ANDERSON, J.:
Two truck drivers, Herman Lingard and Randell Williams, were terminated after
they were discovered at home rather than on their routes. Lingard and Williams
brought suit against their employer on the basis of the progressive disciplinary
policy found in their employee handbook. The circuit court determined the handbook
did not constitute a contract, and even if it did, the employer fulfilled its
obligations to the employees. We affirm.

FACTUAL/PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Herman Lingard and Randell Williams
worked as truck drivers at the Branchville facility of Carolina By-Products,
which is a division of Valley Proteins Company.

During their employment, Lingard
and Williams received an employee handbook. They signed a written “Receipt
of ‘Employee Handbook,’” which stated:

I . . . understand that
I may terminate my employment at any time, with or without cause, and that the
Company may terminate me at any time, with or without cause and without liability.
I know my employment here does not constitute a contract of employment between
the Company and myself and that this manual is not a contract of employment.

The handbook addressed company rules and created
a progressive disciplinary procedure. Different classes of behavior would result
in different responses from management. The most serious, Group I, could result
in immediate discharge.

Lingard and Williams drove
grease trap trucks that went to various restaurant locations in the lowcountry
and off-loaded the used grease. This was a difficult and dirty position that
frequently required fifteen-hour workdays. At the start of the day, the drivers
were required to go to the Branchville facility where their trucks were located.
Once there, they clocked in. Next, if the grease on their truck had not been
off-loaded the night before, they had to off-load the grease. Then, the drivers
performed a pre-trip procedure. This involved checking the truck to see if
it was in good mechanical condition and inspecting the hoses on the truck.
Finally, they scaled out, or weighed their truck, and left to begin their route.
When the drivers scaled out, a ticket with a scale out time was generated.
When the drivers returned after a day of work, they weighed their truck, which
again generated a ticket with a time of weighing.

During the course of the day, Lingard and Williams
were allowed a total of one hour in breaks — designed to be taken as a thirty
minute lunch break and two fifteen minute breaks. However, the drivers were
not required to clock-out during these breaks or otherwise keep a record of
the breaks taken.

Carolina By-Products was purchased by
Valley Proteins. Subsequent to this sale, Richard Frank Miller became the general
plant manager of the facility where Lingard and Williams worked. Melvin Mitchell
served under Miller as Lingard and Williams’ route supervisor. Because of a
lack of productivity, a series of changes was made. These changes, including
some impacting the drivers, did not lead to the desired increase in productivity.

Acting on a workplace rumor, Mitchell
drove to the houses of Lingard and Williams during the morning on July 6, 2000.
At approximately 6:45 a.m., the work trucks of both Lingard and Williams were
parked in front of their houses. On this day, Lingard and Williams had weighed
their trucks and left the Branchville location at 4:04 a.m. and 3:57 a.m., respectively.
Mitchell did not immediately take action as he determined “[a]nything can happen
once,” and he wanted to give Lingard and Williams the benefit of the doubt.

On July 12, 2000, Mitchell and Miller
drove to the houses of Lingard and Williams and again witnessed the work trucks
parked at the employees’ homes. Lingard and Williams had both clocked into
work at 3:42 a.m. and weighed their trucks before leaving at 3:53 a.m. and 3:52
a.m., respectively. Mitchell and Miller photographed the trucks located in
front of the houses of Lingard and Williams at 6:57 a.m. and 6:51 a.m., respectively.
Mitchell testified he felt the power steering fluid reservoir on Williams’ truck
to determine how long it had been sitting there and, based on his experience
with diesel trucks, determined because the reservoir was cool to the touch the
truck had not been driven in an hour and forty minutes. He did not perform
the same test on Lingard’s truck because it was parked on Lingard’s property
and inaccessible.

On the afternoon of July 12, 2000, Lingard
and Williams completed their routes and returned their trucks to the facility.
Miller met with each separately and presented them with a notice of discharge.
The notices were virtually identical, stating: “You are hereby discharged from
Carolina By Products due to not following company rules Group I.” The notices
further explain, “[o]ur investigation showed the following: on two occassion
[sic] Carolinas By Product Truck . . . was sitting at your home. Not being
at prescribe[d] location at time of incident. Giving false information.” Neither
Lingard nor Williams attempted to explain why they were at their houses rather
than on their routes.

After their termination, both Lingard
and Williams brought suit against Carolina By-Products and Valley Proteins Company
for wrongful termination. The theory of the action was that the employee handbook
created an employment contract, the employment contract included a progressive
disciplinary policy, and their terminations violated that progressive disciplinary
policy. The case went to trial. At the close of evidence, the circuit court
granted a directed verdict. The directed verdict was based on the court’s determination
there was no employment contract, and even if a contract existed, the employer
made a good faith decision it had grounds for termination.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

“In ruling on motions for directed verdict
and JNOV, the trial court is required to view the evidence and the inferences
that reasonably can be drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the party
opposing the motions and to deny the motions where either the evidence yields
more than one inference or its inference is in doubt.” Jinks v. Richland
County, 355 S.C. 341, 345, 585 S.E.2d 281, 283 (2003). “The trial
court can only be reversed by this Court when there is no evidence to support
the ruling below.” Id.

LAW/ANALYSIS

Lingard and Williams
present two arguments on appeal. First, the circuit court erred in concluding
the employee handbook did not represent an employment contract. Second, the
circuit court erred in concluding their termination did not violate the promises
of a progressive disciplinary policy. We agree enough evidence was presented
to normally require the existence of a contract to be a jury question. However,
in this case, the circuit court correctly determined there was a reasonable
good faith belief that sufficient cause existed for termination.

South Carolina recognizes the doctrine
of at-will employment. Baril v. Aiken Reg’l Med. Ctrs., 352 S.C. 271,
573 S.E.2d 830 (Ct. App. 2002). This doctrine provides that a contract for
permanent employment is terminable at the pleasure of either party when unsupported
by consideration other than the employer’s duty to provide compensation in exchange
for the employee’s duty to perform a service or obligation. Id. However,
in Small v. Springs Indus., Inc., 292 S.C. 481, 357 S.E.2d 452 (1987),
our supreme court recognized that statements in employee handbooks could be
strictly enforced against employers as contractual obligations. Id.
at 485, 357 S.E.2d at 454-55. A contract of employment created by an employee
handbook is a unilateral contract. SeegenerallyMiller v.
Schmid Lab., Inc., 307 S.C. 140, 414 S.E.2d 126 (1992).

The Small decision seemed to suggest
that a conspicuous disclaimer would prevent an alteration of the at-will employment
status. Small, 292 S.C. at 485, 357 S.E.2d at 455. Yet, Fleming
v. Borden, Inc., 316 S.C. 452, 450 S.E.2d 589 (1994), involved a handbook
that contained a disclaimer and a claim that it was inconspicuous. Id.
at 460, 450 S.E.2d at 594. In Fleming, the supreme court did not simply
determine the conspicuousness of the disclaimer, but stated:

“[T]he disclaimer is merely one factor to consider in ascertaining
whether the handbook as a whole conveys credible promises that should be enforced.
. . . [T]he entire handbook, including any disclaimer, should be considered
in determining whether the handbook gives rise to a promise, an expectation
and a benefit.”

When looking at the handbook to determine
to what degree it gives rise to a promise, an expectation, and a benefit, the
court must focus on the actual language of the employee handbook. The court
should consider whether the promises are couched in permissive or mandatory
language. SeeConner v. City of Forest Acres, 348 S.C. 454, 560
S.E.2d 606 (2002); see alsoJones v. General Elec. Co., 331 S.C.
351, 503 S.E.2d 173 (Ct. App. 1998) (concerning a handbook containing both mandatory
and permissive language, thus creating a jury issue); seegenerally
Note, Conner v. City of Forest Acres: The End of the At-will Employment Era?,
54 S.C. L. Rev. 1113, 1128 (2003).

(1) the disciplinary procedure “is to be viewed
as the guiding policy insofar as taking disciplinary action . . . ;”
(2) “supervisors are not required to go through the entire three steps
involved in this disciplinary procedure;” (3) “[d]iscipline may begin
at any step in the procedure depending on the seriousness of the offense committed;”
and (4) “supervisor may repeat any of the first two steps of this procedure
when he feels it is necessary, so long as the discipline is commensurate with
the offense committed.”

Id. at 67 n.7, 599 S.E.2d at 461 n.7 (emphasis
in original).

This evolution involving the effectiveness
of disclaimers and the balancing of them against the actual language contained
in the handbook was recently addressed by the General Assembly. On March 15,
2004, section 41-1-110 of the South Carolina Code was signed into law. This
section states that a handbook shall not create an employment contract if it
is conspicuously disclaimed. [1]
However, this statute is inapplicable to the case at hand as it only applies
to handbooks issued after June 30, 2004, and this employee handbook was issued
to Lingard and Williams on January 21, 1999.

While Lingard and Williams signed papers
acknowledging receipt of the handbooks, and that the handbooks do not constitute
an employment contract, the handbook creates a progressive disciplinary policy
that is couched in mandatory terms. The “Company Rules” section discusses four
groups of behavior that can lead to varying degrees of punishment. The handbook
states a violation of each group rule “will subject” the employee to certain
levels of disciplinary action. For instance, a Group I violation “will subject
an employee to disciplinary action ranging from a written reprimand to immediate
discharge without any previous warning.” “A violation of Group II rules will
subject an employee to:

Written Warning

Failure to Earn Attendance/Performance
Bonus

Second Offense

Up to and including Termination.”

“A violation of Group III rules will subject an
employee to:

Written Warning

Failure to earn Attendance/Performance
Bonus

Second Offense

Suspension (2 working days)

Third Offense

Up to and including Termination.”

“A violation of Group IV rules will subject an employee
to:

First Three Offenses

Written warning and failure
to earn attendance/performance bonus

Fourth Offense

Final written warning and
suspension (2 working days)

Fifth Offense

Up to and including Termination.”

The instant case is
factually similar to this court’s decision in Baril v. Aiken Reg’l Med. Ctrs.,
352 S.C. 271, 573 S.E.2d 830 (Ct. App. 2002). In Baril, a handbook purported
not to change the at-will employment status while simultaneously containing
a progressive disciplinary policy couched in mandatory terms. Id. at
282, 573 S.E.2d at 837. Under those facts, this court determined the existence
of an employment contract is a jury decision. While South Carolina jurisprudence
has continued to grapple with the existence of employment contracts, this essential
holding from Baril remains extant. When our courts have found progressive
disciplinary policies did not create a contract, those policies were couched
in permissive rather than mandatory terms. For example, the Horton court
articulated:

The disciplinary policy in the
manual provides:

. . . .

The following is to be viewed
as the guiding policy insofar as taking disciplinary action for infractions
of company rules and misconduct is concerned.

1. At first offense, if not in
itself serious enough to warrant suspension or discharge, give warning and advise
that another offense will result in suspension for 3 days without pay as a disciplinary
measure.

2. At second offense, if not
in itself serious enough to warrant discharge, give 3 days’ suspension without
pay and warn that another offense may result in discharge.

3. At third offense, discharge,
and point out to employee that he brought the action on himself and left the
supervisor without any alternative.

. . . .

It should be emphasized again
that supervisors are not required to go through the entire three steps involved
in this disciplinary procedure. Discipline may begin at any step in the procedure
depending on the seriousness of the offense committed.

. . . .

Respondent’s manual exemplifies
the appropriate manner in which to give employees a guide regarding their employment
without altering the at-will employment relationship. The manual contained
conspicuous disclaimers and appellant understood those disclaimers. Further,
the disciplinary procedure contained permissive language and did not provide
for mandatory progressive discipline. Appellant, who himself had the responsibility
of interpreting the manual, stated he interpreted the manual as not limiting
his ability to terminate employees. Accordingly, the policy manual did not alter
the employment at-will relationship between appellant and respondent.

Horton, 360 S.C at 61-68,
599 S.E.2d at 457-61 (footnote omitted).

In the present case, the circuit court
ruled that even if there was an employment contract, the employer did not violate
the progressive disciplinary policy when it terminated Lingard and Williams.
Lingard and Williams were terminated after an investigation revealed they had,
on at least two occasions, spent time for which they were being compensated
by the company at their homes rather than working their routes. Lingard and
Williams attempt to argue the final incident was short in duration. However,
the facts suggest otherwise. Their weigh-out tickets, which signify when they
left the facility, were at 3:52 a.m. and 3:53 a.m. Both men testified they
were at the facility longer because they had to prepare their trucks for the
routes. Yet, this assertion is in direct contrast to the weigh-out tickets.
Both men testified it took approximately thirty minutes to travel from the facility
to their houses and they had traveled home to perform quick tasks before beginning
their day’s route. Lingard declared he stopped to make sandwiches to eat on
the road. Williams averred he stopped to shower after performing the long and
dirty task of cleaning his truck, an assertion that is debased by the fact that
the time between which he clocked in and weighed out was thirty minutes. The
testimony regarding a short stop is undercut by testimony and pictures of their
trucks in front of their houses at 6:51 a.m. and 6:57 a.m. This leaves nearly
three unaccounted hours.

While the mere testimony of the men regarding
their departure times and quick stops, which could be accounted for by their
permissible one hour breaks, would typically raise a jury issue, South Carolina
law does not allow judges and juries to peer unchecked into employment decisions.
In Conner v. City of Forest Acres, 348 S.C. 454, 560 S.E.2d 606 (2002),
the supreme court focused on whether there was a reasonable good faith belief
that sufficient cause existed for terminating Conner. The city terminated Conner,
a grievance committee reinstated her, and the city council overturned the reinstatement.
The court found reasonable minds could differ as to whether just cause existed
to support Conner’s termination and the circuit court should not have granted
summary judgment.

Recently, in Horton v. Darby Electric Co.,
360 S.C. 58, 599 S.E.2d 456 (2004), the supreme court found, unlike Conner,
reasonable minds could not differ as to whether just cause existed in support
of Horton’s termination and, therefore, summary judgment was appropriate. The
Horton court explained that even if the handbook was interpreted as altering
the at-will status, Horton’s behavior and the evidence demonstrated a reasonable
good faith belief that sufficient cause existed for termination. Id.
at 68, 599 S.E.2d at 461.

While Group I behavior does not specifically list
stealing from the employer by spending company time at home, it does enumerate
theft, falsifying time cards, and giving false information to management. Time
spent at home performing personal tasks is not time spent working. However,
Lingard and Williams expected to be paid for this time. Lingard and Williams
did not affirmatively report time at home to supervisors, instead letting their
time cards stand uncorrected. Knowing that they were paid based on the times
reported on their time cards, this was not only theft but also falsification
of time cards. Furthermore, Lingard and Williams provided false information
to management by representing themselves as working when they were not.

The discovery by Mitchell and Miller that Lingard
and Williams were at home when they were supposed to be on their routes constitutes
a good faith belief that the behavior of Lingard and Williams justified termination.
Although Lingard and Williams attempt to portray their time spent at home as
short and within their allowed breaks, the facts do not support this assertion.
More importantly, the conclusions of Mitchell and Miller do not have to be uncontested
fact, but must instead simply be supported by enough evidence to support their
good faith belief in the cause for termination. The facts support this good
faith belief that Lingard and Williams were staying at home when they should
have been working. We conclude that classification of this behavior as Group
I was made in good faith.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, the directed verdict
is

AFFIRMED.

GOOLSBY and WILLIAMS, JJ., concur.

[1] Section 41-1-110 reads in full: “It is the public policy of
this State that a handbook, personnel manual, policy, procedure, or other
document issued by an employer or its agent after June 30, 2004, shall not
create an express or implied contract of employment if it is conspicuously
disclaimed. For purposes of this section, a disclaimer in a handbook or personnel
manual must be in underlined capital letters on the first page of the document
and signed by the employee. For all other documents referenced in this section,
the disclaimer must be in underlined capital letters on the first page of
the document. Whether or not a disclaimer is conspicuous is a question of
law.”