Report
of General Braxton Bragg, C. S. Army, commanding
Army of Tennessee,
Battle of Chickamauga

WARM SPRINGS, GA.,
December 28, 1863.

General S. COOPER,
Adjutant- General, C. S. Army, Richmond, Va.

SIR: Most of the subordinate reports of the
operations of our troops at the battle of Chickamauga having
been received are herewith forwarded, and for the better
understanding of the movements preceding and following that
important event the following narrative is submitted:
On August 20, it was ascertained certainly that
the Federal army from Middle Tennessee, under General
Rosecrans, had crossed the mountains to Stevenson and
Bridgeport. His force of effective infantry and artillery
amounted to fully 70,000, divided into four corps. About the
same time General Burnside advanced from Kentucky toward
Knoxville, East Tennessee, with a force estimated by the
general commanding that department at over 25,000.
In view of the great superiority of numbers
brought against him General Buckner concluded to evacuate
Knoxville, and with a force of about 5,000 infantry and
artillery and his cavalry took position in the vicinity of
Loudon. Two brigades of his command (Frazer's, at Cumberland
Gap, and Jackson's, in Northeast Tennessee) were thus severed
from us.
The enemy having already obtained a lodgment in
East Tennessee by another route, the continued occupation of
Cumberland Gap became very hazardous to the garrison and
comparatively unimportant to us. Its evacuation was
accordingly ordered, but on the appeal of its commander,
stating his resources and ability for defense, favorably
indorsed by Major-General Buckner, the orders were suspended
on August 31. The main body of our army was encamped near
Chattanooga, while the cavalry force, much reduced and
enfeebled by long service on short rations, was recruiting in
the vicinity of Rome, Ga.
Immediately after crossing the mountains to the
Tennessee the enemy threw a corps by way of Sequatchie
Valley, to strike the rear of General Buckner's command,
while Burnside occupied him in front. One division already
ordered to his assistance proving insufficient to meet the
force concentrating on him, Buckner was directed to withdraw
to the Hiwassee with his infantry, artillery, and supplies,
and to hold his cavalry in front to check the enemy's
advance. As soon as this change was made the corps
threatening his rear was withdrawn, and the enemy commenced a
movement in force against our left and rear.
On the last of August, it became known that he had
crossed his main force over the Tennessee River at and near
Caperton's Ferry, the most accessible point from Stevenson.
By a direct route he was now as near our main depot of
supplies as we were, and our whole line of communication was
exposed, while his was partially secured by mountains and the
river. By the timely arrival of two small divisions from
Mississippi our effective force, exclusive of cavalry, was
now a little over 35,000, with which it was determined to
strike on the first favorable opportunity.
Closely watched by our cavalry, which had been
brought forward, it was soon ascertained that the enemy's
general movement was toward our left and rear in the
direction of Dalton anti Rome, keeping Lookout Mountain
between us. The nature of the country and the want of
supplies in it, with the presence of Burnside's force on our
right, rendered a movement on the enemy's rear with our
inferior force extremely hazardous, if not impracticable. It
was therefore determined to meet him in front whenever he
should emerge from the mountain gorges. To do this and hold
Chattanooga was impossible without such a division of our
small force as to endanger both parts.
Accordingly our troops were put in motion on
September 7 and 8, and took position from Lee and Gordon's
Mills to La Fayette, on the road leading south from
Chattanooga and fronting the east slope of Lookout Mountain.
The forces on the Hiwassee and at Chickamauga Station took
the route by Ringgold A small cavalry force was left in
observation at Chattanooga, and a brigade of infantry,
strongly supported by cavalry, was left at Ringgold to hold
the railroad and protect it from raids.
As soon as our movement was known to the enemy his
corps nearest Chattanooga, and which had been threatening
Buckner's rear, was thrown into that place, anti shortly
thereafter commenced to move on our rear by the two roads to
La Fayette and Ringgold. Two other corps were now in Will's
Valley--one nearly opposite the head of McLemore's Cove (a
valley formed by Lookout Mountain and a spur of the main
range, called Pigeon Mountain) and the other at or near
Colonel Winston's, opposite Alpine.
During the 9th it was ascertained that a column.
estimated at from 4,000 to 8,000, had crossed Lookout
Mountain into the cove by way of Stevens' and Cooper's Gaps.
Thrown off his guard by our rapid movement, apparently in
retreat, when in reality we had concentrated opposite his
center, and deceived by the information from deserters and
others sent into his lines, the enemy pressed on his columns
to intercept us and thus exposed himself in detail.
Major-General Hindman received verbal instructions on the 9th
to prepare his division to move against this force, and was
informed that another division from Lieutenant-General Hill's
command, at La Fayette, would join him. That evening the
following written orders were issued to Generals Hindman and
Hill:

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF
TENNESSEE,
Lee and Gordon's Mills, September 9, 1863--11.45 p.m.

Major-General
HINDMAN,
Commanding Division:

General: You will
move with your division immediately to Davis'
Cross-Roads, on the road from La Fayette to Stevens' Gap.
At this point you will put yourself in communication with
the column of General Hill, ordered to move to the same
point, and take command of the joint forces, or report to
the officer commanding Hill's column according to rank.
If in command you will move upon the enemy, reported to
be 4,000 or 5,000 strong, encamped at the foot of Lookout
Mountain at Stevens' Gap. Another column of the enemy is
reported to be at Cooper's Gap; number not known.

I am, general,
&c.,
KINLOCH FALCONER,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

HEADQUARTERS
ARMY OF TENNESSEE,
Lee and Gordon's Mills, September 9, 1863-11.45 p.m.

Lieutenant-General
HILL,
Commanding Corps:

GENERAL: I inclose orders given
to General Hindman. General Bragg directs that you send
or take, as your judgment dictates, Cleburne's division
to unite with General Hindman at Davis' Cross-Roads
to-morrow morning. Hindman starts at 12 o'clock to-night,
and he has 13 miles to make. The commander of the column
thus united will move upon the enemy encamped at the foot
of Stevens' Gap, said to be 4,000 or 5,000. If unforeseen
circumstances should prevent your movement, notify
Hindman. A cavalry force should accompany your column.
Hindman has none. Open communication with Hindman with
your cavalry in advance of the junction. He marches on
the road from Dr. Anderson's to Davis' Cross-Roads.

I am, general, &c.,
KINLOCH FALCONER,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

On the receipt of his order, during the night,
General Hill replied that the movement required by him was
impracticable, as General Cleburne was sick, and both the
gaps (Dug and Catlett's) had been blocked by felling timber,
which would require twenty-four hours for its removal. Not to
lose this favorable opportunity--Hindman, by a prompt
movement, being already in position--the following orders
were issued at 8 a.m. on the 10th, for Major-General Buckner
to move with his two divisions and report to Hindman:

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF
TENNESSEE,
Lee and Gordon's Mills, September 10, 1863--8 a.m.

Major-General BUCKNER,
Anderson's:

General: I inclose orders
issued last night to Generals Hill and Hindman. General
Hill has found it impossible to carry out the part
assigned to Cleburne's division. The general commanding
desires that you will execute without delay the order
issued to General Hill. You can move to Davis'
Cross-Roads by the direct road from your present position
at Anderson's, along which General Hindman has passed.

I am, general, &c.,
GEORGE WM. BRENT,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

And both Hindman and Hill were notified. Hindman
had halted his division at Morgan's, some 3 or 4 miles from
Davis' Cross-Roads, in the cove, and at this point Buckner
joined him during the afternoon of the 10th.
Reports fully confirming previous information in
regard to the position of the enemy's forces were received
during the 10th, and it became certain he was moving his
three columns to form a junction upon us at or near La
Fayette.
The corps near Colonel Winston's moved on the
mountain toward Alpine, a point 20 miles south of us. The one
opposite the cove continued its movement and threw forward
its advance to Davis' CrossRoads. and Crittenden moved from
Chattanooga on the roads to Ringgold and Lee and Gordon's
Mills. To strike these isolated commands in succession was
our obvious policy. To secure more prompt and decided action
in the movement ordered against the enemy's center, my
headquarters were removed to La Fayette, where I arrived
about 11.30 p.m. on the 10th, and Lieutenant-General Polk was
ordered forward with his remaining division to Anderson's, so
as to cover Hindman's rear during the operations in the cove.
At La Fayette, I met Major Nocquet, engineer
officer on General Buckner's staff, sent by General Hindman,
after a junction of their commands, to confer with me and
suggest a change in the plan of operations. After hearing the
report of this officer, and obtaining from the active and
energetic cavalry commander in front of our position
(Brigadier-General Martin) the latest information of the
enemy s movements and position, I verbally directed the major
to return to General Hindman and say that my plans could not
be changed, and that he would carry out his orders. At the
same time the following written orders were sent to the
general by courier:

General: Headquarters are here,
and the following is the information: Crittenden's corps
is advancing on us from Chattanooga. A large force from
the south has advanced to within 7 miles of this point.
Polk is left at Anderson's to cover your rear. General
Bragg orders you to attack and force your way through the
enemy to this point at the earliest hour that you can see
him in the morning. Cleburne will attack in front the
moment your guns axe heard.

I am, general, &c.,
GEORGE WM. BRENT,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

Orders were also given for Walker's Reserve Corps
to move promptly and join Cleburne's division at Dug Gap to
unite in the attack. At the same time Cleburne's was directed
to remove all obstructions in the road in his front, which
was promptly done, and by daylight he was ready to move. The
obstructions in Catlett's Gap were also ordered to be
removed, to clear the road in Hindman's rear. Breckinridge's
division (Hill's corps) was kept in position south of La
Fayette, to check any movement the enemy might make from that
direction.
At daylight I proceeded to join Cleburne at Dug
Gap, and found him waiting the opening of Hindman's guns to
move on the enemy's flank and rear. Most of the day was spent
in this position, waiting in great anxiety for the attack by
Hindman's column. Several couriers and two staff officers
were dispatched at different times urging him to move with
promptness and vigor.
About the middle of the afternoon the first gun
was heard, when the advance of Cleburne's division discovered
the enemy had taken advantage of our delay and retreated to
the mountain passes. The enemy now discovered his error, and
commenced to repair it by withdrawing his corps from the
direction of Alpine to unite with the one near McLemore's
Cove, while that was gradually extended toward Lee and
Gordon's Mills.
Our movement having thus failed in its justly
anticipated results, it was determined to turn upon the third
corps of the enemy, approaching us from the direction of
Chattanooga. The forces were accordingly withdrawn to La
Fayette, and Polk's and Walker's corps were moved immediately
in the direction of Lee and Gordon's Mills. The one corps of
the enemy in this direction was known to be divided, one
division having been sent to Ringgold. Upon learning the
dispositions of the enemy from our cavalry commander in that
direction, on the afternoon of the 12th Lieutenant-General
Polk, commanding the advance forces, was directed in the
following note to attack at daylight on the 13th:

GENERAL: I inclose you a
dispatch from General Pegram. This presents you a fine
opportunity of striking Crittenden in detail, and I hope
you will avail yourself of it at daylight to-morrow. This
division crushed, and the others are yours. We can then
turn again on the force in the cove. Wheeler's cavalry
will move on Wilder, so as to cover your right. I shall
be delighted to hear of your success.

Very truly, yours,
BRAXTON BRAGG.

Upon further information, the order was renewed in
two notes at later hours of the same day, as follows:

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF
TENNESSEE,
La Fayette, September 12, 1863--8 p.m.

Lieutenant-General POLK,
Commanding Corps:

GENERAL: I inclose you a
dispatch, marked A,(*) and I now give you the orders of
the commanding general, viz, to attack at day dawn
to-morrow. The infantry column reported in said dispatch
at three-quarters of a mile beyond Pea Vine Church, on
the road to Graysville from La Fayette.

I am, general, &c.,
GEORGE WM. BRENT,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF
TENNESSEE,
La Fayette, Ga., September 12, 1863.

Lieutenant-General POLK,
Commanding Corps:

GENERAL: The enemy is
approaching from the south, and it is highly important
that your attack in the morning should be quick and
decided. Let no time be lost.

I am, general, &c.,
GEORGE WM. BRENT,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

At 11 p.m. a dispatch was received from the
general, stating that he had taken a strong position for
defense, and requesting that he should be heavily
re-enforced. He was promptly ordered not to defer his attack,
his force being already numerically superior to the enemy,
and was reminded that his success depended upon the
promptness and rapidity of his movements. He was further
informed that, Buckner's corps would be moved within
supporting distance the next, morning.
Early on the 13th, I proceeded to the front, ahead
of Buckner's command, to find that no advance had been made
on the enemy, and that his forces had formed a junction and
recrossed the Chickamauga. Again disappointed, immediate
measures were taken to place our trains and limited supplies
in safe positions, when all our forces were concentrated
along the Chickamauga, threatening the enemy in front.
Major-General Wheeler, with two divisions of cavalry,
occupied the positions on the extreme left, vacated by Hill's
corps, and was directed to press the enemy in McLemore's
Cove, to divert his attention from our real movement.
Brigadier-General Forrest, with his own and Pegram's
divisions of cavalry, covered the movement on our front and
right. Brig. Gen. B. R. Johnson, whose brigade had been at
Ringgold, holding the railroad, was moved toward Reed's
Bridge, which brought him on the extreme right of the line.
Walker's corps formed on his left opposite Alexander's
Bridge, Buckner's next near Thedford's Ford, Polk's opposite
Lee and Gordon's Mills, and Hill's on the extreme left. With
Johnson moved two brigades just arrived from Mississippi, and
three of Longstreet's corps, all without artillery and
transportation.
The following orders were issued on the night of
the 17th, for the forces to cross the Chickamauga, commencing
the movement at 6 a.m. on the 18th by the extreme right,
at Reed 's Bridge:

[CIRCULAR.] HEADQUARTERS ARMY
OF TENNESSEE,
In the Field, Leet's Tan-yard, September 18, 1863.

1. Johnson's column (Hood's),
on crossing at or near Reed's Bridge, will turn to the
left by the most practicable route and sweep up the
Chickamauga, toward Leo and Gordon's Mills.
2. Walker, crossing at Alexander's Bridge, will unite in
this move and push vigorously on the enemy's flank and
rear in the same direction.
3. Buckner, crossing at Thedford's Ford, will join in the
movement to the left, and press the enemy up the stream
from Polk's front at Lee and Gordon's Mills.
4. Polk will press his forces to the front of Lee and
Gordon's Mills, and if met by too much resistance to
cross will bear to the right and cross at Dalton's Ford,
or at Thedford's, as may be necessary, and join in the
attack wherever the enemy may be.
5. Hill will cover our left flank from an advance of the
enemy from the cove, and by pressing the cavalry in his
front ascertain if the enemy is re-enforcing at Lee
and-Gordon's Mills, in which event he will attack them in
flank.
6. Wheeler's cavalry will hold the gaps in Pigeon
Mountain and cover our rear and left and bring up
stragglers.
7. All teams, &c., not with troops should go toward
Ringgold and Dalton, beyond Taylor's Ridge. All cooking
should be done at the trains. Rations, when cooked, will
be forwarded to the troops.
8. The above movements wall be executed with the utmost
promptness, vigor, and persistence.
By command of General Bragg:

GEORGE WM. BRENT,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

The resistance offered by the enemy's cavalry and
the difficulties arising from the bad and narrow country
roads caused unexpected delays in the execution of these
movements. Though the commander of the right column was
several times urged to press forward, his crossing was not
effected until late in the afternoon. At this time
Major-General Hood, of Longstreet's corps, arrived and
assumed command of the column, Brigadier-General Johnson
resuming his improvised division of three brigades.
Alexander's Bridge was hotly contested and finally
broken up by the enemy just as General Walker secured
possession. He moved down stream, however, a short distance,
and crossed, as directed, at Byram's Ford, and thus secured a
junction with Hood after night.
The movement was resumed at daylight on the 19th, and
Buckner's corps, with Cheatham's division, of Polk's, had
crossed and formed, when a brisk engagement commenced with
our cavalry under Forrest on the extreme right about 9
o'clock. A brigade from Walker was ordered to Forrest's
support, and soon after Walker was ordered to attack with his
whole force. Our line was now formed, with Buckner's left
resting on the Chickamauga about 1 mile below Lee and
Gordon's Mills. On his right came Hood with his own and
Johnson's divisions, with Walker on the extreme right,
Cheatham's division being in reserve, the general direction
being a little east of north. The attack ordered by our right
was made by General Walker in his usual gallant style, and
soon developed a largely superior force opposed. He drove
them handsomely, however, and captured several batteries of
artillery in most gallant charges. Before Cheatham's
division, ordered to his support, could reach him, he had
been pressed back to his first position by the extended lines
of the enemy assailing him on both flanks. The two commands
united were soon enabled to force the enemy back again and
recover our advantage, though we were yet greatly
outnumbered.
These movements on our right were in a direction
to leave an opening in our line between Cheatham and Hood.
Stewart's division, forming Buckner's second line, was thrown
to the right to fill this, and it soon became hotly engaged,
as did Hood's whole front.
The enemy, whose left was at Lee and Gordon's
Mills when our movement commenced, had rapidly transferred
forces from his extreme right, changing his entire line, and
seemed disposed to dispute with all his ability our effort to
gain the main road to Chattanooga, in his rear.
Lieutenant-General Polk was ordered to move his remaining
division across at the nearest ford, and to assume the
command in person on our right. Hill's corps was also ordered
to cross below Lee and Gordon's Mills and join the line on
the right. While these movements were being made, our right
and center were heavily and almost constantly engaged.
Stewart, by a vigorous assault, broke the enemy's center and
penetrated far into his lines, but was obliged to retire for
want of sufficient force to meet the heavy enfilade fire
which he encountered from the right. Hood, later engaged,
advanced from the first fire, and continued to drive the
force in his front until night. Cleburne's division, of
Hill's corps, which first reached the right, was ordered to
attack immediately in conjunction with the force already
engaged. This veteran command, under its gallant chief, moved
to its work after sunset, taking the enemy completely by
surprise, driving him in great disorder for nearly a mile,
and inflicting a very heavy loss.
Night found us masters of the ground, after a
series of very obstinate contests with largely superior
numbers. From captured prisoners and others we learned with
certainty that we had encountered the enemy's whole force,
which had been moving day and night since they first
ascertained the direction of our march. Orders had been given
for the rapid march to the field of all re-enforcements
arriving by railroad, and three additional brigades from this
source joined us early next morning. The remaining forces on
our extreme left, east of the Chickamauga, had been ordered
up early in the afternoon, but reached the field too late to
participate in the engagement of that day. They were ordered
into line on their arrival, and disposed for a renewal of the
action early the next morning. Information was received from
Lieutenant-General Longstreet of his arrival at Ringgold and
departure for the field. Five small brigades of his corps
(about 5,000 effective infantry, no artillery) reached us in
time to participate in the action, three of them on the 19th
and two more on the 20th.
Upon the close of the engagement on the evening of
the 19th, the proper commanders were summoned to my camp
fire, and there received specific information and
instructions touching the dispositions of the troops and for
the operations of the next morning. The whole force was
divided for the next morning into two commands and assigned
to the two senior lieutenant-generals, Longstreet and
Polk-the former to the left, where all his own troops were
stationed, the latter continuing his command of the right.
Lieutenant-General Longstreet reached my headquarters about
11 p.m., and immediately received his instructions. After a
few hours' rest at my camp fire he moved at daylight to his
line, just in front of my position.
Lieutenant-General Polk was ordered to assail the
enemy on our extreme right at day-dawn on the 20th, and to
take up the attack in succession rapidly to the left. The
left wing was to await the attack by the right, take it up
promptly when made, and the whole line was then to be pushed
vigorously and persistently against the enemy throughout its
extent.
Before the dawn of day myself and staff were ready
for the saddle, occupying a position immediately in rear of
and accessible to all parts of the Free. With increasing
anxiety and disappointment I waited until after sunrise
without hearing a gun, and at length dispatched a staff
officer to Lieutenant-General Polk to ascertain the cause of
the delay and urge him to a prompt and speedy movement. This
officer, not finding the general with his troops, and
learning where he had spent the night, proceeded across
Alexander's Bridge to the east side of the Chickamauga and
there delivered my message.
Proceeding in person to the right wing, I found
the troops not even prepared for the movement. Messengers
were immediately dispatched for Lieutenant-General Polk, and
he shortly after joined me. My orders were renewed, and the
general was urged to their prompt execution, the more
important as the ear was saluted throughout the night with
the sounds of the ax and falling timber as the enemy
industriously labored to strengthen his position by hastily
constructed barricades and breastworks. A reconnaissance made
in the front of our extreme right during this delay crossed
the main road to Chattanooga and proved the important fact
that this greatly desired position was open to our
possession.
The reasons assigned for this unfortunate delay by
the wing commander appear in part in the reports of his
subordinates. It is sufficient to say they are entirely
unsatisfactory. It also appears from these reports that when
the action was opened on the right about 10 a.m. the troops
were moved to the assault in detail and by detachments,
unsupported, until nearly all parts of the right wing were in
turn repulsed with heavy losses.
Our troops were led with the greatest gallantry
and exhibited great coolness, bravery, and heroic devotion.
In no instance did they fail when called on to rally and
return to the charge. But though invariably driving the enemy
with slaughter at the points assailed, -they were compelled
in turn to yield to the greatly superior numbers constantly
brought against them. The attack on the left, promptly made
as ordered, met with less resistance, much of the enemy's
strength having been transferred to our right, and was
successfully and vigorously followed up.
About 2 p.m., passing along the line to our left,
I found we had been checked in our progress by encountering a
strong position strengthened by works and obstinately
defended. Unable to afford assistance from any other part of
the field, written orders were immediately dispatched to
Lieutenant-General Polk to again assault the enemy in his
front with his whole force and to persist until he should
dislodge him from his position. Directing the operations on
our left to be continued, I moved again to the right and soon
dispatched a staff officer to General Polk, urging a prompt
and vigorous execution of my written orders.
About 4 p.m. this general assault was made and the
attack was continued from right to left until the enemy gave
way at different points, and finally, about dark, yielded us
his line. The contest was severe, but the impetuous charge of
our troops could not be resisted when they were brought to
bear in full force, even where the enemy possessed all the
advantage of position and breastworks. The troops were halted
by their respective commanders when the darkness of the night
and the density of the forest rendered further movements
uncertain and dangerous, and the army bivouacked on the
ground it had so gallantly won.
Both flanks having advanced more rapidly than the
center, they were found confronting each other in lines
nearly parallel and within artillery range. Any advance by
them, especially at night, over ground so thickly wooded,
might have resulted in the most serious consequences.
The enemy, though driven from his line, still confronted us,
and desultory firing was heard until 8 p.m. Other noises,
indicating movements and dispositions for the morrow,
continued until a late hour at night.
During the operations by the main forces on the
19th and 20th, the cavalry on the flanks was actively and
usefully employed, holding the enemy in observation and
threatening or assailing him as occasion offered.
From the report of Major-General Wheeler.
commanding on the left, it will be seen what important
service was rendered both on the 20th and 21st by his
command, especially in the capture of prisoners and property
and in the dispersion of the enemy's cavalry.
Brigadier-General Forrest's report will show
equally gallant and valuble services by his command, on our
right. Exhausted by two days' battle, with very limited
supply of provisions, and almost destitute of water, some
time in daylight was absolutely essential for our troops to
supply these necessaries and replenish their ammunition
before renewing the contest.
Availing myself of this necessary delay to inspect
and readjust my lines, I moved as soon as daylight served on
the 21st. On my arrival about sunrise near Lieutenant-General
Polk's bivouac. I met the ever-vigilant Brigadier-General
Liddell, commanding a division in our front line, who was
awaiting the general to report that his picket this morning
discovered the enemy had retreated during the night from his
immediate front. Instructions were promptly given to push our
whole line of skirmishers to the front, and I moved to the
left and extended these orders. All the cavalry at hand,
including my personal guard, were ordered to the front.
Members of my staff, in passing through the lines
of our left wing with their escort, were warned of danger and
told that they were entering on the neutral ground between us
and the enemy. But this proved to be an error, and our
cavalry soon came upon the enemy's rear guard where the main
road passes through Missionary Ridge. He had availed himself
of the night to withdraw from our front, and his main body
was already in position within his lines at Chattanooga.
Any immediate pursuit by our infantry and
artillery would have been fruitless, as it was not deemed
practicable with our weak and exhausted force to assail the
enemy, now more than double our numbers, behind his
intrenchments. Though we had defeated him and driven him from
the field with heavy loss in men, arms, and artillery, it had
only been done by heavy sacrifices, in repeated, persistent,
and most gallant assaults upon superior numbers strongly
posted and protected.
The conduct of our troops was excellent throughout
the prolonged contest. Often repulsed where success seemed
impossible, they never failed to rally and-return to the
charge until the last combined and determined effort, in
which the spirit of every man seemed to conspire for success,
was crowned with the reward due to such gallantry in a just
cause.
Our loss was in proportion to the prolonged and
obstinate struggle. Two-fifths of our gallant troops had
fallen, and the number of general and staff officers stricken
down will best show how these troops were led.
Major-General Hood, the model soldier and
inspiring leader, fell after contributing largely to our
success, and has suffered the irreparable loss of a leg. That
his valuable life should be spared to us is, however, a
source for thankfulness and gratitude.
Major-General Hindman, highly distinguished for
gallantry and good conduct, received a severe contusion, but
persisted in keeping the saddle until he witnessed the
success in which his command largely participated.
Brig. Gens. B. H. Helm, Preston Smith, and James
Deshler died upon the field in the heroic discharge of duty.
They were true patriots and gallant soldiers, and worthy of
the high reputation they enjoyed.
Brigadier-Generals Adams, Gregg, and McNair fell
severely wounded while gallantly leading their commands in
the thickest of the fight. It is gratifying to know they are
convalescing and will be again found at the post of duty and
danger.
Judging from appearances on the field, the enemy's
losses must have exceeded our own largely, but we have no
means of correctly estimating them. We captured over 8,000
prisoners, 51 pieces of artillery, 15,000 stand of
small-arms, and quantities of ammunition, with wagons,
ambulances, and teams, medicines, hospital stores, &c.,
in large quantities.
The accompanying maps (1, 2, 3, and 4), based on
accurate surveys, will afford the necessary information for
the correct understanding of the movements of both armies.
The positions of the troops on the field are given mostly
from the sketches of their respective commanders. The times
selected for indication were the morning of the 19th, when
the action commenced; the morning of the 20th, and the
evening of the 20th at the close of the operations.
There has been much delay in rendering some of the
subordinate reports, and none have been received from
Lieutenant-Generals Polk and Hill, and only two from brigades
in Longstreet's corps. The absence of these has caused a
delay in making up my own, and induced me to defer forwarding
the others, hoping that all might be submitted together.
For the many deeds of daring and acts of heroic
devotion exhibited on this field reference is made to the
subordinate reports. It will be remarked that the private
soldier is eminently distinguished, as he always will be in
an army where the rank and file is made up of the best
citizens of the country.
The medical officers, both in the field and in the
hospitals, earned the lasting gratitude of the soldier and
deserve the highest commendation. The great number of wounded
thrown suddenly upon their hands taxed every energy and every
faculty. With means greatly inadequate, especially in
transportation, they soon reduced confusion into order, and
by assiduity and skill afforded to. the gallant sufferers
that temporal relief for which they might look in vain to any
other source. In this connection it is a pleasing duty to
acknowledge in grateful terms the deep indebtedness of the
army to the hospital relief associations, which so promptly
and so generously pressed forward their much needed
assistance. Under the admirable management of their officers
in Atlanta we were soon furnished with every necessary and
comfort, and stores continued to arrive until notice was
given that our wants were all supplied.
The officers of my staff, personal and general,
served me on this field and on the arduous marches preceding
with their usual zeal, intelligence, and gallantry.
The whole cavalry force having been dispatched to
press the enemy and cut off detachments, orders were given
for the army to move to a point near the railroad and
convenient to Water, still interposing between the enemy and
our large number of wounded our trophies and our wounded
prisoners, whose removal from the field occupied many days.
Our supplies of all kinds were greatly reduced,
the railroad having been constantly occupied in transporting
troops, prisoners, and our wounded, and the bridges having
been destroyed to a point 2 miles south of Ringgold. These
supplies were ordered replenished, and as soon as it was seen
that we could be subsisted the army was moved forward to
seize and hold the only communication the enemy had with his
supplies in the rear. His most important road and the
shortest by half to his depot at Bridgeport lay along the
south bank of the Tennessee. The holding of this
all-important route was confided to Lieutenant-General
Longstreet's command, and its possession forced the enemy to
a road double the length, over two ranges of mountains, by
wagon transportation. At the same time our cavalry, in large
force, was thrown across the river to operate on this long
and difficult route. These dispositions faithfully sustained
insured the enemy's speedy evacuation of Chattanooga for want
of food and forage. Possessed of the shortest road to his
depot, and the one by which re-enforcements must reach him,
we held him at our mercy and his destruction was only a
question of time.
The disastrous loss of these advantages and our
subsequent operations in consequence must be the subject of a
future communication.
The suggestion of a movement by our right
immediately after the battle to the north of the Tennessee
and thence upon Nashville requires notice only because it
will find a place on the files of the department. Such a
movement was utterly impossible for want of transportation.
Nearly half our army consisted of re-enforcements just before
the battle without a wagon or an artillery horse, and nearly,
if not quite, a third of the artillery horses on the field
had been lost. The railroad bridges, too, had been destroyed
to a point south of Ringgold, and on all the road from
Cleveland to Knoxville. To these insurmountable difficulties
.were added the entire absence of means to cross the river
except by fording at a few precarious points too deep for
artillery and the well-known danger of sudden rises, by which
all communication would be cut, a contingency which did
actually happen a few days after the visionary scheme was
proposed. But the most serious objection to the proposition
was its entire want of military propriety. It abandoned to
the enemy our entire line of communication and laid open to
him our depots of supplies, while it placed us with a greatly
inferior force beyond a difficult and at times impassable
river, in a country affording no subsistence to men or
animals. It also left open to the enemy, at a distance of
only 10 miles, our battle-field, with thousands of our
wounded and his own, and all the trophies and supplies we had
won. All this was to be risked and given up for what? To gain
the enemy's rear and cut him off from his depot of supplies
by the route over the mountains, when the very movement
abandoned to his unmolested use the better and more
practicable route, of half the length, on the south side of
the river. It is hardly necessary to say the proposition was
not even entertained, whatever may have been the inferences
drawn from subsequent movements.