Reforming
FIFA, or Not

This
book looks back at the work of the Independence Governance Committee
(IGC). This Committee, constituted in 2011, had as
primary objective to drive a reform process of FIFA initiated by its President
Sepp Blatter. After ordering from the Swiss anti-corruption expert Mark Pieth,
a report
on the state of FIFA’s governance, FIFA decided to mandate him with the leadership
of a consulting body composed of a mix of independent experts and football
insiders, which would be accompanying and supervising the internal reform
process of FIFA. The IGC was officially dissolved
at the end of 2013, after completing its mandate. The book is composed of eight
chapters, written by former members of the IGC, including former chairman Mark
Pieth. In addition to the chapters, it includes the different reports
(available here,
here
and here)
submitted by the IGC to FIFA across the years. In the words of Pieth, this
account is “fascinating because it gives a hands-on, realistic perspective of
the concrete efforts, the achievements and the remaining challenges in the
struggle for the reform of this organization [FIFA], avoiding the usual
glorification or vilification.”[1]
This review will first summarize the core of the account of the FIFA reform
process provided by the book, before critically engaging with the outcome of
the process and outlining the deficiencies that culminated on 29 May 2015 with
the re-election of Sepp Blatter as FIFA president.

I.
Reforming FIFA…

In
his introduction to the book, Mark Pieth provides a compelling account of the
reasons why FIFA needs a reform process in the first place. He talks of the
““old boys” suddenly becoming rich”[2]
and of the lack of “public accountability”[3]
of FIFA. This narrative is similar to the one provided by Guillermo Jorge later
in the book. He highlights the fact that FIFA relies on a “solide patronage
network”, creating “incentives for member associations to engage in rent
seeking – which means: spend time and efforts in obtaining such funds – and, at
the same time, creates incentives for incumbents to request the favour back at
the ballot box.”[4]
Jorge’s detailed account of the institutional features of FIFA underlying this
“patronage system” is in itself of great value.

It
is further argued that with the scandals triggered by the Bin Hammam affair, in 2011, “Mr Blatter, realized that the
governance structure needed to be adapted to the new challenges.”[5]
In other words, it “was a product of the personal ambition of its president.” [6]
All along the book, Pieth and other members of the IGC, consider Blatter as a
key supporter of the reform process and shift the blame for its incompleteness
on UEFA’s shoulders amongst others.[7].
UEFA, it is claimed, has been instrumental in blocking a centralized integrity
check on FIFA officials (especially the members of the ExCo). Blatter, for his
part, is said to have understood “sooner than many of his colleagues”, that
“the system” was falling apart”[8]
and that a “self-controlled reform seemed to be a rational response to pre-empt
or delay external regulation and mitigate the risk for future, more uncertain
investigations.”[9]

The
substance of the reform triggered by the IGC is not discussed in great detail,
nor is its implementation in practice assessed in depth. To be fair, the book chapters
were probably written early 2014 and could hardly have done so. The core
changes highlighted by the members of the IGC concern the function and structure
of the Ethics Committee and the Audit and Compliance Committee. As claimed by
Pieth, “the most tangible changes are the institutional changes in the area of
the Ethics Committee and the Audit and Compliance Committee.”[10]
In particular, “the independent permanent chairs and deputy chairs of the
Ethics Committee and the Audit and Compliance Committee.”[11]
Pieth praises the fact that “[t]he investigator and his deputy have full
discretion which cases they take on and decide to investigate.”[12]
Moreover, the “investigation is independent both from the FIFA administration
and from the judicial chamber.”[13]
This is also underlined by the contribution of Lord Peter Goldsmith focusing on
the investigatory process.[14]
Damian Heller discusses the core changes introduced to the Audit and Compliance
Committee (ACC) in a separate chapter.[15]
After the reform, the ACC has gained new important competences, e.g. drawing up
the Organisation Regulation (governing the rights and obligations of FIFA’s
organs), controlling the compensation policy of FIFA executives, monitoring the
bidding process for the World Cup and auditing the use of the development
funds. In addition to this, the independence of the Committee members has been
reinforced. Thus, Pieth expect “that these independent agents within FIFA will
make a big difference in the culture of the organization during their tenure.”[16]

The
members of the IGC are not all positive about the changes triggered by the
reform process engaged by FIFA. For Leandro Grosso, the member of IGC
representing FIFPro, the football players’ union, the reform is clearly a
failure.[17]
Pieth himself is cautious enough to remind in his introduction “that pure
self-regulation is a slow and uncertain process.”[18]
He insists, that “[t]o be successful it has to change the culture of the whole
organization, it needs to reach the associations in particular and it has to
permeate the everyday life of the organization.”[19]
Yet, throughout the book, there is still a clear sentiment that the FIFA reform
process was a success. Indeed, Pieth considers that “[w]ith the new independent
chairs in place, a first essential step has been taken.”[20]
He adds: “it must be acknowledged that, overall, the last three years have been
rather successful in bringing the regulations up to a certain standard.”[21]
As another IGC member puts it “[t]he IGC has largely succeeded in its efforts
to reform FIFA’s governance.”[22]
After the reform, “there are far greater systems and controls and far greater
ethical standards within FIFA.”[23]
In short, “FIFA is today much closer to public and corporate governance
standards than it was two years ago.”[24]
Is this true?

II.
…Or Not

The
IGC’s members’ optimism might go a bit too far. The recent events surrounding
the investigation of the bidding process for the World Cup 2018 and 2022 seem
to call for a critical assessment of the scope of progress made. Independent
investigatory personnel make little difference if a final report is later
shelved without allowing for external scrutiny of its findings as happened with
the by now infamous Garcia report on the attribution of the 2018 and 2022 World
Cup. Similarly, having a competent check on FIFA’s compensation policy is of
little use if those rigorous accounts are not made freely available for
journalists and the public to peruse them. The institutional changes celebrated
by the members of the IGC are not negligible, but to gain real currency they
must be coupled with a duty of transparency and the new Committees must be able
to dispose of their findings independently. The resignation of Michael Garcia,
who was deemed a token figure of the success of the reforms supported by the
IGC, is there to remind us that even the, allegedly, best individuals are
powerless if the institution is in a position to block their work. With his scorecard
(see also here
and the response
of FIFA) on the reform process, Roger Pielke had convincingly quantified the
limited nature of FIFA’s reforms. His findings are now corroborated in practice;
even the few reform proposals FIFA actually implemented did not fundamentally
change the institution. This is critical stance is shared by a recent report on
‘The reform of football governance’ adopted by the Parliamentary Assembly of the
Council of Europe, urging FIFA to reinforce transparency and accountability
across the board.

The
IGC’s members were probably blinded
by Blatter’s apparent goodwill. In fact, Blatter may even have held these good
intentions, though his new stint at the head of FIFA is there to remind us that
however enlightened, he remains a power-hungry monarch. Moreover, Blatter is truly
accountable to only one forum: the FIFA Congress. Thus, it is doubtful that the
“patronage system” put in place to control it will go away without resistance.
In fact, Blatter would probably have never been re-elected in 2015 if he had
imposed a radical clean up of past (and maybe present) FIFA practices relating
to the use of development funds and vote buying. In that regard, the recent
decision to give to the FIFA Congress the responsibility for the election of
the host state of the FIFA World Cups is a potentially dangerous move that could
enhance the risk of vote-buying. It shifts even more the decisive power away
from the biggest Confederations to the small peripheral FAs.

All
in all, it is naturally difficult for the members of a body that was invested
with the responsibility to guide FIFA’s latest reform to recognize their
failure to really change the way FIFA works. Some members of the IGC have done so;
Alexandra Wrage resigned in protest against FIFA's “rotten reform record”. Even though one can criticize
the independence of the IGC, the IGC’s members were probably genuinely committed
to changing FIFA. But the main lesson one can draw from their very limited
success in doing so is that sheer commitment and expertise is not enough to
transform an institution grounded on a political system that promotes inertia
and to some extent corruption. The illusion of an enlightened reform of FIFA
driven by insiders, especially by Mr. Blatter, has been shattered. In the case
of FIFA, a revolution is needed, heads need to roll, and a radically new
political system needs to be put in place. Those are not easy tasks. Triggering
a revolution will take time and energy. It will involve the appliance of
extreme political pressure, either through the open threat of secession of UEFA
or through criminal proceedings initiated by public authorities. In the end,
Pieth himself is right: “self-regulation alone rarely works”[25].
This points to ‘[t]he responsibility of the host country’.[26]
The “lax regulatory attitude”[27]
of the Swiss government is certainly a key disincentive to a true FIFA reform. It
is Switzerland’s duty to “define the minimum standard for organizations, in
particular in the areas of democracy, accountability and financial controls.”[28]
As the recent raid by the Swiss Police has proven, if there is the will to
intervene, there is no insurmountable legal obstacle to do so. It is true, as
many members of the IGC argue, that States are not in an easy position. The
power of the FIFAs and IOCs of this world is extremely strong. Through their
exit option, they can blackmail national States, and in particular Switzerland,
into adopting an accommodating stance. But, it is simply not true that “ISOs
[International Sporting Organisations] have extensive privileges and
immunities, and are not governed by national laws – so cannot generally be
reached by such prosecutors and regulators”[29],
as Lord Goldsmith states. Still, it makes sense that the most far-reaching
interventions to date that triggered reforms of Sports Governing Bodies (SGBs)
were made by the EU and the US.[30]
Both are strong enough to confront the political strength of the SGBs. Hence, the
recent indictment
of a number of FIFA officials on various criminal grounds in the US might be
the first necessary step towards truly reforming FIFA.

This
book is a valuable testimony of a process that has unfortunately failed to
fundamentally change FIFA for the time being. One should not radically
undermine the progress done, the new institutions put in place and rules
adopted might serve as a basis for an overhaul of FIFA in the future, though
for that to happen it will most likely need an assist from the EU or the US.

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