I. This then is
what might be said to cut short our opponents’ readiness to argue
and their hastiness with its consequent insecurity in all matters, but
above all in those discussions which relate to God. But since to
rebuke others is a matter of no difficulty whatever, but a very easy
thing, which any one who likes can do; whereas to substitute
one’s own belief for theirs is the part of a pious and
intelligent man; let us, relying on the Holy Ghost, Who among them is
dishonoured, but among us is adored, bring forth to the light our own
conceptions about the Godhead, whatever these may be, like some noble
and timely birth. Not that I have at other times been silent; for
on this subject alone I am full of youthful strength and daring; but
the fact is that under present circumstances I am even more bold to
declare the truth, that I may not (to use the words of Scripture) by
drawing back fall into the condemnation of being displeasing to
God.35073507Heb. ii. 4; x. 38. And since every discourse is of a
twofold nature, the one part establishing one’s own, and the
other overthrowing one’s opponents’ position; let us first
of all state our own position, and then try to controvert that of our
opponents;—and both as briefly as possible, so that our arguments
may be taken in at a glance (like those of the elementary treatises
which they have devised to deceive simple or foolish persons), and that
our thoughts may not be scattered by reason of the length of the
discourse, like water which is not contained in a channel, but flows to
waste over the open land.

II. The three most ancient opinions concerning God
are Anarchia, Polyarchia, and Monarchia. The first two are the
sport of the children of Hellas, and may they continue to be so.
For Anarchy is a thing without order; and the Rule of Many is factious,
and thus anarchical, and thus disorderly. For both these tend to
the same thing, namely disorder; and this to dissolution, for disorder
is the first step to dissolution.

But Monarchy is that which we hold in
honour. It is, however, a Monarchy that is not limited to one
Person, for it is possible for Unity if at variance with itself to come
into a condition of plurality;35083508 Billius and
others here read Authority, which is not supported by the best
mss., or by the context. but one which is
made of an equality of Nature and a Union of mind, and an identity of
motion, and a convergence of its elements to unity—a thing which
is impossible to the created nature—so that though numerically
distinct there is no severance of Essence. Therefore
Unity35093509 Elias explains this to
mean that of old men knew only One Person in the Godhead: and
until the Incarnation this knowledge was sufficient; but from that time
forward they acknowledged a Second Person, and through Him a Third
also, the Holy Ghost. But this explanation falls far short of
Gregory’s meaning, which certainly is that the movement of
self-consciousness in God from all Eternity made the Generation of the
Son, and the Procession of the Holy Ghost, a necessity. All is
objective in God. cf. Petav. de Deo, II., viii., 16; also, Greg.
Naz., Or. xxiii. 5. having from all eternity arrived by motion
at Duality, found its rest in Trinity. This is what we mean by
Father and Son and Holy Ghost. The Father is the Begetter and the
Emitter;35103510προβολεὺς-προβολὴ
was a term used by the Gnostics to describe the Emanations by which the
distance between the Finite and the Infinite was according to them
bridged over; and on this account it fell under suspicion, and was
rejected by both Arius and Athanasius. Tertullian used it with an
explanation which is satisfactory as regards the προβολὴ of the Son;
but when he comes to apply it to the Procession of the Holy Ghost he
uses an illustration which is in almost the very words rejected by
Gregory (c. Prax., 7, 8. See Swete, p. 56). Origen did not
admit it. Later when this danger was past, the word came into use
again as the equivalent of ἐκπόρευσις,
at first with reserve and explanations in the text, but later on as an
accepted term. See Swete ,“On The Doctrine Of The Holy
Spirit,” p. 36. without passion of
course, and without reference to time, and not in a corporeal
manner. The Son is the Begotten, and the Holy Ghost the Emission;
for I know not how this could be expressed in terms altogether
excluding visible things. For we shall not venture to speak of
“an overflow of goodness,” as one of the Greek Philosophers
dared to say, as if it were a bowl overflowing, and this in plain words
in his Discourse on the First and Second Causes.35113511 The expression is from
Plato. Let us not ever look on this
Generation as involuntary, like some natural overflow, hard to be
retained, and by no means befitting our conception of Deity.
Therefore let us confine ourselves within our limits, and speak of the
Unbegotten and the Begotten and That which proceeds from the Father, as
somewhere God the Word Himself saith.

III. When did these come into being? They
are above all “When.” But, if I am to speak with
something more of boldness,—when the Father did. And when
did the Father come into being. There never was a time when He
was not. And the same thing is true of the Son and the Holy
Ghost. Ask me again, and again I will answer you, When was the
Son 302begotten? When the Father
was not begotten. And when did the Holy Ghost proceed? When
the Son was, not proceeding but, begotten—beyond the sphere of
time, and above the grasp of reason; although we cannot set forth that
which is above time, if we avoid as we desire any expression which
conveys the idea of time. For such expressions as
“when” and “before” and “after” and
“from the beginning” are not timeless, however much we may
force them; unless indeed we were to take the Æon, that interval
which is coextensive with the eternal things, and is not divided or
measured by any motion, or by the revolution of the sun, as time is
measured.

How then are They not alike unoriginate, if They are
coeternal? Because They are from Him, though not after Him.
For that which is unoriginate is eternal, but that which is eternal is
not necessarily unoriginate, so long as it may be referred to the
Father as its origin. Therefore in respect of Cause They are not
unoriginate; but it is evident that the Cause is not necessarily prior
to its effects, for the sun is not prior to its light. And yet
They are in some sense unoriginate, in respect of time, even though you
would scare simple minds with your quibbles, for the Sources of Time
are not subject to time.

IV. But how can this generation be
passionless? In that it is incorporeal. For if corporeal
generation involves passion, incorporeal generation excludes it.
And I will ask of you in turn, How is He God if He is created?
For that which is created is not God. I refrain from reminding
you that here too is passion if we take the creation in a bodily sense,
as time, desire, imagination, thought, hope, pain, risk, failure,
success, all of which and more than all find a place in the creature,
as is evident to every one. Nay, I marvel that you do not venture
so far as to conceive of marriages and times of pregnancy, and dangers
of miscarriage, as if the Father could not have begotten at all if He
had not begotten thus; or again, that you did not count up the modes of
generation of birds and beasts and fishes, and bring under some one of
them the Divine and Ineffable Generation, or even eliminate the Son out
of your new hypothesis. And you cannot even see this, that as His
Generation according to the flesh differs from all others (for where
among men do you know of a Virgin Mother?), so does He differ also in
His spiritual Generation; or rather He, Whose Existence is not the same
as ours, differs from us also in His Generation.

V. Who then is that Father Who had no
beginning? One Whose very Existence had no beginning; for one
whose existence had a beginning must also have begun to be a
Father. He did not then become a Father after He began to be, for
His being had no beginning. And He is Father in the absolute
sense, for He is not also Son; just as the Son is Son in the absolute
sense, because He is not also Father. These names do not belong
to us in the absolute sense, because we are both, and not one more than
the other; and we are of both, and not of one only; and so we are
divided, and by degrees become men, and perhaps not even men, and such
as we did not desire, leaving and being left, so that only the
relations remain, without the underlying facts.35123512 Elias explains this to
refer to the fact that children leave and are left by parents; or else
to the death of either one or the other.

But, the objector says, the very form of the
expression “He begat” and “He was begotten,”
brings in the idea of a beginning of generation. But what if you
do not use this expression, but say, “He had been begotten from
the beginning” so as readily to evade your far-fetched and
time-loving objections? Will you bring Scripture against us, as
if we were forging something contrary to Scripture and to the
truth? Why, every one knows that in practice we very often find
tenses interchanged when time is spoken of; and especially is this the
custom of Holy Scripture, not only in respect of the past tense, and of
the present; but even of the future, as for instance “Why did the
heathen rage?”35133513Ps. ii. 1. when they had not
yet raged and “they shall cross over the river on
foot,”35143514Ps. lxvi. 6. where the meaning
is they did cross over. It would be a long task to reckon up all
the expressions of this kind which students have noticed.

VI. So much for this point. What is their
next objection, how full of contentiousness and impudence? He,
they say, either voluntarily begat the Son, or else
involuntarily. Next, as they think, they bind us on both sides
with cords; these however are not strong, but very weak. For,
they say, if it was involuntarily He was under the sway of some one,
and who exercised this sway? And how is He, over whom it is
exercised, God? But if voluntarily, the Son is a Son of Will; how
then is He of the Father?—and they thus invent a new sort of
Mother for him,—the Will,—in place of the Father.
There is one good point which they may allege about this argument of
theirs; namely, that they desert Passion, and take refuge in
Will. For Will is not Passion.

303Secondly, let
us look at the strength of their argument. And it were best to
wrestle with them at first at close quarters. You yourself, who
so recklessly assert whatever takes your fancy; were you begotten
voluntarily or involuntarily by your father? If involuntarily,
then he was under some tyrant’s sway (O terrible violence!) and
who was the tyrant? You will hardly say it was nature,—for
nature is tolerant of chastity. If it was voluntarily, then by a
few syllables your father is done away with, for you are shewn to be
the son of Will, and not of your father. But I pass to the
relation between God and the creature, and I put your own question to
your own wisdom. Did God create all things voluntarily or
under compulsion? If under compulsion, here also is the tyranny,
and one who played the tyrant; if voluntarily, the creatures also are
deprived of their God, and you before the rest, who invent such
arguments and tricks of logic. For a partition is set up between
the Creator and the creatures in the shape of Will. And yet I
think that the Person who wills is distinct from the Act of willing; He
who begets from the Act of begetting; the Speaker from the speech, or
else we are all very stupid. On the one side we have the mover,
and on the other that which is, so to speak, the motion. Thus the
thing willed is not the child of will, for it does not always result
therefrom; nor is that which is begotten the child of generation, nor
that which is heard the child of speech, but of the Person who willed,
or begat, or spoke. But the things of God are beyond all this,
for with Him perhaps the Will to beget is generation, and there is no
intermediate action (if we may accept this altogether, and not rather
consider generation superior to will).

VII. Will you then let me play a little upon this
word Father, for your example encourages me to be so bold? The
Father is God either willingly or unwillingly; and how will you escape
from your own excessive acuteness? If willingly, when did He
begin to will? It could not have been before He began to be, for
there was nothing prior to Him. Or is one part of Him Will and
another the object of Will? If so, He is divisible. So the
question arises, as the result of your argument, whether He Himself is
not the Child of Will. And if unwillingly, what compelled Him to
exist, and how is He God if He was compelled—and that to nothing
less than to be God? How then was He begotten, says my
opponent. How was He created, if as you say, He was
created? For this is a part of the same difficulty. Perhaps
you would say, By Will and Word. You have not yet solved the
whole difficulty; for it yet remains for you to shew how Will and Word
gained the power of action. For man was not created in this
way.

VIII. How then was He begotten? This
Generation would have been no great thing, if you could have
comprehended it who have no real knowledge even of your own generation,
or at least who comprehend very little of it, and of that little you
are ashamed to speak; and then do you think you know the whole?
You will have to undergo much labour before you discover the laws of
composition, formation, manifestation, and the bond whereby soul is
united to body,—mind to soul, and reason to mind; and movement,
increase, assimilation of food, sense, memory, recollection, and all
the rest of the parts of which you are compounded; and which of them
belongs to the soul and body together, and which to each independently
of the other, and which is received from each other. For those
parts whose maturity comes later, yet received their laws at the time
of conception. Tell me what these laws are? And do not even
then venture to speculate on the Generation of God; for that would be
unsafe. For even if you knew all about your own, yet you do not
by any means know about God’s. And if you do not understand
your own, how can you know about God’s? For in proportion
as God is harder to trace out than man, so is the heavenly Generation
harder to comprehend than your own. But if you assert that
because you cannot comprehend it, therefore He cannot have been
begotten, it will be time for you to strike out many existing things
which you cannot comprehend; and first of all God Himself. For
you cannot say what He is, even if you are very reckless, and
excessively proud of your intelligence. First, cast away your
notions of flow and divisions and sections, and your conceptions of
immaterial as if it were material birth, and then you may perhaps
worthily conceive of the Divine Generation. How was He
begotten?—I repeat the question in indignation. The
Begetting of God must be honoured by silence. It is a great thing
for you to learn that He was begotten. But the manner of His
generation we will not admit that even Angels can conceive, much less
you. Shall I tell you how it was? It was in a manner known
to the Father Who begat, and to the Son Who was begotten.
Anything more than this is hidden by a cloud, and escapes your dim
sight.

IX. Well, but the Father begat a Son who
304either was or was not in
existence.35153515 This is the Arian
dilemma, “Did the Son exist before he was begotten?” What utter
nonsense! This is a question which applies to you or me, who on
the one hand were in existence, as for instance Levi in the loins of
Abraham;35163516Heb. vii. 10. and on the other
hand came into existence; and so in some sense we are partly of what
existed, and partly of what was nonexistent; whereas the contrary is
the case with the original matter, which was certainly created out of
what was non-existent, notwithstanding that some pretend that it is
unbegotten. But in this case “to be begotten,” even
from the beginning, is concurrent with “to be.” On
what then will you base this captious question? For what is older
than that which is from the beginning, if we may place there the
previous existence or non-existence of the Son? In either case we
destroy its claim to be the Beginning. Or perhaps you will say,
if we were to ask you whether the Father was of existent or
non-existent substance, that he is twofold, partly pre-existing, partly
existing; or that His case is the same with that of the Son; that is,
that He was created out of non-existing matter, because of your
ridiculous questions and your houses of sand, which cannot stand
against the merest ripple.

I do not admit either solution, and I declare that your
question contains an absurdity, and not a difficulty to answer.
If however you think, in accordance with your dialectic assumptions,
that one or other of these alternatives must necessarily be true in
every case, let me ask you one little question: Is time in time,
or is it not in time? If it is contained in time, then in what
time, and what is it but that time, and how does it contain it?
But if it is not contained in time, what is that surpassing wisdom
which can conceive of a time which is timeless? Now, in regard to
this expression, “I am now telling a lie,” admit one of
these alternatives, either that it is true, or that it is a falsehood,
without qualification (for we cannot admit that it is both). But
this cannot be. For necessarily he either is lying, and so is
telling the truth, or else he is telling the truth, and so is
lying. What wonder is it then that, as in this case contraries
are true, so in that case they should both be untrue, and so your
clever puzzle prove mere foolishness? Solve me one more
riddle. Were you present at your own generation, and are you now
present to yourself, or is neither the case? If you were and are
present, who were you, and with whom are you present? And how did
your single self become thus both subject and object? But if
neither of the above is the case, how did you get separated from
yourself, and what is the cause of this disjoining? But, you will
say, it is stupid to make a fuss about the question whether or no a
single individual is present to himself; for the expression is not used
of oneself but of others. Well, you may be certain that it is
even more stupid to discuss the question whether That which was
begotten from the beginning existed before its generation or not.
For such a question arises only as to matter divisible by time.

X. But they say, The Unbegotten and the
Begotten are not the same; and if this is so, neither is the Son the
same as the Father. It is clear, without saying so, that this
line of argument manifestly excludes either the Son or the Father from
the Godhead. For if to be Unbegotten is the Essence of God, to be
begotten is not that Essence; if the opposite is the case, the
Unbegotten is excluded. What argument can contradict this?
Choose then whichever blasphemy you prefer, my good inventor of a new
theology, if indeed you are anxious at all costs to embrace a
blasphemy. In the next place, in what sense do you assert that
the Unbegotten and the Begotten are not the same? If you mean
that the Uncreated and the created are not the same, I agree with you;
for certainly the Unoriginate and the created are not of the same
nature. But if you say that He That begat and That which is
begotten are not the same, the statement is inaccurate. For it is
in fact a necessary truth that they are the same. For the nature
of the relation of Father to Child is this, that the offspring is of
the same nature with the parent. Or we may argue thus
again. What do you mean by Unbegotten and Begotten, for if you
mean the simple fact of being unbegotten or begotten, these are not the
same; but if you mean Those to Whom these terms apply, how are They not
the same? For example, Wisdom and Unwisdom are not the same in
themselves, but yet both are attributes of man, who is the same; and
they mark not a difference of essence, but one external to the
essence.35173517 cf. Petavius De Trin.,
V. ii., 2. Are
immortality and innocence and immutability also the essence of
God? If so God has many essences and not one; or Deity is a
compound of these. For He cannot be all these without
composition, if they be essences.

XI. They do not however assert this, for these
qualities are common also to other beings. 305But God’s Essence is that which
belongs to God alone, and is proper to Him. But they, who
consider matter and form to be unbegotten, would not allow that to be
unbegotten is the property of God alone (for we must cast away even
further the darkness of the Manichæans).35183518 The Manichæans,
who believed in two eternal principles of good and evil, light and
darkness, held that darkness too was unbegotten (Elias). But suppose that it is the property of
God alone. What of Adam? Was he not alone the direct
creature of God? Yes, you will say. Was he then the only
human being? By no means. And why, but because humanity
does not consist in direct creation? For that which is begotten
is also human. Just so neither is He Who is Unbegotten alone God,
though He alone is Father. But grant that He Who is Begotten is
God; for He is of God, as you must allow, even though you cling to your
Unbegotten. Then how do you describe the Essence of God?
Not by declaring what it is, but by rejecting what it is not. For
your word signifies that He is not begotten; it does not present to you
what is the real nature or condition of that which has no
generation. What then is the Essence of God? It is
for your infatuation to define this, since you are so anxious about His
Generation too; but to us it will be a very great thing, if ever, even
in the future, we learn this, when this darkness and dulness is done
away for us, as He has promised Who cannot lie. This then may be
the thought and hope of those who are purifying themselves with a view
to this. Thus much we for our part will be bold to say, that if
it is a great thing for the Father to be Unoriginate, it is no less a
thing for the Son to have been Begotten of such a Father. For not
only would He share the glory of the Unoriginate, since he is of the
Unoriginate, but he has the added glory of His Generation, a thing so
great and august in the eyes of all those who are not altogether
grovelling and material in mind.

XII. But, they say, if the Son is the Same
as the Father in respect of Essence, then if the Father is unbegotten,
the Son must be so likewise. Quite so—if the Essence of God
consists in being unbegotten; and so He would be a strange mixture,
begottenly unbegotten. If, however, the difference is outside the
Essence, how can you be so certain in speaking of this? Are you
also your father’s father, so as in no respect to fall short of
your father, since you are the same with him in essence? Is it
not evident that our enquiry into the Nature of the Essence of God, if
we make it, will leave Personality absolutely unaffected? But
that Unbegotten is not a synonym of God is proved thus. If it
were so, it would be necessary that since God is a relative term,
Unbegotten should be so likewise; or that since Unbegotten is an
absolute term, so must God be.…God of no one. For words
which are absolutely identical are similarly applied. But the
word Unbegotten is not used relatively. For to what is it
relative? And of what things is God the God? Why, of all
things. How then can God and Unbegotten be identical terms?
And again, since Begotten and Unbegotten are contradictories, like
possession and deprivation, it would follow that contradictory essences
would co-exist, which is impossible.35193519 Because
“Son” implies “begotten.” But (ex hyp.)
“Unbegotten” is synonymous with “God.” Or
again, since possessions are prior to deprivations, and the latter are
destructive of the former, not only must the Essence of the Son be
prior to that of the Father, but it must be destroyed by the Father, on
your hypothesis.

XIII. What now remains of their invincible
arguments? Perhaps the last they will take refuge in is
this. If God has never ceased to beget, the Generation is
imperfect; and when will He cease? But if He has ceased, then He
must have begun. Thus again these carnal minds bring forward
carnal arguments. Whether He is eternally begotten or not, I do
not yet say, until I have looked into the statement, “Before all
the hills He begetteth Me,”35203520Prov. viii. 25. more
accurately. But I cannot see the necessity of their
conclusion. For if, as they say, everything that is to come to an
end had also a beginning, then surely that which has no end had no
beginning. What then will they decide concerning the soul, or the
Angelic nature? If it had a beginning, it will also have an end;
and if it has no end, it is evident that according to them it had no
beginning. But the truth is that it had a beginning, and will
never have an end. Their assertion, then, that which will have an
end had also a beginning, is untrue. Our position, however, is,
that as in the case of a horse, or an ox, or a man, the same definition
applies to all the individuals of the same species, and whatever shares
the definition has also a right to the Name; so in the very same way
there is One Essence of God, and One Nature, and One Name; although in
accordance with a distinction in our thoughts we use distinct Names and
that whatever is properly called by this Name really is God; and what
He is in Nature, That He is truly called—if at
306least we are to hold that
Truth is a matter not of names but of realities. But our
opponents, as if they were afraid of leaving any stone unturned to
subvert the Truth, acknowledge indeed that the Son is God when they are
compelled to do so by arguments35213521 The Benedictines here
translate λόγῳ
by “Scripture,” on the ground that Reason is not competent
to assert the Divinity of the Word. and evidences;
but they only mean that He is God in an ambiguous sense, and that He
only shares the Name.

XIV. And when we advance this objection against
them, “What do you mean to say then? That the Son is not
properly God, just as a picture of an animal is not properly an
animal? And if not properly God, in what sense is He God at
all?” They reply, Why should not these terms be ambiguous,
and in both cases be used in a proper sense? And they will give
us such instances as the land-dog and the dogfish; where the word Dog
is ambiguous, and yet in both cases is properly used, for there is such
a species among the ambiguously named, or any other case in which the
same appellative is used for two things of different nature. But,
my good friend, in this case, when you include two natures under the
same name, you do not assert that either is better than the other, or
that the one is prior and the other posterior, or that one is in a
greater degree and the other in a lesser that which is predicated of
them both, for there is no connecting link which forces this necessity
upon them. One is not a dog more than the other, and one less so;
either the dogfish more than the land-dog, or the land-dog than the
dogfish. Why should they be, or on what principle? But the
community of name is here between things of equal value, though of
different nature. But in the case of which we are speaking, you
couple the Name of God with adorable Majesty, and make It surpass every
essence and nature (an attribute of God alone), and then you ascribe
this Name to the Father, while you deprive the Son of it, and make Him
subject to the Father, and give Him only a secondary honour and
worship; and even if in words you bestow on Him one which is Equal, yet
in practice you cut off His Deity, and pass malignantly from a use of
the same Name implying an exact equality, to one which connects things
which are not equal. And so the pictured and the living man are
in your mouth an apter illustration of the relations of Deity than the
dogs which I instanced. Or else you must concede to both an equal
dignity of nature as well as a common name—even though you
introduced these natures into your argument as different; and thus you
destroy the analogy of your dogs, which you invented as an instance of
inequality. For what is the force of your instance of ambiguity,
if those whom you distinguish are not equal in honour? For it was
not to prove an equality but an inequality that you took refuge in your
dogs. How could anybody be more clearly convicted of fighting
both against his own arguments, and against the Deity?

XV. And if, when we admit that in respect of
being the Cause the Father is greater than the Son, they should assume
the premiss that He is the Cause by Nature, and then deduce the
conclusion that He is greater by Nature also, it is difficult to say
whether they mislead most themselves or those with whom they are
arguing. For it does not absolutely follow that all that is
predicated of a class can also be predicated of all the individuals
composing it; for the different particulars may belong to different
individuals. For what hinders me, if I assume the same premiss,
namely, that the Father is greater by Nature, and then add this other,
Yet not by nature in every respect greater nor yet Father—from
concluding, Therefore the Greater is not in every respect greater, nor
the Father in every respect Father? Or, if you prefer it, let us
put it in this way: God is an Essence: But an Essence is
not in every case God; and draw the conclusion for
yourself—Therefore God is not in every case God. I think
the fallacy here is the arguing from a conditioned to an unconditioned
use of a term,35223522 Or as the schoolmen
say the fallacy is, A dicto secundum quid ad dictum simpliciter, one of
the many forms of Undistributed Middle Term. Petavius, however
(De Trin.. II., v., 12), pronounces the argument of this section
unsatisfactory. to use the
technical expression of the logicians. For while we assign this
word Greater to His Nature viewed as a Cause, they infer it of His
Nature viewed in itself. It is just as if when we said that such
a one was a dead man they were to infer simply that he was a
Man.

XVI. How shall we pass over the following point,
which is no less amazing than the rest? Father, they say, is a
name either of an essence or of an Action, thinking to bind us down on
both sides. If we say that it is a name of an essence, they will
say that we agree with them that the Son is of another Essence, since
there is but one Essence of God, and this, according to them, is
preoccupied by the Father. On the other hand, if we say that it
is the name of an Action, we shall be 307supposed to acknowledge plainly that the Son is
created and not begotten. For where there is an Agent there must
also be an Effect. And they will say they wonder how that which
is made can be identical with That which made it. I should myself
have been frightened with your distinction, if it had been necessary to
accept one or other of the alternatives, and not rather put both aside,
and state a third and truer one, namely, that Father is not a name
either of an essence or of an action, most clever sirs. But it is
the name of the Relation in which the Father stands to the Son, and the
Son to the Father. For as with us these names make known a
genuine and intimate relation, so, in the case before us too, they
denote an identity of nature between Him That is begotten and Him That
begets. But let us concede to you that Father is a name of
essence, it will still bring in the idea of Son, and will not make it
of a different nature, according to common ideas and the force of these
names. Let it be, if it so please you, the name of an action; you
will not defeat us in this way either. The Homoousion would be
indeed the result of this action, or otherwise the conception of an
action in this matter would be absurd. You see then how, even
though you try to fight unfairly, we avoid your sophistries. But
now, since we have ascertained how invincible you are in your arguments
and sophistries, let us look at your strength in the Oracles of God, if
perchance you may choose to persuade us out of them.

XVII. For we have learnt to believe in and
to teach the Deity of the Son from their great and lofty
utterances. And what utterances are these? These:
God—The Word—He That Was In The Beginning and With The
Beginning, and The Beginning. “In the Beginning was The
Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God,”35233523John i. 1. and “With Thee is the
Beginning,”35243524Ps. cx. 3. and “He who
calleth her The Beginning from generations.”35253525Isa. xli. 4. Then the Son is Only-begotten:
The only “begotten Son which is in the bosom of the Father, it
says, He hath declared Him.”35263526John i. 18. The Way,
the Truth, the Life, the Light. “I am the Way, the Truth,
and the Life;” and “I am the Light of the
World.”35273527John vii. 12; ix. 5; xiv. 6. Wisdom and
Power, “Christ, the Wisdom of God, and the Power of
God.”352835281 Cor. i. 24. The
Effulgence, the Impress, the Image, the Seal; “Who being the
Effulgence of His glory and the Impress of His Essence,”35293529Heb. i. 3 R.V. and “the Image of His
Goodness,”35303530Wisd. vii. 26. and “Him hath
God the Father sealed.”35313531John vi. 27. Lord, King,
He That Is, The Almighty. “The Lord rained down fire from
the Lord;”35323532Gen. xix. 24. and “A
sceptre of righteousness is the sceptre of Thy Kingdom;”35333533Ps. xlv. 6. and “Which is and was and is to come,
the Almighty”35343534Rev. i. 8.—all which are
clearly spoken of the Son, with all the other passages of the same
force, none of which is an afterthought, or added later to the Son or
the Spirit, any more than to the Father Himself. For Their
Perfection is not affected by additions. There never was a time
when He was without the Word, or when He was not the Father, or when He
was not true, or not wise, or not powerful, or devoid of life, or of
splendour, or of goodness.

But in opposition to all these, do you reckon up
for me the expressions which make for your ignorant arrogance, such as
“My God and your God,”35353535John xx. 17, 28. or greater, or
created, or made, or sanctified;35363536Prov. viii. 22; John x. 36; Acts ii.
36. Add, if you
like, Servant35373537Phil. ii. 7. and
Obedient35383538Phil. ii. 8. and Gave35393539John i. 12. and Learnt,35403540Heb. v. 8.
and was commanded,35413541John x. 18; xiv. 31. was sent,35423542Ib. iv.
34; v. 23, sq. can do nothing of Himself, either say, or
judge, or give, or will.35433543Ib. v. 19,
30. And further
these,—His ignorance,35443544Mark xiii. 32.
subjection,354535451 Cor. xv. 28. prayer,35463546Luke vi. 12. asking,35473547John xiv. 16.
increase,35483548Luke ii. 52. being made
perfect.35493549Heb. v. 9, etc. And if you
like even more humble than these; such as speak of His
sleeping,35503550Matt. viii. 24; Mark iv. 38. hungering,35513551Matt. iv. 2; Luke iv. 2. being in an agony,35523552Luke xxii. 44.
and fearing;35533553Heb. v. 7. or perhaps you
would make even His Cross and Death a matter of reproach to Him.
His Resurrection and Ascension I fancy you will leave to me, for in
these is found something to support our position. A good
many other things too you might pick up, if you desire to put together
that equivocal and intruded god of yours, Who to us is True God, and
equal to the Father. For every one of these points, taken
separately, may very easily, if we go through them one by one, be
explained to you in the most reverent sense, and the stumbling-block of
the letter be cleaned away—that is, if your stumbling at it be
honest, and not wilfully malicious. To give you the explanation
in one sentence. What is lofty you are to apply to the Godhead,
and to that Nature in Him which is superior to sufferings and
incorporeal; but all that is lowly to the composite condition35543554 S. Gregory often
speaks of Human Nature as our composite being; and here he means
the Sacred Humanity exclusively; there is no shadow of suspicion of
Nestorianism or Eutychianism attaching to his name. of Him who for your 308sakes made Himself of no reputation and
was Incarnate—yes, for it is no worse thing to say, was made Man,
and afterwards was also exalted. The result will be that you will
abandon these carnal and grovelling doctrines, and learn to be more
sublime, and to ascend with His Godhead, and you will not remain
permanently among the things of sight, but will rise up with Him into
the world of thought, and come to know which passages refer to His
Nature, and which to His assumption of Human Nature.35553555 The word οἰκονομία
is used in four principal senses: (a) The ministry of the Gospel,
cf. Ephes. iii. 2; Col. i.
25; etc., and S. Cyril
Hieros., has the expression “Economy of the Mystery” (Cat.
xxv.). It is also used absolutely by S. Chrysostom and
others. (b) The Providence of God, as by Epiphanius, Greg. Nyss.,
and others. (c) The Incarnation, as in the text, without any
epithet—in which use it is opposed to ἡ θεότης. Sometimes
however epithets are added. (d) The whole Mystery of Redemption,
including the Passion.

XIX. For He Whom you now treat with contempt
was once above you. He Who is now Man was once the
Uncompounded. What He was He continued to be; what He was not He
took to Himself.35563556 cf. S. Leo, Serm.
xxi., De Nativ. Dei, c. ii. “Remaining what He was, and
putting on what He was not, He united the true form of a servant to
that form in which He was equal to God the Father, and combined both
natures in a union so close that the lower was not consumed by
receiving glory, nor the higher lessened by assuming lowliness. In the
beginning He was, uncaused; for what is the Cause of God? But
afterwards for a cause He was born. And that cause was that you
might be saved, who insult Him and despise His Godhead, because of
this, that He took upon Him your denser nature, having converse with
Flesh by means of Mind.35573557 “Mediante
anima,” cf. Orat. xxxviii., 13. S. T. Aq., Summa, III.,
vi. Jungmann, de Verbo Incarn., c. 68. Forbes, On Nicene
Creed, p. 188. Petav. de Incarn, IV., xiii., 2. While His
inferior Nature, the Humanity, became God, because it was united to
God, and became One Person35583558γενόμενος
ἄνθρωπος ὁ
κάτω θεός. The
passage is one of great difficulty. Elias Cretensis renders the
words as follows:—“Becoming Man, the inferior God, because
humanity was” etc.; but his rendering is rejected as impossible
by Petavius (de Incarn., IV., ix., 2, 3). (i.) It is
grammatically possible (Madvig, Gk. Syntax, 9 a. rem. 3) for
ὁ κάτω, standing as it does, to qualify
ἄνθρωπος. (ii.)
But the καὶ
γενόμενος
…θεός may be taken as a nom. absolute,
which would have been expressed by a gen. if ἄνθρωπος had not been
the same Person as ὁμιλήσας. because the Higher
Nature prevailed in order that I too might be made God so far as He is
made Man.35593559 As by the Incarnation
He who was God was made perfect Man, so Man was made perfect God, and
each nature retained its own qualities. Or it may mean that God
Incarnate was made Man in respect of body, soul, and mind; that is, in
all points: and the Humanity which He assumed was in all these
points Deified; and therefore they who are His kindred and imitators
share to that extent the Deification (Elias). In the First
Epistle to Cledonius (v. infra) the Priest, against Apollinarius, which
is sometimes reckoned as the 51st Oration, S. Gregory says, “The
Godhead and the Manhood are two natures, just as soul and body
are. But there are not two Sons or two Gods; although Paul did
thus entangle the outward man and the inward. And, to speak
succinctly, the Natures which make our Saviour are distinct, for the
Invisible is not the same as the visible, nor the Timeless as that
which is subject to time; but He is not two Persons, God forbid, for
both these are one in the union, God being made Man, and Man being made
God, or however else you may express it.” And upon this S.
Thomas Aquinas remarks that it is true, if by Man you understand simply
Human Nature, and not a Human Person; in this sense it was brought to
pass that Man was God; or in other words Human Nature was made that of
the Son of God. (Summa, III., xvi., 7.) He was
born—but He had been begotten: He was born of a
woman—but she was a Virgin. The first is human, the second
Divine. In His Human nature He had no Father, but also in His
Divine Nature no Mother.35603560 “If any does not
admit Mary to be the Mother of God (θεοτόκον), he is
separated from God. If any say that He passed through the Virgin
as through a conduit, and that He was not formed in her both divinely
and humanly (divinely, because without a human father; humanly, because
in accordance with the laws of gestation), he is in like manner
atheistic. If any assert that the Humanity was thus formed, and
the Deity subsequently added, he is condemned; for this is not a
generation of God, but an evasion of generation” (S. G. N. ad
Cled., Ep. i.) S. Thomas Aquinas explains the fitness of the
title thus: The Blessed Virgin could be denied to be the Mother
of God only if either His Humanity had been conceived and born before
That Man was the Son of God:—which was the position taken up by
Photinus; or else if the Humanity had not been assumed into the unity
of the Person (or Hypostasis) of the Son of God;—which was the
position of Nestorius. Both these positions are erroneous.
Therefore to deny that the Blessed Virgin is the Mother of God is
heretical (Summa, III.. xxxv. 4). In the text S. Gregory merely
means that the Godhead of our Lord was not derived from His Blessed
Mother, just as his Manhood was not derived from any man; but, as the
extract at the beginning of this Note shews, he would be the last to
take up the Nestorian notion, which was afterwards condemned at the
Council of Ephesus. Both
these35613561 Both These, i.e., the
being without Father, and without Mother is a condition which belongs
only to the Godhead. belong to Godhead. He dwelt in the
womb—but He was recognized by the Prophet,35623562 S. John the Baptist
(S. Luke i.). himself still in the womb, leaping before
the Word, for Whose sake He came into being. He was wrapped in
swaddling clothes35633563Luke ii. 41.—but He took
off the swathing bands of the grave by His rising again. He was
laid in a manger—but He was glorified by Angels, and proclaimed
by a star, and worshipped by the Magi. Why are you offended by
that which is presented to your sight, because you will not look at
that which is presented to your mind? He was driven into exile
into Egypt—but He drove away the Egyptian idols.35643564 Referring, perhaps, to
the tradition that at the coming of Christ into Egypt all the Idols in
the land fell down and were broken. He had no form nor comeliness in the
eyes of the Jews35653565Isa. liii. 2.—but to David
He is fairer than the children of men.35663566Ps. xlv. 2. And on the Mountain He was bright as
the lightning, and became more luminous than the sun,35673567Matt. xvii. 2. initiating us into the mystery of the
future.

XX. He was baptized as Man—but He
remitted sins as God35683568Matt. iii. 13; ix. 6.—not because
He needed purificatory rites Himself, but that He might sanctify the
element of water. He was tempted as Man, but He conquered as God;
yea, He bids us be of good cheer, for He has overcome the
world.35693569John xvi. 33. He
hungered—but He fed thousands;35703570Ib. vi.
10. yea, He is the
Bread that giveth life, and That is of heaven. He
thirsted—but He cried, If any man thirst, let him come unto Me
and drink.35713571Ib. vii.
37. Yea, He
promised that foun309tains should flow from them that
believe. He was wearied, but He is the Rest of them that are
weary and heavy laden.35723572Matt. xi. 28. He was heavy
with sleep, but He walked lightly over the sea.35733573Ib. viii.
24. He rebuked the winds, He made Peter
light as he began to sink.35743574Ib. xiv.
25, 30. He pays
tribute, but it is out of a fish;35753575Ib. xvii.
24. yea, He is the
King of those who demanded it.35763576John xix. 19. He is called
a Samaritan and a demoniac;35773577Ib. viii.
48.—but He saves
him that came down from Jerusalem and fell among thieves;35783578Luke x. 30, etc. the demons acknowledge Him, and He drives
out demons and sinks in the sea legions of foul spirits,35793579Luke viii. 28–33. and sees the Prince of the demons falling
like lightning.35803580Ib. x.
18. He is stoned,
but is not taken. He prays, but He hears prayer. He weeps,
but He causes tears to cease. He asks where Lazarus was laid, for
He was Man; but He raises Lazarus, for He was God.35813581John xi. 43. He is sold, and very cheap, for it is
only for thirty pieces of silver;35823582Matt. xxvi. 15. but He redeems
the world, and that at a great price, for the Price was His own
blood.358335831 Pet. i. 19. As a sheep He
is led to the slaughter,35843584Isa. liii. 7. but He is the
Shepherd of Israel, and now of the whole world also. As a Lamb He
is silent, yet He is the Word, and is proclaimed by the Voice of one
crying in the wilderness.35853585John i. 23. He is bruised
and wounded, but He healeth every disease and every infirmity.35863586Isa. liii. 23. He is lifted up and nailed to the
Tree, but by the Tree of Life He restoreth us; yea, He saveth even the
Robber crucified with Him;35873587Luke xxiii. 43. yea, He wrapped the
visible world in darkness. He is given vinegar to drink mingled
with gall. Who? He who turned the water into wine35883588John ii. 1–11., who is the destroyer of the bitter taste,
who is Sweetness and altogether desire.35893589Cant. v.
16. He lays down His life, but He has
power to take it again;35903590John x. 18. and the veil is
rent, for the mysterious doors of Heaven are opened; the rocks are
cleft, the dead arise.35913591Matt. xxvii. 51. He dies, but
He gives life, and by His death destroys death. He is buried, but
He rises again; He goes down into Hell, but He brings up the souls; He
ascends to Heaven, and shall come again to judge the quick and the
dead, and to put to the test such words as yours. If the one give
you a starting point for your error, let the others put an end to
it.

XXI. This, then, is our reply to those who
would puzzle us; not given willingly indeed (for light talk and
contradictions of words are not agreeable to the faithful, and one
Adversary is enough for us), but of necessity, for the sake of our
assailants (for medicines exist because of diseases), that they may be
led to see that they are not all-wise nor invincible in those
superfluous arguments which make void the Gospel. For when we
leave off believing, and protect ourselves by mere strength of
argument, and destroy the claim which the Spirit has upon our faith by
questionings, and then our argument is not strong enough for the
importance of the subject (and this must necessarily be the case, since
it is put in motion by an organ of so little power as is our mind),
what is the result? The weakness of the argument appears to
belong to the mystery, and thus elegance of language makes void the
Cross, as Paul also thought.359235921 Cor. i. 17. For faith is
that which completes our argument. But may He who proclaimeth
unions and looseth those that are bound, and who putteth into our minds
to solve the knots of their unnatural dogmas, if it may be, change
these men and make them faithful instead of rhetoricians, Christians
instead of that which they now are called. This indeed we entreat
and beg for Christ’s sake. Be ye reconciled to
God,359335932 Cor. v. 20. and quench not the Spirit;359435941 Thess. v. 19. or rather, may Christ be reconciled to you,
and may the Spirit enlighten you, though so late. But if you are
too fond of your quarrel, we at any rate will hold fast to the Trinity,
and by the Trinity may we be saved, remaining pure and without offence,
until the more perfect shewing forth of that which we desire, in Him,
Christ our Lord, to Whom be the glory for ever.
Amen.

3508 Billius and
others here read Authority, which is not supported by the best
mss., or by the context.

3509 Elias explains this to
mean that of old men knew only One Person in the Godhead: and
until the Incarnation this knowledge was sufficient; but from that time
forward they acknowledged a Second Person, and through Him a Third
also, the Holy Ghost. But this explanation falls far short of
Gregory’s meaning, which certainly is that the movement of
self-consciousness in God from all Eternity made the Generation of the
Son, and the Procession of the Holy Ghost, a necessity. All is
objective in God. cf. Petav. de Deo, II., viii., 16; also, Greg.
Naz., Or. xxiii. 5.

3510προβολεὺς-προβολὴ
was a term used by the Gnostics to describe the Emanations by which the
distance between the Finite and the Infinite was according to them
bridged over; and on this account it fell under suspicion, and was
rejected by both Arius and Athanasius. Tertullian used it with an
explanation which is satisfactory as regards the προβολὴ of the Son;
but when he comes to apply it to the Procession of the Holy Ghost he
uses an illustration which is in almost the very words rejected by
Gregory (c. Prax., 7, 8. See Swete, p. 56). Origen did not
admit it. Later when this danger was past, the word came into use
again as the equivalent of ἐκπόρευσις,
at first with reserve and explanations in the text, but later on as an
accepted term. See Swete ,“On The Doctrine Of The Holy
Spirit,” p. 36.

3521 The Benedictines here
translate λόγῳ
by “Scripture,” on the ground that Reason is not competent
to assert the Divinity of the Word.

3522 Or as the schoolmen
say the fallacy is, A dicto secundum quid ad dictum simpliciter, one of
the many forms of Undistributed Middle Term. Petavius, however
(De Trin.. II., v., 12), pronounces the argument of this section
unsatisfactory.

3554 S. Gregory often
speaks of Human Nature as our composite being; and here he means
the Sacred Humanity exclusively; there is no shadow of suspicion of
Nestorianism or Eutychianism attaching to his name.

3555 The word οἰκονομία
is used in four principal senses: (a) The ministry of the Gospel,
cf. Ephes. iii. 2; Col. i.
25; etc., and S. Cyril
Hieros., has the expression “Economy of the Mystery” (Cat.
xxv.). It is also used absolutely by S. Chrysostom and
others. (b) The Providence of God, as by Epiphanius, Greg. Nyss.,
and others. (c) The Incarnation, as in the text, without any
epithet—in which use it is opposed to ἡ θεότης. Sometimes
however epithets are added. (d) The whole Mystery of Redemption,
including the Passion.

3556 cf. S. Leo, Serm.
xxi., De Nativ. Dei, c. ii. “Remaining what He was, and
putting on what He was not, He united the true form of a servant to
that form in which He was equal to God the Father, and combined both
natures in a union so close that the lower was not consumed by
receiving glory, nor the higher lessened by assuming lowliness.

3558γενόμενος
ἄνθρωπος ὁ
κάτω θεός. The
passage is one of great difficulty. Elias Cretensis renders the
words as follows:—“Becoming Man, the inferior God, because
humanity was” etc.; but his rendering is rejected as impossible
by Petavius (de Incarn., IV., ix., 2, 3). (i.) It is
grammatically possible (Madvig, Gk. Syntax, 9 a. rem. 3) for
ὁ κάτω, standing as it does, to qualify
ἄνθρωπος. (ii.)
But the καὶ
γενόμενος
…θεός may be taken as a nom. absolute,
which would have been expressed by a gen. if ἄνθρωπος had not been
the same Person as ὁμιλήσας.

3559 As by the Incarnation
He who was God was made perfect Man, so Man was made perfect God, and
each nature retained its own qualities. Or it may mean that God
Incarnate was made Man in respect of body, soul, and mind; that is, in
all points: and the Humanity which He assumed was in all these
points Deified; and therefore they who are His kindred and imitators
share to that extent the Deification (Elias). In the First
Epistle to Cledonius (v. infra) the Priest, against Apollinarius, which
is sometimes reckoned as the 51st Oration, S. Gregory says, “The
Godhead and the Manhood are two natures, just as soul and body
are. But there are not two Sons or two Gods; although Paul did
thus entangle the outward man and the inward. And, to speak
succinctly, the Natures which make our Saviour are distinct, for the
Invisible is not the same as the visible, nor the Timeless as that
which is subject to time; but He is not two Persons, God forbid, for
both these are one in the union, God being made Man, and Man being made
God, or however else you may express it.” And upon this S.
Thomas Aquinas remarks that it is true, if by Man you understand simply
Human Nature, and not a Human Person; in this sense it was brought to
pass that Man was God; or in other words Human Nature was made that of
the Son of God. (Summa, III., xvi., 7.)

3560 “If any does not
admit Mary to be the Mother of God (θεοτόκον), he is
separated from God. If any say that He passed through the Virgin
as through a conduit, and that He was not formed in her both divinely
and humanly (divinely, because without a human father; humanly, because
in accordance with the laws of gestation), he is in like manner
atheistic. If any assert that the Humanity was thus formed, and
the Deity subsequently added, he is condemned; for this is not a
generation of God, but an evasion of generation” (S. G. N. ad
Cled., Ep. i.) S. Thomas Aquinas explains the fitness of the
title thus: The Blessed Virgin could be denied to be the Mother
of God only if either His Humanity had been conceived and born before
That Man was the Son of God:—which was the position taken up by
Photinus; or else if the Humanity had not been assumed into the unity
of the Person (or Hypostasis) of the Son of God;—which was the
position of Nestorius. Both these positions are erroneous.
Therefore to deny that the Blessed Virgin is the Mother of God is
heretical (Summa, III.. xxxv. 4). In the text S. Gregory merely
means that the Godhead of our Lord was not derived from His Blessed
Mother, just as his Manhood was not derived from any man; but, as the
extract at the beginning of this Note shews, he would be the last to
take up the Nestorian notion, which was afterwards condemned at the
Council of Ephesus.

3561 Both These, i.e., the
being without Father, and without Mother is a condition which belongs
only to the Godhead.