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Russian Electronic Warfare

I'm starting this thread with a short introduction on how the U.S. describes Electronic Warfare (EW) in its Joint Doctrine to provide context, which will be followed by a post on Russia's view of EW, and then an article from Defense One on how NATO can disrupt Russia's use of EW.

U.S. Joint Doctrine description of Electronic Warfare

Electronic warfare. Military action involving the use of electromagnetic and directed energy to control the electromagnetic spectrum or to attack the enemy. Three categories attack, protection, warfare support.

Electronic Attack: Use of electromagnetic energy, directed energy, or antiradiation weapons to attack personnel, facilities, or equipment with the intent of degrading, neutralizing, or destroying enemy combat capability and is considered a form of fires Electronic.

Electronic Protection: Actions taken to protect personnel, facilities, and equipment from any effects of friendly or enemy use of the electromagnetic spectrum that degrade, neutralize, or destroy friendly combat capability.

Russian Thoughts on New Generation Warfare

Nonmilitary options have come to play a greater role in achieving political and strategic goals and, in some situations, are greatly superior to the power of weapons. The role of mobile joint forces operating in an integrated reconnaissance and information environment is rising through the use of new opportunities now available to control and logistic systems. new information
technologies have reduced appreciably the distance – physical, temporal,
and informational – between the troops and their superiors. remote engagement of the enemy ‘at arm’s length’ is turning into the principal tactic to achieve the goals of a combat action or an operation. Adversary targets are now attacked at any point of enemy territory. differences between strategic, operational, and tactical actions, and between offense and defense are leveling off.

The new content and character of armed warfare derive today from
the network-centric environment in which military operations are controlled –
information and electronically guided fire operations (transformed eW and computer network operations) are conducted along with aerospace operations, and air force operations that follow a systemic pattern. No goal will be achieved in future wars unless one belligerent gains information superiority over the other.

How NATO Can Disrupt Russia’s New Way of War Here are a few things the West can do against Moscow’s potent combo of special forces and electronic warfare

Technology and new EW doctrines have accelerated the decades-old competition between active attack systems and countermeasures, shortening the evolutionary cycle from weeks and months to mere hours.

Retired Colonel-General Anatoly Zaitsev writes how the ultimate goal of SOF “is to destroy the enemy’s critical facilities and disrupt or destroy his forces’ systems.”

Moscow has proven adept at using EW and SOF in concert to fragment and slow adversaries’ strategic decision-making. While “little green men” secure key locations and train local forces, electronic-warfare forces distort ISR collection by adversaries and third parties, limiting their ability to project an accurate counter-narrative to inform confused domestic audiences and a divided international community.

Proposed countermeasures:

First, build stronger and more redundant C3I by encrypting radio, data links, and satellite communications, and developing promising new technologies such as cognitive EW.

NATO partners must explore developing new operating concepts; for example, ground forces should be prepared to mimic the U.S. Navy’s “emissions control” by operating in the absence of a data network.

How Good Is Russian Electronic Warfare? (Part I)

. “But ‘Krasukha-2’ is not altogether such universal equipment capable of jamming numerous radars as it is fashionable to believe. It cannot simultaneously jam both E-8 ‘AWACS’ and E-2 ‘Hawkeye,’ since a jamming station suppressing only the required band of very distinct frequencies for DRLO aircraft radars will be needed for each type of DRLO aircraft.”

“It’s notable that work on ‘Krasukha-2’ began back in 1996 and was completed only in 2011.”

“The ‘+30 dB’ idea is used in yet one more of the newest developments of VNII ‘Gradient’ — 1RL257 ‘Krasukha-4,’ which is at present being actively placed in EW brigades and independent battalions and is designated for suppression of air-based radars, including not only those on fighters and fighter-bombers, but also on E-8 and U-2 reconnaissance aircraft. True, there are doubts about the effectiveness of ‘Krasukha’ against the ASARS-2 radar at a U-2 altitude, since, judging by the available data, its signal is not only sufficiently complex, but still also noise-like.”

“In the opinion of developers and the military, under certain conditions, the 1RL257 can even jam warhead seekers of AIM-120 AMRAAM ‘air-to-air’ missiles, and also the command and control radars of the ‘Patriot’ surface-to-air missile system.”