This paper employs an econometric methodology (the Panzar-Rosse H-statistic) to test the level of competition in the Italian car insurance market, where in 2000 the Antitrust Authority imposed a conspicuous fine on 39 companies for their anti-competitive behavior deriving from an ad hoc information exchange from 1994 onwards. Our set of results shows that during the years 1998–2003 the group of firms whose business in the motor segment exceeds 60% of total gross premiums has earned revenues as if it were under monopoly or collusive oligopoly conditions, and therefore appears to support the decision of the Antitrust Authority.

This paper employs an econometric methodology (the Panzar-Rosse H-statistic) to test the level of competition in the Italian car insurance market, where in 2000 the Antitrust Authority imposed a conspicuous fine on 39 companies for their anti-competitive behavior deriving from an ad hoc information exchange from 1994 onwards. Our set of results shows that during the years 1998–2003 the group of firms whose business in the motor segment exceeds 60% of total gross premiums has earned revenues as if it were under monopoly or collusive oligopoly conditions, and therefore appears to support the decision of the Antitrust Authority.