Early life and education

Stilwell was born on March 19, 1883, in
Palatka, Florida.[2] His parents were
Doctor Benjamin Stilwell and Mary A. Peene. Stilwell was an eighth generation descendant of an English colonist who arrived in America in 1638, whose descendants remained in New York up through the birth of Stilwell's father.[3] Named for a family friend, as well as the doctor who delivered him, Joseph Stilwell, known as Warren by his family, grew up in Yonkers, New York, under a strict regimen from his father that included an emphasis on religion. Stilwell later admitted to his daughter that he picked up criminal instincts due to "...being forced to go to Church and Sunday School, and seeing how little real good religion does anybody, I advise passing them all up and using common sense instead."[4]

Stilwell's rebellious attitude led him to a record of unruly behavior once he reached a post-graduate level at
Yonkers High School. Prior to this last year, Stilwell had performed meticulously in his classes, and had participated actively in
football (as
quarterback) and
track.[4] Under the discretion of his father, Stilwell was placed into a post-graduate course following graduation, and immediately formed a group of friends whose activities ranged from card playing to stealing the desserts from the senior dance in 1900. This last event, in which an administrator was punched, led to the expulsions and suspensions for Stilwell's friends. Stilwell, meanwhile, having already graduated, was once again by his father's guidance sent to attend the
United States Military Academy at West Point, rather than
Yale University as originally planned.[5]

Despite missing the deadline to apply for Congressional appointment to the military academy, Stilwell gained entry through the use of family connections who knew President
William McKinley.[5] In his first year, Stilwell underwent
hazing as a
plebe that he referred to as "hell".[6] While at West Point, Stilwell showed an aptitude for languages, such as French, in which he ranked first in his class during his second year. In the field of sports, Stilwell is credited with introducing
basketball to the Academy, and participating in
cross-country running (as captain), as well as playing on the
varsity football team. At West Point he had two demerits for laughing during drill. Ultimately, Stilwell graduated from the academy, class of 1904, ranked 32nd in a class of 124 cadets.[7] In 1910, he married Winifred Alison Smith (1889-1972).[8] They were the parents of five children, including Brigadier General
Joseph, Jr., (West Point 1933) served in World War II,
Korea, and
Vietnam.[9][10]

Military career prior to World War II

Lt. Col. Stillwell as Assistant Chief of Staff, 4th Army Corps, October 1918 in France.

Stilwell is often remembered by his sobriquet, "Vinegar Joe", which he acquired while a commander at
Fort Benning,
Georgia. Stilwell often gave harsh critiques of performance in field exercises, and a subordinate – stung by Joe's caustic remarks – drew a caricature of Stilwell rising out of a vinegar bottle. After discovering the caricature, Stilwell pinned it to a board and had the drawing photographed and distributed to friends.[11] Yet another indication of his view of life was the motto he kept on his desk: Illegitimi non carborundum, a form of
fractured Latin that translates as "Don't let the bastards grind you down."[12]

Between the wars, Stilwell served three tours in China, where he mastered spoken and written Chinese, and was the military attaché at the U.S. Legation in
Beijing from 1935 to 1939. In 1939 and 1940 he was assistant commander of the
2nd Infantry Division and from 1940 to 1941 organized and trained the
7th Infantry Division at
Fort Ord,
California. It was there that his leadership style – which emphasized concern for the average soldier and minimized ceremonies and officious discipline – earned him the nickname of "Uncle Joe."

Just prior to
World War II, Stilwell was recognized as the top corps commander in the Army and was initially selected to plan and command the Allied invasion of North Africa.[13] When it became necessary to send a senior officer to China to keep that country in the War, Stilwell was selected, over his personal objections, by President
Franklin Roosevelt and his old friend, Army Chief of Staff
George C. Marshall. He became the Chief of Staff to
GeneralissimoChiang Kai-shek, served as US commander in the
China Burma India Theater, was responsible for all
Lend-Lease supplies going to China, and was later Deputy Commander of
South East Asia Command. Despite his status and position in China, he became involved in conflicts with other senior Allied officers, over the distribution of Lend-Lease materiel, Chinese political sectarianism and proposals to incorporate Chinese and US forces in the
11th Army Group (which was under British command).

Political and personal views

Barbara W. Tuchman records that Stilwell was a lifelong Republican: "...he retained the family Republicanism and joined naturally in the exhilarating exercise of Roosevelt-hating" and later (at the time of his meeting with Roosevelt) "At home Stilwell was a conventional Republican who shared the sentiments and adopted the tone of the Roosevelt-haters, in which he was influenced by his brother John, an extremist of the species.".[14] Elsewhere she notes that, in the view of an (unnamed) close friend, "Stilwell was liberal and sympathetic by instinct. But he was conservative in thought and politics."

Tuchman also notes his use in his letters and diaries of a catalogue of now insulting words which she says "he used easily and seemingly without pejorative content": these included "limeys for the English, frogs for the French ("met a frog and his wife on shipboard"), huns and squareheads for Germans, wops for Italians, chinks or chinos for Chinese, googs for Filipinos, niggers or coons for Negroes",[15] while at the end of the war Tuchman says he took "a harsh pleasure in touring the gutted and burned-out districts of Yokohama and staring at the once arrogant [Japanese] now living in shanties of scrap lumber and tin and scratching in the dirt to plant onions".[16] His diary entry for 1 September 1945 (in Yokohama) reads in part: "What a kick to stare at the arrogant, ugly, moon-faced, buck-toothed, bowlegged bastards, and realize where this puts them. Many newly demobilized soldiers around. Most police salute. People generally just apathetic. We gloated over the destruction & came in at 3:00 feeling fine."[17]

Burma: retreat and offensive

Stilwell's assignment in the
China-Burma-India Theater was a geographical administrative command on the same level as the commands of
Dwight D. Eisenhower and
Douglas MacArthur. But unlike other combat theaters, for example the
European Theater of Operations, the CBI was never a "
theater of operations" and did not have an overall American operational command structure. The China theater came under the operational command of Generalissimo
Chiang Kai-shek, commander of Nationalist Chinese forces, while the Burma India theater came under the operational command of the British (first
India Command and later Allied
South East Asia Command whose supreme commander was Admiral
Lord Louis Mountbatten). The British and Chinese were ill-equipped and more often than not on the receiving end of Japanese offensives. Chiang Kai-shek was interested in conserving his troops and Allied Lend-Lease supplies for use against any sudden Japanese offensive, as well as against Chinese Communist forces in a later civil war. His wariness increased after observing the disastrous Allied performance against the Japanese in Burma.[18][19] After fighting and resisting the Japanese for five years, many in the Nationalist government felt that it was time for the Allies to assume a greater burden in fighting the war.[20]

The first step to fighting the war for Stilwell was the reformation of the Chinese Army.[21] These reforms clashed with the delicate balance of political and military alliances in China, which kept Chiang in power. Reforming the army meant removing men who maintained Chiang's position as commander-in-chief.[22] While he gave Stilwell technical overall command of some Chinese troops, Chiang worried that the new American-led forces would become yet another independent force outside of his control.[19] Since 1942, members of his staff had continually objected to Chinese troops being used in Burma for the purpose, as they viewed it, of returning that country to British colonial control.[18][19] Chiang therefore sided with General
Claire Chennault's proposals that the war against the Japanese be continued largely using existing Chinese forces supported by air forces, something Chennault assured the Generalissimo was feasible. The dilemma forced Chennault and Stilwell into competition for the valuable Lend-Lease supplies arriving over the
Himalayas from British-controlled India — an obstacle referred to as "
The Hump".[23]George Marshall, in his biennial report covering the period of July 1, 1943 to June 30, 1945, acknowledged he had given Stilwell "one of the most difficult" assignments of any theater commander.[1]

Stilwell marches out of Burma, May 1942

Arriving in Burma just in time to experience the collapse of the Allied defense of that country, which cut China off from all land and sea supply routes, Stilwell personally led his staff of 117 men and women out of Burma into
Assam, India on foot, marching at what his men called the 'Stilwell stride' – 105 paces per minute.[24][25] Two of the men accompanying him, his aide
Frank Dorn and the war correspondent,
Jack Belden, wrote books about the walkout: Walkout with Stilwell in Burma (1971) and Retreat with Stilwell (1943), respectively. The Assam route was also used by other retreating Allied and Chinese forces.

In India, Stilwell soon became well-known for his no-nonsense demeanor and disregard for military pomp and ceremony. His trademarks were a battered Army
campaign hat, GI shoes, and a plain service uniform with no insignia of rank; he frequently carried a
Model 1903, .30-06 Caliber, Springfield rifle in preference to a sidearm. His hazardous march out of Burma and his bluntly honest assessment of the disaster captured the imagination of the American public: "I claim we got a hell of a beating. We got run out of Burma and it is humiliating as hell. I think we ought to find out what caused it, go back and retake it.".[25] Stilwell's derogatory remarks castigating the ineffectiveness of what he termed Limey forces, a viewpoint often repeated by Stilwell's staff, did not sit well with British and Commonwealth commanders.[26] It was well known among the troops that Stilwell's disdain for the British was aimed toward those high command officers that he saw as overly stuffy and pompous.

After the Japanese occupied Burma, China was almost completely cut off from Allied aid and materiel except through the hazardous route of flying cargo aircraft over
the Hump. Early on, the Roosevelt administration and the
War Department had given priority to other theaters for U.S. combat forces, equipment, and logistical support. With the closure of the Burma Road and the fall of Burma, it was realized that even replacing Chinese war losses would be extremely difficult. Consequently, the Allies' initial strategy was to keep Chinese resistance to the Japanese going by providing a lifeline of logistical and air support.

Convinced that the Chinese soldier was the equal of any given proper care and leadership, Stilwell established a training center (in Ramgarh, India, 200 miles west of Calcutta) for two divisions of Chinese troops from forces that had retreated to Assam from Burma. His effort in this regard met passive, sometimes active, resistance from the British, who feared that armed, disciplined Chinese would set an example for Indian insurgents, and from Chiang Kai-shek who did not welcome a strong military unit outside of his control. From the outset, Stilwell's primary goals were the opening of a land route to China from northern Burma and India by means of a ground offensive in northern Burma, so that more supplies could be transported to China, and to organize, equip, and train a reorganized, reequipped, modernized, and competent Chinese army that would fight the Japanese in the China-Burma-India theater (CBI).[19][27] Stilwell argued that the CBI was the only area at that time where the possibility existed for the Allies of engaging large numbers of troops against their common enemy, Japan. Unfortunately, the huge airborne logistical train of support from the USA to British India was still being organized, while supplies being flown over the Hump were barely sufficient to maintain Chennault's air operations and replace some Chinese war losses, let alone equip and supply an entire army.[19][27] Additionally, critical supplies intended for the CBI were being diverted due to various crises in other combat theaters.[19] Of the supplies that made it over the Hump a certain percentage were diverted by Chinese (and American) personnel into the black market for their personal enrichment.[28] As a result, most Allied commanders in India, with the exception of General
Orde Wingate and his
Chindit operations, were focused on defensive measures.

Command of the Chindits

During this time in India, Stilwell became increasingly disenchanted with British forces, and did not hesitate to voice criticisms of what he viewed as hesitant or cowardly behavior. Ninety percent of the Chindit casualties were incurred in the last phase of the campaign from 17 May when they were under the direct command of Stilwell.[26] The British view was quite different and they pointed out that over the period from 6 June to 27 June,
Calvert's
77th Brigade, which lacked heavy weapons, took
Mogaung and suffered 800 casualties (50%) among those of the brigade involved in the operation. Stilwell expected 77th Brigade to join the siege of
Myitkyina but
Michael Calvert, sickened by demands on his troops which he considered abusive, switched off his radios and withdrew to Stilwell's base.
111th Brigade, after resting, were ordered to capture a hill known as Point 2171. They did so, but were now utterly exhausted. Most of them were suffering from
malaria,
dysentery and
malnutrition. On 8 July, at the insistence of the Supreme Commander, Admiral Louis Mountbatten, doctors examined the brigade. Of the 2200 men present from four and a half battalions, only 119 were declared fit. The Brigade was evacuated, although
John Masters sarcastically kept the fit men, "111 Company" in the field until 1 August.

The portion of 111 Brigade east of the
Irrawaddy were known as Morris Force, after its commander, Lieutenant-Colonel "Jumbo" Morris. They had spent several months harassing Japanese traffic from
Bhamo to Myitkyina. They had then attempted to complete the encirclement of Myitkyina. Stilwell was angered that they were unable to do so, but Slim pointed out that Stilwell's Chinese troops (numbering 5,500) had also failed in that task. By 14 July, Morris Force was down to three platoons. A week later, they had only 25 men fit for duty. Morris Force was evacuated about the same time as 77th Brigade.

Captain
Charlton Ogburn, Jr., a U.S. Army Marauder officer, and Chindit brigade commanders
John Masters and
Michael Calvert later recalled Stilwell's appointment of a staff officer specially detailed by him to visit subordinate commands in order to chastise their officers and men as being 'yellow'.[29] In October 1943, after the Joint Planning Staff at
GHQ India had rejected a plan by Stilwell to fly his Chinese troops into northern Burma,
Field MarshalSir Archibald Wavell asked whether Stilwell was satisfied on purely military grounds that the plan could not work. Stilwell replied that he was. Wavell then asked what Stilwell would say to Chiang Kai-shek, and Stilwell replied "I shall tell him the bloody British wouldn't fight."[30]

Disagreements with Chiang and the Allies

After Stilwell left the defeated Chinese troops that he had been given nominal command of by Chiang Kai-shek (Chinese generals admitted later that they had considered Stilwell as an 'adviser' and sometimes took orders directly from Chiang), he escaped Burma in 1942.[31] Chiang was outraged by what he saw as Stilwell's blatant abandonment of his
best army without orders and began to question Stilwell's capability and judgment as a military commander.[32] Chiang was also infuriated at Stilwell's strict control of U.S. lend lease supplies to China. But instead of confronting Stilwell or communicating his concerns to Marshall and Roosevelt when they asked Chiang to assess Stilwell's leadership after the Allied disaster in Burma, Chiang reiterated his "full confidence and trust" in the general[33] while countermanding some orders to Chinese units issued by Stilwell in his capacity as Chief of Staff. An outraged Stilwell began to call Chiang "the little dummy" or "Peanut" in his reports to
Washington,[34] ("Peanut" originally being intended as a code name for Chiang in official radio messages[35]) while Chiang repeatedly expressed his pent-up grievances against Stilwell for his "recklessness, insubordination, contempt and arrogance" to U.S. envoys to China.[36] Stilwell would press Chiang and the British to take immediate actions to retake Burma, but Chiang demanded impossibly large amounts of supplies before he would agree to take offensive action, and the British refused to meet their previous pledges to provide naval and ground troops due to Churchill's "
Europe first" strategy.[37] Eventually Stilwell began to complain openly to Roosevelt that Chiang was hoarding U.S. lend lease supplies because he wanted to keep
Chinese Nationalist forces ready to fight the
Communists under
Mao Zedong after the end of the war with the Japanese,[38] even though from 1942 to 1944 98 percent of U.S. military aid over the Hump had gone directly to the
14th Air Force and U.S. military personnel in China.[39]

Stilwell also continually clashed with
Field Marshal Archibald Wavell, and apparently came to believe that the British in India were more concerned with protecting their colonial possessions than helping the Chinese fight the Japanese. In August 1943, as a result of constant feuding and conflicting objectives of British, American, and Chinese commands, along with the lack of a coherent strategic vision for the China Burma India (CBI) theater, the Combined Chiefs of Staff split the CBI command into separate Chinese and Southeast Asia theaters.

Stilwell was infuriated also by the rampant corruption of the Chiang regime. In his diary, which he faithfully kept, Stilwell began to note the corruption and the amount of money ($380,584,000 in 1944 dollars) being wasted upon the procrastinating Chiang and his government. The Cambridge History of China, for instance, estimates that some 60%–70% of Chiang's
Kuomintang conscripts did not make it through their basic training, with some 40% deserting and the remaining 20% dying of starvation before full induction into the military. Eventually, Stilwell's belief that the generalissimo and his generals were incompetent and corrupt reached such proportions that Stilwell sought to cut off Lend-Lease aid to China.[40] Stilwell even ordered
Office of Strategic Services (OSS) officers to draw up contingency plans to assassinate Chiang Kai-shek after he heard Roosevelt's casual remarks regarding the possible defeat of Chiang by either internal or external enemies, and if this happened to replace Chiang with someone else to continue the Chinese resistance against Japan.[41]

Myitkyina Offensive and aftermath

With the establishment of the new South East Asia Command in August 1943, Stilwell was appointed Deputy Supreme Allied Commander under
Vice AdmiralLord Louis Mountbatten. Taking command of various Chinese and Allied forces, including a new U.S. Army special operations formation, the 5307th Composite Unit (provisional) later known as
Merrill's Marauders, Stilwell built up his Chinese forces for an eventual offensive in northern Burma. On December 21, 1943, Stilwell assumed direct control of planning for the invasion of Northern Burma, culminating with capture of the Japanese-held town of
Myitkyina. In the meantime, Stilwell ordered General
Merrill and the Marauders to commence long-range jungle penetration missions behind Japanese lines after the pattern of the British
Chindits. In February 1944, three Marauder battalions marched into Burma. Though Stilwell was at the Ledo Road front when the Marauders arrived at their jump-off point, the general did not walk out to the road to bid them farewell.[42]

Stilwell awarding medals at Myitkyina, 1944

In April 1944, Stilwell launched his final offensive to capture the Burmese city of
Myitkyina. In support of this objective, the Marauders were ordered to undertake a long flanking maneuver towards the town, involving a grueling 65-mile jungle march. Having been deployed since February in combat operations in the jungles of Burma, the Marauders were seriously depleted and suffering from both combat losses and disease, and lost additional men while en route to the objective. A particularly devastating scourge was a severe outbreak of
amoebic dysentery, which erupted shortly after the Marauders linked up with the
Chinese Army in India, called X Force.[43] By this time, the men of the Marauders had openly begun to suspect Stilwell's commitment to their welfare, and made no effort to hide their displeasure with their hard-driving commander.[44] Despite their sacrifices, Stilwell appeared unconcerned about their losses, and had rejected repeated requests for medals for individual acts of heroism.[45] Initial promises of a rest and rotation were ignored; the Marauders were not even air-dropped replacement uniforms or mail until late April.[46][47]

On May 17, 1,310 remaining Marauders attacked Myitkyina airfield in concert with elements of two Chinese infantry regiments and a small artillery contingent.[48][49] The airfield was quickly taken, but the town, which Stilwell's intelligence staff had believed to be lightly defended,[50] was garrisoned by significant numbers of well-equipped Japanese troops, who were steadily being reinforced.[46] A preliminary attack on the town by two Chinese regiments was thrown back with heavy losses.[46][51] The Marauders did not have the manpower to immediately overwhelm Myitkyina and its defenses; by the time additional Chinese forces arrived and were in a position to attack, Japanese forces totaled some 4,600[51] fanatical Japanese defenders.[48][49]

During the Myitkyina siege, which took place during the height of the monsoon season, Marauders' second-in-command, Col. Hunter, as well as the unit's regimental and battalion level surgeons, had urgently recommended that the entire 5307th be relieved of duty and returned to rear areas for rest and recovery. By this time, most of the men had fevers and continual dysentery, forcing the men to cut the seats out of their uniform trousers in order to fire their weapons and relieve themselves simultaneously.[52][53] Stilwell rejected the evacuation recommendation, though he did make a frontline inspection of the Myitkyina lines. Afterwards, he ordered all medical staff to stop returning combat troops suffering from disease or illness, and instead return them to combat status, using medications to keep down fevers.[54] The feelings of many Marauders towards General Stilwell at that time were summed up by one soldier, who stated, "I had him [Stilwell] in my sights. I coulda' squeezed one off and no one woulda' known it wasn't a Jap who got that son of a bitch."[52]

Stilwell also ordered that all Marauders evacuated from combat due to wounds or fever first submit to a special medical 'examination' by doctors appointed by his headquarters staff. These examinations passed many ailing soldiers as fit for duty; Stilwell's staff roamed hospital hallways in search of any Marauder with a temperature lower than 103 degrees Fahrenheit.[52] Some of the men who were passed and sent back into combat were immediately re-evacuated as unfit at the insistence of forward medical personnel. Later, Stilwell's staff placed blame on Army medical personnel for overzealously interpreting Stilwell's return-to-duty order.[55]
During the Myitkyina siege, Japanese soldiers resisted fiercely, generally fighting to the last man. As a result, Myitkyina did not fall until August 4, 1944, after Stilwell was forced to send in thousands of Chinese reinforcements, though Stilwell was pleased that the objective had at last been taken (his notes from his personal diary contain the notation, "Boy, will this burn up the Limeys!"[56]). Later, Stilwell blamed the length of the siege, among other things, on British and Gurkha Chindit forces for not promptly responding to his demands to move north in an attempt to pressure Japanese troops. This was in spite of the fact that the Chindits themselves had suffered grievous casualties in several fierce pitched battles with Japanese troops in the Burmese jungles, along with losses from illness and combat exhaustion.[54] Stilwell also had not kept his British allies clearly informed of his force movements, nor coordinated his offensive plans with those of General Slim.

Bereft of further combat replacements for his hard-pressed Marauder battalions, Stilwell felt he had no choice but to continue offensive operations with his existing forces, using the Marauders as 'the point of the spear' until they had either achieved all their objectives, or were wiped out.[47] He was also concerned that pulling out the Marauders, the only U.S. ground unit in the campaign, resulted in charges of favoritism, forcing him to evacuate the exhausted Chinese and British Chindit forces as well.[47] When General
William Slim, commander of the British Commonwealth
Fourteenth Army in Burma, informed Stilwell that his men were exhausted and should be withdrawn, Stilwell rejected the idea, insisting that his subordinate commanders simply did not understand enlisted men and their tendency to magnify physical challenges.[57] Having made his own 'long march' out of Burma under his own power using jungle trails, Stilwell found it difficult to sympathize with those who had been in combat in the jungle for months on end without relief. In retrospect, his statements at the time revealed a lack of understanding of the limitations of lightly equipped unconventional forces when used in conventional roles.[47][58] Myitkyina and the dispute over evacuation policy precipitated a hurried Army Inspector General investigation, followed by U.S. congressional committee hearings, though no disciplinary measures were taken against General Stilwell for his decisions as overall commander.[59]

Only a week after the fall of Myitkyina in Burma, the 5307th Marauder force, down to only 130 combat-effective men (out of the original 2,997), was disbanded.

Conflict with General Chennault

One of the most significant conflicts to emerge during the war was between General Stilwell and General
Claire Lee Chennault, the commander of the famed "
Flying Tigers" and later air force commander. As adviser to the Chinese air forces, Chennault proposed a limited air offensive against the Japanese in China in 1943 using a series of forward air bases. Stilwell insisted that the idea was untenable, and that any air campaign should not begin until fully fortified air bases supported by large ground forces had first been established. Stilwell then argued that all air resources be diverted to his forces in India for an early conquest of North Burma.[27]

Following Chennault's advice, Generalissimo Chiang rejected the proposal; British commanders sided with Chennault, aware they could not launch a coordinated Allied offensive into Burma in 1943 with the resources then available.[27] During the summer of 1943, Stilwell's headquarters concentrated on plans to rebuild the Chinese Army for an offensive in northern Burma, despite Chiang's insistence on support to Chennault's air operations. Stilwell believed that after forcing a supply route through northern Burma by means of a major ground offensive against the Japanese, he could train and equip thirty Chinese divisions with modern combat equipment. A smaller number of Chinese forces would transfer to India, where two or three new Chinese divisions would also be raised. This plan remained only theoretical at the time, since the limited available airlift capacity for deliveries of supplies to China over
the Hump was used to sustain Chennault's air operations instead of equipping Chinese ground units.[19]

In 1944, the Japanese launched the counter-offensive,
Operation Ichi-Go, quickly overrunning Chennault's forward air bases and proving Stilwell correct. By this time, Allied supply efforts via the Hump airlift were steadily improving in tonnage supplied per month; with the replacement of Chinese war losses, Chennault now saw little need for a ground offensive in northern Burma in order to re-open a ground supply route to China. This time, augmented with increased military equipment and additional troops, and concerned about defense of the approaches to India, British authorities sided with Stilwell.[60]

In coordination with a southern offensive by Nationalist Chinese forces under General
Wei Li-huang, Allied troops under Stilwell's command launched the long-awaited invasion of northern Burma; after heavy fighting and casualties, the two forces linked up in January 1945. Stilwell's strategy remained unchanged: opening a new ground supply route from India to China would allow the Allies to equip and train new Chinese army divisions for use against the Japanese. The new road network, later called the
Ledo Road, would link the northern end of the
Burma Road as the primary supply route to China; Stilwell's staff planners had estimated the route would supply 65,000 tons of supplies per month.[19] Using these figures, Stilwell argued that the Ledo Road network would greatly surpass the tonnage being airlifted over the Hump.[27] General Chennault doubted that such an extended network of trails through difficult jungle could ever match the tonnage that could be delivered with modern cargo transport aircraft then deploying in-theater.[61] Progress on the Ledo Road was slow, and could not be completed until the linkup of forces in January 1945.

In the end, Stilwell's plan to train and modernize thirty Chinese divisions in China (as well as two or three divisions from forces already in India) was never fully realized. As Chennault predicted, supplies carried over the Ledo Road at no time approached tonnage levels of supplies airlifted monthly into China via the Hump.[62] In July 1945, 71,000 tons of supplies were flown over the Hump, compared to only 6,000 tons using the Ledo Road, and the airlift operation continued in operation until the end of the war.[61][63] By the time supplies were flowing over the Ledo Road in large quantities, operations in other theaters had shaped the course of the war against Japan.[19] Stilwell's drive into North Burma, however, allowed Air Transport Command to fly supplies into China more quickly and safely by allowing American planes to fly a more southerly route without fear of Japanese fighters. American airplanes no longer had to make the dangerous venture over
the Hump, increasing the delivery of supplies from 18,000 tons in June 1944, to 39,000 tons in November 1944.[64] On August 1, 1945 a plane crossed the hump every one minute and 12 seconds.[65]

In acknowledgment of Stilwell's efforts, the
Ledo Road was later renamed the Stilwell Road by Chiang Kai-shek.

Recall from China

With the rapid deterioration of the China front after Japanese launched
Operation Ichi-Go in 1944, Stilwell saw this as an opportunity to gain full command of all Chinese armed forces. Operation Ichi-Go was the largest Japanese offensive of World War II designed to "liquidate the China affair" by knocking China out of the war once and for all that saw some half-million men and 800 tanks, supplied by 70,000 to 100,000 horses dragging wagons and 12,000 to 15,000 vehicles committed to an operation that overran huge areas of China.[66] Stillwell clashed with Chiang over the question of the city of
Guilin, which was besieged by the Japanese.[67] Chiang wanted Guilin defended to the last men while Stillwell claimed Guilin was a lost cause.[44] In his diary, Stillwell wrote: "What they ought to do is to shoot the G-mo [Chiang] and Ho [General He Yingqin] and the rest of the gang".[67] Stillwell ordered the American troops to pull out of Guilin, and was able to persuade Chiang to reluctantly accept the loss of Guilin.[68] The clash over Guilin was only a prelude to another clash, where Chiang demanded the return of the Y Force from Burma to defend
Kunming, the capital of Yunnan province, which was also threatened by the Japanese advance.[68] After meeting Chiang, Stilwell wrote in his diary that Chiang was a "crazy little bastard with that hickory nut he uses for a head... Usual cockeyed reasons and idiotic tactical and strategic conceptions. He is impossible!"[68]

Stilwell appealed directly to President Roosevelt for help with his dispute with Chiang, and as a result, Roosevelt sent Chiang a message which read: "I have urged time and again in recent months that you take drastic action to resist the disaster which has been moving closer to China and to you. Now, when you have not yet placed General Stilwell in command of all forces in China, we are faced with the loss of a critical area... with possible catastrophic consequences".[68] Roosevelt ended his ultimatum to Chiang with the threat to end all American aid unless Chiang "at once" placed Stilwell "in unrestricted command of all your forces."[69][70] General Chennault later claimed that Stilwell had deliberately ordered Sino-American forces out of Guilin as a way of creating a crisis that would force Chiang to give up command of his armies to Stilwell.[71] Stilwell's diary supports Chennault's claim as Stilwell wrote that if a crisis emerged that was "just sufficient to get rid of the Peanut without entirely wrecking the ship, it would be worth it," going on to write that the entire Kuomintang system had to be "torn to bits" and Chiang would just have to go.[71]

I have waited long for vengeance,
At last I've had my chance.
I've looked the Peanut in the eye
And kicked him in the pants.

The old harpoon was ready
With aim and timing true,
I sank it to the handle,
And stung him through and through.

The little bastard shivered,
And lost the power of speech.
His face turned green and quivered
As he struggled not to screech.

For all my weary battles,
For all my hours of woe,
At last I've had my innings
And laid the Peanut low.

I know I've still to suffer,
And run a weary race,
But oh! the blessed pleasure!
I've wrecked the Peanut's face.

An exultant Stilwell immediately delivered this letter to Chiang despite pleas from
Patrick J. Hurley, Roosevelt's special envoy in China, to delay delivering the message and work on a deal that would achieve Stilwell's aim in a manner more acceptable to Chiang.[73] Stillwell wrote in his diary about handing over Roosevelt's message: "I handed this bundle of paprika to the Peanut and than sank back with a sigh. The harpoon hit the little bugger right in the solar plexus and went right through him. It was a clean hit, but beyond turning green and losing his powers of speech, he did not bat an eye".[71] The British journalist Jonathan Fenby wrote about Roosevelt's letter: "Unless the President was ready for America to take over effective control of China, or halt Lend-Lease supplies and abandon the KMT to its fate, his stern words merely amounted to bluff".[74] Seeing this act as a move toward the complete subjugation of China, Chiang gave a formal reply in which he said that Stilwell must be replaced immediately and he would welcome any other qualified U.S. general to fill Stilwell's position.[75][76] Chiang called Roosevelt's letter the "greatest humiliation I have been subjected to in my life" and stated it was "all too obvious that the United States intends to intervene in China's internal affairs".[77] Chiang told Hurley the Chinese people were "tired of the insults which Stillwell has seen fit to heap upon them".[78] Chiang delivered a speech before the Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang, which was leaked to the press, which called Roosevelt's letter a form of imperialism and stated that to accept Roosevelt's demands would make him no different from the Japanese collaborator
Wang Jingwei in Nanking.[78] On 12 October 1944, Hurley reported to Washington that Stilwell was a "fine man, but was incapable of understanding or co-operating with Chiang Kai-shek", going on to say that if Stilwell remained in command, all of China might be lost to the Japanese.[78] Before sending his cable, Hurley showed it to Stilwell who accused Hurley to his face of "cutting my throat with a dull knife".[78]

On October 19, 1944, Stilwell was recalled from his command by President
Franklin D. Roosevelt. Partly as a result of controversy concerning the casualties suffered by U.S. forces in Burma and partly due to continuing difficulties with the British and Chinese commanders, Stilwell's return to the United States was not accompanied by the usual ceremony. Upon arrival, he was met by two Army generals at the airport, who told him that he was not to answer any media questions about China whatsoever.

Stilwell was replaced by General
Albert C. Wedemeyer, who received a telegram from General Marshall on October 27, 1944 directing him to proceed to China to assume command of the China theatre and replace General Stilwell. Wedemeyer later recalled his initial dread over the assignment, as service in the China theater was considered a graveyard for American officials, both military and diplomatic.[79] When Wedemeyer actually arrived at Stilwell's headquarters after Stilwell's dismissal, Wedemeyer was dismayed to discover that Stilwell had intentionally departed without seeing him, and did not leave a single briefing paper for his guidance, though departing U.S. military commanders habitually greeted their replacement in order to thoroughly brief them on the strengths and weaknesses of headquarters staff, the issues confronting the command, and planned operations.[80] Searching the offices, Wedemeyer could find no documentary record of Stilwell's plans or records of his former or future operations.[80] General Wedemeyer then spoke with Stilwell's staff officers but learned little from them because Stilwell, according to the staff, kept everything in his "hip pocket".[81]

In November, he was appointed to lead a "War Department Equipment Board" in an investigation of the Army's modernization in light of its recent experience. Among his recommendations was the establishment of a combined arms force to conduct extended service tests of new weapons and equipment and then formulate doctrine for its use, and the abolition of specialized
anti-tank units. His most notable recommendation was for a vast improvement of the Army's defenses against all airborne threats, including
ballistic missiles. In particular, he called for "
guided interceptor missiles, dispatched in accordance with electronically computed data obtained from radar detection stations."[82]

In late February 1946, Stilwell assumed command of the
6th Army with its headquarters at the
Presidio of San Francisco.[83] The 6th Army had been reorganized as an administrative command in charge of Army units in the western United States. In May 1946, Stilwell and his former subordinate
Frank Merrill led two
Marine platoons in suppressing the prison uprising known as the
Battle of Alcatraz.[84]

Aftermath

Stilwell's home, built in 1933–1934 on Carmel Point,
Carmel, California, remains a private home. A number of streets, buildings, and areas across the country have been named for Stilwell over the years, including Joseph Stilwell Middle School in
Jacksonville, Florida. The Soldiers' Club he envisioned in 1940 (a time when there was no such thing as a soldiers' club in the Army) was completed in 1943 at Fort Ord on the bluffs overlooking
Monterey Bay. Many years later the building was renamed "Stilwell Hall" in his honor, but because of the erosion of the bluffs over the decades, the building was taken down in 2003. Stilwell's former residence in Chongqing – a city along the Yangtze River to which Chiang's government retreated after being forced from Nanjing by Japanese troops – has now been converted to the
General Joseph W. Stilwell Museum in his honor.

Legacy

A bust of Stilwell at the "Former Residence of General Stilwell" museum in
Chongqing

In her book Stilwell and the American Experience in China, 1911-45,
Barbara Tuchman wrote that Stilwell was sacrificed as a political expedient because of his inability to get along with his allies in the theater. Some historians, such as
David Halberstam in his final book, The Coldest Winter: America and the Korean War, have theorized that Roosevelt was concerned that Chiang would sign a separate peace with Japan, which would free many Japanese divisions to fight elsewhere, and that Roosevelt wanted to placate Chiang. The power struggle over the China Theater that emerged between Stilwell, Chennault, and Chiang reflected the American political divisions of the time.

A very different interpretation of events suggests that Stilwell, pressing for his full command of all Chinese forces, had made diplomatic inroads with the Chinese Communist Red Army commanded by
Mao Zedong. He bypassed his theater commander Chiang Kai-shek and had gotten Mao to agree to follow an American commander. His confrontational approach in the power struggle with Chiang ultimately led to Chiang's determination to have Stilwell recalled to the United States.[89]
According to Guan Zhong, President of the
Examination Yuan, Stilwell had once expressed his regret of never having the opportunity to fight alongside the Chinese Communist army, especially with General
Zhu De, before his death.[90]

Stilwell, a "soldier's soldier", was nonetheless an old-school American infantry officer unable to appreciate the developments in warfare brought about by World War II—including strategic air power and the use of highly trained infantrymen as jungle guerrilla fighters.[91] One of these disagreements was with the equally acerbic Gen.
Claire L. Chennault, who Stillwell felt over-valued the effectiveness of air power against massed ground troops — as demonstrated by the fall of the 14th Air Force bases in eastern China (Hengyang, Kweilin, etc.) during the Japanese eastern China offensive of 1944. Stilwell also clashed with other officers, including
Orde Wingate, who led the
Chindits, and Col. Charles Hunter, officer in charge of
Merrill's Marauders. Stilwell could neither appreciate the toll constant jungle warfare took on even the most highly trained troops, nor the incapacity of lightly armed, fast-moving jungle guerrilla forces to dislodge heavily armed regular infantry supported by artillery. Accordingly, Stilwell abused both Chindits and Marauders, and earned the contempt of both units and their commanders.[92]

In other respects, however, Stilwell was a skilled tactician in U.S. Army's land warfare tradition, with a deep appreciation of the logistics required of campaigning in rough terrain (hence his dedication to the
Ledo Road project, for which he received several awards, including the Distinguished Service Cross and the US Army Distinguished Service Medal).[93] The trust Stilwell placed in men of real insight and character in understanding China, particularly the
China Hands,
John Stewart Service and
John Paton Davies, Jr., confirms this assessment.[94]

Arguably, had Stilwell been given the number of American regular infantry divisions he had continually requested, the American experience in China and Burma would have been very different.[95] Certainly, his Army peers, Gen.
Douglas MacArthur and Gen.
George Marshall had the highest respect for his abilities, and both ensured that he replaced Gen.
Simon Bolivar Buckner, Jr. as commander of
Tenth U.S. Army at Okinawa after the latter's death. During the last year of the war, however, the U.S. was strained to meet all its military obligations, and cargo aircraft diverted to supply Stilwell, the 14th Air Force, and the Chinese in the East left air-drop-dependent campaigns in the West, such as
Operation Market Garden, woefully short of aircraft.[96]

Although Chiang succeeded in removing Stilwell, the public relations damage suffered by his
Kuomintang regime was irreparable. Right before Stilwell's departure, New York Times drama critic-turned-war correspondent
Brooks Atkinson interviewed him in
Chungking and wrote:

The decision to relieve General Stilwell represents the political triumph of a moribund, anti-democratic regime that is more concerned with maintaining its political supremacy than in driving the Japanese out of China. The Chinese Communists... have good armies that they are claiming to be fighting guerrilla warfare against the Japanese in North China—actually they are covertly or even overtly building themselves up to fight Generalissimo's government forces... The Generalissimo naturally regards these armies as the chief threat to the country and his supremacy... has seen no need to make sincere attempt to arrange at least a truce with them for the duration of the war... No diplomatic genius could have overcome the Generalissimo's basic unwillingness to risk his armies in battle with the Japanese.[97]

Atkinson, who had visited Mao in
Yenan, saw the Communist Chinese forces as a democratic movement (after Atkinson visited Mao, his article on his visit was titled Yenan: A Chinese Wonderland City), and the Nationalists in turn as hopelessly reactionary and corrupt; this view was shared by many of the U.S. press corps in China at the time.[98] The negative image of the Kuomintang in America played a significant factor in
Harry Truman's decision to end all U.S. aid to Chiang at the height of the
Chinese civil war.

The British historian
Andrew Roberts quoted Stilwell's disparaging remarks about the British war effort in Asia to illustrate his strong Anglophobia, which became a stumbling block to smooth cooperation between US and UK forces in Asia.[99] The British historian
Rana Mitter argues that Stilwell never appreciated that his position as Chief of Staff to Chiang Kai-shek did not give him as much authority as Marshall had in his position as Roosevelt's Chief of Staff. Chiang was the Commander-in Chief of Chinese forces, not Stilwell, and he resisted Stilwell's initiatives when they involved committing Chinese forces to do-or-die engagements or when Chinese troops were removed from his immediate control to bases in India. Mitter views Chiang as correct in attempting to husband China's resources after the serious losses of 1937-1941. Mitter also supports the view that Chennault could have accomplished much more had Stilwell not diverted a large proportion of Lend-Lease equipment to the Chinese troops in India. Mitter factors in the impact of collaborationist
Wang Jingwei as yet another major force in China. Stilwell's mastery of written and spoken Chinese made him the United States' default choice for the China command; Mitter projects that his talents could have been far better employed in North Africa, as Marshall had originally planned.[100]

The award for the Outstanding Overall Cadet, Senior Division, in the
California Cadet Corps is named the General Joseph W. Stilwell Award.[102]

A reference to Stilwell was made in the 1995 film "Outbreak." During a discussion between Morgan Freeman and Donald Sutherland, Sutherland makes the remark that, "FDR stopped Stilwell from going into Indochina, he caused the Vietnam War."

Stilwell's nickname was 'Vinegar Joe' which was the name used by a British Blues Band formed in 1971 with members Robert Palmer and Elkie Brooks providing the vocals. Their third album was called "Six Star General" after Stilwell and has his name printed across the back cover.

^Guan Zhong (關中) (2010).
中國命運關鍵十年: 美國與國共談判相, 1937-1947 [China's Fate Sealed 1937-1947]. 天下遠見出版. p. 40.
ISBN978-986-216-568-3. A different perspective on this same "regret" is given in the final chapter of Tuchman's book: it "represented for Stilwell, as for so many others, an inclination toward the Chinese Communists that was simply the obverse of disgust with the Kuomintang."

Barbara Tuchman, Stilwell and the American Experience in China, 1911-45, Macmillan 1970. Grove Press 2001. British edition: Sand Against the Wind: Stilwell and the American Experience in China 1911-45, London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 2001. ISBN978-1-84212-281-5. Sympathetic full scale biography.

John Masters, The Road Past Mandalay, London: Michael Joseph, 1961. First-hand account of the fighting in Burma by a Chindit officer.

Hans Van de Ven, "Stilwell in the Stocks: The Chinese Nationalists and the Allied Powers in the Second World War," Asian Affairs 34.3 (November 2003): 243-259. Revisionist study argues that Stilwell misunderstood Chiang's military strategy, which was actually flexible and well founded in Chinese realities.

Hans J. Van de Ven, War and Nationalism in China, 1925-1945 (London; New York: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003). Expands revisionist view including longer period of time.

Andrew Roberts, "Masters and Commanders: How Four Titans Won the War in the West, 1941-1945" (New York: Harper Perennial. 2010). Presents a harsher picture of Stilwell in course of examining Churchill, Roosevelt, Brook, and Marshall.

Rana Mitter, "Forgotten Ally: China's World War II. 1937-1945" (Boston; New York: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt. 2013). Complete re-examination of the Chinese wars with Japan which argues that the memory of 'betrayals' by Britain, America, and Russia continues to influence China's worldview today.