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Feed provided by GAO. Click to visit.Elections: Issues Related to State Voter Identification Laws [Reissued on February 27, 2015], September 19, 2014http://gao.gov/products/GAO-14-634
What GAO Found
The studies GAO reviewed on voter ownership of certain forms of identification (ID) documents show that most registered voters in the states that were the focus of these studies possessed the selected forms of state-issued ID, and the direct costs of required ID vary by state. GAO identified 10 studies of driver's license and state ID ownership, which showed that estimated ownership rates among all registered voters ranged from 84 to 95 percent, and that rates varied by racial and ethnic groups. For example, one study estimated that 85 percent of White registered voters and 81 percent of African-American registered voters in one state had a valid ID for voting purposes. The costs and requirements to obtain certain forms of ID, including a driver's license, state ID, or free state ID, vary by state. GAO identified direct costs for these forms of ID in 17 states that require voters to present a photo or government-issued ID at the polls and do not allow voters to affirm their own identities, and found that driver's license direct costs, for example, range from $14.50 to $58.50.
Another 10 studies GAO reviewed showed mixed effects of various forms of state voter ID requirements on turnout. All 10 studies examined general elections before 2008, and 1 of the 10 studies also included the 2004 through 2012 general elections. Five of these 10 studies found that ID requirements had no statistically significant effect on turnout; in contrast 4 studies found decreases in turnout and 1 found an increase in turnout that were statistically significant.
GAO conducted a quasi-experimental analysis to compare voter turnout in Kansas and Tennessee to turnout in the four comparison states that did not have changes in their voter ID requirements from the 2008 to 2012 general elections. In selecting these states from among 14 potential states that modified their ID requirements and 35 potential comparison states, GAO applied criteria to ensure that the states did not have other factors present in their election environments that may have significantly affected turnout. GAO selected states that did not experience contemporaneous changes to other election laws that may have significantly affected voter turnout; had presidential general elections where the margin of victory did not substantially change from 2008 to 2012 and all other statewide elections, such as U.S. Senate races, were non-competitive in both the 2008 and 2012 general elections; and ballot questions were not present, noncompetitive, or similarly competitive in both the 2008 and 2012 general elections. GAO analyzed three sources of data on turnout among eligible and registered voters, including data from official voter records and a nationwide survey. GAO's evaluation of voter turnout suggests that turnout decreased in two selected states—Kansas and Tennessee—from the 2008 to the 2012 general elections (the two most recent general elections) to a greater extent than turnout decreased in the selected comparison states—Alabama, Arkansas, Delaware, and Maine. GAO's analysis suggests that the turnout decreases in Kansas and Tennessee beyond decreases in the comparison states were attributable to changes in those two states' voter ID requirements. GAO found that turnout among eligible and registered voters declined more in Kansas and Tennessee than it declined in comparison states—by an estimated 1.9 to 2.2 percentage points more in Kansas and 2.2 to 3.2 percentage points more in Tennessee—and the results were consistent across the different data sources and voter populations used in the analysis.
To further assess the validity of the results of this analysis, GAO (1) compared Kansas and Tennessee with different combinations of comparison states and with individual comparison states, and (2) controlled for demographic characteristics that can affect turnout, such as age, education, race, and sex. GAO also conducted an analysis using survey data on registrants from Kansas and Tennessee and a nationwide comparison group of all states other than the selected comparison states. These additional analyses produced consistent results. GAO's estimates are limited to turnout in the 2012 general election in Kansas and Tennessee and do not apply to other states or time periods.
GAO also estimated changes in turnout among subpopulations of registrants in Kansas and Tennessee according to their age, length of voter registration, and race or ethnicity. In both Kansas and Tennessee, compared with the four comparison states, GAO found that turnout was reduced by larger amounts:
among registrants, as of 2008, between the ages of 18 and 23 than among registrants between the ages of 44 and 53;
among registrants who had been registered less than 1 year than among registrants who had been registered 20 years or more; and
among African-American registrants than among White, Asian-American, and Hispanic registrants. GAO did not find consistent reductions in turnout among Asian-American or Hispanic registrants compared to White registrants, thus suggesting that the laws did not have larger effects among these subgroups.
A small portion of total provisional ballots in Kansas and Tennessee were cast for ID reasons in 2012, and less than half were counted. In Kansas, 2.2 percent of all provisional ballots in 2012 were cast due to ID reasons, and 37 percent of these provisional ballots were counted. In Tennessee, 9.5 percent of all provisional ballots in 2012 were cast due to ID reasons and 26 percent were counted. Provisional ballots cast for ID reasons may not be counted for a variety of reasons in Kansas and Tennessee, including the voter not providing valid ID during or following an election. GAO's analysis showed that provisional ballot use increased between the 2008 and 2012 general elections by 0.35 percentage points in Kansas and by 0.17 percentage points in Tennessee, relative to all other comparison states combined; these findings are not generalizable.
Challenges exist in using available information to estimate the incidence of in-person voter fraud. For the purposes of this report, “incidence” is defined as the number of separate times a crime is committed during a specific time period. Estimating the incidence of crime involves using information on the number of crimes known to law enforcement authorities—such as crime data submitted to a central repository based on uniform offense definitions—to generate a reliable set of crime statistics. Based on GAO's review of studies by academics and others and information from federal and state agencies, GAO identified various challenges in information available for estimating the incidence of in-person voter fraud that make it difficult to determine a complete picture of such fraud. First, the studies GAO reviewed identified few instances of in-person voter fraud, but contained limitations in, for example, the completeness of information sources used. Second, no single source or database captures the universe of allegations or cases of in-person voter fraud across federal, state, and local levels, in part because responsibility for addressing election fraud is shared among federal, state, and local authorities. Third, federal and state agencies vary in the extent they collect information on election fraud in general and in-person voter fraud in particular, making it difficult to estimate the incidence of in-person voter fraud.
In comments on draft report excerpts the Kansas, Tennessee, and Arkansas Secretary of State Offices disagreed with GAO's criteria for selecting treatment and comparison states and Kansas and Tennessee questioned the reliability of one dataset used to assess turnout. GAO notes that any policy evaluation in a non-experimental setting cannot account for all unobserved factors that could potentially impact the results. However, GAO believes its methodology was robust and valid as, among other things, GAO's selection of treatment and comparison states controlled for factors that could significantly affect voter turnout, and GAO used three data sources it determined to be reliable to assess turnout effects.
Why GAO Did This Study
The authority to regulate U.S. elections is shared by federal, state, and local officials. Congress has addressed major functional areas in the voting process, such as voter registration. However, the responsibility for administration of state and federal elections resides at the state level. In 2002 Congress passed the Help America Vote Act (HAVA), which requires states to request ID from first time voters who register by mail, when they register to vote or cast a ballot for the first time, and to permit individuals to vote a provisional ballot if they do not have the requisite ID. Numerous states have enacted additional laws to address how an individual may register to vote or cast a ballot. As of June 2014, 33 states had enacted requirements for all eligible voters to show ID before casting a ballot at the polls on Election Day.
GAO was asked to review issues related to voter ID laws. This report reviews (1) what available literature indicates about voter ownership of and direct costs to obtain select IDs; (2) what available literature and (3) analyses of available data indicate about how, if at all, voter ID laws have affected turnout in select states; (4) to what extent provisional ballots were cast due to ID reasons in select states; and (5) what challenges may exist in using available information to estimate the incidence of in-person voter fraud.
GAO reviewed relevant literature to identify 10 studies that estimated selected ID ownership rates. GAO reviewed the studies' analyses and determined that these studies were sufficiently sound to support their results and conclusions. GAO also reviewed state statutes and websites to identify acceptable forms of voter ID in selected states and the price for certain forms of ID.
GAO also reviewed relevant literature and identified 10 other studies that estimated the effect of voter ID laws on turnout. GAO reviewed the studies’ design, implementation, and analyses, and determined that the studies weresufficiently sound to support their results and conclusions. Further, GAO compared turnout in two states—Kansas and Tennessee—that changed ID requirements from the 2008 to 2012 general elections with turnout in fourselected states—Alabama, Arkansas, Delaware, and Maine—that did not. GAO used a quasi-experimental approach, a type of policy evaluation that compares how an outcome changes over time in a treatment groupthat adopted a new policy, to a comparison group that did not make the same change. GAO selected states for evaluation that did not have other factors in their election environments that also may have affected turnout, such as significant changes to other election laws. GAO analyzed three sources of turnout data for the 2008 and 2012 general elections: (1) data on eligible voters, using official voter records compiled by the United States Elections Project at George Mason University, (2) data on registered voters, using state voter databases that were cleaned by a vendor through data-matching procedures to remove voters who had died or moved, and (3) data on registered voters, as reported to the Current Population Survey conducted by the U.S. Census Bureau.
GAO also analyzed data from Kansas and Tennessee election officials on the number of provisional ballots cast for ID reasons in the 2012 general election, and data from the Election Assistance Commission’s Election Administration and Voting Survey on the number of provisional ballots cast in select states in 2008 and 2012.
GAO reviewed relevant literature and identified 5 studies that attempted to identify instances of in-person voter fraud. GAO reviewed the studies’ analyses, and determined that these studies were sufficiently sound to support their results and conclusions. GAO also interviewed election officials in 46 states and the District of Columbia and officials from federal agencies that maintain federal crime data to determine how, if at all, instances of in-person voter fraud are tracked in state and federal databases.
For more information, contact Rebecca Gambler at (202) 512-8777 or gamblerr@gao.gov or Nancy R. Kingsbury at (202) 512-2700 or kingsburyn@gao.govFri, 27 Feb 2015 12:00:00 -0500Letter ReportDrug-Impaired Driving: Additional Support Needed for Public Awareness Initiatives, February 24, 2015http://gao.gov/products/GAO-15-293
What GAO Found
Various state and national-level data sources—including surveys, arrest data, drug-testing results, and crash data—provide limited information on the extent of drugged and drug-impaired driving in the United States. For example, based on preliminary results from a representative sample of weekend-nighttime and Friday daytime drivers, the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration's (NHTSA) 2013-2014 National Roadside Survey of Alcohol and Drug Use by Drivers ( NRS ) estimated that 20 percent of drivers would have tested positive for at least one drug, with marijuana being the most common drug. However, the survey does not capture the extent to which drivers were impaired by drugs. Arrest data and drug-testing results provide some information on drug-impaired driving, but these data are limited. For example, data for drug impairment may not be separated from that for alcohol impairment and drug testing is not standardized. According to NHTSA officials, currently available data on drug involvement in crashes are generally unreliable due to variances in reporting and testing.
The lack of a clear link between impairment and drug concentrations in the body makes it difficult to define drug impairment, which, in turn, exacerbates challenges related to enforcement and public awareness. Compared to alcohol, defining and identifying impairment due to drugs is more complicated due to the large number of available drugs and their unpredictable effects. For example, the NRS includes tests for 75 illegal prescriptions, and over-the-counter (OTC) drugs identified as potentially impairing. Additionally, law enforcement processes for obtaining samples for drug testing can be time consuming and result in a loss of evidence. For example, there is no validated device for roadside drug testing, and obtaining a search warrant to collect a blood sample to confirm the presence of drugs in a driver's system could take several hours, during which time the concentration of the drug in the driver's system could dissipate. Further, state officials identified limited public awareness about the dangers of drugged driving as a challenge. As a result, members of the public may drive while impaired without knowing the risks, potentially leading to collisions, injuries, and fatalities.
Federal and state agencies—including NHTSA, the White House Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP), and the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS)—are taking actions to address drug-impaired driving, including improvements in the areas of research and data, education for police officers, evidence gathering, and legal changes. For example, NHTSA is currently conducting research to assess the crash risk associated with drug use (including illegal, prescription, and OTC drugs) by collecting samples from more than 10,000 drivers. However, public awareness of the dangers of drug-impaired driving is an area in which state officials told us that NHTSA could do more to support their efforts. As part of its mission to support state safety efforts, NHTSA has provided media and other materials to states for impaired-driving awareness programs, but these materials are focused on alcohol-impaired driving. While NHTSA plans to improve public awareness through initiatives to conduct surveys on drug-impaired-driving behaviors and attitudes as well as training for medical professionals, these plans could take several years to implement. Additional efforts, such as general messaging reminding the public about the impairing effects of drugs, could help improve public awareness in the near term.
Why GAO Did This Study
The issue of alcohol-impaired driving has received broad attention over the years, but drug-impaired driving also contributes to fatalities and injuries from traffic crashes. However, knowledge about the drug-impaired- driving problem is less advanced than for alcohol-impaired driving.
Through Senate Report No. 113-45 (2013), Congress required GAO to report on the strategies NHTSA, ONDCP, and states have taken to address drug-impaired driving and challenges they face in detecting and reducing such driving. This report discusses (1) what is known about the extent of drug-impaired driving in the United States; (2) challenges that exist for federal, state, and local agencies in addressing drug-impaired driving; and (3) actions federal and state agencies have taken to address drug-impaired driving and what gaps exist in the federal response. GAO reviewed literature to identify sources of data on drug-impaired driving; reviewed documentation and interviewed officials from NHTSA, ONDCP, and HHS; and interviewed officials from relevant advocacy and professional organizations and seven selected states. States were selected based on: legal status of marijuana, proximity to states with legalized marijuana, and drugged-driving laws.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that NHTSA take additional actions to support states in emphasizing to the public the dangers of drug-impaired driving. DOT agreed with GAO's recommendation.
For more information, contact Susan Fleming, at (202) 512-2834 or flemings@gao.gov.Tue, 24 Feb 2015 12:00:00 -0500Letter ReportWhistleblower Protection: Additional Actions Needed to Improve DOJ's Handling of FBI Retaliation Complaints, January 23, 2015http://gao.gov/products/GAO-15-112
What GAO Found
The Department of Justice (DOJ) closed 44 of the 62 (71 percent) Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) whistleblower retaliation complaints we reviewed within 1 year, took up to 4 years to close 15 complaints, and took up to 10.6 years to close the remaining 3. DOJ terminated 55 of the 62 complaints (89 percent) and awarded corrective action for 3. (Complainants withdrew 4.) We found that DOJ terminated many (48 of 62) complaints we reviewed because they did not meet certain regulatory requirements. For example, DOJ terminated at least 17 complaints in part because a disclosure was made to someone in the employee's chain of command or management, such as a supervisor, who was not one of the nine high-level FBI or DOJ entities designated under DOJ regulations to receive such disclosures. Unlike employees of other executive branch agencies, FBI employees do not have a process to seek corrective action if they experience retaliation based on a disclosure of wrongdoing to their supervisors or others in their chain of command who are not designated officials. This difference is due, in part, to DOJ's decisions about how to implement the statute governing FBI whistleblowers. In 2014, DOJ reviewed its regulations and, in an effort to balance competing priorities, recommended adding more senior officials in FBI field offices to the list of designated entities, but did not recommend adding all supervisors. DOJ cited a number of reasons for this, including concerns about the additional resources and time needed to handle a possible increase in complaints if DOJ added supervisors. However, DOJ is already taking other steps to improve the efficiency of the complaint process. More importantly, dismissing retaliation complaints made to an employee's supervisor or someone in that person's chain of command leaves some FBI whistleblowers—such as the 17 complainants we identified—without protection from retaliation. By dismissing potentially legitimate complaints in this way, DOJ could deny some whistleblowers access to recourse, permit retaliatory activity to go uninvestigated, and create a chilling effect for future whistleblowers.
We also found that DOJ and FBI guidance is not always clear that FBI employees reporting alleged wrongdoing to a supervisor or someone in their chain of command may not be a protected disclosure. Ensuring that guidance always clearly explains to whom an FBI employee can report wrongdoing will help FBI whistleblowers ensure that they are fully protected from retaliation.
DOJ took from 2 to 10.6 years to resolve the 4 complaints we reviewed that DOJ adjudicated, and DOJ did not provide complainants with estimates of when to expect DOJ decisions throughout the complaint process. Providing such estimates would enhance accountability to complainants and provide additional assurance about DOJ management's commitment to improve efficiency.
Further, DOJ offices responsible for investigating whistleblower retaliation complaints have not consistently complied with certain regulatory requirements, such as obtaining complainants' approvals for extensions of time. One investigating office does not track investigators' compliance with specific regulatory requirements and does not have a formal oversight mechanism to do so. Effectively monitoring investigators' compliance with such requirements could help assure complainants that their cases are making progress and that they have the information they need to determine next steps for their complaints.
Why GAO Did This Study
Whistleblowers help safeguard the federal government against waste, fraud, and abuse—however, they also risk retaliation by their employers. For example, in 2002, a former FBI agent alleged she suffered retaliation after disclosing that colleagues had stolen items from Ground Zero following the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks. DOJ found in her favor over 10 years after she reported the retaliation. GAO was asked to review DOJ's process for handling such complaints.
GAO examined (1) the time DOJ took to resolve FBI whistleblower retaliation complaints, (2) the extent to which DOJ took steps to resolve complaints more quickly, and (3) the extent to which DOJ complied with certain regulatory reporting requirements.
GAO reviewed all DOJ case files for FBI whistleblower retaliation complaints DOJ closed from 2009 to 2013, and interviewed whistleblower attorneys, advocates, and government officials about the complaint process. The interview results are not generalizable.
What GAO Recommends
Congress may wish to consider whether FBI whistleblowers should have means to seek corrective action if retaliated against for disclosures to supervisors, among others. Further, GAO recommends that DOJ clarify guidance to clearly convey to whom employees can make protected disclosures, provide complainants with estimated complaint decision timeframes, and develop an oversight mechanism to monitor regulatory compliance. DOJ and the Office of the Inspector General concurred with GAO's recommendations.
For more information, contact David Maurer at (202) 512-8777 or maurerd@gao.gov.Mon, 23 Feb 2015 12:00:00 -0500Letter ReportIdentity and Tax Fraud: Enhanced Authentication Could Combat Refund Fraud, but IRS Lacks an Estimate of Costs, Benefits and Risks, January 20, 2015http://gao.gov/products/GAO-15-119
What GAO Found
Identity Theft (IDT) Refund Fraud Cost Estimates. The Internal Revenue Service's (IRS) fraud estimates met several GAO Cost Guide best practices, such as documenting data sources and detailing calculations. However, the estimates do not reflect the uncertainty inherent in measuring IDT refund fraud because they are presented as point estimates. Best practices suggest that agencies assess the effects of assumptions and potential errors on estimates. Officials said they did not assess the estimates' level of uncertainty because of resource constraints and methodological challenges. Because making different assumptions could affect IDT fraud estimates by billions of dollars, a point estimate (as opposed to, for example, a range) could lead to different decisions about allocating IDT resources. Reporting the uncertainty that is already known from IRS analysis (and conducting further analyses when not cost prohibitive) might help IRS communicate IDT refund fraud's inherent complexity.
IRS Estimates of Attempted IDT Refund Fraud, 2013
While IRS's fraud estimates note the relevant cost assumptions used to develop estimates, they do not provide the rationale or analysis to support them. Officials stated they did not document the rationale because of the time and resources required. Best practices suggest that agencies should document assumptions. Given the evolving nature of IDT refund fraud, documenting assumptions' rationale would help IRS management and policymakers determine whether the assumptions remain valid or need to be updated.
Taxpayer Authentication. IRS recently created a group aimed at centralizing several prior ad hoc efforts to authenticate taxpayers across its systems. IRS's planning documentation contains goals and short- and long-term priorities (including implementation plans). However, a commitment to cost, benefit and risk analysis is not documented in the group's short- and long-term priorities. The draft planning documentation makes no mention of where such analyses would be included in IRS's priorities. Office of Management and Budget guidance states that agencies should use cost-benefit analyses that consider alternatives to promote efficient resource allocation and that agencies should ensure that authentication processes provide the appropriate level of assurance by assessing risks. Without analysis of costs, benefits and risks, IRS and Congress will not have quantitative information that could inform decisions about whether and how much to invest in the various authentication options. Cost, benefit and risk estimates for authentication would have the additional benefit of allowing comparisons with other options for combating IDT refund fraud. IDT options could have significant costs for taxpayers and IRS, so more information about the tradeoffs would help inform IRS and congressional decision making.
Why GAO Did This Study
IRS estimated it prevented $24.2 billion in fraudulent identity theft (IDT) refunds in 2013, but paid $5.8 billion later determined to be fraud. Because of the difficulties in knowing the amount of undetected fraud, the actual amount could differ from these point estimates. IDT refund fraud occurs when an identity thief uses a legitimate taxpayer's identifying information to file a fraudulent tax return and claims a refund.
GAO was asked to review IRS's efforts to combat IDT refund fraud. This report, the second in a series, assesses (1) the quality of IRS's IDT refund fraud cost estimates, and (2) IRS's progress in developing processes to enhance taxpayer authentication.
GAO compared IRS's IDT estimate methodology to GAO Cost Guide best practices (fraud is a cost to taxpayers). To assess IRS's progress enhancing authentication, GAO reviewed IRS documentation and interviewed IRS officials, other government officials, and associations representing software companies, return preparers, and financial institutions.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends IRS improve its fraud estimates by (1) reporting the inherent imprecision and uncertainty of estimates, and (2) documenting the underlying analysis justifying cost-influencing assumptions. In addition, IRS should estimate and document the economic costs, benefits and risks of possible options for taxpayer authentication. IRS agreed with GAO's recommendations and provided technical comments that GAO incorporated, as appropriate.
For more information, contact James R. White, (202) 512-9110, whitej@gao.gov.Thu, 19 Feb 2015 12:00:00 -0500Letter ReportPrenatal Drug Use and Newborn Health: Federal Efforts Need Better Planning and Coordination, February 10, 2015http://gao.gov/products/GAO-15-203
What GAO Found
Federally funded research mostly focused on neonatal abstinence syndrome (NAS), and federal programs and other agency efforts made services available or conducted activities to address prenatal opioid use or NAS. From fiscal years 2008 through 2014, federal agencies obligated almost $21.6 million for 18 research projects related to prenatal opioid use or NAS, most of which focused on preventing, understanding, or treating NAS. Fourteen federal programs on substance abuse, health, and welfare—12 of which were administered by agencies within the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS)—made direct services available (such as screening and referral for treatment) or conducted other activities (such as training or technical assistance) to address prenatal opioid or NAS in fiscal years 2013 or 2014 as part of broader objectives. Outside of research and programs, 11 federal agencies made direct services available through their health systems or engaged in other efforts during fiscal years 2008 through 2014.
The gaps in efforts to address prenatal opioid use and NAS most commonly cited by federal agency officials and experts were related to the treatment of prenatal opioid use and NAS. With regard to research, the most commonly cited gaps were inadequate research on treatment of prenatal opioid use and the long-term effects of prenatal opioid exposure on children. Reasons cited for these research gaps included difficulties in conducting research, such as identifying and retaining pregnant women with substance use disorders for studies, and prenatal opioid use and NAS not being as high a priority as other research areas. With regards to programs, agency officials and experts most commonly cited the lack of available treatment programs for pregnant women and newborns with NAS, including the availability of comprehensive care and enabling services, such as transportation and child care. Reasons cited for these program gaps included the stigmatization and criminalization of pregnant women who use drugs. In addition to research and program gaps, other gaps cited by agency officials and experts included a lack of guidance on criminalization policies for states, screening and treatment practices, and opioid prescribing.
The Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP)—the agency responsible for coordinating drug control efforts across federal agencies—plans and coordinates with other agencies by sharing information and developing national action items to address prenatal opioid use and NAS. However, ONDCP does not document its process for developing action items, including the information considered or discussions with agency officials. Within HHS—which has nine agencies that address prenatal opioid use or NAS—the department relies on its agencies to plan and coordinate individual efforts, and also has established a council that identifies activities that may influence, but are not targeted specifically at, prenatal opioid use and NAS. However, HHS lacks a focal point to lead planning and coordination of efforts related specifically to prenatal opioid use or NAS across the department. These limitations in planning and coordination by ONDCP and HHS may limit the effectiveness of federal efforts to reduce prenatal opioid use among pregnant women and rates of NAS. Additionally, there is a risk that federal efforts may be duplicated, overlapping, or fragmented.
Why GAO Did This Study
The prenatal use of opioids, including heroin and opioids prescribed for pain management, can produce a withdrawal condition in newborns known as NAS. A recent study found that cases of NAS have tripled over the last decade and that treatment costs for newborns with NAS—most of which are paid by Medicaid—are more than five times the cost of treating other newborns at birth.
GAO was asked to provide information on how federal agencies have addressed prenatal opioid use and NAS. In this report, GAO examines (1) federally funded research, federal programs, and other federal agency efforts related to prenatal opioid use or NAS; (2) gaps identified by federal agency officials and experts in efforts to address prenatal opioid use or NAS; and (3) how federal efforts to address prenatal opioid use or NAS are planned and coordinated. GAO analyzed information from federal agencies, including documents and data, on research, programs, and other agency efforts; interviewed federal agency officials and experts about gaps; and interviewed federal agency officials about planning and coordination of federal efforts.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that ONDCP document the process for developing action items on prenatal opioid use and NAS and that HHS designate a focal point to lead departmental planning and coordination on these issues. ONDCP and HHS concurred with GAO's recommendations and provided technical comments that GAO incorporated as appropriate.
For more information, contact Vijay A. D'Souza at (202) 512-7114 or dsouzav@gao.gov.Tue, 10 Feb 2015 12:00:00 -0500Letter ReportAnthrax: Agency Approaches to Validation and Statistical Analyses Could Be Improved, December 19, 2014http://gao.gov/products/GAO-15-80
What GAO Found
After the 2001 Anthrax attacks, the genetic tests that were conducted by the Federal Bureau of Investigation's (FBI) four contractors were generally scientifically verified and validated, and met the FBI's criteria. However, GAO found that the FBI lacked a comprehensive approach—or framework—that could have ensured standardization of the testing process. As a result, each of the contractors developed their tests differently, and one contractor did not conduct verification testing, a key step in determining whether a test will meet a user's requirements, such as for sensitivity or accuracy. Also, GAO found that the contractors did not develop the level of statistical confidence for interpreting the testing results for the validation tests they performed. Responses to future incidents could be improved by using a standardized framework for achieving minimum performance standards during verification and validation, and by incorporating statistical analyses when interpreting validation testing results.
GAO identified six characteristics of a statistical framework that can be applied for analyzing scientific evidence. When GAO compared the approach the FBI used to this framework, it found that that the FBI's approach could have been improved in three of six areas. First, the FBI's research did not provide a full understanding of the methods and conditions that give rise to genetic mutations used to differentiate between samples of B. anthracis. Second, the FBI did not institute rigorous controls over the sampling procedures it used to build the repository of B. anthracis samples. Third, the FBI did not include measures of uncertainty to strengthen the interpretation of the scientific evidence. GAO found that since 2001 the FBI has taken some steps to build formal forensic statistical expertise. The FBI's approach to future incidents could benefit from including such expertise early in an investigation.
The lack of an understanding of how bacteria change (mutate) in their natural environment and in a laboratory is a key scientific gap that remains and could affect testing conducted in future incidents. Specifically, the significance of using such mutations as genetic markers for analyzing evidentiary samples to determine their origins is not clear. This gap affects both the development of genetic tests targeting such mutations and statistical analyses of the results of their use on evidentiary samples. The Department of Homeland Security is currently funding some research on genetic changes in bacteria and genome sequencing methods, among others. Such research is a step in the right direction since the FBI is planning to use genome sequencing methods in future investigations. However, because this research may not be complete for several more years, the extent to which it will close this gap is not known.
Why GAO Did This Study
In 2001, the FBI investigated an intentional release of B. anthracis, a bacterium that causes anthrax, which was identified as the Ames strain. Subsequently, FBI contractors developed and validated several genetic tests to analyze B. anthracis samples for the presence of certain genetic mutations. The FBI had previously collected and maintained these samples in a repository.
GAO was asked to review the FBI's genetic test development process and statistical analyses. This report addresses (1) the extent to which these genetic tests were scientifically verified and validated; (2) the characteristics of an adequate statistical approach for analyzing samples, whether the approach used was adequate, and how it could be improved for future efforts; and (3) whether any remaining scientific concerns regarding the validation of genetic tests and statistical approaches need to be addressed for future analyses. GAO reviewed agency and contractor documentation, conducted literature reviews, and conducted statistical analyses of the repository data. GAO's review focused solely on two aspects of the FBI's scientific evidence: the validation of the genetic tests and the statistical approach for the analyses of the results. GAO did not review and is not taking a position on the conclusions the FBI reached when it closed its investigation in 2010.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that the FBI develop a framework for validation and statistical approaches for future investigations. The FBI agreed with our recommendations.
For more information, contact Timothy M. Persons, Chief Scientist, at (202) 512-6412 or personst@gao.gov.Fri, 19 Dec 2014 12:00:00 -0500Letter ReportProfessional Misconduct: DOJ Could Strengthen Procedures for Disciplining Its Attorneys, December 11, 2014http://gao.gov/products/GAO-15-156
What GAO Found
The Department of Justice (DOJ) has made changes to improve its processes for managing complaints of attorney professional misconduct since 2011 but has not implemented plans to improve processes for demonstrating that discipline is implemented, or achieving timely and consistent discipline decisions. For example, GAO found that changes to the Office of Professional Responsibility's (OPR) processes for assessing the merits of misconduct complaints reduced assessment time that took up to 90 days in 2008 to about 7 days in 2014. However, GAO found that DOJ does not require its components to demonstrate that attorneys have served the discipline imposed on them for misconduct. Ensuring that discipline is implemented helps hold attorneys accountable for violating professional standards and provides the public reasonable assurance that misconduct is being addressed. DOJ also has not implemented a change called for in a January 2011 memorandum from the Attorney General that would expand the purview of the Professional Misconduct Review Unit (PMRU)--the unit that proposes and decides discipline for attorneys with findings of misconduct by OPR. With this change, PMRU would go from deciding discipline for attorneys with professional misconduct findings in U.S. Attorneys' Offices (USAO) and the Criminal Division to all components. According to the Attorney General, this change could help reduce delays in implementing discipline and ensure consistent decisions about discipline. DOJ did not provide GAO with reasons for not making this change.
DOJ policy provides that supervisors of attorneys accused of, or found to have engaged in, professional misconduct can use discretion to determine what work to assign to these attorneys. DOJ also provides agency-wide guidance to supervisors, such as administrative directives and the U.S. Attorneys' Manual, that identify steps supervisors may take when dealing with attorneys accused of misconduct. Representatives for 12 of the 20 USAOs and 20 of the 28 litigating sections we surveyed reported that supervisors assign work on a case-by-case basis but consider factors, such as the nature of the alleged misconduct, in doing so. A smaller number of respondents reported that supervisors may assign work to such attorneys no differently than to other attorneys until the supervisors determine allegations have merit or professional misconduct is confirmed.
Under departmental policy, DOJ is not to authorize legal representation for attorneys in OPR proceedings, including representation to assist such attorneys in preparing submissions to support their defense. However, DOJ attorneys, like all federal employees, may be provided legal representation by DOJ for carrying out their duties, under certain circumstances. For example, DOJ may provide representation for an attorney whose conduct is the subject of a state bar proceeding while the attorney is also the subject of an OPR investigation related to the same conduct. The representation would cover defense for the state bar but not the OPR proceeding. As a result, from fiscal years 2008 through 2013, DOJ expended $3.66 million for private counsel representation for 38 DOJ attorneys involved in 18 legal proceedings where there were also related OPR investigations. DOJ found 12 attorneys within these investigations to have engaged in professional misconduct.
Why GAO Did This Study
Instances of professional misconduct—such as a violation of an attorney’s responsibilities to be honest—among DOJ attorneys have called into question DOJ’s efforts to oversee attorney behavior, including its processes for investigating and disciplining misconduct complaints.
Congress mandated GAO to review DOJ's performance in disciplining attorneys. This report addresses (1) DOJ's processes to manage misconduct complaints; (2) how supervisors determine work responsibilities for attorneys accused of, or found to have engaged in, misconduct; and (3) DOJ's policies for paying for representation for attorneys investigated for misconduct. GAO reviewed DOJ regulatory obligations and policies, and legal representation costs from fiscal years 2008 through 2013. GAO also analyzed survey responses on assigning work responsibilities from 48 selected litigating sections. Responses are not generalizable, but provided helpful insights. GAO also interviewed DOJ officials who manage misconduct complaints.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that DOJ (1) require components to demonstrate that they have implemented discipline for misconduct and (2) establish near-term milestones for expanding PMRU's jurisdiction to decide discipline for all attorneys with findings of misconduct.DOJ agreed with GAO's recommendations.
For more information, contact Eileen Larence at (202) 512-8777 or larencee@gao.gov.Thu, 11 Dec 2014 12:00:00 -0500Letter ReportImmigration Benefits: Improvements Needed to Fully Implement the International Marriage Broker Regulation Act, December 10, 2014http://gao.gov/products/GAO-15-3
What GAO Found
The Departments of Homeland Security (DHS), Justice (DOJ), and State (State) have processes to help ensure compliance with the International Marriage Broker Regulation Act of 2005 (IMBRA), as amended, but State could better document information on IMBRA disclosures. Specifically, consistent with IMBRA, DHS's U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) collects information from petitioners—U.S. citizens who apply to bring noncitizen fiancé(e)s, spouses, and their children (beneficiaries) into the country—through I-129F petitions for K visas. DOJ is responsible for pursuing federal civil and criminal penalties for IMBRA violations. State has guidance on processes for providing IMBRA information to beneficiaries (referred to as disclosures), such as a pamphlet outlining for beneficiaries the K visa process and legal rights and resources available to immigrant crime victims. Specifically, State's guidance requires consular officers to document within case notes in State's database whether they made all of the IMBRA-required disclosures to the beneficiary during the visa interview. However, GAO's review of a sample of K visa applications showed that in about 52 percent of interview case notes (76 of 147), consular officers did not document that they had provided beneficiaries the IMBRA pamphlet as required by State's guidance. In October 2014, State drafted a guidance cable for consular officers on IMBRA implementation, including a reminder to follow guidance regarding IMBRA documentation. State's consular officer training courses, however, do not cover IMBRA-related documentation procedures outlined in its guidance. Incorporating IMBRA-related documentation requirements into training courses could help State better ensure that consular officers are aware of the requirements for documenting IMBRA disclosures.
Consistent with IMBRA, USCIS is to collect and maintain data on, among other things, eight elements in the K visa process for GAO reporting purposes; however, six of the eight elements are either not reliable or are not collected or maintained in a reportable (i.e., electronic) format. Thus, these elements were not readily available for GAO's review. For example, USCIS is to collect and maintain data on I-129F petitions where the petitioner had one or more criminal convictions. This information is maintained in hard copy in the petition file and thus was not readily available for GAO's review. USCIS has begun planning to electronically capture I-129F petition data under the agency's overarching transformation to an electronic immigration benefits system. However, this transformation has faced significant delays, and as of September 2014, the electronic I-129F petition design requirements have not been finalized. Consistent with federal internal control standards, ensuring that all of the IMBRA-related requirements will be captured with the release of the I-129F electronic petition would better position USCIS to collect and maintain complete data on petitioners for reporting purposes and management oversight. Further, USCIS officers have not consistently adjudicated I-129F petitions or recorded complete and accurate data. Specifically, GAO found that USCIS's data are not reliable for determining the number of I-129F petitions filed by persons who have previously filed I-129F petitions for a fiancé(e) or spouse or that required IMBRA waivers because of, among other things, officer error in recording data on petitions. Additional training for officers could help USCIS better ensure its officers are aware of IMBRA requirements to assist them in maintaining petitions data consistent with IMBRA.
Why GAO Did This Study
Enacted in January 2006, IMBRA was passed by Congress to address reports of domestic violence and abuse of foreign beneficiaries married or engaged to U.S. citizens who have petitioned for them to enter the United States on a K visa. As amended, IMBRA requires that the federal government collect and provide to beneficiaries information about petitioners' prior K visa petitions and criminal histories. USCIS is responsible for collecting this information and adjudicating petitions, State is responsible for disclosing information to beneficiaries, and DOJ is authorized to enforce IMBRA. The Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2013 mandates that GAO report on IMBRA implementation.
This report examines the extent to which (1) DHS, State, and DOJ have implemented processes to ensure compliance with IMBRA, and (2) DHS collects and maintains reliable data to manage the K visa process. GAO analyzed IMBRA, USCIS, and State policies, procedures, and guidance, and K visa petition data from March 2012 through March 2014. GAO also interviewed USCIS, State, and DOJ officials regarding their agencies' implementation of IMBRA.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that State provide training to consular officers on IMBRA documentation requirements. GAO also recommends, among other things, that USCIS ensure that all IMBRA-related data will be captured with the planned electronic release of the I-129F petition and that its officers receive additional training on IMBRA requirements. State and DHS concurred with our recommendations.
For more information, contact Rebecca Gambler at (202) 512-8777 or gamblerr@gao.gov.Wed, 10 Dec 2014 12:00:00 -0500Letter ReportSex Offender Registration and Notification Act: Survey of Federally Recognized Tribes on Implementation of the Act (GAO-15-30SP, November 2014), an E-supplement to GAO-15-23, November 18, 2014http://gao.gov/products/GAO-15-30SP
This e-supplement is a companion to our report titled, Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act: Additional Outreach and Notification of Tribes About Offenders who Are Released from Prison Needed (GAO-15-23). The purpose of this e-supplement is to provide information from GAO's Web-based survey of the tribes that retained their authority to implement the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA) about these tribes' implementation status; the types and extent of challenges the tribes experienced with SORNA implementation; the steps the tribes are taking to address the challenges; and the funding and other assistance the tribes have received or could receive from federal, state, or local law enforcement agencies to assist them with implementing the act.Tue, 18 Nov 2014 12:00:00 -0500Other Written ProductSex Offender Registration and Notification Act: Additional Outreach and Notification of Tribes about Offenders Who Are Released from Prison Needed, November 18, 2014http://gao.gov/products/GAO-15-23
What GAO Found
Most eligible tribes have retained their Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA) implementation authority and have either substantially implemented the act or are in the process of doing so. As of August 2014, 77 percent (164 of the 214) of eligible tribes had retained their implementation authority. Tribes that lacked the resources, among other factors, to implement SORNA either delegated their own authority, or the SMART Office delegated the tribe's authority, to a state. According to the Office of Sex Offender Sentencing, Monitoring, Apprehending, Registering, and Tracking (SMART Office)—the office SORNA established within the Department of Justice (DOJ) to administer and assist jurisdictions with implementing the law—43 percent (71 of 164) of tribes that retained their authority to implement SORNA have substantially implemented the act; the SMART Office has not yet made a final determination on 43 percent (70 of 164); and 13 percent (22 of 164) have not submitted complete packages. The SMART Office determined that 1 tribe has not yet substantially implemented SORNA.
In GAO's survey of tribes that retained their authority, the four most frequently reported implementation challenges included inability to submit convicted sex offender information to federal databases, lack of notification from state prisons upon the release of sex offenders, lack of staff, and inability to cover the costs of SORNA implementation. Federal agencies have taken steps to address these challenges, but more could be done. For example, DOJ and the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) within the Department of the Interior (Interior) have formed a working group to better coordinate federal efforts to address tribes' difficulties submitting convicted sex offender information to federal databases. However, some states have not notified tribes—those that retained their SORNA authority, as well as ineligible and delegated tribes—when sex offenders who will be or have been released from state prison register with the state and indicate that they intend to live, work or attend school on tribal land, as SORNA requires; and while the SMART Office has taken some actions, more could be done to encourage states to provide notification to tribes. Such notification would help tribes identify and monitor sex offenders who live on their lands and enforce tribal laws pertaining to sex offenders. The SMART Office, U.S. Marshals Service, and BIA provided financial assistance, equipment, and staff to help tribes address their resource needs. However, BIA offered assistance only to tribes for which BIA provides direct law enforcement services, which account for only 20 percent of the tribes that retained their SORNA implementation authority, even though BIA is responsible for assisting and advising all federally recognized tribes regarding their law enforcement and public safety needs. Taking steps to ascertain what, if any, resource or other needs all tribes that retained their authority may have could better position BIA to support the tribes' efforts to implement the act.
Why GAO Did This Study
According to DOJ, tribal nations are disproportionately affected by violent crimes and sex offenses in particular. In 2006, Congress passed SORNA, which introduced new sex offender registration and notification standards for states, territories, and eligible tribes. The act made special provisions for eligible tribes to elect either to act as registration jurisdictions or to delegate SORNA functions to the states in which they are located. GAO was asked to assess the status of tribes' efforts to implement SORNA and the challenges they face doing so.
This report addresses, among other things, (1) the extent to which eligible tribes have retained their authority to implement, and for those that did, describe their implementation status and (2) implementation challenges tribes that retained their authority reported, and steps federal agencies have taken or could take to address these challenges. GAO reviewed data on eligible tribes' implementation status; conducted a survey of tribes that retained their authority; and interviewed federal, state, and local officials.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that, among other things, the SMART Office encourage states to notify tribes about offenders who plan to live, work, or attend school on tribal land upon release from prison. GAO also recommends that BIA reach out to all tribes that retained their authority to determine what, if any, assistance they would like from BIA. DOJ and Interior concurred.
For more information, contact Eileen R. Larence at (202) 512-8777 or larencee@gao.gov.Tue, 18 Nov 2014 12:00:00 -0500Letter ReportHuman Trafficking: Oversight of Contractors' Use of Foreign Workers in High-Risk Environments Needs to Be Strengthened, November 18, 2014http://gao.gov/products/GAO-15-102
What GAO Found
Current policies and guidance governing the payment of recruitment fees by foreign workers on certain U.S. government contracts do not provide clear instructions to agencies or contractors regarding the components or amounts of permissible fees related to recruitment. GAO found that some foreign workers—individuals who are not citizens of the United States or the host country—had reported paying for their jobs. Such recruitment fees can lead to various abuses related to trafficking in persons (TIP), such as debt bondage. For example, on the contract employing the largest number of foreign workers in its sample, GAO found that more than 1,900 foreign workers reported paying fees for their jobs, including to recruitment agencies used by a subcontractor. According to the subcontractor, these fees were likely paid to a recruiter who assisted foreign workers with transportation to and housing in Dubai before they were hired to work on the contract in Afghanistan (see figure). Some Department of Defense (DOD) contracting officials GAO interviewed said that such fees may be reasonable. DOD, the Department of State (State), and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) have developed policy and guidance for certain contracts addressing recruitment fees in different ways. However, these agencies do not specify what components or amounts of recruitment fees are considered permissible, limiting the ability of contracting officers and contractors to implement agency policy and guidance.
Sample Recruitment Paths for Foreign Workers on a U.S. Government Contract in Afghanistan
GAO found that agency monitoring, called for by federal acquisition regulations and agency guidance, did not always include processes to specifically monitor contractor efforts to combat TIP. For 7 of the 11 contracts in GAO's sample, DOD and State had specific monitoring processes to combat TIP. On the 4 remaining contracts, agencies did not specifically monitor for TIP, but rather focused on contractor-provided goods and services, such as building construction. In addition, some DOD and State contracting officials said they were unaware of relevant acquisitions policy and guidance for combating TIP and did not clearly understand their monitoring responsibilities. Both DOD and State have developed additional training to help make contracting officials more aware of their monitoring responsibilities to combat TIP. Without specific efforts to monitor for TIP, agencies' ability to implement the zero tolerance policy and detect concerns about TIP is limited.
Why GAO Did This Study
Since the 1990s, there have been allegations of abuse of foreign workers on U.S. government contracts overseas, including allegations of TIP. In 2002, the United States adopted a zero tolerance policy on TIP regarding U.S. government employees and contractors abroad and began requiring the inclusion of this policy in all contracts in 2007. Such policy is important because the government relies on contractors that employ foreign workers in countries where, according to State, they may be vulnerable to abuse.
GAO was mandated to report on the use of foreign workers. This report examines (1) policies and guidance governing the recruitment of foreign workers and the fees these workers may pay to secure work on U.S. government contracts overseas and (2) agencies' monitoring of contractor efforts to combat TIP. GAO reviewed a nongeneralizable sample of 11 contracts awarded by DOD, State, and USAID, composing nearly one-third of all reported foreign workers on contracts awarded by these agencies at the end of fiscal year 2013. GAO interviewed agency officials and contractors about labor practices and oversight activities on these contracts.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that agencies (1) develop a more precise definition of recruitment fees and (2) ensure that contract monitoring specifically includes TIP. DOD concurred with the first recommendation, while State and USAID noted that forthcoming regulations would prohibit all recruitment fees. Agencies concurred with the second recommendation.
For more information, contact Thomas Melito at (202) 512-9601 or melitot@gao.gov.Tue, 18 Nov 2014 12:00:00 -0500Letter ReportAlternatives to Detention: Improved Data Collection and Analyses Needed to Better Assess Program Effectiveness, November 13, 2014http://gao.gov/products/GAO-15-26
What GAO Found
From fiscal year 2011 through fiscal year 2013, the number of aliens who participated in the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement's (ICE) Alternatives to Detention (ATD) program increased from 32,065 to 40,864, in part because of increases in either enrollments or the average length of time aliens spent in one of the program's components. For example, during this time period, the number of aliens enrolled in the Full-service component, which is run by a contractor that maintains in-person contact with the alien and monitors the alien with either Global Positioning System (GPS) equipment or a telephonic reporting system, increased by 60 percent. In addition, the average length of time aliens spent in the Technology-only program component, which offers a lower level of supervision at a lower contract cost than the Full-service program component and involves ICE monitoring of aliens using either telephonic reporting or GPS equipment provided by a contractor, increased by 80 percent—from about 10 months to about 18 months. In 2011, ICE recommended practices in guidance to its Enforcement and Removal Operations (ERO) field offices to better ensure cost-effective implementation of the program. For example, ICE recommended that field officers move aliens who have demonstrated compliance under the Full-service component to the less costly Technology-only component. GAO's work showed differences in ERO field offices' implementation of the guidance. However, ICE headquarters officials said that because of limitations in how they collect and maintain program data, they do not know the extent to which field officers have consistently implemented this guidance. ICE plans to institute new data collection requirements to address these limitations and use these data for a variety of purposes; however, ICE has not considered how to analyze these data to monitor the extent to which ERO field offices are implementing the guidance. Analyzing these data, once collected, could help ICE better monitor the extent to which ERO field offices are implementing the practices in its guidance intended to ensure more cost-effective program operation.
ICE has established ATD program performance measures to, among other things, assess alien compliance with requirements to appear in court and leave the country after receiving a final order of removal, but it has not collected complete data for assessing progress against these measures. Specifically, ICE's ATD contractor collected data for the Full-service component, and from fiscal years 2011 through 2013, these data showed that over 99 percent of aliens with a scheduled court hearing appeared in court as required. However, ICE did not collect similar performance data to report results for aliens enrolled in the Technology-only component—which composed 39 percent of the overall ATD program participants in fiscal year 2013—because when the program was first created, ICE officials stated that they envisioned that most aliens would be in the Full-service component with data tracked by the contractor. ICE plans to expand the contractor's role in data collection but does not plan to require collection of performance data for aliens enrolled in the Technology-only component; rather ICE plans to leave it to the discretion of field officials as to whether to require the contractor to collect these data. Without requirements to collect these data, ICE may not have complete information to fully assess program performance.
Why GAO Did This Study
Aliens awaiting removal proceedings or found to be removable from the United States are detained in ICE custody or released into the community under one or more options, such as release on bond and under supervision of the ATD program. Within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), ICE is responsible for overseeing aliens in detention and those released into the community. In 2004 ICE implemented the ATD program to be a cost-effective alternative to detaining aliens. ICE administers the program with contractor assistance using case management and electronic monitoring to ensure aliens comply with release conditions—including appearing at immigration court hearings and leaving the United States if they receive a final order of removal. The Joint Explanatory Statement to the 2014 Consolidated Appropriations Act mandated that GAO evaluate ICE's implementation of the ATD program.
This report addresses (1) trends in ATD program participation from fiscal years 2011 through 2013 and the extent to which ICE provides oversight to help ensure cost-effective program implementation, and (2) the extent that ICE measured the performance of the ATD program for fiscal years 2011 through 2013. GAO analyzed ICE and ATD program data, reviewed ICE documentation, and interviewed ICE and ATD contractor officials.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that ICE analyze data to monitor ERO field offices' implementation of guidance and require the collection of data on the Technology-only component. DHS concurred with the recommendations.
For more information, contact Rebecca Gambler at (202) 512-8777 or gamblerr@gao.gov.Thu, 13 Nov 2014 12:00:00 -0500Letter ReportCombating Nuclear Smuggling: Risk-Informed Covert Assessments and Oversight of Corrective Actions Could Strengthen Capabilities at the Border, September 22, 2014http://gao.gov/products/GAO-14-826
What GAO Found
The Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) covert operations provide limited assessment of capabilities to detect and interdict the smuggling of nuclear and radiological materials into the United States. DHS's U.S. Customs and Border Protection's (CBP) Operational Field Testing Division (OFTD) conducted 144 covert operations at 86 locations from fiscal years 2006 through 2013, selecting its locations from a total of 655 U.S. air, land, and sea port facilities; checkpoints; and certain international locations. These operations allowed OFTD to assess capabilities for detecting and interdicting—or intercepting—nuclear and radiological materials at locations tested. Results showed differences in the rate of success for interdicting smuggled nuclear and radiological materials across facility types. CBP had a $1 million budget for covert operations of various activities—including nuclear and radiological testing—covering fiscal years 2009 through 2013, and DHS policy requires that components with limited resources make risk-informed decisions. However, CBP testing does not inform capabilities across all border locations, and CBP has not conducted a risk assessment that could inform and prioritize the locations, materials, and technologies to be tested through covert operations. Given limited resources, assessing risk to prioritize the most dangerous materials, most vulnerable locations, and most critical equipment for testing through covert operations, DHS could better inform its decisions on how to expend its limited resources effectively, consistent with the department's risk management policies.
OFTD has not issued reports annually as planned on covert operation results and recommendations, limiting CBP oversight for improving capabilities to detect and interdict smuggling at the border. OFTD has issued three reports on the results of its covert operations at U.S. ports of entry since 2007. However, OFTD officials stated that because of resource constraints, reports have not been timely and do not include the results of covert tests conducted at checkpoints. Furthermore, OFTD tracks the status of corrective actions taken to address recommendations in these reports; however, CBP does not track corrective actions identified from their individual covert operations that were not included in these reports. Establishing appropriate time frames for reporting of covert operations results and addressing barriers to meeting these time frames would help enhance CBP's accountability for its covert testing operations. Further, developing a mechanism to track whether ports of entry and checkpoints have implemented corrective actions could help inform management decision making on the need for further investments in equipment or personnel training to protect U.S. borders.
Why GAO Did This Study
Preventing terrorists from smuggling nuclear or radiological materials into the United States is a top national priority. To address this threat, DHS has deployed radiation detection equipment and trained staff to use it. CBP conducts covert operations to test capabilities for detecting and interdicting nuclear and radiological materials at air, land, and sea ports of entry into the United States as well as checkpoints. GAO was asked to review CBP's covert testing operations. This report assesses the extent to which (1) CBP covert operations assess capabilities at air, land, and sea ports and checkpoints to detect and interdict nuclear and radiological material smuggled across the border and (2) CBP reports its covert operations results and provides oversight to ensure that corrective actions are implemented. GAO analyzed documents, such as test summaries, directives, and planning and guidance papers and interviewed DHS, CBP, and Domestic Nuclear Detection Office officials. This is a public version of a sensitive report that GAO issued in July 2014. Information that DHS deemed sensitive has been redacted.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that DHS inform priorities for covert operations by using an assessment of risk, determining time frames for reporting results, addressing barriers for meeting time frames, and developing a mechanism to track corrective actions. DHS concurred with GAO's recommendations.
For more information, contact David C .Maurer at (202) 512-9627 or maurerd@gao.gov; or David C. Trimble at (202) 512-3841 or trimbled@gao.gov.Tue, 14 Oct 2014 13:00:00 -0400Letter ReportImmigration Detention: Additional Actions Needed to Strengthen Management and Oversight of Facility Costs and Standards, October 10, 2014http://gao.gov/products/GAO-15-153
What GAO Found
Within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) uses two different methods to collect and assess data on detention costs; however, these methods do not provide ICE with complete data for managing detention costs across facilities and facility types. One method uses the agency's financial management system to estimate total detention costs per detainee per day for the purposes of developing ICE's annual detention budget request. However, ICE identified errors in the entry of data into this system and limitations in the system make it difficult for ICE to accurately record expenditures for individual facilities. ICE's other method involves the manual tracking of monthly costs by individual facilities for the purposes of reviewing data on individual facility costs. However, this method does not include data on all costs for individual facilities, such as for medical care and transportation, and such costs are not standardized within or across facility types. Thus, ICE does not have complete data for tracking and managing detention costs across facilities and facility types. ICE has taken some steps to strengthen its financial management system, such as implementing manual work-arounds to, among other things, better link financial transactions to individual facilities. However, ICE has not assessed the extent to which these manual work-arounds position ICE to better track and manage costs across facilities or facility types and the extent to which additional controls are needed to address limitations in its methods for collecting and assessing detention costs, in accordance with federal internal control standards. Conducting these assessments could better position ICE to have more reliable data for tracking and managing costs across facility types.
GAO's analysis of ICE facility data showed that ICE primarily used three sets of detention standards, with the most recent and rigorous standards applied to 25 facilities housing about 54 percent of ICE's average daily population (ADP) as of January 2014. ICE plans to expand the use of these standards to 61 facilities housing 89 percent of total ADP by the end of fiscal year 2014; however, transition to these standards has been delayed by cost issues and contract negotiations and ICE does not have documentation for reasons why some facilities cannot be transitioned to the most recent standards in accordance with internal control standards. Documenting such reasons could provide an institutional record and help increase transparency and accountability in ICE's management of detention facilities.
GAO's analysis of ICE facility oversight programs showed that ICE applied more oversight mechanisms at facilities housing the majority of the ADP in fiscal year 2013. For example, 94 percent of detainees were housed in facilities that received an annual inspection. GAO's analysis of ICE's inspection reports showed that inspection results differed for 29 of 35 facilities inspected by both ICE's Enforcement and Removal Operations (ERO) and Office of Detention Oversight (ODO) in fiscal year 2013. ICE officials stated that ODO and ERO have not discussed differences in inspection results and whether oversight mechanisms are functioning as intended. Assessing the reasons why inspection results differ, in accordance with internal control standards, could help ICE better ensure that inspection mechanisms are working as intended.
Why GAO Did This Study
DHS has reported that the number of noncitizens in immigration detention has increased from about 230,000 in fiscal year 2005 to about 440,600 in fiscal year 2013. ICE applies various sets of detention standards—such as medical services—at over 250 facilities owned by ICE or private contractors, or owned by or contracted to state and local governments. GAO was asked to examine differences in cost, standards, and oversight across types of facilities.
This report addresses the extent to which (1) ICE has processes to track costs, (2) standards vary across facility types and the reasons for any differences, and (3) oversight and the results of that oversight vary across facility types. GAO reviewed ICE data and information on costs, detention population, standards, and oversight for 166 facilities that held detainees for 72 hours or more, from fiscal years 2011 through 2013, reviewed facility contracts, and interviewed federal contractors and DHS and ICE officials.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends, among other things, that ICE assess the extent to which it has appropriate controls for tracking facility costs, document reasons why facilities cannot be transitioned to the most recent standards, and review reasons for differences in inspection results. DHS concurred with all recommendations but one to document reasons why facilities cannot be transitioned to the most recent standards because, among other reasons, DHS believes it already has sufficient documentation. As discussed in this report, GAO continues to believe in the need for such documentation.
For more information, contact Rebecca Gambler at (202) 512-8777 or gamblerr@gao.gov.Fri, 10 Oct 2014 13:00:00 -0400Letter ReportMedicaid: Information on Inmate Eligibility and Federal Costs for Allowable Services, September 05, 2014http://gao.gov/products/GAO-14-752R
What GAO Found
In 2013, the Medicaid program financed health care services for more than 72 million individuals, and an additional 7 million beneficiaries are expected to enroll in 2014 as a result of states choosing to expand Medicaid eligibility as allowed under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA). Most of these newly eligible individuals will be low-income adults, a population that may include individuals who are inmates in state prisons and local jails. In the 27 states that opted to expand Medicaid eligibility as allowed under PPACA, the majority of inmates are likely to have incomes that would qualify them for Medicaid—a circumstance that did not generally exist before 2014, since Medicaid eligibility for adults has generally been limited to certain categories of low-income individuals, such as pregnant women and individuals who are aged or disabled. For example,
officials from New York and Colorado—two states that expanded Medicaid—estimated that 80 percent and 90 percent of state prison inmates, respectively, were likely eligible for Medicaid; an
officials in North Carolina, a state that did not expand Medicaid, estimated that 2 percent of inmates are likely eligible at any given time.
Although the expansion allowed under PPACA will result in increased eligibility among inmates, federal law prohibits states from obtaining federal Medicaid matching funds for health care services provided to inmates—except when inmates are patients in medical institutions, such as hospitals.&nbsp;Further, the proportion of inmates with inpatient stays that qualify for federal Medicaid funds is likely small.&nbsp;For example,
inmates who were eligible for Medicaid and received allowable inpatient services ranged from 1.0 percent to 2.3 percent in 2013 in four of six states GAO contacted that could provide data on allowable services; and
data from California and Washington indicated that—even with increases in eligibility—the percentage of inmates with allowable services may remain relatively small, less than 5 percent.
The federal matching funds obtained for allowable services provided to prison inmates were small relative to total federal Medicaid spending for inpatient services. For example, four states reported obtaining federal funds ranging from $1.3 million to $38.5 million in 2013. These funds accounted for 0.1 percent to 1.0 percent of the federal funds these states obtained for inpatient services for all beneficiaries. As of July 2014, two states were implementing efforts, such as hiring and training staff to assist with inmate enrollment in Medicaid, that could increase the amount of federal funds obtained; and the four other selected states had taken similar steps, generally prior to 2014.
The Department of Health and Human Services reviewed a draft of this report and provided technical comments, which GAO incorporated as appropriate.
Why GAO Did This Study
PPACA gives states the option to expand Medicaid eligibility to individuals with incomes up to 133 percent of the federal poverty level beginning in 2014. Most of those newly eligible will be low-income adults, a population that includes inmates. While some inmates have historically been eligible for Medicaid, the number has likely increased in the states that opted to expand Medicaid as allowed under PPACA. Federal law prohibits states from obtaining federal Medicaid matching funds for inmate health care with the exception of when inmates are patients in qualifying medical institutions--such as hospitals--for at least 24 hours. The intent of the federal prohibition is to ensure that federal Medicaid funds are not used to finance care that is the responsibility of state and local authorities.
GAO was asked to examine information on enrollment and federal Medicaid costs for inmates. This study provides information on the proportion of inmates eligible for Medicaid and state efforts to enroll inmates in Medicaid and obtain federal matching funds for allowable services. GAO collected information from six states--California, Colorado, New York, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, and Washington--that were geographically diverse and included states that expanded Medicaid as allowed under PPACA and states that did not. For these six states, GAO collected and analyzed estimates of the proportion of inmates eligible for Medicaid in 2014 and data for 2013 on inmates with inpatient stays and federal matching funds obtained by the state for allowable services. GAO also interviewed Medicaid and corrections officials from the selected states.
For more information, contact Carolyn L. Yocom at&nbsp;(202) 512-7114 or yocomc@gao.gov.Mon, 06 Oct 2014 13:00:00 -0400CorrespondenceUnmanned Aerial Systems: Department of Homeland Security's Review of U.S. Customs and Border Protection's Use and Compliance with Privacy and Civil Liberty Laws and Standards, September 30, 2014http://gao.gov/products/GAO-14-849R
What GAO Found
In its review of the U.S. Customs and Border Protection’s (CBP) unmanned aerial systems (UAS) program, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) reported that CBP has an oversight framework and procedures for its UAS program that help ensure its compliance with privacy and civil liberty laws and standards. DHS’s review contains information on CBP procedures on collecting, retaining, storing, and disseminating images from UAS, among others, to help ensure compliance with privacy and civil liberty laws and standards. DHS’s review did not address the extent to which CBP had institutionalized these procedures in written policies. However, GAO found that CBP has taken steps to document these procedures and has issued or plans to issue policies to institutionalize the procedures that help protect privacy and civil liberties.
DHS’s review found that CBP’s use of UAS is not limited to border and coastal areas of the United States. According to DHS’s review, the location of UAS operations is limited by Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) requirements and CBP’s policies and procedures. DHS’s review did not address the extent to which CBP’s UAS operations are in border and coastal areas of the United States. GAO analysis of CBP UAS flight hour data found that over 80 percent of UAS flight hours were associated with border and coastal areas of the United States. &nbsp;
Why GAO Did This Study
House Committee Report 113-91 accompanying the Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2014 mandated GAO to review DHS’s Privacy Office (Privacy Office) and Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties (CRCL) joint review (DHS’s review) of CBP’s unmanned aerial systems program. House Committee Report 113-91 accompanying the fiscal year 2014 DHS Appropriations Act also mandated CRCL and the Privacy Office to conduct a review of CBP’s efforts to ensure that CBP’s UAS use (1) complies with existing law and applicable privacy and civil liberty standards and (2) is limited to operation along the border and coastal areas. CRCL and the Privacy Office completed their review and provided it to GAO on June 12, 2014.
This report examines the extent to which DHS’s review of CBP’s UAS addressed CBP efforts to (1) ensure compliance with existing privacy and civil liberty laws and standards and (2) ensure its UAS usage is limited to border and coastal areas of the United States.
GAO analyzed DHS’s review, CBP policies, and UAS flight data from fiscal year 2011 through April 2014, covering the time period when all UAS centers became operational.&nbsp;
What GAO Recommends
GAO makes no recommendations in this report.
For more information, contact Rebecca Gambler at (202) 512-8777 or GamblerR@gao.gov.
&nbsp;Tue, 30 Sep 2014 13:00:00 -0400CorrespondenceBureau of Prisons: Information on Efforts and Potential Options to Save Costs, September 30, 2014http://gao.gov/products/GAO-14-821
What GAO Found
Correctional services—which includes salaries and benefits for correctional officers—is the Department of Justice's (DOJ) Bureau of Prisons' (BOP) largest operational cost, and BOP has undertaken a number of initiatives to reduce costs. Specifically, on the basis of GAO's analysis of BOP's fiscal year 2013 obligations of approximately $6.6 billion, BOP obligated the largest share—about $3.9 billion, or 59 percent—for personnel compensation and benefits. Further, BOP has undertaken a number of initiatives, such as renegotiated contracts, to achieve cost savings of about $61 million over the last 3 years.
BOP has designed internal processes to identify opportunities for additional cost efficiencies, but could improve the monitoring of corrective actions to achieve them. For example, BOP focuses on cost efficiency and innovation in its strategic plan and has developed mechanisms for staff to share information on best practices and cost savings efforts. BOP also employs an internal control system with processes, such as program reviews, that allows it to identify opportunities for cost efficiencies. However, when program reviews repeatedly cited frequent deficiencies or significant findings that could increase costs—such as insufficient contract monitoring—responsible BOP Central Office divisions did not provide specifics or documentation for how they always monitor the effectiveness of corrective actions to prevent the same deficiency or issue from reoccurring. Establishing a mechanism for relevant Central Office divisions to consistently monitor the progress of bureau-wide corrective actions in the presence of repeated frequent deficiencies or significant findings could help BOP better ensure that it is resolving such deficiencies or issues promptly and, ultimately, operating more efficiently.
BOP's current authorities to reduce inmate sentence length result in limited cost savings, but potential actions outside of its authority could have a greater impact on costs. GAO has reported previously on BOP authorities to reduce inmate sentences, and thus its costs, in detail, and found that inmate eligibility for certain programs and lack of capacity affect BOP's use of them. For example, greater use of programs such as Compassionate Release for terminally ill inmates could reduce sentences, but cost savings relative to BOP's budget would be small—about $651,000 in 2013. Additional opportunities outside of BOP's authority, including those requiring legislative or executive action, such as options to reduce sentence length, could reduce BOP's population, and thus potentially significantly reduce its costs. For example, an option to reduce sentences of incarcerated drug offenders by an average of 44 percent could save about $4.1 billion. Potential savings could be even higher if the changes sufficiently reduced the inmate population to allow BOP to reduce its staff or close facilities. Expert entities GAO consulted reported that all of the options GAO reviewed also have advantages and disadvantages unrelated to costs that should be taken into consideration, such as potential effects on public safety if released inmates reoffend. GAO is not taking a position on any of these options, but presents information on estimated cost savings and experts' views of advantages and disadvantages for such options to inform policymakers as they weigh whether and how to address rising costs at BOP.
Why GAO Did This Study
BOP is responsible for the custody and care of 216,000 federal inmates—an almost 9-fold increase since 1980. At the same time, BOP appropriations increased more than 20-fold. DOJ states that the costs of the growing population are BOP's greatest challenge. BOP's population size is driven by several factors, such as law enforcement policies and sentencing laws.
GAO was asked to review BOP's opportunities to save costs. This report (1) describes BOP's major costs and actions to achieve savings, (2) assesses the extent to which BOP has mechanisms to identify additional efficiencies, and (3) describes potential changes within and outside of BOP's authority that might reduce costs.
GAO analyzed BOP financial data for fiscal years 2009 through 2013, reviewed but did not test its internal control system and processes for achieving efficiencies, and interviewed BOP officials. On the basis of sentencing reform options identified by experts and actions by the Attorney General, GAO developed a list of policy options that could reduce BOP's population. GAO gathered views on their potential effects from entities and 4 states selected for their criminal justice expertise. The views are not generalizable, but provide insights.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that BOP establish a mechanism to consistently monitor if bureau-wide corrective actions address repeated deficiencies and findings. DOJ concurred.
For more information, contact David C. Maurer at (202) 512-9627 or maurerd@gao.gov.
.Tue, 30 Sep 2014 13:00:00 -0400Letter ReportIdentity Theft: Additional Actions Could Help IRS Combat the Large, Evolving Threat of Refund Fraud, August 20, 2014http://gao.gov/products/GAO-14-633
What GAO Found
Based on preliminary analysis, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) estimates it paid $5.2 billion in fraudulent identity theft (IDT) refunds in filing season 2013, while preventing $24.2 billion (based on what it could detect). The full extent is unknown because of the challenges inherent in detecting IDT refund fraud.
IDT refund fraud takes advantage of IRS's “look-back” compliance model. Under this model, rather than holding refunds until completing all compliance checks, IRS issues refunds after conducting selected reviews. While there are no simple solutions, one option is earlier matching of employer-reported wage information to taxpayers' returns before issuing refunds. IRS currently cannot do such matching because employers' wage data (from Form W-2s) are not available until months after IRS issues most refunds. Consequently, IRS begins matching employer-reported W-2 data to tax returns in July, following the tax season. If IRS had access to W-2 data earlier—through accelerated W-2 deadlines and increased electronic filing of W-2s—it could conduct pre-refund matching and identify discrepancies to prevent the issuance of billions in fraudulent refunds.
Time Delay Between Refund Issuance and IRS W-2 Posting Date, Filing Season 2012
Accelerated W-2 deadlines. In 2014, the Department of the Treasury (Treasury) proposed that Congress accelerate W-2 deadlines to January 31. However, IRS has not fully assessed the impacts of this proposal. Without this assessment, Congress does not have the information needed to deliberate the merits of such a significant change to W-2 deadlines or the use of pre-refund W-2 matching. Such an assessment is consistent with IRS's strategic plan that calls for analytics-based decisions, and would help IRS ensure effective use of resources.
Increased e-filing of W-2s. Treasury has requested authority to reduce the 250-return threshold for electronically filing (e-filing) information returns. The Social Security Administration (SSA) estimated that to meaningfully increase W-2 e-filing, the threshold would have to be lowered to include those filing 5 to 10 W-2s. In addition, SSA estimated an administrative cost savings of about $0.50 per e-filed W-2. Based on these cost savings and the ancillary benefits they provide in supporting IRS's efforts to conduct more pre-refund matching, a change in the e-filing threshold is warranted. Without this change, some employers' paper W-2s could not be available for IRS matching until much later in the year, due to the additional time needed to process paper forms.
Why GAO Did This Study
Identity theft tax refund fraud is a persistent, evolving threat to honest taxpayers and tax administration. It occurs when an identity thief files a fraudulent tax return using a legitimate taxpayer's identifying information and claims a refund.
GAO was asked to review IRS's efforts to combat IDT refund fraud. This report, the first of a series, examines (1) what IRS knows about the extent of IDT refund fraud and (2) additional actions IRS can take to combat IDT refund fraud using third-party information from, for example, employers and financial institutions.
To understand what is known about the extent of IDT refund fraud, GAO reviewed IRS documentation, including the Identity Theft Taxonomy . To identify additional actions IRS can take, GAO assessed IRS and SSA data on the timing of W-2s; and interviewed SSA officials and selected associations representing software companies, return preparers, payroll companies, and others.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that Congress should consider providing Treasury with authority to lower the annual threshold for e-filing W-2s. In addition, IRS should fully assess the costs and benefits of shifting W-2 deadlines, and provide this information to Congress. IRS neither agreed nor disagreed with GAO's recommendations, and it stated it is determining how these potential corrective actions align with available resources and IRS priorities.
For more information, contact James R. White at (202) 512-9110 or whitej@gao.gov.Mon, 22 Sep 2014 13:00:00 -0400Letter ReportBureau of Prisons: Management of New Prison Activations Can Be Improved, August 22, 2014http://gao.gov/products/GAO-14-709
What GAO Found
The Department of Justice's (DOJ) Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) is behind schedule activating all six new institutions—the process by which it prepares them for inmates—and does not have a policy to guide activation or an activation schedule that reflects best practices. BOP is behind schedule, in part, because of challenges, such as staffing, posed by the locations of the activating institutions. According to BOP officials, delays in receiving congressionally directed activation funding can exacerbate these challenges (see fig.). None of the six institutions is fully activated, or at rated capacity, as they do not house the number of inmates they are designed to safely and securely house.
Schedule Slippages for Institutions in the Activation Process
BOP does not effectively communicate to Congress how the locations of new institutions may affect activation schedules. BOP officials said that when directed by Congress to investigate a location, they consider this as direction to focus on construction at that site. DOJ and BOP could more effectively manage activation timelines and costs by using the BOP annual budget justification to communicate to Congress the factors associated with certain locations that can delay activations, such as challenges hiring staff and placing inmates in institutions. Also, BOP officials said they review staffing data system-wide, but they have not prioritized an analysis of such data at the institution level. Analyzing staffing data on institutions in the activation process could help BOP assess its progress in staffing and tailoring effective mitigating strategies. Finally, BOP lacks a comprehensive activation policy to guide activations, as well as an activation schedule that reflects best practices, and it has largely relied on staff's past experience to complete ongoing activations. Developing and implementing a comprehensive policy and a schedule that reflects best practices, could better position BOP to meet its estimated timeframes and activation costs.
DOJ purchased Thomson to help reduce crowding among inmates requiring high levels of security. Once it is fully populated, it will reduce BOP-wide crowding by 16 percent at the high-security level. Thomson will cost about $160 million annually to operate once fully activated, adding to BOP's system-wide costs. BOP officials said Thomson will provide benefits, such as high-security bed space, which outweigh the costs associated with the institution.
Why GAO Did This Study
The federal inmate population has increased over the last two decades, and as of July 2014, BOP was responsible for the custody and care of more than 216,000 inmates. To handle the projected growth of between 2,500 and 3,000 or more inmates per year from 2015 through 2020, BOP has spent about $1.3 billion constructing five new institutions and acquiring one in Thomson, Illinois. BOP is activating these institutions by staffing and equipping them and populating them with inmates.
GAO was requested to review BOP's activation process of newly constructed and acquired institutions. GAO reviewed, among other things, (1) the extent to which BOP is activating institutions within estimated timeframes and has an activation policy or schedules that meet best practices, and (2) why DOJ purchased Thomson and how the purchase affected system wide costs. GAO reviewed BOP budget documents from fiscal years 2008 to 2015 and assessed schedules against GAO's Schedule Assessment Guide. GAO conducted site visits to the six institutions, interviewed BOP officials, and reviewed staffing data from fiscal years 2010 through 2013.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that DOJ use its annual budget justification to communicate to Congress factors that might delay prison activation, and that BOP analyze institution-level staffing data and develop and implement a comprehensive activation policy and a schedule that reflects best practices. DOJ concurred with all of GAO's recommendations.
For more information, contact Dave Maurer at (202) 512-9627 or maurerd@gao.gov.Mon, 22 Sep 2014 13:00:00 -0400Letter ReportMilitary Personnel: DOD Needs to Take Further Actions to Prevent Sexual Assault during Initial Military Training, September 09, 2014http://gao.gov/products/GAO-14-806
What GAO Found
The Air Force implemented most recommendations from the 2012 Commander's report intended to better prevent, investigate, and respond to sexual assaults and related misconduct during the Air Force's basic training for new enlisted personnel, but it has not evaluated the effectiveness of its actions. GAO found that as of July 2014, of the 46 recommendations, the Air Force implemented 39, partially implemented 6, and did not implement 1. The Air Force established a council to provide senior leadership and oversight of actions taken in response to those recommendations. However, the Air Force has not fully established an oversight framework to evaluate the effectiveness of actions taken in response to the recommendations. Key practices for organizational change call for using a results-oriented framework to enable program oversight and for the framework to include performance goals. Without fully establishing an oversight framework for evaluating the effectiveness of its actions to prevent sexual assault during basic training, the Air Force will not know whether to sustain the efforts it has implemented or undertake different actions.
Most military services share lessons learned through the Council on Recruit Basic Training (CORBT) and collect selected information to oversee their efforts, but do not have comprehensive, detailed data about sexual assault and related misconduct during initial military training, which includes basic and subsequent career training. CORBT was established in 2013 to address a variety of topics to improve basic training. Key practices for interagency collaboration include clearly defining roles and responsibilities of stakeholders in formalized guidance. However, the draft charter for CORBT does not identify the council's role as the forum for discussing sexual assault prevention for the entire range of initial military training. Further, it does not include key stakeholders who are critical to the success of sharing lessons learned on prevention of sexual assault and misconduct, such as the Marine Corps and service representatives responsible for sexual harassment. Without formalizing this role and involving key stakeholders, the Department of Defense (DOD) cannot ensure that the council is the most effective mechanism for sharing lessons learned for better prevention and response to sexual assault during initial military training. Also, three services have taken steps to obtain more comprehensive and detailed data that are specific to initial military training and provide better information about unreported misconduct for oversight, but these efforts vary by service. Further, none of the services have detailed data for both their basic and subsequent training environments. For example, the Air Force has a survey administered during basic training and the Navy has a survey given during subsequent career training. The Army has an annual survey but plans to develop a more comprehensive survey for basic training. The Marine Corps obtains information through leadership meetings with groups of recruits but does not have a formalized survey. Without developing or leveraging existing surveys about sexual assault and misconduct that can occur during initial military training, service officials may not have the comprehensive and detailed data needed to improve their sexual assault and sexual misconduct prevention programs. Further, military training leadership may have difficulty in determining the corrective actions that could best address remaining challenges in preventing sexual assault within initial military training.
Why GAO Did This Study
In September 2012, following investigations for alleged sexual assaults during basic training, an Air Force Commander-directed report made 46 recommendations intended to better prevent sexual assaults during basic training. Congress mandated that GAO review the Air Force's efforts to implement the recommendations and lessons learned to better prevent and respond to sexual assault incidents among the services.
This report examines the extent to which (1) the Air Force implemented the recommendations to better prevent, investigate, and respond to sexual assault during basic training and evaluated the effectiveness of actions taken and (2) the military services have a process to share lessons learned and have data to oversee their efforts to prevent sexual assault and related misconduct during initial military training. GAO analyzed the Commander's report, DOD policies, annual reports on efforts to improve the Air Force's program, and surveys, and met with officials.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends, among other things, that the Air Force establish an oversight framework to evaluate the effectiveness of its actions, the military services formalize CORBT's role and include key stakeholders, and the services develop or leverage existing military training surveys to provide more comprehensive and detailed data. DOD concurred with the first three recommendations but partially concurred with the last, citing a need for more analysis. GAO continues to believe the recommendation is valid as discussed in this report.
For more information, contact Brenda S. Farrell at (202) 512-3604 or farrellb@gao.gov.Tue, 09 Sep 2014 13:00:00 -0400Letter ReportFair Labor Standards Act: Department of Labor Needs a More Systematic Approach to Developing Its Guidance, July 23, 2014http://gao.gov/products/GAO-14-629T
What GAO Found
Substantial increases occurred over the last decade in the number of civil lawsuits filed in federal district court alleging violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, as amended (FLSA). Federal courts in most states experienced increases in the number of FLSA lawsuits filed, but large increases were concentrated in a few states, including Florida and New York. Many factors may contribute to this general trend; however, the factor cited most often by stakeholders GAO interviewed—including attorneys and judges—was attorneys' increased willingness to take on such cases. In fiscal year 2012, an estimated 97 percent of FLSA lawsuits were filed against private sector employers, often from the accommodations and food services industry, and 95 percent of the lawsuits filed included allegations of overtime violations.
FLSA Lawsuits Filed in Federal District Court in Florida, New York, and Other States, Fiscal Years 1991-2012
The Department of Labor's Wage and Hour Division (WHD) has an annual process for planning how it will target its enforcement and compliance assistance resources to help prevent and identify potential FLSA violations. In planning its enforcement efforts, WHD targets industries that, according to its recent enforcement data, have a higher likelihood of FLSA violations. WHD, however, does not have a systematic approach that includes analyzing relevant data, such as the number of requests for assistance it receives from employers and workers, to develop its guidance, as recommended by best practices previously identified by GAO. In addition, WHD does not have a routine, data-based process for assessing the adequacy of its guidance. For example, WHD does not analyze trends in the types of FLSA-related questions it receives from employers or workers. According to plaintiff and defense attorneys GAO interviewed, more FLSA guidance from WHD would be helpful, such as guidance on how to determine whether certain types of workers are exempt from the overtime pay and other requirements of the FLSA.
Why GAO Did This Study
The FLSA sets federal minimum wage and overtime pay requirements applicable to millions of U.S. workers and allows workers to sue employers for violating these requirements. Questions have been raised about the effect of FLSA lawsuits on employers and workers and about WHD's enforcement and compliance assistance efforts as the number of lawsuits has increased.
This statement examines what is known about the number of FLSA lawsuits filed and how WHD plans its FLSA enforcement and compliance assistance efforts. It is based on the results of a previous GAO report issued in December 2013. In conducting the earlier work, GAO analyzed federal district court data from fiscal years 1991 to 2012 and reviewed selected documents from a representative sample of lawsuits filed in federal district court in fiscal year 2012. GAO also reviewed DOL's planning and performance documents, interviewed DOL officials, as well as stakeholders, including federal judges, plaintiff and defense attorneys who specialize in FLSA cases, officials from organizations representing workers and employers, and academics.
What GAO Recommends
In its December 2013 report, GAO recommended that the Secretary of Labor direct the WHD Administrator to develop a systematic approach for identifying and considering areas of confusion that contribute to possible FLSA violations to help inform the development and assessment of its guidance. WHD agreed with the recommendation and described its plans to address it.
For more information, contact Andrew Sherrill at (202) 512-7215 or sherrilla@gao.gov.Wed, 23 Jul 2014 13:00:00 -0400TestimonyBureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives: Enhancing Data Collection Could Improve Management of Investigations, June 30, 2014http://gao.gov/products/GAO-14-553
What GAO Found
Since fiscal year 2003, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF), within the Department of Justice, has been focusing more on decreasing violent crime. Beginning in 2010, ATF made criminal organization investigations one of its highest priorities, similar to firearms investigations, and deemphasized alcohol and tobacco investigations that do not involve violent crime. ATF data show that alcohol and tobacco investigations decreased by 85 percent (from 168 to 25 investigations opened) from fiscal years 2003 through 2013. In 2012, to more effectively identify and address the most violent criminal threats, ATF established the Frontline initiative to, among other things, prioritize investigations and evaluate ATF's efforts in reducing violent crime. ATF began evaluating its efforts in March 2014, and does not yet have a time frame for completing the evaluations. As such, it is too early to tell how well Frontline helps ATF to assess how effective its investigations are in addressing violent crime.
ATF reported facing funding and hiring challenges. ATF's number of special agents generally increased from fiscal years 2004 through 2010, but decreased by about 6 percent (from 2,562 to 2,399) through fiscal year 2013, which represents the lowest number of special agents in 8 years. According to ATF management officials, ATF was unable to hire agents because its funding did not keep pace with the cost of employee salaries and benefits. According to ATF data, the average salary and benefits costs for ATF employees increased by 55 percent from $100,000 in fiscal year 2003 to $155,000 in fiscal year 2013. Further, about a quarter of ATF's on-board special agents were eligible to retire as of the end of fiscal year 2013, with an additional 20 percent becoming eligible to retire through fiscal year 2018. As of April 2014, ATF was hiring human resources personnel to assess how to better address staffing challenges, but it is too soon to tell the extent to which these efforts will address such challenges.
ATF does not have readily available data to track and monitor the timeliness and outcomes of delayed denial investigations. Delayed denial investigations are investigations of individuals who improperly purchased firearms when background checks did not initially determine that the individuals were ineligible to purchase a firearm. N-Force, ATF's investigations database, does not have information readily available to systematically track the timeliness and outcomes—such as if a firearm is retrieved—of delayed denial investigations. ATF considers these investigations a top priority and is committed to responding to them quickly to protect public safety and prevent violent crime. A mechanism to (1) readily obtain data on the timeliness of such investigations and (2) allow managers to easily query and analyze trends on the outcomes of such investigations could help ensure that ATF is retrieving firearms from prohibited persons to maximize public safety.
Why GAO Did This Study
ATF, which was transferred from the Department of the Treasury to DOJ in 2003, is responsible for investigating federal laws related to firearms, explosives, arson, alcohol, and tobacco. In 2012, there were almost 9,000 reported murders involving firearms. ATF oversight was a DOJ's 2013 top management challenge for ensuring effective and efficient law enforcement. Congress continues to raise questions about ATF's criminal law enforcement activities and operations. GAO was asked to review ATF's activities.
This report addresses (1) how ATF's priorities for its criminal law enforcement investigations have changed since fiscal year 2003, (2) ATF's staffing challenges, and (3) the extent to which ATF has data to monitor the timeliness and outcomes of delayed denial investigations. GAO reviewed ATF policies, analyzed investigative data from fiscal years 2003 through 2013, and interviewed ATF officials.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that ATF establish a mechanism to provide headquarters managers readily available data to better monitor the timeliness and outcomes of delayed denial investigations. ATF concurred with the recommendation and ATF officials outlined steps they plan to take to address it.
For more information, contact Eileen R. Larence at (202) 512-8777 or larencee@gao.gov.Wed, 09 Jul 2014 13:00:00 -0400Letter ReportBorder Security: Opportunities Exist to Strengthen Collaborative Mechanisms along the Southwest Border, June 27, 2014http://gao.gov/products/GAO-14-494
What GAO Found
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has coordinated border security efforts using collaborative mechanisms in Arizona and South Texas, specifically (1) the Joint Field Command (JFC), which has operational control over all U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) resources in Arizona; (2) the Alliance to Combat Transnational Threats (ACTT), which is a multiagency law enforcement partnership in Arizona; and (3) the South Texas Campaign (STC), which integrates CBP resources and facilitates coordination with other homeland security partner agencies. Through these collaborative mechanisms, DHS and CBP have coordinated border security efforts in (1) information sharing, (2) resource targeting and prioritization, and (3) leveraging of assets. For example, to coordinate information sharing, the JFC maintains an operations coordination center and clearinghouse for intelligence information. Through the ACTT, interagency partners work jointly to target individuals and criminal organizations involved in illegal cross-border activity. The STC leverages assets of CBP components and interagency partners by shifting resources to high-threat regions and conducting joint operations.
DHS and CBP have established performance measures and reporting processes for the JFC and ACTT in Arizona and the STC in South Texas; however, opportunities exist to strengthen these collaborative mechanisms by assessing results across the efforts and establishing written agreements. Each collaborative mechanism reports on its results to DHS or CBP leadership through a variety of means, such as accomplishment reports and after-action reports. However, CBP has not assessed the JFC and STC mechanisms to evaluate results across the mechanisms. JFC and STC components GAO interviewed identified challenges with managing resources and sharing best practices across the mechanisms. For example, officials from all five JFC components GAO interviewed highlighted resource management challenges, such as inefficiencies in staff conducting dual reporting on operations to CBP leadership. Best practices for interagency collaboration call for federal agencies engaged in collaborative efforts to create the means to monitor and evaluate their efforts to enable them to identify areas for improvement. An assessment of the JFC and STC could provide CBP with information to better address challenges the mechanisms have faced. In addition, DHS has not established written agreements with partners in the ACTT and STC Unified Command—the entity within STC used for coordinating activities among federal and state agencies—consistent with best practices for sustaining effective collaboration. Officials from 11 of 12 partner agencies GAO interviewed reported coordination challenges related to the ACTT and STC Unified Command, such as limited resource commitments by participating agencies and lack of common objectives. For example, a partner with the ACTT noted that that there have been operations in which partners did not follow through with the resources they had committed during the planning stages. Establishing written agreements could help DHS address coordination challenges, such as limited resource commitments and lack of common objectives.
Why GAO Did This Study
According to DHS's CBP, Arizona and South Texas represent some of the highest-threat areas along the southwest border for illegal entrants and smuggling. DHS and CBP coordinate border security with interagency partners, including other federal, state, local, and tribal entities. DHS established collaborative mechanisms in Arizona and South Texas to integrate CBP operations and improve interagency coordination.
GAO was asked to review DHS efforts to coordinate resources along the southwest border. This report (1) describes how DHS uses collaborative mechanisms in Arizona and South Texas to coordinate border security efforts, and (2) examines the extent to which DHS has established performance measures and reporting processes and how, if at all, DHS has assessed and monitored the effectiveness of the collaborative mechanisms in Arizona and South Texas. GAO analyzed documentation, such as campaign plans for the mechanisms; conducted visits to Arizona and South Texas; and interviewed CBP components and interagency partners selected on the basis of agency type and level of participation in the mechanism. Information from these interviews cannot be generalized to all components and partners, but provided insights into the mechanisms.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that CBP assess the JFC and STC, and that DHS, among other things, establish written agreements with ACTT and the STC Unified Command partners. DHS concurred with the recommendations.
For more information, contact Rebecca Gambler at (202) 512-8777 or gamblerr@gao.gov.Fri, 27 Jun 2014 13:00:00 -0400Letter ReportVirtual Currencies: Emerging Regulatory, Law Enforcement, and Consumer Protection Challenges, May 29, 2014http://gao.gov/products/GAO-14-496
What GAO Found
Virtual currencies are financial innovations that pose emerging challenges to federal financial regulatory and law enforcement agencies in carrying out their responsibilities, as the following examples illustrate:
Virtual currency systems may provide greater anonymity than traditional payment systems and sometimes lack a central intermediary to maintain transaction information. As a result, financial regulators and law enforcement agencies may find it difficult to detect money laundering and other crimes involving virtual currencies.
Many virtual currency systems can be accessed globally to make payments and transfer funds across borders. Consequently, law enforcement agencies investigating and prosecuting crimes that involve virtual currencies may have to rely upon cooperation from international partners who may operate under different regulatory and legal regimes.
The emergence of virtual currencies has raised a number of consumer and investor protection issues. These include the reported loss of consumer funds maintained by bitcoin exchanges, volatility in bitcoin prices, and the development of virtual-currency-based investment products. For example, in February 2014, a Tokyo-based bitcoin exchange called Mt. Gox filed for bankruptcy after reporting that it had lost more than $460 million.
Federal financial regulatory and law enforcement agencies have taken a number of actions regarding virtual currencies. In March 2013, the Department of the Treasury's Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) issued guidance that clarified which participants in virtual currency systems are subject to anti-money-laundering requirements and required virtual currency exchanges to register with FinCEN. Additionally, financial regulators have taken some actions regarding anti-money-laundering compliance and investor protection. For example, in July 2013, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) charged an individual and his company with defrauding investors through a bitcoin-based investment scheme. Further, law enforcement agencies have taken actions against parties alleged to have used virtual currencies to facilitate money laundering or other crimes. For example, in October 2013, multiple agencies worked together to shut down Silk Road, an online marketplace where users paid for illegal goods and services with bitcoins.
Federal agencies also have begun to collaborate on virtual currency issues through informal discussions and interagency working groups primarily concerned with money laundering and other law enforcement matters. However, these working groups have not focused on emerging consumer protection issues, and the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB)—whose responsibilities include providing consumers with information to make responsible decisions about financial transactions—has generally not participated in these groups. Therefore, interagency efforts related to virtual currencies may not be consistent with key practices that can benefit interagency collaboration, such as including all relevant participants to ensure they contribute to the outcomes of the effort. As a result, future interagency efforts may not be in a position to address consumer risks associated with virtual currencies in the most timely and effective manner.
Why GAO Did This Study
Virtual currencies—digital representations of value that are not government-issued—have grown in popularity in recent years. Some virtual currencies can be used to buy real goods and services and exchanged for dollars or other currencies. One example of these is bitcoin, which was developed in 2009. Bitcoin and similar virtual currency systems operate over the Internet and use computer protocols and encryption to conduct and verify transactions. While these virtual currency systems offer some benefits, they also pose risks. For example, they have been associated with illicit activity and security breaches, raising possible regulatory, law enforcement, and consumer protection issues. GAO was asked to examine federal policy and interagency collaboration issues concerning virtual currencies.
This report discusses (1) federal financial regulatory and law enforcement agency responsibilities related to the use of virtual currencies and associated challenges and (2) actions and collaborative efforts the agencies have undertaken regarding virtual currencies. To address these objectives, GAO reviewed federal laws and regulations, academic and industry research, and agency documents; and interviewed federal agency officials, researchers, and industry groups.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that CFPB take steps to identify and participate in pertinent interagency working groups addressing virtual currencies, in coordination with other participating agencies. CFPB concurred with this recommendation.
For more information, contact Lawrance L. Evans, Jr. at (202) 512-8678 or evansl@gao.gov.Thu, 26 Jun 2014 13:00:00 -0400Letter ReportMedicare Fraud: Further Actions Needed to Address Fraud, Waste, and Abuse, June 25, 2014http://gao.gov/products/GAO-14-712T
What GAO Found
The Centers for Medicare &amp; Medicaid Services (CMS)—the agency within the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) that oversees Medicare—has made progress in implementing several key strategies GAO identified or recommended in prior work as helpful in protecting Medicare from fraud; however, implementing other important actions that GAO recommended could help CMS and its program integrity contractors combat fraud. These strategies are:
Provider and Supplier Enrollment : The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA) authorized, and CMS has implemented, actions to strengthen provider and supplier enrollment that address past weaknesses identified by GAO and HHS's Office of Inspector General. For example, CMS has hired contractors to determine whether providers and suppliers have valid licenses and are at legitimate locations. CMS could further strengthen enrollment screening by issuing a rule to require additional provider and supplier disclosures of information, such as any suspension of payments from a federal health care program, and establishing core elements for provider and supplier compliance programs, as authorized by PPACA.
Prepayment and Postpayment Claims Review : Medicare uses prepayment review to deny claims that should not be paid and postpayment review to recover improperly paid claims. GAO has found that increased use of prepayment edits could help prevent improper Medicare payments. For example, prior GAO work identified millions of dollars of payments that appeared to be inconsistent with selected coverage and payment policies and therefore improper. Postpayment reviews are also critical to identifying and recouping overpayments. GAO recommended better oversight of both (1) the information systems analysts use to identify claims for postpayment review, in a 2011 report, and (2) the contractors responsible for these reviews, in a 2013 report. CMS has taken action or has actions under way to address these recommendations.
Addressing Identified Vulnerabilities : Having mechanisms in place to resolve vulnerabilities that could lead to improper payments is critical to effective program management and could help address fraud. However, prior GAO work has shown weaknesses in CMS's processes to address such vulnerabilities. For example, GAO has made multiple recommendations to CMS to remove Social Security numbers from beneficiaries' Medicare cards to help prevent identity theft. HHS agreed with these recommendations, but reported that CMS could not proceed with the changes for a variety of reasons, including funding limitations, and therefore has not taken action.
GAO work under way addressing these key strategies includes examining: (1) how well CMS's information system can prevent and detect the continued enrollment of ineligible or potentially fraudulent providers and suppliers in Medicare, (2) the potential use of electronic-card technologies to help reduce Medicare fraud, (3) CMS's oversight of program integrity efforts for prescription drugs, and (4) CMS's oversight of some of the contractors that conduct reviews of claims after payment. These studies could help CMS more systematically reduce potential fraud in the Medicare program.
Why GAO Did This Study
GAO has designated Medicare as a high-risk program, in part because the program's size and complexity make it vulnerable to fraud, waste, and abuse. In 2013, Medicare financed health care services for approximately 51 million individuals at a cost of about $604 billion. The deceptive nature of fraud makes its extent in the Medicare program difficult to measure in a reliable way, but it is clear that fraud contributes to Medicare's fiscal problems. More broadly, in fiscal year 2013, CMS estimated that improper payments—some of which may be fraudulent—were almost $50 billion.
This statement focuses on the progress made and important steps to be taken by CMS and its program integrity contractors to reduce fraud in Medicare. This statement is based on relevant GAO products and recommendations issued from 2004 through 2014 using a variety of methodologies. Additionally, in June 2014, GAO updated information based on new regulations regarding enrollment of certain providers in Medicare by examining public documents.
For more information, contact Kathleen M. King at (202) 512-7114 or kingk@gao.gov.Wed, 25 Jun 2014 13:00:00 -0400Testimony