The Limits of Envelopment: The Invasion of Serbia, 1915

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The achievement of encircling and destroying an enemy force is something that commanders throughout time have sought to attain. In the Imperial German army, with the shining examples of Helmut von Moltke the Elder (1800-91)'s victories over the French at Metz and Sedan in 1870, envelopment of the enemy became the standard intermediate goal of German war planning. The ultimate goal, based on the writing of Prussian theorist Carl von Clausewitz (1780-1831), was the destruction of the opposing force in a decisive battle. Envelopment thus was not a goal in itself, but rather merely a means to an end. (1)

The concept of envelopment was greatly emphasized over the course of Count Alfred von Schlieffen (1833-1913)'s tenure as Chief of the General Staff. Schlieffen's interest in encirclement was enhanced, rather ironically, by his reading an analysis of the battle of Cannae in 216 BCE by Hans Delbruck (1848-1929), the one-time scourge of the German General Staff. (2) Schlieffen, faced with the prospect of a two-front war against France and Russia, ultimately decided that France would have to be decisively dealt with first, as a quick defeat of France would spare the German army the prospect of a potentially open ended campaign in the endless spaces of the Russian hinterland. (3) To attain the defeat of France, Schlieffen sought to get to the French operational flank, which ultimately could be attained only by going through Luxembourg, Belgium, and even Holland. Ultimately, as recent scholarship has shown, Schlieffen envisioned a large scale battle (Schlieffen used the term Gesamtschlacht, literally translated as "total battle") somewhere between Paris and the Franco-German border. The capture of Paris was envisioned only as a contingency. (4)

When Schlieffen retired at the end of 1905, he was succeeded by Helmut von Moltke the Younger (1848-1916), so called as he was the nephew of the victor of 1866 and 1870. Moltke basically adhered to Schlieffen's concept, although he did make some changes on the edges, such as removing Holland from the plan. Nonetheless, the stress on the ultimate encirclement and especially destruction of the French forces remained the essence of the plan. (5)

In the actual event, envelopment or encirclement proved something of a chimera. The execution of the German war plan in the west miscarried in 1914 for a variety of reasons, up to and including the refusal of the French to go along with the plan. In the east, General Yakov Zhilinski (1853-1918)'s Russian Northwest Front attempted its own encirclement of the German forces in East Prussia. The result, however, was less than satisfactory for Zhilinski, as major elements of one of his enveloping pincers, General Aleksandr Samsonov (1859-1914)'s Russian Second Army, were encircled and destroyed at Tannenberg. In Galicia, the Austro-Hungarian armies directed by Franz Conrad von Hotzendorf (1852-1925) had their flanks partially enveloped by the armies of General Nikolai Ivanov (1851-1919)'s Russian Southwest Front, that were endowed with the combination of superior numbers and an abundance of space in which to maneuver. (6)

The chimera of encirclement remained a powerful influence in some circles of the German high command. The most notable devotees of this were the duumvirate that controlled the principal German headquarters in the east (Oberbefehlshaber Ost, or Ober Ost), Field Marshal Paul von Hindenburg (1847-1934) and his chief of staff, Major General Erich Ludendorff (1865-1937). (7) In early 1915, they attempted to replicate their success at Tannenberg by launching an attack against the Russian Tenth Army, in an attempt to achieve a decisive victory and to bring succor to Germany's hard pressed Austro-Hungarian allies then locked in a vicious struggle against Russian forces in the Carpathian passes. Although great results were expected, the combination of tough Russian resistance in spots, plus the harsh winter conditions and primitive environment, meant that the Second Masurian Lakes operation did not bring about the destruction of the Russian XX Corps. Nor did the effort bring any material help to Conrad's failing attempts to fight through the Carpathians and relieve the besieged fortress of Przemysl. (8)

The ensuing campaign in Galicia conducted by the German and Austro-Hungarian forces under Colonel General (later Field Marshal) August von Mackensen (1849-1945) and his chief of staff, Major General Hans von Seeckt (1866-1936), and the following drive into Russian Poland, brought about an interesting argument over encirclement. Ober Ost, especially Ludendorff, envisioned two large pincers ultimately meeting at Minsk, a deep envelopment of the Russian forces still fighting in Poland. (9) The de-facto head of the German high command (Oberste Heeresleitung, or OHL), General of Infantry Erich von Falkenhayn (1861-1922), had something much less ambitious in mind. Working off of a concept initially developed by Seeckt in mid-June 1915, Falkenhayn sought a much shallower envelopment, with the major targets of the Central Powers' offensive being much further to the west than those proposed by Ludendorff. Ultimately, Falkenhayn was able to get his way, securing Kaiser Wilhelm II's support as well as Conrad's backing, and then having the decision confirmed at a very contentious meeting with Ober Ost at Posen on 2 July 1915. (10)

Although the approach taken by Falkenhayn, Mackensen, and Seeckt was more consonant with the logistical realities of the eastern front, it too revealed the difficulties inherent in attempting to envelop a large force. Tough Russian resistance against Mackensen's forces in the south and Colonel General Max von Gallwitz (1852-1937)'s German Twelfth Army trying to cross the swampy Narew River forced the Germans and Austro-Hungarians to take a methodical approach to break the Russian defensive positions. Alive to the danger of encirclement, the Russian forces were able to evade the grasping pincers, scorching the earth as they retreated. Ultimately the operation took on the character of a general pursuit, bringing in considerable hauls in prisoners, guns, and equipment, plus conquering large swaths of territory, catching the enemy in an envelopment remained as elusive as ever. (11)

The next (and actually last) great attempt to envelop and destroy an enemy force was in the invasion of Serbia. The campaign was born of the need to open a direct route to Ottoman Turkey, Germany's hard pressed ally, fighting against the British in the Middle East and Gallipoli as well as against the Russians in the Caucasus. Serbia, at the heart of the chain of events that had led to the war, had fought off three separate Austro-Hungarian invasions over the course of 1914, inflicting humiliating defeats on the poorly commanded Austro-Hungarian forces. (12) Although the need for a renewed invasion of Serbia had been understood by both political and military leaders in Germany as early as the fall of 1914, the head of OHL, Erich von Falkenhayn, had to put off the operation for the time being. (13) Falkenhayn's immediate concern in early 1915 was the Russian threat to Austria-Hungary. This was resolved by the offensive launched by Mackensen's forces at Gorlice-Tarnow, and later the offensive into Poland. By the late summer of 1915, the Russian threat to Austria-Hungary was but a memory. …

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