Antifederalist No. 9 A CONSOLIDATED GOVERNMENT IS A TYRANNY

"MONTEZUMA," regarded as a Pennsylvanian, wrote this essay which
showed up in the Independent Gazetteer on October 17, 1787.

We the Aristocratic party of the United States, lamenting the many
inconveniences to which the late confederation subjected the well-born, the
better kind of people, bringing them down to the level of the rabble-and holding
in utter detestation that frontispiece to every bill of rights, "that all
men are born equal"-beg leave (for the purpose of drawing a line between
such as we think were ordained to govern, and such as were made to bear the
weight of government without having any share in its administration) to submit
to our Friends in the first class for their inspection, the following defense of
our monarchical, aristocratical democracy.

lst. As a majority of all societies consist of men who (though totally
incapable of thinking or acting in governmental matters) are more readily led
than driven, we have thought meet to indulge them in something like a democracy
in the new constitution, which part we have designated by the popular name of
the House of Representatives. But to guard against every possible danger from
this lower house, we have subjected every bill they bring forward, to the double
negative of our upper house and president. Nor have we allowed the populace the
right to elect their representatives annually . . . lest this body should be too
much under the influence and control of their constituents, and thereby prove
the "weatherboard of our grand edifice, to show the shiftings of every
fashionable gale,"-for we have not yet to learn that little else is wanting
to aristocratize the most democratical representative than to make him somewhat
independent of his political creators. We have taken away that rotation of
appointment which has so long perplexed us-that grand engine of popular
influence. Every man is eligible into our government from time to time for
life. This will have a two-fold good effect. First, it prevents the
representatives from mixing with the lower class, and imbibing their foolish
sentiments, with which they would have come charged on re-election.

2d. They will from the perpetuality of office be under our eye, and in a
short time will think and act like us, independently of popular whims and
prejudices. For the assertion "that evil communications corrupt good
manners," is not more true than its reverse. We have allowed this house
the power to impeach, but we have tenaciously reserved the right to try. We
hope gentlemen, you will see the policy of this clause-for what matters it who
accuses, if the accused is tried by his friends. In fine, this plebian house
will have little power, and that little be rightly shaped by our house of
gentlemen, who will have a very extensive influence-from their being chosen out
of the genteeler class ... It is true, every third senatorial seat is to be
vacated duennually, but two-thirds of this influential body will remain in
office, and be ready to direct or (if necessary) bring over to the good old way,
the young members, if the old ones should not be returned. And whereas many of
our brethren, from a laudable desire to support their rank in life above the
commonalty, have not only deranged their finances, but subjected their persons
to indecent treatment (as being arrested for debt, etc.) we have framed a
privilege clause, by which they may laugh at the fools who trusted them. But we
have given out, that this clause was provided, only that the members might be
able without interruption, to deliberate on the important business of their
country.

We have frequently endeavored to effect in our respective states, the happy
discrimination which pervades this system; but finding we could not bring the
states into it individually, we have determined ... and have taken pains to
leave the legislature of each free and independent state, as they now call
themselves, in such a situation that they will eventually be absorbed by our
grand continental vortex, or dwindle into petty corporations, and have power
over little else than yoaking hogs or determining the width of cart wheels.
But (aware that an intention to annihilate state legislatures, would be objected
to our favorite scheme) we have made their existence (as a board of electors)
necessary to ours. This furnishes us and our advocates with a fine answer to
any clamors that may be raised on this subject. We have so interwoven
continental and state legislatures that they cannot exist separately; whereas we
in truth only leave them the power of electing us, for what can a provincial
legislature do when we possess the exclusive regulation of external and internal
commerce, excise, duties, imposts, post-offices and roads; when we and we alone,
have the power to wage war, make peace, coin money (if we can get bullion) if
not, borrow money, organize the militia and call them forth to execute our
decrees, and crush insurrections assisted by a noble body of veterans subject to
our nod, which we have the power of raising and keeping even in the time of
peace. What have we to fear from state legislatures or even from states, when
we are armed with such powers, with a president at our head? (A name we thought
proper to adopt in conformity to the prejudices of a silly people who are so
foolishly fond of a Republican government, that we were obliged to accommodate
in names and forms to them, in order more effectually to secure the substance of
our proposed plan; but we all know that Cromwell was a King, with the title of
Protector). I repeat it, what have we to fear armed with such powers, with a
president at our head who is captain- -general of the army, navy and militia of
the United States, who can make and unmake treaties, appoint and commission
ambassadors and other ministers, who can grant or refuse reprieves or pardons,
who can make judges of the supreme and other continental courts-in short, who
will be the source, the fountain of honor, profit and power, whose influence
like the rays of the sun, will diffuse itself far and wide, will exhale all
democratical vapors and break the clouds of popular insurrection? But again
gentlemen, our judicial power is a strong work, a masked battery, few people see
the guns we can and will ere long play off from it. For the judicial power
embraces every question which can arise in law or equity, under this
constitution and under the laws of "the United States" (which laws
will be, you know, the supreme laws of the land). This power extends to all
cases, affecting ambassadors or other public ministers, "and consuls; to
all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction; to controversies to which the
United States shall be a party; to controversies between two or more States;
between a State and citizens of another State; between citizens of different
States; between citizens of the same State, claiming lands under grants of
different States; and between a State or the citizens thereof, and foreign
States, citizens or subjects."

Now, can a question arise in the colonial courts, which the ingenuity or
sophistry of an able lawyer may not bring within one or other of the above
cases? Certainly not. Then our court will have original or appellate
jurisdiction in all cases-and if so, how fallen are state judicatures-and must
not every provincial law yield to our supreme flat? Our constitution answers
yes. . . . And finally we shall entrench ourselves so as to laugh at the cabals
of the commonalty. A few regiments will do at first; it must be spread abroad
that they are absolutely necessary to defend the frontiers. Now a regiment and
then a legion must be added quietly; by and by a frigate or two must be built,
still taking care to intimate that they are essential to the support of our
revenue laws and to prevent smuggling. We have said nothing about a bill of
rights, for we viewed it as an eternal clog upon our designs, as a lock chain to
the wheels of government-though, by the way, as we have not insisted on rotation
in our offices, the simile of a wheel is ill. We have for some time considered
the freedom of the press as a great evil-it spreads information, and begets a
licentiousness in the people which needs the rein more than the spur; besides, a
daring printer may expose the plans of government and lessen the consequence of
our president and senate-for these and many other reasons we have said nothing
with respect to the "right of the people to speak and publish their
sentiments" or about their "palladiums of liberty" and such
stuff. We do not much like that sturdy privilege of the people-the right to
demand the writ of habeas corpus. We have therefore reserved the power of
refusing it in cases of rebellion, and you know we are the judges of what is
rebellion.... Our friends we find have been assiduous in representing our
federal calamities, until at length the people at large-frightened by the gloomy
picture on one side, and allured by the prophecies of some of our fanciful and
visionary adherents on the other-are ready to accept and confirm our proposed
government without the delay or forms of examination--which was the more to be
wished, as they are wholly unfit to investigate the principles or pronounce on
the merit of so exquisite a system. Impressed with a conviction that this
constitution is calculated to restrain the influence and power of the LOWER
CLASS-to draw that discrimination we have so long sought after; to secure to our
friends privileges and offices, which were not to be ... [obtained] under the
former government, because they were in common; to take the burden of
legislation and attendance on public business off the commonalty, who will be
much better able thereby to prosecute with effect their private business; to
destroy that political thirteen headed monster, the state sovereignties; to
check the licentiousness of the people by making it dangerous to speak or
publish daring or tumultuary sentiments; to enforce obedience to laws by a
strong executive, aided by military pensioners; and finally to promote the
public and private interests of the better kind of people-we submit it to your
judgment to take such measures for its adoption as you in your wisdom may think
fit.