1- Any given modern state derive its legitimacy from within its nation (the nation is the source of all authorities), and then comes the international recognition as this modern state join the UN and regional organizations.

2- In ancient eras, legitimacy was derived from the military power; it could be of foreign military conquerors that dominate the occupied nations, as was the case with the Pharaonic, Arab, Roman, Persian, Mongolian, Spanish Mameluke, and Ottoman empires and the colonial powers (e.g., Japan, Italy, France, Britain, Belgium) of our modern era. The military power could belong to the inside of a given nation that defeated the existing regime and ruled instead; for instance, as was the case when the Abbasids defeated the Umayyads, when the Fatimids defeated the Abbasids and ruled Egypt and the Levant instead of them, and when the crusaders defeated the Abbasids and established their kingdoms in the Levant and Asia Minor.

3- The Sunnite sharia laws recognize the following: (1)'right' of sultans/rulers who conquered cities and countries via the military power and became 'owners' of people/nations and lands, (2) the existing sultans/rulers who inherited thrones, and (3) rebels and revolting men who defeated existing sultans/rulers and establish new regimes/rule. The historian and scholar Al-Mawardy has detailed this in his book titled (Al-Ahkam Al-Sultaniyya) (or literally in English: Rules of the Sultans).

4- Within the deserts of Arabia, especially in the Najd region, many kingdoms emerged and fought one another; such temporary states typically emerged and collapsed when defeated by other states. Some movements (e.g., the Zanj rebellion and the Qarmatians) relied on an earthly religion to unify its men to expand their kingdoms/states eastward and northward under a religious banner, and they collapsed when its religious trend waned gradually. This is exactly what happened to the first and second Saudi states which emerged, expanded, using military power and Wahabi trend, and then collapsed eventually. This was done despite the difference of the extremist religious trends between the Qarmatians (extremist Shiites) and the Saudi state (extremist Sunnite Wahabis). The Arab scholar with rare genius, Ibn Khaldoun, whose seminal book titled (The Introduction) on sociology is analyzed in our book titled "The Introduction of Ibn Khaldoun: An Analytical Study", has written a theory on tribalism and religious extremism of Bedouins as unifying forces. This theory applies to the Saudi state that emerged three centuries after the death of Ibn Khaldoun; he says in his book that desert-Arabs and Bedouins get unified within temporary states based on tribalism and they thus destroy civilized cities/countries; this temporary states gain longer duration if based on an extremist religious call, so that two legitimacies would exist: tribalism (the sword and military power) and religion (mottoes to urge others to join the military forces to defend 'Islam' and theocratic rulers). This theory of Ibn Khaldoun applies to the Saudi states that collapsed and the current KSA that will collapse later on.

5- We provide below an overview about the Saudi state between its fake/sham tribal 'legitimacy' (i.e., using the sword or military power) and its fake/sham Wahabi 'legitimacy', in order to examine the possibility of the KSA eliminating Wahabism and thus getting rid of the so-called Wahabi 'legitimacy'.

Firstly: the Saudi state:

1- When founder of Wahabism, M. Ibn Abdul-Wahab, emerged in the Najd region tribalism dominated in cities that fought against one another, based on the 'legitimacy' of the sword and belonging to strong tribes as allies. M. Ibn Saud was the ruler of a city-state called Al-Dariyya, which was never very strong among other city-states in Arabian deserts. This changed when Ibn Saud made a religious and political alliance with Ibn Abdul-Wahab in 1748 A.D., and Ibn Abdul-Wahab deputized Ibn Saud within this religious call of Wahabism to declare all non-Wahabis as disbelievers who deserve to be fought and put to death and that their countries must be occupied and invaded by Wahabis led by Ibn Saud to expand his kingdom. Ibn Saud used to rule s per tribalism as he inherited his throne from his ancestors; this type of legitimacy was recognized and acknowledged at the time, even when other city-states fought under tribalism and sought to expand their lands at the expense of one another. Yet, the Wahabi religious 'legitimacy' was deemed stronger in the eyes of desert-Arabs and Bedouins, and a great number of them converted to Wahabism and joined the rows of jihadists fighting under the leadership of the prince Ibn Saud for the sake of their Wahabi religion, while assuming that they will enter into Paradise after their death, if they were killed in the battlefield or if they achieved military victory.

2- As the case was with the Qarmatians, the Al-Saud family managed to conquer most Arabia and the first Saudi state emerged; they occupied the Hejaz region (where Mecca is situated) and attacked Iraq many times. The Qarmatians with their military power struggled against the Abbasid caliphate, and likewise, the Saudis struggled against the Ottoman caliphate. Another similarity is that desert-Arabs and Bedouins managed (with help of foreign, external interference, of course) to bring about the downfall of the Qarmatians, whereas the Egyptian army of the ruler Muhammad Ali Pacha (and this also is a foreign, external interference) defeated and destroyed the first Saudi state, to serve the Ottomans and to crush a threat that might have endangered Egypt.

3- As for the Saudi 'legitimacy' of rule within the first Saudi state, the Al-Saud family would not have achieved such victory to annex to their rule most of Arabia by themselves or though tribalism; rather, this change was done via the Wahabi Sunnite Ibn Hanbal doctrine 'legitimacy'. Thus, the Al-Saud family combined two 'legitimacies': the 'legitimacy' of tribalism or the sword (i.e., the military power) as a family that managed to defeat others within battles, and the Wahabi Sunnite Ibn Hanbal doctrine 'legitimacy', as if Al-Saud rulers were defenders of Islam!

4- The basis and origin was the 'legitimacy' of tribalism or the sword as the Al-Saud family managed to conquer most Arabia. Even Ibn Abdul-Wahab resorted to the military power of the Al-Saud family to live under its protection and fight under the banner of the prince Ibn Saud. By the way, before the alliance with Ibn Abdul-Wahab, Ibn Saud had the legitimacy of inheriting his throne from his ancestors; i.e., his ancestral grandfather Mani' Ibn Rabeia Al-Muraydi Al-Dari' (the oldest known ancestor of the Al-Saud family) was the one who established the city called Al-Dariyya. This legitimacy of inheriting the throne remained strong and side-by-side with the Wahabi 'legitimacy'. When Ibn Saud died in 1765 A.D., his son Abdul-Aziz ruled, and when he died in 1803, his eldest son, Saud, ruled, and he in his turn died in 1814, succeeded by his son Abdullah who was defeated by the Egyptian army led by Ibrahim Pacha (son of M. Ali Pacha, king of Egypt), in 1818. This inheritance of the throne has been legitimate and done within the presence of the founder of Wahabism: Ibn Abdul-Wahab, who himself died in 1791 during the reign of Abdul-Aziz Ibn M. Ibn Saud. This means that the Wahabi Sunnite Ibn Hanbal doctrine 'legitimacy' was a secondary that helped the tribal and inherited legitimacy of the Al-Saud family within the notions accepted during the Middle-Ages.

5- Within the second Saudi state, formed only in the Najd region, the role of the Wahabi Sunnite Ibn Hanbal doctrine 'legitimacy' was dwarfed and no expansions outside the Najd region occurred. This second Saudi state was established by the prince Turki Ibn Abdullah Ibn M. Ibn Al-Saud in Riyadh, but his sons disputed among one another, and this resulted in the collapse of this second Saudi state in 1891 by Al-Rasheed family who ruled Al-Hael region. The last Saudi prince, Abdul-Rahman Ibn Al-Feisal Ibn Turki, left Riyadh and moved to Kuwait. The dwarfed Wahabi legitimacy (which was, in fact, almost absent) during the emergence of the second Saudi state reinforced the role of the legitimacy of tribalism and inherited throne of the Saudi family, and this led to the fact that brothers of the same ruler (prince Turki) fought against one another and became so weak that the Al-Rasheed family rulers of Al-Hael region (who used to be loyal to the Al-Saud family) defeated the Al-Saud family and brought about the collapse of the second Saudi state. It is noteworthy that the Al-Rasheed family rulers were Wahabis but their Wahabism did not prevent them from fighting the Al-Saud family.

6- The role of Wahabism was dwarfed at the time when Abdul-Aziz Ibn Abdul-Rahman Ibn Al-Feisal Ibn Turki Ibn Al-Saud began in 1902 A.D. the endeavors to establish the third, current Saudi state. The massacres committed by the first Saudi state (crushed by the Egyptian army) and internecine fighting within the second Saudi state (crushed by Al-Hael rulers) lingered still in the minds of desert-Arabs and Bedouins. In fact, Abdul-Aziz Al-Saud suffered a lot from the oscillating stances and shifting loyalties of Bedouins as the allied themselves to him and turned against him (and vice versa) many times. This made Abdul-Aziz Al-Saud feel urged to revive Wahabism once more to unify these Bedouins within a religious banner. In fact, he revived the idea of the Qarmatians of building cities/colonies in the deserts (called immigration centers) to train Bedouins militarily and religiously and to each them blind obedience and loyalty to their prince and leader Abdul-Aziz Al-Saud. The Qarmatians built such centers/cities to teach their followers their Shiite doctrine and military skills in the same manner of blind obedience and loyalty to their Qarmatian rulers. Such military camps had mosques to teach Bedouins Wahabism as if it were Islam; they were taught that they have the 'right' to massacre all the 'infidels' (i.e., non-Wahabis who refuse to convert!) and to confiscate their lands, women, and possessions. Abdul-Aziz Al-Saud named these warriors as the Najd Brothers who were trained to be fierce, savage fighters who would rather die (presumably to go to Paradise!) than to accept defeat. They helped Abdul-Aziz Al-Saud to 'restore' regions ruled as one kingdom by his ancestors in the name of Wahabism and by the swords of the Najd Brothers. This victory led to the emergence of the third Saudi state, and the Najd Brothers felt they played a major role in this achievement and they saw – along with their Wahabi sheikhs – that they have the 'right' to rule the Saudi state established by their swords and their Wahabism. This led to the first collision between the Saudi 'legitimacy' of a throne gained by the sword (in the view of Abdul-Aziz Al-Saud) and Wahabi 'legitimacy' deemed as above any ruler (in the view of the Najd Brothers and Wahabi sheikhs). In our book in English titled "The Wahabi Opposition Movements in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in the Twentieth Century" (found on this link: http://www.ahl-alquran.com/arabic/book_main.php?main_id=85), we have detailed the stages of how the Najd Brothers opposed their master Abdul-Aziz Al-Saud within conferences and armed revolts, and they were eventually defeated and crushed in the Sabilla battle in 1930. Abdul-Aziz Al-Saud managed to make Wahabi sheikhs submit to his throne and to confine and limit the 'legitimacy' of the Saudi state to the Al-Saud family members. This means that Abdul-Aziz Al-Saud restored by the sword regions ruled by his ancestors, and he declared that sovereignty is God's and then to sons of Ibn Saud.

7- Abdul-Aziz Al-Saud in a preemptory measure to prevent the chance of the emergence of any opposition movement or rebellion named the Saudi state after his family in 1932 A.D.; the KSA stands for the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Thus, he never thought of naming it the Wahabi Saudi kingdom, or anything of the sort; rather, he intentionally disregarded the use of the term Wahabism inside the KSA and used the term ''Islam'' instead. This grave mistake has tarnished the name of Islam, making it appear as if it were responsible for the heinous crimes committed by Wahabis. Abdul-Aziz Al-Saud planned earlier to get rid of the Najd Brothers after making use of them to serve his purposes to found his Saudi state, and he established an alternative group: the terrorist MB group, established in 1928 in Egypt. Yet, Abdul-Aziz Al-Saud prevented the Egyptian MB members to work inside the KSA, so that 'legitimacy' of his Saudi state would NOT be derived from Wahabism but from the Saudi royal family members who inherited the throne and kingdom from their forefathers.

Lastly: it is NOT difficult for the KSA to reject Wahabism:

1- The Wahabi opposition movements have not ended inside the KSA after defeating the Najd Brothers (most of them killed and the remainder were neutralized); oil revenues or petrodollars have encouraged the Saudi royal family members to spread and propagate Wahabism outside the KSA. This increased the credibility of this fake and shame Wahabi legitimacy, the same weapon used by Wahabi opposition movements and figures inside and outside the KSA who rebel against Al-Saud royal family and incite rebellion and revolt. This is exemplified by Juhayman Al-Otaybi (who occupied and invaded the Kaaba Sacred Mosque in 1400 A.H. and took pilgrims as hostages) and the rebel thinkers/sheikhs Dr. Al-Masaary, Dr. Al-Faqeeh, Salman Ouda, and Safar Al-Hawali, as well as Wahabi terrorists of Bin Laden and Al-Qaeda. Wahabi expansion worldwide added new enemies to the long list of archenemies of the Wahabi Al-Saud royal family members. This means that the Saudi state has made a beast that has turned against it eventually; the Wahabi terrorist organizations like the MB, Al-Qaeda, and ISIS (and the ones that will emerge after ISIS!) are archenemies of the KSA and the Saudi royal family now. Besides, the cost of protecting Wahabism from being criticized, discussed, and questioned is exorbitant and very high; in fact, the political and military burdens required by Wahabism are now beyond the (financial) capacity of the Saudi royal family. Let us remember that those allies of the KSA (especially the USA) begin to criticize the KSA outspokenly and more often than not.

2- Today, many people wait eagerly for the imminent 'horrific' collapse of the KSA and the fall of the mighty Saudi royal family members; hence, this is not the time for temporary solutions that will NOT last or be effective in the long run such as 'sifting', 'reviewing', and 'selecting' some hadiths and rejecting other hadiths. Events of today's world are faster in pace: attempts to beautify and embellish the terribly ugly face of Wahabism will be in vain however large the sums of US$ dedicated to such attempts. Such endeavors will be of no use at all; victims of Wahabism and bloodbaths caused by it increase with the passage of time now. The KSA needs a radical solution soon before tempests would eradicate and cause the ouster of the Saudi royal family members who are already dispute among one another. This is not to mention bloodbaths in Yemen caused by the KSA (by the way, Yemen is like Afghanistan: a veritable graveyard for occupiers and invaders; even Abdul-Aziz Al-Saud refused to invade it after he defeated its ruler/imam, saying Yemen was never part of the Saudi kingdoms established by his forefathers!). The master of the White House still dreams of milking the Saudi cow more and more! There are those inside the USA who think seriously about the pros and cons of both profitable situations: to milk the Saudi cow to the last drop of milk (and of blood!) or to slaughter this Saudi cow immediately!

3- The founder of the KSA, king Abdul-Aziz Al-Saud, was generous with the remainder of the Najd Brothers who did not got killed in Al-Sabilla battle when they were defeated; he forced them to retire after grating them large financial rewards to live in peace, but on the margin. King Salman, the son of the late Abdul-Aziz Al-Saud, can do the same with the Al-Sheikh family members and their likes among Wahabi clergymen who still live in the caves of the Middle-Ages. It is enough that king Salman would declare or issue a decree that Wahabism is no longer fit to be the official religion for his kingdom; when he would do this, Wahabis inside the KSA will never dare to protest against his declaration or decree. The reason: simply because Wahabism is collapsing and declining already; its expected lifespan has ended when the KSA has been modernized. The only one carrying the burden of Wahabis over his shoulders is the Saudi king; he should throw this burden away to eliminate and put an end to Wahabism so that the whole world will get rid of it and sigh in relief.

4- But how Wahabism is to be eliminated from the current Saudi state (a.k.a. the KSA)? We provide the answer to this question in the next article.

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