South Carolina Election Commission; Marci Andino, as Executive Director and as
a representative of the South Carolina State Election Commission; South
Carolina Democratic Party; Richard A. Harpootlian, as Chair of the Executive
Committee of and as a representative of the South Carolina Democratic Party;
South Carolina Republican Party; Chad Connelly, as Chair of the Executive
Committee of and as a representative of the South Carolina Republican Party;
Lexington County Commission of Registration and Elections; Dean Crepes, as
Director of and as a representative of the Lexington County Commission of
Registration and Elections; Lexington County Democratic Party; Kathy Hensley,
as Chair of and as a representative of the Lexington County Democratic Party;
Lexington County Republican Party; Steven Isom, as Chair of and a representative
of the Executive Committee of the Lexington County Republican Party, Defendants.

PER CURIAM:
This is a matter in the Court's original jurisdiction seeking declaratory
relief in connection with a dispute as to the requirements for a candidate's
name to properly appear on a primary election ballot. We are asked to construe
the meaning of S.C. Code
Ann. § 8-13-1356 (Supp. 2011), which provides that "[a] candidate must
file a statement of economic interests for the preceding calendar year at the
same time and with the same official with whom the candidate files a
declaration of candidacy or petition for nomination." Under longstanding rules
of statutory construction, we find the statute means what it says.
Accordingly, we grant declaratory relief to plaintiffs.

We grant declaratory relief as follows: (1) that individuals not exempt who are seeking
nomination by political party primary to be a candidate for office must file a
Statement of Economic Interest (SEI) at the same time and with the same
official with whom the individuals file a Statement of Intention of Candidacy
(SIC); (2) that an official authorized to receive SICs may not accept the forms
unless they are accompanied by an SEI; (3) that an individual who did not file
an SEI at the same time and with the same official with whom the individual
filed an SIC should not appear on the party primary election ballot or the
general election ballot; and (4) that the Lexington County Democratic Party,
the Lexington County Republican Party, the South Carolina Democratic Party, and
the South Carolina Republican Party (political parties) unlawfully certified
individuals seeking nomination by political party primary who did not file an
SEI at the same time and with the same official with whom the individual filed
an SIC.

The State Election Commission and the Lexington County
Commission of Registration and Elections have filed cross-claims asking that
the political parties: (1) provide the State Election Commission and the
appropriate county election commissions by May 4, 2012 with a list of certified
candidates who filed an SEI at the same time and with the same official with
whom they filed an SIC; and (2) reimburse the State Election Commission and the
appropriate county election commissions for the additional costs which will be
incurred in revising the ballot databases and audio files to reflect the
corrected list of certified candidates. We grant relief as to the May 4, 2012
deadline but decline to resolve the requests for costs at this time.

SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION

The Republican Party claims this Court lacks subject
matter jurisdiction over the legislative races because the General Assembly has
exclusive authority over disputes involving legislative elections. South Carolina
Const. art. III, § 11 provides, "Each house shall judge of the election
returns and qualifications of its own members." Accordingly, this Court
has declined to opine on issues where the Constitution delegates authority to
the General Assembly. South Carolina Public Interest Found. v. Judicial
Merit Selection Comm'n, 369 S.C. 139, 632 S.E.2d 277 (2006). Here we are
not asked to judge a disputed legislative election but rather to interpret a
statute. The construction of a statute is a judicial function and
responsibility. JRS Builders, Inc. v. Neunsinger,364 S.C. 596,
614 S.E.2d 629 (2005). Accordingly, we reject the argument that this Court
lacks subject matter jurisdiction in this case.

JUSTICIABILITY

There is a question of whether this
dispute is ripe for review, as no harm has been incurred because an unqualified
candidate has not been elected. This issue is ripe for judicial determination.
Absent relief, plaintiffs, as voters, face the substantial likelihood that they
will be presented with a slate of candidates, of whom one or more may not be
certified after the election. This is a matter of great public importance.
Integrity in elections is foundational. It is that recognition of the
importance of the integrity of public elections that leads us to grant relief
at this time. We acknowledge that S.C. Code Ann. § 8-13-1356(E) (Supp. 2011) contemplates
a post-primary election remedy prohibiting a person whose name inadvertently
appears on the ballot from being certified as a candidate for the general
election. However, we discern no legislative intent that such remedy is
exclusive. Where there exists the substantial likelihood that the respective
political parties have erroneously certified candidates for inclusion on the
primary ballot, by requiring compliance with the law now, we avoid the greater
chaos and multiple challenges that would inevitably follow the party primary
elections. Moreover, § 8-13-1356(E) envisions only the occasional situation
where "the candidate’s name inadvertently appears on the ballot
…" (emphasis added). We are confronted not with the prospect of a single
candidate’s name appearing on a ballot "inadvertently," but with
systemic failure of the political parties to follow the law. The effect of the
political parties ignoring their statutory gatekeeping role is the prospect of
the inclusion of many candidates on the ballot who did not comply with the
statutory requirements. Accordingly, we grant relief to require compliance
with the law and ensure that only legally qualified candidates are included on
the ballots.

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION

The primary rule
of statutory construction is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the
General Assembly. Beaufort Cnty. v. S.C. State Election Comm'n, 395
S.C. 366, 718 S.E.2d 432 (2011). In construing statutory language, the statute
must be read as a whole, and sections which are a part of the same general
statutory law must be construed together and each one given effect. Id.; Hodges v. Rainey, 341 S.C. 79, 533 S.E.2d 578 (2000). Unless there is
something in the statute requiring a different interpretation, the words used
in a statute must be given their ordinary meaning. Mid-State Auto Auction
of Lexington, Inc. v. Altman,324 S.C. 65, 476 S.E.2d 690 (1996). When a statute's terms are clear and unambiguous on their face, there is
no room for statutory construction and a court must apply the statute according
to its literal meaning. Id.

South Carolina Code Ann. § 8-13-1356(B)
states a non-exempt candidate must file an SEI for the preceding calendar year
"at the same time and with the same official with whom the candidate files
a declaration of candidacy or petition for nomination." To comply with
that section, an individual must file an SEI with the appropriate political
party. Section 8-13-1356(E) provides that an officer authorized to receive
declarations of candidacy and petitions for nominations may not accept an SIC
unless it is accompanied by an SEI.

Section 8-13-1356(B) unambiguously mandates
that an individual file an SEI at the same time and with the same official with
whom the individual files an SIC. This requirement is buttressed by the
unambiguous prohibition against a political party accepting an SIC unless it is
accompanied by an SEI.

We reject the argument of the South
Carolina Republican Party that S.C. Code Ann. § 7-11-15(3) (Supp. 2011), which
provides that an individual's name must appear on the ballot if the individual
produces a signed and dated copy of a timely filed SIC, is irreconcilably in
conflict with § 8-13-1356. Instead, we hold, as recognized by the remaining
parties in this action, that these two statutes may be harmonized. Section
7-11-15(3) sets forth the requirements for an individual's name to appear on the
ballot "except as otherwise provided by law." Section 8-13-1356(E)
expressly references Chapter 11 of Title 7 and prohibits a political party from
accepting an SIC for filing if it is not accompanied by an SEI. Therefore, an
individual who fails to provide an SEI to the political party when filing an
SIC would not have a timely filed SIC. We decline to ignore the "except
as otherwise provided by law" language of § 7-11-15(3) and the clear
mandate the General Assembly imposed in § 8-13-1356(E) when the statutes are
easily reconciled.

The Democratic
Party additionally directs our attention to S.C. Code Ann. §8-13-365 (Supp.
2011), requiring that the SEI be filed electronically, which is done on the
State Ethics Commission's website. However, this statute is not part of
the process that qualifies an individual for inclusion on the ballot.
Similarly, while S.C. Code Ann. § 8-13-1170(B) (Supp. 2011) provides that
extensions of time for electronic filing of an SEI with the State Ethics
Commission may be granted, that also does not concern ballot
requirements. Accordingly, we reject the argument by the Democratic Party
that the requirement of § 8-13-1356(B) may be alternatively satisfied by filing
an SEI electronically with the State Ethics Commission. Filing an SEI
with the State Ethics Commission cannot excuse noncompliance with § 8-13-1356(B).

The Republican Party contends that § 8-13-1356
impermissibly adds qualifications for an individual to serve in the General
Assembly. In particular, it argues that S.C. Const. art. III, § 7 sets forth
the only qualifications for service, and § 8-13-1356, therefore, cannot raise
the bar. However, § 8-13-1356 does not alter the qualifications for one to
serve as a legislator. Instead, it merely delineates filing requirements to
appear on a ballot. We, therefore, reject this argument.

Because the statutes at issue, when given
their plain and ordinary meaning, can each be given effect without doing harm
to the other, "the rules of statutory interpretation are not needed and
the [C]ourt has no right to impose another meaning." See Hodges v. Rainey, supra. We hold the unambiguous language and expression of legislative
intent of § 8-13-1356(B) and (E) require an individual to file an SEI at the
same time and with the same official with whom an SIC is filed, and prohibit
political party officials from accepting an SIC which is not accompanied by an
SEI. Accordingly, the names of any non-exempt individuals who did not file
with the appropriate political party an SEI simultaneously with an SIC were
improperly placed on the party primary ballots and must be removed. We direct
the appropriate official of the political parties to file with the State
Election Commission or the appropriate county election commission, by noon on
May 4, 2012, a list of only those non-exempt candidates who simultaneously
filed an SEI and an SIC as required by § 8-13-1356(B). This Court’s injunction
issued April 20, 2012, is hereby lifted.

We fully appreciate the consequences of
our decision, as lives have been disrupted and political aspirations put on
hold. However, the conduct of the political parties in their failure to follow
the clear and unmistakable directives of the General Assembly has brought us to
this point. Sidestepping the issue now would only delay the inevitable.

In order to expedite a resolution of this
matter of public importance, we do not reach the cross-claims of the State
Election Commission and the Lexington County Commission of Registration and
Elections for reimbursement of the costs of revisions to the ballot databases
and audio files. This is without prejudice to the right of the commissions to resubmit
requests for reimbursement once the applicable costs are known and ascertained.

Finally, while a petition for rehearing is
normally due within fifteen days after the filing of an opinion under Rule
221(a), SCACR, because of the urgency of this matter, any petition for
rehearing must be received by this Court by 10:00 a.m. on May 3, 2012.