Shell-Shocked

Map 1: Mogadishu: Insurgent attacks through mid-March 2007

Map 2: Mogadishu:
Ethiopian offensives in March and April 2007

-

I. Summary

The year 2007 brought little respite to hundreds of
thousands of Somalis suffering from 16 years of unremitting violence. Instead,
successive political and military upheavals generated a human rights and
humanitarian crisis on a scale not seen since the early 1990s.

Since January 2007, residents of Mogadishu, the Somali capital, have been
gripped by a terrifying campaign of violence that has killed and injured
hundreds of civilians, provoked the largest and most rapid displacement of a
civilian population for many years, and shattered the lives, homes, and
livelihoods of thousands of people. Although overlooked by much of the world,
it is a conflict whose human cost is matched by its regional and international
significance.

The conflict in Mogadishu
in 2007 involves Ethiopian and Somali government forces against a coalition of
insurgent groups. It is a conflict that has been marked by numerous violations
of international humanitarian law that have been met with a shameful silence
and inaction on the part of key foreign governments and international
institutions.

Violations of the laws of war documented in this report include
the deployment of insurgent forces in densely populated neighborhoods and the
widespread, indiscriminate bombardment of these areas by Ethiopian forces. The
deliberate nature of these bombardments, evidence of criminal intent, strongly
suggests the commission of war crimes.

Underpinning the developments in Somalia
is the striking rise to power and rapid collapse of the Islamic Courts Union
(ICU), a movement based on a coalition of sharia courts, in Mogadishu in mid-2006. The Islamic Courts
were credited with bringing unprecedented stability to a city plagued by
lawlessness and extreme violence. Speculation about whether early indicators of
extreme and repressive action by the ICU would evolve into more moderate policy
was cut short by the events that followed.

The presence of some radical and militant Islamist elements
within the ICU and their belligerent statements stoked fears within and outside
the region. The ICU's dominance also threatened the Somali Transitional Federal
Government (TFG), which had little international support and minimal popular
legitimacy, particularly in Mogadishu.
In December 2006 Somalia's
historic rival Ethiopia
intervened in Somalia in
support of the TFG and with the backing of the United States government, and
ousted the ICU in a matter of days. Although the campaign was conducted in the
name of fighting international terrorism, Ethiopia's
actions were rooted in its own regional and national security interests, namely
a proxy war with Eritrea and
concern over Ethiopian armed opposition movements supported by Eritrea and the
ICU.

Following the establishment of Ethiopian and TFG troops in Mogadishu in January 2007, residents of Mogadishu witnessed a steady spiral of
attacks by insurgent forces aimed at Ethiopian and TFG military forces and TFG
officials. Increasingly, Ethiopian forces launched mortars, rockets, and
artillery fire in response. A failed March 21 and 22 disarmament operation by
the TFG resulted in the capture of TFG troops and-in scenes evocative of the
deaths of US soldiers in 1993-the mutilation of their bodies in Mogadishu's
streets.

In late March Ethiopian forces launched their first
offensive to capture Mogadishu's
stadium and other locations, which met with resistance from a widening
coalition of insurgent groups. Ethiopian forces used sustained rocket
bombardment and shelling of entire neighborhoods as their main strategy to
dislodge the mobile insurgency and then occupy strategic locations. Hundreds of
civilians died trying to flee or while trapped in their homes as the rockets
and shells landed. Tens of thousands of people fled the city.

Four days of intense bombardment
and fighting was ended by a brief ceasefire negotiated by the Ethiopian
military and Hawiye clan elders. The ceasefire faltered and then broke in late
April, when Ethiopian forces launched their second major offensive to capture
additional areas of north Mogadishu.
Again, heavy shelling and rocket barrages were used against insurgents in
densely populated civilian neighborhoods. Hundreds more people died or were
wounded. On April 26 the TFG, which played a nominal role supporting the
Ethiopian military campaign, declared victory. Within days, insurgent attacks
resumed, increasingly based on targeting Ethiopian and TFG forces with remote-controlled
explosive devices.

Based on dozens of eyewitness
accounts gathered by Human Rights Watch in a six-week research mission to Kenya
and Somalia in April and May 2007, plus subsequent interviews and research in
June and July, this report documents the illegal means and methods of warfare
used by all of the warring parties and the resulting catastrophic toll on
civilians in Mogadishu.

The insurgency routinely deployed their forces in densely
populated civilian areas and often launched mortar rounds in "hit-and-run"
tactics that placed civilians at unnecessary risk. The insurgency possibly used
civilians to purposefully shield themselves from attack. They fired weapons,
particularly mortars, in a manner that did not discriminate between civilians and
military objectives, and they targeted TFG civilian officials for attack. In at
least one instance, insurgent forces executed captured combatants in their
custody, and subjected the bodies to degrading treatment.

Ethiopian forces failed to take all feasible precautions to
avoid incidental loss of civilian life and property, such as by failing to
verify that targets were military objectives. Ethiopian commanders and troops
used both means of warfare (firing inherently indiscriminate "Katyusha" rockets
in urban areas) and methods of warfare (using mortars and other indirect
weapons without guidance in urban areas) that violated international
humanitarian law. They routinely and repeatedly fired rockets, mortars, and
artillery in a manner that did not discriminate between civilian and military
objectives or that caused civilian loss that exceeded the expected military
gain. The use of area bombardments in populated areas and the failure to cancel
attacks once the harm to civilians became known is evidence of criminal intent
necessary to demonstrate the commission of war crimes. The Ethiopian forces
also appeared to conduct deliberate attacks on civilians, particularly attacks
on hospitals. They committed pillaging and looting of civilian property,
including of medical equipment from hospitals.

The Transitional Federal Government forces failed to provide
effective warnings when alerting civilians of impending military operations,
committed widespread pillaging and looting of civilian property, and interfered
with the delivery of humanitarian assistance. TFG security forces committed
mass arrests and have mistreated persons in custody.

Reaction to these
serious international crimes has been muted to the point of silence. Despite
the scale and gravity of the abuses in Mogadishu
in 2007, there has been no serious condemnation by key governments or
institutions. The human rights crisis that has permeated Somalia for
years, now significantly amplified in the past six months, has yet to even
reach the agenda of many international actors. Easing the suffering of Somali
civilians and building a stable state cannot be accomplished in a human rights
vacuum.

Key governments and international institutions such as the United States, the European Union and its
members, the African Union, the Arab League, and the United Nations Security
Council must recognize the urgent need for human rights protection and
accountability in Somalia.

International donors and actors must take immediate action
to condemn the appalling crimes that have been perpetrated and senda
clear signal to all the warring parties that impunity for these crimes
willnot be tolerated. The United States
and the European Union provide significant financial, technical, and other
assistance to both Ethiopia
and the Somali Transitional Federal Government and should use their leverage to
press for respect for human rights and international humanitarian law.

Independent human rights monitoring and reporting must be
increased and international donors should encourage, assist, and finance
efforts to make those responsible for abuses accountable for Somalia's
latest cycle of violence.

II. Key Recommendations

To the Transitional Federal Government of Somalia
(TFG)

Immediately
issue clear public orders to all TFG security forces to cease attacks on
and mistreatment of civilians and looting of civilian property, and ensure
that detainees have access to family members, legal counsel, and adequate
medical care while in detention.

Ensure
humanitarian assistance to all civilians in need, including by
facilitating the access of humanitarian agencies to all displaced persons
in and around Mogadishu.

Investigate
allegations of abuses by TFG forces and hold accountable the members of
the TFG forces, whatever their rank, who have been implicated in abuses.

Take all necessary steps to
build a competent, independent, and impartial judiciary that can provide
trials that meet international fair trial standards. Abolish the death
penalty as an inherently cruel form of punishment.

Invite
the United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights
(OHCHR) to increase the number of staff monitoring and reporting on human
rights abuses in Somalia
and request technical support for the judiciary and the establishment of
an independent national human rights commission.

To the groups comprising the insurgency

Cease all attacks on civilians and
civilian objects, including government officials and employees not
directly participating in the hostilities. Cease all attacks that cause indiscriminate or disproportionate harm
to civilians or civilian objects, including attacks in crowded
civilian areas, such as busy roads, village or city streets, markets, or
other public gathering places.

Avoid locating, to the extent feasible,
insurgent forces within or near densely populated areas, and where
possible remove civilians from the vicinity of such forces. Avoid using
populated areas to launch attacks and cease threatening civilians who
protest the use of their neighborhoods as launching sites. Never
purposefully use civilians to shield insurgent forces from attack.

Publicly commit to abide by
international humanitarian law, including prohibitions against
targeting civilians, using indiscriminate and disproportionate attacks,
and using civilians as "human shields."

To the government of Ethiopia

Cease
all attacks that deliberately target civilians and cease using means and
methods of combat that cannot discriminate between civilians and military
objectives. Civilian objects such as schools, hospitals, and homes must
not be attacked unless currently being used for military purposes.

Cease
all indiscriminate attacks and attacks in which the expected civilian harm
is excessive compared to the concrete and direct military gain
anticipated. In particular, cease the use of area bombardments of
populated areas of Mogadishu.

Issue
clear public orders to all forces that they must uphold fundamental
principles of international humanitarian law and provide clear guidelines
and training to all commanders and fighters to ensure compliance with
international humanitarian law.

Investigate
and discipline or prosecute as appropriate military personnel, regardless
of rank, who are responsible for serious violations of international
humanitarian law including those who may be held accountable as a matter
of command responsibility.

To the European Union and its member states, the European
Commission, the United Nations Security Council, the African Union, the Arab
League, and the government
of the United States

Publicly
condemn the serious abuses of international human rights and humanitarian
law committed by all parties to the conflict in Mogadishu in 2007, and call on the
Ethiopian government and the Transitional Federal Government of Somalia to
take all necessary steps, including public action, to ensure that their
forces cease abuses against civilians.

Support
measures to promote accountability and end impunity for serious crimes in Somalia,
including through the establishment of an independent United Nations panel
of experts to investigate and map serious crimes and recommend further
measures to improve accountability.

Publicly promote and
financially support civil society efforts to provide humanitarian
assistance, services such as education, monitoring of the human rights
situation, and efforts to promote national solidarity. Promote and support
TFG efforts to improve the functioning of the judicial system and
to establish a national human rights commission. Provide voluntary
contributions to support an expanded OHCHR field operation in Somalia.

III. Background

The continuing crisis in Somalia is multifaceted, with roots
that can be traced back to the 21-year rule of President Mohamed Siad Barre
(19691991).[1]
Barre's military coup in 1969 ended Somalia's first post-independence
experiment with democratic civilian government (1960-69), a period which in
later years became marked by corruption, inefficient governance, and
increasingly fragmentary politics centered around clan-based political parties
and patronage.[2]

When Siad Barre took power in 1969, he sought and obtained
support from the Soviet Union and embraced "scientific socialism" for Somalia. Among
his first steps were to abolish Somalia's
clan and patronage system as counter-revolutionary: a national campaign (olole) against "tribalism, corruption,
nepotism, and misrule" was launched and even informal references to clan
alliances were outlawed.[3]
A new intelligence agency, the National Security Service (NSS), was established
in 1970 to monitor "security" offenses that included nepotism and tribalism.

Barre's early rule did have some positive aspects, such as
his establishment of the first written script for the Somali language, a
nationwide literacy campaign (1973-75), and the empowerment of women through
fairer marriage, divorce, and inheritance laws. However, his government soon
degenerated into increasing dictatorship, repression, and a personality cult
focused around the "Holy Trinity" of Marx, Lenin, and "the Beneficent Leader"
Barre, who established an increasingly repressive and authoritarian security
state, placing himself in control of all facets of state power.[4]

Barre's government suffered a serious blow when he launched
an unsuccessful military invasion of the ethnic Somali Ogaden region of Ethiopia in
1977. Barre's invasion accelerated the Soviet Union's decision to support the
Marxist Ethiopian regime and to abandon support for Somalia, leading to a military
defeat for Barre in 1978. This set in motion an economic and political crisis
of legitimacy that ultimately led to the collapse of the Barre dictatorship.[5]
After breaking with the Soviet Union,[6]
Barre abandoned "scientific socialism," allied himself with the West, and
sought refuge increasingly in the support of his Darod clan.[7]

The increasing clan basis of Barre's regime led to the
formation of opposition fronts that were similarly clan-focused, as non-Darod
clans felt excluded from power.[8]
One of the first setbacks to Barre came in 1981 when his attempts to undermine
the economic and political power of the Isaaq clan led to the formation of the
Isaaq-dominated Somali National Movement (SNM).[9]
The SNM soon began launching small-scale attacks against government and
military posts inside Somalia.

Barre responded to the SNM with what Human Rights Watch
described as "savage counterinsurgency tactics," ordering massive bombardments
of northern towns and villages that killed tens of thousands of Somali
civilians and led to the internal displacement of some 500,000 northerners, with
another 500,000 seeking refuge in Ethiopia.[10]

Following his 1978 break with the Soviet Union, Barre had
enjoyed substantial support from the West, particularly the United States[11]-allowing
Barre to expand his army from an estimated 3,000 at the time of independence to
a "suffocating" 120,000 by 1982.[12]
Reports from Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, and the press about the
atrocities being committed by the Barre regime led, however, to a sharp
reduction in US and western aid by late 1989.

The Fall of the Barre Regime and the Outbreak of Clan Fighting

President Barre was overthrown in January 1991 by a
coalition of insurgency movements including the Isaaq-dominated SNM, Gen.
Mohamed Farah Aideed's largely Hawiye clan-based United Somali Congers (USC) fighting
in the south-central regions, and the Ogaden clan-dominated Somali Patriotic
Movement (SPM) that was based in southern Somalia.[13]

The removal of the Siad Barre government spurred new
conflict among and within the clan-based opposition movements. The USC split
into two factions, one supporting General Aideed and a second supporting a
Hawiye businessman from the Abgal sub-clan, Ali Mahdi Mohammed. Mohammed was
appointed as interim president by a group of politicians and influential elders
from the Hawiye clan within two days of Barre's ouster.[14]

By late 1991 increasing numbers of individuals and armed
groups competed for power in the vacuum left by Siad Barre's departure. The
early 1990s saw some of Mogadishu's
worst fighting as militia mobilized by General Aideed fought with those of Ali
Mahdi to impose their control over the capital and the rest of the country.[15]

The war divided the capital city into two zones separated by
a "green line,"[16]
displaced tens of thousands of people, and cost thousands of civilians in Mogadishu and south-central Somalia their lives. The fighting
in Mogadishu and subsequent clan-based conflict
further south also severely affected the local harvest, creating an
unprecedented famine in fertile southern Somalia.[17]
Humanitarian organizations estimated that between February 1991 and December
1992, 300,000 people may have lost their lives.[18]

Between 1991 and 1993, as people
died of starvation and related illnesses in their tens of thousands, freelance
and clan-based militia obstructed aid efforts and looted relief. A 1992 United
Nations (UN)-negotiated ceasefire failed and prompted the first UN military
intervention to protect relief access and aid workers-the operation known as
the United Nations Operation for Somalia (UNOSOM). In December 1992 UNOSOM's
failure to end the fighting led the United States
to overcome its initial reluctance and to send troops, under US command, to the UN Task Force on Somalia (known
as UNITAF and codenamed "Operation Restore Hope"). In May 1993 UNOSOM and
UNITAF were replaced by UNOSOM II, which had a more robust mandate under
Chapter VII of the UN Charter and more than 30,000 troops from various
countries.[19]US
troops withdrew in 1994 after they became embroiled in conflict with General
Aideed.[20]
UNOSOM II left Somalia in
March 1995 without achieving a breakthrough towards long-term political
stability for Somalia,
initially a key objective of the mission.[21]

The civil war and the successive US and UN military
interventions in the early 1990s left several legacies, including a dramatic
increase in the number of Somali factions and armed groups (none of which
shared any common political platform or national vision), the empowerment of
individual warlords, and a deep reluctance on the part of powerful states such
as the United States to intervene in Somalia.[22]

Successive Failed Peace Processes: 19912004

Peace initiatives began as early as 1991. After UNOSOM
withdrew in 1995, diplomatic responsibility for Somalia was left to regional
governments. Egypt, Djibouti, Yemen,
Ethiopia, and Kenya took
turns hosting peace conferences to end the violence and reestablish a Somali
state.[23]
Of more than a dozen peace conferences, two were noteworthy for an
understanding of current events.

The first of these was in May 2000 in Arta, a town in
neighboring Djibouti.[24]
During the negotiations Djibouti
tried to create an atmosphere that limited the role and influence of the
warlords in the conference, instead emphasizing the role of civil society
groups and clan elders. The conference resulted in the first Transitional
National Government (TNG) led by Abdulkasim Salad Hassan, a controversial and
long-time minister under Siad Barre.[25]

The Djibouti conference also created a
245-member parliament and approved the appointment of Ali Khalif Gallaydh as
prime minister. It set up a power-sharing system based on the so-called 4.5
system-meaning an equal number of representatives for the four major clans and
half of a major clan's share for all the minority clans together.

Key players such as the United States, the European Union,
and the African Union (then the Organization of African States, OAS) were
hesitant to make any firm commitment to Somalia, given the numerous previous
failed peace processes, and provided little support to the TNG.[26]
But the biggest setback came from local warlords who refused to recognize and
collaborate with the new administration and instead formed a Somali
Reconciliation and Restoration Council (SRRC) in Ethiopia in 2001 to challenge
the legitimacy of the new government.[27]

By 2002 it was clear the TNG had failed to establish any
credible administration and its mandate was running out. It lacked authority on
the ground and could not prevail against the opposition of powerful warlords. Kenya offered
to host both sides, the TNG and SRRC, for European Commission-financed talks in
Eldoret in October 2002. After two years of difficult negotiations, in 2004
Kenya brokered a power-sharing agreement through the Inter-Governmental
Authority on Development (IGAD, a regional umbrella group which comprises
Ethiopia, Kenya, Djibouti, Sudan, Somalia, Uganda; Eritrea withdrew from
membership this year in protest of IGAD's view on Ethiopia's role in Somalia).[28]
The result of this process was the establishment of the current Transitional
Federal Institutions: a Transitional Federal Charter, a Transitional Federal
Government (TFG) and a Transitional Federal Parliament (TFP) consisting of 275
members.

In October 2004 the TFP elected Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed, a
leading member of the SRRC group, as president of the TFG, who in turn
appointed Ali Mohammed Gedi as prime minister.[29]
Following pressure from Kenya
to relocate and establish a government in Somalia,
in May 2005 the TFG tried to establish itself within Somalia, but immediately split,
with some members moving to Jowhar and some to Baidoa.[30]

The Ethiopian Factor

Recent events in Somalia are closely linked to
regional developments. Ethiopia
and Somalia are
historically, socially, and politically intertwined, with several episodes of
religious and territorial disputes over the Somali region of eastern Ethiopia known
as the Ogaden, most recently in 1964 and 1977.[31]
Ethiopian concerns over continuing Somali nationalist sentiments towards the
ethnic Somali Ogaden region remains a key element in Ethiopian foreign policy
decision-making.[32]

Successive Ethiopian governments have supported Somali
opposition leaders and movements and the Ethiopian government led by Prime
Minister Meles Zenawi has been closely involved in the various Somali peace
processes. Several of the current leading figures in Somalia's military and
political landscape have either received longstanding support from-in the case
of Abdullahi Yusuf-or had antagonistic relations with-in the case of Sheikh
Hassan Dahir Aweys, a former deputy leader of the militant Islamist group
Al-Itihaad Al-Islaami-the Ethiopian government.

Ethiopian mistrust of Sheikh Aweys stems from his connection
to Al-Itihaad Al-Islaami, originally a Salafi religious movement that evolved
into a militant Islamist organization. Sheikh Aweys was actively involved in
forming Al-Itihaad's military wing in the early 1990s, which fought against Ethiopia and
then-militia leader and current TFG President Abdullahi Yusuf's faction in
Puntland.[33]
Al-Itihaad was allegedly responsible for several bombings in Ethiopia in the mid-1990s that led to its
designation on a US
sanctions list of individuals and organizations after the September 11, 2001
attacks.[34]
In 1998, following Ethiopia's
defeat of Al-Itihaad in southwestern Somalia,
Sheikh Aweys returned to Mogadishu
and helped found one of the clan-based Islamic Courts.

Ethiopian involvement in Somalia
remains a divisive and politically charged issue for Somalis, many of whom view
Ethiopian motives in Somalia
with deep distrust.[35]
Some Somalis blame Ethiopia
for the inability of the TNG, the predecessor to the current TFG, to establish
an enduring government.[36]

Ethiopian interests in Somalia
are also closely linked to Ethiopia's
relations with Eritrea.
Although there has been little active fighting since their bloody 1998-2000
border war ended, Eritrea and Ethiopia remain bitter rivals and both
governments have engaged in a form of proxy war in Somalia dating back to the
late 1990s.[37]Eritrea has provided
military aid and training to a variety of Ethiopian insurgent groups based in
the Ogaden and Somalia, and Ethiopia has
supported the TFG.[38]

The Rise of the Islamic Courts in 2006

In June 2006 the Somali political scene was shaken by the
emergence of an alliance of sharia (Islamic law) courts, the Islamic Courts
Union (ICU). The ICU, with Sheikh Hassan Dahir Aweys among its leaders, drove
the warlords from Mogadishu.[39]
Although the appearance of the Islamic Courts as a potent political movement
was a surprise to many observers, the courts had longstanding roots in Mogadishu.[40]

In December 2004, just two months after the formation of the
TFG, a group of clan-based courts that had been operating in Mogadishu for years joined to launch the ICU.[41]
Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed, a schoolteacher from Mogadishu, was appointed chair of the
alliance.[42]
By 2005 there were 11 Islamic Courts from different clans operating in Mogadishu under sharia.[43]

The increasing influence of the Islamic Courts came against
the backdrop of growing US
concern over the presence of alleged terrorism suspects in Somalia.[44]
The US had claimed for
several years that several individuals linked to al Qaeda and the 1998 bombing
of the US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania
were being sheltered by radical Islamists in Mogadishu.[45]
The US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) initially tried to capture the
individuals by paying warlords in Mogadishu
to abduct the men and transfer them to CIA custody. Three of the individuals
most wanted by the US were
Fazul Abdullah Mohamed, a national of the ComorosIslands,
Abu Talha al-Sudani, a Sudanese national, and Saleh Ali Saleh Nabhan, a Kenyan.[46]

Reports of a growing jihadi network in Somalia strengthened fears that the ICU would
encourage Somalia
to become a breeding ground for terrorism in the Horn of Africa.[47]
On February 18, 2006, a few key warlords in Mogadishu
formed a new alliance called the Alliance
for the Restoration of Peace and Counter-Terrorism (ARPCT), with US backing.[48]
Its aim was to capture the individuals linked to the east Africa
bombings.[49]

Instead, US support for the notorious warlords who formed
the APRCT backfired, generating further popular support for the ICU,[50]
which extended its territorial control over a large part of central and
southern Somalia and ultimately defeated the APRCT in bitter fighting in
Mogadishu in June 2006.[51]

As the ICU fought the US-backed
warlords in early 2006, the Transitional Federal Government of Somalia was
struggling to establish itself in Somalia.[52]
It set up temporary bases, initially in Jowhar town and later on in Baidoa, 250
kilometers northwest of Mogadishu,
but received little international support.[53]
It was only when the ICU emerged as a powerful political actor in southern Somalia that
regional and international actors turned to the TFG as a more palatable form of
Somali leadership.[54]

Within a matter of four months, between June and October
2006, the ICU was in control of seven of the ten regions in south-central Somalia. The
Islamic Courts had restructured into the Council of Somali Islamic Courts
(CSIC), with the formation of a consultative council headed by Sheikh Aweys and
an executive body headed by Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed.[55]
The appointment of Sheikh Aweys as one of the main leaders of the CSIC further
alarmed both Ethiopia and
the US,
which had already placed Sheikh Aweys on a sanctions list in 2001 for his
alleged links to terrorism.[56]

A June 30, 2006 video message from Osama Bin Laden urged
Somalis to support the ICU and build an Islamic state, and threatened to fight
the US if it intervened in Somalia.[57]

Nationalist statements from some of the ICU leadership
further fuelled Ethiopian fears that the ICU hoped to unite ethnic Somali
communities in neighboring northern Kenya
and Ethiopia's Ogaden with Somalia. Ethiopia was also concerned by the potential
impact on Ethiopia's own
large Muslim and Somali population of the Islamic Courts' effort to establish
political Islam in Somalia.[58]

The emergence of the ICU as a military threat in 2006
prompted the Ethiopian government to strengthen its political and military
support to the TFG.[59]Ethiopia was the primary
supplier of arms to the TFG and some individual warlords, but Uganda and Yemen also contributed arms and
other supplies.[60]

On the other side, UN experts monitoring Somalia's utterly ineffective arms embargo in
2006 documented arms flows and supply of military materiel and training to the
Islamic Courts from seven states: Djibouti,
Egypt, Eritrea, Iran,
Libya, Saudi Arabia, and Syria.[61]

Following the ICU's victory over the warlords in June 2006, Ethiopia moved
increasing amounts of troops and military materiel into Baidoa, the TFG
stronghold, to protect it from any ICU attack.[62]
The US government supported
its ally Ethiopia.[63]

Peace Talks Fail: JuneDecember 2006

The rise of the Islamic Courts narrowed down the rival
groups in Somalia
to two: the Transitional Federal Government and the Islamic Courts Union.
Appeals for peace talks mounted in an effort to combine the political
legitimacy of the TFG and the stability restored to many parts of southern Somalia
by the Islamic Courts.

Sudan
agreed to host negotiations and on June 22, 2006, the two sides agreed on
mutual recognition and further talks in Khartoum.
A second round of talks under Arab League auspices in September 2006 made
further apparent progress, with agreement on integrated security forces and a
commitment to discuss power sharing arrangements. A third round of negotiations
was scheduled for October 30, 2006, but was forestalled by Somalia's first
suicide bombing on September 18, an assassination attempt on President
Abdullahi Yusuf.[64]
ICU leaders denied responsibility for the attack.[65]

Throughout the negotiations both the ICU and the
TFG/Ethiopia continued to bolster their military preparations. In the run-up to
the third round, the ICU also continued its territorial expansion, taking the
strategic southern town of Kismayo in late
September 2006, allegedly with a coalition of forces including advisors from Eritrea and
fighters from the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF) and the Oromo
Liberation Front (OLF).[66]

The TFG, Ethiopia,
and international government backers viewed this development with alarm,
interpreting it as a prelude to an ICU attack on Baidoa, the only TFG
stronghold in south-central Somalia.
The Ethiopian military moved to bolster its presence not only in Baidoa, but
also in Puntland and other areas of Somalia.[67]

By the time the third round of
talks began in Khartoum
in October 2006, the situation was at an impasse. The ICU insisted that Ethiopian
troops leave Somalia
and that IGAD should not have a mediating role in the talks. The TFG took the
opposite position, calling for IGAD involvement and the ICU's withdrawal from
recently captured areas. The talks ended in deadlock and Somalia entered
a new round of hostility.[68]

The Fall of the Islamic Courts

November and December saw rising tensions between the ICU
and the TFG/Ethiopians and increasing military preparations on the ground by
both sides.[69]
The UN Security Council on December 6 passed resolution 1725 authorizing a
regional military intervention in Somalia, a development long desired
by the TFG. The US-led resolution did
little to reduce the tensions and in fact may have increased them.[70]
Although the final resolution specified that troops from bordering countries
should not be included in IGASOM, the proposed IGAD deployment in Somalia, it
made no mention of the existing Ethiopian presence in Somalia and contained
enough elements to be viewed as pro-TFG by the Islamic Courts and independent
analysts.[71]

The ICU saw the Security Council resolution as blatant
support for the Ethiopian presence. On December 12, 2006, the ICU's defense
chief, Sheikh Yusuf Mohamed Siyad Indha'adde, gave the Ethiopian military in Somalia a week
to withdraw or face forcible expulsion.[72]
The day after the deadline passed, December 20, fighting started around Baidoa.
Although the Ethiopian military were actively defending the town, they denied
involvement for several days and only publicly acknowledged their role four
days later.[73]

Ethiopian and TFG forces went on the offensive (TFG militia
included forces from Puntland-the President's home region, the Sa'ad subclan of
the Hawiye, and Rahanweyn clan militias) and quickly drove the ICU from Mogadishu and its other
urban positions.[74]
The resistance apparently dissolved after several battles south and east of
Baidoa and in the central regions of Somalia just south of Galkayo town.
Hundreds of Islamic Courts militia members and some foreign fighters who
supported what they viewed as jihad[75]
reportedly died under Ethiopia's
superior firepower, particularly its aerial capacity.[76]

The Islamic Courts leadership left Mogadishu
on December 26 as the Ethiopian forces advanced on the capital, moving south
towards Kismayo and the JubaValley while many of
their Somali supporters merged back into the civilian population.[77]
Kismayo fell to the Ethiopians on January 1, 2007, forcing the Islamic Courts
leadership and supporters further south. The outflux included dozens of
foreigners who supported the Islamic Courts, some of whom had been living in Mogadishu with their wives
and children.[78]
Fazul Mohammed and several other individuals on the US
wanted list were apparently among the exodus from Mogadishu.[79]

The US
became overtly involved in the military campaign when it launched several
airstrikes from AC-130 gunships in southern Somalia on January 7 and 8,[80]
apparently targeting these fleeing individuals, and sent a limited number of
special forces across the border.[81]
The US
had previously made cautious public statements supporting the Ethiopian
offensive, but left the military ground operations to its Ethiopian ally. In
mid- and late January, Ethiopian, US, and Kenyan security forces cooperated in
a coordinated pincer operation. While Ethiopian troops pushed the fleeing
Islamists and their supporters towards Ras Kamboni, at the very tip of Somalia on the Kenyan border, US navy ships positioned off the Somali coast
cut off potential escapes by sea across the Gulf of Aden.[82]

As hundreds of people fleeing the conflict arrived at border
crossings or in Kenya,
Kenyan security forces closed the border and arrested dozens of Somali and
foreigners suspected of affiliation with the Islamic Courts or with men wanted
by the US
(see above).[83]

Meanwhile, as the Ethiopian and US forces pursued supporters
of the Islamic Courts south towards Kismayo, other Ethiopian units and TFG
forces settled into military bases and buildings in Mogadishu in the first days of January 2007.
These sites included strategic locations such as the new seaport, the airport, Somalia's former Presidential Palace (also known
as Villa Somalia),
and other strategic buildings including the former Ministry of Defense and the
former headquarters of the Custodial Corps.[84]
The Ethiopian military also occupied three former Somali military bases
situated on the two main highways that link Mogadishu to the southern and central
regions.[85]

IV. Mogadishu Under Siege: JanuaryApril 2007

By the end of January 2007 three main actors emerged in the
looming military confrontation: the insurgency, the Ethiopian armed forces, and
the forces supporting the Transitional Federal Government.[86]

The Ethiopian government has
closely guarded details of the number of troops deployed in Somalia and statistics of casualties incurred in
the fighting, but credible sources told Human Rights Watch that by early 2007 Ethiopia may have had as many as 30,000 troops
in Somalia.[87]
In 2006 Ethiopian military convoys carrying troops and military materiel came
into Somalia regularly from Ethiopia, passing through Beletweyne town, in Somalia's Hiran
region.[88]
Ethiopian forces deployed in Mogadishu
in early 2007 included infantry and air support.

The Ethiopians provided the backbone of the military power
on the side of the TFG, which itself brought an estimated 5,000 fighters into Mogadishu. The bulk of the TFG forces consist of
militias from President Yusuf's home region, Puntland, and members of the
Rahanweyn Resistance Army.[89] Most of
these militia forces had basic military training by the Ethiopians in Manaas
and Daynuunay former military barracks in Bay region in 2006.[90]
Ethiopian military officers also gave up to 3,000 newly recruited Somali
government militias a few weeks of training at Balidogle airport early in 2007.[91]

While much remains unknown about its organization,
membership, and leadership, it is widely believed that the insurgency consists
of three groups:[92]

The first group is comprised of
members of Al-Shabaab, a
well-trained militia and the core of the group that led the Islamic Courts to
victory during their rise to power in mid-2006. Many observers believe that
Al-Shabaab consisted of between 500 and 700 fighters, largely from the Hawiye
and Ogaden clans. Sheikh Hassan Turki is reportedly their spiritual leader
while their operational commander is Adan Hashi Ayrow.[93]

The second group consists of members of the Hawiye clan
militia who loathed the presence of the TFG leadership and the Ethiopian
military in Mogadishu.
These comprised perhaps the largest group in terms of numbers within the
insurgency; the leadership and organizational structure of these militia is
unclear.

The third group consists of disgruntled fighters and
nationalists who opposed Ethiopian involvement in Somalia's affairs. It too has no
known leadership.[94]

Although Hawiye fighters constituted the largest group in
terms of numbers, some analysts believe that Al-Shabaab members are the
backbone of the insurgency and provided discipline and strategy for all groups.[95]
All the groups seem to have respected the brief ceasefires negotiated on their
behalf by the Hawiye elders (see below).

Initially, many of the Somali
media reports referred to the insurgency as "unidentified groups."[96]
The international media described the armed groups in Mogadishu
as "insurgents" or "remnants of the ICU," while by February 2007 many residents
of Mogadishu
referred to them as Muqaawama [the Resistance].[97]

A witness told Human Rights Watch, "The fighters were a
mixture of the ICU, Al-Itihaad,
Al-Shabaab, but the majority were Hawiye clan fighters. They had
defenses in the areas where they fought against the government, hiding behind
concrete walls. They were firing weapons-they would fire and then leave the
area. They would come to the people and say, "This is our jihad, come
out and join us."[98]

Hurtling Toward Conflict

Somali Prime Minister Ali Mohammed Gedi arrived in Mogadishu on December 29,
2006, the first senior TFG official to return to the capital.[99]
Among his first public statements was a request to clan elders to surrender the
three men wanted by the US
as alleged al Qaeda affiliates.[100]
In another exercise to signal the government's arrival, on January 1, 2007, he
ordered that all weapons be handed over to TFG forces within three days or Mogadishu residents would
face forced disarmament.[101]
The order did not go down well with some of the clans in Mogadishu.[102]

Within a week of the TFG and Ethiopian army's arrival in Mogadishu the first
insurgent attacks began.[103]
Ethiopian and TFG forces responded by sealing off areas around the attack sites
and conducting house-to-house searches.[104]
The TFG also passed a three-month emergency law in parliament on January 13,
2007.[105]
The provisions of the emergency law gave the TFG much wider powers and allowed
President Yusuf to rule by decree.[106]

Between January and March 2007
insurgent attacks took several forms: assassinations of government officials;
attacks on military convoys; and rocket-propelled grenade (RPG) or mortar
attacks on police stations, TFG and Ethiopian military bases, or other locations
or individuals deemed by the insurgency to be political or military targets.
For instance, several hotels known to accommodate TFG officials, such as the
Ambassador, Global, and Lafweyne Hotels, were repeatedly hit with RPGs and
mortar rounds and were the site of attempted assassinations of TFG officials
(see Map 1).[107]

The insurgency was mobile, often using hit-and-run tactics
in its attacks or setting up and launching mortar rounds within minutes, then
melting back into the civilian population. After an insurgent attack on a
convoy or other mobile target, Ethiopian and TFG forces typically sealed off
the area and conducted house-to-house searches of the area. The Ethiopian and
TFG response to mortar attacks increasingly included the return firing of mortars
and rockets in the direction of origin of insurgency fire.

On March 1 President Yusuf announced plans to hold a
National Reconciliation Congress (NRC) on April 16,[108]
but also maintained that it would not negotiate with those responsible for the
attacks in the capital.[109]
Many of Mogadishu's residents distrusted the
TFG's capacity to implement genuine and effective reconciliation, feared
potential reprisals, and were concerned about the Ethiopian presence and agenda
in Somalia.[110]As insurgent attacks escalated, the
government made further security announcements to the effect that the capital
would be a safe venue for the meeting[111]:
Deputy Defense Minister Salad Ali Jelle announced that Mogadishu would be secured in 30 days.[112] Media
reports indicated that Mogadishu
residents were nervous and concerned after the government's announcements. In
the words of one resident, "There is fear that it will lead to more violence
and more displacement if not properly handled."[113]

Many Somalis talked
about the possibility of the Mogadishu
situation reviving clan-based hostilities. For instance, many in Mogadishu who belong to
the Hawiye clan distrusted the president, a member of the Darod clan. The
Hawiye elders who later arranged ceasefire agreements with the Ethiopian military
claimed in several statements that the president was instigating the hostility
in Mogadishu in
order to exact revenge on the Hawiye, who had been responsible for many abuses
against the Darod during the civil war of the early 1990s.[114]
Many Hawiye felt the security operations were aimed at disarming them, one of
the biggest reasons they were opposed to the security operation announced by
the deputy defense minister.[115]

The attacks and counter-attacks between the insurgency and
the Ethiopian and TFG forces steadily escalated in March 2007. Insurgent
tactics took a new twist when they also resorted to suicide bombings.[116]

The 1,500-member African Union force of Ugandan troops
deployed in Mogadishu in early March had a
limited mandate and did not become directly involved in the hostilities,
although the troops occupied key positions at the airport and the TFG base at
Villa Somalia.[117]

On March 21 and 22, 2007, the TFG launched its first major
disarmament operation. Insurgent groups ambushed an Ethiopian and TFG convoy
near the Ministry of Defense and fighting spread to several neighborhoods. At
least 200 wounded people were brought to Mogadishu's
hospitals.[118]
More than 20 TFG militiamen were captured by the insurgency. The insurgents
summarily executed several of the captured fighters and dragged their burned
bodies through the streets.

A March 26 suicide attack on an Ethiopian base just outside Mogadishu, and the
Ethiopian army's apparent determination to occupy more strategic locations in
the city appear to have been among the catalysts for a serious escalation in
the fighting.[119]

March 29 marked the start of the first round of major
fighting between the insurgency and the Ethiopian forces. In the period from
March 29 to April 1, several districts of Mogadishu
that were either perceived to be insurgent strongholds or were located in
strategic areas received the full brunt of Ethiopian offensives and bombardment
(see Map 2).

Neighborhoods like Casa Populare (KPP) in the south, Towfiq
and Ali Kamin around the Stadium, all along Industrial Road, and the road from the
Stadium to Villa Somalia
were heavily shelled or repeatedly hit by Ethiopian BM-21
multiple-rocket-launcher and mortar rounds.[120]
The Ethiopian military objective appeared to be to capture the Stadium and
control the main roads leading to it from the Ministry of Defense and Villa Somalia. During
the course of the bombardment, the insurgency continued to use neighborhoods
around the Stadium to fight and shell Ethiopian and TFG targets, and to ambush
Ethiopian convoys, particularly during the battle for the Stadium.

The impact of the fighting on the civilian population was
devastating. Reports from local human rights groups claimed that nearly 400
civilians were killed in the first round of fighting, although these figures
could not be corroborated.[121]
Local Hawiye clan elders and the Ethiopians negotiated a brief ceasefire
beginning April 2, 2007, to collect the dead,[122]
but shooting and sporadic rocket exchanges continued. Tens of thousands of
people used the brief respite in the bombardment to flee the city.[123]

On April 18, amid spiraling
conflict and tension, particularly following another suicide bombing aimed at
an Ethiopian barrack, the second round of fighting began.[124]
Ethiopian forces resumed heavy artillery shelling and rocket barrages, which
expanded to new areas of the city, such as in the northeast around the Ramadan
Hotel and the Pasta Factory. The Ethiopian aim in this offensive was clearly to
take the Pasta Factory, which was thought to be an insurgent base and a
strategic junction.

The second round of fighting
ended abruptly on April 26 when the insurgency apparently and unexpectedly
dissipated and the TFG announced victory.[125]
The second bout of fighting was alleged to have claimed at least 300 civilian
lives, again a figure that could not be independently verified. Although the
shelling was described as even heavier than in the first round (March 29 to
April 2), civilian casualties in the second round were estimated to be fewer
because many people had already fled the city.

By late April the UN estimated
that at least 365,000 people had fled the city.[126]
In the days and weeks during and following the end of the fighting on April 26,
humanitarian agencies trying to reach the displaced around Mogadishu
were obstructed by TFG restrictions that included onerous limitations on aid
convoys and on movement into Mogadishu.
This prompted key governments such as the US and the EU to issue several
statements and condemnations in late April.

Since May 2007 it has been increasingly apparent that the
March and April fighting did not stem the insurgency. Roadside bombings and
assassination attempts targeting TFG officials resumed in May and have
continued on an almost daily basis. Attempts to convene the reconciliation
conference were postponed by the TFG, first until mid-June, and then to
mid-July.[127]

Many details about the specific
events, intent, and acts of the warring parties remain murky. However, what is
abundantly clear in reviewing the events of January to June 2007 in Mogadishu is that none of
the three main warring parties-the insurgency, the Ethiopian forces, and the
forces of the transitional Somali government-have made any meaningful efforts
to protect civilians. On the contrary, the military strategies used by all
parties during the events in Mogadishu
demonstrate a wanton disregard for civilian life and property in violation of
international humanitarian law. When committed with criminal intent-evident for
instance in the Ethiopian area bombardments of populated neighborhoods-such
violations amounted to war crimes.

Regional and international actors likewise did little to
help protect the civilian population: the African Union peacekeeping mission
was constrained by its mandate and was apparently unwilling to act on behalf of
civilians during Mogadishu's
worst fighting in 15 years, despite having some 1,500 troops on the ground. Key
players with strategic involvement in the region like the US and the EU
failed even to condemn the abuses as they were happening, remarking only on
obstruction to humanitarian relief. As has been the case for more than a
decade, the suffering of hundreds of thousands of Somali civilians was met with
almost total silence.

V. International Humanitarian Law and the Armed Conflict
in Somalia

International humanitarian law (the laws of war) imposes
upon parties to an armed conflict legal obligations to reduce unnecessary
suffering and to protect civilians and other non-combatants. It is applicable
to all situations of armed conflict, without regard to whether the conflict
itself is legal or illegal under international or domestic law, and whether
those fighting are regular armies or non-state armed groups. All armed groups
involved in a conflict must abide by international humanitarian law, and any
individuals who violate humanitarian law with criminal intent can be prosecuted
in domestic or international courts for war crimes.[128]

International humanitarian law does not regulate whether
states and armed groups can engage in hostilities, but rather how states
and armed groups engage in hostilities. Insurgency itself is not a violation of
international humanitarian law. The laws of war do not prohibit the existence
of insurgent groups or their attacks on legitimate military targets. Rather,
they restrict the means and method of warfare and impose upon insurgent forces
and regular armies alike a duty to protect civilians and other non-combatants
and minimize harm to civilians during military operations.[129]

VI.
Patterns of Abuses by Parties to the Conflict in Mogadishu

Indiscriminate or Disproportionate Attacks

Early in the morning of the first day, bullets started
flying between the insurgents and the government; we could not even leave our
homes. The militia [insurgents] that were fighting were behind our compound, I
don't know if they were Al-Shaabab or Hawiye fighters. They were firing mortars
and then running away. They were firing the mortars at the TFG and the
Ethiopians, at the Presidential Palace and at the Ministry of Defense where the
Ethiopians were based. Whenever the insurgents fired mortars at the Ethiopians,
the Ethiopians responded with shells, but the Ethiopians shot them untargeted,
they killed many civilians and even our animals.

-42-year-old woman from Towfiq neighborhood, describing the
events of March 29, 2007[130]

While the laws of war do not prohibit fighting in urban
areas, combat in Mogadishu
has been conducted with little or no regard for the safety of the civilian
population, resulting in massive and unnecessary loss of civilian life. All
parties to the Somalia
conflict have committed serious violations of international humanitarian law by
using weapons in Mogadishu
without discriminating between military objectives and civilians. Ethiopian
forces conducted area bombardments in populated areas and failed to call off
attacks that disproportionately harmed civilians. Commanders who order
indiscriminate attacks knowingly or recklessly are responsible for war crimes.
Casualties have been further heightened by the deployment of insurgent forces
in densely populated areas and the launching of attacks from such areas. None
of the parties has taken-as international law requires-all feasible precautions
to spare the civilian population from the effects of attacks.

The human cost

The appalling consequences of indiscriminate attacks, the
deployment of forces in densely populated areas, and the failure of all warring
parties generally to take steps to minimize civilian harm is reflected in the
thousands of civilians who died or whose lives were shattered by the injuries
they sustained or by the loss of family members. It is also reflected in the
staggering numbers of people who fled Mogadishu
in March and April 2007 and in the scale of the destruction of homes, hospitals,
schools, mosques, and other infrastructure in Mogadishu.

Local human rights groups and Hawiye clan elders estimated
that the numbers of civilians killed in the first round of fighting in March
2007 alone ranged from nearly 400 to 1,000, with more than 4,000 others
wounded.[131]
Hawiye elders estimated that the second round of fighting resulted in the
deaths of almost 300 civilians and wounded 587 more.[132]
It is not possible to give more precise mortality figures at this stage for
several reasons.

The intensity of the fighting and bombardment in late-March
restricted civilian movement in and around conflict areas. As the fighting
escalated on March 29, many of the dead were left in their homes, in other
buildings, or even on the streets where they had been killed because it was too
dangerous to collect and bury the bodies.[133]
By April 2, when Ethiopian forces and Hawiye clan elders negotiated a ceasefire
to collect and bury the dead, some bodies had already seriously decomposed in
the heat, making identification difficult.

On April 4 and 6 the ceasefire committee of Ethiopian
officials, Hawiye elders, and Red Crescent staff toured parts of the affected
areas. A group of Somali Red Crescent volunteers tried to collect bodies around
Ali Kamin junction and Al-HayatHospital, just south of
the Stadium, which had been one of the frontlines in the previous days, but
were unable to move beyond the main road into the affected neighborhoods and
assess the situation more closely.[134]
A credible source said that on April 4 and 6 the Somali Red Cross collected at
least 24 bodies from one small section of the neighborhood around Al-Hayat, the
vast majority of them civilians.[135]

According to members of the
ceasefire committee interviewed by Human Rights Watch, although some of the
dead were not recognizable, others were clearly identified as civilians. For
instance, one body was identified by committee members as that of a "madman"
who was known in the area, another was a woman who died with a prescription in
her hand, and a third was a watchman who was shot while guarding private
vehicles. A journalist who joined the ceasefire committee recalled a haunting
sight: "I saw a mother and a child, apparently trying to flee the fighting,
were caught by bullets and fell in front of their house, dead. They were
holding hands."[136]

The volatile situation along the
frontlines did not permit further attempts to continue collecting bodies and
the operations came to a halt. The Hawiye elders estimated on April 10 that
based on battlefield assessment, talking to civilians, and hospital records,
more than 1,000 people had been killed in the first round of fighting alone.[137]

Given the scale of the displacement from Mogadishu and the dispersal of families
across the country, it is almost impossible to methodically gather and
corroborate information about dead or missing family members. In addition, many
of the people who died on the spot, or were severely injured and died of their
wounds before they were able to access medical care, were not registered in
medical facilities or by independent sources. As one medical professional told
Human Rights Watch:

Most patients die when wounded, and the worst of it is that
patients can't make it to the hospital after being wounded. Most of the people
who arrived at the hospital survived-less than 5 percent died once they reached
the hospital. But no one can count how many people died-some just disappeared
[were blown apart].[138]

Access to medical care was particularly difficult during the
periods of intense fighting between March 29 and April 1 and in late-April. In
addition to the constant rockets, shelling, and mortar fire, both the
insurgency and the Ethiopian and TFG forces closed the roads. Thus, many
wounded people had to wait until the following days to even try to access
hospitals, sometimes in wheelbarrows, on donkey carts, or carried by family,
friends, and neighbors.

Al-Hayat and Al-Arafat hospitals, both of which are located
in the frontline areas, were also bombarded in the first days of the offensive
(see below, "Attacks on Medical Facilities.") Most of the staff fled and the
hospitals stopped functioning, which meant that many civilians had to undertake
dangerous journeys through the city to get to functioning facilities further
away, such as Medina
and Kaysanay. Several Somali doctors working in the hospitals made public
appeals to all parties to permit wounded civilians to access medical care, as
did the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), but no one heeded
these appeals.[139]

Even though an unknown number of people died from their
injuries or were unable to access medical care, Mogadishu's hospitals were still inundated as
the fighting escalated. The types of injuries treated in the city's medical
facilities illustrate the change in the means of warfare to more destructive
forms of weaponry. Gunshot wounds, by far the most common type of
violence-related trauma injury in Mogadishu
in the first months of the year (and in prior years), were rapidly outnumbered
by shrapnel wounds as the conflict escalated.

As one medical staff member noted:

The injuries and profile of the injured are different from
the usual violence in Mogadishu,
which is usually injuries of individuals from light weapons. Different weapons
are being used than before. At the hospitals you see injuries from tank shells,
mortars, Katyusha rockets. It's urban warfare in the middle of the cityYou see
whole families at the hospitals, because the shells are landing on homes. The
scenes at the hospital are horrible: children with legs and arms amputated,
people with intestines coming out and with head injuries.[140]

Types of weaponry used in Mogadishu

Ethiopian forces, TFG forces, and the insurgency have used
weaponry without sufficient precision to minimize or avoid civilian casualties
in an urban setting such as Mogadishu.
Some weapons, particularly the BM-21 multiple-rocket-launchers (firing
"Katyusha" rockets) used by Ethiopian armed forces, are inherently
indiscriminate weapons that should never be deployed in a populated urban environment.
Other indirect-fire weapons, such as mortars, can be very accurate weapons when
used with spotters or other guidance systems; however, Human Rights Watch's
research found no evidence of the systematic use of spotters or other guidance
for the mortar rounds fired by the insurgency or Ethiopian forces, making such
indirect fire attacks indiscriminate. The result was hundreds of civilian
casualties in a very short period.

According to photograph and video evidence and eyewitness
accounts obtained by Human Rights Watch, insurgent groups in Somalia are armed
with 60, 80, 81, or 82 millimeter (mm) mortars,[141]rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs), B-10 recoilless rifles, Zu-23 and Zu-50
anti aircraft guns, and various other small arms.[142]
Anti-aircraft artillery mounted on the back of pickup trucks (known as
"technicals") have also been a typical feature of the Somali conflict.

In 2006 the UN Panel of Experts monitoring the porous arms
embargo on Somalia
documented the supply to the ICU by Eritrea of large quantities of DShK
(heavy machine guns), 82 and 120 mm mortars, B-10 recoilless rifles, RPGs,
ZU-23 anti-aircraft ammunition, as well as large quantities of PKM machine guns
and AK-47 and FAL assault rifles.[143]
The November 2006 UN report also noted that "new and more sophisticated weapons
are also coming into Somalia,
including man-portable surface-to-air missiles such as the Strela-2 and 2M,
also known as the SA-7a and 7b 'Grail,' and the SA-6 'Gainful' low-to-medium
altitude surface-to-air missile."[144]

While the ICU no doubt used some of this weaponry during
fighting with the Ethiopian forces in December 2006, it is very likely that
much of it was left in Mogadishu
when the ICU fled. The ICU had confiscated many arms from Mogadishu militia when it took control in
June 2006, but clan elders apparently demanded that the ICU return confiscated
arms when the Ethiopians were approaching.[145]
The insurgency would also have had access to independent arms traders in Mogadishu's Bakara market
in the early months of 2006.[146]

By January 7, within 10 days of the arrival of Ethiopian and
TFG forces in Mogadishu,
armed groups began attacking them with small arms, mortars, and other weaponry.
By late March the attacks expanded to include suicide bombings and, in later
months, the use of remotely-controlled explosive devices.

The Ethiopian armed forces have used BM-21 multiple barrel
rocket launchers firing Katyusha-type rockets, 120 mm mortars, T-55 tanks
firing 100mm shells, and M-30 and D-30 artillery in the course of their attacks.[147]
The Ethiopian military also used Mi-24 helicopter gunships in the first two
days of the March offensive, which fired into neighborhoods of Mogadishu. Human Rights Watch's research has
not been able to verify what types of weapons were used on the helicopter
gunships, but these gunships have an internal 12.7 machine gun and also likely used 57 or 80 mm
rockets. The Ethiopian army ceased using the helicopters after insurgents shot
one down on March 30.[148]

Human Rights Watch was often able to determine the weapons
used in a particular attack because civilians in Mogadishu became expert at identifying
different weaponry by their specific characteristics. Dozens of eyewitnesses
consistently named specific weapons that were used, and accurately described to
Human Rights Watch the sound or sight of different types of weaponry even when
they were unable to name the exact type of weapon. For instance, individuals
repeatedly named BM-21 rockets or Katyushas, which they called "Bii-em"
or described as "whistling" due to the sound they made when launched and the
loud noise upon impact.[149]

Numerous eyewitnesses accurately told Human Rights Watch
that mortars, by contrast, were silent in their flight. As one person noted,
"Katyushas, you know the sound, it sounds like 'whooooo,' and then a thud. But
with mortars you don't hear anything."[150]

Indiscriminate attacks by Ethiopian forces

When the insurgency launched rocket or mortar attacks, the
Ethiopians responded with barrages of rockets, artillery, and mortar shelling of
areas of Mogadishu
perceived to be the areas of origin of the attack or strongholds of the
insurgency. Eyewitnesses to the fighting in March repeatedly told Human Rights
Watch that the Ethiopian barrages came from Ethiopian bases located in the
former Ministry of Defense building, Villa Somalia, the Custodial Corps
headquarters, Kabka (a former repairs factory for the Somali military), and, in
April, from the Mohamoud Ahmed Ali Secondary School and the former headquarters
of the Somali Police Transport (see Map 2). Many of these locations are two or
more kilometers from the neighborhoods they were targeting, distances that
would require a spotter in the air or on the ground for mortar shelling to be
used with any degree of precision.

The Ethiopian rockets were inherently unable to target
specific military objectives. Residents of Mogadishu described patterns of rocket
barrages that match the use of BM-21 multiple barrel rocket launchers. The use
of BM-21s by the Ethiopian forces was confirmed not only by eyewitness
descriptions of the weapons by name but also by description of the sounds they
made when fired.

There is strong evidence that
the indiscriminate bombardment of populated neighborhoods by Ethiopian forces
was intentional. Commanders who knowingly or recklessly order indiscriminate
attacks are responsible for war crimes. In Towfiq, Hamar Jadid, and Bar Ubah
neighborhoods, eyewitnesses reported that the Ethiopian BM-21 rockets and heavy
artillery often landed in systematic patterns, equidistantly, and at regularly
spaced time intervals. In Towfiq, for instance, Ethiopian rockets landed 10-20
meters apart, while in Hamar Jadid they were sometimes 40 meters apart.[151]
One man with a military background told Human Rights Watch, "The Ethiopians
would shell on a line-start with one area and move to the next, and the next
day they started all over again, the same way."[152]
Another man observed, "The shells were coming in a sustained format: each shell
fell 40 meters from the other. In some areas, you would find 10 houses next to
each other destroyed."[153]

According to military experts this type of shelling is
typical of area shelling where troops move the coordinates from one target to
the next, going down a grid pattern. Area bombardment is fundamentally inappropriate
as a strategy to target a mobile insurgency in a densely populated civilian
setting. It constitutes an indiscriminate attack, which is a serious violation
of international humanitarian law. This type of attack on populated
neighborhoods is indicative of criminal intent to blanket an entire area rather
than hit specific military objects-evidence of a war crime.

Indiscriminate and disproportionate attacks by the
insurgency

Although the insurgency generally targeted military
objectives such as Ethiopian and TFG military units and convoys, there
frequently were civilian casualties. Human Rights Watch conducted an analysis
of some of the reported attacks by the insurgency between January and March
2007. The numbers presented here are rough estimates based on media and other
reports, and are not a conclusive analysis of the impact of insurgent attacks
on civilians, and Human Rights Watch was not able to investigate and confirm
details of many of the attacks. However, these estimates provide a preliminary basis
for assessing the impact of such attacks on civilians. Our analysis covered
more than 80 attacks that appeared to target Ethiopian and TFG forces, police
and police stations, and military objectives such as the airport and seaport
where Ethiopian and TFG forces were located. In the period of January to March,
approximately 50 civilians died and up to 100 were injured from the attacks; 20
attacks generated the majority of the deaths. In terms of the impact on
civilians, one of the clear conclusions is that the insurgency's attacks,
particularly its use of mortars, have at times been indiscriminate or caused
disproportionate civilian casualties compared to the expected military gain.

Insurgency attacks on military targets such as military
convoys or bases in crowded civilian areas were sometimes conducted without any
apparent effort to minimize the effects of such attacks on civilians. While
Ethiopian or TFG forces may themselves have failed to take all feasible steps
to minimize the risks to the civilian population, such as by establishing bases
in crowded civilian neighborhoods, this did not relieve insurgent forces of the
obligation to minimize civilian harm when conducting attacks. (See also below,
"Deployment in populated areas.")

Many mortar attacks launched at military targets appear to
have been poorly targeted because spotters were not used. These mortar attacks
failed to hit military objectives, frequently killing and injuring civilians
instead. Photo and video evidence of mortar fire by the insurgency confirms
that the weapons were typically fired without guidance. A few examples
demonstrate these types of attacks:

On
February 7, 2007, suspected insurgents fired a mortar shell that struck a Qur'anic
school in south Mogadishu.
Medical officers recorded seven deaths.

On
February 14 insurgents fired at least five mortar rounds at or in the
direction of Ethiopian forces based in Hodan (possibly DigferHospital),
the seaport, and Bakara market. A shell apparently aimed at the seaport
landed near a group of children who were swimming. One child died and six
were wounded. In total, the five shells killed at least four civilians and
wounded 17 people, all of whom are believed to be civilians.[154]

On
March 8 insurgents targeted an African Union convoy with a rocket
propelled grenade but missed as it passed a busy junction, two days after
Ugandan AU troops arrived in the city. According to press reports, 10
civilians died from the explosion and subsequent gunfight.[155]

On
March 18 the insurgency launched more than 10 simultaneous mortar attacks
on the seaport and former intelligence headquarters. The mortar attack on
the seaport hit a restaurant, killing one person and wounding at least
three other civilians.[156]

As the fighting intensified in late-March, so did the
bombardment of neighborhoods like X-Fiyore, just behind Villa Somalia. A
resident of X-Fiyore told Human Rights Watch,

The first madfa' [Somali word for artillery that
Somalis often use to describe a weapon making a loud noise] that hit the area came
during the Stadium fighting. Four madfa' landed; it was the second day
of the fighting [March 30] around 1 p.m. One man was injured. His name was
Dalab, around 65 [years old]. He was taken to Medina hospital. [Others who] died during the
stadium battle in Sheikh Sufi neighborhood were two children, age seven and
eight years. Both of them were boys. [The children's aunt] who was visiting the
family was injured. This happened on Monday, April 2, 2007. It happened when a
mortar hit their house. The missiles that were landing in the area continued.
On Thursday, April 5, 2007, three mortars landed in the neighborhood, wounding
two sisters [Halimo and Amina Hussein, age around 34 and 35]. Amina's
six-day-old baby girl was killed in the same incident. This happened around 2
p.m.
On the same day, two other mortars landed on a house-one in the house and the
other just beside it. The house belonged to a friend, Mohamoud Abshir Shiine.
Eight people were injured in this incident.
Just the day before we left, another mortar landed in front of the former
national museum. A prominent elder in the area-Sheikh Ali, around 55 [years
old], who lived in the museum, was killed. He just came back from prayers at
the mosque, around 3 p.m., and was sitting outside when the mortar landed near
him. The shell cut him to pieces. Another elder ran towards him in order to
help but a second mortar landed and cut off both of his legs. They had both
came back from Sheikh Abdilqadir Mosque. You could only see dust and shrapnel
at the scene.[157]

Human Rights Watch cannot confirm which group was
responsible for these attacks.However,
the area is close to Somalia's
Presidential Palace which has been a constant target for the insurgent groups.

One eyewitness who lived close to the Ambassador Hotel
described to Human Rights Watch attacks that may have violated the prohibition
against indiscriminate or disproportionate attacks:

I could not tell the type of weapons used but our area was
a constant target for bombings. One of the explosions went off around 100
meters from the Ambassador Hotel. Two people were killed in this attack. It
happened between 4 and 6 p.m., I can't remember the exact date. Another
explosion followed another day at around 7 p.m., killing one man instantly; a
second man died of his wounds. Both men were civilians. These explosions seemed
to have been targeting a Corolla car transporting a government official.[158]

Deployment in Populated Areas

International humanitarian law requires that all warring
parties must to the extent feasible avoid locating their forces within or near
densely populated areas, and must remove civilians under their control from the
vicinity of military objectives. They must never intentionally use civilians to
shield themselves from attack or to carry out attacks.

The insurgency groups regularly used several populated
neighborhoods to launch mortar and other attacks. Residents of several of these
areas described to Human Rights Watch the nature of attacks and counter-attacks
in the period leading up to the first round of fighting in late-March 2007.

A 33-year-old woman who lived in Laba-dhagax neighborhood,
near the Stadium, told Human Rights Watch that insurgent groups had been using
her neighborhood to launch attacks and that the Ethiopians responded with BM
rockets:

The Muqaawama used to bring their madfa' in
sacks and reassemble [them] on the scene. When the Muqaawama arrived,
they used to give orders to people to close their doors and put hands over
their ears. They used to come in the evening. They used to launch up to 20
rounds of madfa' at a time. Sometimes they used to fire madfa'
just opposite my house; they have done this around six times. When this
happened we used to vacate the house and take refuge in a concrete building
nearby. Sometimes the Muqaawama fired up to 16 madfa' and the
Ethiopians responded with six rounds of BM missiles.[159]

A 45-year-old woman living in the Arwo Itko area between
Hamar Jadid and Bar Ubah also described insurgency
fighters firing mortars from the area. She noted that on the night the
Presidential Palace was first targeted on January 19, nine rounds were fired
from the area. Ten rockets came in by return fire.[160]

A resident of the Bar Ubah neighborhood in Hawlwadag
district explained the tactics used by the insurgency when firing mortar and artillery shells from within
the residential areas:

They used to fire madfa' from the area and then run
away. They have done this continuously throughout [the conflict]. We saw them
hiding themselves. They had their eyes and mouth masked. They would come, fire
a single madfa' and run away immediately. They would go somewhere else
in the neighborhood and do the same.[161]

Ethiopian and TFG forces may also have violated the
prohibition on deploying a military asset near a densely populated civilian
area by placing one of their central bases in Villa Somalia. Action should have been
taken to transfer civilians from the vicinity of the base.

Insurgency abuses in response to civilian protests

In some neighborhoods, local residents tried to stop the
insurgency from using their areas as locations to launch mortar rounds or stage
other attacks. A resident of Wardhigley district said, "They were just 20
people without cars, moving around. They would tell the people there that they
come to fight so we could choose to leave. Some elders tried to speak to them
to tell them to stop fighting in the area, but they didn't respect them, saying
it was their duty to fight the Ethiopians."[162]

By late February, some neighborhoods set up vigilante squads
to resist insurgent attempts to use the areas as launch sites for attacks. The
underlying motive was to deter Ethiopian and TFG counter-attacks or reprisals
on the neighborhoods. According to news reports, some of the areas that applied
this strategy included Tawakal in Yaqshid district, Gubta, Hamar Jadid and
Wardhigley districts, and NBC neighborhood in Hodan district.[163]

In a few cases investigated by Human Rights Watch, the
insurgency apparently summarily executed individuals who resisted the use of their
neighborhoods as launch sites or who were suspected of being informers. A
photograph taken on April 24, 2007, appears to show two insurgent fighters in
the process of shooting an unarmed man lying on the ground who was suspected of
being an informer.[164]

The February 21 killing of Abdi Omar Googooye, the deputy
commissioner of Wadajir District (see below, "Deliberate killings of public
officials"), was allegedly due to his involvement in a campaign to set up
neighborhood guards and stop the area from being used by the insurgency to
launch attacks.[165]
In Bar Ubah neighborhood of Hawlwadag district, a resident said the "Muqaawama"
murdered four members of the neighborhood guards-two who were killed in Bar
Ubah and two others killed in the Black Sea
area. She could not remember the dates or other details of the killings, and
Human Rights Watch could not independently confirm the information.[166]
A woman living in the Arwo Itko area between Hamar Jadid and Bar Ubah told
Human Rights Watch that when a local vigilante group in Hamar Jadid tried to
confront the armed insurgency, the latter summarily executed six of them.[167]
Human Rights Watch learned of these cases in two independent interviews, but
was unable to obtain further details of either allegation.

Attacks on Medical Facilities

The Ethiopian military bombardment in March and April hit
several hospitals during the course of the fighting in Mogadishu, causing some hospitals to suspend
their provision of medical care at a time when this care was desperately needed
by hundreds of people. The protection of hospitals and other medical facilities
is a bedrock principle of international humanitarian law. The Second Additional
Protocol of 1977 to the Geneva Conventions (Protocol II), on the protection of
medical units and transports, which is reflective of customary international
law, states,

1. Medical units and transports shall be respected and
protected at all times and shall not be the object of attack.

2. The protection to which medical units and transports are
entitled shall not cease unless they are used to commit hostile acts, outside
their humanitarian function. Protection may, however, cease only after a
warning has been given setting, whenever appropriate, a reasonable time-limit,
and after such warning has remained unheeded.[168]

The SOS, Al-Arafat, and Al-Hayat hospitals were located in
critical frontline areas caught up in the conflict. Human Rights Watch research
found that Mogadishu's
hospitals were bombarded repeatedly and without warning, with loss of civilian
life and significant destruction. While it is not clear to what extent the
insurgents fired from the near vicinity of the hospitals, the Ethiopian forces
should have had no trouble spotting the often tall (by Mogadishu standards) and highly visible
hospital buildings. This failure to spare them from bombardment indicates, at
minimum, indiscriminate attacks and, at most, deliberate attacks on the
hospitals. [169]

Shelling and occupation of Al-ArafatHospital

Ethiopian troops first searched Al-Arafat hospital on
January 14, 2007, soon after they arrived in Mogadishu, so its status as a medical
facility was known to them. According to eyewitnesses, Ethiopian forces entered
the hospital that day at around 5:30 a.m. and conducted a thorough search.
Ethiopian soldiers confiscated weapons that were being used by the hospital to
protect equipment and patients.[170]
While international humanitarian law prohibits the use of medical facilities
for military purposes, medical personnel may be equipped with light individual
weapons.[171]
A person present said that Ethiopian personnel told hospital staff that day
that the hospital was suspected of being a base for the "Courts" and "Ayr clan" insurgent groups.[172]

Soon thereafter, senior members of the hospital staff
visited Ethiopian bases in El-Irfid and Maslah, seeking the return of the
confiscated weapons. However, the Ethiopian officials at these bases denied
that any confiscation operation had been organized from their base.[173]

Al-Arafat hospital
is located along Industrial Road,
northeast of the Stadium in Towfiq neighborhood. On
March 29, when the first round of heavy fighting started around the stadium (see
Chapter VII, "A Case Study in Laws of War Violations"), the hospital
was hit at least four times, including by tank shells and BM-21 rockets. The
tank shells hit the water tank, the store, and the office of the hospital
director.[174]
When the fighting started there were more than 30 patients at the hospital. A
relative of one of the patients was injured by shrapnel. During the following
days, as the fighting continued in the area, the patients were released or
referred to other hospitals. The hospital staff took the precautionary step of
removing some of the key medical equipment, such as the laboratory equipment
and medicines, out of the hospital.[175]

During the second round of fighting in late April the
hospital was hit again. A total of seven rockets struck the hospital: three
rockets hit the outpatient department; another three rockets hit the generators
store, putting all three generators beyond use;[176]
and a seventh rocket struck the hospital kitchen. Staff quarters in the
hospital were also damaged by these rockets.[177]

One of the staff who witnessed the events told Human Rights
Watch,

These were heavy shells. The shells damaged the outpatient
department, making a big hole. The three shells that destroyed the electric
generators were the first to hit the hospital around April 20-21. The BMs and
rockets landed on top of the buildings. The three shells which hit the generators
landed simultaneously. They came from the direction of the Custodial Corps
[under control of Ethiopian forces]. The shells which landed in the office of
the director and the water tank were tank shells. I know this because it was a
direct hit. Our staff saw the tank at the Charcoal Market.[178]

Available evidence indicates the attacks on Al-Arafat may
have been deliberate. Unlike rockets or artillery, tank guns are primarily
direct-fire weapons-the tank crew is expected to aim at the target at which it
is firing. One of the tank shells struck squarely on the front face of the
building, just below a large sign with the name of the hospital. There is
little other shell or rocket damage evident on the front of the building.

The actions by Ethiopian
officials at the hospital in January raise concerns that the military might
have believed the hospital was being used to treat wounded insurgents. This was
denied by an eyewitness, who told Human Rights Watch, "[W]e never received any
wounded militias."[179]
However, even if wounded insurgents had been there, under the laws of war
wounded combatants no longer taking part in the hostilities may not be
attacked. Others at the hospital-patients, medical personnel, and visitors-are
also protected from attack. To deliberately target a hospital is a war crime.[180]

On April 26, at the end of the fighting, the Ethiopians came
into the hospital and occupied the facility for three days. They ordered
hospital security guards to leave the hospital after disarming the only
security guard, who was armed with an AK-47 to protect the facility.

When staff from Al-Arafat returned to the facility after the
Ethiopians moved out on April 29, the hospital had been completely ransacked.
One staffer described the scene to Human Rights Watch: "They have broken all
doors, the safe, and put everything out of its place. There were files,
letters, and books littered inside the rooms. They have taken some of the text
and reference books as well as some medical filesThe Ethiopian military left
graffiti on the walls. One read, 'al Qaeda Hospital.'"[181]
The reference of course suggested that the hospital was being used by
terrorists.

Shelling and occupation of Al-HayatHospital

Al-Hayat hospital is located on the main road from Villa Somalia to the
Stadium, close to Ali Kamin junction. Ethiopian bombardments frequently hit
this site, particularly in the late March fighting.

On March 29, as the Ethiopian military fought their way to
the Stadium from Villa Somalia (see Chapter VII, "A Case Study in Laws of War
Violations"), an Ethiopian unit entered Al-Hayat hospital, inspected the
facility, and left. There were more than 70 patients in the hospital at the
time. The Ethiopian commander did not ask or suggest that staff at the hospital
evacuate the patients.[182]

The following day, March 30, a rocket apparently launched
from a BM-21 landed inside the hospital compound, wounding three people
including a doctor and damaging cars and rooms in the hospital. Most of the
patients were evacuated or left the facility that day, as did many of the
staff. A few staff remained to try to protect the facility.[183]

Two days later, on April 1, Ethiopian troops returned to the
hospital and detained the remaining staff. One of the hospital staff who was
held at gunpoint and questioned described the events to Human Rights Watch:

The soldiers were different from those who had come the
other day. The Ethiopians tried to get into the hospital at around 6 a.m. First
they tried to break the gate with a bullet. But the door wouldn't open. Then
they kept knocking until I opened for them. A soldier asked me if there were
"al Qaeda" [insurgents] in the hospital. I replied "no." I showed him around
the hospital, the medical equipment, beds, etc. He asked about the patients, I
told him they fled because of the fighting.[184]

According to eyewitness accounts, approximately 150
Ethiopian soldiers entered the hospital and took up defense positions, putting
their guns out of the windows. Al-Hayat staff were detained in the building for
the next seven days. They saw Ethiopian troops bringing sandbags and rockets
into the hospital to consolidate their defense positions in the three-story
building, which they used as a base in the following days.

Staff were questioned-"Where is 'al Qaeda'? Are you with the
government or with al Qaeda?"-and were denied permission to leave when they
requested it. On April 9, a week after the occupation of the hospital began,
the staff were permitted to leave when the ceasefire commission visited
Al-Hayat. One of the released staff told Human Rights Watch, "Until the day we
left, the hospital and its materials were safe. The money for the hospital
staff was secure in the safe; the medical equipment was in order. We were
expecting they would leave the hospital intact. We contacted the interior
minister and health minister in order to help us get the Ethiopians out."[185]

A week later, Al-Hayat staff returned to the hospital with a
team of police officers and were shocked by the destruction they found. Heavy
looting had taken place. "The computers, the laptops, the money, and the
shelves-all destroyed," said an eyewitness. The Ethiopian army vacated Al-Hayat
hospital on May 5, more than a month after first occupying it. According to a
statement seen by Human Rights Watch, the hospital staff estimated that the
Ethiopian military caused more than US$800,000 worth of damage.[186]

International humanitarian law not only prohibits attacks on
hospitals, but also stipulates that they not be harmed in any way or that their
functioning be impeded, even if they do not have any patients at the time.[187]

Shelling of SOSHospital

SOSHospital, a pediatric and
obstetric facility located in Huriwa district, was heavily bombarded by
Ethiopian forces in the last days of the conflict in late April. On April 23,
2007, at least five rockets landed in the grounds of the hospital and one
rocket hit a ward housing 20 to 30 wounded adults.[188]

Prior to the bombardment on April 23, the hospital building
had been hit by stray bullets but they had caused no casualties or damage.
According to eyewitnesses, on April 19 several doctors and elders affiliated
with the insurgent groups approached the hospital administration and said they
wanted to use the SOS facility to treat their wounded. Apparently the
insurgency's existing medical facility near the Pasta Factory was coming under
intense shelling.[189]

The doctors and elders representing the insurgents and the
hospital management agreed to meet the following day, April 20, but the meeting
never took place. On April 21 the doctors and elders returned with more than 20
wounded people, the majority of them young men who were apparently fighters,
but also some civilians. They came with their own medications to treat the
wounded.

Two days later, on the morning of April 23, the hospital was
hit four or five times, apparently by BM rockets, with a fixed interval between
each rocket strike.[190]
One round hit the children's department in the hospital, destroying one room
and damaging another. Another round struck the wall of the hospital. Two other
rounds landed in a sports field just opposite the hospital. There were no
casualties.[191]

The hospital continued to serve wounded civilians and
insurgents for two more days, as fighting grew closer. On the night of April 25
all the wounded people in the hospital were moved out of the facility. The
following morning at 8 a.m. the Ethiopian military entered the hospital, asked
the staff the whereabouts of the wounded people, searched the wards and stores,
and left the hospital within half an hour.[192]

Over the next 10 days, Ethiopian military roadblocks and
security checks in the area near the hospital restricted medical activity.
Ethiopian troops returned and searched the facility again in early May, and
then again in early July following clashes in the area, but otherwise left the
facility untouched.[193]

Intentional Shootings and Summary Executions of Civilians

Human Rights Watch learned of
various incidents in which Ethiopian troops are believed to have intentionally
fired upon and killed or wounded plainly identifiable civilians.

On March 29, a 45-year-old charcoal porter and another male
civilian were shot and wounded, and a woman civilian killed, by an Ethiopian
soldier in Towfiq. The charcoal porter had been collecting charcoal in the
Charcoal Market in Towfiq when fighting erupted. He told us,

I didn't get a chance to escape, [there was] no place to
hide so I stayed near a lorry [truck]. There was also another man and a woman
hiding by the lorry. There was an Ethiopian soldier close by, in a defensive
position [he motions crouching down with
a rifle]. Some shells landed near the soldier and he got angry and fired
five bullets at us. The woman died and the two men were hit but survived. The
soldier was maybe five meters away, he had been there more than five minutes
before he fired on us. I know he was an Ethiopian because of his military
uniform and they came in two convoys. He was holding a heavy machine gun. The
woman's name was Noura; she was maybe 50, an older woman. She died on the spot.[194]

Other civilians were shot while trying to flee the area, or
when they returned to see if their homes had survived the bombardment and
fighting.

On April 26, a 35-year-old businessman came back to his home
near the Pasta Factory having fled to Afgoi with his family during the
fighting. He came back with two other neighbors to check on their property. He
recalled what happened on their return:

We arrived in Huriwa at around 9:30 a.m. As we were walking
towards our house near the Pasta Factory, the Ethiopian soldiers called us.
They told us to "come." They spoke to us in SomaliThey began to call us
repeatedly. We decided to run away from them. They fired at us as we tried to
escape from them. The other two survived but I was hit in the upper arm by a
small bullet. It is broken around the elbow. All three of us continued running
despite the wound and the bleeding. The Ethiopians chased us momentarily but
gave up.[226]

The area between JaalleSiyadCollege
and the Pasta Factory runs parallel to Industrial Road, is at least 10
kilometers long, and includes some of the most populated districts in Mogadishu. While precise
population figures are impossible to obtain, a conservative estimate would be
in the range of tens of thousands of residents. Any expectation that a civilian
population of this size could relocate with a few hours' notice was totally
unrealistic.

President Abdullahi Yusuf
reiterated these positions in an interview with Voice of America on March 21.
The president defended his government and the Ethiopian military's earlier
bombardment of populated neighborhoods, asserting that government forces had
the right to respond with force wherever they received attacks:[227]

Q: The government is using artillery to shell civilian
areas according to reports, therefore why are you using these artilleries?
A: Why shouldn't we use it? They are within the civilian areas. The public
should make them [the insurgents] leave the civilian areas. When those guys
leave the civilian areas no harm will come to the civilians. We want the
civilians to remove them [insurgents] telling them to go away from our midst.
It is you [insurgents] that are causing us all these troubles. It is them
[insurgents] who are the cause of all the troubles and not the government
because any place from which a bullet is fired [at us] we will bombard it
regardless of whoever is there.
Q: Even if civilians are there you are going to bombard it?
A: Yes we will bombard it! Because the civilians should not be used as human
shields. The civilians should get out of there and we have warned the
civilians. We said there is fighting going on in those neighborhoods get out of
there while the fighting is going on because one of the sides will be made to give
up. The civilians have that warning.[228]

Aside from these statements from officials on March 21, the
government made no attempts to systematically inform civilians to leave
specific locations, for instance by issuing repeated radio announcements (given
the broad radio access in the city). No leaflets, speakers, TV, radio,
newspaper, or online advertisements were used by the TFG to communicate the
warnings.

In addition, there were no specific procedures or guidance
for the civilians to follow when ordered to vacate their areas. There were also
no provisions made to facilitate departure or relocation, particularly for the
tens of thousands of destitute residents, including many internally displaced
people who had been living in displaced persons camps or in abandoned buildings
in Mogadishu
for years.

One or other of the officials would make statements to the
media, but there was no official campaign to warn people to leave and some of
the statements came after the fact; the fighting [had] already started. It was
a surprise to me to hear that such an amount of people living in a place had to
leave. There are FM radio stations in Mogadishu.[229]

(For TFG failures adequately to protect civilians in flight
from Mogadishu
see Chapter VIII, "Displacement by the Fighting.")

Looting of civilian property

TFG militia forces are widely alleged to have been
responsible for most of the looting and harassment of civilians that have taken
place in Mogadishu over the past six months, for instance at checkpoints and
during house searches. TFG forces were also described by several witnesses as
moving behind or with the Ethiopian forces during their March and April
offensives, breaking into shops and extensively looting the contents.[230]

Items usually confiscated by TFG militias included cell
phones and cash. Several sources told Human Rights Watch that in April and May
two communications centers in Huriwa were repeatedly raided by the TFG militias
who ordered the staff out and then stole cell phones and cash.[231]
The same items were targeted in stop-and-search operations, as a Huriwa
resident described: "The government militias were stopping people. They would
say to the person, 'Stop to be searched, you are a suspect.' Then they would
take mobile [phones] and any money they found in pockets during the search."[232]

After the second round of fighting in late April, TFG
militias looted khat (a mild stimulant widely used in Somalia) from
the women vendors in the Huriwa area and established checkpoints at X-Control
and Towfiq to extort money from passing vehicles.[233]

Some residents of Mogadishu
described a difference between the Ethiopian and TFG troops in the city in this
respect, and attributed some of it to discipline. One resident said,

The Ethiopians had a checkpoint near my house and there
were no problems for one month. When the TFG replaced the Ethiopians, there
were big problems with looting; the TFG soldiers would spread out looking for
something to loot. Then the Ethiopians returned and it was quiet again.[234]

However, in other instances, Ethiopian troops were clearly
responsible for looting, for instance of materials and equipment in the
hospitals they occupied (see above, "Attacks on Medical Facilities").

A resident of Medina
neighborhood described a visit by TFG troops to his home in February, during
one of the house-to-house searches: "They said they were looking for weapons,
but they took cell phones, clothes. We were lucky-all of them had the safety
off on their guns and I was afraid my children would be killed."[235]

TFG looting was also systematic in some cases. For instance
on April 26, during the last day of the second round of fighting, the Ethiopian
military reached an area near SOSHospital after pushing
the insurgents back. The TFG forces continued to move further into the
Livestock Market neighborhood. According to eyewitnesses, they were looting the
shops, the business centers, and garages, but they were not entering the
houses.

Checkpoints were set up on the roads to Afgoi and on Bal'ad
road where TFG forces extorted money from commuting vehicles. Some witnesses
also described TFG militias harassing fleeing civilians on minibuses on the
road between Mogadishu
and Afgoi (see Chapter VIII, "Displacement by the Fighting"). In some cases,
passengers were ordered out of the vehicles, searched, and had their personal
belongings confiscated.[236]
TFG militias manning checkpoints within the city have also been accused of
extorting money from civilian buses.[237]

Most recently, TFG militia were responsible for widespread
looting in Bakara market during several weapons search operations in July. Two
businessmen who were victims of the looting provided detailed accounts of the
incidents to Human Rights Watch.

A fruit seller told Human Rights Watch that a group of armed
TFG forces were in the area searching the stores and four policemen came into
his store on July 5."They were wearing
police uniforms, [a] white uniform and blue hats [and] were carrying their
AK-47 gunsThey told us they were searching for weapons," he said."They told me to open the qasnad [the safe]. They saw the money
inside which I counted and labeled separately: $3000 and $45. They shouted at
me and told me to face the wall. One of them was searching the store, the other
three were guarding us. They took the money and left the store."[238]

The fruit seller and another businessman told Human Rights
Watch that after the looting they complained to police officers at Hawlwadag
police station, who promised to investigate, but that to date nothing had been
done.[239]
On July 8 Mogadishu's
mayor, Mohammed Dheere, apologized to the business community in Bakara Market
and said, "We are going to investigate, and whoever is proved to be involved
will be dealt with according to the law."[240]

Obstruction of humanitarian assistance by TFG
officials

As tens of thousands of civilians fled the March and April
offensives, TFG officials and security forces obstructed delivery of
humanitarian assistance to the displaced population. Restrictions included
limiting humanitarian agency access to and use of airstrips outside Mogadishu
(which were essential given the ongoing attacks on Mogadishu International
Airport); blocking aid convoys; the imposition of new regulations on aid
workers and relief material, including taxes; and threats to aid workers.

A report by the UN Office of the Coordination of
Humanitarian Affairs on April 20 described the restrictions:

Many of the displaced have not had adequate food, water or
shelter for weeks. Meanwhile, aid deliveries to south/central Somalia have been hampered by the continued
insecurity, including the harassment and detention of aid workers, as well as
new bureaucratic regulations imposed by the TFG and lack of access to pre-positioned
stocks in MogadishuThousands of people
displaced in and around the Mogadishu
areas are at high risk of infection. The United Nations and its partners have
been working to deliver assistance to those in need, where possible.[241]

In an April 9, 2007 letter written by the Somali interior
minister, Mohamed Mohamoud Guled, and addressed to Peter Goossens, the World
Food Programme (WFP) representative for Somalia, the minister stated,

It is the TFG decision that there will be no food
distribution that can take place any where in Somalia without being inspected and
approved by the government. Hence UN agencies and any other organisation that
is planning to bring any relief to Somalia should submit the documents
for the goods before shipment for checkup.

He adds,

Any organisation that does un-authorized food and non-food
items distribution will solely take the responsibility of any bad consequences
from the consumption of that distribution. It is the government decision that
any future items [whether be food or drug] should go under the government
inspection.[242]

An April 12 letter addressed to Prime Minister Gedi from the
acting UN humanitarian coordinator raised concerns over the TFG's new
directives and noted the "apparently systematic harassment of humanitarian
workers by military forces."[243]
It also described an incident in which a WFP convoy loaded with food for a
distribution to more than 30,000 displaced people in Afgoi was turned back at a
TFG checkpoint in early April on the grounds that "clearance had not been
obtained from the TFG."[244]
An April 23 letter from European Commissioner Louis Michel also condemned the
"unreasonable administrative obstacles imposed by the Transitional Federal
Government" and urged the TFG to allow "aid agencies to use all ports and
airstrip facilities whose access is currently severely limited if not
hindered."[245]

International humanitarian law requires that parties to a
conflict allow and facilitate impartial humanitarian relief for civilians in
need. The party concerned may require consent and ensure the quality of relief
goods, but it must refrain from deliberately impeding the delivery of relief
supplies to populations in need.[246]
The TFG requirements were imposed suddenly on aid agencies in the midst of the
largest displacement of civilians in many years, at a time when the TFG had
neither the resources nor the administrative structures in place to
appropriately inspect relief goods at the scale that was needed.

By late April the Somali government backed down on its restrictive
regulations after diplomatic criticism of its stance on humanitarian assistance
to the displaced population.[247]

Executions without due process

In January, when the TFG entered Mogadishu, it made efforts to reestablish the
long defunct judicial system. Prime Minister Gedi presided over the swearing in
of a number of judges to positions in the district courts (Mogadishu has 16, one for each district of
the city). Currently, district and regional courts operate at a minimal level
in Banadir (Mogadishu)
and Baidoa, but many staff are not being paid.

Under Somali law,
the legal period for detention without charge is 24 hours.Realistically, however, the judicial
process in Mogadishu faces tremendous challenges
given the fact that it has not been functioning since the collapse of the Siad
Barre government and Mogadishu
remains extremely insecure.

While it would not be realistic to expect the current TFG to
realize all due process rights of detainees in the current environment, at an
absolute minimum the Somali government should ensure that detainees are not
summarily executed, tortured, or otherwise mistreated, in line with its
obligations under international humanitarian law.Detainees should have access to family
members and impartial humanitarian agencies. Ethiopian forces should also make
every effort to support efforts by the TFG to reestablish the rule of law and a
functioning judiciary, and should cease mistreating detainees in those cases
where Ethiopian forces are participating in arrests or detentions.

On July 5, the TFG appears to have executed two men without
minimal due process. Thirty-year-old Abdullahi Dahir Muse and 25-year-old
Mohammed Abdi Wardhere were arrested on June 25, apparently on suspicion of
killing two government soldiers. According to Human Rights Watch research, they
were detained in Baarista Hisbiga (an
underground detention center near Villa Somalia) and sentenced by a
military tribunal (possibly within the detention center) on July 3.[248]
On July 5 Abdullahi Dahir Muse and Mohammed Abdi Wardhere were shot dead by a
firing squad. Human Rights Watch learned from credible sources that the two men
had no access to legal counsel prior to their execution.[249]
The speed of the judicial procedure and the lack of due process guarantees
raise serious concerns.Human Rights
Watch opposes the death penalty in all circumstances because of its inherent
cruelty.

Mistreatment of detainees

Human Rights Watch is also concerned about detention
practices by the TFG and Ethiopian forces. Since March TFG security forces,
with Ethiopian military backing, have increasingly conducted mass arrests of
people suspected of links to the insurgency and have detained many of them
without any legal process.The majority
of arrests appear to involve members of the Hawiye clan, from which the
insurgency derives many of its fighters. Many individuals have been beaten in
custody and held at different locations in Mogadishu without access to family members.
Those who get released typically do so after paying bribes to their captors.
Detainees paid at least US$50 for their release, but the majority paid more
than US$100.[250]

Mass arrests became increasingly prevalent in June and July
2007 with TFG militias and Ethiopian troops cordoning off large neighborhoods
of the city, and then arresting and detaining hundreds of individuals,
including children in some cases.[251]

According to Human
Rights Watch's research, the detainees are being held in several
locations:Baarista Hisbiga;[252]
Saldhigga Bari police station; Hawlwadag police station; the CID prison at K-4
junction; and a detention center inside Villa Somalia.[253]
Some of the prisoners initially held in these locations were later transferred
to the main central prison known as Galshire, near the sea port.[254]

A significant number
of the detainees, including individuals who were arrested as long ago as March,
were held without charge. The emergency law passed on January 13, 2007 (see
Chapter IV, "Mogadishu Under Siege"), does not address periods that detainees
can be held without charge, although apparently police told some detainees that
they could hold people indefinitely without charge during the duration of the
emergency law.[255]
Although the emergency law was of only three months duration (and therefore due
to end in April), it was July by the time the speaker of the Parliament
announced its expiry.[256]

Human Rights Watch
is concerned that detainees are being subjected to beatings, mistreatment, and
possibly torture in detention. Released individuals have described serious abuses
by TFG and Ethiopian security forces against detainees.

A man arrested by
the Ethiopian military on March 30 told Human Rights Watch his experience.[257] He was arrested, along with seven other men,
while passing Florence
junction at 4:30 p.m. Three Ethiopian soldiers hit him with the butt of
a gun when they were ordering him to sit down. Two hours later they transferred
him to TFG militias who detained him in an underground bunker used as a
detention center in Villa Somalia.[258]
There were government troops as well as Ethiopian soldiers guarding the
detainees. More than 30 prisoners were being held in the underground bunker.

TFG officials interviewed the detainees several times, he
said, asking their nationality, other identifying characteristics, whether they
were members of Al-Shabaab, and examining their hands and shoulders to see if
there were signs of recent weapons handling. This detainee was released after
40 days in detention, without charge, but only after his family paid $50 to
commanders in charge of the detention facility.[259]

Although this particular individual was not assaulted or
mistreated in detention, he said he saw many other people who were. While
detained in Villa Somalia
he saw a wounded detainee of about age 20 who was regularly taken out for
interrogation. He saw Somali government militias hitting him with a gun butt
and kicking him in the legs.[260]

Another man who was arrested in a June 7 operation that
detained more than 100 people was transferred to Baarista Hisbiga.[261]
He saw at least five other detainees there who were badly beaten, with blood
covering their faces, and some had broken noses, split lips, and other injuries
to the head. He saw boys as young as 16 and 17 years old among the detainees.[262]

A released detainee described Baarista Hisbiga as the "worst
place to be detained."[263]
He added, "Some guards let a few detainees go outside to have some fresh air.
Those who have influential people campaigning for their release often get this
opportunity. The majority of the detainees do not get any chance to come out of
these underground bunkers."[264]

Some detainees are wounded individuals who were arrested
while in hospital. For instance, on June 2, TFG troops arrested a patient from
a Mogadishu
hospital. One of the hospital staff told Human Rights Watch that the patient
had been brought to the hospital on May 10 with serious shrapnel injuries to
both legs, and one leg had been amputated.[265]

Human Rights Watch learned that this prisoner was taken to
Saldhigga Bari station where he was detained for 12 days before being
transferred to Baarista Hisbiga without any notification of his family.[266]
In Baarista Hisbiga, his leg became infected. "I did not have any treatment for
eight days. It was desperately painful. I tried to crawl upstairs to ask for
treatment. The guard at the stairs said I would be shot if I did not turn back.
I crawled back," he said. "Other people who were released told my relatives
that I was detained [in Baarista Hisbiga]. Then I had the first contact from my
family. I received a visit from a pharmacist who treated me and gave me
antibiotics."[267]

This man and many others were released on June 26 after a
presidential amnesty. He said he and others signed a letter prior to release:

The letter said: "The President of Somalia pardons you from
the crimes you have committed, and for being a collaborator and supporter of
the Islamic Courts." I hesitated about signing the letter because I don't
believe I have committed any crime. But other detainees who were signing it
suggested I had no chance of getting out if I did not sign the letter.[268]

VII. A Case Study in Laws of War
Violations: The MarchApril Offensives

From March 29 through April 1, 2007, Ethiopian forces
launched their first major offensive in the city. The aim of the offensive was
apparently to capture Mogadishu's Stadium and
several surrounding neighborhoods considered insurgency strongholds, and to
control the main strategic roads leading from the former Ministry of Defense
and from Villa Somalia
to the Stadium (see Map 2).

Following negotiations with Hawiye clan elders, a brief
ceasefire was declared on April 2. However, within days the Ethiopian military
and the TFG launched a second major offensive, this time mainly in north Mogadishu, around Fagah
junction, the Pasta Factory, and the Livestock Market.

From March 29 through April 1, and then again from April 18
through 26, Ethiopian forces used intense barrages of rockets, artillery, and
mortar shells on areas of Mogadishu perceived to be insurgency strongholds,
then used tanks and infantry to capture key strategic locations. Although TFG
forces supported the military campaign in a number of important ways, it was
Ethiopian troops who led the operation.

The devastating loss of civilian life and property in the
neighborhoods fought over by the Ethiopian forces and the insurgency in March
and April reflected an unwillingness by both sides to abide by the laws of war
to minimize harm to the civilian population.

The first Ethiopian offensive: the battle for Mogadishu Stadium,
March 29April 1

In the early hours of Thursday, March 29, the Ethiopian
military launched twin attacks, almost simultaneously, in an attempt to take
the Stadium, which was in insurgent controlled territory (a building near the
Stadium used to be one of the headquarters of the ICU). The military offensive
started between 4:30 and 5:30 a.m. The Ethiopian forces were based in a number
of different buildings or compounds around Mogadishu,
including the former Ministry of Defense, Villa Somalia,
the Custodial Corps headquarters, DigferHospital, and other
sites.

Many eyewitnesses described March 29 as the start of "the
big fight." For the next four days, constant mortar shelling and rocket
barrages were reported in the neighborhoods of Bar Ubah, Al-Baraka, Shirkole,
Towfiq, Hamar Bile, Suq Ba'ad, and Hamar Jadid. Villa Somalia and the
Ministry of Defense were the launching sites for most of the Ethiopian
bombardment.[269]

The first ground attack was launched from the former
Ministry of Defense, located just off Industrial
Road. The Ethiopian military sent tanks and troops
north along Industrial Road
and reached the Charcoal Market just north of the Stadium with little
resistance. A second attack was almost immediately launched from Villa Somalia along Wardhigley Road
towards the Stadium.

Several eyewitnesses described what happened next. One man
told Human Rights Watch, "The Ethiopians moved into Charcoal Market and then
were ambushed. There was heavy fighting. I saw two tanks, two Urals [a large
military truck for transporting personnel and logistics], one transporting
soldiers and the other one carrying logistics. The Ethiopians were attacked and
they had to move into the Stadium."[270]

Another eyewitness said, "The fighting started early in the
morning. The TFG and Ethiopians were trying to capture the areas and control
the main streets. They came with tanks and armored cars. They met resistance
from local militias and big fighting started."[271]

The fighting soon spread to new areas around the Stadium,
continuing for four days and nights as the Ethiopian forces tried to capture
and control the Stadium and nearby strategic junctions: Ali Kamin, Ifka Halane,
and Florence
junctions, as well as Hamar Bile and Towfiq neighborhoods.[272]
A 37-year-old woman who lived near Ali Kamin junction said, "In Ali Kamin,
weapons were being fired from the area towards the Ethiopians in Hamar Bile.
Those who were involved in this fighting lived in the area. I was not counting
the number of rockets that came in as a reply but the area was receiving more
shells than fired."[273]

Some of the areas most devastated by the bombardments were
among the most densely populated areas in the capital. A journalist who toured
the affected areas as the first bout of fighting declined on April 2 described what
he saw:

From the Tawfiq neighborhood to the pasta factory, within a
large perimeter around the stadium, the Ethiopianshelling with heavy
artillery and Katyusha rockets was practically uninterrupted for several days.
In these neighborhoods, all the buildings were hit, including ArafatHospital,
whose facade and outbuildings havehuge gaping holesand where
patients and doctors were wounded by shrapnel. In this part of Mogadishu, tens of thousands of people are
currently fleeing in long human columns.[274]

The fighting continued for four daysIf the [Ethiopians and
TFG] had sent in more infantry to fight the insurgents, they would have
overpowered them. But they didn't do this-they stayed in their positions and
shelled, and this is what caused the destruction. The shelling was heaviest at
night time, because the fighters also fired mostly at night...I didn't count
the shells that fell, but in my area the shelling was heaviest between 2 and 3
a.m. At this time, there was a minimum of 10-30 rounds per hour, maybe up to 50
at some times.[275]

Other residents corroborated that the heaviest bombardment
was often at night, when the insurgency also launched mortar shells. A
displaced woman who lived in the Ministry of Defense compound said, "The
Ethiopians dug trenches in and around the compound. They were firing madfa'
and were receiving madfa' too. Launching shells from the Ministry of
Defense continued day and night-midnight, morning, and during the daytime.
Midnight was always the heaviest."[276]

The first round of fighting, which started in the early
hours of March 29, eased for several days when the temporary ceasefire
agreement between Ethiopian military commanders and Hawiye elders came into
effect on April 2. The purpose of the ceasefire was to collect bodies from the
streets and free those trapped in the battle zones, but both sides used the
interim period to rearm and reorganize.

Most residents of Mogadishu
and observers anticipated that the conflict was far from over.[277]
Tens of thousands of civilians used the lull to move to other areas or flee the
city.

The second Ethiopian offensive: the battle for the Pasta
Factory, April 1826

Although the ceasefire was in effect as of April 2,
exchanges of fire, mortar shelling, and armed clashes continued in certain
parts of the city, particularly in frontline areas and Fagah neighborhood,
where the insurgents continued to fight TFG forces.[278]
The insurgency dug trenches on many of the smaller streets in the Hamar Jadid, AfricanVillage, Ramadan Hotel, and Ali Kamin
areas and in neighborhoods around the Stadium to block Ethiopian tank and
vehicle access.[279]

On April 18 the insurgents carried out their second suicide
attack in Mogadishu-a
truck bomb at an Ethiopian base in the former Custodial Corps headquarters.[280]
The city was on course for another wave of bloodshed and destruction.

By April 20 intensive Ethiopian bombardment of Mogadishu started anew.
Eyewitnesses described the Ethiopian mortar, rocket, and artillery attacks as
even heavier than in the first round of fighting in March. In the first period
of fighting for control of the Stadium the Ethiopian military had been mainly
launching rockets from Villa Somalia, the former Ministry of Defense, and the
Custodial Corps headquarters, but after capturing the Stadium the Ethiopian
military occupied several buildings in and around the Stadium and deployed
artillery and BM-21 multiple-rocket-launchers in two new locations in the city:
the former Mohamoud Ahmed Ali High School and the former headquarters of Somali
Police Transportation.

For at least seven days the Ethiopian forces sent almost
non-stop rocket fire from their bases into the Towfiq, Hamar Jadid, Bar Ubah,
Hararyale, Suq Ba'ad, Jamhuriya, and Huriwa neighborhoods. A 44-year-old man
living near the Livestock Market, in Huriwa district, described the intensity
of the incoming rocket barrages in this period:

On April 18, around 11 p.m., heavy shelling started,
targeting the Livestock Market. It was on Wednesday. I was at home when the
shelling started. I heard BM rockets landing. People were saying it was BM
because of its whistling sound. The [shells] were landing at X-Control-Bal'ad,
Huriwa, and InsuranceBuildings. It is very
difficult to tell the number. At a minimum, I believe 30-40 rounds were landing
in these areas every hour. I heard the [rockets] were coming from various
locations such as Villa Somalia,
Shirkole, the Ministry of Defense, the Custodial Corps, and MohamoudAhmedAliSchool.[281]

In some other areas such as Towfiq, witnesses estimated that
there was a minimum of 10-30 rockets landing per hour.[282]
Rockets were fired day and night but mostly at night.[283]

The relentless shelling and rocket barrages continued
alongside sporadic armed clashes on the ground in Fagah and Jamhuriya areas. In
the last three days of the fighting, between April 23 and 26, Ethiopian
military ground operations escalated as both sides battled for control of the
Pasta Factory. Insurgents launched their third suicide truck bomb on an
Ethiopian military base in Afgoi on April 24.[284]
The shelling and rocket barrages, and the battle at the frontlines,
intensified. Some witnesses described the level of rocket barrages as "twice
more than previous days."[285]

Capturing the Pasta Factory was strategically important for
the Ethiopian and TFG forces because it is located on a strategic junction
linking two main roads: Industrial
Road and Bal'ad
Road. It was also close to the insurgent
stronghold in Huriwa district. The TFG militias joined the ground attack in the
last few days of the fighting, deploying from Fagah area alongside the
Ethiopian army. While the shelling and rocket barrages continued, sites like
the Ramadan Hotel changed hands several times but neither side gained
significant territory.[286]
On April 25 reports began to emerge that the Ethiopian and TFG were cornering
many of the insurgents. The following day the TFG announced victory.[287]
Hundreds of civilians were dead, several thousand were wounded, and at least one-third
and possibly more of the population of Mogadishu
had fled.[288]

The civilian victims of the March-April indiscriminate rocket
barrages and shelling

The deployment of insurgent forces in densely populated
neighborhoods around the Stadium, the Pasta Factory, and the Livestock Market,
and Ethiopian military offensives that relied on intense rocket, mortar, and
artillery bombardments resulted in the unnecessary deaths of hundreds of
civilians and injuries to thousands more. The Ethiopian forces violated
international humanitarian law by failing to take all feasible precautions to
minimize harm to civilians, to verify that targets were military objectives, to
use means and methods of warfare that would avoid incidental loss of civilian
life, and to cancel attacks when it became clear they were causing
disproportionate civilian casualties compared to the expected military gain.
These indiscriminate attacks, if committed intentionally or recklessly, were
war crimes.

The Towfiq, Hamar Jadid, Bar Ubah, and Suq Ba'ad
neighborhoods and areas around Ramadan Hotel, Jamhuriya neighborhood, and Ali
Kamin junction were particularly severely hit, partly because these areas were
insurgent strongholds and were frequently used by the insurgency to launch
attacks. But in some instances, residents told Human Rights Watch that their
neighborhoods were hit when there was no insurgent presence whatsoever. Further
investigations are required to determine whether Ethiopian commanders
intentionally directed rockets or artillery at populated areas where it was
known that the insurgency was not present-and thus deliberately targeted
civilians.

Human Rights Watch received scores of eyewitness accounts of
Ethiopian army shelling and rocket barrages that resulted in numerous civilian casualties.
Entire families were killed when Ethiopian rockets, mortars, or artillery hit
their homes. A woman who lived near Ali Kamin junction said the rocket attacks
on her area started on March 29 at around 2 a.m. and continued until 7 a.m.,
killing many civilians. She knew some of the victims in one home that was
believed to have been hit by a BM-21 rocket:

When the fighting reached Mogadishu Stadium, shells were
landing almost everywhere. In the neighborhood, lots of people were killed. In
a nearby house three children and their mother died. They were Halimo Hassan
[47 or 48 years old], Lul Osman Hersi [14], Falis Osman Hersi [13], and Yasin
Osman Hersi [12]. This happened in the early afternoon on the first day of the
fighting. Their father, Osman Hersi, was injured too. The family lived in a
villa and used to run a telephone call centerAnother house was hit by shrapnel
from a rocket which landed nearby. A religious man, Sheikh Hassan Moallim, died
in this incident. He left seven children and their mother who fled earlier.[289]

Another woman living near Ali Kamin had a similar
description of the events on March 29:

I was living in Ali Kamin with my seven children and my
husband. I heard the Ethiopians launched the offensive. Heavy shelling was used
in the fighting. Both sides were firing madfa' but the Ethiopians fired
more. In the morning lots of dead and wounded were reported. One of the shells
landed on a house three doors away. The house collapsed. I do not know how many
people were killed but the name of the lady who owned the house is Bisharo. She
had six children. We fled three days later to the Livestock Market.[290]

A 50-year-old man living in Gubta neighborhood told Human
Rights Watch, "There were no confrontations in Gubta; it was only destroyed by
shelling. There was no [insurgent] firing from Gubta, but they were firing from
the edge of Gubta, near the cigarette and matches factory, towards Villa Somalia."[291]

A woman from Gubta told Human Rights Watch that her
neighbor, Hawa Mohammed Osman, and her four children under 10 years of age were
all killed when a rocket hit their house on March 31.[292]
She said, "Whenever there was fighting between the Stadium and the Ministry of
Defense they shelled our area. Most of the shells came from the Ministry of Defense."[293]

As described above, the insurgents often used mobile tactics
that unlawfully placed civilians at additional risk: bringing mortars in bags
or wheelbarrows to a location in a populated area, launching several mortar
rounds indiscriminately in the direction of Villa Somalia, the Ministry of Defense or
other Ethiopian targets, and then leaving the area. The Ethiopian return fire
was frequently aimed at general areas and was certain to hit civilians and
civilian objects rather than military targets, in some cases because the
insurgents were already gone. A woman said, "The Ethiopians used to fire back
at wherever they received fire from-they would respond within minutes and
sometimes keep firing shells for a few hours."[294]

An elderly man from Towfiq told Human Rights Watch,

Some of the neighbors suffered a lot of destruction. Many
houses were destroyed. In every five houses in Towfiq, three of them were
destroyed by the shelling. The shelling was simultaneous. Both sides used to
fire at every direction. However, the Ethiopians fired more shells. The
Ethiopians targeted everywhere and at wherever they sensed some kind of
movement. It was difficult to spot the insurgents. You could hear them firing
mortars and then 50 shells came as a response.[295]

A medical staff member at Al-Hayat Hospital, which was
located on the frontline in Hamar Bile, near Ali Kamin junction, told Human
Rights Watch that on March 30, one of the heaviest days of the fighting in that
neighborhood, he estimated that between seven and 32 rounds of BM-21 rockets
and other shells struck in the area per hour.[296]Al-HayatHospital
itself was hit by at least one BM-21 rocket, and some of the staff were wounded
(for further detail on the attacks on Al-Hayat, see Chapter VI, "Patterns of
Abuse by Parties to the Conflict in Mogadishu,"
above). An eyewitness said, "I was in a ground floor room when a rocket making
a whistling sound hit the car park in the building, spreading shrapnel. One of
the shrapnel hit [me] in the leg while other shrapnel wounded [others]. The
rocket came from the direction of Florence
junction."[297]

Six people were killed in another incident outside Al-HayatHospital that same day. One witness told
Human Rights Watch that all victims were killed by a BM rocket. A woman living
in Hamar Bile said,

Lots of people were injured in the area. Just outside Al-HayatHospital, six people were killed,
including men and women. Among the dead was SaladoShe
used to sell tea outside Al-Hayat hospital. This happened on Friday [March 30]
around 8 a.m. There were some men who were firing guns from the area. They
carried AK-47s. The other side was responding immediately with heavy weapons.
Sometimes they would continue bombardment for hours. On the day we fled, they
[the Ethiopians] started the heavy shelling at around 12 noon and continued
until 10 p.m.[298]

A resident described the destruction of Towfiq mosque, which
killed at least 10 people:

In our area, there was lots of shelling, many houses were
destroyed or damaged. There were lots of people in the streets who died from
the shelling and fighting. Our house was hit partially but one of the
neighbours ran to a mosque with a concrete roof for safety. It was called
Towfiq mosque. They were hit by a shell and they all died when the building collapsed-10
people died there at the mosque, including a two-month-old baby. It was in the
second day of the fighting [March 30].[299]

Like other civilian objects that can become military
objectives if used by a warring party for military purposes, hospitals and
mosques can lose their immunity from attack, but they should never be fired
upon unless the attacker is able to target a military objective and the
collateral loss of civilians and property would not exceed the expected
military gain. Towfiq Mosque was very near to the Stadium, but it was not a
military objective-it was being used by families for shelter because it was
thought to be secure.

Ultimately, no area was truly secure. Civilians were killed
and wounded by rockets, shells, and during firefights in their homes, on the
streets, and in shops. While the deaths of civilians in combat situations does
not necessarily mean that the laws of war were violated, the general disregard
for the safety of the civilian population shown by both the insurgency and the
Ethiopian forces raises legitimate concerns in every incident where there were
civilian casualties.

Fahmo Elmi Ali was a 35-year-old woman who was nine months
pregnant. When the rocket fire and shelling increased on March 30, she left Al-HayatHospital
with her husband, and tried to go to SOSHospital, a maternity and
pediatric hospital. According to medical staff at Al-Hayat, Fahom Elmi Ali and
her husband left Al-HayatHospital at around 2 p.m.
on their way to SOS. A few minutes later, a shell landed on them, killing her
husband on the spot. She sustained injuries to both her legs. She was taken to
the hospital where she gave birth to a stillborn baby. One of her legs was
amputated in SOS. She was then transferred to Medina where her second leg was amputated.
She died a few days later.[300]

A 42-year-old mother of seven from Towfiq said her uncle
Gududow Abdullahi went to buy food and was hit by a shell on the way, near Al-ArafatHospital.[301]

A resident of the Livestock Market neighborhood described
the terror of people fleeing under bombardment: "I saw people fleeing in
groups. I saw terrified relatives pulling their elderly relatives out of the
houses. People were fleeing to the open areas near MogadishuUniversity."[302]
People fled on foot and on vehicles. Some sought to leave Mogadishu, carrying their belongings such as
mattresses and bags. Others were seen trying to move to safer places within the
city. Often the fighting and bombardment was so intense that any movement was
impossible.

Many civilians lost their lives when trying to flee the
fighting. An eyewitness described an incident on April 22 in Hawlwadag:

I saw three buses with fleeing civilians caught in the
fighting. A BM [rocket] hit the convoy, all three of the buses were hit. The
rocket blew one bus into two pieces; only the driver survived. The other two
vehicles were also hit-all three buses burned. I saw this with my own eyes. I
don't know how many died, but all three buses had fleeing civilians. People
carried bodies out of the vehicles: some bodies were burned beyond recognition.
It was Sunday, one day before I left [April 22], around 10:30-11 p.m. Those
vehicles carry between 15 and 30 people-it was one minibus and two bigger
buses.[303]

Human Rights Watch research indicates that the first round
of fighting in late-March resulted in most of the civilian casualties, since
many civilians were unable to flee until the ceasefire came into effect.
However some of the worst physical destruction to civilian areas appears to
have occurred during the second period of fighting in late April, which mostly
affected Towfiq, Suq Ba'ad, and northern areas of Mogadishu around the Pasta Factory and the
Livestock Market. A resident of the area around the Livestock Market who
witnessed most of the fighting explained:

There were no armed confrontations, just completely
sustained shelling in our area. The heaviest shelling was a few days after the
suicide bombing attack [April 18]. The [Livestock] Market received the heaviest
shelling. It is difficult to describe the destruction, you have to see it with
your own eyes. The shells were coming in a sustained format, each shell fell 40
meters from the other one. In some areas, you would find 10 houses next to each
other destroyed. [The Livestock Market neighborhood] is huge-there are 14 main
streets, and each block is eight houses by sixteen houses. Thirty to forty
percent of the houses in my area of the Livestock Market were destroyed, but
Ali Kamin is even more destroyed. Lots of people were killed; most of them were
buried under the rubble of their homes. I don't know the names of the people
who were killed, but the whole area was emptied because of the shelling. You
could walk for blocks without seeing anyone. And you could smell the bodies
under the rubble.[304]

Dozens of civilians died in the last days of the April
fighting, in the Livestock Market area and other areas that were shelled. On
April 23, Abdullahi (not his real name) was with one of his wives in the SOSHospital
area when he learned that his family's home in Towfiq had been hit by a rocket
that killed his second wife and seven children:

I was phoned at the time [right after the attack], but
there was no transport and it was too dangerous to go to Towfiq because of the
fighting. It was the first time in my life that I cried, at the age of 65, and
I am still crying all the time. The next morning, when I reached the house,
there were no survivors. I tried to find survivors but I could only see blood
and body parts. BM rockets, RT-5, and mortars were being fired into the
neighborhood.[305]

A 44-year-old resident of the Livestock Market area visited
his mortally wounded brother-in-law at the SOSHospital
on the day it was bombarded. He told Human Rights Watch that he saw three
rockets strike in front and on either side of the hospital building around 12
noon. He said, "Some [patients] were being treated [on] the veranda; some were
lying on a mat. I saw seven dead bodies-six men and a woman-and around 10
wounded persons. The ages of the dead ranged from 20 and above. But the
majority of the wounded were women and children."[306]

Several residents of the Livestock Market area told Human
Rights Watch the shelling and rocket barrages reached their peak in this area
on April 25, a day before the offensive ended.

VIII. Displacement
by the Fighting

Displacement within Mogadishu

As the clashes intensified in February and March, some
civilians moved to different areas of the city, trying to find a safe place to
live. However, for poorer communities this was less of an option. Some people
who had sufficient money moved their families to safer neighborhoods or even
outside of Mogadishu
as the attacks and reprisals increased, and sometimes moved several times as
the fighting shifted or neighborhoods came under attack from either side.

The experience of 39-year-old "Khadija" (not her real name)
and her family illustrates the challenges of finding security in Mogadishu in this period.
The family lived in the Bulahubay neighborhood, close to Villa Baidoa, a large
complex about two kilometers northwest of the airport, which was a base for
Ethiopian troops and quickly became a target for insurgency mortar fire.

Fearing that the Ethiopian
troops in the proximity could be targeted, Khadija moved her family from the
Bulahubay area to KPP, in Hodan district, in early February. However,
insurgents deployed in Hodan soon became a target for Ethiopian fire. She said,
"The insurgents used the area as a platform to launch rocket attacks. I had to
move again. I was accommodated by a friend at Bakara market area. My friend and
her two children lived in a concrete house as this was the best place to take
refuge."[307]

When the fighting intensified in late-March, two more
families moved into the house. Khadija's family survived the fighting during
the first Ethiopian offensive from March 29 through April 1, although they
heard and witnessed explosions in their area, and some of their neighbors lost
family members. As soon as the ceasefire came into effect on April 2, she
decided to flee Mogadishu,
fearing-as indeed was the case-that the lull in the bombardment was temporary
and the fighting would soon resume.

For many of the poorer residents
and displaced people living in Mogadishu, moving around the city and renting
new accommodation was impossible, and even paying for transport to flee the
city was beyond their means. As the fighting and bombardment continued, the
roads filled with many of the city's poorest people fleeing on foot.[308]

Treatment of Displaced People Fleeing Mogadishu

At least 365,000 people fled Mogadishu in the period from February to May
2007, according to UN estimates.[309]
Many of those who fled the city escaped during the temporary ceasefire
beginning April 2 and in the roughly two-week period that followed. Tens of
thousands of people stayed within the vicinity of Mogadishu, relocating to
neighboring towns such as Afgoi and Marka (respectively 30 and 100 kilometers
from the city, but many others traveled as far as Hargeysa and Bosaso in the
north or all the way to the Kenyan border in the south.

Bandit attacks on civilians fleeing Mogadishu

After leaving their homes and surviving the intense fighting
in the city, thousands of displaced people from Mogadishu suffered further attacks from
criminal elements as they fled the city in March and April. Many of the fleeing
civilians were attacked in an area between Marka and Jilib along the route to
Kismayo. Others who took the road to Baidoa were attacked near Lego village.
Those people who fled north used the main road that leaves Mogadishu towards the central regions, and
Human Rights Watch heard many accounts of attacks on this group between
Bulaburte and Beletweyne and between Beletweyne and Mataban.

The armed individuals and groups responsible for the attacks
varied depending on the location, though the attacks often shared certain
characteristics. The attackers appear to have been motivated by the opportunity
to steal cash, goods, and other assets from unarmed civilians. In addition, in
some areas there was a pattern of rape and sexual violence against women and
girls.

Witnesses blamed bandits and other criminal elements for the
attacks, not TFG or Ethiopian forces or the insurgency. However, even in
locations like Marka and Afgoi that were under TFG control, the TFG failed to
take steps to improve security for those in flight. Likewise, Ethiopian troops
present in locations where attacks were occurring made no effort to intervene
to stop or prevent attacks. For instance, many fleeing people were attacked
near Lego village, which is close to Ballidogle airport, where the Ethiopian
military has one of its biggest bases in Somalia.

Human Rights Watch interviewed dozens of individuals who
told consistent accounts of armed men firing on them, stealing their
possessions, and occasionally raping women and girls.[310]
A few illustrative accounts are provided below:

A
17-year-old girl who fled Mogadishu
on March 23 said that she and her sister were in a minibus on the way to
Dobley when it was attacked between Marka and Jilib. Armed men fired at
the bus to stop it, then ordered everyone out and looted all possessions.
The gunmen told everyone to lie down and those who refused were beaten.
The men took the loot on a donkey cart, told men not to look at them, and
then they left. She said, "They took away three women including my sister.
They raped all three women, kept them for three to four hours and allowed
them to rejoin us. My sister told me that she was raped by two men,
alternating between them."[311]

A
17-year-old girl who fled Mogadishu
on April 21 was in a convoy that was ambushed just past Afgoi at 10 p.m.
She said, "I witnessed one incident when a girl was taken out of a vehicle
and raped in the bush nearby, she was about 25 years old. I saw the woman
after she was released. She could not speak, she was crying."[312]
Later in the journey, as her convoy traveled between Bulohawo and Mandera,
it was ambushed again. Up to six people were wounded, including a driver
who later died.

On
April 2 a woman who traveled through Wanlaweyn witnessed the aftermath of
an attack on a vehicle in Lego village. When armed men tried to stop a
minibus, she said, "The driver of the minibus speeded up in order to
escape, prompting the gunmen to fire. Two people were killed and five were
injured. I saw two dead male bodies in the bus as we passed by. An
Ethiopian checkpoint was not that far from where these incidents took
place."[313]

A
35-year-old woman who was nine months pregnant and fled Mogadishu in late-April was in a convoy
that was ambushed at Bal'ad. After bandits fired on the vehicle, "The
driver stopped the bus and bandits came and took household materials and
clothes. They were three men armed with AK-47s. They kept on searching the
bus for three hours. They took away a bag full of household materials from
me. They did not take away any women from the bus."[314]

A
man who left Mogadishu
on April 29 was in a convoy that was ambushed at Jimbiley village, near
Buloburte. He said, "The vehicle in front of us was shot at first. The
driver of our vehicle managed to drive back and escaped. Three women and
the driver were wounded in the first vehicle. This happened around 10 p.m.
We drove back to a small village. However, we heard they robbed the other
vehicle and took bags, clothes and money.[315]

IX. Applying International Humanitarian
Law to the Conflict in Somalia

A. Applicable International Law

Under international humanitarian law, the conflict in Somalia is
considered a non-international armed conflict. (An international armed conflict
is an armed conflict between two or more states.) Although Ethiopian forces
(and initially some US
forces) were involved in the conflict in Somalia, they were acting at the
invitation of, and in coalition with, the Somali Transitional Federal
Government.[316]
All warring parties, including the armed groups that comprise the insurgency,
are bound by international humanitarian law (the laws of war).[317]

Article 3 common to the four Geneva Conventions of 1949
(Common Article 3) expressly binds all parties to a non-international armed
conflict, including non-state armed groups. Common Article 3 requires the
humane treatment of civilians and captured combatants and prohibits violence to
life and person, particularly murder, mutilation, cruel treatment, and torture;
taking of hostages; outrages upon personal dignity; and the passing of
sentences and the carrying out of executions without previous judgment
pronounced by a regularly constituted court.[318]

International humanitarian law on the conduct of hostilities
is set out in the Hague
Regulations of 1907[319]
and the First Additional Protocol of 1977 to the Geneva Conventions (Protocol
I).[320]
Protocol I, which provides the most detailed and current codification of the
conduct of hostilities during international armed conflicts, is not directly
applicable to the conflict. The Second Additional Protocol of 1977 to the
Geneva Conventions (Protocol II) on non-international armed conflicts is also
not directly applicable because Somalia
is not a party to the protocol (although Ethiopia is). Nevertheless, many if
not most of the provisions of Protocols I and II have been recognized by states
to be reflective of customary international law.[321]

The legal analysis applied in this report frequently
references norms enshrined in Protocols I and II, but as an important codification
of customary law rather than as a treaty obligation. Customary humanitarian law
as it relates to the fundamental principles concerning conduct of hostilities
is now recognized as largely the same whether it is applied to an international
or a non-international armed conflict.[322]

B. Protections for Civilians and Civilian Objects

International humanitarian law limits permissible means and
methods of warfare by parties to an armed conflict and requires them to respect
and protect civilians and captured combatants. "Means" of combat refers
generally to the weapons used, while "methods" refers to the manner in which
such weapons are used.

The two fundamental tenets of international humanitarian law
are those of "civilian immunity" and "distinction."[323]
They impose a duty, at all times during the conflict, to distinguish between
combatants and civilians, and to target only the former. Article 48 of Protocol
I states, "Parties to the conflict shall at all times distinguish between the
civilian population and combatants and between civilian objects and military
objectives and accordingly shall direct their operations only against military
objectives."[324]
While Protocol I recognizes that some civilian casualties are inevitable,
parties to a conflict may not target civilians and civilian objects and may
direct their operations against only military objectives.

Civilian objects are those that are not considered military
objectives.[325]
Military objectives are combatants and those objects that "by their nature, location,
purpose or use make an effective contribution to military action and whose
total or partial destruction, capture or neutralization, in the circumstances
ruling at the time, offers a definite military advantage."[326]
In general, the law prohibits direct attacks against what are by their nature
civilian objects, such as homes and apartments, places of worship, hospitals,
schools, or cultural monuments, unless they are being used for military
purposes.[327]

International humanitarian law prohibits indiscriminate
attacks. Indiscriminate attacks are "of a nature to strike military objectives
and civilians or civilian objects without distinction." Examples of
indiscriminate attacks are those that "are not directed at a specific military
objective" or that use means that "cannot be directed at a specific military
objective."[328]

One form of prohibited indiscriminate attack is area
bombardment. Any attack, whether by artillery shelling or other means, that
treats as a single military objective a number of clearly separated and
distinct military objectives located in a city, town, or other area containing
a concentration of civilians and civilian objects, is regarded as an
indiscriminate attack and prohibited. Similarly, if a combatant launches an
attack without attempting to aim properly at a military target, or in such a
way as to hit civilians without regard to the likely extent of death or injury,
it would amount to an indiscriminate attack.[329]

Also prohibited are attacks that violate the principle of
proportionality. Disproportionate attacks are those that are expected to cause
incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, or damage to civilian
objectives that would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct
military advantage anticipated from the attack.[330]
The expected danger to the civilian population and civilian objects depends on
various factors, including their location (possibly within or near a military
objective), the accuracy of the weapons used (depending on the trajectory, the
range, environmental factors, the ammunition used, etc.), and the technical
skill of the combatants (which can lead to random launching of weapons when
combatants lack the ability to aim effectively at the intended target).[331]

International humanitarian law requires that the parties to
a conflict take constant care during military operations to spare the civilian
population and to "take all feasible precautions" to avoid or minimize the
incidental loss of civilian life, as well as injury to civilians and damage to
civilian objects.[332] In its authoritative Commentary on Protocol I, the
International Committee of the Red Cross explains that the requirement to take
all "feasible" precautions means, among other things, that the person launching
an attack is required to take the steps needed to identify the target as a
legitimate military objective "in good time to spare the population as far as
possible."

These precautions include:

Doing
"everything feasible to verify" that the objects to be attacked are
military objectives and not civilians or civilian objects. If there are
doubts about whether a potential target is of a civilian or military
character, it "shall be presumed" to be civilian.[333]
The warring parties must do everything feasible to cancel or suspend an
attack if it becomes apparent that the target is not a military objective.[334]

Taking
"all feasible precautions in the choice of means and methods" of warfare
so as to avoid and in any event minimize "incidental loss of civilian
life, injury to civilians and damage to civilian objects."[335]

"When
a choice is possible between several military objectives for obtaining the
same military advantage," carrying out the attack that may be "expected to
cause the least danger to civilian lives and civilian objects."[337]

Avoiding
"locating military objectives within or near densely populated areas."[338]

Endeavoring
"to remove the civilian populationfrom the vicinity of military
objectives."[339]

International humanitarian law does not prohibit fighting in
urban areas, although the presence of civilians places greater obligations on
warring parties to take steps to minimize harm to civilians. Humanitarian law
prohibits belligerents from using civilians to shield military objectives or
military operations from attack. "Shielding" refers to purposefully using the
presence of civilians to render certain points, areas, or military forces
immune from military attack.[340]
Taking over a family's home and not permitting the family to leave for safety
so as to deter the enemy from attacking is a simple example of using "human
shields."

The prohibition on shielding is distinct from the
requirement that all warring parties take "constant care" to protect civilians
during the conduct of military operations by, among other things, taking all
feasible precautions to avoid locating military objectives within or near
densely populated areas.[341]
Such a determination will depend on the situation.

With respect to individual
responsibility, serious violations of international humanitarian law, including
deliberate, indiscriminate and disproportionate attacks harming civilians, when
committed with criminal intent, are considered war crimes. Individuals may also
be held criminally liable for attempting to commit a war crime, as well as
assisting in, facilitating, aiding or abetting a war crime. Responsibility may
also fall on persons planning or instigating the commission of a war crime.[342]
Commanders and civilian leaders may be prosecuted for war crimes as a matter of
command responsibility when they knew or should have known about the commission
of war crimes and took insufficient measures to prevent them or punish those
responsible.[343]

C. Violations of International Humanitarian Law by the Parties
to the Conflict in Mogadishu

This report describes numerous violations of the laws of war
by insurgent, Ethiopian, and TFG forces since January 2007. Violations by one
party to a conflict do not justify violations by the opposing side: the
unlawful deployment of insurgent forces in densely populated neighborhoods of Mogadishu did not justify
indiscriminate and disproportionate bombardments of those areas by Ethiopian
forces. Serious violations committed by individuals knowingly or recklessly are
war crimes. States have an obligation to investigate and prosecute individuals
implicated in war crimes committed on their territory.[344]

Violations by the insurgency

The insurgency:

Deployed
their forces in densely populated civilian areas and often launched mortar
rounds in "hit-and-run" tactics that placed civilians at unnecessary risk.
Further investigation is required to determine whether insurgents
purposefully used civilians to shield themselves from attack, a war crime.

Fired
weapons, particularly mortars, in a manner that did not discriminate
between civilians and military objectives.

Targeted
TFG civilian officials for attack.

In
at least one incident executed captured combatants in their custody, and
subjected the bodies to degrading treatment.

Violations by Ethiopian forces

Ethiopian forces:

Failed
to take all feasible precautions to avoid incidental loss of civilian life
and property. They failed to verify that targets were military objectives.

Failed
to take all feasible precautions to avoid civilian casualties by their
choice of means (firing inherently indiscriminate rockets in urban areas)
and methods (using mortars and other indirect weapons without spotters) of
warfare.

Routinely
and repeatedly fired rockets, mortars, and artillery in a manner that did
not discriminate between civilian and military objectives or that caused
civilian loss of life that exceeded the expected military gain. The use of
area bombardments in populated areas and the failure to cancel attacks
once the harm to civilians became known is evidence of criminal intent
necessary to demonstrate the commission of war crimes.

In
specific instances-namely attacks on hospitals-appeared to deliberately
target civilian objects known to contain civilians.

Committed
widespread pillaging and looting of civilian property, including of
medical equipment at hospitals.

Violations by the Transitional Federal Government
forces

TFG forces:

Failed
to provide effective warnings when alerting civilians of impending
military operations.

Committed
widespread pillaging and looting of civilian property.

Interfered
with the delivery of humanitarian assistance and in some instances
directly attacked humanitarian personnel.

Committed
mass arrests and mistreated persons in custody.

X. Recommendations

To the Transitional Federal Government of Somalia (TFG)

Immediately
issue clear public orders to all TFG security forces to cease attacks on
and mistreatment of civilians, and looting of civilian property.

Ensure
humanitarian assistance to all civilians in need, including by
facilitating humanitarian agencies in their access to all displaced
persons in and around Mogadishu.

Publicly
reassure all displaced residents of Mogadishu
that they are welcome to return to Mogadishu
and that the TFG is cognizant of its responsibility to provide security to
all Somali civilians under its control, regardless of clan affiliation.

Cease
all mistreatment of detainees and ensure that they have access to family
members, legal counsel, and adequate medical care while in detention.
Immediately and publicly communicate these instructions to all police and
other security forces in Mogadishu.
Encourage independent monitoring of detention facilities.

Investigate
allegations of abuses by TFG forces and hold accountable members of the
TFG forces, whatever their rank, implicated in abuses.

Take all necessary steps to
build a competent, independent, and impartial judiciary that can provide
trials that meet international fair trial standards. Abolish the death
penalty as an inherently cruel form of punishment.

Support
efforts to deter abuses in Somalia
in the future, such as by inviting and facilitating UN and independent
international human rights organizations to investigate allegations of
abuses by all sides.

Invite
the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights to increase the
number of staff monitoring and reporting on human rights abuses in Somalia
and request technical support for the judiciary and the establishment of
an independent national human rights commission.

To the groups comprising the insurgency

Cease all attacks on civilians and
civilian objects. Commanders and other leaders of the Al-Shabaab
and other armed groups should ensure that civilians are never targeted for
attack. International humanitarian law defines civilians to include
government officials and employees not directly participating in the
hostilities, school teachers and other non-combatant civil servants,
humanitarian aid and development workers, journalists, and doctors.

Cease all attacks that cause
indiscriminate or disproportionate harm to civilians or civilian objects.
Insurgent forces attacking military targets must take all feasible steps
to minimize harm to civilians. No attack should be carried out that uses
means and methods of war that do not distinguish between civilians and
combatants or are expected to cause excessive civilian harm. The
insurgency should avoid any attacks in crowded civilian areas, such as
busy roads, village or city streets, markets, or other public gathering
places.

Avoid locating, to the extent feasible,
insurgent forces within or near densely populated areas, and where
possible remove civilians from the vicinity of such forces. Avoid using
populated areas to launch attacks and cease threatening civilians who
protest the use of their neighborhoods as launching sites. Never
purposefully use civilians to shield insurgent forces from attack.

Publicly commit to abide by
international humanitarian law, including prohibitions against
targeting civilians, using indiscriminate and disproportionate attacks,
and using civilians as "human shields."

To the government of Ethiopia

Cease
all attacks that deliberately target civilians and cease using means and
methods of combat that cannot discriminate between civilians and military
objectives. Civilian objects such
as schools, hospitals, and homes must not be attacked unless currently
being used for military purposes.

Cease
all indiscriminate attacks and attacks in which the expected civilian harm
is excessive compared to the concrete and direct military gain
anticipated. In particular, cease the use of area bombardments of
populated areas of Mogadishu.

Avoid
locating, to the extent feasible, military assets such as bases in or near
densely populated areas.

Protect
medical facilities and other protected sites.

Issue
clear public orders to all forces that they must uphold fundamental
principles of international humanitarian law and provide clear guidelines
and training to all commanders and fighters to ensure compliance with
international humanitarian law.

Investigate
and discipline or prosecute as appropriate military personnel, regardless
of rank, who are responsible for serious violations of international
humanitarian law including those who may be held accountable as a matter
of command responsibility.

To the participants in the National Reconciliation
Conference and representatives of civil society

Call for accountability and
oppose amnesties for serious violations of international law committed by
all parties to the conflict to help ensure the rights of individual
victims to justice and an effective remedy, and to build a genuine and
lasting peace.

Acknowledge the plight of
women, displaced persons and minorities and allow their representatives to
participate meaningfully in the National Reconciliation Conference.

To the European Union and its member states, the
European Commission, the government of the United States, the African Union,
and the Arab League

Publicly
condemn the serious abuses of international human rights and humanitarian
law committed by all parties to the conflict in Mogadishu in 2007, and specifically call
on the Ethiopian government and Transitional Federal Government to take
all necessary steps, including public action, to ensure that their forces
cease abuses against all persons in custody.

Support
measures to promote accountability and end impunity for serious crimes in Somalia,
including through the establishment of an independent United Nations panel
of experts to investigate and map serious crimes and recommend further
measures to improve accountability.

Remind
the Ethiopian and Somali governments of their obligations under
international law to investigate and discipline or prosecute as
appropriate military personnel, regardless of rank, who are responsible
for serious violations of international human rights or humanitarian law,
including those who may be held accountable as a matter of command
responsibility.

Reiterate that amnesties at the
national level are not applicable to international crimes.

Publicly
and privately demand that the Ethiopian government cease summary
executions, deliberate attacks against civilians and civilian objects, and
the use of area bombardment in populated areas, reminding the government
that these are grave violations of international humanitarian law that can
amount to war crimes.

Publicly promote and
financially support civil society efforts to provide humanitarian
assistance, services such as education, monitoring of the human rights
situation, and efforts to promote national solidarity, and also TFG
efforts to improve the functioning of the judicial system and to establish
a national human rights commission. Provide voluntary contributions to support
an expanded OHCHR field operation in Somalia.

To the government of the United
States

Investigate
reports of abuses by Ethiopian forces, identify the specific units
involved, and ensure that they receive no assistance or training from the
United States until the Ethiopian government takes effective measures to
bring those responsible to justice, as required under the "Leahy law,"
which prohibits US military assistance to foreign military units that
violate human rights with impunity.

To the African Union

Ensure
that the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) publicly raises
concerns over violations of international human rights and humanitarian
law with all parties to the conflict in Mogadishu.

Establish dialogue mechanisms
with TFG and Ethiopian commanders as well as the insurgency about rules of
engagement, tactics and international humanitarian law.

To the United Nations

To the UN Security Council

Condemn
serious violations of international humanitarian and human rights law that
have been and continue to be perpetrated in Somalia by all parties to the
conflict.

Support
measures to promote accountability and end impunity for serious crimes in Somalia,
including through the establishment of an independent panel of experts to
investigate and map serious crimes and recommend further measures to improve
accountability.

Ensure
that any peacekeeping operation authorized by the United Nations Security
Council, whether a regional or UN operation, includes robust protection of
civilians within its mandate, and gender and child specific components.

Call
on the UN secretary-general to take immediate action on the grave human
rights situation in Somalia
including by:

Providing
monthly progress reports on the human rights situation to the Security
Council; and

Establishing
an independent panel of experts to investigate abuses associated with the
recent conflict in Mogadishu,
retrospectively map the most serious crimes in Somalia's recent history, and
present recommendations for accountability.

To the UN Secretary-General

Support
an increase in the number of OHCHR staff monitoring and publicly reporting
on human rights abuses in Somalia
and urge donors to provide additional
voluntary contributions for this operation.

Establish
an independent panel of experts to investigate abuses associated with the
recent conflict in Mogadishu,
retrospectively map the most serious crimes in Somalia's recent history, and
present recommendations for accountability.

To the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR)

Increase the number of human rights
officers monitoring and publicly reporting on human rights abuses in Somalia,
and include staff with expertise on child and minority protection and
sexual and gender-based violence.

Explore the possibility of providing
technical support to the Somali judiciary and to Somali government
efforts to establish an independent national human rights commission.

To the UNDP Resident Representative (and head of the UN Country Team)

Ensure
that the program and advocacy work of the UN agencies operating in Somalia
highlights the protection of displaced and conflict-affected populations
and that it is based on international human rights and humanitarian law
standards.

Support
an increase in the number of OHCHR staff monitoring and publicly reporting
on human rights abuses in Somalia
and urge donors to provide additional
voluntary contributions for this operation.

Ensure
that all TFG forces participating in UNDP-funded training programs have
been screened for human rights abuses.

XI. Methodology

This report is based on a six-week fact-finding mission to Kenya and Somalia in April and May and
subsequent telephone research in June and July 2007. Human Rights Watch
researchers included staff with extensive experience investigating violations
of international humanitarian law in armed conflicts.

In April and March Human Rights Watch researchers conducted
in-depth interviews in Nairobi, Galkayo, Hargeysa, Bosaso, and Mogadishu with
more than 70 victims, family members of victims and other eyewitnesses.
Researchers also conducted more than 30 telephone interviews with victims and
witnesses to events in Mogadishu
in June and July. In addition, we interviewed dozens of medical staff, independent
analysts, diplomatic officials, aid workers, and journalists, some of whom were
eyewitnesses to events described in the report.

For security reasons, many people spoke to Human Rights
Watch on the condition of confidentiality, requesting that the report not
mention their names or other identifying information. We also omitted details about
individuals and locations of interviews where we believed that information
could place a person at risk.

XII. Acknowledgements

Researchers in the Africa division wrote this report based
on research in Kenya and Somalia in April and May 2007 by Africa division
and emergencies program staff, and subsequent research by Africa
division staff in June and July.

The report was edited by Georgette Gagnon, deputy director
of the Africa division, and Iain Gorvin,
consultant to the program office. Several Human Rights Watch staff reviewed
sections of the report, including Peter Bouckaert, emergencies director; Marc
Garlasco, senior military analyst; and Joanne Mariner, terrorism and
counter-terrorism program director. James Ross, legal and policy director,
provided legal review.

Anna Gressel, associate in the Africa
division, coordinated report production and provided invaluable administrative
support. Thanks are due to Ndeye Fatu Sesay, Anja Kortenaar, Lucy Cohen, and
Michael Ginsberg, interns in the Africa
division, who provided research assistance. Veronica Matushaj, audio-visual
director of Human Rights Watch, and Anna Lopriore assisted with the cover
photograph. Andrea Holley and Fitzroy Hepkins made possible the production of
the report. Yaron David designed the maps of Mogadishu.

Human Rights Watch would like to thank the many individuals
and organizations who offered assistance, analysis, or information that made
this report possible. Many of their names have been withheld due to the fear of
reprisals.

Above all, Human Rights Watch is deeply grateful to the many
Somali men and women who agreed to share their experiences with our
researchers.

[1]Maj.-Gen. Mohamed Siad Barre took power in a bloodless
coup in October 1969, six days after the assassination of President Abdurashid
Ali Sharmarke. For further description and analysis of Somalia's troubled history, see I.M. Lewis, A
Modern History of the Somali: Nation and State in the Horn of Africa (Athens, OH:
Ohio University Press, 2003); and Lee V. Cassanelli, The Shaping of Somali
Society: Reconstructing the History of a Pastoral People, 1600-1900
(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1982). See also Ismail I.
Ahmed and Reginald Herbold Green, "The heritage of war and state collapse in Somalia and Somaliland:
local-level effects, external interventions and reconstruction," Third World
Quarterly 1999,
http://somali-jna.org/downloads/Heritage%20of%20war%20&%20state%20collapse.pdf
(accessed August 2, 2007).

[6]President Barre reacted angrily to the Soviet refusal
to support Somalia's
invasion of the Ogaden region and the ensuing war with Ethiopia. All
Soviet military experts and diplomatic representatives were expelled from Somalia and Somalia switched policy towards the
West. For further analysis, see Ahmed I. Samatar, Socialist Somalia: Rhetoric
and Reality (London: Zed Books, 1988); and David A. Korn, Ethiopia, the United
States and the Soviet Union
(Carbondale, IL: Southern Illinois University Press, 1988).

[8]One of the first of these opposition movements was the
Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF), led by then-Colonel and current
President Abdullahi Yusuf after he survived a failed coup attempt against Siad
Barre and fled to Ethiopia
in 1978. See Daniel Compagnon, "The Somali Opposition Fronts," Horn of Africa, vol. 13, no. 1 & 2, April-June 1990, pp.
29-54.

[15]Africa
Watch (now Human Rights Watch/Africa) and Physicians for Human Rights, No Mercy
in Mogadishu:
The Human Cost of the Conflict & The Struggle for Relief, March 26, 1992,
http://www.hrw.org/reports/1992/somalia/.

[21] Ibid.
See also John L. Hirsch and Robert B. Oakley, Somalia and Operation Restore
Hope (Washington DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1995).

[22] The
six factions that existed just after Siad Barre left power fragmented into
dozens of other factions and splinter groups each vying for power and national
resources. See Alex de Waal, Social Science Research Council, "Class and Power in a Stateless Somalia,"
February 20, 2007, http://hornofafrica.ssrc.org/dewaal/index3.html (accessed
July 3, 2007).

[23]Ethiopia hosted four peace conferences, Kenya and Djibouti
each hosted three, while Egypt,
Yemen and Libya hosted
one conference each. These conferences sometimes undermined each other. US
State Department, "Background Note: Somalia,"
May 2007, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2863.htm (accessed August 3, 2007);
Ibrahim H. Gagale, "The only Road to Peace in Somalia," February 8, 2007, http://www.garoweonline.com/stories/publish/article_7525.shtml
(accessed August 3, 2007).

[26]
The UN did support the TNG, however, and a TNG representative occupied Somalia's seat at
the UN, which had been vacant since 1991. Andre le Sage, Centre for
Humanitarian Dialogue, "Stateless Justice in Somalia Formal and Informal Rule
of Law Initiatives," July 2005, http://www.hdcentre.org/datastore/Justice/Somalia%20final.pdf
(accessed August 1, 2007).

[29] Prime
Minister Ali Mohammed Gedi is a former veterinarian who had little political
experience when he was appointed to the position. President Abdullahi Yusuf is a former warlord whose
relations with Ethiopia
started in 1978 during the Derg regime, when
Abdullahi Yusuf and other former Somali army officers orchestrated a failed
coup to unseat Siad Barre. When Barre executed most of the officers who planned
the coup, Yusuf escaped to Ethiopia
and helped create one of the first rebel groups based in Ethiopia, the
SSDF (see footnote 8). Yusuf was later detained by the Derg government after a
difference of opinions, but he was released by Meles Zenawi after Zenawi took
power in Ethiopia
in May 1991. For further analysis see Mohammed Adow, "Why Ethiopia is on war
footing," BBC News Online, July 21, 2006,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/5201470.stm (accessed August 2, 2007).

[31]Peter
Woodward, The Horn of Africa: Politics and International Relations, (London,
New York: Tauris Academic Studies, 1996); David D. Laitin and Said S. Samatar, Somalia: Nation
in Search of a State, (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1987). For a brief
timeline on the historical events, see "Timeline: Ethiopia
and Somalia,"
BBC News Online, January 25, 2007, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/6159735.stm
(accessed July 4, 2007).

[32]Somali nationalism stems from the 19th century
"scramble for Africa" by the European powers.
The northern regions of Somalia
came under the protectorate of Britain
in 18841886. Between 1889 and 1905, the Italian government established its
control over the southern regions. In 1896 France
claimed Somalia's red sea
coast region and named it French Somaliland (later to become Djibouti after
independence in 1977). These three regions plus the northeastern region of Kenya (named the Northern District Frontier by
the British), and the western Somali region known as the Ogaden or Region 5 in
eastern Ethiopia
constitute "Greater Somalia." In 1960 two of these five regions joined to make
the first Somali republic. But Somalia's
first post-independence president, Aden Abdulle Osman (Aden Adde) asserted that
Somalis must get the "missing regions" through peaceful means no matter how
long it takes.

[33]
There is debate among analysts about the extent to which Al-Itihaad remained a
potent force after its defeat by Abdullahi Yusuf and Ethiopian forces in the
1990s. For analysis of Sheikh Aweys and the origins of Al-Itihaad Al-Islaami
see International Crisis Group, "Counter-Terrorism in Somalia: Losing Hearts and
Minds?" Africa Report No. 95, July 11, 2005; "Somalia's Islamists," Africa Report
No. 100, December 12, 2005; and "Can the Somali Crisis Be Contained?" See also
Andr Le Sage, "Prospects for Al Itihad and Islamist Radicalism in Somalia," Review of African Political Economy,
vol. 27, no. 89, September 2001.

[34]Al-Itihaad was placed on a US list of organizations designated
for asset freezes on September 23, 2001. Sheikh Aweys was named on the same US list on
November 7, 2001. See US Department of the Treasury, Office of Foreign Assets
Control, "Executive Order 13224-Blocking Property and Prohibiting Transactions
with Persons who Commit, Threaten to Commit, or Support Terrorism," http://www.treasury.gov/offices/enforcement/ofac/programs/terror/terror.pdf(accessed
August 1, 2007).

[36] See
United Nations Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General on the
situation in Somalia,
S/2002/709, June 27, 2002, p. 4,
http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N02/439/83/PDF/N0243983.pdf?OpenElement
(accessed August 1, 2007).

[37] In "Avoiding Conflict in the Horn of Africa,"
published by the Council on Foreign Relations, regional analyst Terrence Lyons
argued that the breakdown of the Eritrea-Ethiopia peace implementation process
precipitated the intervention of both countries in neighboring Somalia. Eritrea's policy of supporting the ICU and rebel
groups fighting inside Ethiopia-such
as the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF) and the Oromo Liberation Front
(OLF)-escalated in 2006. These rebel groups are led by Gen. Mohammed Omar and
Dawud Ibsa respectively and both men are currently based in Eritrea.
Terrence Lyons, Council on Foreign Relations, "Avoiding Conflict in the Horn of
Africa," December 2006,
http://www.cfr.org/content/publications/attachments/Ethiopia_EritreaCSR21.pdf
(accessed August 5, 2007). For further analysis see Abdul Mohammed, Social
Science Research Council, "Ethiopia's Strategic Dilemma in the Horn of Africa,"
February 20, 2007, http://hornofafrica.ssrc.org/Abdul_Mohammed
(accessed July 4, 2007).

[38]For a detailed description of Eritrean
military support to the ICU and Ethiopian military support to the TFG in early
2006, see United Nations Security Council, Report of the Monitoring Group on
Somalia pursuant to Security Council resolution 1676 (2006), S/2006/913,
November 22, 2006, pp. 11-21.

[39]
Sheikh Aweys took a leading role in the rise of the ICU and became chair of the
ICU's consultative council in mid-2006. After the fall of the courts in
December 2006, he apparently fled Mogadishu and
is currently thought to be in Asmara,
Eritrea.

[40]The establishment of Islamic courts in Mogadishu
began in 1994, while UNOSOM II was still present in Somalia, and quickly received
popular support from a population exhausted by years of lawlessness and
violence at the hands of numerous corrupt warlords. The main aim of the courts
was to tackle pervasive crime in Mogadishu.
As the courts expanded, they drew the attention of north Mogadishu's then-political leader, Ali Mahdi
Mohammed, who feared that the courts' growing support base could diminish his
power. In 1996 he cracked down on the courts in north Mogadishu, but popular support for the Courts
continued. In 1998, with the support of the business community, two of the
clans in south Mogadishu
set up Islamic courts to curb banditry and murders within their own clans. US
State Department, "Somalia:
Country Reports on Human Rights Practices," Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights,
and Labor, February 23, 2001, http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2000/af/780.htm(accessed
August 2, 2007).

[41]
Ken Menkhaus, "There and back again in Somalia," Middle East Report
Online, February 11, 2007, http://www.merip.org/mero/mero021107.html
(accessed July 5, 2007).

[44] James
Phillips, "Somalia and Al-Qaeda: Implications for the War on Terror," Heritage
Foundation, April 5, 2002, http://www.heritage.org/Research/HomelandDefense/BG1526.cfm
(accessed July 11, 2007); International Crisis Group, "Counter-Terrorism in
Somalia"; United Nations Security Council, Report of the Monitoring Group on
Somalia pursuant to Security Council resolution 1558 (2004), S/2005/153, March
8, 2005.

[45]US State Department, Office of the
Coordinator for Counterterrorism, Country Reports on Terrorism 2004, April 27,
2005, http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/crt/45388.htm (accessed August 1, 2007).

[46] International
Crisis Group, "Counter-Terrorism in Somalia," p. 8. All three
individuals are on US
sanctions lists for their alleged affiliation to terrorist activity, along with
several Somalis, including Sheikh Aweys and Hassan Al-Turki.

[47]
"A state of utter failure-Somalia,"
Economist, December 17, 2005.

[48]The Somali warlords behind the formation of
the ARPCT were members of the TFG. They included Muse
Sudi Yalahow (trade minister), Mohammed Qanyare Afrah (security minister),
Botan Issa Alim (disarmament minister), and Omar Mohammed Finish (religious affairs
minister), as well as several business and other militia leaders.

[58] International Crisis Group,
"Counter-Terrorism in Somalia."
See also Tom Allard, "Terrorists look to Somalia as an emerging safe haven,"
Sydney Morning Herald, November 4, 2006.

[59]
Both the ICU and the TFG received substantial military support and supplies
from regional and other states, as well as independent arms trading networks.
The UN Security Council imposed an arms embargo on Somalia in 1992, but the embargo has
been repeatedly violated. For further details on the arms flows and military
build up in 2006, see United Nations Security Council, Report of the Monitoring
Group on Somalia pursuant to Security Council resolution 1676 (S/2006/913),
November 22, 2006, and previous reports by the UN Monitoring Group,
http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/committees/Somalia/SomaliaSelEng.htm (accessed July
14, 2007).

[60] United
Nations Security Council, Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia pursuant to
Security Council resolution 1676 (S/2006/913), November 22, 2006, pp. 27-29.

[61]
Ibid., pp. 10-16, 21-25. Much of the UN report was viewed by independent
experts and analysts as largely credible, with the exception of allegations of
ICU support and cooperation with Hezbollah and allegations that Iran attempted
to trade arms for Somali uranium. Confidential email communication from
correspondent (name withheld) to Human Rights Watch, November 21, 2006. See
also Andrew McGregor, "Accuracy of New UN Report Doubtful," Global Terrorism Analysis, The Jamestown
Foundation, vol. 3, no. 45, November 21, 2006,
http://jamestown.org/terrorism/news/article.php?articleid=2370213 (accessed
July 14, 2007).

[63]A confidential UN cable
obtained by Human Rights Watch indicates that in a conversation with UN
officials in June 2006, US Assistant Secretary of State Jendayi Frazer noted
that the situation in Somalia
was "uncertain." According to the notes, she presented the view that Eritrea had stepped over the line and that Ethiopia viewed Eritrean action in Somalia "as tantamount to opening a second front
against Ethiopia."
Dr. Frazer's best-case scenario was that the ICU and TFG would engage in
dialogue; the worst-case scenario was the expansion of the ICU throughout Somalia and the
disintegration of the TFG. Dr. Frazer noted that the latter scenario would have
a major negative impact in the Horn and that the US and IGAD would not allow it. She
allegedly expressed the view that while the US
feared an Ethiopian intervention could rally "foreign elements," the US would rally with Ethiopia if the "Jihadists" took
over. Document on file with Human Rights Watch.

[66]
"Somalia:
Protests after Islamic courts take Kismayo," IRINnews, September 25, 2006, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/news/2006/09/mil-060925-irin01.htm
(accessed July 14, 2007). See also United Nations Security Council, Report of
the Monitoring Group on Somalia pursuant to Security Council resolution 1676
(2006), p. 41.

[67]Ethiopia may have also been concerned by the
apparently strengthening links between Eritrea, the ICU, and the Ethiopian
insurgencies. United Nations Security Council, Report of the Monitoring Group
on Somalia pursuant to Security Council resolution 1676 (2006), pp. 17-19.

[70]"Security council approves African
protection, training mission in Somalia,"
UN Security Council news release, December 6, 2006, http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2006/sc8887.doc.htm
(accessed July 4, 2007). For a critical analysis of the resolution see Matt
Bryden, "Storm Clouds over Somalia
as Rivals Prepare for Battle,"
Nation, December 8, 2006.

[71] Resolution
1725 mandated the mission to monitor progress by the Transitional Federal
Institutions and the Islamic Courts Union in implementing agreements reached in
their dialogue, to ensure the free movement and safe passage of all involved
with the dialogue process, and to maintain and monitor security in Baidoa.
United Nations Security Council, Resolution 1725, S/RES/1725 (2006), December
6, 2006, http://www.un-somalia.org/docs/Resolution1725-2006.pdf (accessed
August 1, 2007).

[77]"Islamists abandon Somali capital," BBC News
Online, December 28, 2006, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/6213499.stm
(accessed July 5, 2007). For analysis on the defeat of the Islamic Courts, see
International Crisis Group, "Somalia:
The Tough Part Is Ahead," Africa Briefing No. 45, January 26, 2007. See also
Dr. Abdishakur Jowhar, "A war of miscalculation," Hiiraan.com, December 2006, http://www.hiiraan.com/op2/2006/dec/a_war_of_miscalculation.aspx
(accessed July 5, 2007); and "Islamic leader vows to keep fighting for control
of Somalia," Associated Press, December 29, 2006, reproduced at http://www.cbc.ca/world/story/2006/12/29/somalia-islamists.html
(accessed July 5, 2007).

[83] "Kenya captures
Islamists Fleeing Somalia," United Press International reproduced in World Peace Herald, January 3, 2007,
http://wpherald.com/articles/2874/1/Kenya-captures-Islamists-fleeing-Somalia/Include-foreign-jihadists.html
(accessed August 1, 2007). Among the people detained in Kenya were more than 30 women and children of
numerous nationalities, including the family of Fazul Mohammed, a man on the US wanted list.
After weeks and months in detention in Nairobi
prisons, where many were interrogated by US and British security agents, at
least 85 people were expelled to Somalia
and then transferred to Ethiopia,
where many are still in incommunicado detention. Daniel Maldonado, a US citizen, was rendered from Kenya to the US for prosecution in federal
court. "US: Stop the Guantanamo Circus," Human Rights Watch news release, March
27, 2007, http://hrw.org/english/docs/2007/03/27/usdom15572.htm.In June the US Department of Defense
announced that another detainee, Mohammed Abdulmalik, had been rendered to Guantanamo several days
after he was reportedly arrested. "Terror Suspect Transferred to Guantanamo," Department of
Defense news release, June 6, 2007, http://www.defenselink.mil/releases/release.aspx?releaseid=10976
(accessed August 5, 2007). At least 25 women and children were deported from Kenya to Somalia in January and February, some
of whom were the subject of pending habeas corpus applications in the Kenyan
courts. See "Somalia:
People Fleeing Somalia War Secretly Detained," Human Rights Watch news release,
March 30, 2007, http://hrw.org/english/docs/2007/03/30/kenya15624.htm.
For further detail see Letter from Human Rights Watch to Kenyan Director of
Political Affairs Thomas Amolo, March 22, 2007,
http://hrw.org/english/docs/2007/03/30/kenya15622.htm.

[84]
The headquarters of Somalia's
Custodial Corps (Prison Services) is close to a number of key roads that go to
the sea and airport and lies on the main highway that leaves the capital
towards Baidoa, Kismayo, and the southern regions of the country.

[85]The bases are Arbiska, on Afgoi road,
and El-Irfid and Maslah Barracks, situated on Bal'ad road.

[86]
The term Transitional Federal Government and Somali government are used
interchangeably in this report.

[94]
Human Rights Watch was told by at least one interviewee, a civilian, that sometimes
the insurgencyfighters operating in
a Mogadishu
neighborhood offered people cash to join them. Human Rights Watch interview
with a resident of Towfiq neighborhood (name withheld), Bosaso, May 7, 2007.

[97]
In this report the term insurgency is generally used to refer to the various
armed groups who were responsible for attacks on Ethiopian or TFG forces. The
term "Muqaawama" ("the Resistance" in
Somali), is used only when individuals interviewed by Human Rights Watch
specifically used that term.

[103]
On January 5, 2007, an alleged statement from al Qaeda urging Somalis to fight
Ethiopian forces was posted on the internet. It is unclear whether there was
any connection between the alleged statements and growing insurgent activity,
although TFG and Ethiopian officials claimed this was the case. "Al-Qaeda No. 2
urges Somali Islamists to fight 'crusaders,'" Associated Press, January 5,
2007, reproduced at http://www.cbc.ca/world/story/2007/01/05/alqaeda-message.html
(accessed August 2, 2007).

[106]
Although the emergency law was only supposed to be valid for three months, and
was never extended, it took almost six months for the speaker of the Parliament
to announce that the law had expired. "Parliament Speaker: Martial Law Over," Banadir.com, July 8, 2007, http://banadir.com/martial.shtml
(accessed July 9, 2007).

[116]
The first suicide bombing took place in September 2006. There have been at
least five suicide attacks since then: November 30, 2006, and March 26, April
18, April 24, and June 3, 2007.

[117]
The mandate of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), as described in
UN Security Council Resolution 1744, is limited to supporting the political
dialogue, protecting the Transitional Federal Institutions, and "[t]o
contribute, as may be requested and within capabilities, to the creation of the
necessary security conditions for the provision of humanitarian assistance." It
does not include protection of civilians. United Nations Security Council,
Resolution 1744, (S/RES/1744) February 21, 2007,
http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N07/245/31/PDF/N0724531.pdf?OpenElement
(accessed August 5, 2007).

[120]
For a detailed description of the fighting by an international journalist who
was in Mogadishu throughout the March 29-April 2 period see Jean-Philippe Rmy,
"Between Two Bombardments, Population of Mogadishu Tries to Flee Combat Zone"
(Entre deux bombardements, la population de Mogadisciu tente de fuire les zones
de combats), Le Monde, April 2, 2007.

[124]
It is unclear who was responsible for the attack and whether the incident was
connected to an earlier statement from a senior ICU leader. Two days earlier,
former ICU chairman Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed, who was interviewed by Al
Jazeera in Qatar, had said,
"There is no Al Qaida in Somalia."
Salad Dahul, "Islamic leader says Al Qaida does not exist in Somalia,"
Associated Press, April 16, 2007. Deputy Defense Minister Salad Ali Jelle
alleged that al Qaeda was responsible for the April 18 suicide attack, but it
is unclear on what evidence he based the allegation. Salad Duhul, "Al Qaida
blamed for suicide car bombing at Ethiopian army base in Somalia,"
Associated Press, April 19, 2007.

[128]
See International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), Customary International Humanitarian Law (Cambridge, UK:
Cambridge University Press, 2005),rule
158.

[129]While
insurgency is not a violation of international law, acts by armed groups are
frequently in violation of domestic law. The criminal law of Somalia is applicable with respect
to many insurgent activities described in this report. Somali law, like the
laws of most nations, proscribes basic domestic crimes including murder,
assault, arson, rebellion, and crimes relating to attacks on government forces
or installations. See Book 2, Chapter I of the Somali Penal Code, 1967. On May
3, 2007, the Somali parliament approved a new Anti-Terrorism Law. Human Rights
Watch is still seeking confirmation of the final text as this report goes to
press but a number of provisions in the available text are of concern because
they are extremely vague and open to wide interpretation. Unofficial
translation of Anti-Terrorism Law on file with Human Rights Watch.

[142]
There is video and photographic evidence of the weaponry used by the
insurgency. See "Violent Fighting between Ethiopian and Somali Forces"
(Violents combats entre les forces thiopiennes et somaliennes), Reuters video
report, reproduced in Le Monde vido, April 26, 2007, http://www.lemonde.fr/web/video/0,47-0@2-3212,54-902107@51-754471,0.html.
See also Reuters photos on file with Human Rights Watch.

[143]
Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia pursuant to Security
Council resolution 1676 (2006), United Nations Security Council (S/2006/913),
pp. 11- 17.

[146]
Arms sales in Mogadishu's
Bakara market declined considerably after the ICU took control and imposed
regulations on the weapons market in late 2006. However, sales swiftly resumed
after the ICU was ousted. United Nations Security Council, Report of the
Monitoring Group on Somalia pursuant to Security Council resolution 1676
(S/2006/913), November 22, 2006, pp. 29-30; and Report of the Monitoring Group
on Somalia pursuant to Security Council resolution 1676 (S/2007/436), July 18,
2007, p. 18.

[147]
Residents of Mogadishu
called the latter M-30 and D-30, and referred to BM-21
multiple-rocket-launchers as "BM."

[148]
Media reports on the type of weapon used to shoot down the helicopter varied
from rocket-propelled grenades to anti-aircraft missiles. See Alisha Ryu,
"Helicopter Shot Down in Somalia,"
VOA News, March 30, 2007, http://www.voanews.com/english/archive/2007-03/2007-03-30-voa7.cfm?CFID=174401568&CFTOKEN=69449398
(accessed July 12, 2007).

[169]
Although this report focuses on the events in Mogadishu between January and June 2007,
these accounts of attacks on medical facilities are not the only indications
that Ethiopian forces have deliberately interfered with the functioning of
hospitals. During the December 2006 offensive against the ICU, Ethiopian forces
entered a hospital in Dinsor, southern Somalia, confiscated confidential
medical files and threatened staff. See "After a week of intense fighting in Somalia, MSF is
extremely concerned about the security of medical staff and safety of
patients," MSF news release, December 28, 2006, http://www.msf.org/msfinternational/invoke.cfm?objectid=CE048BD6-5056-AA77-6CCE27E54B230182&component=toolkit.pressrelease&method=full_html
(accessed August 2, 2007).

[211]
Article 3 of the Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the
Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field (First Geneva Convention), 75
U.N.T.S. 31, entered into force October 21, 1950; Geneva Convention for the
Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed
Forces at Sea (Second Geneva Convention), 75 U.N.T.S. 85, entered into force October
21, 1950; Geneva Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War
(Third Geneva Convention), 75 U.N.T.S. 135, entered into force October 21,
1950; Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time
of War (Fourth Geneva Convention), 75 U.N.T.S. 287, entered into force October
21, 1950; see also Protocol II, art. 4(2)(a), and the Rome Statute, art. 8(2)(c).

[212]
Common Article 3 and Protocol II, art. 4(2)(a); see also the Rome Statute, art.
8(2)(c)(ii) on "committing outrages upon personal dignity." According to the
Elements of Crimes for the ICC, this provision applies to dead persons. See
commentary to Rule 90 of the Elements of Crimes.

[214]
Press accounts of the total number of casualties differed. Most stated that a
total of 13 or 14 people were killed, including either six or seven combatants,
and that several of the dead fighters were alleged to be Ethiopian soldiers,
but this remains unclear. See Mustafa Haji Abdinur, "Angry residents burn
bodies in Mogadishu
mayhem," Agence France-Presse, March 21, 2007, reproduced at http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/RWB.NSF/db900SID/LSGZ-6ZHE8N?OpenDocument
(accessed July 9, 2007).

[243]
Letter from Graham Farmer, Acting UN Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator for Somalia, to
Prime Minister Ali Mohammed Gedi, April 12, 2007. A copy of the letter is on
file with Human Rights Watch.

[252]Baarista Hisbiga is a three-story building originally
built for the former Somali Revolutionary and Socialism Party (SRSP) of Siad
Barre. It contains an underground detention bunker which the Barre government
used to detain political dissidents. It reportedly has seven to ten large rooms
which can accommodate up to 200 people. The center is currently believed to be
controlled by the National Security Agency.

[253]
The detention center in Villa Somalia
is apparently a single large underground hall. It is believed that the most
valuable detainees are detained here. Human Rights Watch telephone interviews, Mogadishu, June and July
2007.

[258]The
single bunker had four small air holes in the roof but no windows or lights.
According to the witness, Ethiopian soldiers sometimes talked to the prisoners
through these holes, saying "Hey al Qaeda" or "Hey Al-Shaabab." Human Rights
Watch telephone interview (name and location withheld), June 20, 2007.

[261]
According to eyewitness accounts, each room in Baarista Hisbiga is about 6x6
meters and can take up to 30 detainees. It has no running water, no fresh air,
no windows, and is hot, humid and overcrowded. Human Rights Watch telephone
interviews (names withheld), Mogadishu,
June 15, 2007.

[272]
For a media description of the fighting see Jonathan Clayton, "War-scarred Mogadishu plunges back
into the abyss,"Times, April 2, 2007,
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/africa/article1599965.ece (accessed
July 11, 2007).

[286]
Ramadan Hotel is owned by Somali businessman Abubakr Omar Aden, who is alleged
to be one of the principal financiers of the Islamic Courts. "Prominent Somali
Businessman Denies Ties to Terrorism, Calls for New Government," Associated
Press, February 18, 2007, reproduced in Somaliland Times, http://www.somalilandtimes.net/sl/2006/266/21.shtml
(accessed August 2, 2007). For details on the April fighting around the Ramadan
Hotel, see "Somalia:
Heavy fighting rages in capital," BBC Monitoring Newsfile, April 21, 2007, from
HornAfrik online.

[316]
TFG officials have repeatedly called for the deployment of regional and
international forces in Somalia
to support the weak transitional government. On June 14, 2006, after long
disagreement, the Somali parliament voted for the deployment of African Union
troops "no matter what country they are from." "Somalia: Parliament votes in favor
of foreign peacekeepers," IRINnews,
June 15, 2007, http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/RWB.NSF/db900SID/LSGZ-6QSE39?OpenDocument
(accessed July 18, 2007).

[317]See generally the discussion of the applicability of
international humanitarian law to non-state armed groups in ICRC, Customary International Humanitarian Law,
pp. 497-98.

[318]
Article 3 of the First, Second, Third, and Fourth Geneva Conventions. Somalia became
a party to the Geneva Conventions in 1962. Ethiopia became a party to the
Geneva Conventions in 1969.

[319]Convention
(IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land and the Annexed Regulations
Concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land of 18 October 1907 (Hague
Regulations), 3 Martens Nouveau Recueil (ser. 3) 461, 187 Consol. T.S. 227,
entered into force January 26, 1910.

[320] Protocol Additional to the Geneva
Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of
International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I) of 8 June 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3,
entered into force December 7, 1978. Somalia is not party to Protocol I.
Under article 96 of Protocol I,
non-state actors may commit, under certain specific circumstances, to apply the
Geneva Conventions and the protocols if they declare their willingness to do so
to the Swiss government.

[321]
See Yorem Dinstein, The Conduct of
Hostilities under the Law of International Armed Conflict (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2004), pp. 10-11 (the "Hague Convention (IV) of
1907 has acquired over the years the lineaments of customary international law"
and "[m]uch of the Protocol may be regarded as declaratory of customary
international law, or at least as non-controversial"). See generally ICRC, Customary International Humanitarian Law.

[322]
One important difference relates to reprisals, which are permitted in very
limited circumstances during international armed conflicts but not in
non-international armed conflicts.