Throughout the Cold War nuclear security issues dominated a
substantial measure of foreign policy. Now, even a decade after the collapse of the Soviet
Union, nuclear weapons remain as a prominent security issue not only for the United
States, but also for much of the international community. For decades the primary
political actors, Washington and Moscow, have undertaken a multitude of security
cooperation initiatives to reduce their nuclear weapon arsenals, control nuclear
proliferation, enhance physical security, and prevent mishaps. While they have made much
progress, threats to stable international security arrangements continue to arise from the
challenges of shifting politicssuch as Americas recent withdrawal from the
Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, Russias new first-use nuclear doctrine against
domestic and external threats, and the emergence of aspiring nuclear nations.

The three books
reviewed here contribute to further enhancing security and cooperation by providing
detailed information and analyzing policies and decisions that influence nuclear arms
control agreements and nonproliferation efforts. Each book takes a different approach, but
each effectively presents crucial, usable information and political insights that can
positively influence decisionmaking, policies, and actions.

Defense by Other
Means: The Politics of US-NIS Threat Reduction and Nuclear Security Cooperation, by
Jason D. Ellis, provides an explanatory analysis of the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative
Threat Reduction (CTR) program, presented as a case study. It analyzes the dynamics behind
the formulation of policies and implementation of decisions amid the changing post-Cold
War security environment. Ellis employs a sequential methodology to discuss key aspects of
threat reduction, including the programs components and rationale, cooperative
security practice in Ukraine and Russia, the US domestic political process, program
achievements from 1991 through 1996, and the road ahead.

The book begins by
presenting a multidimensional decisionmaking approach as the foundation for the larger
study. Elliss overall intent is not simply to detail historically how and why the
executive branch and Congress molded Nunn-Lugar; rather, he exploits a detailed analysis
of the Nunn-Lugar program as a way of evaluating the domestic political bargaining process
and its influence on foreign policy formulation and implementation. The study also looks
at the degree of institutional consent inherent in cooperative agreements between the
United States, Russia, and the other New Independent States. Last, the study seeks out
causes and other factors related to varying levels and types of support for US-Russian
strategic collaboration as it relates to cooperative threat reduction and achieving
nonproliferation objectives.

Ellis sufficiently
discloses the enormous complexities of Nunn-Lugar itself, and the relationships and
interactions between the executive and legislative branches of

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the United States
and the New Independent States, most notably Russia. With exacting detail he presents a
multidimensional view of Nunn-Lugar including its many separate program elements,
political underpinnings influencing its support and criticisms, and the intricate
political sensitivities surrounding cooperative threat reduction. Ellis makes clear that
the Nunn-Lugar program as a whole, while challenged by complexity, partisan politics, and
changing goals, successfully advanced US security. And based on its success, he concludes
that the program or components of it will continue to influence threat reduction policies
and practices into at least the early years of the 21st century.

This book is
valuable for a few reasons. First, it effectively scrutinizes and details the US domestic
political bargaining processes of executive and legislative actors to reveal the effects
of political pressures and the significance of interactions on outcomes. In this respect
the book is quite instructive because it exposes the intent and process of US foreign
policy decisionmaking, development, and implementation. Additionally, revealing details of
the Nunn-Lugar program itself contribute to the overall knowledge and importance of the
entire cooperative threat reduction field of study. Finally, this type of attention given
to Nunn-Lugar, sometimes maligned as a Russian charity program, highlights the
programs credibility and tremendous value, perhaps bolstering support for its
continuance.

Best of
Intentions: Americas Campaign Against Strategic Weapons Proliferation, by Henry
D. Sokolski, is a detailed examination of five nonproliferation efforts, beginning with
the Baruch Plan of 1946 through the Counterproliferation Initiative of 1993. Sokolski
doesnt want to look only at specific cases or results to reveal the degree of
effectiveness of nonproliferation efforts, because such a limited view makes it hard to
clearly determine causes of success or failure. Therefore he employs an alternative
approach, which seeks to identify and consider the premisethe original
rationale of these nonproliferation effortswith the intent of comparing what
their supporters had hoped to achieve with the efforts actual accomplishments. He
then uses this analysis to judge the relative merits of each effort and determine what
worked, what didnt, and why as a way to help formulate future initiatives. These
five effortsthe Baruch Plan, the Atoms for Peace Program, the Nuclear
Nonproliferation Treaty, proliferation technology control regimes, and the
Counterproliferation Initiativeare thoroughly inspected chronologically in
successive chapters. Although each initiative is fundamentally distinct, they also build
on policies, outcomes, and consequences of the preceding nonproliferation efforts.

For each
nonproliferation initiative Sokolski meaningfully takes an often confusing, convoluted
policy area and methodically discusses the domestic and international political
developments, influences, and outcomes. He details the logic behind these nonproliferation
initiatives within their historical context. The author is quite effective in his analysis
partly because he explains complex issues in understandable, simple language. After his
examination of these efforts, Sokolski uses his understanding of the past to formulate a
few recommendations for future initiatives. First, he concludes that several of these
efforts and their strategic assumptions still influence todays nonproliferation
efforts. Therefore, a more thorough understanding of these previous initiatives and their
rationales could help highlight the strengths and weaknesses of current initiatives.
Second, he logically suggests that past initiatives provide direction for formulating more
effective nonproliferation initiatives. Third, he stresses that future efforts should
avoid using technological or military assumptions and assessments as their basis. Here,
Sokolski emphasizes that analysis based predominantly on such strategic developments falls
short because it fails to include other crucial global trends, which must also be
investigated to help shape

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the political and
practical aspects of nonproliferation initiatives. Specifically, Sokolski contends that
future nonproliferation efforts should discriminate between progressive, growing
democracies and hostile governments, something previous initiatives failed to do.

There is
considerable importance in Sokolskis analysis of these five nonproliferation
efforts. Clearly this is a timely issue. Nonproliferation is a focus of the international
community and it likely will remain so, particularly with the availability of nuclear
material and components and threats from wannabe nuclear states and non-state
actors. Moreover, the shifting international security environment requires recognition of
a multitude of trends in order to comprehensively determine specific future threats and
develop nonproliferation initiatives to help defeat them.

The third book, Russian
Strategic Nuclear Forces, edited by Pavel Podvig, chronicles the Russian nuclear
complex from the development of the first Soviet nuclear weapon up to current disarmament
agreements governed by the START I and II treaties. Based on a similar book published in
Russian in 1988, this book uses only open sources, though most are Russian. It is filled
with large amounts of technical details, such as data about nuclear weapon tests and
production facilities; the status, structure, and operations of nuclear forces; and types,
numbers, and purposes of nuclear weapons and delivery platforms found in each component of
the Russian nuclear triad of rocket, naval, and aviation forces.

Through its
presentation of detailed data the book also reveals considerable information about the
political and bureaucratic structure of the overall military complex, as well as insights
into Soviet political decisionmaking. Moreover, in the books Afterword, additional
information is presented on the structural transition and modernization of Russian nuclear
forces and the political agenda surrounding arms control.

Russian Strategic
Nuclear Forces was published to promote a broader knowledge and understanding of
Russias present nuclear status and situation following the collapse of the Soviet
Union. Certainly this book was a massive undertaking, and it does contribute to an
increased understanding of the development and current status of the Russian nuclear
complex and related politics. Additionally, the structure of the book makes it a
tremendous reference, filled with easy-to-locate information on every aspect of the
Russian nuclear complex.

The potential
destruction from nuclear weapons is enormous. With pressures from a shifting international
security setting, technological advancements, globalization, and increasing competition
for the worlds finite resources, nuclear weapons could well provide a distinct
advantage to an adversary seeking to influence world affairs. Therefore, continuing to
reduce nuclear stockpiles, controlling proliferation, and seeking arms control agreements
remain critical. Each of these books makes a valuable contribution to the enhancement of
nuclear security and cooperation, and all are recommended reading.

In What Kind of Nation: Thomas Jefferson, John Marshall, and the
Epic Struggle to Create a United States, James F. Simon writes interesting history by
showing why the clash between Thomas Jefferson and Chief Justice John Marshall had such a
powerful effect on the direction of our nation. The issue was states rights versus a
strong federal government. Jefferson versus Marshall was one of the most important
confrontations in American history, a point Mr. Simon makes clear by keeping his central
theme in front of the reader.

Thomas Jefferson was
a tough, devious politician who viewed the states as supreme. His competitor, John
Marshall, may have started out in a weaker position but won the long-term battle by
aligning his views with the Constitution. The more one learns about Jefferson, the less
likeable he becomes. He evidently was a man who would not hesitate to slander John Adams
or even George Washington. Indeed, when Washington found out what kind of a man Jefferson
was, he cut off all communications with him.

In contrast, Richard
Brookhiser writes a somewhat more difficult book to read in Americas First
Dynasty: The Adamses, 1735-1918, covering four generations of the Adams family. The
author is clearly intelligent, but his focus is on countless small points at the expense
of the big picture. John Adams was a giant of the founding period and someone who had
great influence on both Jefferson and Marshall. One would not grasp this important fact
from reading Brookhisers book.

Brookhiser could
have more effectively focused on a central overall concept that tied together the lives of
John Adams, John Quincy, Charles Francis, and Henry Adams. The overwhelming link between
these four generations was the character of John Adams as a man, and as a political
thinker and leader. Brookhiser writes: Public service in New England, during the
lifetimes of the Adamses, was not just a job but an essential and moral social task.
Unfortunately, this book fails to link the important points together. It is more a
compilation of isolated and at times puzzling historical facts, leaving the reader more
confused than informed.

For example, it was
difficult for this reviewer to understand Mr. Brookhisers point regarding the prime
theme of the Declaration of Independence versus the Massachusetts Constitution written in
1779 by Adams. All men are born equally free and independent, written by
Adams, is more precise than Jeffersons All men are created equal. The
American goal is for all men and women to be free and independent. Most would
agree with John Adams that all men are created equal but only in the eyes of
God.

The prelude to the
clash between Jefferson and Marshall began with factions. Mr. Jeffersons goal was
not only to beat John Adams in the 1800 presidential election but to destroy the
Federalist Party. The Federalists, starting with George Washington, John Adams, and
Alexander Hamilton, believed that the best way for the United States to prosper was with a
strong federal government. Jefferson distrusted this idea.

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Washington and Adams
kept their eye on what direction the country would take. The founding period meant
everything to them, and this formed the basis of their actions. In contrast, Jefferson
represents the political opportunist who used events to serve his personal goals. He
appears to have been a totally self-centered man who truly believed that winning was
everything. He was so good at it that most Americans still have no idea regarding the dark
side of Jefferson.

Brookhiser writes of
Jefferson and Adams: Politics drove them apart. If Jefferson was to defeat the
unwholesome schemes of Federalism and win office himself, he had to supplant John Adams,
and he did it as coolly as one would put down a dog. Certainly, one would never
expect this kind of behavior from Washington or Adams. That is why they were such great
men, and it says much about John Marshall that he recognized this fact.

Mr. Simon writes
that Jefferson conceded broad power to the federal government only in the sphere of
foreign affairs. Domestically, he believed that the states represented the most
efficacious governmental unit, in large part because they were closest to the
people. Marshall disagreed, but just as important, he never trusted Jefferson.

Consider this: It
was Jefferson and James Madison who made the deal with Alexander Hamilton in June 1790
that allowed the federal government to take over the debts of the states. In exchange,
Hamilton supported moving the capital to the Potomac. This brilliant move by Hamilton
brought power to the central government. It helped the country to establish an economic
system that enabled it to prosper. Washington fortunately supported Hamiltons plan.
Surely Jefferson did not understand until later the full meaning of his deal with
Hamilton. Simon writes that Jefferson later admitted that it was the worst political
decision he ever made, providing Hamilton with the first important victory in his drive to
increase the power of the federal government.

Jefferson did not
hesitate to throw dirt. He even was foolish enough to throw it at George Washington,
something Marshall never forgave Jefferson for doing. In the delicate 1798 X.Y.Z. affair
that almost resulted in war with France, three French intermediaries attempted to bribe
the United States. Jefferson blamed Marshall for what happened. He wrote: . . . and
particularly the X.Y.Z. dish cooked up by Marshall where the swindlers are made to appear
as the French government. Jeffersons problem may have been that he thought
everyone was as dishonest as he was.

Simon outlines
clearly what went wrong in the Adams Administration in the relationship between President
Adams and Vice President Jefferson. For example, the Alien and Sedition Acts became a
burden to Adams, and Jefferson took full advantage of the situation. The fact is the
federal judges were acting improperly by helping the Adams Administration.

Simon writes:
Their blatantly partisan actions in pursuit of convictions under the Sedition Act
reinforced Jeffersons profound distrust of the federal judiciary, a distrust that
would develop into outright hostility after he was elected President. Jefferson
believed the Federalists were consolidating power in the executive and judicial branches
of the federal government at the expense of Congress and the state governments.

When he became
President, Jefferson did not object to selective prosecutions of his political
critics under state seditious libel laws. Simons book includes the activities
and the consequences of Jeffersons dirty dealings using William Duane, Thomas
Cooper, and the notorious James T. Callender, appropriately called scribblers.
It was Callender who wrote an ugly piece, The Prospect Before Us, knocking the
Federalists. Later Callender even turned on Jefferson. In this case Brookhiser hits his
mark by wisely using a quote from Abigail Adams to make his point: When one of
Jeffersons hacks switches

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sides and publishes
the first account of the Sally Hemings story, Abigail wrote her famous friend [Jefferson]
triumphantly, the serpent you cherished and warmed, bit the hand that nourished
him. Abigail knew how to deal with truth, especially when it came to
Jefferson. And she, like Washington, permanently ended her relationship with Jefferson.

Marshall had close
contact with Washington and he admired him greatly. Interestingly, it was Washington who
persuaded Marshall to run for Congress, which started him on the way to his becoming
Secretary of State for President Adams and then Chief Justice in 1801, a position he held
for 34 years. President Adams had made one of the most important judicial appointments in
American history.

How pleasant it is
to read about Marshalls loyalty to Adams. Simon writes: With an unwavering eye
on Adamss re-election chances, Marshall more than any other Federalist member of the
House, assiduously protected the Presidents interests.

Marshall not only
wanted Adams to win the election of 1800, he wanted Jefferson to be defeated. Simon
writes: For Marshall, Jeffersons insult of his mentor and hero [Washington]
was morally indefensible and . . . disqualified him for the presidency.

The fight over the
direction of our country started on 27 January 1801, when Marshall became Chief Justice,
and on 4 March 1801, when Jefferson became President. Jefferson asked the Chief Justice to
administer the oath of office, and Marshall replied with a sting: I shall with much
pleasure attend to administer the oath of office on the 4th & shall make a point of
being punctual. It was clear to both men that, as Mr. Simon writes,
Jeffersons Republican dream was Marshalls nightmare. Marshall
understood that the judiciary had to defend the Constitution especially against the wishes
of Thomas Jefferson. Marshall wrote at the time: Of the importance of the Judiciary
at all times, but more especially the present, I am fully impressed.

When the Supreme
Court made clear in Marbury v. Madison that it would decide what laws are
constitutional, Marshall jumped right over Jefferson. Simon writes: Marshalls
opinion also served notice that the Court, not the President, would be the ultimate judge
of claims of executive privilege, an authority of seismic proportions.

It is interesting
that if Jefferson had stuck to his basic philosophy of government he could not have
completed the Louisiana purchase without a constitutional amendment. He urged his
supporters in Congress to ratify the purchase in silence and with as
little debate as possible, and particularly so far as respects the constitutional
difficulty.

It bothered this
reviewer that Mr. Simon refers to our form of government as a constitutional democracy.
Most scholars and students would define our government instead as a constitutional
republic. James Madison put it this way: Majority rule is tyranny in disguise.
As the brilliant educator and appointed politician John W. Gardner said, Majority
rule does not always define the common good. This is why the delicate separation of
powers in the Constitution is so brilliant.

It is also of
particular interest that in Talbot v. Seeman, Marshall wrote that Congress alone,
based on the Constitution, has the warmaking power. One hopes that Congress and the
President understand this fundamental fact as they consider further military action around
the world.

George Washington
said: The Constitution rests the power of declaring war with Congress; therefore no
offensive expedition of importance can be undertaken until after they have deliberated
upon the subject [and] authorized such a measure. James Madison approvingly wrote:
In no part of the Constitution is more wisdom to be found, than in the clause which
confides the question of war and peace to the legislature, and not to the ex-

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ecutive
department. How Congress could allow every President since Harry Truman to disregard
the Constitution regarding the warmaking power is beyond comprehension.

Considering what
happened to our country on 11 September 2001, we had better make sure that we listen to
what Washington said about threats to our country. Simon writes: Washington
advocated [extreme measures] against those who acknowledge no allegiance to country
and in many cases are sent among us . . . for the express purpose of poisoning the minds
of our people and to sow dissensions among them. Washington also gave us wise
council which is applicable today when, as Brookhiser points out, he said: It is a
maxim founded on the universal experience of mankind that no nation is to be trusted
farther than it is bound by its interest.

The strength of
Simons book is in making the connection between what happened politically to our
country based on the dislike and mistrust between Jefferson and Marshall. He writes:
The distrust between Jefferson and Marshall was palpable; it started in general
terms, in 1798, when each man viewed the other as a leader of political forces the other
believed could devastate the nation. Others believe it started when Marshall was at
Valley Forge while Jefferson fought the Revolutionary War from Monticello.

Simons What
Kind of Nation is a well written and interesting book which deals with an important
part of our founding period. If you want to learn more about John Adams and our early
history, I would recommend: Setting The World Ablaze: Washington, Adams, Jefferson, and
the American Revolution by John Ferling, and John Adams & The Spirit of Liberty
by C. Bradley Thompson.