THOMAS, J.: Alfred
Adams appeals his conviction for trafficking cocaine. He argues the trial
court erred in refusing to suppress drugs found on his person during a traffic
stop. We affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

In July 2008, the North Charleston Police Department
(the Department) learned that Adams was involved in a shooting and attempted
robbery associated with a drug deal. Based on further investigation, the
Department believed Adams was a drug dealer whose source of supply was in
Atlanta, Georgia. The Department consequently installed a tracking device[1] on Adams's vehicle while the vehicle was parked in a public parking garage.
The Department did not seek a warrant or judicial order before installing the
device.

Five days later, the Department learned from the
device that Adams's vehicle traveled to Atlanta, remained in that area for less
than an hour, and began returning toward Charleston on Interstate 26.[2]
Around 11:55 p.m., the Department contacted Sergeant Timothy Blair, who was
accompanied by his drug dog and sitting in his cruiser at a rest area off of
the interstate. The Department instructed Sergeant Blair to "be on the
lookout" for the vehicle and stop it if it violated any traffic laws. As
Sergeant Blair entered the interstate, he spotted the vehicle and observed it
change lanes twice without using a turn signal. Sergeant Blair initiated a
traffic stop at 11:57 p.m., and the vehicle pulled into a gas station.

Sergeant Blair approached the driver's side of the vehicle
without his drug dog. Adams was driving, and Sergeant Blair advised him of the
violations. At that time, Adams "was acting very nervous. He had his
hands down below where [Sergeant Blair] couldn't see them." Sergeant
Blair asked Adams to keep his hands visible and noticed another vehicle turn
into the gas station as he initiated the stop. Sergeant Blair was worried the
second vehicle was a "trail vehicle" because the driver was watching
the traffic stop, acting "kind of panicky, looking back and forth,"
and "fidgeting with his jacket." Sergeant Blair requested backup out
of concern for his safety.

Officer James Greenawalt arrived approximately three
minutes later. He removed Adams from the vehicle and began a license check. Meanwhile,
Sergeant Blair used his dog to conduct a perimeter sniff of the vehicle.
During this period, Adams repeatedly attempted to talk to the officers, and his
eyes "were looking in other directions like trying to make a way for
escape." The dog alerted at the driver's door and then on the driver's
seat and center console.[3]

After the dog alerted, Officer Greenawalt began to pat
down Adams for weapons. In doing so, he felt a "jagged, round object"
in Adams's groin area that his training and experience led him to believe was
drugs. He placed Adams in handcuffs and retrieved the item, which was 141.62
grams of packaged cocaine. The license check was not complete when the dog
alerted and ensuing pat-down occurred. The drugs were found a little less than
8 minutes after Adams was pulled over. Adams was never issued a citation for
the traffic violations.

A Charleston County grand jury indicted Adams for
trafficking cocaine. During pretrial motions, Adams moved to suppress the
drugs, alleging the Department failed to obtain a warrant or court order before
installing the tracking device pursuant to the Fourth Amendment and section
17-30-140 of the South Carolina Code (Supp. 2011). The trial court agreed that
the Department violated the statute. However, the court held the violation did
not warrant suppression of the evidence without a corresponding constitutional
violation. Relying on United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 (1983), the
court held that the use of the tracking device was not a search. Moreover, the
court held the traffic stop, pat-down, and retrieval of the drugs did not
violate Adams's Fourth Amendment rights. Thus, the court found no
constitutional violation occurred, and the motion to suppress was denied.

Adams was found guilty and sentenced to twenty-five
years' imprisonment and a $50,000 fine. This appeal followed.

ISSUE ON APPEAL

Did the trial court err in denying Adams's motion to
suppress?

STANDARD OF REVIEW

"The admission
of evidence is within the discretion
of the trial court and will not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion. An
abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court's ruling is based on an error
of law or, when grounded in factual conclusions, is without evidentiary
support." State v. Wright, 391 S.C. 436, 442, 706 S.E.2d 324, 326
(2011) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). In Fourth
Amendment search and seizure cases, "an appellate court
must affirm if there is any evidence to support the ruling. The appellate
court will reverse only when there is clear error." Id. (citation
and internal quotation marks omitted).

ANALYSIS

Adams argues the trial court erred in denying his
motion to suppress because the drugs were obtained in violation of his Fourth
Amendment rights.[4]
Specifically, he maintains the Department's use of the tracking device constituted
an unlawful search because the Department did not obtain a prior warrant.[5]
We agree that the Department conducted an unlawful search by installing the tracking
device on Adams's vehicle and monitoring the vehicle's movements without
obtaining a prior warrant. However, this unlawful search did not require
suppression of the drugs.

I. The Fourth Amendment and Tracking
Device

"The Fourth Amendment provides in relevant part
that '[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated.'" United States v. Jones, 132
S.Ct. 945, 949 (2012) (alteration in quotation). "[S]earches and
seizures conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by
judge or magistrate, are perse unreasonable under the Fourth
Amendment—subject only to a few specifically established and well delineated
exceptions." Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 372 (1993)
(internal quotation marks omitted).

In United States v. Jones, the United States Supreme
Court held that "the Government's installation of a GPS device on a
target's vehicle, and its use of that device to monitor the vehicle's
movements, constitutes a 'search.'" 132 S.Ct.
at 949. The Court characterized the government's conduct as the "physical[] occup[ation of] private property for the purpose
of obtaining information." Id. The Court reasoned, "such a
physical intrusion would have been considered a 'search' within the meaning of
the Fourth Amendment when it was adopted." Id.

Here, the tracking device was installed while Adams's
vehicle was parked in a public parking garage, and the device was used to
monitor the vehicle's movements while it was on public streets and highways. Under Jones, the Department's installation of the device on Adams's vehicle
and use of that device to monitor the vehicle's movements constituted a "search."[6]
Therefore, the Department's failure to obtain a warrant made that search
unreasonable and resulted in a violation of Adams's constitutional rights.[7]
Nevertheless, we must still determine whether that violation required
suppression of the drugs seized from Adams's person. For the reasons below, we
find it did not.

II. The Exclusionary Rule and Adams's
Traffic Violations

Although the installation of the tracking device on
Adams's vehicle and monitoring of the vehicle's movements without a prior
warrant constituted an unlawful search, the State argues as an additional
sustaining ground that the exclusionary rule does not require suppression of
the drugs found on Adams's person. The State maintains Adams's traffic
violations were intervening criminal acts sufficient to cure the taint arising
from unlawfully installing the device and monitoring the vehicle.[8]
We agree.

The exclusionary rule prohibits the admission of
evidence that is the fruit of an unlawful search. Specifically, it prohibits
the admission of evidence (1) directly acquired during an unlawful search and
(2) later discovered and derivative of the unlawful search.[9]Murray v. United States, 487 U.S. 533, 536-37 (1988); see alsoWong
Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 488 (1963). However, under our case
law the exclusionary rule does not apply to evidence obtained during a search
or seizure conducted pursuant to an "intervening illegal act." State
v. Nelson, 336 S.C. 186, 194, 519 S.E.2d 786, 790 (1999); see alsoIn
re Jeremiah W., 361 S.C. 620, 624-25, 606 S.E.2d 766, 768 (2004).

In State v. Nelson, a police
officer driving behind the defendant flashed his high beams to get the
defendant's attention without intending to initiate a traffic stop. 336 S.C.
at 189, 519 S.E.2d at 787. The defendant then ran a stop sign and sped through
a neighborhood, and the officer initiated a traffic stop, with which the
defendant complied. Id. When the officer approached the defendant's
vehicle, he smelled alcohol and the defendant refused to participate in a field
sobriety test. Id. The defendant was arrested for driving under the
influence. Id. Our supreme court held that even if the officer acted
unlawfully in initially attempting to get the defendant's attention, the
evidence seized as a result of the subsequent traffic stop was admissible
because the intervening traffic violations "constituted new and distinct
crimes for which [the officer] had probable cause to stop [the
d]efendant." Id. at 194-95, 519 S.E.2d at 790.

In this case, Sergeant Blair witnessed
Adams commit two traffic violations before initiating the traffic stop. See S.C. Code Ann. § 56-5-2150(a)-(b) (2006) (providing that a driver must use his
turn signal to indicate the lane change he intends to make); S.C. Code Ann. §
56-5-6190 (2006) ("It is a misdemeanor for any person to violate any of
the provisions of this chapter unless such violation is by this chapter or
other law of this State declared to be a felony."). Thus, the trail of taint
arising from the Department's unlawful search was broken, and the intervening
illegal act exception permitted admission of the drugs so long as they were lawfully
obtained during the stop.

III. The Resulting Search and Seizure

Adams contends the traffic stop and
pat-down were unlawful because they were a mere pretext for a drug search. We
disagree.

A traffic stop initiated pursuant to a
traffic violation creating probable cause is not "rendered invalid by the
fact that it was a mere pretext for a narcotics search." State v.
Corley, 383 S.C. 232, 241, 679 S.E.2d 187, 191-92 (Ct. App. 2009) (internal
quotation marks omitted), affirmed
as modified by 392 S.C. 125, 708 S.E.2d 217 (2011); see alsoWhren v. United States, 517
U.S. 806, 813 (1996). A police officer's "subjective intentions play no
role in ordinary, probable-cause Fourth Amendment analysis." Corley,
383 S.C. at 241, 679 S.E.2d at 192 (internal quotation marks omitted); see
alsoWhren, 517 U.S. at 813. Therefore, Sergeant Blair's and
Officer Greenawalt's prior intentions and knowledge of Adams's involvement with
drugs did not prevent the officers from conducting a lawful traffic stop and
pat-down. A person stopped by the police in such a situation is protected from
abuse of their rights by our Fourth Amendment framework.

a. The Traffic Stop

Evidence in the record supports the trial court's
finding that the traffic stop was conducted consistently with Adams's Fourth
Amendment rights.

"Temporary detention of individuals
by the police during an automobile stop constitutes a 'seizure' of an
individual within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment." State v. Banda,
371 S.C. 245, 252, 639 S.E.2d 36, 40 (2006). However, "[t]he decision to
stop an automobile is reasonable where the police have probable cause to
believe that a traffic violation has occurred." Id.

A lawful traffic stop can become unlawful
if it exceeds the scope or duration necessary to complete its mission. State v. Pichardo, 367
S.C. 84, 98, 623 S.E.2d 840, 848 (Ct. App. 2005); see alsoIllinois
v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 407 (2005). An extension is permitted only if
(1) the encounter becomes consensual or (2) the officer has at least a
reasonable, articulable suspicion of other illegal activity. Pichardo,
367 S.C. at 99, 623 S.E.2d at 848. If an officer uses a drug dog to sniff the
exterior of a defendant's car during a lawful traffic stop, the sniff does not make
the traffic stop unlawful, even without any evidence of drug activity, so long
as the sniff does not extend the length of the stop beyond that time necessary
to complete the stop's purpose. Caballes, 543 U.S. at 407-09.

Here, Sergeant Blair had probable cause to
stop Adams's vehicle because he witnessed Adams commit two traffic violations.
The officers acted reasonably in instructing Adams to step out of the vehicle while
they waited for a license and registration report. Sergeant Blair was also
permitted to walk his drug dog around the vehicle while waiting for the
completion of Adams's license and registration check. The first alert occurred
a mere five to six minutes after the traffic stop began, and no evidence in the
record indicates the drug sniff extended the duration of the stop.[10]
Consequently, the officers' conduct up to that point was within constitutional
bounds. Whether the drugs were admissible depends upon whether the resulting
pat-down complied with Adams's Fourth Amendment rights.

b. The Pat-down

Evidence in the record supports the trial
court's finding that the pat-down of Adams and retrieval of the drugs complied
with his Fourth Amendment rights.

An officer conducting a lawful traffic
stop may conduct a pat-down search for weapons if the officer "has reason
to believe the person is armed and dangerous." State v. Smith, 329
S.C. 550, 556, 495 S.E.2d 798, 801 (Ct. App. 1998). "The officer need not
be absolutely certain that the individual is armed; the issue is whether a
reasonably prudent man in the circumstances would be warranted in the belief
that his safety or that of others was in danger." Terry v. Ohio, 392
U.S. 1, 27 (1968).

"The purpose of [a pat-down] search is not to
discover evidence of crime, but to allow the officer to pursue his
investigation without fear of violence." Dickerson, 508 U.S. at 373.
Therefore, a Terry "protective search—permitted without a warrant
and on the basis of reasonable suspicion less than probable cause—must be
strictly 'limited to that which is necessary for the discovery of weapons which
might be used to harm the officer or others nearby.'" Id. (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 26). "If the protective search goes beyond what
is necessary to determine if the suspect is armed, it is no longer valid under Terry and its fruits will be suppressed." Id.

Under the plain feel doctrine, an officer
may seize an item felt during a lawful pat-down search for weapons if the item's
contour or mass makes its incriminating character immediately apparent. Dickerson,
508 U.S. at 375-77; State v. Abrams, 322 S.C. 286, 288-89, 471 S.E.2d
716, 717-18 (Ct. App. 1996). If that character is not immediately apparent,
any manipulation of the item constitutes a further, unlawful search and the item
will be suppressed. Dickerson, 508 U.S. at 375-77.

In Minnesota v. Dickerson, the United States
Supreme Court held that evidence obtained during a pat-down for weapons was
inadmissible. During the pat-down, a police officer testified he "felt a
lump, a small lump . . . . [He] examined it with [his] fingers
and it slid and it felt to be a lump of crack cocaine in cellophane." 508
U.S. at 369. The Supreme Court deferred to the state supreme court's
interpretation of the record, which provided that the police's own testimony
belied "any notion that [the police] immediately recognized the lump as
crack cocaine. Rather, . . . the officer determined that the lump
was contraband only after squeezing, sliding and otherwise manipulating the contents
of the defendant's pocket—a pocket which the officer already knew contained no
weapon." Id. at 378 (internal quotation marks omitted). The Supreme
Court thus held that, although the police lawfully initiated the pat-down,
"the officer's continued exploration of the [defendant's] pocket after
having concluded that it contained no weapon" was a further search,
unsupported by the concern for weapons. Id.

In State v. Abrams, this court held evidence
seized during a pat-down was inadmissible. 322 S.C. at 287-89, 471 S.E.2d at
717-18. The officer testified that he felt a "hard instrument" that
was "tube like" and "about the size of a shotgun shell." Id.
Moreover, the officer explained that he thought the object "could have
been 'an instrument used to transport contraband' when he 'found out that there
were no weapons on [the defendant's] person.'" Id. Thus, the
court determined the evidence's incriminating character was not immediately
apparent and "[a]ny further search was
impermissible" because the officer did not believe the evidence was
contraband until after he concluded the defendant was unarmed. Id.

In contrast, this court in State v. Smith held
evidence obtained during a pat-down was admissible. 329 S.C. at 561, 495
S.E.2d at 804. Unlike in Abrams, the officer immediately determined the
evidence was drugs during the initial pat-down search; even though he did
squeeze the evidence further, the officer's "testimony indicate[d] he
determined the object was contraband as soon as he felt it," and the
"identification of the substance did not require additional squeezing or
manipulation." Id. at 560-61, 495 S.E.2d at 803-04.

Here, evidence in the record supports the
finding that Officer Greenawalt had reason to believe Adams was armed and
dangerous to conduct a pat-down for weapons. Adams exhibited suspicious
behavior, and the dog alerted for drugs before the pat-down began. SeeState
v. Banda, 371 S.C. 245, 253, 639 S.E.2d 36, 40 (2006) ("This Court has
recognized that because of the indisputable nexus between drugs
and guns, where an officer has reasonable suspicion that
drugs are present in a vehicle lawfully
stopped, there is an appropriate level of suspicion of criminal activity and
apprehension of danger to justify a frisk of both the driver and the passenger
in the absence of other factors alleviating the officer's safety
concerns." (internal quotation marks omitted)); see alsoTerry,
392 U.S. at 30 (holding that "where a police officer observes unusual
conduct which leads him reasonably to conclude in light of his experience that
criminal activity may be afoot and that the persons with whom he is dealing may
be armed and presently dangerous," he may conduct a pat-down for weapons).

Evidence in the record also supports the finding that
Officer Greenawalt immediately recognized the identity of the item. He felt a
"jagged, round object" in Adams's groin area while conducting the
pat-down search, and his training and experience led him to believe the object
was drugs. The record does not indicate he determined the evidence's identity
because of further manipulation of the object or that he determined Adams was
unarmed before concluding the evidence was drugs. In light of our standard of
review, therefore, the trial court properly denied the motion to suppress.

CONCLUSION

For the aforementioned reasons, we affirm
the trial court's denial of Adams's motion to suppress.

AFFIRMED.

WILLIAMS and LOCKEMY, JJ., concur.

[1] The tracking device was the size of a pack of
cigarettes, ran on its own battery, and sent information detailing its position
to the Department via satellite. The Department installed the device by
magnetically attaching it to the vehicle's undercarriage. The device did not
provide any information other than the vehicle's location.

[2] The Department did not learn this information from
any other source.

[3] The first alert occurred five to six minutes after
Adams was pulled over.

[4] Adams also argues the drugs should be suppressed
because the Department failed to obtain a prior judicial order pursuant to section
17-30-140 in installing the tracking device and monitoring Adams's vehicle.In light of our finding that the Department failed to obtain a warrant necessitated
by the Fourth Amendment, however, we do not address this argument. SeeState v. Bostick, 392
S.C. 134, 139 n.4, 708 S.E.2d 774, 776
n.4 (2011) (holding that if one issue is dispositive of another, the court need
not address the other issue).

[5] The State contends Adams does not raise a Fourth
Amendment argument on appeal. However, a review of Adams's appellate materials
makes clear that he does.

[6] The device in this appeal operated identically to the
device in Jones. SeeJones, 132
S.Ct. at 948 (stating that its device was installed on the vehicle's
undercarriage, used batteries, and transmitted information via satellite).

[7] The State does not contend an exigency existed to
foreclose the need to obtain a warrant while placing the device on the vehicle
and monitoring the vehicle's movements.

[8] As a second additional sustaining ground, the State claims
suppression is not required because the Department used the tracking device in
good-faith reliance upon United States v. Knotts, which the State
contends Jones later overruled. SeeDavis v. United States,
131 S.Ct. 2419, 2434 (2011) (providing that the exclusionary rule does not
apply "when the police conduct a search in objectively reasonable reliance
on binding appellate precedent" that was later overruled). We need not
address this argument because we find the drugs were obtained after intervening
illegal acts and during a lawful traffic stop and pat-down search. SeeBostick, 392 S.C. at 139
n.4, 708 S.E.2d at 776 n.4 (holding that if
one issue is dispositive of another, the court need not address the other
issue).

[9] Here, the movement of Adams's vehicle was the
"direct evidence" obtained as a result of the unlawful search—the Department's
installation of the device and monitoring of the vehicle. In contrast, the
drugs subsequently seized from Adams's person constitute evidence derivative of
the unlawful search.

[10] In fact, Adams does not contend the stop's duration
was unlawfully extended.