Don't Sentimentalize Hirohito's Wartime Role

Published: October 11, 1988

To the Editor:

''The Day the General Blinked'' by Faubion Bowers (Op-Ed, Sept. 30) ignores some serious problems about the role the Japanese Emperor Hirohito played in history. In view of the political situation in Japan and East Asia, we feel obliged to point out the possible political consequences such negligence could have.

Mr. Bowers's article almost intentionally overlooks the issues that many in Japan, East Asia, Southeast Asia and the United States have been concerned with: the Emperor's legal and political responsibility for atrocities and destruction caused in East and Southeast Asian countries by the Japanese Imperial forces during the Sino-Japanese and Pacific wars.

The most serious problem in Mr. Bowers's seemingly personal memoir is that this kind of depiction of Emperor Hirohito displaces and disperses what we have to continue to probe about his role in history. Although we are fully aware that the article is Mr. Bowers's personal account of a historical incident, there is no doubt that it generates an effect of pardoning Hirohito, on personal ground, of his responsibility for the war, a responsibility that is of a legal and institutional nature.

One may argue that the Emperor did not lead or organize the war of invasion as the leaders of the German National Socialist Party did, and that, while he personally aspired to peace and democracy, he was manipulated by the military against his will. Very often, attention is drawn to Hirohito's decision to accept the terms of the Potsdam Declaration and to surrender to the Allied Powers unconditionally. Obviously, Mr. Bowers is in accord with this kind of historical interpretation, which praises the Emperor's personal bravery and portrays his decision as if he had not been informed of military developments until then, as if he had not participated in many decisions at the highest level.

However, it is clear from the recorded accounts of his entourage and other published sources, that Emperor Hirohito positively supported the activities of the military's adventurism from 1930 on. Furthermore, it would be logically absurd if he could end the war yet could not have decided against starting war in the first place. Indeed, Japan declared war against the United States and Britain in the name of Emperor Hirohito. We do not think this is a matter one can cast aside easily, even if one should wish to pay homage to his supposed courage. It is very dangerous to confuse personality with political and official responsibility, and thereby sentimentalize the problem.

Some have argued that the legal status of the Emperor in the prewar Japanese Imperial Constitution was nominal, and that it did not carry any commanding power. But the Emperor possessed the right to inquire about governmental policies; in which case, his inquiry could have functioned as a brake upon the reckless policies of the Government. Furthermore, his personal opinion could have influenced the cabinet's decision making. We think it is extremely hard to deny that he did not exercise his legal and political power when he was given quite a few opportunities to intervene in the military's plans in Asia, so as to stop the expansion of war or to make Japanese forces withdraw. He is still responsible for the destruction committed by the Japanese Imperial forces.

During his visit to the United States in 1975, the Emperor expressed his concern for the war and ''deeply deplored'' this past unfortunate incident. Thus, in a sense, he admitted his past mistake. Yet, what is astonishing is that, until now, he has not uttered even a single word of apology to the peoples of Asia, particularly in China and Korea. This does not seem accidental. As has been reported in the United States many times, the Japanese Ministry of Education has attempted to eliminate from its state-sponsored history textbook the description of Japanese imperialism and military invasion of Asian countries, as well as the miseries of the war, including the dropping of the atomic bombs.

It seems that the Japanese Government wants to erase from postwar memory anything associated with ''Japan's dark past.'' Only six years ago, Japanese textbook revision provoked severe criticism from many countries in East and Southeast Asia.

Out of political consideration, the Allied Powers decided soon after the war to overlook the Emperor's war responsibility to Asian countries. However, this does not mean the Asian peoples agreed with that decision. This problem has remained unsolved and is a cause of friction between Japan and its neighbors.

Today, Hirohito's sickness is used as an excuse to induce the public to impose self-constraints upon social activities, including the expression of opinions, to such an extent that hardly any free discussion about the Emperor's role in 20th century history can exist.

Mr. Bowers writes, ''In the Japanese language, emperors don't die: they 'hide in the clouds.' From that vantage point, one day Hirohito will look down and see that he fulfilled the destiny of his Phoenix Throne.'' If so, we must equally fantasize that those in Asian countries who were brutally destroyed, those in Japanese colonies who were victimized by being made to participate as Japanese nationals in Japanese military ventures and all those who were killed in and for the Emperor's name will be there alongside him. JIRO YAMAGUCHI NAOKI SAKAI Ithaca, N.Y., Oct. 2, 1988

The writers are, respectively, associate professor of politics at Hokkaido University (a visiting fellow at Cornell University) and assistant professor of Japanese literature at Cornell.