Box 11.5 Reformers in

Box 11.5 Reformers in Chile negotiated changes gradually (continued) opposition of teachers’ unions to performance-related pay. Before implementing a mandatory program for all teachers, the administration introduced a voluntary individual assessment and incentive system that set a precedent for teacher evaluation. Because these steps allowed time to adjust and gain support for the new system, they were key to its success. Establishing credibility with the teachers’ union early on was another key strategy. The Teacher Statute passed in 1991 conferred civil service status on teachers, guaranteeing associated job benefits, protection, and an opportunity for centralized wage negotiations. This move sent a positive signal to teachers. Trust between the union and the government increased further through regular discussions on the implementation of reforms. As part of these efforts, union members codesigned the performance evaluations used for the incentive program. A final factor in the successful adoption of these reforms was their inclusion in a broader set of reforms that increased resources for education and raised teachers’ salaries. SNED became part of the teacher professionalism pillar of the Full School Day reform package. More teachers were covered by the reforms, and the incentive amount was increased. Salary increases before the start of the program may have helped to lessen opposition to the mandatory individual pay incentive. As a consequence, the Chilean programs remain one of the few long-running “pay for performance”–type reforms that have been successfully scaled to the national level. In other contexts, such reforms have often been unpopular, but in Chile the reforms continue: in 2016 new legislation passed to widen the coverage of the incentive program, while strengthening teacher professional development. Sources: WDR 2018 team, based on Avalos and Assael (2006); Contreras and Rau (2012); Delannoy (2000); Mizala and Schneider (2014); OECD (2016); World Bank (2017a). have contributed to Chile’s steady improvement in international learning assessments. Negotiations can also include strategies to compensate actors disadvantaged by reform. One such strategy is to provide targeted assistance to students harmed by reforms to improve system efficiency. Additional services for children affected by school closures, for example, can ease school consolidations. 28 Another strategy is to use “dual-track” reforms to protect some incumbents from the negative impacts of reforms. For example, pay-for-performance programs in Peru and in the District of Columbia in the United States were initially introduced voluntarily. Compensating perceived losers can help get reforms approved, but that approach comes with risks. In 2005 the Indonesian government introduced a comprehensive reform program aimed at raising the competencies of teachers. Teacher certification was the centerpiece of the reforms, with teachers required to pass a competency test to continue teaching. 29 In exchange for these new obligations, the negotiated agreement provided certified teachers with an additional monthly allowance as large as their base salary. But early in implementation, the requirements for certification were diluted because of political pressures, so that teachers were no longer required to pass a competency test. In the end, the reforms had little impact on teacher competencies or student learning, but they had a major impact on public spending. 30 By 2011, with less than a third of teachers certified, 9 percent of the education budget already went to certification allowances. 31 Building partnerships between schools and communities Sustained reform requires strong partnerships between schools and communities. Where incentives for systemwide reform are weak, local action can substitute. In South Africa, the political and economic context has constrained efforts to improve education performance in some provinces, but local progress has been made possible in some schools through strong partnerships between parents and schools. 32 Local partnerships are particularly important in fragile and conflict-affected areas. 33 For example, a program that built community-based schools in Afghanistan reduced the distance to school, increased enrollment, and improved learning outcomes, particularly for girls. 34 Yet these local partnerships tend to work best when supported by responsive higher-level institutions, which are sorely lacking in fragile environments. Aligning the incentives and capacity of system actors with learning The success of reforms depends on the ability, incentives, and motivations of public officials. Managing 206 | World Development Report 2018

education systems effectively requires competent public service–oriented personnel, which in turn means commensurate pay and working conditions. 35 But if the political economy of education is misaligned with public goals, candidates with less desirable attributes may be attracted to public service. In Mexico, teachers were often hired based on political patronage rather than merit, which resulted in lower-quality hires compared with those in test-based systems. 36 Efforts to build the capacity of bureaucracies have been disappointing. 37 Even where individual capacity is built successfully, the incentives to use this capacity to develop and implement effective policies are often absent. 38 Put another way, building organizational capability to improve education outcomes tends to work best when incentives in education systems are aligned with the same goals. For example, where politicians face stronger incentives to provide public goods, this has inspired efforts to build professional bureaucracies that can deliver better public services. 39 Encouraging innovation and agility FIGURE 11.2 Political and technical complexities make it challenging to design and implement policies to improve learning. Some parts of the solution to low learning are relatively straightforward. Inadequate infrastructure and learning materials, while logistically challenging, can be addressed directly: the technologies needed are well known, and most education systems have enough experience solving these issues. But improving what happens in the classroom is much harder. It involves changing student and teacher behavior, as well as supporting teachers in efforts to tailor their teaching to the needs of their students. The traditional approaches to reform—in which predefined interventions are introduced with little room to adapt during implementation—are rarely effective. Learning reforms need a more agile approach, with room for adaptation. 40 This is not the same as experimenting with different interventions in pilot projects. Rather, it means testing approaches at scale in their political and economic contexts and using the existing capabilities of implementing agencies. A recent review of complex public management reforms, including in education, highlighted the key elements of successful reforms. 41 Those reforms started out with a clear articulation of the problem, together with an initial set of potential solutions, and then adopted solutions that emerged from experimentation during implementation (figure 11.2). Final interventions tended to be hybrids, drawing on local and global evidence. Figure 11.2 Problem-driven iterative adaptation drives successful reforms 1 Define and diagnose problems 1 Redefine and rediagnose problems 1 Redefine and rediagnose problems Repeat 2 Design options 2 Redesign options 2 Redesign options IMPROVED LEARNING 5 Adapt 3 Implement 4 Evaluate 3 Implement 4 Evaluate 3 Implement 4 Evaluate Source: Adapted from Andrews, Pritchett, and Woolcock (2017). How to escape low-learning traps | 207