New UK-US
Extradition Treaty- removes or restricts
key protections for defendants
- signed and adopted without any parliamentary scrutinyThis
Special Report is also available in "pdf" format to
download: Analysis
no 18

On 31 March, David Blunkett, UK Home Secretary, signed an
Extradition Treaty on behalf of the UK with his United States
counterpart, Attorney General Tom Ashcroft, ostensibly bringing
the US into line with procedures between European countries.
The UK parliament was not consulted at all and the text was not
public available until the end of May. The only justification
given for the delay was "administrative reasons", though
these did not hold-up scrutiny by the US senate, which began
almost immediately.

The UK-US Treaty has three main effects:

- (1) it removes the requirement on the US to provide
prima facie evidence when requesting the extradition of people
from the UK but maintains the requirement on the UK to
satisfy the "probable cause" requirement in the US
when seeking the extradition of US nationals;

- (2) it removes or restricts key protections currently open
to suspects and defendants;

- (3) it implements the EU-US Treaty on extradition, signed
in Washington on 25 June 2003, but far exceeds the provisions
in this agreement.

An analysis of the new UK-US Treaty - which will replace the
1972 UK-US Treaty - follows below, together with a number of
relevant cases and issues that raise serious concern about the
new agreement (and those between the EU and US).

Ben Hayes of Statewatch comments:

"Under the new treaty, the allegations of the US government
will be enough to secure the extradition of people from the UK.
However, if the UK wants to extradite someone from the US, evidence
to the standard of a "reasonable" demonstration of
guilt will still be required.

No other EU countries would accept this US demand, either
politically or constitutionally. Yet the UK government not only
acquiesced, but did so taking advantage of arcane legislative
powers to see the treaty signed and implemented without any parliamentary
debate or scrutiny.

Guantanamo Bay, the failed extradition of Lofti Raissi
and US contempt for the International Criminal Court make this
decision to remove relevant UK safeguards all the more alarming"

Evidence
requirements in the new UK-US extradition treatyArticle 8 of the UK-US Treaty sets out the new extradition
procedures between the two countries [1]. As with the old treaty
[2], the offences in question must satisfy 'dual criminality'
and be punishable in both states by a minimum custodial sentence
of one year or more. The crucial 'update' is that under the old
treaty (Article IX), the requesting state had to provide evidence:

"sufficient according to the law of the requested
Party to justify the committal for trial"

A reasonable standard and not especially high (essentially
the same standard required at the committal stage in domestic
criminal proceedings). Under the new treaty (art. 8, para. 2(b))
the state seeking extradition must provide:

"a statement of the facts of the offense(s)"
[sic]

The Home Office press release announcing the treaty (to parliament
and public alike) stated that a 'detailed statement of the facts
of the case' would be required [3]. In the event it hardly matters,
"facts" here do not mean evidence but refer instead
to allegations. By way of example, the equivalent requirement
in the European Arrest Warrant [4] is a:

"Description of the circumstances in which the offence(s)
was (were) committed, including the time place and degree of
participation in the offence(s) by the requested person"

In practise this may only be a few sentences. Critically,
there is an additional requirement on the UK only to provide
(art. 8, para. 3(c)):

"for requests to the United States, such information
as would provide a reasonable basis to believe that the person
sought committed the offense" [sic]

In effect, the evidence requirement on the US has been
dropped altogether while the UK must still provide evidence to
the standard of a 'reasonable' demonstration of guilt. As
Justice note in a recent briefing on the treaty [5], the
reasoning behind this lack of reciprocity is:

"that the United States has a constitutional protection
which prevents it from extraditing a US citizen purely on the
say-so of a foreign government. As the UK does not have such
a constitutional protection, the UK is at liberty to forego this
important safeguard in the interests of speeding up extraditions
to the US"

The attempted extradition of Algerian pilot Lofti Raissi from
the UK failed precisely because the US did not provide any evidence
to support their 'holding charges' that he trained the 11 September
hijackers (see below). Not only would Mr Raissi almost certainly
have been extradited under the new treaty, it is also possible
that he could be the subject of a new US request requiring no
evidence (unlike the EU-US extradition treaty the UK-US agreement
will be retrospective (Article 22(1))).

Barriers
to extraditionArticle 7 of the UK-US treaty covers the death penalty,
stating that:

"the executive authority may refuse extradition unless
the Requesting State provides an assurance that the death penalty
will not be imposed or, if imposed, will not be carried out".

The term 'may refuse' replicates that in the EU-US extradition
agreement and fails to meet the member states' obligations under
Protocols 6 and 13 to the European Convention on Human Rights
or respect the case law of the of the European Court which has
upheld an absolute bar to extradition where the death penalty
may be imposed [6]. It is hard to see why the treaty could not
state unequivocally that the UK will not extradite in death penalty
cases. It might even be questioned, in the current political
climate, whether 'assurances' to this effect will be respected
in practice.

Application of the "speciality rule" is equally
ambiguous. This should mean that a person cannot be tried for
offences other than those for which they were extradited, unless
first given an opportunity to return to the country that extradited
them. Although there have been narrow exceptions to this rule
in the past, not to say various breaches of it by the US (see
below), the new UK-US treaty allows the Home Secretary to waive
speciality and consent to "detention, trial or punishment"
(rather than simply prosecution) for any offence, not just an
extraditable offence (Article 18(1)(c)). As Justice point out
[5], this allows for the possibility that the Home Secretary
could consent to indefinite detention of a person in Guantanamo
Bay for an offence other than which they were initially extradited
(see below).

Other existing barriers to extradition have also been weakened
in the new agreement. The long established principle that states
may derogate from their extradition obligations if they believe
the offence committed was of a political character or if the
prosecution is seen as political persecution (the "political
offences" rule). This protection was unequivocal in the
1972 UK-US treaty but in the new agreement a whole host of offences
can no longer qualify as political (Article 4).

Both the "military offences" exception (allowing
states to refuse to extradite where no general criminal law offence
has been committed) and the "re-extradition rule" (preventing
a person being re-extradited to a third state without the prior
consent of the extraditing state) are retained. Not surprisingly,
the UK has:

"confirmed our understanding that this covers surrender
to the international criminal court" [see also below].

"Lapse of time limitations", where states set time
limits on how long charges sought by prosecutors can stand, will
no longer prevent extradition between the UK and the US (Article
6), though no justification is given for ignoring time limits
set by national law just because the offender has left the country.

Finally there is the principle of "ne bis in idem"
(or "double jeopardy"): no one shall be liable to be
tried or punished again in criminal proceedings for an offence
for which they have already been finally acquitted or convicted.
Under Article 5 of the new UK-US treaty, this can potentially
be ignored in cases where trial took place in a third state.
The European Courts have upheld the ne bis in idem principle
and any attempt by the UK to ignore final judgments from other
EU states would also breach the UK's commitment to mutual recognition.

Parliamentary
scrutiny and ratification of the treatyThere
was no parliamentary debate or scrutiny of the new treaty. It
was drafted by Home Office officials and their US counterparts,
signed on behalf of the UK by the Secretary of State and then
published two months later.

In the UK the treaty will become law through an arcane process
known as "Orders in Council" as international treaties
are agreed by the Privy Council (Cabinet Ministers automatically
become Privy Counsellors) in the name of the head of state, the
Queen . This procedure falls under what is called the "royal
prerogative", that is where powers have never been passed
over to parliament and Ministers exercise powers on behalf of
the Monarch - a thoroughly undemocratic procedure.

The Queen calls a meeting of the Privy Council, usually four
or five Cabinet Ministers, at which there is no discussion, simply
agreement on matters before it. The decision to agree the new
treaty on extradition then becomes an "Order", which
as it relates to existing legislation (the 1989 Extradition Act)
is subject to the 1946 Statutory Instruments Act. Under this
latter Act the proposal will be "laid before" parliament
(simply listed in the daily order paper) and if MPs do not demand
a vote on the floor of the house it automatically become law.
It is almost unknown for MPs to force a debate and vote on such
a matter because it means disrupting the planned agenda of the
government of the day [7].

Although the UK-US treaty has been signed and will be ratified
under the 1989 Extradition Act [8], it will only be implemented
when this act is replaced by new extradition legislation currently
before parliament. The government's Extradition Bill will implement
the EU Framework Decision on a European Arrest Warrant [4], shortening
procedures and removing a number of barriers to extradition.
The UK-US treaty applies many of these 'streamlined' provisions,
though it is highly debatable whether the US should be treated
on an equal footing to European states (see below).

The relationship between the various pieces of legislation
raise a serious question about the timing of the UK-US agreement.
When the current Extradition Bill becomes law, it is likely that
future bilateral extradition treaties will no longer be agreed
by statutory instrument, but will have to be approved by both
the House of Commons and Lords as well [9]. By agreeing the
extradition treaty with the US just before the adoption of new
domestic extradition legislation, parliamentary scrutiny has
been completely avoided and the agreement will be implemented
without debate.

Relationship
between the UK-US and EU-US extradition treatiesThe
implications of this highly questionable timing do not stop there.
The UK-US extradition treaty also means that the government will
also avoid 'normal' parliamentary ratification of the controversial
EU-US extradition treaty signed on 6 June 2003. Scrutiny committees
in both the Commons and the Lords contributed significantly to
pressure from civil society to publish the text of the draft
EU-US agreements shortly before their adoption [10]. It is therefore
ironic that the extradition treaty may be concluded by the UK
without any further meaningful parliamentary scrutiny whatsoever.
As the UK government's declaration on the treaty said:

"The United Kingdom welcomes the Agreements between
the European Union and the United States of America on mutual
legal assistance in criminal matters and extradition. Much of
the legislation necessary to implement the agreements in the
United Kingdom is already in force and, where it is not, Parliament's
consideration of the draft legislation is, for the most part,
at an advanced stage. The United Kingdom aims to complete its
domestic requirements in the near future and looks forward to
applying the Agreements at the earliest opportunity thereafter"

The UK-US extradition treaty also goes further than the provisions
in the EU-US agreement in a number of areas. Most notably, the
other EU states could not agree to the abolition of the evidence
requirement for the US side while it refused to drop the 'probable
cause' requirement and this issue was omitted from the agreed
EU-US treaty. So as the UK government welcomed the EU agreement,
all the other (public) member state declarations reserved the
right to consider the constitutional implications of the agreement
before the agreement is concluded [11].

Conclusion

There are a number of questions that need to be asked about
this treaty. The lack of reciprocity over evidence requirements
and the manner in which the agreement was signed and will be
implemented are obvious concerns. The removal of other safeguards
and ambiguity over speciality, the death penalty, political offences
and ne bis in idem are also important. This has all been done
in the name of 'efficiency':

"This new treaty will mean much closer co-operation
and cut out much of the paperwork which has led to unnecessary
delays in the current system and allowed criminals to exploit
loopholes and deliberately thwart justice." - David
Blunkett, 31 March 2001.

While it is true that there will be much less paperwork and
faster procedures, it is an old adage that lengthy extradition
proceedings are often both inevitable and necessary in the interest
of justice. The reduction of standards is all the more alarming
in the context of widespread about US failure to respect international
law. Various examples put the new treaty in context.

Judicial
cooperation with the United States: ten areas of concernA number of cases and international human rights issues
raise serious concern about the new UK-US extradition agreement
and the recent EU-US treaties on extradition and mutual legal
assistance.

1. The US regularly breaches international law

The US government justifies breaches of international law
since 11 September on the basis of the 'war on terrorism'. This
does not hide the fact that US violations were increasingly evident
before this time, not least where extradition procedures and
UK court procedures are concerned:

"There is a growing body of case law and evidence
that the United States of America is breaching the procedures
of the extradition treaties under which it seeks the return of
suspects to face trial. It does so at the cost of the rights
of individuals concerned, the principles of 'comity and reciprocity'
upon which extradition procedures are founded, and the British
tax payer" (Linda Woolley, extradition specialist and
partner in criminal department, Kingsley Napley, June 2001).
[12]

The Home Office would probably argue that the 'streamlined'
UK-US extradition treaty will lead to a reduction in breaches
of law and procedure, though this is only possible by weakening
or removing the minimum standards for the treatment of suspects
and defendants that have been breached in the first place.

The new treaty brings extradition procedures with the US into
line with extradition procedures to European countries, necessary
we are told because the US is our "biggest single extradition
partner" (this again is somewhat disingenuous: as the Home
Office website states: "the majority of extraditions from
the United Kingdom take place under the European Convention on
Extradition").

There are several reasons why the US should not be considered
an 'equal' to Council of Europe states for judicial cooperation
in criminal maters. Primarily, the US is not a signatory to any
of the international human rights conventions applicable to judicial
cooperation between European states. So while are there are concerns
about judicial standards in certain Council of Europe countries
(not to mention several EU countries) at least all are party
to the European Convention on Human Rights and potentially accountable
through the European Court of Human Rights.

2. The US is legally and politically unaccountable

The degree of protection provided by the ECHR and Strasbourg
Court is not applicable to the US which is not accountable to
any international court. It has also shown in the past its disregard
for judgments from international tribunals such as the International
Court of Justice (ICJ). The 1986 ICJ ruling against the US for
the "unlawful use of force" in Nicaragua is the most
famous example [13]. More relevant here is the execution of a
German national by the State of Arizona in 1999, breaching an
ICJ order for provisional measures to suspend the execution pending
a judgment in relation to a breach of international obligations.
The United States Solicitor-General in that case took the position
that "an order of the International Court of Justice indicating
provisional measures is not binding and does not furnish a basis
for judicial relief" [5].

It follows that any breach of international obligations or
human rights which might occur following extradition or mutual
legal assistance to the US will not be effectively judicially
reviewable. Nor is the US politically accountable to any international
organisation (such as the EU or Council of Europe ministerial
committees).

3. US contempt for the International Criminal Court

Since 'unsigning' the 1988 Rome Treaty on the International
Criminal Court (which entered into force on 1 July 2002), the
US has secured an apparently rolling annual immunity for US peacekeepers
from the UN Security Council after threatening the withdrawal
of all its personnel from UN operations around the globe if it
did not get its way. It then began applying massive diplomatic
and economic pressure on states that have ratified the ICC statute
to grant exemptions to US citizens [14].

This begs the question that if the US is so unwilling to cooperate
in the international prosecution of genocide, war crimes and
crimes against humanity, why is the UK, and to a lesser extent
the EU, so willing to cooperate in its international prosecution
of its 'war on terrorism' (as distinct from the war on 'rogue
states')? Meanwhile, it is likely that if other ICC signatory
states sought to bring a case against Israel (another ICC pariah),
the US might even seek to undermine the prosecution by pressuring
smaller states not to participate. In this way the US threatened
to pull the NATO headquarters out of Brussels if Belgium did
not repeal a retrospective law on war crimes and extraterritorial
jurisdiction under which charges against Ariel Sharon would have
been pursued [15].

4. Guantanamo Bay, military tribunals and breach of the
Geneva Conventions

There is increasing concern over the conditions of detention
of many non-US nationals being held in legal limbo and the potential
use of military tribunals at Camp Delta, Guantanamo Bay. The
US is refusing to release British nationals for trial in the
UK and the British government apparently unwilling to press the
point. As Louise Christian who is acting for three of the families
of the British detainees argues:

"nothing less than bringing the British citizens back
to the UK will suffice. We have the most draconian terrorism
laws in Europe. If they cannot be prosecuted and convicted here
then clearly they should not be." [16]

The situation in Guantanamo raises doubts as to the compatibility
of any reduction in safeguards for extradition to the US with
the UK's obligations under the Human Rights Act and the ECHR.
Moreover, discretion in the application of the speciality rule
in the new UK-US Treaty (see above and further below):

"appears to allow for the possibility of the Secretary
of State consenting to indefinite detention in Guantanamo Bay
for an offence other than that which a person was extradited
for once that person has been returned to the US"

The rule of speciality was one of a number of issues on which
agreement could not be reached in the EU-US treaty, leaving open
the possibility that in implementing the Treaty other EU countries
will also allow for consent to waive speciality.

5. US lack of evidence: Lofti Raissi

The failed attempt by the US to extradite Lofti Raissi from
the UK raises doubts about the wisdom of removing the evidence
requirement in the new treaty. The Algerian pilot was arrested
on 21 September 2001 on 'holding charges' in a request to extradite
him to the US that alleged he had trained the 11 September hijackers.
At his first appearance in Bow Street Magistrates Court, US authorities
said they had video evidence and telephone evidence connecting
him to one of the hijackers and that he would likely face charges
of conspiracy to murder and, potentially, the death penalty.

Over a series of court appearances, the FBI's 'evidence' diminished.
The video evidence, for example, turned out to be a webcam shot
of Lofti not with a hijacker, but his cousin. Finally, on 12
February 2002, after spending almost five months locked up for
more than 23 hours a day in Belmarsh high-security prison, Mr
Raissi was freed on conditional bail on the grounds that the
US did not have enough evidence to bring a prosecution [17].

As suggested above, not only would Mr Raissi almost certainly
have been extradited under the new treaty, it is possible that
he could now be the subject of a new US request requiring no
evidence (under Article 22(1) the Treaty covers offences committed
before its entry into force). The US also wants Raissi on lesser
charges of lying on his application for a pilot's licence (failing
to declare knee surgery for an old tennis injury and a conviction
for theft when he was 17).

The US is also seeking the extradition of a Mr Makhlulis from
the UK on the sole basis of testimony from Ahmed Ressam, who
was sentenced in 2001 to 140 years for terrorist offences that
included causing an explosion at Los Angeles airport. Ressam
did not mention Makhlulis' name until well after his own conviction
and only then as part of a 'deal' with the US authorities to
see him freed. The courts have approved the extradition and representations
now being to made to the Home Secretary who will give the order
to proceed with the extradition or halt proceedings.

6. US non-disclosure of evidence: the Kashamu case

In the case of Kashamu, the Divisional Court quashed the committal
order "by reason of the unfairness of the proceedings resulting
from the non-disclosure of crucial evidence" by the US government
- a witness in the US prosecution case had in fact identified
someone other than the defendant. It then tried to supply a different
identifying witness. The UK court cited correspondence between
US prosecuting authorities which showed that non-disclosure was
a conscious decision made on the basis that "the extradition
treaty.. did not require that such disclosures be made".
The Court declined to categorise the conduct as "anything
other than the error of judgment that it is conceded to be".

7. US breaches of speciality in extradition cases

The speciality rule means that a person cannot be tried for
offences other than those for which they were extradited (unless
first given an opportunity to return to the territory that extradited
them). In an article on breaches of extradition procedures and
UK court procedures, extradition specialist Linda Woolley cites
a number of examples where the US has flouted the speciality
rule. The most interesting of these is the case of Robert Gross,
which highlights not only breaches of procedural guarantees,
but the contempt in which the US holds those who exercise and
successfully assert their rights to protection under UK law [12].

In 1998 the US Department of Justice sought the extradition
of Dr Robert Gross from the UK for false accounting, obtaining
a passport by deception, bribery and contempt of court. The international
warrant on which Gross was arrested valued the fraud at US $2
million. In fact the Bow Street magistrate committed Dr Gross
only on six charges of false accounting (with a value of US $3,450)
and one of obtaining a passport by deception. Despite this, correspondence
from the US authorities continued to state that Gross would be
tried on the basis of the wider alleged fraud, bribery and contempt
of court. Gross's lawyers made detailed representations to the
UK Home Office that if extradited Gross would not be treated
in accordance with the speciality provisions of the treaty.

Suddenly, in May 2000, the US authorities withdrew their extradition
request. This apparently welcome news evaporated when the US
Justice department wrote to Dr Gross suggesting that the decision
to withdraw the extradition request had been a deliberate tactical
step designed to put maximum pressure on him to return - leaving
him without the protections of extradition such as trial guarantees
upon which he should have been entitled to rely. He was effectively
left in exile. The letter also suggested that Dr Gross should
be punished for defending the extradition despite the fact that
he had simply pursued his legal rights under UK law, and moreover,
that his applications to the court had been successful and the
conduct of the US authorities criticised.

The letter from the US also wrongly asserted that there was
"no end of the extradition process in sight", whereas
representations to the Home Secretary are the final stage in
the extradition process. One conclusion to the proceedings would
have been for the Home Secretary to order Dr Gross's return only
if clear and unambiguous undertakings were given to the US government
to protect his position. By acting as it did, the US Department
of Justice avoided having to give those undertakings, effectively
undermining the whole purpose of the extradition process at great
cost to the defendant, the UK prosecuting authorities, the courts
and the British taxpayer which had brought, heard and funded
the proceedings for nearly four years.

8. Breaches of by the US of mutual legal assistance rules

Linda Woolley argues that a:

"similar position prevails in the field of mutual
assistance, where US courts countenance the production and use
of unlawfully obtained material and the use of evidence provided
for a specific offence in relation to others" [12]

In the case of Zacarias Moussaoui, the FBI had apparently
concocted an elaborate plan to use mutual legal assistance provisions
to conduct a search of Moussaoui's computer by extraditing temporarily
extraditing him to France since a warrant could not be granted
in the US.

A month before the 11 September attacks Moussaoui had aroused
suspicion when he paid cash to learn how to fly a 747-400 though
only trained in a single engine Cessna. He was detained for overstaying
his visa by the FBI who were unable to link him to terrorist
activity nor, according to the Washington Post, satisfy the probable
cause requirement to obtain a warrant to search his laptop [18].
According to the newspaper French intelligence agencies then
linked Moussaoui to Chechen rebels, though could still not provide
enough evidence for the warrant. To circumvent this requirement,
the FBI then apparently planned to deport Moussaoui to Paris,
where he could be held for three days as the French authorities
sought a way to conduct the search. The attacks on 11 September
gave the authorities probable cause and proceedings against Moussaoui
are underway.

9. Mistaken identity

"The case of Derek Bond, the British national arrested
in South Africa on a US extradition request which turned out
to be based on mistaken identity is another demonstration that
requests for extradition to the United States cannot necessarily
be taken on face value and that procedural safeguards must be
maintained in extradition to countries which retain the death
penalty and are not judicially accountable for their actions"
(Justice [5]; see also the Guardian, 27 February 2003
[19])

10. Beyond the pale? Abduction

Alvarez-Machain was forcibly abducted from Mexico to the US
by Drug Enforcement Agents. The Mexican authorities protested
and the US supreme Court held that the abduction was "shocking"
and in violation of general principles of international law.
However, the court also held that the conduct did not violate
the extradition treaty with Mexico or prohibit trial of the accused.
In a ruling on a similar case, the UK House of Lords took the
opposite view [20].

In this context many were shocked to read in the Guardian
newspaper recently of the detention of two London based businessmen,
Bisher al-Rawi and Jamil al-Banna in Guantanamo Bay. In November
2002 they were arrested by British police at Gatwick airport.
Although freed without charge and allowed to travel to Gambia
where they own a peanut oil factory they were rearrested on arrival
and detained for a month by local secret police, allegedly at
request of the British government, and questioned by the US agents.
They were then flown to a CIA interrogation centre at Bagram
airbase in Afghanistan, before being transferred to Camp Delta
in Cuba where they are held for alleged links to al-Qaida.

Refusing to help the men, the government maintains that it
will not press the US authorities over the men's fate because
they are not British citizens. Mr al-Rawi is an Iraqi national
who has been living here for 19 years and Mr al-Banna is a Jordanian
who was granted refugee status in Britain three years ago. If,
as the Guardian suggests, the UK ordered their arrest
in Gambia and the CIA their subsequent transfer to Cuba, a clear
and deliberate breach of their human rights has taken place and
the rule of law and extradition ignored [21].

Another relevant case maybe that of Nizar al-Khazraji, the
head of Iraq's armed forces from 1987 to 1990, who fled to Jordan
in 1995 and four years later applied for political asylum in
Denmark. He was denied asylum as immigration authorities thought
it likely he was involved in chemical weapon attacks on the Kurds
in northern Iraq in the late 1980s. But he was allowed to stay
in Denmark under special rules applied to individuals thought
to be at serious risk if they return home.

Khazraji had been under investigation by Danish authorities
for his alleged crimes since 2001. He had surrendered his passport
and had to report to police three times a week in his home town
of Soro, south of Copenhagen. On 17 March 2003, Khazraji disappeared
having earlier told Reuters he wished to leave Denmark for Iraq
and join efforts to topple President Saddam Hussein before a
U.S.-led attack on his country. International media reports had
also linked Khazraji to the U.S. war build-up in Iraq, saying
the former army chief was on a Bush government short-list of
suitable persons to succeed Saddam.

On April 2, Danish Justice Minister, Ms. Lene Espersen, wrote
to the US ambassador asking for "any information from relevant
American authorities on the circumstances under which Khazraji
disappeared and his whereabouts since March 17". Espersen
noted in her letter that the disappearance had been the subject
of intense debate in Danish media and in parliament. She said
she was enclosing a selection of newspaper articles offering
theories on what had happened to Khazraji. One theory was that,
in view of current developments in Iraq, he had escaped with
the aim of returning there. "It has also been proposed,
however, that he escaped with the assistance of authorities of
foreign countries or that he was even abducted by such authorities,"
Espersen wrote. "In this connection, the Central Intelligence
Agency has been mentioned in several articles," she said.

The U.S. embassy replied "If Khazraji has indeed left
the country the embassy has no knowledge of how he did so or
his whereabouts". The US embassy in Copenhagen may not know,
but has failed to answer the question in respect to authorities
in the US itself, such as CIA or others. According to Nizar al-Khazraji's
son who has now left Denmark and is living in Norway, sources
in the Middle East area trusted by the family say his father
is in Iraq and is doing political work there (this has not yet
been confirmed by other sources).

Footnotes

[1] Extradition Treaty between the Government
of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and
the Government of the United States of America, 31 March 2003:
2003 UK-US extradition treaty

[2] Extradition Treaty between the Government of the United
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government
of the United States of America, 1972: 1972
UK-US extradition treaty

[7] As this particular treaty is both delegated legislation
(by statutory instrument) under an existing 1989 Extradition
Act and is based on an international treaty it raises yet another
arcane procedure known as the "Ponsonby Rules". Arthur
Ponsonby, a life-long pacifist and campaigner for open government,
was an Under-Secretary of State at the Foreign Office in the
Ramsay MacDonald Labour government of 1924. He gave an undertaking,
during the 2nd reading of the Treaty of Peace (Turkey) Bill on
1 April 1924, that the House of Commons would be informed of
all treaties and agreements and that they would be "laid"
before the House for 21 days and it became the constitutional
practice. Unlike most other national legislatures where written
constitutions gives parliaments the formal power of ratifying
treaties and international agreements this power rests with the
government in the UK (exercising the royal prerogative on behalf
of the monarch).

[9] In its proposed Extradition bill the government sought
to retain the power to enter into bilateral extradition treaties
by way of Privy Council Orders (the "negative procedure").
However, this has been strongly opposed by the Home Affairs Committees
in both the Commons and the Lords who state that a draft of the
order must be approved by both houses (the "positive procedure").
The government looks set to accept this change, see its response
in a special report on the Home
Affairs Select Committee's first report on the Extradition Bill

[11] Outcome of Proceedings of Justice and Home Affairs Council
meeting on: 6 June 2003, "Draft Council Decision concerning
the signature of an Agreement between EU - USA on mutual legal
assistance and extradition", 10409/03,
13 June 2003

[12] "Extradition: a study of the Abuse of by US authorities
of Treaty Obligations and UK Court Procedures", Linda Woolley,
Business Crime Newsletter, June 2001.

[20] In a similar case in the UK trial was prohibited, with
Lord Griffiths stating that "the judiciary accepts a responsibility
for the maintenance of the rule of law that embraces a willingness
to oversee executive action and to refuse to countenance behaviour
which threatens either basic human rights or the rule of law".

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