Comments on: Patent office arms race will hurt nanotechnologyhttp://www.foresight.org/nanodot/?p=2581
examining transformative technologyMon, 09 Mar 2015 21:23:08 +0000hourly1http://wordpress.org/?v=3.0.4By: http://www.foresight.org/nanodot/?p=2581#comment-836224
Thu, 23 Apr 2009 12:03:05 +0000http://www.foresight.org/nanodot/?p=2581#comment-836224Hi!zebo! http://metffhxr.com rbwmo zuegoHi!zebo! http://metffhxr.com rbwmo zuego
]]>By: Phillip Hugganhttp://www.foresight.org/nanodot/?p=2581#comment-411039
Phillip HugganTue, 20 Nov 2007 20:23:30 +0000http://www.foresight.org/nanodot/?p=2581#comment-411039Giving this some more thought...
This problem seems inherently self-limiting in that the complexity of an innovation is itself a barrier; no need to patent an idea that is so hard and multi-faceted as to be unlikely to be copied. Trade secrets work fine too.
Two public goods patents provide is a greater incentive to spend R+D dollars for an item that can't be pirated for 20 years, and also providing an industrial product library for all. The latter utility could be expanded if a first-mover advantage is given: Allow a given patent existing liberties. But if a second actor patents something that includes the initial patent and beyond, and the patent is so complex as to dwarve the faculties of the P.O., have the second actor pay the cost to the patent office of hiring independant consultants/engineers/scientists to verify the second actor is not merely acting as a "legal leech". The net process would be an increase in initial vague patents, with a reduction in further specific patents. I don't know how to best penalize initial patents filed to be too broad. Perhaps reducing their lifespan?Giving this some more thought…
This problem seems inherently self-limiting in that the complexity of an innovation is itself a barrier; no need to patent an idea that is so hard and multi-faceted as to be unlikely to be copied. Trade secrets work fine too.
Two public goods patents provide is a greater incentive to spend R+D dollars for an item that can’t be pirated for 20 years, and also providing an industrial product library for all. The latter utility could be expanded if a first-mover advantage is given: Allow a given patent existing liberties. But if a second actor patents something that includes the initial patent and beyond, and the patent is so complex as to dwarve the faculties of the P.O., have the second actor pay the cost to the patent office of hiring independant consultants/engineers/scientists to verify the second actor is not merely acting as a “legal leech”. The net process would be an increase in initial vague patents, with a reduction in further specific patents. I don’t know how to best penalize initial patents filed to be too broad. Perhaps reducing their lifespan?
]]>By: Phillip Hugganhttp://www.foresight.org/nanodot/?p=2581#comment-400561
Phillip HugganMon, 12 Nov 2007 20:11:52 +0000http://www.foresight.org/nanodot/?p=2581#comment-400561How about PO's accrediting "partial patents"? That is, letting a complicated interdisciplinary patent proceed tentatively, with the patent office reserving the right to question the validity of the patent at a later date using more skilled patent examiners.
Another variable to adjust would be the patent price, a development that would be anathnaemia to industrializing cutting edge fields.
Tax breaks for corporations/individuals who volunteer staff/time for patent examinations where no conflict of interest exists?
A wiki-patents where the editors have Ph.D's?How about PO’s accrediting “partial patents”? That is, letting a complicated interdisciplinary patent proceed tentatively, with the patent office reserving the right to question the validity of the patent at a later date using more skilled patent examiners.
Another variable to adjust would be the patent price, a development that would be anathnaemia to industrializing cutting edge fields.
Tax breaks for corporations/individuals who volunteer staff/time for patent examinations where no conflict of interest exists?