And here I would make this enquiry of those worthy
characters who composed a part of the late Federal Convention.
I am sure they were fully impressed with the necessity
of forming a great consolidated Government, instead
of a confederation. That this is a consolidated
Government is demonstrably clear, and the danger of such
a Government, is, to my mind, very striking. I have the
highest veneration of those Gentlemen,--but, Sir, give me
leave to demand, what right had they to say, We, the People.
My political curiosity, exclusive of my anxious solicitude
for the public welfare, leads me to ask who authorised [Volume 1, Page 289]
them to speak the language of, We, the People, instead
of We, the States? States are the characteristics, and the
soul of a confederation. If the States be not the agents of
this compact, it must be one great consolidated National
Government of the people of all the States.

[5 June]

I am not free from suspicion: I am apt to entertain
doubts: I rose yesterday to ask a question, which arose in
my own mind. When I asked the question, I thought the
meaning of my interrogation was obvious: The fate of this
question and America may depend on this: Have they
said, we the States? Have they made a proposal of a compact
between States? If they had, this would be a confederation:
It is otherwise most clearly a consolidated government.
The question turns, Sir, on that poor little thing--the
expression, We, the people, instead of the States of
America. I need not take much pains to show, that the
principles of this system, are extremely pernicious, impolitic,
and dangerous. Is this a Monarchy, like England--a
compact between Prince and people; with checks on the
former, to secure the liberty of the latter? Is this a Confederacy,
like Holland--an association of a number of independent
States, each of which retain its individual sovereignty?
It is not a democracy, wherein the people retain
all their rights securely. Had these principles been adhered
to, we should not have been brought to this alarming
transition, from a Confederacy to a consolidated Government.
We have no detail of those great considerations
which, in my opinion, ought to have abounded before we
should recur to a government of this kind. Here is a revolution
as radical as that which separated us from Great
Britain. It is as radical, if in this transition our rights and
privileges are endangered, and the sovereignty of the
States be relinquished: And cannot we plainly see, that this
is actually the case? The rights of conscience, trial by jury,
liberty of the press, all your immunities and franchises, all
pretensions to human rights and privileges, are rendered
insecure, if not lost, by this change so loudly talked of by
some, and inconsiderately by others. Is this same relinquishment
of rights worthy of freemen? Is it worthy of
that manly fortitude that ought to characterize republicans:
It is said eight States have adopted this plan. I declare
that if twelve States and an half had adopted it, I
would with manly firmness, and in spite of an erring
world, reject it. You are not to inquire how your trade may
be increased, nor how you are to become a great and powerful
people, but how your liberties can be secured; for
liberty ought to be the direct end of your Government.

. . . . .

The distinction between a National Government and a
Confederacy is not sufficiently discerned. Had the delegates
who were sent to Philadelphia a power to propose a
Consolidated Government instead of a Confederacy? Were
they not deputed by States, and not by the people? The
assent of the people in their collective capacity is not necessary
to the formation of a Federal Government. The
people have no right to enter into leagues, alliances, or
confederations: They are not the proper agents for this
purpose: States and sovereign powers are the only proper
agents for this kind of Government: Shew me an instance
where the people have exercised this business: Has it not
always gone through the Legislatures? I refer you to the
treaties with France, Holland, and other nations: How
were they made? Were they not made by the States? Are
the people therefore in their aggregate capacity, the
proper persons to form a Confederacy? This, therefore,
ought to depend on the consent of the Legislatures; the
people having never sent delegates to make any proposition
of changing the Government. Yet I must say, at the
same time, that it was made on grounds the most pure,
and perhaps I might have been brought to consent to it so
far as to the change of Government; but there is one thing
in it which I never would acquiesce in. I mean the changing
it into a Consolidated Government; which is so abhorent
to my mind. The Honorable Gentleman then went on
to the figure we make with foreign nations; the contemptible
one we make in France and Holland; which, according
to the system of my notes, he attributes to the present feeble
Government. An opinion has gone forth, we find, that
we are a contemptible people: The time has been when we
were thought otherwise: Under this same despised Government,
we commanded the respect of all Europe:
Wherefore are we now reckoned otherwise? The American
spirit has fled from hence: It has gone to regions,
where it has never been expected: It has gone to the people
of France in search of a splendid Government--a
strong energetic Government. Shall we imitate the example
of those nations who have gone from a simple to a
splendid Government. Are those nations more worthy of
our imitation? What can make an adequate satisfaction to
them for the loss they suffered in attaining such a Government
for the loss of their liberty? If we admit this Consolidated
Government it will be because we like a great splendid
one. Some way or other we must be a great and mighty
empire; we must have an army, and a navy, and a number
of things: When the American spirit was in its youth, the
language of America was different: Liberty, Sir, was then
the primary object. We are descended from a people
whose Government was founded on liberty: Our glorious
forefathers of Great-Britain, made liberty the foundation
of every thing. That country is become a great, mighty,
and splendid nation; not because their Government is
strong and energetic; but, Sir, because liberty is its direct
end and foundation: We drew the spirit of liberty from
our British ancestors; by that spirit we have triumphed
over every difficulty: But now, Sir, the American spirit,
assisted by the ropes and chains of consolidation, is about
to convert this country to a powerful and mighty empire:
If you make the citizens of this country agree to become
the subjects of one great consolidated empire of America,
your Government will not have sufficient energy to keep
them together: Such a Government is incompatible with
the genius of republicanism: There will be no checks, no
real balances, in this Government: What can avail your
specious imaginary balances, your rope-dancing, chain-rattling,
ridiculous ideal checks and contrivances? But, Sir, we
are not feared by foreigners: we do not make nations
tremble: Would this, Sir, constitute happiness, or secure
liberty? I trust, Sir, our political hemisphere will ever direct [Volume 1, Page 290]
their operations to the security of those objects. Consider
our situation, Sir: Go to the poor man, ask him what
he does; he will inform you, that he enjoys the fruits of his
labour, under his own fig-tree, with his wife and children
around him, in peace and security. Go to every other
member of the society, you will find the same tranquil ease
and content; you will find no alarms or disturbances: Why
then tell us of dangers to terrify us into an adoption of
this new Government? and yet who knows the dangers
that this new system may produce; they are out of the
sight of the common people: They cannot foresee latent
consequences: I dread the operation of it on the middling
and lower class of people: It is for them I fear the adoption
of this system.

[9 June]

We are told that this Government collectively taken, is
without an example--That it is national in this part, and
federal in that part, &c. We may be amused if we please,
by a treatise of political anatomy. In the brain it is national:
The stamina are federal--some limbs are federal--others
national. The Senators are voted for by the State
Legislatures, so far it is federal.--Individuals choose the
members of the first branch; here it is national. It is federal
in conferring general powers; but national in retaining
them. It is not to be supported by the States--The
pockets of individuals are to be searched for its maintenance.
What signifies it to me, that you have the most curious
anatomical description of it in its creation? To all the
common purposes of Legislation it is a great consolidation
of Government. You are not to have a right to legislate in
any but trivial cases: You are not to touch private contracts:
You are not to have the right of having arms in
your own defence: You cannot be trusted with dealing out
justice between man and man. What shall the States have
to do? Take care of the poor--repair and make highways--erect
bridges, and so on, and so on. Abolish the
State Legislatures at once. What purposes should they be
continued for? Our Legislature will indeed be a ludicrous
spectacle--180 men marching in solemn farcical procession,
exhibiting a mournful proof of the lost liberty of
their country--without the power of restoring it. But, Sir,
we have the consolation that it is a mixed Government:
That is, it may work sorely on your neck; but you will have
some comfort by saying, that it was a Federal Government
in its origin.

I beg Gentlemen to consider--lay aside your prejudices--Is
this a Federal Government? Is it not a Consolidated
Government for every purpose almost? Is the Government
of Virginia a State Government after this
Government is adopted? I grant that it is a Republican
Government--but for what purposes? For such trivial domestic
considerations, as render it unworthy the name of
a Legislature.

[12 June]

The State Governments, says he, will possess greater advantages
than the General Government, and will consequently
prevail. His opinion and mine are diametrically
opposite. Bring forth the Federal allurements, and compare
them with the poor contemptible things that the State
Legislatures can bring forth. On the part of the State Legislatures,
there are Justices of Peace and militia officers--And
even these Justices and officers, are bound by oath in
favour of the Constitution. A constable is the only man
who is not obliged to swear paramount allegiance to this
beloved Congress. On the other hand, there are rich, fat
Federal emoluments--your rich, snug, fine, fat Federal offices--The
number of collectors of taxes and excises will
outnumber any thing from the States. Who can cope with
the excisemen and taxmen? There are none in this country,
that can cope with this class of men alone. But, Sir, is
this the only danger? Would to Heaven that it were. If we
are to ask which will last the longest--the State or the General
Government, you must take an army and a navy into
the account. Lay these things together, and add to the
enumeration the superior abilities of those who manage
the General Government. Can then the State Governments
look it in the face? You dare not look it in the face now,
when it is but an embryo. The influence of this Government
will be such, that you never can get amendments; for if
you propose alterations, you will affront them. Let the
Honorable Gentleman consider all these things and say,
whether the State Governments will last as long as the Federal
Government.