A series of Gulf and Middle
East-related developments suggest that resolving some of the Middle East’s most
debilitating and devastating crises while ensuring that efforts to pressure
Iran do not perpetuate the mayhem may be easier said than done. They also
suggest that the same is true for keeping US and Saudi interests aligned.

Optimists garner hope from the fact
that the US Senate may censor
Saudi crown prince Mohammed bin Salman for the October 2 killing of journalist Jamal Khashoggi
in Istanbul; the positive start of Yemeni peace talks
in Sweden with an agreement to
exchange prisoners, Saudi Arabia’s invitation to Qatar to attend an October 9
Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) summit in Riyadh, and a decision by the
Organization of Oil Exporting Countries (OPEC) to cut production.

That optimism, however, may not be
borne out by facts on the ground and analysis of developments that are likely
to produce at best motion rather than movement. In fact, more fundamentally,
what many of the developments suggest is an unacknowledged progressive shift in
the region’s alliances stemming in part from the fact that the bandwidth of
shared US-Saudi interests is narrowing.

There is no indication that, even if
Qatari emir Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani decides to accept an invitation by
Saudi king Salman to attend the GCC summit rather than send a lower level delegation or not attend
at all, either the kingdom or the United Arab Emirates, the main drivers behind
the 17-month old economic and diplomatic boycott of the Gulf state, are open to
a face-saving solution despite US pressure to end to the rift.

Signalling that the invitation and an
earlier comment by Prince Mohammed
that “despite the differences we
have, (Qatar) has a great economy and will be doing a lot in the next five
years” do not indicate a potential policy shift, UAE Minister of State for
Foreign Affairs Anwar Gargash insisted that the GCC remained strong despite the
rift. “The political crisis will end when the cause behind it ends and that is
Qatar’s support of extremism and its interference in the stability of the
region.,” Mr. Gargash said, reiterating
long-standing Saudi-UAE allegations.

Similarly, United Nations-sponsored
peace talks in Sweden convened with the help of the United States may at best
result in alleviating the suffering of millions as a result of the almost
four-year old Saudi-UAE military intervention in Yemen but are unlikely to
ensure that a stable resolution of the conflict is achievable without a
lowering of tension between Saudi Arabia and Iran. Even humanitarian relief
remains in question with the parties in Sweden unable
to agree on a reopening of Sana’a airport to facilitate the flow of aid.

More realistically, with the Trump
administration, backed by Saudi Arabia and Israel, determined to cripple Iran
economically in a bid to force it to alter its regional policies, if not change
the regime in Tehran, chances are the Yemeni conflict will be perpetuated
rather than resolved.

To Yemen’s detriment, Iran is emerging
as one of the foremost remaining shared US-Saudi interests as the two countries
struggle to manage their relationship in the wake of Mr. Khashoggi’s killing.
That struggle is evident with the kingdom’s Washington backers divided between
erstwhile backers-turned-vehement critics like Republican senator Graham
Lindsey and hardline supporters such as national security advisor John Bolton.
The jury is out on who will emerge on top in the Washington debate.

The risks of the Saud-Iranian rivalry
spinning out of control possibly with the support of hardliners like Mr. Bolton
were evident in this week’s suicide bombing in the Iranian port of Chabahar, an
Indian-backed project granted a waiver from US
sanctions against the Islamic republic to counter influence of China that support the nearby
Pakistani port of Gwadar.

The vote suggested that Mr. Trump may
be hoping in vain for Saudi backing of his as yet undisclosed plan to resolve
the Israeli-Palestinian dispute that is believed to be slanted towards Israel’s
position.

Saudi ambassador to the UN Abdallah
Al-Mouallimi said the defeated UN resolution would “undermine the two-state
solution which we aspire to”
and divert attention from Israel’s occupation, settlement activities and
“blockade” of territories occupied during the 1967 Middle East war.

To get an OPEC deal on production
levels, the kingdom, once the oil market’s dominant swing producer, needed an
agreement with non-OPEC member Russia on production levels as well as Russian
assistance in managing Iranian resistance, suggesting

The agreement, moreover, had to
balance Mr. Trump’s frequently tweeted demand for lower prices, and the
kingdom’s need for higher ones to fund its budgetary requirements and Prince
Mohammed’s ambitious economic reforms and demonstrate that the Khashoggi affair
had not made it more vulnerable to US pressure.

With some of Mr. Trump’s ambassadorial
political appointees expressing support for populist, nationalist and
authoritarian leaders and political groups, the fact that some of the
president’s closest Congressional allies back the anti-Saudi resolution
illustrates that there are red lines that a significant number of the
president’s supporters are not willing to cross.

All told, recent developments in the
Middle East put a spotlight on the changing nature of a key US relationship in
the Middle East that could have far-reaching consequences over the middle and
long-term. It is a change that is part of a larger, global shift in US
priorities and alliances that is likely to outlive Mr. Trump’s term(s) in
office.