As Japan prepares for its first spy satellite launch March 28, it is stepping
up observation of North Korea over concerns that Pyongyang might test a ballistic
missile around the same time. And North Korea may well be preparing another
missile test, particularly as U.S. forces get ready to encounter Iraqi forces
around Baghdad. North Korea has been studying the war on Iraq and has taken
some hope from the Iraqi strategy thus far ...

Analysis

Japan will launch its first two indigenous spy satellites March 28, four and
a half years after being taken by surprise when a North Korean Taepo Dong-I
flew over Hokkaido in Pyongyang's first attempted satellite launch. Tokyo is
stepping up its watchfulness of its neighbor over concerns that Pyongyang might
take this opportunity to test another long-range ballistic missile.

And North Korea's leaders, who convened the sixth session of the 10th Supreme
People's Assembly on March 26, might well be considering another missile launch
soon, particularly as they watch the U.S. military action in Iraq. From Pyongyang's
viewpoint, the fighting there offers new insights into U.S. readiness and war-fighting
capability...

North Korea was slow to react to the onset of military action in Iraq, but
when it did, it strongly condemned the action as a "grave encroachment
upon sovereignty." A Foreign Ministry spokesman issued a statement cautioning
that "this high-handed action of the U.S. against Iraq and the war preparations
now being made by the U.S. and its followers in the Korean Peninsula compel
the DPRK to do all it can to defend itself."

Pyongyang is carefully studying the war in Iraq, as it represents a test case
of U.S. will and ability to disarm and "liberate" a member of Washington's
so-called "axis of evil." But far from the expectations so widely
touted in international media, the Iraqi people have not risen up against their
government, the military has not deserted en masse and the regime has not collapsed.
Instead, irregular forces have carried out harassment attacks against rear-area
positions while regular forces have established a ring of defenses around Baghdad.
And despite some limited signs of popular revolt, the military campaign seems
if anything to be strengthening the resolve of the Iraqi people to resist --
or at least not directly support -- the U.S. campaign.

From Pyongyang's view, the lesson of Iraq thus far is that, although the United
States has a technologically superior military, it is not suited to a war where
the stated aim is disarmament and liberating the citizens of a nation from their
own government. If North Korea launched an attack on South Korea, officials
in Pyongyang know that the technological might of the U.S. military would triumph.
However, if Washington decided to disarm North Korea pre-emptively, its own
rules of engagement would hinder it from fully using its superior firepower
and force projection -- leaving U.S. forces vulnerable to irregular and asymmetrical
warfare from the North Koreans.

Pyongyang is taking hope from this assessment of U.S. military actions in Iraq.
If North Korea refrains from striking first, the United States will be tied
by a set of combat constraints that significantly narrows the technology gap
between the U.S. and North Korean forces. And even if Washington eventually
wins in Iraq, the message already will have been delivered: Unilateral attempts
at disarmament and regime change are no cakewalk. Since Pyongyang has little
interest in instigating a full-scale war with the United States, the regime
now feels more confident in its ability to withstand a U.S. assault under the
aegis of "liberating" the North Korean people from their own leadership
or "disarming" a rogue nation.

That said, in order to gain maximum leverage against the United States, leaders
in Pyongyang feel they must move now to take advantage of the military situation
in Iraq. Thus, the North Korean regime has withdrawn from military liaison talks
with the United States, warned that "no one can vouch that the U.S. will
not spark the second Iraqi crisis on the Korean Peninsula," and moved vehicles
around its nuclear and missile facilities -- in plain view of U.S. satellites.
Pyongyang also has delayed talks with Seoul and threatened that the upcoming
Japanese satellite launch will only ensure Japan's destruction.

Rhetoric will not be enough to press home the dire nature of the situation
in North Korea to Washington, Pyongyang has seen, and North Korea may well be
preparing two more concrete steps to up the ante: firing up the nuclear reprocessing
facilities and launching another long-range ballistic missile. Both moves would
trigger an outcry from South Korea and Japan, thus pressuring the United States
to address the situation immediately. And in North Korea's calculations, Washington
has only two choices in such circumstances: either launch a pre-emptive strike
against North Korean facilities or accede to bilateral talks aimed at ending
the nuclear standoff and formulating a non-aggression pact with the North.

The spring session of the Supreme People's Assembly is currently under way.
With that complete, and with U.S. military forces nearing Baghdad, Pyongyang
will see its window of opportunity to act opening over the next few weeks.

The regime continues to monitor the tactical situation in Iraq carefully, seeking
to gauge the strengths and weaknesses of the U.S. military, and it is growing
ever more confident that self-imposed combat restrictions on U.S. forces significantly
degrade any advantage the U.S. military would have over North Korea. Bolstered
by this new insight, Pyongyang is surer that the United States actually can
be coerced into bilateral negotiations and -- should that assumption prove incorrect
-- that the North Korean military does indeed have a fighting chance against
a U.S. attack.