By Anita Inder Singh

The Sino-Indo-US Great Game in the Indian Ocean

China’s growing economic and naval presence in
the Indian Ocean region challenges India, the major South Asian power in the
Indian Ocean area, and the US, the primary power since 1945. The question is
why.

The Indian Ocean in International
Power Politics

Since ancient times the Indian
Ocean has been a dynamic area of interaction between traders, cultures and
civilizations from Africa’s eastern coastline across the Arabian Sea and Bay of
Bengal to Australia. Its major sea lanes connect the
Middle East, Africa, and East Asia with Europe and the Americas.

Strategically,
the Indian Ocean is the location, among other things, of much of the world’s
energy supplies, key trade routes, the incipient Sino-US and Sino-Indian
rivalries, Islamist extremists and a powerful Iran committed to a nuclear
program which could be militarized.

Most
of the world’s trade passes through the Indian Ocean. Oil is one of the most
important goods to be carried through the Indian Ocean: some 40 billion barrels
traverse it every day.

For
the US, the Indian Ocean is the main gateway to Asia, where 60 percent of its
navy is placed.

Parts
of the Indian Ocean comprise India’s territorial waters. About 90
percent of India’s trade by volume — and all its vital oil imports — are
carried by sea, so the protection of international sea lanes is a strategic and
economic imperative.

China’s rising economy is reliant on trade routes that cross the
Indian Ocean. Beijing would therefore wish to protect Chinese interests along
the Indian Ocean’s seaways. Threats to China’s trade could range from maritime
piracy to the potential for India or the US to disrupt Chinese supply routes,
especially in the event of conflict.

The Indian
Ocean has not been a traditional Chinese sphere of interest. But over nearly a
decade, China has expanded its economic and military presence in its
international waters. The established American superpower, as well as the
rising Chinese power, have tended to
make a show of strength by deploying naval power in the Indian Ocean. And, challenged
by China’s economic and military expansion in a strategically important area,
India is strengthening its own military presence in the Ocean. The great naval game
in the Indian Ocean is being played vigorously by all three countries.

China has increased its influence in two outstanding ways. First,
it has built trade and investment ties with many countries in the Indian Ocean
region. Unsurprisingly,
it has gained strategically by creating economic partnerships with these
countries. Second, it has
expanded its naval presence. These intertwined
policies have enhanced its regional clout.

However, China is unlikely to displace
the US as the primary Indian Ocean power. The reasons?The US
spends more than USD 700 billion annually on defense. China spends a little
over USD 200 billion. And despite its expansion over
the last decade, China’s navy is
still behind America’s in both technology and operational capability. The
US retains maritime superiority throughout the Indian and Pacific Oceans.

China’s
military forays into the Indian Ocean and its acquisition of bases — the
“string of pearls” — reflect its enhanced presence in the Indian Ocean. The term “string
of pearls” was first used in a report, Energy
Futures in Asia,whichwasprepared in 2004 for the
US Department of Defense. It showed how much China’s rising geopolitical
influence is owed to its increasing access to ports and airfields, developing special
diplomatic ties and modernizing its military forces. The US National Security Strategy
Document of 2017 sees China and Russia as strategic competitors and revisionist
powers, contesting America’s geopolitical
advantages and aiming to change the international order in their favor.

There
is debate about China’s intentions. Does China seek to dominate the Indian
Ocean area? Or is it merely trying to safeguard
its trading interests and securing its maritime supply lines? What China has certainly gained by
assembling the so-called “string of pearls” is a network of overseas deep water
port facilities to service its expanding navy. This string of pearls is really
a series of trade routes from China across the Asian land mass and the Indian
Ocean to Europe. Together they symbolize China’s attempt to position itself as
a generous friend to Indian Ocean countries by building roads, ports and
railways.

How China Projects
Power in the Indian Ocean

To
project power in the Indian Ocean, China has gained reliable access to naval
facilities in key points around the area. Its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)
has simultaneously advanced its trading and strategic interests. In South Asia,
all the countries in which China has access to deep water ports are India’s
neighbors. They include Bangladesh, Myanmar, Pakistan and Sri Lanka.
Pakistan, like China,
has a border dispute with India. That has aroused Indian fears about both its
South Asian rivals uniting against it. Further to the west, in North Africa,
just off the Red Sea, China has acquired a base in Djibouti, where the US and
France already have military facilities. Whether and how much that threatens
the American and French positions in the Horn of Africa remains to be seen.
China has also built ports and acquired port facilities in Kenya and Tanzania. These ports can
be used for both commercial and military purposes.

How would
China use such bases? A primary concern would be to use the ports to refuel and
resupply its ships — and even to carry out at least minor repairs. It would not
then be necessary for them to return to China for those purposes. Such
facilities would enhance China’s ability to sustain its armed forces in an
Asian strategic theater.

China’s rise as a naval power has been based
on the sustained development of its economy and domestic infrastructure,
followed by the strengthening of economic and military ties with Indian Ocean
countries.

In the short
run — and in peacetime — China might conduct counter-piracy operations around
the Horn of Africa. This could serve many purposes. For instance, Chinese
forces could gain practice in organizing operations far away from their home turf.
At another level, counter-piracy could provide opportunities to observe the activities
of foreign militaries, especially of the US, India, Japan and, Australia — the
four countries comprising the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue.

Meanwhile,
China is selling arms to Indian Ocean countries. Myanmar, Pakistan and
Bangladesh buy most of their weapons from China, and Pakistan is the biggest
buyer of Chinese materiel. In return, China is helping Pakistan to develop its
military capabilities. China has also invested USD 46 billion in the
China-Pakistan Economic Corridor. The Corridor is a bilateral project to transform Pakistan’s economy by
modernizing its road, rail, air and energy transport systems —and to
connect the deep sea ports of Gwadar and Karachi to
China’s Xinjiang province and beyond
by overland routes. Cutting across
Kashmiri territory disputed by India and Pakistan, the Corridor has aroused New
Delhi’s concern about China’s intentions in the Indian Ocean area.

Generally,
China intends to increase its military footprint in the Indian Ocean, while claiming
to protect its economic investments along the Silk Road. Confirming the link
between strategy and economics, the 2015 Defense White Paper highlights “the new
requirement of safeguarding national security and development interests”. It confirms
China’s ambition to develop a modern maritime
military force “commensurate with its national security and development
interests, so as to provide strategic support for building itself into a
maritime power”. The Defense White Paper also underlines a change in naval
strategy. China’s navy will gradually shift from
“offshore waters defense” to the combination of “offshore waters defense” and
“open seas protection”. The implication is that the navy will defend
China’s interests beyond its core interest (the South China Sea) and will aim
at securing vital maritime trade routes internationally.

Implications
for India

India has traditionally regarded the Indian Ocean as
its sphere of maritime influence. China recognizes that geography gives India a special role to play in stabilizing Indian
Ocean and the South Asian region, but has warned that the Ocean is “not
India’s backyard”.

India
has been concerned at China’s securing refueling and docking facitlities for its
warships involved in anti-piracy operations. In 2018, it signed trade and
investment agreements with The Seychelles and Mauritius. But the Seychelles did
not allow India to develop a military base on its territory. Meanwhile, in Sri Lanka, China has invested
billions of dollars in loans and infrastructure ventures. There have been
reports that China is developing Sri Lanka’s Hambantota and Pakistan’s Gwadar
ports as military bases.

India
still enjoys advantages in the Indian Ocean region. Geography gives it an edge.
India’s navy is well acquainted with this large oceanic space, and the country’s
strategic location facilitates efforts to keep watch over maritime traffic
passing through the Indian Ocean and the Strait of Malacca. India is building
bases on its own: Andaman and Nicobar Islands, which lie close to the Strait of
Malacca, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand.

The big challenge for the Indian navy is
keeping track of Chinese submarines in its near seas.The present Indian
government has denied that there is tension between the Indian and Chinese navies
in the Indian Ocean. But some Indian strategic analysts hold that China’s naval
activities have already restricted India’s space for political and operational ploys.
They point out that China has moved submarines, destroyers, special operations
forces and guided-missile frigates into the Indian Ocean.

Washington’s Free and Open Indo-Pacific

One American
response to Chinese maneuvers in the Indian and Pacific Oceans is President Donald
Trump’s call for a free and open Indo-Pacific (FOIP). The US, India, Japan, and
Australia visualize the FOIP as a rules-based order. But the concept is
vague and ASEAN countries are wary of getting embroiled with China. They
are also unenthusiastic about a concept from which the word “Asia” has been
excluded, and which disregards the historical significance of the “Asia-Pacific”.

In its attempts to
maintain a favorable balance of naval power in the Indian Ocean, New Delhi has
drawn close to Washington and Tokyo. The trilateral India–US–Japan
Malabar exercises have grown in scope and complexity with the
addition of more combat drills.

New Delhi is also investing
more in the Indo-Pacific region — especially in infrastructure. It has signed logistical
pacts with Oman and France, strengthened maritime ties with Mauritius,
Seychelles, Mozambique and Madagascar. And a visit by Indian President Ram Nath
Kovind to East African island states in April 2018 showed New Delhi’s resolve
to rise to the perceived challenge posed by China in the Western Indian Ocean
littoral.

Outlook

Three to
four decades economically behind China, India faces tough competition in the
Indian Ocean. China’s rise as a naval power has been based on the sustained
development of its economy and domestic infrastructure, followed by the
strengthening of economic and military ties with Indian Ocean countries. India also
needs to modernize its armed forces — especially its navy. And India must strengthen
its capacity to implement major infrastructure projects in littoral states and islands
scattered around the Indian Ocean.

Chinese
investments have reportedly left some countries in the Indian Ocean region indebted
to Beijing. They include Djibouti, Pakistan and Maldives. India, the US, Australia
and Japan will appear as more attractive partners to Indian Ocean countries
only if their financing of infrastructure and other projects can match the huge
investments made by China.

Initially
driven by China’s growing economic interests, China’s naval presence in the
Indian Ocean is likely to increase in the years to come. Yet the possibility of
catching up wth the US — let alone displacing it — is not even a spot on the distant
horizon. China cannot dominate the Indian Ocean. But its mix of economics, strategy
and building of a world class navy have already secured it a major role in the enduring
Great Game in the Indian Ocean.

About The Author

Anita Inder Singh, a Swedish citizen, is a Founding Professor of the Centre for Peace and Conflict Resolution in New Delhi. She has been a Fellow at the National Endowment for Democracy in Washington DC and has taught international relations at the graduate level at Oxford and the LSE. She has written for the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights and the UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs.