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Several readers sent word that the website for TrueCrypt, the popular disk encryption system, says that development has ended, and Windows users should switch to BitLocker. A notice on the site reads, "WARNING: Using TrueCrypt is not secure as it may contain unfixed security issues. ... You should migrate any data encrypted by TrueCrypt to encrypted disks or virtual disk images supported on your platform." It includes a link to a new version of TrueCrypt, 7.2, and provides instructions on how to migrate to BitLocker. Many users are skeptical of a site defacement, and there's been no corroborating post or communication from the maintainers. However, the binaries appear to be signed with the same GPG key that the TrueCrypt Foundation used for previous releases. A source code diff of the two versions has been posted, and the new release appears to simply remove much of what the software was designed to do. It also warns users away from relying on it for security. (The people doing an audit of TrueCrypt had promised a 'big announcement' soon, but that was coincidental.) Security experts are warning to avoid the new version until the situation can be verified.

A FOSS project shutters itself and, rather than linking to a fork or posting tarballs of a few versions' worth of source, recommends commercial alternatives? If this isn't a hacked site then I'm thinking Lavabit - someone pressured someone else and in order to spill without spilling, they made the most absurd possible kind of announcement that they were closing.

Yeah, it doesn't quite make sense up. First, why has the page suddenly dropped all styling and logos? And then there's the quote at the top:

The development of TrueCrypt was ended in 5/2014 after Microsoft terminated support of Windows XP. Windows 8/7/Vista and later offer integrated support for encrypted disks and virtual disk images. Such integrated support is also available on other platforms (click here for more information). You should migrate any data encrypted by TrueCrypt to encrypted disks or virtual disk images supported on your platform.

It seems to imply that the following thought process: The only purpose of TrueCrypt was in order to support Windows XP, which is no longer supported, so it's not useful for that purpose anymore. Since new operating systems provide their own encryption mechanisms, there is no value in the project, so we're shutting things down.

However, the fact that Windows XP has lost official support does not mean that no one is using Windows XP anymore. Further, one of the valuable aspects of TrueCrypt was that it was open source (meaning the encryption could be independently verified) and cross-platform (meaning a disk encrypted on Mac could be accessed on Windows and vice versa). There's still a lot of potential uses for such a project.

Aside from that, what would possibly be the harm in continuing to provide the source code? If the intention were to deny people binaries as a method of providing a stern warning to potential users, surely they could still provide the source and say, "... but if you know what you're doing well enough to make use of the source code, go ahead and use at your own risk."

Something's wrong here, unless the people maintaining the project are just kind of retarded.

All sorts of people who like the idea of encryption enough to check a few boxes and type their password, but not enough to make their system hard to support or use, and who don't consider their data valuable enough to be worth much extra work -- i.e. people choosing between doing nothing to protect their data and doing something. Common applications include transparent encryption on all corporate desktops/laptops.

Whether you trust MS or not, BL provides reasonable protection against the most common threat -

As a former softie, all I can say is that i would trust bitlocker over pretty much any solution on the market and here are the reasons why:

1. Microsoft would not knowingly backdoor bitlocker. The NSA pressured the team leads, but management was adamantly opposed and declined to acquiesce.

2. Suppose bitlocker was knowingly backdoored, the amount of reputational harm that Microsoft would endure would literally be crippling. Crippling not with the OSS crowd, but enterprise customers. The only loser would be Microsoft and they would not recover.

3. There simply not enough people involved in the Truecrypt project at the moment to make it a truly secure solution. This isn't the Linux Kernel. For FDE, I wouldn't trust an FOSS until more audits and testing has been done. The reason is not because of technicalities, but because of legal liability reasons. For an FDE solution I either would want a private company to back the product or I would want a strong and active community truly backing the continuing development of the FOSS.

That said, I'm really hoping the audits come back positive and that development continues.

I have been slowly moving from TrueCrypt to Bitlocker just because I've had issues with permissions and Windows 8/8.1.

It may not be as secure as TC, but it is a lot more recoverable, and to me, my main reason for using FDE is ensuring that a stolen HDD winds up "just" a hardware theft, and not something that can be used for extortion (yes... when I was in college, I was asked to help someone who had some private things stored on his laptop... and when the thieves stole it, they demanded $3000 or else they would post all the nudie pictures of his GF that the victim took to the Internet.)

The recoverability issue is nice. I can enable BitLocker on a drive or image. Then, add a recovery key, and a certificate. Then, the image can be copied/used on a cloud provider, and due to no easy to guess password being used, brute force is off the table. To boot, one can have the computer automatically unlock the drive, so it is basically a set and forget mechanism (with good and bad points.) The BDE keys for recovery wind up stashed in an old smartphone that shed its Wi-Fi, BT, and 3G antenna. Less attack surface for a remote intruder.

For file archives, tossing them into an expandable disk image and flipping on BitLocker may not be perfect, but it seems to do the job to keep people out.

As for Linux and OS X, I'd say Apple's encrypted Sparse Images are useful (as only small 8 MB "bands" change.) LUKS is also decent on Linux.

The nice thing about TC was the fact that it was one program that worked on three platforms, so you could stash your files in a TC container (assuming FAT32 for a filesystem) on your Mac, then access it on your Windows machine.

Automatically unlock the drive to boot is a false sense of security, if the computer can boot autonomously then it has the key and therefore so does anyone who steals the whole machine (as opposed to stealing just the drive)... You're no longer relying on the strength of the encryption, but rather the strength of the obfuscation used to hide the key.

Won’t comment on unsubstantiated “senior developer” claims, but as for the encrypting malware issue, recovery of older versions of Cryptodefense was possible because the malware itself had a bug which leaked the necessary decryption keys somewhere on the target system. After the bug was made public, future versions of the malware fixed it and are no longer recoverable using that technique. It wasn’t a Bitlocker backdoor or similar. Not that I have evidence to contradict the existe

As a former softie, all I can say is that i would trust bitlocker over pretty much any solution on the market and here are the reasons why:

1. Microsoft would not knowingly backdoor bitlocker. The NSA pressured the team leads, but management was adamantly opposed and declined to acquiesce.

That was then. Nowadays we have (unconstitutional) things like a National Security Letter [wikipedia.org] where they can force you to put in a backdoor and prohibit you from telling anybody about it under penalty of imprisonment. If you are a little guy like Lavabit you can just go out of business rather than comply but if you are Microsoft you put the backdoor in, telling only the actual people that need to know and informing them they are going to federal PMITA prison if they tell anyone. Unless you were the guy who put the code in you wouldn't know anything about it.

2. Suppose bitlocker was knowingly backdoored, the amount of reputational harm that Microsoft would endure would literally be crippling. Crippling not with the OSS crowd, but enterprise customers. The only loser would be Microsoft and they would not recover.

With only binaries to analyze it is certainly possible that a NSA backdoor could go undetected in bitlocker. Particularly if the backdoor was in the form of an intentional error in an algorithm or a purposefully weak cipher (hello RSA!).

3. There simply not enough people involved in the Truecrypt project at the moment to make it a truly secure solution. This isn't the Linux Kernel. For FDE, I wouldn't trust an FOSS until more audits and testing has been done. The reason is not because of technicalities, but because of legal liability reasons. For an FDE solution I either would want a private company to back the product or I would want a strong and active community truly backing the continuing development of the FOSS.

That said, I'm really hoping the audits come back positive and that development continues.

I hope that development continues as well. More developers would be nice but on a mature project usually there is only low-glory bugfixing going on so a) less developers want to participate because there is less glory and bugfixes are boring and b) there doesn't need to be a lot of developers as there is less workload. Obviously an independant audit would be ideal but that generally means money and somebody has to pay.

As a former softie, all I can say is that i would trust bitlocker over pretty much any solution on the market and here are the reasons why:

1. Microsoft would not knowingly backdoor bitlocker. The NSA pressured the team leads, but management was adamantly opposed and declined to acquiesce.

2. Suppose bitlocker was knowingly backdoored, the amount of reputational harm that Microsoft would endure would literally be crippling. Crippling not with the OSS crowd, but enterprise customers. The only loser would be Microsoft and they would not recover.

I would have thought that point valid until RSA backdoored their encryption for chump change from the NSA. Or if I had not remembered MS having _NSAKEY in their software.

You have no liability for using OpenSSL. That it was affected by a bug does not put you at legal risk, as it is a reasonable product decision.

If you had used JerrysSSLMadeInMyBasementAsACollegeProject, and it was found vulnerable, and you leaked personal information, a court would likely find you negligent. Of consideration would be an analysis of the product on the face: if it looks like a Geocities site done in FrontPage and says "I made this SSL implementation as a college project", you are neglige

There was 2 years to the previous version, so it seems that the TrueCrypt project wasn't very active anyway. Maybe they thought that the discontinuation of Windows XP was a good moment to finally officially shut down operations.

TC was Sabu's pet project. Since he was caught and working for the Feds, he has provided the very access everybody is afraid of them now having.

Sabu was just released from the service of the Feds a few days ago. Enough time to rewrite the binaries, change the passwords, and disable the whole lot since it's all been compromised for years. Gets rid of a dangerous product, and pisses off the Feds without violating the terms of anything since TC is still available for download, just in a crippled form.

Enough time to rewrite the binaries, change the passwords, and disable the whole lot since it's all been compromised for years. Gets rid of a dangerous product, and pisses off the Feds without violating the terms of anything since TC is still available for download, just in a crippled form.

Well, the TrueCrypt audit project [opencryptoaudit.org] did manage to exactly recreate the binaries from the source file and so far haven't seen anything fishy in the source code other than some slightly weak encryption options making brute forcing of weak to medium strength passwords realistic.

Sabu doesn't have the skill to write TrueCrypt. No offence to the guy, but it's just not the sort of thing he does. He was a glorified script kiddie, his main value being community standing and some admin tricks he learned to defeat DDOS attacks and dox the people behind them.

It's only forkable if you keep the new fork under the TrueCrypt License

You must not change the license terms of This Product in
any way (adding any new terms is considered changing the
license terms even if the original terms are retained),
which means, e.g., that no part of This Product may be put
under another license. You must keep intact all the legal
notices contained in the source code files. You must include
the following items with every copy of Your Product that You
make and distribute: a clear and conspicuous notice stating
that Your Product or portion(s) thereof is/are governed by
this version of the TrueCrypt License, a verbatim copy of
this version of the TrueCrypt License (as contained herein),
a clear and conspicuous notice containing information about
where the included copy of the License can be found, and an
appropriate copyright notice.

So what? The author of TrueCrypt is not known and does want to remain anonymous. So suppose I create a fork and distribute it under GPLv3, who is going to complain? A lawyer has to represent someone who can prove he has the rights to the code, he won't be able to do that while representing someone who wants to remain anonymous.

Odd, 6 hours ago someone updated the TruCrypt-key.asc files, then 3 hours later posted all the new binaries.Also odd is whoever posted the new binaries completely yanked all the previous ones, leaving only the new and questionable binary available for download.

If you're gonna post compromised binaries of TrueCrypt, you generally wouldn't stick them on a page with "WARNING: Using TrueCrypt is not secure" in large, bright red text. You'd also expect some kind of statement from the good folks that have been running TrueCrypt for the past decade.

I'll join the chorus of people speculating about them getting a court order they couldn't bring themselves to follow. I would stay far, far away from that latest binary, if I had to guess it contains whatever loophole they were ordered to put in place, hence all the big and bright warnings.

I'll join the chorus of people speculating about them getting a court order they couldn't bring themselves to follow.

I think that's exactly wrong -- I think he DID follow the court order and actually gave up the keys.

And therein lies:-) the trick: in order to keep them from actually using their new keys to create TC-NextGen -- with New! and Improved! Holes for Your Convenience! -- he trashed the brand. Now, *NO ONE* will trust new versions of TC.

"I gave you the keys just like the order said. But you never said that I couldn't make any new version worthless."

This is an analog to a groups' public secretary who in every meeting says they haven't received an NSL, and then in one fine meeting doesn't say that.

Yep, I'm guessing National Security Letter. The only defence against being forced to hand over signing keys or release versions with flaws and backdoors is to release a final version yourself to discredit any future releases.

The web site looks hastily knocked up, which supports this theory. What I can't quite get my head around is the suggestion to use BitLocker though. I know MS resisted an NSL recently, but that doesn't meant we can trust BitLocker.

Alternatively, maybe the site is by the person behind the NSL, trying to drive people to BitLocker which is already compromised. Since TrueCrypt is being audited maybe they figure they can't insert back doors now.

Either way, this is and extremely worrying development in the crypto wars.

Correct. But there is a downside. In order to use BitLocker without one, you will require using a USB drive for unlocking the system. A big security risk with using that method in a company environment would be how many simply leave the key in the computer. That would be like leaving the key to your house in the keyhole on the outside of your house. If you have to go that route, you can also add a password with the USB drive to unlock.

Source: Experience

That is true for Windows 7, but Windows 8 does not need an USB key. I have tested this personally.

But TrueCrypt doesn't have master keys as I understand it. It's not like Dropbox. There's nothing an NSL (plague be upon whoever got the idea to legalize that) could discover that would do NSA/DHS/USA any good.

They could get the signing key, and release their own version of the software that appears legit? It's a stretch, but maybe even (secretly) take over the project to *add* backdoors, so TC decided to commit seppuku first?

I really don't know. It's a mess. If they come back and *say* it was just defacement/mis-timed April Fools/whatever, they're going to be under even more scrutiny than before for a good long while.

But TrueCrypt doesn't have master keys as I understand it. It's not like Dropbox. There's nothing an NSL (plague be upon whoever got the idea to legalize that) could discover that would do NSA/DHS/USA any good.

The NSA would just need to force them to install the NSA's code. Keep in mind, we have no idea what their capabilities are. They're probably the highest payer for almost every exploit out there. The NSA is likely also very adept at obfuscating their code. I don't know if this is the case here, but I put no limits on their capabilities. I'm in full on paranoia mode now.

Even more concerning is that both their code signing keys were used. If an Authenticode key got compromised, that is one thing. However, both their gpg and Authenticode keys were used to sign that last release, so it either was a very sophisticated intruder, or the TC Foundation dropped their cards on the table and stopped playing ball for some reason.

So what do we use to replace TC as a multi-platform solution for things like external drives? There are many decent products, but TC seemed to be alone as far as OpenSource tools capable of running on Windows, Linux and Mac. Suggestions?

That works fine for now, but it's a terrible idea to just keep using software that has known flaws (which will continue to accumulate) but no longer gets patches. At some point, while 7.1a will still be executable, it will no longer be safe in any way.

I took Archeron's question to mean "So, what should we start migrating to now?" That's a very good question, sadly...

Hadn't been updated much... but there's a big ongoing audit of the code that already turned up some findings. Nothing major, certainly not enough that I'd say it warrants the kind of warnings currently all over the site, but enough that there really *should* be a newer version to patch them.

Flaws will continue to be discovered, including after the audit. They don't even have to be flaws in TC itself, properly speaking; if somebody finds a major break in some cryptographic primitive (cipher, hash function, e

7-Zip encrypted files? I kind of hate to recommend them as a "safe" alternative, and they're definitely not as convenient from a "mount this volume, work in it, save your files, unmount the volume, it's now securely encrypted" user experience standpoint.

They're not only not convenient, they're also not secure in the sense that in order to work with your data, you have to decrypt it _somewhere_. Unless you secure erase your free drive space after zipping your files back up and deleting the unencrypted copies, I wouldn't consider that data to be secure anymore, at all.

The website itself says that integrated encryption is supported in Windows 8/7/Vista, but when you go to MS's website about Bitlocker for Win 7, it says that it's only supported in Enterprise and Ultimate versions of Windows 7. Guess everyone on Home / Pro versions gets screwed!

Yeah.. the TC site gives you a step-by-step on how to upgrade your Windows edition, but they don't seem inclined to hand over the money it costs. Not that they're under any obligation to - it's not as if they were under any obligation to develop TC in the first place, either - but as a guide its usefulness is severely limited.

Win8 at least has BL in the Pro edition (having reduced the range of SKUs considerably from Win7) but... yeah. Vista doesn't even (officially) support BL on removable media at all, in addition to (like Win7) only offering it on Enterprise and Ultimate SKUs.

So, assuming that this IS real, any suggestions on FOSS encryption for those without access to BitLocker?

On a side-note, how could TrueCrypt be actually broken? Even if the encryption is broken, that can be fixed in a later release. There is a LOT of stuff in TC (boot manager, GUI, etc.), and you cannot tell me that ALL of it is bad.

The only things in my TrueCrypt volume are password lists, tax info, etc.And those are encrypted separately before being put in the Truecrypt volume.That way if my machine were to be hijacked while I have the volume mounted, I wouldn't lose all the data to nefarious purposes.And if the device is stolen, there's two layers of security to get through. (Which around here would just be the thieves deleting everything and selling it for Oxy)

Good that you do this three times, as you probably know that twice simply undos the first attempt! I'm a little confused as to why you put your "volumes" in "volumes", so plural. Is that a confusing tactic?

Tax returns contain the following:Name, address, Social Security number, income, employer info, spouse and dependent names and Social Security numbers, bank account number and routing number (if using direct deposit for your refund). Surely you can see why you wouldn't want that information falling into the hands of whoever stole your laptop, right? A tax return is basically the golden snitch of identity theft.

I think what a lot of people want to know is whether 7.1a is still reliable and, if not, how many versions back one must go to get a release that's still feature-complete but not questionable in security.

In the meantime, if you need to encrypt a file, you can use GPG [gnupg.org] and Cryptophane [google.com] if you want a GUI. Nowhere near as elegant as TC but it should get the job done.

WARNING: Using TrueCrypt is not secure as it may contain unfixed security issues... Windows 8/7/Vista and later offer integrated support for encrypted disks and virtual disk images. You should migrate any data encrypted by TrueCrypt to encrypted disks or virtual disk images supported on your platform.

All the major platforms can create virtual disk images, it's just not one of them is cross platform.

Windows 7 (not sure about previous) lets you create VHD disk images in Disk Management. I assume BitLocker can be enabled on these, more cumbersome than TrueCrypt since you'd need to attach the VHD then mount the BitLocker volume. Not sure how correct this is as I have Windows 7 Home Premium which doesn't do BitLocker.

Alternatively you could GPG encrypt the VHD file, but that would require decrypting it be

OKMain currently accepted theory is the NSA or whoever (insert your fave 3 letter agency here!) tried to get the signing keys TC decides all it can do is "salt the field" and shut up shop.

may as well throw in my 2 theories :[less likely]1) one lucky scammer/hacker got the mother-load of a hack and got access to one of the developers systems and managed to get the signing keys as well as full access to the TC sites.

[more likely]
2) Due to internal ego's and in-fighting one of the development team did a "Eric Cartman" on the others and go "Screw you guys I'm outta here!" putting up the "closed for business sign" and issuing a suspect (but officially signed!) version that only decrypts, killing the brand in the process.

They REUPLOADED a new key file, that contains the SAME key they used before.The new files were signed with that key (the new and old key are the SAME, but they wiped everything and reuploaded new key files, then the TC 7.2)

Alas, one or more of the TrueCrypt devs (syncon?) have been located and are acting under duress, as a 'canary' previously agreed upon has been published:1. Compiling with VC2010, and then not manually changing the.rc's language from "English (United States)" to "English (U.S.)" as it was in VC6;2. Changing the published release date from "on " to "in ";3. Format/InPlace.c #12, remove reference in comment to "(likely an MS bug)" - changing this parenthetical should not be counted as canary, but removing it should

TC's build process is surprisingly arcane (includes old software due to bootloader code size, etc), and while a lot of it is accumulated dust, some of the dust is deliberately placed.

I do not know precisely what this means, as I have no contact with the developers anymore: but this is what was agreed upon.

They should no longer be trusted, their binaries should not be executed, their site should be considered compromised, and their key should be treated as revoked. It may be that they have been approached by an aggressive intelligence agency or NSLed, but I don't know for sure.

While the source of 7.2 does not appear to my eyes to be backdoored, other than obviously not supporting encryption anymore, I have not analysed the binary and distrust it. It shouldn't be distributed or executed.

I figure it was my fault but still not sure what I did wrong. I read all of the text on trueCrypt from the site and thought I had a handle on it, so two hard drives were organized and TrueCrypted.

I had just assumed a password would allow one to access the/a device.

I install Windows when it starts doing odd thing, about every 6 months. I installed a new clean install of Win7, hooked up the drives and the passwords wouldn't allow me access to the drives. Ended up formatting both drives as I couldn't access them no matter what I tried.

So I am very reluctant to try TrueCrypt again, yet BitLocker isn't an option.

I remember when I was still using windows (a long time ago), if you connected a TC-encrypted disk (at the device level), it of course wouldn't recognise it, but would ask to 'sign' it (or some other similar term), which would actually write some tag in the first sector and nuke the TC header, thus rendering the drive unusable. 99% Windows fault, but maybe TC should have a backup of the header in some later sectors.

Anyway, I've been using TC on linux for a decade, very happy about it, and just like everybod

I've had copies of TrueCrypt 7.1a on my TrueCrypt'd external HDD (I tend to save everything I download) from about a year ago predating this event so I'll provide MD5 and SHA-1 hashes of them if that helps at all. I'm just a random guy on the internet so you may want to take this with a grain of salt but hopefully it'll help you find legit copies or validate any downloads that you find somehow.

They probably just decided to end the project. My experience is that it has been slowly dieing for a long time.
I have been heavily involved with truecrpyt and its source code for many years. I make programs to custom edit the boot screen and otherwise customise TC's appearance. My programs are not forks, rather they edit the actual binary code installed, so that users can easily use it on existing installations.
What you have to understand is that truecrypt has added very little functionality for a very long time. In particular they seem to have lost the key developers who did the code in the boot sectors. For those who don't know, along time ago the program was to big to fit into the boot sectors, and a special deflate algorithm was added to decompression the boot sector code. My code to unzip the boot program and edit its string display strings is still the same code from tc 5.0, and it still works on the latest edition. The guys who code this section appear to be long gone from the project, hence absolutely nothing done over UEFI. The changes that have occured look questionable, in that the people making them seem to have very limited assembly understanding and were hacking on bits instead of properly modifing the programs flow.
Secondly getting TC to work with operating systems is extremely complicated, especially for windows. It was micorosoft who eventually released the API's that were used to make truecrypt properly handle sleep/hibernate. These API's are not forthcoming to Win8 or beyond, and in all honesty - windows is the only market that matters.
I am going to guess that one of the last known developers knows there is a bug that they can not longer believe they have the experience or skill to fix properly, and hence has decided to shut it down.

Yes that would be a sensible excuse except, programs which are abandoned typically do not cause:

- the website to be defaced and debranded.- a new version of the software to be released with gutted functionality.- old versions to be removed.- recommend commercial alternatives to open source programs.- pretend that the announcement happened due to loss of support for an OS still used by 20% of all machines.- not get in contact with the outside world.

Someone went to great lengths to make this look as nefarious as possible. This isn't the typical project shutting down. Actually my first thought was hacked, and my second through was NSA'd even though I swore not to follow the typical Slashdot NSA paranoia.

An Estonian website [cyberside.net.ee] seems to hold the source, but of course you would have to verify that it has not been tampered with. Sadly, the older 7.1a version (which I'm assuming does not have the features removed as is being claimed) seems to not be available at the project's SourceForge source code folder [sourceforge.net].