% WARNING: This file may contain UTF-8 (unicode) characters.
% While non-8-bit characters are officially unsupported in BibTeX, you
% can use them with the biber backend of biblatex
% usepackage[backend=biber]{biblatex}
@techreport{NBERw4381,
title = "Effciency and Equality in a Simple Model of Unemployment Insurance",
author = "Andrew Atkeson and Robert E. Lucas, Jr.",
institution = "National Bureau of Economic Research",
type = "Working Paper",
series = "Working Paper Series",
number = "4381",
year = "1993",
month = "June",
doi = {10.3386/w4381},
URL = "http://www.nber.org/papers/w4381",
abstract = {This paper describes the efficient allocation of consumption and work effort in an economy in which workers face idiosyncratic employment risk and considerations of moral hazard prevent full insurance. We impose a lower bound on the expected discounted utility that can be assigned to any agent from any date onward, and show, with this feature added, that the efficient unemployment insurance scheme induces an invariant cross sectional distribution of individual entitlements to utility. The paper thus provides a simple prototype model suited to the study of the normative question: what is the tradeoff between equality and efficiency in resource allocation?},
}