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Biometrics Collection and Explore Broader Data Sharing' which was
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Report to Congressional Committees:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
October 2008:
Defense Management:
DOD Can Establish More Guidance for Biometrics Collection and Explore
Broader Data Sharing:
GAO-09-49:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-09-49, a report to Congressional Committees.
Why GAO Did This Study:
The events of September 11, 2001, and operations in Afghanistan and
Iraq have made it critical for military units to identify individuals
they encounter and share this information with other units and federal
agencies. Biometrics are unique personal aspects such as fingerprints
and iris images used to identify an unfamiliar person. Federal agencies
with national security missions, such as the Departments of Homeland
Security (DHS) and State (DOS), need access to certain biometrics data
gathered by the Department of Defense (DOD). GAO was asked to determine
to what extent (1) DOD has guidance on the biometrics data to be
collected to support military activities, and (2) there may be gaps in
biometrics information shared between DOD and DHS. This is a public
version of a For Official Use Only report, GAO-08-430NI, issued in May
2008. GAO examined DOD’s guidance for field collection of biometrics
data, biometrics sharing agreements, and information on national level
efforts to enhance data sharing.
What GAO Found:
DOD has issued guidance on the biometrics data collected from
individuals who are detained or allowed access to U.S. bases in Iraq,
but has not issued guidance on data to be collected during field
activities where U.S. forces encounter hostile or questionable
individuals such as in Afghanistan and Iraq. DOD has allowed commanders
to determine the type of data to collect, such as fingerprints or iris
images, during their operations. GAO’s analysis showed that allowing
for this flexibility results in the collection of different data that
are not necessarily comparable to each other. Some units may collect
iris images while others collect fingerprints, which are not comparable
data. Broader national security implications can arise, such as
military personnel’s inability to identify someone who has harmed or
attempted to harm U.S. or coalition forces. These newly collected data
are not necessarily comparable with data collected by other units or
with federal databases that store biometrics data, such as the FBI’s
fingerprint database, DOD’s biometric database, or the DHS biometric
database. Having a standard set of data would help ensure consistent
identification and confirmation of an individual’s identity thus
allowing forces to compare data across multiple databases in different
commands. A standard set of data also would allow for comparison of new
biometrics data collected in the field with existing biometrics data.
DOD shares biometrics data that it collects on non-U.S. persons with
other federal agencies through a variety of inter-agency agreements,
but some gaps in data sharing may remain. Since the events of September
11, 2001, the President and Congress have issued policies that require
agencies to share counterterrorism information, and agencies have in
turn issued their own policies. National efforts to develop policies
about such information sharing are still in development. In January
2007, the Deputy Secretary of Defense issued a memo that stated that
DOD would immediately adopt the practice of sharing, when asked,
unclassified DOD biometrics data records with other U.S. agencies that
have counterterrorism missions—this includes data related to terrorism
information but excludes data pertaining to U.S. persons. According to
a DHS memorandum, DHS is not regularly receiving updates on certain
types of DOD biometrics data that it could use. DHS officials told GAO
they could use such data in various ways, such as to prohibit
individuals from entering the United States who are determined to be
inadmissible based on these data and other relevant information. GAO
found that DHS officials are consulting with DOD on how to obtain
additional biometrics data from DOD. Until national level policies are
developed, opportunities to reduce gaps in national security through
comprehensive data sharing may be lost unless remaining needs for
biometrics data are identified and filled as appropriate and in
accordance with U.S. laws and regulations and international agreements.
What GAO Recommends:
GAO recommends that (1) DOD establish guidance specifying a standard
set of biometrics data for collection during military operations in the
field, and (2) the Secretaries of Defense and Homeland Security
address, as appropriate, biometrics data sharing gaps, in accordance
with U.S. and international law. DOD partially concurred with the first
recommendation and concurred with the second recommendation.
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-09-49]. For more
information, contact Davi D'Agostino at (202) 512-5431 or
dagostinod@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Contents:
Letter:
Results in Brief:
Background:
DOD Has Issued Limited Guidance for Collecting Biometrics Data:
DOD Shares Data on Non-U.S. Persons through Interagency Agreements, but
Some Gaps in Data May Remain:
Conclusion:
Recommendations for Executive Action:
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology21:
Scope:
Methodology:
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense24:
Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments28:
Tables:
Table 1: Installations and Offices Where GAO Obtained Documentary
Evidence and Officials' Views Pertaining to Defense Biometrics:
Table 2: Non-DOD and Interagency Offices Where GAO Obtained Documentary
Evidence and Officials' Views Pertaining to Defense Biometrics:
Figure:
Figure 1: DOD Biometrics Data Collection and Sharing:
Abbreviations:
ABIS: Automated Biometric Identification System (DOD):
DHS: Department of Homeland Security:
DOD: Department of Defense:
DOS: Department of State:
FBI: Federal Bureau of Investigation:
IAFIS: Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification System:
IDENT: Automated Biometric Identification System (DHS):
US-VISIT: U.S. Visitor and Immigration Status Indicator Technology
Office:
[End of section]
United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
October 15, 2008:
The Honorable Solomon P. Ortiz:
Chairman:
The Honorable J. Randy Forbes:
Ranking Member:
Subcommittee on Readiness:
Committee on Armed Services:
House of Representatives:
The Honorable Adam Smith:
Chairman:
The Honorable Mac Thornberry:
Ranking Member:
Subcommittee on Terrorism and Unconventional Threats and Capabilities:
Committee on Armed Services:
House of Representatives:
The events of September 11, 2001, and operations to defeat insurgents
in Afghanistan and Iraq have made it increasingly critical for military
units to identify individuals they encounter in the field[Footnote 1]
and share this information with other units and certain federal
agencies. Biometrics--measurements of unique personal characteristics,
such as fingerprints,[Footnote 2] irises,[Footnote 3] and faces,
[Footnote 4] to identify an unfamiliar person--have become an important
tool in these operations, as well as in the Department of Defense's
(DOD) business functions and military activities. For example, DOD uses
biometrics to verify its common credential and to support access
controls. In military activities, DOD uses biometrics to identify
[Footnote 5] and verify[Footnote 6] individuals encountered in the
field as friend, foe, or neutral; to operate detention facilities; to
protect DOD personnel at expeditionary bases in theater (force
protection); and to recover and identify U.S. personnel in Afghanistan
and Iraq. Army and Marine Corps forces currently collect biometrics
data (fingerprints, iris scans, and facial images) from (1) persons
seeking access to U.S. installations in Iraq and Afghanistan, (2)
detainees,[Footnote 7] and (3) persons encountered by U.S. forces
during military operations. Latent fingerprints are also recovered in
combat zones from unknown individuals who may be foes or neutral.
Several DOD organizations are involved in developing guidance on the
collection and use of biometrics data. The Secretary of Defense
designated the Secretary of the Army as the Executive Agent for Defense
Biometrics. Subsequently, the Secretary of the Army designated the
Director of the Army's Biometrics Task Force as the Executive Manager
for Biometrics, making her responsible for developing guidance for
collecting and processing biometrics data. Additionally, DOD appointed
the Director, Defense Research and Engineering, as the Principal Staff
Assistant for Biometrics. The Director has developed and issued a
biometrics directive identifying organizational roles and authorities
for managing biometrics data.
Biometrics data, and the sharing of these data among federal agencies,
are important to the United States' broader national security mission
beyond DOD's operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. Homeland Security
Presidential Directive 6, issued in September 2003, states that it is
the policy of the United States to develop, integrate, and maintain
terrorist information, and to use that terrorist information as
appropriate and to the full extent permitted by law to support certain
screening and other processes, including military, intelligence, law
enforcement, immigration, and visa processes. In accordance with this
and other laws and regulations, DOD, the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI), the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and the
Department of State (DOS)[Footnote 8] share biometrics information. The
Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act[Footnote 9] created an
Information Sharing Environment, defined as an approach that
facilitates the sharing of terrorism and homeland security information,
with a Program Manager responsible for information sharing across the
federal government. Additionally, the National Science and Technology
Council, part of the Executive Office of the President, has created a
subcommittee to address the use of biometrics across the federal
government.
Within DOD, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, in a January 2007
memorandum, stated that DOD would immediately adopt the practice of
sharing unclassified DOD biometrics data with other U.S. departments
and agencies with counterterrorism missions. According to the
memorandum, this includes data related to terrorism information defined
in the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act[Footnote 10]
regarding terrorists, detainees, and those individuals or groups posing
a threat to the United States, U.S. persons, or U.S. interests, but
excludes data pertaining to U.S. persons, defined as U.S. citizens and
aliens lawfully admitted for permanent residence. Non-U.S. persons are
individuals who are neither U.S. citizens nor aliens lawfully admitted
into the United States for permanent residence. The memorandum further
states that sharing unclassified biometrics data unrelated to terrorism
information will be determined based upon relevant law and directives
but will require, at a minimum, a written memorandum from a requesting
agency stating the official need for the data, the intended use of the
data, the protections and safeguards that will be afforded the data,
and the nature or extent of possible further distribution of the data
to other organizations or agencies. Further, the memorandum stated that
sharing of biometrics data on an individual must be conducted pursuant
to U.S. law and regulations and international agreements where
appropriate.
The federal government currently does not maintain a comprehensive,
governmentwide, biometrics-based terrorist database or watch list. In
the absence of such a database or watch list and to increase the
utility of the biometrics data it collects, DOD has established
relationships--both with its own components and with interagency and
multinational partners--through which it can share standardized
biometrics files, analyses, and associated information in order to
match results and determine whether there is a link between an
individual's biometrics file and available associated information. Gaps
in DOD's and other agencies' biometrics collection and sharing
processes can increase the risk that terrorists will avoid
identification in subsequent encounters with U.S. personnel during
military operations, the visa application process, and U.S. border
crossings. For example, during the visa application process or at a
U.S. entry point, if terrorists are not identified as such, U.S.
personnel may unknowingly grant them access to the United States.
While a number of biometrics databases exist across the federal
government, there are three major federal biometrics databases that
include, among other data sets, information on known and suspected
terrorists:[Footnote 11] (1) the FBI's Integrated Automated Fingerprint
Identification System (IAFIS); (2) DOD's Automated Biometric
Identification System (ABIS), which is collocated with IAFIS; and (3)
the DHS Automated Biometric Identification System (IDENT), which is
used by DHS for border patrol, customs, naturalization, and
counterterrorism activities, as well as by DOS as part of its visa
approval process.[Footnote 12] DOD, the FBI, DHS, and DOS have
established formal and informal arrangements, pursuant to applicable
U.S. laws and regulations and international agreements, regarding the
sharing of information among the IAFIS, ABIS, and IDENT databases.
At your request, we reviewed and reported on DOD's strategic efforts to
manage identity information, including biometrics data, which is used
for a variety of purposes, such as to identify individuals seeking
access to bases.[Footnote 13] In the course of this work, we identified
collection and sharing issues that we brought to your attention in a
version of this report that was designated For Official Use Only and
issued in May 2008.[Footnote 14] This following report is the public
version of that report, GAO-08-430NI. As our May 2008 report contained
information that DOD considered sensitive and designated For Official
Use Only, this version of the report omits references and information
pertaining to detailed collection guidance and sensitive database
information, including an appendix. We have indicated those changes
with footnotes within the report. Our objectives in this report were to
determine to what extent (1) DOD has guidance that establishes the
biometrics data to be collected to support military activities and (2)
there may be gaps in biometrics information shared between DOD and DHS.
To answer the first objective, we examined DOD's policies and
procedures for the collection of biometrics data during field
operations. We also interviewed DOD officials from Marine Corps
Headquarters, the Army's Biometrics Task Force, the National Ground
Intelligence Center, U.S. Central Command, and U.S. Special Operations
Command. To determine the extent to which there may be gaps in
biometrics information sharing between DOD and DHS, we reviewed
available interagency biometrics data-sharing agreements and held
discussions with officials from DOD, DOS, the FBI, and DHS's U.S.-
Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology (US-VISIT) program
office.[Footnote 15] We focused our work in this area on DOD, DOS, the
FBI, and US-VISIT because of the biometrics database locations and
sharing relationship among the databases. We included other federal
agencies that use DOD-collected biometrics in carrying out their own
national security missions. Because DOD viewed some aspects of the
report as sensitive and designated them For Official Use Only, and
because other information was classified, some details of our evidence
could not be discussed in this report. We conducted this performance
audit from May 2007 to May 2008 in accordance with generally accepted
government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and
perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide
a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit
objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable
basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. A
full description of our scope and methodology can be found in appendix
I.
Results in Brief:
DOD has issued guidance specifying the biometrics data to be collected
on individuals who are detained or allowed access to U.S. bases in
Iraq, but has not issued guidance specifying a standard set of data to
be collected during field activities. In 2000, DOD established the
Biometrics Task Force to provide guidance on the collection of
biometrics data. In recognizing the different conditions commanders may
encounter in the field, DOD has allowed commanders to determine the
type of biometrics data to collect during their operations. However, we
determined that allowing for this flexibility results in the collection
of different data that are not necessarily comparable to each other.
For example, some units may collect iris images while others collect
fingerprints, which are not comparable data. Broader national security
implications can arise from the collection of incomparable data, such
as military personnel's inability to identify someone who has harmed or
attempted to harm U.S. or coalition forces. These newly collected data
would not necessarily be comparable with data collected by other units
or with large federal databases that store biometrics data, such as the
FBI's fingerprint database and DOD's biometrics database. For example,
iris image data collected by military units are not comparable with the
FBI's fingerprint database. Thus, iris-only screenings cannot be used
to identify these individuals. Similarly, biometrics files that include
only iris images cannot be used to match latent fingerprints, which are
often collected in combat zones. Having a standard set of biometrics
data would help ensure consistent identification and confirmation of an
individual's identity thus allowing forces to compare data across
multiple databases in different commands and to determine whether
individuals should be detained. A standard set of data would also allow
for comparison of new biometrics data collected in the field with
existing biometrics data. Therefore, we recommend that the Secretary of
Defense direct the Secretary of the Army's Executive Manager for
Biometrics to establish guidance specifying a minimum baseline standard
set of biometrics data for collection during military operations in the
field so that biometrics data can be compared across multiple databases
in different commands and across federal agencies as appropriate and in
accordance with U.S. laws and regulations and international agreements.
DOD shares biometrics data that it collects on non-U.S. persons
[Footnote 16] with other federal agencies through a variety of
interagency agreements, but some gaps in data sharing may remain. For
example, according to a 2007 DHS memorandum, there are certain types of
DOD biometrics data that DHS is not receiving updates of on a routine
basis. DHS officials told us they could use such biometrics data in
various ways, such as to prohibit individuals from entering the United
States who are determined to be inadmissible based on these data and
other relevant information, to detain individuals for law enforcement
reasons, or to provide DHS additional information about refugees and
their potential eligibility to enter the United States. The DHS
memorandum also states that DHS was consulting with DOD on how to
obtain additional biometrics data from DOD. However, DHS officials
stated that to date the only progress has been the sharing of Iraqi
asylum and refugee data, which provides DHS with biometrics data on
individuals that DOD has encountered in Iraq. The National Science and
Technology Council has several efforts under way to develop national
policies and procedures to better coordinate the use of biometrics data
among agencies. Also, the Program Manager for the Information Sharing
Environment is to plan and oversee the implementation of the
information sharing environment, among other duties. For example, the
Program Manager for the Information Sharing Environment is involved
with the National Science and Technology Council's efforts.[Footnote
17] However, until such national-level policies are developed and
implemented, opportunities to fill or reduce gaps in our national
security through comprehensive data sharing may be lost unless
remaining needs for biometrics data are appropriately filled. We
recommend that until a formalized, governmentwide biometrics data-
sharing architecture is implemented, the Secretaries of Defense and
Homeland Security, in consultation with other federal agencies, such as
the FBI and DOS, determine if biometrics information sharing needs are
being met and address, as appropriate, any biometrics data-sharing gaps
that may exist, in accordance with U.S. laws and regulations and
international agreements, as well as Information Sharing Environment
efforts.
In commenting on a draft of this report, DOD partially concurred with
our recommendation that the Secretary of Defense direct the Biometrics
Task Force to establish guidance specifying a standard set of
biometrics data for collection during military operations in the field.
DOD stated that if our recommendation to establish this guidance was
directed at DOD personnel in stable environments--not field
environments--then DOD fully agreed with our recommendation and would
take action to implement it. However, DOD commented that if we were
referring to collection in field environments, DOD officials still
wanted to rely on commanders' judgment about what data to collect. We
disagree and continue to believe that DOD should establish guidance on
the collection of a minimum baseline standard set of biometrics data
when collecting biometrics data during military activities in the
field, or what DOD refers to as screening operations, as has been done
in Afghanistan, to mitigate the risks we identified and DOD
acknowledged. DOD concurred with our recommendation to determine if
biometrics information sharing needs are being met and if there are any
gaps in sharing that may exist. In its comments, DOD stated that it is
fully participating in and fully supportive of interagency forums
specifically chartered to address improved sharing of biometrics data
and interoperability of biometrics systems. DOD's written comments are
reprinted in appendix II.
Background:
As the technologies for collecting, storing, and sharing biometrics
data advance, DOD and other federal agencies that collect, use, store,
and share such data in the conduct of their national security missions
have expanded their biometrics efforts. DOD uses biometrics for various
purposes--including controlling access to DOD facilities, intelligence
analysis,[Footnote 18] and identifying and verifying non-U.S. persons
encountered during field activities in Afghanistan and Iraq. U.S.
forces collect, match, and share biometrics data, and DOD has developed
a number of policies and procedures to govern these activities.
However, guidance for the collection and use of biometrics data is
still evolving.
Governmentwide Policies Regarding Biometrics Data Are Evolving:
Historically, the FBI has been the dominant federal government user of
biometrics, with a long-established fingerprint database--IAFIS--as its
primary biometrics data repository. Other federal agencies, like DHS
and DOS, also use biometrics in support of their respective national
security missions, including border patrol, customs, disaster recovery,
naturalization, visa processes, and counterterrorism. DHS's US-VISIT
program office administers IDENT on behalf of all of DHS. IDENT is the
database DHS has designated as the central point for all of the
department's biometrics collection, identification, and storage
efforts. DOS has access to IDENT data via its sharing agreement with
DHS for use in its visa screening process. To date, DOD and DHS have
not established a direct link between their two biometrics databases
and rely on the FBI's IAFIS database as an indirect link between DOD
and DHS. This is a result of specific biometrics sharing agreements and
other information sharing policies and agreements. If biometrics data
for non-U.S. persons collected by DOD are not retained in the FBI's
IAFIS, other agencies, like DHS and DOS, that send biometrics data for
searching to IAFIS, do not have access to this DOD information when
they conduct searches for visa, citizenship, border control, and other
homeland security purposes. While limited occasional direct sharing of
DOD and DHS biometrics has occurred, it is not regularized.
Several efforts are under way to develop national policies and
procedures to better coordinate the use of biometrics data and to
ensure that concerns such as privacy are addressed. For example, the
National Science and Technology Council has established the
Subcommittee on Biometrics and Identity Management to address issues
such as identity management, privacy, and biometrics system
improvements and to develop policy foundations for those issues.
[Footnote 19] In addition, the Information Sharing Environment Program
Manager, in consultation with the Information Sharing Council, is to
plan and oversee the implementation of and manage an Information
Sharing Environment, an approach that facilities the sharing of
terrorism and homeland security information. The Program Manager is
also responsible for assisting, monitoring, and assessing the
implementation of the Information Sharing Environment by federal
departments and agencies to ensure adequate progress, technological
consistency, and policy compliance, among other duties.
While these efforts are under way, many departments, including DOD,
continue to collect biometrics data to meet their individual missions.
However, even within departments, there may not be policies to ensure
that officials in different parts of the organization are aware of or
have access to biometrics data that are collected by others.
DOD Collection, Matching, and Sharing of Biometrics Data:
During DOD field activities, such as those in Afghanistan and Iraq,
U.S. forces collect biometrics data for a variety of purposes, such as
to control access to U.S. bases in order to protect personnel and to
identify and verify non-U.S. persons that they encounter. The primary
system for biometrics data collection in U.S. Central Command,
including Afghanistan and Iraq, is the Biometric Automated Toolset. The
Biometric Automated Toolset is a DOD biometrics system that allows U.S.
forces to collect fingerprints, iris scans, facial photographs, and
biographical information of persons of interest and store them in a
searchable database. DOD has also established the Biometric
Identification System for Access, which includes similar types of
biometrics data but is limited to use on installations in Iraq to
determine whether non-U.S. persons should have access to U.S. bases.
Once U.S. forces have collected the biometrics data, they attempt to
compare and match the data to previously collected data stored in the
Biometric Automated Toolset and the Biometric Identification System for
Access. These data are also sent to ABIS[Footnote 20]--the DOD-wide
database for non-U.S. persons' biometrics--to determine if U.S. forces
have previously encountered an individual and entered the individual's
biometrics data into this database. If there is not a match, the new
data are stored in the Biometric Automated Toolset and ABIS and
maintained for future use, as appropriate. Figure 1 illustrates this
process.[Footnote 21]
Figure 1: DOD Biometrics Data Collection and Sharing:
[See PDF for image]
This figure is an illustration of DOD biometrics data collection and
sharing, as follows:
Biometrics data collected by U.S. forces:
fingerprints;
iris scans;
facial photographs;
biographical information.
Biometric automated toolset:
* Data acquisition;
* Search;
* Match;
* Data collection.
No match: data stored in biometrics database;
Match: Decision (for example, decision to give or deny access to U.S.
base);
Data exchange: with Automated Biometric Identification System (ABIS).
Biometric Identification System for Access:
* Data acquisition;
* Search;
* Match;
* Data collection.
No match: data stored in biometrics database;
Match: Decision (for example, decision to give or deny access to U.S.
base);
Data exchange: with Automated Biometric Identification System (ABIS).
Automated Biometric Identification System (ABIS):
* Data acquisition;
* Search;
* Match;
* Data collection.
No match: data stored in biometrics database;
Match: Decision (for example, decision to give or deny access to U.S.
base).
Sources: GAO analysis of DOD data, Corbis (fingerprint), and GAO (iris,
facial photograph, and documents).
[End of figure]
Once biometrics data are in ABIS, they can be shared or sent to another
biometrics database, such as the FBI's IAFIS, for additional matching
attempts against non-DOD records. DOD has established agreements with
the FBI and DHS that allow it to share its biometrics data with them,
both to assist DOD in identifying the individuals it encounters during
its military activities and to inform other federal agencies of DOD's
interactions with non-U.S. persons who might be of interest. For
example, DOD uses the Biometric Identification System for Access to
collect biometrics from a non-U.S. person seeking access to a U.S.
facility in Iraq and sends that information back to DOD's ABIS database
to see if the new data match any biometrics data currently stored in
ABIS. While ABIS is being searched, DOD forwards the biometrics data to
the FBI's IAFIS database to see if there is a U.S. criminal history for
the individual seeking access to U.S. facilities in Iraq. Once the FBI
conducts its search, it sends the results back to DOD and does not keep
noncriminal biometrics data collected using the Biometric
Identification System for Access. In other cases, for example, when an
individual is detained in Iraq or Afghanistan by DOD, the process is
the same until DOD sends the biometrics data to the FBI. In most of
these cases, the FBI stores the biometrics data in IAFIS, a criminal
database, for potential future use.
During field activities, DOD personnel collecting biometrics data may
not know if the person is a non-U.S. person until the data are
collected and then matched with already existing data. For example, DOD
personnel collecting latent fingerprints during and after combat
operations may not know until the fingerprints are matched with
existing data if the person is a non-U.S. person.
DOD Has Issued Limited Guidance for Collecting Biometrics Data:
The Biometrics Task Force has not issued guidance specifying a standard
set of biometrics data that would allow for comparison of newly
collected biometrics data with existing biometrics data in the field.
Having a standard set of biometrics data would help ensure consistent
identification and confirmation of an individual's identity thus
allowing forces to compare data across multiple databases in different
commands and to determine whether individuals should be detained. In
recognition of the conditions commanders face in the field, DOD
delegated responsibility to field commanders to determine the type of
biometrics data personnel should collect during their operations. As a
result, some units may collect fingerprints and facial photos, while
others may collect only iris images, even though they are all using
devices that can collect the same types of biometrics. For example,
Marine Corps units prefer to collect iris scans during field
identification and verification activities, but Special Operations
Forces and Army units in other parts of Iraq prefer to collect
fingerprints in the field--typically a minimum of two index finger
prints and two thumb prints.[Footnote 22]
The lack of comparable data also has implications for broader national
security issues. For example, military personnel may be unable to
identify someone who has harmed or attempted to harm U.S. or coalition
forces. The collection of similar or baseline data by DOD and
departments or agencies involved in national security activities, such
as counterterrorism, could enable them to use the same biometrics data
across a wide range of national security missions. Given the lack of
comparability of the new data collected in the field, such as when a
unit collects exclusively iris images, the data would not match against
records in larger federal databases, such as the FBI's IAFIS. If these
data could be compared to such databases, this capability would help
the unit determine with certainty whether these individuals had been
encountered before and whether they should be detained.[Footnote 23]
For example, biometrics files that include only iris images cannot be
used to match latent fingerprints collected in combat zones. Thus,
military personnel collecting only iris images may be unable to
identify someone who has harmed or attempted to harm U.S. or coalition
forces.
DOD and other federal agency officials said that there can be a trade-
off between tactical (warfighter) needs--for example, the necessity
when operating in a hostile environment to perform tasks expeditiously
to reduce the risk of bodily harm--and strategic (national security)
needs--for example, the ability of intelligence analysts to make
connections among individuals, groups, and events, or the use of data
for counterterrorism and border security in the United States. Thus,
localized discretion about what types of biometrics data to collect may
enable DOD personnel to conduct quick and efficient screenings under
potentially hostile conditions, but the data they collect may be of
little use to both military units in the field and other U.S.
government entities in support of future counterterrorism efforts,
including border security. Agencies both within and outside of DOD--the
National Ground Intelligence Center, U.S. Central Command, U.S. Special
Operations Command, the Biometrics Fusion Center, and the FBI--
acknowledge that without a baseline national standard for biometrics
collection that maximizes the utility of the data both for the
warfighters in the field and for national security efforts at home,
opportunities to identify persons of interest may be lost.
DOD Shares Data on Non-U.S. Persons through Interagency Agreements, but
Some Gaps in Data May Remain:
DOD shares biometrics data that it collects on non-U.S. persons with
other federal agencies through a variety of interagency agreements, but
some gaps in data sharing may remain. Despite the sharing agreements, a
DHS memorandum indicates that DHS does not regularly receive certain
types of data from DOD. DHS officials stated that this information
could potentially be used to carry out DHS's national security mission.
DOS officials also believe such data could be used to support DOS's
visa processing mission. To date, the only regular progress has been
the sharing of Iraqi asylum and refugee data, which provide DHS with
biometrics data on individuals that DOD has encountered in Iraq.
Since the events of September 11, 2001, the President and Congress have
issued broad policies that require federal agencies to share
counterterrorism information, and federal agencies have in turn issued
their own policies. A January 2007 Deputy Secretary of Defense
memorandum called for DOD to immediately adopt the practice of sharing
unclassified DOD biometrics data records with other U.S. departments
and agencies that have counterterrorism missions, including data
related to terrorism information defined in the Intelligence Reform and
Terrorism Prevention Act regarding terrorists, detainees, and those
individuals or groups posing a threat to the United States, U.S.
persons, or U.S. interests, but excluding data pertaining to U.S.
persons, defined as U.S. citizens and aliens lawfully admitted for
permanent residence. The memorandum also specified that the sharing of
biometrics data records on an individual must be conducted in
accordance with U.S. laws and regulations and international agreements.
[Footnote 24] This memorandum was issued pursuant to Homeland Security
Presidential Directive 6, Homeland Security Presidential Directive 11,
[Footnote 25] an interagency memorandum of understanding agreeing to
support the Terrorism Screening Center,[Footnote 26] and the
Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004--all federal
policies that encourage the sharing of terrorism information. Also, the
Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 directed the
President to, among other things, create an Information Sharing
Environment for the sharing of terrorism information in a manner
consistent with national security and with applicable legal standards
relating to privacy and civil liberties. The act further stated that
the President shall ensure that the Information Sharing Environment
provides and facilitates the means for sharing terrorism information
among all appropriate federal, state, local, and tribal entities and
the private sector through the use of policy guidelines and
technologies. To the greatest extent practicable, the President shall
ensure that the Information Sharing Environment, among other things,
connects and builds upon existing systems capabilities in use across
the government, where appropriate; allows users to share information
among agencies, between levels of government, and as appropriate with
the private sector; and facilitates the availability of information in
a form and manner that facilitates its use in analysis, investigations,
and operations. The act also created a Program Manager to plan and
oversee the implementation of the Information Sharing Environment,
among other responsibilities. Additionally, the National Science and
Technology Council has several efforts under way to develop national
policies and procedures to better coordinate the use of biometrics data
among federal agencies.
According to DOD's January 2007 memorandum, sharing unclassified DOD
biometrics data with other U.S. departments and agencies with
counterterrorism missions includes data related to terrorism
information defined in the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention
Act regarding terrorists, detainees, and those individuals or groups
posing a threat to the United States, U.S. persons, or U.S. interests,
but excludes data pertaining to U.S. persons, defined as U.S. citizens
and aliens lawfully admitted for permanent residence. The memorandum
further states that the sharing of unclassified biometrics data
unrelated to terrorism information will be determined based upon
relevant law and directives and will require, at a minimum, a written
memorandum from a requesting agency stating the official need for the
data, the intended use of the data, the protections and safeguards that
will be afforded the data, and the nature or extent of possible further
distribution of the data to other organizations or agencies. Further,
the memorandum states that sharing of biometrics data on an individual
must be conducted pursuant to U.S. law and regulations and
international agreements where appropriate.
DOD and other federal agencies involved in national security operations
share biometrics data through a variety of agreements that have evolved
on a case-by-case basis. However, a 2007 DHS memorandum indicates that
the department is not receiving frequent updates on some DOD biometrics
data. DHS officials said that the department could use these data for
national security purposes. According to an April 2007 DHS memorandum,
certain categories of information that DHS is not receiving frequent
updates on include information from DOD's Biometric Automated Toolset.
According to DHS officials, DHS does not have a sharing agreement with
DOD regarding[Footnote 27] these data, and such an agreement could
allow DHS to update its database on a routine basis. Because DHS
obtained the data from DOD as a one time event through the FBI, it
received only the data that existed at that 2006 date. Additionally,
the DHS memorandum states that DHS does not have access to DOD's
Biometric Identification System for Access, a noncriminal database.
While DOD sends Biometric Identification System for Access data to the
FBI for potential matches, the FBI does not retain this noncriminal
information. According to FBI officials, DHS has sharing agreements
with the FBI, but in this case, since the FBI told us that it does not
retain the DOD data and DHS does not have an agreement with DOD, DHS
does not receive the data. Lastly, the DHS memorandum states that DHS
receives latent fingerprint images from various sources under Operation
Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom as part of the larger set
of all latent prints associated with the FBI's Unsolved Latent File--
latent fingerprints that have not been linked to an identity. However,
the memorandum further states that DHS has requested that DOD submit
latent fingerprints separately to better provide awareness of any
possible subsequent DOD-specific latent fingerprint identifications.
According to the April 2007 DHS memorandum, DHS was discussing how it
could obtain additional biometrics data from DOD. According to DHS,
these data could be used to (1) prohibit individuals from entering the
United States who are determined to be inadmissible based on these data
and other relevant information, (2) detain individuals for law
enforcement reasons if needed, or (3) provide additional information
about refugees and their potential eligibility to enter the United
States. DHS officials further stated that the department could receive
some of the DOD data through the FBI, if the FBI retained it, or if DHS
had a specific data-sharing agreement with DOD. The DHS memorandum
states that DHS will continue to engage DOD regarding the sharing of
additional biometrics data. However, DHS officials stated that to date
the only progress has been the sharing of Iraqi asylum and refugee
data, which provides DHS with biometrics data on individuals that DOD
has encountered in Iraq.[Footnote 28] DOS officials stated that they
also could potentially use DOD's Biometric Identification System for
Access data. According to DOS officials, these data could assist DOS in
verifying that a non-U.S. person has legitimately accessed U.S.
facilities in Iraq.
Conclusion:
If DOD does not have a standard set of biometrics data for use in the
field, then it will be unable to determine whether the individuals its
forces encounter in the field are friend, foe, or neutral and will
therefore possibly endanger its forces. Moreover, until comprehensive
information sharing agreements are worked out or the National Science
and Technology Council develops and implements a national architecture
for biometrics data collection, in consultation with information
sharing environment efforts, biometrics information collected by U.S.
forces from individuals encountered in the field may not be fully
utilized by other federal agencies for national security activities.
For example, the sharing of latent fingerprints collected by DOD
personnel in combat zones could potentially help enable a DOS consular
official to deny a visa to an individual who attacked U.S. forces in
Iraq. Opportunities to reduce gaps in our security through
comprehensive data sharing may be lost unless remaining needs for
biometrics data are appropriately filled. Because potential harm could
come to U.S. interests from those individuals DHS and DOS could have
prevented from entering the United States--if those individuals were
determined to be inadmissible based on these data and other relevant
information--it is important that DOD, the FBI, DHS, and DOS work
together to determine the biometrics data needed and to share these
data in accordance with applicable laws, regulations, and international
treaties.
Recommendations for Executive Action:
We recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of the
Army's Executive Manager for Biometrics to establish guidance
specifying a minimum baseline standard set of biometrics data for
collection during military operations in the field so that biometrics
data can be compared across multiple databases in different commands
and across federal agencies as appropriate and in accordance with U.S.
laws and regulations and international agreements.
Additionally, we recommend that until a formalized, governmentwide
biometrics data-sharing architecture is implemented, the Secretaries of
Defense and Homeland Security, in consultation with other federal
agencies, such as the FBI and DOS, determine if biometrics information
sharing needs are being met and address, as appropriate, any biometrics
data-sharing gaps that may exist, in accordance with U.S. laws and
regulations and international agreements, as well as information
sharing environment efforts.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
We requested comments on a For Official Use Only draft of this report
from the Executive Office of the President's National Science and
Technology Council; DOD; DOS; DHS; the FBI; the Program Manager,
Information Sharing Environment; and the Office of the Director of
National Intelligence's National Counterterrorism Center. DOD was the
only agency to provide written comments on the For Official Use Only
version of this report. As such, this public version of the For
Official Use Only report was sent to DOD for comment. DOD partially
concurred with our recommendation to establish guidance specifying a
standard set of biometrics data for collection during military
operations in the field. In comments, DOD stated that if our
recommendation to establish this guidance was directed at DOD personnel
in stable environments--not field environments--then DOD fully agreed
with our recommendation and would take action to implement it. However,
DOD commented that if we were referring to collection in field
environments, DOD officials still wanted to rely on commanders'
judgment as to what to collect. In our recommendation, we referred to
collection of biometrics during military operations in the field, which
we equate to DOD's screening operations of suspicious or potentially
hostile individuals, which could include biometrics collection in
hostile environments. Our point was that if one unit collected one type
of biometrics, such as an iris scan from an individual, and another
unit later collected fingerprints from the same individual, no match
could be made between the two different encounters of the individual
and potential persons of interest could be released. Moreover, DOD
acknowledges this risk in its comments, stating that DOD officials want
to continue to rely on the commanders' judgment on the biometrics to be
collected during military operations in the field, including hostile
environments. However, we continue to believe that DOD should establish
guidance for a minimum baseline biometrics collection standard to
mitigate this risk, especially since guidance in place in Afghanistan,
a hostile area of operations, already establishes such a minimum. A DOD
document[Footnote 29] sets forth the procedures for standardization of
mandatory fields that must be completed during the collection processes
for various biometrics collection systems. Collecting biometrics data
above and beyond such a minimum baseline standard could be left up to
the commander's discretion; however, we continue to believe that a
minimum biometrics collection requirement for military operations in
the field, or what DOD calls screening operations, should be
established, as was done for Afghanistan operations, to mitigate the
risks we identified and DOD acknowledged in its comments. Based on
DOD's comments on the For Official Use Only draft report, we revised
this recommendation and the final report to reflect the appropriate
office responsible for this guidance and to clarify that we intend for
DOD to establish a minimum standard for biometrics data collected from
individuals encountered during military operations in the field.
DOD concurred with our recommendation to determine if biometrics
information sharing needs are being met and if there are any gaps in
sharing that may exist. In its comments, DOD stated that it is fully
participating in and fully supportive of interagency forums
specifically chartered to address improved sharing of biometrics data
and interoperability of biometrics systems.
The Executive Office of the President's National Science and Technology
Council; DOD; DHS; the Program Manager, Information Sharing
Environment; and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence's
National Counterterrorism Center provided technical comments on the For
Official Use Only version of this report, which we have incorporated
into this report as appropriate.
DOD's written comments are reprinted in appendix II.
As agreed with your offices, we are sending copies of this report to
the Chairman and Ranking Member of the House Committee on Armed
Services and other interested congressional parties. We are also
sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Defense; the
Secretary of State; the Attorney General of the United States; the
Secretary of Homeland Security; the Executive Office of the President's
Office of Science and Technology Policy, National Science and
Technology Council; the Director, the Federal Bureau of Investigation;
the Director, National Counterterrorism Center; and the Program
Manager, Information Sharing Environment, Office of the Director of
National Intelligence.
If you or your staff have any questions concerning this report, please
contact me at (202) 512-5431 or dagostinod@gao.gov. Contact points for
our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found
on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made key contributions
to this report are listed in appendix III.
Signed by:
Davi M. D'Agostino:
Director:
Defense Capabilities and Management:
[End of section]
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
Scope:
We focused the scope of our work on the Department of Defense (DOD),
the four military services (Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force),
the Department of State (DOS), the Department of Homeland Security's
(DHS) U.S.-Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology (US-VISIT)
program office, and the Department of Justice's Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI). Federal agencies outside of DOD were included
because of their use of DOD-collected biometrics as part of their
national security portfolios, and we reviewed their use of biometrics
inasmuch as it relates to the biometrics information collected by DOD
and shared with other agencies. Any other information gathered
regarding federal agencies outside of DOD was strictly for background
purposes. Because DOD viewed some aspects of the report as sensitive
and designated them For Official Use Only, and because other
information was classified, some details of our evidence could not be
discussed in this report.
Methodology:
To determine the processes and procedures under which DOD is collecting
biometrics data for military operations, we reviewed DOD-wide and
service-specific directives, memorandums, concepts of operations, and
standard operating procedures. To develop background on the collection
of biometrics data by DOD, we analyzed information published by GAO,
DOD, the Defense Science Board, and the Executive Office of the
President's National Science and Technology Council. We reviewed
documents from and obtained the perspectives of officials in relevant
DOD commands and agencies throughout the department and the military
services, as listed in table 1. The documents and meetings with
officials allowed us to obtain an integrated understanding of how DOD
uses biometrics, specifically for military operations such as detainee
management, force protection, and identifying individuals during combat
operations.
Table 1: Installations and Offices Where GAO Obtained Documentary
Evidence and Officials' Views Pertaining to Defense Biometrics:
Service: DOD;
Installation or office: Joint Staff J34, Operations Directorate,
Antiterrorism and Homeland Defense.
Service: DOD;
Installation or office: Joint Staff J8, Force Structure Resources and
Assessment.
Service: DOD;
Installation or office: Director, Defense Research and Engineering.
Service: DOD;
Installation or office: DOD Chief Information Officer.
Service: DOD;
Installation or office: U.S. Central Command.
Service: DOD;
Installation or office: U.S. Special Operations Command.
Service: DOD;
U.S. Joint Forces Command.
Service: Army;
Installation or office: Biometrics Task Force.
Service: Army;
Installation or office: Program Executive Office, Enterprise
Information Systems, Program Manager, Biometrics.
Service: Army;
Installation or office: Biometrics Fusion Center.
Service: Army;
Installation or office: Headquarters, Department of the Army, Deputy
Chief of Staff for Intelligence (G-2).
Service: Army;
Installation or office: National Ground Intelligence Center.
Service: Navy;
Installation or office: Office of the Secretary of the Navy.
Service: Marine Corps;
Installation or office: Headquarters U.S. Marine Corps, Plans,
Policies, and Operations, Force Protection Branch, Security Division.
Service: Marine Corps;
Installation or office: Headquarters U.S. Marine Corps, Command,
Control, Communications, and Computers.
Service: Marine Corps;
Installation or office: Marine Corps Systems Command.
Source: GAO.
[End of table]
To assess the extent to which biometrics data collected by DOD are
shared with other federal agencies, we met with and reviewed documents
from officials at DOD and the federal agencies listed in table 2.
Table 2: Non-DOD and Interagency Offices Where GAO Obtained Documentary
Evidence and Officials' Views Pertaining to Defense Biometrics:
Agency: Interagency;
Installation or office: Technical Support Working Group.
Agency: Executive Office of the President;
Installation or office: National Science and Technology Council,
Subcommittee on Biometrics and Identity Management.
Agency: Department of State;
Installation or office: Consular Affairs.
Agency: Department of State;
Installation or office: Diplomatic Security.
Agency: Department of Justice;
Installation or office: Federal Bureau of Investigation, Criminal
Justice Information Services.
Agency: Department of Homeland Security;
Installation or office: US-VISIT.
Agency: Department of Commerce;
Installation or office: National Institute of Standards and Technology.
Source: GAO.
[End of table]
The documents and meetings with officials allowed us to obtain an
integrated understanding of how biometrics collected by DOD are shared
with other federal agencies with national security (specifically
counterterrorism) missions. To determine the processes and procedures
under which DOD is sharing biometrics and related information with
other federal agencies, we reviewed DOD-wide and service-specific
directives, memorandums, and interagency agreements, as well as
relevant agreements between other federal agencies, such as the FBI and
US-VISIT. We also gathered and reviewed documentation regarding the
information sharing environment and the National Science and Technology
Council.
We conducted this performance audit from May 2007 to May 2008 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those
standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that
the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and
conclusions based on our audit objectives.
[End of section]
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense:
Note: Page numbers in the draft report may differ from those in this
report.
Director Of Defense Research And Engineering:
3030 Defense Pentagon:
Washington, D.C. 20301-3030:
October 3, 2008:
Ms. Davi M. D'Agostino:
Director, Acquisition and Sourcing Management:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20548:
Dear Ms. D'Agostino:
This is the Department of Defense (DoD) response to the GAO draft
report, GAO-09-49, "Defense Management: DoD Can Establish More Guidance
for Biometrics Collection and Explore Broader Data Sharing," dated
September 22, 2008 (GAO Code 351261). Detail comments on the report
recommendations are enclosed.
The Department concurs that the collection of standardized biometric
modalities for biometric enrollments is critical to our ability to
compare data and reliably identify individuals who pose a threat. Since
the time of the research for this report, DoD has established
additional guidance to standardize the biometric modalities collected
during enrollments, but continues to maintain that screening
procedures, vice enrollment, must be conducted in consideration of the
tactical environment as determined by the Commander.
The Department fully supports more robust sharing of biometric and
biographic data with other agencies, including the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS), to the extent that it is conducted in full
compliance of the laws pertaining to the protection of privacy and
personal identifying information, and is actively pursuing more formal
arrangements for doing so with DHS and other government departments and
agencies.
Sincerely,
Alan R. Shaffer:
Principal Deputy:
Enclosure: As stated:
GAO Draft Report - Dated September 22, 2008:
GAO Code 351261/GAO-09-49:
Defense Management: DoD Can Establish More Guidance for Biometrics
Collection and Explore Broader Data Sharing:
Department Of Defense Comments To The Recommendations:
Recommendation 1: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense
direct the Secretary of the Army's Executive Manager for Biometrics to
establish guidance specifying a minimum baseline standard set of
biometrics data for collection during military operations in the field
so that biometrics data can be compared across multiple databases in
different commands and across Federal agencies as appropriate and in
accordance with U.S. laws and regulations and international agreements.
(Page 19/GAO Draft Report)
DOD Response: Partially Concur.
GAO clearly identifies the risk associated with inconsistent collection
of biometrics modalities. Different biometric modalities cannot be
matched to one another (e.g., an iris image cannot be matched to a
fingerprint) and attempts to screen target individuals by using a
modality that is not stored and available within the watch-list will
necessarily fail. In recognition of this risk, policy has been
developed and promulgated to guide the collection of biometrics. In
March 2005, the Army Biometrics Task Force, acting on behalf of the DoD
Executive Agent for Biometrics, published a Standard Operating
Procedure that identified the three modalities that should be collected
whenever possible. Additionally U.S. Central Command and its components
have issued policies that specify collection requirements, including
which biometric modalities are to be collected, during enrollment.
In all cases, this published guidance includes the requirement to
collect fingerprints, iris images and facial images when enrolling a
person into the Automated Biometric Identification System (ABIS) and
the Biometric Automated Toolset (BAT). Not all encounters in the field,
however, result in the enrollment of a person into the biometrics
repositories. In many cases, persons who are not suspected of causing,
or intending to cause, harm to U.S. interests are simply screened
against the DoD biometrics watchlist when encountered. Screening can be
accomplished by comparing any biometric modality against that same
modality that is resident within our watchlist. So long as the
watchlist contains all modalities, there is no need to screen multiple
modalities for each person encountered. The risk of not screening
against all modalities contained within the watchlist for every
encounter must be weighed by the Commander in the context of his
tactical mission requirements. Should the tactical operators have
reason to suspect the person of intending harm to U.S. interests,
however, he will be enrolled and full biometrics will be collected
thereby ensuring that future encounters can be matched against any
biometric. To the extent that GAO recommends collection of full
modalities for biometric enrollments, DoD fully concurs with the
recommendation and will take additional steps to promulgate such
policy. Screening procedures, however, must be conducted in
consideration of the tactical environment as determined by the
Commander.
Recommendation 2: The GAO recommends that, until a formalized,
Government-wide, biometrics data-sharing architecture is implemented,
the Secretaries of Defense and Homeland Security, in consultation with
other Federal agencies, such as the Federal Bureau of Investigation and
the Department of State, determine if biometrics information sharing
needs are being met and address, as appropriate, any biometrics data
sharing gaps that may exist, in accordance with U.S. laws and
regulations and international agreements, as well as information
sharing environment efforts. (Page 19/GAO Draft Report)
DOD Response: Concur.
The ongoing conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan have given DoD an
unprecedented opportunity to collect biometric and biographical data on
persons encountered overseas who intend harm to U.S. interests. DoD has
developed and actively maintains a robust biometrically enabled
watchlist that allows DoD commanders to vet persons encountered in the
field or seeking access to U.S. facilities or positions of trust. The
success of this watch-listing process, which begins with data
collection in the field and includes the data storage and matching
capability, has led to the detention of hundreds of adversaries. As GAO
properly states, the data that has enabled DoD successes in the forward
operating theaters is equally relevant to other federal agencies
charged with screening for persons who present a threat to the U.S. DoD
fully supports more robust sharing of biometric and biographic data
with other agencies, including the Department of Homeland Security
(DHS), to the extent that it is conducted in full compliance of the
laws pertaining to the protection of privacy and personal identifying
information. To that end, as recognized in the GAO report, in January
2007 the Deputy Secretary of Defense promulgated guidance directing all
DoD components to immediately begin sharing all unclassified biometric
data with other U.S. Departments and Agencies having a counter-
terrorism mission.
As correctly stated in the GAO report, DoD has made its full repository
of non-US person biometrics, ABIS, available real-time to the FBI
Criminal Justice Information Services (CJIS) division. More relevant
than the full DoD biometric database, however, is the DoD biometrically
enabled watchlist that contains the biometric records of those
individuals known to present a threat to the U.S. and our coalition
partners. This watch-list is also provided to the FBI and has been made
available to the Department of Homeland Security. In July 2007 DoD
provided its full watchlist, all tiers, to the Dept of Homeland
Security and is in active discussions with DHS concerning the
establishment of a formal sharing agreement. Additionally, DoD makes
available the full contextual background of persons contained on the
DoD biometrically enabled watchlist available to all federal agencies
with Secret Internet Protocol Router (SIPR) or Joint Worldwide
Intelligence Communications System (JWICS) access and the lawful need
to know.
In addition to bilateral efforts to improve biometric related data
sharing among the federal agencies, DoD is fully participating in and
fully supportive of interagency forums specifically chartered to
address improved sharing of biometrics data and interoperability of
biometrics systems. Among these bodies are the National Science and
Technology Council Subcommittee on Biometrics and Identity Management
and the Department of Justice led interagency working group that is
drafting the implementation guidance for National Security Presidential
Directive-59/Homeland Security Presidential Directive-24. Although bi-
lateral arrangements between DoD and the various agencies provide a
short-term mechanism for sharing relevant biometric data, the strategic
solution to the sharing issue is being developed within these groups.
[End of section]
Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contacts:
Davi M. D'Agostino, (202) 512-5431 or dagostinod@gao.gov:
Acknowledgments:
In addition to the contact named above, Lorelei St James, Assistant
Director; Bethann Ritter; David Artadi; Brian Kime; Joanne Landesman;
Katherine Lenane; John Nelson; and Karen Werner made key contributions
to this report.
[End of section]
Footnotes:
[1] For the purposes of this report, "in the field" refers to military
activities that take place in combat zones, like Iraq and Afghanistan,
outside of U.S. bases and facilities. Specifically, this includes what
DOD refers to as screening activities.
[2] Fingerprint identification is the method of identification using
the impressions made by the minute ridge formations or patterns found
on the fingertips.
[3] Iris recognition is the process of recognizing a person by
analyzing the random pattern of the iris, which is the muscle within
the eye that regulates the size of the pupil, controlling the amount of
light that enters the eye.
[4] According to the March 2007 Report of the Defense Science Board
Task Force on Defense Biometrics, (Washington, D.C.: Office of the
Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics,
March 2007), facial recognition is a convenient biometric because it is
one of the few that is identifiable by both machines and humans, so it
is generally used for identification cards and badges, although it
should generally be used in combination with other biometrics.
[5] Identification is the one-to-many process of comparing a submitted
biometric sample against all of the biometric reference templates on
file to determine whether it matches any of the templates and, if so,
the known identity of the biometric subject whose template was matched.
[6] Verification is the one-to-one process of comparing a submitted
biometric sample against the biometric reference template of a single
enrollee whose identity is being claimed to determine whether it
matches the enrollee's template.
[7] Detainees are persons in the custody of DOD as a result of military
operations.
[8] The FBI and DHS each maintain their own biometrics databases. DHS's
U.S.-Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology Office (US-
VISIT) is responsible for DHS's biometrics database. DOS uses DHS's
biometrics database in addition to its own database.
[9] The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act (IRTPA) of
2004, Pub. L. No. 108-458, § 1016 (2004), codified as amended at 6
U.S.C. § 485.
[10] The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act (IRTPA) of
2004, Pub. L. No. 108-458, § 1016(a)(4) (2004).
[11] Other federal government databases containing terrorist-related
information include the National Counterterrorism Center's Terrorist
Identities Datamart Environment and the Terrorist Screening Center's
database. Though these databases contain and search against
biographical information, they do not search against biometrics data.
However, the federal government is working toward including biometrics
information on known and suspected terrorists in the national database
maintained by the Terrorist Screening Center.
[12] DOS uses DHS's biometrics database in addition to its own
database.
[13] GAO, Defense Management: DOD Needs to Establish Clear Goals and
Objectives, Guidance, and a Designated Budget to Manage Its Biometrics
Activities, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-08-1065]
(Washington, D.C.: Sept. 28, 2008).
[14] GAO, Defense Management: DOD Needs to Establish More Guidance for
Biometrics Collection and Explore Broadening Data Sharing, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-08-430NI] (Washington, D.C.: May
21, 2008).
[15] US-VISIT administers DHS's IDENT on behalf of all of DHS.
[16] In some cases, DOD cannot be certain if the fingerprints are from
a non-U.S. person.
[17] Officials from the office of the Program Manager for the
Information Sharing Environment stated that they have made efforts to
incorporate biometrics into future versions of various biometrics
standards, including standards efforts for Terrorist Watch listing with
the Terrorist Screening Center and the National Counterterrorism
Center.
[18] The Army's National Ground Intelligence Center has a mission to
produce intelligence to support the U.S. forces on the battlefield.
This currently includes analysis of matches of biometrics data and the
maintenance of a watch list for use by warfighters.
[19] To date, the National Science and Technology Council's
Subcommittee on Biometrics and Identity Management states that it has
published the following documents on biometrics: The National
Biometrics Challenge (Washington, D.C.: August 2006); NSTC Policy for
Enabling the Development, Adoption, and Use of Biometric Standards
(Washington, D.C.: Sept. 7, 2007); and Privacy and Biometrics: Building
A Conceptual Foundation (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 15, 2006).
[20] ABIS is DOD's electronic database and associated set of software
applications that support the storage, retrieval, and searching of
multiple types of biometric data collected from persons of national
security interest. Over time, DOD plans for ABIS to incorporate
functionality to support the storage, retrieval, and searching of
additional biometric modalities such as face images, iris images, and
voice print samples. ABIS shares the same fundamental design, and is
collocated, with the FBI's IAFIS.
[21] A brief paragraph noting some of the biometrics information
included in ABIS was removed because DOD designated such information
For Official Use Only.
[22] A sentence regarding a Marine Corps report was removed because DOD
designated such information For Official Use Only.
[23] An example regarding a terrorist watch list was removed because
DOD designated such information For Official Use Only.
[24] Also in January 2007, the Deputy Secretary of Defense issued
another memorandum authorizing combatant commanders to share DOD-
collected biometrics records (excluding those pertaining to U.S.
persons) with coalition partners and other allies as required to meet
mission requirements.
[25] Homeland Security Presidential Directive 11, issued in 2004,
builds upon Homeland Security Presidential Directive 6, issued in 2003,
and states that it is the policy of the United States to implement a
coordinated and comprehensive approach to the collection, analysis,
dissemination, and use of information related to certain threats to the
United States. It states that agencies should build upon existing
systems and best practices.
[26] The original memorandum of understanding on the integration and
use of biometrics screening was signed in 2003 by DOS, the Department
of Justice, and DHS as well as the intelligence community. The
agreement was updated in 2004 to include DOD and the Department of the
Treasury.
[27] The names of certain data sets were removed because DOD designated
such information For Official Use Only.
[28] According to DHS, progress to that end has included development of
a draft data-sharing agreement between DHS and DOD for the regularized
sharing of actionable biometrics. Additionally, Iraqi individuals
applying for DHS asylum or refugee status are periodically searched
against DOD biometrics data.
[29] Specific information about this document was removed because DOD
designated such information For Official Use Only.
[End of section]
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