A blog about developments in the nongovernmental, nonprofit, charitable sector in China.

Saturday, October 28, 2017

The Need to Return to Social Governance after the 19th Party Congress

With the closing of the 19th
Party Congress, some have been quick to label this period the “Xi era”, and it’s
easy to see why. Centralization of power, consolidation of strongman rule,
bolstering national security and rule of law, rejuvenating the Chinese
Communist Party, and extending China’s global influence – these are all hallmarks of XJP’s rule, and
they are impressive. But we may be too quick in anointing this the “Xi era”
simply because it is too early to know whether Xi’s policies will find
broad-based support and make a lasting impact beyond his tenure.

Certainly the policies of Mao and Deng had
such an impact, and their names are worthy of pinning “era” next to their names.
But we should remember that five and even 10 years into the “Deng era,” it was
by no means clear whether Deng’s reform policies would survive, particularly
when confronted with the 1989 democracy protests. Now, five years into the “Xi
era,” we know that he has centralized the policy making process and cemented
his strongman status. But it is by no means clear that Xi’s particular approach
to consolidating power has created a more stable and robust national security
and rule of law regime, or rejuvenated the CCP, let alone put China on the socioeconomic
path to achieving a moderately prosperous, and more equitable, society.

Looking back at the threats confronting CCP
rule when Xi came to power, it is hard to fault him for centralizing power in
Beijing and himself, because he attributed those threats to the fragmentation
and decentralization of power in the CCP in the years preceding his tenure.
Centralizing power, which went hand in hand with strengthening Xi’s own
authority, was critical if Xi was to formulate quick responses to what he
perceived as unbridled corruption and lax discipline within the party, and
security threats inside and outside China’s periphery.

But the course that Xi chose came fraught
with its own pitfalls. One is that this
concentration of power, which was intended as the means to an end could easily become an end unto itself. In this scenario,
Xi’s effort to strengthen the “rule of law” and rejuvenate the CCP ends up
becoming the “rule of Xi” and destabilizing the party and the rule of law as institutions, as David Shambaugh and others remind us. This risk
would become a reality if Xi were to go against party norms and keep leaders
who have reached “retirement age” such as Wang Qishan in the Politburo Standing
Committee (which Xi did not do), or staying on as General Secretary of the CCP
for a third term. If so, then Xi would
be guilty of committing the biggest irony of all: by seeking to rejuvenate the
CCP, he would be undermining efforts made by Deng Xiaoping and his successors
to strengthen CCP rule by strengthening collective leadership and leadership succession
norms.

Even if Xi were not to go that far, his
approach to politics and governance still runs the risk of not being sustainable
because it may be unable to garner broad support. Unlike Deng Xiaoping’s rural
and fiscal reforms which played to farmers and provincial leaders, Xi’s
centralizing policies, particularly his anti-corruption campaign, have not had
a galvanizing effect on local leaders or any other key constituency. In this
sense, XJP’s governance approach has been more about building up his own
personal authority and the authority of the Party than about cultivating
support from key constituencies.

The big question then is whether Xi’s governance
measures will outlive him when he steps down, either according to form in 2022
at the 20th Party Congress after serving his second five-year term,
or by breaking form and serving a third term and then stepping down in 2027 at
the 21st Party Congress.

This brings me to the crucial contribution
of civil society to stable and legitimate governance. As others have pointed
out, the concentration of power in central bodies and Xi, without feedback mechanisms
from different segments of society, raises grave risks in a country as large
and diverse as China. As China’s successful rural and private sector reforms of
the 1980s and 1990s show, effective and sustainable policies require input and
buy-in from local authorities and social actors who are unlikely to feel a
strong sense of ownership over policies that are not beneficial to their lives.
In direct contrast, disastrous policy
experiments such as the Great Leap Forward and Cultural Revolution were the
result of an overconcentration of power and inadequate feedback from the
grassroots.

At an earlier point in time, Xi seemed to
understand the importance of consulting with civil society in improving China’s
governance. In the 2013 Third Plenum Decision of the 18th Central
Committee on Comprehensively Deepening the Reforms, which was extolled at the
time as being Xi’s signature statement and is now seen by many commentators as
destined for the garbage bin, Xi recognized the significance of working with social
actors in strengthening governance. Entire sections of the Decision discussed
the importance of “consultative democracy” and “social governance.”

We will, under the Party's
leadership, carry out extensive consultations on major issues relating to economic and social development as well
as specific problems involving the people's immediate interests, and conduct
consultations before and during the implementation of policy decisions. We will
build a consultative democracy featuring appropriate procedures and complete
segments to expand the consultation channels of the organs of state power,
committees of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, political
parties, and community-level and social organizations. We will conduct
intensive consultations on issues relating to legislation, administration,
democracy, political participation and social problems.

The section on “innovations in social
governance” called for clarifying the rights and interests of social
organizations and working with them to create mechanisms to prevent and resolve
social conflicts.The language here was
still state-centered, emphasizing the role of party leadership and adhering to
the law, but the call for reinvigorating horizontal interactions between the
state and society, rather than strengthening the state’s vertical management of
society, was notable, unprecedented and yes even innovative.

Four years after the Third Plenum Decision,
it is clear that Xi has turned his back on his own prescription for better
governance, and instead condoned tightening controls over social actors, and silencing
those who advocate for socioeconomic changes. There have been a few exceptions.
The revised
Environmental Protection Law which went into effect on January 1, 2015
allowed social organizations for the first time to file public interest
lawsuits against polluters. In November 2015, facing historically high levels
of labor disputes and strikes, Xi also took the official trade union, the
All-China Federation of Trade Unions (ACFTU), to task for becoming irrelevant
to workers and called on them to reform to better represent workers. But these
measures have been too few and more
symbolic than substantive.

The tragedy of these last few years is that
the voices that have been muzzled were not calling for revolution,
instigating violence, or fomenting social disorder. They were instead constructive
voices calling for practical, innovative ways to address official corruption,
unpaid wages and social insurance, sexual harassment, pollution, and
discrimination against ethnic minorities. The people calling for these changes
were doing so out of a sense of responsibility to the nation, because they
wanted to make China a more inclusive, equitable and just place very much in
the socialist spirit. They were in fact the very voices that could help Xi
craft better policies if he had listened to them and incorporated their ideas
into his policies.

The challenges Xi and his new leadership
team face after the 19th Party Congress are immense as Xi himself acknowledges.
If he continues his current governance approach, he runs the very substantial
risk of undermining the long-term capacity of the Party to govern by vesting so
much power and authority in himself. Or
he could use his immense power wisely and return to his original playbook of
social governance, reaching out to social constituencies to give them a voice
in shaping socioeconomic policies, thereby creating broad-based support that
would strengthen their legitimacy and sustainability.