After a truck struck and knocked down Plaintiff Priscilla Wood's companion, Wood
pounded on the side of the truck in a frantic attempt to get the driver to stop before the truck
crushed her companion. We find that Wood sustained the requisite direct impact necessary

to maintain an action in Indiana for negligent infliction of emotional distress.

Background

On September 1, 1993, Priscilla Wood and her friend and co-worker, Patricia
Brittain, were walking in downtown Indianapolis and stopped at the southeast corner of
Illinois and New York streets. When the pedestrian Walk signal appeared, Brittain and
Wood prepared to cross New York Street, with Brittain walking to the immediate left of
Wood.

As the two women crossed the street, Defendant Carl Conder was driving a truck
northbound on Illinois Street and was attempting a right turn onto New York Street. Wood
noticed the truck coming toward them and yelled that the truck was not going to stop. Wood
then jumped out of the path of the oncoming truck and attempted to pull Brittain out of
harm's way. However, before Brittain had a chance to react, the right front wheel of
Conder's truck struck her, hurling her to the pavement.

As the truck continued to roll forward, it came close to where Wood was standing.
Brittain was lying in the direct path of the truck's rear wheels. Fearing that the truck would
run over Brittain again, Wood began pounding on the panels of the truck trailer as it moved
past her, trying to get the driver's attention. The truck came to a stop just before the rear

wheels ran over Brittain's head. Brittain died at the scene.

On August 31, 1995, Wood and her husband filed a complaint for damages against
Conder and Moore-Langen Printing Company, Inc.See footnote
1 They sought recovery for physical and
emotional injuries resulting from the incident, including bruises to Wood's left arm,
emotional and psychological trauma, stress-related headaches, insomnia, and personality
changes. In addition, they sought recovery for her husband's loss of consortium. At trial,
Defendants moved for summary judgment, which the trial court denied. The Court of
Appeals reversed, finding that because Wood had not suffered any direct physical impact
from Conder's negligence, she was precluded under the modified impact rule from
recovering for her emotional distress. Conder v. Wood, 691 N.E.2d 490, 493 (Ind. Ct. App.
1998).

Discussion

Indiana had long maintained a rule that damages for emotional distress injury could
only be recovered when the injury was accompanied by a physical impact to the plaintiff.
Historically referred to as the impact rule, it required proof of three elements: (1) an
impact on the plaintiff; (2) which caused physical injury to the plaintiff; (3) which physical

However, in Shuamber v. Henderson, 579 N.E.2d 452 (Ind. 1991), this Court
reformulated this longstanding rule. In Shuamber, a mother and daughter were involved in
an automobile accident in which a younger family member died. Both mother and daughter
sustained various physical injuries, but did not seek recovery for emotional trauma arising
out of their own physical injuries. Instead, they sought recovery for emotional trauma
caused by witnessing the death of a younger family member. As such, the Shuambers were
precluded from recovery under the impact rule then in effect. After analyzing the policies
supporting the impact rule, we came to the conclusion that there was no reason under
appropriate circumstances to refrain from extending recovery [to a plaintiff] for emotional
distress to instances where the distress is the result of physical injury negligently inflicted
on another. Shuamber, 579 N.E.2d at 455.

With this reasoning as the backdrop, we said:
When . . . a plaintiff sustains a direct impact by the negligence of another and,
by virtue of that direct involvement sustains emotional trauma which is
serious in nature and of a kind and extent normally expected to occur in a
reasonable person, we hold that such a plaintiff is entitled to maintain an
action to recover for that emotional trauma without regard to whether the
emotional trauma arises out of or accompanies any physical injury to the
plaintiff.

The modified impact rule maintains the requirement of a direct physical impact.
However, the impact need not cause a physical injury to the plaintiff and the emotional
trauma suffered by the plaintiff need not result from a physical injury caused by the impact.
Applying this modified standard to the facts in Shuamber, this Court found that the
Shuambers were entitled to recovery.

In the present case, Wood contends that the impact she sustained in pounding on
Conder's truck as it drove near her, in an attempt to get Conder to stop before striking
Brittain a second time, was sufficient to meet the requirements of the modified impact rule.
In modifying the impact rule in Shuamber, we recognized the diminished significance of

contemporaneous physical injuries in identifying legitimate claims of emotional trauma from
the mere spurious. Rather, direct impact is properly understood as the requisite measure
of direct involvement in the incident giving rise to the emotional trauma. Viewed in this
context, we find that it matters little how the physical impact occurs, so long as that impact
arises from the plaintiff's direct involvement in the tortfeasor's negligent conduct.See footnote
3

Wood clearly sustained an impact as she pounded on Defendants' truck in her
effort to prevent it from running over Brittain with its rear wheels. It is also clear that Wood
has alleged that she suffered mental and emotional trauma as a result of her direct
involvement in Defendant's negligent conduct. Accordingly, we find that Wood's
allegations have met the requirements for application of the modified impact rule and that
Defendants were not entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

Conclusion

Having previously granted transfer, thereby vacating the opinion of the Court of
Appeals, we now affirm the judgment of the trial court.

SHEPARD, C.J., and DICKSON, SELBY, and BOEHM, JJ., concur.

Footnote: 1
At the time of the accident, Conder was acting within the course and scope of his
employment and/or agency at Moore-Langen Printing Company, Inc. (R. at 36.)Footnote: 2
Though acknowledging the limitations of the impact rule in Shuamber, we declined an
invitation to abolish the rule, finding that the resolution of the case did not require it. A similar
invitation has been extended by the plaintiffs of this case; however, the modified impact rule,
whatever may be said of its limitations, need not be abolished to achieve the proper resolution of this
case.Footnote: 3
We also note that the actual language of the rule announced in Shuamber merely requires
a plaintiff to sustain a direct impact by the negligence of another, but imposes no requirement that
the impact be initiated by the tortfeasor. The majority reads into the Shuamber standard a limitation
which cannot be found in the language of that standard and which is not required by the rationale
underlying the modification of the impact rule in that decision. Conder, 691 N.E.2d at 493-94.
(Barteau, J., dissenting).