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Fenkil: The Chess Game

My colleague Solomon Berhe and I, one particular day went to General Philipos Weldeyohannes and said “we would like you to share your experiences of Operation Fenkil with us”.

“In that case, why
not give me a chance to refer to my notes, refresh my memory and show you the
maps of the operation” he replied. We agreed to meet up again five days later.

We had decided to
focus on something different, an unusual aspect of Operation Fenkil, a subject hitherto not
raised, when we next met the General. To this end, we wanted to discuss
strategies played out with all the intricacies and intrigues of a game of chess.
Given the opportunity, it was our intention to let question lead to question,
to go around corners following every twist and turn of the narrative in its
fullest, to fulfil our quest. The General did not disappoint, he shared all the
details we had sought in full and unreservedly.

The leaders of the
Eritrean Peoples Liberation Front (EPLF) like all the members of the EPLF, have
a vast infinite repository hidden deep inside them, that holds the intimate
secrets of the Struggle. In spite of this, those who led the Struggle against
the Ethiopians, be it as leaders of an entire front or a battle field, those who
played out the strategic chess games in the theatre of war, remain adamant that
it is yet not time to reveal all. The question is, when will it be the right
time? Who knows.

We were curious
about the extent the Dergue (Ethiopian government) was blissfully unaware,
snoring away in its slumber of the impending danger it faced? Did it not have
any inclination that the EPLF was about to streak across the plains of Semhar
on its way to liberate Massawa? We asked Tegadali (freedom fighter) Philipos.

“But it did! They
were fully prepared” he replied smiling. It was not a response we were
expecting and looked at each other bewildered. We had always assumed that that
the Dergue was never aware of the actions of the EPLF until they happened. This
was a different intriguing perspective and we wanted to dig deeper to shed
light on it.

In war, the element
of surprise is paramount for victory, you lose it and your chances of achieving
victory is greatly hindered. The lingering question was, how did Operation Fenkil,
an operation that had lost the element of surprise manage to succeed? To
understand this, we unleashed a volley of questions.

The enemy had
snatched the element of surprise from us said the General. The success of the
operation was put in jeopardy. But, the EPLF was no novice when it came to playing
out the chess game strategies, that is why we were able to turn the tables and
restore our element of surprise.

The manner in which
they had restored their advantage in the
strategic chess game must have come all come back to him as he gazed towards
the ceiling lost in thought. We let him rearrange and contemplate his thoughts
and memories.

We pushed him to
tell us how they restored the element of
surprise to such a large operation. He recounted to us a story that showed
the guile and competence of the EPLF leadership and battle readiness tempered
with courage of its fighters.

As he started to
tell us the story of how they managed to snatch back the element of surprise,
and as the story of the strategic chess game unfolded, we listened mesmerised
by what we were hearing. The stories took us back to a by gone era, and we felt
that the General had transformed back to the fighter of old we knew. Now that
the stories were gushing out, we were
careful not to hinder the flow.

By 1990, the EPLF
had become a force much bigger and stronger than the EPLF of previous years. It
was patently obvious that it had become a force that was led by seasoned and
proficient leaders with determined, experienced
and able fighting units to match, explained the General.

In 1988 the EPLF
had managed to annihilate one of the most powerful commands of the Ethiopian
Revolutionary army stationed in Eritrea, called Nadew. In wiping out Nadew, the EPLF managed to
acquire strategic weapons which had helped it further strengthen and develop
its fighting capability. At this point, the EPLF became the strongest that it
had ever been in its entire history.

At that time,
continued the General, the EPLF was aware that it was now in a position to
launch an operation on its enemy, an operation unlike any other, an operation which
would be vastly different in magnitude and complexity to the others that had gone before it, an operation which would have a lasting and greater effect on the course of the
Struggle. To this end, the EPLF embarked on preparing its fighters and
reorganizing itself.

It was decided to
name this operation, Fenkil (uproot).
It was to be a co-ordinated land and seaborne operation. The purpose of the
operation was declared to be an attack on the Ethiopian army which controlled
the port city of Massawa from its positions on the plains of Semhar.

The studying and
analysis of the fighting capacity of the Ethiopian forces in great detail was
deemed to be the first and most important task of the operation. To this end,
military intelligence units of the EPLF began to gather information by going to
the front, penetrating deep into enemy
lines, intercepting enemy communication, liaising with the local population and
using other means they deemed to be effective to achieve their goal.

The EPLF’s 85th Division at the
time was stationed on the eastern front overlooking Semhar near the plains of
Sheab. Responsibility for the gathering of the military intelligence needed for
the success of the operation was given to the covert operation wing of this
division. This unit was capable of penetrating deep into the recess of the
enemy and it carried out its mission with the utmost care and determination.

At the time there
were more than ten brigades of the Ethiopian army stationed at Semhar,
including a special force division called Nebelbal
(burning flames) and five infantry
units. They were equipped with more than 110 tanks, additional Ballistic
Missile (BM) rocket launchers, various heavy artilleries, modern anti-tank
missiles, machine guns and additional mechanized units.

When one takes into
account the presence of the 35 year old Ethiopian Navy with its modern weaponry
and the air superiority of the Ethiopian forces, it was abundantly clear to
envisage the difficulties that would be faced in the battles of Operation
Fenkil.

The top level
leadership of the EPLF set about sifting through and analysing all the
intelligence gathered from various sources, to come up with a strategy for the
game changing cataclysmic operation it had in mind. It was imperative that
nothing would stand in the way of the success of this operation. This was of
paramount importance because the experiences of the battle at Salina in 1977
were still embellished in the memories of the fighters that had taken part then.
At the time, the Ethiopian forces had cleared most of Massawa and the EPLF
forces were speeding towards the Naval base to try and control it.
Unfortunately, as the EPLF forces entered the salt plains of Salina the Dergue
was able to inflict heavy losses on them. The gruesome losses at Salina will forever be indelibly imprinted on the
annals of the Eritrean Revolution.

All units that were
to take part in the Operation Fenkil were fully engaged in ensuring that their equipment
was battle ready and they too were prepared for the physical demands of the
operation. Apart from those that were directly involved in the assault, no
other fighters were aware of the planned operation, no hint was given about the
impending major operation and everything was shrouded in complete secrecy. This
was done to maintain that all important element
of surprise.

By way of deception

In the conduct of
war, the element of surprise is one
the most important elements that will determine the final outcome. Your enemy
should have absolutely no inclination as to how and where you are going to
attack. Strike like lighting and vanish like the wind, is one of the basic
concepts of the conduct of war. This message had been conveyed to all those
within the EPLF at all levels of the membership. But most importantly, the EPLF
fighters were familiar with this concept from the experiences they had acquired
during their engagements in the countless successful operations conducted
against the Ethiopian army, where they had struck like lighting and vanished
like the wind.

One has to remember
that the Ethiopian army was one of the largest army in sub-Saharan Africa at
that point. The Generals who led this army were no push overs and could not be
simply dismissed as incompetent stooges of the regime.

The hot dry plains
of Semhar were set to be the scene where the different land and sea weapons of
war, would stoke the fire that would rage in the crucible called Fenkil, where
those fighters cloaked in their perseverance would face a third of the Dergue’s
army which was equipped with multitudes of tanks, artillery pieces, fighter planes
and warships. All fighters of the EPLF, including those that would be braving
the sea in boats incapable of withstanding the perils of the sea, were expected
not only to be of superior morale than their foe, but it was demanded of them
to be well equipped, physically ready, steadfast in their resilience and
readiness to overcome the exertions of battle on the dry plains.

One of the divisions
tasked with crossing through the searing hot plains of Semhar and set itself up
in the centre of Massawa, was the 70th Division of the EPLF. The
division was one of the bedrocks of this planned cataclysmic operation. It was
deemed to be of paramount importance to prepare the fighting units of this division
for the vagaries of battle on the hot plains of Semhar, and the units embarked
on a training programme to prepare them for the upcoming operation. It was therefore
necessary for the division to leave its entrenched position which stretched
from the precinct of Echet Debray (ዕጨት ደብራይ) through
Hager Geni (ሃገር ግኒ) up until the River Anseba reaching up to
Hal Hal overlooking Keren. The division retreated back to the area of Haberon (ሃበሮን) to commence its training.

The division not
only withdrew from its positions but was under strict instructions to maintain
radio silence. It was extremely important that the enemy should not get wind of
the intention of the division.

The 70th
Division withdrawing from its position and disappearing from the air waves
caused great consternation amongst the Dergue military hierarchy. The reason
being that in the theatre of war, radio silence was taken to be the calm before
the storm. Each army has a unit that monitors and deciphers the radio
communication of its opponent. The mission of the monitoring units was not only to monitor in
detail the movement of a Brigade or
Division, but to go even further and know exactly where each individual leader
or commander was at any given time. The monitoring units of the EPLF would be
keeping an eye on the Ethiopian army divisions while those of the Ethiopian
army would be monitoring the units of the EPLF.

It was clear that
the EPLF division that had withdrawn and was maintaining radio silence was
capable of launching an attack on the Dergue at any time and place. It was
imperative to the officers of the Dergue
who had been unsettled by the sudden disappearance of the EPLF division, to
find out where it had gone and what its intention was through their
intelligence network and analysis. An order of the utmost importance was
immediately issued to all military intelligence units in the Second
Revolutionary Army of Ethiopia, to find out where this division had gone to, by
whatever means at their disposal. Fifth column members in the west and spies of
the self administration region in the east, set about trying to find the
missing division. Officers of the Dergue intelligence units begun to search for this division in Eritrea
and even in Tigray (Northern Ethiopia) with greater haste and determination
never witnessed before. The entire divisions (infantry, artillery, tank) of the
Second Revolutionary Army which were based in Eritrea, were put on high alert.

Wrong intelligence, right analysis

The plains of
Semhar were buzzing from the activities of the undercover EPLF fighters who were
striving to uproot their enemy on one hand and on the other by the undercover
covert operators of the Dergue trying to find the missing division. Everything
was done in stealth. It was inevitable that the paths of these two opposing
factions of undercover agents would cross at some point. The laws of military
intelligence reconnaissance forbid engagement with the enemy unless the enemy
had become a direct threat to the agent as the information gathered would be of
greater importance than whatever limited damage any engagement would have
entailed. Such is the hide and seek nature of the theatre of war.

The covert
operators of the Dergue attached great importance to the purposeful activities
of the EPLF agents they had witnessed in the plains of Semhar. The Dergue
military experts determined that this activity they were observing was somewhat
related to the disappearance of the division from its positions and radio waves.

The Dergue military
experts reached the conclusion that the covert agents of the 70th Division
were in the Semhar area because the division was preparing an imminent attack
on their positions on the plains, hence the reason why it had vanished. The
information they had was wrong, but their conclusion was right. The Ethiopian
army in Semhar opened its eyes and ears wide open in anticipation and was
placed on the highest alert level. The plains of Semhar were flooded by the
Ethiopians with experienced forces, tanks, artillery and other weapons. It was
good-bye element of surprise.

The raising of the
alert level of the Ethiopian army was an unforeseen consequence of the decision
to hide the 70th Division, it was a major obstacle to the planned
operation Fenkil. This was because the biggest factor in achieving victory, the
all important element of surprise,
had in no uncertain way been lost to the Dergue. To attack an army that had snatched
your element of surprise from you and was waiting for you as alert as it could
possibly be, was tantamount to going into battle with your eyes closed. Cons of
such an attack far outweighed any pros. It was self-evident that a battle under
such circumstances had the potential to be a disastrous quagmire with no exit.

A new game of deception

The leaders of the
EPLF who were planning Operation Fenkil and had lost their much vaunted element of surprise now faced a big
challenge. They were faced with two options, either cancel the operation or
restore their advantage by claiming back the element of surprise.

It was not hard to
guess which option was the most viable one to them. The operation that whose planning
was at an advanced stage and on whose outcome rested so much, could not be cancelled.
The only real option open was to employ
guile to restore the element of surprise that
had been wrenched from our hands and carry on with the operation that was
intended to clear the path for the independence of Eritrea. The chess game of
Fenkil resumed with new fervour, the game had to warp the minds of the leaders
of the Second Revolutionary Army.

To restore the element of surprise that the Second
Revolutionary army had claimed, plots and ploys were set in motion. First and
foremost it was decided that the EPLF should play along with the Dergue’s
conclusion reached by their military analysts based on erroneous intelligence. As
such, some of the radio operators of the 70th Division who had
disappeared from the air waves were reassigned to the 85th Division
taking with them their own instructions.
They established radio communications with EPLF units in the plains of Sheab. When
the radio communications interceptors of the Second Revolutionary Army
intercepted their communications, they believed that they had indeed located the
70th Division and immediately informed their superiors. This caused
the Dergue’s high command to further strengthen their belief in the information
and analysis given by their military intelligence. The commanders of the Dergue
army now had great faith in the veracity of their previous analysis. They
believed that Shaebia’s element of
surprise was safe in their bosom. Truth be told, it did seem that way.

Those leaders of
the EPLF who had plotted the game of chess now turned their attention to
matters that had been previously planned but had been set aside until a
suitable time was found. On checking their records in detail they came across
an entry that said Should it be carried
out prior or after Fenkil, referring to a plan to carry out an attack
within Ethiopia itself. They chose to attack the Ethiopian army stationed in
Assoa, Wellega where the Ethiopians least expected an attack. The 70th
Division, whose disappearance had wreaked havoc with the minds of the Ethiopian
Generals, together with a mechanized unit was to play a key role in this game
of chess. Members of the 70th
Division backed by their colleagues in the mechanized units finished their
preparation for the unexpected mission in record time.

The commanders of
the Ethiopian army were finishing off their preparations for the imminent
attack on their positions in the plains of Semhar. The division whose arrival
they were going to feign surprise at, the division who was the reason why the element of surprise had slipped away
from the hands of the EPLF had to regain that advantage by any means. To this
end it had left the tributaries of the river Sahle together with the mechanised
units and heavy artillery units heading west perched on the faithful Mercedes
lorries.

Commanders of
Second Revolutionary Army of Ethiopia were blissfully unaware that it was only
a handful of radio operators from the 70th Division embedded in
units not their own, that were feeding them false information. The commanders, satisfied
with their work, said in their minds “ what deception? What game of chess?”

The operation that
would cross through the Sudan and then turn towards western Ethiopia having
travelled 1800 Km to launch an attack on Assoa, had to resolve at the very least
three issues.

From a military point of view, the EPLF
believed that as long as the Dergue’s preferred method of struggle was to
employ its military might, it was essential to engage the Dergue on its own
territory with the intention to take the necessary steps to severely limit and
degrade its manpower capability in
addition to decimating its weapons arsenal.

Helping other armed groups who were engaged
in fighting the Dergue, groups like the Oromo Liberation Front was a second aim
included in this mantra of weakening the Dergue.

Most important of all, the main purpose of
the operation was to restore the element
of surprise of Operation Fenkil,that
had been wrenched away on the plains of Semhar. There was no doubt, attacking
Assoa would restore the element of
surprise.

The EPLF fighters
who had begun their arduous journey in the latter days of 1989 from their
homeland, having crossed the rugged terrain of Eritrea and plains of Sudan in
great secrecy, reached the jungles of western Ethiopia on 1 January 1990. They
set about getting their tanks, artilleries and all other equipments ready for
the planned attack. In accordance with the pre-planned arrangements, the attack
on the Dergue’s army, which was quite confident that no entity would dare challenge
it on its home turf, was launched on 2 January 1990. The fire of the EPLF was
unleashed in the heartland of Ethiopia on the unsuspecting Dergue.

Not in their
wildest dreams did the Ethiopians expect to encounter such a ferocious attack
within what they believed until then, to be their impregnable fortress. The
leaders of Ethiopia were thrown into confusion and turmoil by the turn of
events. They were well aware that the Ethiopian rebel forces which they held in
great disdain, were incapable of launching an attack of such magnitude.

The radio waves of
the divisions of the Ethiopian army went into overdrive, “who are they” was the
prevalent question being asked.

“Shaebia” came back
the response.

“Which Division?”
was the next question.

“the 70th Division!”, came back the
reply that they could hardly believe but nonetheless was true and deeply
unsettling to them.

At that point the
Ethiopians realised that they had been out witted. They thought that all the
shenanigans and intrigue that had unfolded in the dry plains of Semhar was to
divert attention to attack Assoa, little did they know what the real reason
behind the ploy of the game of chess was. Whether they understood it or not was
immaterial, they had no other alternative but play the game of deception, the
all important game of chess.

Reversal of thought

After the attack on
Assoa, it was only natural that the commanders of the Dergue army to be
overwhelmed with concern. Their unease at the realistic possibility of the
presence of an entire EPLF division in Ethiopia and the potential damage it
could wreak, greatly increased their trepidation. Their preoccupation about the
consequence of the igniting of hostilities in their very own heartland led them
to strengthen their forces in Ethiopia and put them on high alert, so that they
would be able to thwart any potential attack launched by the EPLF in their very own back yard.

Shaebia, was not an
organisation that got easily distracted from the aims that it had laid out. Having
misled the Dergue army officials successfully, the focus of the EPLF was still
on carrying out its initial operation. Beyond the initial attack on Assosa, the
EPLF had no intention to carry out further attacks in the Ethiopian heartlands.
It was in the third week of January 1990, the 70th Division having
successfully carried out its lighting strike in collaboration with the
mechanised units of the EPLF, gathered its belongings and got back on the swarm
of Mercedes trucks that it had used to descend on its target in Ethiopia and
headed back on the long tortuous journey back to Eritrea. They reached Eritrea
at the end of the same month.

As a result of the
70th Division reinforced by mechanised units, launching a strike in
the heartlands of Ethiopia, while the Ethiopians were expecting it to attack on
the plains of Semhar, the Dergue’s army was at its wits end trying to figure
out where next the wrath of the EPLF would befall it.

Because of the
attack on Assosa, the Dergue downgraded the alert level of its army stationed
in Semhar. It was obvious to the Dergue that the 70th Division which it had
expected at Semhar was no longer in Eritrea and therefore not much of a threat
to it on the plains of Semhar. The Ethiopians came to believe that their
analysis about the intent of the 70th Division was fundamentally
flawed.

The Ethiopians were
of the mind that it was highly improbable, actually well nigh impossible, that the
70th Division would return to Eritrea from Ethiopia and launch a
meaningful attack any time soon. Instead, they rushed to send divisions of their
weaker Third Revolutionary army which were stationed in Tigray and closer to Assoa, to reinforce their positions
in Wellega. The element of surprise that had been snatched from the hands of
Shaebia, now turned its face back to Shaebia.

Who uprooted whom?

The game of chess
that was being played out to retrieve the element
of surprise, never for a moment caused the preparations for Operation
Fenkil to stall. The plans for the units taking part in the operation, which
included their entry points into the battle, their aims and goals were
constantly revised and refined. It was to the EPLF’s advantage that members of
its military intelligence managed to infiltrate the enemy’s 606 Corps and study
it until they knew it like the back of their hands.

The EPLF finalised
its preparation for its planned operation. All that was left was for the
mechanised units and the 70th Division that had been key players in
the chess game to regain the element of
surprise, to take up their battle positions. With the plans finalised and
the preparation completed, members of the military intelligence of the 85th
Division, who had drawn up the plans in sand, were ready to carry them out in
person. Each and every unit that was to take part in the operation was well
drilled as to where and how it would attack the enemy’s positions.

The task force that
was to take part in the large scale land and seaborne assault, comprised of;

Nine infantry units which were ready for a
deadly hand to hand duel with the enemy’s men and machine.

Three quarters of the EPLF’s mechanised
units, armed with a total of forty-five tanks, heavy artillery and machine guns.

About a hundred members of the EPLF naval
forces precariously perched on rickety
speed boats which were tossed side to side by the slightest of gales, boats
which were primarily designed for fishing and never intended to be used as
assault vessels.

Those who by their
ferocious attack in Wellega, had thrown the Dergue high command into utter
confusion and disarray, upon their return to Eritrea remarkably dived straight
back into action after a few days of respite. They dusted themselves off from
the dust of Assosa and prepared themselves to be doused by the blessed dust of
Semhar. They readied themselves yet again and together with the machine
gunners, tank drivers artillery gunners made
their way to the eastern plains of Semhar via Afabet. Where they combined with
units from the 61st Division who were stationed at Solomuna, the legendary
units of the 85th Division who had slipped through Bade-Eleh to
carry out a devastating blow on the enemy, and formed a new division, the 96th
Division. This new division was to be the eastern flank of Operation Fenkil and
was expected to speed across the plains of Semhar to capture Gerar and the
Ethiopian Naval Base in Massawa.

On the dawn of 8
February 1990, those who through their ability and sheer dogged willingness,
those that had traversed 3,600 Km, those that had fought unreservedly to get
back the all important element of surprise,
struck the match that ignited Operation Fenkil. Having destroyed the occupying
enemy forces that were stretched from the River
Kensal to their fortifications in Kentibay, they romped on the searing
plains of Semhar and the Asmara-Massawa road, like a young calf. It was through
their sense of purpose that they had succeeded in the unfamiliar lands of
Ethiopia, but here in their back yard, it was a different song. They were the
owners of the song, the conductors that controlled and dictated the rhythm and
the beat.

Reinforced with
mechanised units, they threw themselves at the unfolding titanic grinding clash
being witnessed on the dry plains of Semhar. On the plains of Gurgusm, Edaga,
Forto, Salina, Gerar, Naval-Base Segalt, Resi-Medri Tewalet they entangled
themselves in the battle for Massawa with the men and machinery of the Second
Revolutionary Army and with all they had, aimed to dislodge it.

The port city of
Massawa for once and for all, fell into the hands of her heroic children. With
the liberation of Massawa, Operation Fenkil ended in victory.

The impact of the
defeat of the Ethiopian army on Mengistu Hailemariam, the leader of the Dergue,
was indescribable. He considered the capture of Massawa as the strangulation of
the Second Revolutionary army, and heralded the imminent secession of Eritrea. There
was no doubt that the Ethiopian army was shaken to its very core by the
cataclysmic operation, which was a result of the convoluted game of chess that
was played out. The operation had managed to bring within touching distance
liberation, the prize that every fighter, every civilian had longed for and had
steadfastly struggled for.

Video #Ethiopian map from the 1940s till present explained clearly starting from the meeting between Ethiopian Emperor Haile Selassie and President Franklin D. Roosevelt aboard the USS Quincy in the Suez Canal, Egypt. The video also explains on the golden days/years of Ethiopia and how it rose to prominence by building its Navy, Air force, and Infantry to the hosting of the OAU on the expense of Eritrea by the rent paid to the use of Kagnew Station (Eritrea) making Ethiopia the centre of gravity in Africa. The video also sheds light where the current dangerous Ethiopian map is headed to with regards to the struggle in Ogaden, and Civil Disobedience in Oromia.