PhD in Economics from UCLA, MSc in Mathematics from IMPA, Professor of Economics at the University of Brasilia.

Apr 16, 2017

The ontological necessity of soul according to Marsilio Ficino(Rodrigo Peñaloza, 16/4/2017)

Here I present quite succinctly the neoplatonic argument for the existence of soul as summarized by Marsilio Ficino (1433–1499) in his Theologia Platonica de Immortalitate Animorum. The main line of the argument relies on Aristotle’s four causes.

There are four kinds of causes, according to Aristotle: efficient, final, material, and formal. When applied to Man, the efficient cause is Nature, the final cause is happiness, the material cause is body, and the formal cause is the soul. As pointed out by Marsilio Ficino:

In the ancient texts, the concept of soul is given by the anima or ψυχή (psyché) in the Aristotelian sense of animic principle, vital force, which is divided into vegetative, animal, and rational soul. If something exists without cause, it is said to exist per se. Only God is causeless, thus only God exists per se. On the other hand, body needs all four causes, because of its passive nature, often symbolized by the image of a receptacle or cup (patera, κράτηρ [kráter]) ready to receive. Then matter exists “omnino per alia”, absolutely through other things.

God and Matter are, therefore, two opposite extremes in causal terms: while God is causeless, Matter needs them all. Then, there must be something between God and Matter, something which is neither per se neither omnino per alia. This intermediate being is soul (anima). Indeed, as Marsilio Ficino writes: