{1}
Defendant Bryce Franklin was convicted of first degree murder
and other offenses. He was sentenced to life imprisonment,
plus seven and one-half years to be run consecutively and
appeals directly to this court. N.M. Const. art. VI, §
2; Rule 12-102(A)(1) NMRA. Franklin contends that his
convictions should be reversed and his case remanded for
dismissal of the charges because "the district court
erred in denying [his] multiple motions to dismiss for
violations of his constitutional right to a speedy
trial." We reject this challenge and affirm his
convictions. We issue this non-precedential decision because
Franklin raises no questions of law that New Mexico precedent
does not already sufficiently address. Rule 12-405(B)(1)
NMRA.

I.BACKGROUND

{2}
What follows is only a brief overview of the events in
Franklin's case. Additional facts will be presented as
necessary in the course of our discussion. On December 1,
2012, the police discovered the corpse of Fernando Enriquez
at the bottom of a collapsed lava tube (a large hole) in El
Malpais National Monument, which is in west-central New
Mexico. Information the police received indicated that
Franklin had killed Enriquez. When police discovered
Enriquez's corpse and received the information linking
Franklin to Enriquez's death, Franklin was already
incarcerated for violating probation in an entirely unrelated
matter and was serving the approximately five remaining years
of a nine-year sentence. A warrant to arrest Franklin for the
suspected killing of Enriquez was served on Franklin at the
Cibola County Detention Center where he was already
imprisoned.

{3}
On December 17, 2012, Franklin was indicted for the murder of
Enriquez. On December 26, 2012, Franklin filed a pro forma
demand for a speedy trial. During pretrial proceedings,
Franklin filed two almost-identical motions to dismiss for
violation of his right to a speedy trial: the first was filed
on May 1, 2014 and the second was filed on November 17, 2014.

{4}
Franklin's trial commenced on August 10, 2015, roughly
thirty-two months after he was indicted. The district court
finally adjudicated the speedy-trial issue at the outset of
trial. After both parties presented argument, the district
court denied the motion. The court concluded that (1)
Franklin's case is complex; (2) Franklin asserted his
right to a speedy trial; (3) the delay was attributable to
administrative difficulties; and (4) Franklin was not
prejudiced by the delay as he was incarcerated for other
matters during the entire period of delay. Franklin contends
that the court was wrong when it concluded that his speedy
trial rights were not violated.

II.DISCUSSION

{5}
We use the four-factor test articulated in Barker v.
Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972) "[t]o determine whether
the accused has been deprived of his speedy trial
right." State v. Samora, 2016-NMSC-031, ¶
9, 387 P.3d 230. We consider "(1) the length of delay in
bringing the case to trial, (2) the reasons for the delay,
(3) the defendant's assertion of the right to a speedy
trial, and (4) the prejudice to the defendant caused by the
delay." Id. (internal quotation marks and
citations omitted). "The Court weigh[s] these factors
according to the unique circumstances of each case in light
of the [s]tate and the defendant's conduct and the harm
to the defendant from the delay." Id.
(alteration in original) (internal quotation marks and
citations omitted). "In reviewing a district court's
ruling on a speedy trial violation claim, we defer to the
court's findings of fact, and we weigh and balance the
Barker factors de novo." Id. (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted).

A.Length of Delay

{6}
"The first factor . . . has a dual function: it acts as
a triggering mechanism for considering the four
Barker factors if the delay crosses the threshold of
being 'presumptively prejudicial, ' and it is an
independent factor to consider in evaluating whether a speedy
trial violation has occurred." State v. Serros,
2016-NMSC-008, ¶ 22, 366 P.3d 1121. "We have
established benchmarks for presumptively prejudicial delay
according to the complexity of a case: one year for a simple
case, 15 months for a case of intermediate complexity, and 18
months for a complex case." Id.

{7}
The district court found that Franklin's case is complex.
This determination is not challenged on appeal and we defer
to that finding. See State v. Thomas, 2016-NMSC-024,
¶ 11, 376 P.3d 184 (observing that appellate courts
defer to the trial court's finding regarding the
complexity of any given case, as long as that finding is
supported by substantial evidence). We must next determine
the length of the delay.

{8}
"The right to a speedy trial is implicated when the
putative defendant becomes an 'accused.'"
Salandre v. State, 1991-NMSC-016, ¶ 13, 111
N.M. 422, 806 P.2d 562, holding modified on other grounds
by State v. Garza, 2009-NMSC-038, ¶ 22, 146 N.M.
499, 212 P.3d 387. A putative defendant becomes an
"accused" upon the "filing of a formal
indictment or information or arrest and holding to
answer." State v. Urban, 2004-NMSC-007, ¶
12, 135 N.M. 279, 87 P.3d 1061 (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted). This is because "indictment, or the
actual restraints of arrest and holding for charges,
implicates the speedy trial guarantee."
Salandre, 1991-NMSC-016, ¶ 14 (emphasis and
footnote omitted).

{9}
The warrant to arrest Franklin for killing Enriquez was
served on Franklin on December 3, 2012. At that time,
Franklin was already incarcerated and serving a sentence on
other criminal matters. Thus, Franklin's liberty was not
additionally restricted when he received the arrest warrant
and any adverse consequences he experienced due to
incarceration did not arise as a consequence of the arrest
warrant. Accordingly, we measure the length of delay in
Franklin's case not from the date the arrest warrant was
served but from the date he was indicted: December 17, 2012.
See State v. Haar, 1990-NMCA-076, ¶ 18, 110
N.M. 517, 797 P.2d 306 (holding that the defendant's
speedy trial right attached upon the filing of the indictment
and not upon his arrest for other charges). Franklin agrees
that the length of delay should be measured from the date of
indictment.

&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;{10}
Franklin's trial commenced on August 10, 2015. The delay
from indictment to trial is two years, seven months, and
twenty-four days, or roughly thirty-two months. This delay
stretched fourteen months beyond the eighteen-month benchmark
for complex cases ...

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