Alan D. MacCormack

Alan MacCormack is the MBA Class of 1949 Adjunct Professor of Business Administration at Harvard Business School. His research examines the management of innovation and product development in high-technology industries, with a focus on the computer software sector. Alan's research has been published in a variety of leading journals including Management Science, Research Policy and Harvard Business Review. In addition, he has written over 50 cases and notes that explore how organizations like Intel, Microsoft and NASA manage new product and service innovation efforts. Alan is currently teaching FIELD, a new MBA Required-Curriculum course that develops students’ teamwork and leadership abilities by helping them to solve real world problems in small teams. In 2011, he received the Apgar Award for Innovation in Teaching for his role in designing this course. Alan holds a DBA from Harvard Business School, an MSc from MIT's Sloan School of Management and a BSc from the University of Bath in England.

In this paper, we describe an operational methodology for characterizing the architecture of complex technical systems and demonstrate its application to a large sample of software releases. Our methodology is based upon directed network graphs, which allows us to identify all of the direct and indirect linkages between the components in a system. We use this approach to define three fundamental architectural patterns, which we label core–periphery, multi-core, and hierarchical. Applying our methodology to a sample of 1286 software releases from 17 applications, we find that the majority of releases possess a "core–periphery" structure. This architecture is characterized by a single dominant cyclic group of components (the "Core") that is large relative to the system as a whole as well as to other cyclic groups in the system. We show that the size of the Core varies widely, even for systems that perform the same function. These differences appear to be associated with different models of development—open, distributed organizations develop systems with smaller Cores, while closed, co-located organizations develop systems with larger Cores. Our findings establish some "stylized facts" about the fine-grained structure of large, real-world technical systems, serving as a point of departure for future empirical work.

Alan MacCormack, Fiona Murray, and Erika Wagner examine the phenomenon of corporations using innovation contests. They write: "Companies are searching for better ways to identify and exploit novel solutions. Increasingly, they are discovering that many of the very best ideas lie outside their organizations, in an ecosystem of potential innovators who possess wide-ranging skills and knowledge."

This paper provides a systematic examination of the use of a Grand Innovation Prize (GIP) in action—the Progressive Automotive Insurance X PRIZE—a $10 million prize for a highly efficient vehicle. Following a mechanism design approach we define three key dimensions for GIP evaluation: objectives, design, and performance, where prize design includes ex ante specifications, ex ante incentives, qualification rules, and award governance. Within this framework we compare observations of GIPs from three domains—empirical reality, theory, and policy—to better understand their function as an incentive mechanism for encouraging new solutions to large-scale social challenges. Combining data from direct observation, personal interviews, and surveys, together with analysis of extant theory and policy documents on GIPs, our results highlight three points of divergence: first, over the complexity of defining prize specifications; secondly, over the nature and role of incentives, particularly patents; thirdly, the overlooked challenges associated with prize governance. Our approach identifies a clear roadmap for future theory and policy around GIPs.

A variety of academic studies argue that a relationship exists between the structure of an organization and the design of the products that the organization produces. Specifically, products tend to "mirror" the architectures of the organizations in which they are developed. This dynamic occurs because the organization's governance structures, problem solving routines, and communication patterns constrain the space in which it searches for new solutions. Such a relationship is important, given that product architecture has been shown to be an important predictor of product performance, product variety, process flexibility, and even the path of industry evolution. We explore this relationship in the software industry. Our research takes advantage of a natural experiment, in that we observe products that fulfill the same function being developed by very different organizational forms. At one extreme are commercial software firms, in which the organizational participants are tightly coupled, with respect to their goals, structure, and behavior. At the other, are open-source software communities, in which the participants are much more loosely coupled by comparison. The mirroring hypothesis predicts that these different organizational forms will produce products with distinctly different architectures. Specifically, loosely coupled organizations will develop more modular designs than tightly coupled organizations. We test this hypothesis, using a sample of matched-pair products. We find strong evidence to support the mirroring hypothesis. In all of the pairs we examine, the product developed by the loosely coupled organization is significantly more modular than the product from the tightly coupled organization. We measure modularity by capturing the level of coupling between a product's components. The magnitude of the differences is substantial—up to a factor of six, in terms of the potential for a design change in one component to propagate to others. Our results have significant managerial implications, highlighting the impact of organizational design decisions on the technical structure of the artifacts that these organizations subsequently develop.

Many firms rely on a single new-product development process for all projects. But designing new products for different business contexts requires that a firm deploy different new-product development processes. Products designed for stable and mature end-user markets require a process optimized for control and efficiency. In contrast, first-of-a-kind "breakthrough" products require a more emergent process that aims to discover whether there is any market to be served in the first place. Applying a uniform "best-practice" process to all development efforts ignores the major differences between these projects and may result in missed opportunities. This article describes a framework to address this problem, allowing a firm to better align the design of its development processes to the specific aims of individual projects. We illustrate this framework with examples from Hewlett-Packard, a large, diversified electronics firm that has successfully piloted this new approach across multiple business units.

This article focuses on how to choose the "right" software development process, how to structure global software design chains, how to manage the interaction of project structure and software design, and how to balance innovation and efficiency in a software business.

Innovations are increasingly brought to the market by networks of firms, selected for their unique capabilities and operating in a coordinated manner. This collaborative model demands that firms develop different skills, yet despite this need, there is little guidance on how to develop these abilities. Based on a recent study, this article describes the main factor differentiating those firms who excel at collaboration from those who struggle—the ability to learn how to collaborate. We describe the four areas in which firms must invest to get better at learning: People, Process, Platforms and Programs.

We propose a network-based methodology for operationalizing enterprise architecture. Our methodology is based upon using a "Design Structure Matrix" (DSM) to capture the coupling between different components in a firm's architecture, including business and technology-related aspects. We apply our methodology to data gathered in a large pharmaceutical firm. We show that this methodology helps to identify layers in the firm's architecture associated with different technologies (e.g., applications, servers and databases). We also show that it reveals the main "flow of control" within the architecture, as denoted by the classification of components into Core, Peripheral, Shared and Control elements. We analyze the cost of change for a subset of software applications within this architecture. We find that the cost of change is associated with the degree to which applications are highly coupled. We show the best measure of coupling that predicts the cost of change is one that captures all the direct and indirect connections between components. We believe our work constitutes an important step in making the concept of enterprise architecture more operational, improving a firm's ability to analyze its architecture, understand its performance implications, and adapt and improve it in the future.

In this paper, we test a method for visualizing and measuring software portfolio architectures and use our measures to predict the costs of architectural change. Our data is drawn from a biopharmaceutical company, comprising 407 architectural components with 1,157 dependencies between them. We show that the architecture of this system can be classified as a "core-periphery" system, meaning it contains a single large dominant cluster of interconnected components (the "Core") representing 32% of the system. We find that the classification of software applications within this architecture, as being either Core or Peripheral, is a significant predictor of the costs of architectural change. Using OLS regression models, we show that this measure has greater predictive power than prior measures of coupling used in the literature.

We test a method that was designed and used previously to reveal the hidden internal architectural structure of software systems. The focus of this paper is to test if it can also uncover new facts about the components and their relationships in an enterprise architecture, i.e., if the method can reveal the hidden external structure between architectural components. Our test uses data from a biopharmaceutical company. In total, we analyzed 407 components and 1,157 dependencies. Results show that the enterprise structure can be classified as a core-periphery architecture with a propagation cost of 23%, core size of 32%, and architecture flow through of 67%. We also found that business components can be classified as control elements, infrastructure components as shared, and software applications as belonging to the core. These findings suggest that the method could be effective in uncovering the hidden structure of an enterprise architecture.

We test a method for visualizing and measuring enterprise application architectures. The method was designed and previously used to reveal the hidden internal architectural structure of software applications. The focus of this paper is to test if it can also uncover new facts about the applications and their relationships in an enterprise architecture, i.e., if the method can reveal the hidden external structure between software applications. Our test uses data from a large international telecom company. In total, we analyzed 103 applications and 243 dependencies. Results show that the enterprise application structure can be classified as a core-periphery architecture with a propagation cost of 25%, core size of 34%, and architecture flow through of 64%. These findings suggest that the method could be effective in uncovering the hidden structure of an enterprise application architecture.

In this paper, we describe an operational methodology for characterising the architecture of complex technical systems and demonstrate its application to a large sample of software releases. Our methodology is based upon directed network graphs, which allows us to identify all of the direct and indirect linkages between the components in a system. We use this approach to define three fundamental architectural patterns, which we label core-periphery, multi-core, and hierarchical. Applying our methodology to a sample of 1,286 software releases from 17 applications, we find that the majority of releases possess a "core-periphery" structure. This architecture is characterized by a single dominant cyclic group of components (the "Core") that is large relative to the system as a whole as well as to other cyclic groups in the system. We show that the size of the Core varies widely, even for systems that perform the same function. These differences appear to be associated with different models of development—open, distributed organizations develop systems with smaller Cores, while closed, co-located organizations develop systems with larger Cores. Our findings establish some "stylized facts" about the fine-grained structure of large, real-world technical systems, serving as a point of departure for future empirical work.

Any complex technological system can be decomposed into a number of subsystems and associated components, some of which are core to system function while others are only peripheral. The dynamics of how such "core-periphery" structures evolve and become embedded in a firm's innovation routines has been shown to be a major factor in predicting survival, especially in turbulent technology-based industries. To date however, there has been little empirical evidence on the propensity with which core-periphery structures are observed in practice, the factors that explain differences in the design of such structures, or the manner in which these structures evolve over time.

We address this gap by analyzing a large number of systems in the software industry. Our sample includes 1,286 software releases taken from 19 distinct applications. We find that 75-80% of systems possess a core-periphery structure. However, the number of components in the core varies widely, even for systems that perform the same function. These differences appear to be associated with different models of development—open, distributed organizations developing systems with smaller cores. We find that core components are often dispersed throughout a system, making their detection and management difficult for a system architect. And we show that systems evolve in different ways—in some, the core is stable, whereas in others, it grows in proportion to the system, challenging the ability of an architect to understand all possible component interactions. Our findings represent a first step in establishing some stylized facts about the structure of real world systems.

A variety of academic studies argue that a relationship exists between the structure of an organization and the design of the products that this organization produces. Specifically, products tend to "mirror" the architectures of the organizations in which they are developed. This dynamic occurs because the organization's governance structures, problem solving routines, and communication patterns constrain the space in which it searches for new solutions. Such a relationship is important, given that product architecture has been shown to be an important predictor of product performance, product variety, process flexibility, and even the path of industry evolution. We explore this relationship in the software industry. Our research takes advantage of a natural experiment, in that we observe products that fulfill the same function being developed by very different organizational forms. At one extreme are commercial software firms, in which the organizational participants are tightly coupled, with respect to their goals, structure, and behavior. At the other are open source software communities, in which the participants are much more loosely coupled by comparison. The mirroring hypothesis predicts that these different organizational forms will produce products with distinctly different architectures. Specifically, loosely coupled organizations will develop more modular designs than tightly coupled organizations. We test this hypothesis using a sample of matched-pair products. We find strong evidence to support the mirroring hypothesis. In all of the pairs we examine, the product developed by the loosely coupled organization is significantly more modular than the product from the tightly coupled organization. We measure modularity by capturing the level of coupling between a product's components. The magnitude of the differences is substantial-up to a factor of eight-in terms of the potential for a design change in one component to propagate to others. Our results have significant managerial implications in highlighting the impact of organizational design decisions on the technical structure of the artifacts that these organizations subsequently develop.

Much academic work asserts a relationship between the design of a complex system and the manner in which this system evolves over time. In particular, designs which are modular in nature are argued to be more "evolvable," in that these designs facilitate making future adaptations, the nature of which do not have to be specified in advance. In essence, modularity creates "option value" with respect to new and improved designs, which is particularly important when a system must meet uncertain future demands.

Despite the conceptual appeal of this research, empirical work exploring the relationship between modularity and evolution has had limited success. Three major challenges persist: first, it is difficult to measure modularity in a robust and repeatable fashion; second, modularity is a property of individual components, not systems as a whole, hence we must examine these dynamics at the microstructure level; and third, evolution is a temporal phenomenon, in that the conditions at time t affect the nature of the design at time t+1, hence exploring this phenomenon requires longitudinal data.

In this paper, we tackle these challenges by analyzing the evolution of a successful commercial software product over its entire lifetime, comprising six major "releases." In particular, we develop measures of modularity at the component level, and use these to predict patterns of evolution between successive versions of the design. We find that modularity has a strong and unambiguous impact on design evolution. Specifically, we show that i) tightly-coupled components are "harder to kill," in that they have a greater likelihood of survival in subsequent versions of a design; ii) tightly-coupled components are "harder to maintain," in that they experience more surprise changes to their dependency relationships that are not associated with new functionality; and iii) tightly-coupled components are "harder to augment," in that the mix of new components added in each version is significantly more modular than the legacy design.

Many recent studies highlight the need to rethink the way we manage innovation. Traditional approaches, based on the assumption that the creation and pursuit of new ideas is best accomplished by a centralized and collocated R&D team, are rapidly becoming outdated. Instead, innovations are increasingly brought to the market by networks of firms, selected for their unique capabilities, and operating in a coordinated manner. This new model demands that firms develop different skills, in particular, the ability to collaborate with partners to achieve superior innovation performance. Yet despite this need, there is little guidance on how to develop or deploy this ability.
This article describes the results of a study to understand the strategies and practices used by firms that achieve greater success in their collaborative innovation efforts. We found many firms mistakenly applied an "outsourcing" mindset to collaboration efforts which, in turn, led to three critical errors: First, they focused solely on lower costs, failing to consider the broader strategic role of collaboration. Second, they didn't organize effectively for collaboration, believing that innovation could be managed much like production and partners treated like "suppliers." And third, they didn't invest in building collaborative capabilities, assuming that their existing people and processes were already equipped for the challenge. Successful firms, by contrast, developed an explicit strategy for collaboration and made organizational changes to aid performance in these efforts. Ultimately, these actions allowed them to identify and exploit new business opportunities. In sum, collaboration is becoming a new and important source of competitive advantage. We propose several frameworks to help firms develop and exploit this new ability.

The case describes innovation and new product development at TouchTunes, the leader in the Digital Jukebox market. In March 2013, after releasing its innovative “Virtuo” jukebox developed in collaboration with frog design, TouchTunes was at a crossroads. Having developed a “platform” by which many different kinds of digital media can be delivered to customers in bars and restaurants, it must select among competing opportunities as to how to exploit its dominant position. Should it focus on expanding the range of applications for Virtuo, and if so, what role should external developers play in this process? Should it develop a new version of Virtuo targeted at the rapidly growing international market? Or should it invest in a new venture to develop a restaurant tablet, that would combine e-menu, gaming and payment options at a diner's table?

The case describes competition in the market for E-Books, and Barnes & Noble's Strategy in this industry. As a traditional retailer, B&N was challenged by the introduction of digital technologies that allow books to be published, distributed and sold to consumers electronically. New competitors like Amazon and Apple attacked the traditional industry structure, creating many uncertainties over the long-term viability of traditional retailers. Amid this uncertainty, B&N must decide how to compete, in terms of both devices that can read E-Books, as well as standards for their distribution. Should they create a separate digital business, centered around their "Nook" E-Book reader, or maintain an integrated strategy? And how should they think about the fragmented standards for distributing E-Books? The case allows students to probe the dynamics of platform-based industries, as well as what happens in traditional industries when attacked by new competitors adopting new digital technologies. It is developed using public source material.

In 2012, Barnes & Noble found itself in a difficult position. While the company had weathered the advent of online retailing relatively well, the arrival of electronic books (e-books) threatened the company's viability. Primary competitor Borders had already fallen by the wayside, and the decisions Barnes & Noble would take with regard to e-books would dictate whether the company would have a bright future. The case explores the arrival of the e-book industry, its history and key players, and provides a basis from which to explore Barnes & Noble's outlook and options as the company seeks to adapt to the onset of a transformative new technology.

This case gives an overview of the current business environment in Vietnam as of 2012. The first part of the case introduces the main economic, political and cultural aspects of the country of which anyone who has business interest in the country ought to be aware. The second section highlights some of the advantages and challenges of investing and doing business in Vietnam, by drawing upon the experiences and insights of HBS alumni who have worked in the country. Finally the case presents the decision of an HBS alumnus who is a director of a multinational cement company in Vietnam. The company's concrete business would benefit from full integration of its supply chain, which would include securing a quarry. He must decide how best to pursue this integration, given the business and regulatory environment in Vietnam and weighing other factors such as the macroeconomic outlook and the forecast for the construction industry in Vietnam.

The case describes competition in the market for smart phones in the US, and the position of one player, Research In Motion (RIM) who manufacture the popular Blackberry line of products. Early in 2011, RIM is in trouble. Its stock price has plummeted, amidst poor business results, and its future as an independent company is in doubt. A new Chief Executive Officer, Thorsten Heins, must decide how to position the company for the future. The case allows students to understand the strategic dynamics in platform-based industries in general, and to explore more specifically how a firm that led the industry in 2007 could fall to earth so dramatically four years later. The case is based upon data and information from public sources.

Considers whether BYD Co., Ltd., the largest Chinese maker of rechargeable batteries, should enter the Chinese automobile industry by acquiring Qinchuan Auto, a state-owned car manufacturer. Set just after BYD's initial public offering on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange in 2002, it describes the development of BYD's labor-intensive approach to battery manufacturing -- an approach decidedly different from its more capital-intensive Japanese competitors and one that took advantage of the abundant supply of low-cost labor in China. Highlights the unique benefits and challenges created by BYD's operations strategy and asks students to determine whether the capabilities developed by the company in battery manufacturing can productively be applied to the automobile sector. Asks students to consider which, if any, aspects of BYD's operations constitute sources of sustainable competitive advantage for the company.

Describes the first module of a Harvard Business School 30-session elective course called Managing Innovation in an Uncertain World. The course helps students understand the challenges that uncertainty implies for innovation and how to overcome these challenges. The course emphasizes multiple levels of analysis--from creating and executing development projects to building and balancing portfolios of project, to assessing and selecting future opportunities for development--showing how to align these activities to take advantage of the opportunities uncertainty presents. Students respond to all the situations they encounter from these multiple perspectives, and they wear an array of hats, from project manager to CEO, to appreciate how various organizational roles themselves reflect these perspectives. The first module, Innovation and Uncertainty, introduces students to the challenge of managing innovation in general and underscores the relationship between innovation and uncertainty in particular. It introduces the terminology used in the course--specifically, how the challenge of uncertainty can be framed in terms of how an organization explores its innovation landscape and exploits design spaces that are carved out of it. The module helps students understand that organizations make decisions differently when they think in such terms.

The Harvard Business School Managing Innovation in an Uncertain World course helps students understand the challenges that uncertainty implies for innovation and how to overcome them. The course emphasizes multiple levels of analysis--from creating and executing development project, to building and balancing portfolios of project, to assessing and selecting future opportunities for development--showing how to align these activities to meet uncertainty and take advantage of the opportunities it presents. Allows students to respond to all the situations they encounter from multiple perspectives, assume different roles--from project manager to CEO--to appreciate how the various organizational roles themselves reflect these perspectives.

Describes the third module of the 30-session Harvard Business School elective course Managing Innovation in an Uncertain World. The course helps students understand the challenges that uncertainty implies for innovation and how to overcome them. The course emphasizes multiple levels of analysis--from creating and executing development projects to building and balancing portfolios of projects to assessing and selecting future opportunities for development--showing how to align these activities to face uncertainties and take advantage of the opportunities they present. Allows students to respond the situations from multiple perspectives and assume different roles--from project manager to CEO--to appreciate how various organizational roles themselves reflect these perspectives. The third module, Expanding Diversity, exposes students to several perspectives and associated techniques by which organizations identify new dimensions along which innovation is possible. Rather than adopt a single best practice approach for this endeavor, the module emphasizes, organizations much acknowledge an array of techniques, each of which provides a different lens through which to view opportunities. The module thus resolves a seeming paradox: By embracing greater variation in the processes that an organization uses to explore new innovation possibilities, the landscape that results appears less unpredictable. The materials introduce several structured techniques through which managers can exercise their cognitive abilities to perceive new possibilities, expanding the opportunities available to them.

Describes the fourth module of the 30-session Harvard Business School elective course Managing Innovation in an Uncertain World. The course helps students understand the challenges that uncertainty implies for innovation and how to overcome them. The course emphasizes multiple levels of analysis--from creating and executing development projects to building and balancing portfolios of projects to assessing and selecting future opportunities for development--showing how to align these activities to face uncertainties and take advantage of the opportunities they present. Allows students to respond the situations from multiple perspectives and assume different roles--from project manager to CEO--to appreciate how various organizational roles themselves reflect these perspectives. The fourth module, Sensing Opportunity, focuses on how organizations manage opportunities for innovation in the future. A central theme is that in many environments, opportunities emerge and evolve in a dynamic and unpredictable manner. New possibilities may arise in locations far from a firm's existing focus and along dimensions not previously considered relevant. Hence, there is a need both to sense and to shape the evolution of the organization's innovation landscape, allowing what is unknown to come into view. (Students, having explored the dimensions of this landscape in the prior module, are primed for this perspective.) The module introduces a structured way to achieve this objective--in particular, through the design of so-called sensing networks, which scan the periphery of a firm's innovation landscape for important signals that demand attention. The materials motivate the need for such networks, demonstrate how they can be designed and managed, and highlight the mechanisms through which they create value.

Describes the second module of the 30-session Harvard Business School elective course Managing Innovation in an Uncertain World. The course helps students understand the challenges that uncertainty implies for innovation and how to overcome these challenges. The course emphasizes multiple levels of analysis--from creating and executing development projects to building and balancing portfolios of projects to assessing and selecting future opportunities for development--showing how these activities can be aligned to face uncertainties and take advantage of the opportunities they present. Students respond to the situations from multiple perspectives and assume different roles--from project manager to CEO--to appreciate how various organizational roles themselves reflect these perspectives. The second module forms the heart of the course. Focuses on how firms define and explore the design spaces they choose to exploit, emphasizing themes that highlight how firms respond to the uncertainty they face in new product development projects and new business ventures. These themes address various organizational aspects, including development process flexibility, systems for experimentation and learning, product and organizational design, and program and portfolio design. They emphasize that a coherent approach to managing innovation requires that a firm understand how to deal with uncertainty within projects, across projects (i.e., in designing a portfolio), and over time (i.e., in designing a program). A central insight is the need to coordinate actions across these levels.

It is 2004 and David Tennenhouse, the director of Intel Research, is reviewing the organization he has built since 2000. Intel Research was charged with exploring new and disruptive technologies that lay off the "silicon roadmap" that drove most of Intel's R&D efforts. This exploratory research was conducted using an approach that Tennenhouse oversaw during his years at the Defense Advanced Research Project Agency. Predicated on the funding of university grants, internal research efforts, joint labs run with universities, and selective corporate venture investments, the idea was to build a network to give advance warning of important new technologies. In 2004, Tennenhouse was reviewing its performance.

Describes the history of General Motor's attempts to develop a hydrogen fuel-cell powered car. As of 2003, GM developed several prototypes of such a vehicle to demonstrate the viability of the overall concept. Many uncertainties remained, however, with respect to the issues of cost, safe storage of hydrogen on a vehicle, and the lack of a hydrogen-refueling infrastructure. Aids students in developing a strategy for pushing this initiative forward, including tackling the question of how radical the new design should be and what to do about competitors who have aggressively pushed interim technology-hybrid vehicles--which GM has chosen not to emphasize in its product portfolio. Includes color exhibits.

Mike Ward, the producer in charge of developing the Kelly Slater's Pro Surfer game for Activision, must decide whether to launch the game in time for the 2002 Christmas season. Complicating his decision are the lukewarm response from consumers to TV test spots of the game and the need to fund a multimillion dollar marketing campaign. Also describes Activision's approach to game development, which was based on a green-light process adopted by the firm in 2000 to better control new game development better.

In 1628, the royal warship Vasa was launched. It was Sweden's most expensive naval vessel ever built, costing over 5% of GNP. On its maiden voyage, the ship sailed 1,400 yards in its own harbor, heeled over to the side, and then sank. One third of the 150 crew and officers were killed. An inquiry was convened to establish the cause of the disaster, with testimony taken from, among others, the ship's captain, its officers, the ship's designer, and those responsible for its construction. No one was found guilty of negligence. The question is "Why did the Vasa sink?" The answer lies in the state of knowledge about shipbuilding of the time, the continual changes requested by the king, who was fighting in the Baltic, and the resulting experimental nature of the design.

Set in the summer of 2000, following the unveiling of Microsoft's .NET initiative to the public. Three of the key figures in .NET's development are considering the next steps they would have to take to keep the initiative moving forward. Specifically, the challenges they face include the retirement of a key executive sponsor and the need to make major changes across many of Microsoft's core products. The protagonists must come up with a process and an organizational structure to keep the initiative moving forward.

D-Wave Systems is a start-up seeking to commercialize a quantum computer. Its business model is unique: as of 2003, it had very few technical resources within the firm. Instead, it financed a series of projects undertaken at universities and government labs. In return for partial funding, these organizations gave D-Wave the ownership of--or exclusive rights to--intellectual property developed in the project. Geordie Rose, CEO of D-Wave, wonders how long this model is appropriate in contrast to the alternative of centralizing the research in an in-house facility, with all the costs this would incur.

Dragon's Teeth Vineyards (DTV) is a South African wine producer that is considering whether to use genetically modified organisms (GMOs) in its wine-making process. GMOs promise to lower the costs of wine production significantly through increased yields and reduced processing times as well as significantly improve the quality of the final product via the use of GM yeasts in fermentation. However, the market acceptance of GMOs is unclear, due to perceived health risks and reactions from traditional "old world" producers who believe the beauty of wine lies in its craft, dependence on local soil and climate, and inherent variability.

This case is set in spring 2000, several months after two successive, failed missions to the planet Mars. Students are asked to evaluate the reasons for these failures in the context of NASA's "Faster, Better, Cheaper" program, which was initiated in 1992. They are also faced with the task of reconstructing a program for the exploration of Mars that considers the many uncertainties--political, financial, outcome related, and scientific--that can impact the program. Includes color exhibits.

Brigitte Gagne, Le Petit Chef's director of microwave R&D, is deciding on the product development agenda for next year. She has to decide which of the available projects to fund, and evaluate the overall portfolio of projects currently under development. The recent poor performance of the firm prompts Gagne to think about reassessing the way projects are generated, evaluated, and selected at Le Petit Chef. However, Gagne has a pressing deadline to meet—the executive team is due to review the next year's agenda at a meeting in Paris tomorrow.

Describes the development of ShareNet, an innovative knowledge management system used by a division of Siemens. ShareNet attempts to capture the knowledge and experience of Siemen's many dispersed sales and marketing units around the globe, making it available to all. ShareNet has to date been funded as a corporate initiative, free to all who use it. But as the telecommunications market has collapsed, the group that runs it is under increasing pressure to cut costs. As a result, it is considering charging users who subscribe to the tool in the belief that these users will willingly pay for it. This relies, however, on being able to demonstrate that the tool/system has a positive return on investment--a notoriously difficult task.

Set in the summer of 2000, following the unveiling of Microsoft's .NET initiative to the public. Three of the key figures in .NET's development are considering the next steps they would have to take to keep the initiative moving forward. Specifically, the challenges they face include the retirement of a key executive sponsor and the need to make major changes across many of Microsoft's core products. The protagonists must come up with a process and an organizational structure to keep the initiative moving forward.

Describes the conceptual foundations for a module on venture design, which forms part of an MBA course called Managing Technology Ventures. The objective of the course is to teach students how to think critically about the design of a technology venture, using cases that span a spectrum of different technological contexts. The premise for the course is that many technology ventures fail, not because they are based on bad ideas per se (although many are) but because they are poorly designed and executed. This module develops a number of concepts underlying a more evolutionary approach to venture design, geared to overcoming the fact that technology ventures typically face great uncertainty with respect to the opportunities they face.

Space Data Corp. plans to partner with the U.S. National Weather Service to place transceivers on weather balloons and thereby create a national mobile communications network. The company is in the late development stages and is planning to launch a regional test that will demonstrate its ability to provide paging and messaging. It intends to sell its service to existing mobile carriers, such as Skytel and Verizon, rather than directly to end users. This case illustrates how Space Data has applied flexible business processes throughout its initial market research and technology development to create a system that can make optimal use of its limited resources and respond rapidly to changing conditions. As the case concludes, the executive team at Space Data faces three opportunities, each with very different costs and benefits for the company. It can proceed with a regional test of paging and messaging as planned, leap forward to develop a more complex but potentially more lucrative voice service (forgoing a regional test), or make a transition to the small but financially stable telemetry market. Includes color exhibits.

The case describes the history of the Linux operating system and the open-source movement in general. Focuses on a critical decision being made by Red Hat, the largest distributor of Linux, about its future development efforts. The decision allows students to explore alternative approaches to software development and examine the dramatic success of the open-source method.

Socrates, Inc., a provider of e-learning tools and technologies to educational institutions and, potentially, corporations, must decide which of several opportunities to pursue next and which priorities to focus on in terms of better structuring the firm's processes and structures.

Examines the history of Iridium Communications, a provider of mobile satellite services. Discusses the genesis of Iridium's technical design, then follows the venture through various stages of development. Describes Iridium's attempts to build a subscriber base after the launch of commercial service, ending with the company's filing for Chapter 11 in 1999.

Richard Owen, CEO of AvantGo, is preparing for a meeting in which he will set the human resource policy for the firm going forward. It has been three months since the company's IPO, and given the tremendous cramp in hiring over the six months prior to the IPO, he knows that this meeting will set the expectations for the many annual evaluations that will follow. Uppermost in his mind is the decision on whether to implement a "forced-curve" grading scheme, and the implications of this decision on staff perceptions and notification.

Describes the evolution of Virgin's dot-com organization and the decision it faced in mid-2000--whether to consolidate several separate dot-com ventures into one larger venture or, instead, to allow each to run independently. Also contains a history of Virgin's development so that students can examine the implications for Virgin's core businesses of moving online.

Describes the evolution of Dialpad, a voice-over-Internet-protocol telephony company. Set in September 2000, CEO Brad Garlinghouse faces a dilemma: what to do about the large number of international users who use Dialpad to call the United States for free. He must also continue to develop Dialpad in the face of strong competition and a negative investment environment.

Describes the development of WholesalerDirect, a B2B electronic commerce venture in the plumbing, heating, cooling, and piping industry. Adam Berger, the CEO, is trying to raise funding to roll out the company's e-commerce platform to the industry's more than 3,000 wholesalers. But amid the sinking stock market, no one is ready to commit funds. WholesalerDirect has valuable assets and a solid idea, but how can it communicate these attributes to potential investors?

An integrated exercise culminating in a team project to design and develop a Web site for a fictitious company. Allows instructors to establish a technical baseline for students prior to starting the team project. Students are asked to develop a personal web site which incorporates specific types of content (e.g., HTML links, graphics, mail-to function). Insight is gained into specific practices which can improve development performance, as well as criteria for assessing what consitutes good web site design. Intended to be accompanied by formal training in web page design using a standard authoring tool such as Microsoft Frontpage.

Describes the history of Microsoft's Office product suite. Discusses evolution of the Office 2000 project. Set at the end of the project when Steven Sinofsky, Office vice president, must decide upon the direction for the next version of Office, as well as make changes to the process.

Describes the history of Microsoft's Office product suite. Discusses evolution of the Office 2000 project. Set at the end of the project when Steven Sinofsky, Office vice president, must decide upon the direction for the next version of Office, as well as make changes to the process. This case is also available in multimedia format on a CD-ROM, order # 9-600-023. Must be used in conjunction with video # 9-600-502.

An integrated exercise culminating in a team project to design and develop a Web site for a fictitious company. Puts students in the position of designing a Web site for a demanding client (a local pizza company). Students are given a (purposefully) brief description of what the site must accomplish and are told that the site must be complete within a week. During this week, they have the opportunity to submit early "beta" versions of the web site to gain feedback from other teams. Insight is gained into specific practices which can improve development performance, as well as criteria for assessing what consitutes good Web site design.

Describes how four companies in the Internet software market approach product development. Drawing upon short case studies of three recent projects, students are invited to synthesize the common attributes of development practice in turbulent environments.

The case describes the development process used by Team New Zealand to design their two yachts for the 1995 America's Cup. During development, the team makes extensive use of simulation and physical prototyping to improve the initial design concept. As they approach construction, they must decide whether to build both boats at the same time and, if so, whether to vary their designs. The decision hinges on evaluating the benefits of different experimentation strategies. Includes color exhibits.

After the release of the "Challenge" computer in 1993, Silicon Graphics executives meet to discuss the follow-up project. Should they pursue an incremental improvement to the Challenge, or opt for a radically new design recently demonstrated at Stanford University?

MacCormack, Alan. "Exploring the Links Between Product and Organizational Architectures: An Empirical Study of Open and Closed Source Software." Paper presented at the International Product Development Management Conference, Milan, Italy, June 11–13, 2006. View Details

MacCormack, Alan. Exploring the Relationship between Product Architecture and Organizational Form: A Test of "Conway's Law". In Empirical Studies of Software Development (Session Chair). Paper presented at the Annual Conference of the Production and Operations Management Society, Boston, MA, April 28–May 1, 2006. View Details

MacCormack, Alan. "Empirical Research in Software Deveopment: Lessons from the Field." In Empirical Research in New Product Development. Paper presented at the INFORMS Annual Meeting, Denver, CO, October 24–27, 2004. View Details

MacCormack, Alan. "Achieving Flexibility in NPD: New Processes and New Ways of Organizing." In Better, Faster Innovation: Leading the Flexible Organization Conference. Paper presented at the Better, Faster Innovation : Leading the Flexible Enterprise, Boston, August 01, 2004. View Details

McAfee, Andrew, and Alan MacCormack. "To Beta or Not to Beta?: The Pedagogy and Execution of a Web-based New Product Development Exercise." Paper presented at the Production and Operations Management Society Annual Conference, San Francisco, April 01, 2002. View Details

MacCormack, Alan, and Roberto Verganti. "Managing the Sources of Uncertainty: Matching Process and Context in New Product Development." Paper presented at the International Product Development Management Conference, Belgium, May 05, 2000. View Details