Thursday, August 13, 2015

Since the time of Marshal Józef Piłsudski,
Polish foreign policy thinkers have periodically sought the creation of an
alliance of states in between Germany and Russia—from Estonia (and perhaps even
Finland and Scandinavia) in the north, to Ukraine (and potentially down to the
Balkans) in the south—as a way of promoting Poland’s interests and security.
But except in times of heightened East-West tension (such as during the August
2008 Russian-Georgian war), Warsaw has had little success in creating what some
might call a buffer zone or cordon
sanitaire, but which the Poles and their supporters have always labeled the
“Intermarium” (“Międzymorze”) or
“land between the seas” (for detailed background on this idea, see Marek Jan
Chodakiewicz, Intermarium:The
Land between the Black and Baltic Seas,
Transaction, 2012).

On August 5, one day before his
inauguration, Polish president-elect Andrzej Duda said that he would make the
creation of such an alliance among the states between the Baltic, Black and
Adriatic Seas the centerpiece of his foreign policy efforts. Over time, he
suggested, this regional bloc could lead to deeper economic, military and even
political integration (Forsal.pl,
August 5). Duda then alluded again to this proposal in more generalized
terms on his inauguration day (Prezydent.pl,
August 6). In doing so, he resuscitated an idea that had been pushed by his
predecessor and mentor, the former president Lech Kaczyński, who passionately
supported this brainchild of Piłsudski (Natemat.pl,
August 5). Kaczyński died in a tragic aircraft accident over western
Russia in April 2010—an accident that a small but vocal minority inside Poland remains
convinced was caused by Moscow. For its part, Moscow has always been against any
type of cooperation among the states of Central-Eastern Europe, viewing it as a
kind of wall blocking Russia off from the rest of Europe (Rusjev.net, August 6).

The new Polish head
of state clearly sees the time as being ripe for such a push: East-West
tensions are at their highest levels since the dark days of the Cold War;
Ukraine needs help, and cooperation of this kind with its Central-Eastern
European neighbors would open the way for more assistance; the United Kingdom
and France are not against an arrangement that might counterbalance growing
German power in the East; and Poland itself
is interested in creating an alliance or buffer zone to protect itself
against the aggressive designs of Vladimir Putin’s Russia. The United States
has not taken a position on this notion, but would likely oppose it if the Intermarium
is directed—as it almost certainly would be—against Moscow.

As Viktor
Shevchuk writes for Rusjev.net, if Poland and Ukraine were able to unite in
this way, they would become, within a decade or so, an economic, and
potentially, a military power on the same level as Germany, Britain or France,
far surpassing Russia, at least economically.
Moreover, he argues, from a geopolitical perspective, an Intermarium
alliance would throw Russia back “to the position it occupied in pre-Petrine
times”—that is, largely depriving it of access to Europe except through third
countries (Rusjev.net, August 6).

What are the
prospects for the formation of an Intermarium alliance or even more? Some in
Poland and elsewhere are dismissing this as Duda repaying a debt to his late mentor.
They believe his foreign policy promises will have no further consequence
beyond empty rhetoric or energizing the Law and Justice’s (the political party
of both Duda and Kaczyński) electorate ahead of the upcoming parliamentary
elections. Moreover, these same commentators note that under the Polish
constitution, President Duda cannot act unilaterally; and they expect Polish
parliamentarians to be suspicious of any assumption of such a geopolitical
burden, even for possible enormous geopolitical gains (Rusjev.net, August 6).

But the biggest obstacle is
Russia: Moscow will do whatever it takes to prevent the formation of such a
bloc, not only because of what the Intermarium would mean directly but because
the Kremlin would assume that such a grouping or unity would be used by the
West as a Trojan horse against Russian interests. Consequently, the prospects
for this idea are not great, but its attractions to many in the region are substantial,
indeed.

Friday, August 7, 2015

On July 14, after a long period of tense
and complicated negotiations, the “P5+1” group—the United States, Russia,
France, China, the United Kingdom and Germany—reached a historical deal with
Iran over the Islamic Republic’s nuclear program. The nuclear deal will have
both global and regional consequences, especially for Iran’s neighboring
states. In this context, the agreement is of crucial importance for Iran’s
landlocked northern neighbor Armenia. For the past 20 years, Armenia has lived
under a dual blockade imposed by Turkey and Azerbaijan. Thus, the country’s
cooperation with Iran serves crucially as one of Armenia’s two remaining possible
routes (the other being across Georgia) to access the global market. Consequently,
the long-term hostility in Iran’s relations with the West and rigorous international
restrictions on Iran had provoked a deep anxiety in Armenia.

Armenia announce its official position on
the Iranian de-nuclearization accord immediately after the deal was reached. On
July 14, the minister of foreign affairs of Armenia, Edward Nalbandian, stated:
“Armenia welcomes the agreement reached over the Iranian nuclear program as a
result of constructive and goal-oriented efforts by Iran and the international
mediators. This long-expected agreement is an important achievement in favor of
strengthening international, regional stability and cooperation. We [Armenia] hope
that it will be an additional impetus to the enhancement of trade and economic
cooperation between Armenia and friendly Iran, the realization of joint
projects” (Mfa.am, July 14).

The possible implications of the Iran deal for
Armenia will have political, economic and geopolitical consequences. From a
political point of view, Armenia will no longer be bound by the United States’
and the European Union’s sanctions as obstacles to wider and deeper political
dialogue with Iranian authorities. Previously, the US aimed at isolating Iran
from almost all of its neighbors. But after the détente in US-Iranian
relations, new conditions may now be able to emerge for further political
dialogue between the governments of Yerevan and Tehran.

The economic aspect of the deal is perhaps the
most important dividend for Armenia. As Foreign Minister Nalbandian mentioned
in his statement, the nuclear deal has opened new perspectives for bolstering
bilateral economic relations and joint projects. According to the Custom
Service of Armenia, in 2014 Armenia-Georgia trade turnover reached nearly $150 million,
whereas the trade with Iran reached $290 million (Customs.am, accessed July 23).
Nevertheless, the majority of Armenian exports presently reach global markets via
Georgian transit. For now, overland travel between Armenia and Iran is limited
to one bridge across the Arax River. But once on the Armenian side of the
border, this road then becomes the country’s major “North-South” highway, which
is currently under renewed construction for the purpose of “expanding and
facilitating [Armenia’s] access to foreign markets toward Central Asia and
Europe” (Northsouth.am, accessed July 23).

Both the Armenian government and the
domestic expert community believes that the new situation brought about by the
Iran deal will have a positive impact on economic cooperation between Armenia
and the Islamic Republic. While delivering a speech at the joint summit of the BRICS
(Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa), the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU)
and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), in Ufa last month, President
Sargsyan expressed hope that “success would crown negotiations on the Iranian
nuclear file, which in turn will strengthen both international and regional
security and stability, as well as open up new opportunities for economic
cooperation” (President.am, July 9).

The discussion over the future construction
of the Armenia-Iran railway is a top issue in the two countries’ bilateral
economic agenda. At the July Ufa summit and during his earlier state visit to
China (March 24–28), President Sargsyan stressed the importance of the railway
and invited all interested parties to contribute to this project. The nuclear
deal, if it is successfully implemented, is expected to open Iran up to
significant flows of foreign direct investment, thus increasing the possible
interest of foreign companies in the railway project. This fact attracted even the
Chinese official news agency, “Xinhua” (Russian.news.cn, July 15).

Along with the railway program, the two
states will now have the opportunity to initiate cooperation in other spheres
of mutual interest, especially in agriculture and cattle breeding. Expert Sevak
Sarukhanyan mentions that some investment in Armenian farm industry are focused
on export to Iran, however the heretofore instability of the Iranian currency
(which was directly connected with sanctions) until now halted all goods
exchanges in this sphere (Media-center.am, July 17).

The geopolitical consequences will have
long-term effect on Armenia’s foreign and economic policy. Armenia is the only
member of the EEU that neighbors Iran and the wider Middle East. Therefore, if
economic cooperation between the Eurasian Union and Iran grows in the coming years,
Armenia will inevitably gain transit status, connecting the transport routes of
the EEU members with those of Iran. Armenian ambassador to Iran, Artashes
Tumanyan, states that Iran will have the opportunity to enter the 200-milion-person
market of the EEU, and considers Armenia “a gate to the EEU” for Iranian
exporters (Armenia.irib.ir, July 15). Moreover, at the Ufa summit, President
Sargsyan declared that “interaction at the junction of the BRICS-EEU-SCO lies
in our [Armenian] interests in ensuring complementarity and mutually beneficial
development of those integration processes” and that “construction of the
railroad connecting Armenia to Iran might be such a project that would provide
the EEU nations with direct access to the Indian Ocean through the Persian
Gulf” (President.am, July 9).

The obstacle to Armenia’s ability to take
on a large-scale transit role is the lack of a common border with the EEU.
Goods from Armenia to the rest of the EEU—and vice-versa—are, therefore, mainly
limited to passing overland through Georgia. But although Georgia is pursuing
European integration, Georgian officials have always underlined that the
difference in Georgian versus Armenian integration models will not affect bilateral
relations and that this “might set a good example for the international
community” (Gov.am, August 21, 2014).

In
order to make the road connection with Armenia stronger, Russia plans to repair
the Avar-Kakheti road that passes from Dagestan southward to the border with
Georgia (Georgianjournal.ge, October 23, 2014). Despite warnings from experts
about the negative implications of the Russian Avar-Kakheti road to Georgia’s
security (Gcssi.org, July 31; see
EDM, October
2, 2014; December
15, 2014), the Georgian government does not seem opposed: The secretary of
the Security Council of Georgia, Irine Imerlishvili, said late last year that
“the Avar-Kakheti road,” which would be linked up with the strategically
important east-west Georgian Military Road, “does not threaten the security of
Georgia” (Vestikavkaza.ru, December 14, 2014). So, in case of successful
reconstruction of the road, Armenia and Iran would have easier access to the EEU.

About The Jamestown Foundation

The Jamestown Foundation’s mission is to inform and educate policy makers and the broader community about events and trends in those societies which are strategically or tactically important to the United States and which frequently restrict access to such information. Utilizing indigenous and primary sources, Jamestown’s material is delivered without political bias, filter or agenda. It is often the only source of information which should be, but is not always, available through official or intelligence channels, especially in regard to Eurasia and terrorism.