If you have a question about this talk, please contact Philip Woodall.

This talk will present a case study from the ongoing
project Dungeness B Power station on the replacement of its Data
Processing System with a modern equivalent system. The first part of the
talk will provide a general background of the replacement project,
including an overview of the safety case approach being adopted in the
project. The second part will then focus on the specific aspects of
software testing of so-called “high-integrity” control applications
within the replacement system.

Safety related systems refer to systems whose malfunction, either
directly or indirectly, can lead to safety of the overall system being
compromised. Unlike “safety system”, i.e. systems directly responsible
for the safety of the plant, safety related systems may have less
onerous safety claims and can be based on more complex technologies or
implementation platforms. Verification/validation of safety related
systems can thus pause significant challenges, in terms of safety
assessment of the underlying hardware, firmware and in particular, the
software. This talk will highlight some of the issues faced when
verifying a large-scale system with modest safety claim compared to
those observed elsewhere, e.g. in defence and aerospace sectors.