Wednesday, November 26, 2014

Premier Abadi’s Attempt To Reform Iraq’s Security Forces

Prime Minister Haider Abadi had the unfortunate experience
of becoming Iraq’s leader after the fall of Mosul. When he stepped into office
the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) had collapsed in the north in the face of the
insurgency. This was due to deep institutional problems and the politicization
of the force by his predecessor Nouri al-Maliki. Abadi has attempted to reform
the ISF by getting rid of Maliki loyalists and those deemed unqualified. This
is a necessary step in a very long process to create a professional military
and police that can defend the country.

(EPA)

Given the dire security situation in the country cleaning up
the ISF was going to be Premier Abadi’s top priority. He got right to business
by retiring the Ground Forces Commander General Ali Ghidan and the deputy chief
of staff of operations General Abboud Qanbar al-Maliki on September 23, 2014 shortly
after coming into office. At the same time, Abadi got
rid of the Office of Commander in Chief, which Nouri al-Maliki had used as
an alternative chain of command to directly give orders to officers and units.
On September
25, he replaced the commander in Salahaddin General Ali Furaiji with
General Abdul Wahab. Four
days later, Abadi took a more sweeping step when he dismissed 132 officers
including three senior ones and 24 brigade commanders. The next
month he fired another 150 high-ranking officers, most of which were in
Ninewa, Salahaddin and Kirkuk when insurgents overran those provinces in June. Then
on November
12 the premier cleaned out another 36 top officers in what he said was to
increase professionalism and get rid of corruption. Some of those dismissed and
retired included the Army Chief of Staff General
Babaker Zebari, four
of his deputies, the secretary general of the Defense Ministry General
Ibrahim al-Lami, chief of the Baghdad Operations Command General Abed
al-Amir Shammari, the head of the Anbar Operations Command General
Rasheed Flayh, commander of the Samarra Operations Command General Sabah
Fatlawi, and the director of Military Intelligence at the Defense Ministry
General Hatem Magsusi. Then on November
17 the two top officers at the Babil Operations Command were reassigned to
the Defense Ministry. Finally, on November
23 the prime minister replaced the deputy Interior Minister Adnan Asadi who
ran the ministry for Maliki, and a new head
of intelligence was appointed as well. These were all necessary moves to reform
the ISF. Many of these men like General Ghidan and Adnan Asadi were Maliki
loyalists who owed their positions to the former premier. Generals Ghidan and al-Maliki
were also blamed
for the fall of Mosul. Others like General Flayh were known for stealing
supplies from his men, while the majority of Anbar the province under his
command fell to insurgents. If Abadi is intent upon cleaning up the police and
army he had to start at the top.

All these officers were symptomatic of the deeper problems
facing the Iraqi Security Forces. First, corruption is endemic. Many soldiers
and police do not want to serve and pay their officers a portion of their
salaries so they don’t have to show up to work. In turn, their commanders
register fake names to collect more money. Another issue is that officers are
in charge of requisitioning supplies for their units, but often take the funds
for themselves. Some of these men bought their positions as well from their
higher ups. This creates a culture of graft and abuse within the police and
armed forces, and leads to a leadership gap as well as many commanders are in
it for the money rather than to serve their country. Additionally, Maliki
politicized the ISF. Like many leaders in developing countries he was afraid of
a coup, so he placed his own men in leadership positions, many of which had no
right to be there. He also used the Office of Commander and Chief and the
operations commands to get around the chain of command, so that he could
directly control the forces. Abadi’s moves have attempted to address some of
these problems, but ultimately he has to repair the institutions. If not then new
officers will simply fall into the same pattern as their predecessors. It will
take years to really solve these problems, and require more firings, court
martials, retraining and other steps to create a professional, competent and
accountable security forces in a country where those attributes are sorely
lacking in the government overall.

2 comments:

PeteM
said...

Interesting account of this purge of the ISF, Joel. I think Abadi has no military background so who handed him the list of those to be removed, was it Soleimani? Who, besides the few you list, are going to fill these vacant positions, will it be personnel from the Badr Brigades?

I wonder if there were incentives offered to the high ranking officers because they could become powerful enemies if not treated carefully.

Corruption of this magnitde is difficult to control so Iran taking a firm hand in the ISF may be they only way to root it out.

Many of the replacements for the dismissed officers were division commanders. Some but not all of them have been listed in the press.

As for Iran determining who should take over the ISF that would only cause more problems that Abadi probably wants to avoid. Tehran would only put in their own loyalists and it's important to remember that one of it's main goals is make sure that Iraq never develops as a strong country again.

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Musings On Iraq was started in 2008 to explain the political, economic, security and cultural situation in Iraq via original articles and interviews. If you wish to contact me personally my email is: motown67@aol.com