Abstract

Neither the major assumptions of developmental statist theories nor their revised arguments (e.g. network and internal organization theories) can persuasively elucidate the South Korean state's strong autonomy vis-ri-vis the capitalist group in establishing and implementing economic/industrial policies. A more relevant elucidation can be made by attending to the following three points: 1) one can more clearly show the former's autonomy in relation to the latter by examining discordant rather than amicable aspects of the relationship between them; 2) the strength of the East Asian state's autonomy lies not in its inherent, absolute cohesiveness but in its 'political integrating power'; 3) in interpreting the state's strong autonomy vis-a-vis society, more research on political and administrative factors (rather than economic ones) need to be conducted. Also important are the behaviour of political and administrative agents who operate institutions and various interactions among them. To enforce these points, this article analyzes the political aspects of the state-capital relationship while the South Korean government established anti-chaebol policies to restrict economic concentration via big businesses.