The following chapter has been contributed by the author Edward Moxon-Browne with
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National identity assumes an importance in Northern Ireland not
evident elsewhere in the United Kingdom. In Britain, for the most
part, lines of ethnicity, class and religion run across the preponderant
'British' identity. That identity itself encapsulates wide variations
of racial and national origin: Jewish, Jamaican, Scots, Bangladeshi
and Hong Kong Chinese. For all these groups, and indeed the hundreds
of other ethnic minorities living in Britain, 'British' national
identity can be regarded as a primordial umbrella under which
subordinate ethnic identities can co-exist with reasonable ease.

In Northern Ireland, by contrast, primordial national identity
is an exclusive and divisive concept. Moreover, national identity
in Northern Ireland is not simply a reflection of diverse ethnicities
based on successive waves of immigration. It is rooted in the
colonisation of Ulster by Protestants; and, consequently, by opposing
views of the legitimacy of the state and its boundaries.

In Britain, political conflict is largely mediated by rules and
institutions that command widespread consent; in Northern Ireland,
the conflict is rooted in rules and institutions. For example,
in the present survey, when respondents were asked if they thought
that 'The law should always be obeyed, even if a particular
law is wrong', there was a stark contrast between Catholic
and Protestant responses, with almost half (49%) of Protestants
agreeing, while only 28% of Catholics did so. Likewise, when asked
about the death penalty for terrorism, while 71% of Catholics
oppose it, only 19% of Protestants do so -
the same as in Britain as a whole. Not only does divided
national identity lie at the heart of the political conflict in
Northern Ireland, but also it informs and underlies other social
divisions, not to mention strong divergences of attitude towards
many basic issues.

The differences between the two communities in Northern Ireland
are palpable. The lines of division tend to reinforce each other.
There are few, if any, overarching institutions or foci of loyalty
that can transcend the cleavages. Although the lines of division
are often considered to be religious in character, religion is
best seen as a badge of difference - the
visible symbol of deeper and less tangible attachments to national
'roots'. These roots derive from historical events whose interpretation
is itself a subject of conflict. Today, these conflicting interpretations
manifest themselves in two sets of apparently irreconcilable political
aspirations: unionists determined to maintain Northern Ireland's
position within the United Kingdom, and nationalists aiming at
some kind of all-Ireland structure.

At least two major surveys have previously examined the salience
of national identity in Northern Ireland. Rose (1971) and Moxon-Browne
(1983) report the results of attitude surveys carried out, respectively,
in 1968 and 1978. Both surveys interviewed around 1300 respondents.

Rose's interviews were fortuitous in their timing: they took place
a few months before the 'troubles' began in 1968. As one commentator
has observed, they 'embalm for us a permanent record of attitudes
in Northern Ireland at the last moment when the region was still
at peace' (Whyte, 1990, p.6). The main value of the Moxon-Browne
survey, carried out in the midst of the 'troubles' exactly 10
years later, was in the replication of certain key questions.

The present survey asks virtually the same questions as both Moxon-Browne
and Rose, but uses a slightly different set of response-categories.
For example, while all three surveys ask 'Which of these (terms)
best describes the way you usually think of yourself?', the
Social Attitudes survey substitutes 'Northern Irish' for 'Anglo-Irish'
and does not include 'sometimes British - sometimes
Irish'. Although such differences mean that findings across the
three surveys can never be precisely comparable, it is nonetheless
possible to draw useful conclusions from them as a series.

This chapter examines three aspects of national identity in Northern
Ireland: the overlap between religion and national identity; the
impact of social class on national identity; and the relationship
between party political allegiance and national identity. It concludes
with some comments on the evolution of national identity.

The dichotomy between 'British' and 'Irish' national identity
in Northern Ireland might have become less sharp had it not been
for high rates of intra-group marriage (that is, endogamy). Most
ethnic groups show a strong preference for endogamy. American
Jews and American Blacks marry preponderantly within their own
group. There is an underlying fear that the ethnic group will
not survive in the next generation if only one parent is of that
group. In colonial situations, or where there is a stark contrast
in the respective sizes of two or more ethnic groups or, more
particularly, in the gender composition of the groups, interbreeding
often developed and was condoned.

In Northern Ireland, however, despite a Protestant majority, endogamy
has been preserved. This has been due partly to an adequate gender
balance within each community and partly to religious and political
objections to intermarriage. By contrast, in the Republic of Ireland,
where the Protestant minority is very small and the political
implications of intermarriage are perceived as unimportant, much
more intermarriage takes place. In any society in which the boundaries
between communities are clearly defined, endogamy is frequently
the single most important factor in maintaining the boundaries.
In Northern Ireland, endogamy is both a reflection and a cause
of strong communal identity.

Rose (1971) found that only 5% of marriages crossed the communal
divide; 10 years later, Moxon-Browne (1983) found the proportion
to be the same, and the figure in the current survey is only slightly
less (4%). The consistency of these figures reflects not only
the crystallisation of the sectarian division in Northern Ireland,
but a strong belief in maintaining such a division.

This lends support to the conclusions of a recent discussion (Whyte,
1986) of the factors which may be responsible for delineating
boundaries between the two communities in Northern Ireland. Educational
segregation and high rates of endogamy were considered to be more
pertinent than party political affiliations, residential segregation,
economic status or membership of the Orange Order. Much earlier,
Harris (1972) had found endogamy to be the single most powerful
factor in maintaining the divide between the two communities in
the rural area she studied. The supremely important ties of kinship
never crossed the sectarian divide. The fundamental relevance
of sectarian identity patterns is underlined by Whyte's observation
that when intermarriage did occur, 'it bridged no gaps, for usually
the husband cut off all ties with his own kin' (Whyte, 1986, p.230).
This fear of 'diluting' the prime reference-point for identity
points to its significance. Marriages across social class boundaries
do not arouse the same negative reactions.

Given the clearly delineated boundaries between the two communities
in Northern Ireland, it might be assumed that national identity
and religion are virtually synonymous. Indeed, 'Catholic' and
'nationalist', and 'Protestant' and 'unionist', respectively,
are often used interchangeably. However, the evidence from four
attitude surveys, including the present one, shows that there
are important exceptions to this. It can be seen that, although
most Protestants feel 'British' and most Catholics feel 'Irish',
it is far from being a universal rule. In 1968, just before the
onset of civil unrest in Northern Ireland, 20% of Protestants
claimed to feel 'Irish'. Ten years later, after having borne the
brunt of the IRA campaign, Protestants have swung more definitely
towards adopting the label 'British'. This swing is confirmed
by the David Smith survey of 1986 reported in Whyte (1990) and
by the present survey.

If social class is a part of the Northern Irish identity, its
importance is obscured, in the political domain at least, by religion.
Rose (1971) found that Northern Irish people are well aware of
a class structure which approximates to that found in the rest
of the United Kingdom. This was true of both Protestants and Catholics.
However, in response to questions about their self-identification
in class terms, Protestants placed themselves disproportionately
in the middle and upper classes. Even when class was assigned
more objectively, there was still 'a limited tendency for Protestants
to have a higher occupational class than Catholics' (Rose, 1971,
p.280). This socioeconomic imbalance in favour of the Protestant
community, as well as its relatively lower unemployment rates,
was confirmed both by Aunger (1975) and Moxon-Browne (1983). Rose's
famous dictum that there are 'more poor Protestants than poor
Catholics in Northern Ireland' (Rose, 1971, p.289) was not supported.
In the 1989 Social Attitudes survey, 47% of Catholic respondents
ascribed themselves to the working class, compared with 33% of
Protestants; and one in six Catholics and one in ten Protestants
were unemployed. These figures suggest a narrowing of the gap
between the socio-economic positions of the two communities.

National identity and social class

Protestants

.

I

II

IIINM

IIIM

IV

.

%

%

%

%

%

British

82

60

72

65

69

Irish

18

8

3

1

4

Ulster

-

8

6

17

12

Northern Irish

-

21

13

18

11

British/Irish

-

5

4

1

3

Catholics

.

I

II

IIINM

IIM

JY

British

-

14

14

10

6

Irish

56

44

55

65

63

Ulster

-

-

7

-

3

Northern Irish

44

34

16

22

26

British/Irish

-

8

8

4

2

Is social class a barrier to social relationships? Rose asked
his respondents whether they thought that they had more in common
with people of the same class but a different religion, or with
people of the same religion but a different class. Thirty-nine
per cent of both Protestants and Catholics felt that they had
more in common with those of the same class as themselves, irrespective
of religion. Only 15% thought that they had more in common with
co-religionists of a different class. Thirty-six per cent said
that neither religion nor class makes any difference to social
relations. In all three cases, there were no great differences
between Protestant and Catholic views. Rose concluded from this
that there was a sense of community among people in Northern Ireland
and that religion played a relatively small role in their day-to-day
lives. Religious differences only became important in the domain
of politics. But, as Harris tells us, politics is normally a taboo
subject in contacts between people of different religions in Northern
Ireland, and great efforts are made to avoid controversial topics
in 'mixed company' (Harris, 1972, pp.146-8).

The Social Attitudes survey suggests that both religion and class
are important in social relationships. In answer to the question
'How close would you say you feel towards people who have the
same religious background as yours?', and 'to people who
have the same social class background as you?', 65% said 'close'
or 'very close' to both. Both religion and class were more important
in this respect than area of residence, area of birth, or political
beliefs.

Who do you feel closest to?

.

Northern Ireland

Britain

.

Prot.

Cath.

.

'Very close'/'Fairly close'

%

%

%

People born in the same area

57

63

49

People of the same social class

68

65

59

People of the same religion

67

70

36

People of the same race

65

67

56

People of the same political beliefs

54

52

34

People who live in the same area

55

66

46

Rose found that political attitudes were much less affected by
class than by religion (1971, pp.280-i). Within the two religious
communities he found virtually no differences in socio-economic
status that explained extreme or moderate political positions.
In the late 1970s, however, class clearly did have an impact on
national identity, political party affiliation, and attitudes
towards constitutional solutions. Among Catholics, self-perceptions
of being 'British' were more common among middle-class Catholics
than among their working-class co-religionists (Moxon-Browne,
1983). Among Protestants the 'Ulster' label was adopted by more
working-class than middle-class respondents. These contrasts are
further emphasised by the social structure of support for the
main political parties. The proportion of voters who were working
class was greater in the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) and Sinn
Fein than in either the Official Unionist Party (OUP) or the Social
Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP). Among the predominantly middle-class
supporters of the Alliance Party, Catholics were noticeably more
likely to see themselves as 'British' than in either the SDLP
or Sinn Fein (Moxon-Browne, 1983; MoxonBrowne and Munday, 1984).

The present survey found that an Ulster identity is still relatively
attractive to lower-class Protestants, though as many referred
to themselves as Northern Irish, an alternative that was not available
to respondents in the two earlier surveys. The 'British' label
is still as strong among Protestants as it was in 1978 and 1968.
Among Catholics, if the 'British' label is applied, it is more
likely to be by middle-class than working-class respondents. The
'Northern Irish' label is attractive to many middle-class Catholics.

The reasons for class attachments to different national labels
is a matter for speculation. It seems reasonable to suppose that
middle-class Protestants benefit from the union with Britain more
directly than those who are less well-off. The latter, and especially
unemployed Protestants, would feel no great affinity with the
status quo and still less with any attempts to extend political
or economic opportunities to the Catholic community. An Irish
identity is rejected by almost all Protestants. The more disadvantaged
groups reject a British identity as well, perhaps because Britain
is perceived to be acting in a way that is not conducive to the
best interests of the Protestant working class. The claim to an
'Ulster' identity may be in protest against what are seen as alien
'English' policies. For the Protestant, national identity is a
pragmatic issue. Waddell and Cairns (see Whyte, 1990, p.71) argue
that national identity is more 'situationally determined' for
Protestants than for Catholics. They cite the familiar observation
that Protestants feel most Irish when 'watching Ireland play rugby'.
Since the imposition of direct rule in 1972, a shift towards 'Ulster
nationalism' has coincided with the growth of Loyalism. Both can
be seen as a reaction to the more 'neutral' -
and, therefore, less anti-Catholic policies -
pursued by government in Northern Ireland since 1972.

What emerges unmistakeably from the present survey is the attractiveness
of the 'Northern Irish' label. As a badge of identity, it is clearly
less divisive than many others. Its attractiveness rests on an
inherent ambiguity. Catholics can see the label as referring geographically
to the northern part of Ireland. As such it can be taken to include,
say, the counties of Donegal, Sligo, Cavan, Monaghan and Leitrim,
all of which are politically in the Republic. This interpretation
of 'Northern Ireland' avoids any legitimisation of the border;
Catholics' Irishness is thus not compromised. Protestants, on
the other hand, see the term as adjectivally derived from 'Northern
Ireland', the official nomenclature for a part of the United Kingdom;
thereby, they do not compromise their British identity.

It might be expected that the sentiment of feeling Northern Irish
would be related to supporting an independent Northern Irish state.
But the general weakness of support for this constitutional option
and its relatively greater unpopularity among Catholics confound
such a hypothesis. Support for an independent Northern Ireland
has remained consistently in single figures, among both Catholics
and Protestants. Asked which of seven constitutional options they
would least like to see, 48% of Catholics chose an independent
Northern Ireland, but only 31% of Protestants did so (Moxon-Browne,
1983, p.l05).

In the 1978 survey (Moxon-Browne, 1983), a polarisation of national
identity deflected party political support. Seventy-six per cent
of SDLP supporters chose an Irish identity, while 71% of OUP respondents
chose a British one. More interesting was the relatively stronger
preference for an Ulster identity among DUP (34%) than among OUP
supporters (2 1%). This asymmetry reflected the much stronger
tendency for the DUP than the more moderate OUP to take 'direct
action' against British government policies. The Alliance Party,
befitting its trans-sectarian base, incorporated both British
(43%) and Irish (29%) identities and, more significantly, a higher
proportion than other parties of respondents unwilling to commit
themselves to either the 'British', 'Ulster' or 'Irish' labels
- 17%, as against 4%, 3% and 8%, respectively,
for the OUP, DUP and SDLP.

A survey of local council representatives in 1984 produced the
same predictable cleavages: SDLP and Irish Independence Party
(IIP) councillors were almost entirely 'Irish'. The OUP (80%)
and DUP (65%) opted heavily for a 'British' identity, though one-third
of the DUP described themselves as having an 'Ulster' identity.
Alliance supporters were divided more or less equally between
an Irish and British identity, though the largest proportion of
them (36%) felt that they were 'sometimes British/sometimes Irish'
(Moxon Browne and Munday, 1984).

By 1989 the disparity between the DUP and OUP over Ulster identity
has disappeared. Arguably, both parties have become alienated
by the Anglo-Irish Agreement, and are equally anxious to resist
any weakening of the link between Northern Ireland and the rest
of the United Kingdom. The SDLP remains substantially 'Irish'.
But about a quarter of supporters of the SDLP, as well as of the
Alliance Party and Sinn Fein, are attracted by the notion of 'Northern
Irish' identity. The complete absence of a 'British' identity
among Sinn Fein supporters, and the 8% of 'British' respondents
in the ranks of SDLP supporters, may reflect their differing faiths
in the possibility of reform within existing political institutions
(Moxon-Browne, 1986).

In his pioneering study in 1968, Rose found that there were three
national labels of importance in Northern Ireland: 'British',
'Irish' and 'Ulster'. Ten years later these had virtually collapsed
into 'British' and 'Irish'. Protestants had become more inclined
to see themselves as British, and less as identified with Ulster,
while Catholics overwhelmingly saw themselves as Irish. The violence
of the intervening period had undoubtedly made Protestants less
inclined to see themselves as Irish, and more likely to cling
to a British identity. This may, however, have derived from a
perception that the Ulster identity was linked to a 'weak' political
unit and that Britain, although constituting an untrustworthy
custodian of Ulster's political future, was the stronger of the
two contenders for control over Northern Ireland.

The present survey shows that the polarisation between Catholic
Irishness and Protestant Britishness is as strong as before. The
Protestant identity may be negatively based -
that is, Protestants are more sure of what they are not
than of what they are; their perceptions of self-identity rest
on constitutional arrangements, and not on 'being born and bred',
as Rose (1971) pointed out. But it shows no signs of having weakened.
The fact that more Protestants now vote for the Conservative Party
in Northern Ireland than vote for the Alliance Party could be
interpreted as one sign of the persistence of the British attachment
in the Protestant community.