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...Since government forces booted Al Qaida out of major port cities in the province of Hadramout on April 24, the governor of Hadramout, Major General Ahmad Bin Bourek, has come under the spotlight apparently for playing a role along with many generals in engineering the plan that pushed out Al Qaida at stunning speed. General Bin Bourek talked to Gulf News about the operation and post-Al Qaida Mukalla, the capital of Hadramout.

What is your general assessment of the situation in the recently liberated areas in Hadramout?

The situation is improving quickly. Today is better than yesterday and yesterday was better than the day before. We are working day and night to bring about security and stability in the city of Mukalla and other regions. The most important [achievement] is putting an end to theft and pillage gangs. The security situation in Mukalla would improve much more when we deploy policemen and army soldiers in their uniform at checkpoints in order for the people to see the features of a standing army that represents the state. Also, armed police officers in uniform would be deployed on streets and in police stations. We seek to present the liberated Mukalla’s culture and civilisation as a model.

You are talking about your efforts to bring peace and security to the city of Mukalla. How about other liberated cities like Ghayel Bawazer and Sheher?

We have sent army troops to the two cities to replace local resistance committees who took charge of security after liberation. We are determined to entrench the state’s symbolism in these two cities through the presence of the army and security services. The army sappers are removing mines planted by Al Qaida in Sheher, and along roads between these two cities and interior localities.

The liberated areas, especially Mukalla, are weirdly peaceful. Many people thought that Al Qaida would retaliate for defeat by mounting deadly suicide attacks. But nothing has happened since liberation. Why?

The forces that were designated to liberate Mukalla were professionally trained in raids and clashes. During our stay outside Yemen, we prepared our plan based on intelligent information from inside Mukalla. We knew their locations and numbers. [Shortly before the operation] we were informed that Al Qaida’s professional fighters had departed the city to Hajjar valley [in Hadramout], Shabwa, Abyan and Marib. The accurate air strikes and their inability to fight off our forces prompted them into exiting.
...

How about the UAE military’s support?

The Emirati brothers had played a vital role by providing air and logistical support that helped Hadrami forces during battles. They trained the elite forces for a year, paid their salaries, armed them and would continue helping us until we stand on our own feet and make sure that the Hadrami leaders would take Hadramout to safety.

Let’s talk about Mukalla liberation plan. How did you prepare it? Who helped you?

Before Al Qaida captured Mukalla in April 2015, we had intelligence that Al Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula was gathering in Hadramout and their leaders were flocking to training and recruiting camps. They were trained in making bombs. The militants were not only from Yemen but of many nationalities including Egyptian, Syrian, American, Australian, French, British and from GCC states. Some militants who plotted the blowing up of US airlines were trained in Hadramout. Our intelligence information showed that the armed men who attacked the French magazine Charlie Hebdo and some who plotted attacks in Belgium were trained in Hadramout and got their plans from here.

Practically, Hadramout has been classified as a central breeding ground for producing and financing terrorism worldwide. Their capture of Mukalla in April last year supported the overall impression about Al Qaida. So it was imperative to create a plan to purge Hadramout of them. But we lacked abilities and training.

So how did you set up this plan?

When Decisive Storm operation began, the coalition, mainly Saudi Arabia and the UAE, backed our plan. The first step was mobilising military forces from Hadramout as the people here would not welcome foreign forces. At the same time, we gathered information about them from our agents who penetrated them.

A month before the beginning of the liberation process, a group of people, who were misled by Al Qaida’s religious banners, contacted us and said they would part ways with Al Qaida if and only if we protected them. They tipped us off about Al Qaida car bombs and training camps. We managed to get rid of Al Qaida in 20 hours as the operation came within a series of military operations by the coalition in other provinces like Lahj, Abyan and Aden. The operations weakened them to a great extent and crippled their abilities for manoeuvring.

We succeeded because all walks of Hadrami society including tribes and Salafis regardless to their religious and political affiliations took part in liberation. We succeeded in record time because Al Qaida realised that no one would fight for or cover them. They found themselves exposed. A night before marching towards Mukalla, we landed some armed Salafis from the sea who controlled the seaport and airport.

Is it true that Al Qaida planted mines inside vital facilities in Mukalla?

They planted a huge number of mines because they felt that no one would stand by them. We are in need of help from brotherly and friendly countries to help us defuse them. They planted them inside police stations, government buildings, parks, the airport and Dhabah oil terminal. The UAE sappers would not be able to completely clear them before six months.

Some media reports say that militants retreated after mediation by local tribal and religious leaders. Can you confirm?

They pushed some forces into mediating with us. After realising that they cannot fight our forces, they demanded that they should be allowed to depart to one area. We refused, as per the directives from the president that there should not be any talks with the terrorists.

Hm... sounds like 'typical Arab-style warfare': short battle, then negotiate (or the other way around).

... Preparations for the current anti-AQAP campaign began as early as April 2015 with the opening of quiet negotiations between the Gulf coalition and key tribes in southern and eastern Yemen. By February 2016, the coalition was engaged in a major military effort to clear AQAP from al-Mukalla and the Lahij-Abyan coastal corridor.

To facilitate the campaign, units from the United Arab Emirates have brought to bear many of the lessons learned during deployments in Somalia, Afghanistan, and Libya. In Aden, the coalition developed six 100-man units of local resistance fighters bolstered by UAE special forces, while Gulf intelligence agencies worked with locals to create an AQAP and Islamic State target list. In early March, coalition airstrikes hit AQAP's leadership in Burayqah and in northern neighborhoods such as Salahuddin, Sheikh Othman, and Mansoura; on March 14, a UAE Mirage 2000 jet crashed in Burayqah during a low pass over Aden, reportedly downed by an AQAP 9K32 Strela man-portable air-defense system (MANPADS). On March 20, 600 Yemeni personnel mounted in UAE-supplied Nimr tactical vehicles launched ground operations against AQAP. With support from UAE Apache helicopters, they cleared the Mansoura district and dislodged AQAP fighters from their stronghold in the Mansoura central prison, killing an estimated 120 of them.

To the east, the coalition undertook a similar project in al-Mukalla, but on a far greater scale. A year ago, it began patiently developing a 10,000-strong force to recapture the city, including around 4,500 Yemeni army troops of the 2nd MRC, around 1,500 tribal fighters from the Hadramawt Tribal Confederation (HTC), and around 4,000 anti-AQAP rebels from within al-Mukalla itself. As in Aden, these forces eventually helped the coalition create a granular target list of AQAP operating locations, which were then hit by airstrikes and naval gunfire beginning on April 18, 2016. On April 20, army troops of the 1st MRC supported by UAE Apaches recaptured the PetroMasila oil facilities 190 kilometers north of al-Mukalla. And on April 23, the coalition launched ground operations to recapture the city itself and its nearby port and military bases. In two days of heavy fighting, AQAP tried to block the 2nd MRC and HTC forces from sweeping south into al-Mukalla, employing defensive positions on the three approach roads about 50 kilometers north. These blocking positions were defeated, allowing relief forces to link up with the anti-AQAP resistance inside the city on April 25, while UAE marines made ancillary landings along the coast to the east. An estimated 450 AQAP fighters were killed in these operations.

The campaigns in al-Mukalla and Aden have been complemented by follow-on efforts to prevent AQAP re-infiltration. Pursuit operations have spread east of Aden and west of al-Mukalla to break the group's hold on coastal towns and roads, and internal resistance forces are being retained as local police, with salaries paid by the coalition for now. In addition, even before liberating certain neighborhoods, coalition forces covertly surveyed the essential services needed by local communities, enabling them to immediately distribute food from warehouses and dispatch reconstruction teams in AQAP's wake to replace or improve on services the group and its tribal allies were providing.
...

Curiously, the final chapter - 'Implications for US Policy' - falls rather short. It is not addressing the issue of negative repercussions for the US (and UK's) politics towards the KSA, allies and Yemen, in the light of what is de-facto a 'defeat' on the PR-plan.

Namely, while it now turns out there was a carefully orchestrated strategy for launching an offensive against the AQAP, run already since April 2015, nothing was done to prevent creation of impression that 'Saudis are not the least keen to fight AQAP', which came into being in the last 15 months.

Even less so to explain cases (especially in such places like Ta'iz) where there is no doubt that US-supported actions by Saudi-led coalitions resulted in support of the local branch of the AQAP too.

My conclusion is that part of reason for this situation is that militaries like those of the Saudis, Emiratis etc. remain 'public shy'. Essentially, for them everything military-related is de-facto OPSEC. However, their brass should either know better, or at least learn that nowadays it's not enough to spend a few billions to buy critical or potentially critical media: one has to take care for the actual message to reach the public too. In the case of this war, there was clearly a failure in this regards.

Correspondingly, a missing lesson from this campaign is that while specific 'Arab' militaries came of their age and are 'finally functioning', their and PR-skills and -relations of their political masters remain a major problem, exactly like in the last 70+ years.

The Gulf coalition has noted AQAP’s focus on winning over the locals through well-publicized (but not necessarily widespread) jobs, social services, and financial inducements. This is one of the many areas in which the United Arab Emirates can draw on its operational experiences in Lebanon, Somalia, Kosovo, Libya, Sinai, and Afghanistan (where a U.A.E. task force operated for over twelve years). Since the summer of 2015, the Emiratis have been preparing the ground for civil-military operations in areas liberated from AQAP, most notably in Mukalla. According to my contacts, U.A.E. special operators and civilians have been used to covertly survey gaps in stocks of food and medicine in local warehouses and hospitals. This has allowed the coalition to immediately begin meeting local needs in terms of food security, medical and teaching support, and replacements for damaged infrastructure.

In Aden, this allowed the coalition to support the reopening of numerous schools in time for the autumn 2015 term, with school furniture and uniforms sourced locally from Yemeni manufacturers to maximize the local economic impact of aid provision. Civil-military operations teams quickly got to work on installing diesel generators and maintaining water pumps and sewage facilities. In Mukalla, the coalition prepositioned humanitarian support onshore and aboard the U.A.E. naval flotilla off the coast, and new supplies are now being flown in. Food, medicines and water purification materials were surged ashore. The Emirates also followed up the liberation of Mukalla by deploying military bridges into the city. If they follow patterns set in other conflict areas, road-building will likely follow, using local contractors. U.A.E. telecommunication companies may throw up new cellphone towers as they did in Afghanistan. The Gulf states will probably support development of local schools, clinics and mosques, and may also invest more broadly in boosting the local economy as a strategic investor, as the Emirates did in Khost province in Afghanistan.
...

Fighting AQAP in coalition

Thanks for the pointer to the WoTR article on UAE's COIN approach; which make very interesting reading. I note the importance of having historical "kith & kin" between southern Yemen and the UAE.

The article ends with an optimistic slant:

AQAP is used to being the smartest player around with the deepest local ties, but a partnership between the Gulf coalition, Yemen, and the United States could present Al-Qaeda and the emergent Islamic State in Yemen with a much tougher set of opponents.

So I note today in Foreign Policy's e-briefing this:

American special operators are back in Yemen, and it doesn’t look like they’re going to leave any time soon. A group of about a dozen U.S. commandos sent to the country in April are going to stick around, U.S. defense officials say, and will help troops from the United Arab Emirates hunt down fighters from al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP).

That sounds like a priority shift for Emirati troops, who have been fighting Houthi rebels for the past year. But Yousef al-Otaiba, the U.A.E.’s ambassador in Washington, told the Washington Post that said his country’s fight against AQAP “will go on for a long period of time...the military priorities have shifted from fighting the Iranian-backed Houthis to being more focused on AQAP".

One must wonder will the UAE have learnt enough to avoid the mistakes the USA and on a smaller scale others encountered in their Yemeni dealings.

IMHO, it's the other way around: there is meanwhile nothing the Emiratis can learn from Americans in this regards any more; only Americans can learn from Emiratis.

Namely, we do not get to hear much about this topic, but Emiratis were actually fighting a low-level COIN war against their own MBs since years, and have de-facto squashed these.

Ops in question included 'regular' (at least 'a few every night') helicopter patrols along their shores, a number of which resulted in discovery and - usually - sinking of boats smuggling militants, arms, etc.

So, they 'arrived in Yemen' already 'blooded', well-experienced, and well-connected.

And ever since... well, their ties to the local population are always going to be several magnitudes better than those of any US troops deployed there.

Crisis in Yemen: The Forgotten War

Last week London's Fontline Club held a meeting on the Yemen, as the war entered a second year; with Iona Craig (who still visits), a yemeni expat who works for Oxfam (one of the sharper UK charities), a regional HRW speaker and an independent UK reporter in the chair (who has reported from the Yemen):http://www.frontlineclub.com/crisis-...forgotten-war/

There is a 90 min podcast, which I expect includes the Q&A. Yet to be listened to.

Since late 2013, two main regional blocs have competed over how to deal with the rise of extremist forces in Syria. The policy in Syria today seems to have finally settled in favour of one of the arguments.

Saudi Arabia and the UAE, on one hand, favoured a twin policy of fighting extremist factions at the same time as battling the regime of Bashar Al Assad. Turkey and Qatar, on the other hand, pushed for toppling Mr Al Assad first. They argued that it would be easier to build a local, regional and international consensus to fight extremists after the downfall of the regime. With varying success, the two sides competed to advance their visions on the ground in Syria and in policy circles outside it.

Around this time in 2013, Jabhat Al Nusra had already revealed its links to Al Qaeda after two years of acting as a local Syrian group with a jihadist bent. ISIL began to establish a foothold for itself in much of Syria, mostly focusing on policing rebel-held areas. Syrian Islamist groups then began discussions to form a unified front. By the end of the year, Islamist and jihadist forces became the main players in rebel-held Syria.

At the beginning of 2014, clashes erupted between the rebel forces and ISIL. This continued until the summer, when the latter took over #Mosul and returned to Syria with a vengeance – eventually controlling about half of the country.

Two summers later, it should be clear that the twin policy of fighting the regime and extremists would have a better chance of working. Today, the two superpowers involved in the Syrian conflict are getting closer to working together to defeat ISIL and Jabhat Al Nusra, after American president Barack Obama reportedly proposed a partnership with Moscow against the Al Qaeda affiliate. Turkey’s policy in Syria was also widely criticised after last Tuesday’s terror attacks inside Istanbul’s Ataturk airport, with many saying that the attacks were payback for neglecting the growing presence of extremists in Syria.

The lesson that must be drawn from how the situation developed in Syria is that the twin policy is more effective. But there is an inherent issue with counterterrorism efforts in the region, often because they have been largely led by the United States, or because operations show little regard for local sensitivities or aspirations. Shifting politics in Washington may also undermine ongoing efforts and therefore perpetuate or exacerbate the problem. So, the apparent solution is for regional countries to take on the task.

This is where the UAE comes in. On Tuesday, Reuters published a detailed account of the Emirati special forces’ counterterrorism mission in southern Yemen – an operation that turned out to be more extensive and impressive than initially made out in media. An Emirati eight-person special forces team landed in Yemen in April 2015 and began to train Yemeni soldiers. The UAE teams trained a 2,000-strong force that drove the Houthi rebels from Aden last July, and further 4,000 forces to run the newly captured city. The UAE special forces then began to prepare for the Mukalla operation which culminated with driving out Al Qaeda.

A US official told the agency that some in Washington had doubted the UAE’s sincerity in attacking Al Qaeda in the port city of Al Mukalla. But the Pentagon deployed a small number of military personnel to help in the fight after an evacuation in early 2015, according to Reuters, in a possible sign of increasing US willingness to re-engage on the ground.

“Whether there’s secession or not, the south is in the hands of its sons and that was made possible by the coalition countries," Mahmoud Al Salmi, a professor at Aden University, said.

What makes the UAE’s mission particularly significant is that the effort is conducted by local forces and led by a regional country with a long-term commitment to the neighbourhood’s stability. This aspect is critical for any counterterrorism effort. While locals who want to expel extremist forces from their areas often seek support from the US, long-term commitment weighs heavily in their calculation. This dynamic is felt in Iraq, Syria and other countries where extremists dominate.

Local tribes or insurgents would rather strike temporary alliances with extremists, even though they could defeat them with some help from the US, because they know the US commitment is often fickle but extremists always come back. That is a lesson many have learnt from the Iraq war, when the people of Anbar joined forces with the American troops to expel the predecessor of ISIL from their areas between 2005 and 2010. The US withdrew from Iraq and left them to deal with an increasingly sectarian government in Baghdad and a growing jihadist force in their midst.

Today, many seek US support but they also want a regional guarantor of long-term commitment. The UAE offers an example of what that commitment looks like.

BUT WAIT the Obama\Rhodes WH policy in fighting IS was what again????......not doing any "stupid ####".....

Defeating AQAP: some context and options

At a recent conference @ Oxford University, hosted by Pembroke College, entitled 'The Lure of Jihad: Propaganda & the Construction of Jihadist Identities' amidst the presentations was one talk that fits here: Keeping the Lure Alive: The evolution of AQAP's Propaganda Strategy & What we can Learn from it' by Dr Elisabeth Kendall. Her research has taken to the eastern provinces, most recently in November 2015.

Due to the Saudi-led blockade AQAP is making US$2m per day taxing imports, especially of fuel;

There is no appetite in the eastern provinces for the Caliphate;

Polling using locally recruited staff to conduct interviews found that 21% state an Iman's role is to advise on all matters; 10% want a 'single, strong leader' definitely not a distant man;

Each family can have up to twenty children and child mortality is high and death is accepted. Alongside having more guns than books in each home - makes them a hardened audience and it is hard to terrorise people like that;

The ability of AQAP to get local "buy in" depends on local, tribal factors and it is clear there is mutual toleration of each other as business is pursued;

When shown an IS 2015 video, showing a local Yemeni IS group, it was widely ridiculed and caused bewilderment;

AQAP have adapted their approach, it is now more nuanced, but there is a contradiction between business and war. No longer are the punishments and stoning seen in 2011-2012 used. They now aim to get popular support by proving they can govern and so help the people. Then they radicalise;

AQAP does not portray graphic violence against non-Muslims;

It is almost a "Robin Hood" method, fighting for justice and righting wrongs. The jihad today is a continuation of the fight against the British (who left in 1967) and AQAP have used stills of British soldiers being buried in Aden in that conflict;

AQAP's tweets (I do wonder how many locals use Twitter) when examined are by issue: 57% development, 18% law, 13% celebrations & parties and 3% Sharia;

There has been considerable population movement to the eastern provinces, notably Al-Mukalla, from the north following the damage caused by the war.

Drones in South Arabia and Yemen

In June 2016 Professor Clive Jones, Durham University, gave a seminar paper which combines history, the wider aspects of drones and contemporary events in the Yemen; the full title being 'Drones as Air Proscription? The case of South Arabia and Yemen in comparative perspective'.

UAE asserts itself

There are several articles in this thread on the UAE's role in this war, so it fits here!

I had not spotted:

But Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates had an on-hand replacement: neighboring Eritrea, Djibouti’s regional rival, which boasts rudimentary ports on the Red Sea just 150 kilometers further north. On April 29, the very day that Djibouti evicted Gulf troops, Eritrean President Isaias Afewerki met with Saudi Arabia’s King Salman bin Abdel Aziz and concluded a security and military partnership agreement with the Gulf states offering basing rights in Eritrea.

On the ground, Saudis in the air

Peter Oborne, a UK journalist, has been to Houthi & others controlled Yemen, with two short film clips - with the caveat Houthi minders were with them. He denounces the UK stance on supporting the Saudi role, principally aerial bombing of civilian targets.
Link:http://www.middleeasteye.net/columns...orne-855615638

Ouch! UAE ship hit & burns in Red Sea

Via twitter by Alex Mello just:

1) UAE HSV-2 Swift making runs between Assab and Aden hit with Houthi anti-ship missile off Mokha; 2) And looks like Houthi dudes in a dhow or speedboat tracked the Swift and filmed the missile strike. Big fail for UAE opsec...; 3) Keep in mind Before UAE HSV was hit by Houthi missile Unconfirmed news about an attack on Assab base

The vessel is a former USN vessel, Swift by class and disposed of to the private sector in 2013 and now operated UAE company. IRRC it was used earlier in the Yemen conflict to move UAE heavy kit to Aden and presumably was ferrying supplies from Assab, Eritrea to the Yemen.

Wiki has:

The UAE leased Swift was reportedly sunk off the Yemeni coast on the 1st of October, 2016 by an anti-ship missile from the brigade 17 tunnel-bunker network in Dhubab[8], the UAE officials reported that the ship was carrying aid when targeted by the anti-ship missile [9]

The U.S. Navy dispatched three warships near the southern coast of Yemen after four rockets hit and nearly sank a United Arab Emirates auxiliary ship Saturday, two U.S. defense officials told Fox News.

Iran-backed Houthi rebels in Yemen claimed responsibility for the attack. There were no reported injuries to the Emerati crew. Al Jazeera reported on video of the attack.

Iran supplied the Houthis with the “shoulder-fired rockets” that nearly destroyed the UAE ship, according to two U.S. officials. It was not immediately clear what type of rocket the rebels may have fired.

The ship was formerly contracted to the U.S., two defense officials confirmed, and at one time an American company owned the vessel.
...

...but photos are clearly showing only one 'entry hole' - with possibility of there being another one, on the port side of the ship.

What's making no sense to me: a radar-guided weapon like C.701 or C.802 would go for either the centre of the ship, or the point with highest RCS, while Swift was hit at the bow.

Another 'problem' is that Swift was made of aluminium, and aluminium is relatively easy to set on fire (burning point at 650°C). So, except for that hole on the staboard side of the bow, most of visible damage was actually caused by fierce fire that burned the entire bridge (and collapsed its flour), and most... well, actually: all of the bow.