Tuesday, 10 December 2013

The Qamishli Front

The
northeastern corner of Syria- with the city of Qamishli and its
surrounding area- has attracted some media attention as a scene of
what is known as the wider “Kurdish-Jihadi” conflict that erupted
since the expulsion of jihadis from the Hasakah northern border town
of Ras al-Ayn by the YPG in July. So which factions are fighting on
the Qamishli front on both sides?

Rebel Offensive

On the
offensive, most egregious is the ongoing wave of suicide bombings
that have struck the positions of the YPG and of the Assad regime’s
National Defense Force militia (NDF) in the city of Qamishli itself,
perpetrated more recently by the Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham
[ISIS]. Fighting between ISIS and factions defending Qamishli has
been intermittent for a number of months now, including the claimed
capture by ISIS in early August of two villages near Qamishli:
namely, al-Baza and al-Hamara. Similarly, in
late October, ISIS sources reported ongoing clashes between ISIS
and the YPG on a number of fronts.

Figure 1: Photo circulated in ISIS
circles of aftermath of a suicide car bombing in late November in
Qamishli, targeting the YPG.

Figure 2: Aftermath of suicide car
bombing perpetrated by one Abu Saleh al-Qasimi of ISIS, targeting the
NDF. Photo released on 6 December.

Keen to downplay accusations of
anti-Kurdish racism, ISIS has been eager to show Kurdish
participation in its operations on the Qamishli front in particular
and Hasakah governorate in general (now renamed ‘al-Baraka’
province in ISIS circles).

Figure 3: Aftermath of a suicide car
bombing perpetrated against the YPG in Qamishli by ISIS’ Abu Omar
al-Kurdi al-Muhajir in late November.

Figure 4: Kurdish fighters for ISIS.

Figure 5: “Message from Kurdish
Mujahideen from the Islamic State.” ISIS video of Kurdish fighters
in Syria, speaking in Kurdish, not Arabic.

It would be mistaken to characterize
ISIS as the sole or leading participant in the offensive on the
Qamishli front. For example, in July, in the immediate aftermath of
the expulsion of ISIS and Jabhat al-Nusra from Qamishli, an umbrella
“liberation front” for the Qamishli area was announced, with
chanting featured at the end of a jihadist orientation, most notably
the slogan: “The Caliphate is the promise of God.”

Figure 6: “Statement of the
Liberation Front of Qamishli if God wills.”

In this context,
it is worth mentioning another major set of groups on the Qamishli
front of a jihadi/Caliphate orientation: namely, those going by the
name of Ansar al-Khilafa. At least one of these ruled with Jabhat
al-Nusra/ISIS as part of a joint coalition over the eastern border
town of Yaroubiya until these forces were expelled by the YPG in late
October. This Ansar al-Khilafa of the ruling coalition of Yaroubiya-
described as ‘ansar’ (i.e. affiliates) of ISIS by a local
pro-ISIS Hasakah contact- is independent from the Ansar
al-Khilafa brigade affiliated with Hizb-ut-Tahrir in the western
Aleppo countryside.

However, an announcement posted on 15
October announcing a new offensive on the Qamishli front entitled
“And say: Truth has come and Falsehood has perished” indicates
that Hizb-ut-Tahrir’s Ansar al-Khilafa has sent deployments to the
Qamishli area as well, cooperating with these other Ansar al-Khilafa
groups. Indeed, the announcement listed the following participating
battalions: “Jabhat al-Nusra, Liwa Amjad al-Islam, Collection of
Ansar al-Khilafa Brigades, including”[NB: emphasis
my own]the Ansar al-Khilafa brigades of western Aleppo
countryside and the town of Aleppo itself, and finally Liwa
al-Qadisiyah.

The last
brigade in this list has claimed some dead fighters as of October
in Hasakah province through fighting regime forces and the “militias
of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party” (PKK, used interchangeably in
rebel discourse with the PYD and YPG): namely, Abdullah Said al-Namar
al-Dagheem, Ahmad Ali Ibrahim al-Dagheem, Hafez Saleem al-Omori and
Mahmoud Khattab.

Figure 7: Ansar al-Khilafa tank
operating in the Qamishli area as part of the new offensive announced
in October.

Figure 8: Ansar al-Khilafa fighters
celebrate victory over the dead corpse of a regime fighter killed
amid the claimed capture of the Abu Qusayeb checkpoint in Qamishli
area. From late June

Figure 9: One of the logos used by
Liwa Amjad al-Islam, a battalion primarily based in Aleppo
governorate that has also deployed fighters for the Qamishli front as
part of the October offensive.

At the same time as this “And say:
Truth has come and Falsehood has perished” offensive was announced,
a “Battle of Furqan” offensive in the Qamishli area was declared
against the PKK/PYD, including ISIS, Jabhat al-Nusra, Ahrar ash-Sham
and the “Free Army.” Ahrar ash-Sham has previously coordinated
with Anṣar
al-Khilafa and fellow Salafist rebel groups such as Jaysh
al-Tawheed (part of the former Syrian Islamic Front coalition) in the
Qamishli area.

More generally in Hasakah province, Ahrar
ash-Sham coordinates and maintains good relations with ISIS,
contrasting with localized tensions in both Aleppo and Idlib
governorates out towards the west (e.g. see this local Ahrar ash-Sham
statement on conflict with
ISIS in Maskana, Aleppo province, over a court dispute). Thus a
joint
ISIS-Ahrar ash-Sham operation was conducted against the YPG in Tel
Ma’aruf in late November. An Ahrar ash-Sham supporter from
Qamishli similarly confirmed to me an overall good working
relationship between ISIS and Ahrar ash-Sham in Hasakah province.

Considering how often rebel groups
announce new umbrella fronts and united battle initiatives, one
should not imagine an organized sustained offensive on the Qamishli
front. There are instances of cooperation but fighting remains
haphazard and confused, though the overall effort to push on Qamishli
and surrounding towns is undoubtedly being led by groups of jihadist
and Salafist orientation.

Factions on the DefensiveThe
city of Qamishli itself is controlled by two main factions: the YPG
militias, and the Assad regime’s NDF. Since the summer, the YPG has
significantly expanded its power base in the city at the expense of
regime forces, but the exact nature of the relationship between the
two factions remains nebulous. Any cooperation that does exist-
perhaps in trying to prevent suicide bomb attacks on the town, for
example- ought to be attributed more to PYD pragmatism rather than
ideological sympathy and affinity. A more recent incident pointing to
tension between the two factions involved the case
of an American journalist whom regime forces in Qamishli tried to
detain as opposed to YPG policy of securing the person’s
release.

Perhaps of most interest in the context of relations
between factions on the defensive in the Qamishli area is the
existence of Syriac Christian defense militias going by the name of
Sootoro. They exist in Qamishli, al-Malikiya and al-Qahtaniya.

Figure 11: A Sootoro emblem,
associated with the “Syriac Protection Office” of the city of
Qamishli.

According to Echoue Gouriye, head of
the Syriac Union Party that seeks to advance Syriac Christian
interests in Syria and has a base in Qamishli, Sootoro had its
beginnings among Syriac youth in the town of al-Qahtaniya after the
withdrawal of regime forces, then in al-Malikiyah (again, outside of
regime control), and finally in Qamishli, rooted in the belief that
Syriac Christians must take it upon themselves to defend their areas
and cannot simply rely on others to provide protection. At the same
time, Gouriye made clear to me that the approach does not exclude
cooperation with Kurds or Arabs when problems arise.

It
has been suggested that the Sootoro movement has split since its
inception, with the Qamishli branch overrun by pro-regime elements
while those in al-Qahtaniya and al-Malikiya remaining linked to the
Syriac Union Party. The Qamishli branch officially claims neutrality,
with the Syriac Protection Office having stated the following to me
in an interview: “We do not fight against any side of the conflict
in Syria, but our work encompasses protecting our regions from theft
or kidnapping operations…and we have forged an excellent
relationship with all groups of Syrian society in general and with
the people of Qamishli in particular.”

However, an overview
of the Qamishli Sootoro’s photos quickly shows a regime affinity at
least on the part of the leadership, most notably through the
presence of the regime flag in its images. Of course, it does not
necessarily follow that these Sootoro members are somehow diehard
Ba’athists. They should rather be seen as analogous to the Druze
militias of southern Syria: that is, they likely see the regime as
the best guarantor of the protection of the Syriac community’s
lands and interests, any reservations about the traditional Ba’athist
denial of non-Arab-Christian identity notwithstanding. This tendency
is reinforced by the Islamic supremacist tendencies of fighters
leading the offensive on the Qamishli front, culminating in the
desecration of some Syriac churches.

Figure 12: Sootoro militiamen in a
Qamishli street. Note the regime flag on the building.

Figure 15: The Mar Malki Church in
the Qamishli countryside, burnt down in September.

Pointing to a split between the
Qamishli Sootoro and groups using the name Sootoro in other towns is
a statement released in late October by the Qamishli office,
addressed to the people of al-Hasakah, al-Malikiya and al-Qahtaniya,
reading as follows:

“Stories have proliferated recently
about the existence of members affiliated with the protection office
(Sootoro) in your great towns, so we inform you that we in the
protection office have not formed until now any branch outside the
city of Qamishli and that we were in the process of forming branches
to cover al-Malikiya, al-Qahtaniya and al-Hasakah as well with these
branches composed of your great sons….and [with cooperation etc.]
there will be an announcement about it in official form.”

The
statement therefore quite clearly separates the Qamishli Sootoro from
any groups using this name in other towns.

Figure 16: Qamishli Sootoro
statement in late October denying formation of new branches in
al-Malikiya, al-Qahtaniya and al-Hasakah.

In any event, Sootoro groups maintain
generally cordial relations with local Kurdish militias in
particular, as the Qamishli group in particular has attended
funerals for YPG fighters killed in July in clashes with Jabhat
al-Nusra, offering words of praise for their efforts. In a similar
vein, the Qamishli protection office claims to have given refuge to a
Kurdish militiaman from al-Malikiya who had personal problems,
allowing him to spend the night in the Qamishli office and be
restored to his family the following day.

This fits in well
with the Qamishli Sootoro’s claim to me that the group makes no
sectarian distinctions in their areas. Indeed, such an approach makes
sense in a context where, like the Druze of southern Syria, there is
little capacity for or interest in establishing any kind of
separatist trend. There is also a contrast here with the 1980s
when many Assyrian Christians joined Kurdish Peshmerga militias
(rather than form separate militias) in the face of Saddam Hussein’s
al-Anfal campaign that saw the destruction of numerous Christian
villages in the north of the country.

ConclusionNeither
those attempting to take Qamishli and the surrounding area nor those
factions defending the region form united fronts, with relations
between the YPG, regime forces and Sootoro groups particularly
complex. However, in the long-term, territorial control is likely to
remain out of rebel hands, since the rebel factions lack local
demographic appeal in the face of a strengthened YPG in Hasakah
province in particular.

Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi is a
student at Brasenose College, Oxford University, and a
Shillman-Ginsburg Fellow at the Middle East Forum. Thanks to David
Vergili for establishing contact with Echoue Gouriye.