LEE HARVEY OSWALD spent almost all of the last 48 hours of his life
in the Police and Courts Building, a gray stone structure in downtown Dallas that housed the headquarters
of the Dallas Police Department and the city jail. Following his arrest early Friday afternoon, Oswald
was brought immediately to this building and remained there until Sunday morning, November 24, when
he was scheduled to be transferred to the county jail. At 11:21 that morning, in full view of millions
of people watching on television, Oswald was fatally wounded by Jack Ruby, who emerged suddenly from
the crowd of newsmen and policemen witnessing the transfer and fired a single shot at Oswald.

Whether the killing of Oswald was part of a conspiracy involving
the assassination of President Kennedy is considered in chapter VI.
Aside from that question, the occurrences within the Police and Courts
Building between November 22 and 24 raise other important issues
concerning the conduct of law enforcement officials, the
responsibilities of the press, the rights of accused persons, and the
administration of criminal justice in the United States. The
Commission has therefore deemed it necessary to determine the facts
concerning Oswald's detention and death and to evaluate the actions
and responsibilities of the police and press involved in these events.

The focal center of the Police and Courts Building during
Oswald's detention was the third floor, which housed the main offices
of the Dallas Police Department. The public elevators on this floor
opened into a lobby midpoint of a corridor that extended along the
length of the floor for about 140 feet. At one end of this 7-foot-wide
corridor were the offices occupied by Chief of Police Jesse E. Curry
and his immediate subordinates; at the other end was a small pressroom
that could accommodate only a handful of reporters. Along this
corridor were other police offices, including those of the major
detective bureaus. Between the pressroom and the lobby was the complex
of offices

The policemen who seized Oswald at the Texas Theatre arrived with
him at the police department building at about 2 p.m. and brought him
immediately to the third floor offices of the homicide and robbery
bureau to await the arrival of Captain Fritz from the Texas School
Book Depository. After about 15 or 20 minutes Oswald was ushered into
the office of Captain Fritz for the first of several interrogation
sessions.2 At 4:05 p.m. he was taken to the basement assembly room
for his first lineup.3 While waiting outside the lineup room, Oswald
was searched, and five cartridges and other items were removed from
his pockets.4 After the lineup, at about 4 :20, Oswald was returned
to Captain Fritz' office for further questioning.5 Two hours later,
at 6:20 p.m., Oswald was taken downstairs for a second lineup and
returned to Captain Fritz' office within 15 minutes for additional
interrogation.6 Shortly after 7 p.m., Captain Fritz signed a
complaint charging Oswald with the murder of Patrolman Tippit. Oswald
was formally arraigned, i.e., advised of the charges, at 7:10 p.m.,
before Justice of the Peace David L. Johnston, who came to Captain Fritz'
office for the occasion.7

After a third lineup at about 7:40 p.m., Oswald was returned to
Fritz' office.8 About an hour later, after further questioning,
Oswald's fingerprints and palmprints were taken and a paraffin test
(see app. XI) administered in Fritz' office, after which the
questioning resumed.9 At 11:26 p.m. Fritz signed the complaint
charging Oswald with the murder of President Kennedy. 10 Shortly
after midnight, detectives took Oswald to the basement assembly room
for an appearance of several minutes before members of the press.11
At about 12 :20 a.m. Oswald was delivered to the jailer who placed him
in a maximum security cell on the fifth floor. 12 His cell was the
center one in a block of three cells that were separated from the
remainder of the jail area. The cells on either side of Oswald were
empty and a guard was nearby whenever Oswald was present.13 Shortly
after 1:30 a.m. Oswald was brought to the identification bureau on
the fourth floor and arraigned before Justice of the Peace Johnston,
this time for the murder President Kennedy.14

Questioning resumed in Fritz' office on Saturday morning at
about 10:25 a.m., and the session lasted nearly an hour and 10
minutes.15 Oswald was then returned to his cell for an hour, and at
12:35 p.m. he was brought back to Fritz' office for an additional
half-hour of questioning.16 From 1:10 to 1:30 p.m., Oswald's wife and
mother visited him in the fourth floor visiting area;17 at 1:40 p.m.
he attempted to call an attorney in New York. 18 He appeared in another
lineup at, 2:15 p.m.19 At 2:45 p.m., with Oswald's consent, a member
of the identification bureau obtained fingernail scrapings and
specimens of hair from him.20 He returned to the fourth floor at 3:30

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p.m. for a 10-minute visit with his brother, Robert. 21 Between 4 and
4:30 p.m., Oswald made two telephone calls to Mrs. Ruth Paine 22 at
her home in Irving; at about 5:30 p.m. he was visited by the president
of the Dallas Bar Association 23 with whom he spoke for about 5
minutes. From 6 to 7:15 p.m. Oswald was interrogated once again in
Captain Fritz' office and then returned to his cell. 24 At 8 p.m. he
called the Paine residence again and asked to speak to his wife, but
Mrs. Paine told him that his wife was no longer there.25

Oswald was signed out of jail at 9:30 a.m. on Sunday, November
24, and taken to Captain Fritz' office for a final round of
questioning.26 The transfer party left Fritz' office at about 11:15
a.m.;27 at 11:21 a.m. Oswald was shot.28 He was declared dead at
Parkland Hospital at 1:07 p.m.29

During the period between 2:30 p.m. on Friday afternoon and 11:15
a.m. Sunday morning, Oswald was interrogated for a total of
approximately 12 hours.30 Though subject to intermittent questioning
for more than 7 hours on Friday, Oswald was given 8 to 9 hours to rest
that night. On Saturday he was questioned for a total of only 3 hours
during three interrogation sessions, and on Sunday he was questioned
for less than 2 hours. 31 (These interrogations are discussed in ch.
IV.)

Captain Fritz' office, within which the interrogations took
place, was a small room, 14 feet by 9 and a half feet in size. 32 In
addition to the policemen guarding the prisoner, those present usually
included Dallas detectives, investigators from the FBI and the Secret
Service, and occasionally other officials, particularly a post office
inspector and the U.S. marshal. (See statements in app. XI.) As
many as seven or eight people crowded into the small office.33 In
all, more than 25 different persons participated in or were present at
some time during interrogations. Captain Fritz, who conducted most of
the interrogations, was frequently called from the room. He said, "I
don't believe there was any time when I went through a very long
period without having to step to the door, or step outside, to get a
report from some pair of officers, or to give them additional
assignments." 34 In his absence, others present would occasionally
question Oswald.35

The interrogators differ on whether the confusion prevailing in
the main third floor corridor penetrated Fritz' office and affected
the atmosphere within.36 Oswald's processions through the third floor
corridor, described more fully below, tended, in Fritz' opinion, to
keep Oswald upset, and the remarks and questions of newsmen sometimes
caused him to become annoyed. Despite the confusion that frequently
prevailed, Oswald remained calm most of the time during the
interrogations.37 According to Captain Fritz:

You know I didn't have trouble with him. If we would
just talk to him quietly like we are talking right now, we talked
all right until I asked him a question that meant something, every

Page 200

time I asked him a question that meant something, that would
produce evidence he immediately told me he wouldn't tell me about it and he seemed to anticipate what
I was going to ask. 38

Special Agent James W. Bookhout, who represented the FBI at most of
the interrogations, stated, "I think generally you might say anytime
that you asked a question that would be pertinent to the
investigation, that would be the type of question he would refuse to
discuss." 39

The number of people in the interrogation room and the tumultuous
atmosphere throughout the third floor made it difficult for the
interrogators to gain Oswald's confidence and to encourage him to be
truthful. As Chief Curry has recognized in his testimony, "we were
violating every principle of interrogation ... it was just against
all principles of good interrogation practice." 40

All available evidence indicates that Oswald was not subjected to
any physical hardship during the interrogation sessions or at any
other time while he was in custody. He was fed and allowed to rest.
When he protested on Friday against being handcuffed from behind, the
cuffs were removed and he was handcuffed in front. 41 Although he made
remarks to newsmen about desiring a shower and demanding his "civil
rights," Oswald did not complain about his treatment to any of the
numerous police officers and other persons who had much to do with him
during the 2 days of his detention.42 As described in chapter IV,
Oswald received a slight cut over his right eye and a bruise under
his left eye during the scuffle in the Texas Theatre with the
arresting officers, three of whom were injured and required medical
treatment. These marks were visible to all who saw him during the 2
days of his detention and to millions of television viewers.43

Before the first questioning session on Friday afternoon, Fritz
warned Oswald that he was not compelled to make any statement and that
statements he did make could be used against him.44 About 5 hours
later, he was arraigned for the Tippit murder and within an additional
6 and a half hours he was arraigned for the murder of President
Kennedy. On each occasion the justice of the peace advised Oswald of
his right to obtain counsel and the right to remain silent.45

Throughout the period of detention, however, Oswald was not
represented by counsel. At the Friday midnight press conference in
the basement assembly room, he made the following remarks:

Oswald. Well, I was questioned by Judge-------[Johnston].
However, I protested at that time that I was not allowed legal representation during that very short and
sweet hearing. I really don't know what the situation is about. Nobody has told me anything except that
I am accused of, of, murdering a policeman.

Page 201

I know nothing more than that and I do request someone to come forward
to give me legal assistance.

Q. Did you kill the President?

A. No. I have not been charged with that. In fact nobody has said
that to me yet. The first thing I heard about it was when the
newspaper reporters in the hall asked me that question.

Q. Mr. Oswald, how did you hurt your eye?

A. A policeman hit me.46

At this time Oswald had been arraigned only for the murder of
Patrolman Tippit, but questioning by Captain Fritz and others had been
substantially concerned with Oswald's connection with the
assassination.47

On Friday evening, representatives of the American Civil Liberties
Union visited the police department to determine whether Oswald was
being deprived of counsel. They were assured by police officials and
Justice of the Peace Johnston that Oswald had been informed of his
rights and was being allowed to seek a lawyer.48 On Saturday Oswald
attempted several times to reach John Abt, a New York lawyer, by
telephone, but with no success. 49 In the afternoon, he called Ruth
Paine and asked her to try to reach Abt for him, but she too failed.
50 Later in the afternoon, H. Louis Nichols, president of the Dallas
Bar Association, visited Oswald in his cell and asked him whether he
wanted the association to obtain a lawyer for him. Oswald declined the
offer, stating a first preference for Abt and a second preference for
a lawyer from the American Civil Liberties Union.51 As late as Sunday
morning, according to Postal Inspector Harry D. Holmes, Oswald said
that he preferred to get his own lawyer.52

Within an hour of Oswald's arrival at the police department on
November 22, it became known to newsmen that he was a possible suspect
in the slaying of President Kennedy as well as in the murder of
Patrolman Tippit. At least as early as 3:26 p.m. a television report
carried this information. Reporters and cameramen flooded into the
building and congregated in the corridor of the third floor, joining
those few who had been present when Oswald first arrived. 53

On the Third Floor

Felix McKnight, editor of the Dallas Times-Herald, who handled
press arrangements for the President's visit, estimated that within 24
hours of the assassination more than 800 representatives of news media
were in Dallas, including correspondents from foreign newspapers and
press associations.54 District Attorney Henry M. Wade

Page 202

thought that the crowd in the third floor hallway itself may have
numbered as many as 300.55 Most estimates, including those based on
examination of video tapes, place upwards of 100 newsmen and cameramen
in the third floor corridor of the police department by the evening of
November 22.55 (See Commission Exhibit No. 2633, p. 203.)

In the words of an FBI agent who was present, the conditions at
the police station were "not too much unlike Grand Central Station at
rush hour, maybe like the Yankee Stadium during the World Series
games...." 57 In the lobby of the third floor, television cameramen set up
two large cameras and floodlights in strategic positions that gave
them a sweep of the corridor in either direction. Technicians
stretched their television cables into and out of offices, running
some of them out of the windows of a deputy chief's office and down
the side of the building. Men with newsreel cameras, still cameras,
and microphones, more mobile than the television cameramen, moved
back and forth seeking information and opportunities for interviews.
Newsmen wandered into the offices of other bureaus located on the
third floor, sat on desks, and used police telephones; indeed, one
reporter admits hiding a telephone behind a desk so that he would have
exclusive access to it if something developed.58

By the time Chief Curry returned to the building in the middle
of the afternoon from Love Field where he had escorted President
Johnson from Parkland Hospital, he found that "there was just
pandemonium on the third floor." 59 The news representatives, he
testified:

... were jammed into the north hall of the third floor, which are
the offices of the criminal investigation division. The television
trucks, there were several of them around the city hall. I went into
my administrative offices, I saw cables coming through the
administrative assistant office and through the deputy chief of
traffic through his office, and running through the hall they had a
live TV set up on the third floor, and it was a bedlam of confusion.60

According to Special Agent Winston G. Lawson of the Secret
Service:

At least by 6 or 7 o'clock ... [the reporters and cameramen] were
quite in evidence up and down the corridors, cameras on the tripods,
the sound equipment, people with still cameras, motion picture-type
hand cameras, all kinds of people with tape recorders, and they were
trying to interview people, anybody that belonged in police
headquarters that might know anything about Oswald ... 61

The corridor became so jammed that policemen and newsmen had to
push and shove if they wanted to get through, stepping over cables,

wires, and tripods.62 The crowd in the hallway was so dense that
District Attorney Wade found it a "strain to get the door open" to
get into the homicide office.63 According to Lawson, "You had to
literally fight your way through the people to get up and down the
corridor." 64 A witness who was escorted into the homicide offices on
Saturday afternoon related that he

tried to get by the reporters, stepping over television cables and you
couldn't hardly get by, they would grab you and wanted to know what
you were doing down here, even with the detectives one in front and
one behind you.65

The television cameras continued to record the scene on the third
floor as some of the newsmen kept vigil through the night.66

Such police efforts as there were to control the newsmen were
unavailing. Capt. Glen D. King, administrative assistant to Chief
Curry, witnessed efforts to clear an aisle through the hallway, but
related that "this was a constant battle because of the number of
newsmen who were there. They would move back into the aisleway that
had been cleared. They interfered with the movement of people who had
to be there." 67 According to one detective, "they would be asked to
stand back and stay back but it wouldn't do much good, and they would
push forward and you had to hold them off physically." The detective
recalled that on one occasion when he was escorting a witness through
the corridor he "stopped ... and looked down and there was a joker
had a camera stuck between ... [his] legs taking pictures. ... "68
Forrest V. Sorrels of the Secret Service had the impression that the
"press and the television people just ... took over." 69

Police control over the access of other than newsmen to the third
floor was of limited but increasing effectiveness after Oswald's
arrival at the police department. Initially no steps. were taken to
exclude unauthorized persons from the third floor corridor, but late
Friday afternoon Assistant Chief Charles Batchelor stationed guards at
the elevators and the stairway to prevent the admission of such
persons. He also directed the records room in the basement to issue
passes, after verification by the bureaus involved, to people who had
legitimate business on the third floor.70 Throughout the 3 days of
Oswald's detention, the police were obliged to continue normal
business in all five bureaus located along the third floor hallway.
Thus many persons--relatives of prisoners, complainants, witnesses 71
--had occasion to visit police offices on the third floor on business
unrelated to the investigation of the assassination.

Newsmen seeking admission to the third floor were required to
identify themselves by their personal press cards; however, the
department did not follow its usual procedure of checking the
authenticity of press credentials.72 Captain King felt that this would
have been impossible in light of "the atmosphere that existed over
there, the tremendous pressures that existed, the fact that telephones
were ringing constantly,

Page 205

This page reproduces COMMISSION EXHIBIT No. 2631: photograph showing Oswald being moved through third floor corridor.

Page 206

that there were droves of people in there ... the fact that the
method by which you positively identify someone ... it's not easy."
73

Police officers on the third floor testified that they
carefully checked all persons for credentials, and most newsmen
indicated that after Batchelor imposed security they were required to
identify themselves by their press cards.74 Special Agent Sorrels of
the Secret Service stated that he was requested to present credentials
on some of his visits to the third floor.75 However, other newsmen
apparently went unchallenged during the entire period before Oswald
was killed, although some of them were wearing press badges on their
lapels and some may have been known to the police officers. 76

According to some reporters and policemen, people who appeared to
be unauthorized were present on the third floor after security
procedures were instituted, and video tapes seem to confirm their
observations.77 Jack Ruby was present on the third floor on Friday
night.78 Assistant Chief of Police N. T. Fisher testified that even on
Saturday "anybody could come up with a plausible reason for going to
one of the third floor bureaus and was able to get in." 79

When the police car bringing Oswald from the Texas Theatre drove
into the basement of police headquarters at about 2 p.m. on Friday,
some reporters and cameramen, principally from local papers and
stations, were already on hand. The policemen formed a wedge around
Oswald and conducted him to the elevator, but several newsmen crowded
into the elevator with Oswald and the police. When the elevator
stopped at the third floor, the cameramen ran ahead down the corridor,
and then turned around and backed up, taking pictures of Oswald as he
was escorted toward the homicide and robbery bureau office. According
to one escorting officer, some six or seven reporters followed the
police into the bureau office.80

From Friday afternoon, when Oswald arrived in the building, until
Sunday, newspaper reporters and television cameras focused their
attention on the homicide office. In full view and within arm's
length of the assembled newsmen, Oswald traversed the 20 feet of
corridor between the homicide office and the locked door leading to
the jail elevator at least 15 times after his initial arrival. The
jail elevator, sealed off from public use, took him to his fifth
floor cell and to the assembly room in the basement for lineups and
the Friday night news conference.81

On most occasions, Oswald's escort of three to six detectives
and policemen had to push their way through the newsmen who sought to
surround them. (See Commission Exhibit No. 2631, p. 205.) Although
the Dallas press normally did not take pictures of a prisoner without
first obtaining permission of the police, who generally asked the
prisoner, this practice was not followed by any of the newsmen with
Oswald.82 Generally when Oswald appeared the newsmen turned their
cameras on him, thrust microphones at his face, and shouted

questions at him. Sometimes he answered. Reporters in the forefront of
the throng would repeat his answers for the benefit of those behind
them who could not hear. On Saturday, however in response to police
admonitions, the reporters exercised more restraint and shouted fewer
questions at Oswald when he passed through the corridor.83

Oswald's most prolonged exposure occurred at the midnight press
conference on Friday night. In response to demands of newsmen,
District Attorney Wade, after consulting with Chief Curry and Captain
Fritz, had announced shortly before midnight that Oswald would appear
at a press conference in the basement assembly room.84 An estimated
70 to 100 people, including Jack Ruby, and other unauthorized persons,
crowded into the small downstairs room. No identification was
required.85 The room was so packed that Deputy Chief M. W. Stevenson
and Captain Fritz who came down to the basement after the crowd had
assembled could not get in and were forced to remain in the doorway.86

Oswald was brought into the room shortly after midnight.87 Curry
had instructed policemen not to permit newsmen to touch Oswald or get
close to him, but no steps were taken to shield Oswald from the
crowd.88 Captain Fritz had asked that Oswald be placed on the platform
used for lineups so that he could be more easily removed "if anything
happened." 89 Chief Curry, however, insisted that Oswald stand on the
floor in front of the stage, where he was also in front of the one-way
nylon-cloth screen customarily used to prevent a suspect from seeing
those present in the room. This was done because cameramen had told
Curry that their cameras would not photograph well through the
screen.90

Curry had instructed the reporters that they were not to "ask any
questions and try to interview ... [Oswald] in any way," but when he
was brought into the room, immediately they began to shoot questions
at him and shove microphones into his face." 91 It was difficult to
hear Oswald's answers above the uproar. Cameramen stood on the tables
to take pictures and others pushed forward to get close-ups. (See
Commission Exhibit No. 2965, p. 207.) The noise and confusion mounted
as reporters shouted at each other to get out of the way and cameramen
made frantic efforts to get into position for pictures.92 After Oswald
had been in the room only a few minutes, Chief Curry intervened and
directed that Oswald be taken back to the jail because, he testified,
the newsmen "tried to overrun him." 93

In Dallas, after a person is charged with a felony, the county
sheriff ordinarily takes custody of the prisoner and assumes
responsibility for his safekeeping. Normally, the Dallas Police
Department notifies the sheriff when a prisoner has been charged with
a felony and the sheriff dispatches his deputies to transport the
accused to the county jail. This is usually done within a few hours
after the complaint

Page 209

has been filed. In cases of unusual importance, however, the Dallas
city police sometimes transport the prisoners to the county jail.94

The decision to move Oswald to the county jail on Sunday morning
was reached by Chief Curry the preceding evening. Sometime after 7:30
Saturday evening, according to Assistant Chief Batchelor, two
reporters told him that they wanted to go out to dinner but that "they
didn't want to miss anything if we were going to move the prisoner."
Curry came upon them at that point and told the two newsmen that if
they returned by 10 o'clock in the morning, they wouldn't "miss
anything." 95 A little later, after checking with Captain Fritz,
Curry made a similar announcement to the assembled reporters. Curry
reported the making of his decision to move Oswald as follows:

Then, I talked to Fritz about when he thought he would transfer the
prisoner, and he didn't think it was a good idea to transfer him at
night because of the fact you couldn't see, and if anybody tried to
cause them any trouble, they needed to see who they were and where it
was coming from and so forth, and he suggested that we wait until
daylight, so this was normal procedure, I mean, for Fritz to determine
when he is going to transfer his prisoners, so I told him "Okay." I
asked him, I said, "What time do you think you will be ready
tomorrow?" And he didn't know exactly and I said, "Do you think about
10 o'clock," and he said, "I believe so," and then is when I went out
and told the newspaper people ... "I believe if you are back here by
10 o'clock you will be back in time to observe anything you care to
observe." 96

During the night, between 2:30 and 3 a.m., the local office of
the FBI and the sheriff's office received telephone calls from an
unidentified man who warned that a committee had decided "to kill the
man that killed the President." 97 Shortly after, an FBI agent
notified the Dallas police of the anonymous threat. The police
department and ultimately Chief Curry were informed of both threats.98

Immediately after his arrival at the building on Sunday morning
between 8:30 and 8:45 a.m., Curry spoke by telephone with Sheriff J.
E. Decker about the transfer. When Decker indicated that he would
leave to Curry the decision on whether the sheriff's office or the
police would move Oswald, Curry decided that the police would handle
it because "we had so much involved here, we were the ones that were
investigating the case and we had the officers set up down stairs to
handle it." 99

After talking with Decker, Curry began to discuss plans for the
transfer. With the threats against Oswald in mind, Curry suggested to
Batchelor and Deputy Chief Stevenson that Oswald be transported to the
county jail in an armored truck, to which they agreed. While Batchelor
made arrangements to have an armored truck brought to the building,
Curry and Stevenson tentatively agreed on the route the armored truck
would follow from the building to the county jail.100

Page 210

Curry decided that Oswald would leave the building via the
basement. He stated later that he reached this decision shortly after
his arrival at the police building Sunday morning, when members of the
press had already begun to gather in the basement. There is no
evidence that anyone opposed this decision.101 Two members of the
Dallas police did suggest to Captain Fritz that Oswald be taken from
the building by another exit, leaving the press "waiting in the
basement and on Commerce Street, and we could be to the county jail
before anyone knew what was taking place." 102 However, Fritz said
that he did not think Curry would agree to such a plan because he had
promised that Oswald would be transferred at a time when newsmen could
take pictures.103 Forrest Sorrels also suggested to Fritz that Oswald
be moved at an unannounced time when no one was around, but Fritz
again responded that Curry "wanted to go along with the press and not
try to put anything over on them." 104

Preliminary arrangements to obtain additional personnel to assist
with the transfer were begun Saturday evening. On Saturday night, the
police reserves were requested to provide 8 to 10 men on Sunday, and
additional reservists were sought in the morning.105 Capt. C. E.
Talbert, who was in charge of the patrol division for the city of
Dallas on the morning of November 24, retained a small number of
policemen in the building when he took charge that morning and later
ordered other patrolmen from several districts to report to the
basement. 106 At about 9 a.m. Deputy Chief Stevenson instructed all
detectives within the building to remain for the transfer.107 Sheriff
Decker testified that his men were ready to receive Oswald at the
county jail from the early hours of Sunday morning.108

With the patrolmen and reserve policemen available to him, Captain
Talbert, on his own initiative, undertook to secure the basement of
the police department building. He placed policemen outside the
building at the top of the Commerce Street ramp to keep all spectators
on the opposite side of Commerce Street. Later, Talbert directed that
patrolmen be assigned to all street intersections the transfer vehicle
would cross along the route to the county jail. 109 His most
significant security precautions, however, were steps designed to
exclude unauthorized persons from the basement area.

The spacious basement of the Police and Courts Building
contains, among other things, the jail office and the police garage.
(See Commission Exhibit No. 2179, p. 211.) The jail office, into
which the jail elevator opens, is situated on the west side of an auto
ramp cutting across the length of the basement from Main Street, on
the north side of the building, to Commerce Street, on the south side.
From the foot of this ramp, on the east side, midway through the
basement, a decline runs down a short distance to the L-shaped police
garage. In addition to the auto ramp, five doors to the garage provide
access to the basement from the Police and Courts Building on the west
side of the garage and the attached Municipal Building on the east.
Three of these five doors provide access to three elevators opening
into the garage, two for passengers near the central part of the
garage and

one for service at the east end of the garage. A fourth door near the
passenger elevator opens into the municipal building; the fifth door,
at the Commerce Street side of the garage, opens into a subbasement
that is connected with both buildings.110

Shortly after 9 o'clock Sunday morning, policemen cleared the
basement of all but police personnel. Guards were stationed at the
top of the Main and Commerce Streets auto ramps leading down into the
basement, at each of the five doorways into the garage, and at the
double doors leading to the public hallway adjacent to the jail
office. Then, Sgt. Patrick T. Dean, acting under instructions
from Talbert, directed 14 men in a search of the garage. Maintenance
workers were directed to leave the area. The searchers examined the
rafters, tops of air conditioning ducts, and every closet and room
opening off the garage. They searched the interior and trunk
compartment of automobiles parked in the garage. The two passenger
elevators in the central part of the garage were not in service and
the doors were shut and locked; the service elevator was moved to the
first floor, and the operator was instructed not to return it to the
basement.111

Despite the thoroughness with which the search was conducted,
there still existed one and perhaps two weak points in controlling
access to the garage. Testimony did not resolve positively whether or
not the stairway door near the public elevators was locked both from
the inside and outside as was necessary to secure it effectively.112
And although guards were stationed near the double doors, the hallway
near the jail office was accessible to people from inside the Police
and Courts Building without the necessity of presenting
identification. Until seconds before Oswald was shot, newsmen hurrying
to photograph Oswald were able to run without challenge through those
doors into the basement.113

After the search had been completed, the police allowed news
representatives to reenter the basement area and gather along the
entrance to the garage on the east side of the ramp. Later, the
police permitted the newsmen to stand in front of the railing on the
east side of the ramp leading to Main Street. The policemen deployed
by Talbert and Dean had instructions to allow no one but identified
news media representatives into the basement. As before, the police
accepted any credentials that appeared authentic, though some
officers did make special efforts to check for pictures and other
forms of corroborating identification. Many newsmen reported that they
were checked on more than one occasion while they waited in the
basement. A small number did not recall that their credentials were
ever checked.114

Shortly after his arrival on Sunday morning, Chief Curry issued
instructions to keep reporters and cameramen out of the jail office
and to keep television equipment behind the railing separating the
basement auto ramp from the garage. Curry observed that in other
respects Captain Talbert appeared to have security measures in hand
and allowed him to proceed on his own initiative. Batchelor and

Page 213

Stevenson checked progress in the basement during the course of the
morning, and the officials were generally satisfied with the steps
Talbert had taken.115

At about 11 a.m., Deputy Chief Stevenson requested that Capt.
O. A. Jones of the forgery bureau bring all available detectives from
the third floor offices to the basement. Jones instructed the
detectives who accompanied him to the basement to line the walls on
either side of the passageway cleared for the transfer party.116
According to Detective T. D. McMillon,

... Captain Jones explained to us that, when they brought the
prisoner out, that he wanted two lines formed and we were to keep
these two lines formed: you know, a barrier on either side of them,
kind of an aisle ... for them to walk through, and when they came
down this aisle, we were to keep this line intact and move along with
them until the man was placed in the car.117

With Assistant Chief Batchelor's permission, Jones removed
photographers who had gathered once again in the basement jail office.
Jones recalled that he instructed all newsmen along the Main Street
ramp to remain behind an imaginary line extending from the southeast
corner of the jail office to the railing on the east side of the ramp;
other officers recalled that Jones directed the newsmen to move away
from the foot of the Main Street ramp and to line up against the east
railing. In any event, newsmen were allowed to congregate along the
foot of the ramp after Batchelor observed that there was insufficient
room along the east of the ramp to permit all the news
representatives to see Oswald as he was brought out.118

By the time Oswald reached the basement, 40 to 50 newsmen and
70 to 75 police officers were assembled there. Three television
cameras stood along the railing and most of the newsmen were
congregated in that area and at the top of the adjacent decline
leading into the garage. A group of newsmen and police officers, best
estimated at about 20, stood strung across the bottom of the Main
Street ramp. Along the south wall of the passageway outside the jail
office door were about eight detectives, and three detectives lined
the north wall. Two officers stood in front of the double doors
leading into the passageway from the corridor next to the jail
office.119 (See Commission Exhibit No. 2634, p. 214.)

Beginning Saturday night, the public had been kept informed of
the approximate time of the transfer. At approximately 10:20 a.m.
Curry told a press conference that Oswald would be moved in an armored
truck and gave a general description of other security precautions.120
Apparently no newsmen were informed of the transfer route, however,
and the route was not disclosed to the driver of the armored truck
until the truck arrived at the Commerce Street exit at about 11:07
a.m.121 When they learned of its arrival, many of the remaining
newsmen who had waited on the third floor descended to the basement.
Shortly after, newsmen may have had another indication

that the transfer was imminent if they caught a glimpse through the
glass windows of Oswald putting on a sweater in Captain Fritz' office.
122

Because the driver feared that the truck might stall if it had
to start from the bottom of the ramp and because the overhead
clearance appeared to be inadequate, Assistant Chief Batchelor had it
backed only into the entranceway at the top of the ramp. Batchelor
and others then inspected the inside of the truck.123

When Chief Curry learned that the truck had arrived, he informed
Captain Fritz that security controls were in effect and inquired how
long the questioning of Oswald would continue. At this point, Fritz
learned for the first time of the plan to convey Oswald by armored
truck and immediately expressed his disapproval. He urged the use of
an unmarked police car driven by a police officer, pointing out that
this would be better from the standpoint of both speed and
maneuverability. Curry agreed to Fritz' plan; the armored truck would
be used as a decoy. They decided that the armored truck would leave
the ramp first, followed by a car which would contain only security
officers. A police car bearing Oswald would follow. After proceeding
one block, the car with Oswald would turn off and proceed directly to
the county jail; the armored truck would follow a lead car to the jail
along the previously agreed upon and more circuitous route.124

Captain Fritz instructed Detectives C. W. Brown and C. N. Dhority
and a third detective to proceed to the garage and move the follow-up
car and the transfer car into place on the auto ramp. He told Lt. Rio
S. Pierce to obtain another automobile from the basement and take up a
lead position on Commerce Street.125 Deputy Chief Stevenson went back
to the basement to inform Batchelor and Jones of the change in
plans.126 Oswald was given his sweater, and then his right hand was
handcuffed to the left hand of Detective J. R. Leavelle.127 Detective
T. L. Baker called the jail office to check on security precautions in
the basement and notify officials that the prisoner was being brought
down.128

On arriving in the basement, Pierce asked Sgts. James A.
Putnam and Billy Joe Maxey to accompany him in the lead car. Since
the armored truck was blocking the Commerce Street ramp, it would be
necessary to drive out the Main Street ramp and circle the block to
Commerce Street. Maxey sat on the back seat of Pierce's car, and
Putnam helped clear a path through reporters on the ramp so that
Pierce could drive up toward Main Street. When the car passed by the
reporters at about 11:20 a.m., Putnam entered the car on the right
front side. Pierce drove to the top of the Main Street ramp and
slowed momentarily as Patrolman Roy E. Vaughn stepped from his
position at the top of the ramp toward the street to watch for
traffic.129 After Pierce's car left the garage area, Brown drove
another police car out of the garage, moved part way up the Commerce
Street ramp, and began to back down into position to receive Oswald.
Dhority also proceeded to drive the follow-up car into position ahead
of Brown.130

Page 216

As Pierce's car started up the ramp at about 11:20 a.m.,
Oswald, accompanied by Captain Fritz and four detectives, arrived at
the jail office. Cameramen in the hallway of the basement took
pictures of Oswald through the interior glass windows of the jail
office as he was led through the office to the exit.131 Some of these
cameramen then ran through the double doors near the jail office and
squeezed into the line which had formed across the Main Street
ramp.132 Still others remained just inside the double doors or
proceeded through the double doors after Oswald and his escort emerged
from the jail office.133 (See Commission Exhibit No. 2177, p. 217.)

When Fritz came to the jail office door, he asked if
everything was ready, and a detective standing in the passageway
answered yes.134 Someone shouted, "Here he comes!"; additional
spotlights were turned on in the basement, and the din increased. A
detective stepped from the jail office and proceeded toward the
transfer car. Seconds later Fritz and then Oswald, with Detective
Leavelle at his right, Detective L. C. Graves at his left, and
Detective L. D. Montgomery at his rear, came through the door. Fritz
walked to Brown's car, which had not yet backed fully into position;
Oswald followed a few feet behind. Newsmen near the double door moved
forward after him.135 Though movie films and video tapes indicate that
the front line newsmen along the Main Street ramp remained fairly
stationary, it was the impression of many who were close to the scene
that with Oswald's appearance the crowd surged forward. According to
Detective Montgomery, who was walking directly behind Oswald, soon as
we came out this door ... this bunch here just moved in on us." 136
To Detective B. H. Combest, standing on the Commerce Street side of
the passageway from the jail office door, it appeared that

Almost the whole line of people pushed forward when Oswald started to
leave the jail office, the door, the hall--all the newsmen were poking
their sound mikes across to him and asking questions, and they were
everyone sticking their flashbulbs up and around and over him and in
his face.137

After Oswald had moved about 10 feet from the door of the jail office,
Jack Ruby passed between a newsman and a detective at the edge of the
straining crowd on the Main Street ramp. With his right hand extended
and holding a .38 caliber revolver, Ruby stepped quickly forward and
fired a single fatal bullet into Oswald's abdomen.138 (See Commission
Exhibit No. 2636, p. 218.)

immediate speculation that one or more members of the police
department provided Jack Ruby assistance which had enabled him to
enter the basement and approach within a few feet of the accused
Presidential assassin. In chapter VI, the Commission has considered
whether there is any evidence linking Jack Ruby with a conspiracy to
kill the President. At this point, however, it is appropriate to
consider whether there is evidence that Jack Ruby received assistance
from Dallas policemen or others in gaining access to the basement on
the morning of November 24. An affirmative answer would require that
the evidence be evaluated for possible connection with the
assassination itself. While the Commission has found no evidence that
Ruby received assistance from any person in entering the basement, his
means of entry is significant in evaluating the adequacy of the
precautions taken to protect Oswald.

Although more than a hundred policemen and newsmen were present in
the basement of police headquarters during the 10 minutes before the
shooting of Oswald, none has been found who definitely observed Jack
Ruby's entry into the basement. After considering all the evidence,
the Commission has concluded that Ruby entered the basement unaided,
probably via the Main Street ramp, and no more than 3 minutes before
the shooting of Oswald.

Ruby's account of how he entered the basement by the Main Street
ramp merits consideration in determining his means of entry. Three
Dallas policemen testified that approximately 80 minutes after his
arrest, Ruby told them that he had walked to the top of the Main
Street ramp from the nearby Western Union office and that he walked
down the ramp at the time the police car driven by Lieutenant Pierce
emerged into Main Street.139 This information did not come to light
immediately because the policemen did not report it to their superiors
until some days later.140 Ruby refused to discuss his means of entry
in interrogations with other investigators later on the day of his
arrest.141 Thereafter, in a lengthy interview on December 21 and in a
sworn deposition taken after his trial, Ruby gave the same explanation
he had given to the three policemen.142

The Commission has been able to establish with precision the
time of certain events leading up to the. shooting. Minutes before
Oswald appeared in the basement, Ruby was in the Western Union office
located on the same block of Main Street some 350 feet from the top of
the Main Street ramp. The time stamp on a money order which he sent
and on the receipt found in his pocket establish that the order was
accepted for transmission at almost exactly 11:17 a.m. Ruby was then
observed to depart the office walking in the direction of the police
building.143 Video tapes taken without interruption before the
shooting establish that Lieutenant Pierce's car cleared the crowd at
the foot of the ramp 55 seconds before the shooting. They also show
Ruby standing at the foot of the ramp on the Main Street side before
the shooting.144 (See Commission Exhibit No. 2635, p. 220.) The
shooting occurred very close to 11:21 a.m. This time has been
established by observing the time on a clock appearing in motion
pictures

of Oswald in the basement jail office, and by records giving the time
of Oswald's departure from the city jail and the time at which an
ambulance was summoned for Oswald.145

The Main Street ramp provided the most direct route to the
basement from the Western Union office. At normal stride, it requires
approximately 1 minute to walk from that office to the top of the Main
Street ramp and about 20-25 seconds to descend the ramp.146 It is
certain, therefore, that Ruby entered the basement no more than 2-3
minutes before the shooting. This timetable indicates that a little
more than 2 of the 4 minutes between Ruby's departure from the Western
Union office and the time of the shooting are unaccounted for. Ruby
could have consumed this time in loitering along the way, at the top
of the ramp, or inside the basement. However, if Ruby is correct that
he passed Pierce's car at the top of the ramp, he could have been in
the basement no more than 30 seconds before the shooting.147

The testimony of two witnesses partially corroborates Ruby's claim
that he entered by the Main Street ramp. James Turner, an employee of
WBAP-TV Fort Worth, testified that while he was standing near the
railing on the east side of the Main Street ramp, perhaps 30 seconds
before the shooting, he observed a man he is confident was Jack Ruby
moving slowly down the Main Street ramp about 10 feet from the
bottom.148 Two other witnesses testified that they thought they had
seen Ruby on the Main Street side of the ramp before the shooting.149

One other witness has testified regarding the purported movements of a
man on the Main Street ramp, but his testimony merits little credence.
A former police officer, N.J. Daniels, who was standing at the top of
the ramp with the single patrolman guarding this entrance, R. E.
Vaughn, testified that "3 or 4 minutes, I guess" 150 before the
shooting, a man walked down the Main Street ramp in full view of
Vaughn but was not stopped or questioned by the officer. Daniels did
not identify the man as Ruby. Moreover, he gave a description which
differed in important respects from Ruby's appearance on November 24,
and he has testified that he doesn't think the man was Ruby.151 On
November 24, Vaughn telephoned Daniels to ask him if he had seen
anybody walk past him on the morning of the 24th and was told that he
had not; it was not until November 29 that Daniels came forward with
the statement that he had seen a man enter.152

Although the sum of this evidence tends to support Ruby's claim
that he entered by the Main Street ramp, there is other evidence not
fully consistent with Ruby's story. Patrolman Vaughn stated that he
checked the credentials of all unknown persons seeking to enter the
basement, and his testimony was supported by several persons.153
Vaughn denied that the emergence of Lieutenant Pierce's car from the
building distracted him long enough to allow Ruby to enter the ramp
unnoticed, and neither he nor any of the three officers in Lieutenant
Pierce's car saw Ruby enter.154

Page 222

Despite Vaughn's denial the Commission has found no credible
evidence to support any other entry route. Two Dallas detectives
believed they observed three men pushing a WBAP-TV camera into the
basement minutes before the shooting, while only two were with the
camera after Oswald had been shot.155 However, films taken in the
basement show the WBAP-TV camera being pushed past the detectives by
only two men.156 The suspicion of the detectives is probably
explained by testimony that a third WBAP-TV employee ran to help
steady the incoming camera as it entered the basement, probably just
before the camera became visible on the films.157 Moreover, since the
camera entered the basement close to 4 minutes before the shooting,158
it is virtually impossible that Ruby could have been in the basement
at that time.

The possibility that Ruby entered the basement by some other
route has been investigated, but the Commission has found no evidence
to support it. Ruby could have walked from the Western Union office
to the Commerce Street ramp on the other side of the building in about
2 and a half minutes. 159 However, during the minutes preceding the
shooting video tapes show the armored truck in the entranceway to this
ramp with only narrow clearance on either side. (See Commission
Exhibit. No. 2710, p. 223.) Several policemen were standing near the
truck and a large crowd of spectators was gathered across the
street.160 It is improbable that Ruby could have squeezed past the
truck without having been observed. If Ruby entered by any other
means, he would have had to pass first through the Police and Courts
Building or the attached Municipal Building, and then secondly through
one of the five doors into the basement, all of which, according to
the testimony of police officers, were secured. The testimony was not
completely positive about one of the doors.161

There is no evidence to support the speculations that Ruby used a
press badge to gain entry to the basement or that he concealed himself
in a police car. Police found no form of press card on Ruby's person
after his apprehension, nor any discarded badges within the
basement.162 There is no evidence that any police officer admitted
Ruby on the pretense that he was a member of the press or any other
pretense.163

Police vehicles in the basement were inspected during the course
of the search supervised by Sergeant Dean.164 According to Patrolman
Vaughn, the only vehicles that entered the basement while he was at
the top of the Main Street ramp were two patrol cars, one of which
entered twice, and a patrol wagon which was searched by another
policeman after it entered the basement. All entered on official
police business and considerably more than 4 minutes before Oswald was
shot.165 None of the witnesses at the top of the Main Street ramp
recalled any police car entering the basement in the 4-minute period
after Ruby left the Western Union office and preceding the
shooting.166 The possibility that Ruby could have entered the basement
in a car may therefore be completely discounted.

Page 223

This page reproduces COMMISSION EXHIBIT No. 2710: photograph

Page 224

The Dallas Police Department, concerned at the failure of its
security measures, conducted an extensive investigation that revealed
no information indicating complicity between any police officer and
Jack Ruby.167 Ruby denied to the Commission that he received any form
of assistance.168 The FBI interviewed every member of the police
department who was on duty in the basement on November 24, and
Commission staff members took sworn depositions from many. With few
exceptions, newsmen who were present in the basement at the time also
gave statements and/or depositions. As the record before the
Commission indicated, Ruby had rather free access to the Dallas
police quarters during the period subsequent to the assassination, but
there was no evidence that implicated the police or newsmen in Ruby's
actions on that day.169

Ruby was known to have a wide acquaintanceship with Dallas
policemen and to seek their favor. According to testimony from many
sources, he gave free coffee at his clubs to many policemen while they
were on duty and free admittance and discounts on beverages when they
were off duty.170 Although Chief Curry's estimate that approximately
25 to 50 of the 1,175 men in the Dallas Police Department knew Ruby
171 may be too conservative, the Commission found no evidence of any
suspicious relationships between Ruby and any police officer.

The Commission found no substantial evidence that any member of
the Dallas Police Department recognized Jack Ruby as an unauthorized
person in the basement prior to the time Sgt. P. T. Dean, according to
his testimony, saw Ruby dart forward toward Oswald. But Dean was then
part way up the Commerce Street ramp, too far removed to act.172
Patrolman W. J. Harrison, Capt. Glen King, and reserve officers Capt.
C. O. Arnett and Patrolman W. M. Croy were among those in front of
Ruby at the time Dean saw him. They all faced away from Ruby, toward
the jail office.173 Video tapes show that Harrison turned in the
direction of the ramp at the time Lieutenant Pierce's car passed, and
once again 25 seconds later, but there is no indication that he
observed or recognized Ruby.174 The policemen standing on the south
side of the passageway from the jail office, who might have been
looking in Ruby's direction, had the glare of television and
photographer's lights in their eyes.175

The Commission also considered the possibility that a member of
the police department called Ruby at his apartment and informed him,
either intentionally or unintentionally, of the time of the planned
transfer. From at least 10:19 a.m., until close to 11 a.m., on
Sunday, Ruby was at his apartment,176 where he could have received a
call that the transfer was imminent. He apparently left his apartment
between 10:45 and 11 a.m.177 However, the drive from Ruby's apartment
to the Western Union office takes approximately 15 minutes.178 Since
the time of the contemplated transfer could not have been known to
anyone until a few minutes before 11:15 a.m., a precise time could not
have been conveyed to Ruby while he was at his apartment. Moreover,
the television and radio publicized

Page 225

the transfer plans throughout the morning, obviating the need for Ruby
to obtain information surreptitiously.

The shooting of Lee Harvey Oswald obviously resulted from the
failure of the security precautions which the Dallas Police Department
had taken to protect their prisoner. In assessing the causes of the
security failure, the Commission has not overlooked the extraordinary
circumstances which prevailed during the. days that the attention of
the world was turned on Dallas. Confronted with a unique situation,
the Dallas police took special security measures to insure Oswald's
safety. Unfortunately these did not include adequate control of the
great crowd of newsmen that inundated the police department building.

The Dallas police had in custody a man whose alleged act had
brought upon him immediate and universal opprobrium. There were many
possible reasons why people might have attempted to kill him if given
the opportunity. Concerned that there might be an attempt on Oswald's
life, FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover sent a message to Chief Curry on
November 22 through Special Agent Manning C. Clements of the FBI's
Dallas office, urging that Oswald be afforded the utmost security.
Curry does not recall receiving the message.179

Although the presence of a great mass of press representatives
created an extraordinary security problem in the building, the police
department pursued its normal policy of admitting the press. That
policy, set forth in General Order No. 81 of the Dallas Police
Department, provided--

... that members of this Department render every assistance, except
such as obviously may seriously hinder or delay the proper functioning
of the Department, to the accredited members of the official
news-gathering agencies and this includes newspaper, television
cameramen and news-reel photographers.180

In a letter to all members of the police department, dated February 7,
1963, Chief Curry explained the general order, in part, as follows:

The General Order covering this subject is not merely permissive.
It does not state that the Officer may, if he so chooses, assist the
press. It rather places on him a responsibility to lend active
assistance.
° ° ° ° °
... as a Department we deal with public affairs. It is the
right of the public to know about these affairs, and one of the most
accurate and useful avenues we have of supplying this information is
through the newspapers and radio and television stations.

Implied in the General Order is a prohibition for the Officer to
improperly attempt to interfere with the news media representative,

Page 226

who is functioning in his capacity as such. Such activity on the part
of any Police Officer is regarded by the press as an infringement of
rights, and the Department shares this view.181

Under this policy, news representatives ordinarily had access
to the Police and Courts Building. The first newsmen to arrive on
Friday afternoon were admitted in accordance with the policy; others
who came later simply followed behind them. Shortly after Oswald
arrived, Captain King granted permission to bring television cameras
to the third floor.182 By the time the unwieldy proportions of the
crowd of newsmen became apparent, it had already become well
entrenched on the third floor. No one suggested reversing the
department's policy expressed in General Order No. 81. Chief Curry
testified that at no time did he consider clearing the crowd from the
building; he "saw no particular harm in allowing the media to observe
the prisoner." 183 Captain King later stated candidly that he simply
became "accustomed to the idea of them being out there." 184

The general policy of the Dallas police recognized that the
rule of full cooperation did not apply when it might jeopardize an
investigation.185 In retrospect, most members of the department
believed that the general rule allowing admittance of the press to the
police quarters should not have been followed after the assassination.
Few, if any, thought this at the time.186 By failing to exclude the
press from the building on Friday and Saturday, the Dallas police made
it possible for the uncontrolled crowd to nearly surround Oswald on
the frequent occasions that he moved through the third floor corridor.
The decision to allow newsmen to observe the transfer on Sunday
followed naturally the policy established during these first 2 days of
Oswald's detention. The reporters and cameramen descended upon the
third floor of the Police and Courts Building in such numbers that the
pressroom on the third floor proved wholly inadequate. Rather than
the "two or three or maybe a half dozen reporters" who normally
appeared to cover local police stories, 187 the police were faced with
upward of 100. Bringing with them cameras, microphones, cables, and
spotlights, the newsmen inevitably spilled over into areas where they
interfered with the transaction of police business and the maintenance
of security.188

Aside from numbers, the gathering of reporters presented a
problem because most of them were representatives of the national and
foreign press, rather than the local press.189 These newsmen carried
individual press cards rather than identification cards issued by the
Dallas police. Therefore, it was impossible for the police to verify
quickly the identity of this great number of unfamiliar people who
appeared almost simultaneously.190 Because of the close physical
proximity of the milling mass of insistent newsmen to the prisoner,
the failure to authenticate press credentials subjected the prisoner
to a serious security risk.

Although steps were taken on Friday afternoon to insure that
persons seeking entry to the third floor were there for a legitimate
purpose,

Page 227

reasons could be fabricated. Moreover, because of the large crowd, it
was easier for unauthorized persons to slip by those guarding the
entrances. Jack Ruby, for one, was able to gain entry to the
third-floor corridor on Friday night.191

The third-floor corridor provided the only passageway between
the homicide and robbery bureau and the jail elevator. No thought
seems to have been given, however, to the possibility of questioning
Oswald on some other floor.192 Moreover, Oswald's most extended
exposure to the press, at the Friday evening press conference, was
unrelated to any phase of the investigation and was motivated
primarily by the desire to satisfy the demands of the news media to
see the prisoner.193 The risks attendant upon this appearance were
emphasized by the presence of unauthorized persons, including Jack
Ruby, at the press conference in the basement assembly room.194

Although Oswald was repeatedly exposed to possible assaults on
Friday and Saturday, he met his death on Sunday, when police took the
most extensive security precautions. The assembly of more than 70
police officers, some of them armed with tear gas, and the
contemplated use of an armored truck, appear to have been designed
primarily to repel an attempt of a mob to seize the prisoner.195
Chief Curry's own testimony indicated that such a focus resulted not
from any appraisal of the varied risks to Oswald's life but came about
in response to the telephone threat Sunday morning that a hundred men
were going to attack Oswald.196

A more balanced appraisal would have given thought to protection
against any attack. For example, the acceptance of inadequate press
credentials posed a clear avenue for a one-man assault. The
likelihood of an unauthorized person obtaining entry by such means is
confirmed not alone by the fact that Jack Ruby managed to get by a
guard at one entrance. Several newsmen related that their credentials
were not checked as they entered the basement Sunday morning. Seconds
before Oswald was shot, the double doors from the hallway next to the
jail office afforded a means of entry to the basement without
presentation of credentials earlier demanded of newsmen.197

The swarm of newspeople in the basement also substantially limited
the ability of the police to detect an unauthorized person once he had
entered the basement. While Jack Ruby might have been easily spotted
if only police officers had been in the basement,198 he remained
apparently unnoticed in the crowd of newsmen until he lunged forward
toward Oswald. The near-blinding television and motion picture lights
which were allowed to shine upon the escort party further increased
the difficulty of observing unusual movements in the basement.
Moreover, by making public the plans for the transfer, the
police attracted to the city jail many persons who otherwise might not
have learned of the move until it had been completed. This group
included the onlookers gathered on Commerce Street and a few people on
Main Street. Also, continuous television and radio coverage of

Page 228

the activities in the basement might have resulted in compromise of
the transfer operation.

These risks to Oswald's safety, growing in part out of adherence
to the general policy of the police department, were also accepted for
other reasons. Many members of the police department believed that the
extraordinary public attention aroused by the tragic death of
President Kennedy obliged them to make special efforts to accommodate
the press. Captain King carefully articulated one reason why the
newsmen were permitted

... to remain in the hallways, ... to view the investigation and
to keep in constant touch with progress of the investigation.
° ° ° ° ° °
We realized that if we arrested a suspect, that if we brought him into
the police station and then conducted all of our investigations behind
closed doors, that if we gave no reports on the progress of our
investigation and did not permit the newsmen to see the suspect--if we
excluded them from it--we would leave ourselves open not only to
criticisms that we were fabricating a suspect and were attempting to
pin something on someone, but even more importantly, we would cause
people to lose faith in our fairness and, through losing faith in our
fairness, to lose faith to a certain extent in the processes of law.
We felt it was mandatory that as many people knew about it as
possible. We knew, too, that if we did exclude the newsmen, we would
be leaving ourselves open to a charge that we were using improper
action, duress, physical abuse, all of these things.199

While Oswald was in custody, the Dallas police kept the press
informed about the treatment Oswald was receiving. The public could
have been assured that the prisoner was not mistreated and that his
rights were fully respected by the police, without each one of
hundreds of cameramen and reporters being permitted to satisfy himself
that the police had not abused the prisoner. This result could have
been accomplished by obtaining reports from members of the family who
visited him, or by a committee of the bar or other substantial
citizens of the community. When it became known on Saturday that
Oswald did not have an attorney, the president of the Dallas Bar
Association visited him to inquire whether he wished assistance in
obtaining counsel.200

Moreover, the right of the public to know does not give the press
license to interfere with the efficient operation of law-enforcement
agencies. Permitting the press to remain on the third floor of the
building served no valid purpose that could not have been met if the
press had been excluded from the third floor, as it was from the
fourth and fifth floors, and informed of developments either through
press releases or at press conferences elsewhere in the building.

Having failed to exclude the mass of the press from the
basement during the transfer of Oswald, the police department's
security measures

Page 229

could not be completely effective. Despite the pressures that
prevailed, planning and coordination of security arrangements could
have been more thorough and precise. No single member of the Dallas
Police Department ever assumed full responsibility for the details of
Oswald's transfer.201 Chief Curry participated in some of the
planning, but he felt that primary authority for the transfer should
be Fritz', since Fritz had charge of the investigation. According to
Chief Curry--

Fritz and I, I think, discussed this briefly, the possibility of
getting that prisoner out of the city hall during the night hours and
by another route and slipping him to the jail, but actually Fritz was
not too much in favor of this and I more or less left this up to Fritz
as to when and how this transfer would be made, because he has in the
past transferred many of his prisoners to the county jail and I felt
that since it was his responsibility, the prisoner was, to let him
decide when and how he wanted to transfer this prisoner.202

Fritz, on the other hand, felt that Curry was directing the
transfer arrangements: "I was transferring him like the chief told me
to transfer him." 203 When Capt. W. B. Frazier notified Fritz by
telephone early Sunday morning about the threats to Oswald's life,
Fritz replied that Curry should be notified, since he was handling the
transfer.204 When urged to modify the transfer plans to avoid the
press, as he later testified he would have preferred to do, Fritz
declined on the ground that Curry had already decided to the
contrary.205 Hence, if the recollection of both officials is accurate,
the basic decision to move Oswald at an announced time and in the
presence of the news media was never carefully thought through by
either man. Curry and Fritz had agreed Saturday evening that Oswald
should not be moved at night, but their discussion apparently went
little further.206

Perhaps the members of the Dallas Police Department were, as
many testified, accustomed to working together so that formal
instructions were sometimes unnecessary. On the other hand, it is
clear, at least in retrospect, that this particular occasion demanded
more than the usual informal unspoken understandings. The evidence
indicates that no member of the department at any time considered
fully the implications of moving Oswald through the basement. Nor did
any single official or group of officials coordinate and direct where
the transfer vehicle would be stationed to accept Oswald, where the
press would stand, and the number and positioning of police officers
in the basement. Captain Jones indicated that there were to be two
solid lines of policemen from the jail office door to the transfer
vehicle, 207 but lines were formed only along the walls of the areaway
between the jail office door and the ramp. The newsmen were not kept
east of the auto ramp where a railing would have separated

Page 230

them from Oswald. No strong ranks of policemen were ever placed in
front of the newsmen once they were allowed to gather in the area of
the Main Street ramp.208 Many policemen in the basement did not know
the function they were supposed to perform. No instructions were
given that certain policemen should watch the crowd rather than
Oswald.209 Apparently no one gave any thought to the blinding effect
of television and other camera lights upon the escort party.

Largely on his own initiative, Captain Talbert undertook to secure
the basement, with only minimal coordination with those responsible
for and familiar with the route Oswald would take through the
basement. Several officials recalled that Lt. Woodrow Wiggins was
directed to clear the basement jail office, but Wiggins testified that
he received no such assignment. 210 In any event, less than 20 minutes
before the transfer, Captain Jones observed newsmen in the jail office
and had them removed. But no official removed news personnel from the
corridor beside the jail office; indeed, cameramen took pictures
through the glass windows of the jail office as Oswald walked through
it toward the basement, and then approached to within 20 feet of
Oswald from the rear at the same time that Jack Ruby moved toward
Oswald from the front.211

A clear example of the inadequacy of coordination was the
last-minute change in plans to transfer Oswald in an unmarked police
car rather than by armored truck.212 The plan to use an armored
vehicle was adopted without informing Fritz. When Fritz was told of
the arrangement shortly after 11 o'clock, he objected, and hurried
steps were taken to modify the arrangements. Fritz was then
prematurely informed that the basement arrangements were complete.
When Oswald and the escorting detectives entered the basement, the
transfer car had not yet been backed into position, nor had the
policemen been arranged to block the newsmen's access to Oswald's
path.213 If the transfer car had been carefully positioned between the
press and Oswald, Ruby might have been kept several yards from his
victim and possibly without a clear view of him. Detective Leavelle,
who accompanied Oswald into the basement, testified:

... I was surprised when I walked to the door and the car was not in
the spot it should have been, but I could see it was in back, and
backing into position, but had it been in position where we were told
it would be, that would have eliminated a lot of the area in which
anyone would have access to him, because it would have been blocked.
by the car. In fact, if the car had been sitting where we were told it
was going to be, see -- it would have been sitting directly upon the
spot where Ruby was standing when he fired the shot.214

Captain Jones described the confusion with which Oswald's entry
into the basement was in fact received:

Page 231

Then the change--going to put two cars up there. There is no reason
why that back car can't get all the way back to the jail office. The
original plan would be that the line of officers would be from the
jail door to the vehicle. Then they say, "Here he comes." ... It is
too late to get the people out of the way of the car and form the
line. I am aware that. Oswald is already coming because of the furor,
so, I was trying to keep everybody out of the way and keep the way
clear and I heard a shot.215

Therefore, regardless of whether the press should have been
allowed to witness the transfer, security measures in the basement for
Oswald's protection could and should have been better organized and
more thorough. These additional deficiencies were directly related to
the decision to admit newsmen to the basement. The Commission
concludes that the failure of the police to remove Oswald secretly or
to control the crowd in the basement at the time of the transfer were
the major causes of the security breakdown which led to Oswald's
death.

Consistent with its policy of allowing news representatives to
remain within the working quarters of the Police and Courts Building,
the police department made every effort to keep the press fully
informed about the progress of the investigation. As a result, from
Friday afternoon until after the killing of Oswald on Sunday, the
press was able to publicize virtually all of the information about the
case which had been gathered until that time. In the process, a great
deal of misinformation was disseminated to a worldwide audience. (For
some examples see app. XII.)

As administrative assistant to Chief Curry, Captain King also
handled departmental press relations and issued press releases.
According to King, it was "the responsibility of each member of the
department to furnish to the press information on incidents in which
they, themselves, were involved, except on matters which involved ... personnel policies of the department, or ... unless it would
obviously interfere with an investigation underway." 216 In Oswald's
case, Chief Curry released most of the information to the press. He
and Assistant Chief Batchelor agreed on Friday that Curry would make
all announcements to the press.217 However, there is no evidence that
this decision was ever communicated to the rest of the police force.
The chief consequence appears to have been that Batchelor refrained
from making statements to the news media during this period.

Most of the information was disclosed through informal oral
statements or answers to questions at impromptu and clamorous press
conferences in the third floor corridor. Written press releases were
not employed. The ambulatory press conference became a familiar sight
during these days. Whenever Curry or other officials appeared in the

Curry appeared in interviews on television and radio at least a
dozen times during November 22-24. He did not attend any of the
interrogations of Oswald in Captain Fritz' office except at the
beginning and toward the end of Sunday morning's session; he received
his information through Captain Fritz and other sources.218
Nevertheless, in sessions with the newsmen on Friday and Saturday he
gave detailed information on the progress of the case against Oswald.
Recorded statements of television and radio interviews with Curry and
other officials in Dallas during November 22-24 have been transcribed
and included in the record compiled by the Commission.219 An example
of these interviews is the following transcript of remarks made by
Curry to newsmen on Saturday:

Q. Chief Curry, I understand you have some new information in this
case. Could you relate what that is?

A. Yes, we've just been informed by the Federal Bureau of
Investigation, that they, the FBI, have the order letter from a mail
order house, and the order was sent to their laboratory in Washington
and the writing on this order was compared with known samples of our
suspect, Oswald's handwriting and found to be the same.

Q. This order was for the rifle?

A. This order was for the rifle to a mail order house in Chicago.
It was [inaudible]. The return address was to Dallas, Texas, to the
post office box under the name of A. Hidell, H-I-D-E-double L. This is
the post office box of our suspect. This gun was mailed parcel post
March 20, 1963. I understand he left Dallas shortly after this and
didn't come back until I think about two months ago.

Q. Do you know again on what date this rifle was ordered and 'are
you able to link it. definitely as the rifle which you confiscated at
the School Book Depository?

A. That we have not done so far. If the FBI has been able to do
it I have not been informed of it yet. We do know that this man
ordered a rifle of the type that was used in the assassination of the
President from this mail order house in Chicago and the FBI has
definitely identified the writing as that of our suspect.

Q. On another subject-- I understand you have photographs of the
suspect, Oswald, with a rifle like that used. Could you describe that
picture?

A. This is the picture of Oswald standing facing a camera with a
rifle in his hand which is very similar to the rifle that we have in
our possession. He also had a pistol strapped on his hip. He was
holding two papers in his hand, with one of them seemed to be The
Worker and the other says Be Militant--I don't know whether that was
headlies or the name of the paper.

Page 234

Q. How much did the gun cost from the mail order house?

A. I understand the gun was advertised for $12.78, I believe.

Q. Have you received any results on the ballistics test conducted
on the gun and on Oswald?

A. They're going to be favorable. I don't have a formal
report yet.

Q. But you are sure at this time they will be favorable?

A. Yes.

Q. Do you feel now that you have the case completely wrapped up,
or are you continuing?

A. We will continue as long as there is a shred of evidence to be
gathered. We have a strong case at this time.

Q. I believe you said earlier this afternoon that you have a
new development which does wrap up the case--the first time
you said the case definitely is secure. Is that correct?

A. That was this morning. This additional evidence just makes a
stronger case.

Q. But this is not the same evidence you were referring to
then?

A. No, that's true.

Q. Would you be willing to say what that evidence was?

A. No, sir. I don't wish to reveal it. It might jeopardize our
case.

Commentator: Thank you very much Chief Jesse Curry of the Dallas
Police Department.220

Although Captain Fritz permitted himself to be interviewed by the
news media less frequently than did Chief Curry, he nevertheless
answered questions and ventured opinions about the progress of the
investigation. On Saturday he told reporters that he was convinced
beyond a doubt that Oswald had killed the President. He discussed some
of the evidence in the case, especially the rifle, but his
contribution to the knowledge of the reporters was small compared with
that of Chief Curry.221

Many other members of the police department, including high
officials, detectives, and patrolmen, were also interviewed by news
representatives during these days.222 Some of these men had
participated in specific aspects of the case, such as the capture of
Oswald at the Texas Theatre and the search for evidence at the Texas
School Book Depository Building. Few, if any, seemed reluctant to
submit to questions and to being televised. It seemed to District
Attorney Wade that the newsmen "just followed everybody everywhere
they went ... they interviewed some of your patrolmen ... on the
corner ... they were interviewing anybody." 223

Wade himself also made several statements to the press. He
visited police headquarters twice on Friday, twice on Saturday, and
twice on Sunday. On most of these occasions he was interviewed by the
press and appeared on television.224 After Oswald had appeared before
the press on Friday night, Wade held an

Page 235

impromptu conference with reporters in the overflowing assembly
room.225 Wade told the press on Saturday that he would not reveal any
evidence because it might prejudice the selection of a jury.226 On
other occasions, however, he mentioned some items of evidence and
expressed his opinions regarding Oswald's guilt. He told the press on
Friday night that Oswald's wife had told the police that her husband
had a rifle in the garage at the house in Irving and that it was
missing the morning of the assassination. On one occasion he repeated
the error that the murder rifle had been a Mauser. Another time, he
stated his belief that Oswald had prepared for the assassination
months in advance, including what he would tell the police. He also
said that Oswald had practiced with the rifle to improve his
marksmanship.227

The running commentary on the investigation by the police
inevitably carried with it the disclosure of many details that proved
to be erroneous. In their efforts to keep the public abreast of the
investigation, the police reported hearsay items and unverified leads;
further investigation proved many of these to be incorrect or
inaccurate. For example, the rifle found on the sixth floor of the
Texas School Book Depository Building was initially identified as a
Mauser 7.65 rather than a Mannlicher-Carcano 6.5 because a deputy
constable who was one of the first to see it thought it looked like a
Mauser. He neither handled the weapon nor saw it at close range.228

Police sources were also responsible for the mistaken notion that
the chicken bones found on the sixth floor were the remains of
Oswald's lunch. They had in fact been left by another employee who
ate his lunch there at least 15 minutes before the assassination.229
Curry repeated the erroneous report that a Negro had picked up Oswald
near the scene of the assassination and driven him across town.230 It
was also reported that the map found in Oswald's room contained a
marked route of the Presidential motorcade when it actually contained
markings of places where Oswald may have applied for jobs, including,
of course, the Texas School Book Depository.231

Concern about the effects of the unlimited disclosures was being
voiced by Saturday morning. According to District Attorney Wade,
he received calls from lawyers in Dallas and elsewhere expressing
concern about providing an attorney for Oswald and about the amount of
information being given to the press by the police and the district
attorney.232 Curry continued to answer questions on television and
radio during the remainder of the day and Sunday morning.233

FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover became concerned because "almost
as soon as ... [FBI Laboratory reports] would reach the Dallas
Police Department, the chief of police or one of the representatives
of the department would go on TV or radio and relate findings of the
FBI, giving information such as the identification of the gun and
other items of physical evidence." 234 On Sunday, after Oswald was
shot, Hoover dispatched a personal message to Curry requesting him

Page 236

"not to go on the air any more until this case ... [is] resolved."
Hoover testified later that Curry agreed not to make any more
statements.235

The shooting of Oswald shocked the Dallas police, and after the
interviews that immediately followed the shooting they were disposed
to remain silent. Chief Curry made only one more television appearance
after the shooting. At 1:30 p.m., he descended to the assembly room
where, tersely and grimly, he announced Oswald's death. He refused to
answer any of the questions shouted at him by the persistent
reporters, concluding the conference in less than a minute.236

District Attorney Wade also held one more press conference.
Before doing so on Sunday evening, he returned once more to the police
station and held a meeting with "all the brass" except Curry. Wade
told them that "people are saying ... you had the wrong man and you
all were the one who killed him or let him out here to have him killed
intentionally." Wade told the police that "somebody ought to go out
in television and lay out the evidence that you had on Oswald, and
tell them everything." He sat down and listed from memory items of
evidence in the case against Oswald. According to Wade, Chief Curry
refused to make any statements because he had told an FBI inspector
that he would say no more. The police refused to furnish Wade with
additional details of the case.237

Wade nonetheless proceeded to hold a lengthy formal press
conference that evening, in which he attempted to list all of the
evidence that had been accumulated at that point tending to establish
Oswald as the assassin of President Kennedy. Unfortunately, at that
time, as he subsequently testified, he lacked a thorough grasp of the
evidence and made a number of errors.238 He stated that Oswald had
told a woman on a bus that the President had been killed, an error
apparently caused by the busdriver having confused Oswald with another
passenger who was on the bus after Oswald had left. Wade also
repeated the error about Oswald's having a map marked with the route
of the motorcade. He told reporters that Oswald's description
and name "went out by the police to look for him." 239 The police
never mentioned Oswald's name in their broadcast descriptions before
his arrest.240

Wade was innocent of one error imputed to him since November
24. The published transcript of part of the press conference furnished
to newspapers by the Associated Press represented Wade as having
identified the cabdriver who took Oswald to North Beckley Avenue after
the shooting, as one named "Darryl Click." The transcript as it
appeared in the New York Times and the Washington Post of November 26,
reads:

A. [Wade] a lady. He then the bus, he asked the bus driver to
stop, got off at a stop, caught a taxicab driver, Darryl Click. don't
have his exact place--and went to his home in Oak Cliff, changed his
clothes hurriedly, and left.241

Page 237

The correct transcript of the press conference, taken from an
audio tape supplied by station WBAP, Fort. Worth, is as follows:

A. [Wade] A lady. He then--the bus, he asked the bus driver to
stop, got off at a stop, caught a taxicab driver.

Q. Where?

A. In Oak Cliff. I don't have the exact place--and went to his
home in Oak Cliff, changed his clothes hurriedly and left.242

In this manner, a section of Dallas, "Oak Cliff," became a
nonexistent taxicab driver, "Darryl Click." Wade did not mention the
cabdriver by name at any time. In transcribing the conference from
the sound tape, a stenographer apparently made an error that might
have become permanently imbedded in the literature of the event but
for the preservation and use of an original sound tape.

Though many of the inaccuracies were subsequently corrected by the
police and are negated by findings of the Commission included
elsewhere in this report, the publicizing of unchecked information
provided much of the basis for the myths and rumors that came into
being soon after the President's death. The erroneous disclosures
became the basis for distorted reconstructions and interpretations of
the assassination. The necessity for the Dallas authorities to
correct themselves or to be corrected by other sources gave rise not
only to criticism of the police department's competence but also to
doubts regarding the veracity of the police. Skeptics sought to cast
doubt on much of the correct evidence later developed and to find
support for their own theories in these early police statements.

The immediate disclosure of information by the police created a
further risk of injuring innocent citizens by unfavorable publicity.
This was the unfortunate experience of Joe R. Molina, a Dallas-born
Navy veteran who had been employed by the Texas School Book Depository
since 1947 and on November 22, 1963, held the position of credit
manager. Apparently because of Molina's employment at the Depository
and his membership in a veterans' organization, the American G.I.
Forum, that the Dallas police considered possibly subversive, Dallas
policemen searched Molina's home with his permission, at about 1:30
a.m., Saturday, November 23. During the day Molina was intermittently
interrogated at police headquarters for 6 or 7 hours, chiefly about
his membership in the American G.I. Forum, and also about Oswald. He
was never arrested, charged, or held in custody.243

While Molina was being questioned, officials of the police
department made statements or answered questions244 that provided the
basis for television reports about Molina during the day. These
reports spoke of a "second suspect being picked up," insinuated that
the Dallas police had reason to suspect another person who worked in
the Texas School Book Depository, stated that the suspect had been
arrested and his home searched, and mentioned that Molina may have

Page 238

been identified by the U.S. Department of Justice as a possible
subversive.245

No evidence was ever presented to link Molina with Oswald except
as a fellow employee of the Texas School Book Depository. According
to Molina, he had never spoken to Oswald.246 The FBI notified the
Commission that Molina had never been the subject of an investigation
by it and that it had never given any information about Molina to the
Dallas police concerning any alleged subversive activities by him.247
The Dallas police explained in a statement to the FBI that they had
never had a file on Molina, but that they did have one on the American
G.I. Forum.248

Molina lost his job in December. He felt that he was being
discharged because of the unfavorable publicity he had received, but
officials of the Depository claimed that automation was the reason.
Molina testified that he had difficulty in finding another position,
until finally, with the help of a fellow church member, he secured a
position at a lower salary than his previous one.249

If Oswald had been tried for his murders of November 22, the
effects of the news policy pursued by the Dallas authorities would
have proven harmful both to the prosecution and the defense. The
misinformation reported after the shootings might have been used by
the defense to cast doubt on the reliability of the State's entire
case. Though each inaccuracy can be explained without great
difficulty, the number and variety of misstatements issued by the
police shortly after the assassination would have greatly assisted a
skillful defense attorney attempting to influence the attitudes of
jurors.

A fundamental objection to the news policy pursued by the Dallas
police, however, is the extent to which it endangered Oswald's
constitutional right to a trial by an impartial jury. Because of the
nature of the crime, the widespread attention which it necessarily
received, and the intense public feelings which it aroused, it would
have been a most difficult task to select an unprejudiced jury,
either in Dallas or elsewhere. But the difficulty was markedly
increased by the divulgence of the specific items of evidence with
which the police linked Oswald to the two killings. The disclosure of
evidence encouraged the public, from which a jury would ultimately be
impaneled, to prejudge the very questions that would be raised at
trial.

Moreover, rules of law might have prevented the prosecution
from presenting portions of this evidence to the jury. For example,
though expressly recognizing that Oswald's wife could not be compelled
to testify against him, District Attorney Wade revealed to the Nation
that Marina Oswald had affirmed her husband's ownership of a rifle
like that found on the sixth floor of the Texas School Book
Depository.250 Curry stated that Oswald had refused to take a lie
detector test, although such a statement would have been inadmissible
in a trial.251 The exclusion of such evidence, however, would have
been meaningless if jurors were already familiar with the same facts
from previous television or newspaper reports. Wade might have
influenced prospective jurors by his mistaken statement that

Page 239

the paraffin test showed that Oswald had fired a gun. The tests
merely showed that he had nitrate traces on his hands, which did not
necessarily mean that he had fired either a rifle or a pistol.252

The disclosure of evidence was seriously aggravated by the
statements of numerous responsible officials that they were certain of
Oswald's guilt. Captain Fritz said that the case against Oswald was
"cinched." Curry reported on Saturday that "we are sure of our case."
253 Curry announced that he considered Oswald sane, and Wade told the
public that he would ask for the death penalty.254

The American Bar Association declared in December 1963 that
"widespread publicizing of Oswald's alleged guilt, involving
statements by officials and public disclosures of the details of
'evidence,' would have made it extremely difficult to impanel an
unprejudiced jury and afford the accused a fair trial." 255 Local
bar associations expressed similar feelings.256 The Commission agrees
that Lee Harvey Oswald's opportunity for a trial by 12 jurors free of
preconception as to his guilt or innocence would have been seriously
jeopardized by the premature disclosure and weighing of the evidence
against him.

The problem of disclosure of information and its effect on trials
is, of course, further complicated by the independent activities of
the press in developing information on its own from sources other than
law enforcement agencies. Had the police not released the specific
items of evidence against Oswald, it is still possible that the other
information presented on television and in the newspapers, chiefly of
a biographical nature, would itself have had a prejudicial effect on
the public.

In explanation of the news policy adopted by the Dallas
authorities, Chief Curry observed that "it seemed like there was a
great demand by the general public to know what was going on." 257 In
a prepared statement, Captain King wrote:

At that time we felt a necessity for permitting the newsmen as much
latitude as possible. We realized the magnitude of the incident the
newsmen were there to cover. We realized that not only the nation but
the world would be greatly interested in what occurred in Dallas. We
believed that we had an obligation to make as widely known as possible
everything we could regarding the investigation of the assassination
and the manner in which we undertook that investigation.258

The Commission recognizes that the people of the United States,
and indeed the world, had a deep-felt interest in learning of the
events surrounding the death of President Kennedy, including the
development of the investigation in Dallas. An informed public
provided the ultimate guarantee that adequate steps would be taken to
apprehend those responsible for the assassination and that all
necessary precautions would be taken to protect the national security.
It was therefore proper and desirable that the public know which
agencies

Page 240

were participating in the investigation and the rate at which their
work was progressing. The public was also entitled to know that Lee
Harvey Oswald had been apprehended and that the State had gathered
sufficient evidence to arraign him for the murders of the President
and Patrolman Tippit, that he was being held pending action of the
grand jury, that the investigation was continuing, and that the law
enforcement agencies had discovered no evidence which tended to show
that any other person was involved in either slaying.

However, neither the press nor the public had a right to be
contemporaneously informed by the police or prosecuting authorities of
the details of the evidence being accumulated against Oswald.
Undoubtedly the public was interested in these disclosures, but its
curiosity should not have been satisfied at the expense of the
accused's right to a trial by an impartial jury. The courtroom, not
the newspaper or television screen, is the appropriate forum in our
system for the trial of a man accused of a crime.

If the evidence in the possession of the authorities had not
been disclosed, it is true that the public would not have been in a
position to assess the adequacy of the investigation or to apply
pressures for further official undertakings. But a major consequence
of the hasty and at times inaccurate divulgence of evidence after the
assassination was simply to give rise to groundless rumors and public
confusion. Moreover, without learning the details of the case, the
public could have been informed by the responsible authority of the
general scope of the investigation and the extent to which State and
Federal agencies were assisting in the police work.

While appreciating the heavy and unique pressures with which the
Dallas Police Department was confronted by reason of the assassination
of President Kennedy, primary responsibility for having failed to
control the press and to check the flow of undigested evidence to the
public must be borne by the police department. It was the only agency
that could have established orderly and sound operating procedures to
control the multitude of newsmen gathered in the police building after
the assassination.

The Commission believes, however, that a part of the
responsibility for the unfortunate circumstances following the
President's death must be borne by the news media. The crowd of
newsmen generally failed to respond properly to the demands of the
police. Frequently without permission, news representatives used
police offices on the third floor, tying up facilities and interfering
with normal police operations. Police efforts to preserve order and
to clear passageways in the corridor were usually unsuccessful. On
Friday night the reporters completely ignored Curry's injunction
against asking Oswald questions in the assembly room and crowding in
on him. On Sunday morning, the newsmen were instructed to direct no
questions

Page 241

at Oswald; nevertheless, several reporters shouted questions at him
when he appeared in the basement.259

Moreover, by constantly pursuing public officials, the news
representatives placed an insistent pressure upon them to disclose
information. And this pressure was not without effect, since the
police attitude toward the press was affected by the desire to
maintain satisfactory relations with the news representatives and to
create a favorable image of themselves. Chief Curry frankly told the
Commission that

I didn't order them out of the building, which if I had it to do over
I would. In the past like I say, we had always maintained very good
relations with our press, and they had always respected us... 260

Curry refused Fritz' request to put Oswald behind the screen in
the assembly room at the Friday night press conference because this
might have hindered the taking of pictures.261 Curry's subordinates
had the impression that an unannounced transfer of Oswald to the
county jail was unacceptable because Curry did not want to disappoint
the newsmen; he had promised that they could witness the transfer.262
It seemed clear enough that any attempt to exclude the press from the
building or to place limits on the information disclosed to them would
have been resented and disputed by the newsmen, who were constantly
and aggressively demanding all possible information about anything
related to the assassination.

Although the Commission has found no corroboration in the video
and audio tapes, police officials recall that one or two
representatives of the press reinforced their demands to see Oswald by
suggesting that the police had been guilty of brutalizing him. They
intimated that unless they were given the opportunity to see him,
these suggestions would be passed on to the public.263 Captain King
testified that he had been told that

A short time after Oswald's arrest one newsman held up a photograph
and said, "This is what the man charged with the assassination of the
President looks like. Or at least this is what he did look like. We
don't know what he looks like after an hour in the custody of the
Dallas Police Department." 264

City Manager Elgin Crull stated that when he visited Chief Curry in
his office on the morning of November 23, Curry told him that he "felt
it was necessary to cooperate with the news media representatives, in
order to avoid being accused of using Gestapo tactics in connection
with the handling of Oswald." Crull agreed with Curry.265 The
Commission deems any such veiled threats to be absolutely without
justification.

The general disorder in the Police and Courts Building during
November 22-24 reveals a regrettable lack of self-discipline by the
newsmen.

Page 242

The Commission believes that the news media, as well as the police
authorities, who failed to impose conditions more in keeping with the
orderly process of justice, must share responsibility for the failure
of law enforcement which occurred in connection with the death of
Oswald. On previous occasions, public bodies have voiced the need for
the exercise of self-restraint by the news media in periods when the
demand for information must be tempered by other fundamental
requirements of our society.

At its annual meeting in Washington in April 1964, the American
Society of Newspaper Editors discussed the role of the press in Dallas
immediately after President Kennedy's assassination. The discussion
revealed the strong misgivings among the editors themselves about the
role that the press had played and their desire that the press display
more self-discipline and adhere to higher standards of conduct in the
future.266 To prevent a recurrence of the unfortunate events which
followed the assassination, however, more than general concern will be
needed. The promulgation of a code of professional conduct governing
representatives of all news media would be welcome evidence that the
press had profiled by the lesson of Dallas.

The burden of insuring that appropriate action is taken to
establish ethical standards of conduct for the news media must also be
borne, however, by State and local governments, by the bar, and
ultimately by the public. The experience in Dallas during November
22-24 is a dramatic affirmation of the need for steps to bring about a
proper balance between the right of the public to be kept informed and
the right of the individual to a fair and impartial trial.

Bibliographic note: Web version based on Report of the President's Commission on the
Assassination of President John F. Kennedy, Washington, DC: United States Government Printing
Office, 1964. 1 volume, 888 pages. The formatting of this Web version may differ from the
original.