Sunday, September 9, 2012

How much do Obama and Romney differ on China?

With one potentially important exception and with several
differences in emphasis and tone, the treatment of China in the platforms of the two
major political parties and in the statements of the two presidential nominees
suggest a remarkable degree of consensus on American policy toward China this
year.I say “remarkable” because of the intense
polarization on so many policy issues these days, and the high level of
controversy over China policy in some past presidential election campaigns
(especially 1960, 1980, 1992, and 2000).
So far at least, China does not appear to be the contentious issue that it once was.

What are the similarities in approach and the differences in
emphasis?

·Both platforms declared an American interest in
a “peaceful and prosperous China,” but the Republican platform went on to say
that “we will welcome even more the development of a democratic China,” whereas
the Democratic platform spoke of the importance of “respecting the universal
human rights of the Chinese people.”This
difference echoes a long-standing difference in emphasis between those who
focus on a change in China’s domestic political institutions and those who
focus on the promotion of a broader set of human rights, but it does not
suggest any concrete ways in which the China policies of the two candidates
might differ.

·Compared with the Democratic Party platform, the
Republican counterpart has a far longer list of American concerns about China,
including its “pursuit of advanced military capabilities without any apparent
need; a barbaric one-child policy involving forced abortion; the erosion of
democracy in Hong Kong and its destabilizing claims in the South China
Sea.”Relatedly, the Republican platform
did not include a commitment to try to build a “cooperative relationship” with
China, as did the Democratic platform, which listed Korea, Iran, and climate
change among the issues that present “opportunities for cooperation.”And yet neither the Republican platform nor
statements by Governor Romney have included a description of China as a “strategic
competitor” – as George W. Bush did in the 2000 campaign, let alone a portrait
of Beijing as a prospective adversary.

·

Both platforms reiterated the American
commitment to Taiwan’s security and the American interest that the future of
Taiwan be resolved peacefully that are embodied in the Taiwan Relations Act. But the Republican platform went on to take a number
of other positions favorable to Taipei, including supporting Taiwan’s: “full
participation” in multilateral organizations, “the timely” sale of defensive
arms” to the island, and “free trade agreements status” for Taiwan-- presumably
a somewhat awkward reference to either a free trade agreement with the U.S. or
Taiwanese membership in the Trans-Pacific Partnership.But these differences pale in comparison to
the statements on Taiwan policy by Ronald Reagan during the 1980 campaign and
by George W. Bush just after his inauguration in 2001.

These are all interesting differences of
emphasis:the Republican platform more
supportive of democracy in China, the Democratic platform willing to call for a
cooperative relationship with Beijing, and the Republic platform somewhat more
forthcoming with regard to Taiwan.But
in themselves, these differences do not suggest major differences in China
policy no matter who wins the election in November.

The more
important and potentially significant differences involve trade policy. Both platforms
called for a “firm response” (as the Republicans put it) to unfair Chinese
trade practices.But they differed over
which party would do the better job of being firm.The
Democratic platform claimed that the Obama Administration had already taken a
tough position with Beijing by bringing trade cases against China to the World
Trade Organization at “twice the rate of the previous administration.”But the Republican platform declared that it
would take a “new Republican Administration” to address trade issues
successfully.In a fuller presentation
of his position, Mitt Romney’s September 2011 “Believe in America”
manifesto accused the Obama Administration of having “singularly failed in
handling commercial relations with China. He came into office with high hopes
that displays of American goodwill toward Beijing would lead to better
relations across all fronts.Predictably,
the good will has not been reciprocated. .. Having tried and failed with ‘engagement,’ the
Obama Administration now behaves as if the United States has no leverage” in dealing
with China and has “acquiesced” to the “one-way arrangements the Chinese have
come to enjoy.”

Romney’s “Believe in America” plan went on to
call for a policy of “confronting China” on trade issues,” being prepared to
“walk away” from trade negotiations with Beijing, showing a willingness to “say‘no more’ to a relationship that too often benefits them and harms us” and to
“put on the table all unilateral actions within our power to ensure that the
Chinese adhere to existing agreements.”

More specifically, Romney
has declared that among other executive orders he would issue on the first
day of the new administration, he would declare Beijing to be engaged in
“currency manipulation” and instruct the Commerce Department to impose
countervailing duties on China “if it does not move quickly to float its
currency.”– (This charge that China
manipulates its currency was repeated in the Republican Party platform,
but without the accompanying promise that a President Romney would issue a
formal declaration to that effect in his first day in office.) This is
reminiscent of Bill Clinton’s promise in the 1998 election campaign that
he would revoke China’s most-favored-nation status if its human rights
situation had not improved, but so far is different in several
respects:it is not as prominent a
feature of Romney’s campaign rhetoric as it was of Clinton’s; and the
consequences of such a declaration are less immediate, since China would
doubtless file bring a case against the U.S. before the World Trade
Organization, and such a case would almost certainly delay the imposition
of the American countervailing duties.For those interested in a stable U.S.-China relationship, this
feature of the Romney platform is a matter of concern, but should not yet be
cause for alarm.

Otherwise, the Romney campaign
appears to be promising a high degree of continuity in American policy toward
China.There are differences in the way
in which China is portrayed, but they are not as great as they were during the
2000 campaign between George W. Bush and Al Gore, let alone in the 1998
campaign between Clinton and George H.W. Bush.This suggests that, unless there are unexpected developments in China’s
domestic or foreign policies, there is likely to be a high degree of continuity
in American policy toward China no matter whether Obama or Romney wins the 2008
election.

About Me

Harry Harding is founding dean of the Frank Batten School of Leadership and Public Policy at the University of Virginia. He was previously a member of the faculties of Swarthmore College (1970-71) and Stanford University (1971-83), a Senior Fellow in the Foreign Policy Studies Program at the Brookings Institution (1983-94), Dean of the Elliott School of International Affairs at George Washington University (1995-2005), Director of Research and Analysis at Eurasia Group, a political risk consulting firm headquartered in New York (2005-07), and University Professor of International Affairs at George Washington University (2007-09). In spring 2009, he was Visiting Professor of Politics and Public Administration at the University of Hong Kong.
Among other positions, he is a Vice Chairman of the Asia Foundation, Senior Fellow in the Center on U.S.-China Relations at the Asia Society in New York, and a Counselor to Eurasia Group.
Among his published works is A Fragile Relationship: The United States and China since 1972.