East Germany

Political Stability, Legitimation, and Succession

Despite its continuing search for political legitimation,
since its formation East Germany has enjoyed a relatively stable
political system. During the span of Ulbricht's rule, from
approximately 1950 to 1971, only the workers' uprising of 1953
and one large-scale purge of the SED ranks, which occurred in
1957, disrupted his regime. As of 1987, there had been no major
upheavals during the sixteen years of Honecker's rule, although
there had been periodic personnel reshuffling in the ranks of the
party and the government, and important changes had occurred in
the occupational and educational backgrounds of political
decision makers. These changes reflected the rise to power of a
more educated and technologically aware generation, a trend that
is especially apparent in the rosters of the SED Central
Committee and the Council of Ministers.

Although stability marked the East German regime in the
1970s, three noteworthy political changes took place during that
decade. The first and most significant political change occurred
when Ulbricht was removed from the post of first secretary.
Ulbricht's ouster was extremely significant even though it was
not followed by a purge of the party and state apparatuses. As a
result of this change, over time the status of certain key SED
officials was enhanced. In virtually every instance, the
individuals involved were close associates of Honecker's or
people responsible for policy areas that Honecker, the general
secretary, considered necessary for stabilizing his leadership.
Of particular importance in this regard were the promotions to
full Politburo membership of Werner Krolikowski and Werner
Lamberz, individuals with substantive experience in the agitation
and propaganda apparatuses of the SED. The promotions of
Krolikowski and Lamberz reflected Honecker's heightened
sensitivity to the need to improve the public's level of
political education.

The second important change within the leadership of the SED
took place on October 29, 1976, when Willi Stoph and GŁnter
Mittag were returned to their former respective positions as
chairman of the Council of Ministers and secretary in charge of
the economy on the Secretariat of the Central Comittee. The
previous incumbents in these positions, Sindermann and
Krolikowski, had been thrust into the political limelight in the
aftermath of Ulbricht's death in August 1973 but replaced by
Stoph and Mittag three days later. The move may have been
motivated by Honecker's desire to bring back two key veterans who
had gained considerable political influence during the turbulent
1950s and 1960s. Honecker also used the occasion to assume the
post of chairman of the Council of State in addition to his
position as general secretary. The third change in the SED
hierarchy occurred in the spring of 1978 after the death of
Politburo member Lamberz in a helicopter crash in Libya.
Lamberz's death was significant because of his close ties to
Honecker; after Honecker he was the party's second most important
ideological spokesman, and he was a leading proponent of the
regime's increasingly ambitious policy toward Africa. Lamberz was
replaced by Joachim Hermann, former chief editor of Neues
Deutschland.

Honecker's control of the party and state apparatuses has
been secure since the early 1980s, and his leadership has been
able to balance domestic policy priorities with expanding foreign
policy demands. Honecker also has devoted considerable attention
to the concerns of lower ranking functionaries and initiated a
more active program of agitation and propaganda within the party
and state structures than had been the case under Ulbricht.

An enduring problem for the SED has been the desire to attain
political legitimacy in the eyes of the East German public. The
multiparty system introduced at the end of the 1940s left some
room for political participation outside the SED, but repression
constituted a vital element of the system. Repressive factors
included the stationing of Soviet troops on East German
territory, a sealed border, and an extensive network of political
informants employed by the State Security Service
(see Agencies of the Ministry of State Security
, ch. 5). None of these aspects
of the political system can be challenged by public questioning
or debate. The regime erected the Berlin Wall in August 1961 to
halt illegal emigration after 2.5 million people had escaped to
the West. Since that time, the SED has attempted to strengthen
its political authority through repressive measures when
necessary, to encourage increased political participation and
influence public opinion, and to improve the standard of living
and economic performance.

The SED has continued to place significant emphasis on mass
participation. The regime attempts to demonstrate that "socialist
democracy," a term used to describe public participation, is an
integral part of the political process. The concept, however,
emphasizes not the individual rights and liberties that define
citizenship in Western Europe and North America but the
opportunities for individuals publicly to participate in
organized political activities. Thus it is common for East German
sources to emphasize the variety of opportunities for
participation. For example, in the mid-1980s, approximately
195,000 citizens were members of national or local assemblies;
500,000 citizens were active in commissions of these local
assemblies; 335,000 citizens participated in various committees
of the National Front; 95,550 working people were engaged in the
almost 10,000 production consultative bodies of the country's
industrial enterprises; and 105,000 parents were active members
of the parent associations that worked with teachers in the
country's educational system.

The political function of mass participation is largely one
of mobilization for goals that have already been articulated by
the party and state. Nonetheless, the public has some influence
over both the content and the administration of policies
formulated by the political leadership. Whether in the end the
country's citizens supported the goals of the party and state
apparatuses remains an open question.

Despite its extremely powerful position in the society, since
the mid-1970s the SED has been aware of the importance of public
opinion. East Germany's research institutions have been
particularly active in analyzing opinion on such issues as work,
family life, the position of women in society, and leisure. The
focus and results of public opinion research are carefully
guarded secrets, and it is known that the Politburo itself makes
the final determination on basic emphases and content of the
Central Research Plan. Two party institutes have played
especially important roles in this area: the Institute for
Opinion Research of the Central Committee of the SED and the
Institute for Marxist-Leninist Sociology of the Academy for
Social Sciences.

In the mid-1980s, empirical research provided the SED with an
up-to-date profile on the attitudes and feelings of the public
across a range of major sociopolitical issues. Such data have
provided the party with information that has helped it more
effectively to communicate its goals and purposes to the public.
Since the 1970s, the SED has deliberately attempted to make
respondents feel that their needs were being taken seriously. In
other words, since the 1970s the regime has used public opinion
research as another means to develop political legitimacy. Given
the authoritarian character of the regime, it is worth
considering whether citizens were willing to answer questions in
a totally honest and open manner.

The SED has used the instruments of socialization and control
to achieve political passivity on the part of society, if not
legitimacy. For example, the East German educational system has
had an impact on the political values and expectations of the
East German citizenry
(see The Educational System
, ch. 2). The
military is also an important instrument for the inculcation of
regime values
(see The National Security System and the Citizen
, ch. 5). Hence, there is reason to suggest that many of the social
and political goals of the SED have been accepted by large parts
of the public. (How strongly they support these goals is another
matter entirely.) Still, the country's increased vulnerability to
the industrial West, and particularly to West Germany, made the
problem of legitimacy a troubling one for the SED. Despite
efforts to instill an "East German consciousness" in the 1970s
and 1980s, closer ties between the two German states have made
that task increasingly difficult. All that can be said is that
the political leaders remained aware of their legitimacy
problems.