China’s answer to the Asia Pivot

Nile Bowie is an independent writer and current affairs commentator based in Singapore. Originally from New York City, he has lived in the Asia-Pacific region for nearly a decade and was previously a columnist with the Malaysian Reserve newspaper, in addition to working actively in non-governmental organisations and creative industries. He can be reached at nilebowie@gmail.com.

Members from a pro-Taiwan group "China Youth Service & Recreation Centre" tear a portrait of Vietnamese President Truong Tan Sang as they chant slogans, demanding apology and compensation from Vietnam, outside the Vietnamese Consulate in Hong Kong May 15, 2014.(Reuters / Bobby Yip) / Reuters

​Tensions over China’s offshore territorial dispute with Vietnam have given rise to the worst crisis between the two countries in decades.

Over 20 people were killed in an industrial park during recent
clashes that saw Vietnamese mobs chase down and beat Chinese
workers. This episode of violence also saw Taiwanese and other
foreign workers targeted because they were mistaken for Chinese
nationals.

Cases of mass looting and arson have also erupted in areas of
southern and central Vietnam targeting Chinese nationals and
business interests, and reports indicate that anti-China unrest has
swept through 22 of Vietnam’s 63 provinces.

China’s recent decision to setup a $1 billion deep-water oil
drilling rig in a disputed area of the South China Sea that
Vietnam also lays claim to triggered the latest waves of
violence.

Beijing has maintained an unwavering stance on maritime disputes,
and regards the Paracel Islands near the drilling site (known as
the Xisha Islands in China) as its sovereign territory. The
islands have no permanent human residents except for Chinese
military personnel and fishermen, and are valued for productive
fishing grounds and potential oil and gas reserves that China
would like to develop without depending on exploration agreements
with Western oil companies.

The controversial oil rig is located some 17 miles south of the
southwestern-most land feature in the Paracels, and within the
200-nautical-mile exclusive economic zone (EEZ) that China
demarcates based on its claim to the islands, which are also
claimed by Vietnam and Taiwan. The rig itself is 120 miles off
Vietnam’s Ly Son Island and thus on Vietnam’s continental shelf
and well within Hanoi’s EEZ.

Although China recognizes the territory as its own and may have
some legal historical justification for its position, Beijing was
fully aware that drilling in the area would be perceived as a
provocation. China has confirmed it has no plans to abandon the
drilling, and has called on the US to take on a neutral stance on
territorial disputes between Beijing and its neighbors.

The view from Hanoi

Vietnam’s leadership empathized with the protests but denounced
the violent actions taken by some demonstrators. Vietnam's Prime
Minister Nguyen Tan Dung is very cognizant of the destabilizing
effects that protracted protests can have on the economy, as he
urged measures to protect foreign investors, who are expected to
receive payouts for any damages incurred.

Vietnam has maintained bilateral relations throughout the years
with China and has consistently kept communication channels open.
Hanoi has held successive rounds of high-level negotiations over
disputed territories with Beijing, and would certainly prefer to
solve any issues and address tensions through bilateral dialogue,
as China has consistently called for.

Vietnam and China have yet to reach an agreement on their
territorial claims over the South China Sea, but the two
countries have productively struck deals over land border
disputes and maritime rights in the Gulf of Tonkin in the past.
Some kind of compromise is clearly within the realm of
possibility if cooler heads prevail and both sides remain
committed to negotiations.

Hanoi and Beijing both accuse each other of ramming each other’s
vessels and firing water cannons at the site of the Chinese oil
rig. Hanoi claims to have exercised restraint, while Beijing’s
unilateral moves to drill in such sensitive waters could
conceivably put it in breach of a 2011 bilateral maritime pact it
signed with Vietnam to manage territorial disputes in a peaceful
way, among other international agreements.

When compared to the stance on territorial disputes taken by the
Philippines, which is less willing to hold dialogue with China
and instead unilaterally filed an arbitration case at the UN
against Beijing in March, Vietnam has exercised far more
restraint and willingness to solve the issues in a
non-antagonistic way.

Vietnam feels, very understandably, that China’s move to dispatch
an oil drilling rig backed by a sizable squadron of paramilitary
vessels was an entirely unprovoked, hostile act. An editorial in Vietnam’s state-owned media
elaborates, “Vietnamese people are angry. The nation is
angry. We are telling the world that we are angry. We have every
right to be angry.”

The article addresses concerns over the infringement of national
sovereignty, and how Vietnam has not undertaken any action that
could trigger such a reaction from China. “China's action is
considered provocative because it has sent 80 ships, including
seven warships, to accompany the oil rig. The action smacks of a
bully doing something wrong just because it can,” the
editorial argues.

The view from Beijing

China’s latest moves in the South China Sea have prompted a
debate in think-tank and foreign policy circles, who are at pains
to decipher the underlying message behind Beijing’s unfolding
tussle with Hanoi. While many would prefer to think that China is
behaving in an irrational and non-strategic way, others would
argue that it is attempting to send a message.

Beijing’s actions should be interpreted as a calculated response
to Washington’s policy shift to Asia, which has been given
renewed priority following US President Barack Obama’s recent
four-nation tour of the region. During his trip, Obama
offered specific security guarantees to Japanese Prime Minister
Shinzo Abe that Washington would support Tokyo’s territorial
claims in its dispute with Beijing in the event of conflict
between the two sides.

The US President also warned China against pressing its maritime
claims after it unilaterally declared an air exclusion zone over
the disputed chain of islands that both Tokyo and Beijing claim.
China’s dispute with Japan is historically complex and
multidimensional, more so than the disputes in the South China
Sea. Beijing’s claim in its dispute with Tokyo is historically
and legally more sound, and China deeply resents Washington’s
position on the issue.

In the Philippines, Washington and Manila inked a controversial
defense agreement to give the US government de facto
basing access in the country for a 10-year period. China
interpreted both these developments as Washington inserting
itself into matters of territory and sovereignty, which it
insists on dealing with through bilateral negotiations with the
other countries.

Beijing also believes with some justification that other
countries will be more willing to behave provocatively and
challenge China’s bottom line if Washington supports their
claims. China is totally opposed to any US-dominated multilateral
dispute mechanism for territorial issues, and it is also under a
high degree of domestic pressure not to be pushed around by
states like the Philippines, and by extension, the United States.

Vietnam isn’t a treaty ally of the United States, and it has a
complicated history with Washington that has long prevented the
two countries forming a comprehensive partnership. China knew
that Vietnam would take offense to drilling in contested waters,
but it did so anyway to test the limits of Washington's
commitment to upholding freedom of navigation as part of the
pivot strategy.

China ultimately wants to send a message that it will not be
deterred by Washington’s pivot and an alliance of anti-China
states that it intends to consolidate. Beijing is now willing to
openly challenge the idea that a US-led security alliance can
deter it from safeguarding what it perceives to be its
territorial integrity, and the exploitation of all the natural
resources within that territory.

Beijing’s actions are intended to call Washington’s bluff, while
being sufficiently bold, but not destabilizing enough to
compromise China's overall national security and economic
interests. A recent editorial in China’s state-owned Global Times
publication gives some insight into Beijing’s thinking.

“China faces a dilemma with its growing power. On the one
hand, it will be confronted by neighbors like Vietnam, the
Philippines and Japan, and other stakeholders like the US if it
makes use of its power,” claims the article. One can infer
that thinkers in Beijing view these state actors as separate
fingers on the same hand.

The editorial continues, “On the other, if China conceals its
power, its determination to safeguard territorial integrity will
be underestimated, which would further foster the
unscrupulousness of countries like Vietnam, the Philippines and
Japan.”

China clearly does not want its resolute stance to be
misinterpreted so that other states feel like they can antagonize
Beijing without consequences. The question is whether China’s
latest unilateral action is a one-off reaction to US policy in
the region, or the start of a fundamentality new policy line, one
that will inevitably drive the ASEAN region further into
Washington’s corner in the years ahead.

A unified ASEAN bloc that has gravitated into America’s security
orbit could give the next US administration a greater hand to
escalate tensions recklessly where it sees fit, through sanctions
and other mechanisms that could put economic strain on all sides.

The US, through the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) trade deal
currently being negotiated, intends to prioritize its economic
relations with the ASEAN bloc so as to reduce its dependence on
China, putting Washington in a position where future sanctions on
Beijing would not boomerang back as hard and become
destabilizing.

Beijing still sees itself as a developing country and doing
business is its top priority, so it should be conscious of the
huge power asymmetry between itself and its neighbors.

At the recent ASEAN summit, the regional organization agreed to
its first unified position on territorial disputes between China
and other regional states, which calls upon all parties to
refrain from using force and escalating tensions, in addition to
calling on both China and ASEAN to agree upon and conclude a Code
of Conduct (COC) in dealing with disputes in the South China Sea.

As the top trading partner of almost all Southeast Asian
countries, China should do its utmost to be perceived as a benign
power that can accord the same degree of rights and respect to
others as it demands for itself. It is not in Beijing’s interests
to be perceived as a bully or a regional hegemon.

China should realize that the best way to keep the US pivot
policy in check is to accommodate the interests of its neighbors
by showing a willingness to reach pragmatic and mutually
beneficial solutions to territorial disputes, rather than
stubbornly refusing to yield or compromise.

The statements, views and opinions expressed in this column are solely those of the author and do not necessarily represent those of RT.