The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.

The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.

The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.

To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.

Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol).
Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #05GENEVA1403.

This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 07 GENEVA 001403
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR T, AC, NP, VC, EUR AND S/NIS
DOE FOR AN-1
JCS FOR J5/DDIN AND J5/NAC
SECDEF FOR OSD/ISP AND OSD/SACC
NAVY FOR CNO-N514 AND DIRSSP
DTRA FOR SA AND DIRECTOR
NSC FOR MILLER
DTRA FOR OSA
DIA FOR RAR-3
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/08/2015
TAGS: PARMKACTUSRSUPBOKZSTARTJCICINF
SUBJECT: JCIC-XXVII: (U) SECOND WORKING GROUP MEETING ON
RSM-56 ATTRIBUTION AND SS-25 ELIMINATIONS, JUNE 2, 2005
REF: A. RUSSIAN BRIEF ON RSM-56 FROM MARCH 2005 NRRC TALKS
¶B. GENEVA 1342 (JCIC-XXVII-010)
Classified By: Dr. George W. Look, U.S. Representative
to the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission (JCIC).
Reason: 1.4 (b) and (d).
¶1. (U) This is JCIC-XXVII-016.
¶2. (U) Meeting Date: June 2, 2005
Time: 10:30 A.M. - 12:30 P.M.
Place: Russian Mission, Geneva
SUMMARY
¶3. (S) A second Working Group meeting with all Parties
present was held at the Russian Mission on June 2, 2005, to
discuss RSM-56 warhead attribution and throw-weight
accountability, and SS-25 elimination inspections. The U.S.
Delegation informed the Russian Delegation that it had
reviewed Russia's briefing, presented during the NRRC
Consultations held in March 2005, on plans for the RSM-56 and
still had questions regarding Russia's plans for launcher
conversion, flight-testing, warhead attribution, and
throw-weight accountability. The U.S. Delegation requested
that Russia forward information to the United States on its
plans as soon as it became available to help facilitate
agreement in the JCIC on the procedures to be used to
establish throw-weight accountability. The Russian
Delegation stated that the deployed SLBM launchers on a
Typhoon submarine are in the process of being converted, in
accordance with Treaty provisions, and would become
accountable as RSM-56 launchers as soon as the converted
submarine left the conversion facility in Severodvinsk.
However, determination of RSM-56 warhead attribution and
throw-weight accountability was not feasible until after some
flight-testing. This situation represented the first time a
Party declared a new strategic offensive arm under the
Treaty. The Russian Delegation confirmed that Russia planned
to forego the prototype phase and would flight-test the
RSM-56 SLBM from the newly-converted RSM-56 launchers on a
Typhoon submarine.
¶4. (S) On the issue of SS-25 ICBM elimination, the Russian
Delegation stated that it would not present the section of
the missile that the United States describes as the forward
section of the self-contained dispensing mechanism (SCDM) and
which Russia describes as the guidance and control section
for elimination. Russia also stated that it would object to
U.S. inspectors' use of open-source photographs during the
elimination inspection to confirm the identity of nozzles
presented for elimination. The United States responded that
its inspectors would continue to use these photographs
because they assisted inspectors in determining the types of
nozzles that were being eliminated. Russia also stated that
it would not object if U.S. inspectors continued to make
comments in the inspection report that they could not confirm
nozzle types if they stopped making comments in the
inspection report that they could not confirm the elimination
of the entire missile.
¶5. (S) The Russian Delegation made a proposal to assist U.S.
inspectors in confirming the type of ICBM undergoing
elimination if the length of the first-stage rocket motor
case was shortened during propellant removal by low pressure
burning. Russia offered to make a statement that would list
the length of the cylindrical portion of the first stage,
exclusive of the fore and aft end domes. This measurement,
6.54 meters, could be obtained after the propellant had been
removed, since it may not be possible to obtain the end-dome
to end-dome measurement.
RUSSIA'S PLANS FOR RSM-56 WARHEAD
AND THROW-WEIGHT ATTRIBUTION
¶6. (S) Buttrick asked Russia to confirm that it would not
present its brief from the March 2005 NRRC Consultations (REF
A) here at the JCIC. Fedorchenko responded that Russia had
no instructions to provide this briefing, nor did it have the
necessary software and equipment available. Buttrick stated
that the U.S. Delegation was able to obtain a copy of this
briefing from Washington and had a couple of questions. The
first question for Russia was whether RSM-56 flight-testing
would be conducted from the deployed SLBM launchers on the
submarine currently undergoing conversion to support the
RSM-56 SLBM. The second question was whether Russia was
bypassing the prototype validation phase with the RSM-56.
¶7. (S) Fedorchenko responded to the first question by
confirming that flight-tests will be conducted from the
Typhoon submarine currently undergoing launcher conversion to
RSM-56, and that the notification for the SLBM launcher
conversion had been submitted in January 2005, by NRRC
notification STR-05-21/011. He said that the third paragraph
of this notification states that 20 launchers were being
converted from RSM-52 to RSM-56. Fedorchenko further stated
that, in April 2005, Russia had provided advance notification
that the Typhoon submarine would be entering the Severodvinsk
SLBM Launcher Conversion Facility (Ref: RNC/STR 05-91/53)
and that on May 5, 2005, launcher conversion had commenced
(Ref: RNC/STR 05-126/56). Fedorchenko stated that
conversion will be completed at Severodvinsk before testing
begins.
¶8. (S) Buttrick asked when RSM-56 warhead attribution would
be declared. Fedorchenko said that RSM-56 warhead
attribution was planned to be accomplished after flight-tests
were complete, in accordance with Article III. Buttrick
asked when the conversion of the 20 Typhoon launchers to
support the RSM-56 would be completed. He explained that
Treaty Article III, Paragraph 7(c), defines when the
launchers on an existing submarine undergoing conversion are
considered to be converted. Fedorchenko confirmed this
requirement. Buttrick asked whether Russia was going to
declare RSM-56 warhead attribution before the first
flight-test, and what missile type the launchers would be
attributed with when the flight-test commenced. Fedorchenko
replied that as soon as the converted submarine leaves the
conversion facility and begins sea trials, it will be
attributed with 20 RSM-56 launchers.
¶9. (S) Fedorchenko explained that the aggregate number of
warheads for this submarine would be annotated with an
asterisk in the MOU. Russia would not indicate either RSM-56
throw-weight accountability or warhead attribution until
after flight-testing had taken place. He said that the
Nerpich'ye submarine base will be attributed with 20 RSM-56
launchers and 20 fewer SS-N-20 launchers. The first RSM-56
that is produced will be reported as a deployed missile. He
also indicated that the aggregate warhead number in the MOU
would be decreased by 200 when the 20 existing SS-N-20
launchers completed conversion to RSM-56, since each SS-N-20
SLBM is attributed with ten warheads. Buttrick asked how
many warheads the United States should consider for each of
the launchers of the converted SSBN equipped with the RSM-56
SLBMs when the submarine first comes out of the conversion
facility. Fedorchenko responded that the United States could
pick any number; it would be not less than one and not more
than ten.
¶10. (S) Buttrick explained that he understood the difficulty
in determining throw-weight and warhead attribution prior to
flight-tests and that he understood that Russia was not ready
to declare warhead attribution for this new missile. He
reminded Fedorchenko that, at the last meeting, the Russian
Delegation said that the Thirty-Second Agreed Statement would
apply to throw-weight accountability for RSM-56. He
requested that Russia inform the United States as soon as
possible if fewer than eight flight-tests for the RSM-56
would be conducted so that the Parties could begin the
process for establishing the throw-weight accountability for
the RSM-56. This discussion had to take place in the JCIC
pursuant to the Thirty-Second Agreed Statement. Any delay in
this process could create Treaty problems associated with the
deployment of the RSM-56 SLBM.
¶11. (S) Fedorchenko thanked Buttrick for understanding
Russia's situation and noted that he concurred with
Kottymyer's statement in the previous meeting (REF B)
regarding Treaty drafters not foreseeing this situation.
First, we had to make provisions for SLBMs in launch
canisters. The next problem is that not having a prototype
phase impacts warhead and throw-weight accountability. He
said Russia would provide the United States with flight-test
telemetry recordings and interpretative materials 65 days
after flight-tests. This data would also include the usual
warhead dispensing and separation information, and the
maximum number of warheads would be accounted for. He said
throw-weight accountability would have to be discussed in the
JCIC after flight-testing had begun because it did not make
sense to discuss it prior to flight-testing.
¶12. (S) Shevtsov said that this was another case of a
situation that was not envisioned when the Treaty was
created. He used Vandenberg as an example, but Fedorchenko
promptly refuted this, stating there was no connection and
this was not a good analogy. Fedorchenko stated that the
RSM-56 represented the first strategic offensive arm of a new
type created under the Treaty and that the Treaty Parties had
no experience or template to follow. He stated further that
Russia was trying to be legally pure, had informed the
Parties in advance of the development of the RSM-56, and had
put the RSM-56 issue on the JCIC agenda. He said that Russia
performed a demonstration of the missile in September 2004,
and was waiting for the JCIC agreement on corresponding
documents before Russia begins testing.
SS-25 ELIMINATION
¶13. (S) Buttrick began by reiterating U.S. concerns raised
at the first meeting. He said the Parties had discussed
three areas of concern. First, in terms of the missing
forward portion of the SCDM that was not presented as part of
the SS-25 elimination, Russia had stated that it did not
consider this portion of the missile either part of the SCDM
or part of the front section of the SS-25. Buttrick asked
Fedorchenko what Russia considered this portion of the
missile to be. Fedorchenko responded that it was an
independent part of the missile that contained the guidance
and control devices. Just because it was connected to the
SCDM does not mean that it was part of it; he referred to the
Treaty Conversion or Elimination (C or E) Protocol, Section
I, Subparagraph 2(b). Buttrick responded by reading the
Treaty definition of SCDM as "a device that separates from
the final stage of a missile together with the front section
and that independently targets and releases the reentry
vehicle or reentry vehicles and penetration aids." Buttrick,
using open-source photographs of the SS-25 missile as a
visual aid, said that, in accordance with this definition,
the whole section of the missile forward of the SCDM
containing the maneuvering rockets separates from the final
stage of the missile and provides guidance and control to
target. Section I, Subparagraph 4(c) of the C or E Protocol
requires the destruction of the SCDM and front section of the
missile; it was clearly the intent of the Treaty drafters to
eliminate the whole section of the SS-25 ICBM forward of the
SCDM. Buttrick said Fedorchenko had told the U.S. Delegation
in the previous meeting that Paragraph 2 of the C or E
Protocol allows Russia to remove the guidance and control
systems from the missile. Buttrick stated that this
provision does not state that the entire section of the
missile may be removed prior to elimination. Buttrick said
that Dr. Look wanted an explanation from Russia as to why it
believes the section of the missile containing the guidance
system does not need to be eliminated. Fedorchenko indicated
that Russia had the right to remove guidance and control
systems. Buttrick asked Fedorchenko if the devices inside
could not be removed without damage and Fedorchenko
acknowledged that this was so. Buttrick asked why Russia was
concerned about damaging these components since the SS-25 was
being eliminated.
¶14. (S) Buttrick stated he understood that Russia would not
be providing the section of the missile containing the
guidance and control system for destruction and said that he
would take this information back to Washington.
IDENTIFICATION OF SS-25 NOZZLES
¶15. (S) Regarding the SS-25 nozzle identification issue,
Buttrick reminded Fedorchenko of the SS-24 eliminations and
asked him whether he agreed that there were no concerns with
these eliminations. Fedorchenko responded that the topic of
SS-24 eliminations was not on the agenda, but there were
concerns with U.S. inspectors using photographs provided by
Ukraine during the first SS-24 inspection in Russia. Russia
had chosen not to raise them at the time and now considered
the issue closed because U.S. inspectors have not used the
photographs on subsequent inspections.
¶16. (S) Buttrick asked Fedorchenko whether Russia would
object if U.S. inspectors brought photographs from an
open-source book copyrighted in Russia to identify SS-25
nozzles and, if so, on what grounds. Fedorchenko responded
that inspectors were required to use official photographs
during inspections. Buttrick said that U.S. inspectors
planned on continuing to use photographs to help them
identify SS-25 nozzles during elimination inspections, and
that it would be helpful if Russia could confirm they are
accurate. Fedorchenko replied that unofficial photographs
can be used for preparation, but not for inspections.
Buttrick said that U.S. inspectors could not identify the
nozzles, Russia had not provided any reference photographs,
and the nozzles presented during the inspection were
separated from the missiles. It was, therefore, impossible
to confirm that the nozzles corresponding to the SS-25
missile being eliminated had in fact been eliminated.
RUSSIAN PROPOSAL REGARDING
NOZZLE/MISSILE ELIMINATION
¶17. (S) Fedorchenko stated that he had a significant
proposal regarding the SS-25 nozzle. He suggested that
Russia would not object to U.S. inspectors continuing to make
a comment in the inspection report, that the inspectors could
not confirm the type of nozzles for the first, second, and
third stages of the SS-25 ICBM, if they would no longer make
comments that they could not confirm the elimination of the
missile. He noted that the Treaty did not require that
photographs of the nozzles be provided, and said he
understood the inspector's difficulty. He said trust was
required and he hoped the United States believed that Russia
was providing SS-25 nozzles for elimination. Furthermore,
Fedorchenko stated that he failed to comprehend how the
United States could not consider these missiles to be
eliminated. He said that none of the four missiles exist any
longer and that this was a fact. Buttrick stated that he did
not think this would satisfy the requirements of the C or E
Protocol, but said he would forward this information to
Washington for consideration.
¶18. (S) Buttrick asked whether Russia planned to continue to
present pre-cut SS-25 nozzles that had large segments of the
nozzles removed, as had been done during the first
elimination inspection. He reminded Russia that the
understanding between Russia and the United States was that
pre-cuts could be made as long as the cuts did not affect the
shape, dimensions, or distinguishing features of the element
that was being eliminated. Fedorchenko replied that, as
Russia readied more SS-25 ICBMs for elimination, there would
be fewer occurrences of this situation. However, there were
several nozzles that had been subjected to pre-cuts and may
have segments missing, but he was not sure how many.
RUSSIAN PROPOSAL FOR
FIRST-STAGE MEASUREMENT
¶19. (S) Buttrick said that dimensional changes of SS-25
first-stage rocket motors after propellant was removed by
low-pressure burning could cause difficulty for inspectors in
confirming missile type for the elimination following
burn-out of the motor. He expressed interest in
Fedorchenko's proposal on this issue. Fedorchenko tabled a
draft statement and before and after burn photographs to help
explain the proposal. He indicated that the proposal
consisted of measuring the length of the cylindrical portion
of the first-stage rocket motor. It should be possible to
obtain a consistent measurement of 5.64 meters because
Russian experts expected only the end domes to be eroded as
the result of low-pressure burning. To illustrate the
problem, he provided photographs showing an SS-25 first-stage
motor before it had been burned out and a photograph after
burn-out had occurred. He added that U.S inspectors also
could use these photographs to assist them in confirming the
type of ICBM undergoing elimination. Buttrick stated that he
would take this information back to Washington. Buttrick
concluded by asking how soon inspectors will encounter these
motors; and Fedorchenko responded "soon."
¶20. (S) Begin text (Russian-proposed statement on the
elimination of SS-25 ICBMs of July 31, 1991):
Official Translation
JCIC-XXVII
June 2, 2005
Statement by the Representative of the
Russian Federation to the
Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission for the
Treaty Between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and
the United States of America on the Reduction and
Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms
of July 31, 1991
On the Elimination of SS-25 ICBMs
In connection with the beginning of SS-25 ICBM
elimination, the Russian side reaffirms that such elimination
will be carried out in strict accord with the Treaty
provisions governing conversion or elimination of the items
covered by the Treaty.
These provisions provide for the right of the inspected
Party to remove the fuel from the missile stages before a
confirmatory inspection.
The Russian Federation removes the fuel from the stages
of SS-25 ICBMs by slow-burning them without the nozzle. The
slow burn can result in burning out the end domes of these
stages. This makes it impossible to use the length of the
first stage, specified in the Memorandum of Understanding on
the Establishment of the Data Base Relating to the Treaty, to
confirm the type of ICBM. In view of this, the Russian side
proposes that in such cases the length of the cylindrical
portion of the first stage casing, which is equal to 6.54
meters and which does not change as a result of the slow
burn, be used to confirm the type of an SS-25 ICBM located at
a conversion or elimination facility. The relevant
photographs are attached.
End text.
¶21. (U) Documents exchanged.
- Russia:
-- Russian-proposed Statement by the Representative of
the Russian Federation to the JCIC on the Elimination of
SS-25 ICBMs, dated June 2, 2005;
-- Picture of SS-25 First-Stage Motor Before Burn-out; and
-- Picture of SS-25 First-Stage Motor After Burn-out
(Pictures e-mailed to State/AC/SNI).
¶22. (U) Participants:
U.S.
Mr. Buttrick
Mr. Dunn
Col(sel) Emig
Mr. Foley
Mr. Herrick
Ms. Kottmyer
Mr. Mullins
Mr. Sessions
Mr. Singer
Mr. Smith
Mr. French (Int)
Belarus
Mr. Grinevich
Kazakhstan
Mr. Baysuanov
Russia
Col Fedorchenko
Mr. Venevtsev
Col Razumov
Mr. Bolotov
Col Maksimenko
Lt Col Novikov
Col Ryzhkov
Ms. Sorokina
Mr. Smirnov
Mr. Shabalin
Col Yegorov
Ms. Yevarovskaya (Int)
Ukraine
Dr. Shevtsov
Col Taran
¶23. (U) Look sends.
Moley