Criminal Investigation and Detection Group; the
investigatory arm of the PNP

CPP

Communist Party of the Philippines

DPWH

Department of Public Works and Highways

DSWD

Department of Social Welfare and Development

IB

Infantry Battalion

ID

Infantry Division

NBI

National Bureau of Investigation; a civilian investigatory
agency under the Department of Justice

NDFP

National Democratic Front of the Philippines

NPA

New People’s Army; military wing of the CPP

PNP

Philippine National Police

Purok

Territorial enclave inside a barangay, especially
in rural areas

Sangguniang Bayan

Legislature of municipal governments

Tricycle

A motorcycle with a sidecar on a third wheel for carrying
passengers

Waiting shed

An open, sheltered structure built along most roads in the
Philippines, where people wait for public transport

Summary

Armed
men [in military uniforms] entered the house and immediately began beating Toto
with their rifles. They beat him continuously; he was trying to escape …
but they kept pulling him back and beating him…. Then they shot him.

—“Jaime,”
a witness to the October 1, 2010 killing of leftist activist Rene Quirante

Cases of extrajudicial killings need to be solved, not just
identify the perpetrators but have them captured and sent to jail.[1]

—Benigno Aquino III, June 1, 2010, then Philippine
president-elect

It is almost four years now. My family is living in agony.
It is torture on my part, financial, emotional, psychological. The only normal
part of my life now is the abnormality around my daughter Karen’s
disappearance.

—Concepcion Empeño, whose daughter was
allegedly abducted by soldiers on June 26, 2006, and has not been seen since

On the morning of July 5, 2010, Fernando Baldomero became
the first reported victim of an extrajudicial killing under President Benigno
Aquino III’s newly minted administration.

Baldomero—the provincial coordinator of the leftist
Bayan Muna political party, and a town councilor in Lezo, Aklan
province—was leaving home to take his 12-year-old son to school when a
gunman approached, aimed a .45 caliber pistol at the 61-year-old, and shot him
in the head and neck before fleeing on a motorcycle.

Two decades earlier, Baldomero had been a member of the New
People’s Army (NPA), the armed wing of the Communist Party of the
Philippines (CPP), but had left the NPA following his release from prison in
1994. Police and the military had continued to tag Baldomero as an NPA member.
In the days before he was killed, several witnesses had seen men in military
uniforms around Baldomero’s residence.

Charges have been filed against the alleged gunman, a
civilian, but police have not pursued evidence of military involvement. Nor
have they executed the court’s January 10, 2011 arrest warrant, leaving
the alleged gunman at large.

During his campaign for president, Benigno Aquino III
pledged to end serious violations of human rights in the Philippines. Yet since
taking office on June 30, 2010, the Philippine military continues to be
implicated in apparently politically-motivated extrajudicial killings—deliberate
unlawful killings by state security forces—and enforced disappearances.
These abuses persist in part because of the Philippine police’s failure
to conduct thorough and impartial investigations, particularly when evidence
points to military involvement. The ability to bring the perpetrators to
justice has also been hindered by the Justice Department’s inadequate
protection program for witnesses, who have been subject to harassment and
intimidation.

Human Rights Watch has documented seven extrajudicial
killings implicating the military and three enforced disappearances of leftist
activists since Aquino took office. We were not able to investigate several
other suspected extrajudicial killings reported by local media due to time
constraints. In addition to recent abuses, this report also examines the
government’s lackluster efforts to investigate and prosecute serious
human rights violations perpetrated during the last decade, and the
state’s continuing failure to hold perpetrators accountable.

Baldomero’s
killing has a familiar ring to it. Like many of the victims of killings and
“disappearances” detailed in this report, Baldomero was a leftist
activist. Some, like Baldomero, were previously members of the CPP-NPA.
However, in none of these cases is there evidence they were still NPA members
or actively participating in combat at the time of the killing.

Like Baldomero, several victims were killed or abducted in
front of witnesses, either when gunmen entered the victims’ property and
shot them in cold blood, or shot them from atop motorbikes. The perpetrators
either wore civilian clothes with bonnets (balaclavas), or wore military
uniforms and made no attempt to hide their faces. In several cases there is
evidence that soldiers worked with members of paramilitary
forces—primarily the Citizen Armed Force Geographical Unit
(CAFGU)—or paid military “assets,” including “rebel
returnees” (former NPA members).

The military appears to have targeted several of these
victims as CPP-NPA members because of their involvement with leftist
organizations, work on land reform, or opposition to military presence in their
communities. The military operating in areas affected by the NPA conflict often
considers all leftist organizations to be fronts for the armed group and any
individuals who oppose military presence to be NPA members.

For more than four decades the NPA has engaged in an
insurgency against the Philippine government, with their armed strength at its
peak in the mid-1980s. In addition to attacks on government military targets,
the NPA has claimed responsibility for killing—among others—civilians,
government officials, and tribal leaders allegedly associated with the
military, in violation of international humanitarian law (the laws of war).
They have also unlawfully executed military personnel and others considered to
be “enemies of the people” after conviction by so-called
People’s Courts or Hukumang Bayan. NPA attacks on civilians and
mistreatment and execution of all persons in custody are serious violations of
the laws of war. Those who carry out or order such abuses are responsible for
war crimes.

The Philippine government has a duty and obligation to
protect the population from insurgent attacks. However, abuses by insurgents
never justify violations of the laws of war or human rights violations by
government security forces. This includes extrajudicial killings and enforced
disappearances of any person, including alleged members of political groups and
civil society organizations that are deemed to be sympathetic to the
insurgents’ cause.

A former soldier, “Ricardo” (not his real name),
gave a detailed account of military structure and practices. He told Human
Rights Watch he had been ordered to kill and “disappear” leftist
activists from the late 1990s until about 2007. Ricardo spoke of how senior
military commanders ordered him to kill leftist activists and hide or burn the
bodies, and how the military had trained him and his fellow soldiers to make
targeted killings look like the NPA’s Special Partisan Unit (SPARU) had
perpetrated them, by using a .45 caliber pistol and wearing bonnets
(balaclavas), thought to be favored by the NPA. While much of Ricardo’s
account could not be independently confirmed, his information seemed credible
based on its consistency and detail.

Extrajudicial killings have long been a problem in the
Philippines. Hundreds of members of left-wing political parties, political
activists, critical journalists, and outspoken clergy have been killed or
forcibly disappeared in the Philippines during the past decade. The military
and police, as well as paramilitary forces, have been implicated in many of
these killings. As a result of international and local pressure, the number of
extrajudicial killings has dropped since 2007, but they still occur with
impunity. To date, there have been only seven successfully prosecuted cases of
extrajudicial killings, resulting in the conviction of 12 defendants. There has
not been a single conviction of active military personnel at the time of the
killing. No senior military officers have been convicted either for direct
involvement in these violations or as a matter of command responsibility.

The public rhetoric of senior military officers has changed
somewhat since Aquino took office—one need only drive along Epifanio
Delos Santos Avenue (EDSA) in Manila to see the “I am a soldier and a
human rights advocate” sign outside the headquarters of the armed forces
at Camp Aguinaldo. But this change in language has not yet been reflected in
action, such as improved military cooperation with investigating authorities,
comprehensive internal investigations of implicated military personnel, or
increased openness within the military structure. In the recent cases
documented by Human Rights Watch, the military continues to deny all
allegations of soldiers’ involvement in extrajudicial killings and other
serious abuses, despite evidence to the contrary.

Police investigations into alleged extrajudicial killings
and enforced disappearances are woefully inadequate. Several core aspects of
investigations are often disregarded by investigators, including effectively
examining crime scenes and canvassing for witnesses. Investigators routinely
fail to pursue evidence of military involvement and the absence of military
cooperation exacerbates this problem. Witness protection is rarely provided,
and where it is the protection program is inflexible.

Longstanding problems of the criminal justice system are
exacerbated in human rights cases, where victims and witnesses may justifiably
fear retribution from soldiers. Despite official orders requiring prosecutors
and police to work together in order to ensure that a strong case is presented
to court, such cooperation remains extremely unusual. Once a case is filed in
court, hearings occur only at monthly intervals. Often they are less frequent,
with some breaks lasting several months, so that trials typically last for
years. Court delays and a judicial hesitancy to act when the authorities are
implicated in crimes have also hampered the Supreme Court writs of amparo and
habeas data, which were designed to compel military and other government officials
to release information on people in their custody, thereby preventing
“disappearances.”

The widespread impunity enjoyed by perpetrators of
extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances in the Philippines is
exacerbated by the inadequacies of institutions charged with promoting human
rights and accountability, including the Department of Justice, the Commission
on Human Rights, the Ombudsman, and the Joint Monitoring Committee. The Joint
Monitoring Committee is specifically tasked with implementing an agreement on
human rights and international humanitarian law between the government and the
National Democratic Front of the Philippines (NDFP), including the CPP and the
NPA.

Abusive behavior by security forces persists when
perpetrators are not held accountable for their actions. Curtailing human
rights violations requires more than new policies and senior officials
committed to reform; it requires that would-be perpetrators know that they will
go to prison and their careers will end if they order or participate in serious
abuses. The Philippine government should adopt effective measures to end
extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances, hold perpetrators
accountable, and prevent them from recurring.

Key
Recommendations

To
the Philippine Government:

Investigate and prosecute all those responsible in each case of
extrajudicial killing and enforced disappearance detailed in this report.

Issue an executive order directing police and National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI) investigators to vigorously pursue crimes allegedly
committed by the military, or themselves be subject to disciplinary measures.

Communicate fully to all military personnel that officers and
soldiers who provide evidence or testimony in cases of human rights violations
will be eligible for witness protection and other measures to ensure their
safety.

Order the inspector general and the provost marshal of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines (AFP) to investigate and report publicly within 90
days on the involvement of military personnel in extrajudicial killings, and to
identify failures within AFP investigative agencies to prosecute officers under
principles of command responsibility.

Order the military to cease targeted attacks on civilians, to
cease the practice of denying military involvement in all extrajudicial
killings, and to cease labeling leftist groups as fronts for the CPP-NPA, which
places group members at considerable risk.

Take all necessary measures, including reforming the witness
protection program, to ensure the safety of survivors of serious crimes,
witnesses, and families of victims and witnesses before, during, and after
trial.

Submit a bill to Congress that prohibits and protects against
enforced disappearances and ratify the International Convention for the
Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance.

To Donors and External Partners,
including the United States, European Union, Japan, and Australia:

Publicly press the Philippine government to investigate and
prosecute members of the military for extrajudicial killings, including those
liable under command responsibility. Diplomats based in Manila should closely
monitor Philippine government investigations of individual extrajudicial
killing and enforced disappearance cases.

Full recommendations—of both a general nature and with
respect to specific cases—appear at the end of this report.

Methodology

This report is based on Human Rights Watch research in the
Philippines from February to April 2011. Researchers travelled to the provinces
of Agusan del Sur, Aklan, Bataan, Batangas, Compostela Valley, Davao del Norte,
Davao del Sur, Laguna, Negros Occidental, Negros Oriental, Nueva Ecija, and
Surigao del Sur, and to Davao City to investigate recent alleged extrajudicial
killings and enforced disappearances.

Human Rights Watch conducted a total of 45 interviews with
victims of abuses, their family members and friends, and eyewitnesses. Many
were reached by referral from local community groups. We spoke with multiple
sources to verify the veracity of statements.

Human Rights Watch interviewed 16 police officials, 11
military officers, and three public prosecutors. We also spoke to barangay and
other local officials.

One of the most detailed accounts of military structure and
practices came from a former soldier. “Ricardo,” not his real name,
told Human Rights Watch that military officers had ordered him to kill and
“disappear” leftist activists from the late 1990s to about 2007. He
died of natural causes during the course of this research.

Human Rights Watch spoke with more than two dozen local
human rights activists, academics, lawyers, and journalists who have been
looking into extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances for many years
and who, in many cases, were able to provide corroborating evidence.

Human Rights Watch has also drawn on its own past research.
Since August 2009, we have researched the progress of government investigations
and prosecutions into more than 20 targeted killings and enforced
disappearances perpetrated between 2004 and 2010 in several provinces
throughout the Philippines. In the course of this research, researchers
interviewed more than 50 victims of abuses, their family members and friends,
and eyewitnesses in Bicol, Central Luzon, and Negros.

Interviews were conducted in English or in Tagalog, Cebuano,
Ilonggo or Bikol with the aid of interpreters. The names of many interviewees
have been withheld for security reasons, and pseudonyms used for those
repeatedly quoted. Where pseudonyms are used the name is given in quotation
marks. Wherever possible and in the majority of cases, interviews were
conducted on a one-on-one basis. None of those interviewed received payment.

In May 2011, Human Rights Watch sent letters to the
Philippine officials listed below to obtain data and solicit views on
extrajudicial killings:

Hon. Leila de Lima, secretary of the Department of Justice

Gen. Eduardo Oban, Jr., chief of staff of the Armed Forces
of the Philippines

Raul M. Bacalzo, director general of the Philippine
National Police

Officer-in-Charge,
deputy ombudsman for Military and Other Law Enforcement Offices

Human Rights Watch also sent a letter to the Central
Committee of the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP). One of the letters
to the government and the letter to the CPP is attached as an appendix. The
rest of the letters are posted on the Philippines page of the Human Rights
Watch website: www.hrw.org.

At this writing, Human Rights Watch has received a response
from the Ombudsman’s office, which is attached as an appendix. Future
responses will be posted on the website.

I. The Philippine Context

The
Communist Insurgency, Government Response, and Peace Talks

Killings and enforced disappearances in the Philippines
occur in the context of a four-decade-long communist insurgency that affects
many of the country’s 80 provinces.

The New People’s Army (NPA) is the armed wing of the
Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP), which since 1969 has been engaged in
an armed rebellion with the goal of establishing a Marxist state.[2]
The National Democratic Front of the Philippines (NDFP) is charged with forging
alliances with so-called people’s organizations to develop a
revolutionary united front.[3]
Military estimates put the armed strength of the NPA at around 4,100
guerrillas, backed by a broad network of non-combatant
supporters.[4]
Membership in the CPP has been legal since 1992.[5]

During the course of this 42-year conflict, the CPP-NPA has
splintered with evolving and conflicting ideologies and personality
differences, leading to the creation of other communist armed groups such as
the Revolutionary Proletarian Army-Alex Boncayao Brigade (RPA-ABB) in 1992 and
the Revolutionary People’s Army (Rebolusyonaryong Hukbong Bayan, RHB) in
1998.[6]
These groups continue to perpetrate numerous serious human rights
abuses—including abductions, torture, and killings—against
suspected adversaries and ordinary civilians.

The CPP-NPA has admitted killing numerous former members,
government officials, soldiers and police officers, and civilians since its
creation in 1969. Since June 30, 2010, it has claimed responsibility for
killing or executing several civilians, government officials, tribal leaders
allegedly associated with the military, and soldiers, in circumstances that may
violate international humanitarian law.

Often, the CPP-NPA seeks to justify the killings by arguing
that a “people’s court” has condemned the victim to death
because of various crimes against the people, sometimes criminal acts such as
rape and murder, and other times spying on the NPA for the military. For
instance, on July 23, 2010, NPA members shot and killed sugar farmer Sergio
Villadar in Escalante City, Negros Occidental. The NPA, which claimed
responsibility for the killing, said it was forced to kill Villadar because he
resisted arrest after being charged before the NPA’s “revolutionary
people’s court” for a 2007 killing and involvement in several
beatings.[7]
Philip Alston, then-UN special rapporteur on extrajudicial executions, has
stated this court system “is either deeply flawed or simply a
sham.”[8]

The CPP-NPA has targeted indigenous leaders who are viewed
as allied with the military. For instance, on August 6, 2010, at around 10
a.m., approximately 30 NPA fighters reportedly ambushed several people
including Datu Ruben Labawan, the Supreme Tribal Council for Peace and
Development, which is affiliated with the AFP, in Paquibato district, Davao
City. Labawan was travelling with two soldiers, his wife, and other indigenous
leaders. Two soldiers, Pfc. Elansio Alonsagay and Pfc. Kimpio Labawan, together
with one civilian, Datu Enecencio Dangkay, died from gunshot wounds.[9]

The NPA has also targeted members of the Revolutionary
Proletarian Army (RPA), which broke away from the CPP in 1992 due to
ideological differences and has worked with government forces since 2000 when
it signed a peace accord with the government.[10] On November 2,
2010, NPA fighters shot and killed former RPA leader and barangay tanod
Renante Cañete in Sagay City, Negros Occidental. According to news
reports, the NPA alleged Cañete was a hired gunman used by landlords in
collaboration with the military, and that it had summoned Cañete to
resolve the complaints against him but he had not responded.[11]

Attacks on civilians and the torture or execution of any
prisoner constitute serious violations of the laws of war and may be war
crimes. The Philippine government has a duty and obligation to protect the
population from insurgent attacks. However, abuses by insurgents never justify
violations of the laws of war or human rights violations by government security
forces. This includes attacks on members of political groups and civil society
organizations viewed as sympathetic to the insurgents’ cause.

Members of the military and police
often lump members of leftist organizations, labor unions, and party-list
groups together with the NPA—frequently with deadly outcomes. Leftist
organizations in the Philippines encompass a range of views towards the
CPP-NPA, which rejects the Philippine government and constitution. Some
militant left-wing organizations support the NPA and its armed struggle, if not
openly. Other organizations share the CPP’s political ideology, or
elements of it, but advocate peaceful reform. Others fully reject the
CPP’s perspective but are still targeted by the military and police.
Since members of these groups are not NPA fighters, who are armed and
combat-ready, they are less dangerous targets of attack for the military and
police. In any case, attacks on members of leftist organizations, whatever the
extent of their support for the CPP-NPA, is unlawful under the laws of war,
unless they are directly participating in hostilities. Also unlawful is the
killing of any person in government custody, including surrendered members of
the NPA.

The
military has over the years publicly labeled a number of organizations, unions,
and party-list groups as “NPA fronts.” The affect is pernicious.
Once labeled—and the labels are hard to remove—the members of such
organizations may be the targets of government attack.

The military’s designations may reflect the whims of
individual commanders in a locale. Lt. Col. Oliver Artuz, commander of the 39th
Infantry Battalion based in Davao del Sur, told Human Rights Watch that all unions
are linked to the NPA, whose aim is to raise wages so high that companies go
out of business, thus creating more recruits for the NPA.[12]
Several military officers have labeled protesting as a form of violence.
According to one officer, “Once the organizations have been infiltrated
[by the NPA] you will notice they are being violent.... They will join mass
protests.”[13]

A police insider explained how political activism is also
misunderstood within the police force. Speaking of a recent victim of extrajudicial
killing, he said, “Some police officers have a misconception of what
[activists] are doing. They say that [the targeted person] is a traitor to the
government. But I have never heard of him being involved in a criminal act; he
just leads rallies.”[14]

Many government-targeted killings over the years had the
involvement of state-supported paramilitary forces, “vigilante
groups” such as Alsa Masa (“Masses Arise”), and
“private armies.”[15]
The official status of these forces has changed over time, but they have long
been responsible for abuses against suspected NPA members and supporters, and
other politically-motivated targets. Most notoriously, members of a private
army, along with soldiers and police, were implicated in the November 2009
massacre of 58 relatives and supporters of a political candidate and media
workers in Maguindanao on the island of Mindanao.[16]Despite this, successive Philippine governments have taken no serious
steps to dismantle or disarm paramilitary forces or militias on a large scale.
Only a few militia or paramilitary members have been prosecuted for abuses, and
even fewer military and police officers overseeing their crimes have been prosecuted.

According to government sources, in 2010 the NPA killed 176
soldiers and 11 police officers, while the government killed 141 suspected NPA
members in military and police operations.[17]

In his July 2010 State of the Nation Address, President
Aquino announced that the government was prepared to declare a ceasefire with
the CPP-NPA and resume peace talks. The CPP-NPA agreed to move toward peace
talks, but not a ceasefire. Formal negotiations between the government and the
NDFP, which negotiates on behalf of the CPP-NPA, resumed on February 15, 2011.
Both sides agreed on a general time frame for completing the draft
comprehensive agreements on the remaining items of the agenda, which include
social and economic reforms, political and constitutional reforms, and ending
hostilities and disposing of forces.[18]
They also discussed confidence-building measures, such as the release of
captured NPA/CPP members and government soldiers.[19]

Extrajudicial killings have continued since the peace talks
commenced.

The
Legacy of Extrajudicial Killings

Extrajudicial killings are an enduring problem in the
Philippines, but they received international attention in 2006 when the number
of alleged extrajudicial killings skyrocketed.[20] During the
administration of President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, who was in office from
2001 to 2010, hundreds of leftist politicians and political activists,
journalists, and clergy were killed or abducted.[21]
In 2007, the number of killings dropped significantly due to domestic and
international pressure, but killings have nonetheless continued.

Arroyo
Administration Initiatives to Address Extrajudicial Killings

In
response to domestic and international pressure, the Arroyo administration
instituted several initiatives to address extrajudicial killings, including
creating special bodies within the Philippine National Police and the
Department of Justice to investigate and prosecute political killings. While
the number of killings dropped, there was virtually no accountability for those
responsible. During Arroyo’s nine-year term, only 11 people were
convicted for politically-motivated killings, none for the abductions, and no
member of the military active at the time of the killing has been brought to
justice. These initiatives are briefly discussed below.

Melo Commission

In August 2006 Arroyo created a commission under former
Supreme Court Associate Justice Jose Melo to probe the killings of journalists
and leftist activists since 2001.[22]
The commission’s report, made public in February 2007 after much public
pressure, concluded:

There is no official or sanctioned policy on the part of
the military or its civilian superiors to resort to what other countries
euphemistically call “alternative procedure”—meaning illegal
liquidations. However, there is certainly evidence pointing the finger of
suspicion at some elements and personalities in the armed forces, in particular
Gen. Palparan, as responsible for an undetermined number of killings, by
allowing, tolerating, and even encouraging the killings.[23]

In its initial report, the commission made several
recommendations relating to command responsibility, witness protection, and the
need for thorough investigations.[24]These
reports were expanded upon in an August 2007 letter from the commission to
then-Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita, which has not been made public. Among
its recommendations, the commission called on Arroyo to investigate senior
members of the military, in particular Gen. Jovito Palparan, and order the
military to do away with its continuing “state of denial” mindset
and to stop labeling left-wing or cause-oriented groups mere
“fronts” for the CPP-NPA and “enemies of the state.”[25]

Arroyo never implemented these or the commission’s
other recommendations, nor has Aquino since taking office.[26]

Task Force Usig

In August 2006 Arroyo created Task Force Usig, a special
police body, which she charged with solving 10 cases of killings of political
activists or journalists within 10 weeks. Task Force Usig has continued to
operate beyond its 10-week mandate. In practice, it does not itself investigate
killings, but oversees the work of local investigators and monitors the status
of investigations.

Task Force 211

In November 2007, Arroyo created the Task Force against
Political Violence, known as Task Force 211. Officially, the task force was:

Created to harness and mobilize government agencies,
political groups, the religious, civil society and sectoral organizations and
the public for the prevention, investigation, prosecution and punishment of
political violence, the care and protection of people and communities
victimized and threatened with violence, and the promotion of a culture opposed
to violence and for the advancement of reconciliation and peace.[27]

In practice, however, Task Force 211 interpreted its mandate
as limited to killings, excluding enforced disappearances and other forms of political
violence, and operated with a small staff simply monitoring the status of
certain alleged extrajudicial killings. For instance, it refused to investigate
the enforced disappearance of Sherlyn Cadapan and Karen Empeño in
Bulacan, Central Luzon on June 26, 2006, even when an eyewitness had testified
that the military had detained, tortured, and most likely killed them.

During
Task Force 211’s tenure, it has looked into more than 200 cases, 53 of
which were classed as having progressed through the justice system and four in
which convictions were secured.[28]

In December 2010, Justice Secretary Leila de Lima created a
task force that she says has a broader mandate than Task Force 211.[29]
De Lima directed the new task force to review all reported and unsolved cases
of extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances, with the intention of
speeding up the resolution of cases with sufficient evidence and
reinvestigating cases in which the trail of evidence has gone cold.

Human Rights Desks

In 2007, the PNP and AFP each created human rights offices.
Since then, they have pledged to create such offices or human rights desks at
different levels of command to monitor and maintain records regarding personnel
allegedly involved in human rights violations.[30]The desks were not
to have an investigative function; rather, they were to maintain and analyze
records of reported violations and to provide human rights training. At their
Manila headquarters, these desks mainly seek information from the commanders in
areas where alleged human rights violations have occurred. Outside Manila, the
desks don’t appear to function. Many provincial police offices that are
meant to have such desks, do not.[31]

President Aquino’s Commitments

Benigno Aquino III was
elected president and inaugurated on June 30, 2010, after campaigning to
address extrajudicial killings, enforced disappearances, and other human rights
violations by government security forces.

Aquino has acknowledged the problems of impunity. In a
meeting with European Union ambassadors a month before his inauguration, he
said, “Cases of extrajudicial killings need to be solved, not just
identify the perpetrators but have them captured and sent to jail.”[32]
In his inauguration speech he said, “There can be no reconciliation without
justice. When we allow crimes to go unpunished, we give consent to their
occurring over and over again.”[33]

While Aquino’s language has been strong, he has not
implemented the systemic reforms necessary to stop the killings and hold
perpetrators accountable.

II. Extrajudicial Executions and Enforced
Disappearances

An
extrajudicial killing is a deliberate, unlawful killing by state security
forces. In the Philippines, there is much debate about the terminology, in
particular extrajudicial killing versus extralegal killing; but the meanings
are the same. An enforced disappearance is when an individual is deprived of
liberty by or with the state’s acquiescence, and officials refuse to
provide information regarding the victim’s detention, whereabouts, or fate.[34]Extrajudicial killings and
enforced disappearances violate basic human rights, including the right to
life, the right to liberty and security of the person, the right to a fair and
public trial, as well as the prohibition on torture and cruel, inhuman, and
degrading treatment or punishment.[35]

Human Rights Watch investigated seven apparent extrajudicial
killings and three enforced disappearances that occurred since June 30, 2010,
in which there was significant evidence of military involvement (see below).
News media have reported other possible cases during that period that Human
Rights Watch was not able to investigate due to time constraints. In three
other cases, Human Rights Watch found no evidence of military involvement;
another reported case could not be adequately investigated because of ongoing
military hostilities in the area. In all of these cases we examined the
response of police and other authorities to the killings.

The investigated cases show no consistent patterns. Several
victims were leftist activists who may have been killed because of perceived
association with the New People’s Army (NPA), while others appear to have
been ordinary farmers involved in land disputes with local officials. In one
case local politics was at issue.

A former soldier, “Ricardo,” told Human Rights
Watch that commanding officers of his battalion ordered him to carry out
several extrajudicial killings during his time in the Philippine Army from the
mid-1980s to the mid-2000s. While much in Ricardo’s account could not be
independently confirmed, his information seemed credible based on its
consistency and detail.

Ricardo said army intelligence had determined that the
targets were working for the NPA. He said that in 2005, an officer in the
army’s 8th Infantry Division ordered him to kill Felidito
Dacut, a lawyer and Bayan Muna-Eastern Visayas regional coordinator because,
“as a human rights lawyer, he was hampering military activities.”
Ricardo said a fellow soldier shot and killed Dacut with a .45 caliber pistol
on March 14, 2005, near Tacloban City in Leyte.[36]
He said that military officers trained him to make such assassinations look
like they were perpetrated by the NPA’s Special Partisan Unit (SPARU) by
using a .45 caliber pistol and wearing bonnets (balaclavas).

“Ricardo” also said that military officers on
several occasions ordered him to help dispose of victims’ bodies. He
described one instance in 2007 at Fort Bonifacio, the Philippine Army
headquarters in Manila, where commanding officers ordered him and several
intelligence officers to put a male corpse inside a steel drum, seal it, and
place the drum in a vehicle as it was to be taken elsewhere, but he was not
aware where. He said he was unable to describe the dead man because his face
was covered with blood.

Killing
of Fernando “Nanding” Baldomero, July
5, 2010

At about 6.30 a.m. on July 5, 2010, an armed man riding
tandem on a motorcycle gunned down Fernando Baldomero with a .45 caliber pistol
outside his family home along the national highway in barangay Estancia,
Kalibo, Aklan. Baldomero, 61, had just mounted his motorcycle with his
12-year-old son, whom he was taking to school, as he did every day. An NPA
member until his release from prison in 1994, Baldomero was the provincial
coordinator of the leftist political party Bayan Muna and a town councilor in
Lezo, Aklan.[37]

Several witnesses saw men in military uniforms around
Baldomero’s residence in the days before he was killed. A witness told
Human Rights Watch that she saw a military truck parked for three consecutive
days at a waiting shed (an open, sheltered structure built along the road) just
a few meters from Baldomero’s house, about one week before he was killed.
She said that she saw the identified suspect, Dindo Lovon Ancero, standing with
soldiers, and had even teased Baldomero, “Maybe they are looking for you?”[38]

On January 10, 2011, the Aklan regional trial court issued
an arrest warrant for Ancero and several “John Does,” or
unidentified suspects.[39]
However, there is no evidence that police have pursued evidence of military
involvement. When a relative asked a police investigator why he had not pursued
leads regarding military involvement, he said, “Tigok tayo dyan”
or “We’re dead”—indicating that he thought his life
would be at risk if he investigated military involvement.[40]
The family said that the provincial police director told them that pursuing
military personnel “only complicates the investigation.”[41]
To date the arrest warrant has not been served on Ancero, despite having sworn
a counter-affidavit before a prosecutor in Mandaue City, Cebu, on August 14,
2010. The warrant has since been returned to the court.[42]

On several occasions both the military and the police had
tagged Baldomero as a current member of the CPP-NPA.[43] On
March 19, 2010, just four months before he was killed, unidentified men threw
two hand grenades into Baldomero’s ancestral home in Lezo, Aklan. While
charges were never brought against the perpetrators, a police report said the
prime suspects were political rivals of Baldomero with links to the Philippine
Army.[44]
Relatives said that motorcycles had often tailed Baldomero since he left prison
in the mid-1990s.[45]

Killing
of Pascual Guevarra, July 9 2010

On July 9, 2010, at about 4:30 pm, an unidentified man
walked onto the property of Pascual Guevarra, 78, within Fort Magsaysay
military reservation in barangay San Isidro, Laur, Nueva Ecija province
and shot him dead with a 9mm pistol.[46]
The gunman’s accomplice waited nearby on a motorcycle without a license
plate and they drove off in tandem.[47]
Guevarra was the leader of two local leftist organizations, one of which was
pressing the government to compensate farmers for land resumed by the
government for widening a road.[48]

According to the family and police investigators, an officer
of the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH) had contacted Guevarra
and asked him to stay home on the day he was killed, telling him that they
would deliver the compensation for the land resumption.[49]
While the police formed a task force to investigate this killing, the
investigation has stalled primarily, a police investigator alleges, because the
DPWH has not cooperated with the investigation. He told Human Rights Watch:

We tried to invite [the DPWH officer]; however he is very
hesitant to cooperate because he is the one implicated in the case….
[Regional, provincial, and district DPWH offices] told us that they have
created their own investigative body, however they [would not provide] any
report [as to the] outcome of the investigation…. It is
“heated,” … because they don’t want to give us the
documents we needed to file a complaint against [the suspect].[50]

Neither the police nor the NBI have investigated possible
military involvement in the killing, despite the killing taking place on a military
reserve. The military had previously tagged Guevarra’s organization as
affiliated with the CPP-NPA. A military officer from the 702nd IB
told Human Rights Watch, “In our opinion, this group is an organization
of the farmers that was being infiltrated by the NPA, the local terrorists. But
we do not [have evidence of this].”[51]

Military officers said the police had initially suspected
military involvement, but this ceased when a DPWH official was implicated.[52]
Investigators never pursued a possible military role, such as a soldier being
used as the gunman. According to military officials, officers stationed at Fort
Magsaysay did investigate the killing but there was no independent
investigation by the provost marshal or an independent unit. An officer with
the 702nd IB stationed away from Fort Magsaysay said that, “We
don’t have a special report on this … because [the killing was]
within the military reservation.”As a result, he explained, it was for
officials stationed at Fort Magsaysay to investigate. Military officials at
Fort Magsaysay confirmed the provost marshal had not been tapped to investigate
because, “It came out in our intelligence operation that no military were
involved, [so] we turned it over to the police.”

Guevarra’s relatives told Human Rights Watch that
since the killing they have answered telephone calls from unknown numbers in
which no one speaks, and received blank text messages from unknown
numbers—unusual and intimidating occurrences they interpret as a signal
not to push the investigation. Relatives have also noticed strangers passing by
Guevarra’s house at night.[53]
According to a relative, some six months after the killing, an army truck
stopped almost in front of Guevarra’s property and someone inside
photographed the house and farmland.[54]

In late August and early September 2010, farmers Agustito
Ladera, 35, and Renato Deliguer, 21, were working at their respective family
farms in barangay Mahaba, Marihatag, Surigao del Sur when military
operations against the NPA began.[55]
Both farms are remote—about a half-day walk from the center of barangay
Mahaba.

Deliguer had gone to his family farm on September 1, 2010.
He would routinely stay there for about a week at a time and the family, who
has not seen him since, initially assumed that he was unable to return home
because of the military operations.[56]

Ladera, who had been at the family farm with his parents and
brother, was waiting for abacafibers from a banana plant to dry, so he
sent his parents to evacuate first. His brother left the farm on August 28, and
Ladera said he would follow. His family has not seen him since.[57]

In early September, when the evacuees were able to return to
barangay Mahaba, Ladera’s father and brother and Deliguer’s
father went to the farms to find their missing relatives. The Ladera family
found that all belongings were secure, as if Agustito had packed everything up
and left the farm hut.[58]Deliguer’s father, Hipolito, said he saw the distinctive prints of
combat shoes around the hut.[59]
Inside the hut, he found used sleeping mats and mosquito nets that were not
returned to their proper place, and cooked rice in the pot. His family’s bolo,
or machete knife, was missing.[60]
Hipolito Deliguer said that he concluded that the military had passed the hut
and taken his son around dawn.[61]

Ladera’s father heard that the military had arrested
both Ladera and Deliguer, so he went to San Isidro, Marihatag, a place where he
knew the soldiers would have passed, to ask people if they had seen anything.
He said a local resident told him that soldiers had tied up and gagged two men.
Another person told him that soldiers had taken the two men to the military
camp.[62]
Someone else told Hipolito Deliguer that a man was in police custody.[63]

The families have visited the military camp and police
station several times asking for their relatives. A police officer said to
Hipolito Deliguer, “Maybe your son went to the mountains and joined the
NPA.”[64]
Soldiers at the military camp in Dayo-an, Tago, said that they had arrested
someone from San Isidro and San Pedro, but not from Mahaba, and did not allow
the relatives to see the arrested men.[65]

Both families reported to the police that the men were
missing, but at no time did the police visit any of their residences or farms
to investigate.[66]
A police report dated October 8, 2010, recommended that the police “be
given ample time to conduct [a] thorough and in depth investigation.”
However, when interviewed in March 2011, neither the chief investigator nor the
police chief could speak of any steps taken to investigate since this date,
indicating that no further steps had been taken since October 2010.[67]

In the police report, the police superintendent wrote:

There were unconfirmed reports also that the two missing
persons could be possible members of the CTs [Communist Terrorists] operating
in the area and might have been casualties in the recent encounters in the area
where the military were conducting intensified and large scale operations.[68]

Chief Investigator Joel Vertudazo, reading from a more
detailed police report, said that perhaps the “casualties had already
been buried by the NPA without informing the families, in order to [avoid]
discouraging other recruitees.”[69]

The families sought the help of Governor Johnny Pimentel of
Surigao del Sur and the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, the provincial legislature.[70]
On October 4, 2010, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan Committee on Laws and Justice
and Human Rights in Surigao del Sur met to discuss the missing men.[71]
The commanding officer of the 36th IB did not respond to a request
to appear.[72]
The Sangguniang Panlalawigan also sent requests to the police and regional
National Bureau of Investigation, among other government bodies, to investigate
the case. At this writing, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan has not received a
response from any of these agencies.

Killing
of Reynaldo “Naldo” L. Labrador, September 3, 2010

In the early evening of September 3, 2010, two men
approached Reynaldo “Naldo” Labrador’s home in Paquibato
Proper, Paquibato District, Davao City in Mindanao. Labrador was a member of
the local Paquibato District Peasant Alliance (PaDiPA). Several witnesses
identified one of the assailants as Roberto “Kulot” Repe, a known
local CAFGU member. Repe allegedly kept watch while the second man entered the
house and shot and killed Labrador with a .45 caliber pistol.[73]

Labrador’s wife, Leonisa Labrador, told Human Rights
Watch:

I was doing the washing when a man called out, “Nalds,
come and receive this.” I told the man [who I did not recognize],
“He is upstairs.” The man went upstairs. Then I heard three
gunshots. My 11-year-old son went and saw his father with blood all over him.
My children and I left the house calling to our neighbors for help…. The
gunman [then] escaped.[74]

Reylun, Reynaldo’s then 10-year-old son, said that
Repe made a sign to him “not to say any word (his finger crossing his
mouth) when he was outside the house.”[75] Leonisa said the
gunman had a note, which she thought he wanted to give Labrador. Witnesses
found a note at the crime scene that read, “You are evil and you will be
dealt with.”[76]

According to the barangay captain, a neighbor saw
Repe together with a soldier from the 69th IB near
Labrador’s residence at around 2 p.m. on the day he was killed.[77]

Repe’s relative told Human Rights Watch that Repe he
had been working with the military since 2009.[78] He personally saw
Repe working with the military on two occasions, wearing full army uniform and
carrying an M16 assault rifle. The community assumed that he was a CAFGU
because he would patrol with the military in full uniform.[79] From
time to time, he would send cell phone text messages warning his relatives to
be careful of upcoming military operations. For instance, on one occasion, he
sent a message saying something like, “People in barangay Lumiad
[a nearby barangay in Paquibato district] had better watch out because
we are going to take one out.”[80]

NPA members killed Repe on November 28, 2010, which they say
was in line with a standing order from the revolutionary authorities to do so.[81]

Fearful of reprisals from seeking justice for
Labrador’s death, Leonisa moved from the family home. Neighbors said that
in October—one month after Labrador was killed—soldiers visited the
family house asking where Leonisa was and whether her children were with her.[82]

Killing
of Rene “Toto” Quirante, October 1, 2010

On the evening of September 30, 2010, after visiting his
farm, Rene “Toto” Quirante and his companion Romeo Gador sought
shelter from heavy rain in the house of a friend, Tito, in barangay Trinidad,
Guihulngan, Negros Oriental.[83]
Early the next morning, uniformed men entered the house and brutally beat
Quirante, the provincial vice-chair of the leftist political party, Anakpawis.
They then shot him dead in front of several witnesses, including children. A
witness described what happened:

Around 2 a.m. [I awoke to hear] someone banging on the door
[of the house]. They were shouting, “NPA ni!” and “NPA
ito!” [“This is the NPA”]. No one was answering. The armed
men used their rifle butts to enter the house. They saw Toto immediately and
used their rifles to beat him. They beat him continuously; he was trying to
escape to the second floor of the house, but they kept pulling him back and
beating him….

Together with others, I was trying to pull Toto onto the
second floor. When we finally succeeded in doing so, the soldiers followed and
continued to beat him…. They pulled him away from us and pushed him to
the ground floor. Then the soldiers jumped down. One soldier shouted to another
to hold on to him; then they shot him [three times].

The commander then ordered the soldiers to move, so they
left. We were very scared. We couldn’t do anything, not even shout or
utter a word.[84]

Another witness explained how she shouted, “This is
… Toto Quirante, a barangay tanod and peace officer.” But
the uniformed men continued to beat him.[85]

Several witnesses have identified the perpetrators as Dandy
Quilanan, a CAFGU member, Junel Librado, a former member of the NPA working as
a “guide” for the military, and six unidentified soldiers.[86]
One witness described the men:

They were wearing head lamps. One of them was wearing
camouflage fatigues. It had the army patch on the sleeve…. All of them
had rifles and ammunition wrapped around their shoulders…. They were all
wearing black combat shoes…. I’m very sure [Quilanan] is a CAFGU
because they patrol our area…. I know Librado as a “rebel
returnee” [a former member of the NPA working as a “guide”
for the military] because when he was still active with the NPA, from time to
time he would come to my house and ask for food.[87]

Quirante had received warnings the military was targeting
him. According to a relative, months before his death a friend who was a CAFGU
had told Quirante that four leaders of leftist organizations, including him,
were on a list of people to be “shot on sight,” and that the
military had set up ambush positions ready to “get him.”[88]
Quirante’s colleague told Human Rights Watch that during a meeting
several years earlier, Quirante said that during a military operation an army
lieutenant had warned him that the military considered Anakpawis to be an NPA
front organization and he should stop being active because his family was known
to support the NPA.[89]

On February 1, 2011, the court in Guihulngan City issued a
warrant of arrest for Quilanan and Librado.[90] At this writing,
the warrants have not been served.[91]

Since
the killing, the military has harassed the Quirante family. For instance, on
November 22, 2010, about 12 soldiers in full combat gear visited
Quirante’s relative’s home. More than a dozen other soldiers were
in the wider area. A soldier asked the relative, “Where are the firearms
that the NPA left in your house?” The relative replied, “The NPA
never left firearms in my house.” The soldier said, “What do you
want? Do you want us to kill you and all of your [family]?”[92]

Killing
of Ireneo “Rene” Rodriguez, November 7, 2010

In the early morning of November 7, 2010, two men riding
tandem on a motorcycle and wearing bonnets shot and killed Ireneo
Rodriguez, a former leftist activist, in Balayan town, Batangas province.

Days before he was killed, several armed and uniformed men
from the Philippine Air Force visited Rodriguez’s father’s home
asking for Rodriguez, who was not there.[93]At this
writing, police investigators have not questioned the soldiers who made this
visit.[94]

Several relatives and friends said the Air Force had shown
interest in Rodriguez for some years. Rodriguez’s neighbor said that he,
Rodriguez, and 11 other members of a local organization were called up to the
Air Force camp in 2004 and told they were on the “order of battle”—a
list of those considered military targets—because they were NPA
sympathizers.[95]
His father said that he heard the military had tagged Rodriguez as an NPA
member and were looking for him in about 2005, and that he went to the camp to
clear his son’s name.[96]

Another relative said that the military often approached her
in around 2002 and 2003 and asked her to encourage Rodriguez to surrender.[97]
Lt. Col. Vincent Incognito, the commander of the 730th Combat Group,
Philippine Air Force, confirmed to Human Rights Watch that Rodriguez “is
one of the ‘target’ personalities, one [of] the sympathizers of the
NPA.”[98]

In recent years, Rodriguez had been less active with leftist
organizations. A relative said that about two months before he was killed,
Rodriguez would frequently receive text messages from different numbers saying,
“Ang galling monce magtago” (Hiding yourself pretty well).[99]

Lieutenant Colonel Incognito told Human Rights Watch that
his soldiers had visited Rodriguez to try to convince him that the “time
for a change is now.”[100]
He said:

And that’s all. We are doing it in front of other
people so that others may see that we frequent the area and that’s
it.… If we want him killed why would we visit him? … Of course we
could be the one suspected of killing him.[101]

Rodriguez’s relatives have received threatening text
messages since his death. One relative received a message saying, “Good
morning. Your time is near, be careful, I’ll wait for you in Balayan.
Sorry, but this is both of your payment [you and Rene], hehehe, okay,
bye.”

Enforced
Disappearance of Alfredo Bucal, November 10, 2010

On November 10, 2010,
tricycle driver Alfredo Bucal passed by a joint Philippine Air Force and
Philippine National Police checkpoint in barangay Lutal, Tuy, Batangas. The
authorities allege that he was driving his tricycle (a motorcycle taxi with a
sidecar) in convoy with another tricycle driver and that both were carrying
passengers who were NPA members. According to witnesses, the military took him
into custody. His family has not seen him since.

A government official told Human Rights Watch that a witness
told him that he had seen uniformed Philippine Air Force personnel capture
Bucal, drag him to a vehicle, and force him inside. The official said, “I
am afraid that if I get involved, the Philippine Air Force might come and get
me.”[102]
A witness who had initially agreed to testify in court proceedings against the
Air Force told the family that she would no longer do so as she was afraid for
her life after soldiers threatened her.[103]

The day after Bucal went missing, relatives searched for him
and found the tricycle impounded at a police station. Police officers told the
family that there had been an “encounter”—that is, a
firefight with the NPA—so to inquire after Bucal at the Air Force camp.
At the camp, an Air Force lieutenant initially joked with the family, saying
“Don’t worry, if he’s with us, surely he’ll be eating
some choice food.” The family asked to speak to the commanding officer
but was denied; instead the same lieutenant told family members that while
there had been an encounter, they did not have Bucal in their custody.[104]
Police and military officials have acknowledged that two alleged NPA members,
Roberto Garcia and Tomas Sitag, were killed during an encounter at an Air
Force/PNP checkpoint in barangay Lutalon November 10, and a
third person escaped.[105]

At this writing, government agencies have not conducted any
independent investigation into this incident. Relatives told Human Rights Watch
that when they visited a Commission on Human Rights office in San Pablo City,
Batangas, staff said that they could not assist because of an internal issue,
directing them instead to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the national
organization of lawyers.[106]

Killing of Rudy and Rudyric Dejos,
February 27, 2011

On the afternoon of February
27, 2011, unidentified assailants killed Rudy Dejos, age 50, and his adult son
Rudyric, age 26, at their farmhouse in Santa Cruz, Davao del Sur. Rudy, a
tribal chieftain, held several leadership positions in the community, including
barangay human rights officer.

Rudy’s body showed signs of torture. Mercy Dejos,
Rudy’s wife and Rudyric’s mother, described the scene she
encountered on returning to the farmhouse at about 5 p.m. on February 27, after
selling vegetables in town:

I saw droplets of blood. When I walked around the corner, I
saw the bodies of my husband and son. My husband was lying with open wounds on
his chest and neck…. His fingernails were removed…. His forearms
were scratched like his arms had been tied up…. His chest was bruised as
if he had been beaten with the butt of a rifle. My son, Rudyric, was curled up
on his side and I could see bullet wounds on his back with exit wounds on his
upper chest…. I then fell unconscious.[107]

A note was left in a box, a short distance from the house
where the men were killed, which read: “The NPA killed you because your
wrongdoings against the NPA were already too much.”[108]
However, the family does not believe that the NPA are behind the killing as
they had not threatened or harassed Rudy or Rudyric in the past and aside from
this note, there is no evidence of NPA involvement in the killing. According to
the family, the NPA has denied killing the two men.[109]
The police immediately blamed the NPA for the killing, before gathering any
evidence.[110]
At this writing, the police have not filed charges.

Prior to the killing, according to Rudy’s wife,
soldiers from the 39th Infantry Battalion of the Philippine Army had
on several occasions threatened and harassed Rudy. Mercy said that in June 2010
soldiers visited the farmhouse, accused Rudy of being an NPA, and tried to
encourage him to surrender and join the Barangay Defense System, a
military-allied community defense force. One of the soldiers threatened Rudy,
saying, “You are too proud. If we’re able to find you, we will skin
you.”[111]
Later that year, on December 4, armed soldiers surrounded the family house in
the main area of Santa Cruz while Rudy was watching television. Irene,
Rudyric’s wife, heard someone yell, “You NPAs come out!” She
then heard what sounded like a gunshot. Sgt Morales of the 39th IB said
that he had received a text message saying the NPAs were in the area and that
the presumed gunshot was merely a firecracker. He apologized to Rudyric for the
incident later that day, after the Dejos family filed a complaint at the barangay
hall.[112]

Officers and soldiers from the 39th IB
intimidated the Dejos family in the days following the killings. Human Rights
Watch witnessed more than 20 soldiers armed with M16s and pistols present at
the March 9 funeral march. One soldier filmed the march, while another took
still photographs.[113]
Lt. Col. Oliver Artuz, the commander of the 39th IB, said that they
attended the march fully armed because NPA members were participating, and were
filming and taking photographs for documentation purposes.[114]
Officers also visited the wake.[115]

III. Military Failure to Address Extrajudicial Killings

The Philippine military has repeatedly denied allegations of
soldiers participating in extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances,
is uncooperative with civilian investigations into military involvement, has
not reformed policies and practices that foster an environment in which such
abuses are tolerated, and does not adequately investigate via internal military
mechanisms abuses in which soldiers are implicated.

Since President Aquino assumed office on June 30, 2010, the
rhetoric of some senior military officers has changed. For instance, in July
2010, Brig. Gen. Francisco Cruz, head of the armed forces civil relations
service, stated in relation to the families of victims of extrajudicial
killings that, “We deeply empathize with their loss and we offer the
highest degree of cooperation to help resolve these cases. The AFP [Armed
Forces of the Philippines] firmly asserts that these violent incidents run
contrary to its stance on human rights as the cornerstone of all its
operations.”[116]

However, this change in language has not been reflected in
improved military cooperation with investigating authorities, comprehensive
internal investigations of implicated members of the armed forces, or increased
openness within the military structure. One soldier told Human Rights Watch,
“You’ll never get information [about extrajudicial killings] from
within the service as mishandling of confidential information [is treated
harshly].”[117]

A former soldier, “Ricardo,” told Human Rights
Watch that when he tried to stop an extrajudicial killing in 2000, a military
officer accused him of being a rebel for sympathizing with the victims. The
military officer told him, “I will kill you because you are also a
rebel.”[118]
Such behavior sends a clear message to soldiers not to question even clearly
illegal conduct of other military personnel. There is little evidence that
senior military officers have tried to change this message.

Military Labeling of Civilians as NPA
Members

The trouble began when the
military entered Maco [a town in Compestela Valley province, Mindanao]. They
said they had come to help build schools, improve the water system, and provide
medical care. But since they arrived, they have not done any of this. Instead
the military has been calling on civilians and tagging them as NPAs.

The AFP Internal Peace and Security Plan (IPSP) “Oplan
Bayanihan,” which went into effect in January 2011, stresses the
importance of “winning the peace.” Community-based peace and
development efforts, along with meaningful engagement of the local community,
are core elements of this strategy.[120]
While this strategy appears to be an attempt to improve relations between
civilians and security forces in conflict-affected areas, Human Rights Watch
research has found little change in military operations in the field. The
military still fails—both in its words and actions—to differentiate
between the armed NPA and NGOs and political parties that may espouse some
elements of communist or other leftist ideology. Several officers told Human
Rights Watch that in their view military practice had not changed since January
2011 when Oplan Bayanihan was launched.[121]

When asked how the military identifies CPP-NPA members when
they enter a community, a officer said, “Immediately when the soldiers
arrive in the barangay, those [people] that have violent reactions [are
identified as allied with the CPP-NPA]; if they don’t want the soldiers
there immediately [when they arrive].”[122] There is a
widespread belief in the military that the only reason that community members
would oppose a military presence is because they actively support the CPP-NPA.[123]

The officer said the military then typically conducts
information-gathering in the locale. This involves conducting community
seminars known as pulong-pulong and talking to residents to find out
which people belong to what organizations.[124] Failing to attend
the pulong-pulong invariably gets noticed by the military.[125]
The officer continued:

Once we identify an organization or person, we talk to
them. When we talk to them most will admit that they are supporting the NPA by
giving this ... by being the courier ... by being the one that gives
information.... Once we learn that, that they are being forced to do that by
the NPA, we ask them to take an Oath of Allegiance. [If they don’t take
the oath,] we just tolerate him.... But if we know that he is being visited by
the NPA we conduct operations…. We just monitor them.[126]

Human Rights Watch was told of several incidences in which
soldiers threatened and harassed civilians because military informants
allegedly identified them as providers of food or shelter for the NPA. But as
one civilian said, “We were in the mountain, so if the NPA asked for
help, then we would help.”[127]
Whether civilians provide food or shelter to the NPA because they are scared of
NPA retribution, because of Filipino hospitality, or because they are NPA
supporters, should not make them subject to military threats, harassment, or
assault. Should they be implicated in a criminal offence, the authorities
should arrest and charge them.

A resident of Paquibato district, a rural area in Davao
City, told Human Rights Watch of one such incident:

Early in the morning one day, I was planting coconut trees
when I felt an M60 [machine gun] placed on my shoulders, pointing to my neck. A
soldier asked, “Who is inside your house? Where is the NPA?” I
said, “My family.” The soldier then went inside my house and my
wife followed him. I was punched with a closed fist in my stomach. I asked,
“Why did you do that to me?” He said, “We have seen NPAs in
the area and in your house.” I said, “Maybe you just saw my
children?” Soldiers were also pointing their guns at my children. He
said, “I don’t believe you.”[128]

Soldiers, paramilitary members, and “rebel
returnees” working with the military have continued to refer to an
“order of battle” and similar lists in threatening ways. According
to the government, “an ‘order of battle’ is a compilation of
data on various threat groups … which aims to better understand the
strengths and weaknesses of these threat groups and to anticipate their future
actions.”[129]
Philip Alston, then-UN special rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary, or
arbitrary executions, reported that in a leaked order of battle provided to
him—the authenticity of which he had no reason to doubt—hundreds of
prominent civil society groups and individuals were listed as members of organizations
that the military deemed “illegitimate.”[130]

For example, several residents in the Paquibato district of
Davao City said that they saw the army carrying a list when accompanied by a
rebel returnee whom they assumed had become a CAFGU. According to a former barangay
captain, the rebel returnee told several people in the community that he had
seen the “list” of the 69th IB. He would threaten
members of the community, saying, “You’d better watch out or
you’ll be included in the list.”[131]The
residents believed the list was of people to be targeted for having links with
the NPA.[132]

Military’s
Denial of Involvement in Extrajudicial Killings

The highest ranks of the military have consistently denied
responsibility for extrajudicial killings, rather than recognizing the gravity
of the problem, investigating how and why the military is involved, and holding
perpetrators accountable, regardless of rank. Less than a week after the 2010
killing of Fernando Baldomero, armed forces spokesman Brig. Gen. Jose Mabanta
reportedly said:“Certainly we are not involved in that…. We all
know that in the leftist organization, purging from within has always been
instituted or is a strategy of the underground armed organization.”[133]
More broadly, Mabanta has said: “The performance of our duty is hindered
when our personnel are faced with human rights violations…. [M]ost human
right violations are in the line of duty.”[134]

At the lowest ranks, the military has created an environment
in which foot soldiers have readily participated in killings of leftist
activists. A military insider told Human Rights Watch that even if the local
commander did not give the order to kill, “he knows of everything”
and will protect his soldiers.[135]
Soldiers have also been paid as hired killers, acting on behalf of private
interests or other government agencies.

The extent of participation by senior commanding officers in
the killing of leftist activists—and how far up the chain of
command—is less clear. There is much evidence of involvement of certain
senior officers, most prominently now-retired Gen. Jovito Palparan. As early as
2004 the House of Representatives’ Committee on Civil, Political and
Human Rights recommended that Palparan be relieved of his position and
investigated for his involvement in the killings. The Arroyo government’s
Melo Commission also recommended that the Justice Department investigate his
involvement.[136]

Failure to investigate and prosecute perpetrators in the
military sends a message that killing leftist activists is allowed and an
acceptable part of counterinsurgency operations.

Military
Failure to Cooperate with Police and Other Inquiries

The military has not cooperated with police investigations
in the cases that Human Rights Watch investigated.

For instance, in relation to the September 2010 killing of
leftist activist Rene Quirante, the Guihulngan police chief, Carlos Lacuesta,
said the military failed to respond to a formal request for information about
the two identified suspects—one of whom is an alleged paramilitary
member, the other an alleged military “asset”—or provide any
information to assist in identifying the six accused, unidentified members of
the Philippine Army.[137]
Lacuesta said that police investigators had not formally interviewed any
soldiers. The police have attempted to determine what military operations were
being conducted that night, but the military claims that no operations took
place.

At the same time, army investigators from the 11th
IB interviewed the police investigator about the case.[138] The
outcomes of the army investigation have not been shared with the police.[139]
Even more concerning, Lacuesta described the close, informal military and
police relationship, saying “[Lt. Col. Bitong, commander of the 11th
IB, and I are] friends and can have a casual talk about [the killing].”[140]

In the September 2010 killing of Vicente Felisilda in the
Compostela Valley of Mindanao, police are investigating reports that a CAFGU
member whose father was allegedly killed by Felisilda some years earlier had
killed Felisilda out of revenge.[141]
The police investigator sought a copy of the log book, which indicated that
this CAFGU member was on duty at the time of the killing, but the commander of
the 72nd IB would not release it, saying it is necessary for the
army’s defense if charges are filed at a later date.[142]

The military has also failed to cooperate with local
government inquiries. For instance, on October 4, 2010, the Surigao del Sur
Sangguniang Panlalawigan Committee on Laws and Justice and Human Rights met to
discuss the late August, early September 2010 forcible disappearances of Renato
Deliguer and Agustito Ladera.[143]
The commanding officer of the 36th IB was invited to shed light on
what happened, but he did not appear.[144] Nor did he send a
representative or explain his non-appearance.[145]

The military’s lack of cooperation with civilian
authorities extends to the very top. Despite a Supreme Court order that
required the AFP chief to provide to the Commission on Human Rights all
evidence that may be relevant to the case of Jonas Burgos, the military judge
advocate’s office refused to provide certain documents. To do so, he
said, would “sanction a fishing expedition conducted at the expense of
military personnel whose names will be unnecessarily dragged into
[question].”[146]

The military’s failure to cooperate with police
investigations is an old excuse for inaction by police investigators. In June
2007, the Philippine government said, with respect to the August 2006 killing
of Pastor Isias Santa Rosa, “Police investigators are having difficulty
solving the case due to the noncooperation of the Philippine Army in the
investigation.”[147]
In this case there was clear physical evidence of involvement by military
personnel.[148]

Failure
of the Military to Investigate

The military inspector general and the provost marshal are
tasked with investigating soldiers and officers for administrative violations.
The inspector general has the power to direct a board of inquiry to conduct
such investigations.[149]
Human Rights Watch researchers have been unable to identify any case where
either offices have investigated any member of the armed forces or paramilitary
forces for alleged involvement in extrajudicial killings or enforced
disappearances.

Neither office has forwarded information suggesting it has
conducted such investigations. A letter from Human Rights Watch to the AFP
requesting clarification on the issue remained unanswered at this writing.

Several military officers said the inspector general will
only direct a board of inquiry to investigate a case when the local commander
thinks it is “a serious case.”[150] Similarly, the
provost marshal will only investigate when “tapped” by senior
military commanders to do so.[151]
Military officials at Fort Magsaysay told Human Rights Watch the provost
marshal had not been asked to investigate the Guevara killing, for instance,
because, “It came out in our intelligence operation that no military were
involved, [so] we turned it over to the police.”[152]

In practice, local military officers in the area where the
killing took place are often tasked with investigating the killing,
compromising independence since it is typically the battalion stationed in the
area that is implicated in the killing. First, a spot report is completed. Then,
often, a more detailed special report is commissioned. The AFP has not provided
Human Rights Watch with copies of any such reports to date.[153]

The military’s public statements suggest that a core
goal of these reports is to absolve implicated soldiers. In the 2006 killing of
Pastor Santa Rosa, the AFP investigation was confined to investigating the
death of a military officer whose body was found near Santa Rosa’s body
shortly after 10 armed men in fatigue uniforms abducted Santa Rosa from his
home. Santa Rosa’s wife identified the dead military officer as one of
her husband’s abductees. The report concluded the NPA was responsible,
without citing any evidence to support such a conclusion.[154]

Human Rights Watch research found only one extrajudicial
killing case in which a soldier has testified against members of the armed
forces in the last decade.

The military subjected this whistleblower—former
Sgt. Esequias Duyogan—to harassment and financial sanctions, and the
government did nothing to secure his safety from the time he came forward to
testify in 2007 until early 2011, when the Justice Department admitted him
into the witness protection program. The accused, on the other hand, has
received preferential treatment in jail.

On October 14, 2000, six friends, Romualdo Orcullo,
Jovencio Legare, Arnold Dangquiasan, Joseph Belar, Diosdado Oliver, and
Artemio Ayala, were at a barangay fiesta—a village street
party—when Army Cpl. Rodrigo Billones of the 62nd Infantry
Battalion arrested them and took them to the nearby military camp. Their families
have not seen them since.

Some years later, Duyogan came forward and told how,
following the arrests, he witnessed a dozen soldiers from his unit beat the
six young men to death with an iron rod and bury them. Three days later, they
dug up the bodies, loaded them on a service vehicle, and brought them to a
remote area where they burned the corpses. The Regional Trial Court in Agusan
del Sur in July 2008 convicted Cpl. Billones of kidnapping and “serious
illegal detention” of the six men and sentenced him to 9 to 15 years in
prison for each of the six victims. He has appealed his conviction to the
Court of Appeals.[155]

Military personnel and other unidentified individuals have
threatened and harassed Duyogan, his family, and human rights defenders
working with him on several instances since he came forward to testify.[156]
In August 2007, a military officer visited him at his Agusan del Sur home,
purportedly at the behest of the divisional commander, and offered him
200,000 pesos (US$4,600) to “go back to the folds of the
military.”[157]
Further, military officers told Duyogan that his salary, which he had not
received since he agreed to testify, was being used for Cpl. Billones’
legal defense.[158]

Despite
his conviction and sentencing for a serious offense, Cpl. Billones lives with
his wife and two children in a house outside of the fence surrounding the
Agusan del Sur provincial jail, though within the prison compound. An
official at the jail told Human Rights Watch that the jail warden, who is a
military reservist, had granted Billones this privilege out of
“camaraderie.”[159]

Granting extraordinary privileges to soldiers convicted of
serious crimes reinforces impunity and sends a message that abuses will go
unpunished.

IV. Failure to Investigate and Prosecute

I just want a thorough investigation. We don’t expect
it to be speedy…. We just want it to be thorough.

—Wife of a leftist activist allegedly killed by the
military, February 2011

The Philippine government has consistently failed in its
obligations under international human rights law to hold accountable
perpetrators of politically-motivated killings and enforced disappearances.
Victims’ families are denied justice as killers literally get away with
murder. With inconclusive investigations, implausible suspects, warrants of
arrest infrequently executed, and no convictions, impunity prevails.

Prosecutions in human rights cases are stymied by the poor
policing that affects all criminal investigations in the Philippines. But even
the most common problems will be exacerbated in cases where military personnel,
police, and paramilitary members are implicated. Police investigations into
alleged extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances are not only
woefully inadequate because of poor investigative skills and lack of capacity,
but they face the further obstacles of little will to uncover abuses by the
security forces. Many obstacles remain for those investigations that progress
to the prosecutor, including lack of cooperation between police and the prosecutor
and lengthy trial processes, all of which heighten the risks for victims and
witnesses when government officials are the perpetrators.

The government institutions charged with promoting human
rights and accountability have done little to end the widespread impunity
enjoyed by perpetrators of extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances.
Reforms to curtail “disappearances,” such as Supreme Court writs of
amparo and habeas data, which were designed to compel the military to release
information on people in their custody, have been largely ineffectual.

Poor
Policing

Instead of “to serve and protect,” [the police
logo should be] “to hide and to run.” … Justice is all we
want…. No justice just adds to the pain.

—Maridezda and Arnel Guran, parents of Rei Mon Guran,
a student activist killed in July 2006

Poor and indifferent policing, and profound public mistrust
in the government’s investigative efforts, affects all criminal
investigations in the Philippines. Several witnesses and victims’
families whom Human Rights Watch interviewed said they expect no real results
from government investigations. The wife of a victim told how her family is
slowly conducting the investigation themselves, which she feels is her only
option.[160]
In several cases, the family only had contact with the police once, often at
the wake, when they were interviewed.[161] Then, as one
relative said, “nothing more happened.”[162]
Neither police nor prosecutors regularly update victims’ families;
rather, families said, police often ask them for updates.

Police still frequently believe that it is the
families’ duty to push the investigation, and conduct only the most
rudimentary of investigations. Too often, police fail to visit and adequately
examine the crime scene. Police continue to pressure victims’ relatives
to provide information on witnesses and motives, and at times identify unlikely
perpetrators. Investigators routinely cease their investigation after
identifying one suspect, rather than pursuing accomplices, particularly those
who ordered the killing.

Since investigators do not visit the crime scene,
unqualified barangay officials or even family members collect obvious
evidence from the site of the killing, often contaminating the evidence and
interrupting the evidentiary chain-of-custody. For example, the purok
leader and barangay tanods visited the place where Julius Tamondez was
killed on August 12, 2010, to recover the body. They collected the bullet
casing and turned it over to barangay officials who wrapped it in
cellophane and kept it at the barangay hall. At some later date, the
police collected it from the barangay hall.[163] Despite
a barangay official reporting the crime to a police investigator over
the phone on the day of the killing and requesting that police investigate,
police did not visit the crime scene or interview any first responders about
it.[164]

Investigators
collect only the most obvious evidence, such as bullet casings. In each case
Human Rights Watch examined, investigators have not collected shoe marks,
cigarette butts, or phone records, and have not sought more advanced forensic
examination for obvious evidence.[165]

Some police officers blamed inadequate investigations on
lack of appropriate equipment. One investigator explained that his police
station does not own a camera and has only one patrol car, which can only be
used in the town proper.[166]
These are valid concerns and investigators should have viable transport and
necessary equipment for evidence collection, particularly cameras.

Even in cases where investigators did visit the crime scene,
they often did not invite forensic experts from Scene of the Crime Operatives
(SOCO) to assist. Several police officers explained that SOCO only gets
involved when the first responder or investigator requests their involvement.[167]
A local police chief explained that he only requests SOCO involvement after
initial processing of the evidence. However, he chose not to in the Dejos case
because the investigator was “handling the situation.”[168]
Investigators typically interview only the most obvious witnesses—family
members or eyewitnesses who come forward and present themselves at police
stations. They do not routinely proactively look for witnesses in the place
where the crime was committed. For example, a review of the police
investigation into the killing of Baldomero revealed that police did not go door-to-door
in the area canvassing for possible witnesses, even though he was killed in a
populated area along a national highway. Often, the family or private
prosecutors are expected to identify witnesses.[169]

Too
often police only file cases if a relative is willing to be a complainant. In a
November 2010 case in which the victim of an alleged extrajudicial killing was
separated from his wife, his colleague explained that police officers had told
him that, “According to law, the first dependent needs to push the
case…. If the family doesn’t push for the case the case is
considered closed.”[170] Since the wife is not doing
so, police are not actively pursuing the investigation.

In a break with this practice, the police department
investigating the July 12, 2010 killing of Josephine Estacio in Bataan filed a
case against Alfred Alipio—allegedly a member of a breakaway communist
group—saying that a witness had come forward and identified Alipio as the
gunman.[171]
However, this reform has not been institutionalized and this case presents a
questionable example as the charges were filed against an unlikely perpetrator.
Several things indicate that this witness may not actually have seen the
gunman, and the witness identified Alipio from a “photo board” that
showed only his photograph.[172]
Investigators told Human Rights Watch that the witness was under their
protective custody, but he failed to appear at a hearing called by the
prosecutor and police said that they were not concerned for his welfare.[173]
Furthermore, the tricycle driver who drove Estacio on the day she was killed
had described the gunman as wearing a mask, not that tall, and with a slightly
rounded body. Alipio is tall and well built. On this basis, the prosecutor was
“not convinced” that the new witness had positively identified
Alipio as the gunman.[174]

There is a widespread belief that families have to pay for
an investigation to be thorough. In particular, colleagues of a victim
described investigators telling them that they would have to pay money to
involve the National Bureau of Investigation in the case.[175]
In one case, the wife of a victim said that she refused to consent to having
her husband’s body autopsied because she did not have the money.[176]

There is very little oversight of police investigations and
police stations are disorganized. In one incident, the city police chief
explained that the investigator was not around and “I do not know even
where he placed the investigation folder.”[177]
In another, the deputy city police chief explained that he had only recently
been transferred and did not know where investigation folders were kept. He
said, “Usually the investigator manages his case folder” rather
than there being a central filing cabinet.[178] In cases that
Human Rights Watch examined, investigations often stalled due to a personnel
change within a police station, which is a regular occurrence.[179]

Investigations
of Extrajudicial Killings and Enforced Disappearances

Investigations
in Conflict Areas

The investigator is just like a desk officer; just making
reports from his table.

—Wife
of a human rights activist allegedly killed by the military, February 2011

In addition to the serious shortcomings that all criminal
investigations experience in the Philippines, police investigations into crimes
allegedly committed by military personnel face further hurdles. Police
investigations often rely entirely on witnesses; in several killings
investigated by Human Rights Watch, investigators did not go to the scene of
the crime at all.[180]
In others, they only examined the immediate vicinity where the body was found,
even if evidence suggested the person was killed elsewhere.

Given that killings of suspected CPP-NPA supporters often
take place in the vicinity of conflict areas between the NPA and the military,
the police’s security concerns in reaching the crime scene may be
genuine. For instance, the police officer in charge of Mawab police station
said security concerns meant that investigators could not go to the area where
Felisilda was killed. “There are a lot of land mines in the area,”
he said.[181]
In several cases, investigators instead asked the family to bring witnesses to
the police station.

The
local police chief in Guihulngan said that investigators did not visit the
scene of the crime as the area is “three or four hours walking distance
and is very hostile.”[182] The investigator said:

I wanted to go to the crime scene to collect evidence, but
no other police officer would accompany me because [they were afraid for their]
security. Also, because we have only one patrol car that can only go on the
highway, we had to rely on the mayor for transport.[183]

In other instances, police failure to investigate reflected
lack of willingness on the part of authorities to pursue a case implicating the
military. In the forcible disappearances of Deliguer and Ladera, both families
reported to the police that the men were missing. However, at no time did
police visit their residences or farms to investigate.[184] According
to a police report, the chief of police in Marihatag asked the commanding
officer of the 36th IB if the two were in military custody. He had
“no knowledge of the ‘disappearance,’” but directed his
intelligence operatives to assist in locating the missing persons.[185]
The October report recommended that the police “be given ample time to
conduct thorough and in depth investigation.” However, when interviewed
in March 2011, neither the chief investigator nor the police chief could
identify any investigative steps taken since this date.[186]

Failure to Pursue Evidence of Military
Involvement

Police routinely avoid pursuing evidence of military
involvement. A foreign police officer who has been working with Philippine
police investigators said that he had found investigations went cold as soon as
they pointed to the military.[187]
The relative of an alleged perpetrator explained that although police visit the
remote area where her husband was killed to investigate regular criminal cases,
“police distance themselves from abuses by the military.”[188]
Investigators have not formally interviewed any soldiers or commanders in any
of the cases investigated by Human Rights Watch, despite evidence of military
involvement.

This has long been a problem. “Ricardo,” the
former soldier, told Human Rights Watch that when he was ordered to kill two
alleged NPA runners in the 1990s, the police “pointed to the NPA [as the
perpetrators] since they are afraid of us (the Philippine Army)…. They
were afraid that they might be [the] next [target, if they properly investigated
the army].”[189]
He said that the police did not question any member of the military about the
killings.[190]

Police have captured and charged two alleged soldiers for
the June 14, 2010 killing of Benjamin Bayles in Negros Occidental. Police
arrested the suspects after an alert was placed for a black Honda TMX
motorcycle without a plate number, being ridden by two men.[191] Police
saw the two, arrested them, and found them in possession of unregistered
firearms.[192]
Initially, the police chief said over radio that the two accused had introduced
themselves as members of the 61st IB of the Philippine Army.[193]
The next day he withdrew this statement: the suspects now claim to be fishermen
and deny any links to the military.[194]
The registered owner of motorcycle they were riding, Pfc. Reygine Laus, is a
soldier with the 61st IB.[195] During a budget
hearing, Defense Secretary Voltaire Gazmin accepted that the accused men were Philippine
Army personnel.[196]
In addition, Bayles’ neighbor has testified that armed men in military
camouflage who introduced themselves as members of the army visited her place
and asked her about Bayles on several occasions.[197]

The police investigator has not interviewed anyone in the
military about the case. He said that his only action to determine whether the
accused are members of the armed forces was to give the case to an intelligence
officer and ask him to profile the suspects.[198] Nor has he
monitored or attempted to determine whether members of the military are
visiting the accused in jail. He told Human Rights Watch that since the jail
was “a long way away” he had no way to find out who visits them.[199]
Moreover, he said that to further investigate this case would violate the sub
judice rule—a rule that prevents people from commenting on the
outcome of a case while it is before the court.[200]

In several cases implicating military personnel, police
investigators sought to show that the motive was personal. This may have been
due to camaraderie with the military and the police force’s “with
us or against us” attitude, fear of military reprisal, or the additional
pressure and reporting obligations that local police officers face in
extrajudicial killing cases.

Investigators have claimed personal motives from seemingly
arbitrary evidence. For instance, in the case of Carlo “Caloy”
Rodriguez, union president of the Calamba Water District who was gunned down
along the National Highway in Calamba City on November 12, 2010, investigators
determined that, because he suffered multiple gunshot wounds, he was the victim
of a crime of passion fuelled by a personal grudge.[201] This
is a dubious conclusion: while police may dismiss any motive relating to a
labor dispute because several witnesses spoke of Rodriguez having a good
relationship with the general manager, the number of gunshots was no basis to
determine that the killing was “not politically motivated.”[202]

Rodriguez was affiliated with the Confederation for Unity
and Recognition Advancement Government Employee (COURAGE) and the Samahan ng
Water District Sa Buong Pilipinas (WATER), broader leftist organizations that
the military has said are connected with the CPP-NPA.[203] Police
have not investigated this potential motive.

Since President Aquino came to office, several police
investigators and local police chiefs have said that provincial and national
police headquarters have pressured them to file cases in extrajudicial killing
cases. However, families have said this pressure often unintentionally means
that investigators fail to investigate the killing thoroughly; instead, they rush
the investigation and file charges against only one of several suspects, and
pressure families to identify witnesses and—essentially—conduct the
investigation themselves and report back to police. A victim’s relative
said, “[The police investigator] was pleading because he was being
questioned by provincial and national PNP why a case hadn’t been filed.
He wanted to fast track the filing of a case as they were under such
pressure.”[204]

Task
Forces Established to Investigate Cases

In four of the seven extrajudicial killing cases that Human
Rights Watch investigated, the police established some form of a task force to
investigate. No such task forces were created in the three cases of enforced
disappearances. The task forces have had negligible effect.

In one case, an investigator explained that although
“a Special Investigation Task Group had been formed to investigate the
case, the group has just relied on me to do the work.”[205]

In several cases, the formation of the task force appears to
be little more than a public relations exercise. For example, the police formed
Task Group Baldomero the day after the killing and the day before Baldomero was
buried on July 17, 2010. The task group held a press conference to announce
that a suspect had been identified and that charges were to be filed.[206]
But the task group was active for a month at most, a relative told Human Rights
Watch, and the family “felt the pressure to file the case” before
investigators had sufficiently examined the involvement of other suspects,
particularly the military. The family said the press conference made them feel used.[207]

Hasty
Discontinuance of Investigations

In the cases of alleged extrajudicial killings that Human
Rights Watch investigated, investigations ceased once a first suspect was identified.
Perhaps because it would have meant investigating up the military chain of
command, investigators did not continue with the aim of identifying accomplices
or people who may have ordered the killing. For instance, once one of the
alleged perpetrators in the Baldomero killing was identified and police filed
charges with the prosecutor, investigators did not continue to work to identify
his accomplice, whoever ordered the killing, or to investigate reports of
military involvement. Investigators told Human Rights Watch it was now up to
the courts.[208]
In the Guevarra case, the military ceased to be suspected when a DPWH officer
was implicated.[209]
However, investigators did not continue to investigate the possibility that
military members were involved, including as the gunmen.

The October 25, 2005 killing of Ricardo “Ric”
Ramos, then-president of Central Azucarera de Tarlac Labor Union, is another
example of police discontinuing an investigation once a suspect has been
identified, and the military failing to help police identify military suspects.
In Ramos’ case, a gunman shot him twice in the head as he sat at a table
with about 20 men, killing him.[210]
On the morning of his death, Ramos had had a stern conversation with soldiers,
who were present when wages were being distributed to union workers following a
deal made during a strike. That afternoon and evening, two soldiers had visited
him three times and were sent away. Ramos had received a funeral wreath that
said “RIP Ricardo Ramos” a month earlier. The night after Ramos was
killed, the small army detachment, which had been set up about 50 meters from
where the killing occurred, was removed.[211]

Pfc.
Roderick dela Cruz has been identified as one of the soldiers that visited
Ramos on October 25, 2005, and is currently standing trial. However, there is
debate over who the second soldier was. At least three witnesses identified
Sgt. Romeo Castillo as the second solider; as such, he was included as a
respondent in the complaint.[212] He denied that he visited
Ramos at all that day and presented further evidence at the preliminary
investigation before the Office of the City Prosecutor to support this. The
assistant provincial prosecutor, Ma. Lourdes D. Soriano, recommended that he be
dropped as a party from the complaint.[213]
Dela Cruz and 2d Lt. Alberto Tolledo informed the Office of the City Prosecutor
that Sgt. Melchor Santos was the soldier who accompanied dela Cruz. Police have
not filed charges against Santos or investigated the local commander. Still,
they have classified this case as solved.

At present, the PNP does not have a central database or
method for collecting information about criminal investigations to allow for
cross-checking of evidence. The EU is set to fund the creation of such a system
in 2011.

Police
Fears of Military Retaliation

Several police officers expressed fears about investigating
alleged extrajudicial killings implicating the military. When a relative told
one investigator about witnesses seeing soldiers near where her husband was
killed, he told her to forget about the military’s involvement. “Tigok
tayo dyan” or “We’re dead” he said—indicating
that he thought his life would be at risk if he investigated military
involvement.[214]
In another case, the police told a victim’s son the “suspects are military,
but it is dangerous to investigate about the case.”[215] One
police investigator told how police officers avoid becoming involved in
investigating extrajudicial killing cases implicating the military, either out
of a belief that it is disloyal or because they fear reprisal. He said:

On the day of the killing, [the police chief called me and]
asked [me] to handle the case. Other investigators did not want to
[investigate] the case because the victim was seen as an NPA member and the
military were accused [as the perpetrators]. They did not want to [because] the
military would be unhappy with them.[216]

Colleagues have ostracized and threatened this police
officer for investigating the killing—treatment that he said is not
unusual. The officer has received several threatening text messages from
unknown numbers.[217]
He said:

[Most of my fellow police officers] have created a threatening
environment for me…. One time when I arrived at the police station, one
police officer shouted at me that I am an enemy of the state…. There is a
group influence…. I just avoid them and … do my work. One day in
the station a fellow officer said to me, “There will be a time of
reckoning because you’re going out of your way [to investigate this case].”[218]

Human Rights Watch is unaware of any police officer who
harassed or threatened investigators for working on such cases being
investigated or sanctioned.[219]
Mistreatment has at times directly interfered with investigation of the case.
In one case that Human Rights Watch investigated, someone—supposedly a
fellow police officer—stole the case folder of an extrajudicial killing
investigation from the police station. It has never been recovered.[220]

Fears
of Retaliation Against Witnesses and Victim’s Relatives

There has been harassment. They are monitoring what I am
doing… I am cautious. I fear for my life. How can I carry this? I want to
get justice. But at the same time I am scared they might go after my family.

Each witness and relative of victims that Human Rights Watch
interviewed spoke of fears for their safety. One police officer said,
“Here in the Philippines, if you talk, you will be killed.”[221]
Several police investigators said witnesses were too afraid to tell them what
they saw.[222]

A local government official told Human Rights Watch how the
military harassed someone who had witnessed military abuse. He said that the
witness:

Told me five men came to her house and [one] introduced
himself as Ka Ben [a name suggesting an NPA nom de guerre]. However, she
recognized “Ka Ben’s” face from the [incident she witnessed].
They were from the military. Ka Ben then threatened her that if she
[testified], something would happen to her family…. He said, “I am
not bluffing and very serious about this conversation.” Since then,
people have told her that people have been regularly visiting [her place].
She’s not been staying in her house since.[223]

A witness in the case filed against two alleged soldiers
regarding the June 2010 killing of Benjamin Bayles reported to police that on
November 5, 2010, she was sleeping with her six children when about 20
unidentified armed men wearing army fatigues woke her around midnight. It was
the second time that armed men in fatigues had visited and threatened her since
she had agreed to testify in an extrajudicial killing case in which the accused
were allegedly soldiers.[224]
She said one of them said to her, “Do you want me to shoot you in the
head?” while pointing a .38 caliber pistol at her.[225]

Retribution takes various forms. A witness to the November
2010 killing of Carlo Rodriguez—a security guard—was reassigned to
another place after he cooperated with the police investigation.[226]
His employer later terminated his employment, he believes, because he
cooperated with the investigation.[227]
A police investigator explained that some businesses consider it risky to
cooperate with investigations, so discourage employees from doing so.[228]

Military harassment of witnesses and victims’ families
has long been a problem in the Philippines. “Ricardo,” the former
soldier, told Human Rights Watch that he was ordered to harass witnesses and
relatives of extrajudicial killings from time to time. He said that in a case
in which a fellow soldier had been accused of shooting and killing a civilian,
a senior commanding officer ordered him and his fellow soldiers to wear
civilian clothes and fill the court room.[229] He said:
“The purpose was to frighten the complainant and witnesses so as they could
not speak.”[230]

In several cases prior to the Aquino administration that
Human Rights Watch has previously reported on, relatives of victims continue to
fear for their safety.[231]
The parents of student leader Rei Mon “Ambo” Guran—who was
killed on July 31, 2006, at around 6 a.m. on a crowded bus in Bulan,
Sorsorgon—said that when they wrote to the National Bureau of
Investigation to seek their assistance, they were told, “Our enemy is
strong.”[232]

Inadequate,
Inflexible Witness Protection

There have been improvements in the implementation of the
witness protection program since Aquino took office, but substantial reforms
are still needed.

Anyone
who has witnessed or has information about a serious crime who will testify
before any investigating authority or court may be admitted to the Justice
Department’s witness protection program, provided the testimony can be
corroborated and there is a real threat to the safety of the witness or his or
her family.[233] The witness must sign an
undertaking, among other things, to testify.[234]
Under the program, witnesses are to be provided with secure housing (until they
have testified, the threat disappears, or is reduced to a manageable level),
assistance in obtaining means of livelihood, financial assistance, health care,
and job protection.[235] When the circumstances
warrant, the witness and immediate family members are entitled to relocation
and/or change of identity at the department’s expense.[236]
Investigating agencies and the courts are to ensure speedy trials in cases in
which witnesses are in protection, with the aim of concluding the case within
three months.[237]

In practice, witnesses admitted to the witness protection
program are confined to safe houses for years on end. Although witnesses
receive financial assistance, it is limited and they have little to no ability
to earn a livelihood. In reality, trials that involve protected witnesses are
not dealt with more swiftly than others, and witnesses do not receive new
identities at the end of proceedings.[238] Justice
Department officials on occasion continue to construe the witness protection
program in an inflexible, limited way, and do not adequately assist witnesses
and families in applying for protection.

Witnesses have told Human Rights Watch that they believe
authorities will detain them under the program. A barangay official said
of a witness, “He wants to be free; he doesn’t want his life
rearranged because of witness protection.”[239] This
understanding is not far removed from the reality. One couple under protection
said, “Sometimes they let us out…. They’ve even allowed us to
plant a small garden in the yard.”[240] Witness
protection needs to address security and also economic concerns of witnesses
who do not want to leave their businesses or sources of livelihood. Several
witnesses have sought the protection of NGOs or churches. A private prosecutor
explained, “They don’t trust authorities.”[241]

Few police officers and prosecutors appear familiar with the
program, and provide incorrect or limited information about it. The chief investigator
in one case said incorrectly that the program only provides security once the
witness testifies.[242]
In a 2010 case where a child was an eyewitness to a killing, the prosecutor
claimed only the child would be protected:

As far as I know, it is the [witness] who would be
transferred to a safe-house, but certain protections would be extended to the
rest of the family. However, according to the [witness’s] mother, this
would add further trauma [for the child witness].[243]

In fact, the witness protection program would accommodate
the immediate family of a child witness. The child’s mother sought a
flexible form of witness protection that includes funding her and her
child’s relocation to another town of her choice where she has family and
the necessary support for raising a child alone. She did not want to go into a
safe house as she did not want her son isolated from society.[244]
She said that regional justice department officers told her that she would have
to accept the terms they set out for her: “This is a package…. They
told me only the DOJ can choose the place [for relocation].”[245]

The
government has provided some form of protection for witnesses or family members
of victims in only two of the recent cases that Human Rights Watch
investigated. In a positive move reflecting what was hoped to be increased
flexibility in applying protection, police provided security outside the home
of witnesses and victims’ relatives immediately after the killings in
these two cases.[246] In the Estacio case,
protection was provided for a short period as the family relocated itself, for
its own protection. However, in the Baldomero case police withdrew protection
at short notice without providing a justified reason, when the risk to the
witnesses remained high. When Human Rights Watch raised concerns about this
with the Justice Department in May 2011, the department said it had told the
family in writing that witnesses could apply for witness protection but had not
received any applications.[247]

Obstacles
to Prosecution

Prosecutions in the Philippines have long been hindered by
various obstacles, many of which affect the Philippine justice system
generally, but which appear to be exaggerated in cases involving serious human
rights violations. These include the failure of police and prosecutors to
coordinate their efforts to develop a strong case, failure of police to serve
arrest warrants, and delays throughout departmental and court processes.

Out of hundreds of killings and enforced disappearances
since 2001, there have been only seven successfully prosecuted cases, resulting
in the conviction of 12 defendants.[248]
There has not been a single conviction of active military personnel at the time
of the killing. No senior military officers have been convicted either for
direct involvement in these violations or as a matter of command
responsibility.

An
additional hurdle in “disappearance” cases is the fact the
Philippines lacks specific legislation criminalizing enforced disappearances.
Rather, these must be prosecuted under the crimes of kidnapping and unlawful
detention. The Philippines has yet to sign the International Convention for the
Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance, which outlines the
international standards on preventing and punishing enforced disappearances.[249]

Cooperation
between prosecutors and police in human rights cases appears to be the
exception rather than the norm despite several departmental orders to
prosecutors and police to work together. The recent alleged extrajudicial
killings investigated by Human Rights Watch demonstrated no evidence of real
police collaboration with prosecutors, which contributes to the lack of
prosecutions.

Two
cases that Human Rights Watch previously investigated illustrate several
obstacles to justice that arise after police file a case with the prosecutor.
Despite strong evidence of military involvement in the August 3, 2006 killing
of Pastor Isias Santa Rosa in Bicol, prosecutors have twice dismissed charges
that police filed against a military officer, citing insufficient evidence.[250] The prosecutors never worked with the
police to identify what evidence should be gathered to sustain a case that
could go to court. Nor have the prosecutors requested that police investigate
further, indicated to police what evidence is necessary, or taken an active role
in acquiring this evidence.

The
September 8, 2004 killing of Bacar and Carmen Japalali shows many of the
challenges present in even those cases that are properly investigated.

More
than 30 soldiers allegedly shot to death Bacar Japalali—a suspected
member of the Moro National Liberation Front, an ethnic Moro armed
group—and his wife, Carmen while they were asleep. Bacar’s
brother, Talib Japalali, described what he saw when he arrived at his
brother’s house: “There were bullet holes everywhere; pieces of
bone were splattered around the house.” Meanwhile, his brother’s
body still lay on his sleeping mat under his mosquito net. A soldier told
Talib that they had had to kill Bacar because he fought back. Police investigators,
including forensic experts, and the governor arrived promptly at the Japalali
residence and conducted a full investigation.

Despite
forensic evidence revealing no traces of gunpowder on the hands of the couple
and two eyewitness accounts countering the military’s response that the
deaths were the result of an armed encounter, the prosecutor dismissed the
complaint for lack of probable cause without attempting to gather additional
evidence, or informing the family.[251]
After some time, the deputy ombudsman overturned this decision, resolving to
file murder charges against 32 soldiers and referred the case back to the local
prosecutor, for prosecution.

The
Regional Trial Court judge—without a motion from the defense—downgraded
the charges to the lesser charge of homicide and dismissed the charges
against all but 8 of the 32 soldiers whom the ombudsman had said should be
charged. He delayed issuing even these eight arrest warrants. One day when
Talib went to the court to follow up on the case, he received a message that
the judge would see him. Talib said the judge told him in a private meeting,
“They’re willing to pay.” Talib answered, “I did not
come here for money; I want justice.”[252]

The
Japalali family filed a complaint against the judge with the Supreme Court. The
judge recused himself from hearing the case but has not been disciplined or
criminally charged.[253] The new judge issued the
eight warrants of arrest, however even then, arrest warrants were not served
until the family placed considerable pressure on the police and an NGO
assisted with serving the warrants. The eight have now been arrested and are
confined to the military camp. Five years later, the court is still hearing
evidence, and no new charges have been brought against the 24 soldiers whose
charges were dismissed.

Failure
to Serve Arrest Warrants

The process for serving arrest warrants does not encourage
police to take the initiative, which becomes especially problematic where the
suspect to be served is a member of the armed forces. Once a court issues an
arrest warrant, the standard procedure is that the court sends it to the police
chief, who gives it to the warrant server, a police officer solely responsible
for serving warrants and subpoenas.[254]
Within 10 days, the warrant server is required to serve the warrant and then
notify the court. A clerk of court told Human Rights Watch that if a warrant is
not served, the court will wait six months, then archive the case.[255]

In one case, after the court had issued a warrant of arrest,
the police investigator told the victim’s family to make an official
request to a certain police official to serve the warrants, because other
police stations cover the scope of the addresses of the two suspects.[256]
In another case, the clerk of the court said:

Hopefully the family of the victim is working for the
arrest of the accused. If the family has friends in the military, they can ask
them to coordinate with the police or hire a private agent. If there is no
motion from the family, [the court] has no choice but to archive [the case].[257]

The military appears to be less than willing in serious
human rights cases to assist police in serving warrants of arrest on soldiers.
The Guihulngan police chief, Carlos Lacuesta, told Human Rights Watch that his
office had provided the commander of the 11th IB, Lt. Col. Ramil
Bitong, with a copy of the warrant of arrest in the Quirante case shortly after
it was issued.[258]
However, a military officer said the “warrant hasn’t reached
us” and that it is not the military’s role to assist in the service
of warrants.[259]

In the case of the October 25, 2005 killing of labor leader
Ricardo Ramos, the police did not serve the warrant for the arrest of an army
private, Pfc. Roderick dela Cruz, for nearly two years.[260] Dela
Cruz continued to serve the army during this period and was eventually arrested
on May 21, 2008, after Task Force 211 intervened, at the armed forces
headquarters in Taguig City.[261]
Human Rights Watch is unaware of any police officers being disciplined or
prosecuted for failing to make proper efforts to serve arrest warrants in cases
of human rights violations. Nor have any military officers been disciplined for
failing to cooperate with the police. The court archived the Ramos case when
the warrant against dela Cruz was not served within six months of issuance.
Courts have similarly archived numerous cases despite strong evidence against
the accused.

Failure
of the Special Courts

In March 2007, Chief Justice Reynato Puno designated 99
regional trial courts “special courts,” with orders to resolve
extrajudicial killing cases within 90 days.[262] These courts were
mandated to hold a continuous trial in such cases, as trials in the Philippines
involve scheduling several half-day sessions over several months, with many
postponements. The trial was to be completed within 60 days of when the case
was filed in court, and judgment was to be rendered within a further 30 days.
If an extrajudicial killing case was sent (“raffled”) to a court
that was not designated a “special court,” the court was still to
comply with these guidelines. Special courts were to submit a status report to
the chief justice on the tenth day of each month. These guidelines were never
implemented.

Writ of Amparo

We did everything for their
release but nothing happened…. The last case we filed was a motion for
review in the Supreme Court [in March 2009]. Until now it has not been
resolved…

—Mother of Karen Empeño, who disappeared in
2006, October 2009. The Supreme Court handed down its decision more than two
years after the motion was filed, on May 31, 2011.

Optimism
over Supreme Court writs to compel military and other government agents to
release information about people in their custody has been dampened by the
difficulty in enforcing them and long court delays. The writs of amparo and
habeas data empower courts to issue orders to protect a person; produce
information needed to establish a missing person’s whereabouts; inspect
likely detention facilities; update, rectify, suppress, or destroy information
about a threatened person; and provide other relief to people whose right to
life, liberty, and security is unlawfully violated or threatened with
violation.[263] These remedies go beyond the
better known writ of habeas corpus, which—in a bid to overcome the
state’s blanket denial of custody—empowers a court to free a
detainee if the public body detaining the person does not prove he or she is
lawfully detained. Rather than merely ordering the release, authorities may
have to exercise great diligence to determine the missing person’s whereabouts.

In September 2008, the Court of Appeals granted writs for
the release of Karen Empeño, 22, Sherlyn Cadapan, 29, and Manuel Merino,
57, whom the military arrested in mid-2006 in Haganoy, Bulacan.[264]
The court ordered the military to “immediately release” the three
detainees[265]
Several witnesses have testified to seeing the three in military custody.[266]
Raymond Manalo, who together with his brother Reynaldo escaped military custody
in 2008, has told how he witnessed soldiers kill Merino and burn his body. He
has also told of the horrific torture and sexual violence that he witnessed
soldiers force Cadapan and Empeño to endure.[267]
Cadapan’s mother, Erlinda, told Human Rights Watch how she thinks of
Manalo’s testimony of what her daughter was forced to endure:

When I can recall [what] the military [had] been doing to
her—as a lady being hung upside down when naked and being played like an
animal, it’s really painful for me.

Despite this evidence indicating that the women are at grave
risk, as of March 2009, the court had not enforced the writs.[268]

On March 5, 2009, the Court of Appeals issued a resolution
denying the Cadapan and Empeño families’ motion to cite
respondents in contempt for failing to comply with the court’s order to
release the two women detainees. Justice Mendoza said in the resolution:

While
the Court, in the dispositive portion, ordered the respondents “to
immediately RELEASE, or cause the release from detention the persons of Sherlyn
Cadapan, Karen Empeño and Manuel Merino,” the decision is not ipso
facto [or, by the fact itself] executory. The use of the term “immediately”
does not mean that it is automatically executory. There is nothing in the Rule
on the Writ of Amparo which states that a decision rendered is immediately
executory.[269]

Further, the judge ruled that the parties’ petitions
for review stopped the decision from being final and executory.[270]

On March
30, 2009, Cadapan and Empeño’s families filed a petition for
review of this decision by the Supreme Court. The court, which took more than
two years to decide this urgent matter, ruled on May 31, 2011, that the
appellate court erred in ruling that its directive to immediately release
Sherlyn, Karen, and Merino was not automatically executed and that there was no
need to file a motion for execution in amparo or habeas data
cases—effectively removing a procedural delay in enforcing the writs.[271] The court found that the appellate court
also erred when it did not specifically name the respondents that it found to
be responsible for the abduction and continued detention of the three and named
Lt. Col. Anotado, Lt. Mirabelle, Gen. Palparan, Lt. Col. Boac, Arnel Enriquez,
and Donald Caigas as apparently responsible. “They should thus be made to
comply with the September 17, 2008 Decision of the appellate court to
immediately release Sherlyn, Karen and Merino,” the court said.[272]

In recognizing the urgency of such cases, the court said:

Since
the right to life, liberty and security of a person is at stake, the
proceedings should not be delayed and execution of any decision thereon must be
expedited as soon as possible since any form of delay, even for a day, may
jeopardize the very rights that these writs seek to immediately protect.[273]

The court did not explain its two-year delay in deciding
this matter, which further jeopardized the lives as well as the rights of
Cadapan, Empeño, and Merino.[274]

Weakness
of Human Rights Institutions

The widespread impunity enjoyed by perpetrators of
extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances is exacerbated by the
inadequacies of institutions charged with promoting human rights and
accountability, including the Commission on Human Rights, the Ombudsman, and
the Joint Monitoring Committee.

During the past several years, agencies at all levels of
government have created their own human rights mechanisms. For instance, the
PNP and the AFP have created human rights desks within their agencies.[275]
In addition, many barangay, municipal, provincial, and regional councils
have committees responsible for human rights. However, there are real
limitations, particularly at local levels. One member of a barangay human
rights committee told Human Rights Watch, “We don’t know how to do
the job. When we approach a local office, they tell us to go to other offices.
We don’t know the processes.”[276]

National
Commission on Human Rights

The Commission on Human Rights (CHR) is an autonomous
government body charged with, among other things, investigating “on its
own or on complaint by any party, all forms of human rights violations
involving civil and political rights,” and recommending prosecution when
its investigation establishes a prima facie case of a violation.[277]

In several recent cases that Human Rights Watch has
investigated, the CHR did not actively investigate the killing or “disappearance,”
did not provide updates to relatives on the status of their investigations, and
placed significant burdens on family members who were applying for compensation
from the commission. The CHR did not provide psychological support to the victims’
relatives or witnesses in any of the investigated cases.

The commission has a central office in Metro Manila, and
regional and sub-regional offices throughout the rest of the country.[278]

The commission’s effectiveness largely depends on the
personnel at the regional or sub-regional office, or whether the central office
has taken a particular interest in the case.[279] Certain directors
are proactive in investigating extrajudicial killings and enforced
disappearances, carrying on their own investigation while actively following up
with other investigating agencies; others are not. In the course of Human
Rights Watch’s research, only in one case did a family speak of the CHR
actually visiting the crime scene.[280]

In each of the cases from 2010 that Human Rights Watch investigated,
commission staff did not—on even one occasion—provide
victims’ families with an update of their investigation. Leonisa
Labrador, whose husband was killed on September 3, 2010, allegedly by a soldier
with the assistance of a paramilitary member, said, “I filed the case
with the CHR but until now I have not received an update.”[281]

Several relatives of victims said that the commission did
not actively investigate the killing or disappearance of their family member.[282]
Atty. Alberto Sipaco, Jr. of the Region XI office told Human Rights Watch,
“There is a problem of witnesses not coming into the office. People are
getting more silent.”[283]
In each “disappearance” case discussed here, the CHR has not been
at all involved in assisting the families or investigating the alleged abuse,
as is required under its mandate.[284]
Sonia Santa Rosa recounted one conversation with the Region V CHR office
following her husband’s death:

I told them that it’s their job to investigate. But
they said that they had no fare, or transport, or allowance…. Their
investigation involved recording the events; as for what action should be
taken, they did not do anything.…I asked for their help [when
I felt I was under military surveillance], but said they couldn’t do
anything.[285]

In each incident of a killing, the commission is supposed to
determine whether it was an extrajudicial killing and if so, provide the family
with 10,000 pesos [US$230] in compensation. This process often becomes an
additional burden for the victim’s family. Porcino Tamondez, whose son
was killed in Davao City in August 2010, told Human Rights Watch: “We
filed a complaint with them, but there were lots of requirements, each which
cost money [in transport] and time—they require a police report, a report
from the embalmer.”[286]
Similarly, the family of an activist killed in Negros said:

The CHR promised to give us financial help, but it’s
hard for us to process all the necessary requirements to claim the money. We
are just farmers, we live a very humble life here in the province and for us to
get the claim the money would be very tedious and very hard for us.[287]

The CHR does not provide any form of psychological support
to families of victims or witnesses. In a case in which a child witnessed the
killing, the mother said she requested counseling for her son and was told she
would have to pursue it at her own expense.[288]

On occasion, CHR employees are subject to threats and
harassment, particularly in cases in which the military or police are
implicated. One regional director told Human Rights Watch that someone called
him and advised him to “go slow,” because the suspect is a
high-ranking officer.[289]

Office
of the Ombudsman

The Office of the Ombudsman is a government body tasked with
investigating complaints filed against government officers or employees and
enforcing administrative, civil, and criminal liability.[290] Formally
independent of the executive branch and the armed forces, it is in a position
to effectively investigate allegations of abuse by local government officials and
security force personnel. However, it has a poor record when it comes to
resolving complaints brought to its attention.

Human Rights Watch had found that the Office of the
Ombudsman has done almost nothing to investigate the involvement of members of
the security forces in extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances
during the administration of President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo. It is hoped
that under the new ombudsman, not yet appointed at this writing, the office
will actively investigate cases for prosecution.[291]

Joint
Monitoring Committee

The Joint Monitoring Committee, created under the
Comprehensive Agreement on Respect for Human Rights and International
Humanitarian Law, which the government and NDFP signed in 1998, is charged with
monitoring implementation of the agreement by receiving complaints and making
recommendations to the parties. The committee is to comprise six members and
four observers, who are to be representatives of human rights organizations,
half of whom the government is to appoint, half of whom the NDFP is to appoint.[292]
It is to operate by consensus, receiving complaints of violations, requesting
investigation of complaints by the party concerned, and making recommendations.

Although the committee was formed in 2004, peace negotiations
collapsed later that year and the government was not willing to convene the
committee outside of peace talks. The government and NDFP-nominated sections of
the committee continued to operate, however, receiving complaints and making
some queries to act on them. The committee reconvened during the February 2011
formal peace talks and discussed the supplemental guidelines for the
committee’s operation, the process for consolidating complaints received
thus far, and parameters for the conduct of joint investigations.[293]

V. Legal Framework

Duty to
Investigate and Prosecute Human Rights Violations

Under international law, the Philippines has a duty to
investigate serious violations of international human rights law and punish the
perpetrators.[294]
As a state party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR), the Philippines has an obligation to ensure that any person whose
rights are violated “shall have an effective remedy” when
government officials or agents have committed the violation. Those seeking a
remedy shall have this right determined by competent judicial, administrative,
or legislative authorities. When granted, these remedies shall be enforced by
competent authorities.[295]

In accordance with the UN Principles on the Effective
Prevention and Investigation of Extra-Legal, Arbitrary and Summary Executions,
all suspected cases of unlawful killings, including in response to complaints
by relatives and reliable reports, should have a “thorough, prompt and
impartial investigation.” This investigation should “determine the
cause, manner and time of death, the person responsible, and any pattern or
practice which may have brought about that death.” The investigation
should result in a publicly available written report.[296]

The United Nations has developed guidance for the
investigation of extrajudicial executions, the Model Protocol for a Legal
Investigation of Extra-legal, Arbitrary and Summary Executions
(“Minnesota Protocol”). The Minnesota Protocol, drawing on lessons
learned from major inquiries into serious human rights violations, details
procedures for conducting investigations consistent with international law.
They include:

Where the political views, religious or ethnic affiliation,
or social status of the victim give rise to suspicion of government involvement
or complicity in the death because of any one or combination of the following
factors:

Where the
victim was last seen alive in police custody or detention;

Where the modus
operandi is recognizably attributable to government-sponsored death squads;

Where persons in the government or
associated with the government have attempted to obstruct or delay the
investigation of the execution;

Where the physical or
testimonial evidence essential to the investigation becomes unavailable.

… [A]n independent commission of inquiry or similar
procedure should also be established where a routine investigation is
inadequate for the following reasons:

The lack
of expertise; or

The lack of
impartiality; or

The importance of the matter; or

The apparent existence of a
pattern of abuse; or

Complaints from
the family of the victim about the above inadequacies or other substantial
reasons.[297]

The
Philippines has not signed or ratified the 2006 International Convention for
the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance, which sets out
specific standards on preventing and punishing enforced disappearances.[298] The convention is based on the 1992 UN
Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearances.[299] Enforced disappearances are a grave threat
to the right to life and violate many fundamental rights, including the right
to liberty and security of the person and the right not to be subjected to
torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment.[300]
States should “take effective legislative, administrative, judicial or
other measures to prevent and terminate acts of enforced disappearance”
in their territory.[301] Acts of enforced
disappearance should be criminal offenses punishable by penalties that take
into account their extreme seriousness.[302]

Individuals who order extrajudicial killings or enforced
disappearances can be held criminally liable. In addition, under international
principles of command (or superior) responsibility, superior officers can be
held criminally liable for the actions of their subordinates, when the superior
knew or had reason to know that their subordinate was about to commit or had
committed a crime, and the superior failed to take necessary and reasonable
measures to prevent the crime or to punish the perpetrator.[303]

Philippine
National Law

In line with international standards, the Philippine
Constitution guarantees fundamental human rights, including the right to life,
liberty, and security of person, the right to a fair trial, and a prohibition
against torture.[304]

Most abuses detailed in this report would be covered by
criminal offenses found in the Philippines criminal code, including murder,
kidnapping and serious illegal detention, and arbitrary detention.[305]

The Anti-Torture Act of 2009 criminalizes “torture and
other cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment,” and provides
remedies and redress for victims of torture.[306] It prohibits
secret detention places, solitary confinement, incommunicado, or other forms of
detention where torture may be carried out with impunity.[307] As
a preventative measure, it requires the PNP and the AFP to make an updated list
of all detention facilities under their jurisdiction together with information
on persons detained.[308]
Although partly addressed by other offenses, there is no specific crime of
enforced disappearance in the Philippine criminal code.

Duties of
Law Enforcement Officials and Prosecutors

Under Philippine law, police have a duty to protect lives
and property, investigate and prevent crimes, arrest criminal offenders, bring
offenders to justice and assist in their prosecution, and exercise powers of
arrest, search, and seizure in accordance with the law, among others.[309]
PNP guidelines further detail the duties of police officers in crime scene
investigations, including interviewing witnesses, gathering physical evidence,
and arresting suspects, among other tasks.[310]

The Philippine Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for
Public Officials and Employees mandates that all government employees,
including police officers, attend to the problems of the public promptly.[311]
The code further specifies that public officials have a duty to respond to
letters and requests by the public within 15 working days of receipt.[312]

Under
Administrative Order 181 of 2007, the National Prosecution Service is directed
to work closely with police and NBI investigators from the start of a criminal
investigation into an extrajudicial killing until the termination of the case
in court, and the PNP and NBI are directed to consult with prosecutors at all
stages of such investigations.[313] This order provides that a
separate prosecutor should undertake the preliminary investigation of the case,
to protect the independence of this process. In determining whether a killing
is a political offense, agencies are to consider the political affiliation of
the victim, the method of attack, and reports state agents are involved in the
commission of the crime or have acquiesced in them.[314]
This order was never implemented in the absence of implementing rules and
regulations.

Further,
Administrative Order 249 of 2008 provides that the Department of Justice is
“to exhaust all legal means for the swift and just resolution of cases of
alleged human rights violations against political and media personalities, and
leaders in the labor, urban poor, and agricultural sectors, and to ensure that
the perpetrators are held accountable before the law.”[315]

Command
Responsibility

Command responsibility for criminal offenses was integrated
into Philippine criminal law in December 2009 by Republic Act No. 9851.[316]
Some academics have argued that prior to the passage of this act, command
responsibility was already incorporated into Philippine law.[317]
However, to date, no superior officer has been tried as a matter of command
responsibility in the Philippines.[318]

Supervising officers can also be held administratively
accountable for neglect of duty under the doctrine of command responsibility
under Executive Order No. 226 (1995).[319]

VI. Role of the International Community

Bilateral
trade partners and donors to the Philippines should encourage the Philippine
government to vigorously investigate extrajudicial killings and enforced
disappearances, prosecute perpetrators regardless of position or
rank—including under principles of command responsibility—and
implement systemic reforms to prevent such abuses in the future.

Pressure from the international community was effective in
reducing extrajudicial killings in the Philippines in the past. In 2006, at the
height of the killings under the administration of President Arroyo, the United
States, Japan, and the European Union, among others, condemned the widespread
killings in the Philippines and pressed the government to take action. This
followed a high-profile visit from the then-UN special rapporteur on
extrajudicial executions, Philip Alston, and his subsequent report. Although
killings continued, in 2008 the numbers fell drastically to about 30 percent of
previous levels.[320]

A month after the April 2009 follow-up report by Alston,
President Arroyo abolished the Inter-Agency Legal Action Group, implementing
one of Alston’s recommendations. Alston had reported that the
inter-agency group had used prosecutions to dismantle civil society
organizations and political groups that the government deemed to be front
organizations for the Communist Party of the Philippines.[321]

Despite the positive results that its pressure had generated
in the past, the international community has been near silent on extrajudicial
killings and enforced disappearances since President Aquino came to office in
June 2010.

The US is the Philippines’ most influential ally and,
together with Australia and Japan, one of its three largest bilateral donors,
yet the Obama administration has been largely silent on extrajudicial killings.
Up until the release of the US State Department’s annual human rights
report in April 2011, the US government had failed to publicly raise military
abuses including extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances since
Aquino took office.

This silence extended to US Ambassador Harry Thomas,
Jr.’s address on April 5, 2011, at the opening of the 27th
Balikatan exercises—annual joint US-Philippines military exercises
designed to promote professionalism—which was just days before the launch
of the human rights report. As these exercises indicate, the United States
maintains considerable military ties with the Philippines. The US armed forces
have access to specified land and sea areas under a Visiting Forces Agreement.
In fiscal year for 2009-2010 the US government authorized US$32 million to be
provided to the Philippines under Foreign Military Financing for procurement of
US military equipment, services, and training. Under US appropriations law,
US$2 million is contingent on the Philippine government showing progress in
addressing human rights violations, including extrajudicial killings.[322]

Australia signed a Status of Visiting Forces Agreement with
the Philippines in May 2007; this agreement remains before the Philippine
Senate. On June 17, 2010, the Australian embassy in Manila hosted a policy
forum on human rights at which experts discussed the problem of extrajudicial
killings.

In October 2009, the EU announced a €3.9 million
(US$5.5 million) program to address extrajudicial killings and strengthen the
criminal justice system by providing training and technical assistance in
2009-2011. A considerable component of this program was directed at improving
police investigation skills. The EU’s police expert worked with
Philippine police to develop a criminal investigation manual, a field manual
for crime scene investigations, and a case management manual, to develop a
training of trainers course—pursuant to which at least two investigators
at each police station are to be trained by the end of 2011, and conducted
workshops on case management, which involved reviewing investigations of numerous
extrajudicial killings.

Ongoing plans exist to work with the Philippine National
Police to develop a new criminal intelligence system for extrajudicial killings
and enforced disappearance cases, including a national database of missing
persons corroborated with medical and dental records.

However, since Aquino took office, EU ambassadors have not
matched this investment in training with persistent advocacy for improvements.
Capacity building alone is not enough. None of the investigators have
implemented recommendations of the EU’s police expert or Task Force Usig,
which came out of the case management workshops.

The Philippine government should promptly act to investigate
and prosecute each of the extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances
outlined in this report. Outlined below are several initial steps that the
government should take in relation to each of these abuses.

Killing
of Fernando “Nanding” Baldomero, July 5, 2010

National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) investigators
should investigate military involvement in the killing of Fernando
Baldomero. In particular, they should search for witnesses who saw
soldiers around Baldomero’s residence in the days and weeks before
he was killed, and investigate threats the military made against him.

Police and NBI investigators should actively work to serve
the arrest warrant against Dindo Lovon Ancero.

The Department of Justice should act to protect witnesses
to the killing. In particular, officials in charge of witness protection
should meet with witnesses and discuss what measures can be taken, within
the confines of the witness protection program, which would be acceptable
for the witnesses and particularly the child witness.

Internal
police investigators should investigate police officers in Aklan who
refused to pursue evidence of military involvement and consider
disciplinary measures for insubordination or a criminal investigation for
obstruction of justice or graft and corruption.

In conjunction with other relevant government agencies,
including the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD), the
Commission on Human Rights (CHR) should offer the witnesses, particularly
the child witness, counseling and psycho-social support.

Killing
of Pascual Guevarra, July 9, 2010

Police and NBI investigators should investigate the
involvement of Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH) staff and
military involvement in the killing, including subpoenaing any relevant
public documents, interviewing soldiers, and compelling departmental staff
to cooperate with the investigation.

DPWH should investigate its staff for failing to cooperate
with a police investigation and, if appropriate, commence disciplinary
proceedings.

The Justice Department should discuss with the
victim’s family and witnesses any concerns about their safety and
take steps to protect them if necessary.

Police and NBI investigators should vigorously investigate
the disappearance of Agustito Ladera and Renato Deliguer, including by
interviewing all people with information about the disappearances,
canvassing for witnesses in areas surrounding the farms, questioning
soldiers who were involved in operations in the area, and having crime
scene experts examine the Ladera and Deliguer farms.

The AFP inspector general and provost marshal should
independently investigate the disappearances, publicly report findings,
and commence disciplinary proceedings against any military personnel as
appropriate.

The CHR should actively investigate the disappearances,
provide appropriate assistance to the families, and recommend to the
Justice Department any charges that should be brought.

Internal police investigators should investigate police officers
in Surigao del Sur who failed to properly investigate these disappearances
and consider disciplinary measures for insubordination or a criminal
investigation for obstruction of justice or graft and corruption.

The AFP should investigate the commander of the 36th
IB for failing to comply with a request to appear before the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan Committee on Laws and Justice and Human Rights in Surigao del
Sur on October 4, 2010, and, if appropriate, bring disciplinary
proceedings.

The NBI and police directors should investigate regional
directors for failing to respond to correspondence from the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan Committee on Laws and Justice and Human Rights and issue
directives to require personnel to comply with such inquiries in future.

Killing
of Reynaldo “Naldo” L. Labrador,
September 3, 2010

Police and NBI investigators should investigate military
involvement in the killing of Reynaldo Labrador, including by canvassing
for witnesses who saw the alleged soldier who was with Roberto “Kulot”
Repe and questioning military personnel.

The Justice Department should discuss with the
victim’s family and witnesses any concerns about their safety and
take steps to protect them if necessary.

The CHR should actively investigate the killing and threats
against the family and other residents in Paquibato district, provide
appropriate assistance to the families, and recommend to the justice
department any charges that should be brought.

Killing
of Rene “Toto” Quirante, October 1, 2010

The PNP should send an independent team to serve arrest
warrants against Dandy Quilanan, a CAFGU member, and Junel Librado, a
former member of the NPA allegedly working as a “guide” for
the military.

NBI investigators should investigate the killing of Rene
Quirante with the aim of identifying the six unidentified soldiers whom
witnesses have testified were involved in the killing.

The Justice Department should discuss with the
victim’s family and witnesses any concerns about their safety and
take steps to protect them if necessary.

The CHR should actively investigate the killing and
threats against the family, provide appropriate assistance to the
families, and recommend to the Justice Department any charges that should
be brought.

PNP headquarters should investigate why police
investigators did not visit and examine the scene of the crime, and take
steps to ensure that investigators examine such crime scenes in future.

Killing
of Ireneo “Rene” Rodriguez, November 7, 2010

NBI investigators should investigate Air Force involvement
in the killing of Ireneo Rodriguez. In particular, they should investigate
the Air Force personnel that attempted to visit Rodriguez days before he
was killed and canvass for witnesses close to where he was killed.

The AFP inspector general and provost marshal should
independently investigate the killing, publicly report findings, and
commence disciplinary proceedings against any Air Force personnel as
appropriate.

The Justice Department should discuss with the
victim’s family and witnesses any concerns about their safety and
take steps to protect them if necessary.

The CHR should actively investigate the killing and
threats against the family, provide appropriate assistance to the family,
and recommend to the Justice Department any charges that should be
brought.

Enforced Disappearance of Alfredo Bucal,
November 10, 2010

NBI investigators should
investigate Air Force and police involvement in the killing of Alfredo
Bucal. In particular, they should individually interview each member of
the police and Air Force that was present at the checkpoint in barangay
Lutal, Tuy, Batangas and investigate how Bucal’s tricycle ended
up in police possession.

NBI investigators should investigate all reports of Air Force
and police personnel threatening witnesses with view to filing charges.

The AFP and PNP inspector general and provost marshal
should independently investigate the disappearance and the shooting at the
check point, publicly report findings, and commence disciplinary
proceedings against any military and police personnel as appropriate.

Internal
police investigators should investigate police officers in Batangas who
did not actively investigate this disappearance and consider disciplinary
measures for insubordination or a criminal investigation for obstruction
of justice or graft and corruption.

The Justice Department should discuss with the
victim’s family and witnesses any concerns about their safety and
take steps to protect them if necessary.

The CHR should actively investigate the killing and
threats against the family, provide appropriate assistance to the family,
and recommend to the justice department any charges that should be
brought.

Killing
of Rudy and Rudyric Dejos, February 27, 2011

NBI investigators should investigate military involvement
in the killing of Rudy and Rudyric Dejos. In particular, they should
investigate threats made by the military against Rudy Dejos.

The AFP inspector general and provost marshal should
independently investigate the killings, publicly report findings, and commence
disciplinary proceedings against any military personnel as appropriate.
They should also investigate the 39th IB’s presence at
the Dejos’ wake and funeral march, commence discipline commanders as
appropriate, and issue directives not to attend such events other than in
exceptional circumstances.

Internal police investigators should investigate police
officers in Sta. Cruz, Davao del Sur, who did not actively investigate
these killings and consider disciplinary measures for insubordination or a
criminal investigation for obstruction of justice or graft and corruption.

PNP headquarters should investigate reports that police
investigators did not visit and examine the scene of the crime, and that
the local police director chose not to seek Scene of Crime Operatives
(SOCO) assistance and take steps to ensure that investigators thoroughly
examine such crime scenes in future.

The Justice Department should discuss with the
victim’s family and witnesses any concerns about their safety and
take steps to protect them if necessary.

The CHR should actively investigate the killing and
threats against the family, provide appropriate assistance to the family,
and recommend to the Justice Department any charges that should be
brought.

Killing
of Bacar and Carmen Japalali, September 8, 2004

The
Department of Justice should review the dismissal of charges against 24 of
the 32 soldiers accused of killing Bacar and Carmen Japalali and consider
bringing new charges.

Police investigators should investigate the Regional Trial
Court judge who dismissed charges against 24 of the 32 accused soldiers,
without a motion from the defense, for obstruction of justice or graft and
corruption.

The Department of Justice should work with the police,
NBI, and CHR to gather evidence and file charges against those that the
Supreme Court has named as apparently responsible for the abduction and
continued detention of Sherlyn Cadapan, Karen Empeño, and Manuel
Merino—being Lt. Col. Anotado, Lt. Mirabelle, Gen. Palparan, Lt.
Col. Boac, Arnel Enriquez, and Donald Caigas.

Police and NBI investigators should urgently exert all
necessary measures to locate the missing three.

NBI investigators should investigate military commanders
for involvement in the abduction and continued detention of the three and
the cover up of these crimes.

The Department of Justice should act to protect witnesses
to the abduction and continued detention.

Internal police investigators should investigate police
officers who refused to investigate this “disappearance” and
consider disciplinary measures for insubordination or a criminal
investigation for obstruction of justice or graft and corruption.

In conjunction with other relevant government agencies,
including the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD), the
Commission on Human Rights (CHR) should offer the witnesses and the
victims’ families counseling and psycho-social support.

The Supreme Court should investigate why it took more than
two years to decide on this case and take steps to avoid such delays on
writ of amparo and habeas data cases in the future.

VIII. Recommendations

The Philippine government could implement several
recommendations immediately. Others should be instituted without delay but can
be expected to take longer to fully implement.

To demonstrate resolve about ending extrajudicial killings
and enforced disappearances and holding perpetrators accountable, President
Aquino should immediately:

Order
the Philippine National Police (PNP) and the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI) to take all necessary steps to investigate and serve
outstanding arrest warrants in the cases discussed in this report.

Issue an executive order directing police and NBI
investigators to vigorously pursue crimes allegedly committed by the
military or themselves be subject to disciplinary measures.

Order the inspector general and provost marshal of the AFP
to investigate and report publicly within 90 days on the involvement of
military personnel in extrajudicial killings, and to identify failures
within the AFP investigative agencies to thus far prosecute officers under
principles of command responsibility.

Order the military to cease targeting all civilians, to
cease the practice of denying military involvement in all extrajudicial
killings and to cease labeling leftist groups as fronts for the CPP-NPA,
which places group members at considerable risk.

Communicate fully to all military personnel that
officers and soldiers who provide evidence or testimony in cases of human
rights violations that they will be eligible for witness protection and
other measures to ensure their safety.

To
the President of the Philippines

Issue an executive order directing police and National
Bureau of Investigation (NBI) investigators to vigorously pursue crimes
allegedly committed by the military, or themselves be subject to
disciplinary measures for insubordination or a criminal investigation for
obstruction of justice or graft and corruption.

Direct the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) to take
all necessary measures to end military involvement in extrajudicial
killings.

Ensure AFP compliance at all levels with investigations of
other agencies, including the police, NBI, Commission on Human Rights
(CHR), the ombudsman, and inquiries by legislative bodies and other public
officials.

Produce a plan for the implementation of the
recommendations contained in the reports of the United Nations special
rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary, or arbitrary executions, the Melo
Commission, and human rights NGOs reporting on extrajudicial killings.

Ask congress to create a nationwide emergency assistance
number for family members and witnesses to killings and
“disappearances.”

Sign the International Convention for the Protection of
All Persons from Enforced Disappearance, and transmit to the Senate for
prompt ratification.

Invite the UN Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary
Disappearances and the special rapporteur on human rights defenders to
visit the Philippines.

To the
Department of Justice

Direct the NBI to give priority to investigating alleged
extrajudicial killings and other serious abuses that may involve
government officials, security forces, or militia forces.

Direct the NBI to investigate the role of senior military
officials in extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances, including
retired Gen. Jovito Palparan—in line with a 2004 recommendation of
the Committee on Civil, Political and Human Rights of the House of
Representatives that the Department of Justice investigate then-Col.
Jovito Palparan and similar recommendations from several other bodies.

Direct the NBI to investigate and report publicly within
90 days on the failure of police to adequately investigate military
involvement in extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances,
including threats and harassment of investigators who try to conduct
proper investigations. Conduct such an investigation in a manner that
ensures the safety of those providing information.

Broaden the witness protection program to ensure that it
is accessible, flexible, and properly funded. Implement mechanisms for
witnesses to change identity, transfer locations other than their places
of residence, including to other provinces, for as long as necessary. This
program should provide protection for witnesses from the onset of a police
investigation until after trial, when necessary.

Institute measures for witnesses to offer testimonies
safely, while protecting the rights of defendants, for example by using
video-conferenced testimonies, closed courtrooms, or depositions.

In cooperation with the Department of Interior and Local
Government, circulate an explicit set of operational guidelines for the
police regarding:

Individual police officer’s duties to provide
protection to witnesses and individuals who report threats on their
lives;

Information to provide to witnesses about the witness
protection program and at what stages to provide this information;

Clear sanctions for officers who fail to provide
necessary protection in conformity with these guidelines.

Order Task Force 211 or an alternative body in the
Department of Justice tasked with monitoring extrajudicial killings and
enforced disappearances to publish a list of all cases under its mandate
and the status of the case. Publish regular and frequent status reports on
all cases.

Produce and disseminate information for victims of crime
that explains their legal rights, such as the state’s requirement to
pay for autopsies in alleged murder cases and to be informed of the status
of relevant investigations. Adopt mechanisms to facilitate the filing of
complaints by people whose rights have been infringed by law enforcement
officers.

Improve access to social services such as medical care,
including counseling, and legal aid for victims of and witnesses to
serious human rights violations.

To the
Department of Interior and Local Government

Direct police to consult with prosecutors regarding the
collection of evidence in alleged extrajudicial killings and enforced
disappearances to bring all the perpetrators to justice.

In cooperation with the Department of Justice, circulate
an explicit set of operational guidelines for the police regarding:

Individual police officer duties to provide protection to
witnesses and individuals who report threats on their lives;

Information to provide to witnesses about the witness
protection program and at what stages to provide this information;

Clear sanctions for officers who fail to provide
necessary protection in conformity with these guidelines.

To the
Supreme Court

Order all trial courts to comply with the procedures under
Supreme Court Administrative Order 25-2007 in extrajudicial killing cases,
which means they must:

Complete trials in extrajudicial killing cases within 60
days of when the case is filed in court, and render judgment within a
further 30 days.

Submit to the chief justice of the Supreme Court a list
of such cases and a report on their status monthly. The chief justice
should publish a quarterly report on the status and progress of such
cases.

To overcome difficulties identifying extrajudicial cases
in which Administrative Order 25-2007 applies, order all trial courts to
expedite the disposition of murder, homicide, and kidnapping cases in
which a police officer, member of the Armed Forces of the Philippines or
paramilitary force, or government official is implicated, and to hear such
cases on a continuous basis.

Order all courts to expedite writ of amparo
cases—including the Supreme Court—to hear and decide them
within five days, be they in the first instance or on appeal.

To
the Philippine National Police

Promptly
and fully investigate all alleged cases of extrajudicial killings and
enforced disappearances, including those discussed in this report.

Through
Task Force Usig, work with all police agencies to coordinate
investigations of extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearance cases,
and to routinely follow up ongoing cases. In particularly complex or
politically sensitive cases of human rights violations, bring in specially
qualified investigators from outside the area to assist in the
investigation.

Order
Task Force Usig to publish a list of all cases under its mandate and the
status of the cases. Publish regular and frequent status reports.

Review
“closed” cases of alleged extrajudicial killings that have not
resulted in convictions with a view to identifying and obtaining new
evidence and bringing prosecutions.

Open
hotlines or comparable lines of communication to receive anonymous
information on abuses perpetrated by local government officials and
security force members.

Sanction
officers who do not thoroughly and promptly investigate alleged human
rights violations.

Develop
a national database on missing persons, corroborated with medical and
dental records.

Draft specific protocol for police officers to ensure full
cooperation with prosecutors and other government officials, particularly
in human rights cases. The protocol should be incorporated in the relevant
police manual.

Make operational procedures, the investigators’
manual, and other guidelines setting out duties of police officers easily
accessible to the public. Ensure that the guidelines place a duty on law
enforcement officers to investigate alleged crimes irrespective of whether
a formal complaint has been filed.

Create
standards for file management of criminal cases including the
chronological documentation of all police and judicial intervention
measures that have been met.

Sanction
officers who fail to provide necessary witness protection in accordance
with the law.

To the Armed
Forces of the Philippines

Cease all targeting of civilians, and extrajudicial
killings and enforced disappearances of all persons in custody.

Issue a public order to all forces stating clearly that
political activists, unionists, and members of civil society groups are to
be distinguished from combatants involved in the armed conflict.

Fully assist all prosecutorial authorities in apprehending
members of the armed forces, regardless of rank, implicated in
extrajudicial killings and other serious human rights violations.

End abusive uses of intelligence lists of suspected
NPA/CPP members, known as “orders of battle” and “watch
lists.” Hold commanding officers responsible for abuses committed
against individuals placed on such lists. Issue public guidelines that
would permit a person who suspects they are named on such a list to
challenge their inclusion before a civilian authority.

Fully comply with all inquiries by investigative bodies
including legislative committees and public officials.

Cease the routine denial of involvement in reported cases
of extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances. Instead, condemn
such abuses and order the Inspector General and the Provost Marshal to
promptly and impartially investigate.

Suspend military personnel implicated in extrajudicial
killings or enforced disappearances while an investigation is ongoing.

To the
National Bureau of Investigation

Give
priority to investigating alleged extrajudicial killings and other serious
human rights violations that may involve government officials, security
forces, or militia forces.

Investigate the involvement of senior military officials
in ordering and failing to investigate extrajudicial killings and enforced
disappearances, including the role of retired Gen. Jovito Palparan.

To the
Philippine Congress

Conduct hearings on the involvement of the AFP in ordering
and perpetrating extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances.
Provide necessary protections to all those who provide information.

Enact legislation to prohibit and protect against enforced
disappearances.

Conduct committee hearings on best practices for
preserving the testimonies of witnesses to extrajudicial killings and
enforced disappearances and enact appropriate legislation to establish the
necessary mechanisms for this purpose.

In line with House bills 265 and 1123 of the 14th
Congress, enact legislation mandating autopsy examinations in all cases of
suspected extrajudicial killings.

Pass a resolution urging the president to promptly sign
the International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from
Enforced Disappearance and file it with the Senate for ratification.

To the
Commission on Human Rights

Investigate and report publicly and promptly on cases of
alleged extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances.

Publish regular and frequent lists of all cases of killings
and abductions in which police, military, or other government officials
are suspected, including when the case was referred to the office and the
status of the case.

Investigate and report publicly within 90 days on
obstacles to investigations of extrajudicial killings and the enforced
disappearances, particularly collusion between the police and military.
Provide all necessary safeguards to those willing to provide information.

To the
Office of the Ombudsman

Investigate police, military, and other government
officials, regardless of rank, suspected of perpetrating extrajudicial
killings and enforced disappearances.

Publish regular and frequent lists of all cases of
killings and abductions in which police, military, or other government
officials are suspected, including when the case was referred to the office
and the status of the case.

To the New
People’s Army/Communist Party of the Philippines

Cease all targeting of civilians, and the killing of all
persons in custody.

Consistent
with the above, provide safe passage to police and NBI investigators who
are investigating extrajudicial killings, enforced disappearances, or
other serious abuses.

To
the Joint Monitoring Committee

Expedite the drafting of supplemental guidelines for the
committee’s operation, the process for consolidating complaints
received thus far, and parameters for the conduct of joint investigations
between the NDFP and the government monitoring committees. Ensure that all
processes and investigations are transparent.

To
Donors and External Partners, including the United States, European Union,
Japan, Australia, the World Bank, and the Asian Development Bank

To promote human rights, the rule of law, and good
governance in the Philippines, press the Philippine government to initiate
investigations into the involvement of senior military officials in
extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances perpetrated by military
personnel, and prosecute the perpetrators.

All programs to assist the PNP or AFP should vet all
participating police officers and military personnel to ensure that they
have not been implicated or complicit in extrajudicial executions,
enforced disappearances, or other serious human rights abuses. The vetting
process should be transparent.

Offer to support external law enforcement assistance with
investigations into serious human rights violations, particularly in
forensic analysis, witness protection, case preparation, and tracing of fugitives.

Support NGOs that work with victims’ families to
closely follow individual cases and push for thorough investigations,
filing of cases, execution of arrest warrants, and protection of the
families and witnesses.

To the
United States, European Union Member States, Japan, Australia, and other
Concerned Governments

Publicly press the Philippine government to improve efforts to
investigate and prosecute members of the military for extrajudicial killings
and enforced disappearances, including those liable under command
responsibility. Be clear that failing to conduct full investigations and
prosecutions will increasingly call into question aspects of the relationship
with the Philippines.

Through embassies in Manila, monitor Philippine government investigations
of alleged extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances.

Offer to work with the Philippine government to provide witness
protection abroad for witnesses who are under grave threat, in particular
whistleblowers within the AFP.

To the United
States Government

Encourage the US Millennium Challenge Corporation to
specifically include the Philippines’ record in failing to prosecute
extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances as an indicator of the
country’s progress in the areas of civil liberties, political
rights, accountability, and the rule of law. The Millennium Challenge
Corporation should condition future funding to the Ombudsman’s
Office on the latter’s prosecution of government officials for
abuses within the office’s mandate.

The US Pacific Command, US Agency for International
Development (USAID), Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Department of
Defense, Drug Enforcement Agency, International Criminal Investigative
Training Assistance Program (ICITAP) , and all other US agencies that work
with the PNP or AFP should vet all police officers and military personnel
enrolling in US-funded programs in accordance with the Leahy Law to ensure
that participants have not been implicated or complicit in extrajudicial
executions, enforced disappearances, or other serious human rights abuses.
The US government should consult NGOs and the Philippine Commission on
Human Rights during this vetting process.

Closely
monitor the progress and effectiveness of police investigations into
military abuses, particularly alleged extrajudicial killings and enforced
disappearances, and the cooperation of the AFP with these investigations.
If there is no progress in prosecuting military personnel for involvement
in extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances, the US should
suspend the next annual bilateral Balikatan exercises.

IX. Appendix

Letter from Human Rights Watch to Justice Secretary Leila de Lima

Letter from Human Rights Watch to the Central Committee of the
Communist Party of the Philippines

Letter to Human Rights Watch from the Office of the Ombudsman

IX. Acknowledgments

This report was researched and written by Jessica Evans,
researcher in the Asia Division of Human Rights Watch.

Diana Parker, associate for the Asia Division, provided
research, administrative and technical assistance. Veejay Villafranca, a photojournalist,
provided research assistance together with his professional photography.

Human Rights Watch would like to thank the victims,
families, and eyewitnesses who agreed to talk to us for this report. We are
indebted to the many NGOs, lawyers, and activists who generously assisted us
during our research. We would also like to thank several independent expert
reviewers who provided comments and feedback on our work.

[2] The
island of Mindanao in the southern Philippines has a large Muslim population
known as Moros. Various Moro armed opposition groups, unconnected to the
Communist insurgency, are engaged in armed hostilities for independence or
autonomy against the government. These include the Moro Islamic Liberation
Front (MILF), the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), and the Abu Sayyaf
Group (ASG).

[3] The
NDFP, established in 1973, says it is the “united front organization of
the Filipino people fighting for national independence and for the democratic
rights of the people,” including the CPP-NPA. National Democratic Front
of the Philippines, “About the NDFP,” undated, http://ndfp.net/joomla/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=21&Itemid=27
(accessed May 7, 2011).

[5] Republic
Act No. 7636, which took effect on October 11, 1992, repealed the
Anti-Subversion Act, R.A. 1700, which had outlawed the CPP in 1957.

[6] For a
discussion of the various armed groups in the Philippines, see Soliman Santos
and Paz Verdades Santos, Primed and Purposeful: Armed Groups and Human
Security Efforts in the Philippines (Geneva: South-South Network for
Non-State Armed Group Engagement and the Small Arms Survey, 2010). The
splintering of the CPP-NPA also affected nongovernmental organizations. In 1992
the leader of the CPP-NPA, Jose Maria Sison, sought to reassert certain Maoist
principles into the movement, including the primacy of the rural armed struggle, and rejecting more moderate positions of political engagement.
Those who supported Sison have been labeled “reaffirmists” or
“RAs,” and those
who rejected this realignment of the CPP-NPA have been labeled
“rejectionists” or “RJs.” This same division remains
evident in nongovernmental organizations and political parties today. See Human
Rights Watch, The Philippines — Scared Silent: Impunity for
Extrajudicial Killings in the Philippines, June 2007, http://www.hrw.org/en/reports/2007/06/27/scared-silent-0,
pp. 11-17. For discussion of this and other developments since the 1992 division, see International Crisis
Group, “The Communist Insurgency in the Philippines: Tactics and
Talks,” Asia Report No. 202, February 14, 2011, http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/asia/south-east-asia/philippines/202-the-communist-insurgency-in-the-philippines-tactics-and-talks.aspx
(accessed May 7, 2011), pp. 6-10.

[9] “Another
victim in Davao ambush dies,” Sun Star, August 8, 2010, http://www.sunstar.com.ph/network/another-victim-davao-ambush-dies
(accessed May 6, 2011). Labawan believes that the NPA was targeting him.
Similarly, on July 31, 2010, two NPA members shot and killed Leonardo
“Andot” Behing, a leader of LUPACA (Lumadnong Pakigbisog sa
CARAGA), which is reported to have been formerly affiliated with the AFP and
now largely a bandit group, in Sibagat town, Agusan del Sur. According to news
reports, Maria Malaya, spokesperson of the NPA’s NorthEastern Mindanao Regional Committee said,
“Behing was a legitimate military target for his anti-revolutionary work
and crimes against the people like rape, kidnapping, illegal logging and
harassments.” Franklin A. Caliguid, “NPA
admits killing Manobo man over ‘crimes against people,’” Philippine Daily Inquirer, August 3, 2010, http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/breakingnews/regions/view/20100803-284695/NPA-admits-killing-Manobo-man-over-crimes-against-people
(accessed May 6, 2011).

[10] Known
as the Revolutionary Proletarian Army-Alex Boncayao Brigade (RPA-ABB). The NPA
called on RPA-ABB members to “desist from doing its worst against the
mainstream revolutionary organization and surrender so that any appeal they
want to present could be processed.” Edgar Cadagat, “Slain RPA-ABB Leader Led Hold-Up Gang, Death Squad in Negros
Combined,” Daily Bulletin, November 9, 2010, http://www.ndb-online.com/nov0910/negros-local-news/Slain+RPA-ABB+Leader+Led+Hold-Up+Gang-Death+Squad+in+Negros+Combined
(accessed May 6, 2011).

[14] Human
Rights Watch interview with a police investigator, place name and date
withheld.

[15] For a
discussion of the paramilitary and militia forces in the Philippines, see Human
Rights Watch, The Philippines — “They Own the People”: The Ampatuans, State-Backed Militias, and Killings in the Southern
Philippines, November 2010, http://www.hrw.org/en/reports/2010/11/16/they-own-people-0,
pp. 19-24.

[17] US
State Department, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights,
and Labor, “Country Reports on Human Rights Practices — 2010: The
Philippines,” April 8, 2011, http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2010/eap/154399.htm
(accessed May 7, 2011). This figure does not include members of paramilitary
forces.

[18] The
draft Comprehensive Agreement on Social and Economic Reforms (CASER) may be
completed and signed by the Panels in September 2011; the draft Comprehensive
Agreement on Political and Constitutional Reforms (CAPCR) may be completed and
signed by the Panels in February 2012; and lastly the draft Comprehensive
Agreement on End of Hostilities and Disposition of Forces (CAEHDF) may be
completed and signed by the Panels in June 2012. The Joint Statement of
GPH-CPP-NPA-NDF at the Conclusion of the Current Round of Peace Talks in Oslo,
Norway, February 21, 2011, http://gphndfpeacetalks.wordpress.com/2011/03/08/joint-statement-of-gph-cpp-npa-ndf-at-the-conclusion-of-the-current-round-of-peace-talks-in-oslo-norway/
(accessed May 6, 2011).

[25] The
letter went on to say, “That there was a marked increase in the incidence
of killings in all the areas where Gen. Palparan was assigned—which he
admitted—should be enough to justify his investigation. Indeed, Gen.
Palparan’s statements and cavalier attitude about the killings should
have warranted early on at the very least administrative or disciplinary
actions by his superiors.” Letter from Jose A. R. Melo, chairman of the
Melo Commission, to Eduardo R. Ermita, executive secretary, August 21, 2007,
pp. 3, 9.

[26] Arroyo
did implement an earlier recommendation, seeing to the passage in December 2009
of a law providing for command responsibility as a basis for criminal
liability; however, this has not yet been applied. Republic Act No. 9851 of the
Philippines. See also Republic Act No. 9745 of the
Philippines, sec. 13.

[28] Letter from Ricardo Blancaflor, former chairman, Task Force 211, to Human Rights Watch, May 27, 2011. On June 10, 2008,
Joel Flores was convicted of murder for the May 16, 2006 killing of Bayan Muna
secretary general Jose Doton. On March 6, 2009, Rafael Cardeño was
convicted of murder for the December 31, 2001 killing of reported whistleblower
and Young Officer’s Union spokesperson Baron Cervantes. On April 29,
2009, Joy Anticamara was convicted of homicide for the July 18, 2006 killing of
broadcaster Armando Pace. On January 29, 2010, Robert Woo was convicted of
murder, as an accomplice, of the May 4, 2005 killing of radio commentator Klein
Cantoneros.

[30]
Philippine National Police Commission, Resolution No. 2009-072,
“Approving the activation of the human rights desks at the different
levels of command in the Philippine National Police,” February, 2009.
“All AFP units ordered to set up human rights office,” GMA News,
November 15, 2010,http://www.gmanews.tv/story/206015/all-afp-units-ordered-to-set-up-human-rights-office
(accessed May 13, 2011).

[31] For
instance, a police officer at the PNP provincial headquarters in Nueva Ecija
said that they did not have a human rights desk there. He said, “Maybe
there is one at the regional headquarters?” Human Rights Watch interview
with P/Supt. Eduardo B. Soriano, Nueva Ecija, February 25, 2011.

[35]UN
Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on
extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, Philip Alston, A/HRC/14/24, May
20, 2010,http://www2.ohchr.org/english/issues/executions/annual.htm
(accessed December 17, 2010). See especially, “Killings
by Law Enforcement Officials or Other Security Forces.”

[38] Human
Rights Watch interview, name, place and date of interview withheld. A family
member told Human Rights Watch that several witnesses had told members of the
family that they had seen uniformed men watching Baldomero’s home in the
weeks prior to the killing, but that they were scared to testify: Human Rights
Watch interview with Ernan Baldomero, Aklan, March 23, 2011.

[43] Police
filed charges against Baldomero in 2005 and 2007 alleging involvement in
killings and arson allegedly perpetrated by the NPA. Police records indicate
that Baldomero was “neutralized” when he was arrested on August 18,
2005, indicating that they believed he was an NPA member: Undated document
entitled, “MUG SHOTS” and “BIOGRAPHICAL PROFILE”
obtained from the Philippine National Police on March 22, 2011, on file with
Human Rights Watch. The charges were dismissed. A relative and colleague also
spoke of a “tit for tat” between a military commander from the 47th
IB’s civil military operation and Baldomero over the radio station, just
weeks before he was killed, in which the military official spoke of Baldomero,
as a Bayan Muna leader, being a legal front of the CPP-NPA and a communist
terrorist. Human Rights Watch interview with a relative, “Rosita,”
and an activist colleague, George Calaor, provincial chair of Bagong Alyansang
Makabayan (BAYAN), Aklan, March 22, 2011.

[50] Human
Rights Watch interview with PO3 Ricardo Lopez, Nueva Ecija, February 26, 2011. The
task force comprised several agencies, including police representatives from
various stations and the CIDG, together with the NBI.

[55] It is
difficult for the families to identify precisely when their relatives went missing
because they would often go to the farm for some days. The Deliguer family only
realized Renato was missing after he did not return home after more than a
week.

[78] Human
Rights Watch interview with a relative of Kulot, Davao del Norte, March 12,
2011. This relative told how Kulot had been engaging in various criminal
activities and had become a problem for the family and the community, so they
sent him off to the NPA to learn discipline. After less than a year, in 2009,
he defected to the Philippine Army and had been working with them until he was
killed in December 2010.

[110] The police
spot report states: “The gunmen were unidentified but believe[d] to be
members of the New People’s Army under the command of Roberto Castillote
AKA Kumander Marvin of Front Committee 51:” Note from Maj. Demetrius
Emuardo Taypin, Police chief inspector, Sta. Cruz, Davao del Sur, February 27,
2011.

[125] Human
Rights Watch interview with a representative of the 702nd IB, Nueva
Ecija, February 26, 2011. Several community members said that the military
takes notice of the people that do not attend the pulong-pulong.A soldier explained, “Of course, the soldiers will notice who
is not around.... If they are not around, of course they will make an extra
effort to talk to that person.”

[127] Human
Rights Watch interview with a relative of Ladera, San Agustin, Surigao del Sur,
March 15, 2011. A barangay official said, “If the NPA comes and
asks me for food, I give it. But if I don’t have it, we don’t give
it.” Human Rights Watch interview with a barangay
official, place name and date withheld.

[136] The
commission said, “There is certainly evidence pointing the finger of
suspicion at some elements and personalities in the armed forces, in particular
Gen. Palparan, as responsible for an undetermined number of killings, by allowing,
tolerating, and even encouraging the killings.”Independent Commission to Address Media and Activist Killings,
“Report,” January 22, 2007, p. 53. A subsequent letter from the
commission to the government went on to say, “That there was a marked
increase in the incidence of killings in all the areas where General Palparan
was assigned—which he admitted—should be enough to justify his
investigation. Indeed, General Palparan’s statements and cavalier
attitude about the killings should have warranted early on at the very least
administrative or disciplinary actions by his superiors.” Letter from
Jose A. R. Melo, chairman of the Melo Commission, to Eduardo R. Ermita,
executive secretary, August 21, 2007, p. 3.

[137] Human
Rights Watch interviews with P/C Insp. Carlos Lacuesta, Guihulngan chief of
police, Guihulngan, March 21, 2011 and SPO2 Samuel Cañete, Manila, April
21, 2011. Cañete said that the request sought various details about the
two identified suspects, in particular their personal and duty details, duty,
appointment and assignment status, and issued armaments.

[141] Human
Rights Watch interview with police investigator Joel Lumakang, Mawab, March 15,
2011. Memorandum from PO1 Joel D. Lumakang, investigator, to Compostela Valley
provincial police director, November 6, 2010. Armed men killed Felisilda in
Mawab, Compestela Valley, in Mindanao on September 9, 2010. Human Rights Watch
was unable to visit the remote area in Mawab where Felisilda was killed by the
time of this writing because of ongoing fighting between the AFP and the NPA.

[145] Human
Rights Watch interview with several members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of
Surigao del Sur Committee on Laws, Justice, and Human Rights, March 14, 2011.

[146]Edita
Burgos v. Gloria Macapagal Arroyo et al., G.R. No. 183711, Investigation
Report submitted by Commissioner Jose Manuel Mamaug, March 15, 2011, p. 8. In
April 2007, armed men abducted Jonas Burgos in broad daylight from a mall in
Quezon City. Burgos’ mother, Edita, petitioned the court for a writ of
amparo—a habeas corpus-like procedure in which state agencies are
compelled to reveal to the court the whereabouts of named persons, disclose
documentary evidence or allow court-authorized searches of premises. In 2010,
the Supreme Court ordered the Commission on Human Rights to investigate
Burgos’ “disappearance,” and report back to it. In June 2010,
Edita Burgos filed with the Justice Department charges of arbitrary detention
against the military personnel identified in the report, including Maj. Harry
Baliaga, Jr., Lt. Col. Melquaides Feliciano, Col.
Eduardo Ano and several unidentified soldiers. At this writing, the department
is considering the complaint.

[147] UN
Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial,
summary or arbitrary executions, Addendum: Summary of cases transmitted to
Government and replies received, A/HRC/8/3/Add.1, May 30, 2008, p. 319.

[154] 9th
Public Affairs Office, AFP, Investigation Report, August 7, 2006; Affidavit of
Maj. Ernest Marc Rosal, October 6, 2006. The August 7, 2006 report of the 9th
ID concludes that on August 3, 2006, Pfc Lordger
Pastrana encountered undetermined number of SPARU elements; “he was able
to draw his firearm however he was killed by the SPARU.” SPARU is the
term used for the Special Partisan Unit of the NPA.

[160] Human
Rights Watch interview with the wife of an extrajudicial killing victim, place
name and date withheld. The family is canvassing for witnesses that they can
later present to the police.

[161] Human
Rights Watch interview with a relative of Guevarra, place name and date
withheld; a relative of R. Rodriguez, place name and date withheld; a relative
of Baldomero, place name and date withheld; a friend of Labrador, place name
and date withheld.

[162] Human
Rights Watch interview with the father of an extrajudicial killing victim,
place name and date withheld.

[165]
European Union police expert Bo Astrom has confirmed that he also found that
investigators had not collected evidence—other than the most
obvious—and regularly did not seek advanced forensic examination of
evidence collected.

[166] Human
Rights Watch interview with a police investigator, place name and date
withheld.

[169]
Benjamin Bayles was killed on a national highway during a busy period, in front
of many witnesses. However, the police did not canvass for witnesses. All of
the witnesses to be presented in the trial were identified by the private
prosecutors in the case. Human Rights Watch interview with private prosecutor
Atty. Ben Ramos, March 18, 2011.

[171] Human
Rights Watch interview with Romel Morales, CIDG, investigating the killing of
Estacio, Bataan, February 24, 2011. This case is not discussed above as Human
Rights Watch research indicated that it does not fit the pattern of an
extrajudicial killing and did not find evidence of security force involvement
in the killing. On July 12, 2010, a masked gunman killed Josephine Estacio, a
teacher, outside the school at which she was teaching in Balanga City, Bataan.
Estacio was not associated with any leftist organization. Police investigators
are yet to identify a motive behind this killing.

[172]
Resolution, Balanga City Police v. Alfredo Alipio, NPS Docket No.
III-02-INV-10H-00102, November 23, 2010; Case file, shown to Human Rights Watch
during an interview with Investigator Canare, Bataan,
February 24, 2011. A photograph of this process shows only the enlarged ID
picture of Alipio, posted on a wall, with the witness pointing to it, rather
than a photo board showing several possible suspects. The investigator
maintains the photo board showed photographs of several people.

[175] For
instance, in one case colleagues of the victim told Human Rights Watch,
“The NBI is asking for at least 100,000 pesos as a primer to start to
investigate the case.” Human Rights Watch interview with several
colleagues of an extrajudicial killing victim, place name and date withheld.

[179]
Police Officer Deris said, with respect to the killing of Carlo Rodriguez, that
the chief of the investigation who had handled the case had been transferred,
so she and other investigators had to wait to consult a new chief before
continuing the investigation. Human Rights Watch interview with PO2 Lilly Ann
“Leah” Deris, Calamba City, February 22, 2011.

[180]
Investigators did not visit the crime scene in the cases of Quirante, Tamondez,
Felisilda, Deliguer, or Ladera. The Dejos family also said that investigators
did not visit the crime scene, though the local police chief disputes this.
Human Rights Watch interviews with Carlos Lacuesta, Guihulngan chief of police,
Guihulngan, March 21, 2011; PSI Allan Reginald L. Basiya, Mawab Officer in
Charge, Mawab, March 15, 2011; Porciso Tamondez, Davao del Norte, March 12,
2011; Hipolito P. Deliguer, San Agustin, Surigao del Sur, March 15, 2011; and a
relative of Ladera, San Agustin, Surigao del Sur, March 15, 2011.

[195]
According to barangay officials, no one by the names of either of the
suspects reside at the barangays where they claimed they lived. Human
Rights Watch interview with private prosecutor Atty. Ben Ramos, March 18, 2011.

[200]
Memorandum from SPO1 Virgilio D. Parcon, Himamaylan City Police Station, to
Police Regional Office 6, February 25, 2011. For further discussion of this
case, see above Failure to Pursue Evidence of Military
Involvement. The sub judice rule does not
prevent police from continuing investigations and filing further information
with prosecutors.

[202]
Memorandum from P/Supt. Nestor Barba Dela Cueva, officer in charge, Calamba
City Police Station, to PD, Laguna PPO, November 23, 2010. PO2 Lilly Ann Deris
said, “Our assumption [is that Rodriguez was killed] due to a personal
grudge as this is far different to an EJK [extrajudicial killing]. When it is
an EJK, the assailant usually only had one or two shots.” Deris went on
to say that Rodriguez has been labeled a womanizer because they recovered
photographs of him with several women on his cell phone. His colleagues,
however, suggest that many of these photographs came from an evening work
gathering all taken during one night. Human Rights Watch interview with PO2
Lilly Ann Deris, Calamba City, February 22, 2011.

[203]
Rodriguez’s colleagues said, “Caloy was lending his talents to
other unions in southern Tagalog, to help them negotiate…. His specialty
[was assisting] in developing collective negotiating agreements.” Human
Rights Watch interview with several colleagues of Carlo Rodriguez, Calamba
City, February 22, 2011.

[204] Human
Rights Watch interview with a relative of an extrajudicial killing victim,
place name and date withheld.

[214] Human
Rights Watch interview with a relative of an extrajudicial killing victim,
place name and date withheld.

[215]On July 19, 2006, Danilo Hagosojos was riding home in Sorsorgon,
Bicol, on his motorbike with his seven-year-old daughter when he was shot
multiple times in the chest and head by two unidentified assailants. This
killing has not been thoroughly investigated and no charges have been filed.
Human Rights Watch, Scared Silent, pp. 41.

[216] Human
Rights Watch interview with a police investigator, place name and date withheld.

[223] Human
Rights Watch interview with a local government official, place name and date
withheld. Human Rights Watch has changed the names used in this statement; Ka
Ben was not the name used. The term Ka is short for comrade, used as part of
NPA noms de guerre.

[224] On
October 27, 2010, at about 5 p.m., the witness was three armed men in fatigues
visited the witness and threatened her. Complaint Police Blotter of Himamaylan
City Police Station, Entry No. 2010-3016, Page No. 0182, October 29, 2010.
Affidavit of Vilma E. Tejada, February 10, 2011.

[238]Telephone conversation with Att.
Martin Meñez, acting program director, Witness Protection Program,
Department of Justice, July 4, 2011. Meñez said that other government
agencies had been reluctant to cooperate with the Justice Department in
changing the identity of witnesses, despite provision for this in RA 6981.
Therefore, the department has proposed legislative change to enable the
secretary of justice to order relevant government agencies to take the
necessary steps to effect changes of identity. The bill proposing this
legislative change has been passed by the House of Representatives but remains
before the Senate.

[239] Human
Rights Watch interview with a local government official, place name and date
withheld.

[240] Human
Rights Watch interview with a couple in witness protection, place name and date
withheld.

[248] On January 29, 2010, Robert Woo was convicted of murder, as an
accomplice, for the May 2005 killing of radio commentator Klein Cantoneros. On
April 29, 2009, Joy Anticamara was convicted for the July 2006 murder of radio
broadcaster Armando Pace. In March 2009, Rafael Cardeño was convicted
for the December 31, 2001 murder of reported whistleblower and Young
Officer’s Union spokesperson Baron Alexander Cervantes; Jaime Centeno,
Joseph Mostrales, and Erlindo Flores had been convicted in August 2004. In June
2008, Joel Flores, formermilitary at the time of murder, was convicted
for the May 16, 2006 murder of Bayan Muna Secretary-General Jose Doton. In
October 2006, Gerry Cabayag, Randy Grecia, and Estanislao Bisamos were
convicted for the March 2005 murder of journalist Marlene Esperat. In January
2006, Edgar Belandres was convicted for the November 2004 murder of Allan
Dizon, a photographer for The Freeman. In November 2005, Guillermo
Wapili, a formerpolice officer was convicted for the May 2002
murder of radio commentator Edgar Damalerio.

[249]International
Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance
(Convention against Enforced

[250]
Office of the Provincial Prosecutor, Legazpi City Atty. Ruben M. Azanes v.
Ernest Marc P. Rosal and Arnaldo L. Majares, Resolution, June 8, 2007; Office
of the Regional State Prosecutor, Region V., Sonia Sta. Rosa v. Ernest Marc P.
Rosal et al., Resolution, November 9, 2007; Human Rights Watch interview with Sonia
Santa Rosa, Bicol, September 7, 2009. About an hour after 10 armed men entered
Santa Rosa’s home and abducted him, and about 30 minutes after his wife
had heard nine gunshots, local police found two bodies by the a nearby
stream—Santa Rosa and a man wearing a balaclava over his face, carrying
an AFP identification card in the name of Corporal Lordger Pastrana. Sonia
Santa Rosa later identified Pastrana by the clothes he was wearing as the
leader when the men entered her house. In Pastrana’s possession, police
found a mission order marked “SECRET” from the 9th Military
Intelligence Battalion, signed by Major Ernest Marc P. Rosal, for Pfc. Lordget
Pastrana, authorizing him to carry a .45 caliber Llama pistol from July 1,
2006, until September 30, 2006. They also found a .45 caliber Llama pistol with
silencer and with one magazine loaded was found near Pastrana’s body. The
evidence suggests that Pastrana may have been shot by accident by another
member of his team while either he or another team member attempted to execute
Pastor Santa Rosa. PNP, Daraga Municipal Police Station, Shooting Incident at
Brgy. Malobago, Daraga, Albay, resulting [in the] Death of Isais Sta. Rosa,
August 21, 2009.

[258] Human
Rights Watch interview with Carlos Lacuesta, Guihulngan chief of police,
Guihulngan, March 21, 2011. Lt. Col. Bitong has publicly blamed the NPA for
Quirante’s killing, without citing any evidence for this conclusion.
Philippine Army Public Affairs Office, “NPA’s Killings Up by 150%
as Army Appeals to Rebels: Spare the Civilians,” October 13, 2010, http://www.facebook.com/note.php?note_id=164828943542528
(accessed April 19, 2011). See also, Pro-Democracy Movement, “Man killed
in Guihulngan,” http://www.facebook.com/topic.php?uid=113621142013721&topic=228
and “NPA killings up 150% in Negros, Army says,” http://www.facebook.com/topic.php?uid=113621142013721&topic=234
(accessed April 19, 2011).

[260] Regional
Trial Court of Tarlac City, Branch 65, in Criminal Case No. 14419 People of the
Philippines v PFC Roderick dela Cruz a.k.a. Joshua dela Cruz. On June 6, 2006,
Judge Viliran, Regional Trial Court, Tarlac City, issued a warrant for his arrest,
specifying that he was not eligible for bail. Police did not serve the warrant,
so on December 14, 2006, the court ordered that the case be archived
“without prejudice to reactivation upon the apprehension of the accused
as the accused are still at large notwithstanding the lapse of six months since
the order of arrest was issued.” At this time an alias arrest warrant was
issued.

[265] Human
Rights Watch interview with Concepcion Empeño, Manila, October 13, 2009.
Empeño told Human Rights Watch what happened when she found out that the
writ of amparo had been granted: “I brought the newspaper [to the police
station], it was on the front page of the newspaper. I was so very happy at
that time. I said to the police, ‘The military are going to release her
and there is already an order from the court of appeals.’… I was so
happy—but nothing has happened.”

[274] Cadapan’s
mother told Human Rights Watch, “I do not know how to continue my search
now. I am just waiting for the decision of the court. That’s my life,
waiting for the decision.”Human Rights Watch interview with
Erlinda T. Cadapan, Manila, October 13, 2009. On May 4, 2011, the families of
Cadapan and Empeño filed with the Justice Department charges against
Ret. Maj. Gen. Jovito Palparan Jr., for rape, arbitrary detention, serious
physical injuries, maltreatment of prisoners, grave threats, and grave
coercion. At this writing, the department is considering these charges.

[278] The
commission does not have a regional office in Autonomous Region of Muslim
Mindanao (ARMM). Instead, the offices of Regions IX, X, and XII in Mindanao
cover certain provinces in ARMM.

[279] For
example, the central office actively investigated the 2007 enforced
disappearance of Jonas Burgos, including by identifying and interviewing an AFP
witness. The CHR has recommended that the Supreme Court direct the Philippine
Army to produce Burgos and that the Justice Department file criminal charges
against several soldiers. However, this investigation was only completed after
the Supreme Court referred the case to the CHR, following a petition for writ
of amparo, nearly four years after Burgos disappeared. And the CHR, which the
Supreme Court had asked to report within 90 days, sought three extensions of
time, totaling almost six months. Edita Burgos v. Gloria Macapagal Arroyo et
al., G.R. No. 183711, Investigation Report submitted by Commissioner Jose
Manuel Mamaug, March 15, 2011.

[280] Human
Rights Watch interview with relatives of an extrajudicial killing victim, place
name and date withheld. The CHR office that investigated was Region III.

[291] The
overall deputy ombudsman, Orlando C. Casimiro, is currently acting ombudsman.
He is also covering the vacant offices of deputy ombudsman for Luzon and deputy
ombudsman for military and other law enforcement offices. The president is to
appoint the ombudsman from a list of at least six
nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council. At this writing, the
Judicial and Bar Council has not submitted this list to the president. The
ombudsman shall serve for a term of seven years without reappointment.
Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, 1986, secs. 8-11.

[292] Comprehensive
Agreement on Respect for Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law
(CARHRIHL), between the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and the
National Democratic Front of the Philippines, including the Communist Party of
the Philippines and the New People’s Army, August 7, 1998, part 5.

[293] The Joint
Statement of GPH-CPP-NPA-NDF at the Conclusion of the Current Round of Peace
Talks in Oslo, Norway, February 21, 2011, http://gphndfpeacetalks.wordpress.com/2011/03/08/joint-statement-of-gph-cpp-npa-ndf-at-the-conclusion-of-the-current-round-of-peace-talks-in-oslo-norway/
(accessed May 6, 2011).

[294] The
duty to try and punish those responsible for grave violations of human rights
has its legal basis in such treaties as the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights (art.2); and the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel,
Inhuman and Degrading Treatment or Punishment (arts. 4, 5, and 7).

[295]International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), adopted December 16, 1966, G.A.
Res. 2200A (XXI), entered into force March 23, 1976, art. 2. The Philippines
ratified the ICCPR in October 1986.

[302]
Ibid., art. 4. The Declaration on Enforced Disappearances also includes
provisions intended to reduce the likelihood of enforced disappearances and
resolve ongoing cases.

[303]Command responsibility and its
elements are well-established under customary international law. See
International Criminal Court for the former Yugoslavia, Delalic and Others, Judgment,
IT-96-21-T, Nov. 16, 1998, sec. 333. See e.g., Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court, art. 28; First Additional Protocol of 1977 to the
Geneva Conventions, art. 86(2). The Convention against Torture in articles 4
and 16 provide that superior officials may be found guilty of complicity or
acquiescence if they knew or should have known of torture or ill-treatment
practiced by persons under their command. See Manfred Nowak and Elizabeth
McArthur, The United Nations Convention Against Torture: A Commentary (Oxford:
Oxford Univ. Press, 2008), p. 248.

[304] 1987 Constitution
of the Republic of the Philippines, art. III, sec. 12.

[312]Republic
Act No. 6713 of the Philippines, sec 5: Duties of Public Officials and Employees.
“In the performance of their duties, all public officials and employees
are under obligation to (a) Act promptly on letters and requests. All public
officials and employees shall, within fifteen (15) working days from receipt
thereof, respond to letters, telegrams or other means of communications sent by
the public. The reply must contain the action taken on the request.”

[316] The
president signed Republic Act No. 9851 of the Philippines into law December 11,
2009. Section 10 provides, Responsibility of Superiors. “In
addition to other grounds of criminal responsibility for crimes defined and
penalized under this Act, a superior shall be criminally responsible as a
principal for such crimes committed by subordinates under his/her effective
command and control, or effective authority and control as the case may be, as
a result of his/her failure to properly exercise control over such
subordinates, where:

(a) That superior either knew or,
owing to the circumstances at the time, should have known that the subordinates
were committing or about to commit such crimes;

(b) That superior failed to take all
necessary and reasonable measures within his/her power to prevent or repress
their commission or to submit the matter to the competent authorities for
investigation and prosecution.”

[318]At a
meeting with then Justice Secretary Agnes Devanadera in October 2009, at which
time Republic Act No. 9851 remained before the Congress, Justice
Department officials told Human Rights Watch that command responsibility is relevant only to disciplinary proceedings.Human Rights Watch meeting with Agnes Devanadera,
Secretary for Justice, Rolando B. Faller, Chief of Staff, Department of
Justice, Atty. Nestor Mantaring, NBI Director, Undersecretary Ricardo
Blancaflor, Task Force 211, Leo Dacera, Director, Witness Protection, Manila,
October 20, 2009.Then Chief
Prosecutor Jovencito Zuño said that command responsibility is not really a theory in criminal
law in the Philippines. When asked whether he would consider bringing a test
case, utilizing ordinary principles of criminal responsibility in conjunction
with international humanitarian law principles of command responsibility, he said
he might, but he was concerned that then even the president may be a commander.
Human Rights Watch meeting with Chief Prosecutor Jovencito
Zuño, Manila, October 21, 2009.

[319]
Executive Order 226, Institutionalization of the doctrine of “Command Responsibility” in all
Government Offices, Particularly At All Levels Of Command In The Philippine
National Police and other law enforcement agencies, sec. 1 provides: “Neglect
of Duty Under the Doctrine of ‘Command
Responsibility.’” Any government official
or supervisor, or officer of the Philippine National Police or that of any
other law enforcement agency shall be held accountable for “Neglect of
Duty” under the doctrine of “command responsibility” if he
has knowledge that a crime or offense shall be committed, is being committed,
or has been committed by his subordinates, or by others within his area of
responsibility and, despite such knowledge, he did not take preventive or
corrective action either before, during, or immediately after its commission.”

Criminal Investigation and Detection Group; the
investigatory arm of the PNP

CPP

Communist Party of the Philippines

DPWH

Department of Public Works and Highways

DSWD

Department of Social Welfare and Development

IB

Infantry Battalion

ID

Infantry Division

NBI

National Bureau of Investigation; a civilian investigatory
agency under the Department of Justice

NDFP

National Democratic Front of the Philippines

NPA

New People’s Army; military wing of the CPP

PNP

Philippine National Police

Purok

Territorial enclave inside a barangay, especially
in rural areas

Sangguniang Bayan

Legislature of municipal governments

Tricycle

A motorcycle with a sidecar on a third wheel for carrying
passengers

Waiting shed

An open, sheltered structure built along most roads in the
Philippines, where people wait for public transport

Summary

Armed
men [in military uniforms] entered the house and immediately began beating Toto
with their rifles. They beat him continuously; he was trying to escape …
but they kept pulling him back and beating him…. Then they shot him.

—“Jaime,”
a witness to the October 1, 2010 killing of leftist activist Rene Quirante

Cases of extrajudicial killings need to be solved, not just
identify the perpetrators but have them captured and sent to jail.[1]

—Benigno Aquino III, June 1, 2010, then Philippine
president-elect

It is almost four years now. My family is living in agony.
It is torture on my part, financial, emotional, psychological. The only normal
part of my life now is the abnormality around my daughter Karen’s
disappearance.

—Concepcion Empeño, whose daughter was
allegedly abducted by soldiers on June 26, 2006, and has not been seen since

On the morning of July 5, 2010, Fernando Baldomero became
the first reported victim of an extrajudicial killing under President Benigno
Aquino III’s newly minted administration.

Baldomero—the provincial coordinator of the leftist
Bayan Muna political party, and a town councilor in Lezo, Aklan
province—was leaving home to take his 12-year-old son to school when a
gunman approached, aimed a .45 caliber pistol at the 61-year-old, and shot him
in the head and neck before fleeing on a motorcycle.

Two decades earlier, Baldomero had been a member of the New
People’s Army (NPA), the armed wing of the Communist Party of the
Philippines (CPP), but had left the NPA following his release from prison in
1994. Police and the military had continued to tag Baldomero as an NPA member.
In the days before he was killed, several witnesses had seen men in military
uniforms around Baldomero’s residence.

Charges have been filed against the alleged gunman, a
civilian, but police have not pursued evidence of military involvement. Nor
have they executed the court’s January 10, 2011 arrest warrant, leaving
the alleged gunman at large.

During his campaign for president, Benigno Aquino III
pledged to end serious violations of human rights in the Philippines. Yet since
taking office on June 30, 2010, the Philippine military continues to be
implicated in apparently politically-motivated extrajudicial killings—deliberate
unlawful killings by state security forces—and enforced disappearances.
These abuses persist in part because of the Philippine police’s failure
to conduct thorough and impartial investigations, particularly when evidence
points to military involvement. The ability to bring the perpetrators to
justice has also been hindered by the Justice Department’s inadequate
protection program for witnesses, who have been subject to harassment and
intimidation.

Human Rights Watch has documented seven extrajudicial
killings implicating the military and three enforced disappearances of leftist
activists since Aquino took office. We were not able to investigate several
other suspected extrajudicial killings reported by local media due to time
constraints. In addition to recent abuses, this report also examines the
government’s lackluster efforts to investigate and prosecute serious
human rights violations perpetrated during the last decade, and the
state’s continuing failure to hold perpetrators accountable.

Baldomero’s
killing has a familiar ring to it. Like many of the victims of killings and
“disappearances” detailed in this report, Baldomero was a leftist
activist. Some, like Baldomero, were previously members of the CPP-NPA.
However, in none of these cases is there evidence they were still NPA members
or actively participating in combat at the time of the killing.

Like Baldomero, several victims were killed or abducted in
front of witnesses, either when gunmen entered the victims’ property and
shot them in cold blood, or shot them from atop motorbikes. The perpetrators
either wore civilian clothes with bonnets (balaclavas), or wore military
uniforms and made no attempt to hide their faces. In several cases there is
evidence that soldiers worked with members of paramilitary
forces—primarily the Citizen Armed Force Geographical Unit
(CAFGU)—or paid military “assets,” including “rebel
returnees” (former NPA members).

The military appears to have targeted several of these
victims as CPP-NPA members because of their involvement with leftist
organizations, work on land reform, or opposition to military presence in their
communities. The military operating in areas affected by the NPA conflict often
considers all leftist organizations to be fronts for the armed group and any
individuals who oppose military presence to be NPA members.

For more than four decades the NPA has engaged in an
insurgency against the Philippine government, with their armed strength at its
peak in the mid-1980s. In addition to attacks on government military targets,
the NPA has claimed responsibility for killing—among others—civilians,
government officials, and tribal leaders allegedly associated with the
military, in violation of international humanitarian law (the laws of war).
They have also unlawfully executed military personnel and others considered to
be “enemies of the people” after conviction by so-called
People’s Courts or Hukumang Bayan. NPA attacks on civilians and
mistreatment and execution of all persons in custody are serious violations of
the laws of war. Those who carry out or order such abuses are responsible for
war crimes.

The Philippine government has a duty and obligation to
protect the population from insurgent attacks. However, abuses by insurgents
never justify violations of the laws of war or human rights violations by
government security forces. This includes extrajudicial killings and enforced
disappearances of any person, including alleged members of political groups and
civil society organizations that are deemed to be sympathetic to the
insurgents’ cause.

A former soldier, “Ricardo” (not his real name),
gave a detailed account of military structure and practices. He told Human
Rights Watch he had been ordered to kill and “disappear” leftist
activists from the late 1990s until about 2007. Ricardo spoke of how senior
military commanders ordered him to kill leftist activists and hide or burn the
bodies, and how the military had trained him and his fellow soldiers to make
targeted killings look like the NPA’s Special Partisan Unit (SPARU) had
perpetrated them, by using a .45 caliber pistol and wearing bonnets
(balaclavas), thought to be favored by the NPA. While much of Ricardo’s
account could not be independently confirmed, his information seemed credible
based on its consistency and detail.

Extrajudicial killings have long been a problem in the
Philippines. Hundreds of members of left-wing political parties, political
activists, critical journalists, and outspoken clergy have been killed or
forcibly disappeared in the Philippines during the past decade. The military
and police, as well as paramilitary forces, have been implicated in many of
these killings. As a result of international and local pressure, the number of
extrajudicial killings has dropped since 2007, but they still occur with
impunity. To date, there have been only seven successfully prosecuted cases of
extrajudicial killings, resulting in the conviction of 12 defendants. There has
not been a single conviction of active military personnel at the time of the
killing. No senior military officers have been convicted either for direct
involvement in these violations or as a matter of command responsibility.

The public rhetoric of senior military officers has changed
somewhat since Aquino took office—one need only drive along Epifanio
Delos Santos Avenue (EDSA) in Manila to see the “I am a soldier and a
human rights advocate” sign outside the headquarters of the armed forces
at Camp Aguinaldo. But this change in language has not yet been reflected in
action, such as improved military cooperation with investigating authorities,
comprehensive internal investigations of implicated military personnel, or
increased openness within the military structure. In the recent cases
documented by Human Rights Watch, the military continues to deny all
allegations of soldiers’ involvement in extrajudicial killings and other
serious abuses, despite evidence to the contrary.

Police investigations into alleged extrajudicial killings
and enforced disappearances are woefully inadequate. Several core aspects of
investigations are often disregarded by investigators, including effectively
examining crime scenes and canvassing for witnesses. Investigators routinely
fail to pursue evidence of military involvement and the absence of military
cooperation exacerbates this problem. Witness protection is rarely provided,
and where it is the protection program is inflexible.

Longstanding problems of the criminal justice system are
exacerbated in human rights cases, where victims and witnesses may justifiably
fear retribution from soldiers. Despite official orders requiring prosecutors
and police to work together in order to ensure that a strong case is presented
to court, such cooperation remains extremely unusual. Once a case is filed in
court, hearings occur only at monthly intervals. Often they are less frequent,
with some breaks lasting several months, so that trials typically last for
years. Court delays and a judicial hesitancy to act when the authorities are
implicated in crimes have also hampered the Supreme Court writs of amparo and
habeas data, which were designed to compel military and other government officials
to release information on people in their custody, thereby preventing
“disappearances.”

The widespread impunity enjoyed by perpetrators of
extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances in the Philippines is
exacerbated by the inadequacies of institutions charged with promoting human
rights and accountability, including the Department of Justice, the Commission
on Human Rights, the Ombudsman, and the Joint Monitoring Committee. The Joint
Monitoring Committee is specifically tasked with implementing an agreement on
human rights and international humanitarian law between the government and the
National Democratic Front of the Philippines (NDFP), including the CPP and the
NPA.

Abusive behavior by security forces persists when
perpetrators are not held accountable for their actions. Curtailing human
rights violations requires more than new policies and senior officials
committed to reform; it requires that would-be perpetrators know that they will
go to prison and their careers will end if they order or participate in serious
abuses. The Philippine government should adopt effective measures to end
extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances, hold perpetrators
accountable, and prevent them from recurring.

Key
Recommendations

To
the Philippine Government:

Investigate and prosecute all those responsible in each case of
extrajudicial killing and enforced disappearance detailed in this report.

Issue an executive order directing police and National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI) investigators to vigorously pursue crimes allegedly
committed by the military, or themselves be subject to disciplinary measures.

Communicate fully to all military personnel that officers and
soldiers who provide evidence or testimony in cases of human rights violations
will be eligible for witness protection and other measures to ensure their
safety.

Order the inspector general and the provost marshal of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines (AFP) to investigate and report publicly within 90
days on the involvement of military personnel in extrajudicial killings, and to
identify failures within AFP investigative agencies to prosecute officers under
principles of command responsibility.

Order the military to cease targeted attacks on civilians, to
cease the practice of denying military involvement in all extrajudicial
killings, and to cease labeling leftist groups as fronts for the CPP-NPA, which
places group members at considerable risk.

Take all necessary measures, including reforming the witness
protection program, to ensure the safety of survivors of serious crimes,
witnesses, and families of victims and witnesses before, during, and after
trial.

Submit a bill to Congress that prohibits and protects against
enforced disappearances and ratify the International Convention for the
Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance.

To Donors and External Partners,
including the United States, European Union, Japan, and Australia:

Publicly press the Philippine government to investigate and
prosecute members of the military for extrajudicial killings, including those
liable under command responsibility. Diplomats based in Manila should closely
monitor Philippine government investigations of individual extrajudicial
killing and enforced disappearance cases.

Full recommendations—of both a general nature and with
respect to specific cases—appear at the end of this report.

Methodology

This report is based on Human Rights Watch research in the
Philippines from February to April 2011. Researchers travelled to the provinces
of Agusan del Sur, Aklan, Bataan, Batangas, Compostela Valley, Davao del Norte,
Davao del Sur, Laguna, Negros Occidental, Negros Oriental, Nueva Ecija, and
Surigao del Sur, and to Davao City to investigate recent alleged extrajudicial
killings and enforced disappearances.

Human Rights Watch conducted a total of 45 interviews with
victims of abuses, their family members and friends, and eyewitnesses. Many
were reached by referral from local community groups. We spoke with multiple
sources to verify the veracity of statements.

Human Rights Watch interviewed 16 police officials, 11
military officers, and three public prosecutors. We also spoke to barangay and
other local officials.

One of the most detailed accounts of military structure and
practices came from a former soldier. “Ricardo,” not his real name,
told Human Rights Watch that military officers had ordered him to kill and
“disappear” leftist activists from the late 1990s to about 2007. He
died of natural causes during the course of this research.

Human Rights Watch spoke with more than two dozen local
human rights activists, academics, lawyers, and journalists who have been
looking into extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances for many years
and who, in many cases, were able to provide corroborating evidence.

Human Rights Watch has also drawn on its own past research.
Since August 2009, we have researched the progress of government investigations
and prosecutions into more than 20 targeted killings and enforced
disappearances perpetrated between 2004 and 2010 in several provinces
throughout the Philippines. In the course of this research, researchers
interviewed more than 50 victims of abuses, their family members and friends,
and eyewitnesses in Bicol, Central Luzon, and Negros.

Interviews were conducted in English or in Tagalog, Cebuano,
Ilonggo or Bikol with the aid of interpreters. The names of many interviewees
have been withheld for security reasons, and pseudonyms used for those
repeatedly quoted. Where pseudonyms are used the name is given in quotation
marks. Wherever possible and in the majority of cases, interviews were
conducted on a one-on-one basis. None of those interviewed received payment.

In May 2011, Human Rights Watch sent letters to the
Philippine officials listed below to obtain data and solicit views on
extrajudicial killings:

Hon. Leila de Lima, secretary of the Department of Justice

Gen. Eduardo Oban, Jr., chief of staff of the Armed Forces
of the Philippines

Raul M. Bacalzo, director general of the Philippine
National Police

Officer-in-Charge,
deputy ombudsman for Military and Other Law Enforcement Offices

Human Rights Watch also sent a letter to the Central
Committee of the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP). One of the letters
to the government and the letter to the CPP is attached as an appendix. The
rest of the letters are posted on the Philippines page of the Human Rights
Watch website: www.hrw.org.

At this writing, Human Rights Watch has received a response
from the Ombudsman’s office, which is attached as an appendix. Future
responses will be posted on the website.

I. The Philippine Context

The
Communist Insurgency, Government Response, and Peace Talks

Killings and enforced disappearances in the Philippines
occur in the context of a four-decade-long communist insurgency that affects
many of the country’s 80 provinces.

The New People’s Army (NPA) is the armed wing of the
Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP), which since 1969 has been engaged in
an armed rebellion with the goal of establishing a Marxist state.[2]
The National Democratic Front of the Philippines (NDFP) is charged with forging
alliances with so-called people’s organizations to develop a
revolutionary united front.[3]
Military estimates put the armed strength of the NPA at around 4,100
guerrillas, backed by a broad network of non-combatant
supporters.[4]
Membership in the CPP has been legal since 1992.[5]

During the course of this 42-year conflict, the CPP-NPA has
splintered with evolving and conflicting ideologies and personality
differences, leading to the creation of other communist armed groups such as
the Revolutionary Proletarian Army-Alex Boncayao Brigade (RPA-ABB) in 1992 and
the Revolutionary People’s Army (Rebolusyonaryong Hukbong Bayan, RHB) in
1998.[6]
These groups continue to perpetrate numerous serious human rights
abuses—including abductions, torture, and killings—against
suspected adversaries and ordinary civilians.

The CPP-NPA has admitted killing numerous former members,
government officials, soldiers and police officers, and civilians since its
creation in 1969. Since June 30, 2010, it has claimed responsibility for
killing or executing several civilians, government officials, tribal leaders
allegedly associated with the military, and soldiers, in circumstances that may
violate international humanitarian law.

Often, the CPP-NPA seeks to justify the killings by arguing
that a “people’s court” has condemned the victim to death
because of various crimes against the people, sometimes criminal acts such as
rape and murder, and other times spying on the NPA for the military. For
instance, on July 23, 2010, NPA members shot and killed sugar farmer Sergio
Villadar in Escalante City, Negros Occidental. The NPA, which claimed
responsibility for the killing, said it was forced to kill Villadar because he
resisted arrest after being charged before the NPA’s “revolutionary
people’s court” for a 2007 killing and involvement in several
beatings.[7]
Philip Alston, then-UN special rapporteur on extrajudicial executions, has
stated this court system “is either deeply flawed or simply a
sham.”[8]

The CPP-NPA has targeted indigenous leaders who are viewed
as allied with the military. For instance, on August 6, 2010, at around 10
a.m., approximately 30 NPA fighters reportedly ambushed several people
including Datu Ruben Labawan, the Supreme Tribal Council for Peace and
Development, which is affiliated with the AFP, in Paquibato district, Davao
City. Labawan was travelling with two soldiers, his wife, and other indigenous
leaders. Two soldiers, Pfc. Elansio Alonsagay and Pfc. Kimpio Labawan, together
with one civilian, Datu Enecencio Dangkay, died from gunshot wounds.[9]

The NPA has also targeted members of the Revolutionary
Proletarian Army (RPA), which broke away from the CPP in 1992 due to
ideological differences and has worked with government forces since 2000 when
it signed a peace accord with the government.[10] On November 2,
2010, NPA fighters shot and killed former RPA leader and barangay tanod
Renante Cañete in Sagay City, Negros Occidental. According to news
reports, the NPA alleged Cañete was a hired gunman used by landlords in
collaboration with the military, and that it had summoned Cañete to
resolve the complaints against him but he had not responded.[11]

Attacks on civilians and the torture or execution of any
prisoner constitute serious violations of the laws of war and may be war
crimes. The Philippine government has a duty and obligation to protect the
population from insurgent attacks. However, abuses by insurgents never justify
violations of the laws of war or human rights violations by government security
forces. This includes attacks on members of political groups and civil society
organizations viewed as sympathetic to the insurgents’ cause.

Members of the military and police
often lump members of leftist organizations, labor unions, and party-list
groups together with the NPA—frequently with deadly outcomes. Leftist
organizations in the Philippines encompass a range of views towards the
CPP-NPA, which rejects the Philippine government and constitution. Some
militant left-wing organizations support the NPA and its armed struggle, if not
openly. Other organizations share the CPP’s political ideology, or
elements of it, but advocate peaceful reform. Others fully reject the
CPP’s perspective but are still targeted by the military and police.
Since members of these groups are not NPA fighters, who are armed and
combat-ready, they are less dangerous targets of attack for the military and
police. In any case, attacks on members of leftist organizations, whatever the
extent of their support for the CPP-NPA, is unlawful under the laws of war,
unless they are directly participating in hostilities. Also unlawful is the
killing of any person in government custody, including surrendered members of
the NPA.

The
military has over the years publicly labeled a number of organizations, unions,
and party-list groups as “NPA fronts.” The affect is pernicious.
Once labeled—and the labels are hard to remove—the members of such
organizations may be the targets of government attack.

The military’s designations may reflect the whims of
individual commanders in a locale. Lt. Col. Oliver Artuz, commander of the 39th
Infantry Battalion based in Davao del Sur, told Human Rights Watch that all unions
are linked to the NPA, whose aim is to raise wages so high that companies go
out of business, thus creating more recruits for the NPA.[12]
Several military officers have labeled protesting as a form of violence.
According to one officer, “Once the organizations have been infiltrated
[by the NPA] you will notice they are being violent.... They will join mass
protests.”[13]

A police insider explained how political activism is also
misunderstood within the police force. Speaking of a recent victim of extrajudicial
killing, he said, “Some police officers have a misconception of what
[activists] are doing. They say that [the targeted person] is a traitor to the
government. But I have never heard of him being involved in a criminal act; he
just leads rallies.”[14]

Many government-targeted killings over the years had the
involvement of state-supported paramilitary forces, “vigilante
groups” such as Alsa Masa (“Masses Arise”), and
“private armies.”[15]
The official status of these forces has changed over time, but they have long
been responsible for abuses against suspected NPA members and supporters, and
other politically-motivated targets. Most notoriously, members of a private
army, along with soldiers and police, were implicated in the November 2009
massacre of 58 relatives and supporters of a political candidate and media
workers in Maguindanao on the island of Mindanao.[16]Despite this, successive Philippine governments have taken no serious
steps to dismantle or disarm paramilitary forces or militias on a large scale.
Only a few militia or paramilitary members have been prosecuted for abuses, and
even fewer military and police officers overseeing their crimes have been prosecuted.

According to government sources, in 2010 the NPA killed 176
soldiers and 11 police officers, while the government killed 141 suspected NPA
members in military and police operations.[17]

In his July 2010 State of the Nation Address, President
Aquino announced that the government was prepared to declare a ceasefire with
the CPP-NPA and resume peace talks. The CPP-NPA agreed to move toward peace
talks, but not a ceasefire. Formal negotiations between the government and the
NDFP, which negotiates on behalf of the CPP-NPA, resumed on February 15, 2011.
Both sides agreed on a general time frame for completing the draft
comprehensive agreements on the remaining items of the agenda, which include
social and economic reforms, political and constitutional reforms, and ending
hostilities and disposing of forces.[18]
They also discussed confidence-building measures, such as the release of
captured NPA/CPP members and government soldiers.[19]

Extrajudicial killings have continued since the peace talks
commenced.

The
Legacy of Extrajudicial Killings

Extrajudicial killings are an enduring problem in the
Philippines, but they received international attention in 2006 when the number
of alleged extrajudicial killings skyrocketed.[20] During the
administration of President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, who was in office from
2001 to 2010, hundreds of leftist politicians and political activists,
journalists, and clergy were killed or abducted.[21]
In 2007, the number of killings dropped significantly due to domestic and
international pressure, but killings have nonetheless continued.

Arroyo
Administration Initiatives to Address Extrajudicial Killings

In
response to domestic and international pressure, the Arroyo administration
instituted several initiatives to address extrajudicial killings, including
creating special bodies within the Philippine National Police and the
Department of Justice to investigate and prosecute political killings. While
the number of killings dropped, there was virtually no accountability for those
responsible. During Arroyo’s nine-year term, only 11 people were
convicted for politically-motivated killings, none for the abductions, and no
member of the military active at the time of the killing has been brought to
justice. These initiatives are briefly discussed below.

Melo Commission

In August 2006 Arroyo created a commission under former
Supreme Court Associate Justice Jose Melo to probe the killings of journalists
and leftist activists since 2001.[22]
The commission’s report, made public in February 2007 after much public
pressure, concluded:

There is no official or sanctioned policy on the part of
the military or its civilian superiors to resort to what other countries
euphemistically call “alternative procedure”—meaning illegal
liquidations. However, there is certainly evidence pointing the finger of
suspicion at some elements and personalities in the armed forces, in particular
Gen. Palparan, as responsible for an undetermined number of killings, by
allowing, tolerating, and even encouraging the killings.[23]

In its initial report, the commission made several
recommendations relating to command responsibility, witness protection, and the
need for thorough investigations.[24]These
reports were expanded upon in an August 2007 letter from the commission to
then-Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita, which has not been made public. Among
its recommendations, the commission called on Arroyo to investigate senior
members of the military, in particular Gen. Jovito Palparan, and order the
military to do away with its continuing “state of denial” mindset
and to stop labeling left-wing or cause-oriented groups mere
“fronts” for the CPP-NPA and “enemies of the state.”[25]

Arroyo never implemented these or the commission’s
other recommendations, nor has Aquino since taking office.[26]

Task Force Usig

In August 2006 Arroyo created Task Force Usig, a special
police body, which she charged with solving 10 cases of killings of political
activists or journalists within 10 weeks. Task Force Usig has continued to
operate beyond its 10-week mandate. In practice, it does not itself investigate
killings, but oversees the work of local investigators and monitors the status
of investigations.

Task Force 211

In November 2007, Arroyo created the Task Force against
Political Violence, known as Task Force 211. Officially, the task force was:

Created to harness and mobilize government agencies,
political groups, the religious, civil society and sectoral organizations and
the public for the prevention, investigation, prosecution and punishment of
political violence, the care and protection of people and communities
victimized and threatened with violence, and the promotion of a culture opposed
to violence and for the advancement of reconciliation and peace.[27]

In practice, however, Task Force 211 interpreted its mandate
as limited to killings, excluding enforced disappearances and other forms of political
violence, and operated with a small staff simply monitoring the status of
certain alleged extrajudicial killings. For instance, it refused to investigate
the enforced disappearance of Sherlyn Cadapan and Karen Empeño in
Bulacan, Central Luzon on June 26, 2006, even when an eyewitness had testified
that the military had detained, tortured, and most likely killed them.

During
Task Force 211’s tenure, it has looked into more than 200 cases, 53 of
which were classed as having progressed through the justice system and four in
which convictions were secured.[28]

In December 2010, Justice Secretary Leila de Lima created a
task force that she says has a broader mandate than Task Force 211.[29]
De Lima directed the new task force to review all reported and unsolved cases
of extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances, with the intention of
speeding up the resolution of cases with sufficient evidence and
reinvestigating cases in which the trail of evidence has gone cold.

Human Rights Desks

In 2007, the PNP and AFP each created human rights offices.
Since then, they have pledged to create such offices or human rights desks at
different levels of command to monitor and maintain records regarding personnel
allegedly involved in human rights violations.[30]The desks were not
to have an investigative function; rather, they were to maintain and analyze
records of reported violations and to provide human rights training. At their
Manila headquarters, these desks mainly seek information from the commanders in
areas where alleged human rights violations have occurred. Outside Manila, the
desks don’t appear to function. Many provincial police offices that are
meant to have such desks, do not.[31]

President Aquino’s Commitments

Benigno Aquino III was
elected president and inaugurated on June 30, 2010, after campaigning to
address extrajudicial killings, enforced disappearances, and other human rights
violations by government security forces.

Aquino has acknowledged the problems of impunity. In a
meeting with European Union ambassadors a month before his inauguration, he
said, “Cases of extrajudicial killings need to be solved, not just
identify the perpetrators but have them captured and sent to jail.”[32]
In his inauguration speech he said, “There can be no reconciliation without
justice. When we allow crimes to go unpunished, we give consent to their
occurring over and over again.”[33]

While Aquino’s language has been strong, he has not
implemented the systemic reforms necessary to stop the killings and hold
perpetrators accountable.

II. Extrajudicial Executions and Enforced
Disappearances

An
extrajudicial killing is a deliberate, unlawful killing by state security
forces. In the Philippines, there is much debate about the terminology, in
particular extrajudicial killing versus extralegal killing; but the meanings
are the same. An enforced disappearance is when an individual is deprived of
liberty by or with the state’s acquiescence, and officials refuse to
provide information regarding the victim’s detention, whereabouts, or fate.[34]Extrajudicial killings and
enforced disappearances violate basic human rights, including the right to
life, the right to liberty and security of the person, the right to a fair and
public trial, as well as the prohibition on torture and cruel, inhuman, and
degrading treatment or punishment.[35]

Human Rights Watch investigated seven apparent extrajudicial
killings and three enforced disappearances that occurred since June 30, 2010,
in which there was significant evidence of military involvement (see below).
News media have reported other possible cases during that period that Human
Rights Watch was not able to investigate due to time constraints. In three
other cases, Human Rights Watch found no evidence of military involvement;
another reported case could not be adequately investigated because of ongoing
military hostilities in the area. In all of these cases we examined the
response of police and other authorities to the killings.

The investigated cases show no consistent patterns. Several
victims were leftist activists who may have been killed because of perceived
association with the New People’s Army (NPA), while others appear to have
been ordinary farmers involved in land disputes with local officials. In one
case local politics was at issue.

A former soldier, “Ricardo,” told Human Rights
Watch that commanding officers of his battalion ordered him to carry out
several extrajudicial killings during his time in the Philippine Army from the
mid-1980s to the mid-2000s. While much in Ricardo’s account could not be
independently confirmed, his information seemed credible based on its
consistency and detail.

Ricardo said army intelligence had determined that the
targets were working for the NPA. He said that in 2005, an officer in the
army’s 8th Infantry Division ordered him to kill Felidito
Dacut, a lawyer and Bayan Muna-Eastern Visayas regional coordinator because,
“as a human rights lawyer, he was hampering military activities.”
Ricardo said a fellow soldier shot and killed Dacut with a .45 caliber pistol
on March 14, 2005, near Tacloban City in Leyte.[36]
He said that military officers trained him to make such assassinations look
like they were perpetrated by the NPA’s Special Partisan Unit (SPARU) by
using a .45 caliber pistol and wearing bonnets (balaclavas).

“Ricardo” also said that military officers on
several occasions ordered him to help dispose of victims’ bodies. He
described one instance in 2007 at Fort Bonifacio, the Philippine Army
headquarters in Manila, where commanding officers ordered him and several
intelligence officers to put a male corpse inside a steel drum, seal it, and
place the drum in a vehicle as it was to be taken elsewhere, but he was not
aware where. He said he was unable to describe the dead man because his face
was covered with blood.

Killing
of Fernando “Nanding” Baldomero, July
5, 2010

At about 6.30 a.m. on July 5, 2010, an armed man riding
tandem on a motorcycle gunned down Fernando Baldomero with a .45 caliber pistol
outside his family home along the national highway in barangay Estancia,
Kalibo, Aklan. Baldomero, 61, had just mounted his motorcycle with his
12-year-old son, whom he was taking to school, as he did every day. An NPA
member until his release from prison in 1994, Baldomero was the provincial
coordinator of the leftist political party Bayan Muna and a town councilor in
Lezo, Aklan.[37]

Several witnesses saw men in military uniforms around
Baldomero’s residence in the days before he was killed. A witness told
Human Rights Watch that she saw a military truck parked for three consecutive
days at a waiting shed (an open, sheltered structure built along the road) just
a few meters from Baldomero’s house, about one week before he was killed.
She said that she saw the identified suspect, Dindo Lovon Ancero, standing with
soldiers, and had even teased Baldomero, “Maybe they are looking for you?”[38]

On January 10, 2011, the Aklan regional trial court issued
an arrest warrant for Ancero and several “John Does,” or
unidentified suspects.[39]
However, there is no evidence that police have pursued evidence of military
involvement. When a relative asked a police investigator why he had not pursued
leads regarding military involvement, he said, “Tigok tayo dyan”
or “We’re dead”—indicating that he thought his life
would be at risk if he investigated military involvement.[40]
The family said that the provincial police director told them that pursuing
military personnel “only complicates the investigation.”[41]
To date the arrest warrant has not been served on Ancero, despite having sworn
a counter-affidavit before a prosecutor in Mandaue City, Cebu, on August 14,
2010. The warrant has since been returned to the court.[42]

On several occasions both the military and the police had
tagged Baldomero as a current member of the CPP-NPA.[43] On
March 19, 2010, just four months before he was killed, unidentified men threw
two hand grenades into Baldomero’s ancestral home in Lezo, Aklan. While
charges were never brought against the perpetrators, a police report said the
prime suspects were political rivals of Baldomero with links to the Philippine
Army.[44]
Relatives said that motorcycles had often tailed Baldomero since he left prison
in the mid-1990s.[45]

Killing
of Pascual Guevarra, July 9 2010

On July 9, 2010, at about 4:30 pm, an unidentified man
walked onto the property of Pascual Guevarra, 78, within Fort Magsaysay
military reservation in barangay San Isidro, Laur, Nueva Ecija province
and shot him dead with a 9mm pistol.[46]
The gunman’s accomplice waited nearby on a motorcycle without a license
plate and they drove off in tandem.[47]
Guevarra was the leader of two local leftist organizations, one of which was
pressing the government to compensate farmers for land resumed by the
government for widening a road.[48]

According to the family and police investigators, an officer
of the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH) had contacted Guevarra
and asked him to stay home on the day he was killed, telling him that they
would deliver the compensation for the land resumption.[49]
While the police formed a task force to investigate this killing, the
investigation has stalled primarily, a police investigator alleges, because the
DPWH has not cooperated with the investigation. He told Human Rights Watch:

We tried to invite [the DPWH officer]; however he is very
hesitant to cooperate because he is the one implicated in the case….
[Regional, provincial, and district DPWH offices] told us that they have
created their own investigative body, however they [would not provide] any
report [as to the] outcome of the investigation…. It is
“heated,” … because they don’t want to give us the
documents we needed to file a complaint against [the suspect].[50]

Neither the police nor the NBI have investigated possible
military involvement in the killing, despite the killing taking place on a military
reserve. The military had previously tagged Guevarra’s organization as
affiliated with the CPP-NPA. A military officer from the 702nd IB
told Human Rights Watch, “In our opinion, this group is an organization
of the farmers that was being infiltrated by the NPA, the local terrorists. But
we do not [have evidence of this].”[51]

Military officers said the police had initially suspected
military involvement, but this ceased when a DPWH official was implicated.[52]
Investigators never pursued a possible military role, such as a soldier being
used as the gunman. According to military officials, officers stationed at Fort
Magsaysay did investigate the killing but there was no independent
investigation by the provost marshal or an independent unit. An officer with
the 702nd IB stationed away from Fort Magsaysay said that, “We
don’t have a special report on this … because [the killing was]
within the military reservation.”As a result, he explained, it was for
officials stationed at Fort Magsaysay to investigate. Military officials at
Fort Magsaysay confirmed the provost marshal had not been tapped to investigate
because, “It came out in our intelligence operation that no military were
involved, [so] we turned it over to the police.”

Guevarra’s relatives told Human Rights Watch that
since the killing they have answered telephone calls from unknown numbers in
which no one speaks, and received blank text messages from unknown
numbers—unusual and intimidating occurrences they interpret as a signal
not to push the investigation. Relatives have also noticed strangers passing by
Guevarra’s house at night.[53]
According to a relative, some six months after the killing, an army truck
stopped almost in front of Guevarra’s property and someone inside
photographed the house and farmland.[54]

In late August and early September 2010, farmers Agustito
Ladera, 35, and Renato Deliguer, 21, were working at their respective family
farms in barangay Mahaba, Marihatag, Surigao del Sur when military
operations against the NPA began.[55]
Both farms are remote—about a half-day walk from the center of barangay
Mahaba.

Deliguer had gone to his family farm on September 1, 2010.
He would routinely stay there for about a week at a time and the family, who
has not seen him since, initially assumed that he was unable to return home
because of the military operations.[56]

Ladera, who had been at the family farm with his parents and
brother, was waiting for abacafibers from a banana plant to dry, so he
sent his parents to evacuate first. His brother left the farm on August 28, and
Ladera said he would follow. His family has not seen him since.[57]

In early September, when the evacuees were able to return to
barangay Mahaba, Ladera’s father and brother and Deliguer’s
father went to the farms to find their missing relatives. The Ladera family
found that all belongings were secure, as if Agustito had packed everything up
and left the farm hut.[58]Deliguer’s father, Hipolito, said he saw the distinctive prints of
combat shoes around the hut.[59]
Inside the hut, he found used sleeping mats and mosquito nets that were not
returned to their proper place, and cooked rice in the pot. His family’s bolo,
or machete knife, was missing.[60]
Hipolito Deliguer said that he concluded that the military had passed the hut
and taken his son around dawn.[61]

Ladera’s father heard that the military had arrested
both Ladera and Deliguer, so he went to San Isidro, Marihatag, a place where he
knew the soldiers would have passed, to ask people if they had seen anything.
He said a local resident told him that soldiers had tied up and gagged two men.
Another person told him that soldiers had taken the two men to the military
camp.[62]
Someone else told Hipolito Deliguer that a man was in police custody.[63]

The families have visited the military camp and police
station several times asking for their relatives. A police officer said to
Hipolito Deliguer, “Maybe your son went to the mountains and joined the
NPA.”[64]
Soldiers at the military camp in Dayo-an, Tago, said that they had arrested
someone from San Isidro and San Pedro, but not from Mahaba, and did not allow
the relatives to see the arrested men.[65]

Both families reported to the police that the men were
missing, but at no time did the police visit any of their residences or farms
to investigate.[66]
A police report dated October 8, 2010, recommended that the police “be
given ample time to conduct [a] thorough and in depth investigation.”
However, when interviewed in March 2011, neither the chief investigator nor the
police chief could speak of any steps taken to investigate since this date,
indicating that no further steps had been taken since October 2010.[67]

In the police report, the police superintendent wrote:

There were unconfirmed reports also that the two missing
persons could be possible members of the CTs [Communist Terrorists] operating
in the area and might have been casualties in the recent encounters in the area
where the military were conducting intensified and large scale operations.[68]

Chief Investigator Joel Vertudazo, reading from a more
detailed police report, said that perhaps the “casualties had already
been buried by the NPA without informing the families, in order to [avoid]
discouraging other recruitees.”[69]

The families sought the help of Governor Johnny Pimentel of
Surigao del Sur and the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, the provincial legislature.[70]
On October 4, 2010, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan Committee on Laws and Justice
and Human Rights in Surigao del Sur met to discuss the missing men.[71]
The commanding officer of the 36th IB did not respond to a request
to appear.[72]
The Sangguniang Panlalawigan also sent requests to the police and regional
National Bureau of Investigation, among other government bodies, to investigate
the case. At this writing, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan has not received a
response from any of these agencies.

Killing
of Reynaldo “Naldo” L. Labrador, September 3, 2010

In the early evening of September 3, 2010, two men
approached Reynaldo “Naldo” Labrador’s home in Paquibato
Proper, Paquibato District, Davao City in Mindanao. Labrador was a member of
the local Paquibato District Peasant Alliance (PaDiPA). Several witnesses
identified one of the assailants as Roberto “Kulot” Repe, a known
local CAFGU member. Repe allegedly kept watch while the second man entered the
house and shot and killed Labrador with a .45 caliber pistol.[73]

Labrador’s wife, Leonisa Labrador, told Human Rights
Watch:

I was doing the washing when a man called out, “Nalds,
come and receive this.” I told the man [who I did not recognize],
“He is upstairs.” The man went upstairs. Then I heard three
gunshots. My 11-year-old son went and saw his father with blood all over him.
My children and I left the house calling to our neighbors for help…. The
gunman [then] escaped.[74]

Reylun, Reynaldo’s then 10-year-old son, said that
Repe made a sign to him “not to say any word (his finger crossing his
mouth) when he was outside the house.”[75] Leonisa said the
gunman had a note, which she thought he wanted to give Labrador. Witnesses
found a note at the crime scene that read, “You are evil and you will be
dealt with.”[76]

According to the barangay captain, a neighbor saw
Repe together with a soldier from the 69th IB near
Labrador’s residence at around 2 p.m. on the day he was killed.[77]

Repe’s relative told Human Rights Watch that Repe he
had been working with the military since 2009.[78] He personally saw
Repe working with the military on two occasions, wearing full army uniform and
carrying an M16 assault rifle. The community assumed that he was a CAFGU
because he would patrol with the military in full uniform.[79] From
time to time, he would send cell phone text messages warning his relatives to
be careful of upcoming military operations. For instance, on one occasion, he
sent a message saying something like, “People in barangay Lumiad
[a nearby barangay in Paquibato district] had better watch out because
we are going to take one out.”[80]

NPA members killed Repe on November 28, 2010, which they say
was in line with a standing order from the revolutionary authorities to do so.[81]

Fearful of reprisals from seeking justice for
Labrador’s death, Leonisa moved from the family home. Neighbors said that
in October—one month after Labrador was killed—soldiers visited the
family house asking where Leonisa was and whether her children were with her.[82]

Killing
of Rene “Toto” Quirante, October 1, 2010

On the evening of September 30, 2010, after visiting his
farm, Rene “Toto” Quirante and his companion Romeo Gador sought
shelter from heavy rain in the house of a friend, Tito, in barangay Trinidad,
Guihulngan, Negros Oriental.[83]
Early the next morning, uniformed men entered the house and brutally beat
Quirante, the provincial vice-chair of the leftist political party, Anakpawis.
They then shot him dead in front of several witnesses, including children. A
witness described what happened:

Around 2 a.m. [I awoke to hear] someone banging on the door
[of the house]. They were shouting, “NPA ni!” and “NPA
ito!” [“This is the NPA”]. No one was answering. The armed
men used their rifle butts to enter the house. They saw Toto immediately and
used their rifles to beat him. They beat him continuously; he was trying to
escape to the second floor of the house, but they kept pulling him back and
beating him….

Together with others, I was trying to pull Toto onto the
second floor. When we finally succeeded in doing so, the soldiers followed and
continued to beat him…. They pulled him away from us and pushed him to
the ground floor. Then the soldiers jumped down. One soldier shouted to another
to hold on to him; then they shot him [three times].

The commander then ordered the soldiers to move, so they
left. We were very scared. We couldn’t do anything, not even shout or
utter a word.[84]

Another witness explained how she shouted, “This is
… Toto Quirante, a barangay tanod and peace officer.” But
the uniformed men continued to beat him.[85]

Several witnesses have identified the perpetrators as Dandy
Quilanan, a CAFGU member, Junel Librado, a former member of the NPA working as
a “guide” for the military, and six unidentified soldiers.[86]
One witness described the men:

They were wearing head lamps. One of them was wearing
camouflage fatigues. It had the army patch on the sleeve…. All of them
had rifles and ammunition wrapped around their shoulders…. They were all
wearing black combat shoes…. I’m very sure [Quilanan] is a CAFGU
because they patrol our area…. I know Librado as a “rebel
returnee” [a former member of the NPA working as a “guide”
for the military] because when he was still active with the NPA, from time to
time he would come to my house and ask for food.[87]

Quirante had received warnings the military was targeting
him. According to a relative, months before his death a friend who was a CAFGU
had told Quirante that four leaders of leftist organizations, including him,
were on a list of people to be “shot on sight,” and that the
military had set up ambush positions ready to “get him.”[88]
Quirante’s colleague told Human Rights Watch that during a meeting
several years earlier, Quirante said that during a military operation an army
lieutenant had warned him that the military considered Anakpawis to be an NPA
front organization and he should stop being active because his family was known
to support the NPA.[89]

On February 1, 2011, the court in Guihulngan City issued a
warrant of arrest for Quilanan and Librado.[90] At this writing,
the warrants have not been served.[91]

Since
the killing, the military has harassed the Quirante family. For instance, on
November 22, 2010, about 12 soldiers in full combat gear visited
Quirante’s relative’s home. More than a dozen other soldiers were
in the wider area. A soldier asked the relative, “Where are the firearms
that the NPA left in your house?” The relative replied, “The NPA
never left firearms in my house.” The soldier said, “What do you
want? Do you want us to kill you and all of your [family]?”[92]

Killing
of Ireneo “Rene” Rodriguez, November 7, 2010

In the early morning of November 7, 2010, two men riding
tandem on a motorcycle and wearing bonnets shot and killed Ireneo
Rodriguez, a former leftist activist, in Balayan town, Batangas province.

Days before he was killed, several armed and uniformed men
from the Philippine Air Force visited Rodriguez’s father’s home
asking for Rodriguez, who was not there.[93]At this
writing, police investigators have not questioned the soldiers who made this
visit.[94]

Several relatives and friends said the Air Force had shown
interest in Rodriguez for some years. Rodriguez’s neighbor said that he,
Rodriguez, and 11 other members of a local organization were called up to the
Air Force camp in 2004 and told they were on the “order of battle”—a
list of those considered military targets—because they were NPA
sympathizers.[95]
His father said that he heard the military had tagged Rodriguez as an NPA
member and were looking for him in about 2005, and that he went to the camp to
clear his son’s name.[96]

Another relative said that the military often approached her
in around 2002 and 2003 and asked her to encourage Rodriguez to surrender.[97]
Lt. Col. Vincent Incognito, the commander of the 730th Combat Group,
Philippine Air Force, confirmed to Human Rights Watch that Rodriguez “is
one of the ‘target’ personalities, one [of] the sympathizers of the
NPA.”[98]

In recent years, Rodriguez had been less active with leftist
organizations. A relative said that about two months before he was killed,
Rodriguez would frequently receive text messages from different numbers saying,
“Ang galling monce magtago” (Hiding yourself pretty well).[99]

Lieutenant Colonel Incognito told Human Rights Watch that
his soldiers had visited Rodriguez to try to convince him that the “time
for a change is now.”[100]
He said:

And that’s all. We are doing it in front of other
people so that others may see that we frequent the area and that’s
it.… If we want him killed why would we visit him? … Of course we
could be the one suspected of killing him.[101]

Rodriguez’s relatives have received threatening text
messages since his death. One relative received a message saying, “Good
morning. Your time is near, be careful, I’ll wait for you in Balayan.
Sorry, but this is both of your payment [you and Rene], hehehe, okay,
bye.”

Enforced
Disappearance of Alfredo Bucal, November 10, 2010

On November 10, 2010,
tricycle driver Alfredo Bucal passed by a joint Philippine Air Force and
Philippine National Police checkpoint in barangay Lutal, Tuy, Batangas. The
authorities allege that he was driving his tricycle (a motorcycle taxi with a
sidecar) in convoy with another tricycle driver and that both were carrying
passengers who were NPA members. According to witnesses, the military took him
into custody. His family has not seen him since.

A government official told Human Rights Watch that a witness
told him that he had seen uniformed Philippine Air Force personnel capture
Bucal, drag him to a vehicle, and force him inside. The official said, “I
am afraid that if I get involved, the Philippine Air Force might come and get
me.”[102]
A witness who had initially agreed to testify in court proceedings against the
Air Force told the family that she would no longer do so as she was afraid for
her life after soldiers threatened her.[103]

The day after Bucal went missing, relatives searched for him
and found the tricycle impounded at a police station. Police officers told the
family that there had been an “encounter”—that is, a
firefight with the NPA—so to inquire after Bucal at the Air Force camp.
At the camp, an Air Force lieutenant initially joked with the family, saying
“Don’t worry, if he’s with us, surely he’ll be eating
some choice food.” The family asked to speak to the commanding officer
but was denied; instead the same lieutenant told family members that while
there had been an encounter, they did not have Bucal in their custody.[104]
Police and military officials have acknowledged that two alleged NPA members,
Roberto Garcia and Tomas Sitag, were killed during an encounter at an Air
Force/PNP checkpoint in barangay Lutalon November 10, and a
third person escaped.[105]

At this writing, government agencies have not conducted any
independent investigation into this incident. Relatives told Human Rights Watch
that when they visited a Commission on Human Rights office in San Pablo City,
Batangas, staff said that they could not assist because of an internal issue,
directing them instead to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the national
organization of lawyers.[106]

Killing of Rudy and Rudyric Dejos,
February 27, 2011

On the afternoon of February
27, 2011, unidentified assailants killed Rudy Dejos, age 50, and his adult son
Rudyric, age 26, at their farmhouse in Santa Cruz, Davao del Sur. Rudy, a
tribal chieftain, held several leadership positions in the community, including
barangay human rights officer.

Rudy’s body showed signs of torture. Mercy Dejos,
Rudy’s wife and Rudyric’s mother, described the scene she
encountered on returning to the farmhouse at about 5 p.m. on February 27, after
selling vegetables in town:

I saw droplets of blood. When I walked around the corner, I
saw the bodies of my husband and son. My husband was lying with open wounds on
his chest and neck…. His fingernails were removed…. His forearms
were scratched like his arms had been tied up…. His chest was bruised as
if he had been beaten with the butt of a rifle. My son, Rudyric, was curled up
on his side and I could see bullet wounds on his back with exit wounds on his
upper chest…. I then fell unconscious.[107]

A note was left in a box, a short distance from the house
where the men were killed, which read: “The NPA killed you because your
wrongdoings against the NPA were already too much.”[108]
However, the family does not believe that the NPA are behind the killing as
they had not threatened or harassed Rudy or Rudyric in the past and aside from
this note, there is no evidence of NPA involvement in the killing. According to
the family, the NPA has denied killing the two men.[109]
The police immediately blamed the NPA for the killing, before gathering any
evidence.[110]
At this writing, the police have not filed charges.

Prior to the killing, according to Rudy’s wife,
soldiers from the 39th Infantry Battalion of the Philippine Army had
on several occasions threatened and harassed Rudy. Mercy said that in June 2010
soldiers visited the farmhouse, accused Rudy of being an NPA, and tried to
encourage him to surrender and join the Barangay Defense System, a
military-allied community defense force. One of the soldiers threatened Rudy,
saying, “You are too proud. If we’re able to find you, we will skin
you.”[111]
Later that year, on December 4, armed soldiers surrounded the family house in
the main area of Santa Cruz while Rudy was watching television. Irene,
Rudyric’s wife, heard someone yell, “You NPAs come out!” She
then heard what sounded like a gunshot. Sgt Morales of the 39th IB said
that he had received a text message saying the NPAs were in the area and that
the presumed gunshot was merely a firecracker. He apologized to Rudyric for the
incident later that day, after the Dejos family filed a complaint at the barangay
hall.[112]

Officers and soldiers from the 39th IB
intimidated the Dejos family in the days following the killings. Human Rights
Watch witnessed more than 20 soldiers armed with M16s and pistols present at
the March 9 funeral march. One soldier filmed the march, while another took
still photographs.[113]
Lt. Col. Oliver Artuz, the commander of the 39th IB, said that they
attended the march fully armed because NPA members were participating, and were
filming and taking photographs for documentation purposes.[114]
Officers also visited the wake.[115]

III. Military Failure to Address Extrajudicial Killings

The Philippine military has repeatedly denied allegations of
soldiers participating in extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances,
is uncooperative with civilian investigations into military involvement, has
not reformed policies and practices that foster an environment in which such
abuses are tolerated, and does not adequately investigate via internal military
mechanisms abuses in which soldiers are implicated.

Since President Aquino assumed office on June 30, 2010, the
rhetoric of some senior military officers has changed. For instance, in July
2010, Brig. Gen. Francisco Cruz, head of the armed forces civil relations
service, stated in relation to the families of victims of extrajudicial
killings that, “We deeply empathize with their loss and we offer the
highest degree of cooperation to help resolve these cases. The AFP [Armed
Forces of the Philippines] firmly asserts that these violent incidents run
contrary to its stance on human rights as the cornerstone of all its
operations.”[116]

However, this change in language has not been reflected in
improved military cooperation with investigating authorities, comprehensive
internal investigations of implicated members of the armed forces, or increased
openness within the military structure. One soldier told Human Rights Watch,
“You’ll never get information [about extrajudicial killings] from
within the service as mishandling of confidential information [is treated
harshly].”[117]

A former soldier, “Ricardo,” told Human Rights
Watch that when he tried to stop an extrajudicial killing in 2000, a military
officer accused him of being a rebel for sympathizing with the victims. The
military officer told him, “I will kill you because you are also a
rebel.”[118]
Such behavior sends a clear message to soldiers not to question even clearly
illegal conduct of other military personnel. There is little evidence that
senior military officers have tried to change this message.

Military Labeling of Civilians as NPA
Members

The trouble began when the
military entered Maco [a town in Compestela Valley province, Mindanao]. They
said they had come to help build schools, improve the water system, and provide
medical care. But since they arrived, they have not done any of this. Instead
the military has been calling on civilians and tagging them as NPAs.

The AFP Internal Peace and Security Plan (IPSP) “Oplan
Bayanihan,” which went into effect in January 2011, stresses the
importance of “winning the peace.” Community-based peace and
development efforts, along with meaningful engagement of the local community,
are core elements of this strategy.[120]
While this strategy appears to be an attempt to improve relations between
civilians and security forces in conflict-affected areas, Human Rights Watch
research has found little change in military operations in the field. The
military still fails—both in its words and actions—to differentiate
between the armed NPA and NGOs and political parties that may espouse some
elements of communist or other leftist ideology. Several officers told Human
Rights Watch that in their view military practice had not changed since January
2011 when Oplan Bayanihan was launched.[121]

When asked how the military identifies CPP-NPA members when
they enter a community, a officer said, “Immediately when the soldiers
arrive in the barangay, those [people] that have violent reactions [are
identified as allied with the CPP-NPA]; if they don’t want the soldiers
there immediately [when they arrive].”[122] There is a
widespread belief in the military that the only reason that community members
would oppose a military presence is because they actively support the CPP-NPA.[123]

The officer said the military then typically conducts
information-gathering in the locale. This involves conducting community
seminars known as pulong-pulong and talking to residents to find out
which people belong to what organizations.[124] Failing to attend
the pulong-pulong invariably gets noticed by the military.[125]
The officer continued:

Once we identify an organization or person, we talk to
them. When we talk to them most will admit that they are supporting the NPA by
giving this ... by being the courier ... by being the one that gives
information.... Once we learn that, that they are being forced to do that by
the NPA, we ask them to take an Oath of Allegiance. [If they don’t take
the oath,] we just tolerate him.... But if we know that he is being visited by
the NPA we conduct operations…. We just monitor them.[126]

Human Rights Watch was told of several incidences in which
soldiers threatened and harassed civilians because military informants
allegedly identified them as providers of food or shelter for the NPA. But as
one civilian said, “We were in the mountain, so if the NPA asked for
help, then we would help.”[127]
Whether civilians provide food or shelter to the NPA because they are scared of
NPA retribution, because of Filipino hospitality, or because they are NPA
supporters, should not make them subject to military threats, harassment, or
assault. Should they be implicated in a criminal offence, the authorities
should arrest and charge them.

A resident of Paquibato district, a rural area in Davao
City, told Human Rights Watch of one such incident:

Early in the morning one day, I was planting coconut trees
when I felt an M60 [machine gun] placed on my shoulders, pointing to my neck. A
soldier asked, “Who is inside your house? Where is the NPA?” I
said, “My family.” The soldier then went inside my house and my
wife followed him. I was punched with a closed fist in my stomach. I asked,
“Why did you do that to me?” He said, “We have seen NPAs in
the area and in your house.” I said, “Maybe you just saw my
children?” Soldiers were also pointing their guns at my children. He
said, “I don’t believe you.”[128]

Soldiers, paramilitary members, and “rebel
returnees” working with the military have continued to refer to an
“order of battle” and similar lists in threatening ways. According
to the government, “an ‘order of battle’ is a compilation of
data on various threat groups … which aims to better understand the
strengths and weaknesses of these threat groups and to anticipate their future
actions.”[129]
Philip Alston, then-UN special rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary, or
arbitrary executions, reported that in a leaked order of battle provided to
him—the authenticity of which he had no reason to doubt—hundreds of
prominent civil society groups and individuals were listed as members of organizations
that the military deemed “illegitimate.”[130]

For example, several residents in the Paquibato district of
Davao City said that they saw the army carrying a list when accompanied by a
rebel returnee whom they assumed had become a CAFGU. According to a former barangay
captain, the rebel returnee told several people in the community that he had
seen the “list” of the 69th IB. He would threaten
members of the community, saying, “You’d better watch out or
you’ll be included in the list.”[131]The
residents believed the list was of people to be targeted for having links with
the NPA.[132]

Military’s
Denial of Involvement in Extrajudicial Killings

The highest ranks of the military have consistently denied
responsibility for extrajudicial killings, rather than recognizing the gravity
of the problem, investigating how and why the military is involved, and holding
perpetrators accountable, regardless of rank. Less than a week after the 2010
killing of Fernando Baldomero, armed forces spokesman Brig. Gen. Jose Mabanta
reportedly said:“Certainly we are not involved in that…. We all
know that in the leftist organization, purging from within has always been
instituted or is a strategy of the underground armed organization.”[133]
More broadly, Mabanta has said: “The performance of our duty is hindered
when our personnel are faced with human rights violations…. [M]ost human
right violations are in the line of duty.”[134]

At the lowest ranks, the military has created an environment
in which foot soldiers have readily participated in killings of leftist
activists. A military insider told Human Rights Watch that even if the local
commander did not give the order to kill, “he knows of everything”
and will protect his soldiers.[135]
Soldiers have also been paid as hired killers, acting on behalf of private
interests or other government agencies.

The extent of participation by senior commanding officers in
the killing of leftist activists—and how far up the chain of
command—is less clear. There is much evidence of involvement of certain
senior officers, most prominently now-retired Gen. Jovito Palparan. As early as
2004 the House of Representatives’ Committee on Civil, Political and
Human Rights recommended that Palparan be relieved of his position and
investigated for his involvement in the killings. The Arroyo government’s
Melo Commission also recommended that the Justice Department investigate his
involvement.[136]

Failure to investigate and prosecute perpetrators in the
military sends a message that killing leftist activists is allowed and an
acceptable part of counterinsurgency operations.

Military
Failure to Cooperate with Police and Other Inquiries

The military has not cooperated with police investigations
in the cases that Human Rights Watch investigated.

For instance, in relation to the September 2010 killing of
leftist activist Rene Quirante, the Guihulngan police chief, Carlos Lacuesta,
said the military failed to respond to a formal request for information about
the two identified suspects—one of whom is an alleged paramilitary
member, the other an alleged military “asset”—or provide any
information to assist in identifying the six accused, unidentified members of
the Philippine Army.[137]
Lacuesta said that police investigators had not formally interviewed any
soldiers. The police have attempted to determine what military operations were
being conducted that night, but the military claims that no operations took
place.

At the same time, army investigators from the 11th
IB interviewed the police investigator about the case.[138] The
outcomes of the army investigation have not been shared with the police.[139]
Even more concerning, Lacuesta described the close, informal military and
police relationship, saying “[Lt. Col. Bitong, commander of the 11th
IB, and I are] friends and can have a casual talk about [the killing].”[140]

In the September 2010 killing of Vicente Felisilda in the
Compostela Valley of Mindanao, police are investigating reports that a CAFGU
member whose father was allegedly killed by Felisilda some years earlier had
killed Felisilda out of revenge.[141]
The police investigator sought a copy of the log book, which indicated that
this CAFGU member was on duty at the time of the killing, but the commander of
the 72nd IB would not release it, saying it is necessary for the
army’s defense if charges are filed at a later date.[142]

The military has also failed to cooperate with local
government inquiries. For instance, on October 4, 2010, the Surigao del Sur
Sangguniang Panlalawigan Committee on Laws and Justice and Human Rights met to
discuss the late August, early September 2010 forcible disappearances of Renato
Deliguer and Agustito Ladera.[143]
The commanding officer of the 36th IB was invited to shed light on
what happened, but he did not appear.[144] Nor did he send a
representative or explain his non-appearance.[145]

The military’s lack of cooperation with civilian
authorities extends to the very top. Despite a Supreme Court order that
required the AFP chief to provide to the Commission on Human Rights all
evidence that may be relevant to the case of Jonas Burgos, the military judge
advocate’s office refused to provide certain documents. To do so, he
said, would “sanction a fishing expedition conducted at the expense of
military personnel whose names will be unnecessarily dragged into
[question].”[146]

The military’s failure to cooperate with police
investigations is an old excuse for inaction by police investigators. In June
2007, the Philippine government said, with respect to the August 2006 killing
of Pastor Isias Santa Rosa, “Police investigators are having difficulty
solving the case due to the noncooperation of the Philippine Army in the
investigation.”[147]
In this case there was clear physical evidence of involvement by military
personnel.[148]

Failure
of the Military to Investigate

The military inspector general and the provost marshal are
tasked with investigating soldiers and officers for administrative violations.
The inspector general has the power to direct a board of inquiry to conduct
such investigations.[149]
Human Rights Watch researchers have been unable to identify any case where
either offices have investigated any member of the armed forces or paramilitary
forces for alleged involvement in extrajudicial killings or enforced
disappearances.

Neither office has forwarded information suggesting it has
conducted such investigations. A letter from Human Rights Watch to the AFP
requesting clarification on the issue remained unanswered at this writing.

Several military officers said the inspector general will
only direct a board of inquiry to investigate a case when the local commander
thinks it is “a serious case.”[150] Similarly, the
provost marshal will only investigate when “tapped” by senior
military commanders to do so.[151]
Military officials at Fort Magsaysay told Human Rights Watch the provost
marshal had not been asked to investigate the Guevara killing, for instance,
because, “It came out in our intelligence operation that no military were
involved, [so] we turned it over to the police.”[152]

In practice, local military officers in the area where the
killing took place are often tasked with investigating the killing,
compromising independence since it is typically the battalion stationed in the
area that is implicated in the killing. First, a spot report is completed. Then,
often, a more detailed special report is commissioned. The AFP has not provided
Human Rights Watch with copies of any such reports to date.[153]

The military’s public statements suggest that a core
goal of these reports is to absolve implicated soldiers. In the 2006 killing of
Pastor Santa Rosa, the AFP investigation was confined to investigating the
death of a military officer whose body was found near Santa Rosa’s body
shortly after 10 armed men in fatigue uniforms abducted Santa Rosa from his
home. Santa Rosa’s wife identified the dead military officer as one of
her husband’s abductees. The report concluded the NPA was responsible,
without citing any evidence to support such a conclusion.[154]

Human Rights Watch research found only one extrajudicial
killing case in which a soldier has testified against members of the armed
forces in the last decade.

The military subjected this whistleblower—former
Sgt. Esequias Duyogan—to harassment and financial sanctions, and the
government did nothing to secure his safety from the time he came forward to
testify in 2007 until early 2011, when the Justice Department admitted him
into the witness protection program. The accused, on the other hand, has
received preferential treatment in jail.

On October 14, 2000, six friends, Romualdo Orcullo,
Jovencio Legare, Arnold Dangquiasan, Joseph Belar, Diosdado Oliver, and
Artemio Ayala, were at a barangay fiesta—a village street
party—when Army Cpl. Rodrigo Billones of the 62nd Infantry
Battalion arrested them and took them to the nearby military camp. Their families
have not seen them since.

Some years later, Duyogan came forward and told how,
following the arrests, he witnessed a dozen soldiers from his unit beat the
six young men to death with an iron rod and bury them. Three days later, they
dug up the bodies, loaded them on a service vehicle, and brought them to a
remote area where they burned the corpses. The Regional Trial Court in Agusan
del Sur in July 2008 convicted Cpl. Billones of kidnapping and “serious
illegal detention” of the six men and sentenced him to 9 to 15 years in
prison for each of the six victims. He has appealed his conviction to the
Court of Appeals.[155]

Military personnel and other unidentified individuals have
threatened and harassed Duyogan, his family, and human rights defenders
working with him on several instances since he came forward to testify.[156]
In August 2007, a military officer visited him at his Agusan del Sur home,
purportedly at the behest of the divisional commander, and offered him
200,000 pesos (US$4,600) to “go back to the folds of the
military.”[157]
Further, military officers told Duyogan that his salary, which he had not
received since he agreed to testify, was being used for Cpl. Billones’
legal defense.[158]

Despite
his conviction and sentencing for a serious offense, Cpl. Billones lives with
his wife and two children in a house outside of the fence surrounding the
Agusan del Sur provincial jail, though within the prison compound. An
official at the jail told Human Rights Watch that the jail warden, who is a
military reservist, had granted Billones this privilege out of
“camaraderie.”[159]

Granting extraordinary privileges to soldiers convicted of
serious crimes reinforces impunity and sends a message that abuses will go
unpunished.

IV. Failure to Investigate and Prosecute

I just want a thorough investigation. We don’t expect
it to be speedy…. We just want it to be thorough.

—Wife of a leftist activist allegedly killed by the
military, February 2011

The Philippine government has consistently failed in its
obligations under international human rights law to hold accountable
perpetrators of politically-motivated killings and enforced disappearances.
Victims’ families are denied justice as killers literally get away with
murder. With inconclusive investigations, implausible suspects, warrants of
arrest infrequently executed, and no convictions, impunity prevails.

Prosecutions in human rights cases are stymied by the poor
policing that affects all criminal investigations in the Philippines. But even
the most common problems will be exacerbated in cases where military personnel,
police, and paramilitary members are implicated. Police investigations into
alleged extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances are not only
woefully inadequate because of poor investigative skills and lack of capacity,
but they face the further obstacles of little will to uncover abuses by the
security forces. Many obstacles remain for those investigations that progress
to the prosecutor, including lack of cooperation between police and the prosecutor
and lengthy trial processes, all of which heighten the risks for victims and
witnesses when government officials are the perpetrators.

The government institutions charged with promoting human
rights and accountability have done little to end the widespread impunity
enjoyed by perpetrators of extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances.
Reforms to curtail “disappearances,” such as Supreme Court writs of
amparo and habeas data, which were designed to compel the military to release
information on people in their custody, have been largely ineffectual.

Poor
Policing

Instead of “to serve and protect,” [the police
logo should be] “to hide and to run.” … Justice is all we
want…. No justice just adds to the pain.

—Maridezda and Arnel Guran, parents of Rei Mon Guran,
a student activist killed in July 2006

Poor and indifferent policing, and profound public mistrust
in the government’s investigative efforts, affects all criminal
investigations in the Philippines. Several witnesses and victims’
families whom Human Rights Watch interviewed said they expect no real results
from government investigations. The wife of a victim told how her family is
slowly conducting the investigation themselves, which she feels is her only
option.[160]
In several cases, the family only had contact with the police once, often at
the wake, when they were interviewed.[161] Then, as one
relative said, “nothing more happened.”[162]
Neither police nor prosecutors regularly update victims’ families;
rather, families said, police often ask them for updates.

Police still frequently believe that it is the
families’ duty to push the investigation, and conduct only the most
rudimentary of investigations. Too often, police fail to visit and adequately
examine the crime scene. Police continue to pressure victims’ relatives
to provide information on witnesses and motives, and at times identify unlikely
perpetrators. Investigators routinely cease their investigation after
identifying one suspect, rather than pursuing accomplices, particularly those
who ordered the killing.

Since investigators do not visit the crime scene,
unqualified barangay officials or even family members collect obvious
evidence from the site of the killing, often contaminating the evidence and
interrupting the evidentiary chain-of-custody. For example, the purok
leader and barangay tanods visited the place where Julius Tamondez was
killed on August 12, 2010, to recover the body. They collected the bullet
casing and turned it over to barangay officials who wrapped it in
cellophane and kept it at the barangay hall. At some later date, the
police collected it from the barangay hall.[163] Despite
a barangay official reporting the crime to a police investigator over
the phone on the day of the killing and requesting that police investigate,
police did not visit the crime scene or interview any first responders about
it.[164]

Investigators
collect only the most obvious evidence, such as bullet casings. In each case
Human Rights Watch examined, investigators have not collected shoe marks,
cigarette butts, or phone records, and have not sought more advanced forensic
examination for obvious evidence.[165]

Some police officers blamed inadequate investigations on
lack of appropriate equipment. One investigator explained that his police
station does not own a camera and has only one patrol car, which can only be
used in the town proper.[166]
These are valid concerns and investigators should have viable transport and
necessary equipment for evidence collection, particularly cameras.

Even in cases where investigators did visit the crime scene,
they often did not invite forensic experts from Scene of the Crime Operatives
(SOCO) to assist. Several police officers explained that SOCO only gets
involved when the first responder or investigator requests their involvement.[167]
A local police chief explained that he only requests SOCO involvement after
initial processing of the evidence. However, he chose not to in the Dejos case
because the investigator was “handling the situation.”[168]
Investigators typically interview only the most obvious witnesses—family
members or eyewitnesses who come forward and present themselves at police
stations. They do not routinely proactively look for witnesses in the place
where the crime was committed. For example, a review of the police
investigation into the killing of Baldomero revealed that police did not go door-to-door
in the area canvassing for possible witnesses, even though he was killed in a
populated area along a national highway. Often, the family or private
prosecutors are expected to identify witnesses.[169]

Too
often police only file cases if a relative is willing to be a complainant. In a
November 2010 case in which the victim of an alleged extrajudicial killing was
separated from his wife, his colleague explained that police officers had told
him that, “According to law, the first dependent needs to push the
case…. If the family doesn’t push for the case the case is
considered closed.”[170] Since the wife is not doing
so, police are not actively pursuing the investigation.

In a break with this practice, the police department
investigating the July 12, 2010 killing of Josephine Estacio in Bataan filed a
case against Alfred Alipio—allegedly a member of a breakaway communist
group—saying that a witness had come forward and identified Alipio as the
gunman.[171]
However, this reform has not been institutionalized and this case presents a
questionable example as the charges were filed against an unlikely perpetrator.
Several things indicate that this witness may not actually have seen the
gunman, and the witness identified Alipio from a “photo board” that
showed only his photograph.[172]
Investigators told Human Rights Watch that the witness was under their
protective custody, but he failed to appear at a hearing called by the
prosecutor and police said that they were not concerned for his welfare.[173]
Furthermore, the tricycle driver who drove Estacio on the day she was killed
had described the gunman as wearing a mask, not that tall, and with a slightly
rounded body. Alipio is tall and well built. On this basis, the prosecutor was
“not convinced” that the new witness had positively identified
Alipio as the gunman.[174]

There is a widespread belief that families have to pay for
an investigation to be thorough. In particular, colleagues of a victim
described investigators telling them that they would have to pay money to
involve the National Bureau of Investigation in the case.[175]
In one case, the wife of a victim said that she refused to consent to having
her husband’s body autopsied because she did not have the money.[176]

There is very little oversight of police investigations and
police stations are disorganized. In one incident, the city police chief
explained that the investigator was not around and “I do not know even
where he placed the investigation folder.”[177]
In another, the deputy city police chief explained that he had only recently
been transferred and did not know where investigation folders were kept. He
said, “Usually the investigator manages his case folder” rather
than there being a central filing cabinet.[178] In cases that
Human Rights Watch examined, investigations often stalled due to a personnel
change within a police station, which is a regular occurrence.[179]

Investigations
of Extrajudicial Killings and Enforced Disappearances

Investigations
in Conflict Areas

The investigator is just like a desk officer; just making
reports from his table.

—Wife
of a human rights activist allegedly killed by the military, February 2011

In addition to the serious shortcomings that all criminal
investigations experience in the Philippines, police investigations into crimes
allegedly committed by military personnel face further hurdles. Police
investigations often rely entirely on witnesses; in several killings
investigated by Human Rights Watch, investigators did not go to the scene of
the crime at all.[180]
In others, they only examined the immediate vicinity where the body was found,
even if evidence suggested the person was killed elsewhere.

Given that killings of suspected CPP-NPA supporters often
take place in the vicinity of conflict areas between the NPA and the military,
the police’s security concerns in reaching the crime scene may be
genuine. For instance, the police officer in charge of Mawab police station
said security concerns meant that investigators could not go to the area where
Felisilda was killed. “There are a lot of land mines in the area,”
he said.[181]
In several cases, investigators instead asked the family to bring witnesses to
the police station.

The
local police chief in Guihulngan said that investigators did not visit the
scene of the crime as the area is “three or four hours walking distance
and is very hostile.”[182] The investigator said:

I wanted to go to the crime scene to collect evidence, but
no other police officer would accompany me because [they were afraid for their]
security. Also, because we have only one patrol car that can only go on the
highway, we had to rely on the mayor for transport.[183]

In other instances, police failure to investigate reflected
lack of willingness on the part of authorities to pursue a case implicating the
military. In the forcible disappearances of Deliguer and Ladera, both families
reported to the police that the men were missing. However, at no time did
police visit their residences or farms to investigate.[184] According
to a police report, the chief of police in Marihatag asked the commanding
officer of the 36th IB if the two were in military custody. He had
“no knowledge of the ‘disappearance,’” but directed his
intelligence operatives to assist in locating the missing persons.[185]
The October report recommended that the police “be given ample time to
conduct thorough and in depth investigation.” However, when interviewed
in March 2011, neither the chief investigator nor the police chief could
identify any investigative steps taken since this date.[186]

Failure to Pursue Evidence of Military
Involvement

Police routinely avoid pursuing evidence of military
involvement. A foreign police officer who has been working with Philippine
police investigators said that he had found investigations went cold as soon as
they pointed to the military.[187]
The relative of an alleged perpetrator explained that although police visit the
remote area where her husband was killed to investigate regular criminal cases,
“police distance themselves from abuses by the military.”[188]
Investigators have not formally interviewed any soldiers or commanders in any
of the cases investigated by Human Rights Watch, despite evidence of military
involvement.

This has long been a problem. “Ricardo,” the
former soldier, told Human Rights Watch that when he was ordered to kill two
alleged NPA runners in the 1990s, the police “pointed to the NPA [as the
perpetrators] since they are afraid of us (the Philippine Army)…. They
were afraid that they might be [the] next [target, if they properly investigated
the army].”[189]
He said that the police did not question any member of the military about the
killings.[190]

Police have captured and charged two alleged soldiers for
the June 14, 2010 killing of Benjamin Bayles in Negros Occidental. Police
arrested the suspects after an alert was placed for a black Honda TMX
motorcycle without a plate number, being ridden by two men.[191] Police
saw the two, arrested them, and found them in possession of unregistered
firearms.[192]
Initially, the police chief said over radio that the two accused had introduced
themselves as members of the 61st IB of the Philippine Army.[193]
The next day he withdrew this statement: the suspects now claim to be fishermen
and deny any links to the military.[194]
The registered owner of motorcycle they were riding, Pfc. Reygine Laus, is a
soldier with the 61st IB.[195] During a budget
hearing, Defense Secretary Voltaire Gazmin accepted that the accused men were Philippine
Army personnel.[196]
In addition, Bayles’ neighbor has testified that armed men in military
camouflage who introduced themselves as members of the army visited her place
and asked her about Bayles on several occasions.[197]

The police investigator has not interviewed anyone in the
military about the case. He said that his only action to determine whether the
accused are members of the armed forces was to give the case to an intelligence
officer and ask him to profile the suspects.[198] Nor has he
monitored or attempted to determine whether members of the military are
visiting the accused in jail. He told Human Rights Watch that since the jail
was “a long way away” he had no way to find out who visits them.[199]
Moreover, he said that to further investigate this case would violate the sub
judice rule—a rule that prevents people from commenting on the
outcome of a case while it is before the court.[200]

In several cases implicating military personnel, police
investigators sought to show that the motive was personal. This may have been
due to camaraderie with the military and the police force’s “with
us or against us” attitude, fear of military reprisal, or the additional
pressure and reporting obligations that local police officers face in
extrajudicial killing cases.

Investigators have claimed personal motives from seemingly
arbitrary evidence. For instance, in the case of Carlo “Caloy”
Rodriguez, union president of the Calamba Water District who was gunned down
along the National Highway in Calamba City on November 12, 2010, investigators
determined that, because he suffered multiple gunshot wounds, he was the victim
of a crime of passion fuelled by a personal grudge.[201] This
is a dubious conclusion: while police may dismiss any motive relating to a
labor dispute because several witnesses spoke of Rodriguez having a good
relationship with the general manager, the number of gunshots was no basis to
determine that the killing was “not politically motivated.”[202]

Rodriguez was affiliated with the Confederation for Unity
and Recognition Advancement Government Employee (COURAGE) and the Samahan ng
Water District Sa Buong Pilipinas (WATER), broader leftist organizations that
the military has said are connected with the CPP-NPA.[203] Police
have not investigated this potential motive.

Since President Aquino came to office, several police
investigators and local police chiefs have said that provincial and national
police headquarters have pressured them to file cases in extrajudicial killing
cases. However, families have said this pressure often unintentionally means
that investigators fail to investigate the killing thoroughly; instead, they rush
the investigation and file charges against only one of several suspects, and
pressure families to identify witnesses and—essentially—conduct the
investigation themselves and report back to police. A victim’s relative
said, “[The police investigator] was pleading because he was being
questioned by provincial and national PNP why a case hadn’t been filed.
He wanted to fast track the filing of a case as they were under such
pressure.”[204]

Task
Forces Established to Investigate Cases

In four of the seven extrajudicial killing cases that Human
Rights Watch investigated, the police established some form of a task force to
investigate. No such task forces were created in the three cases of enforced
disappearances. The task forces have had negligible effect.

In one case, an investigator explained that although
“a Special Investigation Task Group had been formed to investigate the
case, the group has just relied on me to do the work.”[205]

In several cases, the formation of the task force appears to
be little more than a public relations exercise. For example, the police formed
Task Group Baldomero the day after the killing and the day before Baldomero was
buried on July 17, 2010. The task group held a press conference to announce
that a suspect had been identified and that charges were to be filed.[206]
But the task group was active for a month at most, a relative told Human Rights
Watch, and the family “felt the pressure to file the case” before
investigators had sufficiently examined the involvement of other suspects,
particularly the military. The family said the press conference made them feel used.[207]

Hasty
Discontinuance of Investigations

In the cases of alleged extrajudicial killings that Human
Rights Watch investigated, investigations ceased once a first suspect was identified.
Perhaps because it would have meant investigating up the military chain of
command, investigators did not continue with the aim of identifying accomplices
or people who may have ordered the killing. For instance, once one of the
alleged perpetrators in the Baldomero killing was identified and police filed
charges with the prosecutor, investigators did not continue to work to identify
his accomplice, whoever ordered the killing, or to investigate reports of
military involvement. Investigators told Human Rights Watch it was now up to
the courts.[208]
In the Guevarra case, the military ceased to be suspected when a DPWH officer
was implicated.[209]
However, investigators did not continue to investigate the possibility that
military members were involved, including as the gunmen.

The October 25, 2005 killing of Ricardo “Ric”
Ramos, then-president of Central Azucarera de Tarlac Labor Union, is another
example of police discontinuing an investigation once a suspect has been
identified, and the military failing to help police identify military suspects.
In Ramos’ case, a gunman shot him twice in the head as he sat at a table
with about 20 men, killing him.[210]
On the morning of his death, Ramos had had a stern conversation with soldiers,
who were present when wages were being distributed to union workers following a
deal made during a strike. That afternoon and evening, two soldiers had visited
him three times and were sent away. Ramos had received a funeral wreath that
said “RIP Ricardo Ramos” a month earlier. The night after Ramos was
killed, the small army detachment, which had been set up about 50 meters from
where the killing occurred, was removed.[211]

Pfc.
Roderick dela Cruz has been identified as one of the soldiers that visited
Ramos on October 25, 2005, and is currently standing trial. However, there is
debate over who the second soldier was. At least three witnesses identified
Sgt. Romeo Castillo as the second solider; as such, he was included as a
respondent in the complaint.[212] He denied that he visited
Ramos at all that day and presented further evidence at the preliminary
investigation before the Office of the City Prosecutor to support this. The
assistant provincial prosecutor, Ma. Lourdes D. Soriano, recommended that he be
dropped as a party from the complaint.[213]
Dela Cruz and 2d Lt. Alberto Tolledo informed the Office of the City Prosecutor
that Sgt. Melchor Santos was the soldier who accompanied dela Cruz. Police have
not filed charges against Santos or investigated the local commander. Still,
they have classified this case as solved.

At present, the PNP does not have a central database or
method for collecting information about criminal investigations to allow for
cross-checking of evidence. The EU is set to fund the creation of such a system
in 2011.

Police
Fears of Military Retaliation

Several police officers expressed fears about investigating
alleged extrajudicial killings implicating the military. When a relative told
one investigator about witnesses seeing soldiers near where her husband was
killed, he told her to forget about the military’s involvement. “Tigok
tayo dyan” or “We’re dead” he said—indicating
that he thought his life would be at risk if he investigated military
involvement.[214]
In another case, the police told a victim’s son the “suspects are military,
but it is dangerous to investigate about the case.”[215] One
police investigator told how police officers avoid becoming involved in
investigating extrajudicial killing cases implicating the military, either out
of a belief that it is disloyal or because they fear reprisal. He said:

On the day of the killing, [the police chief called me and]
asked [me] to handle the case. Other investigators did not want to
[investigate] the case because the victim was seen as an NPA member and the
military were accused [as the perpetrators]. They did not want to [because] the
military would be unhappy with them.[216]

Colleagues have ostracized and threatened this police
officer for investigating the killing—treatment that he said is not
unusual. The officer has received several threatening text messages from
unknown numbers.[217]
He said:

[Most of my fellow police officers] have created a threatening
environment for me…. One time when I arrived at the police station, one
police officer shouted at me that I am an enemy of the state…. There is a
group influence…. I just avoid them and … do my work. One day in
the station a fellow officer said to me, “There will be a time of
reckoning because you’re going out of your way [to investigate this case].”[218]

Human Rights Watch is unaware of any police officer who
harassed or threatened investigators for working on such cases being
investigated or sanctioned.[219]
Mistreatment has at times directly interfered with investigation of the case.
In one case that Human Rights Watch investigated, someone—supposedly a
fellow police officer—stole the case folder of an extrajudicial killing
investigation from the police station. It has never been recovered.[220]

Fears
of Retaliation Against Witnesses and Victim’s Relatives

There has been harassment. They are monitoring what I am
doing… I am cautious. I fear for my life. How can I carry this? I want to
get justice. But at the same time I am scared they might go after my family.

Each witness and relative of victims that Human Rights Watch
interviewed spoke of fears for their safety. One police officer said,
“Here in the Philippines, if you talk, you will be killed.”[221]
Several police investigators said witnesses were too afraid to tell them what
they saw.[222]

A local government official told Human Rights Watch how the
military harassed someone who had witnessed military abuse. He said that the
witness:

Told me five men came to her house and [one] introduced
himself as Ka Ben [a name suggesting an NPA nom de guerre]. However, she
recognized “Ka Ben’s” face from the [incident she witnessed].
They were from the military. Ka Ben then threatened her that if she
[testified], something would happen to her family…. He said, “I am
not bluffing and very serious about this conversation.” Since then,
people have told her that people have been regularly visiting [her place].
She’s not been staying in her house since.[223]

A witness in the case filed against two alleged soldiers
regarding the June 2010 killing of Benjamin Bayles reported to police that on
November 5, 2010, she was sleeping with her six children when about 20
unidentified armed men wearing army fatigues woke her around midnight. It was
the second time that armed men in fatigues had visited and threatened her since
she had agreed to testify in an extrajudicial killing case in which the accused
were allegedly soldiers.[224]
She said one of them said to her, “Do you want me to shoot you in the
head?” while pointing a .38 caliber pistol at her.[225]

Retribution takes various forms. A witness to the November
2010 killing of Carlo Rodriguez—a security guard—was reassigned to
another place after he cooperated with the police investigation.[226]
His employer later terminated his employment, he believes, because he
cooperated with the investigation.[227]
A police investigator explained that some businesses consider it risky to
cooperate with investigations, so discourage employees from doing so.[228]

Military harassment of witnesses and victims’ families
has long been a problem in the Philippines. “Ricardo,” the former
soldier, told Human Rights Watch that he was ordered to harass witnesses and
relatives of extrajudicial killings from time to time. He said that in a case
in which a fellow soldier had been accused of shooting and killing a civilian,
a senior commanding officer ordered him and his fellow soldiers to wear
civilian clothes and fill the court room.[229] He said:
“The purpose was to frighten the complainant and witnesses so as they could
not speak.”[230]

In several cases prior to the Aquino administration that
Human Rights Watch has previously reported on, relatives of victims continue to
fear for their safety.[231]
The parents of student leader Rei Mon “Ambo” Guran—who was
killed on July 31, 2006, at around 6 a.m. on a crowded bus in Bulan,
Sorsorgon—said that when they wrote to the National Bureau of
Investigation to seek their assistance, they were told, “Our enemy is
strong.”[232]

Inadequate,
Inflexible Witness Protection

There have been improvements in the implementation of the
witness protection program since Aquino took office, but substantial reforms
are still needed.

Anyone
who has witnessed or has information about a serious crime who will testify
before any investigating authority or court may be admitted to the Justice
Department’s witness protection program, provided the testimony can be
corroborated and there is a real threat to the safety of the witness or his or
her family.[233] The witness must sign an
undertaking, among other things, to testify.[234]
Under the program, witnesses are to be provided with secure housing (until they
have testified, the threat disappears, or is reduced to a manageable level),
assistance in obtaining means of livelihood, financial assistance, health care,
and job protection.[235] When the circumstances
warrant, the witness and immediate family members are entitled to relocation
and/or change of identity at the department’s expense.[236]
Investigating agencies and the courts are to ensure speedy trials in cases in
which witnesses are in protection, with the aim of concluding the case within
three months.[237]

In practice, witnesses admitted to the witness protection
program are confined to safe houses for years on end. Although witnesses
receive financial assistance, it is limited and they have little to no ability
to earn a livelihood. In reality, trials that involve protected witnesses are
not dealt with more swiftly than others, and witnesses do not receive new
identities at the end of proceedings.[238] Justice
Department officials on occasion continue to construe the witness protection
program in an inflexible, limited way, and do not adequately assist witnesses
and families in applying for protection.

Witnesses have told Human Rights Watch that they believe
authorities will detain them under the program. A barangay official said
of a witness, “He wants to be free; he doesn’t want his life
rearranged because of witness protection.”[239] This
understanding is not far removed from the reality. One couple under protection
said, “Sometimes they let us out…. They’ve even allowed us to
plant a small garden in the yard.”[240] Witness
protection needs to address security and also economic concerns of witnesses
who do not want to leave their businesses or sources of livelihood. Several
witnesses have sought the protection of NGOs or churches. A private prosecutor
explained, “They don’t trust authorities.”[241]

Few police officers and prosecutors appear familiar with the
program, and provide incorrect or limited information about it. The chief investigator
in one case said incorrectly that the program only provides security once the
witness testifies.[242]
In a 2010 case where a child was an eyewitness to a killing, the prosecutor
claimed only the child would be protected:

As far as I know, it is the [witness] who would be
transferred to a safe-house, but certain protections would be extended to the
rest of the family. However, according to the [witness’s] mother, this
would add further trauma [for the child witness].[243]

In fact, the witness protection program would accommodate
the immediate family of a child witness. The child’s mother sought a
flexible form of witness protection that includes funding her and her
child’s relocation to another town of her choice where she has family and
the necessary support for raising a child alone. She did not want to go into a
safe house as she did not want her son isolated from society.[244]
She said that regional justice department officers told her that she would have
to accept the terms they set out for her: “This is a package…. They
told me only the DOJ can choose the place [for relocation].”[245]

The
government has provided some form of protection for witnesses or family members
of victims in only two of the recent cases that Human Rights Watch
investigated. In a positive move reflecting what was hoped to be increased
flexibility in applying protection, police provided security outside the home
of witnesses and victims’ relatives immediately after the killings in
these two cases.[246] In the Estacio case,
protection was provided for a short period as the family relocated itself, for
its own protection. However, in the Baldomero case police withdrew protection
at short notice without providing a justified reason, when the risk to the
witnesses remained high. When Human Rights Watch raised concerns about this
with the Justice Department in May 2011, the department said it had told the
family in writing that witnesses could apply for witness protection but had not
received any applications.[247]

Obstacles
to Prosecution

Prosecutions in the Philippines have long been hindered by
various obstacles, many of which affect the Philippine justice system
generally, but which appear to be exaggerated in cases involving serious human
rights violations. These include the failure of police and prosecutors to
coordinate their efforts to develop a strong case, failure of police to serve
arrest warrants, and delays throughout departmental and court processes.

Out of hundreds of killings and enforced disappearances
since 2001, there have been only seven successfully prosecuted cases, resulting
in the conviction of 12 defendants.[248]
There has not been a single conviction of active military personnel at the time
of the killing. No senior military officers have been convicted either for
direct involvement in these violations or as a matter of command
responsibility.

An
additional hurdle in “disappearance” cases is the fact the
Philippines lacks specific legislation criminalizing enforced disappearances.
Rather, these must be prosecuted under the crimes of kidnapping and unlawful
detention. The Philippines has yet to sign the International Convention for the
Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance, which outlines the
international standards on preventing and punishing enforced disappearances.[249]

Cooperation
between prosecutors and police in human rights cases appears to be the
exception rather than the norm despite several departmental orders to
prosecutors and police to work together. The recent alleged extrajudicial
killings investigated by Human Rights Watch demonstrated no evidence of real
police collaboration with prosecutors, which contributes to the lack of
prosecutions.

Two
cases that Human Rights Watch previously investigated illustrate several
obstacles to justice that arise after police file a case with the prosecutor.
Despite strong evidence of military involvement in the August 3, 2006 killing
of Pastor Isias Santa Rosa in Bicol, prosecutors have twice dismissed charges
that police filed against a military officer, citing insufficient evidence.[250] The prosecutors never worked with the
police to identify what evidence should be gathered to sustain a case that
could go to court. Nor have the prosecutors requested that police investigate
further, indicated to police what evidence is necessary, or taken an active role
in acquiring this evidence.

The
September 8, 2004 killing of Bacar and Carmen Japalali shows many of the
challenges present in even those cases that are properly investigated.

More
than 30 soldiers allegedly shot to death Bacar Japalali—a suspected
member of the Moro National Liberation Front, an ethnic Moro armed
group—and his wife, Carmen while they were asleep. Bacar’s
brother, Talib Japalali, described what he saw when he arrived at his
brother’s house: “There were bullet holes everywhere; pieces of
bone were splattered around the house.” Meanwhile, his brother’s
body still lay on his sleeping mat under his mosquito net. A soldier told
Talib that they had had to kill Bacar because he fought back. Police investigators,
including forensic experts, and the governor arrived promptly at the Japalali
residence and conducted a full investigation.

Despite
forensic evidence revealing no traces of gunpowder on the hands of the couple
and two eyewitness accounts countering the military’s response that the
deaths were the result of an armed encounter, the prosecutor dismissed the
complaint for lack of probable cause without attempting to gather additional
evidence, or informing the family.[251]
After some time, the deputy ombudsman overturned this decision, resolving to
file murder charges against 32 soldiers and referred the case back to the local
prosecutor, for prosecution.

The
Regional Trial Court judge—without a motion from the defense—downgraded
the charges to the lesser charge of homicide and dismissed the charges
against all but 8 of the 32 soldiers whom the ombudsman had said should be
charged. He delayed issuing even these eight arrest warrants. One day when
Talib went to the court to follow up on the case, he received a message that
the judge would see him. Talib said the judge told him in a private meeting,
“They’re willing to pay.” Talib answered, “I did not
come here for money; I want justice.”[252]

The
Japalali family filed a complaint against the judge with the Supreme Court. The
judge recused himself from hearing the case but has not been disciplined or
criminally charged.[253] The new judge issued the
eight warrants of arrest, however even then, arrest warrants were not served
until the family placed considerable pressure on the police and an NGO
assisted with serving the warrants. The eight have now been arrested and are
confined to the military camp. Five years later, the court is still hearing
evidence, and no new charges have been brought against the 24 soldiers whose
charges were dismissed.

Failure
to Serve Arrest Warrants

The process for serving arrest warrants does not encourage
police to take the initiative, which becomes especially problematic where the
suspect to be served is a member of the armed forces. Once a court issues an
arrest warrant, the standard procedure is that the court sends it to the police
chief, who gives it to the warrant server, a police officer solely responsible
for serving warrants and subpoenas.[254]
Within 10 days, the warrant server is required to serve the warrant and then
notify the court. A clerk of court told Human Rights Watch that if a warrant is
not served, the court will wait six months, then archive the case.[255]

In one case, after the court had issued a warrant of arrest,
the police investigator told the victim’s family to make an official
request to a certain police official to serve the warrants, because other
police stations cover the scope of the addresses of the two suspects.[256]
In another case, the clerk of the court said:

Hopefully the family of the victim is working for the
arrest of the accused. If the family has friends in the military, they can ask
them to coordinate with the police or hire a private agent. If there is no
motion from the family, [the court] has no choice but to archive [the case].[257]

The military appears to be less than willing in serious
human rights cases to assist police in serving warrants of arrest on soldiers.
The Guihulngan police chief, Carlos Lacuesta, told Human Rights Watch that his
office had provided the commander of the 11th IB, Lt. Col. Ramil
Bitong, with a copy of the warrant of arrest in the Quirante case shortly after
it was issued.[258]
However, a military officer said the “warrant hasn’t reached
us” and that it is not the military’s role to assist in the service
of warrants.[259]

In the case of the October 25, 2005 killing of labor leader
Ricardo Ramos, the police did not serve the warrant for the arrest of an army
private, Pfc. Roderick dela Cruz, for nearly two years.[260] Dela
Cruz continued to serve the army during this period and was eventually arrested
on May 21, 2008, after Task Force 211 intervened, at the armed forces
headquarters in Taguig City.[261]
Human Rights Watch is unaware of any police officers being disciplined or
prosecuted for failing to make proper efforts to serve arrest warrants in cases
of human rights violations. Nor have any military officers been disciplined for
failing to cooperate with the police. The court archived the Ramos case when
the warrant against dela Cruz was not served within six months of issuance.
Courts have similarly archived numerous cases despite strong evidence against
the accused.

Failure
of the Special Courts

In March 2007, Chief Justice Reynato Puno designated 99
regional trial courts “special courts,” with orders to resolve
extrajudicial killing cases within 90 days.[262] These courts were
mandated to hold a continuous trial in such cases, as trials in the Philippines
involve scheduling several half-day sessions over several months, with many
postponements. The trial was to be completed within 60 days of when the case
was filed in court, and judgment was to be rendered within a further 30 days.
If an extrajudicial killing case was sent (“raffled”) to a court
that was not designated a “special court,” the court was still to
comply with these guidelines. Special courts were to submit a status report to
the chief justice on the tenth day of each month. These guidelines were never
implemented.

Writ of Amparo

We did everything for their
release but nothing happened…. The last case we filed was a motion for
review in the Supreme Court [in March 2009]. Until now it has not been
resolved…

—Mother of Karen Empeño, who disappeared in
2006, October 2009. The Supreme Court handed down its decision more than two
years after the motion was filed, on May 31, 2011.

Optimism
over Supreme Court writs to compel military and other government agents to
release information about people in their custody has been dampened by the
difficulty in enforcing them and long court delays. The writs of amparo and
habeas data empower courts to issue orders to protect a person; produce
information needed to establish a missing person’s whereabouts; inspect
likely detention facilities; update, rectify, suppress, or destroy information
about a threatened person; and provide other relief to people whose right to
life, liberty, and security is unlawfully violated or threatened with
violation.[263] These remedies go beyond the
better known writ of habeas corpus, which—in a bid to overcome the
state’s blanket denial of custody—empowers a court to free a
detainee if the public body detaining the person does not prove he or she is
lawfully detained. Rather than merely ordering the release, authorities may
have to exercise great diligence to determine the missing person’s whereabouts.

In September 2008, the Court of Appeals granted writs for
the release of Karen Empeño, 22, Sherlyn Cadapan, 29, and Manuel Merino,
57, whom the military arrested in mid-2006 in Haganoy, Bulacan.[264]
The court ordered the military to “immediately release” the three
detainees[265]
Several witnesses have testified to seeing the three in military custody.[266]
Raymond Manalo, who together with his brother Reynaldo escaped military custody
in 2008, has told how he witnessed soldiers kill Merino and burn his body. He
has also told of the horrific torture and sexual violence that he witnessed
soldiers force Cadapan and Empeño to endure.[267]
Cadapan’s mother, Erlinda, told Human Rights Watch how she thinks of
Manalo’s testimony of what her daughter was forced to endure:

When I can recall [what] the military [had] been doing to
her—as a lady being hung upside down when naked and being played like an
animal, it’s really painful for me.

Despite this evidence indicating that the women are at grave
risk, as of March 2009, the court had not enforced the writs.[268]

On March 5, 2009, the Court of Appeals issued a resolution
denying the Cadapan and Empeño families’ motion to cite
respondents in contempt for failing to comply with the court’s order to
release the two women detainees. Justice Mendoza said in the resolution:

While
the Court, in the dispositive portion, ordered the respondents “to
immediately RELEASE, or cause the release from detention the persons of Sherlyn
Cadapan, Karen Empeño and Manuel Merino,” the decision is not ipso
facto [or, by the fact itself] executory. The use of the term “immediately”
does not mean that it is automatically executory. There is nothing in the Rule
on the Writ of Amparo which states that a decision rendered is immediately
executory.[269]

Further, the judge ruled that the parties’ petitions
for review stopped the decision from being final and executory.[270]

On March
30, 2009, Cadapan and Empeño’s families filed a petition for
review of this decision by the Supreme Court. The court, which took more than
two years to decide this urgent matter, ruled on May 31, 2011, that the
appellate court erred in ruling that its directive to immediately release
Sherlyn, Karen, and Merino was not automatically executed and that there was no
need to file a motion for execution in amparo or habeas data
cases—effectively removing a procedural delay in enforcing the writs.[271] The court found that the appellate court
also erred when it did not specifically name the respondents that it found to
be responsible for the abduction and continued detention of the three and named
Lt. Col. Anotado, Lt. Mirabelle, Gen. Palparan, Lt. Col. Boac, Arnel Enriquez,
and Donald Caigas as apparently responsible. “They should thus be made to
comply with the September 17, 2008 Decision of the appellate court to
immediately release Sherlyn, Karen and Merino,” the court said.[272]

In recognizing the urgency of such cases, the court said:

Since
the right to life, liberty and security of a person is at stake, the
proceedings should not be delayed and execution of any decision thereon must be
expedited as soon as possible since any form of delay, even for a day, may
jeopardize the very rights that these writs seek to immediately protect.[273]

The court did not explain its two-year delay in deciding
this matter, which further jeopardized the lives as well as the rights of
Cadapan, Empeño, and Merino.[274]

Weakness
of Human Rights Institutions

The widespread impunity enjoyed by perpetrators of
extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances is exacerbated by the
inadequacies of institutions charged with promoting human rights and
accountability, including the Commission on Human Rights, the Ombudsman, and
the Joint Monitoring Committee.

During the past several years, agencies at all levels of
government have created their own human rights mechanisms. For instance, the
PNP and the AFP have created human rights desks within their agencies.[275]
In addition, many barangay, municipal, provincial, and regional councils
have committees responsible for human rights. However, there are real
limitations, particularly at local levels. One member of a barangay human
rights committee told Human Rights Watch, “We don’t know how to do
the job. When we approach a local office, they tell us to go to other offices.
We don’t know the processes.”[276]

National
Commission on Human Rights

The Commission on Human Rights (CHR) is an autonomous
government body charged with, among other things, investigating “on its
own or on complaint by any party, all forms of human rights violations
involving civil and political rights,” and recommending prosecution when
its investigation establishes a prima facie case of a violation.[277]

In several recent cases that Human Rights Watch has
investigated, the CHR did not actively investigate the killing or “disappearance,”
did not provide updates to relatives on the status of their investigations, and
placed significant burdens on family members who were applying for compensation
from the commission. The CHR did not provide psychological support to the victims’
relatives or witnesses in any of the investigated cases.

The commission has a central office in Metro Manila, and
regional and sub-regional offices throughout the rest of the country.[278]

The commission’s effectiveness largely depends on the
personnel at the regional or sub-regional office, or whether the central office
has taken a particular interest in the case.[279] Certain directors
are proactive in investigating extrajudicial killings and enforced
disappearances, carrying on their own investigation while actively following up
with other investigating agencies; others are not. In the course of Human
Rights Watch’s research, only in one case did a family speak of the CHR
actually visiting the crime scene.[280]

In each of the cases from 2010 that Human Rights Watch investigated,
commission staff did not—on even one occasion—provide
victims’ families with an update of their investigation. Leonisa
Labrador, whose husband was killed on September 3, 2010, allegedly by a soldier
with the assistance of a paramilitary member, said, “I filed the case
with the CHR but until now I have not received an update.”[281]

Several relatives of victims said that the commission did
not actively investigate the killing or disappearance of their family member.[282]
Atty. Alberto Sipaco, Jr. of the Region XI office told Human Rights Watch,
“There is a problem of witnesses not coming into the office. People are
getting more silent.”[283]
In each “disappearance” case discussed here, the CHR has not been
at all involved in assisting the families or investigating the alleged abuse,
as is required under its mandate.[284]
Sonia Santa Rosa recounted one conversation with the Region V CHR office
following her husband’s death:

I told them that it’s their job to investigate. But
they said that they had no fare, or transport, or allowance…. Their
investigation involved recording the events; as for what action should be
taken, they did not do anything.…I asked for their help [when
I felt I was under military surveillance], but said they couldn’t do
anything.[285]

In each incident of a killing, the commission is supposed to
determine whether it was an extrajudicial killing and if so, provide the family
with 10,000 pesos [US$230] in compensation. This process often becomes an
additional burden for the victim’s family. Porcino Tamondez, whose son
was killed in Davao City in August 2010, told Human Rights Watch: “We
filed a complaint with them, but there were lots of requirements, each which
cost money [in transport] and time—they require a police report, a report
from the embalmer.”[286]
Similarly, the family of an activist killed in Negros said:

The CHR promised to give us financial help, but it’s
hard for us to process all the necessary requirements to claim the money. We
are just farmers, we live a very humble life here in the province and for us to
get the claim the money would be very tedious and very hard for us.[287]

The CHR does not provide any form of psychological support
to families of victims or witnesses. In a case in which a child witnessed the
killing, the mother said she requested counseling for her son and was told she
would have to pursue it at her own expense.[288]

On occasion, CHR employees are subject to threats and
harassment, particularly in cases in which the military or police are
implicated. One regional director told Human Rights Watch that someone called
him and advised him to “go slow,” because the suspect is a
high-ranking officer.[289]

Office
of the Ombudsman

The Office of the Ombudsman is a government body tasked with
investigating complaints filed against government officers or employees and
enforcing administrative, civil, and criminal liability.[290] Formally
independent of the executive branch and the armed forces, it is in a position
to effectively investigate allegations of abuse by local government officials and
security force personnel. However, it has a poor record when it comes to
resolving complaints brought to its attention.

Human Rights Watch had found that the Office of the
Ombudsman has done almost nothing to investigate the involvement of members of
the security forces in extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances
during the administration of President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo. It is hoped
that under the new ombudsman, not yet appointed at this writing, the office
will actively investigate cases for prosecution.[291]

Joint
Monitoring Committee

The Joint Monitoring Committee, created under the
Comprehensive Agreement on Respect for Human Rights and International
Humanitarian Law, which the government and NDFP signed in 1998, is charged with
monitoring implementation of the agreement by receiving complaints and making
recommendations to the parties. The committee is to comprise six members and
four observers, who are to be representatives of human rights organizations,
half of whom the government is to appoint, half of whom the NDFP is to appoint.[292]
It is to operate by consensus, receiving complaints of violations, requesting
investigation of complaints by the party concerned, and making recommendations.

Although the committee was formed in 2004, peace negotiations
collapsed later that year and the government was not willing to convene the
committee outside of peace talks. The government and NDFP-nominated sections of
the committee continued to operate, however, receiving complaints and making
some queries to act on them. The committee reconvened during the February 2011
formal peace talks and discussed the supplemental guidelines for the
committee’s operation, the process for consolidating complaints received
thus far, and parameters for the conduct of joint investigations.[293]

V. Legal Framework

Duty to
Investigate and Prosecute Human Rights Violations

Under international law, the Philippines has a duty to
investigate serious violations of international human rights law and punish the
perpetrators.[294]
As a state party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR), the Philippines has an obligation to ensure that any person whose
rights are violated “shall have an effective remedy” when
government officials or agents have committed the violation. Those seeking a
remedy shall have this right determined by competent judicial, administrative,
or legislative authorities. When granted, these remedies shall be enforced by
competent authorities.[295]

In accordance with the UN Principles on the Effective
Prevention and Investigation of Extra-Legal, Arbitrary and Summary Executions,
all suspected cases of unlawful killings, including in response to complaints
by relatives and reliable reports, should have a “thorough, prompt and
impartial investigation.” This investigation should “determine the
cause, manner and time of death, the person responsible, and any pattern or
practice which may have brought about that death.” The investigation
should result in a publicly available written report.[296]

The United Nations has developed guidance for the
investigation of extrajudicial executions, the Model Protocol for a Legal
Investigation of Extra-legal, Arbitrary and Summary Executions
(“Minnesota Protocol”). The Minnesota Protocol, drawing on lessons
learned from major inquiries into serious human rights violations, details
procedures for conducting investigations consistent with international law.
They include:

Where the political views, religious or ethnic affiliation,
or social status of the victim give rise to suspicion of government involvement
or complicity in the death because of any one or combination of the following
factors:

Where the
victim was last seen alive in police custody or detention;

Where the modus
operandi is recognizably attributable to government-sponsored death squads;

Where persons in the government or
associated with the government have attempted to obstruct or delay the
investigation of the execution;

Where the physical or
testimonial evidence essential to the investigation becomes unavailable.

… [A]n independent commission of inquiry or similar
procedure should also be established where a routine investigation is
inadequate for the following reasons:

The lack
of expertise; or

The lack of
impartiality; or

The importance of the matter; or

The apparent existence of a
pattern of abuse; or

Complaints from
the family of the victim about the above inadequacies or other substantial
reasons.[297]

The
Philippines has not signed or ratified the 2006 International Convention for
the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance, which sets out
specific standards on preventing and punishing enforced disappearances.[298] The convention is based on the 1992 UN
Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearances.[299] Enforced disappearances are a grave threat
to the right to life and violate many fundamental rights, including the right
to liberty and security of the person and the right not to be subjected to
torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment.[300]
States should “take effective legislative, administrative, judicial or
other measures to prevent and terminate acts of enforced disappearance”
in their territory.[301] Acts of enforced
disappearance should be criminal offenses punishable by penalties that take
into account their extreme seriousness.[302]

Individuals who order extrajudicial killings or enforced
disappearances can be held criminally liable. In addition, under international
principles of command (or superior) responsibility, superior officers can be
held criminally liable for the actions of their subordinates, when the superior
knew or had reason to know that their subordinate was about to commit or had
committed a crime, and the superior failed to take necessary and reasonable
measures to prevent the crime or to punish the perpetrator.[303]

Philippine
National Law

In line with international standards, the Philippine
Constitution guarantees fundamental human rights, including the right to life,
liberty, and security of person, the right to a fair trial, and a prohibition
against torture.[304]

Most abuses detailed in this report would be covered by
criminal offenses found in the Philippines criminal code, including murder,
kidnapping and serious illegal detention, and arbitrary detention.[305]

The Anti-Torture Act of 2009 criminalizes “torture and
other cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment,” and provides
remedies and redress for victims of torture.[306] It prohibits
secret detention places, solitary confinement, incommunicado, or other forms of
detention where torture may be carried out with impunity.[307] As
a preventative measure, it requires the PNP and the AFP to make an updated list
of all detention facilities under their jurisdiction together with information
on persons detained.[308]
Although partly addressed by other offenses, there is no specific crime of
enforced disappearance in the Philippine criminal code.

Duties of
Law Enforcement Officials and Prosecutors

Under Philippine law, police have a duty to protect lives
and property, investigate and prevent crimes, arrest criminal offenders, bring
offenders to justice and assist in their prosecution, and exercise powers of
arrest, search, and seizure in accordance with the law, among others.[309]
PNP guidelines further detail the duties of police officers in crime scene
investigations, including interviewing witnesses, gathering physical evidence,
and arresting suspects, among other tasks.[310]

The Philippine Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for
Public Officials and Employees mandates that all government employees,
including police officers, attend to the problems of the public promptly.[311]
The code further specifies that public officials have a duty to respond to
letters and requests by the public within 15 working days of receipt.[312]

Under
Administrative Order 181 of 2007, the National Prosecution Service is directed
to work closely with police and NBI investigators from the start of a criminal
investigation into an extrajudicial killing until the termination of the case
in court, and the PNP and NBI are directed to consult with prosecutors at all
stages of such investigations.[313] This order provides that a
separate prosecutor should undertake the preliminary investigation of the case,
to protect the independence of this process. In determining whether a killing
is a political offense, agencies are to consider the political affiliation of
the victim, the method of attack, and reports state agents are involved in the
commission of the crime or have acquiesced in them.[314]
This order was never implemented in the absence of implementing rules and
regulations.

Further,
Administrative Order 249 of 2008 provides that the Department of Justice is
“to exhaust all legal means for the swift and just resolution of cases of
alleged human rights violations against political and media personalities, and
leaders in the labor, urban poor, and agricultural sectors, and to ensure that
the perpetrators are held accountable before the law.”[315]

Command
Responsibility

Command responsibility for criminal offenses was integrated
into Philippine criminal law in December 2009 by Republic Act No. 9851.[316]
Some academics have argued that prior to the passage of this act, command
responsibility was already incorporated into Philippine law.[317]
However, to date, no superior officer has been tried as a matter of command
responsibility in the Philippines.[318]

Supervising officers can also be held administratively
accountable for neglect of duty under the doctrine of command responsibility
under Executive Order No. 226 (1995).[319]

VI. Role of the International Community

Bilateral
trade partners and donors to the Philippines should encourage the Philippine
government to vigorously investigate extrajudicial killings and enforced
disappearances, prosecute perpetrators regardless of position or
rank—including under principles of command responsibility—and
implement systemic reforms to prevent such abuses in the future.

Pressure from the international community was effective in
reducing extrajudicial killings in the Philippines in the past. In 2006, at the
height of the killings under the administration of President Arroyo, the United
States, Japan, and the European Union, among others, condemned the widespread
killings in the Philippines and pressed the government to take action. This
followed a high-profile visit from the then-UN special rapporteur on
extrajudicial executions, Philip Alston, and his subsequent report. Although
killings continued, in 2008 the numbers fell drastically to about 30 percent of
previous levels.[320]

A month after the April 2009 follow-up report by Alston,
President Arroyo abolished the Inter-Agency Legal Action Group, implementing
one of Alston’s recommendations. Alston had reported that the
inter-agency group had used prosecutions to dismantle civil society
organizations and political groups that the government deemed to be front
organizations for the Communist Party of the Philippines.[321]

Despite the positive results that its pressure had generated
in the past, the international community has been near silent on extrajudicial
killings and enforced disappearances since President Aquino came to office in
June 2010.

The US is the Philippines’ most influential ally and,
together with Australia and Japan, one of its three largest bilateral donors,
yet the Obama administration has been largely silent on extrajudicial killings.
Up until the release of the US State Department’s annual human rights
report in April 2011, the US government had failed to publicly raise military
abuses including extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances since
Aquino took office.

This silence extended to US Ambassador Harry Thomas,
Jr.’s address on April 5, 2011, at the opening of the 27th
Balikatan exercises—annual joint US-Philippines military exercises
designed to promote professionalism—which was just days before the launch
of the human rights report. As these exercises indicate, the United States
maintains considerable military ties with the Philippines. The US armed forces
have access to specified land and sea areas under a Visiting Forces Agreement.
In fiscal year for 2009-2010 the US government authorized US$32 million to be
provided to the Philippines under Foreign Military Financing for procurement of
US military equipment, services, and training. Under US appropriations law,
US$2 million is contingent on the Philippine government showing progress in
addressing human rights violations, including extrajudicial killings.[322]

Australia signed a Status of Visiting Forces Agreement with
the Philippines in May 2007; this agreement remains before the Philippine
Senate. On June 17, 2010, the Australian embassy in Manila hosted a policy
forum on human rights at which experts discussed the problem of extrajudicial
killings.

In October 2009, the EU announced a €3.9 million
(US$5.5 million) program to address extrajudicial killings and strengthen the
criminal justice system by providing training and technical assistance in
2009-2011. A considerable component of this program was directed at improving
police investigation skills. The EU’s police expert worked with
Philippine police to develop a criminal investigation manual, a field manual
for crime scene investigations, and a case management manual, to develop a
training of trainers course—pursuant to which at least two investigators
at each police station are to be trained by the end of 2011, and conducted
workshops on case management, which involved reviewing investigations of numerous
extrajudicial killings.

Ongoing plans exist to work with the Philippine National
Police to develop a new criminal intelligence system for extrajudicial killings
and enforced disappearance cases, including a national database of missing
persons corroborated with medical and dental records.

However, since Aquino took office, EU ambassadors have not
matched this investment in training with persistent advocacy for improvements.
Capacity building alone is not enough. None of the investigators have
implemented recommendations of the EU’s police expert or Task Force Usig,
which came out of the case management workshops.

The Philippine government should promptly act to investigate
and prosecute each of the extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances
outlined in this report. Outlined below are several initial steps that the
government should take in relation to each of these abuses.

Killing
of Fernando “Nanding” Baldomero, July 5, 2010

National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) investigators
should investigate military involvement in the killing of Fernando
Baldomero. In particular, they should search for witnesses who saw
soldiers around Baldomero’s residence in the days and weeks before
he was killed, and investigate threats the military made against him.

Police and NBI investigators should actively work to serve
the arrest warrant against Dindo Lovon Ancero.

The Department of Justice should act to protect witnesses
to the killing. In particular, officials in charge of witness protection
should meet with witnesses and discuss what measures can be taken, within
the confines of the witness protection program, which would be acceptable
for the witnesses and particularly the child witness.

Internal
police investigators should investigate police officers in Aklan who
refused to pursue evidence of military involvement and consider
disciplinary measures for insubordination or a criminal investigation for
obstruction of justice or graft and corruption.

In conjunction with other relevant government agencies,
including the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD), the
Commission on Human Rights (CHR) should offer the witnesses, particularly
the child witness, counseling and psycho-social support.

Killing
of Pascual Guevarra, July 9, 2010

Police and NBI investigators should investigate the
involvement of Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH) staff and
military involvement in the killing, including subpoenaing any relevant
public documents, interviewing soldiers, and compelling departmental staff
to cooperate with the investigation.

DPWH should investigate its staff for failing to cooperate
with a police investigation and, if appropriate, commence disciplinary
proceedings.

The Justice Department should discuss with the
victim’s family and witnesses any concerns about their safety and
take steps to protect them if necessary.

Police and NBI investigators should vigorously investigate
the disappearance of Agustito Ladera and Renato Deliguer, including by
interviewing all people with information about the disappearances,
canvassing for witnesses in areas surrounding the farms, questioning
soldiers who were involved in operations in the area, and having crime
scene experts examine the Ladera and Deliguer farms.

The AFP inspector general and provost marshal should
independently investigate the disappearances, publicly report findings,
and commence disciplinary proceedings against any military personnel as
appropriate.

The CHR should actively investigate the disappearances,
provide appropriate assistance to the families, and recommend to the
Justice Department any charges that should be brought.

Internal police investigators should investigate police officers
in Surigao del Sur who failed to properly investigate these disappearances
and consider disciplinary measures for insubordination or a criminal
investigation for obstruction of justice or graft and corruption.

The AFP should investigate the commander of the 36th
IB for failing to comply with a request to appear before the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan Committee on Laws and Justice and Human Rights in Surigao del
Sur on October 4, 2010, and, if appropriate, bring disciplinary
proceedings.

The NBI and police directors should investigate regional
directors for failing to respond to correspondence from the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan Committee on Laws and Justice and Human Rights and issue
directives to require personnel to comply with such inquiries in future.

Killing
of Reynaldo “Naldo” L. Labrador,
September 3, 2010

Police and NBI investigators should investigate military
involvement in the killing of Reynaldo Labrador, including by canvassing
for witnesses who saw the alleged soldier who was with Roberto “Kulot”
Repe and questioning military personnel.

The Justice Department should discuss with the
victim’s family and witnesses any concerns about their safety and
take steps to protect them if necessary.

The CHR should actively investigate the killing and threats
against the family and other residents in Paquibato district, provide
appropriate assistance to the families, and recommend to the justice
department any charges that should be brought.

Killing
of Rene “Toto” Quirante, October 1, 2010

The PNP should send an independent team to serve arrest
warrants against Dandy Quilanan, a CAFGU member, and Junel Librado, a
former member of the NPA allegedly working as a “guide” for
the military.

NBI investigators should investigate the killing of Rene
Quirante with the aim of identifying the six unidentified soldiers whom
witnesses have testified were involved in the killing.

The Justice Department should discuss with the
victim’s family and witnesses any concerns about their safety and
take steps to protect them if necessary.

The CHR should actively investigate the killing and
threats against the family, provide appropriate assistance to the
families, and recommend to the Justice Department any charges that should
be brought.

PNP headquarters should investigate why police
investigators did not visit and examine the scene of the crime, and take
steps to ensure that investigators examine such crime scenes in future.

Killing
of Ireneo “Rene” Rodriguez, November 7, 2010

NBI investigators should investigate Air Force involvement
in the killing of Ireneo Rodriguez. In particular, they should investigate
the Air Force personnel that attempted to visit Rodriguez days before he
was killed and canvass for witnesses close to where he was killed.

The AFP inspector general and provost marshal should
independently investigate the killing, publicly report findings, and
commence disciplinary proceedings against any Air Force personnel as
appropriate.

The Justice Department should discuss with the
victim’s family and witnesses any concerns about their safety and
take steps to protect them if necessary.

The CHR should actively investigate the killing and
threats against the family, provide appropriate assistance to the family,
and recommend to the Justice Department any charges that should be
brought.

Enforced Disappearance of Alfredo Bucal,
November 10, 2010

NBI investigators should
investigate Air Force and police involvement in the killing of Alfredo
Bucal. In particular, they should individually interview each member of
the police and Air Force that was present at the checkpoint in barangay
Lutal, Tuy, Batangas and investigate how Bucal’s tricycle ended
up in police possession.

NBI investigators should investigate all reports of Air Force
and police personnel threatening witnesses with view to filing charges.

The AFP and PNP inspector general and provost marshal
should independently investigate the disappearance and the shooting at the
check point, publicly report findings, and commence disciplinary
proceedings against any military and police personnel as appropriate.

Internal
police investigators should investigate police officers in Batangas who
did not actively investigate this disappearance and consider disciplinary
measures for insubordination or a criminal investigation for obstruction
of justice or graft and corruption.

The Justice Department should discuss with the
victim’s family and witnesses any concerns about their safety and
take steps to protect them if necessary.

The CHR should actively investigate the killing and
threats against the family, provide appropriate assistance to the family,
and recommend to the justice department any charges that should be
brought.

Killing
of Rudy and Rudyric Dejos, February 27, 2011

NBI investigators should investigate military involvement
in the killing of Rudy and Rudyric Dejos. In particular, they should
investigate threats made by the military against Rudy Dejos.

The AFP inspector general and provost marshal should
independently investigate the killings, publicly report findings, and commence
disciplinary proceedings against any military personnel as appropriate.
They should also investigate the 39th IB’s presence at
the Dejos’ wake and funeral march, commence discipline commanders as
appropriate, and issue directives not to attend such events other than in
exceptional circumstances.

Internal police investigators should investigate police
officers in Sta. Cruz, Davao del Sur, who did not actively investigate
these killings and consider disciplinary measures for insubordination or a
criminal investigation for obstruction of justice or graft and corruption.

PNP headquarters should investigate reports that police
investigators did not visit and examine the scene of the crime, and that
the local police director chose not to seek Scene of Crime Operatives
(SOCO) assistance and take steps to ensure that investigators thoroughly
examine such crime scenes in future.

The Justice Department should discuss with the
victim’s family and witnesses any concerns about their safety and
take steps to protect them if necessary.

The CHR should actively investigate the killing and
threats against the family, provide appropriate assistance to the family,
and recommend to the Justice Department any charges that should be
brought.

Killing
of Bacar and Carmen Japalali, September 8, 2004

The
Department of Justice should review the dismissal of charges against 24 of
the 32 soldiers accused of killing Bacar and Carmen Japalali and consider
bringing new charges.

Police investigators should investigate the Regional Trial
Court judge who dismissed charges against 24 of the 32 accused soldiers,
without a motion from the defense, for obstruction of justice or graft and
corruption.

The Department of Justice should work with the police,
NBI, and CHR to gather evidence and file charges against those that the
Supreme Court has named as apparently responsible for the abduction and
continued detention of Sherlyn Cadapan, Karen Empeño, and Manuel
Merino—being Lt. Col. Anotado, Lt. Mirabelle, Gen. Palparan, Lt.
Col. Boac, Arnel Enriquez, and Donald Caigas.

Police and NBI investigators should urgently exert all
necessary measures to locate the missing three.

NBI investigators should investigate military commanders
for involvement in the abduction and continued detention of the three and
the cover up of these crimes.

The Department of Justice should act to protect witnesses
to the abduction and continued detention.

Internal police investigators should investigate police
officers who refused to investigate this “disappearance” and
consider disciplinary measures for insubordination or a criminal
investigation for obstruction of justice or graft and corruption.

In conjunction with other relevant government agencies,
including the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD), the
Commission on Human Rights (CHR) should offer the witnesses and the
victims’ families counseling and psycho-social support.

The Supreme Court should investigate why it took more than
two years to decide on this case and take steps to avoid such delays on
writ of amparo and habeas data cases in the future.

VIII. Recommendations

The Philippine government could implement several
recommendations immediately. Others should be instituted without delay but can
be expected to take longer to fully implement.

To demonstrate resolve about ending extrajudicial killings
and enforced disappearances and holding perpetrators accountable, President
Aquino should immediately:

Order
the Philippine National Police (PNP) and the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI) to take all necessary steps to investigate and serve
outstanding arrest warrants in the cases discussed in this report.

Issue an executive order directing police and NBI
investigators to vigorously pursue crimes allegedly committed by the
military or themselves be subject to disciplinary measures.

Order the inspector general and provost marshal of the AFP
to investigate and report publicly within 90 days on the involvement of
military personnel in extrajudicial killings, and to identify failures
within the AFP investigative agencies to thus far prosecute officers under
principles of command responsibility.

Order the military to cease targeting all civilians, to
cease the practice of denying military involvement in all extrajudicial
killings and to cease labeling leftist groups as fronts for the CPP-NPA,
which places group members at considerable risk.

Communicate fully to all military personnel that
officers and soldiers who provide evidence or testimony in cases of human
rights violations that they will be eligible for witness protection and
other measures to ensure their safety.

To
the President of the Philippines

Issue an executive order directing police and National
Bureau of Investigation (NBI) investigators to vigorously pursue crimes
allegedly committed by the military, or themselves be subject to
disciplinary measures for insubordination or a criminal investigation for
obstruction of justice or graft and corruption.

Direct the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) to take
all necessary measures to end military involvement in extrajudicial
killings.

Ensure AFP compliance at all levels with investigations of
other agencies, including the police, NBI, Commission on Human Rights
(CHR), the ombudsman, and inquiries by legislative bodies and other public
officials.

Produce a plan for the implementation of the
recommendations contained in the reports of the United Nations special
rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary, or arbitrary executions, the Melo
Commission, and human rights NGOs reporting on extrajudicial killings.

Ask congress to create a nationwide emergency assistance
number for family members and witnesses to killings and
“disappearances.”

Sign the International Convention for the Protection of
All Persons from Enforced Disappearance, and transmit to the Senate for
prompt ratification.

Invite the UN Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary
Disappearances and the special rapporteur on human rights defenders to
visit the Philippines.

To the
Department of Justice

Direct the NBI to give priority to investigating alleged
extrajudicial killings and other serious abuses that may involve
government officials, security forces, or militia forces.

Direct the NBI to investigate the role of senior military
officials in extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances, including
retired Gen. Jovito Palparan—in line with a 2004 recommendation of
the Committee on Civil, Political and Human Rights of the House of
Representatives that the Department of Justice investigate then-Col.
Jovito Palparan and similar recommendations from several other bodies.

Direct the NBI to investigate and report publicly within
90 days on the failure of police to adequately investigate military
involvement in extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances,
including threats and harassment of investigators who try to conduct
proper investigations. Conduct such an investigation in a manner that
ensures the safety of those providing information.

Broaden the witness protection program to ensure that it
is accessible, flexible, and properly funded. Implement mechanisms for
witnesses to change identity, transfer locations other than their places
of residence, including to other provinces, for as long as necessary. This
program should provide protection for witnesses from the onset of a police
investigation until after trial, when necessary.

Institute measures for witnesses to offer testimonies
safely, while protecting the rights of defendants, for example by using
video-conferenced testimonies, closed courtrooms, or depositions.

In cooperation with the Department of Interior and Local
Government, circulate an explicit set of operational guidelines for the
police regarding:

Individual police officer’s duties to provide
protection to witnesses and individuals who report threats on their
lives;

Information to provide to witnesses about the witness
protection program and at what stages to provide this information;

Clear sanctions for officers who fail to provide
necessary protection in conformity with these guidelines.

Order Task Force 211 or an alternative body in the
Department of Justice tasked with monitoring extrajudicial killings and
enforced disappearances to publish a list of all cases under its mandate
and the status of the case. Publish regular and frequent status reports on
all cases.

Produce and disseminate information for victims of crime
that explains their legal rights, such as the state’s requirement to
pay for autopsies in alleged murder cases and to be informed of the status
of relevant investigations. Adopt mechanisms to facilitate the filing of
complaints by people whose rights have been infringed by law enforcement
officers.

Improve access to social services such as medical care,
including counseling, and legal aid for victims of and witnesses to
serious human rights violations.

To the
Department of Interior and Local Government

Direct police to consult with prosecutors regarding the
collection of evidence in alleged extrajudicial killings and enforced
disappearances to bring all the perpetrators to justice.

In cooperation with the Department of Justice, circulate
an explicit set of operational guidelines for the police regarding:

Individual police officer duties to provide protection to
witnesses and individuals who report threats on their lives;

Information to provide to witnesses about the witness
protection program and at what stages to provide this information;

Clear sanctions for officers who fail to provide
necessary protection in conformity with these guidelines.

To the
Supreme Court

Order all trial courts to comply with the procedures under
Supreme Court Administrative Order 25-2007 in extrajudicial killing cases,
which means they must:

Complete trials in extrajudicial killing cases within 60
days of when the case is filed in court, and render judgment within a
further 30 days.

Submit to the chief justice of the Supreme Court a list
of such cases and a report on their status monthly. The chief justice
should publish a quarterly report on the status and progress of such
cases.

To overcome difficulties identifying extrajudicial cases
in which Administrative Order 25-2007 applies, order all trial courts to
expedite the disposition of murder, homicide, and kidnapping cases in
which a police officer, member of the Armed Forces of the Philippines or
paramilitary force, or government official is implicated, and to hear such
cases on a continuous basis.

Order all courts to expedite writ of amparo
cases—including the Supreme Court—to hear and decide them
within five days, be they in the first instance or on appeal.

To
the Philippine National Police

Promptly
and fully investigate all alleged cases of extrajudicial killings and
enforced disappearances, including those discussed in this report.

Through
Task Force Usig, work with all police agencies to coordinate
investigations of extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearance cases,
and to routinely follow up ongoing cases. In particularly complex or
politically sensitive cases of human rights violations, bring in specially
qualified investigators from outside the area to assist in the
investigation.

Order
Task Force Usig to publish a list of all cases under its mandate and the
status of the cases. Publish regular and frequent status reports.

Review
“closed” cases of alleged extrajudicial killings that have not
resulted in convictions with a view to identifying and obtaining new
evidence and bringing prosecutions.

Open
hotlines or comparable lines of communication to receive anonymous
information on abuses perpetrated by local government officials and
security force members.

Sanction
officers who do not thoroughly and promptly investigate alleged human
rights violations.

Develop
a national database on missing persons, corroborated with medical and
dental records.

Draft specific protocol for police officers to ensure full
cooperation with prosecutors and other government officials, particularly
in human rights cases. The protocol should be incorporated in the relevant
police manual.

Make operational procedures, the investigators’
manual, and other guidelines setting out duties of police officers easily
accessible to the public. Ensure that the guidelines place a duty on law
enforcement officers to investigate alleged crimes irrespective of whether
a formal complaint has been filed.

Create
standards for file management of criminal cases including the
chronological documentation of all police and judicial intervention
measures that have been met.

Sanction
officers who fail to provide necessary witness protection in accordance
with the law.

To the Armed
Forces of the Philippines

Cease all targeting of civilians, and extrajudicial
killings and enforced disappearances of all persons in custody.

Issue a public order to all forces stating clearly that
political activists, unionists, and members of civil society groups are to
be distinguished from combatants involved in the armed conflict.

Fully assist all prosecutorial authorities in apprehending
members of the armed forces, regardless of rank, implicated in
extrajudicial killings and other serious human rights violations.

End abusive uses of intelligence lists of suspected
NPA/CPP members, known as “orders of battle” and “watch
lists.” Hold commanding officers responsible for abuses committed
against individuals placed on such lists. Issue public guidelines that
would permit a person who suspects they are named on such a list to
challenge their inclusion before a civilian authority.

Fully comply with all inquiries by investigative bodies
including legislative committees and public officials.

Cease the routine denial of involvement in reported cases
of extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances. Instead, condemn
such abuses and order the Inspector General and the Provost Marshal to
promptly and impartially investigate.

Suspend military personnel implicated in extrajudicial
killings or enforced disappearances while an investigation is ongoing.

To the
National Bureau of Investigation

Give
priority to investigating alleged extrajudicial killings and other serious
human rights violations that may involve government officials, security
forces, or militia forces.

Investigate the involvement of senior military officials
in ordering and failing to investigate extrajudicial killings and enforced
disappearances, including the role of retired Gen. Jovito Palparan.

To the
Philippine Congress

Conduct hearings on the involvement of the AFP in ordering
and perpetrating extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances.
Provide necessary protections to all those who provide information.

Enact legislation to prohibit and protect against enforced
disappearances.

Conduct committee hearings on best practices for
preserving the testimonies of witnesses to extrajudicial killings and
enforced disappearances and enact appropriate legislation to establish the
necessary mechanisms for this purpose.

In line with House bills 265 and 1123 of the 14th
Congress, enact legislation mandating autopsy examinations in all cases of
suspected extrajudicial killings.

Pass a resolution urging the president to promptly sign
the International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from
Enforced Disappearance and file it with the Senate for ratification.

To the
Commission on Human Rights

Investigate and report publicly and promptly on cases of
alleged extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances.

Publish regular and frequent lists of all cases of killings
and abductions in which police, military, or other government officials
are suspected, including when the case was referred to the office and the
status of the case.

Investigate and report publicly within 90 days on
obstacles to investigations of extrajudicial killings and the enforced
disappearances, particularly collusion between the police and military.
Provide all necessary safeguards to those willing to provide information.

To the
Office of the Ombudsman

Investigate police, military, and other government
officials, regardless of rank, suspected of perpetrating extrajudicial
killings and enforced disappearances.

Publish regular and frequent lists of all cases of
killings and abductions in which police, military, or other government
officials are suspected, including when the case was referred to the office
and the status of the case.

To the New
People’s Army/Communist Party of the Philippines

Cease all targeting of civilians, and the killing of all
persons in custody.

Consistent
with the above, provide safe passage to police and NBI investigators who
are investigating extrajudicial killings, enforced disappearances, or
other serious abuses.

To
the Joint Monitoring Committee

Expedite the drafting of supplemental guidelines for the
committee’s operation, the process for consolidating complaints
received thus far, and parameters for the conduct of joint investigations
between the NDFP and the government monitoring committees. Ensure that all
processes and investigations are transparent.

To
Donors and External Partners, including the United States, European Union,
Japan, Australia, the World Bank, and the Asian Development Bank

To promote human rights, the rule of law, and good
governance in the Philippines, press the Philippine government to initiate
investigations into the involvement of senior military officials in
extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances perpetrated by military
personnel, and prosecute the perpetrators.

All programs to assist the PNP or AFP should vet all
participating police officers and military personnel to ensure that they
have not been implicated or complicit in extrajudicial executions,
enforced disappearances, or other serious human rights abuses. The vetting
process should be transparent.

Offer to support external law enforcement assistance with
investigations into serious human rights violations, particularly in
forensic analysis, witness protection, case preparation, and tracing of fugitives.

Support NGOs that work with victims’ families to
closely follow individual cases and push for thorough investigations,
filing of cases, execution of arrest warrants, and protection of the
families and witnesses.

To the
United States, European Union Member States, Japan, Australia, and other
Concerned Governments

Publicly press the Philippine government to improve efforts to
investigate and prosecute members of the military for extrajudicial killings
and enforced disappearances, including those liable under command
responsibility. Be clear that failing to conduct full investigations and
prosecutions will increasingly call into question aspects of the relationship
with the Philippines.

Through embassies in Manila, monitor Philippine government investigations
of alleged extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances.

Offer to work with the Philippine government to provide witness
protection abroad for witnesses who are under grave threat, in particular
whistleblowers within the AFP.

To the United
States Government

Encourage the US Millennium Challenge Corporation to
specifically include the Philippines’ record in failing to prosecute
extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances as an indicator of the
country’s progress in the areas of civil liberties, political
rights, accountability, and the rule of law. The Millennium Challenge
Corporation should condition future funding to the Ombudsman’s
Office on the latter’s prosecution of government officials for
abuses within the office’s mandate.

The US Pacific Command, US Agency for International
Development (USAID), Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Department of
Defense, Drug Enforcement Agency, International Criminal Investigative
Training Assistance Program (ICITAP) , and all other US agencies that work
with the PNP or AFP should vet all police officers and military personnel
enrolling in US-funded programs in accordance with the Leahy Law to ensure
that participants have not been implicated or complicit in extrajudicial
executions, enforced disappearances, or other serious human rights abuses.
The US government should consult NGOs and the Philippine Commission on
Human Rights during this vetting process.

Closely
monitor the progress and effectiveness of police investigations into
military abuses, particularly alleged extrajudicial killings and enforced
disappearances, and the cooperation of the AFP with these investigations.
If there is no progress in prosecuting military personnel for involvement
in extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances, the US should
suspend the next annual bilateral Balikatan exercises.

IX. Appendix

Letter from Human Rights Watch to Justice Secretary Leila de Lima

Letter from Human Rights Watch to the Central Committee of the
Communist Party of the Philippines

Letter to Human Rights Watch from the Office of the Ombudsman

IX. Acknowledgments

This report was researched and written by Jessica Evans,
researcher in the Asia Division of Human Rights Watch.

Diana Parker, associate for the Asia Division, provided
research, administrative and technical assistance. Veejay Villafranca, a photojournalist,
provided research assistance together with his professional photography.

Human Rights Watch would like to thank the victims,
families, and eyewitnesses who agreed to talk to us for this report. We are
indebted to the many NGOs, lawyers, and activists who generously assisted us
during our research. We would also like to thank several independent expert
reviewers who provided comments and feedback on our work.

[2] The
island of Mindanao in the southern Philippines has a large Muslim population
known as Moros. Various Moro armed opposition groups, unconnected to the
Communist insurgency, are engaged in armed hostilities for independence or
autonomy against the government. These include the Moro Islamic Liberation
Front (MILF), the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), and the Abu Sayyaf
Group (ASG).

[3] The
NDFP, established in 1973, says it is the “united front organization of
the Filipino people fighting for national independence and for the democratic
rights of the people,” including the CPP-NPA. National Democratic Front
of the Philippines, “About the NDFP,” undated, http://ndfp.net/joomla/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=21&Itemid=27
(accessed May 7, 2011).

[5] Republic
Act No. 7636, which took effect on October 11, 1992, repealed the
Anti-Subversion Act, R.A. 1700, which had outlawed the CPP in 1957.

[6] For a
discussion of the various armed groups in the Philippines, see Soliman Santos
and Paz Verdades Santos, Primed and Purposeful: Armed Groups and Human
Security Efforts in the Philippines (Geneva: South-South Network for
Non-State Armed Group Engagement and the Small Arms Survey, 2010). The
splintering of the CPP-NPA also affected nongovernmental organizations. In 1992
the leader of the CPP-NPA, Jose Maria Sison, sought to reassert certain Maoist
principles into the movement, including the primacy of the rural armed struggle, and rejecting more moderate positions of political engagement.
Those who supported Sison have been labeled “reaffirmists” or
“RAs,” and those
who rejected this realignment of the CPP-NPA have been labeled
“rejectionists” or “RJs.” This same division remains
evident in nongovernmental organizations and political parties today. See Human
Rights Watch, The Philippines — Scared Silent: Impunity for
Extrajudicial Killings in the Philippines, June 2007, http://www.hrw.org/en/reports/2007/06/27/scared-silent-0,
pp. 11-17. For discussion of this and other developments since the 1992 division, see International Crisis
Group, “The Communist Insurgency in the Philippines: Tactics and
Talks,” Asia Report No. 202, February 14, 2011, http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/asia/south-east-asia/philippines/202-the-communist-insurgency-in-the-philippines-tactics-and-talks.aspx
(accessed May 7, 2011), pp. 6-10.

[9] “Another
victim in Davao ambush dies,” Sun Star, August 8, 2010, http://www.sunstar.com.ph/network/another-victim-davao-ambush-dies
(accessed May 6, 2011). Labawan believes that the NPA was targeting him.
Similarly, on July 31, 2010, two NPA members shot and killed Leonardo
“Andot” Behing, a leader of LUPACA (Lumadnong Pakigbisog sa
CARAGA), which is reported to have been formerly affiliated with the AFP and
now largely a bandit group, in Sibagat town, Agusan del Sur. According to news
reports, Maria Malaya, spokesperson of the NPA’s NorthEastern Mindanao Regional Committee said,
“Behing was a legitimate military target for his anti-revolutionary work
and crimes against the people like rape, kidnapping, illegal logging and
harassments.” Franklin A. Caliguid, “NPA
admits killing Manobo man over ‘crimes against people,’” Philippine Daily Inquirer, August 3, 2010, http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/breakingnews/regions/view/20100803-284695/NPA-admits-killing-Manobo-man-over-crimes-against-people
(accessed May 6, 2011).

[10] Known
as the Revolutionary Proletarian Army-Alex Boncayao Brigade (RPA-ABB). The NPA
called on RPA-ABB members to “desist from doing its worst against the
mainstream revolutionary organization and surrender so that any appeal they
want to present could be processed.” Edgar Cadagat, “Slain RPA-ABB Leader Led Hold-Up Gang, Death Squad in Negros
Combined,” Daily Bulletin, November 9, 2010, http://www.ndb-online.com/nov0910/negros-local-news/Slain+RPA-ABB+Leader+Led+Hold-Up+Gang-Death+Squad+in+Negros+Combined
(accessed May 6, 2011).

[14] Human
Rights Watch interview with a police investigator, place name and date
withheld.

[15] For a
discussion of the paramilitary and militia forces in the Philippines, see Human
Rights Watch, The Philippines — “They Own the People”: The Ampatuans, State-Backed Militias, and Killings in the Southern
Philippines, November 2010, http://www.hrw.org/en/reports/2010/11/16/they-own-people-0,
pp. 19-24.

[17] US
State Department, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights,
and Labor, “Country Reports on Human Rights Practices — 2010: The
Philippines,” April 8, 2011, http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2010/eap/154399.htm
(accessed May 7, 2011). This figure does not include members of paramilitary
forces.

[18] The
draft Comprehensive Agreement on Social and Economic Reforms (CASER) may be
completed and signed by the Panels in September 2011; the draft Comprehensive
Agreement on Political and Constitutional Reforms (CAPCR) may be completed and
signed by the Panels in February 2012; and lastly the draft Comprehensive
Agreement on End of Hostilities and Disposition of Forces (CAEHDF) may be
completed and signed by the Panels in June 2012. The Joint Statement of
GPH-CPP-NPA-NDF at the Conclusion of the Current Round of Peace Talks in Oslo,
Norway, February 21, 2011, http://gphndfpeacetalks.wordpress.com/2011/03/08/joint-statement-of-gph-cpp-npa-ndf-at-the-conclusion-of-the-current-round-of-peace-talks-in-oslo-norway/
(accessed May 6, 2011).

[25] The
letter went on to say, “That there was a marked increase in the incidence
of killings in all the areas where Gen. Palparan was assigned—which he
admitted—should be enough to justify his investigation. Indeed, Gen.
Palparan’s statements and cavalier attitude about the killings should
have warranted early on at the very least administrative or disciplinary
actions by his superiors.” Letter from Jose A. R. Melo, chairman of the
Melo Commission, to Eduardo R. Ermita, executive secretary, August 21, 2007,
pp. 3, 9.

[26] Arroyo
did implement an earlier recommendation, seeing to the passage in December 2009
of a law providing for command responsibility as a basis for criminal
liability; however, this has not yet been applied. Republic Act No. 9851 of the
Philippines. See also Republic Act No. 9745 of the
Philippines, sec. 13.

[28] Letter from Ricardo Blancaflor, former chairman, Task Force 211, to Human Rights Watch, May 27, 2011. On June 10, 2008,
Joel Flores was convicted of murder for the May 16, 2006 killing of Bayan Muna
secretary general Jose Doton. On March 6, 2009, Rafael Cardeño was
convicted of murder for the December 31, 2001 killing of reported whistleblower
and Young Officer’s Union spokesperson Baron Cervantes. On April 29,
2009, Joy Anticamara was convicted of homicide for the July 18, 2006 killing of
broadcaster Armando Pace. On January 29, 2010, Robert Woo was convicted of
murder, as an accomplice, of the May 4, 2005 killing of radio commentator Klein
Cantoneros.

[30]
Philippine National Police Commission, Resolution No. 2009-072,
“Approving the activation of the human rights desks at the different
levels of command in the Philippine National Police,” February, 2009.
“All AFP units ordered to set up human rights office,” GMA News,
November 15, 2010,http://www.gmanews.tv/story/206015/all-afp-units-ordered-to-set-up-human-rights-office
(accessed May 13, 2011).

[31] For
instance, a police officer at the PNP provincial headquarters in Nueva Ecija
said that they did not have a human rights desk there. He said, “Maybe
there is one at the regional headquarters?” Human Rights Watch interview
with P/Supt. Eduardo B. Soriano, Nueva Ecija, February 25, 2011.

[35]UN
Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on
extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, Philip Alston, A/HRC/14/24, May
20, 2010,http://www2.ohchr.org/english/issues/executions/annual.htm
(accessed December 17, 2010). See especially, “Killings
by Law Enforcement Officials or Other Security Forces.”

[38] Human
Rights Watch interview, name, place and date of interview withheld. A family
member told Human Rights Watch that several witnesses had told members of the
family that they had seen uniformed men watching Baldomero’s home in the
weeks prior to the killing, but that they were scared to testify: Human Rights
Watch interview with Ernan Baldomero, Aklan, March 23, 2011.

[43] Police
filed charges against Baldomero in 2005 and 2007 alleging involvement in
killings and arson allegedly perpetrated by the NPA. Police records indicate
that Baldomero was “neutralized” when he was arrested on August 18,
2005, indicating that they believed he was an NPA member: Undated document
entitled, “MUG SHOTS” and “BIOGRAPHICAL PROFILE”
obtained from the Philippine National Police on March 22, 2011, on file with
Human Rights Watch. The charges were dismissed. A relative and colleague also
spoke of a “tit for tat” between a military commander from the 47th
IB’s civil military operation and Baldomero over the radio station, just
weeks before he was killed, in which the military official spoke of Baldomero,
as a Bayan Muna leader, being a legal front of the CPP-NPA and a communist
terrorist. Human Rights Watch interview with a relative, “Rosita,”
and an activist colleague, George Calaor, provincial chair of Bagong Alyansang
Makabayan (BAYAN), Aklan, March 22, 2011.

[50] Human
Rights Watch interview with PO3 Ricardo Lopez, Nueva Ecija, February 26, 2011. The
task force comprised several agencies, including police representatives from
various stations and the CIDG, together with the NBI.

[55] It is
difficult for the families to identify precisely when their relatives went missing
because they would often go to the farm for some days. The Deliguer family only
realized Renato was missing after he did not return home after more than a
week.

[78] Human
Rights Watch interview with a relative of Kulot, Davao del Norte, March 12,
2011. This relative told how Kulot had been engaging in various criminal
activities and had become a problem for the family and the community, so they
sent him off to the NPA to learn discipline. After less than a year, in 2009,
he defected to the Philippine Army and had been working with them until he was
killed in December 2010.

[110] The police
spot report states: “The gunmen were unidentified but believe[d] to be
members of the New People’s Army under the command of Roberto Castillote
AKA Kumander Marvin of Front Committee 51:” Note from Maj. Demetrius
Emuardo Taypin, Police chief inspector, Sta. Cruz, Davao del Sur, February 27,
2011.

[125] Human
Rights Watch interview with a representative of the 702nd IB, Nueva
Ecija, February 26, 2011. Several community members said that the military
takes notice of the people that do not attend the pulong-pulong.A soldier explained, “Of course, the soldiers will notice who
is not around.... If they are not around, of course they will make an extra
effort to talk to that person.”

[127] Human
Rights Watch interview with a relative of Ladera, San Agustin, Surigao del Sur,
March 15, 2011. A barangay official said, “If the NPA comes and
asks me for food, I give it. But if I don’t have it, we don’t give
it.” Human Rights Watch interview with a barangay
official, place name and date withheld.

[136] The
commission said, “There is certainly evidence pointing the finger of
suspicion at some elements and personalities in the armed forces, in particular
Gen. Palparan, as responsible for an undetermined number of killings, by allowing,
tolerating, and even encouraging the killings.”Independent Commission to Address Media and Activist Killings,
“Report,” January 22, 2007, p. 53. A subsequent letter from the
commission to the government went on to say, “That there was a marked
increase in the incidence of killings in all the areas where General Palparan
was assigned—which he admitted—should be enough to justify his
investigation. Indeed, General Palparan’s statements and cavalier
attitude about the killings should have warranted early on at the very least
administrative or disciplinary actions by his superiors.” Letter from
Jose A. R. Melo, chairman of the Melo Commission, to Eduardo R. Ermita,
executive secretary, August 21, 2007, p. 3.

[137] Human
Rights Watch interviews with P/C Insp. Carlos Lacuesta, Guihulngan chief of
police, Guihulngan, March 21, 2011 and SPO2 Samuel Cañete, Manila, April
21, 2011. Cañete said that the request sought various details about the
two identified suspects, in particular their personal and duty details, duty,
appointment and assignment status, and issued armaments.

[141] Human
Rights Watch interview with police investigator Joel Lumakang, Mawab, March 15,
2011. Memorandum from PO1 Joel D. Lumakang, investigator, to Compostela Valley
provincial police director, November 6, 2010. Armed men killed Felisilda in
Mawab, Compestela Valley, in Mindanao on September 9, 2010. Human Rights Watch
was unable to visit the remote area in Mawab where Felisilda was killed by the
time of this writing because of ongoing fighting between the AFP and the NPA.

[145] Human
Rights Watch interview with several members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of
Surigao del Sur Committee on Laws, Justice, and Human Rights, March 14, 2011.

[146]Edita
Burgos v. Gloria Macapagal Arroyo et al., G.R. No. 183711, Investigation
Report submitted by Commissioner Jose Manuel Mamaug, March 15, 2011, p. 8. In
April 2007, armed men abducted Jonas Burgos in broad daylight from a mall in
Quezon City. Burgos’ mother, Edita, petitioned the court for a writ of
amparo—a habeas corpus-like procedure in which state agencies are
compelled to reveal to the court the whereabouts of named persons, disclose
documentary evidence or allow court-authorized searches of premises. In 2010,
the Supreme Court ordered the Commission on Human Rights to investigate
Burgos’ “disappearance,” and report back to it. In June 2010,
Edita Burgos filed with the Justice Department charges of arbitrary detention
against the military personnel identified in the report, including Maj. Harry
Baliaga, Jr., Lt. Col. Melquaides Feliciano, Col.
Eduardo Ano and several unidentified soldiers. At this writing, the department
is considering the complaint.

[147] UN
Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial,
summary or arbitrary executions, Addendum: Summary of cases transmitted to
Government and replies received, A/HRC/8/3/Add.1, May 30, 2008, p. 319.

[154] 9th
Public Affairs Office, AFP, Investigation Report, August 7, 2006; Affidavit of
Maj. Ernest Marc Rosal, October 6, 2006. The August 7, 2006 report of the 9th
ID concludes that on August 3, 2006, Pfc Lordger
Pastrana encountered undetermined number of SPARU elements; “he was able
to draw his firearm however he was killed by the SPARU.” SPARU is the
term used for the Special Partisan Unit of the NPA.

[160] Human
Rights Watch interview with the wife of an extrajudicial killing victim, place
name and date withheld. The family is canvassing for witnesses that they can
later present to the police.

[161] Human
Rights Watch interview with a relative of Guevarra, place name and date
withheld; a relative of R. Rodriguez, place name and date withheld; a relative
of Baldomero, place name and date withheld; a friend of Labrador, place name
and date withheld.

[162] Human
Rights Watch interview with the father of an extrajudicial killing victim,
place name and date withheld.

[165]
European Union police expert Bo Astrom has confirmed that he also found that
investigators had not collected evidence—other than the most
obvious—and regularly did not seek advanced forensic examination of
evidence collected.

[166] Human
Rights Watch interview with a police investigator, place name and date
withheld.

[169]
Benjamin Bayles was killed on a national highway during a busy period, in front
of many witnesses. However, the police did not canvass for witnesses. All of
the witnesses to be presented in the trial were identified by the private
prosecutors in the case. Human Rights Watch interview with private prosecutor
Atty. Ben Ramos, March 18, 2011.

[171] Human
Rights Watch interview with Romel Morales, CIDG, investigating the killing of
Estacio, Bataan, February 24, 2011. This case is not discussed above as Human
Rights Watch research indicated that it does not fit the pattern of an
extrajudicial killing and did not find evidence of security force involvement
in the killing. On July 12, 2010, a masked gunman killed Josephine Estacio, a
teacher, outside the school at which she was teaching in Balanga City, Bataan.
Estacio was not associated with any leftist organization. Police investigators
are yet to identify a motive behind this killing.

[172]
Resolution, Balanga City Police v. Alfredo Alipio, NPS Docket No.
III-02-INV-10H-00102, November 23, 2010; Case file, shown to Human Rights Watch
during an interview with Investigator Canare, Bataan,
February 24, 2011. A photograph of this process shows only the enlarged ID
picture of Alipio, posted on a wall, with the witness pointing to it, rather
than a photo board showing several possible suspects. The investigator
maintains the photo board showed photographs of several people.

[175] For
instance, in one case colleagues of the victim told Human Rights Watch,
“The NBI is asking for at least 100,000 pesos as a primer to start to
investigate the case.” Human Rights Watch interview with several
colleagues of an extrajudicial killing victim, place name and date withheld.

[179]
Police Officer Deris said, with respect to the killing of Carlo Rodriguez, that
the chief of the investigation who had handled the case had been transferred,
so she and other investigators had to wait to consult a new chief before
continuing the investigation. Human Rights Watch interview with PO2 Lilly Ann
“Leah” Deris, Calamba City, February 22, 2011.

[180]
Investigators did not visit the crime scene in the cases of Quirante, Tamondez,
Felisilda, Deliguer, or Ladera. The Dejos family also said that investigators
did not visit the crime scene, though the local police chief disputes this.
Human Rights Watch interviews with Carlos Lacuesta, Guihulngan chief of police,
Guihulngan, March 21, 2011; PSI Allan Reginald L. Basiya, Mawab Officer in
Charge, Mawab, March 15, 2011; Porciso Tamondez, Davao del Norte, March 12,
2011; Hipolito P. Deliguer, San Agustin, Surigao del Sur, March 15, 2011; and a
relative of Ladera, San Agustin, Surigao del Sur, March 15, 2011.

[195]
According to barangay officials, no one by the names of either of the
suspects reside at the barangays where they claimed they lived. Human
Rights Watch interview with private prosecutor Atty. Ben Ramos, March 18, 2011.

[200]
Memorandum from SPO1 Virgilio D. Parcon, Himamaylan City Police Station, to
Police Regional Office 6, February 25, 2011. For further discussion of this
case, see above Failure to Pursue Evidence of Military
Involvement. The sub judice rule does not
prevent police from continuing investigations and filing further information
with prosecutors.

[202]
Memorandum from P/Supt. Nestor Barba Dela Cueva, officer in charge, Calamba
City Police Station, to PD, Laguna PPO, November 23, 2010. PO2 Lilly Ann Deris
said, “Our assumption [is that Rodriguez was killed] due to a personal
grudge as this is far different to an EJK [extrajudicial killing]. When it is
an EJK, the assailant usually only had one or two shots.” Deris went on
to say that Rodriguez has been labeled a womanizer because they recovered
photographs of him with several women on his cell phone. His colleagues,
however, suggest that many of these photographs came from an evening work
gathering all taken during one night. Human Rights Watch interview with PO2
Lilly Ann Deris, Calamba City, February 22, 2011.

[203]
Rodriguez’s colleagues said, “Caloy was lending his talents to
other unions in southern Tagalog, to help them negotiate…. His specialty
[was assisting] in developing collective negotiating agreements.” Human
Rights Watch interview with several colleagues of Carlo Rodriguez, Calamba
City, February 22, 2011.

[204] Human
Rights Watch interview with a relative of an extrajudicial killing victim,
place name and date withheld.

[214] Human
Rights Watch interview with a relative of an extrajudicial killing victim,
place name and date withheld.

[215]On July 19, 2006, Danilo Hagosojos was riding home in Sorsorgon,
Bicol, on his motorbike with his seven-year-old daughter when he was shot
multiple times in the chest and head by two unidentified assailants. This
killing has not been thoroughly investigated and no charges have been filed.
Human Rights Watch, Scared Silent, pp. 41.

[216] Human
Rights Watch interview with a police investigator, place name and date withheld.

[223] Human
Rights Watch interview with a local government official, place name and date
withheld. Human Rights Watch has changed the names used in this statement; Ka
Ben was not the name used. The term Ka is short for comrade, used as part of
NPA noms de guerre.

[224] On
October 27, 2010, at about 5 p.m., the witness was three armed men in fatigues
visited the witness and threatened her. Complaint Police Blotter of Himamaylan
City Police Station, Entry No. 2010-3016, Page No. 0182, October 29, 2010.
Affidavit of Vilma E. Tejada, February 10, 2011.

[238]Telephone conversation with Att.
Martin Meñez, acting program director, Witness Protection Program,
Department of Justice, July 4, 2011. Meñez said that other government
agencies had been reluctant to cooperate with the Justice Department in
changing the identity of witnesses, despite provision for this in RA 6981.
Therefore, the department has proposed legislative change to enable the
secretary of justice to order relevant government agencies to take the
necessary steps to effect changes of identity. The bill proposing this
legislative change has been passed by the House of Representatives but remains
before the Senate.

[239] Human
Rights Watch interview with a local government official, place name and date
withheld.

[240] Human
Rights Watch interview with a couple in witness protection, place name and date
withheld.

[248] On January 29, 2010, Robert Woo was convicted of murder, as an
accomplice, for the May 2005 killing of radio commentator Klein Cantoneros. On
April 29, 2009, Joy Anticamara was convicted for the July 2006 murder of radio
broadcaster Armando Pace. In March 2009, Rafael Cardeño was convicted
for the December 31, 2001 murder of reported whistleblower and Young
Officer’s Union spokesperson Baron Alexander Cervantes; Jaime Centeno,
Joseph Mostrales, and Erlindo Flores had been convicted in August 2004. In June
2008, Joel Flores, formermilitary at the time of murder, was convicted
for the May 16, 2006 murder of Bayan Muna Secretary-General Jose Doton. In
October 2006, Gerry Cabayag, Randy Grecia, and Estanislao Bisamos were
convicted for the March 2005 murder of journalist Marlene Esperat. In January
2006, Edgar Belandres was convicted for the November 2004 murder of Allan
Dizon, a photographer for The Freeman. In November 2005, Guillermo
Wapili, a formerpolice officer was convicted for the May 2002
murder of radio commentator Edgar Damalerio.

[249]International
Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance
(Convention against Enforced

[250]
Office of the Provincial Prosecutor, Legazpi City Atty. Ruben M. Azanes v.
Ernest Marc P. Rosal and Arnaldo L. Majares, Resolution, June 8, 2007; Office
of the Regional State Prosecutor, Region V., Sonia Sta. Rosa v. Ernest Marc P.
Rosal et al., Resolution, November 9, 2007; Human Rights Watch interview with Sonia
Santa Rosa, Bicol, September 7, 2009. About an hour after 10 armed men entered
Santa Rosa’s home and abducted him, and about 30 minutes after his wife
had heard nine gunshots, local police found two bodies by the a nearby
stream—Santa Rosa and a man wearing a balaclava over his face, carrying
an AFP identification card in the name of Corporal Lordger Pastrana. Sonia
Santa Rosa later identified Pastrana by the clothes he was wearing as the
leader when the men entered her house. In Pastrana’s possession, police
found a mission order marked “SECRET” from the 9th Military
Intelligence Battalion, signed by Major Ernest Marc P. Rosal, for Pfc. Lordget
Pastrana, authorizing him to carry a .45 caliber Llama pistol from July 1,
2006, until September 30, 2006. They also found a .45 caliber Llama pistol with
silencer and with one magazine loaded was found near Pastrana’s body. The
evidence suggests that Pastrana may have been shot by accident by another
member of his team while either he or another team member attempted to execute
Pastor Santa Rosa. PNP, Daraga Municipal Police Station, Shooting Incident at
Brgy. Malobago, Daraga, Albay, resulting [in the] Death of Isais Sta. Rosa,
August 21, 2009.

[258] Human
Rights Watch interview with Carlos Lacuesta, Guihulngan chief of police,
Guihulngan, March 21, 2011. Lt. Col. Bitong has publicly blamed the NPA for
Quirante’s killing, without citing any evidence for this conclusion.
Philippine Army Public Affairs Office, “NPA’s Killings Up by 150%
as Army Appeals to Rebels: Spare the Civilians,” October 13, 2010, http://www.facebook.com/note.php?note_id=164828943542528
(accessed April 19, 2011). See also, Pro-Democracy Movement, “Man killed
in Guihulngan,” http://www.facebook.com/topic.php?uid=113621142013721&topic=228
and “NPA killings up 150% in Negros, Army says,” http://www.facebook.com/topic.php?uid=113621142013721&topic=234
(accessed April 19, 2011).

[260] Regional
Trial Court of Tarlac City, Branch 65, in Criminal Case No. 14419 People of the
Philippines v PFC Roderick dela Cruz a.k.a. Joshua dela Cruz. On June 6, 2006,
Judge Viliran, Regional Trial Court, Tarlac City, issued a warrant for his arrest,
specifying that he was not eligible for bail. Police did not serve the warrant,
so on December 14, 2006, the court ordered that the case be archived
“without prejudice to reactivation upon the apprehension of the accused
as the accused are still at large notwithstanding the lapse of six months since
the order of arrest was issued.” At this time an alias arrest warrant was
issued.

[265] Human
Rights Watch interview with Concepcion Empeño, Manila, October 13, 2009.
Empeño told Human Rights Watch what happened when she found out that the
writ of amparo had been granted: “I brought the newspaper [to the police
station], it was on the front page of the newspaper. I was so very happy at
that time. I said to the police, ‘The military are going to release her
and there is already an order from the court of appeals.’… I was so
happy—but nothing has happened.”

[274] Cadapan’s
mother told Human Rights Watch, “I do not know how to continue my search
now. I am just waiting for the decision of the court. That’s my life,
waiting for the decision.”Human Rights Watch interview with
Erlinda T. Cadapan, Manila, October 13, 2009. On May 4, 2011, the families of
Cadapan and Empeño filed with the Justice Department charges against
Ret. Maj. Gen. Jovito Palparan Jr., for rape, arbitrary detention, serious
physical injuries, maltreatment of prisoners, grave threats, and grave
coercion. At this writing, the department is considering these charges.

[278] The
commission does not have a regional office in Autonomous Region of Muslim
Mindanao (ARMM). Instead, the offices of Regions IX, X, and XII in Mindanao
cover certain provinces in ARMM.

[279] For
example, the central office actively investigated the 2007 enforced
disappearance of Jonas Burgos, including by identifying and interviewing an AFP
witness. The CHR has recommended that the Supreme Court direct the Philippine
Army to produce Burgos and that the Justice Department file criminal charges
against several soldiers. However, this investigation was only completed after
the Supreme Court referred the case to the CHR, following a petition for writ
of amparo, nearly four years after Burgos disappeared. And the CHR, which the
Supreme Court had asked to report within 90 days, sought three extensions of
time, totaling almost six months. Edita Burgos v. Gloria Macapagal Arroyo et
al., G.R. No. 183711, Investigation Report submitted by Commissioner Jose
Manuel Mamaug, March 15, 2011.

[280] Human
Rights Watch interview with relatives of an extrajudicial killing victim, place
name and date withheld. The CHR office that investigated was Region III.

[291] The
overall deputy ombudsman, Orlando C. Casimiro, is currently acting ombudsman.
He is also covering the vacant offices of deputy ombudsman for Luzon and deputy
ombudsman for military and other law enforcement offices. The president is to
appoint the ombudsman from a list of at least six
nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council. At this writing, the
Judicial and Bar Council has not submitted this list to the president. The
ombudsman shall serve for a term of seven years without reappointment.
Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, 1986, secs. 8-11.

[292] Comprehensive
Agreement on Respect for Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law
(CARHRIHL), between the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and the
National Democratic Front of the Philippines, including the Communist Party of
the Philippines and the New People’s Army, August 7, 1998, part 5.

[293] The Joint
Statement of GPH-CPP-NPA-NDF at the Conclusion of the Current Round of Peace
Talks in Oslo, Norway, February 21, 2011, http://gphndfpeacetalks.wordpress.com/2011/03/08/joint-statement-of-gph-cpp-npa-ndf-at-the-conclusion-of-the-current-round-of-peace-talks-in-oslo-norway/
(accessed May 6, 2011).

[294] The
duty to try and punish those responsible for grave violations of human rights
has its legal basis in such treaties as the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights (art.2); and the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel,
Inhuman and Degrading Treatment or Punishment (arts. 4, 5, and 7).

[295]International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), adopted December 16, 1966, G.A.
Res. 2200A (XXI), entered into force March 23, 1976, art. 2. The Philippines
ratified the ICCPR in October 1986.

[302]
Ibid., art. 4. The Declaration on Enforced Disappearances also includes
provisions intended to reduce the likelihood of enforced disappearances and
resolve ongoing cases.

[303]Command responsibility and its
elements are well-established under customary international law. See
International Criminal Court for the former Yugoslavia, Delalic and Others, Judgment,
IT-96-21-T, Nov. 16, 1998, sec. 333. See e.g., Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court, art. 28; First Additional Protocol of 1977 to the
Geneva Conventions, art. 86(2). The Convention against Torture in articles 4
and 16 provide that superior officials may be found guilty of complicity or
acquiescence if they knew or should have known of torture or ill-treatment
practiced by persons under their command. See Manfred Nowak and Elizabeth
McArthur, The United Nations Convention Against Torture: A Commentary (Oxford:
Oxford Univ. Press, 2008), p. 248.

[304] 1987 Constitution
of the Republic of the Philippines, art. III, sec. 12.

[312]Republic
Act No. 6713 of the Philippines, sec 5: Duties of Public Officials and Employees.
“In the performance of their duties, all public officials and employees
are under obligation to (a) Act promptly on letters and requests. All public
officials and employees shall, within fifteen (15) working days from receipt
thereof, respond to letters, telegrams or other means of communications sent by
the public. The reply must contain the action taken on the request.”

[316] The
president signed Republic Act No. 9851 of the Philippines into law December 11,
2009. Section 10 provides, Responsibility of Superiors. “In
addition to other grounds of criminal responsibility for crimes defined and
penalized under this Act, a superior shall be criminally responsible as a
principal for such crimes committed by subordinates under his/her effective
command and control, or effective authority and control as the case may be, as
a result of his/her failure to properly exercise control over such
subordinates, where:

(a) That superior either knew or,
owing to the circumstances at the time, should have known that the subordinates
were committing or about to commit such crimes;

(b) That superior failed to take all
necessary and reasonable measures within his/her power to prevent or repress
their commission or to submit the matter to the competent authorities for
investigation and prosecution.”

[318]At a
meeting with then Justice Secretary Agnes Devanadera in October 2009, at which
time Republic Act No. 9851 remained before the Congress, Justice
Department officials told Human Rights Watch that command responsibility is relevant only to disciplinary proceedings.Human Rights Watch meeting with Agnes Devanadera,
Secretary for Justice, Rolando B. Faller, Chief of Staff, Department of
Justice, Atty. Nestor Mantaring, NBI Director, Undersecretary Ricardo
Blancaflor, Task Force 211, Leo Dacera, Director, Witness Protection, Manila,
October 20, 2009.Then Chief
Prosecutor Jovencito Zuño said that command responsibility is not really a theory in criminal
law in the Philippines. When asked whether he would consider bringing a test
case, utilizing ordinary principles of criminal responsibility in conjunction
with international humanitarian law principles of command responsibility, he said
he might, but he was concerned that then even the president may be a commander.
Human Rights Watch meeting with Chief Prosecutor Jovencito
Zuño, Manila, October 21, 2009.

[319]
Executive Order 226, Institutionalization of the doctrine of “Command Responsibility” in all
Government Offices, Particularly At All Levels Of Command In The Philippine
National Police and other law enforcement agencies, sec. 1 provides: “Neglect
of Duty Under the Doctrine of ‘Command
Responsibility.’” Any government official
or supervisor, or officer of the Philippine National Police or that of any
other law enforcement agency shall be held accountable for “Neglect of
Duty” under the doctrine of “command responsibility” if he
has knowledge that a crime or offense shall be committed, is being committed,
or has been committed by his subordinates, or by others within his area of
responsibility and, despite such knowledge, he did not take preventive or
corrective action either before, during, or immediately after its commission.”