The nuclear policy of Russia is a component of the military
policy of the Russian Federation (RF). It is a system of officially recognized
decisions about the development of nuclear weapons, their missions and role in
providing for Russia’s security; maintenance of a viable nuclear deterrence;
keeping strategic weapons in readiness for employment; and on the use of
nuclear weapons in war.

The foundations of Russia’s nuclear policy were laid by
the leadership of the Soviet Union. Russia inherited this doctrinal legacy
when it took the place of the USSR in the international community, and assumed
control of its nuclear weapons. It is important to note, however, that having
declared itself the legitimate heir of the USSR, Russia, speaking through its
first president, Boris Yeltsin, declared that it did not view any nation as an
enemy. Moreover, Yeltsin emphasized that Moscow regarded as potential partners
every nation whose policies did not threaten Russia’s national interest and
security, and did not contradict the UN Charter. This declaration, reflected
in the Main Provisions of the Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation,
approved by President Yeltsin in 1993, has determined the principles of
subsequent Russian military policy, including its nuclear component.

The sections of the Main Provisions related to military
doctrine were further developed in 1994-1996 to reflect the new positions of
the Russian political and military leadership on the concept of nuclear
deterrence, decision-making for the use of nuclear weapons, and release of
authority for such use. Russia, together with the other Commonwealth of
Independent States (CIS) members in possession of Soviet strategic nuclear
weapons (Belarus, Kazakstan and Ukraine), ratified the US-Soviet Strategic
Arms Reduction Treaty I (START I), and, beginning on December 5, 1994, began
to implement it. Nevertheless, in that period Russia still lacked an
integrated nuclear policy. Only in November 1998 did the Russian
Federation’s Security Council consider and approve the Policy on Nuclear
Deterrence, subsequently signed as an executive order by Yeltsin on December
31, 1998. This executive order was the first comprehensive new formulation of
Russian nuclear policy, no longer dependent upon the Soviet legacy, although
it continued to strive for nuclear parity with the United States.

Security through
Deterrence

The Policy on Nuclear Deterrence state that Russia’s
nuclear policy is based on the constitution of the Russian Federation and the
existing body of Russian law, and takes into account Russia’s international
obligations. Russia’s nuclear policy plays a key role in creating favorable
external conditions for the development of the Russian state; implementation
of social, economic and military reforms, promotion of national interests; and
preservation of the geopolitical position and status of the Russian Federation
as a great power. Russian policy adheres firmly to a strategic course that
involves:

- Consistent reductions by
the five nuclear powers of their nuclear forces, on the basis of reciprocity
and equal security;- Making nuclear
non-proliferation global and universal;- An end to the testing of
nuclear weapons and a global ban on nuclear weapons.

The Russian Federation seeks to eliminate military threats
by giving priority to political, diplomatic, international legal and other
non-military measures, including collective actions by the international
community to maintain peace and end aggression. At the same time, as long as
the world lacks a reliable system of collective security, Russia regards its
nuclear forces as the main guarantor of its national security, and will
maintain them at a level sufficient to guarantee deterrence.

Nuclear deterrence is defined as the ability to convince
any potential aggressor that is planning or considering war against Russia and
her allies, that the use of force cannot hope to achieve the aggressor’s
military and political goals. Deterrence is established by an obvious, viable
and guaranteed capability and willingness to deliver unacceptable damage to
the aggressor through the use of nuclear weapons. The deterrent warning may be
conveyed to potential enemies both politically, through diplomatic and other
channels, as well as militarily - by demonstrating Russia’s nuclear force
capabilities for purposes of deterrence. Russia’s strategic nuclear
infrastructure should provide:

- Guaranteed deterrence of
any state (or coalition of states) from aggression on any scale, employing any
weapons, including weapons of mass destruction (WMD), against Russia and her
allies;- A flexible nuclear deterrent
adequate to all emerging threats and challenges;- Timely detection of critical
threats to the national security of Russia and her allies, and the swift
provision of information about such threats to military and political leaders,
who then can make and implement decisions on the use of nuclear forces within
designated timeframes;- Adequate levels of safety at all
stages in the development, production and operation of nuclear weapons.

Russia’s Strategic Nuclear Forces (SNF) must provide for
reliable global deterrence against nuclear and conventional attack, while the
forces equipped with tactical nuclear weapons should be prepared for a
flexible response to any changes in the security environment, in order to
achieve the goals of deterrence. These tactical forces also must be able to
carry out deterrence at the regional level.

Russia views the use of nuclear weapons as an extreme
measure, forced upon it by the need to stop critical threats against its
national security, when all other measures have failed. Only the president of
the Russian Federation, who also is the supreme commander-in-chief of the
armed forces, can authorize the use of nuclear weapons.

Russia will never use nuclear weapons against those states
that are signatories of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), that do
not possess nuclear weapons (known as non-nuclear weapons states). Exceptions
are in the case of an invasion or other attack against the Russian Federation,
its territory, its armed forces or other troops, against its allies or a state
with which it has treaty obligations, when such an attack is undertaken by a
non-nuclear weapons state together with a nuclear power, or if such a state
has an alliance with a nuclear power. Russia absolutely adheres to such
“negative guarantees” to non-nuclear weapons states.

Russia’s main goal in the development of nuclear
deterrent forces is to maintain them at a level that can guarantee the
national security of Russia and her allies under any conditions. These forces
are developed according to several key criteria:

- Maintaining the optimal composition of nuclear weapons to
fulfill missions of deterrence;
- Planning for the balanced development and optimal combination of nuclear
strategic and tactical weapons;
- Improving the protection of
nuclear weapon systems and their command and control from unsanctioned use;- Providing the maximum level of
nuclear safety;- Adopting all measures necessary
to strengthen nuclear non-proliferation regimes.

Russia’s nuclear policy is not directed against any
specific nations or alliances of nations. The RF confirms all its
international obligations in the field of nuclear arms control, including
consistent and systematic efforts to reduce nuclear weapons at the global
level and eventually to eliminate them.

A New Era

A new stage in the evolution of Russia’s nuclear policy
began after Vladimir V. Putin’s accession as president of the RF. In January
2000 he approved a new version of the Concept of National Security of the
Russian Federation, and in April of the same year he approved the Military
Doctrine of the RF. At the same time, Russia ratified START 2 and the
international Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT).

These events required alterations in the nuclear policy
that was in place under President Yeltsin. These emerging changes were
formalized at a meeting of the RF Security Council on August 11 2001, along
with decisions regarding further reform of the armed forces for the period up
to 2010. Within the framework of START 2, which had not been ratified by the
United States Senate and therefore had not entered into force, Russia’s
political and military leaders addressed important decision on Russia’s
nuclear policy that extended beyond 2010. The essence of these deliberations
was the decision to end the race for nuclear parity with the United States,
and instead seek an acceptable balance between the Russian and US nuclear
arsenals. In terms of numbers, this meant that according to START 2, the
United States could have 3,000-3,5000 nuclear warheads in its strategic
offensive forces. Russia decided that its ceiling would be 1,500-2,000
warheads, on the reasonable and considered assumption that this number of
warheads would be sufficient to fulfill the main mission of strategic
deterrence against aggression.

There were two main factors behind this decision. First, in
mid-2000 President Vladimir Putin, determined that the main goal of future
Russian foreign policy would be to achieve rapprochement with the West and
establish a partnership with the United States in particular, as well as with
the NATO nations as a whole. Once it stopped viewing the United States as an
enemy, it no longer was necessary for Russia to engage in a nuclear arms race
with the Americans.

Second, most, but certainly not all, of Russia’s military
and political leaders came to the conclusion that the main military threat to
Russia, both external and internal, would for the foreseeable future come from
regional armed conflicts. Russia’s armed forces already had proved
themselves unready to neutralize or prevent such conflicts or to engage armed
terrorist groups, demonstrated by the limited progress Russian “power
agencies” (e.g., the regular military, internal troops of the Ministry of
Internal Affairs, the counterintelligence FSB) were making in
counter-terrorist operations in the North Caucasus. Once Russia’s leaders
recognized the need for this shift in priorities, they also saw the necessity
of reorienting limited financial and material resources to improve combat
capabilities and develop the regular components of the armed forces for these
regional missions. It no longer made sense to continue spending limited
resources on excessive nuclear weapons, which by their nature cannot be used
in local armed conflicts.

Thus Russian nuclear policy finally shed the stereotypes it
inherited from the USSR. It is true nevertheless that not all of Russian
society approved of the new approach, especially members of the older Cold-War
generations who had lived most of their lives under Soviet rule. But this is
normal in a democracy. Certainly not everybody in the United States approves
of Washington’s military policy.

SORT

After the Republican administration of George W. Bush came
to power in the United States in 2001, and it became clear that Washington
would withdraw from the ABM Treaty and would not ratify START 2, Russia’s
political leaders made the utmost effort to prevent the disintegration of the
established system of strategic stability. These efforts eventually met with a
response from the Bush administration. During the 2001 summits between
Presidents Putin and Bush, the two leaders agreed in principle to develop and
sign a bilateral treaty on the reduction of strategic offensive forces (SORT).
This agreement was facilitated by the strengthening of US-Russian cooperation
in many fields of international politics, especially after the terrorist
attacks of September 11, 2001.

When it became apparent, in April 2002, that the SORT
agreement could be ready for signing during the US-Russian summit in Moscow
scheduled for late May, President Putin met with select members of the Russian
Security Council to discuss not only the final details of the SORT agreement,
but also the changes in Russia’s nuclear policy, including appropriate
responses to the US withdrawal from the ABM Treaty. The main thrust of the
Council’s final decision was the need to review all previously adopted
parameters relating to development of the SNF, according to START 2
limitations.

On May 24, 2003, Putin and Bush signed the SORT agreement,
according to which, by December 31, 2012, each will have no more than
1,700-2,200 warheads. Within these limits, however, each side is allowed to
determine the composition and structure of its strategic offensive forces.
SORT was to be ratified according to the constitutional requirements of each
of its signatories, and come in force on the day ratification papers were
exchanged. The presidents also confirmed that the START 1 agreement will
remain in force.

The American side ratified SORT on March 7, 2003. Moscow intended to ratify
in later that same month, but put off a decision when the United States, Great
Britain and their allies attacked Iraq to overthrow the regime of Saddam
Hussein without the approval of the UN Security Council. The Russian State
Duma is expected to consider final ratification again in mid-May 2003. It is
likely this time that ratification will be supported both by the Duma and the
Council of the Federation of the Federal Assembly of the

Russian
Federation.

As part of preparations for the ratification decision,
President Putin ordered the research institutions under the General Staff to
conduct a system study of various nuclear deterrent weapons. The study
confirmed that Russia could, without overburdening itself with military
expenditures, have 1,900-2000 warheads in its SNF by the end of 2012. Out of
this number, 550-600 warheads would be in the Strategic Rocket Forces (SRF),
800-850 in the navy, and up to 560 in the air force. The actual number of
warheads in Russia’s SNF by the end of 2012 will be determined by the
condition of the Russian economy, as well as by trends in the global strategic
situation. On January 1, 2003, Russia’s SNF had 4,950 warheads.

Tactical Weapons

Russia’s policy in the field of tactical nuclear weapons
has not changed substantially since SORT was signed. The earlier decision to
reduce the arsenal of tactical weapons to a sufficient minimal level is being
carried out meticulously; excessive weapons are being decommissioned and
dismantled.

Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev pledged in October 1991
to reduce substantially the Soviet Union’s arsenal of tactical nuclear
weapons, in response to a similar unilateral initiative made on September 27,
1991 by US President George H. W. Bush. This pledge subsequently was confirmed
and broadened by President Yeltsin. Russia so far has destroyed one third of
its naval tactical nuclear weapons, one half of its nuclear warheads for
anti-ballistic missiles (ABMs) and anti-aircraft missiles (SAMs), one half of
its nuclear gravity bombs for tactical aviation, and all nuclear charges for
artillery shells and land mines. (The process of decommissioning of nuclear
charges may not be completed because the Ministry of Atomic Energy lacks the
necessary productive capacity). None of Russia’s tactical nuclear weapons
are actually deployed with troops any longer; they are kept under reinforced
guard at storage facilities belonging to the 12th Main Directorate of the
Ministry of Defense. Nor does Russia have any tactical nuclear weapons outside
of Russian territory, unlike the United States, which continues to deploy up
to 200 B61 nuclear gravity bombs at ten airbases in seven European NATO states
(Belgium, Great Britain, Germany, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, and Turkey).

Russia’s political and military leaders are determining
the future qualitative and quantitative composition of tactical nuclear forces
with the following goal in mind: Russia should have an arsenal of tactical
nuclear weapons sufficient for regional nuclear deterrence (apart from
Russia’s SNF, which are responsible for global deterrence). To fulfill this
mission, experts conclude that Russia should have about 3,000 tactical nuclear
warheads.

Such a bi-level system of nuclear deterrence will enable
Russia’s leaders to react in a flexible and effective fashion to any changes
in the military-strategic situation, and will allow them, with minimal risk,
to defend against emerging threats to the state’s military security.

Conclusion

Russia, along with the United States and the other official
members of the nuclear club, has legitimate concerns that the traditional
mechanisms of nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament can no longer fulfill
their mission. Events of recent years demonstrate that some states are willing
not only to circumvent but to ignore outright existing agreements and treaties,
even those to which they are legally bound signatories (North Korea is a
characteristic example). Although the UN Security Council reacts appropriately
to such actions, it does not carry out the critically necessary activities of
monitoring and managing treaty compliance on a systematic basis.

In order to make progress in this area, which would in turn
make the mechanisms of nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament stronger and
more effective, Russia and the United States together should initiate the
establishment of a permanent commission of the UN Security Council for
monitoring the observance of treaties on nuclear arms and delivery system
reduction, and non-proliferation. (Such a commission could also broaden its
mandate to include chemical and biological weapons.) The UN Security Council
should give the commission broad powers, including the power to sue UN members’
military forces, to enforce nuclear disarmament obligations. These should
include the security of dismantled and surplus nuclear materials that could be
used in any program to resume production of nuclear warheads and other nuclear
explosive devices, and confirm the irreversibility of the disarmament process.
The commission will have access to the rich experience of UN peacekeeping
operations, that employed military formations provided by the UN members, and
could benefit from the experience of the UN Security Council commissions on
the disarmament of Iraq - UNSCOM and UNMOVIC, even though these were not a
complete success. Both the commission members and all military formations
assigned to carry out any special missions mandated by the UN would require
specialized training.

This proposal for strengthening the effectiveness of
control mechanisms relating to nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament is
not the only possibility. But addressing it in a positive spirit would allow
development of an internationally recognized mechanism, in addition to those
that already exist, for neutralizing threats related to the proliferation of
nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction. Russia and the United
States, which have a mutual interest in maintaining international stability,
should proceed from an understanding of the obvious importance of this task.