Riding the Raisina Tiger

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In a bid to foil an infiltration bid, Major Akash Singh was killed in the exchange of fire that started around midnight when militants tried to infiltrate the Mendhar Sector.

His young children -- a three-year-old daughter and two-year-old son -- are unsure of what's going on. Just three days back his father, Major Singh, returned to duty on a forward post at the LoC after spending 10 days with the family.

"Father got a phone call from the commanding officer at 6 am, we were told infiltration bid has taken place and two militants were killed by the Army and when they were chasing another militant he took a bullet, we were told he is no more," said Vikas Singh, Akash Singh's brother.

Major Akash joined the army in 1998 as it was his long cherished dream.

"We are sad we lost a friend but we are proud that he gave his life for the country," said Bite Rakesh Sharma, a friend.

He was killed after an infiltration bid was foiled in the Poonch sector of Jammu and Kashmir. Two militants were also killed in the night-long operation.

According to the Army there is a possibility of more militants having been killed during the encounter, though just two bodies have been found so far. The search operation, however, is going on.

In the last nine months, there has been a spurt in infiltration. Compared to 45 infiltration attempts last year, this year has already seen more than 70 infiltration attempts so far.

"Major Akash Singh's friends remember him as a brave man who always wanted to be in the Army an

d serve the country. Today he is no more, but he will always remain alive in the hearts and a role model for his colleagues.

The father of Pakistan's nuclear bomb, A Q Khan, has spoken out. In an interview to a news channel, Khan has said that America looked the other way as Pakistan began it's nuclear programme since Islamabad was helping them in the Afghan war against the Soviet Union.

He also said that this gave them space to test as early as 1984, but General Zia decided against it arguing, "Since the United States had to overlook our nuclear programme due to our support in the Afghan war, it was an opportunity for us to further develop the programme. The tests could be conducted any time later."

Khan also said what has been suspected for years that Pakistan helped Iran's nuclear programme.

Khan also said that Pakistan indeed helped in Iran's nuclear programme.

"Since Iran was an important Muslim country, we wished Iran to acquire this technology. If Iran succeeds in acquiring nuclear technology, we will be a strong bloc in the region to counter international pressure," Khan said.

Khan also said that Sri Lankan Muslims, based in Dubai, were the suppliers of nuclear material and equipment to Pakistan, Iran and Libya.

Khan, who was put under house arrest several years ago by Musharraf, now wants a trial against the former President for a long list of crimes -- from the Lal Masjid operation to the sacking of Supreme Court judges.

The man America still describes as a proliferation risk, also said he was forced into admitting that by the Musharraf regime.

THE recent reports that Pakistan has modified its ship/submarine/aircraft-fitted Harpoon anti-ship missiles (supplied by the USA) to enable attacks on targets on land have caused some consternation. It is necessary to look dispassionately at the issues involved in the alleged modifications assuming that some have been made.

There are three aspects meriting consideration: one, the purpose of the modifications, two their feasibility and finally, breach of contract with the supplier country. As far as the first is concerned, every credible military will seek to get the best out of what it has; if it does not, it fails in one of its prime responsibilities.

In 1968 the Soviets sold us some missile boats. In their doctrine, these were to be deployed close to the coast to deter enemy attacks.

Soviet Admiral Gorshkov, who enthusiastically supported this acquisition, said that the Indian Navy could now easily prevent raids of the type carried out by a lone Pakistani warship off the Saurashtra coast during the 1965 war.

But within a year of acquiring these potent boats, the Indian Navy was practising something entirely different. And, when war broke out in 1971, these boats were not deployed in defence of our own coast but to attack that of the enemy.

They had a limited range but to overcome this handicap they were towed by the bigger warships and then let loose on an unsuspecting adversary with results which are now folklore. Even the supplier Navy was taken by surprise by the audacity of this move. But this was not enough.

The Indian Navy wanted missile capability in its ocean-going ships, so missile launchers and associated radars and control systems were physically lifted out of two missile boats and of the eight launch tubes thus available, six were installed and interfaced on two frigates and two in the coast battery in then Bombay. All this was done on our own.

Later, recognising operational weakness in not having anti-ship missiles in its long range aircraft, serious efforts were made to integrate the British Sea Eagle missile with the Soviet IL 38 surveillance aircraft.

The Navy has had a very competent set-up in place for decades to arrange interface of weapons and sensors acquired from different sources. This entire activity, of constantly working on upgraded operational exploitation of whatever weaponry one has, is part and parcel of the military function and, if the Pakistan Navy has been about this work, it has acted like any other of its counterparts.

The next proposition is that the modifications carried out will permit attacks from sea on land targets. This has no rationale because all anti-ship missiles can be fired against land targets.

The data to launch these missiles against ships includes the range and direction of the target and its movement so that future positions can be calculated by the fire control computers. The data can either come from one’s own radars or from those of a supporting aircraft. Nearing the target, the missile’s nose radar becomes operative. It locks on to the strongest echo received and then homes on to it.

This is true of the Harpoon missile as it is of any of our own missiles of that category. The missile can also be exploited on less information which will affect its accuracy. For example, it can be launched just in a given direction.

When its radar is activated, it will home on to any echo received. If none is, it will continue in the direction fired and either explode at the end of its fuel, wherever, or go to any targets on land which provide echoes as metallic structures do.

This is how, in 1971, missiles fired from one of our missile boats hit the oil tanks in Karachi and created the huge conflagration that they did.

There is no real certainty about the result but anything could happen. This is possible with Harpoon missiles as with any others, so there is nothing new.

As for range enhancement, this is not so easy. Any increase will need augmented fuel. Since the booster is essentially needed, this is possible only if the war head size is reduced; with an already small 200 kg warhead (against 400 kg in Russian missiles), no one would want this punch reduced.

So, the options are few. One can, of course, increase the overall dimensions of the missile and, therefore, weight, but that will need new launchers; it will be a different system altogether.

All this for a missile whose range is around 50 miles at the most seems somewhat odd. There would be more value for money in doing something with the 300 km M11 missiles which Pakistan already has to adapt for use from the sea.

The Indian Navy is now fitting its ships with missiles of this about range but has never tried to tinker with the shorter range anti-ship Russian missiles of the Harpoon category.

What then is the issue might well be asked. Repeatedly, despite India’s protestations, the Americans have supplied potent weapon systems to Pakistan, most recently, to provide capabilities in the “War against Terror”.

Yet all weaponry supplied earlier, and now being provided as military aid under this umbrella, has been and is being used by Pakistan to confront us.

When India signs an End User Verification Agreement or any other contract, it can be taken for granted that its provisions will be strictly enforced but when Pakistan signs on the line, it is just a piece of paper.

For their own reasons, and for many years, the Americans have regularly turned a blind eye to such things. It is, therefore, timely that truth has come in the public domain.

One can only hope that it will be pursued vigorously by the Americans and will persuade them to look at the entire issue of military aid to Pakistan with greater clarity.

It is for this reason, more than for others, that we should welcome the pressure that is being mounted on Pakistan and do whatever we can to have its intensity enhanced.

Cynics might argue that this is just ‘déjà vu’. Even allowing for the logic of this position, there is a difference. India is now a credible buyer in the US arms market which has its own momentum. The challenge to our diplomacy is to recognise this power and, then, to integrate it with issues which impact on our national interests.

The writer is a former Commander-in-Chief of the Eastern Naval Command

With fresh reports of incursion in Ladakh, Nawang Norboo, Councillor of Ladakh Autonomous Hill Development Council on Tuesday said that Chinese troops frequently intrude into Indian territory and even threaten Indian shepherds.

Indian media reports say the Chinese troops had entered nearly 1.5 kilometres into the Indian territory near Mount Gya, which is recognised as an international border by both India and China.

As the government downplays the news of the Chinese incursions in Ladakh, it has caused great concern among Indian strategists. B Raman believes any confrontation as a result of this hysteria would damage the interests of both countries.

A dangerous hysteria has taken hold of India-China relations since the anti-Beijing uprising in Lhasa in March last year. This hysteria is not due to any actions or rhetoric by the two governments, which have been conducting themselves in a balanced and restrained manner.

They have been trying to preserve and expand the gains in bilateral relations since Rajiv Gandhi's [ Images ] famous visit to China in 1988. They have been sincerely trying to adhere to the bilateral agreement on maintaining peace and tranquility till a final solution is reached to the border dispute between the two countries. This hysteria has been the creation of some sections of the non-governmental strategic communities in the two countries.

There are issues on which the two governments have reasons to be concerned and unhappy with each other. India has reasons to be concerned over past Chinese contacts with the Naga and Mizo insurgents in the Northeast and with their present contacts, as suspected, with the United Liberation Front of Asom, ULFA.

Similarly, China has reasons to be concerned over the activities of the set-up of His Holiness the Dalai Lama [ Images ] and the Tibet [ Images ]an Youth Congress, TYC, from Indian territory and over the reported presence in the Indian territory of the National Endowment for Democracy, NED, of the US which they blame for part of their troubles in Xinjiang and Tibet.

The two governments have refrained from publicly articulating these concerns and have taken care to see that these concerns do not come in the way of the further development of bilateral relations.

Even in respect of the bilateral dispute over the border, one has to take note of the fact that there has been no attempt by either government to change the status quo by setting up an illegal territorial presence in any sector of the border.

In respect of the Ladakh sector, India feels that the status quo favours the Chinese because of the Chinese occupation of large parts of our territory in this sector after the People's Republic of China came into existence in 1949.

The Chinese have consolidated the status quo, which favours them, by constructing roads, setting up border posts and creating border habitations in areas which used to be unpopulated. India, while not accepting the status quo de jure, has not tried to disturb it de facto.

In the Eastern sector (Arunachal Pradesh), the status quo, which we inherited from the British, favours us. The Chinese disturbed it briefly during the Sino-Indian war of 1962 by occupying large parts of it by taking advantage of our weak military and administrative presence in that area, but they unilaterally restored the status quo by withdrawing from the area occupied by them.

If they had not withdrawn unilaterally, our army was not in a position to eject them and we would have been confronted in the Eastern sector with a situation similar to the one in the Western sector -- that is, with a new post-1949 status quo set up by the Chinese which we are not in a position to change.

The Chinese have been trying to change the status quo in the Eastern sector in their favour not through military means, but by claiming a large part of this territory and insisting on our conceding their demand over some (Tawang) if not all of this territory as part of a border settlement.

Unfortunately, we find ourselves in an unequal position with the Chinese. This is because while the Chinese have consolidated the status quo in the Western sector and made sure that India will not be able to change it militarily, we have similarly not consolidated the status quo in the Eastern sector and made sure that the Chinese will not be able to change this militarily.

Our long-neglect of the Northeast and our failure to consolidate the status quo in Arunachal Pradesh have placed China in a strategically advantageous position in the Eastern sector. Only in the last two or three years have we realised the importance of consolidating the status quo in the Eastern sector by strengthening our military and administrative presence in the area through the construction of roads and inducting fresh military units to protect this area from any adventurist Chinese action.

While the Chinese have not sought to change the status quo in the Arunachal Pradesh sector militarily, they have created for themselves a capability for doing so eventually if the border talks fail. They have done this by developing road and rail communications in Tibet and by strengthening military deployments in Tibet.

We have only recently realised the importance of giving ourselves a capability in the Arunachal Pradesh sector to thwart any Chinese attempt to change the status quo militarily if the bilateral border talks fail to break the deadlock.

The Chinese long-term strategy with regard to India has many facets. The trans-border developments are only one -- but the most important -- component of their strategy.

There are other components -- namely, strengthening their relationship with Pakistan in order to confront India with the danger of a two-front war should it try to change militarily the status quo either in respect of China or in respect of Pakistan with regard to Jammu & Kahmir; giving Pakistan a nuclear and missile capability for threatening India; weakening the Indian influence in the rest of South Asia and strengthening their presence and influence in Bangladesh, Sri Lanka [ Images ] and Nepal; creating a presence for their navy in the Indian Ocean region and opposing India's attempts to emerge as an Asian power on par with China.

Till recently, we had no well thought-out long-term strategy with regard to China --neither in the border region, nor in South Asia nor in the Indian Ocean region. Only recently the initial rudiments of such a strategy have been appearing. Our attempts to strengthen our strategic relationship with the US and Japan [ Images ] is one such building-block of this comprehensive strategy.

Our proactive Indian Ocean policy is another building block. But we find ourselves handicapped in further developing such a comprehensive strategy because we have let our influence be weakened in Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and Nepal.

The post-March 2008 hysteria in the bilateral relations has not been the creation of the two governments. It has been the outcome of a new activism with regard to each other in the non-governmental strategic communities of the two countries.

Sections of the Indian strategic community saw in the Lhasa uprising an opportunity to change the status quo in Tibet by playing the Tibet card against China through helping the Tibetans in securing their legitimate rights from the Han Chinese.

By changing the status quo in Tibet -- not militarily which is out of question, but politically by backing the Tibetan people's efforts to change the status quo themselves -- India might be able to change the status quo in the Western sector and preserve the status quo in the Eastern sector. So these analysts believed and started advocating vigorously a policy of playing the Tibet card against China.

The activism in the Chinese non-governmental strategic community is partly the result of what they see as the Indian activism on Tibet and partly the result of the Indian activism in Arunachal Pradesh for consolidating the status quo. They want their government to be more assertive in playing the Arunachal Pradesh card and to take advantage of the difficulties faced by India in the North-East to counter any attempt by India to play the Tibet card.

This hysteria has resulted in a campaign of mutual demonisation and mutual sabre-rattling. This sabre-rattling is only at the non-governmental level. The two governments have maintained a distance from this hysteria without trying to discourage it.

The danger of such hysteria is that it could acquire an uncontrollable momentum and take the two countries towards a precipice from where they may not be able to withdraw.

Any confrontation as a result of this hysteria would damage the interests of both the countries. This hysteria has to be defused in time by the top leaderships of the two countries interacting with each other more frequently and more directly than now and taking initiatives to remove wrong perceptions about each other.

It is unwise for Indian analysts to talk of the Tibetan card. The international community has recognised Tibet as a part of China. While it will be sympathetic to any Tibetan attempts to free themselves of Chinese control, it will not support any Indian initiative or move in this regard. By frequently talking of the Tibetan card, we will only be adding to the suspicions and concerns in the Chinese mind.

It is equally unwise for Chinese analysts to talk of the Arunachal Pradesh (southern Tibet as they call it) or the Northeast card. The international community looks upon these areas as a part of India and will not support any Chinese move to change the status quo. Much of this hysteria will die down automatically if the two countries reach a border settlement.

The only border settlement, which will be equally advantageous, is for India to accord de jure recognition to the status quo in the Western sector in return for China recognising the status quo in the Eastern sector.

The present difficulties in the Eastern sector are apparently due to the fact that China wants a face-saving formula by India handing over at least Tawang to it.

India cannot do this because Tawang is a populated area. Its inhabitants are Indian citizens. No India political leader will be able to sell to the people and Parliament any concession, which would involve any population transfer.

So, what are the options? Either go on holding one meeting after another without any forward movement or think of some idea which could break the present deadlock. One idea could be to explore the possibility of a 'status quo plus' solution under which China will recognise the status quo in Arunachal Pradesh in return for India accommodating some of the Chinese interests in Tawang.

Once the border dispute is solved to our mutual satisfaction, the danger of a military confrontation between the two countries across the Himalayas will lessen considerably. But the competition between the two countries for influence in the region and outside will remain in the near and medium-term future, but this competition need not lead to a military confrontation.

JAMMU/SRINAGAR: Army on Wednesday foiled yet another attempt by Pakistan-based terrorists to infiltrate into India by gunning down three

infiltrators in Mendhar sector of Poonch district in Jammu region but lost one of its senior officers in the fierce encounter.

"A group of heavily armed terrorists attempted to cross LoC in Sona Gali area of Mendhar sector, about 200km from Jammu, early on Wednesday morning, but were challenged by troops at Rocket post," an Army spokesperson said.

"Major Akash Singh gunned down two terrorists before being hit by a bullet during the encounter which lasted for more than three hours," said the spokesperson, Lt-Col Biplab Nath. Major Singh was taken to a hospital where he succumbed to his injuries. Another militant was killed aro-und 7am, defence sources said.

Major Singh was with Maratha Light Infantry and a resident of Shiv Nagar, Jammu. He is survived by his wife and two children. Lt-Col Nath said that the two slain terrorists belonged to Lashkar-e-Taiba but did not give their names. Their bodies have been recovered along with two AK rifles, ammunition and some other items from the encounter site.

‘‘The area has been cordoned off and search-cum-combing operation is on,’’ he added.

Brig Gurdeep Singh, commander 16 Corps, told TOI that troops so far have thwarted 24 infiltration bids from across the border this year.

Sources said infiltration was being attempted from across the boundary despite a ceasefire between the two armies and a three-metre-high barbed wire security fence along most of the 742km LoC.

Meanwhile, as the news about Major Singh’s death was flashed on news channels, people reacted with shock and began streaming into the slain officer’s home in Shiv Nagar to condole the bereaved family.

BANGALORE: Israel-based IT services & solutions firm Ness Technologies is betting on the Indian defence market and government sector which is

in a heavy modernisation mode, Ness Technologies president & CEO Sachi Gerlitz, told ET in an interview. With almost one third of its employees based in India, Ness has plans to have 5,000 employees in India as part of its growth strategy. The company opened its first special economic zone facility in Bangalore on Tuesday. Excerpts:

What kind of opportunities are you seeking in India?

Indian defence and government sector are some of the biggest opportunities. We are very much looking into opportunities to work with Indian Ministry of Defence. The multi-million dollar defence contract which we won to provide command and control system to Latin American government is one the value propositions that we have offered to the Indian government and we hope to implement the same here. As a vendor we look at Indian market in two different perspectives, on one hand, India is our software factory. From an employment perspective, this is the fastest growing geography for us.

What are your focus areas in the Indian defence sector and what are the applications?

One of the most fast growing market in the system integration space is the defence and home land security. We are focusing on three different types of solutions which are based on cutting edge technologies covering full spectrum for the Airforce, Army , Navy and special forces. On implementation of these systems Indian defence will be able to increase its efficiencies and perform better than before.

For example, some of our solutions will enable the defence forces to locate and use shorter passages to reach specific locations quickly and share data with each other in real time. All the forces are connected with each other by special communication devices which even gets data from unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) during operations.

What kind of advantage do you have to tap the Indian market?

We are not targeting contracts which are worth billions of dollars, which allows us flexibility in the solutions that we offer. Independent vendors like us have got better capabilities to produce a solution that is coming from system integration point of view and not from a vendor that is applying software to support the platform. For example, at air traffic control (ATC) you have multiple radar’s in different locations and the issue is how to merge the visual information and data together.

We have developed a unique solution that can fuse the information. We expect after Indian defence finishes with bigger contracts, they will approach system integrators and solutions providers like us.

Panchkula A lecture on career options in the Indian Army was held at Bhavan Vidyalaya School, Sector 15, Panchkula, on Tuesday. The lecture was organised by the school in collaboration with NGO Yuvsatta and HQ Western Command. Captain Anand of Air Defence Regiment was the main speaker on the occasion.

Addressing the students, Captain Anand said the Indian Army works not only to counter external threats and maintain internal security but also to preserve national interests. “Apart from attractive pay and perks, Indian Army offers its officers the best in lifestyle, better than any other profession. Be it social interaction, finest clubs, golf courses, medical facilities and ample opportunities to indulge in adventure and sports, the army has it all,” said a proud Captain Anand.

He further added that after the 6th pay commission recommendations, officers and jawans are offered better pay apart from “facilities like subsidised housing, free medical facility for self and family, canteen facilities, group insurance cover, soft loans for house and vehicle and above all the feeling of belonging to the army family.”

Principal of the school, Shashi Banerjee, presented a vote of thanks and motivated students to join the Indian Army not only to get trained to be an officer but a gentleman for life.

It is a truth now being widely acknowledged that the 1965 war was not of Pakistan Army’s making. Rather, it was imposed on Pakistan. Barring a few scores of officers, majority of them were not in favour of creating tension which could end up in a full-fledged war against India .

However, circumstances took such an ugly turn in 1965 that Pakistan Army was left with no option except entering into war with India. India on its part took Pakistan Army by surprise and launched full throated attacks against Lahore and Sialkot. However, they were taken by surprise on seeing the speed and the quality of Pakistan Army’s reaction. Placing the 1965 conflict in proper perspective, it may be difficult to rank it among major wars but within resources, the two nations did manage to wage a ferocious war against each other. Peeping into the past, we see that the seeds of confrontation between India and Pakistan were laid in the tortured and soul-stirring birth of the two states. The mass killings during the process of partition had left a legacy of acrimony and distrust. As will be seen, the tension between the two countries, continued to assume alarming proportion and war clouds started houring over the horizon. Eventually, it so happened that on 6th September, India launched a full throated attack on Lahore . Responding to this, a first reaction, the Chief of General Staff called a meeting of Directors at GHQ. During the course of deliberations, the participants were informed that the Indians had attacked Lahore and Sialkot , without administrating proper warning and without any provocation. Obviously this news upset the audience.

Next to Lahore , Sialkot was the second target. Others to follow were the war theatres of Kasur, Sulemanki, Rann of Kutch (Phase 2nd). The battle of Sialkot was controlled by Lt Gen Bakhtiar Rana, Commander 1 Corps. According to operational plans, the Corps was responsible for controlling operations from river Chenab to Sulemanki in the South, in front of approximately 300 miles. It had the following formations under command: (1) 1st Armoured Division; (2) 6th Armoured Division; (3) 10 Division; (4) 11 Division; (5) 19 Division. In early September, the operational responsibility of 1 Corps were reduced to an area between Chenab and Ravi and the order of battle was reduced to 6 Armoured Division and 15 Division.

Here it may not be amiss to mention that Maj Gen ® Shaukat Reza has given a graphic account of the ’65 War in his well-researched book: The Pakistan Army – War 1965. The present scribe has profesely benefited from his research. According to Gen Shaukat Reza’s account, in the battle of Sialkot , 6 Armoured Division and 15 Division were pitted against India ’s three infantry and one armoured division. India ’s advantage in numbers was reinforced by the surprises, they had achieved in attacking through Charwa. With six artillery brigades available for support they had the mean to break through the Marala-Ravi Link (MRL). However, they did not achieve this goal. After their united advance through 4 FF, Indian thrusts were reduced to squadron level, overly cautious probe.

History is a witness to the fact that until 18th September, 15 Division continued to be responsible for troops in Sialkot, as also from 115 Brigade, 6 Armoured Division, continued to be overburdened with brigades from 1 Armoured Division and any other troop without a parent. Obviously in view of these adhoc and speedy arrangements, the command arrangements did not make for the best employment of available resources. Strangly, the available armour was never used in a decisive role. Here, through out the period of fighting, reports from forward troops were accepted at their face value and led to weakness in decision. They were unable to make a reasonable assessment of enemy opposition. With regard to defence of Lahore , Maj Gen Sarfraz Khan was assigned the responsibility of defending a front of approximately 60,000 yards from Ravi in north to Bedian in South. On the opening day of battle of Lahore , two Indian divisions, two armoured regiments and three artillery brigades were set against 10 Division. Pakistan ’s units were no more than 75 percent of their authorized strength. The major difference in relative strength was in respect of officers. Pakistani units, in some cases, were below 50 percent of their authorization.

Looking back, we see that Pakistan had division commanders with 25 years service and brigade commanders with 23 years service. Most of them had seen action during World War II. Some of them had commanded battalion/company during 1948 in Kashmir . Almost all the officers who commanded brigades and units had been through some excellent training during the years 1952-64. On courses of instruction in USA and UK , they had competed with some of the best in the world and obtained distinction. It is a matter of great satisfaction to note that during the period 1948 to 1965, inspite of involvement in Martial Law and other non-professional commitments, our officers corps, proudly maintained its professionalism. Comparing the performance of the two armies, one come to the conclusion that the advantage of organizational and numerical superiority, the Indian Army had every opportunity to obtain a decision within 48 hours. But, due to excellent performance of Pakistan Army the Indian Army was halted in its tracks. In several places, it was hurled back across the border. The world was surprised. Surely Pakistan Army had something for which it could be justly proud!

Chandigarh, September 9Air Marshal NAK Browne, Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief, Western Air Command, arrived on a two-day inspection visit to the Air Force Station here today.

On his arrival at 12 Wing, he reviewed a Guard of Honour. He addressed IAF personnel and interacted with the senior officials of the station. He also reviewed the operational and training preparedness of the various units based at the station.

Recalling his earlier days at the station, Air Marshal Browne said there had been significant development towards modernisation of the Air Force since then. He exhorted personnel to be prepared for any kind of role that they may be called upon to perform in future.

The Western Air Command Chief also called upon the Governor of Punjab and UT Administrator, Gen SF Rodrigues (retd), at the Raj Bhawan here.

Earlier, on arrival, Air Marshal Browne and his wife Kiran, President, Air Force Wives Welfare Association (Regional), were received by Air Commodore SRK Nair, Air Officer Commanding, 12 Wing. Kiran Browne visited the Air Force School, family welfare centre and other welfare ventures being run by the local chapter of AFWWA.