Finding a genuine curbside Packard is undoubtedly one of the highlights of any CC’er. I’ve managed to snag two, a ’51 200 and a ’46 Clipper Super, both in my neighborhood. But that’s been it, so I’m always ready to share the thrill of someone else finding one, especially when it’s a bit out of the ordinary, as this mild custom that appears to get driven and lives on the street. nifty43 posted these at the Cohort; shot in British Columbia. When’s the last time you saw a Packard with lake pipes and mildly lowered? It’s got attitude along with its lowered altitude.

Well, from that rear-quarter shot, anyway. From this angle, it looks a bit more sedate, or should we say patrician? No, not an actual “Patrician”, as that name was reserved for the genuine Packards. The lower-tier Clippers were in the process of being “divorced” from the senior Packard line; by 1956, “Clipper” had been registered as a distinct make, and all Packard dealers had to have both “Clipper” and “Packard” signs. Talk about re-arranging the deck chairs on the Titanic.

Enough of that ugly history; it certainly wasn’t supposed to turn out that way with these new 1955 models. They were Packard’s Hail Mary pass, and it was fumbled. Literally; as in a bad decision to use a crowded body plant on Connor Avenue instead of its spacious main plant on East Grand Boulevard to build its bodies in-house after body-supplier Briggs was bought by Chrysler.

Body production experienced serious bottlenecks as well as quality shortcomings. In a boom year for the industry, Packard managed to deliver some 55,000 cars, not nearly the great and desperately-needed come-back hoped for. And sales took a terminal dive in 1956. By 1957, it was just “Packardbakers“.

But these ’55s had a lot going for them: a major do-over stylistically, although still using the basic ’51 body; a powerful new OHV V8 engine (with a problematic oil pump) to replace the antediluvian straight eights, and “Torsion-Level” suspension, a rather remarkable affair that involved torsion bars front and rear, as well as an electric motor to adjust ride height and effectively linking all four wheels. The brochures are a bit sketchy, but it appears that “Torsion Aire” was standard on the senior Packards, and available on the upper-tier Clipper Custom.

I’m not exactly sure if this is a base Clipper or Clipper Custom. The base Clipper came with a 320 CID version of the new V8, with 225 hp. The Custom got the bigger 352 inch version, with 245 hp. Given that this Clipper’s owner seems quite interested in its performance, what with the tach and lake pipes, I’d like to think it has the 352, perhaps with the dual four-barrel carb induction system that generated 275 hp in the Packard Caribbean. Since there’s no clutch pedal, we know it has Packard’s Ultramatic drive, which was further refined for the additional power of the V8s.

As per the badge out front, we shouldn’t really be using the word “Packard” in this post, except for perhaps “Built by Packard Craftsmen”, the line used in Clipper ads. That didn’t work in 1955, and it’s not going to work now; no,we’re not going to start a new listing in the CC Portals for “Clipper”. It’s a Packard. And a genuine curbside classic one, at that. Welcome to the club.

68 Comments

Too cool, with just the right amount of ephemera to distinguish a Clipper. I am almost finished with my seventh decade, and this is the first Packard with lakes pipes I have ever seen – open or closed dumps. With a wrap? Or just satin paint finish?

What a great find!I’m not usually a custom car/hot rod fan but this could easily be restored.I’m one of the few fans of the last “real “Packards. I’ve never seen a Clipper in the metal.My earliest memories of Packards is seeing Lancashire comedienne Hylda Baker in one in the West End of London in the early 60s and seeing her in the same car a few months later in Cleveleys near Blackpool where she lived.
A sad end to a great car maker,thanks for another great read

I like it. From pics I’ve seen online, the factory 2-tone paintjob would’ve included red in the lower portion of the front fender, separated by the chrome strip. I think I like this better though. Needs to go to the pinstriper’s shop next.

I think there were options for the 2 tone on these. The lower side scallops could be a second color along with this treatment or in place of it. I like this treatment, or the contrasting lower side scallops, but not both together.

an excellent new OHV V8 engine to replace the antediluvian straight eights,

That spiffy new V8 had a fatal flaw, the oil pump. Seems that, in short order, the shaft seal in the pump housing would wear enough that air from the crankcase got sucked into the oil. The cars soon developed a reputation for failed lifters and bearings.

Packard tried to sell the 352 to the Defense Department as a truck engine. They ran one on a test stand for 500 hours. The rod bearings failed due to the same oil aeration issue.

Packard designed a mod, but it didn’t solve the problem. In recent years, Packard collectors have devised a method of adopting an aftermarket Olds pump which finally appears to have solved the problem.

In 56, all the Packard badging was removed from the Clippers, but customers and dealers rebelled to the point that the company sent out Packard badges for dealers to install on cars in inventory and for any customers who wanted them.

I have never seen a Packard with that front end. And I’ve owned a 56 Clipper. That is not the front end of any Packard I know of. The two-tone paint scheme suggests a 55 Clipper body. What is it? A show car?

as in a bad decision to use a crowded body plant on Connor Avenue instead of its spacious main plant on East Grand Boulevard to build its bodies in-house after body-supplier Briggs was bought by Chrysler.

Thank Packard Finance VP Walter Grant for that one. The numbers he presented to Jim Nance were, iirc, $12M in savings by combining final assemly in the existing body plant on Conner, vs only $8M in savings by taking over Conner and running it as Briggs had: building and painting the bodies at Conner, then trucking them to East Grand for final assembly.

Why Packard outsourced body building to Briggs in the first place is another story.

I’ve never seen a Packard or Clipper hot rod. there was a bathtub late ’40’s Packard that was a famous drag race car. The ’56 Clipper tail lights became iconic for “kustom” cars however. I drive by a ’56 Clipper 4 door every day in the light yellow color. It’s pretty classy and it has a 4 sale sign on it. Not in my wheel house however.

It seems like most times you have an expensive and a cheaper version of the same car, the expensive version suffers and the lower priced one benefits. That did not seem to be the case with these Clippers. Maybe by 1955, there was no longer enough prestige in the Packard name for the Clipper to benefit.

I really like these final Packards. And I know the thrill of finding one in the wild. Several years before CC, I saw a 55 or 56 Packard sedan for sale about 3 doors down from my mother in law. It was an original but well worn car that looked to have just been pulled out of someone’s garage for the first time since maybe 1967. It looked like a money pit, but a really cool one.

Never understood this Clipper nonsense. After the war, Packard could sell every high-priced car it could build, even the ugly “pregnant elephants” of 1948-50. Why Nance didn’t just cancel Clipper and get back to the business of building only real Packards and nothing else, is beyond me.

A difficult one,a Packard was out of reach of most people.Did a poor man’s Packard take away some of the magic or(hopefully) bring in more buyers?It did nothing to stop the rot I’d sooner have a Clipper than the last Studebakers in drag!

The original (1942) Clipper was a fancy style leader intended as a rival for the Cadillac Sixty Special and was actually one of the most expensive models in the line. You could call the Clipper and Sixty Special the conceptual ancestors of the modern Mercedes CLS-Class and BMW 6-Series Gran Coupe.

After the war, Packard could sell every high-priced car it could build,

George Christopher, who was President from when Max Gilman was fired, iirc 44, until he was fired in 49 was not interested in the luxury market. He openly stated that he saw Packard as competing with Buick. After the war, the only tooling on hand was for the Clipper. Various stories float around that the senior Packard tooling had been given to the Russians, or had not been stored properly and the dies had rusted. My theory is Christopher wasn’t interested in the senior line, so sold the tooling for scrap during the war.

Why Nance didn’t just cancel Clipper and get back to the business of building only real Packards and nothing else, is beyond me.

The dealers wanted the sales volume they got from the Clipper. Clipper volume helped amortize R&D cost. The Clipper name had been discontinued in the late 40s, replaced by a cheap Packard, the 200. What Nance was trying to do was move the Packard brand back upmarket, reversing what Christopher had done. That created the problem of establishing a stand alone midmarket brand, so they could still get the volume, without devaluing the Packard brand. So he reintroduced the Clipper name and started using different styling elements to separate it from the senior line.

Packard had also learned the hard way in the ’30s that they really couldn’t survive on the volume of what they called the senior cars. Cadillac also relied heavily on the cheaper Series 60/Series 61 cars — even the Sixty Special, which sold much better than the V-16 or old V-12 cars, was too pricey to be a sustaining-volume model (although it was very profitable). Packard’s old senior cars were too expensive to build, so they had to be expensive, and then didn’t sell well enough to sustain the company.

The other problem for Packard was that Christopher just wasn’t that interested in staying in the ultra-luxury field. He thought it made much more sense to reposition as a Buick rival and shoot for much bigger volume so Packard wouldn’t always be hand to mouth in terms of revenue. Offering a car like the original 120, which was a very high-quality item one might compare to the Mercedes W201, wouldn’t itself have wrecked Packard’s prestige position, but it would have needed to supplement rather than replace the senior cars. Instead, Packard just scaled it up to take their place.

Well, the Zephyr was never a separate brand (it was a Lincoln-Zephyr) and, as at Packard, it eventually displaced the big Lincolns, whose sales were negligible. DeSoto was a very different kettle of fish — it was not a companion for Chrysler (Plymouth did that), but a medium-price car intended to fill a similar role as Dodge (which Chrysler hadn’t yet acquired when DeSoto was conceived).

As for Cadillac, the reason they dropped LaSalle (which was conceived and launched before the stock market crash, remember) was that Cadillac management decided that it would be simpler, cheaper, and more profitable to just have a cheaper Cadillac, which is exactly what they did. In the last year of LaSalle (1940), there was a spread of about $300 between the most expensive LaSalle and the cheapest Cadillac — a lot of money. In 1941, after LaSalle was dropped, Cadillac added a DeLuxe Series 61 (which was basically the previous Series 61 in content) and a price leader base Series 61 that was within about $10 of the previous senior LaSalles. The V-16 was dropped at the same time.

So, Cadillac did exactly the opposite of what people always say Packard should have done and it actually worked out very well for them. The difference was that Cadillac managed to establish themselves very effectively as both style and technology leaders while Packard had some difficulty trying to bring its traditional themes up to date. The original Clipper and the postwar Clipper/Super Clipper spun off from it were really quite handsome, but Packard shot itself in the foot with the “bathtub” cars: They looked awkward and by 1949 they couldn’t match Cadillac’s V-8 or Hydra-Matic.

These cars seem very much in the spirit of the early 50s. They remind me of the dresses worn by starlets…the strapless evening gowns with all the “attention” on the front tapering down to the hemline dragging on the floor.

Were the cathedral tailights introduced in 1955 or ’56? This car obviously does not have them, but I seem to recall some ’55’s that did.

The ’55-’56’s were interesting cars that should have competed favorably with Buick and Olds. They might have too, if they had merged with Nash/Hudson instead of Studebaker. Cash poor Studebaker just bled them dry, with no money for true new models. Instead we got the wretched Packardbakers, then, the end.

This car obviously does not have them, but I seem to recall some ’55′s that did.

The cathedrial taillights were on the senior cars only: Patrician, 400 and Carribean. The senior cars also had a different front clip with deeper eyebrows, a different eggcrate in the grill and the Packard badge, instead of the Clipper ship’s wheel.

Langworth’s book about Hudson was written in the mid 70s, when a lot of the principles, including Roy Chapin and Jim Nance were still alive and were interviewed for the book.

It was in his interview with Nance that Langworth first heard of this grand plan, supposedly a gentlemen’s agreement between Nance and George Mason of Nash, that Nash would take Hudson over and Packard would take Studebaker over, then merge to bring all four brands under AMC. Mason died just as Packard was buying Studebaker, and Nance implied that he had been double crossed by George Romney…Romney declined to be interviewed for the book.

Hudson had contacted Packard about a merger around August 53, but Packard was not interested, so Hudson agreed to merge with Nash, as Mason had propsed to Hudson repeatedly since the end of the war.

A Packard/Hudson tieup would have been interesting. The Hornet was in the same size and price class that Nance was trying to establish the Clipper in. A merger could have offered cost savings by immediate closure of Jefferson and consolidation of assembly at East Grand, with the Hudson using the differentiated styling elements that had been developed for the Clipper, while the Clipper would be moved upmarket as a short wheelbase Packard, as the Executive was in 56. Meanwhile, Packard would gain access to the fully equipped and manned Hudson body plant, just as they lost Briggs.

Probably would not have saved the company long term, but it would have addressed some short term problems and bought some time.

Mason also formally approached the Packard board about a Packard-Nash merger prior to the Studebaker deal, but Packard (Nance excepted) wasn’t interested in even hearing him out. They had already decided that Studebaker was the best bet, based in part on Studebaker’s very optimistic appraisal of their finances and break-even (they didn’t request an independent audit, which was a huge mistake).

The problem with Hudson as a merger partner was that Hudson was in really bad shape and there was a general perception that they were on their way out. Their volume was smaller in any case and except for the Jet, they were positioned awfully close to where Packard hoped to position its junior cars.

The Packard board’s big preoccupation with Studebaker was that it was (or looked like) a big volume, lowish-price player with minimal overlap with Packard. They weren’t thinking about it in terms of body plants (although they should have been), but still in terms of getting big total volume.

The problem with Hudson as a merger partner was that Hudson was in really bad shape and there was a general perception that they were on their way out. Their volume was smaller in any case and except for the Jet, they were positioned awfully close to where Packard hoped to position its junior cars.

The situation at Hudson is what makes the deal appealing. Hudson’s market cap at the time of the AMC merger was a bit under $19M, vs Packard’s $50M, so they would have avoided the conflict of the S-P merger, which was structured so that the Studebaker stockholders had a voting majority in the merged company.

Hudson volume was not that far off of Packard’s. A merger would gain the Hudson dealers and existing customer base, so overall Packard volume would about double.

The Packard board’s big preoccupation with Studebaker was that it was (or looked like) a big volume, lowish-price player with minimal overlap with Packard.

The investment bankers sold Packard on cost saving synergies with Studebaker, but Studebaker had moved so far down market that it was impossible to make a credible Packard out of Studie parts, and nothing could be built out of the Packard parts bin that would be cheap enough to sell as a Studie. To realise the synergies the bankers were projecting required 3 years and tens of millions of dollars to develop a new platform. Time and money that Packard did not have.

The Hornet being in the same price bracket as the Clipper makes it easy to offer a retrimmed Clipper as a Hornet.

Of course, Nash was a direct competitor of Hudson, so production was consolidated in Kenosha with a retrimmed Ambassador sold as a Hornet, retrimmed Statesman sold as a Wasp, and the Jet replaced by the Rambler. AMC even kept the Hudson engine plant open for 55-56 so the Hornet could be had with the 308, in addition to the Packard V8, and the 308 had a higher take rate than the V8. The Wasp was offered with the 202 that had been developed for the Jet, rather than a Nash engine.

Most importantly of all, from Nance’s viewpoint, Barit was over 60 and willing to step aside. Something that neither Mason or Romney would have done, and Nance was not willing to step aside either. In Studebaker’s case, Hoffman was only working part time and commuting from California so he didn’t care and Vance was 64 and ready to retire, so he stepped aside as well, leaving Nance to be the big dog.

Another tidbit from the Langworth interview, Nance said that when he interviewed for the Packard job, he was told about this big four way merger being in the works and that he would be running it. He told Langworth he would not have taken the Packard job just to run Packard.

See, everything I’ve seen about Nance indicates that he was willing to work with Mason, in part because by the time of the merger talks, Mason was also over 60, so he wasn’t going to hang around indefinitely. The real conflict as I understand it was Romney, who was close to Nance’s age and had basically the same kind of ambitions.

Obviously, what you’re describing about Studebaker is correct — my point is that the board let the bankers paint a much rosier picture (stemming in part from Studebaker’s wildly optimistic sense of its own financial status). Even Nance wasn’t expecting to create commonality with Studebaker’s existing models; the plan they came up with was to create three all-new, interrelated shells: one for Studebakers, one for senior Studebakers and Clippers, one for senior Packards, all with the kind of commonality of GM’s contemporary A-B-C bodies. Of course, the dilemma was doing that would have taken several years in a best-case scenario, but that was the goal. Even after Studebaker’s real financial situation came to light, Nance was taken aback when he was unable to secure financing for any all-new bodies — he really hadn’t expected to have to make due with both Studebaker and Packard’s existing bodies for as long as they did.

Because Hudson looked so terminal, I can’t see the Packard board even seriously entertaining the prospect. By late 1953, the Jet was a flop, the Step-Down cars were well past their prime, and I assume Hudson was losing dealers. From Packard’s perspective, they would have had to sink a bunch of money into Hudson to shore up a failing company (essentially what ended up happening with Studebaker) when what they wanted was a big-volume partner for greater stability. In retrospect, getting the body plant would have been worthwhile even if they dumped everything else, but it seems like nobody saw the writing on the wall when Walter Briggs died in ’52.

CPJ

Posted September 4, 2014 at 4:27 PM

What an interesting chapter in American automobile history. Imagine, its been 60 years since there was any serious domestic competition to the big three. Imagine George Mason’s American Motors with the Rambler as the compact (which at the time had zero competition), the Nash on par with Chevy/Ford/Plymouth, the Hudson as the Buick/Olds fighter and Packard as the luxury marque. They coulda been a contender!

Steve

Posted September 4, 2014 at 5:38 PM

See, everything I’ve seen about Nance indicates that he was willing to work with Mason, in part because by the time of the merger talks, Mason was also over 60, so he wasn’t going to hang around indefinitely. The real conflict as I understand it was Romney

A very good point about Mason’s age, but if the grand plan had existed, you would have thought Romney would have been clued in, as he would have otherwise expected to succeed Mason, even had he lived to retirement.

For that matter, if Barit knew about the grand plan, why did he approch Packard in 53, just before sitting down to serious negotiations with Nash?

If Nance knew about the grand plan when he was hired, as he claimed he did, why did he keep ordering study after study of every possible merger partner, even Kaiser?

By the fall of 54, there were no dancing partners left except Studebaker.

Because Hudson looked so terminal, I can’t see the Packard board even seriously entertaining the prospect. By late 1953, the Jet was a flop, the Step-Down cars were well past their prime, and I assume Hudson was losing dealers.

Hudson was worthwhile for Nash. The Detroit plants, with the exception of the engine line, were closed within a few months of the merger closing. Nash gained the dealers and customer base. Packard would have gained everything Nash did, plus the body plant, plus the Hudson brand which was already established in the market segment that Nance was trying to move into with the Clipper.

…the plan they came up with was to create three all-new, interrelated shells: one for Studebakers, one for senior Studebakers and Clippers, one for senior Packards,

Here’s the body part matrix they came up with. My first question would be “where is the Champion” as this car is clearly too big for the Champ’s price segment, and wheezy little flathead six.

Steve

Posted September 4, 2014 at 5:52 PM

Imagine George Mason’s American Motors with the Rambler as the compact (which at the time had zero competition), the Nash on par with Chevy/Ford/Plymouth, the Hudson as the Buick/Olds fighter and Packard as the luxury marque.

By one source I have read, there was a possiblity that the Rambler might have been dropped.

By that source, the grand plan had Studebaker as the cheap line as it had already gone downmarket to compete with Ford and Chevy, Nash as lower mid market, Hudson as upper mid market and Packard as the luxury offering.

Geeber

Posted September 5, 2014 at 7:55 AM

When considering George Romney’s role, it’s important to remember that George Mason’s death in October 1954 was entirely unexpected. He may have been 63 at the time of the merger of Nash and Hudson, but I believe that everyone expected him to stick around for at least one or two more years before retiring. No one expected him to be out of the picture within months of the merger’s completion. (He died of pneumonia, if I recall correctly.)

Perhaps Romney was fully aware of Mason’s plans. He may have been able to voice his concerns over a merger with Studebaker-Packard, but I don’t believe he could have stopped it as long as Mason was around and in charge.

I also believe that, by the time of Mason’s death, knowledge of Studebaker’s true financial condition had become more widespread. One cannot blame George Romney for refusing to saddle a fledgling American Motors with a company that was nearly bankrupt, especially given that American Motors itself was in dire straits until the middle of 1957.

Romney never seemed all that enthusiastic about merging the independents to form a “mini-GM.” He believed that the way to salvation was to offer an alternative to the Big Three in the Rambler. He was ultimately correct, of course, given the sales boom enjoyed by American Motors in the late 1950s and early 1960s, and the difficulty that even Chrysler Corporation faced in trying to keep up with GM by the 1970s.

Chris M.

Posted September 8, 2014 at 12:51 PM

That product matrix above is quite interesting, with the Packard front clip looking very much like the predictor show car (and as it happens bearing a passing resemblance to Edsel) and the Studebaker ute in the lower corner. Wonder if they knew of the upcoming Ranchero or if they were independently considering going into the segment?

Shows that “what could have been” with new bodies might have had a much better shot at success…

Steve

Posted September 8, 2014 at 2:34 PM

That product matrix above is quite interesting, with the Packard front clip looking very much like the predictor show car

They had a mule running with the proposed 57 body. Supposedly with the V8 enlarged to 400cuin and a revised version of Torsion Level suspension. I see 57 Plymouth tailfins and a 58 Lincoln roof. Not too crazy about the front end treatment, though, supposedly, long time Packard owners had been pining for a return to the traditional radiator shape

jpcavanaugh

Posted September 8, 2014 at 3:16 PM

Also, had this car come out in 57, the Edsel might have had an easier go of it in the court of public opinion.

In the US, most automakers had brought bodybuilding in house by the mid 50s. Chrysler was Briggs’ largest customer. The large Briggs Mack Ave plant was on the next block from the Chrysler Jefferson plant, so it was a short haul to get the bodies to the assembly plant.

Truckloads of bodies were a common sight in Detroit at that time. Packard bodies were trucked from Conner and Warren to East Grand, Chrysler bodies went from Mack to Jefferson. The Hudson body plant was on Conner between Haper and Gratiot, while the Hudson assembly plant was on Jefferson across Conner from the Chrysler plant. This truckload would keep the line running for about 10 minutes.

Briggs had I believe 12 U.S. plants, so buying the whole U.S. operation was a much bigger endeavor than just the one plant in Dagenham, which I imagine was formally a separate company that was a wholly owned subsidiary of the U.S. organization.

I agree about the deck chair analogy. Perhaps if there had been more differentiation between the Clippers and the senior Packards, there would have been more reason to buy the more expensive models. It seemed the worst of both worlds: a senior Packard line that looked too much like your cheaper Clipper line, and a cheaper Clipper line that failed to generate the volumes Packard needed to stay afloat, esp . after the Stude buyout.

The Packardbakers were always reviled, but I thought they looked nice and did have some “real” Packard features such as the taillights. Wonder what the ’57 Packardbaker would have looked like if Stude had spent just a little bit more time and money on it, maybe with large round wheel openings trimmed in flashy chrome, much like the ’53 Carribean, something to differentiate from the lesser Studes. I realize they had no money at that point. Somebody should do a photoshop of that one!

The big problem for Packard as a luxury car maker was that their residuals were just awful throughout the ’50s. Cadillac resale values in those days were iron-clad — if you bought one with cash and then traded every year, the net cost was competitive with buying a much cheaper car. A Packard wasn’t necessarily more expensive on a purchase price basis, but the depreciation would bite you hard. The ultra-wealthy wouldn’t necessarily care (high-end luxury cars usually depreciate heavily), but the affluent businessmen type that bought a lot of Cadillacs in those days would and did do the math.

The big problem for Packard as a luxury car maker was that their residuals were just awful throughout the ’50s.

Packard had lost it’s prestige, and people were buzzing about whether the company would survive. That’s murder on resale value.

When I am at the Gilmore for a show, I usually stop in their buildings and check out the Hudsons and the Packard Executive. Ran into a guy last time who had bought a Hudson Commodore second hand in 53-54. His Commodore was a step down, so no older than a 48, yet he bought it for $40. The dealer was trying to get $100 for it but, as he said “noone wants a Hudson” so he took the $40 this guy had. He said the tires were nearly new and alone worth the $40. The car ran fine and he drove it for several years.

Definitely, although I was reading some contemporary articles on Packard (in the Brooklands portfolio) and was surprised to see references to their resale values tanking as early as 1949–50. I would attribute that to a fusty image — the company was still quite healthy at that point, but I think there was the sense that Packard had become sort of the automotive equivalent of Norma Desmond in Sunset Boulevard. I know Nance was concerned about that when he arrived, although as Packard’s financial situation went from okay to bad, things got worse instead of better.

Geeber

Posted September 5, 2014 at 7:35 AM

If I recall correctly, Packard overproduced in 1949. It therefore had to institute a price cut to move the cars, which angered people who had bought at the higher price. Packard also changed the serial numbers on some unsold 1949 models to turn them into 1950 models.

Both moves showed a serious softening in demand for Packards, which should have set off the alarm bells. The postwar sellers market wasn’t quite over, even if it had cooled down somewhat from 1946-48.

What really hurt Packard was the debut of the first postwar Cadillacs, Buicks and Oldsmobiles. Park one of them next to a “bathtub” Packard, and it’s easy to see why the cars encountered stiff sales resistance.

Steve

Posted September 5, 2014 at 7:51 AM

If I recall correctly, Packard overproduced in 1949. It therefore had to institute a price cut to move the cars, which angered people who had bought at the higher price. Packard also changed the serial numbers on some unsold 1949 models to turn them into 1950 models.

Had not heard that about Packard. Did hear it about Kaiser. There was a titanic argument between Henry Kaiser and Joe Frazer in 48. They both knew that GM and Ford were both coming out with new models for 49. Frazer was advising planning for a drop in sales of their then several years old model. Kaiser thundered “Kaisers never retrench” and ordered tooling produced to build 200,000 cars for 49. Kaiser ended up selling half that many 49s, so sent factory reps out to the dealers with a supply of new VIN plates to reserial the thousands of left over 49s as 50s.

Joe Frazer was pushed out of K-F management for arguing with Kaiser. They overproduced again for 50. The 51 Kaiser got a complete restyle. The 51 Frazer was, for the first time, a completely different design as it’s sole function was to use up left over 50 parts. The 51 Frazer proved suprisingly popular, but as it finally exhausted the supply of left over parts, that was the end of the Frazer nameplate.

Geeber

Posted September 5, 2014 at 8:07 AM

This was contained in a book on the 1948-50 Packards written by a club member. Apparently there is a way to tell whether the Packard is a 1949 model with a new serial number (and minor trim changes to bring the cars in line with “true” 1950 models).

George Christopher made a big deal about Packard building and selling 200,000 cars annually when production resumed after the war. He was first hampered by a steel shortages. By the time that problem was addressed, GM had debuted its postwar Buicks, Cadillacs and Oldsmobiles, and it was becoming apparent that not many people liked the new “bathtub” Packards.

Packard often had the right leaders – at the wrong time. During the immediate postwar years, Packard really needed a leader on the order of James Nance who was more market-savvy and attuned to changing buyer tastes. When it came time to decide what to do when its body supplier was sold, George Christopher could have warned them of the difficultly of consolidating all production at the cramped Connor Avenue plan.

” it was fumbled. Literally; as in a bad decision to use a crowded body plant on Connor Avenue instead of its spacious main plant on East Grand Boulevard to build its bodies in-house after body-supplier Briggs was bought by Chrysler.”

The bad decision wasn’t that they continued to use Connor Avenue plant, leased from Chrysler after its purchase of Briggs, to build their bodies. Given the shortness of time before the new 1955’s would go into production, they had little choice. The bad decision was to move complete assembly from East Grand Boulevard into Connor Avenue, a plant which had been adequately sizes for their body production only, which had gone on there since 1946. Roger Grant and Ray Powers presented figures and persuasive arguments for a one-story assembly operation being more efficient and cost-affective. Nance, woefully short on financial and manufacturing experience up to that point, bought the idea, ordered chassis and finally assembly be moved there. It was the move that killed the company.

I want to add to that that I think Nance was well aware it was risky, but the potential payoff was substantial: It was a big short-term expense and hassle, but it seemed achievable and if they’d weathered it, they would have been a lot better off afterwards. It was sort of the corporate equivalent of trying to pay off the remaining principal on your mortgage in less than two years — if you can do it, you’re in clover after, but if not, well…

Today flat or satin paint is associated with “old school”, so a lot of rodders like the look. If the owner had some hand-painted pinstripe designs added, they would jump right off the car and look very sharp.

It may be misplaced nostalgia but with the popularity of satin finishes, even on expensive cars, I think it works here. Perhaps not accurate to those who remember the era, but in the current interpretation, the satin works. I like it and agree that it does need some pinstripes.

Also, as I’ve commented on a few other articles of mild customs, I like that the owner has applied their own look to the car but hasn’t done anything that isn’t reversible. Great-looking ride.

In the late 40s/early50s, the Defense Department had a “second source” policy so if the prime contractor’s plant is bombed by the Russkies, there would be another factory still turning out that product.

All the defense contracts were “cost plus” meaning the government would pay all the costs of production, whatever they were, plus a guaranteed profit.

Kaiser was building cars in a former aircraft factory, so had the right kind of facilities. Kaiser was granted a contract to build C-119 cargo planes under license from Fairchild, which cheezed Fairchild off as they had plenty of production capacity and could have built all the Air Force wanted, and kept all the guaranteed profit for themselves.

Kaiser had titanic cost overruns on the planes. Kaiser blamed the cost overruns on obstruction from Fairchild. There was a Congressional investigation and all Air Force contracts to Kaiser were revoked in June 53.

Under the same second source policy, Packard won a contract to build J47 jet engines under license from GE. At the end of the Korean War, Air Force need for J47s was sharply reduced, GE was agitating to bring all J47 production under it’s roof, so it could get all the profit, and the new Secretary of Defense, Charlie Wilson, was a former General Motors executive and found ways to take defense contracts away from other automakers and give them to GM instead.

Packard’s once lucrative J47 contract was cut to a trickle of engines, leaving it’s new $15M plant in Utica that had been built for the jet engine program mostly vacant. Packard moved it’s powertrain production operations into the Utica plant in late 54.

When Packard shut down in 56, the millions of dollars of nearly new engine production equipment was sold for only $200,000. The Utica plant was taken over by Curtiss-Wright, which had been given contracts to overhaul J47s and build J57s as part of the backdoor S-P bailout by the Eisenhower administration.

Here’s the ad for the Utica plant when Curtiss-Wright sold it in 61. Ford Motor bought it and used it as a trim production plant until just a few years ago. The plant has since been torn down

Cool to see a whole page about my car. You all pretty much nailed it, 55 Packard clipper super Panama, barn find from the Bay Area. I’m not a big wallet car guy, so I try to do all the work myself with a bunch of help from retired car guys politely dealing with my constant phone calls, haha!. I lowered it a bunch because I don’t need a tractor quite yet, and I replaced the heavy as hell stock V8 with a high compresion chevy 305 and a 700R4.
Lake pipes for loud days and glasspacks for quiet cruises. It was orange and white originally but was in need of a spruce up, I went with a satin finish so I wouldn’t be pissed about a scratch here and there. I’m here to drive, not to sit in a lawn chair and show it.
Thanks for looking.
-e-