Britain's nuclear deterrent at stake if Scotland goes

Moving bases for ballistic-missile subs could be cost-prohibiitive

Hey there, time traveller!This article was published 1/8/2014 (860 days ago), so information in it may no longer be current.

Novelist and longtime Scotland resident J.K. Rowling did not mention national-security issues when she recently donated one million pounds (US$1.71 million) to the Better Together Campaign, which wants Scottish voters to reject the independence option in the Sept. 18 referendum.

Rowling -- creator of Harry Potter and the Hogwarts School of Witchcraft -- did emphasize the economic downsides of a divorce from the rest of the United Kingdom. But if her funds and celebrity status help No voters carry the day, she will share the credit for a real-life geo-strategic feat: saving Britain's nuclear deterrent.

LEFTERIS PITARAKIS / THE ASSOCIATED PRESS FILES

If Scottish voters choose to stay in the U.K., J.K. Rowling will share the credit for saving Britain's nuclear deterrent.

The pro-independence leaders of the ruling Scottish National Party have pledged to terminate arrangements, dating from the 1960s, for basing British ballistic missile submarines and their nuclear warheads at Faslane and Coulport on Scotland's west coast. In June, they unveiled an interim constitution that would obligate a newly independent Scottish government to "pursue negotiations with a view to securing nuclear disarmament... and the safe and expeditious removal from the territory of Scotland of nuclear weapons based there." The proposed constitution does not specify a deadline, but if the referendum passes, the nationalists hope to see the submarines and warheads removed by 2020.

At the same time, the British government's case for replacing, beginning in 2028, the aging force of four Vanguard-class submarines (which carry U.S.-built Trident missiles) with a "like for like" fleet of four new boats has scored political gains over the last year.

In July 2013, the British Cabinet Office published its assessment of potential alternatives to the "like for like" plan. These include building only two or three submarines, replacing some or all of the Trident systems with yet-to-be developed nuclear-armed and stealthy cruise missiles, and abandoning the Royal Navy's "continuous at-sea deterrence" posture, which requires one sub to be on patrol at all times.

But the assessment found none of those alternatives offered the overall deterrence and operational advantages of the "like for like" approach. Moreover, some would cost more than the roughly $34-billion life-cycle price of the "like for like" plan.

And this month, an independent experts commission, including prominent figures linked to the coalition parties and the Labor opposition, concluded unanimously Britain should retain and deploy a nuclear arsenal. The commission's report stated: "We cannot expect the United States to shoulder indefinitely the awesome responsibilities that lie in providing extended nuclear deterrence to Europe, particularly if the United Kingdom were to abandon its own nuclear force." Ironically, the commission had been assembled by BASIC, a small but influential British-American think-tank whose stated goal is a nuclear-weapon-free world.

The debate over the successor deterrent remains unsettled and might flare up during Britain's parliamentary election campaign next spring. Even within the country's defence community, some argue funds would be better spent for conventional military capabilities. Ultimately, the next government would decide, in 2016, how many new subs to buy.

However, if Scottish voters opt for independence, that picture will change radically. A defence ministry report to Parliament warns any other arrangement for basing the deterrent force would involve "huge" costs. George Robertson, a former British defence minister and NATO secretary general, believes the costs of moving the nuclear force out of Scotland could be prohibitive. "Effectively, it might mean the unilateral nuclear disarming of the remainder of the United Kingdom," he told a Washington audience in April.

That would be a tough blow for Britain's two nuclear allies and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization as a whole.

For decades, the special nuclear relationship between the United States and Britain, underpinned by their 1958 Mutual Defense Agreement, has ensured their respective strategies, weapons systems and operational concepts are well-co-ordinated and mutually supportive. As is the case in the United States with the president, only the prime minister can authorize the use of his nation's nuclear forces. This complicates the planning of any potential aggressor, strengthening NATO's deterrence and collective defence pillars. The two governments also work very closely on sensitive nuclear-proliferation issues, including Iran.

British-French nuclear co-operation is more recent and restricted. Under the 2010 Lancaster House treaty, the countries share two laboratories related to nuclear weapons safety and reliability. Yet, beyond the cost savings of such arrangements, the French have a strategic stake in keeping Britain in the nuclear weapons business. As retired general Henri Bentégeat, a former chief of defence, told French parliament members in April, "By helping the British... we are also protecting our own nuclear deterrent. Imagine the intense pressures that France would confront if they were forced to abandon their deterrent."

But for now, there's little Washington or Paris can do to help London keep Scotland in the fold. President Barack Obama's mention last month of America's "deep interest" in Britain remaining a "strong, robust, united, and effective partner" was an implicit rebuke to Scottish independence leaders. Recent opinion polls show a lead for the No vote, but a significant number of likely voters are undecided. And as the Economist notes, the nationalists "have fire in their bellies." Hence, louder expressions of concern by American or French officials may be counterproductive.

If the nationalists in Scotland win, however, British, American and French strategists will need all the wizardry they can muster.

Leo Michel is a research fellow at the National Defense University in Washington. He wrote this for the Los Angeles Times.

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