Internal conflicts in the Great Lakes Region are never the result of internal factors only, but rather a confluence of other factors, most of which bear a relationship to the 'shadow economic networks' of individuals or institutions connected to the international systems of trade and finance. These networks foster corruption, elite rivalry and ethnic hatred because they survive on the indiscriminate plundering of natural resources. But since they function outside domestic and international legal regimes, they suffer little or no sanctions at all. This paper explores the limitations of international legal regimes in this regard and suggests some improvements that could enhance their conflict-reduction function in the region.

Conflict resolution in the African Great Lakes Region has been linked to the protocols and projects agreed upon at the Second International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR). The ICGLR created a continental-wide framework of conflict circuit breakers focused on resolving the structural and surface situational causes of the 1996 to 2003 armed conflicts that drew in at least six nations and destabilised the entire region. The implementation of these protocols and projects will serve as a test for the African Great Lakes Region to move away from conflict and into a cooperation and development phase; however, the effort to bring peace, stability and development will face obstacles not only in the security sector, but also in developing infrastructure, civil society, and good governance. In summary, this article contends that peace in the Great Lakes Region will depend equally on two factors: internal governance and building civil society institutions, and focused regional interlocking circuit-breaking institutions.

In the aftermath of the signing of the 'Accord Global et Inclusif' (AGI) in Pretoria on 17 December 2002, not much was expected of President Thabo Mbeki's 'imposed political monster'. In effect, after Mbeki came up with his 'final plan' providing for a transitional presidency made up of a president and four vice-presidents, many blamed 'Mbeki's ignorance of Congolese political intricacies'. Mbeki's 'one-plus-four' formula was not only said to be unknown to the Congolese, but was also doomed to failure, given the nature of the stakeholders and the interests at stake in the DRC crisis. However, in view of the latest political developments in the DRC (a successful constitutional referendum as well as presidential, legislative and provincial elections, among others), we contend that, given the complexity of the Congolese conflict, Mbeki's design has emerged as a commendable contribution to the political solution of the Congolese crisis. Factors that have enabled such a transition mechanism to hold ought to be critically studied and eventually applied as a model for similar conflict situations in Africa and probably beyond.

This article examines the dilemmas of post-genocide Rwanda, where society finds itself caught between justice and reconciliation. One of the major challenges for Rwandans today is to engender reconciliation in a deeply wounded nation and do justice to both victims and perpetrators. It is difficulty to affirm the victims, punish the perpetrators and at the same time bring about reconciliation between them. Yet there are unequivocal claims, especially from the victims, that there can be no justice without reparation and there can be no reconciliation without justice. To bring about justice and reconciliation, the Gacaca process was put in place, but it has turned out to be a source of fear for the perpetrators, who are desperate to bury the evidence by intimidating the survivors, and for the survivors, who are now living in fear of their lives. Consequently, the rising insecurity of survivors has become a matter of national concern, and the challenges to the Gacaca process are threatening to hamper its progress. But this apparently is the only viable justice system for communities to carry out trials at community level, for it was there that the crime of genocide was committed in a mass-killing frenzy. Truth telling and confessions by perpetrators, and forgiveness by victims have been identified as crucial steps towards reconciliation, but the dilemma lies in the inherent contradictions in the application of these concepts: truth, confession and forgiveness.

Even though the peace talks in northern Uganda have faltered, attempts at negotiations between the Ugandan government and the rebel Lord 's Resistance Army are continuing. The current rapprochement between the two sides is the most significant move towards peace in the twenty-year civil war in northern Uganda. Even though the war has been extreme in its brutality, it is little known of outside the region - with reports on the conflict often portraying a protective government pitted against a crazed rebel group. But the issues are much more complex. The article examines the history of abuses and atrocities committed by both sides; the wider implications of the conflict for the north; why the rest of Uganda are seemingly disinterested in the conflict; and the politics behind why northern civil society have little trust in the Ugandan government or the International Criminal Court (ICC). The current prospect of peace has also stirred up the debate around justice and the forms of justice for victims of both rebel and government atrocities. And this is where the biggest cleft between the northern civil society and officialdom (government and international NGOs) resides. The article further examines the implications of the ICC's work in Uganda, and why there has been such widespread hostility towards it from northern civil society. The article also asks if - beyond the end of fighting and terror - peace will really mean that northern Uganda can finally partake in the prosperity the rest of the country has almost taken for granted.

Over the past decade, international efforts to end protracted conflict in Africa have directed large streams of funds towards the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of former combatants in rural areas. While designed as an integrated approach, the emphasis tends to lie on short time frames of transition through centrally managed programmes that narrowly target 'the demobilised'. Despite the good intentions of these programmes, there are a number of questions that need to be answered, particularly how the beneficiaries perceive them. This essay tries to answer some of these questions by analysing Caluquembe, a district in central Angola where villagers were subjected to violence on an everyday basis, and where since the war ended in 2002 hundreds of former UNITA soldiers and their families were reintegrated. The essay argues that the ongoing 'normalisation' efforts of reintegrating displaced people and demobilised soldiers are facing a number of challenges due to the narrow targeting of benefits, the lack of involvement of local government, the absence of any form of national reconciliation, and the emphasis on economic reintegration in an environment of extreme poverty and social exclusion. The essay also draws a number of lessons that could benefit reintegration efforts in the Great Lakes Region, particularly for the Democratic Republic of Congo and Burundi.

In view of the fact that women bear the heaviest burden of failed states, it is inevitable and logical that they should play a central role in designing and implementing peace-building programmes. This not only improves the quality but also the increases the chances of success and the consolidation of peace. This article uses Rwanda to highlight how women are affected by collapsing states and prescribes the role that they can play in reconstructing societies emerging from violent conflicts. It strongly recommends the inclusion of women in post-conflict reconstruction and peace-building as model for good governance.

The world watched and lauded the Democratic Republic of Congo's historic elections in 2006. The country has been ravaged by war, inequality, injustice, corruption, poor health, hunger and poverty and the elections were generally regarded as a step towards ending this history of suffering. Given the circumstances, the elections were a resounding success but the root causes of the conflict and neglect remain. The pervasive problems will cripple the new government if they are not immediately addressed. This commentary argues that the elections should not serve as an exit strategy and that there should be continued and increased international attention to ensure security and stability. The elections should also not be seen as the final chapter in a peace process but rather as the first step in solving the evils that plague the DRC. The elections were not the answer, but simply means to an end.