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Tuesday, October 31, 2017

Key
Takeaway: Russia is accelerating its efforts to subvert the Syrian political
process by establishing a new diplomatic framework that sets conditions to
expel the U.S. from Northern Syria. Russia announced its intent to host
delegates from all major opposition, ethnic, and tribal factions at a “Syrian
Congress on National Dialogue” in Sochi on November 18. Russia may exploit the
conference to broker a wider reconciliation deal between the Bashar al Assad
Regime and the Syrian Kurdish YPG under conditions that preclude long-term U.S.
influence in Syria.

Russia
will reportedly host a political conference called the “Syrian Congress on
National Dialogue” in Sochi on November 18. Russian media claims that the
conference will include up to 1,500 participants representing major political
and armed opposition groups, local councils, tribal gatherings, and various
factions of Syrian Kurds.[1]
The Russian Foreign Ministry published an official list of invitees that
includes the Syrian Kurdish Democratic Union Party (PYD) and its rival Kurdish
National Council (KNC); the exiled High Negotiations Committee (HNC) backed by
Saudi Arabia and the Bashar al Assad regime-tolerated Moscow and Cairo
Platforms; and armed anti-Assad opposition groups including the Southern Front.[2]
It remains unclear which if any of these groups will attend the conference,
although the public invitations are likely intended to signal inclusiveness.
Syrian Ambassador to the UN Bashar al-Jaafari also stressed the Assad regime’s willingness
to participate.[3]
Russia will reportedly use the venue to propose constitutional reforms, the
formation of a transitional government that retains Syrian President Bashar
al-Assad, and new municipal, parliamentary, and presidential elections for
Syria by 2021, according to unidentified sources familiar with the conference.[4]

The
conference, if successful, will undermine or coopt international efforts to
reach a political settlement to the Syrian Civil War. Russia has used
alternative diplomatic venues - such as the trilateral Astana Talks with Turkey
and Iran - to capture and shape the UN Geneva Process. Russia uses these
measures to demonstrate its legitimacy as an international arbiter while
simultaneously ensuring a favorable political outcome that preserves its
interests in the Syrian Civil War. Russia could also use the conference to
broker a deal with the Syrian Kurds at the expense of the U.S. in Northern
Syria. Russia is reportedly prepared to offer federal status to the Syrian
Kurds in exchange for their wider reconciliation with the Assad Regime.[5]The Syrian Kurdish PYD has
previously been barred from participation in political negotiations at the
Geneva Talks at Turkey’s insistence. Russia reportedly excluded Turkey from
active participation in the Syrian Congress on National Dialogue - likely to
encourage meaningful engagement by the Syrian Kurds.[6] The
outcome of these negotiations could include an agreement that constrains or
ultimately expels the U.S. Anti-ISIS Coalition from Northern Syria.

Russia
has recently deepened its increased cooperation with the Syrian Kurdish PYD to
assert itself as a viable partner ahead of the Syrian Congress on National
Dialogue. The Russian Armed Forces reportedly assumed full control of the
Menagh Military Airbase north of Aleppo City on October 27 following a
withdrawal by the Syrian Kurdish YPG. Russia previously deployed military
personnel to Menagh Airbase and nearby Tel Rifaat on October 20 to preempt
military operations by Turkey against the majority-Kurdish Afrin Canton in
Western Aleppo Province.[7] Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Mikhail
Bogdanov also met with officials from the Syrian Kurdish PYD in Qamishli in
Hasaka Province on October 18 to discuss Syria’s future political outcome.[8]
Russian Senator Ziad Sabsabi conducted a near-simultaneous visit to Qamishli in
coordination with the Russian Ministry of Defense to secure the release of
twenty-one Russian Chechens and Dagestanis from Afrin Canton.[9]
Russia has also mounted long-standing efforts to generate a unified bloc of
Syrian Kurds. Russian Gen. Alexander Dvornikov hosted a conference for representatives
from 24 Syrian Kurdish political parties - including the PYD and KNC - at the
Hmeymim Airbase on the Syrian Coast in December 2016.[10]
Russia nonetheless faces challenges from its partner in the Assad Regime. Assad
reportedly rejected calls to consider federalism and favorable constitutional
reforms for the Syrian Kurds by Russia in October 2016.[11] The
upcoming Syrian Congress on National Dialogue in Sochi will likely encounter
similar hurdles. Russia nonetheless stands to use its leadership of the
political process to further subvert the future influence of the U.S. in Syria.

Key Takeaway: Russia has likely exploited recent tensions between Hungary and Ukraine to support its campaign to drive a wedge between Ukraine and its neighbors. The Kremlin has also revived its subversion in Western Ukraine focusing on minorities’ autonomy issues. It is unlikely that the Kremlin intends to create an insurgency there as it did in Eastern Ukraine, but it may create another fissure that destabilizes Kyiv. The Kremlin is also likely to attempt to stoke tensions between Ukraine and its other neighbors with minorities in Western Ukraine, such as Poland. The U.S. must watch these trends, which are likely to be slow-burning and subtle. They have implications for Ukraine’s stability and provide insight into Russia’s evolving methods of irregular warfare.

Key Facts

o Ukraine passed an educational bill that mandates the use of the Ukrainian language in schools on September 25.

o Nationalists in Hungary, which shares a border with Ukraine, condemned the bill for infringing upon the rights of 150,000 Hungarians in Western Ukraine’s Zakharpatiya (Trans-Carpathia) region. Hungary’s Russia-linked extreme nationalist[1] Jobbik party participated in a rally calling[2] for the self-determination of Zakharpatiya in Budapest on October 13.

o The Hungarian government threatened to halt Ukraine’s integration with the EU, though it received no support from key EU states. It also blocked[3] the next Ukraine-NATO Commission meeting[4] on October 27.

o Hungarian Prime Minister Victor Orban also has a relatively strong relationship[5] with Russia. Hungary is the only EU country Russian President Vladimir Putin visited twice in 2017. The Kremlin also agreed[6] on a $12 billion nuclear plant modernization project in Hungary planned for early 2018.

o Other Eastern European countries with ethnic communities in Ukraine criticized the bill but did not take as confrontational a stance as Hungary.[7]

o The Russian media launched a campaign to amplify this self-determination narrative, which it has propagated in the past, and criticize the Ukrainian law as “anti-European.”[8]

o Although Ukraine and Hungary might have come to a compromise[9], the Kremlin intervened and set conditions to exploit this vulnerability in the future.

The Kremlin has likely attempted to foster separatist narratives within Hungarian minorities in Western Ukraine for years.

o Russia likely developed and leveraged its ties with a far-right Hungarian party, Jobbik, to propagate the idea of Zakharpatiya’s autonomy. ISW assesses that the Kremlin supports Jobbik. The U.S. has reportedly been investigating[10] Russian funding of political parties in Europe, where Jobbik is a potential Kremlin target. A Jobbik Member of the European Parliament, Bela Kovacs, has been under investigation[11] by Hungarian authorities since 2014 over suspicions of working for Russian intelligence. Kovacs has had an office in Berehove, a key Ukrainian town with Hungarian minorities, since December 2010[12]. Kovacs advocated[13] for the creation of a special administrative district for Hungarian-speaking towns in Zakharpatiya as a necessary precondition to Ukraine’s joining the EU Association Agreement in 2013. Jobbik members were among the observers in support of the illegitimate Russian referendum[14] in Crimea[15] in March 2015 and the illegal election held in the Russian proxy “Donetsk People’s Republic” in November 2014[16]. Jobbik members conducted a rally calling for self-determination[17] of Hungarians in Zakharpatiya in Budapest after the Russian occupation of Crimea in March 2014. Jobbik’s leader, Gábor Vona, called[18] Russia the “Eurasian power that could spearhead a real…resistance against the Euro-Atlantic bloc.”

o The Russian media created false narratives that dramatically overstated the aspirations of Hungarian minorities to gain autonomy. Two notable disinformation campaigns included reports[19] about the Ruthenes, another ethnic group in Zakharpatiya, holding a congress demanding their autonomy in March 2015. Another Russian media campaign[20] claimed that Rusyn and Hungarian communities of Zakharpatiya held a congress in Budapest, where they allegedly called for the federal status of their region in August of 2015. The respective communities’ leaders have debunked both Russian narratives.

o The Kremlin likely attempted to build local organizations to use as a subversion tool. The Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) issued a warning[21] to the Zakarpatiya Regional Organization for the Protection of Workers Rights about its potential criminal liability for encroachment on the territorial integrity of Ukraine in July 2015. The organization, registered only one month earlier[22], promoted the idea of a special self-governing territory for Hungarian minorities as being essential for ensuring workers’ rights. Local investigative journalists soon exposed[23] the organization’s connections to Russia, and the SBU’s warning followed shortly thereafter.

Russia may have exploited the recent tensions between Ukraine and Hungary to revive its subversion efforts on Ukraine’s Western border.

o Jobbik called for the autonomy of Hungarian minorities in Western Ukraine. Jobbik reportedly organized[24] a “Zakharpatiya self-determination” rally in Budapest on October 13, calling for the autonomy of the region. News reports showed some of the participants holding signs reading “Hungary wants Transcarpathia back![25]” Jobbik renewed its push for a regular all-Hungarian roundtable[26] on the Transcarpathian issue on September 29. Jobbik promised to launch a significant “struggle[27] for the autonomy of Hungarian communities living abroad” within the context of its election campaign. Both Jobbik and Hungary’s ruling nationalist Fidescz party are likely to use the issue of Hungarian minorities abroad to gain political capital ahead of Hungary’s 2018 elections.

o The Kremlin launched a media operation to amplify Hungarian nationalist criticism of the Ukrainian educational bill.[28] The Hungarian Government threatened to ask the EU to revise its association agreement[29] with Ukraine, and strongly condemned the bill. Poland, Romania, and others with ethnic communities in Ukraine criticized the bill but did not further press their concerns. Polish officials stated on October 23 that they do not view the bill as a threat and that minority groups should be able to know both Ukrainian and Polish[30] languages. Ukrainian Foreign Minister Pavlo Klimkin stated that Ukraine and Hungary found a compromise[31] and will cooperate on the execution of the law on October 19. Nevertheless, the Hungarian government escalated by blocking[32] the next Ukraine-NATO commission meeting on October 27. Russian propaganda boosted the Hungarian nationalist narrative and continued to frame Ukraine as an oppressor of minorities, suggesting that Ukraine is about to lose additional territory[33] and push away its European[34] and NATO[35] partners.

The Kremlin is likely pursuing a broader campaign aimed at driving a wedge between Ukraine and its European[37] neighbors. Ukrainian authorities arrested a group of saboteurs on October 2 who were attempting to destroy a Hungarian monument in Zakharpatiya. Ukrainian Interior Minister Arsen Avakov stated the detained individuals were connected to the defunct pro-Russia Party of Regions in Ukraine. Avakov stated that the gang was responsible for at least eight other incidents intended to inflame tensions between Ukraine and EU in 2016-2017. Earlier in 2017, for example, protest participants claimed that Russia-backed elements paid them to instigate anti-Polish Ukrainian nationalist protests at the Polish embassy in Kyiv on July 7.[38]

Implications

It is unlikely that Russia intends to or is able to create a Donbas-like insurgency in Zakharpatiya. This Western Ukrainian region has strong pro-Ukrainian sentiments, small minority communities, and other differentiating factors. However, sustained Russian subversion may create another destabilization problem for Kyiv to solve. Growing pre-election rhetoric from Hungarian nationalist parties about protecting Hungarians abroad has amplified the Kremlin’s continued cultivation of minorities’ self-determination and autonomy movements. The Kremlin’s information operations in turn amplify Hungarian messaging. The cumulative effect may lead to more discussions about special status for the region and, potentially, to a referendum in the longer term. Kyiv’s increased focus on its own 2019 elections and the continued war in Eastern Ukraine may prevent the Ukrainian government from allocating necessary resources to address underlying concerns in Zakharpatiya and otherwise resisting Russia’s subversion. The complexity of the situation may allow Russia to effectively conceal its hand and portray any escalation as indigenous confrontation between ethnic groups within Ukraine or Ukraine and its neighbor. Additional destabilization may stretch Kyiv’s already thin resources and damage Ukraine’s relations with its European partners. Finally, the Kremlin’s reinforcement of regional self-determination narratives and the rhetoric about protecting minorities abroad among Eastern European states helps Russia legitimize its own expansionist actions, which it claims are motivated by its desire to “protect” Russian minorities.

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[1] “Intent on unsettling the EU, Russia Taps Soldiers from the Fringe,” The New York Times, December 24, 2016. Available https://www(.)nytimes.com/2016/12/24/world/europe/intent-on-unsettling-eu-russia-taps-foot-soldiers-from-the-fringe.html,

[2] “Jobbik Party is the Organizer of Rally for Zakarpattia Self-Determination,” 122 UA, October 12, 2017. Available https://112.international/politics/jobbik-party-is-organizer-of-rally-for-zakarpattia-self-determination-21600(.)html

[3] “Hungary blocks Ukraine-NATO Commission meeting in December due to education law” UNIAN, October 27, 2017. Available https://www(.)unian.info/politics/2212494-hungary-blocks-ukraine-nato-commission-meeting-in-december-due-to-education-law.html

[8] “Ukraine’s law on education undercuts legal norms of any state, official says” TASS September 26, 2017 Available http://tass(.)com/politics/967613

[9] “Ukraine and Hungary will work together to implement the Law on Education” [Russian] Pravda, October 19, 2017 Available http://www(.)pravda.com.ua/rus/news/2017/10/19/7158982/ ; “Paruby - Venice Commission: The discussion about the Law on Education has more political than legal grounds” [Russian] Censor.net October 31, 2017. Available https://censor.net.ua/news/461178/parubiyi_venetsianskoyi_komissii_diskussiya_vokrug_zakona_ob_obrazovanii_imeet_bolshe_politicheskie

[10] “Russia accused of clandestine funding of European parties as US conducts major review of Vladimir Putin's strategy” The Telegraph, January 16, 2016. Available http://www.telegraph(.)co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/russia/12103602/America-to-investigate-Russian-meddling-in-EU.html

[11] Hungary: European Parliament Lifts Immunity for Spy Suspect,” The New York Times, October 14, 2015. Available https://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/15/world/europe/hungary-european-parliament-lifts-immunity-for-spy-suspect.html; New Dimension of diplomatic Conflict between Ukraine and Hungary [Ukranian] Euromaidan Press October 18, 2017. Available http://euromaidanpress(.)com/2017/10/17/separatism-transcarpathian-style-is-hungary-aiming-to-grab-a-part-of-ukraine/#arvlbdata; “Is the Hungarian far-right Jobbik party financed by Russia?” Hungarian Spectrum January 20, 2017. Available http://hungarianspectrum(.)org/2016/01/20/is-the-hungarian-far-right-jobbik-party-financed-by-russia/

[13] “Baile Kovacs states that Ukraine will not be in the EU without Prityansky district in Transcarpathia” [Ukrainian] Mukachevo.net October 19, 2013. Available http://www(.)mukachevo.net/ua/news/view/81604-Бейла-Ковач-заявляє-що-Україна-не-буде-в-ЄС-без-Притисянського-округу-на-Закарпатті-ФОТО

[16] “Potemkin Observers” The Economist, November 4, 2014. Available https://www(.economist.com/blogs/easternapproaches/2014/11/ukraines-rebels-and-eurosceptics

[17] “Petition to the Government of Hungary for Transcarpathia,” gaudinagytamas, April 3, 2014. Available http://gaudinagytamas(.)hu/petition_government_hungary_transcarpathia; “The Kremlin Connections of the Hungarian Far-Right,” Stratfor April 20, 2015. Available https://worldview(.)stratfor.com/the-hub/kremlin-connections-hungarian-far-right; New Dimension of diplomatic Conflict between Ukraine and Hungary [Ukranian] Euromaidan Press October 18, 2017. Available http://euromaidanpress(.)com/2017/10/17/separatism-transcarpathian-style-is-hungary-aiming-to-grab-a-part-of-ukraine/#arvlbdata; “Experts elaborate on nature of Hungary-Ukraine Tensions,” Unian, October 17, 2017. Available; https://www.unian(.)info/politics/2190989-experts-elaborate-on-nature-of-hungary-ukraine-tensions.html; “Hankering for Transcarpathia? Hungary is attacking Ukraine,” UKrop News, October 12, 2017 Available https://ukropnews24(.)com/hankering-for-transcarpathia-hungary-is-attacking-ukraine/

[19] “Long Live Ruthenia,” The Economist, April 3, 2015. Available http://www.economist.com/news/europe/21647828-russian-press-cooks-up-ethnic-separatism-transcarpathia-long-live-ruthenia; “Rusyns in Transcarpathia demand recognition of their nationality and autonomy edge through dialogue” [Russian] TASS March 14, 2015. Available http://tass.ru/mezhdunarodnaya-panorama/1828915

[20] “Carpatho-Rusyns Deny Reports on their struggle for their Region’s Federal Status,” StopFake, August 14, 2014. Available https://www.stopfake(.)org/en/carpatho-rusyns-refuted-information-about-their-struggle-for-the-federal-status-of-their-region/; “Information Hygiene: Who Spreads Rumors and Fake News” [Ukrainian] MediaSapiens, September 17, 2014. Available http://osvita.mediasapiens.ua/ethics/manipulation/informatsiyna_gigiena_khto_poshiryue_chutki_ta_feyki/

[21] “In Transcarpathia, The SBU Announced the Closure of an Organization associated with the Separatist Gatsk,” [Ukrainian] Tyzhden, July 28, 2015. Available http://mobile(.)tyzhden.ua/news/142108

[22] “Regular Kremlin-“Rusyn" project (DOCUMENTS) (VIDEO) was registered in Uzhhorod under the guise of "Zarobitchan" organization,” [Ukrainian] Zakarpattya, June 10, 2015. Available http://zakarpattya(.)net.ua/News/141042-V-Uzhhorodi-pid-vyhliadom-zarobitchanskoi-orhanizatsii-zareiestruvaly-cherhovyi-kremlivsko-rusynskyi-proekt-DOKUMENTY-VIDEO “Transcarpathia in the context of threats to the territorial Integrity of Ukraine” [Ukrainian] Nbuviap 2015. Available. http://nbuviap(.)gov.ua/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=1271:zakarpattya-2&catid=63&Itemid=393

[23] “Regular Kremlin-“Rusyn" project (DOCUMENTS) (VIDEO) was registered in Uzhhorod under the guise of "Zarobitchan" organization,” [Ukrainian] Zakarpattya, June 10, 2015. Available http://zakarpattya(.)net.ua/News/141042-V-Uzhhorodi-pid-vyhliadom-zarobitchanskoi-orhanizatsii-zareiestruvaly-cherhovyi-kremlivsko-rusynskyi-proekt-DOKUMENTY-VIDEO

[24] “Ukraine Crisis: Hands Off Transcarpathia!” Huffpost, 2014. Available https://www(.)huffingtonpost.com/nikolas-kozloff/ukraine-crisis-hands-off_b_5358893.html; “I’ve lost my illusions about a united Europe, not hope,” Kyiv Post, Oct 17, 2017. Available https://www.kyivpost.com/article/opinion/op-ed/veronika-melkozerova-ive-lost-illusions-united-europe-not-hope.html; “Jobbik Party is the Organizer of Rally for Zakarpattia Self-Determination,” 122 UA, October 12, 2017. Available https://112.international/politics/jobbik-party-is-organizer-of-rally-for-zakarpattia-self-determination-21600(.)html; “Experts elaborate on nature of Hungary-Ukraine Tensions,” Unian, October 17, 2017. Available; https://www.unian(.)info/politics/2190989-experts-elaborate-on-nature-of-hungary-ukraine-tensions.html;

[25] “Ukraine Crisis: Hands Off Transcarpathia!” Huffpost, 2014. Available https://www(.)huffingtonpost.com/nikolas-kozloff/ukraine-crisis-hands-off_b_5358893.html; “Self-determination from the "bobby" and "great Hungary" from Orban. What is happening in Transcarpathia” [Russian] Ctpaha October 14, 2017. Available https://strana(.)ua/articles/analysis/98659-stanet-li-zakarpate-ukrainskoj-kataloniej.html

[30] “Poland not to support Hungary’s protest against Ukraine’s education law” UNIAN October 20, 2017. Available https://www(.)unian.info/politics/2198011-poland-not-to-support-hungarys-protest-against-ukraines-education-law.html, “Waszczykowski critical of Putin visits Hungary” [Polish] Rzeczpospolita October 19, 2017 Available http://www(.)rp.pl/Dyplomacja/171018766-Waszczykowski-krytycznie-o-wizytach-Putina-na-Wegrzech.html

[31] “Ukraine and Hungary will work together to implement the Law on Education” [Russian] Pravda, October 19, 2017 Available http://www(.)pravda.com.ua/rus/news/2017/10/19/7158982/

[32] “Hungary blocks Ukraine-NATO Commission meeting in December due to education law” UNIAN, October 27, 2017. Available https://www(.)unian.info/politics/2212494-hungary-blocks-ukraine-nato-commission-meeting-in-december-due-to-education-law.html

[34] “"Forget about the European future." Why Hungary became the enemy of Ukraine” AIF.ru September 26, 2017 Available http://www(.)aif.ru/politics/world/zabudte_o_evropeyskom_budushchem_pochemu_vengriya_stala_vragom_ukrainy

[36] “Fake: Ukraine Begins Repression of Hungarians in Transcarpathia” StopFake, May 25, 2017. Available https://www(.)stopfake.org/en/fake-ukraine-begins-repression-of-hungarians-in-transcarpathia/; Propaganda piece: “Hungarians create autonomy in Transcarpathia” [Russian] YTPO.py May 19, 2017 available https://utro(.)ru/articles/2017/05/19/1327600.shtml; Hungarian Community in Transcarpathia set a Stele in the Native Language [Russian] May 18, 2017 Available http://ru.golos(.)ua/uncategory/vengerskaya_obschina_zakarpatya_ustanovila_stelyi_na_rodnom_yazyike_video_5307

[37] “In MVD tied series resonant crime audio band, whose members are detained (added)” [Russian] Donbass News October 2, 2017 Available http://novosti(.)dn.ua/news/274911-v-mvd-svyazaly-ryad-rezonansnykh-prestuplenyy-s-odnoy-bandoy-uchastnyky-kotoroy-zaderzhany ; “Ukraine busts gang plotting to blow up Hungarian monument in Zakarpattia to boost tensions UNIAN, October 2, 2017 Available https://www(.)unian.info/society/2165641-ukraine-busts-gang-plotting-to-blow-up-hungarian-monument-in-zakarpattia-to-boost-tensions.html” ; “Avakov Said that the arrest of a groupof performers of nine resonant crimes” [Ukrainian] Ukrinform October 2, 2017. Available https://www(.)ukrinform.ua/rubric-society/2316491-avakov-zaaviv-pro-zatrimanna-grupi-vikonavciv-devati-rezonansnih-zlociniv.html ; “Interior Ministry of Ukraine told about the arrest of the gang, "incited xenophobia"” [Belarusian] Radio Svaboda, October 2, 2017. Available https://www(.)svaboda.org/a/28769533.html

[38] “Provocative rally at the Polish Consulate in Kiev was ordered by the secret services of Russia - Security [Ukrainian] УНІАН July 7, 2017, available : https://www.unian.ua/incidents/2017391-provokativna-aktsiya-bilya-konsulstva-polschi-v-kievi-bula-zamovlena-spetsslujbami-rf-sbu.html”

Sunday, October 29, 2017

Key Takeaway: Iraq and Iran rejected a Kurdish ceasefire offer and launched a new phase of their military campaign against Iraqi Kurdistan. Iraqi forces and Iran’s proxies are prepared for new military operations to seize Iraqi Kurdistan's border crossings if Kurdish forces do not relinquish them. Iranian proxy leaders are coordinating with Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) commanders and may even direct the military operation, if it occurs. It will begin at the Fishkhabur crossing between Iraqi Kurdistan and Syria, where Iran's proxies including the Badr Organization and Asa'ib Ahl al Haq are deployed. Negotiations are underway after Prime Minister Abadi set a deadline for the handover of the crossings on October 28th, but there has been no sign of a Kurdish withdrawal. Kurdistan Regional Government President Masoud Barzani announced he will not seek an extension of his term past November 1st in a letter to the Kurdish Parliament on October 29th.

Iraqi forces and Iran’s proxies are prepared to launch operations to seize Iraqi Kurdistan’s border crossings if Iraq’s Kurds do not surrender them to federal control. Prime Minister Haider al Abadi gave Iraq’s Kurds until 1:00 on October 28th to allow a “joint technical committee” to assume control of the border crossings. Negotiations are underway between the Iraqi government and Kurdish forces. Abadi is prepared to take the crossings by force if negotiations fail. Abadi rejected a previous Kurdish offer for a full ceasefire and return to political negotiations while en route to Tehran on October 26th, reiterating his demand for the full cancellation of the Kurdish referendum outcome and the handover of all border crossings and airports to federal control. His subsequent focus on border crossings likely indicates he is continuing to proceed in stages to compel Iraqi Kurdistan to accept his demands, and that he has Iranian support for a military offensive along the border.

Iraqi forces and Iran’s proxies set conditions from October 24th – 27th for operations to seize the border crossings, starting with the border crossing with Syria at Fishkhabur. The combined forces deployed on two axes from the Rabia border crossing and Zumar district south of Rabia. Iran’s proxies on this front include forces from three brigades of the Badr Organization as well as units from Asai’b Ahl al Haq and Katai’b Sayyid al Shuhada. Iranian proxy leaders are coordinating with Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) commanders and may even direct the military operation.

Abadi also secured Turkish support for continued operations against Iraqi Kurdistan during a visit to Ankara on October 26th. Abadi and Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan also agreed to create a new Iraqi-Turkish border crossing northeast of Fishkhabur, presumably after Iraqi forces and Iran’s proxies seize the area from Iraq’s Kurds.

Internal disruption in Iraqi Kurdistan could preclude a peaceful handover of the crossings. Kurdistan Regional Government President Masoud Barzani announced he will not seek an extension of his term past November 1st in a letter to the Kurdish Parliament on October 29th. He recommended that his presidential powers be divided between the Kurdish government, parliament and judiciary while he “[continues] to serve Kurdistan as a Peshmerga.” Early reports indicate that pro-Barzani supporters stormed the parliament in Arbil while it met to discuss Barzani’s resignation. It is unclear how the political situation in Kurdistan will affect the ongoing negotiations for the surrender of Kurdistan’s border crossings. Escalating intra-Kurdish tensions could preclude a peaceful handover to the Iraqi government and Iran’s proxies.

The U.S. is refusing to acknowledge Iran’s role in the military campaign against Iraqi Kurdistan. U.S. officials have legitimized Iran’s power play in Iraq by denying the role of Iran’s proxies in Abadi’s operations, beginning in Kirkuk. Abadi declared his intent to disarm Iran’s proxies in interviews with Western press on October 25th in an effort to reaffirm his alignment with the U.S. Rhetoric and action differ. An unnamed, senior U.S. official stated on October 27th that Abadi has not yet asserted his authorities over Iran’s proxies. Iran’s proxies are gaining further leverage over Abadi. The U.S. must begin to separate rather than tolerate the intertwinement of ISF and Iranian proxies.

Thursday, October 26, 2017

This graphic marks the latest installment of our Syria SITREP Map made possible through a partnership between the Institute for the Study of War and Syria Direct. This graphic depicts significant developments in the Syrian Civil War from October 10 - 24, 2017. The control of terrain represented on the graphic is accurate as of October 10, 2017.

Special credit to Sana Sekkarie of the Institute for the Study of War for the text of this Syria SITREP Map.

Sunday, October 22, 2017

Key takeaway: The US-led campaign against ISIS achieved a major victory in Raqqa, but post-ISIS conflict in northern Syria remains likely due to the dominant role of the Syrian Kurdish YPG in the Raqqa operation and its commitment to shaping post-ISIS governance in accordance with the vision of PKK founder Abdullah Ocalan. Russia, Iran, and the Syrian regime are meanwhile preparing to cut a deal with the YPG for the future governance of northeastern Syria, which could oust the U.S. Turkey is exploiting US calls for action in Idlib to establish military positions in the province that posture Turkey for future confrontation against the YPG to the north. Turkey is not meaningfully constraining al Qaeda. In Iraq, the Kurdish retreat across Iraq's disputed internal boundaries could destabilize northern Iraq rather than unify the country if Kurdish civilians now under the control of Iraqi forces and Iran's proxies turn to violence. Early indications of civil unrest have already emerged. The Kurdish retreat is nonetheless a political win for Prime Minister Abadi and a military win for Iran, whose proxies are now consolidating control over formerly contested cities and advancing further into northern Iraq.

SYRIA

Raqqa fell, but under conditions that favor continued insurgency. The US announced the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) seized the last pocket in Raqqa City held by the Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) on October 20th. Syrian Kurdish People’s Defense Forces (YPG) exploited the victory for political gain. A large contingent of female Kurdish (YPJ) fighters held a photo shoot in Raqqa’s central roundabout with massive YPG/YPJ flags and a large photo of PKK founder Abdullah Ocalan on October 19th. YPG forces also reportedly arrested Arab fighters flying Syrian revolutionary flags in Raqqa City. This could be an isolated incident, but the YPG’s clear effort to dominate the narrative after defeating ISIS in Raqqa city will drive support for Sunni Arab resistance against the YPG. The U.S.-led anti-ISIS coalition has recruited and trained 1,600 fighters in a “Raqqa Internal Security Force” to provide security in Raqqa after its recapture. It is unclear how much military training these forces received from the coalition, however. They will likely depend on continued YPG support to defend Raqqa against infiltration and spectacular attacks by ISIS and possibly al Qaeda.

Female YPJ units pose for a photo shoot honoring PKK founder Abdullah Ocalan in Raqqa City on October 19th.

Pro-regime forces seized Mayadin, the headquarters of ISIS senior leadership & external operations. Pro-regime forces claimed to seize the city on October 14th, although it is unclear whether ISIS withdrew preemptively. ISIS leader Abu Bakr al Baghdadi and other ISIS senior leaders, including external operators, had reportedly relocated to Mayadin from Mosul and Raqqa in late 2016 and early 2017. They most likely relocated to Abu Kamal IVO the Syrian-Iraqi border. Pro-regime forces are now positioned to disrupt further SDF movements along the Middle Euphrates River Valley (MERV) southeast of Raqqa City.

Russia and the Syrian regime are preparing to cut a deal with the YPG that could oust the US from northeastern Syria. The Syrian Kurdish YPG reportedly handed over the Conoco gas field in Deir ez Zour Province to the Syrian regime, which would most likely allow Russian contractors to operate it. The handover, which the Syrian regime claimed occurred, would be a first sign of a future deal between the YPG and the Syrian regime for the governance of northeastern Syria, which ISW forecasted in September. Negotiations are already underway for that deal, which could apply limits on US presence. A most dangerous possibility is that Russia and the Syrian regime will demand a full withdrawal of US forces in Syria in return for a federal status and return of services to SDF-held areas. Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Mikhail Bogdanov met with senior officials of the YPG’s political wing in Qamishli on the Syrian-Turkish border on October 18th. Russian Senator Ziyad Sabsabi of Chechnya later arrived in Qamishli on October 19th. Russia will reportedly host a conference regarding the Syrian Kurds at the Bassel al-Assad International Airport on the Syrian Coast on 10 NOV. Anonymous sources also claimed that Syrian National Security Bureau (NSB) Director Ali Mamlouk met with senior officials from the Syrian Kurdish YPG in Qamishli on October 17th. The two sides allegedly discussed the post-conflict role of the YPG in Syria as well as the long-term presence of the U.S. in Northern Syria, although the YPG’s political wing denied the meeting took place

Turkey deployed to Idlib, but in coordination with al Qaeda. Turkish armed forces deployed to multiple locations in northern Idlib Province beginning on October 13th in accordance with an agreement with Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS), the successor of al Qaeda’s Syrian affiliate. Turkey is exploiting US calls for Turkish action to constrain al Qaeda-held in Idlib and is instead posturing against the YPG, which holds a “canton” north of Idlib Province. Turkey’s deployment to Idlib positions Turkish troops on a second flank of the Kurdish canton, setting conditions in Turkey’s favor for future confrontation. Turkey is also positioning its troops as potential guarantors of its de-escalation agreement with Russia and the Syrian regime Idlib Province. Turkey’s deployment does not meaningfully constrain al Qaeda, and instead limits U.S. options in Idlib Province. Unconfirmed reports indicate Turkey has offered to help provide targeting intelligence to the U.S. to eliminate high value al Qaeda leaders. High value target (HVT) strikes in Idlib could degrade senior al Qaeda leadership in Syria, but will not reverse al Qaeda’s ongoing and successful efforts to embed within Syrian society in Idlib and to govern through a network of local affiliates and proxies.

IRAQ

Peshmerga forces collapsed across most of the front line in Iraq’s Disputed Internal Boundaries, ceding terrain to ISF and Iranian proxies. The Kurdish retreat empowers Iran and could destabilize northern Iraq rather than unify the county. Iraq and Iran, through Qassem Soleimani and Badr Organization leader Hadi al Amiri, demanded a Kurdish withdrawal from areas seized since 2014, starting with Kirkuk. The Kurdish retreat is a win for both the central Iraqi government and Iran, whose proxies have seized new key terrain and consolidated control over previously contested cities. Iran has downplayed the role of its proxies in order to legitimize them as instruments of the Iraqi state. Western media coverage and statements from US officials have assisted Iran with this deception by denying the role of Iran's proxies in Kirkuk.

Two Iranian proxy leaders – Hadi al Ameri and Abu Mehdi al Muhandis – participate in a flag raising in Kirkuk City along with leadership of the Iraqi Counterterrorism Services (CTS) on October 16th.

Kurdish populations now under the control of the Iraqi government and Iran's proxies may drive an insurgency. Civilunrest against Iraqi forces and Iran's proxies began in Kirkuk and Khanaqin on October 18th. Prime minister Abadi reportedly ordered a handover of security in Kirkuk to local police, and early reports indicate Iraqi forces and Iran's proxies may have drawn back from Khanaqin in northern Diyala. It is unclear whether these withdrawals will pacify the Kurdish population.

*A previous version of this post incorrectly referred to Iraqi Kurdish concerns over an advance past the 2014 front line. Iraqi forces had already breached that front line on October 16, 2017 and began to push to the front line of the Kurdistan Regional Government's formal boundaries on October 18, 2017.

Thursday, October 19, 2017

A collapse of the Iraqi Kurdish
Peshmerga under joint pressure from Iraq and Iran shortly after the
Kurdish independence referendum on September 25, 2017 empowers Iran
and could destabilize northern Iraq rather than unify the country. Iraqi
Kurdish Peshmerga forces withdrew from disputed areas across northern Iraq on
October 16th and 17th, 2017. A combined force of
Iraqi Security Forces and Iranian proxies gathered south of Kirkuk starting on
October 13th in order to compel Iraqi Kurdistan to relinquish
control of the oil-rich city. The combined ISF-proxy force moved in to secure
the city as well as nearby military bases and oil fields on October 16th after
the Peshmerga abandoned their positions. Peshmerga forces also withdrew from
areas in Ninewa, Salah al Din, and Diyala Provinces. The Iraqi Government and
Iran likely signaled their intent to use military force to compel the Peshmerga
withdrawals in those provinces, if necessary. The Kurdish retreat is a win for
both the central Iraqi government and Iran, whose proxies have seized new key
terrain and consolidated control over previously contested cities. Iran
has downplayed the role of its proxies in order to legitimize them as
instruments of the Iraqi state. Western media coverage and statements from US
officials have assisted Iran with this deception by denying the role of Iran’s
proxies in Kirkuk. Kurdish populations now under the control of the Iraqi
government and Iran's proxies may drive an insurgency, however. Civil unrest
against Iraqi forces and Iran's proxies began in Kirkuk and Khanaqin
on October 18th. Prime Minister Abadi ordered a handover of security in
Kirkuk to local police, and early reports indicate Iraqi forces and Iran's
proxies may have drawn back from Khanaqin in northern Diyala. It is unclear
whether these withdrawals will pacify the Kurdish population.

Monday, October 16, 2017

Russia renewed its violent, indiscriminate
air campaign against civilians in Western Syria in order to coerce groups
opposed to the Bashar al-Assad regime to accept a ceasefire or ‘de-escalation
zone’ in Idlib Province. Russia shifted its air campaign to target rebel-held
terrain in Idlib and Hama Provinces following an offensive launched by
Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) – the successor of Syrian al Qaeda affiliate Jabhat
Fatah al-Sham – in Northern Hama Province on September 19. The Russian Ministry
of Defense launched an immediate disinformation
operation to present this shift in its air campaign as a legitimate series of
strikes against extremist groups attempting to disrupt a ‘de-escalation zone’
in Idlib Province brokered
by Russia, Turkey, and Iran on September 15. Russia nonetheless mounted a
systematic campaign of airstrikes against civilian infrastructure – including hospitals, schools,
power
stations, and mosques
– as well as former U.S.-backed rebel groups unaffiliated with HTS or al Qaeda.
The strikes marked a return to the widespread punitive air campaigns Russia previously
directed against opposition-held terrain across Western Syria. Russia also employed
advanced weapons systems to further inflict violence against Idlib Province
under the guise of counter-terrorism operations. The Russian Black Sea Fleet’s Permanent
Mediterranean Task Force launched Kalibr cruise missiles targeting Ma’arat
al-Numan in Southern Idlib Province on September 22. Russia Tu-95MS ‘Bear’
strategic bombers later launched Kh-101 cruise missiles targeting the outskirts
of Idlib City on September 26. Russia’s deliberate use of violence against
civilians precludes any legitimate, Russian-enforced ‘de-escalation’ zone in
Idlib Province.

Russia also leveraged its ongoing
air campaign to co-opt Turkey away from the U.S. and NATO in order to further
set conditions for the planned ‘de-escalation zone’ in Idlib. Russia
concentrated its airstrikes in areas of Western Idlib Province along the
Syrian-Turkish Border from September 25 - 30. The Russian Air Force likely
sought to interdict the movement of HTS and opposition forces ahead of a
Turkish Armed Force (TSK) deployment into Idlib by targeting rebel-held areas
connecting Western Aleppo Province to the Bab al-Hawa Border Crossing on the
Syrian-Turkish Border as well as key supply routes around Idlib City. Turkish
President Recep Erdogan subsequently announced
the start of cross-border operations to implement the Idlib ‘de-escalation
zone’ on October 7. Erdogan stated that Russia would support his intervention. The
TSK began deployments to observation positions in Northern Idlib Province near
the majority-Kurdish Afrin Canton on October
12 following earlier reconnaissance missions. Russia likely perceives an
opportunity to exploit widening diplomatic fissures between the U.S. and Turkey.
Russia could thus attempt to use the ‘de-escalation zone’ to compel Turkey into
deeper – albeit temporary – cooperation with Russia in Northwestern Syria at
the expense of the United States.

The following graphic depicts ISW’s assessment of Russian airstrike locations based on reports from local Syrian activist networks, statements by Russian and Western officials, and documentation of Russian airstrikes through social media. This map represents locations targeted by Russia’s air campaign, rather than the number of individual strikes or sorties. The graphic likely under-represents the extent of the locations targeted in Eastern Syria, owing to a relative lack of activist reporting from that region.

High-Confidence Reporting.ISW places high confidence in reports corroborated by documentation from opposition factions and activist networks on the ground in Syria deemed to be credible that demonstrate a number of key indicators of Russian airstrikes.

Sunday, October 15, 2017

Key Takeaway:A battle is underway between the Iraqi Government, backed by Iran, and Iraqi Kurds for control of Kirkuk, Iraq. Iraqi Security Forces (ISF), Counterterrorism Services (CTS), Federal Police, and Iranian-backed popular mobilization forces (PMF) launched a combined offensive with intent to seize the K1 military base, the Kirkuk airport, and Kirkuk’s oilfields from Kurdish Peshmerga forces at 2:00 a.m. on October 15th. The offensive follows two days of failed negotiations after the government of Iraq (GOI), backed by Iran, demanded Kurdish forces withdraw. US efforts to de-escalate failed. Iran’s role in the offensive further strengthens its influence within Iraq, sidelines the U.S., and will increase Arab Shiite popular support for Iranian-backed candidates in Iraq’s upcoming elections, currently scheduled for April 2018. Iran’s use of an Explosively Formed Penetrator (EFP) against U.S. forces in Salah al Din Province, southwest of Kirkuk, on October 1 likely signals Iran’s resolve to use force to deter the U.S. from taking a direct military role. ISW is monitoring the situation and will provide regular updates.

What happened: Elements
from a combined force of Iraqi Security Forces (ISF), Counterterrorism Services
(CTS), Federal Police, and Iranian-backed popular mobilization forces (PMF) south
of Kirkuk City launched a probing attackagainst
Peshmerga forces southwest of Kirkuk at 2:00 a.m. on October 15th. The
Iranian-backed units include the Badr Organization’s Turkmen Brigade (the 16th
PMU brigade) and three brigades from Asai’b Ahl al-Haq (the 41st,
42nd and 43rd PMU brigades). Clashes are
ongoing in the industrial zone southwest of Kirkuk City at the time of
writing.

Context: The Iraqi Kurdish Regional
Government (KRG) and the government of Iraq (GoI) have been in a standoff after
the KRG held a referendum on
September 25, 2017 to affirm its right to declare independence. The governments
of Iraq, Iran, and Turkey have strongly opposed the Kurdish referendum and took
action to compel the KRG to stop short of declaring independence.The Iraqi Supreme Court declared
the referendum illegal on September 18th, pending legal review. The Iraqi
government and Iran both prohibited
flights to Kurdistan. Iraq held military
exercises with Iran along the latter’s border with Iraqi Kurdistan on October
1 and conducted symbolic
military exercises with Turkey on September 26 in order to demonstrate
solidarity against the referendum. Iraq’s Council of Representatives (CoR) voted
on September 27 to authorize Iraqi Prime Minister Haider al Abadi to retake
Kirkuk and its oil fields, prompting a Kurdish boycott of the CoR.

The Iraqi Kurds have thus faced a decision about
whether to declare outright independence from Baghdad after receiving a popular
mandate to do so through the referendum. Intra-Kurdish divisions both within
Iraq’s main Kurdish political parties, the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK)
and the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), complicated the Kurds’ way forward.
KRG President Masoud Barzani, the President of the KRG and head of the KDP, has
been the referendum’s staunchest supporter. His chief lifetime rival, Jalal
Talabani, died on October
3, 2017 after a stroke in 2012 and protracted hospitalization. Talabani’s death
accelerated a pre-existing competition for leadership over the PUK movement
between his family and a separate sub-faction led by KRG vice president Kosrut
Rasoul. The battle for Kirkuk will unify the PUK and KDP in defense of the Kurdish
region despite their political differences. Its outcome will likely affect the
timeline of KRG elections currently scheduled for November 1, 2017.

What changed:The
government of Iraq backed by Iran began to compel Iraqi Kurdistan into withdrawing its armed
forces from Kirkuk on October 12. Baghdad and Tehran separately issued ultimatums to the KRG. Prime Minister Haider al Abadi and leader
of the Iranian-proxy Badr Organization, Hadi al Ameri, both
issued statements on October 13 demanding Kurdish forces relinquish unilateral
control over Kirkuk. Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps Quds Force
Commander Qassem Soleimani traveled
to Iraq and likely delivered a direct ultimatum from Ayatollah Ali Al Khameni to Kurdish leader. He also
delivered a message of Khameni’s support to Abadi. He remains in Iraqi
Kurdistan at the time of writing, according to local reports.

The joint Iraqi-Iranian demand followed the
deployment of a combined force of Iranian-backed militias, Federal Police, and
the 9th Iraqi
Armored Division to frontline positions with the Kurdish Peshmerga
south and west of Kirkuk City on October 12th. Local Kurdish
Peshmerga commanders claimed that the local PMF and ISF commanders demanded Peshmerga
forces withdraw from oil installations, the Kirkuk airport, and the K1 military
base within 48 hours, citing a decision from Prime Minister Abadi. The KDP and
PUK immediately deployed as many as 6,000
reinforcements to Kirkuk and withdrew from areas west and south of Kirkuk City
in order to consolidate a new defensive perimeter. A lethal Iranian proxy group,
AAH,
attacked the headquartersof the PUK in
Tuz
Khurmatu, a disputed Kurdish and Shiite Turkmen town, overnight on October
13. The attack signaled Iran’s commitment to fight if the Kurds refused to back
down.

Iraqi Kurds initially attempted to de-escalate
the situation in Kirkuk without relinquishing control of the installations and
facilities demanded by Abadi. The Kurdish President of Iraq Fuad Masum traveled to Suleimaniya
on October 14 to mediate a possible resolution of the standoff in Kirkuk. He
later met with leadership from both
the PUK and the KDP in Dokan, Suleimaniya province and then delivered a
five-point proposal to Baghdad.
Baghdad rejected the proposal.

Implications: The attack
against Kurdish forces in Kirkuk could lead to full-sale war between the KRG
and government of Iraq. Iran’s role in the offensive further strengthens its
influence within GoI and will increase Arab Shiite popular support for
Iranian-backed candidates in Iraq’s upcoming elections, currently scheduled for
April 2018. It also sidelines the U.S. Iran’s likely use of an Explosively
Formed Penetrator (EFP) against U.S. forces in Salah
al Din Province, southwest of Kirkuk, on October 1 likely signals Iran’s
resolve to use force to deter a direct U.S. military role, if necessary.