Adrian
D. Riley, a New York state prisoner proceeding pro
se, filed a Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus with
this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Riley is in the
custody of the New York State Department of Corrections and
Community Supervision and incarcerated at Attica Correctional
Facility. Respondent has answered the Petition, and Riley has
replied.

I.
BACKGROUND/PRIOR PROCEEDINGS

On July
11, 2008, Riley was charged with first-degree sexual conduct
against a child for sexual abuses. The indictment alleged
that Riley, “on or about the year 2002 or 2003 through
March 2008 . . . over a period of time, not less than three
months . . . did engage in two or more acts of sexual
conduct, which includes at least one act of sexual
intercourse, oral sexual conduct, anal sexual conduct or
aggravated sexual conduct with a child less than eleven years
old.” According to the indictment, the conduct began
when the victim, the daughter of Riley's girlfriend, was
four or five years old and continued until she was nine years
old.

Prior
to trial, the court held a Sandoval[2] hearing to
address whether the prosecution could question Riley, in the
event he testified, about a September 24, 2008, criminal
conviction for criminal possession of a weapon in the fourth
degree, which stemmed from an arrest on May 2, 2008, at the
residence of the victim and her family. The People wanted to
address the underlying facts of that conviction because the
victim and her mother had been present, and the prosecution
argued that the incident related to child sexual abuse
syndrome. The court expressed concern that Riley had
committed that crime after the incident for which he stood
trial. The court ultimately ruled that the People could
question Riley about the conviction during cross-examination
for Sandoval purposes.

The
prosecution also moved in limine to preclude the
defense from cross-examining witnesses regarding the
victim's allegations of sexual abuse by other persons.
The court determined that such evidence was irrelevant
because Riley failed to prove that the allegations were false
or that the victim was a habitual liar with respect to abuse
allegations.

At
trial, the victim's mother, the executive director of the
housing complex where the victim and her family resided, the
victim, and three nurses who had cared for the victim after
she reported the sexual abuse testified for the prosecution.
Riley testified on his own behalf, after counsel noted that
Riley chose to do so against counsel's advice. The
prosecution requested and received permission to explore
Riley's termination from his employment at a nursing home
due to misconduct. Counsel gave their summations to the jury,
and, after the charge to the jury, defense counsel, who had
objected to a statement made by the prosecutor during
summation, moved for a mistrial due to inflammatory and
improper remarks. The request was denied. After
deliberations, the jury found Riley guilty as charged. He was
subsequently sentenced to a determinate term of 25 years'
imprisonment with 20 years of post-release supervision and an
order of protection in favor of the victim for 45 years.

Riley
then moved pro se to vacate his conviction pursuant
to New York Criminal Procedure Law (“CPL”) §
440.10 on the grounds that: 1) he was denied the effective
assistance of counsel because counsel failed to conduct an
adequate investigation of Riley's case, present expert
defense testimony, and present evidence that the victim had
recanted the allegations of molestation; and 2)
newly-discovered evidence in the form of Family Court
testimony demonstrated his actual innocence. The court denied
the motion, and the Appellate Division of the New York
Supreme Court denied Riley leave to appeal.

Through
counsel, Riley appealed his conviction, arguing that: 1) the
evidence presented was not legally sufficient to support his
conviction and the guilty verdict was against the weight of
the evidence; 2) he was denied a fair trial by the
court's Sandoval ruling and the prosecutor's
remarks during summation; 3) trial counsel was ineffective
for failing to fully investigate the matter, particularly
with regards to the Family Court proceedings and the
Department of Social Services investigation; and 4) the
sentence was harsh and excessive. Riley also filed a pro
se supplemental briefing alleging that: 1) he was
deprived of a fair trial by the trial court's evidentiary
rulings that precluded the defense from offering evidence of
the victim's sexual abuse allegations against others and
allowed the prosecution to cross-examine Riley about his
other conviction; 2) trial counsel was ineffective for
failing to present expert testimony, investigate exculpatory
evidence, and present a defense; and 3) the prosecution
committed misconduct during summation. The Appellate Division
unanimously confirmed the judgment against Riley in a
reasoned opinion issued on May 2, 2014. People v.
Riley, 984 N.Y.S.2d 735, 738 (N.Y.App.Div. May 2, 2014).
Riley sought leave to appeal on all grounds raised in the
Appellate Division, and the New York Court of Appeals denied
leave on December 3, 2014. People v. Riley, 25
N.E.3d 351, 351 (N.Y. 2014).

Riley
then timely filed a pro se Petition for a Writ of
Habeas Corpus to this Court on October 20, 2013. See
28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A).

II.
GROUNDS RAISED

In his
pro se Petition before this Court, Riley argues
that: 1) trial counsel was ineffective for failing to: a)
consult with an expert and present expert testimony, b)
investigate the case, c) oppose the prosecutor's motion
in limine, and d) present a defense; 2) the
prosecution committed misconduct during summation; and 3) the
trial court's evidentiary rulings with regard to the
motion in limine and Sandoval hearing
deprived him of a fair trial.

III.
STANDARD OF REVIEW

Under
the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996
(“AEDPA”), 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), this Court
cannot grant relief unless the decision of the state court
was “contrary to, or involved an unreasonable
application of, clearly established Federal law, as
determined by the Supreme Court of the United States, ”
§ 2254(d)(1), or “was based on an unreasonable
determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented
in the State court proceeding, ” § 2254(d)(2). A
state-court decision is contrary to federal law if the state
court applies a rule that contradicts controlling Supreme
Court authority or “if the state court confronts a set
of facts that are materially indistinguishable from a
decision” of the Supreme Court, but nevertheless
arrives at a different result. Williams v. Taylor,
529 U.S. 362, 406 (2000).

&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;To the
extent that the Petition raises issues of the proper
application of state law, they are beyond the purview of this
Court in a federal habeas proceeding. See Swarthout v.
Cooke, 131 S.Ct. 859, 863 (2011) (per curiam) (holding
that it is of no federal concern whether state law was
correctly applied). It is a fundamental precept of dual
federalism that the states possess primary authority for
defining and enforcing the criminal law. See, e.g.,
Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991) (a
federal habeas court cannot reexamine a state court&#39;s
interpretation and application of state law); Walton v.
...

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