China, January–September 1971

Source: National Archives,
Nixon Presidential
Materials, NSC Files, Box 1031,
Files for the President—China Material, Exchanges Leading up to
HAK’s Trip to China, December
1969–July 1971. Top Secret; Sensitive. Sent for information. A
notation on the memorandum indicated the President saw it. Nixon was in San Clemente,
California, January 5–14. Kissinger and Bogdan met in Washington from 12:30 to
12:50 p.m. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 438,
Miscellany, 1968–1976, Record of Schedule)

Source: National Archives,
Nixon Presidential
Materials, NSC Files, Box 520,
Country Files, Far East, China, Vol. V. Secret; Nodis; Ohio. Sent for information. A
notation on the memorandum indicates the President saw it. In an
attached February 8 memorandum to Kissinger, Holdridge recommended that this memorandum be sent
to the President. Norwegian diplomats also relayed information about
the PRC to U.S. officials in
Washington. The Norwegian Ambassador to the United States, Arne
Gunneng, discussed Sino-American relations at least three times with
U. Alexis Johnson during
1969. (Memoranda of conversation, February 27, September 18, and
December 17, 1969; ibid., RG 59,
S/S Files: Lot 96 D 695, U.
Alexis Johnson Files, Memcons, 1969) During his visit to Washington in
November 1970, Norwegian Ambassador to the People’s Republic of
China Ole Aalgaard suggested
to Johnson that he [Aalgaard] could serve as a conduit
for messages between the United States and People’s Republic of
China. (Memorandum of conversation, November 16, 1970; ibid., Memcons, 1970)

Source: National Archives,
Nixon Presidential
Materials, NSC Files, NSC Insitutional Files (H-Files), Box
H–177, NSSM 106. Secret. Green was responsible for
coordinating the Department of State’s response to NSSM 106. (Memorandum from Cargo t. Green, November 28, 1970; ibid., RG 59, S/S Files; Lot 80 D 212,
NSSM 106) Representatives from
the Departments of State, Defense, Commerce, and Treasury, and
ACDA, USIA, and the CIA met
on December 23 to discuss the draft response. Green noted: “With the exception of
some differences on specific points, the other participating
Agencies appeared to support the general thrust of State’s draft.”
(Memorandum from Green t.
Rogers, January 8, 1971;
ibid.) In an undated memorandum, Green wrote to the Under Secretary of State that the
Interdepartmental Group had reviewed the response to NSSM 106 on February 11. According to
Green, “However, some
differences between DOD and State
remain on specific points, notably in the sections dealing with the
strategic importance of Taiwan and our military presence there and
in the final section on possible arms control discussions with
Peking.” (Ibid., S/S Files: Lot 82
D 126, NSC Files, SRG Meeting
on NSSM 106) A March 6 briefing
memorandum from Levin, Sonnenfeldt, and Kennedy to Kissinger explained that NSSM 106 “in effect, poses the issue of how far we want
to go to improve relations with the People’s Republic of China,
since attempts to achieve these improvements must come, if at all,
at some cost in our relations with the GRC and will raise some questions in our relations with
the Soviets.” In a March 8 memorandum to Kissinger, Holdridge emphasized that NSSM 106 involved conventional, not nuclear forces, and
suggested that these matters would be better discussed in the
context of NSSM 69, U.S. Nuclear
Policy in Asia. (Ibid.) Materials prepared for Kissinger including this response
to NSSM 106, the Department of
State’s Issues Paper, NSDM 17, and
NSSM 106 are ibid. According to
a March 25 memorandum from Helms to Kissinger, there was also an “Intelligence Annex” to
the response to the NSSM, which had
the concurrence of INR, DOD, and the CIA. (Central Intelligence Agency, Job 84–B00513R,
DCI/Executive Registry Files:
NSSMs)

Source: Library of Congress,
Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box TS 14, Geopolitical File, China, Chronological File,
Trips, July 1971, Background Materials, 1970–71. Top Secret; Umbra;
Controlled Dissem. Another copy
is in Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79–R1012, NIE and SNIE Files. According to a note on the covering sheet,
the Central Intelligence Agency and intelligence organizations of
the Departments of State and Defense, and the NSA participated in the preparation of
this estimate. All members of the USIB concurred with the estimate except for the
representatives from the FBI and
AEC, who abstained on the
grounds that the subject was outside their jurisdictions. For the
full text of this NIE, see Tracking the Dragon, p. 678.

Source: Washington National
Records Center, RG 330, OSD Top Secret Files: FRC 330 76 0207, Asia, 471.61, 1971.
Top Secret; Sensitive; Limdis.
Prepared by Colonel Paul Murray on March 18 and
approved by Armistead Selden (ISA).
According to Kissinger’s
record of schedule, the meeting took place from 3:07 to 4:40 p.m. A
short, handwritten note appears at the bottom of the page:
“Interesting—worth reviewing.” A notation on the memorandum
indicates that Laird saw it
on March 22. Two other records of this meeting exist. One, written
by Gathright of the Department of State’s Executive Secretariat, is
in National Archives, RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 80 D 212, National Security Files, NSSM 69; and the other is ibid.,
Nixon Presidential
Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box
H–112, SRG Minutes, Originals, 1971.
According to the NSC record, the
meeting was held in the White House Situation Room. The NSC version is virtually a verbatim
record of the meeting.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1025, President/HAKMemcons, Memcon—the President, Kissinger, and Amb.Chow Apr. 12, 1971. Top
Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. The President’s Daily Diary indicates
that Chow met with the
President from 11:31 a.m. to 12:05 p.m. and that Emil Mosbacher, Chief of Protocol
for the Department of State, was also present. (Ibid., White House
Central Files) The conversation was recorded by the White House
taping system. The statements in quotations marks are actually
paraphrases. (Ibid., White House Tapes, Recording of conversation
between Nixon and Kissinger, April 12, 1971, 11:28
a.m.–12:41 p.m., Oval Office, Conversation No. 477–3)

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Country Files, Far East,
China, Vol. VI. Confidential. Sent for information. Drafted on April
14. The meeting was held in Kissinger’s office. In an April 14 covering
memorandum, Holdridge
suggested that no further distribution be made. Kissinger initialed his approval.
(Ibid.) Kissinger and
Chow met from 3:31 to
3:47 p.m. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division. Kissinger Papers, Box 480,
Miscellany, 1968–1976, Record of Schedule)

Source: National Archives,
Nixon Presidential
Materials, NSC Files, Box 1031,
Files for the President—China Material, Exchanges Leading up to
HAK’s Trip to China, December
1969–July 1971. No classification marking. According to a covering
memorandum from Saunders to
Kissinger, Hilaly called at 3:45 p.m. on April
27 and requested a 5-minute meeting as soon as possible: “He says he
has an urgent message from his President having to do with Communist
China.” Hilaly and Kissinger met from 6:12 to 6:30
p.m., then Kissinger met with
Nixon from 7 to 7:37 p.m.
(Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 438,
Miscellany, 1968–1976, Record of Schedule) A handwritten copy of
this statement, apparently prepared by Hilaly, is attached to the typed version. The
versions are identical. Hilaly
also handed over a record of his December 16, 1970, meeting with
Kissinger, Document 100.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1031, Files for the
President—China Material, Exchanges Leading up to HAK’s Trip to China, December 1969–July
1971. This transcript was prepared by Kissinger’s staff. There is also a tape of this
conversation. (Ibid., White House Tapes, Recording of conversation
between Nixon and Kissinger, April 27, 8:16–8:36
p.m., White House Telephone, Conversation No. 2–52) There are no
substantive differences between the two versions.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 7 US/KENNEDY. Secret. Prepared by
Jurich, Special Assistant
for National Security Affairs to the Secretary of the Treasury.
Telegrams relaying the contents of Kennedy’s discussions with Vice President C.K. Yen on May 1 and Finance
Minister K. T. Li on April 30 are ibid. The
memorandum of Kennedy’s
conversation with Chiang and
his May 12 memorandum to the President are ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials,
NSC Files, Box 820, Name Files,
Ambassador David M. Kennedy.
Kennedy’s May 13 summary
report of his meetings, forwarded to Rogers, then the President, stated that the Chinese
assured him negotiations would take 3 to 5 days. He also mentioned
that the Chinese hoped to obtain a steel mill and greater investment
in “oil resource development” to offset voluntary limitations on the
growth of their textile industry. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 7 US/KENNEDY) Ambassador Kennedy also visited Japan, South
Korea, and Hong Kong, where he sought to obtain commitments to
negotiate limits on textile imports into the United States.
Memoranda of conversations he held were forwarded to Rogers on May 13. (Ibid.)

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1031, Files for the
President—China Material, Exchanges Leading up to HAK’s Trip to China, December 1969–July
1971. Top Secret; Sensitive. A full memorandum of conversation has
not been found. This extract was apparently prepared by the NSC staff.

Source: National Archives,
Nixon Presidential
Materials, NSC Files, Box 698,
Country Files, Europe, Norway, Vol. I. Secret. Sent for information.
A notation on the memorandum indicates the President saw it.
According to an attached covering memorandum. Holdridge drafted the memorandum
for Haig on April
29.

Source: National Archives,
Nixon Presidential
Materials, NSC Files, Box 1031,
Files for the President—China Material, Exchanges Leading up to
HAK’s Trip to China, December
1969–July 1971. Top Secret, Sensitive; Eyes Only. A notation on the
memorandum indicates the President saw it.

Source: National Archives,
Nixon Presidential
Materials, NSC Files, Box 1031,
Files for the President—China Material, Exchanges Leading up to
HAK’s Trip to China, December
1969–July 1971. No classification marking. A handwritten note at the
top of the first page reads: “Handed by Mr. Kissinger to Amb.Hilaly, 12:00, 5/10/71.”
Kissinger met with
Hilaly on May 10 from
12:10 to 12:55 p.m. and from 3:05 to 3:29 p.m. (Library of Congress,
Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 438, Miscellany, 1968–1976,
Record of Schedule) Kissinger
informed Farland via a May 14
backchannel message that
“Message passed to Yahya
through Hilaly along lines of
our conversation. You were designated as point of contact for travel
arrangements.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 426, Backchannel Files, Backchannel
Messages—1971—AmbFarland—Pakistan) Farland informed Kissinger on May 22 that this
message was received by Yahya in Lahore on May 17 and was given to the
PRC Ambassador on May 19.
(Ibid.)

Source: National Archives,
Nixon Presidential
Materials, NSC Files, Box 1031,
Files for the President—China Material, Exchanges Leading up to
HAK’s Trip to China, December
1969–July 1971. Top Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. This message was
sent via special channels from Kissinger to Farland on May 20. Kissinger’s instructions read: “Please deliver the
attached message to Yahya
personally for immediate transmittal by him to PRC Ambassador. Best regards.” (Ibid.)
A copy of the message contains the handwritten notation: “Handed to
Hilaly 12:00 May 20, 1971
(without classification).” Kissinger and Hilaly met from 12:10 to 12:15 p.m. (Library of
Congress, Manuscript Division. Kissinger Papers, Box 438, Miscellany, 1968–1976,
Record of Schedule)

Source: National Archives, RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 80 D 212,
National Security Files, NSSM 124.
Top Secret. Brown, Acting
Chairman of the NSC
Interdepartmental Group for East Asia and the Pacific, submitted
this report to the SRG on May 28.
(Memorandum from Brown to
Kissinger; ibid.)
According to an August 24 memorandum from Helms to Kissinger, the CIA prepared an Intelligence Annex to
NSSM 124 that assessed
reconnaissance operations involving China with an eye toward their
reduction or elimination. (Central Intelligence Agency, Job
84–B00513R, DCI/Executive Registry
Files, NSSMs) According to a
“NSSM Status Reports Prepared
by S/PC,” from December 1971, NSSM 124 was “completed” after it was
submitted to the Senior Review Group, and no NSC meeting was planned. (National Archives, RG 59, Lot 73 D 288, General Files on NSC Matters, NSC Under
Secretaries Memoranda, 1971) NSSM
124 is printed as Document 117.

Source: National Archives,
Nixon Presidential
Materials, NSC Files, Box 1031,
Files for the President—China Material, Exchanges Leading up to
HAK’s Trip to China, December
1969–July 1971. No classification marking. An identical handwritten
copy of this message is attached. It was probably prepared by
Hilaly. Kissinger met with Hilaly from 9:06 to 9:24 a.m. on May
31. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 438,
Miscellany, 1968–1976, Record of Schedule) At that time, he
apparently made Kissinger
aware of the incoming message but did not yet have the actual text.
The two men met again on June 2 from 8:10 to 8:30 p.m. (Ibid.)
According to a notation on another copy of the message, it was
“transcribed from handwritten document handed to HAK by Hilaly, 6–2–71, 8:10 p.m. Taken to Pres.” This
version did not include the comments from Yahya at the end of the message.
(National Archives, Nixon
Presidential Materials, NSC Files,
Box 1031, Files for the President—China Material, Material
Concerning Preparations for First China Trip by HAK, July 1971)

Source: National Archives,
Nixon Presidential
Materials, NSC Files, Box 521,
Country Files, Far East, China, Vol. VII. Secret. Sent for action.
According to a covering memorandum to Kissinger from Holdridge and Ernest Johnson,
with the concurrence of Kennedy, Holdridge and Johnson wrote and then revised this memorandum for
the President. (Ibid.)