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The Korean War (1950-1953)

Inchon Invasion

MacArthur's Dismissal

Summary

MacArthur felt that the North Korean army had been essentially destroyed by
the middle of October, and, against the recommendations of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, he sent his forces into the northernmost parts of North Korea. His
troops were hit by surprise and decimated when Chinese Communists troops began
attacking his forces. On October 25, the PRC made an attack on ROK soldiers
and routed them at Pukchin. On November 1, the Chinese defeated American troops
at Unsan, in the first Chinese-American combat of the war. When MacArthur tried
to order bombing raids against some bridges near the Manchurian border,
Truman and the JCS delayed the bombings out of
fear that errant bombs might land in Manchuria. On November 7, a US
Congressional Election was held, which, although it preserved the Democratic
Party majority, was viewed by many as a referendum criticizing Truman's Korean
War policy.

At this point (November 1950), the Korean Conflict became "an entirely new war."
The Eighth Army withdrew to fortified positions while MacArthur prepared a new
offensive. MacArthur reinitiated the bombing campaign against bridges in the
northernmost provinces, but succeeded in destroying only a third of them. The
Chinese had become excellent fighters during their extended civil war and their
battles against the invading Japanese during WWII, and put up a ferocious fight,
even surrounding the vaunted X Corps at Chosin Reservoir. In December and
January of 1951, US/UN/ROK forces continued retreating. Truman announced in a
press conference that the US was considering using the A-Bomb. Defense spending
for the US had reached $55 Billion for the Fiscal Year 1952 budget, up from $13
Billion annually before the Korean War.

On December 23, 1950 General Walton H. Walker died in a car accident, giving
Lt. General Matthew Ridgway command of US/UN/ROK ground forces in Korea.
Ridgway was well liked by both MacArthur and the JCS, who now dealt with
Ridgway more often than MacArthur. On January 4, 1951, Ridgway evacuated
Seoul and Inchon. From there, Ridgway rebuilt the confidence and morale
of his men, by getting better food and warmer coats for them. Ridgway also
improved the quality of Mobil Army Surgical Hospitals (MASH) under the
philosophy that men who have a chance of living will fight harder. Starting
with operation Thunderbolt, Ridgway and his US/UN/ROK forces went on the
offensive again, righting the war of attrition that had developed since the
involvement of the Chinese. In March, Operation Ripper succeeded in retaking
Seoul from the PRC.

Ridgway's striking success upset MacArthur, who realized Ridgway's successes in
Korea were undermining MacArthur's justifications for attacking Chinese
territory. MacArthur badmouthed Ridgway's conservative strategy as one of
stalemate, leading US troops to label Ridgway's strategy as "Die for Tie."

Commentary

Why did the PRC intervene in Korea? The PRC wanted to preserve a North Korean
Communist State, but not to dominate it. Instead, the PRC wanted North Korea to
serve as a buffer between Manchuria and the US dominated South Korea. The PRC
viewpoint made a certain amount of sense. After all, since the US broke its
promise not to cross the 38th Parallel, what reassurance could the Chinese have
that the US would keep its promise and not cross the Yalu? Resolving to use
force, PRC leaders decided that if they were going to fight the US, the initial
attack would have to be as efficient as possible. For this reason, they planned
a surprise attack, secretly moving troops across the Yalu. China, using the
element of surprise, did not declare war. Furthermore, so that it could
officially disavow responsibility, the PRC troops claimed to be "volunteers."

Some historians claim that MacArthur, in sending his troops to the northernmost
provinces of Korea, was deliberately trying to get the PRC to intervene, in
hopes of restarting the Chinese Civil. The generally accepted consensus is that
he moved farther north simply because he believed the Chinese would never attack
American units. Interestingly, after taking Pyongyang, American troops were
so overjoyed and convinced that the war was over, that they discarded heavy
ammunition and helmets. This premature celebrating came to haunt them when the
Chinese intervened soon after.

American intelligence failed to detect the 180,000 Chinese troops sneaking
across the Yalu because the Chinese traveled at night and hid in the mountains
during the day. US aerial reconnaissance proved unable to detect these troop
movements.

MacArthur, still hoping to one day run for President, became obsessed with an
absolute victory. He began trying to manipulate Washington, massaging
information so that Washington would order him to do exactly what he wanted.
Was MacArthur's behavior simply based on an enormous egotism? Some have
suggested that he was manic-depressive, and suffered mood swings. Infuriated by
MacArthur's actions, Truman certainly wanted to remove him from command, but
MacArthur still remained too popular in the US.

Many believed that PRC intervention in the Korean War might herald the coming of
World War III. Though such a prospect seemed possible, Truman could not simply
allow a US retreat, because that would leave South Korea and Syngman Rhee in
the lurch, ruining American credibility with regard to its other alliances.
Truman had wanted to fight a "limited war," but once engaged, found that
circumstances of war in the modern world did not allow for the concept of
limited war. The world powers, in their ideological struggle, had their
interests everywhere.

many Republican Senators and Congressman continued to support MacArthur and the
idea of a full-scale strike against the PRC. But despite his threat to use the
A-Bomb, Truman probably did not mean it. The US was still the only country that
had ever dropped an A-Bomb, and dropping one again, on yet another Asian nation,
might seem unduly aggressive and racist.