At 7/7/2014 9:20:45 PM, Rational_Thinker9119 wrote:The Big 4, at least as far as the mind is concerned, are Physicalism, Dualism, Idealism, and Neutral Monism. Which one makes the most sense to you and why?

I haven't read much on neutral monism, but it doesn't seem obvious how it is any different to physicalism, which seems by definition to be anything 'not-mental'.

At 7/7/2014 9:20:45 PM, Rational_Thinker9119 wrote:The Big 4, at least as far as the mind is concerned, are Physicalism, Dualism, Idealism, and Neutral Monism. Which one makes the most sense to you and why?

I haven't read much on neutral monism, but it doesn't seem obvious how it is any different to physicalism, which seems by definition to be anything 'not-mental'.

Then anything non-physical would be mental. So, one could just as easily say "how is that any different than Idealism?". So, it seems you are special pleading. Either way, I wouldn't say that anything non-mental is physical. There are other requirements, like, not being spacetime, or existing in spacetime. Neutral Monism is the view that what we call the mind (that which has experiences, thoughts ect.) and what we call the physical (that which is spacetime, and in spacetime), both reduces to some third substance.

At 7/7/2014 9:20:45 PM, Rational_Thinker9119 wrote:The Big 4, at least as far as the mind is concerned, are Physicalism, Dualism, Idealism, and Neutral Monism. Which one makes the most sense to you and why?

None of them? But I'm not exactly concerned with that way of thinking about ontology in the first place. To me, the question of what pure being is is less interesting (and less knowable) then the question of how we experience being as living subjects. Because I think it's an outdated way of thinking about things to presume that we have (or even can approach) pure unmediated understanding of reality (Kant and all that). But the fact that we're nevertheless forced to act as beings in a world which we actively change (and which, conversely, actively changes us) means that we (usually unconsciously) tend to participate in and reify ways of mediating it (Kant for instance argued for transcendental functions in the mind which reality is necessarily mediated through). That isn't to say though that it's not fruitful to talk about ontology. For instance- how our ontological conceptions of the world condition our behaviors (and whether that's positive or negative), whether those conceptions are necessary or subject to change, etc, etc, seems like a much more fruitful endeavor then squinting off into the void and trying to totalize it into some referential grid.

At 7/7/2014 9:20:45 PM, Rational_Thinker9119 wrote:The Big 4, at least as far as the mind is concerned, are Physicalism, Dualism, Idealism, and Neutral Monism. Which one makes the most sense to you and why?

None of them? But I'm not exactly concerned with that way of thinking about ontology in the first place. To me, the question of what pure being is is less interesting (and less knowable) then the question of how we experience being as living subjects. Because I think it's an outdated way of thinking about things to presume that we have (or even can approach) pure unmediated understanding of reality (Kant and all that). But the fact that we're nevertheless forced to act as beings in a world which we actively change (and which, conversely, actively changes us) means that we (usually unconsciously) tend to participate in and reify ways of mediating it (Kant for instance argued for transcendental functions in the mind which reality is necessarily mediated through). That isn't to say though that it's not fruitful to talk about ontology. For instance- how our ontological conceptions of the world condition our behaviors (and whether that's positive or negative), whether those conceptions are necessary or subject to change, etc, etc, seems like a much more fruitful endeavor then squinting off into the void and trying to totalize it into some referential grid.

I think Idealism makes the most sense personally. That is because everything we posit as physically existing is just an aspect of our experience. Take this "computer monitor" for instance, all I am doing is labeling an aspect of my conscious experience; the rectangular shape with colors and more shapes and colors that are part of my experience. However, I have no reason to posit anything "physical" beyond experience and the things experience contains, as all we ever really have at any given moment is experience. So, the idea that everything is mental is the simplest and most rational ontology in my opinion.

At 7/7/2014 9:20:45 PM, Rational_Thinker9119 wrote:The Big 4, at least as far as the mind is concerned, are Physicalism, Dualism, Idealism, and Neutral Monism. Which one makes the most sense to you and why?

None of them? But I'm not exactly concerned with that way of thinking about ontology in the first place. To me, the question of what pure being is is less interesting (and less knowable) then the question of how we experience being as living subjects. Because I think it's an outdated way of thinking about things to presume that we have (or even can approach) pure unmediated understanding of reality (Kant and all that). But the fact that we're nevertheless forced to act as beings in a world which we actively change (and which, conversely, actively changes us) means that we (usually unconsciously) tend to participate in and reify ways of mediating it (Kant for instance argued for transcendental functions in the mind which reality is necessarily mediated through). That isn't to say though that it's not fruitful to talk about ontology. For instance- how our ontological conceptions of the world condition our behaviors (and whether that's positive or negative), whether those conceptions are necessary or subject to change, etc, etc, seems like a much more fruitful endeavor then squinting off into the void and trying to totalize it into some referential grid.

I think Idealism makes the most sense personally. That is because everything we posit as physically existing is just an aspect of our experience. Take this "computer monitor" for instance, all I am doing is labeling an aspect of my conscious experience; the rectangular shape with colors and more shapes and colors that are part of my experience. However, I have no reason to posit anything "physical" beyond experience and the things experience contains, as all we ever really have at any given moment is experience. So, the idea that everything is mental is the simplest and most rational ontology in my opinion.

Thanks for sharing I suppose. Though I think you sort of ignored most or all of what I just said. I'm (for lack of a better word) a materialist. I think that questions as to the being or stuff of the universe is not only an unimportant question in itself (I think philosophy for the most part should definitely have a more political utility- though that's a side dispute I suppose) but that it's a sort of dead question. Kant showed that we don't experience reality unmediated. He argued that our mind itself was transcendental, filtering everything through concepts like space and temporality (so that while pure being may not necessarily exist that way, our minds nevertheless have no other way of experiencing it). Marx went further and argued that while we don't experience reality as it is in itself, the so-called transcendental point of reference which grounds certain universalities of experience was itself materially mediated, that it was historically specific and vulnerable to change (though the tool which guided this change, historical materialism, isn't something which has much merit). Anyways my point is that the question is posed wrongly. I'm not up for debating between different options when it seems clear that the presumptions implicit in all of them is problematic in itself.

At 7/7/2014 9:20:45 PM, Rational_Thinker9119 wrote:The Big 4, at least as far as the mind is concerned, are Physicalism, Dualism, Idealism, and Neutral Monism. Which one makes the most sense to you and why?

None of them? But I'm not exactly concerned with that way of thinking about ontology in the first place. To me, the question of what pure being is is less interesting (and less knowable) then the question of how we experience being as living subjects. Because I think it's an outdated way of thinking about things to presume that we have (or even can approach) pure unmediated understanding of reality (Kant and all that). But the fact that we're nevertheless forced to act as beings in a world which we actively change (and which, conversely, actively changes us) means that we (usually unconsciously) tend to participate in and reify ways of mediating it (Kant for instance argued for transcendental functions in the mind which reality is necessarily mediated through). That isn't to say though that it's not fruitful to talk about ontology. For instance- how our ontological conceptions of the world condition our behaviors (and whether that's positive or negative), whether those conceptions are necessary or subject to change, etc, etc, seems like a much more fruitful endeavor then squinting off into the void and trying to totalize it into some referential grid.

I think Idealism makes the most sense personally. That is because everything we posit as physically existing is just an aspect of our experience. Take this "computer monitor" for instance, all I am doing is labeling an aspect of my conscious experience; the rectangular shape with colors and more shapes and colors that are part of my experience. However, I have no reason to posit anything "physical" beyond experience and the things experience contains, as all we ever really have at any given moment is experience. So, the idea that everything is mental is the simplest and most rational ontology in my opinion.

Thanks for sharing I suppose. Though I think you sort of ignored most or all of what I just said. I'm (for lack of a better word) a materialist. I think that questions as to the being or stuff of the universe is not only an unimportant question in itself (I think philosophy for the most part should definitely have a more political utility- though that's a side dispute I suppose) but that it's a sort of dead question. Kant showed that we don't experience reality unmediated. He argued that our mind itself was transcendental, filtering everything through concepts like space and temporality (so that while pure being may not necessarily exist that way, our minds nevertheless have no other way of experiencing it). Marx went further and argued that while we don't experience reality as it is in itself, the so-called transcendental point of reference which grounds certain universalities of experience was itself materially mediated, that it was historically specific and vulnerable to change (though the tool which guided this change, historical materialism, isn't something which has much merit). Anyways my point is that the question is posed wrongly. I'm not up for debating between different options when it seems clear that the presumptions implicit in all of them is problematic in itself.

"I'm not up for debating between different options when it seems clear that the presumptions implicit in all of them is problematic in itself."

Well, there aren't any other options as far as I can tell. At least one of the 4 is true.

"Marx went further and argued that while we don't experience reality as it is in itself, the so-called transcendental point of reference which grounds certain universalities of experience was itself materially mediated."

What grounds the universalities of our experiences is a grand mind who's dream we all share (God's), at least in my Idealistic view. I don't find any value in positing a physical world that doesn't reduce to the mental.

At 7/7/2014 9:20:45 PM, Rational_Thinker9119 wrote:The Big 4, at least as far as the mind is concerned, are Physicalism, Dualism, Idealism, and Neutral Monism. Which one makes the most sense to you and why?

None of them? But I'm not exactly concerned with that way of thinking about ontology in the first place. To me, the question of what pure being is is less interesting (and less knowable) then the question of how we experience being as living subjects. Because I think it's an outdated way of thinking about things to presume that we have (or even can approach) pure unmediated understanding of reality (Kant and all that). But the fact that we're nevertheless forced to act as beings in a world which we actively change (and which, conversely, actively changes us) means that we (usually unconsciously) tend to participate in and reify ways of mediating it (Kant for instance argued for transcendental functions in the mind which reality is necessarily mediated through). That isn't to say though that it's not fruitful to talk about ontology. For instance- how our ontological conceptions of the world condition our behaviors (and whether that's positive or negative), whether those conceptions are necessary or subject to change, etc, etc, seems like a much more fruitful endeavor then squinting off into the void and trying to totalize it into some referential grid.

I think Idealism makes the most sense personally. That is because everything we posit as physically existing is just an aspect of our experience. Take this "computer monitor" for instance, all I am doing is labeling an aspect of my conscious experience; the rectangular shape with colors and more shapes and colors that are part of my experience. However, I have no reason to posit anything "physical" beyond experience and the things experience contains, as all we ever really have at any given moment is experience. So, the idea that everything is mental is the simplest and most rational ontology in my opinion.

Thanks for sharing I suppose. Though I think you sort of ignored most or all of what I just said. I'm (for lack of a better word) a materialist. I think that questions as to the being or stuff of the universe is not only an unimportant question in itself (I think philosophy for the most part should definitely have a more political utility- though that's a side dispute I suppose) but that it's a sort of dead question. Kant showed that we don't experience reality unmediated. He argued that our mind itself was transcendental, filtering everything through concepts like space and temporality (so that while pure being may not necessarily exist that way, our minds nevertheless have no other way of experiencing it). Marx went further and argued that while we don't experience reality as it is in itself, the so-called transcendental point of reference which grounds certain universalities of experience was itself materially mediated, that it was historically specific and vulnerable to change (though the tool which guided this change, historical materialism, isn't something which has much merit). Anyways my point is that the question is posed wrongly. I'm not up for debating between different options when it seems clear that the presumptions implicit in all of them is problematic in itself.

"I'm not up for debating between different options when it seems clear that the presumptions implicit in all of them is problematic in itself."

Well, there aren't any other options as far as I can tell. At least one of the 4 is true.

Read ma words. I have an epistemological disagreement with the framing of the question you posed bruh

"Marx went further and argued that while we don't experience reality as it is in itself, the so-called transcendental point of reference which grounds certain universalities of experience was itself materially mediated."

What grounds the universalities of our experiences is a grand mind who's dream we all share (God's), at least in my Idealistic view. I don't find any value in positing a physical world that doesn't reduce to the mental.

At 7/7/2014 9:20:45 PM, Rational_Thinker9119 wrote:The Big 4, at least as far as the mind is concerned, are Physicalism, Dualism, Idealism, and Neutral Monism. Which one makes the most sense to you and why?

Dualism! But mainly because I don't think the rest are consistent with scripture. I still need to have a look at all the arguments though.

"Cartesian dualism leads to a problem associated with the connectivity problem we have just discussed: if reality consists of two different "substances", then what connects these substances in one unified "reality"? What is the medium which sustains their respective existences and the putative difference relationship between them? One possible (wrong) answer is that their relationship is merely abstract, and therefore irrelevant to material reality and devoid of material influence; another is that like the physical epiphenomenon of mind itself, it is essentially physical. But these positions, which are seen in association with a slew of related philosophical doctrines including physicalism, materialism, naturalism, objectivism, epiphenomenalism and eliminativism, merely beg the question that Cartesian dualism was intended to answer, namely the problem of mental causation.

Conveniently, modern logic affords a new level of analytical precision with respect to the Cartesian and Kantian dichotomies. Specifically, the branch of logic called model theory distinguishes theories from their universes, and considers the intervening semantic and interpretative mappings. Calling a theory an object language and its universe of discourse an object universe, it combines them in a metaobject domain consisting of the correspondences among their respective components and systems of components, and calls the theory or language in which this metaobject domain is analyzed a metalanguage. In like manner, the relationship between the metalanguage and the metaobject domain can be analyzed in a higher- level metalanguage, and so on. Because this situation can be recursively extended, level by level and metalanguage by metalanguage, in such a way that languages and their universes are conflated to an arbitrary degree, reality can with unlimited precision be characterized as a "metalinguistic metaobject".

In this setting, the philosophical dichotomies in question take on a distinctly mathematical hue. Because theories are abstract, subjectively-formed mental constructs, the mental, subjective side of reality can now be associated with the object language and metalanguage(s), while the physical, objective side of reality can be associated with the object universe and metauniverse(s), i.e. the metaobject domain(s). It takes very little effort to see that the mental/subjective and physical/objective sides of reality are now combined in the metaobjects, and that Cartesian and Kantian "substance dualism" have now been transformed to "property dualism" or dual-aspect monism. That is, we are now talking, in mathematically precise terms, about a "universal substance" of which mind and matter, the abstract and the concrete, the cognitive-perceptual and the physical, are mere properties or aspects."

"Cartesian dualism leads to a problem associated with the connectivity problem we have just discussed: if reality consists of two different "substances", then what connects these substances in one unified "reality"? What is the medium which sustains their respective existences and the putative difference relationship between them? One possible (wrong) answer is that their relationship is merely abstract, and therefore irrelevant to material reality and devoid of material influence; another is that like the physical epiphenomenon of mind itself, it is essentially physical. But these positions, which are seen in association with a slew of related philosophical doctrines including physicalism, materialism, naturalism, objectivism, epiphenomenalism and eliminativism, merely beg the question that Cartesian dualism was intended to answer, namely the problem of mental causation.

Conveniently, modern logic affords a new level of analytical precision with respect to the Cartesian and Kantian dichotomies. Specifically, the branch of logic called model theory distinguishes theories from their universes, and considers the intervening semantic and interpretative mappings. Calling a theory an object language and its universe of discourse an object universe, it combines them in a metaobject domain consisting of the correspondences among their respective components and systems of components, and calls the theory or language in which this metaobject domain is analyzed a metalanguage. In like manner, the relationship between the metalanguage and the metaobject domain can be analyzed in a higher- level metalanguage, and so on. Because this situation can be recursively extended, level by level and metalanguage by metalanguage, in such a way that languages and their universes are conflated to an arbitrary degree, reality can with unlimited precision be characterized as a "metalinguistic metaobject".

In this setting, the philosophical dichotomies in question take on a distinctly mathematical hue. Because theories are abstract, subjectively-formed mental constructs, the mental, subjective side of reality can now be associated with the object language and metalanguage(s), while the physical, objective side of reality can be associated with the object universe and metauniverse(s), i.e. the metaobject domain(s). It takes very little effort to see that the mental/subjective and physical/objective sides of reality are now combined in the metaobjects, and that Cartesian and Kantian "substance dualism" have now been transformed to "property dualism" or dual-aspect monism. That is, we are now talking, in mathematically precise terms, about a "universal substance" of which mind and matter, the abstract and the concrete, the cognitive-perceptual and the physical, are mere properties or aspects."

"Cartesian dualism leads to a problem associated with the connectivity problem we have just discussed: if reality consists of two different "substances", then what connects these substances in one unified "reality"? What is the medium which sustains their respective existences and the putative difference relationship between them? One possible (wrong) answer is that their relationship is merely abstract, and therefore irrelevant to material reality and devoid of material influence; another is that like the physical epiphenomenon of mind itself, it is essentially physical. But these positions, which are seen in association with a slew of related philosophical doctrines including physicalism, materialism, naturalism, objectivism, epiphenomenalism and eliminativism, merely beg the question that Cartesian dualism was intended to answer, namely the problem of mental causation.

Conveniently, modern logic affords a new level of analytical precision with respect to the Cartesian and Kantian dichotomies. Specifically, the branch of logic called model theory distinguishes theories from their universes, and considers the intervening semantic and interpretative mappings. Calling a theory an object language and its universe of discourse an object universe, it combines them in a metaobject domain consisting of the correspondences among their respective components and systems of components, and calls the theory or language in which this metaobject domain is analyzed a metalanguage. In like manner, the relationship between the metalanguage and the metaobject domain can be analyzed in a higher- level metalanguage, and so on. Because this situation can be recursively extended, level by level and metalanguage by metalanguage, in such a way that languages and their universes are conflated to an arbitrary degree, reality can with unlimited precision be characterized as a "metalinguistic metaobject".

In this setting, the philosophical dichotomies in question take on a distinctly mathematical hue. Because theories are abstract, subjectively-formed mental constructs, the mental, subjective side of reality can now be associated with the object language and metalanguage(s), while the physical, objective side of reality can be associated with the object universe and metauniverse(s), i.e. the metaobject domain(s). It takes very little effort to see that the mental/subjective and physical/objective sides of reality are now combined in the metaobjects, and that Cartesian and Kantian "substance dualism" have now been transformed to "property dualism" or dual-aspect monism. That is, we are now talking, in mathematically precise terms, about a "universal substance" of which mind and matter, the abstract and the concrete, the cognitive-perceptual and the physical, are mere properties or aspects."

"Cartesian dualism leads to a problem associated with the connectivity problem we have just discussed: if reality consists of two different "substances", then what connects these substances in one unified "reality"? What is the medium which sustains their respective existences and the putative difference relationship between them? One possible (wrong) answer is that their relationship is merely abstract, and therefore irrelevant to material reality and devoid of material influence; another is that like the physical epiphenomenon of mind itself, it is essentially physical. But these positions, which are seen in association with a slew of related philosophical doctrines including physicalism, materialism, naturalism, objectivism, epiphenomenalism and eliminativism, merely beg the question that Cartesian dualism was intended to answer, namely the problem of mental causation.

Conveniently, modern logic affords a new level of analytical precision with respect to the Cartesian and Kantian dichotomies. Specifically, the branch of logic called model theory distinguishes theories from their universes, and considers the intervening semantic and interpretative mappings. Calling a theory an object language and its universe of discourse an object universe, it combines them in a metaobject domain consisting of the correspondences among their respective components and systems of components, and calls the theory or language in which this metaobject domain is analyzed a metalanguage. In like manner, the relationship between the metalanguage and the metaobject domain can be analyzed in a higher- level metalanguage, and so on. Because this situation can be recursively extended, level by level and metalanguage by metalanguage, in such a way that languages and their universes are conflated to an arbitrary degree, reality can with unlimited precision be characterized as a "metalinguistic metaobject".

In this setting, the philosophical dichotomies in question take on a distinctly mathematical hue. Because theories are abstract, subjectively-formed mental constructs, the mental, subjective side of reality can now be associated with the object language and metalanguage(s), while the physical, objective side of reality can be associated with the object universe and metauniverse(s), i.e. the metaobject domain(s). It takes very little effort to see that the mental/subjective and physical/objective sides of reality are now combined in the metaobjects, and that Cartesian and Kantian "substance dualism" have now been transformed to "property dualism" or dual-aspect monism. That is, we are now talking, in mathematically precise terms, about a "universal substance" of which mind and matter, the abstract and the concrete, the cognitive-perceptual and the physical, are mere properties or aspects."

Ummm, so ya, which of the 4 do you adhere to lol

Neutral Monism (I thought that was clear?).

The last sentence sounded like you were talking about Neutral Monism, but I wasn't sure. I find that a faulty view as it views the mental as something non-fundamental.

"Cartesian dualism leads to a problem associated with the connectivity problem we have just discussed: if reality consists of two different "substances", then what connects these substances in one unified "reality"? What is the medium which sustains their respective existences and the putative difference relationship between them? One possible (wrong) answer is that their relationship is merely abstract, and therefore irrelevant to material reality and devoid of material influence; another is that like the physical epiphenomenon of mind itself, it is essentially physical. But these positions, which are seen in association with a slew of related philosophical doctrines including physicalism, materialism, naturalism, objectivism, epiphenomenalism and eliminativism, merely beg the question that Cartesian dualism was intended to answer, namely the problem of mental causation.

Conveniently, modern logic affords a new level of analytical precision with respect to the Cartesian and Kantian dichotomies. Specifically, the branch of logic called model theory distinguishes theories from their universes, and considers the intervening semantic and interpretative mappings. Calling a theory an object language and its universe of discourse an object universe, it combines them in a metaobject domain consisting of the correspondences among their respective components and systems of components, and calls the theory or language in which this metaobject domain is analyzed a metalanguage. In like manner, the relationship between the metalanguage and the metaobject domain can be analyzed in a higher- level metalanguage, and so on. Because this situation can be recursively extended, level by level and metalanguage by metalanguage, in such a way that languages and their universes are conflated to an arbitrary degree, reality can with unlimited precision be characterized as a "metalinguistic metaobject".

In this setting, the philosophical dichotomies in question take on a distinctly mathematical hue. Because theories are abstract, subjectively-formed mental constructs, the mental, subjective side of reality can now be associated with the object language and metalanguage(s), while the physical, objective side of reality can be associated with the object universe and metauniverse(s), i.e. the metaobject domain(s). It takes very little effort to see that the mental/subjective and physical/objective sides of reality are now combined in the metaobjects, and that Cartesian and Kantian "substance dualism" have now been transformed to "property dualism" or dual-aspect monism. That is, we are now talking, in mathematically precise terms, about a "universal substance" of which mind and matter, the abstract and the concrete, the cognitive-perceptual and the physical, are mere properties or aspects."

Ummm, so ya, which of the 4 do you adhere to lol

Neutral Monism (I thought that was clear?).

The last sentence sounded like you were talking about Neutral Monism, but I wasn't sure. I find that a faulty view as it views the mental as something non-fundamental.

It views the fundamental "substance" of reality as both mental and physical. That is, reality is both a linguistic predicate (a mental construct i.e. a theory) and the objective content of such a predicate. You can't have one without the other.

"Cartesian dualism leads to a problem associated with the connectivity problem we have just discussed: if reality consists of two different "substances", then what connects these substances in one unified "reality"? What is the medium which sustains their respective existences and the putative difference relationship between them? One possible (wrong) answer is that their relationship is merely abstract, and therefore irrelevant to material reality and devoid of material influence; another is that like the physical epiphenomenon of mind itself, it is essentially physical. But these positions, which are seen in association with a slew of related philosophical doctrines including physicalism, materialism, naturalism, objectivism, epiphenomenalism and eliminativism, merely beg the question that Cartesian dualism was intended to answer, namely the problem of mental causation.

Conveniently, modern logic affords a new level of analytical precision with respect to the Cartesian and Kantian dichotomies. Specifically, the branch of logic called model theory distinguishes theories from their universes, and considers the intervening semantic and interpretative mappings. Calling a theory an object language and its universe of discourse an object universe, it combines them in a metaobject domain consisting of the correspondences among their respective components and systems of components, and calls the theory or language in which this metaobject domain is analyzed a metalanguage. In like manner, the relationship between the metalanguage and the metaobject domain can be analyzed in a higher- level metalanguage, and so on. Because this situation can be recursively extended, level by level and metalanguage by metalanguage, in such a way that languages and their universes are conflated to an arbitrary degree, reality can with unlimited precision be characterized as a "metalinguistic metaobject".

In this setting, the philosophical dichotomies in question take on a distinctly mathematical hue. Because theories are abstract, subjectively-formed mental constructs, the mental, subjective side of reality can now be associated with the object language and metalanguage(s), while the physical, objective side of reality can be associated with the object universe and metauniverse(s), i.e. the metaobject domain(s). It takes very little effort to see that the mental/subjective and physical/objective sides of reality are now combined in the metaobjects, and that Cartesian and Kantian "substance dualism" have now been transformed to "property dualism" or dual-aspect monism. That is, we are now talking, in mathematically precise terms, about a "universal substance" of which mind and matter, the abstract and the concrete, the cognitive-perceptual and the physical, are mere properties or aspects."

Ummm, so ya, which of the 4 do you adhere to lol

Neutral Monism (I thought that was clear?).

The last sentence sounded like you were talking about Neutral Monism, but I wasn't sure. I find that a faulty view as it views the mental as something non-fundamental.

It views the fundamental "substance" of reality as both mental and physical.

No, it views the fundamental substance as neither mental or physical (http://plato.stanford.edu...). Something being mental and physical would be a contradiction, because mentality is non-physical, and physicality is non-mental. What we call the mental and physical would be emergent properties of this substance if Neutral Monism is true. It seems like a useless view, because, what could this substance be? At least with Idealism, there is an answer.

That is, reality is both a linguistic predicate (a mental construct i.e. a theory) and the objective content of such a predicate. You can't have one without the other.

The mental world alone suffices to account for the universality of experiences and the coherence between them. The "physical" world would only be as "physical" as a ball inside a dream (at least under Idealism).

"Cartesian dualism leads to a problem associated with the connectivity problem we have just discussed: if reality consists of two different "substances", then what connects these substances in one unified "reality"? What is the medium which sustains their respective existences and the putative difference relationship between them? One possible (wrong) answer is that their relationship is merely abstract, and therefore irrelevant to material reality and devoid of material influence; another is that like the physical epiphenomenon of mind itself, it is essentially physical. But these positions, which are seen in association with a slew of related philosophical doctrines including physicalism, materialism, naturalism, objectivism, epiphenomenalism and eliminativism, merely beg the question that Cartesian dualism was intended to answer, namely the problem of mental causation.

Conveniently, modern logic affords a new level of analytical precision with respect to the Cartesian and Kantian dichotomies. Specifically, the branch of logic called model theory distinguishes theories from their universes, and considers the intervening semantic and interpretative mappings. Calling a theory an object language and its universe of discourse an object universe, it combines them in a metaobject domain consisting of the correspondences among their respective components and systems of components, and calls the theory or language in which this metaobject domain is analyzed a metalanguage. In like manner, the relationship between the metalanguage and the metaobject domain can be analyzed in a higher- level metalanguage, and so on. Because this situation can be recursively extended, level by level and metalanguage by metalanguage, in such a way that languages and their universes are conflated to an arbitrary degree, reality can with unlimited precision be characterized as a "metalinguistic metaobject".

In this setting, the philosophical dichotomies in question take on a distinctly mathematical hue. Because theories are abstract, subjectively-formed mental constructs, the mental, subjective side of reality can now be associated with the object language and metalanguage(s), while the physical, objective side of reality can be associated with the object universe and metauniverse(s), i.e. the metaobject domain(s). It takes very little effort to see that the mental/subjective and physical/objective sides of reality are now combined in the metaobjects, and that Cartesian and Kantian "substance dualism" have now been transformed to "property dualism" or dual-aspect monism. That is, we are now talking, in mathematically precise terms, about a "universal substance" of which mind and matter, the abstract and the concrete, the cognitive-perceptual and the physical, are mere properties or aspects."

Ummm, so ya, which of the 4 do you adhere to lol

Neutral Monism (I thought that was clear?).

The last sentence sounded like you were talking about Neutral Monism, but I wasn't sure. I find that a faulty view as it views the mental as something non-fundamental.

It views the fundamental "substance" of reality as both mental and physical.

I thought that meant it views the fundamental substances as neither only mental or only physical.

Something being mental and physical would be a contradiction, because mentality is non-physical, and physicality is non-mental.

Not if they are both manifestations of the same stuff: infocognition.

What we call the mental and physical would be emergent properties of this substance if Neutral Monism is true. It seems like a useless view, because, what could this substance be? At least with Idealism, there is an answer.

That is, reality is both a linguistic predicate (a mental construct i.e. a theory) and the objective content of such a predicate. You can't have one without the other.

The mental world alone suffices to account for the universality of experiences and the coherence between them. The "physical" world would only be as "physical" as a ball inside a dream (at least under Idealism).

At 7/7/2014 9:20:45 PM, Rational_Thinker9119 wrote:The Big 4, at least as far as the mind is concerned, are Physicalism, Dualism, Idealism, and Neutral Monism. Which one makes the most sense to you and why?

None of them? But I'm not exactly concerned with that way of thinking about ontology in the first place. To me, the question of what pure being is is less interesting (and less knowable) then the question of how we experience being as living subjects. Because I think it's an outdated way of thinking about things to presume that we have (or even can approach) pure unmediated understanding of reality (Kant and all that). But the fact that we're nevertheless forced to act as beings in a world which we actively change (and which, conversely, actively changes us) means that we (usually unconsciously) tend to participate in and reify ways of mediating it (Kant for instance argued for transcendental functions in the mind which reality is necessarily mediated through). That isn't to say though that it's not fruitful to talk about ontology. For instance- how our ontological conceptions of the world condition our behaviors (and whether that's positive or negative), whether those conceptions are necessary or subject to change, etc, etc, seems like a much more fruitful endeavor then squinting off into the void and trying to totalize it into some referential grid.

I think Idealism makes the most sense personally. That is because everything we posit as physically existing is just an aspect of our experience. Take this "computer monitor" for instance, all I am doing is labeling an aspect of my conscious experience; the rectangular shape with colors and more shapes and colors that are part of my experience. However, I have no reason to posit anything "physical" beyond experience and the things experience contains, as all we ever really have at any given moment is experience. So, the idea that everything is mental is the simplest and most rational ontology in my opinion.

"Cartesian dualism leads to a problem associated with the connectivity problem we have just discussed: if reality consists of two different "substances", then what connects these substances in one unified "reality"? What is the medium which sustains their respective existences and the putative difference relationship between them? One possible (wrong) answer is that their relationship is merely abstract, and therefore irrelevant to material reality and devoid of material influence; another is that like the physical epiphenomenon of mind itself, it is essentially physical. But these positions, which are seen in association with a slew of related philosophical doctrines including physicalism, materialism, naturalism, objectivism, epiphenomenalism and eliminativism, merely beg the question that Cartesian dualism was intended to answer, namely the problem of mental causation.

Conveniently, modern logic affords a new level of analytical precision with respect to the Cartesian and Kantian dichotomies. Specifically, the branch of logic called model theory distinguishes theories from their universes, and considers the intervening semantic and interpretative mappings. Calling a theory an object language and its universe of discourse an object universe, it combines them in a metaobject domain consisting of the correspondences among their respective components and systems of components, and calls the theory or language in which this metaobject domain is analyzed a metalanguage. In like manner, the relationship between the metalanguage and the metaobject domain can be analyzed in a higher- level metalanguage, and so on. Because this situation can be recursively extended, level by level and metalanguage by metalanguage, in such a way that languages and their universes are conflated to an arbitrary degree, reality can with unlimited precision be characterized as a "metalinguistic metaobject".

In this setting, the philosophical dichotomies in question take on a distinctly mathematical hue. Because theories are abstract, subjectively-formed mental constructs, the mental, subjective side of reality can now be associated with the object language and metalanguage(s), while the physical, objective side of reality can be associated with the object universe and metauniverse(s), i.e. the metaobject domain(s). It takes very little effort to see that the mental/subjective and physical/objective sides of reality are now combined in the metaobjects, and that Cartesian and Kantian "substance dualism" have now been transformed to "property dualism" or dual-aspect monism. That is, we are now talking, in mathematically precise terms, about a "universal substance" of which mind and matter, the abstract and the concrete, the cognitive-perceptual and the physical, are mere properties or aspects."

Ummm, so ya, which of the 4 do you adhere to lol

Neutral Monism (I thought that was clear?).

The last sentence sounded like you were talking about Neutral Monism, but I wasn't sure. I find that a faulty view as it views the mental as something non-fundamental.

It views the fundamental "substance" of reality as both mental and physical.

I thought that meant it views the fundamental substances as neither only mental or only physical.

Something being mental and physical would be a contradiction, because mentality is non-physical, and physicality is non-mental.

Not if they are both manifestations of the same stuff: infocognition.

Infocognition is mental by nature. I would say the physical is a manifestation though.

What we call the mental and physical would be emergent properties of this substance if Neutral Monism is true. It seems like a useless view, because, what could this substance be? At least with Idealism, there is an answer.

That is, reality is both a linguistic predicate (a mental construct i.e. a theory) and the objective content of such a predicate. You can't have one without the other.

The mental world alone suffices to account for the universality of experiences and the coherence between them. The "physical" world would only be as "physical" as a ball inside a dream (at least under Idealism).

At 7/7/2014 9:20:45 PM, Rational_Thinker9119 wrote:The Big 4, at least as far as the mind is concerned, are Physicalism, Dualism, Idealism, and Neutral Monism. Which one makes the most sense to you and why?

None of them? But I'm not exactly concerned with that way of thinking about ontology in the first place. To me, the question of what pure being is is less interesting (and less knowable) then the question of how we experience being as living subjects. Because I think it's an outdated way of thinking about things to presume that we have (or even can approach) pure unmediated understanding of reality (Kant and all that). But the fact that we're nevertheless forced to act as beings in a world which we actively change (and which, conversely, actively changes us) means that we (usually unconsciously) tend to participate in and reify ways of mediating it (Kant for instance argued for transcendental functions in the mind which reality is necessarily mediated through). That isn't to say though that it's not fruitful to talk about ontology. For instance- how our ontological conceptions of the world condition our behaviors (and whether that's positive or negative), whether those conceptions are necessary or subject to change, etc, etc, seems like a much more fruitful endeavor then squinting off into the void and trying to totalize it into some referential grid.

I think Idealism makes the most sense personally. That is because everything we posit as physically existing is just an aspect of our experience. Take this "computer monitor" for instance, all I am doing is labeling an aspect of my conscious experience; the rectangular shape with colors and more shapes and colors that are part of my experience. However, I have no reason to posit anything "physical" beyond experience and the things experience contains, as all we ever really have at any given moment is experience. So, the idea that everything is mental is the simplest and most rational ontology in my opinion.

So... your mind creates itself? Sounds a little fantastical to me.

No. Our minds are dependent on God's mind, and he would be the "creator", if you will.

At 7/7/2014 9:20:45 PM, Rational_Thinker9119 wrote:The Big 4, at least as far as the mind is concerned, are Physicalism, Dualism, Idealism, and Neutral Monism. Which one makes the most sense to you and why?

None of them? But I'm not exactly concerned with that way of thinking about ontology in the first place. To me, the question of what pure being is is less interesting (and less knowable) then the question of how we experience being as living subjects. Because I think it's an outdated way of thinking about things to presume that we have (or even can approach) pure unmediated understanding of reality (Kant and all that). But the fact that we're nevertheless forced to act as beings in a world which we actively change (and which, conversely, actively changes us) means that we (usually unconsciously) tend to participate in and reify ways of mediating it (Kant for instance argued for transcendental functions in the mind which reality is necessarily mediated through). That isn't to say though that it's not fruitful to talk about ontology. For instance- how our ontological conceptions of the world condition our behaviors (and whether that's positive or negative), whether those conceptions are necessary or subject to change, etc, etc, seems like a much more fruitful endeavor then squinting off into the void and trying to totalize it into some referential grid.

I think Idealism makes the most sense personally. That is because everything we posit as physically existing is just an aspect of our experience. Take this "computer monitor" for instance, all I am doing is labeling an aspect of my conscious experience; the rectangular shape with colors and more shapes and colors that are part of my experience. However, I have no reason to posit anything "physical" beyond experience and the things experience contains, as all we ever really have at any given moment is experience. So, the idea that everything is mental is the simplest and most rational ontology in my opinion.

So... your mind creates itself? Sounds a little fantastical to me.

No. Our minds are dependent on God's mind, and he would be the "creator", if you will.

At 7/7/2014 9:20:45 PM, Rational_Thinker9119 wrote:The Big 4, at least as far as the mind is concerned, are Physicalism, Dualism, Idealism, and Neutral Monism. Which one makes the most sense to you and why?

None of them? But I'm not exactly concerned with that way of thinking about ontology in the first place. To me, the question of what pure being is is less interesting (and less knowable) then the question of how we experience being as living subjects. Because I think it's an outdated way of thinking about things to presume that we have (or even can approach) pure unmediated understanding of reality (Kant and all that). But the fact that we're nevertheless forced to act as beings in a world which we actively change (and which, conversely, actively changes us) means that we (usually unconsciously) tend to participate in and reify ways of mediating it (Kant for instance argued for transcendental functions in the mind which reality is necessarily mediated through). That isn't to say though that it's not fruitful to talk about ontology. For instance- how our ontological conceptions of the world condition our behaviors (and whether that's positive or negative), whether those conceptions are necessary or subject to change, etc, etc, seems like a much more fruitful endeavor then squinting off into the void and trying to totalize it into some referential grid.

I think Idealism makes the most sense personally. That is because everything we posit as physically existing is just an aspect of our experience. Take this "computer monitor" for instance, all I am doing is labeling an aspect of my conscious experience; the rectangular shape with colors and more shapes and colors that are part of my experience. However, I have no reason to posit anything "physical" beyond experience and the things experience contains, as all we ever really have at any given moment is experience. So, the idea that everything is mental is the simplest and most rational ontology in my opinion.

So... your mind creates itself? Sounds a little fantastical to me.

No. Our minds are dependent on God's mind, and he would be the "creator", if you will.

At 7/7/2014 9:20:45 PM, Rational_Thinker9119 wrote:The Big 4, at least as far as the mind is concerned, are Physicalism, Dualism, Idealism, and Neutral Monism. Which one makes the most sense to you and why?

None of them? But I'm not exactly concerned with that way of thinking about ontology in the first place. To me, the question of what pure being is is less interesting (and less knowable) then the question of how we experience being as living subjects. Because I think it's an outdated way of thinking about things to presume that we have (or even can approach) pure unmediated understanding of reality (Kant and all that). But the fact that we're nevertheless forced to act as beings in a world which we actively change (and which, conversely, actively changes us) means that we (usually unconsciously) tend to participate in and reify ways of mediating it (Kant for instance argued for transcendental functions in the mind which reality is necessarily mediated through). That isn't to say though that it's not fruitful to talk about ontology. For instance- how our ontological conceptions of the world condition our behaviors (and whether that's positive or negative), whether those conceptions are necessary or subject to change, etc, etc, seems like a much more fruitful endeavor then squinting off into the void and trying to totalize it into some referential grid.

I think Idealism makes the most sense personally. That is because everything we posit as physically existing is just an aspect of our experience. Take this "computer monitor" for instance, all I am doing is labeling an aspect of my conscious experience; the rectangular shape with colors and more shapes and colors that are part of my experience. However, I have no reason to posit anything "physical" beyond experience and the things experience contains, as all we ever really have at any given moment is experience. So, the idea that everything is mental is the simplest and most rational ontology in my opinion.

So... your mind creates itself? Sounds a little fantastical to me.

No. Our minds are dependent on God's mind, and he would be the "creator", if you will.

At 7/7/2014 9:20:45 PM, Rational_Thinker9119 wrote:The Big 4, at least as far as the mind is concerned, are Physicalism, Dualism, Idealism, and Neutral Monism. Which one makes the most sense to you and why?

None of them? But I'm not exactly concerned with that way of thinking about ontology in the first place. To me, the question of what pure being is is less interesting (and less knowable) then the question of how we experience being as living subjects. Because I think it's an outdated way of thinking about things to presume that we have (or even can approach) pure unmediated understanding of reality (Kant and all that). But the fact that we're nevertheless forced to act as beings in a world which we actively change (and which, conversely, actively changes us) means that we (usually unconsciously) tend to participate in and reify ways of mediating it (Kant for instance argued for transcendental functions in the mind which reality is necessarily mediated through). That isn't to say though that it's not fruitful to talk about ontology. For instance- how our ontological conceptions of the world condition our behaviors (and whether that's positive or negative), whether those conceptions are necessary or subject to change, etc, etc, seems like a much more fruitful endeavor then squinting off into the void and trying to totalize it into some referential grid.

I think Idealism makes the most sense personally. That is because everything we posit as physically existing is just an aspect of our experience. Take this "computer monitor" for instance, all I am doing is labeling an aspect of my conscious experience; the rectangular shape with colors and more shapes and colors that are part of my experience. However, I have no reason to posit anything "physical" beyond experience and the things experience contains, as all we ever really have at any given moment is experience. So, the idea that everything is mental is the simplest and most rational ontology in my opinion.

So... your mind creates itself? Sounds a little fantastical to me.

No. Our minds are dependent on God's mind, and he would be the "creator", if you will.

At 7/7/2014 9:20:45 PM, Rational_Thinker9119 wrote:The Big 4, at least as far as the mind is concerned, are Physicalism, Dualism, Idealism, and Neutral Monism. Which one makes the most sense to you and why?

None of them? But I'm not exactly concerned with that way of thinking about ontology in the first place. To me, the question of what pure being is is less interesting (and less knowable) then the question of how we experience being as living subjects. Because I think it's an outdated way of thinking about things to presume that we have (or even can approach) pure unmediated understanding of reality (Kant and all that). But the fact that we're nevertheless forced to act as beings in a world which we actively change (and which, conversely, actively changes us) means that we (usually unconsciously) tend to participate in and reify ways of mediating it (Kant for instance argued for transcendental functions in the mind which reality is necessarily mediated through). That isn't to say though that it's not fruitful to talk about ontology. For instance- how our ontological conceptions of the world condition our behaviors (and whether that's positive or negative), whether those conceptions are necessary or subject to change, etc, etc, seems like a much more fruitful endeavor then squinting off into the void and trying to totalize it into some referential grid.

I think Idealism makes the most sense personally. That is because everything we posit as physically existing is just an aspect of our experience. Take this "computer monitor" for instance, all I am doing is labeling an aspect of my conscious experience; the rectangular shape with colors and more shapes and colors that are part of my experience. However, I have no reason to posit anything "physical" beyond experience and the things experience contains, as all we ever really have at any given moment is experience. So, the idea that everything is mental is the simplest and most rational ontology in my opinion.

So... your mind creates itself? Sounds a little fantastical to me.

No. Our minds are dependent on God's mind, and he would be the "creator", if you will.

Am I part of God's imagination then?

Yes. We all share God's day-dream.

Do I need to eat shrooms first?

Nope. You just have to exist ;)

Are you sure? I mean, the video is 4:20 long... Plus, no one looks down on you for getting high if it's for philosophical purposes. That's deep.

At 7/7/2014 9:20:45 PM, Rational_Thinker9119 wrote:The Big 4, at least as far as the mind is concerned, are Physicalism, Dualism, Idealism, and Neutral Monism. Which one makes the most sense to you and why?

None of them? But I'm not exactly concerned with that way of thinking about ontology in the first place. To me, the question of what pure being is is less interesting (and less knowable) then the question of how we experience being as living subjects. Because I think it's an outdated way of thinking about things to presume that we have (or even can approach) pure unmediated understanding of reality (Kant and all that). But the fact that we're nevertheless forced to act as beings in a world which we actively change (and which, conversely, actively changes us) means that we (usually unconsciously) tend to participate in and reify ways of mediating it (Kant for instance argued for transcendental functions in the mind which reality is necessarily mediated through). That isn't to say though that it's not fruitful to talk about ontology. For instance- how our ontological conceptions of the world condition our behaviors (and whether that's positive or negative), whether those conceptions are necessary or subject to change, etc, etc, seems like a much more fruitful endeavor then squinting off into the void and trying to totalize it into some referential grid.

I think Idealism makes the most sense personally. That is because everything we posit as physically existing is just an aspect of our experience. Take this "computer monitor" for instance, all I am doing is labeling an aspect of my conscious experience; the rectangular shape with colors and more shapes and colors that are part of my experience. However, I have no reason to posit anything "physical" beyond experience and the things experience contains, as all we ever really have at any given moment is experience. So, the idea that everything is mental is the simplest and most rational ontology in my opinion.

So... your mind creates itself? Sounds a little fantastical to me.

No. Our minds are dependent on God's mind, and he would be the "creator", if you will.

Am I part of God's imagination then?

Yes. We all share God's day-dream.

Do I need to eat shrooms first?

Nope. You just have to exist ;)

Are you sure? I mean, the video is 4:20 long... Plus, no one looks down on you for getting high if it's for philosophical purposes. That's deep.

At 7/7/2014 9:20:45 PM, Rational_Thinker9119 wrote:The Big 4, at least as far as the mind is concerned, are Physicalism, Dualism, Idealism, and Neutral Monism. Which one makes the most sense to you and why?

None of them? But I'm not exactly concerned with that way of thinking about ontology in the first place. To me, the question of what pure being is is less interesting (and less knowable) then the question of how we experience being as living subjects. Because I think it's an outdated way of thinking about things to presume that we have (or even can approach) pure unmediated understanding of reality (Kant and all that). But the fact that we're nevertheless forced to act as beings in a world which we actively change (and which, conversely, actively changes us) means that we (usually unconsciously) tend to participate in and reify ways of mediating it (Kant for instance argued for transcendental functions in the mind which reality is necessarily mediated through). That isn't to say though that it's not fruitful to talk about ontology. For instance- how our ontological conceptions of the world condition our behaviors (and whether that's positive or negative), whether those conceptions are necessary or subject to change, etc, etc, seems like a much more fruitful endeavor then squinting off into the void and trying to totalize it into some referential grid.

"The bud disappears when the blossom breaks through, and we might say that the former is refuted by the latter; in the same way when the fruit comes, the blossom may be explained to be a false form of the plant's existence, for the fruit appears as its true nature in place of the blossom. These stages are not merely differentiated; they supplant one another as being incompatible with one another." G. W. F. HEGEL