Demokratie https://www.boell.de/en/rss.xml/6566
enZimbabwe’s 2018 Elections: Charismatic Appeals vs. Performance Legitimacyhttps://www.boell.de/en/2018/07/26/zimbabwes-2018-elections-charismatic-appeals-vs-performance-legitimacy
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<h2><strong>Behold the New</strong></h2>
<p>On July 30, 2018, Zimbabwe will have its first post-Mugabe harmonised election, where 23 candidates from 22 political parties will engage in mortal political combat for the country's presidency. Over 1648 candidates from at least 55 political parties (about 220 are independent candidates) will compete for 210 National Assembly seats, while 7564 candidates will run to fill 1964 places in 89 local authorities.<a href="https://za.boell.org/2018/07/25/zimbabwes-2018-elections-charismatic-appeals-vs-performance-legitimacy#_edn1" id="_ednref1" name="_ednref1" title="">[i]</a> Besides not featuring Robert Mugabe and his late nemesis Morgan Tsvangirai in the presidential race, the election features the highest number of presidential hopefuls in Zimbabwe’s electoral history and offers an entirely new slate of contenders, as none of them has contested in a presidential election before.</p>
<p>The two leading contenders are President Emmerson Mnangagwa of the ruling Zanu-PF and Advocate Nelson Chamisa of the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC)-Alliance. For the presidential race, Afrobarometer suggests a statistical dead heat, with 40 percent (down from 43 percent in May 2018) of polled voters saying they would vote for Mnangagwa, and 37 percent (up from 31 percent in May 2018) saying they would vote for Chamisa. 21 percent of those surveyed either refused to share their voting intentions or were undecided.<a href="https://za.boell.org/2018/07/25/zimbabwes-2018-elections-charismatic-appeals-vs-performance-legitimacy#_edn2" id="_ednref2" name="_ednref2" title="">[ii]</a> This article provides an overview of how the two leading contenders for the Presidency have gone about winning the hearts and minds of Zimbabweans in the 2018 electoral race.</p>
<h2><strong>The Candidates: Chamisa the Cobra vs. Mnangagwa the Crocodile</strong></h2>
<p>Mnangagwa and Chamisa come from different political stocks, traditions, and generations. Mnangagwa, nicknamed Ngwena (the Crocodile), is a 77-year-old veteran of the liberation war, whose political tradition is steeped in the security sector. Mnangagwa is a shrewd operator, who despite limited charisma has bent the Zanu-PF and Zimbabwean political steel to his will. His survival in Zanu-PF has often been through outmaneuvering opponents strategically, and, as November 2017 showed, forcefully, rather than democratically or through popular politics.<a href="https://za.boell.org/2018/07/25/zimbabwes-2018-elections-charismatic-appeals-vs-performance-legitimacy#_edn3" id="_ednref3" name="_ednref3" title="">[iii]</a> Chamisa, nicknamed Nero (or Cobra), is a charismatic 40-year-old former student and youth leader, who is a trained marketer, evangelist, political scientist, and lawyer. He is given to popular and populist politics, and has consistently run and won elections at multiple levels since the late 90's, bar a loss in the race to be Secretary General of the MDC in 2014. Mnangagwa and Chamisa both see opportunities to increase their political stock in this election.</p>
<h2><strong>Basic Campaign Platforms: Chamisa’s SMART vs. Mnangagwa’s People’s Manifesto</strong></h2>
<p>For Mnangagwa's Zanu-PF, the election is an opportunity to legitimise the November 2017 coup.<a href="https://za.boell.org/2018/07/25/zimbabwes-2018-elections-charismatic-appeals-vs-performance-legitimacy#_edn4" id="_ednref4" name="_ednref4" title="">[iv]</a> In this effort, Zanu-PF has been faced with the onerous propaganda task of paradoxically arguing for the preservation of the old (legacy), while also arguing that it has and is facilitating change (new dispensation), although presided over by the old who fought in the liberation struggle. Zanu-PF’s Manifesto is summed up in its tagline, “Unite, Fight corruption, Develop, Re-Engage, Create Jobs”. The Zanu-PF strategy seems to have been to eat their cake and have it, through trying to limit Mnangagwa’s record to the eight months he has been president, rather than the 38 years he has been in government. This approach has proved onerous, as part of Mnangagwa's appeal is experience, yet the bulk of that experience has been as Mugabe's right-hand man.</p>
<p>For Nelson Chamisa’s MDC-Alliance, the elections present the best opportunity in their 20-year history to facilitate regime change. This is on account of their unprecedented ability to campaign in previously “no go” rural areas; the presence of international observers previously banned by Mugabe, and a deformed Zanu-PF, weaker than it was in 2013 on account of factional fights. Also, there is a perception that Zanu-PF’s control over the security sector beyond the army is limited, leading to perceptions of Zanu-PF’s inability to master the cohesion to facilitate the kind of grand electoral theft that it has been accused of perpetrating in the past. The young voting population has buoyed Chamisa's candidature, and his relative youth has spurred him on.</p>
<p>Chamisa’s central value proposition is to unsettle the old gerontocratic political order, which he alleges Zanu-PF represents, through ushering in a generational transition. His campaign’s tagline from the MDC-Alliance’s Sustainable and Modernization Agenda for Real Transformation (SMART) Pledge, is <strong>“</strong>Behold the new: Change that delivers." However, like Zanu-PF, contradictions also abound, amidst allegations that although young, Chamisa's rhetoric and positioning on some social issues are as conservative as those of the old order, if not worse, especially as it relates to women, gender, and gender roles.</p>
<h2><strong>The Political Machineries: Talented Improvisation vs. Command and Control</strong></h2>
<p>Chamisa is aided by his magnetism, charisma, and exceptional oratory skills. His appeals to the electorate have been both charismatic and programmatic on account of the pillars of his SMART campaign platform. At the beginning of his campaign, Chamisa inherited a broke party, which was deeply divided, had lost the support of international partners and the former white farmers, and was barely in touch with its civil society and labour roots. But Chamisa has mitigated these institutional deficiencies through leveraging the MDC’s mobilising power, and the strategic experience of some of Tsvangirai’s old lieutenants. He has also been able to build a competent voluntary campaign team supported by a sleuth of strategic technical operators from across generations of former student leaders. In the wake of limited resources, Chamisa has appealed for individual donations from supporters through mobile money, and his party’s campaign has primarily hinged on low cost canvassing through door-to-door campaigns, and very few media ad buys. This talented improvisation has done well for Chamisa in the campaign, but questions remain on whether the powerful MDC-Alliance mobilisation machine can turn out the vote for Chamisa on Election Day.</p>
<p>Mnangagwa presides over a formidable institution in Zanu-PF, whose conflation with the state has readily presented him with a solid political machine that has in the past churned out victories for his predecessor, often at his command. Post the 2017 coup, Mnangagwa brought back, into the Zanu-PF commissariat, the team of soldiers and spies that presided over the Zanu-PF 2013 campaign. On assuming the Zanu-PF mantle, perceptions were rife that Mnangagwa was a weak candidate. Because of perceptions of Mnangagwa’s "dullness" the Zanu-PF political machine has been in propaganda overdrive building up their candidate and making him shine through contrived campaign images of an affable, smiling Mnangagwa and short clips of choreographed small vocal doses. Resultantly, Mnangagwa has turned out to be a candidate who shines more on account of, not what he says or does, but what others say about him, and do on his behalf. His lack of charisma has led at some points during the campaign trail to large crowds and supporters, which the machine turned out to his rallies, leaving before and during his long addresses.<a href="https://za.boell.org/2018/07/25/zimbabwes-2018-elections-charismatic-appeals-vs-performance-legitimacy#_edn5" id="_ednref5" name="_ednref5" title="">[v]</a> Lacking charisma, Mnangagwa's appeals have thus been mainly programmatic, centred on trying to appeal through performance legitimacy.</p>
<p>Mnangagwa has mitigated his own shortcomings through ensuring that Zanu-PF rallies are entertainment filled with some of the best artists in the country performing, while also leaning heavily on his deputy General Constantine Chiwenga, who despite his poor English pronunciation, has proved to be quite an eloquent and engaging campaigner when he resorts to addressing multitudes in his native Shona. Zanu-PF campaigners have also attempted to present being “boring” as being serious and presidential, comparing it to Chamisa’s “entertaining” but hyperbolic and “unrealistic” pronouncements.</p>
<p>Despite the preceding, Mnangagwa has hedged his electoral success not on rallies, but on the organisation and mobilisation of the Zanu-PF faithful as a function of the Zanu-PF political machine. As a result, Zanu-PF, the institution, is also the primary campaign strategy, centred on the activation of its elaborate cell structures that will be mobilised to turn out on Election Day.<a href="https://za.boell.org/2018/07/25/zimbabwes-2018-elections-charismatic-appeals-vs-performance-legitimacy#_edn6" id="_ednref6" name="_ednref6" title="">[vi]</a> However, part of Mnangagwa's challenge is that the Zanu-PF structures may not be as easily given to command and loyalty as they were in 2013. Already there are murmurings of a rogue campaign within the structures for people to vote according to their interests and conscience.<a href="https://za.boell.org/2018/07/25/zimbabwes-2018-elections-charismatic-appeals-vs-performance-legitimacy#_edn7" id="_ednref7" name="_ednref7" title="">[vii]</a></p>
<h2><strong>Campaign Strategy: “Touch Me, See Me, Feel Me” vs. ”Watch Me Do the Job”</strong></h2>
<p>Social media is one of the main deviations in the 2018 elections, from traditional campaigning in Zimbabwe. For good and bad reasons, Chamisa was trending on social media, and set the agenda and discourse in ways that the opposition has in the past failed to do. But as the Afrobarometer report from July 2017 shows, the hype must not be believed, at least not as a generalisation. The survey shows that for rural Zimbabwe, government radio remains the media of the people with word of mouth and meetings as the other primary sources of intel on the elections. For urban Zimbabwe it is government television and radio, word of mouth, social media, and newspapers. These sources are instructive in as far as they tell us whether the two primary gladiators have been attempting to win hearts and minds through the appropriate means. It is good then, that both Chamisa and Mnangagwa, while taking to Twitter and Facebook, have also traversed the length and breadth of Zimbabwe doing rallies and meetings.</p>
<p>Chamisa has been running a "touch me, see me, feel me" campaign where the objective is to meet as many people as is possible. His target has primarily been rural Zimbabwe, formerly thought to be Zanu-PF strongholds. Given his limited access to government television and radio, this strategy has been inspired. It will no doubt help to increase Chamisa’s tally in these areas, but the usual approach is to forget about one's opponents strongholds and focus on areas that one's party can win, that is battleground constituencies and one's marginal strongholds. As such while the target to increase presidential votes may be met, it is possible that the strategy may cost the MDC-Alliance parliamentary seats in the neglected battleground and marginal opposition constituencies, especially in the cities. So while Chamisa has been fighting hard in Zanu country, his perceived base in urban areas and the youth have hardly been directly appealed to by his campaign, leaving them open to Mnangagwa and his attacks on the MDC’s record in local government. Mnangagwa’s charge into previously perceived opposition spaces will not get him the majority of votes but because in reality post the 2013 elections the cities ceased to be MDC strongholds becoming battlegrounds, they are ripe for Zanu-PF capture at least at parliamentary level.</p>
<p>Mnangagwa has spared no expense in the 2018 election campaign, with a typical spend rate of about USD 200 million per month since April 2018.<a href="https://za.boell.org/2018/07/25/zimbabwes-2018-elections-charismatic-appeals-vs-performance-legitimacy#_edn8" id="_ednref8" name="_ednref8" title="">[viii]</a> Zanu-PF has splashed billboards across the country, monopolised the airwaves on both public and pseudo-private<a href="https://za.boell.org/2018/07/25/zimbabwes-2018-elections-charismatic-appeals-vs-performance-legitimacy#_edn9" id="_ednref9" name="_ednref9" title="">[ix]</a> platforms <a href="https://za.boell.org/2018/07/25/zimbabwes-2018-elections-charismatic-appeals-vs-performance-legitimacy#_edn10" id="_ednref10" name="_ednref10" title="">[x]</a> as well as print and new media through sponsored outreaches. Resultantly, Mnangagwa has been able to send his carefully curated image to millions of households every day through radio and TV, and has invaded millions of Facebook and Twitter timelines through an army of new media hacks, called Varakashi, reported to be well-financed and powered by hundreds of government-owned TelOne cell phone lines and data bundles. Mnangagwa has taken comfort in incumbency and made fewer rally type campaign stops than Chamisa. This is due in part to the reality, that since inauguration as president, Mnangagwa has been running a “permanent campaign”. He has successfully conflated the business of government with his election efforts. As such, every bank, mine, business openings, groundbreaking ceremonies, deals signed, and visits made as state president, have all fed into a governing performance narrative used to evidence his capacity to voters.</p>
<p>In short, while Chamisa has been campaigning for the presidency, Mnangagwa has focused more on doing the job of president, banking more on performance legitimacy than on performance politics ala Chamisa. This has left Chamisa and the MDC-Alliance to run against Mnangagwa’s 8-month in office, having failed to launch a meaningful attack on his 38-year long record in government. In effect, what Mnangagwa has successfully done is to remain fairly detached from the rat race to replace him, forcing Chamisa and the opposition to run against themselves through fighting each other and for Chamisa, his own guffs and gaffes, hyperbole and salty jokes.</p>
<h2><strong>Too Close to Call</strong></h2>
<p>As 30 July approaches, Chamisa has the momentum, but Mnangagwa continues to have the upper hand on account of incumbency, a reliable political machine, as well as a wide berth of opposition political forces keener on fighting each other than they are to fight him. Before his assent, Mnangagwa's history and association with the Gukurahundi atrocities, limited charisma, and 37 years as Mugabe's henchman, made him a very uninteresting political prospect that many thought was unelectable. However, with elections beckoning, he has been spared the scrutiny of his record and character that could have been his demise. His "Varakashi" on the other hand, have done enough to make some sections of the electorate doubt the uprightness of Chamisa’s character, his maturity, ability and readiness to lead. The presidential race remains a David versus Goliath Affair. If Chamisa is able to turn the multitudes from his rallies into votes on Election Day, he may yet cause an upset against this Goliath of an opponent who has been in politics for longer than Chamisa has been alive.</p>
<div> <br /><div id="edn1">
<p><a href="https://za.boell.org/2018/07/25/zimbabwes-2018-elections-charismatic-appeals-vs-performance-legitimacy#_ednref1" id="_edn1" name="_edn1" title="">[i]</a> Zimbabwe's parliament is a bicameral. National Assembly has 270 seats, of which 210 are directly contested using the first past the post system in single-member districts, while 60 seats are reserved for women through proportional representation using a party list system of 6 per province. The second chamber, Senate, is an 80-member senate where 60 seats are filled through direct elections (6 per province) while the Chiefs Council fills 16, two representatives of the disabled plus the Senate President and a deputy.</p>
</div>
<div id="edn2">
<p><a href="https://za.boell.org/2018/07/25/zimbabwes-2018-elections-charismatic-appeals-vs-performance-legitimacy#_ednref2" id="_edn2" name="_edn2" title="">[ii]</a> see <a href="http://www.afrobarometer.org/countries/zimbabwe-0">http://www.afrobarometer.org/countries/zimbabwe-0</a></p>
</div>
<div id="edn3">
<p><a href="https://za.boell.org/2018/07/25/zimbabwes-2018-elections-charismatic-appeals-vs-performance-legitimacy#_ednref3" id="_edn3" name="_edn3" title="">[iii]</a> See <u>ZIMBABWE AND Zanu PF’S CONTINUING HEGEMONY: Meet The New Boss, Same As The Old </u><a href="http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/africaatlse/2017/12/13/zimbabwe-and-Zanu-pfs-continuing-hegemony-meet-the-new-boss-same-as-the-old-boss/">http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/africaatlse/2017/12/13/zimbabwe-and-Zanu-pfs-continuing-hegemony-meet-the-new-boss-same-as-the-old-boss/</a></p>
</div>
<div id="edn4">
<p><a href="https://za.boell.org/2018/07/25/zimbabwes-2018-elections-charismatic-appeals-vs-performance-legitimacy#_ednref4" id="_edn4" name="_edn4" title="">[iv]</a> On the coup see <a href="https://www.boell.de/en/2017/11/15/military-takeover-zimbabwe-politics-country-will-not-be-same">https://www.boell.de/en/2017/11/15/military-takeover-zimbabwe-politics-country-will-not-be-same</a></p>
</div>
<div id="edn5">
<p><a href="https://za.boell.org/2018/07/25/zimbabwes-2018-elections-charismatic-appeals-vs-performance-legitimacy#_ednref5" id="_edn5" name="_edn5" title="">[v]</a> See for instance Zanu-PF supporters walk out on Mnangagwa at <a href="https://www.newsday.co.zw/2018/07/zanu-pf-supporters-walk-out-on-mnangagwa/">https://www.newsday.co.zw/2018/07/Zanu-pf-supporters-walk-out-on-mnangagwa/</a></p>
</div>
<div id="edn6">
<p><a href="https://za.boell.org/2018/07/25/zimbabwes-2018-elections-charismatic-appeals-vs-performance-legitimacy#_ednref6" id="_edn6" name="_edn6" title="">[vi]</a> The strategy has been called the Dandemutande ( spiderweb) for more See Zanu-PF using spider web campaign strategy- Rugeje at <a href="https://www.herald.co.zw/zanu-pf-using-spider-web-campaign-strategy-rugeje/">https://www.herald.co.zw/Zanu-pf-using-spider-web-campaign-strategy-rugeje/</a></p>
</div>
<div id="edn7">
<p><a href="https://za.boell.org/2018/07/25/zimbabwes-2018-elections-charismatic-appeals-vs-performance-legitimacy#_ednref7" id="_edn7" name="_edn7" title="">[vii]</a> See Chiwenga Speaks on bhora musango at <a href="https://www.dailynews.co.zw/articles/2018/05/30/chiwenga-speaks-on-bhora-musango">https://www.dailynews.co.zw/articles/2018/05/30/chiwenga-speaks-on-bhora-musango</a></p>
</div>
<div id="edn8">
<p><a href="https://za.boell.org/2018/07/25/zimbabwes-2018-elections-charismatic-appeals-vs-performance-legitimacy#_ednref8" id="_edn8" name="_edn8" title="">[viii]</a> <a href="https://www.theindependent.co.zw/2018/05/04/Zanu-pf-launches-200m-campaign/">https://www.theindependent.co.zw/2018/05/04/Zanu-pf-launches-200m-campaign/</a></p>
</div>
<div id="edn9">
<p><a href="https://za.boell.org/2018/07/25/zimbabwes-2018-elections-charismatic-appeals-vs-performance-legitimacy#_ednref9" id="_edn9" name="_edn9" title="">[ix]</a>. Members of Zanu-PF or people associated with them primarily own most of the privately owned radio stations.</p>
</div>
<div id="edn10">
<p><a href="https://za.boell.org/2018/07/25/zimbabwes-2018-elections-charismatic-appeals-vs-performance-legitimacy#_ednref10" id="_edn10" name="_edn10" title="">[x]</a> See Media Monitors Zimbabwe’s media tracking of campaign and election reporting through their daily reports at <a href="http://www.mediamonitors.org.zw/daily-election-report-issue-27/">http://www.mediamonitors.org.zw/daily-election-report-issue-27/</a></p>
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Thu, 26 Jul 2018 14:46:34 +0200McDonald Lewanika298085Zimbabwe's 2018 Elections: The Changing Footprints of Traditional Leadershttps://www.boell.de/en/2018/07/26/zimbabwes-2018-elections-changing-footprints-traditional-leaders
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<p>Corporation (ZBC) stations even broadcasting the manifesto launch of the main opposition party, the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) Alliance, while police have allowed most civil society organisations to carry out their election related work. All interested observers have been given the green light to observe the electoral process. The period has also witnessed changing roles for previously powerful groups within the ruling Zanu-PF campaign machinery like the war veterans, securocrats, and traditional leaders. This article traces the changing role of traditional leaders in Zanu-PF’s electoral playbook.</p>
<h2><strong>The Legal and Constitutional Landscape </strong></h2>
<p>The proximity of traditional leaders to ruling elites has always been fluid both in pre- and post-colonial Zimbabwe. Prior to independence chiefs were made into “decentralised despots” used to enforce the will of the colonisers on black Zimbabweans. Numerous laws such as the 1898 Southern Rhodesia Order in Council, the African Affairs Act of 1957, the Tribal Trust Land Act of 1967 and the African Law and Regional Courts Act of 1969 were introduced to cement their powers. Post-independence, Robert Mugabe’s new government first resented traditional leaders, and largely ignored them as an anachronistic vestige of colonialism that had no place in the new administration. It relegated traditional leaders to peripheral zones of governance, condemning them to play customary and cultural custodial roles through the Chiefs and Headman Act of 1982. Only after the formation of the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) in 1999 and the surge of its support in urban Zimbabwe and promising inroads into rural areas, did government remember the importance of chiefs, putting in place a number of laws to enhance their influence. The Traditional Leaders Act of 1998 was used to restore the legislative powers of the traditional leaders.</p>
<p>The penning and ratification of a new Zimbabwean Constitution in 2013 marked another turning point. During drafting, the ruling party wanted to furnish traditional leaders with more powers, while the opposition sought to curb their influence. The compromise became Chapter 15 of the Zimbabwean constitution, which details the roles of traditional leaders. While it recognises the role of the institution of traditional leadership alongside modern state structures, it also sets out standards that all traditional leaders must follow. Section 281 (2) of the Constitution of Zimbabwe outlines some of the acceptable and unacceptable conduct of traditional leaders, stating that they must not be members of any political party or in any way participate in partisan politics, act in a partisan manner, further interests of any political party or violate the fundamental rights and freedoms of any person.</p>
<p>In the spirit of these constitutional provisions on traditional leadership, Masvingo High Court judge, Garainesu Mawadze in 2015 made a ruling prohibiting traditional leaders from making political statements and declaring allegiance to any political party.</p>
<h2><strong>Politicisation of Traditional Leaders</strong></h2>
<p>The institution of traditional leadership has maintained its influence and resilience as a result of its community functions. These include being seen as the link between the ancestors and their subjects, their responsibility of protecting and distributing land as well as trying all kinds of crimes and disputes.</p>
<p>Given this influence, and rise of the MDC, Zanu-PF could no longer afford to ignore traditional leaders. Having noted the role that some of the chiefs played in mobilising support for the guerrillas during the liberation war, the Zanu-PF government now decided to co-opt them into their struggle against the opposition. Traditional leaders were showered with presents by the government and President Mugabe publicly apologised in 2001 for having neglected the chiefs since independence. More benefits and powers followed, ranging from trucks, houses and land to the mandate to distribute food handouts in times of drought. In return traditional leaders played an active role as electoral ambassadors of Zanu-PF, and remained mute when their subjects were suffering inhuman treatment by forces loyal to the government during election times. The government also instructed them to expel from their chiefdoms members of the opposition party that were branded as “British puppets”. To get food handouts, villagers were supposed to be holders of Zanu-PF party cards. Some chiefs, who in most cases supervised the distribution of this food, announced that the drought relief was meant only for those who support the government. They also allowed the operations of armed youth militias and the establishment of military bases in their areas, effectively sanctioning the beating up and killing of opposition activists.</p>
<h2><strong>Traditional Leaders in the “New Dispensation” - Continuity</strong></h2>
<p>The privileges that the chiefs enjoyed in the 2000s have outlived the Mugabe regime and are still in existence. Following the November 2017 coup, immediately after the inauguration of President Mnangagwa, chiefs were called to the city of Gweru where they were each offered a vehicle. This was after Finance Minister Chinamasa had intimated during his budget statement that the government did not have money and would cut down on expenditures like cars. Despite this early show of returning to the status-quo-ante, the Mnangagwa government has tried to clean up its act, at least in public. This approach has seen the role of traditional leaders in aiding the electoral interests of Zanu-PF retreat, but only to the shadows, taking a more covert character, where they abuse their access to people in order to misinform and manipulate. In Gweru, for instance, traditional leaders were misleading communities into believing that pictures taken during the biometric voter registration process would be used to trace votes. Another strategy that Zanu-PF has employed has been to assimilate traditional leaders into indiscernible party structures. This has been done through making kraal heads and other traditional leaders Zanu-PF cell chairpersons, but without allowing them to have positions beyond, like for example at district or provincial level. A cell is the smallest Zanu-PF structure usually consisting of 50 people. In this way, traditional leaders are part of the Zanu-PF mobilisation mechanism at the very basic level, covertly encouraging villagers to vote for the ruling party at levels that distant observers will not readily notice. In Matobo, Matebeleland South, chiefs reportedly continue to deny those who are not Zanu-PF members access to food aid, while others report opposition supporters to the Zanu-PF structures or the police for victimisation. As a result, opposition parties could not even field candidates in some wards in Matabeleland as their people were threatened, and some had to run for their lives to nearby urban areas like Bulawayo. In the same vein, some traditional leaders continue to act as gatekeepers of communities, only giving their preferred Zanu-PF cronies opportunities to reach out to their areas. In Beitbridge, for instance, some traditional leaders have only invited Zanu-PF leaders to address villagers. In Buhera North some traditional leaders have barred opposition parties from campaigning. Others have been actively campaigning for Zanu-PF. In Guruve South, a headman was seen tearing posters of all opposition parties. He had earlier been seen openly distributing Zanu-PF fliers at a local MDC rally. In Hurungwe West, a headman asked villagers to disclose whether they will be voting and to provide their voter registration slips.</p>
<p>There are also a number of reports alleging that traditional leaders have used threats and memories of past electoral violence to coerce their subjects to behave in a prescribed way. Some chiefs are said to have reminded their subjects of the events of 2008, where those who disobeyed the instruction to vote for Zanu-PF were subjected to different forms of violence.</p>
<h2><strong>Traditional Leaders Working with the Opposition and Being Nonpartisan - Discontinuity</strong></h2>
<p>While many chiefs continue to support Zanu-PF, a growing number has stood their ground and refused to partake in the repression of their people. In Matabeleland, a growing<a name="_GoBack" id="_GoBack"></a> number of chiefs have been at loggerheads with Mnangangwa’s government. The clashes have mainly been about the restoration of the Ndebele kingdom in that province. In July, three prominent chiefs from Matabeleland won a court order against the Minister of Home Affairs, Obert Mpofu who they allege was interfering with their work. In Midlands Province, a number of traditional leaders addressed their subjects on the need to maintain tranquillity during the electoral season. In Manicaland Province, chiefs have castigated politicians from most political parties for fanning divisions among their subjects based on political affiliation. Other traditional leaders have even defended their subjects by simply ruling that they would not tolerate political violence in their chiefdoms. A good number of chiefs have also been working with the opposition. In Zhombe constituency in the Midlands, it has been reported that almost all the traditional leaders are working with the opposition.</p>
<h2><strong>Too little, too late</strong></h2>
<p>Despite the dramatic political changes that have occurred over the last 12 months, traditional leadership structures remain a distorting political institution in Zimbabwe’s electoral process. While the instruments employed by traditional leaders to influence their subjects have become more subtle, they continue to play an important role to ensure Zanu-PF’s electoral victory. Encouragingly however, this time not all traditional leaders have jumped onto the Zanu-PF bandwagon. A growing number is maintaining their independence. But this may turn out to be too little, too late for ensuring free, fair and credible elections in 2018.</p>
Thu, 26 Jul 2018 14:34:42 +0200Rodrick Fayayo298081Family and gender in Orbán’s Hungaryhttps://www.boell.de/en/2018/07/04/family-and-gender-viktor-orbans-hungary
<a href="/en/2018/07/04/family-and-gender-viktor-orbans-hungary"><img typeof="foaf:Image" src="https://www.boell.de/sites/default/files/styles/300x200/public/uploads/2018/07/hungaryorbanfamily.jpg?itok=eB9SSoGu" width="300" height="200" alt="" /></a>
<p>Shortly after Viktor Orbán’s third consecutive two-thirds majority victory in the Hungarian parliamentary elections on April 8th, the freshly re-elected prime minister declared during an interview on state-run Kossuth Rádió that he wishes to “reach a comprehensive agreement with Hungarian women.”</p>
<p>Arguing that “demographics stands or falls [on women],” Orbán stressed the necessity of helping those women who are eager to have children by reaching an agreement with them lasting for “fifteen, twenty, thirty years” about “Hungary’s future.” Orbán’s statement perfectly captures the essence of his Government’s demographics-oriented approach to family policy and also its extremely conservative views on gender.</p>
<h2><strong>Everything for the families…</strong></h2>
<p>On January 1, 2012, the Fundamental Law, Hungary's new constitution that had been drafted by members of the governing Fidesz and Christian Democratic People's Party (KDNP) parties without any genuine coordination with parties of the opposition or the electorate, came into force. The governing coalition went to great lengths to prove its pro-family stance and its commitment to traditional heterosexual relationships by including concerning passages in the new constitution.</p>
<p>The preamble of the Fundamental Law, the so-called National Avowal, contains the following passage: "We hold that the family and the nation constitute the principal framework of our coexistence and that our fundamental cohesive values are fidelity, faith, and love.”</p>
<p>Later the constitution defines family as "as the basis of the survival of the nation." Family ties, the constitution reads, shall be based on marriage and/or the relationship between parents and children. The institution of marriage to be protected by Hungary, however, is defined rather strictly as "the union of a man and a woman established by voluntary decision." The constitution also declares that "Hungary shall encourage the commitment to have children," and that "the protection of families shall be regulated by a cardinal Act."</p>
<p>However, as the Government's family policy unfolded in the following years it became apparent that Viktor Orbán's cabinet has a very precise idea of the exact families whom Hungary shall protect and encourage their commitment to have children, namely, middle-class families with an average or above-average income where preferably both parents are employed.</p>
<h2><strong>...of the employed middle class</strong></h2>
<p>The most troubling aspect of the Fidesz-KDNP (Christian Democratic People’s Party) Government’s family policy is that it is aimed almost exclusively at the more affluent families while it leaves the most vulnerable households on the side of the road.</p>
<p>In 2012, the Government abolished the progressive income tax and introduced a flat-rate 16% income tax, a measure that was generally well-received by the public, especially by higher-income households. Even though lower-income families also saw a minor, one percent decrease in their income tax rate, the fact that the tax reform also abolished tax credits and introduced taxation of the minimum wage left such families with a higher tax burden than before.</p>
<h2>Unfair family tax allowance</h2>
<p>At the same time, the Government introduced the family tax allowance, which gradually became the hallmark of the Orbán cabinet’s family policy. The family tax allowance provides a deduction from an employed parent's tax base per each child in the family. The name is somewhat confusing as only one of the parents can use the deduction. Although married couples and registered life partners can choose to share the tax allowance between each other, the deduction can only be applied to one person’s income at a time.</p>
<p>In a single-child family, the tax allowance results in a net HUF 10,000 (EUR 30) increase to the take-home income of one of the parents. The increase is 3.5 times higher in families with two children and at least 10 times higher in families with three or more children. The higher deduction rate provided for multi-child families might seem justified, as the costs of these families are higher as well.</p>
<p>However, a remarkable aspect of the family tax allowance system is that it does not differentiate between lower and higher-income families; minimum wage employees and top managers alike are eligible and receive exactly the same amount of tax deduction. Also, the system does not take into consideration single parents with one child as they are eligible for the same low deduction rate as two-parent households. It is also worth noting that the fact that it is often the husband who claims the tax allowance may put women who are estranged from their partners in a financially vulnerable situation.</p>
<h2>Deterioration of child benefits</h2>
<p>Meanwhile, as part of its broader middle-class centred family strategy, the Government has gradually let the real value of child benefits and family allowances deteriorate. Although it was the short-lived socialist Government of Gordon Bajnai that froze the amount of these two vastly important benefits as part of its post-2008 austerity measures, during the following two parliamentary cycles the Fidesz-KDNP coalition Government has not raised them.</p>
<p>It is important to note that while the family tax allowance and the rate of numerous other child-related subsidies are calculated based on parents’ income and employment status, child benefit and family allowance are universal benefits, meaning that every mother with a child who is under age three and all households with a child under 16 are eligible for the respective benefits. Due to inflation during the past nine years, families where one or both parents are unemployed or earn minimum wage or less have become extremely vulnerable.</p>
<h2><strong>Demographics is not everything</strong></h2>
<p>In addition to being overly middle-class centred, another problematic aspect of the Orbán Government’s family policy is that it revolves solely around increasing the birth rate.</p>
<p>It should be noted that the Fidesz Government’s obsession with demographics has deep historical roots. Ever since the early 1900s when the mostly Hungarian-populated territories of the Austro-Hungarian Empire started to show worse birth rates than other parts of the Empire, the fear of "the death of the nation" has determined Hungarian politicians' and policymakers' approach to family policy.</p>
<p>Governments preceding the current Fidesz-KDNP cabinet all focused on demographics in some way. It must also be noted that the aging of society is not a uniquely Hungarian problem, but a general trend in the western world. The problem with the Government’s family policy is not that it focuses on demographics, but that it ignores other important factors.</p>
<p>As Dorottya Szikra, Senior Research Fellow at the Institute for Sociology of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences pointed out in an interview with Hungarian news site 444.hu, the Government’s family policy leaves family-related issues like gender inequality and child poverty unaddressed. While the Orbán Government’s family policy spendings exceed the EU average, demographers generally agree, according to Szikra, that increasing the rate of cash transfers will not result in a booming birth rate in and of itself.</p>
<p>A 2017 comprehensive study on Hungarian demographics reached the same conclusion. According to demographers Balázs Kapitány and Zsolt Spéder, “it would be a mistake to expect in the current demographic condition of the country that solely one factor, an effective pronatalist family policy alone, could put Hungary on a desirable, maintainable demographic course.”</p>
<p>Viktor Orbán’s statement, namely that demographics “stands or falls [on women]” suggests that the Prime Minister has yet to understand the complex factors that might influence one’s decision to have a child. Moreover, it hints that the Orbán and his government still identify women first and foremost with their reproductive organs.</p>
<h2><strong>Gender philosophy</strong></h2>
<p>By promoting sexist ideas like this, Orbán and his fellow politicians reinforce the archaic belief that women belong at home and that their role in society should not go beyond cleaning, cooking, giving birth to children and tending them.</p>
<p>In such a toxically misogynistic atmosphere, it comes as no surprise that according to the European Institute for Gender Equality, of all the EU Member States, Hungary only ranks above Greece on the 2017 Gender Equality Index. On the power index that measures gender equality in decision-making positions across the political, economic and social spheres, Hungary ranks last among the EU countries.</p>
<p>Between 2012 and 2015, only 9.7 percent of MPs were female in the Hungarian National Assembly, while the third Orbán Government (2014-18) had no female ministers at all, in contrast to the second (2010-14) which had one. Although on the under secretarial level the second and third Orbán cabinets performed slightly better, the rate of female undersecretaries still did not exceed 15 percent while the average share of female ministers in the EU was 26.8 percent between 2012 and 2015.</p>
<h2>"Women cannot stand the stress of Hungarian politics"</h2>
<p>When Viktor Orbán was asked in 2015 why his Government had no female members, the Prime Minister answered that women could not stand the stress that comes along with participating in Hungarian politics. Last year, when Orbán was asked about the unexpected withdrawal of Hungary’s ambassador to the United States Réka Szemerkényi, he simply replied that he does not deal with “women’s issues”.</p>
<p>Orbán might have had a change of heart after all, as on May 18 economist Andrea Bártfai-Mager took the oath of office as Minister without Portfolio for the Management of State Assets, making her the only female minister of the fourth Orbán government.</p>
<p>Even though it had been known for a long time that every week a woman dies in Hungary as a direct result of domestic violence, it took the scandal of a Fidesz MP who had broken his domestic partner’s nose to finally add “relationship violence” to the penal code as a separate offense in 2013. Meanwhile, the Government still refuses to ratify the Istanbul Convention on preventing and combating violence against women and domestic violence because, according to Fidesz vice president and MP Szilárd Németh, the convention attacks the traditional family model and “tries to transplant the gender philosophy”.</p>
<h2><strong>Small steps, many more to go</strong></h2>
<p>Nonetheless, the Government seems to have understood that encouraging women to stay at home will not necessarily lead to more births. As a result of the Government’s nursery expansion program, the rate of nursery-attending children increased from 11% to 16% in the last couple of years. Even though nurseries are more likely to accept children with two employed parents, which again reflects the family policy’s middle-class-oriented approach, the expansion program is unprecedented in the last decade and somewhat compensates for the lack of an adequate part-time employment scheme in Hungary.</p>
<p>The establishment of a new state-funded institution that deals with single-parent families also gives some hope that the Government has accepted that there are plenty of families that do not fit the “traditional” category but need help nevertheless.</p>
<p>Last year, the Government announced that 2018 would be the “year of families” and launched a series of family-friendly free time activities and a new website promoting the Government’s family policy. However, the long-term effect of a publicity stunt like this is questionable.Viktor Orbán’s sudden alleged desire to understand and please Hungarian women cannot be considered sincere as long as politicians of the governing parties make misogynistic remarks on the floor of the Parliament on a regular basis.</p>
<p>If Orbán and his new Government really want to help women and protect families they should consider a work-hour reform to encourage the long-term part-time employment of women and men alike, further expanding nursery places and making them available for every child regardless of their parents’ employment status, and last but not least, strengthening the child benefit and family allowance against the family tax allowance. These measures could benefit all families, not just the wealthier ones, and thus lead to a more egalitarian society.</p>
Wed, 04 Jul 2018 15:13:11 +0200Balázs Pivarnyik297915Hungary to imprison NGO workers helping asylum seekers and other migrantshttps://www.boell.de/en/2018/06/26/hungary-imprison-ngo-workers-helping-asylum-seekers-and-other-migrants
<a href="/en/2018/06/26/hungary-imprison-ngo-workers-helping-asylum-seekers-and-other-migrants"><img typeof="foaf:Image" src="https://www.boell.de/sites/default/files/styles/300x200/public/uploads/2018/06/hun_srb_border.jpg?itok=Dg6SS6kI" width="300" height="200" alt="" /></a>
<p>The Hungarian Government has voted on new legislation and a seventh amendment to the country’s Fundamental Law that would further deteriorate refugee people's rights and justify the imprisonment of NGO workers and attorneys who attempt to help them. The new legislation is just another step on the road to becoming an authoritarian regime and silencing the most critical voices as well as strengthening the governing parties' successful "freedom fight" against their allegedly biggest enemies, the immigrants.</p>
<p>The Government started their communication attack against NGOs in 2013 and have been conducting a massive hate campaign against refugees since 2015. Soon they connected the two topics and somewhere around 2017 they designated George Soros, a Hungarian-born billionaire philanthropist, as their main enemy. According to their logic, immigrants are basically terrorists, and therefore those who attempt to help them are a threat to the nation as well. Since Soros' foundation has been funding many NGOs who are most critical of the government (including criticising their refugee policy), he seemed to be the perfect embodiment of the enemy. </p>
<p>Through the years the Government has built up a perfect conspiracy theory regarding NGOs. Beside the above-mentioned national security line they have questioned the legitimacy of these organizations, stating that since they are not elected,<a href="#_ftn1" name="_ftnref1" title="" id="_ftnref1">[1]</a> they don't have the right to criticize the Government's policies. They also questioned the NGOs’ transparency, saying that the Hungarian people deserve to know "who is in the background" of these groups.<a href="#_ftn2" name="_ftnref2" title="" id="_ftnref2">[2]</a> After a while their billboards turned into concrete actions. Building on these accusations regarding an alleged lack of transparency, in June 2017 the Parliament voted on the so-called Lex NGO 2017 (aka the <a href="https://www.helsinki.hu/wp-content/uploads/LexNGO-adopted-text-unofficial-ENG-14June2017.pdf">bill on foreign-</a><a href="https://www.helsinki.hu/wp-content/uploads/LexNGO-adopted-text-unofficial-ENG-14June2017.pdf">funded organizations</a>) which included provisions very similar to the "foreign agent law" in Russia. According to this law, those NGOs that receive more than EUR 23 000 euros per year from abroad (even from elsewhere in the EU (!), need to register as "organizations receiving foreign funding" and display this label on their publications and websites. An NGO can be dissolved for disobeying this law.</p>
<p>In February 2018 the Government went even further and, building on the hate against migrants and refugees, announced a proposal called <a href="https://www.helsinki.hu/wp-content/uploads/STOP-SOROS-LEGISLATIVE-PACKAGE-PROPOSAL.pdf">"Stop Soros"</a> <a>which</a> would have demolished organizations critical of the Government. Pretty soon they submitted a more detailed <a href="https://www.helsinki.hu/wp-content/uploads/Stop-Soros-package-Bills-T19776-T19774-T19775.pdf">second version of </a><a href="https://www.helsinki.hu/wp-content/uploads/Stop-Soros-package-Bills-T19776-T19774-T19775.pdf"> "Stop Soros</a>" to Parliament that was even harsher. The NGOs "supporting migration" (which was given a very unclear definition so it could be applied to anyone critical of the Government) would have been required to ask for permission to operate from the Minister of Interior and, even if they would have gotten the licence (after a tax and national security investigation) they would have to have paid 25% in punitive tax for receiving foreign income. Should an NGO fail to apply for such permission, the prosecutor could have conducted an investigation against the NGO, suspend its tax number, impose a fine, and dissolve the organization. Moreover, the proposal contained an 8 km restrictive ban, meaning that NGO workers would not be allowed to enter an 8 km wide zone along the Schengen border.</p>
<p>Since this legislative package would have violated human and constitutional rights it aroused great indignation in Hungary as well as abroad; many organizations and institutions condemned the proposal and urged the Government to withdraw the bill. For months it seemed that the protests were of no use, since the Government used the topic during their election campaign very frequently, stating that they had every intention of "protecting" the Hungarian people from the migrants and their helpers. On the election night, Government spokesperson Zoltán Kovács said those organizations who are trying to have a say in politics should be closed,<a href="#_ftn3" name="_ftnref3" title="" id="_ftnref3">[3]</a> and many other people close to the Government stated that the "Stop Soros" bill would be the first legislation for the new Parliament to vote on. After <a>Fidesz </a>gained a 2/3 majority again in the elections these attacks have become more personal, since one cannot fight a faceless, invisible mass forever - after a while the Government needs scapegoats and has to show people whom they are fighting against. So just a few days after the elections, one of the pro-Government newspapers published a blacklist containing 200 names of persons who are, according to them, the "mercenaries of Soros" and therefore a threat to the nation. The list included investigative journalists, professors at Central European University (which was established by Soros) and NGP workers. As a human rights expert working for one of the most critical NGOs, I am on this list as well.</p>
<p>Since in authoritarian regimes these kinds of lists are often followed by other, more drastical actions (like imprisonment), it is safe to say that their goal was clearly to intimidate those who are still fighting for democratic values and constitutional rights. However the list was not the only thing pointing in this direction - their communication method also corroborated this intention. For a while now, but especially since they submitted the first version of "Stop Soros", people connected to the Government have not mentioned "NGO workers" as such, but have been speaking about "national security threats", "collaborators", "Soros mercenaries" and mentioning various other forms of threat suggesting these people are serving the will of foreign powers and, therefore are threatening national security and are thus criminals.</p>
<p>Not long after the new Government was formed, Fidesz submitted a third, "improved" version of "Stop Soros" - different than the previous one, but in a way even stricter, as it actually contains provisions for the imprisonment of those NGO workers and attorneys who attempt to help asylum seekers and other migrants. There are several speculations about why the text changed so drastically (there are no mentions of permits or punitive taxes anymore), which could be due to the huge national and international indignation over the proposals, but it also could be just a strategic step, since it’s easier to dissolve these organizations one by one than to close all the critical NGOs at the same time (which would generate a bigger convergence among them and would naturally be a bigger scandal).</p>
<p>The new legislation, aka, the new "Stop Soros" (<a href="https://www.helsinki.hu/wp-content/uploads/T333-ENG.pdf">Bill No. T/333 amending certain laws relating to measures to combat illegal immigration</a>) would apply to those NGOs and persons who are working with asylum seekers or potential refugees who would like to apply for asylum. The bill would make several human rights activities illegal, such as providing free legal aid to asylum seekers or even just preparing and distributing information materials. It is not clear what is considered to be "information material", and therefore basically everyone who, for instance, writes something about asylum-seekers’ rights can fall under this law, even journalists.</p>
<p>They have also modified the Penal Code and established a new term, namely, "facilitating illegal migration", which says that "Anyone who conducts organizational activities a) in order to allow the initiating of an asylum procedure in Hungary by a person who, in their country of origin or in the country of their habitual residence, or in another country via which they arrived was not subjected to persecution for reasons of race, nationality, membership of a particular social group, religion or political opinion, or where their fear of indirect persecution is not well-founded (…) if a more serious criminal offense has not been committed by them, is punishable by confinement for this misdemeanour.”<a href="#_ftn4" name="_ftnref4" title="" id="_ftnref4">[4]</a></p>
<p>The trick is that only the authorities are allowed to decide whether someone's fear of persecution is well-founded or not (whether he or she can receive refugee status or not); therefore, those who have not received any refugee status yet (i.e., all the asylum seekers or people waiting to submit their application for such status) are excluded from receiving the help of NGO workers and attorneys. If someone undertakes such "organizational activities" regularly, or provides financial means for them, or commits this crime within 8 km of the Schengen border zone, that person "is punishable by a term of imprisonment of up to one year." It is not clear what "organizational activity" will mean in practice, but they are listing a few examples including border monitoring, preparing or distributing information materials, and building or operating a network.</p>
<p>Beside this new legislation the government has submitted the new Tax Law that would bring back the 25% punitive tax which should be paid after activities supporting migration. The draft bill enlists these actions which includes media campaigns, seminars and the participation of such events, building and operating a network, and “propaganda activities that indicate positive aspects of migration”. The latest can be basically everything; therefore any NGO or even newspaper can fall under this restriction. Primarily the donor organization will be obliged to pay the 25% tax, but the supported NGO will have to contribute in case the donor organization fails to do so. The 25% tax is extended to the operational support of the organization as well. The draft bill would surely have a chilling effect on the donors, therefore the result could even be the bankruptcy of many organizations critical of the Government. </p>
<p>These provisions are especially outrageous because the regulations concerning refugees are already very cruel. In Hungary since January 2018 only two people per day are allowed to submit asylum applications in the southern transit zones, after they were most likely violently pushed back to Serbia and have waited there, sometime, even for months. The transit zones are practically functioning as jails since the asylum-seekers are detained there until they are either expelled back to Serbia or gain refugee status (which is quite rare).<a href="#_ftn5" name="_ftnref5" title="" id="_ftnref5">[5]</a> This means that they have had very limited help from independent attorneys or NGO workers, and now they will get absolutely no legal or humanitarian aid, nor will they have a chance to have their situation monitored. Those who would attempt such "crimes" could be easily sentenced to one year in jail.</p>
<p>Beside the "improved" Stop Soros bill, the Government has voted on the <a href="https://www.helsinki.hu/wp-content/uploads/T332-Constitution-Amendment-29-May-2018-ENG.pdf">seventh amendment </a><a href="https://www.helsinki.hu/wp-content/uploads/T332-Constitution-Amendment-29-May-2018-ENG.pdf">to the Fundamental Law</a> in which they will further deteriorate basic constitutional rights and make the refugees’ situation even more desperate. Article XIV was supplemented with the following clause: "Any non-Hungarian citizen arriving to the territory of Hungary through a country where he or she was not exposed to persecution or direct risk of persecution shall not be entitled to asylum."<a href="#_ftn6" name="_ftnref6" title="" id="_ftnref6">[6]</a> Since, according to the Government, Hungary is surrounded by "safe third countries" where asylum-seekers would naturally never be subjected to any persecution, this new modification will probably mean that the authorities are not planning to give one more person refugee status.</p>
<p>The amendment contains other horrifying provisions. Based on the recent modifications, Fidesz is planning to establish a new jurisdictional system and give a bigger role to the administrative courts. This will probably mean that all the politically sensitive cases will be moved to these courts, where the judges will not be independent of the Government. The bill contains provisions that could restrict the right of assembly referring to others' private and family life, which means that the authorities could ban protests saying that it would disturb others. The bill also bans homelessness, which will further deteriorate the situation of homeless people and criminalize them even more.<a href="#_ftn7" name="_ftnref7" title="" id="_ftnref7">[7]</a> </p>
<p>Both pieces of legislation highly restrict basic human and constitutional rights, leaving those fleeing from war helpless and punishing those who are still brave enough to help them. The full demolition of the critical NGO sphere is just around the corner, since the Lex NGO 2017 will facilitate dissolving organizations not willing to register as "organizations receiving foreign funding", the Lex NGO 2018 will facilitate the imprisonment of NGO workers and the proposed „migration supertax” could financially abolish the organizations.</p>
<p>It seems that an authoritarian regime within the European Union is becoming stronger and stronger and nobody knows how and when it will end. </p>
<div> <br /><hr align="left" size="1" width="33%" /><div id="ftn1">
<p><a href="#_ftnref1" name="_ftn1" title="" id="_ftn1">[1]</a> Magyar Idők (Hungarian Times) Péter Szijjártó: Nobody never elected the NGOs to do something, 14 June 2018</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn2">
<p><a href="#_ftnref2" name="_ftn2" title="" id="_ftn2">[2]</a> Hungary Premier Orban Sticks to Maverick Path as US. Ties Sour <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-12-15/hungary-premier-orban-sticks-to-maverick-path-as-u-s-ties-sour">https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-12-15/hungary-premier-orban-sticks-to-maverick-path-as-u-s-ties-sour</a></p>
</div>
<div id="ftn3">
<p><a href="#_ftnref3" name="_ftn3" title="" id="_ftn3">[3]</a> Index: Government spokesperson: Those organizations who are trying to have a say in politics should be closed <a href="https://index.hu/video/2018/04/08/kormanyszovivo_a_fidesz_donteseit_az_elet_irja/">https://index.hu/video/2018/04/08/kormanyszovivo_a_fidesz_donteseit_az_elet_irja/</a></p>
</div>
<div id="ftn4">
<p><a href="#_ftnref4" name="_ftn4" title="" id="_ftn4">[4]</a><a href="https://www.helsinki.hu/wp-content/uploads/T333-ENG.pdf"> Amending Act C of 2012 on the Penal Code Section 11 </a><a href="https://www.helsinki.hu/wp-content/uploads/T333-ENG.pdf">https://www.helsinki.hu/wp-content/uploads/T333-ENG.pdf</a></p>
</div>
<div id="ftn5">
<p><a href="#_ftnref5" name="_ftn5" title="" id="_ftn5">[5]</a> Hungary's refugee policy in numbers <a href="https://www.helsinki.hu/wp-content/uploads/Magyar-menekultugy-a-szamok-tukreben-2018-januar-1.pdf">https://www.helsinki.hu/wp-content/uploads/Magyar-menekultugy-a-szamok-tukreben-2018-januar-1.pdf</a></p>
</div>
<div id="ftn6">
<p><a href="#_ftnref6" name="_ftn6" title="" id="_ftn6">[6]</a> Seventh amendment of the Basic Law of Hungary Article 5 <a href="https://www.helsinki.hu/wp-content/uploads/T332-Constitution-Amendment-29-May-2018-ENG.pdf">https://www.helsinki.hu/wp-content/uploads/T332-Constitution-Amendment-29-May-2018-ENG.pdf</a></p>
</div>
<div id="ftn7">
<p><a href="#_ftnref7" name="_ftn7" title="" id="_ftn7">[7]</a> Daily News Hungary: Parliament Committee approves constitutional amendment proposals on banning homelessness <a href="https://dailynewshungary.com/parliament-committee-approves-constitutional-amendment-proposals-on-christian-culture-homelessness/">https://dailynewshungary.com/parliament-committee-approves-constitutional-amendment-proposals-on-christian-culture-homelessness/</a></p>
</div>
</div>
<p> </p>
Tue, 26 Jun 2018 11:57:26 +0200Nóra Köves297815Call for Applications: Workshop on Asian-European relationshttps://www.boell.de/en/2018/06/07/call-applications-workshop-young-asian-european-relations
<p>Almost 70 years ago, on December 10, 1948, the United Nations adopted the Human Rights Declaration. It is the basis for our understanding that all humans are equal and free. Today, this idea is being contested. Nationalist and discriminatory thoughts are finding their way into the fabric of society again. Growing levels of economic inequality and the destruction of the environment globally add to the necessity to talk about how we want to live and which values societies are built on.</p>
<p>The world has changed from a bipolar into a multipolar order. New global powers such as China continue to emerge and actively influence economic and political systems. They promote different cultural and moral norms and have unsettled debates about our understanding of common values. The loss of confidence by some citizens in their parliamentary democracies has fanned this discussion. We can only find solutions to these challenges when we discuss them openly and cooperate in a mutually understanding way. The hope for sparking such a debate and finding solutions lies with the young generation, which is growing up in a world much different from that of their parents.</p>
<p>The first green open-space workshop on Asian-European relations invites young people with an interest in Asian-European relations to come together and debate the state of human rights in Asia and Europe. We want to discuss with you how the Human Rights Declaration can sustain its global validity and in what kind of world young Europeans and Asians want to live. We are looking for participants from different backgrounds who are interested in politics and human rights and are willing to share their own experiences and opinions.</p>
<p><strong>Date:</strong> October 8-11, 2018</p>
<p><strong>Place:</strong> Berlin and Gantikow (Brandenburg)</p>
<p><strong>Host:</strong> Heinrich Böll Foundation, Asia Department</p>
<p><strong>Who can apply</strong>: Everyone with an interest in Asian-European relations under the age of 35</p>
<p><strong>Fee:</strong> Costs (transport, accommodation, food) are covered by the Heinrich Böll Foundation</p>
<p><strong>How to apply:</strong> Send a short letter of motivation (max. 1 page) and your CV to Ms Julia Behrens <a href="mailto:behrens@boell.de">behrens@boell.de</a> by July 1</p>
Thu, 07 Jun 2018 16:04:41 +0200Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung297677Malaysia’s Reformasi Movement Lives Up To Its Namehttps://www.boell.de/en/2018/06/01/malaysias-reformasi-movement-lives-its-name
<a href="/en/2018/06/01/malaysias-reformasi-movement-lives-its-name"><img typeof="foaf:Image" src="https://www.boell.de/sites/default/files/styles/300x200/public/uploads/2018/05/malaysia_teaser_pakatan_harapan_rally.jpg?itok=B9z89b4d" width="300" height="200" alt="" /></a>
<p>For people in the states of Penang and Selangor, which had been governed by federal opposition parties for the last ten years, the sudden change whereby the federal power is now an intimately friendly one is dizzily baffling. From being necessarily defensive, strategic and reactive in all they did to parry an antagonistic central power, they now have the weird opportunity to dream big.</p>
<p>It will take a while before they can do that with gusto and confidence. Old habits will die hard. Some hesitation is to be expected, along with much resentment against those who had supported the fallen government so unconscionably. Some frames of thought will appear clearly outdated, and when expressed will sound revisionist or obsolete.</p>
<p>Economically, there is good reason to hope that the country can now live up to its potential again, that many of its migrated sons and daughters, now well trained in foreign lands, will return to help put the country back on track, and that the recent fall of the ringgit will be reversed.</p>
<h3>It is time to learn from the financial crisis</h3>
<p>This toppling of a regime that had been in place since independence in 1957 occurs two decades after the country lost its ability in 1997-98 to soar with fellow Asian flying geese. And with the change in government, it is now finally able to put the lessons it learned - or should have learned - from the Asian Financial Crisis to good use.</p>
<p>While countries such as South Korea, Thailand and Indonesia experienced immediate regime change and institutional reforms that today have left them as unrecognizably different entities from what they were in the Roaring 90s, Malaysia came through that period with its political system intact. That was partly due to the doggedness of then-prime minister Mahathir Mohamad in rejecting external assistance and interference.</p>
<p>But for that achievement, the country had to pay a price. It suffered greater inter-ethnic divisiveness, plunging competence in governance, stupefying levels of corruption and, worst of all, a huge loss of public faith in its ability to ever become a developed nation. The notions of "Bangsa Malaysia" (Malaysian Nation) and "Vision 2020", pushed strategically into public discourse in the early 1990s by Mahathir to engender a stronger sense economic nationalism among his countrymen, also went down in the Crisis.</p>
<h3>The 20-year-old Reformasi Movement</h3>
<p>Along with it fell Anwar Ibrahim, Mahathir’s deputy prime minister and finance minister. Apparently, in being too keen on IMF intrusion into the Malaysian political economy, he brought the wrath of his boss, Mahathir, upon himself. Sacked and subsequently jailed for 12 years in 1999 for abuse of power and for sodomy, Anwar’s downfall gave birth to a reform movement that would not be denied.</p>
<p>Indeed, a whole new generation of young Malaysians, generally well educated, well informed and deeply urban, was inspired by the open battle between the two political giants, who soon turned protesting and demonstrating on the streets into a habit and an art of war.</p>
<p>Their general call for comprehensive reforms quickly defined public discourses, and convinced even the establishment to the extent that under Mahathir’s successor Abdullah Badawi in 2003, the government adopted “reforms” as its biggest promise to the electorate. True to that spirit, Abdullah did not stand in the way of the appeals court when it decided in favour of Anwar on a technicality, and released the prisoner after he had served six years of his two six-year consecutive sentences.</p>
<p>But in the end, Abdullah’s reform agenda was seen by many to be a failure. In the meantime, the opposition had, together with many non-government organisations, formed a body to call for electoral reforms. It went under the name The Coalition for Clean and Fair Elections (Bersih, Malay for “clean”) and through a hugely successful street demonstration in Kuala Lumpur in November 2007, it inspired a strong swing in public sentiments against the federal government. The issue of elections is of course one that is not communal or racial in character and it allowed for a coming together of activists of all communities. This 40,000-strong rally was followed in December that year by another unexpectedly large demonstration, this one led by the Hindu Rights Action Force (Hindraf).</p>
<h3>2008: The opposition parties ride on the tide of discontent</h3>
<p>Quite unaccountably, in the face of these strong anti-government sentiments, Abdullah ill-advisedly called for early elections in March 2008. Riding on the tide of discontent, the opposition parties managed to agree on a concerted electoral strategy under the leadership of Anwar Ibrahim. This move proved successful and together, they won power in five of Malaysia’s 13 states. They also denied the ruling coalition the supermajority in parliament that it had always enjoyed. Constitutional amendments in Malaysia require support from two thirds of parliamentarians to pass.</p>
<p>Stunned by this loss in seats, in power and in face, the United Malays National Organisation (UMNO) ousted Abdullah as its president a year into his second term as prime minister. This move was and is widely understood to have been orchestrated by Mahathir from within. Najib Razak now became UMNO’s president, and by virtue of that, also the country’s prime minister. This was a role that he apparently considered a birthright, given that his father, Abdul Razak Hussein, was prime minister from 1970 to 1976 and is still honoured by the Malay community today as "Bapa Pembangunan" (Father of Development”). Razak was also the man who brought Mahathir back in from the cold in 1973, four years after he was expelled from the party for calling for the resignation of the first prime minister, Tunku Abdul Rahman Putra.</p>
<p>Najib, rightly reading the spirit of the times, assumed the word “transformation” to describe his key policies, in acceptance of the fact that the public still considered reforms a primary goal in the post-Mahathir era. His administration also coined “One Malaysia” in imitation of Mahathir’s "Bangsa Malaysia". The target for the country to reach developed nation status by the year 2020 was kept unchanged despite the fact that the economic and statistical trajectories by then all showed that ambition to be an impossibility.</p>
<p>When his attempt at winning back the electoral middle ground – meaning the urban population, especially the Chinese vote – failed, as became obvious in the 2013 general elections during which his ruling coalition lost the popular vote for the first time in its history, he swung to the right. This he did in two related arcs. While pandering to Malay extremists, he at the same time encouraged or at least avoided discouraging expressions of Muslim fundamentalism in the multicultural country.</p>
<p>This proved strategically effective in that Najib was soon able to draw PAS, the Islamist party that was a member of the opposition coalition, to push for Islamist legislation in parliament. Such a move could only end in a break-up of that coalition since the DAP, the Chinese-based multiracial and nominally social democratic party, was expected to, and did, oppose it vehemently.</p>
<p>This may have weakened the opposition considerably, but it did not win the BN much extra support. In fact, it can be compellingly argued that Najib’s cozying up to extremists accelerated divisions among UMNO supporters - with decisively detrimental results for the party come election time in 2018.</p>
<h3>Finally speaking out against the regime</h3>
<p>Horrified at the bigotry of the extremists, some in the Malay community, both young and old, began slowly but steadily to speak out against the regime. In the meantime, Najib had Anwar jailed on a charge of sodomy when the latter tried by way of a by-election to become the chief minister of the rich state of Selangor.</p>
<p>What made things increasingly intolerable for many Malaysians were the scandals that seemed to circle the Prime Minister. These included suspicions of a shady submarine deal done between Malaysia and France when Najib was Minister of Defence, which had been hanging over him for years, and of course the murder of Altantuya Shaariibuu, a female Mongolian national who had played an assortment of roles in the arms deal. Her body was blown up with military grade explosives outside Kuala Lumpur. Two bodyguards assigned to the Najib household were found guilty of this crime, although the motive was never ascertained. Several strange murders, disappearances and deaths occurred over the few years that Najib was in power.</p>
<h3>Deaths, missing persons and the 1MDB scandal</h3>
<p>And then the 1MDB scandal broke. The intricacies of this phenomenon are too many to describe here, but suffice it to say that Najib, soon after taking power in 2009 had started a sovereign investment fund - called 1MDB - through which he is now being investigated for using to finance his political machinery and from which billions are purported to have been channeled overseas for the enjoyment of individuals close to his family.</p>
<p>The case has allowed foreign powers to brand Malaysia a kleptocracy, and several countries including the USA, Singapore and Switzerland have been investigating cash transfers and money laundering related to 1MDB. Indeed, it is generally suspected that it was this scandal that brought Mahathir back into politics to unseat Najib.</p>
<p>If that was the case, it could then also be the case that gave Mahathir the epiphany that his style of running the government all those years ago was now bringing ruin to the country. He could now not die without righting those wrongs. Now that he has done more than anyone could ask for by way of repentance, he will go down in the history books as the man who had made it possible for others to almost destroy the country, but who at great cost returned to right this wrongs to the extent it was possible to right them. The picture of Mahathir greeting Anwar on the latter’s release on May 16, 2018, is therefore a poignant moment that was in effect the closing of a karmic circle.</p>
<h3>The Future is Now</h3>
<p>The electoral victory of the Pakatan Harapan was indeed a convincing one. It leaves the Barisan Nasional governing only three states - tiny Perlis at the Thai border, Najib’s home state of Pahang, and the giant state of Sarawak. Had the margin been small, the change in power might not have happened, given the Barisan’s history of electoral trickery.</p>
<p>What seems clear at this point is that UMNO and BN are paying the ultimate price for refusing to carry out reforms when they had the chance. The BN will now almost definitely disappear. Apart from UMNO, its members on the peninsula are as good as wiped out, its members in Sabah are leaving in a rush, and signs are pointing to a strong possibility that BN parties in Sarawak will also leave but without joining Pakatan. No doubt UMNO still has 54 seats in parliament, but it is a party in decline, and support for it is bound to drop much further before it has any chance of rebounding.</p>
<p>The <em>Reformasi</em> era in Malaysia - at least its initial stage - is therefore bookended by the street demonstrations of September 1998 at one end, and by its political manifestation, the Pakatan Harapan coalition, taking power in May 2018 at the other end. More poignantly, it is framed by the jailing of Anwar Ibrahim by Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad in 1998 to his release in 2018 by the past and present Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad.</p>
<h3>Ten days in power</h3>
<p>During its first ten days in power, the Pakatan Harapan government led by Mahathir Mohamad had already fulfilled more of the promises made during the election campaign than anyone could have imagined possible. Among some other awe-inspiring things, Mahathir freed Anwar Ibrahim, stopped Najib and his wife from leaving the country and initiated an investigation against the fallen prime minister.</p>
<p>He cut the hugely unpopular goods and services tax (GST) down to 0 percent, and in a move that pleases the Chinese Malaysian population and the stock market greatly, made DAP secretary-general Lim Guan Eng the finance minister of the country. Lim Guan Eng was the chief minister of the rebel state of Penang in the last ten years who had managed its economy well and put certain transparent policies into place.</p>
<p>Creating a cabinet that is acceptable to all the parties in the victorious Pakatan Harapan is no easy task, and early delays caused some worry among observers. The education system in Malaysia has been deteriorated in recent decades, and many therefore thought it was a wise move when he took on the additional portfolio as Minister of Education. However, the public quickly reminded him that his manifesto did promise that no prime minister is ever to hold a second portfolio at the same time, especially the finance portfolio. He quickly backed down, and appointed the lecturer Maszlee Malik to that position instead. </p>
<p>The sense of hope is strong in Malaysia at the moment, as is the sense of bewilderment and disorientation. But there is also a strong sense of empowerment, and of a growing willingness to forgive the past sins and past cowardice of fellow Malaysians.</p>
<p>The future has arrived for the Reformasi Movement and for Malaysia. Now in power, there is much reforming of the system to get on with.</p>
Fri, 01 Jun 2018 15:20:55 +0200Ooi Kee Beng297641Vulnerability and chaos in the Hungarian healthcare systemhttps://www.boell.de/en/2018/05/31/vulnerability-and-chaos-hungarian-healthcare-system
<a href="/en/2018/05/31/vulnerability-and-chaos-hungarian-healthcare-system"><img typeof="foaf:Image" src="https://www.boell.de/sites/default/files/styles/300x200/public/uploads/2018/05/healtchare-hungary.jpg?itok=TC3_f6Io" width="300" height="200" alt="Healthcare in Hungary - Hospital Bed" /></a>
<p>The state of healthcare facilities and institutions is critical in some places, while public funding of the field falls way below the EU average. The Ministry of Health was dissolved into the new Ministry of Human Resources in 2010, thereby losing its power for advocacy. Institutionalized corruption is strongly present in Hungary, including within the healthcare system, while a unique concept of parasolvency (or ’compulsory’ gifts) has been deeply present in the collective consciousness of society since communist times, defining the doctor-patient relationship even today and strengthening discord between professional workers as well.</p>
<p>Highly skilled (mostly young) doctors are continuously leaving the country, while those medical workers who do stay are increasingly overloaded and unsatisfied. The division between public and private healthcare is further deepening the gap between the poor and rich levels of society.</p>
<h2>Administration, resources, financing and structure</h2>
<p>Let’s look into the most controversial measures since 2010 that have affected the Hungarian healthcare scene. First, a social insurance system based on risk pooling and nationwide solidarity was granted by the Constitution until 2010, when that document was replaced by the new “Fundamental Law of Hungary”. From that point forward the social insurance system lost its security. Instead of health insurance contributions, employers now pay a complex social contribution tax that the Government can use as it sees fit. However, employees are obliged to pay a health insurance contribution, and upon turning to a doctor, the validity of their social insurance is checked.</p>
<p>The responsibility for handling the national health insurance fund has been transferred from an independent body to an office under direct ministerial control. Today in Hungary, therefore, there is a unique healthcare system consisting of the mixture of state healthcare and social insurance.</p>
<p>In 2010, the second Orbán Government dissolved the Ministry of Health and melded it with the newly-created “Ministry of Human Resources” (EMMI), a mammoth ministry responsible for numerous fields including healthcare, education, culture, sports, social policies and equal opportunities, to list just a few. There is no minister of health since this change — in this new ministry the field of healthcare is overseen by a state secretary. This strong centralization also means a lack of lobbying power for these fields; healthcare has become a neglected field for this Government.</p>
<p>The fate of independent professional institutions is also informative: Any institutions that were independent of national and local politics and had effectively controlled and inspected public health and epidemiological security have also been dissolved or replaced. Through such measures, the profession has gradually been removed from its controlling position. The ministry has also absorbed the previously-independent, country-wide patients’ rights organization, which held public authority power.</p>
<p>In 2015, the amount of public expenditure in Hungarian healthcare was 4.8% of GDP, while the EU average was 7.2%. It is especially important to note that while the state is spending substantially less than the EU average on healthcare, the burdens on the population for accessing care are disproportionately high, and these are usually “out of pocket” expenses not subject to risk management.</p>
<p>The financing of hospitals in the country is insufficient, which results in a debt of about HUF 40-60 billion (about EUR 120-200 million) each year. This shortfall is then “generously” settled or consolidated by the Government from time to time, but nothing is done to enable the sustainable operations of these institutions.</p>
<p>The state of Hungarian healthcare facilities and institutions is critically uneven. In the past 10 years, due to EU funding, hospitals in the country have been modernized, but the capital could not be included in those tenders. Since the government did not provide budgetary resources for this, Budapest hospitals have remained unrefurbished, and the quality of their services is unpredictable.</p>
<p>This might change in the near future with the announcement of the “For a Healthy Budapest Program” in 2018, which will focus on the modernization of both outpatient and inpatient services and the improvement and realignment of hospitals, including the creation of three central hospitals.<a href="#_ftn1" name="_ftnref1" title="" id="_ftnref1">[1]</a> This step is crucial, as most of the hospitals in the city were built in the early 20<sup>th</sup> century and are not only in very bad condition, but also do not meet today’s requirements and are wasting financial and human resources.</p>
<p>However, these developments and modernization are not being implemented according to a well-designed, long-term strategic plan based on consultations with healthcare professionals. Rather, they are being realized in a haphazard manner, following momentary political and lobbying interests. </p>
<h2>Parasolvency – the system of ‘compulsory’ gifts</h2>
<p>In the 1950s and throughout the socialist era, the intelligentsia in Hungary was systematically ripped from leading positions and their cooperation among themselves was also inhibited. However, doctors were not replaceable by party cadres, so the aim instead was to pit them against each other. The profession was grouped into two parts: those who meet the patients face-to-face regularly, and those working in the background, e.g., in the laboratories.</p>
<p>Wages were redistributed based on this division: the latter group, the “background workers”, was eligible for a higher salary. At the same time, doctors working in direct patient care were allowed to accept money from the patients in addition to their base salaries (generally called ‘parasolvency’, or ‘<em>hálapénz</em>’ in Hungarian, which translates to ‘gratitude-money’ and could be compared to a tipping system).</p>
<p>Unfortunately, this plan worked, and the division and dissention within the medical profession has lasted to this day. The phenomenon of parasolvency is deeply embedded in Hungarian healthcare. Today, patients are so distrustful of healthcare and so vulnerable to the lack of transparency in the system that they use parasolvency as an attempt to secure trustworthy service for themselves. This then generates further distortion of the system, creating a vicious circle.</p>
<p>The doctor-patient relationship thus becomes some kind of business transaction that at the same time violates both the real interests of the patient and the system of state incentives. Doctors became interested in treating their “grateful” patients for as long as possible, even if sending them to other colleagues would be medically indicated. This may also result in unnecessary examinations or interventions. It is not rare (and nowadays it is more like the general practice) that this money is expected, negotiated in advance, and sometimes even extorted—an everyday case of corruption. This is one of the reasons why the official wages of healthcare workers could be kept so low in the past decades.</p>
<p>The system of parasolvency creates a gap between practitioners of different medical fields and also between generations. It makes fair cooperation, collegial relationships and teamwork impossible, even though these are crucial. Let’s take the example of operations: the patients usually choose the surgeon themselves and they may also meet the anesthesiologist (even though not necessarily before the operation). However, what the patients may not know is that there is a group of pathologists working on the histological opinion that highly influences their survival, not to mention the other members of the healing team (nurses, physiotherapists and others). Who should receive the money? Who should the patients be thankful for?</p>
<p>Moreover, parasolvency is also sneaking its way into medical education, since instead of the mentor-student relationship, older doctors rather become the rivals of young ones. In order to keep their access to money, some doctors may just as well keep important information to themselves so as to make themselves indispensable in their profession.</p>
<p>Parasolvency anchors bad structures within our healthcare system, because those in power will not want to release their positions and privileges to others. As a result, a small group of people in the profession has emerged who hold strong lobbying power and for whom the survival of the parasolvency-system is essentially important, so they are determined to protect it.</p>
<p>The Hungarian Medical Chamber has played a crucial role in the fact that this system could survive until this day. As a professional public body, the most important role of the chamber should be to protect the profession’s reputation and to keep the trust of patients. However, the current leadership of the chamber does not step up against even very serious cases of ethical offenses, and fails to publish the decisions of its ethics investigations even though they are supposed to proactively examine each and every such case they are informed about.</p>
<p>The Hungarian Medical Chamber is the only organization in Hungary in which doctors are associated, and membership is obligatory for every practicing doctor. As such, it is a big mistake that this body fails to initiate the necessary professional and structural changes and merely obstructs them instead.</p>
<h2>Lack of doctors and a divided healthcare system</h2>
<p>Nowadays there is a general lack of doctors and medical workers everywhere. In Hungary this situation began to emerge after EU accession as a natural effect of the free movement of workers. It is rather difficult to measure the numbers in this regard, so let’s just look at a few facts about the lack of doctors:</p>
<p>In the first six months of 2017, 402 Hungarian doctors and 208 foreign citizens who have completed their medical studies in Hungary applied for permission to work abroad. However, this data does not show whether all of them actually moved abroad or not. It might sound unbelievable, but we actually do not know exactly how many doctors are working in Hungary. There are several parallel, independent databases for estimating their number; one of them is the above-mentioned Hungarian Medical Chamber’s list of members.</p>
<p>However, this number does not reflect those who are working abroad already and just keeping their Hungarian registration valid (or for that matter those who are on maternity leave, for instance). The other approaches (for instance the number of ‘active stamps’ that represent doctors writing prescriptions, or the number of active registrations for compulsory further trainings) also all fail to provide objective data on the actual number of doctors working in the country. There is no centralized database currently available, which results in the complete lack of a reliable method for keeping track of this.</p>
<p>However, the following facts are important to note nevertheless<a href="#_ftn2" name="_ftnref2" title="" id="_ftnref2">[2]</a>:</p>
<ul><li>It is a fact that the number of doctors working in the country has been decreasing in recent years.</li>
<li>It is mostly young professionals who are leaving the country.</li>
<li>This sends a negative message to other medical students, who see no secure professional career prospects at home.</li>
<li>It is also visible that the average age of healthcare workers in Hungary is rising: doctors working in the healthcare system are on average 49.31 years old, with every second doctor being over 50; the average age of other healthcare professionals is 44.08 years.<a href="#_ftn3" name="_ftnref3" title="" id="_ftnref3">[3]</a></li>
<li>We do know that professional education does not provide enough new workers, as the number of fresh graduates more or less equals the number of doctors leaving the country. As a result, there is no replacement for those who are quitting the system for other reasons (e.g., death or retirement).</li>
<li>It is important to highlight the phenomenon of a significant secession of doctors from the public healthcare system, partially towards working in the private healthcare sector only, but also many doctors are leaving the profession entirely.</li>
<li> The workload of each and every quitting colleague has to be covered by those who are staying due to the lack of replacement resources. For many, this is the last straw—and a domino effect of quitting starts.</li>
<li>The lack of healthcare professionals not only results in inefficient service but also forces doctors to do the work of other professional staff, which in return reduces their capacity to care for their patients.</li>
</ul><p>Based on my experience, the young generation’s main reasons for leaving the country are the inevitable involvement in the parasolvency system and the existence of a strong hierarchy in the medical profession — they simply refuse to work and live under these circumstances. Better career prospects and higher salaries elsewhere are also important aspects, as well as the promise of higher prestige for their profession and a better quality of life, better possibilities for professional development, sufficient equipment, a better state of hospitals to treat patients in, and a better work-life balance abroad.</p>
<p>In Hungary, the Government’s message is that there are no resources to increase wages in the healthcare sector, which is probably true in the current, wasteful system. However, money alone would not solve these problems. There is a need for a complete structural change in order to let the healthcare system become a patient-centered, transparent, clearly-functioning system meeting the requirements of the present day. The current system is nontransparent, corrupt and wasteful, one in which all the resources are lost.</p>
<p>The wages also need to be coherently thought over and restructured into a well-planned system. The hectic way this Government is approaching the issue, by highlighting a particular group of health care workers from time to time, is unacceptable. Just to mention one example: in order to motivate resident physicians to stay in the country, a scholarship scheme was developed for them. It is incomprehensible why professional, full-time, state-employed adults would need to be applying for ‘scholarships’, which they receive instead of a reliable monthly salary.</p>
<p>Moreover, in order to qualify for the scholarships, they need to commit to staying in the country for a specified number of years. These scholarships do not contribute to their pensions and are not considered as income for the purposes of assessing their eligibility for bank loans…</p>
<p>There is another, spontaneously-developing process that needs to be addressed here: the splitting of the Hungarian healthcare system into a rapidly- deteriorating public sector and an emerging, parallel public sector that is uncontrolled and only accessible by a minority of the population. As a study commissioned by the National Healthcare Service Center demonstrates, the total capacity of licensed outpatient care in privately-financed providers exceeds that of the public-funded service. <a href="#_ftn4" name="_ftnref4" title="" id="_ftnref4">[4]</a> </p>
<p>The following facts presented during a conference organized by the economic news portal <em>Portfolio</em> in October 2017 confirm this information: the proportion of people turning to private-service providers in the 20-60 age group was expected to be over 65% [in 2017], with an annual HUF 300 billion spent on healthcare services. These data only show the tip of the iceberg, since they are just sourced from the statistics provided by the legally-operating medical service providers.</p>
<p>There is, however another hidden path, the so-called “apartment-medical-stations”, where consultations or sometimes simple physical examinations take place in return for parasolvency money. These private medical stations are operated mostly by doctors (in many cases with a very high reputation) who otherwise work in the public healthcare system. As an example, the consultation preceding a planned surgery or birth would take place in this private office, but the surgery or birth itself takes place in a public hospital. Then the check-ups are again taken to the private office, but if there are any complications, the patient goes back to the hospital.</p>
<p>This setup is understandable, since nowadays the one patient – one doctor model no longer applies; there is a medical team and an expensive, complicated technical background for each case. However, it is not ethical, and to include undocumented visits and undocumented payments in this process is not acceptable, as they result in the lack of a guarantee and the lack of a right for the patient to claim redress should something go wrong.</p>
<p>It is revolting that such procedures endangering patients’ rights and avoiding professional and tax control can take place uninterrupted. Private healthcare is, of course, necessary, but a transparent, quality-assured, balanced system has to be created in which public and private healthcare can coexist, built on unified professional principles and on guaranteeing safe care for patients with strict, regular controls.</p>
<p>Today in Hungary the biggest danger posed to the healthcare system is the prospect of a complete split: Public healthcare services will be deteriorated and only treat the poor, while an expensive, better-quality, private service sector will emerge for the rich. There are techniques to prevent this scenario, but unfortunately the Government does not show any interest in stepping up to do so.</p>
<p>In our everyday work as physicians, the most critical aspects that always pose a danger to the safety of patient care are clearly visible in Hungary: lack of transparency, low quality of basic and outpatient care, overloaded outpatient care, lack of professionals in the whole system, and the structural fragmentation of healthcare institutions.</p>
<p>The whole system lacks correct professional regulation and protocols, lacks a process for updating the minimal standards for conditions, or for that matter lacks follow-up by monitoring indicators of quality over time and publishing the results. These are the main reasons why the current healthcare system in Hungary is unreliable and chaotic both for the patients and for healthcare workers and is creating so much room for vulnerabilities.</p>
<p><em>This article is part of our ongoing special <a href="https://www.boell.de/en/focus-hungary" target="focus">"Focus on Hungary"</a>.</em></p>
<div> <br /><hr size="1" align="left" width="33%" /><div id="ftn1">
<p><a href="#_ftnref1" name="_ftn1" title="" id="_ftn1">[1]</a> <a href="https://hirlevel.egov.hu/2018/01/07/2018-ban-tobb-penz-meg-tobb-korhazfejlesztes-es-ujabb-beremeles-lesz-az-egeszsegugyben/">https://hirlevel.egov.hu/2018/01/07/2018-ban-tobb-penz-meg-tobb-korhazfejlesztes-es-ujabb-beremeles-lesz-az-egeszsegugyben/</a></p>
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<p><a href="#_ftnref2" name="_ftn2" title="" id="_ftn2">[2]</a> Based on the information collected by the author as the moderator of a closed facebook group with a membership of more than 3000 Hungarian physicians</p>
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<div id="ftn3">
<p><a href="#_ftnref3" name="_ftn3" title="" id="_ftn3">[3]</a> Hungarian Health System Performance Assesment (HSPA), June 2017, <a href="https://mertek.aeek.hu/jelentes-2013-15">https://mertek.aeek.hu/jelentes-2013-15</a></p>
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<div id="ftn4">
<p><a href="#_ftnref4" name="_ftn4" title="" id="_ftn4">[4]</a> Hungarian Health System Performance Assesment (HSPA), June 2017, <a href="https://mertek.aeek.hu/jelentes-2013-15">https://mertek.aeek.hu/jelentes-2013-15</a> (date accessed: 14.5.2018)</p>
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Mon, 21 May 2018 12:01:11 +0200Dr Rita Lénárd297585Media pluralism further declines in Hungaryhttps://www.boell.de/en/2018/05/02/media-pluralism-further-declines-hungary
<a href="/en/2018/05/02/media-pluralism-further-declines-hungary"><img typeof="foaf:Image" src="https://www.boell.de/sites/default/files/styles/300x200/public/uploads/2018/05/img_0422.jpg?itok=0n-3Ou_N" width="300" height="200" alt="Special edition of the shut-down daily Magyar Nemzet" title="Special edition of the shut-down daily Magyar Nemzet in Hungary" /></a>
<p>Just two days after Viktor Orbán’s third consecutive two-thirds majority victory in the Hungarian parliamentary elections on 8 April<a href="#_ftn1" name="_ftnref1" title="" id="_ftnref1"><sup><sup>[1]</sup></sup></a> it was announced that <em>Magyar Nemzet</em>, one of Hungary’s oldest and most prestigious daily newspapers, is going to be shut down immediately. The last issue was published on 11 of April; almost 80 years after the newspaper first began.</p>
<p>The reasons for the closing of the renowned paper are manifold: The first is that it is owned by Lajos Simicska, a formerly close friend and ally of Viktor Orbán<a href="#_ftn2" name="_ftnref2" title="" id="_ftnref2">[2]</a> who managed to accumulate approximately 360 million euros by 2015 (according to the calculations of Forbes Hungary), mainly through good relations with the government and profiting from overpriced public procurements. For still-unclarified reasons, after Orbán’s second consecutive election victory, Simicska got into a fight with the Prime Minister and quickly became his arch-enemy, using his media empire as an instrument to weaken the Government’s position.</p>
<p>The paper did not engage in slander or anti-government propaganda; it was enough for Simicska to give journalists a free hand and finally let them work without the pressure and censorship they had become used to during the years when Simicska was living off of his government ties and enriching himself on taxpayer money.</p>
<p>The second reason for the closure is that the government has made journalistic work at Magyar Nemzet and other Simicska-owned media (for example <em>InfoRádió</em>, which was shut down together with <em>Magyar Nemzet</em>; and <em>Hír TV</em>, where serious layoffs are expected) increasingly hard. Whenever journalists for those media outlets sent inquiries to ministries or other public institutions, their questions were left unanswered, their interview requests were rejected, and they were often subjected to the slander of the newly-established state propaganda outlets (while this treatment was not uncommon when dealing with centre-left or independent media outlets, in the case of the Simicska-owned outlets the government has openly declared many times that it is not going to answer any inquiries from them).</p>
<p>The third reason is financial: <em>Magyar Nemzet</em> used to make more than 3 million euros in profits each year — as long as its owner was in favour of the Government.<a href="#_ftn3" name="_ftnref3" title="" id="_ftnref3"><sup><sup>[3]</sup></sup></a> Once the situation changed, the profits quickly turned into losses of 2-3 million euros per year.<a href="#_ftn4" name="_ftnref4" title="" id="_ftnref4"><sup><sup>[4]</sup></sup></a> This is in part because many of its previous print readers turned their backs on the paper once it started to criticise Viktor Orbán and his regime (while the paper did manage to significantly increase its readership, online journalism is still unable to create the same revenues as print editions). In addition, the paper has lost all its state advertising revenues.</p>
<p>This latter point is especially relevant since, in the Hungarian system, advertisements by the state or by state-owned companies, such as the gambling-service provider <em>Szerencsejáték Zrt</em>. or the Hungarian Electrical Works Company (MVM), are used as indirect state subsidies. As studies by the Mertek Media Monitor,<a href="#_ftn5" name="_ftnref5" title="" id="_ftnref5"><sup><sup>[5]</sup></sup></a> an NGO focusing on issues related to the freedom of the press have shown, these subsidies disproportionately favour media that follow the Government’s narrative in their reporting. The few opposition news sites that receive state advertisements are seen as government-controlled opposition sites where critical voices can still appear, but where investigative articles have no <em>raison d'être</em>. In this sense, Hungary has lost the last political daily that was still willing to be critical of the Government. In recent weeks numerous stories about the corrupt activities of Government members had been broken by <em>Magyar Nemzet</em>.</p>
<p>In Hungary, the state is the biggest advertiser these days, to say nothing of the fact that many commercial companies mimic the state’s advertising tactics and only advertise in pro-Government outlets out of fear that they would otherwise lose out on public procurements or would be subjected to new taxes and regulations.</p>
<h2>A unique voice gets lost</h2>
<p>With the closure of <em>Magyar Nemzet</em>, Hungary loses a unique conservative voice which was (at least in the last three years) willing to combine its worldview with a critical stance towards a Government that may define itself as Conservative, but that can rather be described as reactionary and far-right in terms of its actions. Even as a pro Government news outlet in the pre-2015 years (the reporting of which was often extremely biased, but still refrained from fake news and outright propaganda), <em>Magyar Nemzet</em> managed to produce well-researched articles and quality content, although these were mainly on topics that were outside party politics. In 2012, for example, the most prestigious Hungarian journalism prize, the <em>Soma</em> investigative award, was given to Zoltán Dénes, a journalist with <em>Magyar Nemzet</em>.</p>
<p>While <em>Magyar Nemzet</em>’s reporting was becoming increasingly critical, Fidesz started to create a new, pro-Government news environment, made up of numerous newly- established outlets now controlled by the Cabinet Office of the Prime Minister. According to investigative news reports, this office dictates what topics friendly newspapers should cover and sends them whole stories or guidelines regarding the use of language (the word “refugee” should, for example, be avoided and the term “migrant” should be emphasized).</p>
<p>When looking at these outlets, we can often see that the same politically-motivated story is cross-published on a large number of pro-Government platforms in order to increase their reach. The aim of their coverage is to strengthen the Government’s position and discredit the opposition by spreading biased, opinionated, and often fake or fabricated news, and by openly taking a stance on issues of public interest.</p>
<p>The site 888.hu, for example, advertised a pro-Government demonstration called the Freedom March (<em>Békemenet</em>) that took place on the Hungarian national holiday of March 15, and in the days prior to the election, the articles that were featured on pro-Government media either covered issues related to the Government’s major campaign topics (especially the dangers associated with immigration) or listed reasons why one should vote for Viktor Orbán’s party.</p>
<p>One of these Government mouthpieces, <em>Figyelő</em> (a formerly renowned news outlet that was bought, restaffed and completely transformed by the conservative historian and director of the controversial House of Terror museum, Mária Schmidt) has now published a list of approximately 200 people allegedly working to further the goals of George Soros in the country. The article itself reads like a joke — it mentions that some of these “mercenaries” might not even know they are on this mission and lists the names of NGO employees, as found on their respective websites, while also including some rather unexpected people, such as Ernest Gellner, the renowned nationalism scholar, who passed away in 1995, or the historian Yehuda Elkana, who died in 2012.<a href="#_ftn6" name="_ftnref6" title="" id="_ftnref6"><sup><sup>[6]</sup></sup></a></p>
<p>However, this could signal some serious measures are about to be unleashed, as the campaign against the Central European University was also preceded by a defamatory article in that same newspaper last year and was soon followed by the adoption of a law that aimed to outlaw the Hungarian-American institution. Furthermore, prior to the election, in his speech on 15 March, Viktor Orbán promised retaliation against those who have been in opposition to the Government,<a href="#_ftn7" name="_ftnref7" title="" id="_ftnref7"><sup><sup>[7]</sup></sup></a> which for many people in the opposition means there is not much ground for optimism.</p>
<h2>Masses in the streets</h2>
<p>During the weekend following Fidesz’s new election victory approximately 100 000 people gathered on the streets of Budapest and joined a march from the Opera House to the Parliament building. Their aim was to show that regardless of the governing party’s major victory (whose 49 percent support got them two-thirds of the seats in Parliament), there are still significant numbers of people in the country who have different preferences and disagree with the ways the Government handles issues such as immigration, education or public health, and who disapprove of the high level of corruption as well as the growing euroscepticism in the country.</p>
<p>The demonstration was also a sign that a large part of the population expects the Fidesz Government’s constitutional majority will lead to a misuse of power and that Fidesz will further dismantle checks and balances and crack down on civil liberties. It has already been announced that the governing party will push through its so-called “Stop Soros” laws, a package of bills targeting civil society organisations that work with refugees and migrants.<a href="#_ftn8" name="_ftnref8" title="" id="_ftnref8"><sup><sup>[8]</sup></sup></a></p>
<p>The journalists of <em>Magyar Nemzet</em> prepared a special, self-published “<em>samizdat</em>”<a href="#_ftn9" name="_ftnref9" title="" id="_ftnref9"><sup><sup>[9]</sup></sup></a> version of the newspaper, which they distributed in 40 000 copies among the participants in the demonstration. The employees of the paper still hope that their publication could be saved; even if the print daily won’t resume production, they would see it as feasible to have a print weekly magazine and an online news site that continues the tradition of the paper. However, it is expected that Simics<a name="_GoBack" id="_GoBack"></a>ka would be reluctant to give away the <em>Magyar Nemzet</em> brand out of fear that a businessperson from Orbán’s circles could somehow acquire the name and use it to legitimise a new pro-Government outlet with the 80-year-old brand name.</p>
<p>In the meantime, the ordeals of the Hungarian media landscape ordeals are not over. Not long after the announcement about the fate of <em>Magyar Nemzet</em> was made public, the news came out about the closing of another independent news outlet: Budapest Beacon, which has been a crucial site for those who were interested in reading objective English-language reports about Hungary.<a href="#_ftn10" name="_ftnref10" title="" id="_ftnref10"><sup><sup>[10]</sup></sup></a> Who knows which outlet will be next to cease publishing or fall prey to capture from the Government?</p>
<p>There have already been reports about the government’s intent to somehow acquire Index.hu, the second biggest news site in Hungary which, regardless of its critical stance toward the Government, is still widely read among Fidesz voters. The other outlet important for the government would be <em>RTL Klub</em>, the biggest commercial TV station in the country, which is currently owned by the German-based Bertelsmann corporation.</p>
<p>In a recent interview in the magazine <em>Magyar Narancs</em>, Professor Jan-Werner Müller of Princeton argued that the Government’s control over crucial news sources, such as all regional media, can already be seen as a barrier to the fairness of the elections, as crucial information is unable to reach the voters. Once the above-mentioned outlets are captured, there will be complete Government dominance of the media in Hungary, as the target audiences of the governing party will be completely cut off from information that could become uncomfortable for those in power. Critical media will form a small island on the Internet and in the print media market, and such outlets are mainly read by intellectuals in the capital.</p>
<p>There are, of course some efforts to change this bleak outlook. News outlets such as 444.hu and Mérce.hu are still growing their audiences, atlatszo.hu, <em>Abcúg</em> and <em>Magyar Narancs</em> invest great resources into covering the problems of the countryside, and <em>Szabad Pécs</em>, a small, regional newspaper run by journalists who lost their jobs due to the Government’s takeover of the regional press, has announced that it will start a crowdfunding campaign to set up a network of investigative journalists who will cover those parts of the country that have previously slipped beneath the radar. The number of independent media and persistent journalists shows us that the independent press is still not lost, but those working on informing the people have to put even more effort into their work while knowing that the next four years will be characterised by constant Government pressure.</p>
<p><em>This article is part of our ongoing <a href="https://www.boell.de/en/focus-hungary" target="dossier">special "Focus on Hungary"</a>.</em></p>
<div> <br /><hr size="1" align="left" width="33%" /><div id="ftn1">
<p><a href="#_ftnref1" name="_ftn1" title="" id="_ftn1"><sup><sup>[1]</sup></sup></a> About the election and its outcome, see: Attila Juhász: Hungary after the election: Continuing on Orbán’s path. <a href="https://www.boell.de/en/2018/04/12/hungary-after-election-continuing-orbans-path">https://www.boell.de/en/2018/04/12/hungary-after-election-continuing-orbans-path</a></p>
</div>
<div id="ftn2">
<p><a href="#_ftnref2" name="_ftn2" title="" id="_ftn2">[2]</a> On Orbán’s and his circles’ dominance over the Hungarian media landscape, see: <a href="https://www.boell.de/en/2017/08/22/hostile-takeover-how-orban-subjugating-media-hungary">https://www.boell.de/en/2017/08/22/hostile-takeover-how-orban-subjugating-media-hungary</a></p>
</div>
<div id="ftn3">
<p><a href="#_ftnref3" name="_ftn3" title="" id="_ftn3"><sup><sup>[3]</sup></sup></a> See for example: Attila Bátorfy: How did the Simicska Media Empire Function? <a href="http://kreativ.hu/cikk/how_did_the_orban_simicska_media_empire_function">http://kreativ.hu/cikk/how_did_the_orban_simicska_media_empire_function</a></p>
</div>
<div id="ftn4">
<p><a href="#_ftnref4" name="_ftn4" title="" id="_ftn4"><sup><sup>[4]</sup></sup></a> Mentioned in Gergő Zsiborás: <em>Így omlott össze Simicska Lajos médiabirodalma</em> (“How the media empire of Lajos Simicska collapsed”) <a href="https://forbes.hu/uzlet/igy-omlott-ossze-simicska-lajos-mediabirodalma/">https://forbes.hu/uzlet/igy-omlott-ossze-simicska-lajos-mediabirodalma/</a></p>
</div>
<div id="ftn5">
<p><a href="#_ftnref5" name="_ftn5" title="" id="_ftn5"><sup><sup>[5]</sup></sup></a> see: The end of Magyar Nemzet <a href="https://mertek.atlatszo.hu/the-end-of-magyar-nemzet/">https://mertek.atlatszo.hu/the-end-of-magyar-nemzet/</a></p>
</div>
<div id="ftn6">
<p><a href="#_ftnref6" name="_ftn6" title="" id="_ftn6"><sup><sup>[6]</sup></sup></a> See for example: Pro-Government print weekly, Figyelő, publishes list of Soros “mercenaries” <a href="https://budapestbeacon.com/pro-fidesz-print-weekly-figyelo-publishes-list-of-soros-mercenaries/">https://budapestbeacon.com/pro-fidesz-print-weekly-figyelo-publishes-list-of-soros-mercenaries/</a></p>
</div>
<div id="ftn7">
<p><a href="#_ftnref7" name="_ftn7" title="" id="_ftn7"><sup><sup>[7]</sup></sup></a> “After the election we will of course seek amends – moral, political and legal amends” <a href="http://www.kormany.hu/en/the-prime-minister/the-prime-minister-s-speeches/orban-viktor-s-ceremonial-speech-on-the-170th-anniversary-of-the-hungarian-revolution-of-1848">http://www.kormany.hu/en/the-prime-minister/the-prime-minister-s-speeches/orban-viktor-s-ceremonial-speech-on-the-170th-anniversary-of-the-hungarian-revolution-of-1848</a></p>
</div>
<div id="ftn8">
<p><a href="#_ftnref8" name="_ftn8" title="" id="_ftn8"><sup><sup>[8]</sup></sup></a> On the “Stop Soros” law package, see: Nora Koves: Hungary is to demolish critical NGOs with new bills <a href="https://www.boell.de/en/2018/02/21/hungary-demolish-critical-ngos-new-bills">https://www.boell.de/en/2018/02/21/hungary-demolish-critical-ngos-new-bills</a></p>
</div>
<div id="ftn9">
<p><a href="#_ftnref9" name="_ftn9" title="" id="_ftn9"><sup><sup>[9]</sup></sup></a> The term refers to a form of dissident activity in the former Eastern Bloc: underground publications that wer banned or censored by the state were reproduced by individuals and were passed from reader to reader.</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn10">
<p><a href="#_ftnref10" name="_ftn10" title="" id="_ftn10"><sup><sup>[10]</sup></sup></a> “The Budapest Beacon exit interview” <a href="https://budapestbeacon.com/the-budapest-beacon-exit-interview/">https://budapestbeacon.com/the-budapest-beacon-exit-interview/</a></p>
</div>
</div>
Wed, 02 May 2018 12:45:14 +0200Krisztián Simon297413The war crimes in Ahmići: How Croatia is (not) dealing with the pasthttps://www.boell.de/en/2018/04/25/die-kriegsverbrechen-ahmici-wie-kroatien-seine-vergangenheit-nicht-bewaltigt
<a href="/en/2018/04/25/die-kriegsverbrechen-ahmici-wie-kroatien-seine-vergangenheit-nicht-bewaltigt"><img typeof="foaf:Image" src="https://www.boell.de/sites/default/files/styles/300x200/public/uploads/2018/04/ahmici.png?itok=jk-PUEv_" width="300" height="200" alt="The March in the Memory of the Victims of the War Crimes Committed in the Village of Ahmići, Zagreb, June 2014" title="The March in the Memory of the Victims of the War Crimes Committed in the Village of Ahmići, Zagreb, June 2014" /></a>
<p>On the morning of April 16, 1993, the 4th Battalion of the Croatian Defence Council Military Police (HVO) and the Jokers, the special operations forces of said police, killed 116 Bosniak civilians. Out of those victims, 32 were women and 11 children – the youngest one was only three-months-old.</p>
<p>Two hours after the crime in Ahmići, the members of the Bosnian Army’s special unit Zulfikar killed 15 civilians and seven Croatian soldiers in the village of Trusina in the municipality of Konjic (BiH). The perpetrators of the crimes in Ahmići and Trusina, chiefly commanders, were sentenced to long-term sentences, but and some of them only wound up in prison after spending years in hiding. They were assisted in this by the state organs.</p>
<p>The Ahmići criminals for a while hid in Croatia from the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY). This was facilitated by the administration of Franjo Tuđman, who was the president at the time. The immediate perpetrators of this war crime – Paško Ljubičić, Vlado Ćosić, Ante Slišković, and Tomo Vlajić – lived in the suburbs of two Croatian cities - Zagreb and Zadar - under false identities. The operation of saving the Ahmići criminals was directed by Markica Rebić, the head of the Croatian Army’s intelligence service at the time.</p>
<p>In January of this year, I paid my respects to the victims in Ahmići and Trusina with around twenty other human rights activists from Croatia. We received a warm welcome in Ahmići, and the local’s message was clear:</p>
<blockquote><p>“You are brave for coming here. We would like to thank you for sharing in our pain.” We were especially touched by the message in Trusina, where the president of the victims’ association said: “All victims are equally important, no matter their nationality. Every mother cries the same.”</p>
</blockquote>
<p>One of my companions on the tour was the notable Croatian sociologist Dražen Lalić who is the author of the research “Coming to Terms with the Past in Croatia: Public Opinions and Attitudes After the War.” Lalić reflected on the trip in the text he wrote for the Croatian daily newspaper “Večernji list” and said: “During the visit to Ahmići, I felt a special kind of uneasiness within me. I understood the main reason for my agitation upon our arrival. The crimes in that village were committed by my fellow nationals. The fact that they come from another country does not change the circumstances.”</p>
<p>As my colleague Lalić points out, it does not matter that “the criminal is always an individual… And it defies the idea that the people as a whole should be morally convicted” (Karl Jaspers). However, things are not that simple, and this is where we come to what I find of utmost importance in the processes of dealing with the past:</p>
<blockquote><p>“Even though not all the members of a particular nation are at fault for the crimes committed in their name, they should not feel entirely innocent either.” </p>
</blockquote>
<p>Of course, such a type of purification is primarily expected from the leading members of particular nations.</p>
<h2>Responsibility of the individual</h2>
<p>Croatian people, whether they are in Croatia or Bosnia and Herzegovina, lack politicians who would accept the aforementioned human and rational demand that numerous serious crimes were committed in the name of those people on the territory of the Former Yugoslavia in the 90s. This has especially been clear in the last years, particularly in situations when the UN’s Hague Tribunal reached verdicts based on individual responsibility, regardless of the fact if “our guys” were found guilty or not.</p>
<h2>Suicide of Ex-General Praljak</h2>
<p>I was present at the last judgement at the UN’s ad hoc tribunal in the <a href="http://www.icty.org/x/cases/prlic/cis/en/cis_prlic_al_en.pdf" target="icty">Prlić et al. case</a>.</p>
<p>The tragic act of drinking poison, which was done by one of the war crime convicts, showed that here we still live in a culture in which it is more important to fanatically prove one’s “truth and heroics,” than it is to think of one’s family, the ones who love you, and the ones who trust you. Unfortunately, the individual’s tragic act deprived the victims of justice.</p>
<p>Mile Lasić, from the Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences in Mostar, said the following in his interview for “Slobodna Dalmacija” in December of last year: “The Hague verdict for the Croats from Bosnia and Herzegovina, weighted by the tragic act of General Praljak’s suicide, will serve for the final victory of the selective culture of memory within all three nations of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which means all sides will forget the victims and glorify the ones responsible for the disgrace and plunges into barbarism as heroes. As opposed to the selective culture of memory, which is essentially a consciously nurtured oblivion, the true critical culture of memory entails first and foremost the crimes and other wrongdoings committed against humanitarian law in our name.” He also added that</p>
<blockquote><p>“we only mourn our own victims and celebrate our own heroes, who are mostly culprits in the eyes of the others.”</p>
</blockquote>
<h2>A verdict against individuals and not the people of Croatia</h2>
<p>The verdict in the Prlić et al. case is still a source of dispute in the Croatian public even though it is more than clear. The Board of Appeals confirmed the most important conclusions from the first instance judgement about the international character of the war in BiH due to the participation of Croatia which - as it was concluded - “had real authority in certain counties through the HVO.”</p>
<p>It is also confirmed that the goal of the joint criminal enterprise was shared between President Franjo Tuđman and other Croatian officials, and that certain Croatian counties were “under military occupation.”</p>
<p>Instead of lamentation, once again we received reactions from some of the most responsible politicians in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina who negated the facts determined in court and completely forgot the victims, even though the facts, more than ever, emphasised that the verdict was above all the responsibility of the convicted individuals as well as the Croatian political leaders at that time, and not the people of Croatia.</p>
<h2>Missing analysis and reconciliation of the past </h2>
<p>Once again, there was no dealing with this in the name of the collective - the members of their own nation, the convicted criminals, were victimised, in a collective lamentation, about the destiny of the people of Croatia who could not commit any crimes in the supposedly defensive war. As we have seen on the example of Serbia in the Mladić case, as well as in some other cases, politicians still identify entire nations with war crimes, which is shameful and unacceptable.</p>
<p>No one still cares that the facts determined in the Hague verdicts represent a non-exhaustive source of material for the prevention of crime denial, detailed reconstruction of the past, and genuine dealing with it. It is not the Tribunal's fault that said sources are rarely used or not used at all nowadays and that the public in the region, or the ones shaping the awareness of the public, are interested solely in the final outcome of trials: the verdict and the level of the sentence. At that same time, everything that brought about said outcome – all the findings, determined during rigorous evidence procedures, while fully respecting the rights of the defendants – is being ignored. </p>
<p>Unfortunately, Croatia is struggling with the whole process. In June 2014, human rights activists invited the citizens of Zagreb to a peaceful protest in front of the Zagreb Cathedral called: “The March in the Memory of the Victims of the War Crimes Committed in the Village of Ahmići.” Those days, <a href="http://www.icty.org/x/cases/kordic_cerkez/cis/en/cis_kordic_cerkez_en.pdf" target="icty">Dario Kordić </a>who was convicted for various war crimes, including the one in Ahmići, came to Croatia after serving two thirds of his sentence. He was greeted as a hero by Croatian bishops who waited for him at the Zagreb Airport and also held a service for a man who was convicted by the Hague Tribunal for a civilian massacre in Ahmići.</p>
<p>As my colleague Lalić concludes, in Croatia, and other countries of the Former Yugoslavia (especially in Serbia which started the wars in Yugoslavia) there is still the paradox according to which: “certain intellectuals, civil society peace activist, theologians, news reporters, and others who were in no way included in the violence, feel responsible for the brutality and the violation of human rights, while those who committed the crimes, or are politically or morally responsible for the wrongdoings, deny that they had hardly been committed “on our side” or try to justify them and glorify criminals.” On the other hand, the Croatian judiciary is still dealing with a large number of unprocessed war crimes. </p>
<h2>Many unsettled war crimes</h2>
<p>Out of 490 recorded cases, the perpetrators in 169 of them are still unknown. As time goes by, it will be even harder to investigate crimes committed in the early 90s - there will be less material evidence, as well as surviving victims and witnesses. In its early annual reports, Documenta has warned of the fatigue of both the victims and the witnesses in the repeated statements during criminal proceedings.</p>
<p>Mirko Klarin, the founder of the Hague news agency SENSE, pointed out the following in one of the publications issued by Documenta - Centre for Dealing with the Past, a human rights organisation for which I have been working for an entire decade and which deals with processing war crimes: Regional prosecutors inherited hundreds if not thousands of files from The Hague. Those are the files of suspects investigated by the tribunal’s prosecutors, but were let through its net, which was intended for the big fish only. There is no statute of limitations for war crimes and, until recently, we had trials for WW II war criminals in Germany, Hungary, Italy, and other countries. There is no reason not to have this happen in the region in the decades to come.</p>
Wed, 25 Apr 2018 20:20:23 +0200Eugen Jakovčić 297369Why Armenians Call for a Velvet Revolutionhttps://www.boell.de/en/2018/04/23/why-armenians-call-velvet-revolution
<a href="/en/2018/04/23/why-armenians-call-velvet-revolution"><img typeof="foaf:Image" src="https://www.boell.de/sites/default/files/styles/300x200/public/uploads/2018/04/demo_armenien_5_hp.jpg?itok=LJBe2sxa" width="300" height="200" alt="People protesting on a square in Armenia" title="Protest in Armenia" /></a>
<p><em>The interview was originally published on the <a href="https://polis180.org/polisblog/2018/04/20/10482/">Polis Blog</a>. </em></p>
<p>Armenia, a country of 3 million with a diaspora estimated at around <a href="https://lens.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/04/24/following-armenias-global-diaspora/">8 million</a>, was recently categorised as a <a href="https://freedomhouse.org/report/nations-transit/2018/armenia">semi-consolidated authoritarian state</a>. Still, <a href="http://caucasusbarometer.org/en/cb2017am/PROTEST/">70 percent </a>of the people argue that Armenians “should participate in protest actions against the government, as this shows the government that the people are in charge”.</p>
<p>In fact since 13 April, <a href="https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2018/04/18/around-16000-rally-armenia-against-new-pm/">up to 40.000 Armenians</a>, who finally want to see their country governed by a democratic political culture, are taking to the streets every day to demonstrate against their government. On 19 April alone, more than <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/armenia-protests-yerevan-government-building-sarkisian-cabinet/29176265.html">100 protesters </a>were temporarily detained. Polis180 Co-President Sonja Schiffers spoke to Yerevan-based Olya Azatyan about the trajectory of the protests and the latest dynamics on the ground.</p>
<p><strong>Sonja Schiffers: Olya, how was it today? How has the atmosphere on the streets evolved since the beginning of the protests?</strong></p>
<p><strong>Olya Azatyan: </strong>People who are out on the streets in Armenia those days in Yerevan, Gyumri, Vanadzor spread a lot of energy. They are angry and that is good.<a href="http://ampop.am/en/april-protests-against-pm-candidate/"> Huge civil disobedience protests</a> started in Yerevan on 13 April and are continuing. On Tuesday, 40.000 people attended the protests. Behind them are the Civic Contract Party and the MerjirSerjin (Reject Serzh) civic group.</p>
<p>We can see that the protests are mostly decentralised and self-organised. The organisers are not always aware or controlling or directing what people do on the streets. So it’s more participatory than previous protests. What needs strong improvement in the movement is the promotion of diversity and opening of spaces for various groups.</p>
<p>The participants should refrain from conservative patriarchal practices and the organisers should work towards this goal. We don’t see this happening now and it’s very unfortunate that a really pluralistic, participatory culture is not fully promoted by the organisers.</p>
<p><strong>Could you give us a more in-depth insight into why Armenians are (again) protesting against their government? Who are the protesters?</strong></p>
<p>This time the trigger was <a href="https://eadaily.com/en/news/2018/04/17/serzh-sargsyan-elected-prime-minister-of-armenia-among-clashes-in-yerevan">Serzh Sargsyan’s election</a> as prime minister. But the<a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/2016/12/07/armenia-at-twenty-five-rough-ride-pub-66351"> roots</a> of the protests lie much deeper. Over the last years, there was an increasing build up of <a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/2016/12/07/armenia-at-twenty-five-rough-ride-pub-66351">anger</a> due to social inequality, emigration, systemic corruption, a lack of justice, and non-democratic elections. And since 2007, we can see that civil society groups are stronger than ever before.</p>
<p>Thematically very diverse civic movements (human rights, environmental and urban issues, public property, gender issues) started to emerge and successfully promote a variety of issues. Non-governmental organisations, the media and researchers indirectly created the nucleus of progressive change. So simultaneously with the growing dissatisfaction of ordinary people, they were motivated and ready to act. And now watch how the consequences are coming forward.</p>
<p><img alt="" class="insertasset marginaliafloat" data-boe-fid="2347501" src="https://www.boell.de/sites/default/files/uploads/2018/04/demo_armenien_3.jpg" style="width: 720px; height: 960px;" /></p>
<p>Regarding the <a href="https://www.opendemocracy.net/od-russia/anna-nikoghosyan/armenian-womens-place-protest">socio-demographic characteristics</a> of the protesters, there are quite diverse groups on the streets, however the students form a majority at the moment. For one week already we see student strikes at most of the universities. Half a year ago, hundreds of students from Yerevan State University and other universities held demonstrations protesting against a bill which was later passed by the parliament.</p>
<p>This bill stipulates that in order to get a military draft deferment, all male students who wish to pursue their studies must sign contracts with Armenia’s Ministry of Defense and agree to serve in the military for three years after completing their studies. Apart from the students, we can also see many journalists, NGOs, activists at the protests.</p>
<p> </p>
<p><br /><strong>What are the demands of protest leader Nikol Pashinyan?</strong></p>
<p>Nikol Pashinyan and his team demanded that Serzh Sargsyan should not have become prime minister in the first place. Now they are urging him to leave. This message unites a lot of people in Armenia. Pashinyan is not pushing his party politics, which would perhaps not be a uniting factor for the protests. At the same time, we see that Nikol and his party now have the opportunity to become the key opposition to the ruling Republican Party led by Sargsyan.</p>
<p>What one should also know about Nikol is that he is a journalist by profession, used to write about political issues and criticised the government a lot. In 2007, he started an impeachment movement against the then president<a href="https://eadaily.com/en/news/2018/04/06/8-days-of-power-vacuum-in-armenia-opposition-hopes-for-sabotage-of-elites"> Robert Kocharyan</a>. Later he was involved in protests against the falsified presidential election results of <a href="https://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/armenia/32115?download=true">2008.</a> After that Nikol was a political prisoner and imprisoned for two years. After his release from prison he created the<a href="https://www.azatutyun.am/a/27047588.html"> Civic Contract Party</a>. He has been an MP ever since and was always a strong supporter of non-violent protests and civil disobedience.</p>
<p><strong>How are the official institutions reacting to the protests?</strong></p>
<p>No reaction so far. Only President Armen Sargsyan (no relations to Serzh Sargsyan), who has a ceremonial role, called to abstain from violence. As to the behaviour of the police, it depends on the orders they receive from the top and that is usually not the head of the Armenian police but the Prime Minister Serzh Sargsyan. The past has shown that brutal police actions towards peaceful protesters have at least doubled the number of people at rallies and that this also raised international awareness.</p>
<p>The police has thus learnt their lesson to stay as calm as possible in the streets. However, it seems that they are individually threatening people through various channels and trying to slowly break up street actions. But as the Serzh Sargsyan government feels the slightest danger to its authority, it might use harsher tactics. We all remember the March 2008 protests when peaceful demonstrators came out to protest the results of the elections and<a href="https://www.ft.com/content/ef0a24e4-e859-11dc-913a-0000779fd2ac"> eight people were killed.</a></p>
<p><strong>What does the legacy of <a href="https://www.opendemocracy.net/karena-avedissian/electrified-yerevan">#electricyerevan</a> that shook the capital in 2015 mean for today’s protests?</strong></p>
<p>Electric Yerevan is one important factor behind the current mobilisation, but the quality of today’s movement did not build up spontaneously. Previous protests have had a snowball effect. We have a <a href="https://www.opendemocracy.net/od-russia/gohar-saroyan/depoliticising-protest-in-armenia">long history</a> of protest movements and a lot of people, online media and civil society organisations continue to invest towards this direction.</p>
<p>At the moment, the street is the only medium where people can express their criticism besides social media. People cannot use TV as they are all delivering political orders of the ruling party and printed media has a very limited circulation. Eventually, being an activist came to be perceived as something good. Protesting became part of urban culture.</p>
<p><strong>What can we expect to happen next?</strong></p>
<p>In the long term this will definitely contribute to Armenia’s democratisation progress. People out on the streets will never give up on this, as they have now felt a sense of liberty. It is yet to be seen how much energy the people will continue to have for daily civil disobedience actions, because this also leads to a burnout at some point.</p>
<p>But I can see a good future for sure, there is no alternative to that. I would like to see the protests transforming into real value-based discussions and debates, leaving behind the huge amount of populist texts and activities. That is what people in Armenia need most.</p>
Mon, 23 Apr 2018 15:03:27 +0200Olya Azatyan, Sonja Schiffers297337