Ok, so saw the list on the PERS-472 website (http://www.public.navy.mil/bupers-npc/o ... ault2.aspx). Was anyone else shocked that only 3 FY-17 O-5's were selected with the other 6 getting selected on their 2nd and 3rd looks? And the 3 FY-17 selectees all had XO experience. Hmmmmm, I guess it pays to be an XO, so don't take those Joint jobs! Also in the big picture, what does it mean being an O-5 CO now? How many of the jobs does the CO have operational control over? Aren't most just MT&E? Definitely not equivalent to being a URL CO.

Not shocked. the more senior O5s have an additional year of experience, maybe 2. they are better known to community leadership/the board (this cannot be overstated), maybe had a letter in last year. what does O5 CO mean? good question - so far it means promotion to O6. regarding you comments on XO - do you mean at O4 level or O5 level? probably does pay, but more at the O4 level. XO at O5 is 50/50 for CAPT, likely worse, given O5 COs in the mix. joint is tough because it is 3 years of lock down (typically). thus, it almost has to be a milestone because of the time requirement. Those at O4 don't have enough time to get everything done - a result of holding off on promotions in 2011 and 2012. that created a short tenure at O4 for many who find themselves in zone for O5 in the next year or two, possibly in zone with less than 4 years as an O4. can't pin oak leaves on an officer at the 11 year mark and continue to manage as though they have 6 years preparing for O5. well, i guess it can be done, but it makes those officers look undeveloped.

things i find interesting:-since the onset of the command board, every O5 CO we've had has been worthy of O6. this means we haven't had one sub par O5 CO(?). do we know the job they do well enough? do we tell the truth in FITREPs or are we confirmation biased? Is the screening board that effective?-O5 CO doing MTE: agree we, as a community, don't own ops (except maybe dco) but what's wrong with MTE? no, it's not equivalent to URL CO and won't be for a long time, if ever. but, that's ok, it doesn't have to be. running a command and doing ops are different things.-we continue to report up to FCC/C10F via WAR as if operations at national sites and in overseas theaters are somehow owned by us. we give this information to someone who is completely powerless to do anything and has no authority to make decisions. and, we continually waste time and effort of our people in asking for it. why are we doing this? -on our COs/community owning ops: the arrangements we have with NSA, CYBERCOM/FLTCYBER, and the Fleet Navy have our personnel involved in operations, but not ops which our community directs, determines, or owns (save maybe dco). with this in mind, kind of seems like our value could be estimated by how well we are integrated with those that do own ops, huh? we're pretty good at nsa and cybercom. 2 out of 3 ain't bad - unless one is 100% title 50 and the other depends on the former to be able to work at all. and weren't we the ones who built it this way?! we are supposed to bring value to the service and title 10 stuff, but i see VERY few billets to that end, particularly above O4. it seems pretty small value added when juxtaposed against the expense. we're completely out of balance now, but i think we'll get fixed a little, at least on the cyber side when CYBERCOM splits out and starts doing title 10 at/with the regional COCOMs. probably be disappointing to the Navy crypotologic community, but not to the other services and the COCOMs.

I've derived more joy from being a CO than I deserve. I haven't worried about whether I was viewed as equivalent to a URL CO (whatever that means) - because we don't lead ships, airplanes, submarines or cyberspace tools - we lead people. Command has not been about competing with or comparing myself to others, instead its been about FOCUSING on others (i.e. my team) to have maximum influence and positive impact.

As I've done in previous roles, I continue to avail myself to ANYONE who wants to discuss specific topics further - in this case the topic of command leadership. I will make the time for those who are interested.

yoshi wrote:-we continue to report up to FCC/C10F via WAR as if operations at national sites and in overseas theaters are somehow owned by us. we give this information to someone who is completely powerless to do anything and has no authority to make decisions. and, we continually waste time and effort of our people in asking for it. why are we doing this?

And we've been doing it for at least a decade (personal experience), and most likely a LOT longer than that. Daily briefs to the NIOC CO were straight regurgitation of the PACFLT and 7th Fleet briefs (if information didn't jive 100% a few ringers in the audience could always be counted upon to call the JO out in front of the boss). Can't comment on WARs getting pushed up nowadays because that post-dates my NIOC time. The "why" was always "JO development" and teaching them how to brief seniors, but I found it to be a huge investment in Sailors' time and attention when their primary purpose was providing I&W to afloat units.

yoshi wrote:-on our COs/community owning ops: the arrangements we have with NSA, CYBERCOM/FLTCYBER, and the Fleet Navy have our personnel involved in operations, but not ops which our community directs, determines, or owns (save maybe dco).

Would be curious how you define "directs, determines, or owns" because I can give you examples of operations where the GCC shifts TACON of an afloat asset from cool-kid trigger pullers to the naval component commander for the sole purpose of executing a mission given to C10F. For all intents and purposes, C10F absolutely influences those missions, how they're conducted, and coordinates directly with the GCC. I would add they exert so much influence that a conversation between VADM Gilday and his VADM colleague on the URL side delayed a planned operation.

yoshi wrote:We're completely out of balance now, but i think we'll get fixed a little, at least on the cyber side when CYBERCOM splits out and starts doing title 10 at/with the regional COCOMs. probably be disappointing to the Navy crypotologic community, but not to the other services and the COCOMs.

I'll believe that the split from NSA will allow CYBERCOM to provide more support to GCCs when I see it. I don't think anyone thinks its a good idea, except for CYBERCOM.

Owning mission = decision authority to conduct operations in a given theater, whether they be joint (COCOM level) or component (#'d Fleet). Influencing, persuading, coordinating are not the same thing. Think about how many people we have in FCC/C10F doing the influencing, persuading, coordinating. Might they be as impactful if they were sitting in the COCOM/component CDR with the decision maker, rather than having to coordinate through their own organization's equities from thousands of miles away? Might those people better understand the intent of the COCOMs, might they more easily bring CYBERCOM success? Seems much easier to coordinate, influence, persuade in person rather than continuing to rely on a three star to pick up the phone to have the necessary impact. I don't think that's the solution - I think that's the problem. We do this routinely on one star staffs at O4 and O5, and with only one or two officers; we should be doing this at the COCOMs and Component CDRs with CAPTs who are not in the J2/N2.

The basic strategic flaw with the US military's cyber approach is it spoils unity of C2 within theaters, which is something you can't share or divide by domain. If you could do this, you wouldn't need an OTC/CWC. Sure, we can negotiate, influence, and deconflict. Is that timely and efficient enough to be viable in today's world (and I'm not even touching the career long targeting process yet)? Maybe for some Title 50 where an adversary doesn't know it's affected, but not for Title 10. No matter the technology, genius, or quality, there is no decision advantage when your operational process takes longer than your adversaries. Our approach has elevated the decision/action level required. Higher authority levels are inversely proportional to decision cycle speed. It takes far more people far more time to coordinate, execute, or forestall operations than if title 50 cyber belonged to theater COCOMs. CYBERCOM has to split off from NSA to be practically effective for military operations. We'll agree to disagree on this one.

The world is moving closer to Title 10 scenarios (Ukraine, North Korea, Iran) and preparedness requires our strategic design accommodate this fact. Thus, what we can learn from cyber/SIGINT/EW inherently must give way to what we can do, or support doing, with the same. It doesn't mean intelligence isn't important, it just means Title 10 requirements should be a priori matters (which clearly isn't the case today). This requires a change in approach and in our organizations.

yoshi wrote:Owning mission = decision authority to conduct operations in a given theater, whether they be joint (COCOM level) or component (#'d Fleet). Influencing, persuading, coordinating are not the same thing. Think about how many people we have in FCC/C10F doing the influencing, persuading, coordinating. Might they be as impactful if they were sitting in the COCOM/component CDR with the decision maker, rather than having to coordinate through their own organization's equities from thousands of miles away? Might those people better understand the intent of the COCOMs, might they more easily bring CYBERCOM success? Seems much easier to coordinate, influence, persuade in person rather than continuing to rely on a three star to pick up the phone to have the necessary impact. I don't think that's the solution - I think that's the problem. We do this routinely on one star staffs at O4 and O5, and with only one or two officers; we should be doing this at the COCOMs and Component CDRs with CAPTs who are not in the J2/N2.

The basic strategic flaw with the US military's cyber approach is it spoils unity of C2 within theaters, which is something you can't share or divide by domain. If you could do this, you wouldn't need an OTC/CWC. Sure, we can negotiate, influence, and deconflict. Is that timely and efficient enough to be viable in today's world (and I'm not even touching the career long targeting process yet)? Maybe for some Title 50 where an adversary doesn't know it's affected, but not for Title 10. No matter the technology, genius, or quality, there is no decision advantage when your operational process takes longer than your adversaries. Our approach has elevated the decision/action level required. Higher authority levels are inversely proportional to decision cycle speed. It takes far more people far more time to coordinate, execute, or forestall operations than if title 50 cyber belonged to theater COCOMs. CYBERCOM has to split off from NSA to be practically effective for military operations. We'll agree to disagree on this one.

The world is moving closer to Title 10 scenarios (Ukraine, North Korea, Iran) and preparedness requires our strategic design accommodate this fact. Thus, what we can learn from cyber/SIGINT/EW inherently must give way to what we can do, or support doing, with the same. It doesn't mean intelligence isn't important, it just means Title 10 requirements should be a priori matters (which clearly isn't the case today). This requires a change in approach and in our organizations.

Completely agree that cyber C2 is hosed, but I disagree with your definition of "owning mission." What does the "authority to conduct operations" mean? Necessary authorities to conduct operations exist for all mission areas, and if there are restrictions or authority gaps the units tasked to conduct the missions go back to the requisite Combatant Command through their component commander to seek those additional authorities via EXORD. SROE 022/024, 522, and others are examples that often have to be explicitly requested and justified. The CCMD sets the priorities and provides general tasking, but the components and lower level units DEFINITELY control how those tasks are conducted. So, to say that we don't "own mission" is incredibly misleading.