Supplementing supervision;

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Bulletin HASKINS & SELLS 105
Supplementing Supervision
IT is to be presumed that the public
accountant who is retained by a client
to undertake an engagement will make
every effort to serve the client faithfully
and well. If for one reason or another it
is necessary or desirable to delegate the
work of carrying out the engagement in
whole or in part to representatives, the
presumption follows that the accountant
will so plan, regulate and keep in touch
with the work of such representatives as
to satisfy himself that the work has been
carried out in accordance with his ideas.
Such being the case he is in a position to
adopt the work as his own.
In an ideal system of supervision, oper­ating
as planned, there would be little need
for the representatives to do more than
follow instructions. The plans of the
principal would be thoroughly compre­hensive.
The regulation would be auto­matic.
The contact would be as frequent
and continued as needed.
But practical conditions and the frailties
of human nature constitute variables which
interfere with ideals. Sufficient foresight
or lack of knowledge of some situation may
affect the plan for the execution of the
work. Unforeseen difficulties may get in
the way of regulation or prevent the con­tact
which is desirable.
So the representatives, through the fail­ure
of real and ideal to coincide, gain the
opportunity to become co-operative parties
to the scheme of supervision. When the
plan for work shows signs of breaking down
theirs is the privilege of bringing the
matter to the attention of their principal.
When some new development grows out
of the situation at the instance of the
client, theirs is the duty of consulting those
who are responsible and involved.