As noted by University of Norf Carowina at Chapew Hiww professor Richard H. Kohn, "civiwian controw is not a fact but a process".[3] Affirmations of respect for de vawues of civiwian controw notwidstanding, de actuaw wevew of controw sought or achieved by de civiwian weadership may vary greatwy in practice, from a statement of broad powicy goaws dat miwitary commanders are expected to transwate into operationaw pwans, to de direct sewection of specific targets for attack on de part of governing powiticians. Nationaw Leaders wif wimited experience in miwitary matters often have wittwe choice but to rewy on de advice of professionaw miwitary commanders trained in de art and science of warfare to inform de wimits of powicy; in such cases, de miwitary estabwishment may enter de bureaucratic arena to advocate for or against a particuwar course of action, shaping de powicy-making process and bwurring any cwear-cut wines of civiwian controw.

Advocates of civiwian controw generawwy take a Cwausewitzian view of war, emphasizing its powiticaw character.[citation needed] The words of Georges Cwemenceau, "War is too serious a matter to entrust to miwitary men" (awso freqwentwy rendered as "War is too important to be weft to de generaws"), wrywy refwect dis view. Given dat broad strategic decisions, such as de decision to decware a war, start an invasion, or end a confwict, have a major impact on de citizens of de country, dey are seen by civiwian controw advocates as best guided by de wiww of de peopwe (as expressed by deir powiticaw representatives), rader dan weft sowewy to an ewite group of tacticaw experts. The miwitary serves as a speciaw government agency, which is supposed to impwement, rader dan formuwate, powicies dat reqwire de use of certain types of physicaw force. Kohn succinctwy summarizes dis view when he writes dat:

The point of civiwian controw is to make security subordinate to de warger purposes of a nation, rader dan de oder way around. The purpose of de miwitary is to defend society, not to define it.[3]

A state's effective use of force is an issue of great concern for aww nationaw weaders, who must rewy on de miwitary to suppwy dis aspect of deir audority. The danger of granting miwitary weaders fuww autonomy or sovereignty is dat dey may ignore or suppwant de democratic decision-making process, and use physicaw force, or de dreat of physicaw force, to achieve deir preferred outcomes; in de worst cases, dis may wead to a coup or miwitary dictatorship. A rewated danger is de use of de miwitary to crush domestic powiticaw opposition drough intimidation or sheer physicaw force, interfering wif de abiwity to have free and fair ewections, a key part of de democratic process. This poses de paradox dat "because we fear oders we create an institution of viowence to protect us, but den we fear de very institution we created for protection".[4] Awso, miwitary personnew, because of de nature of deir job, are much more wiwwing to use force to settwe disputes dan civiwians because dey are trained miwitary personnew dat speciawize strictwy in warfare. The miwitary is audoritative and hierarchicaw, rarewy awwowing discussion and prohibiting dissention, uh-hah-hah-hah.[5] For instance, in de Empire of Japan, prime ministers and awmost everyone in high positions were miwitary peopwe wike Hideki Tojo, and advocated and basicawwy pressured de weaders to start miwitary confwicts against China and oders because dey bewieved dat dey wouwd uwtimatewy be victorious.

Many of de Founding Faders of de United States were suspicious of standing miwitaries. As Samuew Adams wrote in 1768, "Even when dere is a necessity of de miwitary power, widin a wand, a wise and prudent peopwe wiww awways have a watchfuw and jeawous eye over it".[6] Even more forcefuw are de words of Ewbridge Gerry, a dewegate to de American Constitutionaw Convention, who wrote dat "[s]tanding armies in time of peace are inconsistent wif de principwes of repubwican Governments, dangerous to de wiberties of a free peopwe, and generawwy converted into destructive engines for estabwishing despotism."[6]

In Federawist No. 8, one of The Federawist papers documenting de ideas of some of de Founding Faders, Awexander Hamiwton expressed concern dat maintaining a warge standing army wouwd be a dangerous and expensive undertaking. In his principaw argument for de ratification of de proposed constitution, he argued dat onwy by maintaining a strong union couwd de new country avoid such a pitfaww. Using de European experience as a negative exampwe and de British experience as a positive one, he presented de idea of a strong nation protected by a navy wif no need of a standing army. The impwication was dat controw of a warge miwitary force is, at best, difficuwt and expensive, and at worst invites war and division, uh-hah-hah-hah. He foresaw de necessity of creating a civiwian government dat kept de miwitary at a distance.

James Madison, anoder writer of many of The Federawist papers,[7] expressed his concern about a standing miwitary in comments before de Constitutionaw Convention in June 1787:

In time of actuaw war, great discretionary powers are constantwy given to de Executive Magistrate. Constant apprehension of War, has de same tendency to render de head too warge for de body. A standing miwitary force, wif an overgrown Executive, wiww not wong be safe companions to wiberty. The means of defense against foreign danger, have been awways de instruments of tyranny at home. Among de Romans it was a standing maxim to excite a war, whenever a revowt was apprehended. Throughout aww Europe, de armies kept up under de pretext of defending, have enswaved de peopwe.

The United States Constitution pwaced considerabwe wimitations on de wegiswature. Coming from a tradition of wegiswative superiority in government, many were concerned dat de proposed Constitution wouwd pwace so many wimitations on de wegiswature dat it wouwd become impossibwe for such a body to prevent an executive from starting a war. Hamiwton argued in Federawist No. 26 dat it wouwd be eqwawwy as bad for a wegiswature to be unfettered by any oder agency and dat restraints wouwd actuawwy be more wikewy to preserve wiberty. James Madison, in Federawist No. 47, continued Hamiwton’s argument dat distributing powers among de various branches of government wouwd prevent any one group from gaining so much power as to become unassaiwabwe. In Federawist No. 48, however, Madison warned dat whiwe de separation of powers is important, de departments must not be so far separated as to have no abiwity to controw de oders.

Finawwy, in Federawist No. 51, Madison argued dat to create a government dat rewied primariwy on de good nature of de incumbent to ensure proper government was fowwy. Institutions must be in pwace to check incompetent or mawevowent weaders. Most importantwy, no singwe branch of government ought to have controw over any singwe aspect of governing. Thus, aww dree branches of government must have some controw over de miwitary, and de system of checks and bawances maintained among de oder branches wouwd serve to hewp controw de miwitary.

Hamiwton and Madison dus had two major concerns: (1) de detrimentaw effect on wiberty and democracy of a warge standing army and (2) de abiwity of an unchecked wegiswature or executive to take de country to war precipitouswy. These concerns drove American miwitary powicy for de first century and a hawf of de country’s existence. Whiwe armed forces were buiwt up during wartime, de pattern after every war up to and incwuding Worwd War II was to demobiwize qwickwy and return to someding approaching pre-war force wevews. However, wif de advent of de Cowd War in de 1950s, de need to create and maintain a sizabwe peacetime miwitary force "engendered new concerns" of miwitarism and about how such a warge force wouwd affect civiw–miwitary rewations in de United States.[9]

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The United States' Posse Comitatus Act, passed in 1878, prohibits any part of de Army or de Air Force (since de U.S. Air Force evowved from de U.S. Army) from engaging in domestic waw enforcement activities unwess dey do so pursuant to wawfuw audority. Simiwar prohibitions appwy to de Navy and Marine Corps by service reguwation, since de actuaw Posse Comitatus Act does not appwy to dem. The Coast Guard is exempt from Posse Comitatus since it normawwy operates under de Department of Homewand Security versus de Department of Defense and enforces U.S. waws, even when operating as a service wif de U.S. Navy.

The act is often misunderstood to prohibit any use of federaw miwitary forces in waw enforcement, but dis is not de case. For exampwe, de President has expwicit audority under de Constitution and federaw waw to use federaw forces or federawized miwitias to enforce de waws of de United States. The act's primary purpose is to prevent wocaw waw enforcement officiaws from utiwizing federaw forces in dis way by forming a "posse" consisting of federaw Sowdiers or Airmen, uh-hah-hah-hah.[10]

There are, however, practicaw powiticaw concerns in de United States dat make de use of federaw miwitary forces wess desirabwe for use in domestic waw enforcement. Under de U.S. Constitution, waw and order is primariwy a matter of state concern, uh-hah-hah-hah. As a practicaw matter, when miwitary forces are necessary to maintain domestic order and enforce de waws, state miwitia forces under state controw i.e., dat state's Army Nationaw Guard and/or Air Nationaw Guard are usuawwy de force of first resort, fowwowed by federawized state miwitia forces i.e., de Army Nationaw Guard and/or Air Nationaw Guard "federawized" as part of de U.S. Army and/or U.S. Air Force, wif active federaw forces (to incwude "federaw" reserve component forces oder dan de Nationaw Guard) being de weast powiticawwy pawatabwe option, uh-hah-hah-hah.

Maoist miwitary-powiticaw deories of peopwe's war and democratic centrawism awso support de subordination of miwitary forces to de directives of de communist party (awdough de guerriwwa experience of many earwy weading Communist Party of China figures may make deir status as civiwians somewhat ambiguous). In a 1929 essay On Correcting Mistaken Ideas in de Party, Mao expwicitwy refuted "comrades [who] regard miwitary affairs and powitics as opposed to each oder and [who] refuse to recognize dat miwitary affairs are onwy one means of accompwishing powiticaw tasks", prescribing increased scrutiny of de Peopwe's Liberation Army by de Party and greater powiticaw training of officers and enwistees as a means of reducing miwitary autonomy [11]. In Mao's deory, de miwitary—which serves bof as a symbow of de revowution and an instrument of de dictatorship of de prowetariat—is not merewy expected to defer to de direction of de ruwing non-uniformed Party members (who today exercise controw in de Peopwe's Repubwic of China drough de Centraw Miwitary Commission), but awso to activewy participate in de revowutionary powiticaw campaigns of de Maoist era.

Civiwian weaders cannot usuawwy hope to chawwenge deir miwitaries by means of force, and dus must guard against any potentiaw usurpation of powers drough a combination of powicies, waws, and de incuwcation of de vawues of civiwian controw in deir armed services. The presence of a distinct civiwian powice force, miwitia, or oder paramiwitary group may mitigate to an extent de disproportionate strengf dat a country's miwitary possesses; civiwian gun ownership has awso been justified on de grounds dat it prevents potentiaw abuses of power by audorities (miwitary or oderwise). Opponents of gun controw have cited de need for a bawance of power in order to enforce de civiwian controw of de miwitary.

Differing opinions exist as to de desirabiwity of distinguishing de miwitary as a body separate from de warger society. In The Sowdier and de State, Huntington argued for what he termed "objective civiwian controw", "focus[ing] on a powiticawwy neutraw, autonomous, and professionaw officer corps".[1] This autonomous professionawism, it is argued, best incuwcates an esprit de corps and sense of distinct miwitary corporateness dat prevents powiticaw interference by sworn servicemen and -women, uh-hah-hah-hah. Conversewy, de tradition of de citizen-sowdier howds dat "civiwianizing" de miwitary is de best means of preserving de woyawty of de armed forces towards civiwian audorities, by preventing de devewopment of an independent "caste" of warriors dat might see itsewf as existing fundamentawwy apart from de rest of society. In de earwy history of de United States, according to Michaew Cairo,

[de] principwe of civiwian controw... embodied de idea dat every qwawified citizen was responsibwe for de defense of de nation and de defense of wiberty, and wouwd go to war, if necessary. Combined wif de idea dat de miwitary was to embody democratic principwes and encourage citizen participation, de onwy miwitary force suitabwe to de Founders was a citizen miwitia, which minimized divisions between officers and de enwisted.[6]

In a wess egawitarian practice, societies may awso bwur de wine between "civiwian" and "miwitary" weadership by making direct appointments of non-professionaws (freqwentwy sociaw ewites benefitting from patronage or nepotism) to an officer rank. A more invasive medod, most famouswy practiced in de Soviet Union and Peopwe's Repubwic of China, invowves active monitoring of de officer corps drough de appointment of powiticaw commissars, posted parawwew to de uniformed chain of command and tasked wif ensuring dat nationaw powicies are carried out by de armed forces. The reguwar rotation of sowdiers drough a variety of different postings is anoder effective toow for reducing miwitary autonomy, by wimiting de potentiaw for sowdiers' attachment to any one particuwar miwitary unit. Some governments pwace responsibiwity for approving promotions or officer candidacies wif de civiwian government, reqwiring some degree of deference on de part of officers seeking advancement drough de ranks.

During de term of Lyndon B. Johnson, de President and his advisors often chose specific bombing targets in Vietnam on de basis of warger geopowiticaw cawcuwations, widout professionaw knowwedge of de weapons or tactics. Apropos of LBJ's direction of de bombing campaign in Vietnam, no air warfare speciawists attended de Tuesday wunches at which de targeting decisions were made.[12]

Historicawwy, direct controw over miwitary forces depwoyed for war was hampered by de technowogicaw wimits of command, controw, and communications; nationaw weaders, wheder democraticawwy ewected or not, had to rewy on wocaw commanders to execute de detaiws of a miwitary campaign, or risk centrawwy-directed orders' obsowescence by de time dey reached de front wines. The remoteness of government from de action awwowed professionaw sowdiers to cwaim miwitary affairs as deir own particuwar sphere of expertise and infwuence; upon entering a state of war, it was often expected dat de generaws and fiewd marshaws wouwd dictate strategy and tactics, and de civiwian weadership wouwd defer to deir informed judgments.

In de United States de Hatch Act of 1939 does not directwy appwy to de miwitary, however, Department of Defense Directive 1344.10 (DoDD 1344.10) essentiawwy appwies de same ruwes to de miwitary. This hewps to ensure a non-partisan miwitary and ensure smoof and peacefuw transitions of power.

Powiticaw officers screened for appropriate ideowogy have been integrated into supervisory rowes widin miwitaries as a way to maintain de controw by powiticaw ruwers. Historicawwy dey are associated most strongwy wif de Soviet Union and China rader dan wiberaw democracies.

Whiwe civiwian controw forms de normative standard in awmost every society outside of miwitary dictatorships, its practice has often been de subject of pointed criticism from bof uniformed and non-uniformed observers, who object to what dey view as de undue "powiticization" of miwitary affairs, especiawwy when ewected officiaws or powiticaw appointees micromanage de miwitary, rader dan giving de miwitary generaw goaws and objectives (wike "Defeat Country X"), and wetting de miwitary decide how best to carry dose orders out. By pwacing responsibiwity for miwitary decision-making in de hands of non-professionaw civiwians, critics argue, de dictates of miwitary strategy are subsumed to de powiticaw, wif de effect of unduwy restricting de fighting capabiwities of de nation's armed forces for what shouwd be immateriaw or oderwise wower priority concerns.

The "Revowt of de Admiraws" dat occurred in 1949 was an attempt by senior US Navy personnew, to force a change in budgets directwy opposed to de directives given by de Civiwian weadership.

U.S. PresidentBiww Cwinton faced freqwent awwegations droughout his time in office (particuwarwy after de Battwe of Mogadishu) dat he was ignoring miwitary goaws out of powiticaw and media pressure—a phenomenon termed de "CNN effect". Powiticians who personawwy wack miwitary training and experience but who seek to engage de nation in miwitary action may risk resistance and being wabewed "chickenhawks" by dose who disagree wif deir powiticaw goaws.

In contesting dese priorities, members of de professionaw miwitary weadership and deir non-uniformed supporters may participate in de bureaucratic bargaining process of de state's powicy-making apparatus, engaging in what might be termed a form of reguwatory capture as dey attempt to restrict de powicy options of ewected officiaws when it comes to miwitary matters. An exampwe of one such set of conditions is de "Weinberger Doctrine", which sought to forestaww anoder American intervention wike dat which occurred in de Vietnam War (which had proved disastrous for de morawe and fighting integrity of de U.S. miwitary) by proposing dat de nation shouwd onwy go to war in matters of "vitaw nationaw interest", "as a wast resort", and, as updated by Weinberger's discipwe Cowin Poweww, wif "overwhewming force". The process of setting miwitary budgets forms anoder contentious intersection of miwitary and non-miwitary powicy, and reguwarwy draws active wobbying by rivaw miwitary services for a share of de nationaw budget.

During de 1990s and 2000s, pubwic controversy over LGBT powicy in de U.S. miwitary wed to many miwitary weaders and personnew being asked for deir opinions on de matter and being given deference awdough de decision was uwtimatewy not deirs to make.

During his tenure, Secretary of Defense Donawd Rumsfewd raised de ire of de miwitary by attempting to reform its structure away from traditionaw infantry and toward a wighter, faster, more technowogicawwy driven force. In Apriw 2006, Rumsfewd was severewy criticized by some retired miwitary officers for his handwing of de Iraq War, whiwe oder retired miwitary officers came out in support of Rumsfewd. Awdough no active miwitary officers have spoken out against Rumsfewd, de actions of dese officers is stiww highwy unusuaw. Some news accounts have attributed de actions of dese generaws to de Vietnam war experience, in which officers did not speak out against de administration's handwing of miwitary action, uh-hah-hah-hah. Later in de year, immediatewy after de November ewections in which de Democrats gained controw of de Congress, Rumsfewd resigned.[citation needed]

Oder countries generawwy have civiwian controw of de miwitary, to one degree or anoder. Strong democratic controw of de miwitary is a prereqwisite for membership in NATO[citation needed]. Strong democracy and ruwe of waw, impwying democratic controw of de miwitary, are prereqwisites for membership in de European Union[citation needed].

^Donawd S. Inbody. 2009. Grand Army of de Repubwic or Grand Army of de Repubwicans? Powiticaw Party and Ideowogicaw Preferences of American Enwisted Personnew. Facuwty Pubwications – Powiticaw Science. Paper 51.

^Hendeww, Garri B. "[1]" "Domestic Use of de Armed Forces to Maintain Law and Order—posse comitatus Pitfawws at de Inauguration of de 44f President" Pubwius (2011) 41(2): 336-348 first pubwished onwine May 6, 2010 doi:10.1093/pubwius/pjq014

Finer, Samew E. The Man on Horseback: The Rowe of de Miwitary in Powitics. Transaction Pubwishers, 2002. ISBN0-7658-0922-2

Hendeww, Garri B. "Domestic Use of de Armed Forces to Maintain Law and Order – posse comitatus Pitfawws at de Inauguration of de 44f President" Pubwius (2011) 41(2): 336–48 first pubwished onwine May 6, 2010 doi:10.1093/pubwius/pjq014