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Why Are Airlines Still Flying over War Zones?

By RAFI RON

July 27, 2014

The fastest growing risk to civil aviation in the world today doesn’t come from any particular part of the world—and it’s not limited to any specific place or group. It is posed by terrorist organizations or quasi-military groups seeking to make a name for themselves—like the separatists in Ukraine—and which are managing to acquire ever-more sophisticated weapons taken from defeated or overrun armies, as we’ve seen occur in countries from Mali to Iraq, Somalia to Syria.

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As the horror of the MH17 shoot-down showed, many of the international civil aviation routes between Southeast Asia and Western Europe still extend over these territories.

What airlines and aviation authorities around the world need to do now, as a matter of priority, is to take two steps: First, to avoid the risk of high-altitude, heavy missiles like the one that apparently struck MH17, commercial airlines should stop flying over areas that serve as war zones or are controlled by terrorists and rebel groups; second, if they do fly near high-risk destinations, airlines should begin to adopt anti-missile systems that are already available to counter the far more common shoulder-borne missiles called MANPADS (man-portable air-defense systems).

Their passengers may not know it, but most commercial airlines today are still flying over hazardous areas such as northern Iraq, large parts of Syria, southern Yemen, Somalia, northern Pakistan and parts of Afghanistan. Diverting routes around these regions may involve greater fuel costs—one reason the airlines are reluctant to do it—but greater security doesn’t come cheap. Routing of flights is first of all in the hands of the airlines, but it can be regulated by governmental aviation authorities like the Federal Aviation Administration. The International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) can help by creating guidelines and prioritizing security consideration when it coordinates the global civil aviation routing. As we witnessed in the case of eastern Ukraine—Flight MH17 was reportedly flying at 33,000 feet when it was shot out of the sky—altitude does not provide protection against the heavy large anti-aircraft missile systems that are now available to some undisciplined militant organizations.

Imposing “no fly” zones in war-torn regions or terrorist controlled areas can be very effective in protecting high-cruising aircraft, since the anti-aircraft systems able to reach this altitude are limited to use in a controlled territory. These are not the small, shoulder-borne missiles that can be easily transported in a concealed manner and used almost anywhere without any special infrastructure, but rather heavy technological systems that cannot be moved out of areas controlled by sponsoring countries.

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As the former chief of security at Tel Aviv’s Ben Gurion International Airport, I should add that these high-risk areas do not include Israel, despite the FAA’s recent decision to temporarily bar U.S. flights into Tel Aviv over fears of rocket fire from Gaza. Israeli airspace is probably the most protected in the world. Terrorists have been targeting Israeli civil aviation for more than 50 years and yet not a single anti-aircraft missile has ever been launched against a flying civilian aircraft inside Israel. This is not for lack of will, but simply because terrorists have lacked the capability to overcome Israeli defense systems. One should not confuse the relatively primitive, unguided rockets that Hamas is launching against Israel with the sophisticated anti-aircraft weapon used in Eastern Ukraine. Hence, I believe it was correct for the FAA to lift its ban after the Israeli authorities demonstrated the capability of the country’s defense systems and the unique level of protection exercised at Ben Gurion airport. Some have suggested that there is a risk of fallen debris from intercepted rockets or the “Iron Dome” projectiles used to take down those rockets. But the fact is that more than 2,000 Hamas rockets and hundreds of these Iron Dome projectiles have been fired over populated areas with hardly any casualties or injuries.

And the more common threat to airliners at lower altitudes—the MANPAD—is not quite as deadly as you might think. Airplanes are only vulnerable to these at “killing” altitudes (about 1,000-to-15,000 feet) on approach for landing and during take-off, and careful authorities can identity and protect the potential relevant launching positions. Beyond that, MANPADS have a relatively small warhead with a limited capability when they are used against large targets like civilian aircraft. As a result, in some past attacks, the aircraft still made a safe landing; in 2003, for example, an Airbus 300 owned by DHL, the international shipping company, landed safely despite a loss of hydraulic power after being struck by an by SA-14 upon takeoff from Baghdad.

Rafi Ron is the President of New Age Security Solution International (www.nasscorp.com) and the former director of security of Tel Aviv Ben Gurion airport.