Thesis: Radicalisation of Immigrants in Europe

According to Eurobarometer research called The European Citizens And the Future of Europe carried out in 2006 by the European Commission, the Europeans are very concerned about

Internal insecurity, partly mixed in the respondents minds with immigration or the difficulty to assimilate immigrants (it is mentioned at this stage in several countries), and also linked to world-wide insecurity (terrorism, rise of integrist groups).

4.Radicalisation and its underlying reasons
4.1 Profile of a radicalised person
4.2 Internet as a means of radicalisation
4.2.1 Conversion to Islam on the Internet
4.2.2 Radicalisation on the Internet
4.3 Radicalisation in mosques
4.4 Radicalisation through the strength of Islamic authoritiesŽ fatwas

According to Eurobarometer research called The European Citizens And the Future of Europe carried out in 2006 by the European Commission, the Europeans are very concerned about

Internal insecurity, partly mixed in the respondents minds with immigration or the difficulty to assimilate immigrants (it is mentioned at this stage in several countries), and also linked to world-wide insecurity (terrorism, rise of integrist groups).

In a number of countries, the increasing sense of insecurity is linked to problems vis-à-vis immigration and the integration of immigrants; this is just as clear in Member States where immigration is a long-standing phenomenon, such as the Netherlands, as in those countries where it is a recent phenomenon, such as Italy, Spain, Ireland and Cyprus. It is expressed alongside the idea that illegal immigrants destined to live on the margins of society are logically inclined to look for ways of survival in trafficking and illegal activities, that immigrants, whether legal or otherwise, have the effect of providing competition on the job market to the detriment of the employment of natives whilst facilitating a decrease in salary levels, and that persons from very different cultures are difficult to assimilate.

International terrorism, mainly perceived as Islamic in nature, is mentioned as a general threat (in particular in the Netherlands, Italy, Spain, the United Kingdom, Denmark, Sweden, Austria, Malta, Slovenia, Poland, Latvia, etc.): this is a threat that is more or less strongly felt, or is put in perspective by the idea that their own country is less in the line of fire than others, or is more generally perceived as having an effect on global peace and stability.

Beyond these perceived failures that are likely to undermine the Community project in its essence, a series of criticisms are seen, more or less contingent  perverse effects or state of incompletion  and more or less broadly and intensely shared by groups and countries:

There is a lack of control over illegal immigration, which creates, for many, un afflux de migrants harmful for employment and social expenditure in the host states. In addition, especially, immigration is often associated with a rise in crime and illegal trafficking. It is the flip side of the coin to the opening of borders, even though immigration is, as a rule, usually welcome.

In the general climate of insecurity experienced, the European Union is credited with a certain number of appreciated actions:

* Reinforced cooperation between police forces in Member States, the creation of Europol (cited quite frequently).

* The systematisation of the exchange of files, information.

* The improvement of extradition agreements (easier, quicker).

* Common actions against terrorism.

EU citizens ask for the reinforcement of existing or initiated structures and actions:

* Working on further adaptability, creating emergency intervention forces (in the event of disasters, for example).

* Creating a European intelligence agency (rarely mentioned).

In the times of struggle for energy supplies, rise of new global actors and nuclear powers, the EU seeks to ensure its security.

The EU, as a global actor, is very competitive in the economic sphere, and also is the most generous global donor of help to developing countries. Nonetheless, it is still considered to be a soft power because the building up of a very strong military capabilities has still been under construction.

It was only in St. Malo in 1998, when the Great Britain and France agreed on main principles of forming a European military force. The EU Member States decided then to agree on giving the EU a capacity to deal with international crisis. The first EU military operation was held in Bosnia in January 2003, followed by the second mission in Kosovo in Spring 2003. From that time on, the EU has managed a number of high profile missions through the ESDP mechanism.1

Immigration is a double-sided phenomenon. On one hand, most of the EUŽs total population growth is due to net migration. Indeed, without immigration, the population of Germany, Greece and Italy would have fallen in 2003. Immigration brings much needed young people into the EU workforce. 2 The EU needs 700,000 extra people a year because of pan-European demographics. 3

On the other hand, it brings numerous new aspects to the European space which can sometimes represent a threat. The Europeans are being influenced and shaped by them, and as long as they are peaceful, they are very welcome as enriching and stimulating for our own growth and competitive strength.

The EU has accepted about 20 to 25 million legal immigrants. With the overall EU population of almost 500 million inhabitants after the accession of Bulgaria and Romania, the percentage of immigrants is rather small, and amounts just to about 5 per cent. Nevertheless, if we take into account illegal migrants and their ethnic, cultural and religious origin, we can see that the most problematic group can be detected as people who practise Islam.

Not only they come from the Islamic world that has difficulties to leave the area of the Third World, but their faith contains elements which are not compatible with the European freedoms and the rule of law. They respect their own religious law and also put the EU citizens under the threat of terrorism.

Europe is no stranger to some kind of terrorism in its past, such as ETA or IRA attacks, but these are mostly of local nature. Islamic terrorism becomes a pan-European acute problem because Muslim minorities are both growing in the EU-15 and gaining positions in the EU-12 countries.

The EU is developing a common approach to tackle home-grown terrorism and to utilize best practices to integrate immigrants into the society. It faces a hard decision: to be strong and impose the hardest measures on anyone who does not respect the European laws, and, as a result, to risk riots and conflicts with the growing Muslim community, or to be soft and let them misuse our human rights for inciting hatred, and, in the worst case, introducing their violent laws in our countries.
Does Europe need immigrants at any cost?

Paradoxically, the EU is imposing democracy elsewhere, but limiting it inside itself.

The EU is built on European values, identical to the ones of the ancient Greece, Rome, Christianity, Enlightenment and Rationalism. Are Islamic values compatible with ours?

Immigrants from Muslim countries are definitely desperately looking for decent life conditions.

But at the same time, at the end of 2007, the conflict we call the War on Terror still continues, and there are indications that its battlefields are expected to spread further, and escalate, in the upcoming years.4

Whether we notice it or not, the infiltration of Islam in the West is so deep that the extremists intend to replace our constitutions by the Qur'an. Hardcore followers of Islam are not trying to be part of the European way of life and of our culture. On the contrary, Islamic thinkers are loyal to Allah, not to the European society. They are using their right of freedom of speech and say that it is our own mistake that we allow it.

Although the UK Muslims condemned the 2001 attacks, they later celebrated the Magnificent 19 - highjackers. Yasir Arafat was known for his double agenda: condemning terrorist attacks, but supporting them in the background.

Many young Muslims are sent abroad to commit an attack. They get training, food and clothing to kill the British. The British are in war (in Iraq) against their brothers, so they have to revenge them.

They are not outside our borders, they are more and more in our countries and form a large and growing minority, minority which is radical and rejecting the society. They use our law, democracy, territory and resources against us.

The Magnificent 19 came to the USA and learnt to fly in order to destroy the World Trade Center (symbol of Rothschild brothers) with a jet plane. They only wanted to learn how to take the plane off, but interestingly, they were not interested in how to land it.

It seems to be a transnational war with transnational players in many states, not controlled in any way. They infiltrate the states and influence them. It seems to be a small problem, but they have already created a global network, so the problem can be considered a global one, too.

Islamism, which is sometimes compared to totalitarian ideologies of Fascism or Communism, grows in 55 countries around the world. Islam is said to be superior to the religions of Jews, Christians, Buddhists and Hinduists, and no non-believer is innocent. It is possible that they want to destroy democracy and western civilisation, as they were told by Allah to spread their religion, until the world is unified under Islam.

Although at the World Islamic Economic Forum held in Kuala Lumpur in May 2007, the Islamic world has admitted that it is in crisis.5

The Malaysian Prime Minister said: "On every major indicator of development, the Muslim ummah (community) today is in critical state. While the O.I.C. nations account for 21 per cent of the global population in 2005, they make up only 5 per cent of global GDP. Although the majority of OPEC members are O.I.C., fifty per cent of the population of Islamic countries live on less than two U.S dollars a day. Many Muslims around the world are trapped in a vicious circle of poverty, illiteracy, malnutrition and disease."

If the Muslim countries do not invest more into education and research and do not promote intellectual freedom, they will be doomed to fall back after the West and East Asia. These critiques were spoken out by representatives of Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates and Indonesia.

They still have some hope turning to the past, when between 9th and 13 centuries, their mathematics, astronomy, botanics, philosophy and other disciplines were superior, compared to the European knowledge of that time.

The lever of literacy in the Islamic countries is not too high (Egypt 58%, Morocco 53%, Iraq 74%, Iran 79%, Saudi Arabia 79%, Pakistan 48%, Afghanistan 36%, Indonesia 90%). Universities are not well-equipped, and teaching materials sometimes have to comply with ideological needs of the ruling regimes.

Gender inequality is generally recognized as one of the main obstacles to development in the Arab Region. This volume of Arab Human Development Report 2005 focuses on the history and contemporary dynamics of Arab women's economic, political, and social empowerment. It details the processes in which gender impacts on Arab development, while suggesting means of overcoming some of the challenges and building more equitable societies.6

2. Immigration worldwide and in Europe

Although human migration has existed for hundreds of thousands of years, immigration in the modern sense refers to movement of people from one nation-state to another, where they are not citizens. Immigration implies long-term permanent residence by the immigrants: tourists and short-term visitors are not considered immigrants. However, seasonal labour migration (typically for periods of less than a year) is often treated as a form of immigration. The global volume of immigration is high in absolute terms, but low in relative terms. The UN estimated 190 million international migrants in 2005, about 3% of global population. The other 97% still live in the state in which they were born, or its successor state. 7

The modern idea of immigration is related to the development, especially in the 19th century, of nation-states with clear citizenship criteria, passports, permanent border controls, and nationality law. Citizenship of a nation-state confers an inalienable right of residence in that state, but residence of immigrants is subject to conditions set by immigration law. The nation-state made immigration a political issue: by definition it is the homeland of a nation defined by shared ethnicity and/or culture, and in most cases immigrants have a different ethnicity and culture. This has led to social tensions, xenophobia, and conflicts about national identity, in many developed countries.

2.1 Global migration statistics

Migration statistics refer to people who have themselves moved from one country to another, i.e. 'first-generation' immigrants. In non-official usage, terms such as 'immigrant' or 'foreigner' are often used for ethnic minorities of immigrant descent, regardless of their place of birth or citizenship.

Special Report on Immigration, the Economist, 5 January 2008

According to the Report of the Secretary-General on International migration and development, most international migrants are in the high-income developed countries, 91 million in 2005. Low and lower-middle income countries have 51 million international migrants. Migration flows are not solely from poor to rich countries, however: about a third of international migrants move from one developing country to another. The absolute number of international migrants is the highest in the United States, 39 million. The highest percentages of migrants in the labour force are found in the Gulf States, 90 percent in the United Arab Emirates, 86 percent in Qatar, 82 percent in Kuwait, 64 percent in Oman. In Europe, only Luxembourg approaches this level, with 45 percent of the labour force foreign.

The European Union allows labour migration between member states (with restrictions on the new member states), but inter-EU migration is relatively low. According to Eurostat, Luxembourg, seat of many European institutions, has the highest percentage of non-nationals (39%). Non-national does not always correspond to 'immigrant': Latvia (22% non-national) and Estonia (20%) have large non-citizen minorities of ex-Soviet citizens. Including these minorities, 5.5% of the total population of the EU was non-national.

2.2 Factors of migration

Theories of migration traditionally distinguish between push factors and pull factors. Push factors refer primarily to the motive for emigration from the country of origin. In the case of economic migration (usually labour migration), differentials in wage rates are prominent. Poor individuals from less developed countries can have far higher standards of living in developed countries than in their originating countries. Escape from poverty is a traditional push factor, the availability of jobs is the related pull factor. The migrants may wish to send remittances to their family. Natural disasters can amplify poverty-driven migration flows. This kind of migration may be illegal immigration in the destination country (emigration is also illegal in some countries, such as North Korea).

Emigration and immigration are sometimes mandatory in a contract of employment: religious missionaries, and employees of multinational corporations, international non-governmental organisations and the diplomatic service can expect to work 'overseas'. They are often referred to as 'expatriates', and their conditions of employment are typically equal to or better than those applying in the host country (for similar work).

For some migrants, education is the primary pull factor (note that students on limited visas are often not defined as immigrants). Retirement migration from rich countries to lower-cost countries with better climate, is a new type of international migration. An example is immigration of retired British citizens to Spain. Some immigrants justify their drive to be in a different country for cultural or health related reasons, while young people from developed countries choose to migrate as a form of self expression towards the establishment or to satisfy their need to perceive directly other cultural environments.

Some cases of migration is for personal reasons, based on a relationship (e.g. to be with family or a loved one). Sometimes, an individual may wish to emigrate to a new country, in a form of transferred patriotism. Evasion of criminal justice (e.g. avoiding arrest) is a (mostly negative) personal motivation. This type of emigration and immigration is not normally legal, if a crime is internationally recognized, although criminals may disguise their identities or find other loopholes to evade detection.

2.3 Reactions to immigration

Immigration is a politicized issue, and in some countries it is a major political issue. Opposition to immigration is generally far more prominent than support for it, but that is to some extent countered by economic interests.

The two main arguments cited in support of immigration are economic arguments, usually related to labour supply, and cultural arguments appealing to the value of cultural diversity. The four main anti-immigration themes are common xenophobia, economic issues (costs of immigration, and competition in the labour market), environmental issues (impact of population growth), and (especially in Europe) the impact on the national identity and the nature of the nation-state itself.

More limited support for increased labour migration comes from economists and some business interests in the developed world. While multinational corporations require free movement of senior staff, they are still not necessarily the main users of immigrant labour. Medium and small businesses (restaurants, farms) may be the most dependent on low-wage labour. In specific sectors, there is a business lobby for immigration, usually in the form of green card systems, intended to facilitate specific and limited labour flows.

This kind of immigration is opposed by labour-market protectionists, often arguing from the standpoint of economic nationalism. The core of their arguments is that one nation's jobs are the property of that particular nation, and that allowing foreigners to take them is equivalent to a loss of that property. They may also criticise immigration of this type as a form of corporate welfare, where business is indirectly subsidised by government expenditure to promote the immigration. A more common criticism is that the immigrant employees are almost always paid less than a non-immigrant worker in the same job, and that the immigration depresses wages - typically, immigrants are not unionised. For some, that is the reason to limit immigration. Other groups feel that the focus should be not on immigration control, but on equal rights for the immigrants, to avoid their exploitation.

Non-economic opposition to immigration is closely associated with nationalism, as in Europe, a nationalist party is almost a synonym for an anti-immigration party. Although, traditionally, economic arguments dominated the United States immigration debate, it has become more polarized in recent years, as evidenced by nationalist demands for the militarization of the US borders. The emergence of private border militias in the United States has attracted much media attention. Nevertheless, the southern border of the European Union in the Spanish exclaves of Ceuta and Melilla is at least as militarised as the US-Mexico border.

The primary argument of the nationalist opponents in Europe is that immigrants simply do not belong in a nation-state which is by definition intended for another ethnic group. Britain, in this view, is for the British, Germany is for the Germans, and so on. Immigration is seen as altering the composition of the national population, and consequently the national identity. From the nationalist perspective, high-volume immigration simply destroys his country. Some of the support for this nationalist opposition comes from xenophobes who instinctively fear the presence of foreigners, but it is also consistent with the nationalist ideology. Germany was indeed intended as a state for Germans: mass immigration was not foreseen by the 19th-century nationalist movements. Immigration has forced Germany and other western European states to re-examine their national identity: part of the population is not prepared to redefine it to include immigrants. It is this type of opposition to immigration which generated support for anti-immigration parties such as Vlaams Belang in Belgium, the British National Party in Britain, the Liga Nord in Italy, the Front National in France, and the Lijst Pim Fortuyn in the Netherlands.

One of the responses of nation-states to mass immigration is to promote the cultural assimilation of immigrants into the national community, and their integration into the political, social, and economic structures. In the United States, cultural assimilation is traditionally seen as a process taking place among minorities themselves, the melting pot. In Europe, where nation-states have a tradition of national unification by cultural and linguistic policies, variants of these policies have been proposed to accelerate the assimilation of immigrants. The introduction of citizenship tests for immigrants is the most visible form of state-enforced assimilation. The test usually include some form of language exam, and some countries have reintroduced forms of language prohibition. The Netherlands' immigration minister, Rita Verdonk, suggested a nationwide ban on the speaking of non-Dutch languages in public, but withdrew the proposal after protests.

The political debate about immigration is now a feature of most developed countries. Some countries such as Italy, and especially the Republic of Ireland and Spain, have shifted within a generation, from traditional labour emigration, to mass immigration, and this has become a political issue.

2.4 Situation in Europe

Some European countries, such as the United Kingdom and Germany, have seen major immigration since the 1950s, and immigration has already been a political issue, for decades. Political debates about immigration typically focus on statistics, immigration law and policy, and the implementation of existing restrictions. In some European countries the debate in the 1990s was focussed on asylum seekers, but restrictive policies within the European Union have sharply reduced asylum seekers. In western Europe, the debate now focuses on immigration from the new member states of the EU, especially from Poland.

The politics of immigration have become increasingly associated with others issues, such as national security, terrorism, and in western Europe especially, with the presence of Islam as a new major religion. Some right-wing parties see an unassimilated, economically deprived, and generally hostile immigrant population as a threat to national stability. They fear new events such as the 2005 civil unrest in France. They point to the Jyllands-Posten Muhammad cartoons controversy as an example of the value conflicts arising from immigration of Muslims in Western Europe. Because of all these associations, immigration has become an emotional political issue in many European countries.

Although freedom of movement is often recognised as a civil right, the freedom applies to movement within national borders: it may be guaranteed by the constitution, or by human rights legislation. Additionally, this freedom is often limited to citizens and excludes others. No state currently allows full freedom of movement across its borders, and international human rights treaties do not confer a general right to enter another state. According to Article 13 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, citizens may not be forbidden to leave their country. There is no similar provision regarding entry of non-citizens. Those who reject this distinction on ethical grounds, argue that the freedom of movement both within and between countries is a basic human right, and that the restrictive immigration policies, typical of nation-states, violate this human right of freedom of movement. Notably, a right to freedom of entry would not, in itself, guarantee immigrants a job, housing, health care, or citizenship.
2.5 Kinds of immigration policies

Where immigration is permitted, it is typically selective. Ethnic selection, such as the White Australia policy, has generally disappeared, but priority is usually given to the educated, skilled, and wealthy. Less privileged individuals, including the mass of poor people in low-income countries, can not avail of these immigration opportunities. This inequality has also been criticised as conflicting with the principle of equal opportunities, which apply (at least in theory) within democratic nation-states. The fact that the door is closed for the unskilled, while at the same many developed countries have a huge demand for unskilled labour, is a major factor in illegal immigration. The contradictory nature of this policy - which specifically disadvantages the unskilled immigrants while exploiting their labour - has also been criticised on ethical grounds.

Immigration polices, which selectively grant freedom of movement, to targeted individuals, are intended to produce a net economic gain for the host country. They can also mean net loss for a poor donor country through the loss of the educated minority -the brain drain. This can exacerbate the global inequality in standards of living, that provided the motivation for the individual to migrate in the first place. An example of the competition for skilled labour is active recruitment of health workers by First World countries, from the Third World.

The movement of people also helps the rich world. Prosperous countries with greying workforces rely ever more on young foreigners. Indeed, advanced economies compete vigorously for outsiders' skills. Around a third of the Americans who won Nobel prizes in physics in the past seven years were born abroad. About 40% of the holders of PhD in science and engineering working in America are immigrants. Around a third of Silicon Valley companies was started by Indians and Chinese. The low-skilled workers are needed too, especially in farming, services and care for children and the elderly. It is no coincidence that countries that welcome immigrantssuch as Sweden, Ireland, America and Britainhave better economic records than those that shun them. 8

3. Radicalisation of certain immigrant groups worldwide and in Europe

In society and politics, radicalization (or, in the UK, radicalisation) refers to a change in the social and political attitudes, views, and associations of individual dissidents and protest groups, in a direction that is claimed or perceived to be "radicalism" and "extremism" (violent protest).

The term "radicalisation" refers to the process by which once passive or otherwise non-violent activists and protesters become militant and thereby use or advocate violence as a means to attain political goals. While such change may be indiscernible within individuals, the term is usually made in reference to political dissident groups, who over time have lost hope in other means for expression and protest, and overtly state their hostile intentions.

Radicalization itself is often the direct result of violence, where the "radicals" themselves have typically been the target and victim of violence and persecution. Otherwise individuals may feel empathy or sympathy with others who have been victimized by an oppressor where such sympathy is often based in personal, ethic, or nationalist association or familiarity. Though radicalization is universally associated with an ideology typically one based in political causes it is less common for radicalism to emerge based on ideology alone, and personal factors often have a strong role. The goals of radicalization may be to gain political recognition, change, or to enact a retribution for previous injustices.

Where a society has been attacked and violated, religion and related ideologies naturally become the nexus of community and social strength and unity. This emphasis on religion is a variable, as determined by other social factors such as class, poverty, literacy, and (controversially) culture, as well as the particular aspects of religion which are cited as guiding in terms of ideology, philosophy, and behaviour.

Surprisingly, none of the radicals are Methodists, or Hindus, Unitarians, Catholics, or Buddhists. And yet, there are plenty of Methodists, Hindus, Unitarians, Catholics, Buddhists, and others who are either bored, feeling stuck in a rut in life, or who feel a need to seek out and serve a higher purpose than material success or the well-worn routine of their possibly quite comfortable existence.

3.1 Islam, Islamism and Islamic Terrorism

The most notable form of radicalism in the world is Islamism, as currently known for its outward manifestations of violence ("terrorism")what some "Islamists" claim to be simple retribution and self-defence. Notable historians characterise the 20th century history of Western (Anglo-American) military influence in the Middle East as imperialist and oppressive toward the region's inhabitants. As the natural consequence of violence is to inflame "radical" sentiment in the Muslim world, lacking any overriding secular ideology (such as Arab nationalism) the locus for
community strength and activism is the native religion.

In a broader historical context, some have claimed that current violence in the Middle East is traceable to much older ethnic divisions and conflicts, including the European repulsion of the Ottoman Empire, the Reconquista, the Crusades, and beyond. In this regard, some advocates of the "Clash of Civilizations" view have claimed that radicalization is intrinsic to Islam, rather than a product of the aggression of Western Empires. Others state disagreement, claiming that the particular religion is irrelevant what matters is that the pain and loss that come with death and various other personal violations and degradations have a natural human response.9

One of the reasons why we have such difficulty in responding to issues related to Islam is that we find it hard to distinguish between Islam' (the whole system of beliefs and the way of life of 1.3 billion Muslims), Islamism' (Islamic Fundamentalism  sometimes called Revivalist, Radical, Activist or Political Islam), and Islamic terrorism' (terrorism carried out by Muslims in the name of Islam). As a result of the failure to make these distinctions, many suggest, for example, that terrorism carried out by Muslims is a natural expression of Islamic beliefs. 10

3.2 Islamic Fundamentalism

In religion, politics, etc: strict adherence to the traditional teachings of a particular religion or political doctrine. The term dates from the 1920s and was originally used of the conservative US Protestant movement, which was characterised by a literal interpretation of the Bible. It was revived to describe conservative Christian and Islamic movements in the late 20th century. 11

The word was applied to Islam for the first time when the Iranian revolution was taking place in the late seventies. Islamic fundamentalism, here, means religious rigidity, militancy and extremism; as well as the use of Islam for political ends rather than for spiritual and moral development.(Thus, it is more than merely a dogmatic approach to moral and spiritual questions.)

As a result, modern globalisation encompasses connectivity, connectivity with different parts of the globe. It may be truly said that, today, all parts of the world are connected as never before. Nothing remains confined to a region or a country. Any major event has a global impact.

Thanks to this connectivity, every Muslim knows the West, in general, and the U.S.A., in particular, is far more powerful than the Islamic lands. Globalisation only leads to the promotion of fundamentalism if other factors are present. It is necessary to discuss these factors in order to understand the relationship between globalisation and Islamic (and other) fundamentalism.

The reason why there is so much discussion of Islamic fundamentalism is the traditional self-understanding of Islam as an ascendant religion that would spread over the whole world. The former American imperative of Manifest Destiny is a pale reflection of the inevitability many, but certainly not all, Muslims feel about the spread of the "Dar al-Islam" in the world.

The "Dar al-Islam" literally translates as the "House of Peace" and implies the eventual conquering and conversion to Islam of the entire planet, without room for compromise.
All other "nations" and religions are within the "Dar al-Harb", literally the "House of the Sword". No permanent peace can exist between the two houses.

To understand the relationship between globalisation and Islamic fundamentalism we have to introduce another factor which is political, in particular the politics of oil in the Middle East.

In Islam, politics and religion are inextricable, and its followers possess an acute knowledge of their own history dating back to the Prophet Mohammed. For Muslims, historyeven ancient historyis just as important (if not more important) as the present.

A preoccupation with a loss of the status and power which the lands of Islam once enjoyed, a worldview looking to blame outsiders rather than looking inward for critical self-examination, and a lack of democratic tradition, continue to radicalise the Muslim world. Muslims remember that the lands of Islam once stretched from India, across Central Asia, the Middle East, North Africa, and southern Italy, to Iberia and the Pyrenees. Extremists want to see those lost lands back under the rule of Islam.

Islam's first real success in European conquests came in 711, when Muslim forces invaded the Iberian peninsula in what the conquerors named Al-Andalus and which included what is now Spain and Portugal. Muslim forces also pushed into southern France but were turned back at the Battle of Tours in 732.

In the 9th century Muslim forces conquered several bases in southern France, from where they pushed into what is now Switzerland in various excursions. Sicily and parts of southern Italy were conquered by the Arabs in 827 and held until the 11th century. Muslim rule in Al-Andalus endured until 1492; the last Muslims were expelled from Spain by 1614. Al-Andalus, reaching at times up until the north of the Iberian peninsula, has been estimated to have had a Muslim majority from the 10th century.

If we consider the Arabic phrase, "inshallah" (whatever Allah wills) Muslim frustration is intense, for, if Allah is omnipotent, and the West is, clearly, today far more powerful than the Islamic lands, then What Went Wrong?12 indeed.

To better understand the hostilities rooted in historyone could start with recognising the long-standing resentment Muslims harbour from having their lands torn apart and re-packaged into political states by occupying Europeans (Westerners). Or go back further to the brutality of the Crusades. Or go straight to the U.S. political meddling in the region (e.g. Iran) throughout the latter 20th century.

Professor Bernard Lewis explores, in The Crisis of Islam, the extent of the chasm between Islam and all modernisation everywhere, including in Islamic lands themselves. The dominant branch of Islam in Saudi Arabia is Wahhabism, named after its founder, Muhammad ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab, an 18th century Arab theologian who preached a return to the "pure and authentic Islam" of Mohammed in response to the shrinking of Islamic influence and the extension of European power into the lands of Islam. Al-Wahhabis cause was taken up by the still-ruling Saudi family, and Mecca and Medina were "cleansed" militarily of all that Wahhabi disapproved.

Later, in 1933, the Saudis officially brought aboard the Americans in the form of Standard Oil of California, so the link between Wahhabi fervour, oil, enormous Saudi wealth and the West, in particular the USA, was forged. In one of the books most fascinating passages, Lewis outlines how certain strands of German philosophy contributed to the rise of Islamist anti-Americanism: In this perception, America was the ultimate example of civilization without culture; rich and comfortable, materially advanced but soulless and artificial; technologically complex but without the spirituality and vitality of the rooted, human, national cultures of the Germans and other authentic peoples.

This philosophy became very popular among the Arab intelligentsia. The U.S.'s increased presence in the region since the Cold War has been construed as renewed imperialism.

Today, the Saudis are seen by their own people as tyrants kept in power because of the Great Satan, Americas, support.

Thus we see the source of religious discontent with the West and modernisation among Saudis, who first saw their underground wealth being brought to the surface by the then US-controlled Aramco (Arabian American Oil Company), Saudi Aramco, now nationalised. This is the stuff of intense frustration, even neurosis. From this we can understand why the largest number of terrorists on the four hijacked airplanes on September 11, 2001, were from Saudi Arabia.

Lewis notes that the American way of lifeespecially that of fulfilment through material gain and sexual freedomis a direct threat to Islamic values (which is why night clubsplaces where men and women publicly touch one anotherare targets of bombings).

But it is basic Western democracy that especially threatens Islamic extremists, notes Lewis, because within its own community more and more Muslims are coming to value the freedom that political democracy allows.

A further problem is that, due to the poverty of many Muslims around the world their only access to any education is via Wahhabi supported schools and mosques. Lewis points out that the analogy breaks down in that there is a good educational system in the West, but there is not a good educational system in many Muslim lands, so the Wahhabist point of view is taught widely, particularly in Saudi Arabia; but also elsewhere, even in some Islamic centres in Europe and the USA.

Lewis then explores the deepening crisis of Islam in the Wahhabist devotion to pure Islam on the one hand and the distinctly un-Islamic acts of suicide and slaughter of innocents and Muslims so common today. If one is going to preach the purity of the early days of Islam and yet so thoroughly revise the teachings as to allow suicide bombings and more to be widely used, a reason has to be found and that reason is... that it is all the fault of the West.
The West, especially the United States is seen as primarily a force for temptation and corruption.

An important factor in any solution is democracy, which empowers people. Unfortunately, in developing countries, where there is so much poverty and backwardness, it often empowers unevenly. Typically, one community or caste or tribe grabs a much greater share in political power or economic development than another community, caste or tribe. Both then mobilise their fellow community, caste or tribe people  one to retain the privileges and the other to obtain them by using religious, caste or tribal identity.

This mobilisation on the basis of religious, caste or tribal identities leads to extremism depending on the political, economic and social situation. This fundamentalism is further fuelled by globalisation as members of the community settled abroad, and comparatively more prosperous, finance leaders of these communities. The growth of Hindu fundamentalism in India and Islamic fundamentalism in Pakistan can be partly explained in this light.

It should also be noted that fundamentalism often grows more in educated middle classes. These middle classes then mobilise poorer members of their community by invoking religion and displaying religious extremism. The more the money from abroad the greater the rigidity and extremism, and the more rigidity and extremism the more the money flows in from abroad.

The jihadis (those who use the Islamic term, jihad) have a clear political agenda. Jihad literally means to "struggle in the way of God" and is sometimes referred to as the sixth pillar of Islam, although it occupies no official status as such in Sunni Islam. In Twelver Shi'a Islam, however, Jihad (Holy Struggle) is one of the 10 Practices of the Religion. Those who see in Islam a great opportunity to gain power invoke the Islamic concept of jihad and practice a most sectarian, extremist kind of Islam.

Ironically, America is partly responsible for creating fundamentalist Islam. In order to bring down the Soviet Russian-supported regime in Afghanistan the U.S.A. supported the training of thousands of Muslims to fight the Soviet army in that country, called mujaheddins, (a laudatory Islamic term which means those who fight bravely). Osama bin Laden is also a creation of the CIA in that he, too, was used in Afghanistan to fight the Soviet forces. Islamic extremism was, thus, deliberately cultivated among the Afghans, Pakistanis and other Muslims who fought the Soviets and their Afghan allies in Afghanistan. However, once Soviet forces withdrew from Afghanistan and the Soviet Union collapsed the USA dropped the mujaheddins.

But these fighters, having defeated Soviet Russia, now decided to fight the Great Satan, America, for supporting the Saudi monarchy and maintaining foreign troops in Saudi Arabia on the one hand, and supporting the Little Satan, Israel, on the other. More recently, their leaders have accused America of attacking and occupying Iraq to serve its own interests in the region. Thus, these jihadi groups are also the products of the struggle for political power in the region.

The greater the power of the military the more Islamic fundamentalism is promoted and, if democratic rule comes, the military, in collaboration with some militant mullahs, intensifies fundamentalism to frustrate the democratic aspirations of the people.

Worse still, the democratic process is seen by some Muslims merely as a tool to achieve power legitimately, then subverted by a method Lewis calls amusingly the "One man (only men), one vote, one time" method. Thus democracy by itself is no remedy for fundamentalism unless other factors like justice and morality become integral parts of it. Social, political and economic justice is, thus, essential for fighting religious fundamentalism.

Yet, most Muslim societies have highly unjust and distorted power structures with high rates of poverty and unemployment. They are, thus, ideal breeding grounds for the religious fundamentalism promoted by their unelected rulers.

If the leaders of Al-Qaida can persuade the world of Islam to accept their views and their leadership, then a long and bitter struggle lies ahead, and not only for America.

 "The Crisis of Islam: Holy War and Unholy Terror, P. 140.13
Europe, more particularly Western Europe, is now home to a large and rapidly growing Muslim community, and many Europeans are beginning to see its presence as a problem, for some even a threat.

 "The Crisis of Islam: Holy War and Unholy Terror, P. 140.
Sheik Omar [regaled] his young followers with the erotic delights of paradise  sweet kisses and the pleasures of bathing with scores of women  while he also preached the virtues of death in Islamic struggle as a ticket to paradise.

 Militants in Europe Openly Call for Jihad and the Rule of Islam.
http://www.nytimes.com/2004/04/26/international/europe/26EURO.html
"All Muslims of the West will be obliged" to "become his sword" in a new battle. Europeans take heed, he added, saying, "It is foolish to fight people who want death  that is what they are looking for.".

 Militants in Europe Openly Call for Jihad and the Rule of Islam.
http://www.nytimes.com/2004/04/26/international/europe/26EURO.html
He spoke of terrorism as the new norm of cultural conflict. At a mosque in Geneva, an imam exhorted his followers to "impose the will of Islam on the godless society of the West".

 Militants in Europe Openly Call for Jihad and the Rule of Islam.
http://www.nytimes.com/2004/04/26/international/europe/26EURO.html
"Our Muslim brothers from abroad will come one day and conquer here and then we will live under Islam in dignity," he said.

 Militants in Europe Openly Call for Jihad and the Rule of Islam.
http://www.nytimes.com/2004/04/26/international/europe/26EURO.html

3.3 The Muslim Brotherhood "Project" 14

One might be led to think that if international law enforcement authorities and Western intelligence agencies had discovered a twenty-year old document revealing a top-secret plan developed by the oldest Islamist organization with one of the most extensive terror networks in the world to launch a program of cultural invasion and eventual conquest of the West that virtually mirrors the tactics used by Islamists for more than two decades, that such news would scream from headlines published on the front pages and above the fold of the New York Times, Washington Post, London Times, Le Monde, Bild, and La Repubblica.

In fact, such a document was recovered in a raid by Swiss authorities in November 2001, two months after the horror of 9/11. Since that time information about this document, known in counterterrorism circles as The Project, and discussion regarding its content has been limited to the top-secret world of Western intelligence communities. Only through the work of an intrepid Swiss journalist, Sylvain Besson of Le Temps, and his book published in October 2005 in France, La conquête de l'Occident: Le projet secret des Islamistes (The Conquest of the West: The Islamists' Secret Project), has information regarding The Project finally been made public. One Western official cited by Besson has described The Project as a totalitarian ideology of infiltration which represents, in the end, the greatest danger for European societies.

What Western intelligence authorities know about The Project begins with the raid of a luxurious villa in Campione, Switzerland on November 7, 2001. The target of the raid was Youssef Nada, director of the Al-Taqwa Bank of Lugano, who has had active association with the Muslim Brotherhood for more than 50 years and who admitted to being one of the organizations international leaders. The Muslim Brotherhood, regarded as the oldest and one of the most important Islamist movements in the world, was founded by Hasan al-Banna in 1928 and dedicated to the credo, Allah is our objective. The Prophet is our leader. Quran is our law. Jihad is our way. Dying in the way of Allah is our highest hope.

The raid was conducted by Swiss law enforcement at the request of the White House in the initial crackdown on terrorist finances in the immediate aftermath of 9/11. US and Swiss investigators had been looking at Al-Taqwas involvement in money laundering and funding a wide range of Islamic terrorist groups, including Al Qaeda, HAMAS (the Palestinian affiliate of the Muslim Brotherhood), the Algerian GIA, and the Tunisian Ennahdah.

Included in the documents seized during the raid of Nadas Swiss villa was a 14-page plan written in Arabic and dated December 1, 1982, which outlines a 12-point strategy to establish an Islamic government on earth  identified as The Project. According to testimony given to Swiss authorities by Nada, the unsigned document was prepared by Islamic researchers associated with the Muslim Brotherhood.

What makes The Project so different from the standard Death of America! Death to Israel! and Establish the global caliphate! Islamist rhetoric is that it represents a flexible, multi-phased, long-term approach to the cultural invasion of the West. Calling for the utilization of various tactics, ranging from immigration, infiltration, surveillance, propaganda, protest, deception, political legitimacy and terrorism, The Project has served for more than two decades as the Muslim Brotherhood master plan. As can be seen in a number of examples throughout Europe  including the political recognition of parallel Islamist government organizations in Sweden, the recent cartoon jihad in Denmark, the Parisian car-burning intifada last November, and the 7/7 terrorist attacks in London  the plan outlined in The Project has been overwhelmingly successful.

Rather than focusing on terrorism as the sole method of group action, as is the case with Al Qaeda, in perfect post-modern fashion the use of terror falls into a multiplicity of options available to progressively infiltrate, confront, and eventually establish Islamic domination over the West. The following tactics and techniques are among the many recommendations made in The Project:

* Networking and coordinating actions between likeminded Islamist organizations;
* Avoiding open alliances with known terrorist organizations and individuals to maintain the appearance of moderation;
* Infiltrating and taking over existing Muslim organizations to realign them towards the Muslim Brotherhoods collective goals;
* Using deception to mask the intended goals of Islamist actions, as long as it doesnt conflict with sharia law;
* Avoiding social conflicts with Westerners locally, nationally or globally, that might damage the long-term ability to expand the Islamist powerbase in the West or provoke a lash back against Muslims;
* Establishing financial networks to fund the work of conversion of the West, including the support of full-time administrators and workers;
* Conducting surveillance, obtaining data, and establishing collection and data storage capabilities;
* Putting into place a watchdog system for monitoring Western media to warn Muslims of international plots fomented against them;
* Cultivating an Islamist intellectual community, including the establishment of think-tanks and advocacy groups, and publishing academic studies, to legitimize Islamist positions and to chronicle the history of Islamist movements;
* Developing a comprehensive 100-year plan to advance Islamist ideology throughout the world;
* Balancing international objectives with local flexibility;
* Building extensive social networks of schools, hospitals and charitable organizations dedicated to Islamist ideals so that contact with the movement for Muslims in the West is constant;

* Involving ideologically committed Muslims in democratically-elected institutions on all levels in the West, including government, NGOs, private organizations and labour unions;
* Instrumentally using existing Western institutions until they can be converted and put into service of Islam;
* Drafting Islamic constitutions, laws and policies for eventual implementation;
* Avoiding conflict within the Islamist movements on all levels, including the development of processes for conflict resolution;
* Instituting alliances with Western progressive organizations that share similar goals;
* Creating autonomous security forces to protect Muslims in the West;
* Inflaming violence and keeping Muslims living in the West in a jihad frame of mind;
* Supporting jihad movements across the Muslim world through preaching, propaganda, personnel, funding, and technical and operational support;
* Making the Palestinian cause a global wedge issue for Muslims;
* Adopting the total liberation of Palestine from Israel and the creation of an Islamic state as a keystone in the plan for global Islamic domination;
* Instigating a constant campaign to incite hatred by Muslims against Jews and rejecting any discussions of conciliation or coexistence with them;
* Actively creating jihad terror cells within Palestine;
* Linking the terrorist activities in Palestine with the global terror movement;

* Collecting sufficient funds to indefinitely perpetuate and support jihad around the world;

In reading The Project, it should be kept in mind that it was drafted in 1982 when current tensions and terrorist activities in the Middle East were still very nascent. In many respects, The Project is extremely prescient for outlining the bulk of Islamist action, whether by moderate Islamist organizations or outright terror groups, over the past two decades.

At present, most of what is publicly known about The Project is the result of Sylvain Bessons investigative work, including his book and a related article published last October in the Swiss daily, Le Temps, L'islamisme à la conquête du monde (Islamism and the Conquest of the World), profiling his book, which is only available in a French-language edition. At least one Egyptian newspaper, Al-Mussawar, published the entire Arabic text of The Project last November.

In the English-language press, the attention paid to Bessons revelation of The Project has been almost non-existent. The only mention found in a mainstream media publication in the US has been as a secondary item in an article in the Weekly Standard (February 20, 2006) by Olivier Guitta, The Cartoon Jihad. The most extensive commentary on The Project has been by an American researcher and journalist living in London, Scott Burgess, who has posted his analysis of the document on his blog, The Daily Ablution. Along with his commentary, an English translation of the French text of The Project was serialized in December (Parts I, II, III, IV, V, Conclusion). The complete English translation prepared by Mr. Burgess is presented in its entirety here with his permission.

The lack of public discussion about The Project notwithstanding, the document and the plan it outlines has been the subject of considerable discussion amongst the Western intelligence agencies. One US counterterrorism official who spoke with Besson about The Project, and who is cited in Guittas Weekly Standard article, is current White House terrorism czar, Juan Zarate. Calling The Project a Muslim Brotherhood master plan for spreading their political ideology, Zarate expressed concerns to Besson because the Muslim Brotherhood is a group that worries us not because it deals with philosophical or ideological ideas but because it defends the use of violence against civilians.

One renowned international scholar of Islamist movements who also spoke with Besson, Reuven Paz, talked about The Project in its historical context:

The Project was part of the charter of the international organization of the Muslim Brotherhood, which was official established on July 29, 1982. It reflects a vast plan which was revived in the 1960s, with the immigration of Brotherhood intellectuals, principally Syrian and Egyptians, into Europe.

As Paz notes, The Project was drafted by the Muslim Brotherhood as part of its rechartering process in 1982, a time that marks an upswing in its organizational expansion internationally, as well as a turning point in the alternating periods of repression and toleration by the Egyptian government. In 1952, the organization played a critical support role to the Free Officers Movement led by Gamal Abdul Nasser, which overthrew King Faruq, but quickly fell out of favour with the new revolutionary regime because of Nassers refusal to follow the Muslim Brotherhoods call to institute an ideologically committed Islamic state. At various times since the July Revolution in 1952, the Brotherhood has regularly been banned and its leaders killed and imprisoned by Egyptian authorities.

Since it was rechartered in 1982, the Muslim Brotherhood has spread its network across the Middle East, Europe, and even America. At home in Egypt, parliamentary elections in 2005 saw the Muslim Brotherhood winning 20 percent of the available legislative seats, comprising the largest opposition party block. Its Palestinian affiliate, known to the world as HAMAS, recently gained control of the Palestinian Authority after elections secured for them 74 of 132 seats in the Palestinian Legislative Council. Its Syrian branch has historically been the largest organized group opposing the Assad regime, and the organization also has affiliates in Jordan, Sudan, and Iraq. In the US, the Muslim Brotherhood is primarily represented by the Muslim American Society (MAS).

Since its formation, the Muslim Brotherhood has advocated the use of terrorism as a means of advancing its agenda of global Islamic domination. But as the largest popular radical movement in the Islamic world, it has attracted many leading Islamist intellectuals. Included among this group of Muslim Brotherhood intellectuals is Youssef Qaradawi, an Egyptian-born, Qatar-based Islamist cleric.

As one of the leading Muslim Brotherhood spiritual figures and radical Islamic preachers (who has his own weekly program on Al-Jazeera), Qaradawi has been one of the leading apologists of suicide bombings in Israel and terrorism against Western interests in the Middle East. Both Sylvain Besson and Scott Burgess provide extensive comparisons between Qaradawis publication, Priorities of the Islamic Movement in the Coming Phase, published in 1990, and The Project, which predates Qaradawis Priorities by eight years. They note the striking similarities in the language used and the plans and methods both documents advocate. It is speculated that The Project was either used by Qaradawi as a template for his own work, or that he had a hand in its drafting in 1982.

Perhaps coincidentally, Qaradawi was the fourth largest shareholder in the Al-Taqwa Bank of Lugano, the director of which, Youssef Nada, was the individual in whose possession The Project was found. Since 1999, Qaradawi has been banned from entering the US as a result of his connections to terrorist organizations and his outspoken advocacy of terrorism.

For those who have read The Project, what is most troubling is not that Islamists have developed a plan for global dominance; it has been assumed by experts that Islamist organizations and terrorist groups have been operating off an agreed-upon set of general principles, networks and methodology. What is startling is how effectively the Islamist plan for conquest outlined in The Project has been implemented by Muslims in the West for more than two decades. Equally troubling is the ideology that lies behind the plan: inciting hatred and violence against Jewish populations around the world; the deliberate co-opting and subversion of Western public and private institutions; its recommendation of a policy of deliberate escalating confrontation by Muslims living in the West against their neighbours and fellow-citizens; the acceptance of terrorism as a legitimate option for achieving their ends and the inevitable reality of jihad against non-Muslims; and its ultimate goal of forcibly instituting the Islamic rule of the caliphate by sharia in the West, and eventually the whole world.

If the experience over the past quarter of a century seen in Europe and the US is any indication, the Islamic researchers who drafted The Project more than two decades ago must be pleased to see their long-term plan to conquer the West and to see the Green flag of Islam raised over its citizens realized so rapidly, efficiently and completely. If Islamists are equally successful in the years to come, Westerners ought to enjoy their personal and political freedoms while they last.15
16

4. Radicalisation and its underlying reasons

Violent radicalisation is the phenomenon of people embracing opinions, views and ideas which could lead to acts of terrorism as defined in Article 1 of the Framework Decision on Combating Terrorism.17
There are several motives:

Personal  those who undergoe a personal crisis are more likely to search for advice and solutions in a mosque

Socioeconomic  people susceptible to radicalisation recruit mostly from lower and middle class

* Social environment
* Political  identification with people of the same origin or religion
* Factors of radicalization:
* Social marginalization
* Crisis
* Isolation
* Lack of integration
* Loss of identity

The first time one gets interested in Islam, Islamism or Islamic terrorism could be when browsing the Internet with a large offer of texts, pictures and videos on the topic. And also in mosques and prisons.

2. Here appear hostility and moral condemnation of Western society, disapproval of Western institutions and principals due to the influence of imams, propaganda in mosques and prisons. Actors: Islamist non-governmental organizations and Muslim Brotherhood

3. At the end of this stage there is already acceptance of violence and a beginning of recruitment enhanced by charismatic individuals and goal-oriented education in small groups. Actors: Hamas, Hizbollah20 and Salafist groups.

4. The recruited individuals get instructions from Al-Qaeda or Arabic mujaheddins, veterans of the Afghanistan war. They get ready to prepare attacks and attack.21

A film called Obsession: Radical IslamŽs War Against the West talks about radicalization as a product of indoctrinalisation. Media spread ideas of terrorism which leads to fanaticism and extremism, violence and terrorism. Children are taught to hate and fear. It is stressed out that infidels lie and are not trustworthy. And those who do not agree with AllahŽs book are enemies of Allah.

If somebody objects that they are extremists, then this person is not politically correct.

At the London rally in May 2005 there were signs stating "Islam will dominate the world." Participants of the rally shouted: UK you will pay or Bomb UK.

What we can hear in London mosques is the following message: Allah is happy when a non-Muslim is killed.

4.1 Profile of a radicalised person

The new terrorists are global citizens, resourceful and meticulous, skilled with technology and with the patience to wait years for the opportunity to attack. Ready to die, they've no need to plan an escape route and they will sacrifice teams to force their way through the layers of defence around their targets. And they operate in a globalised world in which borders and distance offer little protection to potential victims.
The terrorists' goal is ultimately to establish a caliphate - a pan-Muslim superstate uniting all lands now or ever part of the Muslim world from the Middle-East through to Indonesia and parts of the Philippines.22

Marc Sageman, a former CIA officer, worked with the Afghan mujaheddins in the 1980s and early 1990s. He left the US intelligence service and became a clinical psychiatrist, giving him some perspective on Islamic extremism. He has spent the past few years researching terrorist networks and their radicalisation. He said terrorist recruits might range from highly educated doctors to unemployed youths. "

In his Understanding Terror Networks23, he is showing that, for the vast majority of the mujaheddins, social bonds predated ideological commitment, and it was these social networks that inspired alienated young Muslims to join the jihad. These men, isolated from the rest of society, were transformed into fanatics yearning for martyrdom and eager to kill. The tight bonds of family and friendship, paradoxically enhanced by the tenuous links between the cell groups (making it difficult for authorities to trace connections), contributed to the jihad movement's flexibility and longevity. And although Sageman's systematic analysis highlights the crucial role the networks played in the terrorists' success, he states unequivocally that the level of commitment and choice to embrace violence were entirely their own.

"Joining this movement brings significance to their lives." It was friendship that brought together and bound terrorist networks, rather than a common economic or religious experience.
Mr Sageman, adjunct professor of psychology at Penn University, said the behaviour of terrorist groups was not driven by what members thought, but rather how they felt. They generally had little scholarly knowledge of Islam or an intellectual framework behind their extremist views. They live a parallel life, a virtual fantasy life. Exaggerating the terror threat only fed terrorists by enhancing their sense of power, he said.

4.2 Internet as a Means of Radicalisation

Irhabi 007 is an Arabic expression for a terrorist followed by the code 007 according to the example of James Bond. At present this person is in prison having been sentenced to the penalty of 10 years. The web pages he created still exist, spread and evolve. They deal with Islam, jihad, include encyclopaedias, virtual schools for terrorists, instructions how to make explosives and even computer games where players shoot Americans and chase President Bush. Internet newspapers for terrorists, video news and other means of Internet communication are available.

Irhabi 007 made it possible for Al Qaeda to get organized again after the defeat of Taliban and its departure from Afghanistan. He has opened the cyber space; he was the webmaster of countless web sites, taught the users to stay anonymous. On these pages he propagated jihad and also provided space for organisation of a large network where many terrorist attacks of smaller decentralized groups were concluded.

In October 2005 the Bosnian police arrested Mirsad Bektasevic, nicknamed Maximus, a Swedish teenager of Bosnian origin, who propagated jihad and terrorism through Internet. Together with other three people he was sentenced to long years in prison. The police found nineteen kilograms of explosives, guns a video with instructions how to make a bullet resisting vest or another video with veiled men claiming to be members of north-European Al Qaeda.

Irhabi 007 is said to be in the background of prepared attacks on Capitol and World Bank and prostitute clubs in the neighbourhood. These are perceived as clubs of naked women.

Many details are still secret. The Americans admit there are complicated networks within networks, perfect connections on many levels which go across any borders. Terrorists exchange encrypted emails or most recently voice messages over the Internet. They are not so easy to be monitored. The messages can be encoded even in very innocent-looking pictures.

Internet is not only a means of secret communication, but also an excellent means of propagation used to approach a wide range of people. Their web sites are therefore not only in Arabic, but mostly also in English, French and other European languages. The authors can not be censored and yet they stay anonymous. Internet is a meeting point of scattered jihad groups and creates a feeling they belong to a global Islamic movement fighting against a common enemy.

Nowadays, it is very easy and cheap to publish texts, pictures and videos on the Internet. We are witnessing a wave of journalists and medias propagating Islam, jihad and terrorists. Al Qaeda regularly broadcasts latest news which are read by a masked man in a studio and cover many critical areas, e.g. Iraq, Afghanistan, Palestine, Chechnya and others.

There is a bar showing constantly refreshed numbers of killed Americans which are ten times higher than the official numbers published by the Pentagon. The main representatives of Al Qaeda have their floor, especially al-Zawahiri, the second man of Al Qaeda, who comments on the political situation and the current news.

As soon as there happens a suicide attack or attack on Americans within a few minutes new shots from the spot are available. The most drastic parts were put together as a film with male chorale. A pocket camera has become a very important weapon in the hands of Al Qaeda, as important as guns and explosives. According to al-Zawahiri, more than a half of the battle between Islam and its enemies takes place on the battlefield of the media. It is in line with the recommendation given to the jihadists by Irhabi007. Film everything, it will help us in the holy war. Don't denounce photos or films. (Although orthodox Muslims should not take pictures of people.) Every photo or film you make is as important as shooting at our enemies. Shortly before Irhabi007 got arrested he created a website called Youbombit.com where he published these videos.

The decentralised structure of the Internet comes from military structures which are supposed to survive nuclear attacks. It gives jihad webs large manoeuvrability and a chance to overcome any threat. Web pages change constantly and appear elsewhere under a different name. Therefore, the holy warriors, as they call themselves, can always be a step ahead the intelligence services.

The amount of extremist web pages grows geometrically. In 2000 there were a few, now there are thousands. Some estimations go up to tens of thousands. Some of them are openly militaristic, other prefer a comeback of the original forms of Islam as they were articulated by the direct successors of Mohammed.

Some websites contain practical instructions for fighting in the form of books, films or PowerPoint presentations. They provide detailed information on weapons, most efficient techniques of killing and manuals for poison and explosives production. One can also find a constantly growing "Preparation Encyclopaedia". A magazine about the moods and the situation in the movement is issued for new groups willing to join terrorists. Some jihad websites are protected by passwords while others are freely accessible.

The basic strategic manual is a work by Abu Musab al-Suri who is also in prison. His book called the "Global Islamic Resistance Call" has about 1500 pages and is very often searched. It recommends to create independent terrorist cells in Western countries. These should not join the existing large groups, but rather act and organize attacks on their own.

According to psychologists the biggest danger is indoctrination. The Internet provides Islam with new supporters and radicalises already existing groups. It is an open university of Islam and jihad. It does not speak only about war and terrorist attacks. At least 60 per cent of them clarify ideological and cultural questions. Therefore they look interesting to people who happen to visit their pages and would not normally spend their time with similar problems.

A manual is dedicated especially to young Muslims concerning their questions and uncertainties. Its goal is to provide clear answers and minimize all worries and doubts. One example could be why it is possible to use weapons of mass destruction which can also harm other Muslims. Or whether one can shave the beard if necessary for disguising.

The Western secret services are searching the Internet and looking for any suspicion of a terrorist attack under preparation. They are mostly very successful. But not many people are aware of another battle taking place on the Internet - for new supporters of Islam and jihad. Irhabi007 is in jail. He has been replaced by his successor - Irhabi11.

4.2.1 Conversion to Islam on the Internet

It is enough to browse a bit to the web site called the Religion of Islam24 and follow instructions:

If anyone has a real desire to be a Muslim and has full conviction and strong belief that Islam is the true religion of God, then, all one needs to do is pronounce the Shahada, the testimony of faith, without further delay. The Shahada is the first and most important of the five pillars of Islam. With the pronunciation of this testimony, or Shahada, with sincere belief and conviction, one enters the fold of Islam.

Upon entering the fold of Islam purely for the Pleasure of God, all of ones previous sins are forgiven, and one starts a new life of piety and righteousness. The Prophet said to a person who had placed the condition upon the Prophet in accepting Islam that God would forgive his sins:

To convert to Islam and become a Muslim a person needs to pronounce the below testimony with conviction and understanding its meaning: I testify La ilah illa Allah, Muhammad rasoolu Allah.

The translation of which is: I testify that there is no true god (deity) but God (Allah), and that Muhammad is a Messenger (Prophet) of God.

The first part of the testimony consists of the most important truth that God revealed to mankind: that there is nothing divine or worthy of being worshipped except for Almighty God. God states in the Holy Qur'an:

We did not send the Messenger before you without revealing to him: none has the right to be worshipped except I, therefore worship Me. (Qur'an 21:25)

4.2.2 Radicalisation on the Internet

There are many possibilities, one of them is ready on the web pages of The As-Sabiqun movement.25 The As-Sabiqun movement is an Islamic movement/organization under the leadership of founder Imam Abdul Alim Musa. It is based in Washington, D.C., and has branches in Oakland, Los Angeles, San Diego, Sacramento, and Philadelphia.

As-Sabiqun is an Islamic movement that believes in the Islamic State of North America no later than 2050. Those who engage in this great effort require a high level of commitment and determination.

Prophet Muhammad (saw) once said: When you see an evil, you must change it with your hand. If you cannot do so, then change it with your tongue. If you cannot do this, then (detest it) with your heart, and that is the weakest degree of faith.

We must use whatever Allah (swt) gives us to make this world a better place.

Any business person will readily tell you that one of the most important factors for a business to flourish is Location, location, location. People of the world are crying for help. You and I, here in America, are living in the best location to change the world for good. We invite you to join us in this great mission.

4.3 Radicalisation in Mosques

The Undercover Mosque26 is a courageous documentary produced by UK Channel 4s Dispatches program A Dispatches reporter attends mosques run by organisations whose public faces are presented as moderate and finds preachers condemning integration into British society, condemning democracy and praising the Taliban for killing British soldiers

Dispatches has investigated a number of mosques run by high profile national organisations that claim to be dedicated to moderation and dialogue with other faiths. But an undercover reporter joined worshippers to find a message of religious bigotry and extremism being preached.

He captures chilling sermons in which Saudi-trained preachers proclaim the supremacy of Islam, preach hatred for non-Muslims and for Muslims who do not follow their extreme beliefs - and predict a coming jihad. "An army of Muslims will arise," announces one preacher. Another preacher said British Muslims must "dismantle" British democracy - they must "live like a state within a state" until they are "strong enough to take over."

The investigation reveals Saudi Arabian universities are recruiting young Western Muslims to train them in their extreme theology, then sending them back to the West to spread the word. And the Dispatches reporter discovers that British Muslims can ask for fatwas, religious rulings, direct from the top religious leader in Saudi Arabia, the Grand Mufti.

Saudi-trained preachers are also promoted in DVDs and books on sale at religious centres and sermons broadcast on websites. These publications and web casts disseminate beliefs about women such as: "Allah has created the woman deficient, her intellect is incomplete", and girls: "By the age of 10 if she doesnt wear hijab, we hit her," and theres an extreme hostility towards homosexuals
In the Times on 7 September 2007, there appeared an article "Hardline takeover of British mosques" saying almost half of Britains mosques are under the control of a hardline Islamic sect whose leading preacher loathes Western values and has called on Muslims to shed blood for Allah.27

Riyadh ul Haq, who supports armed jihad and preaches contempt for Jews, Christians and Hindus, is in line to become the spiritual leader of the Deobandi sect in Britain. The ultra-conservative movement, which gave birth to the Taleban in Afghanistan, now runs more than 600 of Britains 1,350 mosques, according to a police report seen by The Times.

The Times investigation casts serious doubts on government statements that foreign preachers are to blame for spreading the creed of radical Islam in Britains mosques and its policy of encouraging the recruitment of more home-grown preachers.
The Times has gained access to numerous talks and sermons delivered in recent years by Mr ul Haq and other graduates of Britains most influential Deobandi seminary near Bury, Greater Manchester. Intended for a Muslim-only audience, they reveal a deep-rooted hatred of Western society, admiration for the Taleban and a passionate zeal for martyrdom in the way of Allah.

The seminary outlaws art, television, music and chess, demands entire concealment for women and views football as a cancer that has infected our youth.

Khaled Ahmed said: The UK has been ruined by the Puritanism of the Deobandis. Youve allowed the takeover of the mosques. You cant run multiculturalism like that, because thats a way of destroying yourself. In Britain, the Deobandi message has become even more extreme than it is in Pakistan. Its mind-boggling.

In some mosques the sect has wrested control from followers of the more moderate majority, the Barelwi movement.

A spokesman for the Department for Communities said: We have a detailed strategy to ensure imams properly represent and connect with mainstream moderate opinion and promote shared values like tolerance and respect for the rule of law. We have never said the challenge from extremism is simply restricted to those coming from overseas.

Ishtiaq Ahmed, a Muslim leader in Bradford, estimated in 2001 that around 15 per cent of British Muslims could be called Islamist' or Radical', 15 per cent Liberal or Modernist, while the remaining 70 per cent could be described as Traditionalist or Orthodox. 28

Although some recent polls have given a higher proportion for Islamists, it is clear that they are still a minority, and that those among them who approve of violence in the name of Islam would therefore be a minority within a minority. Many Muslims dissociate themselves completely from the militants and terrorists. There are significant numbers of British Muslims, however, who would not actively support the use of violence, but would not openly condemn it. And many would argue that if violence cannot be justified in the British context, it can be justified in certain other contexts like Afghanistan, Iraq or Israel/Palestine. Neat categories with clear labels do not fit this debate, and even among Islamists there is a wide spectrum of approaches from moderates (in sympathy, for example, with the Muslim Council of Britain and the Muslim Association of Britain) to extremists (like Hizb ut-Tahrir, Supporters of Sharee'ah and the Saved Sect).29

4.4 Radicalisation through the strength of Islamic authoritiesŽ fatwas

The power of an Islamic authority's words is strong, especially if it is spoken out as a fatwa. A fatwa is an Islamic religious ruling, a scholarly opinion on a matter of Islamic law.

A fatwa is issued by a recognized religious authority in Islam. But since there is no hierarchical priesthood or anything of the sort in Islam, a fatwa is not necessarily "binding" on the faithful. The people who pronounce these rulings are supposed to be knowledgeable, and base their rulings in knowledge and wisdom. They need to supply the evidence from Islamic sources for their opinions, and it is not uncommon for scholars to come to different conclusions regarding the same issue.30

In December 2007 Khomeini's spokesman said Europe will eventually become a Muslim continent.

"In a dozen years, Europe will be an Islamic continent," said Rasul Jalilzadeh on Friday as he was speaking to the basiji, a voluntary organisation in the capital Tehran.

"The Islamisation of the European continent is imminent and this step favours the arrival of the Mahdi," he said, referring to the 12th imam of Shiite Islam.

Shiites believe that the Imam Mahdi, who disappeared as an adolescent, will return to bring an end to chaos and bring universal justice.

Rasul Jalilzadeh believes that "the Islamisation of Europe is one of the consequences of the Islamic revolution in Iran" in that "the messages and values that this revolution has transmitted to the Europeans, to convince them "to abandon their current faiths and convert to Shiite Islam." 31

In December 2002 Leading Sunni Sheikh Yousef Al-Qaradhawi and Other Sheikhs herald the coming conquest of Rome.

In articles written by Islamic clerics, the clerics herald the imminent conquest of Rome by Islam, in accordance with the prophecy of Muhammad. The issue is also discussed in Friday sermons. Sheikh Yousef Al-Qaradhawi, one of the most influential clerics in Sunni Islam, often makes this claim in his religious rulings and on his television programs.

The following are remarks made by Al-Qaradhawi and other Muslim clerics:

Al-Qaradhawi: "Islam will Return to Europe as a Conqueror"
In a fatwa posted on the website www.islamonline.net,32 in response to a reader's question, Sheikh Al-Qaradhawi wrote of the "signs of the victory of Islam," citing a well-known Hadith: " The Prophet Muhammad was asked: 'What city will be conquered first, Constantinople or Romiyya?' He answered: 'The city of Hirqil [i.e. the Byzantine emperor Heracles] will be conquered first' - that is, Constantinople Romiyya is the city called today 'Rome,' the capital of Italy. The city of Hirqil [that is, Constantinople] was conquered by the young 23-year-old Ottoman Muhammad bin Morad, known in history as Muhammad the Conqueror, in 1453. The other city, Romiyya, remains, and we hope and believe [that it too will be conquered]."33

"This means that Islam will return to Europe as a conqueror and victor, after being expelled from it twice - once from the South, from Andalusia, and a second time from the East, when it knocked several times on the door of Athens."

Sheikh Al-Qaradhawi qualified his statement: "I maintain that the conquest this time will not be by the sword but by preaching and ideology "34

Al-Qaradhawi made similar statements on other occasions, on his weekly religious program on Al-Jazeera. He declared: "This means that the friends of the Prophet heard that two cities would be conquered by Islam, Romiyya and Constantinople, and the Prophet said that 'Hirqil [i.e. Constantinople] would be conquered first.' Romiyya is Rome, the capital of Italy, and Constantinople was the capital of the state of Byzantine Rome, which today is Istanbul. He said that Hirqil which is Constantinople, would be conquered first and this is what happened "

"All right, Constantinople was conquered, and the second part of the prophecy remains, that is, the conquest of Romiyya. This means that Islam will return to Europe. Islam entered Europe twice and left it Perhaps the next conquest, Allah willing, will be by means of preaching and ideology. The conquest need not necessarily be by the sword [The conquest of Mecca] was not by the sword or by war, but by a [Hudabiyya] treaty, and by peace Perhaps we will conquer these lands without armies. We want an army of preachers and teachers who will present Islam in all languages and in all dialects "35

Another time, Sheikh Al-Qaradhawi said, "The Hadith says that the city of Constantinople, the city of Heracles, will be conquered first. We conquered Constantinople and the second part of the prophecy remains - the conquest of Romiyya. The conquest of Romiyya means that Islam will return to Europe. In one of my previous programs, I said that I think that this conquest would not be by the sword or armies, but by preaching and ideology. Europe will see that it suffers from materialistic culture, and will seek an alternative, it will seek a way out, it will seek a lifeboat. It will find no lifesaver but the message of Islam the message of the muezzin who gives it religion but does not deny it this world, brings it to Heaven, but does not uproot it from Earth. Allah willing, Islam will return to Europe and the Europeans will convert to Islam. Then they themselves will be able to be the ones to disseminate Islam in the world, more than we ancient Muslims. This is within Allah's capabilities."36

Rome, 26 Oct. (AKI) - European countries can expect more terrorist attacks in future because of continuing disaffection among Muslims and the low cost of producing bombs, according to international experts.

Bob Ayers, associate fellow for international security at London-based think-tank, Chatham House, told Adnkronos International (AKI) on Friday, while police successfully foiled the planned terrorist attack in Germany last month, more attacks were inevitable.

"The lessons are clear, this is not a problem confined to the United Kingdom or countries engaged in combat in Iraq, " Ayers told AKI.

"Iraq is a rallying cry but it is not the cause. This is a terrible clash of cultures that transcends boundaries."

Ayers was responding to an Adnkronos interview with terrorism expert Brian Michael Jenkins, who said western countries needed to do more to win the ideological battle against Al Qaeda.

"We need to wage more effective political warfare, not just pound Al Qaeda's operational capabilities, but blunt its message, discredit its ideology and tactics, reduce the appeal of its narrative to angry young men from Copenhagen to Cairo," Jenkins told AKI.

Ayers said UK surveys of Muslims conducted after the London bombings showed 50 per cent of the population considered themselves to be Muslim first, and British second. He said 25 per cent thought suicide bombings were a legitimate form or political expression.

"This shows that they haven't been integrated and the sources of home grown terrorism are people who are economically better off. We in Europe are yet to come to grips with what we are dealing with - fanatical Islam is a theologically motivated movement."

Ayers also expressed concern about instability in Kurdistan and Pakistan - two regions widely considered as ripe recruiting grounds for terrorists.

"Pakistan is a very serious problem because Musharraf is not firmly in power and doesn't control the (country's) boundaries," he said.

James Walston, professor of political science and international relations at the American University in Rome, said terrorist acts like the Madrid bombing were very cheap to produce. He too said European countries should expect more instances of terrorism in continental Europe.

"Whether Al Qaeda exists as an organisation which controls lots of people is almost irrelevant," Walston told Adnkronos International (AKI). "You have local people who carry out operations with very little money. All you need are a few cell phones, a few backpacks and very little money," he said.

"The Madrid bombing cost around 10,000 dollars," he added.

Walston said it was important to create dialogue with Muslim communities, whether in Italy, France or Britain. But he too was pessimistic about the security outlook.

"Sooner or later something is going to happen because of the sorts of resources you need for a terrorist attack, " Walston said.

He said the Italian interior minister, Giuliano Amato, was taking the right steps to better integrate the Muslim community in Italy.

But Ayers said the best solutions would come from Muslims.

"Europe cannot impose its values on culture," he said. "The only solution will come out of the religious communities themselves."

The Madrid train bombings occurred on 11 March 2004 - three days before Spain's general election - killing 191 people and wounding close to 2,000.

In September 2007, German police foiled a major terrorist plot when they arrested three young Islamists who were preparing a series of explosives attacks at several locations including Frankfurt Airport. Two of the men were German nationals who had converted to Islam, while the third was a Turkish man. 37

5.1 EU under threat of a civil war?

Paul Weston in his paper called "Is European Civil War Inevitable By 2025? - Part II" published in April 2007 in the Global Politician talks about possible scenarios of a civil war in Europe due to untamed immigration, Muslim radicalisation and home-grown terrorism.

Europeans have been conditioned from an early age to celebrate diversity and multiculturalism, resulting in our genuine ability to co-exist with peoples of significantly different cultures. But, rather than what we want, is this what Islam wants? Islam is as mono-cultural as mono-cultural gets. How can they possibly live in a liberal, multicultural society?

Islam expanded via the sword. Within decades of erupting out of the deserts of 7th Century Arabia it had conquered Palestine, Persia, Egypt, India, North Africa and Spain; its opponents were paralysed in the face of fanatical violence. It was only in 732 that Charles Martel stopped this frenetic Islamic expansion at the battle of Tours, in France.

In the 13th century Islam rose again. In 1452 they finally conquered Constantinople, the capital of the Byzantine Empire, and within 100 years added Greece, Bulgaria, Serbia, Bosnia, Albania, Romania and Hungary to their empire. Attempts to take Vienna failed twice, before Jan Sobieski finally routed the Ottomans Islamic army in 1683 at the Gates of Vienna. The Ottoman Empire gradually fell apart after this defeat, and most occupied European countries reclaimed their independence. Christian Europe had largely prevailed.

But now, in the 21st Century, Islam is back and wants what it has always wanted; a global caliphate. This time, unlike their previous military attempts to overthrow the West, instead they are already within Europe, well funded, radicalised and rapidly expanding. As their numbers grow, so grows the violence they perpetrate  as we have seen all over Europe within the last few years.

And not only within Europe; Islam is engaged in religious conflict all around the world, from America, Nigeria, Somalia, Sudan, Thailand, the Philippines, Indonesia, Kashmir, India, Russia, the Lebanon, Palestine, etc, etc. Wherever Islam comes into contact with non-Islam there is conflict.

In each and every country, one glaring reality stands out. It is always Islam as the aggressor, even when they are in a minority. In Thailand, where they represent five per cent of the populace, we have a country sliding inexorably toward civil war.

Such is the prevalence of Islamic violence that Samuel Huntingdon, author of The Clash Of Civilisations, coined the phrase Islams bloody borders the violence of which is represented by Gates Of Viennas animated Bloody Borders project which identifies Islamic terrorist activity just since 9/11.

Why do Islamists do this? Because they are commanded to, it is as simple as that. To be a Muslim means to obey the Qur'an, within which there are numerous commands to wage Jihad, or Holy War, against the infidel. Granted, there is no single explicit command, but it is possible to interpret many exhortations this way, which is exactly what radical Imams are doing all across the West. Unlike a modern day Christians tenuous relationship with the Bible, Muslims adhere to every edict of the Qur'an as slavishly as they did in the 7th Century. Unfortunately for us, the principal edict is to conquer or remove all non-believers.

To this end there are now some 2,000 Mosques in Western Europe, many of them funded directly by Saudi Arabia to the tune of 90 billion dollars. In these mosques are Imams  trained or imported from Saudi Arabia  preaching extreme Wahhabism. They call for the overthrow of the West, and promote suicide bombing and martyrdom. Channel Four recently sent an undercover reporter into various Mosques in the UK. The result was an exposure of these Imams in their call for Holy War against the West. It can be seen here on Youtube. CNN also ran an interview with Al-Muhajirouns Anjem Choudray, where he calls for Sharia law in Britain. This is the same man who prophesised that the Islamic flag will fly over 10 Downing Street.

Despite the clear warnings, the concept of Sharia is still not fully understood by most Europeans. Under its laws they could either be killed for refusing to convert to Islam or they could accept that second-class status known as Dhimmitude. Homosexuals could similarly be killed, apostates killed, adulterous woman stoned to death, whilst limbs could be amputated for stealing. Forty percent of British Muslims wish this to be introduced.

What percentage of those who desire this are young males? Muslim women have a great deal to be unhappy about under Sharia law, whilst older Muslims are far less radicalised than the young. It is quite possible therefore, that for young males with a favourable view of Sharia, the percentage of those who favour Sharia in Britain is far higher than this.

So, Islam has a history of attempted Western conquest, and a present day policy of global domination. In countries such as Sudan, they are efficiently perpetrating genocide to achieve that end. In the West, their Jihadist rhetoric is accompanied by large-scale violence and lesser atrocities guaranteed to catch our attention. (Leaving out the violence in India and Pakistan and the Taliban) just in the years since 2001, there have been numerous incidents in the West:

* 9/11, of course;

* the London tube bombings;

* the Madrid train bombings;

* the lesser violence such as the murder of Theo Van Gogh;

* the indescribable torture and murder of Ilan Halami;

* the rape of European women as described by Fjordman [http://globalpolitician.com/articleshow.asp?ID=2612&cid=3&sid=102];

* the civil unrest in France, where police claim they are in the midst of a civil war;

* and the death threats made against politicians who speak out against them, such as Gert Wilders.

Faced with this relentless tidal wave of Islamic aggression, what is the response of Europes ruling elites? Craven submission is the answer. In France the politicians promise more money for the banlieux, within which Sharia law operates and where no white European dare set foot. In Spain they gathered in squares after the Madrid train bombing and held candle-lit peace vigils, before voting out their Government and replacing it with one more in tune to the Islamists demands. In Holland, the Dutch justice minister, Piet Hein Donner has no objection to Sharia law being imposed, providing it is done democratically, and in Sweden, integration minister Jens Orback declared: We must be open and tolerant towards Islam and Muslims because when we become a minority, they will be so towards us.

After the London tube bombings, the governments immediate response was to worry not about the English, but about the terrible oppression the perpetrators must have suffered from in order to commit such a crime. Much to our rulers dismay, the fabulous four were educated and middle class; their drive had come from Islam, not from oppression.

In British schools the Holocaust is no longer taught because it runs counter to the Holocaust denial beliefs of Muslims, whilst British historian David Irving was imprisoned for holding the same views as that of the Muslims. Our teaching unions are also of the opinion that the idea of teaching British values is racist, and the BBC is so viciously anti-Christian and pro-Islamic that there is simply not the space here to detail it. The BBC treachery requires an article all its own, and a lengthy article at that (This is one of the more imponderable pathologies the BBC exhibits, considering the corporation has sheltered and encouraged a high number of homosexuals and feminists. As you know, both groups are on the Islamic extermination lists).

There are many more examples of Islamic aggression and of the consequential European appeasement. It is clear that so far we are impelled toward overwhelming submission. European politicians are clearly terrified of Islam. As well they might be. So, what can be done? Can Islam be contained, or is Europe drifting inexorably to all-out civil war?
Essentially, there are five options.

The first is that Islam integrates within Europes liberal democracies and we all live happily ever after This scenario takes no account of the moral sewer that Liberal policies have turned Europe into; a Europe which Islam, quite understandably, views with revulsion. Nor does it take into account that Islam today is the same as Islam in the 7th century. Why should they reform now? Given the increasing radicalisation of Muslim youth and the disturbing numbers who agree with terrorist activity, this scenario is only possible within the mindset of deluded, ignorant liberals, whose naiveté is suicidal in the extreme. Option one can therefore be discounted.

The second option is that Islam quietly takes over demographically through sheer weight of numbers, and Europe is Islamised under Sharia law. Bernard Lewis and Mark Steyn think this inevitable, Steyn being of the opinion that any country capable of the type of appeasement prevalent in Europe today, is also a country incapable of rousing a defence. Although this is a possibility, it is unlikely we will not fight back, so option two can also be discounted.

The third option is that Europe wakes up to the danger it is in and expels all its Muslims. This is not going to happen; the European Union positively embraces Islam, as noted in Bat Yeor book Eurabia (thankfully abridged by Fjordman). Not only does the EU have no intention of such an action, they will not even stop further Islamic immigration. The 2.2 million predominately Muslim immigrants they wish to bring into Europe each and every year up to 2050 is a done deal as far as they are concerned.

Indeed, in an extract from this disturbing report published by the European Policy Centre, the EU seeks immigration not only for economic reasons but also for social reasons:

However, the arguments against immigration remain dominant in the political debates of many European countries, and must be taken seriously and challenged if immigration is to keep its place on the social and economic agenda.

Whilst this attitude prevails we can discount option three.

The fourth option is that moderate Muslims reclaim their peaceful religion from the fundamentalists, who, as we are told over and over again by our media, are not representative of Islam. But where exactly are these moderate Muslims, what power do they wield within Islam as a whole? When have we seen marches and protests organised by them, waving banners reading Not in my name or Not in the name of Islam? They are as cowed by the radicals as are our politicians, or perhaps they are in agreement with them, but are squeamish when it comes to spilling blood. The only face of Islam we see or hear in the West is that of the violent Jihadist. As such, option four can be discounted.

The fifth option is that we resist the Islamic take over, and fight back. I disagree with Lewis and Steyn, who both appear to think Europe will roll over and submit. The wholesale and unprecedented racial and cultural transformation of a continent with a history of violent warfare will simply not happen without confrontation.

As options one, two, three and four can therefore be discounted; we are left only with option five: to fight. Whilst it is unfortunate that we should be confronted by an expanding, youthful culture with a set of beliefs they will die for, just at the time we are demographically declining, ageing, and apparently believe only in shopping, celebrity and alcohol, does not mean that we will not fight. We will simply have to. Not for domination, but for survival.

E. Raymond Hall, professor of biology at the University of Kansas, is the author of the definitive work on American wildlife, Mammals of North America. He states as a biological law that, two subspecies of the same species do not occur in the same geographic area. (Emphasis in the original) Human races are biological subspecies, and Prof. Hall writes specifically that this law applies to humans just as it does to other mammals: To imagine one subspecies of man living together on equal terms for long with another subspecies is but wishful thinking and leads only to disaster and oblivion for one or the other.

The history of man is essentially a history of warfare, where territory, tribe or religion drives the impetus for conquest. That our ruling liberal elites in the West today believe that history, current reality and the law of nature no longer apply to us, does not mean the end of warfare. Rather, their wishful thinking simply makes it easier for those who are determined to wage war against us. The idea that wars are a thing of the past is so fantastical that only liberals, who cannot distinguish ideological fantasy from historical reality, could possibly believe that war will ever be vanquished.

Islamic terrorist activity is being constantly thwarted by European intelligence services, but over the next ten years some of these Jihadists will slip through the net and carry out their next very large atrocity. Although most Europeans are still in a deep liberal sleep regarding Islam, this will not last. By 2017 the tensions between Europeans and Islam will have become nerve jangling. Impotent officials will employ ever-stricter government controls in a futile attempt to preserve the façade of societal order.

Somewhere between 2017 and 2030, during a period of heightened tension, Islamists in France, Holland or Britain will blow up one church, train or plane too many. Retaliation will begin and they, in turn will respond. So will the spiral begin.

The police are unable to cope now; they will be even less prepared then. The army will be drafted in, and members of the military who are even willing to carry out orders against their neighbours will find themselves massively outnumbered and outflanked. Civilians will be massacred. And so begins the civil war.

When the violence reaches a tipping point every person  be they moderate or extremist in their views  will be forced to take sides in this war. There will be no bystanders, and no civilians. Moderate Muslims will in all likelihood take the sides of the extremists. This war will resemble none of Europes previous conflicts, with their standing armies massed along clearly delineated lines. In the coming conflagration, it will initially be civilians, armed not with tanks and machine guns, but with knives, bombs and terror, who will call out the dogs of war.

I say initially because although the army will be of little use in the beginning, it will certainly be capable of forming an impregnable line behind which the native Europeans, unused to knife fighting, will flee and re-group.

And then, enter America  as always Europes saviour. Whilst Europes navies blockade the ports, America will deliver technical weaponry to the organised Europeans, weaponry against which Islam will have no response. Whilst they are being annihilated in response to the butchery they carried out in the early days of the war, Muslim countries such as Pakistan and Iran will threaten a nuclear response. If they do, they too will be annihilated.

Such is the future brought about by multicultural liberals. Not only will they be responsible for bloodshed unseen even in the last century, they will also be responsible for the extinction of Islam. In 1907 no one could see the coming carnage, whereas in 2007 all educated people with some knowledge of history can see the inevitable. Quite how large this war becomes is of course beyond any prediction. However, it will not be limited to a merely European conflict. Our civil war could well become a global nuclear war against Islam; and one the Islamists have no hope of winning.

Such a scenario is unimaginable to the vapid multiculturalists, but it is their actions, past and present, which will bring about this nightmare. One can hardly blame Islam for wishing to dominate the world, but one can certainly blame liberals for giving them the geographical means and ideological confidence whereby they feel confident that it is actually possible. Will they attempt it? On a small scale, with their ratio of 18:1 they are attempting it now. How do you think they will behave with a ratio of 5:1 let alone 2:1?

The liberal response to an essay such as this is to make accusations of hysteria and paranoia. To those, I would say only one thing: rather than leave sneering one line comments, give us a thousand word, closely reasoned article explaining why the scenario outlined above is not likely. Use reality-based arguments rather than simply repeating outmoded ideology.

6. EU and its response

In Devising a New Counter-Terrorism Strategy in Europe38 Ludo Block states that before 2005, suicide terrorist attacks in Europe were only a dreaded scenario feared by police and the security community. Then, on July 7, 2005, four suicide bombers blew themselves up in three underground trains and one bus in London, causing 52 fatalities and injuring nearly 700 people. Two weeks later on July 21, 2005, four attempted suicide bomb attacks, again in London, failed apparently as a result of faulty explosives. Recently, on August 10, British police arrested almost 30 people suspected of plotting suicide bombings aboard 10 transatlantic flights departing from London. The nightmare became real since the most unsettling part was that many of the suicide bombers were born and raised in Britain.

In terms of risk analysis, the incidents in London show that the threat has shifted from jihadi veteranswho played a large role in the 2004 attacks in Madridto a poisonous ideology of martyrdom. Vulnerabilities have changed from permeable borders and uncontrolled logistic and financial flows to adolescents susceptible to indoctrination and radicalization. This situation is not unique to Britain, but is relevant in many European countries. In a recent assessment, the Dutch Security and Intelligence Service (AIVD) concluded that elements from transnational veteran jihadi networks are still active in Europe. The fragmentation of these networks, however, has led to a temporary reduction of the threat of internationally coordinated attacks. The AIVD states that "the most serious threat to the Netherlands appears to emanate from local jihadist networks rooted in their own breeding ground"39. This and further details from the incidents in London contain lessons for a broader counter-terrorism strategy in Europe.

From the incidents in London, it is now known that the bombers in each case had a crystal-clear intent to cause fatalities on a large scale. In light of this intent, various sides, including the security community, now question the effectiveness of tough anti-terrorism legislation that has been adopted throughout Europe. In its recent assessment, the AIVD not only warns of radicalization, but also of social polarization. From a strategic perspective, Al Qaeda-inspired terrorism in Europe has become as much of a social problem as a law enforcement problem.

Governments have started to realize that an effective counter-terrorism strategy needs to include combating the jihadi ideology of martyrdom by lowering its appeal and unmasking its spurious claims. In December 2005, the European Union adopted a strategy to counter radicalization and recruitment to terrorism. Three key elements are addressed in this strategy: 1) Facilitating factors providing for recruitment; 2) Motivational factors leading individuals to become radicalized; 3) Structural factors creating a socio-economic environment in which the radical message becomes appealing40. Consistently, the EU response to the recently foiled airline plot did not contain the previously recurring void calls for strengthening police cooperation and tougher legislation. On the contrary, it placed further emphasis on efforts to counter radicalization and to enhance protective security cooperation41.

Addressing the root causes that can lead to radicalization is important, especially for the long term security situation. For the short term, however, as the official account of the bombings in London on July 7, 2005 clearly shows, the real difficulty for law enforcement agencies and local communities is identifying potential terrorists. Three of the four bombers on July 7 were well integrated in society, and one of them was even considered a role model in his community42. Despite the much needed effort in the social field, a sizeable law enforcement effort remains necessary to protect society against those already radicalized.

The territoriality of the threat is not an assuring thought, yet it gives law enforcement some direction for an effective counter-terrorism strategy. For example, confronted with the preparedness of radicalized young Muslims to become martyrs, the limitations of repressive legislation are clearly shown. When countering jihadis from abroad that are using a local community as cover, penalizing "association with terrorists" can be a very effective approach as experience in France has shown (Terrorism Monitor, September 8, 2005). In contrast, prosecuting members of the Muslim community for not giving up their own youth to authorities is likely to result in the opposite and lead to more radicalization instead. Winning the hearts and minds of local communities is not achieved through prosecution. This, of course, should not be mistaken for allowing local communities to ignore their responsibilities in this shared problem.

In contrast to preparations abroad, preliminary activities of terrorists on domestic soil leave traces within direct reach of the agencies that can be very difficult to uncover. Domestic human intelligence becomes fundamental, and it appears that this indeed has been crucial to the success in the prevention of the recent airline plot. Nevertheless, both infiltration and the use of informers can be incredibly effective in combating terrorism, yet neither is a risk-free strategy. Infiltrating whole communities will send the wrong signal. Priority should be given to distinguish the "talkers" from the "doers," the latter being legitimate targets for infiltration.

After the attacks of July 7, 2005, it was widely believed that the bombers had links to the Al Qaeda network. Al Qaeda second-in-command Ayman al-Zawahiri praised the attacks and stated that they were launched by Al Qaeda. The apparent careful handling of the bomb making indicates that the plotters received advice from someone with previous experience. Two of the four bombers travelled to Pakistan at the end of 2004 and might have received military training there. Between April and July 2005, the group was in contact with unknown individuals in Pakistan.

Nevertheless, the overall costs of the attacks, which amounted to US$15,000, were self-financed without external sources of income. Furthermore, while the bombings were typical of those inspired by Al Qaeda's ideology, no evidence of any direction from abroad has been uncovered. Altogether, the 7/7 report concludes that "there is as yet no firm evidence to corroborate this claim or the nature of Al Qaeda support, if there was any" 43. The characteristics of the threat of autonomous self-sustaining local networks predict disappointing results from prioritized efforts in finding global terrorist networks through, for instance, counter-terrorist finance systems and controls.

Other clues for a counter-terrorism strategy can be found in the means used by the 7/7 plotters. Although no official statements have been made about the explosives used in any of the incidents, it is widely assumed that these were home-made and peroxide based. This would be consistent with the bleaching effect of the used mixtures in the uncovered bomb factory as described in the 7/7 report. Most likely, the July 7 bombers manufactured triacetone-triperoxide (TATP), which can be made from commercially available precursors. TATP is widely used by suicide bombers in the Middle East and was utilized as an improvised detonator by the "shoe bomber" Richard Reid in his attempt to blow up an airplane in December 2001 (Times Online, July 15, 2005). In September, TATP was found during the arrest of suspected terrorists in the Danish city Odense (Politiken.de, September 11).

The use of home-made explosives indicates an effective control of commercial explosives in Europe. Then again, little comfort is found in the proliferation of the knowledge for successful production of high power explosives. The chemical characteristics of TATP, in particular the absence of any nitrates in its compound and its unsuspicious appearance of white sugar, make it difficult to detect. On the other hand, it has a low chemical stability making it susceptible to impact, open flame, friction and causing it to sublimate easily, limiting its use altogether 44.

The feasibility of the airline plot by smuggling "liquid TATP" aboard as was claimed by unnamed "U.S. senior officials" can seriously be questioned (Time.com, August 10). Although TATP can be dissolved in ether to detonate it, that solution then needs to be highly concentrated. Such a solution would be extremely sensitive and, like nitro-glycerin, probably detonate spontaneously as a result of any sudden movement. The idea of making TATP from its liquid precursors aboard a commercial flight is mere fiction, even if one assumes that the cabin crew would not interfere. Nonetheless, the plot shows that continuous research and education of the police and security community on (the application of) home-made explosives should be part of a counter-terrorism strategy.

A final point illustrated by the airline plot is that timing and mode of intervention remain a continuing challenge in counter-terrorism strategy. As a result of the present-day intensive political attention on counter-terrorism, a strong tendency exists to take tactical and operational decisions in counter-terrorism cases at a higher level politically. At that level, however, political rationality claims a larger role, and other interests start interfering with decisions that should be made based upon professional and judicial considerations. For instance, the current media strategy that leads to excessive coverage (as was witnessed in the airline plot) can be questioned from a professional or legal perspective. A professional counter-terrorism strategy should cover such scenarios in advance by clearly defining the aims, boundaries, roles and responsibilities of the actors involved in counter-terrorism.

The exact nature of the nightmare of home-grown suicide bombers that are now a real threat for Europe is still unknown. Reflection on the counter-terrorism strategy, however, needs to be a continuous process. Lessons learned could help mitigate current and future threats.

6.1 EU latest document on counter-terrorism

EU latest document on counter-terrorism "Stepping up the fight against terrorism" was issued on 14 December 2007 and is a Commission document (Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council).45

It admits the threat of terrorism and understands the key role of Member States to deal with it.

It recalls the context of EU measures, mainly the EU Counter terrorism strategy, which was adopted first in 2001 and updated most recently in December 2005. The Action Plan to implement the strategy was updated last in spring 2007.

Since terrorism is a global phenomenon, the EU also cooperates closely with partner countries and international organisations regarding counter-terrorism legislation, law enforcement and judicial cooperation. The fight against terrorism in its various facets is a standing agenda item in Justice and Home Affairs Ministerial meetings with strategic partners and in other fora such as the UN and the G8. This cooperation has notably resulted in agreements with the United States and Canada on the transfer of Passenger Name Record data allowing to better identify terrorism treats to security, while ensuring protection of personal data. The EU is a major provider of technical assistance to third countries world wide helping them to implement the UN Security Council Resolution 1373 (2001).

The EU Counter Terrorism Strategy defines the way in which the EU can contribute to the fight against terrorism. Key measures identified in the Strategy include:

It also delivers a new package of proposals such as dealing with those who support terrorism, practical action to stem the use of explosives and establishing a European system of exchange of Passenger Name Records.

6.2 EU guidelines on expressing EU views on terrorism in the media

In March 2007 the European Union has drawn up guidelines advising government spokesmen to refrain from linking Islam and terrorism in their statements.

Brussels officials have confirmed the existence of a classified handbook which offers "non-offensive" phrases to use when announcing anti-terrorist operations or dealing with terrorist attacks.

Banned terms are said to include "jihad", "Islamic" or "fundamentalist". The word "jihad" is to be avoided altogether, according to some sources, because for Muslims the word can mean a personal struggle to live a moral life.

One alternative, suggested publicly last year, is for the term "Islamic terrorism" to be replaced by "terrorists who abusively invoke Islam".

An EU official said that the secret guidebook, or, "common lexicon", is aimed at preventing the distortion of the Muslim faith and the alienation of Muslims in Europe. "The common lexicon includes guidance on a number of frequently used terms where lack of care by EU and member states' spokespeople may give rise to misunderstandings," he said.

"Careful usage of certain terms is not about empty political correctness but stems from astute awareness of the EU's interests in the fight against terrorism.

"Terrorists exploit and augment suspicions."

Details on the contents of the lexicon remain secret, but British officials stressed that it is there as a helpful aid "providing context" for civil servants making speeches or giving press conferences. "We are fully signed up to this, but it is not binding," said one.

However, Conservative MEP Syed Kamall hit out at the lexicon. "It is this kind of political correctness and secrecy that creates resentment among both the mainstream in Europe and in Islam," he said.

Meanwhile, UK Independence Party MEP Gerard Batten claimed that the EU was in denial over the true roots of terrorism. "This type of newspeak shows that the EU refuses to face reality," he said. "The major world terrorist threat is one posed by ideology and that ideology is inspired by fundamentalist jihadi Islam."

6.3 EU legislation

Terrorist attacks since 2001 have acted as a catalyst for counter-terrorism legislation. The immediate reaction of the EU was an action plan and subsequent framework decision on combating terrorism. In the light of the London attacks, the European Council set out an EU counter-terrorism strategy with the objective of confronting "the networks of terror with networks against terror".

To enforce such networks, significant legislative initiatives have been launched to enhance the exchange of information and to improve police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters in the EU. The Data Retention Directive of 2006 and the proposal to establish the "principle of availability" are examples of enhanced information exchange. Judicial cooperation today is supported by the European Arrest Warrant and political agreement has been reached on an European Evidence Warrant.46

7. Possible solutions to the situation and conclusion

Immigration, radicalisation and terrorism are interconnected. From my point of view it is not enough to treat terrorism without looking at the other two.

Undoubtedly, the EU needs immigrants to ensure its demographic growth. In this respect, it is recommendable to have a selective approach and make sure immigrants are actively interested in looking for work and let them in once they have found a job and will acquire salary they could live. I suggest to make databases of job which could be offered to applicant immigrants. This also means immigrants should be skilled with the language they would use.

All this relies on a good protection of borders, a well-working police and intelligence services.

The EU is not only an economic or political entity, it is based on values such as human rights, freedom of speech and open-mindedness. It is crucial that immigrants accept our values. It is also important that EU makes a kind of promotion video to show what the life in Europe is like. Immigrants also have to be aware of the European law and culture and it is our task to provide them with know-how so that they can be efficient in their working life and happy in their private life.

Nevertheless, if immigrants can not accept our values or brake our laws, they should be rejected or extradited. The quality of our future lives depends more and more also on the immigration, both in the good and bad sense. Immigration brings so much needed workforce, both qualified and unqualified, but also hidden danger if immigrantsŽ values do not comply with the European.

Indeed, it is very important to create incentives for the Europeans to start families and have at least 2 children through tax reductions, generous allowances and accessible facilities for even the smallest children.

As for radicalisation, it is clear that Islam is the triggering element which uses our democratic freedom of speech in the mosques and on the Internet to indoctrinate and radicalise mostly Muslim immigrants, but also Europeans who seek some values in their lives.

Unfortunately, this scenario is already known from the past when Nazism and communism started to spread their propagandas and many people lost their lives because of them. Islam as a religion is being used as basis for a future plan to conquer the area which used to be part of the "caliphate".

The 11/9 attack was a symbolic start of this renewed war (to commemorate the Muslim defeat at the battle of Vienna on 11 September 1683).

Whether we want to admit it or not, we are facing a danger which is not so much outside anymore. The danger is growing within our borders and sometimes also lives on the money provided by our governments in the form of allowances. Another thing we could do is to motivate immigrants who are not able to integrate to leave our countries with financial means as it is already applied in France.

What could even worsen our situation is the accession of Turkey to the EU. If we accept this country where Islam prevails as a religion and also give it a lot of political power, we can be sure that our European law will be soon replaced by Sharia.

It is high time to do our best to ensure security for our future.

ANNEXES

Discussion Paper on the Approaches to Antiradicalisation and Community Policing in the Transatlantic Space47
Jonathan Paris
23 August 2007

1. Comparative overview of government approaches to counter-radicalization in Europe and America

A trend common across Europe is that there is a decrease in terrorist incidents driven by Al Qaeda (AQ) command and control in South Asia. The conviction earlier this month of the UK dirty bombers under Dhiren Barot represents one of the last of this kind of outside-inside attack. Governments are increasingly confronted, instead, with home-grown terrorist networks. The threat has morphed from a jihadi organization with a physical headquarters and chain of command to a jihadi movement  an ideology motivating dispersed groups internationally.

Terrorists who trained in Afghanistan-based Al Qaeda (AQ) camps are still relevant actors in Europe. For instance, new evidence about the 7/7 bombers shows that Mohamed Siddique Khan and one of his co-bombers made connections with AQ in visits to Pakistan. The difference, however, is that Sid Khan sought out AQ. AQ did not seek out Sid Khan.

The rise of home-grown Jihadis inspired by a movement or ideology as opposed to an organization from outside has deep implications for governments trying to draft counter radicalization strategies:

The first implication has been that developments and communities at home are watched much more closely. How Muslims integrate and what to do about the evolution of parallel societies along with parallel values within European countries is no longer the sole province of social scientists and social workers. Security and the prevention of terrorism depend, increasingly, on such socio-economic dynamics on the ground.

The second implication is that radicalization is now seen as a more important component of terrorism than before. Rather than focus on the terrorist slipping in from a training camp in Afghanistan, governments must now focus on the process by which ordinary citizens, some second or third generation citizens, become radicalized. It is now widely understood that home-grown terrorists are inspired by radical ideas before they become willing to carry out terrorism and that joining radical groups is often a stepping stone to terrorism. Governments are more attentive to countering those radical ideas and are even trying to de-radicalize those within their countries who buy into them. On this point, governments do differ, sometimes sharply.

The third implication is that governments need to develop much better ties with Muslim communities, first because the authorities require their help to source intelligence to counter terrorist acts, and second because they can be crucial in the processes of preventing radicalization.

United Kingdom
The British have a long tradition of upholding free speech and providing a haven for dissidents from other countries. Londonistan was the moniker given by French security services frustrated with the UKs reluctance to extradite an Algerian involved in terrorist acts against public transportation services in Paris during the mid-1990s. The premise in the UK has long been that government should neither try to direct nor interfere with citizens ideas and views: this is the domain of civil society and the marketplace of ideas, even radical ones, is better left unregulated by government.

The debate in the UK these past few years over whether to outlaw Hizb ut-Tahrir or HT, also known as the Islamic Liberation Party, is an example of government upholding the view that groups should not be outlawed simply for radical ideas. The British legal system retains a distinction between word and deed. The platform and pronouncements of Hizb ut-Tahrir do not make them outlaws, notwithstanding their homophobic and anti- Semitic dogma and their call for the replacement of the British political and legal system with the caliphate under Sharia law.

If persuasion and mobilization by imams and media are the critical enablers of radicalization, then criminal law-enforcement
approaches that focus on the operational but not on the motivational side, and treat the symptoms rather than its causes, may be insufficient to deal with the terrorist threat. Emphasis must be placed on influential figures such as Abu Hamza al Masri, the imam who made such a deep impression on his followers, including Richard Reid, the Shoe Bomber, and Zacarias Moussaoui, the twentieth 9/11 hijacker. For every charismatic imam, there are several more young men converted to the cause of radical Islam who pose potential threats to their societies. See Jonathan Paris, A Framework for Understanding Radical Islams Challenge to European Governments

Germany, by contrast, outlawed HT because they violate a provision in the German Constitution proscribing groups that advocate anti-Semitic beliefs. The UK has no such provision, although it does have laws against inciting racial hatred. Even the fact that HT is an international organization actively engaged in violence in parts of Central Asia has not been deemed sufficient to move the Home Office to outlaw the group.

To understand the UKs approach one has to look at the way in which British values have evolved, the UKs history of race and minority relations and multiculturalism. For the British, multiculturalism has its origins in the history of the British Empire. Britain ruled its colonies in the 18th and 19th centuries in places like Yemen with only hundreds of British troops and colonial administrators, and whole subcontinents like India with not much more than thousands. They governed by working with leaders of the native communities and monopolizing firearms and other sources of coercive power. The British authorities did not care much how the local authorities kept law and order, or whether their cultures diverged from British or western values. What mattered was whether the local leaders could keep their people in order. This live and let live philosophy carried over during the waves of migration of whole villages of Kashmiri men in the late 1940s and early 1950s who came to take up jobs in the mines and factories of northern England.

In 2001 UK authorities became aware that there was a link between extremist ideas being propounded in London by preachers like Abu Qatada, known as Osama Bin Ladens religio-ideological mentor, and Abu Hamza al Masri, who preached at the Finsbury Mosque in London. Emerging connections between the 9/11 bombers and the radical ideas being promoted by certain figures in the UK put into question the live and let live credo of multiculturalism.

Another factor prompting a retreat from multiculturalism was the evolving demographic situation in London and some of the northern cities of the UK. British Muslims now number over 2 million.5 Muslims outnumber all the other minorities in the UK combined and over 10% of London is Muslim. The largest cohort within the Muslim population is males aged 16-25, which is the group most susceptible to radicalization.

Nonetheless, the prevailing view of the Home Office has been that radical ideas are part of a phase that people, particularly young people, go through. To paraphrase one Minister of State, there is nothing wrong with having strong views against the Bush/Blair policy on Iraq or other issues as long as you do not veer into violence. Countering that view however have been other official voices like that of the former head of MI5, who told this author that the period of time in which a radical becomes a terrorist is shortening from years to months.

Abid of the Muslim Contact Unit of the Met Police estimated a current 2007 population of 2,250,000 UK Muslims. The often used 1.6 million is based on a census of 2001 and does not account for the illegal Muslims, the legal immigrants in the last six years and the natural increase from birth in that same period.

The combination of jihadi groups on the ground attempting to radicalize young British Muslims, the persuasive messages of jihadi internet, and the connection with Muslim victims all over the world assisted by Arab satellite television, have compelled British authorities to look more closely at the role of UK groups that promote radical views. There has been a marked government shift away from engagement for the sake of engagement towards a more selective, values-based approach.

Now when the Home Office holds dialogues with the Muslim community, they are no longer dominated by the Muslim Council of Britain. The British Government is backing away from condoning groups when they show themselves to be extremist. Extremism is now seen as a midpoint between holding radical views and actively engaging in acts of terrorism.

Although they may stop short of outright advocating violence, extremists succour and support those who would engage in it. Specific policy and legislative steps that the UK has taken to counter radicalization include:

1. legislation was passed following the 7/7 bombing that makes any glorification of terrorism no longer permitted.

2. The holding period for suspects increased from 7 to 28 days.

3. The budgets for MI5 and police anti-terrorism units and other security services has increased significantly.

4. The Home Office has reorganized by moving non-terrorist affairs over to the Department of Justice and retaining at the Home Office an enlarged Office for Security and Counter-terrorism, which becomes the focal point within the government for counter-radicalization initiatives.

5. At the same time, recognizing the need for grass roots engagement and prevention, the Department for Communities and Local Government (DCLG) was established. While criticized initially for being overly lenient with radical groups, Minister, Ruth Kelly, has moved to publicly criticize separatist tendencies amongst certain British Muslim communities, and has insisted on immigrants learning English. Additionally the DCLG no longer funds Muslim organizations that refuse to condemn discrimination on the basis of gender, anti-Semitism, and other core British values. The latter is a term that has increasingly been used in political discussions about the battle against radicalization.

France
With the more frequent appearance of the notion of core British values, there has been something of a shift in British approach but at the heart of traditional British multiculturalism was a reluctance to assert the superiority of any value system. The traditional French approach on the other hand is itself a value system: namely, the Republican ideal that subjugates group or ethnic identity in favour of a universal secular citizenship ideal based on Liberté, egalité, fraternity. Those who confront the French Republican ideals are dealt with categorically by a system defined by laicité or secularism that limits expressions of religion in the public sphere.

The history of Muslims in France is, like in the UK, coloured by Frances colonial past which was guided by a missionary zeal to transform colonies and their people into Republican citizens, assuming their values and political system. In sum, the approach was assimilation. The bulk of the approximately 5 to 6 million Muslims in France come from Algeria. Algeria had been incorporated into France as one of its regions and its residents became French citizens. Most Algerian Muslims came to France after the Algerian War of Independence in the late 1950s and 1960s. Their French citizenship status was never in doubt.

Robust Legal Regime. When it comes to combating extremism, the French system of laicite is buttressed by a tougher legal regime than is found in the UK and other European countries. French law prohibits hate-speech and authorizes the preventive detention of those that incite violence more or less indefinitely. These measures make it easier to deport imams and extremists, even if they hold French passports. French law also permits the security apparatus to engage in more extensive surveillance techniques. A specialized judiciary branch for terrorism has evolved with judges that act in some ways as prosecutors.

The French have the recent and relevant experience of fighting what some would identify as the forerunners of Al Qaeda in the mid 1990s, when the Paris subway was bombed several times by members of the Algerian extremist group GIA. Unburdened by the British system of rights for defendants, French governments have imposed stronger antiterrorist legislation over the last 30 years, passed by a very willing parliament.

The problem with the French reliance on a legal deterrent through prosecution and deportation is that inadequate resources are invested in the root causes and ideological dimensions of extremism. The French governments hyper-secular vantage point also makes it difficult for them to debate Islamists. It seems therefore that the French approach can largely be characterized as one that keeps the symptoms under control, while failing to address their underpinnings.

Socio-Economic Problems and Representation. The engine of radicalization that most concerns French authorities is the social isolation, economic hardships and general hopelessness of the largely North African youth living in the high rise apartment complexes in suburbs that surround major French cities. These youth resent the hypocrisy of the ethnically blind system when employers refuse to hire them because their name is Hassan or Mohamed. The failure of French aspiratory values (equality, solidarity, etc.) to deliver the jobs and wealth promised by assimilation was at the heart of the riots seen in November 2005. The rioters attacked symbols of authority by burning police stations, symbols of unfulfilled promises of education by burning kindergartens and symbols of the wealth they had been denied by burning cars.

Analysts of the 2005 riots are correct in noting that the Islamists still have not penetrated the hearts and minds of disadvantaged French Muslim youth, but France appears to be at a critical point. Many believe that if the harsh tactics of the police are replaced by engagement and dialogue, and by a fairer representation of minorities in government and the media, then the Islamists may be unable to prevail. President Sarkozy's challenge is to create job opportunities so that the promises of egalité resonate among the unemployed and alienated youth of North African origin.

In addition to closer government focus on the economic causes of radicalization, the French are beginning to address the near absence of minority political representation. Until the recent elections, hardly any French Muslims competed for local seats in the National Assembly.

The French have also retreated somewhat from their policy of ethnic blindness and rigid assimilation. In 2003, then Interior Minister Sarkozy created a Muslim Council as a concession to religious identity politics, but this has had a mixed reception amongst Muslims and non-Muslims alike. In addition, Sarkozy has been open to exploring affirmative action, hitherto largely rejected in France. He supported the governments creation of a Museum of Immigration as a way to pay homage to the history of immigrants in France and their contribution to French society, culture and commerce.

Since his rise to the Presidency, Sarkozy has also established a new Ministry for Immigration and Integration again signalling something of a shift away from Frances traditional stance.

While Frances hitherto harsh secularism and poor record on socio-economic integration have alienated and marginalized Muslim communities, the overarching and very visible, French value-system has been seen by many as an effective tool in countering the appeal of radical ideologies. For instance, in a Pew Research poll of Muslims conducted in the spring of 2006 that asked respondents whether they identified more strongly with their nationality or their religion, 81 percent of British Muslims said they were Muslim first and British second, compared with only 46 percent of French Muslims saying they were Muslim first, French second.

Overall, it would seem that the French are inching towards a slightly more Anglo-Saxon approach to integration, while the British have adopted some elements of the French values-based citizenship approach.

Germany
The Muslim community in Germany is characterized by the predominance of Turkish migrants. Of about 3.2 million Muslims, 2 million are of Turkish origin; about 300,000 are of Arab origin; and between one-third and one-half of the Arabs are of Moroccan origin. 14 The German experience with its Muslims might be given poor marks in terms of integration but good marks in terms of averting, thus far, lethal terrorist incidents and other manifestations of radicalization.

On the integration front, the historic approach to immigrants as short term labourers, without thought of the longer term status of those that decided to stay meant that in general the governments emphasis was on getting Muslim and other immigrant groups to adhere to the dominant German identity.

On the radicalization front, some attribute the absence of terrorist attacks to an ethnic cleavage between Turkish and Arab communities. The idea is that factional in-fighting diverts individuals from either side from targeting non-Muslims. The more likely explanation however is that most Turks, who themselves have come from a sharply secular political system, do not buy into radical Islamist interpretations of their religion or the transnational AQ networks. The Muslim migration to Germany historically was driven by economic opportunity. Unlike the UK and France, Germany was never a colonizer of the countries from which its Muslims emigrated.

This is not to say that Germany does not face a threat from future radicalization. That threat comes from several causes, the foremost being the failure of the Muslim populations to integrate into German society and the related lack of upward mobility within the parallel communities that have arisen in the major cities of Germany. From grandfather to grandson, there is little spoken German, little economic advancement and a pattern of illiterate foreign child mothers that have not accessed modern health care and education. Within a mile in either direction, Lebanese neighbourhoods exist without contact with non-Lebanese communities and Turkish neighbourhoods exist without contact with anyone other than Turks.

Compounding the slow pace of Muslim integration is the growing clash of cultural patriarchal mores within the Turkish community pitting the tradition of cousin marriage against the desire of German Turkish women (and men) to marry by choice and outside their families. After several high profile honour killings, which have also occurred in the UK, authorities are beginning to assert German values of gender equality and insist on citizens responsibilities as well as citizens rights. With relatively high birth rate Muslim population is expected to double to 6.5 million by 2015. The Muslim youth bulge will be especially conspicuous in coming decades with the fairly dramatic decline in the birth rate of indigenous Germans.

The German Ministry of Interior sees a link between lack of integration and radicalization. First generation Turkish or Kurdish immigrants may be immune to radical Islamist ideology, but as in other European countries, second and third generation German Muslims are more susceptible to the call of virtual Islamism and less fettered by ethnic moorings.

The German approach is to improve integration by making it more difficult for Turks to have arranged marriages with child brides, often from the poorest parts of Anatolia. New legislation that is pending will require that a bride must be at least 18-years-old and have some knowledge of the German language before being permitted to immigrate. The aim is for this to support the upward mobility of the next generation, which is closely linked the level of education of mothers.

Parenthetically, one of the triggers of the 7/7 UK bomb leaders radicalization was his Pakistani parents insistence on an arranged marriage, which he rejected. The radical groups embraced his decision to marry consensually, as a right granted by true Islam.17 But while the German federal government is trying to address cultural mores that are incompatible with European values of free choice, the regional governments have taken a variety of positions that at times have been contradictory to national policy.

Overall, the German strategy on radicalization can best be characterized as preventive. The government senses that Turkeys increasing political turmoil will impact on German Turks. Islamist organizations like Milli Görüs have expanded their activities recently and their members are known to be extremely violent even though the group has stayed just within the borders of lawful extremism. The German government has banned two other groups, Hizb ut-Tahrir and the Caliph State Organization, for adopting views that are so extremist as to violate the German Constitution and represent a clear danger.

In the last year, the German Ministry of Interior has created a new initiative for preventing radicalization. Called the German Islam Conference (Islamkonferenz), the government has invited apolitical segments of the Muslim community, including artists, teachers, electricians and businesswomen to a structured debate with government (including representatives of all the regional governments and relevant ministries). This selection of people are intended to represent the everyman and identify as Muslims only in terms of their faith. This outreach effort balances the usual participants in such conferences, who are drawn from the official Muslim representative organizations.

The Conference conducts a series of circles or working groups on different topics including:

i. reconciling different religions to achieve common values
ii. the role of faith based schools
iii. economic programs
iv. media coverage to foster integration, and even
v. debating clubs.

The German government claims that Muslims engaged in German local politics rarely if ever espouse radical views.20 As in the case of France, the government is encouraging more political representation of Muslims. If successful, the government hopes to undermine what it considers a key motivator of radicalization by proving the radicals assertion of Muslim political marginalization to be false.

2. Comparative assessment of the successes and failures of community policing methodologies

Community Policing is defined as a preventive style of policing that focuses on building local relationships to engage relevant communities.33

Its goals are:

1. promoting outreach, enhancing inclusiveness and integration, and minimizing the
disaffection that can lead to radicalization particularly among Muslim youth;

2. serving as an early warning system on the ground resources to identify incipient
radicalization or terrorist activities; and

3. opening up new channel of communications with individuals who can navigate
the linguistic and cultural complexities of Islam and provide much needed context
to inform intelligence analysis.

Communities gain from community policing by regaining a sense of control over theirenvironment and having an opportunity to demonstrate their civic responsibility(especially important to communities in the US) and having a channel for addressing
their own concerns regarding terrorism and lawlessness.

Community policing is viewed as a long-term process that depends heavily on developing
partnerships or two-way flows of information with the community. Talking at thecommunity does not lead to the information needed by the police. Engaging with the community requires listening to their concerns, their political views, and their hardships
and complaints.

The main criticism of community policing, which applies to other policing methodologies, is the absence of metrics to evaluate their success. Is it enough to say that the lack of a crime scene is proof that a particular policing methodology is working?

The other criticisms of community policing are:

1. Interlocutors from the community are reluctant to cooperate with authorities in turning in the home grown jihadis. Peter Clarke, head of Police Counter-Terrorism in the United Kingdom, stated bluntly in a public address on April 24, 2007 that (al)most all of our prosecutions have their origins in intelligence that
33 The formal definition of community policing is a policing strategy and approach aimed at reducing crime and the fear of crime through proactive engagement with the community. This assumes greater accountability for the police, a greater role for the
community in collaborative problem solving, and a greater concern for civil rights and liberties. Friedman, Robert, Community

Policing: Some conceptual and Practical considerations Home Affairs Review, 1996, pp 114-23. came from overseas, the intelligence agencies or from technical means. Few have
yet originated from what is sometimes called community intelligence.

2. There is a disturbing disconnect between priorities of the government, focused on promoting integration and countering extremism at the local level, and the Muslim community leaders who are focused, especially in Britain, on Islamophobia in the media and British foreign policy on Iraq, Palestine and other
places far away.

3. Community policing is never a replacement for traditional police work in combating terrorism.

4. Terrorists have moved further underground in response to police outreach into community elders and mosques.

5. There is a risk of police being so reliant on a group of Muslims for information that the police will be reluctant to break with or arrest members of the group in other circumstances, a risk that can sacrifice the rights of the public in order to placate the Muslim community. Some echoed this concern after London Metropolitan Police Chief, Ian Blair announced his soft policing strategy to
establish hundreds of Safer Neighbourhoods teams.

6. Advocates of civil liberties are concerned about turning citizens into spies ontheir fellow citizens when they engage in information exchanges with community police.

7. Questions as to whether the information elicited from some members of the community is tainted by jihadi network efforts to deceive the police.

8. Whether the community will react negatively when the police hold back tactical information on specific counter-terrorism strategies.

9. Whether the real value of policing comes from up and down partnerships within the police command rather than parochial relationships on a neighbourhood level between local police units and the community.

10. Many smaller police departments lack the manpower to sustain the effort and invest significant time effort and energy over the long term, preferring to look for quick successes.

The general response to the above criticisms from advocates of networking with Muslim communities is that there is no alternative to community policing. Traditional policing can supplement community policing but it cannot substitute for the kind of information gained from the community through engagement.

After briefly outlining alternative policing methodologies, this section compares community policing strategies in the US, UK, France and Germany.

Traditional policing relies primarily on crime solving techniques from within the police department. Traditional policing gained ground as police departments became more professionalized in order to root out corruption and brutality. One consequence of
professionalization, however, is a growing separation of police from the community and reliance on fellow police for information and paradigms for solving crimes. Mentoring of junior officers by senior officers reinforced the camaraderie within an increasingly
insular institution.

Intelligence-based policing is a form of community policing that emphasizes the gathering of information from the community as opposed to the gaining of trust from the community. It is not a distinct policing methodology and can be viewed as a subset of
community policing.

Zero Tolerance Policing (ZTP) relies on the broken glass theory which holds that strong use of coercive power to stop minor infractions prevents more serious types of crime by
contributing to an overall feeling of safety. ZTP is a deterrence-oriented, get-tough approach that replaces the iron fist in velvet glove approach with an iron fist in an iron glove.

The criticism of ZTP is that this kind of policing alienates the community, dries up sources of intelligence information on radicalization, encumbers police with administrative details from arrests for very minor offences, and often violates minority
rights that sometimes lead to incidents of corruption and brutality.

The consensus among most experts is that it is far better to utilize problem-oriented policing of which community policing is the major brand.41

Community policing is a profession that emphasizes open training and working with values rather than with rules. It may be that the combination of community and traditional policing is the optimal policy for dealing with radicalization in urban areas. 42

United Kingdom
The Muslim Contact Unit at the London Metropolitan Police was set up after 9/11 when the British police realized they needed access to the Muslim communities, elders, imams, and especially, young men who were dabbling with salafism. Abid, a policeman with the
Muslim Contact Unit who is bearded and wears Pakistani dress calls these young men default salafists, as they lack alternative ways to engage more with Islam but they have also not yet crossed the threshold to violence. Abid is precisely the policeman one would

want to gain the trust of Muslims in the broader London community and beyond.

He understands the various factions within the largely ethnic Pakistani and Bangladeshi community, and he knows how to avoid being side tracked into these factional vendettas by choosing one side over the other. He resists the common trap that outsiders fall into that can be summarized as Sufi good, Salafi bad. There are extremists among Sufis andSalafists who condemn violence and radicalism. The point is that without Muslim policeman like Abid, important information would be difficult to come by.

Abid echoes Police Chief Ian Blair who firmly believes that only the communities will defeat terrorism. In this era of home-grown terrorism, the tacit support of local terrorists by their kin and clan, friends and neighbours, provides the critical oxygen that enables the terrorist to function. In order to blunt this tacit support by fence sitters in the communities, the police need to engage with them and gain their trust.

The UK's approach to community policing has evolved quite far for a number of reasons. Firstly, UK police have been dealing with race riots in places like Brixton, the Midlands and West Yorkshire going back to the 1980s and earlier, giving them more experience
with ethnic communities. More recently the UK has been faced with the urban growth of radicalization amongst young Muslims men. This has forced the security services to develop relationships and alliances within the communities.

In countering Muslim radicalization in the UK, there has been a shift from a crime control response to a more creative approach that tackles the larger issue of integration. The Muslim Contact Unit of the London Metropolitan Police suggests the following:
45 One such initiative of the Department of Justice was Special Registration, in which more than 80,000 immigrant men were
fingerprinted, photographed and questioned by authorities.
46 Aida Balsano and Richard Lerner, The Role of Developmental Assets and Youth Civic Engagement in Promoting Positive
Development Among Youth, Rand Conference, September 2005.

1. Islam is not the issue. By searching for liberal or moderate Islam, the implication is that there is a problem with Islam itself. This notion feeds into AQ propaganda by making the struggle a war against Islam rather than against the misuse of Islam.

2. The problem for many young Muslims is they cannot get enough Islam from their local mosques. Britain needs more scholarly imams and teachers who can mentorthese people and provide answers in an Islamic context to their search for
meaning. Otherwise, they risk becoming Salafists by default.

3. One needs to be aware of terminology in order to avoid the unnecessary alienation of Muslims. For instance, Sharia is not necessarily a threat to British laws and values.

4. There is a need to engender more confidence among Muslims to express themselves.

5. The authorities need to engage Salafists and not demonize them.

6. Community policing is a long-term process of building trust. A two-way relationship is needed so that British Muslims are not afraid to express their opinions.

The challenge for the UK is a comprehensive one that includes effective surveillance to avoid deadly attacks, engaging local communities to counter radicalization of its members, seeking to discourage tacit support among members of the community of
extremists, and improving the integration of Muslim minorities. The question is whether the British authorities have the correct balance between community outreach and the safety of the wider public.

The perception of some analysts and elements of the public is that the government is leaning too far in the direction of soft policing without gaining a commensurate amount of intelligence from the community. They see the authorities acquiescing in the radical
notions of angry young Muslims and kowtowing to certain political Muslim organizations that claim singularly to represent such a diverse Muslim community. This perception however is not representative of reality; there is a lack of public awareness of
the creative counter-radicalization techniques being adopted. But with this lack of public knowledge one must be aware of the serious racial and religious backlash from vocal elements of the UK public if a future terrorist act does occur.

France and Germany

Where the UK may be accused of going too softly on its communities, France might be accused of the opposite. A few months before the riots, then Interior Minister Nicolas
Sarkozy supported tough police tactics over community policing in the so-called zones by saying he wanted to use a karcher or power hose to clean immigrants out and by deriding community policing as a waste of time, playing soccer with young thugs.47

How to explain the French antipathy toward community policing?

 French security services have fairly good intelligence from their penetration of the Algerian immigrant community and their years of experience first with the Algerian War and then with the Algerian related terrorist attacks in Paris in the mid 1980s and mid 1990s.

 The structure of French police forces is highly centralized.

 Since the French citizenship model is culturally and ethnically blind, authorities are reluctant to implement sustained community policing that targets ethnic immigrant communities, even though that is where many of the social and security problems originate and fester.

Germany, by contrast, has a decentralized federal structure with a central agency in Berlin alongside 16 Landers or provinces, each with its own police and security services. The advantages of flexibility that derive from decentralized, localized policing appear to outweigh the disadvantages of duplication of intelligence services. It is not surprising that Germany also has fairly developed community policing outreach that enables them to
operate flexibly according to the needs of each province to gather intelligence and form partnerships with Muslims in the highly segregated neighbourhoods in urban areas. The Landers have been experimenting recently with community crime prevention, and have rejected zero tolerance policing in favour of community policing.48

The weakness of French reliance on traditional policing was seen in the riots of 2005. Many of the banlieuex with masses of unemployed North African youth have become no-go zones for the police. There have been attacks on trains from southern cities like Marseilles by groups of North African thugs. (Incidentally however, the police were reluctant to report the train incidents for fear of stirring a backlash against the Muslim communities). Overall though, the lack of police engagement has limited the ability of the authorities to develop trust in the communities. The critical question is whether the traditional policing methodologies will evolve into a community policing format, in part, to prevent radical and extremist groups from gaining traction in these no-go zones, which have become black holes for the security services.

One structural anomaly of the French police system is that in addition to the Interior Ministry (DST), there is a separate unit, known as the Renseignements Généraux (RG), that deals with community relations. The RG, not the Interior Ministry, go into the zones and interface with the inhabitants there. Given the lack of cooperation between the two agencies and the grim picture in the increasingly isolated zones, it is possible that President Sarkozy may unify the RG with the DST, making one agency responsible for internal police and security and community relations, while another agency, the Directorate for Territorial Surveillance (DGST), remains responsible for external security threats. It is possible that the consolidated Interior Ministry may be more emboldened to explore community policing.
Some Conclusions

 The study of community policing is a new field and metrics for evaluating their success are only now being developed. There are gaps in understanding the where or the nodes where people meet and become radicalized, and the how or the process through which people become radicalized. Given that community policing is a long term process, the evidence thus far suggest that where the resource and manpower input is of high quality, the results are positive.

 While community policing may not be the only answer, there appears to be no real alternative to community policing as a means of engaging Muslimcommunities.

 Buttressing community policing with traditional policing makes sense. They are not contradictory although the open values-based culture of the former often clash with the paramilitary, insular, rules-based and professional culture of the latter.

 US Muslim and Arab communities appear more receptive to engagement withlocal law enforcement than with cooperation with federal authorities.

 In the current era of the home grown jihadi, where extremists live in thecommunity, authorities cannot expect members of the community to turn on theirown. It will take time to develop trust and identification with the interests of public safety over allegiances to ethnicity or religious affiliation. These competing interests and conflicting value systems are discussed in one of the other Conference sessions on the way in which governments articulate, textualise, and convey values through society in the transatlantic space as a means to counter radicalization.
Islam Could Become Europe's Dominant Religion, Experts Say48
CNC News March 2007

London (CNSNews.com) - As the Anglican Communion continues to fight over homosexuality and as church attendance plummets, experts say that Islam is well on its way to becoming the most dominant religion in Europe.

Meeting in London this week in their General Synod, the leaders of the Church of England continued to debate the role of gay and lesbian priests, an issue that increasingly threatens to cause a schism in the worldwide Anglican Church.

This follows another meeting in Tanzania last week in which Anglican bishops issued an official warning over the matter to the Episcopal Church, the American wing of the Communion. Under threat of being relegated to a lesser role in the Communion, the Episcopal Church must promise by the end of September not to consecrate another homosexual bishop or introduce prayers for same-sex couples.

Meanwhile, research studies show that church attendance in Britain is dropping precipitously, as well as across the whole of Western Europe.

According to Christian Research, a British think tank, only 6.3 percent of the British population in 2005 attended Christian services on a weekly basis.

The group also projects that around 4,000 churches will close over the next 15 years, being sold off or rehabilitated for other uses.

Reflecting a trend around Europe, British churches in the past decade have been transformed into restaurants, cafes, art galleries, mosques, and in one notable instance, a training school for circus acrobats in Bristol.

But while church attendance on the continent reportedly shows a similar decline, the level of Muslim religious participation and the Muslim population itself has exploded.

In recent years, experts say that young European Muslims are returning to the faith which their parents observed only sporadically, becoming much more devout.

Though Muslims only comprise around three percent of the British population, Christian Research says that in 35 years there will be twice as many Muslims in mosques on Friday as there are Christians in churches on Sunday.

In a 2004 ICM poll of 500 British Muslims, 51 percent said that they prayed every day.

In November, a study by the Spanish magazine Alba said that more mosques and prayer centres have been built in France than churches over the last century, with over 4,000 mosques currently serving the largest Muslim population in Europe.

Europe has seen a wave of Muslim immigration over the last century, in large part from the countries of North Africa, and some experts predict that they will become the dominant population by the end of this century.

In January, the Islam-Archive Central Institute, a government-sponsored think tank, projected that Muslims will be the majority population of Germany by 2046, based on fertility rates.

Brent Nelson, an expert on European Islam at Furman University in South Carolina, told Cybercast News Service Thursday it was hard to guess what a Europe with a large Muslim minority would look like.

However, he said that unless Christians and Muslims as a whole learn to compromise and live together, there was a danger of a clash between the two cultures.

From introducing daily prayers into the workplace to building mosques and minarets in cities, there would be endless grounds for conflict in the future, he said.

"The danger is that Europe will not come to terms with what it means to absorb a large Muslim population," he said. "And in turn that Muslims won't come to terms with what it means to live in the West, the need to compromise with Western values. If that doesn't occur, you'll have a culture war which will dwarf anything we've seen in the United States."

David Masci, a senior research fellow at the Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life, said Thursday it was difficult for many Muslim immigrants to accept the secular nature of countries like Holland.

"Look," he said. "Holland is a society which is very, very liberal in terms of attitudes towards gender and towards sexuality. These people are clearly pushing against that."

However, he added that the Pentecostal and Evangelical strains of Christianity were showing a revival in Europe, spurred on by an influx of immigrants from Africa and Asia.

Though he didn't believe that Muslims would become the majority in Europe, he said he did see Muslims and Evangelical Christians eventually working together to achieve common goals, in areas such as curbing abortion laws and same-sex "marriage."

Sara Silvestri, an expert on European Islam at Chatham House, a London-based think tank, that many Muslims have a tendency to exaggerate their religious beliefs when asked.

Events over the last five years and the media spotlight on Islamic issues pushed previously nominal Muslims to be more active in their faith, she told Cybercast News Service.

"I know Muslims who don't wear a veil, who don't grow a beard, but who still identify themselves as a Muslim in the social sphere," she said.

Nicole Bourque, a professor of religious studies at Glasgow University, said that she thought increasing numbers of Christians would convert to Islam in the coming years.

She said that she knew of around 200 converts in Glasgow alone, mostly lapsed Christians who had grown up without a strong religious background.

While many were women who had married Muslim men, she said many had been attracted to learn more about Islam by its increased profile since 2001.
Situation state by state

United Kingdom

Brown: Don't say terrorists are Muslims49
Daily Mail 3. July 2007
Gordon Brown has banned ministers from using the word Muslim in connection with the terrorism crisis.

The Prime Minister has also instructed his team; including new

Home Secretary Jacqui Smith; that the phrase;war on terror is to be dropped.
Tuesday July 3,2007
By Macer Hall, Political Editor
Comment Speech Bubble Have your say(42)
Gordon Brown has banned ministers from using the word Muslim in ­connection with the ­terrorism crisis. The Prime Minister has also instructed his team  including new Home Secretary Jacqui Smith  that the phrase war on ­terror is to be dropped. The shake-up is part of a fresh attempt to improve community relations and avoid offending Muslims, adopting a more consensual tone than existed under Tony Blair.

However, the change provoked claims last night that ministers are indulging in yet more political correctness.

The sudden shift in tone emerged in comments by Mr Brown and Ms Smith in the wake of the failed attacks in London and Glasgow.

Mr Browns spokesman acknowledged yesterday that ministers had been given specific guidelines to avoid inflammatory language.

There is clearly a need to strike a consensual tone in relation to all communities across the UK

Mr Browns spokesman

There is clearly a need to strike a consensual tone in relation to all communities across the UK, the spokesman said. It is important that the country remains united.

He confirmed that the phrase war on terror  strongly associated with Mr Blair and US President George Bush  has been dropped.

Officials insist that no direct links with Muslim extremists have been publicly confirmed by police investigating the latest attempted terror attacks. Mr Brown himself did not refer to Muslims or Islam once in a BBC TV interview on Sunday.
Ms Smith also avoided any such reference in her statement to MPs yesterday.
One in 11 British Muslims backs suicide bombers, says Brown aide
This is London 3. August 2007
As many as one in 11 British Muslims agree with and proactively support terrorism, a Government adviser has warned police.

Haras Rafiq also told officers at Scotland Yard that up to 20 per cent of the Muslim population ' sympathise' with militants, while stopping short of being prepared to 'blow themselves up'.

His remarks underline the scale of the task facing Gordon Brown to win the hearts and minds of Muslims, only a week after he promised an extra £70million to councils and community groups to fight extremism.

Mr Rafiq, an adviser to the Government's preventing extremism taskforce, said: "A percentage of people actually agree and support proactively the people that are deciding to blow themselves up.

"It varies, it can be 7 per cent, 5 per cent, 9 per cent."

With 1.6million Muslims living in the UK, nine per cent is the equivalent of 144,000 people supporting terrorism.

'Proactively' supporting terrorism is understood to mean the people are vocal in their support for fanatics, rather than actively helping them to commit atrocities.

Mr Rafiq, filmed by Channel 4's Dispatches, went on: "Next we can have a percentage of people that can actually sympathise.

"These people at this stage. won't go out and be operational and won't decide to blow themselves up but can sympathise with the people that can blow themselves up.

"Again this can be in double digits. Then we have a percentage of the population that actually empathises with the people that blow themselves up. It could be 15 to 20 per cent.

"It could be somebody who says, 'I don't agree that these guys are blowing themselves up but I can actually understand why'."

Mr Rafiq, a member of the Sufi Muslim Council, made his presentation to Scotland Yard earlier this year, after almost two years of Government attempts to combat extremism in the wake of the July 7 bombings.

Critics argue that working parties and an attempt to persuade Muslim leaders and groups such as the Muslim Council of Britain to speak out against extremism have not had the desired impact.

The documentary reveals that fanatics are continuing to peddle a message of hatred in the UK.

This centres on persuading Muslims that the covenant of security that in return for safety and freedom, Muslims do not attack the nation that is their home - has been broken by draconian anti-terror laws and the war in Iraq.

Dispatches discovered that Abu Mohammed, a fanatical preacher based in Europe, managed to make a series of visits to Britain, lecturing to young Muslims in houses in Luton, before being banned by the Home Office in March this year.

He continues to radicalise followers here via the Internet.

Mohammed is filmed by reporter Phil Rees declaring: "We are in a state of war and no covenant exists..British Muslims should know that the British Government will do everything to frighten them, to make them very uncomfortable and they have to be prepared to pay the price and fight back."

Home Secretary Jacqui Smith said yesterday that the Government is changing its approach to dealing with extremism.

She added: "It seems to me that what we should be doing is emphasising the values that we share which are under attack from terrorism-rather than trying to create a battle or war between those who oppose the terror and those who want to carry it out."

Terror suspects in hospital link50
BBC 2. July 2007
Three of the eight people arrested in connection with the failed car bombings in Glasgow and London had links to a hospital in Paisley.
Iraqi Bilal Abdullah, who was arrested at Glasgow Airport, worked as a locum doctor at the Royal Alexandra Hospital.

UK: Eight Al Qaeda fanatics working for the police (but they don't dare sack them)51
Daily Mail 7. July 2007
Up to eight police officers and civilian staff are suspected of links to extremist groups including Al Qaeda. Some are even believed to have attended terror training camps in Pakistan or Afghanistan.
Eight Al Qaeda fanatics working for the police (but they don't dare sack them)
By STEPHEN WRIGHT - More by this author » Last updated at 12:12pm on 7th July 2007 Up to eight police officers and civilian staff are suspected of links to extremist groups including Al Qaeda. Some are even believed to have attended terror training camps in Pakistan or Afghanistan. Their names feature on a secret list of alleged radicals said to be working in the Metropolitan and other forces. Up to eight police officers and civilian staff are suspected of links to extremist groups including Al Qaeda, headed by Osama bin Laden (right)

The dossier was drawn up with the help of MI5 amid fears that individuals linked to Islamic extremism are taking advantage of police attempts to increase the proportion of ethnic staff.

Astonishingly, many of the alleged jihadists have not been sacked because - it is claimed - police do not have the "legal power" to dismiss them.

We can also reveal that one suspected jihadist officer working in the South East has been allowed to keep his job despite being caught circulating Internet images of beheadings and roadside bombings in Iraq.

He is said to have argued that he was trying to "enhance" debate about the war.

Classified intelligence reports raising concerns about police staff's background cannot be used to justify their dismissal, sources said.
First Islamic MBA to be launched in London university52
Gulf Times 21 February, 2007,
LONDON: The world’s first Master of Business Administration (MBA) course with an Islamic finance element is to be launched this year in London, says a news item posted on the Arabian Business website.
Church school renames Three Little Pigs to avoid offending Muslims53
Daily Mail, 15 March 2007
The story of the Three Little Pigs' battle with the Big Bad Wolf has delighted children since it was written more than 150 years ago.
But the tale highlighting the merits of hard work and practicality has become the latest to fall victim to political correctness.
Ethnic baby boom 'crisis'54
Daily Express June 2007
A third of babies being born in Sheffield are to ethnic minority families, an official report has revealed.
UK: Muhammad is No 2 in boy's names55
Times 6. June 2007
Muhammad is now second only to Jack as the most popular name for baby boys in Britain and is likely to rise to No 1 by next year, a study by The Times has found. The name, if all 14 different spellings are included, was shared by 5,991 newborn boys last year, beating Thomas into third place, followed by Joshua and Oliver.
Police guard girl 'forced to become Muslim'
Birmingham Mail 6. June 2007
A TEENAGE Sikh girl was today being guarded by police amid claims she had been forced to convert to Islam. An armed gang smashed their way into a house in Erdington last month and threatened the occupants, apparently in search of the girl.
http://icbirmingham.icnetwork.co.uk/mail/news/tm_headline=police-guard-girl--forced-to-become-muslim-%26method=full%26objectid=19253457%26siteid=50002-name_page.html
1,000 men living legally with multiple wives despite fears over exploitation56
Times 28. May 2007
Polygamous marriage is flourishing as the Government admits for the first time that nearly a thousand men are living legally with multiple wives in Britain.

The Netherlands

Minister Welcomes Sharia In Netherlands If Majority Wants It57
nisnews.nl , 13/09/06
THE HAGUE - Justice Minister Piet Hein Donner considers the Netherlands should give Muslims more freedoms to behave according to their traditions. Muslims refusing to shake hands is fine with him. And Sharia law could be introduced in the Netherlands democratically, in the minister's view.

Muslims have the right to experience their religion in ways that diverge from Dutch social codes, according to the Christian democrat (CDA) minister. He thinks Queen Beatrix was very wise not to insist on a Muslim leader shaking hands with her when she visited his mosque in The Hague earlier this year.

Integration Minister Verdonk did previously scold an imam who would not shake her hand. Without directly referring to this incident, Donner considers "a tone that I do not like has crept into the political debate. A tone of: 'Thou shalt assimilate. Thou shalt adopt our values in public. Be reasonable, do it our way'. That is not my approach".

Donner strongly disagrees with a recent plea by CDA parliamentary leader Maxime Verhagen for a ban on parties seeking to launch Sharia (Islamic law) in the Netherlands. "For me it is clear: if two-thirds of the Dutch population should want to introduce the Sharia tomorrow, then the possibility should exist," according to Donner. "It would be a disgrace to say: 'That is not allowed!'."
Islam Expert: Netherlands Tolerates Muslim Excesses58
nisnews.nl 24/03/07
AMSTERDAM, - Dutch politicians and media are downplaying excesses of multicultural society and thereby increasing these, in the view of Islam expert Hans Janssen. "The Netherlands should resist, using non-peaceful means", he argues in weekly magazine Opinio.
Radical Imam tells Muslims in Holland not to pay taxes to harm Dutch state -Wilders calls for deportation59
Militant Islam Monitor April 2007
Ahmed Salam, the radical Imam from Tilburg, Holland who outraged a significant part of the country's population in November of 2004 when he refused to shake the hand of then Dutch Minister of Immigration Rita Verdonk, on the religious grounds that he would not touch the hand of a woman, has not moderated his radical Islamist agitation.

April 2, 2007 - San Francisco, CA - PipeLineNews.org - Ahmed Salam, the radical Imam from Tilburg, Holland who outraged a significant part of the country's population in November of 2004 when he refused to shake the hand of then Dutch Minister of Immigration Rita Verdonk, on the religious grounds that he would not touch the hand of a woman, has not moderated his radical Islamist agitation.

This despite having taken a integration course paid for by the Dutch government.

In fact he is stepping up his campaign.

Salam, who only speaks Arabic though having been in the country for over 15 years, was reported by the Netherlands based Brabants Dagblad as having called upon his followers, "Do harm to the Dutch state, don't pay taxes."

Stung by the almost universal criticism by Holland's non-Muslim population [Muslims comprise approximately 10% of the country's residents] Imam Salam now claims he never urged tax-refusal, trying to stave off calls for his deportation.

Capitalizing on this controversy Tilburg's Muslims have offered an olive branch of singular brazenness, telling the city's town council that they will stop going to the Imam's radical mosque if the council builds them another one, at public expense in the centre of town.

Marking the extraordinary degree of Dutch dhimmitude, Tilburg lawmaker Jan Hamming has already agreed to that proposal and is urging city residents to help him find a suitable location.

What Tilburg's officials fail to understand is that any Muslims who have been attending Salam's mosque are of the radical Islamist persuasion in the first place and therefore opening another mosque with Salam's "ex-congregants" would only result in two strongholds from which to operate.

Dutch politician Geert Wilders leader of the Freedom Party is heading the call to have a preaching ban enforced on Imam Salam, possibly stripping him of his Dutch citizenship and having him deported.

Tilburg mayor Vreeman has also reacted to Salam's insolence, stating that the Imam "does not belong here" a suggestion which has brought both criticism and support in this increasingly polarized society.

Italy
Italy "terror school" imam had bomb chemicals-police60
Sun 22 Jul 2007, 12:32 GMT
Reuters 21. July 2007
ROME, July 22 (Reuters) - A Moroccan imam arrested in Italy and suspected of running a "terrorism school" in his mosque had a variety of toxic chemicals at his home which could have been used to make explosives, police said on Sunday.

By Robin Pomeroy
ROME, July 22 (Reuters) - A Moroccan imam arrested in Italy and suspected of running a "terrorism school" in his mosque had a variety of toxic chemicals at his home which could have been used to make explosives, police said on Sunday.

The imam was arrested in a dawn swoop on Saturday along with two assistants who worked in the mosque at Ponte Felcino, near the central Italian city of Perugia. Police seized films and Internet files they said were used for combat training.

At the house of the imam, identified as Korchi El Mustapha, police said they found "dozens of bottles" inside three barrels containing a variety of chemicals "with which, when combined and mixed with other easily available products, it would be possible to make improvised explosives."

The arrests shocked Italy which, unlike Britain and Spain, has not experienced attacks by Islamic extremists, and Sunday newspapers carried headlines like "Al Qaeda school in Perugia" and "Terrorists ready to strike".

Police, who searched 23 addresses in the area, said the mosque was being used to recruit and train international terrorists.

The imam of Perugia, Abdel Qader, told the Rome daily Il Messaggero that he condemned anyone who preached violence and that the 10,000 Muslims living peacefully in the city were "a concrete example of successful cohabitation".

Qader said he had met the arrested imam and had no reason to suspect him of militancy, but did not know him well. "Perhaps sometimes he argued about international affairs, but you know how words can fly," he said.

The head of Perugia's Muslim community said he hoped there would not be a backlash against the faith, though this has already started in some quarters.

Roberto Calderoli, an opposition member of Italy's upper house for the anti-immigration Northern League, said all Italy's mosques should be closed and allowed to reopen only after they had been checked for illegal activity.
Italy arrests man for locking up "lively" wife61
Reuters March 2007
ROME, Feb 28 (Reuters Life!) - Italian police arrested a jealous husband in the north of the country who forced his young wife to stay at home for two years because she was "too lively" to be let outside.
"She was too lively. She absolutely had to be locked up otherwise who knows what she might have done," Egyptian immigrant Emad Zied, 31, was quoted as saying in Corriere della Sera daily newspaper on Wednesday.

France
Man gets 30 years for ripping out wife's eyes62
Sydney Morning Herald 21 March 2007
A man who ripped out his wife's eyes in a fit of rage was sentenced by a French court to 30 years behind bars on Tuesday.
Mohamed Hadfi, 31, tore out his 23-year-old wife Samira Bari's eyes following a heated argument in their apartment in the southern French city of Nimes in July 2003 after she refused to have sex with him.
Increasingly alienated and in despair over the illness of his son, Adam, the labourer killed his wife and four daughters by throwing petrol over them as they slept and igniting it.
Islamic pressure in Paris forces evangelical congregation to vacate building63
One news now June 2007
After a long struggle against Islamic intimidation, an evangelical church in the outskirts of Paris has been forced to vacate the 1,000-square-foot facility where it had been meeting.
Islamic pressure in Paris forces evangelical congregation to vacate building
Chad Groening OneNewsNow.com June 15, 2007
After a long struggle against Islamic intimidation, an evangelical church in the outskirts of Paris has been forced to vacate the 1,000-square-foot facility where it had been meeting.
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The Temple de Paris Church has been located in the Paris suburb of Bagnolet. Christine Thabot, the wife of the pastor, says Muslims have been trying to get rid of them since 2005, but local authorities had permitted the church to remain in the facility, paying 8,000 euros a month (~ $9,400 U.S.) in rent.

According to Thabot, the Muslims changed their strategy. "They attacked our owner this time," she explains. "They took up the case and [told him he was] not allowed to have this church open -- and on Friday we [were told] that we had to get out of our premises."

Thabot says Temple de Paris Church has been unable to secure another worship centre. "For an evangelical or Protestant church, it is almost next to impossible to buy or to rent any premises," she says. "As soon as they find out you are a church, there is nothing open to us."

Thabot says many churches in the area have been closed and have had similar difficulties in securing new facilities. But she claims Muslims can secure property for building a mosque simply by paying one euro to the authorities.

Scandinavia
Immigration and Radicalization in Scandinavia Erik Brattberg - 8/17/2007 64
Global Politician August 2007
Current demographic trends suggest that by 2020, ten percent of the overall European population will be Muslim. Although pluralism is by no means an impossibility, a large Muslim presence in Europe is not entirely unproblematic. Islamic radicals are today present in every West European country with a substantial Muslim minority. Up until 11 September 2001, these Jihadists operated in relatively interrelated network structures. The Jihadist movement is, however, currently undergoing a phase of decentralization resulting in a new form of home-grown terrorism. These terrorist cells consists predominantly of second and third generation Muslim immigrants, who inspired by Jihadist ideology are operating independently of traditional organizational structures.

The decentralization trend of terrorist networks is clearly evident in Scandinavia  a region often neglected in the global struggle against radical Islamism. Scandinavian Security Police agencies have long warned against radical tendencies in certain Scandinavian mosques (such as the Brandbergen Mosque in Stockholm and Taiba in Denmark) and among Muslim preachers (such as Mulla Krekar in Norway). Although no serious terror incident has yet been recorded in Denmark, Norway or Sweden, a number of plots by indigenous terrorist operatives to carry out attacks have recently been unravelled in Scandinavia. For instance, in September 2006, five men were sentenced to jail for planning a serious terror attack using explosives in Denmark. In October 2006, four men were charged with shooting at Oslo's synagogue and also for planning acts of terrorism against the US and Israeli embassies. And in Sweden, three were in May 2006, charged with planning an attack against the pro-Israeli Word of Life (Livets Ord) evangelical church in Uppsala.

When accounting for why the small prosperous and traditionally peaceful Nordic countries have become so susceptible to this new type of home-grown terrorism in the post-9/11 security climate, three general patterns stand out. First, Denmark, Norway and Sweden all have considerable Muslim minorities. Large-scale immigration begun after the Second World War when the Nordic countries opened up their borders for labour immigrants from southern Europe, the Balkans and Turkey. During the 1980s and 90s, a new wave of economic, political and religious refugees arrived from the Middle East (mainly Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Turkey and the Palestinian territories) and the horn of Africa. Today there are an estimated 275.000 practicing Muslims in Denmark, 76.000 in Norway and over 300.000 in Sweden.

Furthermore, the often poorly integrated immigrant communities have systematically become dependent on government subsidies as their chief means of income. This has a resulted in a high unemployment level for non-European immigrants. In 2001, persons born outside of Sweden on average received seven times more in social security assistance than Swedish-born nationals. The figures for Denmark and Norway are close to those of Sweden. Whereas the policies of the welfare state in the short term can reduce the economic poverty of low-income takers and thus have a pacifying effect on unassimilated immigrants, the same policies tend, in the long run, to create a dependence on the state which in effect can lead to further alienation from the indigenous society.

Lastly, terrorists and their indigenous sympathizers have been successful in exploiting the benefits of the Scandinavian open liberal democracies with their modern infrastructure offerings. These enlightened and sophisticated systems have enabled domestic perpetrators in the name of "higher principles" to engage in propaganda activities, secure safe-havens, raise funds, purchase weapons and provide logistical support to overseas terrorist organizations.

In the wake of September 11, the Scandinavian governments worked hard to address the terrorism threat and the radicalization of its Muslim immigrants. Despite proven progress, more policy and law-making attention are still required in conjunction with stronger efforts to increase the public awareness over the challenge posed by Islamic radicalism. Despite Islamic radicalization being an equally serious threat in Scandinavia as it is in many other European countries, many Scandinavians unfortunately still view their countries as immune.

Terrorism is unlikely to get an easy solution; instead it seems to be the great struggle of the 21st century. In todays globalized world, no regions can ever be fully isolated from the perils of extremism. When concerned over engaging in this long struggle against radical Islamism, one might bear in mind the inspiring words of the great Swedish statesman and former UN General Secretary, Dag Hammarskjöld, The pursuit of peace and progress cannot end in a few years in either victory or defeat. The pursuit of peace and progress, with its trials and its errors, its successes and its setbacks, can never be relaxed and never abandoned.
Erik Brattberg is a researcher on terrorism affiliated with the Inter-University Center for Terrorism Studies and Uppsala University in Sweden.

Report of the official account of the bombings in London on 7th July 2005

No 1087 200506
11 May 2006
Published by The Stationery Office (TSO) U.K.
WHY DID THEY DO IT?
The key factors in turning Khan, Tanweer, Hussain and Lindsay into bombers are only partly clear at this stage. Who were they?

The backgrounds of the 4 men appear largely unexceptional. Little distinguishes their formative experiences from those of many others of the same generation, ethnic origin and social background, with the partial exception of Lindsay, who will be considered separately at the end of this chapter.

Khan was the oldest of the group. Born in Leeds on 20 October 1974, he was 30 at the time of the bombings. He appears to have been the groups ringleader. Tanweer was born on 15 December 1982, Hussain on 16 September 1986, 22 and 18 respectively when they died. All three were second generation British citizens whose parents were of Pakistani origin. Their respective parents had come to West Yorkshire from Pakistan many years before, found work, settled and taken British citizenship. Khan was the youngest of 6 children, Tanweer the second of 4 and the eldest son, Hussain the youngest of 4.

All 3 grew up in Beeston and the neighbouring district of Holbeck on the outskirts of Leeds. Tanweer and Hussain were still living there with their parents when they died. Khan moved a short distance away after his marriage in 2001, first to Batley then to Dewsbury, although he was still much involved in the area as a teaching assistant and youth worker. The area is largely residential, close-knit and densely populated with back-to-back terraced housing, much of which is in poor condition. The population is ethnically mixed with quite a high transitory element. There are a number of mosques, a large, modern community centre, an Islamic bookshop (now closed) and a large park where the young play football and cricket. The area is deprived. Average income is low (over 10,000 of the 16,300 residents have living standards that are amongst the worst 3% nationally) but there is little to distinguish it from many poorer areas of Britains other big cities and Khan, Tanweer and Hussain were not poor by the standards of the area; with Tanweers father in particular being a prominent local businessman.

All 3 were educated locally. Khan is remembered as quiet, studious and never in trouble. He was apparently a vulnerable boy and sometimes bullied at school. After school, he worked locally for the Benefits Agency and then for the Department of Trade and Industry as an administrative assistant. He left to study at Leeds Metropolitan University in September 1996 and achieved a 2.2
in business studies. It was here that he met his future wife, a British Muslim of Indian origin. They were married on 22 October 2001 and had a daughter in May 2004. The marriage was not arranged and both families are said initially to have disapproved. Khans parents had moved away to Nottingham, but he and some siblings remained in the Leeds area. It was at University that Khan appears to have developed a vocation for helping local disadvantaged people, and took on part-time youth and community work while finishing his degree.

In 2001, Khan joined the staff of a local primary school, where he was employed as a learning mentor, working with special needs children and those with language or behavioural difficulties. The school was ethnically mixed and had a high pupil turnover. The job came to an end in November 2004, following problems over extended sick leave (see next section). During this time he continued to be active as a youth worker in Beeston.

Tanweer did well academically at school and was a gifted sportsman, excelling at cricket and athletics. He played for a local cricket team. He went on to study sports science at Leeds Metropolitan University in 2001 and obtained an HND after 2 years. He left University in 2003 before completing the follow-on BSc course. He worked part-time in his fathers fish and chip shop until November 2004, after which he did not have paid employment and was supported by his family. His father was looking to set him up in business at this time.

Hussain was not a high achiever academically, keen on sport but not outstanding. He left school in 2003 with a few GCSEs at C grade and below. He went on to College to study for an Advanced Business Programme. Although his attendance record was patchy, he stayed to the end of the course in June 2005.

Early signs of extremism?

We do not know how Khan developed his extreme views or precisely when. By the time he began his job as a learning mentor in 2001, it was clear that he was serious about religion. He prayed regularly at work and attended the mosque on Fridays. He told others that he had not had a blameless youth and had got into fights. Associates suggest some alcohol and drug taking in the
1990s. But after one incident in a nightclub, he said that he turned to religion and it changed his life. He was not aggressive, extreme or politicised in the way he spoke about religion to colleagues. He had spoken out against the 9/11 attacks at school.

With hindsight, some of his colleagues believe there was a subtle change in his character around 12 months after starting at the school. He is said to have become less talkative and more introverted. On a couple of occasions, he showed uncharacteristic intolerance out of line with his normally easy gong manner. But his behaviour was not unusual enough to cause concern. Throughout it was clear that Khan, known widely as Sid, had a real talent and vocation for working with young people. He was highly regarded by teachers and parents, and had a real empathy with difficult children. Children saw him as a role model. He was highly successful in calming situations and getting excluded children back into school. He gave an interview to the Times Educational Supplement in 2002 in which he spoke passionately about his work. He took part in a school trip to the Houses of Parliament in 2004.

More problematic was his increasingly poor attendance record. His culminated in a period of sick leave from 20 September to 19 November 2004. The school administration had reason to believe that the absences were not genuine and dismissed him. At the same time, he had in any case, written to say he would not be returning to work.

Tanweer is said to have taken religion seriously from an early age but showed no signs of extremism. Throughout his teenage years, he appeared to have a balanced life. At school, he was remembered as calm, friendly, mature and modest, and was popular with his peers. The nickname his father gave him as a young child, Kaka meaning little one was used by his friends. He owned a red Mercedes, which his father had bought for him. He took care with his appearance, with fashionable hairstyles and designer clothing. He is said to have become more religiously observant from around the age of 16/17. Then from mid-2002 religion appeared to become the major focus of his life. He left his University course early, it is said both because there was no longer a local authority grant available but also because he was losing interest. Thereafter, he appeared to devote the majority of his time to religious study and observance including at a religious school in Dewsbury. But those around him observed no sign at any stage that strict religious observance had turned to extremism. He had received one caution for disorderly conduct in April 2004 but had otherwise not been in trouble with the police.

Hussain is remembered as quiet at school, with few friends. His most distinguishing feature was his large physique. He apparently became involved in a brief period of racial tension at the school but not as a ringleader or prominent troublemaker. He was abusive to a teacher on one occasion but this was said to be out of character.

Hussain undertook a Hajj visit to Saudi Arabia with his family early in 2002. After this, he began wearing traditional clothing and a prayer cap and would wear white on Fridays. Some time after this it was noticed that he had written Al Qaeda No Limits on his RE schoolbook. He was open about his support for Al Qaeda in school and said he regarded the 9/11 bombers as martyrs. He told his teacher on one occasion that he wanted to become a cleric when he left school. It is reported that he would regularly sit up until the early hours reading religious texts and praying. In 2003, he began working out regularly, watching his diet, and lost 5 stone. He was cautioned for shoplifting in Leeds town centre with another (older) youth in 2004, but had not otherwise been in trouble with the police.

Motivation

The best indications of the groups motivation are set out in Khans video statement, first aired on the Arabic television channel, Al Jazeera on 1 September and in his last Will and Testament, discovered by the police after the bombings.

The focus of the video is on perceived injustices carried out by the West against Muslims justifying violence through his own twisted interpretation of Islam. The key passages are:

Our driving motivation doesnt come from tangible commodities that this world has to offer.

Our religion is Islam  obedience to the one true God, Allah, and following the footsteps of the final prophet and messenger Mohammed..This is how our ethical stances are dictated.

Your democratically elected governments continuously perpetuate atrocities against my people all over the world. And your support of them makes you directly responsible, just as I am directly responsible for protecting and avenging my Muslim brothers and sisters.

Until we feel security, you will be our targets. And until you stop the bombing, gassing, imprisonment and torture of my people we will not stop this fight. We are at war and I am a solider. Now you too will taste the reality of this situation..

I myself, I make dua (The word dua in Arabic means calling. In addition to formal prayers, Muslims call upon God throughout the day through personal supplications or prayers dua) to Allah..to raise me amongst those whom I love like the prophets, the messengers, the martyrs and todays heroes like our beloved Sheikh Osama Bin Laden, Dr Ayman al-Zawahiri and Abu Musab al-Zarqawi and all the other brothers and sisters that are fighting in the..of this cause.

Although Khans Will also touches on these, its focus is much more on the importance of martyrdom as supreme evidence of religious commitment. It also contains anti-Semitic comments. It draws heavily on the published Will of a young British man killed during the US bombing of Tora Bora in Eastern Afghanistan in late 2001, and who was married with young children like Khan. He appears as something of a role model to Khan.

As yet little material has been found directly from the others expressing their motivation. There is some evidence that Tanweer was motivated particularly by a desire for martyrdom. As described earlier, there are reports of Hussain and Lindsay expressing extreme views at school. Conspiracy theories also abounded, at least some of the bombers seem to have expressed the view that the 9/11 attacks were a plot by the US.

WERE THEY DIRECTED FROM ABROAD?
It is not known when the group first developed the idea of an attack in the UK. Khan and Tanweers visit to Pakistan from 19 November 2004 to 8 February 2005 may have been an important element in this.

Tanweer said to those around him that the purpose of this visit was to identify a suitable school to study Islam and that Khan knew a number which they would visit together. Khan was regarded as a reliable travelling companion and Tanweers family paid for Tanweers ticket and provided him with spending money. Other evidence suggests that Khan believed he was going to Pakistan to cross the border and fight in Afghanistan.

After arriving in Pakistan, Khan and Tanweer appear to have split up with the latter going to stay with his uncles family in Faisalabad. After a week or so, Khan appears to have collected Tanweer and the 2 went off for a period. Tanweer told his family they were checking out a school near Lahore. It is possible that they went up to the border areas with Afghanistan or over the border for training but we do not have firm evidence of this. Who they may have met in Pakistan has not yet been established, but it seems likely that they had some contact with Al Qaeda figures. It is possible that Khan made his martyrdom video during this visit. Tanweer arrived back from this visit having lost a lot of weight, saying that he had not been well and had not found a suitable school.

Before this, Khan is believed to have had some relevant training in a remote part of Pakistan, close to the Afghan border during a two week visit in July 2003. It is unclear whether he met significant Al Qaeda figures during this trip but we assume the visit would have had at least a motivational impact.

There has been material in the media about training camps in remote parts of Pakistan and Afghanistan. In practice, these are sometimes little more than groups of people getting together on an ad hoc basis in places where their activities will be difficult to detect.

It is also believed that Khan had visited Pakistan, and possibly Afghanistan, on a few other occasions since the late 1990s but there is no confirmation and no details of these trips. There were media reports soon after the attacks that Khan had visited Malaysia and the Philippines to meet Al Qaeda operatives.

These stories were investigated and found to have no basis. It is also reported that he went on a Hajj pilgrimage to Saudi Arabia with his wife in early 2003, also visiting Jordan and Jerusalem for a days sightseeing; and to Turkey on honeymoon with his wife in 2001. There is no evidence of anything suspicious on either of these visits.

Tanweer and Hussain had both visited Pakistan with their families. There were reports in the media that on one of these visits Tanweer met senior members of militant groups but there is no reliable intelligence or corroborative information to support this.

Extended visits to Pakistan by young men are not unusual. Many go to visit family, attend schools for Islamic studies and sightsee, but a small minority have engaged in extremist activity and crossed into Afghanistan. There were nearly 400,000 visits by UK residents to Pakistan in 2004, of an average length of 41 days. The mens visits would not have appeared out of the ordinary to their families and friends, although some associates now say there were rumours that Khan and Tanweer had been to Afghanistan for violent jihad.

We know little about Lindsays travel abroad. He visited Jamaica on at lest one occasion to see his natural father. He claimed to others to have visited Pakistan, but there is nothing to corroborate this.

Between April and July 2005, the group was in contact with an individual or individuals in Pakistan. It is not known who this was or the content of the contacts but the methods used, designed to make it difficult to identify the individual, make the contacts look suspicious.

Khans video statement was broadcast together with a statement by Al Qaeda's deputy leader Ayman Al-Zawahiri supporting the attacks.

In a second video, broadcast on 19 September, Zawahiri went further stating that Al Qaeda launched the attacks. Londons blessed raid is one of the raids which Jamaat Qaidat al- Jihad (Al Qaedah of Jihad Group) was honoured to launch..In the Wills of the hero brothers, the knights of monotheism  may God have mercy on them, make paradise their final abode and accept their good deeds..

There is as yet no firm evidence to corroborate this claim or the nature of Al Qaeda support, if there was any. But, the target and mode of attack of the 7 July bombings are typical of Al Qaeda and those inspired by its ideologies.

HOW DID THEY DO IT?
Shortly after their return from Pakistan, Khan and Tanweer began putting in place the key elements of the plan. By now, both had left their jobs and were able to devote themselves more or less full-time to planning. These 2 appear to have been leader and right hand man, but Hussain and Lindsay also played important subsidiary roles in the planning.

The bomb factory
A key requisite was a location to construct a device away from the Beeston area of Leeds, where at least 3 of the group were well known. In May the group rented 18 Alexandra Grove from an Egyptian chemistry PhD student at Leeds University (now in Egypt) who was himself subletting it to them. Lindsay had met this man at Leeds Grand Mosque in November 2004. 18 Alexandra Grove is a modern ground floor flat in a two-storey block next to the Leeds Grand Mosque. This is a student area, with much property to let and a transitory population. The group would not, in themselves, have stood out.

The factory was discovered on 12 July. It was left with much of the bomb making equipment still in place. It is not clear whether this was deliberate, or whether someone else was supposed to have cleared up and  for whatever reason  failed to do so. 3 of the bombers  Khan, Tanweer and Hussain  have so far been linked by DNA to the bomb factory.

What is certain is the importance of this subject: the current state of Islamist ideology. This is in large measure a result of the London bombings of July 7, 2005 and the attempted bombings of July 21, 2005. In response to those attacks, Prime Minister Tony Blair announced that the ideological component of the struggle with radical Islam was as important as the military and operational aspectsif not more so. President Bush has recently expressed similar views.

In Britain, Blairs pronouncements have received nearly universal assent across the entire political spectrum from left to right. This is very striking, especially in light of the fact that popular opposition in Britain to its role in the war in Iraq remains strong and widespread. It might have been thought that reaction to the bombings in Britain would have seized on British policies in Iraq both to explain the bombings and as a basis for addressing the terrorist challenge in general. But this has proved not to be the case. It is difficult to say exactly why, but it certainly has a lot to do with the fact that the London bombers were either British-born or long-time residents rather than foreign terrorists. Consequently, their path toward terrorism was necessarily linked to a process of radicalization that had occurred within Britain and through an ideological dynamic operative in Britain itself. This was consonant with and perhaps reinforced by the view that such a dynamic is also operative in Western Europe more generallya view that was brought increasingly to the fore by recent events elsewhere, including the murder of Theo Van Gogh by a Dutch born and educated Muslim, and signs of ideological radicalization in other countries such as France, Belgium and Germany.

Already, there has been much talk in the press that a fundamental intellectual and policy reorientation has occurred, with significant implications for how both the American and British administrations will continue to prosecute this conflict. In Britain, Blair took the dramatic step of proposing to ban two organizationsHizb ut-Tahrir and Al-Muhajirounknown to be more or less exclusively ideological organizations, rather than ones that have a direct jihad and terrorist operation. This step was coupled with a proposal to deport radical Islamic preachers. The drama of these actions was made possible by the fact that for some time Londonor Londonistan, as it has come to be calledhas served as one of the principal centres of radical ideological activity. At the same time, it underscores the increase in the focus on ideology.
..
CURRENT TRENDS IN ISLAMIST IDEOLOGY is addressed to the ideological dimension of Americas current struggle with its terrorist adversaries and its potential implications for the successful prosecution of that struggle.
As the 9/11 Commission said in its final report, the war that was inaugurated by the attacks of September 11, 2001 on New York and Washington is not best described as a War on Terror. Rather, it is a war with terrorists who have a specific origin and agenda. They derive from a radical ideological movement (commonly known as Islamism or radical Islam) in the Islamic world which has spawned terrorist groups and violence across the globe.

As a result of this, it has become commonplace to say that the war on terror is also a war of ideas. This is a war that is being fought among Muslims themselves, as well as a war between the radicals and the non-Muslims upon whom they have declared war. This understanding conforms to that of the Islamist terrorists themselves. For as they frequently declare, they regard their enemies as both Muslims and non-Muslims, the near enemy and the far enemywith the former often seen as the corrupt agents of the latter.

This understanding of the two-fold character of the enemy was recently underscored by the leading terrorist authority Osama bin Laden. According to bin Laden, the current struggle is essentially a worldwide struggle between the ideas and principles of heresy and those of the Islamic Nation. If the struggle with Islamist terrorism is in part a war of ideas, it follows that a proper understanding of Islamist ideology must play an important role in our prosecution of the war. In part this is because the objectives and tactics of the terrorists derive to some extent from their ideological orientation.

In part it is because ideology plays a very large role in the recruitment and training of new members of terrorist organizations. This is true whether or not their initial exposure to this ideology comes through contact with terrorist organizations such as Al Qaeda, or with the much wider universe of organizations that espouse a radical vision but do not directly engage in terrorist activities, such as the Muslim Brotherhood. This is so for at least two reasons.

First, existing radical Islamist organizations have historically often been off shoots of other radical organizations that were sometimes more violent in the past. Second, such organizations that today may espouse an agenda de-fined by educational or political concerns often prove to be the entry point for young people who go on to join terrorist groups. Their ideological training in these organizations is what first points them towards this path. As Secretary of Defence Rumsfeld has observed, our current operations to defeat terrorist groups, which have enjoyed some considerable success, may well prove to be Sisyphean if the recruitment of new generations
cannot be impeded. An understanding of the ideological dimension of Islamic terrorism is therefore crucial to any strategy that seeks to contain and defeat it.

There is an additional consideration that recommends a focus on ideology. The threat posed by Islamism or radical Islam to American interests is not solely embodied in the phenomenon of terrorism. Islamism or radical Islam poses to America a political threat as well. This problem has both a foreign and a domestic aspect.

The foreign aspect involves the potential radicalization of existing Muslim states as occurred in the case of Iran and obtained for a period in Sudan and Afghanistan. Such potential continues to exist in a variety of places in the Muslim worldfor example, in Pakistan. There are a number of reasons for this, but among them is the fact that many existing regimes lack popular support and legitimacy whereas radical Islamist ideologies enjoy substantial sympathy. Within the Muslim world, the so-called war of ideas, an ideological war, is to date decidedly one-sided. This is alas also the case for minority Muslim communities in Western countries, including in the United States.

The potential radicalization of these communities would pose important political problems to the future of Western democracy. Just how this war of ideas might issue in an outcome favourable to the United States and its interests remains an open question. However, any serious consideration of the issues and stakes involved in this war of ideas requires as thorough and serious understanding of contemporary radical Islamist ideology as possible. In general, this necessity has come to be acknowledged and has found some expression in studies and accounts of Islamist ideologies. What is still lacking, however, is a concerted and consistent focus on the ideological component akin to that which other recent ideological struggles solicited in their timefor example, the struggles with Communism and Fascism.

IT IS COMMONLY SAID THAT THE WEST HAS EMERGED as a key battleground in the war of ideas with radical Islam. Some even say, perhaps with a little exaggeration, that the West is today the primary theatre of ideological conflict. This analysis expresses both a fear and a hope. The obvious fear is that various ideological forcesemanating from abroad, but also from within the West itselfwill conspire to radicalize portions of the Western Muslim population, resulting in a range of possible threats to the future of European and American democracy, from political challenges like the growth of parallel societies to the related security threat of home-grown jihad.

Such threats are clear and present, as the September 11 attacks, which were piloted by Muslims radicalized in Europe, and most recently, the bombings in the UK, carried out by British-born jihadis who received their ideological indoctrination in the mosques and prayer circles of Londonistan, have each demonstrated. They are also threats that are here to stay for as long as radical ideology continues to hold even the slightest sway over the minds of Western Muslims.

The hope is that Western Muslims will develop an Islamic solution to radicalism, one that combines religious fidelity with an allegiance to the principles, institutions, and sovereignty of liberal democratic government. This solutiona European Islam or American Islam, as many have called itwould serve as an ideological bulwark against both internal and external sources of extremist ideology. Some speculate it might even provide a moderate and democratic alternative to extremism that could, in time, be exported to the strongholds of radical Islam in the wider world.

With so much at stake, the future of Western Islam has been the subject of much discussion in recent years. Surely, many Western Muslims have come forward against radicalism to defend their countries and their faith. It is also clear that the majority of European and American Muslims simply seek to live and worship freely, and to participate, in their own unique way, as equal citizens in the life of Western democracies.

And yet, progress toward the development of a politically moderate and well-organized Western Islam has met with stiff resistance from Islamists abroad as well as from within the West itself. Within the West, resistance has largely come from two separate and often deeply conflicting strains of ideological Islamthat of the Salafists, and that of the mainstream or Wassatiyya Islamism of groups like the Muslim Brotherhood. The differences between these two Islamisms are several, but perhaps foremost are the disparate ways in which they interpret the Sharia and how this, in turn, structures their respective attitudes toward assimilation and citizenship in the West.

The Salafists adhere to a literalist interpretation of Islamic scripture and to a political theology that views Muslims in the West as travellers in enemy territory, a realm they variously speak of as a Land of Kufr or as a Land of War. Some Western-based Salafist groups openly espouse jihad, whereas others, such as Hizb ut-Tahrir, concentrate on ideological activities, believing that fulfilment of the religious duty of jihad should be postponed until the day when their numbers are sufficient enough for a full offensive. They reject all participation in the life of Western societies; for them, the unity of the Muslim Nation is paramount, and any Muslim who endeavours to divide itreligiously or politicallyis guilty of apostasy, that unforgivable Islamic
sin.

In contrast to the Salafists, mainstream Islamists have followed a more conciliatory course in their dealings with the West. Nowadays, this stream is commonly associated with its most prominent spokesperson, Shaykh Yusuf al-Qaradawi, the Qatar-based Egyptian Sunni cleric, popular Al Jazeera preacher, and reputed spiritual steward of the International Muslim Brotherhood.

Qaradawi describes his faith doctrine, Wassatiyya, a broad intellectual movement that emerged with Egypts New Islamists in the 1990s, as a middle way between rejection of Islam and extremism. Ideologically speaking, the Wassatiyya movement is rooted deeply in the Salafist thought of Hassan al-Banna, founder of the Muslim Brotherhood, and his teachings on the wholesomeness of Islam, which holds that Sharia must dominate every realm of human activity and thought, from culture to politics.

Unlike the Salafists, however, the Wassatiyya scholars emphasize the use of ijtihad, or discernment in Sharia matters independent of what is literally prescribed in Islamic scripture. As a result, Wassatiyya jurisprudence reflects a certain modernist orientation, one that has allowed its adherents to adopt a much more pragmatic approach to the task of assimilating to the realities of life in Western democracies. It has also allowed a certain intellectual creativity to develop within Wassatiyya circles, which has included, among other things, a revaluation of the traditional Islamic concept of the West as a Land of War.

Instead, based on the idea that Islam is a universal message, available and open to all, the Wassatiyya Islamists speak of the West as a realm for Islamic proselytizing, or as a land of the religious call, a Land of Dawa.

Salafists doggedly rail against what they perceive to be Wassatiyya Islamisms compromise with the West, asserting their use of ijtihad takes too many liberties in the interpretation of Sharia and erodes the religious and political unity and authenticity of the Muslim Nation. Or, as one European Salafi emphatically expressed itafter praising the slayer of Dutch filmmaker Theo Van Gogh and calling for jihad against the country of Swedenin a recent posting online: This is Islam, not a lunch buffet.

With such nasty co-religionists as this (Qaradawi has personally drawn the ire of Salafists worldwide, including Zarqawi of Mesopotamia), the Wassatiyya scholars have been able to deflect much of the blame for Islamist militancy and radicalism on the conservative and reactionary views of the Salafistsor as they frequently call them, (mirroring Western discussions), the Wahhabis. In turn, the Wassatiyya scholars have been able to ingratiate themselves to Westerners, non-Muslim and Muslim alike, as the peaceable and moderate face of Islam.

But that is a reputation sorely undeserved. Though many mainstream Islamists have renounced jihad against the West (as it is a realm for proselytizing, not for war), they have compensated by making especially cold-blooded juristic and political pronouncements backing the defensive jihad in majority- Muslim countries of terrorist groups like Hamas and of the insurgency
against American and allied forces in Iraq.

Nor has the Wassatiyya compromise with the West moderated the underlying ideological antagonism of mainstream Islamists toward it. As part of their Dawa effort, Qaradawi and others, sometimes with the assistance of Saudi financial-backers (the late King Fahd proclaimed Wassatiyya his official brand of Islam), have built-up a vast web of ideological institutions in the West: think tanks, media outfits, educational centres, and Sharia councils. The purpose of this endeavour, Qaradawi has said, is the conquest of the West not by the sword or armies, but by preaching and ideology. And although some mainstream Islamists pepper their politics with salutary declarations about the benefits of democracy, equality and human rights, its clear that many do not juristically or ideologically accept the sovereignty of Western liberal government. Qaradawi, for instance, has said that short of full conquest, a more realistic goal would be
the establishment of autonomous Islamic societies within the West, operating not in accordance with Western law, but under Sharia law and reflecting Islams wholesomeness. Were we to convince Western leaders and decision-makers of our right to live according to our faithideologically, legislatively, and ethnically without imposing our views or inflicting harm upon them, we would have traversed an immense barrier in our quest for an Islamic state.

Such pronouncements should be of paramount concern, especially given the fact that the self-enclosed Muslim ghettoes of France, the Netherlands, Great Britain and elsewhere in Europe have proven highly susceptible to penetration by radical preachers and ideology.
And yet, the Wassatiyya Islamists campaign to Islamize the West has proven an inherently difficult one. For one thing, it assumes not only that non- Muslims, but that Muslims, too, will acquiesce to their particular religious and political agenda. But due to a variety of factorsincluding the tremendous diversity of Western Islam, not to mention the religious and political freedoms available to Muslims living in the Westthe Wassatiyyas efforts to define Western Islam religiously and politically have been frustrated time and again.

Perhaps most significantly, the opened gates of ijtihad have allowed Western Muslims to re-discover Islamic scripture and to bring forth new interpretations that speak more directly to the novel complexities of modern and democratic life. Increased engagement with the West has also led to the emergence of a similar variety of ideological and political orientations. In its encounter with the West, some deep, possibly irreparable, fissures have emerged within mainstream Islamism, resulting in increasing friction among its offspringfrom born-again radicals and neo-Salafists such as Qaradawi, to those with ostensibly more progressive even liberal inclinations. How this dynamic develops will have far-reaching implications for the struggle of ideas for the future of Islam in the Westboth with regard to the potential growth of a moderate and democratic Western Islam, and in terms of Western Islams relationships with the wider Muslim world.

[NOTE: The following English translation of The Project has been prepared by Scott Burgess and was first published in serial form by The Daily Ablution in December 2005 (Parts I, II, III, IV, V, Conclusion). It is copyrighted and reprinted here with his permission. It is based on the French text of The Project published in Sylvain Besson, La conquête de l'Occident: Le projet secret des Islamistes (Paris: Le Seuil, 2005), pp. 193-205.]

This report presents a global vision of a worldwide strategy for Islamic policy [or "political Islam"]. Local Islamic policies will be drawn up in the different regions in accordance with its guidelines. It acts, first of all, to define the points of departure of that policy, then to set up the components and the most important procedures linked to each point of departure; finally we suggest several missions, by way of example only, may Allah protect us.

The following are the principal points of departure of this policy:

Point of Departure 1: To know the terrain and adopt a scientific methodology for its planning and execution.
Point of Departure 2: To demonstrate proof of the serious nature of the work.

Point of Departure 3: To reconcile international engagement with flexibility at a local level.

Point of Departure 4: To reconcile political engagement and the necessity of avoiding isolation on one hand, with permanent education and institutional action on the other.

Point of Departure 5: To be used to establish an Islamic State; parallel, progressive efforts targeted at controlling the local centres of power through institutional action.

Point of Departure 6: To work with loyalty alongside Islamic groups and institutions in multiple areas to agree on common ground, in order to "cooperate on the points of agreement and set aside the points of disagreement".

Point of Departure 7: To accept the principle of temporary cooperation between Islamic movements and nationalist movements in the broad sphere and on common ground such as the struggle against colonialism, preaching and the Jewish state, without however having to form alliances. This will require, on the other hand, limited contacts between certain leaders, on a case by case basis, as long as these contacts do not violate the [sharia] law. Nevertheless, one must not give them allegiance or take them into confidence, bearing in mind that the Islamic movement must be the origin of the initiatives and orientations taken.

Point of Departure 8: To master the art of the possible on a temporary basis without abusing the basic principles, bearing in mind that Allah's teachings always apply. One must order the suitable and forbid that which is not, always providing a documented opinion. But we should not look for confrontation with our adversaries, at the local or the global scale, which would be disproportionate and could lead to attacks against the dawa or its disciples.

Point of Departure 9: To construct a permanent force of the Islamic dawa and support movements engaged in jihad across the Muslim world, to varying degrees and insofar as possible.

Point of Departure 10: To use diverse and varied surveillance systems, in several places, to gather information and adopt a single effective warning system serving the worldwide Islamic movement. In fact, surveillance, policy decisions and effective communications complement each other.

Point of Departure 11: To adopt the Palestinian cause as part of a worldwide Islamic plan, with the policy plan and by means of jihad, since it acts as the keystone of the renaissance of the Arab world today.

Point of Departure 12: To know how to turn to self-criticism and permanent evaluation of worldwide Islamic policy and its objectives, of its content and its procedures, in order to improve it. This is a duty and a necessity according to the precepts of sharia.
THE FIRST POINT OF DEPARTURE:
Know the terrain and adopt a scientific methodology for [The Project's] planning and execution.

a- Elements:
Know the influential factors in the world, whether they act as Islamic forces, adverse forces, or neutral forces.

Use the necessary scientific and technical means for planning, organization, execution and follow-up.

b- Procedures:
Create observation centres in order to gather and store information for all useful purposes, if need be relying on modern technological methods.

Create centres of study and research and produce studies on the political dimension of the Islamic movement.

c- Suggested missions:
Draw up a map of [religious and ideological] doctrines in the world to have a global vision from 100 years ago to our era, and analyze the current situation in light of that configuration, taking account of changes both happening and predicted.

Draw up a map of doctrines of the Muslim world.

Draw up a map of Islamic movements in the Muslim world.

Carry out successive political and scientific studies in varying Islamic areas, those which apply more particularly to current events.

Carry out a scientific study which addresses the history of contemporary Islamic movements, and use it.

THE SECOND POINT OF DEPARTURE

To demonstrate proof of the serious nature of the work.

a- Elements:
Clarity of the principal objectives of the dawa in the eyes of all, as well as clarity of the temporary objectives, necessitates exploitation, channelling and orientation of the energies.

Devote sufficient effort to the service of the workers [for Allah] and coordinate their efforts to the sole and same objective.

Devote sufficient time.

Spend money to the extent possible.

b-Procedures:
Exploit all the energies of the workers to the service of the dawa, each at his level (the criterion of efficiency, given that each must be devoted to the task to which he's assigned).

Mobilize the greatest possible number of supporters and officials.
Collect money efficiently, control expenses and invest in the general interest.

c- Suggested missions:
Carry out a survey of workers (appropriate men and appropriate location)

Establish schedules with the hours of workers and specialists and use their efforts with good judgment and on time (appropriate effort at the right time).

An engagement with economic institutions adequate to support the cause financially.
THE THIRD POINT OF DEPARTURE

Reconcile international engagement with flexibility at the local level.

a- Elements:
To define the guidelines that everyone [worldwide] must follow.

To leave a margin that provides sufficient flexibility at the local level for the issues that do not conflict with the general lines of the global Islamic policy.

b- Procedures:
The Movement, at a global level, will define the Islamic domain and issues in a general way which will require the engagement of all according to previously defined priorities.

The local leadership will define local issues that come within their prerogative, according to the principle of flexibility and according to previously defined priorities.

c- Suggested Missions
Worldwide Islamic engagement for a total liberation of Palestine and the creation of an Islamic state is the mission which falls to the global leadership.

To establish a dialogue at a local level with those who work for the cause according to the global political lines of the Movement. It is up to the local leadership to define the shape of that dialogue.
THE FOURTH POINT OF DEPARTURE

To reconcile political engagement with the necessity of avoiding isolation, on the one hand, with permanent education and institutional work on the other.

a- Elements
Liberty to function politically in each country according to local circumstances, without however participating in a process which makes a decision which would be contrary to the texts of Sharia.

To invite everyone to take part in parliament, municipal councils, labour unions and other institutions of which the membership is chosen by the people in the interest of Islam and of Muslims.

To continue to educate individuals and generations and to guarantee the training of specialists in various areas according to a previously designed plan.

To construct social, economic, scientific and health institutions and penetrate the domain of the social services, in order to be in contact with the people and to serve them by means of Islamic institutions.

b- Procedures
To study the varied political environments and the probabilities of success in each country.

To plan specialized study missions which will concentrate on useful areas such as communications, the history of Islam, etc.

To conduct feasibility studies concerning various institutions and create them according to priorities established in each country.

c-Suggested Missions
To conduct studies relating to the experiences of political Islam and to draw lessons from them.

To give an Islamic policy perspective on the pressing questions of the day.

To keep questions of local importance such as issues concerning workers, unions, etc. within an Islamic framework.

To create a certain number of economic, social, health care and educational institutions, using available means, to serve the people within an Islamic framework.
THE FIFTH POINT OF DEPARTURE

To dedicate ourselves to the establishment of an Islamic state, in parallel with gradual efforts aimed at gaining control of local power centres through institutional action.

a- Elements
To channel thought, education and action in order to establish an Islamic power [government] on the earth.

To influence centres of power both local and worldwide to the service of Islam.

b- Procedures
To prepare a scientific study on the possibility of establishing the reign of God throughout the world according to established priorities.

To study the centres of power, both local and worldwide, and the possibilities of placing them under influence.

To conduct a modern study on the concept of support for the dawa and Islamic law, and more particularly on the men of influence in the State and the country.

c- Suggested Mission
To draw up an Islamic Constitution in light of efforts deployed up to now.

To draw up Islamic laws, civil laws, etc.

To work within various influential institutions and use them in the service of Islam.

To use the work of economic, social, and other specialized Islamic institutions.
THE SIXTH POINT OF DEPARTURE
To loyally work alongside Islamic groups and institutions in various areas and in agreement on a common ground in order to "cooperate on points of agreement and put aside points of disagreement".

a- Elements
To coordinate the Islamic work in a single direction as will permit the laying of the foundations of the growth of Muslim society and dedication to the power of God on Earth.

For each to work according to his capacities in his chosen field and to master it, with loyalty and coordination of effort.

b- Procedures
To study the true nature of Islamic movements, to evaluate their experiences and draw up plans to initiate collaboration among them.

To avoid creating new Islamic movements in a country which already has one; there will be but one movement, serious and complete.

c- Suggested missions
To coordinate the efforts of all those working for Islam, in each country, and to establish good contact with them, whether they work in individuals or in groups.

To reduce the differences that exists between workers for Islam and to resolve their conflicts according to sharia.
THE SEVENTH POINT OF DEPARTURE

To accept the principle of temporary cooperation between Islamic movements and nationalist movements in the broad sphere and on common ground such as the struggle against colonialism, preaching and the Jewish state, without however having to form alliances. This will require, on the other hand, limited contacts between certain leaders, on a case by case basis, as long as these contacts do not violate the [sharia] law. Nevertheless, one must not give them allegiance or take them into confidence, bearing in mind that the Islamic movement must be the origin of the initiatives and orientations taken.

a-Elements:
To combine all efforts against the supreme forces of evil in accordance with the principle that one must battle one evil with a lesser evil.

To limit the collaboration to the leadership or to a limited number of individuals in order to maximize the benefit and minimize the possible drawbacks.

To work from perspective of the objectives previously defined for the dawa.

b-Procedures:
To make a study to evaluate the areas with the object of mutual assistance between Islamic and other movements and draw lessons from it.

To study the areas which allow cooperation, and define the boundaries.

To study the philosophy and plans of other movements.

c- Suggested Missions:
Each country should study the possibility, in the future, of strengthening internal collaboration.
THE EIGHTH POINT OF DEPARTURE

To master the art of the possible on a temporary basis without abusing the basic principles, bearing in mind that Allah's teachings always apply. One must order the suitable and forbid that which is not, always giving a documented opinion [according to sharia]. But we should not look for confrontation with our adversaries, at the local or the global scale, which would be disproportionate and could lead to attacks against the dawa or its disciples.

a- Elements:
To evaluate the education of individuals and not to excessively use typical modern education that does not correspond to reality, which is devoid of flexibility and could have grave consequences such as the conflict between individuals for a simple comment or a simple failure.

To give a documented and scientific view, in the form of speeches, communiqués and books, that bears on events important to the Ummah.

To avoid the Movement hurting itself with major confrontations, which could encourage its adversaries to give it a fatal blow.

b-Procedures:
To carry out a study to evaluate the experiences of Islamist movements in order to avoid their fatal errors.

To develop educational methods that are at the same time exemplary, realistic and true to our principles, in order to bestow a flexibility sufficient to permit the facing of reality.

c-Suggested Missions:
To develop initiation programs for the faithful and proceed with sensitivity to the foundation of past experience.

To prepare individuals according to modern educational methods.
THE NINTH POINT OF DEPARTURE

To construct a permanent force of the Islamic dawa and support movements engaged in jihad across the Muslim world, to varying degrees and insofar as possible.

a-Elements:
To protect the dawa with the force necessary to guarantee its security at the local and international levels.

To make contact with all new movements engaged in jihad, everywhere on the planet, and with Muslim minorities, and to create links as needed to establish and support collaboration.

To maintain jihad and awakening throughout the Ummah.

b-Procedures:
To form an autonomous security force to protect the dawa and its disciples locally and worldwide.

To study movements engaged in jihad in the Muslim world, as well as among Muslim minorities, to better understand them.

c-Suggested Missions:
To build bridges between movements engaged in jihad in the Muslim world, and between Muslim minorities, and to support them insofar as possible within a framework of collaboration.
THE TENTH POINT OF DEPARTURE

To use diverse and varied surveillance systems, in several places, to gather information and adopt a single effective warning system serving the worldwide Islamic movement. In fact, surveillance, policy decisions and effective communications complement each other.

a-Elements:
To make the policy decisions to collect important and precise information.

To diffuse Islamic policy so that it is largely and efficiently covered by the media.

b-Procedures:
To create a modern surveillance system by means of advanced technology (possibly created at the research centres mentioned earlier).

To create an effective and serious media centre.

c- Suggested Missions:
To warn Muslims of the dangers that threaten them and the international conspiracies directed at them.

To give our views on current events and future issues.
THE ELEVENTH POINT OF DEPARTURE

To adopt the Palestinian cause as part of a worldwide Islamic plan, with the policy plan and by means of jihad, since it acts as the keystone of the renaissance of the Arab world today.

a-Elements:
To provide an Islamic view on all areas, problems and solutions relative to the Palestinian question, based on the precepts of Islam.

To prepare the community of believers for jihad for the liberation of Palestine. [One can lead the Ummah to realize the plans of the Islamic movement above all if victory is ours], if God wills it.

To create a modest nucleus of jihad in Palestine, and to nourish it in order to maintain the flame that will light the road toward the liberation of Palestine, and in order that the Palestinian cause will endure until the moment of liberation.
b-Procedures:

To collect sufficient funds for the perpetuation of jihad.

To conduct a study of the situation of Muslims and the enemy in occupied Palestine.

c-Suggested Missions:
To conduct studies on the Jews, enemies of Muslims, and on the oppression inflicted by these enemies on our brothers in occupied Palestine, in addition to preaching and publications.

To fight against the sentiment of capitulation among the Ummah, to refuse defeatist solutions, and to show that conciliation with the Jews will undermine our Movement and its history.

To conduct comparative studies on the Crusades and Israel, and [the victory that will be that of Islam].

To create jihadi cells in Palestine, and support them in order that they cover all of occupied Palestine.

To create a link between the moujahadin in Palestine and those throughout the Islamic world.

To nourish a sentiment of rancour with respect to the Jews and refuse all coexistence.
THE TWELFTH POINT OF DEPARTURE

To know how to turn to self-criticism and permanent evaluation of worldwide Islamic policy and its objectives, of its content and its procedures in order to improve it. This is a duty and a necessity according to the precepts of sharia.

a-Elements:
To conduct constructive self-criticism, in order to avoid pitfalls.

To proceed with constant evaluation, on a scientific basis, to permit the further construction of policies.

To improve Islamic policies and to take profit from past experiences must be a clear and essential objective.

b-Procedures:
To evaluate current practices and profit from past experience.

To ask officials in the various countries to give their views on direction, methods and results.

c-Suggested Missions:
To produce an official document on global Islamic policy.

To make the countries, the officials and the people aware of that policy.

To begin to apply the policy, to evaluate it annually and to improve it if need be.

Brotherhood, What Art Thou?65
Hudson Institute
From the April 23, 2007, issue of the Weekly Standard

April 16, 2007
by Zeyno Baran

Even though Congress was in recess the first week of April, a number of lawmakers kept busy. A bipartisan delegation led by House majority leader Steny Hoyer paid a visit to Cairo, meeting with several Egyptian members of parliament, including members of the Muslim Brotherhood, a controversial Islamist group officially banned in Egypt. Hoyer's contacts with the Brotherhood have added new intensity to the debate over whether or not the U.S. government should "engage" with the group as an ally in the war on terror.

Making the case for such engagement, Robert Leiken and Steven Brooke wrote an article in the March/April issue of Foreign Affairs entitled "The Moderate Muslim Brotherhood." They conclude that the Brotherhood consists of "moderate Muslims with active community support" and that engaging with its members "makes strong strategic sense."

Yet this could not be further from the truth. The argument for a strategy of engagement flows from the incorrect belief that if Islamist groups that denounce violence are strengthened, they will then confront their more violent brethren and rob them of their support base. Although various Islamist groups do quarrel over tactics and often bear considerable animosity towards one another, a "divide and conquer" strategy will only push them closer together. This is illustrated perfectly by the response to Prime Minister Tony Blair's decision to ban the revolutionary Islamist group Hizb ut-Tahrir (HT) after the July 7, 2005, bombings in London. HT reached out to various British Islamist organizations, including the Muslim Brotherhood (despite their intense historical rivalry), and urged them all to stand united or "be the next in line to be proscribed." Sadly, HT's effort was successful and Blair was forced to withdraw his proposal.

Allies in this war cannot be chosen on the basis of their tactics--that is, whether or not they eschew violent methods. Instead, the deciding factor must be ideology: Is the group Islamist or not? In essence, this means that a non-violent, British-born Islamist should not be considered an ally. Yet a devout, conservative Muslim immigrant to Europe--one who does not even speak any Western languages but rejects Islamist ideology--could be.

Moderate, non-Islamist Muslims have long tried to explain the inherent incompatibility of Islamism with a Western society that extols pluralism and equality. Islamists seek the total imposition of Islamic law upon society at large. To the Brotherhood and groups like it, the Qur'an and Islam are not a source of law but the only source of law. As the Muslim Brotherhood declares in its motto, "Allah is our objective, the Prophet is our leader, the Qur'an is our law, jihad is our way, dying in the way of Allah is our highest hope."

Moreover, engaging with Islamist organizations such as the Brotherhood lends legitimacy to an ideology that does not, in fact, represent the views of the majority of Muslims. Thus, American policymakers who advocate pursuing such a strategy are actually facilitating Islamism by endorsing it as a mainstream ideology. Some have already endorsed organizations that were founded by Brotherhood members and maintain a close ideological affiliation with the group, such as the Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR) and the Islamic Society of North America (ISNA). Whether at home or abroad, such a policy is leading to disaster, as liberal, non-Islamist Muslims--having already been denounced by Islamists as apostates--are now being told by Western governments that they do not represent "real" Islam.

Empowering Islamists at the expense of non-Islamists hardly seems a wise strategy for the United States to pursue if it wants to win the war of ideas. After all, non-Islamists are already tremendously disadvantaged in terms of organization and funding. The Muslim Brotherhood has well-established networks of institutions, educational centres, and think tanks, as well as millions of dollars in donations from the Middle East. At the same time, many moderates are deterred from speaking out because of the ire doing so would provoke from Islamist groups. In the West, not only do critics have to worry about a fatwa calling for their death, but they are also faced with the prospect of getting sued for millions of dollars.

Indeed, Islamist organizations have flourished in the tolerant environment of the West, taking advantage of the freedom of speech to spread their hate-filled, anti-Semitic ideas without fear of reprisal. In the process, they actively and openly create a fifth column of activists who work to undermine the very systems under which Western societies operate. They are creating self-segregated societies in a process that has been called "voluntary apartheid." This tactic has been enthusiastically supported by the Muslim Brotherhood, whose unofficial spiritual leader Yusuf al-Qaradawi has repeatedly advised European Muslims to create their own "Muslim ghettos" to avoid cultural assimilation.

Islamist groups are engaged in a long-term social engineering project, by which they hope to lead Muslims to reject Western norms of pluralism, individual rights, and the rule of law. At the core of Islamist terrorism is the ideological machinery that works to promote sedition and hatred. That the tactics of the Muslim Brotherhood are non-violent (or at least less violent) does not make the ideology behind those tactics any less antagonistic to the United States.

It may be that, when compared with Al Qaeda or Hezbollah, the Muslim Brotherhood is the lesser evil. Yet engagement is worse than no engagement if it legitimizes Islamist ideology and alienates non-Islamists. Recognizing and responding to the threat posed by the Islamist ideology is an important part of the war on terror. Any American or Western engagement with Islamists should be critical in nature. Under no circumstances should we do them the favour of extolling Islamist ideologues as "moderates."

Zeyno Baran joined Hudson Institute as Senior Fellow and Director of Hudsons Center for Eurasian Policy in April 2006.

Qur'an Teaches 66

Terror

3:151
We will cast terror into the hearts of those who disbelieve, because they set up with Allah that for which He has sent down no authority, and their abode is the fire, and evil is the abode of the unjust.

8:60
And prepare against them what force you can and horses tied at the frontier, to terrorize thereby the enemy of Allah..

8:12
I will cast terror into the hearts of those who disbelieve. Therefore strike off their heads and strike off every fingertip of them.

Moreover Allah says of those who reject him. Because, Allah has already sentenced them to death.

Unbelievers

2:191, And slay them wherever ye catch them

2:193, And fight them on until there is no more Tumult or oppression

2:216, Fighting is prescribed for you, and ye dislike it. But it is possible that ye dislike a thing which is good for you

3:28, Let not the believers Take for friends or helpers Unbelievers rather than believers: if any do that, in nothing will there be help from Allah

4:48 Allah forgiveth not that partners should be set up with Him; but He forgiveth anything else, to whom He pleaseth; to set up partners with Allah is to devise a sin Most heinous indeed.

4:84, Then fight in Allahs cause - Thou art held responsible only for thyself - and rouse the believers. It may be that Allah will restrain the fury of the Unbelievers; for Allah is the strongest in might and in punishment.

4:141, And never will Allah grant to the unbelievers a way (to triumphs) over the believers

5:33, The punishment of those who wage war against Allah and His Messenger, and strive with might and main for mischief through the land is: execution, or crucifixion, or the cutting off of hands and feet from opposite sides, or exile from the land: that is their disgrace in this world, and a heavy punishment is theirs in the Hereafter;

8:12, I will instill terror into the hearts of the unbelievers: smite ye above their necks and smite all their finger-tips off them

8:15-16, O ye who believe! when ye meet the Unbelievers in hostile array, never turn your backs to them. If any do turn his back to them on such a day - unless it be in a stratagem of war, or to retreat to a troop (of his own)- he draws on himself the wrath of Allah, and his abode is Hell,- an evil refuge (indeed)!

8:17, It is not ye who slew them; it was Allah: when thou threwest (a handful of dust), it was not thy act, but Allahs: in order that He might test the Believers by a gracious trial from Himself

8:60, Against them make ready your strength to the utmost of your power, including steeds of war, to strike terror into (the hearts of) the enemies, of Allah and your enemies, and others besides, whom ye may not know, but whom Allah doth know. Whatever ye shall spend in the cause of Allah, shall be repaid unto you, and ye shall not be treated unjustly.

8:65, O Prophet! rouse the Believers to the fight. If there are twenty amongst you, patient and persevering, they will vanquish two hundred: if a hundred, they will vanquish a thousand of the Unbelievers

9:5, But when the forbidden months are past, then fight and slay the Pagans wherever ye find them, and seize them, beleaguer them, and lie in wait for them in every stratagem.

9:3, And an announcement from Allah and His Messenger, to the people (assembled) on the day of the Great Pilgrimage,- that Allah and His Messenger dissolve (treaty) obligations with the Pagans. If then, ye repent, it were best for you; but if ye turn away, know ye that ye cannot frustrate Allah. And proclaim a grievous penalty to those who reject Faith.

9:14, Fight them, and Allah will punish them by your hands, cover them with shame, help you (to victory) over them, heal the breasts of Believers,

9:23, O ye who believe! take not for protectors your fathers and your brothers if they love infidelity above Faith: if any of you do so, they do wrong.

9:28, O ye who believe! Truly the Pagans are unclean; so let them not, after this year of theirs, approach the Sacred Mosque.

9:29, Fight those who believe not in Allah nor the Last Day, nor hold that forbidden which hath been forbidden by Allah and His Messenger, nor acknowledge the religion of Truth, (even if they are) of the People of the Book, until they pay the Jizya with willing submission, and feel themselves subdued.

9:39, Unless ye go forth, (for Jihad) He will punish you with a grievous penalty, and put others in your place; but Him ye would not harm in the least.

9:73, O Prophet! strive hard against the unbelievers and the Hypocrites, and be firm against them. Their abode is Hell,- an evil refuge indeed.

9:111, Allah hath purchased of the believers their persons and their goods; for theirs (in return) is the garden (of Paradise): they fight in His cause, and slay and are slain: a promise binding on Him in truth, through the Law, the Gospel, and the Quran

9:123, O ye who believe! fight the unbelievers who gird you about, and let them find firmness in you: and know that Allah is with those who fear Him.

22:9, (Disdainfully) bending his side, in order to lead (men) astray from the Path of Allah: for him there is disgrace in this life, and on the Day of Judgment We shall make him taste the Penalty of burning (Fire).

22:19-22; These two antagonists dispute with each other about their Lord: But those who deny (their Lord),- for them will be cut out a garment of Fire: over their heads will be poured out boiling water. With it will be scalded what is within their bodies, as well as (their) skins. In addition there will be maces of iron (to punish) them. Every time they wish to get away therefrom, from anguish, they will be forced back therein, and (it will be said), Taste ye the Penalty of Burning!

25:52, So obey not the disbelievers, but strive against them herewith with a great endeavour.

25:68 Those who invoke not, with Allah, any other god, nor slay such life as Allah has made sacred except for just cause, nor commit fornication; - and any that does this (not only) meets punishment. (But) the Penalty on the Day of Judgment will be doubled to him, and he will dwell therein in ignominy,-

37:22-23, Bring ye up, it shall be said, The wrong-doers and their wives, and the things they worshipped- Besides Allah, and lead them to the Way to the (Fierce) Fire!

47:4, Therefore, when ye meet the Unbelievers (in fight), smite at their necks; At length, when ye have thoroughly subdued them, bind a bond firmly (on them): thereafter (is the time for) either generosity or ransom: Until the war lays down its burdens.

48:13 And if any believe not in Allah and His Messenger, We have prepared, for those who reject Allah, a Blazing Fire!

48:29, Muhammad is the messenger of Allah; and those who are with him are strong against Unbelievers, (but) compassionate amongst each other.

It is forbidden for a woman to be seen by any man except her husband when she is made up or well-dressed. (TR. P 430)

3. A woman is not a believer if she undertakes a journey which may last three days or longer, unless she is accompanied by her husband, son, father or brother. (TR. P 431 )

4. A woman must veil herself even in the presence of her husband's father, brother and other male relations. (TR. P 432)

5. She is forbidden to spend any money without the permission of her husband, and it includes giving food to the needy or feast to friends. (TR. P 265)

6. A wife is forbidden to perform extra prayers (NAFAL) or observe fasting (other than RAMADAN) without the permission of her husband. (TR. P 300)

7. If prostration were a legitimate act other than to God, woman should have prostrated to her husband. (TR. P 428)

8. If a man is in a mood to have sexual intercourse woman must come immediately even if she is baking bread at a communal oven. (TR. P 428) 9. The marriage of woman to her man is not substantive. It is precarious. For example if the father of the husband orders his son to divorce his wife, he must do so. (TR. P 440)

11. Majority of women would go to hell. (Muslim P 1431)

12. If a woman refuses to come to bed when invited by her husband, she becomes the target of the curses of angles. Exactly the same happens if she deserts her husband's bed. (Bokhari P 93)

13. The women who are ungrateful to their men, are the denizens of hell; it is an act of ingratitude for a woman to say: "I have never seen any good from you." (Bokhari P 96)

14. A woman in many ways is deprived of the possession of her own body. Even her milk belongs to her husband. (Bokhari P 27)
Adultery

Adultery in Islam is a great sin punishable by stoning and sin. But a Muslim can commit adultery with his maid or a married woman if he invades her town and captures her in the war.

The following is a global assessment of the confrontation that has taken place since 2001, though the systematic war waged by the Jihadi forces against democracies and the free world began at least a decade before 9/11. This evaluation isn't comprehensive or definitive, but a collection of observations related to major benchmarks, directions and projections.

Global cohesion lacking
The main powers and allies involved in the War on Terror still lack global cohesion. While the US integrates its efforts in the ongoing wars in Afghanistan and Iraq with its efforts globally to defeat Al Qaeda and contain nuclear proliferation of rogue regimes like Iran, other powers and blocs of countries have different outlooks and plans. While Britain and other U.S partners in Europe espouse common views on the global scale, France, Germany, Spain and Italy agree on the Afghan theatre but still are uninvolved in the Iraqi theatre. All Atlantic partners, however, pursue Al Qaeda and consider it -- along with other Salafi networks -- as the principal threat. Also, most Western partners perceive the Iranian threat as serious, although differ in the ways in which to respond.

Non-Western powers fighting Jihadist forces do not necessarily unite in the international arena against a common foe. India is targeted by Islamists but doesn't associate with the US-led efforts in the Middle East. Russia is also at war with Jihadi terror, yet it distances itself from the Afghan theatre, opposes the US in Iraq, and worse, backs the two terror-spreading regimes in Tehran and Damascus.

In the region, Western-inclined governments claim they fight "terrorism" but only the terrorists who threaten their own regimes, not the worldwide Jihadi threat. The current Turkish government fights the terrorist-coined PKK, but isn't concerned with the growth of Wahhabism and Khomeinism in the region. Saudi Arabia dismantles Al Qaeda cells inside the Kingdom but still spreads fundamentalism worldwide. Qatar hosts the largest US base in the region, and at the same time funds the most notorious indoctrination programs on al Jazeera. In short, there are several "wars" on terror worldwide. Surely America is leading the widest campaign, but efforts around the globe are still dispersed, uncoordinated, and in many cases, contradictive.

Afghanistan

Many critics asserted in 2007 that the Taliban were returning and that NATO wasn't providing full stability yet. This is a long war: the neo-Taliban weren't able to achieve full enclave control anywhere in the country. The government of Mr. Karzai should take advantage of international backing to achieve a breakthrough in the counter-ideology campaign, because the US-led mission will be successful as long as it provides space and time for Kabul to win the war of ideas. Efforts in 2008 must focus on coordination with Pakistan against the Jihadists, and on civil society political gains.

Pakistan

Finally, General Musharaf's government widened its military offensives during 2007 in the neo-Taliban zones, prompting terror counter strikes in various cities and a major Jihadi uprising in Islamabad. The escalation opened a window among political opposition to make gains against Musharaf. By the year's end, Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif came back to the country and were leading the opposition in the next elections. The assassination of Bhutto was a setback to the political process. Musharraf and the secular forces need to coalesce around a platform of national security and democracy and move forward with elections and anti-Terror campaign in 2008. But for international security, the priority is to preserve Pakistan's nuclear assets and keep the Jihadists at bay. Will secular opposition and the President understand this higher national priority in 2008?

Somalia

An important, but still temporary, victory was scored in Somalia against the Islamist Mahakem, the Taliban of the Horn of Africa, and it took Western support to the Somali Government and an Ethiopian intervention to accomplish it. Denying a state sanctuary to Al Qaeda in Africa is a plus, but the future will depend on Bin Laden's advances or defeats across the African continent in 2008.

Sudan

The main international concern in Africa is undoubtedly toward Darfur. The Sudanese regime was able in 2007 to stall Western intervention for one whole year, allowing the Janjaweed to strengthen and perform additional atrocities. Playing the Arab League and the African Union roles to delay a UN action, Khartoum is battling African resistance movements on two fronts: Darfur, but also the south. The regime, similar to other Jihadi powers in the region, is gaining time to crumble its previous commitments and unleash counter campaigns. The international campaign in Darfur must begin in 2008, otherwise the Jihadi counter offensive in Africa will strike deep in Chad and across the Saharan countries by early 2009.

North Africa

Moroccan, Algerian and Tunisian counter terrorism efforts increased in 2007 but so did Terror attacks by Al Qaeda in the Maghreb. The North African battlefield is now wide open after the combat Salafists have joined Bin Laden officially. U.S and European support need to target the Sahara region as a whole from Mauritania to Chad in 2008 before it slips to the Jihadi forces. If Al Qaeda entrenches itself in the area, West Africa will be threatened by 2009.

Iraq

The surge by US forces and allies has worked and Al Qaeda plans have been impacted and delayed in 2007. The goals of the combined enemies of Iraqi democracy (Al Qaeda and the Syrian and Iranian regimes) were to crumble the Coalition's role and to interdict the rise of a Government in the country. US military action eliminated Al Qaeda's attempts to create enclaves. The rise of Sunni Tribes against the Terror groups in the centre is a major development in the Iraq Theatre. Furthermore, the rise of Shia tribes in the south against Iranian influence and in solidarity with the central Sunni tribes is the beginning of a strategic shift in the country. However the persistence of Damascus and Tehran in supporting Terror forces can eventually reverse these advances. Hence, during 2008, it is important for the US-led Coalition to counter the moves by the Iranian and Syrian regimes in Iraq and set up a national Iraqi capacity to deter the Pasdaran activities.

Iran

On the negative side, confusing messages issued by US Congressional leaders regarding a so-called "dialogue" with the Iranian regime during 2007 weakened the US containment strategy and harmed efforts by the Iranian opposition. Furthermore the American NIE findings during the Fall of this year gave Tehran's Mullahs additional room to manoeuvre. On the positive side, the sanctions issued by the US president against the Pasdaran and the Quds force reverberated throughout the country, encouraging an escalation by the opposition inside the country. President Sarkozy's strong attitude reinforced the Western coalition against nuclear weapons sought by the Khomeinists. However if by end of 2008, no further containment is achieved, by 2009, the (Iranian-Syrian) "axis" will be achieving a regional offensive. It is advisable that significant efforts to support Iran's civil society uprising during 2008.

Syria

During 2007 the Syrian regime continued to back Terror activities in Iraq, Lebanon and in the Palestinian territories without significant responses from the international community. In Lebanon, the Assad regime was successful in weakening the Government and the Cedars revolution to a tipping point. In Gaza, it backed Hamas coup along with Iran. And it was able to dodge the Hariri international tribunal for one more year. Furthermore Damascus continued to strengthen its missile capabilities and programs of weapons of mass destruction. As for Iran, if no serious containment strategy is applied to the Assad regime as of 2008, by the following year a domino effect would be taking place in the region against the rise of democracies with Syria playing a significant role. During the present year both US Congress political messaging towards "dialogue" and the Russian backing encouraged Assad to pursue his policies and created harsher conditions for the Syrian opposition.

Lebanon

The year 2007 witnessed a series of tragedies with terror assassinations directed against legislators from the majority in Parliament and a senior general in the Lebanese Army. Hezbollah and its allies were successful in intimidating the Government and the Cedars Revolution with violence and threats. The United States public position stayed the course in support to the democracy movement while French initiatives further confused the Lebanese. In 2008 the fate of Lebanon will be centred on the election of a new President. The US, the European Union and their allies in the region have about 9 months to back free Lebanon, otherwise the following year could witness the fall of the country back into the hands of the "axis."

Turkey

The inevitable dragging of the Turkish Army in incursions against the PKK in northern Iraq during 2007 indirectly serves the interests of the Syro-Iranian "axis." It also deflects the attention from the ideological change performed by the Islamist Government in Ankara.

Saudi Arabia

During 2007, the Saudi Kingdom continued its efforts against the Al Qaeda cells inside the country. It developed additional tactics to wage theological pressures on the organization. But at the same time, Saudi funds were still made available to fundamentalists around the world.

Russia

Although Russia continues to be a main target to Wahhabi and Jihadist terror and incitement, ironically, the Putin government during 2007 staged three moves to the advantage of terror regimes: opposing the US missile defence system in Europe, meant to protect Europe from the Khomeinist threat; shielding Tehran from Western pressures; and protecting the Assad regime. In 2008, the current direction taken by the Kremlin should be addressed seriously by the US and Europe through a historic and open dialogue on the future of Terrorism. Russia's current policies, if not corrected, can backfire against its own national security in view of the Jihadist rising activities in Chechnya and the Caucasus as well as in central Asia.

India

India continued to be targeted by the Jihadists in 2007. As a nuclear power, and the largest democracy in the world, this country should be further included in the international coalition against Terror and granted a more important role in south Asia in 2008.

China

During 2007, Chinese technology and weapons continued to flow to Terrorism-supporting regimes including Sudan, Iran and Syria. As for Russia, China's own security within its own borders can be affected by a growing Jihadi network in its north Western provinces.

France

The election of Nicholas Sarkozy in 2007 is a positive development as the new President intends to increase French participation in the War against Terrorism. Continuous incitements by Jihadists networks against France also escalated projecting forthcoming confrontations in France.

Europe and the West

Developments and arrests made in Great Britain, Spain, Italy, Germany, Denmark, Sweden, the Netherlands and Belgium in 2007 all indicate that Jihadi warfare in Western Europe is to be expected in 2008 and beyond. Similar trends were detected in Australia and Canada during the same year

The United States

During 2007 several arrests and dismantling of cells within the United States demonstrated the spread of the Jihadi networks at various levels and in different areas. A Projection of these developments and of the type of infiltrations already in place in this country shows that the map of the Jihadi web is much wider and deeper than anticipated, even by Government agencies and estimates. The diverse nature of the Jihadi activities in America lead me to believe that the next waves will be more sophisticated and better inserted in the institutions and society. The 2007 arrests and reports show that the Jihadists had interest in penetrating the US defence system.

However another type of threat has also appeared: the Jihadi ideological penetration of various spheres of education and decision-making, including at the strategic level. Both Wahabi and Khomeinist funding and influence have been spotted in 2007. The US Congress and the Administration should be spending time and efforts during 2008 to develop a national consensus on the definition of the threat doctrine, Jihadism. Short of achieving a minimal understanding of the Terror ideology, 2009 and beyond will witness a faster mutation of the Jihadi threat inside the country.

EU Council factsheet: European Union and the fight against terrorism

Brussels, 16 February 2007

Terrorism poses a significant threat to the security of Europe, to the values of our democratic societies and to the rights and freedoms of European citizens. Acts of terrorism are criminal and unjustifiable under any circumstances.

Terrorism must be countered both at national and international level. Action by the European Union has intensified since 9/11, and in particular since the horrendous attacks in Madrid (2004) and London (2005). Following proposals by the Presidency and the Counter-Terrorism Coordinator the Council adopted the EU Counter-Terrorism Strategy, which commits the Union to combat terrorism globally while respecting human rights, allowing its citizens to live in an area of freedom, security and justice. The EU's Counter-Terrorism Strategy covers four strands of work: Prevention, Protection, Pursuit and Response.

Prevent

The first objective is to prevent people turning to terrorism by tackling the factors or root causes which can lead to radicalisation and recruitment, in Europe and internationally.

To improve coordination between the Member States and the Union the Council has adopted a strategy and a detailed action plan to combat radicalisation and recruitment (2005). Implementing measures include initiatives by Member States and Europol to address radicalisation in prisons and to counter violent radicalisation through the Internet ('Check the Web'). Work has started to prepare a European strategy on community policing.
Through its military and civilian crisis management operations under ESDP the EU contributes to improving the security environment which influences the conditions for violent radicalisation in third countries.

Examples include the Aceh operation (2006), the Rafah border monitoring mission (Gaza), and the planned police support mission in Afghanistan (2007). Additional civilian capabilities to prevent and counter terrorism under ESDP are being identified within the Civilian Headline Goal 2008.

EU aid projects to third countries in the field of good governance and the rule of law are addressing factors which can contribute to radicalisaton and recruitment (Euromed, Western Balkans, ASEM, cooperation with Algeria and Morocco).

With the Euromed countries the EU has organised expert meetings to analyse and compare processes of radicalisation in the Mediterranean area. The Commission will organise a Euromed conference on the role of the media in preventing incitement in 2007.

In July 2006 the Council approved guidelines to combat radicalisation and recruitment through media communication in the Union. An expanded version is to be approved under the German Presidency.

An expert group on violent radicalisation has been created by the Commission in 2006. Several cross-border studies on radicalisation have been commissioned under the 6th and 7th EU Research Framework Programme (2006 and 2007).
Prevention of terrorism requires effective coordination at the level of each Member State. To encourage such coordination a peer evaluation of national counter-terrorism arrangements was initiated. Applying EU-wide best practices several Member States have strengthened their legislation and their operational or analytical counter-terrorism instruments.

Protect

The second objective of the EU strategy is to protect citizens and infrastructure and reduce our vulnerability to attack, including through improved security of borders, transport and critical infrastructure.

Measures to improve the protection of borders include the Directive to include biometric features in EU passports (2005), the establishment of the FRONTEX agency (2005), and the modernisation of the Community Customs Code (2005). Political agreement on the SIS II System has been reached in the Council (2006). A Regulation on the Visa Information System is under negotiation in the Council and the Parliament. The Commission is currently undertaking an impact assessment of the need to set up a European Passenger Name Record system. European customs and border protection services have organised joint exercises to prevent the smuggling of radiological material which could be used to fabricate a 'dirty bomb'.

Measures to improve the security of transport include the adoption of the Ports Security Directive (2005) and the initiatives to improve the security at European airports following the aborted attack on transatlantic aircraft in the UK (2006). Measures to reinforce European standards on aviation security (revision of Regulation 2320/02) are in the process of codecision with the European Parliament.

At the request of the European Council wide-ranging measures to improve the protection of critical infrastructure have been proposed by the Commission in December 2006. A Directive establishing a procedure for the identification and designation of European Critical Infrastructure has been put forward. A European rapid alert system to respond to emergencies is being prepared (Critical Infrastructure Warning Information System).

A monitoring regime to control the manufacturing of substances used in the production of explosives is being prepared by the Commission and is a priority of the German Presidency.
For the first time security-related research and development will figure prominently in the EU's research programme. The 7th Research Framework Programme (2007-2013) has earmarked  1.4 billion for this purpose. Research to improve the protection of 'soft' and 'hard' targets against terrorism ranks high among the priorities.

Pursue

The third objective of the Counter-Terrorism Strategy is to pursue and investigate terrorists across our borders and globally; to impede planning, travel, and communications; to disrupt support networks; to cut off funding and access to attack materials, and to bring terrorists to justice.

The European Arrest Warrant, which has so far led to the extradition of more than 2000 criminal suspects, is increasingly being employed as a tool against terrorism and other forms of major crime. Building on this experience the Council has reached political agreement on a proposal to create a European Evidence Warrant (2006). The Council also adopted a Framework Decision to allow mutual recognition of confiscation orders (2006).
Recent initiatives to combat the financing of terrorism include the Third Money Laundering Directive (2005), the Regulation on cash couriers requiring disclosure of cash or equivalent in excess of  10000 (2005), and the Regulation on funds transfers (2006). A draft Regulation on alternative remittance systems (payments services) is currently before the Council.

Several measures aim at strengthening information exchange in the fight against terrorism. A Common Position to improve information sharing on lost and stolen passports, including with Interpol, was adopted in 2005. A Directive on the retention of data was adopted in 2006, as was a Framework Decision on simplifying the exchange of information and intelligence between law enforcement agencies. A proposal to improve the exchange of information on criminal convictions is under discussion in the Council and the Parliament. Seven Member States signed the Treaty of Prüm (2005) which allows national law enforcement authorities access to data bases in other Member States (including of fingerprints and DNA), and which facilitates cross-border police cooperation. Efforts to integrate the Prüm Treaty into the European Union are under discussion in the Council.

Cooperation among security and intelligence agencies has been enhanced through the modernisation and expansion of the EU Situation Centre (2005), which has been providing frequent and high-level assessments of the terrorist threat to the Member States and the Commission.

Europol and Eurojust are each involved in around 20 ongoing terrorism-related investigations in Europe. Transatlantic cooperation has been enhanced by the stationing of US liaison officers at Europol and Eurojust. An agreement strengthening information exchange between Eurojust and the US Department of Justice was agreed in 2006. A proposal to strengthen Europol, including through a change in its legal base, is before the Council. The European Police College (CEPOL) has initiated counter-terrorism training programmes for senior police officials.
In the 7th Research Framework Programme (2007-2013) significant funding will be devoted to enhancing the protection against conventional explosives and against non-conventional terrorist attacks (chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear).

Respond

The fourth objective of the EU Counter-Terrorism Strategy is to prepare ourselves, in the spirit of solidarity, to manage and minimise the consequences of a terrorist attack, by improving capabilities to deal with the aftermath, the coordination of the response, and the needs of victims.

Military assets and capabilities have been identified which could support coordinated EU disaster response efforts. They include strategic transport (air/sea), tactical transport (helicopters), medical units, field hospitals and logistics. Procedures have been finalised for matching transport needs and available military owned or chartered transportation facilities from Member States.
Several initiatives have been taken to improve consular protection of EU citizens in case of terrorist attacks or natural disasters in third countries. Additional proposals have recently been tabled by the Commission.

Multinational exercises to test the readiness of Member States to assist each other in case of man-made or natural disasters continue to be held each year (2006: Bulgaria, Denmark/Sweden; 2007: Luxembourg). Lessons learned include the need to improve communication facilities between national capitals and the European Commission. To improve crisis communication among its own services the Commission has set up the ARGUS network.
A Financial Instrument for Community Action in the field of civil protection (2007-2013) has been created. This will enable the Union to support prevention, preparedness and response to man-made and natural disasters both inside and outside the Union (indicative annual budget:  25 million).

A pilot project has been launched to help victims of terrorism and their families. Additional funds for support to victims have been set aside under the Programme for the prevention of and fight against crime 2007-2013.

At the proposal of the Presidency and the Counter-Terrorism Coordinator proposals have been adopted to establish EU Emergency and Crisis Coordination Arrangements (2005). Operating procedures and a manual for crisis coordination arrangements in the Council were agreed (2006) and tested in an exercise involving Permanent Representatives, the Commission, and the Council Secretariat (2006). A follow-up exercise will take place in 2007.

International cooperation

The fight against terrorism plays a significant and growing part in the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the Union and in its wider international relations.

With strong backing from the Union the United Nations is increasing its role in combating terrorism. Examples include the adoption of the Convention against Nuclear Terrorism (2005) and the adoption of the UN Counter-Terrorism Strategy (2006). The EU continues to push for a comprehensive UN convention against terrorism. In its relations with third countries the EU consistently urges the ratification and implementation of the existing 16 UN conventions and protocols against terrorism.

Between 2004-2006 annual high-level political dialogues on counter-terrorism have been initiated between the EU and the USA, Russia, India, Pakistan, Australia and Japan. Egypt has requested the EU to open a similar dialogue. In the framework of the Asia-Europe Meetings (ASEM) the EU has co-hosted two regional conferences on inter-faith dialogue (Bali, 2005; Cyprus, 2006). A follow-up meeting will be held in Beijing in 2007. Since 2004 the EU has co-organised an annual dialogue to combat terrorist financing with the countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council.

Cooperation against terrorism is being mainstreamed into the Union's external agreements. Examples include the Revised Cotonou Agreement, the Euro-Mediterranean Code of Conduct Against Terrorism (both 2005) and the draft agreement on counter-terrorism and non-proliferation with Pakistan. Cooperation in the field of counter-terrorism has also been included in the 11 Action Plans under the EU's Neighbourhood Policy.

Since 2004 the EU has initiated counter-terrorism capacity-building initiatives with Algeria, Indonesia and Morocco, bringing together aid projects financed by Member States and the Commission. In addition the Commission supports a range of CT-related projects, notably in the fields of border protection and countering of terrorist financing, in regions ranging from the Balkans to South-East Asia. The new Stability Fund (2007-2013) will enable the Union to significantly increase its counter-terrorism capacity-building assistance to third countries.

In 2007 the first CFSP Joint Action on terrorism will be launched. This will consist of financial aid to the African Union's Centre for Counter-Terrorism (Algiers).

In the framework of the G8 the Commission and several Member States support global efforts to reduce the risk of terrorists obtaining weapons of mass destruction. The Union, for example, supports Russia's efforts to reduce its surplus stocks of nuclear and chemical weapons. EU Joint Actions are being implemented to support the non-proliferation activities of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)and the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW). The Union also lends strong support to efforts to prevent the spreading of biological weapons.