Jose Guadalupe Morales-Ramirez appeals his sentence and conviction for
illegal reentry after deportation in violation of 8 U.S.C. §§ 1326(a)(1), (a)(2), &
(b)(2). His counsel moves for leave to withdraw in a brief filed pursuant to
Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967). We AFFIRM
Morales-Ramirez's
sentence, DISMISS the appeal, and GRANT counsel's
motion to withdraw.

On December 9, 2005, U.S. Border Patrol agents stopped Morales-Ramirez, along with
seven other individuals, near Columbus, New Mexico.
Morales-Ramirez admitted that he was a citizen of Mexico without authorization
to be in the United States, and that he had previously been deported. A
background check revealed that in 2004 he was convicted of Attempted Common
Law Robbery, a felony, in Charlotte, North Carolina. On May 17, 2006,
Morales-Ramirez pled guilty to the sole charge against him, illegal reentry, and
was sentenced to 46 months' imprisonment ­ at the bottom of his Guidelines
range. He now appeals.

When an attorney conscientiously examines a case and determines that any
appeal would be wholly frivolous, counsel may so advise the court and request
permission to withdraw. Anders, 386 U.S. at 744. Counsel
must submit a brief
to the appellate court as well as to the client pointing to any potentially
appealable issues. The client may then choose to offer any argument to the court.
If, upon carefully examining the record, the court determines that the appeal is in
fact frivolous, it may grant the request to withdraw and dismiss the appeal. Id.In the present case, acting pursuant to Anders, counsel provided
Morales-Ramirez
with a copy of the appellate brief and he has declined the opportunity
to file a pro
se brief.

Counsel's Anders brief raises two potentially appealable issues. First, the
brief questions whether Morales-Ramirez's guilty plea was knowing and
voluntary. We review a district court's determination of this issue de novo.
United States v. Libretti, 38 F.3d 523, 529 (10th Cir. 1994). In deciding that a
plea is knowing and voluntary, a district court must assess whether the defendant
fully understands the consequences of the plea. Id. Under Federal Rule of
Criminal Procedure 11(b)(1), defendants must be apprised of their rights, the
nature of the charges against them, and the maximum and minimum penalties
they face.

The district court properly conducted the required colloquy in this case,
informing Morales-Ramirez of the rights he would waive by pleading guilty, and
asking him whether he was under the influence of drugs or alcohol, whether he
was being treated for any illness, or if he had been threatened or coerced into
pleading guilty. At the court's request, the prosecutor read to Morales-Ramirez
the penalties he faced. Nothing in the record leads us to doubt Morales-Ramirez's answers on the
day of the plea hearing. Accordingly, we hold that the
district court did not err in finding Morales-Ramirez knowingly and voluntarily
entered his guilty plea.

Counsel also draws our attention to Morales-Ramirez's sentence. We
review a sentence for reasonableness. United States v. Kristl, 437 F.3d 1050,
1053 (2006). A sentence that falls within a properly calculated Guidelines range
is presumptively reasonable. Id. Factual findings made by the district court are
reviewed for clear error and legal determinations are reviewed de novo. United
States v. Serrata, 425 F.3d 886, 906 (10th Cir. 2005).

Morales-Ramirez's Presentence Report (PSR) correctly calculated an
offense level of 21 and a criminal history category of III. The Guidelines provide
a base offense level of eight for illegal reentry and a 16-level enhancement if that
reentry occurs after a deportation following a conviction for a felony crime of
violence. U.S.S.G. §§ 2L1.2(a) & (b)(1)(A)(ii). Morales-Ramirez then
received
a three-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility. His criminal history
category of III was properly based on prior convictions for Receiving Stolen
Property and Attempted Common Law Robbery.

Morales-Ramirez objected to the 16-level enhancement, arguing that the
narrative describing his conviction for Attempted Common Law Robbery was
incorrect, but admitting to the conviction itself. Attempted Robbery is a crime of
violence under the Guidelines. U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2 cmt. (B)(iii). The district court
considered Morales-Ramirez's objection, as well as the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)
factors in determining that a 46-month sentence was appropriate. Morales-Ramirez has done
nothing to overcome the presumption of reasonableness
afforded his sentence. Kristl, 437 F.3d at 1053. Even without that presumption,
however, we conclude that a 46-month sentence is reasonable under the
circumstances.

Because we are not presented with any meritorious grounds for appeal, we
GRANT counsel's request to withdraw, AFFIRM the
sentence, and DISMISS
the appeal.

ENTERED FOR THE COURT

Carlos F. Lucero

Circuit Judge

FOOTNOTESClick footnote number to return to corresponding location in the text.

*. The case is unanimously ordered submitted
without oral argument
pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2) and 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). This order and
judgment is not binding precedent except under the doctrines of law of the case,
res judicata and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive
value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 (eff. Dec. 1, 2006) and 10th Cir. R.
32.1 (eff. Jan. 1, 2007).