Further to the meeting we had of those TF members present in
LA last week, allow me to propose the following expanded terms of reference.
These build on the outline agreed to previously by the
TF.Philip.-------------------------Expanded terms of
reference for the NC TF on (ICANN )structure-

(We need to be
clear about whether our exercise is directed at the whole ICANN structure,
just

the DNSO, or
the latter-but with-a-comment-on-the former. My concern is that our
"expertise"

may be seen by
the Board as limited to the DNSO. I suggest we focus on our own patch, but
make

comment on our
view of likely imopacts on components outside the DNSO. We are a DNSO body,

and
the Board has formed a committee to pull
together all the strands. )

The
terms below provide detail to the outline TOR previously circulated to the
task force.Name

as a result of the proposals from the at-large study
committee, the desire of the ccTLDs to form their own supporting organisation
( various votes by GA and NC concerning an at large
constituency?)and other related proposals and;

Agreed. I
suggest though, in light of my other comments about our role in this, that we
change

the order, to
focus first on our own area of responsibility, then on consequential
changes

To produce a recommendation to the Names Council on key re-structuring
proposals.

(Is this really the goal? This might, if interpreted literally,
restrict us to comment on each proposal separately ;eg ' ALSC=good,
ccSO=excellent, @large constituency= magnificent", but no comment on how best
an integrated approach, taking the best from each proposal, and working
through the consequences of implementation leads to a better overall
structure.

I suggest:

".... Names Council on the re-structuring of the
DNSO, and the consequential impact on ICANN"

To achieve this the
task force should briefly evaluate proposals for re-structuring against the
following criteria:1. the efficacy of ICANN decision
making.- the ability of each proposal to generate valid
consensus-based policy making - possibility of the Board receiving
contradictory advice from its SOs and the impact on resolution mechanisms-
likely financial and representational robustness of any SO.

2. the efficacy of policy making within the
DNSO- degree of formal interaction between stakeholders-
ratio of unique issues of a new SO outside the competence of DNSO versus
issues within competence of DNSO

I have no idea what this
means. If the answer to the question is a ratio of 1:7.5, how does

that lead to better decision
making? If its intended to be an exploration of overlap between,

say, the areas of at large
representation that is handled by the ccSO rather than the @LSO,

what use is that? There will
be an overlap between SO's. The useful task is to ensure that

there are cross SO mechanisms
(preferrably below board level) which can be easily invoked

to resolve
them.

The more useful exercise might be
to look at what the charter of the DNSO becomes after

withdrawal of the cctlds -
its clearly no longer "all domain name" issues, but becomes

"generic domain name" issues,
and if there is to be no individuals constituency in the DNSO

but
an SO for individual domain name
holders.- effect on the DNSO consensus
process.

Timeframe:The task force
will consider proposals made to the Board by the ALSC or DNSO
constituencies before 31 January 2002.