CHENEY, VICE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES,
et al.
v.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT
COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF
COLUMBIA et al.

certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the district of columbia circuit

No. 03475. Argued April 27, 2004Decided June 24, 2004

The President established the National Energy Policy Development Group (Group) to give him advice and make recommendations on energy policy, assigning a number of federal agency heads and assistants to serve as Group members and authorizing the Vice President, as Group chairman, to include other federal officers as appropriate. After the Group issued a final report and, according to the Government, terminated all operations, respondents filed these separate actions, later consolidated in the District Court, alleging that the Group had not complied with the Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA), which,
inter alia
, imposes a variety of open-meeting and disclosure requirements on entities meeting the definition of advisory committee. As relevant here, such a committee is an entity or subgroup … , which is … established or utilized by the President, … exclud[ing] … any committee … composed wholly of full-time, or permanent part-time, [federal] officers or employees. 5 U. S. C. App. §2(B)(i). The complaint alleged that, because nonfederal employees and private lobbyists regularly attended and fully participated in the Groups nonpublic meetings as
de facto
Group members, the Group could not benefit from the §2(B) exemption and was therefore subject to FACAs requirements. The suit sought declaratory relief and an injunction requiring the defendantsincluding the Vice President and the Government officials serving on the Groupto produce all materials allegedly subject to FACAs requirements.

Among its rulings, the District Court granted the defendants motion to dismiss as to some of them, but denied it as to others. The Court held that FACAs substantive requirements could be enforced against the Vice President and the other Government participants under the Mandamus Act,
28 U. S. C. §1361, and against the agency defendants under the Administrative Procedure Act,
5 U. S. C. §706. It deferred ruling on whether the FACA disclosure duty was sufficiently clear and nondiscretionary for mandamus to issue. It also deferred ruling on the Governments contention that to disregard the §2(B) exemption and apply FACA to the Group would violate separation-of-powers principles and interfere with the Presidents and Vice Presidents constitutional prerogatives. Instead, the court allowed respondents to conduct a tightly-reined discovery to ascertain the Groups structure and membership, and thus to determine whether the
de facto
membership doctrine applied. While acknowledging that discovery itself might raise serious constitutional questions, the court explained that the Government could assert executive privilege to protect sensitive materials from disclosure. The court noted that if, after discovery, respondents had no evidentiary support for their allegations about
de facto
members in the Group, the Government could prevail on statutory grounds. Even were it appropriate to address constitutional issues, the court explained, its discovery orders would provide the factual development necessary to determine the extent of the alleged intrusion into the Executives constitutional authority. The court then ordered respondents to submit a discovery plan, approved that plan in due course, entered orders allowing discovery to proceed, and denied the Governments motion for certification under
28 U. S. C. §1292(b) with respect to the discovery orders.

Petitioners sought a writ of mandamus in the Court of Appeals to vacate the discovery orders and for other relief, but the court dismissed the mandamus petition on the ground that alternative avenues of relief remained available. Citing
United States
v.
Nixon
,
418 U. S. 683, the court held that petitioners, in order to guard against intrusion into the Presidents prerogatives, must first assert executive privilege with particularity in the District Court. If the lower court sustained the privilege, the appeals court observed, petitioners would be able to obtain all the relief they sought; but if the District Court rejected the claim, mandamus might well be appropriate. So long as the separation-of-powers conflict remained hypothetical, the court held, it had no authority to exercise the extraordinary remedy of mandamus. Although acknowledging that the scope of respondents discovery requests was overly broad, the appeals court nonetheless agreed with the District Court that petitioners should bear the burden of invoking executive privilege and of objecting to the discovery orders with detailed precision.

Held:

1. Respondents preliminary argument that the mandamus petition was jurisdictionally out of time is rejected. Respondents assert that, because the Governments basic argument was one of discovery immunity
i.e.,
it need not invoke executive privilege or make particular objections to the discovery requeststhe mandamus petition should have been filed within 60 days after the District Court denied the motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(1)(B). On this theory, the last day for any filing in the appeals court was September 9, 2002, whereas the mandamus petition and notice of appeal were not filed until November 7. However, Rule 4(a), by its plain terms, applies only to the filing of a notice of appeal. It is inapplicable to the mandamus petition under the All Writs Act, 28 U. S C. §1651. Respondents alternative argument that the mandamus petition was barred by the equitable doctrine of laches also fails. Laches might be a bar where the petitioner slept on his rights and especially if the delay was prejudicial.
Chapman
v.
County of Douglas,
107 U. S. 348. Here, however, the flurry of motions the Government filed after the District Court denied the dismissal motion overcomes respondents argument. Nor does the Court accept their argument that laches should apply because those Government motions amounted to little more than dilatory tactics. Given the drastic nature of mandamus and this Courts holdings that the writ may not issue while alternative avenues of relief remain available, the Government cannot be faulted for attempting to resolve the dispute through less drastic means. Pp. 79.

2. The Court of Appeals erred in concluding it lacked authority to issue mandamus because the Government could protect its rights by asserting executive privilege in the District Court. Pp. 921.

(a) Mandamus is a drastic and extraordinary remedy reserved for really extraordinary causes.
Ex parte Fahey
,
332 U. S. 258. While the conditions for obtaining it may be demanding, they are not insuperable. This Court has issued mandamus to,
inter alia
, restrain a lower court whose actions would threaten the separation of powers by embarrassing the Executive Branch.
Ex parte Peru,
318 U. S. 578. Were the Vice President not a party, the argument that the Court of Appeals should have entertained a mandamus action might present different considerations. Here, however, the Vice President and his Group comembers are the subjects of the discovery orders. The mandamus petition alleges that the orders threaten substantial intrusions on the process by which those closest to the President advise him. These facts and allegations remove this case from the category of ordinary discovery orders where interlocutory appellate review is unavailable, through mandamus or otherwise. A Presidents communications and activities encompass a vastly wider range of sensitive material than would be true of any ordinary individual.
Nixon
, 418 U. S., at 715. While the President is not above the law, the Judiciary must afford Presidential confidentiality the greatest possible protection
, ibid.,
recognizing the paramount necessity of protecting the Executive Branch from vexatious litigation that might distract it from the energetic performance of its constitutional duties. These separation-of-powers considerations should inform a court of appeals evaluation of a mandamus petition involving the President or the Vice President. Accepted mandamus standards are broad enough to allow a court to prevent a lower court from interfering with a coequal branchs ability to discharge its constitutional responsibilities. See
Ex parte Peru
,
supra
, at 587. Pp. 912.

(b) The Court of Appeals labored under the mistaken assumption that the assertion of executive privilege is a necessary precondition to the Governments separation-of-powers objections. In its view, the requirement that the Vice President and his Group colleagues bear the burden of invoking executive privilege with narrow specificity and objecting to the discovery requests with detailed precision was mandated by
Nixon
s rejection of an absolute, unqualified Presidential privilege of immunity from judicial process under all circumstances, 418 U. S., at 706. The appeals courts analysis overlooks fundamental differences between this case and
Nixon,
which cannot bear the weight the court put on it. Unlike this case, which concerns requests for information for use in a civil suit,
Nixon
involved the proper balance between the Executives interest in the confidentiality of its communications and the constitutional need for production of relevant evidence in a criminal proceeding.
Id.
, at 713. The distinction between criminal and civil proceedings is not just a matter of formalism in this context. The right to production of relevant evidence in civil proceedings does not have the same constitutional dimensions as it does in the criminal context.
Id.
, at 711. Withholding necessary materials in an ongoing criminal case constitutes an impermissible impairment of another branchs essential functions.
Id.
, at 711. Withholding the information in this case does not hamper such essential functions in quite the same way. The District Court ordered discovery here, not to remedy known statutory violations, but to ascertain whether FACAs disclosure requirements apply to the Group at all. This situation cannot, in fairness, be compared to
Nixon
, where a courts ability to fulfill its constitutional responsibility to resolve cases and controversies within its jurisdiction hinged on the availability of certain indispensable information. Another important factor here is the burden imposed by the discovery orders. This is not a routine discovery dispute. The discovery requests are directed to the Vice President and other senior Government officials who served on the Group to give advice and make recommendations to the President. Special considerations control when the Executives interests in maintaining its autonomy and safeguarding its communications confidentiality are implicated. See, e.g.,
Clinton
v.
Jones,
520 U. S. 681. Even when compared against
Nixon
s criminal subpoenas involving the President, the civil discovery here militates against respondents position. There are no checks in civil discovery analogous to the constraints imposed in the criminal justice system to filter out insubstantial legal claims. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 sanctions and private attorneys obligation of candor to the judicial tribunal have proved insufficient to discourage the filing of meritless claims against the Executive Branch. Finally, the narrowly tailored subpoena orders in
Nixon,
which precisely identified and specific[ally] … enumerated the relevant materials, 418 U. S., at 688, and n. 5, stand in marked contrast to the overly broad discovery requests approved by the District Court. Given that disparity, this Courts precedents provide no support for the appeals courts requirement that the Executive Branch bear the burden of invoking executive privilege with sufficient specificity and of making particularized objections. Indeed, those precedents suggest just the opposite. See,
e.g., Clinton, supra,
at 705. Contrary to their conclusions,
Nixon
did not leave the lower courts the sole option of inviting the Executive Branch to invoke executive privilege. Rather, they could have narrowed the scope of the discovery orders on their own. In deciding whether to issue mandamus, the Court of Appeals must not only determine whether there are exceptional circumstances amounting to a judicial usurpation of power,
Will
v.
United States,
389 U. S. 90, or a clear abuse of discretion,
Bankers Life & Casualty Co.
v.
Holland,
346 U. S. 379, but must also ask whether the District Courts actions constituted an unwarranted impairment of another branch in the performance of its constitutional duties. Pp. 1220.

(c) Absent overriding concerns such as the need to avoid piecemeal litigation, see
Schlagenhauf
v.
Holder,
379 U. S. 104, the Court declines to direct the Court of Appeals to issue mandamus against the District Court. This is not a case where, having considered the issues, the appeals court abused its discretion by failing to issue the writ. Instead, it relied on its mistaken reading of
Nixon
and prematurely terminated its inquiry without even reaching the weighty separation-of-powers objections raised in the case or exercising its discretion to determine whether mandamus is appropriate under the circumstances. Because issuance of the writ is vested in the discretion of the court to which to petition is made, this Court leaves it to the Court of Appeals to address the parties arguments and other matters bearing on whether mandamus should issue, bearing in mind the burdens imposed on the Executive Branch in any future proceedings. Special considerations applicable to the President and the Vice President suggest that the lower courts should be sensitive to Government requests for interlocutory appeals to reexamine,
e.g.,
whether the statute embodies the
de facto
membership doctrine. Pp. 2021.

334 F. 3d 1096, vacated and remanded.

Kennedy, J.,
delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
Rehnquist, C. J.,
and
Stevens, OConnor,
and
Breyer, JJ.,
joined, and in which
Scalia
and
Thomas, JJ.,
joined as to Parts I, II, III, and IV.
Stevens, J.,
filed a concurring opinion.
Thomas, J.,
filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, in which
Scalia, J.,
joined.
Ginsburg, J.,
filed a dissenting opinion, in which
Souter, J.,
joined.

RICHARD B. CHENEY, VICE PRESIDENT OF THE
UNITED STATES,
et al.,
PETITIONERS
v.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR
THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA et al.

on writ of certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the district of columbia circuit

[June 24, 2004]

Justice Ginsburg
, with whom
Justice Souter
joins, dissenting.

The Government, in seeking a writ of mandamus from the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, and on brief to this Court, urged that this case should be resolved without
any
discovery. See App. 183184, 339; Brief for Petitioners 45; Reply Brief 18. In vacating the judgment of the Court of Appeals, however, this Court remands for consideration whether mandamus is appropriate due to the
overbreadth
of the District Courts discovery orders. See
ante
, at 1, 1620. But, as the Court of Appeals observed, it appeared that the Government never asked the district court to
narrow
discovery.
In re Cheney
, 334 F. 3d 1096, 1106 (CADC 2003) (emphasis in original). Given the Governments decision to resist all discovery, mandamus relief based on the exorbitance of the discovery orders is at least premature,
id.
, at 1104. I would therefore affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals denying the writ,
1
and allow the District Court, in the first instance, to pursue its expressed intention tightly [to] rei[n] [in] discovery,
Judicial Watch, Inc.
v.
National Energy Policy Dev. Group
, 219 F. Supp. 2d 20, 54 (DC 2002), should the Government so request.

I

A

The discovery at issue here was sought in a civil action filed by respondents Judicial Watch, Inc., and Sierra Club. To gain information concerning the membership and operations of an energy-policy task force, the National Energy Policy Development Group (NEPDG), respondents filed suit under the Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA), 5 U. S. C. App. §1
et seq.;
respondents named among the defendants
the Vice President and senior Executive Branch officials. See App. 1640, 139154;
ante
, at 13. After granting in part and denying in part the Governments motions to dismiss, see 219 F. Supp. 2d 20, the District Court approved respondents extensive discovery plan, which included detailed and far-ranging interrogatories and sweeping requests for production of documents, see App. to Pet. for Cert. 51a; App. 215230. In a later order, the District Court directed the Government to produce non-privileged documents and a privilege log. App. to Pet. for Cert. 47a.

The discovery plan drawn by Judicial Watch and Sierra Club was indeed unbounded in scope.
Ante
, at 17; accord 334 F. 3d, at 1106. Initial approval of that plan by the District Court, however, was not given in stunning disregard of separation-of-powers concerns. Cf.
ante
, at 1620. In the order itself, the District Court invited detailed and precise object[ions] to any of the discovery requests, and instructed the Government to identify and explain … invocations of privilege with particularity. App. to Pet. for Cert. 51a. To avoid duplication, the District Court provided that the Government could identify documents or information [responsive to the discovery requests] that [it] ha[d] already released to [Judicial Watch or the Sierra Club] in different fora.
Ibid.<footcall num="2">
Anticipating further proceedings concerning discovery, the District Court suggested that the Government could submit [any privileged documents] under seal for the courts consideration, or that the court [could] appoint the equivalent of a Special Master, maybe a retired judge, to review allegedly privileged documents. App. 247.

The Government did not file specific objections; nor did it supply particulars to support assertions of privilege. Instead, the Government urged the District Court to rule that Judicial Watch and the Sierra Club could have no discovery at all. See
id.
, at 192 (the governmen[t] position is that … no discovery is appropriate);
id.
, at 205 (same); 334 F. 3d, at 1106 (As far as we can tell, petitioners never asked the district court to
narrow
discovery to those matters [respondents] need to support their allegation that FACA applies to the NEPDG. (emphasis in original)). In the Governments view, the resolution of the case ha[d] to flow from the administrative record
sans
discovery. App. 192. Without taking up the District Courts suggestion of that courts readiness to rein in discovery, see 219 F. Supp. 2d, at 54, the Government, on behalf of the Vice President, moved, unsuccessfully, for a protective order and for certification of an interlocutory appeal pursuant to
28 U. S. C. §1292(b). See 334 F. 3d, at 1100; see App. to Pet. for Cert. 47a (District Court denial of protective order); 233 F. Supp. 2d 16 (DC 2002) (District Court denial of §1292(b) certification).
3
At the District Courts hearing on the Governments motion for a stay pending interlocutory appeal, the Government argued that the injury is submitting to discovery in the absence of a compelling showing of need by the [respondents]. App. 316; see 230 F. Supp. 2d 12 (DC 2002)
(District Court order denying stay).

Despite the absence from this flurry of activity,
ante
, at 8, of any Government motion contesting the terms of the discovery plan or proposing a scaled-down substitute plan, see 334 F. 3d, at 1106, this Court states that the Government did in fact object to the scope of discovery and asked the District Court to narrow it in some way,
ante
, at 18. In support of this statement, the Court points to the Governments objections to the proposed discovery plan, its response to the interrogatories and production requests, and its contention that discovery would be unduly burdensome. See
ante
, at 18; App. 166184, 201, 231234, 274.

True, the Government disputed the definition of the term meeting in respondents interrogatories, and stated, in passing, that discovery should be [both] limited to written interrogatories and limited in scope to the issue of membership.
Id.
, at 179, 181, 233.
4
But as the Court of Appeals noted, the Government mentioned excessive discovery in support of its plea to be shielded from any discovery. 334 F. 3d, at 1106. The Government argument that the burden of doing a document production is an unconstitutional burden, App. 274, was similarly anchored. The Government so urged at a District Court hearing in which its underlying position [was] that its not going to produce anything,
id.
, at 249.
5

The Governments bottom line was firmly and consistently that review, limited to the administrative record, should frame the resolution of this case.
Id.
, at 181; accord
id.
, at 179, 233. That administrative record would consist of the Presidential Memorandum establishing NEPDG, NEPDGs public report, and the Office of the Vice Presidents response to … Judicial Watchs request for permission to attend NEPDG meetings; it would not include anything respondents could gain through discovery.
Id.
, at 183. Indeed, the Government acknowledged before the District Court that its litigation strategy involved opposition to the discovery plan as a whole in lieu of focused objections. See
id.
, at 205 (Government stated: We did not choose to offer written objections to [the discovery plan] … .).

Further sounding the Governments leitmotif, in a hearing on the proposed discovery plan, the District Court stated that the Government didnt file objections to rein in discovery because [in the Governments view] no discovery is appropriate.
Id
., at 192;
id.
, at 205 (same). Without endeavoring to correct any misunderstanding on the District Courts part, the Government underscored its resistance to any and all discovery.
Id.
, at 192194;
id.
, at 201 (asserting that respondents are not entitled to discovery to supplement [the administrative record]). And in its motion for a protective order, the Government similarly declared its unqualified opposition to discovery. See Memorandum in Support of Defendants Motion for a Protective Order and for Reconsideration, C. A. Nos. 011530 (EGS), 02631 (EGS), p. 21 (D. D. C., Sept. 3, 2002) ([Petitioners] respectfully request that the Court enter a protective order relieving them of
any obligation
to respond to [respondents] discovery [requests]. (emphasis added)); see 334 F. 3d, at 1106 (same).
6

The District Court, in short, ignored no concrete pleas to narrow discovery. But see
ante
, at 18. That court did, however, voice its concern about the Governments failure to heed the courts instructions:

I told the government, if you have precise constitutional objections, let me know what they are so I can determine whether or not this [discovery] plan is appropriate, and … you said, well, its unconstitutional, without elaborating. You said, because Plaintiffs proposed discovery plan has not been approved by the court, the Defendants are not submitting specific objections to Plaintiffs proposed request… . My rule was, if you have objections, let me know what the objections are, and you chose not to do so. App. 205.

B

Denied §1292(b) certification by the District Court, the Government sought a writ of mandamus from the Court of Appeals. See
id.
, at 339365. In its mandamus petition, the Government asked the appellate court to vacate the discovery orders issued by the district court, direct the court to decide the case on the basis of the administrative record and such supplemental affidavits as it may require, and direct that the Vice President be dismissed as a defendant.
Id.
, at 364365. In support of those requests, the Government again argued that the case should be adjudicated without discovery: The Constitution and principles of comity preclude discovery of the President or Vice President, especially without a demonstration of compelling and focused countervailing interest.
Id.
, at 360.

The Court of Appeals acknowledged that the discovery plan presented by respondents and approved by the District Court goes well beyond what [respondents] need. 334 F. 3d, at 1106. The appellate court nevertheless denied the mandamus petition, concluding that the Governments separation-of-powers concern remain[ed] hypothetical.
Id.
, at 1105. Far from ordering immediate disclosure of communications between senior executive branch officials and those with information relevant to advice that was being formulated for the President, the Court of Appeals observed, the District Court had directed the Government initially to produce only non-privileged documents and a privilege log.
Id.
, at 1104 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); see App. to Pet. for Cert. 47a.
7

The Court of Appeals stressed that the District Court could accommodate separation-of-powers concerns short of denying all discovery or compelling the invocation of executive privilege. See 334 F. 3d, at 11051106. Principally, the Court of Appeals stated, discovery could be narrowed, should the Government so move, to encompass only whether non-federal officials participated [in NEPDG], and if so, to what extent.
Id.
, at 1106. The Government could identify relevant materials produced in other litigation, thus avoiding undue reproduction.
Id.
, at 1105; see App. to Pet. for Cert. 51a;
supra
, at 3. If, after appropriate narrowing, the discovery allowed still impels the Vice President … to claim privilege, the District Court could entertain [those] privilege claims and review allegedly privileged documents in camera. 334 F. 3d, at 1107. Mindful of the judiciarys responsibility to police the separation of powers in litigation involving the executive, the Court of Appeals expressed confidence that the District Court would respond to petitioners concern and narrow discovery to ensure that [respondents] obtain no more than they need to prove their case.
Id.
, at 1106.

Throughout this litigation, the Government has declined to move for reduction of the District Courts discovery order to accommodate separation-of-powers concerns. See
supra
, at 37. The Court now remands this case so the Court of Appeals can consider whether a mandamus writ should issue ordering the District Court to explore other avenues, short of forcing the Executive to invoke privilege, and, in particular, to narrow, on its own, the scope of [discovery].
Ante
, at 1920. Nothing in the District Courts orders or the Court of Appeals opinion, however, suggests that either of those courts would refuse reasonably to accommodate separation-of-powers concerns. See
supra
, at 3, 78. When parties seeking a mandamus writ decline to avail themselves of opportunities to obtain relief from the District Court, a writ of mandamus ordering the same relief
i.e.
, here, reined-in discoveryis surely a doubtful proposition.

The District Court, moreover, did not err in failing to narrow discovery on its own initiative. Although the Court cites
United States
v.
Poindexter
, 727 F. Supp. 1501 (DC 1989), as sound precedent for district-court narrowing of discovery, see
ante
, at 1920, the target of the subpoena in that case, former President Reagan, unlike petitioners in this case, affirmatively requested such narrowing, 727 F. Supp., at 1503. A district court is not subject to criticism if it awaits a partys motion before tightening the scope of discovery; certainly, that court makes no clear and indisputable error in adhering to the principle of party initiation,
Kerr
, 426 U. S., at 403 (internal quotation marks omitted).
8

* * *

Review by mandamus at this stage of the proceedings would be at least comprehensible as a means to test the Governments position that
no
discovery is appropriate in this litigation. See Brief for Petitioners 45 ([P]etitioners separation-of-powers arguments are … in the nature of a claim of immunity from discovery.). But in remanding for consideration of discovery-tailoring measures, the Court apparently rejects that no-discovery position. Otherwise, a remand based on the overbreadth of the discovery requests would make no sense. Nothing in the record, however, intimates lower-court refusal to reduce discovery. Indeed, the appeals court has already suggested tailored discovery that would avoid effectively prejudg[ing] the merits of respondents claim,
ante
, at 2 (
Stevens, J.
, concurring). See 334 F. 3d, at 1106 (respondents need only documents referring to the involvement of non-federal officials). See also
ante
, at 2, n. (
Stevens, J.
, concurring) (A few interrogatories or depositions might have determined … whether any non-Government employees voted on NEPDG recommendations or drafted portions of the committees report). In accord with the Court of Appeals, I am confident that [were it moved to do so] the district court here [would] protect petitioners legitimate interests and keep discovery within appropriate limits. 334 F. 3d, at 1107.
9
I would therefore affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals.

Notes

1
The Court of Appeals also concluded, altogether correctly in my view, that it lacked ordinary appellate jurisdiction over the Vice Presidents appeal. See 334 F. 3d, at 1109; cf. ante, at 78 (leaving appellate-jurisdiction question undecided). In its order addressing the petitioners motions to dismiss, the District Court stated it would be premature and inappropriate to determine whether any relief could be obtained from the Vice President. Judicial Watch, Inc. v. National Energy Policy Dev. Group, 219 F. Supp. 2d 20, 44 (DC 2002). Immediate review of an interlocutory ruling, allowed in rare cases under the collateral-order doctrine, is inappropriate when an order is, as in this case, inherently tentative and not the final word on the subject. Gulfstream Aerospace Corp. v. Mayacamas Corp.,
485 U. S. 271,
277 (1988)
(internal quotation marks omitted).

2
Government agencies had produced some relevant documents in related Freedom of Information Act litigation. See 219 F. Supp. 2d, at 27.

3
Section 1292(b) of Title 28 allows a court of appeals, in its discretion, to entertain an appeal from an interlocutory order [w]hen a district judge … shall be of the opinion that such order involves a controlling question of law as to which there is substantial ground for difference of opinion and that an immediate appeal from the order may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation.

4
On limiting discovery to the issue of membership, the Court of Appeals indicated its agreement. See 334 F. 3d, at 1106 ([Respondents] have no need for the names of all persons who participated in [NEPDG]s activities, nor a description of each persons role in the activities of [NEPDG]. They must discover only whether non-federal officials participated, and if so, to what extent. (internal quotation marks, ellipsis, and brackets omitted)).

5
According to the Government, 24 boxes of documents [are] potentially responsive to [respondents] discovery requests… . The documents identified as likely to be responsive from those boxes … are contained in approximately twelve boxes. App. 282283. Each box requires one or two attorney days to review and prepare a rough privilege log. Following that review, privilege logs must be finalized. Further, once the responsive emails are identified, printed, and numbered, [petitioners] expect that the privilege review and logging process [will] be equally, if not more, time-consuming, due to the expected quantity of individual emails. Id., at 284.

7
The Court suggests that the appeals court labored under the mistaken assumption that the assertion of executive privilege is a necessary precondition to the Governments separation-of-powers objections. Ante, at 20. The Court of Appeals, however, described the constitutional concern as hypothetical, not merely because no executive privilege had been asserted, but also in light of measures the District Court could take to narrow and carefully focu[s] discovery. See 334 F. 3d, at 1105, 1107.

8
The Court also questions the District Courts invocation of the federal mandamus statute,
28 U. S. C. §1361, which provides that [t]he district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any action in the nature of mandamus to compel an officer or employee of the United States or any agency thereof to perform a duty owed to the plaintiff. See ante, at 20; 219 F. Supp. 2d, at 4144. See also Chandler v. Judicial Council of Tenth Circuit,
398 U. S. 74, and n. 8 (1970) (holding mandamus under the All Writs Act,
28 U. S. C. §1651, improper, but expressing no opinion on relief under the federal mandamus statute, §1361). On the question whether §1361 allows enforcement of the FACA against the Vice President, the District Court concluded it would be premature and inappropriate to determine whether the relief of mandamus will or will not issue. 219 F. Supp. 2d, at 44. The Government, moreover, contested the propriety of §1361 relief only in passing in its petition to the appeals court for §1651 mandamus relief. See App. 363364 (Government asserted in its mandamus petition: The more general writ of mandamus cannot be used to circumvent … limits on the provision directly providing for review of administrative action.). A question not decided by the District Court, and barely raised in a petition for mandamus, hardly qualifies as grounds for drastic and extraordinary mandamus relief, Ex parte Fahey,
332 U. S. 258,
259260 (1947)
.
Justice Thomas urges that respondents cannot obtain §1361 relief if wide-ranging discovery [is needed] to prove that they have any right to relief. Ante, at 3 (opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part) (emphasis in original). First, as the Court of Appeals recognized, see supra, at 89; infra, at 11, should the Government so move, the District Court could contain discovery so that it would not be wide-ranging. Second, all agree that an applicant seeking a §1361 mandamus writ must show that the [federal] defendant owes him a clear, nondiscretionary duty. Heckler v. Ringer,
466 U. S. 602,
616 (1984)
(emphasis added). No §1361 writ may issue, in other words, when federal law grants discretion to the federal officer, rather than imposing a duty on him. When federal law imposes an obligation, however, suit under §1361 is not precluded simply because facts must be developed to ascertain whether a federal command has been dishonored. Congress enacted §1361 to mak[e] it more convenient for aggrieved persons to file actions in the nature of mandamus, Stafford v. Briggs,
444 U. S. 527,
535 (1980)
, not to address the rare instance in which a federal defendant, upon whom the law unequivocally places an obligation, concedes his failure to measure up to that obligation.

9
While I agree with the Court that an interlocutory appeal may become appropriate at some later juncture in this litigation, see ante, at 21, I note that the decision whether to allow such an appeal lies in the first instance in the District Courts sound discretion, see
28 U. S. C. §1292(b); supra, at 4, n. 3.

RICHARD B. CHENEY, VICE PRESIDENT OF THE
UNITED STATES,
et al.,
PETITIONERS
v.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR
THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA et al.

on writ of certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the district of columbia circuit

[June 24, 2004]

Justice Ginsburg
, with whom
Justice Souter
joins, dissenting.

The Government, in seeking a writ of mandamus from the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, and on brief to this Court, urged that this case should be resolved without
any
discovery. See App. 183184, 339; Brief for Petitioners 45; Reply Brief 18. In vacating the judgment of the Court of Appeals, however, this Court remands for consideration whether mandamus is appropriate due to the
overbreadth
of the District Courts discovery orders. See
ante
, at 1, 1620. But, as the Court of Appeals observed, it appeared that the Government never asked the district court to
narrow
discovery.
In re Cheney
, 334 F. 3d 1096, 1106 (CADC 2003) (emphasis in original). Given the Governments decision to resist all discovery, mandamus relief based on the exorbitance of the discovery orders is at least premature,
id.
, at 1104. I would therefore affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals denying the writ,
1
and allow the District Court, in the first instance, to pursue its expressed intention tightly [to] rei[n] [in] discovery,
Judicial Watch, Inc.
v.
National Energy Policy Dev. Group
, 219 F. Supp. 2d 20, 54 (DC 2002), should the Government so request.

I

A

The discovery at issue here was sought in a civil action filed by respondents Judicial Watch, Inc., and Sierra Club. To gain information concerning the membership and operations of an energy-policy task force, the National Energy Policy Development Group (NEPDG), respondents filed suit under the Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA), 5 U. S. C. App. §1
et seq.;
respondents named among the defendants
the Vice President and senior Executive Branch officials. See App. 1640, 139154;
ante
, at 13. After granting in part and denying in part the Governments motions to dismiss, see 219 F. Supp. 2d 20, the District Court approved respondents extensive discovery plan, which included detailed and far-ranging interrogatories and sweeping requests for production of documents, see App. to Pet. for Cert. 51a; App. 215230. In a later order, the District Court directed the Government to produce non-privileged documents and a privilege log. App. to Pet. for Cert. 47a.

The discovery plan drawn by Judicial Watch and Sierra Club was indeed unbounded in scope.
Ante
, at 17; accord 334 F. 3d, at 1106. Initial approval of that plan by the District Court, however, was not given in stunning disregard of separation-of-powers concerns. Cf.
ante
, at 1620. In the order itself, the District Court invited detailed and precise object[ions] to any of the discovery requests, and instructed the Government to identify and explain … invocations of privilege with particularity. App. to Pet. for Cert. 51a. To avoid duplication, the District Court provided that the Government could identify documents or information [responsive to the discovery requests] that [it] ha[d] already released to [Judicial Watch or the Sierra Club] in different fora.
Ibid.<footcall num="2">
Anticipating further proceedings concerning discovery, the District Court suggested that the Government could submit [any privileged documents] under seal for the courts consideration, or that the court [could] appoint the equivalent of a Special Master, maybe a retired judge, to review allegedly privileged documents. App. 247.

The Government did not file specific objections; nor did it supply particulars to support assertions of privilege. Instead, the Government urged the District Court to rule that Judicial Watch and the Sierra Club could have no discovery at all. See
id.
, at 192 (the governmen[t] position is that … no discovery is appropriate);
id.
, at 205 (same); 334 F. 3d, at 1106 (As far as we can tell, petitioners never asked the district court to
narrow
discovery to those matters [respondents] need to support their allegation that FACA applies to the NEPDG. (emphasis in original)). In the Governments view, the resolution of the case ha[d] to flow from the administrative record
sans
discovery. App. 192. Without taking up the District Courts suggestion of that courts readiness to rein in discovery, see 219 F. Supp. 2d, at 54, the Government, on behalf of the Vice President, moved, unsuccessfully, for a protective order and for certification of an interlocutory appeal pursuant to
28 U. S. C. §1292(b). See 334 F. 3d, at 1100; see App. to Pet. for Cert. 47a (District Court denial of protective order); 233 F. Supp. 2d 16 (DC 2002) (District Court denial of §1292(b) certification).
3
At the District Courts hearing on the Governments motion for a stay pending interlocutory appeal, the Government argued that the injury is submitting to discovery in the absence of a compelling showing of need by the [respondents]. App. 316; see 230 F. Supp. 2d 12 (DC 2002)
(District Court order denying stay).

Despite the absence from this flurry of activity,
ante
, at 8, of any Government motion contesting the terms of the discovery plan or proposing a scaled-down substitute plan, see 334 F. 3d, at 1106, this Court states that the Government did in fact object to the scope of discovery and asked the District Court to narrow it in some way,
ante
, at 18. In support of this statement, the Court points to the Governments objections to the proposed discovery plan, its response to the interrogatories and production requests, and its contention that discovery would be unduly burdensome. See
ante
, at 18; App. 166184, 201, 231234, 274.

True, the Government disputed the definition of the term meeting in respondents interrogatories, and stated, in passing, that discovery should be [both] limited to written interrogatories and limited in scope to the issue of membership.
Id.
, at 179, 181, 233.
4
But as the Court of Appeals noted, the Government mentioned excessive discovery in support of its plea to be shielded from any discovery. 334 F. 3d, at 1106. The Government argument that the burden of doing a document production is an unconstitutional burden, App. 274, was similarly anchored. The Government so urged at a District Court hearing in which its underlying position [was] that its not going to produce anything,
id.
, at 249.
5

The Governments bottom line was firmly and consistently that review, limited to the administrative record, should frame the resolution of this case.
Id.
, at 181; accord
id.
, at 179, 233. That administrative record would consist of the Presidential Memorandum establishing NEPDG, NEPDGs public report, and the Office of the Vice Presidents response to … Judicial Watchs request for permission to attend NEPDG meetings; it would not include anything respondents could gain through discovery.
Id.
, at 183. Indeed, the Government acknowledged before the District Court that its litigation strategy involved opposition to the discovery plan as a whole in lieu of focused objections. See
id.
, at 205 (Government stated: We did not choose to offer written objections to [the discovery plan] … .).

Further sounding the Governments leitmotif, in a hearing on the proposed discovery plan, the District Court stated that the Government didnt file objections to rein in discovery because [in the Governments view] no discovery is appropriate.
Id
., at 192;
id.
, at 205 (same). Without endeavoring to correct any misunderstanding on the District Courts part, the Government underscored its resistance to any and all discovery.
Id.
, at 192194;
id.
, at 201 (asserting that respondents are not entitled to discovery to supplement [the administrative record]). And in its motion for a protective order, the Government similarly declared its unqualified opposition to discovery. See Memorandum in Support of Defendants Motion for a Protective Order and for Reconsideration, C. A. Nos. 011530 (EGS), 02631 (EGS), p. 21 (D. D. C., Sept. 3, 2002) ([Petitioners] respectfully request that the Court enter a protective order relieving them of
any obligation
to respond to [respondents] discovery [requests]. (emphasis added)); see 334 F. 3d, at 1106 (same).
6

The District Court, in short, ignored no concrete pleas to narrow discovery. But see
ante
, at 18. That court did, however, voice its concern about the Governments failure to heed the courts instructions:

I told the government, if you have precise constitutional objections, let me know what they are so I can determine whether or not this [discovery] plan is appropriate, and … you said, well, its unconstitutional, without elaborating. You said, because Plaintiffs proposed discovery plan has not been approved by the court, the Defendants are not submitting specific objections to Plaintiffs proposed request… . My rule was, if you have objections, let me know what the objections are, and you chose not to do so. App. 205.

B

Denied §1292(b) certification by the District Court, the Government sought a writ of mandamus from the Court of Appeals. See
id.
, at 339365. In its mandamus petition, the Government asked the appellate court to vacate the discovery orders issued by the district court, direct the court to decide the case on the basis of the administrative record and such supplemental affidavits as it may require, and direct that the Vice President be dismissed as a defendant.
Id.
, at 364365. In support of those requests, the Government again argued that the case should be adjudicated without discovery: The Constitution and principles of comity preclude discovery of the President or Vice President, especially without a demonstration of compelling and focused countervailing interest.
Id.
, at 360.

The Court of Appeals acknowledged that the discovery plan presented by respondents and approved by the District Court goes well beyond what [respondents] need. 334 F. 3d, at 1106. The appellate court nevertheless denied the mandamus petition, concluding that the Governments separation-of-powers concern remain[ed] hypothetical.
Id.
, at 1105. Far from ordering immediate disclosure of communications between senior executive branch officials and those with information relevant to advice that was being formulated for the President, the Court of Appeals observed, the District Court had directed the Government initially to produce only non-privileged documents and a privilege log.
Id.
, at 1104 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); see App. to Pet. for Cert. 47a.
7

The Court of Appeals stressed that the District Court could accommodate separation-of-powers concerns short of denying all discovery or compelling the invocation of executive privilege. See 334 F. 3d, at 11051106. Principally, the Court of Appeals stated, discovery could be narrowed, should the Government so move, to encompass only whether non-federal officials participated [in NEPDG], and if so, to what extent.
Id.
, at 1106. The Government could identify relevant materials produced in other litigation, thus avoiding undue reproduction.
Id.
, at 1105; see App. to Pet. for Cert. 51a;
supra
, at 3. If, after appropriate narrowing, the discovery allowed still impels the Vice President … to claim privilege, the District Court could entertain [those] privilege claims and review allegedly privileged documents in camera. 334 F. 3d, at 1107. Mindful of the judiciarys responsibility to police the separation of powers in litigation involving the executive, the Court of Appeals expressed confidence that the District Court would respond to petitioners concern and narrow discovery to ensure that [respondents] obtain no more than they need to prove their case.
Id.
, at 1106.

Throughout this litigation, the Government has declined to move for reduction of the District Courts discovery order to accommodate separation-of-powers concerns. See
supra
, at 37. The Court now remands this case so the Court of Appeals can consider whether a mandamus writ should issue ordering the District Court to explore other avenues, short of forcing the Executive to invoke privilege, and, in particular, to narrow, on its own, the scope of [discovery].
Ante
, at 1920. Nothing in the District Courts orders or the Court of Appeals opinion, however, suggests that either of those courts would refuse reasonably to accommodate separation-of-powers concerns. See
supra
, at 3, 78. When parties seeking a mandamus writ decline to avail themselves of opportunities to obtain relief from the District Court, a writ of mandamus ordering the same relief
i.e.
, here, reined-in discoveryis surely a doubtful proposition.

The District Court, moreover, did not err in failing to narrow discovery on its own initiative. Although the Court cites
United States
v.
Poindexter
, 727 F. Supp. 1501 (DC 1989), as sound precedent for district-court narrowing of discovery, see
ante
, at 1920, the target of the subpoena in that case, former President Reagan, unlike petitioners in this case, affirmatively requested such narrowing, 727 F. Supp., at 1503. A district court is not subject to criticism if it awaits a partys motion before tightening the scope of discovery; certainly, that court makes no clear and indisputable error in adhering to the principle of party initiation,
Kerr
, 426 U. S., at 403 (internal quotation marks omitted).
8

* * *

Review by mandamus at this stage of the proceedings would be at least comprehensible as a means to test the Governments position that
no
discovery is appropriate in this litigation. See Brief for Petitioners 45 ([P]etitioners separation-of-powers arguments are … in the nature of a claim of immunity from discovery.). But in remanding for consideration of discovery-tailoring measures, the Court apparently rejects that no-discovery position. Otherwise, a remand based on the overbreadth of the discovery requests would make no sense. Nothing in the record, however, intimates lower-court refusal to reduce discovery. Indeed, the appeals court has already suggested tailored discovery that would avoid effectively prejudg[ing] the merits of respondents claim,
ante
, at 2 (
Stevens, J.
, concurring). See 334 F. 3d, at 1106 (respondents need only documents referring to the involvement of non-federal officials). See also
ante
, at 2, n. (
Stevens, J.
, concurring) (A few interrogatories or depositions might have determined … whether any non-Government employees voted on NEPDG recommendations or drafted portions of the committees report). In accord with the Court of Appeals, I am confident that [were it moved to do so] the district court here [would] protect petitioners legitimate interests and keep discovery within appropriate limits. 334 F. 3d, at 1107.
9
I would therefore affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals.

Notes

1
The Court of Appeals also concluded, altogether correctly in my view, that it lacked ordinary appellate jurisdiction over the Vice Presidents appeal. See 334 F. 3d, at 1109; cf. ante, at 78 (leaving appellate-jurisdiction question undecided). In its order addressing the petitioners motions to dismiss, the District Court stated it would be premature and inappropriate to determine whether any relief could be obtained from the Vice President. Judicial Watch, Inc. v. National Energy Policy Dev. Group, 219 F. Supp. 2d 20, 44 (DC 2002). Immediate review of an interlocutory ruling, allowed in rare cases under the collateral-order doctrine, is inappropriate when an order is, as in this case, inherently tentative and not the final word on the subject. Gulfstream Aerospace Corp. v. Mayacamas Corp.,
485 U. S. 271,
277 (1988)
(internal quotation marks omitted).

2
Government agencies had produced some relevant documents in related Freedom of Information Act litigation. See 219 F. Supp. 2d, at 27.

3
Section 1292(b) of Title 28 allows a court of appeals, in its discretion, to entertain an appeal from an interlocutory order [w]hen a district judge … shall be of the opinion that such order involves a controlling question of law as to which there is substantial ground for difference of opinion and that an immediate appeal from the order may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation.

4
On limiting discovery to the issue of membership, the Court of Appeals indicated its agreement. See 334 F. 3d, at 1106 ([Respondents] have no need for the names of all persons who participated in [NEPDG]s activities, nor a description of each persons role in the activities of [NEPDG]. They must discover only whether non-federal officials participated, and if so, to what extent. (internal quotation marks, ellipsis, and brackets omitted)).

5
According to the Government, 24 boxes of documents [are] potentially responsive to [respondents] discovery requests… . The documents identified as likely to be responsive from those boxes … are contained in approximately twelve boxes. App. 282283. Each box requires one or two attorney days to review and prepare a rough privilege log. Following that review, privilege logs must be finalized. Further, once the responsive emails are identified, printed, and numbered, [petitioners] expect that the privilege review and logging process [will] be equally, if not more, time-consuming, due to the expected quantity of individual emails. Id., at 284.

7
The Court suggests that the appeals court labored under the mistaken assumption that the assertion of executive privilege is a necessary precondition to the Governments separation-of-powers objections. Ante, at 20. The Court of Appeals, however, described the constitutional concern as hypothetical, not merely because no executive privilege had been asserted, but also in light of measures the District Court could take to narrow and carefully focu[s] discovery. See 334 F. 3d, at 1105, 1107.

8
The Court also questions the District Courts invocation of the federal mandamus statute,
28 U. S. C. §1361, which provides that [t]he district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any action in the nature of mandamus to compel an officer or employee of the United States or any agency thereof to perform a duty owed to the plaintiff. See ante, at 20; 219 F. Supp. 2d, at 4144. See also Chandler v. Judicial Council of Tenth Circuit,
398 U. S. 74, and n. 8 (1970) (holding mandamus under the All Writs Act,
28 U. S. C. §1651, improper, but expressing no opinion on relief under the federal mandamus statute, §1361). On the question whether §1361 allows enforcement of the FACA against the Vice President, the District Court concluded it would be premature and inappropriate to determine whether the relief of mandamus will or will not issue. 219 F. Supp. 2d, at 44. The Government, moreover, contested the propriety of §1361 relief only in passing in its petition to the appeals court for §1651 mandamus relief. See App. 363364 (Government asserted in its mandamus petition: The more general writ of mandamus cannot be used to circumvent … limits on the provision directly providing for review of administrative action.). A question not decided by the District Court, and barely raised in a petition for mandamus, hardly qualifies as grounds for drastic and extraordinary mandamus relief, Ex parte Fahey,
332 U. S. 258,
259260 (1947)
.
Justice Thomas urges that respondents cannot obtain §1361 relief if wide-ranging discovery [is needed] to prove that they have any right to relief. Ante, at 3 (opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part) (emphasis in original). First, as the Court of Appeals recognized, see supra, at 89; infra, at 11, should the Government so move, the District Court could contain discovery so that it would not be wide-ranging. Second, all agree that an applicant seeking a §1361 mandamus writ must show that the [federal] defendant owes him a clear, nondiscretionary duty. Heckler v. Ringer,
466 U. S. 602,
616 (1984)
(emphasis added). No §1361 writ may issue, in other words, when federal law grants discretion to the federal officer, rather than imposing a duty on him. When federal law imposes an obligation, however, suit under §1361 is not precluded simply because facts must be developed to ascertain whether a federal command has been dishonored. Congress enacted §1361 to mak[e] it more convenient for aggrieved persons to file actions in the nature of mandamus, Stafford v. Briggs,
444 U. S. 527,
535 (1980)
, not to address the rare instance in which a federal defendant, upon whom the law unequivocally places an obligation, concedes his failure to measure up to that obligation.

9
While I agree with the Court that an interlocutory appeal may become appropriate at some later juncture in this litigation, see ante, at 21, I note that the decision whether to allow such an appeal lies in the first instance in the District Courts sound discretion, see
28 U. S. C. §1292(b); supra, at 4, n. 3.

RICHARD B. CHENEY, VICE PRESIDENT OF THE
UNITED STATES,
et al.,
PETITIONERS
v.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR
THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA et al.

on writ of certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the district of columbia circuit

[June 24, 2004]

Justice Ginsburg
, with whom
Justice Souter
joins, dissenting.

The Government, in seeking a writ of mandamus from the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, and on brief to this Court, urged that this case should be resolved without
any
discovery. See App. 183184, 339; Brief for Petitioners 45; Reply Brief 18. In vacating the judgment of the Court of Appeals, however, this Court remands for consideration whether mandamus is appropriate due to the
overbreadth
of the District Courts discovery orders. See
ante
, at 1, 1620. But, as the Court of Appeals observed, it appeared that the Government never asked the district court to
narrow
discovery.
In re Cheney
, 334 F. 3d 1096, 1106 (CADC 2003) (emphasis in original). Given the Governments decision to resist all discovery, mandamus relief based on the exorbitance of the discovery orders is at least premature,
id.
, at 1104. I would therefore affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals denying the writ,
1
and allow the District Court, in the first instance, to pursue its expressed intention tightly [to] rei[n] [in] discovery,
Judicial Watch, Inc.
v.
National Energy Policy Dev. Group
, 219 F. Supp. 2d 20, 54 (DC 2002), should the Government so request.

I

A

The discovery at issue here was sought in a civil action filed by respondents Judicial Watch, Inc., and Sierra Club. To gain information concerning the membership and operations of an energy-policy task force, the National Energy Policy Development Group (NEPDG), respondents filed suit under the Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA), 5 U. S. C. App. §1
et seq.;
respondents named among the defendants
the Vice President and senior Executive Branch officials. See App. 1640, 139154;
ante
, at 13. After granting in part and denying in part the Governments motions to dismiss, see 219 F. Supp. 2d 20, the District Court approved respondents extensive discovery plan, which included detailed and far-ranging interrogatories and sweeping requests for production of documents, see App. to Pet. for Cert. 51a; App. 215230. In a later order, the District Court directed the Government to produce non-privileged documents and a privilege log. App. to Pet. for Cert. 47a.

The discovery plan drawn by Judicial Watch and Sierra Club was indeed unbounded in scope.
Ante
, at 17; accord 334 F. 3d, at 1106. Initial approval of that plan by the District Court, however, was not given in stunning disregard of separation-of-powers concerns. Cf.
ante
, at 1620. In the order itself, the District Court invited detailed and precise object[ions] to any of the discovery requests, and instructed the Government to identify and explain … invocations of privilege with particularity. App. to Pet. for Cert. 51a. To avoid duplication, the District Court provided that the Government could identify documents or information [responsive to the discovery requests] that [it] ha[d] already released to [Judicial Watch or the Sierra Club] in different fora.
Ibid.<footcall num="2">
Anticipating further proceedings concerning discovery, the District Court suggested that the Government could submit [any privileged documents] under seal for the courts consideration, or that the court [could] appoint the equivalent of a Special Master, maybe a retired judge, to review allegedly privileged documents. App. 247.

The Government did not file specific objections; nor did it supply particulars to support assertions of privilege. Instead, the Government urged the District Court to rule that Judicial Watch and the Sierra Club could have no discovery at all. See
id.
, at 192 (the governmen[t] position is that … no discovery is appropriate);
id.
, at 205 (same); 334 F. 3d, at 1106 (As far as we can tell, petitioners never asked the district court to
narrow
discovery to those matters [respondents] need to support their allegation that FACA applies to the NEPDG. (emphasis in original)). In the Governments view, the resolution of the case ha[d] to flow from the administrative record
sans
discovery. App. 192. Without taking up the District Courts suggestion of that courts readiness to rein in discovery, see 219 F. Supp. 2d, at 54, the Government, on behalf of the Vice President, moved, unsuccessfully, for a protective order and for certification of an interlocutory appeal pursuant to
28 U. S. C. §1292(b). See 334 F. 3d, at 1100; see App. to Pet. for Cert. 47a (District Court denial of protective order); 233 F. Supp. 2d 16 (DC 2002) (District Court denial of §1292(b) certification).
3
At the District Courts hearing on the Governments motion for a stay pending interlocutory appeal, the Government argued that the injury is submitting to discovery in the absence of a compelling showing of need by the [respondents]. App. 316; see 230 F. Supp. 2d 12 (DC 2002)
(District Court order denying stay).

Despite the absence from this flurry of activity,
ante
, at 8, of any Government motion contesting the terms of the discovery plan or proposing a scaled-down substitute plan, see 334 F. 3d, at 1106, this Court states that the Government did in fact object to the scope of discovery and asked the District Court to narrow it in some way,
ante
, at 18. In support of this statement, the Court points to the Governments objections to the proposed discovery plan, its response to the interrogatories and production requests, and its contention that discovery would be unduly burdensome. See
ante
, at 18; App. 166184, 201, 231234, 274.

True, the Government disputed the definition of the term meeting in respondents interrogatories, and stated, in passing, that discovery should be [both] limited to written interrogatories and limited in scope to the issue of membership.
Id.
, at 179, 181, 233.
4
But as the Court of Appeals noted, the Government mentioned excessive discovery in support of its plea to be shielded from any discovery. 334 F. 3d, at 1106. The Government argument that the burden of doing a document production is an unconstitutional burden, App. 274, was similarly anchored. The Government so urged at a District Court hearing in which its underlying position [was] that its not going to produce anything,
id.
, at 249.
5

The Governments bottom line was firmly and consistently that review, limited to the administrative record, should frame the resolution of this case.
Id.
, at 181; accord
id.
, at 179, 233. That administrative record would consist of the Presidential Memorandum establishing NEPDG, NEPDGs public report, and the Office of the Vice Presidents response to … Judicial Watchs request for permission to attend NEPDG meetings; it would not include anything respondents could gain through discovery.
Id.
, at 183. Indeed, the Government acknowledged before the District Court that its litigation strategy involved opposition to the discovery plan as a whole in lieu of focused objections. See
id.
, at 205 (Government stated: We did not choose to offer written objections to [the discovery plan] … .).

Further sounding the Governments leitmotif, in a hearing on the proposed discovery plan, the District Court stated that the Government didnt file objections to rein in discovery because [in the Governments view] no discovery is appropriate.
Id
., at 192;
id.
, at 205 (same). Without endeavoring to correct any misunderstanding on the District Courts part, the Government underscored its resistance to any and all discovery.
Id.
, at 192194;
id.
, at 201 (asserting that respondents are not entitled to discovery to supplement [the administrative record]). And in its motion for a protective order, the Government similarly declared its unqualified opposition to discovery. See Memorandum in Support of Defendants Motion for a Protective Order and for Reconsideration, C. A. Nos. 011530 (EGS), 02631 (EGS), p. 21 (D. D. C., Sept. 3, 2002) ([Petitioners] respectfully request that the Court enter a protective order relieving them of
any obligation
to respond to [respondents] discovery [requests]. (emphasis added)); see 334 F. 3d, at 1106 (same).
6

The District Court, in short, ignored no concrete pleas to narrow discovery. But see
ante
, at 18. That court did, however, voice its concern about the Governments failure to heed the courts instructions:

I told the government, if you have precise constitutional objections, let me know what they are so I can determine whether or not this [discovery] plan is appropriate, and … you said, well, its unconstitutional, without elaborating. You said, because Plaintiffs proposed discovery plan has not been approved by the court, the Defendants are not submitting specific objections to Plaintiffs proposed request… . My rule was, if you have objections, let me know what the objections are, and you chose not to do so. App. 205.

B

Denied §1292(b) certification by the District Court, the Government sought a writ of mandamus from the Court of Appeals. See
id.
, at 339365. In its mandamus petition, the Government asked the appellate court to vacate the discovery orders issued by the district court, direct the court to decide the case on the basis of the administrative record and such supplemental affidavits as it may require, and direct that the Vice President be dismissed as a defendant.
Id.
, at 364365. In support of those requests, the Government again argued that the case should be adjudicated without discovery: The Constitution and principles of comity preclude discovery of the President or Vice President, especially without a demonstration of compelling and focused countervailing interest.
Id.
, at 360.

The Court of Appeals acknowledged that the discovery plan presented by respondents and approved by the District Court goes well beyond what [respondents] need. 334 F. 3d, at 1106. The appellate court nevertheless denied the mandamus petition, concluding that the Governments separation-of-powers concern remain[ed] hypothetical.
Id.
, at 1105. Far from ordering immediate disclosure of communications between senior executive branch officials and those with information relevant to advice that was being formulated for the President, the Court of Appeals observed, the District Court had directed the Government initially to produce only non-privileged documents and a privilege log.
Id.
, at 1104 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); see App. to Pet. for Cert. 47a.
7

The Court of Appeals stressed that the District Court could accommodate separation-of-powers concerns short of denying all discovery or compelling the invocation of executive privilege. See 334 F. 3d, at 11051106. Principally, the Court of Appeals stated, discovery could be narrowed, should the Government so move, to encompass only whether non-federal officials participated [in NEPDG], and if so, to what extent.
Id.
, at 1106. The Government could identify relevant materials produced in other litigation, thus avoiding undue reproduction.
Id.
, at 1105; see App. to Pet. for Cert. 51a;
supra
, at 3. If, after appropriate narrowing, the discovery allowed still impels the Vice President … to claim privilege, the District Court could entertain [those] privilege claims and review allegedly privileged documents in camera. 334 F. 3d, at 1107. Mindful of the judiciarys responsibility to police the separation of powers in litigation involving the executive, the Court of Appeals expressed confidence that the District Court would respond to petitioners concern and narrow discovery to ensure that [respondents] obtain no more than they need to prove their case.
Id.
, at 1106.

Throughout this litigation, the Government has declined to move for reduction of the District Courts discovery order to accommodate separation-of-powers concerns. See
supra
, at 37. The Court now remands this case so the Court of Appeals can consider whether a mandamus writ should issue ordering the District Court to explore other avenues, short of forcing the Executive to invoke privilege, and, in particular, to narrow, on its own, the scope of [discovery].
Ante
, at 1920. Nothing in the District Courts orders or the Court of Appeals opinion, however, suggests that either of those courts would refuse reasonably to accommodate separation-of-powers concerns. See
supra
, at 3, 78. When parties seeking a mandamus writ decline to avail themselves of opportunities to obtain relief from the District Court, a writ of mandamus ordering the same relief
i.e.
, here, reined-in discoveryis surely a doubtful proposition.

The District Court, moreover, did not err in failing to narrow discovery on its own initiative. Although the Court cites
United States
v.
Poindexter
, 727 F. Supp. 1501 (DC 1989), as sound precedent for district-court narrowing of discovery, see
ante
, at 1920, the target of the subpoena in that case, former President Reagan, unlike petitioners in this case, affirmatively requested such narrowing, 727 F. Supp., at 1503. A district court is not subject to criticism if it awaits a partys motion before tightening the scope of discovery; certainly, that court makes no clear and indisputable error in adhering to the principle of party initiation,
Kerr
, 426 U. S., at 403 (internal quotation marks omitted).
8

* * *

Review by mandamus at this stage of the proceedings would be at least comprehensible as a means to test the Governments position that
no
discovery is appropriate in this litigation. See Brief for Petitioners 45 ([P]etitioners separation-of-powers arguments are … in the nature of a claim of immunity from discovery.). But in remanding for consideration of discovery-tailoring measures, the Court apparently rejects that no-discovery position. Otherwise, a remand based on the overbreadth of the discovery requests would make no sense. Nothing in the record, however, intimates lower-court refusal to reduce discovery. Indeed, the appeals court has already suggested tailored discovery that would avoid effectively prejudg[ing] the merits of respondents claim,
ante
, at 2 (
Stevens, J.
, concurring). See 334 F. 3d, at 1106 (respondents need only documents referring to the involvement of non-federal officials). See also
ante
, at 2, n. (
Stevens, J.
, concurring) (A few interrogatories or depositions might have determined … whether any non-Government employees voted on NEPDG recommendations or drafted portions of the committees report). In accord with the Court of Appeals, I am confident that [were it moved to do so] the district court here [would] protect petitioners legitimate interests and keep discovery within appropriate limits. 334 F. 3d, at 1107.
9
I would therefore affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals.

Notes

1
The Court of Appeals also concluded, altogether correctly in my view, that it lacked ordinary appellate jurisdiction over the Vice Presidents appeal. See 334 F. 3d, at 1109; cf. ante, at 78 (leaving appellate-jurisdiction question undecided). In its order addressing the petitioners motions to dismiss, the District Court stated it would be premature and inappropriate to determine whether any relief could be obtained from the Vice President. Judicial Watch, Inc. v. National Energy Policy Dev. Group, 219 F. Supp. 2d 20, 44 (DC 2002). Immediate review of an interlocutory ruling, allowed in rare cases under the collateral-order doctrine, is inappropriate when an order is, as in this case, inherently tentative and not the final word on the subject. Gulfstream Aerospace Corp. v. Mayacamas Corp.,
485 U. S. 271,
277 (1988)
(internal quotation marks omitted).

2
Government agencies had produced some relevant documents in related Freedom of Information Act litigation. See 219 F. Supp. 2d, at 27.

3
Section 1292(b) of Title 28 allows a court of appeals, in its discretion, to entertain an appeal from an interlocutory order [w]hen a district judge … shall be of the opinion that such order involves a controlling question of law as to which there is substantial ground for difference of opinion and that an immediate appeal from the order may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation.

4
On limiting discovery to the issue of membership, the Court of Appeals indicated its agreement. See 334 F. 3d, at 1106 ([Respondents] have no need for the names of all persons who participated in [NEPDG]s activities, nor a description of each persons role in the activities of [NEPDG]. They must discover only whether non-federal officials participated, and if so, to what extent. (internal quotation marks, ellipsis, and brackets omitted)).

5
According to the Government, 24 boxes of documents [are] potentially responsive to [respondents] discovery requests… . The documents identified as likely to be responsive from those boxes … are contained in approximately twelve boxes. App. 282283. Each box requires one or two attorney days to review and prepare a rough privilege log. Following that review, privilege logs must be finalized. Further, once the responsive emails are identified, printed, and numbered, [petitioners] expect that the privilege review and logging process [will] be equally, if not more, time-consuming, due to the expected quantity of individual emails. Id., at 284.

7
The Court suggests that the appeals court labored under the mistaken assumption that the assertion of executive privilege is a necessary precondition to the Governments separation-of-powers objections. Ante, at 20. The Court of Appeals, however, described the constitutional concern as hypothetical, not merely because no executive privilege had been asserted, but also in light of measures the District Court could take to narrow and carefully focu[s] discovery. See 334 F. 3d, at 1105, 1107.

8
The Court also questions the District Courts invocation of the federal mandamus statute,
28 U. S. C. §1361, which provides that [t]he district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any action in the nature of mandamus to compel an officer or employee of the United States or any agency thereof to perform a duty owed to the plaintiff. See ante, at 20; 219 F. Supp. 2d, at 4144. See also Chandler v. Judicial Council of Tenth Circuit,
398 U. S. 74, and n. 8 (1970) (holding mandamus under the All Writs Act,
28 U. S. C. §1651, improper, but expressing no opinion on relief under the federal mandamus statute, §1361). On the question whether §1361 allows enforcement of the FACA against the Vice President, the District Court concluded it would be premature and inappropriate to determine whether the relief of mandamus will or will not issue. 219 F. Supp. 2d, at 44. The Government, moreover, contested the propriety of §1361 relief only in passing in its petition to the appeals court for §1651 mandamus relief. See App. 363364 (Government asserted in its mandamus petition: The more general writ of mandamus cannot be used to circumvent … limits on the provision directly providing for review of administrative action.). A question not decided by the District Court, and barely raised in a petition for mandamus, hardly qualifies as grounds for drastic and extraordinary mandamus relief, Ex parte Fahey,
332 U. S. 258,
259260 (1947)
.
Justice Thomas urges that respondents cannot obtain §1361 relief if wide-ranging discovery [is needed] to prove that they have any right to relief. Ante, at 3 (opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part) (emphasis in original). First, as the Court of Appeals recognized, see supra, at 89; infra, at 11, should the Government so move, the District Court could contain discovery so that it would not be wide-ranging. Second, all agree that an applicant seeking a §1361 mandamus writ must show that the [federal] defendant owes him a clear, nondiscretionary duty. Heckler v. Ringer,
466 U. S. 602,
616 (1984)
(emphasis added). No §1361 writ may issue, in other words, when federal law grants discretion to the federal officer, rather than imposing a duty on him. When federal law imposes an obligation, however, suit under §1361 is not precluded simply because facts must be developed to ascertain whether a federal command has been dishonored. Congress enacted §1361 to mak[e] it more convenient for aggrieved persons to file actions in the nature of mandamus, Stafford v. Briggs,
444 U. S. 527,
535 (1980)
, not to address the rare instance in which a federal defendant, upon whom the law unequivocally places an obligation, concedes his failure to measure up to that obligation.

9
While I agree with the Court that an interlocutory appeal may become appropriate at some later juncture in this litigation, see ante, at 21, I note that the decision whether to allow such an appeal lies in the first instance in the District Courts sound discretion, see
28 U. S. C. §1292(b); supra, at 4, n. 3.

RICHARD B. CHENEY, VICE PRESIDENT OF THE
UNITED STATES,
et al.,
PETITIONERS
v.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR
THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA et al.

on writ of certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the district of columbia circuit

[June 24, 2004]

Justice Ginsburg
, with whom
Justice Souter
joins, dissenting.

The Government, in seeking a writ of mandamus from the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, and on brief to this Court, urged that this case should be resolved without
any
discovery. See App. 183184, 339; Brief for Petitioners 45; Reply Brief 18. In vacating the judgment of the Court of Appeals, however, this Court remands for consideration whether mandamus is appropriate due to the
overbreadth
of the District Courts discovery orders. See
ante
, at 1, 1620. But, as the Court of Appeals observed, it appeared that the Government never asked the district court to
narrow
discovery.
In re Cheney
, 334 F. 3d 1096, 1106 (CADC 2003) (emphasis in original). Given the Governments decision to resist all discovery, mandamus relief based on the exorbitance of the discovery orders is at least premature,
id.
, at 1104. I would therefore affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals denying the writ,
1
and allow the District Court, in the first instance, to pursue its expressed intention tightly [to] rei[n] [in] discovery,
Judicial Watch, Inc.
v.
National Energy Policy Dev. Group
, 219 F. Supp. 2d 20, 54 (DC 2002), should the Government so request.

I

A

The discovery at issue here was sought in a civil action filed by respondents Judicial Watch, Inc., and Sierra Club. To gain information concerning the membership and operations of an energy-policy task force, the National Energy Policy Development Group (NEPDG), respondents filed suit under the Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA), 5 U. S. C. App. §1
et seq.;
respondents named among the defendants
the Vice President and senior Executive Branch officials. See App. 1640, 139154;
ante
, at 13. After granting in part and denying in part the Governments motions to dismiss, see 219 F. Supp. 2d 20, the District Court approved respondents extensive discovery plan, which included detailed and far-ranging interrogatories and sweeping requests for production of documents, see App. to Pet. for Cert. 51a; App. 215230. In a later order, the District Court directed the Government to produce non-privileged documents and a privilege log. App. to Pet. for Cert. 47a.

The discovery plan drawn by Judicial Watch and Sierra Club was indeed unbounded in scope.
Ante
, at 17; accord 334 F. 3d, at 1106. Initial approval of that plan by the District Court, however, was not given in stunning disregard of separation-of-powers concerns. Cf.
ante
, at 1620. In the order itself, the District Court invited detailed and precise object[ions] to any of the discovery requests, and instructed the Government to identify and explain … invocations of privilege with particularity. App. to Pet. for Cert. 51a. To avoid duplication, the District Court provided that the Government could identify documents or information [responsive to the discovery requests] that [it] ha[d] already released to [Judicial Watch or the Sierra Club] in different fora.
Ibid.<footcall num="2">
Anticipating further proceedings concerning discovery, the District Court suggested that the Government could submit [any privileged documents] under seal for the courts consideration, or that the court [could] appoint the equivalent of a Special Master, maybe a retired judge, to review allegedly privileged documents. App. 247.

The Government did not file specific objections; nor did it supply particulars to support assertions of privilege. Instead, the Government urged the District Court to rule that Judicial Watch and the Sierra Club could have no discovery at all. See
id.
, at 192 (the governmen[t] position is that … no discovery is appropriate);
id.
, at 205 (same); 334 F. 3d, at 1106 (As far as we can tell, petitioners never asked the district court to
narrow
discovery to those matters [respondents] need to support their allegation that FACA applies to the NEPDG. (emphasis in original)). In the Governments view, the resolution of the case ha[d] to flow from the administrative record
sans
discovery. App. 192. Without taking up the District Courts suggestion of that courts readiness to rein in discovery, see 219 F. Supp. 2d, at 54, the Government, on behalf of the Vice President, moved, unsuccessfully, for a protective order and for certification of an interlocutory appeal pursuant to
28 U. S. C. §1292(b). See 334 F. 3d, at 1100; see App. to Pet. for Cert. 47a (District Court denial of protective order); 233 F. Supp. 2d 16 (DC 2002) (District Court denial of §1292(b) certification).
3
At the District Courts hearing on the Governments motion for a stay pending interlocutory appeal, the Government argued that the injury is submitting to discovery in the absence of a compelling showing of need by the [respondents]. App. 316; see 230 F. Supp. 2d 12 (DC 2002)
(District Court order denying stay).

Despite the absence from this flurry of activity,
ante
, at 8, of any Government motion contesting the terms of the discovery plan or proposing a scaled-down substitute plan, see 334 F. 3d, at 1106, this Court states that the Government did in fact object to the scope of discovery and asked the District Court to narrow it in some way,
ante
, at 18. In support of this statement, the Court points to the Governments objections to the proposed discovery plan, its response to the interrogatories and production requests, and its contention that discovery would be unduly burdensome. See
ante
, at 18; App. 166184, 201, 231234, 274.

True, the Government disputed the definition of the term meeting in respondents interrogatories, and stated, in passing, that discovery should be [both] limited to written interrogatories and limited in scope to the issue of membership.
Id.
, at 179, 181, 233.
4
But as the Court of Appeals noted, the Government mentioned excessive discovery in support of its plea to be shielded from any discovery. 334 F. 3d, at 1106. The Government argument that the burden of doing a document production is an unconstitutional burden, App. 274, was similarly anchored. The Government so urged at a District Court hearing in which its underlying position [was] that its not going to produce anything,
id.
, at 249.
5

The Governments bottom line was firmly and consistently that review, limited to the administrative record, should frame the resolution of this case.
Id.
, at 181; accord
id.
, at 179, 233. That administrative record would consist of the Presidential Memorandum establishing NEPDG, NEPDGs public report, and the Office of the Vice Presidents response to … Judicial Watchs request for permission to attend NEPDG meetings; it would not include anything respondents could gain through discovery.
Id.
, at 183. Indeed, the Government acknowledged before the District Court that its litigation strategy involved opposition to the discovery plan as a whole in lieu of focused objections. See
id.
, at 205 (Government stated: We did not choose to offer written objections to [the discovery plan] … .).

Further sounding the Governments leitmotif, in a hearing on the proposed discovery plan, the District Court stated that the Government didnt file objections to rein in discovery because [in the Governments view] no discovery is appropriate.
Id
., at 192;
id.
, at 205 (same). Without endeavoring to correct any misunderstanding on the District Courts part, the Government underscored its resistance to any and all discovery.
Id.
, at 192194;
id.
, at 201 (asserting that respondents are not entitled to discovery to supplement [the administrative record]). And in its motion for a protective order, the Government similarly declared its unqualified opposition to discovery. See Memorandum in Support of Defendants Motion for a Protective Order and for Reconsideration, C. A. Nos. 011530 (EGS), 02631 (EGS), p. 21 (D. D. C., Sept. 3, 2002) ([Petitioners] respectfully request that the Court enter a protective order relieving them of
any obligation
to respond to [respondents] discovery [requests]. (emphasis added)); see 334 F. 3d, at 1106 (same).
6

The District Court, in short, ignored no concrete pleas to narrow discovery. But see
ante
, at 18. That court did, however, voice its concern about the Governments failure to heed the courts instructions:

I told the government, if you have precise constitutional objections, let me know what they are so I can determine whether or not this [discovery] plan is appropriate, and … you said, well, its unconstitutional, without elaborating. You said, because Plaintiffs proposed discovery plan has not been approved by the court, the Defendants are not submitting specific objections to Plaintiffs proposed request… . My rule was, if you have objections, let me know what the objections are, and you chose not to do so. App. 205.

B

Denied §1292(b) certification by the District Court, the Government sought a writ of mandamus from the Court of Appeals. See
id.
, at 339365. In its mandamus petition, the Government asked the appellate court to vacate the discovery orders issued by the district court, direct the court to decide the case on the basis of the administrative record and such supplemental affidavits as it may require, and direct that the Vice President be dismissed as a defendant.
Id.
, at 364365. In support of those requests, the Government again argued that the case should be adjudicated without discovery: The Constitution and principles of comity preclude discovery of the President or Vice President, especially without a demonstration of compelling and focused countervailing interest.
Id.
, at 360.

The Court of Appeals acknowledged that the discovery plan presented by respondents and approved by the District Court goes well beyond what [respondents] need. 334 F. 3d, at 1106. The appellate court nevertheless denied the mandamus petition, concluding that the Governments separation-of-powers concern remain[ed] hypothetical.
Id.
, at 1105. Far from ordering immediate disclosure of communications between senior executive branch officials and those with information relevant to advice that was being formulated for the President, the Court of Appeals observed, the District Court had directed the Government initially to produce only non-privileged documents and a privilege log.
Id.
, at 1104 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); see App. to Pet. for Cert. 47a.
7

The Court of Appeals stressed that the District Court could accommodate separation-of-powers concerns short of denying all discovery or compelling the invocation of executive privilege. See 334 F. 3d, at 11051106. Principally, the Court of Appeals stated, discovery could be narrowed, should the Government so move, to encompass only whether non-federal officials participated [in NEPDG], and if so, to what extent.
Id.
, at 1106. The Government could identify relevant materials produced in other litigation, thus avoiding undue reproduction.
Id.
, at 1105; see App. to Pet. for Cert. 51a;
supra
, at 3. If, after appropriate narrowing, the discovery allowed still impels the Vice President … to claim privilege, the District Court could entertain [those] privilege claims and review allegedly privileged documents in camera. 334 F. 3d, at 1107. Mindful of the judiciarys responsibility to police the separation of powers in litigation involving the executive, the Court of Appeals expressed confidence that the District Court would respond to petitioners concern and narrow discovery to ensure that [respondents] obtain no more than they need to prove their case.
Id.
, at 1106.

Throughout this litigation, the Government has declined to move for reduction of the District Courts discovery order to accommodate separation-of-powers concerns. See
supra
, at 37. The Court now remands this case so the Court of Appeals can consider whether a mandamus writ should issue ordering the District Court to explore other avenues, short of forcing the Executive to invoke privilege, and, in particular, to narrow, on its own, the scope of [discovery].
Ante
, at 1920. Nothing in the District Courts orders or the Court of Appeals opinion, however, suggests that either of those courts would refuse reasonably to accommodate separation-of-powers concerns. See
supra
, at 3, 78. When parties seeking a mandamus writ decline to avail themselves of opportunities to obtain relief from the District Court, a writ of mandamus ordering the same relief
i.e.
, here, reined-in discoveryis surely a doubtful proposition.

The District Court, moreover, did not err in failing to narrow discovery on its own initiative. Although the Court cites
United States
v.
Poindexter
, 727 F. Supp. 1501 (DC 1989), as sound precedent for district-court narrowing of discovery, see
ante
, at 1920, the target of the subpoena in that case, former President Reagan, unlike petitioners in this case, affirmatively requested such narrowing, 727 F. Supp., at 1503. A district court is not subject to criticism if it awaits a partys motion before tightening the scope of discovery; certainly, that court makes no clear and indisputable error in adhering to the principle of party initiation,
Kerr
, 426 U. S., at 403 (internal quotation marks omitted).
8

* * *

Review by mandamus at this stage of the proceedings would be at least comprehensible as a means to test the Governments position that
no
discovery is appropriate in this litigation. See Brief for Petitioners 45 ([P]etitioners separation-of-powers arguments are … in the nature of a claim of immunity from discovery.). But in remanding for consideration of discovery-tailoring measures, the Court apparently rejects that no-discovery position. Otherwise, a remand based on the overbreadth of the discovery requests would make no sense. Nothing in the record, however, intimates lower-court refusal to reduce discovery. Indeed, the appeals court has already suggested tailored discovery that would avoid effectively prejudg[ing] the merits of respondents claim,
ante
, at 2 (
Stevens, J.
, concurring). See 334 F. 3d, at 1106 (respondents need only documents referring to the involvement of non-federal officials). See also
ante
, at 2, n. (
Stevens, J.
, concurring) (A few interrogatories or depositions might have determined … whether any non-Government employees voted on NEPDG recommendations or drafted portions of the committees report). In accord with the Court of Appeals, I am confident that [were it moved to do so] the district court here [would] protect petitioners legitimate interests and keep discovery within appropriate limits. 334 F. 3d, at 1107.
9
I would therefore affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals.

Notes

1
The Court of Appeals also concluded, altogether correctly in my view, that it lacked ordinary appellate jurisdiction over the Vice Presidents appeal. See 334 F. 3d, at 1109; cf. ante, at 78 (leaving appellate-jurisdiction question undecided). In its order addressing the petitioners motions to dismiss, the District Court stated it would be premature and inappropriate to determine whether any relief could be obtained from the Vice President. Judicial Watch, Inc. v. National Energy Policy Dev. Group, 219 F. Supp. 2d 20, 44 (DC 2002). Immediate review of an interlocutory ruling, allowed in rare cases under the collateral-order doctrine, is inappropriate when an order is, as in this case, inherently tentative and not the final word on the subject. Gulfstream Aerospace Corp. v. Mayacamas Corp.,
485 U. S. 271,
277 (1988)
(internal quotation marks omitted).

2
Government agencies had produced some relevant documents in related Freedom of Information Act litigation. See 219 F. Supp. 2d, at 27.

3
Section 1292(b) of Title 28 allows a court of appeals, in its discretion, to entertain an appeal from an interlocutory order [w]hen a district judge … shall be of the opinion that such order involves a controlling question of law as to which there is substantial ground for difference of opinion and that an immediate appeal from the order may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation.

4
On limiting discovery to the issue of membership, the Court of Appeals indicated its agreement. See 334 F. 3d, at 1106 ([Respondents] have no need for the names of all persons who participated in [NEPDG]s activities, nor a description of each persons role in the activities of [NEPDG]. They must discover only whether non-federal officials participated, and if so, to what extent. (internal quotation marks, ellipsis, and brackets omitted)).

5
According to the Government, 24 boxes of documents [are] potentially responsive to [respondents] discovery requests… . The documents identified as likely to be responsive from those boxes … are contained in approximately twelve boxes. App. 282283. Each box requires one or two attorney days to review and prepare a rough privilege log. Following that review, privilege logs must be finalized. Further, once the responsive emails are identified, printed, and numbered, [petitioners] expect that the privilege review and logging process [will] be equally, if not more, time-consuming, due to the expected quantity of individual emails. Id., at 284.

7
The Court suggests that the appeals court labored under the mistaken assumption that the assertion of executive privilege is a necessary precondition to the Governments separation-of-powers objections. Ante, at 20. The Court of Appeals, however, described the constitutional concern as hypothetical, not merely because no executive privilege had been asserted, but also in light of measures the District Court could take to narrow and carefully focu[s] discovery. See 334 F. 3d, at 1105, 1107.

8
The Court also questions the District Courts invocation of the federal mandamus statute,
28 U. S. C. §1361, which provides that [t]he district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any action in the nature of mandamus to compel an officer or employee of the United States or any agency thereof to perform a duty owed to the plaintiff. See ante, at 20; 219 F. Supp. 2d, at 4144. See also Chandler v. Judicial Council of Tenth Circuit,
398 U. S. 74, and n. 8 (1970) (holding mandamus under the All Writs Act,
28 U. S. C. §1651, improper, but expressing no opinion on relief under the federal mandamus statute, §1361). On the question whether §1361 allows enforcement of the FACA against the Vice President, the District Court concluded it would be premature and inappropriate to determine whether the relief of mandamus will or will not issue. 219 F. Supp. 2d, at 44. The Government, moreover, contested the propriety of §1361 relief only in passing in its petition to the appeals court for §1651 mandamus relief. See App. 363364 (Government asserted in its mandamus petition: The more general writ of mandamus cannot be used to circumvent … limits on the provision directly providing for review of administrative action.). A question not decided by the District Court, and barely raised in a petition for mandamus, hardly qualifies as grounds for drastic and extraordinary mandamus relief, Ex parte Fahey,
332 U. S. 258,
259260 (1947)
.
Justice Thomas urges that respondents cannot obtain §1361 relief if wide-ranging discovery [is needed] to prove that they have any right to relief. Ante, at 3 (opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part) (emphasis in original). First, as the Court of Appeals recognized, see supra, at 89; infra, at 11, should the Government so move, the District Court could contain discovery so that it would not be wide-ranging. Second, all agree that an applicant seeking a §1361 mandamus writ must show that the [federal] defendant owes him a clear, nondiscretionary duty. Heckler v. Ringer,
466 U. S. 602,
616 (1984)
(emphasis added). No §1361 writ may issue, in other words, when federal law grants discretion to the federal officer, rather than imposing a duty on him. When federal law imposes an obligation, however, suit under §1361 is not precluded simply because facts must be developed to ascertain whether a federal command has been dishonored. Congress enacted §1361 to mak[e] it more convenient for aggrieved persons to file actions in the nature of mandamus, Stafford v. Briggs,
444 U. S. 527,
535 (1980)
, not to address the rare instance in which a federal defendant, upon whom the law unequivocally places an obligation, concedes his failure to measure up to that obligation.

9
While I agree with the Court that an interlocutory appeal may become appropriate at some later juncture in this litigation, see ante, at 21, I note that the decision whether to allow such an appeal lies in the first instance in the District Courts sound discretion, see
28 U. S. C. §1292(b); supra, at 4, n. 3.

RICHARD B. CHENEY, VICE PRESIDENT OF THE
UNITED STATES,
et al.,
PETITIONERS
v.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR
THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA et al.

on writ of certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the district of columbia circuit

[June 24, 2004]

Justice Ginsburg
, with whom
Justice Souter
joins, dissenting.

The Government, in seeking a writ of mandamus from the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, and on brief to this Court, urged that this case should be resolved without
any
discovery. See App. 183184, 339; Brief for Petitioners 45; Reply Brief 18. In vacating the judgment of the Court of Appeals, however, this Court remands for consideration whether mandamus is appropriate due to the
overbreadth
of the District Courts discovery orders. See
ante
, at 1, 1620. But, as the Court of Appeals observed, it appeared that the Government never asked the district court to
narrow
discovery.
In re Cheney
, 334 F. 3d 1096, 1106 (CADC 2003) (emphasis in original). Given the Governments decision to resist all discovery, mandamus relief based on the exorbitance of the discovery orders is at least premature,
id.
, at 1104. I would therefore affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals denying the writ,
1
and allow the District Court, in the first instance, to pursue its expressed intention tightly [to] rei[n] [in] discovery,
Judicial Watch, Inc.
v.
National Energy Policy Dev. Group
, 219 F. Supp. 2d 20, 54 (DC 2002), should the Government so request.

I

A

The discovery at issue here was sought in a civil action filed by respondents Judicial Watch, Inc., and Sierra Club. To gain information concerning the membership and operations of an energy-policy task force, the National Energy Policy Development Group (NEPDG), respondents filed suit under the Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA), 5 U. S. C. App. §1
et seq.;
respondents named among the defendants
the Vice President and senior Executive Branch officials. See App. 1640, 139154;
ante
, at 13. After granting in part and denying in part the Governments motions to dismiss, see 219 F. Supp. 2d 20, the District Court approved respondents extensive discovery plan, which included detailed and far-ranging interrogatories and sweeping requests for production of documents, see App. to Pet. for Cert. 51a; App. 215230. In a later order, the District Court directed the Government to produce non-privileged documents and a privilege log. App. to Pet. for Cert. 47a.

The discovery plan drawn by Judicial Watch and Sierra Club was indeed unbounded in scope.
Ante
, at 17; accord 334 F. 3d, at 1106. Initial approval of that plan by the District Court, however, was not given in stunning disregard of separation-of-powers concerns. Cf.
ante
, at 1620. In the order itself, the District Court invited detailed and precise object[ions] to any of the discovery requests, and instructed the Government to identify and explain … invocations of privilege with particularity. App. to Pet. for Cert. 51a. To avoid duplication, the District Court provided that the Government could identify documents or information [responsive to the discovery requests] that [it] ha[d] already released to [Judicial Watch or the Sierra Club] in different fora.
Ibid.<footcall num="2">
Anticipating further proceedings concerning discovery, the District Court suggested that the Government could submit [any privileged documents] under seal for the courts consideration, or that the court [could] appoint the equivalent of a Special Master, maybe a retired judge, to review allegedly privileged documents. App. 247.

The Government did not file specific objections; nor did it supply particulars to support assertions of privilege. Instead, the Government urged the District Court to rule that Judicial Watch and the Sierra Club could have no discovery at all. See
id.
, at 192 (the governmen[t] position is that … no discovery is appropriate);
id.
, at 205 (same); 334 F. 3d, at 1106 (As far as we can tell, petitioners never asked the district court to
narrow
discovery to those matters [respondents] need to support their allegation that FACA applies to the NEPDG. (emphasis in original)). In the Governments view, the resolution of the case ha[d] to flow from the administrative record
sans
discovery. App. 192. Without taking up the District Courts suggestion of that courts readiness to rein in discovery, see 219 F. Supp. 2d, at 54, the Government, on behalf of the Vice President, moved, unsuccessfully, for a protective order and for certification of an interlocutory appeal pursuant to
28 U. S. C. §1292(b). See 334 F. 3d, at 1100; see App. to Pet. for Cert. 47a (District Court denial of protective order); 233 F. Supp. 2d 16 (DC 2002) (District Court denial of §1292(b) certification).
3
At the District Courts hearing on the Governments motion for a stay pending interlocutory appeal, the Government argued that the injury is submitting to discovery in the absence of a compelling showing of need by the [respondents]. App. 316; see 230 F. Supp. 2d 12 (DC 2002)
(District Court order denying stay).

Despite the absence from this flurry of activity,
ante
, at 8, of any Government motion contesting the terms of the discovery plan or proposing a scaled-down substitute plan, see 334 F. 3d, at 1106, this Court states that the Government did in fact object to the scope of discovery and asked the District Court to narrow it in some way,
ante
, at 18. In support of this statement, the Court points to the Governments objections to the proposed discovery plan, its response to the interrogatories and production requests, and its contention that discovery would be unduly burdensome. See
ante
, at 18; App. 166184, 201, 231234, 274.

True, the Government disputed the definition of the term meeting in respondents interrogatories, and stated, in passing, that discovery should be [both] limited to written interrogatories and limited in scope to the issue of membership.
Id.
, at 179, 181, 233.
4
But as the Court of Appeals noted, the Government mentioned excessive discovery in support of its plea to be shielded from any discovery. 334 F. 3d, at 1106. The Government argument that the burden of doing a document production is an unconstitutional burden, App. 274, was similarly anchored. The Government so urged at a District Court hearing in which its underlying position [was] that its not going to produce anything,
id.
, at 249.
5

The Governments bottom line was firmly and consistently that review, limited to the administrative record, should frame the resolution of this case.
Id.
, at 181; accord
id.
, at 179, 233. That administrative record would consist of the Presidential Memorandum establishing NEPDG, NEPDGs public report, and the Office of the Vice Presidents response to … Judicial Watchs request for permission to attend NEPDG meetings; it would not include anything respondents could gain through discovery.
Id.
, at 183. Indeed, the Government acknowledged before the District Court that its litigation strategy involved opposition to the discovery plan as a whole in lieu of focused objections. See
id.
, at 205 (Government stated: We did not choose to offer written objections to [the discovery plan] … .).

Further sounding the Governments leitmotif, in a hearing on the proposed discovery plan, the District Court stated that the Government didnt file objections to rein in discovery because [in the Governments view] no discovery is appropriate.
Id
., at 192;
id.
, at 205 (same). Without endeavoring to correct any misunderstanding on the District Courts part, the Government underscored its resistance to any and all discovery.
Id.
, at 192194;
id.
, at 201 (asserting that respondents are not entitled to discovery to supplement [the administrative record]). And in its motion for a protective order, the Government similarly declared its unqualified opposition to discovery. See Memorandum in Support of Defendants Motion for a Protective Order and for Reconsideration, C. A. Nos. 011530 (EGS), 02631 (EGS), p. 21 (D. D. C., Sept. 3, 2002) ([Petitioners] respectfully request that the Court enter a protective order relieving them of
any obligation
to respond to [respondents] discovery [requests]. (emphasis added)); see 334 F. 3d, at 1106 (same).
6

The District Court, in short, ignored no concrete pleas to narrow discovery. But see
ante
, at 18. That court did, however, voice its concern about the Governments failure to heed the courts instructions:

I told the government, if you have precise constitutional objections, let me know what they are so I can determine whether or not this [discovery] plan is appropriate, and … you said, well, its unconstitutional, without elaborating. You said, because Plaintiffs proposed discovery plan has not been approved by the court, the Defendants are not submitting specific objections to Plaintiffs proposed request… . My rule was, if you have objections, let me know what the objections are, and you chose not to do so. App. 205.

B

Denied §1292(b) certification by the District Court, the Government sought a writ of mandamus from the Court of Appeals. See
id.
, at 339365. In its mandamus petition, the Government asked the appellate court to vacate the discovery orders issued by the district court, direct the court to decide the case on the basis of the administrative record and such supplemental affidavits as it may require, and direct that the Vice President be dismissed as a defendant.
Id.
, at 364365. In support of those requests, the Government again argued that the case should be adjudicated without discovery: The Constitution and principles of comity preclude discovery of the President or Vice President, especially without a demonstration of compelling and focused countervailing interest.
Id.
, at 360.

The Court of Appeals acknowledged that the discovery plan presented by respondents and approved by the District Court goes well beyond what [respondents] need. 334 F. 3d, at 1106. The appellate court nevertheless denied the mandamus petition, concluding that the Governments separation-of-powers concern remain[ed] hypothetical.
Id.
, at 1105. Far from ordering immediate disclosure of communications between senior executive branch officials and those with information relevant to advice that was being formulated for the President, the Court of Appeals observed, the District Court had directed the Government initially to produce only non-privileged documents and a privilege log.
Id.
, at 1104 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); see App. to Pet. for Cert. 47a.
7

The Court of Appeals stressed that the District Court could accommodate separation-of-powers concerns short of denying all discovery or compelling the invocation of executive privilege. See 334 F. 3d, at 11051106. Principally, the Court of Appeals stated, discovery could be narrowed, should the Government so move, to encompass only whether non-federal officials participated [in NEPDG], and if so, to what extent.
Id.
, at 1106. The Government could identify relevant materials produced in other litigation, thus avoiding undue reproduction.
Id.
, at 1105; see App. to Pet. for Cert. 51a;
supra
, at 3. If, after appropriate narrowing, the discovery allowed still impels the Vice President … to claim privilege, the District Court could entertain [those] privilege claims and review allegedly privileged documents in camera. 334 F. 3d, at 1107. Mindful of the judiciarys responsibility to police the separation of powers in litigation involving the executive, the Court of Appeals expressed confidence that the District Court would respond to petitioners concern and narrow discovery to ensure that [respondents] obtain no more than they need to prove their case.
Id.
, at 1106.

Throughout this litigation, the Government has declined to move for reduction of the District Courts discovery order to accommodate separation-of-powers concerns. See
supra
, at 37. The Court now remands this case so the Court of Appeals can consider whether a mandamus writ should issue ordering the District Court to explore other avenues, short of forcing the Executive to invoke privilege, and, in particular, to narrow, on its own, the scope of [discovery].
Ante
, at 1920. Nothing in the District Courts orders or the Court of Appeals opinion, however, suggests that either of those courts would refuse reasonably to accommodate separation-of-powers concerns. See
supra
, at 3, 78. When parties seeking a mandamus writ decline to avail themselves of opportunities to obtain relief from the District Court, a writ of mandamus ordering the same relief
i.e.
, here, reined-in discoveryis surely a doubtful proposition.

The District Court, moreover, did not err in failing to narrow discovery on its own initiative. Although the Court cites
United States
v.
Poindexter
, 727 F. Supp. 1501 (DC 1989), as sound precedent for district-court narrowing of discovery, see
ante
, at 1920, the target of the subpoena in that case, former President Reagan, unlike petitioners in this case, affirmatively requested such narrowing, 727 F. Supp., at 1503. A district court is not subject to criticism if it awaits a partys motion before tightening the scope of discovery; certainly, that court makes no clear and indisputable error in adhering to the principle of party initiation,
Kerr
, 426 U. S., at 403 (internal quotation marks omitted).
8

* * *

Review by mandamus at this stage of the proceedings would be at least comprehensible as a means to test the Governments position that
no
discovery is appropriate in this litigation. See Brief for Petitioners 45 ([P]etitioners separation-of-powers arguments are … in the nature of a claim of immunity from discovery.). But in remanding for consideration of discovery-tailoring measures, the Court apparently rejects that no-discovery position. Otherwise, a remand based on the overbreadth of the discovery requests would make no sense. Nothing in the record, however, intimates lower-court refusal to reduce discovery. Indeed, the appeals court has already suggested tailored discovery that would avoid effectively prejudg[ing] the merits of respondents claim,
ante
, at 2 (
Stevens, J.
, concurring). See 334 F. 3d, at 1106 (respondents need only documents referring to the involvement of non-federal officials). See also
ante
, at 2, n. (
Stevens, J.
, concurring) (A few interrogatories or depositions might have determined … whether any non-Government employees voted on NEPDG recommendations or drafted portions of the committees report). In accord with the Court of Appeals, I am confident that [were it moved to do so] the district court here [would] protect petitioners legitimate interests and keep discovery within appropriate limits. 334 F. 3d, at 1107.
9
I would therefore affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals.

Notes

1
The Court of Appeals also concluded, altogether correctly in my view, that it lacked ordinary appellate jurisdiction over the Vice Presidents appeal. See 334 F. 3d, at 1109; cf. ante, at 78 (leaving appellate-jurisdiction question undecided). In its order addressing the petitioners motions to dismiss, the District Court stated it would be premature and inappropriate to determine whether any relief could be obtained from the Vice President. Judicial Watch, Inc. v. National Energy Policy Dev. Group, 219 F. Supp. 2d 20, 44 (DC 2002). Immediate review of an interlocutory ruling, allowed in rare cases under the collateral-order doctrine, is inappropriate when an order is, as in this case, inherently tentative and not the final word on the subject. Gulfstream Aerospace Corp. v. Mayacamas Corp.,
485 U. S. 271,
277 (1988)
(internal quotation marks omitted).

2
Government agencies had produced some relevant documents in related Freedom of Information Act litigation. See 219 F. Supp. 2d, at 27.

3
Section 1292(b) of Title 28 allows a court of appeals, in its discretion, to entertain an appeal from an interlocutory order [w]hen a district judge … shall be of the opinion that such order involves a controlling question of law as to which there is substantial ground for difference of opinion and that an immediate appeal from the order may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation.

4
On limiting discovery to the issue of membership, the Court of Appeals indicated its agreement. See 334 F. 3d, at 1106 ([Respondents] have no need for the names of all persons who participated in [NEPDG]s activities, nor a description of each persons role in the activities of [NEPDG]. They must discover only whether non-federal officials participated, and if so, to what extent. (internal quotation marks, ellipsis, and brackets omitted)).

5
According to the Government, 24 boxes of documents [are] potentially responsive to [respondents] discovery requests… . The documents identified as likely to be responsive from those boxes … are contained in approximately twelve boxes. App. 282283. Each box requires one or two attorney days to review and prepare a rough privilege log. Following that review, privilege logs must be finalized. Further, once the responsive emails are identified, printed, and numbered, [petitioners] expect that the privilege review and logging process [will] be equally, if not more, time-consuming, due to the expected quantity of individual emails. Id., at 284.

7
The Court suggests that the appeals court labored under the mistaken assumption that the assertion of executive privilege is a necessary precondition to the Governments separation-of-powers objections. Ante, at 20. The Court of Appeals, however, described the constitutional concern as hypothetical, not merely because no executive privilege had been asserted, but also in light of measures the District Court could take to narrow and carefully focu[s] discovery. See 334 F. 3d, at 1105, 1107.

8
The Court also questions the District Courts invocation of the federal mandamus statute,
28 U. S. C. §1361, which provides that [t]he district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any action in the nature of mandamus to compel an officer or employee of the United States or any agency thereof to perform a duty owed to the plaintiff. See ante, at 20; 219 F. Supp. 2d, at 4144. See also Chandler v. Judicial Council of Tenth Circuit,
398 U. S. 74, and n. 8 (1970) (holding mandamus under the All Writs Act,
28 U. S. C. §1651, improper, but expressing no opinion on relief under the federal mandamus statute, §1361). On the question whether §1361 allows enforcement of the FACA against the Vice President, the District Court concluded it would be premature and inappropriate to determine whether the relief of mandamus will or will not issue. 219 F. Supp. 2d, at 44. The Government, moreover, contested the propriety of §1361 relief only in passing in its petition to the appeals court for §1651 mandamus relief. See App. 363364 (Government asserted in its mandamus petition: The more general writ of mandamus cannot be used to circumvent … limits on the provision directly providing for review of administrative action.). A question not decided by the District Court, and barely raised in a petition for mandamus, hardly qualifies as grounds for drastic and extraordinary mandamus relief, Ex parte Fahey,
332 U. S. 258,
259260 (1947)
.
Justice Thomas urges that respondents cannot obtain §1361 relief if wide-ranging discovery [is needed] to prove that they have any right to relief. Ante, at 3 (opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part) (emphasis in original). First, as the Court of Appeals recognized, see supra, at 89; infra, at 11, should the Government so move, the District Court could contain discovery so that it would not be wide-ranging. Second, all agree that an applicant seeking a §1361 mandamus writ must show that the [federal] defendant owes him a clear, nondiscretionary duty. Heckler v. Ringer,
466 U. S. 602,
616 (1984)
(emphasis added). No §1361 writ may issue, in other words, when federal law grants discretion to the federal officer, rather than imposing a duty on him. When federal law imposes an obligation, however, suit under §1361 is not precluded simply because facts must be developed to ascertain whether a federal command has been dishonored. Congress enacted §1361 to mak[e] it more convenient for aggrieved persons to file actions in the nature of mandamus, Stafford v. Briggs,
444 U. S. 527,
535 (1980)
, not to address the rare instance in which a federal defendant, upon whom the law unequivocally places an obligation, concedes his failure to measure up to that obligation.

9
While I agree with the Court that an interlocutory appeal may become appropriate at some later juncture in this litigation, see ante, at 21, I note that the decision whether to allow such an appeal lies in the first instance in the District Courts sound discretion, see
28 U. S. C. §1292(b); supra, at 4, n. 3.

RICHARD B. CHENEY, VICE PRESIDENT OF THE
UNITED STATES,
et al.,
PETITIONERS
v.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR
THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA et al.

on writ of certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the district of columbia circuit

[June 24, 2004]

Justice Ginsburg
, with whom
Justice Souter
joins, dissenting.

The Government, in seeking a writ of mandamus from the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, and on brief to this Court, urged that this case should be resolved without
any
discovery. See App. 183184, 339; Brief for Petitioners 45; Reply Brief 18. In vacating the judgment of the Court of Appeals, however, this Court remands for consideration whether mandamus is appropriate due to the
overbreadth
of the District Courts discovery orders. See
ante
, at 1, 1620. But, as the Court of Appeals observed, it appeared that the Government never asked the district court to
narrow
discovery.
In re Cheney
, 334 F. 3d 1096, 1106 (CADC 2003) (emphasis in original). Given the Governments decision to resist all discovery, mandamus relief based on the exorbitance of the discovery orders is at least premature,
id.
, at 1104. I would therefore affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals denying the writ,
1
and allow the District Court, in the first instance, to pursue its expressed intention tightly [to] rei[n] [in] discovery,
Judicial Watch, Inc.
v.
National Energy Policy Dev. Group
, 219 F. Supp. 2d 20, 54 (DC 2002), should the Government so request.

I

A

The discovery at issue here was sought in a civil action filed by respondents Judicial Watch, Inc., and Sierra Club. To gain information concerning the membership and operations of an energy-policy task force, the National Energy Policy Development Group (NEPDG), respondents filed suit under the Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA), 5 U. S. C. App. §1
et seq.;
respondents named among the defendants
the Vice President and senior Executive Branch officials. See App. 1640, 139154;
ante
, at 13. After granting in part and denying in part the Governments motions to dismiss, see 219 F. Supp. 2d 20, the District Court approved respondents extensive discovery plan, which included detailed and far-ranging interrogatories and sweeping requests for production of documents, see App. to Pet. for Cert. 51a; App. 215230. In a later order, the District Court directed the Government to produce non-privileged documents and a privilege log. App. to Pet. for Cert. 47a.

The discovery plan drawn by Judicial Watch and Sierra Club was indeed unbounded in scope.
Ante
, at 17; accord 334 F. 3d, at 1106. Initial approval of that plan by the District Court, however, was not given in stunning disregard of separation-of-powers concerns. Cf.
ante
, at 1620. In the order itself, the District Court invited detailed and precise object[ions] to any of the discovery requests, and instructed the Government to identify and explain … invocations of privilege with particularity. App. to Pet. for Cert. 51a. To avoid duplication, the District Court provided that the Government could identify documents or information [responsive to the discovery requests] that [it] ha[d] already released to [Judicial Watch or the Sierra Club] in different fora.
Ibid.<footcall num="2">
Anticipating further proceedings concerning discovery, the District Court suggested that the Government could submit [any privileged documents] under seal for the courts consideration, or that the court [could] appoint the equivalent of a Special Master, maybe a retired judge, to review allegedly privileged documents. App. 247.

The Government did not file specific objections; nor did it supply particulars to support assertions of privilege. Instead, the Government urged the District Court to rule that Judicial Watch and the Sierra Club could have no discovery at all. See
id.
, at 192 (the governmen[t] position is that … no discovery is appropriate);
id.
, at 205 (same); 334 F. 3d, at 1106 (As far as we can tell, petitioners never asked the district court to
narrow
discovery to those matters [respondents] need to support their allegation that FACA applies to the NEPDG. (emphasis in original)). In the Governments view, the resolution of the case ha[d] to flow from the administrative record
sans
discovery. App. 192. Without taking up the District Courts suggestion of that courts readiness to rein in discovery, see 219 F. Supp. 2d, at 54, the Government, on behalf of the Vice President, moved, unsuccessfully, for a protective order and for certification of an interlocutory appeal pursuant to
28 U. S. C. §1292(b). See 334 F. 3d, at 1100; see App. to Pet. for Cert. 47a (District Court denial of protective order); 233 F. Supp. 2d 16 (DC 2002) (District Court denial of §1292(b) certification).
3
At the District Courts hearing on the Governments motion for a stay pending interlocutory appeal, the Government argued that the injury is submitting to discovery in the absence of a compelling showing of need by the [respondents]. App. 316; see 230 F. Supp. 2d 12 (DC 2002)
(District Court order denying stay).

Despite the absence from this flurry of activity,
ante
, at 8, of any Government motion contesting the terms of the discovery plan or proposing a scaled-down substitute plan, see 334 F. 3d, at 1106, this Court states that the Government did in fact object to the scope of discovery and asked the District Court to narrow it in some way,
ante
, at 18. In support of this statement, the Court points to the Governments objections to the proposed discovery plan, its response to the interrogatories and production requests, and its contention that discovery would be unduly burdensome. See
ante
, at 18; App. 166184, 201, 231234, 274.

True, the Government disputed the definition of the term meeting in respondents interrogatories, and stated, in passing, that discovery should be [both] limited to written interrogatories and limited in scope to the issue of membership.
Id.
, at 179, 181, 233.
4
But as the Court of Appeals noted, the Government mentioned excessive discovery in support of its plea to be shielded from any discovery. 334 F. 3d, at 1106. The Government argument that the burden of doing a document production is an unconstitutional burden, App. 274, was similarly anchored. The Government so urged at a District Court hearing in which its underlying position [was] that its not going to produce anything,
id.
, at 249.
5

The Governments bottom line was firmly and consistently that review, limited to the administrative record, should frame the resolution of this case.
Id.
, at 181; accord
id.
, at 179, 233. That administrative record would consist of the Presidential Memorandum establishing NEPDG, NEPDGs public report, and the Office of the Vice Presidents response to … Judicial Watchs request for permission to attend NEPDG meetings; it would not include anything respondents could gain through discovery.
Id.
, at 183. Indeed, the Government acknowledged before the District Court that its litigation strategy involved opposition to the discovery plan as a whole in lieu of focused objections. See
id.
, at 205 (Government stated: We did not choose to offer written objections to [the discovery plan] … .).

Further sounding the Governments leitmotif, in a hearing on the proposed discovery plan, the District Court stated that the Government didnt file objections to rein in discovery because [in the Governments view] no discovery is appropriate.
Id
., at 192;
id.
, at 205 (same). Without endeavoring to correct any misunderstanding on the District Courts part, the Government underscored its resistance to any and all discovery.
Id.
, at 192194;
id.
, at 201 (asserting that respondents are not entitled to discovery to supplement [the administrative record]). And in its motion for a protective order, the Government similarly declared its unqualified opposition to discovery. See Memorandum in Support of Defendants Motion for a Protective Order and for Reconsideration, C. A. Nos. 011530 (EGS), 02631 (EGS), p. 21 (D. D. C., Sept. 3, 2002) ([Petitioners] respectfully request that the Court enter a protective order relieving them of
any obligation
to respond to [respondents] discovery [requests]. (emphasis added)); see 334 F. 3d, at 1106 (same).
6

The District Court, in short, ignored no concrete pleas to narrow discovery. But see
ante
, at 18. That court did, however, voice its concern about the Governments failure to heed the courts instructions:

I told the government, if you have precise constitutional objections, let me know what they are so I can determine whether or not this [discovery] plan is appropriate, and … you said, well, its unconstitutional, without elaborating. You said, because Plaintiffs proposed discovery plan has not been approved by the court, the Defendants are not submitting specific objections to Plaintiffs proposed request… . My rule was, if you have objections, let me know what the objections are, and you chose not to do so. App. 205.

B

Denied §1292(b) certification by the District Court, the Government sought a writ of mandamus from the Court of Appeals. See
id.
, at 339365. In its mandamus petition, the Government asked the appellate court to vacate the discovery orders issued by the district court, direct the court to decide the case on the basis of the administrative record and such supplemental affidavits as it may require, and direct that the Vice President be dismissed as a defendant.
Id.
, at 364365. In support of those requests, the Government again argued that the case should be adjudicated without discovery: The Constitution and principles of comity preclude discovery of the President or Vice President, especially without a demonstration of compelling and focused countervailing interest.
Id.
, at 360.

The Court of Appeals acknowledged that the discovery plan presented by respondents and approved by the District Court goes well beyond what [respondents] need. 334 F. 3d, at 1106. The appellate court nevertheless denied the mandamus petition, concluding that the Governments separation-of-powers concern remain[ed] hypothetical.
Id.
, at 1105. Far from ordering immediate disclosure of communications between senior executive branch officials and those with information relevant to advice that was being formulated for the President, the Court of Appeals observed, the District Court had directed the Government initially to produce only non-privileged documents and a privilege log.
Id.
, at 1104 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); see App. to Pet. for Cert. 47a.
7

The Court of Appeals stressed that the District Court could accommodate separation-of-powers concerns short of denying all discovery or compelling the invocation of executive privilege. See 334 F. 3d, at 11051106. Principally, the Court of Appeals stated, discovery could be narrowed, should the Government so move, to encompass only whether non-federal officials participated [in NEPDG], and if so, to what extent.
Id.
, at 1106. The Government could identify relevant materials produced in other litigation, thus avoiding undue reproduction.
Id.
, at 1105; see App. to Pet. for Cert. 51a;
supra
, at 3. If, after appropriate narrowing, the discovery allowed still impels the Vice President … to claim privilege, the District Court could entertain [those] privilege claims and review allegedly privileged documents in camera. 334 F. 3d, at 1107. Mindful of the judiciarys responsibility to police the separation of powers in litigation involving the executive, the Court of Appeals expressed confidence that the District Court would respond to petitioners concern and narrow discovery to ensure that [respondents] obtain no more than they need to prove their case.
Id.
, at 1106.

Throughout this litigation, the Government has declined to move for reduction of the District Courts discovery order to accommodate separation-of-powers concerns. See
supra
, at 37. The Court now remands this case so the Court of Appeals can consider whether a mandamus writ should issue ordering the District Court to explore other avenues, short of forcing the Executive to invoke privilege, and, in particular, to narrow, on its own, the scope of [discovery].
Ante
, at 1920. Nothing in the District Courts orders or the Court of Appeals opinion, however, suggests that either of those courts would refuse reasonably to accommodate separation-of-powers concerns. See
supra
, at 3, 78. When parties seeking a mandamus writ decline to avail themselves of opportunities to obtain relief from the District Court, a writ of mandamus ordering the same relief
i.e.
, here, reined-in discoveryis surely a doubtful proposition.

The District Court, moreover, did not err in failing to narrow discovery on its own initiative. Although the Court cites
United States
v.
Poindexter
, 727 F. Supp. 1501 (DC 1989), as sound precedent for district-court narrowing of discovery, see
ante
, at 1920, the target of the subpoena in that case, former President Reagan, unlike petitioners in this case, affirmatively requested such narrowing, 727 F. Supp., at 1503. A district court is not subject to criticism if it awaits a partys motion before tightening the scope of discovery; certainly, that court makes no clear and indisputable error in adhering to the principle of party initiation,
Kerr
, 426 U. S., at 403 (internal quotation marks omitted).
8

* * *

Review by mandamus at this stage of the proceedings would be at least comprehensible as a means to test the Governments position that
no
discovery is appropriate in this litigation. See Brief for Petitioners 45 ([P]etitioners separation-of-powers arguments are … in the nature of a claim of immunity from discovery.). But in remanding for consideration of discovery-tailoring measures, the Court apparently rejects that no-discovery position. Otherwise, a remand based on the overbreadth of the discovery requests would make no sense. Nothing in the record, however, intimates lower-court refusal to reduce discovery. Indeed, the appeals court has already suggested tailored discovery that would avoid effectively prejudg[ing] the merits of respondents claim,
ante
, at 2 (
Stevens, J.
, concurring). See 334 F. 3d, at 1106 (respondents need only documents referring to the involvement of non-federal officials). See also
ante
, at 2, n. (
Stevens, J.
, concurring) (A few interrogatories or depositions might have determined … whether any non-Government employees voted on NEPDG recommendations or drafted portions of the committees report). In accord with the Court of Appeals, I am confident that [were it moved to do so] the district court here [would] protect petitioners legitimate interests and keep discovery within appropriate limits. 334 F. 3d, at 1107.
9
I would therefore affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals.

Notes

1
The Court of Appeals also concluded, altogether correctly in my view, that it lacked ordinary appellate jurisdiction over the Vice Presidents appeal. See 334 F. 3d, at 1109; cf. ante, at 78 (leaving appellate-jurisdiction question undecided). In its order addressing the petitioners motions to dismiss, the District Court stated it would be premature and inappropriate to determine whether any relief could be obtained from the Vice President. Judicial Watch, Inc. v. National Energy Policy Dev. Group, 219 F. Supp. 2d 20, 44 (DC 2002). Immediate review of an interlocutory ruling, allowed in rare cases under the collateral-order doctrine, is inappropriate when an order is, as in this case, inherently tentative and not the final word on the subject. Gulfstream Aerospace Corp. v. Mayacamas Corp.,
485 U. S. 271,
277 (1988)
(internal quotation marks omitted).

2
Government agencies had produced some relevant documents in related Freedom of Information Act litigation. See 219 F. Supp. 2d, at 27.

3
Section 1292(b) of Title 28 allows a court of appeals, in its discretion, to entertain an appeal from an interlocutory order [w]hen a district judge … shall be of the opinion that such order involves a controlling question of law as to which there is substantial ground for difference of opinion and that an immediate appeal from the order may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation.

4
On limiting discovery to the issue of membership, the Court of Appeals indicated its agreement. See 334 F. 3d, at 1106 ([Respondents] have no need for the names of all persons who participated in [NEPDG]s activities, nor a description of each persons role in the activities of [NEPDG]. They must discover only whether non-federal officials participated, and if so, to what extent. (internal quotation marks, ellipsis, and brackets omitted)).

5
According to the Government, 24 boxes of documents [are] potentially responsive to [respondents] discovery requests… . The documents identified as likely to be responsive from those boxes … are contained in approximately twelve boxes. App. 282283. Each box requires one or two attorney days to review and prepare a rough privilege log. Following that review, privilege logs must be finalized. Further, once the responsive emails are identified, printed, and numbered, [petitioners] expect that the privilege review and logging process [will] be equally, if not more, time-consuming, due to the expected quantity of individual emails. Id., at 284.

7
The Court suggests that the appeals court labored under the mistaken assumption that the assertion of executive privilege is a necessary precondition to the Governments separation-of-powers objections. Ante, at 20. The Court of Appeals, however, described the constitutional concern as hypothetical, not merely because no executive privilege had been asserted, but also in light of measures the District Court could take to narrow and carefully focu[s] discovery. See 334 F. 3d, at 1105, 1107.

8
The Court also questions the District Courts invocation of the federal mandamus statute,
28 U. S. C. §1361, which provides that [t]he district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any action in the nature of mandamus to compel an officer or employee of the United States or any agency thereof to perform a duty owed to the plaintiff. See ante, at 20; 219 F. Supp. 2d, at 4144. See also Chandler v. Judicial Council of Tenth Circuit,
398 U. S. 74, and n. 8 (1970) (holding mandamus under the All Writs Act,
28 U. S. C. §1651, improper, but expressing no opinion on relief under the federal mandamus statute, §1361). On the question whether §1361 allows enforcement of the FACA against the Vice President, the District Court concluded it would be premature and inappropriate to determine whether the relief of mandamus will or will not issue. 219 F. Supp. 2d, at 44. The Government, moreover, contested the propriety of §1361 relief only in passing in its petition to the appeals court for §1651 mandamus relief. See App. 363364 (Government asserted in its mandamus petition: The more general writ of mandamus cannot be used to circumvent … limits on the provision directly providing for review of administrative action.). A question not decided by the District Court, and barely raised in a petition for mandamus, hardly qualifies as grounds for drastic and extraordinary mandamus relief, Ex parte Fahey,
332 U. S. 258,
259260 (1947)
.
Justice Thomas urges that respondents cannot obtain §1361 relief if wide-ranging discovery [is needed] to prove that they have any right to relief. Ante, at 3 (opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part) (emphasis in original). First, as the Court of Appeals recognized, see supra, at 89; infra, at 11, should the Government so move, the District Court could contain discovery so that it would not be wide-ranging. Second, all agree that an applicant seeking a §1361 mandamus writ must show that the [federal] defendant owes him a clear, nondiscretionary duty. Heckler v. Ringer,
466 U. S. 602,
616 (1984)
(emphasis added). No §1361 writ may issue, in other words, when federal law grants discretion to the federal officer, rather than imposing a duty on him. When federal law imposes an obligation, however, suit under §1361 is not precluded simply because facts must be developed to ascertain whether a federal command has been dishonored. Congress enacted §1361 to mak[e] it more convenient for aggrieved persons to file actions in the nature of mandamus, Stafford v. Briggs,
444 U. S. 527,
535 (1980)
, not to address the rare instance in which a federal defendant, upon whom the law unequivocally places an obligation, concedes his failure to measure up to that obligation.

9
While I agree with the Court that an interlocutory appeal may become appropriate at some later juncture in this litigation, see ante, at 21, I note that the decision whether to allow such an appeal lies in the first instance in the District Courts sound discretion, see
28 U. S. C. §1292(b); supra, at 4, n. 3.

RICHARD B. CHENEY, VICE PRESIDENT OF THE
UNITED STATES,
et al.,
PETITIONERS
v.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR
THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA et al.

on writ of certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the district of columbia circuit

[June 24, 2004]

Justice Ginsburg
, with whom
Justice Souter
joins, dissenting.

The Government, in seeking a writ of mandamus from the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, and on brief to this Court, urged that this case should be resolved without
any
discovery. See App. 183184, 339; Brief for Petitioners 45; Reply Brief 18. In vacating the judgment of the Court of Appeals, however, this Court remands for consideration whether mandamus is appropriate due to the
overbreadth
of the District Courts discovery orders. See
ante
, at 1, 1620. But, as the Court of Appeals observed, it appeared that the Government never asked the district court to
narrow
discovery.
In re Cheney
, 334 F. 3d 1096, 1106 (CADC 2003) (emphasis in original). Given the Governments decision to resist all discovery, mandamus relief based on the exorbitance of the discovery orders is at least premature,
id.
, at 1104. I would therefore affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals denying the writ,
1
and allow the District Court, in the first instance, to pursue its expressed intention tightly [to] rei[n] [in] discovery,
Judicial Watch, Inc.
v.
National Energy Policy Dev. Group
, 219 F. Supp. 2d 20, 54 (DC 2002), should the Government so request.

I

A

The discovery at issue here was sought in a civil action filed by respondents Judicial Watch, Inc., and Sierra Club. To gain information concerning the membership and operations of an energy-policy task force, the National Energy Policy Development Group (NEPDG), respondents filed suit under the Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA), 5 U. S. C. App. §1
et seq.;
respondents named among the defendants
the Vice President and senior Executive Branch officials. See App. 1640, 139154;
ante
, at 13. After granting in part and denying in part the Governments motions to dismiss, see 219 F. Supp. 2d 20, the District Court approved respondents extensive discovery plan, which included detailed and far-ranging interrogatories and sweeping requests for production of documents, see App. to Pet. for Cert. 51a; App. 215230. In a later order, the District Court directed the Government to produce non-privileged documents and a privilege log. App. to Pet. for Cert. 47a.

The discovery plan drawn by Judicial Watch and Sierra Club was indeed unbounded in scope.
Ante
, at 17; accord 334 F. 3d, at 1106. Initial approval of that plan by the District Court, however, was not given in stunning disregard of separation-of-powers concerns. Cf.
ante
, at 1620. In the order itself, the District Court invited detailed and precise object[ions] to any of the discovery requests, and instructed the Government to identify and explain … invocations of privilege with particularity. App. to Pet. for Cert. 51a. To avoid duplication, the District Court provided that the Government could identify documents or information [responsive to the discovery requests] that [it] ha[d] already released to [Judicial Watch or the Sierra Club] in different fora.
Ibid.<footcall num="2">
Anticipating further proceedings concerning discovery, the District Court suggested that the Government could submit [any privileged documents] under seal for the courts consideration, or that the court [could] appoint the equivalent of a Special Master, maybe a retired judge, to review allegedly privileged documents. App. 247.

The Government did not file specific objections; nor did it supply particulars to support assertions of privilege. Instead, the Government urged the District Court to rule that Judicial Watch and the Sierra Club could have no discovery at all. See
id.
, at 192 (the governmen[t] position is that … no discovery is appropriate);
id.
, at 205 (same); 334 F. 3d, at 1106 (As far as we can tell, petitioners never asked the district court to
narrow
discovery to those matters [respondents] need to support their allegation that FACA applies to the NEPDG. (emphasis in original)). In the Governments view, the resolution of the case ha[d] to flow from the administrative record
sans
discovery. App. 192. Without taking up the District Courts suggestion of that courts readiness to rein in discovery, see 219 F. Supp. 2d, at 54, the Government, on behalf of the Vice President, moved, unsuccessfully, for a protective order and for certification of an interlocutory appeal pursuant to
28 U. S. C. §1292(b). See 334 F. 3d, at 1100; see App. to Pet. for Cert. 47a (District Court denial of protective order); 233 F. Supp. 2d 16 (DC 2002) (District Court denial of §1292(b) certification).
3
At the District Courts hearing on the Governments motion for a stay pending interlocutory appeal, the Government argued that the injury is submitting to discovery in the absence of a compelling showing of need by the [respondents]. App. 316; see 230 F. Supp. 2d 12 (DC 2002)
(District Court order denying stay).

Despite the absence from this flurry of activity,
ante
, at 8, of any Government motion contesting the terms of the discovery plan or proposing a scaled-down substitute plan, see 334 F. 3d, at 1106, this Court states that the Government did in fact object to the scope of discovery and asked the District Court to narrow it in some way,
ante
, at 18. In support of this statement, the Court points to the Governments objections to the proposed discovery plan, its response to the interrogatories and production requests, and its contention that discovery would be unduly burdensome. See
ante
, at 18; App. 166184, 201, 231234, 274.

True, the Government disputed the definition of the term meeting in respondents interrogatories, and stated, in passing, that discovery should be [both] limited to written interrogatories and limited in scope to the issue of membership.
Id.
, at 179, 181, 233.
4
But as the Court of Appeals noted, the Government mentioned excessive discovery in support of its plea to be shielded from any discovery. 334 F. 3d, at 1106. The Government argument that the burden of doing a document production is an unconstitutional burden, App. 274, was similarly anchored. The Government so urged at a District Court hearing in which its underlying position [was] that its not going to produce anything,
id.
, at 249.
5

The Governments bottom line was firmly and consistently that review, limited to the administrative record, should frame the resolution of this case.
Id.
, at 181; accord
id.
, at 179, 233. That administrative record would consist of the Presidential Memorandum establishing NEPDG, NEPDGs public report, and the Office of the Vice Presidents response to … Judicial Watchs request for permission to attend NEPDG meetings; it would not include anything respondents could gain through discovery.
Id.
, at 183. Indeed, the Government acknowledged before the District Court that its litigation strategy involved opposition to the discovery plan as a whole in lieu of focused objections. See
id.
, at 205 (Government stated: We did not choose to offer written objections to [the discovery plan] … .).

Further sounding the Governments leitmotif, in a hearing on the proposed discovery plan, the District Court stated that the Government didnt file objections to rein in discovery because [in the Governments view] no discovery is appropriate.
Id
., at 192;
id.
, at 205 (same). Without endeavoring to correct any misunderstanding on the District Courts part, the Government underscored its resistance to any and all discovery.
Id.
, at 192194;
id.
, at 201 (asserting that respondents are not entitled to discovery to supplement [the administrative record]). And in its motion for a protective order, the Government similarly declared its unqualified opposition to discovery. See Memorandum in Support of Defendants Motion for a Protective Order and for Reconsideration, C. A. Nos. 011530 (EGS), 02631 (EGS), p. 21 (D. D. C., Sept. 3, 2002) ([Petitioners] respectfully request that the Court enter a protective order relieving them of
any obligation
to respond to [respondents] discovery [requests]. (emphasis added)); see 334 F. 3d, at 1106 (same).
6

The District Court, in short, ignored no concrete pleas to narrow discovery. But see
ante
, at 18. That court did, however, voice its concern about the Governments failure to heed the courts instructions:

I told the government, if you have precise constitutional objections, let me know what they are so I can determine whether or not this [discovery] plan is appropriate, and … you said, well, its unconstitutional, without elaborating. You said, because Plaintiffs proposed discovery plan has not been approved by the court, the Defendants are not submitting specific objections to Plaintiffs proposed request… . My rule was, if you have objections, let me know what the objections are, and you chose not to do so. App. 205.

B

Denied §1292(b) certification by the District Court, the Government sought a writ of mandamus from the Court of Appeals. See
id.
, at 339365. In its mandamus petition, the Government asked the appellate court to vacate the discovery orders issued by the district court, direct the court to decide the case on the basis of the administrative record and such supplemental affidavits as it may require, and direct that the Vice President be dismissed as a defendant.
Id.
, at 364365. In support of those requests, the Government again argued that the case should be adjudicated without discovery: The Constitution and principles of comity preclude discovery of the President or Vice President, especially without a demonstration of compelling and focused countervailing interest.
Id.
, at 360.

The Court of Appeals acknowledged that the discovery plan presented by respondents and approved by the District Court goes well beyond what [respondents] need. 334 F. 3d, at 1106. The appellate court nevertheless denied the mandamus petition, concluding that the Governments separation-of-powers concern remain[ed] hypothetical.
Id.
, at 1105. Far from ordering immediate disclosure of communications between senior executive branch officials and those with information relevant to advice that was being formulated for the President, the Court of Appeals observed, the District Court had directed the Government initially to produce only non-privileged documents and a privilege log.
Id.
, at 1104 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); see App. to Pet. for Cert. 47a.
7

The Court of Appeals stressed that the District Court could accommodate separation-of-powers concerns short of denying all discovery or compelling the invocation of executive privilege. See 334 F. 3d, at 11051106. Principally, the Court of Appeals stated, discovery could be narrowed, should the Government so move, to encompass only whether non-federal officials participated [in NEPDG], and if so, to what extent.
Id.
, at 1106. The Government could identify relevant materials produced in other litigation, thus avoiding undue reproduction.
Id.
, at 1105; see App. to Pet. for Cert. 51a;
supra
, at 3. If, after appropriate narrowing, the discovery allowed still impels the Vice President … to claim privilege, the District Court could entertain [those] privilege claims and review allegedly privileged documents in camera. 334 F. 3d, at 1107. Mindful of the judiciarys responsibility to police the separation of powers in litigation involving the executive, the Court of Appeals expressed confidence that the District Court would respond to petitioners concern and narrow discovery to ensure that [respondents] obtain no more than they need to prove their case.
Id.
, at 1106.

Throughout this litigation, the Government has declined to move for reduction of the District Courts discovery order to accommodate separation-of-powers concerns. See
supra
, at 37. The Court now remands this case so the Court of Appeals can consider whether a mandamus writ should issue ordering the District Court to explore other avenues, short of forcing the Executive to invoke privilege, and, in particular, to narrow, on its own, the scope of [discovery].
Ante
, at 1920. Nothing in the District Courts orders or the Court of Appeals opinion, however, suggests that either of those courts would refuse reasonably to accommodate separation-of-powers concerns. See
supra
, at 3, 78. When parties seeking a mandamus writ decline to avail themselves of opportunities to obtain relief from the District Court, a writ of mandamus ordering the same relief
i.e.
, here, reined-in discoveryis surely a doubtful proposition.

The District Court, moreover, did not err in failing to narrow discovery on its own initiative. Although the Court cites
United States
v.
Poindexter
, 727 F. Supp. 1501 (DC 1989), as sound precedent for district-court narrowing of discovery, see
ante
, at 1920, the target of the subpoena in that case, former President Reagan, unlike petitioners in this case, affirmatively requested such narrowing, 727 F. Supp., at 1503. A district court is not subject to criticism if it awaits a partys motion before tightening the scope of discovery; certainly, that court makes no clear and indisputable error in adhering to the principle of party initiation,
Kerr
, 426 U. S., at 403 (internal quotation marks omitted).
8

* * *

Review by mandamus at this stage of the proceedings would be at least comprehensible as a means to test the Governments position that
no
discovery is appropriate in this litigation. See Brief for Petitioners 45 ([P]etitioners separation-of-powers arguments are … in the nature of a claim of immunity from discovery.). But in remanding for consideration of discovery-tailoring measures, the Court apparently rejects that no-discovery position. Otherwise, a remand based on the overbreadth of the discovery requests would make no sense. Nothing in the record, however, intimates lower-court refusal to reduce discovery. Indeed, the appeals court has already suggested tailored discovery that would avoid effectively prejudg[ing] the merits of respondents claim,
ante
, at 2 (
Stevens, J.
, concurring). See 334 F. 3d, at 1106 (respondents need only documents referring to the involvement of non-federal officials). See also
ante
, at 2, n. (
Stevens, J.
, concurring) (A few interrogatories or depositions might have determined … whether any non-Government employees voted on NEPDG recommendations or drafted portions of the committees report). In accord with the Court of Appeals, I am confident that [were it moved to do so] the district court here [would] protect petitioners legitimate interests and keep discovery within appropriate limits. 334 F. 3d, at 1107.
9
I would therefore affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals.

Notes

1
The Court of Appeals also concluded, altogether correctly in my view, that it lacked ordinary appellate jurisdiction over the Vice Presidents appeal. See 334 F. 3d, at 1109; cf. ante, at 78 (leaving appellate-jurisdiction question undecided). In its order addressing the petitioners motions to dismiss, the District Court stated it would be premature and inappropriate to determine whether any relief could be obtained from the Vice President. Judicial Watch, Inc. v. National Energy Policy Dev. Group, 219 F. Supp. 2d 20, 44 (DC 2002). Immediate review of an interlocutory ruling, allowed in rare cases under the collateral-order doctrine, is inappropriate when an order is, as in this case, inherently tentative and not the final word on the subject. Gulfstream Aerospace Corp. v. Mayacamas Corp.,
485 U. S. 271,
277 (1988)
(internal quotation marks omitted).

2
Government agencies had produced some relevant documents in related Freedom of Information Act litigation. See 219 F. Supp. 2d, at 27.

3
Section 1292(b) of Title 28 allows a court of appeals, in its discretion, to entertain an appeal from an interlocutory order [w]hen a district judge … shall be of the opinion that such order involves a controlling question of law as to which there is substantial ground for difference of opinion and that an immediate appeal from the order may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation.

4
On limiting discovery to the issue of membership, the Court of Appeals indicated its agreement. See 334 F. 3d, at 1106 ([Respondents] have no need for the names of all persons who participated in [NEPDG]s activities, nor a description of each persons role in the activities of [NEPDG]. They must discover only whether non-federal officials participated, and if so, to what extent. (internal quotation marks, ellipsis, and brackets omitted)).

5
According to the Government, 24 boxes of documents [are] potentially responsive to [respondents] discovery requests… . The documents identified as likely to be responsive from those boxes … are contained in approximately twelve boxes. App. 282283. Each box requires one or two attorney days to review and prepare a rough privilege log. Following that review, privilege logs must be finalized. Further, once the responsive emails are identified, printed, and numbered, [petitioners] expect that the privilege review and logging process [will] be equally, if not more, time-consuming, due to the expected quantity of individual emails. Id., at 284.

7
The Court suggests that the appeals court labored under the mistaken assumption that the assertion of executive privilege is a necessary precondition to the Governments separation-of-powers objections. Ante, at 20. The Court of Appeals, however, described the constitutional concern as hypothetical, not merely because no executive privilege had been asserted, but also in light of measures the District Court could take to narrow and carefully focu[s] discovery. See 334 F. 3d, at 1105, 1107.

8
The Court also questions the District Courts invocation of the federal mandamus statute,
28 U. S. C. §1361, which provides that [t]he district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any action in the nature of mandamus to compel an officer or employee of the United States or any agency thereof to perform a duty owed to the plaintiff. See ante, at 20; 219 F. Supp. 2d, at 4144. See also Chandler v. Judicial Council of Tenth Circuit,
398 U. S. 74, and n. 8 (1970) (holding mandamus under the All Writs Act,
28 U. S. C. §1651, improper, but expressing no opinion on relief under the federal mandamus statute, §1361). On the question whether §1361 allows enforcement of the FACA against the Vice President, the District Court concluded it would be premature and inappropriate to determine whether the relief of mandamus will or will not issue. 219 F. Supp. 2d, at 44. The Government, moreover, contested the propriety of §1361 relief only in passing in its petition to the appeals court for §1651 mandamus relief. See App. 363364 (Government asserted in its mandamus petition: The more general writ of mandamus cannot be used to circumvent … limits on the provision directly providing for review of administrative action.). A question not decided by the District Court, and barely raised in a petition for mandamus, hardly qualifies as grounds for drastic and extraordinary mandamus relief, Ex parte Fahey,
332 U. S. 258,
259260 (1947)
.
Justice Thomas urges that respondents cannot obtain §1361 relief if wide-ranging discovery [is needed] to prove that they have any right to relief. Ante, at 3 (opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part) (emphasis in original). First, as the Court of Appeals recognized, see supra, at 89; infra, at 11, should the Government so move, the District Court could contain discovery so that it would not be wide-ranging. Second, all agree that an applicant seeking a §1361 mandamus writ must show that the [federal] defendant owes him a clear, nondiscretionary duty. Heckler v. Ringer,
466 U. S. 602,
616 (1984)
(emphasis added). No §1361 writ may issue, in other words, when federal law grants discretion to the federal officer, rather than imposing a duty on him. When federal law imposes an obligation, however, suit under §1361 is not precluded simply because facts must be developed to ascertain whether a federal command has been dishonored. Congress enacted §1361 to mak[e] it more convenient for aggrieved persons to file actions in the nature of mandamus, Stafford v. Briggs,
444 U. S. 527,
535 (1980)
, not to address the rare instance in which a federal defendant, upon whom the law unequivocally places an obligation, concedes his failure to measure up to that obligation.

9
While I agree with the Court that an interlocutory appeal may become appropriate at some later juncture in this litigation, see ante, at 21, I note that the decision whether to allow such an appeal lies in the first instance in the District Courts sound discretion, see
28 U. S. C. §1292(b); supra, at 4, n. 3.

RICHARD B. CHENEY, VICE PRESIDENT OF THE
UNITED STATES,
et al.,
PETITIONERS
v.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR
THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA et al.

on writ of certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the district of columbia circuit

[June 24, 2004]

Justice Ginsburg
, with whom
Justice Souter
joins, dissenting.

The Government, in seeking a writ of mandamus from the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, and on brief to this Court, urged that this case should be resolved without
any
discovery. See App. 183184, 339; Brief for Petitioners 45; Reply Brief 18. In vacating the judgment of the Court of Appeals, however, this Court remands for consideration whether mandamus is appropriate due to the
overbreadth
of the District Courts discovery orders. See
ante
, at 1, 1620. But, as the Court of Appeals observed, it appeared that the Government never asked the district court to
narrow
discovery.
In re Cheney
, 334 F. 3d 1096, 1106 (CADC 2003) (emphasis in original). Given the Governments decision to resist all discovery, mandamus relief based on the exorbitance of the discovery orders is at least premature,
id.
, at 1104. I would therefore affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals denying the writ,
1
and allow the District Court, in the first instance, to pursue its expressed intention tightly [to] rei[n] [in] discovery,
Judicial Watch, Inc.
v.
National Energy Policy Dev. Group
, 219 F. Supp. 2d 20, 54 (DC 2002), should the Government so request.

I

A

The discovery at issue here was sought in a civil action filed by respondents Judicial Watch, Inc., and Sierra Club. To gain information concerning the membership and operations of an energy-policy task force, the National Energy Policy Development Group (NEPDG), respondents filed suit under the Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA), 5 U. S. C. App. §1
et seq.;
respondents named among the defendants
the Vice President and senior Executive Branch officials. See App. 1640, 139154;
ante
, at 13. After granting in part and denying in part the Governments motions to dismiss, see 219 F. Supp. 2d 20, the District Court approved respondents extensive discovery plan, which included detailed and far-ranging interrogatories and sweeping requests for production of documents, see App. to Pet. for Cert. 51a; App. 215230. In a later order, the District Court directed the Government to produce non-privileged documents and a privilege log. App. to Pet. for Cert. 47a.

The discovery plan drawn by Judicial Watch and Sierra Club was indeed unbounded in scope.
Ante
, at 17; accord 334 F. 3d, at 1106. Initial approval of that plan by the District Court, however, was not given in stunning disregard of separation-of-powers concerns. Cf.
ante
, at 1620. In the order itself, the District Court invited detailed and precise object[ions] to any of the discovery requests, and instructed the Government to identify and explain … invocations of privilege with particularity. App. to Pet. for Cert. 51a. To avoid duplication, the District Court provided that the Government could identify documents or information [responsive to the discovery requests] that [it] ha[d] already released to [Judicial Watch or the Sierra Club] in different fora.
Ibid.<footcall num="2">
Anticipating further proceedings concerning discovery, the District Court suggested that the Government could submit [any privileged documents] under seal for the courts consideration, or that the court [could] appoint the equivalent of a Special Master, maybe a retired judge, to review allegedly privileged documents. App. 247.

The Government did not file specific objections; nor did it supply particulars to support assertions of privilege. Instead, the Government urged the District Court to rule that Judicial Watch and the Sierra Club could have no discovery at all. See
id.
, at 192 (the governmen[t] position is that … no discovery is appropriate);
id.
, at 205 (same); 334 F. 3d, at 1106 (As far as we can tell, petitioners never asked the district court to
narrow
discovery to those matters [respondents] need to support their allegation that FACA applies to the NEPDG. (emphasis in original)). In the Governments view, the resolution of the case ha[d] to flow from the administrative record
sans
discovery. App. 192. Without taking up the District Courts suggestion of that courts readiness to rein in discovery, see 219 F. Supp. 2d, at 54, the Government, on behalf of the Vice President, moved, unsuccessfully, for a protective order and for certification of an interlocutory appeal pursuant to
28 U. S. C. §1292(b). See 334 F. 3d, at 1100; see App. to Pet. for Cert. 47a (District Court denial of protective order); 233 F. Supp. 2d 16 (DC 2002) (District Court denial of §1292(b) certification).
3
At the District Courts hearing on the Governments motion for a stay pending interlocutory appeal, the Government argued that the injury is submitting to discovery in the absence of a compelling showing of need by the [respondents]. App. 316; see 230 F. Supp. 2d 12 (DC 2002)
(District Court order denying stay).

Despite the absence from this flurry of activity,
ante
, at 8, of any Government motion contesting the terms of the discovery plan or proposing a scaled-down substitute plan, see 334 F. 3d, at 1106, this Court states that the Government did in fact object to the scope of discovery and asked the District Court to narrow it in some way,
ante
, at 18. In support of this statement, the Court points to the Governments objections to the proposed discovery plan, its response to the interrogatories and production requests, and its contention that discovery would be unduly burdensome. See
ante
, at 18; App. 166184, 201, 231234, 274.

True, the Government disputed the definition of the term meeting in respondents interrogatories, and stated, in passing, that discovery should be [both] limited to written interrogatories and limited in scope to the issue of membership.
Id.
, at 179, 181, 233.
4
But as the Court of Appeals noted, the Government mentioned excessive discovery in support of its plea to be shielded from any discovery. 334 F. 3d, at 1106. The Government argument that the burden of doing a document production is an unconstitutional burden, App. 274, was similarly anchored. The Government so urged at a District Court hearing in which its underlying position [was] that its not going to produce anything,
id.
, at 249.
5

The Governments bottom line was firmly and consistently that review, limited to the administrative record, should frame the resolution of this case.
Id.
, at 181; accord
id.
, at 179, 233. That administrative record would consist of the Presidential Memorandum establishing NEPDG, NEPDGs public report, and the Office of the Vice Presidents response to … Judicial Watchs request for permission to attend NEPDG meetings; it would not include anything respondents could gain through discovery.
Id.
, at 183. Indeed, the Government acknowledged before the District Court that its litigation strategy involved opposition to the discovery plan as a whole in lieu of focused objections. See
id.
, at 205 (Government stated: We did not choose to offer written objections to [the discovery plan] … .).

Further sounding the Governments leitmotif, in a hearing on the proposed discovery plan, the District Court stated that the Government didnt file objections to rein in discovery because [in the Governments view] no discovery is appropriate.
Id
., at 192;
id.
, at 205 (same). Without endeavoring to correct any misunderstanding on the District Courts part, the Government underscored its resistance to any and all discovery.
Id.
, at 192194;
id.
, at 201 (asserting that respondents are not entitled to discovery to supplement [the administrative record]). And in its motion for a protective order, the Government similarly declared its unqualified opposition to discovery. See Memorandum in Support of Defendants Motion for a Protective Order and for Reconsideration, C. A. Nos. 011530 (EGS), 02631 (EGS), p. 21 (D. D. C., Sept. 3, 2002) ([Petitioners] respectfully request that the Court enter a protective order relieving them of
any obligation
to respond to [respondents] discovery [requests]. (emphasis added)); see 334 F. 3d, at 1106 (same).
6

The District Court, in short, ignored no concrete pleas to narrow discovery. But see
ante
, at 18. That court did, however, voice its concern about the Governments failure to heed the courts instructions:

I told the government, if you have precise constitutional objections, let me know what they are so I can determine whether or not this [discovery] plan is appropriate, and … you said, well, its unconstitutional, without elaborating. You said, because Plaintiffs proposed discovery plan has not been approved by the court, the Defendants are not submitting specific objections to Plaintiffs proposed request… . My rule was, if you have objections, let me know what the objections are, and you chose not to do so. App. 205.

B

Denied §1292(b) certification by the District Court, the Government sought a writ of mandamus from the Court of Appeals. See
id.
, at 339365. In its mandamus petition, the Government asked the appellate court to vacate the discovery orders issued by the district court, direct the court to decide the case on the basis of the administrative record and such supplemental affidavits as it may require, and direct that the Vice President be dismissed as a defendant.
Id.
, at 364365. In support of those requests, the Government again argued that the case should be adjudicated without discovery: The Constitution and principles of comity preclude discovery of the President or Vice President, especially without a demonstration of compelling and focused countervailing interest.
Id.
, at 360.

The Court of Appeals acknowledged that the discovery plan presented by respondents and approved by the District Court goes well beyond what [respondents] need. 334 F. 3d, at 1106. The appellate court nevertheless denied the mandamus petition, concluding that the Governments separation-of-powers concern remain[ed] hypothetical.
Id.
, at 1105. Far from ordering immediate disclosure of communications between senior executive branch officials and those with information relevant to advice that was being formulated for the President, the Court of Appeals observed, the District Court had directed the Government initially to produce only non-privileged documents and a privilege log.
Id.
, at 1104 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); see App. to Pet. for Cert. 47a.
7

The Court of Appeals stressed that the District Court could accommodate separation-of-powers concerns short of denying all discovery or compelling the invocation of executive privilege. See 334 F. 3d, at 11051106. Principally, the Court of Appeals stated, discovery could be narrowed, should the Government so move, to encompass only whether non-federal officials participated [in NEPDG], and if so, to what extent.
Id.
, at 1106. The Government could identify relevant materials produced in other litigation, thus avoiding undue reproduction.
Id.
, at 1105; see App. to Pet. for Cert. 51a;
supra
, at 3. If, after appropriate narrowing, the discovery allowed still impels the Vice President … to claim privilege, the District Court could entertain [those] privilege claims and review allegedly privileged documents in camera. 334 F. 3d, at 1107. Mindful of the judiciarys responsibility to police the separation of powers in litigation involving the executive, the Court of Appeals expressed confidence that the District Court would respond to petitioners concern and narrow discovery to ensure that [respondents] obtain no more than they need to prove their case.
Id.
, at 1106.

Throughout this litigation, the Government has declined to move for reduction of the District Courts discovery order to accommodate separation-of-powers concerns. See
supra
, at 37. The Court now remands this case so the Court of Appeals can consider whether a mandamus writ should issue ordering the District Court to explore other avenues, short of forcing the Executive to invoke privilege, and, in particular, to narrow, on its own, the scope of [discovery].
Ante
, at 1920. Nothing in the District Courts orders or the Court of Appeals opinion, however, suggests that either of those courts would refuse reasonably to accommodate separation-of-powers concerns. See
supra
, at 3, 78. When parties seeking a mandamus writ decline to avail themselves of opportunities to obtain relief from the District Court, a writ of mandamus ordering the same relief
i.e.
, here, reined-in discoveryis surely a doubtful proposition.

The District Court, moreover, did not err in failing to narrow discovery on its own initiative. Although the Court cites
United States
v.
Poindexter
, 727 F. Supp. 1501 (DC 1989), as sound precedent for district-court narrowing of discovery, see
ante
, at 1920, the target of the subpoena in that case, former President Reagan, unlike petitioners in this case, affirmatively requested such narrowing, 727 F. Supp., at 1503. A district court is not subject to criticism if it awaits a partys motion before tightening the scope of discovery; certainly, that court makes no clear and indisputable error in adhering to the principle of party initiation,
Kerr
, 426 U. S., at 403 (internal quotation marks omitted).
8

* * *

Review by mandamus at this stage of the proceedings would be at least comprehensible as a means to test the Governments position that
no
discovery is appropriate in this litigation. See Brief for Petitioners 45 ([P]etitioners separation-of-powers arguments are … in the nature of a claim of immunity from discovery.). But in remanding for consideration of discovery-tailoring measures, the Court apparently rejects that no-discovery position. Otherwise, a remand based on the overbreadth of the discovery requests would make no sense. Nothing in the record, however, intimates lower-court refusal to reduce discovery. Indeed, the appeals court has already suggested tailored discovery that would avoid effectively prejudg[ing] the merits of respondents claim,
ante
, at 2 (
Stevens, J.
, concurring). See 334 F. 3d, at 1106 (respondents need only documents referring to the involvement of non-federal officials). See also
ante
, at 2, n. (
Stevens, J.
, concurring) (A few interrogatories or depositions might have determined … whether any non-Government employees voted on NEPDG recommendations or drafted portions of the committees report). In accord with the Court of Appeals, I am confident that [were it moved to do so] the district court here [would] protect petitioners legitimate interests and keep discovery within appropriate limits. 334 F. 3d, at 1107.
9
I would therefore affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals.

Notes

1
The Court of Appeals also concluded, altogether correctly in my view, that it lacked ordinary appellate jurisdiction over the Vice Presidents appeal. See 334 F. 3d, at 1109; cf. ante, at 78 (leaving appellate-jurisdiction question undecided). In its order addressing the petitioners motions to dismiss, the District Court stated it would be premature and inappropriate to determine whether any relief could be obtained from the Vice President. Judicial Watch, Inc. v. National Energy Policy Dev. Group, 219 F. Supp. 2d 20, 44 (DC 2002). Immediate review of an interlocutory ruling, allowed in rare cases under the collateral-order doctrine, is inappropriate when an order is, as in this case, inherently tentative and not the final word on the subject. Gulfstream Aerospace Corp. v. Mayacamas Corp.,
485 U. S. 271,
277 (1988)
(internal quotation marks omitted).

2
Government agencies had produced some relevant documents in related Freedom of Information Act litigation. See 219 F. Supp. 2d, at 27.

3
Section 1292(b) of Title 28 allows a court of appeals, in its discretion, to entertain an appeal from an interlocutory order [w]hen a district judge … shall be of the opinion that such order involves a controlling question of law as to which there is substantial ground for difference of opinion and that an immediate appeal from the order may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation.

4
On limiting discovery to the issue of membership, the Court of Appeals indicated its agreement. See 334 F. 3d, at 1106 ([Respondents] have no need for the names of all persons who participated in [NEPDG]s activities, nor a description of each persons role in the activities of [NEPDG]. They must discover only whether non-federal officials participated, and if so, to what extent. (internal quotation marks, ellipsis, and brackets omitted)).

5
According to the Government, 24 boxes of documents [are] potentially responsive to [respondents] discovery requests… . The documents identified as likely to be responsive from those boxes … are contained in approximately twelve boxes. App. 282283. Each box requires one or two attorney days to review and prepare a rough privilege log. Following that review, privilege logs must be finalized. Further, once the responsive emails are identified, printed, and numbered, [petitioners] expect that the privilege review and logging process [will] be equally, if not more, time-consuming, due to the expected quantity of individual emails. Id., at 284.

7
The Court suggests that the appeals court labored under the mistaken assumption that the assertion of executive privilege is a necessary precondition to the Governments separation-of-powers objections. Ante, at 20. The Court of Appeals, however, described the constitutional concern as hypothetical, not merely because no executive privilege had been asserted, but also in light of measures the District Court could take to narrow and carefully focu[s] discovery. See 334 F. 3d, at 1105, 1107.

8
The Court also questions the District Courts invocation of the federal mandamus statute,
28 U. S. C. §1361, which provides that [t]he district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any action in the nature of mandamus to compel an officer or employee of the United States or any agency thereof to perform a duty owed to the plaintiff. See ante, at 20; 219 F. Supp. 2d, at 4144. See also Chandler v. Judicial Council of Tenth Circuit,
398 U. S. 74, and n. 8 (1970) (holding mandamus under the All Writs Act,
28 U. S. C. §1651, improper, but expressing no opinion on relief under the federal mandamus statute, §1361). On the question whether §1361 allows enforcement of the FACA against the Vice President, the District Court concluded it would be premature and inappropriate to determine whether the relief of mandamus will or will not issue. 219 F. Supp. 2d, at 44. The Government, moreover, contested the propriety of §1361 relief only in passing in its petition to the appeals court for §1651 mandamus relief. See App. 363364 (Government asserted in its mandamus petition: The more general writ of mandamus cannot be used to circumvent … limits on the provision directly providing for review of administrative action.). A question not decided by the District Court, and barely raised in a petition for mandamus, hardly qualifies as grounds for drastic and extraordinary mandamus relief, Ex parte Fahey,
332 U. S. 258,
259260 (1947)
.
Justice Thomas urges that respondents cannot obtain §1361 relief if wide-ranging discovery [is needed] to prove that they have any right to relief. Ante, at 3 (opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part) (emphasis in original). First, as the Court of Appeals recognized, see supra, at 89; infra, at 11, should the Government so move, the District Court could contain discovery so that it would not be wide-ranging. Second, all agree that an applicant seeking a §1361 mandamus writ must show that the [federal] defendant owes him a clear, nondiscretionary duty. Heckler v. Ringer,
466 U. S. 602,
616 (1984)
(emphasis added). No §1361 writ may issue, in other words, when federal law grants discretion to the federal officer, rather than imposing a duty on him. When federal law imposes an obligation, however, suit under §1361 is not precluded simply because facts must be developed to ascertain whether a federal command has been dishonored. Congress enacted §1361 to mak[e] it more convenient for aggrieved persons to file actions in the nature of mandamus, Stafford v. Briggs,
444 U. S. 527,
535 (1980)
, not to address the rare instance in which a federal defendant, upon whom the law unequivocally places an obligation, concedes his failure to measure up to that obligation.

9
While I agree with the Court that an interlocutory appeal may become appropriate at some later juncture in this litigation, see ante, at 21, I note that the decision whether to allow such an appeal lies in the first instance in the District Courts sound discretion, see
28 U. S. C. §1292(b); supra, at 4, n. 3.

RICHARD B. CHENEY, VICE PRESIDENT OF THE
UNITED STATES,
et al.,
PETITIONERS
v.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR
THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA et al.

on writ of certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the district of columbia circuit

[June 24, 2004]

Justice Ginsburg
, with whom
Justice Souter
joins, dissenting.

The Government, in seeking a writ of mandamus from the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, and on brief to this Court, urged that this case should be resolved without
any
discovery. See App. 183184, 339; Brief for Petitioners 45; Reply Brief 18. In vacating the judgment of the Court of Appeals, however, this Court remands for consideration whether mandamus is appropriate due to the
overbreadth
of the District Courts discovery orders. See
ante
, at 1, 1620. But, as the Court of Appeals observed, it appeared that the Government never asked the district court to
narrow
discovery.
In re Cheney
, 334 F. 3d 1096, 1106 (CADC 2003) (emphasis in original). Given the Governments decision to resist all discovery, mandamus relief based on the exorbitance of the discovery orders is at least premature,
id.
, at 1104. I would therefore affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals denying the writ,
1
and allow the District Court, in the first instance, to pursue its expressed intention tightly [to] rei[n] [in] discovery,
Judicial Watch, Inc.
v.
National Energy Policy Dev. Group
, 219 F. Supp. 2d 20, 54 (DC 2002), should the Government so request.

I

A

The discovery at issue here was sought in a civil action filed by respondents Judicial Watch, Inc., and Sierra Club. To gain information concerning the membership and operations of an energy-policy task force, the National Energy Policy Development Group (NEPDG), respondents filed suit under the Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA), 5 U. S. C. App. §1
et seq.;
respondents named among the defendants
the Vice President and senior Executive Branch officials. See App. 1640, 139154;
ante
, at 13. After granting in part and denying in part the Governments motions to dismiss, see 219 F. Supp. 2d 20, the District Court approved respondents extensive discovery plan, which included detailed and far-ranging interrogatories and sweeping requests for production of documents, see App. to Pet. for Cert. 51a; App. 215230. In a later order, the District Court directed the Government to produce non-privileged documents and a privilege log. App. to Pet. for Cert. 47a.

The discovery plan drawn by Judicial Watch and Sierra Club was indeed unbounded in scope.
Ante
, at 17; accord 334 F. 3d, at 1106. Initial approval of that plan by the District Court, however, was not given in stunning disregard of separation-of-powers concerns. Cf.
ante
, at 1620. In the order itself, the District Court invited detailed and precise object[ions] to any of the discovery requests, and instructed the Government to identify and explain … invocations of privilege with particularity. App. to Pet. for Cert. 51a. To avoid duplication, the District Court provided that the Government could identify documents or information [responsive to the discovery requests] that [it] ha[d] already released to [Judicial Watch or the Sierra Club] in different fora.
Ibid.<footcall num="2">
Anticipating further proceedings concerning discovery, the District Court suggested that the Government could submit [any privileged documents] under seal for the courts consideration, or that the court [could] appoint the equivalent of a Special Master, maybe a retired judge, to review allegedly privileged documents. App. 247.

The Government did not file specific objections; nor did it supply particulars to support assertions of privilege. Instead, the Government urged the District Court to rule that Judicial Watch and the Sierra Club could have no discovery at all. See
id.
, at 192 (the governmen[t] position is that … no discovery is appropriate);
id.
, at 205 (same); 334 F. 3d, at 1106 (As far as we can tell, petitioners never asked the district court to
narrow
discovery to those matters [respondents] need to support their allegation that FACA applies to the NEPDG. (emphasis in original)). In the Governments view, the resolution of the case ha[d] to flow from the administrative record
sans
discovery. App. 192. Without taking up the District Courts suggestion of that courts readiness to rein in discovery, see 219 F. Supp. 2d, at 54, the Government, on behalf of the Vice President, moved, unsuccessfully, for a protective order and for certification of an interlocutory appeal pursuant to
28 U. S. C. §1292(b). See 334 F. 3d, at 1100; see App. to Pet. for Cert. 47a (District Court denial of protective order); 233 F. Supp. 2d 16 (DC 2002) (District Court denial of §1292(b) certification).
3
At the District Courts hearing on the Governments motion for a stay pending interlocutory appeal, the Government argued that the injury is submitting to discovery in the absence of a compelling showing of need by the [respondents]. App. 316; see 230 F. Supp. 2d 12 (DC 2002)
(District Court order denying stay).

Despite the absence from this flurry of activity,
ante
, at 8, of any Government motion contesting the terms of the discovery plan or proposing a scaled-down substitute plan, see 334 F. 3d, at 1106, this Court states that the Government did in fact object to the scope of discovery and asked the District Court to narrow it in some way,
ante
, at 18. In support of this statement, the Court points to the Governments objections to the proposed discovery plan, its response to the interrogatories and production requests, and its contention that discovery would be unduly burdensome. See
ante
, at 18; App. 166184, 201, 231234, 274.

True, the Government disputed the definition of the term meeting in respondents interrogatories, and stated, in passing, that discovery should be [both] limited to written interrogatories and limited in scope to the issue of membership.
Id.
, at 179, 181, 233.
4
But as the Court of Appeals noted, the Government mentioned excessive discovery in support of its plea to be shielded from any discovery. 334 F. 3d, at 1106. The Government argument that the burden of doing a document production is an unconstitutional burden, App. 274, was similarly anchored. The Government so urged at a District Court hearing in which its underlying position [was] that its not going to produce anything,
id.
, at 249.
5

The Governments bottom line was firmly and consistently that review, limited to the administrative record, should frame the resolution of this case.
Id.
, at 181; accord
id.
, at 179, 233. That administrative record would consist of the Presidential Memorandum establishing NEPDG, NEPDGs public report, and the Office of the Vice Presidents response to … Judicial Watchs request for permission to attend NEPDG meetings; it would not include anything respondents could gain through discovery.
Id.
, at 183. Indeed, the Government acknowledged before the District Court that its litigation strategy involved opposition to the discovery plan as a whole in lieu of focused objections. See
id.
, at 205 (Government stated: We did not choose to offer written objections to [the discovery plan] … .).

Further sounding the Governments leitmotif, in a hearing on the proposed discovery plan, the District Court stated that the Government didnt file objections to rein in discovery because [in the Governments view] no discovery is appropriate.
Id
., at 192;
id.
, at 205 (same). Without endeavoring to correct any misunderstanding on the District Courts part, the Government underscored its resistance to any and all discovery.
Id.
, at 192194;
id.
, at 201 (asserting that respondents are not entitled to discovery to supplement [the administrative record]). And in its motion for a protective order, the Government similarly declared its unqualified opposition to discovery. See Memorandum in Support of Defendants Motion for a Protective Order and for Reconsideration, C. A. Nos. 011530 (EGS), 02631 (EGS), p. 21 (D. D. C., Sept. 3, 2002) ([Petitioners] respectfully request that the Court enter a protective order relieving them of
any obligation
to respond to [respondents] discovery [requests]. (emphasis added)); see 334 F. 3d, at 1106 (same).
6

The District Court, in short, ignored no concrete pleas to narrow discovery. But see
ante
, at 18. That court did, however, voice its concern about the Governments failure to heed the courts instructions:

I told the government, if you have precise constitutional objections, let me know what they are so I can determine whether or not this [discovery] plan is appropriate, and … you said, well, its unconstitutional, without elaborating. You said, because Plaintiffs proposed discovery plan has not been approved by the court, the Defendants are not submitting specific objections to Plaintiffs proposed request… . My rule was, if you have objections, let me know what the objections are, and you chose not to do so. App. 205.

B

Denied §1292(b) certification by the District Court, the Government sought a writ of mandamus from the Court of Appeals. See
id.
, at 339365. In its mandamus petition, the Government asked the appellate court to vacate the discovery orders issued by the district court, direct the court to decide the case on the basis of the administrative record and such supplemental affidavits as it may require, and direct that the Vice President be dismissed as a defendant.
Id.
, at 364365. In support of those requests, the Government again argued that the case should be adjudicated without discovery: The Constitution and principles of comity preclude discovery of the President or Vice President, especially without a demonstration of compelling and focused countervailing interest.
Id.
, at 360.

The Court of Appeals acknowledged that the discovery plan presented by respondents and approved by the District Court goes well beyond what [respondents] need. 334 F. 3d, at 1106. The appellate court nevertheless denied the mandamus petition, concluding that the Governments separation-of-powers concern remain[ed] hypothetical.
Id.
, at 1105. Far from ordering immediate disclosure of communications between senior executive branch officials and those with information relevant to advice that was being formulated for the President, the Court of Appeals observed, the District Court had directed the Government initially to produce only non-privileged documents and a privilege log.
Id.
, at 1104 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); see App. to Pet. for Cert. 47a.
7

The Court of Appeals stressed that the District Court could accommodate separation-of-powers concerns short of denying all discovery or compelling the invocation of executive privilege. See 334 F. 3d, at 11051106. Principally, the Court of Appeals stated, discovery could be narrowed, should the Government so move, to encompass only whether non-federal officials participated [in NEPDG], and if so, to what extent.
Id.
, at 1106. The Government could identify relevant materials produced in other litigation, thus avoiding undue reproduction.
Id.
, at 1105; see App. to Pet. for Cert. 51a;
supra
, at 3. If, after appropriate narrowing, the discovery allowed still impels the Vice President … to claim privilege, the District Court could entertain [those] privilege claims and review allegedly privileged documents in camera. 334 F. 3d, at 1107. Mindful of the judiciarys responsibility to police the separation of powers in litigation involving the executive, the Court of Appeals expressed confidence that the District Court would respond to petitioners concern and narrow discovery to ensure that [respondents] obtain no more than they need to prove their case.
Id.
, at 1106.

Throughout this litigation, the Government has declined to move for reduction of the District Courts discovery order to accommodate separation-of-powers concerns. See
supra
, at 37. The Court now remands this case so the Court of Appeals can consider whether a mandamus writ should issue ordering the District Court to explore other avenues, short of forcing the Executive to invoke privilege, and, in particular, to narrow, on its own, the scope of [discovery].
Ante
, at 1920. Nothing in the District Courts orders or the Court of Appeals opinion, however, suggests that either of those courts would refuse reasonably to accommodate separation-of-powers concerns. See
supra
, at 3, 78. When parties seeking a mandamus writ decline to avail themselves of opportunities to obtain relief from the District Court, a writ of mandamus ordering the same relief
i.e.
, here, reined-in discoveryis surely a doubtful proposition.

The District Court, moreover, did not err in failing to narrow discovery on its own initiative. Although the Court cites
United States
v.
Poindexter
, 727 F. Supp. 1501 (DC 1989), as sound precedent for district-court narrowing of discovery, see
ante
, at 1920, the target of the subpoena in that case, former President Reagan, unlike petitioners in this case, affirmatively requested such narrowing, 727 F. Supp., at 1503. A district court is not subject to criticism if it awaits a partys motion before tightening the scope of discovery; certainly, that court makes no clear and indisputable error in adhering to the principle of party initiation,
Kerr
, 426 U. S., at 403 (internal quotation marks omitted).
8

* * *

Review by mandamus at this stage of the proceedings would be at least comprehensible as a means to test the Governments position that
no
discovery is appropriate in this litigation. See Brief for Petitioners 45 ([P]etitioners separation-of-powers arguments are … in the nature of a claim of immunity from discovery.). But in remanding for consideration of discovery-tailoring measures, the Court apparently rejects that no-discovery position. Otherwise, a remand based on the overbreadth of the discovery requests would make no sense. Nothing in the record, however, intimates lower-court refusal to reduce discovery. Indeed, the appeals court has already suggested tailored discovery that would avoid effectively prejudg[ing] the merits of respondents claim,
ante
, at 2 (
Stevens, J.
, concurring). See 334 F. 3d, at 1106 (respondents need only documents referring to the involvement of non-federal officials). See also
ante
, at 2, n. (
Stevens, J.
, concurring) (A few interrogatories or depositions might have determined … whether any non-Government employees voted on NEPDG recommendations or drafted portions of the committees report). In accord with the Court of Appeals, I am confident that [were it moved to do so] the district court here [would] protect petitioners legitimate interests and keep discovery within appropriate limits. 334 F. 3d, at 1107.
9
I would therefore affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals.

Notes

1
The Court of Appeals also concluded, altogether correctly in my view, that it lacked ordinary appellate jurisdiction over the Vice Presidents appeal. See 334 F. 3d, at 1109; cf. ante, at 78 (leaving appellate-jurisdiction question undecided). In its order addressing the petitioners motions to dismiss, the District Court stated it would be premature and inappropriate to determine whether any relief could be obtained from the Vice President. Judicial Watch, Inc. v. National Energy Policy Dev. Group, 219 F. Supp. 2d 20, 44 (DC 2002). Immediate review of an interlocutory ruling, allowed in rare cases under the collateral-order doctrine, is inappropriate when an order is, as in this case, inherently tentative and not the final word on the subject. Gulfstream Aerospace Corp. v. Mayacamas Corp.,
485 U. S. 271,
277 (1988)
(internal quotation marks omitted).

2
Government agencies had produced some relevant documents in related Freedom of Information Act litigation. See 219 F. Supp. 2d, at 27.

3
Section 1292(b) of Title 28 allows a court of appeals, in its discretion, to entertain an appeal from an interlocutory order [w]hen a district judge … shall be of the opinion that such order involves a controlling question of law as to which there is substantial ground for difference of opinion and that an immediate appeal from the order may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation.

4
On limiting discovery to the issue of membership, the Court of Appeals indicated its agreement. See 334 F. 3d, at 1106 ([Respondents] have no need for the names of all persons who participated in [NEPDG]s activities, nor a description of each persons role in the activities of [NEPDG]. They must discover only whether non-federal officials participated, and if so, to what extent. (internal quotation marks, ellipsis, and brackets omitted)).

5
According to the Government, 24 boxes of documents [are] potentially responsive to [respondents] discovery requests… . The documents identified as likely to be responsive from those boxes … are contained in approximately twelve boxes. App. 282283. Each box requires one or two attorney days to review and prepare a rough privilege log. Following that review, privilege logs must be finalized. Further, once the responsive emails are identified, printed, and numbered, [petitioners] expect that the privilege review and logging process [will] be equally, if not more, time-consuming, due to the expected quantity of individual emails. Id., at 284.

7
The Court suggests that the appeals court labored under the mistaken assumption that the assertion of executive privilege is a necessary precondition to the Governments separation-of-powers objections. Ante, at 20. The Court of Appeals, however, described the constitutional concern as hypothetical, not merely because no executive privilege had been asserted, but also in light of measures the District Court could take to narrow and carefully focu[s] discovery. See 334 F. 3d, at 1105, 1107.

8
The Court also questions the District Courts invocation of the federal mandamus statute,
28 U. S. C. §1361, which provides that [t]he district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any action in the nature of mandamus to compel an officer or employee of the United States or any agency thereof to perform a duty owed to the plaintiff. See ante, at 20; 219 F. Supp. 2d, at 4144. See also Chandler v. Judicial Council of Tenth Circuit,
398 U. S. 74, and n. 8 (1970) (holding mandamus under the All Writs Act,
28 U. S. C. §1651, improper, but expressing no opinion on relief under the federal mandamus statute, §1361). On the question whether §1361 allows enforcement of the FACA against the Vice President, the District Court concluded it would be premature and inappropriate to determine whether the relief of mandamus will or will not issue. 219 F. Supp. 2d, at 44. The Government, moreover, contested the propriety of §1361 relief only in passing in its petition to the appeals court for §1651 mandamus relief. See App. 363364 (Government asserted in its mandamus petition: The more general writ of mandamus cannot be used to circumvent … limits on the provision directly providing for review of administrative action.). A question not decided by the District Court, and barely raised in a petition for mandamus, hardly qualifies as grounds for drastic and extraordinary mandamus relief, Ex parte Fahey,
332 U. S. 258,
259260 (1947)
.
Justice Thomas urges that respondents cannot obtain §1361 relief if wide-ranging discovery [is needed] to prove that they have any right to relief. Ante, at 3 (opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part) (emphasis in original). First, as the Court of Appeals recognized, see supra, at 89; infra, at 11, should the Government so move, the District Court could contain discovery so that it would not be wide-ranging. Second, all agree that an applicant seeking a §1361 mandamus writ must show that the [federal] defendant owes him a clear, nondiscretionary duty. Heckler v. Ringer,
466 U. S. 602,
616 (1984)
(emphasis added). No §1361 writ may issue, in other words, when federal law grants discretion to the federal officer, rather than imposing a duty on him. When federal law imposes an obligation, however, suit under §1361 is not precluded simply because facts must be developed to ascertain whether a federal command has been dishonored. Congress enacted §1361 to mak[e] it more convenient for aggrieved persons to file actions in the nature of mandamus, Stafford v. Briggs,
444 U. S. 527,
535 (1980)
, not to address the rare instance in which a federal defendant, upon whom the law unequivocally places an obligation, concedes his failure to measure up to that obligation.

9
While I agree with the Court that an interlocutory appeal may become appropriate at some later juncture in this litigation, see ante, at 21, I note that the decision whether to allow such an appeal lies in the first instance in the District Courts sound discretion, see
28 U. S. C. §1292(b); supra, at 4, n. 3.

RICHARD B. CHENEY, VICE PRESIDENT OF THE
UNITED STATES,
et al.,
PETITIONERS
v.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR
THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA et al.

on writ of certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the district of columbia circuit

[June 24, 2004]

Justice Ginsburg
, with whom
Justice Souter
joins, dissenting.

The Government, in seeking a writ of mandamus from the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, and on brief to this Court, urged that this case should be resolved without
any
discovery. See App. 183184, 339; Brief for Petitioners 45; Reply Brief 18. In vacating the judgment of the Court of Appeals, however, this Court remands for consideration whether mandamus is appropriate due to the
overbreadth
of the District Courts discovery orders. See
ante
, at 1, 1620. But, as the Court of Appeals observed, it appeared that the Government never asked the district court to
narrow
discovery.
In re Cheney
, 334 F. 3d 1096, 1106 (CADC 2003) (emphasis in original). Given the Governments decision to resist all discovery, mandamus relief based on the exorbitance of the discovery orders is at least premature,
id.
, at 1104. I would therefore affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals denying the writ,
1
and allow the District Court, in the first instance, to pursue its expressed intention tightly [to] rei[n] [in] discovery,
Judicial Watch, Inc.
v.
National Energy Policy Dev. Group
, 219 F. Supp. 2d 20, 54 (DC 2002), should the Government so request.

I

A

The discovery at issue here was sought in a civil action filed by respondents Judicial Watch, Inc., and Sierra Club. To gain information concerning the membership and operations of an energy-policy task force, the National Energy Policy Development Group (NEPDG), respondents filed suit under the Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA), 5 U. S. C. App. §1
et seq.;
respondents named among the defendants
the Vice President and senior Executive Branch officials. See App. 1640, 139154;
ante
, at 13. After granting in part and denying in part the Governments motions to dismiss, see 219 F. Supp. 2d 20, the District Court approved respondents extensive discovery plan, which included detailed and far-ranging interrogatories and sweeping requests for production of documents, see App. to Pet. for Cert. 51a; App. 215230. In a later order, the District Court directed the Government to produce non-privileged documents and a privilege log. App. to Pet. for Cert. 47a.

The discovery plan drawn by Judicial Watch and Sierra Club was indeed unbounded in scope.
Ante
, at 17; accord 334 F. 3d, at 1106. Initial approval of that plan by the District Court, however, was not given in stunning disregard of separation-of-powers concerns. Cf.
ante
, at 1620. In the order itself, the District Court invited detailed and precise object[ions] to any of the discovery requests, and instructed the Government to identify and explain … invocations of privilege with particularity. App. to Pet. for Cert. 51a. To avoid duplication, the District Court provided that the Government could identify documents or information [responsive to the discovery requests] that [it] ha[d] already released to [Judicial Watch or the Sierra Club] in different fora.
Ibid.<footcall num="2">
Anticipating further proceedings concerning discovery, the District Court suggested that the Government could submit [any privileged documents] under seal for the courts consideration, or that the court [could] appoint the equivalent of a Special Master, maybe a retired judge, to review allegedly privileged documents. App. 247.

The Government did not file specific objections; nor did it supply particulars to support assertions of privilege. Instead, the Government urged the District Court to rule that Judicial Watch and the Sierra Club could have no discovery at all. See
id.
, at 192 (the governmen[t] position is that … no discovery is appropriate);
id.
, at 205 (same); 334 F. 3d, at 1106 (As far as we can tell, petitioners never asked the district court to
narrow
discovery to those matters [respondents] need to support their allegation that FACA applies to the NEPDG. (emphasis in original)). In the Governments view, the resolution of the case ha[d] to flow from the administrative record
sans
discovery. App. 192. Without taking up the District Courts suggestion of that courts readiness to rein in discovery, see 219 F. Supp. 2d, at 54, the Government, on behalf of the Vice President, moved, unsuccessfully, for a protective order and for certification of an interlocutory appeal pursuant to
28 U. S. C. §1292(b). See 334 F. 3d, at 1100; see App. to Pet. for Cert. 47a (District Court denial of protective order); 233 F. Supp. 2d 16 (DC 2002) (District Court denial of §1292(b) certification).
3
At the District Courts hearing on the Governments motion for a stay pending interlocutory appeal, the Government argued that the injury is submitting to discovery in the absence of a compelling showing of need by the [respondents]. App. 316; see 230 F. Supp. 2d 12 (DC 2002)
(District Court order denying stay).

Despite the absence from this flurry of activity,
ante
, at 8, of any Government motion contesting the terms of the discovery plan or proposing a scaled-down substitute plan, see 334 F. 3d, at 1106, this Court states that the Government did in fact object to the scope of discovery and asked the District Court to narrow it in some way,
ante
, at 18. In support of this statement, the Court points to the Governments objections to the proposed discovery plan, its response to the interrogatories and production requests, and its contention that discovery would be unduly burdensome. See
ante
, at 18; App. 166184, 201, 231234, 274.

True, the Government disputed the definition of the term meeting in respondents interrogatories, and stated, in passing, that discovery should be [both] limited to written interrogatories and limited in scope to the issue of membership.
Id.
, at 179, 181, 233.
4
But as the Court of Appeals noted, the Government mentioned excessive discovery in support of its plea to be shielded from any discovery. 334 F. 3d, at 1106. The Government argument that the burden of doing a document production is an unconstitutional burden, App. 274, was similarly anchored. The Government so urged at a District Court hearing in which its underlying position [was] that its not going to produce anything,
id.
, at 249.
5

The Governments bottom line was firmly and consistently that review, limited to the administrative record, should frame the resolution of this case.
Id.
, at 181; accord
id.
, at 179, 233. That administrative record would consist of the Presidential Memorandum establishing NEPDG, NEPDGs public report, and the Office of the Vice Presidents response to … Judicial Watchs request for permission to attend NEPDG meetings; it would not include anything respondents could gain through discovery.
Id.
, at 183. Indeed, the Government acknowledged before the District Court that its litigation strategy involved opposition to the discovery plan as a whole in lieu of focused objections. See
id.
, at 205 (Government stated: We did not choose to offer written objections to [the discovery plan] … .).

Further sounding the Governments leitmotif, in a hearing on the proposed discovery plan, the District Court stated that the Government didnt file objections to rein in discovery because [in the Governments view] no discovery is appropriate.
Id
., at 192;
id.
, at 205 (same). Without endeavoring to correct any misunderstanding on the District Courts part, the Government underscored its resistance to any and all discovery.
Id.
, at 192194;
id.
, at 201 (asserting that respondents are not entitled to discovery to supplement [the administrative record]). And in its motion for a protective order, the Government similarly declared its unqualified opposition to discovery. See Memorandum in Support of Defendants Motion for a Protective Order and for Reconsideration, C. A. Nos. 011530 (EGS), 02631 (EGS), p. 21 (D. D. C., Sept. 3, 2002) ([Petitioners] respectfully request that the Court enter a protective order relieving them of
any obligation
to respond to [respondents] discovery [requests]. (emphasis added)); see 334 F. 3d, at 1106 (same).
6

The District Court, in short, ignored no concrete pleas to narrow discovery. But see
ante
, at 18. That court did, however, voice its concern about the Governments failure to heed the courts instructions:

I told the government, if you have precise constitutional objections, let me know what they are so I can determine whether or not this [discovery] plan is appropriate, and … you said, well, its unconstitutional, without elaborating. You said, because Plaintiffs proposed discovery plan has not been approved by the court, the Defendants are not submitting specific objections to Plaintiffs proposed request… . My rule was, if you have objections, let me know what the objections are, and you chose not to do so. App. 205.

B

Denied §1292(b) certification by the District Court, the Government sought a writ of mandamus from the Court of Appeals. See
id.
, at 339365. In its mandamus petition, the Government asked the appellate court to vacate the discovery orders issued by the district court, direct the court to decide the case on the basis of the administrative record and such supplemental affidavits as it may require, and direct that the Vice President be dismissed as a defendant.
Id.
, at 364365. In support of those requests, the Government again argued that the case should be adjudicated without discovery: The Constitution and principles of comity preclude discovery of the President or Vice President, especially without a demonstration of compelling and focused countervailing interest.
Id.
, at 360.

The Court of Appeals acknowledged that the discovery plan presented by respondents and approved by the District Court goes well beyond what [respondents] need. 334 F. 3d, at 1106. The appellate court nevertheless denied the mandamus petition, concluding that the Governments separation-of-powers concern remain[ed] hypothetical.
Id.
, at 1105. Far from ordering immediate disclosure of communications between senior executive branch officials and those with information relevant to advice that was being formulated for the President, the Court of Appeals observed, the District Court had directed the Government initially to produce only non-privileged documents and a privilege log.
Id.
, at 1104 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); see App. to Pet. for Cert. 47a.
7

The Court of Appeals stressed that the District Court could accommodate separation-of-powers concerns short of denying all discovery or compelling the invocation of executive privilege. See 334 F. 3d, at 11051106. Principally, the Court of Appeals stated, discovery could be narrowed, should the Government so move, to encompass only whether non-federal officials participated [in NEPDG], and if so, to what extent.
Id.
, at 1106. The Government could identify relevant materials produced in other litigation, thus avoiding undue reproduction.
Id.
, at 1105; see App. to Pet. for Cert. 51a;
supra
, at 3. If, after appropriate narrowing, the discovery allowed still impels the Vice President … to claim privilege, the District Court could entertain [those] privilege claims and review allegedly privileged documents in camera. 334 F. 3d, at 1107. Mindful of the judiciarys responsibility to police the separation of powers in litigation involving the executive, the Court of Appeals expressed confidence that the District Court would respond to petitioners concern and narrow discovery to ensure that [respondents] obtain no more than they need to prove their case.
Id.
, at 1106.

Throughout this litigation, the Government has declined to move for reduction of the District Courts discovery order to accommodate separation-of-powers concerns. See
supra
, at 37. The Court now remands this case so the Court of Appeals can consider whether a mandamus writ should issue ordering the District Court to explore other avenues, short of forcing the Executive to invoke privilege, and, in particular, to narrow, on its own, the scope of [discovery].
Ante
, at 1920. Nothing in the District Courts orders or the Court of Appeals opinion, however, suggests that either of those courts would refuse reasonably to accommodate separation-of-powers concerns. See
supra
, at 3, 78. When parties seeking a mandamus writ decline to avail themselves of opportunities to obtain relief from the District Court, a writ of mandamus ordering the same relief
i.e.
, here, reined-in discoveryis surely a doubtful proposition.

The District Court, moreover, did not err in failing to narrow discovery on its own initiative. Although the Court cites
United States
v.
Poindexter
, 727 F. Supp. 1501 (DC 1989), as sound precedent for district-court narrowing of discovery, see
ante
, at 1920, the target of the subpoena in that case, former President Reagan, unlike petitioners in this case, affirmatively requested such narrowing, 727 F. Supp., at 1503. A district court is not subject to criticism if it awaits a partys motion before tightening the scope of discovery; certainly, that court makes no clear and indisputable error in adhering to the principle of party initiation,
Kerr
, 426 U. S., at 403 (internal quotation marks omitted).
8

* * *

Review by mandamus at this stage of the proceedings would be at least comprehensible as a means to test the Governments position that
no
discovery is appropriate in this litigation. See Brief for Petitioners 45 ([P]etitioners separation-of-powers arguments are … in the nature of a claim of immunity from discovery.). But in remanding for consideration of discovery-tailoring measures, the Court apparently rejects that no-discovery position. Otherwise, a remand based on the overbreadth of the discovery requests would make no sense. Nothing in the record, however, intimates lower-court refusal to reduce discovery. Indeed, the appeals court has already suggested tailored discovery that would avoid effectively prejudg[ing] the merits of respondents claim,
ante
, at 2 (
Stevens, J.
, concurring). See 334 F. 3d, at 1106 (respondents need only documents referring to the involvement of non-federal officials). See also
ante
, at 2, n. (
Stevens, J.
, concurring) (A few interrogatories or depositions might have determined … whether any non-Government employees voted on NEPDG recommendations or drafted portions of the committees report). In accord with the Court of Appeals, I am confident that [were it moved to do so] the district court here [would] protect petitioners legitimate interests and keep discovery within appropriate limits. 334 F. 3d, at 1107.
9
I would therefore affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals.

Notes

1
The Court of Appeals also concluded, altogether correctly in my view, that it lacked ordinary appellate jurisdiction over the Vice Presidents appeal. See 334 F. 3d, at 1109; cf. ante, at 78 (leaving appellate-jurisdiction question undecided). In its order addressing the petitioners motions to dismiss, the District Court stated it would be premature and inappropriate to determine whether any relief could be obtained from the Vice President. Judicial Watch, Inc. v. National Energy Policy Dev. Group, 219 F. Supp. 2d 20, 44 (DC 2002). Immediate review of an interlocutory ruling, allowed in rare cases under the collateral-order doctrine, is inappropriate when an order is, as in this case, inherently tentative and not the final word on the subject. Gulfstream Aerospace Corp. v. Mayacamas Corp.,
485 U. S. 271,
277 (1988)
(internal quotation marks omitted).

2
Government agencies had produced some relevant documents in related Freedom of Information Act litigation. See 219 F. Supp. 2d, at 27.

3
Section 1292(b) of Title 28 allows a court of appeals, in its discretion, to entertain an appeal from an interlocutory order [w]hen a district judge … shall be of the opinion that such order involves a controlling question of law as to which there is substantial ground for difference of opinion and that an immediate appeal from the order may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation.

4
On limiting discovery to the issue of membership, the Court of Appeals indicated its agreement. See 334 F. 3d, at 1106 ([Respondents] have no need for the names of all persons who participated in [NEPDG]s activities, nor a description of each persons role in the activities of [NEPDG]. They must discover only whether non-federal officials participated, and if so, to what extent. (internal quotation marks, ellipsis, and brackets omitted)).

5
According to the Government, 24 boxes of documents [are] potentially responsive to [respondents] discovery requests… . The documents identified as likely to be responsive from those boxes … are contained in approximately twelve boxes. App. 282283. Each box requires one or two attorney days to review and prepare a rough privilege log. Following that review, privilege logs must be finalized. Further, once the responsive emails are identified, printed, and numbered, [petitioners] expect that the privilege review and logging process [will] be equally, if not more, time-consuming, due to the expected quantity of individual emails. Id., at 284.

7
The Court suggests that the appeals court labored under the mistaken assumption that the assertion of executive privilege is a necessary precondition to the Governments separation-of-powers objections. Ante, at 20. The Court of Appeals, however, described the constitutional concern as hypothetical, not merely because no executive privilege had been asserted, but also in light of measures the District Court could take to narrow and carefully focu[s] discovery. See 334 F. 3d, at 1105, 1107.

8
The Court also questions the District Courts invocation of the federal mandamus statute,
28 U. S. C. §1361, which provides that [t]he district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any action in the nature of mandamus to compel an officer or employee of the United States or any agency thereof to perform a duty owed to the plaintiff. See ante, at 20; 219 F. Supp. 2d, at 4144. See also Chandler v. Judicial Council of Tenth Circuit,
398 U. S. 74, and n. 8 (1970) (holding mandamus under the All Writs Act,
28 U. S. C. §1651, improper, but expressing no opinion on relief under the federal mandamus statute, §1361). On the question whether §1361 allows enforcement of the FACA against the Vice President, the District Court concluded it would be premature and inappropriate to determine whether the relief of mandamus will or will not issue. 219 F. Supp. 2d, at 44. The Government, moreover, contested the propriety of §1361 relief only in passing in its petition to the appeals court for §1651 mandamus relief. See App. 363364 (Government asserted in its mandamus petition: The more general writ of mandamus cannot be used to circumvent … limits on the provision directly providing for review of administrative action.). A question not decided by the District Court, and barely raised in a petition for mandamus, hardly qualifies as grounds for drastic and extraordinary mandamus relief, Ex parte Fahey,
332 U. S. 258,
259260 (1947)
.
Justice Thomas urges that respondents cannot obtain §1361 relief if wide-ranging discovery [is needed] to prove that they have any right to relief. Ante, at 3 (opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part) (emphasis in original). First, as the Court of Appeals recognized, see supra, at 89; infra, at 11, should the Government so move, the District Court could contain discovery so that it would not be wide-ranging. Second, all agree that an applicant seeking a §1361 mandamus writ must show that the [federal] defendant owes him a clear, nondiscretionary duty. Heckler v. Ringer,
466 U. S. 602,
616 (1984)
(emphasis added). No §1361 writ may issue, in other words, when federal law grants discretion to the federal officer, rather than imposing a duty on him. When federal law imposes an obligation, however, suit under §1361 is not precluded simply because facts must be developed to ascertain whether a federal command has been dishonored. Congress enacted §1361 to mak[e] it more convenient for aggrieved persons to file actions in the nature of mandamus, Stafford v. Briggs,
444 U. S. 527,
535 (1980)
, not to address the rare instance in which a federal defendant, upon whom the law unequivocally places an obligation, concedes his failure to measure up to that obligation.

9
While I agree with the Court that an interlocutory appeal may become appropriate at some later juncture in this litigation, see ante, at 21, I note that the decision whether to allow such an appeal lies in the first instance in the District Courts sound discretion, see
28 U. S. C. §1292(b); supra, at 4, n. 3.

RICHARD B. CHENEY, VICE PRESIDENT OF THE
UNITED STATES,
et al.,
PETITIONERS
v.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR
THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA et al.

on writ of certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the district of columbia circuit

[June 24, 2004]

Justice Ginsburg
, with whom
Justice Souter
joins, dissenting.

The Government, in seeking a writ of mandamus from the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, and on brief to this Court, urged that this case should be resolved without
any
discovery. See App. 183184, 339; Brief for Petitioners 45; Reply Brief 18. In vacating the judgment of the Court of Appeals, however, this Court remands for consideration whether mandamus is appropriate due to the
overbreadth
of the District Courts discovery orders. See
ante
, at 1, 1620. But, as the Court of Appeals observed, it appeared that the Government never asked the district court to
narrow
discovery.
In re Cheney
, 334 F. 3d 1096, 1106 (CADC 2003) (emphasis in original). Given the Governments decision to resist all discovery, mandamus relief based on the exorbitance of the discovery orders is at least premature,
id.
, at 1104. I would therefore affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals denying the writ,
1
and allow the District Court, in the first instance, to pursue its expressed intention tightly [to] rei[n] [in] discovery,
Judicial Watch, Inc.
v.
National Energy Policy Dev. Group
, 219 F. Supp. 2d 20, 54 (DC 2002), should the Government so request.

I

A

The discovery at issue here was sought in a civil action filed by respondents Judicial Watch, Inc., and Sierra Club. To gain information concerning the membership and operations of an energy-policy task force, the National Energy Policy Development Group (NEPDG), respondents filed suit under the Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA), 5 U. S. C. App. §1
et seq.;
respondents named among the defendants
the Vice President and senior Executive Branch officials. See App. 1640, 139154;
ante
, at 13. After granting in part and denying in part the Governments motions to dismiss, see 219 F. Supp. 2d 20, the District Court approved respondents extensive discovery plan, which included detailed and far-ranging interrogatories and sweeping requests for production of documents, see App. to Pet. for Cert. 51a; App. 215230. In a later order, the District Court directed the Government to produce non-privileged documents and a privilege log. App. to Pet. for Cert. 47a.

The discovery plan drawn by Judicial Watch and Sierra Club was indeed unbounded in scope.
Ante
, at 17; accord 334 F. 3d, at 1106. Initial approval of that plan by the District Court, however, was not given in stunning disregard of separation-of-powers concerns. Cf.
ante
, at 1620. In the order itself, the District Court invited detailed and precise object[ions] to any of the discovery requests, and instructed the Government to identify and explain … invocations of privilege with particularity. App. to Pet. for Cert. 51a. To avoid duplication, the District Court provided that the Government could identify documents or information [responsive to the discovery requests] that [it] ha[d] already released to [Judicial Watch or the Sierra Club] in different fora.
Ibid.<footcall num="2">
Anticipating further proceedings concerning discovery, the District Court suggested that the Government could submit [any privileged documents] under seal for the courts consideration, or that the court [could] appoint the equivalent of a Special Master, maybe a retired judge, to review allegedly privileged documents. App. 247.

The Government did not file specific objections; nor did it supply particulars to support assertions of privilege. Instead, the Government urged the District Court to rule that Judicial Watch and the Sierra Club could have no discovery at all. See
id.
, at 192 (the governmen[t] position is that … no discovery is appropriate);
id.
, at 205 (same); 334 F. 3d, at 1106 (As far as we can tell, petitioners never asked the district court to
narrow
discovery to those matters [respondents] need to support their allegation that FACA applies to the NEPDG. (emphasis in original)). In the Governments view, the resolution of the case ha[d] to flow from the administrative record
sans
discovery. App. 192. Without taking up the District Courts suggestion of that courts readiness to rein in discovery, see 219 F. Supp. 2d, at 54, the Government, on behalf of the Vice President, moved, unsuccessfully, for a protective order and for certification of an interlocutory appeal pursuant to
28 U. S. C. §1292(b). See 334 F. 3d, at 1100; see App. to Pet. for Cert. 47a (District Court denial of protective order); 233 F. Supp. 2d 16 (DC 2002) (District Court denial of §1292(b) certification).
3
At the District Courts hearing on the Governments motion for a stay pending interlocutory appeal, the Government argued that the injury is submitting to discovery in the absence of a compelling showing of need by the [respondents]. App. 316; see 230 F. Supp. 2d 12 (DC 2002)
(District Court order denying stay).

Despite the absence from this flurry of activity,
ante
, at 8, of any Government motion contesting the terms of the discovery plan or proposing a scaled-down substitute plan, see 334 F. 3d, at 1106, this Court states that the Government did in fact object to the scope of discovery and asked the District Court to narrow it in some way,
ante
, at 18. In support of this statement, the Court points to the Governments objections to the proposed discovery plan, its response to the interrogatories and production requests, and its contention that discovery would be unduly burdensome. See
ante
, at 18; App. 166184, 201, 231234, 274.

True, the Government disputed the definition of the term meeting in respondents interrogatories, and stated, in passing, that discovery should be [both] limited to written interrogatories and limited in scope to the issue of membership.
Id.
, at 179, 181, 233.
4
But as the Court of Appeals noted, the Government mentioned excessive discovery in support of its plea to be shielded from any discovery. 334 F. 3d, at 1106. The Government argument that the burden of doing a document production is an unconstitutional burden, App. 274, was similarly anchored. The Government so urged at a District Court hearing in which its underlying position [was] that its not going to produce anything,
id.
, at 249.
5

The Governments bottom line was firmly and consistently that review, limited to the administrative record, should frame the resolution of this case.
Id.
, at 181; accord
id.
, at 179, 233. That administrative record would consist of the Presidential Memorandum establishing NEPDG, NEPDGs public report, and the Office of the Vice Presidents response to … Judicial Watchs request for permission to attend NEPDG meetings; it would not include anything respondents could gain through discovery.
Id.
, at 183. Indeed, the Government acknowledged before the District Court that its litigation strategy involved opposition to the discovery plan as a whole in lieu of focused objections. See
id.
, at 205 (Government stated: We did not choose to offer written objections to [the discovery plan] … .).

Further sounding the Governments leitmotif, in a hearing on the proposed discovery plan, the District Court stated that the Government didnt file objections to rein in discovery because [in the Governments view] no discovery is appropriate.
Id
., at 192;
id.
, at 205 (same). Without endeavoring to correct any misunderstanding on the District Courts part, the Government underscored its resistance to any and all discovery.
Id.
, at 192194;
id.
, at 201 (asserting that respondents are not entitled to discovery to supplement [the administrative record]). And in its motion for a protective order, the Government similarly declared its unqualified opposition to discovery. See Memorandum in Support of Defendants Motion for a Protective Order and for Reconsideration, C. A. Nos. 011530 (EGS), 02631 (EGS), p. 21 (D. D. C., Sept. 3, 2002) ([Petitioners] respectfully request that the Court enter a protective order relieving them of
any obligation
to respond to [respondents] discovery [requests]. (emphasis added)); see 334 F. 3d, at 1106 (same).
6

The District Court, in short, ignored no concrete pleas to narrow discovery. But see
ante
, at 18. That court did, however, voice its concern about the Governments failure to heed the courts instructions:

I told the government, if you have precise constitutional objections, let me know what they are so I can determine whether or not this [discovery] plan is appropriate, and … you said, well, its unconstitutional, without elaborating. You said, because Plaintiffs proposed discovery plan has not been approved by the court, the Defendants are not submitting specific objections to Plaintiffs proposed request… . My rule was, if you have objections, let me know what the objections are, and you chose not to do so. App. 205.

B

Denied §1292(b) certification by the District Court, the Government sought a writ of mandamus from the Court of Appeals. See
id.
, at 339365. In its mandamus petition, the Government asked the appellate court to vacate the discovery orders issued by the district court, direct the court to decide the case on the basis of the administrative record and such supplemental affidavits as it may require, and direct that the Vice President be dismissed as a defendant.
Id.
, at 364365. In support of those requests, the Government again argued that the case should be adjudicated without discovery: The Constitution and principles of comity preclude discovery of the President or Vice President, especially without a demonstration of compelling and focused countervailing interest.
Id.
, at 360.

The Court of Appeals acknowledged that the discovery plan presented by respondents and approved by the District Court goes well beyond what [respondents] need. 334 F. 3d, at 1106. The appellate court nevertheless denied the mandamus petition, concluding that the Governments separation-of-powers concern remain[ed] hypothetical.
Id.
, at 1105. Far from ordering immediate disclosure of communications between senior executive branch officials and those with information relevant to advice that was being formulated for the President, the Court of Appeals observed, the District Court had directed the Government initially to produce only non-privileged documents and a privilege log.
Id.
, at 1104 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); see App. to Pet. for Cert. 47a.
7

The Court of Appeals stressed that the District Court could accommodate separation-of-powers concerns short of denying all discovery or compelling the invocation of executive privilege. See 334 F. 3d, at 11051106. Principally, the Court of Appeals stated, discovery could be narrowed, should the Government so move, to encompass only whether non-federal officials participated [in NEPDG], and if so, to what extent.
Id.
, at 1106. The Government could identify relevant materials produced in other litigation, thus avoiding undue reproduction.
Id.
, at 1105; see App. to Pet. for Cert. 51a;
supra
, at 3. If, after appropriate narrowing, the discovery allowed still impels the Vice President … to claim privilege, the District Court could entertain [those] privilege claims and review allegedly privileged documents in camera. 334 F. 3d, at 1107. Mindful of the judiciarys responsibility to police the separation of powers in litigation involving the executive, the Court of Appeals expressed confidence that the District Court would respond to petitioners concern and narrow discovery to ensure that [respondents] obtain no more than they need to prove their case.
Id.
, at 1106.

Throughout this litigation, the Government has declined to move for reduction of the District Courts discovery order to accommodate separation-of-powers concerns. See
supra
, at 37. The Court now remands this case so the Court of Appeals can consider whether a mandamus writ should issue ordering the District Court to explore other avenues, short of forcing the Executive to invoke privilege, and, in particular, to narrow, on its own, the scope of [discovery].
Ante
, at 1920. Nothing in the District Courts orders or the Court of Appeals opinion, however, suggests that either of those courts would refuse reasonably to accommodate separation-of-powers concerns. See
supra
, at 3, 78. When parties seeking a mandamus writ decline to avail themselves of opportunities to obtain relief from the District Court, a writ of mandamus ordering the same relief
i.e.
, here, reined-in discoveryis surely a doubtful proposition.

The District Court, moreover, did not err in failing to narrow discovery on its own initiative. Although the Court cites
United States
v.
Poindexter
, 727 F. Supp. 1501 (DC 1989), as sound precedent for district-court narrowing of discovery, see
ante
, at 1920, the target of the subpoena in that case, former President Reagan, unlike petitioners in this case, affirmatively requested such narrowing, 727 F. Supp., at 1503. A district court is not subject to criticism if it awaits a partys motion before tightening the scope of discovery; certainly, that court makes no clear and indisputable error in adhering to the principle of party initiation,
Kerr
, 426 U. S., at 403 (internal quotation marks omitted).
8

* * *

Review by mandamus at this stage of the proceedings would be at least comprehensible as a means to test the Governments position that
no
discovery is appropriate in this litigation. See Brief for Petitioners 45 ([P]etitioners separation-of-powers arguments are … in the nature of a claim of immunity from discovery.). But in remanding for consideration of discovery-tailoring measures, the Court apparently rejects that no-discovery position. Otherwise, a remand based on the overbreadth of the discovery requests would make no sense. Nothing in the record, however, intimates lower-court refusal to reduce discovery. Indeed, the appeals court has already suggested tailored discovery that would avoid effectively prejudg[ing] the merits of respondents claim,
ante
, at 2 (
Stevens, J.
, concurring). See 334 F. 3d, at 1106 (respondents need only documents referring to the involvement of non-federal officials). See also
ante
, at 2, n. (
Stevens, J.
, concurring) (A few interrogatories or depositions might have determined … whether any non-Government employees voted on NEPDG recommendations or drafted portions of the committees report). In accord with the Court of Appeals, I am confident that [were it moved to do so] the district court here [would] protect petitioners legitimate interests and keep discovery within appropriate limits. 334 F. 3d, at 1107.
9
I would therefore affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals.

Notes

1
The Court of Appeals also concluded, altogether correctly in my view, that it lacked ordinary appellate jurisdiction over the Vice Presidents appeal. See 334 F. 3d, at 1109; cf. ante, at 78 (leaving appellate-jurisdiction question undecided). In its order addressing the petitioners motions to dismiss, the District Court stated it would be premature and inappropriate to determine whether any relief could be obtained from the Vice President. Judicial Watch, Inc. v. National Energy Policy Dev. Group, 219 F. Supp. 2d 20, 44 (DC 2002). Immediate review of an interlocutory ruling, allowed in rare cases under the collateral-order doctrine, is inappropriate when an order is, as in this case, inherently tentative and not the final word on the subject. Gulfstream Aerospace Corp. v. Mayacamas Corp.,
485 U. S. 271,
277 (1988)
(internal quotation marks omitted).

2
Government agencies had produced some relevant documents in related Freedom of Information Act litigation. See 219 F. Supp. 2d, at 27.

3
Section 1292(b) of Title 28 allows a court of appeals, in its discretion, to entertain an appeal from an interlocutory order [w]hen a district judge … shall be of the opinion that such order involves a controlling question of law as to which there is substantial ground for difference of opinion and that an immediate appeal from the order may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation.

4
On limiting discovery to the issue of membership, the Court of Appeals indicated its agreement. See 334 F. 3d, at 1106 ([Respondents] have no need for the names of all persons who participated in [NEPDG]s activities, nor a description of each persons role in the activities of [NEPDG]. They must discover only whether non-federal officials participated, and if so, to what extent. (internal quotation marks, ellipsis, and brackets omitted)).

5
According to the Government, 24 boxes of documents [are] potentially responsive to [respondents] discovery requests… . The documents identified as likely to be responsive from those boxes … are contained in approximately twelve boxes. App. 282283. Each box requires one or two attorney days to review and prepare a rough privilege log. Following that review, privilege logs must be finalized. Further, once the responsive emails are identified, printed, and numbered, [petitioners] expect that the privilege review and logging process [will] be equally, if not more, time-consuming, due to the expected quantity of individual emails. Id., at 284.

7
The Court suggests that the appeals court labored under the mistaken assumption that the assertion of executive privilege is a necessary precondition to the Governments separation-of-powers objections. Ante, at 20. The Court of Appeals, however, described the constitutional concern as hypothetical, not merely because no executive privilege had been asserted, but also in light of measures the District Court could take to narrow and carefully focu[s] discovery. See 334 F. 3d, at 1105, 1107.

8
The Court also questions the District Courts invocation of the federal mandamus statute,
28 U. S. C. §1361, which provides that [t]he district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any action in the nature of mandamus to compel an officer or employee of the United States or any agency thereof to perform a duty owed to the plaintiff. See ante, at 20; 219 F. Supp. 2d, at 4144. See also Chandler v. Judicial Council of Tenth Circuit,
398 U. S. 74, and n. 8 (1970) (holding mandamus under the All Writs Act,
28 U. S. C. §1651, improper, but expressing no opinion on relief under the federal mandamus statute, §1361). On the question whether §1361 allows enforcement of the FACA against the Vice President, the District Court concluded it would be premature and inappropriate to determine whether the relief of mandamus will or will not issue. 219 F. Supp. 2d, at 44. The Government, moreover, contested the propriety of §1361 relief only in passing in its petition to the appeals court for §1651 mandamus relief. See App. 363364 (Government asserted in its mandamus petition: The more general writ of mandamus cannot be used to circumvent … limits on the provision directly providing for review of administrative action.). A question not decided by the District Court, and barely raised in a petition for mandamus, hardly qualifies as grounds for drastic and extraordinary mandamus relief, Ex parte Fahey,
332 U. S. 258,
259260 (1947)
.
Justice Thomas urges that respondents cannot obtain §1361 relief if wide-ranging discovery [is needed] to prove that they have any right to relief. Ante, at 3 (opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part) (emphasis in original). First, as the Court of Appeals recognized, see supra, at 89; infra, at 11, should the Government so move, the District Court could contain discovery so that it would not be wide-ranging. Second, all agree that an applicant seeking a §1361 mandamus writ must show that the [federal] defendant owes him a clear, nondiscretionary duty. Heckler v. Ringer,
466 U. S. 602,
616 (1984)
(emphasis added). No §1361 writ may issue, in other words, when federal law grants discretion to the federal officer, rather than imposing a duty on him. When federal law imposes an obligation, however, suit under §1361 is not precluded simply because facts must be developed to ascertain whether a federal command has been dishonored. Congress enacted §1361 to mak[e] it more convenient for aggrieved persons to file actions in the nature of mandamus, Stafford v. Briggs,
444 U. S. 527,
535 (1980)
, not to address the rare instance in which a federal defendant, upon whom the law unequivocally places an obligation, concedes his failure to measure up to that obligation.

9
While I agree with the Court that an interlocutory appeal may become appropriate at some later juncture in this litigation, see ante, at 21, I note that the decision whether to allow such an appeal lies in the first instance in the District Courts sound discretion, see
28 U. S. C. §1292(b); supra, at 4, n. 3.

RICHARD B. CHENEY, VICE PRESIDENT OF THE
UNITED STATES,
et al.,
PETITIONERS
v.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR
THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA et al.

on writ of certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the district of columbia circuit

[June 24, 2004]

Justice Ginsburg
, with whom
Justice Souter
joins, dissenting.

The Government, in seeking a writ of mandamus from the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, and on brief to this Court, urged that this case should be resolved without
any
discovery. See App. 183184, 339; Brief for Petitioners 45; Reply Brief 18. In vacating the judgment of the Court of Appeals, however, this Court remands for consideration whether mandamus is appropriate due to the
overbreadth
of the District Courts discovery orders. See
ante
, at 1, 1620. But, as the Court of Appeals observed, it appeared that the Government never asked the district court to
narrow
discovery.
In re Cheney
, 334 F. 3d 1096, 1106 (CADC 2003) (emphasis in original). Given the Governments decision to resist all discovery, mandamus relief based on the exorbitance of the discovery orders is at least premature,
id.
, at 1104. I would therefore affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals denying the writ,
1
and allow the District Court, in the first instance, to pursue its expressed intention tightly [to] rei[n] [in] discovery,
Judicial Watch, Inc.
v.
National Energy Policy Dev. Group
, 219 F. Supp. 2d 20, 54 (DC 2002), should the Government so request.

I

A

The discovery at issue here was sought in a civil action filed by respondents Judicial Watch, Inc., and Sierra Club. To gain information concerning the membership and operations of an energy-policy task force, the National Energy Policy Development Group (NEPDG), respondents filed suit under the Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA), 5 U. S. C. App. §1
et seq.;
respondents named among the defendants
the Vice President and senior Executive Branch officials. See App. 1640, 139154;
ante
, at 13. After granting in part and denying in part the Governments motions to dismiss, see 219 F. Supp. 2d 20, the District Court approved respondents extensive discovery plan, which included detailed and far-ranging interrogatories and sweeping requests for production of documents, see App. to Pet. for Cert. 51a; App. 215230. In a later order, the District Court directed the Government to produce non-privileged documents and a privilege log. App. to Pet. for Cert. 47a.

The discovery plan drawn by Judicial Watch and Sierra Club was indeed unbounded in scope.
Ante
, at 17; accord 334 F. 3d, at 1106. Initial approval of that plan by the District Court, however, was not given in stunning disregard of separation-of-powers concerns. Cf.
ante
, at 1620. In the order itself, the District Court invited detailed and precise object[ions] to any of the discovery requests, and instructed the Government to identify and explain … invocations of privilege with particularity. App. to Pet. for Cert. 51a. To avoid duplication, the District Court provided that the Government could identify documents or information [responsive to the discovery requests] that [it] ha[d] already released to [Judicial Watch or the Sierra Club] in different fora.
Ibid.<footcall num="2">
Anticipating further proceedings concerning discovery, the District Court suggested that the Government could submit [any privileged documents] under seal for the courts consideration, or that the court [could] appoint the equivalent of a Special Master, maybe a retired judge, to review allegedly privileged documents. App. 247.

The Government did not file specific objections; nor did it supply particulars to support assertions of privilege. Instead, the Government urged the District Court to rule that Judicial Watch and the Sierra Club could have no discovery at all. See
id.
, at 192 (the governmen[t] position is that … no discovery is appropriate);
id.
, at 205 (same); 334 F. 3d, at 1106 (As far as we can tell, petitioners never asked the district court to
narrow
discovery to those matters [respondents] need to support their allegation that FACA applies to the NEPDG. (emphasis in original)). In the Governments view, the resolution of the case ha[d] to flow from the administrative record
sans
discovery. App. 192. Without taking up the District Courts suggestion of that courts readiness to rein in discovery, see 219 F. Supp. 2d, at 54, the Government, on behalf of the Vice President, moved, unsuccessfully, for a protective order and for certification of an interlocutory appeal pursuant to
28 U. S. C. §1292(b). See 334 F. 3d, at 1100; see App. to Pet. for Cert. 47a (District Court denial of protective order); 233 F. Supp. 2d 16 (DC 2002) (District Court denial of §1292(b) certification).
3
At the District Courts hearing on the Governments motion for a stay pending interlocutory appeal, the Government argued that the injury is submitting to discovery in the absence of a compelling showing of need by the [respondents]. App. 316; see 230 F. Supp. 2d 12 (DC 2002)
(District Court order denying stay).

Despite the absence from this flurry of activity,
ante
, at 8, of any Government motion contesting the terms of the discovery plan or proposing a scaled-down substitute plan, see 334 F. 3d, at 1106, this Court states that the Government did in fact object to the scope of discovery and asked the District Court to narrow it in some way,
ante
, at 18. In support of this statement, the Court points to the Governments objections to the proposed discovery plan, its response to the interrogatories and production requests, and its contention that discovery would be unduly burdensome. See
ante
, at 18; App. 166184, 201, 231234, 274.

True, the Government disputed the definition of the term meeting in respondents interrogatories, and stated, in passing, that discovery should be [both] limited to written interrogatories and limited in scope to the issue of membership.
Id.
, at 179, 181, 233.
4
But as the Court of Appeals noted, the Government mentioned excessive discovery in support of its plea to be shielded from any discovery. 334 F. 3d, at 1106. The Government argument that the burden of doing a document production is an unconstitutional burden, App. 274, was similarly anchored. The Government so urged at a District Court hearing in which its underlying position [was] that its not going to produce anything,
id.
, at 249.
5

The Governments bottom line was firmly and consistently that review, limited to the administrative record, should frame the resolution of this case.
Id.
, at 181; accord
id.
, at 179, 233. That administrative record would consist of the Presidential Memorandum establishing NEPDG, NEPDGs public report, and the Office of the Vice Presidents response to … Judicial Watchs request for permission to attend NEPDG meetings; it would not include anything respondents could gain through discovery.
Id.
, at 183. Indeed, the Government acknowledged before the District Court that its litigation strategy involved opposition to the discovery plan as a whole in lieu of focused objections. See
id.
, at 205 (Government stated: We did not choose to offer written objections to [the discovery plan] … .).

Further sounding the Governments leitmotif, in a hearing on the proposed discovery plan, the District Court stated that the Government didnt file objections to rein in discovery because [in the Governments view] no discovery is appropriate.
Id
., at 192;
id.
, at 205 (same). Without endeavoring to correct any misunderstanding on the District Courts part, the Government underscored its resistance to any and all discovery.
Id.
, at 192194;
id.
, at 201 (asserting that respondents are not entitled to discovery to supplement [the administrative record]). And in its motion for a protective order, the Government similarly declared its unqualified opposition to discovery. See Memorandum in Support of Defendants Motion for a Protective Order and for Reconsideration, C. A. Nos. 011530 (EGS), 02631 (EGS), p. 21 (D. D. C., Sept. 3, 2002) ([Petitioners] respectfully request that the Court enter a protective order relieving them of
any obligation
to respond to [respondents] discovery [requests]. (emphasis added)); see 334 F. 3d, at 1106 (same).
6

The District Court, in short, ignored no concrete pleas to narrow discovery. But see
ante
, at 18. That court did, however, voice its concern about the Governments failure to heed the courts instructions:

I told the government, if you have precise constitutional objections, let me know what they are so I can determine whether or not this [discovery] plan is appropriate, and … you said, well, its unconstitutional, without elaborating. You said, because Plaintiffs proposed discovery plan has not been approved by the court, the Defendants are not submitting specific objections to Plaintiffs proposed request… . My rule was, if you have objections, let me know what the objections are, and you chose not to do so. App. 205.

B

Denied §1292(b) certification by the District Court, the Government sought a writ of mandamus from the Court of Appeals. See
id.
, at 339365. In its mandamus petition, the Government asked the appellate court to vacate the discovery orders issued by the district court, direct the court to decide the case on the basis of the administrative record and such supplemental affidavits as it may require, and direct that the Vice President be dismissed as a defendant.
Id.
, at 364365. In support of those requests, the Government again argued that the case should be adjudicated without discovery: The Constitution and principles of comity preclude discovery of the President or Vice President, especially without a demonstration of compelling and focused countervailing interest.
Id.
, at 360.

The Court of Appeals acknowledged that the discovery plan presented by respondents and approved by the District Court goes well beyond what [respondents] need. 334 F. 3d, at 1106. The appellate court nevertheless denied the mandamus petition, concluding that the Governments separation-of-powers concern remain[ed] hypothetical.
Id.
, at 1105. Far from ordering immediate disclosure of communications between senior executive branch officials and those with information relevant to advice that was being formulated for the President, the Court of Appeals observed, the District Court had directed the Government initially to produce only non-privileged documents and a privilege log.
Id.
, at 1104 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); see App. to Pet. for Cert. 47a.
7

The Court of Appeals stressed that the District Court could accommodate separation-of-powers concerns short of denying all discovery or compelling the invocation of executive privilege. See 334 F. 3d, at 11051106. Principally, the Court of Appeals stated, discovery could be narrowed, should the Government so move, to encompass only whether non-federal officials participated [in NEPDG], and if so, to what extent.
Id.
, at 1106. The Government could identify relevant materials produced in other litigation, thus avoiding undue reproduction.
Id.
, at 1105; see App. to Pet. for Cert. 51a;
supra
, at 3. If, after appropriate narrowing, the discovery allowed still impels the Vice President … to claim privilege, the District Court could entertain [those] privilege claims and review allegedly privileged documents in camera. 334 F. 3d, at 1107. Mindful of the judiciarys responsibility to police the separation of powers in litigation involving the executive, the Court of Appeals expressed confidence that the District Court would respond to petitioners concern and narrow discovery to ensure that [respondents] obtain no more than they need to prove their case.
Id.
, at 1106.

Throughout this litigation, the Government has declined to move for reduction of the District Courts discovery order to accommodate separation-of-powers concerns. See
supra
, at 37. The Court now remands this case so the Court of Appeals can consider whether a mandamus writ should issue ordering the District Court to explore other avenues, short of forcing the Executive to invoke privilege, and, in particular, to narrow, on its own, the scope of [discovery].
Ante
, at 1920. Nothing in the District Courts orders or the Court of Appeals opinion, however, suggests that either of those courts would refuse reasonably to accommodate separation-of-powers concerns. See
supra
, at 3, 78. When parties seeking a mandamus writ decline to avail themselves of opportunities to obtain relief from the District Court, a writ of mandamus ordering the same relief
i.e.
, here, reined-in discoveryis surely a doubtful proposition.

The District Court, moreover, did not err in failing to narrow discovery on its own initiative. Although the Court cites
United States
v.
Poindexter
, 727 F. Supp. 1501 (DC 1989), as sound precedent for district-court narrowing of discovery, see
ante
, at 1920, the target of the subpoena in that case, former President Reagan, unlike petitioners in this case, affirmatively requested such narrowing, 727 F. Supp., at 1503. A district court is not subject to criticism if it awaits a partys motion before tightening the scope of discovery; certainly, that court makes no clear and indisputable error in adhering to the principle of party initiation,
Kerr
, 426 U. S., at 403 (internal quotation marks omitted).
8

* * *

Review by mandamus at this stage of the proceedings would be at least comprehensible as a means to test the Governments position that
no
discovery is appropriate in this litigation. See Brief for Petitioners 45 ([P]etitioners separation-of-powers arguments are … in the nature of a claim of immunity from discovery.). But in remanding for consideration of discovery-tailoring measures, the Court apparently rejects that no-discovery position. Otherwise, a remand based on the overbreadth of the discovery requests would make no sense. Nothing in the record, however, intimates lower-court refusal to reduce discovery. Indeed, the appeals court has already suggested tailored discovery that would avoid effectively prejudg[ing] the merits of respondents claim,
ante
, at 2 (
Stevens, J.
, concurring). See 334 F. 3d, at 1106 (respondents need only documents referring to the involvement of non-federal officials). See also
ante
, at 2, n. (
Stevens, J.
, concurring) (A few interrogatories or depositions might have determined … whether any non-Government employees voted on NEPDG recommendations or drafted portions of the committees report). In accord with the Court of Appeals, I am confident that [were it moved to do so] the district court here [would] protect petitioners legitimate interests and keep discovery within appropriate limits. 334 F. 3d, at 1107.
9
I would therefore affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals.

Notes

1
The Court of Appeals also concluded, altogether correctly in my view, that it lacked ordinary appellate jurisdiction over the Vice Presidents appeal. See 334 F. 3d, at 1109; cf. ante, at 78 (leaving appellate-jurisdiction question undecided). In its order addressing the petitioners motions to dismiss, the District Court stated it would be premature and inappropriate to determine whether any relief could be obtained from the Vice President. Judicial Watch, Inc. v. National Energy Policy Dev. Group, 219 F. Supp. 2d 20, 44 (DC 2002). Immediate review of an interlocutory ruling, allowed in rare cases under the collateral-order doctrine, is inappropriate when an order is, as in this case, inherently tentative and not the final word on the subject. Gulfstream Aerospace Corp. v. Mayacamas Corp.,
485 U. S. 271,
277 (1988)
(internal quotation marks omitted).

2
Government agencies had produced some relevant documents in related Freedom of Information Act litigation. See 219 F. Supp. 2d, at 27.

3
Section 1292(b) of Title 28 allows a court of appeals, in its discretion, to entertain an appeal from an interlocutory order [w]hen a district judge … shall be of the opinion that such order involves a controlling question of law as to which there is substantial ground for difference of opinion and that an immediate appeal from the order may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation.

4
On limiting discovery to the issue of membership, the Court of Appeals indicated its agreement. See 334 F. 3d, at 1106 ([Respondents] have no need for the names of all persons who participated in [NEPDG]s activities, nor a description of each persons role in the activities of [NEPDG]. They must discover only whether non-federal officials participated, and if so, to what extent. (internal quotation marks, ellipsis, and brackets omitted)).

5
According to the Government, 24 boxes of documents [are] potentially responsive to [respondents] discovery requests… . The documents identified as likely to be responsive from those boxes … are contained in approximately twelve boxes. App. 282283. Each box requires one or two attorney days to review and prepare a rough privilege log. Following that review, privilege logs must be finalized. Further, once the responsive emails are identified, printed, and numbered, [petitioners] expect that the privilege review and logging process [will] be equally, if not more, time-consuming, due to the expected quantity of individual emails. Id., at 284.

7
The Court suggests that the appeals court labored under the mistaken assumption that the assertion of executive privilege is a necessary precondition to the Governments separation-of-powers objections. Ante, at 20. The Court of Appeals, however, described the constitutional concern as hypothetical, not merely because no executive privilege had been asserted, but also in light of measures the District Court could take to narrow and carefully focu[s] discovery. See 334 F. 3d, at 1105, 1107.

8
The Court also questions the District Courts invocation of the federal mandamus statute,
28 U. S. C. §1361, which provides that [t]he district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any action in the nature of mandamus to compel an officer or employee of the United States or any agency thereof to perform a duty owed to the plaintiff. See ante, at 20; 219 F. Supp. 2d, at 4144. See also Chandler v. Judicial Council of Tenth Circuit,
398 U. S. 74, and n. 8 (1970) (holding mandamus under the All Writs Act,
28 U. S. C. §1651, improper, but expressing no opinion on relief under the federal mandamus statute, §1361). On the question whether §1361 allows enforcement of the FACA against the Vice President, the District Court concluded it would be premature and inappropriate to determine whether the relief of mandamus will or will not issue. 219 F. Supp. 2d, at 44. The Government, moreover, contested the propriety of §1361 relief only in passing in its petition to the appeals court for §1651 mandamus relief. See App. 363364 (Government asserted in its mandamus petition: The more general writ of mandamus cannot be used to circumvent … limits on the provision directly providing for review of administrative action.). A question not decided by the District Court, and barely raised in a petition for mandamus, hardly qualifies as grounds for drastic and extraordinary mandamus relief, Ex parte Fahey,
332 U. S. 258,
259260 (1947)
.
Justice Thomas urges that respondents cannot obtain §1361 relief if wide-ranging discovery [is needed] to prove that they have any right to relief. Ante, at 3 (opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part) (emphasis in original). First, as the Court of Appeals recognized, see supra, at 89; infra, at 11, should the Government so move, the District Court could contain discovery so that it would not be wide-ranging. Second, all agree that an applicant seeking a §1361 mandamus writ must show that the [federal] defendant owes him a clear, nondiscretionary duty. Heckler v. Ringer,
466 U. S. 602,
616 (1984)
(emphasis added). No §1361 writ may issue, in other words, when federal law grants discretion to the federal officer, rather than imposing a duty on him. When federal law imposes an obligation, however, suit under §1361 is not precluded simply because facts must be developed to ascertain whether a federal command has been dishonored. Congress enacted §1361 to mak[e] it more convenient for aggrieved persons to file actions in the nature of mandamus, Stafford v. Briggs,
444 U. S. 527,
535 (1980)
, not to address the rare instance in which a federal defendant, upon whom the law unequivocally places an obligation, concedes his failure to measure up to that obligation.

9
While I agree with the Court that an interlocutory appeal may become appropriate at some later juncture in this litigation, see ante, at 21, I note that the decision whether to allow such an appeal lies in the first instance in the District Courts sound discretion, see
28 U. S. C. §1292(b); supra, at 4, n. 3.