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Reproduced below is German
Army Chief of Staff
Erich von Falkenhayn's
account of
the resumed French Champagne Offensive in September 1915.

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Regarded as the major
Allied undertaking of 1915 the offensive quickly became bogged down in the
face of determined German opposition. It was eventually called off for
relatively little material advance.

In his account Falkenhayn
acknowledged certain minor Allied gains but argued that these were minimised
in the face of superior German defences, and particularly by the conduct of
German troops on the ground. He was particularly dismissive of French
Army Commander-in-Chief
Joseph Joffre's optimistic
plans for the battle.

Click here to read the official French statement on the
offensive.
Click here to read the official German statement on the
offensive.

German Chief of Staff Erich
von Falkenhayn on the Battle of Champagne, September 1915

The failure of the
long-expected attacks in France to materialize led us in August to doubt whether
the attempt at relief, now that it could no longer be of use to the Russians,
would be undertaken at all.

For a time we were disposed to
regard the enemy's advancing preparations for attack as a feint. However, from
the beginning of September onwards, more and more frequent reports went to show
that we had to expect an early attack by the British, supported by the French,
in the neighbourhood of Lille, with a simultaneous offensive by the French alone
in Champagne.

In Flanders and Artois, on a front of over 50 miles as the crow flies, the Sixth
Army of the Crown Prince Rupprecht of Bavaria (Chief of Staff being
Major-General Kuhl) held the line with sixteen divisions from south of Ypres,
immediately east of Armentieres, west of Lens, east of Arras, to a point 10
miles from the latter town.

In Champagne, the Third Army, under General von
Einem, with seven and a half divisions, held, on a front of fully30 miles,
positions which ran from north of Rheims to Massiges. In touch on the left, as
far as the Argonne, stood the right wing of the Fifth Army of the German Crown
Prince, with two divisions in line.

On the 21st September drum fire
began against the Sixth Army, and on the 22nd against the Third and the right
wing of the Fifth, of an intensity similar to that which we had for the first
time employed on a large scale at Gorlice-Tarnow.

Reinforcements from the scanty
general reserve had already been sent to the threatened armies, and were now
sent in greater numbers. The Third and Sixth Armies received heavy batteries and
one infantry division each, the Third having a brigade of infantry in addition.

The bombardment raged with
almost undiminished fury in Champagne until the 24th, and in Flanders until the
25th September. On those days the infantry attacks began on both fronts.

Although the terrible gunfire had caused hitherto unheard-of destruction both in
and far behind our positions, in addition to very heavy losses in men, the
French were unable to gain any vital advantages on the 24th in Champagne.

The
English, on the other hand, on the first day of their attack, by the employment
of gas, succeeded in occupying our foremost positions at Loos over a breadth of
7 miles. They were, however, unable to develop this success. Incessant
counter-attacks of the brave defenders not only prevented this, but also
recovered substantial portions of the lost positions. The French, who attacked
the Sixth Army on both sides of the Scarpe in conjunction with the English,
achieved no successes worthy of mention at all.

The position in Champagne on
the 25th September was much more serious. Continuing their offensive, the French
on this day, on and to the east of the Souain-Somme-Py road, with seventeen
divisions, drove the remnants of two German divisions, on a front of 15 miles,
with a depth of 2 miles, back into their rear positions, which unfortunately
had also been shot to pieces.

A serious crisis arose, leading the Staff of the
Third Army to consider the advisability of a further withdrawal of the whole
army front. Such a step would of necessity have led to very serious
consequences, firstly in the moral effect, which would inevitably have been
general, secondly in the tactical results on the neighbouring fronts, and
finally by giving space to the enemy masses, which were crowded helplessly
together against present positions, to escape from their momentarily intolerable
situation.

Fortunately the proposed
withdrawal was never carried out. On the urgent advice of the Chief of Staff of
the neighbouring Fifth Army, Major-General Schmidt von Knobelsdorf, the
consideration of the matter was adjourned until the arrival of G.H.Q., who
were on their way to the Western front, and after their arrival at noon on the
25th September, there was no further question of any voluntary withdrawal.

There
were still reserves available. They at once threw into Champagne one of the last
divisions of the general reserve from Alsace, and the 10th Army Corps, the
Guards Corps going to the Sixth Army. Both these corps had just reached Belgium
from the East.

This additional strength
sufficed to some extent to break the weight of the enemy's first attacks on the
fighting fronts, but it was insufficient to repel the whole offensive, which
lasted for many days. The heavy fighting wore down the strength even of
formations freshly thrown in, all the more quickly because heavy rain had set in
on the evening of the 25th September, turning the shell-torn battlefield into a
marsh.

True, the difficulties thus caused were no doubt even more noticeable in
attack than in defence. The enormous numerical superiority against which we had
to contend is well illustrated by the fact that there were thrown in against the
Third Army no less than thirty-five French divisions, with 2,000 heavy and 3,000
field guns. Behind them were numerous cavalry divisions, of which considerable
portions actually took part, ready to attack.

Accordingly, in the first half
of October, G.H.Q. had many worn troops replaced by fresh divisions, drawn
from quiet sectors of the front, until the arrival of further forces from the
East relieved them of the task. Apart from the modest initial successes
above-mentioned, the enemy had no further advantages of any importance to
record. The fighting did not, however, die down in Flanders until the 13th, or
in Champagne until the 10th October.

"The greatest battle of all
time," as the commander of an English Guards division described it in divisional
orders on the eve of the battle, had been fought. But it had not achieved the
success contemplated by the French C.-in-C., General Joffre, in his battle
orders.

They had not driven the Germans
out of France, not a single one of their countrymen had been freed from his
twelve months' "slavery," and a splendid victory had not been won over the
Germans. The only effect one must admit is that, not the attack, but the
anticipation of it, and the preparation to meet it, had an influence on the
German operations against Russia.

But this fact cannot be credited to the
battle, being a simple result of waging war on many fronts. The "greatest battle
of all time" became a terrible defeat for the attackers. Tremendous sacrifices
in men and material were made for a result which was nothing in comparison to
the objectives aimed at, and in itself amounted to but little, for it was of no
importance from the general point of view whether a few narrow sectors of the
German positions had to be withdrawn a few miles or not. The defensive system
remained absolutely unshaken.

Nor could we have done any more
with all the additional men we might have brought up by breaking off the Eastern
operations earlier. The troops and material available would not even then have
been sufficient for counterattacks, or attacks on other fronts, with large
objectives. And to have made any sacrifice for the sake of local successes was
not at that time in our interests.

Without involving any prejudice to the aims
which we could, on a sober calculation of all the conditions, reasonably pursue
in the East, the reinforcements arrived in the West at exactly the right moment
for the task allotted to them there. Had they arrived earlier they might have
ensured that the small indentations in our front should be smaller still, but
that was of no importance for the general position, while their earlier recall
from the Eastern front would have crippled the operations in progress there, the
prospects of which were most emphatically described by the commanders on the
spot as extraordinarily good.

Finally, it must not be forgotten that the German soldier on the Western front
is entitled to most of the credit for the fact that the reinforcements from the
East came up in time. His marvellous resistance in the pitifully shattered
positions in Flanders and Champagne warded off the danger of their reaching the
front line too late.

Amid death and terror he clung
firm, in accordance with his battle orders, to the spot he had to defend, in
countless cases even when there had long been no officer or N.C.O. left to set
him an example.

Not content with that, he attacked with magnificent
self-sacrifice the enemy masses surging over and around him, whenever
opportunity arose. Thus were formed firm islands and islets in the sea of
destruction created by the enemy artillery.

Against these, the first waves of
the enemy infantry attacks were broken, but the masses following them pressed
forward unceasingly. Blocks and bunches of men formed, in which the German
artillery tore tremendous gaps, while it became impossible to maintain order. Enemy reinforcements failed. The more men were brought up, the worse the
position became. The offensive was throttled by his own mass.

No language could be too strong to describe the achievements of the German
troops in the Champagne battlefield in those days. Every great deed hitherto
done in war paled beside their heroism.

This tribute to the German soldier involves no depreciation of his enemies. To
be defeated in a fight against heroes is no disgrace. If the French and English
cannot be placed on the same level as the defenders, they certainly did their
duty nobly. Their losses are the best proof of this. The lack of success was due
to no failure of theirs. It was probably mainly due to the plan of operations.