SSR 05-1c: THE SOCIAL SECURITY ACT, SECTIONS 223(d)(2)(A) AND
1614(a)(3)(B), AS AMENDED (42 U.S.C. 423(d)(2)(A)
AND1382c(a)(3)(B))— DISABILITY INSURANCE BENEFITS AND SUPPLEMENTAL
SECURITY INCOME—WHETHER PAST RELEVANT WORK MUST EXIST IN SIGNIFICANT
NUMBERS IN THE NATIONAL ECONOMY

This Ruling concerns the Social Security Administration's (SSA)
interpretation of sections
223(d)(2)(A) and
1614(a)(3)(B) of the
Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. 423(d)(2)(A) and 1382(a)(3)(B)) that a
claimant who remains physically and mentally able to perform his or her
past relevant work will be found not disabled (see
20 CFR 404.1520 and
416.920), regardless of
whether that previous work exists in the national economy.

In June 1996, the claimant applied for Social Security disability
insurance benefits and for Supplemental Security Income, alleging
disability due to heart disease and cervical and lumbar radiculopathy. She
had worked as an elevator operator for 6 years until her job was
eliminated in August 1995. The SSA denied her claim at the initial and
reconsideration levels of adjudication and she requested a hearing before
an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ). The ALJ found that she was not under a
disability because her impairments did not prevent her from performing her
past work as an elevator operator. The ALJ rejected the claimant's
argument that she was not able to do her past work because it no longer
existed in significant numbers in the national economy. The SSA's Appeals
Council denied the claimant's request for review. The United States
District Court for the District of New Jersey affirmed the ALJ's findings,
concluding that whether the old job exists is irrelevant under SSA's
regulations. The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed and
remanded, holding that the statute unambiguously provides that the ability
to perform prior work disqualifies a claimant from benefits only if the
work is “substantial gainful work which exists in the national
economy.”

The Supreme Court of the United States (the Court) held that 42 U.S.C.
423(d)(2)(A) and 1382c(a)(3)(B) do not require a different interpretation
and that, because SSA's regulations
(20 CFR 404.1520,
404.1560(b),
416.920, and
416.960(b)) are a reasonable
interpretation of the text of the Act, they must be deferred to and given
effect.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD
CIRCUIT

[November 12, 2003]

JUSTICE SCALIA delivered the opinion of the Court.

Under the Social Security Act, the Social Security Administration (SSA) is
authorized to pay disability insurance benefits and Supplemental Security
Income to persons who have a “disability.” A person qualifies
as disabled, and thereby eligible for such benefits, “only if his
physical or mental impairment or impairments are of such severity that he
is not only unable to do his previous work but cannot, considering his
age, education, and work experience, engage in any other kind of
substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy.” 42
U.S.C. §§423(d)(2)(A), 1382c(a)(3)(B). The issue we must decide
is whether the SSA may determine that a claimant is not disabled because
she remains physically and mentally able to do her previous work, without
investigating whether that previous work exists in significant numbers in
the national economy.

I

Pauline Thomas worked as an elevator operator for six years until her job
was eliminated in August 1995. In June 1996, at age 53, Thomas applied for
disability insurance benefits under Title II and Supplemental Security
Income under Title XVI of the Social Security Act. See 49 Stat. 622, as
amended, 42 U.S.C. §401 et seq. (Title II); as added, 86 Stat.
1465, and as amended, §1381 et seq. (Title XVI). She claimed
that she suffered from, and was disabled by, heart disease and cervical
and lumbar radiculopathy.

After the SSA denied Thomas's application initially and on
reconsideration, she requested a hearing before an Administrative Law
Judge (ALJ). The ALJ found that Thomas had “hypertension, cardiac
arrhythmia, [and] cervical and lumbar strain/sprain.” Decision of
ALJ 5, Record 15. He concluded, however, that Thomas was not under a
“disability” because her “impairments do not prevent
[her] from performing her past relevant work as an elevator
operator.” Id., at 6, Record 16. He rejected Thomas's
argument that she is unable to do her previous work because that work no
longer exists in significant numbers in the national economy. The SSA's
Appeals Council denied Thomas's request for review.

Thomas then challenged the ALJ's ruling in the United States District
Court for the District of New Jersey, renewing her argument that she is
unable to do her previous work due to its scarcity. The District Court
affirmed the ALJ, concluding that whether Thomas's old job exists is
irrelevant under the SSA's regulations. Thomas v. Apfel, Civ. No.
99-2234 (Aug. 17, 2000). The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit,
sitting en banc, reversed and remanded. Over the dissent of three of its
members, it held that the statute unambiguously provides that the ability
to perform prior work disqualifies from benefits only if it is
“substantial gainful work which exists in the national
economy.” 294 F. 3d 568, 572 (2002). That holding conflicts with the
decisions of four other Courts of Appeals. See Quang Van Han v.
Bowen, 882 F. 2d 1453, 1457 (CA9 1989); Garcia v. Secretary of
Health and Human Services, 46 F. 3d 552, 558 (CA6 1995); Pass v.
Chater, 65 F. 3d 1200, 1206-1207 (CA4 1995); Rater v. Chater,
73 F. 3d 796, 799 (CA8 1996). We granted the SSA's petition for
certiorari. 537 U.S. 1187 (2003).

II

As relevant to the present case, Title II of the Act defines
“disability” as the “inability to engage in any
substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable
physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or
which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not
less than 12 months.” 42 U.S.C. §423(d)(1)(A). That definition
is qualified, however, as follows:

“An individual shall be determined to be under a disability only if
his physical or mental impairment or impairments are of such severity that
he is not only unable to do his previous work but cannot,
considering his age, education, and work experience, engage in any
other kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the national
economy....” §423(d)(2)(A) (emphasis added).

“[W]ork which exists in the national economy” is defined to
mean “work which exists in significant numbers either in the region
where such individual lives or in several regions of the country.”
Ibid. Title XVI of the Act, which governs Supplemental Security Income
benefits for disabled indigent persons, employs the same definition of
“disability” used in Title II, including a qualification that
is verbatim the same as §423(d)(2)(A). See 42 U.S.C.
§1382c(a)(3)(B). For simplicity's sake, we will refer only to the
Title II provisions, but our analysis applies equally to Title XVI.

Section 423(d)(2)(A) establishes two requirements for disability. First,
an individual's physical or mental impairment must render him
“unable to do his previous work.” Second, the impairment must
also preclude him from “engag[ing] in any other kind of substantial
gainful work.” The parties agree that the latter requirement
is qualified by the clause that immediately follows it—“which
exists in the national economy.” The issue in this case is whether
that clause also qualifies “previous work.”

The SSA has answered this question in the negative. Acting pursuant to its
statutory rulemaking authority, 42 U.S.C. §§405(a) (Title II),
1383(d)(1) (Title XVI), the agency has promulgated regulations
establishing a five-step sequential evaluation process to determine
disability. See 20 CFR
§404.1520 (2003) (governing claims for disability insurance
benefits); §416.920 (parallel regulation governing claims for
Supplemental Security Income). If at any step a finding of disability or
non-disability can be made, the SSA will not review the claim further. At
the first step, the agency will find non-disability unless the claimant
shows that he is not working at a “substantial gainful
activity.” §§404.1520(b), 416.920(b). At step two, the SSA
will find non-disability unless the claimant shows that he has a
“severe impairment,” defined as “any impairment or
combination of impairments which significantly limits [the claimant's]
physical or mental ability to do basic work activities.”
§§404.1520(c), 416.920(c). At step three, the agency determines
whether the impairment which enabled the claimant to survive step two is
on the list of impairments presumed severe enough to render one disabled;
if so, the claimant qualifies. §§404.1520(d), 416.920(d). If the
claimant's impairment is not on the list, the inquiry proceeds to step
four, at which the SSA assesses whether the claimant can do his previous
work; unless he shows that he cannot, he is determined not to be
disabled.[1] If the claimant
survives the fourth stage, the fifth, and final, step requires the SSA to
consider so-called “vocational factors” (the claimant's age,
education, and past work experience), and to determine whether the
claimant is capable of performing other jobs existing in significant
numbers in the national economy. §§404.1520(f), 404.1560(c),
416.920(f), 416.960(c).[2]

As the above description shows, step four can result in a determination of
no disability without inquiry into whether the claimant's previous work
exists in the national economy; the regulations explicitly reserve inquiry
into the national economy for step five. Thus, the SSA has made it
perfectly clear that it does not interpret the clause “which exists
in the national economy” in §423(d)(2)(A) as applying to
“previous work.”[3]
The issue presented is whether this agency interpretation must be accorded
deference.

As we held in Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,
Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984), when a statute speaks clearly to the
issue at hand we “must give effect to the unambiguously expressed
intent of Congress,” but when the statute “is silent or
ambiguous” we must defer to a reasonable construction by the agency
charged with its implementation. The Third Circuit held that, by referring
first to “previous work” and then to “any other
kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the national
economy,” 42 U.S.C. §423(d)(2)(A) (emphasis added), the statute
unambiguously indicates that the former is a species of the latter.
“When,” it said, “a sentence sets out one or more
specific items followed by 'any other' and a description, the specific
items must fall within the description.” 294 F. 3d, at 572. We
disagree. For the reasons discussed below the interpretation adopted by
SSA is at least a reasonable construction of the text and must therefore
be given effect.

The Third Circuit's reading disregards—indeed, is precisely contrary
to—the grammatical “rule of the last antecedent,”
according to which a limiting clause or phrase (here, the relative clause
“which exists in the national economy”) should ordinarily be
read as modifying only the noun or phrase that it immediately follows
(here, “any other kind of substantial gainful work”). See 2A
N. Singer, Sutherland on Statutory Construction §47.33, p. 369 (6th
rev. ed. 2000) (“Referential and qualifying words and phrases, where
no contrary intention appears, refer solely to the last
antecedent”). While this rule is not an absolute and can assuredly
be overcome by other indicia of meaning, we have said that construing a
statute in accord with the rule is “quite sensible as a matter of
grammar.” Nobelman v. American Savings Bank, 508 U.S. 324,
330 (1993). In FTC v. Mandel Brothers, Inc., 359 U.S. 385 (1959),
this Court employed the rule to interpret a statute strikingly similar in
structure to §423(d)(2)(A)—a provision of the Fur Products
Labeling Act, 15 U.S.C. §69, which defined “'invoice'” as
“'a written account, memorandum, list, or catalog . . . transported
or delivered to a purchaser, consignee, factor, bailee, correspondent, or
agent, or any other person who is engaged in dealing commercially in
fur products or furs'” 359 U.S., at 386 (quoting 15 U.S.C.
§69(f)) (emphasis added). Like the Third Circuit here, the Court of
Appeals in Mandel Brothers had interpreted the phrase “'any
other'” as rendering the relative clause (“'who is engaged in
dealing commercially'”) applicable to all the specifically listed
categories. 359 U.S., at 389. This Court unanimously reversed, concluding
that the “limiting clause is to be applied only to the last
antecedent.” Id., at 389, and n. 4 (citing 2 J. Sutherland,
Statutory Construction §4921 (3d ed. 1943)).

An example will illustrate the error of the Third Circuit's perception
that the specifically enumerated “previous work”
“must” be treated the same as the more general reference to
“any other kind of substantial gainful work.” 294 F. 3d, at
572. Consider, for example, the case of parents who, before leaving their
teenage son alone in the house for the weekend, warn him, “You will
be punished if you throw a party or engage in any other activity that
damages the house.” If the son nevertheless throws a party and is
caught, he should hardly be able to avoid punishment by arguing that the
house was not damaged. The parents proscribed (1) a party, and (2) any
other activity that damages the house. As far as appears from what they
said, their reasons for prohibiting the home-alone party may have had
nothing to do with damage to the house—for instance, the risk that
underage drinking or sexual activity would occur. And even if their only
concern was to prevent damage, it does not follow from the fact that the
same interest underlay both the specific and the general prohibition that
proof of impairment of that interest is required for both. The parents,
foreseeing that assessment of whether an activity had in fact
“damaged” the house could be disputed by their son, might have
wished to preclude all argument by specifying and categorically
prohibiting the one activity—hosting a party— that was most
likely to cause damage and most likely to occur.

The Third Circuit suggested that interpreting the statute as does the SSA
would lead to “absurd results.” Ibid. See also
Kolman v. Sullivan, 925 F. 2d 212, 213 (CA7 1991) (the fact that a
claimant could perform a past job that no longer exists would not be
“a rational ground for denying benefits”. The court could
conceive of “no plausible reason why Congress might have wanted to
deny benefits to an otherwise qualified person simply because that person,
although unable to perform any job that actually exists in the national
economy, could perform a previous job that no longer exists.” 294 F.
3d, at 572-573. But on the very next page the Third Circuit conceived of
just such a plausible reason, namely, that “in the vast
majority of cases, a claimant who is found to have the capacity to perform
her past work also will have the capacity to perform other types of
work.” Id., at 574, n. 5. The conclusion which follows is
that Congress could have determined that an analysis of a claimant's
physical and mental capacity to do his previous work would “in the
vast majority of cases” serve as an effective and efficient
administrative proxy for the claimant's ability to do some work
that does exist in the national economy. Such a proxy is useful because
the step-five inquiry into whether the claimant's cumulative impairments
preclude him from finding “other” work is very difficult,
requiring consideration of “each of th[e] [vocational] factors and .
. . an individual assessment of each claimant's abilities and
limitations,” Heckler v. Campbell, 461 U.S. 458, 460-461, n.
1 (1983) (citing 20 CFR
§§404.1545-
1404.1565 (1982)). There is
good reason to use a workable proxy that avoids the more expansive and
individualized step-five analysis. As we have observed, “[t]he
Social Security hearing system is 'probably the largest adjudicative
agency in the western world.'. . . The need for efficiency is
self-evident.“ 461 U.S., at 461, n. 2 (citation omitted).

The Third Circuit rejected this proxy rationale because it would produce
results that “may not always be true, and . . . may not be true in
this case.” 294 F. 3d, at 576. That logic would invalidate a vast
number of the procedures employed by the administrative state. To
generalize is to be imprecise. Virtually every legal (or other) rule has
imperfect applications in particular circumstances. Cf. Bowen v.
Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 157 (1987) (O.CONNOR, J., concurring)
(“To be sure the Secretary faces an administrative task of
staggering proportions in applying the disability benefits provisions of
the Social Security Act. Perfection in processing millions of such claims
annually is impossible”). It is true that, under the SSA's
interpretation, a worker with severely limited capacity who has managed to
find easy work in a declining industry could be penalized for his troubles
if the job later disappears. It is also true, however, that under the
Third Circuit's interpretation, impaired workers in declining or marginal
industries who cannot do “other” work could simply refuse to
return to their jobs—even though the jobs remain open and
available—and nonetheless draw disability benefits. The proper
Chevron inquiry is not whether the agency construction can give
rise to undesirable results in some instances (as here both
constructions can), but rather whether, in light of the alternatives, the
agency construction is reasonable. In the present case, the SSA's
authoritative interpretation certainly satisfies that test.

We have considered respondent's other arguments and find them to be
without merit.

* * * *

We need not decide today whether §423(d)(2)(A) compels the
interpretation given it by the SSA. It suffices to conclude, as we do,
that §423(d)(2)(A) does not unambiguously require a different
interpretation, and that the SSA's regulation is an entirely reasonable
interpretation of the text. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is
reversed.

It is so ordered.

Justice Scalia delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.

[1] The four-step instructions
to the claimant read as follows: “If we cannot make a decision based
on your current work activity or on medical facts alone, and you have a
severe impairment(s), we then review your residual functional capacity and
the physical and mental demands of the work you have done in the past. If
you can still do this kind of work, we will find that you are not
disabled.” 20 CFR
§§404.1520(e),
416.920(e)(2003).

[2] In regulations that became
effective on September 25, 2003, the SSA amended certain aspects of the
five-step process in ways not material to this opinion. The provisions
referred to as subsections (e) and (f) in this opinion are now subsections
(f) and (g).

[3] This interpretation was
embodied in the regulations that first established the five-step process
in 1978, see 43 FR 55349 (codified, as amended, at
20 CFR §§404.1520
and 416.920 (1982)). Even
before enactment of §423(d)(2)(A) in 1967, the SSA disallowed
disability benefits when the inability to work was caused by
“technological changes in the industry in which [the claimant] has
worked.” 20 CFR
§404.1502(b) (1961).

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