"Event: At 2029 hours, Oconee Unit 3 was in Mode 5 for a refueling outage. The administrative controls which comprise one train of Low Temperature Overpressure Protection (LTOP) were not yet in service, but a dedicated LTOP operator was in place as a Tech Spec required compensatory measure. Instrument Technicians performing a procedure erroneously isolated the low range RCS pressure indication, which removed the Power Operated Relief Valve (PORV) from service while required for LTOP. This placed Unit 3 in a one-hour action statement per Technical Specification 3.4.12, Condition H.

"Initial Safety Significance: This is potentially a condition which could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function (LTOP). Both the automatic PORV train and the Admin Control train were inoperable per Technical Specifications. However, a dedicated LTOP operator was in place meeting the compensatory measures requirement for continued operation per TS 3.4.12, Condition F related to the Admin Control requirement. No event occurred while in this condition which would challenge the LTOP function.

"Corrective Action(s): Operator at the controls recognized the loss of indication and contacted the Instrument Technicians. They verified their error and returned the instrument to service within one hour."

The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.

*** UPDATE FROM R.P. TODD TO J. KNOKE AT 16:34 ON 06/29/06 ***

"At 0215 EDT on 5-2-06, Oconee made an ENS notification to report a condition which could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function, specifically Low Temperature Overpressure Protection (LTOP).

"The LTOP Technical Specification (TS) 3.4.12 requires that a) the Power Operated Relief Valve (PORV) be operable, and b) administrative controls be in place to assure greater than 10 minutes are available for operator action to mitigate an LTOP event. As stated in the initial report, during shutdown for a refueling outage instrument technicians erroneously isolated the low range RCS pressure indication, which made the PORV inoperable for automatic operation while required for LTOP. In addition, the administrative controls were not yet fully established.

"However, if a specific sub-set of administrative controls are in place, the TS allows credit for a dedicated LTOP operator as a compensatory measure. Upon further review, Oconee has confirmed that a) the PORV remained available for manual initiation by the dedicated LTOP operator, and b) the dedicated LTOP operator and associated sub-set of administrative controls were in place. This satisfied the required actions of TS 3.4.12 Condition F and assured that an LTOP event could be mitigated. Therefore, Oconee concludes that this event did not constitute a potential loss of safety function.

"Actions were taken to restore the instrument alignment to restore automatic actuation capability for the PORV within the required action time per TS 3.4.12. Therefore there was no operation in a condition prohibited by Tech Specs. As a result, the event is not reportable under 50.72 or 50.73 and the ENS notification is hereby retracted.

"Corrective Action(s): As stated above, the instrument alignment was restored to return the PORV to an operable status for automatic actuation. Subsequently, the full set of administrative controls were established. As shutdown continued, the unit exited the LTOP region."

"The SC Department of Health and Environmental Control was notified on Friday, June 23, 2006, at 4:05 p.m. that a Troxler Model 3440 portable moisture density gauge had been damaged on a job site at the Anderson County Airport. F&R Construction [name deleted], made the report. The gauge was reportedly run over by a roller on the job site. [F&R Construction] responded to the notice, as did an Anderson County HazMat team. Both [F&R Construction] and the HazMat team had survey meters in their possession. Following survey of the damaged gauge, the source could be retracted into its housing and the source shield was closed. A survey of the exterior of the gauge showed no readings above 10 mR/hr and a survey of the area the gauge had been used in produced background readings. Anderson County HAZMAT Team [name deleted] took a wipe of the bottom of the gauge. It produced no reading above background. The gauge was placed in its case and then inside an over pack container. The Licensee was then instructed by DHEC BRH to transport the gauge to their storage location and secure it until Monday. DHEC BRH was kept updated throughout this entire time via cell phone communication with both [F&R Construction] and [Anderson County HazMat team].

"A follow-up phone call made to [F&R Construction] on Monday, June 26, 2006, confirmed that the gauge was secured and awaiting transport on Tuesday to the manufacturer or a licensed service provider to attempt repair. The licensee was advised to submit a written report detailing this event to the Department within 15 days. All corrective action to prevent such an incident in the future was requested to be included. No indication of internal uptake at this point. The event is considered closed and pending the licensee's investigation and report to the Department, updates will be made through the national NMED system."

This material event contains a "Less than Cat 3" level of radioactive material.

Event Text

MINNESOTA AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - ANALYZER MISSING IN TRANSIT

On 06/26/06 at 1230 CDT, the State was notified that a package shipped by Dayton's Bluff Neighborhood Services arrived empty at Thermo Electron, Corp. in Billerica, MA. The package was shipped on 06/23/06 and was scheduled for delivery on 06/26/06. When shipped, the package contained a NITON X-ray Florescent Paint Analyzer containing a 3.0 milliCurie Cd-109 source which was being returned to Thermo Electron for source replenishment. Thermo Electron and the RSO at FedEx were notified and it was determined that the analyzer must have come out of the package at some point during shipment. FedEx is currently searching for the analyzer (FedEx Tracking No. 854260375661) .

FedEx RSO notified licensee at 1950 CDT on 06/26/06 that the analyzer was found at the Indianapolis FedEx facility and will be shipped to Thermo Electron, Corp. tomorrow. It was reported by FedEx that there was no damage to the analyzer.

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks.