Britain’s Not-So-Iron Fist

June 24, 2014

Re “What to do with the twins?” (June 19): Thomas Friedman’s prescription for what to do in Syria and Iraq might be right on the mark, but his history is a little weak concerning the French and British colonial periods. While the French can be described as “iron fisted” that is not the case with the British.

Britain ruled its empire with a relatively small army. It did so by allowing local leaders to stay in place, helping them maintain power as long as they followed British dictates.

In the Middle East, the British put the Hashemites in power in Transjordan and Iraq, and made sure that the Arab Legion was trained, armed and led by the British officer John Glubb. In Palestine, they allowed the Arab and Jewish communities to choose their own leaders, run their own affairs, educate their own populations and provide the social structure in which the community felt most comfortable — again, with the proviso that they followed the wishes of Britain.

Only after World War II, when the British economy was at its weakest point, and the Jewish and Palestinian populations were at complete loggerheads, did the British send in huge military forces, to try to control the growing unrest.

Jay Stonehill, Atlantic Beach, N.Y.

World War II and Japanese history

Re “Japan’s historical blunders” (June 24): The editorial correctly calls on Japan to tell the truth about its record in World War II. But how can Tokyo rewrite the past when the United States never forced Japan to accurately write its role in the history of that era in the first place?

Thanks to Allied pressure in the post-war years, the German and Austrian people did not try to deny their countries’ responsibility for the wartime horrors in Europe.

But the United States, which maintained control of Japan for almost a decade after the war, never forced the Japanese to do the same. Germany doesn’t deny the Holocaust. Why do we let Japan continue to deny the atrocities committed by its army in East Asia?

Victor W. Mason, Mamaroneck, N.Y.

Incoherence at the opera

Re “The Klinghoffer tragedy” (Editorial, June 21): The directors of New York’s Metropolitan Opera made a bad decision when they decided to cancel broadcasts of “The Death of Klinghoffer” live in movie theaters around the world.

I’ve attended operas at the Met, and enjoy broadcasts from the Met at the cinema and on the radio. I saw “The Death of Klinghoffer” at the English National Opera in London. It is an important, challenging, deeply moral work. The DVD of a film version is freely available in Europe. The recent London production was broadcast nationally on the radio by the BBC.

The decision to perform the opera in the opera house but to cancel the broadcasts is incoherent. Either the work is important, or it is not. Either the piece is dangerous, or it is not.

Andrew Jack, London

The mosque and state power

Re “The mirage of political Islam” (Opinion, June 4) by Mustapha Tlili: The most important issue facing the Muslim world is not its divide with the West but the great irreconcilable divisions within the Muslim world itself.

History has shown that Islamic-based politics and democracy are irreconcilable in that there is a fundamental inability of secular state systems to accommodate Islamist participation in the democratic process. The Muslim world has proved unable to deliver true democratic governments.

But what is not explored is that the success of democracy and pluralism in Western nations was largely based on the separation of church and state. For the Muslim world to make the transition to a secular state in which the same frameworks of democracy are able to thrive and evolve, there will be a need to separate the state from the mosque.

Gerry O’Brien, Ottawa

Kiev and U.S. diplomatic clout

Re “Ukraine’s festering divisions” (Opinion, June 3): Samuel Charap writes that counterterrorism missions like Russia’s in the first Chechen war or Turkey’s against Kurdish separatists “can be deeply counterproductive when the civilian population has as much or more sympathy for the alleged terrorists than it does for the military doing battle with them.”

American policy makers could also learn from their own mistakes in Iraq and Afghanistan. The regional divides facing Ukraine present the Obama administration with a marvelous opportunity to implement the new strategic vision that conceives of American power in terms of diplomatic, and not mere military, might.

Washington should use its considerable resources to encourage Kiev to include the east and west in the new government. A stable Ukraine would be in the strategic interest of Kiev, Moscow and, above all, the Ukrainian people, in all their glorious diversity.