Upon
the President's return to Washington (when this will be is unknown) I shall make
arrangements to call on him and explain to him the subject contained in your
message referred to above. I shall do everything in my power to make a
favorable impression on the President on that occasion.

As
I have pointed out in my various reports on this subject, I am convinced that
as long as we proceed along the lines of our present policy, the United States,
too, will undoubtedly undeviatingly follow the course whose trend has already
been established. The United States assumes that our occupation of South French
Indo-China indicates that Japan has definitely set her course. On this point
the President and the Secretary of State are in complete agreement and it would
be a mistake to try to differentiate between their attitudes. I was made
acutely aware of the firm attitude of the United States during my conversations
of the 6th and the 8th.

In
view of this situation, I greatly fear that even the offer of the Prime
Minister to personally come here, would not move the United States to any perceptible
degree. For this reason, I regret to have to say that I do not expect too much
from the interview I plan to have with the President.

Unless
we can draw up some plan by which we can persuade the United States to change
its policy toward Japan, I can only feel pessimism for any attempts to break up
the present critical situation.

Though
I regret that I can report only dark clouds over the world from my distant
vantage point, I submit these humble opinions to you for whatever value they
may be.

*JD-1: 4429. Immediately upon Roosevelt's return to Washington call upon

him and do your utmost to bring about a materialization of these

conversations (re Jap-American understanding).

20868

JD-1: 4465(D) Navy Trans. 8-12-41 (2)

(EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
, EXHIBIT NO. 1 INTERCEPTED DIPLOMATIC MESSAGES SENT BY THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT
BETWEEN JULY l AND DECEMBER 8, 1941)