Democratic Islam Congress and the Middle East

The Democratic Islam Congresses called for by PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan are promoting an interpretation of Islam that bolsters Kurdish nationalist aspirations, but it remains to be seen exactly how they will deploy this turn to religion.

The Kurdish nationalist
movement has gained tremendous acceleration thanks to over 30 years of struggle
by the PKK in four parts of Kurdistan (Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Syria). Given the
considerable experience gained in those years, this movement flourished from armed
groups to a fully-fledged institutional industry. This includes armed organisations
(PKK and HPG) cultural, political, and social works (human rights associations,
educational support centres, job training courses and the Democratic Society
Congress), (dozens of pro-Kurdish political parties), and recently even an attempt
at forming an economic association consisting of ethnic Kurds.

In addition, instead of
being in ideological opposition to religion (Islam), the movement had the flair to form the Kurdistan
Islam Union in Europe and locally to gather religious figures (Meles and Seydas in Kurdish) within the perameters of the Democratic Society
Congress.

The expansion of the Kurdish
nationalist movement into an institutional industry has happened because of its
ability to adapt itself to counterattacks against so-called 'imperial enemies'. For
a better understanding of the religious stance of the movement, a short
historical evaluation is required. In the 1980s, the PKK lunched an armed organisation
to fight against imperialism. It had a leftist orientation, in particular a Marxist-Leninist perspective which usually considers religion one of the main
obstacles to opening people’s minds up for freedom. As a result, until the late
1980s, the religious stance was dramatically rigid, and religious figures and
symbols were all targets for attack.

However, as a
counter-strategy to the official Islam driven by the state, the traditionalist
conservative Kurdish religious strata, and finally Islamist movements’ use of
Islam for mobilisation, Abdullah Öcalan himself declared that the PKK was not
against Islam. He stated that rejecting Islam was a significant determinant in the failure of most Middle Eastern leftist movements, and he emphasised the revolutionary
essence of Islam to legitimise the existence of so many potential recruits.

Since then, the leftist
ideological background has not significantly changed, but the PKK has formed another
extension to deal with issues regarding Islam. In doing so, Kurdish ethnic
rights have been employed, rather than ideologically leftist perceptions of religion.
Eventually, the Islamic-approved existence of Kurds as a distinctive nation
constituted a main component of the Kurdish nationalist movement’s discourse.

In this context, the imprisoned
leader of the PKK Abdullah Öcalan called for Democratic Islam Congresses, one
of which was held in Diyarbakir, Turkey on 10-11 May by Democratic Society
Congress (DTK) and another one in Hagen, Germany on 24-25 May 2014 by the Federation
of Kurdistan Islamic Community.

This initiative is not as surprising as it sounds, since, compared
to previous regimes, the PKK-led Kurdish nationalist movement is surrounded by
religious powers. These range from the traditionally conservative Barzani
government in northern Iraq, the conservative-democrat AKP government in
Turkey, the arguably radical Islamists in Syria, and finally the
Shi’ite-dominated mullah regime in Iran. Despite their different interpretations
or applications of Islam, it is now an undeniable fact that Islam is an approved
coin of the realm among Middle Eastern societies.

I personally attended the
Democratic Islam Congress in Diyarbakir and externally followed the other one;
I can vouch for the fact that there is another interpretation/application of Islam about to be
born.

To start with, the first
page of the introductory paper delivered by the Democratic Islam Congress (DTK)
in Diyarbakir, Turkey, links current conflicts throughout the Muslim world to the elevation of Islam into an instrument of political power, disburdening Islam of its actual essence, which is of course to be the religion of peace,
brotherhood and justice. It argues that certain tariqas and religion-based
organisations have conducted this politicisation of Islam.

It also argues that Islam
has been materialised by the capitalist world system, and that to do so, the capitalist
world system implements two main methods: radical Islam, or if that does not
work, it pushes Muslims into the trap of morally emptied soft-Islam and historical
dogmatism. Either way, religious conflicts in the Middle East are still seen as
an imperialists’ game over the region, which is making it hard for Kurds to
obtain their basic rights; to be accepted as a distinctive legitimate nation as are other Muslim ethnicities such as Turks, Arabs and Persians.

Whether it is
intentional or unintentional, by formulating Islam in a way that stresses fighting
oppression and pursuing peace and order, the Kurdish nationalist movement is
creating its own interpretation of Islam to consolidate its existence as a
nation among others.

Together with these ideas,
Öcalan’s letter sent to both congresses foregrounded a concept of cultural
Islam. He argues that Shi’ite and Salafi orientations have both been
power-centred state structures that emerged as a result of the rise of
capitalist imperialism after the demise of the Ottoman Empire, and that both
used the “nationalism microbe” against the essence of Islam. He gives the example
of how the British Empire used capitalist imperialism to divide the Islamic ummah into nation-states. To him, that
is why the current implementation of Islam by existing state structures has
been destructive to core values of Islam, which are, most importantly, just and
liberal. He sums up the incumbent state structure of the Middle East as
authoritarian, laicist, nationalist fascism, and the non-state radical versions
(Hezbollah and Al-Qaida and their derivations) as religious fascism.

To avoid conceptual
complications, he prefers to call his vision ‘cultural Islam’ since it is much
more inclusive. Briefly, he sees religions as a set of cultures that will constitute
a system free from the state structure, but at the same time will lead to a
reformation of Middle Eastern societies. Thanks to this vision, he rejects the
claims of being atheist, communist or materialist and instead re-defines his
movement as a contemporary synthesis of Salahaddinian and Huseynian movements.

The Medina contract, signed
by different entities in Medina when the Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him)
migrated to the city from Mecca, was at the core of the understanding of Islam
accentuated in both congresses. It is believed that this contract can be a
solution for all conflicts in the middle east as it was a core cause for
stability among nations then living in the city; Jews, Muslims (together with
migrants and those who helped them) and pagans. The core idea of the contract
was to unite to defend the city in the eventuality of attack from the outside, while
providing equal rights to all constituents regardless of ethnicity and religion.
The intended result of having this contract at the core of the congress was to justify
not only the ethnic distinction of the Kurds, but also the demands other Muslim
nations have today.

The congresses were quite
critical of radical Islamist organisations in the region, especially in Syria. There
is an on-going armed conflict between pro-Kurdish and pro-PKK PYD (Partiya
Yekitiye Demokratik-Democratic Union Party), which allegedly formed Kurdish
cantons, and radical Islamist groups such as ISIS (Islamic State in Iraq and
Sham) and Al-Nusrah.

Taking the Medina contract as an example in this
situation, Kurdish self-determination via cantons has to be accepted if the
actual essence of Islam is followed. Furthermore, all other religious groups
apart from Muslims can live in peace as per the requirements of the contract,
in regard to Christian and Nestorian minorities among the Kurds in Syrian
Kurdish cantons and Armenians and Yezidis in Turkish Kurdistan. According to
the atmosphere of the congresses, that is the actual essence of Islam, which is
also democratic. Therefore, democratic Islam makes sense from the perspective
of the Kurdish nationalist movement.

From a general perspective,
the congresses criticised the current states for the degeneration of the libertarian,
egalitarian and pluralist features of Islam, which is totally consistent with
democracy. It is believed that with the application of this democratic Islam,
all of the issues of the Middle East can be resolved. Both congresses indicate
primarily the Syrian crisis and then the Kurdish question in other adjacent
states as a starting point.

While articulating
appreciation to Abdullah Öcalan for calling this important meeting and
suggesting the Medina contract as the ultimate solution to all problems in the Middle East, most of the attendees did not mention anything about the PKK’s very early animus against religion, yet accused all other organisations and states of using
Islam for their own interests. In this regard, the call for reconsideration of
previous un-Islamic historical mistakes should have applied to the PKK itself.

Given that most of the participants and organisers are sympathisers of the
current PKK to various degrees, this however is unlikely to prevail. However, another
criticism of the congress was that they did not include other religious organisations
or political parties operating in the same region. That is why it is hard to
believe that this initiative will bring easy solutions: but it will provoke a new
version or reading of Islam within the Kurdish nationalist movement.

Looking at the concluding
remarks of both congresses, it is explicit that there is a domination of the Kurdish
issue, which will of course be quite influential in shaping the post-Arab
spring Middle East. At the same time, there is direct approval of
Islam as one of the core components of Middle East politics; the Kurdish
nationalist movement implicitly uses it, regardless of whether they will play
politics with Islam or keep it separate.

About the author

Rahman Dag has a BA in Political Science and International Relations from Istanbul Yeditepe University and an MA Near and Middle Eastern Studies from the School of Orient and African Studies, and finally a PhD in Middle East Politics from Exeter University. He is also director of the CESRAN Turkey desk.

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