Prospects for Turkey’s Role in International Politics at the Beginning of the 21st Century (WP)

Bahri Yilmaz. WP 63/2009 - 14/12/2009

The purpose of this working paper is to discuss Turkey’s new role in international politics at the
beginning of the 21st Century and to analyse the main political and
economic challenges for the country to become a regional power of medium size.

The paper has three main parts. The first provides a brief overview of the main characteristics of Turkey’s
international relations during the Cold War period. Then it examines
Turkey’s present economic and political development in order to
identify its basic handicaps and the pre-conditions necessary for
becoming a regional power. The final section focuses on the future prospects of Turkey’s place in the international order.

Turkey’s international relations after the Second World War were mainly determined by three
interdependent factors: (1) national security; (2) economic
cooperation; and (3) the country’s full integration into
‘Western civilisation’ through the so-called
‘Europeanisation process’.[1]

Security Aspects
Turkey’s external relations with the Western world intensified immediately after the Second World War,
when the militarist and traditional expansionist policies pursued by
Stalin began to threaten Turkey. Despite the Turkish-Soviet treaty of
Friendship in the 1920s, the Soviet Union made territorial claims to
Turkey’s north-eastern provinces of Kars and Ardahan in 1945.
The Soviets also called for joint Turkish-Soviet control over the
Straits (the Bosporus and the Dardanelles). As a result, the Ankara
government, at the time led by Kismet Innu, decided to adopt the
Truman Doctrine in 1948 and Turkey joined NATO in 1952. With these
decisions, Turkey gradually became ‘a reliable NATO partner’,
playing the role of ‘south-east pillar, bulwark and last
bastion’ against any military expansion by the Soviet Union
towards the Mediterranean or the Gulf region. Therefore, Turkey came
to be directly involved in the East-West conflict and antagonism.

Economic Aspects
At the beginning of the 1950s, Turkey was indisputably a poor country. Its economy showed characteristic
socioeconomic features of underdevelopment. It had an annual per
capita income level of roughly US$210, with a population of 20
million people who were mainly employed in the agricultural sector.
The striking negative factors were the obvious scarcity of savings
and foreign exchange and an extremely high level of unemployment.
There was a lack of infrastructure in all fields. However, as Turkey
was clearly unable to overcome its pressing economic problems with
its own resources, it was unable to fulfil its military commitments
as a member of NATO without military and economic assistance from the
West. Apart from security interests, therefore, economic
considerations played an important part in reinforcing Turkey’s
pro-Western and unilateral foreign policy. Foreign aid and close
economic cooperation with the industrialised NATO member states,
which were mainly regulated and financed by the US and partly by West
Germany, were obviously of vital significance for Turkey. The country
would only be in a position to promote its economic development and
thus meet its NATO commitments with the help of Western economic
support. In line with the assignment of tasks within NATO, military
assistance and financial aid were combined; the US and partly West
Germany primarily shouldered the burden. This was one of the main
reasons why the EC Commission accepted Turkey’s application for an association partnership.

Westernisation/Europeanisation/Modernisation through Negotiations with the EU
Turkey’s close cooperation with the West was not only designed to serve security and economic policy
objectives but was also an indispensable component of the process of
Westernisation, which had been initiated over 150 years ago and which
was intensified after the republic was founded in 1923. This process
served to strengthen Turkey’s bonds with Western civilisation.
At the same time, it was hoped it would help to improve the country’s
economic and technological performance and correct its deficiencies
in democracy and human rights. The policy of Westernisation initially
pursued in political life by the Western-oriented elite gradually
gained increased popular support over the years, despite fundamentalist opposition. The finalisation of this process remains
the guiding principal and irrevocable goal of Turkish domestic and
foreign policy. It is one of the main reasons why Turkey is so eager to become a full member of the EU.

To Sum Up Turkey’s close cooperation with
the West during and after the Cold War period was mainly designed to
serve security and economic policy objectives and was also a result
of the Westernisation process. For the West, security interests played
the dominant role in its relations with Turkey against Soviet
expansionism.

On the collapse of the Soviet Union and the breakdown of the Communist regimes in Eastern and Southern Europe in
the 1990s, Turkey was suddenly and unexpectedly forced to take a
major political role and responsibility in the region, which was
originally part of the Ottoman Empire and had been lost at the end of
the First World War in 1918 in the wake of that empire’s
dissolution. Turkey became a centre of political activities in the
‘devilish triangle’ of the regions defined by the Balkans, the Caucasus and the Middle East.

At the beginning of the 1990s, Turkey was regarded as a potential regional power, that could play a dominant
role in the region by re-shaping the international order from the
Balkans, over the Middle East and the Caucasus, to Central Asia. With
a growing self-confidence, policy-makers in Ankara underlined the
country’s new role in international politics in each government
programme presented to the Turkish Parliament.[2]
In 1991 the collapse of the Soviet Union opened up a new dimension for
Turkey with the establishment of diplomatic relations with the new
‘Turkic Republics’.

The opinion in the West was that in this new situation Turkey had a major role to play in the region. Under
Turkey’s leadership and in cooperation with the US and Western
Europe, conditions in the Caucasus and Central Asia should be
re-shaped in such a way as to fill the power vacuum. One central idea
was the export of the so-called ‘Turkish Model’ to the
countries of both regions, based on three main pillars: (1)
secularism in an Islamic society; (2) a western-style
pluralistic-democratic system; and (3) a free market economy. Turkey
was ascribed the role and function of a stabilising element or buffer
zone and a political and social model in order to curb fundamentalist Islamic tendencies in both regions.

However, 18 years and several Turkic summits later, the slogan of the Turkic area ‘from the Adriatic
to Great Wall of China’ now has a hollow ring to it. The
enthusiasm of the initial (re-)encounter with the people from Central
Asia was followed by a return to business as usual.

One of the main reasons for this is that,
like every other country, Turkey was caught unaware by the events of
1989-90. At the time, it was in the middle of a heated election
campaign in which parties were busy with domestic issues. The major
factor was that Turkish foreign policy actors have so far failed to
adjust to the resulting situations of conflict. During the Cold War
period, Ankara was not well prepared to diversify its foreign
relations and never tried to seek possible foreign policy
alternatives. Under the awkward foreign policy circumstances and the
resultant involvement in the East-West conflict, it settled on the
country’s incorporation into the Western system and it did not
want or need to play an active part in international relations.

The end of the bipolar system and the Cold
War not only caused radical changes around Turkey but also had an
immense impact on domestic affairs. Consequently, existing political
taboos were broken. Issues and problems such as human rights, ethnic
and religious identities and democratisation as a frank discussion,
all of which had been forbidden and suppressed for decades, began to
be aired openly in public and in the media. The need for radical
changes and sweeping transformations are imperative in every field
of economic, social and political life. Economic problems, the
widespread nepotism in state-owned enterprises, corruption and the
abuse of power by many politicians remained at the top of the list.

Party leaders and governing elites, who
grew up and served under Cold War conditions, have been shocked by
the partly unexpected radical political and economic changes taking
place around the world. In fact, it was quite difficult for
politicians and established institutions to interpret the new
circumstances and to adjust adequately and correctly by reviewing
and improving party politics and programmes. A political ‘changing
of the old guard’ and a generational shift not only in the
political landscape and in the state but also in all institutions
–private and state-owned alike– was therefore absolutely
essential. Turkey has been challenged both domestically and
internationally and, thus, the pressure on Turkey has grown
irresistibly.

However, much of the establishment
appeared to be indifferent to –and uninterested in– a
series of political and criminal scandals. At this stage, the
country’s need for a political leadership with a long-term
perspective, vision, determination and willingness became very
urgent, as it became necessary to ensure internal political
stability and solve current problems with well-prepared programmes
within a democratic pluralist system. On the economic side, Turkey
began to open up its economy to the world markets in the 1980s,
before the transformation process in the Eastern and South-Eastern
European countries was underway. Since the mid-1980s Turkey made
impressive progress by restructuring its economy from inward to
outward looking. The new economic policy forced the country’s
industrial sector to compete in the international markets. It is
regarded as one of the most promising economies among newly-emerged
markets. But, unfortunately, at the beginning of the 1990s, due to
populist and inconsistent policies, ‘a two steps forward and
one step backward’ sequence was established, with the outward
looking development strategy being interrupted on account of
significant failures by Turkey’s policy makers. A country that
intends to become a full member of the EU would under real
circumstances have had to begin switching import-substitution
policies for export-oriented policies much earlier than in the
1980s, and preparation for full integration into the EU would have
had to be actually completed before the establishment of the Customs
Union in 1996.[4]

In the 2000s, the three main issues on the
Turkish political agenda have been: (1) the rolling back of
secularism, the spread of the Islamic movement in the country and
the advance of the Islamists within Turkey’s power structures;
(2) the so-called ‘South-Eastern question’ (or Kurdish
issue); and (3) the incapacity of Turkey’s political system to
adjust to the rapid economic and social changes that have taken
place since the collapse of the Soviet Union. The country has
suffered from the inability and unwillingness of the short-sighted
politicians of the Cold War period. Due to these factors, the
1990-2002 period can best be described as a decade of political and
economic instability created by various coalition governments. It
has also been a ‘lost decade’, characterised by economic
and political crises.

(3) Milestones in the Period 1990-2008

There were three radical political and
economic events that changed the Turkish scenario after 2002.

The start of an open-ended negotiation
process for full EU membership. The EU finally decided to start
membership negotiations with Turkey on 3 October 2005. As promised
by Europe’s leaders at the 2002 Copenhagen summit meeting, the
EU-25 unanimously agreed to open accession negotiations with Turkey
on the basis of ‘The Progress Report on Turkey’ of 2004
and the Commission’s recommendations of 6 October 2004.[5]

The Turkish economy recorded tremendous
growth and a remarkable recovery after the 2001 economic and
financial crises.[6] The coalition government formed after the April
1999 elections made fighting inflation its first priority. In this
respect, Ankara signed a ‘stand-by agreement’ –or
new stabilisation policy– with the IMF on 22 December 1999.
Despite some initial success, the programme collapsed in February
2001 for three basic reasons: (a) a lack of coordination of economic
policies; (b) an unwillingness to implement structural reforms and
privatise deeply mismanaged state-owned enterprises; and (c)
distrust in the banking system, mainly in the state-banks ruined by
politicians. Since November 2002 the AKP government, headed by Recep
Tayyip Erdoğan, held strictly to the stabilisation programme by
following tight monetary and fiscal policies. The Turkish
economy recovered impressively from the 2001 crisis in only a short
time. Over the 2002-07 period, average economic growth exceeded 7%
annually. Inflation was brought down from 70% to single digits in
2004 for the first time in three decades. Net public debt decreased
from over 90% of GNP in 2001 to 45% in 2006. Turkey’s
remarkable economic performance, based on the credible and
sustainable stabilisation programme imposed by the IMF, improved
confidence among foreign investors and thus created a favourable
climate for higher levels of FDI.[7]

The long march of the Islamists to power.
Turkish voters went to the polls on 3 November 2002, and this
election was widely seen as the most important for many years. The
results of the general election confirmed in an impressive way the
Islamists’ expectations. Erdoğan’s AKP gained a massive parliamentary majority,
with more than a third of all votes cast and 363 out of 550 seats.
The Republican People’s Party (CHP) will be in the new
parliament as an opposition party. In 2007, the
AKP was financially, numerically and organisationally ready to
pursue its permanence in power over the following decades. Its
second breakthrough came in the general election of 22 July 2007,
the results of which were an historic success: it increased its
share of the vote from 2002’s 34% to 47% and was especially
successful in the East and South-East. Finally, a party
with deep Islamic roots had won a landslide victory in Turkey.

The reasons for the heavy defeat of the
established political parties after 2002 and for the unstoppable rise
of the Islamists can be summarised as follows:

It is widely believed that one of the main
reasons for the AKP’s successive election results was the
splintering in Turkey’s political scenario, with none of the
established parties being able to gain more than 20% of the votes
regardless of their position in the political spectrum. Turkey’s
present parliament consists of two centre-right parties (AKP, MHP),
one centre-left party (CHP) and the Kurdish Party (DPT).

Another reason is that the established
parties, regardless of their political attitudes or programmes
failed to solve the huge economic, political and social problems
that had accumulated over the decades. In other words, the
governments led by the parties of the existing system showed neither
the determination to carry through the right policies nor the
political will or resolution for carrying out radical reforms.
Therefore, their policies became unpredictable and confused, putting
the government’s reputation at stake.

Policy uncertainty prompted a decline in
investment, intensified speculation, a stronger underground economy
and, accordingly, contributed to deepening the existing economic
crisis. This caused dissatisfaction among those who were heavily
affected by the high rate of inflation and the deterioration of the
labour market, including small farmers, employees, the unemployed
and marginal groups living on the outskirts of the big cities.

Given these circumstances, lower income
groups and the working class began searching for something more
promising, a political party that held out some hope for the future.
Until the breakdown of the communist system that role had been
played by the socialist and social-democratic parties, but now the
Islamists and the AKP took it up. An election analysis indicates
that the AKP’s voters not only consist of traditional-minded
voters but also of ordinary people affected by economic instability
and of so-called protest voters. These groups have apparently been
persuaded by the Islamists’ ‘Change’ slogan. Over
time it has become obvious that the main goal of the AKP and its predecessors (MSP, RP and
FP) is the step-by-step re-Islamisation of society and the
domination of Islam over all aspects of life, including the
‘modernisation and liberalisation of Turkish society’.

The AKP has promoted a moderate and
sometimes centrist image as a ruling party, in stark contrast with
the extreme political rhetoric and positions it had assumed as an
opposition party. So far the Islamists give the impression that, in
power, they first of all intend to consolidate their power and are
trying to hold on to it under any circumstances.[8]

(4) What Should be Done?

Turkey’s future and possible leading
role in the region depend to a great extent on three main factors:

(a) Macroeconomic stability, sustainable
economic growth and diversification of economic relations with non-EU
countries
An important aspect of international
relations is that political and economic interests are intertwined.
To the extent that there is an overlap in mutual economic interests,
sustainable political relations can be launched. Consequently, the
ability of a country to offer sizeable and stable economic
opportunities is a pre-requisite to enter into sustainable
international economic relations. Therefore, the capacity to create
and maintain a stable domestic economic structure is of the utmost
importance. One of the dimensions of that capacity is the existence
of political structures, which can be only achieved with long-term
stable macroeconomic policies within an open economy. In other words,
the envisaged leading role in the region cannot be successfully
achieved without a considerable national economic effort in creating
sustainable economic growth and macroeconomic stability.

The high unemployment rate, rising current
account deficit and unequal income distribution will continue to be
at the top of the economic agenda in the coming years. Additionally,
Turkey is facing very serious demographic, economic and democratic
challenges such as rapid population growth, poverty, deficiencies in
infrastructure, natural disasters (eg, earthquakes), poor education
and research, health services, energy resources, environmental
degradation, rule of law, human rights and reformation of economic
and political institutions.[9] Apart from the country’s still unresolved economic problems,
the widespread nepotism in state-owned enterprises, ongoing
corruption, abuse of power by many politicians and bribery have hit
the headlines and top the domestic policy agenda.[10] Both macroeconomic policy reforms intended to correct serious
macroeconomic imbalances and structural reforms aimed at reducing the
country’s considerable regional differences in income, as well
as the infrastructure gap between urban and rural areas, which, in
turn, induce political instability. The economic stability and
structural policy reform will foster the economic integration process
into not only the EU’s markets but also other regional markets.

(b)
Europeanisation of political, economic and social life through
the negotiation process and adaptation-implementation of the acquis
Turkey’s basic aim is to become a
full member of the EU in the next decade, but there are major counter
arguments to this. Turkey is different in many ways. It is the
biggest, poorest country ever to have been invited to start talks,
and the most culturally challenging. Obviously, its economic
backwardness in comparison to the EU is one of the main obstacles.
Therefore, it seems reasonable for Turkey to follow the logic of, on
the one hand, moving towards full membership and, on the other,
towards economic integration, including membership of the Monetary
Union. It is often forgotten that Turkey’s political
integration into the EU demands sustainable and stable economic
development in the first place –in the spirit of Jean Monnet’s
concept of political integration through economic integration–.
So far, Turkey is the only country to have joined the Customs Union
without being a full member of the EU. The considerable costs
entailed by becoming a member of the Customs Union were shouldered
without substantial financial assistance from Brussels. Independently
from Turkey’s full membership of the EU, it should be fully
integrated into the European Economic Union. This means that the free
movement of manufacturing goods must be extended to the free movement
of agricultural products and services.

The negotiations for EU membership appear
to be the best choice to reform not only institutions but also to
improve Turkey’s political system by changing its political
culture. In this respect, the Turkish governments in power have to
put their own house in order and continue to enforce and promote the
so-called ‘Europeanisation Process’ –restructuring
and modernising policies in all realms–. Regardless of its
quest for full membership, implementation of EU legislation, norms,
standards and regulations is essential for Turkey. Furthermore, as
long as it does not achieve this, Turkey’s full membership will
remain only a distant possibility.

(c) Political stability through
modifying but retaining the Republic’s fundamental principles,
with a contemporary re-definition of Ataturk’s legacy
Naturally, the government change in Ankara
gave rise to speculation: would Turkey stand up against the ‘Iranian
way’? After Iran and Algeria, might Turkey be next? Does the
era of Atatürk and with it a modern, western-oriented and
relatively liberal system of society come to its end? Would the first
and last stronghold of a secular-oriented country in the Islamic
world fall into the hands of fundamentalists? Can the advance of the
fundamentalists be halted within a democratic-parliamentarian system?
Would Turkey leave its Western allies?

In the Constitution of the Turkish Republic
it is strictly underlined that Turkey is a ‘social, secular,
democratic and legislative country’. Secularism is one of the
fundamental pillars of the Republic, and is also closely related to
women’s rights. Islamic societies have never faced the
Reformation and the Enlightenment that changed Western Europe.
Turkey’s Parliament has approved two constitutional amendments
by significant majorities easing the ban on women wearing Islamic
headscarves in Turkish Universities. The issue will create deep
divisions within the Turkish population, in pro-secularist and
anti-secularist groups,[11] and this might result in very serious political instability. It is
argued by secularists that ‘this step will encourage radical
[Islamic] circles in Turkey, accelerate the movement towards a state
founded on religion and lead to further demands against the spirit of
the republic’, whereas the governing AKP and the nationalist
MHP say it is an issue of human rights and freedoms.[12]

The Ottoman Empire was a multi-cultural and
multi religious state from the Adriatic Sea to the Yemen. Imperial
vassals belonged to different religions, including Islam,
Christianity and Judaism. However. The State’s legal system was
based on the Sharia and represented by a powerful religious class of
priests (ulema), who
later became civil servants of the State. Since 1774 the Ottoman
Sultans had actively exercised the function of head of the Empire and
leader of the Muslim Caliphate at the same time.

Turkey adopted the so-called French
integrationist model, which is based on the separation of State and
religion.[13] Religion is considered part of private life and religious affairs are
not admitted in the public sphere, while religious communities must
operate under public law. Among a series of secular measures put into
force were that the weekend holiday was moved from the Islamic holy
day to the Christian Sunday and the Gregorian calendar replaced the
Islamic lunar calendar. Discrimination of women in public life and
public institutions was officially ended and the Swiss civil code
replaced the former Islamic legal system. The Islamic education
system was abolished and public religious schools were closed in
order to safeguard secular education against both preachers and
theologies. In taking these measures, the young Republic had a
twofold objective. First, it aimed to overcome the country’s
backwardness in the economic, technical and other fields. Secondly,
it expected the political influence of religion on politics to be
limited and any return of a political Islam to power prevented.[14]. The leadership believed, as Philip Robins put it,
that ‘... Islam was repugnant as a manifestation of oriental
mysticism which offended the rigour of European rationalism’.[15]

It should be borne in mind that Turkey is
the only Islamic country that has consistently imposed laicism,
despite the various political fluctuations and tensions over the
decades, both domestically and internationally. Now one of the
fundamental pillars of the secularist state seems to be breaking up
and is being challenged by political Islam. A secularist Turkey is
already facing serious difficulties in becoming a full member of the
EU and, unfortunately, an overwhelmingly Islamised Turkey would have
no chance at all.[16]

In our view, all parties represented in the
parliament should accept the basic rules of the democratic game. They
have to govern the country on the basic principles of a western-type
democracy within the present constitutional framework. In these respects, the AKP has made two fundamental mistakes since
2002. First, it does not have sufficient
experience or qualified leaders to deal with the country’s
serious economic and political problems. Therefore, the AKP
government has been forced to cooperate with the pro-Western oriented
and secular institutions in a peaceful and efficient way. Secondly,
each elected democratic government should look for peaceful
solutions.[17] For these purposes, a broad consensus among the
main interest groups and political segments of society and a
readiness to share the costs of the new economic and political
changes among all social groups are pre-conditions for successful
restructuring and reform policies. Until now, the AKP leadership
gives the impression that its absolute majority in Parliament
entitles it to ‘change what they want according their own will
regardless of the expectations of the rest of the population, even
the main pillars and untouchable principles of the Republic, such as
secularism’.[18]

The South-Eastern/Kurdish Issue
One of the main reasons why the
‘South-Eastern’ or ‘Kurdish’ issue cannot be
solved is the experience of Turks with the micro-nationalist movement
initiated by great powers such as the UK, France and Russia against
the Ottoman Empire throughout the 18th and 19th centuries. The Treaty
of Sevres of 1920, which foresaw dismembering the Ottoman Empire was
never ratified by the nationalistic forces of Mustafa Kemal but had a
significant influence on the Turkish leadership and armed forces. The
fear of dismemberment by foreign powers is deeply rooted and,
therefore, any attempt that could be interpreted as leading to the
collapse and dissolution of the Turkish State is intellectually
resisted by its elites.

After terrorist activities started in 1984,
the dominant belief was that the military solution was the best
policy to tackle the issue and to preserve national unity within the
existing borders. Thus, all previous governments left the solution in
the hands of the military. However, the business community, the press
and some of the Turkish intelligentsia have come to think that the
military option is only part of the solution and that the problem
should be resolved within the economic and political context of a
democratic system with the participation of all groups.

In this framework, the economic solution of
the issue now plays a dominant role and has the priority on the
agenda. According to the SPO report, most investments and economic
activities in the South-East are carried out by the state, which is
the largest employer in the region. Private sector activities are
negligible compared with the western part of the country. As long as
the present economic conditions are not improved gradually and if the
gap between the western and eastern parts of the country continues to
broaden, no settlement will be possible for the time being and
prospects would be more difficult for the future.[19]

Some commentators hope that Ankara will
make some cultural and linguistic concessions and allow the Kurds to
form their own political parties. Certainly, these small steps would
contribute to solving the problem but would not resolve the
fundamental economic issue: a firm and permanent political solution
cannot be achieved unless it is linked to the economic performance of
the country as a whole. There are two pre-conditions for the region’s
economic development to catch up with the rest of Turkey: (1) the
Turkish State must regain the trust of the people and re-establish
law and order with their participation; and (2) a new and long-term
oriented economic and social development plan must be prepared and
enforced immediately in cooperation with the State, private business
and local representatives.

The development plan should have a two-fold
economic target. On the one hand, State economic activities should be
replaced by private enterprise. So far, the Turkish State has
invested huge amounts of money for infrastructure and created job
opportunities for the limited amount of local civil servants and
around 40,000 ‘village guards’ that are dependent on the
financial support of the government. At this stage, the ‘war
economy’ is the main source of economic activity in the region.
Many people would face losing jobs if the armed struggle were to
cease. The private incentive should be based on small-size
enterprises and small farmers must be financially supported and
protected by the State as regards market conditions for a certain
period. For these purposes, a creative, profit-oriented business
class for the region is requisite, who can take risks in managing
economic activities.

The necessary financial funds can be
created from three sources: (1) the introduction of new
‘extra-solidarity funds’ in the form of new taxes for the
South-Eastern region, such as for the former East Germany after
unification; (2) funds from international institutions and special
financial help from the EU should be channelled towards the region;
and (3) the State should support investments and production plants in
the region by helping domestic and foreign investors from outside the
region through credit guarantee funds, venture capital funds, tax
exemptions and reductions and discounts in the cost of services. If
all these measures hold, rapid economic growth could change the
region’s face and economic structure, while also positively
affecting its social structure and helping to abolish the feudal
system. Meanwhile, the transformation process might be accompanied by
new infrastructure investments in the field of education, health,
roads and trade. A region with increasing self-confidence and a
growing economy linked with the western part of the country and
neighbouring nations would not only help the people in the region but
also contribute to Turkey’s economic development.

An Assessment
The impression is that many politicians and
people still believe that the failures of the Parliamentary system
and governments can be corrected and their interests be protected by
the military, as occurred in 1960, 1971 and 1980. However, in the
long term globalisation and international competition will continue
to re-enforce the democratisation process and help correct
deficiencies. Reforms would undoubtedly be a long and sometimes
painful and costly process, and the results less immediate. Thus, an
economic liberalisation process should go hand in hand with a
political liberalisation programme. Interest groups, who have
continued to benefit from Cold War conditions in economic and
political terms, are trying to maintain their status quo with all
instruments available and on all fronts. For all that, the
democratisation of Turkish society is proceeding in cooperation with
the EU. It became obvious since 1991 that, first, the country’s
necessary radical transformation process cannot be realised with the
traditional policy instruments and practices based mainly on Cold War
approaches within the old structure, and, secondly, that the degree
of transformation will largely depend on the replacement of the
politicians and civil servants who served in the Cold War period by a
more open-minded generation. Those who desire the replacement of
leadership in the political parties have, however, not yet
demonstrated their willingness and ability to set in motion and
resolutely effect tough, long-overdue processes of change.

Turkey has adopted all the political and
economic institutions,[20] the rule of law and the fundamental principles of Western-type
democracies, especially from Western Europe. However, it has not been
able to enhance the quality of these institutions by having
highly-qualified civil servants and experts. In other words, the
institutions have not been fully respected and have been unable to
gain a strong upper hand.[21] The basic problem seems to be the unwillingness, weakness and
operational inability of the political power to restructure the state
apparatus from bottom to top over time, under changing national and
international circumstances. Knowing what is the
right policy is not enough, it is also necessary to have both the
political will and the power to implement it.

In our view, it seems to be a serious
mistake to argue that political and economic liberalisation can be
achieved through the re-Islamisation of Turkish society. The most
suitable way would be the re-interpretation and the modification of
the fundamental principles on which modern Turkey is based. It means
that, as the Congress Party did in India by introducing comprehensive
economic reforms in 1991, Ataturk’s party –the CHP–
should renew itself by organising a great ‘reform convention’
to discuss and update all political and economic principles
established by the founder of the Republic.[22]

It is a fact that economic and political
challenges can be tackled by the political power within a free
democratic society. Among the basic challenges facing Turkey are the
quality, willingness and capability of Turkey’s political
power. History shows that besides Atatürk’s revolution,
which was achieved by a strong hand from above in the 1920s and 30s,
the reform movements in the country were initiated and were mostly
put into effect under pressure or sometimes blackmail from external
forces or/and external anchors. Neither the late Ottoman rulers nor
the governments of the Republic after 1950 were able to reform
political and economic institutions of their own will. Interestingly,
since the foundation of the Republic in 1923 none of the elected
governments was able to introduce a new constitution or amend the
current one deeply enough by their own initiative. All three
republican constitutions implemented over the past 80 years –1924,
1960 and 1982– were put into effect by the military or by
military regimes after a coup d’etat.

(5) What Will the Future Look Like?

Security aspects
US President Bill Clinton underlined the
importance of Turkey for the region and for the US itself in a speech
addressing the Turkish Grand National Assembly on 15 November 1999.
He said that ‘Turkey has become an engine of regional growth.
In the months ahead, together we will launch new projects worth
billions of dollars mostly in the energy sector, to bring jobs to
Turkey and to bring our two nations even closer’.[23] Turkish-American cooperation not only covers co-operation in the
newly-independent states of the Caucasus and Central Asia, but also
in the Balkans. Turkey has demonstrated its loyalty to NATO and also
underlined the importance of its strategic position for any possible
and perhaps inevitable regional conflicts. Then the Turkish
government stated its intention of sending Turkish troops to conflict
regions such as Afghanistan, Somalia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo
under UN and NATO Commands. Washington supported Turkey joining
multinational peacekeeping forces in Bosnia-Herzegovina in the
framework of the Dayton Accords and in Kosovo. The US as the leading
military force within NATO helped to end those wars and to establish
peace in the Balkans. Furthermore, Washington supports the close
Turkish-Israeli cooperation in the Middle East.

There are still no clear-cut and
well-defined common European security and foreign policies regarding
the Middle East, Central Asia and the Caucasus. Each member country
follows its own interests and takes its own decision, as seen in the
Iraq war in 2003. In this respect, it is not surprising that the
Europeans were also unable to redefine and to clarify their security
and economic interests for the next decades in their relations with
Ankara as Washington did.[24] The EU still considers Turkey a bridge between Europe and the East,
and as a bulwark against the growing of danger of Islamic
fundamentalism and terrorism. In conclusion, it can be argued that
Turkey will remain in NATO both for its own security and for the
security of other member countries as long as NATO exists.

Economic Aspects
Turkey already reaps substantial economic
benefits thanks to the Association Agreement signed with the EEC in
1963. After a series of negotiations, the
agreement to establish the Customs Union was signed on 6 March 1995.
With the final approval of the European Parliament in December 1996,
the last barrier for accession to the Customs Union was to be removed
as of 1 January 1996. According to the decision (No 1/95) of the
Turkey-EC Association Council of 22 December 1995 on implementing the
final phase of the Customs Union, Turkey would first eliminate all
custom duties, quantitative restrictions, all charges having
equivalent effect to customs duties and all measures having
equivalent effect to quantitative restrictions in trade with the EU
as of 1 January 1996.

This meant that Turkey had to open its
economy completely to international competition. The Customs Union
only covers the free trade of manufacturing commodities and processed
agricultural products and not primary products and services. In
the experiences of other member countries, the Customs Union would
bring more costs than benefits in the short run. However, as far as
the long term is concerned, the economic integration process with the
Community will help Turkey transform its economy and catch up with
the EU. Aside from the question of Turkey’s full membership of
the EU, Turkey will be fully integrated into the European Single
Market in the next decade.

At this stage of economic development, the
new markets in the region have a complementary character and cannot
replace the markets in the industrialised countries in the near
future. The Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC) and the Islamic
countries cannot provide serious alternatives to economic relations
with the OECD and particularly with the Community. Only an
economically strong country, which is fully integrated with the
world’s most advanced economies, can have influence and play a
leading role in the region.

Europeanisation Process
To join the EU, a new Member State must meet three criteria:[25]

Political: stability of institutions
guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect
for and protection of minorities.

Economic: existence of a functioning
market economy and the capacity to cope with competitive pressure
and market forces within the Union.

Acceptance of the Community acquis:
ability to take on the obligations of membership, including
adherence to the aims of political, economic and monetary union.

The negotiation process will help Turkey
reduce its democratic deficiencies through adopting and implementing
European norms and standards. If Turkey is able to complete the whole
process successfully, its political and economic role in the region
could change markedly.

We will have to wait and see whether
institutional changes through the adaptation and implementation of
the Copenhagen Criteria over time will have any radical impact on
Turkey’s political system, political culture and mentality, and
therefore on its economic institutions and lead to long-term
sustainable economic growth. There are two scenarios for Turkey’s
future role in the region:

If Turkey enters the EU as a full member,
then it will coordinate its political and economic activities with
the EU. This means that Ankara will be fully integrated in the
European security, economic and common foreign policy realms and it
will follow policies in coordination with and on behalf of the EU.

If Turkey fails to become a full member of
the EU, for whatever reason, it will be integrated into the European
Economic Union, remain in NATO and complete its Europeanisation
process. In that case there could be four possible sub-scenarios:

Privileged partnership: Turkey is fully
integrated in the European Economic Union but not in the Political
Union.

Membership of the Mediterranean Union.
These two options have been strictly rejected by Turkish
governments.

Forever a candidate: in this scenario the
negotiation process can continue forever without a happy end,
letting Turkey hope against hope in the future.

Turkey can follow an
independent foreign and security policy concerning its own national
interests in close cooperation overwhelmingly with the US in the
region. In an extreme case it could be fully anchored in the Middle
East with all the features of an Islamic society.

In order to achieve its proclaimed target
as a regional power, it is obvious that the need for political and
economic change and its implementation made the initiation of radical
reform measures in all fields of political and economic life
inevitable. Therefore, the changes in political attitude and the
rethinking process seem to be pre-conditions for an adjustment in the
new international order after the collapse of the bipolar system,
which existed since 1945. Turkey has been challenged both
domestically and internationally and the pressure on it has therefore
been mounting. At this stage, the country’s need for a
political power with a long-term perspective, vision, determination
and willingness has become very urgent, as the country wonders who
will be able to establish internal political and economic stability
and solve current problems with well-prepared programmes within a
democratic pluralist system.

As a final note, it is sometimes forgotten
that Turkey is a successor State to the Ottoman Empire and that it
rests on the latter’s heritage. The good and bad experiences of
the Ottoman times should help Turkey overcome its internal and
external problems and to build genuine cooperation, progress and
prosperity by working side by side with its neighbours and allies for
an enduring peace in the region.

Bahri YilmazEU Jean Monnet Professor and Professor of Economics at Sabanci University

[2]
Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit said in his government program (Programme
of the 57th Government, presented to the Turkish Parliament –TBMM– on 4
June 1999): ‘Turkey’s traditional strategic importance and weight has
become all the more pronounced as a result of recent developments in
the Balkans, Caucasia, Central Asia, the Black Sea, the Mediterranean
region and the Middle East. Turkey is now a key player in this axis,
which might be called the process of “Euroasianisation” (Avrasya). Our government is resolved to make use of the
opportunities and responsibilities of this position of our country to the benefit of our nation’.

[4] Decision No:1/95 of the EC-Turkey Association Council of 22 December
1995, Official Journal of the European Communities, Turkey,
13/II/1996.

[5] In December 2004, the European Council said that: ‘The
European Council welcomes the decisive progress made by Turkey in
its far reaching reform process and expressed its confidence that
Turkey will sustain that process of reform […]. Turkey
sufficiently fulfils the Copenhagen criteria to open accession
negotiations [...]. The European Council invites the Commission to
present to the Council a proposal for a framework for negotiations
with Turkey with a view to opening negotiations on 3 October 2005’.

[6] Bahri Yilmaz (forthcoming), ‘The World Economic Crisis and its
Impact on the Turkish Economy’, CarnegieMelon Middle
East Center, Beirut.

[7] It is commonly accepted that the impressive economic performance
between 2002 and 2007 was supported by three basic factors: (1) a
favourable international environment based on expanding word trade,
relatively low inflation, low interest rates and strong demand for
emerging market assets; (2) the important role of two external
anchors, namely the IMF and the EU, in the implementation of the
structural reform process and in establishing macroeconomic
stability through sound fiscal and monetary policies during the past
six years; and (3) the reform of economic institutions under
pressure from external anchors and the full engagement and
participation of the State’s apparatus in the process.

[8] Another AKP tactic was the so-called takkiye, defined as the
‘permitted behaviour of disguise for the sake of promoting the
cause of Islam or furthering Islam in Turkey and elsewhere as a
modern way of reconciling Islam with democracy’. Between 2002 and 2008, the AKP was trying to provide job
opportunities for its supporters and important echelons of power
were occupied by bureaucrats who were close to the governing party.

[9] The short- and long-term economic and political deficiencies and the
still incomplete part of the Copenhagen criteria were underlined by
the European Commission in the Progress Report on Turkey over the
period 2002-07.

[10] William Chislett (2009), ‘Turkey’s
EU Accession Reaches an Impasse’, Working Paper nr 34/2009,
Elcano Royal Institute, p. 1: ‘In
Turkey, the pace of reform has stalled. By June 2009 only around
one-sixth of a self-developed list of legal reform measures
announced in April 2007 had been passed. Global rankings show that
the country is seriously underperforming in a wide range of areas.
It stands 59th in the World Bank’s latest Doing Business
Report, 58th in Transparency International’s 2008 Corruption
Perceptions Index, 75th in the Heritage Foundation’s 2009
Economic Freedom Index, 84th in the latest UN Human Development
Index, 102nd in the Reporters Without Borders 2008 Press Freedom
Index and 123rd in the World Economic Forum’s Gender Gap
Index. It is listed as only “partially free” in Freedom
House’s 2008 Freedom in the World Report, and as a “hybrid”
regime, ranking 88th, in the Economist Intelligence Unit’s
first-ever survey of democracies (2007)’.

[11] Roger Cohen has named the opposing sides as the ‘secular
fascists’ of the Kemalist establishment and the ‘Islam
of fascists’ of the ruling AKP. See Roger Cohen (2008), ‘The
Fight for Turkey’, New York Times, 23/VI/2008.

[13] The second model is the English pluralist model. Under this, each
individual belongs to a multiplicity of communities and there is a
backbone of common legal rules and principles that must apply to
all.

[14] The senior prosecutor of the Republic, Abdurrahman Yalcinkaya, has
made the charges official by asking the constitutional court to shut
AK down because it has become ‘a centre for anti-secular
activities’. In a 162-page indictment, the prosecutor argued
that AK is using democracy as a vehicle for imposing sharia law. He
asked the court to slap a five-year ban on more than 70 AK
officials, including the Prime Minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, and
the President, Abdullah Gül. However, the Constitutional Court
decided not to ban the AKP because although it voted six to five in
favour of the ban, a seven-vote majority was needed. The chief judge
said the party would be deprived of its state financing for a year,
and said this was a ‘serious warning’ to it.

[16] Some European and US media seem to underestimate the importance of
‘secularism’ in a Muslim world. They suspect the
decisions to be taken by the Turkish Constitutional Court concerning
the banning of the AKP: ‘But Turkish secularism can be overly
fundamentalist, implying not just a healthy separation of church and
state but the total control of religion by the state. As for the
constitutional court, it has a spotty, partisan record and a history
of banning political parties, not always with good reason. Some 24
parties have been banned in Turkey since 1961 (against only three in
Western Europe since 1950)’ (Economist, 12/VI/2008, p.
16b and 64), See also Economist, ‘Flags, Veils and
Sharia’, 19/VII/2008, p. 33-36; and Wolfgang G. Lerch, ‘Der
türkische Graben’, FAZ, 19/VI/2008, p. 1.

[17] Some academics believe that ‘A resentful, authoritarian, and
nationalist Turkey would be the opposite in every aspect. More
broadly, the success of Turkey’s experiment in synthesising
Islam, secularism, and liberal democracy would be a rebuke to the
clash of civilisations argument” (Ömer Taşpınar,
2007, ‘The Old Turks’ Revolt. When Radical Secularism
Endangers Democracy, Foreign Affairs, vol. 86, nr 6, p. 130).
Ziya Öniş argues that ‘… one of its (AKP)
objectives is to extend the boundaries of religious freedom and
encourage religious diversity as opposed to challenging the notion
of secularism itself...’ (Ziya Öniş, 2006, ‘Turkey’s
Encounters with the New Europe: Multiple Transformations, Inherent
Dilemmas and the Challenges Ahead’, Journal of Southern
Europe and the Balkans, vol. 8, nr 3, December, p. 287. Almost
the same political arguments, using the same sources, is presented
by Asiye Öztürk (2009), ‘Der innenpolitische Kontext
des aussenpolitischen Wandels der Türkei’, Discussion
Paper/Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik/Bonn.

[18] See decisions given by the European Court of Human Rights regarding
‘headscarf at the universities, headscarf in the public
services and the ban of the “Welfare Party”, the mother
party of the AKP, the application of pupils from the religious
schools (imam-hatip Lisesleri) for the military schools. See http://www.echr.coe.int/ECHR,
European Court of Human Rights.

[19] See ‘Research for Social and Economic Grading’, DPT/SPO,
Ankara, December 1966, p. 98.

[20] We define political power as the set of politicians, political
parties and free elected governments. See Daron Acemoğlu,
‘Political Economy of Development and Underdevelopment- What
are institutions’, Gaston Eyskens Lectures, Leuven, 10/X/2005,
and Daron Acemoğlu, Simon Johnson & James Robinson (2005),
‘Understanding Institutions’, Lionel Robbins Lectures,
LSE, 23-25/II/2005.

[21] According to opinion polls by the International Republican
Institute, 86.5% of Turkish citizens trust the military forces more
than any other institution including the political power. See Yalçın
Doğan, Hürriyet, 10/VI/2008.

[23] The White House, ‘Remarks by President Bill Clinton in an
Address to the Turkish Grand National Assembly’, Office of the
Press Secretary of the American Embassy, 15/XI/1999.

24[] The new European security interests are defined in general and
imprecise terms: stability, prosperity and peace in Europe and its
neighbourhood. see Heinz Kramer, ‘A Changing Turkey’, p.
223.

[25] Any
country seeking membership of the EU must conform to the conditions
set out in Article 49 and the principles laid down in Article 6(1)
of the Treaty on European Union. The relevant criteria were
established by the Copenhagen European Council in 1993 and
strengthened by the Madrid European Council in 1995. They were
finally stated in the Lisbon criteria set by the European Council
Meeting in Lisbon in December 2007.