David Blair became Chief Foreign Correspondent of the Daily Telegraph in November 2011. He previously worked for the paper as Diplomatic Editor, Africa Correspondent and Middle East Correspondent.

It is only the credible threat of force that has muscled Syria into a deal

A diplomatic scramble is now under way at the United Nations to secure a resolution giving effect to the deal to rid Syria of its chemical arsenal. Next week will be dominated by the annual General Assembly, so the aim is to get a resolution through the Security Council by Friday night. Assuming this happens, will this be a triumph for diplomacy or an undignified fudge? Let me offer the following thoughts:

1) The only reason why any sort of agreement was reached was because of the credible threat of force. Unless the Assad regime had believed there was a serious risk of a US strike, they would never have agreed to get rid of a chemical arsenal which they had spent three decades or more acquiring. The British MPs who voted against using force in Syria should take note. Had their advice been taken and this option ruled out, there would have been no deal.

2) The corollary is that Syria will only keep the agreement and disarm if the threat of force remains on the table. The idea that Russia has the power to compel Assad to obey the agreement – even supposing that President Putin can be trusted – is questionable for the reasons I set out here. So it will be up to President Obama to convince Assad that the US will use force if Syria fails to surrender its chemical weapons.

3) The big risk is that Obama will fail this test. By effectively delegating the decision to Congress – which probably would have voted against him if the chance had arisen – Obama has diminished the credibility of his threat to use force. If Assad concludes that the risk of a US strike has disappeared, he will have no reason to keep to the deal.

4) The mammoth task of disarming Syria will take a long time and require hundreds, if not thousands, of inspectors. The idea that it will be concluded by the middle of next year, as specified in the US-Russia agreement in Geneva, is pretty fanciful. This will create endless opportunities for the Assad regime to delay and deceive the inspectors.

The optimistic case holds that the West has achieved a win-win scenario. If the deal works, then Assad will disarm (and who cares if it happens by the arbitrary deadline of June next year or not). If it doesn’t, then America retains the option of using force. My fear is that the agreement won’t deliver significant and verifiable disarmament and, in reality, the will to use force has evaporated.

There would still be one big win, namely that once an inspection mission of sorts is up and running in Syria, it will be much harder for Assad’s forces to use chemical weapons again. That’s a big gain by any standards. But if the possibility of using force disappears, then everything else risks unravelling.