[1991]Re:
Colon [12/12/02] 2002 MTWCC 63 While the statute governing death
benefits provides for payment of a minor child's share to the surviving
parent, by expressly providing benefits for the child the statute contemplates
that the benefits will be applied to benefit the child, hence where the
parent provides no support to the child the benefits may be redirected
to the child and the child's guardian. (Construing sections 39-71-721,
-723 and -116(3), MCA (1991).)

[1989](VanHorn)
Killion v. State Fund [4/22/99] 1999 MTWCC 30 Section 39-71-721(5),
MCA, which provides that workers' compensation benefits to a surviving
spouse terminate upon remarriage, does not violate constitutional guarantees
of freedom of religion, equal protection, or privacy. The statute is also
not overriden by section 49-2-308(1), MCA, which prohibits the State or
its subdivisions from discriminating on the basis of marital status.

[1985]W.R.
Grace & Co. and Transportation Ins. Co. v. Riley [3/23/98] 1998
MTWCC 26 Under section 39-72-701, MCA (1985), previously interpreted
by this Court in Manweiler v. The
Travelers Ins. Co. [6/6/96]
1996 MTWCC 41 (WCC No. 9511-7445), the amount and duration of death
benefits under the Occupational Disease Act is governed by the death
benefits provisions of the Workers' Compensation Act, including section
39-71-721, MCA (1985), which states that where an injured or diseased
worker subsequently dies, the beneficiary "is entitled to the same
compensation as though the death occurred immediately following the
injury, but the period during which the death benefits is paid shall
be reduced by the period during or for which compensation was paid for
the injury." As previously held in Manweiler, the insurer
is entitled to a credit for any portion of settlement monies paid to
decedent which are attributable to periods of time after decedent's
death.

[1983]
Blowers
v. Montana Insurance Guaranty Association [4/25/97] 1997 MTWCC 24
Under section 39-71-721(5), MCA (1983), death benefits must be paid
to a widow or widower for life or until remarriage, and in the event
of remarriage, two years of benefits must be paid in a lump sum. In
case where widow requested lump sum of what would amount to ten years
of benefits, WCC held that lump sum, if otherwise appropriate, was not
necessarily limited to two years of benefits, though the possibility
that claimant might remarry is a significant factor that would be taken
into consideration when determining if an advance of more than two years'
benefits was justified.

[1985]Blowers
v. Montana Ins. Guaranty Association [10/15/96] 1996 MTWCC 64
While section 39-71-721, MCA (1985), provides that a lump sum of two
years of benefits must be paid to a widow who remarries, with no further
benefit entitlement, that section does not limit the conversion of benefits
corresponding to more than two years in a situation where remarriage
has not occurred. Section 39-71-741(1), MCA (1985), provides that "biweekly
benefits . . . may be converted, in whole or in part, into a lump-sum
payment." However, in considering the widow's request for an order
that benefits be converted, the Court will consider the rule of section
39-71-721, MCA (1985), and the possibility of remarriage.

[1983]Kimery v. State Compensation Ins. Fund
[12/11/95] 1995 MTWCC 104
Widow whose death benefits were terminated upon her remarriage moved
for summary judgment on her claim to reinstate benefits, arguing that
District Courtís order of annulment of her remarriage ab initio was
binding on State Fund. WCC denied motion, holding that District Courtís
order was not binding on State Fund where it was not party to that proceeding.