Peter Sugar. "The Early History and the Establishment of the Ottomans
in Europe"

In the middle of the fourteenth century the Balkan Peninsula was in
turmoil. The second Serbian empire was disintegrating, and the Byzantine
Empire, which in previous centuries had always been able to fill the vacuum
left by similar collapses in the area, was too weak to play this role.
Political chaos was paralleled by social and religious controversy. The
lower classes were trying to shake off the rule of the traditional noble
ruling element, and heresies, which often represented social class differences,
flourished. Members of the Slav ruling families were fighting each other,
and a similar struggle for the throne was in progress in the Byzantine
Empire. It was the latter struggle that brought a new force, the Ottomans,
into the Balkans.

Between 1341 and 1355 the corulers of the Byzantine Empire, John V Paleologos
and John VI Cantacuzene, were fighting for sole possession of the throne.
Being short of support and troops, the latter called on Orhan, the ruler
of a rising Turkish principality on the eastern shores of the Marmara Sea,
to come to his aid. Thus, in 1345 the first warriors serving the House
of Osman crossed the Dardanelles and a new chapter began in the history
of Southeastern Europe.

A little more than a hundred years later, in 1453, the House of Osman
conquered Byzantium for which the two Johns had fought so desperately and
made it the capital of a large state that stretched roughly from what is
today central Yugoslavia to eastern Asia Minor. That state, known in the
West as the Ottoman Empire, was called "The divinely protected well-flourishing
absolute domain of the House of Osman." The two basic elements of
the empire, the Islamic and Turkic, are indicated by this curious name.
Neither can be fully explored in this volume, but a few important aspects
must be mentioned to explain the system that determined the fates of Europeans
under Ottoman rule. The House of Osman was a latecomer in the Near East
and created a state based on pre-existing principles that justified its
rule. Throughout the six hundred years of rule they clung to these principles,
which they believed represented the divine and laic justifications for
everything that they and the empire undertook. For that reason an understanding
of these principles is essential.

In order to introduce the Islamic features that played a role in Ottoman
thinking, one must begin with a few remarks about the origin of Islam.
The Muslim lunar calendar begins with the year of the Hijra (migration)
in 622 A.D. when the Prophet Muhammad moved from Mecca to YatrIb (Medina).
The strictly monotheistic religion preached by the prophet included Jewish,
Christian, and traditional Arabic elements together with some original
additions. Islam, while morally and ethically lofty, is theologically much
simpler than other monotheistic creeds. Therefore, it was perfectly suited
for the people to whom the prophet addressed his message. It was equally
well suited then, as it is now, for peoples who had reached a stage in
civilization demanding a higher level of religious and metaphysical beliefs
as well as a moral code regulating the activities of society, but who were
not yet ready to cope with the theological difflculties and complications
of either Judaism or Christianity. The Turks were such a people.

Muhammad recognized the common bond of monotheism between the religion
he preached and Christianity and Judaism. Verse 62 of Chapter (sura) 2
of the Quran clearly links all montheists in a common fate until and including
the Day of the Last Judgement:

" Lo! those who believe (in that which is revealed unto thee Muhammad),
and those who are Jews, and Christians, and Sabaeans -- whoever believeth
in Allah and the Last Day and doeth right their reward is with the Lord,
and there shall no fear come upon them neither shall they grieve."

This recognition went beyond mere statements. Muhammad was willing to
use Christian and Jewish tribes as allies, and when his realm expanded
he incorporated them in his Islamic state without demanding their conversion.
We have several treaties dating from the time of his rule that spell this
out quite clearly. One treaty with the city of Najran in Yemen, dating
from 631, lists the obligations and taxes of the city and then states that
Najran and their followers have the protection of God and the dhimmah [guarantee
of security] of Muhammad the prophet, the Messenger of God, for themselves,
their community, their land, and their goods . . . and for their churches
and services [no bishop will be removed from his episcopate and no monk
from his monastic position, and no church-warden from his church-wardship]...
On the terms stated in this document they have protection of God and dhimmah
of the prophet for ever, until God comes with His command, if they are
loyal and perform their obligations well, not being burdened by wrong."

In these passages we find the first Islamic element that became fundamental
for the life of the people of Southeastern Europe under Ottoman rule. Any
monotheist who accepted the political supremacy of Islam and was willing
to live in a Muslim state under stipulated conditions became a zimmi [dhimmi],
a protected person. This protection extended beyond the religious freedom
made explicit in the above passage. It involved a sort of self-government
that under the Ottomans became institutionalized and known as the millet
system, which was basically a minority home-rule policy based on religious
afflliation. We can trace the origin of that system to the following lines
of the treaty mentioned above:

" If any of them asks for a right, justice is among them (i.e.,
in their own hands) [To see that they are] not doing wrong and not suffering
wrong; it belongs to Najran."

The protectors were the first-class citizens and the protected zimmis
had to carry special burdens. Of these the oldest used throughout the Ot
toman period was the poll-tax (cizye)/jizya. There were other tribute-taxes
and obligations dating from early Muslim days that the Ottomans retained;
these will be discussed in later chapters.

This distinction among the Muslims, the "people of the book"
as the other monotheists were called, and the pagans who theoretically
had to convert or die rested on a basic world view. This view is fundamental
in understanding the "divinely protected" part of the Ottoman
state's official name, and its reasons for existing in the eyes of those
who ruled the empire. Islam, like Judaism and Christianity, believes that
humanity can live happily only if it follows God's command. God made his
will known by repeatedly speaking through prophets. According to the Muslims,
Adam was the first and Muhammad the last prophet. Sinful man always twisted
God's word to suit himself, thus forcing the divinity to send more and
more prophets. Because God is eternal, perfect, and unchanging His commands
were always the same; therefore, all "people of the book" received
the same message. The difference between the Muslims and other monotheists
is simply that the former accepted the last, and therefore uncorrupted,
message while the others stuck to their erroneous versions of divine revelation.
The Muslims' perfect understanding of God's commands makes them His chosen
people, whose duty it is to spread the true word to all mankind.

The basic Muslim beliefs concerning the Qur'an cannot be discussed here,
but it must be pointed out that the book is considered to contain not the
words of tlle prophet, but those of Allah. Therefore, it is neither subject
to interpretation nor translatable because translations distort God's meaning.
The Qur'an contains everything a man must know to live righteously and
save his soul.

It soon became clear, however, that additional legislation was needed
when the small Muslim-Arab community grew into a world-wide empire. First
the community turned to the traditional sayings of the prophet, then to
those of his immediate successors, and finally to the utterances of the
first caliphs. Those statements that were considered genuine were collected
and codified in the Hadiths (traditions). The Hadiths, together with the
consensus of the learned (ijma') and their rulings based on analogy (ijas),
and naturally the Qur'an, formed the Muslim law code, the shari'a. The
splits that occurred in the Muslim community stemmed from diverging views
concerning the acceptability of certain Hadiths, but the great majority
of Muslims followed the four so-called orthodox legal schools and were
jointly known as the Sunnis. The Ottoman were Sunnis and followed the shart'a.
Because this law applied only to Muslims, a system had to be introduced
for the non-Muslims, and it had to follow confessional lines because religious
differences were the only ones that the Muslims understood. That system
was the above-mentioned millet system.

Law was very basic to all Muslim, including the Ottoman, states because
religion, law, and administrative structure and, therefore, correct behavior
and salvation were closely tied together. The Muslims did not distinguish
between secular and sacred or religious law; to them law meant shari'a.
In practice, however, a distinction did exist, and the shari'a was by no
means the only law. The second excerpt from the Najran Treaty indicates
quite clearly that local laws and customs were respected and even reconfirmed.
Later, local laws were confirmed in the Ottoman-ruled parts of Southeastern
Europe at the time of conquest. In addition they were frequently incorporated
into subsequent Ottoman laws, the kanuns, issued by the sultans for use
in their provinces.

Kanuns were secular laws, provided we consider the shari'a sacred or
religious law, something that would not be quite correct but comes nearest
to our western concepts of what it really was. That such laws were needed,
both in the earlier Islamic and later the Ottoman empires, to deal with
a great variety of problems that did not face those who codified the shart'a
is obvious. Nevertheless, in a religious-legal community whose basic law
theoretically covered all the needs of mankind, the issuance of these additional
laws had to be justified.

By definition inferior to the shari'a, these additional laws were based
on urf (adat, orf), which is best translated as customary law. According
to early jurisconsults, this was the law that princes were to follow in
regulating the affairs of the country. Closely related to urf was amme,
general or public law, which regulated state-to-state and state-citizen
relationships. After the Turkish element became dominant in the eleventh
century, the old Turkish principle of toru was added, which recognized
the rights of the ruler to issue decrees. Because toru was closely related
to the Islamic urf concept, it was easily absorbed into the Muslim legal
tradition. These principles were the legal basis for the issuing of the
numerous kanuns that became very important for the European people under
O toman rule. Most kanuns were nothing else but the old laws of any given
region which the Ottomans confirmed in areas they conquered.

The kadis (judges), who administered both the shart a and the kanun
laws, and the muftis (juriconsults who interpreted the former) were also
old Muslim officials whose offlces the Ottomans had taken over from the
former Islamic states and brought intact into Europe. They belonged to
the ulema (plural of alim), the class of learned men who were the educational,
legal, spiritual, and often scientific and cultural leaders of the Muslim
community. They played an important role, as will be seen, in Ottoman life.

What must be obvious from this sketchy outline of Muslim-Ottoman law
is that Ottoman law was not centralized-territorial, but practically territorial-individual,
because every individual's religion, occupation, place of residence, status
in society, and sex determined the law that was applicable to him or her.
This produced important variations that will be discussed later.

Brief mention must be made of one more Islamic aspect that became crucial
for the Ottoman state and its inhabitants: the "Five Pillars of Faith,"
the basic duties of a Muslim. These duties are very simple: Prayer, Almsgiving,
Fasting, Pilgrimage, and Profession of Faith. Naturally the Ottomans followed
these basic rules. Every Ottoman tried to live up to these commands, and
the numerous public buildings, hospitals, roads, and so on that were built
in Southeastern Europe were the result of these endeavors. More important
for the Ottoman state's well-understood mission are verses 1.90-93 of the
second chapter of the Qur'an:

" Fight in the way of Allah against those who fight against you,
but begin not hostilities. Lo! Allah loveth no aggressors.

And slay them wherever ye find them, and drive them out of the places
whence they drove you out, for persecution is worse than slaughter. And
fight not with them at the Inviolable Place of Worship until they first
attack you there, but if they attack you (there) then slay them. Such is
the reward of disbelievers.

But if they desist, then lo! Allah is Forgiving, Merciful.

And fight them until persecution is no more, and religion is for Allah.
But if they desist, then let there be no hostility except against wrongdoers."

Literally, these lines speak of defensive war, condemn aggression, and
appear to address themselves to a religious group subject to persecutions.
Only one line, "fight until persecution is no more, and religion is
for Allah," can conceivably be read to mean the spreading of the word
of God by the sword. Yet, on these lines was based the concept of jihad,
holy war, against unbelievers. In its Ottoman version, gaza, jihad became
the offlcial raison d'etre of the Ottoman Empire.

One of the earliest accounts we have about Osman, the founder of the
dynasty, describes how his future father-in-law, Seyh Edebali, the leader
of a mystical fraternity, ceremoniously hands him the sword of a gazi,
a fighter for the Faith Osman won his first major battle against the Byzantines
as a gazi chieftain at Baphaeum (Koyunhisar) near Nicea (Iznik) in 1301,
for which the Seljuq sultan gave him the title of bey (beg). Although the
Ottoman rulers added a long list of impressive titles to these first two,
including those of sultan (the holder of authority), hudavendigar (emperor),
sultan-i azam (the most exalted sultan), and padisah (sovereign), they
always kept gazi as their first title.

The extension of the realm of the dar al-Islam (the domain of Islam)
at the expense of the dar al-harb (the domain of war, the domain of those
who fought Islam) was the Ottomans' duty. When the empire ceased to expand
and especially when it began to shrink, the Ottomans began to feel that
they had failed in their divinely ordered mission. The above Islamic aspects
of the Ottoman Empire, while not complete, give the most important features
affecting the lives of the people of Southeastern Europe and are sufficient
to explain the Muslim nature of the state that was "divinely protected."
This state was also the "domain of the House of Osman." In the
various states of Europe, the Far East, and even the Arab-Muslim domains,
a change of dynasty was a frequent occur- rence, but in a Turkic-Turkish
state this was impossible. The existence of the Ottoman Empire was closely
tied to the rule of a single dynasty, the Osmanli (Ottoman). This is the
first important Turkish feature that must be noted, and it can be explained
by the development of Turkish states prior to that of the Ottomans.

The original home lands of all Turkish (Turkic) people were the plains
of southern Siberia and the endless expanses between the Caspian Sea and
the Altaic range. The early Turkish "states" were at best tribal
federations put together by strong men whose death usually meant the end
of the "state." This society was dominated by a warrior aristocracy,
the beys; not only was it stratified, but it also had the beginning of
a vague legal system. Everybody had his place, but the entire structure
hinged on a common loyalty to a supreme chief and possibly to his family.
By the beginning of the eighth century the Turkish-inhabited areas bordering
on Iran had been subjugated by the 'Abb-asids and had supplied them with
an endless stream of slaves, many of whom became important functionaries
in Baghdad.

Toward the end of the tenth century a confederation of Ghuz and Oghuz
tribes established itself in the region of the Aral Sea. Known after their
conversion to Islam as Turkomans, these peoples were led by a chief called
Seljuq. The descendants of Seljuq had expanded their realm south and westward
as far as Isfahan by the middle of the next century. In 1055 the weak caliph
Al-Qa'im (1031-75) wanted to free himself from the tyrannical tutelage
of another Turk, the chief of his body guard al-Basasiri. He turned to
the leader of the Seljuq state, Tughril, for help and made him his chief
officer. For the next hundred years, until 1157 when the caliphs reasserted
their power, the Seljuqs were the real masters of the 'Abb-asid state.
Their title was sultan.

When they were finally expelled from Baghdad, the Seljuqs had already
established other power centers. One of these was in Asia Minor (Anatolia,
Anadolu). There were reasons for this development. Turkish warriors were
always looking for strong chiefs to follow, and once the Seljuqs were firmly
established in Baghdad there were more followers than could be usefully
employed. Since the newcomers were able and willing to fight, the Great
Seljuqs, as those ruling in Baghdad were called, sent them to border regions
to fight for faith, honor, advancement, and booty. They were equally eager
to get rid of certain members of their family who had either the ability
or the inclination, and sometimes both, to strive for the sultanate. The
Byzantine border was the ideal place for unwanted relatives as well.

There Muslim gazis and their Christian equivalents, Greek akritoi, had
developed a rough frontier society. This society was the result of centuries
of continuous warfare, during which borderlines were never firmly established
and the authority of the central government in the frontier region was
at best nominal. The resulting no man's land attracted adventurous free
spirits from both sides who made a living from robbing each other, justifying
their action as a "defense of their faith." Even this curious
way of life required rules; what developed was a rough code of behavior
and chivalry acceptable to both sides.

Shortly after he became master of Baghdad, Tughril sent his nephew,
Alp Arslan, to secure the realm's borders. In 1071 at Manzikert (Malazgirt)
north of Lake Van, Alp Arslan won one of the crucial battles of history,
defeating the Byzantines and capturing the emperor, Romanus Diogenes. Byzantium
never recovered from this defeat. Eastern Anatolia was freed from Byzantine
rule, and soon several independent, mainly Armenian, states appeared in
the region. None of these states was strong, and the instability in the
region lured the gazis who could easily reap rich rewards for raids. As
early as 1072 Suleyman, an ambitious young relative of Alp Arslan, was
sent back to Anatolia at the head of a large army of nomadic Turkomans.
He conquered most of Asia Minor and reached Nicaea by 1082. While the First
Crusade was reconquering most of Anatolia, Sulevman's son Kilic Arslan
returned to Anatolia and established the state of the Seljuqs of Rum (Rome,
Byzantium). From 1107 until 130, when their state was destroyed by the
Mongols, the Sultanate of Rum with its capital at Konya (Iconium) developed
the features of the frontier-gazi state as well as certain cultural features
that became the foundations of the Ottoman state.

Constantly fighting not only the Byzantines and Crusaders, but also
other Turkish states -- such that of the Danishmends' was the most importalnt
-- Anatolia was in continllal flux and attracted increasing numbers of
Turkoman warriors. These warriors became settlers once their fighting days
were over, and land was the greatest reward they could receive. Although
Persian and Byzantine models existed for the creation of these military
fiefs, which were known as iqtas, the system was further expanded by the
Seljuqs and eventually evolved into the timar system of the Ottomans. In
its Seljuq-Ottoman form this landholding system tied to military service
can be considered a very important Turkish feature transplanted into Europe.
The timar system will be discussed in detail later, but here it should
be noted that it was the institution basic to the army, agricultural production,
taxation, and local law enforcement. This system, in typical Turkish fashion,
was based on personal loyalty and allegiance, which, unlike in the European
feudal system, was due directly to the ruler. There were no intermediary
lords between the lowest fief holder and the holder of ultimate power.

The most typical, but at the same time the most complicated, development
that faced the Seljuqs of Anatolia and later the Ottomans was the result
not only of continuous warfare, but also of the fact that few major centers
like Konya developed. The countryside continued to favor the life style
of the gazi-akritoi frontier society. As a result the economic base for
an organized state was lacking. There were several reasons for this development.

Between the Battle of Manzikert and the end of the thirteenth century,
Anatolia was a constant battle ground. Except for relatively short periods
when the Seljuq rulers were strong, there was no strong authority able
to maintain security outside the major cities in Asia Minor. Even if the
various Muslim and Christian rulers had been able to maintain order, they
would have been powerless to influence the socioethnic factors that transformed
Anatolia into a Turkish land during these centuries.

Most of the Turks who came into the region were Turkoman nomad warrior-herdsmen.
Their migration became massive in the thirteenth century with the Mongol
conquests of first Central Asia, then Persia, and finally Baghdad in 1258.
These newly arrived Turks fought for various princelings and factions in
a land that rapidly became overwhelmingly rural. The two major waves of
Turkish conquest and migration destroyed most of the urban settlements.
Just as Western Europe had to find a new solution to a similar problem
after the Volkerwanderung and the collapse of the Western Roman Empire,
so Anatolia had to find a solution. A new system of production, marketing,
and public order was needed.

Both the gazis and the akritoi were "fighters of the faith,"
but neither group was educated and sophisticated enough to understand the
true meaning of the religions for which they fought. They were fanatical
upholders of their beliefs, but those beliefs had little to do with what
the Muslim ulema or the Christian theologians would have recognized as
the correct understanding and interpretation of the respective religions.
The religions of the frontier -- with this Christian and Muslim mixture
of supersitions, mysticism, traditional, and in some cases even pagan beliefs
-- were more similar to each other than they were to oficially correct
versions of the creeds. These folk-religions began to fuse and gradually
became dominated by Muslim characteristics.

Just as the western medieval knight needed a code of conduct in fighting
local wars of the early Middle Ages, so did the Anatolian warrior have
to develop his own norms of behavior in conformity with his religious convictions.
With the Turkish element dominant this code of Anatolian chivalry had to
focus on the person (or family) of a leader. With military and religious
considerations predominating in the frontier society, this leader could
either be a religious or a military figure; ideally he should be both.
When this was not possible, a close alliance between a religious leader
,seyh, and a military leader, whose title could be sultan, bey, or gazi,
was sought.

The combination of economic needs, rapid ethnic transformation, unsettled
conditions, rustication, acceptable religious leadership, and the unchanged
desire for a focus for personal loyalty created a new system. We still
do not know how and when it developed exactly; it was a gradual process
that took place during the Seljuq period and was fully developed by the
time Osman began his meteoric rise to power.

The nomenclature also reflects this confusion. We have several expressions
for the same phenomenon, while other terms change their meaning. A few
examples will suffice. In the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries akhi
meant either the leader or any member of a mystic fraternity, and later
it denoted the member of a trade or craft guild. Seyh stood for the leader
of a religious fraternity (synonymous with the early meaning of akhi),
and also for certain tribal leaders; later it referred to the "court-chaplain"
of the sultan as well as to the chief religious officer of a guild. The
crucial word futuwwa could denote an entire mystic fraternity, but it could
also stand for this association's code of ethics and chivalry. The distinction
between sufi a Muslim mystic, and a dervi s only slightly less confusing
denoting at best a certain level of mystical attainment.

These difficulties aside, the final outcome can be roughly described
as the establishment of fraternities on a folk-religious-mystic basis containing
elements of Christianity and Islam as well as folk beliefs, but in its
over-all character Muslim. These fraternities were led by their "holy
man,"seyh, and its members (sufis or dervises) ministered to the spiritual
needs of those who selected their fraternity as the one whose code of ethics,
futuwwa, they were willing to follow.

The activity of the fraternities and the precepts of their futuwwas
extended beyond the religious realm to social and economic spheres. The
fratemities organized or established close contacts with craftsmen, and
the futuwwa became the regulation for all the social and economic activities
of the developing guilds. The code of chivalry was also tied to these futuwwas
because most of the soldiers became members of the various fraternities.
These organizations spread, and the larger ones had tekkes (houses for
their members) and maintained zaviyes (inns for the laymen) all over the
country. Traveling constantly, performing not only religious duties but
often also practicing the trade of the guild with which they were associated,
fraternal members performed numerous duties including the very important
one of disseminating news. It became crucial for rulers or for those who
wished to reach the top of the social pyramid to have the closest possible
relations with the fraternities, because these organizations could spread
their fame, recruit warriors for them, and bring them eco- nomic advantages
through the craft associations.

Osman, as we have seen, began to rise by associating with Seyh Edebali
whose futuwwa he accepted and whose daughter he married. He learned a trade
to show that he had become a member of the fraternity, thereby setting
a precedent that all his successors followed. In this manner Osman achieved
the ideal position; he became both the military and spiritual leader to
whom personal loyalty was due. The followers of Osman, the Ottoman Turks,
therefore were not members of a tribe or clan, but simply a mixture of
all kinds of Turks and turkified people of other origins who followed Osman
and later his family. The crucial traditional Turkish role of the leader
and his family in society and state becomes evident from this fact because
nothing held the "Ottomans" together but loyalty to the ruling
family.

The fraternity system moved with the Ottoman conquest to Europe. There
its religious significance declined because, unlike in Anatolia, mass conversion
to Islam did not occur. There, however, its role in the craft and trading
guilds and charitable institutions became very important.

Naturally, no state could recruit the learned administrators needed
from among the members of the fraternities or the gazis, nor was folk-Islam
suited to become the ideological underpinning of a major political entity.
The administrators of Muslim states were always recruited from among the
learned Muslims and specially trained slaves. Fortunately for the Turkish
states in Anatolia, learned men moved westward along with the warriors.
At the height of its power Seljuq Konya had good adminis- trators and was
an important center of Muslim leaming and culture. When Konya declined
and other principalities rose, including that of the Ottomans, trained,
learned manpower was available. It was expanded by highly trained slaves.

Slavery had been an old, established institution all over the Near East
since time immemorial and was taken over by the Muslims. Islam produced
some changes. Muslims could not be enslaved, but slaves who accepted Islam
remained slaves, although their manumission was encouraged. Children of
Muslim slaves were free men. Because most slaves accepted the religion
of their masters, there was a constant need for new slaves. This need was
filled by prisoners of war and by an active slave trade. Slaves were used
not only in economic endeavors, but to a limited extent also as scholars,
administrators, and soldiersrt, in all possible activities. Those in higher
military and administrative posts were often extremely powerl men. In general
their lot depended on the posi- tion of their master, whose prestige reflected
on them. In a sense an important man's slaves can be likened to the clients
of a prominent Roman patrician.

The Turks who were brought from Central Asia into the centers of Muslim
power were often slaves and used mainly as soldiers. Their free Muslim
descendants became powerful administrators. Those who came of their free
will or were invited, as we have seen in the case of Tughril, occupied
similar positions and also served a"master," the caliph. This
personal service accorded well with their tradition of personal loyalty.
When Turkish principalities arose this tradition survived, and slaves were
used as soldiers and administrators whose functions and feelings of loyalty
differed but little from the free-born servants of the same master. The
important kul (Turkish for slave) system of the Ottomans was based on this
tradition. To be a kul of the sultan opened the doors to the most important
offices of the state, to the point where it became nearly a title of honor.
Even free-born officials of the Ottoman state referred to themselves as
kuls of the sultan. Although this type of slavery differs but slightly
from the Arab-Islamic concept of slavery, it has, by its stress on personal
loyalty, a certain specific Turkish flavor.

The above Islamic and Turkish characteristics will suffice to justify
not only the name the Ottomans gave to their state, but also the contention
of scholars that the Ottoman Empire was an Islamic-Turkish-warrior state
influenced to some extent by Byzantine institutions and practices. The
last-mentioned will be discussed later when they began to penetrate the
Ottoman state. Whatever these were, they never did change the basic nature
of the Ottoman Empire. In this short presentation only those aspects of
the Islamic-Turkish tradition that will be referred to repeatedly in this
volume were discussed.

2. THE FIRST EMPIRE AND ITS EUROPEAN PROVINCES

Traditionally, Ottoman history has been divided into four periods. The
first comprises the two-and-a-half centuries of the first ten sultans (1300-1566),
culminating with the "golden age" during the reign of Suleyman
I (1520-66). The second lasted roughly two hundred years, until the beginning
of Selim III's reign in 1789. This was a period of decline and included
an unsuccessful attempt to reverse the trend in the second half of the
seventeenth century by members of the Koprulu family who held the office
of the grand vezir, Sadrazam, the uppermost of the greatest). The third
period, beginning with Selim III's rule and ending with the revolu- tion
of the Young Turks (1879-1908), was one of attempted reform. Finally, there
was the period of Young Turkish rule, including the First World War, which
ended with the dissolution of the empire and the establishment of modern
Turkey.

Correct as this general periodization is for Ottoman specialists, it
does not meet the needs of our readers. For our purposes we must differentiate
four periods: the years of the first Ottoman conquest (1352-1402); those
of the second conquest and consolidation of power (1413-81); the period
of stability (1453-1595), which overlaps slightly with the second period;
and the period of decline, instability, and even anarchy during the last
two centuries covered by this volume. The origins of the Ottoman Empire
and the first of our four periods will be covered in this chapter.

Assiduous research has not yet clearly established the origin of Osman's
family. We know that his father, Ertugrul, was a gazi warrior who held
a small fief near the city of Sogut. It was not a rich holding, so we can
assume that Ertugrul was only a moderately successful gazi warrior. In
1277 the Mongols, firmly established in Persia, Iraq, and eastern Anatolia,
defeated the Seljuqs, who remained rulers in name only for another thirty
years. During that time strong local leaders were able to carve out independent
principalities. Even lesser figures were encouraged to seek their own fortune.
One of these was Osman, who succeeded his father in Sogut four years after
the great Mongol victory.

A man of outstanding ability, Osman found himself in a fortunate position.
With the exception of the remnants of the Greek state around Trebizond
(Trapezunt, Travzon, Trabson, Trapesus) on the southeastern shores of thc
Black Sea, and an Armenian state in south-central Asia Minor along the
Mediterranean, the only Anatolian lands in Christian hands were the Byzantine
possessions along the Asiatic shore of the Marmara Sea. Their borders ran
roughly from the mouth of the Sakaria (Sangarius) River on the Black Sea
southward east of the important cities of Nicaea and Bursa (Prusa, Brusa),
turned west about sixty miles south of the latter city, and reached the
sea roughly where the Dardenelles join the Aegean near the classical town
of Abydos (present-day Canakkale). Although relatively small in size, this
area was fertile, included some important cities, and was near Constantinople.
For the gazis, who could not fight each other both for religious reasons
and because of their futuwwa code, and who could not venture eastward where
Mongol rule was strong, this Byzantine possession offered the best chances
for employment, fame, and fortune. Osman's fief bordered on this territory,
and he had the intelligence and the ability to take advantage of his opportunity.
While other Turkish leaders were attacking the southem part of the Byzantine
province, Osman moved against the larger and richer northern half, gaining
his first victory, as already mentioned, in 1301 and learning on his death
bed that his son Orhan had captured the great city of Bursa, which became
the first Ottoman capital.

With the conquest of Byzantine lands the realm of Osman became a principality
equal in importance to other principalities, but expansion into Anatolia
proper was also required to make it the leading Turkish power. Here the
Ottomans faced other Muslim-Turkish gazi states, and military action was,
therefore, difficult. The Ottomans seldom, if ever, occupied other Turkish
lands outright. If attacked, they had a right to fight. In most cases,
however, they gained land either by being called in to aid another principality,
or by being asked to protect or serve as an ally of a relatively weak neighbor.
They preferred to legitimatize claims by converting victories into alliances
supported by marriages. Some former ruling families, the Cenderli (Candarli)
dynasty of future grand vezirs being a good example, became leading members
of the highest Ottoman ruling circles.

This practice of alliances was extended to Christians, too, once the
O tomans had crossed to the western shores of the Marmara Sea. Among Orhan's
wives were Theodora, the daughter of Stefan IV Uros, the ruler of Serbia,
and Maria, the daughter of the Byzantine emperor, John VI Cantacuzene;
one of Murad I's wives was the daughter of Emperor John V Paleologos, and
another, Tamara, was a Bulgarian princess whose father, John Alexander
II Shishman, ruled from Turnovo (TVarnovo, T'rnovo). Among the wives of
Bayezid I were the daughter of John Hunyadi (Maria), Lazar I of Serbia
(Despina), Louis, Count of Salona (Maria), and another unnamed daughter
of the emperor John v 8 Mehmed I blamed Christian influence on policies
for his father's failures and gave up marriage alliances with Christians.
However, one of Murad II's wives, Mara, was a Christian princess, the daughter
of George Brankovic of Serbia, and among Mehmed II's numerous women we
find several noble Christian ladies including a Paleologos and a Comnena.
These marriages would not be important if they did not denote certain policies
dealing with the treatment of the European provinces throughout the first
of our chronological periods and parts of the second.

When the Ottomans acquired their first foothold on the European shores
of the Dardanelles at (impe (Tzympe) in 1352, the Byzantine Empire, torn
by civil war, held an area roughly south of a line running due west from
the Black Sea port of Burgas (Purgos, Burgaz) to the Struma (Strimon) River.
In addition to this territory Byzantium held a small area around the city
of Salonika (Thessalonih', Selanik) as well as Euboea, Attica, and an enclave
in the Morea (Peloponnesus). Most of the Morea belonged to Venice, while
a Bulgarian state occupied the area to the north, which stretched to the
Danube. The rest of the Balkan Peninsula belonged to the Serbs.

Three years later, in 1355, Stefan Dusan, the great Serbian ruler, died,
and both his and the Bulgarian state became the scene of prolonged internal
conflict. As a result the Ottomans faced the same anarchic situation in
Europe that had contributed to their first conquests in Anatolia. Here,
too, they could intervene at the request of one side or the other in civil
wars; here, too, they could offer protection, alliances, and treaties.

What is remarkable is the statesmanship of the Ottomans. In Europe the
Turks were operating in Christian territory, and they could have behaved
as they had in the Anatolian provinces of the Byzantines. They did not.
It would be erroneous to ascribe their moderation simply to the early Muslim
policies that recommended that "people of the book" be left to
their own devices if they submitted without fighting. After all, every
Ottoman advance in Europe was the result of a military victory, and they
could have considered the lands thus conquered justifiably theirs, in spite
of the claims of the Christian princes who fought as their allies. They
realized that they did not have sufficient military forces and population
to permit simultaneous extension of their sway in Anatolia where they aimed
to reconstruct the Seljuq Empire under their leadership, maintenance of
large forces in Europe, and turkification of these lands with the help
of numerous settlers. Therefore, they preferred an arrangement that secured
not only territorial advantages, but also additional troops through alliances
or vassalage agreements with the European princes. The numerous marriages
served to cement these arrangements. So long as the Ottomans did not face
treachery or attempts to regain full independence on the part of their
clients, they stuck to these covenants.

From the point of view of the inhabitants of these associated states,
this arrangement was not too favorable. Although civil war between competing
princes was curbed somewhat, the unhappy internal conditions did not change.
Weak princes were unable to prevent the nobles and ecclesiastic dignitaries
from fighting each other, oppressing the peasantry, and engaging in religious
persecution; nor could they prevent taxes -- legal and illegal -- rising
constantly. Trade was disrupted, manufacture and commerce declined, and
urban and rural life became more and more difficult. Discontent grew in
both the Byzantine and the Serbian and Bulgarian lands.

To this the Ottomans paid little attention so long as their interests
remained protected. These interests went beyond the loyalty of the allied
and vassal princes and beyond tribute and tax money. The concept of gaza
and their self-conceived duty to extend the dar al-Islam not only made
the Ottomans consider all territories over which they had overlordship
as permanently in the hands of God's people, but demanded the introduction
of some Ottoman institutions. In doing so they followed not only basic
religious concepts but also satisfied certain very specific needs of the
state and those elements of the population on which its power rested.

The three basic social elements that were the mainstays of Ottoman power
in the first period of conquest in Europe were the leading Turkish families
who held most of the important state offices, the gazis, and the akhi brotherhoods.
The first two groups were interested in land acquisition to enhance their
wealth and social position. The leading families often received rights
to land formerly owned by princes and nobles who opposed the Ottoman advance.
This transfer of ownership naturally a fected the people living on these
lands, but in general the people regarded the change of lords as advantageous
and became "loyal subjects" of the sultan. The case of the gazis
is more complicated. Mostly foot-loose Turkoman tribesmen, they were both
a great strength and a great problem for the first sultans. They belonged
to the "military class" and therefore were exempted from taxes
and had the right to advancement within their class and to an income derived
from landed property. For those among them who had already spent a longer
period in the Turkish principalities of western Anatolia the desire to
better their lot was often the main reason for their military action. Since
the expansion in Anatolia occurred mainly in other Turkish principalities
whose well-established military-land-owning elements simply changed allegiance
when the state switched from its original masters to the Ottomans, few
of these gazis could be compensated for their services. This increased
the pressure on the sultans to gain more land in Christian-inhabited territories.

The major problem was created by those Turkomans who streamed into Ottoman
lands from the east in the early fourteenth century. Fleeing from the Mongols
and attracted by the growing reputation of the Ottoman state, they were
far too numerous to be absorbed smoothly into the "military class."
Even if such a transformation had been possible, it would have upset the
balance between the military and producing elements of the state so that
revenue would have lagged hopelessly behind expenditures. The aim of the
Ottomans was to settle this surplus of people as the Seljuqs had done in
Anatolia during the centuries following the Battle of Manzikert.

From the first Ottoman incursions into Europe to roughly the conquest
of Edime (Adrianopolis, Adrianople, Adrianopol, Odrin) in 1365 several
factors, in addition to the above-mentioned population pressure, made the
extensive settlement of Turks in Europe possible. The Ottomans realized
the necessity to gain fimm control of the Dardanelles for both military
and economic reasons. They wished to secure passage from Anatolia to the
Balkans and charge transit fees on goods carTied through the straits. They
were, therefore, anxious to create a new frontier in Europe, and the set-
tling of this area with professional border-warriors appeared, to the government
and the gazis alike, to be the right thing to do. Turkish raids were feared
by the original inhabitants, and in these early years there were still
territories and states to which they could flee. The Turkomans not only
took over what the fleeing Christians left behind, but also, as will be
seen shortly, established new rural and urban settlements. In this manner
under Orhan (1324-60), and especially under Murad I (1360- 89), the lands
that roughly coincide with today's Turkish provinces in Europe became overwhelmingly
Turkish. This ethnographic transformation had serious repercussions in
the Christian states, which had great difficulty in absorbing the refugee
population. We have no statistical data on this population transfer, but,
given the fertility of eastern Thrace and its proximity to the Dardanelles
and Constantinople, it was probably significant. In later periods the massive
influx of Turks ceased, but it did not stop. Major military roads and strong
points had to be in reliable hands, so Turks were settled around them,
although in considerably smaller numbers.

Throughout, the akhi fraternities played an important role. The sultans
supported them for political, religious, and economic reasons. Wherever
the Ottomans extended their power the akhis followed establishing tekkes
and zaviyes, which often became the centers around which Turks settled.
Several new villages owed their origin to the ukhis. Given the folk-religious
character and eclecticism of those'brotherhoods, they were often able to
find a place in theirfutuwwas for local saints and shrines. In this way
cohabitation of old and new settlers was facilitated. Furthermore, regulations
were established that soon dominated the relationship of the peasantry
and the landlords, and served as channels of communications and maintained
customary ties.

In the cities the role of the akhi fraternities became even more significant
because the old-established guilds had little choice but to merge with
those craftsmen and traders whose economic functions were well established
and protected by the Ottoman state. Although this merger protected the
livelihood of the Christian city population, the administration of the
urban areas soon slipped from their hands into those of the leaders of
the brotherhoods. So long as the system worked properlyy to the end of
the sixteenth centuryransformation, which began in the first period of
conquest, represented an improvement over the conditions that had prevailed
in the cities on the eve of the Ottoman conquest.

Income was needed to support the tekkes and zaviyes, and this too came
from landholding. When a brotherhood established a new house, its seyh
petitioned the authorities for land. When the request was granted, the
peasants acquired a new landlord in the strictest sense of the word because
these grants, considered religious fundations or vaklfs were made in perpetuity.
As will be seen when we discuss landholding, the rights of landlords were
strictly regulated in the Ottoman Empire, and therefore this change of
overlords usually pleased the peasantry. The granting of vak1fs was the
best of the good works included in every Muslim's obligation to give alms.
This broadly defined duty went beyond purely pious purposes to include
helping fellow humans in every way possible. Vaktfs supported inns, baths,
hospitals, fountains, bridges, and even markets where people could eam
a living. The higher a person was on the social scale, the more numerous
and extensive were the vaklfs he was supposed to establish.

These foundations were also supported mainly by the income from large
rural estates. Land was set aside for them from the beginning, and this
added to the change in landholding pattems and peasant obligations in the
territories that came under direct Ottoman rule during the first period
of conquest. Later additional sources of income were attached to these
foundations. In the middle of the sixteenth cenury the establishment of
such foundations transfommed Sarajevo from a practically unknown village
into a city and created the town Uzunkopru (near Edime) in a place where
there had not even been a village. Although we have no such drastic examples
from the first period of conquest, in this period the establishment of
vakfs in Europe began to produce profound changes in the towns and villages
where they were located and in those mral regions whose income was set
aside to support them.

This transformation occurred in territory formerly held by the Byzantines.
The conquests were significant enough to worry not only the Balkan states,
but also the western European powers. While the Ottomans were crossing
the Byzantine-Bulgarian border in 1366, only to be defeated at Vidin, the
Pope tried to organize a crusade against them. He was not successful, but
a Christian fleet was able to reconquer Gallipoli in the same year and
return it to Byzantine control. Although this placed the Ottomans in a
difficult situation because they still lacked a navy and the heavy artillery
needed for attacking fortified places, Murad I continued his operations
in the Central Balkans.

The situation in the Balkans was confused. Both the Serbian and Bulgarian
states were in full dissolution. Being nearer to the Ottomans, the Bulgarians
felt the new influences. The Bulgarians had lost the Macedonian lands to
the strong Serbian state of Stefan Dusan first. Then, in the middle of
the fourteenth century the northeast seceeded and became known by the name
of its second ruler, Dobrotitsa (today, the Dobrudja [Dobrogea] ). In 1365
John Alexander (Ivan Alexandur) divided his realm between his two sons.
After his death in 1371, the two separate kingdoms of Turnovo and Vidin
emerged. The same disintegration took place in Serbia after Stefan Dusan's
death in 1355. Around the cities of Velbuzd on the upper course of the
Struma River, and Prilep (Perlepe) two Macedonian states appeared, and
Albania began to regain her independence.

The rulers of these states were constantly fighting each other to secure
boundaries and recreate greater political units. Murad I saw his chance
in this disunity. When the Macedonian princes attacked him in 1371 at Chirmen
(Chernomen, Chermanon), a small village on the lower Maritsa (Meri, Ebros,
Hebros) River, he defeated his attackers whose leaders were killed in battle.
This opened the road for further conquests to the north and west, and the
Bulgarian King of Tumovo was forced to accept the status of an Ottoman
vassal. The move to the north put great pressure on Byzantium, which bought
peace by returning Gallipoli to the Ottomans in 1376.

For the next few years the Ottomans extended their rule in Asia Minor
and interfered constantly in the dynastic squabbles of Byzantium, giving
the people of the Balkans a few years of relative respite. By 1380 they
had turned again to Europe and the territories of the previously defeated
Macedonian states, reaching the Vardar (Axios) River and following it both
north and southward. In the north they moved through the lands of the Macedonian
states, and, not content, went on to conquer Sofia, which belonged to their
Bulgarian vassal, and to Nis, which was in the hands of Vidin Bulgaria.
Moving southward, they entered Byzantine territory again and occupied Salonika
in 1387.

These campaigns frightened the Balkan princes, who put aside their squabbles
and united against the common menace. Although in 1387 the Byzantine emperor
and the Balkan vassals and allies fulfilled their obligations and helped
the Ottomans with important military forces in defeating the Karamanids,
their major rival in Anatolia, the menacing moves of their overloads forced
them to change their attitude. Lazar I of Serbia, Tvrto I of Bosnia, and
John Stratsimir of Vidin united against Murad I and to- gether won a victory
in 1388 at Plocnik (Plotchnik), a small village west of Nis. The sultan,
however, turned around and invaded Vidin Bulgaria, forcing this state to
acknowledge his overlordship. With the help of Christian vassal forces
he met the last major Balkan rulers who still resisted him at the first
Battle of Kosovo, on June 15, 1389, and defeated the Serbian and Bosnian
forces. Although Murad was murdered by a Serb the night of this very bloody
battle, immortalized in the famous Kosovo Epic, with this decisive victory
he had established Ottoman rule over the Balkans, a rule that was to last
for the next five hundred years.

The fact that he was the absolute master of the Balkans did not escape
the attention of the next sultan, Bayezid I (1389-1402), although he could
not turn to this region immediately. The death of his father had given
new hope to Anatolian Turkish princes, who renounced their alliances and
allegiances, and for three years Bayezid, the grandson, son, and husband
of Christian princesses, had to fight them, relying on vassal Christian
troops from Europe because his gazi forces were reluctant to fight fellow
Muslims. In those years he gained complete control of Anatolia and replaced
the Turkish ruling houses, who until the death of Murad I had retained
their position as vassals, allies, or Ottoman governors, with governors
who were his slaves and almost always of Christian origin. Although toward
the end of his reign this policy cost him his throne and life, the new
system of rule proved permanent and was introduced in the European provinces
after these were transformed into outright Ottoman possessions.

Bayezid clearly thought of himself as a divinely appointed instrument
whose duty it was to conquer the world for the greater glory of God. His
ambition was to become a universal ruler. Yet he, like all Muslim princes,
had to act "legally," especially since he had more enemies than
friends among the Muslim Turkish aristocracy and could not simply turn
around and declare a new "holy war" against those whose troops
had helped him in Anatolia. His "legal" opportunity was furnished
when the Hungarians and their friend and ally, the Wallachian Prince Mircea
cel Batrin (the Old) (1386-1418), invaded the weak Bulgarian states. The
Wallachian occupied the Dobrudja and the city of Silistra (Durostorum,
Silistre) on the Danube, while the Hungarians tried to conquer the Vidin
Kingdom. These infringements on his vassals' lands gave Bayezid authority
to move.

His vassals suffered more from his "help" than did his enemies.
Returning from Asia Minor to the Balkans in 1393, the sultan expelled the
Wallachians from Silistra and the Dobrudja and declared that Danubian (or
Turnovo) Bulgaria, unable to fend for herself, was now an Ottoman province.
The last ruler, John Shishman, was accused of collaboration with the enemy
and was executed at the orders of the sultan. Stefan Lazarevic, the ruler
of Serbia, would probably have gotten the same treatment, in spite of the
fact that he quickly swore a new oath of loyalty to Bayezid, had not the
sultan had more pressing problems to solve.

While the sultan had been occupied in Anatolia, the Paleologi, in an
effort to save their state, made their famous promise to reunite the two
Christian churches. With the help of Venice they greatly strengthened the
Morea. Since the sultan was still without a navy, this was a combination
he could not well face. He therefore resorted to diplomacy and called all
his vassals, including the Byzantine emperor, to Serres to force them to
acknowledge his overlordship. When the emperor did not come Bayezid laid
siege to Constantinople and sent his forces into the Morea at the invitation
of Carlo Tocco, one of the lords fighting in that region. This cam- paign
brought the Turks important gains. With Constantinople under siege and
his back secure from Byzantine-Venetian attacks, Bayezid could turn his
attention to the north again.

There the Hungarian-Wallachian alliance was still in effect, and Bayezid
I now moved against Mircea. Once again, many Christians, mostly Serbs,
fought in his army, including Kraljevic (the son of the king) Marko, the
hero of another famous Epic, who died not in that battle, but in the Battle
of Arges which Bayezid fought with the Wallachians on May 17, 1395. Mircea
appears to have been victorious militarily, but his forces and resources
were so depleted that he had to acknowledge the loss of the Dobrudja, into
which Bayezid moved Turkish garrisons. He also had to accept the status
of an Ottoman vassal and pay regular tribute. This arrangement lasted until
the Danubian Principalities regained their independence. Although it created
problems for the Romanians, it saved them from the much harsher treatment
that went with direct Ottoman rule, especially during the centuries of
decline.

The situation in Constantinople and in the Morea greatly alarmed European
leaders, especially King Sigismund (Zsigmond) of Luxemburg. This famous
Emperor of the Holy Roman Empire and King of Hungary (1387-1437) asked
for help and got it from French knights and Venice. He led his army into
the Balkans only to lose the great battle at Nikopolis (Nikopol, Niyebol)
on September 25, 1396. Because Vidin had opened its doors to the Christian
army, Bayezid took over the Vidin Kingdom, too, transforming it into an
Ottoman province. During the next few years Ottoman armies concentrated
on the Byzantine possessions and the various small Greek states in the
Morea where they gained land and devastated much territory.

By 1400, apart from the Dalmatian coast and some cities in the Morea
most of the Balkans were under Ottoman rule. Serbia, Bosnia, and Wallachia,
were vassal states, and the Byzantine Empire was reduced to the great city
and its immediate surroundings. The rest of the peninsula was divided into
Ottoman provinces.

There can be little doubt that Bayezid would have completed the conquest
of the Balkans had not a new Mongol attack forced him to return to Anatolia.
There he lost the Battle of Ankara in 1402, was captured, and died in captivity
a few years later. The victorious Timur returned the various Turkish lands
to the princely families whom the Ottomans had displaced, leaving Osman's
family only those he considered legitimately theirs in accordance with
the provisions of the shari'a. There Bayezid sons fought among themselves
for supremacy, giving the Balkan states a chance to re-emerge and making
a second conquest necessary. The fact that not all the states took advantage
of this opportunity and that European forces played an important role in
settling the war between the Ottoman princes is as remarkable as is the
fact that those who used this period of respite to reform their realms
learned nothing from past experience and fell under Ottoman rule even faster
and more easily than they had during the first conquest. These two factors
contributed greatly to the establishment of the second Ottoman Empire.

3. CIVIL WAR AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE SECOND OTTOMAN
EMPIRE

When Bayezid I s empire collapsed, Timur recognized those territories
that belonged to the House of Osman on the day of Murad I's death as being
legitimately Ottoman. This ruling returned some Anatolian provinces to
their former masters, something Timur was able to enforce. In theory it
also stripped the Ottomans of all their gains in Europe as well as the
changes introduced there under Bayezid. In Europe, however, Timur was unable
to enforce his rulings, and the decision was left in the hands of those,
including the Christian princes, who were in a position to take advantage
of the new situation. The behavior of these people during the Ottoman interregnum
from 1402 to 1413 is of great interest.

Bayezid was very unpopular among several elements of Turkish society,
and it is well known that he lost the Battle of Ankara because only his
Christian forces remained loyal while numerous Muslim units deserted during
the fight. The gazis resented his highhanded illegal" treatment of
fellow Muslim princes. The leading Turkish families, descendants of the
first successful gazi leaders and of those who allied themselves with the
Ottomans early and had achieved wealth and leading positions, resented
the sultan's increasingly "Byzantine" tendencies. the growing
centralization of power, a court that was more and more "imperial,"
and several new influences including slaves in the ruling and decision-making
process, all of which diminished their position. Both of these groups accused
Bayezid not only of abandoning the gazi tradition, but even of being a
bad Muslim because he was too strongly under the Christian influence of
his mother, wife, and European friends. Bayezid was certainly not interested
in changing his faith, but his desire to become a universal ruler and his
interest in the eclectic religious tendencies then fashionable made him
somewhat more tolerant of other religions than was permissible under the
regulations of strict High Islam. At the same time he was eager to diminish
religious antagonisms. Thus, there were certain facets of his behavior
that were justifiably objectionable to the gazi, the Turkish aristocracy,
and the learned men, the major Turkish-Muslim supporters of his state.

Although two of these dissatisfied Turkish factions agreed on the need
to reverse Bayezid's policies, they did not agree on what had to be restored.
The gazi faction would have preferred a return to the days of Osman and
Orhan, to continued expansion, to the great influence of the brotherhoods
and folk-religion, and to the almost tribal chief role the early sultans
had played. Although the leading families certainly did not object to the
continuation of gazi wars, they wanted a polity modeled on the most glorious
days of the Seljuq state when not Folk but High Islam dominated and where
old Turkic traditions assured the supremacy of their class.

To these two groups must be added a third, which cannot be called Christian,
but can be called European, although it had some partisans in Anatolia
too. For simplicity's sake only two major elements that made up this faction
will be mentioned. On the higher social level there were the important
commercial interests. These persons were eager to re-establish "normal"
conditions. They were not hostile to those"Byzantine" features
that not only favored production and trade, but also made foreign business
connections possible. For them the reunification of western Anatolia, through
which numerous important trade routes led, was of prime importance, even
if it involved the reabsorption of their own lands and the Turkish principalities
into the Ottoman state. Small in number and without a firm religious commitment,
this element needed mass support. It found such support mainly in Europe
among those who were dissatisfied with centuries of religious strife and
persecution and who, although they found Ottoman practices preferable to
what had preceded, wanted to go further, to an elementary proto-democracy
that included religious equality and freedom. This element played an important
role in the civil war that restored the Ottoman Empire. The significance
of this fact is enormous. The extremely elitist and hierarchial Ottoman
State owed its rebirth to grass-root support. Although led by Muslim families
often of European, mainly Greek, origin, this faction did not attempt to
strengthen Byzantium or recreate the various Balkan states. Rather it tried
to rebuild the traditional Ottoman domain.

The religious eclecticism of Bayezid I can be clearly seen in the names
of his four sons who were involved in the civil war. The oldest, Suleyman,
had an Old Testament name (Solomon) as had one of his brothers Musa (Moses).
Isa's name is the Turkish equivalent of Jesus, while Mehmed's is the turkified
form of the most favored Muslim name Muhammad.

The civil war was made possible by several circumstances. When Timur,
playing the role of a Muslim legitimist, left the Ottomans some of their
possessions, he appointed Isa emir of Bursa, and Mehmed governor of Manisa
(Magnesia ad Maenderum), a position he held under his father. In this manner
Timur created two strong Ottoman Anatolian bases in ter- ritories that
were firm in their loyalty to the Osmanli family. Furthermore, he never
came to western Anatolia himself, nor did he send his representatives to
enforce his rulings. On his death in 1405 the local princes were left to
settle the future political development of Asia Minor. Finally, the above-mentioned
factionalism made it possible for the princes to seek followers among various
groups of the population, all of whom were looking for a sultan who would
represent their interests.

Suleyman, who had managed to escape from Ankara, made his way to Edirne
where, with the help of the grand vezir, Ali Cenderli, he proclaimed himself
sultan. He was not, however, able to force his two brothers to recognize
him. When Bayezid I died in captivity, in 1403, Musa was allowed to take
his father's body home to Bursa. Having accomplished this task, he left
the city and joined Mehmed.

By this time the Cenderli family had important commercial interests
and was allied with several other families who belonged either to the highest
bureaucratic circles, to the trading community, or, like the Evrenos family
of Greek origin and the Cenderlis themselves, to both. The leader of the
janissary corps created by Murad I also made his way to Edirne. Consequently,
Suleyman's position was very strong; the military leaders, the leading
functionaries, were in his camp, and he was in the economically richest
regions of the state. Mehmed, ably advised by his former tutor and competent
general, Bayezid, relied mainly on the gazis for support, while Isa, having
no clear faction to back him, was in the weakest position.

Suleyman, in accordance with the interests he represented, concluded
alliances with the Byzantine emperor, Manuel II, and with Michael Steno,
the doge of Venice. To cement his major alliance Suleyman married Manuel's
daughter in 1403 and returned Salonika to his father-in-law. The latter
move was not well received by the gazis who were numerous in eastern Thrace.
His relations with Serbia, Wallachia, and Albania -- three states that
had taken advantage of the Ottoman troubles and had regained their independence
-- were not satisfactory either.

Suleyman was very intelligent and well educated, according to the information
that has survived, but he was also very ambitious and extremely arrogant
and overbearing. He needed the support of his father's ex-vassals to force
his brothers to acknowledge him as sultan, but his behavior turned them
against him. Later even his close collaborators tired of him, and his disregard
of the strong popular movement in his lands alienated both the Muslim and
Christian lower classes.

The struggle began when Musa, now in the service of his brother Mehmed,
attacked Isa in Bursa. Musa was victorious, and Isa took refuge with Suleyman.
The latter now used him, just as Mehmed had used Musa, and sent him back
to Anatolia to recapture Bursa. Isa failed and lost his life. In 1404 Suleyman
himself crossed into Anatolia, forced Musa to flee to Constantinople and
then to Wallachia, and advanced as far as Ankara by 1405. At this moment,
when he had Mehmed in a precarious situation, he had to return rapidly
to Europe because Musa, taking advantage of Suleyman's lack of popularity
with the Balkan princes and the Byzantine habit of backing the weakest
against the strongest, attacked his European possessions with the help
of Mircea of Wallachia, Stefan Lazarevic of Serbia, and the sons of the
last two Bulgarian rulers. After suffering an initial defeat Musa regained
the initiative in 1410 and defeated Suleyman whose bad habits had left
him without any real supporters. As Suleyman was fleeing toward Constantinople
he was killed by the discontented peasantry. Musa was now master of Europe
and refused to recognize the overlordship of Mehmed any longer. Thus, the
European and Asian halves of the erstwhile Ottoman Empire faced each other
in preparation for a final show down.

From the point of view of the European princes, Musa is certainly the
most interesting personality of the civil war. He gained his mastery of
the European half of the empire with their help, yet he began his rule
by moving against them. First, he attacked the Serbs whose "treachery"
he blamed for his first defeat by Suleyman, resumed the siege of Constantinople,
and sent raiding parties down the length of the Greek peninsula and even
westward as far as Austria. He appears to have paid little attention to
Mehmed and the gazi and to the increasingly strong bureaucratic support
his brother enjoyed, and seems to have attempted to build up a new state
structure on a wide popular basis. His military campaigns appear to have
been directed against the leaders of the Balkan states, and he alienated
the higher Turkish circles with their bureaucratic and commercial interests
by constantly favoring the lower classes. Naturally, Mehmed made valiant
efforts to gain the allegiance of the dissatisfied merchants, nobility,
and learned men, adding their support to that of the gazi. Once besieged
by Musa, Manuel II also shifted to an alliance with Mehmed and so did the
European princes.

The best indication of Musa's revolutionary approach to what he considered
to be the proper state structure was his appointment of Seyh Bedreddin
to the highest legal position in the realm. A famous alim and scholar-turned-mystic,
this man, who in 1416 was to lead a dangerous popular revolt against Mehmed
I, was not only one of the leading spokesmen for religious peace and the
union of Judaism, Christianity, and Islam into one creed, but also something
of an early socialist. He was very popular among the peasant masses, and
his close relationship with Musa brought this prince mass support. By about
1410 or 1411 Mehmed had become the leader of the Turkish factions including
those, together with their Christian and Jewish allies, who favored commercial
interests and enjoyed the backing of the various rulers in Europe. Musa
had become the leader of the "populist party," whose aim was
to establish a state based on social and religious egalitarianism. So far
as the inhabitants of the Balkans were concerned, this division meant that
the aristocratic and commercial leadership backed Mehmed, while the masses
followed Musa.

Mehmed's first attempt to defeat Musa, in 1410, was a failure. For the
next two years the brothers left each other alone. While Musa was feuding
with the Byzantine emperor and experimenting with his new approach to government,
Mehmed was occupied in Asia Minor where the emirs of Izmir (Smyrna) and
Ankara (Angora) were contesting his rule. Only after he had defeated these
dignitaries could Mehmed turn westward again, and in 1412 the final battles
began. During Musa's siege of Constantinople Mehmed moved his troops south
of his brother's position, entered Sofia, and pushed on to Nis where he
was joined by the Serbs. He then turned around and in 1413 met Musa's forces
near Sofia. Mehmed won the battle; Musa lost his life. The Ottoman Empire
was finally reunited under Sultan Mehmed I (1413-21), and the reorganization
of the state could begin. Thus, the first step towards the final consolidation
of Ottoman rule in the Balkans had taken place.

Consolidation was difficult. Mehmed still faced challenges not only
from Turkish princes in Anatolia, from Balkan rulers, and from the powerful
Hungarian state, but also from a discontented population that gladly followed
Seyh Bedreddin's call to revolt. Furthermore, he had to unite the various
factions under his own leadership. This Mehmed I and his successor, Murad
II (1421-44), were able to accomplish. They based the new system on the
state structure that Murad I had begun to develop, and while it did not
reach its final form until the days of Mehmed II (1444-46; 1451-81), these
two sultans virtually established what became the Ottoman social and state
system for the remaining centuries of the empire's existence. For this
reason the rest of this section will be devoted to a short discussion of
the various, mainly military, moves of Mehmed I and Murad II in Europe,
and the next chapter will deal with the "Ottoman system," stressing
those aspects that became crucial for our area.

When Mehmed I became the uncontested sultan of the Ottoman state in
1413, Manuel II was still ruling in Constantinople, the capable Mircea
cel Batrin was still Prince of Wallachia, and Stefan Lazarevic ruled Serbia.
Bosnia was still independent, and Albania was in the process of be- coming
a unified state. Hungary, with which the Ottomans still had no common border,
was a strong state ruled by Sigismund of Luxemburg and had Balkan ambitions
of her own, while Venice held territories all around the shores of the
Balkan Peninsula. Thus, the final outcome of the question of who would
become the master of the Balkans was by no means a foregone conclusion.

Numerous possibilities of combinations and alliances existed. Mehmed
realized how precarious the balance of power in Europe was and how unsettled
the situation in his own lands was, and he knew that the descendants of
Timur could still challenge him at any moment in Anatolia. He therefore
became a man of peace after 1413, concentrating on his domestic problems.
The only military campaigns he engaged in were forced on him. He had to
face the Byzantine-supported challenge by his brother Mustafa who reappeared,
probably from the east, after the civil war had been decided. In this war
Venice destroyed his fleet near Gallipoli in 1416, but he defeated Mustafa,
who sought refuge in Byzantium. In the peace that ensued the sultan promised
not to attack Byzantine territory in exchange for Manuel's agreement to
hold Mustafa prisoner.

Mehmed also faced the revolt of Seyh Bedreddin, centered mainly in the
Dobrudja and supported by Mircea who occupied these rich lands when the
revolt was defeated. Mehmed attacked in 1419, and the only European territorial
acquisition during his reign, Giurgiu (Yergogu), was the result of this
war. Thus, the political situation in the Balkans was much the same when
Mehmed I died, in 1421, as it had been when he reunited the empire.

The first years of Murad II's reign were difficult. The Byzantines released
his uncle Mustafa who attacked him; numerous Anatolian princes moved against
the sultan and backed his brother, whose name was also Mustafa. By 1423,
however, the young ruler had re-established order and reigned over all
the lands that were Ottoman at his father's death. While he was occupied
with revolts, the Hungarians were extending their sway into the Balkans,
and the Venetians, as allies of Byzantium, were gaining a strong foothold
in the Morea and had received the city of Salonika from the emperor. Byzantium
was really not a serious enemy, but the war with Venice continued until
1430 when the Ottomans finally reconquered Salonika.

The major menace to Murad proved to be Hungary. During the Venetian
war the Hungarians and Ottomans had agreed, in 1428, to set up a buffer
state and jointly recognize Djordje (George) Brankovic as a legitimate
and independent ruler of Serbia. Obviously, this was a temporary measure.
When the Venetian war ended, Murad returned to the policy of Murad I and
Bayezid 1, that of including all lands south of the Danube-Sava line into
his state. Hungarian influence in Bosnia, Serbia, and Wallachia had to
be eliminated; if this was not-possible, at least the land already in Ottoman
hands had to be fully secured. Therefore, Venice had to be pushed out of
its remaining Balkan strongholds. Murad constantly tried to expand his
rule by raids into the Balkan states and did gain some permanent acquisitions
in Greece proper, the Morea, and southern Albania. The various princelings
turned to Hungary for protection. After 1432 Murad concentrated his energies
on Hungary, conducting raids into Transylvania in that year and continuing
to harass that country and its allies whenever he could. He intensified
his efforts when Sigismund died in 1437 and attacked Transylvania again.
In 1439 he occupied Serbia and made it an Ottoman province. The next year
he attacked Belgrade (Beograd, Nandorfehervar), Hungary's main border fortress
at the time, but was not successful.

After the attack on Belgrade Murad was forced to return to Asia Minor
to deal with an attack by the Karaman principality. The Hungarians, led
by their most famous general Janos (John) Hunyadi, took advantage of the
situation and attacked the Ottoman forces remaining in Europe. In 1441
and 1442 they penetrated deep into the Balkans, forcing Murad to come to
an agreement. The Treaty of Edirne, in 1444, which was extended by the
Treaty of Szeged during the same year, re-established Serbia as a buffer
state. The Hungarians agreed to leave Bulgarian lands unmolested and not
to cross the Danube. Having made peace with the Karamanids during the same
year, Murad abdicated, believing that his realm was secure.

Murad's twelve-year-old son, Mehmed II, ascended to the throne, and
a power struggle ensued between the grand vezir, Halil Cenederli, the tutor
of the new ruler, Zaganos, and the beylerbeyi of the European provinces,
ihabeddln. Taking advantage of this situation, a Hungarian-Wallachian army
encouraged by the Pope and the Byzantines, and supported by various Balkan
princes, of whom the Albanian Scanderbeg (George Kastriote) was the most
remarkable, crossed the Danube and marched through Bulgaria toward Edirne.
At the critical moment this city was destroyed by a great fire. The Venetian
fleet joined the new crusade and closed the Dardanelles, making it impossible
to transfer Ottoman troops from Asia Minor to Europe. Murad II came out
of retirement to take command of the Ottoman armies and won a great victory
at Varna on November 10, 1444. Varna sealed the fate of the Balkans and
Constantinople. At this juncture the squabble of the three dignataries
began to center around the question of how to handle the imperial city.
The grand vezir was opposed to attacking it, the other two argued in favor
of this move. In 1446 the grand vezir, backed by the janissaries, staged
a coup d'etat and forced Murad to reascend the throne and rule for another
five years. The old sultan resumed his former policies and extended Ottoman
realm in the Morea, campaigned against Scanderbeg in Albania, and reasserted
his rule in Serbia. The success of his policies was assured when he defeated
Hunyadi in the second battle at Kosovo in 1448.

Murad's rule represents a watershed in the history of the Ottoman Empire.
Brockelmann states that "in many respects Murad's reign meant the
end of the ancient culture of the Osmanlis." Inalcik points out that
while Murad had intended to fallow his father's policies when he came to
the throne, he soon realized that changes were needed, and cites the introduction
of new armaments as an example of the reforms introduced by this ruler.
Both assertions are correct and indicate the reorganization, finished only
during the second reign of Mehmed II and of equal importance to every inhabitant
of the empire, was well advanced when Murad died in 1451.

What emerged was the Ottoman synthesis of various Turkish, Muslim, Byzantine,
and even western elements into a remarkably well-integrated state structure.

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1. How does Sugar explain Ottoman success in creating the empire in
the 14th century?
2. Do Sugar and Adshead agree on the significance of Timur in Asia
Minor and the Middle East?
3. What steps did the Ottoman leadership take to recover from the Timur/Mongol
disaster?