Tuesday, November 27, 2012

Back in November 2009, we talked about the Liabilities of Hotels and Inns and the applicable provisions - Articles 1998-2004 - of the Civil Code. The Civil Code only covers liability for personal effects, not personal security and safety. But at the end of our piece, we mentioned the then recent Court of Appeals decision (affirming the Quezon City Regional Trial Court’s judgment) ordering the Makati Shangri-la hotel to pay actual and compensatory damages, inter alia, to the heirs of a guest who was murdered in the hotel.

Well, the Supreme Court just
affirmed said Court of Appeals decision. It is worth noting that for a death
which occurred in 1999, the final decision of the Supreme Court came out in
2012, a span of more than eleven (11) years. Justice here has been
long delayed.

The petitioners sought relief
before the Supreme Court when the Court of Appeals ruled against them.

It is interesting to note the main
rationale in both courts’ decisions.The
Supreme Court succinctly states its decision
in its introductory line[1] -

“The hotel owner is
liable for civil damages to the surviving heirs of its hotel guest whom
strangers murder inside his hotel room.”

So how could the hotel be liable
despite the lack of any legal provision applying squarely to the facts of the
case? Negligence.And the CA was able to determine that the
proximate cause of the victim’s death was the hotel’s, and not the victim’s,
negligence.

Let’s read the facts: The Makati
Shangri-la’s closed circuit television (CCTV) tapes showed that the victim,
Christian Fredrik Harper, “entered his room at 12:14 a.m. of November 6, 1999,
and had been followed into the room at 12:17 a.m. by a woman; [and] that
another person, a Caucasian male, had entered Harper’s room at 2:48 a.m.; that
the woman had left the room at around 5:33 a.m.; and that the Caucasian male
had come out at 5:46 a.m.”

Fast forward a few hours later:

“around 11:00 am … a Caucasian male of about 30–32
years in age, 5’4” in height, clad in maroon long sleeves, black denims and
black shoes, entered [a jewelry store in] Makati City and expressed interest in
purchasing a Cartier lady’s watch valued at P320,000.00 with the use of two
Mastercard credit cards and an American Express credit card issued in the name
of Harper. But the customer’s difficulty in answering the queries phoned in by
a credit card representative sufficiently aroused the suspicion of [the]
saleslady … who asked for the customer’s passport upon suggestion of the credit
card representative to put the credit cards on hold. Probably sensing trouble
for himself, the customer hurriedly left the store, and left the three credit
cards and the passport behind.

In the meanwhile, Harper’s family in Norway
must have called him at his hotel room to inform him about the attempt to use
his American Express card. Not getting any response from the room, his family
requested … the Duty Manager of the Shangri-La Hotel, to check on Harper’s
room. Alarcon and a security personnel went to [the room] at 11:27 a.m., and
were shocked to discover Harper’s lifeless body on the bed.”

On direct examination, the Makati Shangri-la’s then Chief
Security Officer stated that “at the time he assumed his position as Chief
Security Officer … he noticed that some of the floors of the hotel were being
guarded by a few guards, for instance, 3 or 4 floors by one guard only on a
roving manner” prompting him to make “a recommendation that the ideal-set up
for an effective security should be one guard for every floor, considering that
the hotel is L-shaped and the ends of the hallways cannot be seen. At the time
he made the recommendation, the same was denied … as the hotel was not doing
well and it was not fully booked so the existing security was adequate enough
...” The “one guard, one floor” policy
was put in place only after Harper’s murder.

Turns out that “the male culprit who entered Christian
Harper’s room was never checked by any of the guards when he came inside the
hotel.” The guards also said that no one knew “said man entered the hotel and
it was only through the monitor that they became aware of his entry. It was
even evidenced by the CCTV that before he walked to the room of the late
Christian Harper, said male suspect even looked at the monitoring camera. Such
act of the man showing wariness, added to the fact that his entry to the hotel
was unnoticed, at an unholy hour, should have aroused suspicion on the part of
the roving guard in the said floor, had there been any.”

Further, “there were prior incidents that occurred in the
hotel which should have forewarned the hotel management of the security lapses
of the hotel. As testified to by Col. De Guzman, “there were ‘minor’ incidents”
(loss of items) before the happening of the instant case.The CA noted that the “minor” incidents may
be of little significance to the hotel, yet relative to the instant case, it
speaks volume [sic]. This should have served as a caveat that the hotel
security has lapses.”

Based on the foregoing facts, the Court of Appeals held
that the Makati Shangri-la “was negligent in providing adequate security due
its guests” and did not exercise “reasonable care to protect its guests from
harm and danger by providing sufficient security commensurate to it being one
of the finest hotels in the country.”

The CA stated that “the hotel business like the common
carrier’s business is imbued with public interest. Catering to the public,
hotelkeepers are bound to provide not only lodging for hotel guests but also
security to their persons and belongings. The twin duty constitutes the essence
of the business.”

This inadequate security was thus deemed the proximate
cause of Harper’s murder as explained by the CA:

“Proximate cause is defined as that cause, which, in
natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause,
produces, the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred.
More comprehensively, proximate cause is that cause acting first and producing
the injury, either immediately or by setting other events in motion, all
constituting a natural and continuous chain of events, each having a close
causal connection with its immediate predecessor, the final event in the chain
immediately effecting the injury as natural and probable result of the cause which
first acted, under such circumstances that the person responsible for the first
event should, as an ordinarily prudent and intelligent person, have reasonable
ground to expect at the moment of his act or default that an injury to some
person might probably result therefrom.”

In affirming the CA’s findings and judgment, the Supreme
Court further stated that:

“Applying by analogy Article 2000, Article 2001 and
Article 2002 of the Civil Code (all of which concerned the hotelkeepers’ degree
of care and responsibility as to the personal effects of their guests), we hold
that there is much greater reason to apply the same if not greater degree of
care and responsibility when the lives and personal safety of their guests are
involved. Otherwise, the hotelkeepers would simply stand idly by as strangers
have unrestricted access to all the hotel rooms on the pretense of being
visitors of the guests, without being held liable should anything untoward·
befall the unwary guests. That would be absurd, something that no good law
would ever envision.”

Cost-cutting
measures are understandable – even for 5-star hotels - but those that place
someone’s personal safety and security at risk are never worth taking. Guests
have an expectation that they will find safe repose in such places, and not an
eternal one.

Tuesday, November 6, 2012

The issue in the case we want to tackle now is not whether or not something said was libel but whether or not the court had
jurisdiction over the libel committed.In this case, the alleged libelous material was found in a blog.[1]

As regards jurisdiction in libel
cases, the relevant provision is found in the 2nd paragraph of Art.
360 of the Revised Penal Code (as amended by Republic Act 4363):

“The criminal and civil
action for damages in cases of written defamations … shall be filed
simultaneously or separately with the court of first instance of the province
or city where the libelous article is printed and first published or where
any of the offended parties actually resides at the time of the commission of
the offense: Provided,
however, … in case one of the offended parties is a private individual, the
action shall be filed in the Court of First Instance of the province or city
where he actually resides at the time of the commission of the offense or where
the libelous matter is printed and first published...” [underline supplied]

The complainant in this case, a Jessie
John P. Gimenez, filed, on behalf of the Yuchengco Family (former Ambassador
Alfonso Yuchengco and Helen Y. Dee of the Malayan Insurance Co., Inc.), a
criminal complaint before the Makati City Prosecutor’s Office, for 13 counts of
libel against the officers of Parents Enabling Parents Coalition, Inc. (PEPCI),
trustees of PEPCI, a member of PEPCI, and a certain John Doe, the administrator
of the website www.pepcoalition.com.Gimenez also alleged that PEPCI owned,
controlled and moderated on the internet a blog at www.pacificnoplan.blogspot.com
and a yahoo e-group at no2pep2010@yahoogroups.com,
sites easily accessible to the public or by anyone logged on to the internet.

Gimenez claimed that when he
accessed websites in Makati
on various dates he “was appalled to read numerous articles [numbering 13],
maliciously and recklessly caused to be published by [the accused] containing
highly derogatory statements and false accusations, relentlessly attacking the
Yuchengco Family, YGC, and particularly, Malayan.” For example:

LET’S MOVE TO THE
BATTLEFIELD.FILE THE CRIMINAL CASES IN
COURT, BSP AND AMLC AND WHEREVER.Pumunta tayong muli sa senado, congreso, RCBC Plaza,
and other venues to air our grievances and call
for boycott ng YGC.Let us start
within ourselves.Alisin natin ang mga investments and deposits natin sa lahat ng YGC and
I mean lahat and again convince friends to do the same.Yung mga nanonood lang noon ay dapat makisali
na talaga ngayon specially those who joined only after knowing that there was a
negotiation for amicable settlements.

FOR SURE MAY TACTICS
PA SILANG NAKABASTA SA ATIN.LET US BE
READY FOR IT BECAUSE THEY HAD SUCCESSFULLY LULL US
AND THE NEXT TIME THEY WILL TRY TO KILL US NA. x x x”

The Makati City Prosecutor’s Office
filed a complaint for libel but on appeal to the Department of Justice, the
“Justice Secretary opined that the crime of “internet libel” was non-existent,
hence, the accused could not be charged with libel under Article 353 of the
RPC.”This prompted the accused to file a
Motion to Quash the Information “on the grounds that it failed to vest
jurisdiction on the Makati RTC; the acts complained of in the Information are
not punishable by law since internet libel is not covered by Article 353 of the
RPC; and the Information is fatally defective for failure to designate the
offense charged and the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the
offense of libel.”

Unfortunately for the accused, the
Court of Appeals found the complaint sufficient in form.

Fortunately for the accused, the
Supreme Court held the opposite and said that -

“… that the venue of
libel cases where the complainant is a private individual is limited to only either
of two places, namely: 1) where the complainant actually resides at the
time of the commission of the offense; or 2) where the alleged defamatory
article was printed and first published.The Amended Information in the present case opted to lay the venue by
availing of the second.Thus, it stated
that the offending article “was first published and accessed by the
private complainant in Makati
City.” In other words, it
considered the phrase to be equivalent to the requisite allegation of printing
and first publication.

The insufficiency of
the allegations in the Amended Information to vest jurisdiction in Makati becomes pronounced
upon an examination of the rationale for the amendment to Article 360 by RA No.
4363.Chavez v. Court of Appeals [G.R.
No. 125813, February 6, 2007, 514 SCRA 279, 285-286] explained the nature of
these changes:

xxx

“Before article 360 was amended, the rule was that
a criminal action for libel may be instituted in any jurisdiction where the
libelous article was published or circulated, irrespective of where it was
written or printed (People v. Borja,
43 Phil. 618). Under that rule, the criminal action is transitory and the
injured party has a choice of venue.

Experience had shown that
under that old rule the offended party could harass the accused in a libel case
by laying the venue of the criminal action in a remote or distant place.

xxx

To forestall such
harassment, Republic Act No. 4363 was enacted. It lays down specific rules as
to the venue of the criminal action so as to prevent the offended party in
written defamation cases from inconveniencing the accused by means of
out-of-town libel suits, meaning complaints filed in remote municipal courts (Explanatory Note for the bill which became Republic
Act No. 4363, Congressional Record of May 20, 1965, pp. 424-5; Time, Inc. v. Reyes, L-28882, May 31,
1971, 39 SCRA 303, 311).”

Further, the Supreme Court noted
that the phrase “where the libelous article is printed and first published’ cannot be
applied to “defamatory material appearing on a website on
the internet as there would be no way of determining the situs of its printing and first publication.”

Before dismissing the case, the
Supreme Court found cause to again cite the Chavez
case and thereby instruct future complainants that–

“These limitations imposed on libel actions filed by private persons are
hardly onerous, especially as they still allow such persons to file the civil
or criminal complaint in their respective places of residence, in which
situation there is no need to embark on a quest to determine
with precision where the libelous matter was printed and first published.”

It’s weird that some people have
said we don’t have internet libel in the Philippines because the Supreme
Court has even instructed us (in this Yuchengco
case) where victims can file such a case.