A couple of people have indicated skepticism (sorta) that anyone has ever described what is best described as "necessary a posteriori" as "analytic a posteriori." Well, the fact was that when asked I didn't have a source at hand. I came by one however. Here is a quote from the author of the Wiki essay.
'Kripke's controversial analysis of naming as contingent and a priori would best fit into Kant's epistemological framework by calling it "analytic a posteriori".' http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/A_priori_and_a_posteriori .
For the purpose at hand what is important is that someone in print has used it. This characterization comes from:
Stephen Palmquist: "A Priori Knowledge in Perspective: (II) Naming, Necessity and the Analytic A Posteriori", The Review of Metaphysics 41:2 (December 1987), pp.255-282.
I have heard and seen it. I used it in the subject header because it is one view of modality and epistemology taken to excess. That excess may be what Palmquist has in mind. He may have a good case with respect to Kant's view. Other views are generally the invention of philosophers who eschew traditional distinctions.
By the way, earlier when I mentioned the "Barcan Principle" I meant that from 'x=y' 'Nec(x=y)' follows. Notice this makes no assumptions about rigidity of designators. I've never been happy about including what are, essentially quantifiers (over worlds) in predicates etc. Why. Oh I can't recall; it may have something to do with certain metaphysical biases that might be built into treating modal operators ('possible' and 'necessary') as interdefinable like ordinary quantifiers. Can't recall.
Regards
Steve
Steve
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