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Rule-Following

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LAST REVIEWED: 21 March 2017

LAST MODIFIED: 27 June 2017

DOI: 10.1093/obo/9780195396577-0106

Introduction

“Rule-following” is best thought of as a title for a number of closely intertwined philosophical questions: What is a rule? Can a rule compel or guide its user, and if so, how? What is it to be committed to following a rule? How can rules be learned? Is it possible to understand rule-following without referring to communities? Is to mean something by a word, and to have a concept, tantamount to being committed to following a rule? Precursors of these questions have always been asked by philosophers in some form or other. But it is primarily due to the work of Wittgenstein (Philosophical Investigations) that rule-following has come to be regarded as a distinct philosophical issue. This is reflected in the fact that much of the contemporary literature on rule-following is concerned with the interpretation of Wittgenstein’s writings. The literature on rule-following is immense and cuts across all areas of philosophy.

Introductory Works

Two very helpful introductions to the Philosophical Investigations in general and the rule-following considerations in particular are McGinn 1997 and Stern 2004. An indispensable tool for every student of Wittgenstein is Glock 1996. The four-volume commentary on the Philosophical Investigations in Baker and Hacker 1985 and Hacker 1993 contains a wealth of information. It is a crucial resource even for readers who disagree with Baker and Hacker’s interpretation of Wittgenstein.

Indispensable commentary on Philosophical Investigations. Volume 1 was published in 1980. The second volume is particularly relevant for the rule-following considerations. See especially “Accord with a Rule” (pp. 81–105) and “Following Rules, Mastery of Techniques and Practices” (pp. 154–178).