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DALIANIS, J. The plaintiffs, twenty-nine employees of defendant City of
Berlin (City), challenge part of the injunctive relief granted by the Superior Court (Nadeau,
J.). The City cross-appealed the court's grant of declaratory judgment and injunctive
relief but at oral argument indicated that it had already implemented the court-ordered
relief, making this portion of its cross-appeal moot. We affirm in part and reverse in
part.

The parties dispute the plaintiffs' entitlement to State retirement
benefits. The plaintiffs, members of Local 1444 of the American Federation of State,
County, and Municipal Employees, AFL-CIO, participate in a city retirement plan. They seek
instead to participate in the State retirement plan, the New Hampshire Retirement System
(NHRS). The City has participated in the State retirement plan since 1946, but it also has
had its own retirement plan since 1962. The central issue is whether the City was entitled
to enroll the plaintiffs in its own plan rather than the State plan.

This case has a long and complex history. We derive the following facts
from the record. The State retirement plan was established in 1945. See Laws 1945,
ch. 183. At the time, municipalities could elect to participate in the State system. See
Laws 1945, 201:2. Once a municipality so elected, it was required to enroll all of its
subsequently hired employees in the State system. Seeid. at :2, :4, II. At
that time, the decision to become a participating employer was irrevocable. Seeid.
at :6, IV. The City elected to participate in the State plan in 1946.

In 1955, the legislature amended the retirement system to permit
municipalities to revoke their election to participate in it with respect to individuals
who, as of July 1, 1956, were inactive members of the State plan, or who became municipal
employees thereafter. See Laws 1955, 301:17. In 1956, the City passed a resolution
purporting to do this. Nonetheless, despite the 1956 resolution, the City continued to
enroll employees in the State plan.

In 1961, the legislature enacted the first of three special acts related
to the City's administration of a local retirement plan. The 1961 act "empowered [the
City] to create a retirement system for the employees [of the department of public works],
who [were] not under any other system of retirement, except social security." Laws
1961, 350:1.

The City created its own retirement plan for public works department
employees in 1962.

In 1963, the legislature amended the 1961 act to permit the City to create
a retirement system for all of its employees. See Laws 1963, 445:1. At oral
argument, the City's attorney conceded that neither the 1961 nor the 1963 act, alone,
altered the City's obligation to enroll its employees in the State retirement plan.

In 1986, the NHRS discovered the 1956 resolution and brought it to the
City's attention. In response, the City and the attorney general's office crafted a
resolution to nullify the 1956 resolution, which the City passed in 1988. In it, the City
acknowledged that "participation in the state's retirement fund at th[e] time of [the
1956 resolution] was not and is not considered optional" and that since the 1956
resolution, the City has continued to participate in the State plan.

Despite the 1988 resolution, the City still enrolled some employees in the
State plan and others in the city plan. The employees in the city plan all were, at one
time, members of Local 1444, the plaintiffs' union.

When the NHRS became aware of this practice in 1989, it notified the City
of its need to enroll all employees in the State plan. The City then sought and
obtained legislation to exempt certain of its union employees from the State retirement
plan. In 1990, the legislature amended the 1961 special legislative act and permitted the
City to create a retirement system "for the collective bargaining unit employees of
the departments of public works, water works, and recreation and parks." Laws 1990,
223:4. Despite the 1990 act, the City and the NHRS continued to discuss ways to bring
these employees into the State plan.

In 1997, the plaintiffs filed a petition in which they asked the court to
declare them entitled to enroll in the State retirement plan and in which they sought
injunctive relief, including attorney's fees. After an evidentiary hearing, the trial
court held that the City's 1956 attempted revocation of its 1946 election into the State
retirement system was ultravires and thus void. The court concluded that
the City has been required, since 1946, to enroll all of its employees in the State plan.
The court rejected the City's argument that the 1961, 1963, and 1990 acts permitted it to
enroll the plaintiffs in its own retirement plan.

The court ordered the City to enroll the plaintiffs in the State
retirement system from the date of the order. It gave the plaintiffs the option of having
the City transfer the funds from the city plan to the State plan or to have the City pay
each of them the balance of the funds in their city retirement accounts. The court denied
the plaintiffs' request for attorney's fees.

Both parties moved for clarification of the court's order. In response,
the court modified the relief granted. The court ordered the City to terminate its plan
and distribute the plan's assets according to the plan documents. It further ordered the
City, on behalf of each plaintiff, to calculate the difference between the contributions
it actually made under its own plan and those it would have made under the State plan. If
the City would have contributed more under the State plan, the court ordered the City to
issue a lump sum payment to each plaintiff in the amount of the difference. If the
contribution under the local plan was greater than the contribution would have been under
the State plan, the court permitted each plaintiff to retain the difference. The court
declined to allow the plaintiffs to "buy back" years of service under the State
plan, pursuant to RSA 100-A:3, VI(d) (Supp. 1999).

We address the City's cross-appeal first. The City argues that the 1961,
1963, and 1990 acts permitted it to enroll the plaintiffs in its own plan. We disagree.

This court is the final arbiter of the intent of the legislature as
expressed in the words of a statute. When construing its meaning[,] we first examine the
language found in the statute, and where possible, we ascribe the plain and ordinary
meanings to words used. Furthermore, when examining statutory language, we construe all
parts of a statute together to effectuate its overall purpose and to avoid an absurd or
unjust result.

None of the special legislative acts permitted the City both to
participate in a State plan and simultaneously to enroll some employees in a city plan.
Since 1946, the City has been obligated to enroll all of its employees in the State
plan. It never effectively revoked its participation in the State plan, and thus has never
been authorized to enroll any of its employees in a city plan, much less to enroll
only Local 1444 members in such a plan. It has never been permitted, by statute, to have a
dual system.

The 1956 resolution, purporting to revoke the City's participation in the
State plan, was legally ineffective, because the City continued thereafter to enroll some
employees in the State plan. Neither it, nor the 1961 and 1963 acts, had any effect upon
the City's obligation to enroll all of its employees in the State plan.

Moreover, although the City may have interpreted the 1990 act to exempt
certain of its union employees from the State plan, by its express terms, it exempted no
one. We agree with the City that the 1990 act is unambiguous and thus do not review its
legislative history. "While legislative history may be helpful in the interpretation
of an ambiguous statute, it will not be consulted when the statutory language is
plain." Appeal of Cote, 144 N.H. ___, ___, 737 A.2d 1114, 1117 (1999)
(quotation omitted).

The City argues that the 1990 act, in particular, "should be viewed
as a remedial, curative act" that "prospectively authorize[d the City] to
operate [a local plan and] also . . . retrospectively sanction[ed] the past operation of
this plan." We disagree.

Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's interpretation of the 1961, 1963,
and 1990 laws and concur with its conclusion that these laws did not authorize the City to
enroll the plaintiffs in its own plan.

The City next asserts that its failure to enroll the plaintiffs in the
State plan was a result of its statutory obligation to bargain with the plaintiffs' union
regarding pension benefits. The City did not raise this argument below, however, and thus
has not preserved it for our review on appeal. SeeIn Re Estate of Cass, 143
N.H. 57, 63, 719 A.2d 595, 600 (1998).

We now address the plaintiffs' appeal. The plaintiffs first argue that the
court erred when it did not permit them to "buy back" prior years of service
through RSA 100-A:3, VI(d). We agree and reverse this portion of the court's order.

RSA 100-A:3, VI(d) provides a mechanism through which an employee may
receive credit for prior service when the employer has failed to enroll him or her in the
State plan. Such prior service credit must be purchased, and the employer and the employee
must each pay one-half of the cost. See RSA 100-A:3, VI(d)(1). RSA 100-A:3,
VI(d)(1) provides:

In the case of an employer which through its own fault, and not the fault
of the employee, failed to enroll an eligible employee at the time such employee became
eligible for membership in this retirement system or a predecessor system, . . . the
employer shall pay 1/2 of the [cost of the prior service credit] and the employee shall
pay 1/2.

If the employee is financially unable to pay his or her portion, then the
employer pays its portion directly to the employee, and the employee receives no prior
service credit. See RSA 100-A:3, VI(d)(3).

We disagree with the City's contention that RSA 100-A:3, VI(d) does not
apply because the City did not "simply neglect[] to enroll employees in NHRS,"
but rather paid substantial sums to provide them with city plan benefits. The record shows
that the City failed to enroll some of its employees in the State retirement system,
despite its statutory obligation to do so. That the City illegally maintained its own plan
is immaterial. Cf. State Employees' Ass'n of N.H., 122 N.H. at 622, 448 A.2d
at 973.

The City asserts that applying RSA 100-A:3, VI(d) would be unfair,
requiring it both to pay for the city plan and one-half of the cost of the plaintiffs'
prior service credits. We hold that the balance of the equities favors the plaintiffs.

RSA 100-A:3, VI(d) is the only provision through which the plaintiffs may
"buy back" years of service. Without it, the plaintiffs would be deprived of the
benefits to which they would have been entitled had the City enrolled them in the State
plan upon date of hire as statutorily required. Seeid. at 626, 448 A.2d at
975. Moreover, while the record shows that the City paid more under its own plan than it
would have paid under the State plan, the record also shows that the city plan's benefits
are now inferior to those under the State plan. Further, we note that the plaintiffs also
contributed to the city plan and that they too will have to pay for any prior service
credit purchased under RSA 100-A:3, VI(d). We therefore hold that RSA 100-A:3, VI(d)
applies and that, consistent with its terms, the plaintiffs may "buy back" prior
service credits.

The plaintiffs' second argument on appeal is that they are entitled to
attorney's fees because they: (1) were required to seek judicial assistance to secure a
clearly defined and established right; and (2) conferred a substantial benefit upon
"the community at large." We affirm the trial court's denial of attorney's fees.

"In reviewing a superior court award of attorney's fees, we apply an
abuse of discretion standard, giving tremendous deference to the court's decision. . . .
If there is some support in the record for the trial court's determination, we will uphold
it." Glick v. Naess, 143 N.H. 172, 175, 722 A.2d 453, 455 (1998) (citations,
brackets, and quotation omitted).

We find no abuse of discretion in the court's denial of attorney's fees.
The City's actions were based upon its "reasonable, albeit mistaken,
interpretation" of the 1961, 1963, and 1990 laws and the 1956 resolution. Dumont
v. Town of Wolfeboro, 137 N.H. 1, 11, 622 A.2d 1238, 1244 (1993). We have had no prior
occasion to interpret these laws. Accordingly, the trial court could properly determine
that the significance of these laws on the City's obligation to enroll its employees in
the State retirement plan "was a fair and reasonable ground for litigation." Casico
v. City of Manchester, 142 N.H. 312, 318, 702 A.2d 302, 306 (1997).

Moreover, the benefit that the plaintiffs secured in this litigation
inured neither to the City's taxpayers as a whole, nor to the general public, and
therefore does not warrant the award of attorney's fees. SeegenerallyClaremont
School Dist. v. Governor (costs and attorney's fees), 144 N.H. ___, ___ A.2d ___
(decided December 30, 1999). At best, it benefitted only a subgroup of the City's
employees: those members of Local 1444 who wished to participate in the State plan. In
support of their argument that they secured a substantial benefit upon the community at
large, the plaintiffs invite us to view their lawsuit as a "qui tam" action
brought on behalf of the State. We decline to do so.