Modern History Sourcebook:
Nikita S. Khrushchev:
The Secret Speech - On the Cult of Personality, 1956

Secret Speech Delivered by First Party Secretary at the Twentieth Party Congress of
the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, February 25, 1956[]Comrades, in the report of the Central Committee of the party at the 20th Congress, in
a number of speeches by delegates to the Congress, as also formerly during the plenary
CC/CPSU sessions, quite a lot has been said about the cult of the individual and about its
harmful consequences. . . .Allow me first of all to remind you bow severely the classics of Marxism-Leninism
denounced every manifestation of the cult of the individual. In a letter to the German
political worker, Wilhelm Bloss, Marx stated: "From my antipathy to any cult of the
individual, I never made public during the existence of the International the numerous
addresses from various countries which recognized my merits and which annoyed me. I did
not even reply to them, except sometimes to rebuke their authors. Engels and I first
joined the secret society of Communists on the condition that everything making for
superstitious worship of authority would be deleted from its statute. . . .The great modesty of the genius of the revolution, Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, is known.
Lenin had always stressed the role of the people as the creator of history, the directing
and organizational role of the party as a living and creative organism, and also the role
of the central committee.Marxism does not negate the role of the leaders of the workers' class in directing the
revolutionary liberation movement.While ascribing great importance to the role of the leaders and organizers of the
masses, Lenin at the same time mercilessly stigmatized every manifestation of the cult of
the individual, inexorably combated the foreign-to-Marxism views about a "hero"
and a "crowd" and countered all efforts to oppose a "hero" to the
masses and to the people.Lenin taught that the party's strength depends on its indissoluble unity with the
masses, on the fact that behind the party follow the people - workers, peasants and
intelligentsia. "Only lie will win and retain the power," said Lenin, "who
believes in the people, who submerges himself in the fountain of the living creativeness
of the people.". . .During Lenin's life the central committee of the party- was a real expression of
collective leadership of the party and of the Nation. Being a militant
Marxist-revolutionist, always unyielding in matters of principle, Lenin never imposed by
force his views upon his coworkers. He tried to convince; he patiently explained his
opinions to others. Lenin always diligently observed that the norms of party life were
realized, that the party statute was enforced, that the party congresses and the plenary
sessions of the central committee took place at the proper intervals.In addition to the great accomplishments of V. I. Lenin for the victory of the working
class and of the working peasants, for the victory of our party and for the application of
the ideas of scientific communism to life, his acute mind expressed itself also in this
that lie detected in Stalin in time those negative characteristics which resulted later in
grave consequences. Fearing the future fate of the party and of the Soviet nation, V.I.
Lenin made a completely correct characterization of Stalin, pointing out that it was
necessary to consider the question of transferring Stalin from the position of Secretarv
General because of the fact that Stalin is excessively rude, that he does not have a
proper attitude toward his comrades, that lie is capricious, and abuses his power. . . .Vladimir Ilyich said: "Stalin is excessively rude, and this defect, which can be
freely tolerated in our midst and in contacts among us Communists, becomes a defect which
cannot be tolerated in one holding the position of the Secretary General. Because of this,
I propose that the comrades consider the method by which Stalin would be removed from this
position and by which another man would be selected for it, a man, who above all , would
differ from Stalin in only one quality, namely, greater tolerance, greater loyalty,
greater kindness, and more considerate attitude toward the comrades, a less capricious
temper, etc.".As later events have proven, Lenin's anxiety was justified; in the first period after
Lenin's death Stalin still paid attention to his (i.e., Lenin's) advice, but, later be
began to disregard the serious admonitions of Vladimir Ilyich.When we analyze the practice of Stalin in regard to the direction of the party and of
the country, when we pause to consider everything which Stalin perpetrated, we must be
convinced that Lenin's fears were justified. The negative characteristics of Stalin,
which, in Lenin's time, were on1v incipient, transformed themselves during the last years
into a grave abuse o f power by Stalin, which caused untold harm to our party. . . .Stalin acted not through persuasion, explanation, and patient cooperation with people,
but by imposing his concepts and demanding absolute submission to his opinion. Whoever
opposed this concept or tried to prove his viewpoint, and the correctness of his
position-was doomed to removal from the leading collective and to subsequent moral and
physical annihilation. This was especially true during the period following the 17th party
congress, when many prominent party leaders and rank-and-file party workers, honest and
dedicated to the cause of communism, fell victim to Stalin's despotism. . . .Stalin originated the concept enemy of the people. This term automatically rendered it
unnecessary that the ideological errors of a man or men engaged in a controversy be
proven; this term made possible the usage of the most cruel repression, violating all
norms of revolutionary legality, against anyone who in any way disagreed with Stalin,
against those who were only suspected of hostile intent, against those who had bad
reputations. This concept, enemy of the people, actually eliminated the possibility of any
kind of ideological fight or the making of one's views known on this or that issue, even
those of a practical character. In the main, and in actuality, the only proof of guilt
used, against all norms of current legal science, was the confession of the accused
himself, and, as subsequent probing proved, confessions were acquired through physical
pressures against the accused. . . .Lenin used severe methods only in the most necessary cases, when the exploiting classes
were still in existence and were vigorously opposing the revolution, when the struggle for
survival was decidedly assuming the sharpest forms, even including a civil war.Stalin, on the other hand, used extreme methods and mass repressions at a time when the
revolution was already victorious, when the Soviet state was strengthened, when the
exploiting classes were already liquidated, and Socialist relations were rooted solidly in
all phases of national economy, when our party was politically consolidated and had
strengthened itself both numerically and ideologically. It is clear that here Stalin
showed in a whole series of cases his intolerance, his brutality, and his abuse of power.
Instead of proving his political correctness and mobilizing the masses, he often chose the
path of repression and physical annihilation, not only against actual enemies, but also
against individuals who had not committed any crimes against the party and the Soviet
Government. Here we see no wisdom but only a demonstration of the brutal force which had
once so alarmed V.I Lenin. . . .Considering the question of the cult of an individual we must first of all show
everyone what harm this caused to the interests of our party. . . .In practice Stalin ignored the norms of party life and trampled on the Leninist
principle of collective party leadership.Stalin's willfulness vis-a-vis the party and its central committee became fully evident
after the 17th party congress, which took place in 1934. . . .It was determined that of the 139 members and candidates of the party's Central
Committee who were elected at the 17th congress, 98 persons, that is, 70 percent, were
arrested and shot (mostly in 1937-38). [Indignation in the hall.] . . .The same fate met not only the central committee members but also the majority of the
delegates to the 17th party congress. Of 1,966 delegates with either voting or advisory
rights, 1,108 persons were arrested on charges of anti-revolutionary crimes, i.e.,
decidedly more than a majority. This very fact shows how absurd, wild, and contrary to
commonsense were the charges of counter-revolutionary crimes made out, as we now see,
against a majority of participants at the 17th party congress. [Indignation in the hall.]
. . .What is the reason that mass repressions against activists increased more and more
after the 17th party congress? It was because at that time Stalin had so elevated himself
above the party and above the nation that he ceased to consider either the central
committee or the party. While he still reckoned with the opinion of the collective before
the 17th congress, after the complete political liquidation of the Trotskyites,
Zinovievites and Bukharinites, when as a result of that fight and Socialist victories the
party achieved unity, Stalin ceased to an ever greater degree to consider the members of
the party's central committee and even the members of the Political Bureau. Stalin thought
that now lie could decide all things alone and all he needed were statisticians; he
treated all others in such a way that they could only listen to and praise him.After the criminal murder of S. M. Kirov, mass repressions and brutal acts of violation
of Socialist legality began. On the evening of December 1, 1934, on Stalin's initiative
(without the approval of the Political Bureau - which was passed 2 days later, casually)
the Secretary of the Presidium of the Central Executive Committee, Yenukidze, signed the
following directive:I. Investigative agencies are directed to speed up the cases of those
accused of the preparation or execution of acts of terror.II. Judicial organs are directed not to hold up the execution of death sentences
pertaining to crimes of this category in order to consider the possibility of pardon,
because the Presidium of the Central Executive Committee, U.S.S.R, does not consider as
possible the receiving of petitions of this sort.III. The organs of the Commissariat of Internal Affairs are directed to execute the
death sentences against criminals of the above-mentioned category immediately after the
passage of sentences.This directive became the basis for mass acts of abuse against Socialist
legality. During many of the fabricated court cases the accused were charged with
"the preparation" of terroristic acts; this deprived them of any, possibility
that their cases might be reexamined, even when they stated before the court that their
confessions were secured by force, and when, in a convincing manner, they disproved the
accusations against them. . . .Mass repressions grew tremendously from the end of 1936 after a telegram from Stalin
and Zhdanov, dated from Sochi on September 25, 1936, was addressed to Kaganovich, Molotov,
and other members of the Political Bureau. The content of the telegram was as follows:
"We deem it absolutely necessary and urgent that Comrade Yezhov be nominated to the
post of People's Commissar for Internal Affairs. Yagoda has definitely proved himself to
be incapable of unmasking the Trotskyite-Zinovievite bloc. The OGPU is 4 years behind in
this matter. This is noted by all party workers and by the majority of the representatives
of the NKVD." Strictly speaking we should stress that Stalin did not meet with and
therefore could not know the opinion of party workers. . . .The mass repressions at this time were made under the slogan of a fight against the
Trotskyites. Did the Trotskyites at this time actually constitute such a danger to our
party and to the Soviet state? We should recall that in 1927, on the eve of the 15th party
congress, only some 4,000 votes were cast for the Trotskyite-Zinovievite opposition, while
there were 724,000 for the party line. During the 10 years which passed between the 15th
party congress and the February-March central committee plenum, Trotskyism was completely
disarmed; many former Trotskyites had changed their former views and worked in the various
sectors building socialism. It is clear that in the situation of Socialist victory there
was no basis for mass terror in the country . . . .The majority of the Central Committee members and candidates elected at the 17th
congress and arrested in 1937-38 were expelled from the party illegally through the brutal
abuse of the party statute, because the question of their expulsion was never studied at
the Central Committee plenum.Now when the cases of some of these so-called spies and saboteurs were examined it was
found that all their cases were fabricated. Confessions of guilt of many- arrested and
charged with enemy activity were gained with the help of cruel and inhuman tortures. . . .An example of vile provocation of odious falsification and of criminal violation of
revolutionary legality is the case of the former candidate for the central committee
political bureau, one of the most eminent workers of the party and of the Soviet
Government, Comrade Eikhe, who was a party member since 1905. [Commotion in the hall.]Comrade Eikhe was arrested on April 29, 1938, on the basis of slanderous materials,
without the sanction of the prosecutor of the USSR, which was finally received 15 months
after the arrest.Investigation of Eikhe's case was made in a manner which most brutally violated Soviet
legality and was accompanied by willfulness and falsification.Eikhe was forced under torture to sign ahead of time a protocol of his confession
prepared by the investigative judges, in which he and several other eminent party workers
were accused of anti-Soviet activity.On October 1, 1939, Eikhe sent his declaration to Stalin in which be categorically
denied his guilt and asked for an examination of his case. In the declaration he wrote:"There is no more bitter misery than to sit In the jail of a government for which
I have always fought.". . .On February 2, 1940, Eikhe was brought before the court. Here he did not confess any
guilt and said as follows:"In all the so-called confessions of mine there is not one letter
written by me with the exception of my signatures under the protocols which were forced
from me. I have made my confession under pressure from the investigative judge who from
the time of my arrest tormented me. After that I began to write all this nonsense. The
most important thing for me is to tell the court, the party and Stalin that I am not
guilty. I have never been guilty of any conspiracy. I will die believing in the truth of
party policy as I have believed in it during my whole life."On February 4 Eikhe was shot. [Indignation in the hall.] It has been definitely
established now that Eikhe's case was fabricated; he has been posthumously rehabilitated.
. . .The way in which the former NKVD workers manufactured various fictitious
"anti-Soviet centers" and "blocs" with the help of provocatory methods
is seen from the confession of Comrade Rozenblum, party member since 1906, who was
arrested in 1937 by the Leningrad NKVD.During the examination in 1955 of the Kornarov case Rozenblum revealed the following
fact: when Rozenblum was arrested in 1937 he was subjected to terrible torture during
which be was ordered to confess false information concerning himself and other persons. Be
was then brought to the office of Zakovsky, who offered him freedom on condition that be
make before the court a false confession fabricated in 1937 by the NKVD concerning
"sabotage, espionage and diversion in a terroristic center in Leningrad."
[Movement in the hall.] . . ."You, yourself," said Zakovskv, "will not need to invent anything. The
NKVD will prepare for you a ready outline for every branch of the center; you will have to
study it carefully and to remember well all questions and answers which the court might
ask. Pus case will be ready in 4-5 months, or perhaps a half year. During all this time
you will be preparing yourself so that you will not compromise the investigation and
yourself. Your future will depend on how the trial goes and on its results. If you begin
to lie and to testify falsely, blame yourself. If you manage to endure it, you will save
your bead and we will feed and clothe you at the government's cost until your death."This is the kind of vile things which were then practiced. [Movement in the hall.] . . When we look at many of our novels, films, and historical scientific studies, the role
of Stalin in the patriotic war appears to be entirely improbable. Stalin had foreseen
everything. The Soviet Army, on the basis of a strategic plan prepared by Stalin long
before, used the tactics of so-called active defense, i.e., tactics which, as we know,
allowed the Germans to come up to Moscow and Stalingrad. Using such tactics, the Soviet
Army, supposedly, thanks only to Stalin's genius, turned to the offensive and subdued the
enemy. The epic victory gained through the armed might of the land of the Soviets, through
our heroic people, is ascribed in this type of novel, film, and scientific study as being
completely due to the strategic genius of Stalin.We have to analyze this matter carefully because it has a tremendous significance, not
only from the historical but especially from the political, educational, and practical
point of view. . . .During the war and after the war, Stalin put forward the thesis that the tragedy which
our nation experienced in the first part of the war was the result of the unexpected
attack of the Germans against the Soviet Union. But, comrades, this is completely untrue.
As soon as Hitler came to power in Germany be assigned to himself the task of liquidating
communism. The Fascists were saying this openly; they did not hide their plans. In order
to attain this aggressive end, all sorts of pacts and blocs were created, such as the
famous Berlin-Rome-Tokyo Axis. Many facts from the prewar period clearly showed that
Hitler was going all out to begin a war against the Soviet state and that lie had
concentrated large armed units, together with armored units, near the Soviet borders. . .
.We must assert that information of this sort concerning the threat of German armed
invasion of Soviet territory was coming in also from our own military and diplomatic
sources; however, because the leadership was conditioned against such information, such
data was dispatched with fear and assessed with reservation. . . .Despite these particularly grave warnings, the necessary steps were not taken to
prepare the country properly for defense and to prevent it from being caught unaware.Did we have time and the capabilities for such preparations? Yes; we had the time and
capabilities. Our industry was already so developed that it was capable of supplying fully
the Soviet Army with everything that it needed. . . .Had our industry been mobilized properly and in time to supply the army with the
necessary materiel, our wartime losses would have been decidedly smaller. Such
mobilization had not been, however, started in time. And already in the first days of the
war it became evident that our Army was badly armed, that we did not have enough
artillery, tanks, and planes to throw the enemy back. . . .Very grievous consequences, especially in reference to the beginning of the war,
followed Stalin's annihilation of many military commanders and political workers during
1937-41 because of his suspiciousness and through slanderous accusations. During these
years repressions were instituted against certain parts of military cadres beginning
literally at the company and battalion commander level and extending to the higher
military centers; during this time the cadre of leaders who had gained military experience
in Spain and In the Far East was almost completely liquidated. . . .After the conclusion of the patriotic war the Soviet nation stressed with pride the
magnificent victories gained through great sacrifices and tremendous efforts. The country
experienced a period of political enthusiasm. The party came out of the war even more
united; in the fire of the war party cadres were tempered and hardened. Under such
conditions nobody could have even thought of the possibility of some plot in the party.And it was precisely at this time that the so-called Leningrad affair was born. As we
have now proven, this case was fabricated. Those who innocently lost their lives included
Comrades Voznesensky, Kuznetsov, Rodionov, Popkov, and others. . . .Facts prove that the Leningrad affair is also the result of willfulness which Stalin
exercised against party cadres. . . .We must state that after the war the situation became even more complicated. Stalin
became even more capricious, irritable, and brutal; in particular his suspicion grew. His
persecution mania reached unbelievable dimensions. Many workers were becoming enemies
before his very eyes. After the war Stalin separated himself from the collective even
more. Everything was decided by him alone without any consideration for anyone or
anything.This unbelievable suspicion was cleverly taken advantage of by the abject provocateur
and vile enemy, Beriya, who had murdered thousands of Communists and loyal Soviet people.
The elevation of Voznesensky and Kuznetsov alarmed Beriya. As we have now proven, it had
been precisely Beriya who had suggested to Stalin the fabrication by him and by his
confidants of materials in the form of declarations and anonymous letters, and in the form
of various rumors and talks. . . .The question arises: Why is it that we see the truth of this affair only now, and why
did we not do something earlier, during Stalin's life, in order to prevent the loss of
innocent lives? It was because Stalin personally supervised the Leningrad affair, and the
majority of the Political Bureau members did not, at that time, know all of the
circumstances in these matters, and could not therefore intervene. . . .The willfulness of Stalin showed itself not only in decisions concerning the internal
life of the country but also in the international relations of the Soviet Union.The July plenum of the Central Committee studied in detail the reasons for the
development of conflict with Yugoslavia. It was a shameful role which Stalin played here.
The "Yugoslav affair" contained no problems which could not have been solved
through party discussions among comrades. There was no significant basis for the
development of this "affair;" it was completely possible to have prevented the
rupture of relations with that country.I recall the first days when the conflict between the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia began
artificially to be blown up. Once, when I carne from Kiev to Moscow, I was invited to
visit Stalin who, pointing to the copy of a letter lately sent to Tito, asked me,
"Have you read this?"Not waiting for my reply be answered, "I will shake my little finger and there
will be no more Tito. He will fall.". . .But this did not happen to Tito. No matter how much or how little Stalin shook, not
only his little finger but everything else that be could shake, Tito did not fall. Why?
The reason was that, in this case of disagreement with the Yugoslav comrades, Tito had
behind him a state and a people who had gone through a severe school of fighting for
liberty and independence, a people which gave support to its leaders.You see to what Stalin's mania for greatness led. He bad completely lost consciousness
of reality; he demonstrated his suspicion and haughtiness not only in relation to
individuals in the USSR, but in relation to whole parties and nations. . . .Let us also recall the affair of the doctor plotters. [Animation in the ball.] Actually
there was no affair outside of the declaration of the woman doctor Timasbuk, who was
probably influenced or ordered by someone (after all, she was an unofficial collaborator
of the organs of state security) to write Stalin a letter in which she declared that
doctors were applying supposedly improper methods of medical treatment.Such a letter was sufficient for Stalin to reach an immediate conclusion that there are
doctor plotters in the Soviet Union. He issued orders to arrest a group of eminent Soviet
medical specialists. He personally issued advice on the conduct of the investigation and
the method of interrogation of the arrested persons. He said that the academician
Vinogradov should be put in chains, another one should be beaten. Present at this Congress
as a delegate is the former Minister of State Security Comrade Ignatiev. Stalin told him
curtly, "If you do not obtain confessions from the doctors we will shorten you by a
head." [Tumult in the hall.] . . .In organizing the various dirty and shameful cases, a very base role was played by the
rabid enemy of our party, an agent of a foreign intelligence service-Beriya, who had
stolen into Stalin's confidence. In what way could this provocateur gain such a position
in the part), and in the State, so as to become the First Deputy Chairman of the Council
of Ministers of the Soviet Union and a member of the Central Committee Political Bureau?
It has now been established that this villain bad climbed up the government ladder over an
untold number of corpses.Were there any signs that Beriya was an enemy of the party? Yes; there were. Already in
1937, at a Central Committee plenum, former People's Commissar of Health Protection
Kaminsky said that Beriya worked for the Mussavat intelligence service. But the Central
Committee plenum had barely concluded when Kaminsky was arrested and then shot. Had Stalin
examined Kaminsky's statement? No; because Stalin believed in Beriya and that was enough
for him. And when Stalin believed in anyone or anything, then no one could say anything
which was contrary to his opinion; anyone who would dare to express opposition would have
met the same fate as Kaminsky. . . .Comrades, the cult of the individual acquired such monstrous size chiefly because
Stalin himself, using all conceivable methods, supported the glorification of his own
person. This is supported by numerous facts. One of the most characteristic examples of
Stalin's self -glorification and of his lack of even elementary modesty is the edition of
his Short Biography, which was published in 1948.This book is an expression of the most dissolute flattery, an example of making a man
into a godhead, of transforming him into an infallible sage, "the greatest
leader," "sublime strategist of all times and nations." Finally no other
words could be found with which to lift Stalin up to the heavens.We need not give here examples of the loathsome adulation filling this book. All we
need to add is that they all were approved and edited by Stalin personally and some of
them were added in his own handwriting to the draft text of the book. . . .Comrades, if we sharply criticize today the cult of the individual which was so
widespread during Stalin's life and if we speak about the many negative phenomena
generated by this cult which is so alien to the spirit of Marxism-Leninism, various
persons may ask: How could it be? Stalin headed the party and the country for 30 years and
many victories were gained during his lifetime. Can we deny this? In my opinion, the
question can be asked in this manner only by those who are blinded and hopelessly
hypnotized by the cult of the individual, only by those who do not understand the essence
of the revolution and of the Soviet State, only by those who do not understand, in a
Leninist manner, the role of the party and of the nation in the development of the Soviet
society. . . .Our historical victories were attained thanks to the organizational work of the party,
to the many provincial organizations, and to the self-sacrificing work of our great
nation. These victories are the result of the great drive and activity of the nation and
of the party as a whole; they are not at all the fruit of the leadership of Stalin, as the
situation was pictured during the period of the cult of the individual. . . .Let us consider the first Central Committee plenum after the 19th party congress when
Stalin, in his talk at the plenum, characterized Vyacheslav Mikhailovich Molotov and
Anastas Ivanovich Mikoyan and suggested that these old workers of our party were guilty of
some baseless charges. It is not excluded that had Stalin remained at the helm for another
several months, Comrades Molotov and Mikoyan would probably have not delivered any
speeches at this congress.Stalin evidently had plans to finish off the old members of the political bureau. He
often stated that political bureau members should be replaced by new ones. . . .We can assume that this was also a design for the future annihilation of the old
political bureau members and in this way a cover for all shameful acts of Stalin, acts
which we are now considering.Comrades, in order not to repeat errors of the past, the central committee has declared
itself resolutely against the cult of the individual. We consider that Stalin was
excessively extolled. However, in the past Stalin doubtless performed great services to
the party, to the working class, and to the international workers' movement. . . .We should in all seriousness consider the question of the cult of the individual. We
cannot let this matter get out of the party, especially not to the press. It is for this
reason that we are considering it here at a closed congress session. We should know the
limits; we should not give ammunition to the enemy; we should not wash our dirty linen
before their eves. I think that the delegates to the congress will understand and assess
properly all these proposals. [Tumultuous applause.]Comrades, we must abolish the cult of the individual decisively, once and for all; we
must draw the proper conclusions concerning both ideological-theoretical and practical
work.It is necessary for this purpose:First, in a Bolshevik manner to condemn and to eradicate the cult of the individual as
alien to Marxism-Leninism and not consonant with the principles of party leadership and
the norms of party life, and to fight inexorably all attempts at bringing back this
practice in one form or another.To return to and actually practice in all our ideological work, the most important
theses of Marxist-Leninist science about the people as the creator of history and as the
creator of all material and spiritual good of humanity, about the decisive role of the
Marxist party in the revolutionary fight for the transformation of society-, about the
victory of communism.In this connection we will be forced to do much work in order to examine critically
from the Marxist-Leninist viewpoint and to correct the widely spread erroneous views
connected with the cult of the individual in the sphere of history, philosophy,, economy,
and of other sciences, as well as in the literature and t be fine arts. It is especially
necessary that in the immediate future we compile a serious textbook of the history of our
party which will be edited in accordance with scientific Marxist objectivism, a textbook
of the history of Soviet society, a book pertaining to the events of the civil war and the
great patriotic war.Secondly, to continue systematically and consistently the work done by the party's
central committee during the last years, a work characterized by minute observation in all
party- organizations, from the bottom to the top, of the Leninist principles of party-
leadership, characterized, above all, by the main principle of collective leadership,
characterized by the observation of the norms of party life described in the statutes of
our party, and, finally, characterized by- the wide practice of criticism and
self-criticism.Thirdly, to restore completely the Leninist principles of Soviet Socialist democracy.,
expressed in the constitution of the Soviet Union, to fight willfulness of individuals
abusing their power. The evil caused by acts violating revolutionary Socialist legality
which have accumulated during a long time as a result of the negative influence of the
cult of the individual has to be completely corrected.Comrades, the 20tb Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union has manifested
with a new strength the unshakable unity- of our party, its cohesiveness around the
central committee, its resolute will to accomplish the great task of building communism.
[Tumultuous applause.] And the fact that we present in all the ramifications the basic
problems of overcoming the cult of the individual which is alien to Marxism-Leninism, as
well as the problem of liquidating its burdensome consequences, is an evidence of the
great moral and political strength of our party'. [Prolonged applause.]We are absolutely certain that our party, armed with the historical resolutions of the
20th Congress, will lead the Soviet people along the Leninist path to new, successes, to
new victories. [Tumultuous, prolonged applause.]Long live the victorious banner of our party-Leninism. [Tumultuous, prolonged applause
ending in ovation. All rise.]

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