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Friday, July 4, 2014

The Lost Spring: U.S. Policy in the Middle East, by Walid Phares

The decision had already been
made a year ago that a deal would be cut with the Iranian regime. If one
has a deal, one is not going to enter into a war with the allies of the
Ayatollah, such as Syria. That would kill the deal.
These advisors and the pro-Iranian lobby in Washington are not made
up only of Iranians. They are made of financial interest groups. For all
these years there has been the idea that if we cut a deal with the
Iranian regime, they will stabilize Iran, Iraq, Syria and Lebanon.
When the Iranians moved in to Syria, Hezbollah moved in. When both
moved in, Al-Qaeda moved in. That was the end of civil demonstrations.
The current Middle East policy tracks are in the papers of the
academics who are advising the administration. All one has to do is go
to the libraries and read what the advisors have been writing for so
many decades and then deduce the current policy.
We were in Iraq. By looking at a map, one can understand that by
being in Iraq, the U.S. served as a wall, disconnecting Iran from going
into Syria.

As soon as the Soviet Union collapsed, the West in general, and
America in particular were targeted by the jihadist movements. Some
consisted of Al‑Qaeda and the Taliban, and others consisted of a
different type of jihadism: the Iranian regime.
At the time of the USSR's collapse, the American public knew about
Iranian and Hezbollah threats. There had been attacks on American
targets since the early 1980s -- such as those in Beirut, Lebanon, and
the Khobar Towers, Saudi Arabia -- by America's Iranian "allies."
What Americans did not know much about, however, were jihadist Salafi
movements – even after two declarations of war by Osama bin Laden: the
first in 1996, and again in 1998. If Bin Laden's first declaration of
war was not clear, his second statement was -- a 29‑minute‑long speech
in Arabic, publicized on Al Jazeera.
The next day I thought, "Surely the President of the United States is
going to rush to Congress and say, 'We are at war with Al‑Qaeda.'" But
it did not happen that way. What did happen was that the New York Times,
on page 7,000, said there was a Saudi dissident who declared war
against America. The newspaper had its own explanation: "He is a Saudi
dissident. He is frustrated with the Arabian royal family. He is a
reformer, and he is really not happy with us backing that regime."
That was also the explanation given at the time by the Middle East
Studies community in American universities. American scholars looked
upon the jihadists who came back from Afghanistan as frustrated,
disenfranchised, and then they criticized -- themselves.
What we have as foreign policy today, in blaming America for everything,was actually the stance of academia in the 1990s.

Classroom to Newsroom

It was stunning to see, coming to this country, that members of the
U.S. academia were not informing their students about reality,
especially about who these jihadist movements are and their goals. When,
in 1998, bin Laden finally declared a war against Jews, Christians,
crusaders, infidels, and Americans, the reaction in the mainstream media
was... almost no reaction.
But people in the media are produced where? In the classroom. They graduate, then go from the classroom -- to the newsroom. Graduates then also find their way into -- the courtroom.
This pattern reveals why we also have judges who do not understand how
to distinguish jihadists from non‑jihadists. The problem, however, does
not end in the classroom or the newsroom or the courtroom. It eventually
ends up in the war room.
This was a war of ideas and our entire elite had been misinformed, miseducated and misled on the forthcoming terror.

Minorities Rise in the Middle East

The 1990s also bore witness to the rise of civil society in the
Middle East. People saw the collapse of the Soviet Union and understood
the liberation of Eastern and Central Europe. In the late 1990s, I began
to look at websites and deal with NGOs. In Beirut, I had a magazine, Mashrek International. [Mashrek means "The East."] That magazine, founded in 1982, focused on the struggle of these minorities.
The first type of civil society that arose basically consisted of
marginalized minorities who were bringing to light the issues facing
ethnic and religious minorities in the Middle East. [1] There was a world of minorities moving -- pushing back against both oppressive regimes and against jihadi regimes.
While examining these ethnic and religious minorities, we found other
segments of society that were also frustrated and suppressed, such as
women in the Middle East and the youth.
What had made these minorities more visible was technology.
On the eve of 9/11 -- the end of the 1990s and into the next decade
-- the internet had become available to more and more people, so more
writings about these changes were becoming available, along with the
ideas of the people writing them.
Immediately after the attacks of 2001, the few who were working on
this problem were called upon by members of Congress to "come up with
answers."

Looking for Moderates

Most will remember that after 9/11 there were many questions. One
was, "Where are the moderates?" Others included, "Where are the
anti‑jihadists? Why don't they express themselves?" My argument at the
time was that we needed to "meet them halfway." That experiment had been
tried in Sudan and Lebanon, when I had worked with the administration
on UN Resolution 1559, passed by the Security Council, to ask the
Syrians to withdraw from Lebanon. But by 2010, a lot had changed in the
Middle East. Civil societies had reached a level of intolerance
regarding their suppression.
By early 2010, civil societies -- youth and minorities and all of
those who are anti‑jihadist in the region -- saw several developments
which, ironically, prepared them for both the good news and the bad news
that came from the Arab Spring. First, when the U.S. brought down the
Taliban and Saddam Hussein (we can have a long discussion if this move
was "good" or "bad," move, but that is irrelevant here), and its
military was able to maintain a status quo -- meaning that we were not
militarily defeated in Iraq or Afghanistan, although we would eventually
assure defeat by withdrawing from both -- the real question became:
"What do we leave behind us? Who do we leave behind us? Who will replace us and continue confronting the terror forces?"
When the Taliban was removed, not everything in Afghanistan turned rosy.
We do not have a democracy in Afghanistan. But in the eyes of many
other people in the Middle East, instead of the Taliban, there is now a
parliament where women are allowed. To us, this change is not
significant. But to those in these societies, that change is most
significant.
In Iraq, instead of having one political party, that of Saddam
Hussein, we have now a parliament where people choose among multiple
political parties, maybe even throwing shoes at each other. Iraq has
changed, and is changing.

Two Revolutions Before the "Spring"

Two more events were going to convince many youths in the region that
they needed to act. One was the Cedar Revolution in Lebanon in 2005,
when from 1.5 to 1.8 million people took to the streets of Beirut. They
were nonviolent; they were from diverse communities; they included many
women; they represented many languages. But there was one desired
outcome: To get the Syrians out of Lebanon.
This revolution became known there as the Texting Revolution, after
the mobile phone text messages that allowed one million people to come
together.
The Cedar Revolution may not have been successful -- Hezbollah
continues to control Lebanon. But four years later, in Iran, came the
Green Revolution. Another two million people took to the streets. The
numbers were revealing: 60% of those who demonstrated were under the age
of 20. The regime understands what that means. The future was rising
up. These were not senior citizens demonstrating, nor the allies of the
Shah. These were people who were born two regimes after the Shah.
One‑third of those under-20-demonstrators were girls and women, at
least in the first few days of the revolution. Of course, when the
Iranian Revolutionary Guard took to the streets against them, they fled.
That revolution was known as the Twitter revolution. Without the
means, there can be no mobilization. Ideas may be present and strong,
but the means and the networking were crucial.

First Waves of the Upheaval

In mid-2010, I wrote a book, The Coming Revolution. When we
spoke to, the publisher, he said, "Are you sure? This is a very daring
title." I said, "Yes, the revolution is coming. I don't how it is coming
or when it is coming. But it is coming." You could read the chat rooms,
follow what the Egyptians, the Tunisians, the Lebanese, and the
Iranians were talking about. They were actually waiting for an
opportunity. I thought, perhaps, the revolution might begin in Algeria
with the Berbers. One could see that there was a thin wave of civil
society that would rise up. It might not be effective, it might not win
-- and in the West, especially in America, we have a microwave
mentality: it has to be quick, it has to be successful, or it will not
be on TV.
There are some rebellions -- efforts at revolution -- that will come
and that will not be successful, but even those open the path for a
massive change. In Egypt, the Copts would be the trigger. It was, in
fact, a Coptic student demonstration in Cairo after a blast against a
church that came first. This bold move encouraged the non‑Christian
youth in Egypt to begin their own demonstrations. It also triggered a
Facebook page highlighting the response in Egypt. In three days, the
page got 85,000 "Likes." From those 85,000 Likes, thousands took to
Tahrir Square.
When the first waves of revolution hit Tahrir Square, or Tunisia, or
Libya, or Syria, there was a moment in which the United States -- if it
had had the right leadership or a leadership that wanted to act, or at
least a leadership that did not want to partner with the other side --
could have aided the cause of freedom tremendously. If we had sided with
civil society, it might have stood a chance.
In 2011, Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, and Syria -- and Yemen to a point --
were all experiencing revolutions or civil wars. Tunisia changed
quickly, but in Egypt, the first 80,000‑100,000 people were in Tahrir
Square and they did not leave. That had never happened before.
In Washington and around the United States and the West, many were
arguing, "We should stick with Mubarak." My closest friends were telling
me, "It's too risky to abandon Mubarak." My view, however, was if the
Islamists are the ones who are rising, yes, of course, we will stay with
Mubarak, but if members of the civil society are rising, then we had
better immediately link up with them so that if we let go of Mubarak,
they are not overwhelmed later by the Islamists.

Washington's Wrong Choices

Unfortunately, the administration did just the opposite. So, when
those youths took to the streets and the international community said,
"Okay, it is acceptable," the Muslim Brotherhood, who were watching,
simply waited -- and actually said on Al Jazeera, "We did not go until
we made sure that Tahrir Square is protected, that Mubarak is not going
to launch his army."
This made sense: the Muslim Brotherhood had a long history of being
suppressed by Mubarak. The administration was basically siding with the
Muslim Brotherhood. We were watching those demonstrators growing in the
tens of thousands. The narrative coming from the White House was, 'We
are going to wait and see how this is going to settle down.'"
It was only when members of the Muslim Brotherhood moved from the
edges into Tahrir Square and secured themselves as part of this
demonstration that the statements changed in the White House and the
State Department, and they finally said, "Mubarak, you leave."
The entire administration may not even have known what was happening,
but those who are in charge of the Egypt situation or the State
Department's Egypt Desk knew exactly what they were doing. They wanted
to secure the future leadership of Egypt after Mubarak as one made up
mostly of the Muslim Brotherhood.
The same scenario occurred in Libya and Syria, where the situation
turned immediately into civil wars -- again because of miscalculations
or false calculations from the administration.
In Libya, in the early weeks, secular ex‑Gaddafi bureaucrats, judges,
former diplomats, and military men -- and students --rose up against
Gaddafi. With them, on their side, were also jihadi Islamist militias,
some of whom were actually released by Saif al‑Islam, Gaddafi's son.
In Washington, both the administration and, unfortunately, some
members of Congress said, "Well, these are the rebels, so this whole
party must be 'the rebels.'" The U.S. did not distinguish, within the
rebels, who were the potential partners we needed to work with,and who
were the jihadi Salafists.
In Libya, we beat Gaddafi's forces so quickly that the only organized
force on the ground was that of the Salafist jihadists. They seized the
eastern part of Libya and parts of Tripoli, and that, strengthened by
even more forces averse to U.S. interests, is where Libya is today.

Syria's Drama

In Syria, the early waves of revolution that we saw on TV were made
of demonstrators from Daraa in the south, to Aleppo and Damascus. So,
between March 2011 and January of 2012, we really had a popular
uprising. This was a golden opportunity to do something about Syria.
There are sometimes windows of opportunity that if missed, force you
to wait for another. The opportunity was there simply because we were in
Iraq. By looking at a map, one can understand that by being in Iraq,
the U.S. served as a wall, disconnecting Iran from going into Syria. So
as long as we and our allies were in Iraq, the Iranian regime was not
yet able to connect strategically with the Assad regime.
Also, Hezbollah was not yet heavily inside Syria for the first six to
seven months. Al‑Qaeda had not yet penetrated deep into Syria. A better
policy would have been to use situation -- even if we might have had to
stretch our presence in Iraq a few more months -- to leave Iraq with an
ally force and Syria with a non‑Assad regime. Instead, we had to stick
with the schedule -- the very political schedule -- of leaving Iraq on
December 31 at midnight, regardless of what might happen later.
The Iranians, of course, could and would wait for us to leave. What
were they going to do on January first and second and third? Start
connecting strategically with the Syrian regime. When the Iranians moved
in, Hezbollah moved in. When both moved in, Al‑Qaeda moved in. When
everybody was in, that was the end of the civil demonstrations.
Those events take us to 2012, the midst of a presidential campaign:
"We do not do foreign interventions." Nobody wants to risk anything
unless it will be completely successful in three days and then they can
take the credit through to November.
This scenario did not happen. In 2013, once the elections were over,
everything in Syria had changed. The map had changed: Iran was in Syria.
A short while ago, there was a statement by the head of the al Quds
force, the Iranian central force, and the President of Iran, saying, "We
cannot leave Syria. We cannot let Assad go."
Hezbollah is also now deeply entrenched in Syria, and Al‑Qaeda has
seized, probably, about 40% of Syria's opposition. The Russians -- now
even more than before -- have put in their veto, and the Chinese have as
well.
Remember when the administration was considering striking Syria for
using chemical weapons? That was the final test. We urged Assad, and
then we threatened Assad not to cross the red line. He crossed the red
line. We ordered our battleships to go -- and then we stopped and asked
the Russians to take the problem to the United Nations.
What was behind that, as far as I learned, was that the
administration asked the U.S. military and the national security group
of analysts, "What is going to happen if we engage or if we strike
against the chemical weapons system?" The reports came in: "There is no
such thing, in this configuration of forces, as a limited strike." A
limited strike in Vietnam did not work, right? We had a 20‑year war
against three Communist nations: North Vietnam, China, and Russia. A
limited strike in Syria in 2013 or 2014 could mean possible retaliation
by four regimes: the Assad regime, Hezbollah, Iraq's Maliki regime, and
Iran.
The message was: "President Obama, if you want to do a military
strike in Syria, you will be fighting four regimes." In 2011, the U.S.
was encircling Assad; he was almost gone. But as soon as the U.S. lifted
that option into an agreement with the Assad regime -- which gave Assad
every green light he needed to continue his warfare and has actually
aggrandized Al‑Qaeda further -- ten or fifteen days later, Washington
announced that it had an "interim deal" with Iran.
When the president was considering striking Syria for using chemical
weapons, what did he do? He sent that decision to Congress. Since when
does a president send his decisions on national security and defense to
Congress? But when he cut a deal with the Iranian regime -- after 31
years of the standing U.S. policy, Republican and Democrat alike, of
isolating of that regime -- he did not send it for review in Congress.
It seems now, however, that the reason the administration did not
strike Syria is not just that it meant engaging those four regimes.
The decision had already been made, a year ago, in the discussions
with the Iranian regime, that a deal would be cut with the Iranian
regime. If one has a deal to be declared with the Ayatollahs, one is not
going to enter a war with the allies of the Ayatollahs. That would kill
the deal.

The Administration's Two Tracks

It seems now that the administration, since 2009, had two tracks for
its Middle East policy. Track number one, from Morocco to Gaza, would be
to partner with the Muslim Brotherhood. On what grounds? Because the
academic elite and the advisors for the administration have convinced
senior decision makers that the Muslim Brotherhood is a force for
"change." This is how the administration sees the Brotherhood. The
people of Egypt see the Brotherhood as Fascists, as neo‑Nazis, but to
the elite here -- the academic elite -- which, by the way has been
generously funded by the Brotherhood, or at least inspired by the
petro‑dollars coming under the office of the Brotherhood -- it makes
sense that the Brotherhood is a force we can count on. The Brotherhood
will secure all of this space, and then civilized business can be done
with them, and then they will be secured as a loyal wing.
The other track would run from Beirut to Syria to Iraq to Iran -- if the behavior of the Iranian leadership can be successfully changed.
That these were the current Middle East politics tracks is based on
information not hard to find. It is in the papers of the academics who
are advising the administration. It is simple to go to the libraries and
read what the advisors have been writing for so many decades and then
deduce what the current policy is.
These advisors and the pro‑Iranian lobby in Washington are not made
only of Iranians, as some of my colleagues believe. They are made of
financial interest groups who have been waiting to do business with Iran
because for all these years, there has been the idea that if we cut a
deal with the Iranian regime, the Iranian regime will stabilize Iran,
Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon. Thus the grand design becomes apparent.
And where were the first indicators of that grand design? Look at the
2008 Obama campaign and read what the contributing intellectuals were
saying about the Middle East. And then in June of 2009, the president
went to Cairo and delivered his speech. Actually, one of the
speechwriters went to Egypt and bragged that she was part of the writing
of this speech -- and that she has been an advisor in the White House
and close to the Muslim Brotherhood. The speech was designed to tell the
Muslim Brotherhood that the United States will eventually be changing
its policy and that there will be a new day.
All these words were in the speech. The speech was designed not just
for the Muslim world, but for the Muslim Brotherhood, whose
representatives the White House invited to sit in the front row.

There was also a letter, sent in early June to the Ayatollah Ali
Khamenei of Iran, in which was expressed an intention to engage in
dialogue. There is nothing secret about this policy. From the early
stages of the administration, there was an approach to partner with the
Muslim Brotherhood, even before it came to power, and to unfreeze the
relationship with the Iranians.
The Arab Spring seems to have come as a surprise to the
administration, although many of my colleagues are now saying the
administration was behind the Arab Spring. The Arab Spring caused
the administration to scramble in choosing which partners they were
going to be working with in North Africa and, of course, later on, in
Iran.
The administration did not predict the Arab Spring. When it happened,
the U.S. corrected its own policy to meet the partners it really wanted
to work and cut a deal with. Now, one of the administration's policies,
the partnership with the Muslim Brotherhood, is essentially being
dismantled -- not by us, but by the Egyptian people.

Egypt's Real Revolution

On June 30th, 2013, 33 million Egyptians rose up. Many in Washington,
especially in the administration, immediately called the change of
regime in Egypt a "coup." If 33 million demonstrators are a coup, we
have to change political science. No, it was not a coup; it was a
revolution. Egypt's General Abdel Fattah el-Sisi or Field Marshal
Tantawi or any leader without 33 million people on the streets would
have never conducted any change, would never have dared tell Mr. Morsi,
"stay at home." They would have been removed immediately; the United
States would have called them rebels, and they would have been taken to
The Hague. Even before the revolution, there had been a petition signed
by 22 million people in Egypt.
In the Middle East studies field, academics have been saying, "But
Morsi was elected." Well, Benito Mussolini was elected and Adolf Hitler
was elected. Half of the voters for Morsi were simply protest voters
against the other candidate, who was a relic from the previous regime.
Actually, the number of voters for Morsi was about six million. But 22.5
million signed a petition. That is a recall. If I were Morsi, I would
have resigned or asked my government to resign. That is what is done in
liberal democracies. Think France. If there is an election in France,
and the president loses the majority, what happens? The government
changes.
But that is not the whole story in Egypt. Early this year there was a
referendum. In international law, the last referendum is the last
reflection of what people want. 22.5 million showed up for the
referendum and rejected the proposed Muslim Brotherhood constitution.
This referendum was what opened the path for presidential elections and
parliamentary elections. This is the path Egypt is taking.

Tunisia's Struggle

In Tunisia, the Ennahda party, the Islamist sister-party of the
Muslim Brotherhood, was smarter. Its leaders understood what happened in
Egypt. The opposition in Tunisia is even stronger. They are also
secular. Women in the opposition are strong women. The labor unions are
strong. Tunisia is a bit more advanced than Egypt.
It seems that the Ennahda government got advice from Europe and from
the U.S. to make concessions, to allow changes, to have a national unity
cabinet, and to go again for elections. That saved their skin. Those
are smart Islamists. Ennahda did not reform. Ennahda conducted a
tactical withdrawal. My recommendation in dealing with Islamists has
been that the measure by which you know the Islamists have transformed
themselves into something else -- Muslim Conservative, Muslim Democrat,
etc. -- is that they declare, within their own party, that they have
changed, just as when the Communist Parties declared that they were now
Social Democrats. We do not usually believe them, but at least they make
these declarations.
Nothing of this sort has happened in Tunisia. And in Syria, every day, it is still just going from bad to worse.

Conclusion

Today the region is still witnessing a race between the Islamist forces and the secularists, moderates and liberals.
The Muslim Brotherhood has been struggling to maintain its influence
in Egypt, Tunisia and Libya, as well as within the Syrian opposition in
Jordan and in Iraq.
In the Levant, the Iranian Khomeinists have the upper hand in Tehran,
and, through the Baghdad government, in Damascus and in Beirut. In the
other camp, a diverse web of NGOs, secularists, women, and minorities
are struggling to advance pluralism and democracy.
This race has been affected and will continue to be impacted by
Western and U.S. policies and preferences. If Washington continues to
give advantage to the Islamists, the Islamists will resist reform, and
civil societies will have hard time implementing change toward progress.
But if the U.S. and its Western allies lend their support to civil
societies, the culture of reform could take root in the region.
It is my projection that civil societies and secularists will
eventually shift the balance of power towards their ideals, but it may
be generational. As we see in Egypt, Tunisia and Libya, the secularists
are pushing forward. In the Iranian-dominated Middle East, opposition is
also growing against the Ayatollahs. So far it has been a lost Spring,
but this is only one season. Another is coming soon, and we need to be
prepared for it.

Walid Phares, born and raised in Beirut, Lebanon, is a
professor and lecturer in the U.S., and the author of six books, the
most recent of which is: The Lost Spring: U.S. Policy in the Middle East and Catastrophes to Avoid.A slightly different version of this article was was delivered as
an address to the Gatestone Institute in New York City earlier this
year.

[1]
These groups included Muslim ethnic minorities, such as Kurds and
Berbers; Christian minorities, such as the Copts of Egypt, Assyrians,
Chaldeans, Southern Sudanese; and, in Sudan, black Africans -- both
Christian and Muslim minorities. In Iran, where 37% of the population is
non-Persian, but includes the Kurds and Azeri, student movements were
already in place.