This book, the culmination of Benardete's masterful translation of what Jacob Klein wasReview:

November 2004

Plato's most disturbing political dialogue

This book, the culmination of Benardete's masterful translation of what Jacob Klein was pleased to call `Plato's Trilogy,' includes not only a translation of `The Statesman' but also a superb commentary with notes. (Benardete, btw, is something of a rarity these days, a `non-political' student of Leo Strauss.' This `trilogy' (as Klein would say) in question consists of 3 dialogues; Theaetetus, Sophist, Statesman. But, as Benardete points out, the Sophist and Statesman belong together as a pair. The singular appearance of the Eleatic Stranger - some translate `Stranger' as Visitor - and the near silence of our Socrates, the inability (or unwillingness) of Plato to give us a third dialogue (as seemingly `promised' at 217a) called `The Philosopher,' all this points to the unique pairing of Sophist and Statesman. Benardete also points out that these 2 dialogues are the only ones with specific and "explicit allusions" to each other.

In turning away from the Sophist and turning towards the Statesman we are leaving the rarefied heights (and obscure depths) of theory, and its imitators, for the `lowly' everyday world of political/social life. Indeed this `turn' can perhaps be said to be foreshadowed in the Sophist (at 247e) when the Stranger makes a remarkably `Nietzschean' definition, "I'm proposing, in short, a definition (boundary mark): `The things which are' are not anything but power." Being as Power! Plato is not Nietzsche, however. Plato always hedges. The `proposal' is perhaps only made to convince some so-called `improved' materialists to leave their `artless' materialism. But later, when speaking to some `friends of the forms,' who are `idealists' like Socrates, the logic of this dialectic forces the Stranger (249a) to say, "But, by Zeus, what of this? Shall we easily be persuaded that motion and life and soul and intelligence are truly not present to that which perfectly is, and its not even living, not even thinking, but august and pure, without mind, it stands motionless." Thus materialists and Idealists are `forced' to concede that being is the ability to affect and be affected.

Later, at 249c-d, the Stranger will speak of this arrangement in such a manner that it reminds us of compromise between two warring parties. But compromise, and the seeming impossibility of enduring compromise, brings us towards the very heart of the Statesman. Socrates is going to die. (It is tragically fitting, perhaps almost necessary, that Benardete ends the final installment of his commentary on the Triptych Theaetetus/Sophist/Statesman with the words "Socrates is about to go on trial.") Death, the threat of death, hovers above these pages as it does around political life. "The Statesman is more profound than the Sophist" Benardete (p III.142) correctly reminds us. It is profound for several reasons. Benardete brings at this point to our attention just one: "Virtue consists in the strife of the beautiful with the beautiful." The metaphor/image/standard for morality in the Sophist - health - is replaced in the Statesman by beauty. ...Perhaps it is true that `we have beauty so we don't die of the truth' as Nietzsche somewhere remarked. But he fails to mention that we now die of beauty instead of truth.

The two types of beauty that are at war are courage and moderation. "Dialectics, it seems, is the practice of resolving the strife between moderation and courage." Benardete, I think correctly, indicates there is, and can be, no final reconciliation between them. Indeed, it seems there is no natural mean between them. "Nature might herself be neutral, but her apparitions are always skewed and cluster around either one of two partial kinds." Men and women are emblematic images of courage and moderation, the ever-present reminder that they can never simply be the same.

But the City can, in theory, also be either moderate or courageous. A city of the first sort, "moved by the spirit of accommodation, such a city ends up enslaved, its unwilled and inadvertent cowardice hardly separable from its stupidity." A city of the second type, "in contrast, looks at every other city as its enemy. Its' insight is too keen. The otherness of the stranger [foreigner] is for it so absolute that it must be constantly engaged in war, until it brings upon itself either its enslavement or destruction." This last, the beautiful error of courage, could only not be an error if the courageous city never lost. "The Stranger disregards the possibility that such a city might never fail and thus achieve a universal empire." But this is the beautiful modern dream of Kojeve and his universal homogenous state; it is not the dream of the Stranger or, I think, Benardete and Plato.

Not that a universal state is, for Benardete at least, impossible. "But apart from the difficulty that it [the courageous city] would then be forced to turn against itself if it were not to give up its own nature, the myth [of the Reversed Cosmos, 268e] has taught us that God alone is capable of universal rule, and even he is periodically forced to abandon control. Excessive moderation then, is more a danger to the city than the hubris of courage. The nature of things is more disposed to check the tyranny of a part over the whole than the enslavement of a part to a part. We perhaps might believe that the Stranger in this regard is a shade too hopeful." It seems that while Benardete thinks the Universal State, ala Kojeve, is technically possible, it would be a calamity. It would not be entirely an exaggeration if we were to observe that the major difference between `non-political' or philosophical Straussians and those Straussians actively involved in politics is that the latter no longer believe that the Universal State is necessarily a calamity.

Be that as it may, Benardete points out that while the city executes, exiles or disgraces those courageous natures that oppose it, the moderate it merely enslaves. This only seems, btw, to contradict what Benardete said earlier about moderation being a greater danger. The greater danger to the city qua city is moderation; the most dangerous individuals, however, are always courageous. "The city cannot afford excessive courage; it cannot dispense with excessive moderation." But the binding of "moderation and courage, which the paradigm of weaving [279e] implies, cannot be accomplished politically."

Indeed, we turn from the political to the biological and psychological. Intermarriage (of the moderate and courageous) and education (for common opinion) replace (or augment) pure politics, as the proper form of the paradigm of weaving. "The Stranger's solutuion, then, really amounts to this: the true King assigns the members of courageous families to the city's army, and the members of moderate families to its lawcourts." Benardete doesn't here mention it but in this manner the City itself, the institutions of the city itself, are forced to mimic the Guardians we meet in the Republic; they are fierce to enemies but gentle towards friends. Benardete then observes that "the Stranger does not even hint at which families are to supply the rhetoricians of the city." Or which family supplies the weavers or true Kings.

Benardete fills the penultimate paragraph with observations on how it is very difficult to get the members of the different families (courageous and moderate) to love each other. One can convince them that the `mixed' marriages are best but one cannot make a married couple into lover and beloved by education alone. "Insofar as Eros is love of the beautiful, and not identical with sexual desire, these most suitable marriages are against the grain of Eros." Each `family' sees itself only as beautiful. But the city requires that each family marry its non-beautiful other. "And, likewise, since the divine bond of the city consists of opinions about the beautiful, just and good, which are for the wise statesman nothing but prescriptions for the health of the city, the city through the law incorporates in its ruling families as little satisfaction of the requirements of pure mind as of the needs of Eros." Thus the laws of the city satisfy neither the mind nor the eros of citizens. ...But the city is healthy; and the citizens bodies are protected and sated.

"The law, said the Stranger, is like a stupid and willful human being. We now know what this means. The law combines the vice of moderation with the vice of courage and thus passes itself off as the perfect weaving into the web of justice of the beautiful with the beautiful. But the true synergy of mind and Eros in soul was the impure dialectics of Socrates, and Socrates is about to go on trial." By `impure' dialectics Benardete means a dialectic that is a mixture of moderation and courage. The philosopher Socrates is about to die so the city can live. The city, or, if you prefer, its laws, are an inverted philosopher. The city and its laws are stupid and willful, while the philosopher is both moderate and courageous. ...In any city Socrates would die....more

To begin with, I will start by noting that this book contains a commentary by Lampert on the essaReview:

January 2009

Nietzsche, Strauss, and Philosophy

To begin with, I will start by noting that this book contains a commentary by Lampert on the essay 'Note on the Plan of Nietzsche's "Beyond Good and Evil"' written by Leo Strauss. It also contains the original essay by Strauss. This is a wonderful place to begin to learn of the 'political' esotericism of the philosophers. Lampert is probably the most insistent, and easily the most informed, voice (among admirers of Strauss) maintaining that there are deep similarities between the thought of Nietzsche and Strauss. Today, the defenders of Leo Strauss prefer to see him as a Platonist. But, as Stanley Rosen (perhaps the greatest student of Strauss) has gently pointed out, the unwillingness of Strauss to even mention, much less discuss, the Platonic Ideas makes Strauss an extremely peculiar Platonist - to say the very least!

I believe he is currently working on a book on Nietzsche and Plato tentatively entitled 'Nietzsche and Ancient Times'. It will continue Lampert's task of reinterpreting the history of philosophy in a Nietzschean manner. All the published books are excellent. But keep in mind the strategic nature of all philosophically esoteric works. They reveal as much as they hide. ...Digression ends.]

Lampert is, however, in this superb book, at pains to explain why Leo Strauss was not, in fact, a Nietzschean either. Indeed, since Lampert (who is, unlike Rosen, a 'Nietzschean') maintains that Strauss has given us, in his brief essay on Nietzsche ("Note on the Plan of Nietzsche's 'Beyond Good and Evil'"), the best reading of Nietzsche available, Lampert must show the deep reasons behind the refusal by Strauss of Nietzsche. It is certainly not that Strauss did not learn from Nietzsche, or that he somehow failed to see the profundity of his thought... But first, I would like to highlight the unique form of this book. This book by Lampert is what medieval philosophers would've called a 'supercommentary'; that is, it is a commentary upon a commentary. Leo Strauss, in his essay, writes a commentary upon Nietzsche's 'Beyond Good and Evil' (BGE), and now Lampert writes a commentary upon that commentary. All three authors are esoteric (or, if you prefer, 'esoterically-aware') writers. This means we must read very carefully, referring back and forth from text to text to text. It is a bit like playing Tri-Dimensional Chess!

So why isn't Strauss a Nietzschean? Well, before we get to that we must understand that there are more than a few Nietzsche interpretations out there; of which Lampert's is among the most acute. Briefly, and perhaps most importantly, Lampert argues that far from being 'the village atheist' Nietzsche understands the importance of Religion: it is the Poetry of Everyday Life. However, according to Nietzsche (and Lampert) the monotheisms we live under betrayed today for tomorrow and hated this world in the name of the next. It is these religions of 'tomorrow and elsewhere' that Nietzsche entirely rejects.

Before we get back to Strauss perhaps a bit more about Nietzsche, as interpreted by Lampert, is in order. Now Lampert maintains, quite emphatically, that Nietzsche is no enemy of modern Science. Although this is, strictly speaking, correct we must keep in mind that the Nietzschean Aufklärung, when compared to modern 'popular' enlightenment, is peculiar in that it is only genuine philosophers who are actually enlightened. One could argue that not even scientists, in the new Nietzschean dispensation, are (philosophically speaking) 'enlightened'. The "real interests" of the scientist and scholar, according to Nietzsche,

"lie usually somewhere else, in his family, say, or in making money, or in politics; indeed, it is almost a matter of total indifference whether his little machine is placed at this or that spot in science, and whether the "promising" young worker turns himself into a good philologist or an expert on fungi or a chemist:--it does not characterize him that he becomes this or that. In the philosopher conversely, there is nothing whatever that is impersonal; and above all his morality bears decided and decisive witness to who he is--that is, in what order of rank the innermost drives of his nature stand in relation to each other. (BGE, section 6)"

The "real interests" of the scholar and scientist lie elsewhere; they are not, in any necessary way, at all with the 'enlightened' activities of (say) chemistry and philology. But the truly enlightened activity (i.e., philosophy) of the genuine philosopher is all he is consumed with. In this way Nietzsche reminds us that while philosophy cannot actually 'enlighten' anyone, non-philosophers can still participate in enlightened activities...

But why doesn't Nietzsche just come out and say this? Nietzsche believes the world must be changed and so he sets out to do so. This process of changing that Nietzsche begins causes many problems for both philosophy and world. Not the least being the fact that in exposing the esoteric maneuvers that philosophers used to make (what he was pleased to call 'Platonism') Nietzsche runs the risk of people searching for his maneuvers. Nietzsche needs to say, in effect, 'we are all done with that esotericism. It belongs to the bad old days.' This is the story that Nietzsche (and Lampert) must be heard telling in order not to be decapitated by the guillotine he builds for prior philosophers.

Lampert, of course, does not see it exactly this way. He speaks often of Nietzsche's 'probity'. For instance, he says that, "For Nietzsche, the Platonic lies are both false and base. And both judgments claim a scientific foundation; intellectual probity employing the tools of rational investigation of natural phenomena shows them to be false and base (p. 170)." Hmmm... One wonders exactly which rational 'scientific' tool discovered Dionysus, and which one has proven 'Eternal Return'... Or is it that Science has not (or cannot) disprove them? - But all this really is quite besides the point! Science, despite what its popularizers and idolators say, is, according to Nietzsche, only a method, not a repository of 'Truth'. "It is not the victory of Science that distinguishes our nineteenth century, but the victory of scientific method over science ('Will to Power', 466)." Now, no mere method can ever bring peace to the City.

So Nietzsche creates a non-base (note that we do not dare say non-false) esotericism. In 'Ecce Homo' Nietzsche (in the brief chapter on BGE) speaks of the Yes-Saying and No-Saying parts of his work. He indicates that Zarathustra is the former and the several books that followed Zarathustra (BGE included) are the latter. We can perhaps infer from this that while Yes-Saying (this "great expenditure of goodness") might have been difficult for him, no-saying would prove to be be most difficult for his readers... In any case, it seems to me that one can make a better case for a Nietzschean Aufklärung (=Science of Wisdom) from the post-Zarathustran books than from Zarathustra itself. Zarathustra is purposefully beyond any science... The No-Saying post-Zarathustra books are merely intended to destroy the various 'false and base' Platonisms (whether religious or secular) and to prepare the way for the noble Zarathustrian world.

As we saw, Lampert correctly reminds us of the Nietzschean distinction between noble and base. But the distinction noble/base reminds us of the psychoanalytic distinction between sublimation/neurosis. Just as the latter ultimately refers to 'socially acceptable' and 'socially unacceptable' actions so too the former distinction refers to 'life-affirming' and 'life-denying' actions. Now, orthodox Freudians objected to this understanding of sublimation and neurosis because it made sublimation and neurosis equivalent. Indeed, what was sublimation in one culture could be neurosis in another. In other words, I am maintaining that both pairs of distinctions (noble/base, sublimation/nuerosis) refer to circumstances and nothing but circumstances. One suspects (I almost typed 'fears') that everything that philosophy makes (the 'noble') must eventually be destroyed because in later, changed circumstances this 'noble' activity or speech will, in actual fact, be 'base'. Thus Nietzsche overturns Plato and, eventually, some Philosopher eventually appears and overturns Nietzsche. This process could only stop if circumstances could be entirely understood. Unfortunately, there is no Science of circumstances...

To this problem Political Philosophy is supposedly the answer. You see, Philosophy Itself (Socratic questioning) is a danger to the political health of all cities and all regimes. First, it makes you doubt the political 'health' of your city; then it makes you doubt the possibility of cure, and finally, and most dangerously, you come to doubt the possibility of disease. And so we fall from 'philosophical' criticism, to despair, and lastly, to decadence. This decadence leads to either nihilism or rebirth; that is, for Nietzsche, to either a dark age or a new 'religion'. We now understand how philosophers of the stature of Plato and Nietzsche could be so 'tolerant' of Religion. While it is true that philosophy is the greatest summit that the individual can reach; Myth is the health of the City (that is, Civilization). For the City, Myth is at one and the same time the antidote to Nihilism - and to Philosophy. But, fortunately and unfortunately, myth is not a cure. Every Myth eventually falls...

So, Myth and Philosophy can never be one. Philosophy destroys ones faith in the City (I mean any City); Myth saves the City. Nietzsche famously remarked that perhaps 'the gods too philosophize' (BGE, section 294) and he elsewhere said that philosophers 'do not believe that there are any men of Knowledge' (Gay Science, Book 5, section 351.). As Nietzsche indicates, Philosophy (i.e., the love of Wisdom) is itself an admission that one is not entirely Wise. It was the Sophists who were deluded enough to think that they simply knew. Some people read that the 'gods too philosophize' and purr... "Oh you see! The gods are just like us, lovers of Wisdom!" Of course, this is not exactly what Nietzsche is indicating. The 'gods too philosophize' means that there are no Knowers (weep here) anywhere; that even a genuine 'Revelation' (I mean by that even one that actually was coming from a 'god') would merely be another opinion. In the end, genuinely philosophical enlightenment is accepting responsibility for what one cannot possibly know. But this genuinely philosophical 'enlightenment' does not help any City. The genuine philosophers, whether gods or men, can only help it by concocting myths, made of pre-existing materials, that bring some order, peace and joy to the City. So, one can perhaps say that philosophical myth is (in part) the penance philosophy (as Critique) pays for corrupting the youth of the City. Platonic/Nietzschean esotericism is the penalty philosophy forever pays for Socrates corrupting the youth of Athens...

But what of Leo Strauss? What of his esotericism? Does he toe the Nietzschean/Platonic line and accept the necessity of philosophico-mythical world-making? Well, of course, the answer is no. In order to have done so he would've had to practice 'metaphysically' speculative mythology as Plato (Timaeus, e.g.) and Nietzsche (in Zarathustra) certainly did. Strauss famously does nothing of the sort. Now, what can esoteric philosophy, without the speculative metaphysical component be? ...Could it be Nihilism? Two quotes might be in order here:

First, Rosen will go so far as to say, while alluding to the Medieval legend of the Golden Apple in intricate settings of Silver (Golden Apple = Philosophy), that "Strauss's ambiguity consisted in directing our glances through the small holes in the silver filigree, but in such a way as to give the distinct impression that there was no golden apple within. Inside the silver, as it were, was more silver, perhaps of a purer alloy than the exterior, but in no sense the promised gold." (Stanley Rosen, The Golden Apple, in "Metaphysics in Ordinary Language," p. 65.)

Lampert asks, "Does the public good always depend upon public identification of one's own with one's people or nation? When a public Science has discredited the grounds of such localism and provided a new basis for appreciating the unity of our species across space and time and within the whole staggering array of species, and when history continues to testify to the dangers of such local loves and hates, can it serve the interests of philosophy to make it seem that philosophy itself is tied to such beliefs?" (p. 173)

If one reads the history of philosophy in the manner Spinoza advised us to read the Bible (searching for what the authorities always agree upon, discarding all else) one is left with two points only. First, the struggle towards ever greater universality, and secondly, the war against nihilism. Without the 'yes-saying' component of Nietzsche's philosophy (i.e., Zarathustra) Straussian esotericism is yet another form of genealogical unmasking; the 'no-saying' that the post-Zarathustrian books called forth. Who does Leo Strauss most remind us of? The great philosophical esotericists (Plato, Maimonides, Nietzsche) and their Cosmogonies and Mythographies? No, the works of Strauss contains nothing of the sort. One fears that in the end Strauss is, along with Deleuze, Derrida, and Foucault, one of the Nietzschean 'no-sayers' who merely unmask words, power and (alas) philosophy itself. - But they can neither make nor save anything... The Straussians will object, pointing to their masters 'patriotism' and thus denying his nihilism. However, siding with an old universalism (American liberal capitalism) that cannot possibly win is to side, actually and in effect, with but another particularism (or localism). As Nietzsche said,

"In rare and isolated instances it may really be the case that such a will to truth, some extravagant and adventurous courage, a metaphysician's ambition to hold a hopeless position, may participate and ultimately prefer even a handful of "certainty" to a whole cartload of beautiful possibilities; there may actually be puritanical fanatics of conscience who prefer even a certain nothing to an uncertain something to lie down on - and die . But this is nihilism and the sign of a despairing, mortally weary soul: however courageous the gestures of such a virtue may look." (BGE, section 10)

Thus, as Nietzsche indicated long ago, the inability to believe a philosophical myth, a noble lie, is itself also nihilism... A note to all our Straussian realists!

Philosophy, the struggle towards an ever-greater Universalism and the struggle against Nihilism, demanded so much more of a thinker of the stature of Strauss. ...Sigh. By incorporating the cosmological and mythological into his philosophical esotericism Nietzsche has revealed himself to be an ancient, by refusing to do the same Strauss is revealed to be a (post)modern....more

This is an extremely profound meditation on the failure of Theory and Practice toReview:

August 2006

Theoria, Phronesis, Techne, Nomos and Circumstance

This is an extremely profound meditation on the failure of Theory and Practice to ever sync up; the Eleatic Stranger turns from celestial Theory (i.e., Philosophical Speculation, Science as Wisdom) to earthly practice; from the Ideas to techne (merely technical 'theory', i.e., a craft). Man is no longer the erotic lover of the Ideas, but rather the fabricated animal, or, the animal in need of fabrication to be complete--to be civilized. Humans, of course have a nature, as Rosen points out, "to be partially constructed is already to possess a nature." But we are not natural like deers or wolves. The rules of civilization are imposed. But there are no (certain) rules regarding the creation of civilization. Thus there is no foolproof technique, no adequate Theory, to construct a civilization given an unknown future. In other words, the people and their politicians, and perhaps even our philosophers, are faking it. In a world in which the rulers are guessing as much as the ruled, the question becomes who, in each instance, guesses best. So, who can be trusted with the fabrication of civilization?

Well, since each case will need to be judged on its own unique merits, each action, though grounded in tradition and/or Theory, will be based, at best, on an informed guess. There is no science of politics because there is no science of the future. "Because phronesis [right judgment] rules without laws but by making a judgement that is unique in each case, or at least determined in each case by the particular circumstances that cannot be known in advance, it is impossible for the Stranger or anyone else to give a logos, in other words, a detailed description or account, of phronesis or its decisions." Or, in plain English, political knowledge (as Science) is impossible, which is why the Stranger doesn't bother entertaining questions to which answers don't exist. But not anyone can rule. Plato, and his philosophical epigoni, will tell `Noble Lies', what we can perhaps refer to as myth and ideology, in order to care for the human herd.

Why? Because without someone defending the human herd from the elements (seasons and storms), beasts (wolves), and, as we all know, other human herds (barbarians), humanity itself may well cease to be civilized. But since there is no Science of the future why turn to philosophers ('True Kings')? Because the people, even the peoples' leaders, know less, and are worse, than philosophers. Just as ship captains or doctors know more about the sciences of navigation and health, so too philosophers know more about humanity than the average citizen, or, for that matter, the average king. So, perhaps philosophers know more than the people, but are they better? The Eleatic Stranger tells the story of an assembly that decides it "will no longer submit to this abusive conduct [of captains and doctors] but will ourselves legislate about medicine and navigation, whether or not we know anything about these matters." Of course, as Rosen points out, the story is a parody of democracy, but all parodies point to something real.

The reason that the people (i.e., non-philosophers) can't rule is not merely their lack of technical expertise--remember, the Stranger is not denying the utility of technical skill, only its all-encompassing efficacy--but their unruly souls. Even if the people were technically competent they would still be unfit for rule because of their lack of self-control, their slavery to passion. This is why philosophers are better. Rosen will note, "it is extremely odd that, precisely while showing the unruliness of the multitude, the Stranger talks as if it were due to a lack of technical knowledge. This is a thesis of the scientific Enlightenment." Rosen is right to draw our attention to the modernity of the Stranger, at times he speaks as if he had read Condorcet or Adam Smith, so strong is his certainty that the human situation is manipulable! Rosen's point, however, is that once you know that the people have unruly souls it becomes irrelevant how much skill the people have, or can learn. Knowledge doesn't make bad people better; it makes them dangerous. Thus the people's leaders, with their 'knowledge', may be the most dangerous of all.

Let us recapitulate, phronesis is unattainable, or, what in the long run amounts to the same thing, unpredictably attainable. We never know when we will be graced with a philosopher. Technos is within reach of a few, but, since it is not wisdom, it is merely an ersatz phronesis. Those that aren't truly wise rely on (a merely technical) theory. But even technos will never be within reach of the many. Now, that is why we have Nomos, or law, which is a cheapened form of a debased wisdom (technos). Rosen tells us that, "[the Stranger] begins by assuming that the laws should be changed whenever circumstances make it reasonable to do so." Since everything changes, laws that once were useful, and therefore good, become enormities. The greatest enormity being that once the people have been taught, perhaps we should say trained, in a certain way of life, it becomes almost impossible to change them, to turn them in another direction. Again, phronesis is the best, but since philosophers aren't always around when you need them, we resort to technos, but since merely technical theories and their rules are subject to continual revision, with said revisions not always either teachable or an improvement, nomos (law) becomes our last resort, but, as Rosen observes, "conservatism is at best only a tactic," a miserable war of attrition until a philosopher or a merely technical ideology (or myth) appears with the knowledge or force necessary to cause change. It is interesting to note that Rosen here seems to understand philosophical conservativism as permanent revolution.

So, philosophers tell noble lies, myths and/or ideologies in order to make civilization possible, which, perhaps, is nothing more than putting off the day of ruin. As Rosen says, "A myth is a story, it is a fiction, something that is not true. And yet this untruth, which we hesitate to call a falsehood, is able to communicate deep truths." One is forced to wonder if myths do communicate deep truths, or simply cause deep truths to be embodied, or lived, by the people. The Stranger, when choosing metaphors, will compare the craft of the statesman to weavers, doctors and gymnasts, crafts that operate on the body and its behavior. As Rosen says, "Politics is oriented toward the body; but philosophy, or the genuine art of statesmanship, is oriented toward the soul." One is tempted to ask if philosophy cares for the citizens' bodies because they have no souls? This would go a long way in explaining why modern philosophy, with a clear conscience, turns humans into mere artifacts. Humans are things anyway. Or, as Nietzsche said, "We are entering the phase of the modesty of consciousness." It amazes us that to this day one can meet people who read those words as libratory! The coming practitioners of human husbandry will know how to evaluate those words far better than we do...

But this is the difference according to Rosen, between ancient philosophy and modern philosophy (i.e., ideology). Ancient phronesis defended the human body against nature, beasts and men in order to create a space in which philosophical care for the soul was possible, or at least available. Ancient philosophical interventions were defensive. Modern philosophy (i.e., ideology) has gone on the attack and wishes to change the nature of both man and world. Thus we can say that the 'right' of ancient philosophers to rule rests on their self-control. Phronesis rests on moderation, not the 'philosophical mania' of Theory. While modern philosophy cum ideology rests on the 'philosophical' mania of a merely technical theory.

...But what, exactly, is the difference between an 'offensive' and 'defensive' philosophical construction, if as the Eleatic Stranger seems to maintain, there is no erotic vision of the Ideas vis-à-vis phronesis? If Theory is irrelevant to human action, as the Stranger also seems to maintain, then the difference between offensive and defensive philosophical constructions is entirely circumstantial...

Perhaps there are some problems that do not have answers. The richness of Rosen's analysis can only be hinted at in a review like this. There is utterly no edification at all in this book....more

Excellent. By far the wisest anti-Nietzschean. While you're at it also read 'The Question of Being: A Reversal of Heidegger' which also contaiComment:

Excellent. By far the wisest anti-Nietzschean. While you're at it also read 'The Question of Being: A Reversal of Heidegger' which also contains a great deal of material on Nietzsche. Rosen knows many things about Nietzsche, to the point that the best Marxist commentator on Nietzsche, Geoff Waite, has cribbed some of his best anti-Nietzschean moves from Rosen....more

Excellent. "Enactment of the Nietzschean agenda in science and politics promises a new sense of the sacred, a return of Dionysos and Ariadne."Comment:

Excellent. "Enactment of the Nietzschean agenda in science and politics promises a new sense of the sacred, a return of Dionysos and Ariadne." Or, as Nietzsche once said, from time to time there is magic. Nietzsche, unlike our academics, recognizes that reason must be supplemented by 'magic'. Now, this 'magic' can be understood as either a cosmological or a psychological category -or both. This is one the greatest unstated difficulties in Nietzsche interpretation. That is - do we understand his 'magic' as cosmology or psychology?...more

Jacob Klein is often describes as a 'Straussian' - but of course this is perfectly untrueReview:

March 2007

A note on 'pre-political' Esoteric Practices

Jacob Klein is often describes as a 'Straussian' - but of course this is perfectly untrue. Leo Strauss and Klein (and perhaps even Alexandre Kojeve too) either stumbled upon the practice of pre-modern philosophic esotericism on their own and/or while in contact with each other. Well, this last is an exaggeration too, it is more likely that Kojeve picked it up from the other two rather than his arriving at it entirely on his own as an original insight. Now, all three of these thinkers had been exposed to the greatest song-and-dance man (i.e., Martin Heidegger) of twentieth century philosophy in their formative periods and thus his maneuvering was a great influence on them all. Besides this, Strauss was deeply influenced by several non-Christian Medieval Philosophers (e.g., Alfarabi, Averroes, Maimonides) while both Klein and Kojeve seem to have been almost entirely innocent of the influence of these Falasifa.

In the letters exchanged between Strauss and Kojeve ('On Tyranny', Revised and Expanded Edition, U. Chi. Pr., 2000) we see the regard and respect these two thinkers had for Klein. For instance, in the letter of 8/22/48 Strauss says of his interpretation of Xenophan that "I know of no one besides yourself [i.e., Kojeve] and Klein who will understand what I am after...' (p. 236). This respect for Klein was shared by Kojeve: in a letter of 3/29/62 Kojeve says, "Except for yourself [i.e., Strauss] and Klein I have not yet found anybody from whom I could learn something." (p. 307). There are, by the way, several amusing asides about Kleins almost legendary indolence. I share one example that might be apropos here: "Klein claims to have finished his book on the Meno -only three more months for checking on the footnotes- but since he has said more or less the same three years ago I believe I shall have to wait another lustrum for its appearance." (Letter of 5/29/1962, Strauss to Kojeve, p. 309).

Well, Klein was, in fact, as Strauss divined only 'about' finished (the published date, 1965, is three years after the amusing remarks of Strauss above) but the result, this book, was well worth waiting for. Now, why has this book been in print for 40 odd years? -Because the 'Meno' dialogue is so popular? To be honest, I rather doubt it! It is because the 'Introductory Remarks' at the beginning of this book contain one of the best brief discussions of how to read Plato -that is, how to take into account Plato's esotericism- that I am aware of. In fact, if a novice were to ask me where to first learn of Plato's art of 'cautious writing' - this is the first book I would send him to.

Why? Because Klein gives an extremely acute explanation (and demonstration) of the ancient way of employing esotericism as a method (and a necessity!) of 'soulcraft'. Klein begins the Introductory Remarks by acclimating the student to the notion that the Platonic dialogues are dramatic encounters and not some sort of failed Aristotelian treatise. (It is shameful how many academics still think that it is a great pity that Plato did not write Treatises!) It is in the intercourse between the actions and speeches of the participants in these dialogues that Plato's meaning and intentions emerge. Klein correctly tells us that the dialogues "intent is to imitate oral instruction." In order to do this Plato writes mini-dramas that subtly indicate more than they say.

A means of doing this is irony. But Socratic Irony was not the same as the older types of irony. "The old Irony of the tragic or comic reversal of fortune they perfectly appreciated. But this new kind, which had a trick of making you uncomfortable if you took it as a joke and of getting you laughed at if you took it seriously? People did not like it, did not know what to make of it. But they were quite sure it was Irony." Socratic Irony, unlike the irony of the theatre, intends to force you to reveal yourself. Uncomfortable? - You should be! Plato is neither simply telling a story nor, less simply, lecturing us on philosophical issues; - Plato is trying to get us, dear readers, to reveal our very souls!

Thus Klein says that for any statement to be ironical in the Socratic sense "there must be someone capable of understanding that it is ironical." Socrates "is not ironical to satisfy himself." We are all called upon to be 'silent participants', not 'indifferent spectators' of these dialogues. Klein correctly adds that, "a (Platonic) dialogue has not taken place if we, the listeners or readers, did not actively participate in it..." The Socratic Dialogue is a form of writing that must be completed by our active, but dialogically silent, participation. But why should we participate?

Klein quotes a scholar, "The dialogues are dramas in which the destiny of the human soul is at stake." But to the scholar Klein here quotes the give and take in the dialogues is only a sport of curious aesthetic appeal. Klein will have none of it: "We have to play our role in them too. We have to be serious about the contention that a Platonic dialogue, being indeed an 'imitation of Socrates,' actually continues Socrates' work." The dialogues are notorious for their many difficulties (aporias) and it often seems Plato had no solution at all. But "we are compelled to admit to ourselves our ignorance, that it is up to us to get out of the impasse and to reach a conclusion, if it is reachable at all. We are one of the elements of the dialogue and perhaps the most important one."

Now, this must not be taken to mean that "the dialogues are void of all 'doctrinal' assertions." But a Platonic doctrine is not a philosophical system in the modern sense. "The dialogues not only embody the famous 'oracular' and 'paradoxical' statements emanating from Socrates ('virtue is knowledge,' 'nobody does evil knowingly,' 'it is better to suffer than commit injustice') and are, to a large extent, protreptic plays based on these, but they also discuss and state, more or less explicitly, the ultimate foundations on which those statements rest and the far-reaching consequences which flow from them. But never is this done with complete clarity." It is we who supply the additional clarity by engaging in philosophy. Thus Klein warns us away from fitting Plato's dialogues into some scholarly developmental scheme or reducing it to some technical vocabulary. These are but shadows that the history of Platonism has thrown. But, as Klein correctly says, "it is the familiar that Plato is bent on exploiting."

But he is exploiting the familiar through written words. And written words are, according to Plato, inherently playful; that is, imitative. (See the Phaedrus, and also Sophist 234b, on this theme.) Written texts "cannot defend themselves against misunderstanding and abuse." They resemble living thought but, like statues, they are dead and do not respond to changing circumstances but always maintain the same stance. This is why Plato wrote dialogues in which it is necessary for us to participate; he hoped that by doing so he could make his dialogues resemble living thought. "In brief: a written text is necessarily incomplete and cannot teach properly." In the Phaedrus we learn, according to Klein, that the best texts, "in addition to being playful, can serve as 'reminders' [...], that is, can remind those 'who know' of what the written words are really about."

"Now, Phaedrus and Socrates agree that spoken words can be clear, complete, and worthy of serious consideration provided they come from one who 'knows' - who knows about things just, noble and good - and who also knows, as Socrates insists, how to 'write' or 'plant' these words in the souls of the learners, that is, possesses the 'dialectical art' as well as the 'art of healing souls' which enables him to deal discriminatingly with those souls and even to remain silent whenever necessary." Now, this last is also why Plato writes in a dialogical manner; not only to engage in the great soul-shaping work of philosophy, but also in order to remain silent when necessary. But how can a dialogue do both? It can't "if the written text is to be taken in its dead rigidity." But it can if "the written text gives rise to 'live' discourse under conditions valid for good speaking." Again, the Platonic dialogues demand our active participation in order to be successful.

As if to underscore the lived, changing nature of well-written philosophical texts Klein reminds us that after the myth of the origin of the cicadas in the Phaedrus "we hear Socrates interpreting freely the speeches he himself made, assuming the role of their 'father', that is, supporting and defending the truth in them, adding to them, omitting the doubtful and changing their wording..." How Socrates treats his earlier speeches is how we are to treat Socratic dialogues, we are to continually interpret and, when necessary, reinterpret them. We are to treat the dialogues as conversations in which we must participate in order to get anything out of them. We are, when properly engaged in a Socratic dialogue, attempting to understand Socrates, Plato, philosophy and ourselves.

This soulcraft that Klein is here, at the beginning of the 'Introductory Remarks' to his 'Meno' book, speaking of has utterly nothing to do with the parroting of some doctrine. "Words can be repeated or imitated; the thoughts conveyed by the words cannot: an 'imitated' thought is not a thought." Indeed, in reading and interpreting a Platonic dialogue we reveal who we are. Treat the dialogues, and yourself, with the thoughtful seriousness they deserve.

So we see that Klein, here in the 'Introductory Remarks', has given us a masterful explication of an ancient esotericism too often today forgotten; an esotericism focused on individual soulcraft and not merely or exclusively on political philosophy. It is important to realize that these two esoteric strategies are not entirely in harmony. But what of Klein and Strauss? Are they in harmony? I think the major difference between the two is the medieval philosophers, especially Farabi. He was the first (see especially his 'Attainment of Happiness' e.g.) to use esotericism almost exclusively to manufacture 'politically useful' philosophical artifacts without (seemingly) even the slightest concern for soulcraft. Strauss follows Farabi in this; also, like Farabi (see the 'Philosophy of Plato', e.g.) Strauss gives an entirely political reading of Plato.

Whenever we see Leo Strauss speak of 'Platonic Political Philosophy' we need to immediately add that this Platonic political philosophy has been filtered through Alfarabi. So then, do Klein and Strauss simply disagree about the Platonic Art of Cautious Writing? No, of course not, that would be an exaggeration. Of this notion of readers of Platonic Dialogues as 'silent participants' in the dialogues Klein says that "it certainly obtains whenever Socrates himself is the narrator of the dialogue." But what of the dialogues (e.g., Sophist, Statesman, Timaeus, Laws) in which Socrates is not the principle speaker? Are the principle speakers (Eleatic Stranger, Timaeus, Athenian Stranger) in these dialogues primarily engaged in the art of soulcraft like Socrates? Or, are they, like Farabi and the medieval falasifa, primarily engaged in what might be called social damage control and 'philosophical' artifact making? Insofar as they are doing the latter one can perhaps be forgiven for saying that the split between Socrates' esoteric Platonic soulcraft and Farabi's esoteric political Platonism was already known to, and anticipated by, Plato himself.

Now, Klein isn't oblivious to the difference between esotericism as politics and esotericism as soulcraft. Indeed, even in the latter part of the 'Introductory Remarks' that we have here only begun to consider, he goes on to broach the subject of political esotericism. For those interested in Klein's take on the latter I can recommend his detailed study 'Plato's Trilogy' which includes a discussion of the Eleatic Stranger in 'The Sophist' and 'The Statesman'. I give 'Plato's Meno' five stars for the discussion, defense and demonstration of the ancient esoteric practice of soulcraft, which today, is too often forgotten....more

A note on the unending work of Political Philosophy: Republic, Statesman, Laws

A great source of perplexity to students beginning to study Pla3/30/2007

A note on the unending work of Political Philosophy: Republic, Statesman, Laws

A great source of perplexity to students beginning to study Plato's political philosophy is the question of how the three political dialogues -Republic, Statesman, Laws- hang together. In this brief note I would like to touch on how these three dialogues might be related. At first blush it might seem they have very little in common. Indeed, they do not even share a common primary speaker! The Republic has Socrates, the Statesman has the stranger from Elea, and the Laws has an Athenian Stranger as the primary speaker. We tend to think of the Republic as a revolutionary utopianism, the Statesman as a somewhat aloof, and occasionally absurd, philosophical description of politics, and the 'Laws' as a conservative paean to the traditional virtues. But is there a way of showing that these three dialogues (and the three speakers) do not merely contradict each other but rather correct each other thanks to Plato's allowing each dialogue to represent only a partial truth that we readers must put together with the others in order to see the whole Plato was aiming at? Let's start at the beginning:

Political philosophy truly begins with Plato. There is a crisis in Athens, various sophists and rhetoricians are spreading disrespect for the traditional gods and morality of Athens. In this manner, Athens reminds us of modernity and its fundamental disbelief in traditional values. In 'The Republic' Plato has Socrates (remember, Socrates is only another character in Plato's dialogues, and for all interpretive intents and purposes he is nothing more; the Platonic dialogues are not to be confused with biography) silence the rhetor Thrasymachus by demonstrating the chaos that ensues if everyone does as he pleases. That is, Thrasymachus learns from Clitophon and Polemarchus parroting his points (Book I) the consequences of his sophistry of power. The consequence being that rhetors and sophists will no longer be necessary (or employed) if everyone comes to think exactly as Thrasymachus does... Socrates then demonstrates to Thrasymachus that seductive rhetoric (and, of course, seductive rhetors) will have a role to play in the newly made Platonic Republic. Socrates, with his city built in speech, successfully seduces Glaucon, his brother, and the rest to accept a suitably modified 'city of pigs' - that is, a city in which all mind their own business. The 'city of pigs' (Book II, 372d), of course, is how Glaucon describes the moderate city that the philosopher Socrates is perfectly content to live in. The rest of the Republic, as I said, is little more than Socrates skillful seduction of Glaucon and the rest to accept a modified version of this moderate city. That is, they are to come to accept a city in which everyone minds his own business and has only one job, which is what Socrates' definition of justice demands. But is Socrates' moderate city, once modified, still moderate?

Another question that each of us must decide as we read this text; does Plato's Socrates deceive? - Oh my! At 389b-d Socrates tells us that the ruler of the City, and only he, may lie. Now, are Philosophers rulers? But the whole point of the Republic is to show that there can be no peace or justice until philosophers do indeed rule! Thus we are led to suspect that it is only the Philosopher-King who may tell 'noble lies'. But before philosophy actually rules must it not also tell lies to non-philosophers in oder to achieve the crown? Now, note that near the beginning of Book I (331e) Socrates asks if it is just to lie to the insane. But certainly, I hear many of you objecting, Socrates cannot possibly mean this of the splendid exceptional young men presently (i.e., in this dialogue) gathered around him. Indeed, later at 459c-d, Socrates seems to argue that the lying ruler is only a type of physician. Perhaps philosophical ruling is necessary only because of the sickness in the souls of non-philosophers? What!?! ...It really is quite remarkable how often the insane do not even know they are insane! Now, is the 'treatment' that the philosopher-physician Socrates demonstrates in this dialogue always and everywhere effective? No, for instance, there is nothing that either converts or silences Callicles in the 'Gorgias'. Thus Socrates, and his utopian revolution, fails to bring peace to Athens. (True, at the end of Plato's Symposium 'peace' finally reigns, but everyone has been seduced by words and sedated by drink.) Indeed, the historical Socrates is in fact understood by Athens to be part of the problem, and not a solution. Thus the later Plato elects to modify (or correct) the famous, garrulous Socrates with the silent, unknown Eleatic Stranger.

In Plato's 'Sophist' and 'Statesman' the taciturn Eleatic Stranger is forced to speak. Philosophy must battle Sophists and Statesmen over what can be said and what can be done. The Stranger demonstrates (i.e., acts out, not explains) the difficulty of seeing (and showing) the differences between Sophist, Statesman and Philosopher. Also, note that in the 'Sophist' he shows us how difficult it is to `know' as opposed to (and distinct from) making while in the Statesman he shows the impossibility of mixing (or weaving) flawed types of people into an unflawed whole. Since the weaving of flawed types into a supposedly 'unflawed' whole is an example of making the resulting 'unflawed whole' cannot, in fact, be an example of knowledge. This means that the Eleatic Stranger could not bring philosophy to the City any more than Socrates could. Thus no matter who rules the City Socrates is going to die... Also, always keep in mind that the dramatic date of the action of Sophist/Statesman coincides with the beginning of Socrates trial. Thus the Statesman ends with the Eleatic Stranger leaving the City behind and, in effect, saying to Socrates that there is nothing in the city, for us, but death. I would be remiss if I did not mention that in the 'Statesman', a rather short Platonic dialogue, there are more confusions, errors and repetitions than in any other dialogue that I am aware of. This is due to the fact that the Eleatic Stranger, unlike Socrates, views the political from the viewpoint of theoretical philosophy. From this viewpoint the political is madness itself! But does the Eleatic Stranger also tell 'noble lies'? In a sense yes, at 242b (in the Sophist) the Eleatic Stranger tells Theaetetus that everything he (i.e., the Eleatic Stranger) says is said out of regard for Theaetetus. But note that these philosophically 'noble' lies that the Eleatic Stranger is 'forced' to tell are not really said for the sake of the City; they are only necessitated by theory and pedagogy. The Eleatic Stranger doesn't seem to have the slightest interest in changing the City.

Now, be that as it may, we wonder what becomes of those that must continue to live in a world that condemns a Socrates to death? Plato rejects both the irresponsible silence of the Eleatic Stranger and the responsible silence that results from Socrates' murder by Athens. In 'The Laws' Plato has the Athenian Stranger (Socrates returned from the dead, according to Aristotle) teach the sovereignty of Nomos (law), while in Plato's 'Timaeus' Plato has Timaeus spins fabulous myths about creation and the God to enchant everyone. Thus Plato strove to save philosophy from the city and the city from philosophy by allowing philosophy to be seen revering what the city reveres - that is, laws and myths. But do note that the Laws dialogue ends with the concoction of the so-called 'Nocturnal Council' which is to have power to revise all the Laws (keep in mind that this must also mean laws regarding the gods) in the city whenever necessary. It is in this manner that the 'noble lies' philosophy tells are embodied in an institution hidden within the city itself. Thus the philosophical 'conservatism' of the aged Plato is in reality the founding document of the permanent revolution of Western Philosophy. Or, to put all this yet another way, the utopian revolution that was loudly proclaimed in the Republic has been replaced, in the Laws, by the machinations of the nocturnal council, which operates behind everyones back. Thus the 'philosophical conservatism' in the 'Laws', that has been so-often denounced by modern scholars, is in reality a call, but a call only made to to genuine philosophers, to permanent revolution!

There are those among us who are coming to believe that the 'History of Philosophy' is, in reality, nothing but the record of the maneuvers of our philosophical 'nocturnal council'. But this would be how the Platonic Revolution became perpetual philosophical reform; there is simply no end to it......more

The radicalism and centrality of (philosophical) politics for the Muslim philosopher Farabi (around 90010/14/2004

A Superior work by a superior scholar

The radicalism and centrality of (philosophical) politics for the Muslim philosopher Farabi (around 900 CE) is the first thing that greets you, like the bristling edge of a row of thorn-bushes, in this amazing book; that uncomfortable impression never leaves you. Mahdi situates Farabi in the midst of neoplatonic philosophers intent upon harmonizing Plato and Aristotle. "Yet the complete absence from his [Farabi] authentic writings of the central Neoplatonic philosophic doctrines -of the One, Intellect, and Soul- should have been sufficient to suggest to students of Islamic philosophy who read him that they were in the presence of a philosopher who made use of certain elements drawn from the Neoplatonic philosophic tradition but whose Neoplatonism must remain suspect."

We are shown how Farabi denies(!) that revealed religion is in any real sense an innovation and we are also shown the underlying similarity between pagan and monotheistic religion. "Alfarabi's treatment of these subjects in his works on political philosophy and religion is not an innovation. It points to the similarity between the virtuous royal craft or art and the art of the lawgiver, between the virtuous city as envisioned by Plato and the religious community based on revelation." It seems that Mahdi is here indicating that Farabi said (of the Prophet) what Machiavelli said (of Moses in 'The Prince', chapter 6) many hundreds of years later. ...They were great political (and/or philosophical) innovators, nothing more. Now we find ourselves nervously wondering, has (political) philosophy then made everything?

But why does (political) philosophy make what it does? "The opinions expressed in these two works [Farabi's 'Virtuous City' and 'Political Regime'] not only originate in a political context (in that they are legislated) but are politically relevant, important, and even crucial. For they point to the ends (or the view of happiness) for which the actions are performed, a fundamental subject matter of political science." This suggests that happiness is the fundamental subject of political philosophy. But, as I hope we all know, philosophy itself aims to make men reasonable, not happy. These two views, it should be noted, may not be entirely compatible.

...But what of philosophy proper and its interest in the Cosmos? Is it too an artifact of political philosophy? "The question here is whether, and to what extent, the cosmos and the human body are already interpreted politically or certain conclusions of scientific inquiries are modified to make them more adequate opinions for the citizens and to present them as patterns for the construction of the city" One is tempted to say that if the founder of a religion (or political philosopher masquerading as founder) decides what can be said and not said about cosmos, body and soul then there is only political philosophy.

But the City (and its myths and opinions) cannot be entirely built on myth and opinion otherwise Science and Philosophy could not survive. ...Not any myth is good. "For it is precisely the relationship between science and the city that is at issue," Mahdi correctly reminds us. "Differently stated, the integrity of scientific knowledge should be maintained even when it is used to help form the opinions of the citizens." Can science and philosophy remain free of opinion and myth while spreading myths and opinion among the people? The problem, one suspects and fears, is that after a millennium or two, the differences between philosophy/science and opinion/myth tend to blur. ...Who, for instance, can dare say they see with utter clarity after 2000 years of the 'Platonism for the people'?

Or to perhaps state the same question in another manner: The City (opinion, myth) becomes more real the longer it survives. Its reality challenges the ancient 'realities' of Cosmos and Soul, or if you prefer, nature and individual psyche. The difficulty is twofold; nobody knows how to change nature or the human soul, or even if this can be done. But, and this is the second difficulty, we do know how to change the city, its opinions and myths. Changing religion or regime (these are both the city) is far easier than changing cosmos/nature or soul/psyche.

Thus political philosophy would seem to be doomed to only treat opinion and myth. How does philosophy, or if you prefer, political philosophy, maintain its status as science in such circumstances? Would a medical science that only treated symptoms, never causes - indeed; some of the symptoms were even caused by this so-called medical science - still be worthy of the title of Science?

We have only here scratched the surface of the issues dealt with in this book. I only give 4 stars because in the future I will want to give 5 stars to Farabi himself....more

"The first edition of this collection, published by Pennsylvania State Universit10/11/2004

Difference between the 1993 edition and the 2004 edition is:

"The first edition of this collection, published by Pennsylvania State University Press in 1993, contained a third section, which included several essays by scholars dealing with one or another aspect of the work of Strauss and Voegelin or with comparisons of their work. Partly for reasons of space and partly because the past decade of scholarly work would require significant revision of these papers to make them as useful today as they were then, we have omitted them from this edition." Introduction, 2004 Edition, p XXIII.

The 2004 edition only contains section 1, the correspondence between Strauss and Voegelin, and section 2, which consists of 4 essays - 2 by Voegelin and 2 by Strauss, and NO section 3. ...It would have been only sporting if this had been mentioned in the editorial remarks for the 2004 edition here on the Amazon site. And, to add insult to injury, if you click on the link 'look inside this book' (on the 2004 edition page) it shows you the index (of the 1993 edition) with the absent third section included! You are NOT getting, in the 2004 edition, essays by James L Wiser, Hans-Georg Gadamer, Stanley Rosen, Thomas J.J. Altizer, Timothy Fuller, Ellis Sandoz, Thomas L. Pangle and David Walsh. A pity - the Gadamer, Rosen, Altizer, Sandoz and Pangle pieces look quite interesting.

The collection of letters is well worth owning. I give only three stars because the absence of section 3 was never mentioned....more

This book, first published in 1964, is very difficult, if not impossible, to finReviewed 08/24/2006

Ancients and Moderns - but where are the Medievals?

This book, first published in 1964, is very difficult, if not impossible, to find. And then the price one must pay is absurd. I suspect, given the notoriety/popularity of Leo Strauss (LS), that the reason it was never republished is that too many contributers would either change or withdraw their contributions.

In any case, the contents and full title are as follows:

Ancients and Moderns: Essays on the Tradition of Political Philosophy in Honor of Leo Strauss

Edited by Joseph Cropsey

Leo Strauss on his Sixty-fifth Birthday p. v

Preface by Joseph Cropsey p. vii

I Sophocles' Oedipus Tyrannus by Seth Benardete p. 1

II Human Being and Citizen: A Beginning to the Study of Plato's Apology of Socrates by George Anastaplo p. 16

III Aristotle, An Introduction by Jacob Klein p. 50

IV Aristotle's Poetics by Laurence Berns p. 70

V Two Horses and a Charioteer by Peter H. Von Blanckenhagen p. 88

VI The Emperor Julian and His Art of Writing by Alexandre Kojeve p. 95

VII Averroes on Divine Law and Human Wisdom by Muhsin Mahdi p. 114

VII Natural Law in Albo's Book of Roots by Ralph Lerner p. 132

IX Bastards and Usurpers: Shakespeare's King John by Howard P. White p. 148

X Grimmelshausen's Laughter by Hans Speier p. 177

XI Hobbes and the Transition to Modernity by Joseph Cropsey p. 213

XII An Outline of Gulliver's Travels by Allan Bloom p. 238

XIII Montesquieu and the Classics: Republican Government in the Spirit of the Laws by David Lowenthal p. 258

XIV Mill's On Liberty by Hillail Gildin p. 288

XV Political Philosophy and the Search for Truth by Henry M. Magid p. 304

The Writings of Leo Strauss p. 317

Index p. 323

What really first shocked me in this collection is the absence of al-Farabi and Maimonides. While the notion of esoteric writing in the ancients still meets with stout opposition, it is generally accepted among students of Islamic and Jewish Philosophy. Now, any philosopher, in order to be heard, in order for his works to endure, will make concessions to some special form of ignorance. - I mean to the ignorance that is typical of his time. (Those that don't do this end up like our poor Epicurus; author of 300 books, of which today we only have some scraps.) For instance, LS himself makes a 'concession' in writing in a manner that covers over the profound differences between philosophers and their 'exceptional' readers (i.e., he allows these readers to believe, thanks to the imposition of a method -esoteric reading- that they are now reading [and thinking] as philosophers do). Of course, LS never denies the difference between philosophers and their methodologically conjured imitators - he just allows his readers to forget it. Now, I think, LS had learned the difference between the three partners (philosopher, exception, herd) in that ménage à trois we call Humanity in Farabi ('Book of Letters') and also (probably) in Averroes. He almost certainly learned of the importance of method in the 'Attainment of Happiness' by Farabi.

Actually, I have to confess that more and more I am being won over to the notion that the genuine center of LS' thought is neither Plato nor Xenophon (or, I hasten to add for the cynics out there, not even Nietzsche) but rather Farabi. The 'Freedom to Philosophize' is an entirely different issue in the shadow of universal medieval monotheism (and indeed, its avatar, modern universal ideology) than it ever was in the shadows of the Agora. It was Farabi that first realized that we were no longer living in what LS refers to as the 'first cave' (i.e., the human world before philosophy began remaking it). Farabi's understanding, as it came to be incorporated in Averroes, became the fuse that led to the explosion of European Enlightenment. It was Farabi that first notices the possibility, in the 'Book of Letters' for instance, of a sort of 'detente' between the jurists (i.e., the politically oriented 'exceptions') and the philosophers. ("The jurist resembles the man of practical wisdom.") Every 'detente' is aimed at some third party. We can all see what this becomes in Averroes' 'Decisive Treatise'. The jurists, of course, are the 'politicos' (in the Islamic landscape) that Averroes intends to set against the theologians. It is this turn to the 'politicos' by the medieval philosophers (thanks mainly to the subterranean consequences of Latin Averroism) that leads, albeit indirectly, to our Modernity.

I want to point out that the 'downplaying' we see in LS of the difference between philosopher and his readers is really not very different from what we see in the Medieval Aristotelianism (downplaying here means making philosophy exotericly dependent, in the end, on theology) of Ibn Sina, Maimonides and Aquinas. This is not, given our experience of the myriad unpleasant consequences of Enlightenment, something to be simply deplored. By the term 'downplaying' (concessions to some 'special form of ignorance') I mean, for instance, Ibn Sina's tactical employment of 'neoplatonic' gestures side by side with Aristotelianism. With Maimonides we can also see a thinker making a concession to popular belief in his understanding of prophetology. Maimonides agrees with the falasifa (Islamic philosophers) that prophecy is a 'natural' disposition but quickly adds that God can 'miraculously' choose to withhold it. ...Of course, this is but another of our concessions. So the problem with all genuine philosophers, as I understand it, is not the concessions they make but rather the utility of those concessions - in our time and also in the philosophers time. That there are limits, philosophical limits, to what can and cannot be conceded to theology is demonstrated even by Aquinas in his refusing to say (in the last book of Summa Contra Gentiles) that the Trinity, Incarnation, Sacraments and Resurrection can be philosophically demonstrated.

In fact, even though Aquinas is not, strictly speaking, an esotericist, (in fact, among many 'Straussians' he is an object of contempt) he is also trying to walk a line between philosophy and theology; insofar as he sees that there is a line we can see that he is no mere theologian. Every genuine philosopher walks a line between his time and philosophy. Seeing the concessions they make is one thing, and a relatively easy thing; seeing why they made them, the constraints they were under and what they hoped to achieve with each concession, is entirely another (and far more difficult) matter. It may now be impossible to reconstruct what Aquinas hoped to achieve, btw, because what followed him (in the wake of the disastrous Condemnation of 1277) was not in any real sense Thomism. The 'Via Moderna' is at bottom, I think, but a Latin form of Islamic Kalam (i.e., Speculative Theology). ...But just as we 'enlightened' (and Straussian) moderns do not think any less of (say) Averroes because philosophy (in Islam) was inundated by theology so too we should perhaps consider cutting Thomas similar slack here in the West. It is only because the tactical manner Averroes intended to proceed ('detente' between philosophy and the 'political' jurists) led to us (I mean OUR modern un-philosophical way) that we tend today to think of Averroes as different in kind than Aquinas. ...But this is all merely a result of OUR faith in the 'political'.

You will but rarely find this book up for sale. Your best hope is a college library. The essays by Benardete, Klein, Kojeve and Mahdi are, imho, most worthwhile. If another edition of this book (or an entirely new book) honoring LS (and his understanding of the esotericsm of the philosophers) were to be published I would plead for essays on Farabi and Maimonides. It is also utterly scandalous that there are no essays on Xenophon, Machiavelli and Spinoza in a book honoring the contribution of LS. The strength of the esoteric position LS pioneered lies in its readings of the ancients, medievals and some early modern philosophers. Four stars for this book, five stars for a book revised along the lines just sketched....more