Hawk Engagement: A Dangerous Turn in
US Plans for North Koreaby Gregory Elich
www.dissidentvoice.org
December 6, 2004

The
recent appointment of Victor Cha as Asia Director in the National Security
Council portends a more aggressive approach towards North Korea during
President Bush’s second term. Long an advisor to the Administration, as
Asia Director, Cha will hold responsibility for developing U.S. policy
towards North Korea, and it will be he who maps out the approach to the
Democratic Republic of Korea (DPRK – North Korea) in the coming months.

Selig Harrison,
Director of the Asia Program at the Center for International Policy, visited
the DPRK in the spring of 2004, where he met with high-ranking officials.
Harrison “found the North Korean leadership extremely eager to find a way to
conclude a nuclear deal with the United States. They need such a deal
urgently because North Korea embarked on significant economic reforms in the
middle of 2002, and these have intensified the economic pressures that
confront its leadership.” Consequently, they want to improve relations with
the United States. Harrison said that although the North Korean leadership
is “very eager for settlement,” they are “not prepared to do it in the way
the Bush Administration is asking them to do it. The North Koreans say that
Washington wants them to, in effect, simply roll over and disarm
unilaterally.” Harrison felt that the Bush Administration has “a very rigid
position,” and is “not prepared to trade anything.” That approach, he
added, “risks a war. The point is, the Administration’s objective is really
regime change in Pyongyang.”

This policy was
epitomized in Victor Cha, who Harrison described as “kind of the ideologue
of the Bush Administration” on the subject of Korean affairs – and this even
before his appointment to the NSC. Cha’s book on North Korea, Harrison
said, “lays it all out: the purpose of negotiating with North Korea is not
to settle anything,” because in Cha’s eyes it presents a threat to South
Korean and American interests. “You have these multilateral negotiations in
Beijing simply to show to the other parties in the region – China, South
Korea, Russia and Japan – that it is not possible to make any deals with
North Korea. He says the purpose of the negotiations is to mobilize a
‘coalition for punishment’.” The goal of talks, therefore, is not conflict
resolution but to build a multinational coalition backing sanctions or
military action. Cha has argued that “engagement is the best practical way
to build a coalition for punishment tomorrow. A necessary precondition for
the U.S. coercing North Korea is the formation of a regional consensus that
efforts to resolve the problem in a non-confrontational manner have been
exhausted. Without this consensus, implementing any form of coercion that
actually puts pressure on the regime is unworkable.” The policy Cha terms
“hawk engagement,” is only a means to an end. For Cha, “engagement does not
operate without an exit strategy, engagement is the exit strategy.”

President Bush came
very close to actually launching an attack on North Korea in the spring of
2003. In March the U.S. moved a fleet of ships to the region, including the
aircraft carrier USS Carl Vinson with its 75 aircraft. In preparation for
the attack, 6 F-117 Stealth bombers were sent to South Korea and 25 F-15
Fighters and 24 B-1 and B-52 bombers were stationed in Guam. Plans to
conduct air strikes were in place, Bush admitted to South Korean Foreign
Affairs and Trade Minister Pan Ki-Mun one year later. The danger of war was
averted during the U.S.-South Korean summit in Washington in May 2003, when
South Korean officials strenuously objected to the plan. As in 1994, the
American public never knew just how close the U.S. came to war on the Korean
Peninsula in 2003. South Korean opposition to military action only
strengthened the Bush Administration’s conviction that it would be necessary
to demonstrate the futility of negotiations before it could win the support
of regional allies. It felt it could best accomplish that goal by
presenting an image of negotiating without actually doing so.

In each of the first
two six-party talks with North Korea, James Kelly, head of the U.S.
delegation, was instructed not to negotiate. As a result, the meetings
were little more than an exercise in futility. Russian, Chinese, South
Korean and Japanese diplomats expressed their displeasure with Washington’s
stubborn refusal to engage in real negotiations. China’s deputy foreign
minister, Zhou Wenzhong, appealed to the U.S. to stop using its accusation
of a North Korean uranium enrichment weapons program as an excuse for
obstructing negotiations. “We know nothing about the uranium program,” Zhou
said. “We don’t know whether it exists. So far the U.S. has not presented
convincing evidence of this program.” Zhou pointed out that if such a
program did exist, then it should be included in any agreement, but that the
U.S. should stop making accusations unless it could offer conclusive
proof.

The North Korean
position, as articulated by its foreign minister, Paek Nam-Sun, was that if
the United States would produce evidence, then the DPRK “would certainly
show” suspected sites, “as was the case with the Kumchangni incident.” The
reference was to an occasion in 1999 when the U.S. claimed to have solid
evidence that a nuclear weapon facility was operating in a cave located at
Kumchangni, and charged the DPRK with violating its treaty obligations.
The U.S. pressured North Korea into allowing inspectors into the area, only
to find nothing more than an empty cave.

Examples such as this,
as well as the deliberate lies about Iraqi weapons programs used to justify
invasion tended to leave third parties skeptical of overheated accusations
and claims of evidence which are never produced. One Asian diplomat,
requesting anonymity, said what was on the minds of many. “We think the
U.S. claims are a little exaggerated, not as much as with Iraq, but still we
have to be careful of what the U.S. says.” Cognizant of the perception that
it was as an obstacle to progress, the Bush Administration decided that it
should present a plan. Administration officials admitted privately that
the chaos in Iraq had changed the dynamics of the nuclear dispute with North
Korea and that it was necessary to be seen by its allies as submitting a
serious offer, even one that included conditions they knew the DPRK would
refuse. One U.S. official admitted, “They may say no – and in that case
they will have failed the test,” confirming that the Administration viewed
the process as a means of convincing its allies that talks were useless and
that more hostile measures would eventually be necessary.

At the last round of
talks, in June 2004, the U.S. delegation refrained from using the phrase
“complete, verifiable and irreversible,” which the North Koreans had begun
to find increasingly offensive. Instead lead negotiator James Kelly
proposed a new two-stage plan, in which the DPRK would first commit to
dismantle all nuclear programs, whether peaceful or related to weapons
production. This also would include the highly enriched uranium program
that the U.S. was still insisting was real, but which the North Koreans
always denied existed. In this first stage, North Korea would be given three
months to “provide a complete listing of all its nuclear activities and
cease operation of all of its nuclear activities; permit the securing of all
fissile material and the monitoring of all fuel rods, and; permit the
publicly disclosed and observable disablement of all nuclear weapons/weapons
components and key centrifuge parts.”

All of these actions
would take place under “international,” by which was meant U.S., supervision
and verification. In exchange, other nations, but not the U.S., would
resume shipments of heavy fuel oil to North Korea. Provisional
multilateral security assurances by the U.S. and the other parties would be
offered, stating that the five nations harbored “no intention to invade or
attack” the DPRK. As a provisional statement of intent, it could be
withdrawn at any time prior to the total dismantlement of all nuclear
programs. Furthermore, officials of the Bush Administration indicated, a
security guarantee would not mean committing never to seek regime change.
Nations other than the U.S. would “begin a study to determine the energy
requirements of the DPRK and how to meet them by non-nuclear energy
programs.” They would also “begin a discussion of steps necessary to lift
remaining economic sanctions on the DPRK, and the steps necessary for
removal of the DPRK from the List of State Sponsors of Terrorism.” This
discussion would focus on a series of further demands on North Korea, such
as a reduction in its conventional military forces and an end to missile
development. Although Western news reports on the plan claimed that the
U.S. would be involved in those discussions, James Kelly himself
specifically ruled that out. Speaking before the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee, Kelly emphasized that “as the DPRK carried out its commitments,
the other parties”- meaning South Korea, China, Russia and possibly Japan -
would implement the “corresponding steps.” It is probable, however, that
behind the scenes the U.S. would direct how its allies approached the
dialogue. The only U.S. commitment would be its inclusion in the five-party
provisional security guarantee.

What is most striking
about the first phase of the plan is that the U.S. would essentially
undertake no meaningful obligations. Meanwhile, the DPRK would be compelled
to identify and stop all of its nuclear operations, and permit U.S.
personnel to take control of every element of its programs. Were the plan
to collapse at mid-point, North Korea’s nuclear material would have been
secured and the Pentagon would have the bombing coordinates for every
facility related to nuclear research and development. Presumably during the
three-month preparatory phase, U.S. monitors would also be busily engaged in
marking additional targets while guests of the DPRK.

Failure by North Korea
to provide a list of facilities engaged in uranium enrichment would cancel
the agreement, thereby triggering the automatic withdrawal of the
provisional security guarantee. Given that there is no evidence that such a
program ever existed, it may be concluded that the plan was intended to
fail, but only after obtaining a wealth of intelligence data on North
Korea. In return for handing over control of nuclear material to the U.S.
and the coordinates of its operations to Pentagon planners, the DPRK would
receive nothing substantive in return other than temporary shipments of
heavy fuel oil from other nations. Aside from that solitary concrete
commitment, there was only the promise to “begin a study,” and the
expectation of “discussions” about additional concessions the DPRK would
have to make before yet more discussions could take place.

In the second and
final step of the American plan, North Korea would proceed to dismantle
every element of its nuclear programs, and the multilateral security
guarantee would be made permanent once that process was complete. The U.S.
plan was little more than a more detailed rehash of previous demands, as
Kelly affirmed one month later before the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee: “First, we seek the complete, verifiable and irreversible
dismantlement of the DPRK’s nuclear programs – nothing less.” The plan,
admitted a high-ranking official in the Bush Administration, was only a
“repackaging and elaboration of things we have said before.” It was said
that the plan had been developed in response to South Korean and Japanese
concerns, and represented an exercise in “alliance management.”

U.S. negotiators
behaved as if there was nothing amiss in their demand for North Korea to
abandon plans for the peaceful development of nuclear energy. Russian
Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov was critical of that approach, and felt it
necessary to point out the obvious. “We consider that the DPRK, as any
sovereign state, has a full right – in accordance with international law –
to develop peaceful nuclear power. Toward this end, of course, it is
necessary that the DPRK return to the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of
Nuclear Weapons and fully restore its participation in the IAEA, including
the signing of an additional protocol on inspections.” The head of the
Russian delegation at the six-party talks, Aleksandar Alekseyev, expressed
similar sentiments. “No one has the right to ban peaceful nuclear
programs. This goes against international law.” The Russians were, in fact,
correct. According to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons, “peaceful applications of nuclear technology…should be available
for peaceful purposes to all Parties of the Treaty, whether nuclear-weapon
or non-nuclear weapon States.”

Plans called for the
six parties to meet again in late September, but hopes quickly faded as
relations between the U.S. and DPRK continued to sour. The primary trigger
that set off the chain of events leading to the dissolution of the talks was
a statement by James Kelly before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on
July 15. “Of course, to achieve full integration into the region and a
wholly transformed relationship with the United States, North Korea must
take other steps in addition to making the strategic decision to give up its
nuclear ambitions. It also needs to change its behavior on human rights,
address the issues underlying its appearance on the U.S. list of states
sponsoring terrorism, eliminate its illegal weapons of mass destruction
programs, put an end to the proliferation of missiles and missile-related
technology, and adopt a less provocative conventional force disposition.”
Responding to questions from senators, Kelly emphasized, “We’ve made clear
that normalization of our relations would have to follow these other
important issues.” Here was a clear signal that even an agreement and full
implementation on denuclearization would not bring about a normalization of
relations between the two countries. The North Koreans were dismayed at
the prospect that they were expected to bargain away all of their chips only
to be faced with a series of further demands and the maintenance of hostile
relations. What the DPRK sought above all else was a normalization of
relations between the two nations, and Kelly’s statement was taken as an
indication of a lack of good will.

The highly lauded U.S.
plan, then, was little more than a ruse. It was never meant to lead to a
genuine negotiated settlement of differences with the DPRK. Any future
talks appear destined for failure, given the Bush Administration’s “hawk
engagement” approach, in which negotiations are intended to fail in order to
build support for coercive and violent measures. The DPRK has recently
indicated its willingness to resume negotiations, but says that it wants
coexistence and asks the U.S. to drop its hostile approach so that
meaningful dialogue may take place. The direction of events take on the
Korean Peninsula will depend in large measure on the ability of the other
parties to the talks – Russia, China, Japan and above all South Korea – to
rein in the worst excesses of the Bush Administration without antagonizing
it to the point where it decides to take unilateral military action against
North Korea. Perhaps the best that can be hoped for is continued stalemate
throughout President Bush’s second term, but the appointments of Condoleezza
Rice as Secretary of State and Victor Cha as Asia Director in the NSC warn
of darker possibilities.

Gregory Elich is nearing completion of his book, Strange
Liberators: Militarism, Mayhem and the Pursuit of Profit.