When Chairman Gibson called my name to the podium, I began to speak for about 60 seconds before Board Member David Hubbard abruptly interrupted me. He asked what my comment had to do with expulsion. I said, that I was commenting on expulsions. Before Board Member Hubbard abruptly interrupted me I had just read VUSD’S Board Policy No. 5013 “Suspension and Expulsions,” Section (3), which read: “It is the intent of the Board of Education that its policies and regulations be consistent with current law. Any part of this policy, which is not consistent with current law, shall be void.”

I asked whether VUSD knew if Guajome Park Academy had policies for expulsions? If they knew what those policies were? If the policies were allied with California law and If Guajome Park Academy had a legitimate Expulsion Board?

Board Member Hubbard asked what does this have to do with Section “C.” and that Section C had to do with Readmission of Students who have been expelled from other school districts? Board Member Hubbard told me that I had pulled a card for “Section C.” Board Member Hubbard said we have already ratified the item and you cannot speak on it any more. President of the Board Gibson agreed. They both insisted that I had pulled the card for Section C.

If in fact I had pulled the card for Section C then why would the VUSD Board ratify Section D before Section C?

I have addressed the issue of VUSD Board Member David Hubbard rude and abrupt interruptions, when I have attempted to speak on the Vista Unified School District Board of Trustees Meetings for many years.

I have addressed this same issue with regulatory agencies. Board Member David Hubbard has continued this illegal conduct with complete disregard of California State Open Meeting Laws. David Hubbard as Board Member and attorney has given VUSD legal advice that is contrary to the law for over twelve years. David Hubbard conspired with former superintendent Dave Cowles to defraud the public, students and parents of the Vista Unified School District; with distorted legal advised and recommendations that have bankrupt the Vista Unified School District for over twelve years.

The Vista Unified School Board Members need to be reminded that the people of the state of California have the right to criticize the policies, procedures, programs, or services of the agency, or of the acts or omissions of the legislative body. Baca v. Moreno Valley Unified School District (1996) 936 F.Supp. 719.

“Thus, under the California Constitution, District’s Board may not censor speech by prohibiting citizens from speaking, even if their speech is, or may be, defamatory.” (at pg. 727)

The action to censor my First Amendment Right to Speak by this Board not only violates the State Constitution, but it is also contrary to the Brown Act. This is primary the reason why David Hubbard and the entire Vista Unified School District Board of Trustees has and will continue to have a Permanent Injunction (See also Leventhal v. Vista Unified School District (1997) 973 F.Supp. 951)

The Ralph M. Brown Act (Government Code §54950 et seq.) provides that the public has a right to address the VUSD School Board on any matter on the agenda of the VUSD School Board Meeting before action is taken on that item (Government Code §54954.3), (Section C comes before Section D) and to also address the VUSD School Board on any subject within the subject matter jurisdiction of the VUSD School Board Meetings that is, on subjects for which the VUSD School Board has some ability to take action (Government Code §54954.3).

The censoring of my First Amendment Right to Speak is a violation of my right publicly to share my criticisms of school board policies with the VUSD Board of Trustees and concerned community members pursuant to California Government Code section 54954.3, a code section found in California's open meeting law, commonly known as the Ralph M Brown Act). Cal.Govt.Code, §§ 54950 et seq.

As I have informed you before on many letters sent to the entire Vista Unified School District Board of Trustees:

The Vista Unified School District has constantly been informed by community members of its pervasive Brown Act violations and continues to ignore the public’s request for open government, transparency and accountability. If by any chance you did not read the prior letters, I will repeat once again the Vista Unified School District and every Member of the Board of Trustees has a permanent injunction in respect to Brown Act violations in the United States Court for the Southern District of California in the universally known and quoted Leventhal v. Vista Unified School District., School Board President David Hubbard, in his Official Capacity, et al., Defendants. 973 F. Supp. 951 (1997)

Therefore, pursuant to provisions (Government Code Section 54960.1.), I demand that the Vista Unified School District Board of Trustees cure and correct the illegally taken actions mentioned above.

As a consequence, I am giving you a final formal written demand letter (§ 54960.1(c)(1); County of Del Norte v. City of Crescent City (1999) 71 Cal.App.4th 965, 978; Bell v. Vista Unified School Dist.(2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 672, 684.)

In addition:

I suggest that you take the advice from a true professional instead of Board Member Hubbard. Including a crash course on the California Ralph M. Brown Act for all the members of the Vista Unified School District Board of Trustees panel. So as to enhance your further involvement as representatives of the California Ralph Brown Act. Subsequently, that you may develop a deeper understanding of members of the public rights to attend and participate in public meetings that should be open for public participation for all members of the community. [Government Code Section 54954.3. (a)]

A crash course on open and public meeting law as based on the Ralph M. Brown Act for all VUSD Members of the Board of Trustees and VUSD subcommittees. [Government Code Section 54950., 54950.5. 54952.] May I suggest at minimally that VUSD subcommittee panel members be provided with a current copy of the Brown Act [Government Code Section 54952.7]. Due to the multiple roles the panel members hold with other VUSD subcommittee assignments and other public agencies, perhaps a workshop presentation by Terry Franke from The Californians Aware. 2218 Homewood Way Carmichael, CA 95608 Phone: 916-487-7000 Fax: 916-487-7999 would better serve your efforts of compliance with the law as well as to ensure and protect the community's rights to bring forward public criticism of policies, procedures, programs, or services. The Californians Aware organization is considered the experts in the area of open meeting laws, public record law, and First Amendment.

As Government Code section 54950 "Declaration of Intent" indicates:

"The people of the state (Vista Unified School District Board of Trustees) do not yield their sovereignty to the agencies, which serve them. The people, in delegating authority, do not give their public servants the right to decide what is good for the people to know and what is not good for them to know. The people insist on remaining

informed so that they may retain control over the instruments they have created."

As provided by Section 54960.1 you have 30 days from the receipt of this demand to either cure or correct the challenged actions or inform me of your decision not to do so. If you fail to cure or correct as demanded, such inaction may leave me no recourse but to seek a judicial invalidation of the challenged actions pursuant to Section 54960.1, in which case I would seek the award of court costs and reasonable attorney fees pursuant to Section 54960.5.

"Defendants ...are hereby permanently enjoined and restrained from enforcing the prohibitions on any "criticism, complaint or charge against an employee of the District" contained in Vista Unified School District Bylaw No. 9002, §§ B and C."

United States District Court,S.D. California.MOSKOWITZ, District Judge.

This matter comes before the Court on Plaintiffs' motion for PERMANENT INJUNCTION ... the Court adopts its order of June 18,1997 and applies that order to Defendant David Hubbard and to the new Defendants--Jenny Vervynck, Lance Vollmer, Linda Rhoades and Barbara Donovan, sued in their official capacity ...

Plaintiffs challenge School Board Bylaw No. 9002 (the "Bylaw") under:

--the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution,

--Article I, §§ 2, 3 and 7 of the California Constitution,

--and the state's Brown Act, Cal. Gov't Code §§ 54954.3 and 54960,

seeking declaratory and injunctive relief.

The Bylaw permits the Board President to "terminate a presenter's address" at an open Board meeting "if a presenter persists, after a warning, to engage in improper conduct or remarks."

The Bylaw acknowledges *954 that state law grants the public the right "to directly address the Board on items of interest to the public that are within the subject matter jurisdiction of the Board," but limits those rights "with respect to presenting a complaint or charge against an employee of the District." Under the Bylaw, "[c]omplaints against an individual employee will not be heard at open Board meetings unless the individual employee consents." ......

... Because she had concerns over Gyves's fiscal administration of the District, his supervisory skills, and his prior performance as superintendent of another school district, Leventhal also questioned aloud whether the Board had adequately investigated Gyves prior to hiring him.

As soon as Leventhal mentioned Gyves's qualifications, Board President Hubbard interrupted her, stated that Leventhal was "moving into a personnel issue," and, pursuant to the Bylaw,informed her that her criticisms could not be made in a public Board meeting. According to Leventhal, after Hubbard's interruption, she "respectfully--but not voluntarily--terminated [her] comments about the hiring of Dr. Gyves, rather than face the indignity of further censorship and disruption of the proceedings...."

... Leventhal then spoke, remarking that "it is totally inappropriate to have a community member who is using their free speech rights to speak ... lectured and have judgments made about them publicly."

Hubbard responded to Leventhal, explaining that while criticisms of the Board and the District were permissible,"I'm not going to allow this to turn into a situation where members of the public engage board members in personal attacks.... [I]f that's an abridgment of First Amendment rights, then I'll wait for a court of law to tell me that." ..........

Permanent injunction against Vista Unified School District re free speech

Even after admitting that the Brown Act had been violated before, they’ve done it again.

The notice for the special closed session meeting for San Diego Unified School District’s Board of Education, now scheduled for Wed., June 16 at 6:30 p.m., was sent out Tuesday at 6:43 p.m. – less than 24 hours in advance.

At least the district is doing better this time – only 13 minutes late. Here is the notice:

Last week, in two separate violations, the district was nearly six hours late – distributing the notice around 4 p.m. for a meeting scheduled for 10 a.m. the next morning. And the second violation came the same day – notifying the public at 7:23 p.m. for a 4 p.m. meeting the following day.

The Brown Act clearly states that there needs to be 24 hours’ notice for special meetings, and SDUSD general counsel Mark Bresee even concurred after being called on it before. And yet here we are again, less than two weeks later, with the same violation.

Does anyone even care about following the law at the San Diego Unified School District? Is it too much to ask that the folks in charge do slightly more than thumb their noses at these relatively minor constraints, giving hardly more than a passing nod at the public’s right to know?

Some may say it’s making a mountain out of a molehill – what’s a few minutes among friends, eh?

I’m inclined to agree in some ways. Thirteen minutes one way or the other does not an issue make, in and of itself.

But what rankles is that this repeated pattern of complete disregard for the law, even in the most minor of matters, portends a much larger problem with rules and legalities. If it’s so acceptable to ignore legislation that is easy to follow, how can the public have any assurance that proper behavior is insisted upon in matters less visible and of much greater significance?

This new meeting was called because the board wasn’t prepared to announce its three final candidates for superintendent when it said it would, even though the district has been announcing for a week that the three finalists would be named on June 15. Apparently, the board just wasn’t quite ready.

But that’s another issue entirely – and one worthy of its own critical examination. I’m still stuck on the process and seeing that it’s followed appropriately.

Since the legislation has no teeth, apparently public agencies like the San Diego Unified School District feel they can get away with breaking the law – until someone in some position of authority is willing to make an issue of it.

This is a matter of ethics and integrity – and with San Diego Unified we’re not seeing a whole lot of either of late.

... in the March 20, 1997 Board meeting...According to Bristol, Gyves denied that he had endorsed the proposal,"attack[ing]" Bristol's credibility and referring to her remarks as "bizarre" and "about typical of the accuracy of your statements historically." Bristol states that Hubbard, the Board President, made no effort to restrain Gyves's comments, "despite the fact that Mr. Hubbard has repeatedly silenced several members of the public who have attempted to criticize Dr. Gyves and various Board members at recent Board meetings."

Bristol concludes, "Based on Mr. Hubbard's continuing enforcement of Bylaw No. 9002, I now refrain from speakingopenly at public Board meetings about my concerns and criticisms regarding the District Superintendent's qualifications and performance."...

first, "traditional" public fora--"places which by long tradition or government fiat havebeen devoted to assembly and debate;"

second, "limited" public fora-- "public property which the State has opened for use by the public as a place for expressive activity;" and

third, "nonpublic" fora--property not dedicated in any significant way to free or open communication.

Under this categorical system, the state's ability to regulate speech depends on the nature of the forum. The government's power to restrict expression in traditional public fora, the Perry Court explained, is extremely limited: "reasonable time, place and mannerregulations are permissible, and a content- *957 based prohibition must be narrowlydrawn to effectuate a compelling state interest."

The Court imposed similar restraints on speech in limited public fora: "Although a State is not required to indefinitely retain the open character of the facility, as long as it does so it is bound by the same standards as apply in a traditional public forum." Id. In nonpublic fora, the government may restrict expression only if the regulation is reasonable and viewpoint-neutral.

...the maintenance of the opportunity for free political discussion to the end thatgovernment may be responsive to the will of the people and that changes may beobtained by lawful means, an opportunity essential to the security of the Republic, is afundamental principle of our constitutional system. [I]t is a prized American privilege tospeak one's mind, although not always with perfect good taste, on all public institutions,and this opportunity is to be afforded for vigorous advocacy no less than abstractdiscussion.

...Defendants contend that these concerns are outweighed by the District's interest inprotecting the privacy and property rights of its employees...

[8] Before examining the Defendants' contentions, it is important to remember that evenif the Brown Act sanctioned the Bylaw, First Amendment speech guarantees wouldtrump the statute.

It is no defense to suggest that since the Brown Act created the Boardmeetings, the Brown Act can also authorize unconstitutional limitations on thosemeetings.

The essence of the public forum doctrine is the notion that although thegovernment need not devote its property to expressive activity, once it does it is bound bythe strictures of the First Amendment.

[9] That said, the Brown Act provides little support for the District's position.

Although §54957 allows public employees to demand that a governing body air complaints about the employee in public, it does not grant the employees the right to force the conflict behind closed doors.

Similarly, while the Brown Act permits governing bodies to hold closedsessions about personnel matters, nowhere does it grant those bodies the exceedinglybroader authority to silence public speech that may also touch upon related employmentissues. As noted above, the sections of the Brown Act and the Education Code thatrequire the Board to hold public meetings grant the public a right to speak "on any itemof interest to the public ... that is within the subject matter jurisdiction" *959 of theBoard, without exception. Cal. Gov't Code § 54954.3(a) (emphasis added); Cal.Educ.Code § 35145.5 (emphasis added).The preamble to the Brown Act sets forth the primary purposes of the Act as a whole:The people of this state do not yield their sovereignty to the agencies which serve them.

The people, in delegating authority, do not give their public servants their right to decidewhat is good for the people to know and what is not good for them to know. The peopleinsist on remaining informed so that they may retain control over the instruments theyhave created.

Citing the statute's preamble, the court concluded that it"must construe the 'personnel exception' narrowly and the 'sunshine law' liberally in favor of openness."

The court explained, "Public visibility breedspublic awareness which in turn fosters public activism politically and subtly encouraging the governmental entity to permit public participation in the discussion process."

Thus, while the Brown Act authorizes a school board to discuss personnel matters in closed session, it does not preclude the public from raising such matters at open Board meetings. Once the matter has surfaced in public, the Board and the employee still mayadjudicate the matter in closed session.

While the Court recognizes the privacy and property interests of the District'semployees, the District's asserted interests pale in comparison to the expressive rights ofthe public...

Alternatively, the Bylaw fails even under the more deferential standard ofreview applied to speech restrictions in nonpublic fora. As mentioned above, regulations in nonpublic fora will survive a constitutional challenge only if they are "reasonable in light of the purpose served by the forum and are viewpoint neutral."

...As the Supreme Court explained in New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254,84 S.Ct. 710, 11 L.Ed.2d 686 (1964):

The maintenance of the opportunity for free political discussion to the end thatgovernment may be responsive to the will of the people and that changes may beobtained by lawful means, an opportunity essential to the security of the Republic, is afundamental principle of our constitutional system. [I]t is a prized American privilege tospeak one's mind, although not always with perfect good taste, on all public institutions,and this opportunity is to be afforded for vigorous advocacy no less than abstractdiscussion. Id. at 269, 84 S.Ct. at 720 (internal quotations and citations omitted).

CONCLUSION

...The Court declares that the prohibitions on any criticism, "complaint or charge against an employee of the District"contained in Vista Unified School District Bylaw No. 9002, §§ B and C, violate thePlaintiffs' rights secured under the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United StatesConstitution.

Defendants David Hubbard, Jenny Vervynck, Lance Vollmer, LindaRhoades and Barbara Donovan, acting in their official capacity as members of the SchoolBoard of the Vista Unified School District, and their agents, successors... and employees who have received notice of this order, are hereby permanently enjoined and restrained fromenforcing the prohibitions on any criticism, "complaint or charge against an employee ofthe District" contained in Vista Unified School District Bylaw No. 9002, §§ B and C...

WASCO -- Residents yelled "the city is unhappy" in a packed City Council meeting Tuesday night as discussion turned to a grand jury report that accuses council members and the mayor of having too many 'special meetings.'

"It's been quite a rocky two weeks and it's getting to a point where we need a resolution," said Tilo Cortez Jr., vice mayor and council member for the city.

A grand jury report stated that the council has "far too many 'special meetings'" that leave a perception the city does not want public input.

On Jan. 24, the mayor, Danny Espitia, and one or two council members met to vote on the appointment of an assistant city manager, fire the city attorney and hire a new law firm, according to the grand jury report. The meeting was announced Jan. 23, according to the report.

The grand jury report also said Councilman and former Mayor Fred West Jr. met with the former finance director to discuss his taking on the job as interim city manager. An unsigned contract showed up on the former director's desk, according to the grand jury.

The grand jury report recommends that the City Council get additional training on the Ralph M. Brown Act. The state law allows very limited closed-door meetings concerning public business, according to the report.

The report also recommended that Wasco residents get more involved in City Council meetings, the council stop having special meetings unless it is an emergency and that Espitia should stop voting until the city receives an opinion from the Attorney General of California.

Espitia said he does not want to forward the report to the attorney general because there are lies in it.

"The grand jury was misinformed," he said. "It's wrong. They never interviewed me."

The grand jury said in the report that it interviewed the mayor.

When Cortez asked if the report was telling the truth, Espitia replied, "So we can agree the grand jury can make another mistake."

Dozens of citizens filled the seats and some stood in the aisles as they argued with council members.

"This is just not right," said Wasco resident Susana Rios...

[Bonifacio "Bonny"]Garcia has made about $83,000 in four months as the city attorney, said Councilwoman Cherylee Wegman. The grand jury report said Garcia makes about four to five times more than the previous attorney.

Garcia said he would be happy to have an evaluation of his work another time.

"We have to talk about what's on the agenda," said Wegman who tried to direct discussion toward the grand jury report. "It's the law."

After hearing pleas from the audience, the City Council voted to postpone discussion of the alleged Brown Act violations and the hiring of Garcia until a public meeting on July 3.

By the Fall 1997, Bell had been a VUSD employee for 13 years and the only football coach in RBV's 11-year history. As a tenured instructor, his coaching assignment was separate and renewed annually each fiscal year. That assignment had been renewed on July 1, 1997, and was to expire on June 30, 1998.

In the spring 1997, Robert Ryan, the father of Australian high school student John, asked Bell to help arrange his son's transfer to Vista to attend school and play American football. Bell advised Ryan he had a “no cut” policy, but any decision regarding eligibility would be made by the California Interscholastic Federation (CIF), a voluntary association which governs eligibility for interscholastic competition. Bell immediately reported Ryan's telephone call to Athletic Director Bethel and directed Ryan to the counseling office for processing the transfer. Ryan later asked Bell to obtain a visa for John to enter the United States, an Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) form I-20. In turn, Bell contacted Bethel and VUSD Associate Superintendent Peter McHugh who told him VUSD did not provide the form; made inquiries on Bell's behalf; and later advised him where he could obtain it. A third party obtained the form and Bell had a Vista counselor, Frank Donez, sign it. Bell's assistant coach offered to take John into his home for the year at a minimal cost.

After John's arrival and registration, RBV Principal Johnson wrote the CIF requesting his athletic eligibility. CIF Commissioner Jan Jessop met with John. Upon learning his age, his prior education and Bell's involvement in his transfer, on September 9 Jessop denied the request for eligibility on the grounds he was a “fifth year” senior and a transfer student.

...On October 2, she further ruled Bell had violated CIF's undue influence rule, John was ineligible for one year, and RBV was placed on one-year athletic probation with the suggestion VUSD consider disciplinary action against involved employees.

John appealed the decision to the CIF Appellate Panel, which following hearings on October 13, upheld the undue influence ruling, but reduced his ineligibility to 13 days. The panel placed the school's entire athletic program on probation for one year, suspended its membership in the CIF for the year, and ordered VUSD to review the matter and take whatever action it deemed appropriate regarding Bell. On October 16, the VUSD Board of Trustees (the Board) held a special closed session Board meeting to consider action to take in response to the CIF probation. ...The court further found VUSD neither cured nor corrected its failure to provide Bell notice of a meeting to discuss his termination as football coach or his right to request an open meeting.

The court then ruled that pursuant to section 54960.1, subdivision (a), mandamus was a proper remedy to declare the action taken at the October 16 meeting was null and void. The court directed VUSD to nullify its prior decision terminating Bell as RBV head football coach,remove any mention of termination from his personnel file, not communicate in the future he was ever terminated, and permanently enjoined VUSD, its agents and employees from attempting to enforce the October 16 termination decision.

Finally, the court concluded that Bell had timely requested VUSD to cure or correct the statutorily deficient notice and that his filing suit before the expiration of the 30-day period to correct a Brown Act violation was not prejudicial and did not bar his mandamus action.

The court ruled Bell was entitled to reasonable attorney fees and costs under section 54960.5, subject to a cost memorandum and motion for attorney fees. The matter was then heard on June 19, after which the court took the matter under submission and confirmed its telephonic ruling with slight modification. Judgment was filed on August 14, incorporating an award for attorney fees and costs in the sum of $157,674.81 (costs of $9,812.81 and fees of $147,862.00). VUSD appealed, but the appeal was dismissed without prejudice for violating the one final judgment rule. The remaining tort actions went to trial in March 1999, but the parties resolved them before its completion. VUSD paid Bell $125,000 and gave him a paid leave of absence during the second semester of the 1999/2000 school year to settle his remaining claims. VUSD then timely noticed this appeal on June 22.

THE BROWN ACT WAS VIOLATED

VUSD contends the closed meeting did not violate the Brown Act because Bell was only entitled to a 24-hour written notice of the meeting under section 54957 if the Board intended to consider complaints or charges brought against him by another person or employee. Here, VUSD asserts the Board did not do so, but rather it met to consider whether to discipline an employee after an adverse finding or decision by a separate administrative body (CIF) and that action did not constitute a complaint or charge under the Brown Act. Bell responds that when Superintendent Gary Olson and McHugh, who also served as CIF board chair, presented the CIF's finding of undue influence as a basis for disciplining Bell to the Board it evolved into a charge or complaint presented by a fellow employee or another person, requiring notice of the meeting under section 54957. As we shall explain, we agree.

The Brown Act's requirement that public meetings be open ensures the public's right to attend meetings of local legislative bodies, subject to statutory exceptions. (Freedom Newspapers, Inc. v. Orange County Employees Retirement System (1993) 6 Cal.4th 821, 825, 25 Cal.Rptr.2d 148, 863 P.2d 218; Fischer v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist. (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 87, 95, 82 Cal.Rptr.2d 452.) It established the governing mandate that “meetings of the legislative body of a local agency shall be open and public, and all persons shall be permitted to attend any meeting of the legislative body of the local agency, except as otherwise provided in this chapter.” (§ 54953, subd. (a).) The Brown Act was designed to facilitate public participation in local governmental decisions and to curb misuse of the democratic process by secret legislation. (Boyle v. City of Redondo Beach (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 1109, 1116, 83 Cal.Rptr.2d 164; Fischer v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist., supra, 70 Cal.App.4th at p. 95, 82 Cal.Rptr.2d 452.)

...Even if Bell conferred a significant benefit on the general public by protecting its interest in having access to VUSD meetings, reaffirming procedural due process protections, exposing serious problems at RBV and protecting the rights of his fellow employees, the primary focus of his litigation was personal, that is his reinstatement and quest for compensatory damages. In this context, the Brown Act violation was simply incidental to his personal and pecuniary interests in the matter. To render apportionment moot, he must establish the cost of his victory transcended his personal interests such that the necessity for pursuing the lawsuit placed a burden on him out of proportion to his individual stake in the matter. However, he was statutorily entitled to attorney fees and costs arising from the Brown Act violation under section 54960.5. He had a financial incentive in bringing the lawsuit. His litigation goal was always to obtain reinstatement and compensatory damages. He accomplished that goal by being reinstated, having the discipline rescinded and later recovering more than $125,000 in settlement. Consequently, this is not a case where Bell has shown his expenses in bringing the suit are disproportionate to his personal stake in the outcome of litigation, but rather one where the enforcement of the public interest is merely incidental to the obtaining of personal goals. (See California Common Cause v. Duffy (1987) 200 Cal.App.3d 730, 750-751, 246 Cal.Rptr. 285.) 7

Finally, VUSD challenges the trial court's award of costs, asserting that approximately $4,200 of them are either explicitly or impliedly prohibited by Code of Civil Procedure section 1033.5 (i.e., photocopy, postage, telephone, facsimile and “attorney services” charges). Additionally, it challenges the costs incurred for depositions of persons unrelated to the Brown Act issue. Where a statute authorizes an award of fees and costs, but is silent as to which costs are to be awarded, Code of Civil Procedure section 1033.5 provides the courts with guidance as to those costs that may or may not be recovered in a civil action. (See Davis v. KGO-T.V., Inc. (1998) 17 Cal.4th 436, 441-445, 71 Cal.Rptr.2d 452, 950 P.2d 567; Page v. Something Weird Video (C.D.Cal.1996) 960 F.Supp. 1438, 1447.) Bell has not offered any reason nor can we perceive of one why that statutory guidance should not govern here under the circumstances. Accordingly, on remand, the trial court is directed to award only allowable costs after reasonable apportionment. (See e.g., Ladas v. Cal. State Auto. Assn. (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 761, 773-775, 23 Cal.Rptr.2d 810.) 8

DISPOSITION

The judgment is reversed as to the attorney fees and costs award and the matter is remanded to the trial court to recalculate the award following reasonable apportionment consistent with this opinion. In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed. Each party to bear their own costs on appeal.

San Diego Education Report

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In many cases, attorneys who are "experts in the Brown Act" are apparently hired by schools and cities to argue against the law rather than to advise public entities to follow the law. In the following cases, the California Court of Appeal and federal district court found the Brown Act experts to be wrong about the Brown Act.

Vista Unified violated Brown Act when it failed to give notice that it wanted to fire a coach

Attorney Robert Mahlowitz will present “Dragged Into Closed Session: The Ins and Outs of California’s Brown Act & Personnel Discussions” at the Fall Training Institute for the Association of Chief Human Resource Officers/Equal Employment Officers (ACHRO/EEO). The event will be held at Harrah’s Lake Tahoe October 24-26.

HR Professionals are often called upon to appear in closed session with their Boards to discuss personnel issues. Limited budgets may restrict access to legal counsel when HR Administrators have concerns about whether matters have been properly noticed, what notice has been provided to an employee and what to do when the employee wants a public airing of the discussion. Concerns also arise about potential personal liability for violation of the Brown Act. For 30 years, Stutz Artiano has served as legal counsel to community college and school districts in California and we will share insights to empower senior HR/EEO professionals for those times when the Brown Act invades.

--from Stutz web site

Invasion of the Brown Act? Stutz law firm advises you to call them when "the Brown Act invades":