March 14, 2006

A Public Education Merit Pay System That's Working

Carroll Andrew Morse

Two arguments made (in this forum and elsewhere) against implementing a merit pay system in public education are 1) objective evaluations of the jobs that teachers do are not possible and 2) teachers are motivated differently than are members of other professions, so merit pay would not improve the quality of education.

When Brad Jupp became lead negotiator for the Denver Classroom Teachers Association in 1990, he recalls, the union and the Denver Public Schools were "highly committed adversaries." In 1994, as the two parties sparred over policy and pay, Jupp led a five-day teacher strike. The upshot was a paltry boost in pay raises from 1 percent to 1.2 percent, and a revolution in Jupp's vision of collective bargaining.

Now, twelve years later, having fostered cooperation between the two former antagonists, Jupp has successfully spearheaded a groundbreaking reform of teacher pay. In 2004, union members ratified the Professional Compensation System for Teachers, the nation's most comprehensive overhaul of a system that has until now rewarded teachers equally whether they work hard or just show up. Last November, Denver voters sealed the deal by approving an annual $25 million property tax hike to fund the initiative…

Under the new system, also called ProComp, teachers will receive raises higher than their regular cost-of-living boosts for, among other things, exceeding expectations of student growth on the state test, meeting student-growth objectives set collaboratively by teachers and supervisors, and earning positive performance evaluations. The system provides additional bonuses to teachers working in hard-to-fill positions and hard-to-serve schools.

Denver teachers hired before 2006 have a choice between the traditional salary schedule and this four-dimensional merit pay system. Teachers hired after January 1, 2006 will automatically enter the new system.

Learning Gains

Teachers who exceed expectations for student growth as measured by a statewide Colorado test will receive a sustainable 3% raise.

All teachers will set two student growth objectives with the help of supervisors. Teachers who meet both objectives will receive a 1% raise; those who meet one objective will receive a 1% bonus.

Teachers at schools identified as distinguished will receive a 2% bonus.

Evaluation

Teachers found to be unsatisfactory will have their salary increase delayed for a minimum of one year.

Probationary teachers will be evaluated every year in their first three years of service and will receive a 1% raise if they are judged to be satisfactory.

Non-probationary teachers will be evaluated every three years and will receive a raise of 3% if they are deemed satisfactory.

Battle Pay

Teachers working in assignments identified as hard-to-staff and in schools termed hard-to-serve will receive a 3% bonus.

Credentials

Teachers with active licenses from the National Board for Professional Teaching Standards (MBPTS) will be awarded a salary increase of 9%.

Teachers who complete one Professional Development Unit in their concentration will receive a 2% raise.

Teachers who complete an advanced degree relevant to their assignment will receive a 9% raise.

Mr. Jupp also addresses the idea that teacher motivation makes associating pay with performance in the education profession infeasible...

In fact, Denver teachers have shown surprising open-mindedness about merit pay programs. The Denver Public Schools, with the collaboration of the teacher union, launched a Pay for Performance pilot program in 1999 and, when it ended in 2003, started a more comprehensive Professional Compensation System for Teachers (ProComp). Our independent researchers discovered a surprising amount of support for merit pay by teachers in both programs.

The hallmark of the Pay for Performance pilot was paying teachers $1,500 bonuses for meeting measurable objectives set collaboratively with their principals and based on the academic growth of the students they taught. When asked in the spring of 2003, just as the pilot program was ending, to rate whether setting measurable objectives for bonuses of up to $1,500 had an impact on “cooperation among teachers,” 53.2 percent of the participating teachers said the impact was positive; only 2 percent said the impact was negative.

Could the Denver system work here, or is there something substantially different between Colorado and Rhode Island?

9:02 AM

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Hey Bob Walsh,

What's up with the below noted results? Help me understand how merit pay for teachers is no good for anyone other than the inept and underachievers and those that protect them?

>>>In fact, Denver teachers have shown surprising open-mindedness about merit pay programs. The Denver Public Schools, with the collaboration of the teacher union, launched a Pay for Performance pilot program in 1999 and, when it ended in 2003, started a more comprehensive Professional Compensation System for Teachers (ProComp). Our independent researchers discovered a surprising amount of support for merit pay by teachers in both programs.

Signed,

A career worker in meritocracies.

Tim2

Posted by: Tim2 at March 14, 2006 8:11 PM

Tim2,

Since you asked . . .

I am aware of the Denver experiment with "merit pay." Many of the elements mirror things that we currently have in place in Rhode Island, regarding additonal compensation for teachers with advancee degrees, certifications, and/or additional professional development.

Let me attempt to give a simple example why studnet performance comparisons as a basis for pay are problematic in a compensation system. In many of the districts that NEARI represents, the student population in a given elementary school may stay fairly stable from September to June, and attendance patterns are usually fairly stable as well. For these, and lots of other reasons having to do with the socioeconomic status of the students parents and the educaiton level of the students mother, performance is generally high in these schools. Contrast that with a similary sized school in a poor area of Providence, where an average student population of 400 might actually represent over 800 diffenent kids in the course of a year, attendance rates are lower, and the other predictors of student performance indicate performance issues. Since these factors are all out of the control of the teacher, how can an equitable merit system be based upon them.

If you spent your career in meritocracies, and if you believe that there are "inept" and "underachieving" teachers in the system, why are you suggesting that we pay them less as opposed to removing them?

It will be interesting to see the results in a few years of the Denver experiment.