No Opposition Party is an Island: Taiwan’s Defense and Domestic Politics

Newly elected DPP Secretary-General and opposition party member Dr.
Joseph Wu discusses upcoming elections, mainland China, and Taipei’s
defense posture as part of the wider US-Asia/Pacific rebalancing effort.

Jaushieh Joseph Wu is the Secretary-General of the Democratic
Progressive Party in Taiwan. Prior to his current appointment, he was
the party’s chief policy official and the party’s representative to the
United States. He also served as Deputy Secretary-General to the
President of Taiwan from 2002-2004, Minister of Mainland Affairs from
2004-2007, and Taiwan’s official Representative to the United States
from 2007-2008. He received his Ph.D. in Political Science from The Ohio
State University in 1989 and was a research fellow at the Institute of
International Relations at National Chengchi University.

The DPP (Democratic Progressive Party) has been out of office
since 2008. What are the main policy agenda items you feel are most
important prior to the election cycle in 2016?

The economy is certainly the number one issue of concern for the Taiwanese voters. The KMT (Kuomintang)
government came to power with promises to achieve an average of 6
percent real GDP growth, 3 percent unemployment, and US$30,000 GDP per
capita, but has failed in this regard. The people of Taiwan generally
feel that the economy is worse than before, that income rates have
stagnated, and that the cost of consumer goods is higher than ever.The DPP will
certainly focus on important economic policy issues to address this
public anxiety, especially in regards to the revitalization of Taiwan’s
manufacturing sector.

Recent demonstrations attest
to my depiction of Taiwan’s overall social and economic situation. In
March and April of this year nearly half a million young people
protested over the issue of generational justice, or the idea of
ensuring younger members of society with better futures across the
policy spectrum, not just economically, although this continues to play a
significant role in current discussions. Notably, job training, loans,
educational reform, higher average wages, and incentives for the private
sector to hire younger employees have been on the agenda.

Beyond strict economic policy issues, wealth distribution in Taiwan
has suffered a number of setbacks in the last few years. In short, the
winners win more and the losers lose more. Social justice, better
distribution, encouragement of equality, and education reform will also
be on the DPP’s agenda. The issue of social justice carried the DPP’s
election in 2012, and it was seen as a very successful undertaking. We
anticipate following a similar strategy in 2016.

Finally, cross-straits policy is something none of the major or minor
political parties in Taiwan can ignore. KMT’s recent strategy has been
to agree to the One China Principle,
a position that China prefers, with the result of giving the KMT the
image of effectively managing cross-strait affairs, a portrayal that
wasn’t lost on voters in the last national election.

However, after six years in power, public sentiment in Taiwan is that
the KMT’s overwhelming submission to China may not be in Taiwan’s best
interest. The hastily signed June 2013 Service Trade Agreement and
the impatient maneuvering inParliament brought about public anger
regarding the KMT’s control over cross-strait policy. Like the recent demonstrations over
the nuclear issue, there is some concern by the people of Taiwan that
the KMT government will announce new agreements with China without
proper parliamentary, judicial, and public review and revision. The DPP
advocates a more cautious approach that incorporates public sentiment to
avoid the current climate of skepticism regarding the KMT’s long-term
intentions.

The DPP takes a strong stance on national defense. What improvements should be made over the next ten years?

The DPP has published five defense blue papers to
outline the areas Taiwan needs to strengthen its defense capability,
ranging from overall principles to decision making, research and
development, Taiwan-US cooperation, and threat assessment. We will
continue to publish defense blue papers to highlight our determination
to strengthen Taiwan’s defense. Specifically, the DPP has advocated an
increase in the defense budget up to 3 percent of GDP, including funding
for R&D programs such as at the Chung-san Institute for Science and
Technology.

After publishing our fifth defense blue paper in March of this year DPP Chairperson Su Tseng-chang strongly advocated the DPP’s position that Taiwan should undertake an indigenous submarine program,
establish a cyber security command, and engage in the research and
production of UAV and UCAV. He stressed the absolute necessity that
there must be a substantial increase of the defense budget.

The recent passage of HR 3470 authorizing
the sale of four naval missile frigates is an excellent indication of
continued American support for Taiwan’s defense. Unfortunately, the
current administration in Taiwan subsequently chose to purchase two,
citing budget constraints. The DPP is committed to a much more robust
defense policy position than this, when and if the DPP comes back to
power.

How can Taiwan better partner with the United States over defense policy in the Asia-Pacific region?

Taiwan should never be seen as the weakest link in the US strategic
planning in the Asia-Pacific, and therefore should strive to improve the
good existing security ties with the US in the areas of information
sharing, cyber security, force assessment, war gaming, and joint
training exercises. Taiwan also has a responsibility to better tighten
its domestic control over sensitive information leaks, China’s espionage
activities, and the loyalty of its own military officers.

Moreover, Taiwan should also improve its relations with its
neighbors, particularly China, Japan, the Philippines, and Vietnam. The
reason for improving relations with China is clear: it is the main
threat against Taiwan, and Taiwan should work to improve mutual trust as
a means of conflict prevention. As for Japan, it is the most important
regional ally of the United States and is a strong partner in the US
regional force rebalance. Taiwan should work hard to ensure friendly
relations with Japan so that the two can gradually move into security
cooperation as well.

How should the Republic of China interact with its neighbors over shared maritime lanes, specifically in regard to security?

Taiwan’s relations with its neighbors are paramount. After the signing of the fishery agreement,
there has been increased cooperation between Taiwan and Japan for
example. The two signatories should have more proactive engagement
between our respective coast guard forces however, beginning with joint
search and rescue operations and gradually moving into cross-military
cooperation, such as force observation exercises and officer exchange
programs. The same principles should be applied to Taiwan’s interactions
with the Philippines.

In light of the recent serious dispute between
China and Vietnam in the South China Sea, Taiwan, as a claimant, should
also clarify its claim of sovereignty over the highly disputed and
highly charged area so it can positively contribute to the existing
complex situation. Taiwan’s adherence to the UN Convention on the Law of Sea is
clear with regard to its sovereignty claim; it is in active control and
administration of Tai-ping, the largest island in the South China Sea.
Taiwan should also actively seek possibilities for participation in
multilateral forums for joint codes of conduct, and when it is not able
to, should nonetheless do so in spirit by subscribing to the principles
that emerge from such forums. Additionally, Taiwan currently endorses
the principle of the freedom of navigation and should publicly announce
its intentions to eschew cooperation with China against other claimants
on the sovereignty issue.

In what ways does the DPP encourage focus on its commercial and banking networks from cyber security threats?

Cyber
espionage is the most serious security threat in peacetime, and Taiwan
suffers constantly, along with the United States, from China’s cyber attacks. Taiwan should expand the operations and mandate of its Technical Service Center (cyber
security unit) to improve coverage of important financial transactions
to prevent China or any other hostile state- or non-state agent from
gathering critical information and gaining access to the banking
institutions. In this regard, potential Chinese interruptions to
Taiwan’s normal financial activities during military hostilities have
risen in recent years.

Taiwan is by and large the principal testing ground of China’s
computer hackers, who direct efforts not only against government
institutions but also civilian institutions and individuals in the
public and private sectors. To counter this tendency Taiwan has
developed advanced defense abilities in cyber security, including
signing an information security cooperation agreement with the United
States, which has proven to be important to the information and cyber
security sectors of both countries. More broadly, Taiwan needs to expand
its cyber security cooperation with other democracies and share its
information and technology to prevent Chinese cyber espionage activities
from creating further problems for the rest of the world.