An interim report was made, as required per 10CFR21.21 (a)(2), of a deviation identified by AMEC Environment & Infrastructure, Inc. The CTLGroup, a supplier of AMEC, did not initially provide all the traceable calibration information required for all the chemicals used in performance of procured tests in regard to laboratory test data of screening tests for constituents related to Safety Class C concrete and grout. An evaluation is underway, but could not be completed within 60 days of discovery. AMEC anticipates that the evaluation will be completed within two weeks of this correspondence, August 17, 2013.

"The purpose of this letter is to follow up on the Interim Report of the Evaluation of a Deviation Pursuant to 10 CFR 21.21(a)(2) provided to the Commission on August 3, 2013. The August 3rd report informed the Commission of a deviation identified by AMEC Environment & Infrastructure, Inc. (AMEC) where an evaluation was underway, but could not be completed within 60 days of discovery. The evaluation was completed by AMEC on August 8, 2013 and it was determined that the nonconformance did not represent a defect."

"Reactor Building (Secondary Containment) pressure increased to above the Technical Specification Surveillance requirement of 0,25 inches vacuum water gauge. This event is reportable as an event that could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function needed to control the release of radiation and mitigate the consequences of an accident. The Reactor Building differential pressure controller was placed in manual operation and Secondary Containment pressure was restored to normal (greater than 0.25 inches vacuum water gauge) returning Secondary Containment to operable status. Secondary Containment pressure was outside the allowable Technical Specification requirement for 4 minutes.

"At 2305 on 26AUG13 the Shift Manager Declared PC-ES-1A and PC-ES-1B inoperable due to a Part 21 Notification that called the operability of the equipment into question. PAM [Post Accident Monitoring] Instrumentation LCO 3.3.3.1.A and 3.3.3.1.C were entered for Functions 1 (Reactor Pressure), 3 (Containment Level), and 7 (Containment Pressure). Both divisions are potentially affected. LCO 3.3.3.1.C represents a 7 Day shutdown LCO.

"CR-CNS-2013-6096 identified a Part 21 issue associated with Foxboro Power Supply PC-ES-1A and PC-ES-1B. The Part 21 issue identifies a potential failure mechanism in which the adhesive backing on aluminum tie-wrap base used in the power supply fails and the base becomes detached from the power supply case. The nylon tie-wrap affixed to these bases becomes brittle with age and fails releasing the aluminum base to fall into the power supply where it has the potential to short out electrical equipment and fail the power supply. The equipment affected is: PC-LRPR-1A, PC-LRPR-1B, NBI-PR-2A, and NBI-PR-2B. These power supplies affect both Control Room Reg. Guide 1.97 Cat A instruments and associated PMIS/SPDS points. This instrumentation is utilized for emergency plan actions (EALs) and EOP 3A actions in addition to monitoring the previously mentioned functions. The loss of this instrumentation represents a significant loss of emergency response capability. The affected instruments are for indication only and perform no active safety functions. All of the referenced instrumentation is currently functioning as required.

"This condition has been entered into the CNS Corrective Action Program.