ossibility, howarer, of an attewpt to build up Nlkoyan aa th* front manow approach if tho deolaion bo made to reopen aoonojaio negotiations.

6, that the source, ifosition to know about eonvervatlon* and "bitter struggle" in tho Politburo, would pass on this information, seems alaoat lnoredlble, but further exploitation certainly ia Indloated, Examination of tho stylo, apelling, and idioms avakos it apparent that tha paper either waa written in Bngllsh by aoeso ona thinking in tho French language or was translated literally from tha French*

ROSSI All IbTENTIOHS

The orientation of the foreign polioy of the URSS le at present.the subjeotitter struggle between two tendencies thatfor the same end but that differ In the means of arriving at

THE MCLOTOV-VICaiieKr TENBEKCY

The Molotov-Viohlnsky Party, supported by the General Staff, by the generals oceanandlng the Soviet armies of occupation, and by the Conmuniat Parties of Central Burops, has as its end the maintenance of the present international polioy of intransigence. This Party believes that Soviet politics ahould renaln on its present basis, without concession, for at least two or three years more. At thathe American economic crisis, which is expected, should occur. risis will considerably weaken the Influence of the USA in the world and will be the sign of the collapse of the Capitalist Syatera, in Europe, and in the semi-colonial countries*

The Party's aim Is to guard intact Soviet conquests and Soviet jumplng-off bases in Europe, in the Far Eaat and in the Rear East, until According to the Soviet experts, it is at this time that the expected Amerioanriels should produce direct effects capable of undermining the power of Washington.

Therefore, it is necessary to keep the iron curtain on Central Europe lowered until that time and not to evacuate, militarily, the Balkans before that time. First, to keep tho Balkan "glacis" and the Jumping-off bases of Soviet influence. Then, to prevent the danger of an anti-Soviet military

THE HOLOTOV-VICHINSKl TENDENCY cont'd.

crusade, which Idea night occur to Americaeans of saving the USA froe thedebacle.

The aolotov-Vichl risky tendency does not believo In the success of the Truman Dootrlne. This manifestation of American Imperialism swat claah fatally with tha contradictions of the international capitalist system and is vary first place with British Imperialism, and with tho other colonial and European nationalism and powers. Finally, the coordinated aetion of the various Ccemauiiet Parties and of the various Leftist Groups of the European powers will be able to hold in check Amorioan Influence until American influence decreases by itself.

At that accent thoill be able, without rlak, to raise the iron ourtain and to assume in Europe and ln the coloniaa the Influence lost by tha Americana. To be sura of this, tho URSS now muat hold all possessions which it now haa and must re-enforce Itoolf by all means possible, politically, militarily, economically, as well aa by tho increase of Hussion Industrial potential.

THETENDED!

A number of the economists in tha Politburo are, in part, In agreement with the analysis of the situation as presented by soloto v. however, this group oonaiders that the economic statements of the fiolotov policy areand that the kolotov policy ie not taking into account thoof the international situation

First, the industrial povsr of tho URSS,aault of the ear destructions, at the and of tha war naa at least ten yeara behind,1asis. Thanksormidable effortsinceart

THB raOYAR-TOSKBSSBKKT cont'd

of thisaa bean ovarooam today. But the Soviet potential still la behind and still ia praoarioua beoauae of the laok of any reservea whioh did existery hard effort la being made to reoonatituteeserves, but they are at ill far from being at the asm* level that they were at th* beginning of th* war. Further, during this time, Amerioan Industrial power haa Jumped forward by at leeet fifteen yeara with regardnd by far la at the head of the entire world.

In th* economical paint of view today, theref at least fifteen years between thend th* USA* Aeoording te Voaaaaaenky, this gap oan te reduced te,ire years interval fairly rapidly, a* reservea or* stock piled and If th* eodernltatlon of machineryet offer tec many oomplloated problems. In any oase,ar should break out before this gap is olossd, th*ill betate of greet Inferiority frem the point of view of Industrial potential,

Finally, Klkoyanor*ly the "oaaualnesa" with whloh kolotov under awtiaates th* evolution of Aserloan oapltalism and In refusing to consider that Amerioan oapltalism has advanced Be thinks (and Stalin haa hold him correct on this point) that the example of the Bow Deal proves that th* period of classical oapltalism Is past in th* USA and that itsary te take into aooount th* possibilities ofead-stet* oapltalism oapable of prolonging the life ef th* oepltalist system onational and International soale.

This point of view thus post-pones for several yeara th* idea ef thaoriala of Amerioan power. Th*nvisaged by Molotav

b* possible (provided there is ne war)

THE MIKOYAH-VOSMESSEHKI TENDENCY, cont'd.

possible nor safe to risk the isolation of Russiaeriod that say last area longer

The needs of tho URSS are too imperious to permit Russia to supply their own wsnts and at the same tlee supply tha needs of Central Europe. Tho conquered countries haveonsiderable economic support until recently. owever, they are becoming additional burdens which the Russian economy muat pull after lt. Their Importance lsatrategic, but politically and economically they are burdens.

By adopting the kolotov policies, one would recooaence thirty years later another experience of isolationorld very different8 and one in which Russia possesses stakes from which iaportant benefits may be drawn without risking war. Tho Mikoyan-Voaneasenky tendency reconaonda the conclusion of economic agreements, particularly with European countries, but also with American countries. This polloy envisages also the abandonSectarian Diplomacy" and tho extenalonuropean scale of the former "Now Economic Policy* of Lenin. It is understood in this policy that tha monopoly of foreign commerce in tha Central European countries will be safe-guarded aa it la in the URSS sod will rest above all in the hands of tbe Communist. The general ond remains for Mlkoyan, as for Holotov, to guard the eseential positions of tho URSS until the inevitable American erlale.

The Uolotov-lilkoyan Struggle

kikoyan has been putinority in the Politburo, kolotov violently denounced "the opportunism.11 of Mikoyan and of VosneBsensky and of their deviationourgeois economy. His big argument was that Ulkoyan is convinced that the stabilization of international capitalism is possible for an indeterndned number of years.

At the sane time heeries of reports from Soviet Embassies, from Soviet General Staffs, fron the Soviet Armies of Occupation, and from the Cooounist Parties of Central Europe showing that the people with whom Hikoyan proposed toemi-alliance were all English and American agents^violently anti-Soviet,

Stalin approved the majority tendency of Uolotov-Vichlnsky although at the same time admitting the principles of economic accords with Europe. anction and also to satisfy Uolotov, who was extremely discontented, StalinKaganovitch who had rallied to the Uikoyan-Vosnessensky tendency. Stalin did not, however, remove these two latter men.

After the breakup of the Moscow Conference, the new Truman policy, the breaking off of tho Russo-Turk talks, the Russo-Iranian talks, and so forth, the position of Stalin changed. Dekanosov, Holotov's collaborator and head of the Near East Department in the Foreign Office, was removed. But Uolotov already sensed the evolution that was occurring in Stalin. He adopted,for his ownort of the Ulkoyan plan, with the idea of cutting tbe ground from beneath kikoyan. This part was the reunion of tho Socialist Parties of Central Europe inign of the'aged by Kikoyan.

This reunion that was to bo tho point of departureew Balkan polioy waa held in an attaoaphere of general boycott ism and of quasi clandestinity, kolotov produced at Moscow th* protests of the Soviet General Staffs, of the Communist Parties, and the various other pertinent organizations, aoong than the reports fro* Soviet Embassies.

He enlarged upon the unquietness existing in the Rf^kfrp Soviet and Communistic circles and on the idea that they were going to be "abandoned for the sak* of th* Socialists" and for the sake of an opposition that is the rendezvous of reactionary elements and of Anglo-Saxon agents.

lxlctov displayed to the Politburooftening of th* Balkan policy waa not possible except to the same degree that reactionary and foreign danger could be eliminated beforehand. Uia greatest argument was that the eviction of the Communists by the Western Governments should be answored by the URSS by th* eviction of th* anti-Coasomists In th* Governments of Central Europe.

For kolotov this was an excellent means of continuing his personal polioy while pretending to create the necessary conditionsoftened policy toward which Stalin seemed to lean more and more after the checks on Russian foreign policy, kolotov, who feels his position ahaken, is trying to conserve the initiative in his domain, but instead of ceding to the klkoyan point of view kolotov la atteoptlng to adopt this point of view to his own policy. Stalin's Final Point of View

conflict. However, Uolotov's power has become more and

, j

S^RET.

In the final sens* it is Stalin who will arbitrate the kolotov-kikoyan

only thing that haa kept Stalin from removing him ia the influence that Uolotov haa among foreign Coomuniet circles. rutal removal of Molotov would be consldarod by the whole worldroof of the weakness of

the URSS,

Stalin, however, has come to the point of viewoftening of Russian diplomacy is necessary. He knows that he may diaappear at any time and he wishes above all to place tho URSShelter of any new war before his doath. Io do that he must break the alliance which exists at thia tins between tha Russian Foreign Office and the Russian General Staff and which is supported by the Comintern. This is not an easy task even for Stalin.

However, the removal of Dakanosov, the rebound in credit and position shown to kaisky who had been formerly relegatedubordinate position are significant indications.

The whole idea that Stalin is attempting to do now Is "to prove Uolotov wrong without proving Truman right. As sconeans is found Soviet diplomacy will evolveoftened sense although always oriented toward the end envisaged by Uolotov as well as by klkoyan.

In resume it may be expected that Stalin will attempt in the nearlddl* road between kolotov and Klkoyan and will confide the direction of the Foreign Officeore decile Officer.

-7-

The thesis of the minority tfikoyan-Vosr.essensky faction ia

on economic considerations relative to the present decision off the URSS. In reality it is not very different from Mdtotov's position because that is an agreement of views on the evolution of the internationalertitude of the American and world crisis. However Mdlotov'sIs criticized because it ends upegative waiting polioyeriod of several years during which the international initiative may pass completely to the Amerioans.

Hikoyan, whose independence of character is supported by the personal esteem that Stalin has for him, supports the idea that the next economic crisis in the United States will not develop alonglines of the pre-war depression. Uikoyan has visited the United States and studied closely its economic organization* esteemseal-state capitalism may easily arise and that it is entirely possibleort of technocratic state capable ofertain directed economy may be Imposed. First in the United States, next in South America and finally in Europe.

According to him this process has already commenced in an imperialistic manner butrocess^while it cannot succeed In saving the capitalist system}can prolong itong time. He insists that regard must be taken for this eventuality in the establishment of tbe international politics of the URSS.

Although the majority of the Politburo followed Uolotov, tbe position of tho minority has been reinforced by later events, espeo^Sy by the eviction of the Communists from tho Governments ofj^fStalin

-8-

"SECRET"

baa partially supported Hikoyan's point of view (the negotiations of ccmrrerical agreements with foreign countries). In reality Mototov's position is not especially solid since it is Stalin's habit to let problems ripen. In adopting in tho Politburo an attitude which supports the majority, but at the same time does not out off any bridges with the minority*

According toave learned in Russian Foreign Office circles, the question tbat is most discussed now ie tha imminence of the American economic crisis. All Soviet diplomacy is at present based on the certitude ofrisis

Bat there are two different opinions in Moscow. Tha first Is that of of

Molotov-Vichlnaky, that/the majority today, Is being criticised as tending to loadangerous isolation of tha URSS.

In resume, tho Molotov thesis Is basiadouble conviction: incapacity of the capitalist world to organise itself and to answer the historic needs of evolution and the Truman Doctrine to save tho worldtopia because theUnited States are not oapable of saving themselves, and they will drag down with them their satellites in their own crisis.

It results from that that the URSS should limit itself toow sona of influence and not to raise "the iron curtain" except for agreements designed to reinforce tho Communist aystoo, to prevent tha creation of an anti-Soviet front, and to support the International Communist movement.

C/j

According to the Molotov tendency, the period of stabilisation of the present capitalist system will and with an American crisis, andrisis shouldritical stage in two years. There is no danger of an iamediate war, butendency of American politics to veer to the right there mayanger of 'American noo fascism" that may come into affect with the arrival in power of the Republicans The peril of war nay exist then because to got out of the crisis tho Americana may attempt to launch themselves in an anti-Soviet military crusade. It is in Europe, and particularly on the borders of tha Mediterranean, thatanger can be overcome because the United States will not attack if tbey are not convinced that Europe with tbea.

It is necessary then to win; preventively the battle for Europe and for that much more is counted on by the presence of the Red Army than by theparties and governments of the satellite states.

That is why Uolotov has made the Politburo adopt the resolution that Austria will not be evacuated (and thus naturally neither Hungary, Roumania nor Bulgaria) before tbe breaking out of the American economic crisis. This ovacuation may be changed if the Anglo-Saxons would attempt inter-alliedof the Ruhr and of the Rhine land with the URSSeat on thebody,ew statute for the Dardanelles acceptable to Russia.

In the Russian Foreign Office it is believed that these two steps will not be attempted. If the Anglo-Saxons entered into negotiations on these two subjects they would rapidly see Russian demands increase.

Unless new events intervene, the diplomatic position of the URSS will remain fixed in this mannereasure of security for two or three years. Ho change in Russian diplomacy can be hoped for before the American crisis relieves Moscow from the fear of an anti-Soviet Crusade.

This thesis has in Its overall lines obtained the majority of the Politburo. However, thereinority that sustains an opinion that at first glance does not seam vary different, but whose conclusions are far distant from those of Uolotov. This is the Ulkoyan-Vosnessensky tendency.

These two represent the economists of the Politburo and accept the overall views of Uolotov, but sustain the position that large economic agreements should be signed with the United States and with England and that Uolotov's attitude is determined too exclusively on political factors and if followed will lead to the isolation of tbe URSSeriod that may be prolonged much more than three years and which would permit the Anglo-Saxons to prepare an anti-Soviet

roughtersons with him to the Paris conference and it was tha general concensus anong these people that they were going to dok for nothing" in that conference* They knew that there would be no practical conclusion but they esteemed that the Parison the karahall Plan would onlyreludeonference that will be held later on this year "when circumstances are ripe.'* It is expected that this assumed conference would be another Stalin-Truman meeting which could take place instead of the London Conference of Foreign Ministers or oould precede that conference.

Molotov could not accept the discussion at Paris on the Marshall. Plan in the present circumstances and according to the conditions of European organization laid down by the Americans. It would haveussian diplomatic retreat in Europe.

Besides Moscow does not wish to be the dupe "of diplomatic illusions'1 which would consist in believing in the sincerity of American desires to aid the URSS and tha Central European countries to the same extant that aid would be given to England, France, and western Europe. The Russian delegates were convinced that even if the URSSeneral agreement, Washington would find pretexts to make aamong the countries to be aided and to exclude(either partially

or wholly Russia and the Slav countries. This fear of being the dupe

J

of an American maneuver was apparent In each conversation. According to the Russian delegates, the Marshall Plan is really only the Truman Plan skillfully disguised and destined to check Soviet and Communist influence in Europe.

Th* exclusion of the ComraunlBts from tho Italian Government, th* formation in France end Belgium of non-Communletas been th* base for Amerioan aid. Th* URSS oould noteneral agreement on "bases of capitulation." Moscow would adopt, however, an entirelyattitude if the European political oondltions war* modifiedenae that was nor* favorable toward Russia, and the Russian delegates say this step may still be possible.

The exclusion of th* Communists from th* Western Governments il to be answered in thrss First, the measures taken in the Balkans to liquidate th* opposition* The second phase la the strike movements and aoolal agitations in Italy and Franoe andtlned to weaken the Goversments of those countries. The third phase, whloh it is hoped may prove decisive, is toeneral strike in Italy to overthrow the Gaspari Cabinet and to rsplao* itommunist-Socialist Government. Tola event will be followed automaticallyeneral offensive of Greek partiaans toward Salonika and tho proclamation of an autonomous Macedonian Republic.

Thia willheok for the Truman doctrine and this oheok is the preliminary oonditionhange of international polloles by the URSS. Since an antl-Soviet position has boon takon by Truman, th* Russianst they are on th* defensive. They do not wish to negotiate definitely with the United States until they have been able to retake the initiative and -to beasis of equality." Then they can comeaat Amerloan-Sovlet agreement that will be preparedtalln-Tnuaan meeting.

The above la the thesis of Molotov, aa it is circulated in Communist circles and as it was reported by the members of the Soviet delegation*

The great argument of Molotov to overcome the resistance of the Mikoyan tendencies is that,if the URSS negotiates after the support given by the U.o Greece and to Turkey and after the eviction from the Government of Communists in Italy and France, the URSS will find itselfefinite position of inferiority toward theo another point of view the granting of American credits to non-Coaninistwill rapidly bring about the domination of all European industry by American capital. Only Communist Governments can maintain European independence from tha financial imperialism of Washington*