The Ambassador
of Japan called to see the President at the latter's request. Following some
few exchanges of preliminary remarks, the President then became serious and proceeded
to refer to the strained relations between our two countries. He referred to
the Ambassador's visit to me and the latter's request for a reopening of the
conversations between our two Governments. The President commented briefly on
the policies and principles that this Government has been standing for in its
relations with Japan, and he made some contrast to Japan's opposite course of
conquest by force, et cetera. He concluded by say­ing that our attitude of
opposition to Japan's course has been made well known, and that the next move
is now up to Japan. The Presi­dent inquired of the Ambassador if he had
anything in mind to say in connection with the situation. Thereupon the
Ambassador drew out of his pocket an instruction which he said was from his
Government, in which the Japanese Government set forth some generalities and
asserted very earnestly that it desired to see peaceful relations pre­served
between our two countries; that Prince Konoye feels so Seri­ously and so
earnestly about preserving such relations that he would be disposed to meet the
President midway, geographically speaking, between our two countries and sit
down together and talk the matter out in a peaceful spirit.

The President
thereupon said that this Government should really bring the matters between the
two Governments literally up to date and that he would, therefore, offer
certain observations about the posi­tion of this Government; he added that he
regretted the necessity of so doing but that he had no other recourse. The President
said he had dictated what he was about to say and that he would read it to the
Ambassador and then hand him the written instrument contain­ing the oral
conversation. This the President proceeded to do as follows

[Here follows
teat of the oral statement printed infra.]

The President,
after some little delay in the conversation so as to set apart the first
statement which he read to the Ambassador, then proceeded to turn to the
Ambassador's request to the Secretary of State and to himself for a resumption
of the conversations. The President made further references to Japan's opposing
course of con­quest by force and bitter denunciation of this country by the
Japanese Government‑controlled press and then coming to the request for a
reopening of the conversations he repeated our former statements to the
Japanese Government that, of course, we could not think of reopening the
conversations if the Japanese Government is to continue its present movement of
force and conquest supported by its bitter press campaign against this country.

Thereupon the
President proceeded to read to the Ambassador the following statement, which is
self‑explanatory:

[Here follows
text of the statement printed on p. 715.]

The Ambassador
received each paper in writing and said he would communicate both to his
Government. He reiterated from time to time that his Government was very
desirous of preserving peaceful relations between the two countries and he took
no issue with the President relative to the reasons set forth by this Government
for discontinuing conversations with Japan.

C [ORDELL] H [ULL]

ORAL STATEMENT HANDED
BY PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT TO THE JAPANESE AMBASSADOR (NOMURA) ON AUGUST 17, 1941

During past
months the Governments of the United States and of Japan, through the Secretary
of State and the Japanese Ambassador in Washington, have engaged in protracted
conversations directed toward exploring the possibility of reaching a sound
basis for nego­tiations between the two countries relative to the maintenance
of peace with order and justice in the Pacific. The principles and policies
which were under discussion in these conversations precluded pur­suit by Other
Government of objectives of expansion by force or by threat of force.

Only 24 last the President of the United States
informed the Japanese Government through the Japanese Ambassador in Washing­ton
that he was willing to suggest to the Governments of Great Britain of The
Netherlands and of China that they make a binding and solemn declaration that
they had no aggressive intentions with regard to Indochina and that they would
agree that the markets and raw materials of Indochina should be available to
all Powers on equal terms. The President stated further that he would be
willing to sug­gest to the Powers mentioned that they undertake this
declaration, in which the United States would be willing to join, upon the
under­standing that the Government of Japan would be disposed to make a similar
declaration and would be further disposed to withdraw its military and naval
forces from Indochina.

Notwithstanding
these efforts, the Government of Japan has con­tinued its military activities
and its disposals of armed forces at various points in the Far East and has
occupied Indochina with its military, air and naval forces.

The Government
of the United States is in full sympathy with the desire expressed by the
Japanese Government that there be pro­vided a fresh basis for amicable and
mutually profitable relations be­tween our two countries. This Government's
patience in seeking an acceptable basis for such an understanding has been
demonstrated time and again during recent years and especially during recent
months. This Government feels at the present stage that nothing short of the
most complete candor on its part, in the light of evidence and indications
which come to it from many sources, will at this mo­ment tend to further the
objectives sought.

Such being the
case, this, Government now finds it necessary to say to the Government of Japan
that if the Japanese Government takes any further steps in pursuance of a
policy or program of military domination by force or threat of force of
neighboring countries, the Government of the United States will be compelled to
take immedi­ately any and all steps which it may deem necessary toward safe­guarding
the legitimate rights and interests of the United States and American nationals
and toward insuring the safety and security of the United States.

STATEMENT HANDED BY
PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT TO THE JAPANESE AMBASSADOR (NOMURA) ON AUGUST 17, 1941

Reference is
made to the question which the Japanese Ambassador raised on August 8 during a
conversation with the Secretary of State whether it might not be possible for
the responsible heads of the Jap­anese Government and the Government of the United
States to meet with a view to discussing means whereby an adjustment in
relations between the United States and Japan might be brought about. The
thought of Prince Konoe and of the Japanese Government in offering this
suggestion is appreciated.

Reference is
made also to the desire expressed by the Japanese Am­bassador during a call on
the Secretary of State on August 16 that there be resumed the informal
conversations which had been in progress between the two Governments toward
ascertaining whether there existed a basis for negotiations relative to a
peaceful settlement covering the entire Pacific situation.

When the
Japanese Ambassador brought up these suggestions, the Secretary of State
reminded the Ambassador that the Government of the United States had shown
great patience and had been prepared to continue in that course of patience so
long as the Japanese Govern­ment manifested a desire to follow courses of
peace. It was pointed out to the Ambassador that while proceeding along this
course this Government had received reports indicating clearly that the
Japanese Government was adopting courses directly the opposite of those on
which the recent conversations between the Ambassador and the Secre­tary of
State had been predicated. It was pointed out also that the Japanese press was
being constantly stimulated to speak of encircle­ment of Japan by the United
States and was being officially inspired in ways calculated to inflame public
opinion. The Secretary of State made it clear that he did not see how conversations
between the two Governments could usefully be pursued or proposals be discussed
while Japanese official spokesmen and the Japanese press contended that the
United States was endeavoring to encircle Japan and carried on a campaign
against the United States.

On two occasions
officers of the Department of State, pursuant to instructions from the
Secretary of State, called on the Japanese Am­bassador to indicate concern over
the reports that Japan intended to acquire by force or threat of force military
and naval bases in French Indochina. Subsequently, on July 21 and July 23 the
Acting Secre­tary of State raised with the Japanese Minister and with the
Japanese Ambassador the question of Japan's intentions with regard to French
Indochina and pointed out that the Government of the United States could only
assume that the occupation by Japan of French Indochina or the acquisition of
military and naval bases in that area constituted notice to the United States
that Japan had taken by forceful means a step preparatory to embarking on
further movements of conquest in the South Pacific area. The Acting Secretary
pointed out further that this new move on Japan's part was prejudicial to the
procurement by the United States of essential raw materials and to the peace of
the Pacific, including the Philippine Islands.

The Government
of the United States accordingly had no alterna­tive but to inform the Japanese
Ambassador that, in the opinion of this Government, the measures then being
taken by the Japanese Govern­ment had served to remove the basis for further
conversations relative to a peaceful settlement in the Pacific area.

Informal
discussions between the Japanese Government and the Government of the United
States directed toward ascertaining whether there existed a basis for
negotiations relative to a peaceful settlement covering the entire Pacific
situation would naturally envis­age the working out of a progressive program
attainable by peaceful methods. It goes without saying that no proposals or
suggestions affecting the rights and privileges of either the United States or
Japan would be considered except as they might be in conformity with the basic
principles, to which the United States has long been committed. The program
envisaged in such informal discussions would involve the application in the
entire Pacific area of the principle of equality of commercial opportunity and
treatment. It would thus make possible access by all countries to raw materials
and to all other essential com­modities. Such a program would envisage
cooperation by all nations of the Pacific on a voluntary and peaceful basis
toward utilizing all available resources of capital, technical skill, and
progressive eco­nomic leadership for the purpose of building up not only their
own economies but also the economies of regions where productive capacity can
be improved. The result would be to increase the purchasing power of the
nations and peoples concerned, to raise standards of liv­ing, and to create
conditions conducive to the maintenance of peace. If such a program based upon
peaceable and constructive principles were to be adopted for the Pacific and if
thereafter any of the coun­tries or areas within the Pacific were menaced, the
policy of aiding nations resisting aggression would continue to be followed by
this Government and this Government would cooperate with other nations in
extending assistance to any country threatened.

Under such a
program for the Pacific area Japan would, in the opinion of the Government of
the United States, attain all the objec­tives which Japan affirms that it is
seeking. This program would not enable any country to extend its military or
political control over other peoples or to obtain economic rights of a
definitely monopolistic or preferential character. In those cases where the
production and distribution of essential commodities are vested in monopolies,
the Government of the United States would expect to use its influence to see
that all countries are given a fair share of the distribution of the products
of such monopolies and at a fair price.

If the Japanese
Government is seeking what it affirms to be its objectives, the Government of
the United States feels that the program above outlined is one that can be
counted upon to assure Japan satis­faction of its economic needs and legitimate
aspirations with much greater certainty than could any other program.

In case the
Japanese Government feels that Japan desires and is in position to suspend its
expansionist activities, to readjust its position, and to embark upon a
peaceful program for the Pacific along the lines of the program and principles
to which the United States is committed, the Government of the United States
would be prepared to consider resumption of the informal exploratory
discussions which were interrupted in July and would be glad to endeavor to
arrange a suitable time and place to exchange views. The Government of the
United States, however, feels that, in view of the circumstances attending the
interruption of the informal conversations between the two Governments, it
would be helpful to both Governments, before undertaking a resumption of such
conversations or proceeding with plans for a meeting, if the Japanese
Government would be so good as to furnish a clearer statement than has yet been
furnished as to its present attitude and plans, just as this Government has
repeatedly outlined to the Japanese Government its attitude and plans.

(PEACE AND WAR, UNITED STATES FOREIGN
POLICY 1931-1941,UNITED STATES
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICEWASHINGTON:
1943)