Open Records Decision No. 422
July 26, 1984
Re: Whether details of a shooting incident are excepted from disclosure under the
Open Records Act
Mr. H. Lee Veness, Jr.
Assistant City Attorney
City of Garland
P.O. Box 401889
Garland, Texas 75040
Dear Mr. Veness:
On behalf of an insurance company, a claims adjuster is conducting an
investigation into a shooting incident. The company wishes to know the details of this
incident; specifically, whether the shooting was self-inflicted, and if it was, whether it
represented an attempted suicide or was accidental. The claims adjuster has asked you to
furnish any information whatsoever in regard to this shooting, and you have asked
whether the Open Records Act, article 6252-17a, V.T.C.S., requires you to comply with
this request. You contend that the information is excepted from disclosure under section
3(a)(1) of the act, as "information deemed confidential by law," specifically, under a
common law right of privacy.
The doctrine of common law privacy excepts from disclosure information which
contains highly intimate or embarrassing facts, the disclosure of which would be highly
objectionable to a reasonable person, provided that such information is of no legitimate
concern to the public. Industrial Foundation of the South v. Texas Industrial Accident
Board, 540 S.W.2d 668, 682 (Tex. 1976). We have recognized that information
contained in medical reports might raise a claim of common law privacy if it relates, for
example, to
a drug overdose, acute alcohol intoxication, obstetrical/
gynecological illness, convulsions/seizures or emotional/mental
distress.
Open Records Decision No. 370 (1983). See also, Open Records Decision Nos. 343
(1982); 262 (1980).
In our opinion, information which reveals that an individual was the victim of a
self-inflicted wound does not in itself satisfy the standard of common law privacy. Many
self-inflicted wounds are accidental, and we do not believe it is reasonable to conclude
that revealing the occurrence of an accidental self-inflicted wound reveals "highly
intimate" information. On the other hand, you should not reveal any details of a self-
inflicted wound beyond the fact that it is self-inflicted. A self-inflicted wound is,
necessarily, either accidental or intentional. If intentional, release of that fact might lead
a reasonable person to conclude that the victim was suffering from "emotional/mental
distress." We cannot require release of reports of accidental self-inflicted injuries
without, by implication, revealing that reports of all other self-inflicted injuries
demonstrate intent. It is necessary to conclude, therefore, that while the mere fact of a
self-inflicted injury is not sufficient to meet the first criterion of the common law privacy
test, any details beyond that fact do satisfy that criterion, in that they would reveal highly
intimate or embarrassing facts, the disclosure of which would be highly objectionable to
a person of ordinary sensibilities.
To be excepted by common law privacy, however, information must also be of no
legitimate concern to the public. Most previous decisions in this area have related to
medical information. See, e.g., Open Records Decision Nos. 370 (1983); 343 (1982);
262 (1980). We believe it is clear that the public has a substantially greater interest in
knowing the identities of victims of crime than in knowing the identities of persons
treated at a public hospital. Cf. Open Records Decision No. 339 (1982) (identity of rape
victim may be withheld under common law privacy). Attempted suicide is not, however,
a crime in Texas, even though it may be initially investigated by the police. In our
opinion, that circumstance makes it more akin to the category of "emotional/mental
distress" than to that of homicide. As a result, there is in our view a presumption that the
details of any instance of a self-inflicted wound, beyond the mere fact that it is self-
inflicted, are excepted from disclosure by common law privacy. That presumption may
be overcome by a demonstration that the public has a substantial interest in a particular
incident.
As to your section 3(a)(8) claim, no information may be withheld thereunder
which is not already excepted under section 3(a)(1).
Very truly yours,
Jim Mattox
Attorney General of Texas
Tom Green
First Assistant Attorney General
David R. Richards
Executive Assistant Attorney General
Prepared by Rick Gilpin
Assistant Attorney General
APPROVED:
OPINION COMMITTEE
Rick Gilpin, Chairman
Jon Bible
Colin Carl
Susan Garrison
Jim Moellinger
Nancy Sutton