A mediaevalist trying to be a philosopher and a philosopher trying to be a mediaevalist write about theology, philosophy, scholarship, books, the middle ages, and especially the life, times, and thought of the Doctor Subtilis, the Blessed John Duns Scotus.

Wednesday, October 13, 2010

Scotus on Natural Knowledge of God

This is the first installment of my attempt to lay out the basic positions of Scotus’ thought. At first this will be a bare summary, with little comment, but eventually I hope to expand it.

Duns Scotus’ complex of ideas surrounding the natural knowledge of God involve many of his most characteristic positions, such as univocity, intrinsic modes, quidditative knowledge of God and infinite being. In what follows I will attempt an explanation based on the Ordinatio and try to lay out the context; this goes for both the structure of the question(s) in which it appears as well as the intellectual context of the views Scotus opposed in developing it.In the Ordinatiothe problem of whether there is natural knowledge of God is found in book I d. 3 pt. 1 q. 1-2.

Before stating his own views, Scotus gives a lengthy account of Henry of Ghent’s views. This is significant: the target of criticism here is not Aquinas, whose views are not mentioned; indeed, the only passage where Scotus analyzes any arguments of Aquinas is in Collatio 23.In this question Scotus criticizes the five arguments from the Summa contra gentiles (this is later picked up by Henry of Harclay who repeats them, only to be counter-attacked by Thomas of Sutton).We can only conclude that Aquinas’ views on analogy were not seen to be as important (or normative) circa 1300 as they were in the 1870’s to the present day.

According to Henry, there are three grades of the knowledge of God: most generally (generalissime), more generally (generalius) and generally (generaliter).

“Most generally” has three grades: (1) conceiving a being as “this being”; (2) removing “this” and conceiving being—this being is analogous to God and creature; (3) conceiving the being which is properly that of God, which Henry calls being “negatively undetermined.”

“More generally”: conceiving any divine attribute not as the primary divine attribute but as pre-eminently present in God.

“Generally”: conceiving any divine attribute as as being the same as the primary attribute, being, on account of divine simplicity.

Scotus contradicts the position of Henry on five points.

1. A quidditative concept can be had of God.

not only a concept of a general attribute can be had naturally, but also a quidditative and per se concept. The argument here is that (based on Henry’s views) when we conceive of divine wisdom, we also conceive of the subject of divine wisdom in which wisdom inheres; the concept of the subject, known as not reducible, ends the inquiry and is quidditative.

2. The univocal concept of God and creature

Scotus begins this section by noting that God can be conceived not only (note this) by an analogous concept, but by an univocal one. He does not deny analogy here, although his definition of analogy is that of Henry’s.

(1)every intellect, certain of one concept and doubtful of another, has a different concept for that which it is doubtful of and that which it is certain of.

(2)the intellect in the wayfaring state can be certain that God is a being, but doubtful whether he is a finite or infinite being or created or uncreated

(3)Therefore: the concept of the being of God is other than the concept of whether he is finite or infinite, or created or uncreated, and so neither of it self is included in the other.

(4)Therefore the concept is univocal.

Proof of the major premise: no concept is both certain and doubtful, therefore one or the other, which is what Scotus is trying to prove, or neither, and then there will be no certitude of any concept.

Proof of the minor premise: the ancient philosophers were certain that the first principle was a being (some thought it fire, others water), but they were not certain whether it was created or uncreated, first or not first. They were not certain that it was first, for then they would have been certain of something false and the false is not knowable. Nor were that certain that it was not the first being, because then they would not have posited the opposite of this.

(1)No real concept is caused naturally in the intellect of the wayfarer except those which are naturally able to move our intellect

(2)but these are a phantasm, or the object present in the phantasm, or the agent intellect.

(3)Therefore no simple concept is made naturally in our intellect now except which can be made in virtue of them.

(4)But a concept which would not be univocal to an object present in the phantasm, but entirely other, and prior, to that which has an analogical one, cannot be made by the power of the agent intellect and phantasm.

(5)Therefore such an other concept, analogous, will naturally never be in the intellect of the wayfarer, which is false.

Proof of the assumed: any object—whether present in the phantasm or in the intelligible species, with the agent and possible intellects cooperating—makes according to the extent of its power an effect adequate to itself, its own concept and a concept of everything essentially or virtually included in it. But an analogous concept is not essentially nor virtually included in it, nor is it the concept itself, therefore an analogous concept will not be made by such an object moving the intellect.

The idea here is that the analogy-tradition cannot get to God; since all holding analogy also think that all natural knowledge of God is based on concepts derived from the created realm, Scotus is trying to show that if you deny that these concepts are univocal and instead hold (as does Henry) that there are actually two concepts, one of God and one of a creature that are related by analogy, since God is not included in the created analogical concept you will not be able to move from the created concept to the uncreated naturally (which is contrary to what the holders of analogy maintain).

(1)a proper concept of some subject is a sufficient means of concluding all conceivable things about that subject which necessarily inhere in it.

(2)we have no concept of God through which we are able sufficiently to know all things conceived by us which necessarily inhere to God, as is clear regarding the Trinity and other necessary beliefs.

(3)Therefore, etc.

Proof of the Major premise: we have immediate knowledge of whatever we know the meaning of its terms; therefore the major is true of every conceivable which immediately inheres to the concept of the subject. If it should be said that it is mediate, the same argument will be made about the medium compared to the same subject, and where ever this ends the proposed will be had of the immediate, and further through them the mediates are known [?]

Either some pure perfection (perfectio simpliciter) has a notion (ratio) common to God and creature and so is univocal, or not. If not, then the notion is only that of a creature, and then the notion (ratio) does not formally befall God, which is unsuitable (inconveniens). Or has a notion proper to God, and then it follows that nothing is attributed to God, because it is a pure perfection, fo rthis is nothing other than to say that its notion as it befalls God means pure perfection, therefore it is posited in God; and so perishes the doctrine of Anselm in the Monologion... According to him, first something is known to be such and then it is attributed to God; therefore it is not precise such as it is in God.

A confirmation: every metaphysical inquiry about God proceeds by considering the formal notion/definition (ratio) of something and removing from that formal ratio the imperfection which it has as found in creatures, and reserving that formal ratio and attributing it only to the hightest perfection, and so attributing it to God. For example, take the formal ratio of wisdom or intellect or will: let it be considered in itself and according to itself; and from this that that ratio does not formally conclude some imperfection or limitation, are removed all the imperfections which accompany the ratio when found in creatures, and with that ratio reserved, most perfectly are the rationes of wiesdom and will attributed to God. Therefore all inquisition about God supposes the intellect to have the same concept, univocal, which it receives from creatures.

God is not known naturally and properly under the aspect of his essence as this essence by a creature in the wayfaring state. Scotus rejects Henry’s argument to this effect, and argues that under such an aspect only the divine intellect knows the divine essence as this essence, and it is only knowable to us in the wayfaring state if God wills it, which would make it a voluntary and not a natural object. No essence naturally knowable by us can lead to this knowledge, whether through the likeness of imitation or univocity. Univocity is only in general notions (generalibus rationibus; these work out to be the divine attributes, the Anselmian pure perfections taken as univocally common), and imitation fails because creatures imitate God imperfectly.

4. The concept of infinite being

We can attain to many proper concepts of God, that is, concepts that pertain only to God. These concepts are those of all pure perfections as they are found in the highest degree. The most perfect concept, in wi is by conceiving all perfections in an unqualified and highest degree. Teh most perfect and simple concept is that of infinite being. This concept is simpler than the concepts of the good and the true, because infinite is not a quasi attribute or passion of being or of that of which being is said. Infinity means an intrinsic mode, so that when I say ‘infinite being’ I do not have a concept quasi per accidens, made from subject and attribute, but a per se concept of a subject in a certain grade of perfection, namely of infinity. The example Scotus gives of intrinsic modes is whiteness. An intense whiteness does not mean a per accidens concept such as ‘visible whiteness’, rather ‘intense’ means an intrinsic grade of whiteness in itself.

5. God is known through a species of a creature

Creatures are able to impress intelligible species of varying universality in the human intellect. The same object can cause multiple species. A creature can impress species of itself, as well as of the transcendentals in the human intellect, and then the intellect by its own power can use multiple species to concieve that of which they are the species, such as the species of the good, the species of the highest, or of act, and compose a concept of the highest and most actual good.

4 comments:

Anonymous
said...

Drs Faber and Sullivan,

My comment is not with regards to the topic of this post, but I can think of no other way to contact you all. I am hoping to take an independent study with one of my professors next semester (he is Ted Guleserian) and we both agreed we could do something on the medieval philosophers' views on free will, perhaps focusing on the famed problem of free will and foreknowledge. My professor isn't a medievalist, however, and he told me he'd be learning these things along with me.

My question: what readily accessible (both in the sense of easy to understand [as easy as you can get with these guys!] and easy to get ahold of) works by various major medieval philosophers (Aquinas, Ockham, Anselm, Abelard, Duns Scotus, and perhaps some Moslems too) would you recommend to read to find their treatments on topics of free will and the free will/foreknowledge problem? Of course, I'd ask that they be works which are translated from the Latin because I can't do that kind of translating work myself; and I'd just ask for whichever works are most readily available, so that if the works by Anselm, say, are extremely hard to get ahold of, I will just not search for them.

The first and most important place to look is in Augustine and Boethius. Augustine discusses free will in his work of the same title, and time in the Confessions; then in Book V of Consolation of Philosophy Boethius brings Augustinian conceptions together in an excellent and concise discussion of the relation of free will to divine foreknowledge which is the fundamental source text for later mediaevals. After that I'd recommend going to St Thomas, since the relevant parts of the Summa are easy to find in English.

This is just off the top of my head; for anything else I'd have to look around and see what's available in English and what's not.

I'm not sure about the free will/ predestination/divine foreknowledge, but as far as the nature of the will goes (and whether or not it is determined to particulars or free with respect to its choice between this and that), a very good book is Bonnie Kent's Virtues of the Will.