The debate over whether free will and determinism are compatible is controversial, and produces wide scholarly discussion. This paper argues that recent studies in experimental philosophy suggest that people are in fact “natural compatibilists”. To support this claim, it surveys the experimental literature bearing directly (section 1) or indirectly (section 2) upon this issue, before pointing to three possible limitations of this claim (section 3). However, notwithstanding these limitations, the investigation concludes that the existing empirical evidence seems to (...) support the view that most people have compatibilist intuitions. (shrink)

The eighteenth century was a time of brilliant philosophical innovation in Britain. In Of Liberty and Necessity James A. Harris presents the first comprehensive account of the period's discussion of what remains a central problem of philosophy, the question of the freedom of the will. He offers new interpretations of contributions to the free will debate made by canonical figures such as Locke, Hume, Edwards, and Reid, and also discusses in detail the arguments of some less familiar (...) writers. Harris puts the eighteenth-century debate about the will and its freedom in the context of the period's concern with applying what Hume calls the "experimental method of reasoning" to the human mind. His book will be of substantial interest to historians of philosophy and anyone concerned with the free will problem. (shrink)

I discuss experimental work by Nichols, and Nichols and Knobe, with respect to the philosophical problems of free will and moral responsibility. I mention some methodological concerns about the work, but focus principally on the philosophical implications of the work. The experimental results seem to show that in particular, concrete cases we are more willing to attribute responsibility than in cases described abstractly or in general terms. I argue that their results suggest a deep problem for traditional accounts of (...) compatibilism, and that they may cast some light on the literature surrounding Frankfurt cases. I also suggest a way in which mature philosophical convictions about free will may reflect a contingent process of refining and defending either of two competing strands of intuitions, and suggest that this may partly explain the persistence of philosophical debates about free will. (shrink)

This book is about the influence of varying theological conceptions of contingency and necessity on two versions of the mechanical philosophy in the seventeenth century. Pierre Gassendi (1592-1655) and Rene; Descartes (1596-1650) both believed that all natural phenomena could be explained in terms of matter and motion alone. They disagreed about the details of their mechanical accounts of the world, in particular about their theories of matter and their approaches to scientific method. This book traces their differences back to (...) theological presuppositions they inherited from the Middle Ages. Theological ideas were transformed into philosophical and scientific ideas which led to the emergence of different styles of science in the second half of the seventeenth century. (shrink)

The idea of the élan vital is crucial for an understanding of Bergson’s metaphysical method, underpinning the way in which philosophy stands with other forms of creative activity as an endeavour of “self-overcoming,” the self or subject no longer being at the centre of thought, but understood rather as a product of the process of thinking. In placing a special emphasis on Bergson’s 1907 work, Creative Evolution, the present essay is both an acknowledgement and challenge to the shift from (...) early interpretations of Bergson in which comparisons were made with thinkers such as Schelling and Schopenhauer, to more recent engagements centred on the theories of perception and memory. The aim of this essay is to formulate a response to the marginalized status of Creative Evolution in the “perception-based” strands of Bergson scholarship, by emphasising how Bergson’s theories of memory and consciousness are a means for understanding his definition of evolutionary “creativity.” Bergson suggests that the analysis of consciousness or “will” can provide us with a way of thinking about this creative movement of life, which is not a concept of a “cause” or “origin” in the sense of a “state of nature” (substance, essence, or “being”), but rather the operation of pure tendency. (shrink)

Transcript and English translation of La naissance de la paix -- Analysis of La naissance de la paix -- Did Descartes write La naissance de la paix? -- Descartes's doctrine of the will -- The power of the will -- Controlling bodily desires -- Willing the good -- The sources of willing -- Did Descartes read Corneille? -- Descartes's political philosophy -- Evidence and methods of construction -- The sovereign state -- Descartes's life and politics -- Discours (...) de la methode -- Constitution of a Swedish Academy -- Arts and sciences -- Les passions de l'âme. (shrink)

This paper develops a sympathetic critique of recent experimental work on free will and moral responsibility. Section 1 offers a brief defense of the relevance of experimental philosophy to the free will debate. Section 2 reviews a series of articles in the experimental literature that probe intuitions about the "compatibility question"—whether we can be free and morally responsible if determinism is true. Section 3 argues that these studies have produced valuable insights on the factors that influence our (...) judgments on the compatibility question, but that their general approach suffers from significant practical and philosophical difficulties. Section 4 reviews experimental work addressing other aspects of the free will/moral responsibility debate, and section 5 concludes with a discussion of avenues for further research. (shrink)

We discuss recent work in experimental philosophy on free will and moral responsibility and then present a new study. Our results suggest an error theory for incompatibilist intuitions. Most laypersons who take determinism to preclude free will and moral responsibility apparently do so because they mistakenly interpret determinism to involve fatalism or “bypassing” of agents’ relevant mental states. People who do not misunderstand determinism in this way tend to see it as compatible with free will and (...) responsibility. We discuss why these results pose a challenge to incompatibilists. (shrink)

In this paper, I suggest that the important philosophy of the future will increasingly be found neither in the “continental” nor in the “analytic” traditions but, instead, in the transcending sublation of (all) traditions I call “synthetic philosophy.” I mean “synthetic” both in a sense that encourages the bold combinatorial mélange of existing styles, traditions, and issues, and also in the Hegelian sense of sublating dichotomous oppositions, appropriating the distinctive insights of both sides while eliminating their errors (...) and exaggerations, and thereby creating new syntheses in which the old oppositions are transcended. (shrink)

It is a well established fact that Arthur Schopenhauer was the first major Western thinker who was so much influenced by the Upanishads that he wrote, "In the whole world there is no study so beneficial and so elevating as that of the Upanishads. It has been the solace of my life, it will be the solace of my death”. This view of Schopenhauer about the Upanishads not only shows his familiarity with the Eastern thought but also it reflects (...) his adoration for Indian philosophy, religion and culture, which influenced him in a significant way. Thus in the World As Will and Representation Schopenhauer clearly states that readers can understand his writings better with prior acquaintances with the philosophy of - Plato, Kant and that of Hindus. Unfortunately however, though some attempts have been made earlier by others to find out the links between Schopenhauer and the East, not much work has been done so far to find out the connection between Schopenhauer and Indian thought especially by Indian scholars. Being so motivated I propose to examine this relationship between Schopenhauer and Sankara, a great Vedantist of India in a comparative manner with a focus on the problem of the relationship between the ‘Will and the world as its representations’ in Schopenhauer and of the ‘Brahman and the world of multiplicity’ in Sankara’s philosophy of Monism. I do this in an analytical framework of interpreting the Ontology of the Absolute and its manifestation in the phenomenal world in the literatures of Schopenhauer and Sankaracarya and then I shall try to find out asolution to this problem through the application of the Vedantic notion of identity between the Brahman and the atman in both these thinkers. (shrink)

The paper centers on philosophy's major trends and trials at the turn of the XXt h and XXIs t century, its leading idea is based on several basic assumptions which can be summarized as follows: 1) the title is a query after XXt h-century philosophy's main achievements and their usefulness in the XXIs t ; 2) speaking about philosophy's achievements, the author particularly means its critical role in condemning and de-mystifying evil, dispelling illusion and myth, and disclosing (...) untruth; 3) the answer to the titular question is based on the entire paper's main assumption that there are three main problems of XXt h-century thought which - as a heritage - will be carrying over into the XXIs t . These problems are the problem of being (Sein), the problem of reason, and the problem of humanity (man). In connection with these problems the author formulates his main thesis that the twentieth century philosophy is characterized by three features which are the following: (a) anti-metaphysical disposition, (b) anti-rationalism, and (c) anti-humanism. (shrink)

Many philosophical problems are rooted in everyday thought, and experimental philosophy uses social scientific techniques to study the psychological underpinnings of such problems. In the case of free will, research suggests that people in a diverse range of cultures reject determinism, but people give conflicting responses on whether determinism would undermine moral responsibility. When presented with abstract questions, people tend to maintain that determinism would undermine responsibility, but when presented with concrete cases of wrongdoing, people tend to say (...) that determinism is consistent with moral responsibility. It remains unclear why people reject determinism and what drives people’s conflicted attitudes about responsibility. Experimental philosophy aims to address these issues and thereby illuminate the philosophical problem of free will. (shrink)

Will Kymlicka's Multicultural Citizenship represents an extraordinary attempt to put applied political philosophy to work in the empirical context of contemporary political debates about immigration and ethnic minorities in western society. This paper explores the methodological and interpretative difficulties of combining normative and empirical goals, in a critical discussion of the examples Kymlicka makes of multicultural issues in France, Britain and the US. It goes on to argue that these weaknesses lie in the Rawlsian influence in Kymlicka's work, (...) and that political philosophers may have to rethink their methodological approach if they wish to pursue further the kind of applied work which Kymlicka is aiming for. (shrink)

If one were to make a list of the leading topics of debate in classical Indian philosophy, contenders might include the existence and nature of the self; the fundamental sources of knowledge; the nature of the engagement between consciousness and reality; the existence and nature of God/Brahman; the proper account of causation; the relationship between language and the world; the practices that best ensure future happiness; the most expedient method for any soteriological attainment (or not); or the fundamental constituents (...) of reality. We might also include the various debates engendered by the skeptical challenges to philosophy itself. But, as typically formulated, the problem of free will would not make the cut. As a number of our contributors note, classical Indian philosophy simply does not have an overarching debate about free will that neatly corresponds to that within the Western tradition, where it is a prominent, enduring feature of the philosophical landscape. While there are various debates over the existence and proper construal of agency and individual freedom, the “free will debate” does not have this central position. What then is the motive behind a book centered on the themes of agency and free will in classical Indian philosophy? As illustrated in the following chapters, the lack of a dialectical isomorphism does not entail a lack of shared concerns. In lieu of a clear, genre-defining debate over free will in classical Indian philosophy, discussion of related issues is scattered throughout various topics and ramifies in a number of peculiarly Indian contexts. Commonly, they flow from concerns with agency: what it is and whether we truly have it. The purpose of this volume is to highlight these discussions and bring them into focus. Taken as a whole, this volume illustrates that concerns surrounding the intersection of free will, agency, and selfhood are not unimportant in, or negligible to, the leading schools of Indian philosophy. It also reveals the way in which the concepts of agency and free will provide a helpful context to explore issues within Indian philosophical thought. (shrink)

This collection provides a selection of the most essential contributions to the contemporary free will debate. Among the issues discussed and debated are skepticism and naturalism, alternate possibilities, the consequence argument, libertarian metaphysics, illusionism and revisionism, optimism and pessimism, neuroscience and free will, and experimental philosophy.

Over the last three decades there has been a tremendous amount of philosophical work in the Anglo-American tradition on the cluster of topics pertaining to Free Will. Of course, this work has in many instances built on and extended the historical treatments of this great area of philosophical interest. The issues range from fairly abstract philosophical questions about the logic of arguments about human freedom (and its relationship to prior predictability of our choices and actions, or God's foreknowledge, or (...) causal determinism and scientific explanation) to more concrete practical questions about legal and criminal accountability. The contemporary work has in some instances been in the form of lively debates between proponents of different viewpoints, and the literature is characterized by a genuine vitality. Work has appeared in a wide variety of different places: academic and (and even trade) monographs, anthologies, philosophical and legal academic journals, and conference proceedings. This collection selects the very best of this material and presents it in a single, accessible set of volumes. (shrink)

John Preston has claimed that we must understand Paul Feyerabend's later, post-1970, philosophy in terms of a disappointed Popperianism: that Feyerabend became a sceptical, relativistic, literal anarchist because of his perception of the failure of Popper's philosophy. I argue that this claim cannot be supported and trace the development of Feyerabend's philosophy in terms of a commitment to the central Popperian themes of criticism and critical explanatory progress. This commitment led Feyerabend to reject Popper's specific methodology in (...) favour of a pluralistic methodology, but the commitment to the central values of criticism and critical explanatory progress remained . Moreover, methodological pluralism does not imply scepticism, relativism, or literal anarchism. Feyerabend was not a disappointed Popperian, but, in many respects, a die-hard pluralistic Popperian. (shrink)

I examine Nietzsche's concept of a nihilism of strength\nand the relationship in which it stands to the kind of\nvital self-assertion that he admired in archaic\naristocracies. What is new in Nietzsche's nihilism of\nstrength is a self-awareness that was lacking in the past\nand that would enable a fully autonomous human being to\nrecognize the "being" he imposes on "becoming" as the\nexpression of his own will to power. I show that this idea\nleads to serious incoherencies in Nietzsche's account of\nthis new kind of strength (...) and undermines any possible\nauthority that such volitional enactments might have for\nother people. (shrink)

This is the first book in English on the major works of the German philosopher Johann Gottlieb Fichte (1762-1814). It examines the transcendental theory of self and world from the writings of Fichte's most influential period (1794-1800), and considers in detail recently discovered lectures on the Foundations of Transcendental Philosophy. At the center of that body of work stands Fichte's attempt to integrate the theories of volition and cognition into a unified but complex 'system of freedom'. The focus of (...) this book is the intricate interplay between thinking and willing in the birth of experience out of the spirit of freedom. Combining incomparable erudition, sensitive readings of some of the most difficult of philosophical texts, clarity in exposition and an acute awareness of historical context this book takes its place as the ideal introduction to Fichte's thought. (shrink)

Early modern historians and philosophers interested in human freedom can profitably read this book, which provides a synoptic view of the eighteenth-century British free will debate from Locke through Dugald Stewart. Scholars have not ignored the debate, but as they have tended to focus on canonical figures , the author’s inclusion of lesser-known yet significant thinkers such as Lord Kames, Jonathan Edwards, and James Beattie is especially welcome. The main thesis of James Harris’s book is that the eighteenth-century British (...) debate was animated by a general commitment to “experimentalism,” i.e., the view that we should be faithful to the data of our experiences of willing. Locke initiated the turn to experimentalism, but in Harris’s judgment it was Hume who first fully adopted it. Of course, Hume’s deflationary moves did nothing to slow the debate, let alone settle it, and necessitarians continued to battle libertarians. (shrink)

Sommers (2010) argues that experimental philosophers of free will have largely been asking the wrong question – the question whether philosophically naïve individuals think that free will and moral responsibility are compatible with determinism. The present studies begin to alleviate this concern by testing the intuitive plausibility of Pereboom’s (2001) four case argument. The general pattern of responses from two experiments does not support Pereboom’s predictions. Moreover, those who were high in the personality trait emotional stability tended to (...) judge that manipulated agents were more free and morally responsible compared to individuals low in emotional stability. (shrink)

Richard Watson’s Descartes’s Ballet engages three main questions uncommon to traditional Cartesian scholarship: Did Descartes script La Naissance de la Paix, the ballet performed in honor of Queen Christina’s twenty-third birthday in December 1649? Did Descartes have a political philosophy? Did Descartes read the French dramatist Pierre Corneille? Watson answers no, yes, and yes.By emphasizing the complete lack of evidence that Descartes wrote La Naissance de la Paix, Watson disarms the suggestion made by Adrien Baillet, Descartes’s seventeenth-century biographer, that (...) Descartes authored the ballet. Watson further suggests that only someone who was immersed in the subtleties of political culture in the Swedish court and was in Christina’s confidence could have written it. And Descartes, he argues, could not have met this description. Had it been written by Descartes, the ballet could have provided a foundation on which to build an interpretation of Cartesian political philosophy. Without it, explicit textual support for the construction of Descartes’s political philosophy is nonexistent. Undaunted by the lack of texts, Watson nevertheless constructs one based largely on the. (shrink)

Papers about philosophy, as distinct from papers within it, are like homeopathic medicines – thin in content. We can only hope to provide some substance if we confine ourselves to some particular aspect. The aspect I have chosen to discuss is this. What hope should we have of finding from within this rather curious and academic subject of ours a help in the affairs of life? Could we expect a doctor of philosophy to give practical advice, rather like (...) a medical doctor? (shrink)