The Korean
War is often
called "The
Forgotten
War." Wedged
between
America's
biggest war,
World War
II, and
Vietnam, our
longest war,
Korea
sometimes
gets
overlooked.
That's
unfortunate.
Because much
needs to be
remembered
about the
conflict
that began
over 55
years ago.

Korean War,
civil and
military
struggle
that was
fought on
the Korea
Peninsula
and that
reached its
height
between 1950
and 1953.

The Korean
War
originated
in the
division of
Korea into
South Korea
and North
Korea after
World War II
(1939-1945).
Efforts to
reunify the
peninsula
after the
war failed,
and in 1948
the South
proclaimed
the Republic
of Korea and
the North
established
the People's
Republic of
Korea. In
1949 border
fighting
broke out
between the
North and
the South.
On June 25,
1950, North
Korean
forces
crossed the
dividing
line and
invaded the
South. Soon,
in defense
of the
South, the
United
States
joined the
fighting
under the
banner of
the United
Nations
(UN), along
with small
contingents
of British,
Canadian,
Australian,
and Turkish
troops. In
October 1950
China joined
the war on
the North's
side. By the
time a
cease-fire
agreement
was signed
on July 27,
1953,
millions of
soldiers and
civilians
had
perished.
The
armistice
ended the
fighting,
but Korea
has remained
divided for
decades
since and
subject to
the
possibility
of a new war
at any time.

The Korean
War was the
result of
the division
of Korea, a
country with
a
well-recognized,
ancient
integrity.
Despite its
long history
as an
independent
kingdom,
Korea had
been
forcibly
annexed by
Japan in
1910. Japan
controlled
Korea up to
the end of
World War
II. Late on
the night of
August 10,
1945, as
World War II
was coming
to a close,
the United
States made
the decision
that it
would occupy
the southern
half of
Korea. The
U.S.
government
did so out
of fear that
the Union of
Soviet
Socialist
Republics
(USSR, or
Soviet
Union)-which
had joined
the fight
against
Japan in
northern
Korea a week
earlier-would
take control
of the
entire Korea
Peninsula.
American
planners
chose to
divide Korea
at the 38th
parallel
because it
would keep
the capital
city, Seoul,
in the
American-occupied
southern
zone; the
USSR
acquiesced
to the
division,
with no
official
comment.

Both the
Soviet Union
and the
United
States
proceeded,
with much
help from
Koreans, to
build
regimes in
their halves
of Korea
that
supported
their
interests.
In so doing,
they had to
contend with
major rifts
between
Korean
political
factions
representing
left-wing
and
right-wing
views. These
factions
originally
were united
against
Japan but
had begun to
split as
early as the
1920s. In
the
post-World
War II era,
the main
conflict
centered
around the
left's call
for-and the
right's
resistance
to-a
thorough
reform of
Korea's land
ownership
laws, which
had allowed
a small
number of
wealthy
people to
own most of
the land. As
a result,
many Korean
farmers were
forced to
eke out an
impoverished
existence as
tenant
farmers.

During its
occupation
of the South
(1945-1948),
the United
States
responded to
the
left-right
conflict by
suppressing
the
widespread
leftist
movement and
backing
Syngman
Rhee. A
70-year-old
expatriate
who had
lived for
decades in
the United
States, Rhee
had solid
anti-Communist
credentials
and was
popular with
the right.
In the
North, the
Soviet Union
threw its
support to
the left,
embodied by
33-year-old
Kim Il Sung,
who also
received
significant
support from
North
Koreans and
from China.
Kim was a
Korean
guerrilla
who had
fought with
Chinese
Communist
forces
against the
Japanese in
Manchuria in
the 1930s.
Among Kim's
first acts
in power was
to force
through a
radical
redistribution
of land. By
the end of
1946 the
regimes of
both North
and South
Korea were
effectively
in place,
although the
division of
the
peninsula
was not
formalized
until 1948.
In that
year, the
Republic of
Korea (ROK),
backed by
the United
States and
the United
Nations,
emerged in
the South
under Rhee,
and the
Democratic
People's
Republic of
Korea (DPRK)
emerged in
the North
under Kim,
backed by
the USSR and
China.

The southern
government
was barely
inaugurated
before it
had to
contend with
a left-wing
guerrilla
movement.
Although
this
movement
received
support from
the North,
it had its
greatest
strength in
the South,
particularly
in the
southernmost
provinces
and on Jeju
Island off
the southern
coast. The
ROK Army
required the
better part
of 1948 and
1949 to
suppress the
rebellion,
and it did
so with the
support-and
often the
direction-of
a 500-man
contingent
of American
advisers. By
early 1950
the
guerrillas
appeared to
be defeated.

Although the
Soviets
withdrew
their troops
from the
Korea
Peninsula at
the end of
1948, the
Americans,
concerned
about the
rebellion in
the South
and the
potential of
invasion
from the
North,
delayed
their
withdrawal
until the
end of June
1949. By
this time,
troops from
both North
and South
Korea were
concentrated
along the
38th
parallel. In
May 1949
border
fighting
broke out
and
continued,
on and off,
through
December.
Thousands of
troops were
involved.
According to
formerly
classified
American
reports, the
South
provoked the
majority of
the 1949
border
fights,
prompting
American
advisers to
try to
restrain the
South. After
a U.S.
request,
military
observers
from the
United
Nations were
dispatched
to Korea. In
addition,
the United
States
denied the
ROK Army's
requests for
combat
airplanes
and tanks.
At about the
same time,
U.S.
Secretary of
State Dean
Acheson
delivered
what became
known as the
"Press Club"
speech in
Washington,
D.C., in
which he was
ambiguous
about
whether the
United
States would
defend the
ROK in a
war.

Although Kim
Il Sung
would be
eager to
fight in
1950, he was
not ready in
the summer
of 1949.
Large
contingents
of his best
North Korean
soldiers
were still
in China,
fighting on
the side of
the
Communists
in that
country's
civil war.
In the early
months of
1950,
however,
tens of
thousands of
these
soldiers
returned to
the DPRK,
including
the 6th
Division
under
General Pang
Ho-san,
which had a
distinguished
record in
China. In
May 1950 Kim
perched this
division
just above
the 38th
parallel. He
hoped that
the summer
of 1950,
like the
summer of
1949, would
bring South
Korean
provocations,
which he
could use to
justify an
invasion by
the North.
Kim claimed
he got his
provocation
with a minor
lunge by the
South across
the parallel
in the early
morning
hours of
June 25,
1950.
Whether or
not the
South lunged
across the
parallel
still awaits
further
evidence,
but the
North bears
the major
responsibility
for
escalating a
minor
skirmish to
the level of
massive
conventional
warfare.

Throughout
1949 the
Soviet Union
feared the
consequences
that an
invasion by
North Korea
would have
on
U.S.-Soviet
relations.
Consequently,
for months
Soviet
leader
Joseph
Stalin
declined to
support
Kim's plans
for war. In
early 1950,
however,
Stalin
appeared to
give his
endorsement
to Kim; he
also
suggested
that Kim
seek support
from Chinese
leader Mao
Zedong. The
reasons for
Stalin's
shift are
still not
clear but
may have
been related
to American
plans for a
major Cold
War military
buildup. The
Chinese
response to
Kim's
entreaty is
also still
unknown, but
it seems
unlikely
that the
Chinese did
not know of
Kim's plans.
Indeed, they
sent many
experienced
Korean
soldiers
back to
Korea from
China just
before the
war erupted.

The United
States
maintained
throughout
1949 and
1950 that it
would not
support an
invasion of
the North by
the South.
As early as
1947,
however,
Acheson and
his advisers
had come to
see South
Korea as
important to
the revival
of the
Japanese
industrial
economy,
which
provided
goods and
services to
Korea. From
that time
on, U.S.
policymakers
were
privately
committed to
extending
the Truman
Doctrine,
which called
for the
containment
of
Communism,
to South
Korea. Even
after U.S.
combat
troops left
South Korea
in 1948, a
large
military
advisory
group
remained in
the ROK, and
the United
States gave
the republic
great
amounts of
economic
aid. When
the
Soviet-backed
North
invaded-unprovoked,
in the
perception
of the U.S.
government-Acheson
and
President
Harry S.
Truman led
the United
States into
the war,
despite
objections
from many
U.S.
military
commanders
who thought
Korea was
the wrong
place to
make a stand
against
Communism.

During the
summer of
1949, South
Korea had
expanded its
army to
about 90,000
troops, a
strength the
North
matched in
early 1950.
The North
had about
150 Soviet
T-34 tanks
and a small
but
effective
air force of
70 fighters
and 62 light
bombers-weapons
either left
behind when
Soviet
troops
evacuated
Korea or
bought from
the USSR and
China in
1949 and
1950. By
June 1950
American
data showed
the two
armies at
about equal
strength,
with roughly
equal
numbers
amassed
along the
38th
parallel.
However,
this data
did not
account for
the superior
battle
experience
of the North
Korean army,
especially
among the
troops who
had returned
from China.

The fighting
began around
3 or 4 am on
June 25th
at the
western end
of the
parallel.
Initial
intelligence
reports were
indeterminate
as to who
started the
fighting,
but by 5:30
am the
formidable
6th Division
of the
(North)
Korean
People's
Army (KPA)
had joined
the fighting
in the west.
At roughly
the same
time, KPA
forces in
the center
of the
peninsula
dealt a
heavy blow
to the ROK
Army (ROKA)
south of
Cheorwon.
The ROKA
fell back
and two KPA
divisions
and an
armored
brigade
crashed
through the
38th
parallel,
beginning a
daunting
march toward
Seoul, which
lay just 50
km (30 mi)
to the
south.

Just 20 km
(12 mi)
north of
Seoul stood
the town of
Uijeongbu, a
critical
line of
defense for
the South
maintained
by an ROKA
division. By
the morning
of June 26,
the division
at Uijeongbu
had not
committed
its forces
to battle,
probably
because it
was waiting
to be
reinforced
by another
division
from the
interior of
South Korea.
However,
when the
reinforcing
division
finally
arrived on
June 26th,
troops
panicked,
mutinied,
and fled.
The reasons
for the
mutiny were
many,
including
the relative
lack of ROKA
firepower,
poor
training,
and
ultimately
the
unpopularity
of the Rhee
government-which
had nearly
been voted
out of
office in
relatively
free
elections
held a month
earlier. The
collapse at
Uijeongbu
left a
gaping hole
in the South
Korean
defensive
line, and
North Korean
troops
poured
through. The
ROK
government
fled Seoul,
which was
taken on
June 28th
by a force
of about
37,000 North
Korean
troops.

UN support
for the
defense of
South Korea
enabled
Truman and
Acheson to
gain public
support for
U.S.
intervention.
Only two
days after
the
invasion, on
June 27th,
at the
urging of
the United
States, the
UN Security
Council
voted to
repel the
North Korean
invasion.
The USSR,
which could
have vetoed
the vote,
instead
boycotted
it. The USSR
claimed its
boycott was
a response
to the UN's
refusal to
admit
Communist
China;
however,
historians
have been
unconvinced
by this
argument. On
June 25th
Stalin
explicitly
told the
USSR's UN
representative
not to
return to
the Security
Council, but
Stalin's
reasons for
this order
are not
known. Some
historians
speculate
that Stalin
either
wanted to
draw U.S.
forces into
a war that
would drain
the country
of troops
and money,
or that he
hoped to
reveal the
UN as an
American
tool.

American
ground
troops were
finally
committed in
the early
morning of
June 30th,
over the
reluctance
of the Joint
Chiefs of
Staff (the
United
States' top
military
officers).
The Joint
Chiefs were
concerned
about the
limits of
American
power. In
June 1950
the total
armed
strength of
the U.S.
Army was
593,167,
with an
additional
75,370
Marines.
North Korea
alone was
capable of
mobilizing
perhaps
200,000
combat
soldiers, in
addition to
the immense
reserve of
China's
People's
Liberation
Army (PLA).
Nonetheless,
Truman and
others were
motivated by
the news
that the
ROKA had
mostly
ceased to
fight.
Truman did
not seek a
declaration
of war from
the U.S.
Congress,
relying
instead on
the United
Nations'
support.

In July,
World War II
hero General
Douglas
MacArthur
was placed
in command
of U.S.
troops in
Korea. At
first
MacArthur
wanted only
a regimental
combat team.
Within a
week,
however, he
cabled
Washington
that the KPA
was
"operating
under
excellent
top level
guidance and
had
demonstrated
superior
command of
strategic
and tactical
principles."
He
consequently
asked for a
minimum of
30,000
American
combat
soldiers in
the form of
four
infantry
divisions,
three tank
battalions,
and assorted
artillery.

In the
summer of
1950 the
Korean
People's
Army pushed
southward
with
dramatic
success,
inflicting
one
humiliating
defeat after
another on
the American
forces. An
army that
had defeated
Germany and
Japan in
World War II
found itself
overwhelmed
by what many
thought was
a hastily
assembled,
ill-equipped
peasant army
said to be
doing the
bidding of a
foreign
imperial
power. By
the end of
July 1950,
the combined
U.S. and ROK
forces
numbered
92,000 at
the front
(47,000 were
Americans),
compared
with 70,000
KPA soldiers
at the
front.
Nonetheless,
the KPA
advance
continued
until the
North Korean
forces
occupied
roughly 90
percent of
South Korea.
Kim Il Sung
later said
that his
plan had
been to win
the war in a
single
month, and
by the end
of July he
nearly had
done so.

In the first
week of
August the
U.S. 1st
Marine
Brigade
arrived and
finally
stabilized
the U.S. and
ROK forces,
which by
that time
guarded only
a small area
on the
southeasternmost
part of the
peninsula.
The
right-angled
front, known
as the Busan
Perimeter,
stretched 80
km (50 mi)
from Pohang
on Yŏgil
Gulf to
Daegu in the
interior
before
bending
south 110 km
(70 mi) to
the coastal
Jinju-Masan
region. The
port city of
Busan lay
behind the
front on the
peninsula's
southeastern
tip.

The city of
Daegu became
a symbol of
the American
determination
to halt the
KPA's
advance, and
many attacks
were
repelled
there.
However, it
was probably
due to a
tactical
error at
Pohang, on
the
northeastern
perimeter,
that the KPA
failed to
occupy Busan
and unify
the
peninsula.
The official
American
historian of
the war, Roy
Appleman,
wrote that
the 'major
tactical
mistake' of
the North
Koreans was
not to press
their
advantage on
the eastern
coastal road
between
Pohang and
Busan. The
KPA division
near Pohang
was
concerned
about
covering its
flanks and
so held its
position.
Had it
instead
moved
quickly on
Pohang and
then
combined
with other
KPA
divisions,
Appleman
concluded
that Busan
in all
likelihood
would have
fallen. In
any event,
the
perimeter
held for
most of
August.

At the end
of August
KPA forces
launched
their last
major
offensive at
the
perimeter,
severely
straining
the
American-Korean
lines for
the next two
weeks. On
August 28
three of the
advancing
KPA
battalions
succeeded in
breaching
the critical
parts of the
perimeter.
The cities
of Pohang
and Jinju
were both
lost, with
KPA forces
advancing
along both
coasts to
Busan.
Another
assault was
being
launched on
the city of
Daegu, with
enough
success that
U.S.
commanders
evacuated
the Eighth
Army
headquarters
from Daegu
to Busan.
Prominent
South
Koreans
began
leaving
Busan for
the nearby
Tsushima
Islands of
Japan. Only
in
mid-September
did it
become clear
that the
U.S. and ROK
armies would
stop the
advance. The
decisive
factor was
numbers.
MacArthur
succeeded in
committing
most of the
battle-ready
divisions in
the entire
American
armed forces
to the
Korean
fighting; by
September 8th
the 82nd
Airborne
Division was
the only
combat-trained
Army unit
not in
Korea.
Although
many of
these units
were with
the pending
amphibious
operation
that would
land at
Incheon,
near Seoul,
some 83,000
American
soldiers and
another
57,000 South
Korean and
British
troops faced
the North
Koreans at
the Busan
front. North
Korean
forces at
the front,
including
guerrillas
and a
sizable
number of
female
soldiers,
numbered
98,000. The
Americans
had also
accumulated
five times
as many
tanks as the
KPA and
vastly
superior
artillery.
They also
had complete
control of
the air,
which they
had
maintained
since the
early days
of the war.
The price
for
repelling
the assault
was steep
casualties,
totaling
20,000
Americans,
with 4,280
dead, by
September 15th.

In
mid-September
1950,
MacArthur
oversaw an
amphibious
landing at
Incheon, a
port 35 km
(22 mi) west
of Seoul.
The harbor
at Incheon
had
treacherous
tides that
could easily
have
grounded a
flotilla of
ships
landing at
the wrong
time.
Fortunately,
Admiral
Arthur Dewey
Struble, the
Navy's
foremost
expert on
amphibious
landings,
commanded
the
flotilla.
Struble had
led the
World War II
landing at
Leyte in the
Philippines,
and he had
directed
naval
operations
off Omaha
Beach during
the Normandy
invasion in
Europe.
These World
War II
experiences
served him
well at
Incheon,
where he
commanded an
enormous
fleet of 261
ships
through the
shifting
bays and
flats,
depositing
80,000
Marines
ashore with
very few
losses.

Although the
Marines
landed
almost
unopposed,
they faced a
deadly
gauntlet
before
arriving at
Seoul. By
the end of
September,
however,
U.S. forces
had fought
their way
into Seoul
and
recaptured
the capital.
For years,
many
American
historians
held that
the North
Koreans were
surprised by
the
invasion,
but new
evidence
suggests
that this
was not the
case. The
North
Koreans
simply could
not resist
the assault
and so began
what North
Korean
historians
have called
euphemistically
'the great
strategic
retreat,'
removing
their troops
from the
South to
guard their
northern
homeland.

Shortly
after the
Incheon
landing,
U.S. forces
retrieved a
document
that
contained
Kim Il
Sung's
thoughts on
the fighting
in the
South. "The
original
plan was to
end the war
in a month,"
he wrote,
but "we
could not
stamp out
four
American
divisions."
Instead of
following
orders to
march
promptly
southward,
the North
Korean units
that had
captured
Seoul
dallied,
thereby
giving "a
breathing
spell" to
the
Americans.
Kim wrote
that from
the
beginning
the North's
"primary
enemy was
the American
soldiers,"
but he
acknowledged
that "we
were taken
by surprise
when United
Nations
troops and
the American
Air Force
and Navy
moved in."
This
suggests
that Kim
anticipated
the
involvement
of American
ground
forces, but
not in such
size, and
not with air
and naval
units.
Perhaps the
North
Koreans
believed
that Soviet
air and
naval power
would either
deter or
confront
their
American
counterparts.
Or perhaps
they simply
believed,
like the
U.S. Joint
Chiefs of
Staff, that
the vast
majority of
American
battle-ready
infantry
would not be
transferred
from all
over the
globe to
this small
peninsula of
seeming
marginal
importance
to U.S.
global
strategy.

Regardless,
by early
October 1950
the North
had been
pushed from
South Korea.
The war for
control of
the South
left 111,000
South
Koreans
killed,
106,000
wounded, and
57,000
missing;
314,000
homes had
been
destroyed,
244,000
damaged.
American
casualties
totaled
6,954 dead,
13,659
wounded, and
3,877
missing in
action.
North Korean
casualty
figures are
not known.

The U.S.-led
forces might
have
reestablished
the 38th
parallel as
the border
between
North and
South Korea,
ended the
war, and
declared
that the
Truman
Doctrine's
policy of
containing
Communism
had been
achieved.
Instead,
MacArthur
sent troops
across the
parallel
into North
Korea in
early
October.
Historians
later
faulted
MacArthur
for taking
this action
without
Truman's
approval,
but evidence
has since
shown that
Truman
approved the
march north
at the end
of August,
even before
the landing
at Incheon.
As the
summer
progressed,
nearly all
of Truman's
senior
advisers
decided the
chance had
come not
only to
contain
Communism
but to roll
it back.
Thus,
National
Security
Council
document 81
authorized
MacArthur to
'roll back'
the North
Korean
regime if
there were
no Soviet or
Chinese
threats to
intervene.
The document
also
instructed
MacArthur to
use only
Korean
troops near
the Chinese
border so as
not to
further
antagonize
China.

In September
and October
1950 U.S.
intelligence
agencies
generally
concluded
that China
would not
enter the
war. On
September 20th
the Central
Intelligence
Agency (CIA)
noted that
there was a
slight
possibility
that Chinese
'volunteers'
might enter
the
fighting,
and a month
later it
noted 'a
number of
reports'
that units
from
Manchuria
(along the
Chinese
border with
Korea) might
be sent to
North Korea.
Nonetheless,
the CIA
decided that
'the odds
are that
Communist
China, like
the USSR,
will not
openly
intervene in
North
Korea.'
MacArthur
swept
confidently
onward. By
October 19th
UN troops
had captured
the North
Korean
capital,
P'yŏngyang,
lying 150 km
(90 mi)
northwest of
the 38th
parallel.

Three days
earlier,
Chinese
troops had
crossed
their border
at the Yalu
River into
North Korea.
They dealt
heavy losses
to ROK
troops and
bloodied
U.S. forces
as well,
then
abruptly
ceased
offensives
for three
weeks. This
incursion by
China did
not stop the
American
march to the
Yalu.
General
Walter
Bedell
Smith,
director of
the CIA,
wrote on
November 1st
that the
Chinese
'probably
genuinely
fear an
invasion of
Manchuria.'
He also
predicted
the Chinese
would try to
establish a
buffer zone
along the
border for
security
'regardless
of the
increased
risk of
general
war.'
However, the
CIA still
found
insufficient
evidence
throughout
November
that China
would mount
a major
offensive.

North Korean
and Chinese
documents
released or
declassified
in the 1980s
and 1990s
tell a
different
story. China
did not
enter the
war purely
to protect
its border.
Rather, Mao
decided
early in the
war that
should the
North
Koreans
falter,
China had an
obligation
to help them
because many
North
Koreans had
sacrificed
their lives
alongside
Chinese-in
the Chinese
revolution
that
overthrew
the imperial
government
in 1911 to
1912, in
resistance
to Japan's
decades of
occupation,
and in the
Chinese
civil war of
1946 to
1949. On
August 4,
1950, Mao
told the
Chinese
Politburo
(the highest
decision-making
body of the
Chinese
Communist
Party) that
he intended
to send
troops to
Korea 'in
the name of
a volunteer
army' should
the
Americans
reverse the
tide of
battle. The
day after UN
troops
crossed the
38th
parallel,
Mao informed
Stalin of
his decision
to invade.
In other
words, it
was not the
approach of
American
troops on
the Chinese
border that
prompted
China's
attack; it
was the
American
strategy to
roll back
North Korean
Communism.

The North
Koreans and
Chinese
apparently
waited to
attack UN
forces until
they were
well inside
North Korea
in order to
stretch the
UN supply
lines and
gain time
for a
dramatic
reversal on
the
battlefield.
On November
24th
MacArthur
launched a
general
offensive
all along
the northern
front, which
was nearing
the Yalu. He
described it
as a
'massive
compression
and
envelopment,'
a pincer
movement to
trap the
remaining
KPA forces
that were
backed into
the
mountainous
northern
part of the
peninsula.
The
offensive
rolled
forward for
three days
against
little or no
resistance,
with ROK
units
succeeding
in entering
the
important
city of
Ch'ŏngjin on
the upper
east coast,
70 km (45
mi) short of
China. Lost
amid the
victory were
reports from
U.S.
reconnaissance
pilots that
long columns
of enemy
troops were
'swarming
all over the
countryside.'

Chinese and
North Korean
troops began
strong
counterattacks
on November
27, 1950,
dealing
devastating
blows to
U.S. and ROK
troops. The
U.S. 1st
Marine
Division was
pinned down
at the
Changjin
Reservoir,
the ROK II
Corps
collapsed,
and within
two days a
general
withdrawal
ensued. By
December 6th,
Communist
forces
occupied
P'yŏngyang,
and the next
day the
front was
only 32 km
(20 mi)
above the
38th
parallel. A
little more
than two
weeks after
the
Sino-Korean
offensive
began, North
Korea was
cleared of
enemy
troops.
Chinese
troops in
North Korea
numbered
approximately
200,000. On
New Year's
Eve Chinese
and North
Korean
troops
launched
another
major
offensive,
once again
capturing
Seoul.
Secretary of
State
Acheson
later called
this the
worst
American
defeat since
the Battle
of Bull Run
during the
American
Civil War
(1861-1865).

Under the
field
command of
U.S.
Lieutenant
General
Matthew
Ridgway, UN
troops
finally
stiffened
their
defenses
south of
Seoul in
early 1951.
Bloody weeks
of fighting
ensued as UN
troops
fought
northward to
the Han
River,
opposite the
capital.
Several more
weeks passed
before Seoul
changed
hands again,
and in early
April,
Ridgway's
forces again
crossed the
38th
parallel. By
then
fighting had
stabilized
more or less
along what
later became
the Korean
demilitarized
zone, with
UN forces in
occupation
north of the
parallel on
the eastern
side, and
Sino-North
Korean
forces
occupying
swatches of
land south
of the
parallel on
the western
side.

As early as
November 30,
1950, Truman
said the
United
States might
use any
weapon in
its arsenal
to hold back
the Chinese,
an oblique
reference to
the atomic
bomb. This
threat
apparently
deeply
worried
Stalin.
According to
a high
official who
served at
the time in
the KGB (the
Soviet
intelligence
agency),
Stalin
feared that
global war
would result
from the
American
defeat in
northern
Korea and
favored
letting the
United
States
occupy all
of Korea.
'So what?'
Stalin is
reported to
have said.
'Let the
United
States of
America be
our
neighbors in
the Far
East. ... We
are not
ready to
fight.'
China,
however,
held a
different
view,
apparently
willing to
fight at
least to the
middle of
the Korea
Peninsula,
though not
further if
the
consequence
might be a
third world
war.

The U.S.
government
seriously
considered
using
nuclear
weapons in
Korea in
early 1951.
The
immediate
threat was
the USSR's
deployment
of 13 air
divisions to
East Asia,
including
200 bombers
that could
strike not
just Korea
but also
American
bases in
Japan; and
China's
deployment
of massive
new forces
near the
Korean
border. On
March 10,
1951,
MacArthur
asked Truman
for a 'D-Day
atomic
capability'-the
ability to
launch a
massive
nuclear
assault.
Truman
complied,
ordering the
Air Force to
refurbish
the atomic
bomb loading
pits at
Okinawa,
Japan, which
were used
during World
War II.
Atomic bombs
were then
carried to
Okinawa
unassembled
and put
together at
the base,
lacking only
the
essential
nuclear
cores.

On April 5th,
the Joint
Chiefs of
Staff
ordered
immediate
atomic
retaliation
against
Soviet and
Chinese
bases in
Manchuria if
large
numbers of
new troops
entered the
war. Also on
April 5th,
Gordon Dean,
chairman of
the Atomic
Energy
Commission (AEC),
arranged for
the transfer
of nine
nuclear
capsules
held by the
AEC in the
United
States to
the Air
Force bomb
group that
would carry
the weapons.
Truman
approved the
transfer as
well as
orders
outlining
their use
the next
day.

The
president
also used
this
extraordinary
crisis to
get the
Joint Chiefs
of Staff to
approve
MacArthur's
removal. For
some time,
MacArthur
had chafed
against
restrictions
placed on
him by
Truman.
MacArthur
sought to
expand the
war to
mainland
China and
ignored
Truman's
orders to
use only
Korean
troops near
the Chinese
border. On
April 11,
1951, Truman
asked for
MacArthur's
resignation.
Most
observers
assumed
Truman
wanted a
more
subordinate
commander.
Although
this
observation
was partly
true, U.S.
government
documents
later made
clear that
Truman
wanted a
reliable
commander in
the field
should
Washington
decide to
use nuclear
weapons.
Truman, in
short, was
not sure he
could trust
MacArthur to
use nuclear
weapons as
ordered.

By early
summer 1951
the war had
settled into
the pattern
it would
follow for
the next two
years:
bloody
fighting
along the
38th
parallel,
most of it
in trench
warfare
reminiscent
of World War
I
(1914-1918),
and tortuous
peace
negotiations.
During this
time the UN
forces
engaged
mainly in a
series of
probing
actions
known as the
active
defense.
Periods of
heavy
fighting
continued,
however,
both on the
ground and
in the air.
Although the
Communists
could not
sustain
another
major
offensive,
their
well-entrenched
forces made
even the
UN's active
defense
strategy
very costly.
Some of the
most
desperate
battles took
place on the
hills called
Old Baldy,
Capital,
Pork Chop,
T-Bone, and
Heartbreak
Ridge. On
June 23,
1951, the
USSR's
representative
to the UN,
Adam Malik,
proposed
that the
warring
parties
begin
discussions
for a
cease-fire.
Truman
agreed, and
the ancient
Korean
capital of
Kaesŏng,
located just
south of the
38th
parallel,
was chosen
as a meeting
place. Truce
talks began
on July 10,
led
initially by
U.S. Vice
Admiral C.
Turner Joy
for the UN
side, and
Lieutenant-General
Nam Il of
North Korea.
The talks
dragged on
interminably,
with several
suspensions
and a
removal of
the truce
site to the
village of
Panmunjeom (P'anmunjŏm),
just
southeast of
Kaesŏng.

There were
months of
haggling
over how to
properly and
fairly mark
each side's
military
lines, but
the main
issue that
prolonged
the
negotiations
was the
disposition
of the many
prisoners of
war (POWs)
on both
sides. The
North
Koreans had
maltreated
many
American and
allied POWs,
harshly
depriving
them and
subjecting
many to
political
thought
reform that
was decried
as
"brainwashing"
in the
United
States. In
the South's
POW camps, a
virtual war
ensued over
repatriation.
About
one-third of
North Korean
POWs and a
much larger
percentage
of Chinese
POWs did not
want to
return to
Communist
control,
prompting
struggles
among
pro-Communists
and
anti-Communists.
Meanwhile
South Korea
refused to
sign any
armistice
that would
keep Korea
divided, and
the South's
Syngman Rhee
sought to
hinder the
talks by
abruptly
releasing
thousands of
North Korean
POWs who did
not want to
return home.
The United
States
decided Rhee
could not be
trusted and
developed
plans to
remove him
in a coup
d'état. The
coup was
never
carried out.

The POW
issue was
finally
settled on
June 8,
1953. The
Communists
agreed to
the
placement of
POWs who
refused
repatriation
under the
control of a
neutral
commission
of nations
for three
months; at
the end of
this period
those who
still
refused
repatriation
would be set
free. Two
final and
costly
Communist
offensives
in June and
July 1953
sought to
gain more
ground but
failed, and
the U.S. Air
Force for
the first
time
destroyed
huge
irrigation
dams that
had provided
water for 75
percent of
the North's
food
production.
Although not
widely
reported,
hundreds of
square miles
of farmland
were
inundated.

On July 27,
1953, the
UN, North
Korea, and
China signed
an armistice
agreement-South
Korea
refused to
sign-and the
fighting
ended. The
armistice
called for a
buffer zone
4 km (2.5
mi) wide
across the
middle of
Korea, from
which troops
and weapons
were
supposed to
be
withdrawn.
This
'demilitarized
zone' was in
fact heavily
fortified;
as of the
late 2008,
more than 1
million
soldiers
confronted
each other
along the
zone. With
no peace
treaty
signed, the
two Koreas
remained
technically
still at
war; only
the
armistice
agreement
and
demilitarized
zone kept a
tenuous
peace.

The Korean
War was one
of the most
destructive
of the 20th
century.
Perhaps as
many as 4
million
Koreans died
throughout
the
peninsula,
two-thirds
of them
civilians.
(This
compares,
for example,
with the 2.3
million
Japanese who
died in
World War
II.) China
lost up to 1
million
soldiers,
and the
United
States
suffered
54,246 dead
and 103,284
wounded.
South Korea
soldiers
suffered
227,800 dead
and 717,100
wounded.
Other UN
nations
suffered
3322 dead
and 11,949
wounded.
Economic and
social
damage to
the Korea
Peninsula
was
incalculable,
especially
in the
North, where
three years
of bombing
left hardly
a modern
building
standing.

The war also
had lasting
consequences
beyond
Korea. Much
of the
materiel
used in the
war was
bought from
nearby
Japan. This
gave the
Japanese
economy such
a dynamic
boost after
the ravages
of World War
II that some
have called
the Korean
War 'Japan's
Marshall
Plan,' a
reference to
the U.S.
economic aid
program that
helped
rebuild
post-war
Europe. The
Korean War
had similar
effects on
the American
economy, as
defense
spending
nearly
quadrupled
in the last
six months
of 1950.
Perhaps even
more so than
World War
II, the
Korean War
was
responsible
for
establishing
America's
chain of
military
bases around
the world
and its
enormous
defense and
intelligence
system at
home.

note:
The source
of this
material was
mostly the
online
Ecarta
Encyclopedia,
the site
policy is
that if
content is
copied/borrowed,
the name of
the site
must remain
on the page.
Ecarta
Encyclopedia
is the
source of
the
information
of this page.