CHAPTER XV
Expanding Into the Bismarck Archipelago

General Plans

Further operations in the Bismarck Archipelago had been contemplated for nearly
two years. The Joint Chiefs' directive which launched the campaigns against
Rabaul in 1942 had authorized operations to follow Arawe and Cape Gloucester,
and MacArthur's early plans called for the capture of Kavieng on northern New
Ireland and of Manus in the Admiralty Islands as well as of Rabaul.1
Further,
when the Joint Chiefs were deciding to bypass Rabaul, General Marshall
suggested that CARTWHEEL be extended to include seizure of Kavieng, Manus, and
Wewak. MacArthur was less than enthusiastic about Wewak, which was a major
enemy base. His plan for the drive to the Philippines, RENO III, called for the
invasion of Hansa Bay on 1 February 1944, of Kavieng by the South Pacific on 1
March 1944, and of the Admiralties on 1 March 1944.2

Responsibility for base construction at Kavieng and at Seeadler Harbour at
Manus was to be Admiral Halsey's, and he began planning these bases in November
1943. Kavieng was supposed to become a minor fleet base, a PT base, and a major
air base with six airfields. Manus would serve as an air base (two airfields
and a seaplane base) while Seeadler Harbour would be developed into a major
fleet base whose complete repair facilities would include drydocks, and a main
naval supply base. It would serve Admiral Nimitz' naval forces as well as the
Seventh Fleet.3

Halsey, who conferred with MacArthur in Brisbane in late 1943 before departing
on a trip to Hawaii and the continental United States, opposed the seizure of
Kavieng. He wished to apply the bypass technique and seize Emirau in the Saint
Matthias Islands, about ninety miles northwest of Kavieng, for this group had
never been taken by the Japanese. Kavieng, on the other hand, was a major air
and naval base and was reported to be strongly defended. In December MacArthur
told members of Halsey's staff that an attack against Emirau

Halsey spent four days with Nimitz at Pearl Harbor and then, in early January,
flew to San Francisco where he and Nimitz conferred with Admiral King. Here,
and later in Washington, the South Pacific commander made known his views on
Kavieng and Emirau.5

Halsey was not able to carry his point at this time. He did however discuss
timing and the question of naval support for Manus and Kavieng. These were
important because by now the Central Pacific offensives were well under way.
Nimitz' forces, having invaded the Gilberts in November 1943, were planning
their initial move into the Marshalls (Kwajalein and Roi-Namur) in late
January. Kavieng, almost four hundred miles from Cape Torokina, lay beyond
fighter-plane range of Halsey's most advanced air base. Thus aircraft carriers
would have to provide cover for the invasion forces, and Admiral Nimitz agreed
to furnish them. General MacArthur wanted carriers to cover the invasion of
Manus as well, in case bad weather kept the Fifth Air Force planes grounded in
New Guinea and at Cape Gloucester. Nimitz pointed out, however, that such
weather could also affect carrier operations.6

Admiral Carney, Halsey's chief of staff, had visited Pearl Harbor in December
and reported that the ships for Kavieng would not be available until 1 May.7
This would also put off the Admiralties operation.8
But Admiral Nimitz then
suggested that by delaying his second Marshalls invasion (Eniwetok) until 1 May
he could provide support for Manus and Kavieng about 1 April. MacArthur was
ready and willing to invade Manus and Kavieng in March before moving to Hansa
Bay, but the Joint Chiefs ordered Nimitz to deliver a strong carrier strike
against Truk during March. No direct naval supporting forces could be available
for Manus and Kavieng until April.9
Nimitz proposed that representatives of all
the Pacific areas meet in Pearl Harbor to settle details of co-ordination and
timing.10

The command question came up again in January when Marshall asked MacArthur's
opinion on a draft directive for the next operations. The draft, Marshall told
him, had received the approval of General Kenney, who was also in Washington.
Except for Kavieng it did not specify any particular localities to be attacked
but authorized advances into the Bismarck Archipelago preparatory to the drive
to the Philippines. South Pacific forces attacking Kavieng were to be placed
under MacArthur's "general direction,"

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and Nimitz was ordered to provide fleet support and more assault
shipping for Manus and Kavieng after the approaching conference at Pearl
Harbor.11

MacArthur objected strenuously. After reviewing the course of
CARTWHEEL operations, which took place along two axes and for which, therefore,
"loose co-ordination" sufficed, he argued that in the Bismarck Archipelago the
South and Southwest Pacific forces would be converging in a fairly restricted
area. South Pacific forces alone could not capture Kavieng, and elements of the
forces might have to be mingled. Constant, complete co-ordination of air and
surface units would be required. Unity of command, vested in himself, should be
applied, urged MacArthur, with the South Pacific forces under Halsey's direct
command. And, finally, the Joint Chiefs rather than Nimitz should determine the
extent of fleet support and additional assault shipping.12

In their orders
for the extension into the Bismarck Archipelago, dated 23 and 24 January, the
Joint Chiefs acceded to MacArthur's suggestions on fleet support in a
left-handed way. They directed Nimitz to provide fleet support and cover for
the Manus-Kavieng invasions under his direct command, and to attach more
warships and assault shipping to MacArthur's and Halsey's forces. The exact
amounts were to be determined at the forthcoming Pearl Harbor conference, which
would then forward recommendations to Washington for approval.

Control over South Pacific forces remained the same as for CARTWHEEL. Halsey
was in direct command under MacArthur's direction.13

The conference at Pearl Harbor convened on 27 January. Halsey, flying out from
Washington, had been grounded by bad weather in Fort Worth, Texas, and again in
San Francisco, and so was not present. Carney, whom he had authorized to make
preliminary arrangements with MacArthur, represented him, as did General
Harmon. Representing MacArthur were Sutherland, Kenney, and Kinkaid. Nimitz,
Rear Adm. Forrest P. Sherman, and others spoke for the Central Pacific.

Sutherland made it quite clear that MacArthur now definitely wanted the South
Pacific to capture Kavieng for use as an air base, not Emirau. Halsey's
proposal was shelved for the time being.

Besides discussing operations in the Bismarck Archipelago, the conference
covered a wide range of topics--the value of the Marianas, B-29's, the
possibility of bypassing Truk, and the comparative merits of the Central and
Southwest Pacific routes to the Philippines. All agreed that whether Truk was
bypassed or not, Seeadler Harbour was essential as a fleet base for the
approach to the Philippines.

Nimitz proposed to give long-range support to the Manus-Kavieng invasions with
a two-day strike against Truk by the main body of the Pacific Fleet starting
about 26 March. In addition he agreed to send two divisions of fast carriers

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to operate under Halsey's command during the Manus-Kavieng invasions,
while other carrier divisions and fast battleships operated in covering
positions.14

These were large forces indeed. As originally planned the Bismarck
operations would have been extensive. In addition to the naval forces, Halsey
planned to use all his land-based aircraft and two divisions in assault, with
one in reserve. However, not one of the operations approved by the Joint Chiefs
and MacArthur was carried out according to the original plan.

Reducing Rabaul and Kavieng

All during the invasions of Arawe, Cape Gloucester, and Saidor, and during the
discussions over the Bismarck Archipelago operations, the Solomons air command
had been putting forth a maximum effort to reduce Rabaul. Completion of the
Torokina fighter strip at Empress Augusta Bay, Bougainville, was a major step forward, for now New
Georgia- and Guadalcanal-based bombers could have fighter escort in their
attacks. But by the end of 1943 it was clear that high-level bombing would not
suffice to neutralize Rabaul. Obviously, success depended on completion of the
bomber strips by the Piva River (Piva Uncle and Piva Yoke).15

Piva Uncle, eight
thousand feet by three hundred feet, was ready as a staging field on 30
December 1943. On 5 January 1944 SBD's and TBF's from Munda staged through to
attack Rabaul, but by noon, when the bombers arrived over the target, Rabaul
was as usual blanketed by heavy clouds. A similar attack two days later met the
same difficulties, but on 9 January Piva Yoke was ready and from then on
bombers could be permanently based at the Bougainville fields and could reach
Rabaul in the morning, before it was covered by clouds.

Thereafter during January TBF's, SBD's, B-25's, and B-24's struck regularly at
Rabaul. The Japanese lost many planes but occasionally received reinforcements
from Truk, and continued to resist with fighter interception and antiaircraft
fire. ". . . the skies overhead

Damage to Japanese equipment and weapons on the ground was relatively light,
for in late November the enemy had begun the prodigious task of digging every
possible item underground in Rabaul's volcanic rock, a task that was well along
by January. But all buildings were knocked flat. Ships and grounded planes
were especially vulnerable to low-level bombing and dive-bombing. By February
1944 the Allies had won a signal victory; Japanese surface ships stopped using
the harbor.

During the same period Kavieng received increased attention from both Allies
and Japanese. Halsey, expecting to assault the base eventually, wanted to
reduce Kavieng to help cut the Japanese lines of communication from rear bases
to Rabaul. The Japanese, well aware of the threat to Rabaul, decided to
strengthen Kavieng and the Admiralties to help protect Rabaul.

In October Imamura had sent the 230th Infantry of the 38th Division from Rabaul
to New Ireland. Next month he sent an emissary to Tokyo to ask for one

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more division. Imperial Headquarters responded by sending the 1st Independent
Mixed Regiment to New Ireland. It reached its destination in late 1943 and
early 1944. Imamura placed it, together with the 230th Infantry, under Maj.
Gen. Takeo Ito, infantry group commander of the 38th Division. Ito's soldiers
and the 14th Naval Base Force were responsible for defense of New Ireland.

In December Halsey set a trap and ordered Buka bombarded to lure Japanese
planes and ships away from Kavieng. Admiral Sherman, lying east of Kavieng with
the carriers Bunker Hill and Monterey plus escorts, was then to strike at
Kavieng in the hope of catching troopships and warships in the harbor. Before
dawn on Christmas morning Sherman launched eighty-six planes, which bombed
Kavieng at 0745 and were back aboard their carriers by 1015. But the results
were disappointing as there were almost no ships in the harbor.

On New Year's day Sherman delivered another strike from 220 miles east of
Kavieng. Outside the harbor his planes caught some of the ships that had just
unloaded part of the 1st Independent Mixed Regiment but the Japanese air cover
of forty-two planes prevented the ships from suffering damage. Sherman struck
Kavieng again three days later, again without doing much damage; no ships were
present and the Japanese planes were out against Cape Gloucester.

In February the Fifth Air Force, using Finschhafen as a fighter base and Cape
Gloucester as an emergency field, began to attack Kavieng with the aim of
softening it before the projected invasion, cutting the line of communications
to Rabaul, and supporting the South Pacific's invasion of the Green Islands. On the
11th forty-eight B-24's with P-38 escorts caught Kavieng's planes on the
ground, and the next two days saw similar attacks.

During the first two weeks of February Rabaul's defenses grew obviously weaker
as the Air Command, Solomons, maintained the intensity of its attack.17
There
were few attempts to intercept until 19 February. On that date twenty eight
SBD's, twenty-three TBF's, and sixty-eight fighters, finding no ships in the
harbor, put bombs and rockets on Lakunai airfield. Twenty B-24's with
thirty-five escorting fighters bombed from high altitudes. About fifty Japanese
fighters attempted to break up the attack without success. This was the last
attempted interception. Thereafter attacking Rabaul became a milk run. Allied
pilots encountered antiaircraft fire but no planes. Rabaul no longer could
threaten any Allied advance except one directed against itself.

Rabaul's impotence was of course largely brought about by the South and
Southwest Pacific air and naval campaigns that had been under way for so long,
but it was partly brought about by Admiral Nimitz' naval forces. The Central
Pacific had invaded Kwajalein and Roi-Namur on 31 January and seized them so
rapidly that the reserve and garrison forces did not have to be committed. When
the Joint Chiefs told Nimitz that they were willing to delay the Manus-Kavieng
invasions in order to proceed directly to Eniwetok, using the uncommitted
troops, Nimitz decided to

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go there as quickly as possible. Accordingly he invaded Eniwetok on 17
February. In support of this move the main body of the Pacific Fleet, commanded
by Vice Adm. Raymond A. Spruance, attacked Truk on 16 and 17 February, over one
month ahead of schedule. Spruance's strike was an outstanding success. The
Combined Fleet had already escaped toward home waters, but Spruance's pilots
destroyed or damaged 250-275 planes as well as thousands of tons of shipping.
Admiral Koga, thus almost bereft of planes, ordered all naval planes out of the
Southeast Area at once. ". . . Rabaul, compelled to face the enemy with ground
resources alone and completely isolated, was abandoned."18

The Allies dropped
20,584 tons of bombs on Rabaul throughout the war, and fired 383 tons of naval
shells after Rabaul was reduced to the indignity of suffering destroyer and
nocturnal PBY bombardment in March. Thirty naval vessels were sunk, 23 damaged.
In addition 154 large cargo vessels and 517 barges were sunk; 70 small cargo
vessels suffered damage.19
". . . The [Japanese] Navy lost the pick of its
flight personnel at Rabaul, a fact which told heavily upon subsequent efforts
to rebuild our air forces."20

Rabaul was abandoned only in the strategic
sense, and it was impotent only for offensive action. It could have defended
itself with bloody efficiency had the Allies attacked. The garrison of New Britain numbered almost 98,000 men
(76,300 in the 8th Area Army and 21,570 in the naval forces). The rugged
country of Gazelle Peninsula was well suited for defense. By the war's end some
350 miles of tunnels and caves had been excavated. At peak strength Rabaul had
367 antiaircraft guns (of which 73 were destroyed by air bombing), ranging in
type and caliber from 13.2-mm. to 120.7-mm. dual purpose. There were 43 coast
defense guns (1 destroyed) of calibers up to and including 150-mm. Of the 475
artillery guns and howitzers (37-mm. to 150-mm.), none was destroyed by
bombing, nor were any of the 1,762 machine guns. Imamura's men also had tanks,
mines, ditches, caves, bunkers, and concrete pillboxes, as well as rifles,
grenades, bayonets, and ample ammunition.

Rabaul would not have been as valuable to the Allies as it was to the Japanese
in their southward advance. It would have been useful to the Allies only in a
northward move against Truk and the Marianas. Because the Joint Chiefs had
decided to advance westward, and because Seeadler Harbour in the Admiralties
was better than Rabaul's, the Japanese fortress was not worth the price the
Japanese surely would have exacted.

Seizure of the Green Islands

Plans and Preparations

In December 1943 Admiral Halsey's planes were bombing Rabaul, his ships were
patrolling the Solomon Sea, and his ground troops in Bougainville were either
fighting the enemy or consolidating positions in anticipation of a fight.

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But this was not enough to satisfy him. When he learned that Nimitz' plans, as
they stood in December, would not permit the invasion of Manus and Kavieng for
several months, he decided to seize an air base site within fighter range of
Kavieng in the meantime.21
At a conference in Port Moresby on 20 December
attended by MacArthur, Kinkaid, Carney, Chamberlin, and others, the South
Pacific representatives proposed that the Southwest Pacific attack Manus
directly while South Pacific forces captured the Green Islands, some 37 miles
northwest of Buka, and established there an airfield and PT boat base. Situated
117 miles east of Rabaul and 220 miles southeast of Kavieng, this circular
coral atoll was not strongly held. The Japanese used it only as a barge staging
base between Rabaul and Buka. Allied seizure of the atoll would put South
Pacific fighter planes within range of Kavieng, extend the range of PT boat
patrols as far as New Ireland, and cut the Japanese seaborne supply route to
Buka.

MacArthur, deciding for the time being against a move to Manus in advance of
the projected invasion of Hansa Bay, approved simultaneous attacks against
Manus and Kavieng and told the South Pacific to go ahead with the plan
to attack the Green Islands about 1 February.22

The island group consists of four flat, thickly wooded coral atolls which
encircle a lagoon. The group is about nine miles long from north to south, five
miles from east to west. Horseshoe-shaped Nissan, the main island, provided
good landing beaches on its west shore inside the lagoon, but it was not known
whether the passage between Barahun and Nissan would accommodate landing craft.
Therefore Halsey sent four PT boats from Cape Torokina to examine the passage
on the night of 10-11 January. They found seventeen feet of water there, or
enough to float an LST.23

Admiral Halsey, who returned to Noumea on 3 February, placed control of the
operation and responsibility for the co-ordination of amphibious planning in
Admiral Wilkinson's hands on 5 February.24
This action confirmed warning orders
which had been issued in early January.

Only destroyer-transports and landing craft were assigned to the attack force.
Command of the landing force was given to General Barrowclough of the 3d New
Zealand Division. Barrowclough's division (less the 8th Brigade Group), the
976th Antiaircraft Artillery Gun Battalion of the U.S. Army, a PT base unit,
communications units, a boat pool, and a large naval base unit including an entire

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construction regiment, constituted the landing force. Halsey ordered the
Solomons air command and Ainsworth's and Merrill's cruiser task forces to
support and cover the invasion, and arranged with MacArthur for Kenney's air
forces to deliver the attacks on Kavieng during the first fifteen days of
February.25

As South Pacific headquarters estimated that Rabaul and Kavieng would be
virtually neutralized by mid-February, D Day was set for the 15th. General
Barrowclough, who had been island commander at Vella Lavella, moved his
headquarters to Guadalcanal in January to be near Wilkinson during the
planning. They decided to send a large reconnaissance party to Green in order
to determine the strength of the enemy garrison and to examine possible
airfield sites, beaches, and naval base sites, and the lagoon tides. The party
was to spend twenty-four hours ashore.

Three hundred and twenty-two soldiers of the 30th New Zealand Battalion and
twenty-seven American and eleven New Zealand hydrographic, air, small boat,
communications, and intelligence specialists boarded three APD's on 29 January.
The destroyer-transports hove to west of Barahun about midnight and launched
landing craft. Two of the torpedo boats that had checked the passage led the
landing craft through to the beach. Once ashore the reconnaissance party waited for daylight while the
APD's hauled clear. Guarded by the New Zealand soldiers, the specialists set to
work and gathered their data. They found a good airfield site, and estimated
that the enemy garrison numbered about a hundred. The twelve hundred native
inhabitants proved so friendly and cooperative that preliminary naval
bombardment to support the main landing was omitted. The specialists were not
molested, but the enemy fired on one landing craft that went to the south part
of the island where there was an abandoned Roman Catholic mission and killed
three New Zealanders and one American. When Rabaul heard of the landing Kusaka
sent six bomb-carrying fighters to Green. They attacked the landing boats but
did no damage.

The APD's reclaimed the New Zealanders and Americans on 31 January and returned
safely to Guadalcanal. On the way back two of the escorting destroyers sank a
Japanese submarine near Buka Passage.

The Japanese Green Islands garrison reported it had suffered heavy losses,
asked for reinforcements, and fled northwest in three landing craft to the Feni
Islands. Kusaka put 123 men aboard a submarine on 1 February and sent them to
Nissan. The submarine hove to off the northeast coast about midnight in a sea
so rough that after 77 men had gone ashore, the submarine commander called off
the operation and returned to Rabaul with 46 men still on board. The return of
the original garrison to Nissan on 5 February brought total enemy strength to
102.

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The Landings

In the meantime the South Pacific's APD's returned from service in the Cape
Gloucester operation. Shortly before 12 February the APD's, LST's, LCI's LCT's,
LCM's, and patrol boats and coastal transports of the amphibious force took
aboard the 5,806-man New Zealand-American landing force at Tulagi, Guadalcanal,
the Russells, New Georgia, and Vella Lavella.26
The ships, timing their
departures so as to meet off Bougainville on 14 February, sailed from their
various ports on the 12th and 13th.

A Japanese reconnaissance plane spotted them west of Bougainville on 14
February, reported their presence to Rabaul, and kept contact. Admiral Kusaka
sent thirty-two planes against the ships throughout the moonlit night of 14-15
February. They did no damage to Wilkinson's ships but managed to hit the
cruiser St. Louis in Admiral Ainsworth's task force, which was operating
south of Saint George's Channel. Twelve Japanese planes were lost.

The APD's arrived in the transport area west of Barahun shortly after 0600 on
15 February and promptly dispatched LCVP's toward the passage. Thirty-two
fighters of the Solomons air command were on station overhead. But Kusaka did
not yield easily. He sent out seventeen bombers and about fifteen of these attacked the landing craft. They
scored no hits. At the same time Kenney's airmen, with four A-20 and seven B-25
squadrons, delivered a strong blow against Kavieng which kept that base from
attacking the invaders at Green.

Within two hours all men of the New Zealand combat units went ashore on Nissan.
During the day all ships and boats were completely unloaded and with the
exception of the LCT's, all left for the south once they were emptied. The
LCT's remained as part of the naval advanced base.

Between 15 and 20 February the New Zealand infantrymen hunted down and killed
the Japanese garrison. Ten New Zealanders and 3 Americans were killed; 21 New
Zealanders and 3 Americans were wounded.

By 17 March 16,448 men and 43,088 tons of supplies had been sent to the Green
Islands. The 22d Naval Construction Regiment had begun work at once. Within two
days of the landings a PT boat base opened. This extended the range of torpedo
boat patrols to New Ireland and along the entire northeast coast of
Bougainville. By 4 March a 5,000-foot fighter field was ready; in late March a
6,000-foot bomber field was opened. Kavieng now lay within range of fighters
and light bombers as well as heavy bombers from Bougainville. But, stripped of
its naval planes when Admiral Koga ordered their withdrawal in February, it had
already ceased to menace the Allies.

15. Unless otherwise indicated this section is based on Craven and Cate, The
Pacific: Guadalcanal to Saipan,pp. 350-56; Morison, Breaking the Bismarcks
Barrier, pp. 337-66, 392-410; Samuel Eliot Morison, History of United States
Naval Operations in World War II, VII, Aleutians, Gilberts and Marshalls: June
1942-April 1944 (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1951), 330; Building the
Navy's Bases in World War II, II, 268-74; USSBS, The Allied Campaign Against
Rabaul; 8th Area Army Operations, Japanese Monogr No. 110 (OCMH), p. 123;
Southeast Area Naval Operations, III, Japanese Monogr No. 50 (OCMH), 6, 58-63.