CHRISTOPHER COGHLAN,1 MALIHA MUZAMMIL,1 JOHN

This report analyses impacts of four extreme weather events (a heat wave inRussia, flooding in Pakistan, drought in East Africa, and a typhoon in thePhilippines) on food security. For each case, the nature of the extreme weather ischaracterized, and its impact on vulnerable people is assessed by consideringwhen and why threats emerge, and the role of governance in the state and non-state responses to the emergency. Scenarios of the plausible impacts ofincreased extreme weather severity on food security and other socioeconomicparameters are presented for each case.

Related Oxfam-commissioned research includes Climate Shocks, Food and Nutrition Security:Evidence from the Young Lives cohort study

Oxfam Research Reports are written to share research results, to contribute to public debateand to invite feedback on development and humanitarian policy and practice. They do notnecessarily reflect Oxfam policy positions. The views expressed are those of the author and notnecessarily those of Oxfam.

Section 4: Policy Relevance and Concluding Remarks ............ 36

3EXECUTIVE SUMMARYFrom 2010 to 2013 the world experienced a number of extreme weather events, several ofwhich were notable for their intensity, duration, and impacts on livelihoods and food security.This report focuses on four case studies a heat wave in Russia, flooding in Pakistan, droughtin East Africa, and a typhoon in the Philippines that represent a range of extreme weather. Itanalyses the impact of these extreme weather events on food security, by considering whenand why threats emerge. This involves characterization of the weather events, examination ofthe vulnerable groups affected, and analysis of livelihoods and the role of governance andcapital.

In addition to their immediate impacts in the directly affected regions, this study demonstratesthat weather events can be associated with impacts in other parts of the world. For example, theRussian heat wave, which occurred as a result of an atmospheric blocking high-pressuresystem, had both domestic and international effects: first, it dramatically reduced the wheatharvest in many parts of Russia, undermining resilience of farmers and reducing the nationalfood supply; then, due to Russia banning wheat exports, world wheat prices increased, reducingpoor peoples access to food and, according to some analyses, contributing to the unrest in 1several of the states involved in the Arab Spring, which were dependent on Russian imports. Inthe same year, Pakistan experienced higher monsoon rains, linked to the high pressure overRussia. This led to severe damage to crops, livestock, and markets in Punjab, and to extendedflooding in Sindh, where the greatest impacts on health, housing, and infrastructure wereexperienced.

This study also identifies cases in which extreme weather events exacerbated existingunfavourable conditions, and events in which poor preparation resulted in greater harm. Forexample, in East Africa the failure of the long rains in early 2011 was catastrophic because theregion had already experienced drier-than-average conditions the previous year, and there hadbeen a limited response to early warnings among the regions governments. This combinationof extreme weather and poor preparation and response affected the livelihoods of millions ofpeople in Kenya, Ethiopia and Somalia, and compounded the flow of refugees associated witharmed conflict in Somalia.

In the case of Typhoon Haiyan, a powerful tropical cyclone that hit the Philippines in November2013, the level of destruction was exacerbated by existing damage from earlier storms. Thescale of destruction made the regeneration of farmers livelihoods, in particular those growingrice and coconuts, an urgent issue. In response, the government demanded far more urgentand decisive action on climate change from the global community at the UN Climate talks inPoland Yeb Sano, leading the Philippines delegation, had just learned that Haiyan hadobliterated his hometown.

The findings of this report elucidate the complicated relationship between weather events andfood security. The report also considers the relevance of climate change. On a global level,climate change is expected to increase the magnitude and frequency of heatwaves and heavyrainfall events, due to rising global temperatures and the ability of warmer air to hold more watervapour. However, it will never be possible to say that any specific event, including the fourevents analysed in this report, would not have happened without climate change. Whatscientists can do is estimate whether climate change increased the risk of an event. Initialevidence suggests that the Russian heat wave and the East African drought were made morelikely because of climate change; but it is not yet possible to assess the climate change signal inthe case of the floods in Pakistan and Typhoon Haiyan.

4Given the risk that extreme weather events might increase in frequency and magnitude infuture, but uncertainty in the exact trajectory of future climate, it is valuable to considerhypothetical scenarios for larger or more frequent events, and how these might impact foodsecurity. In this report, explorative scenario analysis demonstrates the potential for adaptivecapacities to be overwhelmed and vulnerable communities to be driven to extremes.

It has become apparent that the weakness or strength of governance at various levels caneither intensify or mitigate the impacts of extreme weather events. This report highlights justsome such governance failings in each case study, and suggests that changes in the risk ofextreme events associated with climate change could put even more pressure on decisionmakers. It is imperative that a cultural shift encompassing governments, NGOs and society atlarge occurs, so that the reduction of risk for vulnerable groups is given consideration beyondimmediate post-disaster response.

In this report, case studies are used to examine the effect of specific extreme weather events onvulnerable groups food security, working within the same food-systems approach. Thisapproach covers access, availability and utilization, and stability. In addition to seeking a betterunderstanding of the interaction between recent extreme weather and food security for eachcase study, the report considers the potential influence of climate change and the possibleimplications for food security if the frequency or magnitude of extreme weather events were toincrease.

The report draws on a wide range of academic and other literature. It has been prepared inclose consultation with climate scientists, food systems researchers, and scenarios experts fromthe University of Oxfords Environmental Change Institute (ECI) and the CGIAR ResearchProgram on Climate Change, Agriculture and Food Security (CCAFS).

1.2 REPORT STRUCTURE

The remainder of this section provides an introduction to the topic, and an explanation of themethodology used for the second section of the report.

The second, and most substantial, section analyses the interaction between extreme weatherand food security for each case study.

The third section considers the relevance of climate change to this issue, including a summaryof the current scientific understanding of the influence of human emissions on extreme weather.Building upon this, some hypothetical climate scenarios are provided.

The final section discusses the implications of the findings.

1.3 NATURE OF VULNERABILITY TO

WEATHER EXTREMESExtreme weather causes social and economic damage, and directly and rapidly affects people, 3property and structures. Vulnerability to extreme weather is exacerbated when the componentsof vulnerability such as livelihood strength and resilience, wellbeing, self-protection, social 4protection, and governance are weak. The economic, social, and environmental factors ofvulnerability are also interrelated, i.e. economically vulnerable communities are more likely to be 5socially vulnerable.

61.4 METHODOLOGY FOR CASE STUDYANALYSISFour recent case studies were selected to represent different types of extreme weather event: aheat wave, a flooding event, a drought, and a typhoon. For each case study, a literature reviewwas undertaken alongside consultation with project partners. The information gathered wasused to:1. describe the nature of the weather event;2. identify the vulnerable groups affected;3. determine the impact of the event on livelihoods;4. examine the response of governments and economies.

This information was then used to make an assessment of the relationship between the weatherevent and food security. This framework is illustrated in Figure 1.

(Why) Politics, policies and

71.3.1 Describing the nature of an extreme weather eventIn order to understand the impacts of a weather event, it is important to first understand itsphysical characteristics. This could include meteorological anomalies in temperature, rainfall,and wind speed, and hydrological conditions such as flood plain inundation or soil moisturedeficits. Potentially important characteristics include the events magnitude, spatial extent, andduration.

It is also useful to understand the event in the context of past variability: how often does anevent of this nature occur? How different is it from normal conditions? Finally, it may be helpfulto analyse the physical processes that led to the extreme event. For example, winter flooding inthe UK is often the result of low-pressure systems from the Atlantic linked to the jet stream, butin spring it may be a consequence of snowmelt.

1.3.2 Defining vulnerable groups

Many factors may influence how vulnerable people are to extreme weather, and can also helpwith the identification of groups vulnerable to food insecurity. Those factors considered in thisstudy include:1. Income and assets: wealth and ownership of assets, e.g. arable land, may lead to people being affected very differently by an extreme event, and will likely influence their ability to recover.2. Gender: women may not have the same access to or control over disaster response as men and they also carry the burden of having the largest burden of care for children and elderly. Women, children and the elderly may be more vulnerable to extreme weather.3. Social divisions: race, religion, the marginalization of groups such as pastoralists, and caste issues may influence who is affected during a crisis, and who receives support before, during and after disasters and into recovery.

Figure 2. Who is vulnerable and why?

81.3.3. Assessing impact pathwaysTo assess the impact of extreme weather on livelihood potential and food security, the followingbasic factors were considered in this study:1. Crops: were there changes in the yield of cash or food crops? Did the amount of cultivated land decrease?2. Livestock: how have livestock populations been impacted?3. Work: how has a weather event impacted livelihood strategies? Has there been a movement of labour out of the region or to particular sectors or industries?4. Trade and markets: how have the dynamics of imported or exported goods changed?

1.3.4. Evaluating politics, policies and economies

Evaluating politics, policies, and economics is fundamental to understanding responses toextreme weather, and how they relate to impacts on food security. Therefore, the followingfactors were considered:1. Loss and damage: what kinds of losses (i.e. permanent or irreparable negative impacts) and damage (i.e. recoverable negative impacts) were recorded, including to homes, infrastructure or freshwater sources?2. Commodity prices: how volatile are local cash and food (crop/livestock) commodity prices? How dependent are local markets on global markets? Have any measures been put in place to limit impacts in times of disasters?3. Power structures: what is the distribution of resources throughout the affected regions and across segments of society?4. Response and reconstruction: are there effective weather response capacities? Do governments and communities have the organizational capacity to provide information and/or education to prevent avoidable loss and damage? Is there a long-term commitment to reconstruction efforts following an event that takes into account the needs of all affected citizens?

9SECTION 2: CASE STUDIESUsing the methodology outlined in Section 1.4, the interaction between extreme weather andfood security will now be explored for each of four case studies: the heat wave in Russia in2010, the 2010 flooding in Pakistan, the East African drought of 2010/2011, and TyphoonHaiyan in the Philippines in 2013.

2.1 RUSSIAS 2010 HEAT WAVE

2.1.1. DescriptionDuring the summer of 2010, an extreme heat wave occurred over much of Eastern Europe, withthe largest anomalies in western Russia. The average daily maximum temperature for Moscow 6in July is approximately 23C; in 2010, a maximum temperature of 38.2C was recorded, and 7western Russia experienced its warmest July since records began in 1880. Unprecedented 2temperature anomalies were measured over an area of more than 2 million km . The heat wavelasted from the beginning of July until mid-August. The very dry conditions that preceded it 8created an environment in which wild fires could easily break out and spread.

The high temperatures and drought conditions were caused by a persistent area of high 9pressurea blocking high or blocking anticyclone centred over Western Russia. Thesesystems are associated with high pollution levels, as the supply of clean air is restricted, andindustrial pollution can be trapped locally. Combined with smoke from forest and peat fires,heavy smog was generated.

Figure 3: Modis satellite temperature image from NASA, 9 August 2010

102.1.2. SignificanceThe heat wave, drought and wild fires had a significant impact on crop yields, which posed bothdomestic and international challenges. Some 13.3 million acres of crops were destroyed bydrought and fire, which represented close to 17 percent of the total crop area of the country, and 10affected close to 25,000 farms. Of Russias grain-producing regions, Volga experienced aharvest decline of 70 percent, while the Central region suffered a 54 percent decline. There was 11,12a countrywide decline of 33 percent in the overall wheat harvest. (It should be noted thatsome districts matched or exceeded their grain harvests from the year before, with the Southernand North Caucasus districts producing 99 percent and 109 percent of their yields, 13respectively. ) This decline in crop production led to domestic food price increases, and manymembers of society entered into poverty. The Russian governments response was to banwheat exports. This had global implications, as Russia was the worlds fourth-largest wheat 14,15exporter, accounting for roughly 14 percent of the global wheat trade. The resultant rise ininternational grain prices may have influenced the political instability in North Africa and theMiddle East during the Arab Spring.

2.1.3. Narrative2.1.3.1. The vulnerable close to home

The heat wave had a substantial impact on Russias poorest and most vulnerable citizens. It 16was associated with close to 56,000 deaths from heat and air pollution, of which an estimated 1711,000 were in Moscow. In addition, the loss of a third of annual domestic wheat productionled to dramatic increases in food prices, including for staples such as bread and buckwheat, aswell as animal feed, which had subsequent impacts on the price of dairy products. Panic buying 18,19aggravated the situation. Between July 2010 and March 2011, the average price of asubsistence basket of food rose by 2030 percent in most regions of Russia. This rise in foodprices at a time when incomes remained steady led to an increase in poverty. Women were thehardest hit due to their role in providing food for their families as they have the largest burden infeeding children and the elderly. Farmers, traders and others working in the agricultural industryalso faced particularly difficult circumstances. The export ban dented Russias reputation as a 20supplier.

The Russian governments response

The decline in crop yields posed a significant challenge to the Russian government, whichresponded by banning wheat exports in August 2010. This ban was in keeping with existing 21food security policies; in the wake of the food price spike of 20072008, the government 22established the Doctrine on Food Security in 2010 to limit food exports. These policies wereinspired by economic nationalism, but the export ban failed to reduce domestic food prices inthe aftermath of the crisis. Although there was enough locally produced supply to coverdomestic consumption, prices continued to rise, with flour increasing by 18 percent and bread 23by 10 percent between July and December 2010. This may have been partly due to hoardingby grain speculators and profiteers, who withheld grain and broke contracts, in anticipation of 24future price increases and opportunities for price-gouging.

The Russian government also reworked some of its long-term agricultural policies. Aprogramme was introduced to protect the animal husbandry sector, On Measures forAccelerating the Development of Animal Husbandry as a Policy Priority for Attaining FoodSecurity in Russia in 2010 and 2011, which aimed to maintain domestic production and reducemeat imports. The government pursued this with incentives to stimulate and strengthen dairyand meat producers. In effect, what was beginning to take shape was a transfer of wealth in the 25country from crop to livestock producers. Even during the export ban, the Russian government 26stated that it would not permit a reduction in the number of cattle and poultry.

11The Russian government seemed to subsequently be taking heed of the potential ongoingthreat to farms from future climate anomalies, and discussed various long-term solutions, suchas increasing land-use efficiency and irrigation. Protecting the production capacity and financial 27solvency of farms and producers was also heavily discussed. A proposed solution was toimprove the insurance system, in order to avoid a repeat of large post-event rebuilding costs tothe state. It was decided that federal funds were no longer to be used to deal with the effects ofextreme weather events. This measure had the potential to make a substantial difference duringfuture events, since only 20 percent of the crops destroyed in 2010 were covered by private 28insurance. However, in the subsequent 2012 drought, it was found that many Russian farmersstill did not have insurance, largely due to a lack of trust in insurance organizations, so this 29strategy has not yet been adopted by many Russians.

2.1.3.2. International shockwaves

The wheat export ban had a major effect on people beyond Russias borders. The Russianexport ban was the central catalyst in the 6080 percent increase in global wheat prices 30between July and September 2010. By April 2011, wheat prices were 85 percent higher on 31international markets than the year before, at $364 per tonne. The effects of this werewidespread. Among Russias neighbours, wheat is a staple food of particular importance to thepoor segments of the population, and prices rose in many cases: Kyrgyzstan (54 percent), 32Tajikistan (37 percent), Mongolia (33 percent), and Azerbaijan (24 percent). Pakistan,Russias fourth-largest customer, experienced a 16 percent increase in the price of wheat. 33During this time, Pakistan also experienced a 1.6 percent increase in people living in poverty. 34Egypt was the worlds largest wheat importer and Russias biggest customer, importing 50 35percent of its grain from the latter. While the Egyptian government was committed tomaintaining the price of the cheapest bread, in order to minimize the impact of price increases 36on poor households, this was an extremely expensive policy measure, amounting to 8 percent 37of the countrys total GDP in 2011. This could not be sustained, and higher wheat pricesaffected the cost and availability of bread in Egypt, and subsequently influenced citizen protests.Bread took on symbolic importance in protests, as evidenced by the widespread slogan bread 38and dignity. As such, it has been suggested that higher wheat prices indirectly contributed to 39the Egyptian revolution.

Among the countries affected by the Arab Spring, it is interesting to note that Egypt ranked first, 40Syria fifth, Yemen ninth, and Tunisia tenth as destinations for Russian wheat exports in 2009.Price increases for a staple such as bread has the potential to cause huge impacts at thehousehold level in many nations in the Middle East and North Africa due to these populationsdependence on wheat, and because food constitutes a large proportion of household spending.Globally in 2010, in terms of wheat imports per capita and per cent of income spent on food,respectively, Libya ranked second (37.2 percent of income), Algeria fifth (43.7 percent), Tunisia 41sixth (35.6 percent), Yemen seventh (45 percent), and Egypt eighth (38.8 percent).

2.1.4. ConclusionThe unprecedented heat wave of 2010 was intense and unexpected, and was associated withdrought, wild fires, and increased pollution levels. It dramatically affected farmers and thedomestic wheat harvest, and many from poorer segments of the Russian population enteredpoverty. The decision of the government to institute a wheat export ban greatly affected worldwheat prices, and played a factor in encouraging unrest in Arab Spring nations dependent onRussian wheat imports.

122.2 PAKISTANS 2010 FLOODS2.2.1. DescriptionDuring July and August 2010, Pakistan experienced higher-than-normal monsoon rainfall,particularly in the upper part of the Indus river system, which drains the western Himalayas. Themonsoons onset was about 10 days earlier than normal, and was followed by a series ofmonsoon surges. Some areas received more than four times their usual monthly rainfall in just 42,43,44three days. These rainfall anomalies led to large-scale inundation in the Indus river basin, 45,46propagating from Khyber Pakhtunkhwa south through Punjab, Balochistan, and Sindh. Inearly August, the flooding was associated with widespread landslides in these regions of the 47country.

The unusual intensity of the monsoon appears to have been linked to the Russian heat wave. Atthe same time as there was very high pressure over western Russia, low pressure wasobserved to the east, including over Pakistan. As the monsoon is driven by pressuredifferences, this acted to bring the monsoon further north than usual. In addition, interactionsbetween the monsoon and disturbances associated with the large-scale circulation pattern led 48to unusually heavy rainfall.

The El Nio Southern Oscillation (ENSO) may also have had an indirect role on the rainfallanomalies in Pakistan. ENSO is a naturally occurring mode of climate variability, oscillatingbetween El Nio, La Nia and neutral conditions. It originates in the tropical Pacific, but hasan important influence on global climate. 2010 marked the beginning of a weak La Nia, whichis associated with warm anomalies and easterly wind anomalies in the western Pacific. Thisreduced the transport of moisture from southern Asia towards the Pacific, and therefore 49contributed to wetter conditions over Pakistan.

Figure 4: Map showing extent of flooding on 26 August 2010 and locations

132.2.2. Significance 50The 2010 floods were one of the worst disasters in Pakistans history. The floods wereassociated with approximately 2,000 fatalities. Roughly 2 million homes were destroyed or 51damaged, and 21 million people were forced to flee their homes. The flooding negativelyimpacted food security on a national scale, and threatened the long-term nutritional needs ofnearly 8 million people. Food consumption scores indicate that roughly a third of people in 52affected areas experienced poor levels of dietary diversity and food intake. While certainlynational in scope an estimated 20 percent of the countrys landmass was underwater theimpacts of the event were spatially variable, determined by local conditions including socio- 53economic factors. This can be particularly illustrated by examining the provinces of Sindh andPunjab.

One of the most significant features of this event was the duration. In 2010, the flooding lasted 54for several weeks in many places, and for several months in Sindh. Since 2010, Pakistan hassuffered from a further three years of less publicized floods.

2.2.3. Narrative

2.2.3.1. Income, prices and asset impacts

According to the Asian Development Bank and the World Bank, Pakistan suffered an estimatedfinancial loss of $9.7bn, with significant damage to homes, farms, transport andcommunications, water supply, power, and sanitation. Some Pakistani sources have speculated 55that the direct and indirect losses were closer to $43bn. Wheat and rice prices increased by 80 56 57percent in 2010 and the average person was spending 65 percent of their income on food.At the national level, the country lost an estimated 2 million hectares of crops, and 40 percent of 58its livestock tens of thousands of animals. Pakistan had been an important exporter of wheatand rice, but struggled to regain its market position after the floods, as other countries stepped 59in to fill its orders.

The impacts were not equally distributed. Those displaced or who lost physical assets in thefloods were disproportionately landless tenants and farmers: 70 percent of this segment of the 60population lost at least 50 percent of their expected income. Some 60 percent of Pakistanscitizens lost their primary livelihood (i.e. more than 50 percent of income) across all but one 61province. While economically vulnerable households were hit the hardest across the board,social divisions played a significant role at the provincial level. The impact of the floods wasparticularly severe for women. In flood-affected areas, 53 percent of women were found to beseverely food insecure compared to 43 percent of the overall population. Standing crops werebadly affected which provide an important source of livelihoods for women in cotton picking, andrice and sugarcane harvesting. Livestock losses were less compared to crops as the ownerswere able to take many of their animals along with them in Punjab and Sindh. However, poultrybirds (an important source of income for women) were completely lost.

In addition, women across the country who found themselves displaced had more limitedaccess to public sanitation facilities. In the camps separate toilet and washing facilities were 62often not available, resulting in increased health risks. In Sindh, women who were due toreceive agricultural support packages under the state land distribution package had this aid 63suspended, as they were not deemed to be a priority. Additionally, religion and caste played arole in the distribution of aid, and some political parties distributed assistance based on member 64affiliation in Sindh.

142.2.3.2. A tale of two provinces

In Punjab province in central-north Pakistan flooding was catastrophic but the water washeddownstream fairly rapidly compared to Sindh in the south where the flooding lasted much 2 2longer. In Punjab, about 12,400 km of cropland was flooded, while 9,200 km was flooded in 65Sindh. Of all Pakistans provinces, Punjab had the highest total area of destroyed cotton and 2sugarcane; the largest area of destroyed rice and wheat was in Sindh, where 5,106 km of 2 66Pakistans 8,762 km of flooded rice crop area was located.

While 42 percent of homes were destroyed or damaged across the country, the highestproportion was in Sindh: out of the 1,910,000 homes affected, about 876,000 (roughly 46 67percent) were in this province. Punjab suffered significant short-term effects due to extensivedamage to both crops and markets. During the flooding, the non-functioning of local foodmarkets directly affected 47 percent of households there - the largest such impact in all 68Pakistans provinces.

In Sindh, the dramatic price spikes and the delayed planting of winter crops resulted in evengreater impact. The percentage of households with poor food consumption increased from 13to 76 percent in Sindh, and from 10 percent to 45 percent in Punjab. After the floods manyhouseholds coped by shifting to less preferred foods, purchasing food on credit, borrowing,limiting portion size, reducing the number of meals and even going entire days without eating. In 69many households women ate less than men.

2.2.3.3. The government response

The scale of the floods of 2010 was quite unprecedented in Pakistans history and arguablybeyond the capacity of any government to respond to adequately. Furthermore, the floodshappened at a time when the countrys disaster management structure had only just completeda major re-organization. In the new structure the Government of Pakistans National DisasterManagement Authority worked with provincial and district level management authorities througha decentralized system. The aim of this structure is to enable more rapid and appropriateresponses driven by local needs and improve local accountability. However, the scale of thedisaster and the fledgling nature of the new structure meant that the floods had very differentimpacts in different regions. Most interventions were led by provincial governments and the 70national army.

While some observers generally praised the efforts of the governments and, in particular, the 71army, others have evaluated the response as insufficient. Food aid, for example, was mostlydisbursed in camps, shelters and makeshift communities, and as such did not reach all who 72were in need. Delays in aid provision contributed to many farmers missing the winter planting 73season. In northern areas, the response was quicker and more organized, largely due to thefact that people in these areas had gained experience from a major earthquake in 2005, andhad therefore developed disaster-management capacities. Whilst flooding in the southernprovinces of Sindh and Punjab happens every year, the sheer scale of the flooding and itsduration in situations of highly unequal political, social and economic power meant that disaster 74response was often inadequate.

Coercive landlords were able to take advantage of this situation. Across the country, flood-affected people were forced to hand over cash assistance received from the government orNGOs. In addition, landlords used the washing away of land borders and the loss of ownership 75deeds as an opportunity to attempt to take over poor farmers land. Oxfam Country DirectorArif Jabber Khan observed: Pakistans flood protection programmes resulted in theconstruction of embankments and other larger structures that protected the landholdings oflarge farmers and at the same time, made millions vulnerable to more extreme conditions thanthey were used to. Additionally, during extreme events, decisions on breaches to protect largeinfrastructure (barrages for example) are made on political grounds and I saw it myself from theair, that the land of large farmers was protected while small farmers land was deliberately

15flooded. A commission of inquiry by the Supreme Court of Pakistan found that the majorbreaches that occurred happened because of infrastructure failure, stemming from failure tomaintain infrastructure, rather than deliberate decisions. However, the commission did notconsider causes of breaches to secondary infrastructure and the testimony of many flood-affected people asserts that in these cases, deliberate decisions were often taken to flood land 76used by poor people rather than by the rich.

2.2.4. ConclusionIn 2010, Pakistan experienced much higher-than-average monsoon rains, leading to large-scaleand prolonged flooding. This weather event had severe impacts on several parts of the country,but not all were equally affected. In Sindh, the flooding lasted longer and large volumes ofstanding water resulted in more direct negative health and nutritional outcomes, and damage tohousing and infrastructure, while the damage to crops, livestock and markets was more severein Punjab. The performance of the countrys emergency response teams was alsogeographically differentiated, with northern areas proving more effective at dealing with theflooding than southern areas. The central government was heavily criticized for not acting moredecisively in the crisis.

2.3 EAST AFRICAS 201011 DROUGHT

2.3.1. DescriptionIn 2011 there was a severe drought in a large area of the Greater Horn of Africa, affecting partsof Ethiopia, Kenya and Somalia and also Djibouti. The region has two main rainfall seasons,known in Kenya as the short rains (OctoberNovember/December), and the long rains 77(MarchMay/June). The 2011 drought was associated with the successive failure of both the 782010 short rains and the 2011 long rains.

East Africa is naturally a dry region, which experiences high variability in rainfall from year toyear, due to a variety of influences including ENSO and the Indian Ocean. A combination ofdifferent factors contributed to the situation in 2011, not all of which are fully understood. The 79failure of the short rains has been linked to La Nia, which is usually associated with drierconditions during this season. The long rains are less well understood (see section 3).

The 2011 drought was severe but it was not unexpected. In summer 2010, the Famine EarlyWarning Systems Network (FEWS NET) issued an alert for key pastoral areas of Ethiopia, 80Somalia and northern Kenya, knowing that a La Nia year was forecasted and this mightweaken the short rains, that there was a risk the long rains could also fail, and that people werealready vulnerable on the ground due to high food prices and previous droughts. Despite the 81warning, the drought had devastating effects. It delayed the regions main cropping season.The number of people in the Horn of Africa in need of food assistance in July of 2011 stood at 8217.5 million, which was double the figure in January. The drought compounded the crisis thatalready existed in South Central Somalia which was racked by conflict and where there was noeffective central government. Elsewhere the worst-affected areas were those already suffering 83from decades of entrenched poverty in communities on the fringe of their respective societies.In Somalia alone the UN estimated that no less than 258,000 excess deaths were attributable 84to the emergency with half of deaths being of children under five years of age.

172.3.3. Narrative2.3.3.1. Food prices

Food prices reached record levels in parts of Kenya, Ethiopia, and Somalia, and each countryhad a particular crop that became a symbol of the crisis. In Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, wholesalewheat prices reached a record of 8,500 birr per tonne, representing an 85 percent increase fromthe previous year. In Nairobi, Kenya, maize prices reached a record high of $450 per tonne, 85representing a 55 percent increase from the previous year. This was directly linked to thenear-total crop failure in some areas of the country, with national maize output predicted to be 86roughly 15 percent below average after the drought. Food availability decreased nationwide.With a decline in purchasing power occurring from month to month, there was a disincentive fortraders to bring in unaffordable food. Government cash grants were limited, so relief agencies 87provided some. In Mogadishu, Somalia, maize and red sorghum were traded at $660 and$670 per tonne, constituting a 106 percent and a 180 percent increase, respectively, from pre- 88disaster prices. In Somalia, locally produced and imported food tended to be available, but 89only at high prices.

Livestock was also seriously affected, with the Food and Agriculture Organization of the UnitedNations (FAO) estimating mortality rates of 60 percent of Ethiopias cattle, 40 percent of sheep 90and 2530 per cent of goats. In the Oromia and Somali regions, livestock market statisticsshowed steadily declining body condition among cattle being sold, and hundreds of thousands 91of animals dying between February and July. This problem was not limited to Ethiopia. In July2011, the market for livestock across northern Kenya had almost completely collapsed, with the 92price of a cow dropping from $220 to $30. The FAO estimated that up to 60 percent of 93Kenyas cattle had died. As a result of losing their livestock many pastoralists lost theirlivelihoods, have been unable to rebuild their herds and have become highly vulnerable tofurther droughts.

2.3.3.2. A humanitarian and refugee crisis

Children were disproportionately impacted by the drought. As mentioned earlier, more than halfof all deaths may have occurred among children under five. In addition, roughly one million 94children under the age of five were treated for malnutrition. In Kenya, an estimated 508,000 95children saw their education disrupted in drought-prone areas of the north and northeast, andthere were accounts of girls aged 1315 being sold in exchange for livestock, and of olderwomen walking long distances in search of food and water, often resorting to binding their 96stomachs to stave off hunger.

A combination of two failed rainy seasons and years of internal violence and conflict resulted in 97some areas of Somalia entering famine. According to UN estimates, the rate of malnutritionincreased in southern and central Somalia from 16.4 percent before the event to 36.4 percent in 982011. In those regions, armed conflict was already impacting children, households and 99communities. According to analysis of deaths among Somalis both within southern and centralSomalia and also in the refugee camps in Ethiopia and Kenya, There is consensus that thehumanitarian response to the famine was mostly late and insufficient, and that limited access tomost of the affected population, resulting from widespread insecurity and operating restrictions 100imposed on several relief agencies, was a major constraint.

In July 2011, an estimated 1.5 million people20 percent of the total populationwere 101displaced within Somalia, which played a role in destabilisation across the region. SomeSomalis fled to drought-affected regions of Kenya and Ethiopia, such that a further 600,000 102refugees were estimated to be located there. The conditions in refugee camps wereextremely difficult; malnutrition rates in Kenyas Dadaab camp and Ethiopias Dollo Ado camp 103were 37 percent and 33 percent, respectively. In Kenya, political insecurity compounded theproblem, and challenged humanitarian operations in Dadaab, preventing access to about 104463,000 refugees for weeks at a time.

182.3.3.3. National failures and space for regional solutions

Regional early warning systems predicted the impending drought in Ethiopia, Somalia, Djiboutiand northern Kenya through the Food Security and Nutrition Working Group for East Africa,which then set up a La Nia task force to deal with impacts associated with the phenomenon. Aseries of alerts and warnings were issued. However, as Jan Egeland, UN Emergency ReliefCoordinator (20032006) observed: The greatest tragedy is that the world saw this disastercoming but did not prevent it. Across Ethiopia, Kenya, Djibouti and Somalia this crisis hasplayed out very differently, but common to all of them was a slow response to early warnings.Early signs of an oncoming food crisis were clear many months before the emergency reachedits peak. Yet it was not until the situation had reached crisis point that the international systemstarted to respond at scale".

Slow and inadequate reactions to the warnings caused delays and large-scale responses bygovernments and international agencies only occurred after malnutrition rates in parts of the 105region exceeded emergency thresholds.

However, the situation varied to a considerable extent between countries:

In Ethiopia, early action took place across several sectors. It was built upon the state- sponsored Productive Safety Net Programme and investment in new health posts which 106 enabled huge increases in access to nutrition responses, and pre-positioned food supplies 107 greatly assisted authorities once drought conditions became severe. In Kenya, the national capacity for response was reduced by political distractions associated with a new constitution and corruption allegations directed at government and donor-funded 108 projects in the drylands. An Oxfam analysis found that: In Kenya, too much weight is given to the food aid system (as opposed to the national early warning system), which is unwieldy and unable to respond quickly to an emerging crisis; assessments are only carried out twice a year and by the time the reports are produced, the figures of those needing aid 109 are already several months out of date." The lack of an effective government in central and southern Somalia, access restrictions and the unwillingness of donors to invest led to famine and a refugee outflow. A National Drought Emergency Relief Committee was hastily formed. This committee made a national disaster 110 appeal to raise funds and supply food and water to affected citizens.

2.3.4. ConclusionThe impact of two consecutive poor rainy seasons in 2010 and 2011 on top of a generaldrying trend across much of the region over several decades was devastating for East Africa.The coincidence of conflict and a lack of central government control in Somalia created arefugee crisis that spread into Kenya and Ethiopia. The arrival of tens of thousands of peopleput huge pressure on the large refugee camps, which already held hundreds of thousands. Themajority of people impacted in this crisis were the most vulnerable members of their societies, inparticular children, women, and pastoralists. The responses to predictions and warnings ofdrought were poor, compounded by wider governance issues.

192.4 TYPHOON HAIYAN IN THEPHILIPPINES, 20132.4.1. Description

Typhoon Haiyan, known as Typhoon Yolanda in the Philippines, developed in the tropicalPacific in early November 2013 and tracked westwards. It made landfall in the Philippines on 7November, hitting regions 6, 7 and 8 including the provinces of Guiuan, Eastern Samar; Tolosa,Leyte Province; Daanbantayan and Bantayan Island, Cebu Province; Concepcion, Iloilo 111Province (Panay Island); and Palawan Island. In total nine regions comprising 44 provinceswere affected.

Figure 6: Typhoon Yolanda - Severity Ranking as at 30 Nov 2013

When it reached the Philippines, Haiyan was an exceptionally strong cyclone, classified as the 112highest category (5) on the SaffirSimpson hurricane scale. Cyclones are low-pressuresystems, and the central pressure of this storm was extremely low, estimated at 895 mb. Thewinds were particularly strong, with sustained speeds near 195mph when averaged over a 113minute, making it probably the strongest tropical cyclone ever recorded to make landfall. The 114high wind speed was combined with storm surges, which caused waves as high as 15m.

202.4.2. SignificanceThe devastation resulting from this typhoon was partly a result of its unusual intensity. However,as the third in a series of storms that struck the country in less than 12 months, it also 115compounded existing damage. Losses and damages associated with the cyclone are stillbeing recorded, but it is predicted that the total sum could reach $23bn. The human costs are 116also significant, with 11.3 million people affected across nine regions, and 4.1 million 117displaced. The impact on key infrastructure, fishing and essential crops required forlivelihoods, especially rice, has raised the possibility of a significant food security tragedy for thePhilippines most vulnerable people.

2.4.3. Narrative2.4.3.1. Overwhelming livelihood and property damage

Haiyan hit the poorest provinces in the country. The typhoon resulted in an estimated 5.9 million 118workers losing their livelihoods, as income sources were destroyed, lost or disrupted. The 119typhoon also damaged roughly 1.1 million houses, and destroyed another 550,000. There 120was widespread damage to rural infrastructure, including irrigation systems, and an estimated 121600,000 hectares of agricultural land were destroyed. Destruction of roads and blockagesfrom fallen trees hampered assistance to more remote areas. State infrastructure suffered greatdamage, including destruction of citizens records.

The Philippine Department of Agriculture estimated that about 150,000 farming households andsome 50,000 fishing households (accounting for roughly 400,000 people) were directly affected 122by the typhoon. Including indirect impacts of the disaster, over one million farmer and fishing 123households will require direct assistance with their livelihoods.

Important crops, including coconuts and rice, suffered extensive damage. In the hardest hit partof the country, region 8, comprising the provinces of Leyte, Samar and Biliran, 33 millioncoconut trees were destroyed, effectively eliminating the livelihoods of the coconut farmers for 125the next six to nine years. Coconut growers are the poorest sector of the agriculturalworkforce. Nationally the production of coconuts and sugar dropped dramatically, such that the 126Philippines were unable to meet self-sufficiency targets and export quotas.

As the typhoon struck between two farming seasons, it severely affected ready-to-harvest, 127harvested and newly planted rice, in addition to destruction of seeds and tools. A total of67,000 hectares of rice crops were destroyed, which reduced production by 131,600 tonnes.This is serious for food security, as rice provides half of the Philippines food energyrequirements. The Eastern Visayas region lost one third of its rice stocks.

The expected production shortfalls, accompanied by rising imports and limited government ricereserves, left millions of households vulnerable to food insecurity from a period of sustainedhigh prices. The threat was moderated because the government implemented immediatemeasures to ensure that the price increase was regulated. The poorest people in the countryspend 30 percent of their income on rice; in the six months directly following the typhoon, the 128worst-affected communities were predicted to experience income drops of 25 percent.

212.4.3.3. Ineffective governance and the impact on the most vulnerable

The Philippines is used to dealing with typhoons. The country experiences an average of 20typhoons per year, and along with floods, landslides, droughts, volcanic eruptions, earthquakes 129and tsunamis this makes it one of the most disaster-prone countries in the world. In factTyphoon Haiyan hit whilst the government was three weeks into disaster responses elsewhere -to a 7.2 magnitude earthquake in Bohol and dealing with internal displacement due to conflict inZamboanga. In the case of Typhoon Haiyan, the storm did not deviate from a direct route andregular timely and accurate warnings were issued by the Philippines MeteorologicalDepartment. It is estimated that disaster preparedness and speedy evacuations helped save atleast 800,000 lives.

However, the colossal destructive power of the typhoon was unlike any previously witnessed.Furthermore, although the meteorological service was putting out frequent alerts to communitiesto warn them about a pending storm surge up to 7m high, communities did not necessarilyunderstand that storm surge meant a huge wave like a miniature tsunami that inflictedenormous damage to coastal communities even some distance inland. The perceived threat ofstronger typhoons, and storm surges enhanced by sea-level rise, were behind calls by thegovernment of the Philippines for the world to combat climate change in the aftermath of the 130typhoon.

Assessments suggested that approximately 5.6 million people required emergency foodassistance and support to prevent food insecurity in the short and long term, or the restoration 131of their agricultural and fishing livelihoods in the long term. If livelihoods are not quicklyrestored, those affected will need to live on food aid until the next potential growing season in 132October 2014. It is concerning that only 17 percent of all emergency response and restoration 133activities currently aim to restore livelihoods.

Domestic institutional barriers hinder the coordination of relief and early recovery efforts as wellas effectiveness of long-term responses. Government inefficiencies need to be tackled, in orderto deal with negative pressure on vulnerable groups, such as women and children. As of June2014 there was need for food aid for 145,000 children, micronutrient supplementation for anadditional 100,000, and treatment for acute malnutrition for a further 27,000. Unfortunately, the 134deficit of skilled workers in the field is hampering the scale-up of such nutrition activities. Inaddition, the distribution of assistance to affected farmers in more remote areas, such as 135highlands, has been either limited or absent, and some members of minority indigenous 136communities have reported discrimination in the delivery of assistance.

2.4.4. ConclusionThe frequency and intensity of typhoons in the Philippines, and the devastation caused byTyphoon Haiyan, has potential implications for food security if reconstruction efforts are notextensive and effective. The regeneration of livelihoods for farmers, especially considering therole of rice in providing for the poor, is essential, as is the restoration of fisheries. Socialprotection systems and longer-term preparedness measures should be implemented bydomestic actors and international partners as key elements to strengthen resilience.

22 2.5 CASE STUDY SUMMARY MATRIX

Governance Power Response and Commodity prices Impact on

structures structures reconstruction vulnerable groups

Russia heat The Russian Hoarding of The government began Global wheat prices rose Domestically,wave government food supplies transferring wealth from dramatically, up 85 increase in poverty responded to the and price grain to livestock percent year-on-year in was felt by crisis by banning gouging by producers. It also April 2011. Possible link agricultural workers wheat exports. speculators encouraged private to political upheaval in and women. compounded insurance to avoid the Middle East. Internationally, the crisis. The rebuilding costs in the Domestic price rises for among Arab Spring informal sector future. subsistence goods nations, Egypts often filled a resulted in poverty hungry protestors void. increases. may have suffered the greatest impact.

Pakistan The newly Some coercive The response was largely There was an 80 percent Those affected byflood established landlords took determined by increase in wheat and the flood were decentralized advantage of geographic location. The rice prices in 2010. disproportionately disaster smallholders south experienced poorer landless tenants management and other flood- emergency response and farmers. 70 system was not affected people. than the north. percent lost at least ready for an Alongside 50 percent of their event of such neglect of income. In addition, magnitude but infrastructure, 53 percent of equally some flooding women were found Pakistans central was the result to be food government did of deliberate insecure, not take a lead breaches by compared with 43 role. wealthy percent of the total landowners. population.

East Africa Ethiopia was best Across the Regional early warning Food prices reached Children under fivedrought prepared, with region a six- signs were not heeded as record levels in several years of age were pre-positioned month delay in required. Significant markets. Each country disproportionately state-sponsored the large-scale pressure on large refugee had a symbol of the affected, safety nets. international camps in Kenya and crisis: wheat in Ethiopia, accounting for over Kenya and domestic Ethiopia. maize in Kenya, and red half of all deaths in experienced aid effort due to sorghum in Somalia. Somalia. Women political a general and pastoralists distractions. culture of risk were also Somalia had no aversion and in impacted. There effective central/southern was huge swelling governance Somalia, in already cramped structures, wariness of the refugee camps. responded too political late, and entered situation and famine. risks posed by armed groups.

23Philippines Central Distribution of Only 17 percent of total Extensive damage to two Farming andtyphoon government assistance to (international + national) consecutive farming fishing issued warnings affected farmers recovery projects aim to seasons led to higher rice communities. and local in more remote restore livelihoods. prices. Women, children governments are areas either and some ethnic prepared for limited or absent. The government made minorities faced typhoons but not Loss of citizens an urgent plea to the discrimination on this scale, and records and international community with aid storm surges documents. to combat climate distribution. were new and not Resettlement of change in response. understood. A fishing lack of support for communities the resumption of inland risks government depriving them of services. livelihoods. Insufficient human resources hampered nutritional goals.

24SECTION 3: RELEVANCE OFCLIMATE CHANGEThe four case studies analysed in Section 2 illustrate how extreme weather events can lead towidespread disturbances in food security. This section will consider how climate change mightcomplicate this situation, by asking: How has the frequency and magnitude of such extreme weather events changed in the recent past and how might it change in future? Has climate change altered the risk of these extreme events occurring? If there are more intense extreme weather events more often, how might this affect food security?

First, we will discuss the association between human greenhouse gas emissions and extremeevents, including a summary of the evidence about the potential role of climate change in eachof the four extreme weather events focused on in this report. Then, we will consider illustrativescenario analyses of potential future risks including the potential implications of such changesfor food security.

All extreme events have unique causes, in the sense that a combination of natural variabilityand external climate drivers lead to a specific event. Therefore it is not possible to say exactlyhow climate change will affect specific events such as heat waves in Russia, flooding inPakistan, droughts in East Africa, or typhoons in the Philippines. However, it is possible to sayhow the likelihood of the types of events we understand and can model reliably heat waves,floods, certain droughts have changed due to climate change. But because of the fact thatspecific extreme events are caused by multiple local factors, as detailed in Section 2,statements attributing changes in the risk of an event to climate change have to be done on acase-by-case basis. On a global scale it can furthermore be said that the magnitude andfrequency of heat waves and extreme precipitation events will increase, simply because of theincreasing global temperatures and the ability of warmer air to hold more water vapour.However, as the global atmospheric circulation is expected to change as well only the increasedrisk of heat waves can be transferred from global to local and regional scales.

Against this background the scenarios explored at the end of this section are purely illustrativeand cannot be assessed with respect to their likelihood of occurring in the future. However, froma climate scientific point of view all scenarios are plausible.

253.1. THE LINK BETWEEN EXTREMEWEATHER EVENTS AND CLIMATECHANGEThe influence of greenhouse gases on the climate system is unequivocal. We know that globaltemperatures rose during the 20th century due to human emissions, and are very likely to rise in 137future. Understanding the influence of greenhouse gases and global warming on extremeweather events is more difficult. This is partly because extreme events are, by definition, rare,and so data are limited, and partly because of natural variability in the climate system. Extremeweather has always occurred, and natural variability will continue to influence weather in future.However, scientists expect that emissions from fossil fuels will alter the frequency and intensityof extreme weather events, and there is an increasing amount of evidence to support this.

There are two related areas of enquiry that can help us to understand the link between weatherand climate change:1. Trends in extreme events, about which we can draw some conclusions from basic physics, historical observations, and model experiments exploring future climate scenarios;2. While it will never be possible to confidently state that an event would not have occurred without human-induced climate change, probabilistic event attribution studies (PEA), that consider whether and to what extent climate change altered the magnitude of and the risk of such an event occurring, can be conducted for certain types of extreme event.

In a seminal 2004 paper, Stott et al. developed a method of PEA, and showed that climate 138change doubled the risk of the record-breaking 2003 European heat wave. Since this time,improvements to climate models and the methodology have allowed for the demonstration oflinks positive or negative, or the absence thereof between some specific extreme eventsand anthropogenic climate change.

While climate models have greatly improved in recent years, with the increase in spatialresolution making the representation of extreme weather much better, their capability tosimulate such events varies. Robust attribution statements can be made for heat waves andextreme precipitation events, and, to a certain degree, droughts. The influence of climatechange on individual hurricanes and typhoons is, however, not analyzable with current researchtools.

While it is possible to attribute individual extreme events, within the above-mentioned

constraints, studies need to be made for each single event because each event results from aspecific set of conditions. For example, for flooding in the UK, PEA studies have suggested thatclimate change increased the risk of flooding in autumn 2000, but decreased the risk of flooding 139in Spring 2001. To date, studies have only been done for a small number of extreme eventson an ad hoc basis, and therefore for many extreme weather events we cannot yet makestatements about whether climate change had an influence on that specific event.

In the following sections, we will consider evidence that might shed light on the associationbetween climate change and each of the weather events discussed in Section 2.

263.1.1. Russias 2010 heat waveThere is strong evidence that anthropogenic greenhouse gases are causing average 140temperatures to rise globally and regionally. Changes in heat wavesdefined as spells ofdays with temperatures above a threshold determined from historical climatologyhave been 141linked to climate change. According to the most recent assessment report from the IPCC, it islikely that human influence has substantially increased the probability of heat waves in somelocations, and made it very likely that heat waves will occur more often and last longer in 142future.

Several studies have investigated the role of climate change in the 2010 Russian heat wave. 143 144Dole et al. suggest that it was mainly natural in origin, while Rahmstorf and Coumoufound that human-induced climate change made its occurrence more likely. They show thatobserved warming in western Russia is more than twice the global mean warming and estimatethat this warming trend has increased the number of records expected in the past decade five- 145fold. Otto et al. demonstrated that these results are not contradictory: the magnitude of theheat wave was no different from what would be expected from natural variability, but climatechange did indeed increase the probability of it occurring.

3.1.2. Pakistans 2010 floods

Flooding can have a variety of causes, both man-made and natural. On many occasionsflooding results from river basin management as well as weather events; therefore, it is toosimple a question to ask whether flooding will become more frequent and widespread. The 2010flooding in Pakistan was associated with very heavy rainfall and the extension of monsoonrainfall further north than on average. These combined with inefficient water management andunsustainable land use to bring disaster.

Abdul Majid Khan, Oxfams Programme Manager for Disaster Risk Reduction and ClimateChange in Pakistan, observed: "It's true we're managing our water resources poorly, and havebeen for 40 years; that's not changed. But what has changed is the pattern and timing of therains. We have very extensive rains, especially in areas where we didn't really have monsoonsbefore; and the rains have been coming later every year now for four or five years. Farmerscan't grow crops - either crops don't mature because the rains are late or in other areas peopleare about to pick the crops when the rain starts and batters them down. And that's why we're 146getting these floods year on year."

What happened in Pakistan in 2010 raises the question of whether we should expect changesin rainfall events because of climate change. 147In general, an increase in heavy rainfall is expected in a warmer atmosphere. This isbecause, as temperatures rise, the atmosphere can hold more water vapour, which increasesthe likelihood of heavy rainfall events. In keeping with this theory, an increase in heavy rainfall 148has been observed globally as the hydrological cycle intensifies. Therefore we are seeing,and can confidently expect, more heavy rainfall events globally because of climate change.

In general, in Pakistan wet months have been becoming wetter and dry months drier from 1991 149onwards compared to the previous 30-year period with wetter summers and drier winters. 150Broadly, mean rainfall has increased in the North and declined in the South since 1960 and 151the number of heavy rainfall events has increased. However, how climate change will affectrainfall events in any particular location is another question. The controls on rainfall are oftenvery complicated. The extremely heavy rainfall leading to Pakistans flooding in 2010 wasassociated with large-scale low pressure systems linked to the Russian heat wave and La Nia.It is as yet very difficult to say how climate change might affect the dynamics of these largescale processes.

27 152There has been one paper which considered the attribution of the 2010 floods. The authorsfound that the model they employed was not able to provide reliable results for this event.Without further research using other models, and/or improvements in model ability, it will remainunclear whether climate change played a role in this specific case.

3.1.3. East Africas 201011 drought

Whether or not more droughts should be expected in the future is an even more challengingscientific question than for flooding. This is largely due to the difficulty of anticipating changes inrainfall and the crucial role of soilatmosphere interactions, which is a challenge forcontemporary climate models. Drought is a very difficult phenomenon to define or measure.There is not a scientific basis for the idea that there has been an observed trend in global-scaledryness or drought in the 20th century. However, there may have been some changes indryness and drought at a regional scale; there is medium confidence that the duration and 153intensity of drought has increased in southern Europe, for example.

For East Africa, there is evidence to suggest that there has been a recent and abrupt decline in 154,155,156,157rainfall and an increase in droughts over the last 20 to 30 years and there have beenincreasing problems for food security. These decreases in rainfall have been accompanied by 158significant increases in air temperatures. Rainfall recession increasingly encroaches onto 159some densely populated and food surplus producing areas in the centre of Kenya. AcrossEast Africa there were poor rains in 2008, 2009, 2011 and 2012. In Somalia the short rainsfailed in 2013 and the long rains in 2014, leading to new warnings of rising acute foodinsecurity. Long season rainfall has declined across much of southern Ethiopia and Somalia,western Uganda, eastern Kenya, Rwanda, Burundi and northern Tanzania (see Figure 5). 160Scientists have found that this is linked to changes in the Pacific Ocean, and warming of the 161Indian Ocean. Large warming of the Indian Ocean has been observed over the 20th 162 163century and further strong Indian Ocean warming is projected in future. If this link proves tobe a major driver, then this suggests droughts in East Africa will continue to occur and, indeed,become even more frequent. However, climate model projections for East Africa suggestconditions will generally become wetter. There seems to be an inconsistency between the trendobserved in the recent past, generally drying, and the wetter futures in the climate models.

28Figure 7: MarchAugust rainfall trends for East Africa

Correlation between CHIRPS March-August rainfall and a linear trend

Source: Climate Hazards Group Infrared Precipitation with Stations (CHIRPS) used for drought monitoring:U.S Geological Survey and University of Santa Barbara Climate Hazards Group (2014), available at TheState of Rain, http://www.usgs.gov/blogs/features/usgs_top_story/the-state-of-rain/

Lott et al.(2013) have conducted an attribution study to specifically investigate the East African 164drought in 2011. As noted in section 2.3, the drought resulted from the failure of both theshort rains in 2010 and the long rains in 2011. Lott et al. found that there is no evidence ofhuman influence on the failure of the first rainy season, which was mainly associated with LaNia, a naturally occurring mode of variability with a strong influence on rainfall in East Africa.However, the study also tested the role of climate change in the long rains of 2011, finding thatthe probability of dry conditions had increased due to human influence.

Combining all these sources of evidence, it is as yet difficult to draw conclusions about linksbetween climate change and drought in East Africa. There is evidence that the region hasbecome drier over the last 30 years, and that that climate change increased the probability ofdry conditions in East Africa in early 2011. Yet models suggest the region could become wetter.The influence of greenhouse gases on the different drivers of rainfall in this region and theinterplay between these drivers demand further investigation to better understand future droughtrisk.

3.1.4. Typhoon Haiyan in the Philippines, 2013

While some evidence indicates that storm intensity has increased over the last three 165decades, reliable data are limited to the north Atlantic, where observations are most 166abundant. The evidence is not yet conclusive in other places, including the Pacific Ocean.

How underlying changes towards wetter and hotter conditions and more intense rainfall willaffect the specific phenomenon of tropical cyclones or typhoons like Haiyan is still very difficultto answer. Earlier studies suggesting an increase in the magnitude of tropical storms on a 167global average due to higher temperatures in the tropical oceans are now thought to have not 168incorporated crucial aspects of changes to circulation. It is also not possible to conductattribution studies on individual storms like Haiyan because the models used for attributionstudies cannot simulate typhoons. More complex models, which are currently too expensive torun for attribution, show improved ability, and therefore this is expected to change.

Uncertainty in projections of tropical cyclones is also too high to draw any conclusions on futurechanges in risk. Heavy rainfall associated with tropical cyclones is, however, likely to increase 169with continued warming. According to government meteorologists the intensity of rainfall hasbeen increasing in most parts of the Philippines and there is a trend towards more extreme daily 170rainfall (19512008). Furthermore, an ongoing rise in sea level is likely to heighten thedestructiveness of tropical cyclones by increasing storm surge capacity so that sea water iscarried further inland.

3.2 CONSIDERING THE IMPACTS OF

HYPOTHETICAL CLIMATE SCENARIOSThe four case studies presented in this report provide different examples of the impacts ofextreme weather events, and begins to indicate how their interactions with socioeconomic andgovernance conditions affect food security. Impacts are often exacerbated by poor governance,while extreme events, in turn, can further undermine governance structures and increasepoverty and vulnerability, leading to further socioeconomic injustice.

As outlined in the previous section, climate change will change the intensity and/or frequency ofsome types of extreme weather events. Given uncertainties about future changes and thedifficulty of predicting specific events, it is valuable to consider some simple, hypothetical and 171,172purely explorative scenarios from among many that can be considered plausible. Aconsideration of the impacts of increased intensity and frequency of extreme events follows. It isimportant to note that these scenarios are not mutually exclusive or exhaustive.

3.2.1. Case study: Russia heat wave

3.2.1.1. Scenario 1 A more intense heat wave in Russia affects a larger geographical area, and more than 50 percent of wheat production is lost (cf. only around 33 percent in the 2010 drought).

If health care conditions were the same, it is likely that more vulnerable people would die fromthis event. Wheat and bread prices could rise above the price range that a significantly largergroup of poor Russians would be able to afford, which could have implications for politicalstability. There could also be greater impacts upon countries normally dependent on Russianwheat due to changes in supply and international prices. The Russian government might enacta longer-lasting export ban, leading to even higher food prices nationally and worldwide. This inturn could have an impact on countries that are currently already in political and security crises,especially those involved in the escalating consequences of the Arab Spring. The extreme pricespike would also be affected by price speculations, which were already problematic in 2010.

303.2.1.2. Scenario 2 Heat waves become more frequent occurrences.

The Russian government already responded to the 2010 heat wave by encouraging a shifttoward livestock, but it is unclear whether this would be effective or rather overwhelmed by morefrequent heat waves. Insurance systems have not been seen as reliable by farmers, and withheat waves becoming more frequent, premiums would increase. With a lack of viable safetynets and increasingly untenable conditions for wheat production, many farmers may have tomove to other livelihood sources. Because of this, Russias future as a global bread basketcould become uncertain as temperatures rise under extreme climate scenarios, particularly from 173the 2030s onwards. Global wheat prices would go up. Russia would need to import morewheat from neighbouring countries. Compensation may come from wheat growing areasextending further north with temperature changes, and adaptations may happen. But the long-term decline of food production in this region could have significant consequences for foodsecurity in Russia, as well as in politically unstable countries that have so far relied on it.

3.2.2. Case study: Pakistan floods

3.2.2.1. Scenario 1 Pakistan suffers a flood of even greater duration than in 2010.

While responses in Punjab in 2010 were relatively quick and effective, aid efforts might beoverwhelmed by more persistent flooding, as getting help to the stricken would be nearlyimpossible in conditions that remained extreme for longer. Longer floods could also destroymore infrastructure and resources, potentially resulting in more widespread migration, as thepossibility to return and rebuild faded. Additionally, there would be a risk of greater socialinjustice from local leaders, who might force affected communities to hand over their aid funds.Potentially, a more decentralized relief response system could lead to people having a greatersay in the use of relief resources and hold local leaders accountable. However, this reformwould be challenging in politically unstable conditions, especially when trust in local leaders hasbeen shaken by abuse of power during previous flooding.

3.2.2.2. Scenario 2 Floods become more frequent.

Pakistan suffered further floods in 2011, 2012 and 2013 and as this report was beingcompleted news bulletins reported severe flooding once again in September 2014 so thisscenario must be considered highly plausible. The capacity of the government to respond tosuch crises might be eroded, if they were less able to muster resources and support from theinternational community due to donor fatigue. In any case, the frequency of flooding couldreduce opportunities for communities, government leaders and other sectors to improvepreparedness for such disasters. Mass migrations would raise difficult questions about landrights, and might increase risks to vulnerable people such as women and children. In terms ofagriculture, replacing the food previously supplied by stricken regions might prove challenging,while investment could depart from areas previously dominated by cash crops.

3.2.3. Case study: East Africa drought

3.2.3.1. Scenario 1 A drought in East Africa covers an even wider area than the case study event.

The drought described in the case study already caused a total collapse of agriculturallivelihoods in large areas. Further failure of crops and death of livestock could occur, affectingareas that thus far merely saw a relative loss of productivity. This in turn would mean that

31refugees might have even fewer possibilities to sustain themselves elsewhere. The recentdroughts saw minimal and delayed interventions from governments, even though early warningsystems were in place and functional. Similarly, international aid was already struggling toprovide sufficient water and other support, and a larger scale drought might leave more peoplewithout any aid. It is worth considering whether warnings of a larger-scale drought would promptquicker and better action, based on learning from the drought described in the case study, orwhether such a drought would still trigger a limited or no response.

3.2.3.2. Scenario 2 East Africa experiences droughts for a number of consecutive years

The climate of East Africa may well be becoming even more extreme, and some scientists 174suggest that the trend towards increasing drought is likely to continue in future. Since therehas been an increase in drought associated with Indian ocean warming (see section 3.1) Sucha scenario is therefore plausible. As with Scenario 1, such a scenario would lead to furtherfailure of crops and livestock, with areas possibly becoming permanently unsuitable foragriculture and even pastoralism. This would lead to more permanent refugees, with migrationadding to long-term political instability. The international response to a long-term crisis of thisnature is unsure. In this context it is disturbing to note that as this report was about to bepublished (September 2014), the UN warned that Somalis had once again suffered two failedrainy seasons resulting in poor harvests, water shortages and livestock deaths. Food priceswere surging because of drought and conflict blocking roads and impeding trade routes and for 175the first time since 2011, more than one million people were in need of food aid.

3.2.4. Case study: Philippines typhoon

3.2.4.1. Scenario 1 A typhoon even stronger than Haiyan makes landfall in the Philippines and beyond.

By the time Haiyan reached Vietnam, it had been downgraded to a tropical storm. However, astronger typhoon could potentially not only wreak greater devastation in the Philippines, butmight continue onwards to cause destruction in mainland South-East Asia. The loss of moreinfrastructure over a wider area could have a negative impact on the availability and reach ofaid. Further, the widespread destruction of infrastructure would likely reduce the ability ofgovernments and international organizations to help. A more extreme typhoon would moregenerally pose a greater challenge in terms of funding and manpower both for the nationalgovernment and international aid. Recovery would take longer, leaving vulnerable groups at riskfor a longer period. If the typhoon severely affects multiple South-East Asian countries,international aid resources may be divided along political allegiances.

3.2.4.2. Scenario 2 Typhoons like Haiyan become frequent events.

The increase in disasters would likely lead to widespread displacement, severely affect attemptsto rebuild rural livelihoods, and increase the scale and number of the social injustices thatemerged during the Haiyan crisis, such as domestic violence and discrimination against certainsocial groups. More generally, there is a risk that remote areas could be left totally to their owndevices, while the capacities and resources of global aid efforts might be exhausted by theaccelerating cycle of destruction and reconstruction. This may lead to local communitiesbecoming increasingly adaptive out of necessity, and local adaptation strategies could besupported by international programs, but it may also lead to a desertion of such remote areas.With increasingly frequent typhoons, strategic considerations of the leading global economicpowers about influence in the Philippines and South-East Asia in general may impact the 176provision of aid resources.

323.2.5. ConclusionHypothetical scenarios based on increasing intensity and frequency of extreme weather eventsraise important questions about the possible future impacts of climate change. This is especiallyimportant in relation to their interactions with socioeconomic and governance conditions, thepotential for adaptive capacities to be overwhelmed, and the circumstances in which vulnerablecommunities can be driven to extremes. Several scenarios presented here indicate strongconsequences for political stability which could heavily exacerbate humanitarian crises.Therefore, strategies for climate change adaptation and coping with extreme weather eventsshould be considered in the context of plausible, multi-dimensional scenarios, and involvemultiple domains of decision making.

Scenario 1 More intense Food price spike. Lost Greater domestic and heat wave, livelihoods for greater number international instability. affecting of farmers. larger geographic Farmers, poor area. Russians, poor individuals in import dependentScenario 2 Heat waves countries. How would farmers cope with Effects of a forced transition become more repeated losses in absence of to other sources of food frequent. trust in governments? Shifts to import on unstable countries other commodities/livelihoods. previously dependent on Russia impracticable as a Russian wheat. global bread basket.

Pakistan

Scenario 1 A flood of More infrastructure and Response capacities of

greater resources destroyed. More government overwhelmed. duration. migrations out of stricken Social injustice by local Rural areas. leaders more widespread. communities and small land owners, thoseScenario 2 More dependent on Repeated destruction of Erosion of government's frequent regional food infrastructure and resources. resources and the ability to floods. production Permanent migrations. Land mobilize international and/or cash rights lost. support. No chance for crops. governments and communities to improve preparedness. How would recurring crises affect political stability?

East Africa

Scenario 1 Larger-scale Further failure of crops and More action or still no

Children under drought livestock, also in previously response from governments five years of affecting a moderately affected areas. and other sectors. age, women, wider area. Educational failures. Fewer pastoralists, places to which refugees can refugees. flee.

34Scenario 2 Droughts for Areas become permanently Migration adding to long- a number of unsuitable for agriculture and term political instability? consecutive pastoralism. More permanent How would the global years. refugees. community respond to long- term crisis?

Philippines

Scenario 1 More Greater destruction in the A greater challenge in terms

powerful Philippines, plus more damage of funding and manpower. typhoon. on the South-East Asian mainland (shifting typhoon paths?). Farming and fishingScenario 2 More communities, Attempts to rebuild rural Exhaustion of national and frequent women, children livelihoods overwhelmed. global efforts and resources. typhoons. and some ethnic Social injustices and minorities. discrimination to become endemic. Remote areas to be left to their own devices. Widespread displacement and land encroachment. Damage to ecosystems.

35SECTION 4: POLICYRELEVANCE ANDCONCLUDING REMARKSEach of the case studies reflects the fact that extreme weather events have played an importantrole in the destabilization of both short- and long-term food security, with impacts on variousaspects of life. In all cases, the impacts left citizens vulnerable and authorities unprepared.While direct measures such as emergency preparedness and the strengthening of response-related institutions would be helpful, this study identifies the need for a wider cultural shift inmany countries facing both food security issues and extreme weather events. More attention tovulnerable groups and inequalities are required in these societies, going far beyond technicalimprovements to equipment or redirected funding. At the very heart of climate justice is thepromise that those who are most vulnerable will not bear the heaviest share of the burden whendisasters inevitably strike.

42ACKNOWLEDGEMENTSChristopher Coghlan is a doctoral student, teaching assistant and tutor in the School ofGeography and the Environment at the University of Oxford. He is currently completing a thesison global food systems across administrative scales. He works on Oxfam-commissionedresearch at the Environmental Change Institute (ECI) at the University of Oxford, and is the jointScenarios and Policy Researcher for the CGIAR Research Programme on Climate Change,Agriculture and Food Security (CCAFS).Maliha Muzammil is joint Scenarios and Policy Researcher for the CGIAR ResearchProgramme on CCAFS at the ECI. She is driving multi-stakeholder scenario development forthe future of food security, livelihoods and environments for South Asia, working extensivelywith a wide range of regional actors. She is currently undertaking her PhD at SOAS, examiningthe opportunities and barriers for low carbon, climate resilient pathways in least developedcountries using a political economy approach. She has worked on climate change adaptation,community-based adaptation, sustainable development and low carbon development.Dr John Ingram trained in soil science and gained extensive experience in the 1980s workingin East and Southern Africa and South Asia in agriculture, forestry and agroecology research. In1991 he was recruited by the UKs Natural Environment Research Council (NERC) to organize,coordinate and synthesize agroecology research as part of the International Geosphere-Biosphere Programme. In 2001 he was appointed Executive Officer for the 10-year internationalproject Global Environmental Change and Food Systems (GECAFS). On the close of GECAFShe was appointed NERC Food Security Leader, during which he represented NERC on the UKGlobal Food Security Programme. In May 2013 he joined the ECI to establish and lead a foodsystems research and training programme.Dr Joost Vervoort is the Scenarios Officer for the CGIAR Research Programme on CCAFS.He drives multi-stakeholder scenario development for the future of food security, livelihoods andenvironments for East and West Africa, South and South-East Asia and Latin America. Workingextensively with a wide range of regional actors he explores the long-term implications ofmultiple socio-economic scenarios combined with climate scenarios. The regional scenarios areused to guide policies, investments and institutional change at national and regional levels.Joost has a PhD in Production Ecology and Resource Conservation from WageningenUniversity and is scenarios work package leader on the TransMango project, funded by theEuropean Commission (FP7), which focuses on plausible futures of the European food systemin a global context.Dr Friederike Otto is a physicist by training but gained a PhD in Philosophy of Science from theFree University Berlin. She was based at the Alfred Wegener Institute of Polar and MarineResearch in Potsdam during her one-year diploma project working on atmospheric dynamics inglobal circulation models. While writing her PhD thesis she worked as a research assistant atthe Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research (PIK) and came to Oxford as a post-doctoralresearcher to work on the quantification of uncertainty in climate system modelling. She nowworks as a senior researcher at the ECI on the attribution of extreme weather and climate-related events to external drivers of the climate system. She is the scientific coordinator of thedistributed-computing project climateprediction.net and leads a project to make the attribution ofextreme events operational.Dr Rachel James is a climate scientist focusing on changes in African rainfall systems. She isinterested in the role of human influence on climate, and the application of climate models tobetter understand risks to water security, biodiversity, infrastructure, and food systems. She hasa PhD from the University of Oxford and is a Research Fellow in Climate Modelling for ClimateServices at the ECI, where she is promoting the use of climate science and climate models toprovide useful information to decision makers. She is interested in the role of scientificinformation in climate policy, including the UNFCCC Mechanism for Loss and Damage.

The authors wish to thank John Magrath, Jenny Peebles and Ricardo Fuentes-Nieva of Oxfamfor their support in the writing of this paper.

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