The Turkish prime minister revealed the iron fist in his velvet glove this summer, but of which is his true character built?

All summer long, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has been in a very bad mood. The public squares and parks of Istanbul and several other Turkish cities were taken over by protesters he angrily dismissed as “riff-raff”, turning the full coercive power of the state on the largely peaceful demonstrators.

Turkey’s prime minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, unveiled the first big package of liberalising reforms in years on Monday, making overtures to the large Kurdish minority and proposing that headscarved women be allowed to sit in parliament and be civil servants for the first time in the history of the Turkish republic.

Where does religion end and politics begin in Turkey: through the prism of The Gezi Park protests

Part 1

It has been a few months now since Turkey, was shaken by Gezi Park Protests– an environmental outcry turn countrywide demonstration. The protest itself showed the side of Turkey many thought was long forgotten- civil popular dissent, unity, and solidarity. For the first time in years in a country of some seventy million, people rose against their government and its gripping authority of the ruling Justice and Development party (Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi) and its leader, the Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan. If someone said that hundreds of thousands of Turks raising their voices against the ruling government’s patronizing and increasingly more conservative policies would take the streets in more than 60 towns few months ago, it would have been hard to believe. The Gezi spirit brought people together as well as left many baffled by what Turkish citizens are capable of and among those scratching their heads is also the Turkish government officials.

Gezi protests: religious storm in the making?

It all began with few environmentalists’ attempt to prevent bulldozers from entering a small park in the heart of Istanbul near Taksim Square on May 27. The Prime Minister, Erdogan envisaged a new development plan for the park- a new shopping center, with cultural centers, opera house, a mosque, Ottoman- era military barracks, and the historic Ataturk Culture Center demolished. The plan was not open to public discussion or a vote, just as it has been the case with other past and recent development projects- construction of a third bridge across the Bosphorus entailing destruction of thousands of more trees (not to mention naming it after Yavuz Selim, an Ottoman Sultan under which thousands of Alevis (1) were slaughtered), a third and biggest new airport, the largest mosque on another green space on the Anatolian side of Istanbul, (2) a canal connecting the Black Sea to the Sea of Marmara and many others.

When the popular unrest escalated (given the heavy handed tactics of police who used tear gas and water cannon to disperse peaceful protesters and burned their tents) on May 31st, Turkey’s Prime Minister could have prevented the approaching storm. Instead he chose to press with the development plans. He refused to accept the debt of the events and left the country for a three- day trip to North Africa. Following his return it was clear his government wont budge from its earlier stand. Shortly after came the religion card. It was a (mis)calculation on behalf of Erdogan’s government to rely heavily on religion and discredit the protesters based on their spiritual affiliation (or lack thereof). Little did he know that Turkey was made up of more than just his staunch supporters (of which he said later he could hardly keep at home (3) as the protests spread across the country) and simply anti- government hoodlums (4) or “chapulcu” in Turkish, a term that was embraced (5) by the protesters following Erdogan’s fiery statement that he wont “seek permission from hoodlums to implement” his plans for Taksim. (6)

From the very start of the protests up until today, Erdogan’s inflammatory rhetoric portrayed and continues to do so, the demonstrations as the work of secular, westernized elite with a goal to repress religious and conservative majority. One must note that it was the Prime Minster himself who started playing the religion card, not the protesters.

The miscalculation of that action was fatal. All throughout the protests the protesters and organizers of the occupy Gezi movement did all they could to “embrace everyone”. And it was a religious sermon organized on a 9th day of protests which coincided with the Lailat-al-Mi’raj also known as Mirac Kandili in Turkish, that left the leaders even more so baffled. The unity among protesters was highlighted in the sermon of Ihsan Eliacik, a religious author from the anti-capitalist Muslims group who spoke that night at the park. “Mirac means ascendance . Muhammed the Holy Prophet has brought Islam by ascending to God. Islam means peace. Peace is a state of harmlessness. Do not harm anyone. Greet everyone; greet also those who are different from you. Be brothers and sisters, spread love and compassion. Today this energy is spreading out from Gezi Park. With God’s grace, completely new things are happening in Turkey” Eliacik (7) said at the park.

Few weeks later, as the holy month of Ramadan came to Turkey, once again the regime was baffled. The so- called unreligious Turks set up “earth tables” in the streets for iftar (dinner to break the day-long fast) with the first one set up on Istiklal Avenue of Istanbul, the city’s main pedestrian and shopping street. Everyone brought something to join the “table”- even those who have never fasted before- as a sign of solidarity. As the time went by, other “earth tables” were set up in other Istanbul neighborhoods. Among these were Fatih, and in Sarigazi Cemevi- a neighborhood known for its Alevi population long ostracized by the conventional Sunnis and the ruling party. (8)

Ironically, this idea of one community is something that Erdogan’s government once promised when it first came to power in 2002. Back then there was rhetoric of a different Turkey- a non-ideological approach to politics, responsiveness to demands of the people, change, development, liberty and democracy. (9) In the initial years of leadership, Erdogan took steps to distance himself and his party from the country’s earlier Islamist parties that were anti- west. In fact he was viewed as a “Nixon-in-China, a man who understood the need for Turkey’s closer integration to Europe and the global economy because of and not despite his political initiation in an openly Islamic political movement. He promised to rewrite Turkey’s international role The new Turkey would not simply be a bulwark but an agent of change- as a beacon of sound governance, a powerhouse economy, and a reservoir of good diplomatic sense”. (10)

It is unfortunate that only a decade later the AKP, especially following its second re-election is shifting further apart from its original rhetoric of a new Turkey. Turkey today no longer is united or at least not for the time being. For the ruling Justice and Development Party Turkey consists of the 50% who voted for Erdogan in the last elections in 2011, and the rest of the country. As for Erdogan himself, many see him and his party more as “xenophobic, anti- Western, inward-looking, anti-globalization and pro-status quo” (11) than what he once used to be.

1) Alevis are the non-Sunni Muslim group in Turkey. Since AKP coming to power Alevi population have had problems as the ruling government refused to recognize their “cemevi”- Alevi places of worship.

The Independent on Sunday (UK) 29 September 2013, p. 37 Patrick Cockburn The country could have enhanced its influence and saved a lot of lives. It did the exact opposite Whatever happened to the idea that Turkey was the coming power in the Middle East, with its surging economy and stable democracy under a mildly

Financial Times (UK) 27 September 2013, p. 4 By Daniel Dombey in Istanbul For years, the overarching question about Turkey was whether the country would become more at home in the Middle East or instead continue its decades-long journey towards European standards. Now an answer has come closer into view: neither of the above. Relations

The deal the United States and Russia struck to get rid of Syria’s chemical weaponry is neither a sign of a sea change in relations nor a victory for one party over the other, writes Olga Oliker. It is, however, something of a testament to diplomacy on both sides.

Pınar was detained in Beşiktaş by two undercover policemen, dragged and beaten. She was taken into an İETT bus again at Beşiktaş, which was used as a detention bus. She was listening to voices coming from outside. That’s where we stopped last week. It was the third day of the Gezi incidents.

Hot on Germany’s heels, Austria is up with its national election on Sunday.

Austria is currently governed by a ‘grand coalition’ of Chancellor Werner Faymann’s centre-left social democrats (SPÖ) and the centre-right People’s Party (ÖVP) lead by Michael Spindelegger. Polls put SPÖ at about 27% and the ÖVP 23% – theoretically enough secure a return to office.

The demand to transfer powers from the EU back to the national level is politically en-vogue in several EU member states at the moment. EU policy on agricultural biotechnology, however, is an interesting exception, writes Maria Weimer.

Maria Weimer is assistant professor in EU law at the Law Faculty of the University of Amsterdam and a senior research fellow at the Amsterdam Centre for European Law and Governance. This commentary was first published here on BlogActiv.

The Council of Ministers has recently become deadlocked over a Commission legislative proposal to re-nationalise parts of EU legislation on the cultivation of genetically modified organisms (GMOs). According to the 2012 Danish EU presidency progress report, “a political agreement on the GMO dossier is not possible.”

If one were writing a guidebook for would-be political leaders, one might well use Angela Merkel as a negative example. She is not media-friendly. She is not charismatic. She is not physically fit or well-dressed. She does not give off an aura of decisiveness; indeed, she has been known to leave extremely important decisions until it is almost too late. Her political campaigns are boring, her personal life even more so. She sometimes likes to compare her economic policies to those of a “Swabian housewife.”

ÇARŞI are being painted as the culprits of the pitch invasion and violence of the Sunday game. However, the ‘losing side’ of the incident is also ÇARŞI and the wider Beşiktaş fan base, a clear contradiction in terms.

The derby match between Besiktas and Galatasaray that was played in Istanbul was abandoned at the 90+2nd minute after an eruption of violence resulted in a pitch invasion. Foreign papers and local news reports alike have concentrated their coverage on the presence of violence without really probing the consequences or the underlying reasons why this event took place in the first place. Conveniently, we have also stopped questioning issues surrounding the AKP’s recent conduct or the ‘democracy package’ that the AKP have been promising to announce for the past 3 weeks.

GNU just turned 30 years old. But much has changed since the beginning of the free software movement; now there’s SaaS and more. Malware is common in proprietary software products since users don’t have control over them. Why does this control matter? Because freedom means having control over your own life.

As of May 2013, 15% of American adults ages 18 and older do not use the internet or email.

Asked why they do not use the internet:

34% of non-internet users think the internet is just not relevant to them, saying they are not interested, do not want to use it, or have no need for it.

32% of non-internet users cite reasons tied to their sense that the internet is not very easy to use. These non-users say it is difficult or frustrating to go online, they are physically unable, or they are worried about other issues such as spam, spyware, and hackers. This figure is considerably higher than in earlier surveys.

19% of non-internet users cite the expense of owning a computer or paying for an internet connection.

7% of non-users cited a physical lack of availability or access to the internet.

63% of adult cell owners now use their phones to go online, a figure that has doubled since we first started tracking internet usage on cell phones in 2009. In addition, 34% of these cell internet users say that they mostly go online using their cell phone. That means that 21% of all adult cell owners now do most of their online browsing using their mobile phone—and not some other device such as a desktop or laptop computer.

Fully 91% of American adults own a cell phone and many use the devices for much more than phone calls. In our most recent nationally representative survey, we checked in on some of the most popular activities people perform on their cell phones and found:

81% of cell phone owners send or receive text messages

60% of cell phone owners access the internet

52% send or receive email

50% download apps

49% get directions, recommendations, or other location-based information

Fictive depictions of tech are influential. In most shows, technology is painted as either implausibly superpowered (‘Wait?enhance that image!’) or alarmingly dangerous. The Good Wife avoids this Manichaean trap.

Facebook announced another tweak to the algorithm that determines which ads appear in users’ News Feeds, giving more weight to the feedback it receives on ads, particularly how often they are hidden or reported.

The NSA has released some details of 12 incidents in which analysts used their access to America’s high-tech surveillance infrastructure to spy on girlfriends, boyfriends, and random people they met in social settings. It’s a fascinating look at what happens when the impulse that drives average netizens to look up long-ago ex-lovers on Facebook is mated with the power to fire up a wiretap with a few keystrokes.