Communications Intelligence

U.S.-U.K. Cooperation

P - Z

"The experience of the British Pacific Fleet (BPF) at the operational and tactical levels of war demonstrates a degree of co-operation that was perhaps more intimate than any other Allied services" during World War II.

Schneider, AHR 103.4, notes that this book "is a comprehensive and critical look at the exchange of military intelligence among Great Britain, the Soviet Union, and the United States." The author uses "a broad range of new declassified archival sources" to produce "an important contribution in the study of the 'sociology of alliances.'"

According to Jonkers, AIJ 17.1/2, Smith finds that "[a] great deal of the intelligence was exchanged.... By the end of 1944 the Allies even provided ULTRA and MAGIC reports to the Soviets." This is a "[w]ell written book by the dean of British authors on intelligence." Stutteford, Publishers Weekly, 30 Sep. 1996, comments that Smith "has thoughtfully catalogued the long sequence of important intelligence materials passed along to the Anglo-Americans by the Soviets." Seamon, Proceedings 123.6 (Jun. 1997), calls this study "detailed and authoritative."

2. "Sharing Ultra in World War II." International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 2, no. 1 (Spring 1988): 59-72.

Surveillant 3.1 says this is a "fascinating study"; it is "well researched and clearly presented." Miller, IJI&C 7.1, finds that The ULTRA-MAGIC Deals has "many outstanding features"; it is an "extraordinarily detailed account ... of major interest to any intelligence professional." To Watt, I&NS 9.1, Smith shows "indefatigable scholarship in teasing out the main lines of his story." Rich, WIR 13.4, notes that the author demonstrates "just how much has come to light" since such groundbreaking works as Winterbotham's The Ultra Secret, Kahn's "invaluable"
Hitler's Spies, and Holmes' "enduring, useful, and readable"
Double-Edged Secrets.

McGinnis, Cryptolog 15.4, believes that Smith "deserves credit for his extensive research. The book contains considerable unique material. Further comments by the reviewer: Captain Safford, USN, head of OP 20-G in 1941, wrote a story for the publication CRYPTOLOGIA in which he made scathing comment on what the British gave and did as their part of the bargain when we delivered the two PURPLE machines. He titled that particular section 'Perfidious Albion'."

According to Kruh, Cryptolog 15.1, Smith "describes in great detail the history of cryptologic operations on both sides of the Atlantic. He tells of efforts to form a closer bond between U.S. units and between both nations. He explains the reasons for the concerns, distrust and suspicion harbored by key people with insight to their origins. It is a fascinating history of a basically unexplored subject.... [His] formidable research and his information is generally buttressed by official documents or interviews with participants.... The few inaccuracies should not prevent anyone from enjoying an extensive view of the development of the Anglo-American cryptologic partnership in WWII and the antagonisms between the U.S. Army and Navy which made it even more difficult to accomplish."

Gardner, I&NS 21.3 (Jun. 2006), believes that the author has tried to cram too much into a single volume. Also, "too much space is devoted to such topics as Allied technical developments ... and ... the matter of security marking of documents in the two nations." Nevertheless, "this book certainly suggests areas for further research and study."

This is a report that Turing made following his visit to NCR, where
the U.S. Navy's Bombe project was underway, in December 1942. Lee A. Gladwin provides an introduction, and adds an extended commentary in a separate article: Lee A. Gladwin, "Alan Turing's Visit to Dayton," Cryptologia
25, no. 1 (Jan. 2001): 11-17.

Worth, Roland H., Jr. Secret Allies in the Pacific: Covert Intelligence and Code Breaking Cooperation between the United States, Great Britain and Other Nations Prior to the Attack on Pearl Harbor. Jefferson, NC, and London: McFarland, 2001.

Seamon, Proceedings 128.1 (Jan. 2002), says that "few studies ... have ranged so widely and probed so deeply into prewar intelligence gathering" as this book does. Along the way, the author "all but demolishes conspiracy theories claiming President Franklin Roosevelt was responsible for the attack."

Although he identifies some "shortcomings" in this work, Jacobsen, I&NS 17.3, concludes that the author "does provide a very readable general overview of the Sigint, and to a lesser degree, the covert intelligence activities of the Allies against Japan" leading up to the attack on Pearl Harbor. Kruh, Cryptologia 26.2, comments that "Worth brings together pieces of often isolated details." which allows the reader "to gain a sense of how the chain of [intelligence-sharing] alliances came to exist, how they functioned and what were their limitations." However, "knowledgeable readers will not find many surprises."