George Bush and Tony Blair in Crawford, Texas, in April 2002. Photograph: Susan Walsh/AP

Lord Goldsmith was not convinced that war in Iraq would be legal even after the UN security council passed resolution 1441 in November 2002, Sir John Chilcot said today.

Basing his remarks on papers he has read but which have not been made public, the chairman of the Iraq inquiry said that the then-attorney general, "immediately after 1441 had been secured, said he would need some time to reflect on it. And it appears from what we read that he did not feel convinced at that time – I'm talking about post-November, before March – that standing on its own it would be a secure base."

Chilcot also suggested that Goldsmith had been discouraged from expressing his doubts about the war in writing.

"There is some reason to suppose that [Goldsmith] might have liked to give written advice, albeit it might have been interim, but was discouraged from doing so," the chairman said.

Chilcot was taking evidence from Jonathan Powell, Tony Blair's former chief of staff. In his evidence, Powell said that George Bush had failed to live up to some of the commitments he gave in relation to the Middle East peace process, such as holding a peace conference or devoting as much time to the problem as Blair had done to Northern Ireland. Powell said this was a "major disappointment".

He also said there was no deal to invade Iraq "signed in blood" between Blair and Bush in April 2002.

Powell told the Chilcot inquiry that testimony to that effect by Sir Christopher Meyer, the former ambassador to the US, was unreliable.

"I was at Crawford," Powell said, referring to Bush's Texas ranch, where the two leaders met in 2002. "Christopher Meyer was not at Crawford. He was at Waco, 30 miles away.

"There was not an undertaking in blood to go to war with Iraq. There was no firm decision to go to war."

Bully

Powell denied that an attempt was made to "bully" Goldsmith into authorising the war.

However he told the inquiry that it was made clear that Goldsmith could not simply sit on the fence with a legal opinion that said "on the one hand, on the other".

Goldsmith was first asked for his professional advice on the legality of military action in July 2002 when he told the cabinet at that stage there was no basis for intervention.

On 7 March 2002, two weeks before the invasion, he gave Blair a lengthy opinion in which he argued that a "reasonable case" could be made that UN security council resolution 1441 on Iraq, passed the previous November, had revived the earlier authorisation for military action dating back to the 1991 Gulf war.

However he also said it would be preferable to obtain a second resolution explicitly authorising military intervention.

Four days later, on 11 March, with the diplomatic efforts in the UN on the verge of collapse, Goldsmith was then called for a meeting with Blair to discuss the matter.

"I don't know if he was asked for a definitive opinion before March 11. He was certainly asked for a definitive view on March 11," Powell said.

"My experience of lawyers is often you have an 'on the one hand, on the other', but sometimes they have to come down on a decision one way or the other on an issue, you can't have it both ways, and I think that is what is happening in this period."

As well as meeting Blair, he said that Goldsmith had also had meetings with himself and Blair's foreign policy adviser, Sir David Manning, and with US government lawyers to discuss the issue.

With the chief of the defence staff, Admiral Lord Boyce, demanding a clear view from the attorney on whether invasion was lawful, on 17 March he issued a second, single-page opinion authorising military intervention.

Chilcot said that at that point Lord Goldsmith could have stopped "the whole things in its tracks" – something the government would not have wanted to happen.

Powell replied: "You are not able to bully the attorney general, but he was bearing a very heavy burden."

Powell said that he had been at the cabinet meeting on 17 March when ministers were given Goldsmith's final opinion. He said there was no discussion about it – ministers simply said he did not need to read it out as they could read it themselves.

Unintended consequences

Powell insisted that Blair had sought to influence Bush's approach to Iraq, warning the US president of "the danger of unintended consequences" if diplomacy failed.

Blair had stressed the importance of winning support from other nations for military action in advance, conscious that diplomacy was precarious and any invasion would likely be swift.

"If we don't and they haven't been bound in beforehand, recriminations will start fast," Powell said, quoting a note Blair wrote to Bush following the Crawford talks.

"We hope to see Tony Blair really held to account for the debacle that was the Iraq War," said Andrew Burgin, of the Stop the War Coalition.

Powell said that Blair had written to Bush 11 months before the invasion warning him of the need to "move quickly" if it came to military action.

The former No 10 chief of staff said that in a note to Bush following their meeting in Crawford the prime minister had warned of the need to be prepared if things became "militarily tricky".

He insisted that Blair had always been committed to trying to resolve the crisis over Saddam Hussein's supposed weapons of mass destruction through the United Nations.

Powell said that in his note to Bush following the meeting in Crawford, Blair was trying to make clear what would be a sensible basis to "go ahead".

"What he was talking about was the danger of unintended consequences. Suppose it became militarily tricky, Iraq suffered unexpected civilian casualties, the Iraqis feeling ambivalent about being invaded," he said.

"If we move quickly, everyone will be our friend. If we don't and they haven't been bound in beforehand, recriminations will start fast."

About this article

Goldsmith was not convinced Iraq war was legal even after UN resolution – Sir John Chilcot

This article was published on
the Guardian website
at 13.26 EST on Monday 18 January 2010.
It was last modified at 05.10 EDT on Friday 3 October 2014.
It was first published at 12.49 EST on Monday 18 January 2010.