~ Reading 2 Nephi 2

2 Nephi 2:25-27

25 Adam fell that men might be; and men are, that they might have joy.

26 And the Messiah cometh in the fulness of time, that he may redeem the children of men from the fall. And because that they are redeemed from the fall they have become free forever, knowing good from evil; to act for themselves and not to be acted upon, save it be by the punishment of the law at the great and last day, according to the commandments which God hath given.

27 Wherefore, men are free according to the flesh; and all things are given them which are expedient unto man. And they are free to choose liberty and eternal life, through the great Mediator of all men, or to choose captivity and death, according to the captivity and power of the devil; for he seeketh that all men might be miserable like unto himself.

Textual Variants

There are not any significant textual variants.

Textual Influence on Samuel the Lamanite

One particularly important textual influence may be in how Samuel the Lamanite employs Lehi’s words. Samuel says, “ye are free; ye are permitted to act for yourselves; for behold, God hath given unto you a knowledge and he hath made you free. He hath given unto you that ye might know good from evil, and he hath given unto you that ye might choose life or death; and ye can do good and be restored unto that which is good, or have that which is good restored unto you; or ye can do evil, and have that which is evil restored unto you” (Helaman 14:30–31, compare 2 Nephi 2:26-27).

Textual Influence on Alma 42

A pattern that has come up several times throughout our discussions is the relationship between Alma 42 and 2 Nephi 2. As I focused on 2 Nephi 2:25-27 one phrase that I was drawn to was the phrase “the punishment of the law” in verse 26. That is the only time this phrase appears in scripture. But the words “punish” and “law” appear together in fourteen verses in the Book of Mormon; the two chapters with the highest frequency are 2 Nephi 2 and Alma 42 (three each).

The connection between these chapters has started to make more sense for me, considering the topic that Alma explicitly states at the beginning of Alma 42: “And now, my son, I perceive there is somewhat more which doth worry your mind, which ye cannot understand—which is concerning the justice of God in the punishment of the sinner; for ye do try to suppose that it is injustice that the sinner should be consigned to a state of misery” (Alma 42:1).

So Alma turns to (among other sources – I’ve also written on his use of Abinadi) Lehi. I’m going to come back to verses 26-27, but first I want to come back to a discussion led by Sheila on 2 Nephi 2:10. In this verse we see the phrase, “Wherefore, the ends of the law which the Holy One hath given, unto the inflicting of the punishment which is affixed, which punishment that is affixed is in opposition to that of the happiness which is affixed, to answer the ends of the atonement.” Sheila points out the general difficulty of following the syntax and then provides a summary as follows: “The most basic point I can see here is that the law is tied to punishment, and the atonement is tied to happiness. It’s interesting that it doesn’t sound like an inherent relationship; rather, it’s something that’s been “affixed”—presumably by God?”

It is interesting that we don’t have any specification of who is affixing this punishment. Is it a law of nature, something out of the control of God, or something that he is in charge of? In Alma 42:16, 18 and 22 the same idea of “punishment” being “affixed” and interestingly, just like in 2 Nephi 2:10 the passive voice is used (no specific indication of who is affixing the punishment).

Regardless, the idea of punishment being affixed seems crucial to Alma’s line of reasoning with Corianton. In Alma 42:16-22 Alma ties the idea of punishment with law. Corianton struggles to understand how it is just for God to condemn (punish) the sinner. Alma says, “Look, a punishment has been affixed, and laws are in place.” This leads to the punch line tying back to 2 Nephi 2:26-27: There is a “punishment of the law” (2 Nephi 2:26) that is going to act on people. Again it’s interesting that it isn’t an individual (God) who acts on them, but another force, “the law” that does the acting (although Alma 42:26 intimates that it is God who is the controlling force).

This is a very long build up to what I think is an important punch line. Alma’s continual allusions to 2 Nephi 2 may be most connected to the basic premise of verses 26 and 27: “[Men] have become free forever, knowing good from evil; to act for themselves and not to be acted upon save it be by the punishment of the law at the great and last day…they are free to choose liberty and eternal life, through the great Mediator of all men, or to choose captivity and death, according to the captivity and power of the devil.”

In other words, “Corianton, you have been worried about the justice of God in condemning the sinner, but you have misunderstood. God does not condemn sinners. Men act for themselves, they are free. The law condemns sinners, but that is not God’s doing, that is up to the basic actions that each individual faces.” Ultimately man’s agency eliminates that argument that God is not just.

Other notes

The word “punish” and its variants occurs 35 times in the Book of Mormon. The chapters where its use is most concentrated are 2 Nephi 2 (4 times), Alma 30 (7 times) and Alma 42 (6 times). I think there are some potentially very interesting threads to connect regarding Rico’s post on Korihor’s critique of the Nephite theology. Hopefully this is something else we can continue to discuss in the comments below!

The phrase “fulness of times” (appearing twice in the Book of Mormon both times in 2 Nephi 2, although see also 2 Nephi 11:7) appears to refer (in the Book of Mormon) to the first coming of Christ. However, as the phrase is used in Ephesians and the D&C it seems to refer to the latter-days. This juxtaposition has made me wonder if the phrase in 2 Nephi 2 actually refers to the Second Coming. If so, what implications would this have?

<UPDATE: Rico pointed out that the Book of Mormon actually uses the phrase “Fulness of time” whereas Ephesians and the D&C use “Fulness of timeS.” Is this an important distinction? Why or why not?>

I am embarrassed that I have not written anything about 2 Nephi 2:25. I hope that my friends in the seminar will add to this glaring weakness and share some insights they have been holding back all seminar waiting for the discussion of this vital verse. If we were to continue in exploring connections between Alma 42 and 2 Nephi 2 the first 12 verses of Alma 42 could be seen as an expansion of this one short verse.

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18 thoughts on “2 Nephi 2:25-27”

This connection is great, in part because it’s not just theological (although it certainly is that) but also because of its literary quality. By this I mean that StL’s words reflect (in my opinion) the kind of thematic and literary constructions that occur when a reader has absorbed a prior text and is incorporating that text into their own linguistic expression. I’m not saying StL read Lehi’s exact words (their are various ways in which this expression can occur), but it is fascinating to imagine him doing so.

Let’s imagine: StL hypothetically has access to Lehi’s words. What would it mean for StL to have studied Lehi (as opposed to, say, Nephi)? One can well imagine that a Lamanite might be inherently skeptical of Nephi’s perspective, and thus turning Lehi for a conceivably more balanced approach.

The phrase in StL’s words “God hath given unto you a knowledge and he hath made you free” could be seen as a re-visioning of the Fall, one that sees transgression in terms of blessing/opportunity/opening rather than straight-cut sin. The transgression of the Fall would be the opening through which God gives a specific knowledge (the knowledge that corresponds to the experience of the transgression).

Is this (admittedly tenuous and creative) reading of StL reading the Fall through Lehi something that might be expected from a descendent culturally accustomed to a distinct narrative regarding the assignation of responsibility for familial fractures? (Joe has a great reading of the Lehite narrative in which the Nephite/Lamanite division is the Fall section of an overarching Creation-Fall-Atonement-Veil structure to 1-2 Nephi; I’m drawing on that a bit here thematically.) I can certainly see a son of Laman and Lemuel reading Fall experiences in terms of knowledge gained and ultimate trajectories toward God rather than in terms of specific instances of sin that result in death.

Re: Alma 42 connections

The case you make for these connections just continues to grow as the seminar continues John. This time around, the thematic emphasis on law and punishment that you develop caused me to pause and ask myself questions of framing. That is, in what kind of universe does Alma see himself and his sons, and how is this universe reflected theologically here?

Hypothesis A: Alma’s worldview is one in which things are both directed and structured by higher causes.

Hypothesis B: For Alma, said higher causes can be either divine (i.e., God) or natural (i.e., law).

Point B-1: In the case of the law, we have natural consequences and natural processes that ultimately lead to death. That is, while the consequences themselves may not be literally deadly, they ultimately fail to save men and women from themselves. Bodies deteriorate. Humans sin. “Good” consequences, however many they are, cannot reverse, overcome, or compensate for these gaps; in the end we are not complete, but rather de-composed.

Point B-2: In the case of God, it is important to recall Alma’s own personal experience of the atonement as an interruption of his sinning. To Alma, it is never a question of whether or not God personally intervenes or directs lives; his conversion experience is the quintessential example of God’s direct involvement in our lives.

Point B-3: Drawing on B-2, we then have the Atonement as a graceful, unmerited interruption of entropy.

Conclusion: The only way the Atonement can be an interruption is if it is interrupting some *thing*, something extant, something structurally prior. Hence, the necessary discussion of law and the affixed punishment: the artificial edifice of law and consequences is structurally necessary so that the Atonement as the graceful interruption of entropy both functions and fractures our lives.

Thanks for your thoughts. I really enjoy thinking hypothetically about the text and exploring different possibilities such as how Samuel might have read Lehi. I did some digging and it appears to me that Samuel is quite prolific in his allusions to the words of previous prophets not just Lehi (for examples, compare Mosiah 3:8/Helaman 14:12, 2 Nephi 26:3-10/Helaman 13:24-30, 2 Nephi 6:11/Helaman 15:12).

My point here is to explore the possibility that Samuel might not have been selectively quoting Lehi as his ancestor, but rather that Samuel has accepted the entire Nephite canon. Does it change things if Samuel is employing Lehi as but one of his witnesses? Perhaps to say, “I have not only referred to your previous prophets, but also our common ancestor.”

I think your point regarding Samuel’s phrase “God hath given unto you a knowledge and he hath made you free” is interesting. Know/knowledge and freedom appear together relatively rarely in the scriptures. Comparing Samuel’s words with Lehi’s (”
they have become free forever, knowing good from evil” (2 Nephi 2:26) provide an interesting relationship to think about. I’ll have to ponder this one more.

There is much to say on these final verses. Rather than breaking these up into different comments, I’m just going to post it and let the chips fall where they may. Apologies in advance. Joe may have the record for the longest post, I’ll set the record for the longest comment.

1) Regarding verse 25, in a previous comment, I attempted to populate all the “missing” or unstated opposites:

“And if ye shall say there is no law, ye shall also say there is no sin. And if ye shall say there is no sin, ye shall also say there is no righteousness [and no wickedness]. And if there be no righteousness [and no wickedness], there be no happiness [and misery]. And if there be no righteousness [or wickedness], nor happiness [and misery], there be [no reward and] no punishment nor [happiness nor] misery. And if these things are not, there is no God. And if there is no God, we are not, neither the earth—for there could have been no creation of things, neither to act, nor to be acted upon. Wherefore, all things must have vanished away.”

Here, we could do the same thing with verse 25:

Adam fell that men might be [and die], and men are that they might [know misery and] have joy.

Lehi is couching the phrase as if they telos of man is joy, but given everything Lehi has built theologically, this seems to be only one half of the equation. If it is only through opposites that things come into being, then the telos of man, according to Lehi, is just as much misery as it is joy. It sounds much more pleasant to “omit” misery from the purpose of existence, but this seems to follow given the house that Lehi has built.

2) Orson Pratt came up with an early interpretation of verse 25. Using Old and New Testament passages as a key, he read into the text a liminal space where Eve had already eaten the fruit but Adam had not yet done so. It was only in that window of time, Pratt argued, that the phrase “Adam fell that men might be” holds true. By way of illustration, Pratt’s interpretation would look something like this:

22a And now, behold, if Adam had not transgressed, he would not have fallen, but he would have remained in the garden of Eden, and all things which were created must have remained in the same state which they were after they were created, and they must have remained forever and had no end. 22b Eve was cast out of the Garden, separated from Adam, and became mortal. 23 And they would have had no children. Wherefore theyAdam would have remained in a state of innocence—having no joy, for theyhe knew no misery; doing no good, for theyhe knew no sin. 24 But behold, all things have been done in the wisdom of him who knoweth all things. 25 Adam fell in order to remain with Eve that men might be, and men are that they might have joy.

Pratt’s sought to solve the problem of making God the author of sin. The reason I mention this is because Pratt’s approach is an implicit agreement with the early critics that (without this liminal understanding) the text would make God the author of sin. Pratt’s approach was extremely influential, especially as it predated the development of the temple liturgy. However, his approach fell out of favor and was replaced by Widtsoe’s approach, which, among other things, seeks to remove the element of sin all together from the narrative (here is where a special distinction between sin and transgression is born, with transgression being offered as a non-sins). The reason I mention this is because these interpretive traditions are driven by an exegetical worry with sin (either by God or by man); they indicate an anxiety with the text requiring an alteration of the text by the reader. Looking at the text alone, Lehi seems to be making a strange argument that man must “oppose” God for man to have joy. What are we to make of that? Is this deliberate on Lehi’s part, or just an unintended consequence of his theology?

3) Samuel the Lamanite and knowledge. We discussed some of this in 2 Ne. 2:14-16.

God hath given unto you a knowledge and he hath made you free. (Helaman 14:30).

John, I appreciated your observations there that the knowledge spoken of by Samuel may refer to “knowledge of their redeemer” rather than a knowledge coming from the tree of the knowledge of good and evil.

Since our discussion, I’ve given more consideration to the way the term knowledge is used in the Book of Mormon and have noticed that the text uses specific phrases “knowledge of their Redeemer” and “knowledge of their God” and “knowledge of the Lord” and “knowledge of the truth.” Samuel uses this phrase three times in chapter 15 :

. . . that they may bring the remainder of their brethren to the knowledge of the truth; therefore there are many who do add to their numbers daily. . . And behold, ye do know of yourselves, for ye have witnessed it, that as many of them as are brought to the knowledge of the truth . . . the restoration of our brethren, the Lamanites, again to the knowledge of the truth. (Helman 15:6-7, 11)

So, it could be (as you said in our past discussion) that Samuel is actually contrasting the knowledge given to the Nephites with that given to the Lamanites and may be saying something more like the following:

30 And now remember, remember, my brethren, that whosoever perisheth, perisheth unto himself; and whosoever doeth iniquity, doeth it unto himself; for behold, ye are free; ye are permitted to act for yourselves; for behold, God hath given unto you [Nephites in contrast to the Lamanites] a knowledge [of God/the Lord/the truth] and he hath made you [Nephites] free.

31 He hath given unto you that ye might know good from evil, and he hath given unto you that ye might choose life or death; and ye can do good and be restored unto that which is good, or have that which is good restored unto you; or ye can do evil, and have that which is evil restored unto you.

Still (and I think I’ve gone back and forth on this one) given the context and close proximity to these other elements in verse 31, I’m thinking that perhaps he is essentially restating himself in verse 31. It doesn’t form a perfect chiastic structure but it is repetitive in nature:

for behold, ye are free; ye are permitted to act for yourselves; for behold, God hath given unto you a knowledge [of good and evil] and he hath made you free [to act for yourselves]. He hath given unto you that ye might know good from evil, and he hath given unto you [to act for yourselves] that ye might choose life or death.

If that is what Samuel is doing he may drawing upon Lehi:

and men are instructed sufficiently that they know good from evil; and the law is given unto men. . . . And because that they are redeemed from the fall, they have become free forever, knowing good from evil, to act for themselves and not to be acted upon. (2 Ne. 2:4-5, 26).

My only other observation is that I still think Samuel diverges from Lehi because in Lehi that knowledge never makes you free. The knowledge condemns you. I see Lehi to be saying that all men have knowledge so they cannot be blameless, and by the law no man is justified, so freedom doesn’t come in knowledge (in fact I’m not sure the Book of Mormon ever speaks of knowledge itself being the cause of freedom). Whereas Samuel’s condensed statement omits Lehi’s teaching that we are only free because we are redeemed from the fall by the Messiah, not because God gives us some kind of saving knowledge. Now, of course Samuel teaches that the Son of God comes to redeem (Helman 13:6; 14:2, 11-19). But maybe for Samuel from the perspective of the Lamanites its being brought to that knowledge that does make them free.

Yea, I say unto you, that the more part of them are doing this, and they are striving with unwearied diligence that they may bring the remainder of their brethren to the knowledge of the truth; therefore there are many who do add to their numbers daily. And behold, ye do know of yourselves, for ye have witnessed it, that as many of them as are brought to the knowledge of the truth, and to know of the wicked and abominable traditions of their fathers, and are led to believe the holy scriptures, yea, the prophecies of the holy prophets, which are written, which leadeth them to faith on the Lord, and unto repentance, which faith and repentance bringeth a change of heart unto them— Therefore, as many as have come to this, ye know of yourselves are firm and steadfast in the faith, and in the thing wherewith they have been made free. (Helaman 15:6-8).

Unfortunately, with the long sentence, I really can’t tell what “the thing” is. Skousen doesn’t say there is any textual variants here but it would make more sense if it read “and in the truth wherewith they have been made free” to connect with ideas in John 8:32. No where in the Book of Mormon is this phrase repeated, but just a thought.

4) Alma 41 and 42: Perhaps there is a movement to shift the one who punishes from God, to law, to man. It would seem at least these are the options.

Lehi: “And because of the intercession for all, all men come unto God; wherefore, they stand in the presence of him, to be judged of him according to the truth and holiness which is in him” (2 Ne. 2:10). There are numerous passages where individuals stand or are brought or come in the presence of God or before God or this bar to be judged by Him. These are all courtroom metaphors.

Alma: “And if their works are evil they shall be restored unto them for evil. Therefore, all things shall be restored to their proper order, every thing to its natural frame—mortality raised to immortality, corruption to incorruption—raised to endless happiness to inherit the kingdom of God, or to endless misery to inherit the kingdom of the devil, the one on one hand, the other on the other—These are they that are redeemed of the Lord; yea, these are they that are taken out, that are delivered from that endless night of darkness; and thus they stand or fall; for behold, they are their own judges, whether to do good or do evil.” (Alma 41:4, 7). Here we get an interesting twist that people are their own judges, or that there really isn’t a “judgment” at all. Rather there is a restoration and good is restored for good and evil restored for evil.

Samuel: “He hath given unto you that ye might know good from evil, and he hath given unto you that ye might choose life or death; and ye can do good and be restored unto that which is good, or have that which is good restored unto you; or ye can do evil, and have that which is evil restored unto you.” (Helaman 14:31). I think Samuel is following Alma here, rather than Lehi, who doesn’t use the language of restoration. But I don’t think these two expressions are mutually exclusive. At least, these thinkers seem to use both depending on the situation.

5) fulness of time vs. fulness of times. We discussed this issue back in 2 Ne. 2:3b-4. It seems to me that the usages are very distinct. The singular refers to the time Christ comes in the flesh (i.e. KJV Galatians 4:4; 2 Ne. 2:3, 26; 11:7). The plural form that appears in the KJV Ephesians 1:10, never appears in the Book of Mormon text (but does appear in the D&C and usually as part of the larger phrase “the dispensation of the fulness of times”). I agree with others that the atonement applies in every age and in all times, so in that sense it is a-historical, but I don’t want to read that concept into the specific phrase “fulness of time” which I think is very strongly pointing to a specific moment in salvation history. Other Bible translations of “fulness of time” in Galatians 4:4 include “But when the set time had fully come” and “But when the right time came” and “But when the appropriate time had come.” So, I have a difficult time reading this other than gesturing at that one special moment in time that is not repeated ever. It is a moment prophesied to come in the future, and one told that happened in the past. But again, that doesn’t mean I don’t agree the influence of God’s atonement applies to people in every age. If the text actually said “fulness of times” then we would get the following:

Verse 3: For thou hast beheld that in the dispensation of the fullness of times he cometh to bring salvation unto men.
Verse 26: And the Messiah cometh in the dispensation of the fullness of times that he might redeem the children of men from the fall.

It seems to me this would drastically change the meaning. It would disconnect these phrases from Abinadi’s statement: “I would that ye should understand that God himself shall come down among the children of men, and shall redeem his people.” (Mosiah 15:1, see also Mosiah 13:34; Mosiah 17:8). It would also disconnect these verses from the passages that speak of “the time of his coming.” (Alma 13:24, 26; 16:16; 39:16-17, 19; Helaman 14:3).

6) “punishment of the law at the great and last day.” This conforms with notions that this life is a probationary state. Lehi does not speak of punishment as occurring during the state of probation, rather the punishment comes only one time at the very end after man stands before God to be judged. Even though it may be the case that we are punished and rewarded constantly over the course of our lives, this does not appear to be the paradigm that Lehi uses. In addition, there seem to be only two options here. Judgment is binary. The judgment is either eternal death or eternal life. Notions of multiple heavens would not come into discourse until at least 1832.

Great comments here – thank you! It is interesting to see how rarely the words “know” or “knowledge” appear in conjunction with the word “free” (I think Lehi and Samuel are the only individuals who use them in the way we’ve been discussing). You shared your observation that with Lehi knowledge never makes you free. The knowledge condemns you. I think this is an interesting point to pursue.
Lehi says, “The Messiah cometh in the fulness of time, that he may redeem the children of men from the fall. And because that they are redeemed from the fall they have become free forever, knowing good from evil; to act for themselves and not to be acted upon, save it be by the punishment of the law at the great and last day, according to the commandments which God hath given” (2 Nephi 2:26).

Clearly being redeemed from the fall is what causes men to “become free forever.” But what do we make of the next phrase, “knowing good from evil”? How closely connected are these phrases? Could this be read as, “Because of the redemption, men have become free forever, essential parts of which is knowing good from evil and having the ability to act for themselves”? Or is it meant to be read, “Because of the redemption, men have become free forever. They also have knowledge and the ability to act, which things will condemn them at the last day if they choose poorly”?

Is Samuel diverging from Lehi when he says, “Whosoever perisheth, perisheth unto himself; and whosoever doeth iniquity, doeth it unto himself; for behold, ye are free; ye are permitted to act for yourselves; for behold, God hath given unto you a knowledge and he hath made you free” (Helaman 14:30).

Again, it is not clear how closely connected being “free” and having “knowledge” are. Do we interpret the last clause as saying, “God hath given unto you a knowledge and [as a result] he hath made you free” or “God hath given unto you a knowledge and [separate from this] he hath made you free [to act and make your own decisions].”

I wonder to what extent a person could truly be free without knowledge. Inherent in the ability to be free to make wise decisions is knowledge. A pedestrian example that is helping me think through this issue: I’ve struggled with a really bad cold for the past six weeks. I’ve take two different rounds of antibiotics and both times I recovered, only to immediately relapse. As I’ve tried to figure out what to do I’ve searched several websites, some of which encourage me to avoid antibiotics, others of which tell me to take more. I’m not a doctor and I don’t really know what the right course of action is. So while I’m free to choose to go to the doctor (and presumably get more antibiotics) or try to suffer through it on my own, I don’t know that I am “free” in the fullest sense of the word. I can make a choice, but not an informed choice, which in some senses limits my freedom.

A quick note on your Alma 41-42 comment. I this it’s difficult to pull apart who Samuel is referring to, and I wonder if he is intentionally weaving together the words of multiple individuals:

Lehi: “They have become free forever, knowing good from evil; to act for themselves and not to be acted upon, save it be by the punishment of the law at the great and last day” (2 Nephi 2:26).

Jacob: “Remember that ye are free to act for yourselves—to choose the way of everlasting death or the way of eternal life” (2 Nephi 10:23).

Alma: “And if their works are evil they shall be restored unto them for evil…they are their own judges, whether to do good or do evil.” (Alma 41:4, 7).

Samuel: “Ye are free; ye are permitted to act for yourselves…He hath given unto you that ye might know good from evil, and he hath given unto you that ye might choose life or death; and ye can do good and be restored unto that which is good, or have that which is good restored unto you; or ye can do evil, and have that which is evil restored unto you.” (Helaman 14:30-31).

I’m finally caught up on last week’s discussion, just in time to be late catching up on this week’s discussion. :)

First, my thanks for the post and subsequent discussion. There’s a lot here to learn from. I’ll confess, though, that I’m finding I have little to say in response to it all. I’m happy just to be listening in.

Consequently, I’ll add to the discussion, if I can, just by doing a bit of theological work on the text itself, ignoring all the complications of subsequent work on these ideas by Alma, Samuel, and others. I’ll also ignore much of what leads up to this point in 2 Nephi 2, since verse 26 marks a shift from Lehi’s long narrative of the Fall to his relatively short—but nonetheless remarkable—analysis of the atonement.

“and the Messiah cometh in the fulness of time” — A few things have already been said about how this should be interpreted, and I concur. We might, though, ask why Lehi makes a kind of return here to verse 3. Is there something in particular to be learned from that? Are verses 26-27 in a certain sense marking a transition back to the concrete setting (which will be front and center beginning in verse 28)? Does this return suggest that verses 14-25 are a kind of filling in of the background to what Jacob had already known or witnessed or beheld somehow—as if the second half of the sermon were meant only to clarify the stakes of what Jacob knew, so that he could understand it?

“that he may redeem the children of men from the fall” — The preceding dozen verses have outlined the Fall in great detail, and now we’re prepared to see what’s at stake in redemption from it. How significant is it that Lehi doesn’t talk about the Fall being reversed or overcome? How significant is it that the verb in question is “to redeem”? What should be read into the use of the phrase “the children of men” (when the preceding verses have almost exclusively focused on “man” and “men”—except, note, in verse 21)? What does it mean to be redeemed from the Fall? If we take the imagery in a relatively literal fashion, it’d seem to indicate that the Fall remains a real force, but that “the children of men” are no longer its slaves. What does that signify? And how significant is it that this blessing seems to be universal? That is, why should we pay attention to the fact that all human beings are redeemed here? The idea is, I take it, that the work of the redeeming Messiah here is the work of the resurrection specifically, the triumph over (temporal) death. Why is that the whole of Lehi’s focus again (as it was, note, in verse 8)?

“and because that they are redeemed from the fall they have become free forever” — Interpreters move way too quickly at this point, methinks. If what I’ve said about the preceding line isn’t amiss, then we might render this line as follows: “and because death has been conquered they have become free forever.” How is death what enslaves us? How is being brought out from under death’s sway a kind—apparently the most important kind—of freedom? And why the emphasis on “forever”? The resurrection definitively overturns death, but why talk about eternity here? However these details are worked out, it seems to me that the crux of Lehi’s theology of atonement is here in this line: the atonement is, so far as Lehi sees, entirely a question of the event of the resurrection, and it’s a matter of death’s enslaving power being removed so that human beings are finally free. Grace in its entirety might consist only in this: the removal of death’s enslaving power so that we can not-sin. Unless we’re inclined to some kind of penal-substitutionary model of atonement (for my own part, I’m not, and I don’t think scripture even remotely commits us to such a model), there’s no need for atonement to be anything more than this.

“knowing good from evil” — Here’s what remains of the fall, of having been under death’s sway, it seems to me. No longer under the enslaving power of death, but still cognizant of the distinction between good and evil, human beings have been redeemed from the Fall. What’s nice is that the freedom that has finally dawned is what makes it possible actually to do good; without the resurrection, we’d only know good from evil (but be unable to do anything but evil), but with the resurrection, we not only know good from evil but can do the former and avoid the latter—if we desire.

“to act for themselves and not to be acted upon” — I hear in “not to be acted upon” the idea of “not to be acted upon by death.” The Fall would seem to have been aimed at making for the possibility of acting and not being acted on—such is suggested, anyway, in verse 16—but it failed. Well, it succeeded and failed at once. It opened the real possibility of acting for ourselves by positioning us in a differential frame in which good and evil (and all the other non-ontological oppositions) mean something, but it foreclosed the practical possibility of acting for ourselves by leaving us under the enslaving power of death. But the Messiah’s triumph over death gives us the best of both worlds: we continue in the tension of opposition, but we do so free—if we desire—from death. (We can, of course, choose death, as verse 27 says, but it’s now something we choose and not something we can’t avoid.)

“save it be by the punishment of the law at the great and last day, according to the commandments which God hath given” — The only way that we’ll be acted upon at this point, it seems, is if we choose death, because the sinfulness that comes with choosing death reengages the disengaged law and so brings the acting-upon punishment back into the picture. But again, this is something that we choose, at this point.

That’s just an outline of what’s going on in verse 26. I think there’s a rather rich theology of atonement at work in it, one that complicates most of what we say about atonement in the Church. We’d do well to pay close attention to it, I think….

Love the questions here Joe. I’ve tried to engage some of them in my comment below in terms of why Lehi does not speak of the fall as being reversed, and also in our discussions on freedom. However, I’d like to briefly list some of my responses.

I think you are exactly right that we need to explore more about this notion of freedom. Like you, I want to say that the free in Lehi means free from the captivity of the devil (captivity in verse 27 corresponds well with the idea of free). I feel good about that interpretation except for or even despite the fact that Lehi never seems to use the word this way. I think one of the interpretive problems is that the sentence could be read one of two ways.

1) And the Messiah cometh in the fullness of time that he might redeem the children of men from the fall. And because that they are redeemed from the fall, they have become free1 forever (knowing good from evil) to act for themselves and not to be acted upon.

2) And the Messiah cometh in the fullness of time that he might redeem the children of men from the fall. And because that they are redeemed from the fall, they have become free2 forever [from death], knowing good from evil, [free1] to act for themselves and not to be acted upon.

If “free” is grammatically connected with the verb “to act” or “to choose” (as it is also in verse 27) then I don’t think the text is intended to mean free “from death.” I would rather read Lehi to say “free from death” and I think he wouldn’t disagree with this, but I question whether the grammar of the sentence allows this particular verse to mean this particular thing, regardless of whether it is a true statement (and I think it is) and regardless of whether Lehi would agree with it (and I think he would). I can’t find the specific phrase “free from death” or “free from hell” in the Book of Mormon text. Of course we have the “free according to the flesh” construction in verse 27, but that could simply be Lehi referring to “free to act” construction.

But clearly the concept is there in passages like 2 Ne. 9:10 “God, who prepareth a way for our escape from the grasp of this awful monster; yea, that monster, death and hell.” There is the notion of escaping or “being set free” from death and hell. So, yes I would agree with you but it seems there are legitimate textual reasons to read “free” to mean “permitted to act” rather than “free from death.” I know you are arguing that redemption here specifically refers to the resurrection, but the connection seems too tenuous for me.

I’ve discussed “knowing good and evil” below, and frankly there is much more to say about what this means in the Biblical texts than we have. But I agree with you that Lehi probably is using it to mean discern or distinguish one from the other. However, I still don’t quite understand why a person cannot do good if he or she does not resurrect. Why does that logically follow? Suppose Adam and Eve fell and God choose not to provide a resurrection. And suppose Adam runs into a burning building and saves his child from burning to death. Why isn’t that considered “doing good”? Why do we say that merely because Adam dies for good never to rise again that he cannot do good? What is the definition of good that is required for this logic to follow? All this means, according to Nephite theology, it that good will not be restored to that person after their death, but why is that act in mortality then uncolored by goodness because they cannot resurrect? Is this to say that unless Adam can resurrect, he would never desire to save a child in his condemned state?

I know for Lehi’s narrative to make sense he has to convince us that Adam and Eve could do no good in the Garden. But is that only because Adam and Eve could not die, or is it because they lacked the ability to distinguish between good and evil? But again, if the latter, then how can the opposing enticements have any real effect on Adam and Eve in the Garden? Lehi wants his audience to accept that God has provided opposing enticements that entice Adam and Eve one way other or the other, thereby allowing them to act for themselves, and that simultaneously Adam and Eve are unaware at a cognitive level of their being enticed one way or the other because they lack knowledge of good and evil. Right? If that is the case, then they really cannot act for themselves in the true sense that they are moral agents. I don’t understand how this logic can follow. Again, Lehi tries to disconnect these two phenomena: acting for oneself and knowing good from evil (for a particular reason as yet unidentified) but I don’t see how he can successfully do so (or why he wants to). Either they can act for themselves before they eat of the fruit or they cannot. If they can, the fruit is redundant, if they cannot, then they really cannot act for themselves, it is a mere semblance of agency but not true agency.

In terms of “not to be acted upon” to mean “acted upon by death” how then do we reconcile this interpretation with verses 13 and 14 that God created “both things to act and things to be acted upon”? Isn’t this the creation? Are you then saying that God created things to act death and things to be acted upon by death? I don’t see the symmetry. Why not say, instead, something like “not be acted upon by the law that incurs or affixes death“? In addition, I don’t understand what you mean by “the fall was aimed” without accepting the notion that the fall was intended by God and designed by him. Given Lehi’s theology, I’m inclined to agree Lehi sets things up as if to say God is intending the fall (another theological move), but if that is the case, I don’t understand what you mean by it “failed.”

First point: I don’t see a strong difference between the two readings of “free.” Why? Because I see “free to act for themselves and not to be acted upon” as being equivalent to “free from death.” The former is, I take it, a fuller way of explaining the latter. Because what acts upon us is death (in this sense we’re, according to verse 27, free to choose life!), to be free to act is to be free from death. So, at any rate, it seems to me.

Second point: I don’t mean to say that one can’t do good unless one resurrects, but that one can’t do good unless one is oriented to the resurrection—that is, unless one is dis-oriented from (her or his unique) death. So long as what one does is a way of serving death, even if what one does has positive effects or is beneficial, it still fails to be good, in my view. This is a very Pauline point: it isn’t the work itself that is either good or evil, but the orientation of the work, whether it responds to grace (the resurrection) or to self (death).

Third point: I think you’re reading Lehi right, but I’m not particularly mystified by the claims. I take Lehi’s point to be that God’s intention was eventually to set up the possibility of human beings acting for themselves, not immediately (that is, in the Garden) to set up that possibility. The way to do that had to unfold in several stages: Adam and Eve had to be inserted into a differential framework (the two trees seem to accomplish this); they then had to come to recognize that differential framework (eating the fruit seems to accomplish this); they then had to be freed from the overwhelming influence of what guarantees that differential framework (namely, from death, and this is accomplished by the resurrection). Only with the fall behind them and the resurrection ahead of them, on my reading, do human beings become free to act for themselves and not to be acted upon. Hence, the fall failed only in the sense that it didn’t alone set up the possibility of acting for oneself. I don’t mean to suggest that God failed, though—only that the fall doesn’t get things all the way. I assume God knew that and planned on the resurrection business from the beginning.

1) Which death do you have in mind? I think what complicates this discussion for me is that the Nephites have a bifurcated notion of death: the first death (temporal death) and the second death (spiritual death). So, when you say “free from death” which one do you mean? I can’t understand this to mean free from the first death since it is appointed unto men to die. All must die and all must resurrect and the choices of man play zero role as to whether man will resurrect. That leaves us with the second death, that man is free (not from the first death) but from the second death. Is this what you mean?

2) Same question as before. Here again, all men are already oriented towards the resurrection, are they not? This has nothing to do with their choices in this life, but this is the result of Christ raising from the dead. As a result, I’m not sure what sense it makes to say that a person responds to the resurrection. Even if the wicked wish not to be resurrected and wish to “become extinct both soul and body” and wish not be “brought to stand in the presence of God, to be judged” they must resurrect. I sense you may be saying something different, but I’m just trying to wrestle out some clarity.

3) But my question is why all these steps? Why does Lehi (or the text, or the Book of Mormon) feel he needs to improve upon the Genesis narrative by including these additional steps, which do not seem, at least on my reading, to serve any significant function. They don’t seem to resolve any particular theological concern. In other words, if we liken Lehi’s overall argument to a machine, it seems to have more parts than needed, and it isn’t clear how his innovations improve the task. What does it add to the narrative?

Normally, we can look to how later Nephi interpreters take up these ideas and repeat or elaborate them for clues, but we look in vain for anyone else in the text to repeat these steps. Might that tell us something? One might argue that its possible other Nephites simply didn’t have Lehi’s discourse, but we know from our discussions that other Nephites are borrowing heavily from Lehi’s discourse. So that line of argument doesn’t hold up. What meaning should we take from the fact that despite borrowing Lehi’s ideas and language, they seem to throw out these steps? Is it that they disagree, don’t understand, don’t see the need?

Well, my complete inability to communicate this clearly may make perfectly obvious that there’s a good deal of theological work on the Book of Mormon presupposed in everything I’m saying. Rather than answering your questions directly, then, let me spell out my reading of Book of Mormon atonement theology a bit and see if that clarifies things. (And I might note that at least one subsequent Nephite sermon seems to have picked up on these sorts of ideas: Alma 12. It’s not Lehi alone who works through this sort of series of steps. Not at all.)

A number of passages in the Book of Mormon make clear that, while there is a certain sort of distinction between Christ’s resurrection and Christ’s atonement, they can’t be uncoupled from one another. This is made clearest, I think, in the fact that the Nephites never distinguish between two redeeming events: there is one redeeming event, namely, the rising of Christ from the grave. What we usually think of as just the event of the resurrection is what the Nephites consider to be the one event of redemption—with effects both temporal and spiritual. If we’re to get anywhere in making sense of the Nephite theology of atonement—what few constants there may be in it over the course of its development in Nephite history—we’ve got to begin by asking, theologically, what could be meant by claiming that spiritual redemption is effected in some way by Christ’s resurrection.

This is confirmed by the much more readily acknowledge fact that, in the Book of Mormon (as in our common discourse), there’s an inextricable entanglement between sin and death. We say that death entered the world through the eating of the fruit in Eden, and we also say that sin had its beginning in the same event. The Nephites are clear on this point as well. Most radically, we have Jacob in 2 Nephi 9 saying that death is the very anchor of sin, since we’d remain in utter sinfulness without the resurrection being a reality. Here again, if we’re to get anywhere with the Nephite theology of atonement, we’re going to have to think carefully about how death—mere temporal death—has effects both temporal and spiritual, about how sin is somehow a function of death.

How to make sense of this? I think we ought to recognize that sin is a certain sort of relationship to one’s death. That, I think, is implied in—and has theologically to be riddled out of—the Nephite conception of things. Mortality, our death-bound-ness, gets us sinning. Our flesh ends up with a certain sort of evil in it—not because that’s just the nature of flesh per se, but because flesh ends up subject to death, ends up oriented to death. Inasmuch as our entire horizon is bounded by death, we give ourselves to sin. (Why? That’s a complicated philosophical and theological story that would require me to start providing bibliographies, etc. For the moment, just work with me.) And it seems that, so long as we remain under the sway of death, we can’t get out from under sin. We’re trapped in sin due to our being trapped in mortality. We might say it radically: we can’t do good so long as we’re irrevocably mortal.

But then there’s the resurrection. Christ effects the (future) resurrection through His own (past) resurrection. That trumps death and frees us all from the power of sin. It becomes possible to do good. That is, we’re finally free according to the flesh, to act and not to be acted upon. The reality of the resurrection—but only on the horizon—is such that we can do otherwise than sin. The root of sin has been pulled out, and we’re free to do otherwise than wallow in self-pity.

But there’s a twist. The resurrection isn’t yet. Indeed, all we have is a preached word, claiming that Christ rose from the dead, and that that past event says something about a future redemption from death. We, as hearers of the word, are caught between the reality of death, which we can see working in us in all sorts of ways, and the word of the resurrection, which we can’t see at all. We have no evidence that Christ really rose from the dead, and we just have to take the word of Christ’s messengers on faith. We’re free of sin-bound mortality, but we can’t know that we’re free. To be faithful is to act as if our death-bound-ness has been trumped. To be faithful is to trust that we can do otherwise than we’ve always done. We’ll still have no evidence, but we’ll have to work in faith.

At this point, then, we have a kind of fundamental choice. We can decide that the resurrection talk is sheer nonsense, and we can remain oriented to death. We can do so consciously and explicitly, but we can also do so implicitly and unconsciously. We can say a whole lot about how we believe in Christ and trust that the resurrection took place, etc., while nonetheless obsessing over ourselves and doing nothing but sin. Or we can decide that the resurrection talk is the truth of truths, and we can become oriented to the resurrection. This, too, I think, can be either explicit and conscious or implicit and unconscious, but I’ll leave that complicating point aside for the moment. If we give ourselves to the truth of the preached word, we become oriented to the resurrection, and we begin to act in a non-sinful way. We’re freed from sin and death, and we begin to do whatever work God would have us do. The flesh itself is transformed—though indiscernibly—and we’re free according to it, no longer acted upon by death. We act. And perhaps for the first time.

That’s the picture I’m working with, and it’s one I’ve worked up over years of theological study of the Book of Mormon. I think it’s the best way to make sense of the whole book, when it comes to the “plan of salvation.” And it’s what I see working all the way through 2 Nephi 2.

Now, you ask why these “additional steps” are helpful. I’m not entirely sure what you mean. I don’t see there being anything here that’s so much in addition to the Genesis story, nor do I see how any of this isn’t absolutely crucial. So that’ll have to be clarified for me. But hopefully this clarifies what I’m after….

Great questions John. I should probably correct myself and point out that Lehi doesn’t explicitly state that knowledge of the law condemns. I inferred that based on his view of the law. Certainly the law does; it is certainly not a salvific law that Lehi has in mind. But I don’t want to make too much of that because I don’t think Lehi is focused on knowledge. I will have to explain what I mean by that in a later comment. But let me see if I can’t answer the rest of your questions.

All, this is a comment I’ve had in draft for a week or so, so it might look like I’m ignoring some of the discussion that occurred after I wrote it, but I’m just trying to kick out these ideas with the little time we have left, and trying not to worry about how they fit into our larger discussion.

One question that keeps coming to me is why Lehi (or the text) chooses to utilize the Genesis account in the manner he does. Why does he choose to highlight certain portions, omit certain portions, or add his own ideas to the narrative?

So, I’d like to examine the development of the Genesis account up until Lehi and then see how Lehi modifies the narrative and more importantly inquire why he does this.

The basic dialectic in the pre-J tradition is the connection of life and knowledge, although for J this element becomes less important. The concern of this pre-J story is “why is man so like the gods in that he has knowledge and yet so unlike the gods in that he is mortal?” -a common motif in the ancient Near East. “Knowledge” is what gods and men share and what distinguishes men from animals. (266).

Clark takes the position that the phrase “good and evil” was not original to the story but introduced by the J tradition for a particular reason. “To know good and evil,” Clark argues should not be understood as a case of merismus where “good and evil” means everything or indicates omniscience (as in saying “we searched high and low” to mean “everywhere”). Rather, Clark argues, “good and evil” refers to a legal judgment or the position to declare what is good and what is bad:

Judgment in the OT is ultimately a matter for God. Man exercises judgment only as the agent of God and to distort this judgment means that one is held responsible before God. . . . Applied to Gen 2 f., I think this investigation strengthens the position of those who say that the J emphasis is not on the content of knowledge but on man’s moral autonomy. Man takes upon himself the responsibility of trying apart from God to determine whether something is good for himself or not. It is not that man has no knowledge before and gains knowledge, or that to know good and evil means to experience evil in addition to good. Rather, man himself declares what is good. He does what is good in his own eyes rather than what is good in the eyes of God. . . .If the trees of life and knowledge are central in the pre-J narrative, the “tree of command” is central for J.

. . . Unlike Laban, Adam did not accept the decision from God as sufficient reason to preclude him from making a contrary decision. Man would determine himself what was good and what was not—a divine prerogative. Thus, like Solomon and David, in regard to knowing good and evil Adam became like God (vs. 22), with the difference that he had seized this likeness whereas it was given to Solomon. (277-78).

I want to explore whether this might assist in reading Lehi. If we can follow the development of the Garden narrative from pre-J, to J, to Lehi, it could highlight Lehi’s meaning. I’m still trying to work through how Lehi’s discourse compares to these narratives, so please jump in, but my tentative observations are as follows:

1) Like J, Lehi is not so much focused “on the content of knowledge but on man’s moral autonomy.” Lehi eliminates all together reference to the name of the tree of knowledge of good and evil, preferring instead to use the term “forbidden fruit” and thereby highlighting the “tree of command.” The focus is not on knowledge but the fact that the fruit was forbidden by God.

2) Unlike J, Lehi reads into the Garden narrative an ontological framework requiring an opposition in all things for man to act for himself (using a different method from J to focus on a concern of man’s moral autonomy that both Lehi and J seem to share). Lehi describes creation of things to act and to be acted upon (a distinction not found in the Genesis account). In order to set up an oppositional element in the Garden he imputes evil to the serpent (a point not made in Genesis) and associates the serpent with an angel that fell from heaven because he sought that which was evil (borrowing Isaiah 14:2-15). This sets up an opposition element in the Garden allowing for man to act for himself.

However, to act for oneself seems to be a distinct idea from gaining knowledge of good and evil and becoming as God. For Lehi, the opposing enticements in the Garden is all that is necessary to say that man can act for himself, so what does knowing good and evil mean for Lehi? I’m struck that Adam and Eve can act for themselves well before they partake of the fruit. We can contrast this with the J story where knowing good and evil is the moment where man becomes morally autonomous in that man takes it upon himself to declare what is good or bad. Unlike J, Lehi doesn’t seem to take “good and evil” to mean a legal judgment or declaration, and therefore does not seem associate good and evil with man making his own moral judgments.

So what does Lehi mean by “good and evil”? He discusses good and evil in three passages: v5 “men are instructed sufficiently that they know good from evil“; v18 “Partake of the forbidden fruit, and ye shall not die, but ye shall be as God, knowing good and evil.”; v26 “And because that they are redeemed from the fall, they have become free forever, knowing good from evil.” This seems to be significant.

Bracketing for a moment any discussion of possible underlying Hebrew (only focusing on English), notice how Lehi changes the phrase from “good andevil” to “good fromevil.” It is significant that this construction that does not appear in the KJV Bible (leaving only the serpent’s language unmodified). Lehi (or the text) seems to be using the phrase to mean “discern good fromevil” and by extension to be able to discern between misery and happiness. The Book of Mormon is idiosyncratic in its usage of this phrase. (Abinadi even inverts this phrase to “knowing evil from good, subjecting themselves to the devil.” cf. Mosiah 16:3).

2) Perhaps most radically, Lehi envisions the Garden of Eden much different from J. I’m drawing upon Gary Anderson, “Celibacy or Consummation in the Garden? Reflections on Early Jewish and Christian Interpretations of the Garden of Eden,” The Harvard Theological Review 82, no. 2 (April 1989): 121-148. In Genesis, the garden represents fertility. God commands Adam and Eve to multiply and replenish. Adam searches for a mate and rejoices when he finally has Eve brought to him (see Gary Anderson’s discussion of zo’t happa’am, 125-127). Presumably Adam and Eve experience joy in eating and drinking in the Garden. Eve, upon looking at the forbidden fruit, notes that it is pleasurable. There still seems to be joy in the Garden. The root ‘d-n, as argued by Anderson, is related to sexual joy (137). Even the punishment directed towards Eve after the fall is not that childbirth will be a brand new experience, but that God will multiply her pain in childbirth (and she can’t avoid that pain by avoiding her husband she will desire her husband). Lehi seems to reject all of that for reasons that continue to remain a mystery.

For Lehi, the Garden is not a place where Adam and Eve can have joy, requiring man to transgress the commandments to experience joy (an unprecedented and theologically bewildering move that I might point out has absolutely no logical relationship to the felix culpa tradition). By transgressing the commandments and partaking the forbidden fruit Adam is cut off temporally and spiritually and therefore requires a redemption. This too, is not found in Genesis.

Lehi seems to say that two things happened as a result of partaking the forbidden fruit: 1) they became as God being able to discern good from evil (but they could act for themselves before this) and 2) they were cut off and lost. One could conceive the redemption as reversing both 1 and 2. That is, through the redemption Adam and Eve 1) become innocent again and 2) are brought back into the presence of God. Lehi wants to make it clear that the redemption only affects 2, not 1. In other words, they retain their ability to discern good from evil. The purpose of redemption is not to restore everything to how it was in the Garden (because the Garden is not ideal for Lehi), but only to free man from death and hell. For this reason I view Lehi to be saying:

And because that they are redeemed from the fall, they have become free forever (knowing good from evil) to act for themselves and not to be acted upon—save it be by the punishment of the law at the great and last day, according to the commandments which God hath given.

But what I see happening in the Nephite tradition is that knowing good and evil gets conflated or equated with being free to choose (even though Lehi deliberate disconnects these two things).

We know Lehi is drawing upon the Garden story but I’m intrigued by the portions that Lehi omits. Lehi tells us what the serpent said to Eve but doesn’t tell us what happened afterwards. Lehi never refers to Genesis 3:7, 22. For example, we don’t get the following:

[W]herefore, [the serpent] said: “Partake of the forbidden fruit, and ye shall not die, but ye shall be as God, knowing good and evil.” And after Adam and Eve had partaken of the forbidden fruit, [missing: their eyes were opened (Genesis 3:7) and they became like the Gods knowing good and evil (Genesis 3:22) and] they were driven out from the garden of Eden to till the earth.

In the Genesis account, God doesn’t give Adam and Eve knowledge of good and evil. Adam and Eve seize this knowledge for themselves. I think that’s an integral part of the Genesis account. For this reason I view references to God giving knowledge of good and evil to be a divergence from the Genesis account.

The Book of Mormon, does however, speak of God giving knowledge of the plan of redemption or knowledge of the truth. He sends angels and prophets, etc (as articulated in Alma 12:28-30). Perhaps that is why I like to think that Samuel means knowledge of the truth (but again maybe he isn’t saying that at all, maybe this is just a divergence).

But what if we looked at Lehi’s omissions as important? Suppose that Lehi omits Genesis 3:7 and 22 deliberately in order to craft a new kind of narrative. God is the one who creates the situation where man can act for himself. As Lehi states: “Wherefore, the Lord God gave unto man that he should act for himself. Wherefore, man could not act for himself save it should be that he were enticed by the one or the other.” (2 Ne. 2:16). Is Lehi disagreeing with J in some way here?

Incidentally, this is another reason why I don’t see Lehi to be teaching that knowledge makes one free. Adam and Eve were free to act for themselves the moment they “were enticed by the one or the other” and knowledge is not required. Lehi is saying that they could act for themselves before they ate the forbidden fruit and before they had a knowledge of good and evil. In a strange way, Lehi separates “act for himself” from “know good and evil.” But again, for what reason? Why is Lehi not satisfied with the J account?

Now, this leads to a situation where “if Adam had not transgressed, he would not have fallen, but he would have remained in the garden of Eden, and all things which were created must have remained in the same state which they were after they were created” but Adam and Eve would still be free to act for themselves in the Garden (but apparently those actions could not be considered good or evil).

But this is not the only way to read the narrative. I would like to point out that each day that Adam and Eve are not eating the forbidden fruit they are being obedient to the commandment not to eat the forbidden fruit! (So we have righteousness, not to mention reaping the reward of immortal life each day they abstain from the forbidden fruit). We have opposition in the Garden and we have law in the Garden and Adam and Eve can act for themselves in the Garden. By Lehi’s own definition the Garden is not “one body” but “a compound in one.” We have every ingredient Lehi claims we need, and yet Lehi still argues that a violation of God’s commandment is necessary or else there is no joy in the Garden.

Finally, we could understand the word free in a variety of different ways. Here are two: 1) free as in permitted or allowed (Helaman 14:30 “ye are permitted to act for yourselves”; “free to choose” 2 Ne. 2:27; “free to act” 10:23; ) or 2) free as in released or delivered from death, hell, captivity of the devil. (2 Ne. 9: 7-12). I think you are right Joe that we need to think more about what free means.

To reiterate, it would seem to me that in the Genesis account man already acts for himself in that he is created in the image of God (being in the image of God plays no role in Lehi, although other Nephites use it). The Genesis text assumes that man acts for himself. The Genesis account, it seems to me, does not require this elaborate system of external structures to bring out the situations where man could act for himself. But in either of these two scenarios, I don’t see a causal nexus between knowledge and freedom.

But all this leads to my largest question. Accepting that Lehi is playing the role of patriarch-philosopher, grafting into the Genesis account a philosophical system of ontological, ethical and existential opposites, why does he do this? What about the traditional Genesis account is he not satisfied with? What theological or exegetical worries is Lehi trying to solve by his narrative? And isn’t it curious that Lehi’s more metaphysical emendations don’t seem to ever get repeated by anyone else in the Nephite tradition, only a severely reductionist version (or inaccurate version) of Lehi’s ontology survives, if it survives at all. Does this mean none of the other Nephites could understand Lehi either, or were not sure what to make of him?

Lastly, I know there is a lot to disagree with here, and the text is a maze of a thousand passages and all that, so I know one temptation is to escape into agnosticism as to what the text could ever mean, and how we could ever know it, etc., but I still think it is worth to ask these questions, despite the difficulties.

Rico, great work. I love how you are helping me worm deeper into the text. I especially appreciate your concluding comment, “I know one temptation is to escape into agnosticism as to what the text could ever mean, and how we could ever know it, etc.,” Truly it is head-spinning to think of the various possibilities and I have to admit, I have been tempted to say, “Well, it’s anybody’s guess!”

For me, part of the temptation to become agnostic about the meaning of the text is that we are forced to make so many assumptions. For example, you ask why Lehi “chooses to utilize the Genesis account in the manner he does. Why does he choose to highlight certain portions, omit certain portions, or add his own ideas to the narrative?”

This is a great question, but it also assumes that Lehi is intentionally omitting certain portions of the text because he doesn’t agree with them or wants to rework them in some fashion. I am not sure that “Lehi is playing the role of patriarch-philosopher, grafting into the Genesis account a philosophical system of ontological, ethical and existential opposites.”

A person today could conceivably give a talk focusing on selected verses from 2 Nephi 2, without any intention of minimizing the rest of the chapter. But then, 2000+ years later, others could be analyzing that talk and asking, “Why did Elder Smith avoid certain sections of 2 Nephi 2? Why did he omit a focus on verses 27-28?” when in reality, Elder Smith just had limited time, or a different focus at that time, with no intention of minimizing any portion of the text.

All of this is to say that we have to be cautious (and I know that you are) about imputing motives to Lehi because we have so little to go on.

Notwithstanding the difficulty, I understand that we need to keep on digging. So with that caveat aside, I’d like to pursue a little bit more the idea that “Lehi is not so much focused “on the content of knowledge but on man’s moral autonomy.” Regarding some of your statements:

-I think your point about the “forbidden fruit” vs “tree of knowledge” is significant. Likewise the point regarding opposition.

-Your point about knowing good from evil before the fall is interesting. I think I understand your line of logic; at the same time we have Eve’s statement that “Were it not for our transgression we …never should have known good and evil” (Moses 5:11). Is Lehi saying something different from Eve, or are these two ways of looking at the same issue? Or do they mean different things by the phrase “knowing good and evil”?

-I did a little searching on the phrase “good from evil.” Doing a Google Book search between 1600-1800 yields hundreds of results for the phrase “good from evil” (there are also a few dozen “evil from good.”) This makes me wonder how much we can depend on the usage being significant, although your point that the phrase appears throughout the Book of Mormon is also important. It could be argued that its occurrence in Moses 6:56 could make it a derivative of brass plate text.

-In addition to your comment that “Lehi seems to say that two things happened as a result of partaking the forbidden fruit” I would add a third. It seems to me that the result of partaking of the fruit that Lehi most emphasizes concerns posterity. Lehi states, “they have brought forth children; yea, even the family of all the earth,” “If Adam had not transgressed he would not have fallen, but he would have remained in the garden of Eden. And all things which were created must have remained in the same state in which they were after they were created; and they must have remained forever, and had no end. And they would have had no children,” and “Adam fell that men might be.”
Now I don’t know that Lehi is intentionally focusing on the connection between the fall and posterity, if is he is, this seems to follow the account in Genesis (“in sorrow thou shalt bring forth children,” and “Adam called his wife’s name Eve; because she was the mother of all living.” It would represent an even stronger connection with the account in Moses: “Were it not for our transgression we never should have had seed.”

-I like how you provide some definitions of free. Here are some others, although likely not as germane to the present conversation. Free as in “not in slavery” (1 Nephi 4:33, 2 Nephi 10:16), free as in “without cost” (2 Nephi 26:33), free as in “without compulsion” (Mosiah 22:10), free as in generously (Jacob 2:17, Mosiah 22:10), and free as in “open” (Alma 23:2) (and there are still other ways the word is used).

Interestingly, the two definitions of free that you described only appear in the Book of Mormon (double check me on this) in 2 Nephi 2, 2 Nephi 9-10, Mosiah 5 (?), Mosiah 18, Mosiah 23 (?), Alma 30 (?), Alma 58, 61 (?), Helaman 14-15. Curiously Alma 42, which has been shown to be parallel to 2 Nephi 2 in so many ways uses the word free only in passing, and it has the meaning of “without cost” or “generously.” I do agree that a deeper study on the word free could be in order.

Rico, I know I have hardly begun to respond to your comment and I apologize for stopping short. I hope this is enough to keep the conversation going amongst all of us in the group, because I would love for it to continue.

Fantastic stuff here, Rico, and helpful responses, John. Thanks to you both. I don’t have much to say in response except thank you, and thank you especially, Rico, for pointing out how it’s particularly this ontological business of verse 11 that doesn’t seem ever to have been picked up by the Nephite tradition. That’s crucial, and it may give me a starting place for my paper….

1) I think we are always making assumptions with the text. As you point out, we cannot help but do so. My aim is to examine our assumptions (or hypotheses) and explore whether those assumptions have merit. Ultimately, some questions may yield very little fruit, but others could be significant. It’s hard to know what a question will yield before asking it. Your suggestion to be cautious when interpreting narrative omissions, gaps, and silence, is very well taken. The approach of considering omissions as a narrative device is an important tool of textual interpretation. Recently, Hardy utilizes this tool (very cautiously!), and cites Meir Sternberg’s The Poetics of Biblical Narrative. Sternberg discusses the importance of the Narrator’s Reticence and Omissions. If we assume that omissions are unintentional and the result of lack of time or space, we may miss out on important insights. It think the time is ripe to consider omissions in the Book of Mormon to interpret the narrative. We may decide that some omissions are not deliberate, but again, I think it would be important to explore this issue.

2) On the one hand, there are good reasons to keep the Book of Moses and the Book of Mormon distinct and separate in terms of narrative. In other words, it may be better to view the Book of Mormon text as a closed system. Lehi may have his own logic in crafting his particular narrative that has a much different emphasis and goal than the author of the Book of Moses. In other words, the Book of Moses may have its own internal logic and narrative goals. By taking the Book of Moses as an extension of the narrative in Lehi, we risk overlooking the possibility that the texts contain their own distinct narrative logic. We may unintentionally harmonize these two accounts. On the other hand, there are good reasons to look to the Book of Moses when seeking to interpret Lehi. Both texts came through Joseph Smith, and the texts are close in time (as well as D&C 29) compared to other texts. As a result, there is less possibility for radical doctrinal development in the interim. I sense that looking at these texts together will tell us something different than looking at the text in Lehi on its own without reference to the Book of Moses. And as we discussed earlier, others have posited that the Book of Moses represents an earlier source and that Lehi’s account may be derivative. In terms of actual production, it is the Book of Moses comes after the Book of Mormon, and I don’t see strong evidence in Lehi’s account t that Lehi possessed what Joseph Smith produced as the Book of Moses. As I mentioned in a previous comment, the Book of Moses contains doctrinal markers that if possessed by Lehi, would mean we should get a much different teaching.

3) I would like to know more about the context of your search for the phrase “good and evil.” My own searches show that the phrase “good from evil” occur very frequently in the context of the larger phrase “distinguishing good from evil” or “discern good from evil” in addition to “know good from evil.” So to recap, here is what we have: The KJV Bible never uses the English construction “know good from evil” but it does use the construction “good and evil.” It would seem that 17th to 19th century English texts often use the construction “distinguishgood fromevil” or “discerngood fromevil” and “know good fromevil.” The Book of Mormon uses both constructions “good and evil” and “good from evil.” Based on this alone, what does this tell us, if anything?

Any any rate, Clark’s reading of Genesis is probably considered novel in that the tradition preceding him tends to view knowledge of good and evil as discernment or the ability to distinguish, or judge between good and evil or judge good from evil, rather than the ability for man to declare, in his own eyes, what is good and what is evil, an element that Clark would argue makes the narrative work, and functions as the very thing that makes Adam and Eve like the God who declares to man what is good and what is evil.

The view incorporated in the Book of Mormon and even in the Book of Moses seems to be that of the ability to distinguish, discern, or judge. “I can judge between thee and God . . . wherefore I can judge between him and thee.” (Moses 1:15, 18). Clark notes that in the Old Testament, judgment is always a matter for God and man may judge good and evil only as an agent of God, but never independent of God. This seems to hold true in the Book of Mormon. Man may be free to choose, but man is never free to judge what is good and what is evil independent or apart from God. This is seen very clearly in Mormon’s words: “For behold, my brethren, it is given unto you to judge, that ye may know good from evil. . . For behold, the Spirit of Christ is given to every man, that he may know good from evil; wherefore, I show unto you the way to judge. . . ye should search diligently in the light of Christ that ye may know good from evil.” (Moroni 7:15-16, 19). This “know” clearly means “discern.” But again, Mormon’s language seems to diverge from Lehi, or he seems to be disconnected from Lehi’s teachings. Isn’t the ability to discern between good and evil a result of the fall (“men are sufficiently instructed”)? If this is the result of the fall, why does man then need the Spirit of Christ as a substitute for the knowledge of good and evil? Isn’t this just redundant? Or is Mormon now retroactively reading the Spirit of Christ into the fall narrative? This is why I don’t think we can have a consistent theology of the Book of Mormon. The Book of Mormon seems to contain distinct and separate theologies. Both Lehi and Mormon might agree that God creates conditions so man can judge, but they do not get there in the same manner.

As a result, it may be that Clark would be more useful in interpreting Genesis, but less useful in interpreting Lehi because Lehi seems to be following a 19th century interpretation of Genesis. Or in other words, it may be doubtful that Lehi interprets “good and evil” in the way Clark suggests was the intent of J.

4) Whether Adam and Eve together in the Garden in their prelapsarian state could have had children or not is still an unresolved tension. And either way we decide we have serious theological problems. Orson Pratt, for example, argues that Adam and Eve were able to have children in the Garden because God gave the commandment to Adam and Eve before the fall and not after the fall. Pratt rejected any notion that God would command Adam and Eve to do something that they were incapable of doing. He certainly rejects any notion that God would give conflicting commandments or that he would require man to break one commandment to obey another. The reason I cite Orson Pratt’s view is not that I consider it authoritative and not even because I think it is the best reading of the text, but rather because he articulates well and explains the essential problem. This is why Pratt argues that Adam and Eve would not be able to have children due to being separated in proximity (Eve being cast out for eating the fruit and Adam remaining in the Garden). Otherwise, we are left with the ethical problem of God providing conflicting commandments to his children and then punishing them for any move they make to the right or the left. The history of exegesis on this point is a history of Mormon interpreters trying to find some way, any way, to reconcile these difficulties (arguing God didn’t really punish or God didn’t really give commandments, the forbidden fruit wasn’t really forbidden, etc). And most of these interpretations are resisted by the text or narrative logic on almost on every point.

But this is precisely why I point out that Lehi omits any reference to God commanding man to multiply and replenish the earth (Genesis 1:28). Lehi’s narrative might make sense if we eliminate the commandment to multiply and replenish the earth. Otherwise, God commands Adam and Eve to do the impossible and then punishes them, or worse, commands Adam and Eve to be disobedient, not unlike the Serpent in the narrative. After Orson Pratt’s death, Mormon interpreters went the other way and argued that Adam and Eve could not have children in the Garden and its been that way ever since. Yet, this interpretation has problems that have never been satisfactorily resolved.

(And I might note that at least one subsequent Nephite sermon seems to have picked up on these sorts of ideas: Alma 12. It’s not Lehi alone who works through this sort of series of steps. Not at all.)

First, let me address Alma 12, because I think it will illustrate what I am getting at in terms of Lehi’s unnecessary steps in 2 Nephi 2. Lehi feels this need to discuss opposition as necessary for man to act for himself. Alma 12 contains no trace of Lehi’s ontology of opposites as a necessary stage for agency to occur. In fact, it seems to me the purpose of Alma 12 is not to specifically address agency but immortality (Antionah’s question). Yes, it is true Alma talks about agency but notice how Alma skips over Lehi’s step.

Wherefore, he gave commandments unto men, they having first transgressed the first commandments as to things which were temporal, and becoming as gods, knowing good from evil, placing themselves in a state to act, or being placed in a state to act according to their wills and pleasures, whether to do evil or to do good (Alma 12:31).

I suggested previously that this is a departure from Lehi. Alma is saying that Adam and Eveplaced themselves in a state to act by partaking of the forbidden fruit, knowing good from evil1. By contrast, Lehi teaches that God places man in a state to act by creating opposing enticements apart from knowing good and evil (2 Ne. 2:16). For Lehi, it would appear that Adam and Eve could act for themselves the moment two opposing enticements were brought into existence and the forbidden fruit is not required. Although they can act for themselves in the Garden, Lehi maintains they can do no good. (Lehi eliminates the element of Adam and Eve’s eyes being opened as occurring after the partaking of the fruit). Now, when we get to Alma’s sermon, there is no need for Alma to repeat to his audience Lehi’s teaching that before partaking the fruit, God needed to set up the first stage by providing opposing enticements, as a necessary, but not sufficient, condition to eventuate moral agency and also that Adam and Eve could do no good in the Garden. This is what I mean by no one repeating Lehi’s steps.

Now, I can anticipate someone saying that Alma and Lehi are saying the same thing. Lehi is saying Adam and Eve could act for themselves in the Garden but couldn’t do evil or good. After they fall they still can act for themselves but now can do evil and good, and Alma is simply repeating that last part (skipping over Lehi’s elaboration of opposites and the opposing enticements as a necessary initial state in the Garden, etc). Even if this is the case, Lehi’s steps are still unnecessary to Alma’s sermon and he does not repeat them.

____

1. It could be that Alma senses his statement isn’t entirely accurate and tries to correct it by rephrasing himself to say “or being placed in a state to act.”

I see. I misunderstood your comment. Yes, Lehi goes further than Alma in his talk about opposition. I thought you meant by “extra steps” the idea that there had to be a tension between fall and atonement—that the fall wasn’t alone enough to set up agency in full. That I see Alma taking up as well as Lehi, though, yes, Lehi alone frames all this in terms of opposition. I’m more than happy to let him be the unique thinker of that. :)

I know I wasn’t clear on what I meant by extra steps. Over the few months we’ve seen several thinkers in the Book of Mormon repeat or rephrase several elements of Lehi’s teachings (Nephi, Jacob, Alma, Samuel, King Benjamin), except, as you put it, “Lehi alone frames all this in terms of opposition.” It wasn’t until we explored many of these passages related to Garden of Eden discourse in the Book of Mormon that this came into relief.

Not only is Lehi alone in framing things in terms of opposition, but I see it that Lehi alone makes sure that Adam and Eve can act for themselves before they fall. Now, it isn’t that this is novel in the history of Eden interpretations. Many 19th century thinkers and those earlier stressed that Adam and Eve were moral agents before the fall, or before partaking of the tree of knowledge of good and evil. For those thinkers, Adam had to be a moral agent before the fall, otherwise it made no sense to punish him for the fall (reading the text to say that he was in fact punished). We even see this idea (only a moral agent can be punished) showing up within Mormon interpretations of the Garden of Eden, except that the opposite was concluded: that Adam and Eve were not moral agents before the fall and therefore we cannot impute sin to them (and idea that ironically interferes with interpretations that want to argue Adam and Eve made good decisions by intentionally falling). But Lehi seems to diverge from traditional interpretations when he eliminates the idea that Adam and Eve could do good in the Garden. And I realize I may be misreading “to do good.” But at the very least, Lehi never grants the possibility that Adam and Eve were obedient to God’s commandment during the time they abstained from the forbidden fruit (as others have recognized). His interpretation will not allow him to see this as obedience. Rather he insists that Adam and Eve could do no good in the garden (which does seem novel among the interpretations of the fall that I’ve canvassed, I haven’t seen the view that Adam and Eve were moral agents that could do not good, and I’m still not sure it makes sense to say you can have a moral agent incapable of doing good or evil). It’s also that teaching that I do not recall repeated by anyone else in the Book of Mormon.

Not sure why, but I feel compelled to keep asking why that is the case. Why didn’t this particular idea get passed on? Why did some and not others? Maybe it’s nothing, but I keep feeling there is something there that might shed light. There is a possibility that this is intentional. When later thinkers modify or even omit ideas of their predecessors it can often signify disagreement. I’m thinking of arguments you’ve made with Nephi and Abinadi or with Alma and Amulek, for example. Whether that is the case here, it’s too early to tell, but it’s a possibility to consider.

Joe, thanks for taking the time to explain your reading of Book of Mormon atonement theology. I really appreciate it. This is extremely useful and helps to clarify our possible points of divergence. My comments presume a different understanding of the text.

First of all, I set forth the textual reasons that I believe justify a distinction between atonement and resurrection. I see in the text a fairly consistent tradition (with a few exceptions) of holding a distinction between atonement and resurrection. I do not see, in the text, the atonement to be doing the same theological work as the resurrection, nor the resurrection to be doing the same theological work as the atonement. In my view, the fact that both the resurrection and the atonement are both brought about in and through Christ does not justify eliminating the fact that the Nephites use the terms atonement and resurrection to mean different things. Whether there is one redeeming event or two, does not factor into my analysis.

I agree that the text places in close proximity sin and death (as does the New Testament) but I don’t read Jacob in the same way. Jacob chooses to speak of death of the body and death of the spirit (2 Ne. 9:10-12). I see 2 Nephi 9 as one of the strongest textual evidence for a clear demarcation between these two deaths.

Sin and death are related, in my reading, because the Nephites use death analogically as a species of separation or cutting off. What the Nephites call the first death, the temporal death, or Jacob calls the death of the body is understood as separation of body from spirit. It is temporal because it will only last for a time and all will be resurrected; their body and spirits will be reunited to die no more (Alma 11:45). What the Nephites call the second death, spiritual death, or Jacob calls death of the spirit, being cut off from the presence of God is understood as separation of man from God or righteousness. The Nephites also understand that the spirit or soul cannot die (Alma 12:20; 43:9. Nephites use souls and spirits interchangeably. Alma 40:11, 15, 19), so this death is analogical in the sense of a separation. There is a separation of flesh from spirit in the one, and a separation of man from God in the other. The fact, however, that the Nephites need to add adjectives to death (the first and second, spiritual and temporal, death of the body, or use the phrase death of the spirit even though the spirit cannot die) indicates to me that they mean something different.

The analogy has limits, however, as the causes and solutions to both of these situations are entirely distinct. God is the one who appoints unto man to die and death is a necessary part of the plan of redemption. Spiritual death is not a necessary part of the plan of redemption. I do not take the second death to have more than an analogical relationship to physiological death, as the second death cannot be cured by the resurrection, because, according to Nephite theology, the wicked are resurrected but not considered to be redeemed, but filthy still. I do not understand the Nephites to hold the view that the resurrection addresses the problem of the second death, only the first death. Immortality is not necessarily equated with righteousness.

Also, I’m not attempting in any of this to make sure this results in a theology of atonement in the Book of Mormon. What I hear in your reading of Book of Mormon atonement theology, is that the only sin that exists is sin that arises because of the fact that we will die or are mortal or death-bound. The fact that we are death-bound is ultimately the source of all sin. Overcome death and we overcome of sin. Christ overcame death via the resurrection, and therefore overcame sin via the resurrection. I may be mistaken, so my apologies if I am misreading you, but the reading of atonement theology you are outlining seems to substitute the resurrection for a theory of atonement.

Given that atonement theory is highly problematic (penal substitutionary theory, etc.), I can see the rationale in finding the work of atonement to be accomplished by the resurrection. This would eliminate the problems associated with atonement theory. For my part, I do not see this in the text. It may be that we are taking past each other or that I am completely misunderstanding you. Or, it could be that we simply disagree on the best reading of the text. I suspect that we are using different definitions for death, mortal, flesh, sin, resurrection, atonement, all the building blocks of a conversation on point, so I’m not entirely confident how to proceed.

(1) Yes, what seems to differentiate our positions is precisely whether the fact that atonement and resurrection are effected by a single redemption event factors into our theological reconstructions. I don’t know how to set that fact aside, how not to factor it into things. How can Christ’s rising from the dead transform us spiritually? That’s the question I hear the Book of Mormon asking me, and the account I’ve outlined is an attempt to answer that perplexing question.

(2) I don’t disagree with more or less anything you say about the two kinds of death discussed in the Book of Mormon. I don’t at all mean to collapse them into one kind of death. I mean to suggest that they—like atonement and resurrection—are complexly interwoven. So I’m happy to concede that there are two sorts of death. What I want to know is why they can’t be entirely disentangled. That’s what my account of Nephite atonement theology is meant to work out.

(3) Yes, I’m claiming that all sin is ultimately rooted in our death-bound-ness. But that doesn’t at all imply that resurrection simply gets rid of sin, that in being resurrected I’m no longer sinless. The resurrection only uproots sin, and that makes it all the more sinful to remain in sin. (Indeed, at that point, my sin binds me to spiritual rather than temporal death; it binds me to a kind of death that won’t be overcome.) And note that all this is a matter of dwelling between the (announcement of the) resurrection of Christ and our own resurrection. That’s what interests the Nephites, that time between learning of the plan of redemption and our own eventual deaths and resurrections, that “time of probation.” That’s why the resurrection (Christ’s, with only the promise of my own) uproots sin but doesn’t eradicate it. I’m faced with the evidential reality of my own death, which works all kinds of sinful things in me, but I’m told that my death—what is most mine!—has been removed, such that I’m free not to sin. Will I believe, be faithful to that event (Christ’s resurrection), and so escape spiritual death? Or will I reject the message, ignore the promise of that event, and so die spiritually? That, I think, is what the Nephites present to us.

Guiding Questions

1. What relationship does the sermon of 2 Nephi 2 bear to scripture generally—whether in terms of its immediate setting, its reliance on other scriptural texts, or its influence on other scriptural texts?

2. In what ways is audience important to the theological bearing of 2 Nephi 2? More specifically, how important are the details of Jacob’s life to the theological interpretation of Lehi’s words, particularly in the first half of the sermon?

3. What important structures can be identified in 2 Nephi 2, and how are those structures theologically significant?

4. Is there a consistent or coherent theology developed in 2 Nephi 2—particularly with respect to purpose, creation, freedom, law, opposition, redemption, and agency? What can be said by of summarizing Lehi’s theological position?