Drug trafficking in Turkey is extensive and has persisted for decades. A variety of drugs, including heroin, cocaine, synthetic cannabis (bonsai), methamphetamine, and captagon (a type of amphetamine), are seized in considerable amounts there each year.

Author

Adjunct Faculty and Research Scholar - Terrorism, Transnational Crime, and Corruption Center (TraCCC), George Mason University

Turkey is mostly a transshipment and destination country. Domestic drug production is limited to cannabis, which is produced mainly for domestic consumption, and small amounts of captagon. An effective poppy cultivation licensing scheme in the 1970s ended illegal poppy cultivation and the diversion of opiates into the illegal trade.

Since the 1970s, Turkish drug trafficking groups have grown in terms of their power, global reach, and market control. They are also among Europe’s most powerful organized crime groups when it comes to heroin trafficking. Moreover, other international drug trafficking groups also operate in Turkey.

The civil wars in Iraq and Syria have reshaped drug smuggling routes in the Middle East. Syrian drug traffickers now play a significant role in Turkey’s illegal drug trade.

The illegal drug trade in Turkey is a complex and multidimensional issue that poses public safety, national security, and public health threats and risks. The Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) is strongly involved in drug trafficking and closely connected to terrorism in the region. Meanwhile, Turkish drug trafficking groups have also become involved in human smuggling, cigarette smuggling, and antiquities trafficking.

Turkey’s drug policy underemphasizes treatment, prevention, and harm reduction approaches, while overemphasizing drug seizures. Tens of thousands of people have been charged with drug trafficking for possession and sale of cannabis.

Policy Recommendations

To improve its drug policies, Turkey should take a more balanced, evidence-based, comprehensive, and integrated approach. It should focus on and expand resources for reducing both demand and harm.

Turkey should strengthen the capacity and independence of law enforcement and the judiciary through better laws, investigative procedures, and bolstered capacities.

The government should improve anti-money laundering and anti-corruption capacities, regional counternarcotics cooperation, border security, and the vetting of migrants and refugees in Turkey for connections to terrorism and organized crime.

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** Key Findings
- Drug trafficking in Turkey is extensive and has persisted for decades. A variety of drugs, including heroin, cocaine, synthetic cannabis (bonsai), methamphetamine, and captagon (a type of amphetamine), are seized in considerable amounts there each year.
Author M
Mahmut Cengiz
Adjunct Faculty and Research Scholar - Terrorism, Transnational Crime, and Corruption Center (TraCCC), George Mason University - Turkey is mostly a transshipment and destination country. Domestic drug production is limited to cannabis, which is produced mainly for domestic consumption, and small amounts of captagon. An effective poppy cultivation licensing scheme in the 1970s ended illegal poppy cultivation and the diversion of opiates into the illegal trade. - Since the 1970s, Turkish drug trafficking groups have grown in terms of their power, global reach, and market control. They are also among Europe’s most powerful organized crime groups when it comes to heroin trafficking. Moreover, other international drug trafficking groups also operate in Turkey. - The civil wars in Iraq and Syria have reshaped drug smuggling routes in the Middle East. Syrian drug traffickers now play a significant role in Turkey’s illegal drug trade. - The illegal drug trade in Turkey is a complex and multidimensional issue that poses public safety, national security, and public health threats and risks. The Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) is strongly involved in drug trafficking and closely connected to terrorism in the region. Meanwhile, Turkish drug trafficking groups have also become involved in human smuggling, cigarette smuggling, and antiquities trafficking. - Turkey’s drug policy underemphasizes treatment, prevention, and harm reduction approaches, while overemphasizing drug seizures. Tens of thousands of people have been charged with drug trafficking for possession and sale of cannabis.
Policy Recommendations
- To improve its drug policies, Turkey should take a more balanced, evidence-based, comprehensive, and integrated approach. It should focus on and expand resources for reducing both demand and harm. - Turkey should strengthen the capacity and independence of law enforcement and the judiciary through better laws, investigative procedures, and bolstered capacities. - The government should improve anti-money laundering and anti-corruption capacities, regional counternarcotics cooperation, border security, and the vetting of migrants and refugees in Turkey for connections to terrorism and organized crime.
** Key Findings
- Drug trafficking in Turkey is extensive and has persisted for decades. A variety of drugs, including heroin, cocaine, synthetic cannabis (bonsai), methamphetamine, and captagon (a type of amphetamine), are seized in considerable ... https://www.brookings.edu/blog/markaz/2017/03/29/6-elements-of-a-strategy-to-push-back-on-irans-hegemonic-ambitions/6 elements of a strategy to push back on Iran’s hegemonic ambitionshttp://webfeeds.brookings.edu/~/285779898/0/brookingsrss/topics/syria~elements-of-a-strategy-to-push-back-on-Iran%e2%80%99s-hegemonic-ambitions/
Wed, 29 Mar 2017 15:08:23 +0000https://www.brookings.edu/?p=394809

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Iran is posing a comprehensive challenge to the interests of the United States and its allies and partners in the Middle East. Over the past four decades, it has managed to establish an “arc of influence” that stretches from Lebanon and Syria in the Levant, to Iraq and Bahrain on the Gulf, to Yemen on the Red Sea. What the United States now needs is a comprehensive, integrated, and sustainable “push-back” strategy.

Any such American strategy needs to take account of the way that, in the Middle East, everything is connected. Push back on Iran in Yemen, and they might well stir up the Shiite population in Bahrain. Push back on Iran in Syria, and they might well use the Shiite militias in Iraq to undermine our effort to eliminate ISIS there, or encourage Hamas to launch rocket attacks on Israel from Gaza.

A comprehensive strategy would need to contain at least six elements:

1Rigorous enforcement of the Iran nuclear deal. Whatever the perceived shortcomings of the JCPOA, it has succeeded in creating a vital 10-year window in which the region is not threatened by Iranian nuclear capabilities and the nuclear arms race that they would inevitably trigger. Nothing is easy about countering Iran in the conflict-ridden Middle East, but everything becomes easier if we do not have an Iranian nuclear threat to contend with at the same time. As long as the Iranians strictly adhere to the agreement, the United States and its regional allies will have gained vital time to develop and implement the other elements of the push-back strategy.

2Support for the Iraqi governmentof Haider al-Abadi and the Iraqi Armed Forces as they campaign to defeat ISIS and regain control of Mosul and the Sunni regions of Iraq. Eliminating Iran’s influence in Iraq is not an achievable or necessary objective given the historic and religious ties between the neighboring Shiites of Iraq and Iran. But providing an effective counter-balance to Iran’s influence in Baghdad is eminently achievable since it is welcomed by the current Iraqi government, which was not the case with the previous Maliki government.

While Saudi Arabia and the Gulf Arab states have long been unwilling to engage meaningfully with the Iraqi government, the recent visit of the Saudi Foreign Minister to Baghdad—and the Saudi effort to engage with the Sunni tribes of Iraq—presages a new approach which needs to be encouraged and sustained. The elimination of ISIS will generate a huge post-conflict reconstruction challenge in Mosul and the other liberated Sunni cities and towns. It will be particularly important to have Sunni state support for a major post-war reconstruction effort led by the Abadi government and reinforced by the United States. It is essential that Iranian-directed Shiite militias not be allowed to fill the vacuum and in the process establish a land bridge between Iran and Syria across northern Iraq.

3Promotion of a political resolution of the civil war in Yemen. The Trump administration is currently considering stepping up military support for Saudi Arabia and the UAE in their two-year long military campaign in Yemen. This makes sense only if it is wedded to a diplomatic strategy for ending the war, which has already caused thousands of civilian casualties and vast human suffering. Otherwise, the United States will be sucked into the Yemen quagmire like so many outside powers before us.

Gains on the battlefield should impact the dynamics at the negotiating table. In that regard, a successful effort to take control of the Red Sea port of Hodeida could impact the Houthi calculus and lead to greater seriousness and reasonableness on their part in the negotiations. But American support needs to be conditioned on the pursuit of a political solution by our Saudi allies as well.

4Reduce Iran’s influence in Syria. This will be difficult and complicated, and implementing it is not helped by loose talk about the unrealistic objective of “pushing Iran out of Syria.” We need to recognize that neither we, nor the Russians, have the will or capacity to achieve that goal—as desirable as it might be—in current circumstances.

Iran has developed a formidable presence on the ground in Syria: the Iranians have penetrated the remaining governing institutions of Asad’s regime, and have embedded some 30,000 forces in the government-controlled areas of western Syria (some 5,000 IRGC, Basij, and Iranian Army elements; some 3,000 to 5,000 highly trained Hezbollah fighters from Lebanon; and some 20,000 Shiite militiamen recruited from Afghanistan and Pakistan). These forces are significantly larger than what is left of the Syrian army or the Russian forces now deployed there.

The Iranian-controlled presence is bolstered by two key factors:

The Iranian-Assad alliance,which was forged by Assad’s father in the 1980s. Since then, Assad’s son has become ever-more dependent on Tehran for his survival. Accordingly Assad will not dare demand Iran’s departure. Nor will Russia, since its primary interest is the survival of the regime.

Iran’s “core interest” in retaining a foothold in Syria because it is the lynchpin of its wider hegemonic strategy. If it loses that foothold, it will seriously jeopardize Hezbollah’s control of Lebanon, the crown jewel of Iran’s regional strategy. That means Iran will mightily resist any effort to force it out of Syria and has considerable ability to do so.

Russia and Iran both seek to keep the Assad regime in power. But they are also rivals for influence in Damascus, and Assad relishes the opportunity to play them off against each other. Exploiting that rivalry has advantages for an American strategy of reducing Iranian influence in Syria. However, that game has strict upper limits. Russia will not cooperate in the undermining of its own influence in Syria for the sake of a partnership with the United States. The idea that Russia will force Iran out of Syria is therefore a dangerous fantasy. And the idea that we should pay for such a fantasy by removing the Ukraine sanctions on Russia would constitute strategic malfeasance, given the impact that would have on our allies in Europe, particularly in Eastern Europe.

Related Books

We should therefore set more modest objectives. We should, for example, press Russia to deny Iran port facilities in Syria. An Iranian-controlled port would enable Iran more easily to ship weapons to Hezbollah, exacerbating the conflict between Iran and Israel—something Russia has an interest in avoiding. Similarly, we should support Israel’s insistence that Russia press Iran and Hezbollah not to send their forces south to the Golan Heights.

Finally, as in Yemen, we should do what we can to promote a political resolution of the Syrian civil war, one that leads eventually but inevitably to Assad’s departure. One requirement of the political settlement should be the departure of all foreign forces. That principle was incorporated into the Taif Agreement, which ended the Lebanese civil war and eventually resulted in the peaceful departure of Syrian forces from Lebanon. Syrians, who do not want Iranian-controlled Shiite militias dominating them in a post-conflict era, will welcome inclusion of that principle. And it will provide us with the legitimacy to demand their eventual departure.

5Concert the capabilities of our regional allies in a regional security framework that can sustain a long-term, burden-sharing effort. The United States is fortunate to have capable regional strategic partners in Israel, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and the Sunni Arab states that share a common interest in countering Iran’s threatening ambitions. While each has its own strategic perspective, there is a new readiness across the region to work together, with Turkey, the Gulf states, and Egypt all improving cooperation with Israel, for example. It is time to test the readiness of our allies to come together in a regional security arrangement that will allow us all more effectively to coordinate our efforts against Iran.

6Lay the foundations for negotiations with Iran about its ambitions and behavior in the region. The Iran nuclear deal demonstrates that it is possible to reach enforceable agreements with Iran, using sanctions and concerted diplomacy as leverage to achieve our objectives. A newly-proposed U.S. sanctions bill—complemented by the effective implementation of the five other elements of the push-back strategy—provides a basis for engaging Iran in a negotiation that focuses on:

Iran’s efforts to export its revolution and interfere in the domestic affairs of Arab states across the region;

Iran’s destabilizing regional activities and its sponsorship of terrorism; and

Iran’s intercontinental ballistic missile program and its nuclear activities after the expiration of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA).

Negotiations are not a concession to Iran, nor a sign of weakness, as long as they are backed by sanctions and the other elements of the strategy, and as long as they are fully coordinated with our regional allies. But they represent a way to signal to Iran that the United States and its regional allies are willing to have a constructive, normalized relationship with it, even to recognize its status as a regional power, if it is willing to change its troubling behavior in fundamental ways. Indeed, if the Iranians prove willing to engage in a serious negotiation about these issues, we should also be prepared to signal a willingness to lift all our bilateral sanctions—i.e. putting a carrot as well as a stick on the table.

Countering Iran’s regional hegemonic ambitions is a deadly serious business. In pursuing this objective, we should be careful about making threats unless we are prepared to back them up, and we should be wary of declaring objectives that we have neither the will nor interest to achieve. Above all, we should be mindful of the logical consequences of our strategy and think those through before launching on a course that could well have the opposite effect of what we intended. None of those cautions, however, should deter the United States from taking up the challenge while we have the opportunity to do so.

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https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/iran_flags_small001.jpg?w=274Iran is posing a comprehensive challenge to the interests of the United States and its allies and partners in the Middle East. Over the past four decades, it has managed to establish an “arc of influence” that stretches from Lebanon and Syria in the Levant, to Iraq and Bahrain on the Gulf, to Yemen on the Red Sea. What the United States now needs is a comprehensive, integrated, and sustainable “push-back” strategy.
Any such American strategy needs to take account of the way that, in the Middle East, everything is connected. Push back on Iran in Yemen, and they might well stir up the Shiite population in Bahrain. Push back on Iran in Syria, and they might well use the Shiite militias in Iraq to undermine our effort to eliminate ISIS there, or encourage Hamas to launch rocket attacks on Israel from Gaza.
A comprehensive strategy would need to contain at least six elements:
1Rigorous enforcement of the Iran nuclear deal. Whatever the perceived shortcomings of the JCPOA, it has succeeded in creating a vital 10-year window in which the region is not threatened by Iranian nuclear capabilities and the nuclear arms race that they would inevitably trigger. Nothing is easy about countering Iran in the conflict-ridden Middle East, but everything becomes easier if we do not have an Iranian nuclear threat to contend with at the same time. As long as the Iranians strictly adhere to the agreement, the United States and its regional allies will have gained vital time to develop and implement the other elements of the push-back strategy.
2Support for the Iraqi governmentof Haider al-Abadi and the Iraqi Armed Forces as they campaign to defeat ISIS and regain control of Mosul and the Sunni regions of Iraq. Eliminating Iran’s influence in Iraq is not an achievable or necessary objective given the historic and religious ties between the neighboring Shiites of Iraq and Iran. But providing an effective counter-balance to Iran’s influence in Baghdad is eminently achievable since it is welcomed by the current Iraqi government, which was not the case with the previous Maliki government.
While Saudi Arabia and the Gulf Arab states have long been unwilling to engage meaningfully with the Iraqi government, the recent visit of the Saudi Foreign Minister to Baghdad—and the Saudi effort to engage with the Sunni tribes of Iraq—presages a new approach which needs to be encouraged and sustained. The elimination of ISIS will generate a huge post-conflict reconstruction challenge in Mosul and the other liberated Sunni cities and towns. It will be particularly important to have Sunni state support for a major post-war reconstruction effort led by the Abadi government and reinforced by the United States. It is essential that Iranian-directed Shiite militias not be allowed to fill the vacuum and in the process establish a land bridge between Iran and Syria across northern Iraq.
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Building “situations of strength” Derek Chollet, Eric S. Edelman, Michèle Flournoy, Stephen J. Hadley, Martin S. Indyk, Bruce Jones, Robert Kagan, Kristen Silverberg, Jake Sullivan, and Thomas Wright February 2017
3Promotion of a political resolution of the civil war in Yemen. The Trump administration is currently considering stepping up military support for Saudi Arabia and the UAE in their two-year long military campaign in Yemen. This makes sense only if it is wedded to a diplomatic strategy for ending the war, which has already caused thousands of civilian casualties and vast human suffering. Otherwise, the United States will be sucked into the Yemen quagmire like so many outside powers before us.
Gains on the battlefield should impact the dynamics at the negotiating table. In that regard, a successful effort to take control of the Red Sea port of Hodeida could impact the Houthi calculus and lead to greater seriousness and ... Iran is posing a comprehensive challenge to the interests of the United States and its allies and partners in the Middle East. Over the past four decades, it has managed to establish an “arc of influence” that stretches from Lebanon and ... https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2017/03/24/how-to-work-with-the-kurds-and-turkey-in-syria/How to work with the Kurds—and Turkey—in Syriahttp://webfeeds.brookings.edu/~/284565110/0/brookingsrss/topics/syria~How-to-work-with-the-Kurds%e2%80%94and-Turkey%e2%80%94in-Syria/
Fri, 24 Mar 2017 15:33:04 +0000https://www.brookings.edu/?p=393980

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American policy towards Syria is stuck in a conundrum. President Donald Trump’s request that the Pentagon deliver him options for accelerating the campaign against ISIS has probably already generated some good tactical initiatives. But Trump’s understandable reluctance to have U.S. forces lead the fight on the ground leaves us dependent on local proxies. Unfortunately, moderate Syrian-Arab allies are too weak to handle the primary responsibility for the liberation of Raqqa and other cities now held by ISIS. Syrian Kurdish forces are quite capable, but President Erdoğan of Turkey fears they are in cahoots with Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) separatists and terrorists inside of his own country, and adamantly objects to any plan to arm them further. Were Washington to ignore his advice, he could deny us access to the Incirlik airfield or even use his own modest-sized military forces within Syria to attack the very Kurdish forces we see as allies. What to do when your respective allies hate each other?

Part of the solution, as recently recommended by Fred and Kimberly Kagan of AEI and the Institute for the Study of War, is undoubtedly a renewed effort to work with the Sunni Arab tribes of eastern Syria to build a stronger opposition force. However, that will take time in a best case. As such, the Kurdish option seems unavoidable at some level. The United States and other coalition partners need to find a way to work with Kurdish forces inside Syria while mitigating Turkish objections to the plan.

There are at least five logical steps we can take to address Ankara’s concerns, some of which are legitimate. They involve a combination of specific military actions on the ground together with political and economic levers. Taking this approach requires that we provide a vision for where the Syria mission is headed even after the defeat of ISIS. By articulating that vision now, we can create incentives for good Kurdish behavior, and leverage to promote such behavior. The essence of the concept is to envision a future Syria in which power is devolved to several autonomous zones in the north, east, and south of the country, even if President Bashar al-Assad remains nominally in charge of the whole nation for some extended period into the future—as now seems nearly certain to be the case. With that overarching vision in place, the five specific steps or options include these:

Firmly clarify that while the United States seeks several autonomous zones in Syria’s north and east, it will in no way ever countenance independent Syrian statelets that might formally break off from the country’s center. Indeed, even these autonomous zones may be only temporary expedients until Assad is someday gone from power, at which point a constitutional convention among Syrians could consider stitching the country back together in a stronger union.

However, in contrast with the Iraqi Kurdistan case, the United States would insist that there be at least two such Kurdish autonomous zones in Syria so they could not join up and seek independence. Turkey’s forces are presently positioned in Syria to ensure just such a separation; Washington should underscore its support for that presence, and the political logic behind it.

Indeed, the United States should declare now that it would support an indefinite Turkish military presence inside Syria, even after the liberation of the east from ISIS, to allow Ankara to keep an eye on the Kurds and to ensure their continued separation into two distinct entities. This Turkish presence in northern Syria could also help monitor the movement of people and weapons across the Syrian-Turkish border, mitigating Ankara’s concerns that Kurds in Syria would militarily assist Kurdish separatists and/or terrorists in Turkey. Indeed, the Turkish forces might eventually be part of an international peacekeeping force that also codified the Russian presence in the country’s western sectors, improving the odds that Moscow would go along with this kind of concept.

Washington should further plan to commit some number of American forces to Kurdish sectors of Syria as part of a potential peacekeeping force. The U.S. military deployment to this region has been growing already in preparation for the expected assault on Raqqa; this concept would simply build on that and give the presence a longer-term purpose. U.S. forces there could help Kurds build up local police forces after the defeat of ISIS, as would be expected as part of a devolution of powers to autonomous regions. They could also provide a platform for American intelligence to monitor any movements of Kurdish weaponry or fighters across the Syria-Turkey border so that such movements could be controlled or curtailed by the Turks.

Finally, and crucially, Washington should loan rather than give weapons to Syrian Kurdish forces as they prepare the liberation of Raqqa, Deir ez-Zor, and other parts of eastern Syria held now by ISIS. To enforce this distinction, the United States should explain that reconstruction aid to Kurdish sectors of Syria, as envisioned under the devolution or autonomy concept that the United States would be proposing, would be contingent on the Kurds returning the heavier weaponry after the defeat of ISIS. Even if not all weapons were returned, this concept could make an important difference in assuaging Turkish worries. Aid conditionality could be used more generally at this envisioned phase of the mission to be sure the Kurds in Syria did not support separatists across the border.

Indeed, aid conditionality could also be used as a tool to gradually push for Assad’s ouster down the road. While humanitarian relief could be provided to parts of the country he controlled once a peace deal was established, the real spigot of reconstruction aid from Western and Arab states would only be opened once Assad stood down in favor of a successor government. If we are patient and united, perhaps a goal that we have failed to achieve to date in Syria—the ouster of Assad—could eventually be orchestrated using financial instruments rather than military ones.

But leave aside Assad and longer-term issues, including the al-Qaida presence in Syria, for the moment. With this kind of approach towards working with the Syrian Kurds, we will have a much more credible concept, and perhaps a more united coalition, for seeking the defeat of ISIS in the first place.

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American policy towards Syria is stuck in a conundrum. President Donald Trump’s request that the Pentagon deliver him options for accelerating the campaign against ISIS has probably already generated some good tactical initiatives. But Trump’s understandable reluctance to have U.S. forces lead the fight on the ground leaves us dependent on local proxies. Unfortunately, moderate Syrian-Arab allies are too weak to handle the primary responsibility for the liberation of Raqqa and other cities now held by ISIS. Syrian Kurdish forces are quite capable, but President Erdoğan of Turkey fears they are in cahoots with Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) separatists and terrorists inside of his own country, and adamantly objects to any plan to arm them further. Were Washington to ignore his advice, he could deny us access to the Incirlik airfield or even use his own modest-sized military forces within Syria to attack the very Kurdish forces we see as allies. What to do when your respective allies hate each other?
Part of the solution, as recently recommended by Fred and Kimberly Kagan of AEI and the Institute for the Study of War, is undoubtedly a renewed effort to work with the Sunni Arab tribes of eastern Syria to build a stronger opposition force. However, that will take time in a best case. As such, the Kurdish option seems unavoidable at some level. The United States and other coalition partners need to find a way to work with Kurdish forces inside Syria while mitigating Turkish objections to the plan.
There are at least five logical steps we can take to address Ankara’s concerns, some of which are legitimate. They involve a combination of specific military actions on the ground together with political and economic levers. Taking this approach requires that we provide a vision for where the Syria mission is headed even after the defeat of ISIS. By articulating that vision now, we can create incentives for good Kurdish behavior, and leverage to promote such behavior. The essence of the concept is to envision a future Syria in which power is devolved to several autonomous zones in the north, east, and south of the country, even if President Bashar al-Assad remains nominally in charge of the whole nation for some extended period into the future—as now seems nearly certain to be the case. With that overarching vision in place, the five specific steps or options include these:
- Firmly clarify that while the United States seeks several autonomous zones in Syria’s north and east, it will in no way ever countenance independent Syrian statelets that might formally break off from the country’s center. Indeed, even these autonomous zones may be only temporary expedients until Assad is someday gone from power, at which point a constitutional convention among Syrians could consider stitching the country back together in a stronger union. - However, in contrast with the Iraqi Kurdistan case, the United States would insist that there be at least two such Kurdish autonomous zones in Syria so they could not join up and seek independence. Turkey’s forces are presently positioned in Syria to ensure just such a separation; Washington should underscore its support for that presence, and the political logic behind it. - Indeed, the United States should declare now that it would support an indefinite Turkish military presence inside Syria, even after the liberation of the east from ISIS, to allow Ankara to keep an eye on the Kurds and to ensure their continued separation into two distinct entities. This Turkish presence in northern Syria could also help monitor the movement of people and weapons across the Syrian-Turkish border, mitigating Ankara’s concerns that Kurds in Syria would militarily assist Kurdish separatists and/or terrorists in Turkey. Indeed, the Turkish forces might eventually be part of an international peacekeeping force that also codified the Russian presence in ... American policy towards Syria is stuck in a conundrum. President Donald Trump’s request that the Pentagon deliver him options for accelerating the campaign against ISIS has probably already generated some good tactical initiatives.https://www.brookings.edu/blog/future-development/2017/03/22/the-war-and-syrias-families/The war and Syria’s familieshttp://webfeeds.brookings.edu/~/283835102/0/brookingsrss/topics/syria~The-war-and-Syria%e2%80%99s-families/
Wed, 22 Mar 2017 14:39:21 +0000https://www.brookings.edu/?p=393521

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The tragedy of the Syrian conflict extends beyond its nearly 500,000 deaths, 2 million injured, and the forced displacement of half its population. The violence and social and cultural forces unleashed by the war have torn families apart, which will likely have a long lasting impact on Syria.

There is universal understanding that the family, as the fundamental unit of society, is entitled to protection as duly enshrined in international law: “It is now recognized, for example, that states have a duty not only to protect, but also to assist, families. Special provisions have been agreed to address the situation of families affected by armed conflict, and those with a member working in a foreign country. There has been, in addition, international confirmation of the equality of men and women as parents, as well as extensive codification of children’s rights, including their right to live with their parents.” There are cultural and religious challenges to this prevailing view, especially when it comes to the role of mothers and fathers and husbands and wives—issues that have surfaced in the context of Syria.

What is clear is that in Syria divorce, polygamy, and child marriages, especially among refugees, have all increased, accompanied by instability and health and psychological consequences. It is difficult to get data on families in rebel occupied areas, including those held by the Islamic State, but it is likely that in these often more conservative areas the same trends are at play. Some of these trends are also seen in countries with large numbers of refugees like Lebanon, Jordan, and Turkey and with Syrians seeking asylum in Europe and elsewhere.

There is consensus that divorces have increased significantly, reportedly up by 100 percent in Damascus in 2013 for example. Others, while recognizing the increase, urge caution with these figures since large population movements make accurate statistics difficult. The reasons for this increase are varied and include tensions around changing roles, unemployment, livelihood issues, long absences by men who go off to war and often bring violence home, couples taking opposing sides on the war, and fragile marriages based on expediency. There are also reports of sharply declining marriage rates, up to a 70-percent drop in Damascus alone.

Polygamy is also on the rise both within Syria and among the forcefully displaced. Polygamous marriages accounted for 30 percent of those registered in Damascus in 2015, up from just five percent in 2010. The reasons include a relative scarcity of men as they go off to fight and are killed, wounded, maimed, or go missing. The fact that polygamy is legal in Syria and all other neighboring countries except Turkey makes it more of an option to consider for women and girls seeking security. Legal measures to provide for some equity among wives are often waved aside by religious authorities.

The presence of marriageable Syrian women, many in dire circumstances, has meant that polygamy has returned to Turkey while increasing in Jordan and Lebanon. In Turkey this has led to an increase in divorces as Turkish wives leave their husbands, and possibly in some degree in Jordan and Lebanon.

In many cases the additional wives are child brides. According to the United Nations, among rural Syrian families where marriage before 18 was already common, girls as young as 13 and 14 are now being married, often to much older men, ostensibly for protection and to safeguard their “honor.” According to CARE’s Isadora Quay: “We have seen a massive increase in child marriage in Syria and Iraq and (…) as far afield as Egypt.” There are health concerns associated with child marriages such as increased child and maternal mortality, increased risk of domestic violence, and reduced access to education and jobs with predictable impact on their children.

What we do know is that Syrian refugee families are under tremendous strain. Just two years ago, women headed over 25 percent of all refugee families—with similar numbers likely for internally displaced people. These numbers are increasing over time. CARE reports that female-headed households in Jordan are now 40 percent of the total. The number in Lebanon is now over 30 percent.

The trek to Europe has also had its challenges as individuals, overwhelmingly men, are sent off for extended stays as anchors to bring the rest of the family, forcing many families to endure separations with a difficult reunification process. Further, women and child brides seeking legal action against unwanted and abusive husbands are challenged by the unfamiliarity of the legal framework and cultural differences in Western society when they arrive.

While the absence of men and the growing number of female-headed households do empower many women, questionable coping mechanisms such as large increases in polygamy and child marriages mean that the pre-2011 Syrian family has undergone significant changes. The country will need to consider these changes as it contemplates recovery and reconstruction. How they are accommodated will play an important role in preparing for eventual reconciliation.

]]>
The tragedy of the Syrian conflict extends beyond its nearly 500,000 deaths, 2 million injured, and the forced displacement of half its population. The violence and social and cultural forces unleashed by the war have torn families apart, which will likely have a long lasting impact on Syria.
There is universal understanding that the family, as the fundamental unit of society, is entitled to protection as duly enshrined in international law: “It is now recognized, for example, that states have a duty not only to protect, but also to assist, families. Special provisions have been agreed to address the situation of families affected by armed conflict, and those with a member working in a foreign country. There has been, in addition, international confirmation of the equality of men and women as parents, as well as extensive codification of children’s rights, including their right to live with their parents.” There are cultural and religious challenges to this prevailing view, especially when it comes to the role of mothers and fathers and husbands and wives—issues that have surfaced in the context of Syria.
What is clear is that in Syria divorce, polygamy, and child marriages, especially among refugees, have all increased, accompanied by instability and health and psychological consequences. It is difficult to get data on families in rebel occupied areas, including those held by the Islamic State, but it is likely that in these often more conservative areas the same trends are at play. Some of these trends are also seen in countries with large numbers of refugees like Lebanon, Jordan, and Turkey and with Syrians seeking asylum in Europe and elsewhere.
There is consensus that divorces have increased significantly, reportedly up by 100 percent in Damascus in 2013 for example. Others, while recognizing the increase, urge caution with these figures since large population movements make accurate statistics difficult. The reasons for this increase are varied and include tensions around changing roles, unemployment, livelihood issues, long absences by men who go off to war and often bring violence home, couples taking opposing sides on the war, and fragile marriages based on expediency. There are also reports of sharply declining marriage rates, up to a 70-percent drop in Damascus alone.
Polygamy is also on the rise both within Syria and among the forcefully displaced. Polygamous marriages accounted for 30 percent of those registered in Damascus in 2015, up from just five percent in 2010. The reasons include a relative scarcity of men as they go off to fight and are killed, wounded, maimed, or go missing. The fact that polygamy is legal in Syria and all other neighboring countries except Turkey makes it more of an option to consider for women and girls seeking security. Legal measures to provide for some equity among wives are often waved aside by religious authorities.
The presence of marriageable Syrian women, many in dire circumstances, has meant that polygamy has returned to Turkey while increasing in Jordan and Lebanon. In Turkey this has led to an increase in divorces as Turkish wives leave their husbands, and possibly in some degree in Jordan and Lebanon.
In many cases the additional wives are child brides. According to the United Nations, among rural Syrian families where marriage before 18 was already common, girls as young as 13 and 14 are now being married, often to much older men, ostensibly for protection and to safeguard their “honor.” According to CARE’s Isadora Quay: “We have seen a massive increase in child marriage in Syria and Iraq and (…) as far afield as Egypt.” There are health concerns associated with child marriages such as increased child and maternal mortality, increased risk of domestic violence, and reduced access to education and jobs with predictable impact on their children.
What we do know is that Syrian refugee ... The tragedy of the Syrian conflict extends beyond its nearly 500,000 deaths, 2 million injured, and the forced displacement of half its population. The violence and social and cultural forces unleashed by the war have torn families apart, which will ... https://www.brookings.edu/blog/markaz/2017/03/17/5-ways-trump-can-navigate-syrias-geopolitical-battlefield/5 ways Trump can navigate Syria’s geopolitical battlefieldhttp://webfeeds.brookings.edu/~/282150632/0/brookingsrss/topics/syria~ways-Trump-can-navigate-Syrias-geopolitical-battlefield/
Fri, 17 Mar 2017 13:00:47 +0000https://www.brookings.edu/?p=392601

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Two months into the Trump administration, it is hard to tell if there has been any discernible shift in U.S. strategy towards Syria. The new president’s 30-day deadline to the U.S. military for devising new plans to defeat ISIS in the Levant and beyond has come and gone—but we cannot easily tell from the outside how consequential that classified set of options may yet have been. In any case, as Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Gen. Joseph Dunford explained in a late February event at Brookings, that 30-day plan was not intended to be the end of the story. In light of current conditions, where should President Trump aim next in regard to what has surely been the worst civil war of the 21st century, and in regard to the ongoing challenge of Takfiri/Salafist violent extremism?

Trump inherited a mess in Syria. Luckily, he also inherited battlefield momentum against ISIS. That is particularly notable in neighboring Iraq, where virtually all of Anbar province and half of Mosul are now liberated from the extremists, but it is partially true in Syria as well. ISIS still holds its “capital” of Raqqa, as well as some smaller towns in Deir ez-Zor and eastern Homs provinces, according to the ongoing excellent work by the Institute for the Study of War on this subject. Yet it has lost ground and the seat of its so-called caliphate in Raqqa is now largely encircled by opposition forces.

Still, given the witches’ brew or, as Gen. David Petraeus puts it, “the geopolitical Chernobyl” found on the Syrian battlefield today, things are a long ways from a success. In the short term, with Turkey and the Kurds at each other’s throats, there is not even a viable plan yet for liberating Raqqa. Even if that issue can be solved, and Raqqa liberated, ISIS may retain smaller sanctuaries elsewhere in the Levant and the broader region. And even if ISIS itself is eventually reduced as a threat, the Front for the Conquest of the Levant (a.k.a. Jabhat al-Nusra, previously al-Qaida) may remain a problem.

Finally, even if both ISIS and the Front for the Conquest of the Levant are somehow weakened throughout Syria in coming months, the potential will remain for a resurgence of violent extremism absent a stable solution to the civil war. Working with Russian president Vladimir Putin and Bashar Assad to achieve that objective cannot, of course, be the entirety of the answer. The Syrian president simply has too much blood on his hands to be a stabilizing and legitimate ruler of all of Syria ever again. He is despised by large segments of the Sunni Muslim majority in Syria, who have seen their neighborhoods barrel-bombed, shelled and their populations deprived of food and medical care—as well as schools and jobs—for six years. We might temporarily defeat ISIS, only to see Jabhat al-Nusra or other extremist groups benefit from the bitterness and disenfranchisement of much of the Sunni population. Another wave of jihadism would surely follow, whether under the same or a different name.

The only way to think logically, even about the short term, the liberation of Raqqa, is therefore to think first about what longer-term political strategy we are pursuing. Replacing Assad as president of the country, however horrible he has been, does not seem to be in the cards. Some form of self government for the Kurds and Sunni Arabs is the only realistic answer. One option might, in theory, be a confederal system by which the whole country is divided into such zones. In light of Assad’s conquest of Aleppo and Trump’s disinterest in mounting a major new effort against Assad, however, a more realistic and minimally acceptable alternative could be the creation of several autonomous zones within an otherwise still-centralized state (not unlike how Iraqi Kurdistan has often functioned). Once those autonomous zones are established, humanitarian and reconstruction aid could be provided to them directly by the international community. International peacekeepers could help them build local police forces, like lightly armed versions of the Iraqi peshmerga, and keep an eye on them to be sure they did not ship weapons to the PKK in Turkey or attempt a pointless march on Damascus to attempt an overthrow of Assad.

The international peacekeepers could include Russians in the country’s west so that Moscow could preserve its core equities in the country. Turks could remain in the north where they are now operating. Arab and other Muslim-majority forces could patrol along the internal demarcation lines. Americans and other NATO troops could help with overall command and control, as well as logistics and ongoing counterterrorism operations. The region in and around Raqqa itself might be administered under a trusteeship, as proposed by James Dobbins, Phil Gordon and Jeff Martini.

As noted, foreign assistance for this reconfigured Syrian state should be provided primarily to the autonomous regions themselves. That would enhance the international community’s leverage with the new, regional governments. They could demand that Syria remain whole and undivided as a condition for future aid, with no attempts at secession. For Assad to see any such aid from European, American and Gulf states for regions that he or his associates controlled, the government would have to call off attacks on the opposition, and Assad would have to agree to a plan to reduce his own future role in the country’s central governance. Full aid flows to the parts of the country he controls now could only occur after his departure, though some aid could flow sooner to help incentivize Assad and Russia to accept this overall approach for ending the war and defeating extremists.

Many Syrians will not like the idea of a confederal nation, or even of a central government controlling half the country with the other half divided into perhaps four–six autonomous zones. But such arrangements need not be permanent. The deal that ultimately codified the autonomous zones could include a provision that, ten years hence, a constitutional convention would be held to consider whether a stronger central government should be restored.

This finally brings us back to the immediate problem: how to liberate Raqqa. Right now, our de facto strategy lacks needed firepower and manpower. Moderate Arab opposition forces in the east of Syria lack the latter. Kurdish forces have some of the latter but not enough of the former, largely because Turkey has objected to our providing weaponry. The Turks themselves have a meaningful, but not decisive, military presence on the ground in Syria. So far, Assad’s forces are showing signs of trying to push out east, but they are still limited in their manpower—even once Russian forces and Hezbollah and other largely Shia militias are added into the equation. American and coalition airpower is important in support, but cannot, itself, take the lead on liberating Raqqa and other cities from thousands of entrenched ISIS fighters.

The solution to this conundrum has to involve providing arms to the Kurds, whether Turkey loves the idea or not. It should also involve greater efforts to cooperate militarily with the Sunni tribes of Syria’s east, as suggested recently by Fred and Kim Kagan, though that may not suffice as a strategy either—hence emphasis on also collaborating with the Kurds. In that regard we can, I believe, do a great deal to attempt to soften Turkish opposition:

As noted, declare that we seek autonomous zones and not independent Syrian statelets, and rally key allies to support this same vision of a future Syria.

Insist that there be at least two such Kurdish autonomous zones so they do not join up and seek independence.

Support the idea of a long-term Turkish military presence inside Syria, even after the liberation of the east from ISIS, in large part to allow Ankara to keep an eye on the Kurds.

Commit some number of American forces to that region over the longer term as well, to help monitor the movement of people and impede the movement of arms across the Syria-Turkey border.

Clarify to Kurdish forces that any weapons provided to them (except small arms) are being loaned, not given. Reconstruction aid would only be provided in full to the Kurds when the heavier weapons were returned, after the defeat of ISIS. This buyback concept needn’t work perfectly to make an important difference.

The above plan of action isn’t perfect and can probably be improved upon. But the key point is that we need to introduce this kind of broader political-military vision, and logic, into our thinking about Syria—even to achieve the immediate purpose of the liberation of Raqqa. If there is one thing we should have learned by now in the Middle East, it’s that military successes built on weak political foundations won’t last—if they can even be achieved in the first place.

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Two months into the Trump administration, it is hard to tell if there has been any discernible shift in U.S. strategy towards Syria. The new president's 30-day deadline to the U.S. military for devising new plans to defeat ISIS in the Levant and beyond has come and gone—but we cannot easily tell from the outside how consequential that classified set of options may yet have been. In any case, as Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Gen. Joseph Dunford explained in a late February event at Brookings, that 30-day plan was not intended to be the end of the story. In light of current conditions, where should President Trump aim next in regard to what has surely been the worst civil war of the 21st century, and in regard to the ongoing challenge of Takfiri/Salafist violent extremism?
Trump inherited a mess in Syria. Luckily, he also inherited battlefield momentum against ISIS. That is particularly notable in neighboring Iraq, where virtually all of Anbar province and half of Mosul are now liberated from the extremists, but it is partially true in Syria as well. ISIS still holds its “capital” of Raqqa, as well as some smaller towns in Deir ez-Zor and eastern Homs provinces, according to the ongoing excellent work by the Institute for the Study of War on this subject. Yet it has lost ground and the seat of its so-called caliphate in Raqqa is now largely encircled by opposition forces.
Still, given the witches’ brew or, as Gen. David Petraeus puts it, “the geopolitical Chernobyl” found on the Syrian battlefield today, things are a long ways from a success. In the short term, with Turkey and the Kurds at each other’s throats, there is not even a viable plan yet for liberating Raqqa. Even if that issue can be solved, and Raqqa liberated, ISIS may retain smaller sanctuaries elsewhere in the Levant and the broader region. And even if ISIS itself is eventually reduced as a threat, the Front for the Conquest of the Levant (a.k.a. Jabhat al-Nusra, previously al-Qaida) may remain a problem.
Finally, even if both ISIS and the Front for the Conquest of the Levant are somehow weakened throughout Syria in coming months, the potential will remain for a resurgence of violent extremism absent a stable solution to the civil war. Working with Russian president Vladimir Putin and Bashar Assad to achieve that objective cannot, of course, be the entirety of the answer. The Syrian president simply has too much blood on his hands to be a stabilizing and legitimate ruler of all of Syria ever again. He is despised by large segments of the Sunni Muslim majority in Syria, who have seen their neighborhoods barrel-bombed, shelled and their populations deprived of food and medical care—as well as schools and jobs—for six years. We might temporarily defeat ISIS, only to see Jabhat al-Nusra or other extremist groups benefit from the bitterness and disenfranchisement of much of the Sunni population. Another wave of jihadism would surely follow, whether under the same or a different name.
The only way to think logically, even about the short term, the liberation of Raqqa, is therefore to think first about what longer-term political strategy we are pursuing. Replacing Assad as president of the country, however horrible he has been, does not seem to be in the cards. Some form of self government for the Kurds and Sunni Arabs is the only realistic answer. One option might, in theory, be a confederal system by which the whole country is divided into such zones. In light of Assad’s conquest of Aleppo and Trump’s disinterest in mounting a major new effort against Assad, however, a more realistic and minimally acceptable alternative could be the creation of several autonomous zones within an otherwise still-centralized state (not unlike how Iraqi Kurdistan has often functioned). Once those autonomous zones are established, humanitarian and reconstruction aid could be provided to them ... Two months into the Trump administration, it is hard to tell if there has been any discernible shift in U.S. strategy towards Syria. The new president's 30-day deadline to the U.S. military for devising new plans to defeat ISIS in the Levant and ... https://www.brookings.edu/events/the-kurdish-question-and-the-future-of-iraq-and-syria/The Kurdish Question and the Future of Iraq and Syriahttp://webfeeds.brookings.edu/~/278165672/0/brookingsrss/topics/syria~The-Kurdish-Question-and-the-Future-of-Iraq-and-Syria/
Tue, 07 Mar 2017 11:46:33 +0000https://www.brookings.edu/?post_type=event&p=390918

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Event Announcement

The weakening of the Iraqi government, the Syrian Civil War, and the rise of the so-called Islamic State have reopened questions about the future of Kurds in West Asia. To discuss recent developments and questions about the future of Iraq and Syria, Brookings India is organizing a private roundtable with Peter Galbraith.

In an illustrious career in diplomacy, politics, and academia, Ambassador Galbraith has been an advisor to the Kurdistan Regional Government in Northern Iraq, UN Deputy Special Representative for Afghanistan, and U.S. Ambassador to Croatia.

This discussion will be private and under the Chatham House Rule.

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Event Announcement
The weakening of the Iraqi government, the Syrian Civil War, and the rise of the so-called Islamic State have reopened questions about the future of Kurds in West Asia. To discuss recent developments and questions about the future of Iraq and Syria, Brookings India is organizing a private roundtable with Peter Galbraith.
In an illustrious career in diplomacy, politics, and academia, Ambassador Galbraith has been an advisor to the Kurdistan Regional Government in Northern Iraq, UN Deputy Special Representative for Afghanistan, and U.S. Ambassador to Croatia.
This discussion will be private and under the Chatham House Rule. Event Announcement
The weakening of the Iraqi government, the Syrian Civil War, and the rise of the so-called Islamic State have reopened questions about the future of Kurds in West Asia. To discuss recent developments and questions about the ... https://www.brookings.edu/blog/markaz/2017/03/01/evaluating-trumps-options-in-syria/Evaluating Trump’s options in Syriahttp://webfeeds.brookings.edu/~/276382648/0/brookingsrss/topics/syria~Evaluating-Trump%e2%80%99s-options-in-Syria/
Thu, 02 Mar 2017 00:21:04 +0000https://www.brookings.edu/?p=389831

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U.S. policy in Syria has failed, but it’s not clear if the new Trump administration can make things better—and some of the options officials are considering would clearly make things worse.

Although the Islamic State has suffered numerous setbacks, the scale and scope of the killing in Syria seems to grow every year, with more than 450,000 Syrians now dead and more than 13.5 million either internally displaced or forced to become refugees. The regime of Bashar al-Assad appears ascendant, while the opposition is increasingly more radical, with the Islamic State and the al-Qaida-linked Jabhat Fatah al-Sham playing important roles. Former Secretary of State John Kerry’s effort to bring about a ceasefire failed, and subsequent Russian efforts appear likely to meet with at best limited success.

It’s reasonable, if cold-blooded, to shrug and ask how this affects America. Historic U.S. interests in the Middle East, after all, are barely affected. Syria has little oil, lacks nuclear weapons, and even before the civil war posed at most a weak military threat to Israel’s security. Trump has given little indication that he cares about the humanitarian carnage of the war, and his disdain for most allies suggests that their fears of spillover and regional rivalries will not deeply affect his thinking.

It is only the risk of terrorism emanating from Syria, where the Islamic State is based, that poses an immediate threat to U.S. interests, and that is clearly the one Syria issue that engages most Americans. Obama tried to walk this line by criticizing Assad but focusing U.S. military efforts against the Islamic State, which saw both America and the Syrian dictator as its enemy (although frankly almost the entire world is its enemy).

Based on his campaign, initial appointments, and first steps as president, it is difficult to anticipate where Trump will go on Syria. Indeed, he is putting out contradictory signals—which, to be fair, is a problem common in most new administrations and even many experienced ones. During the campaign he repeatedly criticized “stupid” wars, notably the invasion of Iraq, and questioned the need to back allies. He pointed out that the Syrian opposition is a mess and questioned whether the moderate opposition is truly moderate. He has long called for getting tough on the Islamic State and working with Russia, which backs Assad’s regime, but he also opposes Iran, which also backs Assad’s regime. But in a recent pronouncement, Trump abruptly promised the U.S. “will absolutely do safe zones in Syria” without specifying what that actually meant. He greets with disdain humanitarian gestures such as providing aid or accepting refugees.

One option, of course, is to do nothing about Syria—and perhaps be more open about it than Obama was. Obama always proceeded cautiously, fearing a quagmire like the one that trapped the United States after the 2003 invasion of Iraq. However, he also talked in moral language about the conflict, while probably also missing opportunities to intervene effectively. Trump is facing a similar quandary—indeed a harder one. For Trump, and for many Americans, the Iraq war seemed to prove that intervention in the Middle East is costly, complex, and often counterproductive. Yet terrorism is real, and as the candidate who swore to keep us safe, Trump can’t be seen as ignoring any terrorism danger. So, like Obama, Trump may want to avoid the war and save U.S. firepower for the Islamic State.

The problem with this balancing act is that terrorism and civil wars are linked, and it’s hard to fight one while ignoring the other. The Islamic State feeds off of civil wars: it helped create the Iraqi civil war and thrived as it raged, and it found new life as the Syrian civil war spread. This should be no surprise. Hizballah emerged out the Lebanese civil war, and Palestinian groups also thrived on civil conflict. Even though the Islamic State is being hit hard, it has made plans to go underground should it lose all its territory, as it did last time. So without solving the question of governance and territorial control, the group and other terrorist organizations are not likely to go away, while the war itself will prove a rallying cry to bring in new recruits. Terrorism in the region and the flow of refugees is likely to continue, and neighboring states will escalate their proxy wars. All this may mean little to Trump—as long as the terrorism doesn’t hit closer to home and he doesn’t need allies’ help in other areas.

Another approach is to “bomb the shit out of them,” as our president memorably phrased it on the campaign trail. The United States Air Force has a remarkable ability to attack fixed targets like buildings and larger mobile ones, such as Islamic State heavy artillery or oil transport trucks. In addition, in the years since 9/11, drones and other air assets are used to kill suspected terrorist leaders. Even if the terrorists successfully hide, it’s far harder for them to operate when constantly keeping their heads down.

Air power, however, has many limits. To be most effective, it needs to coordinate with forces on the ground. With effective ground forces, the adversary can’t simply disperse and hide—the ground forces will root them out. Ground forces can also offer more precise targeting intelligence for air strikes. But most important, it is the ground forces that will change conditions on the ground, providing security and enabling local governance while preventing the terrorists from coming back. Without the ground troops, another local actor will fill the void—perhaps someone even worse than the current adversaries. If we want to eradicate the terrorists for good as Trump, has promised, air power is not enough.

One option that was off the table under Obama (and, indeed, seemed inconceivable to most observers only a year ago) is cooperating with the Russians. This can be done directly by sharing targeting information with Moscow, conducting joint bombing runs, and otherwise working together as military partners. Or it can be done less visibly simply by ending support for the anti-Assad opposition and, in so doing, by increasing Moscow’s relative influence and the strength of the Assad regime, its partner.

Russia is not known for caring about civilian casualties or otherwise exercising restraint in its military operations. So any U.S. partnership will carry a humanitarian taint. In addition, the Assad regime is widely loathed by Sunni Muslims, and effectively taking its side would further put the United States on the wrong side of regional opinion, as well as that of anti-Assad regimes like Saudi Arabia. Helping Russia and helping Assad also helps Iran—Syria’s closest ally—which has provided substantial financial and military support for the Assad regime. A close alliance with Russia to fight the Islamic State thus could backfire, making the terrorism problem worse and hindering America’s regional position.

The recent proposal to establish safe zones, formerly the favored position of Hillary Clinton, was less expected considering Trump’s criticism of it during the campaign. As with all of these options, it is difficult to assess when the specific details remain unclear. In theory, establishing safe zones simply means designating an area, deploying a combination of U.S. and allied ground and air forces to protect that area from combatant parties, and providing aid to civilians. The difficulty is determining what territory is effectively seized, whose forces will be used (particularly on the ground), and the nature of the mandate (i.e. how much force can be used and to what ends). In addition, if the zone is a base for anti-Assad and anti-Islamic State opposition, then both will target it, and in any event, the zone needs to be heavily guarded and policed to secure the people there. The diplomatic and geopolitical considerations alone are incredibly complex as a consequence of the presence of Russian, Iranian, and Turkish forces, besides the most basic consideration of directly intervening in an ongoing, complicated civil war. The Trump team will have no lack of proposals from humanitarian-oriented buffer zones to more ambitious plans seeking a confederal political settlement to the war. Yet to do even a basic zone would require thousands of ground troops and needs to ensure that U.S. and Russian air forces deconflict. And that doesn’t answer the question of who will administer the safe zones, a question that will become more and more important as the zones endure and become mini de facto states. A safe zone, far from being a prudent middle course, could actually make things worse, achieving little but requiring considerable resources and putting the United States unwittingly on the road toward greater intervention.

Although several of the President’s advisors appear to recognize the limits of military force and the diplomatic—to say nothing of the moral—difficulties of allying with Russia and Syria, it is not clear what the President and his core group of advisors in the White House think. In his rhetoric, at least, the president has appeared to dismiss the difficulties and tensions in any policy, contending that the United States can eat its cake and have it too.

It is an open question whether the United States could have intervened effectively in Syria if it had seized opportunities when Assad was first flailing in 2011 or before the civil war became massive in 2013. In 2017, however, there are no good options, only less bad ones. Trump’s domestic political realities also make his options even harder. The president has read Americans’ mood correctly: we don’t want to get mired in yet another swamp in the Middle East, but at the same time, we do want to make sure the Middle East is not a platform for terrorist attacks on the United States. Both intervening and not intervening can easily be portrayed as failures as a result, and the public may prove unforgiving regardless of the direction Trump goes.

So Team Trump has a tough task before it, and those of us hoping for success in Syria are likely to be disappointed.

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U.S. policy in Syria has failed, but it’s not clear if the new Trump administration can make things better—and some of the options officials are considering would clearly make things worse.
Although the Islamic State has suffered numerous setbacks, the scale and scope of the killing in Syria seems to grow every year, with more than 450,000 Syrians now dead and more than 13.5 million either internally displaced or forced to become refugees. The regime of Bashar al-Assad appears ascendant, while the opposition is increasingly more radical, with the Islamic State and the al-Qaida-linked Jabhat Fatah al-Sham playing important roles. Former Secretary of State John Kerry’s effort to bring about a ceasefire failed, and subsequent Russian efforts appear likely to meet with at best limited success.
It’s reasonable, if cold-blooded, to shrug and ask how this affects America. Historic U.S. interests in the Middle East, after all, are barely affected. Syria has little oil, lacks nuclear weapons, and even before the civil war posed at most a weak military threat to Israel’s security. Trump has given little indication that he cares about the humanitarian carnage of the war, and his disdain for most allies suggests that their fears of spillover and regional rivalries will not deeply affect his thinking.
It is only the risk of terrorism emanating from Syria, where the Islamic State is based, that poses an immediate threat to U.S. interests, and that is clearly the one Syria issue that engages most Americans. Obama tried to walk this line by criticizing Assad but focusing U.S. military efforts against the Islamic State, which saw both America and the Syrian dictator as its enemy (although frankly almost the entire world is its enemy).
Based on his campaign, initial appointments, and first steps as president, it is difficult to anticipate where Trump will go on Syria. Indeed, he is putting out contradictory signals—which, to be fair, is a problem common in most new administrations and even many experienced ones. During the campaign he repeatedly criticized “stupid” wars, notably the invasion of Iraq, and questioned the need to back allies. He pointed out that the Syrian opposition is a mess and questioned whether the moderate opposition is truly moderate. He has long called for getting tough on the Islamic State and working with Russia, which backs Assad’s regime, but he also opposes Iran, which also backs Assad’s regime. But in a recent pronouncement, Trump abruptly promised the U.S. “will absolutely do safe zones in Syria” without specifying what that actually meant. He greets with disdain humanitarian gestures such as providing aid or accepting refugees.
One option, of course, is to do nothing about Syria—and perhaps be more open about it than Obama was. Obama always proceeded cautiously, fearing a quagmire like the one that trapped the United States after the 2003 invasion of Iraq. However, he also talked in moral language about the conflict, while probably also missing opportunities to intervene effectively. Trump is facing a similar quandary—indeed a harder one. For Trump, and for many Americans, the Iraq war seemed to prove that intervention in the Middle East is costly, complex, and often counterproductive. Yet terrorism is real, and as the candidate who swore to keep us safe, Trump can’t be seen as ignoring any terrorism danger. So, like Obama, Trump may want to avoid the war and save U.S. firepower for the Islamic State.
The problem with this balancing act is that terrorism and civil wars are linked, and it’s hard to fight one while ignoring the other. The Islamic State feeds off of civil wars: it helped create the Iraqi civil war and thrived as it raged, and it found new life as the Syrian civil war spread. This should be ... U.S. policy in Syria has failed, but it’s not clear if the new Trump administration can make things better—and some of the options officials are considering would clearly make things worse.
Although the Islamic State has suffered ... https://www.brookings.edu/blog/planetpolicy/2017/02/13/how-the-syrian-refugee-crisis-affected-land-use-and-shared-transboundary-freshwater-resources/How the Syrian refugee crisis affected land use and shared transboundary freshwater resourceshttp://webfeeds.brookings.edu/~/270511826/0/brookingsrss/topics/syria~How-the-Syrian-refugee-crisis-affected-land-use-and-shared-transboundary-freshwater-resources/
Mon, 13 Feb 2017 18:03:23 +0000https://www.brookings.edu/?p=363768

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Since 2013, hundreds of thousands of refugees have migrated southward to Jordan to escape the Syrian civil war. The migration has put major stress on Jordan’s water resources, a heavy burden for a country ranked among the most water-poor in the world, even prior to the influx of refugees. However, the refugee crisis also coincided with an unexpected, rapid increase in flow in the Yarmouk River—from Syria to the Al-Wehda reservoir on the Syria-Jordan border. This flow provided a small supplement to Jordan’s agricultural irrigation supply, that although beneficial was modest compared to both the actual freshwater needs of the refugees and the transboundary flow from Syria long anticipated by Jordan.

Given the concurrent refugee migration and river flow increase, we investigated whether a relationship exists among civil conflict, land use, and water consumption in Syria, potentially explaining the observed flow changes in the Yarmouk-Jordan River watershed that is shared by Syria, Jordan, and Israel. In studying this relationship, we found that the rapid increase in the river flow is a consequence of upstream changes stemming from the Syrian civil war. Research findings indicate that the Syrian crisis has resulted in a reduction in irrigated agricultural land in southern Syria, a decline in Syrian water demand for summer irrigation, and a dramatic change in the way the Syrians manage their reservoirs. These changes ultimately resulted in the observed flow increase to downstream Jordan.

How to assess water resources in a war zone

Reliable summer daytime land cultivation maps and urbanization maps (based on night-light images), as well as hydrological data, are essential to investigate the potential relationship between civil conflict, land use, and water consumption, but obtaining on-the-ground data in a war zone is next to impossible. To solve this problem, we turned to remote sensing data. Using spatial and statistical analyses of satellite imagery, we were able to provide evidence of rapid changes in land use, water use, and water management in the southern Syrian Yarmouk-Jordan River watershed.

The migration has put major stress on Jordan’s water resources, a heavy burden for a country ranked among the most water-poor in the world, even prior to the influx of refugees.

In order to test the causal effect of the refugee crisis on land and water resources, we compared changes observed in Syria with corresponding changes observed in nearby regions where irrigation and dam management were unaffected by the refugee crisis: the Jordanian side of the Yarmouk basin to assess changes in irrigated agricultural land use and the Israeli-controlled Golan Heights to evaluate changes in water reservoir management. The causal effect of migration on irrigated land areas and reservoir storage volumes was evaluated statistically by relating pre-migration and post-migration changes in Syria to changes in the control regions over the same periods.

Effect of Syrian migration on land use

To evaluate the effect of refugee migration on Syrian land use, we generated maps of irrigated crop areas for the Jordanian and Syrian portions of the Yarmouk basin between 2000 and 2015. We found that irrigated areas increased in both countries between 2000 and 2006, followed by an abrupt reduction during the following years, which corresponded to a regional drought. However, in Syria irrigated area declined considerably after 2012, coinciding with the flight of Syrian refugees.

Notably, the post-2012 drop was much greater in Syria than in Jordan, suggesting that conflict and the flight of refugees caused a major reduction in farming and associated reduction in irrigation water use in Syria. Using temporal changes in irrigated area in Jordan as a counterfactual, we found that there was a 47 percent decrease in irrigated land in southern Syria caused by the recent mass migration of refugees that started in 2013.

Effect of the Syrian crisis on reservoir levels

Using remote sensing, we estimated surface reservoir storage changes. We investigated the relationship between refugee migration and Syrian reservoir management by using satellite images of the 11 largest Syrian-controlled surface water reservoirs in the basin for the 2000-15 period. As a control, a similar analysis was conducted for the eight reservoirs operated by Israel in the Golan Heights. The effect of the 2006-08 drought is apparent with a minimum in reservoir storage in both Syria and Israel. Both areas saw increased storage in 2009-12, as the region recovered from the drought, before decreasing again during the low rainfall period of 2013-15. However, the decrease was more substantial in Syria than in the Golan Heights during the time period, which suggests that Syrian reservoir storage was largely affected by changes in the country’s water management practices during the conflict. A comparative difference analysis, revealed a 49 percent decrease in reservoir storage for the 2013-15 refugee migration period compared with the reservoir storage decrease in the Golan Heights, where no detectable change was found during the same period.

Effects on the watershed

Finally, we evaluated the impacts of refugee migration along with associated land-use and reservoir storage changes on the hydrological response of the watershed. Coinciding with the refugee crisis of 2013-15, measured inflows into the Al-Wehda reservoir on the Jordan border reveal a three-fold increase in annual flow compared to the 2006-12 period. The imagery showed that Syrian dams retained considerably less wet-season runoff during the refugee migration period compared with prior years. The decreased retention of wet-season flows during the refugee migration period accounts for almost half of the flow increase reaching Jordan.

Armed conflict resulted in significant changes to land use and water management in Syria, and ultimately, in an unanticipated increase in transboundary flow to downstream Jordan.

The refugee crisis also caused a significant decrease in irrigation demand, which likely increased the portion of reservoir releases making it back from irrigation canals to the stream during the summer. We found that about half of the stream flow increase between 2006-12 and 2013-15 is attributable to the rapid migration of Syrian refugees and subsequent abandonment of irrigated agriculture in southern Syria.

Conflict and the implications for water users

Our analysis suggests that the Syrian conflict and subsequent refugee migration caused downstream flow to increase primarily by the reduction in irrigation demand and changes in reservoir management practices. The abnormal recent decrease in Syrian water retention detected on satellite imagery is consistent with reports from the field, which point to the underuse or decommissioning of dams due to targeted military operations and poor operational management.

Armed conflict resulted in significant changes to land use and water management in Syria, and ultimately, in an unanticipated increase in transboundary flow to downstream Jordan. Importantly, the unintended, near-term impact on Jordan represents a very modest irrigation water benefit that does not materially offset the immediate freshwater needs for hundreds of thousands of Syrian refugees received by Jordan. In fact, even with the additional flow Jordan gets far less transboundary water than it anticipated receiving under a series of bilateral water sharing agreements with Syria. This study reveals how conflict can significantly alter the basin-scale water balance with water supply implications for water users in the basin. The work additionally shows the benefit of using counterfactual comparisons combined with satellite remote sensing data to evaluate hydrologic and land-use dynamics in a war zone.

Acknowledgments: This work was supported by the National Science Foundation (NSF) under Grant GEO/OAD-1342869 (to Stanford University). Any opinions, findings, and conclusions or recommendations expressed in this material are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the NSF.

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Since 2013, hundreds of thousands of refugees have migrated southward to Jordan to escape the Syrian civil war. The migration has put major stress on Jordan’s water resources, a heavy burden for a country ranked among the most water-poor in the world, even prior to the influx of refugees. However, the refugee crisis also coincided with an unexpected, rapid increase in flow in the Yarmouk River—from Syria to the Al-Wehda reservoir on the Syria-Jordan border. This flow provided a small supplement to Jordan’s agricultural irrigation supply, that although beneficial was modest compared to both the actual freshwater needs of the refugees and the transboundary flow from Syria long anticipated by Jordan.
Given the concurrent refugee migration and river flow increase, we investigated whether a relationship exists among civil conflict, land use, and water consumption in Syria, potentially explaining the observed flow changes in the Yarmouk-Jordan River watershed that is shared by Syria, Jordan, and Israel. In studying this relationship, we found that the rapid increase in the river flow is a consequence of upstream changes stemming from the Syrian civil war. Research findings indicate that the Syrian crisis has resulted in a reduction in irrigated agricultural land in southern Syria, a decline in Syrian water demand for summer irrigation, and a dramatic change in the way the Syrians manage their reservoirs. These changes ultimately resulted in the observed flow increase to downstream Jordan.
How to assess water resources in a war zone
Reliable summer daytime land cultivation maps and urbanization maps (based on night-light images), as well as hydrological data, are essential to investigate the potential relationship between civil conflict, land use, and water consumption, but obtaining on-the-ground data in a war zone is next to impossible. To solve this problem, we turned to remote sensing data. Using spatial and statistical analyses of satellite imagery, we were able to provide evidence of rapid changes in land use, water use, and water management in the southern Syrian Yarmouk-Jordan River watershed.
The migration has put major stress on Jordan’s water resources, a heavy burden for a country ranked among the most water-poor in the world, even prior to the influx of refugees.
In order to test the causal effect of the refugee crisis on land and water resources, we compared changes observed in Syria with corresponding changes observed in nearby regions where irrigation and dam management were unaffected by the refugee crisis: the Jordanian side of the Yarmouk basin to assess changes in irrigated agricultural land use and the Israeli-controlled Golan Heights to evaluate changes in water reservoir management. The causal effect of migration on irrigated land areas and reservoir storage volumes was evaluated statistically by relating pre-migration and post-migration changes in Syria to changes in the control regions over the same periods.
Effect of Syrian migration on land use
To evaluate the effect of refugee migration on Syrian land use, we generated maps of irrigated crop areas for the Jordanian and Syrian portions of the Yarmouk basin between 2000 and 2015. We found that irrigated areas increased in both countries between 2000 and 2006, followed by an abrupt reduction during the following years, which corresponded to a regional drought. However, in Syria irrigated area declined considerably after 2012, coinciding with the flight of Syrian refugees.
Notably, the post-2012 drop was much greater in Syria than in Jordan, suggesting that conflict and the flight of refugees caused a major reduction in farming and associated reduction in irrigation water use in Syria. Using temporal changes in irrigated area in Jordan as a counterfactual, we found that there was a 47 percent decrease in irrigated land in southern Syria caused by the recent mass migration of refugees that started in ... Since 2013, hundreds of thousands of refugees have migrated southward to Jordan to escape the Syrian civil war. The migration has put major stress on Jordan’s water resources, a heavy burden for a country ranked among the most water-poor in ... https://www.brookings.edu/blog/future-development/2017/02/13/rebuilding-or-redefining-syria/Rebuilding or redefining Syria?http://webfeeds.brookings.edu/~/270415200/0/brookingsrss/topics/syria~Rebuilding-or-redefining-Syria/
Mon, 13 Feb 2017 13:02:32 +0000https://www.brookings.edu/?p=363379

Without a comprehensive peace accord or an outright winner, recovery and reconstruction looks likely to be as fragmented and fragile as the war’s ceasefires and boundaries. Key questions on who will pay, who will draw up the blueprints, when and where the forcibly displaced will return, and whose construction firms, banks, consultancies, etc. will participate remain up in the air. On the ground, however, new realities are being created.

Jordan and Lebanon, hosting proportionally more refugees than any other country, also hope to benefit from Syria’s reconstruction and prepare the ground for refugee repatriation with support from international donors.

Funding concerns and political agendas aside, it is indisputable than an inclusive reconstruction process is paramount if one is not to simply rebuild old fault lines. This means giving voice to local communities and the broader Syrian population. Yezid Sayigh of the Carnegie Middle East Center notes that otherwise “reconstruction will simply empower those who already possess key political levers and social capital, and produce skewed results in terms of reintegration of refugees and displaced persons, societal reconciliation, and sustainable, equitable economic development.”

For now, Syria’s disparate reconstruction efforts appear to be cementing divisions rather than building bridges.

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Syria’s tenuous ceasefire brokered by Russia, Turkey, and Iran has rekindled hopes for ending the horrific violence in the country while reviving interest in various initiatives for reconstruction. The latter include the United Nation’s National Agenda for the Future of Syria, an ambitious undertaking with participation from the regime and opposition groups, assessments from the World Bank, and broader approaches from the European Union, the Arab League, Chatham House, and others.
The reconstruction could well be a generational effort at immense cost, taking Syria at least 20 years to reach its pre-war GDP once hostilities cease. Estimates on costs from the U.N., the International Monetary Fund, and the World Bank converge around $200 billion, but this barely hints at the war’s human tragedy. Half a million are dead, 2 million are wounded, and half the population has been forcefully displaced with some 5 million registered refugees—largely in Lebanon (1 million), Jordan (655,000), and Turkey (3 million)—and over 900,000 seeking asylum in Europe. There are 6.5 million internally displaced people out of 13.5 million Syrians listed as “in need” by the U.N., of which 6 million are children.
Without a comprehensive peace accord or an outright winner, recovery and reconstruction looks likely to be as fragmented and fragile as the war’s ceasefires and boundaries. Key questions on who will pay, who will draw up the blueprints, when and where the forcibly displaced will return, and whose construction firms, banks, consultancies, etc. will participate remain up in the air. On the ground, however, new realities are being created.
The ceasefire underlines Syria’s current de-facto division. The government and its Russian, Iranian, Iraqi, and Lebanese Shia allies control the south and the west, including most cities. Turkey’s safe zone is a reality in parts of the north. The province of Idlib, with 2 million inhabitants and internally displaced people, remains in various rebel hands and has a northern Kurdish zone. Islamic State holds significant territories around Raqqa, Palmyra, and the Iraqi border.
Iranian and Syrian government efforts to repopulate key areas with mostly Shia populations, replacing displaced Sunnis, are exacerbating divisions. Iran has negotiated directly with rebel groups to swap populations in areas around Damascus and further north by bringing in Lebanese and Iraqi Shia families. This process extends to Iraq as Iran and its allies aim for a safe corridor with direct access to Syria and Lebanon.
Reconstruction arrangements are also proceeding apace. In January 2017, agreements between Syria and Iran included a cell phone license, phosphate mining, thousands of hectares for farming, oil and gas terminals, and a port. There is also $660 million in electricity generation deals and plans for linking the electrical grids of Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, and Syria. Russia will likely play an even bigger reconstruction role with deals in off-shore energy, finance, trade, transport, and other sectors. China, a big presence in the pre-war energy sector, will expand on these while rebuilding Syria’s telecom infrastructure and planning further investments.
Turkey with the Free Syrian Army has cleared some 2,000 square kilometers within Syria, ousting the Kurdish Democratic Union Party and Islamic State forces, and plans to build towns for some of its 3 million Syrian refugees. Starting with state agencies and personnel, private contractors are to come in once the area is secure. Already, 450 Turkish-trained Syrian police officers, the vanguard of 5,000, have moved in. There are hopes that the EU’s agreement with Turkey on Syrian refugees may yield funds. President Trump’s campaign call for GCC funded safe zones is now supported by Saudi Arabia but despite closer cooperation in Syria with Turkey, the U.S. ... Syria’s tenuous ceasefire brokered by Russia, Turkey, and Iran has rekindled hopes for ending the horrific violence in the country while reviving interest in various initiatives for reconstruction. The latter include the United Nation’https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/will-assad-ever-be-tried-for-his-crimes/Will Assad ever be tried for his crimes?http://webfeeds.brookings.edu/~/265775746/0/brookingsrss/topics/syria~Will-Assad-ever-be-tried-for-his-crimes/
Wed, 01 Feb 2017 13:18:51 +0000https://www.brookings.edu/?post_type=opinion&p=360930