District Judge Lawrence O’Neil on May 1, 2009, denied Mr. Ioane a speedy trial and declined to set a trial date.

Even more bizarre is that no criminal complaint exists.

What prompted this? Interestingly, the request for the arrest warrant was made by the same IRS agent that Mr. Ioane has a civil lawsuitagainst.

Also interesting–a deputy clerk, NOT the judge, issued the arrest warrant.

Additionally, there is no Oath or Affirmation in support of probable cause. The fourth amendment is quite clear; no arrest warrant is to be executed without Oath or Affirmation in support of probable cause.

Some are calling this indictment and the arrest warrant a sham. The fact is, NO criminal complaint exists against Chiropractor V. Steven Booth, his wife Louise Booth, or Michael Scott Ioane.

After contacting the United States District Court, Fresno, California, and reviewing the file, it is true; there is no Oath or Affirmation in support of the arrest warrant and no underlying criminal complaint charging the Grand Jury.

In response, Mike Ioane stated, “This indictment is like a flashlight–without batteries, uncharged.”

This appears to be an infringement on the constitution–an infringement on our fundamental rights. Could what is happening to Mr. and Mrs. Booth and Mr. Ioane also happen to any of us, at any time?

Upon contacting the court, we asked if the deputy clerk A. Jessen was also a magistrate Judge or had some special congressional authority to execute arrest warrants. We were told that the deputy clerks have no special authority to do so.

Attached is the entire docket sheet involving this matter, the arrest warrants, and the lawsuits naming IRS Special agent Michele Casarez, as a defendant. After reviewing the documents, verifying the signatures and all facts, we found this mind-boggling.

We as Americans assume that our representatives are doing the right thing; we rely on Bill O’Reilly and Glen Beck to keep us informed, yet is our constitution under the “protection of the court” being destroyed?

To what extent are the Justice Department, district court and Grand Jury implicit in this activity? Or is it merely a clerical oversight? Are others sitting in jail right now because of similar fraudulent activity?

1.1: What are the elements of a lawful arrest, detainment, search, or seizure?

For your reference: here is the Fourth Amendment of the
United States Constitution:

“The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation,
and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized.”

So, according the Fourth Amendment of the United States
Constitution, the elements are as follows:

(NOTE: the ordering is important! 1 and 2 should happen
before 3, and 3 before 4.) This means, in common language:

1: A civilian makes a complaint
2: Evidence is found linking the accused with
the victim’s injury, and that the injury was probably
caused by “criminal intent”; that is, it was not
an accident.
3: A document issued describing what is to be searched,
or who/what is to be seized/arrested, and why.
4: The actual arrest/search/seizure/detainment

Yet today, here is what usually happens:

1: There is no complaint from a civilian.
2: There is no injury, thus there can be no Probable Cause.
3: There is no Warrant issued.
4: The Police Officer executes a standing order to
detain/search/arrest someone for a victimless
“pretended offence”.

This is explained further below.

(Note: other Amendments discuss what is supposed to follow
after the arrest: presentment before and accusation by the
people: the Grand Jury indictment, and trial by the people:
the petit or trial jury. READ THE CONSTITUTION!)________Excerpted from Lawful Arrest/Search/Seizure FAQ, by Ahimsa Dhamapada

1.2: What is “Probable Cause”?

“The officer had *probable cause* to believe
that the person had violated a law.”

Probable cause is NOT a simple synonym for “reason”,
yet this is how it is used most often.

Law dictionaries often define Probable Cause as

“A reasonable belief that a crime has been
committed.”

While this is close, it is not adequate, as we will soon see…

If this *were* the definition, then the most common
usage wouldn’t make sense! Make the replacement in the
above phrase:

“The officer had *a reasonable belief that a crime has been committed* to believe that the person had violated a law.”

Huh? Something is wrong here.

Now, if “probable cause” is simply “reason to believe a crime
has occurred”, then it offers the people little protection
against harassment, given the number of obscure “laws”
on the books that the people are subject to. Such a
definition would give the police wide powers to detain
just about anybody for any reason at any time. Hmmm….

Also, there is a common misunderstanding as to the definition
of “crime”. Many people think that a crime is a “violation
of the law”, but this is a circular definition! Which came
first, law or crime? If crime is “things which the law
prohibits”, and law is “that which is crime”, we have
self-reference, a tautology, begging the question, a circular
reference. Anyone who has studied logic will tell you that
this has no meaning at all. (see any logic text, or:http://www.wdv.com/Writings/Stories/TheRules/fallacy.html)

The Founding Fathers wrote *probable cause* and not
“reason to believe that a violation of the law occurred”,
because they were *defining* the law! They obviously meant
something different.

We must all *begin* with an agreement of what is a crime
BEFORE we codify the Law, or else we end up with a meaningless
law that refers to itself, corruption of the courts, legislature,
and the police, and people going to jail for absurd things like
“possessing forbidden flowers”, “not having proper paperwork”,
“having a bad opinion about the court” or “talking about doing
something really nasty”. (Wait! That IS what we have today…)

So, let’s come up with a USEFUL definition of crime:

The body of a crime (Corpus Delicti) must have 2 components [from Gifis]:

1: An injury
2: A criminal cause

A crime is an injury caused by criminal agency (not
an accident or act-of-god). You can injure someone
accidentally: not a crime. Someone can get hurt from a
falling meteorite: not a crime. Someone causes an injury
intentionally: *this* is true crime.

Now replace this in the dictionary definition, and we have
the following:

PROBABLE CAUSE *IS*:
“REASON TO BELIEVE THAT AN *INJURY HAD CRIMINAL CAUSE*”

So if a civilian makes a complaint, and a body of the people such
as the Grand Jury, can reasonably assert:

“The accused PROBABLY CAUSED the injury to the victim”,

then we have met the Constitutional requirement, and the
origin of the phrase becomes clear. (It could alternately
be interpreted as “Probable Cause of Action”, but it is
no different, since a “cause” is a claim, and a claim requires
a right, an injury, and a petition for restitution)

Finally! Now that we know what *probable cause* really is,
now we can define what is required to show or determine
probable cause:

There is really more to it than this; for example, certain
human-caused injury may be simple accident, thus it should
be shown that the injury was intentional and malicious.

But here is the *really* important thing to remember:

If there is NO VICTIM, or the “victim” has suffered NO
INJURY, there can be NO PROBABLE CAUSE. Most police
detainments in the United States these days begin as
traffic “offences” (there is no offended party):
speeding, safety checks, no seat belt, expired tags, etc.
In the absence of any injury, these all lack Probable
Cause, and are thus, unConstitutional.

Think: “He PROBABLY CAUSED the Injury to the Victim”.

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5 thoughts on “Michael Ioane – Grand Jury Returns Sham Indictment”

I have been trying to research this case Mike Ioane aka Michael Ioane. I find it hard to belMike Ioane vs the Arrests .I found this interesting reading on findlaw.com. I think Mike Ioane is right and obviously has done his homework Arrests and Other Detentions .–That the Fourth Amendment was intended to protect against arbitrary arrests as well as against unreasonable searches was early assumed by Chief Justice Marshall 55 and is now established law. 56 At the common law, it was proper to arrest one who had committed a breach of the peace or a felony without a warrant, 57 and this history is reflected in the fact that the Fourth Amendment is satisfied if the arrest is made in a public place on probable cause, regardless of whether a warrant has been obtained. 58 However, in order to effectuate an arrest in the home, absent consent or exigent circumstances, police officers must have a warrant. 59 The Fourth Amendment applies to ”seizures” and it is not necessary that a detention be a formal arrest in order to bring to bear the requirements of warrants or probable cause in instances in which warrants may be forgone. 60 Some objective justification must be shown to validate all seizures of the person, including seizures that involve only a brief detention short of arrest, although the nature of the detention will determine whether probable cause or some reasonable and articulable suspicion is necessary. 61
Until relatively recently, the legality of arrests was seldom litigated in the Supreme Court because of the rule that a person detained pursuant to an arbitrary seizure–unlike evidence obtained as a result of an unlawful search–remains subject to custody and presentation to court. 62 But the application of self-incrimination and other exclusionary rules to the States and the heightening of their scope in state and federal cases alike brought forth the rule that verbal evidence, confessions, and other admissions, like all derivative evidence obtained as a result of unlawful seizures, could be excluded. 63 Thus, a confession made by one illegally in custody must be suppressed, unless the causal connection between the illegal arrest and the confession had become so attenuated that the latter should not be deemed ”tainted” by the former. 64 Similarly, fingerprints and other physical evidence obtained as a result of an unlawful arrest must be suppressed. 65
Searches and Inspections in Noncriminal Cases .–Certain early cases held that the Fourth Amendment was applicable only when a search was undertaken for criminal investigatory purposes, 66 and the Supreme Court until recently employed a reasonableness test for such searches without requiring either a warrant or probable cause in the absence of a warrant. 67 But in 1967, the Court held in two cases that administrative inspections to detect building code violations must be undertaken pursuant to warrant if the occupant objects. 68 ”We may agree that a routine inspection of the physical condition of private property is a less hostile intrusion than the typical policeman’s search for the fruits and instrumentalities of crime. . . . But we cannot agree that the Fourth Amendment interests at stake in these inspection cases are merely ‘peripheral.’ It is surely anomalous to say that the individual and his private property are fully protected by the Fourth Amendment only when the individual is suspected of criminal behavior.” 69 Certain administrative inspections utilized to enforce regulatory schemes with regard to such items as alcohol and firearms are, however, exempt from the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement and may be authorized simply by statute. 70
ieve this is happeing.WHAT IS YOUR OPINION ON HOW THE GOVERMENT – ESPECIALLY THE IRS IS GETTING AWAY with charging Mike Ioane with crimes first it looks like he did not commit and Michael Ioane should have some support from those of us that could not fight like he is.

I agree Mike Ioane should keep fighting. what the heck is going on. Why is the IRS allowed to get away with treating Mike Ioane like a criminal. I have really taken this on as a crusade. The IRS obviously does not have to abide to the 1st -4th amendements. Actually they are allowed to ruin peoples lives. I wish Michael Ioane all the luck in the world.

More research on Mike Ioane and the IRS. Camara and See were reaffirmed in Marshall v. Barlow’s, Inc., 71 in which the Court held violative of the Fourth Amendment a provision of the Occupational Safety and Health Act which authorized federal inspectors to search the work area of any employment facility covered by the Act for safety hazards and violations of regulations, without a warrant or other legal process. The liquor and firearms exceptions were distinguished on the basis that those industries had a long tradition of close government supervision, so that a person in those businesses gave up his privacy expectations. But OSHA was a relatively recent statute and it regulated practically every business in or affecting interstate commerce; it was not open to a legislature to extend regulation and then follow it with warrantless inspections. Additionally, OSHA inspectors had unbounded discretion in choosing which businesses to inspect and when to do so, leaving businesses at the mercy of possibly arbitrary actions and certainly with no assurances as to limitation on scope and standards of inspections. Further, warrantless inspections were not necessary to serve an important governmental interest, inasmuch as most businesses would consent to inspection and it was not inconvenient to require OSHA to resort to an administrative warrant in order to inspect sites where consent was refused. 72
In Donovan v. Dewey, 73 however, Barlow’s was substantially limited and a new standard emerged permitting extensive governmental inspection of commercial property, 74 absent warrants. Under the Federal Mine Safety and Health Act, governing underground and surface mines (including stone quarries), federal officers are directed to inspect underground mines at least four times a year and surface mines at least twice a year, pursuant to extensive regulations as to standards of safety. The statute specifically provides for absence of advanced notice and requires the Secretary of Labor to institute court actions for injunctive and other relief in cases in which inspectors are denied admission. Sustaining the statute, the Court proclaimed that government had a ”greater latitude” to conduct warrantless inspections of commercial property than of homes, because of ”the fact that the expectation of privacy that the owner of commercial property enjoys in such property differs significantly from the sanctity accorded an individual’s home, and that this privacy interest may, in certain circumstances, be adequately protected by regulatory schemes authorizing warrantless inspections.” 75
Dewey was distinguished from Barlow’s in several ways. First, Dewey involved a single industry, unlike the broad coverage in Barlow’s. Second, the OSHA statute gave minimal direction to inspectors as to time, scope, and frequency of inspections, while FMSHA specified a regular number of inspections pursuant to standards. Third, deference was due Congress’ determination that unannounced inspections were necessary if the safety laws were to be effectively enforced. Fourth, FMSHA provided businesses the opportunity to contest the search by resisting in the civil proceeding the Secretary had to bring if consent was denied. 76 The standard of a long tradition of government supervision permitting warrantless inspections was dispensed with, because it would lead to ”absurd results,” in that new and emerging industries posing great hazards would escape regulation. 77 Dewey suggests, therefore, that warrantless inspections of commercial establishments are permissible so long as the legislature carefully drafts its statute.
Dewey was applied in New York v. Burger 78 to inspection of automobile junkyards and vehicle dismantling operations, a situation where there is considerable overlap between administrative and penal objectives. Applying the Dewey three-part test, the Court concluded that New York has a substantial interest in stemming the tide of automobile thefts, that regulation of vehicle dismantling reasonably serves that interest, and that statutory safeguards provided adequate substitute for a warrant requirement. The Court rejected the suggestion that the warrantless inspection provisions were designed as an expedient means of enforcing the penal laws, and instead saw narrower, valid regulatory purposes to be served: e.g., establishing a system for tracking stolen automobiles and parts, and enhancing the ability of legitimate businesses to compete. ”[A] State can address a major social problem both by way of an administrative scheme and through penal sanctions,” the Court declared; in such circumstances warrantless administrative searches are permissible in spite of the fact that evidence of criminal activity may well be uncovered in the process. 79
In other contexts, the Court has also elaborated the constitutional requirements affecting administrative inspections and searches. Thus, in Michigan v. Tyler, 80 it subdivided the process by which an investigation of the cause of a fire may be conducted. Entry to fight the fire is, of course, an exception based on exigent circumstances, and no warrant or consent is needed; firemen on the scene may seize evidence relating to the cause under the plain view doctrine. Additional entries to investigate the cause of the fire must be made pursuant to warrant procedures governing administrative searches. Evidence of arson discovered in the course of such an administrative inspection is admissible at trial, but if the investigator finds probable cause to believe that arson has occurred and requires further access to gather evidence for a possible prosecution, he must obtain a criminal search warrant. 81
One curious case has approved a system of ”home visits” by welfare caseworkers, in which the recipients are required to admit the worker or lose eligibility for benefits. 82 In another unusual case, the Court held that asheriff’s assistance to a trailer park owner in disconnecting and removing a mobile home constituted a ”seizure” of the home. Supp.1
In addition, there are now a number of situations, some of them analogous to administrative searches, where ”’special needs’ beyond normal law enforcement . . . justify departures from the usual warrant and probable cause requirements.” 83 In one of these cases the Court, without acknowledging the magnitude of the leap from one context to another, has taken the Dewey/Burger rationale–developed to justify warrantless searches of business establishments–and applied it to justify the significant intrusion into personal privacy represented by urinalysis drug testing. Because of the history of pervasive regulation of the railroad industry, the Court reasoned, railroad employees have a diminished expectation of privacy that makes mandatory urinalysis less intrusive and more reasonable. 84
With respect to automobiles, the holdings are mixed. Random stops of automobiles to check drivers’ licenses, vehicle registrations, and safety conditions were condemned as too intrusive; the degree to which random stops would advance the legitimate governmental interests involved did not outweigh the individual’s legitimate expectations of privacy. 85 On the other hand, in South Dakota v. Opperman, 86 the Court sustained the admission of evidence found when police impounded an automobile from a public street for multiple parking violations and entered the car to secure and inventory valuables for safekeeping. Marijuana was discovered in the glove compartment. The more that I do research on Michael Ioane’s case I find my self troubled. If they can take his rights away illegally – What would they do to any of us little people. I would love to get anyone opinion on Michael Ioane’s case.

Mike Ioane vs the Execution of Warrants .I found this interesting reading on findlaw.com. I think Mike Ioane is right and obviously has done his homework.–The manner of execution of warrants is generally governed by statute and rule, as to time of execution, 155 method of entry, and the like. It was a rule at common law that before an officer could break and enter he must give notice of his office, authority, and purpose and must in effect be refused admittance, 156 and until recently this has been a statutory requirement in the federal system 157 and generally in the States. In Ker v. California, 158 the Court considered the rule of announcement as a constitutional requirement, although a majority there found circumstances justifying entry without announcement. In Wilson v. Arkansas, Supp.2 the Court determined that the common law ”knock and announce” rule is an element of the Fourth Amendment reasonableness inquiry. The rule does not, however, require announcement under all circumstances. The presumption in favor of announcement yields under various circumstances, including those posing a threat of physical violence to officers, those in which a prisoner has escaped and taken refuge in his dwelling, and those in which officers have reason to believe that destruction of evidence is likely. Recent federal laws providing for the issuance of warrants authorizing in certain circumstances ”no-knock” entries to execute warrants will no doubt present the Court with opportunities to explore the configurations of the rule of announcement. 159 A statute regulating the expiration of a warrant and issuance of another ”should be liberally construed in favor of the individual.” 160 Similarly, inasmuch as the existence of probable cause must be established by fresh facts, so the execution of the warrant should be done in timely fashion so as to ensure so far as possible the continued existence of probable cause. 161
In executing a warrant for a search of premises and of named persons on the premises, police officers may not automatically search someone else found on the premises. 162 If they can articulate some reasonable basis for fearing for their safety they may conduct a ”patdown” of the person, but in order to search they must have probable cause particularized with respect to that person. However, in Michigan v. Summers, 163 the Court held that officers arriving to execute a warrant for the search of a house could detain, without being required to articulate any reasonable basis and necessarily therefore without probable cause, the owner or occupant of the house, whom they encountered on the front porch leaving the premises. Applying its intrusiveness test, 164 the Court determined that such a detention, which was ”substantially less intrusive” than an arrest, was justified because of the law enforcement interests in minimizing the risk of harm to officers, facilitating entry and conduct of the search, and preventing flight in the event incriminating evidence is found. 165 Also, under some circumstances officers may search premises on the mistaken but reasonable belief that the premises are described in an otherwise valid warrant. 166
Although for purposes of execution, as for many other matters, there is little difference between search warrants and arrest warrants, one notable difference is that the possession of a valid arrest warrant cannot authorize authorities to enter the home of a third party looking for the person named in the warrant; in order to do that, they need a search warrant signifying that a magistrate has determined that there is probable cause to believe the person named is on the premises. 167 The more that I do research on Michael Ioane’s case I find my self troubled. If they can take his rights away illegally – What would they do to any of us little people. I would love to get anyone opinion on Michael Ioane’s case.

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Friends of Michael S. Ioane is a blog for postings from various authors. We are dedicated to news and information regarding how the Justice Department aids and abets the IRS in criminal activities with special emphasis on the Eastern District Court of California.
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