Maneesh Gulati
Political Science 472
June 20, 1996
North Korean Insecurity:
Causes of Crisis Escalation
Recent developments in the Korean Peninsula have served to
escalate an already tense standoff into an almost intolerable crisis.
The United States government (USG) has opted to pursue a policy of
reassurance and deterrence in order to combat North Korean aggression.
The dual aspect policy seeks to initially deter further hostility from
the Democratic PeopleUs Republic of Korea (DPRK) through intensified
demonstrations of capabilities and commitment to the security of the
Republic of Korea (ROK). Complementary to this deterrent posture, the
policy of reassurance seeks to simultaneously indicate US benign
intentions in order to alleviate DPRK fears, contingent on the communist
regimeUs retreat from its policy of aggression. The USGUs policy emerges
from theoretical guidelines outlined in the classical theory of
deterrence and the postulateUs assumptions of challenger rationality.
USG unmotivated biases lend decision makers to believe that their policy
of deterrence and reassurance are perceived as intended while dismissing
the psychological factors that currently affect North Korean perceptions
of signals. The complexity of the USGUs policy serves only to complicate
the interpretive processing of signals as intended and, consequently,
encourages a psychological tendency of selective perception on the part
of North Korean leaders.
The DPRKUs communist regime, facing severe domestic economic and
political crises as well as a perceived threat from the international
community, feels that it needs to pursue an aggressive foreign policy to
maintain its existence, ideological sovereignty and independence. The
North Korean government believes that internal instability and external
threats to its existence, necessitate the adoption of an aggressive
policy. In accordance with theoretical assumptions underlying prospect
theory and the loss aversion principle, North Korean actors will incur
greater risks in order to avoid losses. Convinced of the need to pursue
an aggressive foreign policy laden with potentially devastating risks,
North Korean actors affected by motivated biases have, in turn, convinced
themselves that their foreign policy goals are attainable, . It is the
responsibility of the USG to lift North Korea out of its basement of fear
and retreat from an intimidating deterrent posture which only serves to
increase North Korean decision makersU perceived need for aggression.
THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVE
Deterrence/ Rationality
According to the classical theory of deterrence, an actor, hereto
referred to as the defender of the status quo, seeks to prevent or
persuade another actor, the challenger of the status quo, not to take a
certain action. Successful deterrence is based on the ability of the
defender to first, clearly define his deterrent threat, second,
communicate the threat, third, demonstrate the capability to defend the
threat and fourth, demonstrate resolve or a commitment to following
through on the threat. Classical deterrence theory rests heavily on
the assumption of rationality of actors implying the assumption of a
challengerUs ability to clearly perceive threats as intended by the
defender. Rationality is here defined, in economic terms, as the
utilization of coherence and consistency in pursuit of the maximization
of welfare and benefits. Irrespective of cultural or subjective
differences that may effect the actual interests or values involved as an
end, the ability of an actor to pursue those means necessary to
accomplish those values deemed of utmost importance, is the defining
quality of rationality. Proceeding in a manner to uphold and further
these values is the critical criteria of rational action. Although in
particular situations the preferred option may not be achieved, rational
action should achieve Rexpected value maximizing outcomes over the long
run.S As well, rationality can not be defined as an all or nothing
value; instead, rationality must be judged on a continuous scale, in
which varied degrees exist.
Motivated and Unmotivated Biases as Restrictive on Rationality
Whereas classical deterrence theory relies heavily on the assumption of
rational action, the theory fails to account for those psychological
factors or biases that hinder purely rational action and, therefore, is
observed as Rpsychologically bankruptS. Examination of recent
historical examples of situations of deterrence by Robert Jervis has
indicated that even in cases where the defender of the status quo has,
from an objective perspective, demonstrated a clear and credible threat,
challengers occasionally defy the threats, instead pursuing aggressive
action. There appears to be a psychological factor that constrains a
rational response to a stimulus, in this case, to a threat.
Unmotivated biases arise out of restrictions on human
comprehension of complex and ambiguous information which, in turn, impose
a need to circumvent a thorough deductive procedure in favor of
short-cuts to rationality. An actor whose cognitive thinking is tainted
by unmotivated biases perceives that which he expects to see instead of
perceiving the intended message. Actors, especially decision makers,
need to simplify analysis of information. This need has the effect of
transforming the decision making process into a theory driven procedure,
thereby allowing for preconceptions or expectations based on similar
historical situations to alter interpretations of signals. An important
factor in unmotivated biases is availability, a dimension of decision
making that describes an actorUs perceptions to be dominated by those
patterns that Rcome to mindS. Jervis states, RWhat is highly available
to a decision maker is his own plans and intentions. He will see the
behavior of others in light of what he is thinking of doing himself and
will use his own procedures and approaches to interpret what they are
doing.S
Motivated biases arise when an actorUs needs dominate the
decision making process and perception of signals. Situational
imperatives dominate the thought process and, in turn, actors see what
they want or need to see, defying other important signals in a
subconscious act of wishful thinking. Motivated biases often act as a
protective mechanism for actors, denying the actor information that would
demonstrate the harsh reality of a situation. In many cases, motivated
biases allow for a false sense of security to envelope an actorUs thought
process, even to the extent of allowing an actor to believe that the
adversary will allow the stateUs defiance to succeed. Challengers have
been observed to succumb to motivated biases in that they are inner
directed and tend to focus on their own needs, thereby dismissing the
needs, interests and capabilities of defenders.
An important psychological factor affecting defenders of the
status quo is the assumption of both challenger rationality and
challenger perception of the threat as intended. Defenders typically
fail to comprehend or to even attempt to understand the situational
imperatives or predispositions that alter a challengerUs rationality.
Jervis indicates that decision makers act on two premises: (1) that
reassurance demonstrating a non-belligerent, benign state of mind is
unnecessary and (2) that interpretations of signals on the part of
adversaries are inferred as intended. These assumptions, in and of
themselves unmotivated biases, often allow for a degree of complacency to
encompass the defenderUs strategic involvement with the challenger and,
consequently, the defender is often surprised by the challengerUs
response.
Historical Setting
Only weeks before the conclusion of World War II, the USG and the Soviet
Union arbitrarily divided Korea along the 38th parallel in what was
intended to be a temporary joint trusteeship of the peninsula. An
agreement in December of 1945 between the two superpowers outlined a
joint trusteeship of no more than five years, during which time a
provisional government was to be organized. The agreement was
essentially irrelevant, however, since Rthe de facto policies of the two
occupations had identified the Soviets with Kim Il Sung... while the
Americans backed Syngman Rhee.S In 1947, the US reversed its policy
toward the Korean peninsula with the intent to contain communism within
the region. The USG saw the resistance of communism as integral to
engage and revive Japan and as a result the Republic of Korea under
RheeUs leadership was created. In !948 while the ROK was being
established, Kim Il Sung was assuming power in the newly formed DPRK.
With the eruption of the Korean War in the summer of 1950, the US sought
not to simply contain communism but to retake North Korea and unify the
Koreas under RheeUs leadership. The USGUs attempt to reunify Korea
failed, however, when China intervened on the side of North Korea. With
the conclusion of the Cold War in 1953, nothing had been accomplished;
the stalemate across the 38th parallel remained and America again found
itself committed to a strategy of containment of communism. It was for
this reason that the US continued to station troops along the DMZ. No
peace treaty was signed at the conclusion of the Korean War and so
technically both the Koreas remain at war to this day. The Armistice
Agreement, however, was signed by the US and North Korea. The agreement
created a 2.5 mile wide demilitarized zone between North and South Korea
in which limited military personnel are allowed to enter.
Tensions reemerged in the Korean Peninsula in 1984 when
intelligence activities revealed that North Korea was pursuing an active
program of weapon development, although it is believed that the actual
program began in 1980. As a result of pressure from the Soviet Union,
the DPRK joined the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) in December of
1985. In 1992, North Korea officially declared its possession of nuclear
material, but during an inspection by officials from the International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), it was discovered that the North Korean
government had lied about the extent of its nuclear holdings. Pressured
by demands for further inspections, North Korea withdrew from the NPT in
1993. Further relevant information from that point on will be discussed
in greater detail throughout the paper.
US Interests
Before delving into a discussion on US policy and its efficiency it is
necessary to discuss what interests the USG seeks to achieve in East
Asia. Foreign policy interests are subdivided into two categories,
strategic and intrinsic, both of which are interrelated in that they
reinforce each other. Strategic interests involve beliefs and values
such as credibility, security, ideology and morality whereas intrinsic
interests involve tangible gains of monetary and physical value such as
oil and land.
US foreign policy, especially with regard to East Asia, has
focused on achieving strategic interests. The USGUs desire for
maintained global dominance is of utmost importance and underlies all US
policy. The initial draft of the PentagonUs Defense Planning Guidance
for Fiscal Years 1994-1999, leaked to the media in March of 1992, stated,
RWe must account sufficiently for the interests of the large industrial
nations to discourage them from challenging our leadership or seeking to
overturn the established political or economic order... We must maintain
the mechanisms for deterring potential competitors from even aspiring to
a larger regional or global role.S Buttressed in this global
leadership interest in the Post Cold War era, the US has focused on a
geopolitical dominationist strategy centering on East Asia. The US
seeks intermediary interests as a means to secure and maintain this
strategic interest of global and geopolitical leadership. Secretary
Warren Christopher outlined those national interests that serve as
pillars for the ultimate US hegemonic interest in East Asia: maintenance
of core alliances; pursuit of engagement; formation of a regional balance
of power to promote integration, stability and US economic interests;
regional compliance to the NPT; and promotion of democratic values. In
reviewing these interests it is curious to note first, that most of these
interests, with the exception of the economic goals, are strategic in
nature and second, that all these values serve to advantage the USG in
its pursuit of sustained global leadership.
Several of these interests require further discussion as a result of
their direct relevance to US policy toward Korea. Maintained security is
seen as critical in East Asia, since, by nature, it serves as a
prerequisite for the pursuit of all other interests. Ambassador Winston
Lord, the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific
Affairs, described the critical importance of the Korean peninsula in
maintaining regional security, R... the Korean peninsula is rightly
considered perhaps the most serious risk for full scale conflict
involving U.S. troops. Consequently a key objective of US policy must
continue to be the preservation of security and peace on the Korean
peninsula.S Complementary to the interest of security in the Pacific
region is the need to stem the proliferation of nuclear, biological and
chemical weapons. RThe National Security Strategy of Engagement and
Enlargement,S a White House report to define long-term, post-Cold War
strategy, stressed the need of the US to sustain counterproliferation
activities in accordance with the NPT and Missile Technology Control
Regime (MTCR) (RThe White House Issues its Major Report on the National
Security StrategyS). The third aspect of US interests in East Asia
focuses on economic goals. President Bill Clinton stressed the intrinsic
US economic interests in Asia in a recent speech following his April 1996
meeting with South Korean leader, Kim Yong-Sam, R...a lot of our ticket
to the future economically is in the Asian Pacific region as well. It
already accounts for a quarter of the worldUs output, growing every day.
Already more than half our trade is with the nations of the Pacific,
sustaining three million good American jobs.S Certainly US strategic
leadership interests require continued engagement in East Asian affairs.
US POLICY TOWARD NORTH KOREA
The United States government (USG) has focused on a mixed policy of
deterrence and reassurance in its relationship with North Korea. The USG
has decided that in order to achieve its strategic interests of regional
stability in East Asia, it must, first and foremost, deter any aggressive
action from an unstable North Korea while simultaneously offering
concessions as confidence building measures. James T. Laney, the US
Ambassador to South Korea recently indicated US intentions of both
deterrence and reassurance at an international seminar on Korea,
RSince deterrence alone does not address the factors that most threaten
stability on the [Korean] peninsula today, it must be augmented with
confidence building assurances and positive inducements to cooperation.S
Ambassador Robert Gallucci, Ambassador at Large, further echoed US
intentions in a recent press conference in Seoul, RIn present
circumstances, humanitarian aid, military deterrence and opening North
Korea to fresh winds of change all go together.S Deterrent measures and
demonstrations of reassurance are by no means mutually exclusive and,
therefore, US policy is not contradictory. In fact such a policy, in
many situations, can help alleviate a challengerUs overestimation of
hostilities by indicating the defenderUs benign intentions. Whether or
not, however, a mixed policy of deterrence and confidence building
measures can demonstrate the USGUs benign intentions to an isolated and
vulnerable state like North Korea is questionable and will be the focus
of discussion in this paper. First we will seek to outline the USGUs
mixed policy of deterrence and reassurance.
Deterrence
The United States has maintained a strong deterrent posture toward North
Korea since the conclusion of the Korean War. In fact, congressmen in
support of the Agreed Framework, bragged early in 1995 that the USG
Rquietly but systematically upgraded [the USG] deterrent posture and
today, the US is in the strongest position militarily than it has ever
been with regard to the DPRK.S The US presently stations over 37, 000
troops in South Korea, indicative of the USGUs commitment to the defense
of South Korea. The troops serve as a Rtrip wireS to North Korean attack
and, therefore, ensure US involvement in any conflict in the Korean
Peninsula. Early in 1995 the USG delayed its planned phased withdrawal
of US troops from the region. In December of 1995, dozens of warplanes
from American Military bases in Japan were reported to have participated
in military exercises in South Korea. Some accounts indicate that the
warplanes practiced nighttime blows at North Korean territory. Most
recently, on June 4th and 5th of this year, Pyongyang reported that the
US and South Korea took part in military exercises Rto conduct aerial
espionageS. Recent developments have served to further increase USG
deterrent posture in the region. In April of this year, Clinton further
demonstrated his commitment to the defense of South Korea by sending his
top defense officials and US warships to the area. South Korea is
reportedly purchasing advanced weapons from the United States. As well,
the US military forces have placed Rtwo electrified fences topped with
razor wire, a minefield and a huge concrete antitank wallS along the 151
mile long demilitarized zone separating the two Koreas. US Defense
Secretary William Perry indicated that USGUs Rcontingency plans, in
particular [the USGUs] contingency plan which involves the defense of
South Korea, has land mines used in a fundamental way.S
Of greater import to US deterrent measures has been their verbal
articulation of the USGUs commitment to the defense of South Korea. In
November of 1993, President Clinton articulated US resolve,
RI know of no one who seriously believes that the United States and the
Republic of Korea would be defeated in a war of aggression by North Korea
if they were to attack. And I made it as clear as I could that if they
were to do that , they would pay a price so great that the nation would
probably not survive as it is known today.S
On numerous occasions since ClintonUs 1993 meeting with Kim Yong-Sam and
most recently at an April meeting with the South Korean leader, Clinton
reaffirmed the USG commitment to the defense of South Korea.
In reviewing American deterrent policy, one observes that US
policy is focused on attempting to deter Korean aggression through threat
of punishment as opposed to through denial. Although the fences,
antitank wall and sale of missile defense capabilities to South Korea
serve as a source of deterrent denial of aggressive action, US policy,
for the most part, has served to flex US military muscle and demonstrate
US resolve to annihilate North Korea in the event of Korean conflict.
Clinton in his press conference with Kim Yong-Sam sought to deter North
Korean aggression by stressing both US capabilities to defeat North Korea
as well as US resolve to utilize these capabilities, clearly
demonstrating the USGUs policy of deterrence through threat of
punishment. Of greater importance in discussion of ClintonUs attempt at
deterrence was the vague nature of the threat. The ambiguity of the
threat brings into question whether the US intends to use nuclear weapons
in a conflict with North Korea. By stating that North Korea would cease
to exist Ras it is known todayS while leaving the role of nuclear weapons
in achieving this end unclear, Clinton serves to increase North Korean
insecurity, an aspect of US deterrent policy that will be discussed in
more detail later in this paper.
Sanctions
The USG has utilized a complementary policy of sanctions toward North
Korea. Although US sanctions have not focused on either trying to compel
or deter the communist regime, the US policy still remains relevant to
deterrence policy in that both are a negative, punitive policy, as
opposed to the dimension of international relations involving positive
rewarding policy. US economic and diplomatic sanctions against North
Korea are rooted in two very different sources of contention. At the
start of the Korean War in 1950 the USG imposed economic sanctions
against North Korea following guidelines set forth in the RTrading with
the Enemy ActS. The sanctions were imposed as a punitive measure in
response to both the communist nature of North Korean rule as well as the
North Korean initiation of conflict with South Korea. Complementary to
US economic sanctions is the USGUs refusal to recognize North Korea, with
the implication of US denial of diplomatic and ambassadorial level
relations with the communist regime. The second source of contention
justifying US economic and diplomatic sanctions is the USGUs
categorization of North Korea as a state sponsor of terrorism. Despite
the fact that North Korea has not assisted in any terrorist act since
1987 (when it sponsored a mid-flight bombing of a KAL airliner) and the
DPRKUs insistence that it is opposed to Rall kinds of terrorismS and Rany
assistance to itS, the April 1996 release of R1995 Patterns of Global
TerrorismS still categorized North Korea as a state sponsor of
terrorism. As outlined in that report, the USG will consequently Rbring
maximum pressure on states that sponsor and support terrorists by
imposing economic, diplomatic and political sanctions.S
By understanding the nature of US economic sanctions, we can
attempt to infer the goals sought by the USG in imposing these measures.
US diplomatic and economic sanctions appear to be retributive in nature.
Professor Raymond Tanter defines retributive sanctions based on the
following criteria, RIf the main purpose of the sanctions is to oppose a
regime or to right a wrong, retributive justice is at work.S Retributive
sanctions act in a punitive manner in an attempt to change another
stateUs behavior. Rehabilitative sanctions, on the other had, are
imposed Rin response to a particular transaction.S Sanctions imposed on
North Korea in 1950 are strictly retributive in that they demonstrate
opposition to the North Korean communist regime; the sanctions seek to
punish North Korea and are targeted generally at the regimeUs behavior.
Analysis of the sanctions imposed as a result of terrorist activity
offers a more difficult dilemma. Although the sanctions are in response
to a particular transaction, a closer look indicates that, in fact, the
sanctions may be based on retributive justice. Despite the fact that
North Korea has not engaged in any act of terrorism for nearly a decade
and has repeatedly indicated its opposition to such activity, the US
still categorizes the regime as a sponsor of terrorism. As such, the
sanctions may seek to punish North Korea, focusing on the USGUs more
broad opposition to the communist regime, instead of on what weakly
remains of a terrorist policy.
Strategic Reward/ Concessions
The third pillar of US policy toward North Korea focuses on offering
strategic rewards and concessions to the DPRK in an effort to reassure
the communist regime of the USGUs benign intentions. Seeking to
demonstrate a non-belligerent policy and help lift North Korea out of
itUs self-perceived vulnerable and isolated state, the US has attempted
to complement its deterrent and sanctionary posture with policies of
reassurance. In 1992 the USG initiated this concessionary aspect of its
mixed policy by removing US tactical nuclear weapons from the ROK.
Subsequent to this act, the USG reinforced its commitment to a nuclear
free peninsula through private assurances of the removal of weapons as
well as offering the DPRK the opportunity to inspect US facilities in
South Korea. It is important to note, however, that the US has
maintained the organizational infrastructure and personnel training
sessions necessary for nuclear operation in Korea.
In October 1994, in one of the greatest diplomatic successes with
North Korea in recent history, the USG momentarily quelled a brewing
crisis in the Korean Peninsula through offers of a series of strategic
rewards that culminated in the Agreed Framework. In exchange for North
KoreaUs promise to freeze its nuclear activities, both civilian and
military, the US offered over six billion dollars in aid and
consideration for future concessions, contingent on North Korean
behavior. One major aspect of the agreement hinged on the DPRKUs
replacement of already existing gas graphite nuclear reactors with light
water reactors. The USG offered to assume responsibility for arranging
financing and construction of the light water reactors, with the ROK
shouldering most of the actual financial burden, on the condition that
North Korea obtained a clean bill of health from the International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA) . As a strategic reward, the US persuaded North
Korea to discontinue existing nuclear facilities, although this exists as
a right under the NPT, offering heavy oil shipments as an alternate
energy source. As a third strategic reward, the USG promised to
commence normalization of diplomatic and economic relations with North
Korea, contingent on North Korean compliance with the Framework. US
policy during the Agreed Framework negotiations centered on the
application of a carrot and stick strategy to formulate an agreement that
would ensure North Korean adherence to US demands. The US offered
numerous carrots in the form of economic incentives and potential
diplomatic concessions. As a result of the USGUs openness to
concessions, negotiators succeeded in drawing out North Korean promises
of compliance to existing nuclear treaty obligations. Although the
framework served only to assure North Korean compliance with already
existing treaty obligations and temporarily quell an emerging crisis, the
discussions, on a broader scale, serve as a breakthrough for future
negotiations. The Agreed Framework, by no means, serves as an answer to
American political conflict with North Korea, but instead offers a
starting point from which the USG can build. Ambassador Winston Lord,
echoed such beliefs in his recent testimony to the House Committee on
International Relations,
RThe Agreed Framework has frozen the NorthUs nuclear program in its
tracks. It has put us on a path to attain all our strategic objectives,
supporting the international nonproliferation regime and enhancing
security and stability in Northeast Asia.S
A third important effort of reassurance of benign intentions on
the part of the USG was its commendable contribution of two million
dollars in food aid to North Korea following devastating floods that
destroyed crops and inflicted conditions of famine and economic turmoil
on North Koreans. Nicholas Burns, at a briefing for the United States
Department of State, clarified US intentions in offering aid, RThis is a
humanitarian issue. ItUs not a political issue.S US efforts to reduce
devastating economic and living conditions in North Korea serve an
important role in attempting to reassure North Korea of benign US
intentions. By separating this humanitarian issue from political
conflict between the two countries, the USG attempted to indicate to the
DPRK that it did not seek the collapse of North Korea, a policy that
would have been better served by allowing domestic instability to destroy
the communist regime, at least in the eyes of North Korean leaders.
NORTH KOREAN AGGRESSION IN TERMS OF PROSPECT THEORY- A THEORETICAL
PERSPECTIVE
North Korean Aggression
North Korean activity over the past thirty months has been characterized
by belligerent displays of military might. Since the death of Kim Il
Sung in July of 1994, Kim Jong Il, Kim Il SungUs son, has delayed
accession to a formal role of leadership. Under this relatively faceless
government, the North Korean military has pursued a rather aggressive
policy of apparent war preparation. As of December 1995, North Korea is
believed to have deployed over 1.1 million troops along the border
separating the two Koreas. The North Korean army is reported to have
stationed offensive military weapons along the DMZ to within firing range
of Seoul while deploying aircraft forces that could potentially reach
Seoul in five to six minutes. While military troops along the border
have taken part in numerous military exercises, Kim Jong-Il has made
significant strides in streamlining and modernizing the High Command of
the Korean PeopleUs Army (KPA), again in an apparent act of war
preparation.
On April 4 of this year, an official spokesman from Pyongyang
declared that, Rthe KPA shall give up its duty, under the Armistice
Agreement, concerning the maintenance and control of the military
demarcation line and DMZ,S and, Ras a follow up step... have its
personnel and vehicles bear no distinctive insignia and marking when they
enter the joint security area of Panmujon and the DMZ.S North Korea
justified its action by claiming that RpuppetS RSouth Korean authorities
have persistently rejected our proposals and driven the situation to the
brink of war under the protection of their master, the United States, so
that [the DPRK] can no longer expect a negotiated solution... There is a
limit to [DPRK] restraint and patience.R In the days following the
announcement, April 5th to the 7th, North Korea deployed nearly 300
soldiers into Panmujon and the DMZ where they were reported to have
built two covered communication trenches. During this first week
following North KoreaUs unilateral withdrawal from the Armistice
Agreement, the North Korean government further demonstrated its
preparations for war as it staged a rally urging civilians to enlist in
the army.
Prospect Theory- an Overview
Clearly recent North Korean military activity has demonstrated an
aggressive policy of military exercises and preparation. What, however,
has motivated such aggression, especially in light of US attempts at
deterrence? To answer this question a discussion of prospect theory,
introduced by Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky as an alternative to the
expected utility/ rationality postulate is necessary.
Whereas the expected utility principle asserts that decision
makers seek to maximize expected utility by objectively weighing and
pursuing options of both maximum utility value and probability of
occurrence, prospect theory infuses psychological factors into the
decision making process as an explanation for the failure of the expected
utility principle to account for deviations in actual behavior. Prospect
theory posits that decision makers seek outcomes in terms of a reference
point as the critical variable and, in turn, individuals weigh losses as
more significant than gains. The logical deduction of this postulate is
that individuals act as risk acceptant for losses and risk averse for
gains. Individuals tend to frame options in terms of deviations from a
reference point. Although the status quo is commonly utilized at the
reference point, on many occasions the reference point may actually be an
aspiration point. The significance of the positioning of the reference
point rests on the tendency of individuals to imbue greater resolve and
acceptance of risks in order to avoid perceived losses than to achieve
gains. The assumption behind this observed behavior is that individuals
value what they possess more than that which they do not possess, a
tendency known as the endowment effect. The endowment effect directly
challenges assumptions in the expected utility principle which assert
that an objective framing of preferences occurs lending to the pursuit of
that option which maximizes expected utility.
The application of prospect theory to international affairs helps
explain escalation of aggression despite seemingly credible deterrent
threats. The political implications of prospect theory indicate that
individuals acting from a basement of fear resulting from perceived
internal insecurity and external decline of status tend to pursue
aggressive foreign policy. Actors believing that a loss, either in
international or domestic affairs, is imminent, will feel a perceived
need to pursue confrontational policies. Such actors will be more
willing to incur risks associated with the aggressive foreign policy in
order to avoid losses which otherwise appear certain. What may be
perceived as a game of risk-taking, in a sense the rationality of
irrationality in which the actor partaking in risk taking is believed to
be acting irrationality to exact concessions, may, in fact, be
desperation attempts to quell domestic instability and/or external
insecurity. External threats manifest in a policy makerUs perception
that a dramatic restructuring of the international balance of power,
essentially a security dilemma, is imminent. A security dilemma is here
defined as a situation in which one nation perceives that a zero sum
security relationship exists with its adversary, a relationship in which
one stateUs security necessarily implies the otherUs insecurity. Such
actors perceiving potential shifts in its nationUs stability and role in
the international arena feel pressured to react immediately and escalate
hostility through aggressive demonstration of risk taking. Internal
domestic pressure often manifests in an unstable political system or
domestic economic chaos. Political leaders, pressured by such internal
chaos perceive a need to divert domestic attention toward a legitimate or
a contrived foreign hostility, regardless of the credibility of deterrent
threats.
Policy makers convinced of a need to accomplish foreign policy
goals, as a result of either international security dilemmas or domestic
legitimacy crises, in turn convince themselves that such goals are
attainable, irrespective of adversial demonstrations of commitment or
capability. Therefore, classical deterrence theory fails to account for
empirical data suggesting that defendersU efforts to infuse resolve and
credibility in their deterrent threats have minimal effect on actually
deterring challengers. The ultimate source of adversial behavior of
aggression and brinkmanship emerge, in fact, from their perceptions of
external and internal political and strategic interests.
North Korean Aggression Explained
As Lebow suggests, two factors invoke a perceived need on an actor to
pursue an aggressive foreign policy of crisis escalation: internal
instability and external threats to international balances of power. The
first, internal instability, arises from a decision makerUs belief that
domestic crises may culminate in a regimeUs overthrow. North Korea
presently suffers from severe economic devastation and social chaos, both
of which are interrelated in that they reinforce each other. The 1995
floods decimated crops resulting in a shortage of nearly two million tons
of grain, 500,000 homeless, and a famine crisis affecting nearly the
entire North Korean population. The resulting devastation has created a
sense of panic and urgency among North Koreans. Prior to the floods,
the Korean economy was already facing severe restrictions as a result of
North KoreaUs dual system of juche and a command direct economy. Juche
is a system of self-reliance, essentially self-imposed economic,
political and social isolation unique to North Korea. Exacerbating the
economic limitations imposed by juche, the command direct economy
restricts expansion and growth. Even more devastating is the fact that
the socialist regime allots an extraordinary amount of money on military
development, limiting expenditures on social and economic improvement.
Indeed, as John Deutch, Director of the Central Intelligence Agency,
indicates, RNorth KoreaUs large conventional force is an organ of
internal security that is critical to the survival of the Kim Jong-il
regime.S With the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact
at the conclusion of the Cold War, North Korea found itself completely
isolated economically and without any trading partners. Furthermore,
China, as of recently, insisted on hard currency trading terms with North
Korea, a requirement that will significantly disrupt the flow of trade
between the two communist regimes. The social instability imposed by
this economic chaos is evidenced by the recent dramatic increases in high
level defections from North Korea. Major David Maxwell of the United
States Special Forces describes the defections as indicative of both a
Rtransferring of allegiance of the elite of North Korea away from the
regimeS and an Rimpending breakdown of the status quo.S
While North Korea is definitely a totalitarian state where, in
most situations, the regime dominates not only individual activity but
individual thought as well (through control of news reports and public
broadcasts), recent radio broadcasts have made it evident that the Kim
Jong-Il regime is definitely feeling the pressure of social instability.
Feeling pressure to defend the North Korean economic system to the
public, the Korean Central News Agency, controlled by the communist
regime, has not only described North Korea as having Rthe best socialist
systemS but has also blamed their economic problems on Western nations
who have Rrestrained [North Korean] development through sanctions,
blockade and military and economic pressure on the DPRK.S The North
Korean government has also tried to dissuade potential defectors by
describing capitalistic South Korea as Ra living hell based on jungle
law, a society for thieves and swindlersS where defectors are Rmaltreated
and harassed by savage investigation.S Most significant however, is the
fact that Kim Il Jong has failed to take over the leadership role of
North Korea since his fatherUs death nearly two years ago. Many analysts
seriously doubt that Kim-Il Jong will be able to ever assume true control
over the DPRK.
Prospect theory posits that a regime feeling the pressure of
internal instability may seek to avoid losses and divert public attention
toward external threats. Levy states,
RState officials may be tempted to engage in forceful action against
external enemies in order to... distract attention from domestic
politics. The temptation toward such diversionary action may be enhanced
by risk acceptant attitudes in the domain of losses created by a
deteriorating domestic situation... beleaguered political elites often
adopt a Tfortress mentality [and] are particularly inclined to advocate
external war for the purpose of domestic crisis management if chances are
very doubtful.S
This scenario seems to describe North KoreaUs domestic crisis very well.
From the DPRKUs basement of fear, the North Korean regime feels a
perceived need to seek an aggressive foreign policy. General Gary E.
Luck, the commander of USA forces in South Korea voiced his concerns of
North Korean diversionary tactics in March of this year, RWe worry that
in a very short period, this country will either collapse or take
aggressive actions against the South in a desperate attempt to divert
attention from its internal situation. It is entirely possible that the
leadership in Pyongyang is not, or will not remain, cohesive enough to
make rational decisions.S Defense Secretary William Perry articulated
similar concerns regarding aggressive North Korean action, RThe broader
concern is that the North Korean economy is in terrible shape now. And
this is causing... tremendous tensions and conflicts within the country.
We have a continuing concern that the government in North Korea might
respond in some sort of an irrational way to the problem... to simply
keep themselves, keep the regime in power because of these great internal
tensions.S
A second independent factor contributing to a perceived need for
North Korea to pursue an aggressive foreign policy is a perceived
external threat to the DPRKUs sovereignty. North Korea is presently
locked in a basement of fear and believes that RUS imperialistsS and
their Rdominationist purposeS seek to eliminate North Korea entirely.
North Korea perceives that the US Rsecurity strategy is aimed at
permanently occupying South Korea and invading the DPRK.S Furthermore,
North KoreaUs Foreign Ministry reported, RNow that the United States is
scheming to bring the military adventure against our system into practice
together with South Korea and Japan, we can not feel but exposed to
threat and will invariably have to take countermeasures.S North Korea
struggles as one of the last remaining relics of a once powerful
communist bloc. With the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the Eastern
Bloc and with China seeking an intensified relationship with South Korea,
as noted by Chinese President Jiang ZeminUs recent visit to South Korea
and his statement that the DPRK and China Rare not allied relations,S
North Korea feels abandoned ideologically, militarily and economically.
The DPRK envisions a world collapsing upon them with US dominationist
forces leading the way. Senator Paul Simon describes North Korea as
Rfeeling very isolatedS and in fear that a dramatic restructuring of the
balance of East Asian power is imminent, with themselves left as a
casualty. It is from this state of paranoia where North Korean
political leaders may seek to engage in risky behavior in an attempt to
avoid a perceived externally imposed collapse of the communist regime.
Levy indicates that a tendency toward aggressive behavior Ris all the
greater for a state which perceives itself to be in a zero sum
relationship with its adversary.S Definitely North Korea perceives that
such a security dilemma exists between itself and the US, one in which US
security necessarily implies North Korean insecurity and vice versa.
Believing that the United StatesU dominationist interests are in direct
competition with North KoreaUs security interests, North Korea perceives
a need to pursue an aggressive foreign policy and incur risks in order to
avoid losses before their opportunity to do so is lost. North Korean
leaders, whose perceptual biases lead them to overestimate US hostility
through selective perception as described below, Rexpect losses unless
[they] take strong if not aggressive action.S
In summary, North Korean statesmen perceive that both external
and internal factors are contributing to potential losses in North
KoreaUs status. From this basement of fear, the DPRK leaders believe
that its nationUs ideology, sovereignty and even presence are threatened
by internal and external insecurity. Levy indicates that Rthe
combination of perceived external decline and internal insecurity may be
particularly conducive to risk seeking.S It is this fear that continued
inaction would only serve to exacerbate decline and instability resulting
in near certain collapse that invokes a perceived need for an actor to
accomplish certain foreign policy objectives through aggressive
measures. Specifically North Korea, describing Rindependence as its
lifebloodS and the need for the KPA to Rcredibly defend the security of
the socialist motherland and the happiness of the people,S frames its
losses in terms of ideology, sovereignty and even existence as reference
points and will act in risk acceptant manners to avoid losses in these
areas. What may be otherwise perceived as brinkmanship, the rationality
of irrationality, in which an actor appears to Rrock the boatS to exact
concessions, may in fact be an act of desperation. Lebow states,
RBrinkmanship in these cases was conceived of as a forceful response to
this acute and impending danger, a means of preventing or even redressing
the shift in the balance of power before time ran out and such a response
became unrealistic.S
Indeed, North Korean actors have and may continue to pursue an
aggressive foreign policy laden with risks in order to avoid losses. But
are North Korean policy makers acting rationally in terms of the expected
utility principle? The DPRK leaders are not objectively weighing policy
options in terms of what choices offer greatest probability of maximizing
utility. Instead, in their psychological state of desperation and
perceived need to ward off internal and external threats to regime
stability and ideological sovereignty, the DPRK leaders are pursuing an
aggressive foreign policy aimed at averting losses but also coupled with
serious risks. What is of greater significance is that while North
Korean leaders have convinced themselves that internal insecurity and
external threats have imposed a need for aggressive foreign policy, these
same leaders have also convinced themselves that their foreign policy
goals are attainable. A US national security analyst was noted to have
said, RThe problem is not that North Korea can defeat us, but that they
think they can.S Steve Macko and Clark Staten, both of The American
Reporter, continue, RIn their self imposed isolation, the North Koreans
may be suffering from the delusion that they can actually win a
conventional war against South Korea and the United States.S Lebow
contends that such a motivated bias is common, RWhen policy makers become
convinced of the necessity to achieve specific foreign policy objectives,
they become predisposed to see those objectives as attainable.S As
motivated biases generally do, these psychological protective measures
serve to alleviate an actorUs response to the grim prospects of reality.
FAILURE OF US MIXED POLICY
US policy makers have chosen to adopt a Rnuanced combination of military
deterrence and diplomatic engagementS in handling the North Korean
crisis. Through such measures the US seeks to first, indicate US resolve
and strength so as to prevent aggression and second, alleviate North
KoreaUs fears so as to prevent the adversary from being pushed into a
basement of fear where it believes that its weak unstable situation
necessitates pursuit of hostile policy. As Lebow describes, such a mixed
policy as adopted by the USG Rwould aim never to allow oneUs own state to
be perceived as so weak or irresolute as to invite a challenge but at the
same time to avoid encouraging an adversary to feel so weak or threatened
that it has the need to do so.S While such a policy works ideally, it
fails to take into account psychological factors that inhibit expression
of a signal as intended. Such a complex policy hinders the
simplification process required to send a clear message and, in fact,
only serves to complicate the signal, increasing the likelihood of
misperception. Furthermore, such a mixed policy of deterrence and
reassurance fails to account for actors locked in a basement of fear who
act irrationally perceiving not only what they expect to see,
unmotivated biases, but also what they want to see, motivated biases.
Such actors selectively observe certain signals while dismissing others,
usually with the tendency to selectively observe and overestimate hostile
acts while dismissing policies of reassurance. North Korea has clearly
demonstrated this curious psychological behavior of selective perception.
exacerbate decline and instability resulting in near certain collapse
that invokes a perceived need for an actor to accomplish certain foreign
policy objectives through aggressive measures. Specifically North
Korea, describing Rindependence as its lifebloodS and the need for the
KPA to Rcredibly defend the security of the socialist motherland and the
happiness of the people,S frames its losses in terms of ideology,
sovereignty and even existence as reference points and will act in risk
acceptant manners to avoid losses in these areas. What may be otherwise
perceived as brinkmanship, the rationality of irrationality, in which an
actor appears to Rrock the boatS to exact concessions, may in fact be an
act of desperation. Lebow states, RBrinkmanship in these cases was
conceived of as a forceful response to this acute and impending danger, a
means of preventing or even redressing the shift in the balance of power
before time ran out and such a response became unrealistic.S
Indeed, North Korean actors have and may continue to pursue an
aggressive foreign policy laden with risks in order to avoid losses. But
are North Korean policy makers acting rationally in terms of the expected
utility principle? The DPRK leaders are not objectively weighing policy
options in terms of what choices offer greatest probability of maximizing
utility. Instead, in their psychological state of desperation and
perceived need to ward off internal and external threats to regime
stability and ideological sovereignty, the DPRK leaders are pursuing an
aggressive foreign policy aimed at averting losses but also coupled with
serious risks. What is of greater significance is that while North
Korean leaders have convinced themselves that internal insecurity and
external threats have imposed a need for aggressive foreign policy, these
same leaders have also convinced themselves that their foreign policy
goals are attainable. A US national security analyst was noted to have
said, RThe problem is not that North Korea can defeat us, but that they
think they can.S Steve Macko and Clark Staten, both of The American
Reporter, continue, RIn their self imposed isolation, the North Koreans
may be suffering from the delusion that they can actually win a
conventional war against South Korea and the United States.S Lebow
contends that such a motivated bias is common, RWhen policy makers become
convinced of the necessity to achieve specific foreign policy objectives,
they become predisposed to see those objectives as attainable.S As
motivated biases generally do, these psychological protective measures
serve to alleviate an actorUs response to the grim prospects of reality.
FAILURE OF US MIXED POLICY
US policy makers have chosen to adopt a Rnuanced combination of military
deterrence and diplomatic engagementS in handling the North Korean
crisis. Through such measures the US seeks to first, indicate US resolve
and strength so as to prevent aggression and second, alleviate North
KoreaUs fears so as to prevent the adversary from being pushed into a
basement of fear where it believes that its weak unstable situation
necessitates pursuit of hostile policy. As Lebow describes, such a mixed
policy as adopted by the USG Rwould aim never to allow oneUs own state to
be perceived as so weak or irresolute as to invite a challenge but at the
same time to avoid encouraging an adversary to feel so weak or threatened
that it has the need to do so.S While such a policy works ideally, it
fails to take into account psychological factors that inhibit expression
of a signal as intended. Such a complex policy hinders the
simplification process required to send a clear message and, in fact,
only serves to complicate the signal, increasing the likelihood of
misperception. Furthermore, such a mixed policy of deterrence and
reassurance fails to account for actors locked in a basement of fear who
act irrationally perceiving not only what they expect to see,
unmotivated biases, but also what they want to see, motivated biases.
Such actors selectively observe certain signals while dismissing others,
usually with the tendency to selectively observe and overestimate hostile
acts while dismissing policies of reassurance. North Korea has clearly
demonstrated this curious psychological behavior of selective perception.
North Korea described US aerial intelligence gathering activities from
South Korea as Ra sure sign that the US imperialists are watching for a
chance to invade the NorthS despite PyongyangUs Rforthcoming policies.S
Furthermore, in a clear demonstration of the failure of US mixed policy
to achieve the goal of reassuring North Korean leaders of benign US
intentions, Pyongyang reported, RThe US decision to keep forces in South
Korea even after North Korea completely abandoned its military nuclear
program was proof that the US had no intention of complying with the
October 1994 agreement.S Pyongyang further described US security and
deterrent strategy as Ra strategy for military aggression to realize the
US dominationist purposeS and the RUS ambition to stifle the DPRK with
strength and dominate the world.S US policy of continued sanctions
seeking merely to punish North Korea through retributive justice further
demonstrates to the paranoid leaders of North Korea that the US is not
committed to helping the DPRK, but instead, seeks the collapse of the
communist regime.
Robert Jervis describes the inappropriate nature of deterrent
efforts with actors pursuing policies from a position of fear,
RDeterrence theory is designed primarily to explain how to deal with
countries that are seeking gains. In these circumstances deterrence may
be effective. But if the other is driven by fear of losses, threats and
coercion are likely to backfire, producing a spiral of greater
hostility.S Jervis continues to describe, in terms of prospect theory,
how deterrence fails to account for those situations in which the role of
the defender and challenger are blurred. In situations when both actors
believe that they are defending the status quo, Reach [will] accept high
risks in order to avoid a bad outcome.S North Korean policy makers
driven into a basement of fear by internal instability and perceived
external threats at sovereignty, believe that it is necessary to pursue
an aggressive foreign policy in order to maintain the status quo of its
existence, independence and ideological sovereignty. North Korean
leadersU belief that it is defending the status quo is evidenced by its
recent declaration in which Pyongyang takes on a clear deterrent posture,
RWe are ready for dialogue as well as war. The United States continues
to move toward the adventurous road of war by clinging to the policy of
strength as it was regardless of our repeated warnings, it will have to
be wholly responsible for all consequences arising therefrom.S
US Misperception
While US efforts at reassurance are commendable, policies of
deterrence and retributive sanctions only serve to negate the positive
outcomes of these confidence building measures and further drive the DPRK
into its basement of fear. US mixed policy presently rests on the
assumptions of classical deterrence theory in that US policy makers
assume that US signals of reassurance and deterrence are communicated
clearly to a rational North Korea; US policy makers are dismissing the
psychological factors that inhibit a clear interpretation of signals.
While some United States actors such as Defense Secretary William Perry
and General Gary Luck have accounted for North Korea insecurity as a
complicating factor for US policies of deterrence, other American actors,
particularly the White House, still advocate a mixed deterrent and
reassurance policy based on the assumption of DPRK rationality and their
resulting ability to perceive threats as intended. At a recent White
House background briefing, Senior Administrative Officials responded to
the question of why North Korea would be willing to seek diplomatic
negotiations with both the US and South by stating, RProbably because
countries act in their own self-interest, and there is a constellation of
factors [the deteriorating economic conditions] coming together on the
Korean Peninsula now that lead us and others to believe that the timing
for proposal is ripe.S Lieutenant General James R. Clapper Jr. of the
United States Armed Forces, articulated his similar belief on North
Korean rationality, RI believe North KoreaUs leadership now recognizes
its chances for regime survival are better served by strategies
emphasizing economic improvement and political-economic accommodation
rather than those stressing implacable confrontation with the outside
world.S Dismissing the loss aversion principle and perceived need for
aggression, many US actors believe that by pursuing a policy of
reassurance and deterrence the USG can clearly communicate its enduring
commitment to South Korea while simultaneously lifting North Korea out of
its basement of fear. These actors fail to observe that North Korea has
framed its interests in terms of ideological sovereignty and independence
as their reference point. These officials fail to comprehend that North
Korea will incur risks associated with aggressive behavior to not only
distract domestic attention away from internal instability but to prevent
a perceived restructuring of the East Asian balance of power; instead,
these actors believe that internal instability will eliminate any
aggressive North Korean behavior. James T. Laney, in the same manner as
Clapper and the Senior Administration Officials went so far as to say,
RThe shortcomings of the North Korean economy, the defects in its highly
centralized system, and the dissolution of its former allies have eroded
the DPRK military threat.S
Ron Lewis, the chief military analyst of the Intelligyst Group,
attributes the USGUs failure to understand the Korean crisis in terms of
loss aversion principles to American unmotivated biases, specifically
availability. Ron Lewis states that intelligence analysts, Rconstantly
get tripped up by comparing [the USGUs] enemies to [themselves], then
dismissing [the adversary] as incapable if he does not have comparable
assets. What is forgotten is the enemyUs resourcefulness and his ability
to improvise to meet a need.S Ron Lewis describes the USG as needing to
Rignore dismiss or demean other militaries when they donUt do things like
[the USG] would.S The USG uses short-cuts to logical examination of
information by judging other actors according to USG goals, interests and
perceptions of the situation, a tendency known as availability .
Nicholas Eberstadt, a researcher with the American Enterprise Institute,
summarizes the USGUs relations with North Korea, R...AmericaUs grasp of
Korean affairs continues to be woefully inadequate... events in Korea
have consistently taken Washington by surprise. Indeed, nearly all of
the great and terrible events that have defined the Korean drama since
the peninsulaUs partition have caught American policy makers
unprepared.S Partly to the defense of US decision makers, Korea remains
one the most closed nations in the world and access to information that
would illuminate comprehension of North Korean intentions is extremely
restricted.
US POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
In order to appease North Korean insecurities the USG must focus on a
positive policy of expanding diplomatic engagement with the DPRK and
continuing to offer strategic rewards as confidence building measures.
When actors are motivated by fear, appeasement is necessary. Professor
Raymond Tanter endorses such a policy toward actors acting from a
basement of fear, RReassurance dictates that defenders try to communicate
their benign intentions... to reduce fear, misunderstanding [and]
insecurity.S The US must continue to offer strategic rewards in
exchange for North Korean compliance with US demands as negotiators had
in the Agreed Framework. The carrot and stick strategy utilized in the
October 1994 negotiations offers the only solution to alleviating North
Korean fears of external dominationist goals and will also serve to
achieve US interests of security in the Korean peninsula. The USGUs
April 1996 proposal of four way peace talks between the DPRK, the ROK,
the US and China in response to North Korean demands of two way talks
between the US and themselves (with the notable exclusion of South Korea)
was a commendable concessionary policy. The US compromised by retreating
from its policy that peace talks were the responsibility of the two
Koreas, with the US seeking to act in a strictly supportive role. By
compromising and involving all relevant East Asian actors, the US
demonstrated not only its benign intentions but its commitment to East
Asian security as well. Complementing US efforts of strategic rewards,
the US must also begin a phased retreat of its deterrence policy.
Deterrent efforts only serve to increase North Korean insecurity and
misperception of US signals and thus a phased policy of eliminating the
USGUs deterrent posture is necessary. Evidence suggests that the USGUs
downsizing of its deterrent strategy has empirically served to alleviate
tensions on the Korean peninsula. Bruce Cumings, having earned a Ph.D.
in political science and East Asian affairs, supports a strict focus on
reassurance and engagement toward North Korea. He explains,
RThe Nixon Administration withdrew a division of American soldiers
without heightening tension; instead the North Koreans responded by
virtually halting attempts at infiltration (compared to 1968 when more
than 100 soldiers died along the DMZ) and by significantly reducing their
defense budget in 1971... In what seemed to be a miraculous development,
both Koreas held talks at a high level...culminating in a stunning...
announcement that both would seek reunification peacefully, independently
of outside forces...Within a year that initiative had effectively failed,
but it is a reminder of what might be accomplished through enlightened
and magnanimous diplomacy...S
The carrot and stick strategy coupled with a retreat in the USGUs
deterrent posture will serve to eliminate North KoreaUs perception that
the US poses an external threat and, therefore, North Korea will not feel
pressured to seek an aggressive foreign policy of crisis escalation.
The second goal of US policy should seek to eliminate the other
source of North KoreaUs perceived need for aggressive policy, internal
instability. Although Lebow states that Rdefinite limitsS exist on the
ability of an external actor to appease internal instability and prevent
diversionary tactics of aggression, the US must continue to attempt to
stabilize domestic conditions in North Korea through humanitarian
measures. The USGUs rhetoric of separating the humanitarian and
political issues involved in offering aid may be just that, rhetoric.
The humanitarian issue of internal instability has grave consequences on
the political and security dilemmas facing the US and North Korea as
discussed above. The US must continue to pursue policies of aid that
alleviate internal chaos and conditions of famine in North Korea. By
doing so, the US will eliminate North KoreaUs belief that it must pursue
aggressive policy as a diversionary tactic. Removal of economic
sanctions, which may be used as a bargaining chip in negotiations, will
also serve to improve North KoreaUs domestic conditions.
In terms of prospect theory and the loss aversion principle,
Jervis summarizes the effectiveness of diplomatic engagement,
RA statesman will run a significant risk of destruction of his own power
and his regime and devastation of his country if he thinks the
alternative is a certain and significant deterioration in his power and
security. But he would not be willing to run similar risks if he
believed that the status quo could be maintained by diplomacy even though
war, if successful, could bring great gains.S
Only through a strict policy of diplomatic engagement and reassurance can
the US hope to alleviate North Korean fears and eliminate the possibility
of a devastating Korean conflict.