§ 53a-92 (a) (2)
(B): accomplish or advance the commission of a felony.

§ 53a-92 (a) (2)
(C): terrorize (him/her) or a third person.

§ 53a-92 (a) (2)
(D): interfere with the performance of a government function.

For you to find the defendant guilty
of this charge, the state must prove the following elements beyond a reasonable
doubt:

Element 1 -
Abducted another person

The first element is that the
defendant abducted another person. "Abduct" means to restrain a person with the
intent to prevent (his/her) liberation by <insert as appropriate:>

secreting or holding
(him/her) in a place where (he/she) is not likely to be found. There need be
no evidence of the use or threatened use of force. The defendant need only
have effectively hidden <insert name of person> or left (him/her) in
a place where (he/she) was not likely to be found.

using or threatening to use
physical force or intimidation. The defendant does not need to actually use
force. (He/She) need only threaten to use force in such a manner that <insert
name of other person> reasonably believed that force would be used if
(he/she) tried to escape.

"Restrain" means to restrict a
person's movements intentionally and unlawfully in such a manner as to interfere
substantially with (his/her) liberty by moving (him/her) from one place to
another, or by confining (him/her) either in the place where the restriction
commences or in a place to which (he/she) has been moved, without consent. There
is no requirement that the movement be of any specific distance or that the
confinement last any specific period of time. There need not be any movement at
all -- the person could be confined by preventing (him/her) from leaving a place
where (he/she) was.

Any apparent consent on the part of <insert
name of other person> to the movement or confinement must have been actual
and not simply acquiescence brought about by force, fear, shock, or deception. <Insert
as appropriate:>

<If consent is at issue:>
The act of consent must have been truly voluntary. Consent may be express or
you may find that it is implied from the circumstances that you find
existed. Whether there was consent is a question of fact for you to
determine. The defendant has no burden to prove consent. The state must
prove the lack of consent.

<If person abducted is
less than sixteen or an incompetent person:> Without consent in this
case means by any means whatever1,
including acquiescence of the person, if (he/she) is (a child less than
sixteen years old / an incompetent person) and (the parent or guardian /
person or institution having lawful control or custody of (him/her)) has not
acquiesced in the movement or confinement.

In abducting <insert name of person>,
the defendant must have specifically intended to prevent (his/her) liberation. A
person acts "intentionally" with respect to a result when (his/her) conscious
objective is to cause such result. <See Intent: Specific, Instruction 2.3-1.>

Element 2 -
Intent to do further harm

The second element is that the
defendant abducted <insert name of person> with the specific intent to <insert
as appropriate:>

§ 53a-92 (a) (2) (A):
inflict physical injury on the person. "Physical injury" is defined as
impairment of physical condition or pain. It is a reduced ability to act as
one would otherwise have acted. The law does not require that the injury be
serious. It may be minor.

§ 53a-92 (a) (2) (A):
violate or abuse the person sexually. "To violate or abuse the person
sexually" has no technical meaning, and you are to attach to these terms
their ordinary common meaning.

§ 53a-92 (a) (2) (B):
accomplish or advance the commission of a felony. A felony is an offense for
which a person may be sentenced to a term of imprisonment in excess of one
year.

§ 53a-92 (a) (2) (C):
terrorize the person or a third person. To terrorize means to cause intense
fear or apprehension.2

§ 53a-92 (a) (2) (D):
interfere with the performance of a government function.

It is not necessary that actual
(physical injury / sexual violation or abuse / commission of a felony / terror
of another person / interference with the performance of a government function)
be proved, as long as you determine that the defendant intended to <insert
the allegations>, and abducted <insert name of person> with that
intent.

A person acts "intentionally" with
respect to a result when (his/her) conscious objective is to cause such result.
<See Intent: Specific, Instruction 2.3-1.>

To clarify the intent aspects of this
count. Under the first element, the abduction, the defendant must have intended
to prevent the liberation of <insert name of person>, and that prevention
of liberation must have been accomplished. Under the second element, the
defendant must have prevented the liberation of <insert name of person>
with the intent to commit <insert allegation of other intended criminal
conduct>. The defendant must have had both intentions at the time of the
abduction.

You must consider these two intentions
in a further light.3
It is alleged that the restraint used against <insert name of person> was
for the purpose of <insert allegations>. It is not necessary to restrain
a person to <insert allegations>. Nevertheless, some interference with
the person's liberty may be necessary or incidental to <insert allegations>.

To establish the defendant's intent to
prevent the liberation of <insert name of person> independent from the
intent to <insert allegations>, the state must prove that the defendant
intended to prevent the complainant's liberation for a longer time or to a
greater degree than that which would be necessary to <insert allegations>.
In this regard, the defendant's intent to prevent the complainant's liberation
may be manifested by confinement or movement that is more than merely incidental
to the other intended acts. In other words, if the confinement or movement is so
much a part of the other conduct that it could not be accomplished without such
restraint, then the requisite intent to prevent the complainant's liberation has
not been established. There is, however, no minimal period of confinement or
degree of movement necessary to establish kidnapping.

Whether the movement or confinement of
the complainant is merely incidental to other conduct is a question of fact for
you to determine. In determining this, you may consider all the relevant facts
and circumstances of the case, including, but not limited to, the following
factors:4

the nature and duration of
the complainant's movement or confinement by the defendant,

whether that movement or
confinement occurred during the commission of other conduct,

whether the restraint was
inherent in the nature of the other conduct,

whether the restraint
prevented the complainant from summoning assistance,

whether the restraint
reduced the defendant's risk of detection, and

whether the restraint
created a significant danger or increased the complainant's risk of harm
independent of that posed by the other conduct.]

As I said before, it doesn't matter
whether the defendant committed another criminal act or not. What matters is
what (his/her) intent was at the time of the alleged abduction.

[<Include if the defendant is also
charged with the attempt or completion of the offense:>5
So determining the defendant's intent for purposes of the second element is
completely separate from your deliberations on count __.]

Consider all of the evidence when
deciding on what the defendant intended to do. <Insert
Evidence of Intent,
Instruction 2.3-2.>

Conclusion

In summary, the state must prove
beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant abducted <insert the name of the
other person>, and that (he/she) intended to <insert specific allegations
of intent>.

If you unanimously find that the state
has proved beyond a reasonable doubt each of the elements of the crime of
kidnapping in the first degree, then you shall find the defendant guilty. On the
other hand, if you unanimously find that the state has failed to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt any of the elements, you shall then find the defendant not
guilty.
_______________________________________________________

1
The "any means whatever" language was intended "to protect young children and
incompetent persons from being kidnapped when the victim agrees to go with the
kidnapper because of promises of favors or gifts. A competent adult's actual
consent to the restraint would negate lack of consent if not induced by
deception, force, fear or shock; in other words, with no compulsion or
deception. . . . The 'any means whatever' language should not be given in an
instruction when . . . the victim is a competent adult." State v. Benjamin,
86 Conn. App. 344, 355 (2004).

2
See State v. Dyson, 238 Conn. 784, 798-99 (1996) ("[w]hile it seems
likely that every kidnapping would induce some degree of fear on the part of the
abductee, not every perpetrator possesses the specific intent to terrorize his
victim"); State v. Crudup, 81 Conn. App. 248, 261, cert. denied, 268
Conn. 913 (2004).

3State v. Salamon, 287 Conn. 509 (2008), State v. Sanseverino, 287
Conn. 608 (2008), and State v. DeJesus, 288 Conn. 418 (2008), made a
significant change to the law of kidnapping. The trial court should carefully
review those cases before using this instruction.

4State v. Salamon, supra, 287 Conn. 548. These factors are the more
commonly occurring factual scenarios that might support a finding of intent to
restrain beyond that necessary to commit the underlying crime, but they are only
illustrative. Factors should only be included if relevant, and the trial judge
may include other factors that appear in the case. The instruction must be
tailored to the evidence presented by the state.

5
Include only if there is another charge arising out of the same conduct that
would support an inference of intent for purposes of the second element. Of the
possible other criminal conduct intended, only committing a felony is likely to
map exactly to another crime charged in the information. While a criminal charge
may result from the other conduct, it is irrelevant to the defendant's intent
for purposes of this instruction. The same evidence, for example, that supports
an inference that the defendant intended to sexually violate or abuse the person
may also support a charge of sexual assault, but it may not. In addition, the
defendant may not have made enough significant steps towards the other intended
crime to support a charge of an attempted crime.