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Friday, September 12, 2014

UNSG Ban report on UNDOF

Report
of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Disengagement Observer
Force for the period from 29 May to 3 September 2014

I.
Introduction

1.
The present report gives an account of the activities of the United
Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) during the past three
months, pursuant to the mandate contained in Security Council
resolution 350 (1974) and extended by subsequent resolutions, most
recently through resolution 2163 (2014).

II.
Situation in the area and activities of the Force

2.
At the time of writing, the situation in the UNDOF area of operation
is evolving rapidly and remains volatile, with heavy fighting
continuing between the Syrian armed forces and the armed members of
the opposition and other armed groups in the area of separation.
Several UNDOF peacekeepers serving with the Fijian Battalion were
detained by armed elements. At this time, no additional information
on their status or location has been established.*

3.
During the reporting period, the ceasefire between Israel and the
Syrian Arab Republic generally was maintained, albeit in a
continuously volatile environment attributable to the ongoing
conflict in the Syrian Arab Republic and despite a number of
significant violations of the 1974 Disengagement of Forces Agreement
by Israeli and Syrian forces, which are set out below. Several
incidents of firing across the ceasefire line occurred resulting in
casualties. Of particular note, on 22 June, fire from the Bravo side
killed a civilian and injured others on the Alpha side and, in
retaliation, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) fired into the area of
separation and limitation on the Bravo side, resulting in the death
and injury of Syrian armed forces personnel. The Syrian armed forces
significantly increased the number of personnel and equipment
deployed inside the area of separation and carried out military
activities and security operations against armed members of the
opposition, at times in response to offensives carried out by the
armed members of the opposition. Inside the area of separation, the
presence of the Syrian armed forces and military equipment, as well
as any other armed personnel and military equipment, is in violation
of the Disengagement of Forces Agreement. As underscored by the
Security Council in its resolution 2163 (2014), there should be no
military activity of any kind in the area of separation.

4.
In the morning of 27 August, approximately 100 armed members of
several armed groups, including Jabhat al- Nusra, launched an attack
on Syrian armed forces positions at the Bravo gate and in the area of
Quneitra in the area of separation. UNDOF evacuated its personnel
from the Charlie gate to Camp Ziouani. Later that day, UNDOF observed
armed elements taking and removing three United Nations vehicles left
behind at the position, as well as looting equipment and personal
effects at the position. Simultaneous to the attack on Quneitra and
the Bravo gate, armed groups also engaged Syrian armed forces
positions in the area of Tal al-Kurum and Jaba. There were several
incidents when fire, including mortar rounds, landed close to United
Nations positions as a result of which United Nations personnel in
positions affected by the fighting, as well as in Camp Ziouani
entered shelters. Following several hours of heavy fighting, the
armed elements gained control of the Bravo gate and most parts of
Quneitra.

5.
In the afternoon of 27 August, eight armed fighters forcibly entered
position 27 while UNDOF personnel were in the shelter. The armed
elements demanded that the United Nations personnel vacate the
position in order to avoid injury in the ongoing fighting. The UNDOF
personnel refused and remained in the shelter while fighting in
Quneitra continued. The UNDOF Force Commander spoke to the leader of
the armed fighters and requested that the armed elements vacate the
position and not harm the United Nations peacekeepers. However, the
armed fighters remained inside the United Nations premises, and
continued their attack on the SAAF through the night, including from
within position 27. A small group of armed elements ransacked the
position, and took United Nations and personal items from it. They
also put on United Nations uniforms and blue berets taken from the
accommodation of the personnel.

6.
As a result of fire landing inside Position 60, two buildings caught
fire. Due to the continuing fighting in the area, United Nations
personnel had to remain in the shelter and could not extinguish the
fire. The fire completely destroyed both buildings.

7.
In the course of the fighting on 27 August, one IDF soldier and one
Israeli civilian were injured on the Alpha side by fire having landed
across the ceasefire line. The IDF subsequently responded with fire
on a Syrian armed forces position, approximately three kilometres
from Camp Faouar on the Bravo side. The Senior Syrian Arab Delegate
(SSAD) informed UNDOF that one artillery weapon was destroyed.

8.
In the morning of 28 August, the armed fighters, who had remained at
Position 27 overnight, demanded that the UNDOF personnel leave the
position, leaving behind their vehicles. They said that UNDOF
personnel would be moved in vehicles of the armed fighters towards
the Alpha gate. Approximately 300 armed elements were seen outside
the perimeter of the Position. UNDOF readied the Force Reserve for
possible re-location of the UN personnel, however, the Position
personnel were given a 10-minute deadline by the armed elements to
move out. The Force Commander therefore gave orders for the UN
personnel to vacate the position. The armed fighters took the weapons
of the UNDOF personnel and then transported the UNDOF personnel to
the area of the Bravo gate on the understanding that they would be
allowed to cross to the Alpha side. However, a representative of the
armed elements near the Alpha gate on the Bravo side who said that he
was waiting for the arrival of the detained peacekeepers subsequently
informed UNDOF that they had been taken elsewhere. UNDOF then
observed vehicles resembling those of the armed elements that had
been present at Position 27 moving in the direction of Position 60,
but lost sight of them.

9.
Armed elements subsequently moved to United Nations Positions 68 in
Ruihinah and 69 in Braika, with at least two Fijian peacekeepers, and
demanded that United Nations personnel of the two positions give up
their weapons in order for the 45 detained UNDOF peacekeepers to be
released. When the United Nations personnel did not hand over their
weapons, the armed members placed command detonated explosive devices
around the two positions to prevent the United Nations personnel from
leaving and threatened to attack the positions. As a precautionary
measure, to prevent more UN positions and personnel to come under
siege, UNDOF evacuated its personnel from Position 85 to Position 80
and subsequently to the Alpha side. In the evening of 28 August,
armed elements attempted to force their way through the gate of
Position 69. UN personnel fired warning shots and the armed elements
withdrew.

10.
Heavy fighting between the Syrian armed forces and armed elements
continued on 29 August in the central part of the area of separation.
Following some rounds falling close to Position 60, UNDOF evacuated
the position. In the early morning of 30 August, armed elements
exploded at least one explosive they had placed outside the gate of
Position 68 and started to attack the position. UN personnel at the
position fired in return. The exchange of fire lasted for several
hours at which point the Mission managed to agree with the armed
elements a ceasefire until the next day. No injuries were incurred
among the UN personnel during the exchange of fire. The situation at
Position 69 was relatively quiet that morning and UNDOF was able to
evacuate the personnel to the Alpha side. At mid-day, after firing
took place in the vicinity of observation post 52, the Observer Group
Golan (OGG) military observers and UNDOF personnel who had been
placed at the observation post to provide additional security, also
were evacuated.

11.
In the evening of 30 August, UNDOF observed between 100 and 120 armed
elements arrive in the vicinity of Ruihinah from areas further south.
As a precautionary measure, the Mission evacuated the UNDOF personnel
from observation post 56. During the night, United Nations personnel
from Position 68 left the position on foot and moved across the
technical fence to the Alpha side. UNDOF maintains a reinforced
presence at UN position 80 near al- Rafid.

12.
Since the fierce fighting commenced on 27 August that led to the
detention of the UNDOF peacekeepers from the Fijian contingent and
the siege of two UNDOF positions, the UNDOF Force Commander has been
in regular close contact with the SSAD and the IDF. Both parties
provided full support to the Mission in ensuring the safe evacuation
of its peacekeepers from positions that had to be vacated as a result
of the ongoing fighting. The UNDOF Force Commander as well as
Secretariat staff have been in ongoing contact with Member States
that may have influence over the armed groups in order to effect the
immediate, unconditional and safe release of the members of the
Fijian contingent.

13.
In the context of the clashes between the Syrian armed forces and
armed members of the opposition and other armed groups, there were
multiple incidents of firing from the Bravo side across the ceasefire
line and several incidents of fire from the Alpha side to the Bravo
side. In the morning of 2 June, four rockets were fired from the
vicinity of Camp Faouar in a north- northwestern direction. Two
vehicles with mounted multiple-launch rocket systems were seen
speeding away from the firing location. Shortly afterwards, the IDF
informed UNDOF that they had detected a threat near Camp Faouar and
that the IDF would retaliate. UNDOF personnel immediately took
shelter. The first artillery round fired by the IDF landed within a
distance of 100 metres of Camp Faouar as the shelter alarm was
sounded and United Nations personnel were still rushing to the
shelters. Another three rounds landed within one kilometre of the
camp. The IDF subsequently informed UNDOF that one rocket had
impacted west of the ceasefire line, in proximity to one of its
positions. A significant amount of shrapnel and debris fell into Camp
Faouar. There was no injury to United Nations personnel, but slight
damage to United Nations property. The UNDOF leadership was in
immediate contact with both parties to prevent an escalation of the
situation. The SSAD informed UNDOF that the Syrian armed forces were
not involved in the incident and stated that armed elements might
have infiltrated the area overnight to fire against the
pro-Government village of Hadar and instill fear among the population
ahead of the 3 June presidential elections. The IDF informed UNDOF
that it had retaliated because it had assessed that Israel was being
targeted. UNDOF carried out an investigation into the incident, which
showed that the rockets that landed in the area of Hadar and the one
that landed on the Alpha side were of the same calibre and type, and
most likely originated from the same weapon. UNDOF protested to both
parties the firing of rockets across the ceasefire line in violation
of the Disengagement Agreement. UNDOF also expressed grave concern to
the IDF about the firing close to Camp Faouar, thereby placing United
Nations personnel in serious danger.

14.
On 22 June, United Nations personnel observed an explosion in the
vicinity of observation post 52 that hit a vehicle on the IDF patrol
path west of the technical fence. One Israeli teenager was killed and
four other persons were wounded. The IDF retaliated with several tank
rounds onto Syrian armed forces positions in Quneitra, in the area of
separation, in close proximity to United Nations Position 27. The IDF
informed UNDOF of the retaliation afterwards and suggested that
United Nations personnel deployed between Ufaniyah in the north and
Bir Ajam in the south go into shelters. United Nations personnel
remained in shelters until the IDF notified UNDOF that no further
firing would take place that day but cautioned to minimize movement
in the area of separation. Shortly after midnight on 23 June, the IDF
conducted an airstrike on nine locations on the Bravo side dropping
several bombs in the general area of Camp Faouar. United Nations
personnel in the camp went into shelter. The UNDOF investigation into
the 22 June firing indicated that a missile had been fired from the
general area east of Ruihinah across the ceasefire line.The Syrian
authorities informed UNDOF that four Syrian armed forces personnel
were killed and nine more were wounded by the IDF retaliatory fire.
The SSAD maintained that the missile that killed the teenager on 22
June was not fired by the Syrian armed forces. The UNDOF
investigation further showed that the IDF response fire on 23 June
came closest to Camp Faouar when it targeted two Syrian armed forces
positions, located approximately two kilometres from the camp.

15.
On 5 June, the IDF informed UNDOF that three mortars were fired on
the Bravo side, following the announcement of the results of the
presidential election, landed on the Alpha side. On 15 June, the IDF
informed UNDOF that a rocket had landed on the Alpha side, in the
vicinity of Majdal Shams. The UNDOF investigation confirmed that a
rocket had been fired onto the Alpha from the Bravo side. On 7 July,
UNDOF heard three explosions in the vicinity of Masada on the Alpha
side. The IDF responded with five rounds of fire in the vicinity of
Bayt Jinn in the area of limitation on the Bravo side. On 13 July,
unidentified elements fired one rocket from a position north of Camp
Faouar, which landed across the ceasefire line in a mine field in the
vicinity of United Nations outpost 37B. The IDF retaliated with five
missiles into the area of limitation on the Bravo side, hitting one
Syrian armed forces position located three kilometres south of Camp
Faouar. According to the Syrian authorities, one Syrian armed forces
soldier was killed and two others were wounded. Shortly after the
launch of the rocket from the Bravo side, the SSAD had informed UNDOF
of a rocket having been fired by armed elements from north of the
UNDOF Headquarters in the direction of Hadar village. On 14 July,
unidentified elements fired two rockets from the same location north
of Camp Faouar, which impacted on the outskirts of El Rom village on
the Alpha side. The IDF fired two artillery rounds at a location two
kilometres east of Camp Faouar in the area of limitation. The IDF had
informed UNDOF prior to the retaliatory fire and UNDOF personnel at
Camp Faouar went into shelters. On 20 July, the SSAD informed UNDOF
that a shell had been fired by armed elements towards the Alpha side.
The IDF subsequently confirmed that a round had landed approximately
three kilometres west of Majdal Shams. United Nations personnel on
the ground did not observe the firing. The IDF did not retaliate. On
23 July, a tank round landed on the Alpha side close to United
Nations observation post 51, causing damage to the perimeter fence of
the post. On 24 August, unidentified elements fired four rockets from
approximately four kilometres north of Camp Faouar in the area of
limitation on the Bravo side, which landed in Ayn Ziwan on the Alpha
side injuring one civilian. On 27 August, one mortar round fired from
the Bravo side injured one IDF soldier two kilometres from the Alpha
line. The IDF responded with fire on a Syrian armed forces position
approximately three kilometres south of Camp Faouar. In addition,
there were numerous occasions, when small arms and anti-aircraft fire
exchanged between the Syrian armed forces and the armed members of
the opposition and other armed groups in the area of Quneitra and
Al-Qahtaniyah, landed on the Alpha side.

16.
During the night of 29 July and early 30 July, United Nations
observation post 51 personnel heard rounds passing close by their
post and explosions nearby. UNDOF informed the SSAD of the firing in
the area of observation post 51 and urged him to relay to Syrian
armed forces on the ground to stop the firing as fire had landed on
the Alpha side and close to the United Nations observation post. The
SSAD confirmed to UNDOF that the Syrian armed forces had fired
artillery as part of ongoing clashes with armed elements and that all
rounds fired by the Syrian armed forces had landed on the Bravo side.
The following morning, one unexploded artillery round was found in
proximity to the ceasefire line and the perimeter of United Nations
observation post 51. The unexploded ordnance had penetrated the
tarmac of the road leading to the observation post where it remained.
The round was a 122mm dual purpose (anti-armour and anti-personnel)
improved conventional ammunition artillery round of a type usually
containing around 30 sub-munitions. The UNDOF investigation found
that based on the direction and angle of impact of the projectile in
the tarmac, the round was fired from an area that is bounded by Khan
Arnabeh in the south-west, Jaba in the south, and Camp Faouar in the
north.

17.
Crossing of the ceasefire line by civilians, primarily shepherds, was
observed on an almost daily basis by United Nations personnel on the
ground. On 29 May and 29 July, the IDF fired warning shots towards
shepherds who had crossed the ceasefire line. Throughout the
reporting period, UNDOF frequently observed armed members of the
opposition interacting with the IDF across the ceasefire line in the
vicinity of United Nations position 85. UNDOF observed armed members
of the opposition transferring 47 wounded persons from the Bravo side
across the ceasefire line to the IDF and the IDF on the Alpha side
handing over 43 treated individuals to the armed members of the
opposition on the Bravo side. [data as at 10 August; to be updated
prior to finalisation]

18.
UNDOF protested all firings across the ceasefire line to the SSAD and
the IDF, respectively. All incidents of firing into the area of
separation and across the ceasefire line, as well as the crossing by
individuals of the ceasefire line, are violations of the
Disengagement of Forces Agreement.

19.
In utilizing its best efforts to maintain the ceasefire and see that
it is scrupulously observed, as prescribed by the Disengagement of
Forces Agreement, UNDOF reports all breaches of the ceasefire line.
The Force Commander maintained regular and close contact with the IDF
and the SSAD. During periods of heightened tensions, as well as
during and in the immediate aftermath of firing incidents across the
ceasefire line, the Force Commander was in ongoing close contact with
both parties to the Disengagement Agreement to prevent an escalation
of the situation across the ceasefire line. He also engaged closely
with both sides to find mechanisms, including the exchange of
information about civilian activities close to the ceasefire line
that could contribute to preventing incidents in future.

20.
Throughout the reporting period, the heavy firing and intermittent
armed clashes between the Syrian armed forces and armed members of
the opposition and other armed groups continued in the UNDOF area of
operation. In the northern area of limitation, shelling and
explosions were observed in the areas of Mazra‘at Bayt Jinn and
Bayt Jinn, Mughur al Mir, and Baytima, the intensity of which
increased significantly at the end of August. The local truce
arrangement in the areas of Jabbata, Ufaniyah, Trunje, and Khan
Arnabah, in the northern and central parts of the area of separation,
generally held despite sporadic firing from Syrian armed forces
positions in the areas surrounding the villages. Fighting remained
most intense in the central and southern parts of the area of
separation and in the area of limitation just east of it. The
presence and use of heavy weapons and equipment by the Syrian armed
forces and to a somewhat lesser degree, by the armed members of the
opposition and other armed groups, continued. The Syrian armed forces
carried out airstrikes, mostly in the southern part of the area of
limitation around the towns of Nawa and Jaseem, as well as some areas
close to the area of separation, and on one occasion, on 27 July, in
the area of separation in the vicinity of al-Rafid village. On 25
August, UNDOF personnel observed Syrian armed forces firing at an
unmanned aerial vehicle flying in the vicinity of Jaba in the area of
limitation.

21.
In the early morning of 31 May, Syrian armed forces launched a
counter attack on Al- Qahtaniyah village in the area of separation
with heavy tank fire and artillery shelling from several of their
positions. The village had come under the control of the armed
members of the opposition and other armed groups at the beginning of
May. Approximately 100 Syrian armed forces soldiers moved in on the
village and heavy clashes between them and armed groups ensued. The
attack was combined with a second one on the neighbouring village of
Al- Samdaniyah. The armed groups repelled the attacks on both
villages. Until the 27 August attack by armed groups on the Bravo
gate and Quneitra, the two sides continued to exchange fire in the
area of Al-Qahtaniyah and Quneitra on a daily basis without
significant changes to the military situation on the ground. On 15
July, Syrian armed forces again initiated activities in the area of
separation when they deployed on and around Tal al Kurum, and took
control of Al-Samdaniyah from the armed members of the opposition.

22.
On 9 and 10 July, armed groups carried out a ground offensive against
Syrian armed forces positions located at Zbedah al-Sharkia, Nab’
as-Sakhr, Kammuniyah and Majdotiyah, in the area of limitation. Armed
groups took control of eight Syrian armed forces positions. In the
period since the initial attack, the Syrian armed forces have
regained control of two of the positions they initially lost, and
continue to shell areas that remain in the hands of the armed
opposition and other armed groups. At the time of reporting, the two
sides have remained in a standoff of forces. The armed members of the
opposition have enlarged their area of control up to five kilometres
east of the Bravo line.

23.
Concomitantly with these developments, the incidents of firing close
to United Nations positions increased. On numerous occasions during
periods of fighting between the Syrian armed forces and armed members
of the opposition and other armed groups, rounds landed inside or in
close proximity to United Nations positions, at times forcing United
Nations personnel to take shelter. On 15 July, the Syrian armed
forces deployed soldiers with tanks and anti-aircraft weapons on Tal
al Kurum, a hill in the area of separation in the immediate vicinity
of United Nations observation post 56 in violation of the
Disengagement Agreement. The deployment exposed United Nations
personnel at observation post 56 to further risk of being caught in
the crossfire and resulted in frequent incidents of firing close to
and into the observation post. On 22 July, due to the evolving
security situation, UNDOF soldiers temporarily relieved the unarmed
military observers of the Observer Group Golan at observation post
56. Since their deployment on and around Tal al Kurum, Syrian armed
forces and armed members of the opposition and other armed groups
frequently exchanged fire. Multiple incidents of rounds landing close
to the observation post occurred, and forced UNDOF personnel to take
shelter. On 8 August, over 70 mortar rounds landed on Tal al- Kurum,
two of which landed inside the premises of United Nations observation
post and others immediately adjacent to the perimeter fence. The
rounds damaged a United Nations vehicle, the windows of the
observation post, as well as the gate and the two water tanks; water
pipes were damaged as a result of firing close to the observation
post on 17 July.

24.
The UNDOF Force Commander repeatedly protested to the SSAD urging the
Syrian authorities to remove the Syrian armed forces personnel and
their weapons. The Syrian armed forces increased and fortified their
presence on and around Tal al Kurum with more than 100 troops, earth
mounds, pre-fabricated shelters to house the troops and deployed two
tanks, two anti-aircraft weapons and three heavy machine guns mounted
on vehicles, at a distance of 200 to 300 metres from the observation
post towards the bottom of the hill. UNDOF received several demands
from representatives of the armed groups that Syrian armed forces
leave the position around the observation post failure of which the
groups threatened to launch attacks against Syrian armed forces as
well as UNDOF at position 68 and observation post 56. The armed
groups subsequently withdrew their threat against UNDOF. The SSAD
informed the UNDOF Force Commander on 19 July that a senior-level
Government committee had decided that the Syrian armed forces would
be withdrawn from Tal al Kurum after some time. The Syrian
authorities informed the UNDOF Force Commander that the Syrian armed
forces deployment was occasioned by the threat of an attack by armed
groups on the towns of Khan Arnabeh and al-Baath in the central part
of the UNDOF area of operation. At the time of reporting,
approximately 150 Syrian armed forces personnel were in the position
at Tal al Kurum, the majority of whom were in the immediate vicinity
of the observation post towards the bottom of the hill while a small
number continued to come close to the top of the hill and the post to
observe opposition held areas.

25.
On several occasions, tank and artillery rounds, small arms and
machine gun fire landed close to and inside United Nations positions.
On 18 and 25 June, tank rounds landed close to UN position 69, and on
12 July an artillery round impacted close to the position. On 13
June, a stray bullet hit observation post 52. On 25 June, small arms
fire landed inside position 68, causing damage to the water tank and,
on 29 July, a stray bullet landed near the position. In the context
of the ongoing fighting between the Syrian armed forces and armed
members of the opposition and other armed groups in the area of Al
Qahtaniyah, United Nations personnel at observation post 51
frequently observed multiple rounds of machine gun fire and
occasionally anti-aircraft fire landing west of the ceasefire line
and on numerous occasions in close proximity to the observation post.
On 31 May, gunshots hit the observation post causing slight damage to
the building and an armoured vehicle. On 4 July, two tank rounds
landed close to the observation post. On few occasions, small arms
fire coming from Al-Qahtaniyah was directed at the observation post,
seemingly to deter United Nations personnel from observing the area.
Mortar rounds landed in the vicinity of and one inside position 27 on
31 May. On 4 June, two stray bullets were discovered in Camp Ziouani,
one of which had penetrated an UNDOF vehicle causing damage to the
windshield and the rear seats. On several occasions, UNDOF personnel
at position 60 observed firing in close proximity to the position.

26.
There were also incidents involving UNDOF patrols. On 5 July, a
routine UNDOF two- vehicle patrol moving from position 80 to position
69, came under fire shortly before reaching position 69 where it had
stopped in order to check one vehicle. One motorcycle and one pick-up
truck approached from the opposite direction and were about to pass
the United Nations patrol when one tank round landed close to the
truck, with shrapnel injuring two UNDOF personnel and damaging a
United Nations truck. The wounded UNDOF personnel immediately were
medically evacuated to the Alpha side and were released from hospital
the following day. UNDOF assessed that the tank round was fired from
the area of Kammuniyah, an area generally dominated by the Syrian
armed forces, in the area of limitation. Due to the security
situation in the vicinity of the incident UNDOF could not recover the
damaged vehicle. UNDOF observed that the vehicle was looted following
the incident on 5 July and was
taken away by unidentified individuals during the night from 9 to 10
July. On 7 July, in the vicinity of Ruihinah village, in proximity to
United Nations position 68, a seven- vehicle UNDOF convoy was fired
upon with anti-aircraft rounds. There were no injuries to United
Nations personnel. One of the United Nations vehicles sustained
damage. The convoy was able to return to position 68. UNDOF assessed
the fire to have originated from the area of limitation at Zbedah
Al-Sharkia, an area generally dominated by the Syrian armed forces.
The SSAD denied any Syrian armed forces involvement in either of the
two incidents. In the northern part of the area of limitation, owing
to the presence of armed opposition groups in Bayt Jinn and Mazra‘at
Bayt Jinn and increased fighting between Syrian armed forces and
armed members of the opposition, UNDOF continued to re-route its
movements to Mount Hermon positions, doubling the travel time in each
direction.

27.
Throughout the reporting period, the Syrian armed forces maintained a
larger number of soldiers and increased their heavy equipment inside
the area of separation. They significantly increased their presence,
particularly south of the main road between Quneitra in the west and
Kahn Arnabeh in the east, and continued to maintain checkpoints
inside the area of separation mainly along the main road. In
addition, in some areas Syrian armed forces personnel maintained
checkpoints at the eastern entrances to the area of separation,
straddling the Bravo line, to control and restrict traffic. Armed
opposition groups and other armed groups remained dominant in
significant parts of the southern area of separation, maintaining
checkpoints and restricting movement in some areas. For most of the
reporting period, the Syrian armed forces maintained up to six tanks
in the area of separation. UNDOF observed one tank controlled by
armed groups moving between the areas of separation and the
limitation in the vicinity of Ruihinah, Bir Ajam and Braika. Shortly
before fighting broke out in the Quneitra area at the end of August,
UNDOF observed around ten tanks under the control of the Syrian armed
forces that were either deployed in the area of separation or in
areas immediately adjacent to it. At the same time, UNDOF observed
four tanks in the area between Zbedah al-Gharbia and Braika under the
control of armed opposition elements. Checkpoints often interfered
with the freedom of movement of UNDOF and Observer Group Golan.
Restrictions on the movement of UNDOF and Observer Group Golan in the
areas of separation and limitation have increased as a result of
continuing clashes between the Syrian armed forces and armed members
of the opposition and other armed groups, disrupting the supply lines
to UNDOF positions in the southern part of the area of separation.
The SSAD advised UNDOF that, for security reasons, all United Nations
personnel should avoid areas where clashes were ongoing and that
UNDOF should not carry out night-time movements.

28.
The restrictions of movement and risk to United Nations personnel,
owing to the placement of improvised explosive devices alongside
roads in the area of separation by armed members of the opposition
remained high. Until the evacuation of the positions at the end of

August,
UNDOF continued to observe the presence of improvised explosive
devices and roadblocks in the vicinity of or on access roads to
United Nations positions 27, 60 and 68, as well as United Nations
observation posts 51 and 56, and outpost 32A.

29.
UNDOF protested the presence of Syrian armed forces and equipment in
the area of separation, the firing into and inside the area of
separation and the firing towards United Nations personnel and
facilities. The Force Commander reiterated to the Syrian authorities
the obligation of the armed forces to halt military operations in the
area of separation and to cease firing from the area of limitation,
stressing the importance of abiding by the terms of the Disengagement
of Forces Agreement and ensuring the safety and security of United
Nations personnel on the ground. Senior United Nations officials have
conveyed similar messages to the Permanent Representative of the
Syrian Arab Republic to the United Nations.

30.
Within this challenging operational environment and with a view to
ensuring its ability to implement its mandate safely and securely,
UNDOF supervised the area of separation by manning static positions,
conducting around-the-clock observation and conducting patrols along
most of the ceasefire line to ensure no breaches of the ceasefire
line occurred. In the northern part of the area of separation, UNDOF
conducted vehicle patrols as well as foot patrols on routes that are
inaccessible to vehicles. In the southern part of the area of
separation, until the events of late August, UNDOF conducted daily
patrols to United Nations outposts 85A and 86B, with a view to
observing developments in areas from which UNDOF temporarily withdrew
its personnel in early 2013. The UNDOF operations continued to be
supported by the Observer Group Golan military observers whose focus
of activities was shifted from patrolling and inspection to
round-the-clock static observation, investigations and situation
analysis. UNDOF, through Observer Group Golan, continues to establish
temporary observation posts in several locations along the ceasefire
line on the Alpha side several times a week, so as to increase the
Force’s situational awareness of the area of separation, in
particular in the south, where United Nations positions and
observation posts have been vacated temporarily owing to the security
situation. Through the Observer Group Golan, UNDOF continued to carry
out fortnightly inspections of equipment and force levels in the area
of limitation on the Alpha side. On several occasions, Observer Group
Golan observed several 155mm artillery weapons deployed in the 10km
zone. Liaison officers from the Alpha side accompanied Observer Group
Golan inspection teams. Inspections and mobile operations in the area
of limitation on the Bravo side remained suspended because of the
security situation. As in the past, the Force faced restrictions on
freedom of movement and its inspection teams were denied access to
some positions on the Alpha side. Observer Group Golan members
continued to experience regular restrictions of movement on the Alpha
side when entering and exiting United Nations observation posts 52
and 73, located to the east of the Israeli technical fence. The IDF
further reduced the number of technical fence crossings for the two
observation posts from two to one per day, thereby further limiting
the ability of United Nations personnel to carry out vehicle patrols,
as well as access by contractors to perform enhancement works at the
observation posts.

31.
As detailed above (ref para 4) as a result of the fighting that
erupted on 27 August, which led to the detention of United Nations
personnel, and the confinement of others in two UN positions, UNDOF
was forced to leave position 27 and evacuated personnel from
positions 60, 68, 69 and 85 as well as observation posts 52 and 56.
UNDOF personnel deployed at the Charlie gate at the official crossing
between the Alpha and Bravo sides, evacuated their position in the
early morning of 27 August, when fighting had erupted and was coming
close to the area of the gates. Except for observation post 56,
around which Syrian armed forces remain deployed, members of armed
groups have been seen entering all vacated United Nations positions,
and looting UN equipment and personal items. They also took control
of numerous United Nations armoured vehicles. The main effort
continued to remain on static activities combined with a focus on
enhanced situational analysis, reporting and liaising with the
parties to prevent situations from escalating. Both parties
maintained defensive positions in the respective areas of limitation.
Israeli customs officials continued to operate periodically at the
IDF post at the UNDOF crossing gate between the Israeli-occupied
Golan and the Syrian Arab Republic.

32.
In the vicinity of the ceasefire line in the area of separation,
mines continued to pose a threat to UNDOF personnel and local
inhabitants. Owing to the long-term presence of the mines and the
deterioration of their detonation systems, the threat increases from
year to year. On 16 and 30 July, UNDOF observed an explosion at a
location where a Syrian armed forces bulldozer was carrying out
construction works in the vicinity of observation post 56. On each
occasion, the driver was evacuated.

33.
The limitations imposed by the security situation on the Bravo side
notwithstanding, UNDOF continued its efforts to liaise with local
authorities and engage with the local population to explain the
mandate and activities of the Force. This remained important in light
of the security situation in the UNDOF area of operation and as part
of the effort to ensure the safety and security of United Nations
personnel on the ground.

34.
On 8 July and 14 August, UNDOF, in cooperation with the International
Committee of the Red Cross, facilitated the crossing of 47 students
from the Bravo side to the Alpha side and 33 students from the Alpha
to the Bravo side. UNDOF continued to provide emergency medical
treatment to civilians on a strictly humanitarian basis. During
periods of intensive fighting between the Syrian armed forces and
armed members of the opposition and other armed groups, local
inhabitants of areas under fire fled to safer areas in the area of
separation and

limitation.
In late May, civilians from villages in the area of limitation that
had come under aerial and artillery attacks fled to two villages in
the area of separation in the vicinity of United Nations position 80.
Their numbers increased in early June. UNDOF observed approximately
70 small and large tents in the area housing between 200 and 250
individuals. In addition, a total of 34 tents accommodating 170
persons were set up since late May on the outskirts of al- Rafid
village in the area of separation south of Position 80. While the
number of internally displaced persons in the camps is currently low,
UNDOF has learnt from persons in the camp that 15,000 individuals
registered their names with the camps.

35.
As at 2 September, UNDOF comprised 1,271 troops, including 48 women,
from Fiji (445), the Philippines (344), India (191), Ireland (134),
Nepal (155) and the Netherlands (2). In addition, 81 military
observers from the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization
(UNTSO), including one woman, assisted the Force in carrying out its
tasks.

36.
UNDOF continues to adopt and update mitigation measures on the basis
of a comprehensive risk assessment carried out by the Mission with
the support of the Secretariat. During the reporting period, the
Mission made further enhancements to a number of its vulnerable
premises that could be affected by the fighting in the Syrian
conflict. The enhancements included adding hardened watchtowers,
reinforcing buildings against direct and indirect fire, as well as
strengthening perimeter walls and wire fencing. Other mitigation
measures, including regular rehearsals of medical evacuation, shelter
alert and other emergency exercises, improved perimeter defence of
the Force headquarters and all other positions and provision of
personal protective equipment to all military and civilian personnel
and the necessary training remain in place. The UNDOF
counter-improvised explosive device (IED) equipment was inducted into
the Force and has strengthened UNDOF’s capability to cope with the
threat of improvised explosive devices. But, the Government of Syria
still has not allowed, despite its promises, the delivery of the
remaining counter-IED equipment. The overall security situation has
rendered it necessary for UNDOF to continue to use, with the
cooperation of the relevant authorities, alternative ports of entry
and departure for Force personnel.

37.
All regular movements of UNDOF personnel on the Bravo side are
controlled and continue to be carried out in formed convoys using
armoured vehicles. Logistics movements are provided with armed
escorts. UNDOF maintains regular armoured convoy movements between
Damascus and Camp Faouar to allow all UNDOF national staff whose
positions are based at UNDOF Headquarters to report to work
regularly. A number of national staff, whose functions do not
necessarily require their presence in Camp Faouar continue to work
from the UNDOF office in Damascus leaving only essential
international staff to work in Camp Faouar. The offices of
non-essential staff have been relocated to Camp Ziouani, which also
serves as

an
alternate headquarters of the Mission. Between 2 and 4 June, in
accordance with advisories issued by United Nations Department of
Safety and Security Damascus, UNDOF froze all movement between Camp
Faouar and Damascus as a precautionary measure to prevent incidents
in the context of the presidential elections. UNDOF also decided to
suspend movement during the same period between the Alpha and Bravo
sides. On 3 June, election day, UNDOF placed its reserves on stand-by
in potentially sensitive locations and suspended all movements in the
area of operations. Since 27 August, due to the heavy fighting in the
central part of the area of separation during which control of the
Bravo gate fell into the hands of armed groups, UNDOF has suspended
movements on the main road between Camp Faouar on the Bravo side and
Camp Ziouani on the Alpha side. Further adjustments to the Mission’s
working arrangements will need to be considered if safe movement
across the Alpha and Bravo gates cannot be re-established.

III.
Implementation of Security Council resolution 338 (1973)

38.
The Security Council, when deciding in its resolution 2131 (2013) to
renew the mandate of UNDOF for a further period of six months, until
30 June 2014, called upon the parties concerned to immediately
implement its resolution 338 (1973) and requested the
Secretary-General to submit, at the end of the period, a report on
developments in the situation and the measures taken to implement
that resolution. The search for a peaceful settlement in the Middle
East, in particular the efforts made at various levels to implement
resolution 338 (1973), was dealt with in my report on the situation
in the Middle East (A/69/341), submitted pursuant to General Assembly
resolutions 68/16 on Jerusalem and 68/17 on the Syrian Golan.

39.
Since the discontinuation of indirect peace talks in December 2008,
there have been no negotiations between the parties. The Syrian
conflict is further reducing the prospects for their resumption and
progress towards peace between Israel and the Syrian Arab Republic. I
look forward to a peaceful resolution of the conflict in Syria and
the resumption of efforts towards a comprehensive, just and durable
peace settlement, as called for by the Security Council in its
resolution 338 (1973) and other relevant resolutions.

Observations

40.
I note with deep concern the serious violations of the Disengagement
Agreement that have taken place, which resulted, in one instance, in
the tragic death of an Israeli teenager and Syrian armed forces
soldiers, as well as injury to persons on both sides. This is the
result of a significant deterioration of the security situation in
the UNDOF area of operation. The firing by Syrian forces across the
ceasefire line as well as the Israeli responses with artillery fire
and airstrikes jeopardize the maintenance of the ceasefire between
Israel and the Syrian Arab Republic. It remains critical that both
sides work through UNDOF to contain any incidents that occur along or
across the ceasefire line. The mandate of UNDOF remains an important
element in ensuring the stability of the region.

41.
I strongly condemn the forced removal of United Nations personnel
from their position and their detention by armed elements, and call
for their immediate, unconditional and safe release. I also condemn
the confinement of United Nations personnel within their premises
under threat of physical violence. Any hostile act against United
Nations personnel on the ground, including threatening their physical
safety and restricting their movement, the direct and indirect firing
at United Nations personnel and facilities, and the use of United
Nations premises, including those vacated temporarily, by anyone
other than United Nations personnel, is unacceptable.

42.
The activities of several armed elements, including the al-Nusra
Front, in the UNDOF area of operation since late August and the
direct confrontations with United Nations personnel, forced the
Mission to vacate all but one of its positions in the southern area
of separation, thereby significantly impacting the Mission’s
ability to carry out its mandate as agreed between the Governments of
Israel and the Syrian Arab Republic in the 1974 Disengagement of
Forces Agreement.

43.
Armed opposition groups and other armed groups have gained control of
a large part of the area of separation, including a section of the
main road connecting the two UNDOF camps and the crossing between the
Alpha and the Bravo sides. It remains critical that countries with
influence continue to strongly convey to the armed groups in the
UNDOF area of operation the unacceptability of threatening and
detaining United Nations peacekeepers and the need to cease any
actions that jeopardize the safety and security of United Nations
personnel on the ground, including firing at peacekeepers, and to
accord United Nations personnel the freedom to carry out their
mandate safely and securely. Threats by any person or organisation
against United Nations personnel are unacceptable.

44.
The primary responsibility for the safety and security of United
Nations personnel in the areas of separation and limitation on the
Bravo side rests with the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic. I
note the assistance provided by the Government of the Syrian Arab
Republic in facilitating the provision of essential supplies in
support of the Force to ensure that it continues implementing its
mandate safely and securely. It is imperative that respect for the
privileges and immunities of UNDOF and its freedom of movement be
ensured.

45.
There have been numerous incidents involving United Nations personnel
on the ground. I am also gravely concerned about United Nations
positions caught in crossfire and repeatedly sustaining damage to
their infrastructure. The placing of improvised explosive devices by
armed groups, especially close to and on access routes to United
Nations positions, remains of great concern. It exposes United
Nations peacekeepers on the ground to further risk. The safety and
security of UNDOF personnel and Observer Group Golan military
observers must be preserved. I remain deeply concerned about the
continuing deterioration of the security situation in the Syrian Arab
Republic, its impact on the Syrian population and potential
implications for the stability of the region. The ongoing military
activities in the area of separation and incidents across the
ceasefire line have led to phases of heightened tensions between
Israel and the Syrian Arab Republic and increase the risk to United
Nations personnel.

46.
Severe and sustained engagements between the Syrian armed forces and
armed members of the opposition and other armed groups in close
proximity to United Nations personnel and positions are very
worrying. The use of heavy weapons by both the Syrian armed forces
and armed groups in the continuing Syrian conflict, including air
power by Government forces in the area of limitation on the Bravo
side, remains disturbing.

47.
I am also concerned by the firing of a cluster ammunition round,
which, had it exploded and released the sub-munitions, would have
indiscriminately endangered the lives of the civilian population in
the area as well as that of United Nations peacekeepers well beyond
the instant it was fired. The use of such ammunition is contrary to
the 2008 Convention on Cluster Munitions. There should be no military
forces in the area of separation other than those of UNDOF. I note
with concern the presence and use of tanks by Syrian armed forces and
armed groups in the area of separation. I call upon all parties to
the Syrian conflict to cease military actions throughout the country,
including in the UNDOF area of operation. I call on the Government of
the Syrian Arab Republic to stop the use of airstrikes, which cause
suffering to the civilian population. I reiterate that all military
activities in the area of separation conducted by any actor pose a
risk to the ceasefire and the local civilian population, in addition
to United Nations personnel on the ground.

48.
The presence of the Syrian armed forces and unauthorized military
equipment in the area of separation in addition to the firing from
the Bravo side across the ceasefire line, are grave violations of the
Disengagement of Forces Agreement. All incidents of firing into the
area of separation and across the ceasefire line by either party are
also grave violations of the Agreement. I stress the importance of
all parties’ liaison with UNDOF in the first instance to prevent
any escalation of the situation. I call upon all parties to take all
necessary measures to protect civilians and ensure respect for the
safety and security of United Nations personnel, in addition to
freedom of movement for the Mission throughout its area of operation.
For its part, the United Nations will spare no effort in ensuring
that the long-held ceasefire between Israel and the Syrian Arab
Republic continues to hold.

49.
In view of the critical developments in the UNDOF area of operations,
the Force immediately took further measures to adjust temporarily its
posture and operations. In accordance with its mandate, UNDOF will
continue to use its best efforts to monitor the ceasefire between
Syrian and Israeli forces and see that it is observed, albeit in
increasingly challenging and difficult circumstances. Given the
rapidly evolving and volatile situation in the UNDOF area of
operation, DPKO in consultation with UNDOF continues to review
UNDOF's operational posture, configuration and activities. In
addition, UNDOF continuously reviews and updates its contingency
plans.

50.
The support of the parties and the Security Council is critical as
UNDOF continues to adapt to the evolving situation. It is equally
critical that the Security Council continues to bring its influence
to bear on the parties concerned to ensure that UNDOF is accorded the
ability to operate freely and securely within its area of operation
and to carry out its important mandate. It is essential that UNDOF
continue to have at its disposal all necessary means and resources,
particularly in light of the volatile security environment. UNDOF
also needs to retain the confidence and commitment of
troop-contributing countries. I am grateful to the Governments of
Fiji, India, Ireland, Nepal, the Netherlands and the Philippines for
their contributions to UNDOF and for staying the course under
challenging circumstances. In addition, I am grateful to the Member
States contributing military observers to UNTSO. The continued
credible presence of UNDOF remains an important element in ensuring
stability on the Golan and in the region.

51.
In conclusion, I wish to express my appreciation to the Head of
Mission and Force Commander, Lieutenant General Iqbal Singh Singha,
and the military and civilian personnel serving under his leadership,
who continue to perform with efficiency and commitment, under
extremely challenging circumstances, the important tasks assigned to
them by the Security Council. I have full confidence that UNDOF will
continue to use its best efforts to carry out its mandate.

*
As this report was going to press, the 45 UNDOF peacekeepers were
released unharmed on 11 September. They were brought to Position 80,
from where they crossed to the Alpha side. Subsequently, the
peacekeepers returned to the Bravo side and Camp Faouar.