This thesis develops a model in which homogeneous producers and
merchants interact repeatedly in a search market. Merchants are
able to reduce the cost of search by o ering trading certainty to pro-
ducers with whom they have a preexisting relationship. Equilibria
are characterised in Markov strategies, and it is found that price-
dispersed equilibria exist in asymmetric strategies. Conditions in
which a price-dispersed equilibrium can be welfare improving com-
pared to a single-price equilibrium are found, and two extensions
to the basic model are provided.

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