This doctoral dissertation about the evolution of altruism is part of the results from my affiliation as a teaching assistant with the Institutional Economics Group at University of Munich. In its preparation I have been lucky to benefit from the real-life altruism extended by many people, who enabled me to begin and complete this piece of work ...

This doctoral dissertation about the evolution of altruism is part of the results from my affiliation as a teaching assistant with the Institutional Economics Group at University of Munich. In its preparation I have been lucky to benefit from the real-life altruism extended by many people, who enabled me to begin and complete this piece of work and have contributed to making the past four and a half years a highly rewarding experience. Professor Ekkehart Schlicht, who leads the Institutional Economics Group, served as my thesis supervisor and introduced me to the exciting field of institutional analysis. I would like to thank him for his constant encouragement and invaluable advice, and for making his group a highly inspiring place of enormous scientific diversity where real-world prob-lems are addressed by combining the best of economics and its neighboring disciplines. The excellent atmosphere at our chair is also due to my fellow TAs Oliver Nikutowski and Florian Schwimmer, both of whom provided numerous insightful comments and suggestions concerning my work, as did seminar and conference participants in Munich, Barcelona and Tutzing. The same holds true for my former colleagues Thorsten Gliniars and Stefan Schubert and for one of “my ” former students, Martin Leroch. Our chair secre- Minimize

The ability to solve problems of collective action is crucial for economic performance. Growth-fostering behavioral propensities such as respecting property, honoring contracts, or helping others are collectively beneficial but individually costly. The paradigmatic formalization of this rationality gap is provided by the non-iterated Prisoners’ ...

The ability to solve problems of collective action is crucial for economic performance. Growth-fostering behavioral propensities such as respecting property, honoring contracts, or helping others are collectively beneficial but individually costly. The paradigmatic formalization of this rationality gap is provided by the non-iterated Prisoners’ Dilemma, where rational players are locked in at a state of mutual defection while mutual cooperation would be better for everyone. In sporadic, ex-ante anonymous interactions (like in modern large-scale societies), the ‘shadow of the future’ cannot sustain cooperation. Cooperation must be altruistic, in the sense that a cooperator enhances her opponent’s payoff at her own expense. In this piece of work another group selection mechanism is presented that generates and sustains altruism in ex-ante anonymous settings. Assuming that cooperative attitudes are coupled with a preference for participating in costly rituals (religious involvement is taken as an example), interactions take place within two endogenously separated groups. The signaling value of religion in the model derives not from differential costliness but from cooperators’ intrinsic nature of motivation. Noncooperative types have to learn about the matching gains from religious involvement while cooperative types need not. This induces an initial advantage to cooperative/religious types at the beginning of each generation, thereby sustaining altruism in the long run via religious participation. Minimize

The ability to solve problems of collective action is crucial for economic performance. Growth-fostering behavioral propensities such as respecting property, honoring contracts, or helping others are collectively beneficial but individually costly. The paradigmatic formalization of this rationality gap is provided by the non-iterated Prisoners’ ...

The ability to solve problems of collective action is crucial for economic performance. Growth-fostering behavioral propensities such as respecting property, honoring contracts, or helping others are collectively beneficial but individually costly. The paradigmatic formalization of this rationality gap is provided by the non-iterated Prisoners’ Dilemma, where rational players are locked in at a state of mutual defection while mutual cooperation would be better for everyone. In sporadic, ex-ante anonymous interactions (like in modern large-scale societies), the ‘shadow of the future’ cannot sustain cooperation. Cooperation must be altruistic, in the sense that a cooperator enhances her opponent’s payoff at her own expense. In this piece of work another group selection mechanism is presented that generates and sustains altruism in ex-ante anonymous settings. Assuming that cooperative attitudes are coupled with a preference for participating in costly rituals (religious involvement is taken as an example), interactions take place within two endogenously separated groups. The signaling value of religion in the model derives not from differential costliness but from cooperators’ intrinsic nature of motivation. Noncooperative types have to learn about the matching gains from religious involvement while cooperative types need not. This induces an initial advantage to cooperative/religious types at the beginning of each generation, thereby sustaining altruism in the long run via religious participation. ; Altruism; Prisoners' Dilemma; Evolutionary Game Theory; Signaling; Religion Minimize

eed well with the theoretical concept. Hereby, the intracellular water signal was separated from extracellular signal contributions by large diffusion weighting. It showed the characteristic of restricted diffusion as well as a signal decay due to the exchange of intracellular water across the plasma membrane. A map of the mean intracellular exc...

eed well with the theoretical concept. Hereby, the intracellular water signal was separated from extracellular signal contributions by large diffusion weighting. It showed the characteristic of restricted diffusion as well as a signal decay due to the exchange of intracellular water across the plasma membrane. A map of the mean intracellular exchange time for water in living animal brain was determined, and the upper limit in rat brain was evaluated to 15 ms. The presented methods can be applied to correlate local differences in a map of exchange times with tissue morphology and to detect pathological deviations of the exchange time, e.g., during ischemia. 1998 Elsevier Science Inc. Keywords:---Restricted diffusion; Water exchange; Diffusion time dependence; Tortuosity. INTRODUCTION Diffusion-weighted nuclear magnetic resonance (NMR) imaging has become a routine clinical utility for detecting brain pathologies, such as early stages of ischemia. Minimize

Open reading frame IV (ORF-IV) of Borna disease virus (BDV) encodes a protein with a calculated molecular mass of ca. 57 kDa (p57), which increases after N glycosylation to 94 kDa (gp94). The unglycosylated and glycosylated proteins are proteolytically cleaved by the subtilisin-like protease furin. Furin most likely recognizes one of three poten...

Open reading frame IV (ORF-IV) of Borna disease virus (BDV) encodes a protein with a calculated molecular mass of ca. 57 kDa (p57), which increases after N glycosylation to 94 kDa (gp94). The unglycosylated and glycosylated proteins are proteolytically cleaved by the subtilisin-like protease furin. Furin most likely recognizes one of three potential cleavage sites, namely, an arginine at position 249 of the ORF-IV gene product. The furin inhibitor decRVKRcmk decreases the production of infectious BDV significantly, indicating that proteolytic cleavage of the gp94 precursor molecule is necessary for the full biological activity of the BDV glycoprotein. Minimize