The views expressed in FMSO publications and reports are those of the authors and
do not necessarily represent the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.

Air Operations in Low Intensity Conflict:
The Case of Chechnya

RECENT CONFLICTS in Chechnya and Bosnia indicate that for the immediate future,
low intensity conflicts (LIC) will predominate over high-intensity Operation Desert
Stormtype scenarios. The sober reality is that these skirmishes, according to Gen
Charles Boyd, US Air Force, Retired, cannot produce an enduring solution with
military forceair or groundonly one that will last until it departs and
that a reliance on air power alonethe strike optionin this type of
terrain with these kinds of targets has never held any real promise of conflict
resolution.1

Boyds comments appear to hold for the conflict from December 1994 to August 1996
between Russian and Chechen rebel forces. Here, one of the combatants was a former
superpower and the other a loose collection of rebels armed only with ground weapons.
Against no credible air threat other than antiquated ZSU-23/4 air defense artillery, the
Russian air force, while effective, was unable to make a major impact on the course and
outcome of the fighting. As RAND analyst Ben Lambeth noted,

Russias war against Chechnya was emblematic of the security challenges the air
force is most likely to face in the decade ahead. The war was regional yet remote from the
center of Russia. It featured a technologically unsophisticated yet determined ethnic
opponent. It presented no air-to-air threat and offered a permissive environment for
attacking aircraft other than at low altitude. . . . Finally, it entailed little by way of
an opposing air force or target array and accordingly did not place great demands on the
air force for high-technology performance. All in all, despite the occasional effective
use of precision-guided weapons against key targets, quantity prevailed against quality in
air force operations in Chechnya.2

This short assessment examines two aspects of air operations in Chechnya.3
First, it focuses on which tactics and operations worked (within the context of a Russian
military undergoing severe financial and equipment-related hardships that limit training
for such operations). Second, it examines which aircraft fared better in the
conflictrotary or fixed-wing.

The Air Threat

Chechnya, a republic located in the southwest corner of Russia between the Caspian and
Black Seas (the Caucasus region of the country), actually started its break from Russia on
21 August 1991, two days after the August coup in the former Soviet Union, and declared
its independence from Russia on 6 September 1991. Dzhokhar Dudayev, a former general in
the Soviet air force, was invited to the post of president by the Amalgamated Congress of
the Chechen People from Estonia (where some Chechens were in exile). Later, he was
popularly elected and advocated freeing Chechnya from Russia. Many Russians in the current
regime considered the elections illegal and therefore characterized Dudayevs
presidency as illegitimate.4 Russias Fifth Congress of Peoples
Deputies not only decreed the elections illegal but also declared Dudayevs regime
unconstitutional.5 By the latter half of 1993, a Dudayev opposition developed
in Chechnya that evolved into a small-scale guerrilla war. By the spring of 1994, the
Dudayev opposition called upon Russia to support it and help establish constitutional
order. Russia agreed. In November 1994, the Dudayev opposition force, supported by the
Russian security services, led an attack to unseat Dudayev.6 The operation
failed dismally, and Russia decided to intervene militarily.

At the start of the conflict between Chechnya and Russia, Chechen president Dudayev had
nearly 265 aircraft. Nearly half of the force had been left by the Russian army when it
evacuated the Chechen Republic in 1992. The abandoned aircraft included 80 L-29 Delfin
combat trainers, 39 L-39 Albatross trainers, three MiG-17 fighters, two MiG-15UTIs, as
well as six An-2 and two Mi-8 helicopters.7 Only about 40 percent of the force,
however, was combat ready. According to Russian sources, Su-24mr reconnaissance aircraft
observed the active preparation of Dudayevs aircraft for imminent combat in November
1994.8 This caused Russia to preempt the Chechen preparations with attacks on
airfields on the morning of 1 December 1994 with Su-25 aircraft (some say Su-27s also
participated).

For two reasons, Chechen aircraft allegedly presented a threat to both the impending
ground-troop operations and the civilian population of the Russian Federation: (1) their
potential ability to conduct kamikaze-style attacks against Russian nuclear or power
plants (by filling up trainer aircraft with explosives and flying them into the
structures; the presence of an ejection seat in these aircraft could allow Chechen pilots
to turn them into de facto cruise missiles); and (2) their ability to drop bombs on
advancing Russian forces and disrupt their movement. To counter this threat, Russia
attempted to destroy Chechen air assets on the runways and, as the war spread beyond
Grozny, to use the air force and army aviation in close air support (CAS) and interdiction
missions, including the bombing of smaller cities. The air force also bombed Grozny in
support of combat forces there, visually turning the city into another Stalingrad.

The Russians initially gathered their forces at airfields in the North Caucasus
Military District, with most of the aircraft provided by the Fourth Air Army. They
employed aircraft from frontal (high-performance), army, and internal-forces aviation.
Each had its own air corridor, figuratively speaking, and its own missions.9
Aircraft included 140 combat planes (Su-25, Su-22M, and Su-24), 55 helicopters (Mi-24,
Mi-8, and Mi-6), and military transport aircraft (An-12, An-22, An-124, and Il-76). The
Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) contributed 12 Mi-8MT helicopters.

To prevent Dudayev from constructing an air bridge with a country such as Turkey,
Russias air force used A-50 airborne warning and control system (AWACS) aircraft and
from two to six MiG-31 and Su-27 aircraft to conduct combat patrols and serve as an air
cap. From all appearances, they were unchallenged and successful.

The Air Operation

The performance of Russias rotary and fixed-wing aircraft in Chechnya fell below
expectations against this lightly armed force. Problems contributing to the
militarys performance include rough terrain, harsh weather conditions, lack of
training time, aged equipment, and poor stocks of supplies, all of which greatly limited
the effectiveness of air operations. Russian pilots tried to offset these limitations with
initiative and adjustments after the initial stages of the fighting. New methods were
found to acquire targets and to find the right weapon mix. Adjustments were also made in
the tactics and techniques of LIC flying against mobile targets that hid among the
civilian population. This did little to limit civilian casualties, however, in that ground
offensives occurred without preliminary processing of the targets of attack from the air.10
As a result, the civilian-to-rebel death ratio was nearly eight to one,
according to former Security Council chief Alexander Lebed.

One Russian analyst observed that the Russian air force apparently learned very little
from Desert Storm air operations. The focus on Dudayevs air force deflected
attention from the destruction of Chechnyas administrative and military command and
control (C2) facilities, communications hubs, and key elements of the
infrastructure. Most people believed this to be an intelligence and planning failure of
the Military District headquarters.11

Another observation was that this LIC environment offered the same opportunities for
the use of information-warfare capabilities as did any large-scale conflict. For example,
one recommendation early in the conflict called for dramatically increasing the role of
electronic warfare (EW) units and creating a total information vacuum around Chechnya.
Another called for the use of portable jammers near guerrilla bases and the suppression of
satellite communication channels. Commanders were urged to train, equip, and air-drop
raiding and reconnaissance parties into the rear of the Chechens to disrupt lines of
communications; further, they were to utilize aircraft to the maximum extent possible to
conduct strikes against guerrillas utilizing self-guided (fire and forget) or
precision-guided weapons.12 The Chechens, however, conducted the most powerful
information operations through the mass media, mobilizing local opinion while demoralizing
the Russian population. As the chief of the Russian Federal Security Service noted,
Yes, the Russian authorities lost the information war. . . . How splendidly Chechnya
information Minister Movladi Udugov is operating, how skillful and adroit he is at feeding
the press with all kinds of lies, distortions, and misrepresentations of the facts!13

In fact, the purported use of information-warfare techniques eventually allowed the
Russian air force to eliminate President Dudayev. In April, while talking on a cellular
phone, he was reportedly targeted by a Russian A-50 aircraft (the Russian AWACS), which is
capable of searching two hundred targets at one time. The A-50 relayed the information to
an Su-25 ground-attack aircraft that had laser and TV-guided bombs under its wings. A
photo taken from the warhead as it approached Dudayev was printed in the newspaper Argumenti
I Fakti, a publication thought to have close ties with Russian intelligence.14

Rotary Aircraft

Russia assembled close to 55 helicopters at the start of the conflict. By late March
1995, the number had risen to 105, including 52 Mi-24s. One flight of Mi-9 C2
ships was also reportedly present.15 Five helicopters (two Mi-8s and three
Mi-24s) were lost to hostile fire in the first three months of the conflict.16

Colonel-General of Aviation Vitaliy Pavlov, the commander of ground-troop aviation (an
element separate from the air force), had flown missions in Afghanistan and was awarded
the Hero of the Soviet Union medal for his bravery. He also flew missions in Chechnya.
Pavlov noted that the helicopter aviation grouping was primarily used to transport troops
and evacuate the sick and wounded at the start of the conflict. They also supported the
movement of columns and acted as communications relays, but only rarely served as attack
helicoptersand never bombed targets in Grozny. Initially, only the most experienced
pilots participated.17

Chechnyas terrain, mountainous to the south and on the edges, is mixed with
plains throughout the center of the country. Thus, pilots could utilize both
target-approach maneuvers, as in Afghanistan (for the mountains) and practice-range
maneuvers (for the plains). Pilot tactics included flying at extremely low altitudes and
at very high speeds to the targets, thereby limiting Chechen visual detection and response
time; approaching targets from different directions; making hard maneuvers before the
approach to the target; departing at low altitudes; providing mutual covering fire; and
using EW equipment (as well as decoy flares and other devices).18 For Russian
pilots, there were no simulated practice runs, such as those conducted by the coalition
forces in Bosnia (using PowerScene imagery software).

Helicopters integrated strikes in coordination with frontal aviation. On occasion,
Mi-24 helicopters and Su-25 aircraft conducted operations against guerrilla
fortifications. Army helicopters also operated alone in a mode known as
target-of-opportunity roving and against marked targets or on requests from
ground troops.19 The most intense use of helicopter operations occurred in May
1995, when the antiquated Mi-24 carried out the majority of the fire-support missions. By
the end of the month, five to six combat sorties were being flown each day. In addition to
supporting advancing units in the central and southern parts of Chechnya, helicopters
assisted in searching out Dudayevs sabotage/terrorist detachments that had
penetrated the Russian troops rear areas.

Coordination with ground troops was often difficult and aggravated by the absence of
timely and accurate reconnaissance informationthe key to the success of the
helicopters mission. Reconnaissance troops, inserted and extracted by helicopters in
most instances,20 themselves noted that they were introduced into situations
with too much haste and without coordination with infantry subunits or with aviation
assets. Reconnaissance missions in Chechnya included the detection of enemy-fire
positions, the covert study of the defensive systems of villages where Chechen rebels were
concentrated, and the destruction of individual groups of fighters. Missions were
difficult to perform due to a lack of portable radio sets, night-vision devices, silencers
for weapons, and binocularskey items for reconnaissance personnel.

Finally, several misunderstandings occurred between ground-force commanders and
helicopter personnel simply because commanders tried to keep their own missions secret,
issuing only specific instructions to units working together. As a result, one unit often
did not know what the other was doing in an operation.21

At the start of the conflict, Russian pilots had only a poor understanding of Chechen
tactics, which included controlling mobile air defense weapons via radio and changing
these systems positions constantly. The Chechens also tried to integrate and
synchronize the employment of these weapons, attempting to engage targets with the full
set of weapons in the inventory: small arms, heavy-caliber machine guns, cannons, and
grenade launchers. The Chechens made wide use of ambushes, trying to pin down a helicopter
once it entered a zone of effective fire by massing fire from several points.
Dudayevs personnel also made good use of communications and intelligence from covert
agents. As one pilot noted, One had the feeling that they knew a great deal. And how
many times did it happen where the appearance of helicopters in a particular area was no
surprise to the enemy?22 Dudayev clearly had his forces well rehearsed in
Russian air tactics and capabilities based on his experience in the Russian air force.

Russian pilots, on the other hand, had no reliable data on the disposition of Chechen
weapons, forcing crews to operate from maximum possible ranges when employing their
armament. Some helicopter crews employed a new tactic, that of launching their S-24
unguided rockets with a pitch-up maneuver, increasing the range of the weapon by six to
seven kilometers. This allowed pilots to fire without entering the kill zone of the air
defense weapons of Dudayevs forces.23 Although the tactic reduced
accuracy, it probably was a key factor in increasing the number of civilian casualties.

One of the primary Chechen targets for intelligence information was forward air
controllers (FAC), always the objects of a special hunt, according to Russian specialists.
The Chechens were able to pinpoint the place where the FAC was going on the air.
Only later did motorized riflemen seize the equipment with which Dudayevs personnel
were direction-finding the FACs radio.24 Aviation commander Pavlov
noted that FACs were poorly trained for their jobs at the unit level, contributing to such
disastrous results.25

One analyst, writing in the Russian air journal Krylya Rodiny, noted that
helicopter crews had it more difficult than anyone, flying very low in terrible weather
and often returning to home base with bullet holes in the cockpit windshield. Statistics
indicate that every 10th helicopter participating in the conflict was lost and every
fourth was damaged. By the start of August 1995, the Russians had conducted more than
16,547 flights over Chechnya. Nearly 36 percent of the sorties were fire missions, 44
percent were transport-assault (with over 90 percent of the wounded evacuated by army
aviation), 8 percent were reconnaissance flights, and the other 12 percent were for
special missions such as search and rescue, propaganda, or radio relay.26 This
information indicates how the mission posture for helicopters changed as the war continued
and the Russians adapted to the situation.

After nearly a year of fighting, Russian pilots made some assessments of their
equipment, judging the Mi-24, Mi-8, and Mi-6 helicopters as technically obsolete. These
aircraft had limited deployment capabilities in terms of time of day and weather
conditions. Newer helicopters, such as the Ka-50 and Mi-28, were not used. The Mi-8MTV2,
Mi-8MTV3, and Mi-26 turned in good performances. At the heart of Russias helicopter
modernization effort over the next few years will be the Ka-50 (NATO Hokum,
Russian Black Shark), whose signature characteristics are extremely hard to
detect. It is designed to provide accurate data on targets, can move covertly into the
attack area, and can move into an enemys visibility zone only for the flight time of
onboard antitank guided missiles (ATGM), which have an 8 km range due to an automatic
laser-beam guidance system. The Ka-50 can receive target designations over closed-circuit
communications channels and can exchange them with helicopters in proximity or with a
ground facility. Last year, the Russian aviation branch had enough money to buy only
twonone were used in Chechnya. If Russia is to remain modern and fight these kinds
of wars, it needs to acquire 60 Ka-50s annually, according to one analyst.27

Chechnya held many other lessons for rotary-wing pilots. These included limiting damage
to residences and civilian installations; overcoming the poor combat flying proficiency of
many pilots (due to a lack of flying time, now at one-tenth that of most Western nations);
adjusting to an inability to conduct reconnaissance freely (since any village might
bristle with fire at any moment); overcoming the reluctance of higher headquarters to
supply unmanned assets, such as the Shmel remotely piloted vehicle; and, most important,
making corrections to their tactics. One retired Russian colonel blamed pilot performance
on the tactics of retaliatory strikes against an enemy who used the principle of
attack-withdrawal-attack. This took the initiative away from Russian pilots and led to
belated actions and decreased combat capabilities. On the other hand, the colonel added,
using precision weapons for destroying small targets logically fits such tactics.28

In February 1996, General Pavlov noted at a conference that Russia had fallen 15 years
behind the leading countries in the manufacture of helicopters and that within the
next few years army aviation could cease to exist as a branch of the Russian Armed
Forces.29 By the summer of 1997, he talked more optimistically about
starting production of the Ka-50, Ka-52 Alligator (based on the Ka-50 and capable of
reconning targets and distributing information among helicopters in a battle group), the
Mi-28N night version, and a modernized Mi-24; he also spoke of continued research on an
unmanned reconnaissance aircraft that will work in tandem with other helicopters.30

Perhaps the reality is that army aviation has a limited role in LIC as a combat
element, since ground-attack aircraft like Su-25s offer more protection (both for the
cockpit and for preventing the release of information that might give away their position)
and versatility. For example, with mobile weapon platforms, a combatant can sit and listen
for the sound of a helicopter blade and ready his weapon for employment. As the chopper
passes overhead, it is vulnerable to an RPG or small-arms attack as well as 20 mm rounds.
An Su-25 does not offer enemies this pleasure. They hear only the sound of the jet engine
as it passes over at two hundred feet and do not have sufficient time to react; further,
the 17 mm of titanium around the cockpit deflect even 20 mm rounds. Unmanned
reconnaissance aircraft may represent a way of lengthening the service of army aviation in
the absence of means to hush rotor noise.

Fixed-Wing Aircraft

Without a doubt, the workhorse of the Russian aviation effort in Chechnya was the Su-25
(NATO Frogfoot, Russian Rook). One analyst succinctly summarized
the value of this aircraft:

The experience of air combat operations in the Chechen conflict demonstrated the
increased role of close support to ground troops. The participation of attack helicopters
in it was limited, and front fighters and bombers could not operate effectively at low
altitudes and so were not used due to their high airspeed and the shortage of time to
search for targets, aim and employ weapons. . . . This is why the Su-25Ca small,
subsonic, reliable and maneuverable aircraft of simple design with a good view from the
pilot cockpitbasically was used to support ground troops and for ground-attack
operations. . . . Moreover, it has powerful armament, rather reliable navigation and
targeting avionics, and armor protection and can operate both from airstrips with an
artificial surface as well as from dirt airstrips.31

Missions for the aircraft in Chechnya included CAS of troops against small targets in
the mountains or on the plains. The Su-25 can attack in mountain gorges due to its special
aerodynamic configuration in combination with a high thrust-to-weight ratio. Moreover, it
can stay over a battlefield for a lengthy time, making several passes at targets in one
sortie. This factor also led the designer to concoct a special titanium armor cockpit to
defend the pilot from 20 mm and 23 mm projectiles. Such aircraft proved their resilience
in Afghanistan, where attack planes suffered one loss for 8090 damaged versus
1520 losses for other types of aircraft.32 However, some Russians put the
Su-25 in the same class as the USAFs A-10 and look instead to the Su-39 as the
fighter of the future for LIC. They note that experience from LIC and peace operations
indicates that attack aircraft should be used

in direct fire support,

for selective and precise destruction of enemy pockets of resistance,

as emergency assistance and fire support for friendly subunits in ambushes or
encirclements,

for air reconnaissance in real time,

to combat enemy combat helicopters, and

to block or destroy mobile enemy combat groups.33

The Su-39 can fulfill these and other missions using advanced day/night sight and
navigation systems, advanced electronic countermeasures, precision weapons, and advanced
maneuverability and reliability.

The Russians utilized other aircraft during the conflict, as mentioned above. These
included aircraft from long-range aviation, frontal aviation, and transport aviation: the
Su-22M, Su-24, and Su-27 (because of the lack of an air threat, one rarely saw the
MiG-29), as well as the An-12, An-22, An-124, and Il-76. MiG-31 Foxhounds and Su-27
Flankers performed combat air patrol functions, while Tu-22M3 Backfires reportedly dropped
night flares and propaganda leaflets.34 The Su-24 seems to have been the
fighter-bomber used most often. By December 1995, Russian pilots had flown more than nine
thousand sorties, with more than fifty-three hundred devoted to the conduct of
bombing/ground-attack strikes and 672 to aerial reconnaissance (nearly 8 percent).
Principal weapons included S-5, S-8, and S-24B rockets and FAB-250 and FAB-5000
high-explosive bombs. When weather permitted, the Russians employed Kh-25ML guided
missiles, KAB-500L and KAB-500KR smart bombs, and KAB-1500L bombs.35

Like aviation commander Pavlov, the commander in chief of the air force, Col Gen Petr
Deinekin, served as the air forces primary spokesman. He noted that the general
thrust of modern-day equipment and armament developments is to cut back to one or two
aircraft types in each air component and to rely heavily on precision weaponry. Deinekin
assessed the performance of the air force in August 1995 by commenting, I can attest
to one thingRussian pilots, despite objective difficulties, coped fully with their
missions, demonstrating the high effectiveness and reliability of Russian weapons and
aviation equipment and their own high skills.36

Not all assessments were so praiseworthy, however. What troubled most pilots was the
financial situation of the air force and its direct impact on combat readiness. By some
accounts, the lack of funds reduced combat strength by nearly 40 percent. Tactical
proficiency constituted another area of concern. One pilot noted that tactical air
training had been overcautious for too long, indicating that training went by the credo
take no risk, do not do anything to complicate matters, and avoid innovations.
This belief impeded the support of ground troops and will limit the ability of pilots to
survive in dogfights with other aircraft. To rid itself of this type of thinking, the air
force needs new and improved practice ranges as well as exercises in which
enemy aircrews are imported and their tactics utilized.37 Finally,
many pilots noted the need for a modernization effort to develop some twenty-first-century
aircraft and put them into the sky in the next few years.

One of the newest fighter-bombers in the Russian inventory is the Su-34, whose
characteristics indicate that it will be able to fight in LIC environments. Intended for
combat at low and very low altitudes, this aircraft can attack ground targets at any time
of day, regardless of weather, and can use its navigational and special equipment to track
the aerial situation as well as discern point targets on the ground. A 17 mm skin of
titanium on the cockpit along with a titanium covering on the planes engines and
fuel tanks protects the Su-34 from ground fire. The plane also has some stealth
characteristics; a secondary control that allows the navigator to land the plane if the
pilot is killed or injured; a standard range of 4,000 km; and a rest area and toilet
behind the cockpit.38

Conclusions

The air force had a golden opportunity in Chechnya to see that air power cannot
invariably work its reputed magic in circumstances where the target set is elusive,
problems predominate in target location and identification, and there is an ever-present
danger of unintended harm to noncombatants.39 The war in Chechnya focused
Russian attention on two areas: (1) the effectiveness and future potential of airpower in
a LIC environment and (2) the many areas in which Russian aviation needed
improvementfrom training to equipment and tactics.

Russias air force and ground aviation now are two of the most experienced forces
in the world for this type of conflict, as were the US Air Force and ground aviation after
Vietnam. Russian pilots have learned many techniques and tactics that deserve close study.
Some of the lessons underscored by the fighting include the following:

Air superiority is no guarantee of victory, even against a foe with no air force!

Guerrillas can use high-tech information assets (cellular phones, etc.) as easily as
modern armies nowadays, allowing them to quickly contact others, mobilize assets, and
access information. Plans for suppressing these capabilities need to be made in advance.

The deterioration of the Russian air force due to a lack of money, training, and
supplies greatly affected the course and outcome of the fighting and may have contributed
to an increase in the number of civilian casualties.

Civilian populations will be part of any LIC environment and make an excellent area of
operations for any rebel force.

Ground-attack aircraft, according to the Russian experience, appear to have more utility
than helicopters when striking targets in LIC environments.

Flying in LIC environments will mean finding and defending against mobile targets spread
throughout the country and among the civilian population.

Realistic training is essential to overcome LIC threats. Training hours in the air must
be stressful and challenging, and must be supplemented by hours on simulators just before
flying a mission.

Timely and accurate reconnaissance information is vital for pilots.

Guerrilla tactics must be studied closely.

Helicopter and frontal aviation strikes must be integrated, and ground commanders must
learn to work closely with and put more confidence in pilots.

FAC training must be integrated into subunit training plans at the earliest possible
time. FACs must remain sensitive to guerrilla attempts to capture, mortar, or intercept
their positions.

In short, the fighting in Chechnya created another historical chapter in the annals of
warfare that will merit study for decades. It represents one of the first examples of a
protracted conflict involving one of the former superpowers and is worthy of close
attention and consideration.

Both aircraft have two aerial bombs of 100 kg each or two OB-16 clusters with 32 NURS
(unguided missiles) in each. Vladimir Georgiyevich Mukhin, Military Lessons of the
Chechen Campaign: Part One, Nezavisimoye Voyennoye Obozreniye, no. 18 (22)
(26 September 1996): 2, in FBIS-UMA-96-216-S. For information on the other Russian
equipment (aircraft and air defense weapons), see John W. R. Taylor, Gallery of
Russian Aerospace Weapons, Air Force, March 1996, 6680.

8. Vyacheslav Kondratyev, The Awesome Sky over Chechnya, Krylya Rodiny,
no. 1 (January 1996): 15, in FBIS-UMA-96-055-S, 20 March 1996; on-line, Internet, 21
November 1996, available from http://fbis.fedworld.gov/cgi-bin/retrieve. The Krylya
Rodiny reports are some of the best writings on air operations during the conflict.
After the intervention started, Russian authorities uncovered a purported Chechen plan
known as Lasso that included the destruction of several targets throughout
Russia by the Chechen air force. For more information on Russian helicopter support of the
Dudayev opposition from September to November 1994, see Vladimir Georgiyevich Mukhin,
Military Lessons of the Chechen Campaign: Part Two, Nezavisimoye Voyennoye
Obozreniye, no. 19 (23) (10 October 1996): 2, in FBIS-UMA-96-216-S.

21. Yet another potential problem for army aviation was a planned curtailment in the
radio technical-support force. The pilots had protested that a reduction in radio
technical-support subunits would lead to a sharp drop in the combat potential of army
aviation.