Mother appeals
from the family court=s
order terminating her residual parental rights in T.M. Father voluntarily
relinquished his rights. Mother argues that the order should be reversed
because she was denied her right to effective assistance of counsel. We
affirm.

Mother and
father are the biological parents of T.M., born in July 2004. Shortly after
T.M.=s birth, a
pediatrician contacted the Department for Children and Families, expressing
concern that parents were not properly caring for the child. DCF took custody
of T.M. in August 2004 pursuant to an emergency detention order and, after a
detention hearing, T.M. remained in DCF custody. In September 2004, T.M. was
adjudicated CHINS due to mother=s
mental illness and her resistance to mental health treatment, and her inability
to care for or provide safety for T.M. or provide him with proper nutrition.
In January 2005, DCF filed a petition to terminate parental rights. After a
hearing, which mother did not attend despite receiving notice, the court
terminated mother=s
residual parental rights.

In reaching
its conclusion, the court explained that mother had completely failed to comply
with the terms of the DCF case plan. She had not maintained regular contact
with T.M.; she had visited him only three times since August 2004, and she had
not seen him at all since September 2004. Mother had not engaged in services
to address her serious mental illness, and her illness clearly interfered with
her ability to provide for herself and her ability to care for an infant.
Mother had also refused to treat her thyroid problem, a requirement of the case
plan. The court found that mother had not undertaken any efforts to make herself
available to T.M. as a parent. She remained unable to focus on tending to T.M.=s needs over a sustained
period of time, and she had not engaged in any of the team meetings regarding
T.M. or in team meetings regarding her mental illness.

Based on
numerous findings, the court concluded that mother=s parenting ability had stagnated, as
evidenced by her failure to engage in services and to improve, and termination
was in T.M.=s best
interests. The court explained that mother would not be able to parent within
a reasonable period of time, she played no constructive role in T.M.=s life, and T.M. would
benefit from placement with, and adoption by, mother=s relatives.

Mother does
not challenge any of the court=s
factual findings. Instead, she argues that the family court=s order should be reversed
because she was denied effective assistance of counsel. Mother was represented
by counsel at the termination hearing, but she maintains that her attorney was
incompetent because he did not call any witnesses, he barely cross-examined the
State=s witnesses, he
elicited adverse evidence or marginally relevant evidence during
cross-examination, and he failed to raise more than one evidentiary objection
during the hearing. Mother also asserts that certain statements that counsel
made during his closing argument undermined her case.

To establish
her claim, mother needs to show by a preponderance of the evidence Athat (1) counsel=s conduct fell short of the
prevailing standard of a reasonably competent attorney, and (2) this
incompetence was sufficiently prejudicial to create >a reasonable probability= of a different result.@In re M.B. & E.B.,
162 Vt. 229, 234 (1994) (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,
694 (1984)).[1] Mother fails
to meet her burden.

Assuming, for
argument=s sake only,
that mother=s attorney=s conduct fell short of the
prevailing standard of a reasonably competent attorney, mother fails to show or
even assert that this alleged incompetence was sufficiently prejudicial so as
to create a reasonable probability of a different result.[2]
Mother generally asserts that counsel=s
shortcomings cast into doubt whether the termination proceeding Aestablished the truth.@She does not
identify how a different result would have obtained had counsel acted
differently, nor does she identify any evidence that would have contradicted
the testimony of numerous witnesses regarding mother=s severe parental shortcomings and her
absolute failure to comply with the DCF case plan. The family court based its
decision on the factors set forth in 33 V.S.A. '
5540, and its findings appear overwhelmingly supported by the evidence and are
hardly contested, if at all, by mother. See id. at 236 (rejecting
similar claim of ineffective assistance of counsel where record contained clear
and convincing evidence on all the relevant criteria of 33 V.S.A. ' 5540, and evidence
supported the termination of parental rights). The court=s findings support its
conclusion that mother had stagnated in her ability to parent, that she would
not be able to resume parenting in a reasonable amount of time, and that
termination was in T.M.=s
best interests. We find no error.

Affirmed.

BY THE COURT:

_______________________________________

Paul L. Reiber, Chief Justice

_______________________________________

Denise R.
Johnson, Associate Justice

_______________________________________

Brian L. Burgess, Associate Justice

[1] As in In
re M.B. & E.B., we do not reach the issue of whether ineffective
assistance of counsel may be raised to challenge a judgment terminating
parental rights and we express no opinion as to the viability of such a claim,
or the appropriate procedure to hear it. 162 Vt. at 233 n.3. We consider
mother=s claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel in this case because our resolution of the
claim does not require evidence about trial counsel=s competence and because we conclude that
mother=s claim has no
merit. See id.

[2] We note
that, according to the record of mother=s
refusal to participate in proceedings below, her counsel had little to work
with in terms of protecting mother=s
interests or attacking the State=s
position.