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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 TRIPOLI 000430
NOFORN
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR NEA/MAG, S/CT
E.O. 12958: DECL: 5/27/2018
TAGS: PGOVPRELKISLPTERPHUMLYIZ
SUBJECT: DIE HARD IN DERNA
REF: TRIPOLI 120
TRIPOLI 00000430 001.2 OF 004
CLASSIFIED BY: Chris Stevens, CDA, U.S. Embassy - Tripoli, Dept
of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)
¶1. (C) Summary: Frustration at the inability of eastern Libyans
to effectively challenge Qadhafi's regime, together with a
concerted ideological campaign by returned Libyan fighters from
earlier conflicts, have played important roles in Derna's
development as a wellspring of Libyan foreign fighters in Iraq.
Other factors include a dearth of social outlets for young
people, local pride in Derna's history as a locus of fierce
opposition to occupation, economic disenfranchisement among the
town's young men. Depictions on satellite television of events
in Iraq and Palestine fuel the widespread view that resistance
to coalition forces is justified and necessary. One Libyan
interlocutor likened young men in Derna to Bruce Willis'
character in the action picture "Die Hard", who stubbornly
refused to die quietly. For them, resistance against coalition
forces in Iraq is an important act of 'jihad' and a last act of
defiance against the Qadhafi regime. End summary.
¶2. (C) P/E Chief paid an unofficial visit to the eastern Libyan
town of Derna in early May in conjunction with a trip to
Benghazi and the ancient Graeco-Roman ruins of Cyrene. P/E
Chief traveled from Benghazi in a rented car with a
driver/guide. (Note: An apparent lapse in coordination between
security officials in Tripoli and Benghazi led to what appeared
to be a rare gap in surveillance by security organizations. End
note.) Located along Libya's eastern littoral in an area
bracketed with rocky hills, Derna's beautiful, if bleak, setting
and Soviet-style poured concrete buildings evoke Tyre and Sidon
in South Lebanon. While asking directions to the city's old
fort, P/E Chief met local resident Nouri al-Mansuri (strictly
protect), who happened to hail from the same tribe as P/E
Chief's driver/guide. In typical fashion, al-Mansuri promptly
dropped what he was doing and spent the next several hours
accompanying us around Derna, a town of some 50,000 people.
Asked about his livelihood, al-Mansuri described himself as "a
free businessman", usually indicating someone who does not hold
a full-time job, but instead gets by on a mix of odd jobs and
commercial activities.
BAAB AL-SHIHA: WELLSPRING OF LIBYAN FOREIGN FIGHTERS
¶3. (C) P/E Chief visited the Baab al-Shiha neighborhood, site of
the town's old fort (now all but gone) and the district from
which a large number of the Libyan foreign fighters identified
in documents captured during September's Objective Massey
operation in Iraq had hailed. The lower-middle class
neighborhood, comprising poured concrete homes crowded along
largely unpaved streets, sits on a hill overlooking the town.
Unbidden, al-Mansuri pointed out a number of small, discrete
mosques tucked away in side alleys, noting that the profusion of
"popular mosques" complicated effective monitoring by security
forces. (Note: As reported reftel, another contact indicated
previously that while mosques in town centers are closely
monitored, it has been more difficult for secruity organizations
to effectively monitor smaller, more remote mosques in exurbs
and towns in eastern Libya. End note.)
¶4. (C) A number of residents were on the streets; however, they
were visibly more wary and less friendly than in other Libyan
towns. Al-Mansuri later noted that some residents were closely
questioned by security officials after speaking with a visiting
Newsweek reporter in April. Told P/E Chief was an American,
al-Mansuri jokingly swore and said "there goes my evening".
Clarifying, he said he had plans that night, but would likely be
detained and questioned by security officials about his
interactions with an Emboff. While P/E Chief had not obviously
been followed, word would doubtless reach security officials'
ears that foreigners had visited and inquiries would be made.
He dismissed the idea of parting company to avoid creating
problems for him, saying it was important that he, as a son of
Derna, not bow down to the central government's authority.
"They may have their boot on our throat, but it's important that
they know that we are still breathing and kicking", he said.
PERCEIVED U.S. SUPPORT FOR QADHAFI FUELS DESIRE TO FIGHT IN IRAQ
¶5. (C) Over lunch at a popular restaurant just off the
waterfront, al-Mansuri and his business partner (who declined to
give his name)discussed at length the local political-economic,
cultural and religious scene, noting that it was "well-known"
that a large number of suicide bombers (invariably described as
"martyrs") and foreign fighters in Iraq hailed from Derna, a
fact in which the town "takes great pride". Al-Mansuri stressed
TRIPOLI 00000430 002.2 OF 004
the importance of the link between the domestic political
situation in Libya and the flow of foreign fighters in Iraq.
Residents of eastern Libya in general, and Derna in particular,
view the al-Qadhafa clan as uneducated, uncouth interlopers from
an inconsequential part of the country who have "stolen" the
right to rule in Libya. (Note: Qadhafi's hometown, Sirte, is a
remote spot located on the coast midway between the leading
cities of Tripoli and Benghazi. End note.) Easterners had
tried and failed to bring down Qadhafi's regime via the Libyan
Islamic Fighting Group's (LIFG) insurgency in the 1990s.
¶6. (C) There was a strong perception, he said, that the U.S. had
decided in the wake of Qadhafi's decision to abandon WMD
aspirations and renounce terrorism to support the regime to
secure counter-terrorism cooperation and ensure continued oil
and natural gas production. Many easterners feared the U.S.
would not allow Qadhafi's regime to fall and therefore viewed
direct confrontation with the GOL in the near-term as a fool's
errand. At the same time, sending young Libyans to fight in
Iraq was "an embarrassment" to Qadhafi. Fighting against U.S.
and coalition forces in Iraq represented a way for frustrated
young radicals to strike a blow against both Qadhafi and against
his perceived American backers. Dismissing P/E Chief's argument
that we have privately pressed the GOL to adopt further
political and economic reforms, al-Mansuri noted that human
rights activist Fathi el-Jahmi (who hails from Benghazi),
remained in detention. The U.S. surely had the wherewithal to
secure el-Jahmi's release if it really cared about human rights;
the fact that el-Jahmi remained in detention was viewed as one
sign that the U.S. tacitly supported Qadhafi, regardless of his
actions. (Note: We heard a similar line of reasoning from Libyan
contacts in Benghazi. End note.)
TARGETED IDEOLOGICAL CAMPAIGN IN EASTERN LIBYA
¶7. (C) Rejecting the idea that Derna was uniformly extremist,
al-Mansuri and his business partner described the town as being
divided between religiously conservative and secular residents.
A "large number" of Derna's citizens were not happy about the
increasingly conservative religious atmosphere that had
prevailed since the 1980's, he claimed. Elaborating, al-Mansuri
attributed adherence to more extreme iterations of Islam to
"unnatural foreign influences" on religious practices in Derna.
A number of Libyans who had fought and in some cases undergone
"religious and ideological training" in Afghanistan, Lebanon and
the West Bank in the late 1970's and early 1980's had returned
to eastern Libya, including Derna, in the mid to late 1980's.
Claiming their return was "not coincidental", he described a
deliberate, coordinated campaign to propagate more conservative
iterations of Islam, in part to prepare the ground for the
eventual overthrow by the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG)
of Muammar Qadhafi's regime, which is "hated" by conservative
Islamists. (Note: After taking pains to curry favor with the
'ulema' in Libya in the years immediately after the 1969
revolution, Qadhafi broke with them in the late 1970's,
criticizing aspects of Islam as "un-revolutionary". Although he
renewed efforts to cultivate Muslim leaders in the 1990's, deep
suspicions remain. The LIFG waged a successful low-level
guerrilla insurgency in the early to mid-1990's, specializing in
robbery and raids on remote military garrisons to sustain
itself. End note.)
¶8. (C) According to al-Mansuri, these returned former fighters
deliberately targeted towns and areas known to be less heavily
surveilled and controlled by government security officials.
Many of those were located in eastern Libya, where authorities
have since Ottoman times experienced difficulty extending the
writ of the central government. Al-Mansuri mentioned a small
group of Libyans who had reportedly fought in Afghanistan,
subsequently undergone religious training in northern Syria and
Lebanon, and then returned to Derna in the late 1980's as having
been particularly instrumental in steering the community in a
more conservative direction. Stressing their conservatism, he
said they had spearheaded campaigns against many aspects of
daily life, such as smoking cigarettes, which they deemed
"un-Islamic". He pointed out the large number of
religiously-themed audio cassettes and DVDs on offer in Derna's
markets. Many featured sermons and speeches by conservative
imams in Lebanon, Syria, the West Bank and Egypt.
LIMITED SOCIAL OUTLETS CREATE FERTILE ENVIRONMENT; SATELLITE TV
FOSTERS "HARD VIEW"
TRIPOLI 00000430 003.2 OF 004
¶9. (C) A dearth of social outlets for young people in Derna
"created space" for the message of returned fighters and
conservative imams, who deliberately sought to eliminate the few
social activities on offer for young people to monopolize the
social and cultural environment. While Derna's social life had
never been robust, there had been public cinemas, sports leagues
and some youth activities organized outside the auspices of
mosques. Virtually all of those had petered out in the late
1980's and 1990's, in part because of a campaign to label such
activities as "un-Islamic". He cited a popular youth theater
group that had staged up to half a dozen productions a year,
including western plays. Clerics criticized "un-Islamic" themes
and the fact that boys and girls were cast together in some
productions; the resulting social stigmatization of families
whose children had participated led to the group's demise in the
late 1980's.
¶10. (C) The fact that Derna's educational system was weak had
also enabled conservative clerics. Al-Mansuri described a
situation in which mosques and imams effectively offered the
only alternative to schools, sports leagues and after-school
activities. A heavy influx of Arabic-language satellite
television - a phenomenon that dated to the late-1990's - also
fostered a "hard view" of the world, al-Mansuri said. Most
young men watched a mix of al-Jazeera news, religious sermons
and western action films on English language satellite channels
broadcast from the Gulf. The result was a heady mixture of
violence, religious conservatism and hatred of U.S. policy in
Iraq and Palestine. The consensus view in Derna is that the
U.S. blindly supports Israel and has invaded Iraq to secure oil
reserves and position itself to attack Iran, he said. He
dismissed P/E Chief's attempts to clarify U.S. policy, stressing
that most people base their judgments on information they
receive from satellite television and at the mosque.
PRIDE IN DERNA'S HISTORY AS A TOWN OF FIGHTERS
¶11. (C) Al-Mansuri attributed the flow of foreign fighters from
Derna in part to local pride in the town's reputation as a
historical locus of resistance to occupation. While many of the
town's citizens were uncomfortable with the town's increasingly
conservative Islamist bent, the fact that young men from Derna
traveled to Iraq in disproportionate numbers to fight against
coalition forces was viewed through a different lens. Not
everyone liked the "bearded ones" (a reference to conservative
imams) or their message, al-Mansuri said, but the duty of a
Muslim in general - and of a son of Derna in particular - was to
resist occupation of Muslim lands through jihad. "It's jihad -
it's our duty, and you're talking about people who don't have
much else to be proud of." Derna's residents might take issue
with attempts to ban smoking or restrict social activities, but
there was consensus on "basic issues" like jihad. Depictions on
al-Jazeera of events in Iraq and Palestine fueled the
widely-held view in Derna that resistance to coalition forces
was "correct and necessary". Referring to actor Bruce Willis'
character in the action picture "Die Hard", who stubbornly
refused to die quietly, he said many young men in Derna viewed
resistance against Qadhafi's regime and against coalition forces
in Iraq as an important last act of defiance.
¶12. (C) Claiming "most Libyans" shared that sentiment,
al-Mansuri proudly said the difference was that Derna's sons
actually acted on their beliefs. Derna had historically
resisted "occupations of all kinds - Ottoman, Italian, American
(a reference to the 1805 attack on Derna led by William Eaton),
and Qadhafi's." Derna's role in opposing the Italian occupation
in the early 20th century helped foster the near-deification of
Libyan resistance leader Omar al-Mukhtar, who hailed from
eastern Libya. A visit to the al-Sahab mosque near the town's
center was telling. Large murals on the mosque's exterior
(inaccurately) depicted Islamic warriors besting what appeared
to be Roman soldiers. The mosque's imam showed P/E Chief a
series of small shrines to medieval holy men and a small
cemetery filled with graves of "martyrs" who had resisted
Ottoman and Italian occupation. Many of the markers were
garlanded with flowers; al-Mansuri said families often come to
picnic in the mosque's garden on holidays and pay their respects
at the cemetery.
WEAK ECONOMY HURTS MARRIAGE PROSPECTS, FUELS FRUSTRATION
¶13. (C) As discussed reftel, al-Mansuri drew a direct line
between the parlous local economy and the willingness of Derna's
TRIPOLI 00000430 004.2 OF 004
sons to travel to Iraq for jihad. A military base in Derna
closed in the early 1990's, taking with it a large number of
jobs (cooks, washerwomen, auto mechanics, electricians, etc.)
who helped support the base. Derna has a small fishing and
maritime transport industry; other economic activities are
largely restricted to services and smuggling. While a military
prison, located along the town's waterfront, remains open, the
closure of the base hit the town hard and ushered in a more
difficult era of economic austerity. Unemployment, particularly
among young men between the ages of 18 and 40, is high -
al-Mansuri put the percentage of un- and under-employed men in
that demographic at 60 to 70 percent. Dim employment prospects
leave many young men in Derna without the means to marry - a key
social anchor in what remains a traditional society - and the
average age at which men marry has crept upwards. Asked about
reports that many now marry in their early- to mid-30's
(reftel), al-Mansuri said most of his friends and acquaintances
actually did not marry until their mid-30's to early- 40's. He
half-jokingly noted that the cumulative level of sexual
frustration among Derna's young men was "a big problem".
¶14. (C) In addition, while Benghazi and other parts of eastern
Libya had benefited in the last several years from increased
government patronage, Derna continued to "suffer from neglect".
Citing an indeterminate grudge between Libya's former monarch,
King Idriss al-Sanussi, and leading citizens of Derna,
al-Mansuri claimed that Derna had long been the victim of a
deliberate government campaign to keep it poor. He compared
Derna's plight to the fortunes of another conservative eastern
Libyan town, Bayda. While Bayda had been the summer retreat for
King Idriss and was initially shunned in the early years of
Qadhafi's rule, its fortunes changed after Qadhafi married Sadia
Farkhis, daughter of a prominent citizen of the town. The
government subsequently established the Omar al-Mukhtar
University in what had been the royal palace and sited a number
of government-owned enterprises there. By contrast, Derna had
not benefited from any such measures.
¶15. (C) Comment: Al-Mansuri's remarks suggest that frustration
at the inability of eastern Libyans to effectively challenge
Qadhafi's regime, together with a concerted ideological campaign
by returned Libyan fighters from earlier conflicts, have played
an important role in in Derna's development as a wellspring of
Libyan foreign fighters in Iraq. The GOL's limited ability to
extend its writ in eastern Libya - along with limited social
outlets, dim economic prospects and the town's historical role
as a center of resistance - have fostered a landscape in which
Derna's angry young men view the conflict in Iraq through the
lens of dissatisfaction with their government and with the USG's
perceived support of it. Observations of the town, together
with information reported reftel, strongly suggest that comments
by senior GOL officials to the effect that the east is under
control are exaggerated. End comment.
STEVENS