CRS Annotated Constitution

Use of State
Courts in Enforcement of Federal Law.—Although the states–rights proponents in the
Convention and in the First Congress wished to leave to
the state courts the enforcement of federal law and rights
rather than to create inferior federal courts,1141
it was not long before they or their successors began to
argue that state courts could not be required to
adjudicate cases based on federal law. The practice in the
early years was to make the jurisdiction of federal courts
generally concurrent with that of state courts,1142
and early Congresses imposed positive duties on[p.796]state courts to enforce federal
laws.1143 Reaction set in out of hostility to the
Embargo Acts, the Fugitive Slave Law, and other
measures,1144 and in Prigg v.
Pennsylvania,1145 involving the Fugitive Slave
Law, the Court indicated that the States could not be
compelled to enforce federal law. After a long period,
however, Congress resumed its former practice,1146
which the Court sustained,1147 and it went even
further in the Federal Employers’ Liability Act by not
only giving state courts concurrent jurisdiction but also
by prohibiting the removal of cases begun in state courts
to the federal courts.1148

When Connecticut courts refused to enforce an FELA
claim on the ground that to do so was contrary to the
public policy of the State, the Court held on the basis of
the supremacy clause that when Congress enacts a law and
declares a national policy, that policy is as much
Connecticut’s and every other State’s as it is of the
collective United States.1149 The Court’s suggestion
that the Act could be enforced “as of right, in the courts
of the States when their jurisdiction, as prescribed by
local laws, is adequate to the occasion,”1150
leaving the impression that state practice might in some
instances preclude enforcement in state courts, was given
body when the Court upheld New York’s refusal to
adjudicate an FELA claim which fell in a class of cases in
which claims under state law would not be
entertained.1151 “[T]here is nothing in the
Act of Congress that purports to force a duty upon such
Courts as against an otherwise valid excuse.”1152
However, “[a]n excuse that[p.797]is
inconsistent with or violates federal law is not a valid
excuse. . . .”1153

In Testa v. Katt,1154 the Court unanimously
held that state courts, at least in regard to claims and
cases analogous to claims and cases enforceable in those
courts under state law, are as required to enforce penal
laws of the United States as they are to enforce remedial
laws. Respecting Rhode Island’s claim that one sovereign
cannot enforce the penal laws of another, Justice Black
observed that the assumption underlying this claim flew
“in the face of the fact that the States of the Union
constitute a nation” and the fact of the existence of the
supremacy clause.1155

State
Interference with Federal Jurisdiction.—It seems settled, though not without dissent, that
state courts have no power to enjoin proceedings1156
or effectuation of judgments1157 of the
federal courts, with the exception of cases in which a
state court has custody of property in proceedings in rem
or quasi in rem, where the state court has exclusive
jurisdiction to proceed and may enjoin parties from
further action in federal court.1158

Federal courts primarily interfere with state courts
in three ways: by enjoining proceedings in them, by
issuing writs of habeas corpus to set aside convictions
obtained in them, and by adjudicating cases removed from
them. With regard to all three but particularly with
regard to the first, there have been developed certain
rules plus a statutory limitation designed to minimize
needless conflict.

Comity.—“[T]he notion of ‘comity,”’ Justice Black asserted, is
composed of “a proper respect for state functions, a
recognition of the fact that the entire country is made up
of a Union of separate state governments, and a
continuance of the belief that the National Government
will fare best if the States and their institutions are
left free to perform their separate functions in their
separate ways. This, perhaps for lack of a better and
clearer way to describe it, is referred to by many as ‘Our
Federalism’. . . .”1159 Comity is a self–imposed rule
of judicial restraint whereby independent tribunals of
concurrent or coordinate jurisdiction act to moderate the
stresses of coexistence and to avoid collisions of
authority. It is not a rule of law but “one of practice,
convenience, and expediency”1160 which
persuades but does not command.

1155
Id., 389. See, for a discussion as well as an
extension of Testa, FERC v. Mississippi,
456 U.S. 742 (1982). Cases since
Testa requiring state court enforcement of federal
rights have generally concerned federal remedial laws.
E.g., Charles Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney,
368 U.S. 502 (1962); Sullivan v.
Little Hunting Park,
396 U.S. 229 (1969). The Court has
approved state court adjudication under
42 U.S.C.
Sec. 1983
, Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 3 n. 1 (1980),
but curiously in Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277,
283 n. 7 (1980) (emphasis by Court), it noted that it
has “never considered . . . the question whether a State
must entertain a claim under 1983.” See also Arkansas
Writers’ Project, inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221, 234 n.
7 (1987) (continuing to reserve question). But with
Felder v. Casey,
487 U.S. 131 (1988), and Howlett by
Howlett v. Rose,
496 U.S. 356 (1990), it seems
dubious that state courts could refuse. Enforcement is
not limited to federal statutory law; federal common law
must similarly be enforced. Free v. Brand,
369 U.S. 663 (1962).

1156
Donovan v. City of Dallas,
377 U.S. 408 (1964), and cases
cited. Justices Harlan, Clark, and Stewart dissented,
arguing that a State should have power to enjoin
vexatious, duplicative litigation which would have the
effect of thwarting a state–court judgment already
entered. See also Baltimore & Ohio R. Co. v.
Kepner,
314 U.S. 44, 56 (1941) (Justice
Frankfurter dissenting). In Riggs v. Johnson County, 6
Wall. (73 U.S.) 166 (1868), the general rule was
attributed to the complete independence of state and
federal courts in their spheres of action, but federal
courts, of course may under certain circumstances enjoin
actions in state courts.