LETTER X.
January 7, 1788.
Dear sir,
It is said that our people have a high sense of freedom, possess power,
property, and the strong arm; meaning, I presume, that the body of the
people can take care of themselves, and awe their rulers; and, therefore,
particular provision in the constitution for their security may not be
essential. When I come to examine these observations, they appear to me too
triffling and loose to deserve a serious answer.
To palliate for the smallness of the representation, it is observed, that
the state governments in which the people are fully represented, necessarily
form a part of the system. This idea ought to be fully examined. We ought to
enquire if the convention have made the proper use of these essential parts;
the state governments then we are told will stand between the arbitrary
exercise of power and the people: true they may, but armless and helpless,
perhaps, with the privilege of making a noise when hurt — this is no more
than individuals may do. Does the constitution provide a single check for a
single measure, by which the state governments can constitutionally and
regularly check the arbitrary measures of congress? Congress may raise
immediately fifty thousand men, and twenty millions of dollars in taxes,
build a navy, model the militia, &c. and all this constitutionally. Congress
may arm on every point, and the state governments can do no more than an
individual, by petition to congress, suggest their measures are alarming and
not right.
I conceive the position to be undeniable, that the federal government will
be principally in the hands of the natural aristocracy, and the state
governments principally in the hands of the democracy, the representatives
of the body of the people. These representatives in Great-Britain hold the
purse, and have a negative upon all laws. We must yield to circumstances,
and depart something from this plan, and strike out a new medium, so as to
give efficacy to the whole system, supply the wants of the union, and leave
the several states, or the people assembled in the state legislatures, the
means of defence.
It has been often mentioned, that the objects of congress will be few and
national, and require a small representation; that the objects of each state
will be many and local, and require a numerous representation. This
circumstance has not the weight of a feather in my mind. It is certainly
unadvisable to lodge in 65 representatives, and 26 senators, unlimited power
to establish systems of taxation, armies, navies, model the militia, and to
do every thing that may essentially tend soon to change, totally, the
affairs of the community; and to assemble 1500 state representatives, and
160 senators, to make fence laws, and laws to regulate the descent and
conveyance of property, the administration of justice between man and man,
to appoint militia officers, &c.
It is not merely the quantity of information I contend for. Two taxing
powers may be inconvenient; but the point is, congress, like the senate of
Rome, will have taxing powers, and the people no check — when the power is
abused, the people may complain and grow angry, so may the state
governments; they may remonstrate and counteract, by passing laws to
prohibit the collection of congressional taxes; but these will be acts of
the people, acts of sovereign power, the dernier resort unknown to the
constitution; acts operating in terrorum, acts of resistence, and not the
exercise of any constitutional power to stop or check a measure before
matured: a check properly is the stopping, by one branch in the same
legislature, a measure proposed by the other in it. In fact the constitution
provides for the states no check, properly speaking, upon the measures of
congress — Congress can immediately enlist soldiers, and apply to the
pockets of the people.
These few considerations bring us to the very strong distinction between the
plan that operates on federal principles, and the plan that operates on
consolidated principles. A plan may be federal or not as to its
organization; each state may retain its vote or not; the sovereignty of the
state may be represented, or the people of it. A plan may be federal or not
as to its operations — federal when it requires men and monies of the
states, and the states as such make the laws for raising the men and monies
— Not federal, when it leaves the states governments out of the question,
and operates immediately upon the persons and property of the citizens. The
first is the case with the confederation, the second with the new plan: in
the first the state governments may be [a] check, in the last none at all.
This distinction I shall pursue further hereafter, under the head before
mentioned, of amendments as to internal taxes. And here I shall pursue a
species of checks which writers have not often noticed.
To excuse the smallness of the representation, it is said the new congress
will be more numerous than the old one. This is not true; and for the facts
I refer you to my letter of the 4th instant, to the plan and confederation;
besides there is no kind of similitude between the two plans. The
confederation is a mere league of the states, and congress is formed with
the particular checks, and possess the united powers, enumerated in my
letter of the 25th ult. The new plan is totally a different thing: a
national government to many purposes administered, by men chosen for two,
four, and six years, not recallable, and among whom there will be no
rotation; operating immediately in all money and military matters, &c. on
the persons and property of the citizens — I think, therefore, that no part
of the confederation ought to be adduced for supporting or injuring the new
constitution. It is also said that the constitution gives no more power to
congress than the confederation, respecting money and military matters; that
congress, under the confederation, may require men and monies to any amount,
and the states are bound to comply. This is generally true; but, I think, I
shall in a subsequent letter satisfactorily prove, that the states have well
founded checks for securing their liberties.
I admit the force of the observation, that all the federal powers, by the
confederation, are lodged in a single assembly; however, I think much more
may be said in defence of the leading principles of the confederation. I do
not object to the qualifications of the electors of representatives, and I
fully agree that the people ought to elect one branch.
Further, it may be observed, that the present congress is principally an
executive body, which ought not to be numerous; that the house of
representatives will be a mere legislative branch, and being the democratic
one, ought to be numerous. It is one of the greatest advantages of a
government of different branches, that each branch may be conveniently made
conformable to the nature of the business assigned it, and all be made
conformable to the condition of the several orders of the people. After all
the possible checks and limitations we can devise, the powers of the union
must be very extensive; the sovereignty of the nation cannot produce the
object in view, the defence and tranquility of the whole, without such
powers, executive and judicial. I dislike the present congress a single,
assembly, because it is impossible to fit it to receive those powers: the
executive and judicial powers, in the nature of things, ought to be lodged
in a few hands, the legislature in many hands; therefore, want of safety,
and unavoidable hasty measures, out of the question, they never can all be
lodged in one assembly properly — it, in its very formation, must imply a
contradiction.
In objection to increasing the representation, it has also been observed,
that it is difficult to assemble a hundred men or more without making them
tumultuous and a mere mob; reason and experience do not support this
observation. The most respectable assemblies we have any knowledge of and
the wisest, have been those, each of which consisted of several hundred
members; as the senate of Rome, of Carthage, of Venice, the British
Parliament, &c. &c. I think I may without hazarding much, affirm, that our
more numerous state assemblies and conventions have universally discovered
more wisdom, and as much order, as the less numerous ones: There must be
also a very great difference between the characters of two or three hundred
men assembled from a single state, and the characters of the number or half
the number assembled from all the united states.
It is added, that on the proposed plan the house of representatives in fifty
or a hundred years, will consist of several hundred members: The plan will
begin with sixty-five, and we have no certainty that the number ever will be
encreased, for this plain reason — that all that combination of interests
and influence which has produced this plan, and supported so far, will
constantly oppose the increase of the representation, knowing that thereby
the government will become more free and democratic: But admitting, after a
few years, there will be a member for each 30,000 inhabitants, the
observation is trifling, the government is in a considerable measure to take
its tone from its early movements, and by means of a small representation it
may in half of 50 or 100 years, get moved from its basis, or at least so far
as to be incapable of ever being recovered. We ought, therefore, on every
principle now to fix the government on proper principles, and fit to our
present condition — when the representation shall become too numerous, alter
it; or we may now make provision, that when the representation shall be
increased to a given number, that then there shall be one for each given
number of inhabitants, &c.
Another observation is, that congress will have no temptations to do wrong —
the men that make it must be very uninformed, or suppose they are talking to
children. In the first place, the members will be governed by all those
motives which govern the conduct of men, and have before them all the
allurements of offices and temptations, to establish unequal burdens, before
described. In the second place, they and their friends, probably, will find
it for their interests to keep up large armies, navies, salaries, &c. and in
laying adequate taxes. In the third place, we have no good grounds to
presume, from reason or experience, that it will be agreeable to their
characters or views, that the body of the people should continue to have
power effectually to interfere in the affairs of government. But it is
confidently added, that congress will not have it in their power to oppress
or enslave the people, that the people will not bear it. It is not supposed
that congress will act the tyrant immediately, and in the face of day light.
It is not supposed congress will adopt important measures, without plausible
pretences, especially those which may tend to alarm or produce opposition.
We are to consider the natural progress of things: that men unfriendly to
republican equality will go systematically to work, gradually to exclude the
body of the people from any share in the government, first of the substance,
and then of the forms. The men who will have these views will not be without
their agents and supporters. When we reflect, that a few years ago we
established democratic republics, and fixed the state governments as the
barriers between congress and the pockets of the people; what great progress
has been made in less than seven years to break down those barriers, and
essentially to change the principles of our governments, even by the armless
few: is it chimerical to suppose that in fifteen or twenty years to come,
that much more can be performed, especially after the adoption of the
constitution, when the few will be so much better armed with power and
influence, to continue the struggle? probably, they will be wise enough
never to alarm, but gradually prepare the minds of the people for one
specious change after another, till the final object shall be obtained. Say
the advocates, these are only possibilities — they are probabilities, a wise
people ought to guard against; and the address made use of to keep the evils
out of sight, and the means to prevent them, confirm my opinion.
But to obviate all objections to the proposed plan in the last resort: it is
said our people will be free, so long as they possess the habits of freemen,
and when they lose them, they must receive some other forms of government.
To this I shall only observe, that this is very humiliating language, and
can, I trust, never suit a manly people, who have contended nobly for
liberty, and declared to the world they will be free.
I have dwelt much longer than I expected upon the increasing the
representation, the democratic interest in the federal system; but I hope
the importance of the subject will justify my dwelling upon it. I have
pursued it in a manner new, and I have found it necessary to be somewhat
prolix, to illustrate the point I had in view. My idea has ever been, when
the democratic branch is weak and small, the body of the people have no
defence, and every thing to fear; if they expect to find genuine political
friends in kings and nobles, in great and powerful men, they deceive
themselves. On the other hand, fix a genuine democratic branch in the
government, solely to hold the purse, and with the power of impeachment, and
to propose and negative laws, cautiously limit the king and nobles, or the
executive and the senate, as the case may be, and the people, I conceive,
have but little to fear, and their liberties will be always secure.
I think we are now arrived to a new aera in the affairs of men, when the
true principles of government will be more fully unfolded than heretofore,
and a new world, as it were, grow up in America. In contemplating
representation, the next thing is the security of elections. Before I
proceed to this, I beg leave to observe, that the pay of the representatives
of the people is essentially connected with their interests.
Congress may put the pay of the members unreasonably high, or so low as that
none but the rich and opulent can attend; there are very strong reasons for
supposing the latter, probably, will be the case, and a part of the same
policy, which uniformly and constantly exerts itself to transfer power from
the many to the few. Should the pay be well fixed, and made alterable by
congress, with the consent of a majority of the state legislatures, perhaps,
all the evils to be feared on this head might, in the best practicable
manner, be guarded against, and proper security introduced. It is said the
state legislatures fix their own pay — the answer is, that congress is not,
nor can it ever be well formed on those equal principles the state
legislatures are. I shall not dwell on this point, but conclude this letter
with one general observation, that the check[s] I contend for in the system
proposed, do not, in the least, any of them tend to lessen the energy of it;
but giving grounds for the confidence of the people, greatly to increase its
real energy, by insuring their constant and hearty support.