A killing that leaves strategic realities untouched

The death of the founder of Al Qaeda, Osama Bin Laden, is a major blow to his network, but is unlikely to make much of a difference to the situation on the ground in Afghanistan and Pakistan or reduce America’s geopolitical involvement in the region. It comes at a time when the network had become increasingly irrelevant to most Muslims, and Washington was badly in need of good news to neutralise the effect of a string of successful Taliban operations.

Despite his high profile as the head of Al Qaeda, with a number of major terrorist operations , most importantly the 11 September 2001 attacks on New York and Washington, to his credit, Bin Laden had grown to be more of an inspirational figure than an organiser and implementer of many of the subsequent Al Qaeda or Al Qaeda-related attacks taking place around the world. Ever since being dislodged from Afghanistan by the US-led intervention in the country nearly a decade ago, Bin Laden had lost most of his command and control system and organisational ability. As a fugitive wandering in various hiding places in Pakistan, all he could do was to issue video recordings from time to time and serve as a source of inspiration, and as such also franchising Al Qaeda’s operations.

It is astonishing that neither the Pakistani nor the American intelligence had been able to spot him before or induce any individual to collect the $25 million bounty on him. Islamabad continuously denied his presence on Pakistani territory, and yet he is killed in a gun battle outside Islamabad.

There were always speculations that the powerful Pakistani military intelligence service (ISI) had some inkling about his whereabouts, but it was in its interest not to reveal it to the Americans, for one important reason. It would have degraded Pakistan’s importance in Washington’s strategic calculations as a critical partner in the war on terror and recipient of massive American military and economic assistance, amounting to over $10 billion between 2002 and 2009 alone.

It is also argued that the US under President George Bush would not have found it in its interests if Bin Laden had been captured ‘dead or alive’, for it would have deligitimised America’s war on terror and its operations in Afghanistan as well as its bourgeoning strategic links with Pakistan. By the same token it could not go beyond Afghanistan with a rationale to invade Iraq in March 2003.

However, while Bin Laden’s death is bound to have a serious psychological impact on his followers, by the same token it could motivate them to become more assertive in taking revenge. Meanwhile, it is unlikely to change the situation on the ground in turbulent Afghanistan and Pakistan. Most of their problems, ranging from poor governance to corruption and insecurity, are homegrown rather than underpinned by Al Qaeda activities. As the head of the CIA has repeatedly said, there are no more than 50-100 Al Qaeda operatives in Afghanistan, although he has not put a figure on their presence in Pakistan, which may be higher.

Al Qaeda has not been the backbone of the Afghan Taliban and Pakistan Taliban insurgencies. Its elements may have played a part here and there, but on the whole the Taliban from both sides of the border have their own national causes, in most ways unrelated to the wider Al Qaeda issues – such as Israel’s occupation of the Palestinian lands, most importantly Jerusalem, and America’s backing of various regimes and geopolitical dominance in the Middle East and beyond.

In the same vein, it cannot be expected to reduce dramatically the concerns of the United States and those of its allies about how to stabilise Afghanistan and Pakistan to the extent that could enable them to secure an early exit from Afghanistan. The situation in both of those countries is so messy that with or without Al Qaeda it could remain very consuming. For the US and its allies, the issue has been more than destroying Al Qaeda. It has also had the geopolitical objective of containing Iran, marginalising radical political Islam in world politics, preventing nuclear-armed Pakistan from imploding with its nuclear arsenals falling into wrong hands, and deterring any Russian comeback to mineral and market-rich Central Asia (where the US has now established significant military bases) and limiting the space for China to expand its influence in the region.

The killing of Bin Laden will not alter these strategic realities. Nor will it free the United States from issues confronting it in relation to the dire situation in Iraq and the unresolved Palestinian problem as well as the uncertainties and unpredictabilities generated by popular uprisings in the Arab world.

Bin Laden’s death may well be welcome news to the US and its allies, and many others around the world, but it cannot be expected to make the world any less insecure and volatile than it is at present.

Amin Saikal is Professor of Political Science and director of the Centre for Arab and Islamic Studies (the Middle East and Central Asia) at the Australian National University