Commentary on how China and the world are adapting to each other -- or not.

December 05, 2013

The Sweet & Sour of Biden's China Visit

Vice President Biden is completing his visit to China as part of his broader trip through the region. Although China's announcement of a new Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) has dominated the headlines and been a central part of the discussions everywhere he goes, he has addressed a great many issues during the past several days.

I'm particularly struck, though, by the sweet and sour mix of his meetings with Xi Jinping. They in a nutshell embody what may be enduring elements of the broader US-China official relationship.

On the sweet, positive side, there was genuine, sustained personal engagement and substantive back-and-forth. The briefing by a US official stressed how good their personal relationship is and how they talked broadly and strategically about many issues in ways that did not simply sound like negotiations. This is a huge improvement over the interactions during the 10 years of Hu Jintao's leadership. He never deviated from the the cue cards.

Second, the Chinese and Americans aren't letting disagreements on some issues hold the entire relationship hostage. The ADIZ problem isn't stopping cooperation in other areas the way a crisis would've put everything else up in the air, at least temporarily, as in the past, e.g., the 1995-96 Taiwan Straits Crisis and the May 1999 embassy bombing. The two countries are collaborating bilaterally, regionally, and globally on a host of issues. For example, in the midst of these regional events, the Chinese are in Bali at the WTO ministerial, and they've been sufficiently cooperative for there to be a deal. The recalcitrant party is India, which is opposed to a deal for ideological reasons.

And third, the disagreement over the ADIZ is being contested through international rules and their different interpretations. China did not draw vague lines in the western Pacific and start shooting willy nilly. Instead, they studied assiduously about precedents regarding ADIZ's in other countries (22 other countries have ADIZs). They gave very precise geographic coordinates, developed a justification, and are seeking recognition of its existence by others as a basis for their sovereignty claims. Of course, the Chinese are trying to change the facts on the ground (and we should expect other ADIZs before too long), but the attention to international legal frameworks is significant and now commonplace in just about everything the Chinese do.

On the other hand, the relationship has some sour, negative dynamics. Good personal atmospherics didn't stop Xi and Biden from articulating differing positions across a range of issues, from the ADIZ to cyber to human rights. The US and China have narrowed their differences on many issues over the years, but there may be hardwired limits to how much overlap there is in their interests. The two countries compete economically and for strategic influence, and they have different values regarding human rights.

Also, although the two sides are able to compartmentalize and keep problems from bringing the entire relationship into doubt, one does wonder on what issues the US is willing to draw a line. The US is willing to bring cases to the WTO, stop individual Chinese investments it finds threatening, speak out on individual human rights violations, critique specific Chinese military actions, and engage in its own "rebalacing" effort. On the one hand, this represents a cautiously optimistic hedge strategy in which the US promotes cooperation wherever possible but simultaneously deals with areas of disagreement in a forthright manner. But I do wonder sometimes if this is tactically wise and strategically foolish. The bet from the US side is that extended engagement is socializing the Chinese to accept current international norms, but to use a football metaphor, it may be that the US is just gradually and imperceptably giving away field position as China advances downfield. China's bet may be that the US gradually declines and its willingness to defend allies and its own interests so far from the US mainland declines. (Take a look at the most recent polls on the growing isolationism of many Americans.)

Which brings us to the third point. The US has been focused on encouraging China to follow international rules and norms, expecting that compliance in and of itself will make China a status quo power. But the rules don't just promote cooperation; they are also used for competition. And China's greater attention to the international rules of the game is making it a better player at the game. They still do not have the reputational stripes of the US and Europeans, or even the Brazilians, but just because the game has moved from the streets to court houses, press rooms, legislatures, and negotiating tables house doesn't mean competition is going away.

The cumulative result of all of this is a complex relationship characterized by simultaneous cooperation and competition, extensive interaction and communication yet sustained disagreements, and a greater use of legal and regulatory tools on both sides as part of this competition. Such a relationship is competitive, but the extent of interdependence and the location of engagement is quite different than that between the US and Soviets. Perhaps we are in for a long sweet and sour era of lukewarm peace.