Late spring mud my also have had an effect on delaying Barbarossa to June 1941.If Barbarossa had started on its original timeline (giving an extra month or so) and the Germans had had significantly more forces in the field because of closure in the west then who knows how far they could have gotten before the winter shut everything down? IMO it was that first winter on the eastern front that really was the turning point of the eastern front, it gave the USSR time to mobilize fully and gear up its industry. After that it became a war of attrition.

Regarding whether the OSS would steal the nazi nuke first or vce versa. The OSS learned their trade from SOE, if there was no SOE then the OSS may well not have even been formed. The gestapo were internal security, it was the Abwehr who would have attempted to steal the US nuke. Headed by Admiral Canares (who turned out to be an anti-nazi and deliberately sabotaged many of the Abwehrs operations during the war).

I don't see either the OSS or the Abwehr steeling nukes. The Abwehr intell effort was pretty much a joke. The Nazi nuke program was underfunded, underpowered, and working on the wrong path. If the Soviets are in the game they may on the other hand have been able to get info on both programs and might have shared with the US since it was in their interest.

neil hilton wrote: IMO it was that first winter on the eastern front that really was the turning point of the eastern front, it gave the USSR time to mobilize fully and gear up its industry. After that it became a war of attrition.

neil hilton wrote:Regarding whether the OSS would steal the nazi nuke first or vce versa. The OSS learned their trade from SOE, if there was no SOE then the OSS may well not have even been formed. The gestapo were internal security, it was the Abwehr who would have attempted to steal the US nuke. Headed by Admiral Canares (who turned out to be an anti-nazi and deliberately sabotaged many of the Abwehrs operations during the war).

Now here I disagree with both these points.

Firstly I believe that SOE would have continued to operate from outside an occupied Britain, especially if Churchill was leader of a government in exile. Its remit would be to keep intelligence and resistance continuing in Britain, especially Scotland.

Regarding the Abwehr it was already politically suspect. The agency tasked to such operations would be the SD, particulary as Reinhard Heydrich could be expected to develop an interest in the subject.

neil hilton wrote:This was the initial premise of this hypothetical scenario, to answer those who have commented on the nature of the British capitulation. It supposes that Britain was successfully invaded and defeated in the winter and spring of 1941 and then forced into surrender and sort of neutrality just like what the Germans did with France after they defeated them (Vichy France et al).From this it supposes that the mainland of Britain would have to be occupied like France in order to keep both populations in line.The reaction of British overseas possessions and the military forces there (RN, RAF, Army etc) to the defeat and occupation of Britain would be similar to those seen by French overseas territories (some would fight on, some would capitulate). British ex-dominion territories like Canada and Australia were independant countries and Allies of Britain, whether they would fight on or not is part of the question and thus left to those who want to reply to make their case for whatever scenario conclusion they choose to.Essentially put I started the thread with Britain and France (not necessarily their empires included) defeated and occupied and Barbarossa started in May 41 and let everybody run with it.

If Sea Lion succeeds then the war continues from the British Empire. Britain itself gets a quisling government with no popular support. The RN escapes, with sizeable RAF, British Army, French, Dutch, Polish, Czech and Norwegian forces.Continued next post.

Another major aspect following on from this, and a subject so far not mentioned at all, is the role of the Italians. British Empire forces in Africa and the Middle East will have an immediate concern - do they capitulate to the Italians, or do they fight on against the Italians. I can't see Malta surrendering unless the Italians invade. British forces in Egypt, Palestine, Sudan and Kenya (backed by South Africa and the Rhodesian colonies) I can well imagine continuing the war succesfully against the Italians, especially if the Italians are denied the Suez Canal. I suspect that a guerilla war would be used against the Italians in Africa and I can't see the Italians winning. And in Palestine the British stand to gain a desparate and dangerous ally - Jews.

How far does the Italian war distract Germany from Barbarossa - and achieve further dispersion of German forces?

Yet another aspect is in the Far East - does Japan try to seize the Dutch East Indies by force - and find themselves opposed not just by Dutch forces but also by British and Australian forces? Does that bring Japan into the war fully at least six months earlier - and does it mean that attack on PH happens that much earlier?

I would suggest that all of these factors would ultimately make a US invasion of Europe, targetting Britain first an easier proposition than might look at first sight.

neil hilton wrote:One point that hasn't been mentioned regarding Barbarossa. .....the Germans could have sent in a million more men but would still have failed because of the weather and the inability of their vehicles to move during the spring and autumn, German weapons froze during the winter.The only real opportunity to invade Russia successfully would be during the few summer months, so the earlier than historical intended time of May rather than June would be more significant than greater numbers.

Neil - where do these extra million men come from? Where does Germany gain the resources to do this?

RF: I said could have sent a million more men... (I was being purely hypothetical).

I think a 1942 start for Barbarossa would be a bad idea for the Germans as it would the USSR a whole year to prepare. Stalin was a paranoid survivor, he could ignore the German threat as long as someone in the west was fighting them but if the west fell completely (ie sealion succeeded) then he couldn't ignore the Nazi threat.

The Ausland SD took over the Abwehrs responsibilites after the failed plot to kill Hitler in July '44, so you are right it would have been them tasked to steal a US nuke (if possible). Although it would be the Abwehr that would have done any preparation.

I also agree with the British Empire fighting on after Britain itself is occupied and the RFs idea of the Italian forces in north Africa. Not so sure about the idea of Jewish help for the Brits in Palestine, I think the Jews would just fight anybody and everybody that tried to take Palestine from them and damn the rest of the world and its politics.

A 1942 start to Barbarossa might benefit the Germans if they had made full use of the extra year by moving on to a total war economy and greatly increasing tank and aircraft production. Particulary if Stalin had his Siberian reserves further west by 1942.

A 1942 start to Barbarossa might benefit the Germans if they had made full use of the extra year by moving on to a total war economy and greatly increasing tank and aircraft production. Particulary if Stalin had his Siberian reserves further west by 1942.

Quite correct.

An appeaser is one who feeds a crocodile, hoping it will eat him last. Sir Winston Churchill

RF wrote:A 1942 start to Barbarossa might benefit the Germans if they had made full use of the extra year by moving on to a total war economy and greatly increasing tank and aircraft production. Particulary if Stalin had his Siberian reserves further west by 1942.

But didn't the Germans historically cut back on military produciton between the BOB and Barbarossa? The Soviets aren't holding still in this time frame either and if Britian is out of the war Stalin may believe the reports of a German attack. A delay in this situation is IMO more likely to hurt the Germans than help them.

The Germans did indeed cut back on the Heer from July 1940, and German war production wasn't fully mobilised for war anyway.

My suggestion of launching Barbarossa in 1942 was based on the requirement that a more savvy fuhrer would put someone like Speer in charge of armaments production by the summer of 1940 with a remit to massively increase production of tanks, mobile artillery and aircraft. By early spring 1942 the Germans should then have had far more firepower than they had in the real WW2 and substantially have closed the gap between themselves and the number of tanks and planes the Soviets had. If so then they would have had a better chance of succeeding, using the invasion plans drawn up by Alfred Marcks.