Indian nuclear explosions...Pakistan's statement by Ambassador Munir Akram in
the UN Conference on Disarmament, 14 May 1998.

Mr. President,

This Spring session of the Conference on Disarmament opens at a defining moment for the
post-Cold War world security order. It is also a moment of destiny for the 140 million
people of Pakistan.

2. Since its independence, our nation has confronted the
endemic hostility of our neighbour, India. We have thrice been subjected to aggression by
this country, which dismembered our state in 1971, and is even now engaged in an eight
year brutal war to suppress the right of self-determination of the people of occupied
Jammu and Kashmir. This country has deployed almost the whole of its million and half man
Army, its Air force and its Navy on our frontiers. This third large conventional force in
the world is being further augmented through the acquisition of advanced arms worth
billions of dollars.

3. Before assuming office, the present Hindu
fundamentalist leadership of this country had declared that it would conduct nuclear tests
and "induct" nuclear weapons. It had also threatened to conduct attacks on
Pakistan across the Line of Control in Kashmir. It has carried out the first of these
threats. Nuclear weapons proliferation is now a fact of life in South Asia.

4. In evaluating the grave environment created by India's
three plus two nuclear weapons tests, and in evolving an equitable and effective response,
it is essential to bear in mind the history and context of nuclear proliferation in South
Asia. It is essential to be aware of the ambitions of India, and the compulsions of
Pakistan. It is essential to recall the inertia and the responsibility of certain major
powers for this development which has grave portents for regional and international peace
and stability.

Mr. President,

5. India's ambition to acquire nuclear weapons, though
often disguised by chronic deceit and hypocrisy, has been no secret. Prime Minister Nehru,
while inaugurating the Indian Atomic Energy Commission in 1948, declared that "every
country would have to develop and use the latest scientific device foritsprotection".

6. India has proceeded systematically to acquire and
develop nuclear weapons. It acquired a research reactor and other nuclear facilities
outside safeguards in the 1960s. It refused to sign the NPT in 1968. It insisted on the
legitimacy of "peaceful nuclear explosions". Then, India meanwhile, diverted
nuclear fuel from its "civilian" programme to explode a so-called
"peaceful" nuclear device in May 1974. Since then, the scope of its
unsafeguarded nuclear facilities and fissile material stocks have expanded expotentially.

7. Nuclear weapons development has been accompanied by the
development of nuclear delivery systems, specially ballistic missiles. This was done
initially under the cover of a civilian space programme, pursued with the cooperation of
several advanced countries. The short-range `Prithvi' missile was tested 20 times. Four to
five of these missiles are being serially produced every month. The Prithvi's declared
targets are Pakistan's strategic facilities and assets and almost all our cities. The
intermediate range Agni has been tested four times. It is likely to be developed soon for
deployment, against China and Pakistan.

8. India has developed its nuclear and missile programmes
with the active assistance and cooperation of several industrialized countries. This must
be mentioned, not in anger but for the record. Canada supplied india's unsafeguarded
CIRRUS research reactor, a heavy water plant, a nuclear fuel complex and two power
reactors. The United States provided unsafeguarded heavy water, assistance in the
construction of reprocessing facilities and in training dozens of experts in reprocessing.
France offered exchange of personnel and special training in plutonium extraction from
spent nuclear fuel.

9. Similarly, India's missile development is not
indigenous. India's missile Chief visited various U.S. missile bases and research
facilities in 1962 and, on the way back, concluded an agreement with Switzerland for
"Project Indigo", an IRBM research programme. In 1963 and 1964, the doyen of the
Indian missile programme participated in the development and launch of the U.S. Scout
missile, which has provided a technological basis for the AGNI missile. Several Western
countries collaborated in the launching 350 rockets in India's Space programme and the
Space Launch Vehicle (SLV 3), whose first stage provided the motor for the Agni.
Equipment and technologies - the Viking rocket engine, liquid fuel technology, guidance
and navigation systems, high-altitude rocket simulation, electronics - were acquired from
these Western countries. The Prithvi is based on the Viking and SA-2 technologies.
Finally, despite the MTCR, India obtained at least one cryogenic engine from Russia, with
80% of the design and technical information already in its hands.

Mr. President,

10. Pakistan's actions in the nuclear and missile fields -
were taken, at each stage, in response to the escalatory steps taken by India. Pakistan
was able to develop the capability for nuclear enrichment and in missile research and
development, notwithstanding discriminatory embargoes and restrictions. We have the
technological and other capabilities now to develop the various aspects of our programmes
required to respond to India's past, present or future escalatory steps.

11. However, Pakistan has never resorted to adventurist or
irresponsible actions. Our policies have been marked by restraint. After India's 1974
nuclear test, we did not reciprocate. We did not feel the need to do so if India's nuclear
weapons development did not go any further. Similarly, Pakistan exercised unilateral
restraint in the production of highly enriched uranium despite our concerns regarding
India's larger plutonium stockpile. Pakistan has held back so far, from deploying its
missiles. In response to India's 24 missile tests, Pakistan has conducted only one missile
flight test so far.

Mr. President,

12. Despite the fact that every escalatory step on the
nuclear proliferation ladder was initiated by India, it is Pakistan which has been
consistently subjected to a series of discriminatory penalties, sanctions and restraints
designed to prevent us from acquiring the capability to respond to the Indian escalation.

13. After India's 1974 nuclear explosion, the same country
which had provided India an unsafeguarded research reactor, reneged on its contracts to
provide Pakistan safeguarded fuel for our Karachi power reactor, halted shipment of a fuel
fabrication plant and terminated all civilian and safeguarded nuclear cooperation with
Pakistan. In 1976, the U.S. Congress passed the so-called Symington Amendment which
penalized acquisition of enrichment and re-processing capabilities but only after 1976,
thus effectively exempting India but not Pakistan. In 1979, U.S. economic assistance to
Pakistan was terminated for contracting to purchase a reprocessing plant from France.
Soon, that country was also obliged to renege on its contract to supply this safeguarded
reprocessing plant to Pakistan. But it was not halted from providing India a vital
shearing machine for its unsafeguarded reprocessing facility. In 1980, the U.S. decided to
ship 38 tons of enriched uranium to India. In 1985, France took up the supply of enriched
uranium to India. Discrimination against Pakistan was further compounded by the specific
legislation aimed against Pakistan, specially the so-called Pressler Amendment which
required the U.S. President to annually certify that Pakistan - but not India - did not
possess a nuclear device.

Mr. President,

14. Such discrimination against Pakistan was all the more
unjustified because our preference, at every step of India's push towards proliferation,
was to press for political solutions and mutual restraint.

15. The initiatives taken by Pakistan to arrest nuclear
proliferation in South Asia are a matter of historical record. Even after India's 1974
nuclear explosion, Pakistan proposed:

one, a joint Indo-Pakistan declaration renouncing the
acquisition or manufacture of nuclear weapons, in 1978;

two, mutual inspections by India and Pakistan of each other's
nuclear facilities, in 1979;

three, simultaneous adherence to the NPT and India and
Pakistan, in 1979;

four, simultaneous acceptance of full-scope IAEA safeguards, in
1979;

five, a bilateral or regional nuclear test ban treaty< in
1987;

six, a South Asia Zero-Missile Zone in 1994.

16. Pakistan also suggested various modalities to advance
the goal of non-proliferation in South Asia: bilateral talks, five-nation talks, a
multilateral Conference. We fully supported initiatives by the U.S., first for five-nation
talks and later for nine-nation consultations regarding non-proliferation and security in
South Asia. While India predictably opposed all these initiatives, what was most
disappointing for Pakistan is the alacrity with these initiatives were jettisoned by their
author in the face of India's obdurate and bellicose rejection. Such supine responses are
at least consistent. They are all too evident even today. After all, India's 1974 test was
accepted as "peaceful" nuclear explosion by some. And, when India threatened to
veto the CTBT in this Conference, it was told in high-level letters that it need not
adhere to the Treaty so long as it did not block the Treaty's transmission to the General
Assembly. The Ambassador of a great power in New Delhi went further and assured that even
an Indian veto of the CTBT would have no impact on bilateral relations. He was proved
right by events.

17. This track record does not inspire any confidence that
the new endeavours which are now urged are more sincere or will be more effective.

Mr. President,

18. The events of the past few months have vividly
confirmed our conviction that it is Pakistan and not India which is the real target of the
non-proliferation crusaders. The missile tests conducted by India over the past months
evoked no concern or comment, even sanctions were loudly threatened against Pakistan and
China. When the BJP-led government declared its aim of inducting nuclear weapons and
conducting nuclear tests, no official concern was expressed, despite the warning conveyed
in the letters sent by Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif to the leaders of the major powers.
Similarly, the concern expressed by Pakistan's Foreign Minister in this Conference on 19
March this year evoked no response. Instead, the high visiting envoys of the sole super
power sang paens of praise - even in Islamabad - for the "restraint and
responsibility" of the new Indian government. We are now witness to this
"restraint and responsibility"!

19. Such apparent gullibility did not greatly impress the
Pakistani leadership. We were hardly amused when, soon after these visits, MTCR sanctions
were instituted against a Pakistan-government entity. Meanwhile, no sanctions were
considered for India's development of submarine - based missiles.

20. We also saw other curious and disturbing signals. The
Indian Defence Minister, notwithstanding the well known improvement in Sino-Indian
relations, suddenly declared that China rather than Pakistan was the "number one
threat" to India's security. He falsely asserted that China has deployed missiles in
Tibet aimed at India.

21. Evidently, in the Indian view, it was felt that its
nuclear tests would be more palatable if they were seen as serving the goal of
"containing" China. Reported moves at the recently concluded NPT PrepCom meeting
to accommodate India's concerns on the FMCT, full-scope safeguarded etc. have added fuel
to speculation about new deals and alignments.

Mr. President,

22. Conspiracy theories have gained further credence due
to the alleged absence of advance warning about the Indian nuclear tests. We have been
repeatedly told of the awesome capabilities of the National Technical Means of one power.
Indeed, sanctions have been (wrongly) imposed on Pakistan (and China) on the basis of
`evidence' said to be acquired through such NTMs. In December 1995, these NTMs detected
Indian preparations for a test, enabling the international community to take measures to
pre-empt these tests. Why was it different now? Was this really an intelligence failure?

23. A report circulated in Washington by an anti-Indian
"political action group" dated 7 May - i.e. 4 days before the May 11 tests -
stated that "in the meantime preparations for an Indian nuclear test have been
further confirmed by our sources in India, (who so far have never been wrong having
millions of pairs of eyes and ears fixed to the ground) who report all kinds of feverish
night time activities, in the vicinity of Pokharan in Rajasthan state sixty miles from the
Pakistan border. The question is will the United States allow the fundamentalist
Hindu fascists in Delhi to circumvent US non-proliferation laws? Only time will
tell".

24. Well, the Hindu fundamentalists have acted. Now,
unequal restraint is again urged on Pakistan.

Mr. President,

25. The press statement issued by India on 11 May that
"it would be prepared to consider being an adherent to some of the undertakings in
the CTBT" dependent on "a number of reciprocal activities" and that "
it would be happy to participate in FMCT negotiations", indicates a game plan to ease
the cost of the nuclear tests. In India's eyes the CTBT seems to have shed its inequity
overnight. Forgetting its "not now, not later" declaration, India appears to
have given up its call for "nuclear disarmament within a time-bound framework".
It was after all, only a ploy. All of us suspected as much.

26. Interestingly, the demands being made now by some of
the major powers appear to match the Indian "offers". Is this coincidence?

27. India has, however, asked for a price - undefined
"reciprocal activities" - for its acceptance of the CTBT. Is this a reference to
India's desire for technology to carry out sub-critical nuclear tests? Or is this a
reference to its demand for a permanent seat on the UN Security Council? Or even more
ambitiously, is this a demand by India to be formally acknowledged as a nuclear weapon
state? Regrettably, at least two nuclear powers have expressed an interest in eliciting
what price India may be asking for adherence to the CTBT. Is it merely a coincidence that
the same two powers have recently expressed an interest in exploring deals for civil
nuclear cooperation with India?

Mr. President,

28. For Pakistan, the series of nuclear weapon tests
conducted by India on 11 and 13 May have significantly altered the strategic and security
equation in our region. As the Indian press statement itself has stated:

"These tests have established that India has proven capability for a weaponized
nuclear programme. They also provide a valuable database which is useful in the design of
nuclear weapons of different yields for different applications and for different delivery
systems. Further, they are expected to carry Indian scientists towards a sound computer
simulation capability which may be supported by sub-critical experiments, if considered
necessary".

29. Furthermore, as Mr. Joshi, the Indian Minister for
Science and Technology, is quoted as saying on 12 May:

"Indian scientists will put a nuclear warhead on missiles as soon as the situation
requires. India has not closed its option to conduct more tests if and when necessary. In
the meanwhile work on the Agni Phase-II has started in earnest."

Mr. President,

30. What Pakistan confronts today is not merely a nuclear
capable State. We face a nuclear weaponized power. It is strange that senior officials of
a major nuclear power continue to argue, unconvincingly, that India has not
"weaponized" yet. We wonder if they would be convinced of this if India actually
delivers a nuclear weapon against one of its neighbours?

31. In the new strategic environment, it is extremely
disingenuous for anyone to call on Pakistan to exercise restraint, or to sign the CTBT or
agree to FMCT negotiations. These calls are, of course, consistent with the discrimination
to which Pakistan has been historically subjected.

Mr. President,

32. The Government of Pakistan has adopted an important
principle that "we will accept obligations and commitment in the field of nuclear
non-proliferation only if these are equitable and non-discriminatory. We will not accept
unilateral obligations or commitment. We will not accept commitments which would
permanently jeopardize the ability of Pakistan to deter the nuclear and conventional
threats which India poses to our security.

33. Pakistan has consistently acted as a responsible
member of the international community. We have not resorted to adventurism and
provocation. But Pakistan will not allow itself to be subjected to any international
conspiracy to compromise its security. We will not endorse any scheme which fosters or
accepts India's nuclear or political hegemony in our region. The Indian tests are a direct
and most serious challenge to Pakistan's security. It is Pakistan alone which will decide
on and take the measures required to guarantee our security. The people of Pakistan, after
decades of discrimination, have a right to insist that their nation's security and
independence be fully respected by all the members of the international community.

Mr. President,

34. In his statement before the Pakistan Senate yesterday,
my Foreign Minister has stated:

"The news of the carrying out of two further nuclear tests today by India,
corroborates our assessment and provides further confirmation, if any were needed, about
India's consistent pattern of irresponsible behaviour.

The blind pursuit of intrinsic and inherent hegemonic impulses, reflected too often in
Indian behaviour and ignored largely by the international community, despite Pakistan's
repeated efforts to draw attention to them, has definitely encouraged and emboldened India
to throw all caution to the winds.

The invoking of mandatory sanctions under US Laws against India hardly constitutes an
effective response to Indian provocative actions or compensates for errors of judgement,
which have seriously disrupted the regional strategic balance.

India is now admittedly testing the whole range of nuclear weaponry, including
battlefield/tactical nuclear weapons which are Pakistan specific.

Indian actions, which pose an immediate and grave threat to Pakistan's security, will
not go unanswered.

Pakistan once again reiterates that responsibility for consequences that will
inevitably ensue would lie squarely with India and those who have colluded and acquiesced
in the weaponization of India's nuclear programme".