The Diplomacy of Concert: Canada, the G-7 and the Halifax Summit
by John Kirton[1]

Introduction

In its definitive statement on Canadian foreign policy, issued on February 7, 1995,
the Government of Prime Minister Chretien presented an ambitious conception of
Canada's place in the world, of the Group of Seven's (G7) place in Canadian foreign
policy, and of Canada's role in the G7. The statement opened with the bold
declaration: "Canada occupies a position of leadership among the open, advanced
societies which are becoming increasingly influential as world power is dispersing
and becoming more defined in economic terms ... Canada can further its global
interests better than any other country through its active membership in key
international groupings, for example hosting the G7 Summit..."[2] As
the analysis
unfolded, the G7 was presented as a forum which allowed Canada not only to exercise
world leadership and further its global interests, but also to reform the existing
array of international economic and financial institutions, and even to secure its
shared values in the world.

Such far-reaching assertions might be readily dismissed as the rhetorical
flourishes characteristic of government foreign policy reviews, unusually inflated
in this case by the presence of a Canadian-hosted G7 Summit a mere four months
following the statement, and by Prime Minister Chretien's use of Canada's Summit
membership as an argument in the debate surrounding a Quebec sovereignty
referendum long thought to be due one week after the 1995 Summit. Such an
interpretation would come easily to many media commentators and most scholarly
observers, who treat the annual G7 Summits as little more than a great "global hot
tub party" and Canada's involvement as merely one of "being there" to bask in the
reflected glory of the great powers and global media elite,[3] Even
those few scholars
who see some scope for Canadian initiative in the Summit still underscore Canada's
inability to exercise real influence in and through the forum.[4]
Moreover, observers
who credit the G7 as having some real relevance for Canadian foreign policy portray
the body as a malevolent force, diverting attention and support from the United
Nations and other venerable multilateral institutions, middlepower partners and
common policies at the heart of the liberal-internationalist vision of Canada's place
in the world.[5] Those analysts pointing to an influential Canadian role
in, and
beneficial results from the G7 and Canadian diplomacy in it have thus far tended be
former government officials once responsible for producing Canada's Summit
success.[6]

A review of the Summit's record, and Canada's performance within it,
suggests, however, that there is some real foundation for an expansive view of
Canada's Summit influence. Indeed, the advent of the Summit in 1975 and Canada's
membership since 1976 have progressively led to a transformation in the historic post
World War Two pattern of Canadian foreign policy, from the practice of the
traditional "diplomacy of constraint" to that of the modern "diplomacy of concert."[7]
More specifically, the Summit has allowed Canada to move beyond joining coalitions
of like-minded middlepowers in broadly multilateral forums such as the United
Nations in an effort to constrain the unilateral actions of a predominant United
States. Instead, it has enabled Canada to assemble issue- and interest- specific
coalitions of fellow major powers in the plurilateral concert of the G7 and thus
successfully shape international order on the basis of distinctive Canadian interests
and values, even over the initial opposition of such powerful partners as the United
Kingdom and United States. In return Canada has given the Summit a highly
committed and capable member that has broadened the Summit's agenda, that has
helped secure a forward-looking consensus on critical subjects, and that has
complied with its collective commitments to an exceptional degree.

To support this thesis, this essay develops three arguments. Firstly, since
its 1975 inception, the G7 Summit system has become the effective centre of global
governance, replacing the order earlier provided by the 1919-1945 United Nations
and 1947 Atlantic family of institutions, and recurrently creating consensus and
inducing compliance among its members and other states and international
institutions. Secondly, Canada has increasingly used its position in the Summit to
successfully reinforce its major power presence, assert its national interests and
values, form fluid interest- and issue-based coalitions, and secure agreement for its
positions, in ways that attract domestic acclaim. Thirdly, given what is known about
the causes of collective and Canadian Summit performance, the 1995 Halifax
encounter promises to continue this trend toward Canadian Summit success.