Armenia and Azerbaijan’s collision course over Nagorno-Karabakh

Sound principles for conflict resolution over Nagorno-Karabakh exist. But mistrust, a gulf between mediators and the parties involved, as well as Baku and Yerevan's appetite for military gains render the current formula impossible.

May 2017: Soldiers of Nagorno Karabakh army make a patrol close to Martakert frontline, less than 300 meters of the Azerbaijan army positions. (c) NurPhoto/SIPA USA/PA Images. All rights reserved.Twenty-three
years after Armenia and Azerbaijan signed a ceasefire deal that ended
a bloody war over Nagorno-Karabakh, a steady drumbeat of armed
escalation is making a return to large-scale violent conflict more
likely than ever before.

Last
April, a four-day flare-up killed at least 200 people. Further
skirmishes continue to inflict casualties along the Line of Contact
(LoC), the 200km frontline which separates Armenian and Azerbaijani
forces. Both sides intermittently employ heavy artillery and
anti-tank weapons against each other. In May this year, there were
reports of self-guided rockets and missiles falling near densely
populated areas. On 4 July, a
two-year-old
girl and her grandmother
in the Azerbaijani village of Alkhanli were killed.

Years
of military build-up have been propelled in Azerbaijan by oil and gas
windfall and in economically weaker Armenia by Russia’s
preferential prices of weaponry. Alongside highly-mobilised,
bellicose societies
on both sides, these developments risk escalating tensions into an
unprecedented larger-scale conflict. The fallout of a headlong
collision would likely cause immeasurable destruction and exact an
enormous civilian casualty toll far worse than April’s flare-up.
Such developments could even prompt the intervention of regional
powers Russia and Turkey, who have defence commitments with Armenia
and Azerbaijan, respectively.

At
present, Baku and Yerevan say they have little faith in the stalled
conflict settlement process led by the Organisation for Security and
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) Minsk Group. Meetings in May and June
last year between the presidents of Armenia and Azerbaijan produced
no tangible results. Baku’s frustration with the status quo is at
odds with Yerevan’s efforts, in the absence of security, to cement
it.

Yet
after the April 2016 escalation, both sides ultimately share the
conviction that the use of force may be a better means to their ends
than the defunct political talks. This heightens the temptation to
try and use it, or to be ready to respond decisively.

The
aftermath
of April’s escalation

The
April 2016 flare-up stoked up both parties’ appetite for conflict.
Despite heavy casualties on the Armenian and Azerbaijani sides, waves
of pro-war sentiment swept into all segments of society. The four-day
escalation amplified voices calling for a necessary decisive moment
in the two-decades long conflict. Many in both societies now believe
that another war is not only inevitable but may be the best way to
end the perpetual, stalemated tension.

Azerbaijani
society, buoyed by its sense of victory after reclaiming two
strategically significant heights from Armenian side’s control,
felt new confidence in its armed forces. By altering the
much-resented status quo on the ground, it dispelled a myth of
Armenian invincibility built up in the 1992-1994
war. Baku’s heavy investment in its armed forces since 2006 gives
it the feeling of a technological edge that could tip the balance. In
2015, Baku spent $3bn on its military, more than Armenia’s entire
national budget. Many in Azerbaijan consequently believe that a full
reconquest of Nagorno-Karabakh is feasible.

The turbulence after April 2016 was most heavily felt in Nagorno-Karabakh society itself. Although the ethnic Armenian-controlled territory retains close links with Armenia and relies on its military support, much of the population remains relatively isolated

In
contrast, in the aftermath of the April escalation, Armenians
questioned their leadership’s ability to protect Nagorno-Karabakh
and its ethnic Armenian population. At the same time, the escalation
galvanised the Armenian society, which is fully behind a decisive
response to any military challenges. But throughout 2016, with an
upcoming election in Spring 2017, dissatisfaction about the
post-April fall out was directed at politicians. A two-year
constitutional transition from a semi-presidential system to a
parliamentary republic, due to be completed in Spring 2018, has only
increased the ruling elite’s vulnerabilities and restricted its
room for manoeuvrer.
The political elite feels itself under significant pressure not to
repeat their performance and to stand tall in the face of heightening
tensions.

The
turbulence after April 2016 was most heavily felt in Nagorno-Karabakh
society itself. Although the ethnic Armenian-controlled territory
retains close links with Armenia and relies on its military support,
much of the population remains relatively isolated. It harbours a
distinct identity shaped by its experience as a society under siege.
The local de facto Nagorno-Karabakh leadership has in the past years
prioritised economic and administrative reforms through embarking on
programs designed to stimulate the agriculture, energy and foreign
investment sectors, all of which generate local income. Yet following
April’s clashes the local authorities, with Armenia’s support,
reoriented priorities. They shifted local financial resources toward
military purposes, such as the construction of roads and tunnels;
purchasing high-tech equipment; refurbishing trench structures; and
improving surveillance.

Risks
of renewed war

With
increasing militarism on both sides of the Line of Contact, the
relative stability that the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict zone once knew
is vanishing. The danger for both sides is that another flare-up
could easily spiral out of control. In the event of a full-scale
outbreak of violence, neither Baku nor Yerevan are likely to secure
their objectives but rather inflict severe destruction on each other.

Summer-Autumn
2017 is viewed by both sides as a critical period during which their
enemy could intensify military operations. Yerevan believes that the
Azerbaijani public has high expectations after last year’s gains
and thinks Baku’s goal is to re-establish full control over at
least some of the territories surrounding Nagorno-Karabakh (which
are now held by ethnic Armenian forces)
if not all of the conflict region. For its part, Baku believes
Yerevan might provoke a fight to regain the land it lost in April
2016, or otherwise improve its standing. In the absence of military
communications or any dialogue between the sides, a fateful
misinterpretation of both sides’ intentions and activities is
ever-easier to imagine along the front line.

A resident of Shusha displays a photo of a family member killed in the Nagorno-Karabakh War (1991-1994). CC Marco Fieber / Flickr. Some rights reserved.A
new consensus emerged in the Nagorno-Karabakh’s society in the
winter of 2016. In the event of an Azerbaijani attack, it is likely
that Armenian
forces will advance fifteen kilometres
beyond the LoC into Azerbaijani territory in order to establish a
larger buffer zone and secure new bargaining chips for eventual
negotiations. Armenians believe such a move would break their enemy’s
will to fight once and for all. Yet this would be a highly risky
strategy. Baku is keen to make use of its technical and quantitative
advantage in weaponry and equipment supplied by Russia, Israel,
Pakistan and Turkey, as well as its ever-expanding military numbers,
to inflict heavy costs.

Keeping
another flare-up remote, limited and local will be difficult. In the
event that either side comes under heavy pressure, their possession
of ballistic missiles
–
absent during the 1990s conflict –
all but guarantees widespread destruction of civilian, economic and
military infrastructure. Neither side can necessarily prevent
triggering regional tripwires that might cause a far larger war.
While Armenia is a member of the Collective Security Treaty
Organization (CTSO) led by Russia and also has bilateral defence
commitments with Russia, Azerbaijan in 2010 signed an Agreement on
Strategic Partnership and Mutual Support with Turkey.

A
sudden escalation will quickly have major humanitarian impact,
widespread displacement and an unprecedented number of casualties. An
Armenian advance into the Azerbaijani side of the LoC would impact
numerous densely populated settlements of ethnic Azerbaijanis.
Estimates suggest that anywhere between 300,000 to 600,000 residents
would be displaced in the event of open conflict. Moreover, war would
put the 150,000 inhabitants of Nagorno-Karabakh itself under huge
strain. Soviet-era bomb shelters are locked or decrepit and many
residents remain unclear of what to do in the event of war. Basic
medicinal supplies and foodstuffs are limited.

Unlocking
the settlement process

The
April 2016 hostilities clarified the risks
as well as heavy costs
of renewed conflict. But far from spurring the two parties to
cooperate and reinvigorate the moribund negotiation process, two
subsequent high-level meetings in Vienna and St

Petersburg
were unable to reach any agreement. Negotiations ground to a halt in
September 2016, with some indications in Spring 2017 that another
meeting between presidents is being considered for later this year.

Public
opinion on both sides appears increasingly entrenched, bellicose and
uncompromising. Respective leaders tread a fine line between
appeasing hawkish domestic constituencies and compromising just
enough to move the settlement process forward – or at least to
prevent the blame for failure falling on their own shoulders.
Ironically, Armenian and Azerbaijani leaders face the same dilemma.
Mutual concessions that might benefit the two countries and lower
tensions in the longer term could in the shorter run threaten
internal stability and the survival of ruling elites. There is thus
little incentive for compromise. The tactical use of force remains
the dominant modus operandi to gain advantage at the negotiating
table.

October 2014: French president Francois Hollande hosts talks with his Azerbaijan' counterpart Ilham Aliyev as part of the Armenia-Azerbaijan Summit over Nagorno-Karabakh. (c) Pool/ABACA/PA Images. All rights reserved.Further
compounding the stalemate is Yerevan and Baku’s deep mistrust of
international mediators who they perceive as guided by the interests
of major powers and incapable of ensuring the region’s security. In
theory, both sides seek a more proactive mediation role of the OSCE
Minsk Group. In practice, both sides want the Minsk Group to
criticise and assign responsibility for stalled talks and the
deteriorating security situation on the other party. So far the Minsk
Group Co-Chair countries, Russia, the US and France, have remained
highly cautious and only the Russian co-chair has had backing by the
country’s leadership.

The
cause of peace has suffered from waning western interest over the
past decade. Russia is the sole country consistently demonstrating
high level political will to engage, at the same time as selling
weaponry to both parties. Both Baku and Yerevan suspect that Moscow
is using this leverage to buttress its geopolitical presence in the
South Caucasus, an area it considers a “sphere of privileged
interests”. The absence of western leadership has left the two
parties at the mercy of Russian mediation. Although Moscow has been
active in forwarding proposals, they have gained little traction or
support. The Lavrov Plan of late 2015, predicated on the return to
Azerbaijan of five or seven Armenian-controlled Azerbaijani districts
adjacent to Nagorno-Karabakh, security arrangements and interim
status for Nagorno-Karabakh, sparked Armenian anger and fears that
Russia’s position was shifting toward Baku.

Outstanding
issues

So
long as the conflict’s core sticking points remain unaddressed,
both sides treat war as a real option. Three main issues have
remained unresolved on the negotiating table since the end of the
1990s war. Resolution of these are the only way to build a solid
foundation for a durable peace.

First,
seven Azerbaijani districts outside Nagorno-Karabakh itself have been
held by ethnic Armenian forces since 1994. While Baku insists these
territories are under “occupation” – the term used in UN
Security Council Resolutions 822, 853, 874 and 884 from the 1992-1994
war – Yerevan says the territories can only be returned within a
larger agreement, which will also take into consideration security
arrangements and the status of Nagorno-Karabakh.

In order to address the outstanding conflict issues, a first stepping stone will be to combat the profound lack of trust between leaders and the societies

Second,
principles of self-determination and territorial integrity are far
from a black-and-white issue. Azerbaijan insists on self-rule for
Nagorno-Karabakh within Azerbaijan, thus guaranteeing Azerbaijan’s
territorial integrity. Armenia calls for self-determination of
Nagorno-Karabakh outside of Azerbaijan, which would in practice lead
to independence for the territory, even if that may be a prelude to a
union with Armenia.The precedents of Kosovo’s recognition by the
West, and Russia’s unilateral recognition of Abkhazia and South
Ossetia as well as its annexation of Crimea in 2014 have particular
resonance in Nagorno-Karabakh. These cases stoke fears that
discussions of Nagorno-Karabakh’s status might make the conflict’s
parties pawns in a larger geopolitical chess game.

For all sides, state-led propaganda has entrenched public opinion against concessions. (c) Sergei Grits / AP / Press Association Images. All rights reserved.Third,
peacekeeping forces and broader international security agreements are
a precondition for return of the territories around NK under
Azerbaijani control, as well as for the return home of hundreds of
thousands of ethnic Azerbaijanis, displaced by the 1990s war. Aside
from the two sides’ general lack of faith that international
guarantees will be respected, much debate exists on the composition
and mandate of such a security force. Only Russia has expressed
willingness to send military personnel. But in a rare example of
mutual agreement, neither Baku nor Yerevan wish to see Russian
peacekeepers in the conflict zone.

Troop deployment by any outside
power, particularly Russia, is a hard pill to swallow for post-Soviet
Armenia and Azerbaijan,
who have both recently celebrated a quarter century of sovereign
independence.

A
way forward?

In
order to address the outstanding conflict issues, a first stepping
stone will be to combat the profound lack of trust between leaders
and the societies.

Since the 1990s, negotiations have become the
prerogative of the two sides’ presidents and foreign ministers.
While all alternative channels of communications are closed, the
rhetoric since April 2016 has grown increasingly provocative. The
hyper-personalisation of the process means substantive positions are
the sole responsibility of the individual rather than broader
institutions. When relations are frosty between leaders, as present
circumstances demonstrate, negotiations cannot be divorced from the
prevailing political climate.

Progress
will also partly depend on restoring faith in international
diplomatic mediation, namely
the Minsk Group.
Negotiations are the only way out of the current impasse and the best
way to avert another war. Sound principles for conflict resolution
exist, but pervasive mistrust, a gulf between outside mediators and
the parties involved, and Baku and Yerevan’s current appetite for
maximal military gains render the current formula incapacitated.

Western
powers, particularly Washington and Paris, will need to reinvigorate
their interest in conflict. High-level coordination with Moscow to
kickstart substantive discussions on the unresolved issues is
pivotal. In the short term, the Minsk Group can work on enhancing
monitoring, implementing an investigative mechanism and increasing
cross-party communication between political elites and militaries.
Such proposals were discussed in Vienna and St Petersburg and need to
proceed, but must be accompanied by the more substantive discussions
of outstanding issues.

While
Yerevan favours security confidence building measures before
substantive talks, Baku will balk at their implementation without the
prospect of discussions. Pressure from high-level powers here is
capable of bridging the divide. They can also push Armenia and
Azerbaijan to tone down their hostile rhetoric, soften their
negotiating position, and acknowledge – privately and publicly –
that this conflict ultimately will only be resolved through
negotiations. Ultimately, the mentality that currently persists,
namely that stalemate, even war, are better options than compromise
and negotiation, must be overcome.

About the authors

Olesya Vartanyan is the Europe Fellow at International Crisis Group, the independent conflict prevention organisation.

Magdalena Grono is Europe and Central Asia Program Director at International Crisis Group, the independent conflict prevention organisation.

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