B. 04 NICOSIA 1916
C. USDAO NICOSIA IIR 6 823 0128 05
D. USDAO NICOSIA IIR 6 823 0118 05
E. 04 NICOSIA 1754
Classified By: CDA Jane Zimmerman, for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
1. (S) This message is in reply to ref a tasking. The
31-year division of Cyprus has produced two separate, and
quite distinct, populations and governing systems on the
island. While the USG and the international community
recognize the Republic of Cyprus as the sole sovereign
government on the island, the "Turkish Republic of Northern
Cyprus (TRNC)" exercises de facto control over one third of
the island's area and population, with the strong backing of
Turkey and the 25,000-strong Turkish army stationed here.
Due to the transfer of populations after the 1974 war, the
vast majority of the island's Muslim population (roughly
250,000 out of a total population of just under 1 million)
lives in the "TRNC," although a smaller number of third
country Muslims also resides in the south. This cable deals
with each side of the Green Line separately.
SUMMARY
-------
2. (S) The overwhelmingly secular Turkish Cypriot community
in north Cyprus appears to have no sympathy for religious
extremism, and the almost 30,000 foreign students in the
"TRNC" appear mainly uninterested in radical Islam.
Traditionally minded Turkish settlers make up nearly half the
population of the north, however. Although there is little
evidence that Islamic radicalism has taken root in this
community, there have been reports of extremist clerics
visiting the north to teach and preach to the settlers.
Discrimination against mainland Turks by Turkish Cypriots,
the settlers' relative poverty and socio-economic
marginalization, together with an increasing number of
EU-bound illegal migrants from other Muslim countries, could
serve as a catalyst for extremist sympathies. For the
moment, however, local extremism in the north appears to be
limited to marginal, far-right nationalist groups with
limited influence. The "state's" tight control over mosques
and religious education, bolstered by a heavy presence of
Turkish security forces, appears to have minimized the danger
of homegrown Islamic terrorism -- and has also helped keep
KGK/Kongra-Gel at bay. But there are several potentially
tempting targets in the north, including large numbers of
British holiday makers. At the same time, the "TRNC's"
vulnerability to money laundering makes it a potentially
attractive place for terrorist financiers.
3. (S) Similarly, ROC authorities in the south have yet to
come to grips with the porousness of their own borders and
the security threat this could pose. Large numbers of
UK/European tourists, along with UK military personnel and
bases, represent a potentially tempting target for foreign
militants in the south. While there is little evidence of
extremists in the south, tensions between locals and
third-country immigrants (some of whom are Muslim) bear
watching. Meanwhile, Greek Cypriot authorities have allowed
KGK/Kongra-Gel some room to maneuver in the south -- a result
of the ROC's enmity toward Turkey, as well as a desire to
remain useful to (and therefore safe from) Kurdish terrorism.
END SUMMARY.
SECULAR TURKISH CYPRIOTS: ONLY HALF THE EQUATION
--------------------------------------------- ---
4. (SBU) Turkish Cypriots make up a little over half of the
north's population and their presence in Cyprus dates from
the Ottoman conquest in 1571. Within this population,
however, there is significant diversity; many Turkish
Cypriots have European Janissary, Alevi, or even Greek
Cypriot ancestry. It is perhaps due to this diverse and
evolving ethnic mix that Turkish Cypriots have always
practiced a very heterodox form of Islam.
5. (S) Mainly Sunni in name and by tradition, Turkish
Cypriots are nonetheless overwhelmingly secular, and proudly
point this out to anyone who asks. Their behavior bears out
this assertion. With the exception of funerals or other
special occasions, Turkish Cypriots rarely pray or visit
mosques. Fasting at Ramadan is not uncommon, but restaurants
do not close during the holiday. In fact, bars and cafes do
a brisk business selling alcohol year-round, often right next
door to mosques. Although it is impossible to rule out the
existence of individual extremists in the community, as a
group the Turkish Cypriots appear to offer infertile ground
for Islamic extremism.
TURKISH SETTLERS: MORE TRADITIONAL, MORE MARGINALIZED
--------------------------------------------- --------
6. (C) In addition to the Turkish Cypriots, however, there
are roughly 100,000 Anatolian settlers resident in the north
(ref b), who arrived in several waves after the 1974 Turkish
invasion. Some are now "TRNC" citizens, but the most recent
arrivals, are often undocumented, unskilled, economic
migrants hailing from eastern Turkey (especially the
southeastern province of Hatay). A significant number speak
Arabic as a first language, and "TRNC" officials guess that
up to 20 percent are Kurdish.
7. (C) Some of these immigrants have integrated with Turkish
Cypriots through intermarriage. Most remain outside the
mainstream of Turkish Cypriot society, however, and mesh
poorly with the secular and westernized local population.
Compared to Turkish Cypriots, settlers are significantly more
religious and traditional. Headscarves are a common site in
settler areas, and settlers attend prayer services more
regularly than Turkish Cypriots.
8. (S) Nonetheless, Turkish Cypriot officials do not believe
that extremist Islamic ideology enjoys much support in the
settler community at this time. A local demographer and
immigration expert suggested to us that ethnic and religious
diversity among settlers (who include traditional Sunnis
along side "very tolerant" Syrian Alewites, Turkish Alevis,
and Sufis) have so far helped prevent the crystallization of
Islamist political parties or radical religious groups. This
tracks with Post's own observations, especially of visa
applicants. Few applicants from any community on Cyprus
present suspicious travel histories or other potentially
worrying signs of religious radicalism.
9. (S) The danger of extremism in the Turkish-origin
population cannot be discounted entirely, however. Recent
changes in "TRNC" immigration law have put the squeeze on
Turkish immigrants, particularly those poor, unskilled
workers who are in the country without documentation. There
has been angry, if muted, reaction to dramatic scenes of
deportation and the implementation of heavy fines on workers
and their families who have overstayed in Cyprus. This --
coupled with ongoing discrimination Turkish settlers
reportedly suffer at the hands of Turkish Cypriot employers,
officials, and police -- could lay the foundation for
|~rentful extremism among the more marginalized elements of
the settler community.
10. (S) Meanwhile, there are occasional reports of extre%st
Imams entering north Cyprus to preach or teach to the set8ier
community unofficially. Sometimes these are pro-Erbakan
mainland clerQs who enter through Turkey, butpon at least
one occasion in 2004 a group of radiQ,l clerics reportedly
entered via the Greek Cypriot south. There is no indication
that such extremists stay very long or attract much
following, but they continue to make exploratory visits to
the north.
AN UNKNOWN VARIABLE IN THE NORTH: STUDENTS AND MIGRANTS
--------------------------------------------- ----------
11. (S) The third major group of Muslims in the north
consists of temporary residents and transients. Most
significant among these are nearly 23,000 foreign university
students. This population which is likely to grow thanks to
an increase in the number and capacity of the north's
universities, and their increasing efforts to recruit foreign
students. While a large majority of the north's foreign
university students are from mainland Turkey, a significant
number are from third countries -- including Muslim countries
such as Iran, Syria, and the Gulf states. Turkish Cypriot
officials admit that some of these third country nationals
may be more inclined to religiosity than their Turkish or
Turkish Cypriot classmates, but insist that there is no
evidence of gy Islamist groups present at "TRNC"
universities.
12. (S) One lecturer at the north's largest university shares
this view. He contends that students from "places like Iran
or Pakistan" who come to the "TRNC" are drawn precisely
because of the more liberal, secular nature of the north's
universities -- and are therefore not inclined to support
religious radicalism. A Turkish Cypriot demographer
specializing in immigration told us that a "surprising
number" of students, especially those from Iran, are in fact
Christian. He went onto tell us that the "Palestinian
Student Organization" (which he characterized as the most
active foreign student group at the north's largest school,
Eastern Mediterranean Universivy) limits itself to discussion
groups and occasional demonst^tions about the plight of the
Palestinians, but strikes a decidedly secular,
Arab-nationalist line.
13. (S) Turkish Cypriot officials know less, however, about
the religious inclinations of the increasing number of third
country transient migrants in the north -- many of whom use
the "TRNC" as a stepping stone to get to the south (i.e.,
into the EU) where they can claim political asylum. These
migrants come mainly from Iran, Iraq, Syria, Pakistan, and
Bangladesh (ref c), sometimes arriving through legal ports of
entry on forged documents, sometimes bribing officials to let
them through, and sometimes arriving on the Karpass Peninsula
by boat from Turkey, LebanoF or Syria. They are reportedly
housed for short periods in safe houses before trying to
sneak south.
14. (S) Contacts from both the Turkish Embassy and the "TRNC
government" express doubt that these migrants present much
threat of religious extremism. The mayor of one Turkish
Cypriot city with a large immigrant population explained that
these migrants are more interested in keeping their heads
down and slipping quickly into the EU than in causing trouble
in the north. Nonetheless, there are an estimated 4,000
Qtkistanis, Afghans, and others who reside more or less
permanently in the north -- either because they have not yet
tried to cross south or because they prefer to remain in the
north to study or work. These immigrants are harder for the
Turkish Cypriot authorities to monitor, and it is unclear to
what extent this population sympathizes with radical IslQl.
OFFICIALQISLAM IN THE NORTH
-------------------------i
15. (C) To the extent that radical Islam does exist in therQnorth, it i
Tikely confined to small groups on the margins
of society. The "TRNC" mirrors the Turkish model of tight
state control over an officially sanctioned system of
mainstream Sunni mosques and religious instruction -- which
is permitted only in "state" mosques and in elective courses
at the public schools. The north's mosques are run by the
"state" office in charge of religious affairs (Diyanet,
headed by Ahmet Yonluer), which also oversees the curriculum
of all Muslim religious education. Diyanet answers to the
Evkaf organization, which oversees a large array of business
and charity interests as well as the supervising the Diyanet.
Evkaf, in turn, is run by a board of directors appointed by
and responsible to the "TRNC prime minister."
16. (S) According to a contact at the Turkish Embassy, the
majority of the "TRNC's" official Imams are appointed by the
Turkish Cypriot Diyanet from among candidates approved by the
Turkish government. Although there is also a small handful
of Turkish Cypriot clerics, including Yonluer, most are
Turkish government employees seconded to the "TRNC" -- and
consequently have been vetted for extremist tendencies by the
GOT. Turkish Cypriot Diyanet keeps a close eye on the
country's spiritual leaders after they are appointed to make
sure they do not threaten the "state" in their sermons or
with the content of any religion courses they are authorized
to teach.
17. (S) The state permits, but does not actively oversee,
several smaller non-Sunni Muslim religious groups. These
groups, by virtue of their tolerant (some would say
heretical) approach to Islam, are thought to pose little
threat of fundamentalism. Notable among them is the "Haci
Bektas Veli" organization of Turkish- and Kurdish-origin
Alevis (numbering up to 5,000), who enjoy warm relations with
the "government" and have even been given Evkaf land by the
authorities for religious use. Arab Alewites among the
settler population, while theologically related to Turkish
Alevis, do not participate in this organization, preferring
instead a loosely arranged system of informal prayer and
instruction centered in private homes. Sufis and other sects
-- such as the Nakshibendi who are led by Turkish Cypriot
"Sheikh" Nazim -- also operate independently, but with the
consent of the authorities.
THE TURKISH ARMY: KEEPING THE LID ON
------------------------------------
18. (S) Nonetheless, there are scattered rumors of more
radical religious groups in the north. One reliable foreign
military officer reported to DAO there were currently four
unofficial "madrassas" with suspected hard-line tendencies
operating in the north (ref d). Such privately taught
religion classes are occasionally uncovered and closed down
-- or taken over by officially sanctioned Imams. In cases
where the content of these classes is not considered
dangerous, serious penalties for those who teach or attend
are not common. Sometimes the reaction is more severe,
however. One Turkish Cypriot official reported to us that "a
few years ago," the Turkish military identified and
infiltrated a settler-run "Erbakan-style" school in the
Karpass Peninsula; the Turkish Cypriots subsequently closed
the school and deported the teachers to Turkey
19. (S) These stories lend credence to the general impression
most Turkish Cypriots have (and which Post shares) that the
Turkish army keeps a close watch on potential Islamic
extremism in the north. With 25,000-30,000 soldiers and
police on the island, the ratio of security forces 4Hthe
general population is extZordinarily high (roughly one
solider or cop for every 10 civilians). Furthermore, there
are army installations at various locations throughout the
north; few villages are very far from a Turkish base, and
mosques all over the ountry are attended and closely watched
by Turkish military personnel.
20. (S) As a result, very little is believed to escape the
scrutiny of the Turkish army. Former leftist opposition
activists -- now in "government" -- recount their own
experiences being under close and effective surveillance by
the security forces. Other Turkish Cypriot officials
privately confirm that the Turkish army's ivil Affairs
Branch continues to observe "dangerous" religious and student
groups -- working closely with the Turkish Cypriots to
infiltrate suspect organizations and deport troublemakers.
OTHER RADICALS UP NORTH: NATIONALISTS AND KONGRA-GEL
--------------------------------------------- ------
21. (S) It is worth noting that there are at least two other
types of extremists who, though not motivated primarily by
Islam, are present to some degree in the north. The first is
KGK/Kongra-Gel, which is rumored to enjoy significant support
among Kurdish-origin settlers. Turkish Cypriot officials do
not believe there is a significant threat of KGK activity or
attacks in the north, however, thanks largely to the heavy
concentration of Turkish security forces who keep close tabs
an practically every individual of Kurdish decent in the
county. Nonetheless, KGK/Kongra-Gel is believed to use the
north as a transit point for smuggling fighters and
fund-raisers into the sympathetic Greek Cypriot south.
22. (S) In addition, there are several small, home-grown
radical Turkish nationalist groups in the north, which
occasionally conduct small-scale acts of violence such as the
2004 fire-bombing of a Greek Cypriot church in Morphou (ref
f). The UHH (National Popular Movement), which was fingered
EU@~PGI (LREASOR/IWEINSTEIN), EURQ (KINGMANSON), EUR/ACE
(SKUX), EUR/PPD (VWALKER), S/CT (MNOUMAN)
E.O. 1>58: DECL: 1.6XQAND 1.6X6
for the Morphou attack and some other incidents, is a shadowy
organization of Turkish Cypriot veterans and radical
natio*hlists with close ties to the reactionary former
"Presidew Rauf Denktash -- and allegedly to hard-line
elements in thehurkish army and "deep state."
23. (S) Theerm "Grey Wolves" -- officiallylhe name of the
youth branch of the minuscule far-right MAP party -- is alsoQ
commonly used to describe "th the UHH and the loose cadrQDof
young thugs (who are often unemployed witQcriminal recordsQ
who support the UHH and occasionally do its dirty work.
While both groups have a track record of violence and are
cr#3ical of the Unitmd States, neither the UHH nor te Grey
WolQs appear to behM threat to American interests because:
1) their anger is focused mainly on the Greek Cypriots and on
Turkish Cypriots who support peaceful unification of the
island; and 2) they are held largely in check by the Turkish
military, which currently supports an Annan-Plan style vision
for Cyprus.
GREEK CYPRIOTS: RELIGIOUS...
----------------------------
24. (C) Greek Cypriots who populate the south are, by and
large, more religious than their Turkish Cypriot
counterparts. Mainstream religious institutions and
religious leaders play a role in politics that has no
parallel in the north. Archbishop Makarios -- the original
Ethnarch -- was both President of Cyprus and head S the
Cypriot Orthodox Church until his death in 1977. The focal
point of the church's interest in politics, however, is the
Cyprus problem itself. Church leaders do not hesitate to
take public positions on secular political issues. The
Bishop of Kyrenia, for example, infamously warned that those
who voted "yes" to the Annan Plan in the April 2004 referenda
would go to hell.
... BUT NOT USUALLY DANGEROUS
-----------------------------
25. (C) While largely conservative, even reactionary at
timps, mainstream church politics are hardly extreme and
there is no reason to believe that there is any link to
violence. The EOKA militants of the 1950s ad 1960s are now
mostly old men reminiscing about the twin struggles against
the British and their Turkish Cypriot compatriots over a
glass of Zivania. The only "home-grown" extremist group in
the south is actually a Greek Import -- Xrisi Avgi or "Golden
Dawn." Few in Cypr'd view either the group or its goals as
representing a significant threat. There was, however, one
serious incident involving a member of Golden Dawn last July.
A known member of the organization, Christodoulos
Nicolaides, attacked a Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot who
were sitting together in a Nicosia cafe. Nicolaides was
arrested and charged with assault and acting with intent to
incite hostility between Greek and Turkish Cypriots. His
trial is underway. A previously unknown group, the
"Organization of Cypriot Nationalists" claimed responsibility
for a grenade attack on the home of opposition party leader
Nicos Anastassiades in 2004. Cypriot police discounted the
credibility of the claim and the group has not been heard
from since.
THIRD-COUNTRY RESIDENTS IN THE SOUTH
------------------------------------
26. (C) Third-country nationals make up perhaps 10% of the
population in the government-controlled south, but represent
a significantly greater share of the potential threat of
extremist violence. Many third-country nationals work in
low-wage jobs in the services or construction industry.
Reports of discrimination, harassment and exploitation are
far from uncommon, and could serve as a catalyst for
resentment between Cypriots and foreign workers.
27. (S) Although most of this population hails from the
predominantly non-Muslim Philippines, Sri Lanka, and other EU
member states, there are Muslims among the south's foreign
workers -- as weL as among the south's small population of
foreign university s:Qdents. There is one mosque hoilding
services and catering to the local Muslim populati1 in each
of the three major cities: Nicosia, Limassol and Larnaca.
Even on a Friday night, however, there are seldom more than
200 worshipers. None of the major mosques has any kind of
reputation for hard-line politics or firebrand sermons, and
contacts from British military intelligence report they know
of no Muslims preaching extremist views in the ROC. It is
likely that some Muslim clerics preach outside the mosques to
small groups of believers in private homes, and we have heard
reports of some Imams advocating a militant line. Tasos
Tzionis, who in addition to being the President's Diplomatic
Advisor is also formally the head of the Cypriot Intelligence
Services, told us, however, that he does not view either the
mainstream mosques or the itinerant clerics as representing
any kind of security risk either for Cyprus or
internationally.
ROC AND KGK/KONGRA-GEL: BENIGN NEGLECT
---------------------------------------
28. (S) The single most worrisome extremist group active on
Cyprus is Kongra Gel. Cyprus is primarily used for
fund-raising and as a transit point, but there is some
evidence that the KGK leadership is interested in using the
Greek-Cypriot controlled part of the island as an R&R
destination for front-line fighters the way that the PLO used
Chile. The Kurdish community in the south is estimated at
about 1500, a number that is negotiated directly between
senior GOC officials and the local Kurdish leaders.
29. (S) The GOC puts loose boundaries on KGK activities --
many of which are conducted under the alleged auspices of the
YKK Kurdish Cultural Center -- but keeps a watchful eye on
the community's activities and takes active steps to reign in
those it considers threatening or dangerous. Many of the
Kurds in the south are asylees, something that the
authorities use to justify their relative passivity.
30. (S) GOC attitudes towards Kongra Gel are complex. There
is certainly an "enemy of my enemy" mentality related to
Kongra Gel's traditional antagonism towards Ankara. More
importantly, there is an overarching sense that while Kongra
Gel may be misusing Cypriot hospitality, it is precisely the
usefulness of Cyprus that insulates the island from any
potential threat. Cracking down on KGK activities would, in
their view, only risk stirring up a hornets' nest of problems.
ROC: POROUS "BORDERS"
---------------------
31. (S) The sizable (by Cyprus standards) Kurdish presence
also reflects a deeper security concern: the porous nature of
the Green Line. For ideological and other reasons, the GOC
is reluctant to take steps to strengthen controls along the
Buffer Zone that might accelerate the calcification of the
Green Line into a "border." But in practical terms, the
UN-patrolled buffer zone now effectively is the EU's
easternmost frontier. It is relatively easy for KGK
personnel to travel from Turkey and "jump the fence" to claim
asylum in the south. The number of asylum seekers in Cyprus
has risen at a startling clip, almost certainly in response
to Cyprus, accession to the EU. Between 2003 and 2005,
asylum applications in Cyprus grew by 710%. There were 953
asylum applications in 2002 compared to more than 4,000 in
the period from January-June 2005. Asylees in Cyprus are a
relatively diverse group, but the largest number come from
Sri Lanka, Georgia, Iran, Syria, Ukraine, Pakistan, Russia,
Bangladesh, Gaza and China. The large and growing asylee
community in Cyprus represents a source of potential recruits
for extremist groups looking to extend their reach in Europe.
This will bear close watching as Cypriot authorities
struggle to come to grips with an immigration challenge --
and potential security headache -- they are ill-prepared to
handle.
COMMENT: TERRORISM POSSIBLE
---------------------------
32. (S) Post believes there is currently very little
religious extremism on either side of the Green Line, but we
do not rule out the possibility of Islamic radicals seeking
to extend their influence -- or even stage attacks -- in
EUR/PGI (LREASOR/IWEINSTEIN), E4S/SE (KINGMANSON), EUR/ACE
either the "TRNC" or in the ROC-controlled south. Tensions
between immigrants and locals, especially if egged on by
extremists from outside, are a potential source of volatility.
33. (S) Furthermore, Cyprus is a target-rich environment.
The high concentration of Turkish military in the north,
generally thought of as a deterrent to attacks in there,
could also attract the attention of either KGK/Kongra-Gel or
radical Islamists. The "TRNC" is an easily accessible place
for extremists to strike at official Turkish interests. In
the south, two UK mil'tary bases, as well as British and
other allied soldiers who participate in UNFIYCP, are
potential targets. Possible civilian targets are also easy
to identify. On both sides of the island, large numbers of
British/European holiday makers concentrate in coastal resort
towns; a Bali-style attack is not unthinkable. Even if it is
difficult for terrorist groups to organize, plan, and train
in the north, there is very little to stop outside extremists
-- such as those responsible for the recent attacks in nearby
coastal Turkey -- from entering through the north and
conducting operations here, especially if they have Turkish
citizenship.
34. (S) Even if extremists do not opt to target Cyprus, the
country could nonetheless figure in their plans for attacks
elsewhere. Weak immigration controls, especially in the
north, make the island a potential transit point for
terrorists. Furthermore in the "TRNC," a lightly regulated
banking sector and unsupervised casino industry could offer
an attractive terrorist financing haven. Although we do not
have information to suggest terrorist financing activity in
the north, we understand that criminal elements involved in
narcotic smuggling have already discovered the "TRNC," and
are using the financial system there to launder illicit
proceeds. END COMMENT.
ZIMMERMAN

Raw content

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 07 NICOSIA 001566
SIPDIS
EUR/PGI (LREASOR/IWEINSTEIN), EUR/SE (KINGMANSON), EUR/ACE
(SKUX), EUR/PPD (VWALKER), S/CT (MNORMAN)
E.O. 12958: DECL: 1.6X1 AND 1.6X6
TAGS: ASEC, PGOV, PREL, PTER, SOCI, TU, CY
SUBJECT: EXTREMISM IN CYPRUS: (MOSTLY) "NO PROBLEM"
REF: A. STATE 144222
B. 04 NICOSIA 1916
C. USDAO NICOSIA IIR 6 823 0128 05
D. USDAO NICOSIA IIR 6 823 0118 05
E. 04 NICOSIA 1754
Classified By: CDA Jane Zimmerman, for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
1. (S) This message is in reply to ref a tasking. The
31-year division of Cyprus has produced two separate, and
quite distinct, populations and governing systems on the
island. While the USG and the international community
recognize the Republic of Cyprus as the sole sovereign
government on the island, the "Turkish Republic of Northern
Cyprus (TRNC)" exercises de facto control over one third of
the island's area and population, with the strong backing of
Turkey and the 25,000-strong Turkish army stationed here.
Due to the transfer of populations after the 1974 war, the
vast majority of the island's Muslim population (roughly
250,000 out of a total population of just under 1 million)
lives in the "TRNC," although a smaller number of third
country Muslims also resides in the south. This cable deals
with each side of the Green Line separately.
SUMMARY
-------
2. (S) The overwhelmingly secular Turkish Cypriot community
in north Cyprus appears to have no sympathy for religious
extremism, and the almost 30,000 foreign students in the
"TRNC" appear mainly uninterested in radical Islam.
Traditionally minded Turkish settlers make up nearly half the
population of the north, however. Although there is little
evidence that Islamic radicalism has taken root in this
community, there have been reports of extremist clerics
visiting the north to teach and preach to the settlers.
Discrimination against mainland Turks by Turkish Cypriots,
the settlers' relative poverty and socio-economic
marginalization, together with an increasing number of
EU-bound illegal migrants from other Muslim countries, could
serve as a catalyst for extremist sympathies. For the
moment, however, local extremism in the north appears to be
limited to marginal, far-right nationalist groups with
limited influence. The "state's" tight control over mosques
and religious education, bolstered by a heavy presence of
Turkish security forces, appears to have minimized the danger
of homegrown Islamic terrorism -- and has also helped keep
KGK/Kongra-Gel at bay. But there are several potentially
tempting targets in the north, including large numbers of
British holiday makers. At the same time, the "TRNC's"
vulnerability to money laundering makes it a potentially
attractive place for terrorist financiers.
3. (S) Similarly, ROC authorities in the south have yet to
come to grips with the porousness of their own borders and
the security threat this could pose. Large numbers of
UK/European tourists, along with UK military personnel and
bases, represent a potentially tempting target for foreign
militants in the south. While there is little evidence of
extremists in the south, tensions between locals and
third-country immigrants (some of whom are Muslim) bear
watching. Meanwhile, Greek Cypriot authorities have allowed
KGK/Kongra-Gel some room to maneuver in the south -- a result
of the ROC's enmity toward Turkey, as well as a desire to
remain useful to (and therefore safe from) Kurdish terrorism.
END SUMMARY.
SECULAR TURKISH CYPRIOTS: ONLY HALF THE EQUATION
--------------------------------------------- ---
4. (SBU) Turkish Cypriots make up a little over half of the
north's population and their presence in Cyprus dates from
the Ottoman conquest in 1571. Within this population,
however, there is significant diversity; many Turkish
Cypriots have European Janissary, Alevi, or even Greek
Cypriot ancestry. It is perhaps due to this diverse and
evolving ethnic mix that Turkish Cypriots have always
practiced a very heterodox form of Islam.
5. (S) Mainly Sunni in name and by tradition, Turkish
Cypriots are nonetheless overwhelmingly secular, and proudly
point this out to anyone who asks. Their behavior bears out
this assertion. With the exception of funerals or other
special occasions, Turkish Cypriots rarely pray or visit
mosques. Fasting at Ramadan is not uncommon, but restaurants
do not close during the holiday. In fact, bars and cafes do
a brisk business selling alcohol year-round, often right next
door to mosques. Although it is impossible to rule out the
existence of individual extremists in the community, as a
group the Turkish Cypriots appear to offer infertile ground
for Islamic extremism.
TURKISH SETTLERS: MORE TRADITIONAL, MORE MARGINALIZED
--------------------------------------------- --------
6. (C) In addition to the Turkish Cypriots, however, there
are roughly 100,000 Anatolian settlers resident in the north
(ref b), who arrived in several waves after the 1974 Turkish
invasion. Some are now "TRNC" citizens, but the most recent
arrivals, are often undocumented, unskilled, economic
migrants hailing from eastern Turkey (especially the
southeastern province of Hatay). A significant number speak
Arabic as a first language, and "TRNC" officials guess that
up to 20 percent are Kurdish.
7. (C) Some of these immigrants have integrated with Turkish
Cypriots through intermarriage. Most remain outside the
mainstream of Turkish Cypriot society, however, and mesh
poorly with the secular and westernized local population.
Compared to Turkish Cypriots, settlers are significantly more
religious and traditional. Headscarves are a common site in
settler areas, and settlers attend prayer services more
regularly than Turkish Cypriots.
8. (S) Nonetheless, Turkish Cypriot officials do not believe
that extremist Islamic ideology enjoys much support in the
settler community at this time. A local demographer and
immigration expert suggested to us that ethnic and religious
diversity among settlers (who include traditional Sunnis
along side "very tolerant" Syrian Alewites, Turkish Alevis,
and Sufis) have so far helped prevent the crystallization of
Islamist political parties or radical religious groups. This
tracks with Post's own observations, especially of visa
applicants. Few applicants from any community on Cyprus
present suspicious travel histories or other potentially
worrying signs of religious radicalism.
9. (S) The danger of extremism in the Turkish-origin
population cannot be discounted entirely, however. Recent
changes in "TRNC" immigration law have put the squeeze on
Turkish immigrants, particularly those poor, unskilled
workers who are in the country without documentation. There
has been angry, if muted, reaction to dramatic scenes of
deportation and the implementation of heavy fines on workers
and their families who have overstayed in Cyprus. This --
coupled with ongoing discrimination Turkish settlers
reportedly suffer at the hands of Turkish Cypriot employers,
officials, and police -- could lay the foundation for
|~rentful extremism among the more marginalized elements of
the settler community.
10. (S) Meanwhile, there are occasional reports of extre%st
Imams entering north Cyprus to preach or teach to the set8ier
community unofficially. Sometimes these are pro-Erbakan
mainland clerQs who enter through Turkey, butpon at least
one occasion in 2004 a group of radiQ,l clerics reportedly
entered via the Greek Cypriot south. There is no indication
that such extremists stay very long or attract much
following, but they continue to make exploratory visits to
the north.
AN UNKNOWN VARIABLE IN THE NORTH: STUDENTS AND MIGRANTS
--------------------------------------------- ----------
11. (S) The third major group of Muslims in the north
consists of temporary residents and transients. Most
significant among these are nearly 23,000 foreign university
students. This population which is likely to grow thanks to
an increase in the number and capacity of the north's
universities, and their increasing efforts to recruit foreign
students. While a large majority of the north's foreign
university students are from mainland Turkey, a significant
number are from third countries -- including Muslim countries
such as Iran, Syria, and the Gulf states. Turkish Cypriot
officials admit that some of these third country nationals
may be more inclined to religiosity than their Turkish or
Turkish Cypriot classmates, but insist that there is no
evidence of gy Islamist groups present at "TRNC"
universities.
12. (S) One lecturer at the north's largest university shares
this view. He contends that students from "places like Iran
or Pakistan" who come to the "TRNC" are drawn precisely
because of the more liberal, secular nature of the north's
universities -- and are therefore not inclined to support
religious radicalism. A Turkish Cypriot demographer
specializing in immigration told us that a "surprising
number" of students, especially those from Iran, are in fact
Christian. He went onto tell us that the "Palestinian
Student Organization" (which he characterized as the most
active foreign student group at the north's largest school,
Eastern Mediterranean Universivy) limits itself to discussion
groups and occasional demonst^tions about the plight of the
Palestinians, but strikes a decidedly secular,
Arab-nationalist line.
13. (S) Turkish Cypriot officials know less, however, about
the religious inclinations of the increasing number of third
country transient migrants in the north -- many of whom use
the "TRNC" as a stepping stone to get to the south (i.e.,
into the EU) where they can claim political asylum. These
migrants come mainly from Iran, Iraq, Syria, Pakistan, and
Bangladesh (ref c), sometimes arriving through legal ports of
entry on forged documents, sometimes bribing officials to let
them through, and sometimes arriving on the Karpass Peninsula
by boat from Turkey, LebanoF or Syria. They are reportedly
housed for short periods in safe houses before trying to
sneak south.
14. (S) Contacts from both the Turkish Embassy and the "TRNC
government" express doubt that these migrants present much
threat of religious extremism. The mayor of one Turkish
Cypriot city with a large immigrant population explained that
these migrants are more interested in keeping their heads
down and slipping quickly into the EU than in causing trouble
in the north. Nonetheless, there are an estimated 4,000
Qtkistanis, Afghans, and others who reside more or less
permanently in the north -- either because they have not yet
tried to cross south or because they prefer to remain in the
north to study or work. These immigrants are harder for the
Turkish Cypriot authorities to monitor, and it is unclear to
what extent this population sympathizes with radical IslQl.
OFFICIALQISLAM IN THE NORTH
-------------------------i
15. (C) To the extent that radical Islam does exist in therQnorth, it i
Tikely confined to small groups on the margins
of society. The "TRNC" mirrors the Turkish model of tight
state control over an officially sanctioned system of
mainstream Sunni mosques and religious instruction -- which
is permitted only in "state" mosques and in elective courses
at the public schools. The north's mosques are run by the
"state" office in charge of religious affairs (Diyanet,
headed by Ahmet Yonluer), which also oversees the curriculum
of all Muslim religious education. Diyanet answers to the
Evkaf organization, which oversees a large array of business
and charity interests as well as the supervising the Diyanet.
Evkaf, in turn, is run by a board of directors appointed by
and responsible to the "TRNC prime minister."
16. (S) According to a contact at the Turkish Embassy, the
majority of the "TRNC's" official Imams are appointed by the
Turkish Cypriot Diyanet from among candidates approved by the
Turkish government. Although there is also a small handful
of Turkish Cypriot clerics, including Yonluer, most are
Turkish government employees seconded to the "TRNC" -- and
consequently have been vetted for extremist tendencies by the
GOT. Turkish Cypriot Diyanet keeps a close eye on the
country's spiritual leaders after they are appointed to make
sure they do not threaten the "state" in their sermons or
with the content of any religion courses they are authorized
to teach.
17. (S) The state permits, but does not actively oversee,
several smaller non-Sunni Muslim religious groups. These
groups, by virtue of their tolerant (some would say
heretical) approach to Islam, are thought to pose little
threat of fundamentalism. Notable among them is the "Haci
Bektas Veli" organization of Turkish- and Kurdish-origin
Alevis (numbering up to 5,000), who enjoy warm relations with
the "government" and have even been given Evkaf land by the
authorities for religious use. Arab Alewites among the
settler population, while theologically related to Turkish
Alevis, do not participate in this organization, preferring
instead a loosely arranged system of informal prayer and
instruction centered in private homes. Sufis and other sects
-- such as the Nakshibendi who are led by Turkish Cypriot
"Sheikh" Nazim -- also operate independently, but with the
consent of the authorities.
THE TURKISH ARMY: KEEPING THE LID ON
------------------------------------
18. (S) Nonetheless, there are scattered rumors of more
radical religious groups in the north. One reliable foreign
military officer reported to DAO there were currently four
unofficial "madrassas" with suspected hard-line tendencies
operating in the north (ref d). Such privately taught
religion classes are occasionally uncovered and closed down
-- or taken over by officially sanctioned Imams. In cases
where the content of these classes is not considered
dangerous, serious penalties for those who teach or attend
are not common. Sometimes the reaction is more severe,
however. One Turkish Cypriot official reported to us that "a
few years ago," the Turkish military identified and
infiltrated a settler-run "Erbakan-style" school in the
Karpass Peninsula; the Turkish Cypriots subsequently closed
the school and deported the teachers to Turkey
19. (S) These stories lend credence to the general impression
most Turkish Cypriots have (and which Post shares) that the
Turkish army keeps a close watch on potential Islamic
extremism in the north. With 25,000-30,000 soldiers and
police on the island, the ratio of security forces 4Hthe
general population is extZordinarily high (roughly one
solider or cop for every 10 civilians). Furthermore, there
are army installations at various locations throughout the
north; few villages are very far from a Turkish base, and
mosques all over the ountry are attended and closely watched
by Turkish military personnel.
20. (S) As a result, very little is believed to escape the
scrutiny of the Turkish army. Former leftist opposition
activists -- now in "government" -- recount their own
experiences being under close and effective surveillance by
the security forces. Other Turkish Cypriot officials
privately confirm that the Turkish army's ivil Affairs
Branch continues to observe "dangerous" religious and student
groups -- working closely with the Turkish Cypriots to
infiltrate suspect organizations and deport troublemakers.
OTHER RADICALS UP NORTH: NATIONALISTS AND KONGRA-GEL
--------------------------------------------- ------
21. (S) It is worth noting that there are at least two other
types of extremists who, though not motivated primarily by
Islam, are present to some degree in the north. The first is
KGK/Kongra-Gel, which is rumored to enjoy significant support
among Kurdish-origin settlers. Turkish Cypriot officials do
not believe there is a significant threat of KGK activity or
attacks in the north, however, thanks largely to the heavy
concentration of Turkish security forces who keep close tabs
an practically every individual of Kurdish decent in the
county. Nonetheless, KGK/Kongra-Gel is believed to use the
north as a transit point for smuggling fighters and
fund-raisers into the sympathetic Greek Cypriot south.
22. (S) In addition, there are several small, home-grown
radical Turkish nationalist groups in the north, which
occasionally conduct small-scale acts of violence such as the
2004 fire-bombing of a Greek Cypriot church in Morphou (ref
f). The UHH (National Popular Movement), which was fingered
EU@~PGI (LREASOR/IWEINSTEIN), EURQ (KINGMANSON), EUR/ACE
(SKUX), EUR/PPD (VWALKER), S/CT (MNOUMAN)
E.O. 1>58: DECL: 1.6XQAND 1.6X6
for the Morphou attack and some other incidents, is a shadowy
organization of Turkish Cypriot veterans and radical
natio*hlists with close ties to the reactionary former
"Presidew Rauf Denktash -- and allegedly to hard-line
elements in thehurkish army and "deep state."
23. (S) Theerm "Grey Wolves" -- officiallylhe name of the
youth branch of the minuscule far-right MAP party -- is alsoQ
commonly used to describe "th the UHH and the loose cadrQDof
young thugs (who are often unemployed witQcriminal recordsQ
who support the UHH and occasionally do its dirty work.
While both groups have a track record of violence and are
cr#3ical of the Unitmd States, neither the UHH nor te Grey
WolQs appear to behM threat to American interests because:
1) their anger is focused mainly on the Greek Cypriots and on
Turkish Cypriots who support peaceful unification of the
island; and 2) they are held largely in check by the Turkish
military, which currently supports an Annan-Plan style vision
for Cyprus.
GREEK CYPRIOTS: RELIGIOUS...
----------------------------
24. (C) Greek Cypriots who populate the south are, by and
large, more religious than their Turkish Cypriot
counterparts. Mainstream religious institutions and
religious leaders play a role in politics that has no
parallel in the north. Archbishop Makarios -- the original
Ethnarch -- was both President of Cyprus and head S the
Cypriot Orthodox Church until his death in 1977. The focal
point of the church's interest in politics, however, is the
Cyprus problem itself. Church leaders do not hesitate to
take public positions on secular political issues. The
Bishop of Kyrenia, for example, infamously warned that those
who voted "yes" to the Annan Plan in the April 2004 referenda
would go to hell.
... BUT NOT USUALLY DANGEROUS
-----------------------------
25. (C) While largely conservative, even reactionary at
timps, mainstream church politics are hardly extreme and
there is no reason to believe that there is any link to
violence. The EOKA militants of the 1950s ad 1960s are now
mostly old men reminiscing about the twin struggles against
the British and their Turkish Cypriot compatriots over a
glass of Zivania. The only "home-grown" extremist group in
the south is actually a Greek Import -- Xrisi Avgi or "Golden
Dawn." Few in Cypr'd view either the group or its goals as
representing a significant threat. There was, however, one
serious incident involving a member of Golden Dawn last July.
A known member of the organization, Christodoulos
Nicolaides, attacked a Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot who
were sitting together in a Nicosia cafe. Nicolaides was
arrested and charged with assault and acting with intent to
incite hostility between Greek and Turkish Cypriots. His
trial is underway. A previously unknown group, the
"Organization of Cypriot Nationalists" claimed responsibility
for a grenade attack on the home of opposition party leader
Nicos Anastassiades in 2004. Cypriot police discounted the
credibility of the claim and the group has not been heard
from since.
THIRD-COUNTRY RESIDENTS IN THE SOUTH
------------------------------------
26. (C) Third-country nationals make up perhaps 10% of the
population in the government-controlled south, but represent
a significantly greater share of the potential threat of
extremist violence. Many third-country nationals work in
low-wage jobs in the services or construction industry.
Reports of discrimination, harassment and exploitation are
far from uncommon, and could serve as a catalyst for
resentment between Cypriots and foreign workers.
27. (S) Although most of this population hails from the
predominantly non-Muslim Philippines, Sri Lanka, and other EU
member states, there are Muslims among the south's foreign
workers -- as weL as among the south's small population of
foreign university s:Qdents. There is one mosque hoilding
services and catering to the local Muslim populati1 in each
of the three major cities: Nicosia, Limassol and Larnaca.
Even on a Friday night, however, there are seldom more than
200 worshipers. None of the major mosques has any kind of
reputation for hard-line politics or firebrand sermons, and
contacts from British military intelligence report they know
of no Muslims preaching extremist views in the ROC. It is
likely that some Muslim clerics preach outside the mosques to
small groups of believers in private homes, and we have heard
reports of some Imams advocating a militant line. Tasos
Tzionis, who in addition to being the President's Diplomatic
Advisor is also formally the head of the Cypriot Intelligence
Services, told us, however, that he does not view either the
mainstream mosques or the itinerant clerics as representing
any kind of security risk either for Cyprus or
internationally.
ROC AND KGK/KONGRA-GEL: BENIGN NEGLECT
---------------------------------------
28. (S) The single most worrisome extremist group active on
Cyprus is Kongra Gel. Cyprus is primarily used for
fund-raising and as a transit point, but there is some
evidence that the KGK leadership is interested in using the
Greek-Cypriot controlled part of the island as an R&R
destination for front-line fighters the way that the PLO used
Chile. The Kurdish community in the south is estimated at
about 1500, a number that is negotiated directly between
senior GOC officials and the local Kurdish leaders.
29. (S) The GOC puts loose boundaries on KGK activities --
many of which are conducted under the alleged auspices of the
YKK Kurdish Cultural Center -- but keeps a watchful eye on
the community's activities and takes active steps to reign in
those it considers threatening or dangerous. Many of the
Kurds in the south are asylees, something that the
authorities use to justify their relative passivity.
30. (S) GOC attitudes towards Kongra Gel are complex. There
is certainly an "enemy of my enemy" mentality related to
Kongra Gel's traditional antagonism towards Ankara. More
importantly, there is an overarching sense that while Kongra
Gel may be misusing Cypriot hospitality, it is precisely the
usefulness of Cyprus that insulates the island from any
potential threat. Cracking down on KGK activities would, in
their view, only risk stirring up a hornets' nest of problems.
ROC: POROUS "BORDERS"
---------------------
31. (S) The sizable (by Cyprus standards) Kurdish presence
also reflects a deeper security concern: the porous nature of
the Green Line. For ideological and other reasons, the GOC
is reluctant to take steps to strengthen controls along the
Buffer Zone that might accelerate the calcification of the
Green Line into a "border." But in practical terms, the
UN-patrolled buffer zone now effectively is the EU's
easternmost frontier. It is relatively easy for KGK
personnel to travel from Turkey and "jump the fence" to claim
asylum in the south. The number of asylum seekers in Cyprus
has risen at a startling clip, almost certainly in response
to Cyprus, accession to the EU. Between 2003 and 2005,
asylum applications in Cyprus grew by 710%. There were 953
asylum applications in 2002 compared to more than 4,000 in
the period from January-June 2005. Asylees in Cyprus are a
relatively diverse group, but the largest number come from
Sri Lanka, Georgia, Iran, Syria, Ukraine, Pakistan, Russia,
Bangladesh, Gaza and China. The large and growing asylee
community in Cyprus represents a source of potential recruits
for extremist groups looking to extend their reach in Europe.
This will bear close watching as Cypriot authorities
struggle to come to grips with an immigration challenge --
and potential security headache -- they are ill-prepared to
handle.
COMMENT: TERRORISM POSSIBLE
---------------------------
32. (S) Post believes there is currently very little
religious extremism on either side of the Green Line, but we
do not rule out the possibility of Islamic radicals seeking
to extend their influence -- or even stage attacks -- in
EUR/PGI (LREASOR/IWEINSTEIN), E4S/SE (KINGMANSON), EUR/ACE
either the "TRNC" or in the ROC-controlled south. Tensions
between immigrants and locals, especially if egged on by
extremists from outside, are a potential source of volatility.
33. (S) Furthermore, Cyprus is a target-rich environment.
The high concentration of Turkish military in the north,
generally thought of as a deterrent to attacks in there,
could also attract the attention of either KGK/Kongra-Gel or
radical Islamists. The "TRNC" is an easily accessible place
for extremists to strike at official Turkish interests. In
the south, two UK mil'tary bases, as well as British and
other allied soldiers who participate in UNFIYCP, are
potential targets. Possible civilian targets are also easy
to identify. On both sides of the island, large numbers of
British/European holiday makers concentrate in coastal resort
towns; a Bali-style attack is not unthinkable. Even if it is
difficult for terrorist groups to organize, plan, and train
in the north, there is very little to stop outside extremists
-- such as those responsible for the recent attacks in nearby
coastal Turkey -- from entering through the north and
conducting operations here, especially if they have Turkish
citizenship.
34. (S) Even if extremists do not opt to target Cyprus, the
country could nonetheless figure in their plans for attacks
elsewhere. Weak immigration controls, especially in the
north, make the island a potential transit point for
terrorists. Furthermore in the "TRNC," a lightly regulated
banking sector and unsupervised casino industry could offer
an attractive terrorist financing haven. Although we do not
have information to suggest terrorist financing activity in
the north, we understand that criminal elements involved in
narcotic smuggling have already discovered the "TRNC," and
are using the financial system there to launder illicit
proceeds. END COMMENT.
ZIMMERMAN