§Or indirectly
(suffering is instrumentally bad as it gets in the way of achieving goals/aims)

·Although humans
typically have far more elaborate life goals, still even significantly less
sophisticated animals such as fish have some desires (to get food) and
suffering can interfere with such a pursuit.

oSo thwarting
an animal’s attempt to achieve an aim is to harm it (even if it does not
experience frustration)?

§Causing suffering
is one main way we harm animals

§DeGrazia rejects as naïve the idea that causing
suffering is the only way we can harm animals, so that, for example, painless
death is not a harm

§THE HARM OF
CONFINEMENT AND THE VALUE OF ANIMAL FREEDOM

§Sentient animals
have desires (to move around and do things)

oThis gives them pleasure/satisfaction

oWhen those
desires thwarted, result is frustration (or other disagreeable feelings

§Liberty–absence
of external constraint on movement–is generally a benefit for sentient animals,
as permits them to pursue what they want and need

§Confinement–external
constraints on movement that significantly interfere with one’s ability to live
well–is harmful by definition

oForcing a monkey
to live alone in a small barren cage, when monkeys like to roam around, explore
things, play and spend time with other monkeys causes suffering

§Can
deprivation of liberty be harmful for animals (or bad in general) even if it
does not cause causing suffering?

§Depends on if
animal liberty is itself of value (apart from its effects on experiential well
being of the animal)

oThe answer to
this would help us decide when and if animals might be better off in zoos

§Consider the zoo kangaroo,
who is more comfortable in the zoo with higher experiential well being than it would
have in the wild

oIf returned to
wild, would have greater liberty, but more hardship (weather, disease, shorter
life)

oDoes captivity
harms this kangaroo?

oWould Kangaroo be
better off in wild anyway?

§Does being
wild and free count for something apart from effects on experiential
well-being?

§That is, even
if animal’s life has lower experienced quality might it be correct to judge

oOne:The animal is better off in the wild?

oOr two:It is better that the animal be in the wild
even if the animal is not better off (even if animal is worse off)?

§THE HARM OF DEATH

§Example:Should we humanely trap or kill a mouse?Depends on if a mouse is harmed by death

oIf not, then
prefer the mouse trap (that kills) to the “humane” cage trap, as this latter
would involve suffering, experiential harm (being stuck in the gage for hours,
fear at what may come, sadness at being separated from social group members?)

oNeed also to
judge if the harm of death for the mouse (if it is a harm) is worse than the
suffering in the humane trap

§Dog cast
example:Why put a cast on a dog (causing it discomfort and
frustration for a month) rather than euthanize it, unless we assume dog loses
something by death?Thus it appears we
do think death is a harm for animals.

§Is death a harm? Always?Why?

oDifference
between death and dying (latter often involves suffering, former can’t)

oPerhaps death not
for those who lived very full 95 year life

oNor is death a
harm for those suffering unbearable pain and no prospect for improved life
quality

§Individuals
cherish life at least instrumentally–life is a necessary means to pursue more
particular aims

§Many also value
their lives intrinsically

oOn this view,
death only harms those who desire to live, to stay alive

oProbably very few animals possess even concept of
staying alive, much less desire to do so

§Efforts of a dog
to escape fire in a house serve to evade death, as she is terribly frightened,
sensing she may soon be badly hurt, but it is not likely she has concepts of
life/death and desire to live

oGiven he
thinks animals have self-awareness, and thus concept of self, he must be
assuming concept of staying alive (as opposed to being dead) is more
sophisticated

§Two:Death harms when it thwarts future oriented desire

oEven if lack
desire to stay alive, death can harm if it thwarts central desires do have

oE.g., Wolf wants
to become dominant member of a pack; Death harms him as thwarts this desire,
even if has no concept of death

oCan be harmed by
death even if do not have concept of life and desire to stay alive

oSignificantly
broadens the range of animals harmed by death

oDeGrazia does
say that most vertebrates have temporal self-awareness and so you would think
future oriented desires

oDoes this
account trivialize the harm of animal death?

§Consider a cow’s
desire to finish chewing her cud?Or to go
over and see her calf

§Killing her is
only as bad as thwarting this desire?

§Counterexample
to above two desire-based approaches:

oWeek-old baby has
no concept of life or future oriented desires.But clearly death harms her and so need different account.

§Death is an
instrumental harm in so far as it forecloses the valuable opportunities that
continued life would afford

oSo death is
not an intrinsic harm?

§DeGrazia’s
preferred alternative (and Regan and Sapontzis)

§Sentient beings
can have valuable experiences, pleasure, contentment, and exercising one’s
natural capacities (depending on view of well being)

oDeath robs cat
and newborn human of the sort of life otherwise available to that individual,
even if no awareness of opportunities in question

§Sentience
alone entails one can have valuable experiences and since death cuts off such
experiences, death will be a harm to any sentient being

oIn contrast to
view which says death harms only animals with desire to stay alive or with
future oriented projects/desires

§Debatable whether
mere potential for sentience suffices to make death a harm (relevant to abortion
debate)

§On this view,
death not harm for an individual with no desire to live, no future oriented
desires, and his future holds experiences that are predominantly negative (full
of suffering)

oWould this
mean that death is not a harm for the deer shot by the hunter at the beginning of the winter who
would have suffered all winter then died?

oOr for wild
animals whose life has greater suffering than pleasure?

§Harm of death
is function of opportunities it forecloses

§HARMS COMPARABLE
BETWEEN HUMANS AND ANIMALS?

§Are magnitude of
harms of (death, confinement, suffering of human and animal) roughly equal or
significantly different

§Suffering comparable:Strong case that certain
amount of suffering counts as a comparable harm no matter what creature suffers
that amount

§Confinement not comparable:Harm of
confinement (in addition to causing suffering) impedes activities of greater
value or cuts off greater potential enjoyment/satisfaction in case of humans
than at least some animals and thus harms humans more