Relevance of political science to international water conflict
is found in several aspects of the field. The first is the purely
theoretical aspect. The Functionalist Theory of International
Politics, an alternative to the fairly self-explanatory Power
Politics, claims that states will willingly transfer sovereignty
over matters of public concern to a common authority (Mitrany
1975, as cited in Lowi 1990). Cooperation over resources, then,
may induce cooperation over other, more contentious and
emotional, issues. In hydrologic terms, this might be
justification for the viability of river commissions and the
claim that they are useful even among hostile neighbours. The
Realist critics of Functionalism respond that states that are
antagonists in the "high politics" of war and diplomacy
tend not to be able to cooperate in the realm of "low
politics" of economics and welfare. Lowi (1990) concludes in
favour of the Realists on the question of Middle East
hydropolitics, suggesting that, until larger issues of
recognition and refugees are settled, cooperation on water
management would be futile.

The theoretical approach tends to view politics as a passing
wave, the forces of which can be analysed and, if one is skilful,
perhaps the impacts of which can be predicted. Other approaches
tend to take a more deterministic view, as, for example, the
branches of institutional and policy analysis, and of
international relations. If there is conflict, perhaps either the
institutions that make policy or the policy itself may be flawed,
and competent analysis will reveal methods for improvement. In
the international arena, one should also investigate the
likelihood, or even the advisability, of increased cooperation.

Institutional and policy analysis

Several authors approach water conflicts from this angle.
Lynne et al. (1990) describe how scarcity can lead to potential
conflict between water institutions and the people they serve.
Ingram et al. (1984) offer guidelines for effective
implementation of water policy.

Among those dealing with Middle East water scarcity, however,
the question is occasionally asked "How does one translate
the static and dynamic hydrologic realities of the Middle East
into terms that the affected populations can understand?"
The question is a conceptual one, based on the premise that any
political process must ultimately be understood by the people
affected by it.

In the context of Middle East hydropolitics, it is probably
more important to investigate the validity of the premise: that
is, for whom it is really important to "take possession of
the issue," before tackling the larger issue of how it
should be done. This section presents a discussion of the
salience of water in general, and an investigation of the
interests and power of different populations within each
political entity, notably Israel and Jordan, affected by the
water conflict. For simplicity these groups are divided into (a)
domestic and industrial water users, (b) agricultural users, (c)
technical implementers of policy, and (d) policy makers, and
interests of each are assumed to be similar on both sides of the
Jordan River.

In Naff and Matson (1984), the most thorough examination of
regional hydropolitics to date, each actor in the Jordan River
conflict Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, and Israel - is analysed
according to its respective "riparian position,"
"power," and "interest." This approach seems
to be based on some derivation of Coplin and O'Leary's (1976)
PRINCE method's categories of "issue position,"
"power," and "salience" for political
analysis. Whether described as "interests" (Naff and
Matson 1984), or "motivations" (Meltsner 1972), it is
clear that the aspects referred to here as "salience" -
"the importance each political actor attaches to
the particular issue" (Coplin and O'Leary 1976) and
"power" - whether legal, political, riparian position,
or military- are crucial to political analysis. The
"issue" is assumed to be, "where can (or should)
water policy emphasis be placed?"

DOMESTIC AND INDUSTRIAL USERS.

Every person is a member of this category over and above any
other category. Domestic water consumption includes primarily the
requirements for each individual's biology, but also other needs
around the house, including water for hygiene, cooking,
dishwashing, and lawns. The salience of water for domestic
consumption depends on the use to which it will be put.

As mentioned earlier, Maslow (1954) categorizes and ranks
basic human needs to their level of motivating behaviour. From
"inner" to "outer," these are physiological
needs, safety needs, belongingness and love, esteem, and
self-actualization. Water for biological needs would clearly be a
most basic human need, with other domestic uses varying in
importance.

One conclusion that might be drawn, then, is that water is (or
should be) a highly salient issue for the entire Middle East
population. Before jumping to policy conclusions, however, one
should recognize not only that water for domestic consumption is
a comparatively small portion of the total water budget for each
country from 10 per cent in Jordan to 22 per cent in Israel
(Poster 1989b) but also that the region already has among the
lowest per capita consumption rates in any arid area (Falkenmark
1989b).

Moreover, even with a high degree of "salience,"
domestic consumers cannot significantly affect a country's water
budget. This is particularly true, given the price inelasticity
of water for personal use. Darr et al. (1976) suggest that, in
Israel, consumption is more a function of factors such as
geographic location and family size, than it is of price. Policy
makers looking to increase political flexibility by decreasing
demand would be hard pressed to find meaningful cuts in the
domestic sector.

In contrast, industrial users account for a minor portion of
each entity's water budget - from close to 0 per cent in the West
Bank and Gaza to 5 per cent in Israel and Jordan - but have
little influence in water decision-making. In the recent drought,
price increases were levied most against the industrial sector,
even though several analysts, including those within the Israeli
Water Commission, advocated a shift of water resources from
agriculture to industry because of the relatively higher
contribution to the GNP of the latter per unit of water.

AGRICULTURAL USERS.

The vast majority of Middle East water (73 per cent in Israel
to 85 per cent in Jordan) is used in the agricultural sector.
Water for agriculture for one's own population might be
categorized in Maslow's terms (Maslow 1954) as
"physiological needs" the most basic type. Even though
water for agricultural export may be less crucial to survival,
agriculturalists certainly have a vested interest in portraying
all agriculture in terms of "food security."

The Israeli agricultural sector gains relevance through its
ties to settlements and, in turn, to security. Settlements on the
Golan Heights, for example, are viewed as more than a source of
agricultural production: they are also outposts, the presence of
which creates a kind of first line of defence against the
Syrians, whom Israelis view as the likely antagonist in a
subsequent war.

The high degree of salience of agriculture, the high volume of
water in question, and the political power of agriculturalists,
probably give the agricultural sector more impact on national
water policy than any other. The same national water ethics that
give agriculture great economic influence in the region, also
give it great political influence. The Water Commission in
Israel, the ultimate authority for all water planning and
operations in a country where all water is nationalized, is under
the authority of the Ministry of Agriculture. In Jordan, the
Water Minister is a cabinet-level position, and the primary
responsibility of the Jordan Valley Authority is to the farmers
in that region. Any cuts to this sector in both Israel and
Jordan, even during the 1988-1990 drought, came only after heated
political debate.

TECHNICAL IMPLEMENTERS OF POLICY.

This group, the technological talent to assess and monitor the
resource base, is made up of, in effect, the hydrologic
"keepers of the flame" of water policy. Policy makers
rely on this group of hydrologists, hydrogeologists, engineers,
chemists, and economists to implement national policy within the
limits imposed by

normal seasonal and annual variability,

dramatic fluctuations (droughts and floods),

groundwater pumping and recharge within "safe
yield,"

delivery system capability,

adequate water quality for each use, and

economic efficiency.

Agriculturalists and domestic users, similarly, count on this
group to guarantee that, when a tap is opened, adequate, clean
water comes out.

By definition, this group has a high degree of salience and
knowledge of water issues but also, interestingly, has been the
group most amenable to compromise in the international arena,
even without formal power, Scientists on all sides, though
constrained by political forces, do have access to each other
through scientific journals and international conferences,
Possibly as a consequence, along with the tangible nature of
water science (as opposed to water politics), technical
implementers have found agreement, notably in the 1953-1955
Johnston negotiations over Jordan River allocations, and 19671969
planning for nuclear "agro-industrial complexes." Both
plans collapsed when the technical committees sent their
recommendations to the political level.

This group, however knowledgeable and indispensable, seems
often to be taken for granted, particularly by policy makers, for
whom water is not adequately emotionally charged to take
advantage of politically. The question posed might be restated,
then, rather than as, "How to increase salience of water on
the part of the population?" as the alternative, and
probably more relevant, "How to increase the salience of
technical realities on the part of the policy makers?"

One example of such synergy between the two groups can also be
gleaned from the Johnston negotiations, which, in 1953 were
deadlocked when, according to Wishart (1990), an engineering
study was completed that suggested that larger areas of Jordan
could be irrigated with less water than was thought. This allowed
the manoeuvrability that led to the negotiations' (limited)
success.

POLICY MAKERS.

Policy makers receive pressure for policy from the bottom up -
that is, from the sectors described above. Domestic users want
adequate water "no matter what," and can suggest as
much with their votes. It is an interesting contradiction that,
salient though water is for survival, it is difficult to picture
one actually voting for a "water platform" or the
"hydrologic party." Perhaps a new term, such as
"unconscious high salience," with its seeming
contradiction, would be useful.

Agricultural users have greater water needs, and corresponding
political influence. Policy makers incorporate these pressures
with the advice of technicians to develop national and
international policy, the impacts of which are then felt from the
top down.

CONCLUSIONS "SALIENCE," POWER, AND POLICY.

Water is more or less salient to all segments of the Middle
East population depending, in large part, on whether there is
ample supply to accommodate demand. For example, water was a more
common subject, from boundary disputes to government information
packets, until the 1967 war, when hydrologic allocations shifted
with political borders. In recent years, the highest salience has
been among agricultural users and technical implementers,
although occasional droughts induce awareness on the part of
domestic consumers, and policy makers as well.

The interests of each group are summarized as follows:

Domestic and industrial consumers. Want an
adequate, clean water supply as a matter of course. Large
population and therefore high power; small percentage of
consumption; "unconscious high salience."

Agricultural consumers. Seek constant supply
regardless of annual fluctuations. Small population but
high power; large consumer; protective of hydrologic
status quo. Increasing investment in technology.

Technical implementers of policy. Responsible
for accommodation of needs of domestic and agricultural
sectors. Constrained nationally by hydrologic limits and
fluctuations, internationally by political
considerations. Willing to seek technical solutions. Low
power, high salience.

Policy makers. Responsive to needs of all, but
constrained by competing demands. Low salience, except
during international crises or years of drought.

These interests suggest the following guidelines for internal
policy:

It is not crucial that the general public "take
possession" of the issue of water, except to do what
they can to conserve in the home.

Agricultural users have more political influence, given
their vested interests in a status quo, than may be
desirable for effective policy.

The single most important link, and therefore the one
that should be strengthened, is that between technical
implementers and policy makers, for both national and
international policy.

The technical steps that might be taken to increase water
supply or decrease demand were investigated earlier. The summary
above does suggest, however, that in making sure that policy is a
reasonable reflection of the hydrologic realities, the most vital
step that might be taken in both Israel and Jordan is the removal
of responsibility for these policies from its current place in
the heart of agricultural and political pressures.

In Israel, for example, this might mean shifting
water-policymaking from the Agricultural Ministry to a body less
susceptible to constituent interests - perhaps the Ministry of
the Environment, as Galnoor (1978) has suggested. An advisory
body might then be established, led by technical implementers
with input from the other sectors, which could more easily
implement the necessary technical and economic policies, within
the confines of fluctuating hydrologic limits. A similar
framework might work in the institutional hierarchy of Jordanian
government.

International relations

Water policy in this region is at present drawn up within the
boundaries of a nation, rather than within those of a watershed.
Because the flow of water does not respect the political
boundaries, it should be clear that regional management, at the
watershed level at least, would be a much more efficient
approach. In fact, the only point on which the water policy
analyses surveyed earlier do agree is on the need for planned
water sharing and joint water development, as Eric Johnston
envisioned 35 years ago.

Regional cooperation would open the door to a host of new
water distribution alternatives. For example, surface water from
the Yarmuk or the upper Jordan could be provided to the West
Bank, allowing increased development in that area while
alleviating Israeli fears of overpumped Palestinian wells.
Alternatively, Israel and Jordan might cooperatively develop both
banks of the Jordan, eliminating the current redundant costs of
separate delivery systems within each country. In addition, the
larger the region cooperating, the more efficient a regional plan
can be developed. It is cheaper, for example, to bring water from
the Nile to the Negev than it is to pump it from the Sea of
Galilee, as is the current practice (Kelly 1989, 305).

It has been argued that one need not wait for the cessation of
hostilities before developing such water-sharing plans:

A regional water plan need not await the achievement of peace.
To the contrary, its preparation, before a comprehensive peace
settlement is attained, could help clarify objectives to be aimed
for in achieving peace. (H. BenShahar in Fishelson 1989, 7)

It should be clear that any dreams of regional cooperation in
the Middle East run at least the same dangers of confronting
issues of deep national emotion as do public policy solutions -
probably even more. Listing all the reasons why regional
cooperation may not work in the Middle East is certainly well
beyond the scope of this work. However, one question is
particularly relevant to the proposal of joint water projects,
and deserves mention.

Elisha Kally (in Fishelson 1989, 325) contends that "the
successful implementation of cooperative projects ... will
strengthen and stabilize peace." This concept of inducing
increasing integration, even between actors with some hostility,
is also a strategy employed in the United States by the US Army
Corps of Engineers (interview, Jerry Delli Priscoli, June 1992),
and recommended for international settings by their
representatives.

As the regional politics increase the political viability of
some of these international projects, we might re-examine whether
greater interdependence is actually an impetus to greater
cooperation or is, in fact, the opposite, leading to greater
conflict.

Many of the hostilities that have occurred in the region over
water seem to have come about precisely because the water
destined for a downstream user was controlled by an upstream
party. Many "cooperative" projects might only provide
additional opportunity for suspicion and potential for
contention. Lowi (1990) suggests that issues of regional water
sharing can not be successfully broached in the Jordan basin
until the larger political issues of territory and refugees are
resolved.

One point where contention seems most likely to develop is
over control of a major source of water. Many proposed water
transfers, such as the Egyptian offer of Nile water to Israel,
have fallen through partly because of concern for whose hand is
"on the tap." Tensions were raised immediately before
the Gulf War when Turkey closed off the Euphrates River for one
month to fill its Ataturk Dam. Some of the greatest resistance to
the Johnston proposals was encountered whenever an aspect of the
plan called for relinquished control by any of the parties, such
as joint storage in the Sea of Galilee or an international Water
Master. G. White and co-workers (in Glassner 1983, 491) suggest
that, in many group situations, water users prefer private to
communal water sources if there is a choice, "to avoid
situations where there is risk of irritating confrontation."

I recognize the advisability of striving towards
ever-increasing integration between political entities. As has
been pointed out, "lasting peace among nations is
characterized by a broadly based network of relations" (H.
BenShahar in Fishelson 1989,1). I suggest, however, that for
resource conflicts in general and for water conflicts in
particular, an initial condition that should be met is that each
entity has adequate control of an equitable portion of its
primary source. Past and present grievances need to be addressed
before embarking on projects of cooperation or integration. For
water projects, this would involve (a) assigning property rights
to existing resources, (b) guaranteeing control of a water source
adequate to meet future needs, and (c) addressing the issue of
equity within the design of any project for cooperative
development.

The fact that projects would have to be weighed in terms of
the conflictalleviating tendencies of more efficient water
distribution, as opposed to the possible conflict heightening of
greater hydrologic interdependence, should not be a reason to
abandon the concept. Nor, by any means, should the concept of
regional planning be tarnished because of uncertainty about
specific projects. Rather, in planning for watershed development
and in designing transnational water projects, the ultimate goal
might yet be ever-increasing integration. In the initial stages,
however, the reluctance by parties to relinquish control of a
resource as vital as water should be addressed and might even be
incorporated in the project design. This issue of
"control" and cooperationinducing project design is
taken up again later in this chapter and in chapter 4.

Economics, with the individual as a rational maximizer of
satisfaction in a world of relative scarcity, offers a useful
paradigm for water conflict analysis. When deciding between
several possible water development options, for example, the
benefit-cost analysis - an economic tool by which all of the
future benefits and costs of a project are reduced to a single
amount representing the net benefits in current monetary units -
can help one to determine which project would be the most
beneficial.

Economic theory also provides guidelines for policy options
for efficient water distribution. Economic theory argues, for
example, that only when the price paid for a commodity is a
reasonable reflection of the true cost, can market forces work
for efficient distribution of the commodity. In the Middle East,
as elsewhere, the cost of water to the user is highly subsidized,
especially water earmarked for agriculture. The true cost of
water would reflect all of the resource development, pumping,
treatment, and delivery costs of that water, most of which are
not passed on to the user. In Israel alone, 20 per cent of the
country's energy is used solely to move water from one place to
another (Naff and Matson 1984, 12).

Subsidized water, it is argued, leads to waste in agricultural
practices, to too little incentive for research and development
of conservation techniques and practice, and finally, to too much
water being allocated to the agricultural sector as opposed to
industry. Take away subsidies and allow the price to rise, and
market incentives are created for both greater efficiency on the
farm and a natural shift of water resources from the agricultural
sector to industry, where contribution to gross natural product
per unit of water is often much higher. Since, in each of the
areas discussed, between 75 and 95 per cent of water use is
allocated for agriculture, the savings in water could be
substantial (Wishart 1990). Thomas Naff has recommended such a
shift of between 35 and 40 per cent of agricultural water in both
Israel and Jordan (lecture, University of Wisconsin-Madison,
March 1990).

If the price of water reflects the true costs of its
development, and if property rights to water are clear, then a
"water market" can be established to allow buying and
selling, ensuring, through the "invisible hand" of the
market-place, that each unit of water is being used most
efficiently. Water markets, whether national or international,
can provide clear incentives for efficient use and guidelines for
trades or transfers. Howe and Easter (1971) derived the necessary
conditions for economically efficient interbasin water transfers
in the United States, and Dinar and Wolf (1992) discussed
international water markets using a hypothetical transfer from
the Nile to the Jordan basin as a casestudy. Zeitouni et al.
(1992) discussed trading water rights in an international context
and Gonzalez and Rubio (1992) showed that the amount of water to
be transferred between basins in a Spanish case could be reduced
if economic factors were considered, as opposed to straight
extrapolations of need.

Economic analysis may also create a framework for easing
regional water tensions. According to Wishart (1990),
"conflicts over water rights are easier to resolve if
transaction costs of resolution are lower, and if opportunities
exist for improving the efficiency of water use and
discovery." In other words, if it is cheaper for people to
cooperate and save water than it is to fight, they would rather
cooperate.

Some other considerations that have been used in the past to
enhance the potential for economic cooperation between players
include the following:

Recognizing that, while water itself is a finite
commodity, and therefore conducive only to zero-sum
solutions ("distributive" or
"win-lose," in the language of ADR), the
benefit, or welfare, derived from water is variable and
therefore traceable for non-zerosum
("integrative" or "win-win")
solutions.

Welfare can be measured basin-wide and among all the
players participating in cooperation, so that even when
one player's individual welfare is not immediately
enhanced by the loss of the resource, the resulting
pay-offs of trade should result in the region as a whole
being better off.

Infrastructure considerations can enhance the argument
for cooperation, especially when considering the variable
aspects inherent to water resources. One or another of
the players may have better resources to deal with
fluctuating quantity or quality more storage potential,
or better-developed water treatment, for example which
can help encourage an alliance.

There are, however, problems inherent to using economic theory
as the tool for water conflict analysis - problems that can lead
to weaknesses in the economic solutions prescribed. For one,
water is not a pure economic good. Options to the consumer of
most goods include migrating to where it is cheaper or abstaining
from it altogether if the price is too high. Given small
countries with contentious borders, migration to water sources is
not a viable alternative, nor, for more obvious biological
reasons, is abstaining. Presumably, however, the analysis is
restricted to water for agriculture, where there is ample room
for reducing demand before running into such limits.

Another problem with economic analysis is more serious because
it has to do with a force much more fundamental than economic
theory - that is, the emotions of a nation. As mentioned earlier,
all of the countries in the area were built from the farm up, and
the agriculturalist, whether the fellah or the
kibbutznik, holds a special mystique on both sides of the
Jordan. Both Arabic and Hebrew ideologies are rife with slogans
of "making the desert bloom" and "nations rooted
in their land." In this context, water invariably becomes
the "life blood" of a nation. One result of this has
been a certain leeway granted to agriculture in the area, both
political, as noted previously, and economic.

One striking example of water "diseconomy" is the
case of Israeli settlements on the Golan Heights. The 24, mostly
agricultural, settlements of the Golan have a population of about
3,500. In 1980, approximately 80 per cent of the 50 MCM/yr used
by these settlements was pumped up from Lake Kinneret - a height
differential of 600 m (Davis et al. 1980, 27; Inbar and Maos
1984, 22). Each cubic metre of water weighs a metric ton. Were
the settlers to include the costs of the energy required to lift
that much water that high, their crops could not possibly be
competitive in the market-place. But settlements on the Golan
Heights are viewed as more than a source of agricultural
production: as mentioned earlier, they are also outposts, the
presence of which creates a kind of first line of defence against
the Syrians, whom many Israelis view as the likely antagonist in
an ensuing war.

This perceived connection between settlements and security
holds true throughout the country. As Frey and Naff (1985) write,

Israeli agriculture is not merely an ordinary economic sector.
It is linked to the crucial matter of settlements, and
settlements are linked to defense and national security.

This, then, is what makes Golan cotton competitive in the eyes
of the nation.

Overlooking this fundamental aspect of a "national water
ethic" of any of the countries involved, can occasionally
confound an economist, especially one from outside the region.
Cal Burwell, once the Director of Research for the proposed
Agro-lndustrial Complex, mentioned recently that "Some of
what's valuable to the folks over there just doesn't fit into
what our folks would call 'good economics"' (interview,
February 1990).

The economist increasingly recognizes the sometimes
overpowering noneconomic values that water users occasionally
attribute to their water. These might include (from Wolf 1992a):

Political attributes of water, e.g. perceived past
injustice, national pride;

Cooperation per se (e.g. the World Bank does not include
international cooperation as a benefit in benefit-cost
analyses (Olivares 1986);

Physical security;

Perceptions of beauty in the environment;

"The Land Ethic" inherent value of
"non-economic species";

Food or water security - the psychological value of
control;

Open space.

This last represents a departure from historic economic
arguments in the Middle East. In Israel, for example, water has
been subsidized for years as a means of promoting population
dispersion and food security. These subsidies have dwindled
somewhat in recent years, as the Ministry of Agriculture has
accepted more of a market approach. Lately, however, as the
population soars with natural growth and extensive immigration,
the suggestion has been made to increase subsidies once again as
a way to keep open space among the extensive developments
(interview, Martin Sherman, November 1991).

Additional factors often convolute the possibility for a
traditional economic analysis, particularly in an international
setting. Some of these possible political and institutional
constraints to economic cooperation are as follows:

Some level of hostility between the players. Hostility
can be between basins (e.g. northern and southern
California), between economic sectors (urban versus
agricultural users), or, especially, between political
entities (e.g. the Turkish Peace Pipeline, Akdogan 1992;
Nile water transfer, Dinar and Wolf 1992).

Property rights (ownership of water) are often unclear
and, occa signally, bitterly contested. Although water is
internally nationalized in all of the cases discussed in
this work, international ownership is often unspecified.

State-subsidized water often makes the economics of any
transfer or trade unclear, as described above.

National prestige can be tied up in the population's
perception of its water resources, decreasing the
apparent desirability of cooperation. National pride in
"Israeli oranges," or "Egyptian
cotton," for example, may preclude a shift to other
agriculture or industry, even if the product in question
can be imported at less expense from abroad.

Usually, when an inter-basin or international exchange is
agreed upon' it is for one specific amount to be
delivered annually. Because of treaty or infrastructure
limitations (such as pumping, storage, or delivery
capacity), the "solution" is discrete and
cannot be arrived at dynamically. This limits the
potential for efficient water market transactions, which
often rely on variable solutions (e.g. Lekakis and
Giannias 1992; Zeitouni et al. 1992).

Insulation. Negotiating teams usually include diplomats
and engineers. The primary considerations are therefore
often of politics and reliable delivery, rather than
being influenced by economic efficiency.

Even while recognizing its limits, one can still use economic
analy sis as a useful tool to provide some guidelines to increase
hydrologic efficiency. It has been suggested that following these
guidelines can be especially crucial, particularly as water
limits begin to be reached:

Whereas diseconomies dictated by ideology could be tolerated
under condi tions of conventional water sufficiency, they cannot
continue indefinitely, especially with regard to investments
under conditions of system's short age. (Galnoor 1987)

Game theory, like economics, assumes enlightened self-interest
and "rational behaviour." A quantitative analysis can
be performed to show how n number of players should react to a
competitive setting in order to "win." A rational
outcome is defined by an equilibrium point
("pareto-optimality" to economists), where no player
can gain by unilaterally moving away from that point.

Game theory has been applied to a variety of issues as diverse
as national security, social justice, and the existence of
superior beings, but it has been applied to international water
conflicts only sporadically. Rogers (1969) analyses conflicting
interests along the Lower Ganges and suggests strategies for
cooperation between India and Pakistan. Dufournaud (1982) applies
game theory to both the Columbia and the Lower Mekong to show
that "mutual benefit" is not always the most efficient
criterion to measure cooperative river basins. Dinar and Wolf
(1992) use cooperative game theory to explore the economic
pay-offs that might be generated in a technology-for-water
exchange between Israel and Egypt, and how those payoffs might be
distributed to induce cooperation.

As political science asks, "Does cooperation beget
cooperation?," game theory poses, somewhat less
didactically, the question "What is the correlation between
cooperation and efficiency?" In theory, according to R.
Axelrod, a player who in an opening move acts generously and on a
responding move acts cooperatively, never initiating attack, will
outscore any other strategy, given time and averaging. (Cited in
Painter 1988)

In practice between competing nations, however, a strong
positive relationship exists between tendencies to initiate and
to receive international conflict. The correlation between
cooperative initiation and receptive tendencies, however, is much
weaker. (Platter and Mayer 1989)

Either game theory has not yet developed to the point where it
can adequately model complex international decision-making, or
the nations surveyed had neither the time nor the faith in time
and averaging to pursue "efficiency."

Nevertheless, game theory offers a framework for some level of
analysis for water conflict. When the water demand of a
population in a water basin begins to approach its supply, for
example, the inhabitants have two choices that can be modelled
(see Falkenmark [1989a] and LeMarquand [1977] for related work):

They can work unilaterally within the basin (or state) to
increase supply through waste-water reclamation,
desalination, or increasing catchment or storage - or
decrease demand, through conservation or greater
efficiency in agricultural practices.

They can cooperate with the inhabitants of other basins
for a more efficient distribution of water resources.
This usually involves a transfer of water from the basin
with greater resources.

These options are equally true for the inhabitants of a single
basin that includes two or more political entities. A third
option exists, of course, and is practiced most often in arid
countries that are less developed or are racked by military
strife: they can make no changes in planning or infrastructure
and face each cycle of drought with increasing hardship. Since
the most reasonable prescriptions in such a case are usually
beyond game theory modelling, this case is not considered
further.

For the game theorist, this dichotomy between two parties of
whether to work unilaterally (defect) or to cooperate is
recognizable as a familiar two-player, two-strategy game (Rogers
[1978] discusses game theoretical aspects of water resources).
The strategies chosen by each player often depend on the
geopolitical relationship between them. For two water basins
within the same political entity, with clear water rights and a
strong government interest, the game may resemble a "stag
hunt," where mutual cooperation is the rational strategy.

Between somewhat hostile players, either within a state but
more often internationally, the game becomes a "prisoner's
dilemma," where, in the absence of strong incentives to
cooperate, each player's individual self-interest suggests
defection as the rational approach. In cases of high levels of
hostility, a game of "chicken" can develop, with each
player competing to divert or degrade the greatest amount of
water, before the opponent can do the same.

As the amount of water surplus decreases over time, however,
the impetus towards conflict or cooperation (pay-offs) might
change, depending on such political factors as relative power,
level of hostility, legal arrangements, and form and stability of
government.