Sunday, March 29, 2015

The Kobani Precedent

A Syrian Kurdish fighter stands guard atop the rubble of a liberated Kobani.

Recently, I attempted to undertake a reporting trip into the Kurdish
Kobani enclave in northern Syria. It would not have been my first visit
to Syria or Kobani. For the first time, however, I found myself unable
to enter. Instead, I spent a frustrating but, as it turns out,
instructive four days waiting in the border town of Suruc in southeast
Turkey before running out of time and going home.
The episode was instructive because of what it indicated regarding
the extent to which Kurdish control in the enclaves – established in
mid-2012 – is now a fact acknowledged by all neighboring players,
including the enemies of the Kurds. This in itself has larger lessons
regarding US and western policy in Syria and Iraq.

But, I am getting ahead of myself. First, let me complete the account of the episode on the border.
My intention had been to enter Kobani "illegally" with the help of
the Kurdish People's Protection Units (YPG) and local smugglers. This
sounds more exciting than it is. I have entered Syria in a similar way
half a dozen times over the past two years, to the extent that it has
become a not very pleasant but mundane procedure. This time, however,
something was different. I was placed in a local center with a number of
other Westerners waiting to make the trip. Then, it seemed, we were
forgotten.

The Westerners themselves were an interesting bunch whose varied
presence was an indication of the curious pattern by which the Syrian
Kurdish cause has entered public awareness in the West.
There was a group of European radical leftists, mainly Italians, who
had come after being inspired by stories of the "Rojava revolution," the
egalitarian, multi-ethnic mini-state run on communal lines forged out
of the chaos of the Syrian civil war.

A little noted element of the control by the Syrian franchise of the
PKK (Kurdistan Workers' Party) of de facto sovereign areas of Syria has
been the interest this has generated in the circles of the Western
radical left. These circles are ever on the lookout for something that
allows their politics to encounter reality in a way that does not bring
immediate and obvious disaster. As of now, "Rojava," given the leftist
credentials of the PKK, is playing this role. So, the Europeans in
question wanted to "contribute" to what they called the "revolution."

Leftists
around the world have enthusiastically supported the Syrian Kurdish
cause, but few who have arrived in Kobani have picked up a gun.

Unfortunately, their preferred mode of support was leading to a
situation of complete mutual bewilderment between themselves and the
local Kurds. Offered military training by their hosts, the radical
leftists demurred. They would not hold a gun for Rojava before they had
seen it and been persuaded that it did indeed represent the peoples'
revolution they hoped for.

Instead, they had a plan for the rebuilding of Kobani along
sustainable and environmentally friendly lines, using natural materials.
In addition, the health crisis and shortage of medicines in the
devastated enclave led the radicals to believe that this might offer an
appropriate context for popularizing various items of alternative and
naturopathic medicine about which they themselves were enthusiastic.
(I'm not making any of this up.)

European leftists on the scene were more interested in popularizing alternative and naturopathic medicine than fighting.

All this had elicited the predictable reaction from the Kurds who
were trying to manage a humanitarian disaster and a determined attempt
by murderous jihadis to destroy them.

"Perhaps you could do the military training first and then we could
talk about the other stuff?" suggested Fawzia, the nice and helpful
representative of the Democratic Union Party (PYD), the political home
of the YPG militia, who was responsible for us. This led to further
impassioned and theatrical responses from the Italians.

Apart from this crowd, there was a seasoned Chilean war reporter who
looked on the leftists with impatience. He was hoping to get down to the
frontlines south of Kobani where the YPG was trying to cut the road
from Raqqa to Aleppo at an important point close to the Euphrates. Also,
there was a polite and friendly lone American, a Baptist Christian, who
had come to volunteer his services to the YPG. That was us.

But, as the days passed, it became clear that none of us appeared to be getting anywhere near Kobani any time soon.

The reasons given for the delay were plentiful, and unconvincing. "It
is the weather," Fawzia would say vaguely, "too much mud." But, the
presence of mud on the border in February was hardly a new development,
so this couldn't be the reason.

Finally, frustrated at the lack of information, I called a PKK friend
based in Europe and asked for his help in finding out why we weren't
moving. He got back to me a little later. "It seems the Turkish army is
all over the border, more than usual. That's the reason," he told me.

This was more plausible, if disappointing. After four days on the
border, I was out of time and set off back for Gaziantep and then home.
The Italians went to Diyarbakir in southeast Turkey to take part in a
demonstration. The Chilean and the American volunteer stayed and waited.

An Unexpected Partnership

When I got back to Jerusalem, all rapidly became clear.

Hundreds
of Turkish troops entered Syria on February 21 to relocate the remains
of Suleiman Shah, the grandfather of the Ottoman Empire's founder.

News reports were coming in about a large operation conducted by the
Turkish army through Kobani and into Syria. The operation involved the
evacuation of the Turkish garrison at the tomb of Suleiman Shah,
grandfather of the founder of the Ottoman Empire, south of the enclave.
The American volunteer sent me a picture of the Turkish tanks on tank
transporters driving though Suruc at the conclusion of the operation.

This operation was astonishing on a number of levels.

Despite stern Turkish denials, it could only have been carried out on
the basis of full cooperation between the Turkish armed forces and the
Kurdish fighters of the YPG in Kobani. Obviously, any unauthorized entry
of Turkish troops into the Kurdish canton would have meant an armed
battle.
During the fight for Kobani last year, the Turkish government was
very clearly quite content for the enclave to fall. The Turkish army
waited on the border as the prospect of a generalized slaughter of the
Kurds in Kobani came close to realization.

The partnering of US air power with Kurdish YPG forces delivered the first real defeat to the Islamic State in Syria.

But, of course, the slaughter didn't happen. In the end, the
partnering of US air power with the competent and determined forces of
the YPG on the ground delivered the first real defeat to the forces of
the Islamic State in Syria.

This effective partnering has continued, and has now become the main
military element in northern Syria in the battle against IS.

The combination of the YPG and the USAF is now nudging up to a second
strategic achievement against the jihadis – namely, the cutting off of
the road from Tel Hamis to the town of al-Houl on the Iraqi border. This
road forms one of the main transport arteries linking IS conquests in
Iraq to its heartland in the Syrian province of Raqqa. If the links are
cut, the prospect opens for the splitting of the Islamic State into a
series of disconnected enclaves.

The YPG-US partnership is particularly noteworthy given that the YPG
is neither more nor less than the Syrian representative of the PKK. The
latter, meanwhile, is a veteran presence on the US and EU lists of
terror organizations. Despite a faltering peace process, the PKK remains
in conflict with Turkey, a member of NATO.

But the reality of the Kurdish-US alliance in northern Syria has clearly now been accepted by the Turks as an unarguable fait accompli to the extent that they are now evidently willing to work together with the armed Syrian Kurds when their interests require it.

The Kurdish-US alliance in northern Syria has been accepted by the Turks as an unarguable fait accompli.

It is an astonishing turnabout in the fortunes of the Kurds of Syria
who, before 2011, constituted one of the region's most brutally
oppressed and most forgotten minority populations.

This raises the question as to why this reversal of fortune has taken
place. Why is the YPG the chosen partner of the Americans in northern
Syria, just as the Kurdish Pesh Merga further east is one of the
preferred partners on the ground in Iraq?
The answer to this is clear, but not encouraging. It is because, in
both countries, the only reliable, pro-Western and militarily effective
element on the ground is that of the Kurds.

Consider: In northern Syria, other than IS forces, there are three
other elements of real military and political import. These are the
forces of the Assad regime, the al-Qaida affiliated Jabhat al-Nusra and
the YPG.

In addition, there are a bewildering variety of disparate rebel
battalions with loyalties ranging from Salafi Islamism to Muslim
Brotherhood-style Islamism, to non-political opposition to the Assad
regime. Some of these groups operate independently. Others are gathered
in local alliances such as the Aleppo based Jabhat al-Shamiya (Levant
Front), or the Syria-wide Islamic Front, which unites Salafi factions.

In both Syria and Iraq, the only reliable, pro-Western and militarily effective element on the ground is that of the Kurds.

Despite the reported existence of a US-staffed military operations
room in Turkey, the latter two movements are either too weak, or too
politically suspect (because of their Islamist nature), to form a
potential partner for the US in northern Syria.

Nusra is for obvious reasons not a potential partner for the US in
the fight against IS and the US continues to hold to its stated goal
that Bashar Assad should step down. So, the prospect of an overt
alliance between the regime and the US against the Islamic State is not
on the cards (despite the de facto American alliance with Assad's
Iran-supported Shi'a Islamist allies in Iraq).
This leaves the Kurds, and only the Kurds, to work with. And, the
unstated alliance is sufficiently tight for it to begin to have effects
also on Turkish-Kurdish relations in Syria, as seen in the Suleiman Shah
operation.

But what are the broader implications of this absence of any other coherent partner on the ground?
The stark clarity of the northern Syria situation is replicated in
all essentials in Iraq, though a more determined attempt by the US to
deny this reality is under way in that country.

In Iraq, there is a clear and stated enemy of the US (the Islamic
State), a clear and stated Kurdish ally of the West (the Kurdish
Regional Government and its Pesh Merga) and an Iran-supported
government, which controls the capital and part of the territory of the
country.

Unlike in Syria, however, in Iraq, the US relates to the official
government, mistakenly, as an ally. This is leading to a potentially
disastrous situation whereby US air power is currently partnering with
Iran-supported Shi'a militias against the Islamic State.

In Iraq, powerful Shi'a militias have a presence in the Iraqi government, but do not answer to it.

The most powerful of these militias have a presence in the government
of Iraq. But they do not act under the orders of the elected Baghdad
government, but rather in coordination with their sponsors in the Quds
Force of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps.

It is possible that the current partnering with Shi'a Islamist forces
in Iraq is the result of a general US attempt now underway to achieve a
historic rapprochement with Iran, as suggested by Michael Doran in a
recent essay. Or, it may be that this reality has emerged as a result of
poor analysis of the realities of the Levant and Iraq, resulting in a
confused and flailing policy. Either way, the result is an astonishing
mess.

In northern Syria, the obvious absence of any partners other than the
Kurds has produced a momentary tactical clarity. But, as the larger
example of Iraq shows, this clarity is buried in a much larger strategic
confusion.

This confusion, at root, derives from a failure to grasp what is taking place in Syria and Iraq.
In both countries, the removal or weakening of powerful dictatorships
has resulted in the emergence of conflict based on older, sub-state
ethnic and sectarian identities. The strength and persistence of these
identities is testimony to the profound failure of the states of Syria
and Iraq to develop anything resembling a sustainable national identity.
In both Syria and Iraq, the resultant conflict is essentially
three-sided – Sunni Arabs, Shi'a/Alawi Arabs and Kurds are fighting over
the ruins of the state.
Because of the lamentable nature of Arab politics at the present
time, the form both Arab sides are taking is that of political Islam. On
the Shi'a side, the powerful Iranian structures dedicated to the
creation and sponsorship of proxy movements are closely engaged with the
clients in both countries (and in neighboring Lebanon.)

On the Sunni-Arab side, a bewildering tangle of support from
different regional and Western states to various militias has emerged.
But two main formations may be discerned. These are the Islamic State,
which has no overt state sponsor, and Jabhat al-Nusra, which has close
links to Qatar.

In southern Syria, a Western attempt to maintain armed forces linked
to conservative and Western-aligned Arab states (Jordan, Saudi Arabia)
has proved somewhat more successful because of the close physical
proximity of Jordan and the differing tribal and clan structures in this
area when compared with the north. Even here, however, Nusra is a
powerful presence, and IS itself recently appeared in the south Damascus
area.

The available partners for the West
are minority nationalist projects like that of the Kurds and
traditional, non-ideological conservative elites.

The Kurds, because of the existence among them of a secular,
pro-Western nationalist politics with real popular appeal, have
unsurprisingly emerged as the only reliable partner. On both the Shi'a
and Sunni sides, the strongest and prevailing forces are anti-Western.

This reality is denied both by advocates for rapprochement with Iran
and wishful-thinking supporters of the Syrian rebellion. But it remains
so. What are its implications for Western policy?

Firstly, if the goal is to degrade the Islamic State, reduce it,
split it, impoverish it, this can probably be achieved through the
alliance of US air power and Kurdish ground forces. But, if the desire,
genuinely, is to destroy IS, this can only be achieved through the
employment of Western boots on the ground. This is the choice that is
presented by reality.

Secondly, the desire to avoid this choice is leading to the
disastrous partnering with Iraqi Shi'a forces loyal to Iran. The winner
from all this will be, unsurprisingly, Iran. Neither Teheran nor its
Shi'a militias are the moral superiors to the Islamic State. The
partnering with them is absurd both from a political and ethical point
of view.

Thirdly, the determination to maintain the territorial integrity of
"Syria" and "Iraq" is one of the midwives of the current confusion. Were
it to be acknowledged that Humpty Dumpty cannot be put it back together
again, it would then be possible to accurately ascertain which local
players the West can partner with, and which it can not.

As of now, the determination to consider these areas as coherent
states is leading to absurdities, including the failure by the US to
directly arm the pro-US Pesh Merga because the pro-Iranians in Baghdad
object to this; the failure to revive relations with and directly supply
Iraqi Sunni tribal elements in IS-controlled areas for the same reason,
and the insistence on relating to all forces ostensibly acting on
behalf of Baghdad as legitimate.

Ultimately, the mess in the former Syria and Iraq derives from a very
Western form of wishful thinking that is common to various sides of the
debate in the West. This is the refusal to accept that political Islam,
of both Shi'a and Sunni varieties, has an unparalleled power of
political mobilization among Arab populations in the Middle East at the
present time, and that political Islam is a genuinely anti-Western force
with genuinely murderous intentions.

For as long as that stark reality is denied, Western policy will
resemble our Italian leftist friends on the border – baffled and
bewildered as they go about proposing ideas and notions utterly alien to
and irrelevant to the local situation.

The reality of this situation means that the available partners for
the West are minority nationalist projects such as that of the Kurds (or
the Jews) and traditional, non-ideological conservative elites – such
as the Egyptian military, the Hashemite monarchs and, in a more partial
and problematic way, the Gulf monarchs. Attempts to move beyond this
limited but considerable array of potential allies will result in the
strengthening of destructive, anti-Western Islamist forces in the region
of either Sunni or Shi'a coloration.

As for the Syrian Kurds, they deserve their partnership with US air power and the greater security it is bringing them.

The American Baptist volunteer, to conclude the story, made it across
the border and is now training with the YPG. He, at least, has a clear
sense of who is who in the Middle East. Hopefully, this sense will
eventually percolate up to the policymaking community, too.

Jonathan Spyer is
Director of the Rubin Center for Research in International Affairs and a
fellow at the Middle East Forum. He is the author of The Transforming Fire: The Rise of the Israel-Islamist Conflict (Continuum, 2011).

This represents a general opinion site for its author. It also offers a space for the author to record her experiences and perceptions,both personal and public. This is rendered obvious by the content contained in the blog, but the space is here inviting me to write. And so I do.