Philosophy, Medical

This article is about the blending of a mission, vision, and philosophy of care by two systems of health care that are both rich in history and vision. The unique qualities of each hospital are described. The diversified cultures of each organization are discussed in terms of reaching a final decision regarding the joint vision, philosophy of care, and mission of the system that has been redesigned.

In this short theoretical paper, I discuss Bion's three relations of love, hate, and knowledge, using Peirce's semiotic theory of relations and Bakhtin's semiotic/philosophical writings. Reading Bion through the prism of these resources allows us to better understand the meaning and ontogenesis of the basic relations and to examine their clinical explanatory value.

This paper presents the medical practice according to the occidental philosophy (Platon, Spinoza, Kant). Relationships with the concept of "love" (eros, philia, agape) will be described, and the concept of dignity and autonomy as well. The reflection will focus on the end of life aspects. Although medicine cannot avoid morality, ethic, and deontology, it is also part of philosophy and must warrant the respect of human dignity, especially when a physician helps a patient to die.

Bioethical discourse on organ donation covers a wide range of topics, from informed consent procedures and scarcity issues up to 'transplant tourism' and 'organ trade'. This paper presents a 'depth ethics' approach, notably focussing on the tensions, conflicts and ambiguities concerning the status of the human body (as something which constitutes a whole, while at the same time being a set of replaceable elements or parts). These will be addressed from a psychoanalytical (Lacanian) angle. First, I will outline Lacan's view on embodiment as such.

The relationship between love/care and justice was one of the key tensions from which care ethics originated; to this very day it is subject of debate between various streams of thought within care ethics. With some exceptions (e.g. Christa Schnabl) most approaches have in common the belief that care and justice are mutually exclusive concepts, or at least as so different that their application is situated on different levels. Hence, both are complementary, but distinct, so that there is no real interaction.

Cambridge quarterly of healthcare ethics: CQ: the international journal of healthcare ethics committees

Would a "medicalization" of love be a "good" or "bad" form of medicalization? In discussing this question, Earp, Sandberg, and Savulescu primarily focus on the potential positive and negative consequences of turning love into a medical issue. But it can also be asked whether there is something intrinsically regrettable about medicalizing love. It is argued here that the medicalization of love can be seen as an "evaluative category mistake": it treats a core human value (love) as if it were mainly a means to other ends (viz.

Cambridge quarterly of healthcare ethics: CQ: the international journal of healthcare ethics committees

This is a critique of Earp, Sandberg and Savulescu's argument in support of a possible future neuromodulation of love and love-related relationships. I argue that, contrary to what is suggested by Earp, Sandberg and Savulescu, we do have good reason to be concerned about that possibility as well as about the medicalization of love that its pursuit would bring about.

This article seeks to explore and analyze the relationship between autonomy and trust, and to show how these findings could be relevant to medical ethics. First, I will argue that the way in which so-called "relational autonomy theories" tie the notions of autonomy and trust together is not entirely satisfying Then, I will introduce the so-called Encapsulated Interest Account as developed by Russell Hardin. This will bring out the importance of the reasons for trust. What good reasons do we have for trusting someone?