its
. Initially. the newly created Democratic National Salvation Front (FDSN) held its first national convention. They felt that it granted too much power to the executive. This further undermines the autonomy of the parliament. The victorious Roman wing refused to consider the nomination of a presidential candidate. Iliescu issued almost as many decrees (107) as pieces of legislation passed by the parliament (see table 7. On the third and final day of the convention. several FSN MPs renounced their party membership (most of the FSN MPs were Iliescu supporters) and decided to create a new party.14 Significantly. which publicly demonstrated the division between the Iliescu and Roman supporters. the FSN held its national convention. but the constitution allowed MPs also to hold government positions. The next day. FSN members and other MPs overwhelmingly adopted the constitution in November 1991. However. the tension within the FSN escalated. Iliescu made it clear to his party that he wanted to continue a strong presidency. therefore. then the distinction between these institutions is eroded. almost all of the members of the National Peasant Christian Democrat Party (PNT ¸CD) and the UDMR voted against the constitution. If individuals can hold seats in the parliament and government portfolios.13 This is one of the reasons why during the 1990–1991 period. In June. Roman was reelected party leader. Roper
much of its responsibilities to the executive. the next task for Romania’s first post-Communist parliament was to establish a date for new elections. the delegates discussed the forthcoming national elections.164
Steven D. These factions presented draft platforms at the convention concerning the party’s economic policy. the Romanian president’s constitutional powers are actually rather modest. Between the constitutional referendum in December 1991 and the September 1992 national elections.2). As in France. The most crucial issue confronting the committee was the distribution of power between the parliament and the executive. the constitution provides emergency powers to the president and the authority to propose referenda. Iliescu’s supporters considered this decision an attempt to embarrass the president and. within three months it held a majority of seats in the Senate and more than fifty seats in the lower house. In March 1992.

Unlike the 1990 national elections. The FSN was fragmented while the opposition was a much stronger force. Iliescu was reelected with 61 percent of the second-round vote.
THE SECOND POST-COMMUNIST PARLIAMENT (1992–1996)
The political environment in September 1992 had changed considerably from the first election. However.15 However. and many polls predicted a CDR victory. the 1992 elections saw no clear majority party. and the National Liberal Party (PNL). the FDSN held a plurality of seats and began discussions regarding the creation of a coalition government. and privatization. the PNT ¸CD. The economic failure was attributed to the September national elections. the number of presidential decrees increased. education. in July the parliament passed several amendments to the law governing unemployment benefits thereby providing additional benefits by indexing wages to inflation. The newly formed CDR was an opposition coalition composed of several parties including the UDMR. and the Stolojan government undertook an export-led growth policy to rebuild the industrial sector. the parliament passed a number of laws reversing whatever economic reform had occurred. Iliescu and the FDSN were able to obtain substantial funding and significant media coverage. no single party enjoyed an absolute majority. In the months preceding the election. and in addition. were postponed until September. During the pre-electoral period. For example. there was electoral fraud in the 1992 national elections. Iliescu issued 118 decrees ranging from appointments to issues dealing with the criminal code. The FSN received only 10 percent of the parliamentary seats. parliamentary and presidential activity increased. In the meantime the 1992 national elections. Between January and September 1992.16 The CDR had done extremely well in the March 1992 local elections. Iliescu appointed
. This action fueled inflation and increased the budget deficit. In the presidential race. The party received approximately 28 percent of the popular vote (which translated into 35 percent of the parliamentary seats) while the CDR won just over 20 percent of the popular vote (approximately 25 percent of the parliamentary seats). How was the newly formed FDSN able to consolidate its power so quickly? Undoubtedly.17 Following the 1992 parliamentary elections.Parliamentary Development
165
support in the parliament to delay the passage of a new electoral law. however. In early 1992. the FDSN proved far more successful in the elections than the polls had predicted. during this time. which were initially scheduled for early summer. which prevented the government from really pursuing economic reform. Also. the trade deficit and GDP did not improve. He issued more decrees in the months before the 1992 national elections than in all 1990–1991. Romania was experiencing hyperinflation.

Article 18 of the new standing orders prohibited MPs from switching membership from one parliamentary group to another or from creating new parliamentary groups. Unlike the first parliament.3. The new
Table 7. Roper
Nicolae Vacariou as the new prime minister. mainly the CDR. the number of parliamentary groups actually increased from eight to eleven (see table 7.3). Because the FDSN only had a plurality of seats. the Greater Romania Party (PRM). In the second parliament. the percentage of MPs who were returned was only 22 percent. which had afflicted many East European parliaments. there was a clear opposition. it unofficially and covertly formed a coalition government with these parties. no. Therefore. Based on calculations for the House. the percentage of MPs who were reelected in 1992 was quite low. and the Socialist Labor Party (PSM). the number of contested seats in the lower house was reduced from 387 to 328. it was allowed to keep its status as a parliamentary group. and FDSN members were chosen to preside over the renamed House of Deputies18 and the Senate. and several extremist parties including the Party of Romanian National Unity (PUNR). pp. 286 (16 November 1992). In addition. 2–16. However.166
Steven D. House of Deputies Parliamentary Groups. Structure of the Second Post-Communist Parliament Based on a new representational formula adopted for the 1992 national elections. its members held almost all the government portfolios.
.19 This requirement was added to the standing orders so that parties that did not meet the 3 percent electoral threshold (instituted for the 1992 parliamentary elections) could not be represented. 1992
Civic Alliance Party Group Democratic Party Group Greater Romania Party Group Hungarian Democratic Union of Romania Group Liberal Group National Minorities Group National Peasants Party–Christian Democratic and Romanian Group Ecological Party Group Party of Romanian National Unity Group Party of Social Democracy of Romania Group Social Democratic Party of Romania Group Socialist Group
Source: Monitorul Oficial al României. Article 18 was an attempt by the Romanian parliament to prevent the problem of party fragmentation and volatility. when the FDSN changed its name to the Party of Social Democracy in Romania (PDSR) in June 1993. While the number of parties represented in the House decreased after the 1992 national elections.

the Permanent Bureau was now required to provide administrative support to parliamentary groups. While the overall proportion of seats was equal. Religious Denominations. and the House commission system was not altered. the FDSN held 44 percent of the seats on the important Commission on Industries and Services and only 27 percent of the seats on the Commission on Human Rights. The new standing orders adopted in June 1993 did not substantially change the legislative process of the Senate but did affect parliamentary groups. and in fact.21 As in the case of the House. the principle of proportionality was violated on certain commissions. the number of Senate seats increased from 119 to 143. Unlike in the House. and perhaps as a consequence. This illustrates the FDSN policy interests. Article 16 mandated that a specific number of administrative staff be provided to parliamentary groups based on their numeric strength in the parliament.
. Article 14 stated that senators could not move from one parliamentary group to another or create a group that did not run in elections. this principle was more closely followed in the second parliament than in the first. The new representational formula adopted for the 1992 national elections also significantly changed the number of Senate seats. National Minorities and Related Matters. The new standing orders reduced the number of senators necessary to constitute a parliamentary group from ten to five. the new House orders only made minor modifications. the new Senate standing orders allowed senators to hold government positions. in May 1994. The responsibilities of individual members of the Permanent Bureau were not modified. and the jurisdiction of these commissions underwent only minor changes. Election to these commissions was still based on the principle of proportional representation. However.Parliamentary Development
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orders also reflected a shift in the balance of power within the parliament. Because of this change in the standing orders. and in an attempt to increase the professionalization of the parliament. The new orders retained the same number of permanent commissions.20 Between the first and the second parliaments. the number of parliamentary groups increased from three to eight (see table 7. FDSN MPs decided to increase their representation on commissions because their party no longer possessed an absolute majority. By limiting the mobility of rank-and-file MPs. there was a high degree of leadership stability in the Permanent Bureaus. the Romanian Constitutional Court issued a decision that declared Article 18 unconstitutional because it violated Articles 61 and 66 of the constitution. The proportion of FDSN parliamentary and commission seats was approximately 34 percent.4). the authority of parliamentary leaders was enhanced. the Constitutional Court ruled that Article 14 violated the constitution. For example. Also similar to the House. The responsibilities and powers of the Permanent Bureau were increased. While the requirement to form a parliamentary group was lowered. and the increase in the size of the Senate.

following the 1992 elections. and advised on changes in the standing orders in order to strengthen the committee system and improve legislative work. President Iliescu’s party has exercised weak leadership in the Parliament. organizations such as the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). pp. In one survey. depending on its size. John Anelli reports that MPs “tend to see themselves as the experts. However. see a more substantial professional staff as unnecessary or even threatening. the new Senate standing orders mandated that each parliamentary group. the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDI).4. no Western government provided foreign assistance during the first post-Communist parliament. but they did modify its responsibilities and powers. receive between one and five experts and a cabinet chief.”25 At the same time. MPs continued to use outside sources for information. Interviews conducted by Thomas Carothers indicate that these training programs actually had little to no impact on the professionalization of the second post-Communist parliament.”22 Even with more staff. Organizations such as NDI and IRI conducted training programs.23 Legislative History (1992–1996) Due to U.
Steven D. no. and many Members. however. 286 (16 November 1992). Relatively few laws of significance have been passed.
The new Senate standing orders did not change the composition of the Permanent Bureau. and the International Republican Institute (IRI) began to focus on parliamentary training programs. performed well. As was the case in the House. the Constitutional Court was
. 91 percent of the MPs reported using the press as a source of information in their deliberations while only 51 percent stated that they used the parliament’s institutional resources.168
Table 7. Roper
Senate Parliamentary Groups. Even though the new House and Senate standing orders provided for professional staff. He concludes that the “post-1992 Parliament has not. 1992
Civic-Liberal Orientation Group Democratic Party Group Democratic Agrarian Party of Romania Group Party of Social Democracy of Romania Group Hungarian Democratic Union of Romania Group Party of Romanian National Unity Group National Party Group National Peasants Party–Christian Democratic Group
Source: Monitorul Oficial al României. 2–16.S. as a result. concerns over the validity of the 1990 elections and allegations of parliamentary corruption.24 The United States recognized that important economic and social reforms would only occur if the parliament was more professional and active.

it soon found itself fragmented over several important legislative issues. For example. After months of further negotiations. it needed their support. One explanation for this rapid increase has to do with the composition of the parliament. between 1993 and 1995 the parliament passed 380 laws (approximately 127 laws per year). the Vacariou government became much more assertive in defying the parliamentary opposition.2). Indeed. The UDMR and the PNT ¸ CD were often at odds with each other over minority language education in secondary schools and universities. while in the second he had to rely on a parliamentary coalition. economic reform and privatization) allowing the government. it was still considered largely inactive on several important issues (e. While the opposition mounted a united front against the president and the government. the PRM and the PSM also joined the coalition. to continue to exercise legislative power. two separate votes of confidence had been taken.Parliamentary Development
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very active in striking down several important pieces of legislation passed by the parliament. the “Law on Social Security.g.. There were attempts to rectify the situation. PUNR was a junior member of the government. While the parliament’s activity grew.27 Although the PDSR did not want them included. by December 1993. the presidency was unrivalled in the number of decrees it issued.”28
. For example. By August.” This is just one indication that the presidency continued to be a dominant force in parliamentary politics. or 289 decrees annually. as the CDR and other opposition groups attempted to gain some control. For example. Between 1993 and 1995. By August 1993.26 It is telling that Carothers calls the PDSR “Iliescu’s party. during the January 1994 recess. however. especially education.” the “Law of Empowering the Government to Issue Orders.” and even the “Law Regarding the Status of Deputies and Senators” were ruled unconstitutional. President Iliescu issued 867 decrees. Although the second parliament continued to be deferential to the government and the president. Iliescu’s party held an absolute majority of seats. the PUNR leadership was negotiating to officially enter the cabinet. For example. This figure was double the average of the first parliament (see table 7. Part of the problem was that the parliamentary majority was more than happy to delegate legislative authority to the government. Carothers points out that the parliamentary opposition had “engaged in a reflexively negative rather than constructive oppositional mode. During most of the first parliament. the parliament passed a law which allowed the government to rule by decree in order to continue IMF negotiations. and so they signed an agreement with the PUNR in January 1994. and by extension the president. and in March 1994 the Vacariou government was reorganized. Once this coalition was formalized. it was a much more active institution. This figure was five times the average number issued during his first term of office. Even though the parliament passed numerous bills.

the Romanian political landscape had changed substantially. The new entrepreneurial class distrusted the PDSR’s economic policy. Second. the reelection rate between the second and third parliament actually increased. but in order to instill some genuine trust between the majority and opposition. The House orders did not significantly change the structure or functioning of the parliament. CDR presidential candidate Emil Constantinescu defeated Iliescu in the second round. the PRM had been removed from the government. In addition to its parliamentary victory. and the working class began to change its party allegiance because of the poor economic performance of the Vacariou government and the parliament.
THE THIRD POST-COMMUNIST PARLIAMENT (1996–2000)
By the time of the national elections in October 1996.170
Steven D. the CDR offered voters a more positive and clear program called the “Contract with Romania. Iliescu and the PDSR could not control the electronic media as they had done in 1992. the parliamentary majority also had problems finding consensus on several important issues. the PDSR ended its coalition with the PSM.5). in March 1996. The CDR received a plurality of seats in both houses (over 30 percent) and formed a coalition government with the USD and the UDMR. Ultimately. The PDSR’s coalition partners were the parties most opposed to the treaty. The USD was itself a coalition dominated by former Prime Minister Roman and his party the Democratic Party (PD). previous standing orders were incorporated into the new ones. and by September the PUNR was removed from the coalition. it was Iliescu’s attempt in 1995 to sign a basic treaty with Hungary that was the catalyst for the ending of the parliamentary majority. the House reelection rate was 34 percent (12 percent higher than for the previous House). six commission chairs were given to the opposition. First.” Third. there was a change in the Romanian electorate itself. because the orders did not allow deputies to form new groups. Roper
While the parliamentary opposition had a difficult time maintaining its unity. and. The results of the parliamentary and presidential elections indicated a clear rejection of the politics of the past. The number of parliamentary groups in the third parliament decreased to eight. and by October 1995. However. Later. Structure of the Third Post-Communist Parliament Even though the parliament was held in low repute. The independent and popular television station Pro-TV assured that the opposition would receive equal and fair news coverage. The number of commissions remained the same. over thirty MPs were not affiliated members (see table 7.
. For the third parliament.

while the CDR and its leading party. it held only 31 percent of commission seats. the PNT ¸ CD. 1996
Democratic Party Group Hungarian Democratic Union of Romania Group National Liberal Party Group National Peasants Party–Christian Democratic and Romanian Group Ecological Party Group Party of Romanian National Unity Group Party of Social Democracy of Romania Group
Source: Monitorul Oficial al României. It has allowed some of its coalition partners to be slightly overrepresented on commissions. the Reform and Privatization Commission. the CDR was overrepresented on the Foreign Policy (41 percent) and the Defense. Public Order. Like the House. Because of the importance of NATO and EU expansion in 1996 and 1997. the Senate structure and standing orders did not essentially change between the second and third parliament. and thus. House of Deputies Parliamentary Groups. 1996
171
Democratic Party Group Greater Romania Party Group Hungarian Democratic Union of Romania Group National Liberal Party Group National Minorities Group National Peasants Party–Christian Democratic and Romanian Group Ecological Party Group Party of Romanian National Unity Group Party of Social Democracy of Romania Group
Source: Monitorul Oficial al României. Compiled by the author. especially land restitution. were often associated with economic issues. Senate Parliamentary Groups. Compiled by the author.6. it is not surprising that CDR MPs sought seats in foreign policyoriented commissions. and the Budget.
. Finance and Banking Commission.5.29 One factor that can account for this underrepresentation is that the CDR is in a coalition with other parliamentary groups.Parliamentary Development
Table 7. the number of parliamentary groups was approximately the same (see table 7. The new standing orders require five senators in order to form a parliamentary group.
As was the case with the FSN in the first parliament.6). Interestingly. It was actually underrepresented on the Economics Commission. the CDR was somewhat underrepresented on House commissions. While the CDR held approximately 37 percent of the House seats. and National Security Commissions (38 percent).
Table 7.

This was almost the same number of laws passed during the first five years of the parliament’s post-Communist existence. Also. However. there was a great deal of optimism that necessary economic reforms would finally be enacted by the parliament. Roman was now advocating a more cautious economic reform program. as prime minister. The conflict was so severe that to pass the privatization law in December 1997. this episode finally caused Roman to announce. particularly the PNT ¸CD and the PD. After confirming the new government headed by Radu Vasile. Similar to other parliaments. Unlike in 1990 and 1991. between 1997 and 1998. By the summer of 1997. The third parliament was much more active than the previous parliaments. Soon after the formation of the government. the parliament was largely inactive during the spring. it looked like necessary legislation was finally going to be passed. the parliament passed 481 laws. there was an anticipation that the Ciorbea government would either resign or fall. To maintain their image as a reform party. Ciorbea tied the passage of the law to a confidence vote procedure. This event triggered Ciorbea’s resignation on 30 March 1998. the Ciorbea administration sent several “emergency rulings” to the parliament for approval. there was open dissension in the coalition. Roper
Legislative History (1996–2000) The new parliamentary coalition confirmed the mayor of Bucharest. made the passage of legislation difficult. in January 1998. USD MPs did not table a no-confidence vote.30 the Romanian parliament’s rules provide that unless a no-confidence vote is offered within three days. clashed over the pace of economic reform. There was conflict among the coalition
. During 1998.172
Steven D. While the Iliescu-led opposition attempted to assert some control over the government. Roman repeatedly threatened to withdraw his support if the pace of economic reforms continued. Following the electoral success of the CDR. by the fall of 1997. any law with a confidence vote attached is considered adopted without debate.2 reports that. These are omnibus packages that can be voted up or down but cannot be amended. However. Fighting between these members was not surprising. Victor Ciorbea. Beyond economic policy. Several USD MPs joined the opposition and voted against the bill. that all four of his party’s ministers would withdraw from the government. In 1997 and 1998. Table 7. In the first few months following the elections. 381 interpellations were addressed to government officials. during this period. The breaking point came when the Senate did not pass a government-sponsored bill on the use of Hungarian in local administrative bodies. Ciorbea and Roman. the reality was that much of the conflict stemmed from a clash of personalities. who was now president of the Senate. the opposition was more active in addressing interprellations to the government. and that parliamentary support would be given on a case-by-case basis. conflict between the coalition members.

38 percent of respondents answered Iliescu. The mass resignations were obviously orchestrated by Constantinescu. the only ministers who did not resign were PD members (the party that had brought down Ciorbea). Finally in December 1999. conflict eventually arose between Vasile on the one hand. Vasile claimed that Article 106 only applied to the prime minister’s health and. and he was very open about his intention to replace Diaconescu as head of the PNT ¸CD. but the Constitutional Court stated that it was powerless to rule. and the House stripped Gabriel Bivolaru (PDSR MP) of his immunity. Most Romanian constitutional scholars agreed that the president’s decree was a violation of the constitution.Parliamentary Development
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members. Constantinescu stated that the ministerial resignations made it impossible for Vasile to carry out his duties. along with several sessions of parliament. and under Article 106 of the constitution. Until this episode. but by early 1998. and thus the decree stood.31 Vasile resented Constantinescu’s attempts to influence cabinet decisions. so too did Constantinescu’s.32 Therefore. As head of state. the House and the Senate were debating whether to lift the parliamentary immunity of opposition MPs. by the summer of 1999. along with his ability to influence legislation. he also had invested considerable resources on foreign policy issues like NATO and EU entry. As was the case between Iliescu and Roman in 1991. and to eventually to use Vasile as a scapegoat during the 2000 presidential elections. Constantinescu’s popularity diminished. the president in such a case has the right to remove the prime minister. not even the ruling PNT ¸CD was immune to conflict.
. Constantinescu had far less influence than Iliescu. therefore. Ironically. the president was able to unconstitutionally dismiss the prime minister with parliament’s acquiescence. because immediately after the announcement he issued a presidential decree dismissing Vasile. including seven PNT ¸CD ministers. as well as strain between the majority and the opposition. The Senate majority changed the voting requirement so that the immunity of Corneliu Vadim Tudor (senator and president of the PRM) could be lifted. With the perceived lack of Western support on economic and foreign policy matters. many regarded his decree as an attempt to demonstrate his strength. a majority of government ministers resigned. When asked for whom they would vote in the next presidential election. as the fortunes of the CDR declined. Although Constantinescu issued over 1.000 decrees during 1997 and 1998. initially refused to recognize the legitimacy of the decree. In the decree. Ultimately. and Constantinescu and the PNT ¸CD leadership on the other. most of these were personnel changes. Both the PRM and the PDSR boycotted these votes. Because he was so closely associated with the coalition. while only 20 percent selected Constantinescu. The parliamentary majority had initially tried to build trust with the opposition. several polls showed a significant decline in his support among the populace. While Constantinescu and House President Ion Diaconescu (also PNT ¸CD chair) agreed to nominate Vasile as prime minister.

Iliescu’s need to issue presidential decrees was not pressing. The same logic can also be applied to Constantinescu. and.174
Steven D. in the case of the Fifth Republic. President Constantinescu announced his decision not to run for reelection and the PDSR and the PRM had supplanted the CDR as the most popular parties.
. during the coalition years 1993–1996. Even though Iliescu’s party held a plurality of seats. the “presidential system derives its strength from the support it receives from a majority party. The coalition could have submitted Vasile to a motion of no confidence and avoided criticism for supporting the president’s unconstitutional decree. until March 1992. However. House of Deputies Parliamentary Groups.”33 The argument that Suleiman and others make is that the Fifth Republic is a parliamentary system during periods of cohabitation because the president’s party is not the majority party in the parliament. 2000
Democratic Party Group Greater Romania Party Group Hungarian Democratic Union of Romania Group National Liberal Party Group National Minorities Group Social Democratic and Humanist Group
Source: Monitorul Oficial al României. Similar to voting patterns in other post-Communist countries. the number of presidential decrees increased every year.
THE FOURTH POST-COMMUNIST PARLIAMENT (2000–2004)
The inability of the government to confront serious macroeconomic problems as well as deal with charges of corruption led to a significant loss of voter support by the end of the 1990s. The CDR has been in a coalition with the UDMR and the USD since late 1996. with the backing of CDR MPs. Roper
As previously mentioned. decided to use his decree power. the 2000 elections marked a return of the former Communist successor
Table 7. Without that support in the National Assembly. At the time of the 2000 national elections. Constantinescu’s decision to dismiss Vasile demonstrates the coalition’s weakness as much as its strength.2 shows that fewer presidential decrees were issued during this period than at any other time in the 1990s. it did not enjoy a majority. to change the government. Iliescu’s party commanded an absolute majority in the parliament. Instead the president. How does this analysis apply to Romania? During the first parliament. presidential power is considerably diminished. many have described the Fifth Republic as a de facto presidential system for most of its existence.7. probably unconstitutionally. Table 7. Compiled by the author. Despite the PDSR’s need for coalition partners. Ezra Suleiman argues that. Iliescu issued more decrees to preserve his party’s power. therefore.

and Iliescu was once again elected president in a second round runoff with Tudor. it has been the least trusted and most ridiculed institution in Romania.
party (e. Coalition instability stymied legislative efforts during the second.. the number of parliamentary groups also decreased to its lowest level (see table 7.Parliamentary Development
Table 7.
. there is some optimism that after a decade of deferring to the president. four MPs were not affiliated members (see table 7.g. Therefore. the parliament and the government are finally becoming more active participants in the legislative process.
CONCLUSION
This chapter has explored the development of the Romanian parliament since 1990. the USD. the PDSR received almost an absolute majority of seats (46 percent). Structure of the Fourth Communist Parliament The number of parliamentary groups in the fourth parliament decreased to six (continuing the trend since the 1990 election). In the Senate. 2000
175
Democratic Party Group Greater Romania Party Group Hungarian Democratic Union of Romania Group National Liberal Party Group Social Democratic and Humanist Group
Source: Monitorul Oficial al României. the PDSR). the parliament and the government have been much more assertive vis-à-vis President Iliescu than in the past. and the UDMR proved very fragile and volatile. because the orders did not allow deputies to form new groups. Since 2000. The third parliament was supposed to overcome these problems and focus on economic reform. the parliament has tried to actively involve itself in the Euro-Atlantic integration process with the European Union as well as NATO. and the PDSR still commanded significant support among the electorate. In addition. The resignation of Ciorbea in 1998 and the dismissal of Vasile in 1999 demonstrated a lack of parliamentary coordination. Compiled by the author. the parliament. Charges of corruption and inactivity plagued the first parliament. In the 2000 elections. privatization. and by 2002. Unfortunately. After a flurry of activity in late 1996 and 1997. The government of Adrian Na ˘stase has proven much more effective than any previous government. Senate Parliamentary Groups.8). and once again. The results from the 2000 elections showed just how unpopular the CDR had become.8. and other important issues. Since its conception. the coalition between the CDR. the government. legislative output dramatically decreased.7).

1992). 7. 1980). Attila Agh argues that by the late 1980s the Hungarian parliament was a more professional organization. 8. eds.” in Juan J. Triska and Paul M. “Executive Decree Authority in France. One of the reforms enacted during the 1970s introduced multicandidate. no. Later. 2–3. Volume 1: Comparative Perspectives (Baltimore. pp. 401–26. 1995). Steven D. 519–32. 6. The FSN as a catch-all party is discussed in Steven D. “The Romanian Political Party System and the Catch-All Party Phenomenon. The Failure of Presidential Democracy. and Martyn Rady. 1994). 2. History of the Romanian Communist Party (Stanford. MD: Johns Hopkins University Press.. 12. See Attila Agh. Mary Ellen Fischer. single-party elections for some parliamentary seats. The 1990 electoral law stipulated that ethnic minority parties would receive one seat in the Assembly. 11. 2 (June 1998).. 1994). Suleiman.. 1996). Authors such as Robert King. Tauris. eds. NY: Cornell University Press. Executive Decree Authority (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Nation Building. For a more complete discussion of interwar Romanian politics. Romania in Turmoil (London: I. vol. and Ethnic Struggle. CA: Hoover Institution Press. 3. Rumania 1866–1947 (Oxford: Clarendon Press. Mihai Constantinescu and Ioan Muraru.. King. ed. pp. Political Development in Eastern Europe (New York: Praeger. The New Parliaments of Central and Eastern Europe (London: Frank Cass. pp. 13. the key distinction in semipresidential regimes is whether the president has the power to dismiss cabinet ministers unilaterally that have the confidence of parliament. Roper. 4 (January 1995).” in Stephen Whitefield. Roper
NOTES
1. though Romania had fewer such elections than other Communist countries. 1992). 1998). Carey developed the concept of a premierpresidential regime as a specific form of semipresidentialism. Carey. Ezra N. See Matthew Soberg Shugart and John M. “Presidentialism and Stability in France. 10. Carey and Matthew Soberg Shugart.” in John M. 1994). no.” in David M. The New Institutional Architecture of Eastern Europe (New York: St. “Romania. Irina Livezeanu. Olson and Philip Norton. Jonathan Eyal. Matthew Soberg Shugart and John M. 2 (27 December 1989). Martin’s Press. “Democratic Parliamentarism in Hungary: The First Parliament (1990–1994) and the Entry of the Second Parliament. 28. “Participatory Reforms in Romania. Irina Livezeanu. Drept parlamentar (Bucharest: Gramar.
. no. Linz and Arturo Valenzuela. vol. eds. eds.” in Jan F. this requirement was included in the constitution (Article 59:2). 9. see Robert R. Huber. John D. According to them. For example. and Martyn Rady argue that the usurpation of power by King Carol II thwarted any attempts at sustained democracy during this period.. 1918–1930 (Ithaca. Roper and William Crowther. B.” Southeastern Political Review. 26. Monitorul Oficial al României. Cultural Politics in Greater Romania: Regionalism. 1977). Presidents and Assemblies: Constitutional Design and Electoral Dynamics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Keith Hitchens. 5. 4. “The Institutionalization of the Romanian Parliament: A Case Study of the State-Building Process in Eastern Europe. 1993). This is not a power that the Romanian president possesses. Cocks.” East European Quarterly.176
Steven D.

he maintained very close relations with the party. “The Vote of Confidence in Parliamentary Democracies. 30. “Constitution Watch: Romania. Thomas Carothers. 16. 111 (2 June 1995). Because of defections. see Daniel Daianu. 1994). 4–5. although. see Henry F. 2 (Summer 1995). 14 (April 1995). 1 (April 1993). vol. Ibid. 17. Article 18 was modified and the change to the standing orders was adopted in June 1995. For a more complete discussion of economic policy during the Stolojan government. 1. 29. p. 269–82. The PNL withdrew from the coalition shortly before the 1992 national elections. “Baseline Appraisal of the Romanian Parliament” (unpublished paper.” 19. vol. “Dilemmas of the Stabilization Policy in Romania. 2 (June 1996). 42–46.” American Political Science Review. 29. no.” p. pp. the percentage of seats has changed. 31. 22. 32. Once being elected.Parliamentary Development
177
14. 1996). pp. There were 357 MPs that responded to the survey. This figure was the percentage of CDR seats held immediately following the 1996 election. Assessing Democracy Assistance: The Case of Romania. no. Constantinescu had to resign as a PNT ¸CD member. The new standing orders were adopted by the House of Deputies on 24 February 1994 and did not fundamentally change the administrative or the legislative process of the lower house. 23. Because of the Court’s decision. Over 81 percent of MPs voted for the constitution.” Sfera politicii. pp. 146. 178 (27 July 1993). “Irregularities or Rigging: Romania’s 1992 Parliamentary Elections. AG in Bucharest.” East European Quarterly. 22. Assessing Democracy Assistance: The Case of Romania (Washington. p. Carey. 2. 1 (March 1995). 15. 24.
. vol.” East European Constitutional Review. John D. For a thorough analysis of electoral fraud in the 1992 parliamentary elections. no.” Transition. Monitorul Oficial al României. 7. DC: Carnegie Endowment Book. 33. Suleiman. An excellent survey of the use of confidence vote procedures in European parliaments can be found in. no. The modified article can be found in Monitorul Oficial al României. vol. vol. For an excellent account of the development of parliamentary assistance programs in Romania see. no. The Romanian word for house could also be translated as “chamber. p. John Anelli. 21. 58. “Presidentialism and Stability in France. 25. The president cannot belong to a party. 90. 26. pp. 58. 20. 12–13. Michael Shafir. 43–66. pp. 27. Carothers. no. p. “Ruling Party Formalizes Relations with Extremists. See the survey conducted by the Center for the Study of Public Opinion and Market Research during May/June as reported by Mediafax. 18. These data are the result of a 1993 survey of Romanian members conducted by William Crowther in collaboration with Georgeta Muntean and INFORMATIX. 28. Huber. 4. p.

.

Sum and Gabriel Ba ˘ descu
Revolution transforms the relationship between citizens and state officials. The extent to which Romanians participate politically and the degree to which that participation reflects a plurality of viewpoints reveal aspects of new political relationships under liberal democratic principles. Though more than a decade has past since the revolution. who utilize these institutions to voice diverse preferences. . “[P]articipation is more than a favorable condition of democracy. Romanian democratic institutions establish the basis for a legal framework that maintains individual equality before the law. participation may contribute to individual empowerment and freedom. Majority rule. Romania initiated a process of redefining this line of power. . . and the potential for tyrannical majority rule is especially acute.8
An Evaluation of Six Forms of Political Participation
Paul E. [I]t is among democracy’s most essential results. This enables Romanians equal opportunities for free expression and mass participation. issues
179
. Romanian democratic institutions remain fragile. The ability to constrain state actions depends.2 Therefore. through mass mobilization. can strengthen democracy and enhance the legitimacy of the political system. Active citizens. Through democratic institutions. political participation also poses a challenge to Romanian democratic institutions. and many individuals perceive policy choices in zero-sum terms. In 1989. may erode the principles of liberal democracy by systematically excluding minority viewpoints. in part.1 Beyond a functional constraint on political power. as in many post-Communist societies. Romania continues to face serious economic and social problems. In Romania. an end in itself.”3 Despite its potential value. from a liberal standpoint. on communication between citizens and state officials. Romanian citizens now hold the potential to counterbalance the political power exercised through the state by participating in the political process.

extremely low levels of political participation suggest that elite-driven interests dominate the political arena and may even begin to erode the democratic process. as citizens respond to what is perceived as a loss for the Romanian majority.8 Political participation holds the potential to counter hegemonic social interests and personalistic politics if that participation exhibits a broad. we are interested in evaluating the extent to which individuals from advantaged social categories enjoy disproportionate access to the political process.9 Our second question evaluates the attributes which the participants share. Within this context of changing political relationships. such as land reform or privatization. Ceaus ¸escu’s attempts to negate Romanian civil society may very well make this a unique case. and joining legal protests. relatively few Romanians involve themselves in political activities. We use Romanian national survey data to answer two fundamental questions: (1) To what extent have Romanians engaged in varying modes of political participation? (2) What are the characteristics among those who participate in the different forms of political activity? We address the first question through an assessment of Romanian aggregate levels of participation relative to the rates of participation in other political systems. Therefore.”6 The strong electoral showing of the Greater Romania Party in the 2000 national elections suggests that minority cultural rights remain a salient issue for Romanians. Assessing the breadth of participation illuminates the challenges that Romanian democratic institutions face. electoral campaign activity. but interacts with factors that hold the potential to impede the democratic process.4 Volatile political issues are not limited to economic reforms in Romania. signing petitions. where political activity might assist or hinder democratization. which may overburden state institutions and threaten the democratic process. It is a necessary condition for democracy. Sum and Gabriel Ba ˘ descu
that directly affect the distribution of wealth. Those who are active demonstrate a
. Comparing levels of participation allows us to establish a cross-national range for activities and evaluate whether Romania is an exceptional case. We find that. we analyze six forms of participation: voting. Cultural policies aimed at supporting tolerance and ethnic diversity have met with widespread resistance. Alternatively. contacting media sources. may produce high levels of political demands. Although Romanian democratic institutions are open. and “so far [have] led to confrontation. pluralistic character which reflects the diversity of interests within society.7 In Romania. political participation in and of itself is not enough to sustain liberal democratic institutions.5 Constitutional provisions for minority protection and participation have not been fully implemented. with the exception of voting. The national Stalinist legacy may continue to adversely affect political mobilization. contacting public officials.180
Paul E. Political participation shapes democratic relationships. politics have been characterized as possessing a “sultanistic” legacy of personalistic rule.

The process contributes to a public dialogue concerning political orientations and policies. Increased civil society activity would likely increase political participation across social categories. extremely low turnout rates may signal a crisis of democracy if the democratic institutions offer few
. Voting is a uniquely individual act which “requires little initiative or cooperation with others.An Evaluation of Six Forms of Political Participation
181
higher level of political engagement across several categories. approximates 72 percent for the 1992.”10 Although the specificity of the message conveyed through voting is weak. Limited organized group activity within Romania contributes to the low aggregate levels of participation.15 However. The voter turnout is 86 percent.
ROMANIAN VOTER TURNOUT
Voting is perhaps the most fundamental form of political participation in a democratic regime. Average voter turnout rates range from 48 percent in Poland. to over 84 percent in Uzbekistan.825.722 eligible voters in the 1990 election. 1996. Voter turnout varies among countries due to cultural and institutional differences. though the lack of a formal voter registration process raises questions about these results. or even higher if we take into account the possible overestimation of the number of eligible voters11 International and domestic observers questioned the validity of the 1990 election results due to the registration process and irregularities at the polls.12 The 1992 and 1996 general elections met with fewer electoral irregularities. citizens signal preferences to representatives through elections. Elections link individuals to the political system and lend legitimacy to the democratic process. The average voter turnout rate for legislative elections in Central-Eastern Europe is roughly 68 percent and just over 78 percent in Western European countries.13 The average voter turnout rate. and the Czech Republic. The first Romanian general election took place in 1990.764 individuals voted of the 17. the act aggregates general political orientations and indirectly articulates policy stances. with the 2000 elections showing a decline to just over 65 percent of the eligible voters participating. Albania.200. Along with selecting elective office holders. The Romanian Central Electoral Bureau reported that 14. and 2000 parliamentary elections. as reported by the Romanian Central Electoral Bureau.14 Voter turnout rates say little about the functioning of democracy or overall patterns of mass political participation. They tend to possess stronger party identification and discuss politics more often. The low general levels of participation appear to accent discrepancies across social categories such as an individual’s level of education. Romania has held four national elections since its 1989 revolution. Although groups and associations do mobilize their members. voting is also weak in terms of the actual pressure that it places on public officials relative to other forms of participation such as protest activity.

and union membership. This effect of age is consistent with other studies. Only 56 percent from this group respond affirmatively to the voting question. However. and these report having voted at a rate well above the national average. presumably. the ideological or policy platform represented by a particular political party. and those with weak identification fall below the average. Thus. who were between eighteen and thirty years old.1 shows the percentages among these factors and their relationship to voting behavior. 45 percent of the respondents said they discuss politics sometimes or often.19 The frequency with which individuals say they discuss politics is a second factor that correlates strongly in a linear relationship with voting. suggesting that party identification reflects competition of political style and ideas.17 Table 8. Slightly over 20 percent of our sample fell into the eighteen-to-thirty-year-old category.1 also suggests that a respondent’s age and level of education increase the probability of voting. Sum and Gabriel Ba ˘ descu
other outlets for political participation.20 Political discussion. We evaluate Romanian voter turnout using 1996 postelection survey data and correlate individual attributes among voters. Stronger identification indicates that an individual holds specific preferences concerning electoral outcomes and. compared with over 80 percent in each of the other age categories. The survey asked respondents if they had voted in the second round of the 1996 presidential election. This raises the question of whether individuals who abstain from voting share certain social characteristics. Wide fluctuations in turnout rates within a particular country may point to unique and potentially dangerous political circumstances. frequency of discussing politics. Overall. Identification may also indicate that Romanian parties have been successful in eliciting loyalty from voters and linking them more closely to the political system. approximates an individual’s general level of engagement with the political system.22
.21 The effect of age came largely from the youngest category of respondents. the finding indicates that public deliberation over politics occurs within Romania. which show a positive correlation between age and voting. However. no one political party has monopolized strong identification. like party identification. Individuals who identify more strongly with a political party report voting at a rate above the sample average of 77 percent.18 Party identification reflects an individual’s political engagement. age. many eligible Romanian voters do not participate. or the level of political information that individuals possess. five significant factors correlate with an individual saying that he or she had voted in the 1996 election: party identification. it is likely that strong party identification results from at least indirect exposure to the political recruitment efforts of parties. Although voting turnout within Romania appears to fall within an average range compared with other democracies. The figures do not comment on the quality of discussions. education. and voters are more likely to be those individuals who have entered into the discussion.16 In Romania. although these factors appear to hold a curvilinear relationship with turning out to vote. Table 8.182
Paul E.

1 shows that 93 percent of political party members report having voted. Individuals who belong to political parties or other organized groups. These results are consistent with cross-national studies from Western Europe and the United
. Individuals with higher levels of education follow politics more closely.1 show that 86 percent of individuals with a university education report having voted. civic groups. union members tend to vote at a higher rate than nonunion members. The impact of group membership is not limited to unions. such as housing associations. Party ID Discuss politics Age Education Percentage of Voters According to Significant Factors Very weak 70 Never 70 18–30 56 Primary 77 Union 89 74 Weak 65 Rarely 75 31–40 84 Agricultural 79 Party 93 77 Moderate 75 Sometimes 79 41–50 84 Some HS 75 Group 86 77 Strong 85 Frequently 89 51–60 84 HS 75
183
Very strong 88 Ͼ60 81 University 86
Member Nonmember
An individual’s level of education is positively related to voting in Romania. though the numbers of participants are small and not statistically significant. Individuals who have attended a university also may attach a stronger sense of civic duty. Table 8. the voting preferences of those holding a university education tend to be slightly overrepresented through the electoral process. education interacts with political discussion as a factor associated with voter turnout. An individual may be ambivalent toward election outcomes. organized groups do serve as effective mobilizing agents for their members. and discuss politics more often. to the act of voting. Nevertheless. the impact of education on voting is limited to those who have pursued higher education. According to table 8. This result speaks to the influence that such organizations hold over their members in terms of getting out the vote.24 Voting does not require high levels of collective action among voters. also tend to vote at higher rates than individuals who are not active in civil society. it appears that unions hold the capacity to mobilize members.An Evaluation of Six Forms of Political Participation
Table 8. are more informed about issues. Therefore.23 In Romania. but the organizations to which they belong are not. or environmental organizations.1. thus increasing their incentive to get to the polls. Therefore. trade union membership positively correlates with voter turnout.1. In Romania. Of those individuals who belong to civil society groups other than unions and political parties. All other categories of education remain close to the sample average of 77 percent. or political efficacy. The figures in table 8. 86 percent responded affirmatively when asked if they had voted. which is also consistent with studies of voting behavior in other countries. Therefore.

or political orientation. Sum and Gabriel Ba ˘ descu
States. table 8.781 registered nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) in Romania. If we assume that a voting public is a healthy sign of democracy. Individuals under thirty years old tend to vote less than other Romanians. and tend to discuss politics more often. these differences are consistent with voting behavior in many countries. We first view Romanian participation comparatively. civil society is weak in terms of the number of groups actively in existence.
. the results do indicate that individuals who are active within their communities vote at higher rates. Romanian voters tend to identify more strongly with a particular political party.1 are insufficient to answer the question of whether members of a particular organization may or may not vote as a bloc for a specific candidate. Therefore.2 presents the frequency with which individuals have engaged. The absolute numbers of groups is small within Romania. Finally.”26 To summarize. is impressive. Citizens have a wide array of choices beyond voting which can convey their political preferences to elected and appointed officials. The results in table 8. there were 11. each country began its postCommunist period with limited civil society development. such as age and education.27 Although several social categories. However. political party. Comparing aggregate participation brings perspective to the levels of political activity in Romania. group membership has a relatively small impact on aggregate voting rates. “About four hundred NGOs are said to comprise the most active core group with nationwide influence. have an increased tendency to vote. and those who have attended a university vote in rates above the national average. Relatively high turnout rates indicate not only an interested public. and the resources available to it. Romanians who are active within civil society. but also the mobilization capacity of political parties and other groups. which show that communal activity does stimulate individuals to participate politically. as seen through voting. At the end of 1996.184
Paul E.
OTHER FORMS OF POLITICAL PARTICIPATION
Voting is only one form of political participation. the demonstrable change in political relations since 1989. point to a discrepancy in the probability of casting a vote. However. than nonvoters. Political activity benefits from social mobilization agents within civil society. Using European Values Survey data. Romanian voting turnout falls within the range of other European democratic states. Although variance exists. especially union members. the picture appears to be positive. which minimizes their effect on voting turnout. including voting in higher numbers than nonactivists. NGOs are on the right track. When we step back for a moment and consider the oppression that Romania suffered under Ceaus ¸escu. [but] considering the starting point of the associative sector.25 The effect of group membership highlights the importance of civil society in articulating preferences through voting.

Estonia Hungary Latvia Lithuania Poland Romania Russia Slovakia Slovenia Ukraine 56 25 9 12 37 58 21 16 19 31 21 11 12 60 32 14 Joining Boycotts 13 5 4 4 8 9 3 3 4 5 4 2 3 4 8 5 Attending Lawful Demonstrations 29 15 16 17 8 28 11 5 25 14 9 15 24 14 10 18 Joining Unofficial Strikes 7 3 1 5 3 10 1 1 1 2 5 1 2 2 4 3 Occupying Buildings 5 1 1 2 1 1 0 1 0 1 3 1 1 1 2 1
Data Source: European Values Survey. and ultimately begin to undermine the democratic process. Activities such as signing petitions or joining a legal demonstration do articulate a more precise message of preferences to political leaders. The relative aggregate levels of political activity in Romania are low.
.An Evaluation of Six Forms of Political Participation
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The levels of activity for signing petitions. joining boycotts. 1999. Romania meets the average for other countries in Central and Eastern Europe. The breakup of the Soviet Union involved a quite different set of opportunities for citizens to participate. Romanian data from 1996 do not suggest that Romanians are content with democracy or the economy. Frequencies of Participation beyond Voting in Percentages Signing a Petition Western Europe Eastern Europe Belarus Bulgaria Croatia Czech Rep. It is possible that lower levels of participation in activities other than voting indicate that Romanians have had less to contest and are relatively content with the political system. For example. but difficult to fully interpret. For attending lawful demonstrations and occupying buildings. The question of who participates in these ways takes on greater importance because low levels of participation open the possibility that elite-driven interests may dominate political discourse and interest aggregation. and participating in unofficial strikes in Romania are lower relative to the average for post-Communist states.28 Another possible explanation for the relatively low levels of Romanian aggregate participation may be related to the events surrounding the fall of Communism among the various cases.2. the Czechoslovakian transition relied on a relatively peaceful transfer of power and culminated in the negotiated division of the country into the Czech and Slovak Republics. The process afforded many more opportunities for participation.
Table 8.

signing a petition requires fewer resources than working on a political campaign. sign petitions.29 For instance. a respondent’s party identification correlates positively with each form of activity except for contacting officials. Therefore. However. public deliberation surrounds political activity in Romania. and joining legal protests. and type of locality (urban or rural)—produce statistically significant results for each form of political activity. is a significant indicator for each of the five forms of political participation. compared with the national average of 20. or enthusiasm for political issues. Fifteen percent of urban residents reported having signed a petition. contacting public officials. For each mode of political participation. It also suggests that political activists articulate their preferences within the political party system.31 Rural residents are more likely to work on electoral campaigns and contact public officials than urban residents. the level of specificity of the message it conveys. each activity requires more resources. Compared with voting. These are electoral campaign activity. Similar to identification.30 In Romania. This result is especially true for campaign work. we consider five forms of participation derived from the 1996 national survey. which increases the volume expressed to officials. Eight percent of rural residents reported having worked on a political campaign compared with less than five percent of urban dwellers.
. 18 percent of urban dwellers responded positively to having engaged in this activity. rural residents engage in different forms of activities than urban residents. Estimating profiles of active individuals allows us to assess whether they represent particular social categories that may not reflect broader citizen opinion. For contacting public officials. produces a clearer message to political leaders. 28 percent of rural respondents reported having done so. Urban residents contact media sources. Another common characteristic among political activists is that they discuss politics more frequently than other Romanians. political discussion (excepting contacting media sources). The finding also suggests that despite the low aggregate levels of political participation. contacting media sources. It is not unexpected that individuals who identify more closely with political parties are also more likely to engage in forms of political activity beyond voting. and 30 percent acknowledge that they have joined a legal protest since 1990. For contacting media sources. and potentially produces more pressure for leaders to respond. signing petitions. either urban or rural. only three factors—party identification (excepting contacting officials).186
Paul E. Each activity is more effective through group mobilization. and the pressure it generates for officials to respond. Party identification approximates the extent to which a respondent is politically engaged. Each activity varies according to the amount of resources required. and join legal protest at a rate above the national average.7 percent. this reflects an individual’s engagement in politics. Type of locality. Sum and Gabriel Ba ˘ descu
To assess this question of who in Romania participates in political activities other than voting.

This is an important difference since. While levels of education tend to be higher among urban residents. to attitudes or disposition. as civil society develops. consequently. and to the exposure an individual has to the political recruitment efforts of mobilization agents. locality type still produces an independent effect when we control for education. because they want to. especially in rural areas. we might explain
. In other words. We might also account for the variance between urban and rural forms of political participation through political recruitment. such as time. Although this term is difficult to define. and money to engage in each activity. Political engagement also reflects how connected individuals are with the political system. Active civic groups or trade unions increase the opportunities that individuals have to engage in these activities. shapes political behavior and the decision to act. or because they are asked. the logistic regression model does not produce any systematic variance among urban and rural forms of participation. signing petitions. there is reason to believe that individuals in rural communities continue to “emphasize a politics based on the primacy of the household and family” and a subordination of their interests to the state. individuals participate because they can. due to their distance from centers of political power. Although individuals may hold more of these resources within urban communities. Individuals need different combinations of resources. it generally refers to the amount of enthusiasm an individual has for politics.35 Each activity requires an organizational structure that is subject to economies of scale. there is little reason to believe that resources in this sense are the primary factors surrounding the urban–rural difference. skills. In other words. The level of political engagement may produce a more fruitful explanation. Contacting media sources. It may be that rural dwellers are less connected than urban dwellers. organizations will likely concentrate efforts where they can reach the most people at the lowest cost. and joining legal protests are all modes of participation that are maximized through collective action and civil society activity. this is not an unreasonable inference.33 In Romania.An Evaluation of Six Forms of Political Participation
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certain forms of activity are associated with a respondent’s locality type. such as education. Therefore. Political engagement reflects deeper attitudes that an individual holds toward politics and.32 We can utilize this framework to understand why forms of political participation vary along an urban–rural dimension. Individual motives for participation are complex. In the still highly centralized Romanian political system.36 Therefore. approximately 45 percent of Romanians live within rural communities. along other factors representing resources.34 Therefore. locality type may shape attitudes differently and account for why certain political acts tend to be associated with one type of locality or another. Civil society development in Romania is low. according to the Romanian 1991 census. Choosing to participate varies according to the resources available to an individual.

Due to fewer. though many organizations have changed political banners to include nationalist and liberal variants. The parties that are active in rural communities might also account for some of the variance in campaign participation. if campaign work does supplement income. and protesting are more likely to occur within urban areas. social mobilizing agents other than parties. The development of new political parties has followed a similar pattern to that of other elements of civil society in Romania. According to the data. rather than rely on volunteer support. a greater proportion of campaign workers live in rural communities. Sum and Gabriel Ba ˘ descu
the variance among participatory activities. signing petitions. even party members. political party organizations face less competition within rural communities than that experienced in urban areas. Former Communist operators control rural political party organizations. 65 percent of party members live in urban areas. Party financial resources are especially important for campaigns in Romania. and party members in rural areas are more likely than their urban counterparts to work on campaigns. political parties play a greater role in the political life of rural residents. with activists focusing their attention on urban areas. and protesting. Relatively speaking. However. Although further research is needed. such as contacting the media. In part. The prospect of employment after a successful campaign may motivate some workers. the explanation rests with the relative incentives afforded to rural residents for these types of activities. However. note that it is not uncommon for Romanian parties to pay their campaign workers. this organizational infrastructure remains more intact in rural areas compared to urban areas due to the lower levels of party competition in the countryside. it may be more common in rural communities where economic opportunities are more limited. through the higher number of opportunities available to urban dwellers for certain activities.37 Nevertheless. Limited opportunity for rural residents to participate explains. party membership in rural communities tends to have a larger impact on the propensity to campaign. Therefore. in informal interviews.
. Political party organizations depend upon their membership to form their bases of campaign workers. The resources available to party organizations may account for the propensity of rural inhabitants to engage in campaign work. to a certain extent. the Communist legacy in Romania. it is not surprising that rural individuals are more likely to participate in campaign work than urban dwellers. like elsewhere in post-Communist Europe. petitioning. With fewer opportunities to participate in other ways. However. it does not explain why rural dwellers tend to engage in campaign work and contacting public officials at higher rates than urban residents. in offering campaign workers incentives to participate. left a highly developed infrastructure of political organization that penetrated rural communities under the Communist regime. in part.188
Paul E. Political party activists from Cluj-Napoca. why such activities as contacting the media. and it is possible that Romanian political parties rely on this form of political patronage to a certain extent.

Alan Zuckerman and Darrell West argue that political party membership provides access to a social network of contacts. If other political mobilizing agents are absent within the community. It is not surprising that union membership does not have an impact on these activities since union members tend to be clustered in urban. ages 18–30. Finally.0 Petition 19 (42) 22 (15) 30 (18) 10.8
Note: Data are from the 1996 National Survey. Percent of Respondents Who Have Participated in Civil Society Membership Campaign Union Party Group Average 8 (17) 28 (19) 25 (15) 6. have joined a legal protest. The types of problems that rural residents confront also may influence the likelihood of contacting a local official.38 Turning to other individual attributes that significantly correlate with forms of political participation beyond voting. Table 8. industrial areas. 18 percent of respondents aged 18–30 report having contacted the media. Individuals who belong to any association
Table 8. and therefore they would be more likely to approach an official with a problem. Individuals within small communities are more likely to know local officials on a personal level. Twentytwo percent of the respondents.An Evaluation of Six Forms of Political Participation
189
It is more difficult to explain why rural residents tend to contact public officials more often than urban residents. social contacting might be the most efficient method for individuals to articulate political needs and preferences. we find a mix of effects. it is probable that political party members are more likely to engage in contacting officials. even though they may not involve themselves in campaign activity. For instance. Figures in parentheses are the absolute number of respondents who reported having engaged in the political act.3 shows that most group activity is strongly associated with political participation. Union members tend not to work on electoral campaigns or contact public officials at a higher level than the national average. It may be that the size of a community matters.3. In such situations. The results in table 8. the political context may facilitate political patronage and unequal access to political institutions. These two exceptions also involve the two activities that correspond more closely to rural residency.7 Protest 30 (66) 25 (17) 33 (20) 14. This would hold despite relative levels of education or income. It is also reasonable to assume that with fewer alternative avenues to address problems.3 Media 21 (46) 23 (16) 33 (20) 13. individuals within rural communities would be more likely to approach local sources of political authority. This number decreases with each increase in age bracket.9 Contact 20 (37) 45 (29) 43 (26) 20. while only 10 percent of all others in the sample respond affirmatively. The two exceptions to this tendency both involve union membership.3 indicate that civil society activity is correlated with higher rates of political participation.
.

Sum and Gabriel Ba ˘ descu
report that they have engaged in most participatory activities at a rate considerably higher than the national average. However. group members articulate their preferences more often through vehicles that lend themselves to conveying specific messages to political leaders. unions are subject to certain economies of scale and gravitate toward larger economic enterprises. However. institutions that en-
. Despite the high visibility unions have achieved in Romanian politics through protest activities. Therefore. the result indicates that union members are underrepresented in campaign work and contacting officials. The extent of this constraint depends.3 also shows that the absolute number of association members is very low. they do not utilize these vehicles to articulate their preferences. these findings are not inconsistent with patterns found cross-nationally. Individuals signal preferences to political leaders through political participation. education. On one hand. In other words. upon an active public that communicates preferences to elected and appointed officials. aggregate levels of participation beyond voting are low. the result indicates a bias in the means through which the Romanian national political dialogue transpires. we might expect such disparities to exist and to continue. In this way. On the other hand. Although there are several explanations for the difference between urban and rural residents. Union members tend to engage more often in activities associated with urban settings. how government leaders respond to political preferences. reflecting the general weakness of civil society in Romania. the most compelling is the varying distribution of social mobilization agents or. Other discrepancies among participants include party identification and.190
Paul E. unions seek advantages through urban forms of participation. to a lesser extent. it is encouraging that individuals participate in ways that are readily available to them. Differences suggest that disparities extend to viewpoints articulated within the Romanian political dialogue and. In other words. the strength of civil society. it is difficult to say whether union members are systematically excluded from political debates. in part.
CONCLUSION
Democracy allows individuals to constrain political power through institutions. and manifests itself through the tendency for rural and urban dwellers to engage in different forms of participation. more generally. The clearest discrepancy occurs between rural and urban residents. reflecting differences in political engagement and available resources. which in turn applies pressure on public officials to respond. Therefore. perhaps. Collective action within groups lowers the costs of participation. Overall. table 8. Although union membership may include substantial numbers of rural commuters. However.

6. “Inter-Ethnic Relations and the Protection of Minorities. 2. p. p. strengthening civil society in Romania seems vital to deepening and sustaining democracy. In Romania.An Evaluation of Six Forms of Political Participation
191
courage participation broaden the range of individual viewpoints that enter into the political dialogue of a country. Democracy and the Market (New York: Cambridge University Press. NY: M. 4. With the exception of voting. Sharpe. aggregate levels of Romanian political participation tend to be low. 1991). and participation rates reflect discrepancies across corresponding social categories. On another level. Low public interest and participation may result in an increased level of political corruption. On Liberty (New York: The Liberal Arts Press. E. “More Participation. forms of mass participation slowly become less and less effective as public officials become more and more insulated over time. Citizens realize democratic representation partly by articulating political preferences through participation. 126. and increases the volume. Adam Przeworski. The process creates a more dynamic and open political environment.” in International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA). 71. discrepancies extend especially to locality type and group membership. and the pressure. 1991). 1956).
NOTES
1. 4. and Bjorn Wittrock. More Democracy?” in David Beetham. Democracy in Romania: Assessment Mission Report (Stockholm: IDEA. Certain disparities among available individual resources. democratic institutions facilitate the process of open political expression. while also lending legitimacy to the political system. especially in rural areas. Participation and Democracy. Therefore.4 in the appendix. such as age and education. strengthening civil society will overcome these discrepancies.
. See the multivariate regression results in table 8. and constrain public officials. ed. low levels of political activism mean that citizens are not in as good of a position to hold state officials accountable and to constrain actions taken by the state.” in Studia: Sociologia-Politologia. 6. 3. Thus. CA: Sage. 1998). Dietrich Rueschemeyer. refines the message sent to leaders. Marilyn Rueschemeyer. a pattern not dissimilar to many democracies. 1994). Maria Amor Estebanez. pp. 1–2 (Cluj-Napoca: Babes ¸-Bolyai University Press. Group activity lowers the costs of participation. To a certain extent. “Rationality and Democracy in Post-Communist Societies: The Romanian Case. p. 1997). This possibility endangers democracy. the pattern of participation in Romania suggests that not all viewpoints are voiced equally. Geraint Parry and George Moyser. Defining and Measuring Democracy (Thousand Oaks. are present within all democracies. of the message. 159–61. As long as the system can absorb the multiple demands placed upon it. Assuming that social categories do indicate different preferences. John Stuart Mill. 5. Petru Ilut ¸.. East and West: Comparisons and Interpretations (Armonk. p.

313 people who were 18 or higher. See also Daniel N. (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. 1990). 238. no. The data are available at www. Democracy in Romania: Assessment Mission Report (Stockholm: IDEA. 13.umich. E. “Electoral Systems and Electoral Organization. 1988). pp. 1997). Citizen Politics in Western Democra-
. 43–46. The national survey was conducted two weeks after the 1996 Romanian general election. Voter Turnout from 1945-1997: A Global Report on Political Participation (Stockholm: International IDEA. The May 1990 Elections in Romania (Washington. 22. Participation and Democracy. The 1992 Census found only 16.” in Daniel N. 11. 14. Russell J. Nelson. (Boulder. Nelson. “A Theory of Sultanism: A Type of Nondemocratic Rule. In 1992. Chehabi and Juan Linz. p. 43–66. pp. The survey also asked respondents to state their support for the major political parties in Romania.” in H. 1992). and Oxford: Westview Press. Rueschemeyer.). 152. 19. Making Votes Count: Strategic Coordination in the World’s Electoral Systems (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. administered by IREX. 20. p. sometimes. Citizen Politics in Western Democracies. Rueschemeyer and Wittrock.192
Paul E. Citizen Politics in Western Democracies. We categorize both age and education into five categories.415. 9. formerly USIA.. Sultanistic Regimes (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press. 18. p. 16. “Irregularities or Rigging: Romania’s 1992 Parliamentary Elections. Correlations between each party and party identification are low. “A Chance for Romania. pp. For example see. Department of State. 20. 36. Dalton. International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA). there were an inordinate amount of invalidated votes and high numbers of “special list” votes in some counties and precincts indicating systematic fraud. 29. p. 286–87. rarely. ed. It was generously funded through the Social Science Curriculum Development Program. 1997). Voter registration and the lack of voting cards were a problem in both the 1992 and 1996 elections. 18–21. p. 10. vol. See Henry F. Russell J. The appendix table provides the results from logistic regression. 1998). We measure party identification as a five-category scale from weak to strong. See also Gary Cox. The survey asked respondents how often they discuss politics: never.edu/~cses/. Research in Western Europe supports the conclusion that younger individuals (those roughly in their twenties) tend to vote less often than individuals in other age categories. San Francisco. Dalton. 12. or often.” in International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA). and supported by the U. Romania after Tyranny. Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs. 15.S. pp. 1997). 5. 1995). Tom Gallagher. 2nd ed. International Republican Institute (IRI) and National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDIIA). 17.000 less than the 1990 estimate for the 18 or more population. 59–60. 8. pp. E. 21. (Chatham. DC: IRI/NDIIA Publications. Dalton. Emigration between 1990 and 1992 could also account for a part of difference. Romania after Ceaus ¸escu: The Politics of Intolerance. See Svante Renstrom. Sum and Gabriel Ba ˘ descu
7. indicating that no one party monopolizes support among those who report strong identification with a particular party. NJ: Chatham House Publishers. with about 800. Carey.” East European Quarterly. H. 1 (Spring 1995). Chehabi and Juan Linz (eds.

Unfortunately. therefore. unwittingly. the Romanian media became an experiment in public access media and an avenue of individual and national catharsis. The Romanian case is one example.2 Radio broadcasting. are difficult to establish in a transitional society in order to further its transition to democracy. professional media were necessary to help establish democracy in the newly liberated nations.
195
. Romanian journalism in the 1989–1996 period was a mixture of polemics. at best. and by the late 1990s to a media-party parallelism. basically divided between newspapers supporting the Iliescu regime and those opposing it. particularly on the local and regional level. politicians. indirectly. and in a manner not easily measurable. and by 1996 it had become. In short. In the first two months following the collapse of Communism. giving way to ones that were highly partisan and political. On the other hand. Western media scholars. In the simplest formulation.9
Media in the First Post-Communist Decade
Peter Gross
In the aftermath of Communism’s demise. rumor. dominated by national Romanian Radio.3 It was a highly politicized and partisan journalism. the media may still aid the democratization process. began to provide it at the end of 1997. and half-accurate. political scientists. However. and pundits assumed that independent. such media are largely an epiphenomenon of a wellentrenched democratic society and. a joint American-Romanian venture. was quickly faced with competition. Romanian journalism began its postCommunist era in an amateur state. Romanian Television (RTV) was closely controlled by the president’s office and the governments in power from 1989 to 1996. these media disappeared.1 Within three to four years. incomplete. and the few attempts at neutrality failed. and biased information. it had no serious domestic competition on the national level until Pro-TV.

and a legal foundation that would foster professionalism and freedom for an independent media. The media showed limited interest in professionalism during the four-year Constantinescu/CD regime. 3. and socioeconomic life. a professional working environment for journalists.” led by Emil Constantinescu and the Democratic Convention (CD).4 The yet-to-be completed evolution to a democracy-serving. professional media leaves unclarified the “inestimable” role of the media in the “vast ‘Democracy 101’ course” in which Eastern Europe is “collectively enrolled. This chapter6 analyzes the contributions made by the media to the democratic transition in Romania during 1996–2000 and briefly outlines the evolution of Romanian media since November 1996 when the “opposition. is not necessarily central to it. there were four expectations regarding the media: 1. the Constantinescu/CD era turned out to be a disappointment.196
Peter Gross
pre-professional. In 2000. After November 1996. That the 1996 version of the Romanian Penal Code would be reconsidered—it addresses defamation and insults. and. (b) discrete manipulation (by the first three post-Communist governments and by the President’s office). Unfortunately for the media. and to provide needed diversity and pluralism in national television broadcasting. Romanian media are making contributions to the remaking of Romanian politics. and the Social Democratic Party (PSD) took the helm of government. as well as uncalledfor protection for public officials.”5 Indirectly and unwittingly. political culture. and provides harsh prison terms for journalists found guilty under the Code. and (c) a “triumphalist and anesthetic” effect upon its audience. however. its commitment to the establishment of a democratic political culture. with a consonant and enforceable set of professional standards and code of ethics. they mirrored Romanian
.8 It was also expected that laws would be enacted guaranteeing access to information and protection for journalists. That government/state control over national public television (TVR1) would be lifted—TVR had been manipulated during the Iliescu regime and was guilty of three sins: (a) disinformation and misinformation. That media roles would be redefined—a change that would encompass a redefinition of the profession along Western lines. It called into question the nature of democratization envisioned by the new leadership and. specifically. for the most part. 4. a pattern discernible in the majority of post-1989 East European nations. their role. both were given the boot and Ion Iliescu was returned to the presidency. That an independent national television station or stations would be introduced to provide competition for RTV. ascended to power.7 2.

however.
PUBLIC TELEVISION
The major problems that have plagued TVR9 since its liberation from Communist Party control in December 1989 persisted after 1996. and Alina Mungiu-Pippidi. A regularly scheduled program was interrupted in order to broadcast a live press conference from the National Christian Democratic Peasant Party (PNT ¸CD)—one of the main parties in the CD—in the midst of a political battle between it and its coalition partner.10 TVR insiders11 reported that Stere Gulea. However. directors. there were strong signs indicating that the relationship between TVR’s leadership. Whether it really was a case of political manipulation on the part of TVR cannot be ascertained. and the political and economic elites. as well as purveyors of unadulterated. The fury in the TVR leadership’s communiqués and in Mr. The new TVR leadership appointed after November 1996 was accused of being as selfabsorbed. when he affirmed that
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society. Controceni (the presidential offices) and Palatul Victoria (the Prime Minister’s office). a guest of the PNT ¸CD. The president of the European Christian Democrats. lead to a public uproar among politicians. the new post-1996 head of TVR. in particular. continued to be the same as it was during the 1990–96 Iliescu regime. and when media were needed as models in and of themselves. were still directly connected by special telephone to the presidential palace as well as to the prime minister’s office. and open to manipulation as its predecessor. politically partisan. Wim van Welzen. as did the news department. politics. fired the first salvo in the new battle surrounding TVR. was given the opportunity to comment on Romania’s political crisis in a way that made the Democratic Party. Adeva concluded that the incident “was more proof that dictatorship and manipulation are at home in the offices of Palatul Victoria. At a time when a tutorial function in regard to democratization was required. It did.12 dia. undemocratic. and they continued to be expertly manipulated in the interests of owners. a member of the new Administrative Council. and culture. the Democratic Party (PD). and even antidemocratic mentalities. they largely remained prisoners of old.” By fall 1998. and the meˇ rul. A scandal in January 1998 reinforced this suspicion. Cristian Hadjiculea. complete. An editorial in the largest circulation national daily. self-serving. TVR again had a new director. editors. accurate.13 The new leadership began its tenure similarly to the old— controversially. Stere Gulea’s declarations attest to the fact that television is under pressure and blackmail. the head of the news department. Gabriel Liiceanu. Whether TVR remained co-opted by the President or the prime minister’s office is difficult to prove with any degree of certainty. look bad. political parties. and verifiable information.

17 Since the mid-1990s. Local. One example of revenue shortages: Beginning in June 1999. TVR has been in a losing battle with private television channels.18 which reached 68 percent of the Romanian viewing audience by the end of 1997. around 90 percent by 1999. . but still fell short of professional journalism. they were still insufficient. Other quasi-national television companies in the competitive mixture of private television stations included Antena1. Pro-TV slowly became first in audience ratings in the late 1990s.”14 Mironov was accused of having collaborated with the dreaded Securitate. others in the institution did not. Ion Vaciu. the former deputy of the TVR Union. TVR’s Ra ˘zvan Popescu. The strong suspicion that TVR’s News Department was under the control of outside powers continued to be fueled. Aggravating what was already a compromised independence was the fact that TVR’s financial situation was precarious at best. however. Other broadcast laws. both Romanian Radio and Romanian Television broadcasts were cut by four hours each day because they had amassed a debt of 19 billion lei (over $2. the man who allegedly interrupted the regularly scheduled program to air the above-mentioned PNT ¸CD news conference. with the top job in the TVR news department in 1997.1 million) to the Society of RadioCommunications. suggest that even if TVR’s leadership had a cozy working relationship with the powers that be. State funds were insufficient to sustain its operations and while advertising revenues steadily increased throughout the 1990s. with the inclusion in the Administrative Council of some people like Alexandru Mironov. and during the first Iliescu regime he called for Liiceanu and Corneliu Coposu15 to be dragged into court for supporting the anti-Communist demonstration in Piata Universitat ¸ii.” so the story goes. Close political ties between TVR journalists and political parties were legion before and after 1996. and even national stations continued to be added to the lineup of the seventy-five television stations that were operational by the end of 1997. American-style news broadcasts that raised standards in the medium.16 Such incidents. became a personal advisor to Adrian Na ˘stase. the problematic 1994 law20 regulating the status of public television was not reconsidered during 1996–2000. The firing of anchor Gabriela Vranceanu-Firea for allegedly being too neutral (as opposed to biased in favor of those holding political power) brought out accusations of political bias on the part of TVR and infringements of press freedom in fall 1999. were changed and brought the Romanian television and radio fields closer
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“normality cannot make its debut (at TVR) . if we are to believe the allegations. Amerom. a joint Romanian-American venture in 1999. and Tele7abc. . but not least. Last. Former news director Alina Mungiu-Pippidi was a prominent “opposition” journalist who was “rewarded.19 Pro-TV produced some slick. a high official of the Romanian Social Democratic Party (PSDR in Romanian). was subsequently appointed to head the Public Information Department of the Romanian government (controlled by the PNT ¸ CD). the most successful one being Pro-TV. regional.

in September 1997 the new post-Iliescu Minister of Justice.” Journalists continued to be dragged into court. found guilty. adding another alternative penalty: that of prohibiting the convicted journalists from practicing his or her profession. on 22 January 1998. the new code forbade any “exhibition” of the journalists’ political orientation.25 Four months later. Ironically. On 2 February. said that sentencing journalists to prison was not a just punishment. in fact. as well as foreign organizations such as the Helsinki Watch and the Parisbased Reporters Sans Frontiers. and a correspondent for Radio Free Europe in Prague. also raised a ruckus. and promised to have prison sentences replaced with community service and additional fines.Media in the First Post-Communist Decade
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to complying with European Union Standards. the parties formerly in power. Gheorghe Funar. In December 1997. Its ambiguous wording did not help. Stoica proposed an ordinance that would have made it even easier to drag the media into court under the existing definitions of damage to “honor and dignity. he reiterated his views. and responsible for the passage of the antimedia Penal Code amendments.24 elicited criticism from Romania’s then opposition politicians and journalists. however. roughly the equivalent of 7 months salary). The uproar from Romania’s media was instantaneous. but there was little interest and wherewithal to enforce it. Ursu26 writes that the Stoica ordinance eloquently spoke to the manner in which the “new Power” understands how to treat the “democratic right of freedom of expression. and. as illustrated by four cases in 1997–99: 1. Then. driven by political and personal decisions made by its leadership. for instance. was convicted of defaming the city’s mayor.22
THE MEDIA’S LEGAL ENVIRONMENT
The 1996 amendments to the Penal Code. Valeriu Stoica. the editor of Cluj’s Stirea. in one of his editorials. No move in that direction was discernible by mid-1999. Marius Avram.” and gave the impression that high monetary penalties would be mandatory. He was fined 6 million lei (approximately $750. developments in 1997 and 1998 provided a confusing smorgasbord of intentions on the part of the new leaders. and condemned to prison terms and/or penalized with exorbitantly high fines. A new code of ethics introduced in 1998 could have helped to push its journalism in a more professional direction.23 which called for prison sentences for journalists found guilty of defamation and insulting individuals.21 TVR’s journalism remained professionally tenuous. First. Prime Minister Ciorbea stepped in and rescinded the ordinance. The criticism by opposition parties and politicians suggested that they would seek to quickly reconsider and rewrite the offending amendments once they were at the helm of the country.
.

was found guilty of defamation. however. making the media more responsible and professional is not the job of politicians and government officials. Was it the concern of responsible leaders for curbing misinformation. but the journalists were put on probation for three years. Cornel S ¸ abau. The Center for Independent Journalism reported27 that legal actions taken against journalists were common in 1996–2000. President Emil Constantinescu pardoned him.900) in 1999 for “slandering” a police colonel. mostly inspired or brought by local authorities. For example. “the notion of a ‘nation of laws’ is not yet anything more than pallid theoretical-juridical fiction. Ada S ¸ tefan. who wrote on a corruption case involving a judge. and they have refused to use the defamation law as a political tool. regulate the work of journalists were rejected throughout the 1990s and relegated to the backburner of parliament. legal thinking. slowly democratizing society. 3. There is an additional. editor-in-chief of the private news agency Trans-Press.30 It was difficult to gauge the motives of politicians and government officials for their insistence that a press law be adopted. In broader terms. made for some bona fide defamation cases. and the lack of an independent judiciary only aggravated a situation in which bad laws were applied. Freedom of the press in a fragile democracy cannot and should not be curbed by the state in the name of strengthening that democracy. one which requires a new type of judiciary. Calls by politicians and government officials for a press law that would. in essence. 4.” In all fairness. Ovidiu Scutelnicu and Dragos Stangu.
.29 It is also fair to mention that the politically partisan and polemical aspects of many articles. were each sentenced to a one-year prison term and a 100 million lei fine ($8. some courts have shown that they do pay attention to the guarantees of freedom of expression in the Romanian Constitution. Two journalists from Ias ¸ i’s Monitorul. The sentence was suspended. A România Libera ˘ reporter. taken seriously only by the incurably civic-minded. Also in 1999. as Marino28 accurately assesses Romanian reality. or an attempt to craft a legal mechanism to control the media? Ultimately. particularly in the countryside. The cases often dragged out for years. potential explanation for some actions taken by the courts: their ineptness in the face of the demands made upon them by a new. At one point in the case’s journey through the Romanian court system. a judge who happened to be a close relative of the person who sued S ¸ tefan presided over the trial. an appeals court overturned a lower court’s conviction of two Ziua journalists for seditious libel. in addition to the often inaccurate and unverified information.200
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2. in March 1998. and professional ethic. was sentenced to ten months in prison for libeling a judge.

34 In response. in late 1998. In other words. but it did not.36 If the Deputies were not forthcoming. This time. defamation suits still represent the Sword of Damocles hanging over journalists in a society that does not have an independent judiciary. Surveying developments in Romania since November 1996. No matter what changes were made to the Penal Code. parliamentarians demanded C-SPAN-like coverage. the Senate obliged journalists to be accompanied by “persons from the (Senate’s) administration” and to “reflect the activities of the permanent commissions” only on the basis of information offered by the commissions’ spokespersons. The original three-month to threeyear prison sentence was reduced to a fine. journalists were “under guard” and were essentially to function as transmission belts for public relations releases. claiming it was a national security issue. One year later.37 In the late 1990s. and. doors are slamming shut one by one. In March 1997.” This was a strange threat in light of the obligation of the press to inform the public.”33 The next day.35 and it demanded “urgent reevaluation” of the decision.Media in the First Post-Communist Decade
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A law drafted with the intention of modifying and completing the Penal Code was finally adopted on 7 May 1998. the print or broadcasting media as they did before the disappearance of the party press. however. The modification specified that the “meetings of the (Senate’s) commissions are public. Ursu32 asserts. Consequently.” Throughout the 1990s. It was equally strange to have parliamentarians try to control the access of journalists to their deliberations and then complain about the “tendentious” coverage they received from the media. each chamber of Romania’s bicameral Parliament took turns attempting to restrict journalists’ access to its public deliberations. the Romanian Press Club reminded the Permanent Bureau of the Chamber of Deputies that any commission barring access to journalists was trampling on the constitution. with any certainty of success. 11 March 1998.38 Another attempt at keeping the media from covering the work of elected and appointed officials occurred on 22 April 1998. the Club warned. the education commission of the Chamber of Deputies barred journalists from covering its debate regarding the Education Law. on 10 March 1998. “Transparency has become steam. in fact. and attempts to shut the journalists’ mouths and to snatch the pen from their hands have increased. the election of the “democratic” opposition was supposed to have stopped such actions. for example. it would “institute a total embargo on coverage of the Chamber’s work. the Senate finally reconsidered and modified the rules referring to the press’s access to the workings of this legislative institution. but prison sentences for defamation (two months to one year or a fine)31 were retained. it was the Ministry of Agriculture and Food Supply that was erecting obstacles to media
. it played into the hands of the various commissions who obviously did not want press coverage. parliamentarians were no longer able to control or influence. but not if the individual commissions decide otherwise.

39 Further aggravating the media’s access problems. as it presented itself starting in 1990. journalists could no longer put questions to ministers or other officials on the steps of the Victoria Palace. quickly died in embryo in 1997. . and of opposition (to it). rather than having them be independent reporters and analysts. the confusion and misunderstanding regarding media roles in a democracy continued. the government erected a pen-like enclosure in the middle of the palace’s courtroom where journalists could question ministers and other officials. .
. less so subsequently. Nevertheless. At the other end of the spectrum. “the moment of absolute press freedom. and . designed at least in part to strengthen the media’s protection and access to information. the seat of the Romanian government.” was made public in February 1998. One was a proposal emanating from the government and from the Partidul Alternativa România (PAR): the “the Law for protection of freedom of expression in the media. This change in self-assigned function. with the notable exception of TVR.202
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coverage by demanding that journalists be required to have general accreditation to cover government as well as a “special” accreditation.” A second PAR project. “Law concerning the defense of freedom of expression in all media. however. . the media that had toed the official line before 1996 became the media in “opposition” after November 1996. but the fullness and the forms of its assertion is even greater . . . and as Petcu41 writes. . a substitute for justice (system) often weak and inefficient. Instead. but persistently in our day. Alina Mungiu42 defines the Romanian mass media’s role as being
. and they affected the very nature of journalism and the effects it had on the democratization process. a substitute for all the absent structures in Romanian society: a substitute of power. the short period of the 1848 revolution. Authoritarianism and confusion appeared to have reigned supreme with most politicians’ and political parties’ visions of the role of the media in a free society during what was expected to be a more enlightened and democratic Constantinescu/CD rule. more in 1990.40 Two proposed press laws.”
JOURNALISM WITHOUT JOURNALISTS AND MEDIA ROLES
The media that had generally described themselves as ones of “opposition” since 1990 quickly changed their moniker to “presa de transit ¸ie” (the press of transition) after the opposition’s victory at the polls in Fall 1996. freedom of the press was palpably present during this period. as of May 1999. and for some hesitant investigative organs. only has equivalency in . . a substitute for a political class which has only recently and incompletely been educated. the state television station. put them in the service of the new powers. is a unique phenomenon in the history of the national press. In short. but only if they chose to step into the enclosure and submit to questioning. It also demanded a list of the journalists’ articles dealing with the Ministry and their curricula vitae. .

First. Still. as have their audiences. that they do have different news values. the problem in Romania from 1989–2000 was not an absence of pluralist media resulting from “chosen strategies. culturally oriented. (The kind of media that are needed in a transition to democracy is briefly addressed in the next section of this chapter). beyond that of “merely . religious beliefs. the press’s revolving door (i. the death of many publications and the birth of new ones) suggests that audiences are searching for something other than what is offered them. .Media in the First Post-Communist Decade
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Only a superficial case can be made for the “substitute” role. etc. What developed in Romania after 1989 were media that were extreme representations of the Western European model of a pluralistic.47 on their location on a subordination-autonomy continuum. more independent. Mungiu’s vision of media roles suggests a version of the type of modern media seen as “more powerful. ethnic groupings. “as [they] select the persons and issues to be covered and as [they] shape its portrayal of leaders.”44 and there is nothing to suggest. As the first decade of post-Communism came to a close. and the Romanian media could not boast of it during 1998–2000. one that suggests direct media effects. Thus. relatively diverse media system of politically. such as political socialization and providing information to the public about politics and government. Additionally. Romanian media represented the full possible gamut of politics and ideologies. so the argument goes.45 And there was a positive response to new independent.”46 There is no indication that Romanian media fully and directly performed that role since 1989 or that they have the required characteristics to do so. the greater the autonomy.”50 That may have been true in the television field until the second half of the 1990s when private. In theory. Thus. but not exclusively or unalterably. the media became highly heterogeneous since 1989.e. the more media play the role of major actors. and more determined to pursue their own interests through a professional culture of their own making. the media’s role as a “substitute” is effective only if and when the media have high credibility. but was not the case in the print media.” particularly in political/campaign coverage. ethnically. . however. This kind of media role in society depends in large measure. it is fair to say that they were predominantly. other than the circumstantial evidence that there is a disparity between the media’s values and those of their audiences. and market-driven outlets. the media were subordinated to a large number of varied authorities. political and commercial.” and tending to “take on political functions formerly performed by party and party-controlled media.43 Also.. The
. with each of the audience’s subgroups using and interpreting the media in its own idiosyncratic way. commercial television as well as to the new modes of news presentations offered to the audience. the audience must have “different news values than those reflected. commercial national television was expanded. Second.”48 Huntington49 also argues that weak and controlled media cannot provide the kind of accurate information required for meaningful decision making in a democracy. religiously. channel[s] of communication.

were more than just political or commercial. the press-party relationship thinned out into various strands that selectively connected and disconnected.51 Ownership. the Roma media. that will tend to fix the position of media on this [subordinationautonomy] continuum. undefined. but not after that date. and they have seen small but important changes in Romania during the first post-Communist decade.”52 However. varied from medium to medium. This by no means signaled an end to the extreme politicization of journalism. once again. Media ownership was not easy to ascertain during the period under discussion here. for example. and the legal. At the very least. Mungiu’s description of a “substitute” role also suggests that the media in Romania independently and spontaneously formulated this role for themselves in response to several institutional voids. a highly speculative exercise and. while Gerbner’s proposition is sound. they were also sociocultural elements of a multicultural society. Romania since 1989 has been in a transition period. . that it is the “overall cultural mix . how. or a change in the even more de-professionalizing partisanships brought about by the various relationships between media and political and economic elites and interests. Interviewees did not talk about it except in private conversation. Gerbner53 suggested that independence was less important than “by whom. and its consequences. and then only on background. Therefore. the purposes for which it is exercised. and unsecured. it cannot be used as a basis for reaching conclusions about transitional media. as I attempt to show next. and the Romanian case proves. In any case.” In Romania. conceptual. Proving a direct connection between the media and political parties. who controls or influences the media has changed more than once since 1989 and so has the way this control is exercised. that they began to selectively and tentatively define their role. assessing media autonomy as a test of democratization is. and ended their honeymoon with the former opposition (now the new “establishment”). ownership of media is an insufficient gauge of their autonomy or subordination. and the degree of media subordination to other institutions. importantly. . politicians. when the “press of transition” (formerly the “opposition” press) cut the umbilical cord to the official transition cause. in the end. depending on the issue and the perceived balance of power between the media and the political parties and politicians. In the 1970s. as was the case with the religious or religion-affiliated press. or state institutions was difficult.
. particularly their Hungarian component and. at best.54 It was not until 1997. a fruitless one. for what purposes and with what consequences are the inevitable controls exercised. In short. and it has been difficult to pinpoint where the media stand on the continuum because the “cultural mix” has been constantly changing.204
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significant ethnic media. That may have been true in the 22 December 1989 to 1 February 1990 period. and structural constraints on media are equally as unsettled.

made public a ten-article-long ethics code. trivialized. however. Ion Iliescu. “That kind of journalism is a swamp in a way that the older [descriptive] style wasn’t. political. the facts. and for the “destiny” of information after it is published. admits that.Media in the First Post-Communist Decade
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Furthermore.59 The latest attempt was made in February 1998. and commercials for political parties and politicians. completeness. For instance. selectively. and they published unverifiable. Every rule has exceptions. They fashioned themselves to be “analysts” and “experts” in what persisted as a widely recognized practice among journalists of viewing themselves as “different” from the rest of the population and from one another. and the dominant party. politicians and government officials are equally guilty.” he rightly warns. There have been a string of attempts by various professional organizations to “professionalize” journalism by introducing ethics codes since 1989. speeches. increasingly in the United States and almost always in Romania. Nestor Rates ¸. In the final analysis. or financial exigencies. It also suggests that Romanian journalists have been something other than journalists as understood in the West.55 None of the changes in the Romanian media’s relationships with other institutions signaled an end to the politicization of journalism and the deprofessionalizing of the media during 1996–2000. “the story line get assembled first” and then. the PDSR. excusing the lack of impartiality. accuracy. incomplete. he is often “frightened” at how little most Romanian journalists are preoccupied with verifying information or the quality of their sources.58 the director of Radio Free Europe’s Romanian department and a close observer of the Romanian scene. during the 1996 election campaign. and corrupted by personal. None has succeeded because there was no universal acceptance of the codes. the view that Romanian media played a substitute role implies that the journalists were something other than journalists. independence.56 Romanian journalism after 1996 remained a dubious blend of advocacy communication and news reporting. and overall professionalism imposed on them by the demands of their nonjournalistic roles. A large number of Romanian journalists remained highly opinionated. when the Romanian Press Club. the informational chaos found in Romania cannot be exclusively attributed to the journalists. mixed with rumor in the guise of “news. and even fictitious articles. many journalists reported on the 1996 presidential and parliamentary campaign while concurrently writing campaign literature. such as the political phone scam on behalf of the incumbent president. and some articles proved Romanian journalists have the capacity to be professional: articles dealing
. a full decade after the transition began. as a journalist. and no means to enforce them. As Harvard Professor Thomas Patterson57 correctly asserts.60 It was quickly forgotten. which were often sensationalized. with great fanfare. There were occasional first-rate investigative stories during the period under scrutiny here. no interest in them.” all labeled “analytical” journalism.

Iago. they could control or influence them.206
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with economics that were frequently thorough and balanced. nor is it measurable with any degree of certainty or accuracy. and fear of them.. Nistorescu. Politics brought down Prime Minister Victor Ciorbea in April 1998. Thus. Romanian journalism remained an exercise in analysis based on selective reporting. and the politicians and political parties were another way journalists contributed to political battles and converted journalists into political players.e. It remained a mixture of Don Quixote and his sidekick Sancho Panza. the many media outlets that they had hoped to control. and a relative mutual dependency was established. and concludes that this “terror” is only “a sign of a freedom wrongly used. as Adam Michnik62 correctly describes them: (1) the domination of ideological conviction over informative reliability. The power of the media has heretofore been derived mostly from politicians and political parties. with a considerable touch of Lenin. and the reporting of Romania’s responsibility in readying itself for NATO candidacy. not certain when. the media remained dependent on political entities and politicians because they were so politicized and partisan. the presidency. in turn. The public. The power of the media in politics grew.” assigns blame for Ciorbea’s downfall to the media. and to what extent. blames the press for the political chaos. so-
. along with an occasional sprinkling of Woodward and Bernstein. and even politicians are worried about the “terror” of the press. Frankenstein (the embodiment of the many political parties and politicians) was being threatened in the late 1990s by the monster that he helped create (i.” What was encouraging by 2000 was the creeping infusion of good journalism—the exceptions that from time to time lit up the national skies with the brightness of verifiable facts.” and (2) “blindness. coverage of disasters such as the explosion of a military aircraft that killed fifteen people and the floods that ravaged portions of the country in 1997. he writes. It shared with Polish journalism two main enemies.
THE MEDIA AND DEMOCRATIZATION
The exact level and extensiveness of Romanian media contributions to resocialization and reeducation during 1996–2000 is simply not known. political parties and politicians have increased their courting of the media. and Machiavelli on one side and Mencken on the other. Investigations of the government.61 who recognizes that politicians spend more time on television and in front of journalists than working “in the real sense of the word. coupled with the weakness of politicians. their relationship with the media was somewhat equalized by the second half of the 1990s. they elicited contradictory reactions from politicians and political parties themselves: alacrity in using media and their journalists. influence.” Put another way. conducting a serendipitous form of politically motivated investigation. Can any political. and use). which leaves one able to make only trite observations. That is. the figurative Dr.

and mobilization for various partisan causes. an argument can be made that Romanian media have positively contributed to the 1989–2000 transition. In fact. new nongovernmental groups. Thus.
. they contributed to the creation of a public climate of competition. as well as cultural predominance. the political contests continue to revolve more around both politicians and issues. new parties. Romanian media were unwitting and indirect agenda setters. in Romania. but the causal relationship has not been resolved. Furthermore. who should get what share of public funds. The information function was served by the media. where political contests are reported first and foremost as horse races. The very overpoliticization and partisanship actually brought to the fore new issues.64 But this itself may be cause for their audiences. The agenda setting process in a society is a combination of the media’s agenda. as well as through newly introduced political advertising by politicians and political parties vying for votes. the media’s agenda was at first identical. and attitudes—a process that has been slowly unfolding in the country. again. The public’s agenda was. First. behavior. new ideas and possibilities. which ethnic/cultural groups should get certain rights. and where issue-oriented reporting has increasingly been marginalized. the media served an information function even when they were meant to serve one of manipulation.Media in the First Post-Communist Decade
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cial. and often in the absence of fact-based journalism. Romanian media have also managed to inform their audiences. what it perceives and thinks). and insecurity. In Romania. chaos. thanks to the very introduction of political contests. cultural. between a range of competitors for political and economic power. the public’s agenda (what the public wants. by virtue of their overpoliticization and partisanship. unlike in the United States. and concurrently. Second. represented by the media from their own political point of view. and the policy agenda (what is being proposed and carried out by those in power or proposed by those who wish to obtain power). an increasingly wider variety of issues relevant to the audience/citizens were disseminated through news programs. as demonstrated in the varied works on the Romanian media. to rethink or react to extant values.. even when their initial effect was a negative one. I hasten to add that I see no evidence that they have done so by design but. largely missing before 1989. and so on. which definition of “morals” should prevail. propaganda. to the policy agenda. This is in line with major research findings in the Western contexts where a correlation was found between the issues covered or emphasized by the media and those seen as important by the public.g. and indeed for the media themselves. or economic failures identified in this transition period be laid at the doorsteps of the media? Can the media be shown to have engineered whatever successes were accomplished? If we accept Lenart’s63 proposition that media effects should be examined in the context of the climate they create. they also contributed to a climate of distrust. etc. and later in the post-1989 decade at least similar. thanks to newly established economic and social and cultural competition (e.). new leaders. and still is.

journalism does less to influence public opinion and attitudes than to reinforce them. and only if and when the audience finds kinship with.68 In any case. and cultural competition. and the overabundance of views and polemics. examples of. and their editors and news directors. mostly a matter of conjecture. in the absence of studies and experiments similar to those carried out in the West. that Romanian media have attempted to tell their audiences how to think and. Precisely because of that. Iyengar67 outlined a second aspect of agenda setting. policies. first and foremost. or sympathy for the cues in the journalism offered them. “calling attention to some matters while ignoring others”). continents. or the world. Since 1989. and conduits for. The Romanian media’s contribution to the 1996–2000 phase of democratization rested. and candidates for public office are judged. economic.65 In 1987. and cultural options. and thus influencing “the standards by which governments..e. but that they set the voters’ political agendas. and because of their highly politicized and partisan journalism. after exhaustive review of research findings.” In Romania during 1996–2000. on being symbols of liberalization and the struggle to continue this process. Iyengar and Kinder66 demonstrated that the media’s agenda setting influences public opinion and attitudes via “priming” (i.” which he described as the contextual cues embedded within a news story. which also influences public opinion and attitudes. countries. those who chose to avail themselves of a singular news outlet did not gain a full understanding of the events and issues in their communities. at least prior to American journalism’s change to a more analytical model. this framing function was overdone in Romania. there is some truth in their argument that they are presenting choices to the audience and asking them to choose. This approach to journalism is the opposite of the trends identified in the United States. On the other hand. justified this approach by arguing that only in this way can they purposefully guide their audiences in democratization. the availability of political. how successful Romanian media were in this respect remains. where findings suggest that media tell people less how to think than what to think about. “framing. It is through their pluralism and diversity. considering the varied interpretations of information. It is in this way that the media appeared to contribute to changing political culture in this phase of the
. and facilitators of political.208
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For instance. the partisan choice of information to be interpreted. it was concluded that the media have minimal effects. market. It is not an insignificant step in the democratization process considering that the majority was not used to making choices (because they did not have many) prior to 1989. in that context. Romanian journalists. what to think about. Yet. presidents. priming was so vastly different from one news outlet to the next that those who chose to expose themselves to the full gamut of matters being discussed gorged themselves on a smorgasbord of information/views.

news and commentary. and certainly without the guarantee of reaching the articulated designation: a working democracy? The media continue to be
. . new publications were introduced since 2000. Three new television stations were introduced in Bucharest in 2001. national.”73 Meanwhile. often without all the means necessary to make it. Cultural change may stem “from a change in social relations that makes the old cultural patterns dysfunctional to the new order. The Romanian legislature also approved an ambiguous and restrictive Law on State Secrets. the respected news agency.Media in the First Post-Communist Decade
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transition process away from Communism and toward an as yet undefined future. new radio stations were launched all over the country. A major negative development has been the growth of state-controlled media. commercial television channels have borrowed heavily from state coffers and are now subject to manipulation by government officials. those old cultural patterns are now dysfunctional.”70 Indeed. new.”72 This journalism continued into the new millennium together with the “Byzantine” journalistic style reflected in verbosity and flowery language. yet still present. This was not a situation in which there were “dominant communication agencies.”69 There were no discernable “dominant image patterns” to cultivate in a post-Communist phase in which the battle was raging over which image pattern(s) will dominate. however.” but not to information deemed important to national security or information on judicial proceedings. the largest. overall the circulation of print media has decreased.
CONCLUSION
Since 2000. The Parliament passed a Freedom of Access to Information Law in 2001 guaranteeing access to information “of public interest. Furthermore. Rompres. for example. web-based media have been multiplying. almost 27 percent of households subscribed to cable television. The European Institute for the Media concluded in 1997 that Romanian journalism was fraught with “certain flaws . the number of media outlets continued to grow.” even if certain news outlets had gained ascendancy during 1996–2000. was placed under the control of the Ministry of Public Information in 2001. there has been both progress and regression in Romania’s media world. such as failure to separate between fact and opinion. which “creates rumors and is opaquing communication. in post-Communist Romania. .74 The basic functions the media are to serve in a society that remains a “work in progress” are yet to be articulated. that cultivated “the dominant image patterns. How could it be otherwise in a transition that is a journey without a well-defined map.71 The social relations are still changing and have not yet solidly established new cultural patterns.

TVR is still the only truly national television station. 19. Dumitru Iuga. 1993). By 1999. National Audio-Visual Council Bulletin. CA: Sage Publications. Gabor Demszky.” Ziua (10 November 1999). Coposu was one of the few legendary figures of the anti-Communist battles. commercial stations were accessible to most Romanians.oxford. 10. “Applying Europe’s ‘First Amendment’ to Romanian Libel and Access Law. 12. 18 (1994). Creating a Free Press in Eastern Europe (Athens. 235 radio. 3. in fact. they are concurrently mechanisms of change by virtue of the new ideas.
NOTES
1. Peter Gross. 6. debates. pp. Telegrama (8 July 1998).352 cable television licenses. Middleton. 79–85. Colin Seymour-Ure.uk. The Political Impact of Mass Media (Beverly Hills. 17. “Un Grav Caz de ˆ Inca ˘lcare a Liberta ˘t ii Presei. proprietara Pro TV. 3. 13. and 1. no.” Nat ¸ional (7 October 1999). 405–30. they are only adjuncts to it. Liviu Antonesei. The assumption that only an ideally defined. GA: James M. Telegrama (17 June 1999). he spent years in prison. Media in Revolution. pp.” Monitorul Oficial. 5. pp. Center for International Mass Communication Training and Research. the NAVC had issued 148 television. Pro-TV and other private. Ibid. Parliament also named a new Administrative Council for TVR in July 1998. and opportunities they present to the public. eds.. Media in Revolution and National Development: The Romanian Laboratory (Ames: Iowa State University Press. 11. Cox Jr. Adeva ˘ rul (5 February 1998). “The Law Concerning the Organization and Functioning of the Romanian Radio Society and of the Romanian Television Society. 1974). By the end of 1997. 21.” in Media Studies Journal (Summer 1995). 15. “Cultura Politica si Terapie Sociala in Romania Post-Comunista. 1996).” in Al Hester and K.210
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expressions and reinforcers of the extant political culture. 18. the head of the Free Union of RVR. Central European Media Enterprises invested around $20 million in Pro-TV. pcmlp@socio-legal-studies.ac. 7.” Revista de Cercetari Sociale (1994). Post-Communist Media Law and Policy. All translations from Romanian and French are the author’s.. Gross. pluralistic. It was partly derived from an equally faulty notion that media are at the core of this democratization when. CEME was bought by Russian media magnate Vladimir Gusinsky in Fall 1999. Author’s discussion with TVR personnel in October 1997. “Breaking Censorship—Making Peace. See “Un rus a cumpa ˘rat act ¸iuni la CME. See K. White. 14. accused the new leadership of again fulfilling a “political mandate. 8. independent. University of Georgia. 2.” See Telegrama (3 June 1997). 16. 9. 4. R.
. 20. p. 1997. and professional media could help the process of democratization was a mistaken one. 118–23.

55. Media in Revolution. 8. The Effects of Mass Communication (New York: Free Press. 67.A. DC: US Government Printing Office. 176–87.212
Peter Gross
49. 48–56. vol. 53. vol. Henry F. 66. 1991). Rubinstein. 10. 28–41. vol. 7 (September 1998). pp. Maxwell McCombs and Donald Shaw. 56.” Media Studies Journal. 58. p. 62. Direct ties between media and politicians or political parties can be established in some cases. Mass Media Policies in Changing Cultures (New York: John Wiley and Sons. 104–13. On that day. and of the Democratic Convention. Dilema (6–12 February 1998). 26. Ziua (20 February 1998). “After Communism. 52. issue 2/3 (Spring/Summer 1998). Michael Gurevitch and Jay G. Blumler. 20. no. The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press. vol.” in George Gerbner. 36. 61. For example. Ziua was run by the Omega Investment Group owned by Dinu Patriciu of the Liberal Party. “Violence in Television Drama: Trends and Social Functions” in G. Samuel P. Scores of journalists related these practices to the author. Iyengar. George Gerbner. p. 251–68. News That Matters: Television and American Opinion (Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 51. Few of them admitted they are culpable of these practices. Joseph Klapper. pp. 7. 1972). Thomas Patterson is Bradlee Professor of Government and the Press at Harvard University. Cornel Nistorescu. 57.” Journal of Mass Media Ethics. entered the first post-1989 election. no. vol. “Playing in Defense.” East European Politics and Society. ed. the National Salvation Front labeled itself a political party. 14. 50. Evenimentul Zilei (2 April 1998). 54. Silvio Lenart.
. no. Author interviews with editors and journalists in Romanian cities during the 1996 election campaign. vol. R. S. 18–22. 1.. The Impact of Interpersonal Communication and Mass Media (Thousand Oaks.1 (1999) pp. pp. vol. “From Big Lie to Small Lies: State Mass Media Dominance in Post-Communist Romania. “Structuring the Unseen Environment. Kinder. 1994). no. 16–45. pp. “The Agenda-Setting Function of the Mass Media. 1 (Winter 1996). Huntington. 65. “From Big Lie to Small Lies. 2 (1976). Adam Michnik. 1987). 63. eds. Iyengar and D. For an outline of the problems. România Mare was the newspaper of the party that bears the same name and the party leader’s (Corneliu Vadim Tudor) main mouthpiece. Comstoke and Eli A. Television and Social Behavior. “Groping Toward Ethics in Transitioning Press Systems: The Case of Romania. see Kenneth Starck. 2 (Summer 1972). 12. România Libera was a supporter of the monarchy. Is Anyone Responsible? How Television Frames Political Issues (Chicago: University of Chicago Press. and instantly brought politics back into the public domain. Journalism. CA: Sage.. Carey. S. of President Emil Constantinescu.” Journal of Communication. 64. Media Content and Control (Washington. 59. 1977). 60. no. pp. “Mass Media and Political Institutions: The Systems Approach. and Maxwell McCombs and Donald Shaw. 1994). 28–187. Quoted in Judith Sheppard.” and Gross. pp. Shaping Political Attitudes.” American Journalism Review.” Public Opinion Quarterly. Carey. pp. 1960).

for that reason. It is these features of political culture that I find most interesting. and helps shape their operation and results. political culture also infuses new institutions and relationships with meaning. it certainly helps. and to address the issue of how post-Communist political culture is a continuation of Communist political culture. While new institutions. and even antagonistic. nearly fourteen years of post-Communism in Eastern Europe has amply demonstrated that. to identify differences of political culture with ideological differences. in shaping outcomes. rather than precedes. Indeed. Such an approach neglects those critical features of political culture which are shared by sharply different. The manner in which I analyze this question—from a societal-wide focus—reflects my frustration with what I find as the tendency. I focus upon them here. it may even be possible to “consolidate” democracy without the prior institutionalization of a democratic political culture. although a conducive political culture may not be mandatory for the successful institutionalization of democracy and the market. rules. in the literature on post-Communist Romania. the collapse of an authoritarian regime.10
Political Culture in Post-Ceaus ¸escu Romania
Richard Andrew Hall
Evidence from the literature on transitions from authoritarian rule generally supports the seemingly counterintuitive claim that democratic political culture usually follows. Political culture ensures that the same political and economic institutions found in the West may function differently. and potentially most important. in Eastern Europe. and have different outcomes. ideological movements. Nevertheless. This chapter seeks to specify the character of political culture in postCommunist Romania. and incentive structures have the capacity to reshape political culture.
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personalist/clientelist. These characteristics reflected the more enduring totalitarian features of the Romanian regime (compared to other East European regimes). dissimulation (to borrow a term invoked by Jowitt to describe the disjuncture between public behavior and private beliefs). when compared to other regime types. informal networks of pile. avoidance. Romanian political culture in the 1980s was distinguished by fear. acquaintances.4 The result was the paradox of a relatively homogenous but highly fragmented society. elite political culture was pedantic. xenophobic.
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COMMUNIST POLITICAL CULTURE
Communist rule bore sufficient similarities across the various countries of Eastern Europe for us to be able to speak.3 Romanian mass political culture reflected the impact of totalitarianism. dependence on “connections. corrupt. obsessed with unity (Shafir termed this “factional anxiety”). suspicion. intolerant of difference and dissent. enthusiasm. nationalistic. servile. s ¸i relat¸ii (“connections. of a generic “Communist political culture. deceitful. but nonetheless potentially very deep and contentious.”1 This is not to imply. cunos ¸tiint¸e. where the bases of differentiation were necessarily idiosyncratic and somewhat artificial. that “Communist political culture” was a static property during the entire period of Communist rule in Eastern Europe—the same in 1989 as it had been in 1949. ideologically barren. In the late Communist regime. Although Communist rule was never able to homogenize society to the extent envisioned by ideology or promised by elites. elite political culture reflected the above-mentioned features—with some being more developed (corruption) than others (fear)—and added certain other properties specific to the elite. appropriately. differentiation. repression. and relatives”) filled the void as the primary bases of societal organization. and competition in the late Communist era. and zealotry that characterized early Communist rule was not the same as the cynicism and corruption which characterized late Communist rule.” and a preference for the informal over the formal. and constantly on the lookout for traitors and those suspected of antipatriotic behavior. but they also reflected the overall delegitimation of the ruling ideology (which led to what Jowitt termed the party’s “loss of its combat mission”) and the lessening of repression which characterized all East European regimes after the 1960s. corruption. rumor-mongering. however.2 Specifically. The political culture evolved with changes in the character of the regime. The intensity of fear. withdrawal.” Because totalitarian rule simultaneously atomized society and denied its natural propensity toward differentiation. secrecy. it perhaps came closest to creating a relatively undifferentiated “mass society.

and mix with. and dissimulation (born of fear) which characterized mass political culture during the Communist era have substantially dissipated. This applies even to former members of the Communist regime who continue to involve themselves in politics. the older. more negative features. and they are leery of making long-term partisan commitments—as is evidenced by the volatility of post-Communist elections. and have not made any concerted attempt to overturn it. they have demonstrated an acceptance of the basic “rules of the game” (pluralistic competition) of the post-Communist system. They compete with the newer. Despite their criticisms of the post-Communist political and economic systems. What is left is a relatively nonparticipatory society. is significant. The significance of these developments should not be dismissed.” They are loath to join with other citizens in order to participate directly in political parties and civil society organizations.
THE LINGERING EFFECTS OF MASS SOCIETY
Having been denied the right to ideological differentiation and the ability to articulate real interests. it is obvious that the fear. but their impact does at least undermine the democratic content of the contemporary Romanian political system. Nevertheless. as theorists of democratic transitions tell us.5 Moreover. Elite political culture in Romania has undergone meaningful change. antipolitical tactics—the struggle of the community
.or underfulfillment of political and economic expectations. I outline some of the more enduring. secrecy. Post-Communism is not a case of either/or: new. This. both at the elite and mass levels. harmful legacies of Communistera political culture in contemporary Romania. citizens in post-Communist societies continue to bear the marks of the “mass society.Political Culture in Post-Ceaus ¸escu Romania
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POLITICAL CULTURE IN THE POST-COMMUNIST ERA
How much has the political culture of Romania changed since the late Ceaus ¸escu era? It would be foolhardy to contend that it has not changed much at all. features of political culture (discussed previously) created by the new institutions and processes of the post-Communist political system. I maintain that much of the broader features of political culture during the Communist era. This continues the kind of nihilistic. servility. their expressions of nostalgia for the totalitarian past. more virtuous trends in political culture compete. Below. which is highly fragmented and floats its support from one political movement to another. This is not to suggest that such features are destined to scuttle Romania’s democratic experiment. and their attempts to manipulate and evade post-Communist institutions and regulations. and generally more positive. Post-Communist citizens have also displayed a tendency to “blame the incumbents” for the non. remains.

in part. and that the electorate has reserved the right to float its support to different political movements as it sees fit. Nevertheless. POWER STRUGGLES. R.” something he attributes to
. Contrary to the image of elite power that was associated with Romania early in the 1990s. eventually resulted in the transfer of power to opposition forces at the national level in the fall of 1996. Elite fragmentation is often more derivative of personality clashes. personal ambitions. a consequence of the legacy of the “mass society. absence of fixed cleavages. and the authoritarian reflexes of those who came to power in the immediate aftermath of December 1989. this suggests that the legacy of the mass society contributes to elite weakness— not only in terms of the inability of elites to craft winning and enduring constituencies for elections. and nomadic electorate. more than fourteen years after the collapse of Communist rule. which began in provincial urban centers in local elections in the spring of 1992. and position/role-dependent differences in responsibilities and interests than of ideological differences. fragmentation occurs within particular ideological movements as much as between them (the Liberal movement has been a caricature of this phenomenon in the post-Communist era for many Romanians). Post-Communist elites continue to have a difficult time mobilizing citizens. fuzzy institutions and coffeehouse politics. Patapievici maintains that “our politics is all intrigue. there are no ideas. initially retarded the evolution of political diversification and electoral volatility in post-Communist Romania. but in their inability to build such coalitions for successful policy implementation.AND PERSONALITY POLITIC
The absence of well-defined economic interests and ideological cleavages among the public has contributed to elite fragmentation. Romania looks strikingly similar to the rest of Eastern Europe with its electoral volatility. The electoral decline of the Iliescu regime. Hence. where. This is. despite the names of the political parties. POLITICAL POLEMICS. as well as the absence of ideological consensus among the elites themselves.6 So too has the comparative lack of importance attached to ideology in post-Communist society.”
ELITE FRAGMENTATION. The political analyst Dorel S ¸ andor captures this in his description of Romania as “a nation of weak.218
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against “the Power”—which characterized mass publics during late Communist rule. “blame the incumbents” popular mentality. The comparatively greater totalitarian legacy of the Ceaus ¸escu regime. only personal vanity and intrigue. Public opinion polling data in advance of the 2000 parliamentary and presidential elections suggests that the Romanian Democratic Convention has suffered the same price of incumbency that the late Iliescu regime did.”7 The philosopher H.

and contention— whether within the former Front or within the ruling Romanian Democratic Convention—has undoubtedly contributed to political instability and the policy paralysis of those in power. with former Prime Ministers Victor Ciorbea and Radu Vasile alternating their previous roles. and the constitutional/ institutional dispersion of power.”8 Personal ambitions. This appears to be a product of both deeply embedded historical habits and the uncertainty and turbulence which have characterized formal institutions in the post-Communist era. This situation has perhaps been replicated in the post-1996 period in the struggle between the prime minister and the leadership of his party (the PNT ¸CD). which makes everything forever negotiable. at the expense of those who do not. This has been particularly evident in the struggles in the post-1996 cabinets among members of the National Peasant. like many East Europeans. Romanians. Indeed. propelled the implosion of the National Salvation Front (NSF) between 1990 and 1992. competition. have continued to exhibit a preference for informal personal networks over formal institutions. The split within the ranks of the NSF left Prime Minister and party president Petre Roman and Deputy Prime Minister and director of the (in)famous “Interior Ministry unit 0215” Gelu Voican Voiculescu on one side. Formal institutions appear wholly for the benefit of those who rule. this elite fragmentation. As in the case of the lingering effects of the “mass society. generational differences.Political Culture in Post-Ceaus ¸escu Romania
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the “Orthodox habit of communicating traditions orally rather than through written texts. Liberal. The attempt to build unauthorized formal institutions usually meets with the swift response of
.9 Ironically. and President Ion Iliescu and Romanian Intelligence Service (SRI) chief Virgil Ma ˘gureanu on the other. Moreover. The experience of repressive and exploitative rule engenders a preference for informal over formal processes. and Democratic parties.” the new institutional framework chosen by post-Communist elites— a system of representation which stresses proportionality and which has (until changes were adopted in 1999) maintained a low threshold for representation—has merely reinforced the tendency toward fragmentation already present in elite political culture. the personalism and clientelism which dominates many political parties—regardless of their ideological orientation—is perhaps a consequence of disunity and an attempt to overcome it.
A PREFERENCE FOR INFORMAL PROCESSES AND INSTITUTIONS OVER FORMAL ONES
In the post-Communist era. as much as (and probably more than) ideological differences. the accentuated ideological rhetoric of these politicians is less a reflection of consensus than an effort to manufacture it.

. Natalia Dinello’s description of the “Russian F-connection—finance. and intensely valued. inefficiently transferred. as Dinello concludes. “personal connections are often the only means of managing economic transactions. unenforceable (owing in part to the weakness of the state).” Indeed. credit. or nonexistent. undermines the successful legitimation and institutionalization of formal institutions. and can withstand the collapse of formal institutional orders.12 Not only are such networks well established as a result of the character of “real existing socialism”—and thus offer themselves as readily adaptable to the new political and economic environment—but these are mechanisms (as they were under Communist rule) for reducing uncertainty and insecurity. By contrast. confusing. . The result is an almost magical faith in rumor and a preference for it over official forms of spoken and written communication. families. It builds community in an uncertain environment. and expunged. such informal means of information gathering penetrate the new formal institutions of the putatively open society of post-Communist Romania. as they are likely to have greater endurance. and favorites” explains why this should be so. firms. and of questionable motivation. in fact. the preference for the informal over the formal manifests itself in a number of ways. . crushed. maldistributed.10 Rumor is perceived as more personal and controllable. As the noted Romanian literary critic Nicolae Manolescu observed: “Unfortunately. contradictory. friends. the negative effects of rumor-mongering .”11 The ultimate expression of the enduring preference for informal arrangements is the continued pervasiveness and significance of informal networks of pile. where information is partial. Indeed. because formal institutions such as contracts and trademarks are weak. and information are poor. They have the capacity to survive longer than formal institutions and even to penetrate formal institutions. credible. The result
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those who hold power: The unauthorized formal institutions are slated for elimination. informal forms of organization and communication are less visible and hence less detectable. scarce.”13 One might add that the power and necessity of such informal networks perpetuates dissimulation with regard to existing formal institutions—even if such dissimulation is now instigated more by pragmatism and the desire to emulate Western forms (at least on the surface) than out of fear of reprisal—and. [he] is not educated in the spirit of the profession he is practicing. Although the credibility and validity of statements made by politicians and journalists have increased since the Communist era. The choice of informal networks seems a strategic one. and the population remains remarkably cynical and suspicious. . In the post-Communist era. s ¸i relat ¸ii in everyday Romanian life. popular trust in such statements remains low. by sharing the dissemination and consumption of “the secret. cunos ¸tiint ¸e. and hence. the Romanian journalist cannot escape . and for overcoming a situation in which resources.

Peter Gross. the situation has not changed much from the Iliescu era: “Doing business here by Western standards is difficult. RENT-SEEKING ELITE AND A POLITICIZED STATE
Significantly. This suggests that many of these traits have less to do with ideology than with the broader political context. the transfer of power from the Iliescu leadership to its critics has not resulted in the kind of reorientation in elite political culture for which many had hoped for. postauthoritarian societies which have made the transition to the market. owing to the weakness of the state. maintains
. such as South Korea. where it was largely the result of reluctance). Moreover. it was not noticeably reduced under the Constantinescu administration. The result has been strikingly similar: a statist elite with a “don’t rock the boat” mentality. Out of weakness or pragmatism. Whereas an inability to engage in far-reaching economic reform. in the business world. in spite of its highly publicized anticorruption drives. Passive attitudes—which lead state employees and economic elites to seek and secure the approval of the political leadership on key matters before proceeding further (even in situations where such approval is not. No one here likes decisions. Everything depends on politics. more egregious. if “rent-seeking” behavior among state officials was more widespread. the Constantinescu administration appeared to have grudgingly accepted that this was an unavoidable feature of the postCommunist system.14 Nor has the long tradition of the politicization of state institutions disappeared. one which could not be reformed without causing the kind of political instability which might lead the regime to collapse. neither leadership has made bold moves in the economic arena.Political Culture in Post-Ceaus ¸escu Romania
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is that Romanian society—like other post-Communist societies—now bears economic similarities to other recent. and almost tacitly encouraged under the Iliescu regime.
A STATUS QUO-ORIENTED. One Western executive has observed that. be legally or constitutionally necessary)—persist. Ideological commitments and campaign promises notwithstanding. It is important to point out that this is determined as much by state employees and economic elites as the political leadership itself. or should not. the political leadership since November 1996 has not constituted a radical break in terms of policy (especially economic policy) from the Iliescu regime. may be the primary reason for why the post-1996 leadership has not pressed forward with such reforms (in contrast to the Iliescu leadership.”15 The principal Western analyst of the Romanian media. where the informal networks of relations developed during authoritarian rule have given rise to so-called crony capitalism. Without Constantinescu behind you nothing happens.

Publications supported by. the Iliescu regime continued this base political tradition in its attempt to subvert Romania’s nascent political opposition and civil society.222
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that workers at Romanian National Television (TVR) confirmed allegations that the post-1996 TVR leadership. Hungarian.”16
A CULTURE OF NATIONAL SUSPICION:ALLEGATIONS OF ANTIPATRIOTISM AND TREACHERY
Perhaps because of the comparatively (by European standards) late timing of Romanian statehood. and the country’s vulnerable geographic location (surrounded throughout most of history by at least four neighboring states). believes the station has a “political mandate. rather than a break with. The paranoia and xenophobia of the early Communist regime was thus an accentuation.17 Moreover. intellectuals. he contends that “the direct telephone line between the offices of the nation’s president and the head of the news department remains in operation and is used regularly. or Hungarian intelligence organizations. or at least allied with. Such allegations suggest both that the national security card is a generalized feature of the post-Communist Romanian political spectrum. but a consequence of their treasonous relations with the former Soviet Union and Russia.
. After December 1989. or are serving the interests of. or Soviet intelligence organizations. Many Romanian commentators and foreign analysts have been inclined to see the use of the national security card as the exclusive province of the former Communists. Israeli. Iliescu frequently alleged that this or that critic was secretly working for American. like the leadership before it. historical trends. Not surprisingly. Allegations of antipatriotism and treachery have been equally prominent components in the rhetoric of critics of the Iliescu regime. some outside power. they have portrayed the failure of Iliescu and his associates to take a more nationalistic stand with regard to the reincorporation of Moldova into Romania as not merely antipatriotic. national security has always been a prominent theme in Romanian politics.” Moreover. so too have allegations that one’s political opponents are in league with. but such a characterization seems slightly partisan and unfair. and journalists have routinely insinuated or alleged that Iliescu and his associates have been doing the bidding of the Soviet KGB and its Russian successors. The Ceaus ¸escu leadership frequently discredited dissenters and potential opponents by alleging or spreading rumors that they were working for Western. Anti-Iliescu politicians. and that elites believe that this issue has great resonance with the electorate (whether this is actually correct is another matter altogether).

even efforts by intellectuals to undermine the regime—such as through the use of esoteric language—tended to further estrange them from the broader population because such messages were beyond the reach of most ordinary Romanians. Given the continuing deterioration in the standard of living in that country. Societies. but hardly eradicated. The Westward-looking intellectuals of the interwar period spoke French among themselves and appeared painfully embarrassed to be associated with the uncultivated Romanian peasantry with whom they shared their country. Ironically. their only real audience was fellow intellectuals. The depth of this resentment was revealed during the miners’ march toward Bucharest in January 1999. and even doomed. The alienation of the intelligentsia from the broader population has continued in the post-Communist era. such rhetoric cannot sit well with the average Romanian. discredited the intelligentsia in the eyes of many ordinary Romanians. when sympathetic crowds lining the road in the countryside joined in chants of “Down with Bucharest! Down with Bucharest!”
CONCLUSION
The concept of “political culture” is probably insufficient. many intellectuals continue to depict the backward homo sovieticus features of the broader population as the principal obstacles to meaningful economic reform and the consolidation of democratic rule. On the other hand. and their failure to speak out against repression. this divide. by itself. which seemingly
. to determine the chances for democracy in a given society.Political Culture in Post-Ceaus ¸escu Romania
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THE INTELLIGENTSIA ESTRANGED FROM SOCIETY AND THE CAPITAL FROM THE COUNTRY
Throughout history. those among the intelligentsia who longed for change and bravely risked dissent felt constrained. and tragically. The collaboration of intellectuals with the Communist regime. Home to the majority of Romania’s intellectual elite and to the levers of state power. Bucharest.18 Communism redefined. Moreover. Compounding the divide between the intelligentsia and the broader population has been a deepening of resentment toward the capital. Romania’s intelligentsia has had a sharply antagonistic relationship with the broader population. While much of the intelligentsia attempted to compensate for its failure (or inability) to oppose the Communists by publicizing and denouncing the duplicity and manipulation of the Iliescu regime. the capital has increasingly become a symbol—for those who live outside the capital—of everything that is wrong with post-Communist Romania. by what they saw as the docile and backward character of the wider society. the intensity of their anti-Communism often outpaced the sentiments of the broader population.

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had the requisite traits of virtuous political cultures, have either not seen democracy or have seen democracy fail.19 Moreover, as both the Communist and post-Communist era have demonstrated, political culture is malleable—even if not to the degree most elites would like. Certainly, in post-Communist Eastern Europe, the new institutional frameworks of political, media, and economic competition have changed behavior, and this has in turn eaten away at the influence and existence of older facets of political culture. But those older facets of political culture often prove stronger, more flexible, and more adaptable than the prophets of change have predicted. Moreover, they have the capacity to shape the operation and outcomes of these new formal institutions. “Real existing post-socialism,” no less than “real existing socialism,” deviates substantially from the formal institutional configuration. While the legacies of Communist political culture do not condemn Romania to a new authoritarianism—precisely because they compete side by side with the aforementioned newer (and more positive) features of political culture—they do distort the operation of the post-Communist system. Dinello cautions, however, that we should not automatically assume that the outcomes of these negative political cultural legacies are themselves necessarily all negative: they may actually serve a functional (if not optimally efficient) purpose during the transition and circumscribe the dysfunction of the post-Communist system.20 For this reason and because in the first years of post-Communist rule it has indeed been possible to institutionalize some elements of what is considered a virtuous political culture, we should not foreclose on Romania’s democratic experiment just yet.

NOTES
1. Ken Jowitt has perhaps identified the features of Communist political culture better than anyone else. See Ken Jowitt, New World Disorder: The Leninist Extinction (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992). 2. On dissimulation see Ibid., p. 80; on the party’s loss of its combat mission, see Ibid., p. 144. 3. On elite political culture in Communist regimes, see again Ibid., esp. pp. 287–94. For specifics of the Romanian case, see Vladimir Tisma ˘ neanu, “The Quasi-Revolution and Its Discontents: Emerging Political Pluralism in Post-Ceaus ¸ escu Romania,” in East European Politics and Societies, vol. 7, no. 2 (Summer 1993), pp. 309–48. On “factional anxiety,” see Michael Shafir, Romania: Politics, Economics, and Society (London: Pinter, 1985). 4. For a discussion of “real interests,” see Jadwiga Staniszkis, The Dynamics of the Breakthrough in Eastern Europe: The Polish Experience, trans. Chester A. Kisiel (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991), pp. 90–99. 5. Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996), p. 5.

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6. Jowitt discusses elite fragmentation as a legacy of Communist rule in Jowitt, New World Disorder, pp. 294–99. 7. Quoted in Robert D. Kaplan, “The Fulcrum of Europe,” The Atlantic Monthly (September 1998), p. 32. 8. Quoted in Ibid., p. 32. 9. Petre Roman’s Democratic Party has become a key player, a kingmaker of sorts, in Romanian politics, perhaps somewhat analogous to the Free Democrats in Germany—a small party which can make or break elections, is likely to be part of whatever coalition is in power, and yet likely to prove divisive as members of the coalition (in this sense, they are probably much more problematic than the German Free Democrats). 10. For the classic treatment of the role of rumor in Communist Romania (and especially Ceaus ¸escu’s Romania), see Steven Sampson’s fascinating “Rumours in Socialist Romania,” Survey, vol. 28, no. 4 (Winter 1984), pp. 142–64. 11. Quoted from an August 1997 Dilema interview in Peter Gross, “Inching toward Integrity,” Transitions vol. 5, no. 3 (March 1998), p. 83. 12. See Dinello’s excellent piece, “The Russian F-Connection: Finance, Firms, Friends, Families, and Favorites,” Problems of Post-Communism, vol. 46, no. 1 (January/February 1999), pp. 24–33. 13. Ibid., p. 30. It seems similar claims could be made with regard to the uncertainty and weak institutionalization of the political realm, and how informal networks there also function as “mechanisms of risk management.” 14. The highly publicized case of Petre Badea, the millionaire patron of Aedifica Carpat ¸i, who appears to have had similar access to state resources under the Iliescu regime and the Constantinescu administration, seems emblematic of this “rent-seeking” behavior. The case was covered in detail in late July/early August 1999 editions of the daily Ziua. 15. Quoted in Kaplan, “The Fulcrum of Europe,” p. 34. 16. Gross, “Inching toward Integrity,” p. 84. 17. Significantly, such allegations are not at all out of touch with practice during the Ceaus ¸escu era: As was previously mentioned, the “Russian card” was an effective tool of the Ceaus ¸escu regime for preventing and crushing dissent—in part because it appealed to the genuinely strong anti-Russian sentiments of the Romanian population. 18. This may be true of all “late-developing” societies, even by East European standards, the Romanian situation seemed exaggerated. See, for example, Joseph Rothschild’s characterization of the interwar Romanian intelligentsia in Joseph Rothschild, East Central Europe Between the Two World Wars (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1974). 19. See, for example, Andrew C. Janos’ study of the Hungarian case, The Politics of Backwardness in Hungary: 1825–1945 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1982). 20. The concentration of capital post-Communist states, which results from powerful formal networks of personal connections, is frequently portrayed as a uniformly negative outcome. Yet, as Dinello observes: “The fierce battles for financial supremacy in Russia could have been even more vicious without this vehicle [the “F-connection,” personal connections] for reducing competition.” See Dinello, “The Russian F-Connection,” p. 30.

III
CIVIL SOCIETY AND SOCIAL ISSUES

11
NGOs and the Development of Civil Society
Sandra Pralong1

In February 1999, as approximately 10,0002 striking Jiu miners armed with clubs were marching on the capital, Bucharest residents responded with a silent street protest. The protest organizers wanted to show that civil society was strong and ready to defend the young, democratic institutions targeted by the miners’ violence. However, only 4,0003 people showed up for the protest rally—hardly a demonstration that civility can vanquish violence. Having more than twice as many people attack democracy than defend it is not the show of support one expected from civil society. It was, however, a victory of courage over fear if one considers that among the 4,000 nonviolent protesters were some of the very people—mostly intellectuals—whom these same miners had bludgeoned with clubs in 1990.4 Surprisingly, only four or five organizations spoke up against the miners’ hijacking of Romanian politics—the fifth such occurrence in the last ten years. In a country where the growth of the associative sector is relatively strong, and, over time, an estimated average of 400 new associations, foundations, and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) are registered each month, one wonders why so few of them reacted.5 In this chapter, I argue that, contrary to those who see in the Bucharest protest proof that civil society (in its Tocquevillian incarnation) is alive and well in Romania, I see in this same event its very weakness. Beyond the numbers, my claim has deeper, structural reasons. Even though the political prominence of civil society is real, and the statistics tallying the development of the NGO sector show a picture of growth, we need to ask ourselves what this growth represents: the development of grassroots collective action and community cooperation, or the transformation of the associative sector into a source of political capital and/or economic profit?6 I argue that, nearly fourteen
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years into the post-Communist transition, Romania’s civil society corresponds less to the Tocquevillian model7 than to the Hegelian one.8 Tocqueville saw in civil society a sphere of grassroots cooperation, where people get together to resolve issues that they cannot (or choose not to) entrust to the state. According to Tocqueville, in a democracy people are free and equal, and relative social equality makes it natural for them to associate—few can pursue their interest without cooperation from others. Collective action, the stuff of civil society, stems from self-interest rightly understood. For Hegel, on the other hand, civil society is the realm in which individuals become recognized in their particularity and difference; it is where the actualization of individual freedom occurs through property and the competition of interests. In Hegel’s civil society, a person’s ends remain purely private, not communal, and individuals are given their due as free persons through the market. There is little, if any, collective action in civil society, merely individuation. Eventually people do experience solidarity and collective responsibility; however, this happens in the state, not in civil society. It is my contention in this chapter that the Hegelian view of civil society— closer to the state of nature and focused on the market—is more in tune with Romania’s current situation than is Tocqueville’s. In a country like Romania, Communist communalism has obliterated people’s sense of individuality, while collective ownership and political oppression have negated their freedom. The first order of business then, as old reflexes slowly die away, is to develop an intersubjective sense of recognition and help people “become” individuals again. Only then can they associate and cooperate with each other. Until that moment, as long as identities are not yet firmly established, the development of civil society will remain skewed toward the process of recognition and individuation rather than towards association or cooperation. In his book The Idea of Civil Society, Adam B. Seligman defines civil society as an “ethical ideal of the social order, one which, if not overcomes, at least harmonizes, the conflicting demands of individual interest and social good.”9 Seligman’s definition points to the constant social tension between the self and the group, and illustrates why civil society—as a space of reconciliation— helps such tension build, rather than destroy, the social fabric. Individuals, each pursuing his own interests, overcome collective action problems because it is in their interest to do so. Hegel’s conception of civil society focuses on one moment: the identification of individual interest. Tocqueville focuses on the other: the realization of the common good through mediating associations. In Hegel’s world, one evaluates civil society’s development by measuring ownership, estates, and corporations—in other words, the market. In Tocqueville’s realm, one might measure the number of informal, voluntary, grassroots associations. The literature on democracy has ignored Hegel’s view of civil society and focused on Tocqueville. The density of associative life is considered a reliable measure of democracy and proof of its

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solidity because Tocqueville’s measure seeks to capture the extent to which democracy is based on grassroots support. I argue that Tocqueville’s view is not (yet) an appropriate framework for post-Communist Romania. Romania’s voluntary associations belong, in fact, to a sub-segment of the market rather than to the sphere of civil society proper, as defined by Alexis de Tocqueville or Robert Putnam.10 Formal NGOs (registered as not-for-profit corporations), staffed by salaried workers and engaged in the management of structured programs, form the backbone of Romania’s “civil society.” These are not the small, informal associations dear to Tocqueville or the choral societies and bird-watching clubs popularized by Putnam; they are organizations closer to Hegel’s “estates and corporations.” It was transnational flows and international assistance that fueled the initial emergence, and much of the subsequent growth, of the NGO sector—not the urge for local, grassroots social cooperation emphasized by Tocqueville. Closer to Hegel’s view, foreign support created a “market” (of funds for democratic assistance) which allowed the emergence of a nongovernmental sector and the mutual recognition of civil society actors, but not yet their cooperative association.

THE POLITICS OF CIVIL SOCIETY FORMATION
Unlike in Poland, the Czech Republic, or Hungary, there was no dissident movement and no organized civil society to speak of in Romania prior to 1989. No independent “civil life”11 was claimed by the few who dared oppose (albeit mostly in oblique and metaphorical ways, primarily through poetry) the absolute power of Nicolae Ceaus ¸escu. Society was atomized and the people were traumatized. Terrorized by the prevailing surveillance of the secret police, the Romanian people were fearful of getting together and speaking up. With the exception of a handful of state-run associations (Communist Youth, Writers’ Union, etc.) and a state-run Labor Union with no independent power, there was practically no associative life. Within the democratization literature, the Romanian case fits the ideal type of “rupture” rather than that of a pacted transtion.12 Yet the rupture itself was ambiguous: It was the incumbent “soft-liners” who came to power, not the opposition. Those in power co-opted societal support by misrepresenting both their credentials and their intentions. Their pro-Western rhetoric notwithstanding, they were initially largely opposed to key democratic and market reforms. Given this feat of political coat turning performed by the former Communists, the new institutions were born lacking whatever credibility was conferred by their role in the Revolution. Since it successfully stood the test of elections in 1990 and 1992, the Iliescu administration was perceived as legitimate; but it was not actually credible in its democratic, market-driven intentions.13

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This particular political configuration—of “democratic” power being held by authoritarian and anti-market-reform forces—left few clear political spaces to be occupied by democratic elites. President Ion Iliescu and his team shrewdly occupied two places at once: They colonized the “democratic” terrain (with its expectations for political and economic reform), yet they also secured the space on the left, the home of the former nomenklatura, of which they were a part. Thus, the only remaining spaces on the political spectrum were squeezed on the extremes—left and right. Therefore any nonextremist opposition had to draw its legitimacy by traveling not in political space (left or right) but in political time (i.e., in the past)! Thus, the democratic opposition had to draw its ideological roots from the pre-Communist days, which perhaps explains why Romania is the only East European country whose “historical parties” (revived from pre–World War II days) returned after 1989. The center-right National Peasant Party was, up to 2001, led by a generation that had spent up to seventeen years in Communist jails; its top leaders were well past their seventies in 1989. Even though the old Social Democratic party of yore was also revived, its political space was quickly absorbed by the National Salvation Front, which ultimately split in the spring of 1992 into two social democratic parties. This left practically no place for younger generations of non-nomenklatura to be recruited in democratic parties of the center right or left. Most intellectuals eschewed the National Peasant Party, debilitating the tasks undertaken by the democratic opposition in political society, leaving civil society to act in weak, isolated fashion, and therefore giving civil society a much stronger political mandate than should have been the case.14 Given that the state could retaliate against undesirable civil society claims by withholding the legal authorization to associate, the most frequent call heard from NGOs in those days was a call for “political distance.” This transformed one part of ‘civil society’ into just another arena for politics and left the other inoculated against any political claim, and essentially powerless.

CIVIL SOCIETY AFTER 1989—SOME OPERATING DISTINCTIONS
The Foundation for the Development of Civil Society (FDSC) estimates that, in 2002, there were approximately 16,000 to 17,000 associations and foundations officially registered with Romanian courts, of which almost 6,000 have been included in an official Catalogue of Romanian NGOs.15 In absolute terms, the total number seems rather low compared to a country like, for example, Hungary, which already had well over 30,000 NGOs by 1992— almost twice as many as Romania for a country with less than half the population. Yet, in relative terms, the situation is quite encouraging, given that even before 1989 there were already over 8,000 such organizations in Hungary and practically none in Romania.

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In a recent article,16 Thomas Carothers decried what he terms “the fascination with nongovernmental associations,” which he saw “at the core of the current enthusiasm about civil society.” Indeed, several authors warn about automatically equating the growing universe of NGOs with civil society. They remind us that civil society encompasses far more than the NGO sector; it includes all the organizations and associations that exist outside of the state and the market.17 In new democracies, where there is no tradition of free association, it is easy to equate NGOs with civil society because NGOs represent the most visible and sometimes the only fully functioning part of the associative sector. A former advisor to the president for the relation with NGOs says, “There are three kinds of civil society in Romania: the professionals, the enthusiasts, and the profiteers.”18 Indeed, this classification accounts for the distinctions one finds among: 1. The Western-funded professional NGOs active primarily in human rights, democracy promotion, and social services. This group is mostly formed of very young people with limited prior professional experience who were trained by Western NGOs in the early 1990s to be “program officers.” Commitment to “civil society” represents a call for public service without being a “civil servant” and having to work for the state. This group is managerially well trained, versatile, and politically neutral. Mobility among NGOs is high. 2. The “enthusiastic,” but underfunded, local groups (which best correspond to the Tocquevillian idea of self-organized, voluntary organizations) are to be found mostly in the provinces, where Western support has been slower to reach. To these, one should add the civil society activists, such as those in the Civic Alliance, the Group for Social Dialogue, etc. Even though some of the largest groups of local “enthusiasts” have received Western support, unlike the “professionals” they have not employed Western staff, nor were they trained by Westerners. Their staff is local, and their focus is primarily domestic and politically engaged. There are also some nonpolitical organizations in this category: mostly small, local arts and culture associations that manage to just get by with little funding and few projects. These are primarily associations commemorating the life and work of local cultural or past political icons (the Lucian Blaga Association, the Mihai Viteazu Foundation, etc.). 3. The “profiteers” are those shrewd entrepreneurs who took advantage of tax loopholes benefiting nonprofit organizations to disguise profitmaking import-export businesses as NGOs. This disease plaguing Romanian civil society is giving a bad name to the nongovernmental sector in general. It is difficult to estimate exactly how many fraudulent

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NGOs there are, but some statistics are worrisome. In a few rural areas, where economic development is particularly slow, numbers as high as 1,638 NGOs for a small, rural community in the mountains of Northern Moldova are not unusual, and an average of 90 foundations per 1,000 people is the norm—which would mean about 1 foundation per (extended) family. Some locals are said to have as many as 20 NGOs registered in their name. One might assume a correlation between the high poverty index and humanitarian assistance or social cooperation, but there is nothing of the sort. These “foundations,” mostly staffed by local government officials, are mere fronts for thriving black-market businesses, such as the market for imported cars, that profitably use the tax loopholes granted to NGOs.19 To the group of economic profiteers one should add a subgroup, the “political frauds.” These are either the shadow organizations created by the Iliescu regime between 1990 and 1996 to undermine the segment of civil society involved in politics, or they are the current stream of civil servants who, taking advantage of the administration’s slowness, quickly set up foundations to receive Western funds destined to state-run projects—all this, of course, in the name of managerial “expediency” and efficiency. Indeed, in the early 1990s, faced with vocal political opposition coming from civil society, Iliescu had created, out of thin air, myriad associations and foundations, and named them in ways purposefully reminiscent of those already existing (and which were contesting his politics). His goal was to create confusion and thus take the sting out of the opposition, but also, whenever possible, to siphon off funds destined to the NGO sector and use them for the benefit of his ruling party. Now that Romanian politics are less overtly contentious, the siphoning off of funds is the key motivation in most civil servants’ great urge to grow the ranks of foundation or association founders (and owners).

FOR LOVE OR PROFIT? ROMANIA’S CIVIL SOCIETY TO THE TEST
What Tocqueville called “habits of the heart” refers both to the courteous ways in which strangers interact in civil society, as well as to their shared ideals, the realization of which necessitates their association. Since it is a “habit of the heart,” membership in civil society can be said to be a matter of “love”—love for common projects and for one’s fellows. The informality normally associated with such groups only strengthens the power of the bond created by common affections. In a modern state, eventually the bonds of civil society become a matter of contractual, rather than informal, affiliation. By legal status, the groups that actually constitute civil society either are associations, foundations, or, generically speaking NGOs. The initial law that

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regulated the Romanian associative field dated from 1924 and could hardly respond to contemporary social needs. A new law was adopted in 2000, but neither law, for instance, makes distinctions between the institutions of civil society and the organizations in the not-for-profit sector, which introduces considerable methodological confusion. If the operational utility of a notion such as civil society is to distinguish this realm from both state and market (in the Tocquevillian definition),20 then the idea of civil society being equated with nonprofits is misleading. The not-for-profit sector only distinguishes a subset of the market—one in which the state may very well be involved— rather than accurately capturing the difference between state and nonstate actors. The fact that the approximately 17,000 NGOs (associations and foundations) now registered in Romania are, in reality, actually not-for-profit organizations (i.e., legally a subsegment of the market) is more than a matter of semantics. Self-definitions help position these organizations and determine the way in which they construe their activities. According to Hegel, since private property makes individuation possible, the pursuit of profit is likely to occur in all realms—the private and the public, and hence in civil society as well. People will only cooperate with each other—as Tocqueville noted—once social roles are identified and they are settled in relative social equality—not before that. For the moment, in Romania “there are not enough financially independent and socially and politically conscious people to fulfill the task of building and running NGOs.”21 Also, large loopholes and unclear and unenforced legal restrictions make it more attractive for businesspeople to conceal profits via NGOs than for involved citizens to set up bona fide operations of service to the community. In Romania, like in other post-Communist countries, especially in the CIS, the “third sector” (the sector of associative life, as opposed to either the public or the private sectors) has become a market in its own right, especially for labor. For instance, in 1995, the third sector had a salaried workforce that was higher than that employed in solidly entrenched branches of the economy. At 37,000, employees in the NGO sector were more numerous than those working in sectors such as: oil and gas extraction and processing (36,000), water utilities (33,000), publishing and printing (22,000), radio and telecommunications (18,000), the tobacco industry (7,000), etc.22 Actually, less than one-sixth (16 percent) of Romanian NGOs work with volunteers, while two-thirds (62 percent) employ salaried workers. The remaining 22 percent are reported as having neither salaried employees nor volunteers, and thus presumably represent (dormant?) membership organizations.23 All together, the man-hours worked in the NGO sector (both salaried and volunteer work) amount to the equivalent worked by an impressive 84,000 full-time persons. Geographically also, the situation is skewed. Despite the fact that Romania’s population is 55 percent rural, only one out of ten organizations is active in the countryside, while 90 percent

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work in the cities.24 This has, perhaps, less to do with concern for alleviating urban poverty than with the savvy entrepreneurship of city dwellers, who are closer to potential sources of funding and more politically attuned to the need for “developing civil society,” “capacity building,” and “institution building” promoted by Western donors. In 1997, the cumulative revenues of Romanian NGOs were hovering at approximately $83 million, while the expenses (program and operating costs) amounted to only $66 million.25 This means that over 25 percent of the capital raised remained unused, presumably representing amounts ready to be reinvested and savings for future programs. Depending on how one looks at it, this might also represent concealed profits. Together, these indicators support the assumption of this essay: that Hegel’s model of civil society—focused on the market—is more suited to Romania’s current situation than Tocqueville’s. Many see employment with an NGO akin to working in the service sector. It is much better paid than public administration and requires fewer qualifications than managerial positions in the private sector do. Frequent training trips abroad and a high media profile for NGOs add to the appeal. Actually, one hears many a youth say wistfully, when asked about career plans: “I’d like to be president of an NGO.” (The matter of which ideal that NGO should serve usually draws quizzical, incredulous, or dismissive looks). In short, a new, distinctive, socioeconomic category is emerging in Romania: the NGO professional as a “private civil servant,” whose livelihood is directly linked to the amount of international assistance destined to support local civil society. At 1.34 percent of the workforce, Romanian NGOs employ comparable proportions of the workforce as the other countries of the region, making the trend toward rapid “marketization” of the sector prevalent in post-Communism. But is this the same as developing the basis for a robust democracy? As Rueschemeyer puts it, “Organizational density of civil society as such does not guarantee favorable conditions for democracy”;26 nor is it an expression of the civic ethos or “republican spirit” in search of the common good. In addition, Sherri Berman reminds us with respect to Weimar Germany that the high number of organizations does not, by itself, ensure grassroots participation in political, economic, or social decision making; nor is it a sign of a pluralist polity.27 Yet, despite its limitations, Romania’s third sector makes a key contribution to a strong democratic polity: As the (Hegelian) realm of mutual recognition, of identification of needs, and of differentiation, it helps individuals become autonomous and self-reliant. And that is the first step in building a solid, Tocquevillian civil society. Just as Hegel describes the role of estates and corporations, the third sector is, among other things, a means to achieve membership and social identity, which will eventually help develop a need for cooperation.

donors facilitate the actualization and the satisfaction of needs. but did so only after ten years of post-Communism. and so on.” One is tempted to assume that civil society in the region is primarily a creation of the West. Most
. and actualization rather than for grassroots cooperation and organizing. They operate both as NGOs in their own right and as resource centers for other NGOs. This produced a set of relationships between foreign donors. That would. Through involvement in civil society. NGOs help differentiate the arena of competence of state and of society. but there were no such institutions in Ceaus ¸escu’s Romania. however. the creation of networks of cooperation among NGOs. miss a key piece of the puzzle—the fact that domestic support of the NGO sector finally has emerged. but the state. These represent areas in which some NGOs in Romania excelled. incipient collaboration between NGOs and the state (developing a public agenda of human rights. one problem remains: the way in which the Romanian NGO sector sprang to life deprives it of much of the legitimacy normally associated with grassroots movements. for in this way NGOs help engage in “social leapfrogging” and create local awareness of issues that may otherwise have taken years to bring forth. etc. several billion dollars in international aid for the region were earmarked “for the development of civil society and democratic institutions. which continues to make civil society an arena for individuation. providing them with training and other assistance. differentiation. This. the state. identifying and separating the roles and untangling what was a confused and overlapping arena under Communism. In a recent essay on the influence of NGOs in Eastern Europe.NGOs and the Development of Civil Society
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WHOSE CIVIL SOCIETY? REPRESENTING WHAT INTERESTS?
When one looks at the preceding numbers. The main beneficiary of the NGOs’ work seems to be not civil society per se. an obvious question springs to mind about motives: Whose interests are represented by the NGO sector in Romania? Who finances it? And for what kinds of projects? After the fall of the Berlin Wall. the achievement of influence in policy making. Since December 1989. Not all NGOs represent grassroots concerns or have been created from the bottom up: the majority actually were not. it deploys programs which keep elected officials accountable and citizens informed of their rights. consumer and environmental protection. foreign donors seeking to finance nongovernmental programs in Romania had to channel funds through local organizations. Yet their very attachment to the West (via both funding and programming) is an asset.). too. thus helping speed up social maturation. The FDSC and Centras are among the most prominent. Also active is Pro-Democracia— besides election monitoring. But despite these successes. Steven Sampson28 cites several areas where NGOs have been successful: the development of a core of professional organizations (staffed with people who know how to formulate and implement projects). and civil society. in time. will produce (future) viable partners for cooperation.

rather than appeal to Western donors to respond to local needs. On closer examination. As one executive has succinctly put it. consumer protection. but rather they represent the aspirations of civil society in the donor country! Western donors often have their own agendas that are clearly beneficial for social change. for instance. local NGO executives acknowledge to this day that they design their programs to capture Western funds rather than to address local issues needing to be resolved. This is true. In other words. it is nevertheless socially profitable. But they are not it. foreign money chases projects rather than projects chase money. In 1998. One may call
. only a little more than half (56 percent) of the funds supporting the Romanian NGO sector were foreign in 1996. Quite the contrary: Even though such a relation obliterates grassroots representativity. Romanian private donations. already had a timid nongovernmental sector even under Communism. Some of the most progressive social issues would not have been put on the domestic agenda had it not been for Western involvement through NGOs. But even when NGO programs are geared toward addressing particular local issues. associations derive their power and legitimacy from civil society rather than from Western sponsors. one were to use Washington’s lobbyists and Beltway subcontractors as vivid examples of a mass participatory culture. they help. environmental safety.238
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NGOs have thus been created simply in response to available Western funding.”31 Perhaps this explains why so many of the funds earmarked by international donors for Romania have remained unspent. The situation was somewhat similar in the other countries of the region. and only after that do they seek the local need that may be satisfied from such cooperation. It is as if. have more than doubled. such process puts priorities upside down: Local NGOs first identify the preferences of the likely donors. then seek the need to be fulfilled) stands contrary to the expected logic of civil society development and representation. then.30 One could argue that this merely makes them savvy fund-raisers and astute marketers. In the same period. that proportion dropped to only 36 percent.29 Despite this encouraging trend. At worst. “In Romania. and many other standards designed to help and protect citizens are slowly becoming part of the public agenda in spite of society lacking the preconditions for putting them forward. as Sampson notes. This sequence (first find the funds. Hungary and Poland. they are a pathology. it appears that many local NGOs are not representative of Romanian civil society. they tailor projects to fit Western concerns. from 3 percent in 1996 to 8 percent in 1998. This direct correlation between Western funding and the development of civil society means that much of the enthusiasm about the vibrancy of civil society in Eastern Europe should be toned down. Specific women’s and children’s rights. Normally. small to start with. However. when speaking about democracy in the United States. but not necessarily reflecting local needs. Yet. From almost 95 percent in 1990.32 this is not all bad. At best.

the all-powerful socialist state lost much of its ability to respond to society’s needs. NGOs are ideal agents of social learning and leapfrogging because they are in contact with progressive ideas from abroad and have the means to implement them domestically. Tocqueville’s model of social cooperation to the exclusion of the state will become operational only after this first (“Hegelian”) phase. in this process. the state started relying even more directly on NGOs: 9 percent of all Romanian NGOs worked in partnership with agents of the local administration. This means that over one-third (38 percent) of the work done by NGOs was performed in partnership with the state. for instance. leaving social actors and the market alone to solve collective action problems. Between 1990 and 1996. for now. Hegel’s vision of civil society as an arena for individuation offers the proper framework for analysis: an undifferentiated. the Soros Foundation has been a key importer of social ideas and a founder of NGOs ready to implement them. The state seems. NGOs stepped in to provide public goods. but with the kind of relationship established between them and the state. after the new social actors have defined their roles and competencies. the partnerships with the local administration seem to have declined.NGOs and the Development of Civil Society
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this phenomenon “social leapfrogging”—the importation of ideas in a social setting not yet ready for their indigenous development. even though it does not meet Tocquevillian standards (yet). helping it. all-encompassing state first differentiates itself as it “passes the baton” (so to speak) to civil society.33 Once again. After that. While throughout the years the relationship with the central government remained steady. deficient state could no longer perform and which the market had no incentive to take over. In short. In the process of transition. 13 percent with other public institutions. The question arises whether Romanian civil society. the state can withdraw. Once the representatives of civil society came to power. But it does not necessarily follow that it also increases local cooperation among civil society actors. and helps promote social change. the cooperation between foreign donors and local civil society yields mutual recognition and identification of needs. After 1989. unable to support the growth of local philanthropy. to identify its role. fosters identity formation of social actors and promotes civil society’s freedom. can be sustained from domestic sources in the absence of enough economic growth to free up funds and in the absence of serious political will to promote local giving. in Hegelian terms. between 1996 and 2000. the tax-exempt status of not-for-profits and the tax abatements on charitable contributions are considered a drain on state revenues rather than a boost to civil society
. NGOs have stepped in to take over the tasks that a weak. showing additional disconnect between NGOs and efforts to serve local communities. The other effect of Western assistance occurs precisely in this relationship. In short. and 16 percent with the central government. It has to do not with the quality of representation provided by local NGOs. This.

each pursuing his or her own interests. In 1999. Being relatively equal. but also for other. more fundamental reasons. From this perspective two conditions are sine qua non for the development of civil society: first. or not on freedom in a political sense—although that. a definition of the individual as a moral agent. Adam B. and one may claim rights if one also grants them to one’s fellows. Seligman beautifully captures the essence of civil society as being an “ethical ideal of the social order. in Romania. Parliament rescinded the law and. the “professional” NGO sector in Romania is not considered a fully bona fide representative of grassroots efforts to organize locally.240
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development. the legal framework eventually responds to social needs once these are articulated. One gets respect if one is ready to grant it to others. of course. and thus ready to grant a different status to civil society organizations. has been now taxing donations as if they were investments. the need has not yet arisen for a different legal framework that is more protective of local interests. faced with a shortage of cash. requires them to be mindful of each other’s rights and tolerant of each other’s opinions.
ELITISM. LIBERALISM.AND THE REDISCOVERY OF THE INDIVIDUAL
As mentioned earlier. and aware of their own limitations. most of whom pay lip service to it without truly understanding its mechanisms. so now everyone pays! The importance of civil society in a democracy still eludes many politicians. they reckon that they can achieve more in cooperation than either of them would be able to do on his own. the “profiteers” have abused the system. and second.”34 Seligman’s definition focuses on how civil society helps reconcile the social tension between the self and the group. if not overcomes. After all. The Tocquevillian principle at work is that equal moral agents voluntarily agree to cooperate because it is in their best interests to do so. Each is indispensable to forming lasting associations. more focused on enhancing grassroots cooperation. in a democracy. After all. Financial backing is not the only issue at stake. one that. My claim is that. in The Idea of Civil Society. a vision of society as being formed by free and equal citizens. Interaction between individuals. at least harmonizes. is necessary— as it is on the equality of social condition and on the equality of moral agency. The emphasis thus is not on freedom. the conflicting demands of individual interest and social good. so elected officials are less concerned about a local backlash. After all. Romanian civil society functions so often for “profit” rather than “love” not just because of a skewed and imperfect legal framework.
. only three years after the NGO “lobby” had won an important victory by gaining tax-exempt status for philanthropic donations. The fact that such a measure was taken by a democratic Parliament brought to power in part by a politically militant civil society is not as surprising as it may seem.

though now the “vanguard” is intellectual and financial rather than political or ideological. all the citizens are independent and feeble. and none of them can oblige his fellow men to lend him their assistance. and thus is not conducive to the formation of voluntary associations. “Aristocratic communities always contain.”36 “Among democratic nations. as well as for the recognition of rights and individual interest. among a multitude of persons who by themselves are powerless. to this date. it has not done so. and for civil society to harmonize the demands of “individual interest. there was still strong political opposition to widespread private property. recognizing consciousness to some but not to others. implicitly. as it was under Communism.”37 Ties established in civil society are thus created between relatively equal individuals.”39 In addition to well-established property rights. a small number of powerful and wealthy citizens. such as the transfer of state property in individual hands. But the Romanian Constitution. but merely “protected. on the contrary. then Romania needs first to resolve important issues of ownership.35 Tocqueville emphasizes the relationship between the principle of association and that of equality. individual recognition of rights is realized primarily through property. for Hegel. As part of the electoral campaign in 2000. Aristocracy denies equality of social condition and. In observing the practice of democracy in America. equality of moral agency. Even as late as the year 2000. the need to grant equal moral agency to all individuals is another stumbling block in creating a fully functional civil society. in 1989. still deals gingerly with issues of ownership: The right to private property is not actually guaranteed by the state. Seen from this perspective. What happened. the contrary of democracy is not totalitarianism or authoritarianism (which limits political freedom) but aristocracy (which condones inequality). then. Communism has pitted classes against each other.NGOs and the Development of Civil Society
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Equality of social condition and of moral agency is anathema to an elitist view of the world. despite the Constantinescu government’s efforts to speed up privatization. to the enthusiasm that. each of whom can achieve great undertakings single-handed. and in the absence of genuine private owners—who may seek to pursue their interests through cooperation—civil society cannot develop properly. If property is indeed necessary for the actualization of individual freedom. However. Lenin’s idea of a “vanguard” is merely a socialist version of the old feudal order. privatization was extremely sluggish until 1996. they can do hardly anything by themselves. and now that Romania has been extended an invitation to join NATO it is unlikely that the issue will be raised again. adopted in 1991.” such interests need to be deemed legitimate in the first place. In this respect. As it was. with their fundamental equality based on the mutuality of recognition and respect of equal rights. It is still prevalent today. each pursuing his or her own interests.38 Luckily. the leftist opposition threatened to repeal the new restitution laws if it were to win the December 2000 election. toppled the dictatorship of Communist elites and sought democracy under the impetus of a revived civil
.

in a still elitist. is the following: In this “primordial soup” of the post-Communist transition. In the process. then. and supported with.242
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society? In an article about Hungary. Hegel tells us. Thus. But since the genuine part of Romania’s civil society (the “enthusiasts”) is primarily formed of intellectuals. is to combat elitism. that represents little more than a resurrection of Leninism in liberal guise. “aristocratic” (or. civil society seeks to extract the resources and the power that the state controls. as the arena of cooperation between individuals pursuing self-interest in an enlightened way. a progression from “profit” to “love. Elitism prevails. In other words. “civil society” in the traditional. shows nonetheless the emergence of a domestic property-owning class that is
. and though formally rejecting the tenets of Marxism-Leninism that many of them once believed in. rather. start claiming for themselves the right to be considered equal moral agents. small as it may be. and a fear of and contempt for the uncultured masses. it should come as no surprise that.” His explanation is valid for Romania as well: “The majority of the progressive intelligentsia in Hungary are not democrats but liberals.” The Romanian case could exemplify this trajectory: Civil society first forms as a way for intellectuals to contest the (Communist) state and assert their status as an elite group. funds from the outside. people will use just about any means at their disposal to gain their identities and exercise their newly found freedom. can develop only once self-situated individuals are secure in their ownership and in the legitimacy of their pursuits of profit. occurs as a function of property ownership. and as individual identities are still in formation. The transfer of property from the state to society initially bypasses the intellectual elite—which is empowered by. as social roles have yet to be distributed. Tocquevillian sense. then. But the increase in domestic giving. This. where social hierarchies loom large. Then. “feudal”) environment. the first incarnation of civil society will be as a tool for private ownership—as the way to actual “individuation. Individuals are only now in the process of asserting their equal statuses and separate identities. empowered by their new status as owners. this can only be achieved after property enshrines each individual’s claim to equal rights.”40 The issue. they continue to adhere to an elitist belief in the advanced consciousness of the intellectuals.” Only later can Tocqueville’s “equality of social condition” follow.
CIVIL SOCIETY—FROM “PROFIT” TO “LOVE”?
Tocqueville’s observation that the relative equality of social conditions is conducive to collaboration in society makes cooperation difficult in Romania. once self-aware individuals. as the legal framework has yet to be settled. Bill Lomax explains the paradox through what he terms the “betrayal of the intellectuals. My contention. there seems to be a necessary progression of sorts in the development of civil society.

in trying to get rid of the old Communist ideology. though without integrating Tocqueville’s vision of civil society. miners came to Bucharest to “restore democracy. In June 1990. For. I expect that membership in civil society will cease to be a way to individual ownership. and the energies captive in this arena are being freed for other pursuits. Ibid.
NOTES
1. the high incidence of “profiteers” (for-profit NGOs). if Hegel provides a more apt description for Romania’s present.” If these are the byproducts of a society struggling to overcome the legacy of Marxism. and data provided by Carmen Epure and Oana T ¸iga ˘nescu. Reuters Agency and CNN (14–19 January 1999). I believe Hegel’s ideas provide an important explanation for the Romanian situation. 2. to Tocqueville’s cooperation Hegel responds with the mutuality of recognition and individuation through property and profit. and other elements which put civil society on the side of “profit” rather than “love. This chapter has benefited from criticism by Ancut ¸a Vames ¸u.41 one falls straight into Hegel’s lap. then theoretically Hegel is vindicated as well. Almost fifteen years after the fall of Communism.NGOs and the Development of Civil Society
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now ready to invest in collective action. if one stands Marx on his head. Yet. 3. I believe Romania is now on the cusp of this changing world.” Once these institutional changes are implemented. The laws of property restitution were finally promulgated in January 2000. 4. the Tocquevillian idea of civil society can finally develop. and the first signs of a Tocquevillian order are already emerging. the key to which is private ownership. the persistence of a legal framework that places civil society in the market. on the other hand. Several pieces of the puzzle start falling together when civil society is observed from a Hegelian perspective: We find an explanation for elements such as the lack of differentiation between the “third sector” and other businesses. As ownership spreads and the enlightened pursuit of self-interest becomes legitimate. Romania is just now starting to witness the first results of a process of individuation. in which property rights are finally about to be settled. is hoping to introduce a constitutional guarantee of property and not just its “protection. The Liberal Party. and will become instead a collectively profitable enterprise based on cooperation. “identifying” them according to whether or not they wore
. researchers at the FDSC. Estimate. change is under way. To summarize: In civil society. They help clarify the importance of property (as the first abstract right to be actualized in civil society) and allow us to evaluate its impact on the development of the NGO sector. so to speak. executive director of the Foundation for the Development of Civil Society (FDSC).” They did so by ransacking the democratic opposition parties headquarters and by literally beating up intellectuals in the streets. and the pursuit of cooperation at the grassroots level becomes necessary for individuals seeking to prosper.

” Larry Diamond calls “electoral democracy. 11. who reject commerce as vulgar and slavish. 1992). section 37). pp. 1 (March 1995). 1991). if complemented by factions representing a plurality of views. using the Tocquevillian model.” See T. Democracy in America (New York: The Modern Library. who read drafts of this manuscript. Drake and Eduardo Silva. NJ: Princeton University Press. The choice of Hegel to discuss Romanian civil society stems from the very premise of this chapter: Romania does not yet have a functioning civil society. The idea of the 1990 and 1992 elections being “legitimate” is contestable. by H. Madison also sees the representation of propertied interests in factions as inevitable and desirable. 13. Democratization in El Salvador. I merely wish to emphasize that the logic in which Romanian civil society places itself for now is. Hegel. in keeping with Hegel. Carey. One may contrast these views with those of Aristotle and Rousseau. Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy (Princeton. Indeed. As a consequence. eds.. vol. MD:
.” Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics. G. Nisbet (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. see Henry F. 13. Philip Schmitter. 7. 1980–1985 (San Diego: Center for Iberian and Latin American Studies.” and Fareed Zacharia calls “illiberal democracy. “The Strange Death of ‘Civil Society’ in Post-Communist Hungary. no. though international observers present at the time validated the results. 220–274. Elections and Democratization in Latin America. 9. anticipates. Diamond. 43–66. 12. Bill Lomax. Recall his dictum that the private appropriation of land increases “the common stock of mankind” (Second Treatise. President Iliescu officially thanked the miners for “their efforts on behalf of consolidating Romania’s young democracy. no. Hegel’s premise. Adam B. Karl. I. that of the market rather than of the grassroots. 10. voluntary. 1986). 1981). pp. vol.. Their reaction was strengthened by the pejorative connotation that the idea of profit still carries in the former Communist world. Only the Civic Alliance and a few Human Rights organizations responded to the call. 29. For an in-depth analysis of the frauds of 1990 and 1992.” in Paul W. 8. B. in the way democratic theory. “Irregularities or Rigging: The 1992 Romanian Parliamentary Elections. The Idea of Civil Society (New York: The Free Press. trans. were unhappy with my use of the term “profit” as a metaphor for the Hegelian model. 1993).” 5. Consolidating the Third Wave Democracies (Baltimore. W. F. 41–63.” in Diamond. intend no such negative interpretation. Locke similarly regards commerce as favorable for liberty. that it is the market (rather than the associative sector) that matters..244
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glasses or carried newspapers or books. Many of my former colleagues in the NGO world. L. from 1990 to 1996 Romania embarked on what Terry Lynn Karl calls “electoralism. L. eds. best represents the current Romanian situation. Six people died in the incidents. however.. 1 (March 1997). Alexis de Tocqueville. Transitions from Authoritarian Rule (Baltimore. MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press. eds. pp. “Introduction: In Search of Consolidation. “Imposing Consent? Electoralism vs. Laurence Whitehead. associative sector. Elements of the Philosophy of Right. Seligman. 6. there were numerous acts of intimidation and electoral fraud. et al. The archetype is Guillermo O’Donnell. Robert Putnam. 1986).” East European Quarterly.

as do the definitions given by Hegel or Marx. Dimensions of the Non-Profit Sector in Romania. Tocqueville’s definition of civil society is that of an intermediary between the state and the market. South America. vol. and Fareed Zakaria.” Foreign Affairs. Atlanta (4 September 1999). 1998).” World Politics. Quoted in Miszlievetz.” Foreign Policy. 16. 15. vol. “Exporting Democracy through NGOs in Eastern Europe. vol. In terms of revenues. 9–10. 15 (April–May 1989). 18–29. 49. pp. 13. 19. 22. O Analiza a Fundat ¸iilor Umanitare din Judet ¸ul Suceava (An analysis of humanitarian organizations in Suceava county). “Participation and Transition: Can the Civil Society Project Survive in Hungary?” The Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics. though they have not been completely eliminated. pp. Ibid. FDSC.NGOs and the Development of Civil Society
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The Johns Hopkins University Press. 76.1 percent of GDP! See Ferencz Miszlevitz. Steven Sampson. Summary. author’s interview. between 1992 and 1993.” p. Ibid. “Civil Society. 19. pp. such practices are more difficult. 401–29. For a more ample discussion. Anul iii. Berman. see Juan J. 1997). and does not include the market in the associative sector. the aggregate revenues of voluntary associations added up to a whopping $1 billion. “Civil Society. the Romanian Presidency.” World Politics. 3 (April 1997). no. FDSC. Catalogul Organizaciilor Neguvernamentale din România (The Catalogue of Non-Governmental Organizations). “The Rise of Illiberal Democracy. no. 18. 28. There. pp. 1996). pp.” Georgia State University. 21. see chapter 1 in Seligman. Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe. FDSC. Thomas Carothers. The Globalization of the Non-Profit Sector—A Revision. The Idea of Civil Society. Ferencz Miszlevitz. no. 20. p. 1998. Livia Constantinescu and Ancut ¸a Vames ¸u. 27–40. 17. 117 (Winter 1999–2000). no. Info ONG. (joint Johns Hopkins’ project on the Comparative Analysis of the NGO Sector). pp. July 1998). On the destructive effects on democratization via mutually exclusive civil and political society. 14. Linz and Alfred Stepan. no. 49. no. 23. 29. vol. a Preliminary report. “Civil Society and the Collapse of the Weimar Republic. State Advisor. Carothers.” unpublished manuscript. One should note that with the adoption of the new law. “Participation and Transition. MD: The Johns Hopkins University. (Bucharest: Fundacia Pentru Dezvoltarea Societaci Civile. 13. figures valid for 1997. 1 (March 1997). Conference on “NGOs and the Rule of Law. Dragos Ca ˘lit ¸oiu. Romania is far behind a country half its size such as Hungary. (Bucharest. 24. 3 (April 1997). (Bucharest: Fundacia Pentru Dezvoltarea Societaci Civile. or 3. Defining the Non-Profit Sector in Romania (Baltimore. 25. 26. and Post-Communist Europe (Baltimore. vol. 17.)
. 1999). 27–40. MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press. xiv–xvi. “Civil Society and the Collapse of the Weimar Republic. Luminica Petrescu.” See also Sherri Berman. 27. 26. 6 (November/December 1997). p. Center for Civil Society Studies. “Participation and Transition: Can the Civil Society Project Survive in Hungary?” The Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics. 1 (March 1997). no.

Dimensions of the Non-Profit Sector in Romania. pp. 37. As Marx claimed to do with Hegel’s theory. 38. 32. 405. the PDSR. “Exporting Democracy through NGOs in Eastern Europe. The Idea of Civil Society (New York: The Free Press. p. Democracy in America. July 1998). Tocqueville. Democracy in America. 39.) 31.
. has been repeatedly on record as rescinding property laws if elected.” 41. 36. FDSC. Interview with Viorel Micescu. “The Strange Death of ‘Civil Society’ in Post-Communist Hungary. 34. Interview (Bucharest. 1992). 405–6. 40. Adam B. Tocqueville. July 1998.246
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30. Sampson. Director of CENTRAS (Bucharest. Lomax. Democracy in America. Seligman. 35. Iliescu’s opposition party.” 33. The Liberal Party is seeking an amendment to the Constitution to change the wording from “property is protected” to “property is guaranteed ” by the state. Tocqueville.

1 For this reason. Romanian higher
247
. it examines whether the Western concept of multiculturalism is truly appropriate in the context Romanian interethnic relations. with an inflexibility mixed with French Jacobinism and the Prussian KulturKampf. Specifically. Opponents. which include a majority of Romanians. Their arguments range from those grounded in nationalist and xenophobic mistrust of the Hungarian minority in Romania to the need for an inclusive “multicultural” policy toward ethnic minorities more in keeping with Western values. This chapter directly addresses the arguments on both sides. which gave birth to the dual monarchy of the Austrian-Hungarian Empire and expanded Hungarian political power in their half of the Empire—at the time included territories which are now part of Romania. It became especially acute after the compromise (Ausgleich) in 1867. Advocates for an independent Hungarian University cite the need for the preservation of Hungarian high culture and ethnicity within Transylvania and other areas of Romania. This power gave the Hungarian elite the liberty to conduct the politics of forced cultural integration and homogenization. until 1919.
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
The Romanian-Hungarian cultural conflict is ancient.12
Multiculturalism and Ethnic Relations in Transylvania*
Claude Karnoouh
This chapter examines Hungarian-Romanian interethnic relations in the context of the controversy over the proposed independence of the Hungarian University at Cluj. currently a mere department of the larger Romanian University located in this city. dating back to the period of Romanian nationalism in Transylvania at the end of the eighteenth century. advocate its continued incorporation into the Romanian University.

4 Faced with the option of having their professional horizon in their own language reduced. The right to an education in one’s native language was again rescinded.2 However. In Transylvania. with the backing of the Soviets. the Hungarian University of Cluj had been forced to move out to the Hungarian town of Szeged. as the Hungarian University was reestablished. Hungarians now felt the effects of Romanian attempts at forced cultural integration. in 1940. after the recuperation of Northern Transylvania. the Romanian University of Cluj was moved out to southern Transylvania (Sibiu).5 This policy of the intentional marginalization of Hungarian culture transformed the Hungarian language into a private or semiprivate language. Taking advantage of the Hungarian revolution of 1956. when the Royal Romanian government. which was now part of Romania. began to emigrate either to Hungary or to the West. and without the academic freedom to recruit quality faculty. giving rise to the same sentiments of frustration experienced previously by the Romanians. but inexorable policy of reducing Hungarian cultural identity and autonomy. incorporated in the Hungarian University of Cluj.248
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education in Transylvania was reduced to a mere department of Romanian grammar. under the political influence of nationalist parties. While it was ostensibly in the name of class warfare and proletarian internationalism. After the fall of the Austro-Hungarian Empire and its dismemberment at the Treaty of Versailles. the Hungarians would be given a brief respite during the period of Hitler’s Third Reich in Europe. ceded northern Transylvania. Whereas in 1919. successive Romanian governments. back to Hungary. While they possessed the status of a “joint linguistic group” to the Romanian departments. the fortunes of the Hungarians living in these territories changed dramatically. the Romanian authorities. the Hungarian scholarly elite. In the years following the fall of Ceaus ¸escu. they were without real administrative and financial autonomy. It was only after World War II that some kind of a rapprochement was seen. which they remained until 1996. The Romanian Communist Party also decided to extensively Romanize the cities of Transylvania through a slow. these were mere fronts for the pursuit of the same cultural conflict between the two sides and their leaders. closed down3 the Hungarian University in 1959. Once independent Hungarian universities became mere departments of other Romanian universities. This helped create a cultural vacuum of sorts. the effects of which we see today in the shortage of qualified faculty at the Hungarian University of Cluj. The Vienna Diktat of 1940. signed a decree in 1946 which moved the Hungarian University next door to the Romanian University at Cluj (recently returned from exile at Sibiu) and sanctioned the right to an education in one’s native language. However. made painfully slow
. they unleashed a ferocious political repression. including Cluj. with the tacit approval of the Romanian government. which had been forced on the Romanian government by coercive Nazi diplomacy. when the Communists came to power in 1948.

enabling them to seriously pursue their political agendas.7 Of these arguments. This is unfortunate because in the aftermath of the collapse of Communism Western standards of interethnic relations are fast becoming the yardstick by which the laws and institutions created to protect ethnic rights are evaluated. the schools of law. economics. In fact. were then promoted. as they brought to power an opposition coalition that included the Hungarian Party (the UDMR). due in part to the strong opposition by the Romanian faculty in Cluj. This is because the autonomy of the University of Cluj was regarded as a crucial provision of the new legislation. Although in humanistic disciplines. that neither history nor geography. according to most Western observers.e.
THE CONTEMPORARY DEBATE
However. it seems the most progressive. secondary. Among these were proposals to reestablish the independent Hungarian University at Cluj. one of the critical flaws of this law. on the surface. they were without institutional guarantees to assure implementation. as of this writing nothing has happened. the latter is perhaps the most insidious as. the law did not provide for the autonomy of secondary education in the Hungarian theater.6 To exemplify this point. the law admitted Hungarian linguistic groups. raised by the UDMR party. the law on education signed on 24 July 1995 by President Iliescu stipulated. among other provisions. Can we refuse the principle of autonomy of a Hungarian University in the name of a newly proclaimed presence of multiculturalism? Is the Western concept of multiculturalism really applicable in the context of Romanian interethnic relations? And are
. would be taught in Hungarian in the nominally independent Hungarian institutions. which had been dismantled and seriously damaged during the last twenty years of the Ceaus ¸escu era. The elections of November 1996 had brought hope of a new beginning. Hungarians were present in the Romanian government. Particular programs regarding the rebirth of cultural Hungarian institutions. “the separation of the two universities hinders our integration in the Euro-Atlantic institutions and the European Community”). was the lack of a guarantee of primary. nor civic education. It is precisely this point that I seek to address.Multiculturalism and Ethnic Relations in Transylvania
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progress regarding the educational rights of ethnic minorities. or tertiary education in the mother tongue. rather than a denial of ethnic Hungarian rights.. To add to this. Arguments against the reestablishment of an independent Hungarian University have ranged from classic Jacobinism (“we do not form universities on ethnic grounds”) to the evident need of meeting prescribed norms for integration with the “West” (i. Also. Finally. and natural sciences were excluded. where the stability of the new governmental coalition was at stake. the presence of Hungarian linguistics groups in the Romanian departments is depicted as the accomplishment of a successful policy of multiculturalism. For the first time since 1919.

American multiculturalism ostensibly bases itself on the antiracist struggle. One might question whether this concept is applicable to the Eastern European context of “interculturalism. where interethnic relations are often marked by policies which emphasize the separateness of distinct ethnic minorities. or reciprocity. and often insular ethnic minorities with strong feelings of nationality. Serbs. Here is a situation in total contradiction with the democratic multiculturalism of the West. establishing “historical minorities” with communal rights. Whether this was the overt intention or not. It was born of the phenomenon of urbanization or. multiculturalism was used as a practical and descriptive instrument to manage the social strains engendered by the liberal capitalist system through a sort of social compromise based on a philosophy of cultural relativism. This concept makes more sense in the Central and Eastern European context. at the same time. Tartars. or physical elimination. of the American left. few countries in Europe actually approach this ideal type.
. in the Central and Eastern European context. historically rooted.250
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these concepts based on real situations. Jews. and their respective churches are recognized through constitutional rights bestowed upon national minorities. of the original inhabitants). perhaps more accurately. and to be more precise. covers a phenomenon of an entirely different nature from that which exists in contemporary Romania.” The Latin prefix inter in this context stands intermittently for separation. Ukrainians. of course. In Hungary. there is a specific law that covers relations between these communities and the state. Of course. Lipovenians. Thus. It is important to remember that it was in Europe where the concept of the nation-state—a state built on an ethnically cohesive “nation” of people—was first established. space. socioeconomically. distinct. one which reveals the special situation of Central and Eastern Europe. and the recognition of the cultural and social dignity of the African American community and the various immigrant groups which form. It is the same in Romania where Hungarians. the lower strata of American society. relations between ethnic groups is more often marked by “interculturalism” rather than “multiculturalism. this conglomeration is generally composed of longstanding.8 The multiculturalism of the United States. The dominant “nation” of people is often awash in a conglomeration of minorities that live within the borders of the state. it is meant to denote the symbiotic interaction between two cultures which remain. Germans.” where the societies have not been founded on immigration. the socioeconomic marginalization. or are they just a way of hiding the reality of power games used in the new politics of transitional Romania? It is important to observe that the concept of “multiculturalism” is itself derived from countries where immigration has founded modern society (after. and which explicitly recognize their rights as a group. “ghettoization” of the North American megalopolis which grew and intensified with the radicalization of liberal capitalism. Bulgarians. separate and distinct. In contrast to multiculturalism. However.

one of these days. generally do not associate with Romanians or even speak Romanian. There are few common cultural or civic associations where they would have the chance to meet. Oradea. Despite the fact that the majority of Romanian intellectuals today denigrate most of the decisions and actions taken by the Communist regime in the Ceaus ¸escu era. Satu-Mare. or even thousands of years. where the rural and semiurban population is exclusively Hungarian and strongly traditional. manifested in the almost willful ignorance on the part of many Romanian intellectuals of Hungarian high culture. undermining neighborly relations. and are more inclined to associate with those of Romanian nationality. Hungarian students may occasionally seek arrangements with their Romanian counterparts. are more familiar with the Romanian culture. any cultural interaction between Romanian and Hungarian intellectuals and students. Contemporary Hungarian humanities and literature are very seldom translated. a majority of whom view the Romanian-Hungarian
.” a distinguished art historian and descendent of a Bourgeois family that suffered at the hands of the Communists in the 1950s once told me. or couples there are certain taboo subjects that cannot be discussed.Multiculturalism and Ethnic Relations in Transylvania
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In contemporary Romania. of the anti-Hungarian policies they pursued: “It is good to recognize. there continues to be a marked sense of separation between those of Hungarian and those of Romanian nationality. Arad. and some rare musical or theatrical meetings. Of course.” Not entirely by coincidence. a large number of them approve. and creating tensions among mixed couples This sense of separatism between the two ethnic groups is pervasive in contemporary Romanian society. However. While they do not hesitate to pounce on even the lowest quality literature from the West. this attitude is reflected by the representatives of the ultranationalistic parties. Bras ¸ov) and the mixed villages are often bilingual. with the exception of the bureaucratic management of the university. they almost totally ignore the best Hungarian masterpieces. there are exceptions to this rule. While in the common rooms. The students from the east of Transylvania. “that the only positive action of Ceaus ¸escu was the demographic transition of the major cities of Transylvania into Romanian cities. without reservation. On the other hand. Recent debates on the autonomy of the Hungarian University have clearly exposed the strength of these taboos by destroying friendships. properly speaking. neighbors. there is not. most relations are strictly functional (or perfunctory) and occur without any knowledge of the reciprocal culture. who generally choose to ignore the original language. and are unknown to the majority of Romanian scholars.9Also. arranged in alphabetical order and organized largely for the purpose of disciplined study. it is not uncommon to hear private conversations among Romanian intellectuals that support views which would surprise Western observers of post-Communist Romania. Timis ¸oara. the students from the large cities of Transylvania (Cluj. but even between friends. where the Hungarian minority has lived continuously for hundreds.

This belief naturally leads to their opposition to any legislation that would manifest a reawakening of Hungarian culture within the borders of Romania. Ironically. together with the majority of the Romanian faculty at Cluj. agree on the possibility of a multicultural university and are opposed to separate institutions. This is true for most academic disciplines. philosophers. These intellectuals. What the Hungarian “Modernists” do not understand is that the Western “multiculturalism” to which they have become converts may yet reveal itself to be a mere front for the commercialized monoculturalism of the new “Global village” so touted in the West. the most pervasive cultural phenomenon of post-Communist Romania has been the avalanche of Western norms. itself bounded by nothing other
. eating the same fast foods. and watching the same movies. their steadfast opposition to the reestablishment of the independent Hungarian University at Cluj is a prime example of this. The rapid urbanization and accelerated uprooting of indigenous peoples has expanded and intensified over the last fifty years. ideas.252
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relationship through the framework of the old nation-state paradigm where the national minority plays the role of the fifth column for a neighboring state that wishes to conquer lost territory. and is now coupled with an ever increasing integration of economic interests. As far as the Hungarian and Romanian students are concerned. who are the most open to the modern influences from the West. The old symbols. an increasing standardization of products. a growing web of communication and capital circulation channels. and even a increasing uniformity of the social relations between people. whether one is dealing with historians. This process of uniformity is the inevitable byproduct of the Western economic system. The essence of capitalism. who simply want to give more autonomy to the Hungarian linguistics groups that are attached to the Romanian departments. or linguists. While the publicists and politicians prefer the term “globalization”—a more innocent economic and political term—the use of this concept is only one of the numerous forms taken by the contrived posthumanism of the late modernity to describe the phenomenon of global uniformization that is taking place in the late twentieth century. lost in a cultural sea of commercialized modernity. objects. and values which have come to replace the cultural imperialism of the Soviets. their long-standing cultural differences do not impede them from attending the same pop rock concerts.
MULTICULTURALISM AND THE END OF EUROPEAN CULTURE
Like every other country of post-Communist Europe. psychologists. their opposition is joined by the “Modernists” within the Hungarian ethnic community. and signs which once formed the foundations of ethnicity are fast becoming obsolete.

under the pretext of differences. Simultaneously on a social plan. the term of multiculturalism sheds itself of any political thought that articulates the cultural diversity of endangered interests exposed by the general and global rationalization of production. effects a transmutation of values that will permit their integration in the world of merchandise. leaves people without any mechanism of defense facing the onslaught of global uniformity.” In effect. and sports viewed by hundreds of millions of people. and is therefore united to the globalization of the planet under the auspices of an economy more and more concentrated by the centralization of its decision making. We can marvel at the naïveté of the Hungarian scholars. how can we speak of multiculturalism when hundreds of television and radio programs air the same images. Multiculturalism partially hides the social and cultural atomization of the individual. to condemn it to its disappearance.” To this definition. In its generality. and where the only cultural differences are between people who prefer Coca-Cola and McDonald’s.Multiculturalism and Ethnic Relations in Transylvania
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than its inherent dynamic for infinite expansion. everything that seems different.” or the Heimat as the Germans call it. and those who prefer Pepsi-Cola and Kentucky Fried Chicken?
CONCLUSION
The autonomy of the Hungarian University is an attempt to maintain and develop the study. In other words. the territory of one of its historic lands. globalization and multiculturalism can simultaneously be interpreted as social or political mutatis mutandis. dialogues. at a minimum. of the scholarly Hungarian and universal culture in Transylvania. we can add only that at present. illusory at best. who freely adopt the American semantic in the name of democratic modernity without realizing the implications of this semantic. by capturing cultural phenomenon from culture. in Hungarian. which transforms the Hungarians in Transylvania to simple immigrants in a land where they have been living for 1. In the dictionary. and more and more shaken by the decentralization of its production.000 years! They do not see the point that the ideology of the “Global Village” is not based on “Man. The notion of social classes is blurred when we refer to globalization and multiculturalism. due to the apparent neutrality of the economy. This fragmentation. ultimately loses those its spirit. but on the language of that
. This phenomenon gives even more meaning to the definition of the world endangered by capitalism as formulated by Marx: “The world is an accumulation of merchandise. To try to treat it through multiculturalism is. the West. “The world is an accumulation of unequal information(s). lets nothing in society escape the ever-expanding domain of merchandise and the ongoing commercialization of culture. but could be integrated into the sphere of merchandise.

any of the works of the two most important Czech contemporaries. at the same time. The criteria considered by the United States for the integration of Romania to the OTAN are completely separate from any cultural considerations. 32 (19 August 1994). It is in Romania that the leaders of the 1956 Hungarian revolution were detained before being sent back and executed in Hungary. 57–63. 4 (Cluj. See Anne Phillips. 1937). NY: Cornell University Press. Regionalism. in the long run it will appear in the West as a fake posthumanism of generally Romanian (which is generally of Romanian and more rarely Hungarian) character.” Transition. vol. 1918–1930 (Ithaca. no. “Romanians and Hungarians: How to Live Together?” Korunk. 8. This is why this solution seems to meet the approval of Romanian politicians and intellectuals. Carey. Nation Building and Ethnic Struggle. The sociological section of the University of Cluj gave some results that demand attention. most distrustful of the Hungarians. no. see Sorin Mitu Chapin. Thomas. 9.
NOTES
*This chapter was translated from French by Mihnea Ion Na ˘stase with Henry F. the romancer Hrabal and the philosopher Patochka. and simultaneously. 4. The Invention of the People: Romanian Chronicles (Paris: Arcantère. 1997). This was the result of an economic and urban political policy of intense industrialization and urbanization that has led to the actual configuration of Romanian villages. vol. and was shortened with permission by Christopher Eisterhold with Carey. 3. p. 5.” RFE/RL Research Report. 1.
.10 These are the people who are simultaneously the more willing and. 25. J. pp. and Irina Livezeanu. 44 (Winter 1997). 1990). Even if the multiculturalism orchestrated in Transylvania by the Romanian university authorities (and a part of the “Modernist” Hungarian minority) can hide the cultural homogenization under the auspices of Romanian culture. Are the Romanians Our Allies? (Paris: Sorlot. 10. This massive demographic change in the urban population has occurred due to the large rural Romanian population from the Transylvanian country and also Moldova. “Why Worry about Multiculturalism?” Dissent. and Michael Shafir. Since 1990. 1997.) 2. p. See Michael Shafir. P. no. 1 (12 January 1996). “Controversy over Romanian Education Law. vol. Claude Karnoouh. The Genesis of National Identity of Romanians in Translyvania (Bucharest: Humanitas. The majority of the Hungarian students in the humanistic disciplines have a preference for Hungarian departments that are autonomous in a united university. no important texts of the Hungarian sociological school from the 1970s and 1980s was translated. 1995. 2. “Ethnic Tensions Run High in Romania. 35. Cultural Politics in Greater Romania.254
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culture.) 3. were not translated or commented in Translyvania. Claude Karnoouh. 6. 7. Two remarkable examples are sufficient. These criteria consider only economic factors.

This persistent defiance is all the more noteworthy because a variety of rulers and political systems. In the final section. But I do hate Gypsies. I am not a bit xenophobic.13
Romani Marginality and Politics
Zoltan Barany1
Xenophobia has something vulgar in it. The purpose of this chapter is to analyze the Romanian Romas’ socioeconomic and political conditions after the fall of Communism. the Roma (Gypsies) have been an integral part of the ethnic society of the regions which today constitute modern Romania. although a part of Romanian society. .3 Through time. Hungarian authoritarianism. remain worlds apart from its other ethnic entities. and others.
255
. the focus shifts to state policies toward the Roma. . the Roma have maintained their ethnic identity and have refused to integrate with a society composed mostly of Romanians. The second part analyzes the process of Romani political mobilization. . Most historians agree that the first wave of Roma migrants reached present-day Romania during the thirteenth or fourteenth centuries. ranging from Habsburg absolutism. Germans. and Romanian Communism have attempted to assimilate them. The Roma. Magyars.4 The first part examines the socioeconomic conditions and interethnic relations of the Roma in postsocialist Romania. —distinguished poet S ¸tefan Augustin Doinas ¸ How could one integrate people who do not send their children to school? —Romanian intellectual2
For about 700 years.

about 70 percent of the Roma registered as Hungarians.500.723 1. one which is hampered by several incalculable variables. Social scientists believe that approximately one-third of them reside in Transylvania.000 2.000 2. While they make up a proportionately larger share in Slovakia (9.1. Censuses offer no sure guide since a considerable proportion of the Roma have refused to be identified due to the fear of discrimination. which they arrived at in a study supported by a rigorous explanation of their methodology. there were approximately 1. Romania’s total population was 22. and the minority. Some elude the census workers altogether. the largest in Eastern Europe. second. who were nomadic or seminomadic until the settlement policies of the socialist era forced them
Table 13.256
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SOCIOECONOMIC CONDITIONS AND INTERETHNIC RELATIONS
Determining the number of Romanian Roma is a troublesome undertaking at best. who have been settled for many decades. The most important differentiation among them is between the majority.
Estimates of Romania’s Roma Population8 409. that figure will approach approximately 1. The most objective data comes from demographers.760. and statisticians. 8.27 percent of Romania’s population (according to the 1992 census. 3. 2. and the other two-thirds. one can calculate that the Roma make up 5.5 percent).010.000.or third-hand information. Researchers often come up with figures that lack supporting evidence. According to Roma leaders. in the rest of Romania. 7. making them the second largest ethnic minority in the country after the Hungarians. 1. in absolute numbers. whereas Romani leaders and human rights activists tend to do the opposite. According to a 1993 estimate by Ca ˘ta ˘lin and Elena Zamfir.500.000.000
Census of 1992 lena and Cat ˘a ˘ lin Zamfir Romani leaders Roma Federation Isabel Fonseca Isabel Fonseca Iulian R a ˘ dulescu Victoria Clark
. Given their high reproduction rate.000 2.5 Census takers and other government and state officials have been known to underestimate the size of Romani communities. 4.000 4. The Romanian Roma constitute an extremely diverse population. and hearsay. at the latest census (1992) in such counties as Harghit ¸a and Covasna.000 6. sociologists.2 million.7 the Romani community in Romania is.000 3.6 If one accepts the figure of 1.2 million. one may reasonably assume that by the turn of the millennium.500.000 Roma residing in Romania.000).300.49 percent) and Bulgaria (8. 5. 6. and which are often based on guesswork.500.

some speak Hungarian. A small portion of the latter community have returned to their traveling ways for at least part of the year since 1990. many left behind by emigrating Germans and Jews. The average Romani woman gets married at age 17 (22. with a small number of wealthy Roma. Since the fall of socialism. The main Romani groups continue to identify themselves through traditional occupational distinctions. So far.5. caravlahi (coal miners). and most Roma (especially men) held steady jobs. blidari (bowl makers).000 Romanian children who were reported to be in the care of state-run orphanages in 1995.2 percent of Romani families desire no children. Although socialism accelerated the marginalization of ancestral Romani occupations and consequently many elements of traditional Romani life. Their religious identity is likewise diverse: among them there are Catholics.2 for the entire population) and bears the first child by age 18. Some Roma speak only Romanian.35 children per woman) than in Hungarian and Romanian communities (1. or any two. however. housing. of these languages. and an increasing number of Roma have come to identify themselves primarily with those living in the same household. and a large impoverished Romani underclass. the boundaries between certain tribes have become more and more vaporous.10 In postsocialist Romania—as in the rest of Eastern Europe—the Romas’ socioeconomic conditions have considerably deteriorated. This gap between desires and outcomes stems from the fact that nearly 90 percent of Romani women of childbearing age use no birth control devices whatsoever. ca ˘ ra ˘ midari (brick makers). Thousands of Romani families received council flats and houses. The high reproduction rate of the Romani community has been a source of tension in interethnic relations. by the socialist economy.Romani Marginality and Politics
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to abandon their traditional lifestyle. which had no more use for many of these skills. and ca ˘ lda ˘ rari (boilermakers). These distinctions were loosened.11 The majority of their children participated in the education system. Such diversity has frustrated the attempts of Roma leaders who want their people to behave like a coherent group. and especially Orthodox. As a result. Although an extensive survey by Elena Zamfir revealed that 74. such as rudari (wood carvers). the birthrate among the Roma is considerably higher (4. health. aurari (gold washers). some all three.9 Romani children have been the primary victims of this apparent absence of family planning. rich Roma have displayed only limited active solidarity with their needy brethren. They make up 75–80 percent of the 104. it also improved the educational. This phenomenon has slowed the emergence of panRoma consciousness. lingurari (spoon makers).79). a tiny middle stratum of intellectuals and professionals. Many Romanians believe that one of the elements of Nicolae Ceaus ¸ escu’s minority policy was to extend preferential treatment to the Roma in order “to
. and living standards of most Roma. the Romani society has become increasingly stratified. and some speak Romani. Protestants.

Baca ˘u. Some activists admit.5% 23. so there is no sense in spendTable 13. unskilled workers often earned more money than some college-educated people (like teachers). most important. What Is Most Important in Life to Succeed? (Romani respondents over age sixteen) Money Working hard Luck Skill/qualifications Health School/education Job Help from family Relationships Something else (unspecified) No response 28. Reasons include the indirect costs of education.2.13 The virtual unavailability of education in the Romani language is a controversial issue. that the single most important reason for the educational deprivation of their people is their traditional lack of interest in schooling.8% 0. discrimination in schools against Romani children by their peers and teachers alike. the fact that many of these families do not encourage.258
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provoke other ethnic groups. Most of their activists hold that children should acquire the Romani language within the family but should be formally educated in Romanian. whatever headway the Roma had made under the socialist period has largely evaporated.0% 8.14 The fact that there are no postsecondary level courses of the Romani language in Romania precludes the training of future Romani teachers. In 1994.8% 2. on their children’s schooling. including Romanians. In the socialist period. and.3% 4.2% 2. In the post-socialist era. only 51.”16 Many Roma contend that. Romani attendance at educational institutions from preschool to postsecondary levels has declined sharply. and Tîrgu Mures ˇ).1% 3. This was. even though about one-third of them speak no Romani at all. who picked up truant Romani (and other) children and took them to school. however. In 1993. however. there are seldom any state resources for such services. without the assistance of a textbook.”12 Since the December 1989 Revolution. a total of fifty-five Romanian pupils had the opportunity to study the Romani language for three hours per week (in Bucharest.3 percent of ten-year-old Romani children went to school regularly while 33. let alone insist.0% 7.1 percent did not attend at all. and to divert attention away from Ceaus ¸ escu’s other policies.9% 14.3% 5.1%
.15 Even Romani magazines feature reports on the (East) European school systems’ “constant battle against the apathy of the [Romani] parents against education. under socialism. school attendance levels were often kept high by social workers and teachers.

at a time when 16 percent of Romania’s overall population lived below the government established subsistence level. or steal rather than go to school. possession of durable goods. They often see no need for institutional education at all.21 The Roma have fared considerably worse in all socioeconomic indicators (life expectancy and health standards.20 Not surprisingly. the employment opportunities of the Roma in the mainstream economy have dwindled in the last decade.17 In Romania. therefore. as elsewhere in Eastern Europe.4 percent of the Roma had less than high school education. and 9 percent had indoor toilet facilities (16. Thousands work in garbage dumps and live in unspeakable conditions.4 percent of Romani women and 41. 95. and 74 percent of adults had neither traditional nor modern occupational skills. Their living standards have decreased to the extent that in 1994. where about two-thirds of the Romani population resides. This strategy was justified by the notion that the Roma did not own any land prior to the Communist takeover and. nearly 52 percent of the Romanian Roma were unemployed. 8.) than members of other nationalities residing in Romania. Although some Roma who are registered as unemployed actually do earn money from semi-legal and illegal activities. According to an independent sociological survey. However. stealing from private farms in the post-Communist era is not tolerated. Thousands of Roma were squeezed out of their villages following the breakup of agricultural cooperatives. as many Roma have found out the hard way.2 percent of men could read either with difficulty or not at all. At present. the Romas’ general economic well-being has plummeted since 1989. many of whom had worked in the agricultural sector. preferring their children to go to work.7 percent). theft from collective farms was not considered socially unacceptable.19 In 1994. Many Roma who left their villages established squatter settlements close to the town limits of many Romanian cities. 50. housing. The loss of agricultural employment has had an especially negative impact on the living standards. and interethnic relations of Roma in rural areas. etc. many had to resort to subsistence theft. and members of all ethnic groups routinely engaged in it. could not have any legal claim on returned land. beg.22
. a May 1992 report stated that 42. 73. The fact that tens of thousands of Roma had labored on the collective and state farms for decades appears to have made no significant difference. most Roma simply do not possess any marketable skills.3 percent of all Romanians). With their only source of employment gone. During the Communist period.8 percent received any unemployment benefits. 64 percent of the Roma lived under such conditions.6 percent had no source of income at all.1 percent had full bathrooms (53. only 2. social status. This phenomenon is only partially explained by anti-Roma discrimination and the loss of traditional skills during the socialist period.7 percent). however.18 The postsocialist land distribution schemes almost totally overlooked the Roma.9 percent of Romani dwellings in rural areas had mud floors (23.Romani Marginality and Politics
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ing time at school. For instance.

23 Since then. According to police officials. this intolerance has surfaced on a number of occasions in the form of attacks on the Roma. their media presence cannot challenge. personal. the village of Ha ˘ da ˘ reni was the scene of the most serious as-
.638 are youth. Therefore. Although the Roma have their own newspapers and there are a few hours of television and radio broadcast for and about the Roma.260
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Romani impoverishment has contributed to the growing incidence of crime among them. in the first nine months of 1990. however. and Hungarians and Romanians on the other. There is hardly any media discussion of Romani culture. according to the Council. the torching of their dwellings. a report of the General Police Inspectorate in May 1997 stated that among the 21.983 are Roma. and nearly every media portrayal of them is a negative one. in any event. history. murders among Roma are quite rare). although it is still primarily nonviolent (for instance. 1. Romanian media tend to reinforce already widespread anti-Roma prejudices. In September 1993. and collective aggression against members of ethnic minorities” which. Roma committed 8. In 1992.”28 Interethnic tensions between Roma on the one hand.24 The mainstream media is full of lively reports describing the ostentatious wealth of some Roma. let alone reverse. One of the few areas in which there is consensus between Transylvania’s Romanian and Hungarian communities is in their shared prejudices and discriminatory behavior toward the Roma.25 The press releases of police organizations do not divulge the ethnic background of arrested individuals except in cases involving the Roma.1 percent of the entire Romani population over age sixteen were in prison. The central government is practically the only source of support available for the Romani media. Many educated and integrated Roma distance themselves from their less educated brethren rather than trying to assist them. for they are frequent features of Romanian newspapers. were “proliferating every week” and “greatly harming democracy in Romania. but they have yet to rise to the challenge. state resources are limited and. more than 2. During the past decade. The “Gypsy mafia” and the “Gypsy-Arab crime syndicates” must make good copy. 8.8 percent of all crimes in Romania. the Council of National Minorities publicly warned against propagating “xenophobic. “2. the frequency of Romani crimes has increased. the opportunity to forge role models is usually lost. The mainstream media could be influential in combating intolerance against the Roma and other ethnic groups. often with the accompanying contention or implication that their riches are ill-gotten. and accomplishments. in all types of discrimination in a wide variety of social situations. 331 are foreigners. only few Roma read their own newspapers and hardly any gadje (non-Roma) do so.232 are minors. the bigotry oozing out of the mainstream media. are considerable.27 In June 1999. For example.825 people who had been apprehended. and more generally.”26 These figures soon find their way into Romanian newspapers and ultimately serve to increase interethnic tensions.

a significant proportion of the Romani elite has tried to integrate with the majority Romanian or Hungarian society. 100 percent of ethnic Germans. Intermarriage (which occurs extremely rarely) is widely considered the most egregious violation of this rule. Many of these Roma speak no Romani and have adopted gadje lifestyles. The fact that Roma actively supported the Hungarians in the March 1990 disturbances in Tîrgu Mures ˇ has no doubt served to moderate anti-Roma prejudices among them. it has brought about a positive change in their political situation. educational. now it is us.37 Many Roma activists and gadje experts agree that the Romani communities’ socioeconomic integration holds the only promise of long-term resolution to their predicament. few people abide by them.
POLITICAL MOBILIZATION
Although the postsocialist transition has aggravated the Romanian Romas’ socioeconomic marginality. After the forceful integrative and assimilative policies of the socialist period. 50 percent of Hungarians. The casualties included three Roma and one Romanian. or racist attitudes.36 The overwhelmingly negative social attitudes toward the Roma pose a major obstacle to the resolution of their complex social.35 In village societies. It is noteworthy that ethnic Hungarians seem to harbor the least virulent anti-Roma sentiments in Transylvania.30 In many cases.33 The fact that most Roma are unaware of their rights makes their situation even more difficult.Romani Marginality and Politics
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sault to date on the Transylvanian Roma by a mob of Hungarians and Romanians. Romani crimes or provocation. Since 1990.”31 According to a recent opinion poll. many Romanian Roma are now learning. Some Hungarians view the Roma as a marginalized ethnic group just as they are. to adapt to a life of increasing socioeconomic marginality. According to Nicolae Gheorghe. but most of their neighbors still consider them merely as “upstart” Roma. “in earlier days the Jews were blamed for all evil.34 Still. Although some antidiscrimination laws have been passed by the legislature. and 24 percent of Roma themselves regard the Roma in a negative way. a factor that may mitigate their overt anti-Romani actions. once again. 77 percent of Romanians.29 The attacks had been ignited by the resentment of the general population to the ostentatious wealth of a small number of Romani businessmen. the Roma have been used as scapegoats by individuals frustrated by the trauma of the post-Communist transition.32 No other ethnic group is viewed so disapprovingly in Romania. Romania’s most prominent Romani activist. the most typical behavioral norm between Hungarians and Roma is social and residential segregation. and economic problems. there have been no institutional obstacles in
. and damage to Romani property was extensive (thirteen houses destroyed by fire and another twenty-five partially damaged).

” Florin. and according to Franz Remmel. which has centered on the primacy of the emperor versus the king. has continued the feud with Ra ˘ dulescu. The leadership of the Romani community is primarily divided. Although there are dozens of Romani organizations in the country. Cioaba ˘’s nephew and a convicted criminal living not far from the “King. Victor Ta ˘na ˘se reestablished the interwar “General Association of Roma from Romania” in Craiova. During the Revolution. Although prior to the fall of socialism Ion Cioaba ˘ was no more than a bulibasha. but rather by the fault between those with more traditional nomadic lifestyles and those from more settled backgrounds. The previous Communist regime did not permit the Roma to have any independent associations. the “Social and Cultural Federation of the Timis ¸ County Roma. The best-known examples of the traditional Romani leaders in postsocialist Romania are the Cioaba ˘ and Ra ˘ dulescu families in Sibiu. hailing from more modern environments. he was rarely effective.” Cioaba ˘—an illiterate Kalderash Rom with a “doctorate” from “Texas America University” on his office wall—was often dismissed as a buffoon whose antics and ostentatious lifestyle embarrassed the Roma. during which the 300 participants conducted a symbolic trial of
. particularly because their memberships are generally very small.”39 As a result. actor Ion Caramitru read on national television a long text detailing the destiny and predicament of the Roma. Iulian Ra ˘ dulescu. and listing their demands for human. they continue to be strongly dominated by their leaders. while Romani activists. Although Romani leaders have not fully utilized the potential of political participation for improving their overall socioeconomic position. The first new group. or pursue any formal political activities. On the next day. in 1992. In March 1999.” was founded on 25 December 1989. Since his death in 1997.262
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the way of Romani political mobilization. his son and “successor. and minority rights. They were active participants in the Revolution.” quickly proclaimed himself the “Emperor of All Gypsies Everywhere.38 The Romani population was quick to start forming political and social groups both during and after the 1989 Revolution. or a local chieftain. are usually highly educated. he had crowned himself “King of all Gypsies Everywhere. Although he lobbied hard for Romani causes (he demanded that Germany stop the repatriation of Romanian Roma and pay reparation to the thousands of Roma victims of the Holocaust). Florin was the organizer of a so-called European Roma Conference. not by their different political approaches (their programs and demands are very similar). civil. they have carved out a presence in the Romanian political scene. the very first victim of the hostilities in Timisoara was a Rom. They symbolize the idea that a strong personality is necessary to lead the Romani community. and have been able to pressure the state into devoting more attention to their situation. Traditional leaders generally have little formal schooling. however.

nonparty political associations. Whatever prominence they have achieved is due to the momentary spectacle they create and to their long-term supporter. treasury.Romani Marginality and Politics
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Adolf Hitler. in some cases. Parties. not the sixteenth. even campaign funds. The hearing culminated in a death sentence which was quickly commuted to a more damning punishment: “His soul should burn forever in hell while all his victims should line up in front of him so he could apologize to them.
. Some of the major Romani organizations include the Uniunea Democrata ˘ a Romilor (Roma Democratic Union).40 In reality. when asked to comment on the Romas’ traditional leaders. the authority of traditional leaders like Cioaba ˘ and Ra ˘ dulescu is rarely recognized beyond their extended families and the people who are keen to do business with them. complete with throne room. The largest Romani organization in the country. The government extends funds to Romani organizations for office rental and equipment. and. Ion Iliescu’s Party of Social Democracy.” said Ma ˘da ˘ lin Voicu. An equally serious problem is the division between. and stables (which house nine automobiles including four limousines—three Mercedes-Benz and one Lincoln) conducted by the king himself. the high point of the gathering was the tour of the royal palace. These and dozens of other committed and well-prepared Roma have been the engines of Romani political mobilization throughout the last decade. “We need to prepare for the twenty-first century.42 Increasingly. some wealthy Roma finance their own campaigns from private resources. which has used Cioaba ˘ and Ra ˘dulescu as puppets to garner the Romani vote. There are dozens of regional organizations in addition to a few national associations maintaining branch organizations in the region. as well as grants from national and international institutions and foundations. and within.41 Modern. an economist with a second degree in social work. publications. who was Voicu’s predecessor in the Romanian parliament. and the aforementioned Nicolae Gheorghe. Such divisions are caused and deepened by the competition for the resources offered by the political environment. the lone Rom delegate in the Bucharest legislature. and sociocultural organizations have been the primary institutional locus of Romani mobilization. the Asociat ¸ia Nationala ˘ a Romilor din România (National Association of Romanian Roma). was established in March 1990 and has offices in nearly every county. and the Partidul Aliant ¸a Democratica ˘ a Romilor din România (the Democratic Alliance Party of Romanian Roma). One reason for the existence of so many organizations is the diversity of the Romani population itself. The main source of financial support for Romani groups are state subsidies. Their ranks include Gheorghe Ra ˘ducanu.” Still. Partida Romilor. Romani organizations: a phenomenon that seems to have subsided somewhat in the second half of the 1990s. better-educated leaders are considerably less colorful. a sophisticated multilingual sociologist with a doctorate in sociology.

who said that Roma who were reluctant to integrate should be “interned in settlements. the PR’s two top leaders. The Romas’ various cultural and social associations have also cooperated in a number of projects. A fine example of interethnic cooperation is the Association for Interethnic Dialogue. better educational and employment opportunities. The programs and demands of Romani political organizations are similar. which many Roma consider derogatory) ostensibly introduced to prevent confusion between “Romanian” and “Roma” in May 1995. in August 1998. affirmative action programs. improved Romani access to state jobs. The electoral law allows minorities to participate with nonparty organizations in addition to conventional political parties because it is mindful of the fact that some minorities are concentrated in certain counties or regions. when I asked Nicu Paun and Ivan Gheorghe. and the like. the Convention of Cooperation of Romani Associations and the Roma Party (PR) called for an investigation of Senator Corneliu Vadim Tudor. and the government’s reluctance to return gold confiscated from the Roma during the Communist period. the repatriation of Roma migrants from Germany. increased television and radio broadcast time. more effective social welfare policies. They seek strict enforcement of antidiscrimination laws. Taking advantage of this legislation. they preferred not to comment on it. Prior to the elections in 1990. more positive portrayals of the Roma in the mainstream media. leader of the extremist Greater Romania Party. is a personal friend of Tudor hardly does him and his party credit among the Roma and the general population. about the Voicu-Tudor relationship. the single Rom in the Bucharest legislature and one of the PR’s leaders.264
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More important are the incidents of active cooperation between Romani groups because they demonstrate the progress in Romani political behavior.
. and 1996. The Roma have ardently protested policies damaging to their communities such as police passivity during antiRoma attacks. the lack of Romani-language instruction. from the commemoration of Holocaust victims to the rebuilding of destroyed houses. the discriminatory procedures of the judicial system. thus ensuring that they have a national political presence prior to entering national elections.43 More recently. the Roma have established a handful of registered parties (such as the Roma Party). Romanian. or Gypsies. which was founded in Cluj in 1994 with the participation of German. some Romani associations and parties formed electoral alliances and umbrella organizations in order to prevent the squandering of the Roma vote. Indeed. and Romani civic organizations. 1992. One of the few tangible triumphs of these protests was the government’s withdrawal from the announced official name change for the Roma (from “Roma” to T ¸igani.”44 The well-known fact that Madalin Voicu.45 The Romanian Constitution requires registered political parties to maintain branch offices in at least one-half of all the counties in the country. Hungarian.

51 According to the PDSR-PR concord. The Roma are the best organized in Bucharest. In the February 1992 local elections. they have not been successful. preparing for the 2000 national elections. Still.Romani Marginality and Politics
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Although Romani political mobilization has not been without success. the Roma succeeded in electing two deputy mayors and 104 councilors. On the national level. a cohesive leadership.50 At its October 1999 national congress. a dues paying membership. activists documented cases in Romania when the bulibasha went to vote for the entire Romani community. Some Romani organizations. Notwithstanding such disadvantages.49 In the 1996 national and local elections. where the largest vote recipient.000 votes altogether. However. when a party needed only 3 percent of the vote to gain parliamentary presence (since then the threshold has been raised to 5 percent). although they were unsuccessful in the national competition. the five different Roma parties received 120. many Roma are oblivious to any mobilizational activity at all. particularly since their political participation was forbidden or discouraged by their political environment.
. therefore. have been working on teaching Romani communities how to vote properly. and most do not even maintain membership lists. Even in the postsocialist period. outside of the capital. for instance. This is not surprising given that Romani organizations have few electoral resources such as political tradition and experience. Traditionally. a modest but clear advancement is observable in Romani interest in politics. They estimate that Romani electoral participation is less than 15 percent. the Roma were able to elect 132 local officials. In 1992. or supportive political allies. the Roma ended up with no seat other than the constitutionally guaranteed one. such as the Cluj-based Wassdas Foundation. a sound financial base. received approximately 80. the Romani interest in politics has been minimal.48 The vast majority of Romani organizations have few active members.47 There were also many instances when the Romas’ votes were invalid because they voted for all. which is largely due to the work of dozens of indefatigable Roma and gadje activists. and have had to contend with an electoral law that allows one parliamentary representative for every national minority regardless of electoral performance (It should be noted that the Romanian Constitution is without peer in the region in this respect because no other East European basic laws allow for such minority representation).000 votes. no individual party garnered 3 percent of the vote. which would have been sufficient to secure four seats in the legislature. the PR. it is remarkable that the Roma were able to elect a fair number of local representatives.46 Romani leaders often complain of the difficulty they face in persuading Roma to cast their ballots since most of them have no confidence in the electoral system. it has thus far failed to achieve representation for the Roma commensurate with their proportion in the population. of the Romani organizations on the ballot. the Roma Party. rather than for one. concluded an agreement with Ion Iliescu’s Party of Democratic Socialism of Romania (PDSR).

and programs encouraging children to stay in school. and training programs for Romani activists. First. Of course.53 The work of the dozens of social.54 By far the most important group. Moreover. however. and cultural Romani groups has yielded far more tangible results in alleviating the socioeconomic problems of their communities and enhancing their identity formation than have the political organizations.” like Dan Pavel. the PDSR agreed to co-opt the PR into the governing process and promised two important places in the government: a state councilor at the President’s Office for Roma affairs and a governmental minister responsible for dealing with the Roma.266
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the PR would support the PDSR’s campaign and encourage Roma to vote for Iliescu’s party. and has conducted some national cultural events.55 In sum. Critics of the “PDSR-PR protocol. a
. CRISS) are based in Bucharest. the PDSR committed itself to try to solve the Romas’ social problems through a national strategy to be elaborated by the PR. which has not even been recognized by the Socialist international. The YGSR was established in 1991. vaccination campaigns. an important political party was willing to engage the Romanian Roma in substantive discussions and to sign a policy agreement with them. an ethnic group as diverse as the Roma can hardly be expected to create. in organizing and mobilizing their communities.-based Project on Ethnic Relations. income generation projects. Second. However. their programs have extended to all regions of Romania. PR president Nicu Paun says that the PDSR-PR protocol is beneficial for the Roma for three reasons. which has done a wide variety of practical work ranging from preparing Roma children for school. much less maintain. Roma advocacy projects. if the Roma want to support a social democratic party. YGSR) and Nicolae Gheorghe’s Centrul Romilor Pentru Întervent ¸ie Sociala ˘ s ¸i Studii (Roma Center for Social Intervention and Studies. they should not have chosen the PDSR. In return.52 In contrast. violence prevention seminars. Although they have a long way to go before their political representation approximates their share of the population. are quick to point out that the Romas’ conditions under Iliescu’s sixyear reign were worse than they have been since 1996.S. Finally. the Romanian Romas’ political marginality has substantially decreased since 1990. they have succeeded. the PDSR offered to extend social help to the Roma and involve some of its members in policy making. I-li-es-cu” for minutes. to some extent. Participants told me that the ambience at the congress was similar to Ceausescu-era functions: lots of thunderous applause during Iliescu’s speech at the end of which the Roma chanted “I-li-es-cu. fragmentation and infighting among the Roma is a constant problem plaguing their organizational efforts. the Bucharest director of the U. Although the best organized and most successful groups. such as Costel Vasile’s Societatea Tîna ˘ ra Generat ¸ie a Romilor (Young Generation Society of the Roma. economic. for the first time in their history. is CRISS.

Germans. their proportion of the population is well below 10 percent. such as the Czech Republic or Hungary. Especially in Romania. but by the fact that they have not been able to form more effective electoral coalitions. the president could have played an important role in upholding minority rights. unlike other ethnic minorities (i. One significant benefit of their organizational activity. not by the existence of a large number of associations.
. he repeatedly expressed his desire for the Romas’ enhanced integration into Romanian society and actively supported international meetings on human rights issues. has been that it has provided an institutional framework in which hundreds of Romani activists and politicians could mature. the Romanian government has had very few resources for relieving the Romas’ social ills. remains insignificant.. Romani activists and politicians were right to castigate Iliescu for his reluctance to clearly and publicly reproach the perpetrators of ethnic violence. although Romania is home to the world’s largest Romani community. Undoubtedly. the government could have done more. where presidential authority is much stronger than in primarily parliamentary states. which would have enabled them to enhance their representation on a national level.e. given the economic imperatives of the transition.
STATE POLICIES AND INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION
Romania. etc. has received much domestic and international criticism for its alleged indifference to the Romas’ deteriorating conditions.57 No doubt. and their political power. while growing. had been at least partly motivated by increasing international criticism and accelerating Romania’s European integration. and social problems to Romanian politicians of which the “Gypsy Question” was only one of relatively small concern. Fourth. Hungarians. The damage is done. Some of his East European colleagues endowed with far less political power (Václav Havel of the Czech Republic. the Roma have been traditionally viewed with a general lack of sympathy in Romania and elsewhere. Moreover.) the Roma have no “mother state” that protects their interests or speaks out on their behalf. Still. the actions of other East European politicians. the post-Communist transition and consolidation process has presented a large cluster of complex political. Finally. Although former Romanian President Ion Iliescu (1990–1996) had often been criticized for his insensitivity regarding the Roma. Third. and for that matter. however.56 First. like other East European states. Iliescu was more willing to speak out against racial discrimination. Especially in the last couple of years of his tenure. and the modest financial endowments of the state. economic. Second. Iliescu’s actions.Romani Marginality and Politics
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unified organization without a great deal of difficulty. but it is also vital to understand the reasons why the Roma have not been at the top of its political agenda. the Romas’ economic resources are inconsequential.

his Ministry would set aside places in professional schools and postsecondary institutions specifically for the Roma. as well as that of the newly created Romani theater in Timis ¸ oara. the authorities scarcely acknowledged the Romas’ existence. several fundamental changes have occurred in the Romas’ conditions. Although social attitudes toward the Roma have scarcely improved in Romania. Minister of Education Andrei Marga announced that the government was about to introduce a “mechanism of positive discrimination favoring Roma in state education institutions. In April 1998. seven years after the Revolution. They now possess the same “national minority” status as do other ethnic minorities.
. To appreciate the changes in Romania’s treatment of the Roma. the state’s treatment of them has certainly taken a step forward. they rarely failed to offer excuses for the perpetrators. In the 1950s. the authorities confiscated the Romas’ wagons and horses in order to reduce their mobility. the government has allocated some funds for crisis prevention and for the payment. At the same time. the lion’s share of the operating budgets of Romani organizations. the Romas’ situation. Since then the government has clearly become more aware of the Romas’ intensifying problems. at least in part. to the Romani minority. newspapers. Romanians finally elected a president and a government which was publicly committed to substantive democratization. Similar to the president. although the lack of financial resources has meant that only minimal substantive changes could occur in the Romas’ condition. and more concern for. it is important to evaluate its record in evolutionary rather than in static terms. Indeed. Before 1989.”60 Since 1989. the Romanian government has not yet responded to ethnic violence decisively. Although by the mid-1990s government representatives had started to condemn anti-Roma attacks. Romanian politicians have come to recognize that one of the many conditions of successful European integration is improved state-minority relations.59 There can be no doubt that since the interethnic violence in Hadareni. has shown a modest but unmistakable change. President Emil Constantinescu has displayed considerably more empathy toward the Roma than his predecessor has.” According to Marga.58 The government has recognized the critical importance of education in its assistance programs. more generally. Romanian governments have shown more sensitivity to. which received a great deal of international publicity. In December 1996. come from state coffers. of damages caused by anti-Roma extremists. although there have been no notable changes in their conditions. After 1993. and Zhelyu Zhelev of Bulgaria) became active supporters of Romani rights.268
Zoltan Barany
Arpad Goncz of Hungary. the Romanian authorities’ approach to human rights abuses and. Kiro Gligorov of Macedonia. During much of the Ceaus ¸ escu-era (1965–1989) the Roma were basically ignored in accord with the Bucharest government’s declaration that the country’s ethnic problems were “solved.

or at least mediate between. Local authorities. and various educational programs aimed at improving the educational level of the Romani community. the various Romani organizations. the government. a number of Romani experts have been employed in various ministries. from the training of police personnel regarding minorities to the discussion of the role of minorities in national defense. it held a meeting with nearly 200 Romani leaders representing dozens of organizations. clearly demonstrated the evolution of the policies of the Romanian government. but they could not reach an agreement on substantive issues. Its director possesses the governmental rank of a minister without portfolio. but they do suggest a shift in the state’s treatment of the Roma. education and science. The first post1989 government under Petre Roman made several ambitious plans to solve
. The Council has tried to unify. directed by their superiors in Bucharest. textbooks. This group is composed of the representatives of ten ethnic minorities and includes Ma ˘da ˘lin Voicu. finance. but so far without much success. for instance. Another important political body that represents ethnic minority interests is the Minority Parliamentary Group in the Romanian legislature. including those of the Roma. a special department deals with minority affairs.. Its main objectives are to take account of the problems of minorities. in the Ministry of Education. In September 1994.g. a Romani legislator. Dependent on. and administration). The new Department has demonstrated its sensitivity to the needs of the Romani community and has proposed some practical social and economic programs. and supervised by. the Council is composed of representatives of Romania’s eighteen ethnic minorities and of the twelve ministries which have special responsibilities for minority affairs (education. while ignored in the West in general and by human rights organizations in particular. etc. put pressure on those who set the fires to rebuild the houses. Other similar changes do not indicate a drastic turnabout in Bucharest’s policies. For instance. in May 1994 in the village of Racs ¸a (in Satu Mare county). For instance.). In 1997 Victor Ciorbea’s government established a Department of National Minorities under the Office of the Prime Minister. defense. The department has worked on curricula. The Council has proposed several programs.Romani Marginality and Politics
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In the last few years. there have been several cases that. and to prepare a variety of programs to address them. Bulgaria): the Council of National Minorities. In 1993 Romania established an institutional structure for the representation of ethnic minority interests that is considerably more sophisticated than that of some of the other states in the region (e. The Council maintains six working committees (culture. Since 1989. That signaled not only the authorities’ refusal to ignore such incidents but also that they would now force perpetrators to pay for their actions. labor. ten Romani dwellings were burned by ethnic Romanians. mass media.

but praiseworthy original intentions are often overlooked in their daily routines.000 of German aid allocated to the Free and Democratic Community of Gypsies there. which are usually characterized by poor working conditions.68 In 1994. The government promised to set aside fifty-eight positions for Roma experts in key ministries (education.000 Romanians (reportedly 70 percent of them Roma) with DM 30 million. inadequate resources. accusing him of not handing out the DM 15. some Romanian local administrators and mayors have publicly called on the Roma to emigrate.69 To ´ ´kés said that Germany had asked for payment to be halted because Roma leaders misused funds for purposes different from what had been intended. the experience of the Romanian Roma is typical of all East European Roma. and low material rewards.65 In the first six months of 1997 alone.”63 Since 1989. Some local officials are genuinely concerned with improving the conditions of the Romani community in their jurisdictions.270
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or at least reduce Romani unemployment. so that they would consider the protection of fundamental rights of individuals as the ultimate state interest. Notwithstanding the specific nature of their predicament. since 1990.62 Local bureaucrats. tens of thousands of Romanian Roma have taken advantage of the relatively free borders and travelled to Western Europe and beyond. interior). while the social integra-
. nearly 500 Roma left Romania for Ireland. labor. the German government signed a repatriation agreement with Bucharest helping the readjustment of some 20. their socioeconomic conditions have deteriorated in nearly all respects since the state-socialist period.61 The Roma have suffered discrimination from all political institutions and the most injurious has been the treatment by local authorities. Indeed. The two main reasons why they are worse off in Romania than in some other states of the region. Roma in the Bihor county city of Oradea took legal action against Bishop Laszlo To ´ ´kés. although eventually only thirteen Roma were hired. Roma leaders repeatedly complained that they had no control over the funds. is that Romania’s economic situation has been very difficult. policemen. even the Romani activist and politician Gheorghe Ra ˘ ducanu admitted that the great majority of the Roma left for economic rather than for political reasons. A 1998 Amnesty International report contended that incidents of racist violence against the Roma have not ceased in Romania and “a change in the mentality of those representing the state.64 As if to heed their advice.
CONCLUSION
The situation of the Romanian Roma has been extremely difficult situation since 1989. is yet to take place. only a small proportion of which was being spent on assistance to the Roma. aid administrators. and social workers often share the prejudices of the larger society.67 In September 1992.66 However. such as in Hungary or Macedonia.

1997). no. In addition. For studies dealing with earlier periods. the most lamentable development in the postsocialist period has been the Romas’ declining educational attainment. T Monografia etnografica ˘ (The Gypsies of Romania: An Ethnographic Monograph). particularly trying.Romani Marginality and Politics
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tion of Romanian Roma has been even slower. At the same time. in turn. the Romas’ educational level is vastly inferior to the rest of the population. (Contributions to the History of the Gypsies in Romania) ¸iganii din România: (Bucharest: Fundatia Regele Carol I. p.” East European Quarterly. or New York: St. Clearly. 2. see George Potra. vol. and the adjective is Romani. I am indebted to the Ford Foundation and IREX for their financial support of my work. pp. Romanian Gypsies/Roma prefer. Tauris. given the multifaceted divisions within the Romani population. and they face widespread exclusion from other ethnic groups. it is important to recognize that. their rates of unemployment and criminal activities are much higher.
. it will reduce socioeconomic problems and interethnic tensions. and Ion Chelcea. 26 (29 June 1990). Roma. A History of the Gypsies in Eastern Europe and Russia (London: I. Education will generate better job opportunities.” Report on Eastern Europe. Changing traditional Romani attitudes which hold institutionalized education in such low regard is a prerequisite to any substantial long-term improvement in the Romas’ conditions. The only way for them to lessen their marginality is through integration.
NOTES
1. pp. This chapter uses the terminology “Rom. 1944). Even so. The Penguin Atlas of Diasporas (New York: Penguin Books. though certainly not all. Also. Contribut ¸iuni la istoricul t ¸iganilor din România. education is the key to their salvation. local authorities still routinely discriminate against them. “The Gypsies Organize. which makes their own situation and the work of those intending to assist them. Quite simply. there is an institutional structure in place in the country that may well hold the promise of positive developments in future interethnic relations. Romani. and David M. 4 (January 1974). the plural noun is Roma. 3. 7. unifying the Roma for political or other purposes remains a formidable task. Crowe. I am also grateful to Larry Watts for facilitating my field research in Romania throughout the last decade. Romanian policies toward the Roma have improved in the last several years.” which most. 96. “Ethnic Minorities in Romania under Socialism. p. 1. The one area in which the Romanian Romas’ situation has measurably improved is politics.B. 1995). Gerard Chaliand and Jean-Pierre Rageau. which. 1939). Both of these quotes are cited by Dan Ionescu. The singular noun is Rom. 4. 435–64. vol. (Bucharest: Editura Institutului Central de Statistica. Ltd. Martin’s Press. may be expected to spawn a more effective political elite. partly as a result of international pressure. 107–50. This could be accomplished primarily through education. Trond Gilberg. As elsewhere in the region. 40. despite antidiscrimination legislation and directives. no. and it will accelerate the creation of a Roma middle class..

its clerics to be drawn into the web of surveillance and reportage under the guidance of the secret police.” as Romanian theologian Dorin N. Ramet1
The transition from authoritarianism to pluralism. imposed its agenda on all sectors of society. in which the given Church allows itself to be thoroughly penetrated. as for example in the cases of Romania and Bulgaria after the overthrow of the Ottoman yoke.14
Church and State in Romania before and after 1989
Sabrina P. Church-state relations in the Communist world may be analyzed on two axes: penetration by the state and attitude toward nationalism. On the first axis. whereas politicians endeavoring to establish a democratic state in the wake of the collapse of an authoritarian order have before them the models of successful democratic systems established in sundry Western societies. nongovernmental institutions. whether of a liberal democratic type. involves challenges of adaptation not only at the constitutional-juridical level. exercising a strict organizational monopoly. and its newspapers to be written or screened by the secular authorities
275
. or a multiparty ochlocratic type (such as characterized by Poland in the years 1919–1926). Popa has put it. Moreover. In the case of societies in which a single party. endeavoring to chart a “resurrectionist” course since the collapse of Communism have had to chart a course with neither map nor model in hand. at all levels of society. these earlier examples have little to do with the contemporary situation and can provide no guide as to the present dilemmas and challenges. such as the Church. in fact. nongovernmental institutions suddenly freed of party control and surveillance confront the need to stage a kind of “resurrection. a nonliberal democracy (against which John Stuart Mill warned). but. one may distinguish three patterns: co-optation. While history affords examples of adaptation after the overthrow of foreign and/or repressive rule.

Party functionaries routinely attended Church conferences in order to keep an eye on their flocks..276
Sabrina P. Romania. and the regime co-optive of nationalism and Church outside the nationalist discourse (e. Czechoslovakia). Ramet
(the Orthodox Churches of Russia. the Greek-Rite Catholic Church in Ukraine). registered Baptists in the USSR and Jewish congregations in most Communist societies). until 1989. major Churches in Kádár-era Hungary). the Serbian Orthodox Church. and here one may distinguish among four patterns in the Communist era: regime and Church both hostile to nationalism (e.
.. not as favored with privileges such as foreign travel (for example. and. the Jehovah’s Witnesses in Ukraine). in the first place. The second axis relates to nationalism. reviewed pastoral letters and ecclesiastical resolutions to make sure of their “progressive spirit. Party authorities set the themes for church sermons. involving regime co-optation of its own (often fanciful or reconstructed) view of the national history and Church cooperation with the regime on that basis.g. until 1968. involving the direct collaboration of perhaps as many as 80 percent of Orthodox clerics with the Securitate secret service.3 These priests-agents were expected to provide the Securitate with information about believers and to counter the allegations made by Jehovah’s Witnesses and other independent sources concerning regime infringements of human rights. to flatter Ceaus ¸escu. regime hostile to nationalism but Church nationalist (e. Protestants in Romania).2
THE ROMANIAN MODEL
Where the Romanian Orthodox Church is concerned. All (recognized) religious associations were subjected to strict state control. and proscription. the Macedonian Orthodox Church after 1967. according to Traian Sima.” in which given religious associations were legally recognized but not as thoroughly penetrated as “co-opted” Churches and hence.4 The country’s religious leaders were expected to defend the country’s human rights record in international forums and were also expected to sing the glories of Romanian President Nicolae Ceaus ¸escu and of Romanian Communism itself. These expressions of complete satisfaction were not intended. which condemned the illegal associations to an underground existence (as in the case of the Greek-Rite Catholic Church in Communist-era Ukraine. the relationship in the Ceaus ¸escu era was overtly co-optive.” and scheduled meetings of mass organizations on Sundays and holy days of obligation. who. was a high-ranking intelligence operative in Timis ¸oara. the Evangelical Church in the GDR after 1978.g. too.g.. however. regime and Church both co-optive of the national history and heritage (e.g. and Romania in the Communist era affording the clearest examples of this pattern). Bulgaria.. This cooperation extended far beyond mere agreement about the national history. “tolerance.

” Patriarch Teoctist intoned in January 1990 in a typical example of clerical self-justification. Needless to say. had threatened to walk out of the session if the discussion continued. The same requirement was also imposed on the other religious associations that enjoyed legal status in Communist Romania. at a blow. the now self-proclaimed anti-Communist zealot. Metropolitan Antonie Pla ˘ma ˘deala ˘ of Transylvania.8 By contrast. as Teoctist continued.Church and State in Romania
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but rather to cow the prelates into complete submission and to provide useful propaganda for internal and foreign audiences.”5 But. assistant to the patriarch and head of the Department of External Relations of the Romanian Orthodox Patriarchate. apparently oblivious to the selfcontradiction entailed in an “everybody-did-it” defense. When this overture
. in the months following the collapse of the Ceaus ¸escu regime in December 1989. many of Romania’s religious leaders found it necessary to do some backpedaling. Somewhat more honestly. there is not a single Romanian adult who has not been affected by some form of collaboration with Communism. had praised the restrictive 1948 law on religion for having assured “true and perfect religious freedom and rights for all religious beliefs and bodies in Romania.”9 and who had defended Ceaus ¸escu’s demolition of churches in downtown Bucharest. the wealth of the minority Churches of the Germans and Hungarians. eliminating. when the aforementioned Metropolitan Antonie. the government tried to win over Church leaders to the socialist cause. or at least explaining. The Orthodox Church was not alone in being required to express its total contentment with the conditions in which it found itself. in earlier times.”6 Bishop Nifom Ploies ¸teanul. adopted the same stance as his boss. Later that year. who. conceded the Council’s failure to take a critical stand vis-à-vis the Ceaus ¸escu dictatorship.” even conceding that the Communist state’s restrictions in the religious sphere were understandable and “natural. telling a visiting American scholar in October 1990 that the end justifies the means7—that the goal of providing for the Orthodox Church’s material welfare and relative prosperity under Communism justified the hierarchs’ endorsement of mendacious formulas and their refusal to criticize injustice or to defend the persecuted. was by 1990 parading himself as an anti-Communist zealot. “In all honesty. recalling that the WCC had dropped a discussion of human rights violations in August 1988. General-Secretary Emilio Castro. “We merely protected what was left of religion in Romania. the head of the World Council of Churches.10
THE COMMUNIST LEGACY
As early as 23 March 1945. the coalition government of Petru Groza issued a decree on land reform. “We were not collaborators.

a Baptist pastor from Ias ¸i. Authorities issued a decree in May 1947. “Unrecognized” faiths were considered illegal. while another 50 or so were executed outright. who was forced to leave Romania in June 1985 after he had issued an open letter criticizing the regime’s violations of human rights and demanding an end to such transgressions. some were deported.15 and Fr. Constantin Sfatcu. effecting purges among the Orthodox clergy. alongside clerics from other faiths. In exchange for subservience and enthusiastic support for state policies. For example. the Communist government provided salaries and pensions for bishops and priests. and Jehovah’s Witnesses. at least 450 priests were incarcerated in a forced labor camp. Georghe Calciu-Dumitrea ˘sa. imposing a mandatory retirement age for clergy. Those not prepared to be docile servants of the state were punished.000 Orthodox priests were imprisoned between 1946 and 1964. Ramet
failed. Up to 6. There were two striking exceptions to this record: Hungarian Catholic Bishop Antal Jakab. calendars. Dorel Catarama ˘. where more than 200 priests died. to approve the elevation of clerics to leadership posts within the Church. among other things. Meanwhile. Baptist pastors Ioan S ¸tef and Beniamin Cocar were brought to trial in the mid-1980s for having failed to register with the authorities. and theological journals. was likewise arrested and put on trial. this allowed authorities to pension off recalcitrants among the old guard. and to keep watch over all Church publications. Nazarenes. a Seventh Day Adventist.278
Sabrina P.13 Among Catholic clergy. was sentenced to seven and a half years in prison (in July 1985) after being convicted on fabricated charges
. a Union of Democratic Priests. the Communist government recognized only fourteen faiths. which is provided by the state. most surviving clergymen decided that caution and docility were advisable. All Catholic newspapers and other publications were suppressed. the authorities turned to more resolute measures. Jakab and Calciu gained in moral authority as a result of the publicity given to their courage. Under the provisions of the 4 August 1948 Law on Cults. to regulate any proposed changes in diocesan boundaries. thoroughly infiltrated by the security police. The 1948 law empowered the Ministry of Cults to watch over and control the activity of the religious associations. was established. Among those considered illegal were Greek-Rite Catholics.14 After this rough introduction. Mormons. who earned a permanent place in history through his consistent refusal to make the usual embarrassing statements praising Ceaus ¸escu.11 Article 32 of the law warned that “ministers of religious cults who express antidemocratic attitudes may be deprived temporarily or permanently of their salary. Christian Scientists. in contrast to the sixty religious associations recognized before 1948. especially in the West. Lesser-known pastors often proved more vulnerable than either Jakab or Calciu to regime reprisals. and financial subsidies for the publication of Church books.”12 The law institutionalized state control of episcopal elections and packed the Holy Synod with Communist supporters.

the regime of Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej broke off relations with the Vatican and ordered the Papal Nuncio out of the country.”22
.000 villages (including. . Baptist pastors Nicolae Gheorghita and Paul Negrut.16 Two other clergymen. their churches.800 in 1948) were reported to have signed a formulary approving of the suppression of their Church (though some of them protested that their signatures had been forged without their consent). Yet another Baptist pastor. unlike Orthodox believers.20 In 1950. Not surprisingly. they were required. continued to function clandestinely. some 430 Greek-Rite Catholic priests (out of a total of 1. no Orthodox bishop protested any of these violations of human rights. too. as well as several hundred nuns. and to mislead the Vatican about Romania’s true intentions towards its Catholic communities. Conditions for Roman Catholics and Greek Catholics alike continued to deteriorate. as it did in April 1988. . suppressed in 1948 (when it commanded the loyalty of some 1. Blasutti “. Monsignor Luigi Vitoria Blasutti. roughly 600 priests and monks. According to secret police dossiers unearthed in 1996. to discredit dissidents and opponents of the Ceaus ¸escu regime. thanks to the loyalty of a half a dozen bishops.21 Both the Orthodox and Catholic Churches were subject to infiltration and surveillance.57 million adherents). rather obviously. some of which were considered to be of historical importance17) in order to clear the ground for the erection of concrete highrise apartment buildings and the construction of new rural factories. declining to follow this advice. a Romanian Catholic of Italian descent. Roman Catholics were made to feel the pinch of discrimination.19 On the other hand.500 church buildings hitherto owned by the Greek-Rite Catholic Church. One of the Orthodox Church’s few victories was to have thwarted a plan on Ceaus ¸escu’s part to pull down the Orthodox basilica in Bucharest. was paid by the Securitate to influence the Vatican’s East European appointments. Rev. were stripped of their sacerdotal licenses. is alleged to have used his access in Rome to spy on Vatican officials for some thirty years. Dugulescu suffered multiple fractures the following month when an unlicensed and unmarked bus collided with his car in Timis ¸oara. when the regime announced its plans to bulldoze half of the nation’s 13. to pay a 17 percent tax on the salaries of all persons employed by the Church. This latter Church. In the most notorious case. was threatened by security police in August 1985 with a car “accident” unless he stopped preaching.18 One of the means whereby the Communist state bound the Orthodox Church’s fortunes with its own was to turn over to Orthodox Church ownership some 2. The Romanian Orthodox Church also maintained a not-so-dignified silence when the regime demolished Bucharest’s historic Holy Synod Church on Palm Sunday in 1987. There could be no doubt of the state’s determination to reward its supporters and to punish its detractors.Church and State in Romania
279
of attempted murder of a police officer. Petre Dugulescu of the Hateg Baptist Church.

Origen.”27 Of the remaining legally recognized faiths in Romania.30 The decline in the number of Lutherans living in Transylvania has been slower. after the years of the holocaust. 14. 1994) toward the Ceaus ¸escu regime. dwindling to 144. until recently. a much smaller community of ethnic-Hungarian Lutherans). The “Social Apostolate” called on Orthodox clerics to become active in the new People’s Republic.25 Fr.28 Of the two aforementioned religious communities.930 adherents in 1930. Party General Secretary Gheorghe GheorghiuDej (d. Of the 250. and Tertullian.26 With recalcitrants removed from office.” which declared that the Church owed its allegiance to the secular government and should be of service to that government. laid the foundation for the Church’s submission to and collaboration with the state. endorsing the Ceaus ¸escu regime’s concept of nation. St.280
Sabrina P. and.000 Lutheran
. Their decline was driven. but ultimately no less dramatic. who served as patriarch from 1948 to 1977. developed what he called the theory of the “Social Apostolate. by endeavoring to ground it in the writings of St.000 in 1999. in this way. the Communist regime allowed the Jewish community to establish religious schools in Romania and gave a green light to Jewish emigration—both concessions extended in appreciation of the collaborative attitude adopted by Chief Rabbi Moses Rosen (d. John Chrysostome. Vasilescu concluded that Christians owed submission to their rulers because it was God’s will. Augustine. justifying its subservience to the state in terms of supposed theological precepts. two—the Jewish community and the Lutheran Church—were shrinking so rapidly that the Communists scarcely concerned themselves about them (though this is not to deny the ferocity of occasional anti-Semitic campaigns such as that of the early 1950s. 30.23 Similar in concept to the Theology of Diakonia propagated by the Lutheran and Reformed Churches in Communist Hungary. the number of Jews remaining in Romania dropped steadily. supporting the regime’s policies. during which Ana Pauker. an Orthodox priest. was stripped of her offices).198 in 1956. Fr. and barely 10. Foreign Minister and Politburo member. above all.000 in 1982.972 remained in 1945. Based on this alleged tradition. by the dynamics of nationalities relations: the Lutherans of Transylvania were principally German Saxons (alongside what was. The anti-Semitic campaigns notwithstanding.24 the “Social Apostolate” inflamed opposition from the political right wing of the Church hierarchy. Ramet
The Orthodox Church literally constructed a new ecclesiology to fit the times.000 in 1995. Having counted some 756. the Romanian Jewish community calculated that only some 355. Maxim the Confessor.29 As a result of postwar emigration. those Orthodox bishops who remained in office adopted a servile attitude. St. tried to ground the “Social Apostolate” in the Christian tradition. Vasilescu. and even applauding Ceaus ¸escu’s “ideas about peace. Justinian Marina. the Jewish recorded the more drastic decline. 1965) saw to it that these elements were purged from leadership positions in the Church.

and Seventh Day Adventists were subjected to
.37 Despite its ample publications. But between 1969 and 1989. Under Communism. Another 40. some of them dying on the field.32 But it was only after the collapse of the Ceaus ¸escu regime in December 1989 that an avalanche of applications to emigrate sent the number of German-speaking Lutherans in Transylvania plummeting to a mere 30.38 The continuities between the pre-Communist and Communist eras have sometimes been underestimated.9 million adherents in 1997). the Catholic Church (2. Lutheran. After the war. In 1981. some of these returned to Romania. as earlier. with Ceaus ¸escu cashing in on Bonn’s willingness to pay a ransom for each German released.Church and State in Romania
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Saxons living in Transylvania at the beginning of World War Two. and foreign visits by Romania’s Mufti were. the number of Saxon Lutherans had actually dropped beneath the modest level recorded for ethnic Hungarian Lutherans (35.35 Other Protestant and evangelical groups showing resilience included the Unitarians (85.36 The only other group currently present in Romania to record more than 50. before the large Christian Churches. the Evangelical Church in Romania. Baptists.205 Lutheran Saxons in Transylvania. The fastest growing religious associations in Communist times were the Baptist and Pentecostal communities (recorded at 325. There were an estimated 38. 1997).000 served in the German army.000 believers in 1995. which enjoyed legal status throughout the Communist era. and Muslim communities pale in size. there were still 148. the population stabilized for the first two and a half decades. The Jewish. which claimed some 56. only 105.000 Muslims living in Romania in 1977. Under Communism.000 adherents in 1990).000). Pentecostals.000).8 million in its Roman and Greek rites combined.000 in 1978.000 were deported to the USSR. in 1990). and the (Hungarian) Reformed Church (900.34 Despite its small contingent.31 but by 1989.000 adherents in 1997. and the Jehovah’s Witnesses (50. the Romanian Orthodox Church enjoyed a privileged position. Romania’s Islamic community played a role in that country’s relations with Islamic states.000 in 1990). some 40. as earlier. About 35. Thereafter. the Plymouth Brethren (65. as a result of emigration.000 and 300. thousands of German-speaking Lutherans emigrated to Germany.000 German-speaking Lutherans remained in the country. numbered only 20. accordingly.000. the Seventh Day Adventists (75.33 Thus. however.000 were evacuated to Austria and Germany in 1944 by retreating German troops. respectively. as a result of a combination of steady emigration and a certain number of conversions to newer Protestant groups. down from 166. Mention should also be made of the small Islamic community.000).000 members is the Islamic community. whose adherents are German-speakers.000 adherents in 1990). accorded notice in the Romanian press. The largest religious associations in Romania are the Romanian Orthodox Church (18.000 believers.

The authorities sent the Bibles straight to the pulp mill. establish themselves as major contenders in the religious arena. the German-speaking Lutherans were accorded special treatment. which imprisoned their adherents. anti-Hungarian prejudice played a role in the formulation of the regime’s religious policy. Iacub Mehmet was ousted
. as earlier. in due course.282
Sabrina P. it comes as no surprise that the collapse of the Communist power monopoly brought in its wake a resurgence of interest in religion and a dramatic proliferation of religious activity. In other words. the large Greek-Rite Catholic Church figured as the only ideological rival of the Orthodox Church. In the first weeks after the execution of the Ceaus ¸escus. They were subsequently re-legalized by the Communists. chaos reigned in the government and establishment circles. the patterns of the pre-Communist “past” were imprinted on the Communist “present. Communism was supposed to be about the future. between early 1990 and the end of 1996. resigned his post on 18 January. but Biblical passages reappeared later on locally manufactured toilet paper. Patriarch Teoctist. albeit for different reasons. in addition to the 14 registered by the Communist regime. The State Secretariat for Religious Affairs registered nearly 400 further religious associations.000 Bibles that had been sent to the Reformed Church by agencies in the West in 1981. And under Communism. and that high measure of religious trust did not even count those expressing trust of other religious organizations. but a few may. Indeed. these religious associations were declared illegal by the Antonescu regime. as a 1995 opinion poll showed. only to resume his duties a few months later. many Baptists were imprisoned on suspicion of being subversives. Where Bucharest held up official registration of the Hungarian Reformed Church for some twenty years (1920–40) in the preCommunist era. its (ever uncertain) claims to legitimacy depended upon the believability of its quasi-utopian programs and promises.39 Under Communism. Similarly. But. as earlier.40 On toilet paper as in religious policy. the Church’s bishops (Gyula Nagy and László Papp) were constrained to acquiesce in the confiscation by Communist authorities of some 10. but in the late 1950s.41 Given this significant reservoir of trust in religion. Ramet
discriminatory treatment and treated as foreign implants.42 Most of these newly registered associations have only small memberships. some 82 percent of Romanians placed their trust in the Orthodox Church. the believability of the regime’s vision of the future depended on the believability of its claim that people could live happily without placing their trust in a Supreme Deity and in a Church. as earlier. In the sphere of religious life. Under Communism. under fire from critics within the Orthodox Church.”
POST-COMMUNIST YEARS
In inspiration.

and the persistence of problems of intolerance. demands by the Catholic Church.8 million Catholics (7 new bishops for the country’s 1. he too had regained his former position. Probity of the Romanian Orthodox Church Less than a month before the collapse of the Ceaus ¸escu regime. These will be treated in seriatim.47 Vatra Româneasca has exerted a particular attraction for Orthodox priests. László T˝ okés. aligned itself with Ion Iliescu. A few weeks later.Church and State in Romania
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from his post as Mufti of the Islamic community about the same time.46 After 1989. Patriarch Teoctist made a final statement lauding Romania’s “greatest son. the Reformed Church. redefining itself in accord with
. the Reformed pastor whose defiance of the authorities had sparked the turmoil which ultimately catapulted Nicolae Ceaus ¸escu from power and who was subsequently raised to the episcopate. in which Orthodox hierarchs had compromised principles for the sake of state approval and support. of being a Securitate agent! Where the Baptists were concerned. found himself accused. that the appropriate ministers had been so informed. however. Pope John Paul II named 12 new bishops for Romania’s 2. began to display a sympathy for ultranationalist ideology. as well as for the satisfaction of other related needs. specifically. the Jewish community.2 million Roman Catholics and 5 new bishops for the country’s 1. in a bizarre twist. however. Teoctist would have to execute an about-face. The Orthodox Church understood intuitively that the best way to overcome its compromised past was to ignore it.6 million Greek-Rite Catholics).45 The government would later charge. Many Orthodox priests. but had been embrangled in too much chaos to be able to register the information. as prescribed by long tradition. demands for the revival of religious education. the Baptist community opened a new church facility the first week of 1990. the authorities had the building bulldozed. five distinct but interconnected issues stand out: the probity of the Romanian Orthodox Church. having accidentally exceeded the size specified in the permit. and other religious associations for the return of properties confiscated from them by Communist authorities. the Orthodox hierarchy.44 In this context of chaos and uncertainty.”43 But by 19 June. in the face of Vatican denials. tensions between the Greek-Rite Catholic Church and the Orthodox Church. that it had not been informed in advance of the appointments. evidence suggests. often subscribing to neo-legionary publications. they found that repressive policies continued for a while by sheer force of inertia: When. Rev.” It was the last reaffirmation of nearly forty-five years of subservience and docility. in what was later described as “a plot mounted by a restricted group of imams.48 Among the sundry issues arising in the religious sphere in post-Communist Romania. maintaining its long-established habit of embracing the party in power.

make its contribution to the rebirth of social and historical man. on the sacred foundations of love. .50 the Romanian Orthodox patriarchate began to engage in symbolic politics. A leading Romanian daily claimed in November 1997 that at least six members of the Holy Synod. to commemorate the 40. An early move in this spirit came in June 1992. .”49 Belatedly declaring its complete independence of state supervision (on 28 September 1990). a young Orthodox theologian. [and] is always late with many of the changes [demanded] in this epoch.”53 Charging that theological studies in Romania had become “corrupted” and urging that the Orthodox Church make peace with the Greek-Rite Catholic Church. Spiridon’s Church in central Bucharest were Prime Minister Theodor Stolojan and sundry cabinet ministers and parliamentarians. dignity. who had ruled Moldavia from 1457 to 1504. in honor of some 150 anti-Communists who were purged and executed in the Communist era. . One of the problems obstructing any such renewal or “resurrection” is the legacy of forty years of collaboration between Orthodox clergy and the security apparatus. . publicly called for dramatic changes in the Church.000 persons attending the festive pageant at St. consecrating a memorial plaque unveiled on Funar’s initiative. among them Metropolitan Antonie Pla ˘ma ˘deala ˘ of Transylvania (in office since 1982). as well as thousands of ordinary priests. local Orthodox priests in Cluj-Napoca identified themselves with Mayor Gheorghe Funar’s brand of nationalism. including the resignation of the patriarch who.284
Sabrina P. only one hierarch—Nicolae Corneanu. Popa.52 More interesting. in some ways. was a commemorative service conducted jointly by Orthodox Archbishop Bartolomeu of Cluj and by Greek-Rite Catholic Archbishop Gheorge Gutiu of Cluj in early September 1997. Dumitru Staniloae to the young people of Romania. gets in the way of dialogue and makes tensions worse in religious matters.51 Later. The patriarchate required minimal resources for this and stood to reap large gains in terms of public approval.000 Romanians who had died during the Hungarian Revolutionary War of 1848–49. . An early hint of this came on 27 January 1990.54 As of October 1997. pushing against reforms and against European integration. and freedom. gets negatively involved in State affairs. when Tineretul Liber published the text of an address delivered by Fr. Metropolitan of the Banat—had admitted past
. however. The paper also charged that Archbishop Bartholomeu Anania.” later served Communist authorities. imprisoned by the Communists at one point as an “enemy of the people. Later that same month. . that the Church should “. pointedly. . according to Popa. Dorin N. . Ramet
the changed political and social context. In this address. Staniloae portrayed his Church as “a martyr Church” adding. Among the 5. when Patriarch Teoctist canonized thirteen new Romanian saints including Prince Stephen the Great. “. Popa outlined a vision of ecclesiastical “resurrection” for the Romanian Orthodox Church. . had collaborated actively with the Securitate. .

58 Even more embarrassing for the Church. could of course be cleared up by an opening of the files on collaborators. Ziua [Day]. had declared himself the leader of the Legionary (Iron Guard) movement in northern Romania and had even tried to transform the Oradea branch of the Association of Romanian Christian Orthodox Students into a branch of the movement. decided to recommend that the clergy be excluded from the list of those public officials whose past collaboration with the Securitate had to be made public. Pentecostals. shortly after Popa’s charges were made public. which revealed that Patriarch Teoctist had been a member of the fascistic Iron Guard in his youth and had taken part in the rebellion against Marshal Ion Antonescu in January 1941. in a manner of speaking. disputing the authenticity of the document. even if one document is a fabrication. was the revelation. on the part of the clergy. This seems to confirm that.63 At the same
. meanwhile. and that meetings of the fascist movement had been held in several Orthodox monasteries in Transylvania. the leading Romanian Orthodox prelates were.59 Although the patriarch denied the allegation. head of the Piatra Craiului monastery. in the daily newspaper Monitorul on 13 January 2001. however. But the Holy Synod of the Romanian Orthodox Church insisted that files on priests who had collaborated with the secret police in the Communist era remain secret. looking over their shoulders lest Baptists. a prominent anti-Ceaus ¸escu dissident.57 Delays in coming to terms with past ecclesiastical collaboration induced Gabriel Andreescu.60 Moreover. was a report in the daily newspaper Evenimentul zilei on 3 November 2001 that fifteen Orthodox priests from Bihor County had joined the revived Iron Guard. the patriarchate shot back by accusing Popa of attacking the Church and insinuating that he was a KGB spy. How the Holy Synod could be certain of this without having inspected the files is another question. the parliamentary commission entrusted with the oversight of the Romanian Intelligence Service.”61 More troubling than these allegations concerning Teoctist’s sympathies and activities more than half a century earlier. as Lavinia Stan and Lucian Turcescu note. the information contained in one archive has been confirmed by documents found in other archives. as well as in the burning of a Jewish synagogue in Ias ¸i. “. Meanwhile. . the information itself may be true. and American evangelicals should recruit from among Orthodox ranks. The Holy Synod admitted that some priests had collaborated but insisted that such collaboration had not extended to the revelation of the content of confessions. however. These charges appeared in the publication. of a document discovered by historian Dorin Dobrincu.56 In July 2001. .62 The newspaper reported that Father Gregorie. however.Church and State in Romania
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collaboration with the Communists. Instead of admitting past wrongdoings. to sue the National College for the Study of Securitate Archives (CNSAS) for refusing to make public its records on clerical collaboration.55 Allegations about collaboration with the Securitate. the charges were repeated in the Catholic daily Libertatea subsequently.

Metropolitan Daniel is on record as favoring the complete separation of Church and state. age thirty-eight at the time of his election as metropolitan of Moldavia and Bukovina in 1990. the patriarchate was concerned lest its particular desiderata be ignored.69 As already mentioned. Restitution of Property All of Romania’s religious associations were affected by the Communist program of nationalization and confiscation of properties. The Church presented itself as a patriotic institution doing battle against the legacy of totalitarianism (the very totalitarianism which it had so profitably served right up to December 1989). unilaterally declared theirs the “National Church. to speak out wherever injustices arise. Emphasizing the Church’s prophetic mission. the Church conducted a service in his honor (attended by the president-elect) in the cathedral of Alba Iulia. schools. the two leading contenders for the presidency—incumbent Ion Iliescu and liberal challenger Emil Constantinscu—competed for the Church’s favor. postponed. the Romanian Orthodox patriarchate demanded (in 1997) the return of some 350 hectares of farm land (a modest request given how much had been confiscated originally). where Ferdinand I had been crowned “King of All Romanians” in 1922. and forgotten. each endeavoring to appear more religious than the other. Reformed. together with sundry forest. is a striking counterexample. in any event.”64 both to remind Romanians as to which Church had been the most closely identified with Romanian national identity. the patriarchate was not shy about letting its preferences be known. however. At the same time. the Communists are said to have confiscated 1.67 It would be both misleading and unfair. he challenged Iliescu: “Do you believe in God?”66 For its part. and tradition. Altogether. while the Greek-Rite Catholic Church may have lost as many as 2. Many of these properties were turned to secular use. fruit-growing. and Unitarian Churches. and other buildings from the Roman Catholic. culture. to allow the impression to take hold that the entire hierarchy consists only of self-seeking opportunists and Iron Guard sympathizers. In this regard.286
Sabrina P. Later. and to offer consolation to those who suffer unjustly.65 Constantinescu made a clear bid for favor among believers when. Ramet
time.68 Even more strikingly. history. and vinicultural lands. but some (particularly Church facilities confiscated from the Greek-Rite Catholic Church in 1948) were handed over to the Orthodox Church. he has called on the Church to criticize both socialism and capitalism.500 churches and other facilities under de-
. and to place its agenda under the spotlight.593 churches. pasture. the Communist authorities had confiscated properties from all the major religious associations. in the course of a televised speech. when Constantinescu won the election. who had. meanwhile. Metropolitan Daniel Ciobotea. the Romanian presidential elections of 1996 provided an ideal opportunity for the Orthodox hierarchy.

And hence. “Rival gangs of seminary students then converged on the altar. But when the senate followed up on the patriarch’s suggestion and proposed a bill requiring the return of churches to Greek Catholics in municipalities with at least two former Greek Catholic churches and an active Greek Catholic presence. Orthodox priests refused to cooperate and declined to vacate any churches. Orthodox priests and seminary students armed themselves with sticks to resist the court-ordered transfer of the Church of the Transfiguration to the Greek Catholic Church.78 Dispute between the Greek-Rite Catholic and Orthodox Churches Although Greek-Rite Catholic spokespersons claim that up to 2. properties confiscated earlier. Patriarch Teoctist appealed to the state to resolve the dispute unilaterally. the government promised to complete work on a long-delayed law on religion.
.”70 The Jewish community has also been seeking the return of properties confiscated in the 1940s.73 In the course of 1997. A table covered in religious icons was overturned.74 Teoctist denounced the measure as “an inadmissible interference in the national Church’s problems. as negotiations between the two Churches repeatedly hit dead ends. In early 2001. Greek Catholic clerics also mobilized and. there was a breakthrough.Church and State in Romania
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cree 348 of 1 December 1948 on Church “merger. not a single property had been returned to any ethnic Hungarian denomination or parish. or compensation for. swearing and shoving opponents. when the Chamber of Deputies accepted the government’s proposal to return all real estate which had been confiscated from the “religious cults” in Romania. in spite of the fact that they were holding onto properties stolen for them by the Communist Party. serious discussion of property restitution to the Churches was avoided and the issue was postponed from year to year.500 churches and other facilities were confiscated by the Communist authorities. as a result of the change in government and in the wake of a fresh call from Pope John Paul II to address the issue. in which property restitution would be specified. to help the Greek-Rite Catholics to recover nearly 2.71 A spokesperson for the ethnic Hungarian community claimed in June 1996 that while the Romanian Orthodox Church was being afforded rapid restitution of.000 church buildings and other confiscated property. But in October 1997. and fighting broke out.76 In Cluj. as the Sunday Telegraph reported. even in communities meeting the conditions specified in the new law. the Orthodox Church prelates and clergy continued to behave as the aggrieved party. A law passed in 1991 returned only some small land plots to parishes and monasteries.”75 Moreover.”77 Distrust also colored Reformed-Orthodox relations. for example.72 During seven years of leftist government under Ion Iliescu. in particular. The deputies also voted to eliminate any restriction to the number of buildings which religious organizations might claim. shouting abuse. 1989–1996. and. however.

and Orthodox Church officials were blocking state action by claiming that any such action would constitute state interference in religious affairs. to demand the use of referenda to resolve the dispute. Finally. the Council of Europe became involved in the dispute. Ramet
the Church has been seeking the return of only half of this number. in mid-March.82 Both government and Orthodox Church officials began a campaign of innuendo against the Catholic Church. the two sides agreed that the pope would come to Bucharest 7–9 May 1999 but not travel elsewhere in the country.288
Sabrina P. calling the latter “unpatriotic and foreign. But as of mid-August 1997. the Greek Catholics had obtained the return of only 97 of the 2. Although the Holy See placed especial emphasis on visiting Catholics in Transylvania.” and characterizing it as “a foreign body. ranging from the establishment of mixed commissions authorized to propose compromises to the holding of referenda at the local level. In spite of this limitation. The Orthodox Church continued. passing a resolution calling on the Romanian government to take it upon itself to resolve the dispute and to assure the return of an appropriate measure of confiscated properties. the patriarchate suggested other remedies. while Patriarch Teoctist became the first non-Catholic to ride in the famed “Popemobile” next to the pontiff.81 Catholics began to complain of an “anti-Catholic spirit” in Romania.79 The Orthodox patriarchate was loath. citing “the wishes of the people”—a formulation provoking the Greek-Rite Catholic Church to protest strongly. through 1997.84 The lack of resolution on the property dispute between Catholics and Orthodox continued to impact the state’s relations with the Holy See by forcing repeated delays in scheduling a papal visit to Romania.500 church buildings which had been confiscated in the late 1940s. Pomp and circumstance lent the visit simultaneous state and ecclesiastical significance. and instead of simply returning facilities that had been taken from the Catholics. But a decree-law issued in the wake of this meeting tentatively endorsed the referendum concept. forced on the Romanian people against their will.”83 In April 1997. to surrender properties.80 Greek-Catholic representatives decisively rejected the latter proposal during talks with President Iliescu and Orthodox Church representatives on 24 April 1990. in fact. thus violating the separation of Church and state. the visit was seen by all sides as contributing to an easing of interconfessional tensions in the country.85
.000–2. insisting that the pope’s visit be limited to Bucharest. Because of the bad blood associated with this dispute. the Orthodox hierarchy was adamantly opposed. while parliamentary deputy Petre Turlea added fuel to the fire by accusing the Catholic Church of conducting an “offensive” against the Orthodox Church. it was only in early July 1998 that the Orthodox Church finally gave its approval to the state’s standing invitation to John Paul II to visit Romania.

90 though how the Church can integrate itself into a democratic system if it considers those with other views “satanic” remains to be seen. The Church has not been above citing supposed popular preferences in its campaign to keep same-sex relations criminalized and to suppress psychiatric and medical treatments for transsexuals. but has been markedly less impressed by documented popular preferences when abortion has been the topic of discussion. and they were visibly upset when large numbers of high school students opted to skip the weekly classes.92 Over the objections of the Orthodox hierarchy.87 Problems of Intolerance Despite the Ecumenical Association’s aforementioned commitment to promote ethnic reconciliation. The Orthodox Church’s success in aborting a planned international convention of Jehovah’s Witnesses in July 1996 only confirms that Church’s inability to see intolerance in its self-righteous arrogation to itself of a supposed right to veto meetings by “heretical sects.88 while both Orthodox and evangelicals have contributed to religious intolerance between rival Christian confessions. Archbishop Anania declared. albeit on an optional basis. an international conference on homosexuality opened in Bucharest in mid-October 1997.Church and State in Romania
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Religious Education Religious instruction was restored to the curriculum at state schools in autumn 1990.”91 The desecration of certain Jewish graves in the course of summer 1995 also served as a reminder of the endurance of anti-Semitic sentiments in this largely Orthodox country. trans-sexualism. The Orthodox Church has also waged a relentless war against sexual tolerance since 1989. Church conservatives were disappointed that the state was not prepared to make religion classes mandatory in the elementary and secondary schools. moreover. where locals want to see history classes taught from the perspective of Transylvania and its history as a Hungarian outpost. In frustration. But controversy quickly arose because the new education law did not mention that confessional schools might serve as an alternative to state-run schools. and abortion alike. inextricably connected with that of property restitution because many confiscated facilities had been Church-run schools. excoriating same-sex relationships. the Orthodox Church has played its role in fanning the flames of ethnic intolerance.89 It scarcely helps matters that the Orthodox Church has long considered all other religions to be the tools of Satan. Rejecting the attitude prevalent throughout the member-states in the Council of Europe. the Orthodox Church renewed pressure on conservative MPs to make religion classes mandatory. on
. The issue has been especially sensitive in Hungarian minority regions. The issue of confessional schools is.86 Further.

in June 2000. Anania complained in public that “Europe asks us to accept sex. which had heretofore prescribed prison terms of up to five years for any homosexual relationships. in which the na-
. the Communist Party of Romania put history on hold. backed by the rightwing extremist Party of Romanian National Unity and the chauvinistic Association of Christian Orthodox Students. as a price for membership in the Council of Europe. and even the telling of history could only be undertaken according to a fixed teleological line.98 The Senate ignored the pressure from the Church and repealed Article 200. In November 2001. in which same-sex relations were nonetheless characterized as “perverted” and “unnatural.”97 As the bill was forwarded to the Romanian Senate for approval. The debate about the partial legalization of same-sex relationships dragged on for years. Ramet
PRO-TV (a privately owned channel). the Romanian government reluctantly amended Article 200 of its criminal code. which waged a campaign of intimidation against MPs favorably disposed toward the bill. homosexuality. like other Orthodox prelates. The Orthodox Church fought this bill tooth and nail. including cloning. Old arguments between Catholics and Orthodox were stifled. the Chamber of Deputies approved the “liberal” amendment. which had criminalized homosexuality. abortions.”93 Meanwhile. proselytism was disallowed. but. Lumping together various things he disliked. “To believe that society should become normal by adopting abnormal things is dangerous to our society. in placing sex in first place as the most pernicious danger to Romanian society.
CONCLUSION
For nearly half a century. saw the prospect of liberalization for gays and lesbians not as an occasion for the practice of the supposedly Christian virtues of charity and kindness. Finally. Anania exposed the extent of his phobias. the Holy Synod of the Romanian Orthodox Church appealed to that body to reject the measure. Orthodox preferences for barring Protestant and evangelical Churches altogether were censored. as a battlefront for moral purity. while banning “propaganda or association or any other act of proselytism” designed to promote homosexuality among Romanians94—phraseology that sounds paranoid to most Westerners. The revised law would declare same-sex relationships punishable only if “homosexual activities” were performed in public or created a scandal. instead. in 1996.”96 Quite apart from his ignorant notion that Romania was required to endorse cloning and dangerous drugs as a condition for admission to the Council of Europe. vices. and genetic engineering.290
Sabrina P. Romania’s first gay nightclub opened in Bucharest. drugs. still less for ideological modesty and tolerance.95 Archbishop Anania.

Politics and Religion in the Modern World (London and New York: Routledge. Alexander F. 25. Catholic-Orthodox relations continue to be characterized by “mutual distrust and hostility. p. also Frankfurter Allgemeine (7 October 1997). where the class struggle is said to have been “resolved. no. Ibid. esp. vol. 3. the Romanian Communists failed to resolve anything. ed. In fact. 7. C. p. on RFE/RL telex. p. I am grateful to Trond Gilberg. This view is known. 1991). This chapter was previously published in Norwegian translation. pp. 17. Michael Shafir. creating the possibility for tangible changes in the confessional structure of Romanian society over the long run.
.99 But in its own rough way. This discussion builds on an approach I developed in Sabrina Ramet. to Michael Shafir and Patricia J. 8. is effectively banished. 78–90. Elemér Illyés. Smith for sharing research materials. 35. and to Cristina Baltaret ¸u for translating the French and Romanian materials cited in this article. 4 (January 1992).” in East European Quarterly.” and anti-Semitism persists as a problem in Romanian society. as an active process. Deutsche Presse Agentur (Hamburg. 6. 2. A7. According to Marxist teleology (in its twisted Romanian incarnation as elsewhere). Sugar for comments on earlier drafts of this article. established Churches. Hence. 5. 6 October 1997)..” Nordisk Østforum. as moral consequentialism. the end of Communism has signified an intensification of interconfessional competition and has opened the doors for new entrants. and Peter F. 3 (2003) and is reprinted here by permission of the author and of the editor of Nordisk Østforum. And in this regard. “Prophecy and Propaganda in the Romanian Orthodox Patriarchate.” history. “Kirke og stat i Romania før og etter 1989. 519. the Communist Party actually “protected” the fourteen religious associations to which it accorded legal registration. National Minorities in Romania: Change in Transylvania (Boulder. p. and is at odds with the moral universalism customarily preached by traditional Christian Churches. 4. including the Orthodox Church. 6. history can only be the history of the class struggle—which is to say. no. 1982). CO: East European Monographs. vol.” in George Moyser. under the title. Quoted in Washington Times (3 January 1990). among students of ethics. the “battle between Orthodoxy and evangelicals” continues. “Politics and Religion in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union.
NOTES
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tional and the progressive were identified with each other and construed as obtaining their fullest embodiment in the Romanian Communist Party and the personal dictatorship of Nicolae Ceaus ¸escu. by withholding legal status from other religious associations which might otherwise have eroded the demographic strength of the larger. succeeding only in muffling and stifling the open discussion of problems. Webster.

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. more than thirty years ago. It represented a female kangaroo looking leniently and puzzled at the male kangaroo speaking to the public from her own marsupium: “Women are weak creatures who need protection.15
Post-Totalitarian Pre-Feminism*
Mihaela Miroiu and Liliana Popescu
When one of us. The “socialist female kangaroo” contemporary with Betty Friedan’s famous book was involved neither in a war against the beauty myth nor against Re-
*The following chapter was largely completed in 1999 and mostly analyzes the situation then. careers. They are a suitable description of the situation of women in a dynamic and open society.”2 and who started to explicitly refuse. the first thing that came to her mind was the image of a caricature drawing.”1 These are the words of Patricia Mann in her book on agency in a post-feminist era. marriages and geographical venues with the same resignation and optimism as we switch channels.”
WHO KEEPS THE REMOTE CONTROL?
“We may be expected to change jobs. They belong to a world which. made her debut in writing on feminist subjects. fighting energetically against conservatism and opening ways to freedom. transformed Betty Friedan’s The Feminine Mystique into the consciousness of a generation of American women who used to be “daddy’s dolls. Mature liberal democracies allow people to keep the remote controls of their lives in their own hands. to be dolls. The women to whom Patricia Mann referred asserted themselves in a society in which people can afford to change life projects more or less like switching TV channels. more and more. Miroiu.

We are going to talk later about this process of empowering citizens.3 Two important questions can be raised in this context: to what extent the citizens themselves are claiming their autonomy. In this context. However. as a result of this “earthquake. Socialist feminism lost its prestige because it was connected with the emancipation dictated from above by the Communist authorities.” as its ideology was concerned with the “essence. we must acknowledge that we have not as yet reached the stage of having a meaningful feminist movement in Romania. as a result of a return to an obsolete form of patriarchy. The distinction between private-local and state channels has become sharper and sharper. The economic uncertainty generated by the totalitarian state. to what extent are they waiting for the state to distribute the remote controls. The governments have begun to legitimize themselves by their contributions to the process of genuine citizenship recovery. as has already been achieved in countries with a long democratic tradition. represent the background of citizens’ weakness in retrieving their autonomy. we would need to exhaust several stages of the process of feminist development. but rather about “grave problems of the entire humanity. particularly in Romania. agents. Romanian women citizens are twice deprived: first. we are far from having achieved the internalization (or awareness. are not “remote control” keepers and cannot step into the post-feminist era as yet.” She was not fighting for economic emancipation.” and second.” In totalitarian regimes. and to what extent they actually get genuine autonomy. there is currently no substantial liberal movement in the framework of which feminism could develop. is being replaced by other. at least) of the notion of gender equality as citizens—a stage already reached by women in the West as a result of second-wave feminism. She was not even contemplating the bust of the male kangaroo delivering speeches about women’s helplessness because these speeches were not about such “trivial” matters. or at least they have started to acquire the will to do so. the state is keeping the remote controls of its citizens. but have no idea how to use? The citizens of the former socialist countries have started to slowly retrieve their remote controls. Ecofeminism is an exception. often unidentifiable. Moreover.” The Communist regime could not afford to pay attention to “details.298
Mihaela Miroiu and Liliana Popescu
publican “family values. In order to live in a post-feminist era. the remote controls have begun to be distributed by decentralization. and its development would require a significant change of
. The majority of women in Eastern Europe. as former remote control keeper. Social-democratic feminism is insular. and to what extent are the remote controls simple boxes they possess. While there was a budding feminist movement in Romania. and the “earthquake” of the disintegration of the planned economy. In the Eastern Europe societies in transition. the state. and some intellectual figures who were concerned with promoting women’s rights in the aftermath of the First World War. because she had the obligation to work. when approaching the issue of “civic minimalism” in transition societies. In other words. Without overestimating the notion of evolution in stages.

the right to an abortion (between 1945–1965. While citizens had to accept them. occasionally by women themselves. as conservative regarding issues of gender.4 The right to an abortion. their political participation is derided. The strength and the persistence of this feature is derived from a double inheritance: the totalitarian one. and the attitudes associated with this way of thinking are coming out now. does not have the appropriate social preconditions to establish itself. one which would allow citizens to become oriented toward nonhuman beings (and at present there are such grave human problems that other species are almost forgotten). which survived through a hidden underground ideology consistent with our culture and especially with the Christian religion (the religion of the huge majority of Romanians). regained in 1990. While under the Communist regime nobody was grumbling when a woman was appointed to a political position. In fact. and pretend that they truly believed in their importance during the previous regime. and in the few public television programs which dealt collaterally with this issue. peppered with comments like. the situation has. the right to work in public (women represented over 47 percent of the total workforce during the Communist regime.” The explanatory factors for this new situation are to be found in the pre-totalitarian patriarchal inheritance. seems to be more the right of men to have sex without unpleasant obstructions rather than freedom of choice for women (the extremely high rate of abortions after 1989 is meaningful in this sense). The regulation regarding parental leave passed almost unnoticed by the press and public opinion. and the patriarchal
. Radical feminism. and from 1990 on). Now. only conservative evaluations of the new regulation were aired. today.
BACK TO BASICS
An important feature of present Romanian society is the fact that important goals of the feminist movement have been satisfied without any direct participation of an indigenous feminist movement: the right to vote. the right to parental leave (1997).Post-Totalitarian Pre-Feminism
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perspective.
FATHERLESS PATRIARCHY
Romanian society could be described. it is only now that the formal character of the rights given to women during the Communist regime (the right and obligation to work. Its development would require a structural reevaluation of Romanian culture and traditions. “This law is ridiculous” or “It is natural for women to take this leave. and almost 44 percent nowadays). equal salaries for women. without exaggeration. changed radically. and anti-discrimination and domestic violence laws (introduced between 2002–2003). and political representation) has been revealed. their value was not really acknowledged and internalized. for its part.

We may deduce from these figures the inherent bias of citizens toward accepting the paternalist protection of authoritarian institutions. which was revived after 1989. for the latter. or even assertive behavior. 89 percent and the Army. was renamed Barbu Catargiu—the name of an important conservative politician). there are few or no examples of significant protest activities. The few women figures about whom we were taught in school during the Communist era seem to disappear. It is a continuation of the fatherless patriarchy of the Communist regime. This fatherless patriarchy was accompanied by the underground perpetuation of sexist mentalities. The model of the demanding woman who asserts her wants is rather alien in our cultural space. or at least are overshadowed by historical male figures disliked by the Communists (it is significant. One of the differences between the “socialist female kangaroo” and the “transition female kangaroo” is that. Research on the confidence of the population in public institutions indicate high percentages for the authoritarian ones (the Church. In fact. The patriarchy of the Communist period was not derived from the notion of the man as the “breadwinner” and “head of the family”—which was. and to the patriarchal model that pervades the civil society on the other. obligations. and still is. on the part of Romanian women. and their bias towards accepting clear-cut hierarchies. Romanian history says nothing about the struggle for emancipation among Romanian women. a purely ideological notion without correspondence in the economic reality of the society. orders. Women in Romania accept a double paternalism. In our histories and in our literature in general. when the income differences between women and men were quasi absent and everybody. and constraints rather than asserting their rights and liberties. was compelled to work by law. The transition society has cancelled the genderless ideology of “the new Communist man” and replaced it with different values found in the pre-Communist past. Instead. that an important road crossing the city of Bucharest bearing the name of an important female political figure in modern Romania. Romanian literature and his-
. The combination of pre-Communist nostalgia.6 Women tend to subordinate themselves to this authoritarian model on the one hand. for instance.” The present Romanian patriarchy is very different from other kinds of patriarchy (such as the American Republican patriarchy.300
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pre-totalitarian one. Romanian women do not have much choice in selecting models. As it is taught in school. the microphones of the marsupium were reconnected and the speech about women’s weakness can be heard again. Such a model. Ana Ipatescu. the post-Communist reality. regardless of gender. fueled by religion and social customs left over from pre-totalitarian times. is associated more or less with prostitutes and is therefore devalued. 81 percent)5 and low percentages for democratic ones (the Parliament features rates consistently around 21 percent). if present at all. and the “new woman” model of the consumer society created good conditions for the perpetuation of the “fatherless patriarchy. for example).

education. by the micro-politics of survival practiced by most women in Eastern Europe. These people are peasants. This is the syndrome of a recovery of the rural patriarchy based on premodern agricultural means and on premodern marginalization. and as a survival society. These micro-politics have been very well described by Slavenka Drakulic ´ in How We Survived Communism and Even Laughed.4 percent of whom are women. In such households most people are what statistics specialists call “unpaid family workers.Post-Totalitarian Pre-Feminism
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tory focus on the standard myth of the self-sacrificing woman. We could speak of women’s protection only in a
. instead of offering. they are left with no time for themselves. After performing their work in the private sphere.10 Their performance is “rewarded” in that they are able to retire.7 Whereas the West is “flooded” with an increasing number of requests issued by women. five years earlier than men.e. the women). we think that the expression which best captures their situation is the German expression which graced the entrance to the Nazi concentration camp at Auschwitz: Arbeit macht frei. in large part. The development of this myth has been facilitated. Another significant syndrome of the survival society is the low amount that services occupy in the total budget of the family: about 15. Domestic services are almost absent. the problem of human rights is just a city business about which they hear on television. they are inevitably performed by the universal “unpaid family workers” (i. For these women. and where they do exist. The formula that “women perform domestic services and sex in exchange for maintenance and protection” has been functionally obsolete for more than fifty years in Romania.9 Without being able to produce anything more than the reproduction of their own survival. in this country there is a “drought” in this sense. they would feel immoral if they did claim anything. OR WHO PROTECTS WHOM?
Romanian post-Communist society has been described in an important book8 as a society that perpetuates underdevelopment. This population is perpetuating a subsistence economy in their households.” 78. a form of behavior that they have developed in response to the chronic scarcity of resources which characterizes their condition. where they produce everything from flowers to cattle. on average. Women seem not to want anything for themselves. Without trying to be cynical. which is generally performed with unsophisticated tools. they do not support strategies of development and modernization.. not farmers. In fact. and health. Over 45 percent of the population is living and/or working in rural areas. but strategies of survival. Women are in charge of the domestic services. the management of family resources (generally scarce).
SURVIVAL SOCIETY. and it is mainly allocated for transport.5 percent. and the physically exhausting labor of the household.

where laws are silent. Women are generally the first to be fired. This is another area in which Romanian laws are silent. it is practically impossible to charge a man with “date-rape” because the woman is generally considered responsible for the outcome of such an encounter.11 Women seldom make public complaints against such acts. as in most countries. All measures of social protection taken by the government (installed after the November 1996 elections) have not improved the position of women at all. the number of single-parent families (generally where the mother has been abandoned and left with one or more children) has increased by 1. In Romania. women contribute substantially in perpetuating the lack of modernity in the Romanian society. and the police do not take them seriously unless the case is very grave. The economic protection of women is also lip service. Their tacit. by policemen and even some women. Nevertheless. date rape. and having uneducated mates in domestic matters. In fact. given the way they live their lives and their toleration of the fatherless patriarchy. and the chances of finding new employment are particularly low for young women (except for secretarial and striptease jobs). Feeling insecure. economically and socially. and the areas in which women employees are dominant offer salaries lower than the average in the national economy. Their income is on average 10. However. but significant. It is just that these qualities are used as strategies of survival and not of development and self-assertion. freedom is absolute. when anti-discrimination and domestic violence legislation was enacted. Romanian women have proven themselves to be very resistant and skillful. Cases of “light” battery are regarded as tolerable behavior. even normal. Despite (or perhaps because of) their hardships. poverty significantly affects women more than men. There were no laws providing protection from domestic violence. street abuse.12 The policemen (the overwhelming majority of whom are men) do not intervene in what they consider to be “intimate conflicts of the couple. protest is their refusal of maternity and the concomitant incredible increase of abortions over the last decade.14 There is little protection when it comes to unemployment either. and have only mildly improved the situation of their children. a number of public campaigns and manifestations against domestic violence occurred in the country in the last few years. or marital rape until 2002–2003.15 When they get hired.” and they generally sympathize with the men when the latter are accused.9 percent lower than men’s. young women
.13 Moreover.302
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cheap demagogical way. sexual harassment at the workplace. we are justified in saying that. About 23 percent of young women are unemployed. and as Hobbes suggests.5 percent since 1989. young women are extremely vulnerable to sexual harassment. which made citizens more aware of the phenomenon—starting with the demonstration triggered by the publication of an article by Playboy Romania titled “How to Beat Your Wife without Leaving Marks” (April 2000). similarly to the content of the male kangaroo’s speech from the marsupium.

children.18 There are just two women rectors (as of 2002) or government country representatives (prefecti in Romanian)—not even after the 2000 elections. the birth rate has decreased by 38 percent since 1989. Only 3.1 percent of local councillors. having to worrying that their employers would fire them if they got pregnant. women constituted 34 percent of the Communist rubber-stamp parliament.e. 6. after the Revolution.16
WOMEN’S CIVIC MINIMALISM
The road to universal suffrage in Romania was a long and difficult one. now there are five women ministers.5 percent of county councillors were women during the 1996–2000 period. Their problems are always listed in party programs in connection with the issues of seniors. Even counting only the institutions numerically dominated by women. under conditions of reduced paternal responsibility. the government excluded women almost entirely. after prolonged talks about extending it to women (an idea which was rejected). From 1993 to 1996.17 In 1939.. if at all. Their present difficulties in adjusting to full citizenship were also due to Romania’s pre-totalitarian history. Only 2. women were finally enfranchised. “Universal” suffrage (i. They no longer want to raise children in poverty. However. the situation worsened considerably. Whereas during the 1996–2000 legislature one woman was appointed as minister. and 11 percent of the government. by which time voting had become a purely symbolic act under the Communists. and people with handicaps—thus implicitly stressing their powerlessness. and knowing that their problems figure last. where public life was almost exclusively a masculine one.4 percent of the Parliament consisted of women. Various parties also treat women’s issues rather formally. Whereas before the 1989 Revolution. only 5. Of the present Parliament (formed after the 1996 elections). After the 2000 elections the figure increased to above 9 percent. The public perception is that women are weak. the balance between women and men leaders is 36 to 100.Post-Totalitarian Pre-Feminism
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in Romania are increasingly reluctant to have children.7 percent of mayors. Women’s present civic minimalism is partly explainable by this late enfranchisement. For the most fertile women (aged 20–24). universal male suffrage) was not instituted until 1923.5 percent are women. on the agenda of parliament. when political participation became meaningful. and 5. that they need to be protected (by
. the first semi-meaningful vote for Romanian women did not take place until the May 1990 elections. and there was only one woman minister in the government.19 There is a lack of coherence and coordination among the activities of the fifty women’s NGOs in advancing and protecting women’s interests. The rejection of women in politics at the local level is mirrored by their absence in politics at the national level.

of women too. . and realize not only that post-feminism is a remote stage from our present state of cultural development.). it does not even exist . Various “masters” who have preferential access to the marsupium media microphones might be tempted to say: “Slow down with your feminism ‘cause it’s obsolete and you’re ridiculous!” Very few in Romania would disagree with this opinion. they are the poorest citizens (which contributes to their social marginalization). they lack the authority derived from being taxpayers (the civil servants keep on disregarding their demands). and the social democrats are talking in general terms about “a deeper involvement of women in public life. The civic minimalism21 of women citizens can be defined by several features: they are confined to the role of a voter who merely legitimates the rule of the governments (eventually blamed for their leftist choice in many cases). In many people’s minds. astonishingly. Moreover. not to mention the staggering phallocracy of the political world in present Romania in which women are virtually excluded from the parliament. it is only now that the problem becomes visible. government and from the
. and they have the image of a “parthenogenetic mother” (society attributes to them excessive responsibility in rearing children.” The few exceptions20 cannot alter the image of women as second-class citizens.” The message of most political programs is that women need social protection. not only of men but. Their civic minimalism generates a vicious circle of a lack of public participation. they have the complex of hierarchical inferiority. and strengthens a feature noticed by sociologists: women are more conservative than men. no affirmative action. and not even tax reductions for domestic appliances. they are physically insecure (unprotected from domestic violence. Sorin Alexandrescu writes:
Behind the present general democratic emancipation the fact lies hidden that the emancipation of specific categories did not even start. marital rape. The liberal parties adopt genderblind strategies.
VADE RETRO SATANA!22
Cherishing the fact that the West is prepared to step into a post-feminist era (even though this is a very controversial issue among feminists) we need to estimate our own position. For instance.304
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males). subject to sexual harassment at their workplace). etc. with the result that women tend to dedicate excessive time to this kind of activity and are left with virtually no time for self-development and public life). they lack confidence in the laws and in the way they are implemented (especially due to the lack of laws dealing with domestic violence. but not more than that: they need no developmental support. . and that they are “eternally handicapped creatures.” while the nationalists and Christian-democrats cannot get over the nostalgia for the traditional family that “frees women from being constrained to work. but that it is even dangerous to talk about it.

No important woman public figure during the post-totalitarian period has escaped from being “exorcised” through press articles. their displacement (from private to public) is regarded as a sign of the decay of good old traditional morals. their number appears to be small when compared with male leaders. Certainly. how many of the evils of Communism have been attributed to women anyway? The logic goes as follows: “What were women doing in politics? Their place wasn’t there anyway! It’s precisely because they got involved that things went wrong. and is thus less influential in foreign policy making in Romania. Zoe Petre is accused of having subordinated her own son (who is also a part of the president’s entourage).”26 She is compared with a “devilish” female character—the
. culture). Ana Blandiana (poet and president of the Civic Alliance—part of the governmental coalition). Aneta Spornic. who thus becomes “a man who accepts being hired by his mom [and who. education and Suzana Gadea.”25 Ana Blandiana. and face the reactionary politics of Romanian men. Satana! Three such figures are constantly present in the media: Zoe Petre (renowned historian and counsellor to Romania’s president). who is an influential person because of the Civic Alliance’s participation in the governmental coalition. whose generic essence can be captured in the expression Vade retro. The result of this logic is that any woman who is promoted must have been Communist.24 It is a truly fearful event when women get out from their shaded corner. is accused of transforming the male president (of Romania) into a “cardboard doll. and a few women ministers during the Ceaus ¸ escu regime (for example. we find several powerful women leaders: Ana Pauker (minister of foreign affairs and vice-prime minister in the first Communist government).” The most famous example is that of Elena Ceaus ¸ escu.23
In the history of Romanian Communism. painfully necessary. and Alina Mungiu (social psychologist and director of the news department of the public television station). these mistakes are attributed in the most sexist ways to the fact that they are women. Given the simple fact that the promotion of women broke the tradition of their public invisibility. Yet.” and of performing “the unfortunate role played in the history of Romania in the past of running the country without having any open responsibility and hiding herself behind male politicians. enter the public sphere. Apart from being hunted for their mistakes. Elena Ceaus ¸ escu (number two in the party and state hierarchy before 1989).Post-Totalitarian Pre-Feminism
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“democratic” parties’ leadership. For whom are they democratic? This is the reason why a very theoretical discussion about the traps of feminism seems to me disrespectful at a moment when feminism is stringently. While the post-Communist world is populated with “devils” or “monsters”— with the typical “monster” being Communism—feminism has been regarded by many as a smaller “monster. therefore] cannot be a real man.” and women are regarded as bad spirits who should be exorcised from the government.

Carol II. they tend to react against misogynists and only in situations in which famous women are attacked. is accused of being too “man-like” and of having a castrating influence on the men with whom she deals. the bitter lesson of humiliation. Around these women. Alina Mungiu. especially those who have a nostalgia for the interwar period tradition. Such a society is excessively hierarchical. but not when women as a group are concerned. being kept behind closed doors to prepare local reports and coffees for the newly elected representatives. Zoe Petre. Those at the bottom of the scale acquire feminine roles: they are the servants. Women who are authoritative in the media do not react against the sexism. They are compelled to play the bureaucrats’
. People who live in such a world learn. fear. publicly declared that she was a feminist. transforming them into “awkward husbands.” What is worrisome is that the journalists who write about them are the most known and influential in our media. a strong-willed person. and an underlying lack of autonomy and assertiveness.29 The excessive “feminization” is a feature of the “survival society. In private conversations. CONSERVATIVE MENTALITIES
Kathy Ferguson explained in a very convincing way that women are not powerless because they are feminine. using as an argument the idea of this excessive feminization of society. and constant dependence on others.
SUBORDINATED ROLES.306
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lover of the former King of Romania. but rather they are feminine because they are powerless.”27 She is compared not with king-lovers but with the “devilish” figures of the Communist regime. the sensitive type who acts perversely subtle behind the appearance of sensitivity. obedience. perhaps insignificant. regardless of their genders. being a mother). Even the famous women who are subject to “exorcist” practices by the media declare themselves to antifeminists (Ana Blandiana and Nadia Constantinescu—the wife of Romania’s president). and the virile type who acts dictatorial and castrating as a result of her “maleness.28 In confirmation of this idea. many Romanian researchers note that the post-totalitarian society of Romania is excessively feminine.” The Communist regime succeeded in educating people into negative “feminine” features: obedience.” She is “a man from head to toe with a little. Only one of them. exception. Some of these people are fighting against feminism (they are antifeminists without knowing what feminism is). Many women who are members of political parties adopt gender-bound standpoints. three myths about women in public life have been created: the maternal one (the mother who acts irrationally. these women complain that they are exploited in electoral campaigns and then not included on party electoral lists. the auxiliary rank.

Feminism is dangerous everywhere because the feminists suffer from a “blind revisionist anger. The Romanian “democrats” are undermining the process of social modernization and of democratic consolidation by obstructing gender-aware strategies. vengeful. and subordinate roles. to castrate men intellectually. statistically speaking. Whereas the traditional rhetoric is pretty much the same in most cultural spaces. to generate a new kind of eugeny. The reverential type of discourse is displayed by both women and men. the antifeminist one is rather original. It is dangerous because it is socialist and we have already unsuccessfully experimented with socialist ideas. traditionalist (including here the classical rhetoric about “women’s nature” and her “floral sensitivity”). and (2) feminism is dangerous.30 This “feminization” engenders the fear of radical change. We live in a society with serious moral problems. given that they have more concrete responsibilities in this sense. or simply antifeminist. low self-esteem. They suffer from a “traditionalist syndrome essentially hostile to change. to understand their “masters’” wishes. who explain it by the “fear for tomorrow’s survival.”31 The gender dimension of Romanian conservatism is acknowledged by the women members of various nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). They have a weak self-confidence.” which is stronger in women than in men. is precisely the lack of feminist policies—that is.
“FEMINISM MUST BE ABORTED FROM THE BEGINNING”
The dominant discourses on gender topics are either reverential. because it is unfriendly. we cannot risk experimenting with it now at a time when we are trying to implement these classic rights. the lack of feminism as ideology and politics. They are out to destroy rationality. Various books about the transition note that women are. and thus perpetuating the civic minimalism and survival strategies. an understandable fear when the daily fight for survival leaves little or no room for a selfconstructed sense in life. and negative.” They are extremists.” and of women’s conservatism. endangering the great monuments of culture from Plato to Kant. Feminism attacks the classic bases of human rights. undermining the moral order. more conservative than men. and to establish the absolute barbarism of an irrational. hysterical kind. and not to be self-assertive. What the Romanian anti-feminists seem to ignore is that the fundamental cause of “feminization.
.Post-Totalitarian Pre-Feminism
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game.32 2. Feminism is particularly dangerous for our society. particularly in our society. We will discuss two features of this kind of discourse: (1) feminism is dangerous everywhere. So. and must be aborted before its birth: 1. and feminism attacks the traditional virtues.

according to some well-established reflexes. unless women freely choose consumerism as a model.” that is. It is true. Only one program seems
.”
Despite the economic difficulties and despite the two categories of inheritance (the pre-totalitarian patriarchal and the “Communist” one) Romania has started to build up democratic institutions.35 Such commodities do not advance women’s emancipation. and the difficulties in reviving community and a genuine public life. accepting the uncertainty of an urban job. given the fact that going out for the evening is an exception for most Romanians.”34 The politics which focused on “grand problems. This civic “renaissance” is essentially linked with the reevaluation of the ordinary citizens’ experiences as “political centers of our lives. In a society such as ours.” and in which any new ideology had been used to generate cognitive dissonance. Women’s escape from the “totalitarian yard” follows different routes: going back to rural domesticity. all kind of products with high health risks. however. It is a major step forward in a society in which human rights seemed to be. individuals are slowly retrieving their autonomy. reached its peak in Communism. a multiparty system. and imitating Western models of womanhood.”33 It is proof of social normality. which focused on abstract and meaningless problems for the ordinary citizens. to the lack of phallocracy). . we note an important aspect. where the imitation of various stupid solutions is the rule. that in this process. Some Western companies tend to take advantage of the lack of modernity in this region to bring in products that are in increasingly less demand in their original market: new cigarette brands. . Apart from advertisements in which women are presented with many kinds of detergents (seemingly obsessed with bright. “imported goods. and new models of femininity—consumption femininity.308
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The fact that “in the Romanian society. women’s problems tend to fall outside this newly personalized sphere of politics. for a long time. television offers few programs for women. feminism is (almost) absent and has not been copied as yet” is attributable to the feminization of society (a relic of totalitarian times) and to the acute lack of manly virtues in politics (that is to say. Despite the persistent and obvious obstacles. and a pluralist civil society.
“EPPUR SII MUOVE . clean family clothes) and aside from images of long-legged women at top-model competitions. The rediscovery of personal interests and people’s daily experiences is a process parallel with the rediscovery of democratic politics as such. the fact that we do not have feminist and ecological movements is taken as a sign that “our decay is not that dramatic. Television is extremely influential in this country—even more than elsewhere. Regarding the latter route.

creating and perpetuating prejudices. presenting new fashions. without having a special policy in this sense. at the end of the twentieth century). The daily newspapers are the most sexist part of the media. They tend to present serious cases as trash (the best-selling daily Evenimentul Zilei used to “cheer up” its readers. hairstyles.5 percent of the total. the program directors changed the substance of their program. simply called “22. prostitution. etc. an opinion poll conducted to test women’s preferences indicated that they were more interested in things other than waving their hair and being nice. some time ago. It contained postmodern approaches. This program had been initially conceived as a program “of ladies’ liking”—that is.Post-Totalitarian Pre-Feminism
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to be sensitive to the real problems of women today. nevertheless. Accordingly. They ridicule the incipient women’s movement and lump together feminism. sometimes. The journal Contrapunct (Counterpoint) has allocated several columns to cultural feminism and to reviews of feminist books. all mixed in a hybrid which illustrates the present state of people’s awareness of this problem (the cultural avantgarde included here). it disseminates the voices of the “Romanian cultural patriarchs. The journal most open to feminist theories and gender analysis is Observatorul Cultural. and an analysis of the content reveals that news about women comprises only 1. and hence it serves the cause of women’s emancipation. domestic violence. It contained arguments in favor of the necessity of feminism in Romania as well as alarmist rhetoric about the damage to society’s health resulting from feminism. There are also women’s magazines. An entire issue was dedicated to Women and Feminism. Some of them promote the “Western model” in an attempt to colonize the native mind—an attempt that precludes the emergence
. and cake recipes.” publishes such issues from time to time. with sinister front page hot rapes. presenting them in a kind of funny way). on the other hand.37 Another culturally prestigious journal. They were interested in more practical considerations such as the double workday. as well as discourses of a pre-Wollstonecraft mold (written. homosexuality. even in a conservativetraditionalist fashion. and ecology. it represents a sort of avantgarde of the modernization efforts.36 The highly cultured journals are in a paradoxical situation to the extent that they are open to both feminist and conservative standpoints. The issue was typical for the eclecticism of the contemporary Romanian culture. this kind of press plays an ambiguous role: on the one hand. No daily newspaper has a special column for gender problems. the absence of partnership relations. The more specialized journals Sfera Politicii and Revista de cerceta ˘ ri sociale are open to feminist approaches and to fair-play polemics.” Here we have a few examples. whenever the opportunity is there. but they generally address women’s questions in a pre-feminist fashion and. As the latter is dominant. An interesting case is that of a highly respected publication called Secolul 20 (The 20th Century). However.

They have also encouraged women students to express themselves more openly and frequently in the classroom (usually. and have begun to be taught in other universities other than Bucharest (such as Cluj and Timisoara). received with ironic smiles. Mihaela Miroiu. Since 1997 she and her colleagues have introduced modular courses on Public Policies for Women: Feminist Political Theories. For one thing. Gender and Social Institutions. The same year she and Popescu introduced a course on feminist political theory at the undergraduate level. There are now also short-term courses in gender studies—most of which are offered by the Society for Feminist Analysis (AnA) in cooperation with PHARE and UNDP. one of the coauthors of this chapter. and even an M. Miroiu did not have many difficulties in introducing disciplinary courses. women are increasingly finding themselves in jobs which allow them to incorporate feminist perspectives in mainstream Romanian academia. Unfortunately. men perform better in the seminar discussions and women in written papers).A. which are not as conservative regarding gender. became the Dean of Political Science Faculty at the National School for Political Studies and Public Administration (NSPSA) in Bucharest. As a member of the National Commission for Evaluation of Aca-
. through the promotion of feminist approaches and gender-aware policies. While women represent 31. and Gender and Public Policies. While the idea of teaching feminist courses was. women (much less feminists) are not well represented within the payrolls of higher education.A. many of their male colleagues have now familiarized themselves with gender approaches. and the NGOs that focus on gender studies do not have financial support for journals of their own.D. at first.38 However.310
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of two important aspects: the feminist approach and the real problems of the native women. Research and education could also support the process of breaking free from the civic minimalism of Romanian women. as opposed to 42 percent of tutors and 45 percent of assistants. In March 1997.9 percent of all faculty. University teaching careers show an obvious imbalance at the top. there are the scholarships available from Western countries. especially through Western universities (M. Their subjects do not include the themes of civic and political emancipation. modular courses. level). on Gender Studies at the NSPSA. they have become more and more popular.39 Moreover. and Ph. and have introduced them in their own curricula and bibliography: encouraging students to do research into the gender dimension of Romanian political life. they account for only 9 percent of professors. Some other magazines for women continue the “healthy socialist” line. there is reason to hope that things will improve in the foreseeable future. Romanian women graduates have found a space to assert themselves. Also. and have obtained qualifications that not even the autochthonous establishment can contest or ignore any longer.

however. etc. are rather amateurish. That is to say. somewhere else. the role of women in politics. but rather on family charity and support work. and GENDER: Center for the Study of Women’s Identity). There were many liberal parties. in many respects.41 Only two NGOs openly declare their feminist affiliation. The local and general elections in 1996 marginalized. there are fifty organizations that are directly and explicitly concerned with women’s issues.
WHO CAN MOVE A FEMINIST MOVEMENT?
Out of some 12. but cannot represent its substance. on the cultivation of a gender-aware perspective. The women’s NGOs have their “sins” and contributed to this fiasco: They lack a common agenda. Apart from the fact that the “fatherless patriarchy” is still with us. and fear being considered “deviant.000 NGOs worldwide. which do not openly declare themselves to be so. The project included special training sessions for the electoral campaign of women (there was a joint participation of women’s associations from various parties). Romanian political life has yet to reach that stage of maturity that would enable it to engender a liberal movement having widespread support.” the universities may be highly influential in furthering this end. women’s activism in NGOs represents a primum movens but not a movens as such. which was established with the goal of democratizing Romanian society on the gender dimension. rather than strengthened.”42 We must stress that the NGOs tend to adopt the perspective of helping women. and defending professional rights (such as associations for the professional integration of unemployed women. but no liberal movement that would contribute to internalizing the two main values underlying liberal
. a movement for women’s rights. Some of them are focused only on women’s rights. being centered on gender studies (AnA: Romanian Society for Feminist Analysis. These organizations initiated in 1995 the so-called Group 222.40 The question is whether participation in these organizations represents. protection against violence. business women’s association.Post-Totalitarian Pre-Feminism
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demic Education. The causes of the “Group 222” failure are to found.” Change in social attitudes and government policies which can influence the status of women ultimately depends. Her insistence on feminist approaches in academia is directly related to her interest in allowing women to cultivate “minds of their own. it is focused not on gender-aware policies. but not of emancipating them. or will lead to. Miroiu has influenced other professors from the Universities of Cluj and Ias ¸i to introduce feminist political theories and public policies for women.). They cooperate with other feminist organizations. The results of this project were far from what was expected. tend to avoid genderaware language. Our hypothesis is that this kind of participation can spark a movement. Because of their status as centers of “higher learning.

This is Sommer Brodribb’s expression which is shared by other radical feminists.
NOTES
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democracies: liberty and equality. in Romania. right coalitions (Christian-Democratic and Liberals). and now. They represent the implicit background for any social claim. see Nothing Mat(t)ers. Now. The promotion of mutual respect would sort out many problems in Romanian society—including discrimination on ethnic bases. Given this background. Beyond this. and the process of rebuilding other identities is painful. and in which the state offered social protection (work. 1994). and on gender difference. however. on sexual orientation. In countries with a democratic tradition important liberal values have been gradually accepted and internalized by citizens in an “organic” process. this community has vanished and the majority of citizens are disoriented and subjected to the dramatic waves of transition. Patricia Mann. even housing) to individuals on a communal basis. that in order to have a society in which individuals assert their human rights and are concerned with respect for individual differences. health service. with many people’s interests still linked to the remains of the old centrally planned economy (including the working class). 2. Our democrats are faced with making corrections to the injustices generated by statism. in which the individual did not matter. not by excessive liberalism.
. the liberal dimension is the “great absent” from the landscape. Liberal achievements in Romania are largely the outcome of external pressures (of European integration. we believe that a feminist movement will share the same fate of the liberal movement—at least in the near future. Romanian society has grown more mature through Social-Democratic. education. Instead. there are required certain material conditions that allow individuals to feel human in the first place—conditions that have not been met as yet in our transitional society.43 Therefore. The consciousness of the inferior-superior relationship is deeply rooted and fueled by the new. as in all post-Communist societies.) rather than of internal ones. (Melbourne: Spinifex. etc. 1992). Unfortunately. Micro Politics (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. However. again. It is true. a feminist movement in this country would not be similar to a Western one because it is deprived of the prerequisite politics of rights assertion and individual valuation. we have had (and still have) conservatism—a left-kind of conservatism. these values are asserted only here and there. there is an inertial feature coming from totalitarian times. economic inequalities generated by the transition. enormous. The new laws that express liberal values were imported and were not the result of internal normative pressures. People have lost a sense of community. Social-Democratic experiences.

The state money contribution for a child is equivalent to $7 per month. 189–90. the first time when all men could vote was in 1919. Monica Macovei. 7–9 (1996).” 15.1 (Romania: The State of Facts: The Society) (Bucuresti: Nemira. 17. you Devil!” 23. Romania: starea de fapt: societatea. Secolul 20. Pasti et al. the implementation of these legal provisions is rather problematic. women elaborate a socialdemocratic politics of feminist inspiration and seem to be interested in gender dimensions of current politics.. This represents the cost of four pounds of meat and a “half pair of shoes. The regulation regarding the cost increase for having an abortion (1997) has not been preceded by a regulation referring to lowering the prices of contraceptives and to an efficacious plan of contraceptive education. 12. 1997). See Minnesota Advocates for Human Rights. 14. The figures mentioned in the text were valid in 1997. 73 percent of average salaries. 6. Ibid.. 20. Women in Development. 19. meant to better protect victims of domestic violence. Pas ¸ ti et al. Liliana Popescu. People’s trust was shifting toward the president during the spring of 1997 and toward the anticorruption commissions of the Home Affairs Ministry. 1995). A young journalist from a well-known daily newspaper. Romania: starea de fapt: societatea. Alina Mungiu Pippidi. Her conclusion was: “In Romania the only secure ‘job’ for a young woman is prostitution. Within the Democratic Party of Petre Roman. commerce. 22. necessary feminism). This subject is substantially discussed in Vladimir Pas ¸ ti. 7. Mihaela Miroiu. 1991). Slavenka Drakulic ´. People’s trust in the Church is rather axiomatic. was sharing with the readers her experience of looking for a job during July 1997. However. 13. due to a lack of appropriate institutions. education.1 percent. as we can see from the July 1997 reports in the most important newspapers.W. Norton. and Cornel Codit ¸a. 4. and health. necesarul feminism” (The slippery. no. Adeva ˘ rul (The Truth). Lifting the Last Curtain: A Report on Domestic Violence in Romania (Minneapolis. “Step back. That is. 9. Vol. 8. How We Survived Communism and Even Laughed (New York: W. only 11 percent of Romanians are reported as practicing believers. However. 1995). Dilema. 79 percent. Ever since this chapter was initially written. In a recent poll of IMAS (September 2002). Romania: starea de fapt: societatea. whereas people’s trust in the army has decreased to above 70 percent.. 92. pp.
. 18. Sorin Alexandrescu. pp. 10.” 16.6 percent). people’s trust in the Romanian Orthodox Church is even higher (90. Pasti et al. no. Romania: starea de fapt: societatea. and the Equal Opportunities Law (voted earlier in 2002). Romanii dupa 1989 (Bucuresti: Humanitas. 11. 5. MN: MAHR. 220 (1997). 205–6. some changes occurred in the legal framework: The most significant are changes in the Criminal Code (Fall 2001). Ibid. “Alunecosul..Post-Totalitarian Pre-Feminism
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3. According to the National Commission for Statistics (1996). “Cenusareasa tranzitie” (The Transition’s Cinderella). 21. Protectia egala si drepturile femeilor in legislatia romana (Equal Protection and Women’s Rights in Romanian Law) in the framework of the UNDP project.

Sociologia Tranzitiei (The Sociology of Transition) (Bucuresti: Editura Staff. linguistics topic. pp. it would not have passed. “Hrana conservatorismului: antifeminismul” (Conservatism’s Food: Antifeminism).314
Mihaela Miroiu and Liliana Popescu
24. 32.
. 1996). 1997). in Madalina Nicolaescu. dissertation on a feminist.. 35. 38. See also. 41. for instance.” 34. no. 150 (1995). 58–59. Dilema. 40. Mihaela Irimia. eds.. Adeva ˘ rul (20 December 1996). Feminism and Philosophy (Boulder. 111. 27. the Law of parental leave adopted in July 1997. Feminism is still not highly regarded.D. 47 (1997). 26. This research will be published in a forthcoming volume edited by Gail Kligman. 39. p.” See Adrienne Rich’s comments in Of Women Born (London: Virago. 1995). 30. Cine suntem noi? (Who Are We?) (Bucuresti: Anima. 36. See. Social Policies (Bucuresti: Alternative. “Feminismul si efeminarea totalitara” (Feminism and Totalitarian Feminization). Dimensions of Poverty (Bucuresti: Expert. 1997). p. CO: Westview Press. Especially due to the editor-in-chief. Madalina Nicolaescu. ed. 47. and Catalin Zamfir. Ann Phillips. Evenimentul zilei (13 January 1997). no. 43.” (The More Artificial the More Feminine—The Impact of Western Model of Femininity). Dumitru Sandu. 33. Engendering Democracy (University Park: The Pennsylvania State University Press. 28. Cine suntem noi? 37. cu atat mai feminina—impactul idealului de feminitate occidentala. Kathy Ferguson. Evenimentul zilei (21 January 1997). 377. in Nicolaescu. Almost certain. This aspect has also been noted in Democracy in Romania: Assessment Mission Report (Stockholm: IDEA. Ministry of Education’s Commission for Statistics. p. “Feminismul si efeminarea totalitara.” (“Information or Manipulation: About Women’s Image in PostTotalitarian Press”). 25. Elena Zamfir and Catalin Zamfir.” in Nancy Tuana and Rosemary Tong. 1991). Bucharest (1997–1998). If this law had been publicly debated. “Amazoniada. Mihaela Miroiu. “Bureaucracy and Public Life: The Feminization of the Policy. who is currently writing her Ph. 1995). 42. no. Feminists risk losing their “good reputation. It was proposed by the Minister of Labor and Social Protection and promoted by women who were aware of the international legislation. “Cu cat mai artificiala. 150 (1995). 31. more than fifty in 2002 (the fifty figure was valid in 1998 for sure). Sfera Politicii. Preda. “Informare sau manipulare: despre imaginea femeilor in presa posttotalitara. for example. Monica Lotreanu. 29. p. 1995). Cristian Preda. Delia Verdes. 1996). 25.” Dilema. Laura Grunberg is the author of the most important research on women’s NGOs. The Soros Foundation and the Central European University provide substantial suppport. See.

and Article 431 was introduced. but the legal system has vacillated in terms of how to include gay and lesbian activity as a jurisdiction of government. I explore the legal issues surrounding the issue of homosexuality in transitional Romania.16
Gay and Lesbian Rights
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Ceaus ¸escu’s legacy of the denial of “equality” to those who prefer intimate relationships with others of their own gender has persisted in the first years of post-Communism. Then. This code remained in effect for the better part of a century. the code limited reference to homosexuality except in cases of rape. A short time later.” but not otherwise. A repeal of that particular language then appeared in the Penal Code of 1948. legislators were still grappling with the issue. the efforts of human rights nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and the European Union to repeal these laws. In this chapter. By 1968. as well as homosexuals themselves. remained largely out of the public realm. Specifically. the basic code was again reconsidered. and the first paragraph of Article 200
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. Yet.
HISTORIC MILIEU—REPEALS AND REINSTATEMENTS
Romania’s Orthodox culture has leaned toward intolerance of homosexuality. stating that homosexuality could be illegal if it caused “public scandal. The Romanian Penal Code of 1864 criminalized all homosexual acts. until recently. and while it was intermittently reinforced. and the ongoing political debate within Romania concerning the rights of homosexuals. it remained essentially in its original form. in 1936. and how to punish those found guilty of such offenses. I focus on the criminalization of homosexual behavior. political discourse around the subject.

on homosexual relations between nonconsenting adults were not struck down.” However. quipped that legalizing homosexuality would mean “entering Europe from behind. over the “sick. In June 1997. Throughout parliamentary discussions. In a September 1993 vote to admit Romania to the Council of Europe. An observer at the debates noted that “[T]he mere mention of the Council of Europe generated booing and cursing in the hall. failed and Minister of Justice Petre Ninosu. where the expectation was for complete repeal of all sodomy laws. paragraph (1) of Article 200 was struck down by Romania’s Constitutional Court. another repeal package which intended to further modify Article 200.” moral decline. and social decay. the Council’s Assembly made clear that admission was conditional upon repeal of Romania’s “sodomy laws. Moreover. the infraction moved from the public domain and into the private. This is not the
.”1 At that point.316
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read: “Sexual relations between persons of the same sex are punishable by imprisonment of one to five years.5 and another member advised that the value to all of society was served by limiting the rights of few: “The interests of society must prevail over the rights of the individual. the Parliament did not eliminate paragraph (1) at that time. because the definition of a “public scandal” and “outcry” was not clarified. found its voice in concern over threats to the reproductive capability of the Romanian society. the legislation was not materially altered. the reactions from Romanian party leaders had been very negative with respect to loosening the laws any further. in a now infamous quote.” and concerns over the apparent lack of breeding capacity of homosexual couples. In the post-Communist era Romania has come under significant pressure from the European Union (EU) and the Council of Europe to repeal its laws criminalizing homosexuality. concerning homosexual relations between adults and children. However. The defense used by politicians. and the insidious nature of homosexuality in the manner in which it leads to a “loss of sense. traditionally inimical to advocating the civil and legal rights of homosexuals. one prosecutor shouted that “[a]ll sexual relations are not equal.” In July 1994. and paragraph (3).4 Parliamentary debates included legislators’ obstreperous pronouncements citing the “perversion” of homosexuality which “would be immoral to legalize. In 1995. It is absolute craziness to expect there to be the same law for normal people and for curis ¸ti !” (the most vulgar word to describe homosexuals in the Romanian language).” The revision with the language regarding public scandal was not sufficient to satisfy the requirements of the Council of Europe.” “unnatural.” or “sinful” lifestyle of homosexuals.”3 the Constitutional Court ruled that homosexual behavior would only be penalized if the acts were committed in public and led to “public scandal.”2 After finding that the existing language of Article 200 “violated protections for privacy in Article 26 of the Romanian Constitution. effectively decriminalizing homosexual acts between consenting adults. paragraph (2).

Throughout 1997 and 1998. Finally. Romania has many laws that must be changed to conform to various European and International conventions. who objected to the proposal on the ba-
. and do not reflect universal human rights standards currently. but would still criminalize “unnatural sexual acts performed in public” (peculiar language typical of this debate. paragraph 1 since July 1994. While EU human rights standards are evolving quickly. punishing only forced intercourse with minors. A bill was introduced in 1999. materials or related activities—in public or in private. as the standard is only a regional one. were in fact intensified. which was reputed to include a full retraction of the objectionable “Paragraph 200.8 Amnesty International called it “the worst such law in Europe.”7 Then in 1998. It reached the stage of a second reading.” actually increased the scope of the law and the severity of sentences. it has been made clear that Article 200 must be eliminated as part of the necessary legislative revision. Ironically. The modified proposal. As late as 2000. and had implied that the government was already displaying a genuine intent to change the law. instead of being repealed. As of late June 2000. chief among them being the EU’s acquis communautaire. the lower house was considering a version of that 1999 bill which would eliminate Article 200. which would decriminalize homosexuality. Of course. the Council of Europe gave an ultimatum that by 24 April 1999. no progress had been made in the protection of basic human rights for gay and lesbian Romanians.” the proposed modification would also criminalize not only all homosexual acts. it had assured its West European neighbors that revocation was imminent. Whereas the objectionable criminal code that was in place made homosexuality punishable in cases of “public nuisance. it nevertheless appealed to opponents of the reform). assuring the Council of Europe that it was effectively dead. most contemporaneous developments in Romania with regard to civil rights in general have otherwise been consistent with the nation’s increasing “Westernization” and the Romanian government had been publicly committed to repealing the antigay law.”6 As 1998 approached. Romania was formally invited to apply to the EU in November 1999. but there were never a quorum to permit a vote to be taken. Romania’s strict laws prohibiting homosexuality. in complete repudiation of previous official declarations. While long anticipated. these required changes in European human rights law are recent. Romania remained the only state seeking entry into the European Union with a law that criminalized consensual gay activity. a bill to repeal Article 200 (1) was rejected by Parliament. and that “there have been passed no sentences on the basis of Article 200. stunning the Council of Europe.”9 The 1999 reversal of earlier promises to repeal the law was “clearly an anti-European attitude that pays no respect to human rights. but also gay organizations.”10 according to Romania’s Cristian Ra ˘dulescu of the Democratic Party.Gay and Lesbian Rights
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moment to accord individual liberty. Article 200 had to be eliminated.

. the European Community had understood that Romania intended to modify the criminal code punishing homosexuals as criminals at its earliest possible opportunity.
The European Parliament . Romania then stood alone in this approach to the gay and lesbian issue. especially since the draft EU Charter on Human Rights. Continued criticism by the Council created the opportunity to thwart Romania’s desire to join the EU. Romania has officially been a member in good standing of the Council. expresses its profound indignation at these decisions by the Romanian Parliament and condemns any attempt to criminalize sexual relations between adults of the same sex.11 While European Court decisions and European Council “Recommendations” are technically voluntary. to exert pressure to prevent discriminatory provisions from being adopted. the Council.12 Throughout the mid. . it clearly established a position and intent. and the Member States. In response European Community members increased pressure and spoke out against the declaration. each within their respective spheres of responsibility. Romania could not enter the EU if it failed to follow these rulings. While this 1996 vote in the Senate did not constitute a final decision. Furthermore.14
. in 1999. . would mandate decriminalization and discrimination against gays in Romania. even though the European Court of Human Rights has banned discrimination against gays in cases since 1981.
EUROPEAN COMMUNITY REACTION
The intense condemnation of Romania’s continued criminalization of homosexuality by human rights NGOs and the Council of Europe threatened Romania’s prospects of entering the EU in the next five to ten years. which is expected to bind all EU members in their domestic court decisions in a few years.and late 1990s. . The European Parliament announced that it was “shocked” and described its “profound indignation” regarding the 1996 change. as the other fifteen EU members have. and implored Romanian President Ion Iliescu to “use all his powers” to strike the law down. the United Kingdom decided to stop excluding homosexuals from serving in its military because of the unanimous European Court of Human Rights decision in September 1999. the Council of Europe was angered over the shift in stance that this represented: a full elimination of the prejudicial language had been officially pledged. which essentially recommended criminalizing any and all private sexual relations between same-sex adults as well as any public expression of homosexuality.318
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sis of its inconsistency with the nation’s goal of achieving a human rights approach equal to the rest of Europe. .13 In addition to concerns over the human rights issues related to the law. Calls upon the Commission.

in a sudden switch in the “official” Romanian posture. in September of 1996. . . Already.
The Romanian government’s public response was initially defensive. especially Article 200 on homosexual acts. The Assembly therefore earnestly requests that the Romanian authorities amend without delay the provisions of the Penal Code and the Judiciary Act.Gay and Lesbian Rights
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Romania’s admission to the Council of Europe in 1993 had been conditional upon its repealing such statutes in order to be in compliance with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the European Convention for the Protection and Fundamental Freedoms. on 21 April 1998.”15 The Council of Europe’s Parliamentary Assembly expressed its outrage as well in a formal resolution (Resolution 1123). It set an expectation that “. He announced that the further reform of the sodomy law would soon be adopted in keeping with the standards of the European Community. Days later. the proposed change in the law appeared to fly in the face of international expectations and previous promises. charging that the immoral and overly permissive society of the West need not dictate its values to the citizens of Romania. “Even the act of incest is preferable to homosexuality because it gives a chance to procreation. . Also. which cause a public scandal. while this new proposition would reduce sentences for private acts from 1–5 years in prison to 6 months to 3 years. on 26 September 1996. or even having a party in one’s home would have been considered illegal. The language of this conditional acceptance was precise. Romania will shortly change its legislation in such a way that Article 200 of the Penal Code will no longer consider as a criminal offense homosexual acts perpetrated in private between consenting adults. or any act of proselytism”17 related to homosexual acts or information. a committee of the Parliament resolved to modify the law to include those acts committed in public view and/or those. Inclusion of the language to prohibit
. Yet. which are contrary to fundamental freedoms as set forth in the European Convention of Human Rights. any distribution of a leaflet. this language had been proposed and rejected by gay and lesbian activists. the newly appointed Romanian Prime Minister Radu Vasile promised to stamp out cases of human rights violations against gays and lesbians. it retained the 1–5 year sentence for public or “scandalous acts. This effectively meant that any forming of an organization or group. . . The statements from the Deputies continued to demonstrate their intent to retain the legal position on gays. Just one week after the controversial Senate vote. as it was insufficient to protect acts or relationships maintained in private by consenting adults.” This proposed modification would make unlawful any “organizing or associating. Christian Democrat Deputy Emil Popescu was quoted as saying.16 which reads:
Certain provisions of the Penal Code now in force are unacceptable and seriously imperil the exercise of fundamental freedoms.

thereby providing additional legal protection against discrimination based on sexual orientation. At the time of repeal. and the like. and for the distribution of literature. The use of the phrase “public scandal” was of particular concern to detractors as it could be interpreted to mean that a complaint by a neighbor or accusation by a worker might result in a charge and sentencing. In the year ending June 1999.320
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organizing and proselytism directly attacked rights of privacy. forming groups. Also. which criminalized same-sex relations. The European Parliament immediately called on President Ion Iliescu to oppose the deputies’ proposed version. gay. bisexual. Lesbians and Bisexuals. the International Lesbian and Gay Association (IGLA) and the Romanian Action for Gays. an antidiscrimination law was also adopted. The repeal of Article 200 and the adoption of antidiscrimination legislation finally allowed Romania’s LGBT people to obtain dignity vis-à-vis the law. and members of the Green and Communist parties.
. pressed forward with a campaign of faxes and e-mails to the Romanian government. and transgendered (LGBT) people. another nongovernment organization. A law banning discrimination based on gender was adopted as well. and to bring public attention to “prisoners of conscience” still held under the law. was finally repealed. De facto practices will take longer to change. In a letter to the President and to the Romanian Chamber of Deputies. freedom of speech. the right to privacy (Article 26). some trade unions. the notorious Article 200 of the Romanian Penal Code.”18 The International Gay and Lesbian Human Rights Commission also protested. These changes bring Romanian in line with the human rights standards established by the Council of Europe and the EU for both member and accession states. Amnesty International responded by intensifying its activities to pressure Romania. the Romanian Parliament passed the new version of the law. which included provisions for the punishment of any act that might cause public scandal. and the constitutionally stated commitment to subordinate national laws to the international human rights treaties and covenants ratified by Romania. This ratification should help to pave the way for Romanian entrance in the EU. but legal interpretation inclusive of transgendered people has yet to be established. Nonetheless. 99 adults had been charged with violating Article 200 of the law. Regional demonstrations in front of the Camera di Commercio Italo Rumena in Milan included Italy’s gay and lesbian groups. and assembly. freedom of assembly (Article 36). they challenged that “[t]he vote to continue to criminalize homosexuality contradicts Romania’s own constitutional guarantees of equal protection (Article 16). In January 2002. in 1996. Romania’s criminal law was finally freed from discriminatory legal provisions against lesbian.

” The lack of public offices held by women speaks to their institutionalized underrepresentation in government. and others fear sitting near open windows. when the Council ceased official monitoring. and beaten “like punching bags. ACCEPT. Hungarians. The persistent use of vulgar expletives during interviews is commonly reported. physical assaults. imprisonments. Many homosexuals reported that they had also received anonymous threats in the mail or by phone. as is the practice of employing threats against family members.” Police have demanded explicit sexual details and the names of friends and lovers. or marital rape. date rape. and tactics of humiliation have been all too common in the lives of gay and lesbian Romanians.”20 According to the ACCEPT reports. While deplorable. street abuse. we can’t ensure your protection—a car can hit you. Romas. such practices are not without equal in Romania’s treatment of other minorities. intimidation. Reports of abuse by police have included the deaths of at least two youths who were badly tortured while in custody. Svabs. There are “no specific laws that protect them from domestic violence. and quite unexpected in light of Romania’s previous public announcements on the subject. they were routinely released only after submitting names of others. and others have been persecuted. extensive and systematic violations. specifically outlawing the termination of any pregnancy for any reason. In recent years. a Romanian gay and lesbian nongovernment organization.”19 Once taken into custody. Abortion rights and policies under Ceaus ¸escu were far afield from those of Western Europe. and well beyond the date that the government claims the law became ineffective. official monitoring of gay and lesbian human rights violations has uncovered significant. One victim was told “if you do not cooperate. Gay and lesbian Romanians live within in a system where certain citizens are worthy of a particular level of
. Human rights abuses. someone can stick a knife in you on a dark street. sexual harassment at the workplace. Saxons. and locations where gays in the community might be found. It documents cases of interrogation. These revealed a dimension of abuse of Romanian citizens that was stunning. interviewees reported being touched. Gay suicide attempts are identified in ACCEPT reports. Some victims showed physical scars consistent with reports of abuse. slapped.Gay and Lesbian Rights
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GAY AND LESBIAN LIFE UNDER THE LAW
It is useful to understand the context for these changes because de facto changes take much longer to implement than even the effort to establish de jure changes. beatings. Women also experience a status problem that precludes them from full and equal protection of the laws and participation in the society. as well as threats to their parents or children. and Human Rights Watch (HRW) both published detailed reports documenting human rights abuses which reach well into 1997. and the practice of illegal searches of the homes of “suspects.

However. In Bucharest.322
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legal and social treatment not available to “others. true equality is likely to come slowly.” a shared identity supposedly superceding Moldovian. Wallachian and Transylvanian regional allegiances. respectively. that the Church might prove useful in furthering the Party’s aims. at least in Romania’s most cosmopolitan of cities. However.8 percent being Orthodox. the presence of Orthodox religion in and of itself is not sufficient to explain the influence it holds in the political realm of the gay and lesbian issue.21 The Church’s vehement opposition to homosexual rights has done much to fuel the climate of opposition to conformity with European Council expectations. also count the majority of their populations as members of the Orthodox Church. The power and influence of the Romanian Orthodox Church stems from its peculiar association with Romanian politics. although they admit that formal prosecution under Article 200 has been effectively terminated. the Church has been “positioning itself for the very definition of “Romanianism. which still operates as a human rights organization not a gay association.
THE CHURCH AS A FACTOR
The Romanian Orthodox Church has politicized the gay rights issue through its widespread influence in Romanian society. Romania’s neighbors. This accommodative allegiance has been a traditional posture of the Orthodox leadership regardless of the system of rule. and an AIDS hotline to support the community. However. and the ostracism and punishment of targeted subgroups has been.” with 86.”22 The Romanian Communist system recognized. just one day after the governmental repeal of the language of gay criminalization. ACCEPT. Known as the “Romanian solution.23 The relationship was not always congenial. cites continual complaints of citizens who experience persistent and violent interactions with local police. With the advent and flourishing of a national consciousness throughout Eastern Europe. unlike its Soviet bloc counterparts. There is also concern that a false sense of security may exist among gay citizens. a grim reality of civil life in Romania. each abolished their antisodomy laws in 1993 and 1998.
. Activist groups continue to assert that harassment and persecution are common. some recent reports indicate that times may be changing. Russia and Bulgaria. one of the gay clubs was raided by police. Even following the elusive legal revision. a homosexual newsletter.” the Church would remain an unconditional proponent for the party in exchange for some freedom from Communist interference. However.” The denial of basic human rights. there are now two gay bars. and continues to be.3 percent of the population count themselves as “religious. sending a clear message of intolerance by local authorities. Recent surveys report that 99.

It has executed a crusade calling upon citizens and politicians to protect Romanian society from the immorality that such decriminalization would bring. offering a quote from an unnamed government source: “Obviously our point of view is guided by the Church in these matters.3 percent having no opinion. the Church’s aggressive posture is not necessarily representative of the wishes of its patrons. and the Church gained in stature and influence. with an additional 12. and the pattern of close association between Church and state has intensified.
. and intimidation has emerged from the Church regarding the gay issue in general. While public opinion regarding gays appears to be mixed. the Romanian Orthodox Church exerts growing power and leadership in the community and in politics. both the social and political significance of the Church has grown. Present-day political contenders are careful to be seen at Church functions. and other restrictions came in periodic waves. and Article 200 specifically. Fully 42 percent indicated that the Church should not take an official stance on homosexuality. and those in Parliament that support its repeal have been denounced. Any change to Article 200 has been utterly condemned. HRW and International Gay and Lesbian Human Rights Commission (IGLHRC) are of the opinion that the Church’s influence on politicians is strong. denouncement. Yet another survey from the same year (Institute for the Quality of Life) found 25 percent were willing to accept gay neighbors. the Church continued to minimize negative perceptions of such behavior and put a positive front on these incidents for the community’s consumption.Gay and Lesbian Rights
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and imprisonments. which was signed by all Bishops and Archbishops of the official Romanian Orthodox Church as well as by representatives of other Christian groups. Surprisingly however. President Ceaus ¸escu’s use of the Orthodox Church reached new heights. many Romanians prefer that the Church remain mum on the matter. Other politicians followed suit. In April 1995. Citizens responded to a 1993 national sociological survey. This influence is used as a means to pressure politicians and to publicly promote its antigay policies. However. the Church Patriarch issued an official protest of any decriminalization of gay laws. With the fall of Communism. The Church has also made regular televised statements on its position and has officially condemned parliamentary reformers. A bitter campaign of accusation. With its new freedoms. indicating that they were not particularly in favor of the Patriarch regulating their bedroom activities. as he astutely anticipated the utility of the Church in bolstering his plans for industrialization projects and in acquiring Western sympathizers. and 30 percent agreed with a statement proposing equal treatment of gays and lesbians. church demolitions.”24 The Romanian Orthodox Church is strictly and unconditionally opposed to homosexuality. and in the presence of Church fathers. becoming increasingly linked to political leaders.

Norris’s private sexual practices were legally in question.AND THE PROBLEM OF EUROPEAN LAW
As a largely rural nation with an exclusively rural tradition. In a 15–4 decision in his favor.324
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TRADITION. which initially reviewed cases for referral to the European Court in that era. however. the European Court set a precedent to protect his right to privacy under Article 8. On an issue where tradition and modernity are in direct opposition. 1988). In a nearly split vote (6–5). there exists a natural pressure toward homogeneity. The Dudgeon case upheld the rights of a gay Irish man who registered a complaint with the European Commission of Human Rights. The persistence and intensity of pressure toward government (by its own citizens as well as by outside forces) is the antecedent of political transformation. United Kingdom. given the emotional nature of this civil concern—and the legal precedents that exist—that any reprieve would be given to Romania to ease the dilemma. and where the stakes are increasingly high on both sides. Social mobilization theorists suggest that the more rural an area is. Furthermore. The issue in the case was clear: the plaintiff’s private homosexual practices had been considered a criminal offensive by the local authorities. with majority holding that discrimination against gays violated the protections of privacy in the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights. and was faced with the problem of this once outstanding exception. Ireland. concerning the ongoing harassment he received at the hands of police in his community as a result of his being openly gay (Dudgeon v. sanctioned by the European Court of Justice and all fifteen EU member-states in practice. Norris prevailed. Article 119 of the Treaty of Rome.” or modernization.25 Just a few years later the Norris case reached the European Court (Norris v. Political transition. the more traditional and the more resistant to modernization it is. in Romania. provides for no exceptions. It was highly unlikely. and the influence of the Church. the vehement resistance toward civil rights for gay citizens that has marked Romania should not be entirely unexpected. its timing has been consistent with “Westernization. 1981). Cyprus again held against sodomy laws. It is unquestionable that Romania has desired to comply with European standards on nearly all issues. Given this. modernization can be predicted to be more difficult for Romania than has been the case in nations with largely urban populations. Recent EU jurisprudence bears this out. the case of Modinos v.1. This finding was directly pertinent to the Romanian case because “the court held that even the Cypriot government’s ‘consistent policy of not bringing criminal proceedings in respect of private homosexual conduct on the basis that the relevant law is
. MODERNITY. In 1993. and the Romanian Parliament is encountering pressure on this issue from virtually every angle. Romania finds itself in a vexing predicament. is accomplished by the changing human needs that impinge upon the political process. There was no police brutality or other civil charge other than the fact that Mr. Tolerance for same-gender relationships can be viewed as a “modern” idea.

Australia’s criminalization of gay sex violated the right to privacy in the ICCPR. With these legal standards holding firm. colour. sex. As a legal matter. . four European Community member-nations—Denmark. . . and the law shall prohibit any discrimination and guarantee to all persons equal and effective protection against discrimination on any ground such as race. Romania is held to the Court’s rulings on the Convention. which takes cases from individuals in states that have ratified its Protocol One. stating that:
All persons are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to the equal protection of the law .” Every societal group accepts that there may be “deviants” within it that must be managed appropriately. Norway. national or social origin. this case is more important because it reinforces the legal and especially the more powerful political influence emerging from the European Court of Human Rights and the attendant expectations for EU admission. sex. As of 1998.Gay and Lesbian Rights
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a dead letter’ was irrelevant to the government’s obligation to repeal the law. property. The
. universal human rights law prohibits discrimination in a manner that prohibits discrimination against gays. In fact. and Sweden—recognized same-sex partnerships. Romania’s gay policy was not likely to find respite. has ruled on the issue. not subject to criminal code. such as race. the human rights of gays have not only been upheld.”26 The European Court’s precedent had been set: Homosexual activity is a matter of one’s private life. political or other opinion. the Netherlands. . birth or other status. Article 2 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). the Human Rights Committee (for the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights) held that Tasmania. birth or other status. national or social origin. As a member of the Council of Europe. . the most important human rights treaty. colour. language. without distinction of any kind.27
The Human Rights Committee. Similarly. and with today’s European Court of Human Rights likely to demonstrate heightened sensitivity on the issue. language. In 1994. . This is the first effort to universalize gay rights. states:
Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to respect and to ensure to all individuals .
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND CONTEXTUAL POSITION
Opposition to the legalization of homosexuality in Romania has often been justified on the basis of its inherent “deviance.
Article 26 of the ICCPR is clear as well. religion. religion. but expanded by the other member-states. the rights recognized . and eight others barred any discrimination with respect to employment and social services. political or other opinion.

the judgment of normalcy is based only on the assessment of a judging party or group. and completely negative characteristic is the cornerstone of assigning deviance or “lesser than” status for gays. and by viewing deviance as a dynamic system of collective action. as it views and labels another. However. Again. In any case.. is the basis for the formation of a concept for “deviant. criminal.. it is clear that the viewpoints differ from the perspective of the agent perpetrating the objectionable act as opposed to the perspective of the assessor who stands in judgment of that behavior or attribute. race) or taboo practices (e.28 One element (person) in the system performs the socially deviant act. Both the constructs of stigma and symbolic interactionism suggest that identification of one group. either of which society may consider threatening in some way. Romania’s homosexuals found themselves attempting to function in a society where the “official” (and historical) position has been one which judges them as highly deviant. That behaviors or attributes themselves contain some essential. Howard Becker explores perceptions of deviance as a symbolic postmodern interactionism. and then to behave in conformity with that belief.” and helps us to understand the concept of labels as opposed to absolute values. The other functions to witness or understand the act to be deviant.” Stoica proposes that a stigma results from a core of societal mores from which a negative appraisal is made. inherent. and others of “queer” affiliation. Using Goffman’s premise that various types of stigma are used to marginalize those who are not “normal. They assert that ascription of gayness is involuntary and. The unquestionable “deviance” of homosexuality is the premise upon which official—and societal—objections are raised. the use of a comparison group to measure and define what is normal versus abnormal is offered up for consideration. In this model. Whether clearly identifiable or inferred by others to be present. undesirable. or as possessing some unfortunate peculiarity. lesbians.”
.” In other words. to them.g.g. their self-concept is that they act upon natural internal drives.”29 a second model is presented which also defines the predicament of the gay (Romanian) “outsider” and how he or she copes within that cultural definition. Critics of symbolic interactionism posit that labels can be affixed to behaviors not in response to any inherent nature of the behavior. quite natural. witchcraft). the behavior is only truly “deviant” when judged to be so in the interpretation of some other (nondeviant) individual or group. In Stoica’s work on “Otherness. one clearly cannot be “other” unless there is a larger concept of “same. He presents social interactionism as the interplay between people which forms the perception of “sameness” and “otherness.326
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people and groups who are offended by the “deviant” perceive their understanding of normal and abnormal to be absolute and undeniable. and in fact. but as a function of a given society’s reaction to that behavior at a given point in time. In the case of gays. not as some deviant ritual or behavior. Such a status can be applied to easily identifiable characteristics (e.

. such dependency is both economically driven and a matter of national pride: Romanians want very much to be included in the European Community. The benefits and liabilities of membership loom like a two-headed serpent: Romania desperately wants—and needs—one head.” while Romania is not). however unwelcome they may be.
. Yet the country must face these issues as part of the quest for recognition within Europe. Romania’s resistance to complete homogenization consistent with European expectations results from the very fact that it is externally imposed. The government has attempted to balance the dissonance between its need to satisfy the demands of European integration and its simultaneous rejection of the “normalcy” (and legal/social acceptance) of gay relations. It is seen in the rhetoric around modification of the law that is uttered by the very same persons and parties who vote otherwise. This manifests itself in the practice of verbally supporting legal reform while perpetrating practical repression of gay and lesbians. There has been no “natural” social evolution for homosexuals. but has been loath to welcome the second. And ultimately. Such is the hegemonic pressure from the body of European states that it can impose significant legal and social changes. In the case of the United States. civil. It is demonstrated in the practice of issuing promises to the European Community leaders that are clearly in opposition to the discussions and decisions that take place on the parliamentary floor. The press for legal. The issue of human rights for gays has arrived abruptly in Romania. and even the potential of outright rejection of membership in the body of the European Community. Western Europe is “legitimate.e. and dominant cultural ideology. A considerable barrier to Romania moving toward an attitude of gay tolerance is the fact that it has not had a natural social evolution. a passed reform cannot find its way to ratification by Parliament. nor any gay awareness movement in Romania. which “stems from political influence and the problems of legitimacy”31 (i.Gay and Lesbian Rights
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Romania’s dichotomous posturing on the issue of gay legitimacy can also be viewed from the perspective of institutional isomorphism30 as driven by the government’s pursuit of acceptance as a member of the European Community. Romania has responded to the coercive pull from the threat of European-driven sanctions. The process in Romania is inconsistent with the natural development of greater gay and lesbian acceptance in other nations. Institutional isomorphism has developed as Romania has been drawn into a complex situation where European integration directly conflicts with national social policies. and social equality for homosexuals is being superimposed as a function of coercive isomorphism. Membership in the Council of Europe and potential EU membership both require Romania to submit to decriminalization of homosexuality. for example. Coercive isomorphism manifests itself by way of “both formal and informal pressures exerted on organizations by other organizations upon which they are dependent”32 and in Romania. the dictates of the Church.

Romania enjoyed none of these antecedent stages to its own reckoning with gay and lesbian rights.”33 The non-heterosexual option began to transform itself from a separatist subculture to a visible movement. France and Germany already showed signs of general social tolerance for gays. A new addition to the law broadened the scope of intolerance yet further. antiwar activities. There have been both violent and nonviolent social reactions on both sides. Some of the Deputy’s addresses on 5 September of that year spewed contempt for the international community. In fact. As noted in Queer Theory.S. the law held firm. women’s rights. this visibility and social discourse created the platform for the current views on homosexual rights in the many parts of the world. It included language criminalizing “any propaganda or association or any other act of proselytism. The evolution of broader homosexual acceptance in the U. and there have been both organized and sporadic reactions to increased gay openness. and support for greater tolerance and freedom for minorities.” to homosexual behavior. it was again apparent that change would not come easily. The civil rights movement. In cases of hetero-
. “One legislator combating the changes called Article 200 ‘the Gordian knot of the penal code.S. Similar social movements then occurred in Australia and Britain.328
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“gay rights” emerged from a context of rising interest. However. This spawned an increase in both social and legal tolerance in the U. calling them “organizations of degenerates.” and they included accusations of widespread homosexuality in the European Parliament. “gay liberation understood its goals to mesh with those of other social movements and assumed that the different liberationist struggles of the counterculture were connected. Of interest is the fact that a “minor” is legally defined here as a man under the age of eighteen. even catapulted. This is not to say that human and civil rights for gays came easily.” as well as “enticing or encouraging a person. and any act involving a minor.” and it ploughed a fertile ground for the seeds of sexual openness and gay rights activism.34 So raucous were the proceedings that ongoing debate could not be continued. by social activism. and the development of feminist ideology were part of America’s expansive counterculture experience of the 1960s. and a vibrant homosexual subculture began to thrive in the 1960s and 1970s. visibility. In the end. the “coalition of radical movements that constituted the New Left provided much of the impetus for gay liberation.
VACILLATION OR ENTRENCHMENT?
As the Romanian Parliament met to consider the controversial issue in 1996. (such as it is) was enabled. It penalized any consensual homosexual act that is committed in public or if it causes any public scandal.’”35 The final law that was passed on 14 November 1996 and held until 2001 remained clearly intolerant toward gays. and also in other nations.

A place is considered “public” as defined by any of five expansive categories in the Romanian penal code. which includes any location that could be accessible to another. and where “in any way which the perpetrator is aware is likely to come to the knowledge of the public. HRW and IGLA’s Human Rights Council began the year by making specific recommendations to the Romanian government and Inter-Governmental Bodies.” but also to. The year 1998 was anticipated by the Council of Europe.” A police officer pegged the minimum at “two or more. harassment. even one single person. These included the elimination of laws permitting discrimination and those infringing on the privacy of homosexuals.” And a prosecutor in Constant ¸a identified public scandal as “when the act becomes known to someone else. but that even “having a public identity as such”38 was effectively against the law. No corresponding laws regarding heterosexual acts committed in public exist in Romania. Romanian President Emil Constantinescu assured the IGLHRC and the HRW that he would pardon all prisoners convicted under
.’ it is enough to have a few people from the immediate circle in which the persons live comment negatively on the acts.” The chief inspector of police in Constant ¸a agreed: it happens “when anyone finds out. The circumstances of one woman who was serving a three-year sentence for allegedly asking that her roommate have sex with her.” Prosecutor Luha commented: “To ‘come to the knowledge of the public.”37
Throughout 1997 and 1998. and significant changes were eagerly awaited. They called upon the Romanians not only to “bring an end to beatings. public attention to the matter continued to mount.” Prosecutor Eugenia Va ˘rvescu of Ias ¸i said that “a minimum of three persons must express indignation.” numerous recent cases of detentions.”36 The issue of “public scandal” was a particularly thorny one:
Yet a curious numbers game sets the rules for what constitutes a “public. In “Public Scandals: Sexual Orientation and Criminal Law in Romania. The NGOs also argued that the language that had been added to Article 200 not only criminalized gays and lesbians’ intimate acts. “punish those found responsible for such abuses in the past. pure and simple. even if no one else is present. Sentences for these infractions ranged from one to ten years imprisonment (cases involving “grave damage to bodily integrity or health” or death carry up to twenty-five years). and humiliation were recorded throughout 1997. who objects. On 14 January 1998.”39 By 27 January 1998. the female must be under fourteen years of age. and the violent and malicious treatment that she and others had endured was detailed in a joint report by the HRW and IGLA. beatings.Gay and Lesbian Rights
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sexual acts involving a minor. human rights groups and NGOs to be a banner year. maltreatment and other forms of abuse. The issue of an act occurring in public or causing a public nuisance was at the very heart of Paragraph 1 of Article 200.

International pressure for repeal could not be quelled. By stating that the law. This vote took place just days after the Council of Europe. accepted Romania’s promise to repeal the law and officially announced its suspension of human rights monitoring. “This vote reveals yet again the utter unreliability of the Romanian government’s promises. after facing significant pressure from the international community and human rights groups. as well as any gesture. while remaining “formally” on the books. which. While the majority of legislators had publicly voiced support for it. and the republics of the former Yugoslavia (except Bosnia and Serbia). The European Community and international human rights groups embraced this act as a positive and significant gesture. he pardoned several prisoners of conscience. but Romania continued to struggle with the gay issue. the government straddled the metaphorical fence. Romania is one
. But by June’s end.330
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the sodomy law. if approved by both chambers of Parliament. it was again defeated. homosexual relations that might offend others. As it stood. publication.43 In yet another intensely charged session of the Romanian Parliament.”41 That March. “homosexuality is the last remaining human rights problem we have to address in Romania. encouraged by the release of the prisoners of conscience. ACCEPT presented to the Ministry of Justice a draft bill.42 On 6 March 1998. eighty-one abstentions caused the bill to fall short of the absolute majority needed for approval.40 He acknowledged the significance of the problem by stating that. would permit punishment of homosexual acts only if it involved a minor or rape. Here. the Deputies once again officially rejected any consideration of any further reforms. In order to become a member of the European Community and NATO. and we will address it. affiliation. Indications for full repeal of Article 200 were imminent. Poland. On 11 May 1998.44 When the reform issue was brought to vote in Parliament later in June 1998. Bulgaria. Russia. which elicited international condemnation. which would have abolished Article 200 and offered amendments to seven other articles that were inconsistent with human rights standards. Still. along with a clear commitment from many Deputies to protect the law from repeal efforts. and sins against humanity were voiced on the floor. impassioned speeches about the potential moral downfall of the nation. Romania needed to demonstrate its ability to fall in to the ranks of western democracies. gathering. was officially illegal in Romania. was officially characterized as being a dead law.”45 commented the IGLHRC in a press report. and it was asserted that no formal legal charges or convictions against homosexuals were being brought as a consequence of it. was not actually enforced. or any act that upset another citizen. Romania was walking a tightrope with the Council of Europe on a key human rights issue. Article 200. draft legislation was released by the Romanian government. Romania’s leaders assured Europe to the contrary. After Hungary. charges of “immoral” acts.

There is no pending treaty on gay rights. those who were imprisoned for engaging in same-sex sexual activity or those with a gay identity. available at www. Article 200 of the penal code. At the time international human rights law was developed.fc. Among the pending cases. the Human Rights Committee is expected to rule on same-sex marriage on a case from New Zealand. Interview by Scott Long and Bogdan Voicu with criminal prosecutor Ioan Ciofu (Ias ¸i. Transsexuals. 5.org.org. Letter from Neils Helveg Petersen. The repeal of the antigay laws would certainly provide a step forward in the process of Romania’s integration with Europe. Curtea Constitut ¸ionala ˘ (15 July 1994). in birth certificates). among women too. 4. and civil rights consequences for the citizens of Romania. a development that could bring with it a range of political.uk. June 1997). Amnesty International included in its definition of political prisoner. and many countries still criminalize same-sex sexual activity. especially in refugee law for victims of sexual orientation discrimination. In 1993.uk/arcive/den. economic. but have been more successful than gays in obtaining respect for equality and family life. The European Parliament may now address the government’s application to the Council of Europe. 79 (21 June 1968). 8. gays were present in the landmark 1993 Vienna Conference on Human Rights. 3. most member states criminalized sex among males. Report on the Symposium “Homosexuality: A Human Right?” (31 May 1995). have been unsuccessful in obtaining the right to privacy (e. Denmark to Bjoern Skolander. Letter to Scott Long from Mona Nicoara of the Romanian Helsinki Committee (16 October 1994). beginning with the June 1945 UN Charter. as well as female genital mutilation. 1968 version as published in Buletinul.g. but the 1995 Beijing Women’s conference tabled any resolutions on gay rights in the Final Platform for Action. “Once Again Romania Says No to Gays!” available at www. and would effectively demonstrate and sanction democracy as a new way of life for all citizens. In sum. and some.S.” Seventeen states in the U. Bucharest Acceptance Group. 2. Campaign for Romanian Lesbian & Gay Human Rights.net/~zarathus/abroad. Decizia no. which also targeted gays.” 6. Minister of Foreign Affairs. following that
. In 1991. Sydney Levy (IGLHRC). The government’s final repeal of the law in 2001 marked a significant milestone toward entry into the EU. While the Charter’s human rights provisions were prompted in no small measure because of the Nazi Holocaust.raglb. by contrast. 7. Some scholars advocate rights for “sex workers. while gay men and lesbians have gained the right to privacy. no. European human rights law still does not protect the right to family life or the right to equality of sexual orientation. An approximate translation of the term would be “butt-fuckers. available at http://raglb. 81. universal human rights have only begun to cover issues of sexuality.Gay and Lesbian Rights
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of the last countries of the region that is considered to be not yet fully democratized.
NOTES
1..

At a regional level. www.org/Information/finding_a_place_in_international. Howard-Hassmann. 13.resolution. available at http://db. 14. 10.
. that a railroad company could deny travel benefits to a lesbian travel companion. The ECJ. See David M. pp. as well as Rhoda E.stiffer. pp. Ltd. panel on “Evolving International Human Rights. unmarried partner. www. It held that the UK policy excluding gays from its military. 12. 3. The Independent (12 September 1996). Senior Lecturer at the University of Melbourne. did not follow the advice of the EU Advocate General to strike down the discriminatory policy for travel benefits for lesbian partners. United Press International (UPI). violated their human right to privacy.” International Law Weekend (New York: 5 November 1999). and Martin Bowley.du. even though such concessions were offered to a heterosexual. Intlaw Library. “Gay Rights and the right to a Family: Conflict between Liberal and Illiberal Belief Systems. vol. p. which guarantees no discrimination on the basis of race. “Romanian Anti-Gay Law Sparks Criticism. It should be noted that the European Court of Justice. however.int/df/default. The Court did. 11.asp?lang=en. The Court unanimously held in favor of four service men and women who had been discharged during the mid-1990s because of their sexual orientation. Gay.qrd.edu/ humanrights/workingpapers/papers.” by Chris Walker. available at http://www. vol.” New York International Law Review. available on LEXIS. Ukcas. See also Carol Daugherty Rasnic.332
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country’s denial of that right. reject the applicant’s argument that the UK government’s behavior constituted degrading treatment..org. even though married heterosexuals have that right.. 12.htm. but issued new rules on social and sexual conduct. vol. 147 (1997) p.. etc. despite the practice 80 percent of the time.consilium. color.eu. “Romanian Anti-Gay Law Sparks Criticism.world/europe/romania/ep. Howard-Hassmann.penalties (19 September 1996). following denial in Colombia. at p. MN: Human Rights Resource Center/University of Minnesota Law School. ruling on EU law.C. 73–95. New Law Journal.” Human Rights Quarterly. as guaranteed by Article Eight of the European Convention. UPI. taken alone. 1216. “The Gay Cousin: Learning to Live with Gay Rights. 9. 23. as set forth in Article Three.” (20 September 1996). 10. Details from presentation on “Evolving Human Rights Norms around Sexuality. there is a case for conjugal visits among female lovers before the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. Bisexual and Transgender Rights: A Human Rights Perspective (Minneapolis. South-West Trains. The Court also held that the UK violated Article Thirteen of the Convention because the applicants had no effective remedy before a national authority to pursue alleged violations of the Convention. 2000) and Rhoda E. 2 (Summer 1999).ilga.on. Donahue. A Pink Platform. political opinion. The Draft Charter of fundamental rights of the European Union. Ltd. Grant case C-249/96 (1998). as well as investigations into applicants’ private lives and their subsequent dishonorable discharges. regardless of whether homo or heterosexual in nature. Lesbian. The revised British code of military conduct not only eliminated the bans on gays. “The Latest Pronouncement from the European Court of Justice on Discrimination against Homosexuals: Grant v. South-West Trans.” in the Journal of Homosexuality. 1 (February 2001). held in Grant v.” 15. Q. and in conjunction with Article Fourteen. no. national origin. no. 79–92.

and clinically. Ceaus ¸escu. from network anchors to desperate freelancers in search of their lucky scoops. cynical bureaucrats. It has triggered a rather ill-fated transition from the “multilaterally developed socialist society” to yet another avatar of the robber capitalist model. which had been advanced by Ceaus ¸escu’s expedient executioners). as it eventually turned out) toll was down from a whopping. i. The scant body of international literature on Romania generally lies within the Cold War organization of academic curiosity and is rife with the resilient stereotypes of intra-European Orientalism. second-rate scholars and rapacious fortune seekers. self-servingly optimistic
335
. restolution. Dracula.).e. during the various Communist campaigns such as village “systematization. haphazardly produced by the Western media.. surreal 60.2 In the immediate aftermath of the revolution. revolution and restoration. came to Romania. as did world experts in just about everything. which had been sucked into covering Romania by the mesmerizing images of the charred corpses in Timis ¸oara (which were later revealed to be a piece of ruthless propaganda). I would suggest. and other Romanian figures have been expropriated by a hegemonic Orientalist and Gothic narrative. idealistic or merely opportunistic missionaries of every faith. There seemed to be more interest in Romania when it was perceived as a rogue Soviet satellite. the Orientalist part has prevailed because the otherwise grisly (and unnecessary.17
Higher Education and the Post-Communist Generation of Students1
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Romania is not exactly a hot topic in Western scholarship. journalists of all statures.000 (a mathematical shrinking that infuriated the very Western journalists who had disseminated this arbitrary figure.” and finally during the bloody coup of 1989 (or revolution? Or. thanks to the roughly 1. While the Gothic part of the story was eventually salvaged.000 real casualties of 1989.

and taking into account my teach-
. something I have called “The Third Discourse. Romanian scholars writing in and on Romania. and there is some hope. “protochronism”)5 and Westernization (with its local hybrid. A brave new world of Romanian studies was on the rise. and civil society 101.”4 a fusion of local and international discourses situated at a critical distance from both autochthonism (with its specific Romanian expression. successively. I believe. Thus. the free market. Fortunately. Yet. and its reductio ad absurdum political correctness).336
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nongovernmental organization (NGO) professionals. It is. and gifted students. are rare in the global academic market. They came to rob it or to turn an honest penny while the Western aid lasted. Between these two groups. popular heroism. this situation is slowly changing for the better. their contexts. motivated. Lost among these were a small number of genuine. and anomie. and interpreted by their Western betters. and seem to be incapable of effectively speaking on their own. to teach it democracy. competent.” or the “native’s voice. imitation. although still limited number of authors. Even the more sophisticated recent discourses on the “people without history” have been struggling to include the “native’s point of view. This is not the West’s fault. and their discursive and institutional trajectories. it is the responsibility of Romanians themselves. from clients to partners. as autochthonists or postcolonial critics would not suggest.3 from the shrewd impostors to the consummate gentlemen scholars. a fact that has led to a curious situation: Romanians are almost exclusively represented.
THE PERSONAL CONTEXT
Among the scarce satisfactions I experienced in the short periods I spent between 1993 and 1997 at the University of Bucharest was meeting a few smart.6 is being proposed by an increasing. In hindsight. mendacity.” in forms that range from “thick description” (Clifford Geertz) to joint research projects and coauthorship. corruption. one of the most important and one of the most neglected stories in Romania. In this spirit. there have been a variety of locals. They all came to Romania to transform it into a short-lived icon of. They came to save its vagrant souls and to educate it. from the brazen autochthonists to committed Westernizers. and from learners to teachers. analyzed. firstrate people of all professions and allegiances. often after unpleasant episodes with Ceaus ¸escu’s regime. due to decades of isolation. and to quickly narrate it in the refereed journals needed by a booming academic market. analyzing their backgrounds. I will look at Romania’s emerging academics. Some of these specialists had already contributed the best available scholarly work on Romania and were ready to go back to that country. which had made their return prior to 1989 an impossibility. if they are serious about sharing the (inevitably mixed) blessings of globalization. and it is one which I believe ought to be told.

the residual. where the salaries and perks are better.7 Romanian faculty survive materially and intellectually thanks to alternative. Germany. and group cohesion of all those directly involved in higher education. conduct research.10 Evidently. service. extra-institutional resources.9 They often have a (parallel) career in politics and government. of a lively intellectual exchange.
ELECTIVE AFFINITIES
While I was teaching mainly theoretical and methodological courses with the history faculty at the University of Bucharest. and receive publication subsidies granted locally by foreign organizations. The ridiculously low wages in Romania (averaging the equivalent of $100 a month). and where rampant corruption opens the possibility for generating considerable amounts of quick money. quality. They work for the media. English-language graduate school where my students have come from twenty-odd countries—I have found that the best Romanian students compare favorably to their Western colleagues. have another way of beating the system: calling it quits in search of more rewarding jobs. as the Romanians are frequently more ambitious and hardworking. I had the privilege of working with some of the best graduate and undergraduate students drawn from the
. its Albanian-level infrastructure. to the sad profit of Romania’s antiquated. but it is very seldom discussed openly. even a poor. and the institutional stagnation are thus somewhat counterbalanced—at least for those who have other sources of income and access to Western academic infrastructures—by the feeling. whether domestically or abroad. For those who do not use their university positions corruptly to elicit “secondary gains” (Erving Goffman)—from the bribes offered by (mainly foreign) students in exchange for good grades. They also teach courses at private universities. the energy. maybe not just the illusion.The Post-Communist Generation of Students
337
ing experience in the United States. All those who can adjust to the higher mobility rate of a democratic society. They also translate. and so forth. take sojourns abroad (usually thanks to European Union–sponsored international faculty mobility schemes). This is a typical experience among those who teach in Romanian universities. declining prestige of university titles. fledgling one. especially for the private and international electronic media. France.8 They work in the widespread private tutoring system that prepares high school graduates for admission examinations (traditionally very competitive for job-market-oriented universities and faculties). and time spent to identify and use such alternative financial solutions strongly impacts the productivity. and at the Budapestbased Central European University—an international. attention. and the spirit of self-sacrifice keeps them in the otherwise meager business of higher education. corrupt system of in-service teacher training11—only pure scholarly passion.

and even reform them. The need for the 2000 generation to specialize early (perhaps prematurely). are not always available for the best trained (even those coming back to Romania with doctorates from major Western universities). are still dire. I developed a certain perspective on the post-1989 institutionalization of these fields and glanced into the “black box” of the post-1989 university student generation. even for Romanian books and periodicals. those who choose to follow more sophisticated and transdisciplinary academic agendas have had to fight the constraints of the higher education system. and political science. much less Western ones. are serious hindrances for those who stay in. charges of nepotism—the latter being a deeply embedded tradition). Due to the Stalinist purges and constant counter-selection. To get by. sociology (the largest and most sophisticated cohort). frequently at the expense of their own further training or research. most students and graduates dream of emigration.13 With poor career prospects.338
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fields of history. Administrative and legal changes have now made it possible for students to attend two or more programs simultaneously (within the constraints of Newtonian ontology.”12 Students attending universities outside their native localities are less and less common. especially those that need some form of job experience or seniority. or come back to. and mandatory ascetic lifestyles. while Generation 2000 was enjoying unprecedented opportunities to study abroad. philosophy. libraries are antiquated. or easily refute. and lack acquisition funds. letters of recommendation and job interviews increasingly resemble their Western models. as middle-aged competitors have already filled the higher slots in the food chain. and with an increasing number of job ads that are now posted widely by the public sector (especially in order to avoid. Romanian universities have lost much of their scholarly and educational capacities. which has proven detrimental to their academic training. Moreover. The local professional job market is more developed now than it was in the early 1990s. CVs and resumes are now replacing party or “cadre” files. This situation is not entirely unfair to the young because one could argue that. as rents and other living costs have outgrown their or their parents’ Spartan budgets. Romania. and the pressure to join the work force before graduation. make little or no use of computers (for cataloging or access to online databases). and evaluation procedures are slowly being introduced. many have had to take full-time jobs. while being radically different from those under which their 1945–1989 cohorts have struggled. taking advantage of having been around at the critical moment. with multinationals hunting heads.14 But the best positions. bordering on despondency and “quiet desperation. Even today. This heterogeneous group has grown up under circumstances that. this is
. those who were between thirty and forty years old in 1989 had to keep the institutions running. Their everyday lives are frequently hard. Over time. Several fields have barely managed to recover.

but still has to practice those discourses in order to keep an academic job. a subgroup for which the identity costs of settling in the West are considerably greater. but can be successfully integrated and socialized in the medium run. medicine. the split between one’s public and private lives becomes toxic. appear in the case of those specializing in the social sciences and the humanities. these individuals are subject to double alienation. both at home and in ethnic neighborhoods of the typical postmodern metropolis. by both students and faculty) and to choose their courses more freely.15 A special discussion is deserved for those who have the chance. and lifestyles. One can imagine a “politically correct” immigrant social scientist. as sociologists or literary scholars (to give only two examples) have to internalize the host country’s discursive practices in order to succeed professionally. the self-taught have existed everywhere in the world. even devastating. This is not easy. For the former. history. pick up thriving specializations (such as computer science. especially when one wants to be an interpreter or an analyst of the host country on an academic level. or (worse) suspended between two incompletely
. adjusting to the new country of residence is not necessarily easy. outsmart the Immigration and Naturalization Service (or its equivalent). teaching oneself can sometimes be the only choice for university students. It is. or to seek mentoring and supervision outside the institutions of formal learning. and have a bit of luck. Such people experience the usual hardships faced by educated immigrants. As they have left their native country too early to have mastered its culture. while sticking to their original values. to those who successfully turn their hobbies into professions. based on a sharp distinction between the public and the private. even one that would not have a problem adopting values which go against the grain of much of his native culture or worldview. one ends up in a situation of “double bind” (Gregory Bateson). For the latter. Bouvard and Pécuchet. They are more exposed to value-system clashes and cultural shock than their science and engineering counterparts. Of course. moreover. however. who embarked on an encyclopedic self-teaching spree upon retirement.The Post-Communist Generation of Students
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possible thanks to the unusually systematic skipping of classes. However. or fight for the chance. beliefs. the often segregated Western “multicultural” societies allow people with different cultural-ideological-religious allegiances to practice a superficial conformism in the workplace or in unavoidable social situations. becoming doubly socialized. is less possible. nearly fourteen years after the revolution. or business administration). A peculiar feature of Communism was the widespread need for the bright to teach themselves. However.17 Serious problems. from Flaubert’s characters. this double life. of studying in the West. alarming that. if one cannot adopt the discourse of his host country willingly. they might land a good job. As is often the case. economics. and society. Immigrants traditionally struggle to acquire their host country’s cultural intimacy (Michael Herzfeld).16 If they work hard.

but most would have liked to). One may lose face because it is precisely those who “patriotically” stayed home who know best that patriotism alone does not explain one’s reasons for staying in Romania. If such a scholar does not choose a third country as his or her area of field work and expertise (thus learning everything from scratch alongside his or her host country competitors). and lifestyle distances from the native country—they generate less anti-Western resentment than a stay in France.” politicians. they are considered VIPs. newcomers attain the smallest common denominator more easily. They start leading the life of the “nouveau riche. etc. If they return to Romania to stay. talk-show hosts. young scholars in the social sciences and the humanities are not better off either. For this reason. especially in countries that undergo. like post-Communist Romania. precisely because North America offers immigrants a quicker access to lower-middle-class status. although North American sojourns alienate newcomers more quickly and deeply—due to the dramatic spatial. and relaunching the dynamics of a professional and social life are all difficult. although they climb to the top social strata with as much difficulty as in Western Europe (with the exception of those who marry well. trying to keep close ties with their less fortunate friends. low-key social life on a budget. When they take the plane to Bucharest. deep transformations in the symbolic sphere. or simply as a consequence of their own perception of having failed at being “accepted” by their temporary host society. even the experience of a marginal life abroad (modest lodgings. and/or make money very quickly). and famous athletes.) begins to acquire pink shades. the only way you can affirm your status in an impoverished world. Those with a moderate temperament will be more discreet and modest. this means that one has failed (at something that many have never tried. frugality. perform exceptionally well. another sign that the country is headed toward third-world status. I mention this because many Romanians become quite resentful of the West as a consequence of unpleasant experiences abroad. Finding a good job.
. In North America especially. ideological. improvising a household. it does not always guarantee easy readjustment to the (largely) lost habitus (Pierre Bourdieu).” and are introduced to a new community of “intellectuals. One may only return to Romania with pride if one has acquired some wealth. As observed from the Carpathians. They will have lived long enough in a different (and better) world to experience a painful nostalgia. Romania is becoming increasingly more expensive. The return of the prodigal sons and daughters is not exactly a celebration: If one comes back. People who have returned from abroad often adopt a grandiose manner of spending money. In short.340
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internalized cultural intimacies: that of the native country and that of the host country. Romanians have to comfort themselves with the knowledge that it is a round-trip which will eventually bring them back to the West. bureaucratic hassle. cultural. albeit after a long time. or if one does not engage in scholarly projects that do not require the cultural intimacy of field work in the native country.

and attempt to contribute to its wellbeing by returning and contributing their expertise and professionalism to the betterment of the domestic economy. They must compete for the scant resources in Romania. leading to the fragmentation of intellectual circles and the disappearance of transdisciplinary studies. promising youth who pursued their vocation at state universities and abroad have found domestic jobs in their fields to be scarce and poorly paid. youth had optimistic ambitions to revive the arts and other neglected disciplines and to make a contribution to Romanian society. Whereas the previous generations have had an all-encompassing. Ireland. Several vain and vengeful
. the most important task of this decade will be the revision of local canons. There is still hope that those Romanians who have successfully emigrated and achieved financial and professional stability in the West will one day be nostalgic about their mother country. In the West. they have been resourceful in finding other means of supporting their efforts: through international organizations. the day may soon come when social benefits. in trying to achieve status within the country. or through scholarships at foreign institutions (as many Romanian families today rely on foreign aid to survive. one from Bucharest and the other from near the Danube. such as the Soros Foundation. However. as even the most optimistic of idealists have turned cynical toward their miserable society. However. Because of the current migrations of Romanian students into Western countries. and the development of global interaction. A competitive trend has arisen among youth of common backgrounds. the new generation at least attempts to concentrate on a single topic of interest. this phenomenon stagnated during the 1990s.
SINTANA REVISITED
Generation 2000 can be distinguished from the previous one by its attempts to specialize in a certain field or subject. the adoption of intelligent paradigms and discussions. Greece. In Romania. our hospitals will soon be run by elderly doctors and those who were not allowed to emigrate. This has occurred in the long run in countries like Italy. conducted anthropological studies in the town of Sintana for several months. and Sweden. As a result. encyclopedic style of writing. these youth have to maintain their mobility to work and travel abroad.The Post-Communist Generation of Students
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GENERATIONAL CONTEXT
While youth have found it harder to obtain funding for education from the state in the post-Communist era. Two college anthropology students whom I have taught. specialization can be taken to extremes. will be funded by the West as well). like scholarships. while it was the case that during the first few years of democracy.

this strong identity is the root of most tension.
NOTES
1. as evidenced from the fact that recently published historical texts in Romania are just as erroneous as they were under Communism. and heterogeneous discourse that has reached the point of stagnation. It is sad that the rich traditions and folklore of the heterogeneous. Ethnic anxieties and constant minority threats supported by neighboring countries are on the rise. A writer who is published in Romania today often partakes of an indigenous. the ideological and cultural disorientation produced by the Ceaus ¸escu era is. and has failed to grow and merge with the larger international discourse. and the transcendence into global interaction. fragmented. and buying into a collective identity. The two authors. Being part of the Romanian majority meant renouncing all individualistic aspects of life and behavior. It remains confined to a parochial backwater. Today’s Romanian citizen sees herself or himself as the victim of ethnic minority threats. This chapter—more a participant observer’s account than a study—draws freely on my “Generat ¸ia 2000: contextul s ¸i promisiunile unui debut. Liviu Chelce and Puiu Litea. who are attempting to bring about a new way of writing and new subjects to be debated.342
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groups cohabit in this town. Romanian civil society largely vanished during the Communist era for the “greater good” of a common culturalideological identity. which have been preserved since Communist times. still far from being replaced with the more progressive (and coherent) ideas and values of the West. the adoption of intelligent paradigms and discourses. In Romania. Yet. The two students noted a strong resistance to change among the inhabitants. Moreover. a new culture of “political theorists” has been identified. will be the revision of local canons. giving credit to previously unknown authors. The most important task of this decade. Nevertheless. Cultural and educational progress remains retarded. both for academia and the larger Romanian society as a whole. at the same time. who base their knowledge on folk tales and family history. the persistence of militant. as of this writing. Texts written before 1989 have been brought to light. They fail to realize that they are the victims of an ingrained nationalist pride that has obliterated all ethnic influences. ethno-nationalist overtones in the political context indicates the persistence of underdevelopment in Romanian political culture. These people speak of Sintana as a historic place of the “great Romanian experience.” This place produced dynamic heterogeneous identities resembling the mentality of provincial life. often come across stereotypes and inbred dogmas that cause conflict among these groups.” a longer text which was originally published in late 1999 by the Bucharest-based weekly 22 and was
. still retaining its old ethno-nationalist habits and overtones.

Romanians have chosen to defend the historical figure “behind” the myth. Romanian authors writing negatively of the national character and blaming their fellow countrymen for their misfortunes became popular again. Romania’s Orientalist (or. could be construed as the revenge of the repressed. I wrote both that text and this chapter while I was a Fellow at the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences. and E. Puiu Litea. To classics of self-stigmatization such as D.” The Gothic side of the same coin is largely organized around the myth of Dracula. inspired by the medieval ruling prince. 2000). Accordingly. Le stigmate et l’utopie (translated from Romanian by Claude Karnoouh and Mona Antohi. See my “Numai Cela ˘lalt polueaza ˘: analiza unui incident ecologic. the Gothic narrative could be actually used by the “natives” to subvert the logic of Orientalism. eds.
. intra-Orientalist. CA: Stanford University Press. Between Past and Future: The Revolutions of 1989 and Their Aftermath (Budapest: Central European University Press. 1994). or nested Orientalist) image can be understood in the context of the Western “invention” of Eastern Europe and of the Balkans. Montréal: L’Harmattan. 2. I would suggest that the Gothic narrative is not a mere subspecies of the Orientalist one because Orientalism assigns to its discursive object a passive negativity. a strategy which keeps them within the confines of demi-Orientalism. For a recent discussion along the same lines. Imagining the Balkans (New York: Oxford University Press. Cioran. 1997). “the Balkanization of the West. self-stigmatization. 1996).. with the pieces now in his Politice (Bucharest: Humanitas. see the last chapter of my Imaginaire culturel et réalité politique dans la Roumanie moderne. Inventing Europe: The Map of Civilization on the Mind of the Enlightenment (Stanford.” in Sorin Antohi and Vladimir Tismaneanu. One of the side effects of this intensive Romanian-Western interaction was the new vogue phenomenon of a traditional. pp. see my Imaginaire culturel et réalité politique.” During the recent Balkan wars. the brilliant post-1989 cultural revelation of H. I am grateful for the financial support provided by the Andrew W. See Larry Wolff. pp.-R. Patapievici was added. M. 61–77. someone could claim that colonizing (the imagination of the) colonizer is no small feat: such could be the emancipatory. Stanford University. For a theoretical discussion of ethnic stigma and several examples. with their books becoming bestsellers. see my “Habits of the Mind: Europe’s Post-1989 Symbolic Geographies. S ¸tefan Zeletin. 3. Vlad T ¸epes ¸. and Maria Todorova. Instead. and for Christopher Eisterhold’s painstaking assistance to Carey in editing this chapter. Dra ˘ghicescu. (Paris. cathartic function of the Dracula myth. more specifically. pp. 2000]). on Romania’s symbolic geography and the relevant uses of Edward Said’s concept. contract social local s ¸i economie secundar la Sintana [Bucharest: Nemira. “Les Roumains pendant les années 90.” which appeared in Monitorul (Ias ¸i) and Dilema (Bucharest).” the threatening potential of too much interaction with the Balkans. whereas the Gothic negativity is active.The Post-Communist Generation of Students
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reprinted as a preface to the first book of two of my former students (Liviu Chelcea. This activation of the passively negative is similar to that underwent by the concept of “Balkanization. Mellon Foundation (“Lindzey Fellowship”) and the Volkswagen Stiftung. even within the paradigm of postcolonial or subaltern studies. as other authors put it. non-Western elite. 267–97. 1999). some Serbs could see in their devastating negative actions a self-liberating escape from demi-Orientalism. demi-Orientalist. Thus. Carey for assistance with the English translation of some sections originally written in Romanian. I also thank Agatha Vlaic and Henry F. România profund ın comunism: dileme identitare. Orientalism. Géographie symbolique et identité sociale.

anti-canonical rebellion). Mécanismes identitaires et défintions radicales de l’ethnicité. going back at least to Ion Heliade-Ra ˘dulescu. gnosis. in a few cases. an author who was looking in the first half of the nineteenth century for the “equilibrium of the antithese. I have repeatedly argued in favor of what I called “The Third Discourse. vol. pp. or. This discourse would ideally combine the local ideas and historical experiences with those of the West. who speaks of a Romanian inclination towards intellectual-spiritual negotiation and synthesis (“Mihai S ¸ora and the Traditions of Romanian Philosophy. without losing sight of the neighbors (which are typically forgotten by most Romanians. Whether such cultural-ideological products are fortuitous or not. The latter combination seems inevitable after several decades of Communist “polytechnization” of the imaginary and “scientific atheism. 5. discursive practices. to (rather delirious) syncretic projects. along the lines suggested by Virgil Nemoianu. (Oxford: Oxford University Press. 167–214. 1978). alongside all the nuances between the autochthonist-Westernizing poles. 43 [March 1990]. Oxford: University of California Press. from their having an original language to the invention of the alphabet. “Cioran et le stigmate roumain. a phenomenon which is comparable to what I have called “Orthodoxist dandyism” (e. Los Angeles. are still the best) in most domains and human endeavors. translated by Hilda AndrewsRusiecka. The last decade has witnessed in Romania the emergence of increasingly diverse. Cioran were both consummate connoisseurs of the Western canon and fervent promoters of autochthonism).” a discourse that is neither the autochtonist rejection of the West (and.g. and by Mihai Spariosu. in the 1920s and 1930s. insulin. a far cry from the rather dichotomic relationship between autochtonists and Westernizers. 591–605). In this sense. This new discursive diversity includes. see Katherine Verdery. especially pp. odd hybrids due to cultural-ideological confusion. inter-textuality.. (b) after 1989. or cybernetics. National Ideology Under Socialism: Identity and Cultural Politics in Ceaus ¸escu’s Romania (Berkeley. 1994). M. This cultural-ideological confusion is not devoid of positive potential.” 4. who explores the creative side of liminality in a number of books and articles. 1991).” See Lucian Boia. La crise idéologique de l’Église (Paris: Calmann-Lévy. something that seems to illustrate the theory of a mutual contamination of religion.
. they thrive in Romania. as they were more concerned with its formal consequences and its rhetorical dimension (irony and selfirony. The Slavophile Controversy: History of a Conservative Utopia in Nineteenth-Century Russian Thought. the young Mircea Eliade and E. of the Other). Romanian culture has certain traditions. 1975).” the doctrine that claims Romanians were first (and.” To give only three examples: (a) Romanian champions of postmodernism in the 1980s imported the trend without its original left-wing ideological backbone. see Alain Besanμon. La Mythologie scientifique du communisme (Caen: Paradigme. due to what I called “geocultural bovarism”—see my chapter in Between Past and Future). Orthodox Christian ritual and New Age spirituality. typologically close to the one described by Andrzej Walicki in his seminal book. La Confusion des langues. nor its mindless imitation. more generally. For the best analysis of “protochronism.” Review of Metaphysics.344
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177–265. consequently. which merges Orthodoxy and liberalism. science and ideology. and (c) the religiosity of the educated strata seems to be dominated by a combination of traditional.

a new breed of left-wing postmodernists reading cultural and literary studies and ethics—have adopted the most dogmatic tenets of their North-American role models. Patapievici) and dubious nostalgics of national Communism. fully supportive of the otherwise reformist Minister of Education.” which is. Curiously. law-abiding citizens. Many such converts are uncomfortable with the seemingly endemic backwardness of their country and choose this curious metanoia as a (potentially self-stigmatizing) way out of the crisis. feminists. as in other former Communist countries. a political movement in support of the Constantinescu presidency.The Post-Communist Generation of Students
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6. Romanian academics avoid a serious discussion of their everyday misery. Ironically enough.-R. Solidaritatea Universitara ˘.” etc. The sharp decline in living standards is something people in post-Communist countries had to learn how to deal with. This organization seems to be. I tend to see in this uncritical adoption. released on 19 February 2000. for obvious reasons (besides. While the former criticize the “logocratic” (Czeslaw Milosz). faculty have not joined the vocal trade union movements.” “market economy. Professor Andrei Marga. which they could not live under the Communist regime. and the “normal” opportunism of those who know that their grant applications to Western funders depend on the use of key words such as “democracy. but is frequently (ab)used to play out indigenous concerns and polemics. after decades during which only the “parasites. mentioned the dangers of brain drain. and civil disobedience. Many live somehow the experience of activism.” as it was dubbed by the very influential essayist and media figure. Other people sincerely believe that the perfect world they read about in politically correct books and gray literature really exists in the West. and singles out obvious
. a category experienced first hand by only some of them. A number of radical Westernizers— including human and minority rights activists. has published a few candid declarations on the real situation of Romania’s education. while K–12 teachers have gone very frequently on strike. many ministers and MPs are university professors. A study of the reception of the largely extinct American debate around political correctness in the former Soviet bloc would be a great contribution to the social sciences. free association. as they perceive it. Romanians have mixed reactions to “political correctness. In the most recent and most radical document. asking for salary raises and a budget for education equal to 4 percent of GDP. (a duplicity that evokes life under Communism and the various ketmans described by Czesaw Milosz in his seminal The Captive Mind). “crypto-Communist” features of political correctness. So far. beyond the genuine cases of conversion. real democrats (who fear the import of this “American Communism. 7. of Romania’s drifting toward the Third World. the rejection of political correctness unites in Romania. instead. What would be in theory the faculty’s trade union. some were simply too young). People in difficult material situations should not lament incessantly: maintaining necessary social distances asks for a certain discretion. the latter abhor it as a capitalist perversion that is threatening national character and decent. most dramatically in February 2000.” the lazy petty-bourgeois and other class enemies were spectacularly poor. Nevertheless. Solidaritatea Universitara ˘. an almost desperate attempt to assimilate into the normative Western culture. Only in February 2000 have faculty organized protest rallies and gone on Japanese-style strikes in support of the teachers. more vocal when it comes to supporting the restoration of the monarchy or (simultaneously) supporting President Emil Constantinescu. hard-working. of course. H. the organization. stubbornly abstains from strikes and other open form of protest.

at low levels. most Ro-
. are reactions to two structural challenges: (a) Romanian higher education was artificially organized prior to 1989.o. Eventually. 10. and some of the institutional patterns are international (such as the reluctance on the part of university bureaucracies to offer tenure-track positions that cost them considerably more than part-time. and some of the financially challenged academics are in such high demand that they commute endlessly between several universities. Other emerging trends are significant in these respects. Most private universities hire faculty from state universities. adjunct appointments). The situation is not completely dissimilar to that of increasing numbers of (disposable) adjunct faculty in the U. More significantly. just like the multiplication of universities.) pay quite handsomely: The most successful emerging media personalities recruited f