MacIntyre on Emotivism

Emotivism is the view that ethical judgments are simply expressions of approval or disapproval. For the emotivist, the statement “this is good” means roughly “I approve of this” or “hurrah for this”. Most people would agree that ethical statements contain expressions of approval or disapproval. But the claim of emotivism is stronger. It asserts such statements are nothing other than expressions of preference.

There are several strong arguments against emotivism. For example, it is counter-intuitive to an extreme. When we debate morality, we believe that our position is somehow more justified than the position we disagree with. Otherwise, we wouldn’t bother trying to persuade. Emotivism requires that we reinterpret every ethical disagreement in history as merely a struggle for power. While ethical disagreements may mask struggles for power, as in some political discourse, emotivism entails are such disagreements are, by their nature, struggles for power.

“Moral judgments express feelings or attitudes,” it is said. “What kind of feelings or attitudes?” we ask. “Feelings or attitudes of approval,” is the reply. “What kind of approval?” we ask, perhaps remarking that approval is of many kinds. It is in answer to this question that every version of emotivism either remains silent, or by identifying the relevant kind of approval as moral approval – that is, the type of approval expressed by a specifically moral judgment – becomes vacuously circular.

What is “moral approval?” I would say it is approval based on the belief that a particular act is morally good. But this answer is unavailable to the emotivist, who defines “morally good” as an expression of approval. The emotivist, thus, is unable to distinguish between my dislike of citrus fruit from my dislike of genocide. But the difference between the two is profound. I dislike fruit because I don’t like how it tastes. I dislike genocide because it’s immoral.