August 2009 Archives

It need not be decided whether District court's denial of a motion for preliminary injunction filed by the National Hockey League, the Office of the Commissioner of Baseball, and the National Collegiate Athletic Association was proper where, as a matter of law, the elements of Delaware's sports lottery violates the Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act, 28 U.S.C. section 3701.

District court's judgment, involving land title insurance policy dispute, is reversed where: 1) the district court erred in granting Commonwealth's motion to dismiss as in order to except expressly from ALTA 9 Endorsement coverage a right of refusal or other restrictions noted in paragraph 1(b)(2) of the Endorsement, an insurer must list those restrictions specifically in Schedule B: and 2) Commonwealth bore the burden of detecting the restrictions stated in the Declaration, and had to list those restrictions explicitly as exceptions to avoid covering loss from them.

In a licensing agreement dispute involving restriction of Styrofoam-type sales to certain Asian countries, district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of plaintiff-licensee is affirmed where the "fully paid-up" license clearly expired along with defendant's intellectual property rights in the process, and as such, because defendant does not have continuing intellectual property rights in the process, the License Agreement has no continuing force.

In an employment discrimination action under Title VII involving claims of gender stereotyping and religious harassment, district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of defendant is vacated with respect to the gender stereotyping claim as the record below is ambiguous as to whether the claim was based on sexual orientation or discrimination because of sex, and thus because both are plausible, the case presents a question of fact for the jury and is not appropriate for summary judgment. District court's grant of summary judgment on the religious harassment claim was proper as plaintiff cannot satisfy the first element of his cause of action that there was intentional harassment because of religion.

In habeas proceedings arising from petitioner's conviction of two counts of conspiracy to commit murder, district court's judgment is reversed where the evidence was insufficient to allow a rational trier of fact to find defendant participated in two conspiracies and the court's contrary conclusion was an unreasonable application of clearly established Supreme Court precedent, In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970).

District court's decision to deviate from a 30-37 month Guideline range down to a sentence of five years probation for a defendant convicted of knowing possession of child pornography is vacated as procedurally and substantively unreasonable where the district court failed to properly consider the 18 U.S.C. section 3553 factors and failed to offer a sufficient justification for its imposition of a sentence so substantially below the applicable Guidelines range.

Defendant's conviction on two counts of illegal possession of a firearm and ammunition under 18 U.S.C. section 922(g)(1) is affirmed in part and remanded in part where: 1) district court committed plain error in convicting and sentencing defendant on both counts charged under section 922(g)(1), as defendant's possession of both a firearm and ammunition, seized at the same time in the same location, supports only one conviction and sentence under the section; and 2) defendant has met his burden to show that his substantial rights were affected by his unauthorized conviction and sentence on both counts charged under section 922(g).

In a case brought by protesters against the City of York alleging that a ramp in front of the Planned Parenthood Facility was a public forum, district court's decision denying plaintiffs' motion for preliminary injunction is affirmed where: 1) plaintiffs had no chance of success on the merits as the handicap ramp was a nonpublic forum; 2) there was no irreparable harm because plaintiffs were allowed to protest on the public sidewalk next to the ramp and had access to every person entering the clinic through the ramp; 3) allowing the protesters on the ramp could have led to violence between protesters and the patrons of Planned Parenthood Facility, posing likelihood of harm to the defendants; and 4) public interest favors ensuring unrestricted handicapped access to facilities. District court's grant of defendant's motion to dismiss plaintiff's complaint is affirmed as the issues on the preliminary injunction and the motion to dismiss were exactly the same and plaintiffs had full opportunity to present their arguments at the hearing on the preliminary injunction.

On Appeal from the United States District Court for the MiddleDistrict of Pennsylvania (D.C. No. 07 -cv-00088)District Judge: Honorable John E. Jones, IIIArgued January 12, 2009Opinion Filed August 24, 2009

On remand from the Supreme Court in light of Chamber v. US, 129 S.Ct. 687 (2009), defendant's sentence under the enhanced guidelines is affirmed but the designation of defendant as a career offender is reversed where the crime of failure to report for incarceration, as distinguished from escape from custody, is not a violent felony for purposes of the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. section 924(e).

On Appeal from the United States District Court for the MiddleDistrict of Pennsylvania (D.C. No. 06-cr-00064)District Judge: Honorable Christopher C. ConnerArgued February 11, 2008Opinion Filed August 21, 2009

In an employment discrimination case under the Rehabilitation Act,
the district court's dismissal of plaintiff's complaint is vacated and
remanded where: 1) a 4 year limitation applies to plaintiff's
failure-to-transfer claim, and not the general 2 year statute of
limitations the district court applied in barring the complaint; 2)
plaintiff's complaint need only allege sufficient facts to state a
plausible failure-to-transfer claim; 3) plaintiff need only plead that
she is an individual with a disability and the district court
improperly focused on whether she could prove she was disabled; but 4)
the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying an untimely
motion for a class action determination.

Convictions for conspiracy to defraud the IRS are affirmed where: 1)
materiality is an essential element of the charged 18 U.S.C. section
286 offense, but is not required to show a section 287 violation; 2)
despite the fact that the indictment did not use the term material, it
sufficiently alleged facts that warrant an inference of materiality
and 3) the deficiency in the jury instructions as to materiality was
harmless error.

On Appeal from the District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania (Nos. 05-CR-00618-2 & 05-CR-00618-1))District Judge: Honorable Gene E.K. PratterArgued January 28, 2009Opinion Filed August 18, 2009

In a dispute between the Philadelphia Stock Exchange and a member, order dismissing plaintiff-member's motion for a temporary restraining order is vacated and remanded with instructions to dismiss the action for lack of proper subject matter jurisdiction where the district court lacked proper subject matter jurisdiction over the action as plaintiff failed to exhaust the available administrative remedies provided by the Exchange Act, and two exceptions to the exhaustion requirement did not apply.

On Appeal from the District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania (No. 07-cv-05543)District Judge: Honorable Anita B. BrodyArgued March 12, 2009Opinion Filed August 17, 2009

Judges

Honorable A. Wallace Tashima, Circuit Judge for the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, sitting by designation.Before: FUENTES, CHAGARES, and TASHIMA, Circuit JudgesOpinion by Circuit Judge Fuentes

In a procedural due process action involving an allegedly unconstitutional delay in holding a juvenile dependency hearing, district court judgment is reversed where defendants are entitled to qualified immunity, as it was objectively reasonable for defendants to have believed that their particular conduct in this case did not violate clearly established law, and that they had discharged their responsibilities with respect to plaintiffs' procedural due process rights by advancing the case to the point where a hearing could take place within the constitutionally prescribed time frame.

In a dispute over damages and attorney's fees stemming from a Religious Freedom Restoration Act and tort action, district court judgment is vacated where that the district court assessment of the evidence was based on an improper interpretation of the interrogatories and verdict sheet and thus the court erred in attributing a portion of plaintiff's tort award to her RFRA claim. On remand, the Hensley standard should guide the district court's consideration of pendent state claims in a litigation where a plaintiff has prevailed on a fee-eligible federal claim.

In a class action alleging that Snapple products were deceptively labeled, district court judgment is reversed where: 1) defendant waived its express preemption argument; 2) implied field preemption does not apply as neither Congress nor the FDA intended to occupy the fields of food and beverage labeling and juice products; and 3) implied conflict preemption does not apply as there is no FDA policy with which state law could conflict since neither the FDA policy statement nor the FDA's letter regarding the term "natural" have the force of law required to preempt conflicting state law.

In a dispute involving a denial of Social Security disability insurance benefits, district court judgment is vacated and remanded where the ALJ acknowledged plaintiff's severe obesity as an impairment, but failed to consider its impact in combination with her other impairments on her workplace performance.

Sentence for weapons possession in prison is vacated and remanded where: 1) the district court's characterization of defendant's offense as a crime of violence and calculation of defendant's sentencing range was based on Kenney, which no longer remains good law in light of the Supreme Court's recent decision in Begay v. US; and 2) possession of a weapon in prison should not be considered a crime of violence under the Career Offender Guidelines post-Begay.

Conviction and sentence for receiving child pornography is affirmed where: 1) the district court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing defendant as its analysis under 18 U.S.C. sec. 3553(a) was informed and adequate, and the sentence was reasonable; 2) the court did not err in imposing a special condition of supervised release of barring defendant from sexually explicit materials as there is a significant nexus between restricting defendant from access to adult sexually explicit material and the goals of supervised release, and the restriction is not overbroad or vague; and 3) the court did not err in imposing the special condition of supervised release of restricting defendant's access to computers and internet use as the restriction shares a nexus to the goals of deterrence and protection of the public, and does not involve a greater deprivation of liberty than is necessary.

District court's grant of petition for writ of habeas corpus is reversed and remanded where: 1) the court properly determined that petitioner exhausted his Strickland claim in the state courts and that this claim was not procedurally defaulted by Pennsylvania's bar against the relitigation of "previously litigated" claims in PCRA proceedings; 2) petitioner's claim is governed by the test for ineffective assistance of counsel enunciated in Strickland; 3) the court erred in reviewing petitioner's claim de novo as the state courts adjudicated petitioner's claim on the merits and federal habeas relief is subject to the standards prescribed by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act; and 4) the court improperly rejected the Magistrate Judge's finding that petitioner had not demonstrated prejudice as required by Strickland.

Sentence for conspiracy to commit bank robberies and other crimes is affirmed and counsel's motion to withdraw is granted where: 1) although the Anders brief filed by defendant's counsel was deficient, there are no nonfrivolous issues for review on appeal; and 2) the district court properly re-sentenced defendant following the remand in his first appeal for re-sentencing in light of Booker.

In an action for tuition reimbursement under the Individuals with Disabilities in Education Act, district court judgment is affirmed in part and reversed in part where: 1) plaintiffs are not entitled to tuition reimbursement for plaintiff's placement at a long term psychiatric residential treatment center as the center cannot be considered an appropriate placement for tuition reimbursement purposes; and 2) plaintiff is not entitled to compensatory education for the period during which she was in the center's acute care ward as the failure to reevaluate her educational needs and develop a new IEP was attributable to the acute nature of plaintiff's medical condition.

Conviction for intentionally trafficking in goods and knowingly using a counterfeit mark is affirmed where: 1) the district court did not abuse its discretion in its definition of use under 18 U.S.C. sec. 2320(a) and the jury charge accurately submitted the issues to the jury; and 2) there was sufficient evidence of defendant's use of the counterfeit marks on or in connection with the goods to sustain his conviction.

In a dispute involving the removal of a class action, district court judgment finding removal improper is reversed where: 1) plaintiff had no reasonable basis to believe that defendant JEVIC was amenable to suit, and thus defendant was a fraudulently joined party and its status as a defendant could not be used to defeat otherwise proper federal jurisdiction; and 2) the court erred in remanding the case to state court as defendant was not properly before the district court since it was never served with legal process.

About U.S. Third Circuit

U.S. Third Circuit features news and information from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, which hears appeals from U.S. District Courts in Delaware, New Jersey, Pennsylvania and the U.S. Virgin Islands. This blog also features news that would be of interest to legal professionals practicing in the 3rd Circuit. Have a comment or tip? Write to us.