Roderick
D'Anthony Williams makes his third appearance before this
court regarding his convictions following trial for
first-degree murder and kidnapping that he committed while he
was a juvenile. Williams is presently serving a life sentence
for the first-degree murder, with a judicial review hearing
after fifteen years, and a concurrent fifty-year prison
sentence for his kidnapping conviction, with a review hearing
after twenty years. In this appeal, Williams argues that
sections 775.082(1)(b)2. and 921.1402(2)(d), Florida Statutes
(2014), [1] are unconstitutional because the timing of
his respective review hearings under these statutes is
grossly disproportionate based on the relative severity of
his two offenses and thus fails to offer him a meaningful
opportunity for release based on his demonstrated maturity
and rehabilitation. For the following reasons, we decline to
address the constitutionality of these statutes and affirm
Williams's sentences.

Williams
was initially sentenced by the trial court to serve life in
prison on his first-degree murder conviction and to serve a
concurrent fifty years' imprisonment for the kidnapping
conviction. On direct appeal, this court affirmed
Williams's convictions without comment. Williams v.
State (Williams I), 171 So.3d 143, 144 (Fla.
5th DCA 2015). We did, however, reverse his sentence for the
first-degree murder[2] and remand for the trial court to hold an
individualized sentencing hearing under the
then-recently-enacted juvenile sentencing laws to consider
whether Williams's life sentence remained an appropriate
sentence. Id. at 145. Also, because the jury did not
find that Williams actually possessed and discharged a
firearm during the commission of the first-degree murder,
[3]we
specifically directed the trial court to make a separate
written finding under section 775.082(1)(b), Florida
Statutes, as to whether Williams actually killed, intended to
kill, or attempted to kill the victim. Id. Based
upon this determination, Williams would either be entitled
to: a judicial review hearing after twenty-five years under
section 921.1402(2)(a) if the trial court found that he had
actually killed, intended to kill, or attempted to kill the
victim; or a judicial review hearing after fifteen years
under section 921.1402(2)(c) if the trial court had found
that he did not actually kill, intend to kill, or attempt to
kill the victim.

Prior
to his resentencing, Williams moved pursuant to Alleyne
v. United States, 570 U.S. 99 (2013), to empanel a jury
to make the aforementioned factual findings as to whether he
actually killed, intended to kill, or attempted to kill the
victim. In Alleyne, the United States Supreme Court
held that any factor that increases the mandatory minimum
sentence for a crime is an "element" of the crime,
not a "sentencing factor," and must be determined
by a jury. Id. at 106-07.

Williams
contended that Alleyne was applicable in his case
for two reasons. First, under section 775.082(1)(b)1.,
Florida Statutes, a finding that he actually killed, intended
to kill, or attempted to kill the victim would mandate a
minimum sentence of at least forty years' imprisonment
but, without this finding, there is no required minimum
sentence. See § 775.082(1)(b)2., Fla. Stat.
Second, as a juvenile offender, a finding that Williams had
actually killed, intended to kill, or attempted to kill the
victim would entitle him to a judicial review hearing and
potential release to probation after twenty-five years.
See § 921.1402(2)(a), Fla. Stat. However, if it
was found that he did not actually kill, intend to kill, or
attempt to kill the victim, then, under section
921.1402(2)(c), Williams would be entitled to a review
hearing and potential release to probation in fifteen years
(provided the underlying sentence exceeded fifteen years).
Thus, depending solely upon this specific factual finding
made by the trial court, Williams faced either a forty-year
minimum prison sentence or no minimum sentence and a judicial
review hearing, and possible early release, after either
twenty-five years or fifteen years.

The
trial court denied Williams's motion to empanel the jury.
The court reasoned that in Williams I, our court had
specifically ordered the trial court, and not a jury, to make
the factual finding as to whether Williams actually killed,
intended to kill, or attempted to kill the victim. The trial
court thereafter entered an order finding that Williams
actually killed and intended to kill the victim, and it
resentenced Williams to serve life in prison, with a review
hearing after twenty-five years. The trial court also
resentenced Williams to serve a concurrent fifty years'
imprisonment on his kidnapping conviction, but it included in
that sentence a judicial review hearing after twenty years.

Williams
appealed his resentencing, asserting that Alleyne
required that this factual issue as to whether he actually
killed, intended to kill, or attempted to kill the victim
must be determined by the jury by proof beyond a reasonable
doubt. We affirmed. Williams v. State (Williams
II), 211 So.3d 1070, 1073 (Fla. 5th DCA 2017). In doing
so, our court observed that although Williams's
Alleyne argument appeared to have merit, in
Falcon v. State, 162 So.3d 954, 963 (Fla. 2015), the
Florida Supreme Court, under similar circumstances where the
record did not conclusively establish that the juvenile
offender had actually killed, intended to kill, or attempted
to kill the victim, nor had the jury found the defendant to
have been in actual possession of a firearm during the
commission of the subject crime, directed the trial court to
make the factual finding as to whether the juvenile offender
actually killed, intended to kill, or attempted to kill the
victim. Williams II, 211 So.3d at 1073.
Additionally, because it did not appear to us that either
party in Falcon had specifically addressed the
applicability of the Alleyne decision, we certified
a question of great public importance to our supreme court as
to whether Alleyne required the jury, and not the
trial court, to make the factual finding under section
775.082(1)(b) of whether a juvenile offender actually killed,
intended to kill, or attempted to kill the victim.
Id.

The
Florida Supreme Court accepted jurisdiction to answer the
certified question. The court held that Alleyne
requires a jury to make the factual finding under section
775.082(1)(b) of whether a juvenile offender actually killed,
intended to kill, or attempted to kill the victim,
Williams v. State (Williams III), 242 So.3d
280, 282 (Fla. 2018), and receded from its earlier decision
in Falcon to the extent that its decision there
concluded that this determination was to be made by the trial
court. Id. at 288 n.7. The court found that based
upon the jury instructions that were given, including the
principals instruction that allowed the jury to find Williams
guilty of first-degree murder even if he did not actually
shoot the victim, and the general verdict form, which did not
differentiate between whether Williams was convicted of
premeditated or felony first-degree murder, there was no
clear jury finding that Williams had actually killed,
intended to kill, or attempted to kill the victim.
Id. at 288-89. It therefore concluded that an
Alleyne violation had occurred. Id. at 289.

The
court then analyzed whether an Alleyne violation is
subject to harmless error review. Id. It concluded
that it is, and proceeded to conduct a harmless-error
analysis. Id. at 289-90. The court determined that
the record failed to demonstrate beyond a reasonable doubt
that a rational jury would have found that Williams actually
killed, intended to kill, or attempted to kill the victim;
thus, the Alleyne violation in this case was not
harmless. Id. at 292.

&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;The
court next addressed the appropriate remedy for an
Alleyne violation. Id. Williams had
suggested to the court two alternatives: either empanel a new
jury to make this requisite factual finding or simply
resentence him under section 775.082(1)(b)2., which, by the
terms of this statute, equates to a finding that Williams did
not actually kill, intend to kill, or attempt to kill the
victim. Id. As previously discussed, resentencing
pursuant to this statute would entitle Williams to a judicial
...

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