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Dr. ElGindi is assistant professor of Policy, Planning, and Development in the Department of International Affairs at Qatar University.

A theory of well-being that ignores what people want cannot be sustained. On the other hand, a theory that ignores what actually happens in people's lives and focuses exclusively on what they think about their life is not tenable either.1

— Daniel Kahneman

In 2010, both Egypt and Tunisia were achieving remarkable economic gains, with real GDP growth rates of 5.1 and 3.5 percent, respectively. These had been preceded by even higher growth rates, reaching up to 6 and 7 percent, respectively, in the second half of the 2000s. Both countries were applauded by international organizations such as the World Bank (WB) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) for their achievements in the period preceding the uprisings. Tunisia was singled out as "the best student…in the region."2 Therefore, the uprisings of late 2010 and early 2011 in both countries might seem contradictory — if we limit our analysis to macroeconomic indicators. But at the very moment these variables were being applauded by international organizations, around 28.5 percent of Egyptians and 21 percent of Tunisians were dissatisfied with the standards of living they had to endure.3 In fact, numerous surveys reveal a similar picture: resentment and dissatisfaction with the quality of life and a feeling of deteriorating living conditions.

Recent research in social psychology emphasizes the importance of including both objective and subjective measures in order to have a valid assessment of a society's well-being.4 By objective, I mean official statistics published by government agencies; by subjective, I mean people's perceptions of their well-being.5 While some might think that the Arab uprisings took almost everyone by surprise, to those who have studied subjective data, they were a manifestation of what was festering underneath the surface. Despite the appreciation both countries were receiving from various international organizations, their reports lacked any critical assessment of how people felt about their general quality of life. Numerous reports and data extracted from various survey sources (Gallup reports, Arab Barometer and World Values Survey) reveal resentment and frustration in both countries (especially among the youth) toward their economic and social conditions.

Recent research in economics, psychology and sociology has demonstrated that it is quite possible to have discrepancies between objective and subjective measures. In fact, research shows that, in spite of the fact that income distribution in countries such as Germany, France and Switzerland is quite similar, perceptions among their respective citizens vary widely.6 Further, people in the United States tend to hold a far more optimistic view when it comes to inequality within their country.7 Lastly, perceptions of inequality might be a more significant predictor of social policy than official statistics.8

This significance of integrating both objective and subjective data has also been on the radar of Nobel Prize-winning economists such as Joseph Stiglitz and Amartya Sen. Stiglitz, Sen and Jean-Paul Fitoussi9 published a revealing report — commissioned by former French President Nicolas Sarkozy — assessing what had gone wrong with our economic assessments following the 2008 financial crisis. They concluded that there is a dire need to reflect people's subjective well-being when assessing the quality of life within a given country. This was clearly not a priority for either the Tunisian or the Egyptian government. With relatively high and steady economic growth and decent inflows of foreign investment, both governments were confident they were on the right track — so much so that both the WB and IMF noted them as case studies of countries successfully managing globalization challenges.10 Table 1 below indicates GDP growth rates and FDI inflows during the period from 2000 to 2012 in both countries.

TABLE 1.

Real GDP Growth Rates and FDI in Egypt and Tunisia (2000-2012)

Egypt

Tunisia

Year

Real GDP
Growth Rate (%)

FDI (in billion US$)

Real GDP
Growth Rate (%)

FDI (in billion US$)

2000

5.4

1.24

4.7

0.75

2001

3.5

0.51

3.8

0.45

2002

2.4

0.65

1.3

0.79

2003

3.2

0.24

4.7

0.54

2004

4.1

1.25

6.2

0.59

2005

4.5

5.38

3.5

0.71

2006

6.8

10.04

5.2

3.24

2007

7.1

11.58

6.7

1.52

2008

7.2

9.49

4.2

2.60

2009

4.7

6.71

3

1.53

2010

5.1

6.39

3.5

1.33

2011

1.8

0.48

-2.4

0.43

2012

2.2

2.80

3.7

1.55

Source: World Bank Development Indicators.

This research aims to draw from survey resources — World Values Survey, Arab Barometer, Gallup reports — in order to track and describe changes in perception that were taking place in both countries in the years preceding the revolution and compare these results with official macroeconomic indicators. Results show a stark divergence, highlighting the significance of incorporating subjective well-being measures in any sound analysis of prosperity.

This research is novel in several ways. Whereas most previous research focused on a combination of economic, political and social factors (unemployment, inflation, food insecurity, political oppression, corruption, etc.), this research integrates both objective and subjective measures of well-being. Second, it helps fill in a gap in research conducted using qualitative measures such as surveys. Third, it offers policy makers an integrated approach that might yield more accurate results.

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