01899cam a22002657 4500001000700000003000500007005001700012008004100029100002000070245012500090260006600215490004200281500001600323520076900339530006101108538007201169538003601241690005601277690008201333700002401415710004201439830007701481856003801558856003701596w14791NBER20150802151055.0150802s2009 mau||||fs|||| 000 0 eng d1 aDincer, Nergiz.10aCentral Bank Transparencyh[electronic resource]:bCauses, Consequences and Updates /cNergiz Dincer, Barry Eichengreen. aCambridge, Mass.bNational Bureau of Economic Researchc2009.1 aNBER working paper seriesvno. w14791 aMarch 2009.3 aWe present updated estimates of central bank for 100 countries up through 2006 and use them to analyze both the determinants and consequences of monetary policy transparency in an integrated econometric framework. We establish that there has been significant movement in the direction of greater central bank transparency in recent years. Transparent monetary policy arrangements are more likely in countries with strong and stable political institutions. They are more likely in democracies, with their culture of transparency. Using these political determinants as instruments for transparency, we show that more transparency monetary policy operating procedures is associated with less inflation variability though not also with less inflation persistence. aHardcopy version available to institutional subscribers. aSystem requirements: Adobe [Acrobat] Reader required for PDF files. aMode of access: World Wide Web. 7aE0 - General2Journal of Economic Literature class. 7aE58 - Central Banks and Their Policies2Journal of Economic Literature class.1 aEichengreen, Barry.2 aNational Bureau of Economic Research. 0aWorking Paper Series (National Bureau of Economic Research)vno. w14791.4 uhttp://www.nber.org/papers/w1479141uhttp://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w14791