Monday, October 29, 2012

Book review - Strategic Bombing by the United States in World War II: The Myths and the Facts

This short
but very interesting book covers the USAAF strategic bombing effort in WWII.
The author looks into the beginnings of strategic bombing in WWI, the interwar
theories and the history and performance of the US Army Airforce bombers in the
European and Pacific theatres.

There are
separate chapters for the planes used, the bombs, the bombsights, the aircrews,
the campaigns and the postwar bombing surveys.

The author is
highly critical of the theory and practice of strategic bombing in WWII. The
interwar bombing theories of Douhet, Mitchell and Trenchard were superficially
attractive to politicians and military officers. Instead of sending hundreds of
thousands of young soldiers to fight in the trenches a country could invest in
a large bomber force that could quickly attack the enemy’s population and
industrial centers. According to the prophets of airpower these attacks would
lead to the collapse of the enemy’s economy and mass panic would force the
government to surrender. These theories were based on the principles that:

1). The
bombers would always get through to their targets.

2). The
bombers would have no difficulty in locating and bombing the targets.

3). The
civilian population would be predisposed to mass hysteria in the event of
bombing.

In WWII these
preconceptions were proven false. The use of radar meant that the course of
bombers could be correctly estimated and fighters vectored to meet them, it
proved to be extremely difficult to locate ground targets and the civilians of
the Axis countries continued to work despite the bombing campaigns.

Undoubtedly
the promoters of airpower must have realized these problems but they were more
interested in ensuring that their airforces would rise to become a separate
branch of the armed forces.

The greatest
part of the book deals with the USAAF effort and looks into the equipment and
personnel used. The strategic bombers were the B-17, B-24 and B-29.

The author is
not afraid to criticize icons of US airpower. The B-17 was developed in the
early ‘30’s and by the 1940’s was lacking in terms of performance. The RAF
found it ‘uneconomical in relation to the
crew and technical maintenance required’. It could not carry the bomb load
of newer models and its bomb bay could not carry large bombs used against
hardened targets.

The B-24 was
a new aircraft but its ‘Davis wing’ was a source of problems. On the one hand
it provided low drag at cruising speed and did not compromise high speed
performance. However above 20.000 feet it was prone to high speed stalls and its
design made it practically impossible to successfully ditch the plane in case
of an emergency .

The B-29 was
the most expensive bomber produced by the US. However its problems in the field
were legendary. Eventually more were lost to accidents than by enemy action.

These planes
were supposed to be able to defend themselves through heavy defensive armament
and close formation flying. Over Europe the German fighter defenses inflicted
heavy casualties and thus fighter escort was required. This role was performed
by the P-47, P-38 and P-51 fighters. The P-47 was a very heavy plane, affecting
its acceleration and climb rate. However at high altitude it was a good
performer. The twin engined P-38 performed well in the Pacific but in Europe it
had serious engine problems at high altitude. Eventually the fighter that would
change the airwar would be the P-51 due to its unprecedented range and its
excellent flying performance.

Bombing
targets from 20-30.000 feet using unguided bombs was, to put it mildly,
slightly inaccurate. The chances of the bombs dropping close to the target were
minuscule (according to a USAAF study ~1.2% for a single B-17 flying at 20.000
feet to hit a factory sized target). This reality was compounded in Western
Europe by the cloudy weather that made precision bombing impossible most days.
Highly developed bombsights like the US Norden proved to be
useless in W.Europe because of the clouds and smoke. In response to this
problem the British H2S radar
sight was used but its accuracy was even lower than the optical types.

Under these
conditions locating targets was very difficult and accurately bombing them
almost impossible. The USAAF compensated by using large numbers of bombers in
every mission so that some would hit the target. However the cost of building
and operating such forces was huge.

The human
cost of the bombing campaign was also very expensive. Bomber crews had little
chances to survive their 25 missions (increased in 1944). In the first half of
1944 the casualty rate was 89%. Casualties finally went down in the second half
of ’44 when the Luftwaffe could not effectively attack the bomber groups due to
attrition and lack of fuel.

At the end of
the war the USAAF organized a detailed study of the German and Japanese
economies and the effects that strategic bombing had on them. Famous economists,
like Galbraith,
were part of the teams that did the analysis. The results showed that German
war production increased during the war despite the bomber offensive. In fact
the year that production peaked was 1944 despite the huge Anglo-American
effort. The separate RAF study came to similar conclusions.

Galbraith was
critical of the US bombing survey and wrote in ‘A Life in Our Times’: ‘But
strategic bombing had not won the war. At most it had eased somewhat the task
of the ground troops who did. The aircraft, manpower and bombs used in the
campaign had cost the American economy far more in output than they had cost
Germany. However our economy being much larger we could afford it.’

Overall this
is a very interesting and outspoken analysis of the USAAF strategic bombing effort
in WWII.