SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

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1 (Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, Syllabus NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued. The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337. SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES Syllabus RODRIGUEZ v. UNITED STATES CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT No Argued January 21, 2015 Decided April 21, 2015 Officer Struble, a K 9 officer, stopped petitioner Rodriguez for driving on a highway shoulder, a violation of Nebraska law. After Struble attended to everything relating to the stop, including, inter alia, checking the driver s licenses of Rodriguez and his passenger and issuing a warning for the traffic offense, he asked Rodriguez for permission to walk his dog around the vehicle. When Rodriguez refused, Struble detained him until a second officer arrived. Struble then retrieved his dog, who alerted to the presence of drugs in the vehicle. The ensuing search revealed methamphetamine. Seven or eight minutes elapsed from the time Struble issued the written warning until the dog alerted. Rodriguez was indicted on federal drug charges. He moved to suppress the evidence seized from the vehicle on the ground, among others, that Struble had prolonged the traffic stop without reasonable suspicion in order to conduct the dog sniff. The Magistrate Judge recommended denial of the motion. He found no reasonable suspicion supporting detention once Struble issued the written warning. Under Eighth Circuit precedent, however, he concluded that prolonging the stop by seven to eight minutes for the dog sniff was only a de minimis intrusion on Rodriguez s Fourth Amendment rights and was for that reason permissible. The District Court then denied the motion to suppress. Rodriguez entered a conditional guilty plea and was sentenced to five years in prison. The Eighth Circuit affirmed. Noting that the seven or eight minute delay was an acceptable de minimis intrusion on Rodriguez s personal liberty, the court declined to reach the question whether Struble had reasonable suspicion to continue Rodriguez s detention after issuing the written warning. Held:

2 2 RODRIGUEZ v. UNITED STATES Syllabus 1. Absent reasonable suspicion, police extension of a traffic stop in order to conduct a dog sniff violates the Constitution s shield against unreasonable seizures. A routine traffic stop is more like a brief stop under Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1, than an arrest, see, e.g., Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U. S. 323, 330. Its tolerable duration is determined by the seizure s mission, which is to address the traffic violation that warranted the stop, Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U. S. 405, 407 and attend to related safety concerns. Authority for the seizure ends when tasks tied to the traffic infraction are or reasonably should have been completed. The Fourth Amendment may tolerate certain unrelated investigations that do not lengthen the roadside detention, Johnson, 555 U. S., at (questioning); Caballes, 543 U. S., at 406, 408 (dog sniff), but a traffic stop become[s] unlawful if it is prolonged beyond the time reasonably required to complete th[e] mission of issuing a warning ticket, id., at 407. Beyond determining whether to issue a traffic ticket, an officer s mission during a traffic stop typically includes checking the driver s license, determining whether there are outstanding warrants against the driver, and inspecting the automobile s registration and proof of insurance. These checks serve the same objective as enforcement of the traffic code: ensuring that vehicles on the road are operated safely and responsibly. See Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U. S. 648, Lacking the same close connection to roadway safety as the ordinary inquiries, a dog sniff is not fairly characterized as part of the officer s traffic mission. In concluding that the de minimis intrusion here could be offset by the Government s interest in stopping the flow of illegal drugs, the Eighth Circuit relied on Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U. S The Court reasoned in Mimms that the government s legitimate and weighty interest in officer safety outweighed the de minimis additional intrusion of requiring a driver, lawfully stopped, to exit a vehicle, id., at The officer-safety interest recognized in Mimms, however, stemmed from the danger to the officer associated with the traffic stop itself. On-scene investigation into other crimes, in contrast, detours from the officer s traffic-control mission and therefore gains no support from Mimms. The Government s argument that an officer who completes all traffic-related tasks expeditiously should earn extra time to pursue an unrelated criminal investigation is unpersuasive, for a traffic stop prolonged beyond the time in fact needed for the officer to complete his traffic-based inquiries is unlawful, Caballes, 543 U. S., at 407. The critical question is not whether the dog sniff occurs before or after the officer issues a ticket, but whether conducting the sniff adds

3 Cite as: 575 U. S. (2015) 3 Syllabus time to the stop. Pp The determination adopted by the District Court that detention for the dog sniff was not independently supported by individualized suspicion was not reviewed by the Eighth Circuit. That question therefore remains open for consideration on remand. P F. 3d 905, vacated and remanded. GINSBURG, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS, C. J., and SCALIA, BREYER, SOTOMAYOR, and KAGAN, JJ., joined. KEN- NEDY, J., filed a dissenting opinion. THOMAS, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which ALITO, J., joined, and in which KENNEDY, J., joined as to all but Part III. ALITO, J., filed a dissenting opinion.

4 Cite as: 575 U. S. (2015) 1 Opinion of the Court NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D. C , of any typographical or other formal errors, in order that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press. SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES No DENNYS RODRIGUEZ, PETITIONER v. UNITED STATES ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT [April 21, 2015] JUSTICE GINSBURG delivered the opinion of the Court. In Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U. S. 405 (2005), this Court held that a dog sniff conducted during a lawful traffic stop does not violate the Fourth Amendment s proscription of unreasonable seizures. This case presents the question whether the Fourth Amendment tolerates a dog sniff conducted after completion of a traffic stop. We hold that a police stop exceeding the time needed to handle the matter for which the stop was made violates the Constitution s shield against unreasonable seizures. A seizure justified only by a police-observed traffic violation, therefore, become[s] unlawful if it is prolonged beyond the time reasonably required to complete th[e] mission of issuing a ticket for the violation. Id., at 407. The Court so recognized in Caballes, and we adhere to the line drawn in that decision. I Just after midnight on March 27, 2012, police officer Morgan Struble observed a Mercury Mountaineer veer slowly onto the shoulder of Nebraska State Highway 275 for one or two seconds and then jerk back onto the road.

5 2 RODRIGUEZ v. UNITED STATES Opinion of the Court Nebraska law prohibits driving on highway shoulders, see Neb. Rev. Stat. 60 6,142 (2010), and on that basis, Struble pulled the Mountaineer over at 12:06 a.m. Struble is a K 9 officer with the Valley Police Department in Nebraska, and his dog Floyd was in his patrol car that night. Two men were in the Mountaineer: the driver, Dennys Rodriguez, and a front-seat passenger, Scott Pollman. Struble approached the Mountaineer on the passenger s side. After Rodriguez identified himself, Struble asked him why he had driven onto the shoulder. Rodriguez replied that he had swerved to avoid a pothole. Struble then gathered Rodriguez s license, registration, and proof of insurance, and asked Rodriguez to accompany him to the patrol car. Rodriguez asked if he was required to do so, and Struble answered that he was not. Rodriguez decided to wait in his own vehicle. After running a records check on Rodriguez, Struble returned to the Mountaineer. Struble asked passenger Pollman for his driver s license and began to question him about where the two men were coming from and where they were going. Pollman replied that they had traveled to Omaha, Nebraska, to look at a Ford Mustang that was for sale and that they were returning to Norfolk, Nebraska. Struble returned again to his patrol car, where he completed a records check on Pollman, and called for a second officer. Struble then began writing a warning ticket for Rodriguez for driving on the shoulder of the road. Struble returned to Rodriguez s vehicle a third time to issue the written warning. By 12:27 or 12:28 a.m., Struble had finished explaining the warning to Rodriguez, and had given back to Rodriguez and Pollman the documents obtained from them. As Struble later testified, at that point, Rodriguez and Pollman had all their documents back and a copy of the written warning. I got all the reason[s] for the stop out of the way[,]... took care of all

6 Cite as: 575 U. S. (2015) 3 Opinion of the Court the business. App. 70. Nevertheless, Struble did not consider Rodriguez free to leave. Id., at Although justification for the traffic stop was out of the way, id., at 70, Struble asked for permission to walk his dog around Rodriguez s vehicle. Rodriguez said no. Struble then instructed Rodriguez to turn off the ignition, exit the vehicle, and stand in front of the patrol car to wait for the second officer. Rodriguez complied. At 12:33 a.m., a deputy sheriff arrived. Struble retrieved his dog and led him twice around the Mountaineer. The dog alerted to the presence of drugs halfway through Struble s second pass. All told, seven or eight minutes had elapsed from the time Struble issued the written warning until the dog indicated the presence of drugs. A search of the vehicle revealed a large bag of methamphetamine. Rodriguez was indicted in the United States District Court for the District of Nebraska on one count of possession with intent to distribute 50 grams or more of methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U. S. C. 841(a)(1) and (b)(1). He moved to suppress the evidence seized from his car on the ground, among others, that Struble had prolonged the traffic stop without reasonable suspicion in order to conduct the dog sniff. After receiving evidence, a Magistrate Judge recommended that the motion be denied. The Magistrate Judge found no probable cause to search the vehicle independent of the dog alert. App. 100 (apart from information given by the dog, Officer Struble had [no]thing other than a rather large hunch ). He further found that no reasonable suspicion supported the detention once Struble issued the written warning. He concluded, however, that under Eighth Circuit precedent, extension of the stop by seven to eight minutes for the dog sniff was only a de minimis intrusion on Rodriguez s Fourth Amendment rights and was therefore permissible.

7 4 RODRIGUEZ v. UNITED STATES Opinion of the Court The District Court adopted the Magistrate Judge s factual findings and legal conclusions and denied Rodriguez s motion to suppress. The court noted that, in the Eighth Circuit, dog sniffs that occur within a short time following the completion of a traffic stop are not constitutionally prohibited if they constitute only de minimis intrusions. App. 114 (quoting United States v. Alexander, 448 F. 3d 1014, 1016 (CA8 2006)). The court thus agreed with the Magistrate Judge that the 7 to 10 minutes added to the stop by the dog sniff was not of constitutional significance. App Impelled by that decision, Rodriguez entered a conditional guilty plea and was sentenced to five years in prison. The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The seven- or eightminute delay in this case, the opinion noted, resembled delays that the court had previously ranked as permissible. 741 F. 3d 905, 907 (2014). The Court of Appeals thus ruled that the delay here constituted an acceptable de minimis intrusion on Rodriguez s personal liberty. Id., at 908. Given that ruling, the court declined to reach the question whether Struble had reasonable suspicion to continue Rodriguez s detention after issuing the written warning. We granted certiorari to resolve a division among lower courts on the question whether police routinely may extend an otherwise-completed traffic stop, absent reasonable suspicion, in order to conduct a dog sniff. 573 U. S. (2014). Compare, e.g., United States v. Morgan, 270 F. 3d 625, 632 (CA8 2001) (postcompletion delay of well under ten minutes permissible), with, e.g., State v. Baker, 2010 UT 18, 13, 229 P. 3d 650, 658 (2010) ( [W]ithout additional reasonable suspicion, the officer must allow the seized person to depart once the purpose of the stop has concluded. ).

8 Cite as: 575 U. S. (2015) 5 Opinion of the Court II A seizure for a traffic violation justifies a police investigation of that violation. [A] relatively brief encounter, a routine traffic stop is more analogous to a so-called Terry stop... than to a formal arrest. Knowles v. Iowa, 525 U. S. 113, 117 (1998) (quoting Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U. S. 420, 439 (1984), in turn citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1 (1968)). See also Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U. S. 323, 330 (2009). Like a Terry stop, the tolerable duration of police inquiries in the traffic-stop context is determined by the seizure s mission to address the traffic violation that warranted the stop, Caballes, 543 U. S., at 407, and attend to related safety concerns, infra, at 6 7. See also United States v. Sharpe, 470 U. S. 675, 685 (1985); Florida v. Royer, 460 U. S. 491, 500 (1983) (plurality opinion) ( The scope of the detention must be carefully tailored to its underlying justification. ). Because addressing the infraction is the purpose of the stop, it may last no longer than is necessary to effectuate th[at] purpose. Ibid. See also Caballes, 543 U. S., at 407. Authority for the seizure thus ends when tasks tied to the traffic infraction are or reasonably should have been completed. See Sharpe, 470 U. S., at 686 (in determining the reasonable duration of a stop, it [is] appropriate to examine whether the police diligently pursued [the] investigation ). Our decisions in Caballes and Johnson heed these constraints. In both cases, we concluded that the Fourth Amendment tolerated certain unrelated investigations that did not lengthen the roadside detention. Johnson, 555 U. S., at (questioning); Caballes, 543 U. S., at 406, 408 (dog sniff). In Caballes, however, we cautioned that a traffic stop can become unlawful if it is prolonged beyond the time reasonably required to complete th[e] mission of issuing a warning ticket. 543 U. S., at 407. And we repeated that admonition in Johnson: The seizure remains lawful only so long as [unrelated] inquiries do

9 6 RODRIGUEZ v. UNITED STATES Opinion of the Court not measurably extend the duration of the stop. 555 U. S., at 333. See also Muehler v. Mena, 544 U. S. 93, 101 (2005) (because unrelated inquiries did not exten[d] the time [petitioner] was detained[,]... no additional Fourth Amendment justification... was required ). An officer, in other words, may conduct certain unrelated checks during an otherwise lawful traffic stop. But contrary to JUSTICE ALITO s suggestion, post, at 4, n. 2, he may not do so in a way that prolongs the stop, absent the reasonable suspicion ordinarily demanded to justify detaining an individual. But see post, at 1 2 (ALITO, J., dissenting) (premising opinion on the dissent s own finding of reasonable suspicion, although the District Court reached the opposite conclusion, and the Court of Appeals declined to consider the issue). Beyond determining whether to issue a traffic ticket, an officer s mission includes ordinary inquiries incident to [the traffic] stop. Caballes, 543 U. S., at 408. Typically such inquiries involve checking the driver s license, determining whether there are outstanding warrants against the driver, and inspecting the automobile s registration and proof of insurance. See Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U. S. 648, (1979). See also 4 W. LaFave, Search and Seizure 9.3(c), pp (5th ed. 2012). These checks serve the same objective as enforcement of the traffic code: ensuring that vehicles on the road are operated safely and responsibly. See Prouse, 440 U. S., at ; LaFave, Search and Seizure 9.3(c), at 516 (A warrant check makes it possible to determine whether the apparent traffic violator is wanted for one or more previous traffic offenses. ). A dog sniff, by contrast, is a measure aimed at detect[ing] evidence of ordinary criminal wrongdoing. Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U. S. 32, (2000). See also Florida v. Jardines, 569 U. S. 1, (2013) (slip op., at 7 8). Candidly, the Government acknowledged at

10 Cite as: 575 U. S. (2015) 7 Opinion of the Court oral argument that a dog sniff, unlike the routine measures just mentioned, is not an ordinary incident of a traffic stop. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 33. Lacking the same close connection to roadway safety as the ordinary inquiries, a dog sniff is not fairly characterized as part of the officer s traffic mission. In advancing its de minimis rule, the Eighth Circuit relied heavily on our decision in Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U. S. 106 (1977) (per curiam). See United States v. $404, in U. S. Currency, 182 F. 3d 643, 649 (CA8 1999). In Mimms, we reasoned that the government s legitimate and weighty interest in officer safety outweighs the de minimis additional intrusion of requiring a driver, already lawfully stopped, to exit the vehicle. 434 U. S., at See also Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U. S. 408, (1997) (passengers may be required to exit vehicle stopped for traffic violation). The Eighth Circuit, echoed in JUSTICE THOMAS s dissent, believed that the imposition here similarly could be offset by the Government s strong interest in interdicting the flow of illegal drugs along the nation s highways. $404, in U. S. Currency, 182 F. 3d, at 649; see post, at 9. Unlike a general interest in criminal enforcement, however, the government s officer safety interest stems from the mission of the stop itself. Traffic stops are especially fraught with danger to police officers, Johnson, 555 U. S., at 330 (internal quotation marks omitted), so an officer may need to take certain negligibly burdensome precautions in order to complete his mission safely. Cf. United States v. Holt, 264 F. 3d 1215, (CA ) (en banc) (recognizing officer safety justification for criminal record and outstanding warrant checks), abrogated on other grounds as recognized in United States v. Stewart, 473 F. 3d 1265, 1269 (CA ). On-scene investigation into other crimes, however, detours from that mission. See supra, at 6 7. So too do safety precau

11 8 RODRIGUEZ v. UNITED STATES Opinion of the Court tions taken in order to facilitate such detours. But cf. post, at 2 3 (ALITO, J., dissenting). Thus, even assuming that the imposition here was no more intrusive than the exit order in Mimms, the dog sniff could not be justified on the same basis. Highway and officer safety are interests different in kind from the Government s endeavor to detect crime in general or drug trafficking in particular. The Government argues that an officer may incremental[ly] prolong a stop to conduct a dog sniff so long as the officer is reasonably diligent in pursuing the traffic-related purpose of the stop, and the overall duration of the stop remains reasonable in relation to the duration of other traffic stops involving similar circumstances. Brief for United States The Government s argument, in effect, is that by completing all traffic-related tasks expeditiously, an officer can earn bonus time to pursue an unrelated criminal investigation. See also post, at 2 5 (THOMAS, J., dissenting) (embracing the Government s argument). The reasonableness of a seizure, however, depends on what the police in fact do. See Knowles, 525 U. S., at In this regard, the Government acknowledges that an officer always has to be reasonably diligent. Tr. of Oral Arg. 49. How could diligence be gauged other than by noting what the officer actually did and how he did it? If an officer can complete traffic-based inquiries expeditiously, then that is the amount of time reasonably required to complete [the stop s] mission. Caballes, 543 U. S., at 407. As we said in Caballes and reiterate today, a traffic stop prolonged beyond that point is unlawful. Ibid. The critical question, then, is not whether the dog sniff occurs before or after the officer issues a ticket, as JUSTICE ALITO supposes, post, at 2 4, but whether conducting the sniff prolongs i.e., adds time to the stop, supra, at 6.

12 Cite as: 575 U. S. (2015) 9 Opinion of the Court III The Magistrate Judge found that detention for the dog sniff in this case was not independently supported by individualized suspicion, see App. 100, and the District Court adopted the Magistrate Judge s findings, see id., at The Court of Appeals, however, did not review that determination. But see post, at 1, (THOMAS, J., dissenting) (resolving the issue, nevermind that the Court of Appeals left it unaddressed); post, at 1 2 (ALITO, J., dissenting) (upbraiding the Court for addressing the sole issue decided by the Court of Appeals and characterizing the Court s answer as unnecessary because the Court, instead, should have decided an issue the Court of Appeals did not decide). The question whether reasonable suspicion of criminal activity justified detaining Rodriguez beyond completion of the traffic infraction investigation, therefore, remains open for Eighth Circuit consideration on remand. * * * For the reasons stated, the judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit is vacated, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered.

13 Cite as: 575 U. S. (2015) 1 KENNEDY, J., dissenting SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES No DENNYS RODRIGUEZ, PETITIONER v. UNITED STATES ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT [April 21, 2015] JUSTICE KENNEDY, dissenting. My join in JUSTICE THOMAS dissenting opinion does not extend to Part III. Although the issue discussed in that Part was argued here, the Court of Appeals has not addressed that aspect of the case in any detail. In my view the better course would be to allow that court to do so in the first instance.

14 Cite as: 575 U. S. (2015) 1 THOMAS, J., dissenting SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES No DENNYS RODRIGUEZ, PETITIONER v. UNITED STATES ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT [April 21, 2015] JUSTICE THOMAS, with whom JUSTICE ALITO joins, and with whom JUSTICE KENNEDY joins as to all but Part III, dissenting. Ten years ago, we explained that conducting a dog sniff [does] not change the character of a traffic stop that is lawful at its inception and otherwise executed in a reasonable manner. Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U. S. 405, 408 (2005). The only question here is whether an officer executed a stop in a reasonable manner when he waited to conduct a dog sniff until after he had given the driver a written warning and a backup unit had arrived, bringing the overall duration of the stop to 29 minutes. Because the stop was reasonably executed, no Fourth Amendment violation occurred. The Court s holding to the contrary cannot be reconciled with our decision in Caballes or a number of common police practices. It was also unnecessary, as the officer possessed reasonable suspicion to continue to hold the driver to conduct the dog sniff. I respectfully dissent. I The Fourth Amendment protects [t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures. U. S. Const., Amdt. 4. As the text indicates, and as we

15 2 RODRIGUEZ v. UNITED STATES THOMAS, J., dissenting have repeatedly confirmed, the ultimate touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness. Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U. S. 398, 403 (2006). We have defined reasonableness in objective terms by examining the totality of the circumstances, Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U. S. 33, 39 (1996), and by considering the traditional protections against unreasonable searches and seizures afforded by the common law at the time of the framing, Atwater v. Lago Vista, 532 U. S. 318, 326 (2001) (internal quotation marks omitted). When traditional protections have not provided a definitive answer, our precedents have analyzed a search or seizure in light of traditional standards of reasonableness by assessing, on the one hand, the degree to which it intrudes upon an individual s privacy and, on the other, the degree to which it is needed for the promotion of legitimate governmental interests. Virginia v. Moore, 553 U. S. 164, 171 (2008) (internal quotation marks omitted). Although a traffic stop constitutes a seizure of persons within the meaning of [the Fourth Amendment], such a seizure is constitutionally reasonable where the police have probable cause to believe that a traffic violation has occurred. Whren v. United States, 517 U. S. 806, (1996). But a seizure that is lawful at its inception can violate the Fourth Amendment if its manner of execution unreasonably infringes interests protected by the Constitution. Caballes, supra, at 407. Because Rodriguez does not dispute that Officer Struble had probable cause to stop him, the only question is whether the stop was otherwise executed in a reasonable manner. See Brief for Appellant in No (CA8), p. 4, n. 2. I easily conclude that it was. Approximately 29 minutes passed from the time Officer Struble stopped Rodriguez until his narcotics-detection dog alerted to the presence of drugs. That amount of time is hardly out of the ordinary for a traffic stop by a single officer of a vehi-

16 Cite as: 575 U. S. (2015) 3 THOMAS, J., dissenting cle containing multiple occupants even when no dog sniff is involved. See, e.g., United States v. Ellis, 497 F. 3d 606 (CA6 2007) (22 minutes); United States v. Barragan, 379 F. 3d 524 (CA8 2004) (approximately 30 minutes). During that time, Officer Struble conducted the ordinary activities of a traffic stop he approached the vehicle, questioned Rodriguez about the observed violation, asked Pollman about their travel plans, ran serial warrant checks on Rodriguez and Pollman, and issued a written warning to Rodriguez. And when he decided to conduct a dog sniff, he took the precaution of calling for backup out of concern for his safety. See 741 F. 3d 905, 907 (CA8 2014); see also Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U. S. 106, 110 (1977) (per curiam) (officer safety is a legitimate and weighty concern relevant to reasonableness). As Caballes makes clear, the fact that Officer Struble waited until after he gave Rodriguez the warning to conduct the dog sniff does not alter this analysis. Because the use of a well-trained narcotics-detection dog... generally does not implicate legitimate privacy interests, 543 U. S., at 409, conducting a dog sniff would not change the character of a traffic stop that is lawful at its inception and otherwise executed in a reasonable manner, id., at 408. The stop here was lawful at its inception and otherwise executed in a reasonable manner. Ibid. As in Caballes, conducting a dog sniff [did] not change the character of [the] traffic stop, ibid., and thus no Fourth Amendment violation occurred. II Rather than adhere to the reasonableness requirement that we have repeatedly characterized as the touchstone of the Fourth Amendment, Brigham City, supra, at 403, the majority constructed a test of its own that is inconsistent with our precedents.

17 4 RODRIGUEZ v. UNITED STATES THOMAS, J., dissenting A The majority s rule requires a traffic stop to en[d] when tasks tied to the traffic infraction are or reasonably should have been completed. Ante, at 5. If an officer can complete traffic-based inquiries expeditiously, then that is the amount of time reasonably required to complete the stop s mission and he may hold the individual no longer. Ante, at 8 (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted). The majority s rule thus imposes a oneway ratchet for constitutional protection linked to the characteristics of the individual officer conducting the stop: If a driver is stopped by a particularly efficient officer, then he will be entitled to be released from the traffic stop after a shorter period of time than a driver stopped by a less efficient officer. Similarly, if a driver is stopped by an officer with access to technology that can shorten a records check, then he will be entitled to be released from the stop after a shorter period of time than an individual stopped by an officer without access to such technology. I cannot accept that the search and seizure protections of the Fourth Amendment are so variable and can be made to turn upon such trivialities. Whren, 517 U. S., at 815 (citations omitted). We have repeatedly explained that the reasonableness inquiry must not hinge on the characteristics of the individual officer conducting the seizure. We have held, for example, that an officer s state of mind does not invalidate [an] action taken as long as the circumstances, viewed objectively, justify that action. Id., at 813 (internal quotation marks omitted). We have spurned theories that would make the Fourth Amendment change with local law enforcement practices. Moore, supra, at 172. And we have rejected a rule that would require the offense establishing probable cause to be closely related to the offense identified by the arresting officer, as such a rule would make the constitutionality of an arrest... vary from place to place and from time to time, depending

18 Cite as: 575 U. S. (2015) 5 THOMAS, J., dissenting on whether the arresting officer states the reason for the detention and, if so, whether he correctly identifies a general class of offense for which probable cause exists. Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 U. S. 146, 154 (2004) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). In Devenpeck, a unanimous Court explained: An arrest made by a knowledgeable, veteran officer would be valid, whereas an arrest made by a rookie in precisely the same circumstances would not. We see no reason to ascribe to the Fourth Amendment such arbitrarily variable protection. Ibid. The majority s logic would produce similarly arbitrary results. Under its reasoning, a traffic stop made by a rookie could be executed in a reasonable manner, whereas the same traffic stop made by a knowledgeable, veteran officer in precisely the same circumstances might not, if in fact his knowledge and experience made him capable of completing the stop faster. We have long rejected interpretations of the Fourth Amendment that would produce such haphazard results, and I see no reason to depart from our consistent practice today. B As if that were not enough, the majority also limits the duration of the stop to the time it takes the officer to complete a narrow category of traffic-based inquiries. Ante, at 8. According to the majority, these inquiries include those that serve the same objective as enforcement of the traffic code: ensuring that vehicles on the road are operated safely and responsibly. Ante, at 6. Inquiries directed to detecting evidence of ordinary criminal wrongdoing are not traffic-related inquiries and thus cannot count toward the overall duration of the stop. Ibid. (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted). The combination of that definition of traffic-related inquiries with the majority s officer-specific durational limit produces a result demonstrably at odds with our

19 6 RODRIGUEZ v. UNITED STATES THOMAS, J., dissenting decision in Caballes. Caballes expressly anticipated that a traffic stop could be reasonably prolonged for officers to engage in a dog sniff. We explained that no Fourth Amendment violation had occurred in Caballes, where the duration of the stop... was entirely justified by the traffic offense and the ordinary inquiries incident to such a stop, but suggested a different result might attend a case involving a dog sniff that occurred during an unreasonably prolonged traffic stop. 543 U. S., at (emphasis added). The dividing line was whether the overall duration of the stop exceeded the time reasonably required to complete th[e] mission, id., at 407, not, as the majority suggests, whether the duration of the stop in fact exceeded the time necessary to complete the trafficrelated inquiries, ante, at 8. The majority s approach draws an artificial line between dog sniffs and other common police practices. The lower courts have routinely confirmed that warrant checks are a constitutionally permissible part of a traffic stop, see, e.g., United States v. Simmons, 172 F. 3d 775, 778 (CA ); United States v. Mendez, 118 F. 3d 1426, 1429 (CA ); United States v. Shabazz, 993 F. 2d 431, 437 (CA5 1993), and the majority confirms that it finds no fault in these measures, ante, at 6. Yet its reasoning suggests the opposite. Such warrant checks look more like they are directed to detecting evidence of ordinary criminal wrongdoing than to ensuring that vehicles on the road are operated safely and responsibly. Ante, at 6 (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted). Perhaps one could argue that the existence of an outstanding warrant might make a driver less likely to operate his vehicle safely and responsibly on the road, but the same could be said about a driver in possession of contraband. A driver confronted by the police in either case might try to flee or become violent toward the officer. But under the majority s analysis, a dog sniff, which is directed at uncov-

20 Cite as: 575 U. S. (2015) 7 THOMAS, J., dissenting ering that problem, is not treated as a traffic-based inquiry. Warrant checks, arguably, should fare no better. The majority suggests that a warrant check is an ordinary inquiry incident to a traffic stop because it can be used to determine whether the apparent traffic violator is wanted for one or more previous traffic offenses. Ante, at 6 (quoting 4 W. LaFave, Search and Seizure 9.3(c), p. 516 (5th ed. 2012)). But as the very treatise on which the majority relies notes, such checks are a manifest[ation of] the war on drugs motivation so often underlying [routine traffic] stops, and thus are very much like the dog sniff in this case. Id., 9.3(c), at Investigative questioning rests on the same basis as the dog sniff. Asking questions is an essential part of police investigations. Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court of Nev., Humboldt Cty., 542 U. S. 177, 185 (2004). And the lower courts have routinely upheld such questioning during routine traffic stops. See, e.g., United States v. Rivera, 570 F. 3d 1009, 1013 (CA8 2009); United States v. Childs, 277 F. 3d 947, (CA7 2002). The majority s reasoning appears to allow officers to engage in some questioning aimed at detecting evidence of ordinary criminal wrongdoing. Ante, at 5. But it is hard to see how such inquiries fall within the seizure s mission [of] address[ing] the traffic violation that warranted the stop, or attend[ing] to related safety concerns. Ibid. Its reasoning appears to come down to the principle that dogs are different. C On a more fundamental level, the majority s inquiry elides the distinction between traffic stops based on probable cause and those based on reasonable suspicion. Probable cause is the traditional justification for the seizure of a person. Whren, 517 U. S., at 817 (emphasis deleted); see also Dunaway v. New York, 442 U. S. 200,

(Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2010 1 Syllabus NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued. The syllabus

05/14/04 See News Release 043 for any concurrences and/or dissents. SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA No. 04-KK-0273 STATE OF LOUISIANA v. SEAN STRANGE, TALBERT PORTER On Writ of Certiorari to the Third Circuit

UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 10-4683 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee, v. MARCO THOMAS MOORE, Defendant - Appellant. Appeal from the United States

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Office of the Attorney General Information for Crime Victims and Witnesses MARCH 2009 LAWRENCE WASDEN Attorney General Criminal Law Division Special Prosecutions Unit Telephone: (208) 332-3096 Fax: (208)