NEW! By Barry Rubin

“There have been many hundreds of books for and against Israel but no volume presenting the essential information about its domestic politics, its society, as well as its cultural life and its economy. This gap has now been filled.”—Walter Laqueur, author of A History of Zionism

"[An] essential resource for readers interested in learning the truth about the Zionist project in the 20th and 21st centuries."—Sol Stern, Commentary

“Offering in-depth perspectives with encyclopedic breadth on the makeup of the Jewish state, focusing only briefly on Israel's struggle for self-preservation. The section "History" provides a masterful summary of Israel's past from its socialist beginnings before independence to the modern struggles with the Iranian regime. . . .”—Publishers Weekly

“A well-written portrait of a vibrant nation at the center of turmoil in the region.”—Jay Freeman, Booklist

"It is indeed just a starting point, but Israel: An Introduction, if disseminated among our universities to the extent it deserves, will at least allow students of the Middle East and of Jewish history to start off on the right foot. A glimpse into the real Israel may do more for the future of U.S.-Israeli relations than any amount of rhetoric ever could."—Daniel Perez, Jewish Voice New York

Written by a leading historian of the Middle East, Israel is organized around six major themes: land and people, history, society, politics, economics, and culture. The only available volume to offer such a complete account, this book is written for general readers and students who may have little background knowledge of this nation or its rich culture.

About Me

Barry Rubin was founder of the Global Research in International Affairs (GLORIA) Center--now the Rubin Center--and editor of the Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA) Journal. See the GLORIA/MERIA site at www.rubincenter.org.

Israelis are known for being gloomy about the political situation. In fact, they generally enjoy criticizing things (themselves above all). As a result, Israel's enemies often make the mistake of underestimating the country's ability to endure, struggle, and prevail.

A typical example came in a recent Arab newspaper article that claims the serious fire in northern Israel was a sign of the country's collapse. Not so fast!

So when very positive economic figures are released for 2010, Haaretz, the left-wing newspaper, has to put its own spin on them.

Actually, the numbers are really impressive: Israel's economy did better than predicted. It grew by about 4.5 percent in 2010 compared to only 2.7 percent for all of the other OECD (the club of developed) nations. While living standards went down in most of the West, in Israel they rose by 2.7 percent.

Pretty good, right?

So naturally, at the bottom of this article, Haaretz had to have the following:

"More on this topic: Researchers: Israel's economy is headed for disaster."

Why? Because of some rather questionable projections that the Arab and Haredi ("ultra-Orthodox") population will continue to grow until they compose three-quarters of the country's population.

Now, the quiz for the day: Which story received major coverage in the New York Times? Israel is doing very well economically (based on facts) or the prediction of doom (based on, well, not based on facts)? No prizes for this one. Too predictable! LOL

Barry Rubin is director of the Global Research in International Affairs (GLORIA) Center and editor of the Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA) Journal. His latest books are The Israel-Arab Reader (seventh edition), The Long War for Freedom: The Arab Struggle for Democracy in the Middle East (Wiley), and The Truth About Syria (Palgrave-Macmillan). The website of the GLORIA Center is at http://www.gloria-center.org and of his blog, Rubin Reports, http://www.rubinreports.blogspot.com.

The heroic Patrick Poole sums up what happened in the United States regarding the battle of Islamism against American institutions and the support of many American institutions for radical Islamism.

When the attorney-general of an American state argues that people don't have freedom of speech to criticize Islam (Maine); the sheriff of one of America's largest cities angrily defends his having spoken at CAIR fundraisers (Los Angeles); and a pro-al-Qaida cleric opens a session of the U.S. Congress with a prayer; a Hamas supporter gets an insider tour of the FBI; the head of NASA is told by the president that his main priority is to make Muslims feel they are great in science and math; a domestic terrorist group receives $500,000 in U.S. taxpayer funds; and the U.S. ambassador to the UK visits and praises a mosque which has cheered the number-one organizer of anti-American terrorist attacks today, you might be in a bit of trouble, right?

Thursday, December 30, 2010

Since I have written about how easily fooled Western politicians, officials, journalists, and academics are by Middle Eastern radicals, I'm going to try to provide examples in a regular feature called Dopes of the Day. This is a good starting point. (Be sure to read this article to the end to find out about both Dopes of the Day.)

There is a newspaper in Lebanon called al-Akhbar. Curiously, while other newspapers are in decline or starved for funds, al-Akhbar is expanding. The New York Times reporter fell for the foolish notion that this newspaper is some model of independence and enterprise. In fact, it is not exactly a secret in Lebanon that it is a hard-line, Syrian backed newspaper that repeatedly slanders the moderate forces there as well as delivers propaganda for Hizballah. And that's where the money comes from.

So the Times is cheering a Syrian propaganda operation just as, not long ago, the Guardian went into rhapsodies about a supposedly wonderful publication in Turkey that is a front for the Islamists and producing false material that enabled the regime there to throw innocent people into prison on trumped-up charges of conspiring to overthrow the government.

Any serious investigation should have shown the true nature of al-Akhbar but the reporter couldn't even find anyone to quote on this point, apparently not even trying to produce a balanced article, much less an accurate one.

Instead here's what we get:

"It was the latest coup for a five-year-old paper that has become the most dynamic and daring in Lebanon, and perhaps anywhere in the Arab world. In a region where the news media are still full of obsequious propaganda, Al Akhbar is now required reading, even for those who abhor its politics."

But perhaps this free advertising for a Hizballah and Syrian parrot can be explained by the article's lead:

"Ibrahim al-Amine, the hawk-eyed editorial chairman of Al Akhbar, describes his newspaper’s founding ambitions this way: `We wanted the U.S. ambassador to wake up in the morning, read it and get upset.'”

Right, so it's anti-American isn't that recommendation enough? But I don't think Amine would want the Syrian or Iranian ambassador to get upset. If they did they might cut off his funding and cut off other parts as well.

It is like the old Cold War joke about the American insisting that the United States had freedom of speech and the Soviet didn't. "After all, I can go in front of the White House and shout, `Down with Reagan!"

"Oh", replies the Communist, "We have just as much freedom of speech! I can go in front of the Kremlin and shout, `Down with Reagan!' any time I want."

Speaking of free advertising, al-Akhbar needs ads because it seems to prosper even while not running any! How about the Jammal Trust Bank, an institution that launders money for Hizballah, which also funds a tv station that supports Hizballah and is directed by one of al-Akhbar's editors (Jean Aziz), as well as helping to pay the newspaper's bills. The Times reporter didn't notice those details. One can compile a long and publicly known set of links connecting al-Akhbar with Hizballah and Syria, as well as writers who tend to follow the lines set forth by them.

To present such an enterprise as wonderful is shameful, especially since several honest journalists in Lebanon have been murdered or had to flee for their lives, while better newspapers are collapsing for want of financing. Yet it's the totalitarians that get the kudos from the New York Times. Oh, and Politico's Laura Rozen had to chime in about this truly wonderful newspaper which is an example to all Arab media!

I guess the proposed example is: support revolutionary Islamist terrorist groups, get backing from Syria, and only criticize America and those moderates opposed to Iran and Islamism. If there's a Pulitzer Prize for terrorism then al-Akhbar might be in the running for it.

Meanwhile, it seems increasingly likely that an international investigation will show that Hizballah, al-Akhbar's favorite organization, was involved in the murder of the opposition leader and former prime minister Rafik Hariri. Guess that will be one story al-Akhbar won't cover.

Speaking of Syria, while the Saudis are so worried about the United States being too soft on Syria and Iran that they are trying to cut their own deal surrendering Lebanon to the Syrians, what does President Barack Obama do? Why, of course, he is in such a hurry to name a U.S. ambassador to Syria that he bypasses Congress and does a recess appointment! Even though he has gotten nothing from Syria after two years of engagement.

What this technique does, of course, is shield the Syrian dictatorship from any criticism by Congress since if there had been confirmation hearings for the proposed ambassador there would have been a lot of questions about Syria's backing of terrorism, especially against American troops in Iraq. If this administration had more sense it could have used the harder line from Congress as a rationale to get tougher on Syria. But instead of a "good cop/bad cop" approach we get a Keystone cop approach. (Note below)

But there is also a truly remarkable and highly revealing quote from an administration official on this matter:

“We have implemented our commitments, and we expect Syria to [do the same]. The ball is now in the Syrians’ court.”

That statement will stand as the perfect memorial for this administration's foreign policy (including on the "peace process"): We've done everything for you, now it is time for you to do something for us. No, you don't give all the concessions first and then hope that your enemy will do something. That's a dopey thing to do. You use leverage and threats and credibility and sometimes even force. You take advantage to some extent of your being stronger. You make the other side give something, too.

The administration has argued that sending a U.S. ambassador to Syria is not a gift to that dictatorship (which is helping to murder Americans in Iraq, sponsoring Hamas and Hizballah, and helping Iran in every possible way) but a necessity to have a channel through which the United States can communicate with Damascus. But since this U.S. government only wants to communicate flattery and concessions it is hardly worthwhile.

Indeed, have no doubt that everyone in the Arabic-speaking world will interpret this as a Syrian victory. Here is Michael Young's explanation on this point. Equally, al-Nahar insisted that the Syrians must have done something big to earn Obama giving them such a big concession. That's why this action is also worthy of a Dopes of the Day award.

Oh, tremble all of you who depend on the United States as an ally and protector in these days! And tremble, too, if thou doth depend on the New York Times for your understanding of the world!

Note: good cop/bad cop refers to a police interrogation technique in which one policeman would be nasty and tough while the other would act as the suspect's friend to get him to confess or give information. The intimidation made possible the success of a softer approach. The Keystone Cops was a comedy group in the early days of movies who did slapstick comedies making fools of themselves. This name has become something of a slang phrase for people who are total incompetents.

Barry Rubin is director of the Global Research in International Affairs (GLORIA) Center and editor of the Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA) Journal. His latest books are The Israel-Arab Reader (seventh edition), The Long War for Freedom: The Arab Struggle for Democracy in the Middle East (Wiley), and The Truth About Syria (Palgrave-Macmillan). The website of the GLORIA Center is at http://www.gloria-center.org and of his blog, Rubin Reports, http://www.rubinreports.blogspot.com.

The Egyptian government so arranged the parliamentary elections that the share of seats held by the opposition declined from 20 percent for Muslim Brotherhood supporters alone to only 3 percent for all of the half-dozen opposition parties put together. In other words, the regime didn't just steal the election--which it does regularly--it over-stole the balloting. One can sympathize with the idea of the current government of President Husni Mubarak not wanting to let the revolutionary Islamists take power, and one can understand how the regime wants a nice stable situation for the succession next year presumably to Husni's son Gamal.

But they overdid it.

What is worrisome here is that by showing the Muslim Brotherhood that even if it bows its head to repression (with 1,000 members arrested in the days leading up to the election) it won't even get the tiniest crumbs from the government. And that seems to mean--judging from Supreme Guide Muhammad Badi's hardline statements even earlier (see here and here)--that the group may step up efforts to overthrow the regime. There's no question of violence in the near-term, but what about four or six or eight years down the road, especially if Gamal falters as president or the ruling elite splits in factional disputes.

Meanwhile, despite the fact that we've been told by some that the Brotherhoods are really moderate and deserve to be engaged in dialogue, the Jordanian branch has now called on Arab governments to send their armies to Afghanistan in a Jihad to kill Americans and other NATO forces there . When one actually looks at the materials in Arabic of the Egyptian or Jordanian Brotherhoods or their sister organization Hamas, one finds an extremist rhetoric not that much different from al-Qaida's ideology, though not that group's tactics...yet.

And speaking of false moderates, check out the latest issue of the Palestinian Authority's newspaper, Al-Hayat al-Jadida, which tells readers that Israel is "a country whose aim is destruction and ruin of humanity...which disseminates destruction, ruin and weapons in the world...which acts to kill nations, to threaten them and to occupy their land...[and] which acts to disseminate the culture of hatred and racism among human beings."

The fact that this is in an article about sports symbolizes the unending and comprehensive "culture of hatred" disseminated by the PA among its own people, thus making real peace somewhere between incredibly unlikely and impossible.

Here's something worth checking out if you have any interest in Muslim communities in Europe, a serious effort to provide figures for the size of the population in different countries done by Pew.

To use the example of the UK, the Pew study estimates Muslims there at 2.9 million (4.6 percent of the population) while the previous British government estimate was 1.6 million in the 2001 census. This constitutes a 74 percent increase in nine years. The largest communities are in Germany (4.1 million) and France (almost 3.6 million). By percentages, the largest proportion of Muslims are in Belgium, France, Austria and Switzerland (almost 6 percent). The Netherlands, Sweden, and Germany are about 5 percent. And of course these numbers are rising rapidly.

Meanwhile, 200 Jewish families have left Belgium, with increasing emigration also from Holland, and presumably other countries. The situation is also deteriorating in the Netherlands where a sympathetic leading politician has said that recognizable Jews will probably not be able to remain in the country. One factor there is very hostile media coverage of Israel, including the echoing of demonizing stories and Hamas' propaganda. Here's Melanie Phillips on the situation in the UK regarding Islamism and these issues.

Finally, few have noticed that in September 2008 the Iranian parliament passed a law making conversion away from Islam punishable by death for men and life imprisonment for women. For information on repression of Christians in Iran, see the following sites:

Barry Rubin is director of the Global Research in International Affairs (GLORIA) Center and editor of the Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA) Journal. His latest books are The Israel-Arab Reader (seventh edition), The Long War for Freedom: The Arab Struggle for Democracy in the Middle East (Wiley), and The Truth About Syria (Palgrave-Macmillan). The website of the GLORIA Center is at http://www.gloria-center.org and of his blog, Rubin Reports, http://www.rubinreports.blogspot.com.

Some of my readers are always bothered when I say that mistakes in Western Middle East policy are caused by stupidity and ignorance—abetted by ideology—and want to argue that the shortcomings are due to deliberate sabotage or evil intentions (often against Israel).

I can certainly understand why people think such things. But almost forty years of studying the Middle East and Western policy toward it have shown me hundreds of times that foolishness, misunderstanding, wishful thinking, and naivete are powerful forces in international affairs. As the great statesman Charles Maurice de Talleyrand put it almost two centuries ago, “This is worse than a crime, it’s a blunder.”

Remember that we are dealing here with people (policymakers, journalists, academics) trying to function across cultural, experiential, historical, linguistic, and usually religious lines. And what is their biggest handicap at present? Why, the very denial that such lines exist! Once you accept the assumption that everyone is basically alike in their thoughts, dreams, goals, and world view, you have no hope whatsoever of understanding anyone who has a different standpoint.

True, sometimes these decisionmakers and opinionmakers (especially the academics and European journalists) have taken up partisan positions. Yet this is far less true for politicians and policymakers who must keep in mind both their own personal and their country’s national interests. We tend to focus on extreme exceptions—who certainly exist—but they are a minority.

Ideology, of course, is also a powerful deceiver. It sets up preconceptions that often dominate even when the facts go against them. Central here is the sad reality that we are living at a time when ideology rather than pragmatism dominates the Western intellectual and political debate to a greater extent than has happened within living memory.

The academic world has broken down to an astonishing extent in terms of its ability to tell truth from falsehood. The mass media has followed this pattern, albeit to a lesser extent and with more exceptions. Thus, the Western world has been deprived of its two greatest sources for “reality checks.” That’s devastating.

“Since the masses are always eager to believe something,” said Talleyrand, “for their benefit nothing is so easy to arrange as facts.”

But what’s even worse is the domination of governments by forces that cannot even acknowledge that the great struggle of the time is between revolutionary Islamism and other radical forces--as in not only North Korea, Venezuela, etc., but in the West as well!—and traditional liberal, Enlightenment, democratic, freedom of speech, Western civilization, and family values.

In Talleyrand's words, “To succeed in the world, it is much more necessary to possess the penetration to discern who is a fool, than to discover who is a clever man.”

Of course, a number of Western governments do things that favor the wrong side in terms of domestic policies. It is easier to believe that on domestic affairs there is a hidden agenda, that is an ideologically dicated series of goals concealed because the public would reject them if it understood what was really going on.

Yet when it comes to foreign policy, especially in the Middle East, many Western leaders think they are buying peace and stability when they are actually undermining it precisely because they don’t understand their enemies. Often, they no longer seem to understand the foundations of statecraft either. Perhaps this is symbolized by people being able to obtain a degree in “conflict resolution” but not learning about the uses of force, deterrence, and credibility.

Having said all this, though, I want to stress an often-ignored factor in such matters: the power of alternative explanations. These explanations may transgress logic and reality but that doesn’t mean people don’t believe them, especially when they match up with their prejudices.

Let me give two examples. Consider the Tea Party movement. Whatever one thinks of it, how can anybody not understand that it is motivated by a very simple platform: less government, lower taxes, less regulation? Their argument is that this would preserve freedom and allow the economy to grow much faster and more certainly.

Again, one could debate these ideas. But that’s the point: the avoidance of a debate by the movement’s enemies. Instead, the bulk of the establishment, mass media, and academia says it is mystified: what can these people possibly want? They must be just a group of racists and extremists. This alternative explanation probably satisfies at least 40 percent of the American public, maybe more, as being true.

International affairs, of course, are far more arcane. But consider this little case study. The Obama Administration has messed up on Israel-Palestinian issues for two years, a story I can tell—and have in previous articles—in great detail. Recently, it proposed a three-month freeze of construction on West Bank settlements. If it had gotten precisely what it wanted this would have led to no gain at all for anyone.

The Administration reportedly promised Israel a great deal if it agreed to the proposal. The Israeli government responded cooperatively. Yet what was the U.S. government offering? Apparently, the Administration was so incompetent as to contradict itself to the point where Israel couldn’t figure out the supposed deal. Then the Palestinian Authority demanded more, and even if it was given concessions wanted to sabotage talks.

In short, the Obama Administration became increasingly entangled in seeking a goal that wasn’t worthwhile, offering more and more but in a confused, contradictory manner, and having to deal with a Palestinian leadership that refused to cooperate and an Israeli government coalition that conceivably might splinter over the issue.

So the Administration abandoned the whole mess. Yet to read the explanations available to average Americans or even opinionmakers one would never know any of this clearly. The alternative explanations, mostly just blame Israel, for Washington’s failure.

Indeed, after two years in which Israel has offered to negotiate with the Palestinians every day and the Palestinians have refused to negotiate with Israel almost every day, the ruling establishment, mass media, and academia generally persist in saying that the deadlock is Israel’s fault.

Now, if people are unable to understand the simplest points—due to preconceived ideology, failure to look at the facts, or inability to understand them—we are not dealing with a conspiracy but with what might be called intellectually structured blindness.

What is the way out?

First, keep explaining the truth since there’s a large portion of people open-minded enough to be persuaded if they only are allowed to see the ridiculous flaws in what they’ve been told. In other words, use the free marketplace of ideas to the greatest extent possible.

Second, let events (and the behavior of their enemies) teach people that their ideas, policies, and programs just don’t work; make them look like idiots; and lead to a loss of prestige and power. That has been clearly happening to an extent.

Third, develop and put into place a counter-elite that has a far better level of understanding about how the world works.

Having seen so many different and changing eras already, I’m confident that this combination will work. Hopefully, it will work faster so that fewer people will die and suffer, while the damage done already will be easier to reverse.

Or, to quote Talleyrand once again, “The art of statesmanship is to foresee the inevitable and to expedite its occurrence.”

Barry Rubin is director of the Global Research in International Affairs (GLORIA) Center and editor of the Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA) Journal. His latest books are The Israel-Arab Reader (seventh edition), The Long War for Freedom: The Arab Struggle for Democracy in the Middle East (Wiley), and The Truth About Syria (Palgrave-Macmillan). The website of the GLORIA Center is at http://www.gloria-center.org and of his blog, Rubin Reports, http://www.rubinreports.blogspot.com.

Thursday, December 23, 2010

If I had to pick one sentence to show what's profoundly wrong with Middle East coverage in the Western mass media, this is the one I'd choose. It's in a New York Times article entitled, "Israel: Tensions Rise Along Gaza Border" by Isabel Kershner. I'll put the sentence in bold:

"A rocket fired from Gaza fell close to a kindergarten in an Israeli village on Tuesday morning. Earlier, the Israeli Air Force struck several targets in Gaza in retaliation for a recent increase in rocket and mortar shell fire. Small groups appear to be behind the fire, but Israel says it holds Hamas, the Islamist organization that governs Gaza,responsible."

[PS: The next day the Times did it again:"In recent weeks, however, smaller militant groups in Gaza have stepped up rocket and mortar fire against Israel...Holding Hamas responsible for all fire emanating out of Gaza, Israel carried out airstrikes against Hamas targets in Gaza...."]

Why does this bother me so much? Because it seems to symbolize how the West--oh so well-educated, sophisticated people--fall for every trick, no matter how simple, of the terrorists and totalitarians of the world and do their propaganda work for them.

Hamas rules the Gaza Strip as a dictatorship. What it wants to happen happens; what it doesn't want to happen doesn't happen, or if it does someone is going to pay severely for it. There are smaller groups allied to Hamas, notably Islamic Jihad. Nothing could be more obvious than the fact that Hamas uses these groups so it can attack Israel and then deny responsibility for doing so.

But let's assume that Islamic Jihad--which Hamas allows to operate freely in Gaza as its junior partner or some smaller groups or some Hamas people hiding behind some other name--fires rockets or mortars at Israel. Presumably, if Hamas didn't like what they were doing, because they were provoking Israeli retaliation, it would arrest and perhaps torture those responsible. But when it does nothing month after month despite repeated attacks this is a signal that Hamas approves of the attacks.

That New York Times sentence could be used to argue that if Israel hits Hamas facilities in self-defense it is in fact lashing out against an innocent bystander. And every time some devious Hamas leader remarks about the group's willingness to make peace in the ear of some useful idiot politician or reporter, it produces free publicity about Hamas's alleged moderation. This, in turn, sets off other useful idiots to start chattering about how good an idea it would be to engage Hamas in negotiations, maybe even to make some concessions or give some rewards to prove Western credibility.

The radicals and terrorists never seem to have to prove their credibility.

You can substitute for Hamas such words as Iran, Hizballah, the Muslim Brotherhood, Syria, the Taliban, or other such forces.

A couple of years ago I was a consultant on a court case where someone denied that they worked for Fatah. On this basis, the person was admitted to Canada and has been supported by that country for two decades. It took me five minutes on the Internet to find documentary proof that the individual had lied, which had no effect on their status by the way.

More recently, I was an expert witness in the case of a person injured in a terrorist attack who sued the PA, Fatah, and the PLO. Their defense was that the group carrying out the attack, the al-Aqsa Brigades, had nothing to do with Fatah. If you go to the al-Aqsa Brigades website, however, it openly advertises that it is part of Fatah and there is much other evidence of these connections from previous statements by Palestinian leaders. For all practical purposes, though, the defense won the case.

I could cite hundreds of such examples of how Western governments, journalists, academics, courts, and at times public opinion have been fooled by having radicals and terrorists make fools of them.

Yet the truth is hardly well-hidden. In the case of Hamas, it has revealed its new strategy. Mahmoud Zahar, the group’s key leader in the Gaza Strip, which it rules, explains that Hamas's medium-term goal is consolidating its hold on the area, thanks largely to help from the United States and Europe.

"We are not in a hurry to buy or to sell our national interest because this is not the proper market." The group has a long-range strategy, rejecting both negotiations (selling) and all-out war (buying). The medium-term effort is to win broad support among Gazans by improving their lives (with aid money), then using this mass base to go to war with Israel in the future (thus making their lives much worse).

This is the counter to the U.S. argument that raising living standards and improving conditions in the Gaza Strip will inevitably make people more moderate and lead to Hamas’s downfall.

Personally, I’m putting my money on Hamas, not the Obama Administration, proving to be correct.

Zahar said Hamas is not planning to launch new attacks on Israel. Why should they? It is enough to let Islamic Jihad and other small groups allied to Hamas to fire mortars and rockets at Israel while trying to send small squads across the border to do terrorist attacks. If Israel tries to retaliate too much, Hamas will run crying to the Western media and governments to protect it.

Thanks to Western aid and to the lowered sanctions—despite the fact that it is officially listed as a terrorist group in the United States and Europe--Hamas can stay in power and build a strong support base by delivering the goods.

Zahar boasts:

"They told me...`You cannot stay isolated and you are not going to survive more than two months. Now we finished five years and we survived, and we stayed, and we faced two wars," Zahar said. "So we can stay, and we can withstand, and we can win."

Of course, Hamas would not have survived if Israel was enabled to overthrow it during the December 2008-January 2009 war or perhaps if sanctions had remained tight. Hamas succeeded not because of its own ability—its military performance in the war was abysmal—but because the West saved it.

And why is Zahar saying the following: "Time is not important if you are not wasting this time," he said, adding Israel was losing international support as the Palestinians gained legitimacy.

In other words, Western demonization and delegitimization of Israel is directly encouraging terrorist groups to be less moderate and to fight.

What is more, Western aid, pressure to reduce sanctions, and pressure to limit retaliation against Gaza is helping Hamas to build a genocidal-oriented, terrorist, repressive Islamist dictatorship on the shore of the Mediterranean, backed by Iran and determined to spread regional instability and anti-Western revolutions.

Does this make sense?

Finally, it is interesting how Zahar contrasts PA with Hamas strategy. Although he likes to complain that the PA is wasting time in negotiations with Israel, Zahar does understand that the PA's real strategy is bypassing Israel and negotiations. The PA, Zahar explains, "says we are going to make the infrastructure for a state and then the international community will give us a state as a gift."

Hamas’ view is, "We are not beggars here....We are the owners of this land."

So neither side wants to make peace with Israel: the PA wants unilateral independence without conditions or concessions; Hamas seeks ultimate military victory. Western policy encourages both of them not to become more moderate and not to make peace. Even worse, Western misunderstandings and misreportings help make the world a worse and more dangerous place to live.

By the way, if you are interested here's an essay by George Orwell, written in 1946, about how people are fooled by nonsense.

Some of the more interesting Wikileaks concern the U.S. diplomatic perspective on the succession in Egypt from President Husni Mubarak to his son, Gamal. Let’s remember that Egypt is the single most important country in the Arabic-speaking world. Dramatic instability there would be disastrous for U.S. interests. And it might happen.

Even compared to Jordan and Saudi Arabia, Egypt has been remarkably passive in the region’s international affairs over the last two decades. It has not acted as one might have expected, by taking the lead in organizing the Arab nationalist opposition to Iran and revolutionary Islamism.

But Mubarak has certainly been aware of the threat. While Jordan’s King Abdallah compared Iran to an “octopus” reaching out its tentacles to seize control of the region, Mubarak called it a “cancer.” A U.S. State Department cable of April 28, 2009, reports:

“President Mubarak has made it clear that he sees Iran as Egypt's—and the region's — primary strategic threat. His already dangerous neighborhood, he has stressed, has only become more so since the fall of [Iraqi dictator] Saddam [Hussein], who, as nasty as he was, nevertheless stood as a wall against Iran, according to Mubarak. He now sees Tehran's hand moving with ease throughout the region, 'from the Gulf to Morocco,' as he told a recent congressional delegation."

Yet Mubarak also stresses the immediate danger is not so much Iran getting nuclear weapons as it is Tehran’s subverting almost everyone else in the Middle East:

"While he will readily admit that the Iranian nuclear program is a strategic and existential threat to Egypt and the region, he sees that threat as relatively 'long term.' What has seized his immediate attention are Iran's non-nuclear destabilizing actions such as support for Hamas, media attacks, weapons and illicit funds smuggling, all of which add up in his mind to 'Iranian influence spreading like a cancer from the GCC [Gulf Cooperation Council countries] to Morocco.'"

But President Barack Obama also frightens Mubarak:

“[The Egyptians] are worried that [the United States is] going to strike a 'grand deal' with the Iranians....The prevailing [Egyptian government] view remains a principled rejection of any diplomatic rapprochement."

Sounds like Mubarak’s been writing Rubin Reports! Or to put it another way, Mubarak (and the Saudis, Jordanians, and others) are more worried about Tehran than is the United States. Well, they should be! After all, not only are they closer to Iran but they are also dependent on U.S. protection. Nowadays, that's enough to scare anybody.

But the 82-year-old Mubarak won’t be around too much longer. The assumption is he will give the presidency to his 46-year-old son, Gamal Mubarak. Yet even now Gamal remains only the head of the ruling party’s policy committee and is its assistant chairman. He has not been given any high-ranking governmental responsibility.

In 2011 there will be a presidential election. Will Husni run for reelection again or will he give the spot to his son and retire? If Husni, obviously reluctant to yield power, doesn’t make that transition the country will possibly face instability.

Ambassador Francis J. Ricciardone wrote in a May 14, 2007 memo:

"[Gamal’s] power base is his father, and so while he could conceivably be installed prior to Mubarak's death, the task would become far more difficult ...once the pharaoh [Husni] has departed the scene.”

Opposing Gamal, say American diplomats, are Defense Minister Mohammed Hussein Tantawi and intelligence chief Omar Suleiman. I can attest from personal experience that Suleiman loathes Gamal. To give you a sense of how deep this runs, one of Suleiman’s agents always refers to Gamal as “the boy.” The State Department also worries that mid-level officers might some day try to stage a coup.

The most worrisome line in the cables—and remember this for future reference—is the warning that Gamal will be "politically weaker" than his father and thus eager to sound anti-American to build popular support. I was a bit surprised at this point since Gamal is very Westernized and attuned to business. But perhaps this assessment makes sense.

With both Egypt and Jordan run by “princes” who are very lightweight (King Abdallah of Jordan is no King Hussein and one seasoned Western observer recently described him as more British than Arab), the leadership forces on the Arab anti-Iran, anti-Islamist side will be pretty weak.

[By the way, if you are keeping track, only 270 shopping days until Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's birthday. I understand that his friends and colleagues are taking up a collection to get him a nice nearby country or two as a present.]

Barry Rubin is director of the Global Research in International Affairs (GLORIA) Center and editor of the Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA) Journal. His latest books are The Israel-Arab Reader (seventh edition), The Long War for Freedom: The Arab Struggle for Democracy in the Middle East (Wiley), and The Truth About Syria (Palgrave-Macmillan). The website of the GLORIA Center is at http://www.gloria-center.org and of his blog, Rubin Reports, http://www.rubinreports.blogspot.com.

What is the highest priority for Iranian foreign policy--I mean the official and public foreign policy, not spreading revolution and terrorism--today? According to the new foreign minister it's developing strong relations with Turkey and Saudi Arabia.

Ali Akbar Salehi, who by the way holds a degree from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), explained this in his first speech as foreign minister. His last job was running Iran's nuclear program. "Saudi Arabia deserves to have special political ties with Iran. Iran and Saudi Arabia," says Salehi, "as two effective countries in the Islamic world, can resolve many problems together."

The means of persuasion are indicated by Salehi's former job. Perhaps he can tell a few anecdotes about the nuclear program [warning: satire]: "When I was busy getting our nuclear weapons ready--I told you we will have nuclear weapons soon, right?"

He will tell the Saudis that the United States cannot and will not protect them so they better accept the new era of a nuclear Iran and play ball with Tehran. Remember, as we know from Wikileaks, what Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad told India's leaders when he visited that country: Iran is getting stronger; America, under Obama, is getting weaker.

The Saudis, who aren't stupid, won't really submit to Iran but they will hedge their bets. After all, the United States isn't keeping Iran from getting nuclear weapons and isn't countering the spread of Iranian influence in the region.

One can imagine the dialogue taking place in Saudi palaces [warning: more satire]:

Prince A: "That President Obama is a really nice guy! He likes us. He sort of bowed to our king. He says nice things about Islam. He just appointed a Muslim to head NASA."

Prince B: "Yes, and that President Ahmadinejad is not a nice guy. He won't hesitate to trample on us if we cross him. He will send terrorists to assassinate us and to blow up oilfields. Soon he will have nuclear arms and nobody will stand up to him. The Americans can't stop him from getting these weapons. They are afraid to attack him, as we asked them to do. They keep apologizing about past uses of force. They are pulling out of Iraq. They didn't help us save Lebanon from Iran and Syria. They let the Shah fall, ran from Somalia, left Vietnam. Shall I go on?"

Note: If you are wondering and want to get in good with Iranian leaders with a nice greeting card, reemember that Ahmadinejad's birthday is October 28. Supreme Guide Ali Khamanei's is July 17.

Barry Rubin is director of the Global Research in International Affairs (GLORIA) Center and editor of the Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA) Journal. His latest books are The Israel-Arab Reader (seventh edition), The Long War for Freedom: The Arab Struggle for Democracy in the Middle East (Wiley), and The Truth About Syria (Palgrave-Macmillan). The website of the GLORIA Center is at http://www.gloria-center.org and of his blog, Rubin Reports, http://www.rubinreports.blogspot.com.

The U.S. weakness in countering Iran and other radical forces in the Middle East is beginning to bear poisoned fruits. Jordan is already moving toward getting on Iran’s good side; Lebanon has been captured by the Iran-Syria camp; Turkey has moved into its orbit, becoming an ally of Iran and Syria, while the Obama Administration merely makes counterproductive speeches emphasizing how important the relationship is with that country despite differences (that is, the Turkish regime sabotaging U.S. interests repeatedly).

Now Qatar--which hedges its bets between cooperating with the United States on basing rights, sponsors the radical anti-American al-Jazira network, and works with Iran on regional issues—has also moved closer to Tehran. Qatar participated in joint war games with Iran and has now invited Iranian Revolutionary Guards troops for a visit including five warships to inspect Qatar’s defenses. Deputy head of the Revolutionary Guards' navy, Alireza Tangsiri, said, "Such programs will definitely pave the way for mutual cooperation."

You bet.

Meanwhile, in the Gaza Strip all the influx of Western aid and the reduction of sanctions hasn’t helped matters one bit when it comes to the terrorism of its Hamas rulers. On the contrary, 14 rockets were fired at Israel on December 19 and 20 (one narrowly missing a kindergarten class), by far the highest number since the war caused by massive Hamas attacks a year ago.

But guess what? Aid groups are now campaigning for reducing sanctions even more! And after the restrictions have been narrowed to cover only military-related material, Reuters describes this as a "blockade."

Could it be that Western support for Hamas, or at least for stabilizing its rule in the Gaza Strip, is making Hamas bolder?

Might it be that Western criticism of Israel for its military campaign two years ago--without seriously condemning Hamas's aggression and use of civilians as human shields--has convinced Hamas that it can attack Israel regularly but Israel will hesitate to retaliate lest it incur international condemnation again?

Is it possible that Hamas is confident that if Israel does attack it can use this as leverage to gain even more Western concessions and apparent sympathy by cynically sacrificing its own people? [Sarcasm alert] No doubt, when there are no sanctions at all, Hamas will become moderate.

In fact, Israel has already learned the lesson that the more land it withdrew from and the more concessions offered, the more militant, confident, and intransigent the other side became. That's why nowadays those demanding even more concessions--if there is some real cost or risk involved--are going to be ignored if at all possible.

Can there be any correlation between Western eagerness to engage Syria while ignoring its continued aggression in Iraq and Lebanon with that dictatorship's growing boldness and arrogance? (Indeed, at this very moment, Lebanese moderates are complaining that France is making a deal with Hizballah to sell out the investigation of Syrian (and possibly Hizballah) involvement in assassinations and terrorism against Lebanese moderates.)

And might it further be credible that by making the Palestinian Authority feel that it can get international recognition by refusing to negotiate with Israel or compromise is sabotaging the peace process that Western governments so passionately advocate?

"Palestinian Authority leader Mahmoud Abbas]...has sought to negotiate a peace agreement with Israel rather than wage war against it to liberate Palestinian land from 43 years of occupation. As such, he has been central to U.S. efforts to move the foundering peace process forward....His popularity, such as it was, has ebbed, particularly among Arafat's Old Guard, as the prospect of a Palestinian state faded in the face of Israel's intransigence."

Yes, we live in a bizarre world in which Israel has offered to negotiate for two solid years and froze construction for ten months at U.S. request while the Palestinian Authority has refused to negotiate and yet it is Israel that is allegedly showing "intransigence." And in which explanations of the conflict always mention Palestinian demands but never the fact that Israel wants to be secure from 62 years of war waged against it to wipe it off the map.

All of these points are obvious; none of these points seem to shape Western policy or mass media coverage. Probably a year or two from now when the relationship of appeasing or ignoring radical forces is apparent these links will be discovered with astonishment by those who should be coping with them now.

Barry Rubin is director of the Global Research in International Affairs (GLORIA) Center and editor of the Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA) Journal. His latest books are The Israel-Arab Reader (seventh edition), The Long War for Freedom: The Arab Struggle for Democracy in the Middle East (Wiley), and The Truth About Syria (Palgrave-Macmillan). The website of the GLORIA Center is at http://www.gloria-center.org and of his blog, Rubin Reports, http://www.rubinreports.blogspot.com.

Monday, December 20, 2010

This article was published on PajamasMedia. I have included the full text here with a lot of improvements only in this version for your convenience. (Because of these improvements I'd prefer it if you link, reprint, or send to people this version.)

There’s a lot of interesting material in the Pew Foundation's latest poll of the Middle East, a survey that focuses on attitudes toward Islamism and revolutionary Islamist groups. The analysis that accompanies the poll, however, is not very good, so here is mine.

For example, in evaluating attitudes toward Hamas and Hizballah, Pew says that they receive “mixed ratings from Muslim publics [while] opinions of al-Qaida and its leader, Usama bin Ladin, are consistently negative….” The implication is that the poll shows that people in these countries are not radical. Actually, the poll shows the precise opposite.

To begin with, let's look at Jordan. There, 55 percent say they like Hizballah (against 43 percent negative) while 60 percent are favorable (compared to 34 percent negative) toward Hamas. Yet this is even more impressive than the figures indicate. Jordan is a staunchly Sunni country whose government opposes the ambitions of Iran and Syria, indeed it often identifies the threat as coming from Shia Muslims. Hizballah is a Shia group which also is an agent of Iran and Syria. For a majority to praise that organization—conscious of strong government disapproval—is phenomenal.

The figures for Hamas can be more easily explained by the Palestinian connection. Yet the difference between support for Hamas and for Hizballah in terms of public opinion isn’t that great. And liking Hamas also suggests that Jordan's people--of whom a majority are Palestinian--prefer Hamas over Fatah and the Palestinian Authority—Hamas's rival.

Why do people support Hamas and Hizballah? Obviously, one reason is that they fight Israel (a country with which Jordan is at peace, by the way) but sympathy for the revolutionary Islamist aspect of Hamas and Hizballah must be a huge factor here. Indeed, there is not necessarily any conflict between these two aspects. The Islamists are considered to be better fighters than the nationalists, while making war for the next generation is more attractive to those backing Hamas and Hizballah than is making peace (a strategy associated with the Palestinian Authority and Fatah). Finally, let’s not forget that both of these groups are very anti-Western and anti-American.

But now let’s look at al-Qaida. In Jordan, 34 percent are favorable toward that terrorist group while 62 percent are negative. That outcome, however, contrary to Pew’s spin on the numbers, is not at all encouraging. Remember that al-Qaida carried out the September 11 attacks. Moreover, it has conducted terrorist attacks in neighboring Iraq and, most important of all, it has murdered people within Jordan itself. The fact that one-third of Jordanians—whose country is generally considered the most pro-Western in the Arab world--like al-Qaida is chilling indeed. Then, too, this preference cannot be attributed to anti-Israel sentiment since the vast majority of al-Qaida's operations are intended to overthrow Arab, Muslim governments.

So one-third of Jordan’s people favor the most extremist terrorist group—despite the fact that it has murdered Jordanians and is hated by their government—and roughly half or more like revolutionary Islamist organization that are clients of their own country’s nominally biggest threats. What does that say about the hopes for moderation and stability?

Turning to Egypt, “only” 30 percent like Hizballah (66 percent don’t like) 49 percent are favorable toward Hamas (48 percent are negative); and 20 percent smile (72 percent frown) at al-Qaida. This is more encouraging than the figures in Jordan. But remember that not only is Egypt solidly Sunni but the powerful Muslim Brotherhood, the leaders of Islamism in Egypt, don’t like Hizballah because it is a Shia group. The Egyptian government has accused Hizballah of trying to foment terrorism in Egypt. The Egyptian government also views Hamas as a threat.

Roughly speaking, one-fifth of Egyptians applaud the most extreme Islamist terrorist group, while around one-third back revolutionary Islamists abroad. This doesn’t tell us what proportion of Egyptians want an Islamist government at home, but it is an indicator.

And just remember that in two countries considered U.S. allies and receiving U.S. aid, one-third and one-fifth of the population, respectively, support the group that killed 3000 Americans on September 11. The Obama Administration's response is that this is the reason it has to follow certain policies: to win over those who are most antagonistic and to keep others from becoming more radical. The problem is that these policies don't achieve those goals. What determines these views are structural and communal issues within each country.

Here's an example of that point. In Lebanon, attitudes divide along sectarian lines. While 94 percent of Shia Muslims support Hizballah (only 5 percent are negative), 84 percent of Sunnis are unfavorable on Hizballah (only 12 percent are positive) toward it. Christians are 87 percent negative on Hizballah (and only 10 percent positive). This shows why Hizballah cannot just take over Lebanon itself, but of course Lebanon is largely being taken over by Iranian-Syrian power plus their local collaborators, of which Hizballah is only one of the elements.

What are the Lebanese figures on al-Qaida? Only three percent positive and 94 percent negative! Why? Because the Christians and Sunnis don’t want that kind of regime, while the Shias, who tend to support Hizballah’s Islamism, knows that al-Qaida hates Shias. So Arabs and Muslims are quite capable of opposing terrorists if they think the terrorists are against their own interests. They support terrorists who they think are doing things they like. This shows the limit of Western ability to change these attitudes.

Finally, here’s a word on Turkey where public opinion is the opposite of that prevailing in Jordan. In Turkey, Only 5 percent like Hizballah (74 percent negative), just 9 percent like Hamas (67 percent unfavorable), and merely 4 percent are positive (74 percent are hostile) on al-Qaida. Yet the current Turkish Islamist regime is a big supporter of Hamas and Hizballah. Clearly, supporting revolutionary Islamist groups—either through Islamism or the fact they are fighting Israel—is simply not popular in Turkey. Hamas and Hizballah don’t even do much better than al-Qaida.

So, Turkey's people are far more moderate than its government, while in Egypt and Jordan the people are more radical than theirs.

Let’s look at two other indicators of attitudes: Islamism versus “modernizers” and attitudes toward Islamic punishments. The first point of interest in terms of the great ideological battle is that large proportions of people in these countries deny that such a struggle even exists! Only 20 percent in Jordan, 31 percent in Egypt, 53 percent in Lebanon, and 52 percent in Turkey acknowledge that there is a struggle.

Why is this? One can’t definitively tell. I suspect that they may want to avoid taking sides since they live in countries where democracy doesn’t really prevail and authorities punish dissenters. Or perhaps they think that the Islamists are more capable of conducting modernization or that the current regime is sufficiently Islamic.

Nevertheless, those who said that such a struggle does exist (remember this is between only 20 percent in Jordan to 53 percent in Lebanon of those asked) took the following sides:

Other than the truly horrifying figures in Egypt—which one day might be cited to explain an Islamist revolution there—the numbers in Jordan are pretty scary as well. Almost 40 percent favor an Islamist regime and they know that doesn’t mean the current monarchy ruling Jordan.

How to explain the other two countries? In Lebanon, Hizballah is seen as a champion of the Shia community. It is supported for “ethnic” reasons more than because people want an Islamic Republic. Of course, Sunnis have to take into account that if Lebanon were to become an Islamic Republic it would be a Shia one. Lebanese like to think of themselves as modern, too.

As for Turkey, while the ruling AKP government has a hard core of supporters at roughly 30 percent, even most of these people don’t want an Islamist state, just a more Islamic-oriented one. That's why the AKP can only go so far in its Islamization or risk having the people turn against the regime.

Finally there is the attitude toward Islamic punishments. Again, the outcome in Egypt and Jordan is very revealing. In Egypt, 82 percent want stoning for those who commit adultery; 77 percent would like to see whippings and hands cut off for robbery; and 84 percent favor the death penalty for any Muslim who changes his religion.

I would expect that these attitudes don’t differ much from public opinion in Saudi Arabia or Afghanistan.

Yet Turkey and Lebanon are ruled by regimes which are in the Islamist camp, that is, they view themselves as close to the Iran-Syria-Hamas-Hizballah alliance.

It is also important to keep in mind that this poll demonstrates that Muslims are not innately radical or pro-terrorist. Their attitudes, while certainly conditioned by Islam, depends on the same kind of historical, social, and political factors that determine attitudes in other countries. The problem is the specific interpretation of Islam in a given place and time.

But what this analysis also shows is that a future Islamist revolution in Egypt and Jordan is quite possible. So overwhelming is the support for this movement that there is nothing the West can do except ensure the current governments remain in power. As for Lebanon, there is a strong basis for resisting incorporation into the Iran-Syria empire, and in Turkey—where there are free elections—the current regime might well be overthrown.

Remember that Egypt, Jordan, and other Arab governments—notably Saudi Arabia—are so opposed to Iran not only because they hate that country’s non-Arab, Shia, radical Islamist standpoint, but also since they fear its growing power will set off revolutions within their own countries.

The bottom line is that in all four of these countries the radical Islamist, side is winning either in terms of public opinion or actual control. And the West is basically asleep in recognizing that threat.

Barry Rubin is director of the Global Research in International Affairs (GLORIA) Center and editor of the Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA) Journal. His latest books are The Israel-Arab Reader (seventh edition), The Long War for Freedom: The Arab Struggle for Democracy in the Middle East (Wiley), and The Truth About Syria (Palgrave-Macmillan). The website of the GLORIA Center is at http://www.gloria-center.org and of his blog, Rubin Reports, http://www.rubinreports.blogspot.com.

The French news agency AFP is reporting that France is giving the Lebanese army 100 anti-tank HOT missiles in February to be used by the military’s Gazelle helicopters. There are no conditions attached to their use.

Israel is concerned about the deal. In November, the U.S. government lifted a freeze on $100 million in aid to Lebanon when that government—which is basically though not completely controlled by Iran, Syria, and Hizballah—promised that it would not give arms to Hizballah and would try to keep that group from controlling the border and attacking Israel.

Of course, the Lebanese government and army will do nothing of the kind, both because much of it sides with Hizballah and the rest is afraid of Hizballah. Hizballah has accumulated an arsenal estimated at about 40,000 rockets with no interference at all by the Lebanese government, Western countries, or the UNIFIL force that was set up in 2006 to…stop the import of such weapons.

Now let’s see, what country has tanks and might use them against somebody in Lebanon during a future war? Turkey? No. Iran? No. Syria? No. Jordan? No. Al-Qaida? No. See if you can guess.

Of course, the positive side here is that Hizballah doesn’t want the French anti-tank missiles because it has better Soviet-made ones supplied by Syria and paid for by Iran. Moreover, the Gazelle helicopters wouldn’t be effective against Israel since they would easily and quickly be shot down.

This is what comes, however, of pretending that Lebanon is still an independent country rather than one that has largely been taken over by Iran, Syria, and Hizballah. That used to be true but since the United States and France didn’t help Lebanon back then, the country is now close to being a possession of the Iran-Syria bloc.

Unless Western countries face the reality of the situation in the Middle East they will continue to do things that are (or should be), in strategic terms, certifiably insane.

Barry Rubin is director of the Global Research in International Affairs (GLORIA) Center and editor of the Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA) Journal. His latest books are The Israel-Arab Reader (seventh edition), The Long War for Freedom: The Arab Struggle for Democracy in the Middle East (Wiley), and The Truth About Syria (Palgrave-Macmillan). The website of the GLORIA Center is at http://www.gloria-center.org and of his blog, Rubin Reports, http://www.rubinreports.blogspot.com.

After meeting U.S. Special Envoy to the Middle East George Mitchell, EU Foreign Policy chief Catherine Ashton (whose last great idea was Western unilateral disarmament during the Cold War) said: "We believe that urgent progress is needed towards a two-state solution... that ends the occupation that began in 1967.”

Why? Of course, it would make sense to move ahead if it was clear that both sides wanted a deal and an agreement could easily be achieved. But in fact the Palestinian Authority (PA) doesn't even want to negotiate.

"There will not be any negotiations with Israel, in any form--direct, indirect or parallel--without an end to settlement," said Azzam al-Ahmad, a senior member of the Fatah Central Committee, the PA's ruling party. But in fact Israel froze construction for ten months and the PA didn't show any eagerness to negotiate then either.

Maybe the PA doesn't feel "urgent progress is needed" unless it gets everything it wants in return for nothing in exchange. Maybe it believes that its best strategy is NOT to negotiate and wait for the West--which believes that "urgent progress is needed"--to recognize a Palestinian state without needing to negotiate with Israel at all. Maybe this is precisely what the West is leading the PA to believe by statements like the one made by Ashton.

Of course, if the PA were to get Palestine without negotiating a deal with Israel (and not even controlling the Gaza Strip for that matter), what incentive would it have to agree to end the conflict forever, provide Israel with security guarantees, and drop its demand that millions of Palestinians must be allowed to flood into Israel and turn it into...part of a Palestinian Arab state?

None whatsoever.

And why does Ashton refer exclusively to something "that ends the occupation that began in 1967.” How about the attempt to destroy Israel that began in 1948, an even longer time ago? It is precisely because people like Ashton leave out this factor that they don't understand and cannot deal with the issue.

The other missing factor here is the belief that any "solution" must be better than what exists now. What good is a "solution" that would lead to more violence, instability, and extremism in the region? What Ashton is saying is the equivalent of arguing for peace at any price, which almost inevitably doesn't remain peace for very long.

Peace at any price? Ah, that's what Ashton advocated during the Cold War when she followed the Soviet line.

Barry Rubin is director of the Global Research in International Affairs (GLORIA) Center and editor of the Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA) Journal. His latest books are The Israel-Arab Reader (seventh edition), The Long War for Freedom: The Arab Struggle for Democracy in the Middle East (Wiley), and The Truth About Syria (Palgrave-Macmillan). The website of the GLORIA Center is at http://www.gloria-center.org and of his blog, Rubin Reports, http://www.rubinreports.blogspot.com.

George Mitchell, the U.S. envoy to the Middle East, has given the first hint about the Obama Administration's future strategy. He said that he will now take six weeks to talk to Israel and the Palestinian Authority to find out what they want. One idea he will present is that the two sides carry out indirect talks through the United States--essentially what has been going on for the last two years with no progress.

Note the six weeks' timeline. Presumably, Mitchell will make a report around February 1 which will then be considered and debated in the Obama Administration. This would mean that the administration will take its time and come up with something new around April.

Of course, that's speculation but it seems about the best guess one can make at present. According to other statements, the U.S. government opposes a unilateral Palestinian declaration of independence and will try to discourage (how effectively remains to be seen) other countries from recognizing a Palestinian state. I also doubt, from what I'm finding, that this administration will try an imposed solution in 2011. But we shall see.

Barry Rubin is director of the Global Research in International Affairs (GLORIA) Center and editor of the Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA) Journal. His latest books are The Israel-Arab Reader (seventh edition), The Long War for Freedom: The Arab Struggle for Democracy in the Middle East (Wiley), and The Truth About Syria (Palgrave-Macmillan). The website of the GLORIA Center is at http://www.gloria-center.org and of his blog, Rubin Reports, http://www.rubinreports.blogspot.com.

I've been following you for quite some time now, and as a result read your quite frequent analysis of the West's misunderstanding of the Mideast. While it's very tempting as an explanation, as an economist I find it hard to accept. It requires to assume that everyone in the policy establishment of the West is naive. While a lot of them probably are, there must be some rational reason for why they are doing this. One such reason could be that people in general, including in Israel, find it very difficult to accept the notion that some problems don't have a solution. At least not in the short run. But I suspect there are other reasons, of a political nature. You'd probably be much better than I at spotting them.

Response:

Of course you are right. The Western mentality and the diplomatic process don't like to say that problems don't have a solution.

But I also make a distinction between understanding the issue and implementing a policy. In other words, the problem could be:

A. A government doesn't understand the situation.

B. A government does understand the situation but doesn't want to act (possibly for good reasons) or takes the wrong action in response.

Either one is possible. What is interesting about this administration is the frequency with which situation A occurs.

For example, the U.S. government could understand that Syria is an enemy of U.S. interests and will remain one but does not want to have a confrontation with Syria. However, the current administration persists in the belief that it can engage Syria and change its behavior. This, then, is a failure of understanding.

Similarly, it may just be dawning on the administration--though this is not clear yet--that it isn't going to solve the Israel-Palestinian conflict. If it understood this, the government could still pretend to be devoted to rapid progress but not take risks or spend political capital to do so. This has not happened yet though it might be in the process of happening.

I also believe that they don't understand that the central issue in the region is revolutionary Islamism versus nationalism or that the Turkish regime has changed sides (though diplomats have reported on that point).

In contrast, the administration did set out deliberately to withdraw troops from Iraq, seeks to withdraw troops from Afghanistan, and undertake a year-long process of engaging Iran (and failing) as a basis for increasing sanctions. These are examples, for better or worse, of situation B.

One way to tell whether naivete (or misunderstanding) is the issue is if a government ends up behaving in a way that makes it look stupid. Governments don't want to look stupid and don't do so deliberately. I won't go into detail about how the Obama Administration has looked stupid as I have covered this in previous articles so often.

So misunderstanding is an important factor.. This is due to cultural differences, to lack of experience (a president with zero actual experience in dealing with international affairs), and to ideological preconceptions (rather than a pragmatic approach, a problem particularly strong in this administration)--not just "naivete" or incompetence.

In some ways, the ideology of many in the administration pushes them in the precise opposite direction from what is required in the current Middle East situation. It abandons some of the most basic rules of international policy, such as maintaining a strong image, deterrence, credibility, the use of sticks as well as carrots, being willing and able to identify accurately friends and enemies, among them.

What else are relevant factors? Avoiding trouble, maintaining Obama's popularity abroad, focusing on domestic issues are often important. This administration noted how its predecessor became very unpopular through waging two wars. Consequently, a key part of the administration's strategy has been a "charm offensive" to persuade Arabs and Muslims that the United States is nice and likes them.

Thus, the Obama Administration's claim is that it can avoid problems, withdraw U.S. troops to end wars, and make America "popular" again. These things do make sense as a strategy for the administration's, but not necessarily for American, interests.

There are also additional countervailing factors. The question is whether the administration will heed them. That is a test of its ability, flexibility, and may determine its survival into a second term. (Though we all recognize that the economy and domestic issues are the main political determinant in elections.)

Some people believe that the Obama Administration is doing things on purpose because it wants America to be weak or to fail. I do not at all believe this. The essential point here, however, is that the dominant ideology among many leading officials (especially in the White House) leads to this result.

They expect to succeed brilliantly and it is easy to understand those aspects of American experience and contemporary ideology that leads to that miscalculation. Desiring to abandon the diplomatic practices of the past, thinking that America has used too much power (and has even been the world's leading villain), believing that enemies can be won over, and similar ideas simply lead to disaster.

The question is whether they are so blinded by ideology that they don't recognize why they are failing and do something different. If they don't do so, the American people will.

Of course, in every given short article one cannot develop the full sophistication of this multi-factored situation but hopefully the full picture does get drawn over time.

Barry Rubin is director of the Global Research in International Affairs (GLORIA) Center and editor of the Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA) Journal. His latest books are The Israel-Arab Reader (seventh edition), The Long War for Freedom: The Arab Struggle for Democracy in the Middle East (Wiley), and The Truth About Syria (Palgrave-Macmillan). The website of the GLORIA Center is at http://www.gloria-center.org and of his blog, Rubin Reports, http://www.rubinreports.blogspot.com/.

Note that something very important is happening here--unnoticed [surprise!] by the international mass media. Hamas is showing that it can rake in foreign aid money and rebuild, while simultaneously continuing to attack Israel. Of course, if Israel were to retaliate, Hamas would then run crying to the world about how it is the victim of aggression and how all of its beautiful humanitarian projects are being ruined.

Presumably, though, this also means that Hamas will keep the level of attacks low and carried out mostly by Hamas's friendly allies--notably Islamic Jihad--so Hamas can say that it isn't doing anything and "can't stop" others from attacking Israel.

This is, of course, a con-game but it is one that usually works.

Israel will respond with sporadic attacks on specific targets, avoiding a war unless the situation deteriorates sharply and attacks from Gaza vastly increase.

Regarding the north, Hizballah is busy consolidating control of Lebanon and is not seeking a war either. But it has also been playing the same game as Hamas. It brings in advanced weapons, bullies everyone else in Lebanon, supports Iran-Syria hegemony over the country, and rebuilds bases in the south.

The world, through the UN resolution ending the 2006 war, promised to stop these things and sent a large UNIFIL force to do so. But the UN, UNIFIL, EU, and US do nothing.

And then all these same people ask: I wonder why the Middle East is unstable? What could possibly be the cause of these problems?

Barry Rubin is director of the Global Research in International Affairs (GLORIA) Center and editor of the Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA) Journal. His latest books are The Israel-Arab Reader (seventh edition), The Long War for Freedom: The Arab Struggle for Democracy in the Middle East (Wiley), and The Truth About Syria (Palgrave-Macmillan). The website of the GLORIA Center is at http://www.gloria-center.org and of his blog, Rubin Reports, http://www.rubinreports.blogspot.com.

Here’s an old joke that applies to the contemporary Middle East. The Lone Ranger was a Western lawman who chased bad guys with his close friend, a Native American named Tonto. One day, they were surrounded by dozens of Native American warriors.

The Lone Ranger turned to Tonto and said, “Don’t worry, old friend! We can fight them off.”

Tonto replied, “What do you mean `we,’ Paleface?”

Or, in other words, if your friend decides he can’t rely on you to get him out of a jam he can always change sides.

Which brings us to Jordan. Let me begin by telling a story I’ve never recounted before. The year is 1990, after Iraq has invaded and seized Kuwait. I’m sitting in a meeting with some high-ranking Jordanian military officers and officials (don’t ask, it’s a long story).

Someone asks what they would do if Iraq’s army appeared on Jordan’s border and Saddam Hussein asked safe passage to attack Israel. Before responding, the highest-ranking Jordanian there leaned over to the man sitting next to him and whispered in Arabic, “Of course, we’d fight them!”

At the time, of course, the Jordanians knew they could depend on their superpower ally, indeed the only country of that type in the world, the United States.

In 2003, of course, Saddam was overthrown. From Jordan’s standpoint, though, he was replaced by Iran as a threat. And just as the Jordanians had wanted and needed American protection from Baghdad now it required that shield to save it from Iran. We already knew this, of course, but the Wikileaks have documented that fact.

Even in 2004, King Abdallah warned Americans about the Iranian threat. According to the State Department cable, Jordanian officials called Iran an “octopus” whose tentacles “reach out insidiously to manipulate, foment, and undermine the best-laid plans of the West and regional moderates.”

According to the Jordanian government, Iran’s “tentacles,” its allies in seizing control of the region and putting into power revolutionary Islamism, are Qatar, Syria, Hizballah, Hamas, and Shia Muslims in Iraq.

Now, however, the king is singing a different tune. In fact, he has just accepted an invitation from Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad to go to Tehran. It is “imperative,” says the king, “to undertake practical steps for improving Jordanian-Iranian relations.”

Why is it that suddenly the king finds this to be so imperative? Because Iran is getting stronger—and may soon have nuclear weapons—and he can’t depend on the United States to protect him. This is one more signal about how “regional moderates” feel about the current situation.

President Barack Obama thinks he’s being nice to “Arabs” and “Muslims.” In fact, he’s being mean to America’s friends. And they will do whatever is necessary to save themselves. If the United States cannot or will not protect them, they find it “imperative” to get in good with its enemies.

Barry Rubin is director of the Global Research in International Affairs (GLORIA) Center and editor of the Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA) Journal. His latest books are The Israel-Arab Reader (seventh edition), The Long War for Freedom: The Arab Struggle for Democracy in the Middle East (Wiley), and The Truth About Syria (Palgrave-Macmillan). The website of the GLORIA Center is at http://www.gloria-center.org and of his blog, Rubin Reports, http://www.rubinreports.blogspot.com.

The following was published in Hadassah Magazine in an attempt to write a very brief article that included all the most important things someone needs to know in order to understand the current Israel-Palestinian conflict. I reprint it here for your convenience with some additions and alterations.

By Barry Rubin

When people ask me why the Arab-Israeli conflict is so misunderstood, the best and simplest way to explain is by citing the central problem; the contrast between reality and what seems logical to those who live in a far-off land that operates by different political rules, have little knowledge of the issues, or have drawn their information from media accounts.

It is logical, but totally misleading, to see the conflict in the following manner:

• Israel has won all the wars, controls the territories and enjoys the fruits of victory—land, independence and prosperity. The Palestinians are suffering miserably. All they want is a land of their own. Therefore, the conflict can be easily settled: Give them a state and everyone will live happily ever after. Issues like borders, security, refugees and Jerusalem are easily settled.

• Why isn’t the conflict over? Because Israel is well off and does not want peace as a result, while the Palestinians are eager to end the conflict and be happy.

• And/or, because no one has come along who is smart enough or has some clever formula to resolve the issue with a win-win solution in which everyone is happy and at peace.

The missing element here, however, is that the Palestinian leadership is not, and has never been, eager for any compromise resolution. Instead, its top priority has been total victory, possession of the entire land, with Israel’s disappearing from the map. If this seems to be an overstatement, it is because Palestinian politics and society are quite different from, say, that of the United States.

The evidence that proves this proposition about unreadiness for peace is evident not only in history but in every television broadcast, radio clip or newspaper report; every textbook; every sermon; and every speech by leaders that comes out of Palestinian institutions. This is not necessarily what is expressed in English, when interviews are given to Western reporters, but it is about 99 percent of the output in Arabic.

There is also the evidence of the 1993-2000 peace process, and the Palestinian leadership's rejection of any compromise or continued negotiations at the end of it. There is the evidence of the statements made and resolutions passed at Fatah meetings. And also the fact that the PA has refused to negotiate now for two years.

And the great majority of Israelis, wherever they are on the political spectrum, know this.

For the Palestinian Authority and its governing party, Fatah, the goal is the transformation of all of the land into a Palestinian, Arab and Muslim state. For Hamas, it is the transformation of all of the land into an Islamist Palestinian state that is also Arab.

Does every Palestinian believe this? Not at all. But to function and succeed in politics, it is almost impossible to reject such a goal. When individuals do come out with moderate statements—as happened when on October 13, Yasser Abed Rabbo’s stated that the Palestinian Authority might accept Israel as a Jewish state—they are quickly shouted down, threatened. and they back down.

But all of this makes sense, in a way. After all, if you believe total victory is possible and that anything less is unjust, cowardly, treasonous and even heretical, you are not inclined to want a compromise peace or to let anyone else make one.

What, then, are the factors that prevent moderation and compromise, responses that would seem (to a Western observer) logical for the losers and underdogs, the occupied and poorer side in a conflict? I will answer that by briefly listing and discussing a long list of such factors, almost none of which ever make it into the media or academic literature.

They include:

• Even after all these years, there is profound misinformation and miscomprehension about Israel among Palestinians (and, generally, among Arabs and Muslims), viewing it not as a real country but as one that cannot last. Kill enough Israelis, damage the economy, cut it off from Western allies, and it is believed that Israel will crumble. Radicalism is enhanced by a monopoly on information in the hands of a political and clerical elite. Material benefit is not important to this movement which doesn't care if the people are suffering. The leaders and activists view this suffering as worthwhile for the purpose of the cause, as well as useful in international propaganda to gain sympathy. And, anyway, the leaders themselves live in relative luxury.

• Religious and political ideology, believing that the creator of the universe is on your side, guarantees victory. The idea that the proper organization of a revolution—the power of the aroused masses will defeat superior technology—is also a heady concept.

• A political system in which the most militant wins, if necessary by flourishing a gun and threatening to kill dissidents, and in which moderates are branded as traitors, is very effective in inhibiting an alternative approach.

• Poor leadership—first by the wacky Yasser Arafat and now by the weak Mahmoud Abbas, the PA leader—has prevented what has happened in many other movements: a strong, competent leader persuading the people of what they must do in order to gain a reasonable success. While Abbas is relatively moderate in Fatah terms, the majority of its leaders are quite hard line and continue to believe the traditional viewpoint.

• There are also some easy rationales. For example, a peace agreement with Israel can only be made if it would not block a “second round” in which a Palestinian state can continue trying to destroy Israel. Of course, that kind of agreement would never be acceptable to Israel. The PA has always rejected the idea that a peace agreement would explicitly be a final settlement of all claims, an end to the conflict forever. The last resort of all is to argue that this generation has no right to “give up” the claim on all of Israel since, even if it cannot achieve that victory, it must leave the opportunity open for a future generations to do so.

The peace process of the 1990s was an experiment to see if things had changed or could be changed by confidence-building measures and the creation of a Palestinian state-in-the-making. The experiment failed. It showed the answer was “no.” The rise of radical Islam and the absence of a strong leader has made the situation worse than it was in that earlier period.

These problems cannot be waved away by good intentions or clever peace plans. They will prevent an end to the conflict for decades until Palestinian leadership and ideology change.

Barry Rubin is director of the Global Research in International Affairs (GLORIA) Center and editor of the Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA) Journal. His latest books are The Israel-Arab Reader (seventh edition), The Long War for Freedom: The Arab Struggle for Democracy in the Middle East (Wiley), and The Truth About Syria (Palgrave-Macmillan). The website of the GLORIA Center is at http://www.gloria-center.org and of his blog, Rubin Reports, http://www.rubinreports.blogspot.com.