RESTRICTIONS: NONE
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The Computer Incident Advisory Capability
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Information Bulletin
Revised Hewlett-Packard NIS ypbind Vulnerability
January 22, 1993, 1400 PST Number D-05
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PROBLEM: Allows unauthorized access to NIS data.
PLATFORM: HP/UX Operating System for series 300, 700, and 800 computers.
DAMAGE: Remote and local users can obtain unauthorized privileges.
SOLUTION: Install revised patches.
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Critical Information about Hewlett-Packard NIS ypbind
The inclosed advisory was issued by the Computer Emergency Response
Team Coordination Center (CERT/CC) and is an update to a previous
advisory CA-92:17.
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CA-93:01 CERT Advisory
January 13, 1993
Revised Hewlett-Packard NIS ypbind Vulnerability
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*** THIS IS A REVISED CERT ADVISORY ***
*** IT CONTAINS NEW INFORMATION REGARDING AVAILABILITY OF IMAGE KITS ***
*** SUPERSEDES CERT ADVISORY CA-92:17 ***
The CERT Coordination Center has received information concerning a
vulnerability in the NIS ypbind module for the Hewlett-Packard (HP)
HP/UX Operating System for series 300, 700, and 800 computers.
HP has provided revised patches for all of the HP/UX level 8 releases
(8.0, 8.02, 8.06, and 8.07). This problem is fixed in HP/UX 9.0.
The following patches have been superseded:
Patch ID Replaced by Patch ID
PHNE_1359 PHNE_1706
PHNE_1360 PHNE_1707
PHNE_1361 PHNE_1708
All HP NIS clients and servers running ypbind should obtain and
install the patch appropriate for their machine's architecture
as described below.
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I. Description
A vulnerability in HP NIS allows unauthorized access to NIS data.
II. Impact
Root on a remote host running any vendor's implementation of NIS
can gain root access on any local host running HP's NIS ypbind.
Local users of a host running HP's NIS ypbind can also gain root access.
III. Solution
1) All HP NIS clients and servers running ypbind should obtain and
install the patch appropriate for their machine's architecture.
These patches contain a version of ypbind that accepts ypset
requests only from a superuser port on the local host. This prevents
a non-superuser program from sending rogue ypset requests to ypbind.
The patches also include the mod from the superseded patches that
prevents a superuser on a remote system from issuing a ypset -h
command to the local system and binding the system to a rogue ypserver.
These patches may be obtained from HP via FTP (this is NOT
anonymous FTP) or the HP SupportLine. To obtain HP security
patches, you must first register with the HP SupportLine.
The registration instructions are available via anonymous FTP at
cert.org (192.88.209.5) in the file
"pub/vendors/hp/supportline_and_patch_retrieval".
The new patch files are:
Architecture Patch ID Filename Checksum
------------ -------- -------- --------
Series 300 PHNE_1706 /hp-ux_patches/s300_400/8.X/PHNE_1706 38955 212
Series 700 PHNE_1707 /hp-ux_patches/s700/8.X/PHNE_1707 815 311
Series 800 PHNE_1708 /hp-ux_patches/s800/8.X/PHNE_1708 56971 299
2) The instructions for installing the patch are provided in the
PHNE_xxxx.text file (this file is created after the patch has
been unpacked).
The checksums listed above are for the patch archive files from HP.
Once unpacked, each shell archive contains additional checksum
information in the file "patchfilename.text". This checksum is
applicable to the binary patch file "patchfilename.updt".
If you have any questions about obtaining or installing the patches,
contact the USA HP SupportLine at 415-691-3888, or your local HP
SupportLine number. Please note that the telephone numbers in this
advisory are appropriate for the USA and Canada.
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The CERT Coordination Center wishes to thank Brian Kelley of Ford Motor
Company for bringing this vulnerability to our attention. We would also
like to thank Hewlett-Packard for their response to this problem.
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CIAC would like to acknowledge the contributions of: CERT/CC.
For additional information or assistance, please contact CIAC at
(510)422-8193/FTS or send E-mail to ciac@llnl.gov. FAX messages to
(510)423-8002/FTS.
The CIAC Bulletin Board, Felicia, can be accessed at 1200 or 2400
baud at (510) 423-4753 and 9600 baud at (510) 423-3331.
Previous CIAC bulletins and other information is available via
anonymous ftp from irbis.llnl.gov (ip address 128.115.19.60).
PLEASE NOTE: Many users outside of the DOE and ESnet computing
communities receive CIAC bulletins. If you are not part of these
communities, please contact your agency's response team to report
incidents. Some of the other teams include the NASA NSI response team,
DARPA's CERT/CC, NAVCIRT, and the Air Force response team. Your
agency's team will coordinate with CIAC. The Forum of Incident Response
and Security Teams (FIRST) is a world-wide organization. A list of
FIRST member organizations and their constituencies can be obtained by
sending email to Docserver@First.Org with a null subject line, and the
first line of the message reading: send first-contacts.
This document was prepared as an account of work sponsored by an agency
of the United States Government. Neither the United States Government
nor the University of California nor any of their employees, makes any
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