Alexandru Marcoci

About

I am a Fellow in the Department of Government at LSE and before that I received my PhD in the Department of Philosophy, Logic and Scientific Method. I divide my research time between the following projects. Firstly, together with James Nguyen I investigate whether large scientific collaborations can be treated as group agents. Secondly, I collaborate with the SWARM project and together with Mark Burgman and Ans Vercammen I develop and test rubrics for evaluating the quality of reasoning in intelligence reports. Thirdly, Luc Bovens and I argue for a more inclusive policy for bathroom access. Finally, I work together with Diana Popescu on an abstract model explaining ideological polarization.

Research

In this paper I show that Elga's argument for a restricted principle of indifference for self-locating belief relies on the kind of mistaken reasoning that recommends the 'staying' strategy in the Monty Hall problem.

Kuhn argued that scientific theory choice is, in some sense, a rational matter, but one that is not fully determined by shared objective scientific virtues like accuracy, simplicity, and scope. Okasha imports Arrow's impossibility theorem into the context of theory choice to show that rather than not fully determining theory choice, these virtues cannot determine it at all. If Okasha is right, then there is no function (satisfying certain desirable conditions) from 'preference' rankings supplied by scientific virtues over competing theories (or models, or hypotheses) to a single all-things-considered ranking. This threatens the rationality of science. In this paper we show that if Kuhn's claims about the role that subjective elements play in theory choice are taken seriously, then the threat dissolves.

In a recent paper, Samir Okasha imports Arrow's impossibility theorem into the context of theory choice. He shows that there is no function (satisfying certain desirable conditions) from profiles of preference rankings over competing theories, models or hypotheses provided by scientific virtues to a single all-things-considered ranking. This is a prima facie threat to the rationality of theory choice. In this paper we show this threat relies on an all-or-nothing understanding of scientific rationality and articulate instead a notion of rationality by degrees. The move from all-or-nothing rationality to rationality by degrees will allow us to argue that theory choice can be rational enough.

Media

So, what makes a good argument and, more importantly, what's the best way to argue effectively? In this episode, producers James Rattee, Nathalie Abbott and Sue Windebank consider how to debate with conspiracy theorists, see how US intelligence agencies are building tools to formulate better arguments, and ask whether certain people – and points of view – are too dangerous to confront. This episode features the following LSE academics: Dr Owen Griffiths, LSE Department of Philosophy, Dr Bryan Roberts, LSE Department of Philosophy, Dr Bart Cammaerts, LSE Department of Media and Communications, Professor Martin Bauer, LSE Department of Psychological and Behavioural Science and Dr Alexandru Marcoci, LSE Department of Government.

"What’s not to love about gender-neutral restrooms?" ask Bovens and Marcoci. Their spread could only come about trough a sensitive mix of good design and nudges; working on social norms and behaviours. Some discomforts may, however, prove to be beyond nudging, and an incremental, learning approach is probably required.

Teaching

In 2017 I received the Department of Government's Class Teacher Award and I was a finalist in the Students' Union Teaching Excellence Awards for Sharing Subject Knowledge. In 2015 I was awarded a Honourable Commendation for Excellent Class Teaching by the Department of Philosophy, Logic and Scientific Method. In 2014 I won the Students' Union Teaching Excellence Award for Collaborative Research and Guidance.

Contact

Department of Government London School of Economics & Political ScienceHoughton Street, London, WC2A 2AE.A.Marcoci@lse.ac.uk