Abstract: Cooperative behaviors are ubiquitous from nature to human society. Game theory provides a powerful theoretical framework to understand the evolution of cooperation. The network reciprocity, as an efficient mechanism to support the evolution of cooperation in population, has attracted considerable attention from various fields of discipline, such as mathematics, physics, biology, sociology as well as engineering. Understanding the interaction between cooperative behaviors of individuals and underlying complex organization structure of population has become a hot topic of interdisciplinary areas. The aim of this Minisymposium is to bring together researchers working in the area of game theory with complex networks. We will introduce the recent results around evolution of cooperation on complex networks, and discuss potential application of game theory in social network.

MS-We-E-22-116:00--16:30Influence of time slices on temporal networksChi, Liping (College of Physical Sci. & Tech., Central China Normal Univ.)Abstract: The topological structure properties of temporal network can be used to characterize complex system with time-varying interactions. Temporal network is composed of a series of contacts. The topological structure enters through aggregating the contacts within a certain time interval. Our goal is to investigate the influences of time-slices on both the structural and the dynamical properties of temporal networks.

MS-We-E-22-216:30--17:00Evolutionary dynamics on heterogeneous networksZhang, Boyu (Beijing Normal Univ.)Abstract: Recent studies have revealed that graph heterogeneity can considerably affect evolutionary processes. In this talk, we introduce the evolutionary dynamics and the evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) conditions for 2¡Á2 games on heterogeneous graphs based on "birth-death" (BD), "death-birth" (DB) and ¡°pairwise comparison¡± (PC) updatings. We show that graph heterogeneity does not change the evolutionary results of BD and DB updating, but promotes cooperation under PC updating.

MS-We-E-22-317:00--17:30Revisiting the reduced learning and teaching ability of players to the evolution of cooperation in prisoner¡¯s dilemma gameZhi-xi, Wu (Lanzhou Univ.)Abstract: We investigate the evolution of cooperation in spatial prisoner¡¯s dilemma games with the reduced learning or teaching ability of the players. By using extensive MC simulations, we show that cooperation can be always facilitated in both schemes of synchronous and asynchronous strategy updating provided that the teaching ability of the players is reduced. By contrast, cooperation is only promoted in the case of synchronous strategy updating, if otherwise reduced learning ability is considered.

MS-We-E-22-417:30--18:00Probabilistic sharing solves the problem of costly punishmentChen, Xiaojie (Univ. of Electronic Sci. & Tech. of China)Abstract: Cooperators that refuse to participate in sanctioning defectors create the second-order
free-rider problem. Such cooperators will not be punished because they contribute to the public good, but they also eschew the costs associated with punishing defectors. Altruistic punishers¡ªthose that cooperate and punish¡ªare at a disadvantage, and it is puzzling how such behavior has evolved. In this talk, I will show how the consideration of probabilistic sanctioning solves the problem of costly punishment.