The Politics of Plunderhttp://blogs.forbes.com/dougbandow
[Please go to \'Settings\' to change your Tagline]Thu, 30 Jul 2015 14:46:00 +0000en-UShourly1http://wordpress.org/?v=3.9.2India Losing Opportunity To Become Next Great Power? Narendra Modi’s Faltering Revolutionhttp://www.forbes.com/sites/dougbandow/2015/07/30/india-losing-opportunity-to-become-next-great-power-narendra-modis-faltering-revolution/
http://www.forbes.com/sites/dougbandow/2015/07/30/india-losing-opportunity-to-become-next-great-power-narendra-modis-faltering-revolution/#commentsThu, 30 Jul 2015 11:00:00 +0000http://blogs.forbes.com/dougbandow/?p=5845Last year Narendra Modi won an unusually strong majority in India’s parliamentary election. Previously barred from receiving a U.S. visa because of charges that he incited sectarian violence, Modi visited the U.S. last September and was warmly welcomed by both the Obama administration and Indian-Americans. He was treated as the leader of the next great power.

India won independence in 1947 and long was ruled by the dynastic India National Congress Party. Although ethnic Indians circled the globe as entrepreneurs and traders, the Delhi government turned dirigiste economics into a state religion. Mind-numbing bureaucracies, rules, and inefficiencies were legion. Only the well-empowered and well-connected benefited from the socialist illusion that persisted into the 1980s.

Eventually modest reform came, but the Congress Party was never fully committed. Even half-hearted half-steps generated overwhelming political opposition. The Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party later broke the CP’s monopoly on power and made further changes, but that still was not nearly enough. Later CP governments were major disappointments. Last May the BJP, led by Modi, handed Congress its greatest defeat ever. He seemed poised to transform his nation economically. Some Americans called him the Indian Reagan.

As the anniversary of that visit approaches, the Modi dream is fading. An Economist report found him widely described as an “authoritarian” and a “megalomaniac” even by supporters. More important, by all accounts he does not believe in a liberal free market. Rather, like so many Republican politicians who routinely applaud free enterprise, he is more pro-business than pro-market. The Economist noted that “he occasionally praises small government, but the list [of official pledges] contains a striking number of big tasks for the state. Half of the goals involve grand, state-heavy expansion.”

Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi (RAKASH SINGH/AFP/Getty Images)

The Modi government exults in the fact that economic growth is up; India may finally surpass China’s growth rate. Yet there is little evidence on the ground of rapid economic growth. Unfortunately, few reforms of significance have been implemented. The point is not that Delhi has done nothing, but that its failures overshadow its successes and highlight its lost opportunities.

Critics cite continuing outsize budget deficits, driven by subsidies and state infrastructure spending, as one notable shortcoming. Another is continued state direction of bank lending. Also counterproductive is the 2013 Companies Act, which discourages creation of family companies. On the election anniversary the Economist called the Modi government’s record “underwhelming.” Arun Shourie, privatization minister in the last, and more reformist, BJP government, observed last December: “when all is said and done, more is said than done.”

Unfortunately, Modi has missed the “honeymoon” period during which his political capital was at its greatest. Observed Sadanand Dhume of the American Enterprise Institute: “a tepid budget, an unseemly tax row with [foreign institutional investors], and few concrete signs of allegedly high growth have dented business confidence.” Time is slipping away.

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]]>http://www.forbes.com/sites/dougbandow/2015/07/30/india-losing-opportunity-to-become-next-great-power-narendra-modis-faltering-revolution/feed/19Putin Paranoia: Over-Imaginative U.S. And NATO Fear Russian Aggression Aided by Greek Fifth Columnhttp://www.forbes.com/sites/dougbandow/2015/07/28/putin-paranoia-over-imaginative-u-s-and-nato-fear-russian-aggression-aided-by-greek-fifth-column/
http://www.forbes.com/sites/dougbandow/2015/07/28/putin-paranoia-over-imaginative-u-s-and-nato-fear-russian-aggression-aided-by-greek-fifth-column/#commentsTue, 28 Jul 2015 13:13:00 +0000http://blogs.forbes.com/dougbandow/?p=5838In the midst of bitter bailout negotiations between Greece and Europe, warnings proliferated of a possible Greek Fifth Column. The European Union and even NATO would collapse should Athens turn toward Russia. Of all the paranoid fantasies driving U.S. foreign policy, few seem sillier than the specter of Greece joining Moscow to wreck Europe.

For five years Athens has been arguing with its European neighbors over debts and reform. Over time a Greek exit, or Grexit, from the Euro looked increasingly possible.

However, European elites are committed to an ever-stronger political union. Explained German Chancellor Angela Merkel: “If the Euro fails, Europe fails.” To prevent this failure, wealthier European states lent promiscuously to Greece.

That was not a good deal for European peoples. However, the issue doesn’t much concern the U.S. A European economic crisis would be bad for America, but Grexit is not likely to set off such a cataclysm.

Nevertheless, some analysts speculated that Athens might fall out of the European Union and NATO as well as the Eurozone, resulting in geopolitical catastrophe. The perfidious Greeks might switch sides, aiding bloodthirsty Putinistas in breaking apart Europe and crushing Eastern Europe and the Balkans underfoot. Thus, the U.S. should insist that Europe pay off the Greek Judases lest they sacrifice Western civilization to the Russian hordes.

Russian President Vladimir Putin, left, and Greek Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras arrive for their talks at the St. Petersburg International Investment Forum in St.Petersburg, Russia, Friday, June 19, 2015. (AP Photo/Alexander Zemlianichenko)

Although the crisis seemingly has abated, the latest bailout is not yet finalized. And no one really believes that Athens will be able to pay its accumulated debt. Another crisis seems inevitable, in which case the specter of a Greek Trojan Horse likely will reemerge.

This fear betrays an overactive imagination. Moscow is no charity. Faced with declining oil prices and Western sanctions, Moscow could ill afford to subsidize the essentially bankrupt Greek economy and would advance credit only if repayment was assured. Russia failed to save Cyprus, whose banks were filled with Russian deposits, two years ago. Germany and other European creditors might offer a bailout as a form of continental solidarity; Moscow has no similar reason to get involved.

Might Russia trade financial aid for geopolitical advantage? “You do not want Europe to have to deal with a Greece that is a member of NATO but which all of a sudden hates the West and is cozying up to Russia,” warned Sebastian Mallaby of the Council on Foreign Relations. This could put the alliance “’in irons,’ which is to say becalmed and not moving effectively forward,” warned James Stavridis, retired admiral and head of the Fletcher School. (He also worried that Athens might do the same in the EU, but it long has dealt with occasionally recalcitrant members.) Greece might be less willing to participate in alliance operations and host NATO forces.

Worse, Athens might leave the transatlantic alliance, give military bases to Russia, and “become a geographical link between Russia and its Balkan vassal, Serbia,” argued Peter Martino of the Gatestone Institute. Marc Chandler of Brown Brothers Harriman warned that “In what promises to be a protracted western confrontation with Russia, the geostrategic assets represented by Greece are irreplaceable.” Robert D. Kaplan of the Center for a New American Security was even more apocalyptic: “Europe will be increasingly vulnerable to Russian aggression if its links to Greece are substantially loosened. Greece is the only part of the Balkans accessible on several seaboards to the Mediterranean, and thus is a crucial gateway to and from the West.”

It sounds like the Cold War redux. In fact, Daniel McGroarty of the Carmot Strategic Group compared today to 1947, when President Harry S. Truman announced an aid program to keep Greece “free from encroaching Soviet Communism.” A new Dark Age threatens to descend upon the globe!

How might this happen? At the very least, worried the Atlantic Council’s Robbie Gramer and Rachel Rizzo, “A deeper relationship between Russia and Greece would severely undermine the transatlantic communitiy’s efforts to present a united front against Putin.” Athens could block increased European sanctions, for instance, and “prove to be a major headache for future Alliance maneuvers to counter revanchist Russian aggression in Eastern Europe.” And that might just be the start.

In fact, this discussion appears to be a grand bluff, a desperate card played by Athens in a losing game. The University of Oxford’s Dimitar Bechev wisely advocated “a deep, calming breath.” Explained Theocharis Grigoriadis of Berlin’s Free University: Tsipras “has no intention of making Greece a Russian satellite. The Russians know that. The Germans know that. It is pure theater, a Greek game, and I’m afraid it looks like a poodle trying to scare a lion.”

To start, Russia poses little threat to Europe. President Vladimir Putin is an unpleasant authoritarian, but he is no Hitler or Stalin. Rather, he has taken Russia back to a pre-1914 Great Power, concerned about international respect and border security. While Moscow has violated human rights and international law, the West encouraged Russian misbehavior by ostentatiously flouting the latter’s security concerns—expanding NATO to Russia’s borders, dismantling Russia’s traditional Serbian friend, encouraging the overthrow of the flawed but democratically elected (and modestly pro-Russian) president of Ukraine, and pushing U.S.-friendly candidates for office in Kiev.

So far Moscow’s aggressive interventions, though unjustified, have reflected traditional Russian security concerns and, like NATO’s unprovoked attack on Yugoslavia, have been limited in scope. Nothing suggests that Putin has lost his mind and hopes to rule over territory filled with Europeans. And for good reason: the U.S. and Europe far outrange Russia in military power, with or without Greece.

Kaplan contended that Greece’s departure from the Eurozone and subsequent economic problems “could reduce it to a semi-failed state that, along with the dismemberment and weakening of Ukraine, will seriously weaken Europe’s geopolitical position vis-à-vis Russia.” How?

Ukraine is deep within the old Soviet Empire and only at the periphery of “New Europe”; Kiev’s orientation never has mattered much for the continent’s security. Even if Moscow formally severed the Donbass from the rest of Ukraine there would be little impact on Europe and America,

Greece is located well within “New Europe.” Even if “semi-failed” Greece turned toward Moscow, what would Russia gain? Fiercely independent Athens wouldn’t invite a Russian occupation, let alone offer Moscow a base for attacking the rest of Europe. Greece might be a “gateway” to the continent, as Kaplan intoned, but that is different from being a “gateway” to Russian aggression.

Martino worried that “Greece could also serve as a base for the Russians to strengthen their position in the Balkans,” but there are no ethnic Russians appealing for Moscow’s protection in that region. Even fellow Slavs, such as in Serbia, have indicated no interest in submitting to Russia. Kaplan worried that Balkan states with “weak institutions and fragile economies” would see Russia as “momentarily ascendant.” Really? Russia’s economy remains poor and underdeveloped. Its military only has beaten up weak neighbors; Moscow proved unable to save Serbia from NATO in 1999. If nearby Europe cannot compete with Russia in the Balkans without Greece, the problem is Europe, not Greece.

Finally, there are Greek naval bases. George Petrolekas of the Canadian Global Affairs Institute noted that the “Aegean islands control approaches to the Bosporus and the island of Crete has long been important as refueling facility for NATO fleets at Souda Bay, and its airfields used to support NATO operations in Libya.” Useful, yes. Vital, no. After all, the Med is essentially a NATO lake and the Libya intervention was folly.

Kaplan called for European and American aid to Athens to keep “Russian warships away from Greek ports.” Doing so might be desirable, but is hardly necessary. What, exactly, would the far weaker Russian fleet do after visiting Greece? Assault the Dalmatian Coast, occupy Dubrovnik, seize Venice, and occupy Gibraltar in the name of Emperor Putin?

Petrolekas warned that “beyond Russia, there is China. China’s naval expansion seeks a foothold in the Mediterranean.” Unfortunately, Beijing is not so foolish to disperse its limited forces, weakening the fleet available to promote the government’s core interests in the Asia-Pacific. Washington could only hope for such an outcome.

Despite such fevered speculations, Greece is not geopolitically critical for America. Martino argued that Greece is “a hugely important strategic country, which borders on an increasingly unstable part of the world.” Actually, NATO member Turkey is the real front line. Italy is as exposed as Greece to the chaos generated by the succession of Middle Eastern wars.

Syriza’s Rena Dourou was even more florid: “Greece is at a crossroads, between Europe, the Balkans, the Mediterranean Basin and the Middle East—between the West and the East. It is at the junction of important geostrategic interests. It is situated in an area where the established interests of the great powers are pitted against those of the rising regional powers, against the backdrop of a reemergence of blind religious fundamentalism, in the form of the Islamic State—a serious menace to universal human rights and a threat to the principles and values of rationalism.” Actually, many of these claims also apply to Central Asia and North Africa. Nor is it obvious how Greece, even as an economically healthy member of the Eurozone, could address great power competition, religious fundamentalism, rationalism, universal human rights, and so much more.

Bulgarian President Rosen Plevneliev raised another issue, complaining that “Russia uses every opportunity to divide and weaken the European Union.” Imagine a vast Fifth Column across Europe. But Moscow has gained little from its efforts. In Hungary authoritarian-populist Prime Minister Viktor Orban aped Putin in criticizing liberal democracy and denounced EU sanctions against Russia. But other than negotiating a $10.8 billion nuclear energy deal with Moscow, he has delivered few meaningful benefits to Moscow.

Russia has built ties with some ugly opposition parties, such as Marine Le Pen’s National Front in France, but few are close to power. Several other governments have questioned sanctions, but they are mostly left-wing—Italy’s Prime Minister Matteo Renzi and Slovakia’s Prime Minister Robert Fico, as well as the Czech Republic’s largely ceremonial President Milos Zeman. None of them have done much for Russia.

Nor has the Tsipras government. In fact, beyond a couple of friendly meetings little has come from the supposed Athens-Moscow axis. One suspects that Moscow prefers Greece to remain Europe’s problem. While Russia might welcome a Greek exit from NATO, Athens does not much contribute to the alliance’s anti-Moscow activities.

So far Moscow has provided no financial aid, not even something symbolic, like the relatively small loan to Cyprus in 2011. There are few commercial deals. Total bilateral trade came to about $10 billion in 2013, and has dropped dramatically since then. Moscow has neither offered a discount on natural gas nor an exemption from Russia’s counter-sanctions. The “Turkish Stream” natural gas pipeline would be an economic positive for Greece, but remains only a plan. Greece is negotiating to buy more Russian S-300 missiles, but Athens has used that system for years. Moscow has investment objectives, but most are frustrated by Syriza’s opposition to privatization.

“There is fundamental value to Europe in having Greece as part of its orbit,” argued Stavridis, but the reverse also is true. Irrespective of the debt negotiations and Eurozone membership, Greece will continue to have much at stake with Europe.

Indeed, charges of imminent Greek perfidy are hard to credit. Kaplan complained that “Greece, in terms of its politics and culture, is not fully anchored in the West.” That’s true, but it still seems a bit much for him to treat Greece “as the child of Byzantine and Ottoman despotism.” Greeks are relatively less enthused about America and more favorable toward Russia, but Washington and Brussels have consistently ignored Athens’ interests when making Balkan policy. Nevertheless, Greece has remained with the West even through the turbulent years of Andreas Papandreou’s premiership.

Moreover, so far the Tsipras government has made no significant policy changes. It did not obstruct continuation of sanctions against Russia in January, shortly after taking power, or in June. Perhaps Athens believes Russia had offered insufficient benefits to act as Russia’s agent in the EU. More likely, most Greeks continue to look west for economic opportunity.

Indeed, Athens has consistently affirmed its participation in Europe. When meeting Putin Tsipras noted that Greece was “complying with all the commitments we have made to the EU.” The main threat against Europe came from Defense Minister Panos Kammenos, head of Syriza’s small coalition partner. In February he suggested interest in getting “funding from another source.” But Deputy Foreign Minister Nikos Chountis emphasized that no requests had been made. Kammenos’ comment sounded like a negotiating ploy.

The latter similarly proposed: “If Europe leaves us in the crisis, we will flood it with immigrants, and it will be even worse for Berlin if in that wave of millions of economic immigrants there will be some jihadists of the Islamic State, too.” However, nations rarely consciously commit policy suicide. The Syriza government would not want to open its border to jihadists, especially with the demagogic, far-right Golden Dawn party ready to take political advantage.

Frigates patrol, as a Greek special forces officer stands guards on board a Greek Themistocles frigate, north of the island of Crete, Greece, during a NATO “Sea Day” exercise on Friday, May 20, 2005. (AP Photo/Petros Giannakouris)

Moreover, Kammenos affirmed Athens’ commitment to NATO: “We will continue our cooperation on a political level and also on a military level.” But even a less cooperative Greece wouldn’t matter much: no one expects Greek troops to confront Russian forces in the Balkans or Baltic. The country is one of the few NATO members to spend at least two percent of GDP on the military, but that mostly reflects fear of Turkey—and a shrinking GDP. If Athens attempted to be truly disruptive the U.S., the only member of NATO which really matters, especially in shaping military policy toward Russia, could bypass the alliance as it has done so often before.

The Syriza government has criticized sanctions against Russia. Explained Tsipras: “We don’t think that this is a fruitful decision. It’s practically an economic war.” However, Greece is not alone in taking this position. Obviously the penalties have failed to reverse Russian policy in Ukraine. The latter matters far more to Moscow than it does to Europe or America. Thus, Russia always will be willing to invest more resources and take greater risks. Best would be to use possible sanctions repeal to negotiate a deal, admittedly imperfect, that everyone can live with: recognition of Ukrainian sovereignty, enactment of regional autonomy, guarantee of Ukrainian neutrality. Such an approach would be entirely consistent with Greece remaining part of the West.

Athens can hardly be faulted for desiring to pursue a foreign policy reflecting its interest. After meeting Putin in Moscow Tsipras insisted that “Greece is a sovereign state with an indisputable right to its own foreign policy.” He’s correct. The Greek premier urged “a new spring in ties between our countries,” which would benefit both.

If Greece’s partners in both the EU and NATO really believe Athens to be hopelessly faithless, with its vote up for bid, they should defenestrate the potential traitor rather than attempt to outbid the Russians. After all, perfidious Hellas might choose to defect at the most critical moment, defeating allied plans.

The Greek saga is far from over. Whether or not Athens remains in the Eurozone, it almost certainly will remain in the EU and NATO. There is no evidence that Athens’ turn to the Dark Side was ever plausible, let alone imminent. Commented Fyodor Lukyanov, editor of Russia in Global Affairs, on the prospect of a Moscow-Athens axis: “For Greece, it is a dream. For Europe, where it is exaggerated, and the U.S. it, frankly speaking, is something bordering on paranoia. And for Russia, it is nothing. There is nothing there.”

While Greece likely will push a more independent foreign policy, it will do so along with several other nations. And in doing so it might help promote a compromise settlement with Russia, the only likely enduring solution.

Alas, Washington’s brief moment of untrammeled global dominance apparently has created impossible expectations of allied nations, from which any deviation is seen as peddling treason and risking catastrophe. In fact, the paranoid panic that Greece’s economic problems could destroy Europe’s and America’s geopolitical standing should generate a mix of scorn and laughter.

Athens does not possess the keys to the Western kingdom and would not likely turn them over to Vladimir Putin if it did. Washington should calm down, leaving the Greeks and other Europeans alone to solve their problems. Greece subsidized or not, in the Eurozone or out, really isn’t America’s business.

It is a country which the Communist revolutionaries who ruled only four decades ago would not recognize. It’s not just the availability of McDonald’s, Pizza Hut, and KFC. As I sat in a German restaurant featuring steins full of beer and platters covered with sausages listening to a Chinese band cover American pop songs I had to remind myself that I was only a short drive from Tiananmen Square, Mao’s mausoleum, and Zhongnanhai, the Communist Party’s leadership compound.

True believers still exist. One yesterday spoke to me reverently of Mao Zedong’s rise to power and service to the Chinese people. She said people today viewed him as “kind of a god, a Buddha.” However, she is the exception, at least among China’s younger professionals. Few Chinese I meet much think about “the Great Helmsman,” as Mao is known, despite the fact that his image remains common in the People’s Republic of China. When I looked at a Mao souvenir, the vendor told me the infamous dictator was “a bad man.” Certainly no one who realizes that his madcap reign caused the deaths of tens of millions of people identifies with him.

Indeed, younger educated Chinese could not be further from Communist cadres once determined to create a socialist state. The former increasingly emphasize individuality: They are socially active, desire the newest technologies, and worry about going to good schools and getting good jobs. Cynicism about corrupt and unelected leaders is pervasive. Last year a student told me, in front of his classmates, how much he preferred America’s system of electing the national legislature. A couple days ago a female high school student told me that the government was “cruel.”

If there is one common belief, it is hostility toward the government’s Internet controls. Students have complained to me in class about their inability to get to many websites. They don’t like restrictions on what they can see and say. Virtual private networks are routinely shared and irritation with state barriers to access is readily expressed.

But such opinions are not held only by the young. Adults who lived through the Cultural Revolution are only too aware of the mercurial horror of past Communist rule. A high school student told me that his father urged him to study in America because of the restrictions on freedom.

]]>http://www.forbes.com/sites/dougbandow/2015/07/24/can-economic-dynamism-and-political-stability-survive-chinas-battle-against-freedom/feed/0Into The Economic Abyss: Foolish Europeans Give Irresponsible Greeks Third Bailouthttp://www.forbes.com/sites/dougbandow/2015/07/22/into-the-economic-abyss-foolish-europeans-give-irresponsible-greeks-third-bailout/
http://www.forbes.com/sites/dougbandow/2015/07/22/into-the-economic-abyss-foolish-europeans-give-irresponsible-greeks-third-bailout/#commentsWed, 22 Jul 2015 15:22:00 +0000http://blogs.forbes.com/dougbandow/?p=5823Nearly a month ago Greek voters rejected more economic austerity as a condition of another European bailout. “Up yours!,” a landslide majority shouted at Greece’s creditors. But today Athens is implementing an even more severe austerity program. Few expect Greece to pay back the hundreds of billions of dollars it owes. Which means another economic crisis is inevitable, with possible Greek exit (“Grexit”) from the Eurozone. The sacred European Project risks moving in reverse.

Blame for the ongoing crisis is widely shared. Greece has created one of Europe’s most sclerotic economies. Stifling statism enriches the political class, discourages economic innovation, and enshrines class warfare. Joining the Euro changed nothing. Noted the Huffington Post’s Andreas Souvaliotis, Athens “enjoyed the spoils of membership without ever trying to live up to its end of the bargain; it cheated, squandered, abused, begged for more and the cycle continued until the financial crisis suddenly brought the entire country to the brink of bankruptcy.”

The Eurocrats, an elite including politicians, journalists, businessmen, and academics, determined to create a United States of Europe irrespective of the wishes of European peoples. That meant strengthening and centralizing political authority in Brussels. It also meant creating a monetary union which was supposed to promote a common fiscal policy and ultimately a continental nation state.

European leaders welcomed Athens into the Eurozone in 2001 even though everyone knew the Greek authorities were lying about the health of their economy. However, economics was secondary. Which is why German Chancellor Angela Merkel later declared: “If the Euro fails it’s not just the currency that fails, but Europe and the idea of European unification.”

However, equalizing exchange rates cemented Greece’s lack of international competitiveness, precluding Athens from devaluing its currency to lower costs. Enjoying an inflated credit rating, Greece borrowed wildly and spent equally promiscuously on consumption. Observed the Wall Street Journal’s Bret Stephens, Athens “wanted to run a five-star welfare state with a two-star economy.” The expensive party ended only when investors finally noticed.

Greece could have simply defaulted on its debts. However, French, German, Italian, and other European banks had invested heavily in Greek securities. Paris and Berlin, in particular, wanted to rescue their improvident financial institutions. Moreover, the creditors believed that European integration should only tighten. Although EU treaties prohibited bailouts, explained Christian Rickens of Spiegel online, starting in 2010 Eurozone governments “used tricks to circumvent clauses in European law that prohibited precisely this kind of shared liability within the currency union.”

Thus, most of the Greek debt was shifted onto European taxpayers through two bailouts costing roughly $265 billion. As much as 90 percent of the money ended up outside of Greece, mostly as repayments to foreign banks. Loan conditions were enforced through the infamous “Troika”: European Commission, European Central Bank, International Monetary Fund. The result was a 25 percent drop in GDP, more than 25 percent unemployment rate, more than 50 percent youth unemployment rate, and 80 percent fall in stock market values—all comparable or worse than America’s Great Depression. Even with renewed growth Greece won’t return to its 2007 GDP level until the 2020s.

Still, the Greek economy finally began improving last year. But it was too little, too late, as the leftwing coalition party Syriza won Greece’s January election. The new government simultaneously dismantled old reforms and antagonized European creditors. Economic growth lagged and Greece’s financial woes increased. Impasse resulted at the end of June as the second bailout expired.

Greece’s debt/GDP ratio is second only to that of Japan—177 percent, up from 117 percent at the start of the crisis. Without a path to rapid economic growth Greece will be unable to pay, even though the maturities are long and the interest rates are low. However, the Greek people continue to prefer the illusion of social solidarity through government redistribution to wealth creation through economic liberalization.

Athens denounced its creditors for insisting on repayment. Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras criticized “ultimatums, blackmail and fearmongering,” and complained that the Eurogroup sought “to bar the right of a sovereign people to exercise their democratic prerogative.” He then held a popular vote on the latest bailout proposal, promising that a “no” vote would strengthen his negotiating position.

But European lenders have a lot of money at stake in Greece. Overall Austria has $10 billion at risk. Belgium’s share is $12 billion, the Dutch could lose $20 billion, and Spain has committed $42 billion. Italy, with its own debt at 130 percent of GDP, is on the hook for about $62 billion. France could lose $70 billion and Germany is in for $92 billion.

Writing off Greek debt would require European governments to confess their financial folly to their taxpayers. Restructuring Greek debt also would set off similar demands from other heavily indebted states. Governments that have made painful reforms, such as Spain, fear encouraging radical opposition parties in upcoming elections. Particularly resentful are Eastern European states, which, though poorer than Greece, successfully implemented even tougher reform programs. A policy toward Athens of “extend and pretend” seemed better to almost everyone than acknowledging reality.

Finally, Eurocrats committed to a consolidated continental government refused to consider a Grexit. European integration is supposed to move only one way. For decades European elites have simply rolled over any opposition, rewriting constitutions and scheduling revotes. The Eurocrats were determined to do so again.

So now what?

A pedestrian passes an automated teller machine (ATM) illuminated at night outside a National Bank of Greece SA bank branch in Athens, Greece, on Tuesday, July 21, 2015. Greek lawmakers are voting on a second package of measures the country’s creditors demanded as a condition for starting discussions on an aid program. Photographer: Matthew Lloyd/Bloomberg

After the Syriza government nearly wrecked Greece’s economy with its confrontational tactics, Athens required “debt relief on a scale that would need to go well beyond what has been under consideration to date,” noted the IMF. Tsipras encouraged his people to reject their creditors’ best offer, but almost immediately afterwards announced that he had no choice but to request a third bailout.

However, a majority of the other 18 Eurozone members, led by Germany, appeared ready to consider Grexit instead of offering a new deal. Noted Sarunas Cerniauskas and Pauls Raudseps in the Guardian, “From central European minnows such as Slovakia to Baltic Eurozone republics such as Latvia and Lithuania, hard-pressed pensioners and workers earning barely E500 a month are at a loss as to why Greece should qualify for more largesse.” Cyprus, France, and Italy pushed back to keep Athens in the common currency.

After bitter debate the Eurogroup set forth its “minimum requirements to start the negotiations with the Greek authorities.” Euro leaders offered some $96 billion. Although the creditors dropped the toughest condition—a temporary Greek exit from the Euro which could easily become permanent—they insisted that Athens essentially mortgage around $55 billion worth of state assets. Other conditions included hiking taxes, cutting tax breaks, limiting pensions, deregulating labor markets, combatting corruption, improving civil justice, and reducing military outlays.

Alas, even if a new deal is formalized, there is little chance that it will work. The European Commission admitted that success required “a far-reaching and credible reform program, very strong ownership of the Greek authorities for such a program.” But neither is, or has ever been, the case.

While past Athens governments reduced easily measured outlays, they failed at more fundamental restructuring. Even under the prior conservative government, noted Dimitri Sotiropoulos of the University of Athens: “a policy to open up ‘closed shop’ professions was a failure”; “public sector reforms for the most part did not take place”; “privatizations did not materialize on a large scale.” Greece had to be forced by its creditors to even create an independent statistical office, which nevertheless came under constant political and legal attack.

In pressing parliament to approve the latest program, Tsipras announced: “The government does not believe in these measures. We will do our best to protect people from measures we do not believe in but are forced to implement.” Moreover, economic liberalization remains wildly unpopular. “Statesmanship doesn’t pay,” argued Peter Tenebrarum.

Understandably, European distrust of Athens is deep. During the recent negotiations one EU diplomat was quoted as saying that “The hawks are very vocal.” German Finance Minister Wolfgang Schaeuble said “We will certainly not be able to rely on promises.” Even French Finance Minister Michel Sapin, representing one of the few governments friendly to Greece, opined: “Confidence has been ruined by every Greek government over many years which have sometimes made promises without making good on them at all.”

Moreover, the IMF, a party to the first two bail-outs, proclaimed that the latest agreement is not viable. Total Greek government debts were about $354 billion at the end of last year, second only to Japan, which sports the world’s third largest economy. Under the latest program Greece’s obligations will balloon to around $440 billion dollars, some 200 percent of GDP. By 2022 the IMF predicted a debt/GDP ratio of 170 percent, only marginally below that of today. The European Commission figured the best case estimate—assuming reforms are fulfilled—will be 150 percent, with something closer to 176 percent more likely. Stated the Fund, Athens’ “new financing needs render the debt dynamics unsustainable.”

However, Merkel insisted that a “classical haircut is out of the question.” Instead, Schaeuble suggested “reprofiling” the debt, that is, further lengthening maturities and reducing interest payments. However, Euro leaders insisted that any relaxation of Greece’s debt burden could only follow full implementation of the reform program. And even “a very substantial re-profiling,” noted the European Commission, “would still leave Greece with very high debt-to-GDP levels for an extended period.”

Thus, the internal contradictions of the crisis remain: Athens wants more money and debt relief with no reform, European institutions desire maximum reform without debt relief in return for more money, and the IMF recommends both maximum reform and substantial debt relief along with more money. If the latest bailout fails to revive the Greek economy—and few expect a growth spurt from austerity without liberalization—Athens will be unable to pay its new debts. Then there will be little support for another bailout. Grexit may become inevitable.

Perhaps even more significant, instead of advancing continental consolidation the common currency has become an obstacle to European political union. Worried Dusan Reljic of the German Institute for International and Security Affairs: “What we are experiencing now is a huge step toward disintegration.” Said Kris Peeters, Belgian Deputy Prime Minister: “For the first time in its history, it’s in danger of becoming a less-close union.” Opined Financial Times columnist Wolfgang Muenchau, the European creditors have “destroyed the Eurozone as we know it and demolished the idea of a monetary union as a step towards a democratic political union.”

But this was almost inevitable. Nobel Laureate Milton Friedman presciently warned that the Euro “would exacerbate political tensions by converting divergent shocks that could have been readily accommodated by exchange rate changes into divisive political issues.” Populist parties are rising across Europe. Some oppose austerity and others criticize bailouts, but all appeal to people who feel ignored and victimized by the Eurocrats and other elites. Opined Gideon Richman of the Financial Times, the failed Euro experiment “is now actively destroying wealth, stability and European solidarity,” with predictable political consequences.

The Greek crisis has been particularly disillusioning for the Left, which assumed the EU would grow into a centralized transfer union. Instead, nations are acting in their own interest and leading continental powers have made austerity official Eurozone policy. Eintan O’Toole complained: “The “EU project was all about the gradual convergence of equal nations into an ‘ever closer union.’ That’s finished now.”

Indeed, the latest plan is dividing long-time allies. La Figaro reported on “extremely hard, even extremely violent” discussions among the European governments. Franco-German cooperation collapsed and Berlin came under attack from Italy as well. Luxembourg Foreign Minister Jean Asselborn warned that Grexit “would be fatal for Germany’s reputation” and summon “the ghosts from the past,” i.e., World War II.

Germany’s Chancellor Merkel committed to another bailout, but Finance Minister Schaeuble publicly broke with her. He told a reporter: “There are many people, also in the German federal government, that are pretty well convinced that [a Grexit] would be a much better solution for Greece and the Greek people.” Hans Michelbach, head of the Christian Social Union, the sister party of Merkel’s Christian Democratic Union, said “Either Greece declares itself willing for a viable solution or the country must leave the Euro.” A poll found that nine of ten Germans opposed debt relief for Greece and more than half wanted Athens out of the Eurozone.

Lawmaker Yanis Varoufakis, left passes by Panagiotis Lafazanis, a parliament member of Syriza governing party, during a parliament committee in Athens, Wednesday, July 22, 2015. Greece’s parliament has begun an emergency debate on a second round of conditions demanded by international creditors for a new bailout – a vote that could threaten the coalition government. (AP Photo/Thanassis Stavrakis)

Syriza could break apart. Tsipras won initial parliamentary approval for the new deal only with opposition support. On a second vote he lost 32 Syriza deputies, more than half of the party executive committee, and three cabinet members. Explained Energy Minister Panagiotis Lafazanis: “the worst, the most humiliating and unbearable [choice] is an agreement that will surrender, loot and subjugate our people and this country.” Former finance minister Varoufakis asked: “How can I possibly vote ‘yes’ to monsters and the new Versailles Treaty?” Tsipras revamped his cabinet, but his hold over the party has loosened and new elections are likely this fall.

The latest Greek crisis, to paraphrase Yogi Berra, was deja vu all over again. Europe’s leaders are congratulating themselves for reaching agreement. However, the third bailout likely will not be the final word. Athens’ travails continue to spread loss and hardship across the continent. Greece is unlikely to modernize its economy and pay its debts. Attempts to remain in the currency union probably will fail.

Equally significant, the move toward continental consolidation almost certainly is dead. Along with it dies any possibility of Europe becoming a Weltmacht capable of competing geopolitically with the U.S. and China. For the first time in decades, the European Project’s future is in serious doubt.

]]>http://www.forbes.com/sites/dougbandow/2015/07/22/into-the-economic-abyss-foolish-europeans-give-irresponsible-greeks-third-bailout/feed/0Toss South Korea Off America’s Defense Dole: Presidents Obama And Park Should End Military Welfarehttp://www.forbes.com/sites/dougbandow/2015/07/01/toss-south-korea-off-americas-defense-dolepresidents-obama-and-park-should-end-military-welfare/
http://www.forbes.com/sites/dougbandow/2015/07/01/toss-south-korea-off-americas-defense-dolepresidents-obama-and-park-should-end-military-welfare/#commentsWed, 01 Jul 2015 10:00:00 +0000http://blogs.forbes.com/dougbandow/?p=5797South Korean President Park Geun-hye delayed her trip to the U.S. because of a public health emergency at home. That led to much chatter over whether the postponement was necessary and would harm the bilateral relationship.

Woo Jung-Yeop of the Asan Institute argued that “the focus of Park’s U.S. visit should be on what to discuss, not on when to reschedule.” After all, there was no obvious purpose in the trip: North Korea is a chronic problem but hasn’t done anything particularly provocative recently. The low-key summit plans, coming so soon after the high-profile visit by Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, left many South Koreans suffering from an inferiority complex.

However, the delay won’t make a future Park trip any more useful. There is much on which the two nations should cooperate, since the Republic of Korea has graduated from Third to First World status and sports one of the world’s largest and most advanced economies. But the military alliance is outdated. Despite having surged past the North, enjoying a 40-to-1 economic advantage and 2-to-1 population edge, Seoul continues to play the helpless dependent, unable even to command its own forces in a war.

The military relationship was forged in a different time. The U.S. and Soviet Union divided the Korean Peninsula after Japan’s surrender in 1945. There weren’t many alternatives. Continued Japanese rule would have enraged all Koreans and united Soviet rule would have enslaved all Koreans.

A South Korean military officer (C) stands in a line with US officers before a South Korea-US Combined Division activation ceremony. (JUNG YEON-JE/AFP/Getty Images)

But the division resulted in two hostile Korean states. A three-year quasi-civil war erupted 65 years ago, in which the U.S. and West fought against China and the Soviet Union through their respective Koreas. After mass destruction, highlighted by millions of casualties and refugees, the conflict ended roughly where it started. With the ROK a wreck and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea backed by neighboring China and Soviet Union, only Washington’s security guarantee kept the South independent, if not exactly free.

That eventually changed. In the 1960s President Park Chung-hee, the present president’s father, suppressed all political opposition but reformed the economy, leading to the ROK’s dramatic growth. Democracy waited another quarter century, until the growing middle class tired of military rule.

Yet through it all South Korea’s defense dependency on America persisted. Seoul surpassed the DPRK in economic strength and achieved political stability. The Soviet Union disappeared and China joined the international community, with both Beijing and Moscow recognizing the South. South Korean businesses spanned the globe and Seoul began having military ambitions beyond the peninsula. No matter. The ROK insisted that abundant American forces must remain, backed by additional units aground in Okinawa and afloat and aflight in the Pacific.

When Congress returns it could revive Ex-Im, which primarily subsidizes big business exports. But a proper burial for what Barack Obama once called “corporate welfare” would save Americans money, reduce economic injustice, and promote economic growth.

The Bank was established in 1934 to promote trade with the Soviet Union, ExIm now is one of a score of federal agencies tasked with encouraging exports. The agency exists to borrow at government rates to provide credit at less than market rates for select exporters, mostly corporate behemoths.

ExIm claims to be friendly to small business, but cherchez the money: it goes to Big Business. According to Veronique de Rugy of the Mercatus Center, between 2007 and 2013 the Bank subsidized $66.7 billion in sales by Boeing. ExIm also underwrote $8.3 billion for General Electric, $5.2 billion for Bechtel, $4.9 billion for Caterpillar and its subsidiary Solar Turbine, $3.2 billion for CBI Americas, $3.0 for Exxon Mobil, $2.1 billion for Applied Materials, $2.0 billion for Westinghouse, and $1.4 billion for Noble Drilling. During that period Boeing enjoyed 35 percent, GE 4.4 percent, and Bechtel 2.7 percent of the Bank’s largesse.

In 2012, noted Timothy Carney of the Washington Examiner, the aircraft maker accounted for 83 percent of all loan guarantees. The following year just five firms collected 93 percent of the loan guarantees. Also in 2013 the top ten ExIm beneficiaries accounted for two-thirds of the Bank’s total activities: Boeing, General Electric, Bechtel, Applied Materials, Caterpillar, Space Systems/Loral, Komatsu America, Case New Holland, Ford, and Sikorsky Aircraft. Other frequent beneficiaries include Dow Chemical, John Deere, and Lockheed Martin.

A worker helps to assembles a helicopter at the AgustaWestland’s aircraft manufacturing facility Monday, June 22, 2015, in Philadelphia. (AP Photo/Matt Rourke)

Giants of the financial world, such as Citibank and JP Morgan Chase, also do well by the Bank. Loren Thompson of the Lexington Institute thought he was arguing in favor of ExIm when he observed: “Private lenders often don’t like the risk profile of countries seeking export assistance” and “want the kind of protections available to lenders who finance the exports of other countries.” Of course they do. But the U.S. government’s role is not to protect profit-making private firms from risks at home or abroad.

The Bank denies providing subsidies since it charges fees and interest and claims to make a “profit”—more than $1.6 billion since 2008. But if ExIm operated like a normal commercial bank there would be no need for it. Anyway, economists Jason Delisle and Christopher Papagianis explained that the Bank’s “profits are almost surely an accounting illusion” because “the government’s official accounting rules effectively force budget analysts to understate the cost of loan programs like those managed by the Ex-Im Bank.” Most important, there is no calculation for market risk. Including that would provide “a more comprehensive measure of federal costs” concluded the Congressional Budget Office.

]]>http://www.forbes.com/sites/dougbandow/2015/06/30/export-import-bank-closeskill-subsidies-to-cut-federal-liabilities-promote-economic-fairness/feed/1Top Dozen Villains In Greek Soap Opera: Who Is To Blame As Greece And Euro Stagger Toward The Brink?http://www.forbes.com/sites/dougbandow/2015/06/26/top-dozen-villains-in-greek-soap-opera-who-is-to-blame-as-greece-and-euro-stagger-toward-the-brink/
http://www.forbes.com/sites/dougbandow/2015/06/26/top-dozen-villains-in-greek-soap-opera-who-is-to-blame-as-greece-and-euro-stagger-toward-the-brink/#commentsFri, 26 Jun 2015 10:32:00 +0000http://blogs.forbes.com/dougbandow/?p=5802Negotiations in Brussels to resolve the Greek fiscal crisis appear deadlocked, with Athens heading toward default on Tuesday. German Chancellor Angela Merkel insisted that Greece make a deal before the markets open Monday: Germany “will not be blackmailed.” Greek Prime Minister Alexis Tsipris responded by denouncing “blackmails and ultimatum” and scheduling a referendum on the deal on July 5.

The European Union was supposed was supposed to create a de facto United States of Europe. Although the original constitution was rejected by Dutch and French voters, the Eurocratic elite forged ahead with a treaty, which did not require popular ratification. Only the Irish voted, and they first said no. But under pressure from virtually every establishment individual and institution across the continent, the Irish did as they were told and voted yes the second time.

In 2009 the Lisbon Treaty finally took effect. The result was supposed to be a new Weltmacht, a putative superpower with a president, foreign minister, and parliament, moving toward ever greater centralization. The Europeans prided themselves on answering Henry Kissinger, who so many years ago sarcastically asked for Europe’s phone number.

Alas, after last January’s Greek election it was obvious that whoever answers that line does not speak for Greece. Indeed, it isn’t clear if the EU’s leaders, many appointees confirmed by parliamentarians elected by national voters primarily using their ballots as protest votes, represented anyone in Europe other than themselves. And the Eurocrats, an amalgam of bureaucrats, academics, journalists, businessmen, politicians, and lobbyists who dominate Brussels.

To most EU leaders common people are an impediment. The Eurocrats reflexively intone “more Europe” in answer to every question, but voters increasingly are supporting protest parties, some populist, some worse. In countries like the Netherlands the rabble-rousers seem destined for government. In London it is the government, led by Prime Minister David Cameron, which is seeking to weaken Brussels’ control, after which it will hold a referendum on continuing membership in the body.

The most fundamental problem remains the “democratic deficit,” which then Czech President Vaclav Klaus spoke of. The EU began as a forum for economic cooperation, mainly to help integrate West Germany back into Europe. The later Common Market created a relatively free trade zone for member states, breaking down import barriers. But a forum for increased economic liberty offered little to the Eurocrats, who, like most denizens of Washington, D.C., are by inclination and profession meddlers. Their objective is to coercively reorder society. That requires a strong central government. Hence creation of the European Union.

Advocates weren’t shy about their ambitions. In 1992 German Chancellor Helmut Kohl predicted “creation of what the founding fathers of modern Europe dreamed of after the war, the United States of Europe.” Of course, Kohl and his fellow Eurocrats were about the only people with such a fantasy. But that didn’t matter, since they had the power. Or so they thought.

After all, they surmounted the embarrassing defeat of the European constitution. The Euro was another step in the unification process. The commercial union added a monetary union, currently joining 19 nations. The drafters recognized that leaving fiscal policy to individual members created a dangerously unbalanced system. But for the Eurocrats this flaw actually was a benefit: they believed further political integration would be necessary in response. A more powerful EU was expected, one that really would be more like the United States of America.

]]>http://www.forbes.com/sites/dougbandow/2015/06/26/top-dozen-villains-in-greek-soap-opera-who-is-to-blame-as-greece-and-euro-stagger-toward-the-brink/feed/2Washington Confronts Russia Over Ukraine: Yet Europeans Won’t Protect Themselves From Vladimir Putinhttp://www.forbes.com/sites/dougbandow/2015/06/24/washington-confronts-russia-over-ukraine-yet-europeans-wont-protect-themselves-from-vladimir-putin/
http://www.forbes.com/sites/dougbandow/2015/06/24/washington-confronts-russia-over-ukraine-yet-europeans-wont-protect-themselves-from-vladimir-putin/#commentsWed, 24 Jun 2015 10:00:00 +0000http://blogs.forbes.com/dougbandow/?p=5789Europe is at risk, we are told. Russia’s assault on Ukraine threatens the post-Cold War order. Moscow may follow up with similar attacks on Moldova and even such NATO members as Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania.

But no one in Europe seems to care. Even the countries supposedly in Vladimir Putin’s gun sites aren’t much concerned. No one is bolstering their military. And the European people oppose taking any military risks to help their neighbors.

Unfortunately, the Ukraine crisis is likely to continue for some time. The allies hope sanctions will bring Moscow to heel, but the Pew Research Center found that 88 percent of Russians backed Vladimir Putin’s foreign policy, the highest number since Pew started polling in 2003. At least Putin, though no friend of the West, is no fool. He recently opined: “only an insane person and only in a dream can imagine that Russia would suddenly attack NATO.”

But if Putin changes his mind, the Europeans don’t plan on defending themselves. Instead, virtually everyone expects America to save them, if necessary. Washington is being played for a sucker as usual.

Defense Secretary Ashton Carter is visiting Europe this week. On Monday while observing exercises by NATO’s new rapid response force he announced that the U.S. will contribute aircraft, weapons, and personnel to the “Very High Readiness Joint Task Force.” Americans will provide intelligence, logistics, reconnaissance, and surveillance support. That’s not all. Separately, the Obama administration plans to pre-position tanks and other equipment for a combat brigade in seven nations in Eastern Europe. James Stavidis, a former NATO commander, now dean of the Fletcher School at Tufts, said this “provides a reasonable level of reassurance to jittery allies.” Carter explained that Washington was acting “because the United States is deeply committed to the defense of Europe, as we have for decades.”

US Secretary of Defense Ash Carter, right, addresses NATO Response Force soldiers during his visit to the I. German-Dutch Brigade in Muenster, Germany, Monday, June 22, 2015. The troops are part of NATO’s Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF). (AP Photo/Martin Meissner)

America is more committed to Europe than are Europeans. “We are moving forward together, with new capabilities,” he said. What does he mean by “we”? Washington again will do the heavy lifting. “You can nearly hear the sigh of relief in Europe,” said Heather Conley of the Center for Strategic and International Studies, in learning that the U.S. again would bail out its allies. The Europeans scrimp on the military while funding their generous welfare state. They promise Washington whatever it desires—to increase outlays, hit the two percent of GDP level, improve international coordination, and more. Then they will go back to doing what they do best, depend on America.

NATO always stood for North America and the Others. During the Cold War the allied states shamelessly took a very cheap ride on the U.S. That made sense in the immediate aftermath of World War II, but by the 1960s Europe had recovered and should have spent amounts commensurate with the Soviet threat. However, Europeans correctly gauged that Washington wouldn’t leave, despite periodically upbraiding them for their meager efforts.

The problem has gotten worse in recent years. The U.S. accounts for three-quarters of NATO outlays even though Europe has a larger GDP than America. Because of European cutbacks, overall outlays are down 1.5 percent this year.

Of 28 members only the U.S., Britain, and Greece—mostly because of its confrontation with fellow alliance member Turkey—typically broke the officially recommended level of two percent of GDP. Estonia has become a member of that exclusive club, but not Latvia and Lithuania, despite being on the front line. After frenetically demanding that the U.S. do more, Poland only hit that mark this year. But several members have been cutting outlays, despite the continent’s embarrassing showing against Libya (running out of missiles, for instance) and limited capacity to aid the Baltics (little more than nil) let alone defend a nation like Ukraine.

Of the five largest European defense budgets, only France’s will increase. Those of Canada, Germany, Great Britain, and Italy will continue to decline. None of these countries will hit the recommended two percent of GDP level in 2015. Only Britain and France exceed 1.5 percent. Canada barely makes one percent. (At the G-7 Summit President Barack Obama essentially begged the British to spend more; London has responded by considering whether reclassifying intelligence and foreign aid outlays as “military” would allow Britain to technically meet the standard.) Those NATO members spending more this year—Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Netherlands, Norway, and Romania—collectively have outlays only half that of Britain.

Cooperation is poor even among those most at risk. Add Poland to the three Baltic and five Nordic states and the group enjoys a GDP about a third larger than that of Russia. However, their military outlays are only about 40 percent of Moscow’s. Moreover, complains Edward Lucas of the Center for European Policy Analysis, they “are divided” and suffer from “strategic incoherence.”

Never mind the events of the last year. Ukraine has not served as Thomas Jefferson’s famed “fire bell in the night,” despite the supposedly terrible threat posed to the peace and stability of Europe. “It is much more business as usual,” said British defense analyst Ian Kearns. As of 2013 the Europeans devoted just 3.6 percent of their governments’ budgets to the military, compared to a fifth of U.S. government spending. America’s per capita military outlays are five times that of the alliance’s Cold War members and eight times that of those states which joined later. “Total military spending by NATO’s European members was less in real terms in 2014 than in 1997—and there are 12 more member states in NATO today,” observed my Cato Institute colleague Chris Preble.

The issue is more than just money. From the onset of the crisis with Russia a number of American analysts have proposed deploying U.S. forces to Ukraine, treating the latter as if it was a NATO ally. No Europeans have volunteered to follow. The U.S. House has approved legislation to arm Kiev’s forces, and a similar measure is being pushed by ever warlike Senate Armed Services Committee Chairman John McCain. Most European governments have resisted the idea.

“Make no mistake: we will defend our allies,” declared Carter. But will the Europeans defend anyone, even themselves? A new poll suggests not. The Pew Foundation recently surveyed eight leading NATO countries: If Russia got into a conflict with another member of NATO, should your country use military force in the victim’s defense? A majority of French, Germans, and Italians said no. (The Germans were particularly emphatic, with 58 percent rejecting war. German support for NATO has dropped by 18 percent in just six years.) Only pluralities said yes in Poland, Spain, and the United Kingdom. (Yet Poland is insisting that everyone else defend it!) The highest European support level was in Britain, at 49 percent. Only in America, naturally, and Canada did a majority say yes (56 and 53 percent, respectively).

Ivo Daalder, a former U.S. ambassador to NATO, said “it will take a serious effort by the alliance to convince its public of the need to prepare for, deter and, if necessary, respond to a Russian attack.” Yet why should they take action as long as they believe they can count on Washington to save them? According to Pew, two-thirds of Europeans were convinced the Americans would come rushing over to do what they would not do for themselves.

It’s time to change that. Judy Dempsey of Carnegie Europe asked why Washington allowed itself to be used in this way: “Europe is prosperous. It should be confident enough both to take care of its own security and to contribute to a greater role in burden sharing.” It will not do so as long as U.S. policymakers insist that Americans do the job instead.

The Cold War is over. Moscow is an unpleasant regional actor, not a global threat. Europe has a much larger GDP and population than Russia and even with its current anemic level of military outlays devotes more to defense. The U.S. government is essentially bankrupt, with far greater unfunded liabilities than the Europeans, despite Greece’s travails.

Instead of pouring more resources into NATO, Washington should be disengaging militarily, turning leadership of the alliance and responsibility for defending the continent over to Europe. Americans shouldn’t be expected to protect their rich cousins even if the latter were devoted to protecting each other. That the Europeans expect the U.S. to do their job is yet another reason for Americans to say no more.

]]>http://www.forbes.com/sites/dougbandow/2015/06/24/washington-confronts-russia-over-ukraine-yet-europeans-wont-protect-themselves-from-vladimir-putin/feed/10Religious Persecution Rising: Islam Threatens Religious Minorities, Especially In Middle Easthttp://www.forbes.com/sites/dougbandow/2015/06/15/religious-persecution-rising-islam-threatens-religious-minorities-especially-in-middle-east/
http://www.forbes.com/sites/dougbandow/2015/06/15/religious-persecution-rising-islam-threatens-religious-minorities-especially-in-middle-east/#commentsMon, 15 Jun 2015 11:00:00 +0000http://blogs.forbes.com/dougbandow/?p=5784All religious faiths are victims of persecution somewhere. In this supposedly enlightened, tolerant age, people routinely are brutalized, jailed, and killed for their faith—or lack of faith—in God. Hostility to believers is evident even in the West, long home to the strongest advocates for freedom of conscience, expression, and association. Worse, over the last year “a horrified world has watched the results of what some have aptly called violence masquerading as religious devotion” in several nations, observed the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom in its latest annual report.

However, the fact that everyone is persecuted does not mean that everyone persecutes equally, or at all. Authoritarian regimes which fear independent thought and allegiance to anyone or anything beyond the state tend to war against any public expression of faith. But such systems usually are equal opportunity oppressors. It is belief in a transcendent, not what that transcendent looks like, which they usually see as the problem.

In sectarian societies religious minorities often are persecuted for what they believe. They face varying challenges where Buddhists, Hindus, and Jews enjoy a majority, but these states are few (although Hindu India is the world’s second most populous nation). A handful of at least nominally Christian countries persecute; however, this behavior most often reflects authoritarian politics (in former communist states) rather than theology. In a few cases, though, the Orthodox Church relies on the government for support against other Christian faiths.

In contrast, majority Muslim nations almost uniformly persecute. The only question is how virulent the repression. Believers are mistreated everywhere, but Christians most suffer in the birthplace of Christianity. The Iraq invasion and Arab Spring have loosed a campaign of religious cleansing across the Middle East.

In the case of the Islamic State death is the norm, though Shia Muslims and many others fare little better than Christians. Reported USCIRF: “When ISIL last June overtook Mosul, Iraq’s second largest city, it immediately murdered 12 dissenting Sunni clerics, kidnapped Christian priests and nuns, and leveled ancient houses of worship.” Even in relatively tolerant Muslim countries such as Kuwait Islamist radicals call for additional restrictions on non-Muslims.

In this photo taken from the Turkish side of the border between Turkey and Syria, in Akcakale, southeastern Turkey, people walk past a Turkish forces armoured personnel carrier, as a flag of the Islamic State group flies over city of Tal Abyad, Syria, in background. (AP Photo/Lefteris Pitarakis)

The Commission highlighted 27 countries for particularly vicious treatment of religious minorities. Eleven are strong Muslim-majority states. Eleven are communist or formerly communist. Two are other kinds of dictatorships, one is a Hindu–majority state, one has a Christian majority, and one has a more equal sectarian division.

Nine states make the first tier, “countries of particular concern,” in State Department parlance: Burma, China, Eritrea, Iran, North Korea, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan.

Burma. Christians long suffered in the military junta’s attempt to brutally suppress insurgencies from a variety of ethnic groups, several of which were predominantly Christian. Recent ceasefires have ended most of those conflicts and the military has implemented important political reforms. However, noted the Commission, “these steps have not yet improved conditions for religious freedom and related human rights in the country, nor spurred the Burmese government to curtail those perpetrating abuses.” More recently subject to virulent, violent abuse have been the Muslim Rohingya, many of whom have fled their homes and some their country.

China. Nearly half of the population has some faith, with the majority practicing folk religions or Buddhism. However, there now are more Christians than Communist Party members. President Xi Jinping’s attempt to tighten the state’s control over all dissent has impacted believers as well, who “continue to face arrests, fines, denials of justice, lengthy prison sentences, and in some cases, the closing or bulldozing of places of worship.”

Eritrea. Commonly called the North Korea of Africa, Eritrea suffers under a regime almost as repressive, fanatical, and isolationist as that in Pyongyang. President Isaias Afwerki and his Popular Front for Democracy and Justice fear anyone loyal to anything other than his totalitarian dictatorship. Everyone suffers: “The government regularly tortures and beats political and religious prisoners; however, religious prisoners are sent to the harshest prisons and receive some of the cruelest punishments.”

Iran. There was much hope for reform with the ascension of President Hassan Rouhani as president in 2013. But persecution has increased: “The government of Iran continues to engage in systematic, ongoing, and egregious violations of religious freedom, including prolonged detention, torture, and executions based primarily or entirely upon the religion of the accused.” Atheists, Baha’is, Christians, Jews, Sunni Muslims, and Zoroastrians all are at risk.

North Korea. Long the most repressive state on earth, the North surpasses even Eritrea in its mistreatment of believers. Belief in anything other than the supreme leader, a veritable deity, is perceived as a treasonous threat to the system. Missionary activity is particularly feared. Despite a handful of official churches, “Genuine freedom of religion or belief is non-existent. Individuals secretly engaging in religious activities are subject to arrest, torture, imprisonment, and sometimes execution.”

Saudi Arabia. Washington’s most important Arab ally also is the region’s most ruthless persecutor. In contrast to North Korea, not one church, synagogue, or other house of worship is allowed to operate openly. The monarchy, which has underwritten fundamentalist Wahabbist Islam around the world, “continues to prosecute and imprison individuals for dissent, apostasy, blasphemy, and sorcery.” Despite much drivel spouted by U.S. politicians about the liberal attitudes of King Abdullah after his death in January, Riyadh has never veered from religious totalitarianism. Abdullah’s successor, King Salman, appears to be returning to an even more repressive direction.

Sudan. Churches operate in this pariah state; indeed, the Catholic cathedral is next to the Foreign Ministry. However, the small Christian community suffers as a result of the government’s “policies of Islamization and Arabization.” During his recent reelection campaign President Omar Hassan al-Bashir advocated further reliance on Shari’ah law. Moreover, apostasy and conversion are punished, offenses from which Meriam Yahia Ibrahim Ishag, daughter of a Christian mother and Muslim father, last year barely escaped death.

Turkmenistan. This former Soviet republic is overwhelmingly Muslim, but more important, it retains the oppressive philosophy of the Soviet Union. In the most isolated spin-off from the U.S.S.R. the first president established a personality cult. There was a slight relaxation after his death, but religious liberty remains highly restricted: “Police raids and harassment of registered and unregistered religious groups continued.”

Uzbekistan. The most populous of the Central Asian states, Uzbekistan also is among the most repressive. It is determined “to enforce a highly restrictive religion law and to impose severe restrictions on all independent religious activity.” Typical of public officials, including in America, the regime uses claims of violent extremism to bolster its authority. For instance, the state “has arbitrarily used vague anti-extremism laws against peaceful religious adherents and others who pose no credible security threat.”

Central African Republic. CAR has been rent by violence between antagonistic militias. For much of last year it “was engulfed in a religious conflict after a 2013 coup resulted in rampant lawlessness and the complete collapse of government control.” It may be the only majority-Christian nation in which Christians used violence against a minority community—thankfully a recent phenomenon even there.

Egypt. Coptic Christians form a historic and significant minority, but they have suffered persecution under the Mubarak dictatorship, elective presidency of Mohamad Morsi, and al-Sisi dictatorship. Although President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi has attempted to use the Copts for his political advantage, “the Egyptian government has not adequately protected religious minorities” from discrimination, prosecution, and violence.

A mosque under construction is seen on the banks of the new waterway of the Suez canal on June 13, 2015, in the Egyptian port city of Ismailia, east of Cairo. (KHALED DESOUKI/AFP/Getty Images)

Iraq. The historic Christian community was destroyed by sectarian strife resulting from the Bush administration’s misbegotten invasion. Up to half of Christians fled, many to Syria, where today they face new threats. The situation greatly deteriorated last year. While the Islamic State was the worst perpetrator, “the Iraqi government also contributed to the deterioration in religious freedom conditions.”

Nigeria. This closely divided nation long has suffered from sharp religious tensions, many triggered by the imposition of Shari’ah law by the dozen Muslim-majority states. Since 1999 an estimated 18,000 have died in sectarian violence. Today the greatest threat to religious liberty is the radical Islamist group Boko Haram, which attacks Christians and moderate Muslims.

Pakistan. Yet another U.S. ally, Pakistan tolerates “chronic sectarian violence” against religious minorities and the promiscuous misuse of the infamous “blasphemy” law. As a result, this country “represents one of the worst situations in the world for religious freedom for countries not currently designated” a CPC.

Syria. Like Saddam Hussein’s Iraq, Bashar al-Assad’s Syria had little interest in religion. Thus, the latter became a haven for Christians after the former collapsed. Unfortunately, the uprising against Assad has become a sectarian conflict. Members of most religions now suffer at the hands of one faction or another in the multi-sided struggle.

Tajikistan. Yet another isolated, authoritarian, majority-Muslim former Soviet republic penalizes religious believers. Indeed, the government “suppresses and punishes all religious activity independent of state control, particularly the activities of Muslims, Protestants, and Jehovah’s Witnesses.”

Vietnam. Despite a number of economic reforms, this communist state retains its oppressive political structure. Thus, the regime “continues to control all religious activities through law and administrative oversight, restrict severely independent religious practice, and repress individuals and religious groups it view as challenging its authority.”

Afghanistan is a U.S. ally supposedly liberated and uplifted after nearly 14 years of U.S. military action. Yet the status of Baha’is, Christians, Shi’a Muslims, Sikhs, and dissenting Sunni Muslims continues “to be exceedingly poor.” In Azerbaijan, another Central Asian dictatorship, religious liberty continued to decline as “peaceful religious believers, their defenders, and other activists have been detained, fined, and imprisoned on various charges.”

Hope for reform in Cuba, the communist island off of America’s coast, has been largely stillborn. Despite the opening to America, Havana “continues to detain and harass religious leaders and laity, interfere in religious groups’ internal affairs, and prevent democracy and human rights activists from participating in religious activities.” India is the world’s largest democracy on its way to surpassing China’s population. Nevertheless, Hindu nationalism is on the rise, and along with it “incidents of religiously-motivated and communal violence reportedly have increased for three consecutive years.”

Religious tolerance and freedom continued to decline in the most populous Islamic nation, Indonesia, in which “discrimination and violence against religious minorities continued, as well as the harassment and imprisonment of individuals accused of blasphemy.” In 2011 the Central Asian dictatorship of Kazakhstan initiated a concerted crackdown on religious believers of all sorts. Legislation then enacted “has been enforced through the closing of religious organizations, police raids, detentions, and fines.”

Religious liberty is limited in Laos, one of the few remaining communist states. Protestant Christians come under greatest suspicion, and the national government allows “ongoing abuses against religious minority groups, abuses that are most prominent in remote, rural areas.” Commercially sophisticated Malaysia has been expanding the public role of Islam, resulting in “diminished legal protections for religious minorities, non-Muslims and non-Sunni Muslims alike.”

Russia is historically Christian but also became the first Communist state and served as the fount of global revolution. The Orthodox Church receives special favor, while “the government continues to bring criminal extremism charges against peaceful religious individuals and groups, especially Muslims and Jehovah’s Witnesses. Although resolute secularization has been declining in Turkey, so has protection for civil and political liberties. The government “has pervasive control over religion and denies full legal status to all religious communities,” while social hostility toward some believers, especially Jews, is rising.

Plenty of other nations mistreat people of faith in various ways. The Commission also is monitoring Bahrain, Bangladesh, Belarus, Cyprus, Kyrgyzstan, and Sri Lanka. Problems extend well beyond them.

Although religion is in increasing disfavor in many Western societies because it typically sets moral standards and makes moral judgments, religious liberty is the first freedom, the bedrock liberty of conscience upon which civil and political freedoms rest. A society and government which refuse to respect people’s belief in the transcendent are unlikely to respect other basic human rights.

With religious liberty under siege around the world, people of goodwill should stand for the rights of believers everywhere. Unpopular minority faiths are like the proverbial canary in the mine: when they die, further violations of human life and dignity inevitably are coming. It is an experience that constantly recurs overseas. America continues to protect religious liberty, but the foundation is cracking. Americans should learn the lessons overseas and redouble their efforts to prevent similar fates at home.

]]>http://www.forbes.com/sites/dougbandow/2015/06/15/religious-persecution-rising-islam-threatens-religious-minorities-especially-in-middle-east/feed/3Turkish Vote Shatters Erdogan’s Putinesque Dream: Death Of Erdoganism And Kemalism In Turkey?http://www.forbes.com/sites/dougbandow/2015/06/09/turkish-vote-shatters-erdogans-putinesque-dream-death-of-erdoganism-and-kemalism-in-turkey/
http://www.forbes.com/sites/dougbandow/2015/06/09/turkish-vote-shatters-erdogans-putinesque-dream-death-of-erdoganism-and-kemalism-in-turkey/#commentsTue, 09 Jun 2015 10:19:00 +0000http://blogs.forbes.com/dougbandow/?p=5778Two years ago protestors took over the streets of Istanbul, Turkey’s first city. Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan beat them down and last year was elected president. Critics feared his plan to invest the largely ceremonial post with Putinesque authority. On Sunday, however, Turkish voters revoked his party’s majority.

The Justice and Development Party (AKP) came to power in 2002. Erdogan initially allied with liberals to systematically dismantle the authoritarian, nationalistic, coup-prone system that had replaced the Ottoman Empire.

Military leader Mustafa Kemal Pasha, who achieved distinction defending against the allies in the infamous Gallipoli campaign, rose to power in World War I’s tumultuous aftermath. He became the first president of the Republic of Turkey and took on the name Ataturk (“Father of the Turks”), which parliament reserved for him. His ubiquitous image dominates the landscape; his mausoleum and memorial cover an entire city block in the capital of Ankara. The only comparable personality cult which I’ve seen is in North Korea.

Ataturk was no self-effacing republican. He ruthlessly modernized, enforced secularism, and constructed a one-party state. After his death there were elections but the politicians didn’t really rule. The military staged three hard coups, the last in 1980, and a softer putsch in 1997.

People walk by a bust of Turkish Republic founder Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, at the school that will be the polling station where Turkey’s President Recep Tayyip Erdogan will vote later in the day. (AP Photo/Lefteris Pitarakis}

The generals executed and jailed opponents. Even criticism of Ataturk and “Kemalism” resulted in prosecution. Academics and journalists risked their jobs. Ruthless repression of the Kurds (which Ankara denied were a separate people) led to a 30-year war which cost 40,000 lives. In 1974 Turkey invaded Cyprus, seized nearly 40 percent of the island, and ethnically cleansed the occupied zone of Greeks; the division of the island lives on four decades later. Religious minorities, such as the Armenian and Greek Orthodox, were marginalized. The military attempted to suppress even moderate Islamic sentiments. As Istanbul mayor Erdogan read an Islamist poem in public, for which he was ousted and imprisoned briefly.

Eventually the nationalist establishment imploded. Weak coalition governments tolerated corruption and delivered economic malaise. In 2002 the AKP won a dramatic victory.

The party delivered liberty and prosperity. The AKP dismantled repressive elements of the “Deep State,” put the military back in its barracks, created a more business-friendly environment, moved towards Europe, and pushed social reforms. A female journalist told me that the mildly-Islamic AKP paid more attention to problems of domestic violence than had previous nationalist-secularist regimes. Author Graham Fuller argued that the AKP’s first decade was “extraordinary” and “may have been the best government Turkey has ever had since it adopted democratic rule in the 1950s.” Turkey grew wealthier and more influential, and the Turkish people rewarded the AKP with a steadily larger proportion of their votes.

However, Erdogan had foreshadowed an uglier future when he declared a couple decades ago: “Democracy, for us, is a train you get off once you reach your destination.” He apparently believed he reached his destination by 2011, when Fuller dates Erdogan’s shift. That year the AKP purged more moderate members. By then several more liberal Turks told me they were becoming increasingly concerned over the government’s direction.

Today Erdogan denounces critics domestic and foreign, using every repressive tool of the state against them. He dallies with Islamist and terrorist forces as he tries to make Turkey into a regional Weltmacht. He waxes paternalistic, discussing what Turks should eat and drink, and how many children they should have. While switching positions he constructed a $615 million presidential palace, four times the size of Versailles. No Sultan lived so opulently.

Turks see that his past accomplishments are fading. Widespread prosperity cemented his rule, but the Turkish economic engine is slowing: growth is down, unemployment is up, consumer confidence has fallen, the current account deficit is the biggest in the OECD, stock values have declined, and the lira has lost some 40 percent of its value compared to the dollar since 2013.

Growth greatly increased opportunities for corruption. Charges of misconduct reached the cabinet and Erdogan, as prosecutors began investigating. After apparent stealth recordings of damning conversations leaked to the public, Erdogan blamed an earlier ally, cleric Fethullah Gulen, and purged police, prosecutors, and judges. The charges were dropped.

Although elections remain free, political rights and civil liberties are only middling. Overall Freedom House rated Turkey as partly free. The organization downgraded Ankara in its latest report because of the government’s “more pronounced political interference in anticorruption mechanisms and judicial processes, and greater tensions between majority Sunni Muslims and minority Alevis.”

The State Department’s human rights assessment includes a list of depressing particulars. For instance, the government interferes with freedom of assembly and expression, uses excessive force in breaking up protests, makes arbitrary arrests, politicizes the judiciary, maintains impunity for security forces despite claims of torture and unlawful killings, and provides inadequate protection for vulnerable populations.

Despite some reforms, noted State, “The penal code and antiterror law retain multiple articles that restrict freedom of expression, the press, and the internet.” After battling against misuse of security laws, including against himself, Erdogan deployed the legislation against military officers and civilians. The government claimed improbably vast conspiracies, most notably the Diyarbakir KCK (Kurdish), Ergenekon (nationalist), and Sledgehammer (military) cases. Roughly 500 people were arrested and 300 charged in the Ergenekon case alone. Although some of the convictions were ultimately overturned, many defendants spent years in jail awaiting trial.

Ergodan has led a particularly virulent campaign of intimidation against journalists, with Turkey for years leading the world in the number of imprisoned journalists. As of last October roughly 150 awaited trial. In its latest media freedom report, Freedom House ranked Turkey as “not free” and 142 out of 199 countries. The group noted that press freedom continued to fall “as the government moved more aggressively to close the space for dissent.” Turkey registered the ninth biggest drop worldwide from 2010 to 2014. Of course, officials denied any impropriety; regime supporters insisted to me that the media was conspiring with the military.

However, the New Yorker’s Dexter Filkins cited “an extraordinary climate of fear among journalists.” Several reporters and columnists with whom I spoke feared criticizing the prime minister; their editors were reluctant to pursue stories against the government. A number of journalists lost their jobs. Affirmed Freedom House: “Government harassment of journalists is also common, leading to self-censorship and dismissals.”

The government also applies sustained though often invisible pressure on media organizations, including the threat of public investigations and loss of television licenses. Last month a government prosecutor sought to ban two television stations associated with Fethullah Gulen. Businessmen privately admit that they fear political retaliation. The dearth of coverage of the 2013 protests and disproportionate attention given the supposedly nonpartisan President Erdogan campaigning for the AKP in the recent election demonstrate government tactics at work.

After taming the traditional press the Erdogan government began targeting internet freedoms, with, noted Freedom House, “an overall strategy of demonizing and discrediting social media.” Although half of Turks are online, Freedom House rated Turkey as only partly free. People face significant obstacles to access, limits on content, and restrictions on use. In recent months the government has blocked access to Soundcloud, Twitter, Vimeo, and YouTube as well as thousands of websites, arrested dozens of individuals for comments on social media, prosecuted bloggers and websites for postings, and mandated access to user information through ISPs. Those charged include a former Miss Turkey and 16-year-old student. Government critics also suffer from organized online attacks, including denial-of-service assaults on newspapers.

While relaxing unfair restrictions on Muslims—such as the ban on women wearing headscarves—the government has yet to address the lack of legal protection for religious worship and practice by every faith. Indeed, individuals critical of Islam or the Prophet Mohammed face prosecution under the blasphemy statute. Religious minorities remain particularly vulnerable to arbitrary state decisions. For instance, the government continues to interfere with internal operation of the Armenian and Greek Orthodox churches. Ankara has returned a number of confiscated religious properties, but the Greek Orthodox Halki Seminary, remains closed despite government promises to act. Jews can worship freely but, warned the latest report of the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom, “they remain concerned about rising anti-Semitism in society and in the media and occasional derogatory comments by government officials.” One Turkish Jew hoping to emigrate told the New York Times: “last year the level of hate speech in Turkey reached an unnerving level.”

Turkish President Tayyip Erdogan arrives at Esenboga Airport, in Ankara, on June 8, 2015 after Erdogan’s ruling party lost in the June 7 polls its absolute majority in parliament for the first time since coming to power in 2002. (ADEM ALTAN/AFP/Getty Images)

In short, Turkey is headed in a dangerous direction, toward a corrupt, authoritarian state. The country needs an Arab Spring of sorts, but within the democratic process. An electoral revolution, not a street putsch. The use of the rule of law to end an illiberal government. The ballot box must make political power accountable.

On Sunday that process began. One article last week pessimistically warned: “This might be Turkey’s last election.” However, the AKP received less than 41 percent of the vote, down from roughly 50 percent four years ago (and 52 percent in last year’s presidential contest). The ruling party fell 18 seats short of a majority in the 550-member Grand National Assembly.

None of the opposition parties is a likely coalition partner. The Republican People’s Party (CHP) upholds the Kemalist vision and is nationalist and social democratic. More extreme is the Nationalist Action Party (MHP), described as “a stone’s throw from fascist” by Aaron Stein of the RUSI think tank. Making a dramatic entrance in fourth place was the People’s Democratic Party (HDP), a liberal-left Kurdish-based coalition which came together less than three years ago. But these parties also are unlikely to form a countervailing coalition. The AKP could establish a minority ministry and dare its opponents to oust it or trigger early elections.

In any case, Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoglu may not survive, despite claiming victory and calling the AKP the “backbone of Turkey.” Certainly Erdogan’s vision of an enhanced presidency appears dead. Said Selahattin Demitras, head of the HDP: “The discussion of executive presidency and dictatorship has come to an end in Turkey with these elections.” Even half of AKP members oppose the idea. The government no longer can even pass common legislation if the opposition unites. The electoral result also is likely to embolden Erdogan’s opponents. For the first time in more than a decade AKP rule no longer appears to be inevitable.

Indeed, Erdogan may find it hard to control his party. Past prime ministers turned presidents such as Turgut Ozal and Suleyman Demirel lost influence. Some AKP members indicate privately that they do not like being asked to subordinate their beliefs to Erdogan’s ambitions. Moreover, Prime Minister Davutoglu holds the stronger institutional position and may have grown to enjoy making his own decisions. After the president criticized some government actions and policies, Deputy Prime Minister Bulent Arinc responded that “we love our president,” but added: “please do not forget that there is a government in this country.” That sparked a call for Arinc’s resignation.

Erdogan remains his party’s most popular figure and might try to oust his critics, but an intra-party civil war could wreck the AKP and government. Potential aspirants for power abound, led by Abdullah Gul, a former AKP prime minister, foreign minister, and president with international credibility. Erdogan’s and Gul’s partnership ended badly and the former ostentatiously bypassed Gul in tapping Davutoglu as successor. Other senior AKP officials also have run afoul of Erdogan and might enjoy a little revenge served cold.

Of course, fear of losing power could impel Erdogan to launch a crackdown. Daniel Pipes of the Middle East Forum warned that the former “will barrel, bulldoze, and steamroll his way ahead, ignoring traditional and legal niceties with or without changes to the constitution.” But doubling down would be risky. Although the military is unlikely to launch a coup, it might also not stand behind the government. The regime doubted the reliability of the police in reassigning some 45,000 officers, as well as several thousand prosecutors and judges, as suspected Gulen followers. The election demonstrated that Erdogan represents only a plurality of the population. Civil strife could risk his future.

President Erdogan made the democratic transformation of Turkish politics possible. The Turkish people must take full advantage of their opportunities in a new Turkey. Only they can ensure a prosperous and free Turkey.