The emergence of a more visible and powerful judiciary in Mexico in the last 20 years fits a pattern seen in new democracies all over the world. Democratization and judicialization in post-authoritarian regimes seem to converge, at times acting as mutually reinforcing processes. As part of the strengthening of the courts, the role of judicial review of administrative action has expanded considerably and it has given them a bigger role determining the boundaries of the relationship between citizens and the administration. This thesis looks at one instance of judicialization of administrative law using judicial review of expropriation in Mexico as a case study. Mexico has had some form of constitutional review since the nineteenth century, but its role has been largely ignored because Mexico’s system of government for the most part of the twentieth century can be described as a dominant party system in which a single party governed for almost 70 years. The Mexican political system was somewhere in between a full authoritarian regime and a democracy. In this context, formal judicial independence was severely limited and it was assumed that the courts never challenged the executive branch and were completely subordinate. This research examines how the Supreme Court in Mexico decided cases in which owners challenged expropriation orders between 1917 and 2008 and it concludes that judicial review of administrative action in Mexico was stronger than what is generally presupposed and that this judicialization of administrative law is increasingly having some negative consequences.