Defective Leadership:
Americas Greatest Peril

A leadership crisis of substantial magnitude has placed the
United States of Americas in great peril. America has lost military superiority and is
faced with a shrinking scientific-technological advantage. Defective leadership has been
largely responsible for the potentially catastrophic trends toward military and
scientific-technological inferiority. Five manifestations of defective leadership have
become alarmingly prevalent: careerism, intolerance of dissent, substitution of politics
for principle, disparity between rhetoric and reality, and obsession with image. The
combined impact of these deficiencies has caused a bona fide leadership crisis in military
organizations. One of the major consequences of defective leadership has been the loss of
what once was an overwhelming worldwide U.S. military superiority. I will focus on
Americas leadership crisis from the military perspective and discuss these five
manifestations of defective leadership and their consequences within the framework of
national security.

Career-First Orientation

One significant manifestation of leadership deficiency is the
career-first orientation that permeates much of the present Air Force officer corps. This
attitude is reflected by excessive concern for self-enhancement at the expense of
principle and mission effectiveness. Selflessness, devotion to duty, and the courage to
challenge difficult and controversial problems are subjugated to behaviors perceived as
requisites for an outstanding officer effectiveness report (OER) and necessary to create
and maintain a promotable image.

The malady of careerism is readily detectable by those close to the
military. Captain Frank R. Wood conducted more than a hundred hours of unstructured
interviews with Air Force junior officers in their first ten years of service and reported
a trend away from concern for group welfare in favor of personal well-being.1
He described the tendency as the emerging "me first" attitude. This is
consistent with evidence that depicts the military as moving away from an institutional
orientation where the job is viewed as a "calling" toward a civilian job outlook
which emphasizes self -interest.2

Richard Gabriel has claimed that the U.S. Army, over the last two
decades, has spawned a careerism so extreme that protection and advancement of career may
have become the primary objectives of a large number of officers.3 Others have
carried the notion of careerism even further by stating that a brutally self-serving
orientation is necessary for a military officer to attain the rank of general.4

Career-first behavior by a leader is in conflict with commitment to
mission effectiveness. In Vice Admiral James B. Stockdales terms, error avoidance
and careerism take the place of positive achievement.5 The direction of
substantial energy and talent toward career considerations and promotion alters personal
values and priorities. Conformity, control, and compulsive coordination become a typical
behavior pattern in order to reduce risk of error. The propensity to avoid risk or
"play it safe" is driven by the fear that a mistake or failure might tarnish
ones image and put promotion and career progress in jeopardy.

The consequences of unwillingness to put ones career on the line,
reluctance to take risks, and failure to stand up for principle are severe, often
precluding innovative breakthroughs and superior effectiveness. Unfortunately, similar
deficiencies contributed to even more serious consequences such as the My Lai atrocities,
Watergate, the deplorable conduct of the Vietnam War, and the recent erosion of U.S.
military strength and technological advantage.

Intolerance of
Diversity and Dissent

Another manifestation of defective leadership is the inability to
handle dissent constructively. Various euphemisms are used to describe this passion for
conformity: e.g., dont fight the problem; dont make waves; dont rock the
boat. There is far too much emphasis on being a "team player" rather than on
innovation, originality, and independent thinking. Colonel Edsel Field has pointed out the
relationship between the tragedies of Vietnam and Watergate and the lack of open dissent
on important decisions from those in key leadership positions.6 It has become
more important to be a good "team player" than to object strenuously to unwise,
unlawful, or immoral decisions.

Some have suggested that pressure to be a team player in the military
is so strong that the role of devils advocate is considered a hindrance to action,
often precluding constructive debate regarding alternatives.7 Yet, greater
effectiveness and efficiency result from questioning, debating, and dissenting prior to
decisions rather than trying to recover from poor decisions. Diverse viewpoints,
participation, and debate ultimately strengthen final decisions and engender greater
commitment and motivation in implementing decisions. Although debate and dissent yield
substantial advantage, it takes strong, self-confident, and visionary leaders to create
conditions conducive to the expression of diverse viewpoints and novel ideas.

Maureen Mylander has argued that the drive for conformity has
eliminated many of the most resourceful and best qualified officers.8 The
periodic ostracism of superior officers for daring to question policy and morality gives
credence to this supposition and serves as a harsh example to those with a predisposition
for dissent.9 The loss of extraordinarily valuable and gallant officers is
magnified by the constraining influence of such ostracism on the moral behavior of others.

Intolerance of dissent is not limited to the lower levels of government
but, on the contrary, reaches the highest echelons. Former Chief of Naval Operations
Admiral Elmo Zumwalt reported that he was threatened with both the loss of his job and
Navy budget reductions if he spoke his mind concerning administration policies.10
Such circumstances promote paranoia and duplicity rather than candor and honesty.

The federal bureaucracy perpetuates intolerance for diversity through a
selection and promotion process that tends to advance people who pose no threat to its
management.11 The prime criterion for advancement is not performance but
willingness not to cause trouble. Under such a system, it is almost impossible for anyone
but "team players" to reach the top 1evels of management. By contrast, those who
refuse to be part of the "team player" network arouse considerable animosity
because of their honesty, impatience with incompetence and corruption, and persistent
embarrassing questions.12

The marked failure of U.S. military officers to resign or speak out
against policies or decisions that violate moral principles or are not in the best
interests of the nation can be contrasted with the behavior of Canadian officers; in
Canada more flag officers or generals have publicly put their careers on the line over
matters of principle than have their fellow officers in the United States.13 This
is consistent with Colonel Fields observation regarding the lack of contemporary
officers with Billy Mitchell qualities.14

Another side of the "team player" matter also merits
consideration. One should keep in mind that when an organizations goals are worthy
and its means or methods honorable, individuals can easily identify with and internalize
organizational values, rendering superfluous the insulting plea to be a "team
player." The fact that it is necessary to coerce individuals into being "team
players" is in itself a symptom of defective leadership. When an organizations
leadership feels threatened by dissent, is overly defensive of the status quo, and
perceives disagreement to be synonymous with disloyalty, an unhealthy rigidity is created
that severely restricts innovation, adaptation to change, and organizational
effectiveness.

Basically, military organizations reward and support those who show the
greatest conformity. They reinforce behaviors that are often the antithesis of
innovativeness and effectiveness. They reward the organization man, the yes man, the
individual who never makes waves, fills all the squares, and parrots accepted form and
procedure. The sad consequence is that excessive conformity results in loss of initiative
and imaginative, innovative, and creative thinking the kind of bold and daring
perspective and behavior necessary for significant achievement and dramatic increases in
mission effectiveness.

Substitution of Politics for Principle

An excessive preoccupation with expediency as manifested by the
substitution of politics for principle is another visible leadership deficiency. It
explains much capricious behavior and gamesmanship on the part of senior officers. When
political sensitivities are greater than moral sensitivities, loyalty is vested in people
rather than in principle or absolute value standards. This condition spawns a plethora of
miniature Watergates, artificial crises, distortion and hoarding of information, extreme
parochialism, and the investment of energy in accumulating political gratuities.

The politicizing of the officer corps in this manner is a matter of
great concern and one that exacts an unacceptable toll in diminished effectiveness and
compromised integrity. In the less extreme case, it involves paying lip service to the
"right words" and seeking to fill the right squares in a highly visible
mannerall aimed at impressing the "right people."15 More
disastrous consequences of substituting politics for principle were traumatically
demonstrated during the Vietnam War when the pervasiveness of deceit reached epidemic
proportions. It appears that there was more "official duplicity" during this war
than in any other in American history.16

More recently, the ascendant position of politics remains undisturbed,
with shortcomings, failures, and the lack of definitive progress often excused due to the
imperatives of bureaucratic politics.17 R. P. Dunwell has described the
military profession as overpoliticized and as having regressed to the point where the
combined effects of politics and excessive bureaucratic layering have severely diluted
U.S. Armed Forces military capability.18 Major General G. J. Keegan reached the
same conclusion with regard to the intelligence effectiveness of the United States,
stressing that the highly politicized mind-set of the intelligence process has
dramatically reduced the performance of the national intelligence agencies.19

Rhetoric versus Reality

The rhetoric from defense leaders asserts unequivocally that human
capability is the premier American resource. General Lew Allen has repeatedly stressed
that U.S. capability rests more on people than on weapons and that our greatest advantage
over the Soviet Union is the caliber of our personnel.20 It has been noted that
the present Air Force is critically dependent on quality people, particularly in view of
the 30 percent reduction in personnel over the last ten years, the sophisticated
high-technology equipment in use, and the austerity in military funding.21
Comparable statements by other high-level leaders can be found throughout contemporary
Department of Defense literature.

The unique abridgments of constitutional rights accepted by military
personnel (e.g., constraints on freedom of speech, political/organizational activity,
working/living conditions) and the extraordinary rigors and sacrifices of combat jobs and
certain support occupations have been duly recognized.22 Yet, despite the
rhetoric on the importance of our scarce human resources and an acceptance of the
constraints and hazards of the military profession, there is little tangible evidence that
this discourse has translated into reality in terms of appropriate intrinsic rewards or,
until very recently, adequate extrinsic compensation.

The relative diminution of extrinsic compensation during the 1970s
combined with the destruction of intrinsic incentives by bureaucracy and defective
leadership to produce a vastly inferior motivational climate. The severe restriction of
intrinsic incentives within bureaucratic organizations in the form of drastically
curtailed opportunities for growth, use of valued abilities, exercise of initiative,
involvement, and self-control has resulted in only marginal realization of human
potential.

Although a few top-level Air Force leaders have made attempts to
decentralize and restore authority to those closest to the work, these efforts have not
permeated to a level where they might have significant salutary impact.23 For
the most part, such attempts have been nullified by countervailing actions at intermediate
levels of command.

In essence, the rhetoric emphasizes the importance and value of human
resources, while reality paints a picture of more than a decade of neglect for extrinsic
quality-of-life compensations; and stifling bureaucratic encumbrances choke intrinsic
motivation and suppress the full utilization of human talents and capabilities. In the
research and development (R&D) environment, for example, Air Force leadership has
identified the biggest management challenges as the creation of an atmosphere that fosters
and encourages new and innovative ideas and a proper environment for high-quality
scientific work.24

So much for the rhetoric. In reality, the R&D bureaucracy is
pervaded by micromanagement, overregulation, and a highly process-oriented management and
inspection system that together comprise formidable barriers to the high-quality
scientific and innovative environments espoused in the rhetoric.

The disparity between the professional ideal and contemporary reality
is also obvious outside the R&D arena. There is evidence that both flying and support
officers are frustrated by lack of control over work process, inflexibility of higher
level management, and insufficient decision authority.25

The Air Force has advised officers not to be afraid of mistakes, that a
person whose career is free of mistakes probably isnt doing anything.26
Likewise, the Air Force urges its members to dare to innovate, spark new ideas, and create
ways to do things better.27 Again, the rhetoric is unquestionably valid, but in
reality the system is so rigid and intolerant of mistakes that too many officers
"play it safe," remaining timidly indecisive until sufficient consensus can be
obtained.

The problem of retention is another reflection of the rhetoric versus
reality gap. The inability to attract and retain quality people is well documented.28
Inadequate compensation and blunted opportunity for real involvement and growth have
contributed heavily to the exodus of skilled professionals so indispensable to Air Force
scientific-technological advantage and mission effectiveness. As General John Roberts
stressed, lip service to problems or legitimate grievances causes disenchantment and
retention problems.29

The rhetoric versus reality gap extends far beyond the confines of the
military; it pervades much of our society. An especially grave consequence of this
condition is declining confidence in our institutions, expressly government institutions.30
Our young people, in particular, are keenly sensitive to hypocrisy, duplicity, and
lack of integrity. The substitution of politics for principle and the disparity between
rhetoric and reality are, to a large extent, responsible for our young people being
"turned off" by government. Hypocrisy and the resultant loss of credibility in
the military translate to serious recruiting and retention problems such as those
experienced in recent years.

Obsession with
Image Enhancement

The creation of image at the expense of substance has become a
prevalent form of military organizational behavior. Image should be a by-product or
corollary of genuine capability. The elevation of image to stature as a goal or end in
itself can be extremely costly.

Many of the ills of bureaucracy can be traced to the proclivity to
establish and maintain an image of efficiency and effectiveness. Effective leadership or
management is gauged in shallow terms corresponding to measurements of the management
process. In effect, measures of management process are substituted for valid figures of
merit or criteria of effectiveness such as mission performance, quantitative and
qualitative excellence, scientific-technological breakthrough, breadth and profundity of
innovation, improvement in operational capability, etc. The primary result of
image-oriented thinking is that the "process" of management becomes the main
product.

The layered bureaucracy and passion for image-related trivia strangle
line or primary mission functions in a morass of micromanagement, planning exercises,
reporting requirements, briefings, management reviews, paperwork, etc. Then, to ensure
stringent compliance, the Inspector General (IG) conducts exacting and tedious
process-oriented inspections. In fact, in the R&D area, IG inspections are almost
totally a process-oriented activity. A particularly insidious consequence of
management/staff proliferation and obsession with process is the lack of single point
authority and responsibility so prevalent in Air Force organizations.

Another serious consequence of the obsession with image enhancement is
the tendency to give the image treatment to deep-seated personnel and organizational
problems. One example is performance appraisal. A considerable amount of evidence exists
substantiating the inadequacies of the Air Force OER system; yet, no scientifically based
lasting solutions have been achieved.31

Performance appraisal is a vital cornerstone for nearly all significant
personnel and career decisions. Further, the effectiveness of the institutional reward
structure and its motivational potency are directly related to the extent that valued
rewards (e.g., promotion, recognition, awards, etc.) are contingent on performance.
However, performance-contingent reward systems are not possible without valid performance
appraisal and open, honest feedback.

Performance assessment is essentially a highly complicated metric
problem that requires the concerted efforts of top scientific talent. It will take
sustained, intensive effort by highly qualified professionals to produce performance
appraisal systems that have scientific and quantitative validity, management/operational
credibility, and acceptance by the personnel being evaluated.

Another serious organizational problem concerns the need to develop an
improved scientific foundation for leadership and management practices. As in the case of
performance assessment, a strong, continuing organizational research program, employing
high-caliber scientific talent, is required; not arbitrary, cosmetic treatment. The
organizational environment or climate created within a job setting by the synthesis of
leadership style, management practices, organizational policy, and unit structure can have
a decisive influence on human effectiveness.32

With few exceptions, the Air Force has met these fundamental personnel
and organizational issues with an ad hoc task group approach. A smoke screen of highly
visible, frenetic activity has been created, but little significant progress toward
long-term resolution of problems has occurred. Ad hoc work groups fail to marshal the
necessary expertise and in-depth, continuing research required for substantive, lasting
improvements. Consequently, the Air Force has not been able to tailor management practices
and organizational environments to the unique characteristics of its varied missions and
personnel to attain the totally supportive, finely tuned institutional framework which
produces superior effectiveness.

High-quality, full-spectrum (research, development, applications, and
feedback) R&D programs in leadership, management, motivation, organizational climate,
and performance do not exist in the Air Force. Equally unfortunate is the lack of
systematic, scientific efforts to screen, validate, and apply personnel and organizational
research accomplished by other laboratories and institutions to Air Force organizations.
Without these programs, Air Force leaders are denied the scientific-management expertise
required to optimize organizational effectiveness and fully realize human potential.

Other significant detriments associated with image-enhancement
activities involve misuse of manpower, waste of material resources, and loss of respect
and confidence in leadership. Moreover, excessive concern for image by senior officers
creates a ripple effect which makes image enhancement the primary concern of subordinate
elements of command. Full and rational utilization of our scarce human resources demands
that central concerns be aligned with major mission responsibilities, not peripheral,
superficial matters.

The combined influence of all aspects of image enhancement in terms of
reduced effectiveness, improper use of human resources, and loss of confidence in
leadership is substantial. General David C. Jones has identified one of the causes of the
problem and described its main impact:

If we even try to make perfection the standard, we run the risk of
creating artificial pressures for people to concentrate more on image than substance. The
"look good syndrome" is the enemy of personal integrity and professional
reliability.33

Cosmetic approaches and image-enhancement activities never bring
lasting solutions to problems. Problems might be temporarily obscured by a short-term
facelift, but they will most certainly recur and often with more serious consequences.
Emphasis on form and structure must be curtailed and the principal focus placed on
substance and content. Looking good, square filling, and giving the appearance of quality
must be replaced by a strong motivation to achieve genuine in-depth fidelity in all
aspects of mission effectiveness.

The five manifestations of defective leadership interact and combine to
produce a loss in leadership credibility, inappropriate and detrimental management
practices, and organizational environments hostile to effective performance and the
realization of human potential.

The late General George S. Brown outlined several major advantages that
American military personnel have over their Soviet counterparts. These advantages, which
relate to being reared in the American society, include greater willingness to take
responsibility, independence of thought and action, flexibility and initiative, and the
ability to innovate when required by the situation.34 Unfortunately, the five
leadership deficiencies create conditions that suppress the expression of the very
characteristics which can give America a decisive advantage.

America faces unprecedented challenges during the next decade, which
dramatically increase the urgency of correcting our leadership deficiencies and reversing
ominous trends toward the loss of military and technological superiority.

19. Major General G. J. Keegan, The Strategic Balance: Trends and
Perceptions (Washington: United States Strategic Institute, 1977).

20. General Lew Allen, Jr., see Air Force Policy Letter for
Commanders, 1 November 1978, p. 1; 1 December 1978, p. 2; 1 February 1979, pp. 2-3; 1
October 1979, pp. 2-3; 1 December 1979, p. 1; and 1 March 1980, p. 1. Also see Supplement
to the Air Force Policy Letter for Commanders, December 1978, pp. 2-8 and Air
Force, May 1980, pp. 62-63.

22. General L. Allen, Jr., "Air Force Seeks Incentives to Attract
Quality People," Air Force Policy Letter for Commanders, 1 November 1978, p.
1; A. H. Chayes, "The Military Is a Special Kind of Community," Air Force
Policy Letter for Commanders, 1 December 1979, pp. 3-4; General Bennie L. Davis,
"The Demand for Able Professionals," Supplement to the Air Force Policy
Letter for Commanders, March 1979, pp. 34-40; Lieutenant General A. P. Iosue,
"Force Modernization without a New Look at People," Air Force Policy Letter
for Commanders, 15 September 1979, pp. 2-3; General David C. Jones,
"All-Important Aspect of Readiness," Air Force Policy Letter for Commanders, 15
February 1980, p. 1.

Lieutenant Colonel G. E. Secrist, USAF (Ret) (B.S., University of
Utah; M.S., Purdue; Ph.D., University of Utah) is a research scientist for Technology
Incorporated, Life Sciences Division, San Antonio, Texas. During 21 years of Air Force
service, he served as a research scientist and technical director of biotechnology and
human resource research and development programs. Other assignments included Titan II
senior standardization crew member, Strategic Air Command missile forces, and crew safety
project officer for the Manned Orbiting Laboratory Program with Air Force Systems Command.
Colonel Secrist has published numerous articles in professional journals.

Disclaimer

The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author
cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic environment of Air University. They do
not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the
United States Air Force or the Air University.