MERRITT, Circuit Judge. In this unfortunate
immigration case, petitioner does not dispute that she is deportable. She
instead seeks suspension of deportation, a type of discretionary relief
conditioned on, among other criteria, continuous presence in this country. The
Board of Immigration Appeals found her ineligible because she could not show the
requisite seven years' stay. The Board calculated petitioner's time in residence
based upon immigration provisions enacted while her case was pending. Petitioner
now contends that these legislative changes unconstitutionally deprived her of
the opportunity to apply for suspension of deportation. We find that Congress
intended the retroactive reach of the law and that its classification scheme is
rationally related to legitimate federal interests. We therefore
affirm.

I.
Facts

Mrs. Teresa Bartoszewska-Zajac was nearly
18 years old when she entered this country on February 18, 1989. As a
nonimmigrant tourist visitor, she was admitted for six months. She has never
requested an extension of stay and has never applied for asylum. She married
another Polish national here in 1993. She now has two children, both born in and
citizens of the United States.

The Immigration and Naturalization Service
(INS) served petitioner with an order to show cause on August 24, 1994,
initiating deportation proceedings. She then had been in the United States for
five and a half years. At that time, foreign nationals could apply for
discretionary relief by showing hardship, good moral character, and continuous
physical presence in the United States for at least seven years. See 8
U.S.C. § 1254(a) (1994) (repealed 1996). Applicants facing expulsion could
accumulate the statutory seven years even during deportation proceedings. On May
20, 1996, Mrs. Bartoszewska-Zajac filed a Motion to Reopen. Before a hearing
could be held on her petition, however, Congress changed the law concerning
discretionary relief.

The Illegal Immigration Reform and
Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 ("the Illegal Immigration Act" or "IIRIRA")
made sweeping revisions of immigration policy. Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat.
3009, 546-724 (1996) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.).
Section 309(c)(5) is an important exception to the prospective reach of the Act,
setting forth a transitional rule for pending cases. Petitioner falls in this
class. Under the new law, continuous residence ends when the foreign national is
served with an INS charging document. This "stop-time" rule prevents a foreign
national from accumulating the seven years' physical presence during deportation
proceedings. It applies whether the charging document was issued before or after
passage of the Illegal Immigration Act. Illegal Immigration Act §
309(c)(5).

Immigrant communities protested that the
new law unfairly subjected them to higher standards for discretionary relief. In
response, Congress passed the Nicaraguan Adjustment and Central American Relief
Act of 1997 ("the Nicaraguan Act" or "NACARA"). Pub. L. No. 105-100, 111 Stat.
2160, 2193-2201 (1997), amended by Pub. L. No. 105-139, 111 Stat. 2644
(1997). This law lifted the stop-time bar for certain foreign nationals,
allowing them to accrue seven years' presence even during deportation
proceedings. Nationals of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union qualified
under the 1997 law if they had filed for asylum on or before December 31,
1991.

II.
Discussion

The Board of Immigration Appeals found
petitioner ineligible for relief under its interpretation of the 1996 and 1997
laws. We review this legal determination de novo. Kabongo v.
INS, 837 F.2d 753, 756 (6th Cir. 1988). We must decide whether the
stop-time rule of § 309(c)(5) of the Illegal Immigration Act is
unconstitutionally retroactive in violation of due process. We also must decide
whether this provision, as well as § 203(a)(1) of the Nicaraguan Act, violate
equal protection principles. In interpreting these immigration provisions, we
are guided by our recent decision in Ashki v. INS, which addressed
similar statutory and constitutional claims. Ashki v. INS, 233 F.3d
913, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 30456 (6th Cir. Dec. 4, 2000).

A.Retroactivity of the Illegal Immigration Act

Basic principles of fairness and notice
underlie a judicial skepticism of statutory retroactivity. Landgraf v. USI
Film Products, 511 U.S. 244, 272 (1994). The judicial presumption against
retroactivity can be overcome, however, when Congress clearly intends that
result. Id. at 268. Here, Congress plainly intended that the stop-time
section of the Illegal Immigration Act be retroactive, excepting it from
otherwise forward-looking provisions. Section 309(c)(5) of the Act, entitled
"Transitional Rule with Regard to Suspension of Deportation," provides that the
stop-time rule "shall apply to notices to appear issued before, on, or after the
date of the enactment of this Act." At the time of its passage, however, the
language of this section was anachronistic. As first enacted, the provision
applied to "notices to appear." That term came into effect only as a result of
the 1996 Act. Before then, the INS charging document was the "order to show
cause." To clarify, Congress later revised the stop-time provision to include
"orders to show cause." Nicaraguan Act § 203(a)(1), amending §
309(c)(5) of the Illegal Immigration Act. That Congress would amend the
transitional rule, tailoring it specifically to pre-1996 nomenclature, indicates
its retroactive design.

The Board of Immigration Appeals has
previously concluded that the stop-time rule applies to suspension of
deportation cases. In re Nolasco-Tofino, Interim Decision 3385 (BIA
1999) (en banc), available at 1999 WL 261565. We generally defer to the
Board's interpretation of immigration statutes. INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre,
526 U.S. 415, 424-25 (1999) (citing Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984)). Here, that deference
is well-founded. Congress changed the law precisely to prevent accumulation of
statutory time during deportation proceedings, removing the incentive for delay.
See H.R. Rep. No. 104-879, at 108 (1997). We must follow this clear
directive. See Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 280 ("When a case implicates a
federal statute enacted after the events in suit, the court's first task is to
determine whether Congress has expressly prescribed the statute's proper reach.
If Congress has done so, of course, there is no need to resort to judicial
default rules.").

In Ashki v. INS, we first
considered the effect of these changes in immigration law. Ashki v.
INS, 233 F.3d 913, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 30456 (6th Cir. Dec. 4, 2000). In
that case, we concluded that an Iranian citizen could not reopen her deportation
proceedings for the purpose of applying for relief because she had not fulfilled
the time-in-residence requirement. Rejecting a due process challenge to the
Nicaraguan Act, we stated that petitioner could not claim a constitutionally
protected interest in securing discretionary relief. Id. at ___, 2000
U.S. App. LEXIS 30456, at *17. Moreover, as a matter of statutory construction,
we determined that the 1997 Act specifically gave stop-time effect to show cause
orders issued before the Illegal Immigration Act. Id. at ___, 2000 U.S.
App. LEXIS 30456, at *8.

In following Ashki, we also note
the several other circuits that have upheld the retroactive reach of the
stop-time provision. See Rojas-Reyes v. INS, No. 99-4131, ___ F.3d ___,
2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 33206 (2d Cir. Dec. 15, 2000); Angel-Ramos v.
Reno, 227 F.3d 942 (7th Cir. 2000); Afolayan v. INS, 219 F.3d 784
(8th Cir. 2000); Rivera-Jimenez v. INS, 214 F.3d 1213 (10th Cir. 2000);
Appiah v. INS, 202 F.3d 704 (4th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, ___
U.S.___, 121 S.Ct. 140 (2000); Gonzalez-Torres v. INS, 213 F.3d 899
(5th Cir. 2000); Tefel v. Reno, 180 F.3d 1286 (11th Cir. 1999),
cert. denied, ___ U.S.___, 120 S.Ct. 2657 (2000). This array of
persuasive authority confirms our interpretation of the stop-time provision in
Ashki and admits of only one outcome here. The Board properly concluded
that petitioner's period of continuous presence ended on August 24, 1994, when
she was served with an order to show cause.(1) Though in
petitioner's case the stop-time rule bars her from relief, Congress plainly
intended this result by discouraging strategic delay during deportation
proceedings. See Ashki, 233 F.3d at ___, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 30456, at
*16 n.2. Neither this legislative purpose nor the provision enacted to carry it
out offends due process. See Hamama v. INS, 78 F.3d 233, 236 (6th Cir.
1996) ("We agree that the requirements of due process are satisfied if
retroactive application of federal immigration legislation is rationally related
to a legitimate government purpose; the courts have deferred in the past to
immigration legislation at least as much as they have deferred to economic
legislation.").

B.The
Equal Protection Challenges

In matters of immigration, equal protection
challenges warrant very deferential review. Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S.
67, 81-82 (1976) ("The reasons that preclude judicial review of political
questions also dictate a narrow standard of review of decisions made by the
Congress or the President in the area of immigration and naturalization.")
(footnotes omitted). Of course, that deference is not unquestioning. See,
e.g., Francis v. INS, 532 F.2d 268 (2d. Cir. 1976) (finding that
discretionary relief conditioned on "irrelevant and fortuitous factors" violated
equal protection). In this Circuit, "[t]he role of the courts in analyzing an
equal protection challenge to a federal immigration statute is limited to
determining whether the statute at issue is conceivably related to the
achievement of the federal interest." Almario v. INS, 872 F.2d 147, 152
(6th Cir. 1989) (citation omitted).

Petitioner makes two equal protection
arguments. First, petitioner claims that imposition of the stop-time rule to
pending cases creates two classes of foreign nationals seeking suspension of
deportation. Nationals who evaded immigration authorities for seven years can
apply for relief, she contends, while those served before their seventh year are
now ineligible. This argument is unpersuasive. In 1996, Congress intended to
expedite the removal of foreign nationals illegally present in this country. It
recognized that permitting nationals to accumulate time in residence during
deportation only invited delay. See H.R. Rep. No. 104-469, at 122
(1996) ("Suspension of deportation is often abused by aliens seeking to delay
proceedings until 7 years have accrued."). Removing this incentive is a
legitimate government interest. To effectuate it, Congress sought a clear-cut
terminus of continuous presence. Service of the INS charging document provides
notice to the foreign national and initiates removal proceedings. This is a
reasonable point to end physical presence. Applying the rule to pending
petitions only furthers the goal of discouraging delay in a greater number of
cases. Under our deferential review, that is all we require. See Newton v.
INS, 736 F.2d 336, 342 (6th Cir. 1984) (describing, in an equal protection
challenge to an adjustment of status case, that "it is not necessary for
Congress to have drawn the line at the (purportedly) most reasonable point . . .
but only that it had a rational purpose in drawing the line(s) as it did").
Accord Tefel v. Reno, 180 F.3d 1286, 1299 (11th Cir. 1999), cert.
denied, ___ U.S.___ , 120 S.Ct. 2657 (2000) (denying an equal protection
challenge to the stop-time provision).

Second, petitioner claims that the 1997
amendments violate equal protection because they remove the stop-time bar for
only certain foreign nationals. Nicaraguan Act § 203(a)(1), amending § 309(c)(5)
of the Illegal Immigration Act. Among other eligible classes, Poles who filed
for asylum on or by December 31, 1991, could still accrue time in residence
towards the requisite seven years, even during deportation proceedings. Though a
native of Poland, Mrs. Bartoszewska-Zajac is not eligible under this provision
because she never applied for asylum. She came to the United States for a
"better quality of life." Reply Br. of Pet'r at 10. Seeking economic opportunity
rather than political refuge, petitioner "did not file for asylum[] because it
was and still is inappropriate. She easily could have filed, but was honest
enough not to file." Id. In contrast, petitioner notes, Poles who filed
weak, frivolous, or unsuccessful asylum petitions would be eligible
under the Nicaraguan Act. Petitioner claims that this is an unconstitutional
distinction.

Congress passed the Nicaraguan Act to help
refugees from civil war and the fall of Communism. See Senate
Explanatory Memorandum Regarding Title II of the D.C. Appropriations Bill, 143
Cong. Rec. S12266 (1997), available at 1997 WL 693186. As petitioner
suggests, its provisions fall short of blanket relief for all similarly situated
groups, placing restrictions on some nationals but not on others. Congress,
however, was aware of this disparity. See, e.g., 143 Cong. Rec. S12264
(Nov. 9, 1997) (statement of Sen. Kennedy) ("[I]nstead of correcting the
injustice for all refugees, Republicans now propose to pick and choose among
their favorite Latino groups . . . ."). Absent irrational classifications,
however, we defer to Congress to make distinctions at our nation's borders.
"Congressional power to draw lines with respect to what classes of aliens will
be admitted to the United States, and the conditions of such admission, is
subject only to limited judicial review . . . . Moreover, the exercise of such
power, if predicated on a rational basis, may distinguish between classes of
aliens, and confer benefits on one or more classes that are not available to
others." Newton, 736 F.2d at 339 (internal citations
omitted).

Here, Congress sought to help foreign
nationals fleeing violence and unrest. It did not relieve those who had never
filed for asylum, excluding Poles such as petitioner who came to this country to
improve their economic status rather than escape persecution. The Immigration
and Naturalization Service need not elucidate the true intent of Congress to
justify this grouping. "Rational basis review does not require us to identify
the legislature's actual rationale for the distinction; rather, we will uphold
the statute if 'there are plausible reasons for Congress' action.'" Hamama
v. INS, 78 F.3d 233, 237 (6th Cir. 1996) (quoting United States R.R.
Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 179 (1980)). Presumably, Congress
recognized that those most deserving of the Act's largesse would be nationals
who had filed for asylum. Though the Act's ameliorative provisions do not apply
in petitioner's case, we recognize that Congress had a rational basis for making
such distinctions. In Ashki, we acknowledged that the Nicaraguan Act
produced uneven treatment among national groups. Nevertheless, we found that the
statutory distinctions satisfied our rational basis review. As we
explained,

Although the NACARA exemptions clearly
do not cover all aliens who will face hostile conditions in their homelands,
this fact does not make these exemptions irrational. There are a myriad of
political and foreign policy reasons that might explain why aliens from certain
nations were initially encouraged to stay in the U.S. and later exempted from
the stop time provision and other aliens were not. Petitioner has offered no
evidence that the Congressional exemptions were irrational or that they were
based on an impermissible motivation. Therefore, this court will not second
guess the line that Congress has drawn.

Suspension of deportation is strictly
discretionary. INS v. Yueh-Shaio Yang, 519 U.S. 26, 30 (1996)
(describing the Attorney General's suspension of deportation as "an act of
grace" which is accorded pursuant to her "unfettered discretion") (quoting
Jay v. Boyd, 351 U.S. 345, 354 (1956)). In this case, the Board of
Immigration Appeals denied relief because petitioner did not satisfy the
time-in-residence requirement. The Court, however sympathetic, does not enjoy
any discretion in rendering judgment according to Congress' clear mandate. The
decision is AFFIRMED.

Footnotes

*The Honorable
Edmund A. Sargus, Jr., United States District Judge for the Southern District of
Ohio, sitting by designation.

1 We do not decide
today whether petitioner could accrue the requisite seven years in a period of
continuous presence starting after August 24, 1994.