Authors:Maxim BelyaevAbstract: This is a review of the fifth issue of the international almanac “Philosophy of Religion", prepared by the Institute of Philosophy of the Russian Academy of Sciences with the support of the Society of Christian Philosophers. The texts composing almanac are evaluated from criteria of their originality, informativeness, scientific novelty and justifyability. The reviewer seeks to be unprejudiced, paying attention both to the merits of the philosophical and theological positions presented in the text, and to imperfections, which are generated by objective and subjective conditions.PubDate: Tue, 18 Jul 2017 08:03:13 GMT

Authors:John Henry NewmanAbstract: “Lectures on Justification" were read by John Henry Newman, one of the leaders of the Tractarian movement, in 1837 in Oxford, and then published in 1838. This series of lectures exemplifies Newman's doctrine of the “via media" of the Anglican Church. According to this doctrine, Anglican Church is supposed to pass between the extremes of papism and popular Protestantism. The tenth lecture examines the relationship between faith and justification. The author criticizes the popular Protestant doctrine of justification by faith only that neglects the office of sacraments in salvation. He suggests the interpretation of faith as one of the instruments of justification, which justifies only after and not before the baptism.PubDate: Tue, 18 Jul 2017 08:03:11 GMT

Authors:Yulia GorbatovaAbstract: This work is a review of the book by Stephen T. Davis “God, Reason, and Theistic Proofs". The author discusses some methodological, logical and ontological advantages and disadvantages of this book as well as some features related to the translation of the book into Russian. The analysis is presented here not in chronological (chapter by chapter), but in a thematic order that enables the reader to get quickly acquainted with topics and problems considered in the book.PubDate: Tue, 18 Jul 2017 08:03:10 GMT

Authors:Alexander MishuraAbstract: This paper briefly surveys the intellectual context of the lecture “The Office of Justifying Faith" by John Henry Newman. Newman is an outstanding English theologian, writer and philosopher, who had a great influence on the development of the Anglican and Roman Catholic churches in the 19th and 20th centuries. Newman became one of the leaders of the so-called Tractarian Movement. Tractarians offered a radically new understanding of the relation between the Anglican Church and other ecumenical churches. The most famous expression of this rethinking was the branch theory. According to this theory, the Anglican Church is one of the three branches of a single universal Church alongside the Roman Catholic and Orthodox churches. According to the Newman's doctrine of via media, Anglican Church represents the middle way between Roman Catholic Church and Protestant Churches. In the “Lectures on Justification" published in 1838, Newman applies the doctrine of via media to the set of problems that concern the Christian idea of justification. The lecture “The Office of Justifying Faith" is in this sense a very characteristic example of the doctrine of via media. Here Newman demonstrates the difference between the doctrines of the Anglican Church about the relationship between justification and faith and the doctrine of the Protestants about justification by faith only.PubDate: Tue, 18 Jul 2017 08:03:09 GMT

Authors:Alexander KhramovAbstract: The author applies reformed epistemology supplemented by some ideas from evolutionary cognitive science to consider the problem of justification of belief in the God of revelation. He argues that since our cognitive faculties are the result of evolution by natural selection, we have strong reasons for supposing that those spheres of reality which bore neither direct nor indirect relations to the survival needs of our ancestors lie outside our natural knowledge. If there is a certain mighty and benevolent agent, that is, God, which belongs to this unknowable reality, we can expect that he would not leave us ignorant of his existence, even if we are not able to learn about him by ourselves. It could be supposed that God, in order to make us believe in Him, uses the conjunctions of natural circumstances foreseen by Him, in addition to the revelation given in a supernatural way. Therefore, if God exists and one believes in Him, one's religious belief is a product of reliable belief-forming processes installed by God. So, this belief could be regarded as warranted even without appropriate evidences.PubDate: Tue, 18 Jul 2017 08:03:08 GMT

Authors:Larisa MikhaylovaAbstract: The author analyses the specifics of religious consciousness in the post-secular socio-cultural space. The main focus is the study of the nature and dynamics of spirituality in the Post-Soviet Russian society, clarifying the semantic contents of the dichotomous variables “believer - non-believer", “religious - non-religious", and explaining the functioning of these concepts in the mass religious consciousness. Based on the extensive material of sociological studies conducted in Russia over the past decades, the author attempts to identify covert processes that affect the results of religious identification. Among the main features of the modern religious mass consciousness are the following: external nature of spirituality, ethno-confessional reductionism, eclecticism of religious beliefs, magical perception of the sacred, virtualization of religion, religious intolerance, as a result of predominance of the first-generation believers.PubDate: Tue, 18 Jul 2017 08:03:07 GMT

Authors:Jeffrey KoperskiAbstract: Scientific knowledge is not merely a matter of reconciling theories and laws with data and observations. Science presupposes a number of metatheoretic shaping principles in order to judge good methods and theories from bad. Some of these principles are metaphysical (e.g., the uniformity of nature) and some are methodological (e.g., the need for repeatable experiments). While many shaping principles have endured since the scientific revolution, others have changed in response to conceptual pressures both from within science and without. Many of them have theistic roots. For example, the notion that nature conforms to mathematical laws flows directly from the early modern presupposition that there is a divine Lawgiver. This interplay between theism and shaping principles is often unappreciated in discussions about the relation between science and religion. Today, of course, naturalists reject the influence of theism and prefer to do science on their terms. But as Robert Koons and Alvin Plantinga have argued, this is more difficult than is typically assumed. In particular, they argue, metaphysical naturalism is in conflict with several metatheoretic shaping principles, especially explanatory virtues such as simplicity and with scientific realism more broadly. These arguments will be discussed as well as possible responses. In the end, theism is able to provide justification for the philosophical foundations of science that naturalism cannot.PubDate: Tue, 18 Jul 2017 08:03:06 GMT

Authors:Igor NevvazhayAbstract: Author discusses the problem of the relation between scientific and theological discourses. He argues both against the thesis about science and religion as complementary parts as well as against the thesis that they stay in conflict. He defends the position of the strong separation of theology and science. The author considers three fundamental philosophical problems that mark the difference in rational consideration between science and theology: emergence of the world, foundations of belief and knowledge, modes of scientific and religious discourses. The author claims that the incompatibility in the understanding of the emergence of the world in science and religion lies in the concept of the observer: the “external" observer in theology and the “internal" observer in science. “Experience" in science and “religious experience" have different sources, different criteria for reliability, different existential meaning. Religion and science have different purposes: the domination of man over himself in religions and the domination of man over the outside world in science. Therefore, religion and science use fundamentally various discourses: a descriptive discourse in science and prescriptive discourse in religion. Therefore, I think that the dialogue between religion and science doesn't make any sense neither for religion nor for science.PubDate: Tue, 18 Jul 2017 08:03:05 GMT

Authors:Svetlana KonachevaAbstract: The article is devoted to the phenomenological and postphenomenological approaches in philosophy of religion. In the first part of the article the author considers the early Heidegger's philosophy of religion. Heidegger understands the philosophy of religion within his philosophy of the facticity. He considers historical dimension as a key phenomenon of religion. The author focuses on the concept of formal indication as a particular attitude overcoming the theoretical approach. The formal indication achieves the enactment-aspect of phenomenon. In the second part the author deals with methodological issues of phenomenological- hermeneutical philosophy of religion (John Caputo, Richard Kearney), demonstrating the possibility to think of God after God, non-metaphysical thinking of God. It is analyzed Caputo's critique of metaphysics and his concept of “religion without religion". She examines also the notion of micro-eschatological reduction in diacritical hermeneutics of Richard Kearney comparing this kind of reduction with transcendental (Husserl), ontological (Heidegger) and donological (Marion) reduction. The author argues that the phenomenological and post-phenomenological approaches in philosophy of religion unites the understanding of the philosophy of religion, not as one of particular section of philosophy, questioning about the specific region of human existence, rather, the phenomenon of religious experience becomes the starting point of an integrated system of philosophy. The main task here is phenomenological understanding of the original orientations of religious life in its facticity. It's argued that philosophy of religion should arise from our own historical situation and facticity.PubDate: Tue, 18 Jul 2017 08:03:03 GMT

Authors:Igor GasparovAbstract: The author considers the account of epistemic authority as it was proposed by Linda Zagzebski in her book “Epistemic Authority: A Theory of Trust, Authority, and Autonomy in Belief" [Zagzebski, 2012]. Zagzebski claims that the idea of epistemic authority could be reconciled with the modern idea of epistemic subject's autonomy without rejecting the principles of contemporary liberalism. The author aims to show that even if Zazgebski is right in claiming that epistemic authority and epistemic autonomy are closely connected to each other the nature of their connection is different from that which Zagzebski believes to be. In the further analysis the author shows that weakness of her account is that it cannot explain where the substantial link between a subject's following after an epistemic authority and this subject's intention of getting truth can be.PubDate: Tue, 18 Jul 2017 08:03:01 GMT

Authors:John GrecoAbstract: The author addresses his replies to the issues raised in the comments by Professors Berestov, Butakov, Gaginsky and Maslov. This includes some general points about methodology for skeptical arguments, and a related point about the scope of John Greco's project. Some more specific issues raised by my commentators are then considered.PubDate: Tue, 18 Jul 2017 08:03:00 GMT

Authors:Linda ZagzebskiAbstract: Contemporary defenders of autonomy and traditional defenders of authority generally assume that they have so little in common as to make it hopeless to attempt a dialogue on the defensibility of epistemic, moral, or religious authority. In this paper I argue that they are mistaken. Under the assumption that the ultimate authority over the self is the self, I defend authority in the realm of belief on the same grounds as Joseph Raz uses in his well-known defense of political authority in the tradition of political liberalism. The acceptance of authority over certain beliefs extends to moral and religious beliefs and is not only consistent with autonomy, but is entailed by rational self-governance.PubDate: Tue, 18 Jul 2017 08:03:00 GMT

Authors:Pavel ButakovAbstract: The author does not aim to argue with John Greco's theory, but to find out whether it requires any adjustment. The author claims that Greco's theory of the social transmission of knowledge requires the transmitted knowledge to be socially verifiable, that is, to be subject to those means of confirmation that pertain to the social system. Unfortunately, some kinds of religious knowledge are not socially verifiable; therefore, they cannot be transmitted via Greco's social mechanism. The author concludes that Greco's theory turns out to be applicable to the socially verifiable religious testimonies, and not applicable to the rest.PubDate: Tue, 18 Jul 2017 08:02:58 GMT

Authors:Denis MaslovAbstract: The article considers John Greco's conception of testimonial knowledge that aims to overthrow three sceptical arguments against religious knowledge. Prof. Greco presupposes that a religious community already possesses a true religious belief and its reliability is justified exclusively by means of the reliability of transmission. The author puts this conception into question and presents some sceptical arguments regarding the initial origination of a religious belief and verifying the truth-ness of a religious belief in front of epistemic disagreement problem. In particular, he draws an attention on three moments: 1) difference between inside and outside position as to any religious community, 2) lack of inductive verifying evidence in support of religious knowledge, and 3) difference between origination a belief in a community for the first time and transmission of beliefs already given in a community. The author takes a perspective of an outsider who doesn't belong to any religious community (on the assumption that there are secular communities different from religious ones). Firstly, he suggests another from Greco's version of the “luck argument", which concerns the luck in origination of a belief, not the accidence in spreading it. John Greco solves a problem that arises from argument of luck as far as it regards transmission of beliefs inside a community. The author argues that the genuine problem is to establish an originating source of a religious belief, and taking that into consideration, testimonial evidence cannot eliminate this kind of luck. Secondly, he observes the problem of disagreement among different religious communities. He shows that an outsider doesn't have any epistemic reason to prefer one of the conflicting religious beliefs of different communities, for he doesn't belong to any of them. Thus, the problem of “epistemic peers" still remains unsolved.PubDate: Tue, 18 Jul 2017 08:02:56 GMT

Authors:Alexey GaginskyAbstract: The author discusses a number of questions about the theory of John Greco, who distinguishes two types of testimonial knowledge: testimony as transmission of knowledge and as distributing of information. The author expresses doubts that this difference is consistent and, therefore, useful for epistemology. He argues that John Greco's theory needs some refinements without which it will be either trivial or erroneous.PubDate: Tue, 18 Jul 2017 08:02:54 GMT

Authors:Igor BerestovAbstract: The author discusses the mode of introduction of religious testimonial knowledge as a response to skepticism. It is argued that Professor Greco's Answer to The Argumentfrom Peer Disagreement (Part Three; Application to the three skeptical arguments) requires accepting the thesis that has the same conceptual grounding as the skeptical statements about the impossibility to share any belief. Taking into account this common grounding, it is desirable to explain the statement “A major motivation for anti-skepticism about testimony is anti-skepticism in general" (Part Two). The theory of religious testimonial knowledge uses the statement, which can be grounded by accepting the Mental Holism. However, the Mental Holism is also a possible grounding for some skeptical theses. Thus, a philosopher who assumes religious testimonial knowledge takes not only an anti-skeptical position, but also can take a “proto-skeptical" position.PubDate: Tue, 18 Jul 2017 08:02:52 GMT

Authors:John GrecoAbstract: This paper advocates for a “social turn" in religious epistemology. Part One reviews some familiar skeptical arguments targeting religious belief (the argument from luck, the argument from peer disagreement, Hume's argument). All these skeptical arguments say that testimonial evidence cannot give religious belief adequate support or grounding, especially in the context of conflicting evidence. Part Two considers some recent work in social epistemology and the epistemology of testimony. Several issues regarding the nature of testimonial evidence are considered, and an account of testimonial evidence as a means of distribution of information through the system is defended. Part Three uses the results of Part Two to reconsider the skeptical arguments in Part One.PubDate: Tue, 18 Jul 2017 08:02:51 GMT

Authors:Kirill KarpovAbstract: The article presents the main trends in the analytical epistemology of religious belief. Their interrelations and mutual influences are shown. The author argues that epistemology of religious belief has risen as one of the possible answers to the Gettier- problems. Therefore different trends in religious epistemology are bounded not only with each other, but also with trends in general epistemology. As a result of the analysis of all major trends in epistemology of religious belief (reformed epistemology, social epistemology, virtue epistemology, problem of the epistemic authority) the author concludes that the core of each trend is an attempt of defining the phenomenon of religion itself. Hence it is possible to consider epistemology of religious belief as the next step in the history of such attempts. Since finding appropriate definition of the phenomenon of religion is a special task of philosophy of religion (both in analytic and continental traditions), the author argues that epistemology of religious belief is the essential part of philosophy of religion as a scholar discipline.PubDate: Tue, 18 Jul 2017 08:02:49 GMT