01819cam a22002417 4500001000600000003000500006005001700011008004100028100002300069245013100092260006600223490004100289500001600330520084900346530006101195538007201256538003601328700002201364710004201386830007601428856003701504856003601541w3647NBER20161209222907.0161209s1991 mau||||fs|||| 000 0 eng d1 aRebitzer, James B.10aWork Incentives and the Demand for Primary and Contingent Laborh[electronic resource] /cJames B. Rebitzer, Lowell J. Taylor. aCambridge, Mass.bNational Bureau of Economic Researchc1991.1 aNBER working paper seriesvno. w3647 aMarch 1991.3 aThis paper presents an incentive-based dual labor market model. Three implications of the model are emphasized. First, in equilibrium, there is an excess supply of workers to primary jobs. Second, when demand is uncertain, firms may choose a mix of primary and contingent workers to perform the same job, even when these workers are perfect substitutes in production. Third, firms prefer to hire into primary jobs workers with strong job attachment and workers whose preferences lead them to prefer long work hours. We argue that industries with high proportions of part-time workers will tend to have large concentrations of contingent workers. The empirical finding that the wages and benefits of full-time workers are significantly reduced in industries with large concentrations of part-time workers appears consistent with this hypothesis. aHardcopy version available to institutional subscribers. aSystem requirements: Adobe [Acrobat] Reader required for PDF files. aMode of access: World Wide Web.1 aTaylor, Lowell J.2 aNational Bureau of Economic Research. 0aWorking Paper Series (National Bureau of Economic Research)vno. w3647.4 uhttp://www.nber.org/papers/w364741uhttp://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w3647