This publication has examined the interaction between man and
the physical environment in a part of White Nile Province
fronting the White Nile river in the Sudan, an area considered to
have a very high risk of desertification. Physically it is made
up of three main zones orientated north to south and following on
from each other in a westerly direction, from flood plain through
clay plain to sandy qoz. The last covers most of the area and is
made up of fixed dune sands; the delicate balance between
contemporary rainfall conditions and vegetation is maintained so
long as neither intensive crop-growing and grazing nor climatic
change intervene to upset it.

The traditional system of land use by man was pastoral
nomadism, with some crop-growing both on the rainlands and along
the river. The methods of cultivation employed involved crop
production for only a small part of the year. Along the
river,gerf cultivation relied upon the soil water left by the
falling annual flood waters, whilst the shadouf and sagia
irrigation methods, though used with much ingenuity, could only
irrigate small areas because of the wide gap between high flood
and low-season water-levels. For the nomadic pastoralist the
traditional north-to-south seasonal movement was augmented by
movements to and from the White Nile to take advantage of
dry-season pastures that were also created by the falling river.

Under these conditions a state of equilibrium developed
between man and the physical environment, such that an ecological
balance could be maintained. The system could tolerate variations
in its different parts providing these were not too great, were
of short duration, and did not all occur at the same time. Thus a
short series of dry years could be accommodated by a movement
further south by the nomadic pastoralists or by a greater
concentration by both pastoralist and cultivator on the riverbank
lands. Similarly, temporary increases in population- e.g. during
the Mahdiya (18851898)-could be accommodated by increasing the
areas under cultivation. The system was able to cope too with
certain permanent changes, such as the increases in population
and animals which occurred in the region before the Second World
War. Beyond a certain point, however, the equilibrium was in
danger of collapse.

Fears that this point was being approached were first
expressed in the 1940s. The Sudan Soil Conservation Committee
Report of 1944 noted signs of overgrazing and overcultivation in
the White Nile, and here, as in other parts of the north, it
noted that changing circumstances demanded "planned
management" of lands. This theme was again reiterated in the
1950s by the Sudan Government. The particular change that has put
an intolerable strain on the system has been the increase in the
number of people and animals. (The population of White Nile
Province grew from 750,000 in 1955 to 950,000 in 1983; cattle
numbers in Sudan between 1956 and 1981 are estimated to have
increased from 6.9 to 18.8 million, with 5 per cent in White Nile
Province.) The increase in population has been further
exacerbated by the general tendency of people in the Sudan to
migrate eastwards, so that migrating cultivators and pastoralists
have been replaced by newcomers less well versed in local
conditions. At the same time there has been an increase in the
material expectations of peasants.

Other pressures on the region have resulted from the general
process of agricultural development in northern Sudan, based upon
irrigation; this was facilitated in the White Nile by the
completion of the Jebel Aulia Dam, which made pumpscheme
irrigation more attractive. Eventually the banks became lined
with pump schemes, and they too attracted workers from the west.
Irrigation developments in the Gezira, where today the famous
irrigation scheme takes in some 800,000 hectares (2 million
feddans), have made this area, with the Three Towns, the economic
core of the country. This process was facilitated by the
confluence of the White and Blue Niles at Khartoum, a point of
great strategic and political importance, where an urban
concentration of over 1.5 million people has grown up, and where
most of the country's industrial, economic, administrative, and
political activities take place. As the great metropolitan centre
of the country it has attracted manpower, expertise, and
resources to itself, often to the detriment of neighbouring
regions.

Even if it had been possible to maintain an ecological balance
in the traditional system through all these changes, the
inevitable downward climatic fluctuation to a series of drier
years (1968 onwards, but especially 1968-1973 and 19841985) from
a damper sequence (in the 1950s) was catastrophic in so far as
any hope of adjustment was concerned. In other words, changes had
occurred throughout the whole system.

However, it is possible to envisage a situation where changes
throughout the system might lead to a new if different
equilibrium. In truth, though it appears that the whole system
has changed, in practice certain very important elements have
not, and herein lies the region's problem. The attitude to the
rainlands in particular has remained the same, and many
traditional practices have been introduced into the towns and
development schemes from these areas. At the same time the old
views and attitudes of a still largely illiterate peasantry have
been maintained. Change, therefore, has been partial, uneven, and
largely unplanned in a truly regional sense.

The increase in population along the White Nile, in the
Gezira, and in the Three Towns has created new demands for food,
fuel, and industrial raw materials. The main aim of all
irrigation projects in the Sudan to date has been to boost
exports and substitute imports. Thus, the White Nile pump schemes
were mainly established to produce cotton. Except for the fact
that Khartoum North has some cotton textile factories and
oil-seed crushing mills, this activity is largely divorced from
the direct daily needs of the rural people. Though these schemes
also produce aura, and in some cases a little wheat, most of the
surplus cereals have been produced by traditional methods on the
rainlands. However, this has had to come from a reduced area, and
has been achieved by using unsuitable land and dispensing with
fallows, and without new inputs of artificial fertilizer, under
less favourable climatic conditions than in the past.

At the same time the expansion of areas under irrigation
schemes and rainland crops has restricted the areas available to
the nomads and other pastoralists. This has occurred as an
increased population has brought greater demands than ever before
for meat, cheese, and milk, but without any rainland pasture
improvement schemes. In the original plans for White Nile pump
schemes it was envisaged that they would grow lubia (hyacinth
bean) for fodder as well as their cotton and aura. Today this is
not done and the only substantial area under irrigated fodder in
the White Nile is the rather fortuitous situation on the Gummuiya
Scheme, where aura is cut green and lucerne is grown for local
use and for sale in the Three Towns. The nomadic methods of
animal-raising have changed very little, except for some limited
use of ombaz (oil-seed cake). Without intervention the situation
is not likely to improve much even with a series of good rainy
seasons, as so many of the better grazing species have been eaten
out.

The increased population also requires shelter and fuel. Both
items have in the past been supplied by crop residues and other
vegetational sources. The main source of fuel, accounting for
some 90 per cent of the Sudan's energy needs, comes from the
woodlands, either as firewood or charcoal. Even in the capital
these sources account for some 80 per cent of fuel needs. Thus in
a situation with more land cropped and grazed than ever before,
and with demands for wood for fuel and house construction ever
increasing, the pressure on the remaining vegetational resources
has become intolerable because there is no system of
afforestation and control of cutting to conserve what is left of
the woodland resources. The development process has so far not
led to a conversion from wood fuel to electricity and oil for
domestic purposes, even in the capital.

One lesson that clearly emerges from this discussion is the
need for an overall regional development policy for the arid
lands of northern Sudan. A regional policy for rural development
here needs to concern itself not only with the new technology to
be introduced (pump-scheme irrigation) but also with the
traditional systems that will need protection, adaptation, and
change and with the way in which the various elements react
together. A policy is required that will lead to improved
pastures, a mixed farming programme and a rational use of the
woodland resources for timber and fuel. In the new situation it
may not be possible for the White Nile area to look after all its
own needs and to provide for the agricultural needs of the
capital. If this is so, then the necessary infrastructure of
road, rail, and river transport will have to be provided,
enabling supplies to be brought in from greater distances, even
from overseas, and paid for out of export earnings.

At present the concept of an area specializing in what it can
grow best is only dimly perceived in rural Sudan. Most peasants,
including those of the White Nile, perceive things differently.
In a desert margin area where periodic food shortages are common
and animals have to be moved from pasture to pasture, the peasant
is highly reluctant to give up basic food crops and to cultivate
a different crop for sale, using his money income to buy his
necessities. Undoubtedly, top priority for White Nile folk is to
secure one's own food supply and feed for one's animals. Cash is
of a much lower priority. This need for security underlies the
decision of the farmers on the Gummuiya irrigation scheme to grow
lucerne and sorghum rather than potentially lucrative fruit and
vegetables for the nearby Khartoum market.

The failure of peasants to identify wholeheartedly with
agriculture) development schemes in the White Nile is a matter
for serious concern, and a second lesson to be learnt, therefore,
is the need to understand how and why the peasant perceives
things in the way he does, because without his wholehearted
co-operation and understanding no rural development scheme can
really succeed.

The general shortcomings of many of the government irrigation
schemes in the White Nile can only in part be put down to the
failure of peasants to seize apparent opportunities for increased
cash income. Peasants are rational, even if illiterate, and react
in a way that seems right to them, given their own viewpoint.
Much of the blame must be placed before management and
government. Incompetent and uninterested management with little
real commitment to a scheme is a frequent complaint. This is
reflected in shortages, poor agricultural extension work,
irregularities in operation, and slowness in paying the peasant
for his crop. In the Gummuiya area the administrators are
apparently seen as "exploiters" rather than
"enablers." Such a lack of trust between management and
participant is a recipe for disaster. Part of the trouble also
seems to stem from the fact that schemes are introduced from
above rather than generated from below. It is as if the
government planners were saying: "This will be good for you;
these are the aims and aspirations you must have; and this is how
it must be accomplished." However, no matter how [audible
the scheme may be, if it does not fit in with the peasant's
perception of his needs and aspirations then its chances of
success are much reduced. The third lesson must be the need for a
competently trained and sympathetic management able to obtain the
peasant's trust by understanding him and the land upon which the
scheme is to be introduced.

Nevertheless, the local management cannot be held responsible
for all the administrative shortcomings. National policy
frequently dictates to them what they can and cannot do. This may
be in terms of directives as to what line of action is to be
taken, or it may spring from the national economic situation in
which resources are simply not available. Sudan would seem to
have undertaken simultaneously too many agricultural development
schemes, and as a result has been able neither to produce enough
sufficiently trained and motivated managers to service them all
properly, nor to build the necessary infrastructure, nor to
create sufficient foreign earnings capacity to prevent serious
periodic shortages. At the level of national policy it is plain
that realistic and attainable national goals in planning need to
be devised, taking into consideration the limitations and
potential of an area's physical environment, the availability of
trained manpower and other resources, and the aspirations of the
peasantry, as well as the government's own national aims. Without
these prerequisites regional rural development programmes in the
Sudan can never be fully successful.

However, within the White Nile itself the aim must be to
create, in a regional context, a new equilibrium between the
physical environment and man, one in which relationships are
self-generating, in which the region can compete on more equal
terms with its neighbours, especially the capital region and the
Gezira, which constitute the main economic core zone of the
Sudan.

The lessons to be learnt from experience in the White Nile may
thus be neatly summarized:
1. The need for realistic sustainable policies at the national
level.
2. The need for an integrated rather than sectoral approach to a
region's development problems.
3. The need for a competent, committed, and sympathetic
management for all rural development schemes.
4. The need for an understanding not only of the environment's
limitations and of the aims of government, but also of the
peasant's aspirations and perceptions. With out this nothing can
succeed.

The final conclusion must be that these lessons are applicable
not only to the White Nile area but also to the Sudan and all
arid lands in the developing world. The same principles apply too
to all parts of the developing world, but need particular
emphasis in those areas where the environment presents special
difficulties for rural development. Arid lands form one major
group of such areas.