Political Science, American Politics, International Relations and Politics

Chapter 6 provides background material on the Air Force’s culture and recruiting history, before presenting an analysis of the recruiting materials. Air Force advertising has emphasized job training ...
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Chapter 6 provides background material on the Air Force’s culture and recruiting history, before presenting an analysis of the recruiting materials. Air Force advertising has emphasized job training and specifically offered respect and advancement to blue-collar, mechanically inclined young men, reinforcing a working-class masculinity. Air Force recruiting has also made advanced technology a central draw; through association with this technology, the Air Force offers the masculine rewards of mastery, dominance, and control. In recent years, the Air Force has offered recruits not direct physical excitement, but the vicarious thrills of video games, which provide extreme experiences through the mediation of technology. The chapter also gives a brief history of women in the Air Force and examines their portrayal in recruiting advertisements. The Air Force has the largest percentage of women, but its advertising has mainly targeted technically inclined young men; women have been only a token presence.Less

The Air Force

Melissa T. Brown

Published in print: 2012-02-29

Chapter 6 provides background material on the Air Force’s culture and recruiting history, before presenting an analysis of the recruiting materials. Air Force advertising has emphasized job training and specifically offered respect and advancement to blue-collar, mechanically inclined young men, reinforcing a working-class masculinity. Air Force recruiting has also made advanced technology a central draw; through association with this technology, the Air Force offers the masculine rewards of mastery, dominance, and control. In recent years, the Air Force has offered recruits not direct physical excitement, but the vicarious thrills of video games, which provide extreme experiences through the mediation of technology. The chapter also gives a brief history of women in the Air Force and examines their portrayal in recruiting advertisements. The Air Force has the largest percentage of women, but its advertising has mainly targeted technically inclined young men; women have been only a token presence.

Melissa T. Brown

Political Science, American Politics, International Relations and Politics

This book explores how the U.S. military branches have deployed gender and, in particular, ideas about masculinity to sell military service to potential recruits. Military service has strong ...
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This book explores how the U.S. military branches have deployed gender and, in particular, ideas about masculinity to sell military service to potential recruits. Military service has strong historical ties to masculinity, but conscription ended during a period when masculinity was widely perceived to be in crisis and women’s roles were expanding. The central question the book asks is whether, in the era of the all-volunteer force, masculinity is the underlying basis of military recruiting appeals and if so, in what forms It also asks how women fit into the gendering of service. Based on an analysis of more than 300 print advertisements published between the early 1970s and 2007, as well as television commercials and recruiting Websites, the book argues that masculinity is still a foundation of the appeals, but each branch deploys various constructions of masculinity that serve its particular personnel needs and culture, with conventional martial masculinity being only one among them. While the Marines rely almost exclusively on a traditional, warrior form of masculinity, the Army, Navy, and Air Force draw on various strands of masculinity that are in circulation in the wider culture, including economic independence and breadwinner status, dominance and mastery through technology, and hybrid masculinity which combines egalitarianism and compassion with strength and power. The inclusion of a few token military women in recruiting advertisements has become routine, but the representations of service make it clear that men are the primary audience and combat their exclusive domain.Less

Enlisting Masculinity : The Construction of Gender in US Military Recruiting Advertising during the All-Volunteer Force

Melissa T. Brown

Published in print: 2012-02-29

This book explores how the U.S. military branches have deployed gender and, in particular, ideas about masculinity to sell military service to potential recruits. Military service has strong historical ties to masculinity, but conscription ended during a period when masculinity was widely perceived to be in crisis and women’s roles were expanding. The central question the book asks is whether, in the era of the all-volunteer force, masculinity is the underlying basis of military recruiting appeals and if so, in what forms It also asks how women fit into the gendering of service. Based on an analysis of more than 300 print advertisements published between the early 1970s and 2007, as well as television commercials and recruiting Websites, the book argues that masculinity is still a foundation of the appeals, but each branch deploys various constructions of masculinity that serve its particular personnel needs and culture, with conventional martial masculinity being only one among them. While the Marines rely almost exclusively on a traditional, warrior form of masculinity, the Army, Navy, and Air Force draw on various strands of masculinity that are in circulation in the wider culture, including economic independence and breadwinner status, dominance and mastery through technology, and hybrid masculinity which combines egalitarianism and compassion with strength and power. The inclusion of a few token military women in recruiting advertisements has become routine, but the representations of service make it clear that men are the primary audience and combat their exclusive domain.

This chapter describes the surveillance technology the British devised, initially in Iraq, as a result of their conspiracy obsessions. The panoptical ambitions of “air control” followed from wartime ...
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This chapter describes the surveillance technology the British devised, initially in Iraq, as a result of their conspiracy obsessions. The panoptical ambitions of “air control” followed from wartime experiences and the culture of British surveillance in the Middle East—the preoccupation with the region's inscrutability, lack of frontiers, multiplication of rumors and lies—all of which air control would theoretically turn to advantage. In theory, “terror” would enable it to minimize casualties. The chapter describes the regime's actual brutality, showing how cultural conceptions circulated by the agents—the chivalry of Bedouin, the tolerance of a biblical people—helped mute criticism of its inhumanity and inaccuracy, as did its cooperation with allegedly empathetic ground agents. Thus did aerial bombardment become a central part of British military practice. The RAF's dependence on the Middle East for its survival made it impossible for the British to leave Iraq even after Iraqi “independence.”Less

Air Control

Priya Satia

Published in print: 2008-05-01

This chapter describes the surveillance technology the British devised, initially in Iraq, as a result of their conspiracy obsessions. The panoptical ambitions of “air control” followed from wartime experiences and the culture of British surveillance in the Middle East—the preoccupation with the region's inscrutability, lack of frontiers, multiplication of rumors and lies—all of which air control would theoretically turn to advantage. In theory, “terror” would enable it to minimize casualties. The chapter describes the regime's actual brutality, showing how cultural conceptions circulated by the agents—the chivalry of Bedouin, the tolerance of a biblical people—helped mute criticism of its inhumanity and inaccuracy, as did its cooperation with allegedly empathetic ground agents. Thus did aerial bombardment become a central part of British military practice. The RAF's dependence on the Middle East for its survival made it impossible for the British to leave Iraq even after Iraqi “independence.”

Chapter 2 traces the literary response to the seductive futurist appeal and colonialist genealogy of air power in two World Wars. After the Great War, the “empire of the air” was celebrated as a ...
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Chapter 2 traces the literary response to the seductive futurist appeal and colonialist genealogy of air power in two World Wars. After the Great War, the “empire of the air” was celebrated as a last resort of martial heroism and the colonies provided laboratories for experiment. The interwar period saw the consolidating imperial gaze of air power and mechanized war turned on the civilian home front as both apocalyptic nightmare and escapist fantasy. This chapter explores T.E. Lawrence's haunting fantasies of air power as he dedicated mind and body to the RAF's role in policing the empire in the 1920s and 30s. It argues that for those who waged the war of space and movement, the mythology of armored masculinity and panoramic vision all too often resulted in blackout and bodily disintegration. It explores these conflicts of “airmindedness” in the work of Virginia Woolf, Rex Warner, George Orwell, Richard Hillary, and Sir Arthur “Bomber” Harris.Less

The Empire of the Air : British Air Power and the Second World War

Patrick Deer

Published in print: 2009-03-26

Chapter 2 traces the literary response to the seductive futurist appeal and colonialist genealogy of air power in two World Wars. After the Great War, the “empire of the air” was celebrated as a last resort of martial heroism and the colonies provided laboratories for experiment. The interwar period saw the consolidating imperial gaze of air power and mechanized war turned on the civilian home front as both apocalyptic nightmare and escapist fantasy. This chapter explores T.E. Lawrence's haunting fantasies of air power as he dedicated mind and body to the RAF's role in policing the empire in the 1920s and 30s. It argues that for those who waged the war of space and movement, the mythology of armored masculinity and panoramic vision all too often resulted in blackout and bodily disintegration. It explores these conflicts of “airmindedness” in the work of Virginia Woolf, Rex Warner, George Orwell, Richard Hillary, and Sir Arthur “Bomber” Harris.

This chapter describes the opposing statements and propositions about the British nuclear methodologies during the mid-1950s, which happened to be under Prime Minister Anthony Eden's rule. Such ...
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This chapter describes the opposing statements and propositions about the British nuclear methodologies during the mid-1950s, which happened to be under Prime Minister Anthony Eden's rule. Such contradictions are evident in the discordant views between the Army and Navy of Britain, as well as the Royal Air Force, regarding the issue of regaining international control of the Suez Canal through increased reliance on the United States. Because of this, the administration failed its military adventure, which led to Russian protest, national opposition, discharge of support from America, and eventually, Eden's resignation. The techniques employed by the regime were perhaps inadequate to justify re-entitlement of international authority.Less

Eden and the Policy of Strategic Expediency 1955–1956

John Baylis

Published in print: 1995-12-28

This chapter describes the opposing statements and propositions about the British nuclear methodologies during the mid-1950s, which happened to be under Prime Minister Anthony Eden's rule. Such contradictions are evident in the discordant views between the Army and Navy of Britain, as well as the Royal Air Force, regarding the issue of regaining international control of the Suez Canal through increased reliance on the United States. Because of this, the administration failed its military adventure, which led to Russian protest, national opposition, discharge of support from America, and eventually, Eden's resignation. The techniques employed by the regime were perhaps inadequate to justify re-entitlement of international authority.

JUDGE is a decision-making technique designed to aid a commander responsible for dispatching Close Air Support missions in situations wherein resource limitations do not allow all demands to be ...
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JUDGE is a decision-making technique designed to aid a commander responsible for dispatching Close Air Support missions in situations wherein resource limitations do not allow all demands to be fulfilled. As each request for close air support is received, the JUDGE system makes a dispatching decision that maximizes the difference between a return gained for sending aircraft against the target and a cost imputed to expending sorties. This chapter reports an experiment to evaluate JUDGE. For comparison, JUDGE was pitted against a second technique called DASC (Direct Air Support Center)—a hypothetical version of the system the Air Force currently uses. The results showed the superiority of JUDGE over DASC when measured by an expected utility criterion. JUDGE performed at the 90% level when compared with the perfect possible performance. DASC reached a level of only 40%.Less

JUDGE: A Laboratory Evaluation

Jie W WeissDavid J Weiss

Published in print: 2008-10-10

JUDGE is a decision-making technique designed to aid a commander responsible for dispatching Close Air Support missions in situations wherein resource limitations do not allow all demands to be fulfilled. As each request for close air support is received, the JUDGE system makes a dispatching decision that maximizes the difference between a return gained for sending aircraft against the target and a cost imputed to expending sorties. This chapter reports an experiment to evaluate JUDGE. For comparison, JUDGE was pitted against a second technique called DASC (Direct Air Support Center)—a hypothetical version of the system the Air Force currently uses. The results showed the superiority of JUDGE over DASC when measured by an expected utility criterion. JUDGE performed at the 90% level when compared with the perfect possible performance. DASC reached a level of only 40%.

This chapter examines the air-atomic strategy and the organizational struggles it fueled. The structure for national security policy changed dramatically with the National Security Act in July 1947. ...
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This chapter examines the air-atomic strategy and the organizational struggles it fueled. The structure for national security policy changed dramatically with the National Security Act in July 1947. “Unification,” as the creation of a single Defense Department was known, created an independent Air Force and placed all three services under the direction of the secretary of defense. This development was bound to annoy a service that coveted its autonomy as much did the Navy. Ominously, not only was the Air Force placed into the security structure as a coequal to the Army and Navy, but it threatened to seize the latter's position as America's first line of defense. The basis of the Air Force's power was the air-atomic idea. It became the central issue around which revolved interservice fights in war planning and budgeting, culminating in the B-36 hearings. The struggle between the two services was one between different and largely incompatible conceptions of national security. The chapter concludes by assessing an event that bridged the early and late air-atomic periods, the Korean War.Less

Finding a Place

Edward Kaplan

Published in print: 2015-03-12

This chapter examines the air-atomic strategy and the organizational struggles it fueled. The structure for national security policy changed dramatically with the National Security Act in July 1947. “Unification,” as the creation of a single Defense Department was known, created an independent Air Force and placed all three services under the direction of the secretary of defense. This development was bound to annoy a service that coveted its autonomy as much did the Navy. Ominously, not only was the Air Force placed into the security structure as a coequal to the Army and Navy, but it threatened to seize the latter's position as America's first line of defense. The basis of the Air Force's power was the air-atomic idea. It became the central issue around which revolved interservice fights in war planning and budgeting, culminating in the B-36 hearings. The struggle between the two services was one between different and largely incompatible conceptions of national security. The chapter concludes by assessing an event that bridged the early and late air-atomic periods, the Korean War.

Several proposals were made regarding the modifications on defence planning and the utilization of nuclear weapons. These undertakings led to divided feedback from the military personnel (which ...
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Several proposals were made regarding the modifications on defence planning and the utilization of nuclear weapons. These undertakings led to divided feedback from the military personnel (which refers to the Navy and Air Force) and conflicts on bureaucratic interest in terms of the employment of the materials, the dilemma of the defence process of Britain during the two world wars (that was centralized on the continental commitment and maritime/air strategy), and the usage of either supervised weapons or nuclear weapons. Although there are steps to eliminate rivalry in the policy-making bodies, the differences in the concentration and perspectives that each one pursues give rise to an unsuccessful execution of their nuclear blueprints and more importantly, national security. Indeed, nuclear abstractions, no matter how brilliant they can be, will only be useless until they are applied.Less

Nuclear Planning in a Vacuum 1948–1949

John Baylis

Published in print: 1995-12-28

Several proposals were made regarding the modifications on defence planning and the utilization of nuclear weapons. These undertakings led to divided feedback from the military personnel (which refers to the Navy and Air Force) and conflicts on bureaucratic interest in terms of the employment of the materials, the dilemma of the defence process of Britain during the two world wars (that was centralized on the continental commitment and maritime/air strategy), and the usage of either supervised weapons or nuclear weapons. Although there are steps to eliminate rivalry in the policy-making bodies, the differences in the concentration and perspectives that each one pursues give rise to an unsuccessful execution of their nuclear blueprints and more importantly, national security. Indeed, nuclear abstractions, no matter how brilliant they can be, will only be useless until they are applied.

This chapter recounts the continued clashes between the Air Force and its sister services whose new ideas, including finite deterrence and stalemate, threatened its predominance. Although the Air ...
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This chapter recounts the continued clashes between the Air Force and its sister services whose new ideas, including finite deterrence and stalemate, threatened its predominance. Although the Air Force and its air-atomic ideas were secure from immediate threat, the other services continued their struggle against it. Some attempts to seize slices of the Air Force mission and budget, like the fight over tactical airpower, were rooted outside strategic airpower. However, the senior services also attacked strategic air theory to provide leverage in other skirmishes. In the mid-1950s, the Navy began its transition to advocacy of finite deterrence with the Martin XP6M Sea Master seaplane and culminated in the Polaris submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM). The place of finite deterrence, tailored to the strengths and weaknesses of the SLBM, sharply opposed air-atomic theory. Similarly, the Army challenged the theoretical basis of Strategic Air Command's (SAC) predominance by claiming that Soviet nuclear power would cause stalemate—reviving the need for Army limited war forces. These theories became possible because of the characteristics of the air-atomic idea and the size and success of SAC. The interservice disputes also reflected the influence of the civilian strategic community, which emerged as an entity during the 1950s.Less

Stalemate, Finite Deterrence, Polaris, and SIOP-62

Edward Kaplan

Published in print: 2015-03-12

This chapter recounts the continued clashes between the Air Force and its sister services whose new ideas, including finite deterrence and stalemate, threatened its predominance. Although the Air Force and its air-atomic ideas were secure from immediate threat, the other services continued their struggle against it. Some attempts to seize slices of the Air Force mission and budget, like the fight over tactical airpower, were rooted outside strategic airpower. However, the senior services also attacked strategic air theory to provide leverage in other skirmishes. In the mid-1950s, the Navy began its transition to advocacy of finite deterrence with the Martin XP6M Sea Master seaplane and culminated in the Polaris submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM). The place of finite deterrence, tailored to the strengths and weaknesses of the SLBM, sharply opposed air-atomic theory. Similarly, the Army challenged the theoretical basis of Strategic Air Command's (SAC) predominance by claiming that Soviet nuclear power would cause stalemate—reviving the need for Army limited war forces. These theories became possible because of the characteristics of the air-atomic idea and the size and success of SAC. The interservice disputes also reflected the influence of the civilian strategic community, which emerged as an entity during the 1950s.

This chapter discusses the U.S. Navy's efforts to adjust to the increased centralization of defense decision-making dictated by the National Security Act of 1947. It argues that the transition for ...
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This chapter discusses the U.S. Navy's efforts to adjust to the increased centralization of defense decision-making dictated by the National Security Act of 1947. It argues that the transition for the Navy went better than it otherwise might have, largely due to the fact that the new Secretary of Defense, James Forrestal, had been the Secretary of Navy. Yet, this factor also had its drawbacks, since it tended to magnify the differences between the Navy and the recently created U.S. Air Force, whose ambitious secretary, Stuart Symington, was only too ready to see partiality toward the Navy in any of Forrestal's decisions that went against his own service.Less

Adjusting to the National Military Establishment

Published in print: 2009-01-12

This chapter discusses the U.S. Navy's efforts to adjust to the increased centralization of defense decision-making dictated by the National Security Act of 1947. It argues that the transition for the Navy went better than it otherwise might have, largely due to the fact that the new Secretary of Defense, James Forrestal, had been the Secretary of Navy. Yet, this factor also had its drawbacks, since it tended to magnify the differences between the Navy and the recently created U.S. Air Force, whose ambitious secretary, Stuart Symington, was only too ready to see partiality toward the Navy in any of Forrestal's decisions that went against his own service.