CIA, Costa Rica y los contras 'conexión cocaína

CIA and the Contras’ cocaine connectiona true storyhow CIA used cocaine to finance a insurgency

Funny Farm and the Coca Cultivation Programby Kain Sebastian Victor﻿

CIA and the Contras’ cocaine connection (RUB version)﻿

Consider using this space to introdCIA and the Contras’ cocaine connectionFunny Farm and the Coca Cultivation Programa true storyhow CIA used cocaine to finance a insurgencyKain Sebastian VictorRoskilde University CentreSummer 2006Supervisor: Håkan ArvidssonPublished on www.lallepot.dkContentsResume................................................................................................................. 3The Issue and the Problem................................................................................ 3Literature and Methodology............................................................................. 3United States and the Contras.........................................................................10CIA and the Congress...................................................................................... 15Funding the Contras.........................................................................................18The Drug Connection....................................................................................... 20The Frogman Case............................................................................................ 26Guns and Drugs................................................................................................ 36The Super Crack Dealer Freeway Ricky........................................................39The Majors, Blandón and Lister......................................................................43The DEA Connection........................................................................................51Government Sponsored Traffickers............................................................... 55The Contra Cocaine Hub................................................................................. 56US Protection of Narcoterrorists.....................................................................58The Secret Memorandum................................................................................ 59On Government Orders................................................................................... 61Conclusion......................................................................................................... 65Perspective: a Policy Failure............................................................................66Intermediary...................................................................................................... 69Literature............................................................................................................70Page 2 of 71ResumeThe evidence shows that the government knew that the Contras’ decidedto traffic cocaine to finance themselves. The government participated inthe drug trafficking by not interrupting it. CIA ordered the Contras totraffic drugs. Traffickers were protected from prosecution and receivedgovernment contract. The government knew and sanctioned the drugtrafficking into the US to support the Contras. The White House urgedlenience for at least one convicted trafficker and terrorist.The Issue and the ProblemCentral Intelligence Agency (CIA) protected major drug traffickers, whodiverted drug proceeds to finance the Contras. When former Contra mercenariesaccused the CIA run Contras of being involved in drug traffickingthe Senate started to investigate1. Confidential memos and paperswere leaked to the State Department, the Justice Department, the WhiteHouse and CIA, who in a joined effort tried to sabotage the investigation.Documents were withheld, witnesses labelled as terrorist threats and putunder surveillance, and the credibility of the Senatorial subcommittee’smembers was questioned in the press. The conclusion of the investigationwas that CIA had allowed the Contras to traffic cocaine and had protectedthem from prosecution. The conclusion went unnoticed in the media.When the drug connection came to the media’s attention a decadelater, they focused on how the media covered the news2, not news thatthe government had sanctioned drug trafficking. It were three small articlesin San Jose Mercury News that sparked it all, and caused the Senateto force DOJ and CIA to investigate. When the official investigationswere finished two years later and the reports release, the media’s atten-1 Kerry 1989a, 1989b2 San Jose Mercury News, 18, 19 & 20 August 1996tion had turned to Monica Lewinsky affair. All the reporters did was toquote from the conclusions of the reports3. The mainstream media reportedthat the US Government had not sanctioned drug trafficking, but themedia missed the scoop. The reports confirmed that the governmentknew about the Contras involvement in drug trafficking, that the governmentprotected traffickers from prosecution, that the government grantedcontracts to trafficker whom they knew were drug trafficker, and thatthe Contras in part was funded by drug proceeds. The conclusions in theofficial reports denied what their reports confirmed.What evidence does exists, which shows that the government knewabout and was involvement in the Contras’ drugs trafficking?This is the report about the evidence.Literature and MethodologyThe problem steamed from Congress’ ban in 1982 on for funding theContras. The President wanted the Contras kept alive until the Congress’decision could be reversed. The ban on funding and aiding the Contraswas known as the Boland Amendment after the Congressmen who proposedit. As the ban barred CIA from running the Contras, the operationwas transferred to the National Security Council (NSC) in the WhiteHouse where Lt. Col. Oliver North was put in charge of the program.CIA and the Department of Defence (DOD) continued to provide intelligence,which North passed on to the Contras. It would be almost impossibleto prove that information was passed on. Funding the Contraswas the hard part as funds had to come from somewhere. Therefore the3 CIA 1998a,CIA 1998bDOJ 1998Page 3 of 71White House solicited funds from third part countries in return for politicalfavours or increased aid. This was illegal but hard to prove. The IranContraaffair was two different affairs intermingled together. The scopeof the Iran-Contra affair is too large for one person to describe, and forthis reason my focus is on the cocaine issue. There are a few manuscripts,which deals with the issue:• Report of Investigation by the CIA• The CIA-Contra-Crack Cocaine Controversy by the DOJ• The Kerry Report by the US Senate• Dark Alliance by Gary Webb• The Cocaine-Contra Connection by National Security Archives• Cocaine Politics by Peter Dale Scott and Jonathan Marshall• Powderburns by Celerino CastilloCocaine Politics is the only academic book that deals the Contras’ cocaineconnection. The other five required academic works all have a broad focuson issues surrounding my focus. I lacked the space to include all thematerial that I wanted to include, and posed with the chose betweenpresenting the required, but not directly relevant, academic works or materialthat is directly relevant, I have moved the description of the fiveacademic works to the description of studies.An article series in San Jose Mercury News called Dark Alliance4 was thedirect cause for two government investigations. Later articles were elaboratedand published as a book with the same title5. When the Dark Allianceseries was published, ten years had passed since the US financedContra operation ended. It was not the first time that rumours surfaced4San Jose Mercury News, 18, 19 & 20 August 19965 Webb, 1998about the Contras’ involvement in cocaine trafficking. Eleven years earlierAssociated Press reported that the Contras where engaged in cocainetrafficking in part to finance their war6. The administration disapprovedthe story so much that they began a clandestine campaign to besmirchthe professionalism of the two reporters and tried to discredit all futurereporting on the Contras’ cocaine involvement7. The media coverage ofthe Dark Alliance series concern the author’s alleged lack of professionalismand conspiracy tendencies, and did not cover the affair itself. Criticismof Webb was furious and it was hard to find a positive word abouthim on the Internet until after he committed suicide in December 2004 byshooting himself twice in the head. The coverage of Webb changed. Nownot a single negative word about him can be found. No longer is he theunprofessional conspiracy freak, but a hard working and honest journalistwhose career was destroyed by the mainstream media8.The Dark Alliance series focused on the US Government’s connectionwith the Contras’ cocaine trafficking9. The articles described the connectionbetween three major and known cocaine dealers in California. RickyRoss was known as Freeway Ricky who was the biggest supplier ofcrack-cocaine to Los Angeles’ gangs the early 1980s. Ross became importantfor the gangs in Los Angeles as they without him would have lackedthe means to finance themselves and their weapons through the sale ofcheap crack-cocaine. Ross’ cocaine career ended when his cocaine supplierhelped the narcotics police catch him with one kilo cocaine. Ross’ cocainesupplier was the exile-Nicaraguan Danilo Blandón, who workedfor the drug lord Norwin Meneses; another exile-Nicaraguan. Both had6Peter Kornbluh, 1997Cockburn 1999, 300ff7Peter Kornbluh, 1997.8 Extra, Are You Sure You Want to Ruin Your Career? Marts/April 1998.9For a brief introduction to Dark Alliance see NBC’s Dateline story on the Cocaine-Contra Connectionhttp://www.americandrugwar.com/media/links/ricky_ross_bg.ramPage 4 of 71been well connected to the old regime in Nicaragua, and both had to fleethe country after the 1979 revolution. US law enforcement knew themboth. Meneses was described as the kingpin of drug- and gun traffickingin Nicaragua in DEA file, which was first opened in 1974. Blandón wasimplicated in 45 federal investigations10.The Dark Alliance articles described how Blandón met Meneses, was introducedto an old childhood friend of Meneses Enrique Bermúdez, whobecame the first leader of the Contras. The articles described howBlandón met Ross and became his cocaine supplier. The article showedhow cocaine from the Contras went into the US and how money made itback to the Contras. Meneses and Blandón were described as members ofthe CIA run Contras, and its leaders as CIA operatives. The point thatBlandón and Meneses were members of the Contras was not documentedin the news articles, but circumstantial evidence does supportthe claim. The articles claimed, based on interviews with police officers,that the CIA had hindered law enforcement from investigating drug traffickingoffences by Meneses’ network11. The series had no literature referencesbut the book has. It shows that the articles were based oncourtroom transcripts and affidavits by law enforcement officers. Thebook uses the CIA and DOJ reports too, which were the direct result ofthe articles’ allegations. The book also makes use interviews with policeofficers in Central America and the US, members of the former Contradrug ring, and documents from the Iran-Contra investigation.Both official reports explained that mistakes had occurred, but no crimeshad been committed. It is custom not to give political asylum to peoplesuspected of drug related crimes, but Meneses had been granted asylum10 CIA 1998, paragraph 9811 Webb 1998by mistake. It was a mistake that CIA intervene in a drug trafficking case,with links to the Contras and Meneses, and had the prosecution returndrug money to a convicted trafficker12. It was a mistake that the arrest orderfor Meneses was no issued until five year after he left the US forCosta Rica. The arrest order charged Meneses with distributing one kilococaine; not even a pro cent of what he had imported and sold in the US.It was not a mistake according to the DOJ report that evidence againstBlandón and Lister, an arms dealer that worked for Blandón and Meneses,was handed back while the investigation again them was ongoing.How the DOJ can claim it not to be an mistake is untenable. But it wasnot only CIA and DOJ who had committed mistake, so to had the StateDepartment when it selected four known drug trafficking companies ascontractors for the Contras. The State Department forgot to check if thecompanies that CIA had suggested were known for drug trafficking13. Itwas a mistake that DEA closed its office in Honduras after documentingthat the military leadership and the chief of the narcotics police, whoboth were instrumental in setting up the Contras, had either traffickeddrugs or protection drug shipments14. It was a mistake that DEA facilitatedcontact between CIA and a known drug traffickers, so CIA couldbuy two shrimp boats the trafficker had used to smuggle cocaine in tothe US with. It was bad judgement that the President and the WhiteHouse tried to get the drug trafficking terrorist Bueso Rosa off, who hadbeen vital in keeping the Contras running when he was a General inHonduras15. It was a lie the report stated when traffickers claimed thatCIA knew about their trafficking and protected them. If the reports aretrue when must be the political affair were the most mistakes were madeever.12 CIA 1998a, paragraph 341DOJ 1998, Summery 813 Kerry 1989, 42-4814 Kerry 1989, 7515 National Security Archive, The Contras, Cocaine, and Covert OperationsPage 5 of 71Ten years earlier, during the Contra operation, the US Senate begun investigatingthe same claims that the Dark Alliance series later came forwardwith. The Senate report was titled “Drugs, Law Enforcement and ForeignPolicy, A report prepared by the Subcommittee on Terrorism, Narcoticsand International Operations of the Committee on Foreign Relations UnitedStates Senate”. Due to its long name it is often referred to as the Kerry reportafter Senator John Kerry who chair the investigating subcommittee.The investigation took three years and totalled a more than thousandpages of Congressional Subcommittee Hearings. This report is the mostinteresting of the reports for an initial reading. The original scoop of theSenatorial investigation was the Contras’ alleged cocaine trafficking, butbecause of the amount of evidence that the committee was presentedwith, the investigation was expanded to focus on the impact of drugstrafficking on US foreign policy in Latin America. The subcommittee’sfinding was discredited but later the Bush administration used it to prosecuteseveral criminal trials, including the successful prosecution ofGen. Manuel Noriega16.In response to the allegation raised by the Dark Alliance series, the CIAconducted an investigation of itself and published on its findings titled“Report of Investigation, Allegations of Connections Between CIA and TheContras in Cocaine Trafficking to the US”. The CIA report consisted of twovolumes, the first volume17 was issued as a classified report on 17December 1997 with an unclassified version issued on 29 January 1998.The second volume18 was issued as a classified report on 27 April 1998and published in an unclassified version on 8 October 1998. The layout of16 Kerry 1989a, 517 CIA 1998ahttp://www.cia.gov/cia/reports/cocaine/report/index.html18 CIA 1998bhttp://www.cia.gov/cia/reports/cocaine/index.htmlthe report was highly confusing and illogical and the conclusion differedfrom the content of their report. According to the report, 17 full-time staffworked a little over a year on the report, questioned 365 unnamed individualsand read roughly a quarter of a million pages. The methodologyused is rather odd as the CIA in their conclusion copied part of Meneses’testimony and quotes it as evidence for that there was no connectionbetween Meneses-Blandón-Ross and the Contras. This is done withoutinforming the reader that the conclusion is based on the testimony of Meneseswhere he denies any connection between CIA and himself. FurtherCIA forgot to mention that Meneses was suspected of working for CIA.The report is biased. The resume in the report cleared CIA for anywrongdoing and denied that CIA had any knowledge of ongoing narcoticsviolations. Nonetheless, the CIA report does contain several quite interestingparagraphs that does not support their conclusion. It containsinformation about the memorandum of understanding (MOU) for whenthe CIA must report narcotics crimes to DEA. From 1981 to 1995 CIA wasnot obligated to report knowledge of narcotics violations to DEA, unlessit concerned its own agents19. However there is several categories of employmentin the CIA such as contractors, informers, assets, etc. that arenot considered agents – and according to CIA’s report agents working ina operative environment would not be considered agents for the purposeof reporting knowledge of drug trafficking. Narcotics violations by thesegroups do not have to be reported to the DEA. Three quite interestingomissions that CIA made in its report were who they interviewed, whorefused to be interviewed and that CIA’s Office of Inspector General(OIG) lacked subpoena power. Duane Clarridge, Joseph Fernandez, andClair George were all central persons in the Contra affair, and they refusedto be interviewed by CIA’s OIG.19 Waters, 1999bPage 6 of 71The DOJ conducted an investigation and subsequently published a reporton their findings. But contrary to the CIA investigation they werenot concerned with whenever CIA had knowledge of Contra drug traffickingor whenever the Kerry subcommittee’s conclusion was correct,but if the allegations raised in the Dark Alliance series were correct. TheDOJ conducted over 200 interviews, but some central characters refusedto talk to the DOJ. This included the former DEA country attaché inCosta Rica, Robert Nieves, a country where the Contras were heavily involvedin drug trafficking according to former CIA Central Americantask force chief Alan Fiers, who took over the Contra operation afterDuane Clarridge. Fernandez and North refused to be interviewed20. SinceDOJ’s Office of Inspector General (OIG) did not have the power to compelnon-government witnesses to testify, it created “significant gap in theevidence-gathering abilities”21. The DOJ report has a good overview ofsome of the central persons such as Meneses, Blandón, Ricky Ross andRonald Lister. Besides these persons that were central to the Dark Alliancestory, the articles touched on an earlier story known as the Frogmancase. Here the DOJ contained a nice overview of the two central personsJulio Zavala and Carlos Cabezas. Like the CIA report, the DOJ’s methodologyseemed odd as its conclusions differed from its contents. DOJ’sconclusion was that there was nothing to Webb’s article, but the reportalso stated that the article was exaggerated. How can an article be exaggeratedif there is nothing to its allegations? As with CIA’s report thescoop is not in the conclusion but in the chapters between the introductionand conclusion. DOJ admitted that a minor amount of drug moneywas given to the Contras, but they also admit they do not know howmuch drug money was given, which means the DOJ has no basis for assumingthat it was a minor and not a major amount drug money that20 DOJ 1998, chapter 2.G21 DOJ 1998, chapter 2.Gfound its way into the Contras treasury. The three official reports, theKerry, the CIA and the DOJ reports all had access to classified informationthat was filtered out in the final public release. The differencebetween them is that whereas the CIA and DOJ reports’ conclusions arethat the allegations in the Dark Alliance series are wrong, the Kerry report’sconclusion was that the US Government agencies knew and choseto overlook crimes of their allies in return for their cooperation for whatwas perceived as vital US interest: the destruction of the Sandinistas.The focus of Cocaine Politics22 was CIA’s cooperation in the 1980s withtraffickers and drug-corrupted regimes in the Americas. To support itsargument Cocaine Politics drew a parallel from 1940s, when CIA cooperatedwith the Mafia in Marseilles, the French connection, through to the1950s, 1960s and 1970s when CIA collaborated with opium smugglersand drug corrupted regimes in Asia. It continued with the cooperationwith Afghan and Pakistani heroin smugglers when the Reagan Administrationsupported the Mujahedin during the Afghan war. Cocaine Politics’subject was not the Contras per se, but the cooperation and joint interestbetween drug traffickers and the CIA during the 1980s in theAmericas. By tracing the connection between individual drug traffickersand the corporation with the CIA, Peter Dale Scott painted a powerfuland credible picture of joint interest and close corporation between drugtraffickers and CIA from the 1940s to the Nicaraguan conflict. A lot of thestated facts in Cocaine Politics are based on the Kerry Report23.Powder Burns is written the former DEA agent Celerino Castillo, whoworked in Guatemala and El Salvador between 1985-1990. He uncoveredparts of the Contras’ cocaine trafficking operation, and forwarded his re-22Scott 199823 Kerry 1989Page 7 of 71ports to DEA. Nothing happening to the traffickers. Castillo came undera internal DEA investigation. He eventually retired on medical grounds,diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder. Powder Burns is very interesting,and has lot of references to both the Contras and cocaine. Thedraw back is that Castillo seemed to a too quick to draw some of the conclusions.He believed that Vice President Bush knew that the Contraswere run with cocaine money; a conclusion he bases on his intuition aftera short meeting with George Bush. Intuition is not acceptable as scientificand historical proof, but there are certain links that could potential implementBush in the affair. Bush’s friend, the former CIA agent and exileCuban,Felix Rodriguez, was in charge of the Contra operations at Ilopangoairbase. The Vice President’s office is mention in the Kerry reportfor helping a drug trafficker, and the Vice President chaired the crisisgroup in the White House that was in charge of handling the Contrasand terrorism24. There are links to the White House and the Vice President.Castillo’s intuition could be right, but more research is need to disproveor prove George Bush’s involvement, not intuition.Latin American names follows another tradition. The mother’s last nameis added after the family name, so the family name became the secondlast name when the full name is written. Take for example the Somozadictatorship in Nicaragua. Their father was named Anastasio SomozaGarcía, the son Anastasio Somoza Debayle. Somoza is the last name, Garcíaand Debayle is the last names of their mothers. I have used the Englishtradition and refer to people without the name of the mother added,and with just one first name. The full name of the notorious drug dealerNorwin Meneses was Juan Norwin Meneses Centarero. I refer to him asNorwin Meneses.24 Castillo 1994, 126CIA 1998b, paragraph 1064What surprised me the most about Nicaragua during the 1980s was thatthere were not many books on Nicaragua and Contras available at DanishRoyal Library. The entire collection on Nicaragua consists of 124books, which had been published between 1971 and 2003, including allcategories and subjects. Typically these books seemed politically motivated,as they tended to focus on the desire and positive side of theSandinistas policies in Nicaragua. International relations between the USand Nicaragua were even less documented in the library. In all there existed35 books on US-Latin American relations and 7 on US-Nicaragua.Two books the collection concerned narcotics politics and foreign relationswith Latin American. None concerned illegal drug trafficking. CIAand the Contras’ cocaine connect was mentioned in six sentences in thetwo book. The political research seldom mentioned the cocaine issue, it isfor some reason not a research subject.The cocaine oriented literature, unlike the political literature, involves agreat deal of names, places and connections. This made it less readable asyou had to have a certain amount of knowledge regarding a network ofpeople. In between the drug network literature and the political ones, wehave Scott25and Cockburn26. These books put drug trafficking into a largerpicture, like the Kerry report did. We have in these books and reports,what looks like a systematic connection between the drug andpolitics stretching from the mid-1940s till mid-1990s. Due to the criminalnature of drug trafficking where records are not public available, youhave to rely on the accessible literature. In the case of the Contras’ cocaineaffair the sources are Webb, Kerry, and Castillo. The two governmentreports are blatant and failed exercises in white wash. The reports25Scott 199826 Cockburn 1999Page 8 of 71confirms that the government cooperated with known large-scale traffickerswhom support to the Contras.Amazon and Google were been extremely useful in locating literature onthe subject. Google was great in locating official US documents, the CIAreport, the DOJ report, the Kerry report, and various other documents relatingto the subject. I have found Amazon information on what otherbooks their customers have bought quite useful. It is a different way ofcategorising books than traditional done by the libraries, but once youlocated one book within the subject, finding other books on the samesubject became easy as we consumers apparently tends to buy bookswithin the subjects that interest us. Once located I have been able to findall books in the collective library base at http://www.bibliotek.dk/. Relyingon Internet sources can of course be problematic as tampering can bedone quite easy. Therefore I have tried to locate documents on governmentservers. The Kerry report is not available on governmental servers,but parts of it can be found at http://www.thememoryhole.org/kerry/.When again, the mainstream media coverage of the affair shows that youcan not trust a source because its publisher is well known27.The difference between the government reports and the independent researchis the ability to be critical. CIA and DOJ believes all statements tobe true if they fit into a conclusion that denied the allegations. CIA'sclaims, that Meneses and Blandón were not associated with the Contrasand did not funnel cocaine proceeds to the the Contras, is based on theirstatements. The conclusion is that the Contras wasn't financed with drugproceeds because the drug dealers told CIA that they did not do it. EnriqueMiranda who worked for Norwin Meneses told CIA that Menesesand Blandón donated millions of their cocaine proceeds to the Contras.27Parry 1998This is not true according to CIA because Miranda’s statement could notbe collaborated. We are not told what Miranda’s statement could not becollaborated with. All statements made that does not fit into the conclusionCIA have not been able to collaborated. Statements that fits into theconclusion have not be collaborated either; they have been defined as thetruth. When CIA learned that the Contras’ had decided to use cocaine asa means of finance, the information was disregarded because CIA nowbelieved that their informant was a communist double agent.I have not used sources, which denies that the government was involvedin the drug trafficking with the Contras. There are two exceptions, whichare the CIA and DOJ reports. The reports contains explicit denials thatthe US Government was involved in the affair, or that the Contras wereinvolved in organised drug trafficking. The reports are failed whitewashattempts, and contains enough information to prove that their conclusionsare wrong. I chosen not to wasted time or words on the denials inthe reports, as most are incredible bad. The report is full interviews withCIA agents, who explains the Contras could not have been involved indrug trafficking, as the agents would have found out. No agents recallhearing about any drug allegations at all, which is rather odd as the reportis full of reference to CIA cables, which states that the Contras is engagedin organised drug trafficking28. Whenever CIA’s agents are sufferingfrom memory lose, forgot to read their own intelligence reports, orare deliberately lying we can not know. That CIA only employed agentswho all forgot to read their intelligence reports and who all sufferes frombad memory is of cause an explanation, but a very bad one. Only oneagent remember hearing about an airport, which would have been usedfor drug trafficking because of the very low level of security, but of causehe was unable to remember the name of the airport although he could re-28 CIA 1998a, 1998bPage 9 of 71member that he only heard that is would have been possible, not that itdid in fact happen. Since the crime in mention is a capital crime, it shouldbe noted that if it is not stated that people admitted to the crimes, it is assumedthat they have denied any involvement. Government employeeswho worked with the Contras, and are explicit or implicit suspected ofinvolvement, also denies involvement unless the contrary is stated.United States and the ContrasThere exists some confusion as to then Reagan issued the order to createthe Contras but most sources agree on that it was Reagan that created theContras and that he did so in Marts, April, November or December. InWhiteout Cockburn writes that is was Carter who ordered the initial organisationof the Contras using officers from Argentina’s death-squats29.Carter authorized the expenditure of $1 million in covert funds to fosteran internal opposition in Nicaragua30, and there exist evidence that CIAand DOD was involved with the initial build up of the Contras during1980 i.e. before Reagan was either elected or sworn in. Somoza’s cousinLuis Pallais Debayle started making trips around the US to various exilegroups in 1980 to see if anyone was interested in helping fighting Somozaback into power. During his travels Pallais meet with EnriqueBermúdez and asked if he was willing to lead the future resistance31.Bermúdez had been a high-ranking officer in the National Guard andwas properly the National Guardsman with the best ties to the US militaryand intelligence community, since he had served as Nicaragua’s liaisonthe US military in the late 1970s. He had been recommended by theUS to head the National Guard in the final days of Somoza’s regime.When the regime collapsed Bermúdez started a new career as truck driv-29 Cockburn 1999, 430 Walker 1987, 2331 Webb 1998, 46er in Washington DC. Before Bermúdez moved from Washington to Miamihe was invited to Pentagon by Col. Charles G. Boydato “kick someideas around”. These ideas concerned an armed rebellion in Nicaragua.Boyd told Bermúdez that he had a friend in the CIA who as interested inmeeting him. In the summer of 1980 Bermúdez quit his job, moved to Miami,and started around travel in the US and Central America to measurethe sentiment of the former guardsmen. Seemingly Bermúdez was livingoff the profits from the house sale in Washington, which financed his frequenttravel. There is no state time for the meeting between Bermúdezand Somoza’s cousin, but we can assume that the meeting took place beforemid-1980, since Bermúdez by mid-1980 had moved to Miami andbegun to make contract to various pro-Somoza groups. Shortly afterBermúdez moved to Guatemala and became the military leader of theLegion of September 15. According to another account, Webb writes,Bermúdez was on the CIA payroll by then, and as it was CIA that putBermúdez in contract with and in charge of the Legion of September 15in Guatemala this seems plausible. The Legion consisted of former NationalGuard officers, who had established a safe house in GuatemalaCity where they trained on a farm close to the Honduras border. Eitherby historical coincidence or because of their CIA contacts, the farm theytrained on was the same farm that CIA had used as headquarter in theGuatemalan coup in 1954. In the absence of an armed rebellion the Legionturned to mercenary activities. In the trail of its crimes in Guatemalaand Honduras the Legion left behind leftist political leaflets, thereby insinuatingthat leftists guerrillas were behind the crimes. One of thecrimes that the Legion was hired to do, was the killing of El Salvador’sa According to Webb Bermúdez was invited to Pentagon by “Mayor General Charles E. Boyd, a top U.S. Air Forceofficial”. I believe that Gary Webb have made a typo and thereby confused a G with an E and thereby makingCharles G. Boyd into Charles E. Boyd. In 1980 when Bermúdez was invited to Pentagon, Charles G. Boyd was still aColonel; he was first promoted brigadier general in April 1985 and became mayor general in November 1987. Thiscontradicts Webb’s indication that Bermúdez was invited by a Mayor General to Pentagon. However in 1980, thethen Colonel Charles G. Boyd, served as chief, Western Hemisphere Division, Directorate of Plans, HeadquartersU.S. Air Force, Washington DC, which is exactly the right employment position for the meeting to make sense.Page 10 of 71archbishop Oscar Romero. Because of his interest in the country’s disappearingprisoners Romero meet with his God after being hit by a singlebullet in his head as he was holding mess 24 March 198032. The skills theyhad learned during the repression in Nicaragua were used to generatetheir income as hired guns or in self employed hits. This was the Legionthat Bermúdez became leader for before it moved to Honduras in thespring of 198133.As the hawks took charge of the Nicaraguan politics in the Reagan administration,Carter’s politics was viewed as insufficient, and in MartsCIA was ordered to begin a covert operation program in Nicaragua. Thebudget was increased from $1 million to $19.5 million. Officially themoney was to be used to interdict the arms flow from Nicaragua into ElSalvador34. CIA started to make contact with various anti-Sandinista exilesin Miami and Central America, and US envoy Vernon Walters wasdispatch to ensure the support of Argentine, Honduras and CentralAmerican governments. In May CIA gave military intelligence officers inArgentina $50.000 to funnel on to the Contras as an incentive to unite35. Amonth earlier Bermúdez and Hamrick had visited Argentina, where Bermúdezreceived an initial payment from the Argentinian military. Hamrickintroduced Bermúdez to an aid to Senator Jesse Helms and membersof Argentine’s militarily intelligence36. According to Scott Bermúdez wasgiven $50.000 in seed money before he left37, but Webb claims that Bermúdezhad attended the meet together with the representatives of UDN,an other emerging Contra group, and that Bermúdez got $30.000 and32 Webb 1998, 4733 Webb 1998, 4934 Walker 1987, 23North 1992, 26235 Walker 1987, 2436Scott 1998, 4837 Scott 1998, 48UDN’s representative William Baltodano received $50.00038.During Bermúdez’s first meeting with the Argentinians in Buenos Airesat the Latin American Anti-Communist Confederation (CAL) conferencein 1980 they had displayed sympathy but did not donate a nickel. Insteadthey offered Bermúdez a deal. If Bermúdez and the Legion were seriousabout fighting communism, then they should prove themselves by takingout a left wing radio station in Costa Rica that the Argentinians hadattempted to bomb with napalm but failed. Bermúdez agreed. The Legionmet at John Hull’s farm in Costa Rica before raiding the radio station39. When the Legion raided the radio station they were met withheavy machine gun fire. The radio station had beefed up it is securityafter the attempted napalm bombing. The Legionaries managed to throwa Molotov cocktail at storage shed that did not cause any major damaged,contrary to the fortified radio station’s machine gun fire, which inflictedheavy casualties on the legionaries before the survivors were arrestedby Costa Rican police40.In August 1981 CIA’s Director William Casey appointed Duane ClarridgeChief of Latin American Operations i.e. chief of the Contra operation41. Clarridge went Honduras twice that month and visited presidentPaz, Col. Torres-Arias and Col. Guastavo Alvarez Martinez. Alvarez whowas chief of police was trained in Argentina like most of Honduras’ policehad been. The promotion of the Alvarez to general and chief of staffin 1982 did not change the regime’s involvement in drug trafficking. Corruptionand drug trafficking kept flourishing while Alvarez was the defacto leader of the country42. In Honduras relation between the military38 Webb 1998, 6839 Webb 1998, 21240 Webb 1998, 6841 Walker 1987, 2442 Scott 1998, 51Page 11 of 71and drug trafficking was not unknown. In a coup in August 1978 Gen.Policarpo Paz Garcia was brought to power with drug money. Aroundthe same time as the coup the DEA had learned that the coup was financedby Juan Matta Ballesteros, who was well known to the DEA. Mattahad been arrested at Dulles International Airport with 20 kilos cocaine in1970. That arrest earned Matta a mark in DEA’s file as a major trafficker.In 1973 DEA had tried to entrap him but had failed. By 1975 DEA Mattawas classified as the supplier to the Mexican kingpin Miguel Felix Gallardo,whom Matta had been introduced to by his Colombian and Peruviancontacts. Matta was one of the bigger traffickers in Central Americaduring the 1970s. Matta worked with the Cali cartel to smuggle cocainefrom Peru to the US west coast, whereas the Florida market wascontrolled by the Medellín cartel43. Before the coup Honduras was thetransit point for an estimated half billion dollars a year worth in drugs.Under Gen. Paz rule Matta expanded the cocaine trafficking industry inHonduras. Beside Paz Matta’s most important contact was the head ofthe military intelligence Col. Leonides Torres-Arias. In the mid-1970sStandard Fruit, a US company, were aided by the army in taking overpeasants business, set up on the land that the company had abandonedin 1974. The army commander, who directed these attacks and was paidby Standard Fruit, was Torres-Arias. Several of the successors to TorresAriasas head of the military intelligence, were reported to have connectionto drug trafficking; one of them was later appointed head of the newanti-drug enforcement unit in the armed forces44. After the coup in 1978Carter tripled economical aid to Honduras making it the largest receiverof aid in Central America by 1980. Due to the growing importance ofHonduras as a trafficking centre, DEA opened an office in Honduras in1981. In less than two years DEA was able to document that Torres-43 Scott 1998, 55, 79, 99CIA 1998b, Paragraph 61344 Scott 1998, 54-56Arias, Matta and other senior officers were involved in large scale drugtrafficking operation. In 1983 DEA closed down its station in Honduras.The office in Honduras had only make a few arrests, but it had generatedsubstantial amounts of intelligence. DEA had documented that the Honduranpolitical-military establishment had trafficked at least 50 tons ofcocaine. Same year as DEA closed its office CIA’s doubled in size45. Oneof Alvarez’s most trusted men Gen. Jose Bueso Rosa was put in charge ofHonduras day to day handling and management of the Contras. LaterBueso Rosa would become the main suspect in most significant case ofnarcoterrorism in the US at that time46. Clarridge visited Honduras asecond time in August with the Argentinian vice chief of Argentine militaryintelligence Col. Mario Davico. At this meeting Clarridge pledge USsupport for the Contra operation, and urged the Hondurans to cooperatewith Argentina’s training and supply mission47. With those guaranteesHonduras was established as a sanctuary for the Contras in Hondurasand became committed to the US-Argentinian Contra operation48. Samemonth the Argentine president Gen. Leopoldo visited Washington DC toconfirm his country’s support for the Nicaraguan Contras49.Fuerza Democrática Nicaragüense (FDN) was also formed in August.The Legion had moved to Honduras and merged with the Unión DemocráticaNicaragüense (UDN)50. UDN had a better relationship with thegovernment and military in Honduras, and at the time their organisationwas more developed in organising an regional opposition to the45 Scott 1998, 55f, 57Kerry 1989a, 75Democracynow, A Response to the Recent CIA-Crack Report, 5 February 199846 National Security Archive, The Contras, Cocaine, and Covert Operations47 Scott 1998, 4848Scott 1998, 5549 Scott 1998, 49 & 55f50 Webb 1998, 45Scott 1998, 49Page 12 of 71Sandinistas. UDN’s leader Fernando ‘El Negro’ Chamorro had foughtwith the Sandinistas against Somoza, and gained immortality by firing acouple of rockets at Somoza bunker from the rooftop of the nearby hotelin 1974. After the revolution he broke with the Sandinistas and joined hisbrother in Costa Rica before they joined UDN. The Legion and Bermúdezsymbolized all the bad things that Chamorro had fought against with theSandinistas. UDN wanted nothing to do with the Legion, and for the legionariesChamorro was a closet communist. In fact the groups hatedeach other. After the two meetings between Clarridge and Paz, TorresAriasand Alvarez the Honduras withdrew their support of UDN and begunsupporting the Legion. Even though UDN had the best contact toHonduras government, they needed to join FDN under the Legion’scommand if they wanted to fight the Sandinistas. Helping the US wouldmean access to US aid, and if CIA wanted Honduras to support FDN andthe Legion instead of UDN then that was how it would be51. The meetingwere the groups united was held on 10 August 1981 in an upstairs roomat the Legion’s safe house in Guatemala. CIA paid for the meeting, draftedthe agreement, named the organization and the members of the politicaljunta and general staff, and rented the building, according to testimonygiven during trial at the International Court of Justice in Hague bya distant relative of the UDN leader Chamorro52. This explains why theLegion’s safe house in Guatemala was the same as had been used by CIAwhen they executed in coup in 195453. One of the members picked to helpBermúdez run the FDN was Aristides Sanchéz, Somoza’s last ambassadorto Guatemala and an old friend of Bermúdez and Meneses54.In October Casey visited Gen. Leopoldo the head of Argentina’s military51 Webb 1998, 7052 Webb 1998, 7153 Webb 1998, 4754 Webb 1998, 71junta. The result was that 50 Contras were sent to Argentine for trainingand subsequently became instructors at the FDN camps in Hondurasthat the Argentinians had set up along with camps in Costa Rica andPanama. The Argentinians made their chief of army intelligence ambassadorto Panama to oversee the coordinating the operation, and they stationedofficers in Miami to take contact to anti-Sandinistas groups inFlorida55. Among the Argentinians were a member of Battalion 601Leandro Sanchez, who was in charge of financing and currency exchange,which included buying special equipment. Sanchez oversaw thefinances of the Argentina’s special task force in Honduras, were heworked with North’s representative Robert Owen. Sanchez and his superiorRaul Guglielminetti had attended an intelligence course in the USin 1976. Guglielminetti had set up a pawnshop in Miami that was sold toan exile Cuban with connections to CIA. Sanchez was in charge of administratingthe business and its covert arms buying operation56. The USknew Argentina were commitment to the international anticommuniststruggle, and if they had forgotten, they were reminded then US ambassadorBlystone meet with officers from Argentina’s intelligence service inthe summer of 1980. He was briefed on the cooperation between Argentina’sBattalion 601 and Peru’s military intelligence in apprehended fourArgentinians in Peru. The press had arrived so quickly that they couldnot be moved secretly from Peru to Argentina. Instead they would be expelledto Bolivia and from there to Argentina, where they will be “interrogatedand permanently disappeared”57. Blystone was told that Argentinahad dispatched intelligence sources to “Panama, Costa Rica, Guatemala andEl Salvador to analyse the situation and report back to 601”58. Before the USallied with Argentina and Honduras to support the Contras they knew55Scott 1998, 4956 Scott 1998, 49f57 Blystone 198058 Blystone 1980Page 13 of 71about Argentina’s methods and Honduras involvement in drug trafficking.As an US official was quoted for saying in Los Angeles Times “If wemove against these guys on drugs, they can screw us on the Contras”59.A US Government group with Clarridge, Gen. Gorman and from thespring of 1982 also North was set up to oversee the Contra operation60.The group created contingency plans and a series of options papers,which was presented to NSC in November61. Three CIA proposals alsowere presented at the NSC meeting. The first option was to continue financialaid to the internal opposition in Nicaragua that had begun underCarter and was expanded by Reagan. The second option was to create a500 man command force of exile Cubans to attack Nicaragua’s economicalinfrastructure. This Cuban exile force would enable the US to take actionagainst Cubans in Nicaragua. The third option, which was a supplementto the second, was provide financial and logistical support for Argentina’straining of a 1000 man army to overthrow the Sandinistas62.CIA requested $19.95 million for initial funding of the Contra project, butmore would be needed. On 23 November Reagan signed National SecurityDecision Directive 17 ordering CIA to build a 500 men strong paramilitaryforce, collaborate with the governments in the region, foster abroad opposition to the Sandinistas, assisting the Argentine with the creationof a larger 1000 men strong Contra force, and attack special Cubantargets within Nicaragua63. The covert operation would be conductedthrough non American agents – the Unilaterally Controlled Latino Assets(UCLA). If they got caught CIA could claim that CIA wasn't involved.Under the law a Presidential Finding required that Congress be notified59 Scott 1998, 5760 Walker 1987, 24North 1992, 26461 Walker 1987, 2462 Walker 1985, 431f63 Walker 1987, 24Walker 1985, 432fif major covert operations was being planned64. 1 December Caseybriefed the House and Senate’s Intelligence Committee, who raised concernsabout targeting Cubans in Nicaragua and restricted the paramilitaryoperation to arms interdiction. On 2 December Reagan signed a PresidentialFinding were paramilitary operations was limited to arms interdictionand the aspect of targeting special Cuban targets in Nicaraguadropped65.To shield CIA’s involvement an arrangement was worked out with Argentinaand Honduras. Honduras would provide bases along the Nicaraguanborder from where the Contras would operate, Argentina wouldprovide the training and military advisors, and CIA would pay the bills.In return both countries received increased economic and military aid66.But the Contras economic situation did not improve as would be expected.The Contras saw little of the $19.95 millions that Reagan approved.The funnelling of money through the Argentinians helped the Argentiniansmaintain control over the Contras67.They [the Argentinians] handled all the money. The Nicaraguans –from Bermúdez, needing several hundred dollars for the rent on theTegucigalpa [Honduras’ capital] safe house, to a foot soldier onleave in the capital, asking for a couple of bucks to see a movie – hadto get it from the Argentines68.While the Contras had to beg for every dollar Hector Frances, a formerArgentinian advisor, described how they spend millions on office equip-64 Webb 1998, 7265 Walker 1987, 24Walker 1985, 432f66 Webb 1998, 7367 Webb 1998, 7468 Webb 1998, 74Page 14 of 71ment, furniture, hotels etc. It took almost a year before the arms that theUS had promised arrived69. That was the situation when Bermúdez metMeneses and Blandón in the summer of 1981 – a meeting we will returnto.CIA and the CongressArgentina withdrew its support to the Contras in the wake of the FalklandsWar. The bilateral relationship had been harmed when the US supportedthe British in the war. Divisions within the Contras had become amajor problem, and in April 1982 CIA took full control of the operation70.A new front had been opened in the south when Alizana RevolucionariaDemocrática (ARDE) was founded by the former Sandinista commanderEden Pastora,. He had become famous in 1978 when he had let theSandinistas who seized the National Palace. The majority of ARDE wereformer Sandinistas, and therefore ADRE not only enjoyed a much broaderpublic support than FDN; they were also a more potential and credibleforce against the Sandinistas. Clarridge met with Pastora and offered himto join forces with FDN and CIA in the fight against the Sandinistas. Pastoraaccepted on the condition that he would maintain absolutely deniability.Any connection to CIA would severely weaken his credibility as anationalist71.Newsweek’s cover story in November 1982 showed a picture of paratroopersdropping from the sky and was titled “America’s Secret War: TargetNicaragua”. Newsweek’s story portrayed the Contras as strong fightingforce of 4000 men, which could overthrow the Sandinistas. This imageand the fact that the Contras first act of war was blowing up a bridge69 Webb 1998, 7470 Walker 1987, 25Kenworthy 1995, 5471 Walker 1987, 26linking Honduras and Nicaragua, did not match the White House version,which was that the Contras was a 500 man strong paramilitary borderpatrol to intercept weapon shipment from Nicaragua to the El Salvadorianguerrilla. The President had signed a ‘finding’ authorizing CIAto create a 500 person paramilitary force, trained by the Argentinians72, tooperate in Guatemala, El Salvador and Honduras to cut off the armsshipment. Congress’ feared that once the aid to the Contras began to flowthere would be no turning back. Considerable doubt existed on CapitolHill on whenever the Contras would be able to fight a successful guerrillawar even with US financial support, and Congress did not wanted tobe dragged into another jungle war in a hostile country; like fifteen yearsearlier in Vietnam73.It is often claimed that the Boland Amendments was passed either becausethe Congress wanted to prevent US from being dragged into a jungleor because that the Congress wanted a firmer grip on US foreignpolicies. It is along these lines that Molineu74, Kenworthy75, Cockburn76and most encyclopaedias describe the amendments. Common for thisperception is that they see the amendments as intended to limit or preventthe US from funding the Contras in Nicaragua. The amendments isoften referred to in singular, but the more detailed accounts distinguishbetween 1stand 2nd amendment. The difference between the amendmentsis explained as 1stamendment allowed funds to build a the Contras upfor interdict arms purposes, but prohibited attempts to topple the Nicaraguanregime, and with the 2nd amendment funding was cut off77.72 Molineu 1986, 18073 Molineu 1986, 222ff74 Molineu 198675 Kenworth 199576 Cockburn 199977 Molineu 1986, 188Page 15 of 71North and Webb have an alternative perception of the amendments andwhy they were passed. Their accounts of the amendments are similar althoughthey are positioned in the opposite ends of the political spectrum,and their accounts are the most detailed once78. According to North andWebb Congressman Tom Harkin proposed an amendment to the budgetinresponds to Newsweek’s story, which completely cut off of all fundingto overthrow the Nicaraguan government. The White House informedCongress that they would veto the budget if the amendment was passed.Instead the Boland Amendment was passed, named after the Democraticmember of the House Intelligence Committee Edward P. Boland. As amember of the Intelligence Committee Boland had been briefed on CIA’sfunding and support for the Contras with which he had no problem. Bolandproposed his amendment to quiet the liberals. As an amendment tothe budget it was to be in force for one year in the period betweenDecember 1982 to December 1983, and was passed on Christmas eve1982 by a vote 411-079. The reason the amendment received unanimoussupport was that it achieved what it was designed to: nothing, and at thesame time it made it look like Congress was being thought on the WhiteHouse, but did not prohibit the government from funding the Contras.The first amendment was criticized in the Senate, but not by supportersof the Contras but by Senator Christopher Dodd for giving a green lightto continue funding the Contras80. According to Webb internal governmentmemos show that CIA, the White House, the DOD and the Contras’Congressional supporters knew that the Contras had no hope of defeatingthe Sandinistas and therefore funding the Contras could not be consideredas an attempt to overthrow the Sandinistas81.78 North 1992, 280ffWebb 199879 Webb 1998, 151fNorth 1992, 281n, 28280 North 1992, 28281 Webb 1998, 152Walker 1987, 28During 1982 and the first half of 1983 FDN mounted coordinated attackson villages in northern Nicaragua in an attempt to set up a liberated zoneand establish a provisional government. FDN’s raids on Nicaragua becamecostly for Nicaragua, as it caused many deaths and severe economicaldamage, but they failed their primary objectives. FDN’s forces wereunable to fend off the Sandinistas as they started to re-liberate the territories.FDN’s failure proved that the US already expected; the Contrascould not win militarily. Since US forces were needed to win CIA begantheir Unilaterally Controlled Latino Assets (UCLA) program; agents whoCIA would deny any knowledge of or connection to. On 8 SeptemberCIA’s UCLA launched a series of attack against the Nicaraguan harbourat Puerto Sandino. Five weeks later frogmen sabotaged an underwaterpipeline. On 10 October five oil storage tanks at Corinto were attacked bymortar fire and ignited 13 million litres of fuel. The raid left more than100 people death, caused the evacuation of 25.000 residents while the fireraged out of control for two days. Same month a manual the ‘PsychologicalOperations in Guerrilla Warfare’ manual was published, and prescribeddifferent forms of terrorism such as assassinating civilians. The manualinstructed the Contras in selective use of violence against carefully selectedtargets such as government official and village leaders. For the psychologicalpurpose of armed propaganda, as the execution of civilianswas termed, it was important that the local population was present, formulatedaccusations against the selected target or took part in the execution.The US Government claimed that the US sponsored terror manualreduced the number of human-right abuse and civilian casualties, since itstressed that civilian targets should be carefully selected. Enough copieswere circulated for all Contra units to have one82. In December 1983 Reaganapproved NSC proposal to escalate the UCLA operations against82 Walker 1987, 27Page 16 of 71Nicaragua. In January 1984 helicopters raided Potosí’s port. In Februarypilots bombed a communication centre and military training camp. Twotimes in Marts were the petroleum facilities at San Juan Del Sur and PuertoSandino attacked by helicopters. In all CIA carried out at least 22 attackson vital targets between September 1983 and April 1984. In January,February and Marts the CIA/UCLA teams mined the shipping canalsof major Nicaraguan ports on both the Atlantic and Pacific Coasts with300 pounds C4 mines. The mining operation proved too much. The SovietUnion condemned the US for banditry and piracy. Congress condemnedthe actions just as US allies criticized the mining as deliberate violationof international law. The mining incident marked a turning point,CIA’s operation backfired and Congress was no longer willing to let theadministration raged its low intensity warfare against Nicaragua. A newamendment was passed83:To provide that none of the monies appropriated in this Act can beused to fund directly, or indirectly, activities against the governmentof Nicaragua which have not been authorized by or pursuantto law, and for other purposes84.The 3rd Boland amendment was the most restrictive and covered the periodfrom October 1984 to December 1985. It prohibited using funds thatdirectly or indirectly would support Nicaragua’s opposition. This time itmeant no more covert operations and no more funding of the Contras.By 1984 the direct funds from Congress had been used up, and the Contraswas left in the dark. Congress did relax its prohibitions and allowedhumanitarian aid to be given. A 4thamendment was passed, which allowedfor $27 millions in humanitarian aid, communications support83 Walker 1987, 3184 Senate amendment 396 House Resolution 2577and intelligence sharing. A 5thamendment that ran from Marts 1985 toOctober 1986 did allow “a very specific and limited amount of CIA support”and authorized the State Department to solicit humanitarian aid fromthird part countries to the Contras85.Then the 2nd amendment was passed in July 1983 it was a compromisebetween the House that wanted to terminate all aid to the Contras, andthe Senate that wanted to continue the program. An alternative networkwas created to sustain the Contras if Congress decided to end US involvementin Nicaragua. North, MacFarlane and retired Gen. Secondwould take over the Contra operation. Alternative means of funding wasdeveloped, so that then the last funds ran out in 1984 the surrogate networkwas in place86. Despite the Contras operation had been reassignedto NSC CIA was still involved87. The month before the 2nd amendmentwas passed, a failed assassination attempt was made on Pastora who hadrefused to unit ARDE with FDN under the leadership of FDN. Same dayas assassination attempt CIA cut off aid to ARDE. In the aftermath of theassassination attempt Pastora’s right hand Robelo and half of ADRE’stroops joined FDN. Two months later the rest was lured into FDN withthe promises of military aid88.To distribute and administrated the aid to Contras, which the 4thand 5thamendments did allow the Nicaraguan Humanitarian Assistance Office(NHAO) was created in September 1985. Already by December Congressstarted to suspect that the NHAO funds were being misused. The GeneralAccounting Office (GAO) was asked to investigate NHAO manage-85 North 1992, 281n86 Walker 1991, 339Walker 1987, 31fNorth 1922, 283ff87 Walsh 1997, 10488 Walker 1987, 26Page 17 of 71ment of the funds. At first NHAO refused to cooperate with GAO, andlater then they did, it turned out that their records inaccurate at the best.Then GAO testified before Congress in Marts and May and said that millionscould not be traced to the suppliers in Costa Rica, Honduras andMiami which NHAO claimed to have paid. Congress subpoenaedNHAO bank records and found that $1.5 had been paid to the Honduras’military and more than $6 million had disappeared into obscure bank accountsin Miami, Panama and the Cayman Islands89. This severely damagedthe administrations campaign to get Congress to re-approve fundingfor the Contras, and in May 1985 Jack Terrell, a mercenary and drugtrafficker, who had worked at a Contra base in Honduras, publicly accusedthe FDN leaders for corruption, brutal atrocities, and the assassinationattempt on Pastora. Other former FDN officers added their voices toTerrell accusation90. Despite this, despite Terrell’s accusations, despite theinternal conflicts within the Contras and they horrendous human-rightsrecord, and despite the missing NHAO money Congress still approve$100 million for the Contras in June 1986 and removed all restrictions onthe CIA from handling the Contras91.In October, the same month as all restrictions on CIA’s involvementended, Sandinistas shot down one of the surrogate networks supplyplane over Nicaragua, and in November the Lebanese Al-Shiraa newspaperpublished an article on US arms sale to Iran, which lead to the unrevealingof the Iran-Contra affair. As Congress had already lifted all restrictionson aiding the Contras, the Contras received CIA fundsthroughout 1986 while the affair was revelled in the press. In the wake ofthe Iran-Contra scandal CIA withdrew funding for the Contras in 1987.Without CIA’s support the Contras were unable to continue as a military89 Walker 1987, 33f90 Walker 1987, 33f91 Walker 1987, 34fforce, and peace negotiations between the Contras and the Sandinistasbegan. With the peace agreement in 1988 the Contras officially dissolvedas military force, although that in reality had already happened in 1987.The US had no intention to let the Sandinistas stay in power. DuringNicaragua’s election in 1990 US poured in massive funds to have allies ofthe former Contras elected. Foreign funding of parties is a crime in mostcounties, but despite the US’s attempt to subvert democracy the electionwent forward. The Sandinistas lost and left the office, contrary to whatwas feared. The police and armed forces continued to be under the commandof Sandinista officials.Funding the ContrasThe White House never accept the the Boland amendments’ restrictions.The law was circumvented and broken in order to keep the Contras aliveuntil Congress could be turned around as happened were in 198692. Thefunds allowed by the 2nd amendment ran out in the spring of 1984. Theempty bank accounts lead the White House to soliciting funds from thirdpart countries. Robert McFarlane, the former National Security Advisor(1983-1985), had in the fall of 1983 asked North to draw up a list of countries,which could be expected to help finance the Contras93. The list includedBritain, West Germany, Taiwan, Singapore, Israel and Saudi Arabia.The Israelis had declined to help according to North, but did shiphundreds of tons of weapons to the Contras as Israel had captured largequantities of soviet made weapons from the PLO during the invasion ofLebanon in 1982-1983. The weapons were shipped to a DOD warehousesfrom where they were transferred to the CIA who donated the weaponsto the Contras. This operation was directed by Secord94. McFarlane met92 Kenworthy 1995, 5593 North 1992, 28394 North 1992, 284fPage 18 of 71with the Saudi ambassador Prince Bandar Bin Sultan to ask for financialaid to the Contras. The first contribution of $1 million came in June 1984and for the next seven months the Saudis chip in $1 million a month. McFarlane’smeeting with Bandar Bin Sultan was authorized by the Reaganaccording to North. After a meeting in Washington DC between Reaganand the Saudi King Fahd in February 1985, the Saudis doubled theirmonthly contribution95. Soon after the Saudis’ generous doubling of theirmonthly donation they received a quick delivery of Stinger anti-aircraftmissiles that had been held up by the Congress for some time96. Thedonations continued until the spring of 198697then the Boland amendmentswere lifted. By when the Saudis had chipped in $32 million intotal. Singlaub solicited $2 millions from the government of Taiwan98.The Sultan of Brunei Haji Hassanal Bolkiah Mu’izzaddin Waddaulahdonated $10 million after he was approached by the State Department99,but the money apparently never arrived as the Sultan made a typo whenwire transfering the money. According to Wroe Israel also donated cash,which North denies. There was additional sources of funds; the arms saleto Iran and private money raised by the National Endowment for thePreservation of Liberty100.Stanford Technology Trading Group International (STTGI) controlled theaccount that the Brunei donation apparently did not arrived at101. Thepresident of STTGI was Secord whose partner Hakim was the chairman.Hakim and Secord was in full control of the company that they had foun-95 North 1992, 287fWroe 1991, 1796 Wroe 1991, 17North 1992, 28897 Walsh 1993, Chapter 8,5n98 North 1992, 31599 Wroe 1991, 1North 1992, 315n100 North 1992, 284, 284n, 315n101 North 1992, 315nded in 1983 and was renamed Enterprise in 1986. In the fall of 1984 Northhad introduced Secord to Aldolfo Calero to assist Calero in purchasingarms with the Saudi proceeds, which Secord was experienced in. Hakimand Secord acted as brokers for Calero and brought weapons, munitions,and other lethal supplies for the Contras with money that Calero had receivedfrom the Saudis. But from mid-1985 this arrangement waschanged. In June 1985 Harim and Secord meets with Bermúdez andCalero to inform them that instead of deposit the money directly intoCalero’s offshore account they would in the future be deposit directlyinto an account controlled by STTGI. Calero was eliminated as a moneyhandler. After eliminating Calero as money handler Hakim and Secordset up an account name closely assimilating the name of the arms companythat the weapons was bought from. This was done to disguise thefurther mark up of the price that Hakim and Secord made. According tothe Iran-Contra investigation most of the funds went to Enterprise asprofits, and the Contras received equipment worth a minor part of themoney102. In the late 1984 Secord arrange for the first supply of weaponsto the Contras from China103. This shipment did not arrive in CentralAmerica until April 1985, and was when impounded by Honduras’armed forces104. In all Hakim and Secord arranged for 11 deliveries ofarms to the Contras105.Then we add the numbers together $101 million in total were available tothe Contras between December 1983 to March 1986. This figure excludesprivate donations, and materials and secret funds from DOD and CIA106.Officially it was these funds that kept the Contras going until official US102 Walsh 1993, Chapter 8.3, 8.5103 Walsh 1993, Chapter 8.3104 North 1992, 307105 Walsh 1993, Chapter 12106 North 1992, 281Walsh 1993, Chapter 8.2Page 19 of 71funding was resumed. Since the US was not paying officially the questionwas raised about who then paid. This was according to North thereason why people started believing that the Contras was involved indrug trafficking. North claims that all claims was investigated and noevidence of any drug connection was discovered. This claim is a ratherodd as CIA knew at that time that the Contras were involved in drugtrafficking107. Beside the ‘secret funds’ there was the ‘overt funds’ authorisedby either the president or the Congress until Congress re-approvedaid to the Contras in 1986. Compare the $101 million in ‘secret funds’ tothe total of $150 million in ‘overt funds’ and there appears to be no discrepancy.The amounts were to last for 3 years each – the ‘overt funds’from 1981-1983 and the ‘secret funds’ from 1983-1986. DOD transferred‘surplus’ military equipment to CIA free of charge, constructed bases andairbases during their military exercises in Central America and left behindequipment for the Contras to pick up and use. By 1984 the US militaryexercises had become almost continual108. Unfortunately there is noofficial estimate on the amount that DOD spend on surplus material,base construction and left behind equipment. Hence an accurate estimationof the amount spent by the US on the Contras is impossible.If we only consider the amounts we know of it appears that the Contrascould be kept alive on the secret funds collected by North. If we insteadcompare the US spending on the Contras with the Soviet spending on theSandinistas a different situation emerges. The US estimates that the Sovietsaround $3 billion on the Sandinistas in the same time span. Consideringthese numbers it is highly unlikely that a mere $101 millions between1983 and 1986 would be sufficient then the Soviet donation in 1985 alone107 North 1992, 315108 Walker 1985, 437National Security Achieve “Nicaragua: The Making of U.S. Policy, 1978-1990”where $1 billion109. Compare the amount the US spend on the Contraswith the $5 billions a year they spend on the Afghan Mujahidins110. Althoughthe Mujahidin forces were larger than the Contras, the differencein size can't explain the difference in funding. As with the both the Contrasand Mujahidins only a minor amount of what the US spend reachedthe fighting forces. Alternative funding was needed. As the Mujahidinssubstituted the shortfall in cash with opium, the Contras did with cocaine.The Drug ConnectionIn September 1982 Enrique Bermudéz, FDN’s military leader, meet withNorwin Meneses and Danilo Blandón. Meneses and Bermudéz kneweach other from childhood as Bermudéz had been a close friend of Norwin’solder brother Edmondo Meneses. Bermudéz told them that theContras needed money111. The Contra leaders Alfonso Calero and EdgarChamorro have confirmed that the meeting took place112. When Menesesand Blandón left the meeting Blandón was carrying $100.000 in drug proceedsfrom the Contras. Blandón and Meneses travelled to Bolivia viaGuatemala on business where the cash was going to be used in a “Boliviandrug deal” according to Blandón113. Blandón was stopped in TegucigalpaAirport in Honduras, but he was released and the money returnedwhen their Contra escort told the Hondurans that Blandón and Meneseswere Contras114. That Blandón carried drug proceeds from the meeting tobuy cocaine in Bolivia with means that the Contras already had done109 Walker 1991, 260110 Napoleoni 2004, 109111 Webb 1998, 62112 Webb 1998, 64113 CIA 1998a, paragraph 180Webb 1998, 62114 CIA 1998a, paragraph 183Webb 1998, 63Page 20 of 71their first drug trafficking, which is confirmed in CIA’s report.Meneses had conducted large scale drug trafficking in Nicaragua and theUS during Somoza’s regime. He came from a prominent family. One ofhis brothers was a general in the National Guard and another, EdmundoMeneses was chief of the police in Managua115. In the 1960s Norwin startedmoving between Nicaragua and the US. He lived on and off in SanFrancisco Bay Area, were owned several properties. Norwin was arrestedin 1977 for murder of the high-ranking Nicaraguan customs officerOskar Reyes, who had investigated Norwin for smuggling cars, weaponsand drugs. Norwin was released after his brother, the chief of police inManagua had conducted a ‘extensive and rigorous investigation’, buthad been unable to find any evidence that indicated his brother in Reyes’murder116. After the Reyes case Edmondo was promoted brigadier general,retired from the National Guard and joined the diplomatic corpswhere he became ambassador to Guatemala. His diplomatic carrier wasshort. In 1978 he was gunned down in Guatemala City by the People’sGuerilla Army in solidarity with the Sandinistas struggle117. Norwin leftNicaragua in June, one month before the regime collapsed in 1979. Beforehe arrived in San Francisco the beginning of 1980 he had been to El Salvador,Ecuador and Costa Rica where Norwin owned the farm that JohnHull lived on, and from which the Legion of September 15 had launchedits failed attack on the left-wing radio station. Hull’s farm was the centraltransit point in Costa Rica for transfer of drug and guns to the Contras.When Norwin arrived in the US he applied for political asylum in hisown name. Even though Norwin had more than one record with US lawenforcement agencies, he did not seem concern about using his ownname. Norwin is first time mention in a DOJ file in 1968 then FBI for-115 Webb 1998, 53ff116 Webb 1998, 52, 55117 Webb 1998, 53ffwards their arrest and conviction record on Meneses to the Nicaraguanpolice. This record “included convictions for shoplifting in 1963, misuse ofslot machines in 1964, and statutory rape of a female under 18 years old in1964”118. In 1976 when Customs in Nicaragua requested information inconnection with Oscar Reyes investigation the FBI informed the NicaraguanCustoms that Meneses was suspected of running a car theft operationwere cars from Californian and New York are shipped to Nicaraguawhere they were imported by the National Guard119. In 1978 FBI learnedthat Norwin and his brother Ernesto “were smuggling 20 kilos of cocaine ata time into the United States”120and that his nephew Jamie, Edmundo’sson, were their distributor in San Francisco. A month later the DEAlearned through an informant that Meneses were dealing cocaine inMiami too. Next year the DEA determined that Meneses supplied NewOrleans too with cocaine121. According to law enforcement reports Menesesran a large scale drug trafficking operations as early as the early1970s122. In 1979 FBI’s legal attaché in Mexico wanted Meneses consideredfor FBI’s ‘top thief’ program because of his suspected car theftoperation. The attaché wanted an arrest order issued for Meneses so thatif he attempted to enter the US he would be stopped by the Immigrationand Naturalization Service (INS) and questioned. This did not happenbecause an Assistant US Attorney in San Francisco declined to prosecuteMeneses for car theft. According to US law enforcement Meneses hadeluded prosecution in Nicaragua due to his political connections. Thecase was closed as US law enforcement concluded that further investigationin the car theft case would not be productive123. Without an arrestwarrant INS could not stop Meneses from entering the country and ap-118 DOJ 1998, chapter 3.1119 Webb 1998, 55DOJ 1998, chapter 3.1120 Webb 1998, 58121 Webb 1998, 57f122 Webb 1998, 58123 DOJ 1998, chapter 3.1Page 21 of 71ply for political asylum as he did. At that time both FBI and DEA knewthat Meneses was involved in drug trafficking. According to Webb bothimmigrant lawyers and the State Department have confirmed that therewas a zero tolerance policy for immigrants and visitors suspected of narcoticsviolations124. Still Meneses was able to enter the country and applyfor political asylum.Blandón had studied in Bogotá, Colombia were he had received a master’sdegree in marketing. Blandón had, before he fled Nicaragua, beenhead of agricultural export program, which was Nicaragua’s main export.During this time Blandón developed ties with the US Departmentof Commerce, military, CIA and the State Department. Blandón fled inthe final days before the fall of Managua to Miami. His wife had travelstraight to Los Angeles, but according to Blandón he could not effort theticket and had to work as a car washer in Miami. When Blandón joinedhis wife in Los Angles he started to work as a used car salesman for theTorres brothers, who were major cocaine dealers. The brothers lived withtwo Colombian sisters, who were the cousins of one of the Medellín cartel’sfounders, Pablo Escobar. During the late 1970s the Medellín cartelhad fought and won control of the cocaine business in Miami from theexile Cubans. Instead of using the city for small time cocaine traffickingthe Medellín cartel turned Miami into an hub for cocaine distribution.Miami became the official port of call for cocaine dealers, and soonMiami’s banks began to swell with cocaine profits that need to belaundered125. After a short stay in Miami Blandón joined his wife andkids in Los Angeles. According to Blandón his involvement with cocainebegan with a call from his friend Barrios in Miami. Barrios told Blandónthat Meneses was coming to Los Angeles soon and wanted to meet him.124 Webb 1998, 175125 Webb 1998, 44Cockburn 1999, 3Blandón had not met Meneses but had heard that he was known as agangster. He did not know why Barrios wanted him to meet with Meneses,but Blandón assumed that it concerned the Contras as Barrios wasknow to work for the Contras. When Blandón picked Meneses up at theairport Meneses began talking about the need to start a revolutionarymovement to free Nicaragua. They needed to make money to send Honduras.Meneses wanted Blandón to start a drug business in Los Angelesto raise the needed funds. At first Blandón had some reservations for gettinginto the cocaine business working for a gangster, with the Spanishnickname for cocaine ‘El Perico’126. When Blandón started to sell cocaineis a matter of dispute, but according to Blandón he accepted Menesesproposal after meeting with Bermudéz in Honduras127. Other claim thatBlandón began dealing cocaine earlier. No later than September 1982Blandón had begun working in the cocaine industry128. Blandón visitedMeneses in San Francisco for a two day seminar in the cocaine trafficking.Here he was taught how to sell cocaine by the ounce and the kilo,how to transport the it undetected, how to drive, what to do and whatnot. After the seminar Blandón was supplied with a few names of of potentialcustomers and two kilos of cocaine129.Ricky Ross aka Freeway Ricky had been a young talented tennis player.Ross had been invited to play at Long Beach State, but then the universityfound out that Ross could not read or write the offer was retracted.Disillusioned and unable to get into college Ross dropped out ofhigh school just before graduating130. Instead Ross enrolled in a tradeschool were he became friends with Mr. Fisher, one of the teachers. Rossdid not study at the trade school for long before as he was offered to126 Webb 1998, 50ff127 Webb 1998, 61128 Webb 1998, 43129 Webb 1998, 63f130 Webb 1998, 127fPage 22 of 71study and play tennis at a trade college. The friendship between Rossand Fisher continued after Ross left the trade school. Fisher would helpRoss out and buy him tennis shoes, racquets etc. Shortly before Rossdropped out of trade college in 1981, he learned how Fisher could affordjewels, a new car, and a nice house in a nice neighbourhood. Ross’ teacherwas a well connected small time coke user and dealer131. Ross bought afew grams of cocaine from Fisher for $250 and cut the cocaine, i.e. a processwere the cocaine’s purity is diluted by adding any cheaper substanceto the cocaine, which resembles cocaine, and sold it for $500-600132.Instead of spending the profit Ross reinvested it in more cocaine. Fisher’scocaine was a little cheaper than average, so Ross easily got new customersas he would price the cocaine $25-$75 cheaper than average. Rosscontinued to reinvest the cocaine profits, buying more frequent in largeramounts133. Fisher had no ambition of becoming a big professional drugdealer, and told Ross’ that he would not sell them more cocaine. Insteadhe would introduce Ross to his cocaine source Ivan Arguellas. He promisedRoss that his price would be lower than Fisher, and it was. The moreRoss bought at once, the lower the price. Most of the dealers in SouthCentral unlike Ross sold PCP known as angle dust. Around the time Ivanbegan supplying Ross, other dealers noticed that Ross made a lot moremoney than they did, so they started buying cocaine from Ross. It wasnot Ross’ discipline, which made him reinvest his drug proceeds. Rosswas afraid that if he spent the profit his mother, whom he lived with,would notice. She did noticed when he bought a new pair of trainers andthrew him out. Illiterate and with no idea how to rent an apartment, hemoved into their garage and fixed it up with the drug profits134.131 Webb 1998, 129132 Webb 1998, 130133 Webb 1998, 129ff134 Webb 1998, 134ff8 months after Ross started buying from Ivan, Ivan disappeared. Ross’sole cocaine source was gone. Blandón knew Ivan and what happened tohim. Ivan’s wife had shot him in the back and injured his spine. OccasionallyBlandón had sold Ivan a bit of cocaine, but Ivan had anothersource, which Blandón believed to be the Torres brothers. Blandón hadnoticed that the Torres began to make a lot of money around the sametime that Ross’ began to buy from Ivan. Ivan partner and brother-in-lawHenry ran the business while Ivan was hospitalised. Henry had not developedany contacts while he worked with Ivan and he did not knowIvan’s source. Ivan’s customers expected Henry to deliver, but in a businesswhere a man is only as good as his connections Henry could not deliverwhat was expected. Blandón visited Henry and offered to help. Meneseswanted Blandón to sell more cocaine, but Blandón sales had beenslow and small. Blandón learned about Ross from Ivan, and Henry confirmedthat Ross was their best customer. Blandón had his lucky break.Instead of selling 1-2 kilos ever couple of months, Blandón suppliedHenry with 1-2 kilos a week. Then Ross began buying from Henry theprices was lowered again, but since Henry was more concerned withsnoring cocaine than selling it Blandón soon began to sell directly toRoss. Again the prices dropped135.Blandón’s testimony and statements are contradicting, and stated datesfluctuate. The amount of cocaine he sold differs too. Blandón claims thathe sold his first ounce of cocaine in 1982, and he during 1982-1983 sold 1-2 kilos, but he also told investigators that he picked up 1-2 kilos everycouple of month from Meneses in the same periode136. Statements fromBlandón father and mother in law suggest that Blandón was involvedwith drugs before he left Nicaragua in 1979. In a sealed search warrant135 Webb 1998, 135ff136 Webb 1998, 136, 156Page 23 of 71affidavit filed in May 1992 DEA agent Chuck Jones wrote “Blandón hadbeen a cocaine trafficker in Nicaragua prior to the fall of Somoza. (...) Sinceabout 1982 Blandón had been a cocaine trafficker in the Unites States”137. Fouryears later Jones claim that he had confused Blandón with Meneses,whom he was referring to. Regardless of when Blandón started his careeras a cocaine trafficker for the Contras, they were no longer a disorganisedgroup of mercenaries but run by the CIA138. The time Blandón starteddealing with Ross is disputed. Ross have stated two different times thathe began dealing with Blandón, either between 1981-1982 or 1983-1984.Blandón claims that he started selling cocaine to Ross around sometimebetween 1983-1985, and that he sold approximately 200-300 kilos in all.However this is not consistent with his claim he broke with Meneses in1983. Jacinto Torres, who owned the used car lot that Blandón worked at,testified that Blandón was involved with cocaine sales in Glendale in1984. According to Torres Blandón’s cocaine business increased considerablyin 1984, and Meneses between 1983 and 1984 routinely flew 200-400kilos in from Miami to keep up with demands139. The Torres brotherslater told the FBI that Blandón picked up his first two kilos from Menesesin 1980 shortly after Blandón moved to Los Angeles and was introducedto Meneses. Their information proved reliable in other instances140.DOJ estimates that Ross began in the cocaine business in the early of1982, and it was Blandón who supplied both Ivan and his partner Henrywith cocaine. Ivan was shot in October 1983 and shortly after Blandónstarted dealing directly with Ross. DOJ estimates that Blandón first starteddealing directly with Ross early in 1984. Since Ivan was shot 8months after Ivan and Ross started dealing, Ross must have been intro-137 Webb 1998, 65138 Webb 1998, 64f139 Webb 1998, 157140 Webb 1998, 64duced to him in the early 1983 141. This means that Blandón indirectlystarted supplying Ross early in 1983. It is not disputed in DOJ’s reportthat both Meneses and Blandón were “engaged in large-scale drug traffickingin the 1980s”142, and that “Both gave some proceeds from their drug traffickingto the Contras in the early 1980s”143. What is disputed is the amount.How much they contributed to the Contras is unclear. (…), but themonetary amounts appear to be relatively insignificant compared tothe money they made in drug trafficking144.The estimate is based on Blandón’s statement that the “relatively insignificant”amounts were around $40.000 each145. Compared to the chargesthat had been brought forward, that the Contras relied to some extent oncocaine as a means of finance, this could seriously damage CIA. It is indisputablethat the Contras was a top run CIA organization, which isconfirmed in later emails from North. If CIA’s Contras relied on drugproceeds it would almost certainly implicated CIA, unless the group,which had not made a single independent decisions, had decided ontheir own to deal drugs. For this reason CIA and DOJ have a clear interestin minimizing the amounts that Blandón and Meneses donated.CIA has a clear interest in placing the estimation of when Meneses andBlandón began supplying Ross as late as possible. If the cocaine involvementcan be estimated to after 1984 when it can be blamed on North,who was handled the job of running the Contras, after the US Congressprohibited CIA from aiding the Contras. Remember that the unrevealingof the cocaine affair took placed in the mid-1990s, almost a decade afterthe Iran-Contra affair, where North was blamed for being a rouge agent141 DOJ 1998, chapter 6.2.C142 DOJ 1998, executive summery 2143 DOJ 1998, executive summery 2144 DOJ 1998, executive summery 2145 CIA 1998a, paragraph 182-183Page 24 of 71acting on his own. If the cocaine donation can be minimized and tookplace after 1984 then ‘the rogue agent’ North is to blame. According tohis biography he informed his boss of everything he did146. The notes andemails that the National Security Archives have obtained through theFreedom of Information Act confirm North’s claim147. The most bluntand interesting notes was written by North, which made me wonderwhy did he put such incriminating things down on paper in such a bluntlanguage? North claims that he did so to be able to prove that his actionswas authorized148. The strongest evidence for that North did have authorizationis the fact that Judge Walsh who investigated the Iran-Contraaffair believed that North’s boss National Security Advisors Poindextercovered over the President’s and Vice President’s involvement149. Asecond important reason for the government to place the Blandón-Rossconnection as late as 1984 is Blandón’s claim that he broke with Menesesin 1983. This claim is highly unbelievable, but if Blandón’s claim was tobe believed, then Ross’ cocaine enterprise could not have been dealingcocaine supplied from the Contras through Meneses. The official assertionis that both Blandón and Ross started their career in the cocainetrade in 1982 and first in 1984 started dealing with each other. This estimationis placed fare to late. Blandón’s testimony, which is the sole sourcefor the late dates, cannot be regarded as impartial as he was employed bythe government at the time he was interviewed by the CIA. Evidence inthe official reports and in Webb’s book points towards earlier dates. Accordingto these dates Blandón’s started dealing cocaine in 1980150. Ross’entry into the cocaine business began in the early 1981151, and direct dealingbetween Blandón and Ross began late in 1983. If DOJ’s assertion is146 North 1992147 National Security Archive, The Contras, Cocaine, and Covert Operations148 North 1992149 Walsh 1997150 Webb 1998, 64151 DOJ 1998, chapter 6.2.Cright that Blandón was the supplier to Ivan, then Blandón supplied Rossindirectly from the time Ross first started buying cocaine from Fisher. Inline with evidence presented in CIA’s and DOJ’s reports, but contrary tothe reports’ conclusions, the earlier dates seems to fit better into a overalltime frame.US law enforcement had known about Meneses for years, but had neverbeen able to pin any thing on him. In 1981 Meneses’ organizationsmuggled close to a ton of cocaine into the US according to Blandón152,who worked as Meneses’ accountant since the early 1980s. In June 1980DEA received an anonymous call, which informed them that Jairo Meneseshad gone to Costa Rica to obtain 3½ kilo of cocaine. When Norwin’snephew and lieutenant Jairo was arrested in June 1981 DEA wasactively investigating Norwin for cocaine trafficking and possible gunrunning.Sandra Smith, who worked for DEA, investigated Meneses. Bymid-1981 she had enough information to sketch out a detailed picture ofoperation. It appeared that Meneses had an endless supply of cocaine incomingin from everywhere. Rumours was that Nicaraguans was briningin cocaine and taking guns back. In June 1981 Detective Joseph Lee got atip. Julio Bermudéz (not related to Enrique Bermudéz) made two trips amonth to San Francisco “where he contacts a large cocaine smuggling organizationheaded by Norwin Meneses”153. Surveillance began.On 12 November 1981 Julio left his house with a small beige suitcase anddrove off to pick up Jose Herrera. They continued to Los Angles Airportwhere they bought two one way tickets and boarded Flight 425 to SanFrancisco154. They arrived 16:30 and where pick up by Carlos Cabezas155152 Webb 1998, 61153 Webb 1998, 59154 Webb 1998, 60155 Webb 1998, 80Page 25 of 71who drove a golden Toyota registered to Jose Herrera. Cabezas tookthem to his house at 8 Bellevue Ave in Dale City, where all three went in.Soon after Julio came out, open the trunk, took out the suitcase, placed itbehind the driver seat and drove off. At this point police lost the tail onJulio, but 35 minutes later the car is spotted out side Jairo Meneses’ housein Dale City. Police arrested Julio and seized a notebook where Julio hadwritten down that he had paid Jairo $90.000. A few days later Jairo wasarrested too. The police seized a little pot, and envelope containing$9.000, O’Haus triple beam scale, a 12 gauge shotgun, a calibre .22 pistoland miscellaneous documents and passports in Jairo’s house. The casequickly fell apart. Julio was released on bail and was never seen again,and with Julio gone missing DEA decided against prosecuting Jairo156.The surveillance report shows that there was a connection between Menesesand Cabezas; a connection that the police never acknowledge.The Frogman CaseIn January 1983 FBI seized 195 kilos of cocaine while it was being unloadedfrom the Colombian freighter ‘Ciudad de Cucuta’ in San Francisco.The case is named after the frogman suits that some of the traffickerswere wearing at their arrest. The investigation that had begun a yearearlier resulted in more than 50 arrests, including Julio Zavala and CarlosCabezas, and the seizure of 250 kilos of cocaine, the biggest cocaine buston the west coast at that time157.Cabezas had fled from the revolution in 1979. He had study four years inUS to become a commercial pilot, while working as a janitor to supporthimself. After gaining his licence he went back to Nicaragua and joinedthe National Guard as a pilot. Later Cabezas took an accounting degree156 Webb 1998, 60f157 DOJ 1998, chapter 8.1.Aand was hired by Bank of America, where he became head of the Managuabranch’s foreign division. Next he took a degree in law and becamea licensed attorney in 1978, but was shortly after recalled to active dutyagainst the Sandinistas. Cabezas had to flee after the revolution as he hadparticipated in the National Guards terror bombings of Masaya. Cabezassettled in San Francisco where he worked two jobs to support his family.His work paid off and in 1981 after selling both his car and wife’s jewellerythey were able to raise $10.000, enough for a down payment on asmall house in Dale City. Cabezas had done legal research for a couple oflawyers, mainly to keep his skills in tune, but the worked made him realisehow much he missed practising law not to mention the income fromit. In order to practise law he needed to take the California bar exam, butwith a family to support, a mortgage and two jobs there was no way itcould be done; that was until he met his ex brother-in-law Zavala158.Cabezas had meet Nestor Arana at Zavala’s place who had come to pickup a suitcase. Once opened Cabezas had noticed that it was filled withneatly wrapped and stacked cash. Zavala explained that it was part of hisjob to bring cash to Miami, and that he paid Arana to do it for him. Thiswas the job that would enable Cabezas to make ends meet and do the barexam. He asked Zavala if he needed help, but his inquiry was gentlybrushed aside. The more Cabezas though about it, the more it seemedthat Zavala was the solution to his problems. Zavala had plenty ofmoney and if Cabezas could convince Zavala to give him a loan, he couldquit his two jobs and begin studying law again. In October 1981 Cabezascalled Zavala and asked him if he could come over and discuss his ideawith him. Zavala agreed. Zavala was a cocaine dealer, which was thereason why he had plenty of cash. He was nothing compared with Meneses.Zavala as Ross was a mid-level dealer who sold kilos and ounces158 Webb 1998, 76fPage 26 of 71to street dealers who supplied the addits. For several years Zavala hadbeen buying cocaine in kilos from Colombians in San Francisco andNicaraguans in Miami. So fare business had been good, but the day thatCabezas called every thing had begun crumbling around Zavala159. DEAhad arrested several people in Southern San Francisco for possession of½ kilo of cocaine. One of the women arrested was a Contra fund raisernamed Doris Salomon. She told DEA that the cocaine belonged to herboyfriend Noel. A month later DEA questioned Lilliana Blengino, whohad been arrested together with Salomon. She too told DEA that Salomonhad said that she had gotten the cocaine from her boyfriend Noel.Then Salomon 5 months later appeared in court for her bail hearing, shemade a passing reference to her boyfriend Julio Zavala. DEA checked thevisitors’ log and noticed that Zavala had visited Salomon 3 times in 11days – now DEA had the name of her boyfriend and cocaine source160.Zavala was known by the police. The month before Salomon’s arrest hehad been arrested while breaking into a woman’s apartment to collectdrug debt from her husband. She called the cops who arrested Zavala,his henchman Edmundo Rocha, and seizes 28 grams of cocaine in the Cadillacthat Zavala had parked outside. The Cadillac had been stolen inFlorida and was given to Zavala as a gift from his cocaine connection inMiami. Rocha was arrested again a month later, this time together withZavala’s girlfriend Salomon. The second time Rocha was arrest he had aslip of paper in his wallet with Julio’s name and phone number on it. Thecharges against Zavala had been drop both times, but the odds of beatingthe charges one more time was bad; and now DEA was investigatinghim. Zavala had a wide range of customers in Miami, Oakland, Chicago,San Francisco and Los Angeles. His small and successful cocaine busi-159 Webb 1998, 77160 Webb 1998, 78fness made it hard for him to stay low. He needed someone to handle hisbusiness while he stayed out of sight. It was at this time Cabezas phoned.Zavala did not offer him a loan, but a job. Cabezas would make moremoney and work shorter hours. He would be able to support his familyand have time to study. The perfect job, delivering cocaine and collectingdrug debt. He would be paid $500 per kilo he delivered and a percentageof the collected debt. As a bonus he would help the Contras Zavala toldhim, as part of the cocaine profit went to financing the Contras. It waseasy and well paid work, picking up a few kilos here and deliveringthem there. During one of the first days working for Zavala, Cabezas wasasked to pick up some of Zavala’s friends from Los Angeles at the airportand let them stay in his home while they were in town161. Cabezasagreed. He took a golden Toyota to the airport and picked up Zavala’sfriends Julio and Herrera at the airport and brought them to his home on8 Bellevue Ave in Dale City. Agent Smith who had been tailing Julio andHerrera from the airport added Cabezas’ name and address to her investigationof Meneses. Soon Zavala and Cabezas would be busted. FBIand DEA investigated the two Nicaraguans, and at least four of their customerswere informers for FBI. They feed FBI with all the informationneeded, when the cocaine arrived, how much, and who the courierswere. Evidence that the two Nicaraguans were involved in a major cocainetrafficking network piled up fast, but CIA already knew about Zavala’scocaine business. Zavala was named in a CIA cable in 1980 as thesupplier to a drug addicted Nicaraguan official, and it was not the lasttime his name appeared in CIA’s files, as CIA had at least one informantinside the organisation. In Marts 1982 FBI asked CIA to debrief the assetin the organisation periodically on behalf of FBI. As US law enforcementprepared to bust Zavala’s organisation CIA fired its informant; there was161 Webb 1998, 78ffPage 27 of 71to be no link between the drug dealers and CIA162.Hiring Cabezas had been the best thing that Zavala had done. The customersliked him, he was dependable, hard working, and would properlysoon start bring in some customers of his own. Zavala wanted to goon vacation, visit his girlfriend Salomon, who had skipped bail and waswaiting for him in Costa Rica, merry her and spend the honeymoon inCentral America. So after working 1½ month for Zavala Cabezas ran Zavala’sdrug business, met the suppliers and kept the books, which he didthoroughly as an educated accountant. According to Cabezas Zavala hadtwo independent cocaine sources. One was Alvaro Carvajal Minota, aColombian in San Francisco who worked for the Cali cartel. Cabezas negotiatedthe prices and deliveries for Zavala with the cartel on his trips toCali. The other source was in Costa Rica and it offered a much higherquality of cocaine than the Colombians. It was this cocaine that Cabezashad been told belonged to the Contras. Cabezas kept two accounts; onefor each cocaine source as prices and delivery costs were different. InDecember 1981 Cabezas got a call from Zavala. He wanted him to comedown to Costa Rica so Zavala could introduce him to some friends andbusiness associates of his; the two exile-Nicaraguans Horacio Pereira andTroilo Sánchez who was the brother of two senior FDN members: Aristidesand Fernando Sánchez. Aristides, a close friends of Norwin Meneses,was chosen by the CIA to sit on FDN’s Directorate. Fernando replacedEdmundo Meneses as ambassador to Guatemala after Edmundo’sassassination. After the revolution Fernando stayed in Guatemala as theContras’ representative in Guatemala. Troilo had been a one of Norwin’sdrinking buddies and partners before the revolution. Troilo claimed hehad flown for CIA during preparations for the Pigs of Bay invasion. In162 Webb 1998, 60, 79fCIA 1998a, paragraph 229the late 1970s Troilo had become addicted to drugs and was using mostof the family fortune on drugs, women, and gambling. Pereira and Norwinknew each other too, they had grown up the same place, and theyhad been business partners before the revolution. The meeting was indentedas a purely social event, but according to Cabezas they ended updiscussing Pereira and Troilo’s idea of trafficking cocaine to raise fundfor the Contras; both Zavala and Troilo admit they trafficked cocaine, butdenied that they did so for the Contras163.In January 1982 Cabezas was send back to Costa Rica to pick up twokilos of cocaine from Pereira, but to Cabezas surprise Pereira was notcomfortable with the arrangement any more. Pereira had changed hismind because he had received information that Zavala was drinking tooheavily, and now he was affright that Zavala might spend the Contras’profits on his own needs. Cabezas conceded that Zavala was drinkingheavily and was neglecting his responsibilities, forgetting to pay theColombians, and covering his debt to the Colombians by selling of someof Pereira’s cocaine. Pereira wanted the deal changed, so that Cabezasand not Zavala responsible for the cocaine and money. Cabezas calledZavala and explained the situation to him. As he was going to be heldpersonally responsible for the cocaine and money he wanted half of theprofits instead of only $500 per kilos he had been paid so fare. Zavalaagreed as he had to. Cabezas travelled to Honduras with Pereria wherethey stayed at the home of Pereria’s brother-in-law Francisco Aviles, whowas a senior member of UDN, for a couple of days while they waited forthe cocaine to arrive164. Cabezas told investigators that he personally carried12 kilos cocaine in all back on several trip for Pereria in the first halfof 1982, and he was not the only mule brining in the cocaine. Cabezas163 Webb 1998, 70f, 81f164 Webb 1998, 83fPage 28 of 71made 20 trips to Miami and Costa Rica in 1982 carrying $64.000 on eachtrip making a total of at least $1.280.000. Cabezas claims that he once delivered$250.000 to Sánchez and Hereria, a claim which is backed by FBI’srecords. Cabezas delivered $50.000 a month to Aristides Sánchez inMiami. The cash that Cabezas carried to Central America, he handedover to Pereria or an FDN logistics officer named Joaquin ‘Pelon’ Vegawho lived in Honduras. If no one in San Francisco were able to make thedeliveries either Fernando Sánchez or Pereira would bring the moneyback to Central America. FBI knew what was going on thanks to theirwire taps and CIA’s debriefing of the asset working in Zavala’s organisation165.Cabezas was introduced to Ivan Gomez by Troilo and Pereira as CIA’sman in Costa Rica during a meeting in the spring of 1982, and was toldthat “Gomez was there to ensure that the profits from the cocaine went to theContras and not into someone’s pocket”166. Cabezas met Ivan Gomez onemore time; at an airport in Costa Rica with Pereira. CIA confirmed one oftheir agents used the cover name Ivan Gomez during the 1980s, butstates that the Cabezas’ description of Gomez did not match their descriptionof Gomez besides curly black hair and fluent Spanish. Cabezaswas unable to pick out Gomez’s picture when asked to do so by CIA’s investigators15 years after he last saw him. Gomez denied ever havingmet with Cabezas, Pereira or Troilo, and according to CIA Gomez wasnot in Costa Rica at the time of the first meeting in April or May. Troilodenied meeting with Gomez, but claimed that he was introduced by Menesesto another CIA agent named Roberto. Three high-ranking CostaRican Contras, Pastora, Prado, and Aguado, claimed that they workedwith a CIA agent, assigned to help build the southern front during the165 Webb 1998, 84fCIA 1998a, paragraph 269166 CIA 1998a, paragraph 231early years, named Ivan Gomez167.Who Ivan Gomez is, is unknown, and informations about him is minuscule,but according to the information that Webb had gathered, Gomez isproperly Venezuelan and related to Carlos Andrés Pérez, the formerVenezuelan president. Clarridge who was in charge of the Contras from1981-1984 denied knowing that Gomez worked for CIA, but their ownreport confirms that Gomez did work for CIA from June 1982 to Marts1988. CIA’s report states that Gomez was not in Costa Rica in May, but inWashington for a job interview with CIA. Further CIA claims thatGomez had applied for Juan Gomez as his covert name, but because ofhis bad handwriting CIA issued him Ivan Gomez as his covert namewhen he was hired in June 1982. Based on these two claims Cabezas’claim of Gomez involvement in the drug trafficking operation was refused.Before Gomez was reassigned from Costa Rica to another CentralAmerican country in October 1984 CIA had become worried about thatGomez had become to close to ARDE. During 1986-1988 Gomez underwentnumerous polygraph examinations, and during a examination inMarts 1987 he admitted that he had help a family member traffic drugand launder money in the US in Marts or April 1982; around the sametime as Cabezas claimed he first was introduced to Gomez in either Aprilor May 1982. Gomez also admitted that he had helped his brother-in-law,a Miami based drug trafficker, carrying drug proceeds from New York toMiami. Gomez and his brother-in-law was handed $35.000 in a brownpaper bag, which he believed was drug proceeds. Although Gomez admittedtrafficking drugs and laundering money CIA did not refer thecase to DOJ for criminal investigation as Gomez admitted crimes was notsufficient to indicated that there was criminal intentions in the eyes of167 Webb 1998, 84fCIA 1998a, paragraph 231-236, 240Page 29 of 71CIA. According to CIA’s report Gomez admitted being involved in drugtrafficking and money laundering before he was hired by CIA. From thepolygraph examination it is unclear whenever he trafficked while heworked for CIA as he was asked whenever he had trafficked drugs eitherbefore or after was hired by CIA. As only yes or no answer are allowedin a polygraph examination. From CIA’s report it appears that Gomezwas asked questions that only could be inconclusive as his ‘yes’ answerwas. Since CIA chose only to ask inconclusive question it appears thatCIA had no wish to know. CIA’s report states that CIA was still in doubtafter the 1987 polygraph examination if Gomez had trafficked drugs afterhe was hired. But after another polygraph examination in Marts 1988CIA was sure168.Based on the interview, the interviewer believes Gomez directlyparticipated in illegal drug transactions, concealed participation inillegal drug transactions, and concealed information about involvementin illegal drug activity169.There are clear indications in the report that Gomez did indeed smuggledrugs while he worked for CIA. The report confirms that CIA protectedtheir agent from criminal investigation and continued to use him. In 1985an informant told FBI that one of Gomez’s brothers was arranging cocaineshipments with Roberto Suarez, who was the worlds largest producerof cocaine at the time. CIA knew of Gomez family ties to drug traffickers,but as Gomez received fine reviews for his work, his colleaguesand bosses were determined to keep him as an agent170.He was loyal to us. I was supportive of him throughout (...) What168 CIA 1998b, paragraphs 664f, 661, 668, 672, 675, 681f, 714169 CIA 1998b, paragraph 675170 CIA 1998b, paragraphs 700, 708comes across now is the lack of focus on the legal aspects. I was notalone, obviously. It is a striking commentary on me and everyonethat this guy’s involvement in narcotics didn’t weigh more heavilyon me or the system. We were looking more heavily on this officer’scontribution than this incident, accidental or not171.Pereira was arrested in December 1982. An informant had told FBI thatPereira would be flying to Costa Rica via Miami with $80-100.000 in drugproceeds. Then arrested in Miami Pereira was carrying $70.000 that hehad failed to declare. FBI wire taps records shows that Pereira calledCabezas from the jail and told him he needed money. Cabezas repliedthat Jairo Meneses was giving him money to pass on to him. Pereira, whoFBI knew was a major drug trafficker, was fine a minor fine for failing todeclaring the $70.000 and when set free. As soon as Pereira was back inCosta Rica in January 1983 he called Cabezas and told him to get ready toreceived “some material” that he would send him. Pereira continued hisdrug trafficking until 1986 when he was arrested in Costa Rica on drugcharges and sentenced to 12 years imprisonment172. While Pereira hadbeen detained for not declaring the $70.000 FBI had made the first arrestsin what became known as the Frogman case. Through wire taps FBI discoveredthat a cocaine shipment would arrive on a Colombian freighter.Two men was arrested on 22 December 1982 as they were carrying 17.5kilo cocaine off the Colombian freighter ‘Ciudad de Nieva’. In the firstweek of January 1983 another Colombian freighter ‘Ciudad de Cucuta’arrived in San Francisco. FBI knew ‘Ciudad de Cucuta’ as they during aprevious raid had found cocaine on board the ship. A stakeout was setup. On 17 January 1983 the traffickers arrived, some dressed in wetsuits,to unload their cocaine shipment. FBI moved in and arrested all the traf-171 CIA 1998b, paragraph 711172 CIA 1998, n22Webb 1998, 87fPage 30 of 71fickers who was heavily armed; no surprise considering the value of the195 kilo cocaine shipment on the ship. Two week later police seized 67.5kilo cocaine on board another Colombian freighter. Cabezas and Zavalawere arrested along with their Colombian supplier and some minor drugdealers during 14 simultaneous police raids in San Francisco on 15 February1983173.Details of the Colombian involvement with the drug rings was passed onto the press, but not Meneses’ name. Zavala and Cabezas lawyers wereforced to get a court order to get the DOJ to release the documents andacknowledge the searches of Jairo Meneses and Julio Bermúdez’s houses.DOJ claimed that the searches were unimportant to the case, but the defencelawyers came to a different conclusion. They accused FBI of concealthe identity of individuals who had either distributed or supplied cocaineto the individuals in the case. The records showed, the defence lawyersclaimed, that there was a direct and ongoing connection betweenNorwin Meneses’ organistation and Cabezas. The press In Costa Ricaand Nicaragua gave the Frogman case had a different spin, it was not theColombians that were in focus, as the Sandinista paper ‘Barricada’ reported174:Narcotics police of San Francisco, California, carried out a haul lastWednesday of 20 cocaine traffickers, among whom are severalNicaraguans who supported through this criminal activity the economicneeds of Contra groups175.Before Zavala’s trial began the defence handed Judge Roberrt Peckhamtwo letters that were addressed to the court and concerned Zavala’s173 Webb 1998, 88ff174 Webb 1998, 90f175 Webb 1998, 90activities on behalf the Contras. One was written by Pereira’s brother-inlawAviles, who indentified himself as the international relations secretaryof UDN. The other letter was written by Aviles and Vicenta RappaccioloMarquis on behalf the Conservative Party of Nicaraguans in Exile(PCNE). The two letters stated that Zavala’s was a Contra official whowas working for the Contras at the time of his arrest. Zavala was accordingto the letters assistant treasurer of PCNE and a long time member ofUDN. During the raid on Zavala’s apartment police discovered $36.020in his night drawer and seized it as drug proceeds along with cocaineand drug paraphernalia that was found in the apartment. According tothe letters the seized money belonged to the Contras who had asked Zavalato make a some purchases for them in San Francisco. The Contraswanted their money back and Aviles was willing to testify if necessary.Zavala’s defence attorney wanted to go to Costa Rica and take the twoContras’ deposition. If their story was true then he would defend Zavalaon the ground that176:[A]gents of the U.S. Government were intricately involved in thealleged conspiracy and either sanctioned the use of cocaine traffickingto raise funds for the Contra revolutionary activity and/or entrappedthe Defendant into participating under the belief that suchactivity was sanctioned177.Judge Peckham sealed the documents on the defence’s requested, as thedefence feared that if their identity became known to the US Government,it could expose the two Contras to political pressure or harm. Aftera second meeting Judge Peckham orders the prosecution to go to CostaRica and take the two depositions. A week later CIA learns from its LosAngeles office that Aviles and Rappacciolo were to be questioned in con-176 Webb 1998, 91f177 Webb 1998, 92Page 31 of 71nection with Zavala’s trial178. The CIA cable stated that the Los Angelesoffice was:concerned that this kind of uncoordinated activity [i.e., the AUSAand FBI visit and depositions] could have serious implications foranti-Sandinista activities in Costa Rica and elsewhere179.Here the first mix up occurs then CIA misidentified Vicente RappaccioliMarquis with on of their agents with same name, but whom was 10 yearsolder; both Rappacciolis worked for the Contras. Aviles was elected assecretary of the CIA funded PCNE in 1982 but was kicked out of PCNEaccording to CIA in August 1983 because of his handling of the organisationsmoney. A 1984 CIA cable stated that Aviles relationship with theContras should be terminate as it would be most damaging if he continuedto be part of the movement, which indicates he was not fired in 1983.Yet another cable claimed that Aviles was fired in 1986 as the UDN commanderFernando Chamorro was outraged because of Aviles’ connectionto drug trafficking. In the summer of 1984 Chamorro had begun smugglingdrugs with Meneses according to a CIA cable. CIA’s conclusionwas that he wrote the court and claimed that the drug tainted money beforehe joined the Contras later in 1984 and was subsequently fired whenChamorro found out about Aviles’ drug connection. It is more likely thatthe reason for Aviles’ dismissal have to do with the fact that in 1986 thepress was beginning to uncovering the link between the Frogman caseand the Contras. CIA’s report states that they feared the link would beperceived as if CIA was funnelling money into drug trafficking and usingthe proceeds to fund an illegal insurgence. Hence the confusingclaims. The alternative time frame produced in CIA’s report eliminates178 Webb 1998, 92-95CIA 1998a, paragraphs 309-315179 CIA 1998a, paragraphs 314connections between the Frogman case and the Contras and between theFrogman case and CIA. Admitting that Aviles was an active and electedmember of the CIA funded Contra organisation when he wrote the court,it would confirm that there was indeed a link between the drug traffickers,the CIA financed Contras and CIA. If the alternative time frame wastrue it would creates problems too. UDN left ARDE and rejoined the CIArun FDN in 1984. When scrutinising the statements in CIA’s report it isappearent that Aviles was an elected and leading member of PNCE atthe time of the Frogman case, and was fired sometime in 1986 when thepress learned about the links to the Frogman case180.When CIA in August 1984 learned about the two letters from its Contraofficials and that their dispositions were to be taken CIA intervened. CIAasked their Costa Rican office not to contact Aviles or Rappaccioli as theyhad a plan, and if it worked then Aviles and Rappaccioli would not bequestioned. A meeting with the prosecution, US Attorney Zanides, hadbeen arranged. CIA was concerned about the disclosure of the two Contrasidentity, Zanides recalled, and therefore preferred Aviles and Rappaccioli’snot to be questioned. CIA did not explain their interest in thecase was, but simply stated that they would be very grateful, if the depositionswere not taken. A problem that Zanides could understand, butthere was another problem. Neither Zanides nor CIA knew the contentsof the two letters. Zanides filled a motion asking that he be allowed tosee the letters, since it would help the prosecution preparing to take thedepositions. There was no need to unseal the letters, Zanides argued, aslong as the prosecution was allowed to see them, and since the prosecutionhad to take the dispositions of the two Contras, the prosecutionwould have to learn their identities at one point or another. But the Judge180 CIA 1998a, paragraphs 252-254, 312-313, 317, 326, 353Webb 1998, 210Scott 1998, 105Page 32 of 71reasoned that since the letters had been sealed to prevent the governmentfrom learning the identity of the two Contras their would be no need tokeep them under seal as the prosecution were about to take their dispositions.Judge Peckham unsealed the letters. As soon as Zanides and CIAhad finished reading the letters, Zanides went back to the court and requestedthat the letters be placed under seal until the prosecution couldprepare private presentation on why the letters should not be made publicat all. So judge Peckham sealed the two letters he just had unsealedearlier that day. A deal was worked out; the prosecution would returnthe $36.020 to Zavala if the defence would not press the issue of takingthe depositions181.The consul in Costa Rica had been informed that it was ‘funny farm’ whohad the dispositions cancelled. The consul was not sure but thought thatfunny farm meant CIA. The consul had asked the local CIA office, andthey cabled headquarters for advise so the consul could be reassured thatCIA had no hand in the cancellation. It would appeared as if the CostaRican office were attempting to avoid getting their hands dirty; theyknew from earlier cables that headquarters had attempted to avoid thedispositions taken. Instead headquarters cabled back that the prosecutionhad been contacted to avoid inquiries in into CIA’s activities and interestsand the prosecution had on CIA’s request returned the seizedmoney to Zavala and would not introduced it at the trial. The cable continuedby explaining that the prosecution would never have been able todisprove defendant’s claim that the money belonged to CIA, especialconsidering the link to the Contras, and that CIA was lucky that they hadthe dispositions cancelled. Only God knows, the cable said, what othertestimony Aviles and Rappacciolis would give, considering that their let-181 Webb 1998, 95ffCIA 1998a, paragraph 253, 322ters linked CIA and the Contras directly to the biggest cocaine bust onthe west coast. As long as any relationship continue to exist between Zavala,Rappaccioli and Aviles, the cable continued, then Aviles and Rappaccioli’sclaim of the drug tainted money would make it look like CIAfunds was diverted by into the drug trade. And as long as Aviles andRappaccioli play any part in the Contras, the cable stated, then any publicdisclosure would as a certain element have the fact that Aviles andRappaccioli worked for CIA. There is no certain date for then Aviles wasfired, and both 1983, 1984 and 1986 have been mentioned in the report asthe year he was fired, but as the cable is from 1984 it is a strong indicatethat he was still active in the Contras in 1984182. The US Attorney Officedenies that they returned the money because of CIA’s request, and saidthat the money was returned as the costs of proving that the money weredrug proceeds were higher than the amount seized183.There is no mention in neither DOJ nor CIA’s reports of the amount ofcocaine that Zavala’s organisation smuggled into the US for the Contras,but the amount appears to be minor according to the reports. Accordingto FBI Cabezas’ ledger only documents the import of 7 to 8 kilos cocainewhereas Cabezas claimed that he personally imported between 10-30kilos of cocaine184. The official claims that the amount of cocaine wasminor, is not consistent with the fact that 250 kilos cocaine was seizedand that it was the biggest drug bust on the west coast at that time185. Accordingto Costa Rican authorities Pereria was the biggest trafficker inCosta Rica in the early 1980s186. Cabezas claims that Pereira had told him,that:182 CIA 1998a, paragraph 326, 348-360DOJ 1998, chapter 8.E.2, 12.C.1183 CIA 1998a, paragraph 348-360184 DOJ 1998, chapter 9.F.3185 DOJ 1998, chapter 8.1.A186 Webb 1998, 84Page 33 of 71he [Pereira] was representing the UDN-FARN and FDN in CostaRica and that they had choosen Zavala’s organisation to sell the cocainethey were getting in from Peru. He said the money was goingto the Contras and that the CIA would control the delivery of themoney187.CIA’s files contains informations which supports Cabezas’ claim as wewill see. It is uncertain whenever Zavala claimed to be trafficking for theContras as CIA’s report both stated that he claimed and denied it. CIAknew about Zavala as early as 1980 when an CIA asset identified him asa Miami based supplier to a drug addicted Nicaraguan government official.As the asset continued to have contact with Zavala US law enforcementasked CIA in Marts 1982 to debrief the asset periodically so theycould gather information on Zavala’s organisation. Same year CIA terminatedrelations with the asset as it according to CIA was not worth theconsiderable expenditure188. The true reason might well be that CIAknew from information they were passing on to FBI that the drug organisationwas going to get busted, and to prevent CIA from appearing inthe middle of a 250 kilos cocaine case, CIA terminated its contract withtheir drug dealing informant in Zavala’s part of the organisation. CIA acknowledgedthat:a relative of one of those arrested or charged in the 1983 FrogmanCase did have a relationship with CIA until mid-1982. That relationshipbegan in the late 1970s based upon the individual’s accessto information concerning Nicaraguan Sandinista activities189.187 Webb 1998, 83188 CIA 1998a, paragraph 229, 307189 CIA 1998a, paragraphs 307From the information in CIA’s report, it is not possible to determine if itis the same asset that is discussed or if it is two different assets. Howeverwe know that an CIA asset had knowledge about Zavala’s drug traffickingoperations, that an CIA asset was related to Zavala or a member ofthe organization, that one of the Contra was misidentified with an CIAasset with the same name, that Cabezas claimed to have meet a CIA asset,who’s relatives there drug trafficker and who CIA believed to havebeen drug trafficking himself while working for CIA, that CIA got involvedin the prosecution of Zavala’s case to have the depositions of thetwo Contras cancelled, that the two Contras worked for CIA in two Contrasfractions that were funded by CIA, and that one of them was misidentifiedtoo as an CIA asset. Pereira and Sánchez denies trafficking forthe Contras, although they did admit to traffic cocaine. The two Contraleaders Fernando and Aristides admits that they knew that Zavala,Pereira together with their brother Troilo were trafficking drugs.Fernando and Aristides denied involvement or receiving money, but aFBI report stated that Fernando, Pereira and Troilo were Zavala andCabezas’ cocaine suppliers. There was a relationship between the Contrasand Cabezas, Zavala, Pereira and Troilo Sánchez190.UDN served as the southern branch of FDN as CIA had forced UDN tojoin in September 1981, but a year later in September 1982 UDN left FDNand united with Pastora’s group to create ARDE based in Costa Rica. Themerger of UDN with Pastora’s group into ARDE was politically sensible,as both groups had once been part of the Sandinistas struggle against Somoza.Both groups hated the National Guardsmen that controlled FDN,and both Chamorro and Pastora had gained national fame during theirfight against the Somoza regime. Chamorro no longer reported Bermúdezbut to Pastora. In reality little changed as Pastora and Bermúdez190 CIA 1998a, paragraph 314, 326Page 34 of 71reported to CIA who paid both of them. It was at this time when ARDEwas created in September 1982 that Meneses’ cocaine profits started tobankroll ARDE according to Webb. That Meneses’ cocaine profits firstbegan help funding ARDE in 1982 seems valid, but it could have beguneven earlier. Pereira and Meneses were trafficking cocaine together beforethe overthrow of Somoza Troilo Sánchez told DOJ investigators. Meneses’connections was not limited to FDN Contras but did also includedUDN in which Pereira’s brother-in-law was a member, and to whichfunds were diverted according to Webb191.There is contradiction in the story as Webb tells it. As the story goes Zavalawas already getting cocaine from Pereira and Sánchez in Costa Ricawhen Cabezas started working for Zavala in October or November 1981.If Cabezas account of the December meeting in Costa Rica is correct,when the it was at this point that it was decided that the Costa Rican cocainewould be used to fund the Contras, and hence the cocaine then becameContra cocaine in December 1981. This conflicts with the Cabezas’earlier claim; that Zavala had told him, then he started working for him acouple of months earlier, that some of the proceeds would go to the Contras.We must bear in mind that must of the testimony is collected duringthe investigations in 1996-1998. Testifying on events 15 years earliermeans that the placement of certain events at the correct time and datesis bound to be flawed. Webb concluded that the the cocaine proceedsfrom Cabezas and Zavala cocaine sales supported UDN192. This conclusionpuzzles me a bit, because according to FBI then Zavala and Cabezas’Costa Rican cocaine source were Troilo Sánchez, Fernando Sánchez andHoracio Pereira193, and according to Cabezas the cocaine profits were191 Webb 1998, 87DOJ 1998, chapter 9.E.6192 Webb 1998, 85193 Webb 1998, 84Scott 1998, 107sometimes handed to Aristides Sánchez. Since Fernando and AristidesSánchez were members of FDN, it do seems as if the cocaine Cabezas andZavala were selling came from FDN. However Cabezas claimed that thecocaine helped fund UDN194, of which Pereria’s brother-in-law, Avileswas a member and who provided Zavala with a letter, stating that themoney seized during Zavala’s arrest belong PNCE and UDN195. SebastianGonzalez was according to the Kerry report a central figure in thePereira network. Gonzalez were an high-ranking member of ARDEwhich UDN joined in 1982. A possible indication that the cocaine proceedshelped UDN is CIA’s worry that the depositions of Aviles andRappaccioli could “have serious implications for anti-Sandinista activities inC osta Ricaa and elsewhere”196. There is the geographical proximity, UDNwas based in Costa Rica where Zavala and Cabezas’ cocaine came from,whereas FDN was based in Honduras197, but Costa Rica might also justreferrer to John Hull’s farm, which was used as a Contras airbase and amajor transit point for drugs and guns. I would assume that the cocaineand profits helped both UDN and FDN, which UDN was part of untilSeptember 1982.It is seems like another attempted denial in CIA’s report that it states thatZavala denies that Meneses worked for him or that they worked togethertrafficking drugs for the Contras. Norwin Meneses knew Pereira, Zavala,Cabezas, Troilo, and Fernando Sánchez, and he was involved in the theirdrug smuggling activities if not directing them. Police surveillance andwire taps shows that there was a link between the Frogman case and Meneses.Cabezas receive money from Jairo Meneses to give to Pereira then194 CIA 1998a, paragraph 265195 CIA 1998a, paragraphs 243-386a Author’s emphasize196 CIA 1998a, paragraph 314197Scott 1998, 108Webb 1998, 80, 85Page 35 of 71he was jailed. CIA knew about Zavala’s drug trafficking operation too.They were involved too such a degree that they had to intervene to protecttheir interests once law enforcement started unrevealing the drugnetwork. In short: Meneses and CIA were involved in the Frogman case,and funds from CIA was diverted from the Contra organisations intodrug trafficking198. But did CIA know what was going on? As we will seethe answer is yes, but could one expect CIA not to know? Through theirinformant they knew a lot more than FBI did.Guns and DrugsCIA knew about Zavala’s drug trafficking and that was not the only drugtrafficking operation CIA was ware of. The Guatemala based Legion ofSeptember 15, which Bermúdez became leader of in 1980, had been heavilyinvolved in crime to fund their activities. The Legion had kidnapped,extorted and robbed but it was not able to finance their missions, suchthe hijacking and bombing of a civilian Nicaraguan airlines. In order tofeed and cloths its members the Legion had sought to finance itselfthrough crime, which was known to the CIA199. Still CIA choose it isleaders to form the core of the Contras. There were no room for other independentgroups, like UDN, who was forced to join FDN under the Legion’sleadership if they wanted to stay in the fight. Legion and UDNmeet at the CIA rented farm, to sign the CIA drafted documents, andelect its CIA chosen leaders in September 1981200. Same month CIAheadquarters had received a cable, which stated that the Legion had decidedto engage in drug trafficking to raise funds for their activities. Thecable stated that a successful trial run had occurred in July and that thedrug proceeds had been handed over to one of the Legion’s members in198 Webb 1998, 80199 CIA 1998b, paragraph 180200 Webb 1998, 70ffMiami201. CIA’s information came from a single source, which CIA discreditedin another cable from October 1981 where the source is describedas “untrustworthy and a possible agent of the Government ofNicaragua”202. But the discredited source was right. A CIA cable fromFebruary 1982 described that the information did not concern the Legionitself, but a renegade splinter group, which used the Legion’s name.What in the CIA cable is describe as a renegade splinter group was infact the Legion’s elite unit203.CIA received a steady stream of informations during 1981-1982 that indictedthat UDN and FDN were involved in organised crime. In January1981 Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (ATF) had requested thatCIA provide them with a brief background information on FrancescoJose Cardenal and any derogatory information as he was believed to violatedUS criminal laws under jurisdiction of ATF204. CIA forwarded biographicalbackground information and noted that Cardenal “was in contactwith a group of Nicaraguans who are preparing an invasion of Nicaraguafrom Honduras and Costa Rica”205. When AFT a month later requested furtherinformation, CIA replied that it had no additional information and“no interest in Cardenal whatsoever”206. In fact Cardenal was one of theearliest leaders of UDN and became a member of FDN when they wereunited in September 1981. In 1982 Cardenal travelled extensively tryingto unite the different Contras groups. There is no information in the CIAreport that Cardenal worked for CIA, but it appears that he did until hewas kick out of FDN in 1983207. A 1983 CIA cable states that “has shown adisregard for security by indiscriminately divulging details of confidential in-201 CIA 1998b, paragraph 181, 194202 CIA 1998b, paragraph 197203 CIA 1998b, paragraph 179, 183, 196, 197204 CIA 1998b, paragraph 631-633205 CIA 1998b, paragraph 632206 CIA 1998b, paragraph 633207 CIA 1998b, paragraph 621Page 36 of 71formation”208. In Marts 1981 FBI contacted CIA because FBI were investigatingNeutrality Act violations by Cardenal and UDN. FBI believed thatUDN had ties to the US and requested information on both Cardenal andUDN209. In April FBI informed CIA that they had monitored a conversation,and that they might have to make it public if the case went to trial.What the content of the conversation was or who participated is notknown, but the conversation and/or the persons involved must have hadsome interest to CIA, since FBI felt it necessary to inform CIA about theexistence of the tape and its possible publication210. In October 1982 INScontacted CIA for informations on Cardenal and UDN.According to this [INS’] informant, there are indications of linksbetween [a specific U.S.-based religious organization] and twoNicaraguan counter-revolutionary groups [UDN and FDNa].These links involve an exchange in [the United States] of narcoticsfor arms, which then are shipped to Nicaragua211.INS’ informant had mentioned that Cardenal had been invited to speakat a exile Cuban freedom rally, organised by a group with ties to Omega7a, an exile Cuban terrorist group. The INS informant supplied informationabout a upcoming meeting in Costa Rica, attended by FDN, UDNand the Unification Church, where the arms for drugs deal would be discussed.According to CIA’s report CIA was unable to find any informationthat indicated that the drugs for arms meeting in Costa Rica tookplace, but CIA was able to confirm that Cardenal was in Costa Rica at thealleged time of the meeting and that he was in San Francisco at the time208 CIA 1998b, paragraph 638209 CIA 1998b, paragraph 634210 CIA 1998b, paragraph 636a Authors addition211 CIA 1998b, paragraph 623a See Chomsky Superpower Principlesof another meeting mentioned by INS source212. According to CIA’s reportINS’ information was disregarded because it did not make sense toCIA. Therefore CIA concluded that INS had been misinformed213. Againinformation was discredited and the informant labelled unreliable andCIA refuted the allegations. Two years later then ADRE refused to unitedunder FDN leadership CIA surfaced information that indicated thatARDE were heavily involved in drug trafficking to fund their operations.One of the names named that would participant in the Costa Rican armsfor drugs meeting was the FDN member Renato Pena, who was interviewedby CIA during its investigation. Pena, was a drug trafficker as hehimself admits, but he denied having trafficked for the Contras. Penasaid that he was appointed FDN representative in northern California inthe late 1982 by Edgar Chamorro. Pena claims that he never travelledoutside of the US due to his immigrations application, and hence neverparticipated in the alleged arms for drugs meeting in Costa Rica. Penaand Meneses knew each other, and Pena knew that Meneses dealt withBermúdez and the Contras. Pena made a interesting claim, that the Contrasmust have had an alternative source of funding, as the funds they receivedfrom the US was “peanuts”214. Pena had meet an Colombian associateof Meneses who told him that portions of the proceeds from the cocainePena brought from them went to the Contras. In 1984 Pena was removedfrom his position as FDN representative, because because he wasunder investigation for drug trafficking. Instead he was appointed militaryrepresentative for FDN in San Francisco by Bermúdez, which accordingto Pena happened “in part because of Norwin Meneses’ close relationshipwith [Enrique] Bermudez”215.212 CIA 1998b, paragraph 623, 625, 628, 638213 CIA 1998b, paragraph 628214 CIA 1998b, paragraph 653215 CIA 1998b, paragraph 654Page 37 of 71According to all the CIA agent that was interviewed for the CIA report,drug trafficking did not happened and none of them have any recollectionof any drug trafficking by anyone connected with the Contras. Theoverriding priority was to support the Contras. Narcotics was not on theradar screen at the time one agent said. The standard worldwide covertoperation practice was to report any criminal activity to the station director,who was responsible for forwarding the information to Headquarters.As we will discus later, CIA was not obligated to report narcotics violationto US law enforcement, and agents involved in covert operationswere exempted from any obligation at all to report crimes to law enforcement.According to CIA’s Central American personal the one and overridingpriority was ousting the Sandinistas. Politics complicated the taskand it was understood that Congressional restrictions had to be honouredas one CIA agent explained, and then continued216:At the same time, they were determined that the various difficultiesthey encountered not be allowed to prevent effective implementationof the Contra program.217[T]here was a range of derogatory information that may have includednarcotics activities. Early traces revealed these folks shouldbe treated carefully. Some were scoundrels. (...) but we were goingto play with these guys. That was made clear by Casey and (...)Clarridge218.Norwin Meneses was, by most accounts, known as the man to see if yourwanted to join the Contras219. DEA agent Sandra Smith, who had been in-216 CIA 1998b, paragraph 44-176217 CIA 1998b, paragraph 121218 CIA 1998b, paragraph 150219 Webb 1998, 103vestigation the Meneses family, believed that Meneses was running adrug trafficking organization that possible was involved in arms smugglingtoo. Sandra Smith’s hunch was correct. Two days after the Bolandamendment were lifted in 1986 Meneses’ lieutenant Blandón was arrested.According to Sergeant Tom Gordon in LASD Blandón was in chargeof a complex cocaine smuggling operation which laundered the proceedsthrough a bank in Florida, and then used to buy arms for the Contras220.Ronald Lister had worked for Blandón almost since the time thatBlandón had begun working for Meneses. Lister, a former military policeofficer, police officer and a convicted felon, had left law enforcement in1980 and founded Pyramid International, a private security firm. In 1981Lister meet Blandón whom introduced him to Meneses. Lister was hiredand paid in cash to “provided physical security for both men”221. Lister wasinvolved in Blandón’s cocaine business too. Lister’s employee, BillDowning, had told Lister that Meneses and Blandón were cocaine dealersand had suggested that they started to sell cocaine for Blandón. Listerapproached Blandón and “began doing business with him right away”222.Lister’s admitted cocaine trading is not the interesting aspect of his career,that is his arms trading. According to Christopher Moore, one ofLister’s employees, Lister was doing business in Central America, specificallyin El Salvador, where he was involved in arms trading andhelping the Contras, supposedly on behalf the [U.S.] government. Iremember the longest conversations with him – “I’m protected.You’re working for the government. Don’t worry about anything.I’m protected, I’m protected”. I don’t know if that was true or not,but I do know that we stooped worrying about domestic securityjobs and started concentrating on foreign ones223.220 Webb 1998, 307f221 CIA 1998a, paragraph 129222 CIA 1998a, paragraph 129223 Webb 1998, 108Page 38 of 71Moore started working for Lister in 1982 and was shortly after asked tofly to El Salvador and babysit a government while Lister returned to US.Moore agreed, to what became the strangest trip of his life. As Moore didnot speak much Spanish he was accompanied by a man who had introducedhimself as the El Salvadorian consul in Los Angeles, who wouldbe his guide and interpretor during the trip. Moore was flown to an airbase,which the French were building, and to a series of meetings withMajor Roberto D’Aubuisson at Ramada Inn in San Salvador. The head ofthe El Salvadorian parliament Ray Prendes attended one of the meetings.D’Aubuisson and Prendes appeared to have a role in the award of the securitycontract that Lister was seeking. Whenever Lister got the contractor not, Moore did not know. Moore stopped working for Lister in 1983just after Lister began dealing in heavy weapons. Lister is often describedas a man that boasted about having good connections and bugging capabilitiescapable of getting any information any time224. If it is true or not;we do not know, but Frederico Cruz who owned Ramada Inn in San Salvadorwhere Moore and Lister stayed was not in doubt. Lister did whathe said he did; sold arms to the Contras225. In October 1982 Lister’s PyramidInternational had a contract proposal to the El Salvadoran defenceminister for a variety of services that included armed escort service andbodyguards for El Salvadoran public officials, including the presidentand top political and military leaders, protection of sensitive installationsfrom sabotage and terrorism, installation of sophisticated electronic technology,including radio sensors and explosives detectors, at key militaryand industrial installations; but the contract proposal was just but a coverfor another operation according to Timothy LaFrance, a San Diego basedarms manufacture and business partner with Lister at the time. The real224 Webb 1998, 107f225 Webb 1998, 110foperation was to set up arms manufacturing facilities in El Salvador forthe Contras. LaFrance described Lister’s business, Pyramid International,as “a private vendor that the CIA used to do things [the agency] could not do”226. LaFrance said that he twice accompanied Lister to El Salvador as aweapons specialist and helped set up facilities to make pistols for theContras. By setting up arms production in El Salvador US law could becircumvented and the Contras supplied with arms. Attached to Lister’sSalvadoran contract proposal, was a list of nameless biographies whereone employee is identified as a “specialist in the design and manufacture ofunique weapons”227. LaFrance have made custom made weapons forRambo and Miami Vice, and Moore confirmed that Lister had a friendwho was a arms manufacture in San Diego, although Moore could notrecall the name. To LaFrance it was obvious that Lister had friends inhigh places as once LaFrance applied in Pyramid’s name for a State Departmentpermit to take high powered rifles out of the US; it was approvedin two days instead of the usual three months228.The Super Crack Dealer Freeway RickyThe Contras made a policy decision traffic drugs as a means to financetheir operations; information that CIA disregarded. The Contras passedon CIA funds to a drug dealer in the Frogman case, which its many linksto CIA and in which CIA intervened. The Frogman case did have links toMeneses, who was suspected of being involved in guns for drugs trades.Meneses’ employee Lister was involved in supplying the Contras withguns. Meneses supplied Blandón with cocaine, who in turn suppliedRoss. If a just small proceed from the Meneses-Blandón cocaine made itback to the Contras, then it would have been a huge income as Ross was226 Webb 1998, 111227 Webb 1998, 112228 Webb 1998, 111fPage 39 of 71one of the biggest domestic dealers in the mid-1980s. Ross confirmed incourt for the prosecution, where he testified in a criminal case against thecops who had tried and failed to arrest him, that he ran a multi-milliondollars crack-cocaine empire in Los Angeles.Jerry Guzzetta was a narcotics detective in the small town of Bell andhad worked with two federal agents in a investigation of local a drugdealer. When IRS received a tip about the two customers who were makinglarge cash deposit on a regular basis in two local banks the federalagents asked Guzzetta for help. Guzzatta trailed the two customers.Jacinto and Edgar Torres owned the used car lot were Blandón worked.The brothers travelled Los Angeles extensively, picking up and droppingoff packages all over Los Angeles, and then there was their midnight tripto South Central where Ross lived. When police raided one of the Torresbrothers’ houses in August 1986, Guzzatta discovered $400.000 in cashbut no drugs. Like most smart drug dealers the Torres brothers had hiddrugs and cash at different locations. The brothers’ weak spot turn out tobe their girlfriends, who were Pablo Escobar’s cousins. Guzzatta told thebrothers that he would let them walk, but that their girlfriends would beprosecuted on conspiracy and tax evasions charges, afterwards theywould deported as undesirable aliens and forever denied entrance intothe US. By prosecuting their girlfriends it would appear as if that thebrothers had sacrificed their girlfriends to save themselves from the law.Scarifying Pablo Escobar’s relatives was a certain way to have soon andpainful death arranged. The brothers had no choice but to become informants229.“They were scared to death”, Guzzetta said. “They believed verystrongly, and I agreed with them, that if anyone found out they229 Webb 1998, 263ffwere informants – including their girlfriends – they’d be killed in aminute”230.The brothers agreed to plea guilty to drug charges, but under false nameto minimize the risk exposure and Guzzetta was made their sole policecontact for their probation. Even with the precautions it took less than 11days before the brothers was convinced that their girlfriends had hired acouple of assassin to kill them. The brothers was told to call Guzzettaevery 24 hours to let him know that they still were a live. The two brotherscurrently had around 1 ton of cocaine stored in Los Angeles, and admittedto have laundered roughly $100 million since January 1986. Thebrothers had between $250-500 million stored in various locations in LosAngeles that they had been unable to get out of the US. At first Guzzettadoubted the Torres brothers claims; he had never come across an informantwho had a half billion stashed away in Los Angeles, but after trailingthe brothers for a few days Guzzetta believed them. In those few daysthe brothers had picked up and delivered 40 kilos of cocaine, and collectedand delivered $720.000231.The Torres brothers were dealing with one major market in South Central,which was controlled by two black men, Rick and Ollie, Guzzettawrote in his report. The informants, Guzzetta continued, estimates thatthe two black dealers are generating a conservative figure of $10 milliona month. According to the brothers Rick where receiving cocaine fromthree Colombians whom they only knew by nickname, and “a fourth peripheral”source whom they knew quite well: Blandón. The brothers toldGuzzetta that Blandón was extremely dangerous, because of his access toinformation, and because he was able to “(...) override the informants’ mar-230 Webb 1998, 265231 Webb 1998, 265fPage 40 of 71ket, thus cutting of the informants from the supply source of cocaine and currency,(...)”232. The brothers believed that Blandón had access to inside informationsfrom law enforcement. Ricky Ross confirm that Blandón hadan incredible ability to accurately predict upcoming police raids. Accordingto the brothers one of Blandón’s associates were the ex-police officerRonald Lister, who had transported 100 kilos of cocaine for Blandón toRoss, and who had transported millions of dollars to Miami for Blandón.Once the cash arrived in Miami it was laundered by Roberto OrlandoMurillo, an uncle to Blandón’s wife who had been appointed Nicaragua’sNational Bank Director in 1978 by Somoza.Guzzetta suspected that the case was out of his league as he was thesingle drug officer in Bell City’s police corps, but when the two brothersbegan talking about the Contras, and airfields in New Orleans and Texaswere cocaine from the Contras was flown in under armed guard, thenGuzzetta knew it was out of his league. Guzzetta’s boss asked him if hewould mind working with LASD’s Major Violators Squad known by itsnickname: the Majors, an elite narcotics unit that had all the resources, allthe funding, all the surveillance equipment, night vision stuff, helicopters,and overtime pay it needed. The Majors handled all the biggestcases, seized the largest amounts of cocaine and got the biggest overtimechecks233. Guzzetta agreed and handed his notes them over the Sgr. TomGordon in the Majors. The case had an element that Gordon had neverencountered before during his four years with the Majors; a drug peddlingCIA army. The first bust the Majors made using informations fromthe Torres brothers netted three Colombian dealers with military ids, 131kilos of cocaine, and $221.005234. Guzzetta wanted to learn more aboutthe mysterious black dealer called Rick and asked the two Torres broth-232 Webb 1998, 266233 Webb 1998, 267234 Webb 1998, 283fers to show him around South Central. One of the places that the brothersshowed him was the Freeway Motor Inn, which they told Gazzettathat Rick had bought for a million dollars. That made Gazzetta realizedone important thing. Since the late 1985 police had heard rumour about asuper crack dealer in South Central called Freeway Ricky, and by April1986 police had received information which lead them to believed thatsuper crack dealer Freeway Ricky in fact did exist. Driving by the FreewayMotor Inn that Rick owned Gazzetta had realized that the brothersclient named Rick was in fact Freeway Ricky. The brothers had lead himstraight to South Central’s mysterious super crack dealer. Two of thethree Majors units were assigned to the case. Majors I worked on Ross’organisation from the bottom up, and Majors II worked from the topdown235.The Major initially tried to target Ross’ cocaine source, but when the caseagainst Blandón failed, a task force was formed in January 1987 to takeRoss out of business. Since the Majors already knew Ross and his organisation,they made up a large part of the Freeway Ricky Task Force. TheMajors and the task force had harassed and threaten Ross, his family andfriends. When Fenster, Ross’ attorney, complained to the LASD and DOJabout police harassment. Instead Fenster was accused of money launderingand his office searched. It became public knowledge, according to atask force detective, that one of the task force’s members was drivingaround with a kilo of cocaine in the tire well of his car; ready to plan thecocaine on Ricky when he ran into him. Ricky Ross feared for his life,and it might have been with good reason. In February 1987 the task forceransacked his girlfriends apartment and left a note for him, which wasattached to a knife, that had been pined to the wall through the head of235 Webb 1998, 285Page 41 of 71his daughter’s doll236.One evening in April 1987 the task force managed to hunt down Ross.After a car chase Ricky ditched the car and attempted to make a run forit. Behind him Ross could hear gun shots, but all misted and Ross managedto escape. His friends, who had been in the car with Ross, wascaught and beaten up with flash lights and leathers saps. A task forcemember pulled out a kilo of cocaine from his car, and claimed that Rosshad dropped the bag while running, but as the task force needed to explainedwhy they had fired shots, they accused Ross of shooting at them.In all Ross was charged with four counts of conspiracy, three counts oftransporting controlled substances, one count of assault. Three weekslater Ross turned himself in, and the police issued a press release that announcedthe demise of Ross’ multi-million dollar mid level crack cocaineorganisation. Their success became short lived. It was revealed at his trialthat there existed a taped recording where members of the task force discussedhow they should frame Ross. The judge insisted that the tape behanded over to the court. Before it was handed over amateurish attemptswere made to doctor the tape and the judge dismissed the case237.Ross had had it. He decided to quit his career and moved to Cincinnati inOhio. Ross and Blandón had become close friends, and kept in contactafter Ross moved to Cincinnati. Ross had invested most of his remainingmoney in a car business, but his business soon headed towards bankruptcy.So when Blandón, who had often asked Ross to get back intobusiness, again offered Ross cocaine at a cheap price, Ross was sold. Rossmissed doing the one thing he knew he was good at; selling cocaine. In1987 Ross began selling cocaine again, this time in Cincinnati where236 Webb 1998, 285f, 347, 350, 355237 Webb 1998, 376fprofits were higher than in Los Angeles that had been flooded with cocaine.Crack-cocaine spread quickly in Cincinnati. The pattern from LosAngeles repeated itself. With cheap cocaine from Blandón Ross was ableto dominate the marked as he had done in Los Angeles. With his businesssuccess Ross needed trusted employees, and soon gang membersfrom Los Angeles started arriving in Cincinnati to help Ross build hisnew empire. Now Cincinnati had two new problems: crack and theCrips. Ross’ cocaine did not stay within the city limit, and was traced tovarious cities in Ohio and as fare as Missouri, Minnesota, Indiana, Georgia,and Texas238Ross moved back to Los Angeles in fall of 1988 with problems piling upin Cincinnati. Alphonso Jeffries who worked for Ross was caught whenhe had picked up a nine kilo cocaine shipment for Ross at the the Greyhoundterminal in Cincinnati. Ross feared that Jeffries would rat him outas he already had done. Around the same time Ross discovered that anotherof his employees was, literally, fucking his girlfriend. On top ofthat Ross was indicted with cocaine conspiracy in Texas. Before Ross wasarrested in November 1989 he had in June been indicted on cocaine conspiracycharges in Cincinnati too. What Ross did not no know, was thathe would become a witness for the government against the Majors andFreeway Ricky Task Force239. In return for his cooperation the DOJ wouldcut hos sentence in half and allow him to keep his remaining propertiesand money, valued at $2 million240. The Major had been ripping off drugtraffickers, and LASD had started investigating their officers as the storiesthe dealers told were more credible than the officers’. FBI become involvedin the investigation and set up an undercover operation calledOperation Big Spender. The Majors were given a tip that a money laun-238 Webb 1998, 358ff239 Webb 1998, 363ff240 Webb 1998, 381Page 42 of 71der courier had checked into the Valley Hilton Hotel. The Majors raidedthe hotel room, pulled out a suitcase from under the bed with $480.000.While being filmed by FBI’s hidden camera, the Majors stuffed $48.000into a gym bag, confiscated the remaining money and handed them in atthe station. That night FBI raided the homes of the deputies and recoveredsome of the marked cash. Nine members of the Majors were immediatelysuspended and two days later a member of the Majors went toFBI and agreed to testify against his squat. Much of what Ross had saidturned out to be true, the Majors had beaten up suspects, planted drugs,lied in court, falsified search warrants affidavits, stolen drug and drugproceeds241. The first round trials from Operation Big Spender resulted inthe conviction of six of seven Majors who had been charged242.Ross became the governments star witness in the second rounds corruptiontrials following FBI’s Operation Big Spender. The federal prosecutorintroduced Ross as “properly the most significant drug dealer” ever to testifyfor the government243. Ricky Ross and a host of minor crack dealers appearedas government witnesses, and openly told the wide eyed jurorsabout the inner world of big time crack dealing. Alander Smith, a minordealer who was introduced to strengthen the testimony of Ross, endedup being the direct cause for the aquittal of the defendants. After he hadcollaborated Ross’ testimony, Smith commenced a lecture on the drugwar where he accused government officials for trafficking drugs into theUS244.“Yes, I mean President Bush” Smith told the Jurors pointedly.“When he was with the CIA and now... The government is the only241 Webb 1998, 368ff242 Webb 1998, 375f243 Webb 1998, 380244 Webb 1998, 380fpeople that have access to the equipment, but the minorities are theones who do the time for it.”245The trail became a failure but as Ross had kept his part of the agreementand testified the prosecution asked for his sentencing to be reduced. Itwas reduced from 10 years to 4 years and 3 months. Ross would be a freeman in a little more than a year after the trial ended246.The Majors, Blandón and ListerWhat is a curious about the Big Spender trials is that Deputy DanielGarner from the Majors sought to get Ronald Lister to testify. Garner hadsecretly copied 10 pages from the documents that the Majors had seizedthen they raided Lister’s house in 1986. Garner hoped that the pageswould get him off the hook, as the documents showed that the governmentwas involved in drug trafficking and laundering drug profits. HarlandBraun, Garner’s defence attorney, doubted that the copies wouldhave the impact his client hope for, but it could prove at useful bargainingchip. It was not Braun’s opening, but close to. While cross examiningone of the FBI agents who had participated in the Big Spender operation,Braun asked the agent if he knew anything about seized drug money beinglaundered by the federal government and then diverted to the Contrasby CIA. After the day in court, Braun held his usual post trial spinsession, where he was asked about his strange question to the FBI agentabout the Contras and CIA. Braun explained that he was laying thegroundwork for his defence: outrageous government conduct. Garnerwas a court certified expert, Braun pointed out and said, that Garnerwould explain in court how some of the cash he had been accused ofstealing had been laundered by CIA and then used to buy arms for the245 Webb 1998, 380f246 Webb 1998, 381Page 43 of 71Contras or other covert operations. Los Angeles Times ran an articleabout Braun’s accusations247.The prosecution asked the judge bar the defence from using this kind ofargument as it was only meant as a smokescreen, and had no impact onthe crimes committed. Braun replied in a motion that Garner had copied10 pages of the documents that had been seized in the raid at Lister’shouse, and that these 10 pages had names of CIA agents in Iran, mentionedthe Contras, listed various weapons that was being purchased.The pages contained a diagram that showed the route by which drugmoney was taken out of the US and back in again to buy arms for theContras, and named the State Department as one of the involved agencies.The pages, Braun explained, had been seized by the Majors in a raidin 1986 on a money launder, as Lister was identified, who the Majorsknew was associated with a major drug trafficking and money launderingoperation that was connected to the Contras. Braun repeated Lister’sclaim of CIA connections, and listed the items that the Majors had seizedin Lister house, films of military operations in Central America, technicalmanuals, information on assorted military hardware and communications,and numerous documents, which indicated that drug proceedswere used to buy military hardware for the Contras in Central America.The police had seized blown up pictures of Lister in Central Americawith Contras who showed military bases and hardware. The Majors,Braun said, had pieced together that Lister had worked with Blandónwho had imported cocaine from Central America into the US. Braun’smotion linked the crash of Hasenfus’ to, what he termed, the Blandónfamily248.247 Webb 1998, 371ff248 Webb 1998, 371ffThe Judge ruled in favour of the prosecution, and barred Braun fromcontinuing his line of defence as it had nothing to do with Garner’s case.In a later trial of the murder of DEA agent Camarena, the same judge refusedthe defence from introducing material that alleged a link betweenCIA, the Contras and Mexican drug lords249. Camarena was kidnapped,tortured and killed by Mexican authorities, because Camarena had discoveredan CIA operation, former DEA agent Levine writes250. This wasnot the last time the US prosecution decided to protect murders. In 2004US prosecution again decided to protect an Homeland Security informant,who had attempted to kill two DEA agents and their families251.Braun’s attempt to link Lister to the Big Spender case almost succeed, accordingto Webb. Before investigating Ross the Majors had attempted tojail Blandón, and it was during this investigation that the Majors had arrestedBlandón and Lister, who Braun had described as a money launderwith connections to both CIA and the Contras252.When Guzzetta had teamed up with the Majors to investigate the informationsprovided by the Torres brothers, he had handed his notes over toTom Gordon, the sergeant of the Majors second squad. Original the Majorshad targeted the Colombians that the Torres brothers had indicatedwhere Ross’ main suppliers, but the Majors had no luck linking to theColombians to Ross. Instead the Majors targeted Blandón. If the two majordealers who had half a billion dollars and a ton of cocaine stashedaway in Los Angeles and who dated Pablo Escorbar’s cousins wereafraid of Blandón then he most be important the Majors reckoned253.Tom Gordon started the investigation the standard way; by making a249 Webb 1998, 374250Levine 1990251 Expert Witness Radio, 25 November 2005252 Webb 1998, 375253 Webb 1998, 286Page 44 of 71check on Blandón in the NIN and NADDIS databases. Blandón alreadyhad a file in NADDIS were he was listed as a Class One trafficker, whichmeans he was amount the biggest traffickers. The file linked Blandón tothe Torres brothers through an address in Glendale; the area were bothJario Meneses and Carlos Cabezas lived. A couple of files from 1983 and1984 described him as the head of the drug trafficking organisation inLos Angeles. The file named the only two known associates of Blandón:Norwin Meneses and Roger Sandino. The NADDIS check on Sandinoshowed that he had been convicted in 1981 for selling 50.000 Quaaludetables in Florida. It was a small file Sandino had in NADDIS, and nothingcompared to the file that showed up then Gordon checked NADDIS forMeneses name. The NADDIS database showed that Meneses first was investigatedin 1974, and that he had been in NADDIS since 1976, and wasclassified as a Class One trafficker. There were a couple of classified filesattached to his file, which showed that he had been bringing in cocaine toNew York Orleans, Miami, San Francisco and Los Angeles from Colombia,Costa Rica, and Ecuador. The NADDIS file also showed that Menesesfiles had last been accessed 19 days earlier, and that a number ofinvestigations were still open. Although Meneses had been under investigationfor more than a decade, he had never been charged with a singlecrime. Then Gordon brought up Lister’s file, it simply said that he was anex-cop who was under an active DEA investigation. All details in the filewere classified, but it had been opened less than a month earlier. TheNADDIS database lists the owners of the files, which in the case ofBlandón and Lister was DEA agent Sandalio González at the US Embassyin Costa Rica. When Gordon called González in Costa RicaGonzález started screaming that all the lines go through Nicaragua andGordon could not called him on a open line, but that he would fly toPanama and call him from there. Five days later when Gordon came backafter being out of the office for a short while he found a note on his decksaying254:Tom, got a call from Sandy González of Costa Rica DEA. He said[local DEA agent] will let you read the info. Sandy can not talk onthe phone because all the lines are through Nicaragua. Sandy asksthat you don’t mention anything in your s/w [search warrant affidavit].It’s a burn.255‘Burn’ is cop slang for that the investigation had been exposed and thebad guys know about it. For the same reason Gordon should not giveany details in his search warrant affidavit because it would give awaytheir source of informations256. Gordon called the local DEA office in LosAngeles, and was told that González did not investigate Blandón orLister, but that a DEA agent in Riverside was. When Gordon contactedthe Riverside agent Thomas A. Schrettner, Gordon should have been suspicions.Schrettner was happy to help Gordon. According to Gordon,DEA had a reputation for coming in and stealing the best cases, and DEAalmost never handed of national cases to local departments. Yet DEAwas not interested in a multi-kilo and -million drug case. Schrettnermailed a copy of his lasted report to Gordon and all Gordon’s worriesdisappeared. This was a worldwide trafficking case; no worries abouthow the investigation could be a burn. The only investigation that theMajors had done so fare was a couple of NADDIS checks, and only theMajors and a few DEA agents knew about that. How could it be a burn?Why would DEA in Costa Rica open a file on two traffickers in LosAngeles? And why was Schrettner happy to help?257Schrettner told Gordon that DEA had had an informant inside the drug254 Webb 1998, 287f255 Webb 1998, 288256 Webb 1998, 288257 Webb 1998, 289Page 45 of 71network for three years, and that they had investigated Blandón the prioryear. A DEA agent was shot during a raid so the local DEA agents whereeager to bust Blandón, but they had been told not to do the case by theirsuperiors. That was the reason why they handed over a worldwide drugtrafficking case to the LASD. The copy of report that Gordon receivedstated that Schrettner had debriefed an informant that had been workingfor Blandón since 1983 after he first meet him in Miami. The informantadmitted to hauling kilos of cocaine and millions of dollars across theborder for Blandón in 1984 and 1985. Before doing a drug run the informanthad tipped off FBI about the shipment and the route, but nothinghappened. According to the informant the drug network hauled approximately400 kilos of cocaine a month, which was delivered to Blandón’sorganisation in Los Angeles, who then bought the cocaine to Meneses’organisation in San Francisco. According to Schrettner’s informant NorwinMeneses, Roger Sandino, Jacinto Torres, and Ronald Lister were involved,and the groups primary money launder was Blandón’s wife’suncle and the former National Bank Director in Nicaragua Roberto OrlandoMurillo. Schrettner’s informant said that proceeds from the drugsale was going to the Contras in Nicaragua. But it was not only DEA thathad information, which linked Blandón to the Contras. Douglas Aukland,a FBI agent in Riverside, had investigated Blandón too and his informanthad told him that parts of the profits from the drug sales whento the Contras in Nicaragua. Now Gordon had three independentsources who told the same story; that proceeds from cocaine sales werefunding the Contras in Nicaragua258.Gordon informed his boss about his investigation. Gordon was orderedto cooperate with FBI on the case, who suggested that the Majors shouldhalt the investigation as FBI believed it would result in a even bigger case258 Webb 1998, 289ffthan it already was259. One wonders how FBI can suggest to halt an investigationinto a world-wide cocaine business empire, because it wouldbecome an even bigger case, but they did. Thursday the 23 October 1986Gordon did what he had been told not to. He when to the court to obtaina search warrant and handed the court 21 page detailed affidavit. The affidavitstated that Blandón ran a large scaled cocaine distribution network,which included more than 100 persons who stored, transportedand distributed the cocaine for Blandón. Blandón’s network has a centrein South Central from where 10 kilos cocaine is distributed each week,and it also delivers around 20 kilos cocaine each week to Ivan Arguellas,(Ross’ first supplier). Blandón was from the Central American countryNicaragua, which has been at civil war for several years. According toour informant, the affidavits continued, Blandón is a Contra sympathizerand a founder of the FDN that assists the Contras with arms and money.The FDN generates the funds to support the Contras through cocainesales, which is laundered through a bank in Florida by Roberto OrlandoMurillo, before it is used to buy arms for the Contras in Nicaragua260.There is the evidence, written by the police and handed in to the court.The elite anti-narcotics unit in the police believed that the Contras wasfunded through cocaine trafficking, and the court too believed that theevidence was strong enough the issue several search warrants. At thetime when the Majors began its investigation in 1986 the administrationhad just finished a publicity and disinformation campaign. It was nosecret that the Contras were a US proxy army that had the President’ssupport. The White House had managed to convinced Congress to repealthe ban and instead approve a $100 million aid package for the Contras.While the White House had been lobbying in Congress for the Contras259 Webb 1998, 291f260 Webb 1998, 307fPage 46 of 71an air plane from North’s network was shot down over Nicaragua. Beforethe Contras bought the plane, it had belonged to a drug traffickersnamed Barry Seal. The planes cargo kicker and sole survivor of the crash,Eugene Hasenfus, was capture by the Sandinistas. The White Housedenied any connection to the downed plane or Hasenfus, who soon afterappeared on television to tell his tale. He had flown for CIA’s Air Americain Laos when CIA had conducted their secret war in Laos during theVietnam War. Now Hasenfus was working for CIA again and revealedthe secret Contra airbase at Ilopango in El Salvador. Hasenfus identifiedRamon Medina and Max Gomez as his CIA handlers. Ramon Medinawas an alias for Luis Posada Carriles, a exile-Cuban terrorist and suspecteddrug trafficker. Max Gomez was the alias for Felix Rodriguez, anotherexile-Cuban and former CIA agent. The plane crashed just as Congresswere about lift the ban on funding the Contras. The disinformation campaignand congressional reluctance delve on the matter meant that theappearances were keep up long enough for Congress repeal the ban. Asthe bill was waiting on the Presidents desk for his signature, Gordon’s affidavitpersuaded the judge to granted him his search warrant. Friday,the day after obtaining the search warrants from court, Gordon began hisbriefing for Monday’s raids when 45 officers from the Majors, DEA, IRS,ATF, San Bernardino Sheriff and Bell Police would raid 14 locations inLos Angeles, Orange and San Bernardino County261. Several of membersof Majors recalled that they received information that the case was linkedto CIA, and that the federal government was unhappy that the Majorswere going a head with the raids. According to Deputy Virgil Bartlett thebelief was that “the U.S. Government backed the operation. (...) The governmentwas bringing drugs into the country and shipping weapons back out”262.That Monday Blandón and Lister’s and houses’ were raided as the Pres-261 Webb 1998, 308ff262 Webb 1998, 310ident signed the bill. CIA and the Contras were back in business263.In the raid on Blandón’s house the police seized a shotgun, an semi-automaticrifle, records of drug transaction, and 1.5 grams of cocaine. AsBlandón was arrested he spontaneously erupted “the cocaine is mine, thecocaine is mine. It is mine”264. With the evidence and a confession the officerswere sure that the drug kingpin would get convicted but they werewrong. Across town the raids turned up nothing. It appeared that thehouses had been cleaned; one place a police officer found an empty safewith a running garden hose stuck into, and at a other place a residenttold the officers that he had been waiting for them for more than anhour265. When police raided Lister’s address, nobody was home. As thepolice was carrying out boxes of records, card files, video monitors, andphotographs, a neighbour walked over and told them that Lister hadmoved some time ago. Now a Colombian couple, Aparicio and AuraMoreno was living there. Both Lister and a DEA informant confirmedthat Moreno supplied Blandón and Meneses with cocaine, and that hehad transported million of dollars to Roberto Orlando Murillo in Miamifor Blandón. According to a document seized at Lister’s resident Morenowas associated with the FDN which Blandón have confirmed. Menesesintroduced Blandón to Moreno in 1985, and received at least a one toncocaine shipment from Moreno delivered by air via Oklahoma. Blandónthought that266:the plane might be connected to the CIA because someone hadplaced a small FDN sticker somewhere on the airplane. This was263 Webb 1998, 308f264 Webb 1998, 312265 Webb 1998, 312266 DOJ 1998, Chapter 2.BCIA 1998a, paragraph 130, 174Webb 1998, 213fPage 47 of 71just a rumor though267After the raid on Blandón’s FDN connected Colombian cocaine supplier,the Majors rushed to Lister’s new address. As the Majors had no searchwarrant for the new address on which Lister lived, they asked for permissionto search his house, unless he preferred them to wait outside untilthey obtained a search warrant. Given the two choice, Lister invitedthem in. The Majors told Lister that they were searching for drugs andasked him to sign a consent form. To the Majors surprise Lister told themthat he knew why they were there, but that they were not supposed to bethere in the first place. CIA and Washington is not going to like this,Lister told the Majors. When interviewed by the CIA and DOJ in 1996Lister denied that he claimed to connections to CIA or Washington. TheMajors’ recollection is different. According to Detective Boddy JuarezLister told them he was dealing in South America and worked for CIA,and that the Majors would be in trouble then he reported them ScottWeekly of CIA. Deputy Art Fransen said that Lister told them somethinglike “You guys do not know what you are doing. Oh, you do not know whoyou’re dealing with. I deal with the CIA. I got power”. Deputy Richard Loverecalled that Lister stated “You do not know what you’re doing. There is abigger picture here. I’m working for the CIA. I know the director of the CIA inLos Angeles. The government is allowing drug sales to go on in UnitedStates”268. No drugs were found in Lister’s home so Lister was not arrested,but the Majors seized boxes of military material, films of military operations,technical manuals for military hardware, training videos, photosof Lister with Contra leaders, along with documents which indicatedthat drug money was used to buy military equipment for the Contras,and names and address of CIA contractors and officers in Central Amer-267 CIA 1998a, paragraph 174268 Webb 1998, 314fica269. The seized material was brought back to LASD and logged in theMaster Narcotics Evidence Control as “miscellaneous CIA info” and “a lotof Contra rebel correspondence found”270When the officers compared notes after the raids they felt that someonehad burned their investigation, and their suspicions fell on the federalagents who participated in the raids. The Torres’ tips had always yieldedlarge quantities of cash and cocaine, and the only difference betweenearlier raids and these were that FBI and DEA were involved271. The Majors’hunch were correct. DOJ’s report confirmed that the investigationwas burned when a FBI agent conducted a clumsy pre-raid investigation.What is termed a clumsy investigation, is a clumsy attempt in concealingthe truth. Someone within the law enforcement warned the criminals.How else could a clumsy investigation lead to that the criminals knewthe time and places for the raids272.Soon after the Majors started going through Lister’s documents, they tooknew that they were in over their heads. One of the seized documentswas Pyramid International’s security offer to Roberto D’Aubuisson in ElSalvador. Never before had the Majors come across a suspect whom didbusiness with head of states in Central America. Along the seized documentswere training videos for various US military hardware such assurface-to-air missile, tanks and other armoured vehicles, and the manualsappeared to be standard US Government military issue. Members ofthe Majors who had served in the armed forces recognized the codes onsome of the documents as DOD codes. Some of the documents containedreferences to CIA, and that Aparicio Moreno, Blandón’s Colombian co-269 Cockburn 1999, 15270 Webb 1998, 315271 Webb 1998, 315272 DOJ 1998, chapter 2.E.3.BPage 48 of 71caine supplier, was a representative of FDN. Another page contained thenames and phone numbers of Bill Nelson, CIA’s former deputy director,Roberto D’Aubuisson, the El Salvadorian leader of the death squads, RonBrown, a retired Navy Captain, and Scott Weekly, Lister’s alleged CIAcontact. Weekly’s name appeared on a list of armaments, which includedanti-aircraft weapons, fire bombs, AR 15 rifles, air-to-sea torpedos, andnapalm bombs. On another page Lister had written:I had regular meeting with DIA subcontractor Scott Weekly. Scotthad worked in El Salvador for us. Meeting concerned my relationshipwith Contra grp. In Cent. Am273DIA stands for Defense Intelligence Agency; the military version of CIAresponsible for collecting military intelligence. Like CIA DIA involved inthe Contra operation. Lister told investigators that he believed Weeklyworked for DIA because LaFrance had told him that Weekly was connectedto DIA. FBI contacted CIA and DIA to clarify if Weekly worked foreither agency. CIA denied that Weekly ever worked for them, and whatDIA replied if they replied has never been made public274. Webb’s researchshows that Scott Weekly was linked with both the DIA and CIA275.Weekly was arrested with a group of US special forces and bunch ofhigh-tech US militarily hardware on the border between Thailand andLaos heading towards Vietnam on a mission to find POWs. Webb wasable to link Weekly with a training mission of Afghan rebels that receivedfunds from STTGI; the company used in the Iran-Contra affairthat was controlled by North. Weekly acknowledged that he travelledwith Lister to El Salvador to demonstrate special tactics and operations273 Webb 1998, 317274 Webb 1998, 323DOJ 1998, chapter 5.DCIA 1998a, paragraph 95275 Webb 1998, 325-334for the Minister of Defense276.What happened to the evidence that the Majors seized from Lister is disputed,the only thing that is certain is that it disappeared. Three dayslater, 30 October 1986, three federal agents appeared, went through theseized material and spend two days making copies. When Gordon cameback to the office after a couple of days off, Garner told him that CIA hadwalked in and seized the material from Lister. The Majors had seen thelast of the evidence. According to Brunon, Blandón’s attorney, the officialpolice records of the raids on Blandón and Lister disappeared too. For along time the only document that Brunon could find was an informalnote taken during the pre-raid briefing, which was discovered by accidenta few years after the raids277. Brunon:For a long time, they (the Sheriff’s Office) never acknowledged theexistence of the warrant. I mean the whole thing was quite mysterious.Boom, they did 15 locations. Nothing turned up. Nobody gotbusted. There was a little tiny bit of cocaine found in one location,Nobody got filed on. They gave all the stuff back. The whole thingjust was very strange, (...) I’d never had a case where all the reportsdisappeared278.The Majors version of the seized material mysterious disappearances isdisputed. LASD claims that there is a consistent paper trail for eachseized item, which shows that the seized material was handed back toLister a few days after the raid. No copies were kept and the few thingthat was not claimed were destroyed within 6 months. The DOJ disputesthe Majors stories of the disappeared evidence too. According to the DOJ276 DOJ 1998, chapter 5.L.1277 Webb 1998, 319f278 Webb 1998, 320Page 49 of 71the evidence was either handed back or destroyed several months afterthe raids in-line with LASD guidelines. All documents had been copiedby FBI, DEA and IRS according to notes found in LASD. What the DOJdoes not mention is that the investigation was still active when the evidencewas handed back or destroyed. This should make one wonder, howoften police destroy evidence or hand back during an investigation, andif it is within the guidelines to do so. The federal agencies have had problemslocating their copies. Neither FBI and DEA could locate their sets ofcopies, nor could US Attorney Office, who had received copies from bothFBI and DEA, find their copies. IRS could of cause not locate their copies,but IRS was able to provide the DOJ with a partial set of 1000 pages, asan IRS agent had taken the copies for her investigation of another crime.The set included copies of documents that were seized from all fourteenlocations that was raided. The partial recovery seems to have been accidental,and not due to a good archive practice279. LASD managed to locatea copy of Gordon’s search warrant affidavit when they copied fromthe Dark Alliance Series web site ten years after the raids280.In conjunction with the Majors investigation of Blandón and Lister theFBI had opened a file on Weekly and Lister during their investigation ofthe Iran-Contra affair, but the file was closed almost as soon as it wasopened281. The DOJ report concluded that:In the end, when stripped of their quirky embellishments, the documentsseized from Lister in 1986 largely corroborate his account ofhis relationship with Blandón and the Contras.This conclusion is based on the assumption that Lister had no relation-279 DOJ 1998, chapter 2.E.3.E280 Webb 1998, 321281 Webb 1998, 334ship with either CIA or the Contras, which the DOJ reached after “evaluatingthese materials we have“ and “to some extent, considered Lister’s own explanationsof their significance and meaning“ although “Lister is hardly themost credible of witnesses”282. The DOJ reviewed the 10 page document thatGarner had copied and tried to introduce into his defence at his trial.Contrary to what the Majors believed the document did not contain referencesto drug money nor indications of links to the Contras the DOJ reportstated. There was no evidence that Lister had any connections to theContras, because as Lister had explained to the DOJ, his references toContras did not mean the Contras but Blandón, and DIA did not refer tothe Defense Intelligence Agency but Deals In Arms283. Therefore the DOJconcluded that there was no evidence of a link between Lister and theContras or CIA284. The DOJ report also confirms that IRS reviewed part ofthe 10 page document, which they believe indicated illegal arms transactions.The report also confirms that document did contain the names andphone numbers of former CIA agents, US military officials, a Colombiandrug dealer linked to FDN, politicians and the leader of the death squadsin El Salvador, an business relation in Iran, reference to Korea and sellingscramblers to Eastern Europe and several references to the Contras, FDN,CIA, DIA, and Weekly285. The report confirms too that Lister meet Pastoraand Chamarro of ADRE, but it states that Lister never provided theContras with “any significantainformation on weaponry”286; in other words,Lister did provide the Contras with information on weaponry. The DOJreviewed air plane ticket and boarding passes, which documented thatLister had visited Miami in Florida, San Jose in California, and Bogota inColombia during May 1986. The report confirms too that Lister told DOJ282 DOJ 1998, chapter 5.D283 DOJ 1998, chapter 5.C.2.B284 DOJ 1998, chapter 5.D285 DOJ 1998, chapter 5.C, 5.Da Authors emphasis286 DOJ 1998, chapter 5.DPage 50 of 71investigators that Blandón had been looking for a weapon supply sourceto sell weapons and equipment to the Salvadorian Government and theContras287. Still neither FBI nor DOJ could not find evidence that linkedLister with CIA and the Contras.Nothing happened to Blandón or Lister and instead Ross was targeted.That investigation failed too, although it did lead to convictions, but ofthe Majors after Ross testified for US Attorney’s Office against the Majors.When Webb researched the affair he called LASD for informationabout the investigation and raids on Lister and Blandón, LASD deniedthey had investigated or raided Blandón or Lister288.The DEA ConnectionWhat is clear from the DOJ report is that both the FBI and DEA knew alot more about Blandón’s drug trafficking than the Majors did. AlthoughLASD had not targeted Norwin Meneses, his name appeared in a CIAcable from 30 October 1986. CIA’s office in Los Angeles informed CIA’sHQ that three men who claimed CIA affiliation had been arrested on narcoticscharges. CIA’s Los Angeles station requested that HQ forwardedinformation on Blandón, Lister, Murillo, Moreno, and Meneses and theirconnection to CIA. Next day HQ replied that had no information onBlandón or Lister. Meneses was known by HQ as the Nicaraguan Mafia,and was involved in drug dealing, weapons, smuggling, money laundering,and counterfeiting of US and Nicaraguan currency. Meneses wasresiding in Miami as a result of unspecified drug charges in Costa Rica,and was the kingpin of narcotics traffickers in Nicaragua prior to the fallof Somoza the cable stated289.287 Cockburn 1999, 15288 Cockburn 1999, 15289 CIA 1998a, paragraph 98Webb 1998, 321In June 1986 a few months before the Majors started their investigationNorwin Meneses agreed to become a DEA informant290. DEA had openeda new case against Meneses in October 1983 and had successfully introducedundercover agents to members of Meneses’ organisation betweenNovember 1983 and February 1984. As a result Roger Meneses wascaught, charged and convicted to 6 years imprisonment. He had offeredto cooperate, but his offer was rejected291. By January 1984 DEA had atleast one informant inside Meneses’ organisation, who had meet Menesesand had been asked by Meneses to run the operation in San Franciscoas he was unhappy with Jairo’s work. Later that year DEA successfullyintroduced undercover agents to Jairo Meneses and Renato Pena inSan Francisco, and in November 1984 DEA arrested Pena and Jairo afterthey sold had sold one kilo 97% pure cocaine to undercover DEA agents.Left with little choose Pena and Jairo Meneses agreed to cooperate withthe DEA. Jairo admitted that he started to work for Norwin in 1981, andthat the organisation distributed cocaine to between ten and twelve costumers,including Blandón, on a regular basis. The cocaine was providedon a consignment basis to the costumers, and Jairo collected the payments.The US Attorney’s Office mailed a memorandum to the DOJ thatin detail described the information that Jairo had provided on NorwinMeneses’ organisation292. The memorandum stated Meneses dealt directlywith leaders of the Contras since the early 1980s, and that Jairo in1982 had negotiated an cocaine export agreement with Honduras’ militaryon behalf of Norwin. Jairo admitted that it was Norwin who orderedthe high-ranking Nicaraguan customs official Oscar Reyes assassinated.The memorandum stressed that Meneses only concern was the cocainebusiness and that he lacked political allegiance as he dealt with the290 DOJ 1998, chapter 2.G.2.B.2291 DOJ 1998, chapter 3.D.3292 DOJ 1998, chapter 3.D.3Page 51 of 71Sandinistas too. According to Webb’s research Norwin did not lackedpolitical allegiance. He had worked for Somoza’s secret police, his brotherswere generals in the National Guard. Norwin was a strong supporterof the Contras. Because of Jairo and Rena’s cooperation DEA opened adrug conspiracy case in January 1985 that targeted Norwin, but by thattime Norwin had left the US for Costa Rica and cut off contact withJairo293.When Jairo was sentenced in 1985 he admitted that he was a deliverymanand bookkeeper for Norwin, who he described as a large drug dealerwhom sold 30-40 kilos a week. In exchange for his testimony Jairo wassentenced to 1 year in jaila. The amount of evidence that US law enforcementhad on Meneses could have convicted most dealers on either traffickingor conspiracy charges, but nothing happened to Meneses. If thegovernment wanted, they could have barred him from entering the countryagain, but Meneses continued to travel in and out of the US294. Penawas an active member of FDN, but he claims that his drug traffickingactivities were personal and unrelated to the Contras. Pena started towork for Meneses shortly after he first met him at Contra meeting in SanFrancisco in 1981. Contrary to Jairo, whom collected payments from thebuyers, Pena paid the suppliers295. Pena told DEA that the Contras musthave an alternative sources of funding, since the funds that the Contrasreceived from the US Government was peanuts. Pena said that Blandónand Meneses told him, that they were raising money for the Contras byselling drugs. Pena said that Blandón told him that the Contras could nothave operated without the drug proceeds, and that Meneses told him293 DOJ 1998, chapter 3.Ea Webb says that Jairo was sentenced to 3 years imprisonment; the DOJ says 1 year.294 DOJ 1998, chapter 3.D.3Webb 1998, 170f295 DOJ 1998, chapter 3.D.3CIA 1998b, paragraph 651-660that Enrique Bermúdez knew about the drug trafficking296. Pena says thatCarlos, a Colombian supplier to Meneses, told him in general terms thatportions of the proceeds from the sale of the cocaine Pena brought weregoing to the Contras297. According to Pena Jairo told him that the governmentknew about the drug trafficking, and it was therefore highly unlikelythat they would get in trouble. When Pena was removed from hisposition in FDN in mid-1984 Meneses used his close relationship withBermúdez to have Pena appointed FDN’s military representative in SanFrancisco instead298.What happened to DEA’s investigation into Meneses is not clear from thereports, but the case was closed the same month Meneses walked intothe DEA office in Costa Rica and offered to become an informant. Asclosing remarks to the case DEA wrote that their two informants were nolonger willing to cooperate, and it was therefore no longer possible topursue the case against Meneses299. FBI had been investigating Meneses,and FBI had managed to get a taped recording in 1984 where Menesessaid that he used his numerous properties to launder money, that he wasassociated with Pablo Escobar, and that he had smuggled and distributedof kilos of ‘apparatus’ to Nicaraguans in San Francisco. FBI hadfounds three informants who between 1980 and 1985 had discussed traffickingcocaine with Meneses, and were willing to testify. One informantstold FBI that Meneses was known for smuggling arms to Nicaragua,and that Meneses properly worked for CIA300.When Meneses walked into DEA’s Costa Rican office, he told DEA thathe wanted to cooperate and help the administration’s fight against drugs296 DOJ 1998, chapter 4.B.5.B297 CIA 1998b, paragraph 653298 CIA 1998b, paragraph 654299 DOJ 1998, chapter 3.D.3300 DOJ 1998, chapter 3.EPage 52 of 71in view of the Presidents total commitment to free his native land. Menesesalso mentioned a minor problem with IRS as another reason for hiscooperation301. DEA noted in their report that these were the reasons thatMeneses had stated, but the real reason or reasons for his cooperationwas unknown. At the time when Meneses offered his cooperation the administrationwas engaged in a public-relation campaign to get the Congressto re-approve aid to the Contras. As part of the campaign the administrationhad charged the Sandinistas with involvement in drug traffickinginto the US. The administration based the charges on a single picturetaken by the drug dealer Barry Seal who owned the DC-3 that wasshot down over Nicaragua with Hasenfus inside. The picture is widelydisputed, but was presented as proof of that the Sandinistas and PabloEscobar cooperated in smuggling cocaine into the US. This is possible theexplanation why Meneses identified Blandón to DEA as a major traffickerand Sandinista sympathizer who distributed hundreds of kilos of cocaine.During the debriefing Meneses claimed that he had helped DEAbefore. There is no mention in the DOJ report if Meneses claim is true,but the report confirms that Meneses met with DEA in 1981 or 1982302.DEA had tried to convince Jairo to cooperate against uncle Norwin whenJairo was arrested in June 1981 but he refused. Instead he suggested thathe could convince uncle Norwin to work with DEA. Norwin called DEAin 1981 or 1982, and said that he had spoken to Jairo and wanted to helpDEA with information on drug traffickers. Meneses told DEA that hewas not a drug trafficker, he was a revolutionary who’s only interest wasgetting his country back. In 1982, after the initial phone conversation, anDEA agent met with Norwin and Jairo. Norwin repeated his claim, thathe was not a drug trafficker, but involved in the revolution to overthrow301 DOJ 1998, chapter 2.G.2.B.1302 DOJ 1998, chapter 2.G.2.B.1the Nicaraguan government. The DEA agent recalled that Norwin waspretty cryptical about what he did for the Contras, but the agent had theimpression that Norwin was moving guns for the Contras and workedfor CIA. DEA contacted CIA who denied connection with Meneses303. FBItoo believed that Meneses was connected to CIA304. Officially there wasno link between CIA and Meneses but there must have been indication tothe contrary. In 1987 FBI had enough evidence against Meneses to indicthim, but felt it necessary to inquire with DEA if an indictment of Meneseswould “result in national security problems with other agencies”305.DEA replied that they did not believe that it would not be a problem, butthat an indictment would prevent DEA from investigating a group oftraffickers with connections to the Contras306.Webb believed that Norwin did work for DEA, but he bases his conclusionon a different set of materials. According to Webb the US Governmenthad enough evidence in 1985 to indict Meneses and his nephewJairo was willing to testify against uncle Meneses. Instead of indictingMeneses the US attorney contacted and pressured Meneses to become aninformant for DEA. Whatever the reason is, Webb seemed to havemissed the part of the DOJ report, which states that Meneses did becomean informant in 1986. An official Costa Rican document from 1985stated307:He [Norwin Meneses] was one of the first economic supporters ofthe FDN in Costa Rica. There are rumors that he works as an informantfor DEA308.303 DOJ 1998, chapter 3.F.2304 DOJ 1998, chapter 3.H305 DOJ 1998, chapter 2.G.2.B.4306 DOJ 1998, chapter 2.G.2.B.4307 Webb 1998, 203308 Webb 1998, 203Page 53 of 71DOJ’s report confirmed that Meneses did work for DEA. The reportclaims that Meneses offered to become an informant in 1986 and that theoffer was accepted by DEA in 1987. However US Attorney Erik Swensonsaid that Meneses and the US Government began to cooperate in 1985309.The reason why DOJ claims that the cooperation began in 1987 ratherthan 1985 as the US Attorney claimed, is that it would be difficult forDEA to explain why one of their informants was involved in funnellingproceeds from large scale drug trafficking to the Contras. 1987 is a muchbetter year for the cooperation to have begun as the Contra program wasterminated that year. However the DOJ’s report confirms that there wascontact between Meneses and DEA as early as 1981 or 1982. There hasbeen allegations that US law enforcement personal were on Menesespayroll, and that they had tip him off about investigations and raids.Pena claimed that Meneses was tipped off by a corrupted DEA agent afew weeks before Zavala and Cabezas were arrested in the Frogman casein 1983. According to DOJ DEA investigated the matter and found the allegationswere false, but then Meneses later told DEA about the corruptedagent he had paid DEA was not interested310.DEA facilitated contact between CIA and known drug traffickers beforeSeptember 1983. CIA’s UCLA team used two converted shrimp boats asmother ships for their operations311. The two boats was bought from theseafood company Frigorificos de Puntarenas, which was owned by LuisRodriguez. Frigorifcos was also one of the companies that were in 1986given a $261.937 dollars contract to deliver humanitarian aid to the Contras.The humanitarian funds was paid into an account controlled byLuis Rodriguez, who according to Massachusetts law enforcement offi-309 Webb 1998, 201310 DOJ 1998, chapter 3.F.3311 Walker 1987, 27cials directed the largest marijuana traffickings ring in US history312. LuisRodriguez was president of Ocean Hunter, another seafood company,which was owned by Ramon Milian Rodriguez, a convicted money launder.The Cuban born Ramon Milian Rodriguez was an accountant for theMedellín cartel until he was caught in the airport with $5.4 million incash on board his private jet that was headed for Panama313. OceanHunter bough seafood from the Costa Rican based Frigorificos dePuntarenas and imported it into the US. Transactions between Frigorificosde Puntarenas and Ocean Hunter were used to launder money, anddrugs were smuggled into the US in the seafood shipments. Ramon MilianRodriguez told federal law enforcement about Luis Rodriguez’ involvementwith drug trafficking and money laundering in 1983. In Martsand April 1984 IRS questioned Luis Rodriguez regarding Ocean Hunter,money laundering and drug trafficking. In response to every questionLuis Rodriguez took the Fifth Amendment, i.e. refused to answer thequestion as the answer would incriminate him. In September 1984 Miamipolice officials informed FBI that Ocean Hunter was funding Contraactivities through narcotics transactions. This confirmed earlier accountsthat FBI had received on Ocean Hunters involvement with the Contras indrug trafficking314. The State Department knew that Frigorificos dePuntarenas was involvement in trafficking and money laundering whenthe they choose the company to deliver humanitarian aid to the Contras.The official explanation is that the State Department forgot to check ifFrigorificos de Puntarenas was connected to drug trafficking. DEA couldhave told the State Department about the drug connection as they had facilitatedthe contact between the traffickers and CIA to buy the twoshrimp boats in 1983315.312 Kerry 1989a, 44313 Webb 1998, 232Kerry 1989b, 220. 288314 Kerry 1989a, 44f315 Walker 1987, 27fPage 54 of 71Government Sponsored TraffickersFrigorificos de Puntarenas was not the only company with a drug connectionthat the State Department chosed as contractor after ‘suggestion’from CIA. Another example is SETCO that was founded and run JuanMatta Ballestros, who was classified as a Class One trafficker in DEA’sdatabase, and both DEA and Customs knew that Matta ran SETCO316.Matta had a long history in DEA’s database. Matta had financed a militarycoup in Honduras with drug money, was arrested in the US in 1970with 20 kilos of cocaine, supplied Mexican traffickers, had been involvedin the killing of a DEA agent, and worked with both the Medellín andCali cartel. In the 1970s long before the Colombian cartels existed Mattahad been one of the biggest traffickers in the Americas. None were anysecret to law enforcement, but again the State Department neglected tocheck SETCO for drug connections. Neither was it the first time that theGovernment relied on SETCO. Sources in Honduras’ military told reportersthat it was CIA who sat up SETCO in 1983 to transport supplies to theContras; by 1984 SETCO was the primary transporter for the FDN. AfterCIA pulled out North used SETCO in his supply network, before SETCOstarted flying for the State Department. The same year that CIA set upSETCO DEA closed its office after it had documented that the Honduras’military dictatorship had trafficked at least 50 tons cocaine; CIA doubledthe number of employees in its office that year. A former SETCO pilot,convicted of trafficking, started his own company named Hondu Caribin 1985, which subcontracted from SETCO. Two years later DEA seizedand searched one of its planes after it had air dropped a drug shipment.In the plane files were found that contained names and phone numbersof Contra leaders and Robert Owen, who was Oliver North’s personal316 Kerry 1989a, 44aid317.When DIACSA was selected as an contractor in 1985, the State Departmentagain neglected to check for drug relations. DIACSA was knownfor its involvement in trafficking and money laundering, and was underactive investigation when chosen as a contractor. DIACSA too was connectedto the Contras before chosen as a contractor. FDN had used DIACSAto launder money and concealed that it received funds fromNorth. Both DEA and CIA had information, which indicated that DIASCAwas used for drug trafficking and money laundering. When theState Department selected DIACSA its director and his business partnerwere under investigation for trafficking and money launder. Both werelater convicted318The State Department selected a fourth company in 1985, Vortex, whichtoo was involved in drug trafficking. Vortex’s vice president MichaelPalmer had smuggled dope for a decade and a grand jury was preparingto indict him. Vortex’ two aircrafts were used for drug trafficking at thetime when the contract was signed. Afterwards Vortex signed a contractwith CIA, and at the same time Palmer worked for DEA in a sensitivedrug investigation. DEA was concerned that if CIA terminated their contactwith Palmer it would jeopardize the investigation. CIA terminatedall ties to Vortex. While Vortex was still contracting for CIA one of itsplanes was searched by Customs who detained the crew and seized theirGovernment credentials. When Customs searched the plane, which had317Scott 1998, 55ff, 79, 99CIA 1998b, paragraph 613Strong 1996, 142, 145, 151Kerry 1989a 44, 75Democracynow, A Response to the Recent CIA-Crack Report, 5 February 1998318 Kerry 1989a, 47fScott 1998, 11, 70CIA 1998b, paragraph 830Page 55 of 71been modified to make air drops, they found weapons on board. Thecrew, who were indicted for trafficking, could not answer Customs whenasked who owned the plane. Both aircraft and crew were released after ameeting between Customs and CIA. Customs were concerned that CIAflights were used to smuggle drugs, and wanted to know what CIA didto prevent traffickers from using CIA sponsored flights. None. It was,CIA said, impossible to check all their employees, and therefore Customsasked CIA to handover the names of all crews and passengers. What theresult was, or if the names were handed over, is not known319.CIA claims that they did not, like Customs and DEA, known that Palmeror Vortex were involved in drug trafficking. When the allegations surfacedthat CIA had known and assisted Palmer in drug trafficking Congressforced CIA to investigate. There is no record that a final report wasever filed, and CIA’s investigator is not sure as she was taken off the casebefore she finished her investigation. She remembers that she did not receivemuch cooperation from CIA personal, and that she was unable tomake a conclusion concerning CIA’s relationship with Vortex as most ofthe records she requested “were unavailable, unobtainable and undiscoverable”320. She discovered that CIA knew that about Palmer’s drug traffickingactivities before CIA suggested him as a contractor to the State Department.The chief of the Contra program Alan Fiers was told aboutPalmer’s drug connections, and had passed the informations to a higherlevel from where the decision to use Palmer was taken. CIA denied thatit played a roll in the State Department’s selection of contractors exceptin the case of Vortex, which was chosen because Fiers had suggested it.In CIA’s report Fiers is quoted for saying “I believe we guided them toward319 Kerry, 1989a, 48CIA 1998b, paragraph 834-890320 CIA 1998b, paragraph 883carriers they ultimately used”321; as carriers is in plural, not singular, Vortexwas not the only case322.The Contra Cocaine HubCelerino Castillo was the only DEA agent assigned to cover both El Salvadorand Guatemala between 1985 - 1987. When Castillo started workingin Central America his boss Stia briefed him on the Contra operation.The operation was a covert White House operation directed by North,and run out of Ilopango airport in El Salvador. DEA was receiving reportsabout possible drug trafficking out of Ilopango, but DEA had notpursued the matter, Stia said. Ilopango airport was a small airport, butstill the main airport for both civil trafficking and the air force. The airport,which was just 40 kilometres out of El Salvador’s capital San Salvador,was divided into a civil and a military part. Among the informantsthat DEA had lined up for Castillo to work with were three whosupplied him with information on the Contras’ drug trafficking out ofIlopango airport; Socrates Amaury Sofi Perez, Luis Aparecio, and HugoMartinez. Castillo claims he documented drug trafficking out of Ilopangoby the Contras, but DEA denies that his reports documented anything323.Sofi, as Socrates Amaury Sofi Perez was called, worked for both DEAand the Guatemalan government. He had fled the US due to an arrestwarrant for drug trafficking, and had been classed as a Class One traffickerin DEA’s computers. As the Guatemalan government had no intentionof deporting him to the US he was safe in Guatemala. Sofi wasthe first informant who told Castillo about the Contras’ cocaine traffickingout of Ilopango airport. The small Contra air force, Sofi said,321 CIA 1998b, paragraph 805322 Kerry, 1989a, 48CIA 1998b, paragraph 834-890323 Castillo 1994, 105-179Page 56 of 71smuggled drugs to the US and weapons bought with drug money back.Sofi played his part in the Contras’ cocaine operation too with his smallshrimp company in Guatemala. Sofi told Castillo that he picked up cocainein Colombia, hid it with his shrimp shipments for Miami, paid off aUS Customs agents who hurry the shipment past inspection, and thenused his company to launder the drug profits for the Contras324. The otherinformant Luis Aparecio confirmed Sofi’s account, but said that theContras had received carte blanchet to use Ilopango as a cocaine transitpoint from the head of the El Salvadorian air force. An Salvadorian AirForce officer told Castillo that there was nothing covert about the operation.Everybody who spent any time around Ilopango airport or the Salvadorianmilitary knew about the drug smuggling. The people runningthe show did not bother to hide it, and his air force friends supported thesmuggling operation enthusiastically as it meant more US aid. The SalvadorianAir Force received a huge portion of the US military aid thatwas given to combat the FLMN insurgency in El Salvador. Even CIA acknowledgedthat it would have been easy to move drugs in and out ofIlopango airport, if it had occurred, which they denied325.Castillo’s third informant Hugo Martinez worked at Ilopango airport’scivilian side where he was writing the flight plans. Martinez’ access to informationmeant that Castillo’s reports not just had the names of the suspectedtraffickers, but also the their destination, flight path, tail numbers,and time and date for the flights. Martinez told Castillo that the Contrasoperated out of hanger 4 and 5, which were owned by CIA and NSC. Thedrugs was flown in from Colombia via airstrips in Costa Rica or Panamabefore it was transported to the US. The cash was flown from the US toPanama where it was laundered. From Panama the money was wired324 Castillo 1994, 126f325 Castillo 1994, 128CIA 1998b, paragraph 173into accounts in Costa Rica controlled by the Contras who used thelaundered drug money to buy arms and supplies. Martinez told Castillothat every pilot had his preferred way of getting the drugs into the US.Air drops were the least risky and most popular method and many of thepilots had experience in air dropping drug off the Bahamas or coast ofFlorida. Others flew cocaine hidden in innocuous cargoes. Some flashtheir CIA credentials and unloaded the planes in broad daylight. Otherslanded at US military bases knowing that no one would inspect a Contraplane326.Enrique Miranda, who was arrested in Nicaragua together with NorwinMeneses, claimed that drug flights from Ilopango landed at a US Airbasenear Fort Worth. The only airbase close to Fort Worth was Carswell AirForce Base, which is now closed down. All flight records from Carswellhave been destroyed according to the US Air Force. Miranda said thatMeneses and Marcos Aguado supervised the loading of cocaine onto USbound aircraft in Ilopango and that on occasion Meneses flew with thedrug plane to the US, but usually he travelled on commercial airlines usinghis own name. At the same time as he was listed as a Class One traffickerin the computer systems. Crossing the US border set off all thealarm bells in Meneses’ own words. Meneses claimed that he pre-clearedall border crossing between 1985-1986 with DEA, i.e. before he becamean informant according to DOJ. Either DEA clears traffickers to enter thecountry or Meneses was working for DEA while he trafficked drugs forthe Contras327.The traffickers at Ilopango were well connected. One received a US visawhile he was listed as trafficker, another was honorary ambassador to326 Castillo 1994, 139327 Webb 1998, 250fScott 1998Page 57 of 71Panama, yet another was a presidential advisor in El Salvador, and anotherone even had credentials from DEA, CIA and FBI. The traffickerswere not just associated with the local governments but also with the USGovernment. Brasher, the trafficker who had DEA, CIA and FBI credentials,had his house in San Salvador raided by the El Salvadorian narcoticspolice and Castillo. Loads of US and Soviet military equipment wasdiscovered, along with license plates and radios that belonged to the USEmbassy in El Salvador. CIA denied, as is the truth that, Brasher workedfor them. He worked for North in the White House. Castillo had his informants’statements confirmed by embassy staff who knew that Brasherwas running drugs and guns for the Contras. Ambassador Corr toldCastillo that he had been ordered to cooperate with the Contra operationby the White House. When Castillo questioned the Salvadorian Gen.Bustillo, who was in charge of Ilopango airbase, about why they allowedBrasher to smuggle cocaine out of Ilopango, he replied328:“I don’t understand your government” he said. “North comesdown here and tells us he needs our help with his covert operation.Now you tell me what they’re doing is illegal.” As far as he knew,Oliver North represented the White House. That was all the reassurancehe needed329.US Protection of NarcoterroristsIn September 1986 North send an email to his boss the National SecurityAdvisor Admiral Pointdexter. The subject of the email was the sentencingof the Honduran Gen. Jose Bueso Rosa, who had being arrest in conjunctionwith 346 kilos of cocaine and a collection of Cuban and Honduranarms dealers on a remote airstrip in the southern Florida two years328 Castillo 1994, 144, 148f, 160, 163, 165, 167f, 170f329 Castillo 1994, 175earlier. The wholesale price of the 346 kilos of cocaine were estimated tobe worth $40 million. The cocaine was supposed to finance a militarycoup against Honduras’ the democratically elected president, and reinstatethe military dictator Gen. Alvarez who retired to Miami as democracywas introduced to Honduras in 1984. In the US the retired dictatorfound a job, working for Pentagon as a consultant. Before Alvarez becamearmy chief of staff, he had been chief of police, and it was as chiefof police that Alvarez had participated in the meeting in August 1981with Clarridge, where Honduras confirmed its commitment to the USrun Contra operation. Bueso Rosa, who worked for Alvarez, had been instrumentalin setting up the logistics and training for the Contras in Honduras,but with the democratical election and Alvarez’ retirement, BuesoRosa was demoted to Honduras’ military attaché in Chile330.One of the people FBI arrested on the remote airstrip in Florida with 346kilos cocaine was Gerard Latchinian, an arms dealer who was one ofHonduras’ richest men. He told FBI that the cocaine came from Honduras’presently chief of police, who had approached one of the coup plotterson advice on how to dispose of more than a ton of cocaine in the US.When Alvarez retired to Miami he stayed in Latchinian’s house for awhile. One of Latchinian’s business partners was Cuban born formerCIA agent Felix Rodríguez, who was a friend of Vice-President Bush.Rodríguez and worked at Ilopango airbase under his CIA cover nameMax Gomez as a advisor to the head of the El Salvadorian Air Force Gen.Bustillo. Another of Latchinian’s business partner was Pesakh Ben Or, anIsraeli arms dealer in Guatemala, who shipped weapons to the Contras331. The coup plotters hired two former US special forces soldiers’ for330 National Security Archive, The Contras, Cocaine, and Covert Operations, U.S. Officials and Major TraffickersWebb 1998, 335Scott 1998, 48f, 60fLos Angeles Times 1996a331 Scott 1998, 60fPage 58 of 71$300.000 and 18 kilo cocaine to create and lead the hit team that wouldstart the military coup by assassinating the president. The hit teamwould of cause be supplied with a private jet and all high-tech weaponsthey needed for the mission. The two former special forces soldiers acceptedthe mission, called FBI and told them everything, which was thereason why FBI was waiting at the remote airstrip in Florida332.Bueso Rosa has just been sentenced to five years in jail when North wrotethe email to Pointdexter. The sentence must be considered mild whencompared to the charges; conspiring to kill a head of state, stage a coupd’état, finance the operation with a ⅓ ton cocaine, and he had beennamed as the primary conspirator by the arrested arms merchants333. TheDOJ public stated that the case against Bueso Rosa was “most significantcase of narco-terrorism yet discovered”334. Bueso Rosa’s five years term wasthe lowest, his co-conspirators had received up to thirty years imprisonment,but the problem was, as North wrote to Pointdexter, that:He [Bueso Rosa] apparently still believed up until yesterday that hew[ou]ld be going to the minimum security facility at Eglin for ashort period (days or weeks) and then walk free. (...) The problemw/ the Bueso case is that Bueso was the man with whom Negroponte,Gorman, Clarridge and I worked out arrangements [3 censoredlines]. Only Gorman, Clarridge and I were fully aware of allthat Bueso was doing on our behalf. Our major concern – Gorman,North, Clarridge – is that when Bueso finds out what is really happeningto him, he will break his longstanding silence about theNic[araguan] Resistance and other sensitive operations. GormanClarridge, Ravell, Trott and Abrams will cabal quietly in the morningto look at options: pardon, clemency, deportation, reduced sen-332 Scott 1998, 61333 COPESA Chile334 Scott 1998, 61tence. Objective is to keep Bueso from feeling like he was lied to inlegal process and start spilling the beans335.Pointdexter replied that “You may advise all concerned that the Presidentwant to be as helpful as possible to settle this matter”336. Two senior officialsfiled depositions that urge leniency on the ground that “Gen. Bueso Rosahas always been a valuable ally to the United States” and that “As chief of staffof the Honduran armed forces he immeasurably furthered the United States’ interestin Central America”337. The judge made Bueso Rosa eligible for immediateparole, but the move was blocked by DOJ and the State Departmentdespite pressure from CIA and Pentagon. Bueso Rosa served twoyears at Eglin Air Force Base, which is named in Forbes as the nicestcountry club to serve your jail time in. Bueso Rosa never spilled a singlebean338.The Secret MemorandumIn 1982 a secret memorandum was written regarding which crimes CIAshould report to the police. CIA should, the memorandum said, reportany crime by any person as long as it is consistent with the protection ofintelligence sources and methods. CIA’s report explains that rules weredrafted on the language used in the former guidelines governing the requirementsfor CIA to report possible crimes. What CIA reports tries topresent in a misleading manner is the fact that they were excepted fromreporting drug trafficking. CIA claimed that the new memorandum wasstrict compaired to earlier guidelines, but they state the same; that CIAdid not have to report crimes if classified information would be revealed335 National Security Archive, The Contras, Cocaine, and Covert Operations, U.S. Officials and Major Traffickers336Scott 1998, 62337 Scott 1998, 61338Scott 1998, 62ForbesPage 59 of 71during the prosecution of the crime. The specific procedures for crime reportingwas established in the memorandum of understanding (MOU)between CIA and DOJ. The MOU operates with two sets of rules; one forCIA employees and one for non-CIA employees. According to the MOUCIA was required to report a long list of crimes such as violations of thearms export act, neutrality offences, and unlawful enterings into the US.One crime that was not mention on the list was narcotics violations bynon-CIA employee339. The Attorney General wrote Casey regarding theMOU, which only needed Casey’s signature, that.[N]o formal requirement regarding the reporting of narcotics violations[by non-employees] has been included in these procedures340.In the letter there are three references to reporting of narcotics violations,which I have not quoted. In each instance the conclusion was that thediscussed sections did not create a requirement to report narcotics violations.According to CIA’s report the lack of requirement in the MOU toreport drug crimes only concerned reporting to DOJ not DEA, but thenscrutinizing the report it is clear that the requirements were the same;none. But the exceptions continued. It was not only narcotics violationscommitted by non-CIA employees that CIA did not have report. Beforethe MOU was made public with the publication of CIA’s report it waschanged. Now the definition of ‘employee’ was changed to include341:(...) staff employee, contract employee, asset, or other person or entityproviding service to or acting on behalf of any agency within339 CIA 1998b, paragraph 42, 56CIA 1998b, Exhibits 1CIA 1998b, paragraph 42-110340 CIA 1998b, paragraph 59341 CIA 1998b, paragraph 59-62the intelligence community342.With the memorandum CIA was allowed to work with drug traffickers,who could tell CIA all about their drug transactions. Although it is asevere crime to have this knowledge and not informing police, CIA wasexcepted from the law and did not have to report their knowledge. CIAdid have to report CIA employees who participated in drug traffickingaccording to the memorandum. What CIA did was just to change thedefinition of the term employee. The definition of employee was not,contrary to what the report states, a person employed by, assigned to, oracting for CIA. According to Makowka, the former Chief of the IntelligenceLaw Division, narcotics violations by agents or assets did not haveto be reported; both CIA and DOJ were comfortable with the arrangement.CIA was, Makowka said, restricted from reporting narcotics violationscommitted by US citizen. The Office of General Council (OGC) thathandles legal matter defined the term employee strange. Neither CIAagents nor anyone who CIA dealt with operationally was considered employeeswhen it concern the requirements to report narcotics crimes343.The just mentions definitions are from the former guidelines that Carterintroduced, and which was replaced with Reagan’s definitions; here theterm was narrowed down even further344. The truth is in stark Contrast tothe illusion that CIA attempts to create in the beginning of the chapterwere we are told that the term employee is defined as “a person employedby, assigned to, or acting for an agency within the Intelligence Community”345.As had been true under E.O. 11905 [Ford’s guideline] and E.O.12036 [Carter’s guideline], the reporting obligations imposed upon342 CIA 1998b, paragraph 69343 CIA 1998b, paragraph 47, 72, 73, 98, 99344 CIA 1998b, paragraph 78345 CIA 1998b, paragraph 47Page 60 of 71CIA and other U.S. intelligence agencies by these provisions exceededthe obligations of other federal agencies. (…), E.O. 12333[Reagan’s guideline] requires CIA and other intelligence agenciesto report all possible violations of any law by any person346a.CIA’s Directorate of Operations (DO) was preparing a handbook in 1982,which included a section that centred on restrictions and prohibitions regardingcontacts with individuals who were involved in narcotics violations.A summery of the handbook was forwarded to all DO field stationsin July 1982. The draft focused on restrictions and prohibitions onCIA agent from associating with drug traffickers, but it did not apply to:(…) Contra-related individuals or independent contractors discussedin Volume II, (...), since none of those individuals or independentcontractors were involved in the collection of narcotics intelligence347.Since the agents who were involved in aiding and abetting drug traffickingwere not working on collecting narcotics intelligence they could dealwith anyone and did not have to report narcotics violations because theyworked in the operationally sphere of CIA. The handbook was first formallyissued 13 years later in 1995. With the exceptions to the term employeeand with the omission in the obligations to report narcotics violations,no narcotics crimes would ever be reported; and while the MOUwas in effect till 1995 CIA could legally cooperate with traffickers ondrug shipments into the US as long as CIA did not ship the drugs themselves.346 CIA 1998b, paragraph 56a CIA's emphasis347 CIA 1998b, paragraph 112On Government OrdersSo far I have tried to outline the link between the Contras and the traffickersand showed that the link was known by CIA. The evidence indicatesthat it was not a rouge operation or a few corrupted individuals.CIA intervened in the Frogman case, they had informants in working insome of the drug networks, they knew about the Contras’ decision tofund themselves through cocaine trafficking, and they did nothing toprevent cocaine from floating into the US. The State Department selectedknown drug trafficking companies, who where already flying for theContras, to deliver aid to the Contras. CIA suggested that the knowndrug trafficking companies were used. DEA cleared a known and majortrafficker, who supported the Contras, to cross the US border, and theyfacilitated contract between known drug traffickers and CIA, for CIA tobuy used drug trafficking equipment off the traffickers. The Presidentand the White House intervened to have the sentence reduced for a majortrafficker, who had been instrumental in the Contra operation, andthe President signed guidelines that allowed CIA to aid in drug traffickers.It was the government policy from the highest place to aid and abetdrug trafficking.Blandón and Meneses were engaged in drug smuggling beginningin the early 1980s. Both were Contra sympathizers who may haveplayed some role in local FDN chapters at some point. And bothgave some of their drug profits to the Contras. The harder questions,the ones that the OIG cannot answer definitively, are (1) towhat extent did Blandón and Meneses funnel drug profits to theContras? and (2) to what extent were Contra leaders aware thatthey were receiving drug money?348348 DOJ 1998, chapter 4.B.7Page 61 of 71Both CIA and DOJ denied that cocaine proceeds were used to finance theContras as the amounts the traffickers gave were minor. As to the secondquestion DOJ can not have studied CIA’s report, as it confirms that theCIA created Contras choose to engage in drug trafficking, hence the Contrasknew they were receiving drug money. As to the first question bothCIA and DOJ admits that they have no clue about the amount of drugproceeds that was donated to the Contras. Still CIA and DOJ claims thatthe amount must have been minor as two traffickers who worked forthem testified that they only donated around $40.000 each. The Kerry reportdocuments that other traffickers too donated equipment and cash.One trafficker sold a DC-3 for $1 and paid for the fuel to fly the plane toCentral America. Another donated $100.000 a month. It is hard to believethat Blandón and Meneses donated less than $80.000 as Blandón also saidthat he scarcely made a dime as most of the profits when to Meneses andthe Contras. The two official reports claimed that it was only a minoramount that Blandón and Meneses contributed to the Contras, whichwas far from enough to fund the Contras. Therefore, the reports concludes,the Contras was not funded with drug proceeds. It is a logicalcontradiction stating that the Contras did receive drug money but wasnot funded by drug money. Let us let the contradiction pass and speculatea bit.The Torres sold 1 ton of cocaine every month which equals 1 milliongrams per month, if they just made $10 profit from every gram then theirmonthly profits would be $10 million. This number is likely too low, as itwould have taken the Torres 25-50 month to accumulated the $250-500million that they had not managed to get out of the country. Since it is estimatedthat the worlds cocaine production and consumption were on itshighest point in 1986 and therefore prices on their lowest, the same yearthat the Torres had $250-500 million floating around in Los Angeles, thenthe accumulation time must either have been even or the profits. If theaccumulation time is already too high, then it must have been the profitsthat was higher. It therefore seems reasonable to assume that the profithave been between $20-$40 per gram. If 1% of the Torres brothers’ profitwent to the Contras then their monthly contributing would have beenbetween $200.000-$400.000. Another drug trafficker George Moralesdonation around $100.000 per month to the Contras. With numbers likethese then the Torres and Morales contribute 15-25% of Saudi Arabia’smonthly donations. We know that the Torres were smaller scale dealersthan Blandón and Meneses, and that they too funnelled cocaine profits tothe Contras. If profit margins and/or the donated share were higher thanMeneses’ organisation could easily be one of the major contributor to theContras. According to the official numbers from the Iran-Contra investigation,then Morales contributed 4-5% of the Contras’ budget between1984-1986. The official figure is presumable to low, and therefore Moralespro cent vice donation too high. The value of weapons, airbases etc. leftbehind after US military drills is not included in the official figures. Butthe official figures including the secret DOD aid is presumable too hightoo as the Iran-Contra investigation documented that merely a minoramount of the funds actually went to financing the Contras. 2/3 ended upin the pocket of subcontractors. The Contras were through their historyalways short on cash. All in all, a pro cent comparisons seems to be onthe low side then calculated with one pro cent donation of the profit;keep in mind that funding the Contras, at least in Morales case, meantthat CIA insured free and unhindered access to the US349.When the senatorial subcommittee investigation of the cocaine affair, thegovernment did what it could to sabotage the investigation. Subcommit-349 Walsh 1993Webb 1998Page 62 of 71tee staff suspected that members leaked information as were the case.Every step in the investigation was leaked to the State Department fromwhere it was passed on to CIA and the White House. The committee uncoveredconsiderable evidence during its investigation, and concludedthat individuals who helped finance the Contras were involved in drugtrafficking, that the resupply network was used for drug trafficking, thatthe Contras knew they received drug proceeds, and that in each case USGovernment agencies knew about the drug trafficking either while or immediatelyafter it occurred. CIA knew that the Contras had engaged incocaine trafficking, but it was not only CIA who knew. The administrationdid what it could to prevent the Senate from investigating the cocaineaffair. The subcommittee requested that North’s notebook wouldbe made available to them. The committee received a partial copy thatwas censored. Of the 2848 pages half were partial censored and somecompletely blacked out. The subcommittee found 543 pages with referencesto narcotics or terrorism. Because of these references the subcommitteesubpoenaed a full and uncensored copy of the notebook, but neverreceived it350. In North’s notebook there are two entries I will quote:wanted A/C to go to Bolivia p/u paste - want A/C to p/u 1500kilos35114M to finance came from drugs352.A/C refers to aircraft and p/u to pick up, i.e. someone wanted an aircraftto fly to Bolivia and pick up 1500 kilos of paste. Paste can of course beany kind of paste material, i.e. toothpaste, tomato paste etc., but the most350 Kerry 1989a, 36, 147-150351 Kerry 1989a, 146352 National Security Archive. The Contras, Cocaine, and Covert Operations, Documentation of Official U.S. Knowledgeof Drug Trafficking and the ContrasKerry 1989a, 146famous paste in Bolivia is its cocaine paste. The second quote could meanthat the pharmaceutical industry were funding the Contras too. Neitherexplanation is credible. Known and convicted drug traffickers were notconducting covert flights on behalf of CIA with tomato paste for thepharmaceutical industry.CIA not just knew, they condoned the cocaine trafficking. The southernfront commander Cesar testified in front of the subcommittee that he hadtold his CIA contact about the deal with Morales, who supplied the Contraswith both money and aircrafts. Cesar said that CIA told him that itwas all right. Morales testified too for the subcommittee. He believedthat he became protected because of his connection to the Contras. Moralesthough so, because he knew FBI had been tipped off about one cocaineshipment, but did nothing to prevent it from entering the country.Morales thought that DEA and FBI knew about his involvement with theContras353. Ivan Torres made a similar statement to an informant, whomwas regarded as reliable. The informant reported that Torres had saidthat CIA knew about his drug activities, but that they did not mind.Torres told the informant that CIA in fact had gone so fare “as to encouragecocaine traffic by members of the Contras because they know that it is a goodsource of income”354. Torres claimed he was in contact with both FBI andCIA representatives because of his involvement with FDN, and that hisCIA contact had told him to stay away from Blandón, because Blandónwas about to get arrested, as it did happen soon after the informant reportedthe conversation355. When the DOJ and CIA reports were about tobe published ten years after the affair, the reports where withheld becausethe DOJ feared that the publication would jeopardize on going investigations.This means that the cocaine affair that occurred in the 1980s353 Castillo 1994, 143354 DOJ 1998, chapter 2.G.2.B.4355 DOJ 1998, chapter 2.G.2.B.4Page 63 of 71was still under investigation 15 years later; that is a pretty long time, especiallycompared to the short time it took the Majors to investigateBlandón. Police first learn of the Contras’ cocaine connection in May1983, when an they caught an accountant for the Medellín cartel356.What strikes me as being odd, is that although the Contras never developedplaning or intelligence capacities on their own, although CIAdrafted the unification document, rented the house, footed the bills,trained them and planed their mission, then the Contras were able tomake one, and only this one, decision on their own to finance themselvesthrough cocaine trafficking.When Webb researched for his article, he tried without luck to get an interviewwith Blandón. While Webb was attending Ross’ third trial; theone in which Ross was convicted and sentenced to life in prison for helpinga friend buy a kilo of cocaine off Blandón who worked for DEA at thetime, Blandón walked into the court shielded by US Marshals. He wasseated in the row just in front of Webb, who leaned over and askedBlandón one more time for an interview. Blandón said that he did notmind, but that DEA would not allow him to talk to Webb. During the trialthe defence had been kept in the dark about who Blandón was. The defenceknew that Webb was researching the Contras’ cocaine connectionas Webb had interviewed Ross’ while he was waiting to go on trial. Sincegovernment had handed nothing over to the defence about the identityof Blandón, the defence asked Webb for help. Webb agreed and drew upa list of questions for the defence. He would get the interview; indirectlybut under oath. Blandón had testified for the prosecution in the trial thathe stopped selling cocaine for the Contras in 1982, 1983, 1984 and again356 Democracy Now, The CIA-Contra Cocaine Connection, 20 July 1998Cockburn 1999, 54Kerry 1989a, 1511986. There had been a few slips in the attempt to place the supposedbreak between Blandón and the Contras, that would show a direct linkbetween the Contras and Ross’ crack enterprise in Los Angeles. LaterBlandón testified before the Senate and admitted that he did indeed continueto selling cocaine for the Contras throughout 1985. When it was thedefence turn to question Blandón he was asked if he had kept the cocaineproceeds himself357:“No Sir. Let me explain one thing. When we meet – when we raisedmoney for the Contra revolution, we received orders from the –“ Hepaused and looked at [US Attorney] O’Neale. O’Neale stared athim. “From other people.”358.O'Neale was the US Attorney who had Blandón’s sentencing reduced to28½ months and a $50 fine. The investigation showed that Blandón hadsold at least two tons of cocaine; a bit more the ten kilos limit which carriesa mandatory sentencing of ten years to life. When Blandón was sentencedhe had already been detained for 28½ months during which hehad worked for DEA. Therefore he was able to leave the court as a freeman359. Jack Blum, the attorney who was in charge of the subcommitteeinvestigation between 1986-1988, testified before the Senate’s IntelligenceCommittee in 1994.If you ask whether the United States government ignored the drugproblem and subverted law enforcement to prevent embarrassmentand to reward our allies in the contra war, the answer is yes360.357 Webb 1998, 427-436358 Webb 1998, 435359 DOJ 1998, chapter 2.K.11-12, 14360 National Security Archive. The Contras, Cocaine, and Covert Operations, The Storm Over “Dark Alliance”Page 64 of 71ConclusionIt is clear beyond reasonable doubts that the Contras were involved incocaine trafficking, and that it was a political decision within the Contrasto traffic drugs as a means of finance. That is documented in CIA’s report.It clear from the reports too that quite a few of government employeewere involved with the Contras’ cocaine connection; a trait that becamemore obvious after the Contra operation was transferred to OliverNorth in the White House. There is no definite evidence that Menesesdid work for CIA, but strong circumstantial evidence points towards thatconclusion which is what several FBI and DEA agents believed too. It iscertain that Meneses worked for DEA while he was smuggling cocaineinto the US and sending part of the profits back to the Contras. The evidencesuggest that Meneses started working for DEA in 1981; the sametime as we begun to peddle drugs for the Contras.DEA’s involvement in the affair proves that it was not just a rouge operationwhere a few dirty agents worked with some majors drug traffickersto promote the Contras. DEA helped facilitated contact between CIA anddrug traffickers of whom CIA bought equipment. CIA decided whichdrug related companies the State Department should use in the Contraoperation. The State Department showed an extreme interest in monitoringthe Senate’s investigation into the affair, and asked as the first questionif there was any indication of administration complicity in thecrimes. The investigation into Meneses, Blandón and Lister points towardsthat there was a link to the DIA too, who was involved in settingup arms manufacturing plants in Central America. This assumption issupported by the fact that DEA, FBI, Customs and LASD believed Menesesto be involved in guns for drugs swaps. When evaluating the evidencewe end up with a long list of government agencies, which includesDEA, the State Department, DOJ, DOD, and the White House, who wasactive in the affair. FBI and DEA were resultant to investigate the informationthey received on the cocaine link. DEA, FBI, LASD and Customshad information, which showed that the Contras were involved in largescaledrug trafficking, and possible with the aided of CIA. The 1982Memorandum of Understanding allowed CIA to work with traffickerswithout having to report their activities to law enforcement.Information came forward, which showed that the government was complicitin the drug trafficking, but the information was never used. Somehowpeople refrain from attempting to jail several members of the cabinet,if not the President or the Vice President. Arresting the sectary of defenceor -justice is not likely to help your career, nor your boss’ if he approvedit. It was no secret that the Contras were directed by CIA and hadPresident Reagan’s full support. Any investigation into the Contras’ cocainelink would bring the investigators into conflict with the WhiteHouse as, even if untrue, it could be used to smear the Contras. If true,when an investigation would uncover government complicity as the Majorsquickly realised. People who handled information concerning theContras’ cocaine trafficking would most likely show a certain sensitivitytowards the point, that neither you nor your boss would be likely to benefitpositively from trying arrest your head of state, his staff, or the cabinetfor drug trafficking. Some did, which is why we today have documentationthat the cocaine link did exist. None was promoted.As to the question of what evidence there exists, which shows governmentcomplicit in drug trafficking, the answer is short. CIA’s own reportdocuments that the government knew about the Contras’ drug trafficking,but did everything possible to discredit the information. DOJ’s reportconfirms the same points. The Senate’s investigation in the 1980sPage 65 of 71documents the same points, and documents from the State Departmentshows that the investigation where closely monitored by the administration.From neither CIA’s not DOJ’s reports is it clear that the governmentdid participate in the drug trafficking, but plenty of suspicious instantspoints in that direction. There is the links to CIA in the Frogman case,where CIA is worried that it would appear as if they funnelled moneyinto drug trafficking, then there is DEA facilitation of contact betweenCIA and drug traffickers, and the fact that Meneses worked for DEA andpossible CIA too while he smuggled tons of cocaine into the US, there isthe link between DIA/CIA and Lister, there is Blandón’s testimony thatthe Contras was ordered to smuggle drugs, there is the drug connectedCIA agent Ivan Gomez, there is the Majors who believed that the governmentwas sanction the cocaine trafficking, there is the Senate report thatdocumented numerous instants’ were North’s notebook referred to drugtrafficking, the lead investigator who said that the government had subvertedlaw enforcement and rewarded the traffickers and their allies,there is North’s two emails about flying cocaine paste and using drugmoney. Then there is Webb’s research that clearly shows that there wassomething rotten going on, but falls short of documenting actual governmentparticipation.What we end up with is a very long list of circumstantial evidence,which includes the reports from the Senate, CIA, DOJ and North’s emailsthat FBI seized during the Iran-Contra investigation. We have Webb’s research.This collection of document proves that government knew thatdrug trafficking was going on without interrupting it. That is a severecrime in the US. What we do not know is if the government directly participatedor helped the traffickers smuggle cocaine into the US. So did theContras’ get ordered to traffic drugs as Blandón testified? We can notknow for sure, but it seems to be the case if we can trust reason and logic.CIA created, directed, and funded the Contras. It seems odd that theContras would make a decision, which would risk end US support. CIAhad a well established network of informants and assets within the Contras,which the Contras must have known as they were the ones whoworked for CIA. As we know, and as the Contras’ leadership must haveknown too, CIA knew what happened inside the Contras. Therefore itseems odd that the Contras’ made one independent decision, one thatshould risk antagonising CIA. Several of the involved traffickers have atone point or another claimed that CIA knew and encouraged the traffickingbecause it was an effective means to raise funds. The three official reportsdocumented that the government chose to paid traffickers tax dollarsto fly the same route that they smuggled cocaine along. The circumstantialevidence points towards one conclusion, which is the only reasonableconclusion to draw: the government participated knowingly andactively in cocaine trafficking; it was a CIA ordered and directed operationthat had the White House full support.Perspective: a Policy FailureAs we have seen the US police allowed large-scale trafficking of cocaineinto the US in order to build and maintain the Contras. There have onlybeen minor hints in my report about the drug trafficking of the US alliesin Central America. The rulers in at least Panama and Honduras were allowedto traffic cocaine into the US in order to maintain their cooperation,which was vital in order to keep the Contras running. With this directcocaine-pipeline from Colombia the government inflicted massivepain on their population. The domestic cocaine consumption rose in the1980s and created countless numbers of addicts, destroyed both familiesand lives. The problem was made worse as the cocaine was convertedinto crack. The government did not decide that the cocaine should bePage 66 of 71turned into crack, or that it should be sold in the black neighbourhoods,but that was what did happen. The government bears a large part of theblame, not just, for letting the cocaine into the country, but for protectingthe traffickers.Did the US policy archive its aims in Nicaragua? The answer depends onhow the aims are defined, was it containment, eradication or punishment.A ceasefire was signed between the Sandinistas and the Contras in1987, and in 1990 the Sandinista lost the election and left the governmentoffices. Where the aim to remove the Sandinistas from power then theContras failed, as it was achieved through a democratical election. By theearly 1980s the US had realised that the Contras were unable to archive amilitary victory. The US friendly government that come to power in 1990had been heavily funded by the US throughout the election campaign.More money was spend per capita, compared to the seize of the economic,than during the US presidential campaign in 1988. This amount wereminor absolutely minor compared to the money spend on the Contras.Monetarily the Contras were a failure too if the aim was to remove theregime. The US had officially spend at least $350 millions on the failed attemptto create a successful insurgency; the cost was likely several billiondollars higher. More billions were spend on supporting regional allieslike Honduras, El Salvador, Costa Rica, Panama. Mining the Nicaragua’sharbours, which resulted in the sinking of foreign vessels and killing offoreign sailors, did not help the US’ international image. That the InternationalCourt of Justice in Hague convicted the US for sponsoring andaiding terrorists in Nicaragua did not help nor did the US’ subsequentrefusal to uphold international law. Where the populations paid in bloodfor cocaine, the US paid with its prestige for the destruction ofNicaragua. After seven years of war the country was mellow for peace,which could only be achieved if the government was changed; it was.The US wore Nicaragua down in economical and human terms. If thatwas the aim of the policy, then it was highly successful.It was and is obvious that the US could not and would not tolerate ‘anotherCuba’ on the mainland. The revolutionary sentiment needed to becontained to protect US interests and allies in Central America from unrestand the change of revolution. Corruption, poverty and injustice aremajor catalyst for unrest. Both corrupt and poverty was and still is widespreadin Central America. When life, liberty and the pursuit of happinesscan no longer be pursued, people have the right to alter or abolishthe government and institute a new to secure their safety and happiness.But successful political reform, which reduces the amount of injustice, isbound to create a demand for change else where. Nicaragua’s successfuleconomical reform therefore threatened US interests in maintainingstatus quo. Too often the US have mistaken change for socialism.The Carter administration had establish a diplomatic relationship withthe Sandinistas, allowing them freedom to choose within rules as definedby the US. The Carter administrations initial success suggests that politicalchange could have occurred within Nicaragua without breaking its alliancewith the US. The high-level of trade and investment made it necessaryfor any government in the region to maintain friendly relations withthe US. Nicaragua could have been a social-reformed country had the USaccepted political reform and pluralism in Central America without fearingthat it automatically lead to the deployment of soviet missiles. Thereformation could have occurred without terrible costs in human lives,and without growing resented in Latin American, but it was not to be. Itappears that the US wanted punishment and war.The US blockade of the Nicaraguan attempt to buy arms from FrancePage 67 of 71meant that Nicaragua was forced into the arms of the Soviet bloc. TheReagan Administration deliberately pushed Nicaragua into an alliancewith the Soviet Union, and thus gained its casus belli for a war againstNicaragua. It appears that the major factor for US hostility towards politicalchange in Central America was the fear of communism, and changewas perceived as communist subversion. The US history of interventionsin the Americas means that independence movements in Latin Americaalmost automatically assumes an ‘anti-gringo and -imperialist’ stance. Byreacting to the ‘anti-gringo and -imperialist’ stance as thought it wouldautomatically lead to a pro-soviet regime in the US, the US made it difficultto achieve peaceful and US friendly political change in the Americas.With the political logic hard wired to this pattern – if you’re not with us,you’re a communist thread – a conflict was bound to emerge. Successfulleft-wing political reform in Nicaragua strengthen the left-wing in theneighbouring countries and thereby lead to a higher level on social unrestas political reforms were repressed. Nicaragua’s political systemneeded to be changed to preserve stability in the region, and until thathappened Nicaragua’s neighbours needed to be strengthened. The Contraswas the US instrument of punishment, and the Nicaraguans neededto be punished for allowing left-wing radicals to seize power. Nicaraguaserved as a warning to other. The US administration choose war insteadof diplomatic containment, and the war funds came, at least, partial fromthe cocaine sales.During the 1980s, then CIA and the US Government allowed cocaineenter the country, the Colombian cartels grew from being small criminalnetworks in Colombia to big international well established cartels. Theadministrations insistence on war and punishment, meant that massivedrug trafficking was allowed to keep the war in Nicaraguan running.The US cost of war was not only paid for in reputation, but also with thelives of addicts too; the decade of crack babies. There is the price of theaddicts life and the crime that most addicts have to resort to to financetheir addiction, and there is the emotional costs to the relatives. The sideeffects is not that the addicts crime that hurt society, it is that the moneythe addict gains through crime is funnelled back into organised crime ina money flow that is so fat that law enforcement can not compete on afinancial basis. It is impossible to keep up with the traffickers whom canafford the latest equipment as Gen. Gorman testified before Congress. Ifpower corrupt, then even more so does drug money, which can buy policeofficers , politicians, and presidents.Remember the scenes from ‘Miami Vice’, based on the 1980s drug warbetween Colombians and Cubans in Miami. Remember the true storyabout George Jung in ‘Blow’, or the painted description in ‘Traffic’. Thebattle is impossible to win and lost long before it is fought.Beside it is illegal, and some would say immoral, the main problem withthe US Government’s complicity in drug trafficking with the Contras, isnot the human costs. It is that it strengthened the Colombian cartels andorganised crime, and weakened the governments of the Americas.Funding the Contras through cocaine sales was a total and complete failure,if the US wanted to remove the Sandinistas, as they were still inpower when the Contras laid down their weapons. The only way it canbe viewed as an success is if the aim was either punishment or strengtheningthe Colombian cartels. The strengthening of the cartels was a clearand visible side-effect, but it was hopefully not the intended aim. OnlyGod and CIA knows how many tons of cocaine were flown in on CIAPage 68 of 71sponsored flights.The policy failed and the Colombian cartels won the war.IntermediaryThe subject had proven to be a most interesting subject, and – to my surprise– an almost unreported subject too. The subject is to important tocontinue to go unreported as US Government involvement in drug traffickingis not just a serious offence, and a way to divert funds to covertoperations, it is a certain way to strengthen organised crime while poisingthe populations of both producer and consumer countries.First, while studying the subject you come across several true ‘short stories’that seems to incredible to believe. These stories – like North, WhiteHouse and Gen. Bueso Rosa, CIA’s Venezuelan Cocaine, the secretmemorandum of understanding from 1982, or Lister that tells the ColombianMafia to fuck off after stealing $500.000 from them – all have theproperties needed for being published as short articles, which I will attemptto do as soon as this paper has been handed in. It is too importantto let go – CIA and White House complicity in drug trafficking.Secondly, my theses will be published on the Internet, and should be upand running at http://www.lallepot.dk around the time I hand it in. Atfirst the format will just be simple homepage, but in time I will assemblethe documentation and publish it too with link reference between thispaper and the the documents too ease the task of verification. With anongoing collection of documents and related information, I will try to setup a database of names and incident to help further public research.Thirdly, the material I have used is excellent for teaching source critic, asfor example the White House publication of the picture which Reagan allegeddocumented that the Sandinistas where involved in cocaine traffickingwith Pablo Escobar and the Medellín cartel. This story is not includedin this paper as it is not relevant to my focus, but it would be excellentfor the study of source critic with plenty of official claims to thestory’s truth, denials from DEA to the contrary, the Kerry report whichcontains reference, just like North’s notebook that indicates that Reagan’sclaim is false, and independent researchers who is divided. As the task ofbuilding and develop a website with a database is huge, I will not be constructingany educational material, but I truly believe that the subjectwould be the perfect subject to use for teaching source critic – it is contradictory,and perhaps more important, it might be able to capture theminds of teenage boys as it involves the secret services, government conspiracies,organised crime and drug trafficking, the main ingredients fora Hollywood thriller.Fourthly, this subject needs far more research done. We have two greatbooks on the subject, Peter Dale Scott’s Cocaine Politics, and GaryWebb’s Dark Alliance. The first deals with the international settings inwhich the cocaine alliance unfolded, whereas the second investigates thedomestic settings of one of the cocaine connections describe in the first.We have three important official report on the subject, CIA’s, DOJ’s andthe US Senate’s. First two are attempts of white wash, and the third, althoughthe Contras are a minor issue for it, could definitely be used formore throughout research, especial the two last volumes. There is a lot ofofficial material mostly collected in connection with the Iran-Contra affair,some of is bound to be related to the Contra cocaine affair. There is aneed for researching and describing all this material, i.e. the books, officialreports, and declassified documents, into one very thick and comprePage69 of 71hensive account of what did happened. On the other hand the is the domesticpolicies in the US, the propaganda campaigns, the foreign policy,the cold war; and on the other side of the other hand, is the situation inNicaragua, it is policies and alliances. And to make an comprehensive accountof what happened, there is a need to put into it is proper context inorder to understand why it happened. In short, there is material enoughfor a long range of publications and books.Literature• Agence France Presse, US court indicts CIA-related Venezuelan general,23 November 1996.• Air & Space Power Chronicles. The Air War in El Salvador, Dr. JamesS. Corum. United States Air Force. Summer 1998.• Ambassador Pezzullo. “National Guard Survival”. 30 June 1979, Departmentof State. Web.• Blum, Jack. Testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee,Senate Select Committee on Intelligence on Drug Trafficking and theContra War, 23 October 1996.• Blystone, James J. “Meeting with Argentine Intelligence Service”. 19June 1980. Department of State. Web.• Byrne, Malcolm & Kornbluh, Peter. 1990. The Iran-Contra Scandal inPerspective. National Security Archives, Washington.• Castillo, Celerino & Harmon, Dave. 1994. Powderburns, Cocaine,Contras & the Drug War. Mosaic Press, Oakville.• Chomsky, Noam. 1994. Secret, lies and democracy, Odonian Press,Tucson, Arizona.• Chomsky, Noam. Ed. 2005. Superpower Principles. Common CouragePress , Monroe, ME.• Cockburn, Alexander. & St. Clair, Jeffrey. 1999. Whiteout, The CIA,Drugs and the Press. Verso, New York.• COPESA Chile. General Bueso, entre el complot y el narcotráfico. Web• Democracy Now. CIA Involvement with the War On Drugs. 15 May1998.• Democracy Now. The CIA-Contra Cocaine Connection. 20 July 1998.• Democracy Now. A Response to the Recent CIA-Crack Report. 5February 1998.• Department of State. 1986a, Senator Kerry Requests Hearings on ContraCrimes.• Expert Witness Radio, 25 November 2005.• Flanders, Stephen A. 1993. Dictionary of American foreign affairs.Macmillan, New York.• International Court of Justice, Nicaragua vs. United States, 27 June1986.• House Amendment 461, House Resolution 2968.• Kenworthy, Eldon. 1995. America/Américas. Pennsylvania University,Pennsylvania.• Kerry, John. 1998. Committee on Foreign Relations. Subcommittee onTerrorism, Narcotics and International Operations. Drugs, Law Enforcementand Foreign Policy: Hearings before the Subcommittee onTerrorism, Narcotics, and International Operations of the Committeeon Foreign Relations, United States Senate, One Hundred FirstCongress, Second Session. Washington, US GPO.• Kornbluh, Peter. The Storm Over The Dark Alliance. Columbia JournalismReview, January/February 1997.• Kornbluh, Peter. Commentary. Los Angeles Times, 15 November1996.• Merrill, Tim L. 1994. Nicaragua a country study. Library of Congress,Federal Research Division, Washington DC.• Levine, Michael. 1993. The Big White Lie: The CIA and thePage 70 of 71Cocaine/Crack Epidemic – An Undercover Odyssey. New York, Thunder’sMouth Press.• Levine, Michael. 1990. Deep Cover: The Inside Story of How DEA Infighting,Incompetence, and Subterfuge Lost Us the Biggest Battle ofthe Drug War. New York: Delacorte Press.• Levine, Mike. Is Anyone Apologizing To Gary Webb? July 1998.• Miranda, Roger & Ratliff, William. 1994. The Civil War in Nicaragua,Transaction Publishers, New Brunswick.• Molineu, Harold. 1986. US Policy Towards Latin America, WestviewPress, Boulder.• Napoleoni, Loretta. 2004. Terror Inc. Penguin Books. London.• National Security Archive. Nicaragua: The Making of U.S. Policy,1978-1990. Web.• National Security Archive. The Contras, Cocaine, and Covert Operations.Web.• National Security Archive. Cold War, Episode 18. Interview with DuaneClarridge. Web.• National Security Archive. Cold War, Episode 18. Interview with YuriPavlov. Web.• North, Oliver & Novak, William. 1992. Under Fire, An American Story.HarperCollins Publishers, New York.• Parry, “NYT’s New Contra Lies”, News Consortium, 1 October 1998.• Robinson, William I. 1992. A Faustian Bargain, Westview Press,Boulder.• San Jose Mercury News, Dark Alliance, 18, 19 & 20 August 1996.• Scott, Peter Dale. & Marshall, Jonathan. 1998. Cocaine Politics. Universityof California, Berkeley, CA.• Senate Amendment 396 House Resolution 2577.• Strong, Simon. 1996. Whitewash, Pablo Escobar and the cocaine wars.Macmillam Publishers Ltd, London.• United Nations. 2004. The Value of Illegal Drugs Transiting theCaribbean 1981-2000. United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime,Bridgetown, Barbados.• Walker, Thomas N. 1982. Nicaragua in Revolution. Praeger, NewYork.• Walker, Thomas N, Ed. 1985. Nicaragua. Praeger, New York.• Walker, Thomas N, Ed. 1985. Revolution & Counterrevolution inNicaragua. Westview, Boulder.• Walker, Thomas N, Ed. 1987. Reagan versus the Sandinistas. Westview,Boulder.• Walsh, Lawrence E. 1993. Iran-Contra affair, report by the independentcouncil. Web.• Walsh, Lawrence E. 1997. Firewall. W. W. Norton & Company, NewYork.• Waters, Maxine. 1999a. 13 May 1999. Web• Waters, Maxine. 1999b. 14 May 1999. Web.• Webb, Gary. 1998. Dark Alliance. Seven Stories Press. New York.• Wroe, Ann. 1991. Lives, Lies & the Iran-Contra Affair. I.B. 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