Is India's defence NOT secure under Antony ?

As our China debate continues, we must thank Defence Minister A.K. Antony for injecting a new word into the argument — capabilities — and facilitating a long overdue shift away from New Delhi’s anxious talk about Beijing’s intentions.

If India’s military capabilities and security infrastructure were in better shape, New Delhi would have no reason to be surprised by Beijing’s many moves — including the most recent one on issuing visas on separate pieces of paper for Indian citizens from Jammu and Kashmir.

According to Antony, who has held the defence portfolio for some time, India did not invest adequately in military modernisation in the past, it was doing it now, and there was no reason to worry. His remarks amount to a confession, policy affirmation and public reassurance all rolled into one.

The minister’s remarks reveal the different policy universes that China and India inhabit. China’s national security elite has learnt the art of talking softly but acquiring bigger and better sticks. India, as a collective, in contrast, talks loudly, non-stop, and carries a small stick.

Take, for example, our nuclear debate. No other country in the world is as obsessed as India is with the “text” of the nuclear treaties and agreements. As a result, it spends so little time on the “context” of the changing nuclear and missile capabilities of other powers and the shifting balance among them.

Our Parliament repeatedly debated the civil nuclear initiative with the US during 2005-08 and came close to pulling down the Manmohan Singh government, thanks to the tacit partnership between the CPM and the BJP.

The Karat-Advani combine had not once sought a parliamentary debate on the first ever agreement on the principles of a border settlement that the UPA government signed with China in April 2005.

It is easy to understand why Karat did not, but certainly not why Advani chose silence on the China border issues.

No one, least of all China, stops us from modernising our armed forces and defence infrastructure. Consider the Chinese reaction to our nuclear tests in May 1998. Beijing was relatively mute when the first round of tests was announced on May 11. It went ballistic on May 13, when Beijing concluded that Delhi was using the “China threat” to justify its tests.

If Beijing has not and cannot prevent us from building our defence capabilities, the defence minister will have to offer a little better than the casual remarks that his government has a policy to match China’s infrastructure on our borders.

We certainly know that the UPA government had taken a policy decision a few years ago on upgrading India’s civilian and military infrastructure all along the China border. Prime Minister Manmohan Singh himself went to Arunachal Pradesh, days after returning from a trip to Beijing, to announce a massive aid package on improving the infrastructure on the frontiers.

We presume it is the Border Roads Organisation under the defence ministry that is responsible for building, maintaining and upgrading transport infrastructure on the borders. As the minister in charge, could Antony tell us why the government cannot implement its own decisions on the China border?

It is nearly three years since China tested an anti-satellite weapon — in January 2007. That test certainly woke up Delhi into recognising China’s expansive military space programme. At that moment there were calls in Delhi for setting up a “space cell” to facilitate a focused Indian response.

Could the defence minister tell us what happened to that somewhat minimalist response to the dramatic transformation of China’s space strategy? Could Antony explain why he is not pressing for an explicit military space programme that his three services consider so necessary?

Staying with space, did the defence minister ever ask the Defence Research and Development Organisation and his public sector undertakings why India is so far behind China — in terms of both quality and quantity — on missile production? Has anyone told him that China is making big strides on using ballistic missiles for conventional military missions?

For nearly half a decade, the world has been abuzz with China’s rapid advances in cyber-warfare. China has made a strategic decision to focus on asymmetric warfare and has developed capabilities to hack into the computers of even the United States on a routine basis. Could Antony tell us what the government has done in response? Or why India, an alleged superpower in the IT domain, is lagging behind China on cyber-warfare?

Across the full spectrum of defence — from road building on the borders to missile production and from space technology to cyber-strategy — there is nothing in the public domain to suggest that our defence ministry is on top of its China game. As the minister responsible for the security of this nation, Antony owes the nation a serious explanation on how he proposes to address China’s widening lead on all major indicators of defence and military technology.

China, with its enduring tradition of respecting the logic of power, may be more sensitive to India’s concerns if it finds out that New Delhi has the will to power.

If New Delhi embarks on purposeful military modernisation and is open to constructive negotiations, it might discover interesting trade-offs with Beijing on Kashmir, Tibet and the entire Himalayan frontier.

But if the Indian establishment continues to oscillate between the loose talk on television and the perfunctory official assurances, China is bound to turn up the heat on a range of difficult issues and the UPA government will soon find there is no place to hide.

The writer is Henry A. Kissinger Chair in Foreign Policy and International Relations at the Library of Congress, Washington, DC

it is at the bottom of the article Roma.
The writer is Henry A. Kissinger Chair in Foreign Policy and International Relations at the Library of Congress, Washington, DC.

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The writer couldn't have been Henry A. Kissinger. He uses the first person in the plural: 'our' frequently - and refers to 'our parliament', our nation', 'our armed forces', etc. That is obviously a misnomer. From the link itself, the author appears to be C. Rajamohan.

Let me interject my thoughts on this: at one level, the "rhetoric" is certainly necessary. We have different prerogatives than China does that come from being a democratic state- and temporal assuages of public outrage are necessary in the form of PR moves that would be supererogatory in China. Their media for instance is not as active in exposing government ills as ours is, and the "talking the talk" is necessary both as a face-saving measure and as the most obvious reaction to the public response.

As for the space cell, I have it on good accord, from Mr. Ajay Lele, a research fellow at the Institute for Defense Studies and Analysis in New Delhi, that a Space Cell has been formed by the MoD and is acting as a conduit between the ISRO and the armed forces to leverage space assets towards the enhancement of synchronized fighting capabilities. It is not fully operational, but some of its most essential components have been put in place.

Apparently Cartosat-2A, the 690- kilogram satellite with .8-meter resolution imaging camera and Israeli-made S.A.R. that was handed over to the Indian military "pulls in images from Russian and Israeli satellites when required" according to an ISRO official and is used exclusively by the Defence Intelligence Agency's Defence Imagery Processing and Analysis Center in New Dehli. The four RISATs, that were initially intended for crop monitoring with their ability to collect day/night imagery in all weather will also be an asset to the military.

Surely, he doesn't expect us to develop KE-ASAT capabilites overnight what took China years in the making.

As for India's missile program, some insight would help: India's Integrated Guided Missile Development Program can largely be divided into five phases. Let me put this in context: The 3rd phase - which is the period between 1980-1994, marked a crucial turning point during which India's forays into missile building program were transformed from exercises in technology-gathering, reverse-engineering, and design competence into a full-fledged program to build a series of operational missile systems: including the Prithvi, the Agni and its variants. The 4th phase: the period that spanned the mid 90's to the 2000's and that we are todaymost inclined to remember given our tendency to examine and evaluate in retrospect- sometimes on the basis of outmoded information, as I have demonstrated in the article on the fake CNBC video on India's missile tests- was one that marked partial success and failures for the IGMDP. The 5th phase, the one that is most concurrent- the period from 2001 to the present, has been characterized by the following: projects to manufacture BrahMos variants for the different services, the hypersonic variant of the BrahMos, the development of 'smart' missiles that are smaller, lighter, agile, and can home in on targets with great accuracy; the incorporation of technologies to improve the "hit to kill" capabilities of ballistic missiles; the development of hypersonic vehicles, nanotechnologies, homing guidance, very large systems integration (VLSI), miniaturized electro-mechanical systems, system on chip, and newer materials such as ceramics and lightweight composites. How therefore, the author can insinuate the present phase of the IGMDP to be a 'failure' is simply beyond me- I have a feeling it is because he is not aware of the extent of the Defence Research Development Org's involvement in research and program activities.

Border roads construction has admittedly been dogged by delays- state-centre bickering over who should get the largest share of the pie. But here's something to suggest that that is about to change:

As for 'cyber warfare', we are obviously lacking. According to one official, China has mounted sustained attacks on India's government and private computer networks that allow them to constantly scan and map India's official networks, giving them a decent idea of not just the networks, but also how to temporarily disable or distract them during a conflict. I know of no new developments that would suggest we are getting ahead of our game. But here's something from our dear friend 'Farzana Shah' that would suggest something on a different front - take it for what it's worth, which is $hit, but all the same.:

The article makes brief mention of 'Divine Matrix', in March 2009 in which the Army simulated a nuclear attack by China in 2017 [that apparently left the Chinese "astonished"] and a preceding cyber attack to disable infomation networks.

Here is a very illuminating article on the 'cyber warfare' element of the article above:

The Art of (Cyber) War

Brian M. Mazanec

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the People’s Republic of China (PRC) is increasingly developing and fielding advanced capabilities in cyberspace. These capabilities are focused not only on collecting sensitive information, but also on achieving military effects capable of causing economic harm, damaging critical infrastructure, and influencing the outcome of conventional armed conflicts.

China, in other words, is interested in cyberwarfare as a tool of national power, and is greatly improving its capabilities to conduct military operations in cyberspace. In its most recent report to Congress on China’s military power, the Pentagon noted that “China’s strategic strike capabilities… are expanding from the land, air, and sea dimensions of the traditional battlefield into the… cyber-space domains.” Understanding China’s cyberwarfare strategy will provide valuable insight into its future ambitions, principally in light of the U.S.’s heavy reliance on the cyberspace domain from both a military and economic standpoint.

The roots of Chinese cyberwarfare

In many ways, China’s contemporary focus on cyberwarfare is an extension of traditional Chinese stratagems, namely Sun Tzu’s “overcoming the superior with the inferior” (i.e., asymmetric warfare) and Chairman Mao Zedong’s concept of “People’s War.” It is intimately connected to the country’s broader geopolitical strategic interests: regime survival; dominance in the Asia/Pacific region; growing influence on a global level; and prevention of Taiwan’s independence, coupled with its ultimate assimilation into the PRC.

Cyberwarfare has been a pillar of Chinese military strategy since the early 1990s, when the Gulf War provided China’s leaders with a painfully clear example of the importance of technological superiority and the advantage “informationalized” forces possess over their less advanced opponents. PRC strategists quickly came to embrace the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) and believed the future of warfare would increasingly rely on denying or degrading an enemy’s information flow, rather than simple kinetic firepower. This is particularly true when one considers a theoretical Sino-U.S. conflict, in which U.S. military power would be difficult if not impossible to defeat head-on. Thus, in their infamous 1999 manifesto, Unrestricted Warfare, People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Colonels Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui proposed a form of warfare that “transcends all boundaries and limits,” and exploits the central role that cyberspace plays in future conflict.

A decade on, the results are striking. In recent years, the PRC has steadily leveraged its rapidly growing economy to advance its capabilities to act in cyberspace. As Richard Lawless, then Deputy Undersecretary for Defense for Asian and Pacific Security Affairs, noted back in 2007: “Chinese capabilities in this area have evolved from defending networks from attack to offensive operations against adversary networks… [They are] leveraging information technology expertise available in China’s booming economy to make significant strides in cyber-warfare.”

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Beijing’s notorious lack of transparency regarding its armed forces has made the scope of China’s cyberwarfare capabilities difficult to determine. What is clear, however, is that the PRC is heavily investing in cyberwarfare relative to other nations. Equally evident is that their investments are paying major dividends. According to a 2008 study by Dartmouth College’s Institute for Security Technology Studies, China alone among other potential U.S. competitors has developed the full spectrum of capabilities and practices for cyberspace dominance and cyberwarfare.

China’s leaders did not develop this capability overnight. Their interest in cyberwarfare led to a sustained investment in asymmetric disruptive capabilities. As early as 2003, the PLA had already organized its first cyberwarfare units. Since then, these cadres have leveraged China’s economy to force IT companies, most significantly Microsoft, to reveal sensitive and proprietary information regarding their software and applications. This information allows the PLA to utilize “zero-day” security flaws in Microsoft Office applications that exploit unknown or un-patched software vulnerabilities before the vendor patch is available. It also greatly enhances the PRC’s ability to plant malicious software designed to collect sensitive information or potentially damage networks and infrastructure.

Perhaps the best example of China’s burgeoning cyberwarfare capabilities is known as Titan Rain. The Titan Rain cyber attacks occurred from 2003 to 2005, and involved systematic intrusions into hundreds of U.S. government computers and the computer networks of America’s Western European allies. The U.S. media reported that the intrusions originated from three routers in the PRC’s Guangdong province, and unofficial statements from senior U.S. officials leave little doubt that this was a highly sophisticated state-sanctioned Computer Network Exploitation (CNE) attack from the PRC intended to exfiltrate huge amounts of sensitive data. While these CNE attacks are damaging and pose serious risks for U.S. national security, they are less troubling when compared to the looming threat of Chinese Computer Network Attacks (CNA), which seek to move beyond cyber-espionage in order to achieve real-world military effects in a true cyberwar.

Why China wages cyberwar

China’s interest in achieving military effects via cyberwarfare begins with deterrence. The goal is not to deter other nations from conducting cyberwarfare against the PRC; rather, it is to use the threat of cyberwarfare to deter an actor from behaving in a manner that is in opposition to Chinese strategic interests.

In the near term, the PRC’s primary focus is the question of an independent Taiwan. Chinese planners seek to use cyberwarfare to deter U.S. military involvement in a hostile reunification scenario with Taiwan. One advantage of threatening strategic cyberwarfare for a deterrence impact is that it is a more realistic threat when compared to the threat of other strategic weapons such as nuclear weapons. It is highly implausible that the PRC would use its limited force de frappe to keep the U.S. out of the Formosa Strait, especially in light of its no-first-use policy. But a strategic cyberwarfare attack, with less international stigma and a likely more restrained retaliatory response, is more credible. Furthermore, the challenge of attribution in cyberspace provides China with plausible deniability and makes cyberwarfare all the more attractive. “Independent” patriotic hackers, cultivated and loosely controlled as a 21st-century version of Mao’s “People’s War,” provide the perfect mechanism to give the PRC cyber threat credibility.

Deterrence theory has been largely associated with nuclear policy, but its application extends to cyberwarfare. During the Cold War, the U.S. and Soviet Union adopted a survivable nuclear force to present a credible deterrent that maintained the “uncertainty” inherent in a strategic balance as understood through the accepted theories of Herman Kahn and, later, Thomas Schelling. This arguably prevented a world war through the threat of massive nuclear retaliation—a formula commonly known as Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD). Deterrence can be both offensive (such as MAD) or defensive (deterrence by denial) and based on neutralizing or mitigating the adversary’s undesired action/threat so as to credibly remove the perception that benefits would result from the action.

When one assesses PRC cyberwarfare deterrence, the focus is on the offensive side of the spectrum. For deterrence to function, the target of deterrence must be a rational actor, which certainly is the case with the U.S. In fact, the transparency inherent in U.S. society and government decision-making ensure that its calculus in a conflict such as one associated with Taiwan would be relatively easy to discern. This only increases the appeal of using cyberwarfare to achieve successful deterrence. Targets held at risk to achieve deterrence are divided into counterforce and countervalue, the former holding a military target at risk and the latter targeting civilian infrastructure and population or anything else the adversary values. China believes strategic cyberwarfare is capable of targeting both of these segments to achieve significant deterrence effects.

The PRC cyber-threat is not limited to the mere threat of counterforce/countervalue cyberwarfare to deter an adversary such as the U.S., however. For the deterrent effects discussed above to be legitimate and credible, China must actually be prepared to follow through with the threatened punishment or action even if deterrence fails. It is likely to do so in response to one of three principal conflict scenarios.

War over Taiwan

The most likely scenario relates to Taiwan. In the event of an outbreak of hostilities with the island nation, the PLA can be expected to seek a quick knockout blow of Taiwan’s defenses while simultaneously delaying U.S. armed forces’ entry into the Formosa Strait and then degrading their ability to fight if/once they have arrived. James Mulvenon, an expert on Chinese cyberwarfare, has outlined the probable situation as follows:

For the PLA, using [information warfare] against U.S. information systems to degrade or even delay a deployment of forces to Taiwan offers an attractive asymmetric strategy. American forces are highly information-dependent and rely heavily on precisely coordinated logistics networks… If PLA information operators... were able to hack or crash these systems, thereby delaying the arrival of a U.S. carrier battle group to the theater, while simultaneously carrying out a coordinated campaign of short-range ballistic missile attacks, “fifth column” and [information warfare] attacks against Taiwanese critical infrastructure, then Taipei might be quickly brought to its knees and forced to capitulate to Beijing.​

Limited PRC cyberwarfare would likely target U.S. logistics as the opening salvo of the conflict. The PRC believes both that U.S. logistical processes are the most vulnerable aspect of military activity, and that U.S. operational vulnerabilities are greatest during the early deployment phase of war. This preemptive approach can be described as part of the Chinese strategy of “gaining mastery before the enemy has struck” (xianfa zhiren). In this scenario, Chinese cyberwarfare would seek to slow down the deployment of additional U.S. forces required to engage the PLA with overwhelming force in the defense of Taiwan (via misdirection of U.S. matériel stores or delay of re-supply efforts). And because of the U.S. aversion to casualties and continued belief in the so-called “Powell Doctrine” of only engaging an adversary with overwhelming maximal force required for quick success, the U.S. would not likely engage on a large scale until additional forces were forward deployed and re-supply processes established. This could ultimately buy the PRC an additional week or longer before U.S. military forces were brought to bear, creating a decisive window of opportunity to seize Taiwan and dramatically increase the cost of U.S. involvement.

Assuming such a preemptive scenario is unsuccessful, the PRC could seek to use cyberwarfare more overtly to attack U.S. military technologies directly. Such an attack would be focused on the accuracy, timeliness and reliability of information upon which U.S. forces depend (i.e., C4ISR systems). This approach was described by PRC scholars in their 2000 Science of Campaigns report:

The goal of information warfare is, at the critical time and region related to overall campaign operations, to cut off the enemy’s ability to obtain, control, and use information, to influence, reduce, and even destroy the enemy’s capabilities of observing, decision-making, and commanding and controlling troops, while we maintain our own ability to command and control in order to seize information superiority, and to produce the strategic and campaign superiority, creating conditions for winning the decisive battle.​

This tactical application of PRC cyberwarfare is a highly evolved form of Chairman Mao Zedong’s dictum that China must “seal up the enemies’ eyes and ears, and make them become blind and deaf, and we must as far as possible confuse the minds of their commanders and turn them into madmen, using this to achieve our own victory.” It would effectively increase Clausewitz’s “fog of war” for the U.S., while reducing it for the PLA.

Regional conflicts in Asia

PRC cyberwarfare capabilities are not exclusively valuable to a conflict with the U.S. The PRC could find itself in limited wars with a nation other than the U.S., where its current U.S.-focused cyberwarfare capabilities could also prove advantageous.

India is the most likely adversary in such a regional scenario. Relations between China and India have been marked by political tensions ever since the two countries went to war in 1962 over a still disputed region of the Himalayan border in Arunachal Pradesh. The PLA was largely successful in defeating the Indian military in that conflict, but skirmishes continued into the late 1980s and the issue remains unsettled today. In the mid-1990s, the PRC and India signed the Sino-Indian Bilateral Peace and Tranquility Accords promoting stability along the “Line of Actual Control” in the border conflict. Despite this progress, the PLA maintains a growing presence in the region and many anticipate future conflicts between the two economically rising giants.

India is an increasingly high-tech nation reliant on cyberspace. It has over 60 million Internet users, with its use growth rate exceeding that of China. Much of India’s impressive economic growth is due to globalization and the ability to reliably connect to the rest of the world via cyberspace and IT systems. If the PRC could credibly threaten cyberwarfare against Indian civilian targets in cyberspace, it has the potential to succeed in deterring India from opposing its interests. If deterrence failed, the PRC would have an effective tool to strike at the heart of India’s growth and thus severely erode its will to fight.

Militarily, New Delhi is also vulnerable. While the Indian military is nowhere near as advanced as that of the U.S., it is a relatively modern fighting force—with all of the vulnerabilities that that entails. The PLA could use its cyberwarfare capabilities to leverage those shortfalls as part of a limited regional war. Beyond the Arunachal Pradesh border dispute, the PRC could covertly or overtly leverage its cyberwarfare capabilities in support of Pakistan during a potential Pakistani-Indian conflict.

Conflict between China and India will be increasingly likely as both rise in terms of relative power over the coming decades. As India develops into an armed power with global aspirations and an increasing reliance on cyberspace, the PRC will benefit from being able to hold Indian targets at risk via the threat of cyberwarfare. Such capabilities will not only provide a strategic advantage in conflicts with the U.S. and India, but also with any other modern power with which the PRC comes into conflict.

Total war

The most severe application of PRC cyberwarfare would, for obvious reasons, occur in the context of an unlimited total war with the U.S. Such a conflict would witness the full display of all PLA capabilities, both conventional and asymmetric, and potentially even nuclear.

It should be noted, however, that such a scenario is exceedingly unlikely. According to the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, PRC leaders believe future wars “will be limited in geographical scope, duration, and political objectives, and will be highly dependent on command, control, communications, and computer (C4) systems.” Yet the catastrophic effects of such a confrontation suggest that, however remote, the scenario warrants examination.

PRC cyberwarfare during total war with the U.S. would include a massive strategic cyberwarfare campaign aimed at the U.S. homeland. In 2001, senior analysts at the U.S. Computer Emergency Response Team (US-CERT) and NATO published an article highlighting the broad and unrestricted nature of such a strategic cyberwarfare attack:

An unrestricted cyber campaign would almost certainly be directed primarily against the target country’s critical national infrastructure: energy, transportation, finance, water, communications, emergency services and the information infrastructure itself. It would likely cross boundaries between government and private sectors, and, if sophisticated and coordinated, would have both immediate impact and delayed consequences. Ultimately, an unrestricted cyber attack would likely result in significant loss of life, as well as economic and social degradation.

What would such a campaign look like? Back in 2002, Professionals for Cyber Defense (PCD), a private cybersecurity group, assembled a planning team to model a realistic strategic cyberwarfare attack on the U.S. Their scenario, called Dark Angel, assumed an attacker would have modest funding ($500 million) and would be focused on destabilizing the U.S. in order to reduce the U.S. ability to project military power and deplete the will to fight. The validated Dark Angel attack targeted rail transportation, oil and gas pipelines, difficult-to-replace power infrastructure, financial service systems, emergency service systems such as 911, and disabled general Internet service.

Chinese cyberwarfare would likely resemble this scenario, without suffering from many of the constraints associated with it. In a total war with the U.S., the PRC would have no need to cloak its actions and would use the full extent of its capability (well beyond those postulated in Dark Angel). Eliminating these financial and political limitations would allow the PRC to destroy as much cyber-based infrastructure as possible in an attempt to throw the U.S. economy into chaos, which would simultaneously degrade the U.S.’s ability and will to wage a protracted total war. Such an attack would likely be modeled after the reinvigorated concept of “People’s War” mentioned earlier. Estimates indicate China has 50,000 Internet police and 50,000 military hackers in place or being trained, who will populate over 250 cyber units. Additionally, China has more than a quarter-billion Internet users, many of whom could be employed as patriotic hackers or whose computers could be utilized by the government as part of a Distributed Denial of Service attack. All of these individuals could be used in a strategic cyberwarfare first strike meant to cripple the U.S., just as the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor sought to do decades earlier. The PRC could also augment these efforts with electronic warfare-based cyberwarfare, potentially using non-nuclear or even nuclear electromagnetic pulse (EMP) weapons delivered by covert means to key infrastructure nodes in North America. Furthermore, because computer networks and IT systems are extremely interconnected, such an attack would have global consequences.

Strategic cyberwarfare attacks during a total war with the U.S. would destroy critical infrastructure and wreak economic havoc, but their most critical impact may be on the will of the U.S. population. By creating a chronic loss of services such as power, emergency response, television and telephony across the U.S., citizens would suffer a loss of confidence in the U.S. government. Individuals would question the status and security of their personal finances in savings and retirement accounts, and uncertainty could lead to rioting and hoarding that would act as a force multiplier, further stressing an already damaged infrastructure. The PRC would be in a position to fuel this chaos further by conducting psychological operations within the U.S. through covert means.

Forging a US Response [Excerpts]

Perhaps the most obvious recommendation to address the threat posed by Chinese cyberwarfare is to develop and strengthen U.S. capabilities in cyberspace, both of a defensive and offensive nature. Within the United States military, the U.S. Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM) is the global synchronizer for cyberspace operations and is reportedly already pursuing greater offensive capabilities under its Joint Task Force-Global Network Operations (JTF-GNO). Currently, military units from Air Force Space Command (to which the cyber mission was recently reassigned), the developing Navy Cyber Forces Command, and the provisional Army Network Warfare Battalion are working with other U.S. cyberwarfare professionals to establish a durable interagency structure for coordination on cyber threats. Since in cyberspace, even more so than in other domains, the best defense is a good offense, these units, working under U.S.STRATCOM and the JTF-GNO, must continue to develop the tools that could be used to disable the PRC’s own cyberwarfare capabilities in the early stages of a conflict.

Finally, the U.S. military must continue to foster flexibility that will prepare men and women in uniform to adapt and respond if IT processes fail or become unreliable due to a cyberwarfare attack. This effort can be considered a hardening of the target of sorts, in this case the actual personnel who use the systems dependent on cyberspace. Old fashioned skills utilizing pre-printed field manuals, phones, paper and pencils should remain viable, albeit less efficient, avenues to compensate for systems brought down in a cyberwarfare attack. These “Plan B” tactics, moreover, should be regularly exercised. As Secretary of Defense Robert Gates recently cautioned, the U.S. should be modest about what technology can accomplish: “…the advances in precision, sensor, information and satellite technology have led to extraordinary gains in what the U.S. military can do… But also never neglect the psychological, cultural, political and human dimensions of warfare, which are inevitably tragic, inefficient and uncertain.” Gates’ advice, although not focused specifically on cyberwarfare, should be taken to heart by those planning to avert or mitigate a catastrophic electronic attack on the United States.

Taking Chinese cyberwarfare seriously

The threat of cyberwarfare from the PRC is real and growing. The U.S. cannot afford to ignore the looming asymmetric threat from its rising peer competitor in Asia. There is strong evidence that suggests the PRC cyberwarfare threat will increase in sophistication and severity as technology and the offensive advantage outpace cyber defense measures. China’s interest in cyberwarfare extends beyond intelligence collection into attacks geared towards both the strategic and tactical disruption of U.S. power in order to gain an asymmetric advantage, and Beijing’s investments in these capabilities is unlikely to diminish. All of which makes continued investments by the United States in both offensive and defensive capabilities in cyberspace essential to preserving both U.S. national security and U.S. freedom of action within this new domain.

And here's a very dated article [2005] on the IAF and its preparations for handling cyberwarfare:

Indian Air Force gets ready for cyber warfare

Posted: Monday, Jul 04, 2005 at 0000 hrs IST

New Delhi: Information warfare is an emerging area. It relates to computer virus attacks, precision attacks on command and control nodes and soft and hard skill capabilities to significantly degrade or paralyse the information structure of the adversary.

“Although there is a chance of hackers doing some damage, they cannot affect equipment because they have stand-alone computerised systems integral to the weapon system and equipment. However, anything on a network or dependent on satellite-based functioning can be affected," say officials in the Indian Air Force (IAF).

Exploitation of technologies by developed countries is bringing about profound changes in the operational concept of warfare. Use of satellites, high altitude aircraft, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), sensors and digital communications in high intensity conflicts have brought in the new paradigm of information warfare. Countries that can leverage cutting-edge technologies in the development of weapon systems will have the strength to leapfrog obstacles they may encounter during war.

Presently, the IAF is in the process of acquiring technology for communications and computer networks. It plans to use a multi-sensor command and control constellation (MC2C) based around the use of radars, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), airborne warning and control systems (AWACS), and aerostats.

"Of all the three forces, the Navy and Air Force take the cake when it comes to IT implementation”, say officials in the Army.

Agrees Air Commodore NK Chibber, secretary general, Pacific Telecommunication Council (PTC) India Chapter, "Though we have still not reached the stage being totally computerised, many of our air systems are fully automated thanks to usage of IT." To counter such attacks, many Indian agencies are working on IT-based defence systems. The Centre for Development of Advanced Computing’s (C-DAC) Networking and Internet Software Group (NISG) at Pune is working on the development of core network security technologies, which include C-DAC’s Virtual Private Network (C-VPN), a crypto package (C-Crypto) and prototypes of e-commerce applications. Besides, DRDO has been successful in integrating security mechanisms in the Army Radio Engineering Network (AREN) and Army Static Switch Communication Network (ASCON).

Recently, a study team was formed at Air HQ which analysed various communication needs of Air Force and proposed a solution which is scalable, reliable and secure. The team interacted with user directorates and command HQs to assess their bandwidth requirements. Based on these interactions, the team proposed an architecture for IAF Wide Area Network (WAN) project which is scalable and highly reliable to meet both peace and wartime needs of.

While India’s defence forces are increasingly using IT, the pace of IT-enablement definitely needs to be speeded up. And cooperation between the private sector and the defence sector is a must, especially when it comes to India’s software sector....

"If India’s military capabilities and security infrastructure were in better shape, New Delhi would have no reason to be surprised by Beijing’s many moves....

According to Antony, who has held the defence portfolio for some time, India did not invest adequately in military modernisation in the past, it was doing it now, and there was no reason to worry. His remarks amount to a confession, policy affirmation and public reassurance all rolled into one."

Isn't it fair to say that Mr. Antony, or any other Indian Defense Minister, is constrained by a smaller defense budget (in comparison to China) and has to make difficult choices in rationing scarce resources? Isn't it understandable that India will continue to struggle in its military modernization to catch up to China?

Ostensibly, China's greater resources allow her to potentially widen the technological gap. Any Indian defense minister will have a serious problem trying to close the gap with a moving target that seems to be pulling further away.

I can think of only one approach to close the gap. Spend more money on spies. Spies are cheap. If they are successful, the stolen technology is potentially worth billions. If other members have ideas on how to close the gap, I would be very interested to hear your thoughts.

Isn't it fair to say that Mr. Antony, or any other Indian Defense Minister, is constrained by a smaller defense budget (in comparison to China) and has to make difficult choices in rationing scarce resources? Isn't it understandable that India will continue to struggle in its military modernization to catch up to China? .

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totally understandable

so indian needs to specialise in less areas but which are capable of forming a strong deterrent

Focusing more resources into a strong nuclear deterrent is consistent with the Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) theory. However, there may be some complications in the India-China situation.

The Indo-China dispute is a sliver of land in Arunachal Pradesh. Will India really push the nuclear button when the amount of territory in dispute is less than 3% of India's landmass? Also, do the Chinese believe that India will push the button?

If the answer is "no" then India will have to invest money in conventional arms for a border conflict.

If the answer is "yes" (India will push the button) then the question is whether it will achieve India's goal. In opting for a nuclear response, India is saying that Indian civilization is threatened to the point that it is willing to risk mutual annihilation.

By pushing the nuclear button, India knows that there will be a retaliatory strike from the Chinese nuclear missiles in Tibet. The damage to India will be severe.

However, what is the probability that the Indian strike on far away Beijing and Shanghai (that are thousands of miles away) will succeed? China has the opportunity of trying to shoot down the Indian missiles with S-300 or S-400 or some other conventional anti-ballistic missiles. Let's assume that the conventional response fails.

The United States detonated its first nuclear bomb in 1945. By 1958, only 13 years later, the United States had nuclear-tipped Nike Hercules anti-ballistic missiles. China's first nuclear test was in 1964. 45 years have passed. There is a good chance that China may have its own Nike Hercules-class missiles. See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nike_missile

"The missile also had an optional nuclear warhead to improve the probability of a kill. The W-31 warhead had four variants offering 2, 10, 20 and 30 kiloton yields. The 20 KT version was used in the Hercules system. At sites in the USA the missile almost exclusively carried a nuclear warhead."

From an Indian strategist's point of view, it would be dangerous to launch a nuclear first strike at China. It is unknown whether the Indian missiles can successfully run the Chinese gauntlet of conventional and nuclear anti-ballistic missiles.

Given the uncertainties, do you think that India will stick to a conventional border war with China? If it is the case that India is more likely to wage a strictly conventional border war with China and not choose the nuclear option then India will have to invest more money into conventional arms.

The Indian Navy, which has a longer record of modern operations at sea and enjoys many maritime advantages over China, appears increasingly tied down by the terrible timidity of the MoD's political leadership.

In contrast, the Chinese Communist Party has embarked on a massive mobilisation of naval nationalism. CCP chairman Hu Jintao repeatedly talks of China's "manifest maritime destiny". Thanks to the CCP campaign, Chinese citizens are turning up in droves to offer personal donations to help Beijing build aircraft carriers.
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hahahha???????
west probganda from a indian american , first ,i am tired of reading ccp as a excuse ,second ,forget it .i like indian style of big mouth.

The Indian Navy, which has a longer record of modern operations at sea and enjoys many maritime advantages over China, appears increasingly tied down by the terrible timidity of the MoD's political leadership.

In contrast, the Chinese Communist Party has embarked on a massive mobilisation of naval nationalism. CCP chairman Hu Jintao repeatedly talks of China's "manifest maritime destiny". Thanks to the CCP campaign, Chinese citizens are turning up in droves to offer personal donations to help Beijing build aircraft carriers.
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hahahha???????
west probganda from a indian american , first ,i am tired of reading ccp as a excuse ,second ,forget it .i like indian style of big mouth.

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Well he is speaking truth can you confront the points. IN has more experience the PLAN in terms of long reach operations.

Given the uncertainties, do you think that India will stick to a conventional border war with China? If it is the case that India is more likely to wage a strictly conventional border war with China and not choose the nuclear option then India will have to invest more money into conventional arms.

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I really dont understand what you are rambling about. India nuclear program is simply about not being bullied by another nuclear state.....thats it.
Thats basically it for every nuclear weapon state today.

No country in the world today has the option of using a nuclear weapon on a first strike unless it feels it is going to be completely demolished. It would just have disasterous global consequences, and the whole global economy may collapse.

Having said that it can still be used for bullying purposes and give a military commander a strategic edge in a conventional war when dealing with another non-nuclear state.

If India goes to war with China over the border; it will be a conventional conflict and nothing more. China is so dependent on the rest of the world for its economic growth and its energy supplies thru the Indian Ocean that it simply cannot sustain a long drawn out border conflict with India. It would be more disasterous for them than it would be for India. Indian economy's exposure to the outside world is still fairly limited.

If the Chinese ever go to war with India again, they would want it to be over as quickly as possible. For this not to happen; India has to build a strong enough conventional capability that will make Chinese military planners question their ability to limit it to a short war(blink). The 2nd thing that has to happen is that it needs a nuclear deterrent to prevent an all out conventional attack. Having a nuclear deterrent prevents another country from launching an all out conventional attack against your whole country. This is what i mean by the bully factor ??

So India has to invest money and resources in both options - its not a question of one or the other.

The author has made this assertion
""Across the full spectrum of defence — from road building on the borders to missile production and from space technology to cyber-strategy — there is nothing in the public domain to suggest that our defence ministry is on top of its China game."

He doesn't mention that we have not made progress, but wrt China obviously we are woefully short on quantity and quality.

You have successfully argued that not all Indian programmes have been failures but there is nothing to suggest that ANY of our programmes triumph the Chinese programmes.

The author has made this assertion
""Across the full spectrum of defence — from road building on the borders to missile production and from space technology to cyber-strategy — there is nothing in the public domain to suggest that our defence ministry is on top of its China game."

He doesn't mention that we have not made progress, but wrt China obviously we are woefully short on quantity and quality.

You have successfully argued that not all Indian programmes have been failures but there is nothing to suggest that ANY of our programmes triumph the Chinese programmes.

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Singh, you need me to explain to you "what I am on about"?

It is very evident from the article, if you cared to read it properly, that the author is not just talking about India's programs "triumphing" the Chinese programs.

That is evident from the following statements:

"Could Antony explain why he is not pressing for an explicit military space programme that his three services consider so necessary?"

"For nearly half a decade, the world has been abuzz with China’s rapid advances in cyber-warfare....Could Antony tell us what the government has done in response?"

"....the Indian establishment continues to oscillate between the loose talk on television and the perfunctory official assurances...."

Now, let me explain to you what I am on about:

- My post was an attempt to elucidate that the "loose talk and perfunctory assurances" were necessary in a democratic polity as opposed to a communist polity, even while they are yet not adquate.

- To answer the uninformed assertion that Antony is "is not pressing for an explicit military space programme that his three services consider so necessary", while it is explicitly clear that he has, and that while it is "not fully operatioal", some of its "most essential components are put in place", and that furthermore, that "ISRO has worked in close collaboration with the Indian military since the 1970s", but because it is a civilian agency, its defense roles — both direct and indirect — are not publicized."

Furthermore, that despite these caveats, a little cursory research in "the public domain" might reveal the following:

- that India's "cyber warfare" program is not stagnant merely because of the lack of 'active targetting' or that of a record of hacking other nations. If you were to read my article by Brian M. Mazanec, you would realize that every component of an active cyber-war suite is set up and running in India. Furthermore, that even that pacifist accord of not actively targetting other nations' websites is beginning to change with the institution of Operation Divine Matrix and Indo-Israeli collaboration vis-a-vis Pakisthan.

You seem to ignore the author's other "assertions" in favour of his final one.

Moreover, it is fatuous for you or anyone else to expect India's programmes to match the Chinese programs for "quantity or quality" at present, given that:

- they are 2.8 times the size of India, are mutually antagonistic to the global hegemon and its conglomerate of defence-industry confederates, border a former superpower rival with whom relations have been strained in the past, and have several more broad-based globular assets of which they have equally more ward to be concerned about because of the above considerations.

- they have had a two-decade head-start in terms of economic liberalization, a more consolidated defence-industrial complex borne of their purloining of third-party technology, designs and know-how, and a significantly larger financial reserve to fund all their projects.

- that it is equally fatuous to suggest that India is not seeking to perambulate the gulf with China; as Antony himself said, India is beginning to embark upon the same path of modernization that China did in the 90's.

Our doctrine vis-a-vis China is based on a policy of simultaneous disuassive deterrence, not upon any predilection of parity.

China's "amazing successes" have stemmed from years of failure, abandonment and prevarications in numerous defence fields- from aircraft building to ship construction to engine R&D to the quality of junior officer training and shortage. Just because you are not aware, doesn't make it not so.

Here I go again. I'm going to try and think outside of the box. Couldn't India close the military gap with China by doubling or tripling the Indian defense budget? Why in the world is the defense budget at less than 2% of GDP? For comparison, Israel spends 9% of GDP on defense.