Key Questions on the White House Report and Petraeus-Crocker Testimony

In anticipation of the forthcoming White House report on Iraq benchmarks and testimony by Gen. Petraeus and Ambassador Ryan Crocker before Congress, legislators should be prepared to ask tough questions so that the American public has a complete picture of what is happening in Iraq.

The White House has already begun manipulating comments made by Gen. David Petraeus in support of continuing the troop surge. Case in point: The Bush Administration seized upon a comment made by Gen. Petraeus late last month that there had been a 75 percent reduction in religious and ethnic killings in the capital, instantly highlighting only this one fact in a White House press briefing.

Yet more thorough reports depict a much more pessimistic outlook. Last month’s grim National Intelligence Estimate depicted an Iraq suffering from high levels of sectarian violence. A more recent report from the nonpartisan Government Accountability Office demonstrated that Iraq’s political transition is deadlocked. And then a third independent commission found that Iraq’s security forces simply are not standing up as President Bush said they would.

Here are the questions Congress should ask Gen. Petreaus and Ambassador Crocker:

The Pentagon’s own numbers do not include Shi’a-on-Shi’a violence, Sunni-on-Sunni violence, car bombings, or people being shot in the head from in front. For example, the Pentagon does not consider large-scale bombings such as the bombing in northern Iraq last month that killed more than 500 ethnic Yezidis an example of sectarian violence.

3. Is a possible drop in violence in Baghdad the result of the surge or some other factor?

The recent National Intelligence Estimate on Iraq indicates that some of the reduced violence may be a product of population displacements and sectarian cleansing.

5. Are the “bottom-up reconciliation” and a turn by Sunni tribes against Al Qaeda a significant turnaround in the war?

The U.S. Intelligence Community indicates that Sunni tribal cooperation with the U.S. military will intensify sectarian violence: “Perceptions that the Coalition is withdrawing probably will encourage factions anticipating a power vacuum to seek local security solutions that could intensify sectarian violence and intra-sectarian competition.”

6. Are the “bottom-up reconciliation” and a turn by Sunni tribes against Al Qaeda a result of the surge?

The recent NIE on Iraq indicates that Sunni tribal elements are only cooperating with us because they believe we will leave Iraq.

“Fearing a Coalition withdrawal, some tribal elements and Sunni groups probably will continue to seek accommodation with the Coalition to strengthen themselves for a post-Coalition security environment.”

8. Have Iraqis made progress on the benchmarks agreed upon at the beginning of the surge?

The GAO has reported that only three of the 18 benchmarks laid out by the administration in January have been satisfactorily met. (Those that were met include: establishing supporting political, media, economic, and service committees in support of the Baghdad security plan; establishing the planned joint security stations in neighborhoods across Baghdad; ensuring that the rights of minority political parties are protected in the Iraqi legislature).

The U.S. Provincial Reconstruction Team program is under-funded, lacks clear objectives, suffers from repeated leadership changes, and has a staff of which 95 percent lack the cultural knowledge and Arabic-language skills needed to work with Iraqis.