Getting Ukraine to Safe Shores

About the Author

Ariel Cohen, Ph.D.Visiting Fellow in Russian and Eurasian Studies and International Energy Policy in the Douglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign and National Security Policy, a division of the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies, at The Heritage FoundationDouglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign and National Security Policy

Ukraine's Orange Revolution demonstrated
the deep desire of the people of Ukraine for honest, responsive,
and democratic government. It was a drama worthy of the 1989 scenes
in Wenceslas Square in Prague and Solidarity's surge to freedom in
Poland. Victor Yushchenko's inauguration as president following his
heroic victory in the third round of elections in December now
focuses attention on how the West can help to make the Ukrainian
transition a success.

The
Bush Administration should facilitate Ukraine's membership in the
World Trade Organization (WTO) and European Union (EU), lift
Jackson-Vanik trade restrictions, expand NATO's cooperation with
Kyiv, offer a bridging loan for economic restructuring, and state
unequivocally that the U.S. will not tolerate threats to Ukraine's
territorial integrity.

Post-Election
Challenges. Having won 52 percent of the vote, Yushchenko
will face multiple challenges. His primary concerns include the
polarized electorate; calls for regional autonomy; decrepit
rust-belt coal and steel industries in the East; and the opposition
of protectionist oligarchs, apparatchiks, and thugs. Some 44
percent of voters favored Prime Minister Victor Yanukovich, an
ex-con who promised to tighten Ukraine's ties with Russia, make
Russian the second official language, and introduce dual
citizenship. Ukrainian oligarchs--Yanukovich's supporters and main
beneficiaries of the economic links with Russia--may launch a
political opposition that will be difficult to overcome. If Russia
retaliates against the Orange revolutionary victory by banning its
large Ukrainian guest workforce, Yushchenko's popularity may
suffer.

Finally, Ukraine finds itself in the
epicenter of the East-West strategic competition. The Orange
Revolution opened the door to Ukraine's reintegration with Europe.
Russia's influence in the country declined, though Ukraine's
relations with its giant neighbor remain a long-term national
priority.

Implications for
the West. The United States and the EU cooperated
extensively to achieve a coordinated position in support of
Ukraine's transformation--an important post-Iraq achievement. Since
the revolution, however, the EU has proceeded with caution. In
addition to its future relations with Ukraine, the EU faces the
difficult accession of Turkey. The EU may pursue a good-neighbor
policy toward Ukraine, sign an associate-member agreement, or
explore outright membership--which could take from 10 to 15 years
to achieve.

Relations with NATO are another promising
direction for cooperation. NATO is a leading Western organization
to ensure Ukraine's Western integration, as well as to restore a
greater cohesion in transatlantic foreign policy. However,
Ukrainian membership may cause friction with Russia.

The
U.S. has supported the triumph of democracy in Ukraine and is
interested in a Ukraine that is stable, prosperous, and integrated
in Euro-Atlantic structures. At the same time, America's
relationship with Russia is important, as the Bush Administration
seeks President Vladimir Putin's support on future diplomatic
action on Iran, reconstruction of Iraq, non-proliferation,
counter-terrorism, and energy cooperation. Support for Ukraine
should not damage this relationship.

Supporting
Ukraine. It is in the U.S. interest to provide support for
Ukraine's integration with the West, encourage the EU to take
Ukraine into membership, and preserve a working relationship with
Russia. Therefore, the Bush Administration should:

Convince Congress to repeal
Jackson-Vanik amendment's applicability to Ukraine. The amendment,
which curbs normal trade status, is an irrelevant legacy of the
Cold War as far as Ukraine is concerned.

Direct
the U.S. Trade Representative and Department of Commerce to support
Ukraine's joining the WTO and positively consider Ukraine's request
for approval of market economy status subject to the six statutory
factors, especially openness to foreign investment, that guide the
Commerce Department in determining a country's standing.

Encourage the EU to sign an
associate-membership agreement with Ukraine and begin preliminary
consultations on accession, including setting a date for the start
of negotiations.

Expand
NATO's Partnership for Peace program to further modernize Ukraine's
military, promote civilian control over the military, and explore a
"trusted ally" non-member relationship.

Work
with and through international financial institutions such as the
World Bank and International Monetary Fund to diversify Ukraine's
Soviet-era heavy industries and provide, if necessary, a bridging
loan to shut down unprofitable mines.

Develop
a comprehensive package of reforms in the rule of law,
privatization, free trade, taxation, and civil service overhaul,
including law enforcement. The U.S. should promote regionally
focused export-oriented projects in Ukraine and should foster
technical assistance and cooperation with the private sector to
make Ukraine a foreign investment magnet.

Make a
statement that the U.S. fully endorses the territorial integrity of
Ukraine. Washington should clarify to the Kremlin that U.S. support
of Ukraine is not aimed at hurting Russian political and economic
interests there, such as the Russian naval base in Sevastopol,
investment, energy transit to Europe, or overflight rights.

Work
with the Yushchenko administration to reverse pre-election promises
to withdraw the Ukrainian contingent from Iraq, which is the fourth
largest in the U.S.-led coalition.

Conclusion. Ukraine presents a renewed
opportunity for U.S. engagement in the region. Washington should
demonstrate unwavering support for Ukraine's pursuit of its
democratic aspirations. An ongoing, cohesive transatlantic U.S.
foreign policy toward Ukraine should be at the core of the Bush
Administration's support for Ukraine.

Ariel Cohen,
Ph.D., is Research Fellow in Russian and Eurasian
Studies in the Douglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign Policy
Studies, a division of the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis
Institute for International Studies, at The Heritage
Foundation.

About the Author

Ariel Cohen, Ph.D.Visiting Fellow in Russian and Eurasian Studies and International Energy Policy in the Douglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign and National Security Policy, a division of the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies, at The Heritage FoundationDouglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign and National Security Policy