Background

It
is unfortunate that since 911
the ongoing media
spectacle of the Global War on Terror and Operation Iraqi Freedom
have diverted the public and media focus in Australia away from
happenings in the
nearer region. In recent years several important developments have
taken place, with Malaysia and Indonesia signing contracts for and
taking delivery of, respectively,
their first top-tier Sukhoi Su-30 fighters, and India establishing
production of its first fully configured Su-30MKI aircraft. While these
developments were expected, they represent an ongoing change in
regional
aerospace power and capabilities which Australia should not choose to
ignore.

Some defence analysts in Canberra
have argued vocally in the
media that the Global War on Terror demands that Australia
fundamentally
restructure its basic strategic doctrine and indeed reshape its force
structure. It is proposed that the needs of coalition warfighting in
distant locations should take precedence over the Defence of
Australia in the nation's force structuring and funding priorities.
Media comments attacking established doctrine and ridiculing it as
'Fortress Australia Policy' suggest that this perspective is more
popular than one might imagine.

Such reasoning is dangerous and
ill informed - reflecting on
the part of most protagonists of this view a weak if not wholly absent
understanding of modern air power and its implicit strategic influence.
To better understand how foolish this point of view actually is, we
must explore more closely the capabilities of the latest Sukhoi
fighters and their inherent longer term growth potential.
This analysis is an updated and
greatly expanded derivative of the two part series published in 2003
(see Resources).

Indian
AF
Su-30K
at
Cope
India (U.S.
Air Force photo)

Sukhoi Su-30
Derivatives

The early
history of the Su-27 family of
fighters has been
widely
documented, and some excellent references exist (Andrei Fomin's Su-27
Flanker Story published by RA Intervestnik is arguably the single best
printed reference, while Easy Tartar's reference at the Fighter Tactics Academy
is the best website).

The original design aim of the Perspektivnyy Frontovoy
Istrebitel (PFI - Future Tactical Fighter) was to kill the US Air
Force's then new F-15A, and both the Sukhoi and Mikoyan bureaus
submitted designs. The Sukhoi T-10 concept emerged in the early 1970s,
and was conceptually closest to a fusion of the fixed wing Grumman
VFX-404 configuration with the blended strake/wing/body configuration
of the GD LWF demonstrator, later to become the F-16A. From the outset
the design was to use various combinations of mechanical-hydraulic and
Fly By Wire (FBW) controls with some reduced static stability to
achieve exceptional manoeuvrability. The early T-10-1 demonstrator
evolved into the current T-10-15/Su-27 configuration through an almost
complete but necessary redesign during the early eighties. The result
has been the most aerodynamically refined of all of the third
generation fighters. Like the MDC F-15A, the basic design was devised
from the outset to accommodate both single and dual seat
configurations. The Su-27UBK tandem dual trainer airframe became the
basis of the Su-30 series.

The
Soviets
made
good
use
of sample Iranian Grumman F-14A Tomcats and their
AN/AWG-9/AIM-54A weapon system.

Introduction into PVO-S (Protivo-Vozdushnaya Oborona Strany -
air defence force) and FA (Frontovaya Aviatsia - tactical air force)
service was protracted, especially due to problems with manufacturing
an airframe with a substantial amount of titanium alloy and honeycomb
laminates, but also due to difficulties with the complex F-15-like
avionics package.

To demonstrate the aircraft's potency as an F-15 killer, the
Sovs in 1986 stripped and modified the T10-15 prototype, redesignated
it the P-42 and promptly took out no less than 22 FAI records, mostly
in the time to height categories previously held by the F-15A. Such
impressive basic performance results from the exceptionally clean
aerodynamic design and the pair of large Lyulka AL-31F series
afterburning turbofans - the P42 would have used early variants of the
engine.

Chinese
PLA-AF
Su-27SK
Flanker
B

The baseline Su-27 airframe resulted in two nearly identical
variants for the PVO and FA, the Su-27 and Su-27S Flanker B, with a
common dual
trainer in the Su-27UB Flanker C. The single seat Su-27/Su-27S was
manufactured
by the KNAAPO plant at Komsomolsk-on-Amur and the dual Su-27UB was
manufactured by the IAPO plant at Irkutsk, with design authority
remaining at the Sukhoi bureau. The principal distinction in the
Frontal Aviation Su-27S was a capability to deliver dumb bombs and
rockets - not unlike the F-15A/B/C/D models. Both types were to carry
the large pulse Doppler Myech air intercept radar, which was to use a
mechanically steered planar array antenna with electronic vertical beam
steering, but production aircraft with the NIIP N001 used a simple
mechanically steered cassegrain antenna.

Several early derivatives of the Su-27 are of much interest
since they paved the way for the production Su-30 subtypes new seen in
the Asian export market.

The navalised Su-27K Flanker D, K for 'Korabl'ny',
was developed
for the
Project 1143.5 55,000 tonne class aircraft carrier, of which four were
to have been built. The Su-27K had beefed up undercarriage with twin
nosewheels, upgraded hydraulics, a tailhook, enlarged flaperons, a
modified ejection seat angle, folding outer wings and stabs, upgraded
FBW, modified LERX (Leading Edge Root Extensions) with canards,
enlarged leading edge slats and a deployable aerial refuelling probe.

The refuelling probe modification included a pair of deployable
floodlights in the nose, used to illuminate the tanker aircraft, here
intended to be either an Il-78 Midas or another Su-27 buddy tanker
carrying a centreline UPAZ hose-drogue pod. The probe permits a fuel
transfer rate into the fighter of up to 4,000 lb/min. Another notable
Su-27K feature to migrate to later variants was the right offset IR
Search and Track housing, this improving the pilot's downward view over
the aircraft's nose. Production Su-27Ks operated by the Russian Navy
are often designated the 'Su-33'. Perhaps the most important feature of
the Su-27K/Su-33 are the enlarged LERX/canards which increase the
available body lift of the aircraft, and the centre of pressure
forward thus enhancing achievable pitch rates. The Su-27 series shares
with the F-14 series a large body lift capacity resulting from the wide
fuselage tunnel - as a result the aircraft's effective wing loading is
much lower than that of aircraft with different configurations. This is
reflected in superb high alpha handling and sustained turn rates.

An Su-27K
prototype performs a dry hookup during buddy refuelling trials using
the
UPAZ-1A Sakhalin series centreline refuelling store. Most late
build Flankers are equipped with a retractable aerial refuelling probe
and floodlights (RuAF photo).

The side-by-side dual navalised trainer was so successful
it
evolved into the F-111 like Su-32/34 Fullback series bombers, intended
to replace
the Su-24 Fencer. [Click for more]

The Su-33 Flanker D has now been ordered by the PLA-N for
trials on the refurbished former Soviet Project 1143.5 carrier Varyag.
It is expected that around 50 aircraft will eventually be acquired to
equip an air wing.

The
Su-27K/Su-33
Flanker
D
was
recently ordered by the PLA-N Air Arm to
equip the
Varyag air wing (RuN). Further
images.

The
dual seat Su-27KUB/Su-33UB is a mulirole naval variant suitable for
carrier conversion training, but also a wide range of strike and air
defence roles. It retains the existing avionics of the Su-27K/Su-33
Flanker D (Sukhoi). [Click
for
more]

While the navalised Sukhois
spawned key aerodynamic design
innovations in the series, the land based variants accounted for most
of the avionic and propulsion improvements. The most important early
derivative was the dual role single seat Su-27M strike fighter,
frequently labelled as the Su-35. Initiated in 1982, the baseline Su-35
best
compares to the F-15C in basic capabilities. It was to be the initial
platform for the then new Vympel R-77 AMRAAM-ski active radar guided
AAM. The Su-35 was to carry a complete EWSP package, a cockpit wide
angle Head Up Display (HUD), triple MFDs, an improved RSLU-27/N011 fire
control radar package using a new slotted planar array antenna rather
than the N001 design, an N012 tail warning radar, an improved OLS-27K
Infra-Red Search/Track (IRST), the Schchel-3UM Helmet Mounted Sight
(HMS), ShO-13A Doppler nav, an inertial nav package, air/air and
air/ground GCI (Ground Control Intercept) datalinks, two additional
inboard wing hardpoints to permit up to 12 external stores, and the
aerial refuelling probe.

Rollout
of the first Su-35BM Mid Life Upgrade configuration Flanker E, January
2007 (MilitaryPhotos.net)

Structural changes were required to the forward fuselage to
accommodate
the larger radar aperture, relocated IRST, aerial refuelling probe and
revised avionics. The additional 3,000 lb of empty weight required
strengthened undercarriage, dual nosewheels, detail structural changes,
and the Su-33's canards were later incorporated. To offset the loss of
combat radius due to additional weight the wet portion of the wing was
extended to the 13th rib, from the 9th, and a 360 litre tank was added
to each vertical tail thus providing a total internal capacity of
22,630 lb (10,250 kg). The dual combat trainer variant designed by
KNAAPO is designated the Su-35UB. Twelve pre-production Su-35s were
built, and tail number 711 became the Su-37 demonstrator.

The Su-37 was to incorporate two important advancements over
the Su-27M/35. These were thrust vectoring nozzles and the new NIIP
N011M passive shifter technology ESA (Electronically Steered Array -
phased array). In addition, an electrical sidestick controller was
mounted in the right side of the cockpit. The Lyulka bureau designed
the first axisymmetric two dimensional thrust vectoring (2D TVC) nozzle
ever deployed during this demonstration program - the nozzle Time
Between Overhauls (TBO) is reported at 250 hours vs the 1,000 hr TBO
for the AL-31FP core.

Su-37
Demonstrator '#711' The KNAAPO sponsored Su-37 demonstrator was an
advanced derivative of
the Su-27M/Su-35, incorporating digital fly-by-wire, thrust vectoring
nozzles, canards and the NIIP N-011M phased array radar. Much of the
technology developed in this program has since migrated into the Indian
Su-30MKI and will most likely be seen in its Irkut sibling, the
Malaysian Su-30MKM.(Sukhoi).

The all important Flight Control System (FCS) in the
Su-27
family evolved incrementally, with the first generation hybrid analog
system running in parallel with the conventional hydro-mechanical
design. The Su-37 introduced a genuine redundant digital system,
similar in concept to its contemporary Western designs.

The Su-30 series is not directly evolved from the Su-27M line,
but has incorporated many design features demonstrated in the
Su-27M/35/37 line. The origins of the Su-30 lie in the last years of
the Soviet era, when the PVO sought a combat capable derivative of the
existing Su-27UB conversion trainer. The dual variant was to be
equipped for aerial refuelling and used as a long range / long
endurance interceptor and combat command and control fighter to lead
long range CAPs. The aircraft was initially designated the Su-27PU
(Perekhvatchik - Uchebnoy) and later relabelled the Su-30. The Su-30
was developed in part by the Irkutsk plant, responsible for
manufacturing the Su-27UB. The export variant of the Su-30 was
designated Su-30MK and unveiled in 1993 - as a multirole strike fighter
rather than interceptor.

The hard sell by the Irkut
(formerly IAPO) and Sukhoi paid off
in late
1996 when the Indian Air Force signed for an advanced derivative of the
baseline Su-30, the Su-30MKI (M-Improved, K-Export, I-India) Flanker H.
In a
complex deal which saw initial deliveries of basic Su-30K and
progressive development and later delivery of full configured and
licence build Su-30MKI, India negotiated a deal which will see around
180 of these aircraft deployed with IAF squadrons.

The Su-30MKI is a fusion of technology from the Su-37
demonstrator and Su-30 program, with additional Indian designed and
built processor hardware in the Mission Computers, Radar Data Processor
provide under the Vetrivale (Lance) industry program, and some items of
Israeli and EU hardware. The aircraft has a Sextant Avionique HUD and
RLG (Ring Laser Gyro) INS/GPS, glass cockpits, NIIP N011M phased array,
AL-31FP TVC engines, enlarged rudders, Su-33/35/37 canards and aerial
refuelling probe, and an improved OLS-30 IRST package. The Indian
developed Tarang RWR is used in the EWSP suite. The TVC system in the
Su-30MKI has evolved beyond the Su-37 system, which deflected only in
the vertical plane. The Su-30MKI variant has a 32 degree canted TVC
plane to introduce a lateral and vertical vectored force component, and
is driven by the engine's fuel system rather than main aircraft
hydraulic loop.

Since 2003, more details have also been revealed about the
N-011M BARS
('Panther') hybrid phased array radar designed for the Su-35/37 and
supplied on the
Su-30MKI and likely the Su-30MKM. The BARS phased array assembly is
mechanically steerable to +/-55 degrees off-boresight, providing a
total field of regard in azimuth of +/-100 degrees off-boresight - in
effect the combination of mechanical array steering and electronic beam
steering provides full forward hemispherical coverage. NIIP claim a 3
dB noise figure three channel receiver, and an average transmit power
of 1.2 kW, with 1 kW in illuminator mode for semi-active missiles.
Air-air modes include Track While Scan for 15 targets and concurrent
engagement of four, raid assessment and Non-Cooperative Target
Recognition (NCTR). Air-surface modes include real beam mapping,
Doppler beam sharpening, Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR) imaging,
Ground/Maritime Moving Target Indicator (GMTI/MMTI), target position
measurement and GMTI tracking of two concurrent targets. Aerial fighter
sized targets have been acquired at 76 NMI, and moving tanks at 25 NMI.
While reports of an Active ESA (AESA) have surfaced, details are as yet
not available to the public.

The Indian Su-30MKI is to date the most advanced Su-27
derivative to enter production and with the exception of mission
avionics and software is a credible equivalent to the F-15E/I/K/S
family. It also underscores the 'no holds barred' international arms
market, in which an export customer is supplied with a product which is
half a generation ahead of the Russian air force - the IAF designates
it as its Air Dominance Fighter.

Irkut/Sukhoi
Su-30MKI
Crew
Stations.

However, the greatest Sukhoi export success to date has been
KNAAPO's deal to supply and licence build Su-27SK Flanker Bs and
Su-27UBK Flanker Cs for
the Chinese PLA-AF - also the very first export deal for the aircraft.
The initial order was for 20 x Su-27SK and 4 x Su-27UBK, essentially
the same configuration as Soviet Frontal Aviation units flew but
claimed to be fitted with Phazotron Zhuk rather than the NIIP radars. A
second batch of aircraft was, numbering 16 x Su-27SK and 6 x Su-27UBK.
was supplied in 1996, bringing the fielded total to 46. That same year
KNAAPO were awarded a contract to set up licence production of the
Su-27SK at the Shenyang plant in the PRC - these are designated as the
J-11 and up to 250 may be built. An additional buy of twenty or more
imported Su-27UBK dual trainers was reported in 2002.

India's buy of the Su-30MKI triggered a response in Beijing -
the PLA-AF ordered around 50 Su-30MKK Flanker G fighters from KNAAPO.
The KNAAPO
Su-30MKK is not the same as the Irkut Su-30MKI in configuration,
despite the shared Su-30MK designation. The baseline Su-30MKK the
Su-35/37 vertical tail design, no canards, no TVC capability, Russian
avionics and a variant of the Phazotron Zhuk planar array radar. An
improved OEPS-31E-MK IRST package is fitted. There are reports the
aircraft has an increased maximum takeoff weight against the
Su-30/Su-30MKI, requiring structural changes. Like the PLA-AF Su-27SK
the Su-30MKK uses the original analogue FCS. The Su-30MKK is a KNAAPO
development which is closest in concept to a dual seat Su-35 without
the canards added to the production Su-35. It is like the Su-35 a dual
role fighter, occupying the same niche as the F-15E but less accurate
and less capable in the air-air role as the Su-30MKI.

The PLA-N Air Arm was evidently not satisfied with the
domestically
built JH-7 Flying Leopard strike fighter, and opted to expand its fleet
by acquiring the Su-30MK2, a derivative of the Su-30MKK, with a rated
maximum takeoff weight of 85,000 lb. The Su-30MK2 has an enhanced
weapon system optimized for maritime strike, built around the N-001VEP
radar. The radar will target the Kh-31A ramjet supersonic anti-shipping
missile, and a radar seeker equipped variant of the Kh-59, designated
the Kh-59MK2. A radar guided
derivative of the Kh-59M, the Kh-59Mk, was also developed for the PLA-N
Flanker G. Chinese sources claim that 36 Su-30MK2 aircraft were
ordered, with deployment as yet undisclosed. Venezuela is acquiring
this variant.

The Russians were reported to have been developing a third PLA
variant of the
Su-30, the Su-30MK3. The Su-20MK3 was to incorporate the 'Panda'
upgrade package for the N-001 radar, including a signal processor
upgrade based on COTS software and a Ts-100 processor, and the new Pero
phased array. The Pero, developed by NIIP and Ryazan GRPZ, is a
reflective passive phased array antenna, replacing the legacy
cassegrain design. It is lighter than the legacy design, but offers
similar beamsteering agility to the latest Western AESAs. Recent
reports suggest this program
is no longer funded.

The PLA-AF was dissatified with the limitations of the
Su-27SK/J-11 and renegotiated the licence arrangement to have the
latter 100 aircraft delivered as the Su-27SKM (also reported as SMK)
variant. The principal improvement is
that the Su-27SKM incorporates all of the refinements of the multirole
Su-30MK variants, and can thus support guided munitions, making it
equivalent to proposed but never built single seat multirole
derivatives of the F-15E. As such the Su-27SKM can carry the full suite
of air to ground munitions now carried by the Su-30MKK series. The
radar
configuration has not been disclosed but may include the Pero passive
phased array. Another possible alternative is a derivative of the
developmental Phazotron AESA, reported to have been tested with a 0.7
metre array size on the MiG-29.

The Chinese also recently unveiled the 'indigenised' J-11B,
incorporating Chinese technology, specifically the Woshan-10A (WS-10A)
engine replacing the AL-31F, the Shedian-10 radar replacing the N-001,
and the PL-12 (SD-10) BVR missile replacing the R-77 and R-27, and a
range of indigenous guided munitions replacing the Russian types. It is
likely that the J-11B will be introduced to production on completion of
the J-11 build.

KnAAPO/Sukhoi
Su-30MKK Crew Stations.

Russian sources put the current total supplied to the PLA-AF
as
76 x Su-27SK/UBK, 50 x Su-30MKK with outstanding orders for 19 more,
and a commitment for licence production of around 200-250 aircraft.
Russian estimates of the ultimate size of the PLA-AF Su-27/30 fleet
fall between 350 and 500 aircraft. For comparison, the US Air Force
fielded around 400 F-15Cs and 200 F-15Es, putting the PRC's orders into
a similar force structure size bracket - and almost twice the size of
the Indian Su-30MKI fleet.

Malaysia committed in 2003 to purchase 18 Su-30MKMs
beating the Boeing F/A-18F bid - evidently Malaysia's bilateral MiG-29
support relationship with India exposed the RMAF/TUDM to Indian
Su-30MKI program and they liked what they saw. The Su-30MKM is being
supplied by Irkut and will therefore be close in configuration to the
Su-30MKI, although as yet no details are available on the specific fit
of the MKM variant - it is known that some French avionics will be
used. The aircraft were to be delivered from 2006, but reports in 2006
indicated the aircraft remained parked in Russia pending payment. It is
likely that a
large portion of the deal will be financed by barter of Malaysian
industrial and consumer goods.

Indonesia's TNI-AU has had a long standing interest in the
Sukhoi fighters and prior to the Asian economic crisis committed to
purchase the Su-30KI. This aircraft was to be supplied by KNAAPO and
was derived from the single seat Su-27SMK, a Mid Life Upgrade design
package for the baseline Su-27S. The Su-30KI is thus an improved single
seat Su-27S, with the improved N001E radar and cassegrain antenna,
aerial refuelling probe, centreline OLS-27 IRST, ILS-31 HUD, and
provisions for the R-77 Adder missile. This variant is more the air
superiority fighter than dual role strike fighter and is essentially a
low cost upgrade of the basic production KNAAPO Su-27 line - the use of
the early configuration centreline IRST installation suggests the
Su-30KI may be built from refurbished low time PVO Su-27 airframes.

In late April 2003, Indonesian President Megawati signed
an
MoU with Russia for the supply of four Sukhoi fighters, two Su-27SK and
two Su-30MK (some sources claim Su-35, others Su-30KI) to the
Indonesian TNI-AU later this year. Media reports from Jakarta indicated
that the TNI-AU intends to acquire between 48 and 54 of these aircraft
over this decade, and often report the inclusion of an aerial
refuelling capability - part of the Su-30KI configuration. Whether the
TNI-AU aircraft are Su-27SKs, Su-35s, Su-30KIs or Su-30MKs is
immaterial in the longer term, since the basic KNAAPO/Irkut T-10 family
of designs permits incremental retrofits, and cash permitting any of
these variants can over time morph into a more advanced model.

Since then the TNI-AU had its four aircraft delivered.
In 2006, Indonesian President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono visited Moscow
and ordered an additional six aircraft, as part of a larger arms
package.

Su-30 Growth
Paths

The Su-27/30 series is by far
the
aerodynamically most refined
of the
third generation fighters in the market and is a direct equivalent to
the late build F-15E/I/K/S variants. While it does not offer quite as
good top end supersonic performance and handling to the F-15, it makes
up for
this with exceptionally good low speed high alpha handling and
performance.

From an 'information age'
warfighting perspective, the basic
Su-30 series airframe has some very attractive features absent in
competing Western third generation fighters.

The NIIP N011M BARS phased array is the
most capable fighter radar produced
by Russian industry and is designed to support the R-77M family of
ramjet missiles. The NIIP Irbis-E is an evolution of the BARS using a
20 kW ganged TWT transmitter and increases range performance
significantly. The depicted detection range curves are based on
publicly disclosed Russian performance figures for co-altitude BVR
engagements. It is evident that inside the 10-20 nautical miles
envelope the radar will be able to challenge aircraft with quite good
stealth characteristics. The curves for the Agat 9B-1103M and 9B-1348E
seekers are based on the most recent Agat data release, and include the
TMS320 equipped digital variant. The 9B-1101K has not been included
(Author - NIIP, Phazotron, Agat data).

Radar

The first of these is its
massive
radar bay, capable of
fitting a 1
metre class X-band phased array antenna. In the long range BVR combat
game, radar
range is a key factor and for any given radar technology, the larger
the aperture the better. While the current N011M/ME BARS (Panther) and
Pero
(Plume) upgrades use passive array
technology which delivers less peak power than competing active arrays
(AESA) it is only a matter of time before NIIP and Phazotron adapt
commercial GaAs MMIC technology (98% of the total GaAs chip market) to
build an AESA variant competitive against the AESAs in the latest
Western evolved 3rd Gen fighters.

With similar TR
(Transmit-Receive) module
performance, the fighter with the largest aperture size wins in this
game - for instance the N011M has around twice the aperture size of the
JSF AESA and F/A-18E/F's APG-79 and even with inferior TR module
technology will be highly competitive. It is worth noting that India is
only the fourth nation worldwide to field a phased array equipped
aigile air combat fighter, after France, the US and Russia.

Electrical power and liquid
cooling have been issues for the integration of AESAs in Western
fighters, especially so with smaller types like the F/A-18E/F, F-16E/F
and Joint Strike Fighter. This is not an issue given the sheer size of
the Flanker.

While the existing N011M has
limitations in its older
technology back end processing, the future is the path India has
followed, retrofitting third party hardware with better performance
than the Russian processor hardware. With widely available commodity
processor chips in the 1 to 2 GHz class, we can expect to see many
other Sukhoi users emulate the Indians in coming years, be it in MLUs
or new build aircraft.

The baseline N011M radar uses a
vertically polarised 0.9 metre diameter aperture hybrid phased array,
with individual per element receive path low noise amplifiers
delivering a noise figure cited at 3 dB, similar to an AESA. Three
receiver channels are used, one presumably for sidelobe blanking and
ECCM. The EGSP-6A transmitter uses a single Chelnok Travelling Wave
Tube, available in variants with peak power ratings between 4 and 7
kiloWatts, and CW illumination at 1 kW. Cited detection range for a
closing target (High PRF) is up to 76 NMI, for a receding target up to
50 NMI. The phased array can electronically steer the mainlobe through
+/-70 degrees in azimuth and +/-40 degrees in elevation. The whole
array can be further steered mechanically. Polarisation can be switched
by 90 degrees for surface search modes.

NIIP
Irbis
E
Prototypes
(above,
below)

NIIP
Irbis
E
Components
(above)

The
follow on to the BARS is the
new Irbis-E (Snow Leopard) hybrid phased array, in development since
2004 and planned for the Su-35 block upgrade, and as a block upgrade or
new build radar for other Flanker variants. The Irbis-E is an evolution
of the BARS design, but significantly more powerful. While the hybrid
phased array antenna is retained, the noise figure is slightly worse at
3.5 dB, but the receiver has four rather than three discrete channels.
The biggest change is in the EGSP-27 transmitter, where the single 7
kiloWatt peak power rated Chelnok TWT is replaced with a pair of 10
kiloWatt peak power rated Chelnok tubes, ganged to provide a total peak
power rating of 20 kiloWatts. The radar is cited at an average power
rating of 5 kiloWatts, with 2 kiloWatts CW rating for illumination.
NIIP claim twice the bandwidth and improved frequency agility over the
BARS, and better ECCM capability. The Irbis-E has new Solo-35.01
digital signal processor hardware and Solo-35.02 data processor, but
retains receiver hardware, the master oscillator and exciter of the
BARS. A prototype has been in flight test since late 2005.

The performance increase in the
Irbis-E is commensurate with the increased transmitter rating, and NIIP
claim a detection range for a closing 3 square metre coaltitude target
of 190 - 215 NMI (350-400 km), and the ability to detect a closing 0.01
square metre target at ~50 NMI (90 km). In Track While Scan (TWS) mode
the radar can handle 30 targets simultaneously, and provide guidance
for two simultaneous shots using a semi-active missile like the R-27
series, or eight simultaneous shots using an active missile like the
RVV-AE/R-77 or ramjet RVV-AE-PD/R-77M. The Irbis-E was clearly designed
to support the ramjet RVV-AE-PD/R-77M missile in BVR combat against
reduced signature Western fighters like the Block II Super Hornet or
Eurofighter Typhoon. Curiously, NIIP do not claim superiority over the
F-22A's APG-77 AESA, yet their cited performance figures exceed the
public (and no doubt heavily sanitised) range figures for the APG-77.

The existing N011M series lacks
a
Low Probability of Intercept
capability, in part due to antenna bandwidth limits and in part due to
processor limitations. This is likely to change over the coming decade,
with the Irbis-E,
as customers demand an ability to defeat or degrade Western ESM
equipment and the technology to do this becomes more accessible.

The N012 tail warning radar has
been reported to be part of
the Su-30MKI suite and is offered as a retrofit to other models.

In terms of block upgrades, of
the two competing radar houses
in Russia, NIIP (http://www.niip.ru/)
and
Phazotron, the former has been the most active of recent. A block
upgrade package, designated 'Panda' was recently developed for the
baseline N-001-01 radar carried by Su-27S/SK. The first stage is the
N-001V back end upgrade using C/C++ COTS software and a Ts-100
processor.

Of more interest however is a low
cost phased array block
upgrade package designated Pero ('Plume'), designed jointly with Ryazan
GRPZ. This lightweight design avoids the cost and complexity of the
backplane fed BARS (N-011M) phased array, instead using a space
(optical) feed scheme, and reflective rather than transmissive phase
elements, a technique used with the 64N6E Big Bird SAM system
radar. The design
incorporates the phase element array, and a strut supported boom
which mounts the X-band waveguide and radiating horn. Cost is
comparable to the existing Su-27S/SK Cassegrain antenna, weight is
lower. The launch customer is the RuAF, but reports indicate one of the
two prototypes was sent to China for evaluation. The Pero will provide
the beam
steering agility of modern Western AESAs, but with lower cost and
transmit power ratings, and is likely to appear in regional MLUs later
this decade. An open question is whether a future Pero based block
upgrade would include the 20 kiloWatt Irbis-E transmitter, as
engineering the space feed for a 20 kiloWatt rated transmitter is
neither difficult nor expensive. While a 20 kiloWatt Pero system would
have inferior receiver sensitivity due to the space feed loss, compared
to the BARS hybrid array, it would be significantly cheaper to build
and deploy en masse.

In summary, near term we can
expect to see the Irbis-E and Pero appear in new build and upgrade
packages, in the
longer term an AESA is an inevitability.

Electro-Optical
Systems

Another attractive design
feature
of the Flankers is the large IRST housing,
which can fit an aperture larger than competing Western IRST systems -
the more photons the IRST can capture, the greater its detection range
potential. The baseline OLS-27 IRST can scan a 120x75 degree field of
regard, and cover as field of view as narrow as 3x3 degrees but has
poor sensitivity with a head on detection ranges cca 8 nautical miles.
The integrated laser rangefinder is effective to about 1.5 nautical
miles. Specifications for the OLS-30 have not been disclosed - it is
known that further development is under way on an IRST/FLIR design
similar in concept to the Eurofighter's Pirate system. As with radars,
IRST and FLIR aperture size matters, and the Sukhoi is in a commanding
position with the existing OLS-27/30 package. With commercial
technologies such as Quantum Well longwave/multiband imagers of 800x600
pixel resolution in the EU market, it is only a matter of time before
this technology finds its way into an OLS-30/31 derivative. Current US
IRSTs using older MCT imaging arrays have detected fighters at
distances of many tens of miles.

The advent of HDTV compatible CCD
and CMOS daylight imaging devices in COTS applications opens up the
possibility of a dual band derivative of the OLS-27/30 package, longer
term.

Cockpits,
Computers
and
Networking

The cockpit of the existing
Su-30
series provides plenty of
opportunities for further growth, both in display technology and back
end processing. With militarised commodity AMLCD display panels
becoming increasingly available, the trend we have observed with the
Sextant displays in the MKI is likely to grow over time, driven by the
need to compete against US and EU cockpit designs. We should not be
surprised to see India and Israel become prominent in the Sukhoi MLU
market. The same will be true of mission computer equipment.

Upgrades available for Su-27/30
include the encrypted TKS-2/R-098
(Tipovyi Kompleks Svyazi) Intra Flight Data Link (IFDL) which permits
the networking of up to 16 Sukhoi fighters. It is not known whether the
5U15K-11 datalink designed for networking the A-50 AWACS and MiG-31 has
been adapted to the Su-27/30, or whether a unique equivalent design is
used. The TKS-2 was used effectively during the 2004 Cope India
exercise against US F-15Cs.

Maturity in flight control
software has seen aggressive
improvements in types such as the F/A-18E/F, and it is reasonable to
surmise that the adoption of digital FBW controls in recent Su-30
variants will see similar evolution in the Sukhoi types - especially
given the Russian obsession with close in manoeuvre performance.

The KNIRTI L005S
Sorbtsiya-S mid/high band defensive jammer is carried in wingtip pods.
Unlike competing Western designs, this system uses a steerable mainlobe
to maximise the Jam/Signal ratio at the threat emitter. The design uses
a wideband phased array and dielectric lens arrangement
(KNIRTI).

Electronic
Warfare

Defensive systems in legacy and
production Flankers
include a
Radar Warning Receiver, mostly variants of the SPO-32 / L150 Pastel
digital receiver carried. The latest subtypes like the Su-35BM/Su-35-1
carry the KNIRTI L175M Khibiny M Radio Frequency Surveillance (RFS =
ESM/RHAW)
system,
initially developed for the Su-34 Fullback. The Khibiny M is believed
to
use a channelised receiver and most likely employs a wideband dual
baseline interferometer in the forward sector, to permit passive
targeting of Kh-31P and R-27P/R-77P variants in defence suppression and
air combat roles.

Newer
Flankers
carry the podded wingtip mounted KNIRTI SPS-171 / L005S
Sorbtsiya-S mid/high band defensive jammer (ECM), this system being an
evolution of a jammer developed for the Backfire C. The Sorbtsiya-S,
unlike most Western jamming pods, is designed to operate in pairs and
uses forward and aft looking steerable wideband phased arrays to
maximise jamming effect, a similar arrangement to the Eurofighter
Typhoon EWSP package. It is worth observing that the Sorbtsiya is
clearly built to provide cross-eye jamming modes against monopulse
threats, and the wideband mainlobe steering capability provided by the
phased array permits best possible utilisation of available jamming
power. A graded dielectric lens is employed. Russian contractors have
been recently using Digital RF Memory (DRFM) technology, which is of
the same
generation as the US IDECM EWSP, and competing Israeli
systems.

The most recent defensive jamming equipment to be offered on Flanker
variants is the new KNIRTI SAP-518 wingtip jamming pod, displayed at
MAKS 2009. Concurrently KNIRTI displayed a high power support jamming
pod, the SAP-14, intended for centreline carriage on a large pylon. To
date little has been disclosed on these pod designs, which are likely
to retain the wideband phased array / lens antenna system first used on
the Sorbstiya.

Propulsion
-
Supercruising
Al-41F

In terms of propulsion, we have
seen incremental improvements
in the AL-31F series, with the F-3 model cited at 28,250 lbf cf the
baseline F-1 at 27,600 lbf. KNAAPO/Irkut are offering TVC kits as
retrofit items to existing
models, as they are offering seamless engine upgrades.

Engine makers NPO Lyulka-Saturn
and MMPP Salyut are now actively
competing with block upgrades to the basic AL-31F turbofan. Salyut have
described a three phase block upgrade to the AL-31F, with components
for the first phase already flight tested. The -M1 upgrade sees the
addition of the KND-924-4 0.924 m dia front end and SAU-235 FADEC,
pushing the engine to 18,320 lb (75.21 kN) dry and 29,180 lb (129.8 kN)
wet thrust. The -M2 upgrade phase implements a new cooling system for
the turbine stages, pushing the engine to 31,082 lb (138.26 kN) wet
thrust. The third -M3 upgrade stage sees the addition of a three stage
blisk technology KND-924-3 front end boosting the compression ratio
from 3.55 to 4.2, and wet thrust to 32,186 lb, competitive against the
latest US F100 and F110 variants. NPO Lyulka-Saturn's competing
upgrade, including hot end changes, is to increase wet thrust to 31,473
lb (143.17 kN). Salyut and Klimov are also working on a second
generation TVC nozzle design.

It is unclear when the 33,000 to
44,000 lbf class NPO Saturn-Lyulka AL-41F family will find its way into
the Su-30 series. The AL-41F is the Russian equivalent to the F-22's
F119-PW-100 engine, designed for supersonic cruise and improved
performance across the full fighter envelope. Originally developed for
the MiG MFI, the engine was built around the 'big bore' geometry
already used in the AL-31F series, making it compatible with existing
airframes.

The AL-41F is reported to have
recently entered Low Rate Initial Production (LRIP) the intent being to
equip the Sukhoi Su-34 Fullback which recently entered LRIP. In
2004 an Su-27M/Su-35 Flanker E was flown with the prototype AL-41F1, a
derated variant of the baseline AL-41F, intended to increase the
performance of the Flanker across all flgiht regimes, and enhance
dry supersonic thrust (http://www.flightglobal.com/Articles/2004/03/23/179164/Su-27M+flies+with+power+upgrade.html).

In terms of avionic systems and
propulsion we can expect to
see
ongoing incremental growth in the Su-30 series, as market pressures
drive KNAAPO and Irkut to integrate newer technologies in the aircraft.
As the Su-30 is the primary export revenue earner in Russia's defence
industry, and a primary means of exporting Russian guided munitions, it
is apt to continue to be the platform for the deployment of the latest
domestic and imported technologies. The unknown factor is how much
modern EU and Israeli technology will find its way into the Sukhois
over the next decade. With Germany, France and Israel active in the MiG
MLU market the existence of Asian aggregrate fleet numbers around 600
or more aircraft will present an irresistable attraction for the sale
of avionic and systems upgrades, be they incremental or major block
upgrades.

Air to Air
Weapons

Air to air weapons are one area
where the Russians have been
very aggressively developing and marketing new products. The baseline
Su-27S was armed with the R-27 (AA-10 Alamo) semiactive radar homing
BVR missile and the R-73 (AA-11 Archer) WVR missile. The thrust
vectoring R-73 (refer AA 4/97) was a trend setter and we have since
seen an improved R-73M marketed, as well as a digitised seeker equipped
R-74E variant credited with 75 degree off boresight capability and
kinematics to kill 12 G targets. Indian press reports suggest the
Rafael Python 4 has been offered to India and it is not inconceivable
that this missile will find its way on to Indian and other regional
Sukhois - India is currently negotiating for the Phalcon AEW&C
system fitted to the Ilyushin A-50E airframe and has acquired ballistic
missile defence radars from Israel.

The Vympel R-27 is the Russian
equivalent to the late model US
AIM-7 Sparrow series BVR missiles, but the similarity ends there since
the R-27 is available in a plethora of variants. The basic airframe is
supplied in long and short burn variants with differing range
performance, and with heatseeking or datalink aided inertially
midcourse guided semi-active radar seekers. The R-27R1 and R-27ER1 are
the radar guided long and short burn versions, respectively, credited
with F-pole ranges of 70 nautical miles and 43 nautical miles. The
R-27T1 and R-27ET1 are the respective heat seeking equivalents,
credited with slightly lower engagement ranges. The X-band
anti-radiation seeker equipped R-27P/EP has been reported, designed to
kill emitting fighters in the forward quarter by homing on their radar
emissions. More recently Agat have offered new build or retrofit active
radar seekers as the R-27A/EA, the AGAT 9B-1103M/9B-1348E, derived from
the R-77 seeker.

The most recently exported
missile in the region is the Vympel
R-77 RVV-AE (AA-12 Adder), the AMRAAMski. This missile, with unique
lattice controls, is a modern BVR weapon designed to kill 12G targets,
and credited with an A-pole range of 54 nautical miles, although some
reports suggest early production rounds are not delivering the
kinematic performance advertised, not unlike early AIM-120A AMRAAMs. As
the R-77 has AMRAAM-like capabilities, it permits an Su-30 to launch
multiple rounds and guide these concurrently, engagement geometry
permitting. As the R-77 matures, we can expect to see refinements in
propellants, autopilot kinematics and seeker jam resistance.

We have yet to see reports of
regional deliveries of the
Vympel
R-77M RVV-AE-PD (Povyshlenayya Dal'nost') ramjet adder, credited with
an A-pole range around 80 nautical miles. This missile is a direct
derivative of the R-77.

Alternate seekers for the R-77
have been advertised - the
heatseeking R-77T using an MK-80M seeker from the R-73M and R-27T, and
the antiradiation R-77P. The deployment of the new F/A-22A later in the
decade will see significant pressure on Vympel to supply heatseeking,
anti-radiation and electro-optical imaging seekers on the R-77/R-77M in
an attempt to counter the combined kinematics and all-aspect stealth of
the F/A-22A. While such seekers may do little to offset the
overwhelming advantages of the supercruising F/A-22A, they are likely
to prove quite effective against inferior types such as the JSF,
F/A-18E/F, late model F-15E and F-16C/B50. If the Su-30 can close to a
range where an advanced longwave IRST can track the target, an optical
seeker equipped R-77 variant can be used to effect an engagement,
defeating the RCS reduction measures on these aircraft. The
anti-radiation R-77P could be used to engage at maximum missile range.

In the long range missile
domain,
the Vympel R-37 (AA-X-13)
series of AIM-54 Phoenix look-alikes have been proposed - a
developmental R-37 successfully engaged a target at 162 nautical miles
of A-pole range in 1996. A more interesting proposal has been the use
of the Novator R(KS)-172 RVV-L (AAM-L) missile, a 215 nautical mile
range
1,650 lb launch weight long range AAM. The R-172 uses
datalink/inertial midcourse guidance and an active radar terminal
seeker, and Russian sources claim a snap-up capability to 100,000 ft
and snap-down capability to 10 ft AGL. KS-172 mockups have been
photographed on Su-30 displays but its production status is unclear at
this time, although India is negotiating licence production.

Of no less interest is the
Kh-31P
(AS-17 Krypton) family of
ramjet anti-radiation missiles, offered as a standard store on the
Su-30/35 subtypes. This missile, in basic anti-radiation and dual mode
seeker variants is often dubbed the AWACS killer and
would be used to destroy opposing AEW&C aircraft, or surface based
radars. Sukhoi advertise a load of up to six rounds, two on the inlet
stations.

Russian
missiles either carried by or proposed for Flanker variants (Author).

The dominance of US ISR
capabilities is
producing an increasing demand for hard kill 'counter-ISR' weapons and
the Sukhoi
fighter equipped with missiles like the Vympel R-77M, R-37, Novator
KS-172 and Zvezda-Strela Kh-31 variants qualifies exactly as that.

It is clear that the Su-30 has
at
least two decades more of
yet
to be exploited technological growth capacity, especially in systems
and weapons. The excellent kinematics, large airframe and large
apertures give it a decisive long term advantage in growth potential
against all teen series types, and with an increasingly borderless
international upgrade market, regional users with the cash required
will be able to fit some very capable upgrades over time.

A two color band FLIR/IRST
sensor replacing the OLS-30,
using QWIP imaging array technology.

COTS based computer hardware
running COTS based
software.

A Helmet Mounted Display with
FLIR projection capability.
Such an upgrade was being discussed some years ago, and would be easily
accommodated with a FLIR/IRST sensor.

Full glass cockpit based on
digital technology. Given the
current delivery of first generation glass cockpits in Su-30MK and
Su-27SKM, this is a natural progression.

Heatseeking and anti
radiation variants of the R-77
Amraamski, and extended range ramjet powered variants of the R-77. All
are in advanced development and actively being marketed.

Advanced digital variants of
the R-73/74 Archer close-in
air to air missile. These have been actively marketed.

AWACS killer long range
missiles in the 160 to 200
nautical
mile range category. The R-37/AA-X-13

Arrow remains in development for
the Su-35, the R-172 was recently reported as the subject of licence
negotiations with India. Su-35 upgrade marketing literature depicts the
use of such missiles.

Cruise missiles for standoff
attacks. China acquired
Kh-55SM/AS-15 Kent cruise missiles from the Ukraine, and is
manufacturing indigenous designs. India intends to use the supersonic
Brahmos on its Su-30MKIs.

Advanced jam resistant
fighter to fighter and fighter to
AWACS datalinks and networks. Further evolution
of protocol software will see this technology grow to match current US
capabilities.

Su-30 vs RAAF
Alternatives

Many visitors will be asking the obvious question of how the
Sukhois
stack up against the F/A-18A HUG, the JSF panacea and recently proposed interim
fighters such as the F/A-18E/F.

Against all three types the Su-30 derivatives, especially with
later engine subtypes, will always have a significant kinematic
advantage - there is no substitute for thrust in the kinematic
performance game. There is another factor to consider here, which is
the superlative 10 tonnes of internal drag free fuel the Sukhoi
carries. When not operating at extended combat radii, the Sukhoi driver
has more fuel to convert into energy, and that energy can nearly always
be used to an advantage.

With mutually competitive WVR missiles and Helmet Mounted
Sights/Displays for close-in combat, all three types will live or
die
in a close in engagement with an advanced Su-30MK variant by pilot
ability and good or bad luck. The Sukhoi combines high alpha manoeuvre
capabilities with excellent thrust/weight performance, and is apt to
have an energy advantage entering and prosecuting a close in fight. A
JSF driver opting to engage a thrust vectoring late model Su-30MK in a
knife fight may not survive to speak of the experience, unless the
Sukhoi driver is unable to exploit his advantage properly.

In close in air combat terms the JSF qualifies as 'double
inferior' against the later model Sukhois, since the Sukhois have an
advantage in both thrust/weight ratio and in wing loading (interested
visitors refer R.L. Shaw's Fighter Combat), and with its canard and
thrust vectoring capability will generally be able to gain a firing
solution quicker. Because the JSF is designed within the kinematic
performance class of the F/A-18 and F-16, it is right in the middle of
the performance envelope of aircraft the Sukhoi was designed to kill.

This chart compares some
cardinal design parameters for the Su-30MK
series, the JSF and the F/A-18 family, using manufacturer's data. The
effective wing loading of the Su-30 is better than depicted, since the
aircraft's configuration delivers a considerable amount of body lift.
While in the near term the AESAs in the JSF and F/A-18E/F will be
competitive, in the longer term the retrofit of AESA technology in the
N011M series radar will see the advantage in power aperture go to the
Sukhoi - both the JSF and F/A-18E/F are aperture size and cooling
capacity limited in growing AESA performance (Author).

In Beyond Visual Range (BVR) combat, the Sukhoi will again
have
a kinematic advantage, which may be exploitable at the bounds of
engagement radii, as the Sukhoi can gain separation in and out of the
missile envelope of the F/A-18's and JSF faster - it has the extra
thrust and combat fuel to play kinematic games both smaller fighters
cannot.

The BVR game is however dominated by sensor capabilities, both
onboard
and offboard the fighters, and long range missile capabilities. The
F/A-18A HUG is wholly outclassed by an Su-30MK with an N011M phased
array and R-77M ramjet missile. A late model F/A-18E with minimal
external stores and the APG-79 AESA fares much better due to its radar
signature reduction measures and better radar power-aperture
performance, but with external stores its margin of survivability is
eroded and it is likely to fall well within the engagement envelope of
the Sukhoi and also come to grief (refer radar/missile plot). A post
2010 AESA equipped Sukhoi could almost certainly take on the F/A-18E
with confidence as it will have much better power-aperture capability
in the radar, enough to offset the radar signature reduction measures
in the F/A-18E/F, with an advanced IRST to supplement radar data.

What happens when the
existing OLS-27/30/31 series IRST is replaced
with a newer longwave Focal Plane Array device - such as a single chip
QWIP device? The result will be a capability to engage opposing
aircraft under clear sky conditions regardless of RCS reduction
measures. While the supercruising F/A-22A can defeat such techniques by
kinematics alone, fighters in the teen series performance envelope will
have to contend with BVR shots using the R-27ET, R-77, R-77T and R-77M
cued by the thermal imaging search and track set. Similar issues arise
with the deployment of modern ESM receivers on the Su-30MK, analogous
to a number of existing Western systems. The Su-30MK series can then
launch long range BVR missiles such as the R-27ET, R-77T with infrared
seekers, or the R-27EP and R-77P with passive radio-frequency
anti-radiation seekers. If cued by such sensors or offboard sources,
these weapons will permit the Su-30MK to engage the JSF despite the
JSF's good forward sector radar stealth performance (Author).

A clean JSF will have the advantage of a very low X-band radar
signature in the forward quarter which will significantly degrade the
Sukhoi's otherwise overwhelming radar power-aperture advantage over
other types. However, the JSF is not designed to be a hot supersonic
performer and like the F/A-18s will need to generously use afterburner
to effect an intercept against a rapidly penetrating Sukhoi.

This exposes the JSF to detection and tracking by a newer
technology
IRST, and engagement by a long burn heatseeking or optically guided
AAMs such as the R-27ET, R-77T or likely future variants with imaging
seekers analogous to the AIM-9R and ASRAAM seekers. With the latter
seekers an R-77/R-77M acquires many of the capabilities of the RAAF's
superlative ASRAAM, especially jam resistance, but in a long range
missile with datalink midcourse guidance. A new two-colour infrared
seeker with 10.8 nautical mile acquisition range has been announced by
the Arsenal infrared systems house, ostensibly for use on the R-77
series. Professionals might contemplate that these are not 1980s 36T
series seekers.

Russia and the Ukraine have a competent infrared systems
industry -
e.g. Cyclone JSC recently described their QWIP single chip thermal
imagers with 128x128 and 320x256 resolution, competitive against the
latest EU technology and suitable for missile seekers and thermal
imaging IRST detectors. Therefore an advanced derivative of the
OLS-30/31 series with capabilities similar to the Eurofighter PIRATE
thermal imaging IRST, but with better detection range, will be
implementable with Russian hardware in the latter half of this decade
given the current
rate of evolution.

In the beam and aft sectors the JSF may be also quite
vulnerable to an active or semiactive radar guided missile shot - its
beam and aft sector radar signature reduction is much less refined than
that in the forward sector. Another factor for the JSF is its radar
emission - making it vulnerable to a long range shot with an
anti-radiation seeker equipped R-27P, R-27EP, R-77P or when eventually
deployed, ramjet R-77MP. While some Low Probability of Intercept (LPI)
techniques may reduce vulnerability to anti-radiation missiles, radar
modes for closing missile shots typically require high update rates and
favour the anti-radiation seeker. Since the R-77/R-77M has a midcourse
inertial package - Agat are developing FOG (fibre) gyro technology to
avoid dependency on Western Ring Laser Gyro technology - transient loss
of the JSF radar emission may not defeat the R-77P/R-77MP - or late
model R-27P/EP.

Soviet and more recent Russian BVR doctrine has always
emphasised firing pairs of missiles, one with heat-seeking guidance and
one with radar guidance, to defeat countermeasures. With the option of
active radar, heat-seeking and anti-radiation seekers, and by the end
of the decade an imaging seeker, the result is a very lethal cocktail
from a defensive countemeasures perspective - a defending fighter may
only have datalink transmissions to provide warning and no indication
of the seeker mix on the inbound missiles. With three of the four
seeker technologies passive defeating such weapons is not trivial.

On publicly available data the JSF is likely to be detected
and
engaged by an N011M ESA equipped Su-30 inside the 10 to 20 nautical
miles head on range envelope, unless the JSF can get the first shot off
and successfully kill the Sukhoi. If the Sukhoi can close with the JSF,
all bets are off on the JSF's ability to survive the close in
engagement.

A view commonly heard in Canberra these days is that the use
of
the Wedgetail AEW&C to provide offboard targeting for the JSF will
provide a decisive advantage over the Sukhois - 'Network Centric
Warfare' will ostensibly offset all other deficiencies in the force
structure and
platform capabilities. This argument is clearly contingent upon a great
many 'ifs' - if the Sukhois do not shoot very long range missiles at
the Wedgetail to force it to shut down or indeed kill it, if the
Wedgetail MESA is not jammed, if the JTIDS/MIDS or other datalinks to
the fighters are not jammed, if the Sukhois are not carrying advanced
IRSTs or X-band homing receivers, and if the Sukhois are not supported
by HF or low VHF band radars.

If a JSF were deployed in 2005
with a supporting Wedgetail and
existing Su-30 capabilities, then the argument probably holds most of
the time. However, in a post 2010 environment it is most likely not
going to hold up most of the time.

If Iraq could acquire smuggled
Russian GPS jammers during a UN arms embargo, there is no guarantee
that equipment like high power L-band jammers, advanced IRST, ESM
receivers, long range ramjet powered anti-radiation missiles and low
band radars will not proliferate into the region - the Kh-31P has been
already been reported in use with the PLA-AF. Given the mistrust of the
US and its allies we see in many regional players, be it the PRC or
lesser nations, the odds are very good that the existing trend will
persist and the most advanced Russian hardware, and indigenous
equipment, will be widely used.

While this will not put a dent into the
US Air Force's stealthy supercruising F-22A fleet, it is likely to
make life very difficult for the USN with a planned force structure of
F/A-18E/Fs and JSFs. If the RAAF opts for the JSF as its single type
solution, and F/A-18F as an interim types, it is likely to experience
similar grief.

In the long term the Russians will find a growing market for
'Counter-ISR' weapons - the 215 nautical mile R-172, 160 nautical mile
R-37 and 60 nautical mile Kh-31 series. In any engagement against a
Western air force, the first wave of Sukhois would shoot long range
'AWACS-killer' weapons such as the R-172, R-37, Kh-31 - or types as
yet unknown - to either destroy the AEW&C/AWACS or force it to shut
down and retreat - the 'AWACS-killer' theme is frequently seen in
Russian marketing literature , statements and more recently
promotoional video footage. The result is that forward
defending CAPs have to then light up their radars to attempt to
function autonomously - in turn making them vulnerable to detection by
ESM and shots by anti-radiation missiles like the R-27EP or R-77P/MP.
This Russian doctrine of a deluge of long range missiles is not new -
it is a variation on their proven theme of attacking naval task forces
with long range missiles. It is an evolutionary adaption to the growing
dependency of Western air forces on large and vulnerable ISR platforms
- the E-3 AWACS, RC-135V/W Rivet Joint, E-8 JSTARS, E-10 MC2A and of
course the RAAF's new Wedgetail.

The reality is that of an evolving technological landscape in
which advanced conventional weapons and supporting technologies
proliferate often very rapidly. The rate of Su-30 uptake in the region
is a good case study - any nation with the cash can acquire very
quickly large numbers of top-tier combat aircraft often with the latest
Western avionics and Russian weapons and sensors fitted.

The acquisition of long range Su-27SK/30MKK fighters and
supporting
Il-78MKK aerial refuelling tankers provides the PLA-AF with
unprecedented reach across the near region (C. Kopp).

The
arrival
of
the
Su-27/30
series fighters in this region changes
Australia's strategic context significantly. The superb combat radius
of
these large aircraft provides a significant capability to cover
the sea-air gap (C. Kopp).

Strategic
Impact of Su-30
in the Region

We have yet to see the full
strategic impact of the Su-30
proliferating
in the nearer and wider region. India and the PRC will not have most of
their Sukhoi force structures deployed until 2015 or later, and it is
unclear how many Sukhois both Malaysia and Indonesia will ultimately
operate. In the near term, both Indonesia and China will have
difficulties with fully exploiting the aircraft as they have steep
learning curves to climb in training and support - India and Malaysia
are apt to fare much better with Western based training systems. We can
expect to see regional users of the Su-30 maturing their capabilities
to use the aircraft in the latter part of this decade. Much has been
said about the PRC's difficulties in recruiting and training competent
Sukhoi drivers - with a population base of over a billion it is however
only a matter of time before they learn to do this properly. The view
widely held in some Canberra circles that Asia's air forces will remain
at
current proficiency levels is not supportable in the longer term.

Much has been made of the
serviceability and support problems
experienced by the IAF and the PLA-AF with their initial Sukhoi
aircraft, indeed the Indian government audit public report listed a
litany of contractual problems and Su-30K/MK servicabilities as low as
50% in 2003. These problems should been seen in the proper context as
they
represent the transient state experienced when introducing a radically
new piece of technology and supporting systems. The Sukhois are a
generation beyond the MiG-29 Fulrcums flown by the IAF and two
generations
ahead of the 1950s technology which makes up the backbone of the
PLA-AF. With HAL and Shenyang to perform domestic assembly and part
production, in time both nations will have the ability to domestically
manufacture high failure rate components, and perform factory/depot
deep overhauls. As a result what we see now in the support base for the
aircraft will not persist and should not be used as an indicator of the
long term supportability of the aircraft. With large fleet sizes even a
large proportion of grounded aircraft still leaves strategically
significant numbers to cause mayhem with.

Another
factor in time will be the availability of third party
Indian
and Chinese made spares to other Sukhoi users in the region.
Bottlenecks in the supply of Russian made spares may not persist past
2010 since the commercial incentives to bypass Russian suppliers are
considerable - and many regional Sukhois will use substantial fractions
of Western avionic hardware. In time we can expect to see more
bilateral deals, of the ilk seen between India and Malaysia for MiG-29
support, emerging between regional players and this will change the
support environment seen by smaller regional users of the aircraft.
With four sources of spare component supply rather than one - Irkut,
KNAAPO, HAL and Shenyang lines and subcontractor pools - market forces
will have their impact. To assume that historical case studies of
Russian aircraft support will be representative of the longer term
future in this region is arguably to misunderstand the developing
dynamic across the region. The era of Cold War technology monopolies is
long gone - only the US can sustain such due its commanding lead in
stealth, propulsion and computing technologies. This model is not a
valid one for assessing the longer term regional situation in Russian
and third party hardware.

The Su-30s are 'honest' 700+
nautical mile radius class
fighters, with plenty of combat gas to burn at shorter radii. This
provides all of the Sukhoi operators with a much larger air defence
footprint than we have ever seen before. India is now taking delivery
of its six Il-78 Midas tankers and will be able to robustly project
their Sukhoi force well beyond their borders - China ordered six
Il-78MKKs in late 2005.

Even without a proper tanking
capability, lesser regional
players have the option of buddy refuelling Su-30s with the UPAZ
hose/drogue pod - at the expense of half of the force committed to
tanking sorties. On a buddy refuelling sortie the shooter gains around
200-250 nautical miles of radius - yielding a radius very close to
1,000 nautical miles. With a 200 nautical miles class standoff missile
such as a 3M-54E or Kh-41 variant, both advertised on Sukhois, this
provides a limited strike capability beyond a 1,000 nautical miles
radius. While such a strike refuelling technique is not viable for
sustained high intensity operations, it is feasible for nasty pinprick
raids against very high value assets, such as airfields,
petrochemical/gas plants, shipping, aircraft carriers and other targets
the destruction of which could be highly politically embarrassing to
the victim.

What this means in practical
terms is that Su-30 users will
have the potential to contest airspace up to 500 nautical miles or
further from their runways, and launch limited strikes out to around a
1,000 nautical miles radius. While the latter is not the kind of heavy
iron 1,000 nautical mile radius capability Australia possesses in its
F-111 fleet, it is nevertheless enough capability to cause considerable
mayhem, if used cleverly.

In the longer term the Sukhoi
will have several strategic
effects. The first is that it will provide its users with the ability
to threaten or intimidate neighbours with lesser capabilities, if they
fall within the footprint of the Sukhoi. The second is that the US
Navy's CVBGs will lose much of their ability to intimidate by gunboat
diplomacy - the ability to threaten a CVBG with a mixed package of
shooter and escort Su-27/30s to radii essentially greater than that of
the F/A-18E/F and JSF mix on a carrier deck drives up the risk for the
US Navy in a nasty political stand-off. Unless the US is prepared to
take the gloves off early in a dispute and deploy the F-22A centric
US Air Force Global Strike Task Force, the US Navy may cease to be a
viable tool for coercive diplomacy.

Even for the US Air Force the
Su-30 presents some interesting
challenges, since it has the radius to threaten both tankers and large
ISR platforms in a shooting contest. While the F-22A would deal with
the Sukhois quickly and effectively, in many scenarios the Sukhois
could create genuine complications by forcing a relatively high ratio
of F-22A escort sorties to F-22A strike sorties, thus diminishing
the strike sortie rate - a major issue for the dual role tasked F-22A
fleet.

Another factor to consider is
the
ongoing proliferation of
advanced guided munitions and other hardware produced by competing
Russian vendors. Just as we have seen Irkut and KNAAPO competing in the
sales of Sukhois, we have seen a wide range of Russian weapon makers
like Vympel, Zvezda, Raduga and others selling their products across
the accessible market. Many of these products incorporate modern
Western digital COTS technology, an example being the upgraded second
generation 9B-1103M active radar seeker for the Vympel R-27A/EA
missile, which is built around a Texas Instruments TMS320C44 digital
signal processor chip and achieves a 25% acquisition range improvement
over the baseline seeker, derived from the R-77's first generation
9B-1348E - a second generation '9B-1348ME' will almost certainly carry
the same TMS320C44 digital signal processor.

Some of the air-surface weapons
being offered for the Sukhois
are genuinely capable. The Raduga Kh-41 Moskit (3M-80/82 SS-N-22
Sunburn) has been integrated on the Sukhois' centreline station (Su-33)
and is considered to be one of the most lethal supersonic
sea skimming anti-ship weapons in existence. The NPO Soyuz/Turayevo
TKMB ramjet powered Mach 4 class Zvezda-Strela Kh-31 (AS-17 Krypton) is
offered on Sukhoi variants, both in the active radar anti-shipping A
model (PLA-N) and anti-radiation P model (PLA-AF). The latest
advertised Kh-31 variant includes a dual mode air-air seeker,
incorporating an active radar seeker and passive anti-radiation seeker,
optimised for engaging 'nonmaneuvering airborne targets such as AWACS'
out to 100 nautical miles. Both the supersonic OKB-52
P-800/3K-55/3M-55/Kh-61 Yakhont / Brahmos (SS-N-26) and Novator 3M-54
Club
(SS-N-27) have been publicly discussed as options for the Sukhoi
fighters, especially the Su-34 series, but it is unclear whether any
integration work has taken place to date.

Cruise missiles
integrated on
or proposed for the Flanker (Author).

For strikes against land targets,
the 1,500 lb class Molniya
Kh-29 (AS-14 Kedge) is available in television (Kh-29T), thermal
imaging contrast lock homing (Kh-29D) and semi-active laser homing
(Kh-29L) variants - the weapon is a direct equivalent to the very
effective French Aerospatiale AS.30 series, with the television and
thermal imaging guided variant seeker equivalent to the AGM-65 Maverick
series. The smaller semi-active laser homing S-25LD and Zvezda Kh-25ML
(AS-12 Kegler) are also on offer. An equivalent to the RAAF's AGM-142
is available in the 2,000 lb class 50 nautical mile range turbojet
sustained Raduga Kh-59M (AS-18 Kazoo), which uses a conceptually
similar TV/datalink guidance scheme, using an APK-9 Tekon datalink
guidance pod carried on the left inlet pylon. An anti-radiation
variant, the Kh-59 (AS-13 Kingbolt) is available but has not been
advertised on the Sukhoi - the newer Kh-31R series appearing to be
favoured by the market.

GNPP
KAB-500
and
KAB-1500
guided
bombs (Author)

The Russians are also actively
marketing guided bomb kits for
the Sukhoi fighters. The KAB-500L is a direct equivalent to the GBU-16
using the 27N series laser seeker, the KAB-500Kr is equivalent to a TV
contrast lock guided 1,000 lb GBU-8 HOBOS fitted with a bunker busting
or fuel air explosive warhead. The KAB-1500 is a family of guidance
kits for 3,000 lb class dumb bombs, available with unitary or bunker
busting warheads. The KAB-1500L is a semi-active laser homing kit, the
KAB-1500TK a TV command link guided kit analogous to the GBU-15 but 50%
bigger, and the KAB-1500Kr a TV contrast lock guided system. Either
three of the 1,500 kg weapons, or six of the 500 kg weapons can be
carried by an Su-27/30 with suitable avionics.

Su-27SKM
loadout
(Sukhoi).

Su-30MK
loadout (Sukhoi).

To date most regional users
have
invested in Sukhois primarily
to provide air superiority capabilities. The availability of a wide
range of competitively priced Russian guided weapons is likely to
result over time in an increasing broadening of the role of regional
Sukhoi fleets. The principal impediment to the wider use of Russian
laser guided bombs has been a shortage of good targeting pods - with
suitable laser coding modifications third party pods are likely to
evolve to fill this niche over the next decade. The impact of the US
GBU-12 in Afghanistan and Iraq will not have gone unnoticed.

The television guided KAB-500Kr
and KAB-1500Kr kits are also
worth
closer scrutiny, since they provide a fire-and-forget capability very
similar to the long retired GBU-8, or a GBU-15 used in
lock-on-before-launch mode - highly accurate and devoid of the need for
a targeting pod. With the potential for a pre-programmed scene matching
correlation capability (ie pre-loading the bomb with a digitised target
image not unlike the early Tomahawk DSMAC), a technology the Russians
do have, this presents the prospect of a JDAM like capability to
attack multiple aimpoints on a single pass, albeit daylight limited.
The large volume of the KAB series seekers would easily permit a lot of
evolutionary growth in the design, and low cost commodity processing
chips and QWIP thermal imagers would facilitate this. It is likely that
we will see more of this family of bomb seekers in time.

Conclusions

For Australia the Su-30 presents
the prospect of a more
difficult to
defend sea-air gap. While we might choose to argue ad nauseam as to
whether a future Indonesian regime might opt to get into a fight with
Australia, or debate the likelihood of PLA-AF Sukhois being based in
the northern apporaches at a future date, or debate India's future role
in the near region, the stark reality is that the tyranny of distance
which has protected Australia for decades is being rapidly eroded by
developing capabilities across the region.

In this context the 2002 JSF
decision, and ongoing
lobbying for
F/A-18E/F interim fighters, seem both to be quite incongruous. Neither
aircraft offers a decisive capability margin against the Su-30 series,
especially longer term as the sensors, avionics and weapons evolve in
the Sukhois and regional players acquire AEW&C aircraft and other
supporting capabilities.

Indeed, one idea popular in some
Canberra circles seems to be
that the
RAAF is now less needed and should be downsized to save money since
Indonesia is in a state of chaos and all the RAAF is needed to do is
participate in the odd US coalition force - of course if anything goes
really bad in our neighbourhood the US will instantly assist!

This is a
particularly lame argument insofar as the US Air Force is badly
stretched with worldwide commitments, and is having genuine
difficulties with a poorly ageing tanker and fighter fleet - in a
crisis the US may not be in the position to deploy sufficient assets
quickly enough, even if the then incumbent US administration wants to
do so. There is of course no guarantee that a future US leadership
group will have the kind of relationship with Australia which we
observe today. The Americans may not solve their block obsolescence
problems until later in the next decade, leaving a genuine window of
strategic vulnerability should the more vocal proponents of RAAF
capability reduction have their way in Canberra.

The belief in some Canberra
circles that the JSF will somehow
solve all of the RAAF's force structure problems does not stand up to
scrutiny, in the light of the known capabilities and demonstrated
growth potential of the Sukhoi Su-30 which is rapidly becoming the
'standard' fighter across the region. Similarly the belief that
F/A-18E/F interim
fighters will somehow address the capability gap in the F/A-18A HUG
fleet is hard to accept. The belief that the F-111's heavyweight
counter-air strike capability is now irrelevant also conflicts with the
reality that the best way to fight an Su-30 without an F-22A is to
shut down its basing from day one of a conflict - and if possible
convert the Sukhois to scrap metal in situ - neither achievable with a
handful of standoff missile shots.

Strategy
has
always
been
a
game of positional advantage, and
in
the modern age this positional advantage lies largely in air power. If
Australia is to retain its relative strategic position in the region it
must start thinking realistically about its long term force structure
and abandon the quick fix panacea solution mindset which seems to be so
prominent in the current Canberra defence debate. There are no quick or
cheap fixes in this game.