In this petition
for prohibition and mandamus filed on December 9, 1999, petitioner Ramon
A. Gonzales, in his capacity as a citizen and taxpayer, assails the constitutionality
of the creation of the Preparatory Commission on Constitutional Reform (PCCR)
and of the positions of presidential consultants, advisers and assistants.
Petitioner asks this Court to enjoin the PCCR and the presidential consultants,
advisers and assistants from acting as such, and to enjoin Executive Secretary
Ronaldo B. Zamora from enforcing their advice and recommendations.
In addition, petitioner seeks to enjoin the
Commission on Audit from passing in audit expenditures for the PCCR and the
presidential consultants, advisers and assistants. Finally, petitioner prays
for an order compelling respondent Zamora to furnish petitioner with
information on certain matters.
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On January 28,
2000, respondent Hon. Andres R. Narvasa, impleaded in his capacity as Chairman
of the PCCR, filed his Comment to the Petition. The rest of the respondents,
who are being represented in this case by the Solicitor General, filed their
Comment with this Court on March 7, 2000.
Petitioner then filed a Consolidated Reply on April 24, 2000, whereupon
this case was considered submitted for decision.
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The Preparatory
Commission on Constitutional Reform (PCCR) was created by President Estrada on
November 26, 1998 by virtue of Executive Order No. 43 (E.O. No. 43) in order
to study and recommend proposed amendments and/or revisions to the 1987
Constitution, and the manner of implementing the same.[1 Petitioner disputes the
constitutionality of the PCCR on two grounds.
First, he contends that it is a public office which only the legislature
can create by way of a law.[2 Secondly, petitioner asserts that
by creating such a body the President is intervening in a process from which he
is totally excluded by the Constitution the amendment of the fundamental
charter.3chanrobles virtual law library

It is alleged by
respondents that, with respect to the PCCR, this case has become moot and
academic.
We agree.
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An action is
considered moot when it no longer presents a justiciable controversy because
the issues involved have become academic or dead.[4 Under E.O. No. 43, the PCCR was
instructed to complete its task on or before June 30, 1999.[5 However, on February 19, 1999, the
President issued Executive Order No. 70 (E.O. No. 70), which extended the time
frame for the completion of the commissions work, viz chanrobles virtual law library

Time Frame.
The Commission shall commence its work on 01 January 1999 and complete
the same on or before 31 December 1999.
The Commission shall submit its report and recommendations to the
President within fifteen (15) working days from 31 December 1999.
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The PCCR submitted its recommendations to the President on December 20,
1999 and was dissolved by the President on the same day.
It had likewise spent the funds allotted to
it.[6 Thus, the PCCR has ceased to exist,
having lost its raison detre. Subsequent events have overtaken the
petition and the Court has nothing left to resolve.
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The staleness of
the issue before us is made more manifest by the impossibility of granting the
relief prayed for by petitioner.
Basically, petitioner asks this Court to enjoin the PCCR from acting as
such.7 Clearly, prohibition is an
inappropriate remedy since the body sought to be enjoined no longer
exists.
It is well established that
prohibition is a preventive remedy and does not lie to restrain an act that is
already fait accompli.[8 At this point, any ruling regarding
the PCCR would simply be in the nature of an advisory opinion, which is
definitely beyond the permissible scope of judicial power.
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In addition to
the mootness of the issue, petitioners lack of standing constitutes another
obstacle to the successful invocation of judicial power insofar as the PCCR is
concerned.
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The question in
standing is whether a party has alleged such a personal stake in the outcome
of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the
presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination
of difficult constitutional questions.[9 In assailing the constitutionality
of E.O. Nos. 43 and 70, petitioner asserts his interest as a citizen and
taxpayer.10 A citizen acquires standing only if
he can establish that he has suffered some actual or threatened injury as a
result of the allegedly illegal conduct of the government; the injury is fairly
traceable to the challenged action; and the injury is likely to be redressed by
a favorable action.[11 In Kilosbayan, Incorporated v.
Morato,[12 we denied standing to petitioners
who were assailing a lease agreement between the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes
Office and the Philippine Gaming Management Corporation, stating that,
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in Valmonte v. Philippine
Charity Sweepstakes Office, G.R. No. 78716, Sept. 22, 1987, standing was
denied to a petitioner who sought to declare a form of lottery known as Instant
Sweepstakes invalid because, as the Court held,
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Valmonte brings the suit as a
citizen, lawyer, taxpayer and father of three (3) minor children. But nowhere
in his petition does petitioner claim that his rights and privileges as a
lawyer or citizen have been directly and personally injured by the operation of
the Instant Sweepstakes.
The interest
of the person assailing the constitutionality of a statute must be direct and
personal.
He must be able to show, not
only that the law is invalid, but also that he has sustained or in immediate
danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of its enforcement, and not
merely that he suffers thereby in some indefinite way.
It must appear that the person complaining
has been or is about to be denied some right or privilege to which he is
lawfully entitled or that he is about to be subjected to some burdens or
penalties by reason of the statute complained of.
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We apprehend no difference between
the petitioner in Valmonte and the present petitioners.
Petitioners do not in fact show what
particularized interest they have for bringing this suit.
It does not detract from the high regard for
petitioners as civic leaders to say that their interest falls short of that
required to maintain an action under Rule 3, d 2.
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Coming now to
the instant case, petitioner has not shown that he has sustained or is in
danger of sustaining any personal injury attributable to the creation of the
PCCR.
If at all, it is only Congress,
not petitioner, which can claim any injury in this case since, according to
petitioner, the President has encroached upon the legislatures powers to
create a public office and to propose amendments to the Charter by forming the
PCCR.
Petitioner has sustained no direct,
or even any indirect, injury.
Neither
does he claim that his rights or privileges have been or are in danger of being
violated, nor that he shall be subjected to any penalties or burdens as a
result of the PCCRs activities.
Clearly, petitioner has failed to establish his locus standi so
as to enable him to seek judicial redress as a citizen.
chanrobles virtual law library

A taxpayer is
deemed to have the standing to raise a constitutional issue when it is
established that public funds have been disbursed in alleged contravention of
the law or the Constitution.[13, Thus payers action is properly
brought only when there is an exercise by Congress of its taxing or spending
power.14 This was our ruling in a recent
case wherein petitioners Telecommunications and Broadcast Attorneys of the Philippines
(TELEBAP) and GMA Network, Inc. questioned the validity of section 92 of B.P.
No. 881 (otherwise knows as the Omnibus Election Code) requiring radio and
television stations to give free air time to the Commission on Elections during
the campaign period.[15The Court held that petitioner
TELEBAP did not have any interest as a taxpayer since the assailed law did not
involve the taxing or spending power of Congress.[16chanrobles virtual law library

Many other
rulings have premised the grant or denial of standing to taxpayers upon whether
or not the case involved a disbursement of public funds by the
legislature.
In Sanidad v.
Commission on Elections,[17 the petitioners therein were
allowed to bring a taxpayers suit to question several presidential decrees
promulgated by then President Marcos in his legislative capacity calling for a
national referendum, with the Court explaining that
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...[i]t is now an ancient rule that
the valid source of a statute Presidential Decrees are of such nature may
be contested by one who will sustain a direct injury as a result of its
enforcement.
At the instance of
taxpayers, laws providing for the disbursement of public funds may be enjoined,
upon the theory that the expenditure of public funds by an officer of the State
for the purpose of executing an unconstitutional act constitutes a
misapplication of such funds.
The
breadth of Presidential Decree No. 991 carries an appropriation of Five Million
Pesos for the effective implementation of its purposes. Presidential Decree No.
1031 appropriates the sum of Eight Million Pesos to carry out its
provisions.
The interest of the
aforenamed petitioners as taxpayers in the lawful expenditure of these amounts
of public money sufficiently clothes them with that personality to litigate the
validity of the Decrees appropriating said funds.
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In still another case, the Court held that petitioners the Philippine
Constitution Association, Inc., a non-profit civic organization - had standing
as taxpayers to question the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 3836 insofar
as it provides for retirement gratuity and commutation of vacation and sick
leaves to Senators and Representatives and to the elective officials of both
houses of Congress.[18 And in Pascual v. Secretary of
Public Works,[19 the Court allowed petitioner to
maintain a taxpayers suit assailing the constitutional soundness of Republic
Act No. 920 appropriating P85,000 for the construction, repair and improvement
of feeder roads within private property.
All these cases involved the disbursement of public funds by means of a
law.
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Meanwhile, in Bugnay
Construction and Development Corporation v. Laron,[20 the Court declared that the trial
court was wrong in allowing respondent Ravanzo to bring an action for
injunction in his capacity as a taxpayer in order to question the legality of
the contract of lease covering the public market entered into between the City
of Dagupan and petitioner.
The Court
declared that Ravanzo did not possess the requisite standing to bring such
taxpayers suit since [o]n its face, and there is no evidence to the contrary,
the lease contract entered into between petitioner and the City shows that no
public funds have been or will be used in the construction of the market
building.
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Coming now to
the instant case, it is readily apparent that there is no exercise by Congress
of its taxing or spending power.
The
PCCR was created by the President by virtue of E.O. No. 43, as amended by E.O.
No. 70. Under section 7 of E.O. No. 43, the amount of P3 million is appropriated
for its operational expenses to be sourced from the funds of the Office of the
President. The relevant provision states -
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Appropriations.
The initial amount of Three Million Pesos (P3,000,000.00) is hereby
appropriated for the operational expenses of the Commission to be sourced from
funds of the Office of the President, subject to the usual accounting and
auditing rules and regulations.
Additional amounts shall be released to the Commission upon submission
of requirements for expenditures.
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The appropriations for the PCCR were authorized by the President, not by
Congress.
In fact, there was no an
appropriation at all. In a strict sense, appropriation has been defined
as nothing more than the legislative authorization prescribed by the Constitution
that money may be paid out of the Treasury, while appropriation made by law
refers to the act of the legislature setting apart or assigning to a
particular use a certain sum to be used in the payment of debt or dues from the
State to its creditors. [21 The funds used for the PCCR were
taken from funds intended for the Office of the President, in the exercise of
the Chief Executives power to transfer funds pursuant to section 25 (5) of
article VI of the Constitution.
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In the final
analysis, it must be stressed that the Court retains the power to decide
whether or not it will entertain a taxpayers suit.[22 In the case at bar, there being no
exercise by Congress of its taxing or spending power, petitioner cannot be
allowed to question the creation of the PCCR in his capacity as a taxpayer, but
rather, he must establish that he has a personal and substantial interest in
the case and that he has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of
its enforcement.[23 In other words, petitioner must
show that he is a real party in interest - that he will stand to be benefited
or injured by the judgment or that he will be entitled to the avails of the
suit.24 Nowhere in his pleadings does
petitioner presume to make such a representation.
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The second issue
raised by petitioner concerns the presidential consultants. Petitioner alleges
that in 1995 and 1996, the President created seventy (70) positions in the
Office of the President and appointed to said positions twenty (20)
presidential consultants, twenty-two (22) presidential advisers, and
twenty-eight (28) presidential assistants.[25 Petitioner asserts that, as in the
case of the PCCR, the President does not have the power to create these
positions.26chanrobles virtual law library

Consistent with
the abovementioned discussion on standing, petitioner does not have the
personality to raise this issue before the Court. First of all, he has not
proven that he has sustained or is in danger of sustaining any injury as a
result of the appointment of such presidential advisers.
Secondly, petitioner has not alleged the
necessary facts so as to enable the Court to determine if he possesses a
taxpayers interest in this particular issue.
Unlike the PCCR which was created by virtue of an executive order,
petitioner does not allege by what official act, whether it be by means of an
executive order, administrative order, memorandum order, or otherwise, the
President attempted to create the positions of presidential advisers,
consultants and assistants.
Thus, it is
unclear what act of the President petitioner is assailing.
In support of his allegation, petitioner
merely annexed a copy of the Philippine Government Directory (Annex C)
listing the names and positions of such presidential consultants, advisers and
assistants to his petition.
However,
appointment is obviously not synonymous with creation.
It would be improvident for this Court to
entertain this issue given the insufficient nature of the allegations in the
Petition.
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III.
Right to
Information
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Finally,
petitioner asks us to issue a writ of mandamus ordering Executive
Secretary Ronaldo B. Zamora to answer his letter (Annex D) dated October 4,
1999 requesting for the names of executive officials holding multiple positions
in government, copies of their appointments, and a list of the recipients of
luxury vehicles seized by the Bureau of Customs and turned over to Malacanang.[27chanrobles virtual law library

The right to
information is enshrined in Section 7 of the Bill of Rights which provides that
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The right of the people to
information on matters of public concern shall be recognized.
Access to official records, and to
documents, and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions,
as well as to government research data used as basis for policy development,
shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided
by law.
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Under both the
197328 and 1987 Constitution, this is a
self-executory provision which can be invoked by any citizen before the
courts.
This was our ruling in Legaspi
v. Civil Service Commission,[29 wherein the Court classified the
right to information as a public right and when a [m]andamus proceeding involves the assertion
of a public right, the requirement of personal interest is satisfied by the
mere fact that the petitioner is a citizen, and therefore, part of the general
public which possesses the right. However, Congress may provide for
reasonable conditions upon the access to information. Such limitations were embodied in Republic Act No. 6713,
otherwise knows as the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public
Officials and Employees, which took effect on March 25, 1989.
This law provides that, in the performance
of their duties, all public officials and employees are obliged to respond to
letters sent by the public within fifteen (15) working days from receipt
thereof and to ensure the accessibility of all public documents for inspection
by the public within reasonable working hours, subject to the reasonable claims
of confidentiality.[30chanrobles virtual law library

Elaborating on
the significance of the right to information, the Court said in Baldoza v.
Dimaano[31that [t]he incorporation of this right in the
Constitution is a recognition of the fundamental role of free exchange of
information in a democracy.
There can
be no realistic perception by the public of the nations problems, nor a
meaningful democratic decisionmaking if they are denied access to information
of general interest.
Information is
needed to enable the members of society to cope with the exigencies of the
times. The information to which the public is entitled to are those concerning
matters of public concern, a term which embrace[s] a broad spectrum of
subjects which the public may want to know,
either because these directly affect their lives, or simply because such
matters naturally arouse the interest of an ordinary citizen.
In the final analysis, it is for the courts
to determine in a case by case basis whether the matter at issue is of interest
or importance, as it relates to or affects the public.[32chanrobles virtual law library

Thus, we agree
with petitioner that respondent Zamora, in his official capacity as Executive
Secretary, has a constitutional and statutory duty to answer petitioners
letter dealing with matters which are unquestionably of public concern that
is, appointments made to public offices and the utilization of public
property.
With regard to petitioners
request for copies of the appointment papers of certain officials, respondent
Zamora is obliged to allow the inspection and copying of the same subject to
the reasonable limitations required for the orderly conduct of official
business.33chanrobles virtual law library

WHEREFORE, the
petition is dismissed, with the exception that respondent Zamora is ordered to
furnish petitioner with the information requested.
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The right of the people to information on matters of public
concern shall be recognized. Access to official records, and to documents and
papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decision, shall be
afforded the citizen subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.