In this paper I critically assess some aspects of the Ley 41/2002 having to do with the minors’ consent as regards to medical treatment. My starting point is the defense of the value of personal autonomy, which I deem nuclear. I understand autonomy as the capability of rational and independent judgment, and I also claim that the State rightly decides in favour of the best interests of incompetents —understood as objective goods— above their parents’ or tutors’ decision. The reason is that in doing so the State is making possible the future exercise of autonomy, once the minor becomes a competent person. I dismiss other possible justifications as the so called «paternalism of the will». I also defend the notion of «material competence» which is embraced in the Ley 41/2002, although I criticize certain contradictions within the statute as well as between this statute and other statutes that are part of Spanish law. In particular, I analyze the case of the abortion when the pregnant woman is incompetent or minor.