Space Shuttle Accidents in Perspective: Challenger
& Columbia

November 1, 2003

(NOTE:This is a generic lesson plan set provided as
an example for HCST faculty.Students
may find it useful as a guide to further study.Specific presentations and sequences in any given year or lecture will
vary.See the appropriate syllabus for
details.)

Dr. Ted Foster
(Engineering) and Dr. Joseph N. Tatarewicz(History)

1-week: Lecture, Discussion,
Video; (Laboratory Exercise Option)

Distributed Readings:Brief overview of the event and its context
(Collins & Pinch, "The Naked Launch: Assigning Blame for the
Challenger Explosion."; Rogers Commission Report select Documents, keyed
to Boisjoly Tape on Day Two.

Day One – The Challenger Accident in Context
(Tatarewicz lead)

Challenger: On January
28, 1986 a space
shuttle exploded during its twenty-fifth mission killing seven crew
members.Because of the
non-astronaut middle school teacher on board, many school children around
the country watched the explosion.This event halted U.S.crewed space
flight for 32 months, and changed NASA decisively.High-profile investigations found that
the technical cause (leaking joints in the solid rocket boosters) was
suspected and troubling to engineers and managers before launch, but that
for various political and financial reasons they were overruled and
pressured to conform and approve launch.This case shows how a seemingly minute technical issue can have
wide-ranging social, political, and other dimensions.It also introduces the issue of ethical
conduct in a technical context where there is ambiguity, conflicting
interpretations, and uneven power relationships.

The Context: the
Space Race; Apollo; Shuttle; previous accidents. (particularly
AS-204 in 1967); Teacher-in-Space, the State of the Union Speech, prior
launch delays and scrubs.

The Space
Shuttle vehicle and a normal Launch

The events of January
28, 1986

Immediate
aftermath: no Access to Space (missions lined up, Titan III-C explodes,
military satellites rationed, rush to Europeans and Japanese for launch
services)

Focus on the critical
decision: The Teleconference and the prior Flight Readiness Reviews and
other elements of the process.

Day Two – The Critical
Decision and its context(Foster lead)

Introduction – Engineering knowledge, prediction, and
proof.Engineering knowledge is a
mixture of accumulated information gathered deliberately and
serendipitously; engineers try to understand the objects they are
designing with only limited insight into what is happening in reality; at
various times they must decide, alone and in groups, just what is
happening in the engineered object, what will happen to it under various
circumstances, and what the consequences would be.Further, they may be subject to strong
social, political, and other forces that try to skew the predictions.

Boisjoly Tape – this
interview with one of the engineers who tried unsuccessfully to stop the
launch discusses the critical decision in detail; the tape runs 20-min
total, but pauses several times to allow class discussion of various
elements of the decision.Documents
referenced are on the MIT web site (see bibliography below).

Conclusion

Day Three – Role Playing the
Challenger Flight Readiness Review & Teleconference

Columbia: On February 1, 2003 a space shuttle broke up during a
seemingly routine reentry, killing seven crew members.The Israeli astronaut on board had
provided the only interest, because of the heightened fear of
terrorism.A high-profile
investigation found that the technical cause (damage to the left wing
during launch) was suspected and troubling to some engineers and managers
during the mission.For various
institutional and technical reasons, the damage was never verified before
reentry.The investigation, which
included a political scientist-historian and a sociologist, found that the
institutional culture of the agency and contractors played a decisive
role.

Focus on the critical issues: repeated strikes on the
orbiter from foam breaking off the external tank during launch, their
discussion before and during the mission, and the decision that the strike
was benign.

Day Five – The Columbia
Decisions and their context (Foster Lead)

Day Six – Role Playing the Columbia
Decisions concerning the significance of the foam strike

Bibliography

(suggestions for future
instructors or for students wanting to learn more)

Published Archives (microfilm)

1.Presidential Commission on the
Space Shuttle Challenger Accident (Rogers Commission). "Challenger"
Commission P.C. Numbered Documents.Washington: U.S. National Archives, 1986.
Abstract: Microfilm edition (73 rolls) of the primary archival collection
available at the U.S. National Archives.

2.———. Indexes to Records of the Presidential Commission on
the Space Shuttle "Challenger" Accident.Washington: U.S. National Archives, 1986.
Abstract: M1501 30 cards (microfiche)

Book Chapters

1.Collins, Harry, and Trevor
Pinch. "The Naked Launch: Assigning Blame for the Challenger
Explosion." The Golem: What You Should Know About Technology. Harry
Collins, and Trevor Pinch, 30-56. New York: CambridgeUniversity Press, 1998.

2.Feynman, Richard. "Mr.
Feynman Goes to Washington: Investigating the Space
Shuttle Challenger Disaster." What Do You Care What Other
People Think?Further Adventures of a
Curious Character. Richard Feynman, 113-239. New York: W. W. Norton, 1988.

22.Amier, Mark and Messerschmidt James W. "Commonalities, Conflicts And Contradictions In Organizational Masculinities:
Exploring The Gendered Genesis Of The Challenger Disaster." Canadian Review of Sociology and Anthropology35, no. 3 (1998): 325-44.

35.———.
""Challenger" Commission P.C. Numbered Documents."1986.
Abstract: Official archive of the Commission, available at National
Archives:"The Presidential
Commission on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident, chaired by former
Secretary of State William P. Rogers, investigated the circumstances
surrounding the explosion of the Space Shuttle Challenger shortly after liftoff
on January 28, 1986. The Commission was
established in February 1986, pursuant to Executive Order 12546, and it issued
its final report in June 1986. At the conclusion of its investigation, the
records of the Commission were transferred to the National Archives and Records
Administration (NARA) for permanent preservation. They have been accessioned in
the Records of Temporary Committees, Commissions, and Boards (Record Group 220)
[see entry 220.19, Guide to Federal Records in the National Archives of the United States (1995)], and are available
to the public. "8-linear feet or 148-boxes.See INFORMATION FOR RESEARCHERS: RECORDS OF THE PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION
ON THE SPACE SHUTTLE CHALLENGER ACCIDENT
http://www.nara.gov/nara/electronic/challngr.html and RECORDS OF THE
PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON THE SPACE SHUTTLE CHALLENGER ACCIDENT http://www.archives.gov/research_room/research_topics/space_shuttle_challenger_accident.html

36.Columbia Accident
Investigation Board (CAIB) manuscripts and other materials will be archived at
a future date.Details may be found in
the CAIB Final Report, Volume 1, pp. 235-236, “A.6. Board Documentation System.”

1.Adams, Rick. "The
Challenger's Final Minutes." Web page, Available at http://www.winternet.com/~radams/chall/.
[Note: the link was not functioning 9/1/2003]
Abstract: Reliable compilation of information and links concerning the last
recorded words of the crew and the widely circulated hoax transcript beyond 73
seconds.

4.Federation of American
Scientists. "51-L The Challenger Accident."
Web page,[accessed
7 June 2001]. Available at http://www.fas.org/spp/51L.html.
Abstract: Extensive and well-annotated list of links.

5.Friendly, Michael.
"Gallery of Data Visualization: The Best and Worst of Statistical
Graphics: Challenger Disaster." Web page,[accessed 7
June 2001]. Available at http://www.math.yorku.ca/SCS/Gallery/

7.Mark A. Haisler
and Robert Throop. "The Challenger Accident:: An
Analysis of the Mechanical and Administrative Causes of the Accident and the
Redesign Process that Followed." Web page, Fall
1997 [accessed 7 June 2001]. Available at http://www.me.utexas.edu/~uer/challenger/chall2.html.
Abstract: Well designed and annotated site.

8.MIT Online EthicsCenter for Engineering and
Science. "Roger Boisjoly on the Challenger
Disaster." Web page,[accessed 7 June 2001]. Available at http://onlineethics.org/moral/boisjoly/RB-intro.html.
Abstract: Morton Thiokol engineer Roger Boisjoly's
discussion of the Challenger Disaster is separated into seven sections. Each
section is then followed by responses and supporting material.

10.NASA. "Implementation
of the Recommendations of the Presidential Commission on the Space Shuttle
Challenger Accident." Web page,[accessed 7
June 2001]. Available at http://history.nasa.gov/rogersrep/51lcover.htm.
Abstract: Full text of the NASA Report to the President on implementing the
recommendations of the Rogers Commission

11.NASA. "Information on
the STS-51L/Challenger Accident." Web page,[accessed 7
June 2001]. Available at http://history.nasa.gov/sts51l.html.
Abstract: NASA History Office official site, containing both NASA and non-NASA
links with no commentary.

12.Ray A.
Williamson.“Developing the Space
Shuttle,” from Exploring the Unknown: Selected Documents in the History of
the U.S. Civil Space
Program, Volume IV: Accessing Space.Available at: http://history.nasa.gov/sts1/pdfs/explore.pdf

14.Presidential Commission on
the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident (Rogers Commission). "Report
of the Presidential Commission on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident."
Web page, June 1986 [accessed 7 June 2001]. Available at http://history.nasa.gov/rogersrep/51lcover.htm.
Abstract: Full text of the Rogers Commission Report

Warning:
there are numerous web sites ranging from authoritative to miserably
erroneous.Our comments are intended to
help you evaluate the reliability of the information found.Official and reputable web sites themselves
have points of view and their content is slanted or missing certain
perspectives.Even the best sites may
contain some errors.