Before turning to the specific arguments, we provide a background
concerning the marginal lands statutory scheme and its application in Lane County.
Enacted in 1983, the marginal lands statute, ORS 197.247 (1991), permitted counties to
authorize procedures for designation of certain land as "marginal land" and to permit
certain uses on it that otherwise would not be permitted, if the land met certain specified
criteria. The criteria at issue in the present case are found in ORS 197.247(1) (1991):

"(a) The proposed marginal land was not managed, during three of
the five calendar years preceding January 1, 1983, as part of a farm
operation that produced $20,000 or more in annual gross income or a forest
operation capable of producing an average, over the growth cycle, of
$10,000 in annual gross income; and

"(b) The proposed marginal land also meets at least one of the
following tests:

"* * * * *

"(C) The proposed marginal land is composed predominantly of
soils in capability classes V through VIII in the Agricultural Capability
Classification System in use by the United States Department of Agriculture
Soil Conservation Service on October 15, 1983, and is not capable of
producing * * * eighty-five cubic feet of merchantable timber per acre per
year in those counties west of the summit of the Cascade Range, as that
term is defined in ORS 477.001(21)."

In 1997, the Lane County Board of Commissioners issued a directive
concerning how it would apply ORS 197.247 (1991) ("the 1997 directive"). The 1997
directive, which is central to our review, provides, in pertinent part:

"The legislative intent of the 'management and income test' of the Marginal
Lands Law was to identify those lands which were not, at the time the
Marginal Lands law was enacted (1983), making a 'significant contribution'
to commercial forestry. Therefore, it is appropriate and statistically valid to
use the following methodology:

"1. Based on the best information available regarding soils, topography,
etc., determine the optimal level of timber production for the tract
assuming reasonable management.

"2. ssume that the stand was, in 1983, fully mature and ready for
harvest.

"3. Using the volumes calculated in step (1), and 1983 prices, calculate
the average gross annual income over the growth cycle."

Returning to the particular circumstances of this case, we draw the
following facts concerning the land from the county's unchallenged findings. The land in
question was designated for agricultural use and zoned E-40 (Exclusive Farm Use -
40-acre minimum) in the county's Rural Comprehensive Plan, but has never been planted
in crops. A limited amount of grazing has occurred on the property, but it did not qualify
as part of a "farm operation" under the first clause of ORS 197.247(1)(a) (1991). The
land consists mostly of south-facing slopes, and the soil is entirely Class VI and VII and,
thus, is unsuitable for farming practices. A considerable portion of the property has very
shallow soils, and aerial photos establish that trees have not grown over a large portion of
the land for approximately 80 years. Easements for power lines run over approximately
10 acres of the land.

The applicant retained a consulting forester, Marc Setchko, to make the
necessary calculations of whether the land in question would qualify as marginal land
pursuant to ORS 197.247 (1991), as interpreted by the 1997 directive. As described in
the county's findings, Setchko

"presented an analysis of the timber growing potential of the Subject
Property which established that it could not be managed as a forest
operation capable of producing an average, over the growth cycle, of
$10,000 in annual gross income. This conclusion was based on a detailed
analysis of the existing soils and on-site growing conditions, their ability to
grow timber (Douglas fir) and conversion of that growth potential into
dollars based upon log prices in 1983. This methodology is dictated by the
[1997 directive]."

Petitioners raised a variety of challenges to the correctness of the
methodology prescribed by the 1997 directive and to Setchko's methodology and results,
which they reiterated before LUBA and reprise on judicial review. The county rejected
those challenges, found Setchko's opinion to be persuasive, and relied on it extensively in
concluding that the land should be designated marginal land:

"We find Mr. Setchko's written analysis of the income potential for
the Subject Property to be very persuasive for a number of reasons. First,
Mr. Setchko's projection for income is, as a practical matter, virtually
impossible to attain because it assumes a fully stocked stand of a single
species. This is not realistic for this site because of the large areas of
grassland and exposed rock which are not capable of growing stands of
timber. Further, there is at least 9-10 acres of the site that is directly under
major power lines (BPA and EWEB) which, due to provisions of the
recorded easements, are not allowed to grow trees of any type. Therefore,
we recognize that Mr. Setchko's estimate of $5,173 per year as the projected
income for this site over a 50-year growth cycle is, as Mr. Setchko
concludes, 'extremely difficult, if not impossible, to reach.'"

Specifically, in response to petitioners' arguments that Setchko's analysis
was inadequate because it failed to comply with OAR 660-006-0010's directive
concerning methods of determining forest land suitability, the county indicated, first, that
Setchko's reports did satisfy the rule and, second, that, in any event, OAR 660-006-0010
(and the related rule OAR 660-006-0005(2)) were not directly applicable to marginal land
determinations under ORS 197.247 (1991). Accordingly, the county concluded that the
applicant's evidence demonstrated that the land should be designated as marginal land.

With respect to OAR 660-006-0010, LUBA agreed with petitioners that that
rule applied in this context. LUBA concluded that "[d]esignating forest lands as marginal
lands and amending the comprehensive plan designations and zoning for those lands from
one Goal 4 designation/zone to another Goal 4 designation/zone is a modification of the
county Goal 4 inventory." However, LUBA further concluded that the county's
determination that OAR 660-006-0010 did not apply was not reversible error, because the
county specifically found that Setchko had employed a methodology that, in fact,
complied with OAR 660-006-0010 and related rules.

As to the county's use of 1983 timber prices for making its determination
pursuant to ORS 197.247(1)(b)(C) (1991), LUBA followed its own precedent from Just v.
Lane County, 49 Or LUBA 456 (2005). In Just, LUBA affirmed the county's decision to
use 1983 timber prices, pursuant to the methodology set out in the 1997 directive.

Finally, LUBA concluded that the county's decision to use a 50-year growth
cycle to calculate a forest operation's average annual income under ORS 197.247(1)(a)
(1991) was appropriate. LUBA also rejected additional arguments by petitioners that are
not at issue on judicial review, and affirmed the county's decision.

Petitioners seek judicial review of LUBA's affirmance of the county's
decision. We write only to address petitioners' arguments concerning the applicability of
OAR 660-006-0010 in the present circumstances and to consider whether the use of the
1983 timber prices is consistent with the statutory directive of ORS 197.247(1)(b)(C)
(1991). We reject petitioner's remaining arguments without discussion.

As to OAR 660-006-0010, petitioners assign error to LUBA's "harmless
error" holding--that is, that the county's conclusion that the rule does not apply was, albeit
erroneous, harmless, given the county's further finding that, in all events, Setchko's
methodology did comport with that rule. Petitioners acknowledge that the county did find
that the methodology used by Setchko comported with the rule, but assert that that finding
was conclusory and not backed up by any evidence in the record of any comparison of the
consultant's methodology to those required by the Department of Forestry.

The county responds with two alternative arguments. First, the county
asserts that, contrary to LUBA's conclusion, OAR 660-006-0010 does not apply in this
context. That is, the county contends that it was correct in the first instance. Second, the
county argues that, even if the rule does apply, LUBA's "harmless error" determination
must be sustained because petitioners' challenge is, in effect, a substantial evidence
challenge and LUBA correctly determined that the county's finding was supported by
substantial evidence.

We agree with the county that OAR 660-006-0010 does not, in fact, apply
in these circumstances. Consequently, we do not reach and address the question of
whether LUBA's "harmless error" rationale comported with substantial evidence review.

OAR 660-006-0010 provides:

"Governing bodies shall include an inventory of 'forest lands' as
defined by Goal 4 in the comprehensive plan. Lands inventoried as Goal 3
agricultural lands or lands for which an exception to Goal 4 is justified
pursuant to ORS 197.732 and taken are not required to be inventoried
under this rule. Outside urban growth boundaries, this inventory shall
include a mapping of forest site class. If site information is not available
then an equivalent method of determining forest land suitability must be
used. Notwithstanding this rule, governing bodies are not required to
reinventory forest lands if such an inventory was acknowledged previously
by the Land Conservation and Development Commission."

(Emphasis added.)

As noted above, LUBA concluded that the rule applied to the present
situation on the theory that a change "from one Goal 4 designation/zone to another Goal 4
designation/zone is a modification of the county Goal 4 inventory." Although that
proposition may well be correct in the abstract, the problem with applying it to the present
case, as the county points out, is that the land at issue here was not, in fact, included in the
county's Goal 4 inventory in the first instance. Rather, the county asserts--and the record
confirms--that the land was included in the county's Goal 3 inventory as "agricultural
land." Thus, we agree with the county that OAR 660-006-0010, by its own terms, does
not apply. We thus reject petitioners' first assignment of error.

Petitioners next argue that LUBA erred in upholding the county's use of
1983 prices in making its determination of potential gross income under ORS
197.247(1)(a) (1991). As noted, the county relied on its 1997 directive, which directs that
the calculation of "average gross annual income over the growth cycle" under ORS
197.247(1)(a) (1991) be made using "1983 prices." See ___ Or App at ___ (slip op at 3).
LUBA concluded that the statute gave the county "some latitude" in how to perform the
calculation required by ORS 197.247(1)(a) (1991), reasoning that the statute is silent as to
how a county is to determine whether a forest operation is "capable of producing an
average, over the growth cycle, of $10,000 in annual gross income."

On judicial review, the county first posits that LUBA's rationale was
correct, because counties' "reasonable interpretations" of state statutes should be upheld.
Suffice it to say that the authorities that the county invokes for that "reasonable
interpretation" proposition do not support it. The question is simply one of statutory
construction, to which we apply the well-known methodology for discerning legislative
intent. We determine that intent by applying the principles of PGE v. Bureau of Labor
and Industries, 317 Or 606, 610-12, 859 P2d 1143 (1993), first examining the text of the
statute in context, and, if that inquiry is inconclusive, then turning to legislative history
and other aids to construction.

Here, the county argued, and LUBA agreed, that ORS 197.247(1)(a) (1991)
did not give precise instructions as to how to make a calculation of potential annual gross
income with respect to a "forest operation." The statutorily prescribed methodology with
respect to a farm operation is, in contrast, unambiguous and straightforward: Was the
land part of a farm operation "that produced" a specified amount ($20,000) of annual
gross income "during three of the five calendar years preceding January 1, 1983"?
Conversely, the application of the statute to a forest operation is potentially problematic
in at least two respects. First, it is predicated on a determination of earning capacity--i.e.,
whether the operation was "capable of producing" a certain annual gross income--rather
than whether it actually did so. Second, the forest operation's potential annual gross
income is to be determined by "averag[ing], over the growth cycle." The growth cycle of
a forest, obviously, does not correlate to "the five calendar years preceding January 1,
1983," much less to "three of the five calendar years preceding January 1, 1983."

LUBA recognized those methodological difficulties, observing:

"For forest operations, the question is whether the subject property was
managed as part of a forest operation during three of five years between
1978 and 1982 that was capable of producing an average annual gross
income, over the growth cycle. Because forest operations do not produce
annual revenue, the analysis of forest operations is necessarily more
hypothetical than for farm operations, and the significance of the five-year
period is less clear. The statute is simply silent as to how that five-year
period is applied in determining whether the forest operation is 'capable of
producing an average, over the growth cycle, of $10,000 in annual gross
income.'"

(Emphasis in original.) LUBA went on to conclude that the county's reliance, in the 1997
directive, on the 1983 prices represented a reasonable and permissible resolution of those
difficulties:

"The legislature adopted the marginal lands statute in mid-1983, and it is
reasonable to assume that the $10,000 threshold is expressed in 1983
dollars, not $10,000 in 1978 dollars or an average of dollar values during
the years 1978-82. If so, then it also seems reasonable to assume that the
legislature did not intend to preclude use of 1983 log prices to determine
whether the forest operation exceeds the $10,000 threshold."

We agree with LUBA's overarching observation that the statutory text,
when viewed in context, does not provide precise guidance as to how the calculation
concerning gross annual income of forest operations is to be performed. However--and
contrary to LUBA's affirmance of the county's reliance on 1983 prices--the statute is not
unclear as to what years' timber prices are relevant to the calculation.

To reiterate, ORS 197.247(1)(a) (1991) provides:

"The proposed marginal land was not managed, during three of the five
calendar years preceding January 1, 1983, as part of a farm operation that
produced $20,000 or more in annual gross income or a forest operation
capable of producing an average, over the growth cycle, of $10,000 in
annual gross income."

(Emphasis added.) The pertinence of "the five calendar years preceding January 1, 1983"
is clear with respect to calculating the annual gross income of a farm operation: To
qualify as marginal land, the land must not have been managed, during any three of the
five years before January 1, 1983, as part of a farm operation that produced $20,000 or
more in annual gross income in those years. Thus, if the land was managed as part of a
farm operation in 1978, 1979, 1980, 1981, and 1982, and annual gross income exceeded
$20,000 only in the latter two years, the land would satisfy the marginal lands "farm
operation" income (or lack of income) criterion of ORS 197.247(1)(a) (1991).

The qualifying phrase "the five calendars years preceding January 1, 1983"
applies equally, and functionally, to the statutorily prescribed calculation with respect to
forest operation-related income. That is so because, as a matter of syntax, the legislature
employed a parallel structure, rendering that qualifying phrase equally applicable to both
farm and forest income. See Bryan A. Garner, A Dictionary of Modern American Usage
479 (1998) (Parallelism: "By phrasing parallel ideas in parallel grammatical
constructions, you show the reader how one idea relates to another."); cf. Priest v. Pearce,
314 Or 411, 415-16, 840 P2d 65 (1992) (parallel construction in separate sentences of
same constitutional provision indicated references were to same subject matter).

We note, finally, that, in rejecting petitioners' challenge to reliance on the
1983 timber prices, LUBA made an additional observation, suggestive of an alternative
basis for affirmance:

"In any case, as the county notes, the applicants' consulting forester
made an alternative calculation that used the 1978-82 log prices suggested
by petitioners. While the result was higher than using 1983 log prices, the
average annual income still fell below $10,000."

LUBA concluded that petitioners' arguments "provide no basis for remand."

To the extent that the county suggests on judicial review that LUBA's
ultimate conclusion may be affirmed based on that alternative rationale, we disagree.
Evidence in the record indicates that Setchko did, indeed, make alternative calculations of
annual gross income based on 1978 through 1982 log prices. However, the county's
findings were not based on those calculations; instead, the county's approval of the
application was expressly based on Setchko's calculations that used 1983 prices. Given
our respective review functions, and given that the county never purported to rely on
Setchko's alternative calculations, neither we nor LUBA can affirm on an alternative basis
that there is other evidence in the record which might, if accepted by the local
decision-maker, have been sufficient to support its initial determination. See Newcomer
v. Clackamas County, 92 Or App 174, 184-85, 758 P2d 369, adh'd to as modified on
recons, 94 Or App 33, 764 P2d 927 (1988) (court will not presume that county would
have made a finding that it did not, in fact, make).

Reversed and remanded to LUBA with instructions to remand to county for
further proceedings.

4. That is to say, the statute may well be ambiguous as to some details of how the
legislature intended the potential annual income to be calculated, such as whether the legislature
intended the calculation to be based on trees hypothetically harvested in 1978 through 1982 or,
perhaps, on the projected value of trees actually existing on the land in 1978 through 1982.
Those questions, however, are not presented in this case, and ambiguities in one aspect of a
statute do not necessarily render all aspects of a statute ambiguous.

5. We note, parenthetically, that the limited legislative history on this point confirms
that construction. See, e.g., Tape Recording, House Committee on Energy and Environment, SB
237, Apr 25, 1983, Tape 260, Side A (testimony of Richard Benner) (indicating that, for the
income test, "you use the five-year period preceding the effective date of the Act"); id. (statement
of Committee Chair Darlene Hooley) (the income test involves "averaging of gross income in
three of the five years preceding the effective date of this Act--1983").