Tuesday, 21 April 2015

How the U.S. Contributed to Yemen’s Crisis

As a Saudi-led military coalition continues to pound rebel targets in Yemen, the country is plunging into a humanitarian crisis. Civilian casualties are mounting.

With U.S. logistical support, the Saudis are attempting to re-instate the country’s exiled government — which enjoys the backing of the West and the Sunni Gulf monarchies — in the face of a military offensive by Houthi rebels from northern Yemen.

None of this had to be.

Not long ago — at the height of the Arab Spring in 2011 — a broad-based, nonviolent, pro-democracy movement in Yemen rose up against the U.S.-backed government of dictator Ali Abdullah Saleh. If Washington and Saudi Arabia had allowed this coalition to come to power, the tragic events unfolding in Yemen could have been prevented.

The movement had forged an impressive degree of unity among the various tribal, regional, sectarian, and ideological groups that took part in the pro-democracy protests, which included mass marches, sit-ins, and many other forms of nonviolent civil resistance. Leaders of prominent tribal coalitions — as well as the Houthis now rebelling against the government — publicly supported the popular insurrection, prompting waves of tribesmen to leave their guns at home and head to the capital to take part in the movement.

These tribesmen, along with the hundreds of thousands of city dwellers on the streets, were encouraged to maintain nonviolent discipline, even in the face of government snipers and other provocations that led to the deaths of hundreds of unarmed protesters.

The Obama administration, however, was more concerned about maintaining stability in the face of growing Al-Qaeda influence in rural areas. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates acknowledged that Washington had not planned for an era without Saleh, who had ruled the country for more than three and a half decades. As one former ambassador to Yemenput itin March 2011, “For right now, he’s our guy.”

“That’s How It Is”
Though the pro-democracy movement largely maintained a remarkably rigorous nonviolent discipline in its protests, some opposition tribes and rebel army officers added an armed component to the resistance movement. An assassination attempt against Saleh that June forced the severely wounded president to leave for Saudi Arabia for extended medical treatments.

John Brennan, Obama’s chief counterterrorism adviser and future CIA director, visited Saleh in a Saudi hospital in July andencouraged himto sign a deal transferring power. Not only was the mission unsuccessful in convincing Saleh to resign, however, the regime — in a continuation of its efforts to use Saleh’s close relationship with the United States to reinforce his standing —broadcast imagesof the surprisingly healthy-looking president and emphasized his statesmanlike demeanor in meeting with a top U.S. official as a signal of continued U.S. support for the regime.

As the pro-democracy struggle tried desperately to keep the movement nonviolent in the aftermath of the assassination attempt and a growing armed rebellion, the United States escalated its own violence by launching unprecedented air strikes in Yemen, ostensibly targeting Al-Qaeda cells. The Pentagonacknowledged, however, that Al-Qaeda operatives often intermingled with other anti-government rebels.

Indeed, U.S. policy allowed the CIA to target individuals for drone strikes without verifying their identity, resulting in some armed Yemeni tribes and others allied with pro-democracy forces apparently being attacked under the mistaken impression they were al-Qaeda. This scenario was made all the more likely by U.S. reliance on the Yemeni regime for much of its intelligence in determining targets. Complicating the situation still further during this critical period of ongoing protests, teams of U.S. military and intelligence operatives were continuing to operate out of a command post in the Yemeni capital.
It’s entirely possible, then, that the Yemeni government may have used the pretext of al-Qaeda to convince the U.S. government to take out its rivals.

U.S. officials insisted that the violence between the pro- and anti-regime elements of the Yemeni armed forces did not involve U.S.-trained Yemeni special operations forces, and Brennan initially maintained that the unresthad not affectedU.S.-Yemeni security cooperation. By the end of the year, however, heacknowledgedthat the “political tumult” had led these U.S.-trained units “to be focused on their positioning for internal political purposes as opposed to doing all they can against AQAP.”
That meant that Yemeni forces trained by the United States for the purpose of fight al-Qaeda were instead directly participating in the squelching of a democratic uprising. “Rather than fighting AQAP,”an exposéinThe Nationnoted, “these U.S.-backed units — created and funded with the explicit intent to be used only for counterterrorism operations — redeployed to Sanaa to protect the collapsing regime from its own people.”

According to the well-connected Yemeni political analyst Abdul Ghani al-Iryani, these U.S.-backed units exist “mostly for the defense of the regime.” For example, rather than fighting a key battle against Al-Qaida forces in Abyan, al-Iryani told reporter Jeremy Scahill, “They are still here [in Sanaa], protecting the palace. That’s how it is.”

“Keeping Enough of the Regime Intact”
At the end of July 2011, despite the ongoing repression of pro-democracy forces, a congressional committee approved more than $120 million in aid to the Yemeni government, primarily in military and related security assistance. The aid was conditional on the State Department certifying that the Yemeni government was cooperating sufficiently in fighting terrorism, but there were no conditions regarding democracy or human rights.

As the repression increased, U.S. officials praised the Yemeni regime’s cooperation with U.S.-led war efforts, with Brennandeclaringin September, “I can say today the counterterrorism cooperation with Yemen is better than it’s been during my whole tenure.”
Meanwhile, the United States and Saudi Arabia, joined by the other monarchies of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), presented a plan whereby Saleh would step down. According to the deal, he and other top officials in the regime would be granted immunity from prosecution, and a plebiscite would be held within 60 days to ratify the transfer of power to Saleh’s vice-president, Major General Abd Rabbuh Mansur Hadi.

Pro-democracy protesters largely rejected this U.S.-Saudi mandate for Hadi. It soon became apparent that despite occasional calls for Saleh to step down — such as U.S. ambassador to the United Nations Susan Rice’s strong statement in early August — the Obama administration was deferring to its autocratic GCC allies on the peninsula to oversee a political transition.
In mid-August, opposition activists formed a National Council, which they hoped would form a provisional government until multiparty elections could be held. It consisted of 143 members representing a broad coalition of protest leaders, tribal sheiks, South Yemen separatists, opposition military commanders, former members of the governing party, and the Houthi militia representing the Zaydi minority in the north.

The Saudis and the U.S. government, however, kept pushing for Saleh to transfer power to his vice president. Supporters of the National Council denounced these foreign efforts as “only a plot to foil the revolution.”

Following a meeting with Hadi in September, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs Jeffrey Feltmansaid, “We continue to believe that an immediate, peaceful, and orderly transition is in the best interest of the Yemeni people. …We urge all sides to engage in dialogue that peacefully moves Yemen forward.” Pro-democracy protesters pushed ahead in their campaign of civil resistance, insisting that the National Council representing a broad array Yemenis not be circumvented.
Shortly thereafter, government security forces fired into crowds during a massive pro-democracy protest in Sanaa. Dozens of protesters were killed and hundreds more wounded.
The U.S. embassy, however,appeared to blame both sidesfor the killings, saying the United States “regrets the deaths and injuries of many people” and calling “upon all parties to exercise restraint. In particular, we call on the parties to refrain from actions that provoke further violence.” Similarly, U.S. ambassador Gerald Feiersteincriticizeda peaceful pro-democracy march from Taiz to Sanaa in December as “provocative.”

Soon afterwards, 13 more pro-democracy demonstrators were killed by government security forces, leading many activists to accuse the ambassador of preemptively giving Saleh permission to shoot civilians.Timemagazine,summarizingthe view of pro-democracy activists, noted, “The early intercession of foreign powers with a transition plan distracted attention from popular demands, they say, and allowed the president to cite ongoing talks in delaying his resignation. Many Yemenis believe the key interest guiding the U.S. has been keeping enough of the regime intact to combat al Qaeda, and that this has distorted the outcome.”

“This Revolution Has Been Stabbed in the Back”
Eventually, U.S. officials bowed to international concerns and put forward a threat of United Nations sanctions against the regime, which finally forced Saleh to formally resign.
In January 2012, the Obama administration allowed Saleh into the United States for medical treatment, rejecting calls for his prosecution. U.S. officials believed that doing so was the best way of finally forcing him to step down as president and finally make a peaceful transition of power possible.

Pro-democracy activists in Yemen were outraged.

Protest leader Tawakkol Karman, who was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize the previous month, called on the United States to “hold Saleh accountable.” She alsoobserved, “There shouldn’t be any place for tyrants in the free world. This is against all international agreements, laws, and covenants. The entry of Ali Saleh into America is an insult to the values of the American people. This was a mistake by the administration, and I am confident he will be met with wide disapproval in America. This will tarnish the reputation of America among all those who support the Arab Spring revolutions.”
Saleh returned to Yemen the following month to oversee the transfer of power to his vice-president and has remained the country ever since. Now, he’s making a bid to retake control, having formed an alliance with his former Houthi adversaries and, with the support of some allied army units, playing a critical role in their rise to power.

This has greatly angered the pro-democracy movement, whose leaders twice petitioned the Obama administration for support but were rejected in favor of negotiations led by the Saudi regime and other autocratic GCC monarchies. This greatly set back the hopes for a genuine democratic revolution and alienated the very liberal youth who would otherwise be the West’s most likely Yemeni allies.
As Francisco Martin-Royal, an expert on counter-radicalization in the region, at that time, “The lack of U.S. support means that these young men and women, who effectively ousted Saleh and continue to call for democratic institutions, have broadly failed to have a voice in the formation of Yemen’s new government or have their legitimate concerns be taken seriously.”

He continued, “Yemen’s pro-democracy activists largely blame the U.S. for failing to live up to its rhetoric — a disillusionment that potentially makes them vulnerable to recruitment by other well-organized forces that are against the existing regime, namely extremist groups like AQAP and separatist movements. From their perspective, the only real changes in Yemen — the establishment of a semi-autonomous region by the Houthis and the propagation of sharia law in various cities in southern Yemen by Ansar al-Sharia — have come through violence.”

U.S. Ambassador Feierstein kept pushing the vague idea of a “national dialogue” among elites and criticized ongoing protests within the government institutions,particularly military units, on the grounds that “the problems have to be resolved through this process of dialogue and negotiations.” By contrast, hecastigatedthe pro-democracy activists, saying “We’ve also been clear in saying we don’t believe that the demonstrations are the place where Yemen’s problems will be solved.”
In February 2012, President Obamapublicly endorsedHadi, claiming — despite Hadi’s service as vice-president in a repressive regime and his distinction as the only candidate in the subsequent plebiscite — that his subsequent election was “a model for how peaceful transition in the Middle East can occur.”

The pro-democracy movement thus largely gave up on the United States, with prominent young pro-democracy activist Khaled al-Anesifuming, “This revolution has been stabbed in the back.”

What Could Have Been?
This marginalization of Yemeni civil society — which had struggled for so many months nonviolently for democracy — and Washington’s failure to accept the broad-based National Council to head an interim government created the conditions that led to the dramatic resurgence of the armed Houthi uprising, which until last year had only operated in the Zaydi heartland in the far northern part of the country.
The Houthis were helped along by the Hadi government’s lack of credibility, ongoing corruption and ineptitude at all levels of government, a mass resignation of Yemen’s cabinet, and controversial proposals for constitutional change. They also received support from armed groups allied with the former Saleh dictatorship, which enabled the Houthis — who represent only a minority of Yemenis — to nevertheless emerge as the most powerful force in Yemen. They surprised the world by seizing the capital of Sanaa in August, consolidating power in January, and subsequently expanding southward.
Most Yemenis strongly oppose the Houthi militia and, in Taiz and other parts of the country, have challenged their armed advance through massive civil resistance and other nonviolent means. Yet the Houthis have actually expanded their areas of control in some key regions, even where they’ve faced armed resistance and Saudi air strikes.

It would be much too simplistic to blame the current crisis in Yemen entirely on the United States. However, one still has to wonder: If instead of allying with Saudi autocrats to install another strongman in the name of stability, Washington had supported that country’s nonviolent pro-democracy movement, what might have been?

“In
the summer of 2013 this government proposed [military] action in Syria, the
bombing of Syria, right? I was called into a room by David Cameron and Nick
Clegg because President Obama had been on the phone, The Leader of the Free
World, right? I listened to what they said and over those days I made up my
mind and we said ‘No’, right?”

Miliband has also repeatedly
pointed out that he opposed the 2003 Iraq War. Desperate to shore up the Labour
vote, Guardian columnist Polly Toynbee has been only too happy to confirm Miliband
“rejected the Iraq war”.

However, before everyone starts
labelling ‘Red Ed’ as anti-war, it’s worth taking some time to consider his
positions on recent British foreign policy.

2014: The bombing of
ISIS in Iraq
After he had unironically referred
to Barack Obama as “The Leader of the Free World” on the Sky News/Channel Four
programme, Miliband went on to explain he did not want to “repeat the mistakes
of the 2003 Iraq War when Labour was in power, which was a rush to war without
knowing what your strategy is and without being clear about what the
consequences would be.”
Given these – apparently sincerely
held – concerns, one would presume Miliband would be opposed to, or at least very
sceptical of, the on-going US-led airstrikes on Islamic State (ISIS) in Iraq.
However, he fully supported the airstrikes in the House of Commons in September
2014 – and continues to do so as far as I am aware.

He supported the war for a number
of reasons. “Iraq is a democratic state. It is a government that we would want
to support”, he said. As I’ve argued elsewhere this
statement conceals the deeply authoritarian and undemocratic nature of the
present Iraqi government, and the West’s role in helping to create it.

Miliband also referred positively
to the regional support the proposed airstrikes had from Jordan, the United
Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia and Qatar. Side-stepping the question of
whether being in a coalition with the most fundamentalist nation on earth is a
good thing, it is important to remember Saudi Arabia and Qatar have played
an important role in
the rise of ISIS.
In September 2014 the Director of
the FBI told Congress
the US-led airstrikes were increasing support for ISIS. Similarly, the former
head of counterterrorism at MI6 has warned the
airstrikes could “increase the risk” of terrorist attacks in the West. In terms
of the military action itself, President Obama recently said the war against
ISIS is likely to take up to three years, with the US Defence Secretarysuggesting this
was probably an underestimate. And what of the democratic Iraqi Government
Miliband was so keen to protect?

In February 2015 Human Rights
Watch (HRW) released a report arguing the
widespread abuses perpetrated by the government-enabled Shia militias could
well be war crimes, while an October 2014 HRW commentary noted the
"relentless arson and pillaging" carried out by Shia militias in Iraq
have displaced over 7,000 families in recent months.After recently visiting Iraq,
award-winning US journalist Matthieu Aikins explained that
“Iraq has become a militia state”. With US arms sent to the Iraqi government
ending up in the hands of Shia militias the “US risks helping to perpetrate the
same violence and state corruption that led to ISIS's stunning rise last year”,
he noted.

2013: The proposed
US-led bombing of Syria
Miliband told Paxman he had stood
up to the Prime Minister and “The Leader of the Free World” over Syria in
September 2013. The normally questioning Labour backbencher Michael Meacher
MP declared Miliband’s
actions on Syria will be “recognised as an act of courage and statesmanship
that shows his mettle as a leader.”

The reality is a little less
heroic than Miliband and Meacher would have us believe.
A read of the parliamentary debate about
the proposed military action shows the Labour motion was very similar to the
defeated Government motion, a fact not lost on some of the more experienced
foreign affairs experts in the House of Commons. “I can find no difference of
substance or principle anywhere in the two offerings”, said Sir Menzies
Campbell, the former Foreign Affairs spokesperson for the Liberal Democrats.
Likewise, former Foreign Secretary Malcolm Rifkind noted “virtually all” of
Labour’s list of requirements for supporting military action “appear in the
Government’s own motion.”

Moreover, in the parliamentary
debate Miliband explained he would support military action against Syria
without a United Nations Security Council Resolution – essentially agreeing
with the Government again. As Jonathan Steele, the Guardian’s former Chief
Correspondent, noted “Cameron
and Miliband used dubious legal grounds to try to justify bypassing a veto in
the UN Security Council by saying western military strikes were needed to
protect Syrians.” Does Miliband’s self-serving position on the UN remind you of
any other Labour leader?

2011: The NATO
intervention in Libya
Along with the vast majority of
British newspapers and 557 MPs, Miliband supported the NATO intervention in
Libya, supposedly carried out to stop a massacre of civilians in Benghazi.
Accepting the government’s – highly questionable –
narrative of the crisis, Miliband cited his parents’ experience of the
Holocaust in the House of Commons debate.
The NATO intervention arguably
escalated the violence and elongated the conflict, plunging the country into a
militia-dominated Hobbesian nightmare. Fast-forward four years and, as I
have argued elsewhere,
Libya is a chaotic mess:

“In
November 2014 Amnesty International warned that ‘lawless militias and armed
groups on all sides of the conflict in western Libya are carrying out rampant
human rights abuses, including war crimes.’ The same month the UN refugee
agency reported that nearly 400,000 Libyans had been displaced by the ongoing
violence, while the Associated Press noted the Libyan city of Darna had become
the first city outside of Syria and Iraq to pledge allegiance to the Islamic
State group.”

With this reality in mind, again
it is worth reminding ourselves of Ed Miliband’s supposedly sincere concerns
about Iraq in 2003: “a rush to war without knowing what your strategy is and
without being clear about what the consequences would be.”

2003: The US-UK
invasion of Iraq
In attempt to disassociate himself
with New Labour’s 2003 illegal, aggressive attack on Iraq, Miliband has
repeatedly boasted he was opposed to the invasion. Miliband was in the US in
the run-up to the war, teaching at Harvard. However, he has said “I
did tell people at the time that asked me that I was against the war.” Ed
Miliband’s biographer Mehdi Hasan claims that
Miliband Jr rang Gordon Brown from the United States to try and persuade the
then Chancellor of the Exchequer to resist the push to war.

Speaking at the Labour leader
hustings in 2010 Ed Balls labelled Miliband’s claim to be anti-war as
“ridiculous” noting that Miiband “did not tell people” he was against the war.
Speaking at the same hustings, Former Foreign Secretary David Miliband made a
rare honest statement: “Diane Abbott [who was also standing to be Labour
leader] is the only candidate that can say she was against the war at the time,
and if that is the sole criterion, she is in a different position to every
other candidate. She did not just think she was against it, she said she was
against it, and she marched against it.”
And this is the key point. There
were numerous opportunities for Miliband to make a public stand against the
impending war – which arguably would have had a far greater impact than his
supposed behind the scenes advice – including speaking at the biggest protest
in British history. That Miliband, at best, opposed the war in private strongly
suggests to me that he was thinking more about his future political career than
the welfare of Iraqis or the British soldiers being sent to fight in Iraq.
And we should not forget that
Miliband voted against
an official inquiry into the Iraq War being set up on four occasions.

2001-14: The invasion
and occupation of Afghanistan
Though it’s difficult to find out
Miliband’s position on Afghanistan prior to him becoming Labour leader in 2010,
his record of support for the bloody and deeply unpopular British
occupation since then has been clear. “I want you to know that our mission in
Afghanistan is not a matter of party politics”, he told British
troops when he visited Afghanistan in 2011. “It is about what is right for our
country. A more stable Afghanistan will lead to a more safe Britain… above all
I want you to know you have our support, our respect and our admiration for
what you are doing for our country.”
Compare this pro-military guff to
the brutal reality of the British occupation. “In practice, we ended up killing
a lot of people, destroying lots of bazaars and mosques. We absolutely knew it
was not what we were there to do, and would not be helpful”, explained General
David Richards, the former Chief of the Defence Staff, about what went wrong in
Afghanistan. Mike Martin, a former British Army Officer, notes that
in summer 2006 British forces dropped 18,000 pounds of explosives on the town
of Now Zad alone, “flattening the bazaar” and killing civilians. This
“injudicious use of firepower was reminiscent of Soviet military operations”
and “made funding and recruitment non-issues” for the Afghan insurgency, Martin
explains.

Unsurprisingly, these actions have
not led to stability. Far from it. Former British military intelligence
officer Frank Ledwidge:
“Britain’s efforts have resulted in the ‘stabilization’ (i.e. the temporary
pacification) of 3 of the 14 districts that make up the province of Helmand –
just one of 34 provinces in a country with a population that is half that of
the UK. In terms of overall political significance, this might be the
equivalent of three large market towns in rural Lincolnshire. Before the
British burst onto the scene, Helmand was ‘stable’, in the sense there was
almost no Taliban presence and little prospect of any.”

As for the British occupation of
Afghanistan making “a more safe Britain”, it is likely the opposite is true. In
the words of Anatol Lieven, a professor in the War Studies Department of King’s College London: “What
we can surely say is that UK policy has been an absolute disaster in the
perception of the Muslim population and has produced a significantly increased
terror threat.” The justification
given for the murderous attack on British
soldier Lee Rigby suggest Lieven’s analysis is correct.

Trident
Miliband supports the renewal of
Trident, which is estimated to cost the UK over 80 billion over the next 100
years, with a lower-cost deterrent. “I’m not in favour of unilateral
disarmament”, he explained in
January 2015.

And the rest
In addition to the big set piece
interventions set out above, it is important to note Miliband’s lack of criticism
of other parts of British foreign policy that either has already had, or will
likely have, serious, deleterious consequences: the UK training of Syrian
rebels; the UK training of Ukrainian Government forces; the UK support for the
Saudi Arabian attack on Yemen; the UK’s support for the Bahrain Government’s
deadly crackdown on pro-democracy protests; the on-going diplomatic and
military support the UK gives to Saudi Arabia and the other Gulf monarchies;
Obama’s drone wars.

Conclusion
What all these examples show is
that far from being anti-war Miliband has repeatedly supported wars of choice,
often with dubious legal and moral justifications (Afghanistan, Libya, Iraq
2014), most of which have turned out to be a disaster for the country he
claimed to be protecting and the wider world (Afghanistan, Libya, Iraq 2014).
Like the deeply unpopular Tony Blair, Miliband has publicly stated he would
support military action without a UN Security Council resolution. When he did
oppose military action this was either done in private, thus minimising the
danger to his future political career (Iraq 2003), or has been presented as a
clear, moral stand, when in actual fact his position was difficult to
distinguish from the government’s own position – and based on ignoring the will
of the United Nations (Syria).

If this is how Miliband acts in
opposition, what can we expect from him as Prime Minister when he is likely to
be under intense American and domestic pressure (from a combination of the
armed forces, the intelligence services, the press, his own cabinet, his own
party, the opposition party) and is keen to show he is “tough enough”?

It is clear the fight against the
UK’s aggressive foreign policy will have to continue after the election,
whether it is David Cameron or Ed Miliband sitting in 10 Downing Street.

Friday, 10 April 2015

Hillary Clinton’s campaign for
the White House in 2016 will need to answer many major questions about her
integrity and judgement as much as what she might do about the Ukraine, ISIS or
China’s rise. Her campaign hit trouble even before it began – on using a
private email address throughout her tenure as secretary of state, claims of
‘missing emails’ from that account that might compromise her official role and,
more recently, on conflict of interest claims regarding foreign government
donations to the Clinton Foundation. Yet, there are also rather disturbing
concerns about the Foundation’s role in post-earthquake Haiti, the
philanthropy’s major claim to fame.

Most recently, it's come to light that after Hillary Clinton, as US Secretary of State, lobbied Russia for Boeing, and the latter won a bid to sell 50 737 passenger jets, the Clinton Foundation received a $900,000 donation from Boeing for its programmes in Haiti. (See below for the shoddy and dangerous character of some the Foundations's programmes in Haiti).

The Bill, Hillary and
Chelsea Clinton Foundation accepted millions of dollars from seven foreign governments – including
governments with a dubious record on human rights - during Hillary Clinton’s
tenure as US secretary of state, skirting dangerously close to outright
violation of conflict-of-interest agreements it had made with the Obama
administration. Other reports in 2013 suggested a prominent businessman and
donor to the Clinton Foundation secured major contracts from Kazakhstan after
former President Bill Clinton introduced him to the central Asian republic’s
president - http://ij-poli-blog.blogspot.co.uk/2015/02/clinton-foundation-corruption-and-human.html. Businessman Frank Giustra, who
secured lucrative uranium mining contracts, and later donated over $30 million
to the Clinton Foundation, with a promise of a further $100 million, is on the
foundation’s governing Board of Directors.

In response, the Clinton
Foundation argued that it was more transparent than the law required and would
continue to be once Hillary declared her presidential candidacy. But this
is unlikely to quell criticism, however, as the Clintons and controversy are
familiar bedfellows.

The Clinton Foundation’s work in the aftermath of the 2010 Haiti earthquake
has been roundly condemned by independent agencies and local people themselves:
the Clinton Foundation's first contributions to Haiti --
"hurricane-proof . . . emergency shelters that can also serve as schools .
. . to ensure the safety of vulnerable populations in high-risk areas during
the hurricane season" – were revealed as shoddy and dangerous.

An investigation
by The Nation found the following: temperatures in the
shelters/classrooms reached over 100 degrees, causing kids headaches and other illnesses;
trailers also showed high levels of formaldehyde, a known carcinogen (and also
a cause of asthma and other lung diseases); trailers were manufactured by
Clayton Homes, which is being sued by the Federal Emergency Management
Administration (FEMA) for having provided formaldehyde-laced trailers to
Hurricane Katrina victims; and Clayton Homes is owned by Warren Buffet’s
Berkshire Hathaway; Buffet was was an early and high-profile member of the
Clinton Global Initiative.

Yet,
Republicans who attack the Clintons are unlikely to recall the scandals that
surrounded high profile members of their own party – John McCain, Newt
Gingrich, Tom DeLay, for example – who set up non-political foundations that
called into question their objectivity. Nor do they much care for the people of
Haiti.

In the
end, politicians are interested in power; their foundation activities reflect
that fundamental principle.

The Stanford-NYU Report outlined below provides some evidence of what it's like for victims of US drone strikes in Pakistan, based on research on the ground in that tragic land.

In
the United States, the dominant narrative about the use of drones in
Pakistan is of a surgically precise and effective tool that makes the US
safer by enabling “targeted killing” of terrorists, with minimal
downsides or collateral impacts.[1]

This narrative is false.

Following nine months of intensive research—including two
investigations in Pakistan, more than 130 interviews with victims,
witnesses, and experts, and review of thousands of pages of
documentation and media reporting—this report presents evidence of the
damaging and counterproductive effects of current US drone strike
policies. Based on extensive interviews with Pakistanis living in the
regions directly affected, as well as humanitarian and medical workers,
this report provides new and firsthand testimony about the negative
impacts US policies are having on the civilians living under drones.

Real threats to US security and to Pakistani civilians exist in the
Pakistani border areas now targeted by drones. It is crucial that the US
be able to protect itself from terrorist threats, and that the great
harm caused by terrorists to Pakistani civilians be addressed. However,
in light of significant evidence of harmful impacts to Pakistani
civilians and to US interests, current policies to address terrorism
through targeted killings and drone strikes must be carefully
re-evaluated.
It is essential that public debate about US policies take the negative effects of current policies into account.First, while civilian casualties are rarely acknowledged by
the US government, there is significant evidence that US drone strikes
have injured and killed civilians. In public statements, the US states that there have been “no” or “single digit” civilian casualties.”[2]
It is difficult to obtain data on strike casualties because of US
efforts to shield the drone program from democratic accountability,
compounded by the obstacles to independent investigation of strikes in
North Waziristan. The best currently available public aggregate data on
drone strikes are provided by The Bureau of Investigative Journalism (TBIJ), an independent journalist organization. TBIJ
reports that from June 2004 through mid-September 2012, available data
indicate that drone strikes killed 2,562-3,325 people in Pakistan, of
whom 474-881 were civilians, including 176 children.[3]TBIJ
reports that these strikes also injured an additional 1,228-1,362
individuals. Where media accounts do report civilian casualties, rarely
is any information provided about the victims or the communities they
leave behind. This report includes the harrowing narratives of many
survivors, witnesses, and family members who provided evidence of
civilian injuries and deaths in drone strikes to our research team. It
also presents detailed accounts of three separate strikes, for which
there is evidence of civilian deaths and injuries, including a March
2011 strike on a meeting of tribal elders that killed some 40
individuals.Second, US drone strike policies cause considerable and
under-accounted-for harm to the daily lives of ordinary civilians,
beyond death and physical injury. Drones hover twenty-four
hours a day over communities in northwest Pakistan, striking homes,
vehicles, and public spaces without warning. Their presence terrorizes
men, women, and children, giving rise to anxiety and psychological
trauma among civilian communities. Those living under drones have to
face the constant worry that a deadly strike may be fired at any moment,
and the knowledge that they are powerless to protect themselves. These
fears have affected behavior. The US practice of striking one area
multiple times, and evidence that it has killed rescuers, makes both
community members and humanitarian workers afraid or unwilling to assist
injured victims. Some community members shy away from gathering in
groups, including important tribal dispute-resolution bodies, out of
fear that they may attract the attention of drone operators. Some
parents choose to keep their children home, and children injured or
traumatized by strikes have dropped out of school. Waziris told our
researchers that the strikes have undermined cultural and religious
practices related to burial, and made family members afraid to attend
funerals. In addition, families who lost loved ones or their homes in
drone strikes now struggle to support themselves.Third, publicly available evidence that the strikes have made the US safer overall is ambiguous at best.
The strikes have certainly killed alleged combatants and disrupted
armed actor networks. However, serious concerns about the efficacy and
counter-productive nature of drone strikes have been raised. The number
of “high-level” targets killed as a percentage of total casualties is
extremely low—estimated at just 2%.[4]
Furthermore, evidence suggests that US strikes have facilitated
recruitment to violent non-state armed groups, and motivated further
violent attacks. As the New York Times has reported, “drones have replaced Guantánamo as the recruiting tool of choice for militants.”[5]
Drone strikes have also soured many Pakistanis on cooperation with the
US and undermined US-Pakistani rel­ations. One major study shows that
74% of Pakistanis now consider the US an enemy.[6]Fourth, current US targeted killings and drone strike
practices undermine respect for the rule of law and international legal
protections and may set dangerous precedents. This report casts
doubt on the legality of strikes on individuals or groups not linked to
the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, and who do not pose
imminent threats to the US. The US government’s failure to ensure basic
transparency and accountability in its targeted killing policies, to
provide necessary details about its targeted killing program, or
adequately to set out the legal factors involved in decisions to strike
hinders necessary democratic debate about a key aspect of US foreign and
national security policy. US practices may also facilitate recourse to
lethal force around the globe by establishing dangerous precedents for
other governments. As drone manufacturers and officials successfully
reduce export control barriers, and as more countries develop lethal
drone technologies, these risks increase.In light of these concerns, this report recommends that the
US conduct a fundamental re-evaluation of current targeted killing
practices, taking into account all available evidence, the concerns of
various stakeholders, and the short and long-term costs and benefits.
A significant rethinking of current US targeted killing and drone
strike policies is long overdue. US policy-makers, and the American
public, cannot continue to ignore evidence of the civilian harm and
counter-productive impacts of US targeted killings and drone strikes in
Pakistan.
This report also supports and reiterates the calls consistently made
by rights groups and others for legality, accountability, and
transparency in US drone strike policies:

The US should fulfill its international obligations with
respect to accountability and transparency, and ensure proper democratic
debate about key policies. The US should:

Release the US Department of Justice memoranda outlining the legal basis for US targeted killing in Pakistan;

Make public critical information concerning US drone strike
policies, including as previously and repeatedly reques­ted by various
groups and officials:[7]
the tar­geting criteria for so-called “signature” strikes; the
mechanisms in place to ensure that targeting complies with international
law; which laws are being applied; the nature of investigations into
civilian death and injury; and mechanisms in place to track, analyze and
publicly recognize civilian casualties;[8]

Ensure independent investigations into drone strike
deaths, consistent with the call made by Ben Emmerson, UN Special
Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights and
fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism in August 2012;[9]

In conjunction with robust investigations and, where appropriate, prosecutions, establishcompensation programs for civilians harmed by US strikes in Pakistan.

The US should fulfill its international humanitarian and human rights law obligations with respect to the use of force, including
by not using lethal force against individuals who are not members of
armed groups with whom the US is in an armed conflict, or otherwise
against individuals not posing an imminent threat to life. This includes
not double-striking targets as first responders arrive.

Journalists and media outlets should cease the common
practice of referring simply to “militant” deaths, without further
explanation. All reporting of government accounts of “militant”
deaths should include acknowledgment that the US government counts all
adult males killed by strikes as “militants,” absent exonerating
evidence. Media accounts relying on anonymous government sources should
also highlight the fact of their single-source information and of the
past record of false government reports.

[1]
The US publicly describes its drone program in terms of its
unprecedented ability to “distinguish … effectively between an al Qaeda
terrorist and innocent civilians,” and touts its missile-armed drones as
capable of conducting strikes with “astonishing” and “surgical”
precision. See, e.g., John O. Brennan, Assistant to the
President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism, The Efficacy and
Ethics of U.S. Counterterrorism Strategy, Remarks at the Woodrow Wilson
International Center for Scholars (Apr. 30, 2012), available athttp://www.wilsoncenter.org/event/the-efficacy-and-ethics-us-counterterrorism-strategy.