Declassified CIA Documents—Studies in Intelligence

For the benefit of researchers, Lawfare has reviewed and digested documents released in September of 2014 by the Central Intelligence Agency. The bulk of the materials hail from the CIA’s in-house intelligence journal, Studies in Intelligence.

Intelligence Agency Leadership and Governance

Brennan discusses the aims and goals of the Terrorist Threat Integration Center, explaining that he thinks that terrorism analysis is “a distinct discipline in the intelligence arena”, but that TTIC also has to work closely with intelligence officers across its partner agencies. But, Brennan points out, there is often a lack of “orchestration” between agencies, causing competition and redundancies between agencies that should really be working together.

Keith Hall, at the time of interview the Director of the National Reconnaissance Office, describes the evolution of his career in Washington and the Intelligence Community. Hall also outlines his three goals that he had in mind when he started in his role as NRO Director: getting the “financial house in order”, improving the NRO’s “bedside manner”, and preparing the NRO for a “post-Cold War world.”

A transcript of speeches given by Tenet, then-Director of Central Intelligence, and Calder, then-Deputy Director for Administration, at a 2000 event honoring the CIA's Office of Communications. In their speeches, Tenet and Calder pay tribute to the Office of Communication’s achievements since its creation in 1947.

Pavitt noted a concern that he didn’t feel as though the agency had particularly good retention rates for its case and operations officer, and part of the reason for that is poor compensation and difficulties getting promoted from within the agency.

Text of document nearly entirely redacted. Tenet uses famous phrase “we steal secrets” multiple times in describing the agency’s work: “I cannot explain what we do here other than to say we steal secrets for a living and we take those secrets and put them into all-source products that make a difference to somebody.”

Likely written shortly after the start of the Iraq war, a history of the at-times uneasy relationship between the CIA and NSA, and the factors giving rise to the increasingly active collaboration between the two agencies. Also, a bullet-point list of the challenges still ahead for continued partnership between the two agencies.

Hayden discusses his transition in becoming NSA Director, and how he approached the role differently to his predecessors. Hayden touches on the evolving and amorphous threats that target the United States, very different to threats that used to be clear and almost always less technologically advanced. Explains that the NSA handles technology very differently to other agencies: “NIMA, DIA, and DoD generally use technology to cut the corners on the common problems of less money and demands that are far less focused than they used to be. That is not true for the NSA, and it was makes us unique. Technology is part of our problem set. It can be part of our solution set.”

Former Inspector-General of the CIA John H. Waller discusses his early years with the CIA, which included being part of the team that opened a CIA station in Iran in 1947. Discussion mainly surrounds the USSR’s contacts in the Middle East and how the CIA tried to mitigate the USSR’s power in places like Iran and Azerbaijan.

Nolte explains his path to and through the NSA, up to his current position as Deputy Director. He spends time discussing his areas of “greatest concern” for the Intelligence Community, including the increasing complexity of intelligence systems and the volume of information being created by modern technology.

An interview with the Former Deputy Director of the CIA, also Former Director of the NSA. Studeman urges for greater inter-agency cooperation and communication in the interview. He speaks of the challenges facing the Intelligence Community in a post-Cold War world.

Profiles the life and career of Colonel Lawrence K. White, who rose to became CIA’s Deputy Director for Administration and Executive Director. The piece marst the first in a series profiling a number of CIA “greats.”

Evaluates measures of “strategic balance” popular in DOD and CIA analyses of the time. The author argues that the measures are inaccurate and detrimental to the success of deterrence. It notes that residual military capability is an inadequate measure of strategic assessment.

Long before he was Secretary of Defense, or Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, Robert Gates was briefly the director of the Strategic Evaluation Center, Office of Strategic Research at the CIA (he held that position from 1979-1981). He wrote this article, concerning how the White House uses and regards intelligence, during that time. Gates explains that that bulk of the President’s intelligence briefing is done by someone outside of the Intelligence Community, presented in his Daily Brief. Gates outlines why Presidents are often skeptical of intelligence analysis: first, because when the unpredictable happens, the “Chief Executive will not unnaturally wonder why his billions for intelligence do not spare him surprise”; second because intelligence analysis can often be contradictory and a president does “not like internal controversy”; third because “Presidents do not welcome new intelligence assessments undercutting policies based on earlier assessments”; and, finally, because “successive Administrations have generally regarded with skeptical the growing direct relationship between Congress and CIA above and beyond the actual oversight process.” Ultimately, Gates describes the Intelligence Community as somewhat “isolated” and the Executive Branch as naturally “suspicious” of the IC, and discusses ways to overcome the icy relationship.

A play-by-play of the national media firestorm that grew out of a 1996 article in the San Jose Mercury-News alleging that the CIA was behind a massive operation to sell cocaine in Los Angeles and use the profits to fund the Contra rebels in Nicaragua, and a description of the CIA’s public relations response.

An unpublished excerpt from a book by the the former Director of Intelligence (and later Secretary of Defense). Gates chiefly argues that, contrary to "conventional wisdom," President Carter's defense policy in the late 1970s was far from weak or characterized by “antidefense.”

A detailed, hour-by-hour recollection by President George W. Bush's briefer (and, later, the CIA's Deputy Director), of his work on the day and days following the infamous terrorist attacks. Among many other things, Morell recounts his conversation with President Bush, when the latter initially inquired who might be responsible for the attacks.

This article lays out the rivalry between General MacArthur and the OSS during the South Pacific campaign. General MacArthur felt that the OSS civilians were encroaching on the military sphere, and that their methods were ineffective. Despite repeated attempts from the beginning of the war on, MacArthur rejected offers of OSS support. A key sticking point, it seems, was General MacArthur’s requirement that any OSS personnel in his theater be subject to his command—a situation the nascent OSS could not tolerate.

An introduction to the interview outlines McMahon’s colorful career with the CIA, and his rise to Deputy Director of Central Intelligence. McMahon touches on multiple issues in the interview, including how he chose to restructure the Director of Intelligence’s office to a region-based format. He also speaks to the evolving relationship between the CIA and Congress.

A history of the unique intelligence challenges that arose during the Korean War and the key intelligence operations the CIA mounted in response. Caught off-guard by the initial North Korean invasion of South Korea that triggered the war, the United States Army at first "hastily improvised" a small clandestine human intelligence (HUMINT) operation; by the end of the war, the ad hoc program had grown into a "large Army-controlled clandestine collection apparatus."

A Lieutenant addresses how law enforcement can better deal with a "longstanding problem" in maritime counternarcotics operations: drug trafficking vessels that stash drugs in sophisticated hidden compartments, which often go undiscovered even after thorough searching of the vessel. Typical, the Lieutenant suggests, is the case of the Nataly I in 1995. There, the Coast Guard investigating a compact 112-foot fishing vessel almost did not find the 12 tons of cocaine stowed away within the vessel’s fuel tanks.

Discusses the history and importance of “covers” for intelligence operatives. Recounts historical instances of cover from the fall of Jericho to the Trojan War to Nathan Hale to Mata Hari. Substantial redactions as article approaches present day.

Critiques a paper by Charles Cogan summarizing the Directorate of Operation’s culture. The author of this article believes that Cogan’s piece focused too heavily on operations officers. The author uses his/her 30-year career in the DO as a basis to qualify and critique Cogan’s description.

This article profiles the life and work of Sharon Scranage, a CIA intelligence officer based in Ghana. Much of the story is redacted, but it takes note of her Ghanaian lover and mentions that Ghanaians played a significant role in her downfall.

The author presents the CIA station in Saigon in the early 1960s as an exemplar for timely and comprehensive synthesis of rapidly changing events. Based on the author’s own experiences while stationed in Saigon, he attributes the station’s success to the number of assets the office cultivated, the use of vehicle-mounted radios to report events to the station as they occurred, and the efficient, non-hierarchical system for processing intel. The author further recounts both the small role that the CIA sometimes played in these coups and their simultaneous desire not to play such roles.

Kirby writes a book review of Jean-Denis Bredin’s “The Affair,” which is an account of French intelligence and security tradecraft (or techniques) around the beginning of the 20th century. The book profiles the case of Alfred Dreyfus, a French officer accused of spying on Germany’s behalf.

This article provides the archival history of the documents produced by the original OSS. The documents moved around from agency to agency before finally being transferred to the National Archives, largely for public consumption.

Details Adlai Stevenson’s role, in his capacity as U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, during and after the failed Bay of Pigs invasion. According to the story, Stevenson was never supportive of the military plan, and resented having – perhaps unknowingly – lied to the U.N. after an emergency session was called after the D-2 airstrike in Cuba on April 15 1961. What Stevenson did or didn’t know prior to the invasion is very much up for debate.

This article first rejects the hypothesis that intelligence agents—because their work involves deceit—are particularly vulnerable to ethical lapses. It notes, however, that trust is important both in the work of an agent and because legitimacy is so important to the way of American government. A wise intelligence agency, therefore, will ensure its agents behave ethically at every turn.

A former CIA operative recollects in broad strokes the various intelligence assignments he worked in Miami and Havana from the 1950s through the 1970s—from stashing and caching radios throughout Cuba to broadcasting pirate radio to the island from offshore.

Snapshots from former British intelligence officers’ memoirs on their post-WWI assignments in the newly independent Baltic states, at the time regarded by Western countries as "ideal bases from which to mount clandestine intelligence operations against Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union.” By the account of one former intelligence officer, British efforts during this period were rather “lackadaisical.”

An ex-cryptologist, Johnson reflects on the moral dilemmas he encountered working in human intelligence (HUMINT), and how those experiences compared to the “cleanness” of working cryptology assignments in signals intelligence (SIGINT).

An intelligence officer-cum-historian writes of the little known tale of espionage that surrounded the American delegation at the 1814 Ghent negotiations that brought an end to the War of 1812. To prevent the British from intercepting and reading their letters, the American commissioners encrypted their messages with sophisticated codes, which the British almost certainly attempted to obtain. However, there is no affirmative evidence that the British succeeded.

This article reviews the life and forty year career of David Henry Blee. Blee spent long career working for American intelligence, receiving two intelligence medals for his exceptional work. Many of the details of his major intelligence-related work is redacted.

Reviews the CIA’s role in planning the assassinations of Guatemalan officials working as part of the Jacobo Arbenz Guzman regime. The article examines CIA proposals that were not reported in a 1967 CIA Inspector General report on assassination plotting and left out of the 1976 Church Committee investigation of CIA assassination plots. The documents were revealed because of a FOIA request.

Assembles an oral history, based on interviews with agency officers, of the CIA’s contributions to the investigation and trial of the two Libyans accused of organizing the explosion of Pan American flight 103 in December 1988.

Urges closer integration between counterintelligence and counterterrorist activities. Because terrorists operate clandestinely, like spies, similar tactics are required. In the terrorist context, the intelligence community must be vigilant not only to threats such as the erroneous recruitment of John Walker Lindh-types into the CIA, but also must be wary of low-level employees who do not have access to classified information but can still wreak havoc. Sharing of counterintelligence with counterterrorists (i.e., law enforcement), however, raises the risk of leaks which could hurt relationships with foreign intelligence services.

A CIA engineer who worked on the “Azorian” project—a massive ship designed for the sole purpose of recovering a sunken Soviet submarine—relates the challenges of the massive engineering effort that proceeded under intense time constraints. Design and construction proceeded simultaneously in order to meet the strict schedule. Because of the secretive nature of the work, the engineers were unable to test the equipment prior to use. The article includes several photographs from construction during the project.

This article recounts the CIA efforts to influence the 1964 Chilean election. The CIA offered support for the Christian Democratic candidate, Eduardo Frei. Because of the sensitive nature of the work, the effort was closely coordinated between the CIA and the State Department, and included input from White House staff. In addition to providing funds to Frei’s campaign, the CIA worked to keep the third party candidate in the race to dilute support for the “communist” candidate. In addition to monetary support, the CIA directed intelligence resources to help shape the campaign strategy. The author concludes that the CIA effort was essential to garnering an absolute majority for Frei, but its estimation of the exact number of votes the CIA contributed is redacted.

Law and Oversight

Excerpts from multiple interviews with Warner, the CIA’s Deputy General Counsel from 1946 (the year of the Agency’s inception) to 1973 and General Counsel from 1973 to 1976. Topics discussed include the involvement of a former CIA operative in the Watergate burglary, as well as the controversial 1950s CIA program that studied the use of LSD for mind control.

An anecdote from a former chief of the Indo-China Branch in the CIA’s Directorates of Intelligence and Operations about various incidents in which Congress acquired intelligence. Specifically, the former chief tells of then-Secretary of State Henry Kissinger’s outrage in 1974 over the Congressional use of an executive branch finished intelligence report to attack the President’s important foreign policy initiative of providing economic support for the Cambodian government against Khmer Rouge.

Highlights some of the problems faced by the CIA’s AZORIAN program, which sought to retrieve the wreckage of the Soviet Golf-II submarine. The basic legal issue arose from the lack of clear cut rules with respect to the International Law of the Sea, leaving the CIA with little guidance as to how it might recover a sunken foreign war ship.

(Naftali delivered these remarks at a memorial service held for Pforzheimer.) The remarks take note of a variety of Pforzheimer’s interests and career highlights, including his work as the CIA’s first legislative counsel.

Analysis

A brief history of the United States’s ballistic missile defense programs, followed by an assessment of the intelligence community’s missile defense efforts at the time. In particular, the author urges the intelligence community to adopt or increase the usage of "red team" approaches—"employing . . . scientists and engineers to play the role of the enemy countermeasures designers, charging them to come up with various means they believe would defeat the U.S. system.”

Critiques the Directorate of Intelligence’s internal review process as too slow to provide timely information: “consumers would be willing to bear the burden of split infinitives and the occasional misplaced comma if the information could be made more timely.” Suggests that the improvements under DCI Bob Gates’ stewardship are being undone, and recommends setting clear deadlines for reviews of each intelligence memorandum and limiting reviewers to one edit.

This article tackles issues of what happens when the Intelligence Community ‘gets it wrong’ or doesn’t see something coming. The author addresses multiple “barriers to good intelligence analysis”, including coordination between intelligence operatives and the Intelligence Community’s relationship with policy makers.

This article assessing the growing post-Cold War threat of foreign intelligence operations targeted against American economic interests. The article points out that the “threat has become more extensive in recent years [because] the number of foreign intelligence services capable of conducting sophisticated operations has increased.” The article outlines different levels and categories of economic threats, and offers suggestions for dealing with the problem.

This document highlights several books about the Ministry for State Security (also known as the “Stasi”), East Germany’s state security organization. These books are said to be critical to understanding the Stasi because of the limited access to Stasi intelligence and security files.

This article asserts that the intelligence community forewarned of the growing tension between China and Vietnam in the late 1970s, but that its warning were ignored due to the political environment. After the Vietnam war, intelligence resources were diverted from southeast Asia and political attention shifted to building a cooperative relationship with China. As a result, there were fewer reports related to the region, and those that predicted the imminent hostilities went unheeded by successive administrations focus elsewhere.

The author, who joined the CIA’s Geography Division in 1951, briefly recounts the history of maps and their importance in modern intelligence products. The author recounts in great narrative detail instances where maps played important roles, from the U.S. Civil War to peace negotiations in the Middle East. The author laments the overreliance of analysts on imagery instead of maps—which often present far more important data in a visually compelling way.

The author critiques the current system of evaluation for intelligence memoranda. The author contends that “[t]he subjective nature of the product . . . make[s] productivity improvements difficult. The author then proposes a set of objective evaluation criteria within five quality categories: research, analysis, exposition, policy relevance, coordination with other analysts. A focus on these categories will ensure uniformly high quality intelligence products.

Offers 14 recommendations on how to minimize the odds of surprise attacks. The recommendations are designed to help commanders and civilian decision-makers better predict hostilities before they transpire. The report was inspired by hostilities in the Middle East that occurred in October 1973.

Betts argues that the belief that all intelligence failures can be avoided through perfecting the intelligence model is an “illusory” one. Betts walks his readers through every step of the intelligence model – from gathering information, to interpreting it, to understanding what to do with it – explaining that, along the way, there will inevitably be failures.

A CIA analyst who spent two years as the Special Adviser to the Ambassador-at-Large for the New Independent States at the State Department reflects upon the role of those at the CIA charged with serving as intelligence liaisons with the State Department. Several recommendations for the CIA result: for instance, increasing the number of such liaisons between the CIA and State Department, and serving as a more streamlined source of hard facts.

An interagency publication issued by the Director of the CIA that summarizes all “impending political developments abroad that may have serious implications for US interests.” This particular document actually serves as a review of previously published memoranda, commenting on their efficacy.

This article mainly considers the relationship between policy makers and the Intelligence Community, particularly in regards to arms control negotiations. The Director of Central Intelligence is responsible for explaining to Congress the realistic abilities of the United States’ monitoring certain provisions, and this information often helps to shape arms treaties.

This article highlights how thinkers of all kinds struggling to find ways to explain world politics in light of the end of the Cold War could benefit from the use of biographics. The report says that biographical analysis of African leaders is particularly important given institutional development and events in those countries are often the result of individual personalities.

This is the final installment of case studies designed to illuminate issues related to policymakers’ use of intelligence. This installment focuses on the period from 1989-1991, the Bush-Gorbachev years.

This case study reviews the CIA’s analysis of the Soviet Union under Gorbachev (1985 to 1991). The case study is in part inspired by the criticism the CIA was subject to following the collapse of the USSR, which the agency did not predict would happen because of overestimates of Soviet strength.

Discusses the impact on intelligence gathering of then-recent Soviet economic policy shifts characterized by “coexistence.” Notes that increasing Soviet aid to developing countries should not be “taken as a direct measure of Soviet political influence there.” Soviet strategy may shift as they realize they are not achieving desired results—therefore “the most important task is to determine the Soviet government’s own assessment of its progress by its chosen means.”

Noting the post-Cold War angst within the Directorate of Intelligence, the author proposes a new mission statement centered on three key standards: provision of support to policy makers, promotion of the national interest, and ensuring adequate funding. Analysts, the author argues, must be cognizant of their customers’ needs without falling prey to politicization of analysis: “any mission statement that seals off intelligence analysis from politics seals it off from a significant (that is, fundable) role in the policymaking process.” The author argues that analysts should focus on indentifying facts and patterns in those facts, and leave the judgment to the policymakers: “what these hands-on policy officials want most from intelligence professionals is solid information and sound argumentation for reaching their own bottom-line conclusions.”

Science and Technology

Edited transcript of a roundtable with various NIMA officials on the founding of NIMA. Conversation ranges from the impetus (changing technology after Desert Storm) to the bureaucratic hurdles (the secretary of defense did not want to create a new three-star position). DNI James Clapper participated in his role as an editor.

A two-pager from some time around the turn of the millennium calling attention to the escalating security threats posed by “offensive information warfare.” The article refers specifically to a 1998 incident in which a series of Indian underground nuclear tests went undetected by United States intelligence personnel in charge of analyzing satellite imagery.

A discussion of how the international community may respond to the increasing availability of high-resolution commercial satellite imagery, especially when the satellite imagery may conflict with determinations made by the United States intelligence community. For instance, commercial satellite imagery called into question United States intelligence's assessment of how an accident at a Libyan chemical weapons facility played out.

Suggests different ways in which the CIA might improve its internal processes by collecting and studying information on how the organization functions. The document suggests that “corporate intelligence” as adopted in the private sector could improve CIA procedures.

This article catalogs the wildly differing bomb-damage assessments offered respectively by CIA imagery analysts and CENTCOM pilot reports. The CENTCOM reports based on A-10 and F-111 pilots visual reports estimated far higher damage to enemy mechanized forces than the CIA analysts using high-resolution satellite imagery. Although these differing reports did not affect the outcome of the war, the tension between the national intelligence agencies and the DoD persisted in post-mortems well after the war. The Office of Military Affairs should help improve relations between the CIA and the DoD.

A sketch of the Signals Intelligence’s (SIGINT) efforts to intercept and crack enemy communications during the Korean War. Johnson reveals that while SIGINT caught forewarning of some attacks early on during the war, the enemy’s suspected switch to communicating through very high frequency range transmissions as the war progressed came to frustrate SIGINT efforts.

David speaks about her department’s shift from focusing on issues of space to addressing the “technological revolution” much closer to our everyday lives. She specifically addresses the changes in modes of communication, and the need for the agency to change its approach in collecting that kind of information.

Wheelen worked at the CIA for four years, but his work was deemed “so important” that he was named a “Trailblazer during CIA’s 50th Anniversary” celebration. Wheelen’s biggest achievement while at the Agency was designing three new satellite systems that “formed the backbone of the Agency’s overhead program for the next several decades.” Wheelen touches on his role during the Cuban Missile Crisis, and how he was one of the first people at the Agency who that had correctly predicted the situation.