In reality the share count won't change and cash will be burned. The winners are throw with options based compensation.

Posted via CB10

Cash burn as much as you want, it is a low price to pay for the signal it sends to 1. Employees : Management cares about employees morale, and 2. The general public: we ain't dead yet.

If there was a way to measure media attention (positive this time) this move is allowing on BBRY, that on top of what it allows you to do internally with your employees, the cost /benefit ratio of this share repurchase plan may be of substantial benefit to BBRY. Even if this was voted down...

I haven't posted since Monday when I made a purchase of BBRY stock so I thought I would post a chart today. We are at an interesting juncture today, just below overhead resistance and looking to pop above that level now.

We have resistance at $ 10.40/shr on the down-sloping line, and, we have some monthly resistance at the close at $ 10.45/shr. So it makes sense that we need to close above these two levels in order to enter a new sideways channel. I mentioned on Monday that I wanted to own an additional block of BBRY because I felt I could sell some very short-term call options and pull together $ .70 - $ .80/shr profit. The news of the share buy-back will help me get there today.

As for the share buy-back, it sends a message, first, there won't be 12 MM shares available for shorts and day traders to play with, they will disappear. Secondly, only extremely healthy balance sheets do this, none of our well financed biotechs will try this move, not HALO, not ACAD, or SPHS, none of them. The cost to send this message out to the market is little more than the additional cash-flow they'll obtain this quarter, big deal. The message to those who think BBRY will disappear is quite the big deal though, BB is about to spend some of that massive amount of cash and this is just one of the many areas they have chosen. I would like them to spend much of that cash on acquisitions, not dividends or shares buy-backs. The trick is to grow revenues, generate cash-flow and invest those proceeds too. So let's see firsthand how the market accepts this share buy-back news. A close above $ 10.45/shr should see us head for the elusive $ 11.13/shr level without the need for a take-over rumour! GL

I agree, I would prefer spending the money on a new aquisition that improves the overall offering and that can generate additional revenue. Once we have revenue growth we will fly imo. This move will be short lived in my opinion,

I agree, I would prefer spending the money on a new aquisition that improves the overall offering and that can generate additional revenue. Once we have revenue growth we will fly imo. This move will be short lived in my opinion,

I would have purchased 10% of the convertible bond issue, now that would have sent a message home to investors and eliminate the interest on the same.

That's the kind of mindless article I expected to see today, the facts are clear, they are able to buy back 12 million shares, they might not buy any of them. They can retire more shares than will be issued to anyone in the company on June 23rd and this is a net reduction in dilution of stock. They can issue shares any time they like. The cost of this program is about the same as if they added cash-flow positive to their balance sheet for Q1 2016, big deal. Chen would not be doing this if he didn't see stabilization in the company, he must be looking at hardware/services and liking the feedback. Let Chen decide what to do with BB money and leave the arm chair quarterbacking to authors who know little about the internal workings of BlackBerry. (That felt good!)

You know I'm well aware of that! If we ever form a business, we'll have to drag you into it as a partner, you are saving me tons of time on research sir! Keep up the good work. I see we have dropped back to resistance and held it, we now need to mount a slow rally that takes us to new highs today.

But why would those bond holders sell? They are getting guaranteed 6%, and they can convert to stock when the SP is much higher anyways @$10/sh?

The provisions are in the issue to retire those bonds with a slight penalty. They will be paying a premium to purchase shares now so what's the difference? I would think that Chen considered this option and realized that you can't tap major Funds for $ 1.25 B and then exercise the right to take away their investment 2 years later. The message would have been huge, I would guess he floated the idea and backed off for now.

Telcel (America Movil) has launched the Blackberry Classic smartphone in Mexico, a device aimed at QWERTY keyboard loyalists. Available now from Telcel stores and online, the Classic runs on the BlackBerry 10.3.1 OS and comes with a 1.5 GHz Qualcomm processor and 2GB RAM, 16 GB internal storage plus a microSD card slot, an 8 megapixel back camera and 2 megapixel front camera. Telcel customers can use the phone on the company's 4G network at no additional cost and regardless of their pre-paid or post-paid plan.

But it’s not all bad news for Chen. BlackBerry stock has seen strong growth (albeit from very low levels) since Chen took the reins, and the company filing shows that his $85-million stock package is now worth $140 million U.S.

Chen’s base salary for the most recent fiscal year was $1 million U.S., and he received another $2.4 million in share-based awards and incentive plans.

That means he earned significantly less than some other BlackBerry execs, at least this fiscal year. Chief operations officer Marty Beard was paid nearly $4.2 million in total compensation, while chief legal officer Steve Zipperstein walked away with $6.2 million.

And new hire Sandeep Chennakeshu, who joined the company last year to run its Business Technology Solutions unit, walked away with $18.2 million, of which all but $268,000 was shares.

Digging a little from the above article ...
Interesting figures and forecasts to set the picture of the forthcoming years ... with QNX/NOC/BES in mind.
(P.S: dated nov. 2014, salt it as it's more than 6 months old)http://www.gartner.com/newsroom/id/2905717

Table 1: Internet of Things Units Installed Base by Category

Category

2013

2014

2015

2020

Automotive

96.0

189.6

372.3

3,511.1

Consumer

1,842.1

2,244.5

2.874.9

13,172.5

Generic Business

395.2

479.4

623.9

5,158.6

Vertical Business

698.7

836.5

1,009.4

3,164.4

Grand Total

3,032.0

3,750.0

4,880.6

25,006.6

Source: Gartner (November 2014)

“Organizations must straddle the tension of all the information available from smart things by balancing their desire to collect and analyze it with the risk of its loss or misuse,” Mr. Prentice said.

The IoT highlights the tight linkages between information security, information technology security, operational technology security and physical security like never before. Executives now face a decision regarding the future of security in their enterprise and who governs, manages and operates it. Gartner said that by the end of 2017, over 20 per cent of organizations will have digital security services devoted to protecting business initiatives using devices and services in IoT.

The IoT will bring into the digital security architecture dozens of new platform options, hundreds of variations on hybrid IT/IoT integration, new standards per industry, and a new view of an application. IT leaders will have to accommodate the differences in technologies across those areas and develop a multifaceted technology approach to IoT risk and security. In addition, with some machines producing enormous amounts of data and other sensors sending a handful of bits per day or week, IT leaders will need to balance digital business requirements with digital security realities.

J.C surely has early access to Gartners' reports ;-)
Some growth rates are really impressive ... isn't it ?
Gimme a penny for each Gb ... lol

Wow, a share buyback by BBRY. That is definitely a great sign. I continue to be confident in my holdings and am even more so after this news.

The stock may not be responding too much to the news. But I also wouldn't take today's price as fully indicative of what the market thinks. Most of the "real" traders didn't come in today or they aren't making it back from lunch. Today is a low volume day where day traders ply their tricks in the hopes of wild swings on low volume. The real decision makers at the long term investment shops are not available today. They may have guys at the desk, but the younger guys aren't authorized to trade unless it is an emergency. Maybe sometime next week the new theory about BBRY's position is going to make it to the real money movers. Right now there is the possibility to invest in a major tech company which is so cash flow positive they are doing buybacks and yet the stock price is still super low.

Get ready for a wave of BB bashing and rehashing of Jacquie McNish's and Sean Silcoff's fine upstanding work, no doubt... Aren't they proud...

The Inside Story of How the iPhone Crippled BlackBerry‘Losing the Signal’ examines Research In Motion’s efforts to take on Apple’s game-changing smartphone

BOOK EXCERPT
Condensed and adapted from the forthcoming book “Losing the Signal: The Untold Story Behind the Extraordinary Rise and Spectacular Fall of BlackBerry.”

By JACQUIE MCNISH And SEAN SILCOFF
May 22, 2015 12:25 p.m. ET

Mike Lazaridis was home on his treadmill when he saw the televised report about Apple Inc.’s newest product. Research In Motion’s founder soon forgot about exercise that day in January 2007. There was Steve Jobs on a San Francisco stage waving a small glass object, downloading music, videos and maps from the Internet onto a device he called the iPhone.

“How did they do that?” Mr. Lazaridis wondered. His curiosity turned to disbelief when Stanley Sigman, the chief executive of Cingular Wireless joined Mr. Jobs to announce a multiyear contract with Apple to sell iPhones. What was Cingular’s parent AT&T Inc. thinking? “It’s going to collapse the network,” Mr. Lazaridis thought.

The next day Mr. Lazaridis grabbed his co-CEO Jim Balsillie at the office and pulled him in front of a computer.

“Jim, I want you to watch this,” he said, pointing to a webcast of the iPhone unveiling. “They put a full Web browser on that thing. The carriers aren’t letting us put a full browser on our products.”

Mr. Balsillie’s first thought was RIM was losing AT&T as a customer. “Apple’s got a better deal,” Mr. Balsillie said. “We were never allowed that. The U.S. market is going to be tougher.”

If the iPhone gained traction, RIM’s senior executives believed, it would be with consumers who cared more about YouTube and other Internet escapes than efficiency and security. RIM’s core business customers valued BlackBerry’s secure and efficient communication systems. Offering mobile access to broader Internet content, says Mr. Conlee, “was not a space where we parked our business.”

The iPhone’s popularity with consumers was illogical to rivals such as RIM, Nokia Corp. and Motorola Inc. The phone’s battery lasted less than eight hours, it operated on an older, slower second-generation network, and, as Mr. Lazaridis predicted, music, video and other downloads strained AT&T’s network. RIM now faced an adversary it didn’t understand.

“By all rights the product should have failed, but it did not,” said David Yach, RIM’s chief technology officer. To Mr. Yach and other senior RIM executives, Apple changed the competitive landscape by shifting the raison d’tre of smartphones from something that was functional to a product that was beautiful.

“I learned that beauty matters....RIM was caught incredulous that people wanted to buy this thing,” Mr. Yach says.

Verizon’s Big Ask

RIM faced the iPhone threat by joining forces with Verizon Communications Inc. The powerful U.S. carrier understood that AT&T’s exclusive deal to sell the iPhone was a serious competitive threat.

More than 1 million iPhones, dubbed the Jesus Phone, had been sold in its first three months during the summer of 2007. This was no ordinary phone. It was a cult with a devoted and rapidly growing following.

Verizon went searching for an antidote to viral iPhone sales in August and RIM, then the world’s largest smartphone maker, was its chosen supplier. Mr. Lazaridis initially offered BlackBerry’s planned new Bold phone, with its traditional keyboard and new touch-screen display, as the answer. But Verizon officials waved him off. If Apple and AT&T were gaining ground with a touch-screen phone, Verizon had to have one.

Mr. Lazaridis’s solution was Storm, a phone that was little more than a prototype in 2007. Like the iPhone, Storm featured a glass screen. Unlike Apple’s phone, it had a movable screen. Users could activate the phone’s digital keyboard by pressing the screen down, replicating the click and tactile pleasure that made BlackBerry’s physical keyboard so popular.

‘There was a point where the carrier, by changing the rules, forced all the other carriers to change the rules eventually. It allowed Apple to reset what the expectations were. Conservation didn’t matter. Battery life didn’t matter. Cost didn’t matter. That’s their genius.’
—Mike Lazaridis, RIM’s founder

Verizon officials loved Storm, promising a marketing budget of as much as $100 million to promote Storm in thousands of retail outlets. It was a huge breakthrough in the U.S. market for BlackBerry, and Mr. Lazaridis felt he couldn’t say no even though Verizon set a punishing deadline of launching Storm by the spring of 2008.

The nine-month deadline came and went, and it wasn’t until 15 months later in November 2008 that RIM was able to start shipping Storm phones for the busy Christmas season. Internally, most of RIM’s engineers knew the company was shipping a flawed product.

The browser was painfully slow, the clickable screen didn’t respond well in the corners and the device often froze and reset. Like most tech companies launching a glitchy product, RIM played for time. Verizon stoked sales with heavy subsidies, while RIM’s engineers raced to introduce software upgrades to eliminate Storm’s many bugs. “It was the best-selling initial product we ever had,” says Mr. Lazaridis, with 1 million devices sold in the first two months. “We couldn’t meet demand.”

Storm’s success was fleeting. By the time Mr. Balsillie was summoned to Verizon’s Basking Ridge, N.J., headquarters in the spring of 2009 to review the carrier’s sales data, RIM’s senior executives knew Storm was a wipeout. Virtually every one of the 1 million Storm phones shipped in 2008 needed replacing, Verizon’s chief marketing officer, John Stratton, told Mr. Balsillie. Many of the replacements were being returned as well. Storm was a complete failure, and Mr. Stratton wanted RIM to pay.

“You’re going to make us whole on the money we’ve spent fixing your Storm product problems,” Mr. Stratton told Mr. Balsillie, “or we’ll revisit our whole supplier relationship with you. This is your responsibility. We expect you to step up because this is your fault, not ours.” Verizon wanted RIM to pay close to $500 million to cover the carrier’s losses.

“I can’t write a check like that,” Mr. Balsillie said.

Instead, he and his team walked Mr. Stratton through an alternative solution. Mr. Balsillie offered Mr. Stratton a range of concessions, including a free repair and upgrade program and a cache of complimentary BlackBerrys. The fix would cost RIM more than $100 million, a cost that would barely dent RIM’s income statement compared to the bath it would have to take to make Verizon whole.

Mr. Stratton wasn’t happy, but he had little choice. Verizon had signed a “take-or-pay” deal, meaning it was stuck with the units it committed to buy. Mr. Stratton wouldn’t get his $500 million, but he warned Mr. Balsillie that the carrier’s relationship with the Waterloo, Ontario, company would change dramatically.

Storm’s Wake

For the first time since it went public, RIM had delivered a product that widely missed the mark. Given the opportunity to vault past Apple and regain its lead in the smartphone race, RIM had fallen short. RIM was used to winning praise and adulation for its devices; now critics were questioning whether it could still innovate.

“Everybody was upset. It was demoralizing for the whole organization,” says Chief Operating Officer Don Morrison. “You’re shattering the very fabric of what BlackBerry stood for.”

Mr. Conlee says, “We thought it was within our ability to get it done. We were wrong. I think people were embarrassed.”

Only Mr. Lazaridis didn’t regard Storm as a failure. To him, it was RIM’s first crack at a new technology. When he looked at Storm, Mr. Lazaridis saw its technical achievements: It had a good camera, video-streaming capabilities, a great speaker and a replaceable battery. It was Verizon’s first 3G device. Most of all, he loved the clickable screen. Mr. Lazaridis hated the sensation of typing on glass, of using a touch-screen keyboard that didn’t physically respond to every click. He couldn’t fathom that consumers might not love his clickable screen—it had to be the fault of his staff for delivering a poorly built product.

“We let Mike down, in his mind, because he made a request and we didn’t deliver,” says Mr. Morrison. “Whether the request is reasonable or not is not part of that sentence.”

Mr. Yach, chief technology officer in charge of software, shouldered much of the blame from Mr. Lazaridis for Storm’s shortcomings. “He would say, ‘You must have crappy people,’” Mr. Yach says. “He was clearly frustrated. From his perspective he felt that he was let down.”

Mr. Lazaridis was convinced Storm was the kind of device BlackBerry should continue to improve. RIM would take another stab at a clickable screen with Storm 2. Even though sales were tepid, Mr. Lazaridis persisted with the clickable Storm screen until 2010, when U.S. carriers finally lost interest.

Although the market rejected his initial touch-screen approach, Mr. Lazaridis believed the four pillars of BlackBerry’s success—good battery life, miserly use of carrier’s spectrum, security and the ability to type—still ruled in the new smartphone world and gave his company its competitive advantage. Two years after Apple’s launch, it still amazed Mr. Lazaridis that iPhone users had to cart around adapters to power up depleted batteries. His early prediction that Apple would cause AT&T headaches by using up its network bandwidth also proved right.

But there was no going back. Apple was setting a new agenda for the wireless industry. RIM, like others, were now followers. “We built a perfectly evolved, optimized service and product offering that made the industry take off,” says Mr. Lazaridis. “There was a point where the carrier, by changing the rules, forced all the other carriers to change the rules eventually. It allowed Apple to reset what the expectations were. Conservation didn’t matter. Battery life didn’t matter. Cost didn’t matter. That’s their genius. We had to respond in a way that was completely different than what people expected.”

Strategic Confusion

If the failure of Storm sent Mr. Lazaridis back to the lab with a sense of purpose, it left Mr. Balsillie winded. For a leader who thrived on ambiguity, Mr. Balsillie found it hard to grapple with the new competitive dynamic.

To Mr. Balsillie, RIM was in an existential crisis, mired in what he describes as “strategic confusion.” The company’s business had been disrupted on several levels, with no obvious path forward. Was RIM supposed to defend BlackBerry’s QWERTY keyboard, or jump all-in and become a touch-screen smartphone maker? Was it supposed to challenge Apple at the high end of the smartphone market or focus on the lower end with devices like its Curve and Gemini models, which were driving heady sales gains in foreign markets where Apple wasn’t yet a factor? Should the company stick to its closed, proprietary software technology or open its platform?

One of the biggest puzzles was what to do about apps. For years Mr. Balsillie had fought carriers for the right to sell apps to customers, reassuring them RIM was “constructively aligned” with the wireless carriers. Then Apple waltzed in with an app store despite AT&T exclusion from any app revenues.

Now RIM was forced to play catch-up. Unlike RIM, Apple had an army of outside developers who had already built consumer apps for its computers and iPods and were primed to do the same for the iPhone. By the time BlackBerry launched its app store in spring 2009, iPhone customers had already downloaded 1 billion apps. Was RIM taking the right approach, Mr. Balsillie wondered, or should it stick to its “constructive alignment” narrative and leave the sale of apps to carriers?

Mr. Balsillie struggled with each question. “The Storm failure made it clear we were not the dominant smartphone company anymore. We’re grappling with who we are because we can’t be who we used to be anymore, which sucked...It’s not clear what the hell to do.”

couple of notes after reading
(4) Within two years following the Closing Date, if a Purchaser, acting reasonably, so requests in writing, BlackBerry shall use its reasonable commercial efforts to obtain TSX approval of the listing of the Debentures.

also

The Issuer may at its option at any time on or after November —, 2016, and from time to time thereafter, redeem all, or any of the Debentures on not less than forty (40) and not more than sixty (60) days’ prior notice to the Holders for cash at the following redemption prices:

(a) 104% of the principal amount of the Debentures to be redeemed, plus accrued and unpaid interest thereon, if any, to but excluding the Redemption Date, if redeemed on or after November —, 2016 and prior to November —, 2017;

(b) 103% of the principal amount of the Debentures to be redeemed, plus accrued and unpaid interest thereon, if any, to but excluding the Redemption Date, if redeemed on or after November —, 2017 and prior to November —, 2018;

(c) 102% of the principal amount of the Debentures to be redeemed, plus accrued and unpaid interest thereon, if any, to but excluding the Redemption Date, if redeemed on or after November —, 2018 and prior to November —, 2019; and

(d) 101% of the principal amount of the Debentures to be redeemed, plus accrued and unpaid interest thereon, if any, to but excluding the Redemption Date, if redeemed on or after November —, 2019 and prior to November —, 2020.