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Eight Questions: Scott Kennedy, ‘Beyond the Middle Kingdom’

China is so big and so complicated that most scholars have viewed it in glorious isolation.

In “Beyond the Middle Kingdom,” a new collection of essays edited by Indiana University professor and China-hand Scott Kennedy, some of the world’s leading China scholars attempt to turn that around – exploring China in comparative perspective.

China Real Time recently caught up with Mr. Kennedy to get the lowdown on the new approach.

Most China experts look at the middle kingdom in isolation, why is that?

Because of China’s size, the complexity of Chinese culture, and the country’s long history, many experts begin with the untested assumption that China is unique, and that comparison would only yield contrasts.

Just as important, learning Chinese and doing field work in China requires a huge amount of time and energy. Since Chinese is not the main language in any other country, save perhaps in Singapore, the skill set China specialists have is not as portable as say for experts who do research on countries where people speak Spanish, French, or Arabic.

You’ve uncovered a misunderstanding in what the term ‘middle kingdom’ actually means?

The Chinese word for China, zhongguo, is often mis-translated as “Middle Kingdom.” In fact, a more accurate rendering is “central states,” plural, not singular. The central states were those kingdoms that existed in what is today central, east and southeastern China during the Spring and Autumn Period prior to the Qin Dynasty and the creation of a unified country.

Given this history, the more contemporary meaning of zhongguo likely is more about unifying the country than being in the center of the world. Foreigners — not Chinese people — use the term “Middle Kingdom” to imply Chinese see themselves as part of a superior civilization. But Chinese do not conceive of “zhongguo” as “Middle Kingdom.” So if there’s a Middle Kingdom complex, it’s the West’s, not China’s.

What’s wrong with looking at China in isolation?

Whether we like it or not, we all compare China to other places. When you say that China is large, isn’t pro-environment, is ethnically homogenous, has a lot of inequality, or is highly corrupt, you are implicitly making comparisons. I advocate being explicit about cross-national comparisons because doing so reveals unexpected similarities and differences.

One obvious comparator is Asian neighbors like Korea and Japan. But there are some important differences in China’s growth story.

Many Chinese officials have hoped that China would follow the lead of its East Asian neighbors. There is a common commitment to active industrial policy and limited faith in the ability of free markets to generate socially valuable outcomes.

But there are substantial differences between China and its neighbors. Policymaking in China is less coordinated and exhibits greater infighting and turf battles. Many of China’s economic policies are geared toward helping state-owned enterprises, more so than elsewhere in the region. And unexpectedly, China largely had lower trade and investment barriers than its neighbors in part because South Korea and Japan were given greater leeway until the 1980′s because they were American allies during the Cold War.

Economic performance has also differed. China has actually enjoyed a longer “high-growth” era than any of its neighbors, but wealth there is much more unevenly distributed.

Russia, as a former Communist state, also yields some fruitful comparisons.

The Chinese state may be less functional than that of its East Asian neighbors, but China’s bureaucratic institutions and economy are much more robust than those of Russia. Take the auto sector. Cross-provincial competition and joint ventures with foreign partners have led Chinese automakers to substantially improve their performance over the last 15 years. By contrast, Russia’s auto companies have been far less successful as a result of Russia’s more chaotic inter-regional competition and less well-designed national policies.

And other emerging markets like Mexico, Brazil and India?

These three democracies are excellent reference countries to understand the extent to which China’s authoritarian system shapes its political economy. There are clear differences, such as more aggressive business lobbying within these three countries as compared to China. For example, Mexican banks have successfully lobbied to be part of cross-national mergers and acquisitions, while their state-controlled Chinese cousins have not. But there are also surprising similarities across the four countries. Corruption levels, income inequality, and the unevenness of social welfare systems are similar. In addition, all four have faced similar difficulties moving higher up within the global supply chains.

What does all this mean for our understanding of the “Beijing Consensus?”

The “Beijing Consensus” is a myth propagated by observers who have not bothered to compare China’s development experience to that of others. Systematic comparison yields both differences and similarities. Asserting that China is unique is no more valuable than recognizing that each of the world’s 192 countries has something special about themselves. Slogans such as the Beijing Consensus or China Model are more useful for advertising campaigns than for genuine understanding.

What’s the next step for the study of China through the comparative lens?

There are still many areas of governance, economic policy, business performance, and international behavior that await more in-depth and systematic comparisons. Equally important, comparativists typically operate at the national level. But there is a tremendous amount that can be learned by sub-national comparisons. We may be able to gain more insights by comparing, for example, the growth strategies of Shanghai to Los Angeles, Cairo, and St. Petersburg, than comparing China with the United States, Egypt, and Russia.