Tuesday, 30 September 2014

Fleet support ship, INS Jyoti (centre) replenishes two warships in the Tropex exercise earlier this year

By Ajai Shukla

Business Standard, 30th Sept 14

Over the last
six weeks, the Indian Navy commissioned three frontline warships, boosting its fleet
to 140 vessels. Another 41 warships are being built in the country, including
the 40,000-tonne aircraft carrier, INS Vikrant. All these will join a “blue
water” navy that will radiate influence across the Indian Ocean.

This navy’s
strike power will centre on at least two carrier battle groups (CBGs), self-sufficient
flotillas built around a floating air base --- the aircraft carrier. Each
carrier will be escorted by multi-role corvettes, frigates and destroyers,
which together handle threats from all three dimensions --- underwater, surface
and air. With its arsenal of weapons and sensors, the CBG dominates a huge
chunk of ocean, establishing “sea control” wherever it moves.

Sea control
is central to the outlook of the Indian Navy, which draws inspiration from
Alfred Thayer Mahan, the 19th century US strategist. Mahan argued
that a navy’s primary task is to locate and destroy the enemy fleet, thereby dominating
the sea and controlling commercial shipping. Essential for this is the powerful
surface fleet that India is building.

Naval guru
Julian Corbett presented an alternative philosophy, placing naval warfare in a
larger political-economic-strategic context. More defence-minded than Mahan, Corbett
emphasised the importance of sea lines of communications (SLOCs), essential for
the movement of warships and merchant fleets. Corbett’s outlook shapes the “sea
denial” strategy of weaker navies like Pakistan. Their smaller fleets --- inadequate
for sea control --- instead deny the enemy unfettered use of the sea by using
platforms like submarines to interdict SLOCs, ambush his shipping and laying
mines at straits, narrows and outside his harbours, or by using missile boats
for swarm attacks on large warships.

Given its Mahanian
outlook and superior surface fleet, the Indian Navy would, in any future war
with Pakistan, seek sea control over the northern Arabian Sea by sending one,
or even two, CBGs to destroy or degrade Pakistan’s surface fleet. With that
done, the attack would shift to coastal installations and to supporting the
land battle through amphibious landings.

“Indian sea
control would complicate Pakistan’s defence dilemma. In addition to defending
2,900-odd kilometres of land border, Pakistan would then have to defend an
additional 1,046 kilometres of coastal boundary”, points out Vice Admiral
Pradeep Chauhan (Retired), a highly regarded naval strategist who has commanded
the aircraft carrier, INS Viraat.

Yet, sea
control must go hand-in-hand with sea denial. While CBGs seek battle with
Pakistan’s navy, Indian submarines would cut oil supplies and war material from
Pakistan’s West Asian allies; and bottle up shipping in Karachi, Gwadar and the
new naval base at Ormara. For this, Indian submarines would lurk outside this
ports, while also deploying in the Gulf of Aden and the Strait of Hormuz.

This
combination of sea control and sea denial would also play out in a war with
China. Sea control would be quickly imposed over China’s SLOCs through the
Indian Ocean, since our CBGs would enjoy proximity to bases; and to shore-based
air support from the “unsinkable aircraft carrier” that is the Andaman &
Nicobar Islands. Even as China’s oil supplies and trade are strangled, Indian
submarines would block the People’s Liberation Army (Navy) from the Indian
Ocean, at the straits of Malacca, Sunda, Lombok and Ombai Wetar. It would be vital
to hold the PLA(N)’s 77 major surface warships, 60 submarines, 55 amphibious
ships, and 85 missile boats, at bay.

Here lies
India’s Achilles’ heel. With just 14 submarines in its fleet, the navy’s sea
denial capacity is less convincing than its ability for sea control --- which stems
from a far-sighted decision in the 1950s to include aircraft carriers in the
fleet. (Part II of this article tomorrow
will deal with sea denial).

Sea control against Pakistan

In establishing
sea control across the northern Arabian Sea, the Indian Navy would fight a
tricky battle in coastal waters against the Pakistan Navy. The latter,
outnumbered and outgunned, knows it would get quickly wiped out on the open
seas. It is likely, therefore, to withdraw close to the Pakistan coast where the
Pakistan Air Force (PAF) would provide it air cover.

To close in
with this fleet, India’s CBGs must have the air defence capability to beat off
the PAF. Key to this would be the MiG-29K fighter, flying from aircraft carriers;
and air defence systems like the Barak, and the much-awaited new Long Range
Surface to Air Missile. The LR-SAM, which the Defence R&D Organisation
(DRDO) is developing with Israel, will be deployed on warships by end-2015.
These missiles would also protect the CBG against anti-ship missiles --- like
the Harpoon and Exocet --- fired from Pakistani submarines, warships and
aircraft.

“The Israeli
Barak missile, which was bought in 2001, for the first time provided the Indian
Navy with genuine air defence capability. The LR-SAM will make air defence even
more reliable,” asserts Chauhan.

Until the
LR-SAM is operational, Indian warships remain critically vulnerable to air and
missile attack, but the navy believes it will be worth the wait. “This (delay) is
the price that you pay when you go in for high-tech, state-of-the-art systems”,
says Vice Admiral Satish Soni, who heads Eastern Naval Command.

The LR-SAM will
also defend Indian warships against a feared ocean predator --- long-range
maritime patrol (LRMP) aircraft like Pakistan’s P3C Orion, which will fly
12-hour missions from Karachi to scour the seas, locate Indian warships, and
launch anti-ship missiles from 50 kilometres away.

The LR-SAM’s
70-kilometre range will let it engage the LRMP aircraft even before it launches
its anti-ship missile. If the aircraft manages to launch, the LR-SAM is
designed to shoot down the missile before it strikes a warship. For the LRMP
aircraft, an attack on a CBG would be suicidal. Its presence betrayed by the
launch of a missile, MiG-29Ks fighters scrambled from an aircraft carrier would
quickly overtake it and shoot it down.

After coming
within range of Pakistan’s surface fleet, Indian warships would launch an
air-sea attack --- striking Pakistani warships with anti-ship missiles like the
Brahmos, from ranges of up to 300 kilometres; and with fighter aircraft launched
from the aircraft carrier.

Detracting
from India’s convincing naval superiority in the Indian Ocean region is only
its vulnerability to enemy submarines. This stems not just from a depleted
submarines force, but also neglect of the capability to detect and destroy
enemy submarines.

(This is the first of a two-part series on
naval strategy. In Part II tomorrow: In submarine operations, the Indian Navy’s
Achilles’ heel)

Is the new ISI chief as rational as his US Army War College paper might suggest?

By Ajai Shukla

Business Standard, 30th Sept 14

On
September 22, Pakistan’s military nominated Lieutenant General Rizwan Akhtar to
replace Lt Gen Zahir-ul-Islam as chief of the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI)
on October 8. It is important to know what makes him tick, given his
organisation’s continued reliance on “sub-conventional assets” --- referred to
in more sensible circles as jihad-fuelled
crazies.

The
announcement was notable for two reasons First; it was made by the military,
not the civilian government, indicating that the army, not Prime Minister Nawaz
Sharif, controls the appointments of generals. Second, this was the first time
Pakistan’s military made such a key announcement on Twitter and Facebook, proving
itself a hip, trendy, forward looking bunch of really cool dudes. No, not
really! Like most armies, it remains an insular, inward-looking,
self-perpetuating bureaucracy. Unlike most armies, it also radicalises and
trains killers to use against India, which is so, so uncool.

Most ISI
chiefs are anonymous folks, since militaries value officers who remain in the
background. Yet, in 2008, when Akhtar was a brigadier attending a one-year
course at the US Army War College, he wrote a 6,313-word paper entitled:
“US-Pakistan trust deficit and the war on terror”. This spelt out his views on
America; militant Islam; the roiling Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA)
along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border, where Pakistan’s army is currently fighting;
and on Pakistan’s relations with India.

A caveat: a
paper written by a sub-continental military officer on a course in America, or
in a military publication in his own country, is seldom an outpouring of deeply
held beliefs. Instead, most such writing is an image building exercise. On an
American course, a Pakistani brigadier would want to be seen as rational and
accommodative. While writing in a Pakistani publication, he would portray
himself as a staunch upholder of military and national ideology.

Even so,
Akhtar’s dissertation is worth reading, if only because of a paragraph that
goes: “Pakistan needs to enhance its credibility by publicly identifying some
of its critical strategic challenges. It must reform its governance, improve
the economy, confront and eliminate Islamic extremism, and create a more
tolerant society. Most important, it must aggressively pursue rapprochement
with India.”

Encouraging,
but a full reading of Akhtar’s paper suggests that his proposed outreach to
India, like that of many Pakistanis, can be summed up as: We must have peace,
and we must have Kashmir, and Washington must deliver it. Akhtar writes, “(T)he
threat posed by India has served as a primary enabler for US-Pakistani
relations as US involvement and support can help mediate and ensure an
equitable settlement of the Kashmir issue as well as help represent Pakistani
interests within the United Nations.” Akhtar acknowledges Washington’s role in preventing
the Kargil conflict (1999) and Operation Parakram (2001-02) from triggering a
full-scale conflagration.

Yet, Akhtar
recognises that US-Pakistan ties are transactional, an on-off relationship
based on transient convenience. He writes: “The US and Pakistan have been drawn
together by coincident interests on three separate occasions. The first
occurred during the height of the Cold War (from the mid-1950s to mid-1960s);
the second was during the Afghan Jihad in the 1980s (again lasting about a
decade); and the third engagement dates to September 11, 2001, and the
subsequent war on terrorism. Since the event of 9/11, Pakistan has been a key
ally in the Global War on Terrorism.”

In this
cynical alliance, friction is inevitable. Yet, Akhtar wants differences to
remain unseen, especially those that make Pakistan seem mercenary. He writes: “(I)t
is routinely reported in the news media that the US has given Pakistan more
than $10 billion in assistance, channeled primarily through the Pakistani
military, and these reports add that Pakistan is not doing enough to control
Taliban/Al Qaeda elements in FATA. The general impression it gives to the
Pakistani people and many international actors is that this is some sort of
business transaction where Pakistan was hired to perform a job and is being
paid.”

Akhtar’s
paper reflects his army’s increasing tolerance for the rhetoric and trappings
of democracy, providing the generals retain control over key security policies.
In an unusually forthright endorsement of democracy he writes: “The mechanism
for establishing the rule of law begins with a free political process but also
extends to an effective and independent judicial system and a modern, well
equipped professional police force. The role of the military should be limited
to ensuring the Nation’s security from external threats and in waging the war
against terrorists and only be utilized for internal security as a last resort.”

On the
issue of the moment --- military operations in FATA --- Akhtar laments
America’s “short-term perspective”. He says US operations (presumably drone
strikes) “alienate the tribals and result in increased tribal support for the
Taliban/Al Qaeda.” In contrast, “The Pakistani government understands the
importance of building close ties with the tribal chiefs (Maliks) for the
long-term strategic success against the Al Qaeda/Taliban radicals.”

Numerous
independent commentators have said this is rubbish. They say Pakistan triggered
the radicalisation of FATA in the 1980s, during the anti-Soviet jihad, when the
army preferred radical Islam, rather than Afghan nationalism, as the driving
ideology of the Afghan resistance. None but the ISI engineered the passage of
tribal leadership from the Maliks to a crop of radical clerics, many closely
linked to Islamist institutions in Saudi Arabia. In this the ISI dealt directly
with jihadi leaders, marginalising America so that Pakistan’s agenda could
prevail.

Akhtar
indirectly admits this modus operandi
was used again in FATA, noting “Pakistan has repeatedly rejected requests by
the US to allow its combat troops to operate in the tribal areas inside
Pakistan or to allow US personnel to deal directly with local tribal leaders.”

All told,
Pakistan’s new spymaster comes off as a rational, intelligent officer who can
see the shortcomings within his establishment but is unwilling to challenge
core beliefs. For now, Rizwan Akhtar must dance to the tune of his boss, Raheel
Sharif, which has so far resonated as a distinctly anti-Indian melody.

Monday, 29 September 2014

Indian
private companies that aspire to design and develop indigenous defence equipment
are worried. The ministry of defence (MoD) is poised to clear a new policy that
will let foreign defence companies enjoy Indian subsidies for developing
equipment for the military.

The policy
in question --- the “Make” category of procurement --- was included in the
Defence Procurement Procedure (DPP) of 2006 to foster Indian research & design
(R&D) capability; to retain control of technology; and to ensure that
defence equipment is supported through its service life. In “Make” category
projects, the MoD pays the vendor 80 per cent of the development cost.

This was to
enable Indian companies to compete with global defence giants that had established
themselves over decades, mostly with enormous subsidies from their respective
governments.

Strict
conditions exist for a company to be eligible for a “Make” project and,
therefore, for MoD funding. The company should have been in operation for at
least 10 years; have a minimum annual turnover of Rs 1,000 crore; have been
profitable for at least three of the last five years; and have a defence
licence.

The new
policy that will come up before the MoD’s apex Defence Acquisition Council
(DAC) seriously dilutes these conditions, opening the door for foreign vendors to
enter as joint venture companies (JVs) and claim “Make” funding.

The new
policy reduces the operating period from 10 years to just 5; the asset base is
no longer Rs 1,000 crore, but linked with the size of the “Make” project in
question; and a defence licence is no longer essential; it is enough to have
applied for a licence.

An Indian CEO
points out that the proposed changes would permit an Indian business house that
has had a non-operating (sleeping) company for 5 years to form a JV with 49 per
cent FDI, apply for a defence licence, and be eligible for “Make” category
projects.

As
worrying, says an MoD official who opposed the new “Make” procedure, is the
fact that foreign holding would subject the JV to export control laws and
technology restrictions of the country to which the foreign vendor belongs. The
US Code of Federal Regulation mandates that a foreign JV, in which an American
company owns more than 20 per cent, is subject to US technology control laws.

That would
seriously violate the basic aim of the “Make” procedure --- which is to create
an Indian product that is not subject to foreign control or licensing. Ensuring
that key intellectual property (IP) remains in India would ensure life cycle
support and subsequent upgrades of the equipment in question.

In discussions
with the MoD from June-Oct 2013, Ficci had strongly opposed diluting the eligibility
conditions for “Make” projects. The MoD then engaged private management
consultants, PricewaterhouseCoopers, or PwC, to develop the proposed “friendly”
policy.

Dhiraj
Mathur, Executive Director of PwC, argues that the existing policy does not exclude
foreign participation. The truth is, however, that the existing eligibility
conditions rule out foreign bidders from “Make” procurements.

This was
illustrated in the eventually abortive “Make” project to build a Future
Infantry Combat Vehicle. The MoD invited four companies, including Mahindra, to
submit proposals. Since Mahindra wanted to partner global major, BAE Systems, they
established a JV called Defence Land Systems India (DLSI), in which BAE Systems
owned 26 per cent. With DLSI ineligible to bid, it remained a vendor to the
principal bidder, Mahindra.

Consequently,
Mahindra would have remained in control of the IP, which would not be the case
had DLSI been the primary vendor.

The raising
of FDI limits in defence, on August 6, from 26 to 49 per cent, allows foreign
vendors to have a larger stake in the JV. Anticipating this, Ficci had stated
at the time that, “such (JV) companies can be permitted to participate in Buy
(Indian) and Buy & Make (Indian) categories of procurement.”

Notably, Ficci
did not welcome JV participation in “Make” category procurement. Yet, if the
MoD sanctions the proposed new policy this week, the very foundation of the
“Make” procedure would have been shifted.

Friday, 26 September 2014

The
US-India defence relationship has been talked up as one of the highlights of Prime
Minister Narendra Modi’s visit to the US from Sept 26-30. Yet, with the
National Democratic Alliance (NDA) government having spent just four months in
office, there has been little time to reverse the “arms-length” policies of Mr
AK Antony’s 8-year custodianship of the defence ministry (MoD) that ended in
May.

Mr Modi’s
visit, therefore, is unlikely to achieve the “deliverables” and “outcomes” in
defence cooperation that are used to measure a visit’s success.

Aware of
the embarrassing absence of substance and big-ticket signings, New Delhi last
month initiated the draft of a fresh agreement to renew the defence framework
agreement that expires in June. The “New Framework for the US-India Defence
Relationship”, signed on June 28, 2005, was valid for ten years.

The
proposed agreement is referred to --- tongue-in-cheek --- as the “New New Defence
Framework”. With Washington and New Delhi still negotiating drafts, there is
little prospect of the agreement being signed during Mr Modi’s visit.

Nor is
there any big-ticket defence contract to sign. Defence Minister Arun Jaitley
told parliament in July that India’s proposed purchase of M777 ultralight
howitzers from BAE Systems is mired in disagreement over the price.

The two big
contracts that the MoD recently cleared --- for 22 AH-64E Apache attack
helicopters; and 15 Chinook heavy lift helicopters, together worth about Rs
15,000 crore --- have not been cleared by the union cabinet. There could be an
announcement that India has selected the two Boeing helicopters, but a contract
signature is unlikely.

Boeing CEO,
James McNerney, will have a one-on-one meeting with Mr Modi in New York on Sept
29. Company sources suggest that Boeing will outline its plans to design and
manufacture defence equipment in India.

Another CEO
with interests in defence who will meet Mr Modi that morning is Jeffrey Immelt
of General Electric.

“India and
US are strategic partners and cooperating across a wide canvas…. We cooperate
from issues relating to the atom to issues relating to outer space,” said
India’s foreign office spokesperson, Syed Akbaruddin, on September 23.

Yet, US officials
complain that the empty agenda reflects the Indian MoD’s reluctance to respond
to repeated US defence cooperation proposals.

To be sure,
much of that stonewalling took place under Antony. After US Secretary of
Defense, Chuck Hagel, visited Delhi last month, American officials said they
encountered a far more engaged and receptive Indian MoD.

Even so, progress
seems unlikely before Jaitley travels to Washington next month for a meeting of
the Defence Policy Group (DPG) --- the apex US-India defence cooperation forum,
co-chaired by India’s defence minister and the US secretary of defence.

It is a
measure of how moribund the defence partnership had become under the United Progressive
Alliance that the DPG, which is supposed to meet every year, has not met since
Feb 2012.

As their
best hope in resuscitating the defence relationship, New Delhi and Washington
are looking to the Defence Trade and Technology Initiative (DTTI). Proposed by
US Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta in 2012, the DTTI’s role has never been
formally spelt out. Even so, both sides informally agree that its basic role should
be to overcome bureaucratic hurdles that arise due to the different working
styles of the two defence establishments.

Under the
DTTI, the Pentagon made a dozen proposals to the MoD during Chuck Hagel’s visit
last month. He said these would “transfer significant qualitative capability,
technology, and production know-how” to India.

Of these,
the one that might come up during Mr Modi’s visit is a first-ever US offer to
co-produce the FGM-148 Javelin anti-tank missile in India; and to co-develop a
“next-generation Javelin” with Indian defence R&D agencies. The Indian Army
was poised to buy the Spike anti-tank missile from Israel, but the Javelin
offer has caused New Delhi to reconsider.

India’s
secretary for defence production, G Mohan Kumar, was in Washington on Sept 23,
apparently discussing the Javelin proposal. It remains unclear, however,
whether any announcement will be made during Mr Modi’s visit.

In talking
up the DTTI, Washington will cite Secretary Hagel’s invitation to Mr Jaitley to
a summit level inter-agency meeting in October, where Secretary of State, John
Kerry; and Secretary of Commerce, Penny Pritzker, would join them. This
high-power forum could discuss every dimension of the US technology control
regime, which has been a major bugbear in US-India relations.

A day after
the Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO) highlighted India’s scientific
capability by placing the spaceship, Mangalyaan, in orbit around Mars, another milestone
in indigenous design was celebrated in New Delhi on September 25: The 50th
anniversary of the Directorate of Naval Design (DND).

Even as the
air force and army import the bulk of their equipment requirements, the DND has
spearheaded the navy’s striking success in “making in India”. Over the last
half century, it has produced 19 separate designs --- from small coastal vessels
in the 1960s; through increasingly sophisticated frigates and destroyers, to
India’s first indigenous aircraft carrier, INS Vikrant, which Cochin Shipyard is
currently building.

Interestingly,
India was building world-class warships two centuries ago. In 1817, Mumbai
Docks (today the Naval Dockyard) built HMS (Her Majesty’s Ship) Trincomalee, the
oldest warship afloat, which is currently berthed in Hartlepool, UK. Mumbai
Docks also built HMS Minden, on which Francis Scott Key composed America’s
national anthem, “The Star Spangled Banner” in Baltimore. Also built in Mumbai
was the HMS Cornwallis, on which China signed the Treaty of Nanking, ceding
Hong Kong to the British in 1842.

After
independence, when the navy took the far-reaching strategic decision to build,
rather than buy, its warships, a Corps of Naval Constructors was set up
in 1956. In 1964, this evolved into the Central Design Office, the forerunner
of today’s Directorate of Naval Design.

Tellingly,
neither the army nor the air force have their own design agency --- and they
have achieved little success in indigenisation. Analysts are unanimous that the
DND, with its present corps of 350 uniformed warship designers, has been
instrumental in the navy’s successful indigenisation.

Its first major success came in the late 1970s, when it
designed the Godavari class frigate. For a decade before that, the DND had cut
its teeth on the British-designed Leander-class frigates, which were being built
in India. The last two Leanders featured modifications by the DND, especially
to their helicopter deck.

Even so, experts were taken aback by INS Godavari. A heavily
armed frigate that weighed 1,000 tonnes more than the Leanders, the 3,600-tonne
Godavari could actually sail faster than the highly regarded British warship.

On 3rd April 1989, the
cover of Time magazine featured INS Godavari, with a cover story entitled,
“Super India: The Next Military Power.”

Buoyed by the Godavari, the DND
began developing the ambitious 6,200-tonne Delhi-class guided missile destroyer
in the late 1980s. The three warships of this class --- INS Delhi, Mumbai and
Mysore --- are acknowledged as exceptionally handsome warships. Their sturdy
design and sea-keeping ability was also acknowledged when INS Delhi spent two
days in a cyclone in the South China Sea, en route to China. Following that
came the 6,200-tonne Shivalik class multi-role frigates, which saw increasing
levels of indigenization.

“I have had the privilege of serving on each of these
classes of ships… As a user I can vouch (for the fact) that these are some very
fine ships, very potent ships. I would like to salute the professionalism of
our naval designers”, declared Admiral Dhowan.

The DND’s golden jubilee year has seen the commissioning of three
DND-designed warships --- the new guided missile destroyer, INS Kolkata; the
first anti-submarine corvette, INS Kamorta; and an offshore patrol vessel, INS
Sumitra. Another 41 indigenously
designed warships are currently being built in Indian shipyards.

While lauding the DND, the navy chief pointed out that more
should be done to indigenize weapons and sensors --- the so-called “fight capability”
of a warship. India has indigenized 90 per cent of its warships’ “float
capability”, or its hull structure; and 60 per cent of their “move capability”,
or engines, transmission and propellers. However, only INS Kamorta has fitted a
range of indigenous sensors and weapons to emerge 90 per cent indigenous.

Wednesday, 24 September 2014

China’s People’s
Liberation Army (PLA) has requested a flag meeting to resolve the border
confrontation at Chumar, in southern Ladakh. The contest, which has been
running for a week, now has over a thousand armed troops facing off at three
separate spots, with neither side willing to allow the other to move deeper
into territory that each claims as its own.

Top army
generals say they are in no hurry to accede to the Chinese request. They say
they are “evaluating the agenda” and will respond in due course.

Chumar has emerged
as a hotly disputed segment of the Line of Actual Control (LAC) between India
and China. Here, both sides perceive the LAC differently, with a difference of
3-4 kilometres between the two claims. India has a road almost up to its claim
line while, until this year, Chinese troops had to walk several kilometres to
reach the LAC. That allowed Indian patrols to dominate the LAC, while the Chinese
patrolled less frequently and aggressively.

Over the
last two years, however, China too has connected up a new road to the LAC,
leading to more vigorous patrolling. A face-off like the current one, say local
Indian commanders, was inevitable.

Chumar is
one of 14 identified hot spots, where India and China perceive the LAC
differently. The other locations that have seen trouble in the past include the
Thagla Ridge/Namka Chu Valley (where the 1962 war began), the Thangdrong
Ridgeline (which saw a major Chinese incursion in 1986), and Daulet Beg Oldi,
where the Chinese set up camp last April.

Indian
commanders in the Leh-headquartered 14 Corps, however, are sanguine that this
confrontation, like every other in the last four decades, will be resolved
through discussions. “The Chinese are making the point that this area remains
disputed”, says one general. “They absolutely don’t want a shooting war.”

Yet, Indian
analysts have made much of Chinese President Xi Jinping’s exhortation to PLA
commanders, at a meeting in Beijing on Sept 22, to be ready “to win a regional
war in the age of information technology.” Commentators have interpreted Xi’s
mention of “a regional war” as a direct threat to India.

In fact, Xi
is articulating a two-decade-old PLA strategic doctrine that, at the end of the
Cold War, jettisoned the threat of the “early, major and nuclear war”, that Mao
had foreseen. In 1985, China’s Central Military Commission (then led by Deng
Xiao-ping and today by Xi Jinping) declared that the PLA’s most likely threat
was “local, limited war”.This allowed
Deng to dramatically downsize the bloated, 4 million-strong PLA.

In January
1993, after the globally televised US military wizardry of the First Gulf War,
Jiang Zemin issued a new set of “Military Strategic Guidelines”, which shifted
focus to fighting “local wars under modern high-technology conditions”.

The “local
war” that Jiang explicitly defined was to “prevent Taiwan from fomenting any
great ‘Taiwan independence’ incidents.” This came to be known as the PLA’s
“main strategic direction”.

A decade
ago, in the early 2000s, a technologically evolving PLA modified its strategy further
to “local war under conditions of informatization.” Here again, Taiwan remained
the likely objective, with India barely mentioned in PLA literature.

On Sunday, Xi
also urged the PLA to show “absolute loyalty and firm faith in the Communist
Party of China… (to) make sure all decisions from the central leadership are
fully implemented,” says the official website of China’s Ministry of National
Defence.

This may
have been a mere affirmation of the Communist Party of China’s bedrock
principle of tight control over the military. In Yan’an in 1938, Mao had
written, “The party commands the gun, and the gun must never be allowed to
command the party.” Every top Chinese leader since Mao has reaffirmed this
principle periodically; Xi might have been doing the same.

However,
the Chumar face-off at a politically sensitive time might also reflect the
PLA’s growing autonomy and clout in Xinjiang and Tibet, which includes the
management of the LAC. China watchers are closely observing the relationship
for signs that Xi’s iron grip over China might not include the security
establishment in its roiling western provinces.

Postscript: China's foreign ministry spokesperson, Hua Chunying, on Tuesday denied that Xi's remarks about "regional war" were aimed at India. Replying to a question about whether his remarks were related to the border standoff, Hua said, "I believe that this may be a wild guess... (that was) completely off the mark."

Monday, 22 September 2014

Eleven persons on board an Indian Air Force (IAF) AN-32
aircraft that crashed and caught fire while landing in Chandigarh on Saturday
evening are fortunate to be alive, say sources close to the accident
investigation.

The aircraft, which was returning from Srinagar, via
Bhatinda, after delivering flood relief supplies, had five IAF crewmembers and
six passengers from the National Disaster Response Force (NDRF) on board.

Had all of them not escaped through an emergency hatch, this
accident could have paralleled the Uttarakhand helicopter crash, in which five
IAF crewmembers, six Indo-Tibet Border Police troopers, and nine NDRF personnel
were killed in an IAF helicopter crash during a flood relief mission on June
25, 2013.

The AN-32 aircraft, while landing, appears to have dropped
too quickly, bounced off the runway, and hit one wing against the ground. Since
an AN-32’s wing also serves as the fuel tank, the aviation turbine fuel spraying
around at high temperature set the wing alight --- forcing the passengers into
an emergency evacuation while airport tenders fought the blaze. Some of the
injuries caused by the crash are believed to be serious.

The AN-32 transport aircraft is one of the IAF’s most
reliable workhorses, capable of landing on short strips at high altitudes. The
fleet of more than 100 aircraft is being refurbished to extend its service
life. The aircraft that crashed on Saturday had been upgraded in Ukraine
recently.

Saturday, 20 September 2014

A day
before President Xi Jinping of China travelled to India for a state visit from
Sept 17-19, China’s foreign ministry in Beijing termed the visit “a new
historical starting point… of great significance”.

Yet, on
Thursday, when Xi echoed that sentiment in New Delhi after talks with Prime
Minister Narendra Modi, describing his visit as “a historic opportunity to
renew ties”, that prospect had already been scuttled by a brewing confrontation
on the de facto Sino-Indian border in Ladakh.

Even as the
leaders talked, some 500 armed Indian soldiers stood eyeball-to-eyeball with as
many Chinese border guards, a paramilitary setup that works under the People’s
Liberation Army (PLA). In the run up to Xi’s visit, the Chinese had intruded
3-4 kilometres across what India perceives as the Line of Actual Control (LAC),
travelling in vehicles along a road the PLA had earlier built.

That
face-off near Chumar Post is continuing, with tensions rising as neither side
is backing off. This 14,000-feet-high enclave is a known hotspot, where the LAC
is disputed. Chinese troops claim they are on their side of the LAC, while the
Indians are intruding.

There is no
way to know whether President Xi knew about the Chinese intrusion ahead of his
visit, or whether it had his tacit or explicit sanction. Indian analysts say
there are three possible explanations, and none of them make Xi look good.

The first
option is that Xi was taken by surprise by the intrusions. If this is correct,
the PLA, long thought to be firmly under Xi’s control, is pursuing its own
agenda boldly enough to undermine a presidential visit to India.

That would seriously
question Xi’s reputation as China’s paramount leader. Many have argued that the
quickness with which Xi consolidated power --- assuming three key posts of president
of the People Republic of China; general secretary of the Chinese Communist
Party; and chairman of the Central Military Commission --- makes him China’s
most powerful leader since Deng Xiao-ping.

This, say
Indian policymakers, would complicate New Delhi’s calculations by having to
factor the PLA as an independent, or at least semi-autonomous, actor.

A second
possibility is that Xi knowingly permitted the intrusion to coincide with his
visit, to put brakes on the strategic and security relationship even while
dangling the bait of $20 billion in Chinese investment to boost the economic
relationship with India. By this logic, Xi wants access to India’s markets
without having to service a real strategic partnership with Delhi, which Beijing
views as inherently adversarial.

New Delhi
has not missed that Xi travelled to Delhi via the Maldives and Sri Lanka, where
he splashed out cash for various projects --- an inter-island “China bridge” in
the Maldives, and $1.4 billion in financing to Sri Lanka to build a new port
outside Colombo. India regards this as a part of China’s “string of pearls”
strategy, which involves creating a network of allies to undermine India’s predominance
in the Indian Ocean.

Over the
preceding year, Beijing has energetically pursued the reactivation of the
ancient “maritime silk route”; a trade corridor linking the Maldives and Sri
Lanka with India, Myanmar and south-east Asia. Maritime specialists in New
Delhi say this proposal has the same objective as the string of pearls strategy
--- to expand Chinese influence along India’s maritime periphery.

A third possible
reason for the intrusion could be Xi’s belief that China’s border management
should not be constrained by an improving relationship with India. In this
view, the PLA is allowed to run an aggressive border policy, while relying on
the network of confidence building agreements --- the 1993 Peace and
Tranquillity Agreement; further agreements in 1996, 2005 and 2012; and the Border
Defence Cooperation Agreement of 2013 --- to prevent escalation.

This pro-active
border management would ensure that, when maps are exchanged or a border
delineated, China is well poised to claim as much territory as possible.

This explains
the PLA’s use of civilian border populations to establish fresh territorial claims,
as reported in this newspaper (“China’s
border guards target populations along LAC”, Sept 17).

Even so,
the intrusion has undermined the prospect of Sino-Indian strategic convergence.
It has taken some of the focus off trade and commerce and retrained the
spotlight on the need for an early border settlement. Government sources say
Modi twice raised this requirement with Xi.

Addressing
the media with Xi standing by his side, Modi expressed his unhappiness with
Chinese transgressions; said peace on the border is “an essential foundation”
for the relationship; urged a resumption of the process to clarify the LAC
(i.e. exchange maps); and “seek an early settlement of the boundary question”.

In his
speech to a New Delhi audience later that day, Xi declared his willingness to
“settle the boundary question at an early date”.

New Delhi has
still to announce a successor to Shivshankar Menon as the PM’s special
representative on the border dialogue, which began in 2003. So far, 17 rounds
of talks have been held.

Thursday, 18 September 2014

Current reports
from the border about Chinese incursions into Indian territory at Chumar and
Demchok have renewed speculation that the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) steps
up border tensions on the eve of important visits, such as the on-going state
visit of China’s president, Xi Jinping.

In fact, the
PLA has simply shifted strategy; say multiple army and civilian sources that closely
monitor border dynamics along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) between India
and China. Chinese authorities now routinely use inhabitants of the border
region to establish fresh claims, even as the PLA and border guards patrol up
to their traditional claim lines.

China’s
shock troops in this strategy are the Changpas --- the local name for residents
of Changthang, the high Tibetan plateau. Chinese authorities exhort these nomadic
graziers to move with their herds of yaks and ponies and encroach upon grazing
grounds on the Indian side of the LAC.

According
to ancient tradition, each grazier village enjoys territorial rights over certain
grazing grounds, which are asserted each year by moving their herd to that
pasture. By encroaching and using Indian grazing grounds, graziers from across
the LAC create a plausible claim to that pasture. Gradually, China would claim
that pasture; citing usage to claim that it belongs to a village on the Tibetan
side. Over time, the PLA can be expected to extend patrolling to those areas.

According
to numerous local accounts, Chinese troops are providing money, provisions,
moral support and even troop escorts to help graziers and settled villagers to
encroach on the Indian side of the undemarcated LAC.

Meanwhile Indian
authorities have largely left their border people to their fate, reluctant to
get involved even when local graziers report being beaten up by Chinese border
guards.

“In
disputed areas like around Demchok, Chinese soldiers have threatened our
locals, ordered them to leave the area and have even inflicted violence short
of opening fire,” says Siddiq Wahid, a Ladakhi himself, and a former Harvard
University professor who is now an activist in J&K.

Wahid
rightly points out that both sides have long used border villagers and nomads
to buttress their claims, but says the Chinese have now implemented this as policy
in Ladakh, as well as vulnerable areas of Arunachal Pradesh. With Indian’s
border inhabitants increasingly opting to shift away from the LAC, China is systematically
weakening India’s territorial claims.

The chief
minister of Arunachal Pradesh, Nabam Tuki, has described the gradual
depopulation of border areas as a “strategic problem”. Last year he warned that
border populations must be supported “to establish our territorial sovereignty”.

China’s
aggressive strategy is having a two-fold effect: besides weakening India’s
territorial claim, it is insidiously alienating Ladakhi and Arunachali locals,
who are wondering ever more loudly whether the government has the appetite to
support them, or has it left them at China’s mercy.

Tellingly,
there are no Sino-Indian agreements that cover border populations. In contrast,
military issues like patrolling and border violations are governed by a raft of
agreements --- starting from a 1993 Agreement on Peace and Tranquillity on the
LAC; through further agreements in 1996, 2005, 2012; to the most recent Border
Defence and Cooperation Agreement of 2013 --- which have succeeded in maintaining
relative peace on the LAC.

“New Delhi seems to have little appetite for confronting
Beijing on these matters. We have even diluted the terminology for Chinese
incursions; we now refer to them as transgressions”, points out Wahid.

Asked whether New Delhi would raise border issues like the
ongoing LAC confrontation during talks on Thursday with President Xi, India’s
foreign ministry spokesperson, Syed Akbaruddin responded, “Our brave sentinels
on the border will address any issue that happens on the border.”

Q.There
is growing concern about the induction of warships without essential equipment
like the Advanced Towed Array Sonar (ATAS), or the Long Range Surface to Air
Missile (LR-SAM), which are delayed in development.

I wouldn’t
say there is serious cause for concern. If you are developing a new weapon
system (like ATAS, or LR-SAM), you cannot expect it to come exactly on time.
What do you do? Do you not commission the ship, or do you commission the ship
and wait for (the weapon system) to materialise?

A warship
has many roles (such as anti-submarine, anti-air, anti-surface). One such role
may not be met to a hundred per cent satisfaction. This happens all over the
world, and it is happening here. I think we should be happy that we are getting
new, state-of-the-art weapon systems for the first time. To get them exactly on
time, you’ve got to be very lucky.

Q.You
are saying we should accept capability gaps when warships are inducted, so that
we have a cutting edge system later?

It is not a
capability gap. It is a dilution of a particular capability, in a particular
ship, in a particular sphere. If, for example, INS Kolkata is not commissioned
with an (LR-SAM), there are many other such systems in the fleet. So the
Kolkata can be used for anti-submarine warfare. It is a multi-role ship. The Kolkata
can still be operationally exploited. This (kind of delay) is the price that
you pay when you go in for high-tech, state-of-the-art systems.

Q.What
happens if the ship is called into operational use before its weapons are
developed and fitted?

Even if it
is called into operational use, the fleet operates together and it is the
fleet’s capability that matters, not individual ships’. For example (the
anti-submarine corvette) INS Kamorta does not have surface-to-surface missiles.
That doesn’t mean there is a capability gap. That (land attack) role will be
fulfilled by other vessels in the fleet, which have that capability.

Q.What
is alarming is the delay in fitting weaponry that a warship is designed to
have. On another note, has the navy’s new Rukmini satellite created a digitally
networked navy?

Our navy
has made a huge jump with the launch and operation of Rukmini. Networking
various units (warships) is important for quick reactions in action. It is
important for units to know where other units are, (and to) interact with other
units, and for specialists on one ship to interact with specialists on another
ship to coordinate attacks, and bear weapons on a particular target.

In Feb
2014, we had our annual exercise, TROPEX (Theatre Level Operational Readiness
Exercise). This is the ultimate test of networking, of the ability of units to
participate in a 10-day or 15-day war, dispersed over different parts of the
sea. We operated (widely dispersed). It was possible because we were able to
network and for fleet commanders to pass orders, and for ships to interact with
each other and know where they are and to coordinate plans.

Q.Can
you explain with a practical example?

In an
anti-submarine operation, if two ships are hunting for a submarine, they can
coordinate duties. If you are networked well, you can just punch in a digital message
(from one ship to another), “I am altering course to starboard, or to port”. If
you are not networked, you pass messages (more unreliably) by voice.

Alternatively,
if a warship contacts an enemy vessel but does not have weapons with the range
to strike, it can digitally hand over that target to another warship that is
within range.

Q.You
are saying one ship can designate a target, which will be engaged by weapons
from another ship?

That is very
much possible, but you can only do that if you are networked. Every ship in the
fleet with a Rukmini antenna on board can talk to another.

Q.Is
China emerging as a key adversary for the eastern naval command?

We don’t
have any maritime disputes with China. We look upon China as a partner in
ensuring peace and stability in the maritime element. China is now operating in
our waters and we sometimes go to the South China Sea, but essentially we
operate in different waters. There is no acrimony between the two services.

As a navy
grows in power and responsibility, it should provide some kind of (security)
umbrella to the smaller navies to try and build them up. That is what we are
doing. Today, Maldives, Seychelles, Mauritius, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh and
Myanmar --- all these navies are training with us. We are giving material
support to them. There is frequent exchange of delegations. We are trying to
build around us some kind of cohesion in the Indian Ocean. We expect China to
do the same.

Q.Given the security situation in the Indo-Pacific,
and India’s Look East policy, is your fleet adequate?

In the
longer term we have a Maritime Capability Perspective Plan, which is formulated
by navy headquarters. While we would like more assets that are being given, we have
enough surface ships to meet our responsibilities. We are short of submarines
now… we have only six, including (the nuclear powered) INS Chakra. We would
want more submarines definitely.

But you
know the Scorpene class is going to be commissioned only in 2016-17 and we are
going to have one every year, six of them. So 2016 to 2022, that is going to be
the only accretion to our submarine fleet. There is no point in saying, “I want
30”, because you know that till 2022, you are not reaching anywhere.