If Major Anderson had added no further word to the
clear and straightforward statement and recommendation
thus far quoted, his professional judgment and manly
sense of duty would stand honorably vindicated before
posterity. But his language of loyalty, of wisdom,
of humanity, of soldierly devotion, which ought to
have elicited a reply as inspiring as a drum-roll
or a trumpet-blast, brought him no kindred echo.
There was fear in the Executive Mansion, conspiracy
in the Cabinet, treason and intrigue in the War Department.
Chilling instructions came that he might employ civilians
in fatigue and police duty, and that he might send
his proposed party of laborers to Castle Pinckney.
Meanwhile some of his suggestions would be under consideration;
besides, he was cautioned to send his communications
to the Adjutant-General or Secretary of War, with
the evident purpose to forestall and prevent any patriotic
order or suggestion which might otherwise reach him
from General Scott.

Nevertheless, Anderson did not weary in his manifest
duty. His letters of November 28 and December
1, though perhaps not as full and urgent, are substantial
repetitions of his former recommendations. The
growing excitement of the Charleston populace and
the increasing danger to the forts are restated with
emphasis. He says that there appears to be a
romantic desire urging the South Carolinians to have
possession of Fort Moultrie. Various reports
come, that as soon as the State should secede the
forts would be demanded, and if not surrendered, they
would be taken. All rumors and remarks indicate
a fixed purpose to have these works. The Charlestonians
are drilling nightly, and making every preparation
for the fight which they say must take place.

Once more he repeated that the security of Fort Moultrie
would be more greatly increased by throwing garrisons
into Castle Pinckney and Fort Sumter than by anything
that could be done in strengthening its own defenses.
He sent a detailed report of his command to force again
upon the attention of the Department his fatal deficiency
in numbers, and to show the practical impossibility
of repelling an assault, or resisting a siege with
any reasonable hope of success. His letters reached
the same inevitable conclusion: “The question
for the Government to decide—­and the sooner
it is done the better—­is, whether, when
South Carolina secedes, these forts are to be surrendered
or not. If the former, I must be informed of it,
and instructed what course I am to pursue. If
the latter be the determination, no time is to be
lost in either sending troops, as already suggested,
or vessels of war to this harbor. Either of these
courses may cause some of the doubting States to join
South Carolina. I shall go steadily on preparing
for the worst, trusting hopefully in the God of battles
to guard and guide me in my course.”