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Xinjiang Unrest

A striking feature of the riots unfolding in the far-western province of Xinjiang this week is that the Chinese press is actively reporting on them. On Monday afternoon, for instance, the state-run news service was announcing that the death toll had risen to a hundred and forty, and that the unrest had “bruised the beautiful city of Urumqi and shocked the world, barely sixteen months after the nightmarish Lhasa violence that still clings to many Chinese minds.” It is a remarkable contrast with the posture of the Chinese press three or four years ago, when Chinese authorities punished editors who covered acts of unrest that might suggest social tension in the countryside.

Not anymore. As David Bandurski, of the China Media Project at the University of Hong Kong, points out in a characteristically smart post, this new policy of actively reporting mass unrest is part of a fundamental shift in Party ideological strategy that Bandurski and his colleague Qian Gang have dubbed “Control 2.0.” In short, that strategy means “overtures of ‘transparency’ within the context of tightening control.” As Bandurski has documented in recent months, “we have seen much faster response on the part of the government, which has moved to release limited information quickly through official media.” So is this a sign of greater openness?

Far from it, he concludes. The state still vigorously controls information on political corruption and other sensitive issues, but, in the face of the information revolution, the government of Hu Jintao has taken a sharp turn toward, in Party-speak, “grabbing the initiative” on the news. Bandurski quotes from People’s Daily from a little over a week ago:

In the age of the Web, everyone can potentially be a source of information and a wellspring of opinion. It is as though everyone has a microphone before them. This has raised the bar on the need for public opinion channeling. Faced with sudden-breaking issues, it is not sufficient for the government and mainstream [official] media to release information. They must also move quickly to understand the pulse of new information emerging on the Internet, reacting quickly to public doubts. This requires that governments, and especially propaganda offices, be equipped with the ability to rapidly and accurately compile and analyze public opinion.

If this pattern continues, expect to hear a lot more from the Chinese official media in the days ahead.

Evan Osnos joined The New Yorker as a staff writer in 2008, and covers politics and foreign affairs.