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Title: A Discourse Concerning the Being and Attributes of God, the
Obligations of Natural Religion, and the Truth and Certainty of the
Christian Revelation.
Creator(s): Clarke, Samuel (1675-1729)
Print Basis: Glasgow: Printed for Richard Griffin and Co. (1823)
Rights: Public Domain
CCEL Subjects: All;
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A
DEMONSTRATION
OF THE
BEING AND ATTRIBUTES OF GOD,
MORE PARTICULARLY
IN ANSWER TO MR HOBBES, SPINOZA,
AND THEIR FOLLOWERS.
WHEREIN THE NOTION OF LIBERTY IS STATED, AND THE POSSIBILITY AND
CERTAINTY OF IT PROVED, IN OPPOSITION TO NECESSITY AND FATE.
BEING THE SUBSTANCE OF EIGHT SERMONS, PREACHED IN THE CATHEDRAL-CHURCH
OF ST PAUL, IN THE YEAR 1704, AT THE LECTURE FOUNDED BY THE HONOURABLE
ROBERT BOYLE, ESQ.
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Rom. i. 20.--For the invisible things of Him from the Creation of the
World are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made;
even his Eternal Power and Godhead: So that they are without excuse.
A
DISCOURSE
CONCERNING THE
OBLIGATIONS OF NATURAL RELIGION,
AND THE
TRUTH AND CERTAINTY
OF THE
CHRISTIAN REVELATION.
IN ANSWER TO MR HOBBES, SPINOZA, THE AUTHOR OF THE
ORACLES OF REASON, AND OTHER DENIERS OF
NATURAL AND REVEALED RELIGION.
BEING SIXTEEN SERMONS PREACHED IN THE CATHEDRAL-CHURCH OF ST. PAUL,
IN THE YEARS 1704-5, AT THE LECTURE FOUNDED BY
THE HON. ROBERT BOYLE, ESQ.
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WITH SUPPLEMENTARY MATTER.
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By SAMUEL CLARKE, D.D.
Late Rector of St James#8217;s, Westminster.
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A NEW EDITION.
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GLASGOW:
PRINTED FOR RICHARD GRIFFIN AND CO.
T. TEGG, G. OFFOR, J. & C. EVANS, J. JONES, R. BALDOCK. T. ROBINSON &
CO. C. SHARPE & SON, AND E. BAYNES, LONDON; E. WEST & CO. AND A.
ALLARDICE, EDINBURGH; AND M. JELLET, BELFAST.
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1823.
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Prefatory Material
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Dedication
TO THE
MOST REVEREND FATHER IN GOD,
THOMAS,
LORD ARCHBISHOP OF CANTERBURY, AND PRIMATE OF ALL ENGLAND;
SIR HENRY ASHURST, BARONET;
SIR JOHN ROTHERAM, KNIGHT, SERGEANT AT LAW;
JOHN EVELIN, ESQ.
TRUSTEES APPOINTED BY THE HONOURABLE ROBERT BOYLE, ESQ.
THIS DISCOURSE
IS HUMBLY DEDICATED.
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THE PREFACE.
THERE being already published many and good books to prove the Being
and Attributes of God, I have chosen to contract what was requisite for
me to say upon this subject, into as narrow a compass, and to express
what I had to offer, in as few words as I could with perspicuity. For
which reason I have also confined myself to one only method or
continued thread of arguing, which I have endeavoured should be as near
to mathematical as the nature of such a discourse would allow; omitting
some other arguments which I could not discern to be so evidently
conclusive; because it seems not to be at any time for the real
advantage of truth to use arguments in its behalf founded only on such
hypotheses as the adversaries apprehend they cannot be compelled to
grant: Yet I have not made it my business to oppose any of those
arguments, because I think it is not the best way for any one to
recommend his own performance by endeavouring to discover the
imperfections of others who are engaged in the same design with
himself, of promoting the interest of true religion and virtue. But
every man ought to use such arguments only as appear to him to be clear
and strong, and the readers must judge whether they truly prove the
conclusion.
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A
DEMONSTRATION
OF THE
BEING AND ATTRIBUTES
OF
GOD.
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MORE PARTICULARLY IN ANSWER TO MR HOBBES, SPINOZA, AND THEIR FOLLOWERS.
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Introduction
ALL those who either are or pretend to be atheists; The introduction.
who either disbelieve the being of God, or would be thought to do so;
or, (which is all one,) who deny the principal attributes of the divine
nature, and suppose God to be an unintelligent being, which acts merely
by necessity; that is, which, in any tolerable propriety of speech,
acts not at all, but is only acted upon: all men that are atheists, I
say, in this sense, must be so upon one or other of these three
accounts.
Either, first, Because being extremely ignorant Atheism arises from
stupid ignorance. and stupid, they have never duly considered any thing
at all; nor made any just use of their natural reason, to discover even
the plainest and most obvious truths; but have spent their time in a
manner of life very little superior to that of beasts.
Or from gross corruption of manners: Or, secondly, Because being
totally debauched and corrupted in their practice, they have, by a
vicious and degenerate life, corrupted the principles of their nature,
and defaced the reason of their own minds; and, instead of fairly and
impartially inquiring into the rules and obligations of nature, and the
reason and fitness of things, have accustomed themselves only to mock
and scoff at religion; and, being under the power of evil habits, and
the slavery of unreasonable and indulged lusts, are resolved not to
hearken to any reasoning which would oblige them to forsake their
beloved vices.
Or from false philosophy. Or, thirdly, Because in the way of
speculative reasoning, and upon the principles of philosophy, they
pretend that the arguments used against the being or attributes of God,
seem to them, after the strictest and fullest inquiry, to be more
strong and conclusive than those by which we endeavour to prove these
great truths.
These seem the only causes that can be imagined, of any man's
disbelieving the being or attributes of God; and no man can be supposed
to be an atheist but upon one or other of these three accounts. Now, to
the two former of these three sorts of men; namely, to such as are
wholly ignorant and stupid, or to such as through habitual debauchery
have brought themselves to a custom of mocking and scoffing at all
religion, and will not hearken to any fair reasoning; it is not my
present business to apply myself. The one of these wants to be
instructed in the first principles of reason as well as of religion.
The other disbelieves only for a present false interest, and because he
is desirous that the thing should not be true. The one has not yet
arrived to the use of his natural faculties: the other has renounced
them; and declares he will not be argued with, as a rational creature.
It is therefore the third sort of atheists only (namely those who in
the way of speculative reasoning, and upon the principles of
philosophy, pretend that the arguments brought against the being or
attributes of God, do, upon the strictest and fullest examination,
appear to them to be more strong and conclusive, than those by which
these great truths are attempted to be proved;) these, I say, are the
only atheistical persons to whom my present discourse can be supposed
to be directed, or indeed who are capable of being reasoned with at
all.
Now, before I enter upon the main argument, I shall premise several
concessions, which these men, upon their own principles, are
unavoidably obliged to make.
And first, They must of necessity own, that, supposing The being of God
very desirable. it cannot be proved to be true, yet at least it is a
thing very desirable, and which any wise man would wish to be true, for
the great benefit and happiness of men; that there was a God, an
intelligent and wise, a just and good Being, to govern the world.
Whatever hypothesis these men can possibly frame; whatever argument
they can invent, by which they would exclude God and providence out of
the world; that very argument or hypothesis will of necessity lead them
to this concession. If they argue, that our notion of God arises not
from nature and reason, but from the art and contrivance of
politicians; that argument itself forces them to confess, that it is
manifestly for the interest of human society that it should be believed
there is a God. If they suppose that the world was made by chance, and
is every moment subject to be destroyed by chance again; no man can be
so absurd as to contend that it is as comfortable and desirable to live
in such an uncertain state of things, and so continually liable to
ruin, [1] without any hope of renovation; as in a world that were under
the preservation and conduct of a powerful, wise, and good God. If they
argue against the being of God, from the faults and defects which they
imagine they can find in the frame and constitution of the visible and
material world; this supposition obliges them to acknowledge, that it
would have been better the world had been made by an intelligent and
wise Being, who might have prevented all faults and imperfections. If
they argue against providence, from the faultiness and inequality which
they think they discover in the management of the moral world, this is
a plain confession that it is a thing more fit and desirable in itself,
that the world should be governed by a just and good Being, than by
mere chance or unintelligent necessity. Lastly, if they suppose the
world to be eternally and necessarily self-existent, and consequently
that every thing in it is established by a blind and eternal fatality,
no rational man can at the same time deny, but that liberty and choice,
or a free power of acting, is a more eligible state, than to be
determined thus in all our actions, as a stone is to move downward, by
an absolute and inevitable fate. In a word, which way soever they turn
themselves, and whatever hypothesis they make, concerning the origin
and frame of things, nothing is so certain and undeniable, as that man,
considered without the protection and conduct of a superior being, is
in a far worse case, than upon supposition of the being and government
of God, and of men's being under his peculiar conduct, protection, and
favour. Man, of himself, is infinitely insufficient for his own
happiness: [2] he is liable to many evils and miseries, which he can
neither prevent nor redress: he is full of wants which he cannot
supply, and compassed about with infirmities which he cannot remove,
and obnoxious to dangers which he can never sufficiently provide
against: he is secure of nothing that he enjoys in this world, and
uncertain of every thing he hopes for: he is apt to grieve for what he
cannot help, and eagerly to desire what he is never able to obtain, &c.
Under which evil circumstances it is evident there can be no sufficient
support, but in the belief of a wise and good God, and in the hopes
which true religion affords. Whether therefore the being and attributes
of God can be demonstrated or not, it must at least be confessed, by
all rational and wise men, to be a thing very desirable, and which they
would heartily wish to be true, that there was a God, an intelligent
and wise, a just and good Being, to govern the world.
Now, the use I desire to make of this concession is only this: that
since the men I am arguing with are unavoidably obliged to confess that
it is a thing very desirable at least, that there should be a God, they
must of necessity, upon their own principles, be very willing, nay,
desirous, above all things, to be convinced that their present opinion
is an error, and sincerely hope that the contrary may be demonstrated
to them to be true; and consequently they are bound with all
seriousness, attention, and impartiality, to consider the weight of the
arguments by which the being and attributes of God may be proved to
them.
Secondly, All such persons as I am speaking of, Scoffing at religion,
inexcusable. who profess themselves to be atheists, not upon any
present interest or lust, but purely upon the principles of reason and
philosophy, are bound by these principles to acknowledge, that all
mocking and scoffing at religion, all jesting and turning arguments of
reason into drollery and ridicule, is the most unmanly and unreasonable
thing in the world. And consequently, they are obliged to exclude out
of their number, as irrational and self-condemned persons, and unworthy
to be argued with, all such scoffers at religion, who deride at all
adventures without hearing reason; and who will not use the means of
being convinced and satisfied. Hearing the reason of the case, with
patience and unprejudicedness, is an equity which men owe to every
truth that can in any manner concern them; and which is necessary to
the discovery of every kind of error. How much more in things of the
utmost importance!
Virtue and good manners absolutely necessary. Thirdly, Since the
persons I am discoursing to cannot but own, that the supposition of the
being of God is in itself most desirable, and for the benefit of the
world, that it should be true; they must of necessity grant further,
that, supposing the being and attributes of God to be things not indeed
demonstrable to be true, but only possible, and such as cannot be
demonstrated to be false, as most certainly they cannot; and much more,
supposing them once made to appear probable, and but more likely to be
true than the contrary opinion: nothing is more evident, even upon
these suppositions only, than that men ought in all reason to live
piously and virtuously in the world; and that vice and immorality are,
upon all accounts, and under all hypotheses, the most absurd and
inexcusable things in nature.
This much being premised, which no atheist, who pretends to be a
rational and fair inquirer into things, can possibly avoid granting;
(and other atheists, I have before said, are not to be disputed with at
all; as being enemies to reason, no less than to religion, and
therefore absolutely self-condemned;) I proceed now to the main thing I
at first proposed; namely, to endeavour to show, to such considering
persons as I have already described, that the being and attributes of
God are not only possible, or barely probable in themselves, but also
strictly demonstrable to any unprejudiced mind, from the most
incontestable principles of right reason.
And here, because the persons I am at present dealing with, must be
supposed not to believe any revelation, nor acknowledge any authority
which they will submit to, but only the bare force of reasoning; I
shall not, at this time, draw any testimony from Scripture, nor make
use of any sort of authority, nor lay any stress upon any popular
arguments in the matter before us; but confine myself to the rules of
strict and demonstrative argumentation.
Now, many arguments there are, by which the being and attributes of God
have been undertaken to be demonstrated. And perhaps most of those
arguments, if thoroughly understood, rightly stated, fully pursued, and
duly separated from the false or uncertain reasonings which have
sometimes been intermixed with them; would at length appear to be
substantial and conclusive. But because I would endeavour, as far as
possible, to avoid all manner of perplexity and confusion; therefore I
shall not at this time use any variety of arguments, but endeavour, by
one clear and plain series of propositions necessarily connected and
following one from another, to demonstrate the certainty of the being
of God, and to deduce in order the necessary attributes of his nature,
so far as by our finite reason we are enabled to discover and apprehend
them. And because it is not to my present purpose to explain or
illustrate things to them that believe, but only to convince
unbelievers, and settle them that doubt, by strict and undeniable
reasoning; therefore I shall not allege any thing, which, however
really true and useful, may yet be liable to contradiction or dispute;
but shall endeavour to urge such propositions only as cannot be denied,
without departing from that reason, which all atheists pretend to be
the foundation of their unbelief. Only it is absolutely necessary,
before all things, that they consent to lay aside all manner of
prejudices; and especially such as have been apt to arise from the too
frequent use of terms of art, which have no ideas belonging to them;
and from the common receiving certain maxims of philosophy as true,
which at the bottom seem to be only propositions without any meaning or
signification at all.
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[1]
Maria ac terras coelumque--
Una dies dabit exitio, multosque per annos
Sustentata ruet moles, et machina mundi.
--Dictis dabit ipsa fidem res
Forsitan, et graviter terrarum motibus orbis
Omnia conquassari in parvo tempore cernes.
Lucret. lib. 5.
[2] Archbishop Tillotson's Sermon on Job, xxviii. 28.
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Proposition I.
I. Proposition I. First then, it is absolutely and undeniably certain,
that Something must have existed from eternity. something has existed
from all eternity.--This is so evident and undeniable a proposition,
that no atheist in any age has ever presumed to assert the contrary;
and therefore there is little need of being particular in the proof of
it. For since something now is, it is evident that something always
was; otherwise the things that now are must have been produced out of
nothing, absolutely and without cause, which is a plain contradiction
in terms. For to say a thing is produced, and yet that there is no
cause at all of that production, is to say that something is effected,
when it is effected by nothing; that is, at the same time when it is
not effected at all.--Whatever exists, has a cause, a reason, a ground
of its existence; (a foundation, on which its existence relies; a
ground or reason why it doth exist rather than not exist;) either in
the necessity of its own nature, and then it must have been of itself
eternal; or in the will of some other being, and then that other being
must, at least in the order of nature and causality, have existed
before it.
Of the difficulty of conceiving eternity. That something therefore has
really existed from eternity, is one of the certainest and most evident
truths in the world; acknowledged by all men, and disputed by none. Yet
as to the manner how it can be; there is nothing in nature more
difficult for the mind of man to conceive, than this very first plain
and self-evident truth. For, how any thing can have existed eternally;
that is, how an eternal duration can be now actually past, is a thing
utterly as impossible for our narrow understandings to comprehend, as
any thing that is not an express contradiction can be imagined to be:
and yet to deny the truth of the proposition, that an eternal duration
is now actually past, would be to assert something still far more
unintelligible, even a real and express contradiction.
Difficulties arising merely from the nature of eternity, not to be
regarded, because equal in all suppositions. The use I would make of
this observation, is this: That since in all questions concerning the
nature and perfections of God, or concerning any thing to which the
idea of eternity or infinity is joined; though we can indeed
demonstrate certain propositions to be true, yet it is impossible for
us to comprehend or frame any adequate or complete ideas of the manner
how the things so demonstrated can be: therefore, when once any
proposition is clearly demonstrated to be true, it ought not to disturb
us that there be perhaps perplexing difficulties on the other side,
which merely for want of adequate ideas of the manner of the existence
of the things demonstrated, are not easy to be cleared. Indeed, were it
possible there should be any proposition which could equally be
demonstrated on both sides of the question, or which could on both
sides be reduced to imply a contradiction; (as some have very
inconsiderately asserted;) this, it must be confessed, would alter the
case. Upon this absurd supposition, all difference of true and false,
all thinking and reasoning, and the use of all our faculties, would be
entirely at an end. But when to demonstration on the one side, there
are opposed on the other, only difficulties raised from our want of
having adequate ideas of the things themselves; this ought not to be
esteemed an objection of any real weight. It is directly and clearly
demonstrable, (and acknowledged to be so, even by all atheists that
ever lived,) that something has been from eternity: All the objections
therefore raised against the eternity of any thing, grounded merely on
our want of having an adequate idea of eternity, ought to be looked
upon as of no real solidity. Thus in other the like instances: It is
demonstrable, for example, that something must be actually infinite:
All the metaphysical difficulties, therefore, which arise usually from
applying the measures and relations of things finite, to what is
infinite; and from supposing finites to be [aliquot] parts of infinite,
when indeed they are not properly so, but only as mathematical points
to quantity, which have no proportion at all: (and from imagining all
infinites to be equal, when in things disparate they manifestly are not
so; an infinite line, being not only not equal to, but infinitely less
than an infinite surface, and an infinite surface than space infinite
in all dimensions:) All metaphysical difficulties, I say, arising from
false suppositions of this kind, ought to be esteemed vain and of no
force. Again: it is in like manner demonstrable, that quantity is
infinitely divisible: All the objections therefore raised, by supposing
the sums total of all infinities to be equal, when in disparate parts
they manifestly are not so; and by comparing the imaginary equality or
inequality of the number of the parts of unequal quantities, whose
parts have really no number at all, they all having parts without
number; ought to be looked upon as weak and altogether inconclusive: To
ask whether the parts of unequal quantities be equal in number or not,
when they have no number at all, being the same thing as to ask whether
two lines drawn from differently distant points, and each of them
continued infinitely, be equal in length or not, that is, whether they
end together, when neither of them have any end at all.
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Proposition II. There must have existed from eternity one independent being.
II. Proposition II: There must have existed from eternity one
independent being. There has existed from eternity, [3] some one
unchangeable and independent being. For since something must needs have
been from eternity, as has been already proved, and is granted on all
hands, either there has always existed some one unchangeable and
independent being, from which all other beings that are or ever were in
the universe have received their original; or else there has been an
infinite succession of changeable and dependent beings, produced one
from another, in an endless progression, without any original cause at
all. Now this latter supposition is so very absurd, that though all
atheism must in its account of most things (as shall be shown
hereafter,) terminate in it, yet I think very few atheists ever were so
weak as openly and directly to defend it; for it is plainly impossible,
and contradictory to itself. I shall not argue against it from the
supposed impossibility of infinite succession, barely and absolutely
considered in itself; for a reason which shall be mentioned hereafter.
But, if we consider such an infinite progression, as one entire endless
series of dependent beings, it is plain this whole series of beings can
have no cause from without, of its existence; because in it are
supposed to be included all things that are or ever were in the
universe: And it is plain it can have no reason within itself, of its
existence; because no one being in this infinite succession is supposed
to be self-existent or necessary, (which is the only ground or reason
of existence of any thing that can be imagined within the thing itself,
as will presently more fully appear,) but every one dependent on the
foregoing: and where no part is necessary, it is manifest the whole
cannot be necessary: absolute necessity of existence, not being an
extrinsic, relative, and accidental denomination, but an inward and
essential property of the nature of the thing which so exists. An
infinite succession, therefore, of merely dependent beings, without any
original independent cause, is a series of beings that has neither
necessity, nor cause, nor any reason or ground at all of its existence,
either within itself or from without; that is, it is an express
contradiction and impossibility; it is a supposing something to be
caused, (because it is granted in every one of its stages of
succession, not to be necessarily and of itself;) and yet that, in the
whole, it is caused absolutely by nothing; which every man knows is a
contradiction to imagine done in time; and, because duration in this
case makes no difference, it is equally a contradiction to suppose it
done from eternity; and, consequently, there must, on the contrary, of
necessity, have existed from eternity some one immutable and
independent being.
To suppose an infinite succession of changeable and dependent beings
produced one from another in an endless progression, without any
original cause at all, is only [4] a driving back from one step to
another, and (as it were) removing out of sight, the question
concerning the ground or reason of the existence of things. It is in
reality, and in point of argument, the very same supposition, as it
would be to suppose one continued being, of beginningless and endless
duration, neither self-existent and necessary in itself, nor having its
existence founded in any self-existent cause; which is directly absurd
and contradictory.
Otherwise, thus: Either there has always existed some one unchangeable
and independent being, from which all other beings have received their
original; or else there has been an infinite succession of changeable
and dependent beings, produced one from another, in an endless
progression, without any original cause at all. According to this
latter supposition, there is nothing in the universe self-existent or
necessarily-existing: and, if so, then it was originally equally
possible, that from eternity there should never have existed any thing
at all, as that there should from eternity have existed a succession of
changeable and dependent beings: which being supposed, then, what is it
that has from eternity determined such a succession of beings to exist,
rather than that from eternity there should never have existed any
thing at all? Necessity it was not; because it was equally possible, in
this supposition, that they should not have existed at all. Chance is
nothing but a mere word, without any signification: And other being it
is supposed there was none, to determine the existence of these. Their
existence, therefore, was determined by nothing; neither by any
necessity in the nature of the things themselves, because it is
supposed that none of them are self-existent; nor by any other being,
because no other is supposed to exist. That is to say; of two equally
possible things, (viz. whether any thing or nothing should from
eternity have existed,) the one is determined, rather than the other,
absolutely by nothing; which is an express contradiction. And,
consequently, as before, there must on the contrary, of necessity, have
existed, from eternity, some one immutable and independent being,
which, what it is, remains in the next place to be inquired.
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[3] The meaning of this proposition, (and all that the argument here
requires,) is, that there must needs have always been some independent
being, some one at least. To show that there can be no more than one,
is not the design of this proposition, but of the seventh.
[4] This matter has been well illustrated by a late able
writer.--"Suppose a chain hung down out of the heavens, from an unknown
height; and, though every link of it gravitated toward the earth, and
what it hung upon was not visible, yet it did not descend, but kept its
situation: And, upon this, a question should arise, What supported or
kept up this chain? Would it be a sufficient answer to say, that the
first or lowest link hung upon the second, or that next above it; the
second, or rather the first and second together, upon the third; and so
on in infinitum? For, what holds up the whole? A chain of ten links,
would fall down, unless something able to bear it hindered: One of
twenty, if not stayed by something of a yet greater strength, in
proportion to the increase of weight. And therefore one of infinite
links, certainly; if not sustained by something infinitely strong, and
capable to bear up an infinite weight: And thus it is in a chain of
causes and effects, tending, or (as it were) gravitating, towards some
end. The last, or lowest, depends, or, (as one may say) is suspended
upon the cause above it. This, again, if it be not the first cause, is
suspended, as an effect, upon something above it, &c. And if they
should be infinite, unless (agreeably to what has been said) there is
some cause, upon which all hang or depend, they would be but an
infinite effect without an efficient: and to assert there is any such
thing, would be as great an absurdity as to say, that a finite or
little weight wants something to sustain it, but an infinite one (or
the greatest) does not."--Religion of Nature Delineated, page 67.
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Proposition III. The one independent Being must be necessarily existing.
Proposition III: The one independent Being must be necessarily
existing. III. That unchangeable and independent Being, which has
existed from eternity, without any external cause of its existence,
must be self-existent, that is, necessarily existing. For whatever
exists, must either have come into being out of nothing, absolutely
without cause; or it must have been produced by some external cause; or
it must be self-existent. Now, to arise out of nothing, absolutely
without any cause, has been already shown to be a plain contradiction.
To have been produced by some external cause, cannot possibly be true
of every thing; but something must have existed eternally and
independently, as has likewise been shown already. It remains,
therefore, that that being which has existed independently from
eternity must of necessity be self-existent. Now, to be self-existent
is not to be produced by itself; for that is an express contradiction.
But it is, (which is the only idea we can frame of self-existence; and
without which, the word seems to have no signification at all;) it is,
I say, to exist by an absolute necessity originally in the nature of
the thing itself: And this necessity must be antecedent; not, indeed,
in time, to the existence of the being itself, because that is eternal;
but it must be antecedent in the natural order of our ideas, to our
supposition of its being; that is, this necessity must not barely be
consequent upon our supposition of the existence of such a being; (for
then it would not be a necessity absolutely such in itself, nor be the
ground or foundation of the existence of any thing, being on the
contrary only a consequent of it;) but it must antecedently force
itself upon us, whether we will or no, even when we are endeavouring to
suppose that no such being exists. For example: when we are
endeavouring to suppose, that there is no being in the universe that
exists necessarily, we always find in our minds, Page 10, &c. (besides
the foregoing demonstration of something being self-existent, from the
impossibility of every thing's being dependent;) we always find in our
minds, I say, some ideas, as of infinity and eternity; which to remove,
that is, to suppose that there is no being, no substance in the
universe, to which these attributes or modes of existence are
necessarily inherent, is a contradiction in the very terms. For modes
and attributes exist only by the existence of the substance to which
they belong. Now, he that can suppose eternity and immensity (and
consequently the substance by whose existence these modes or attributes
exist,) removed out of the universe, may, if he please, as easily
remove the relation of equality between twice two and four.
That to suppose immensity removed out of the universe, or not
necessarily eternal, is an express contradiction; is intuitively
evident to every one who attends to his own ideas, and considers the
essential nature of things. To suppose [5] any part of space removed,
is to suppose it removed from and out of itself: and to suppose the
whole to be taken away, is supposing it to be taken away from itself,
that is, to be taken away while it still remains; which is a
contradiction in terms. There is no obscurity in this argument but what
arises to those who think immense space to be absolutely nothing: which
notion is itself likewise an express contradiction; for nothing is that
which has no properties or modes whatsoever; that is to say, it is that
of which nothing can truly be affirmed, and of which every thing can
truly be denied; which is not the case of immensity or space.
From this third proposition it follows,
1st, That the only true idea of a self-existent or The true notion of
self existence. Pages 10 and 14. necessarily-existing being, is the
idea of a being, the supposition of whose not-existing is an express
contradiction. For since it is absolutely impossible but there must be
somewhat self-existent; that is, which exists by the necessity of its
own nature; it is plain that that necessity cannot be a necessity
consequent upon any foregoing supposition, (because nothing can be
antecedent to that which is self-existent, no not its own will, so as
to be the cause or ground of its own existence,) but it must be a
necessity absolutely such in its own nature. Now, a necessity, not
relatively or consequentially, but absolutely such in its own nature,
is nothing else but its being a plain impossibility or implying a
contradiction to suppose the contrary. For instance; the relation of
equality between twice two and four is an absolute necessity only
because it is an immediate contradiction in terms to suppose them
unequal. This is the only idea we can frame of an absolute necessity;
and to use the word in any other sense seems to be using it without any
signification at all.
If any one now asks, what sort of idea the idea of that being is, the
supposition of whose not-existing is thus an express contradiction; I
answer, it is the first and simplest idea we can possibly frame; an
idea necessarily and essentially included or presupposed, as a sine qua
non, in every other idea whatsoever; an idea, which (unless we forbear
thinking at all) we cannot possibly extirpate or remove out of our
minds; of a most simple being, absolutely eternal and infinite,
original and independent. For, that he who supposes there is no
original independent being in the universe, supposes a contradiction,
has been shown already. And that he who supposes there may possibly be
no eternal and infinite being in the universe supposes likewise a
contradiction, is evident from hence; (besides that these two
attributes do necessarily follow from self-originate independent
existence, as shall be shown hereafter;) that when he has done his
utmost, in endeavouring to imagine that no such being exists, he cannot
avoid imagining an eternal and infinite [6] nothing; that is, he will
imagine eternity and immensity removed out of the universe, and yet
that at the same time they still continue there; as has been above [7]
distinctly explained.
This The error of the Cartesians. argument the Cartesians, who supposed
the idea of immensity to be the idea of matter, have been greatly
perplexed with. For, (however in words they have contradicted
themselves, yet in reality) they have more easily been driven to that
most intolerable absurdity of asserting matter [8] to be a necessary
being; than being able to remove out of their minds the idea of
immensity, as existing necessarily and inseparably from eternity. Which
absurdity and inextricable perplexity of theirs, in respect of the idea
of immensity, shows that they found that indeed to be necessary and
impossible to be removed; but, in respect of matter, it was only a
perverse applying an idea to an object, whereto it noways belongs; for,
that it is indeed absolutely impossible and contradictory to suppose
matter necessarily-existing, shall be demonstrated presently.
2dly. Nothing so certain as the existence of a supreme independent
cause. From hence it follows, that there is no man whatsoever, who
makes any use of his reason, but may easily become more certain of the
being of a supreme independent cause, than he can be of any thing else
besides his own existence; for how much thought soever it may require
to demonstrate the other attributes of such a being, as it may do to
demonstrate the greatest mathematical certainties, (of which more
hereafter,) yet, as to its existence, that there is somewhat eternal,
infinite, and self-existing, which must be the cause and origin of all
other things; this is one of the first and most natural conclusions
that any man, who thinks at all, can frame in his mind: and no man can
any more doubt of this, than he can doubt whether twice two be equal to
four.--It is impossible, indeed, a man may in some sense be ignorant of
this first and plain truth, by being utterly stupid, and not thinking
at all; (for though it is absolutely impossible for him to imagine the
contrary, yet he may possibly neglect to conceive this: though no man
can possibly think that twice two is not four, yet he may possibly be
stupid, and never have thought at all whether it be so or not.) But
this I say: there is no man, who thinks or reasons at all, but may
easily become more certain, that there is something eternal, infinite,
and self-existing, than he can be certain of any thing else.
3dly. Of the idea of God, including self-existence. Hence we may
observe, that our first certainty of the existence of God does not
arise from this, that in the idea our minds frame of him, (or rather in
the definition that we make of the word God, as signifying a being of
all possible perfections,) we include self-existence; but from hence,
that it is demonstrable both negatively, that neither can all things
possibly have arisen out of nothing, nor can they have depended one on
another in an endless succession; and also positively, that there is
something in the universe, actually existing without us, the
supposition of whose not-existing plainly implies a contradiction. The
argument which has by some been drawn from our including self-existence
in the idea of God, or our comprehending it in the definition or notion
we frame of him, has this obscurity and defect in it: that it seems to
extend only to the nominal idea or mere definition of a self-existent
being, and does not with a sufficiently evident connexion refer and
apply that general nominal idea, definition, or notion which we frame
in our own mind, to any real particular being actually existing without
us. For it is not satisfactory, that I have in my mind an idea of the
proposition; there exists a being indued with all possible perfections;
or, there is a self-existent being. But I must also have some idea of
the thing. I must have an idea of something actually existing without
me. And I must see wherein consists the absolute impossibility of
removing that idea, and consequently of supposing the non-existence of
the thing, before I can be satisfied, from that idea, that the thing
actually exists. The bare having an idea of the proposition there is a
self-existent being, proves indeed the thing not to be impossible; (for
of an impossible proposition there can be no idea;) but that it
actually is, cannot be proved from the idea; unless the certainty of
the actual existence of a necessarily-existing being follows from the
possibility of the existence of such a being; which that it does in
this particular case, many learned men have indeed thought; and their
subtile arguings upon this head are sufficient to raise a cloud not
very easy to be seen through. But it is a much clearer and more
convincing way of arguing, to demonstrate that there does actually
exist without us a being, whose existence is necessary and of itself;
by shewing the evident contradiction contained in the contrary
supposition, (as I have before done,) and at the same time the absolute
impossibility of destroying or removing some ideas, as of eternity and
immensity, which therefore must needs be modes or attributes of a
necessary being actually existing. For if I have in my mind an idea of
a thing, and cannot possibly in my imagination take away the idea of
that thing as actually existing, any more than I can change or take
away the idea of the equality of twice two to four; the certainty of
the existence of that thing is the same, and stands on the same
foundation as the certainty of the other relation. For the relation of
equality between twice two and four has no other certainty but this;
that I cannot, without a contradiction, change or take away the idea of
that relation. We are certain, therefore, of the being of a supreme
independent cause; because it is strictly demonstrable, that there is
something in the universe actually existing without us, the supposition
of whose not-existing plainly implies a contradiction.
Some writers have contended, [9] that it is preposterous to inquire in
this manner at all into the ground or reason of the existence of the
first cause: because evidently the first cause can have nothing prior
to it, and consequently must needs (they think) exist absolutely
without any cause at all. That the first cause can have no other being
prior to it, to be the cause of its existence, is indeed self-evident.
But if originally, absolutely, and antecedently to all supposition of
existence, there be no necessary ground or reason why the first cause
does exist, rather than not exist; if the first cause can rightly and
truly be affirmed to exist, absolutely without any ground or reason of
existence at all, it will unavoidably follow, by the same argument,
that it may as well cease likewise to exist, without any ground or
reason of ceasing to exist: which is absurd. The truth therefore
plainly is: Whatever is the true reason, why the first cause can never
possibly cease to exist, the same is, and originally and always was,
the true reason why it always did and cannot but exist: that is, it is
the true ground and reason of its existence.
4thly. From hence it follows, that the material That the material world
cannot possibly be the self-existent being. world cannot possibly be
the first and original being, uncreated, independent, and of itself
eternal. For since it hath been already demonstrated, that whatever
being hath existed from eternity, independent, and without any external
cause of its existence, must be self-existent; and that whatever is
self-existent, must exist necessarily by an absolute necessity in the
nature of the thing itself. It follows evidently, that unless the
material world exists necessarily by an absolute necessity in its own
nature, so as that it must be an express contradiction to suppose it
not to exist, it cannot be independent, and of itself eternal. Now that
the material world does not exist thus necessarily, is very evident.
For absolute necessity of existing, and a possibility of not existing,
being contradictory ideas, it is manifest the material world cannot
exist necessarily, if without a contradiction we can conceive it either
not to be, or to be in any respect otherwise than it now is; than
which, nothing is more easy. For whether we consider the form of the
world, with the disposition and motion of its parts, or whether we
consider the matter of it, as such, without respect to its present
form, every thing in it,--both the whole and every one of its parts,
their situation and motion, the form and also the matter, are the most
arbitrary and dependent things, and the farthest removed from
necessity, that can possibly be imagined. A necessity indeed of
fitness, that is, a necessity that things should be as they are, in
order to the well-being of the whole, there may be in all these things:
but an absolute necessity of nature in any of them, (which is what the
atheist must maintain,) there is not the least appearance of. If any
man will say in this sense, (as every atheist must do,) either that the
form of the world, or at least the matter and motion of it, is
necessary, nothing can possibly be invented more absurd.
If he says, that the particular form is necessary; that is, The form of
the world not necessary. that the world, and all things that are
therein, exist by necessity of nature, he must affirm it to be a
contradiction to suppose that any part of the world can be in any
respect otherwise than it now is. It must be a contradiction in terms,
to suppose more or fewer stars, more or fewer planets, or to suppose
their size, figure, or motion different from what it now is; or to
suppose more or fewer plants and animals upon earth, or the present
ones of different shape and bigness from what they now are. In all
which things there is the greatest arbitrariness, in respect of power
and possibility, that can be imagined; however necessary any of them
may be, in respect of wisdom, and preservation of the beauty and order
of the whole.
If Nor its motion. the atheist will say, that the motion in general of
all matter is necessary, it follows that it must be a contradiction in
terms to suppose any matter to be at rest; which is so absurd and
ridiculous, that I think hardly any atheists, either ancient or modern,
have presumed directly to suppose it.
One late author [10] indeed has ventured to assert, and pretended to
prove, that motion (that is, the conatusto motion, the tendency to
move, the power or force that produces actual motion,) is essential to
all matter. But how philosophically, may appear from this one
consideration: The essential tendency to motion, of every one, or of
any one particle of matter in this author's imaginary infinite plenum,
must be either a tendency to move some one determinate way at once, or
to move every way at once. A tendency to move some one determinate way
cannot be essential to any particle of matter, but must arise from some
external cause; because there is nothing in the pretended necessary
nature of any particle to determine its motion necessarily and
essentially one way rather than another. And a tendency or conatus
equally to move every way at once, is either an absolute contradiction,
or at least could produce nothing in matter but an eternal rest of all
and every one of its parts.
If the atheist will suppose motion necessary and essential to some
matter, but not to all, the same absurdity, as to the determination of
motion, still follows; and now he moreover supposes an absolute
necessity not universal; that is, that it shall be a contradiction to
suppose some certain matter at rest though at the same time some other
matter actually be at rest.
If Nor the bare matter. he only affirms bare matter to be necessary
then, besides the extreme folly of attributing motion and the form of
the world to chance, (which senseless opinion I think all atheists have
now given up; and therefore I shall not think myself obliged to take
any notice of it in the sequel of this discourse;) it may be
demonstrated, by many arguments drawn from the nature and affections of
the thing itself, that matter is not a necessary being. For instance,
thus: Tangibility, or resistance, (which is what mathematicians very
properly call vis inertiæ, is essential to matter; otherwise the word
matter will have no determinate signification. Tangibility, therefore,
or resistance, belonging to all matter, it follows evidently, that, if
all space were filled with matter, the resistance of all fluids (for
the resistance of the parts of hard bodies arises from another cause,)
would necessarily be equal. For greater or less degrees of fineness or
subtilty can in this case make no difference; because the smaller or
finer the parts of the fluid are, wherewith any particular space is
filled, the greater in proportion is the number of the parts; and
consequently the resistance still always equal. But experience shows,
on the contrary, that the resistance of all fluids is not equal; there
being large spaces in which no sensible resistance at all is made to
the swiftest and most lasting motion of the solidest bodies. Therefore
all space is not filled with matter; but, of necessary consequence,
there must be a vacuum.
Or thus. It appears from experiments of falling bodies, and from
experiments of pendulums, which (being of equal lengths and unequal
gravities,) vibrate in equal times; that all bodies whatsoever, in
spaces void of sensible resistance, fall from the same height with
equal velocities. Now, it is evident, that whatever force causes
unequal bodies to move with equal velocities, must be proportional to
the quantities of the bodies moved. The power of gravity therefore in
all bodies, is, (at equal distances, suppose from the centre of the
earth,) proportional to the quantity of matter contained in each body.
For if, in a pendulum, there were any matter that did not gravitate
proportionally to its quantity, the vis inertiæ of that matter would
retard the motion of the rest, so as soon to be discovered in pendulums
of equal lengths and unequal gravities in spaces void of sensible
resistance. Gravity, therefore, is in all bodies [11] proportional to
the quantity of their matter. And consequently, all bodies not being
equally heavy, it follows again necessarily, that there must be a
vacuum. [12]
Now, if there be a vacuum, it follows plainly, that matter is not a
necessary being. For if a vacuum actually be, then it is evidently more
than possible for matter not to be. If an atheist will yet assert, that
matter may be necessary, though not necessary to be everywhere, I
answer, this is an express contradiction: for absolute necessity is
absolute necessity everywhere alike. And if it be no impossibility for
matter to be absent from one place, it is no impossibility (absolutely
in the nature of the thing; for no relative or consequential necessity
can have any room in this argument,) it is no absolute impossibility, I
say, in the nature of the thing, that matter should be absent from any
other place, or from every place.
Spinoza, Spinoza's opinion confuted. the most celebrated patron of
atheism in our time, who taught that there is no difference of
substances, [13] but that the whole and every part of the material
world is a necessarily-existing being, and that there is no other God
but the universe; [14] that he might seemingly avoid the manifold
absurdities of that opinion, endeavours by an ambiguity of expression,
in the progress of his discourse, to elude the arguments by which he
foresaw his assertion would be confuted. For, having first plainly
asserted, that all substance is necessarily-existing, [15] he would
afterward seem to explain it away, by asserting, that the reason why
every thing exists necessarily, [16] and could not possibly have been
in any respect different from what it now is, is because every thing
flows from the necessity of the divine nature. By which, if the unwary
reader understands, that he means things are therefore necessarily such
as they are, because infinite wisdom and goodness could not possibly
make things but in that order which is fittest and wisest in the whole,
he is very much mistaken: for such a necessity is not a natural, but
only a moral and consequential necessity, and directly contrary to the
author's true intention. Further, if the reader hereby understands,
that God was determined, not by a necessity of wisdom and goodness, but
by a mere natural necessity, exclusive of will and choice, to make all
things just as they now are; neither is this the whole of Spinoza's
meaning: for this, as absurd as it is, is still supposing God as a
substance distinct from the material world; which he expressly denies.
[17] Nay, further, if any one thinks his meaning to be, that all
substances in the world are only modifications of the divine essence,
neither is this all; for thus God may still be supposed as an agent,
acting upon himself at least, and manifesting himself in different
manners, according to his own will; which Spinoza expressly denies.
[18] But his true meaning, therefore, however darkly and ambiguously he
sometimes speaks, must be this; and if he means any thing at all
consistent with himself, can be no other than this: that, since it is
absolutely [19] impossible for any thing to be created or produced by
another; and [20] also absolutely impossible for God to have caused any
thing to be in any respect different from what it now is; every thing
that exists, must needs be so a part [21] of the divine substance, not
as a modification caused in it by any [22] will or good-pleasure, or
wisdom in the whole, but as of absolute necessity in itself, with
respect to the manner [23] of the existence of each part, no less than
with respect to the self-existence of the whole. Thus the opinion of
Spinoza, when expressed plainly and consistently, comes evidently to
this; that the material world, and every part of it, with the order and
manner of being of each part, is the only self-existent, or
necessarily-existing being. And now, consequently, he must of necessity
affirm all the conclusions which I have before shown to follow
demonstrably from that opinion. He cannot possibly avoid affirming,
that it is a contradiction, (not to the perfections of God, for that is
mere senseless cant and amusement in him who maintains that there is
but one substance in the universe; but he must affirm that it is in
itself and in terms a contradiction,) for any thing to be, or to be
imagined, in any respect otherwise than it now is. He must say it is a
contradiction, to suppose the number, or figure, or order of the
several parts of the world, could possibly have been different from
what they now are. He must say, motion is necessarily of itself, and
consequently that it is a contradiction in terms to suppose any matter
to be at rest; or else he must affirm, (which is rather the more absurd
of the two, as may appear from what has been already said in proof of
the second general head of this discourse; [24] and yet he has chosen
to affirm it;) that motion, as a dependent being, has been eternally
communicated from one piece of matter to another, without having at all
any original cause of its being, either within itself or from without,
which, with other the like consequences touching the necessity of the
existence of things, (the very mention of which is a sufficient
confutation of any opinion they follow from,) do, as I have said,
unavoidably follow from the fore-mentioned opinion of Spinoza. And
consequently, that opinion, viz. that the universe, or whole world, is
the self-existent or necessarily-existing being, is demonstrated to be
false.
I have, in this attempt to show that the material world cannot possibly
be the first and original being, uncreated, independent, and
self-existent, designedly omitted the argument usually drawn from the
supposed absolute impossibility, in the nature of the thing itself, of
the world's being eternal, or having existed through an infinite
succession of time; and this I have done for the two following reasons.
1st. Of the opinion concerning the eternity of the world. Because the
question between us and the atheists is not whether the world can
possibly have been eternal, but whether it can possibly be the
original, independent self-existing being?--which is a very different
question. For many, who have affirmed the one, have still utterly
denied the other. And almost all the ancient philosophers, that held
the eternity of the world, in whose authority and reasons our modern
atheists do so greatly boast and triumph, defended that their opinion
by such arguments as show plainly that they did by no means thereby
intend to assert that the material world was the original, independent,
self-existing being, in opposition to the belief of the existence of a
supreme all-governing mind, which is the notion of God. So that the
deniers of the being of God have no manner of advantage from that
opinion of the eternity of the world, even supposing it could not be
disproved. Almost all the old philosophers, I say, who held the
eternity of the world, did not thereby mean (at least their arguments
do not tend to prove) that it was independent and self-existent; but
their arguments are wholly levelled, either to prove barely that
something must needs be eternal, and that the universe could not
possibly arise out of nothing absolutely and without cause; which is
all that Ocellus Lucanus's arguments amount to: or else that the world
is an eternal and necessary effect, flowing from the essential and
immutable energy of the divine nature; which seems to have been
Aristotle's opinion: or else that the world is an eternal voluntary
emanation from the all-wise and supreme cause; which was the opinion of
many of Plato's followers. None of which opinions or arguments will in
the least help out our modern atheists; who would exclude supreme mind
and intelligence out of the universe. For, however the opinion of the
eternity of the world is really inconsistent with the belief of its
being created in time, yet so long as the defenders of that opinion
either did not think it inconsistent with the belief of the world's
being the effect and work of an eternal, all-wise, and all-powerful
mind; or at least could defend that opinion by such arguments only as
did not in the least prove the self-existence or independency of the
world, but most of them rather quite the contrary; it is with the
greatest injustice and unreasonableness in the world, that modern
atheists (to whose purpose the eternity or non-eternity of the world
would signify nothing, unless at the same time the existence and
sovereignty of eternal intelligence or mind were likewise disproved,)
pretend either the authority or the reasons of these men to be on their
side.
Ocellus Lucanus, one of the ancientest asserters of the eternity of the
world, (whose antiquity and authority [25] Mr Blunt opposes to that of
Moses,) in delivering his opinion, speaks, indeed, like one that
believed the material world to be self-existent; asserting, [26] that
it is utterly incapable either of generation or corruption, of
beginning or end; that it is of itself eternal and perfect, and
permanent for ever, and that the frame and parts of the world must
needs be eternal as well as the substance and matter of the whole. But
when he comes to produce his arguments or reasons for his opinion, they
are either so very absurd and ridiculous, that even any atheist in this
age ought to be ashamed to repeat them; as when he attempts to prove
[27] that the world must needs be eternal, without beginning or end,
because both its figure and motion are a circle, which has neither
beginning nor end: or else they are such arguments as prove only, what
no man ever really denied, viz. that something must needs be eternal,
because it is impossible for every thing to arise out of nothing, or to
fall into nothing; as when he says [28] that the world must have been
eternal, because it is a contradiction for the universe to have had a
beginning, since, if it had a beginning, it must have been caused by
some other thing, and then it is not the universe. To which one
argument all that he says in his whole book is plainly reducible. So
that it is evident all that he really proves, is only this: that there
must needs be an eternal being in the universe; and not, that matter is
self-existent, in opposition to intelligence and mind. For, all that he
asserts about the absolute necessity of the order and parts of the
world, is confessedly most ridiculous; not at all proved by the
arguments he alleges; and in some passages of this very book, as well
as in other fragments, he himself supposes, and is forced expressly to
confess, that, however eternal and necessary every thing in the world
be imagined to be, yet even that necessity must flow from an eternal
and intelligent mind, [29] the necessary perfections of whose nature
are the cause [30] ) of the harmony and beauty of the world, and
particularly of men's having [31] faculties, organs of sense,
appetites, &c. fitted even to final causes.
Aristotle, likewise, was a great asserter indeed of the eternity of the
world; but not in opposition to the belief of the being, or of the
power, wisdom, or goodness of God. On the contrary, he for no other
reason asserted the world to be eternal, but because he fancied that
such an effect must needs eternally proceed from such an eternal cause.
And so far was he from teaching that matter is the first and original
cause of all things, that, on the contrary, he everywhere expressly
describes God to be an intelligent being; [32] incorporeal; [33] the
first mover of all things, [34] himself immoveable; and affirms, that
[35] if there were nothing but matter in the world, there would be no
original cause, but an infinite progression of causes, which is absurd.
As to those philosophers who taught plainly and expressly that matter
was not only eternal, but also self-existent and entirely independent,
co-existing from eternity with God, independently, as a second
principle, I have already shown the impossibility of this opinion, at
the entrance upon the present head of discourse, where I proved that
matter could not possibly be self-existent: and I shall further
demonstrate it to be false, when I come to prove the unity of the
self-existent being.
Plato, whatever his opinion was about the original matter, very largely
and fully declares his sentiments about the formation of the world,
viz. that it was composed and framed by an intelligent and wise God.
And there is no one of all the ancient philosophers, who does in all
his writings speak so excellently and worthily [36] as he, concerning
the nature and attributes of God. Yet as to the time of the world's
beginning to be formed, he seems to make it indefinite, when he says
[37] the world must needs be an eternal resemblance of the eternal
idea. At least his followers afterward so understood and explained it,
as if, by the creation of the world, was not to be understood a
creation in time; [38] but only an order of nature, causality and
dependence, that is, that the will of God, and his power of acting,
being necessarily as eternal as his essence, [39] the effects of that
will and power might be supposed coeval to the will and power
themselves; in the same manner as light would eternally proceed from
the sun, or a shadow from the interposed body, or an impression from an
imposed seal, if the respective causes of these effects were supposed
eternal.
From all which, it plainly appears how little reason modern atheists
have to boast either of the authority or reasons of those ancient
philosophers who held the eternity of the world. For since these men
neither proved, nor attempted to prove, that the material world was
original to itself, independent or self-existing, but only that it was
an eternal effect of an eternal cause, which is God, it is evident that
this their opinion, even supposing it could by no means be refuted,
could afford no manner of advantage to the cause of atheists in our
days, who, excluding supreme mind and intelligence out of the universe,
would make mere matter and necessity the original and eternal cause of
all things.
2dly. The other reason why (in this attempt to prove that the material
world cannot possibly be the first and original being, uncreated,
independent and self-existent,) I have omitted the argument usually
drawn from the supposed absolute impossibility of the world's being
eternal, or having existed through an infinite succession of time,--is,
because that argument can never be so stated as to be of any use in
convincing or affecting the mind of an atheist, who must not be
supposed to come prepared beforehand with any transcendent idea of the
eternity of God. For since an atheist cannot be supposed to believe the
nice and subtile (and indeed unintelligible) distinctions of the
schools, it is impossible by this argument so to disprove the
possibility of the eternity of the world, but that an atheist will
understand it to prove equally against the possibility of any thing's
being eternal; and, consequently, that it proves nothing at all, but is
only a difficulty arising from our not being able to comprehend
adequately the notion of eternity. That the material world is not
self-existent or necessarily-existing, but the product of some distinct
superior agent, may (as I have already shown) be strictly demonstrated
by bare reason against the most obstinate atheist in the world. But the
time when the world was created, or whether its creation was, properly
speaking, in time, is not so easy to demonstrate strictly by bare
reason, (as appears from the opinions of many of the ancient
philosophers concerning that matter;) but the proof of it can be taken
only from revelation. To endeavour to prove, that there cannot possibly
be any such thing as infinite time or space, from the impossibility of
an addition [40] of finite parts ever composing or exhausting an
infinite; or from the imaginary inequality of the number of years,
days, and hours, that would be contained in the one; or of the miles,
yards, and feet, that would be contained in the other; is supposing
infinites to be made up of numbers of finites; that is, it is supposing
finite quantities to be aliquot or constituent parts of infinite; when
indeed they are not so, but do all equally, whether great or small,
whether many or few, bear the very same proportion to an infinite, as
mathematical points do to a line, or lines to a superficies, or as
moments do to time; that is, none at all. So that, to argue absolutely
against the possibility of infinite space or time, merely from the
imaginary inequality of the numbers of their finite parts, which are
not properly constituent parts, but mere nothings in proportion,--is
the very same thing as it would be to argue against the possibility of
the existence of any determinate finite quantity, from the imaginary
equality or inequality of the number of the mathematical lines and
points contained therein; when indeed neither the one nor the other
have (in propriety of speech) any number at all, but they are
absolutely without number: neither can any given number or quantity be
any aliquot or constituent part of infinite, or be compared at all with
it, or bear any kind of proportion to it; or be the foundation of any
argument in any question concerning it.
__________________________________________________________________
[5] Moveantur partes spatii de locis suis, et movebuntur (ut ita dicam)
de seipsis.--Newton. Princip. lib. I. Schol. ad Definit. 8.
[6] See the Answer to a Seventh Letter, at the end of this Book.
[7] Page 15.
[8] Puto implicare contradictionem, ut mundus sit finitus: i. e. I
think it implies a contradiction for the world to be finite.--Cartes.
Epist. 69. primæ partis. And his follower Mr. Regis, Mais peutê tre
(saith he) que je raisonne mal, &c. i. e. But perhaps I argue ill, when
I conclude that the property my idea hath to represent extension, [that
is, in the sense of the Cartesians, matter,] comes from extension
itself as its cause. For, what hinders me from believing that if this
property comes not from myself, yet at least it may come from some
spirit [or being] superior to me, which produces in me the idea of
extension, though extension does not actually exist? Yet when I
consider the thing attentively, I find that my conclusion is good; and
that no spirit [or being] how excellent soever, can cause the idea
which I have of extension to represent to me extension rather than any
thing else, if extension does not actually exist; because if he should
do so, the idea which I should then have of extension would not be a
representation of extension, but a representation of nothing; which is
impossible. But it may be I still deceive myself, when I say that the
idea I have of extension supposes an object actually existing. For it
seems that I have ideas, which do not suppose any object: I have, for
example, the idea of an enchanted castle; though no such thing really
exists. Yet when I consider the difficulty still more attentively, I
find there is this difference between the idea of extension, and that
of an enchanted castle, that the first, being natural, that is,
independent on my will, supposes an object which is necessarily such as
it represents, whereas the other, being artificial, supposes indeed an
object, but it is not necessary that that object be absolutely such as
the idea represents, because my will can add to that object, or
diminish from it, as it pleases, as I have before said, and as shall be
proved hereafter, when I come to treat of the origin of ideas.--Regis
Metaphys. lib. I. par. 1. cap. 3.
[9] See the Answer to a Seventh Letter at the end of this book.
[10] Mr Toland, Letter III.
[11] Neutoni Princip. Philosoph. edit. 1ma. p. 304. edit. 2da. p. 272.
edit. 3tia. p. 294.
[12] Neutoni Princip. Philosoph. edit. 1ma. p. 411. edit. 2da, p. 368.
[13] Una substantia non potest produci ab alia substantia. Et hi par.
1. prop. 6. Omnis substantia est necessaria infinita. Ibid. prop. 8. Ad
naturam substantiæ pertinet existere. Ibid. prop. 7.
[14] Præter Deum nulla dari neque concipi potest substantia. Ibid.
prop. 14.
[15] Ad naturam substantiæ pertinet existere. Prop. 7.
[16] Res, nullo alio modo, neque alio ordine, a Deo produci potuerunt
quam productæ sunt. Prop. 33. Ex necessitate Divinæ Naturæ, infinita
infinitis modis (hoc est, omnia quæ sub intellectum infinitum cadere
possunt,) sequi debent. Prop 16.
[17] Locis supra citatis.
[18] Deum non operari ex libertate voluntatis. Prop. 32. corol. 1. et
scholium ad prop. 17.
[19] Una substantia non potest produci ab alia substantia. Prop. 6.
[20] Res, nullo alio modo, neque alio ordine, a Deo produci potuerunt
quam productæ sunt. Prop. 33.
[21] Præter Deum nulla dari, neque concipi potest substantia. Prop. 14.
[22] Deum non operari ex libertate voluntatis. Prop. 32. corol. 1.
[23] Nullo alio modo, neque ordine, &c.
[24] Corpus motum, vel quiescens, ad motum vel quietem determinari
debuit ab alio corpore, quod etiam ad motum vel quietum determinatum
fuit ab alio, et illud iterum ab alio, et sic in infinitum. Par. II.
prop. 13. lemma 3.
[25] Oracles of Reason; Letter to Mr Gildon, p. 216.
[26] Agenneton to pan kai anolethron. Anarchon kai ateleuteion. Kosmos
autos ex heautou aidios esti kai autoteles, kai diamenon ton panta
aiona. Aei ontos tou kesmou, anankaion kai ta mere autou sunuparchein.
Lego de mere ouranon, gen, &c. Ocell. Lucan. Peri tes ou pantos
phuseos.
[27] To anarchon kai ateleuteton ou schematos kai tes kieseos
pistoutai, dioti agennetos ho kesmos kai aphthartos hete gar tou
schematos idea, kuklos houtos de pantothen hisos kai homoios, dioper
anarchos kai ateleuteeos, he te tes kineseos, &c. Ibid. Thus
translated: Nay, that the figure, motion, &c. thereof, are without
beginning and end; thereby it plainly appears, that the world admitteth
neither production nor dissolution. For the figure is spherical, and
consequently on every side equal, and therefore without beginning or
ending. Also the motion is circular, &c. Oracles of Reason, p. 215.
[28] Agenneton to pan.--ex ou gar gegonen, ekeino proton tou pantos
esti.--To ge de pan genomenon sun pasi ginetai, kai touto ge de
adunaton--Ektos gar tou Pantos, ouden. Ocell. Ibid.
[29] To aeikineton theion men, kai logon echon kai emphron. Ocell. Luc.
de Leg. Fragm.
[30] Sunechei ton kosmon harmonia. Tautes d' aitios ho TheosIbid.
[31] Tas dunameis kai ta Organa kai tas horexeis upo Theou dedomenas,
anthropos, ouch hedones heneka dedosthai sumbebeken, alla, &c. Idem,
Peri tes tou pantos phuseos.
[32] Nous.
[33] Theon asomaton apephens. Diog. in Vita Aristol.
[34] To proton kinoun, akineton. Aristot. Metaph.
[35] Ei me estai para ta aistheta alla, ouk estai arche kai taxis, all'
aei t8es arches arche. Ibid
[36] Ho poetes kai patertoude tou pantos Ho gen, ouranon, kai Theous,
kai p8anta ta en ourano kai ta en adou kai upo ges hehapanta
ergasamenos. De Republ. lib. 10.
[37] Pasa ananke tonde kosmon, eikona tinos einai. Plato in Timæo.
Which words being very imperfect in our copies of the original, are
thus rendered by Cicero: Si ergo generatus [est mundus;] ad id effectus
est, quod ratione sapientiaque comprehenditur, atque immutabili
æternitate continetur. Ex quo efficitur, ut sit necesse hunc quem
cernimus mundum, simulacrum æternum esse alicujus æterni. Cic. de
Univers.
[38] Noun pro kosoou einai, ouch hos chrono proteron autou onta, all'
hoti ho kosmos para nou esti, phusei proteros ekeinos kai aition
toutou. Plotinus.Qui autem a Deo quidem factum fatentur, non tamen eum
volunt temporis habere, sed suæ creationis initium; ut, modo quodam vix
intelligibili, semper sit factus. Augustin. de Civit. Dei, lib. 11.
cap. 4. De mundo, et de his quos in mundo deos a Deo factos scribit
Plato, apertissime dicit eos esse cæpisse, et habere initium.--Verum id
quomodo intelligant, invenerunt [Platonici;] non esse hoc videlicet
temporis, sed substitutionis initium. Ibid. lib. 10. cap. 31. Sed
mundum quidem fuisse semper, philosophia auctor est; conditore quidem
Deo, sed non ex tempore. Macrob. in Somn. Scip. lib. 2. cap. 10.
[39] Kai ei boulei, paradeigmati si ti9ne ton gnorimon xenagess pros to
zeteuenon; phasi gar hoti kath8aper aition to soma tes hekastou skias
ginetai; homochronos deto somati he skia, kai ouch homotimos; houto de
kai hode ho kosmos parakolouthema esti to Theou aitio9u ontos auto tou
einai, k9ai sunaidios esti to Theo, ouketi de kai homotimos. Zachariæ
Scholast. Disputat. Sicut enim, inquiunt [Platonici,] si pes ex
æternitate semper fuisset in pulvere, semper ei subesset vestigium;
quod tamen vestigium a calcante factum nemo dubitaret; nec alterum
altero prius esset quamvis alterum ab altero factum esset: Sic,
inquiunt, et mundus atque; in illo dii creati, et semper fuerunt,
semper existente qui fecit; et tamen facti sunt.--Augustin de Civitate
Dei. lib. 10. cap. 31.
[40] Cudworth's System, p. 643.
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Proposition IV: The essence of the self-existent Being [is] incomprehensible.
IV. Proposition IV. The essence of the self-existent Being
incomprehensible. What the substance or essence of that being, which is
self-existent, or necessarily-existing, is, we have no idea; neither is
it at all possible for us to comprehend it. That there is such a being
actually existing without us, we are sure (as I have already shown) by
strict and undeniable demonstration. Also what it is not, that is, that
the material world is not it, as modern atheists would have it, has
been already demonstrated. But what it is, I mean as to its substance
and essence, this we are infinitely unable to comprehend. Yet this does
not in the least diminish the certainty of the demonstration of its
existence. For it is one thing to know certainly that a being exists;
and another, to know what the essence of that being is. And the one may
be capable of the strictest demonstration, when the other is absolutely
beyond the reach of all our faculties to understand. A blind or deaf
man has infinitely more reason to deny the being, or the possibility of
the being, of light or sounds, than any atheist can have to deny, or
doubt of the existence of God: For the one can, at the utmost, have no
other proof but credible testimony, of the existence of certain things,
whereof it is absolutely impossible that he himself should frame any
manner of idea, not only of their essence, but even of their effects or
properties; but the other may, with the least use of his reason, be
assured of the existence of a Supreme Being, by undeniable
demonstration; and may also certainly know abundance of its attributes,
(as shall be made appear in the following propositions,) though its
substance or essence be entirely incomprehensible. Wherefore nothing
can be more unreasonable and weak, than for an atheist upon this
account to deny the being of God, merely because his weak and finite
understanding cannot frame to itself any adequate notion of the
substance or essence of that first and supreme cause. We are utterly
ignorant of the substance or essence of all other things; even of those
things which we converse most familiarly with, and think we understand
best. There is not so mean and contemptible a plant or animal, that
does not confound the most enlarged understanding upon earth; nay, even
the simplest and plainest of all inanimate beings have their essence or
substance hidden from us in the deepest and most impenetrable
obscurity. How weak then and foolish is it, to raise objections against
the being of God from the incomprehensibleness of his essence! And to
represent it as a strange and incredible thing, that there should exist
any incorporeal substance, the essence of which we are not able to
comprehend! As if it were not far more strange, that there should exist
numberless objects of our senses, things subject to our daily inquiry,
search, and examination, and yet we not be able, no not in any measure,
to find out the real essence of any one even of the least of these
things.
Nevertheless, it is very necessary to observe here, by the way, that it
does not at all from hence follow, that there can possibly be, in the
unknown substance or essence of God, any thing contradictory to our
clear ideas. For, as a blind man, though he has no idea of light and
colours, yet knows certainly and infallibly that there cannot possibly
be any kind of light which is not light, or any sort of colour which is
not a colour; so, though we have no idea of the substance of God, nor
indeed of the substance of any other being; yet we are as infallibly
certain that there cannot possibly be, either in the one or the other,
any contradictory modes or properties as if we had the clearest and
most distinct idea of them.
From what has been said upon this head, we may observe,
1st. Of infinite space. The weakness of such as have presumed to
imagine infinite space to be a just representation or adequate idea of
the essence of the supreme cause. This is a weak imagination, arising
from hence, that men, using themselves to judge of all things by their
senses only, fancy spiritual or immaterial substances, because they are
not objects of their corporeal senses, to be, as it were, mere
nothings; just as children imagine air, because they cannot see it, to
be mere emptiness and nothing. But the fallacy is too gross to deserve
being insisted upon. There are perhaps numberless substances in the
world, whose essences are as entirely unknown and impossible to be
represented to our imaginations, as colours are to a man that was born
blind, or sounds to one that has been always deaf. Nay, there is no
substance in the world, of which we know any thing further than only a
certain number of its properties or attributes; of which we know fewer
in some things, and in others more. Infinite space is nothing else but
abstract immensity or infinity, even as infinite duration is abstract
eternity. And it would be just as proper, to say that eternity is the
essence of the supreme cause, as to say, that immensity is so. Indeed,
they seem both to be but modes of an essence or substance
incomprehensible to us; and when we endeavour to represent the real
substance of any being whatsoever in our weak imaginations, we shall
find ourselves in like manner deceived.
2dly. From hence appears the vanity of the schoolmen, The vanity of the
schoolmen. who, as in other matters, so in their disputes about the
self-existent being, when they come at what they are by no means able
to comprehend or explain, lest they should seem ignorant of any thing,
they give us terms of art, and words of amusement, mere empty sounds,
which, under pretence of explaining the matter before them, have really
no manner of idea or signification at all. Thus, when they tell us
concerning the essence of God, that he is purus actus, mera forma, and
the like, either the words have no meaning, and signify nothing; or
else they express only the perfection of his power and other
attributes; which is not what these men intend to express by them.
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Proposition V. That the self-existent being must be eternal.
V. Proposition V. That the self-existent being must be eternal. Though
the substance or essence of the self-existent being is in itself
absolutely incomprehensible to us; yet many of the essential attributes
of his nature are strictly demonstrable, as well as his existence.
Thus, in the first place, the self-existent being must of necessity be
eternal. The ideas of eternity and self-existence are so closely
connected, that, because something must of necessity be eternal
independently and without any outward cause of its being, therefore it
must necessarily be self-existent; and, because it is impossible but
something must be self-existent, therefore it is necessary that it must
likewise be eternal. To be self-existent, is (as has been already
shown,) to exist by an absolute necessity in the nature of the thing
itself. Now this necessity being absolute, and not depending upon any
thing external, must be always unalterably the same; nothing being
alterable but what is capable of being affected by somewhat without
itself. That being, therefore, which has no other cause of its
existence but the absolute necessity of its own nature, must of
necessity have existed from everlasting, without beginning; and must of
necessity exist to everlasting without end.
As Of the manner of our conceiving the eternity of God. to the manner
of this eternal existence: it is manifest, it herein infinitely
transcends the manner of the existence of all created beings, even of
such as shall exist for ever; that whereas it is not possible for their
finite minds to comprehend all that is past, or to understand perfectly
all things that are at present, much less to know all that is future,
or to have entirely in their power any thing that is to come; but their
thoughts, and knowledge, and power must of necessity have degrees and
periods, and be successive and transient as the things themselves. The
eternal supreme cause, on the contrary, (supposing him to be an
intelligent being, which will hereafter be proved in the sequel of this
discourse,) must of necessity have such a perfect, independent, and
unchangeable comprehension of all things, that there can be no one
point or instant of his eternal duration, wherein all things that are
past, present, or to come, will not be as entirely known and
represented to him in one single thought or view; and all things
present and future be equally entirely in his power and direction as if
there was really no succession at all, but all things were actually
present at once. Thus far we can speak intelligibly concerning the
eternal duration of the self-existent being; and no atheist can say
this is an impossible, absurd, or insufficient account. It is, in the
most proper and intelligible sense of the words, to all the purposes of
excellency and perfection, interminabilis vitæ tota simul et perfecta
possessio; the entire and perfect possession of an endless life.
Others With respect to succession. have supposed that the difference
between the manner of the eternal existence of the supreme cause, and
that of the existence of created beings, is this: that, whereas the
latter is a continual transient succession of duration, the former is
one point or instant comprehending eternity, and wherein all things are
really co-existent. But this distinction I shall not now insist upon,
as being of no use in the present dispute, because it is impossible to
prove and explain it in such a manner as ever to convince an atheist
that there is any thing in it; and besides, as, on the one hand, the
schoolmen have indeed generally chosen to defend it, so, on the other
hand, [41] there are many learned men, of far better understanding and
judgment, who have rejected and opposed it.
__________________________________________________________________
[41] Crucem ingenio figere, ut rem capiat fugientem captum.--Tam fieri
non potest, ut instans [temporis] coexistant rei successivæ, quam
impossibile est punctum coexistere [coexistendi] lineæ.--Lusus merus
non intellectorum verberum.--Gassend. Physic. lib. 1. I shall not
trouble you with the inconsistent and unintelligible notions of the
schoolmen; that it [the eternity of God] is duratio tota simul, in
which we are not to conceive any succession, but to imagine it an
instant. We may as well conceive the immensity of God to be a point, as
his eternity to be an instant.--And how that can be together, which
must necessarily be imagined to be co-existent to successions, let them
that can, conceive.--Archbishop Tillotson, vol. 7. serm. 13. Others
say, God sees and knows future things, by the presentiality and
co-existence of all things in eternity; for they say, that future
things are actually present and existing to God, though not in mensura
propria, yet in mensura aliena. The schoolmen have much more of this
jargon and canting language. I envy no man the understanding these
phrases; but to me they seem to signify nothing, but to have been words
invented by idle and conceited men, which a great many ever since, lest
they should seem to be ignorant, would seem to understand. But I wonder
most, that men, when they have amused and puzzled themselves and others
with hard words, should call this explaining things.--Archbishop
Tillotson, vol. 6. serm. 6.
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Proposition VI. That the self-existent being must be infinite and omnipresent.
VI. Proposition VI. That the self-existent being must be infinite and
omnipresent. The self-existent Being must of necessity be infinite and
omnipresent. The idea of infinity or immensity, as well as of eternity,
is so closely connected with that of self-existence, that, because it
is impossible but something must be infinite independently and of
itself, (for else it would be impossible there should be any infinite
at all, unless an effect could be perfecter than its cause,) therefore
it must of necessity be self-existent: and because something must of
necessity be self-existent, therefore it is necessary that it must
likewise be infinite. To be self-existent (as has been already shown,)
is to exist by an absolute necessity in the nature of the thing itself.
Now, this necessity being absolute in itself, and not depending on any
outward cause, it is evident it must be everywhere as well as always,
unalterbly the same. For a necessity, which is not everywhere the same,
is plainly a consequential necessity only, depending upon some external
cause, and not an absolute one in its own nature; for a necessity
absolutely such in itself, has no relation to time or place, or any
thing else. Whatever therefore exists by an absolute necessity in its
own nature, must needs be infinite as well as eternal. To suppose a
finite being to be self-existent, is to say that it is a contradiction
for that being not to exist, the absence of which may yet be conceived
without a contradiction; which is the greatest absurdity in the world.
For if a being can, without a contradiction, be absent from one place,
it may, without a contradiction, be absent likewise from another place,
and from all places: and whatever necessity it may have of existing,
must arise from some external cause, and not absolutely from itself;
and, consequently, the being cannot be self-existent.
From hence it follows,
1st. That the infinity of the self-existent being must be an infinity
of fulness as well as of immensity; that is, it must not only be
without limits, but also without diversity, defect, or interruption:
For instance; could matter be supposed boundless, it would not
therefore follow that it was in this complete sense infinite; because,
though it had no limits, yet it might have within itself many
assignable vacuities. But whatever is self-existent, must of necessity
exist absolutely in every place alike, and be equally present
everywhere; and consequently must have a true and absolute infinity,
both of immensity and fulness.
2dly. From hence it follows, that the self-existent being must be a
most simple, unchangeable, incorruptible being; without parts, figure,
motion, divisibility, or any other such properties as we find in
matter. For all these things do plainly and necessarily imply
finiteness in their very notion, and are utterly inconsistent with
complete infinity. Divisibility is a separation of parts, real or
mental: meaning, by mental separation, not barely a partial
apprehending, (for space, for instance, which is absolutely indivisible
and inseparable, either really or mentally, may yet be partially
apprehended; [42] but a removing, disjoining or separating of parts one
from another, even so much as in the imagination. And any such
separation or removing of parts, one from another, is really or
mentally a setting of bounds; either of which destroys infinity.
Motion, for the same reason, implies finiteness; and to have parts,
properly speaking, signifies either difference and diversity of
existence, which is inconsistent with necessity; or else it signifies
divisibility, real or mental as before, which is inconsistent with
complete infinity. Corruption, change, or any alteration whatsoever,
implies motion, separation of parts, and finiteness. And any manner of
composition, in opposition to the most perfect simplicity, signifies
difference and diversity in the manner of existence, which is
inconsistent with necessity.
It is evident, Of the manner of our conceiving the immensity of God.
therefore, that the self-existent being must be infinite in the
strictest and most complete sense. But as to the particular manner of
his being infinite or everywhere present, in opposition to the manner
of created things being present in such or such finite places; this is
as impossible for our finite understandings to comprehend or explain,
as it is for us to form an adequate idea of infinity. Yet that the
thing is true, that he is actually omnipresent, we are as certain as we
are that there must something be infinite, which no man who has thought
upon these things at all ever denied. The schoolmen, indeed, have
presumed to assert that the immensity of God is a point, as his
eternity (they think) is an instant. But this being altogether
unintelligible, that which we can more safely affirm, and which no
atheist can say is absurd, and which nevertheless is sufficient to all
wise and good purposes, is this: that whereas all finite and created
beings can be present but in one definite place at once, and corporeal
beings even in that one place very imperfectly and unequally, to any
purpose of power or activity, only by the successive motion of
different members and organs; the Supreme Cause, on the contrary, being
an infinite and most simple essence, and comprehending all things
perfectly in himself, is at all times equally present, both in his
simple essence, and by the immediate and perfect exercise of all his
attributes, to every point of the boundless immensity, as if it were
really all but one single point.
__________________________________________________________________
[42] Ordo partium spatii est immutabilis; moveantur hæ de locis suis,
et movebuntur (ut ita dicam) de seipsis. Newton. Princip. Schol. ad
definit. 8.
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Proposition VII. That the self-existent being can be but one.
VII. Proposition VII. That the self-existent being can be but one. The
self-existent being must of necessity be but one. This evidently
follows from his being necessarily-existent: for necessity absolute, in
itself, is simple and uniform and universal, without any possible
difference, difformity, or variety whatsoever: and all variety or
difference of existence must needs arise from some external cause, and
be dependent upon it, and proportionable to the efficiency of that
cause, whatsoever it be. Absolute necessity, in which there can be no
variation in any kind or degree, cannot be the ground of existence of a
number of beings, however similar and agreeing: because, without any
other difference, even number is itself a manifest difformity or
inequality (if I may so speak) of efficiency or causality.
Again: To suppose two (or more) distinct beings existing of themselves,
necessarily, and independent from each other, implies this plain
contradiction; that each of them being independent from the other, they
may either of them be supposed to exist alone, so that it will be no
contradiction to imagine the other not to exist; and consequently
neither of them [43] will be necessarily-existing. Whatsoever therefore
exists necessarily, is the one simple essence of the self-existent
being; and whatsoever differs from that, is not necessarily-existing;
because in absolute necessity there can be no difference or diversity
of existence. Other beings there may be innumerable, besides the one
infinite self-existent: but no other being can be self-existent,
because so it would be individually the same, at the same time that it
is supposed to be different.
From hence it follows,
1st. Of the Trinity. That the unity of God is a true and real, not
figurative unity. With which prime foundation of natural religion, how
the scripture-doctrine of the Trinity perfectly agrees I have elsewhere
endeavoured to show particularly, in its proper place.
2dly. The impossibility of two independent principles. From hence it
follows, that it is impossible there should be two different
self-existent independent principles, as some philosophers have
imagined; such as God and matter. For, since self-existence is
necessary-existence, and since it is an express contradiction, (as has
already been shown,) that two different beings should each be
necessarily-existing; it evidently follows, that it is absolutely
impossible there should be two independent self-existent principles,
such as God and matter.
3dly. The error of Spinoza. From hence we may observe the vanity,
folly, and weakness of Spinoza; who, because the self-existent being
must necessarily be but one, concludes from thence, [44] that the whole
world, and every thing contained therein, is one uniform substance,
eternal, uncreated, and necessary: whereas, just on the contrary, he
ought to have concluded, that, because all things in the world are very
different one from another, and have all manner of variety, and all the
marks of will and arbitrariness and changeableness, (and none of
necessity) in them, being plainly fitted with very different powers to
very different ends, and distinguished one from another by a diversity,
not only of modes, but also of essential attributes, and consequently
(so far as it is possible for us, by the use of our present faculties,
to attain any knowledge at all of them) of their substances themselves
also; therefore none of these things are necessary or self-existent,
but must needs depend all upon some external cause, that is, on the one
supreme, unchangeable, self-existent being. That which led Spinoza into
his foolish and destructive opinion, and on which alone all his
argumentation is entirely built, is that absurd definition of
substance, [45] that it is something, the idea of which does not depend
on, or presuppose the idea of any other thing, from which it might
proceed; but includes in itself necessary-existence. Which definition
is either false, and signifies nothing; and then his whole doctrine
built upon it falls at once to the ground: Or, if it be true, then
neither matter nor spirit, nor any finite being whatsoever, (as has
been before shown,) is in that sense properly a substance, but (the ho
on) the self-existent being alone: and so it will prove nothing
(notwithstanding all his show and form of demonstration,) to his main
purpose, which was to make us believe that there is no such thing as
power or liberty in the universe, but that every particular thing [46]
in the world is by an absolute necessity just what it is, and could not
possibly have been in any respect otherwise. Supposing, I say, his
definition of substance to be true, yet even that would really conclude
nothing to his main purpose concerning the necessity of all things. For
since, according to that definition, neither matter nor spirit, nor any
finite beings whatsoever, are substances, but only modes; how will it
follow, that, because substance is self-existent, therefore all these
modes are so too? Why, because, [47] from an infinite cause infinite
effects must needs follow. Very true, supposing that infinite
self-existent cause not to be a voluntary, but a mere necessary agent,
that is, no agent at all: and supposing also, that in mere necessity
there could and must be all or any variety. Both which suppositions (in
the present argument) are the question begged: and what he afterwards
attempts to allege in proof of them, shall afterwards be considered in
its proper place.
__________________________________________________________________
[43] See this farther explained, in the Answer to the First Letter at
the end of this book.
[44] Una substantia non potest produci ab alia. Ethic. par. 1. prop. 6.
Ad naturam substantiæ pertinet existere. Prop. 7. Præter Deum nulla
dari, neque concipi potest substantia. Prop. 14.
[45] Per substantiam intelligo id quod in se est et per se concipitur;
hoc est, id cujus conceptus non indiget conceptu alterius rei a quo
formari debeat.--Definitio 3. which, presently after, he thus
explains:--Ad naturam substantiæ pertinet existere; hoc est, ipsius
essentia involvit necessario existentiam. Ethic. Par. 1. prop. 7.
[46] Res nullo alio modo, neque alio ordine, a Deo produci potuerunt
quam productæ sunt.--Prop. 33.
[47] Ex necessitate divinæ naturæ, infinita infinitis modis (hoc est,
omnia quæ sub intellectum infinitum cadere possunt,) seque
debent.--Prop. 16.
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Proposition VIII. That the self-existent being must be intelligent.
VIII. Proposition VIII. That the self-existent being must be
intelligent. The self-existent and original cause of all things must be
an intelligent being. In this proposition lies the main question
between us and the atheists. For, that something must be self-existent,
and that that which is self-existent must necessarily be eternal and
infinite, and the original cause of all things, will not bear much
dispute.--But all atheists, whether they hold the world to be of itself
eternal both as to the matter and form, or whether they hold the matter
only to be necessary and the form contingent, or whatever hypothesis
they frame, have always asserted, and must maintain, either directly or
indirectly, that the self-existent being is not an intelligent being,
but either pure unactive matter, or (which in other words is the very
same thing) a mere necessary agent. For a mere necessary agent must of
necessity either be plainly and directly in the grossest sense
unintelligent; which was the ancient atheist's notion of the
self-existent being: or else its intelligence (which is the assertion
of Spinoza and some moderns,) must be wholly separate from any power of
will and choice; which, in respect of any excellency and perfection, or
indeed to any common sense, is the very same thing as no intelligence
at all.
Now, that the self-existent being is not such a blind and unintelligent
necessity, but in the most proper sense an understanding and really
active being, does not indeed so obviously and directly appear to us by
considerations a priori; because (through the imperfection of our
faculties) we know not wherein intelligence consists, nor can see the
immediate and necessary connexion of it with self-existence, as we can
that of eternity, infinity, unity, &c. But, a posteriori, almost every
thing in the world demonstrates to us this great truth, and affords
undeniable arguments to prove that the world, and all things therein,
are the effects of an intelligent and knowing cause.
And 1st. Proved from the degrees of perfection in things, and the order
of causes and effects. Since in general there are manifestly in things
various kinds of powers, and very different excellencies and degrees of
perfection, it must needs be, that, in the order of causes and effects,
the cause must always be more excellent than the effect: and
consequently the self-existent being, whatever that be supposed to be,
must of necessity (being the original of all things) contain in itself
the sum and highest degree of all the perfections of all things: not
because that which is self-existent must therefore have all possible
perfections; (for this, though most certainly true in itself, yet
cannot be so easily demonstrated a priori;) but because it is
impossible that any effect should have any perfection, which was not in
the cause. For, if it had, then that perfection would be caused by
nothing; which is a plain contradiction. Now an unintelligent being, it
is evident, cannot be indued with all the perfections of all things in
the world; because intelligence is one of those perfections. All
things, therefore, cannot arise from an unintelligent original; and
consequently the self-existent being, must, of necessity, be
intelligent.
There is no possibility for an atheist to avoid the force of this
argument any other way than by asserting one of these two things:
either that there is no intelligent being at all in the universe; or
that intelligence is no distinct perfection, but merely a composition
of figure and motion, as colour and sounds are vulgarly supposed to be.
Of the former of these assertions, every man's own consciousness is an
abundant confutation. For they who contend that beasts are mere
machines, have yet never presumed to conjecture that men are so too.
And that the latter assertion (in which the main strength of atheism
lies,) is most absurd and impossible, shall be shown presently; though
if that assertion could be supposed to be true, yet even still it would
unavoidably follow, that the self-existent being must needs be
intelligent; as shall be proved in my fourth argument upon this present
head. In the meantime, that the assertion itself, viz. that
intelligence is not any distinct perfection, properly speaking, but
merely a composition of unintelligent figure and motion; that this
assertion, I say, is most absurd and impossible, will appear from what
shall be said in the ensuing argument.
2dly. From the intelligence that is in created beings. Since in men in
particular there is undeniably that power, which we call thought,
intelligence, consciousness, perception or knowledge; there must of
necessity either have been from eternity, without any original cause at
all, an infinite succession of men, whereof no one has had a necessary,
but every one a dependent and communicated being; or else these beings,
indued with perception and consciousness, must at some time or other
have arisen purely out of that which had no such quality as sense,
perception, or consciousness; or else they must have been produced by
some intelligent superior being. There never was nor can be any atheist
whatsoever, that can deny but one of these three suppositions must be
the truth. If, therefore, the two former can be proved to be false and
impossible, the latter must be owned to be demonstrably true. Now, that
the first is impossible, is evident from what has been already said in
proof of the second general head of this discourse; and that the second
is likewise impossible, may be thus demonstrated: If perception, or
intelligence, be a distinct quality or perfection, and not a mere
effect or composition of unintelligent figure and motion, then beings
indued with perception or consciousness can never have arisen purely
out of that which had no such quality as perception or consciousness;
because nothing can ever give to another any perfection, which it hath
not either actually in itself, or at least in a higher degree. But
perception or intelligence is a distinct quality or perfection, and not
a mere effect or composition of unintelligent figure and motion.
First: If perception or intelligence be any real distinct quality, or
perfection, and not a mere effect or composition of unintelligent
figure and motion, then beings indued with perception or consciousness
can never possibly have arisen purely out of that which itself had no
such quality as perception or consciousness; because nothing can ever
give to another any perfection which it hath not either actually in
itself, or at least in a higher degree. This is very evident; because,
if any thing could give to another any perfection which it has not
itself, that perfection would be caused absolutely by nothing; which is
a plain contradiction. If any one here replies, (as Mr Gildon has done
[48] in a letter to Mr Blount,) that colours, sounds, tastes, and the
like, arise from figure and motion, which have no such qualities in
themselves; or that figure, divisibility, mobility, and other qualities
of matter, are confessed to be given from God, who yet cannot, without
extreme blasphemy, be said to have any such qualities himself; and that
therefore, in like manner, perception [49] or intelligence may arise
out of that which has no intelligence itself; the answer is very
easy,--first, that colours, sounds, tastes, and the like, are by no
means effects arising from mere figure and motion; there being nothing
in the bodies themselves, the objects of the senses, that has any
manner of similitude to any of these qualities; but they are plainly
thoughts or modifications of the mind itself, which is an intelligent
being; and are not properly caused, but only occasioned, by the
impressions of figure and motion. Nor will it at all help an atheist,
(as to the present question) though we should here make for him, (that
we may allow him the greatest possible advantage,) even that most
absurd supposition, that the mind itself is nothing but mere matter and
not at all an immaterial substance. For, even supposing it to be mere
matter, yet he must needs confess it to be such matter as is indued not
only with figure and motion, but also with the quality of intelligence
and perception; and consequently, as to the present question, it will
still come to the same thing, that colours, sounds, and the like, which
are not qualities of unintelligent bodies, but perceptions of mind, can
no more be caused by, or arise from mere unintelligent figure and
motion, than colour can be a triangle, or sound a square, or something
be caused by nothing. Secondly, as to the other part of the objection;
that figure, divisibility, mobility, and other qualities of matter, are
(as we ourselves acknowledge) given it from God, who yet cannot,
without extreme blasphemy, be said to have any such qualities himself;
and that therefore, in like manner, perception or intelligence may
arise out of that which has no intelligence itself; the answer is still
easier: That figure, divisibility, mobility, and other such like
qualities of matter, are not real, proper, distinct, and positive
powers, but only negative qualities, deficiencies, or imperfections.
And though no cause can communicate to its effect any real perfection
which it has not itself, yet the effect may easily have many
imperfections, deficiencies, or negative qualities, which are not in
the cause. Though, therefore, figure, divisibility, mobility, and the
like, (which are mere negations, as all limitations and all defects of
powers are,) may be in the effect, and not in the cause; yet
intelligence, (which I now suppose, and shall prove immediately, to be
a distinct quality, and which no man can say is a mere negation,)
cannot possibly be so.
Having therefore thus demonstrated, that if perception or intelligence
be supposed to be a distinct quality or perfection, (though even but of
matter only, if the atheist pleases,) and not a mere effect or
composition of unintelligent figure and motion; then beings indued with
perception or consciousness can never have arisen purely out of that
which had no such quality as perception or consciousness; because
nothing can ever give to another any perfection which it has not
itself. It will easily appear, secondly, that perception or
intelligence is really such a distinct quality or perfection, and not
possibly a mere effect or composition of unintelligent figure and
motion; and that for this plain reason, because intelligence is not
figure, and consciousness is not motion: For whatever can arise from,
or be compounded of any things, is still only those very things of
which it was compounded. And if infinite compositions or divisions be
made eternally, the things will still be but eternally the same; and
all their possible effects can never be any thing but repetitions of
the same. For instance, all possible changes, compositions, or
divisions of figure, are still nothing but figure; and all possible
compositions or effects of motion can eternally be nothing but mere
motion. If, therefore, there ever was a time when there was nothing in
the universe but matter and motion, there never could have been any
thing else therein but matter and motion. And it would have been as
impossible there should ever have existed any such thing as
intelligence or consciousness, or even any such thing as light, or
heat, or sound, or colour, or any of those we call secondary qualities
of matter, as it is now impossible for motion to be blue or red, or for
a triangle to be transformed into a sound. That which has been apt to
deceive men in this matter is this; that they imagine compounds to be
somewhat really different from that of which they are compounded: which
is a very great mistake. For all the things of which men so judge,
either, if they be really different, are not compounds nor effects of
what men judge them to be, but are something totally distinct; as, when
the vulgar think colours and sounds to be properties inherent in
bodies, when indeed they are purely thoughts of the mind: or else, if
they be really compounds and effects, then they are not different, but
exactly the same that ever they were; as, when two triangles put
together make a square, that square is still nothing but two triangles;
or when a square cut in halves makes two triangles, those two triangles
are still only the two halves of a square; or when the mixture of a
blue and yellow powder makes a green, that green is still nothing but
blue and yellow intermixed, as is plainly visible by the help of
microscopes. See my letter to Mr. Dodwell, with the four defences of
it. And in short, every thing, by composition, division, or motion, is
nothing else but the very same it was before, taken either in whole or
in parts, or in different place or order. He therefore that will affirm
intelligence to be the effect of a system of unintelligent matter in
motion, must either affirm intelligence to be a mere name or external
denomination of certain figures and motions, and that it differs from
unintelligent figures and motions, no otherwise than as a circle or
triangle differs from a square; which is evidently absurd: or else he
must suppose it to be a real distinct quality, arising from certain
motions of a system of matter not in itself intelligent; and then this
no less evidently absurd consequence would follow, that one quality
inherred in another; for, in that case, not the substance itself, the
particles of which the system consists, but the mere mode, the
particular mode of motion and figure, would be intelligent. Mr. Hobbes
seems to have been aware of this: and therefore, though he is very
sparing, and as it were ashamed to speak out, yet finding himself
pressed, in his own mind, with the difficulty arising from the
impossibility of sense or consciousness being merely the effect of
figure and motion, and it not serving his purpose at all, (were the
thing never so possible,) to suppose that God, by an immediate and
voluntary act of his almighty power indues certain systems of matter
with consciousness and thought, (of which opinion I shall have occasion
to speak something more hereafter,) he is forced [50] to have recourse
to that prodigiously absurd supposition that all matter, as matter, is
indued not only with figure and a capacity of motion, but also with an
actual sense of perception; and wants only the organs and memory of
animals to express its sensation.
3dly. From the beauty, order, and final causes of things. See Mr.
Boyle, of Final Causes; & Mr Ray, of the Wisdom of God in the Creation;
and Mr. Derham's Physico-Theology. That the self-existent and original
cause of all things is an intelligent being, appears abundantly from
the excellent variety, order, beauty, and wonderful contrivance and
fitness of all things in the world to their proper and respective ends.
This argument has been so learnedly and fully handled both by ancient
and modern writers, that I do but just mention it, without enlarging at
all upon it. I shall only at this time make this one observation; That,
whereas Des Cartes and others have endeavoured to give a possible
account, (possible, did I say? nay, indeed, a most impossible and
ridiculous account,) how the world might be formed by the necessary
laws of motion alone; [51] they have, by so seemingly vast an
undertaking, really meant no more than to explain philosophically how
the inanimate part, that is, infinitely the least considerable part of
the world, might possibly have been framed. For as to plants and
animals, in which the wisdom of the Creator principally appears, they
have never, in any tolerable manner, or with any the least appearance
of success, pretended to give an account how they were originally
formed. In these things, matter and the laws of motion are able to do
nothing at all. And how ridiculous the Epicurean hypothesis is, of the
earth producing them all at first by chance, (besides that, I think, it
is now given up even by all atheists;) appears from the late discovery
made in philosophy, that there is no such thing as equivocal generation
of any the meanest animal or plant; the sun, and earth and water, and
all the powers of nature in conjunction, being able to do nothing at
all towards the producing any thing indued with so much as even a
vegetable life. (From which most excellent discovery we may, by the
way, observe the usefulness of natural and experimental philosophy,
sometimes even in matters of religion.) Since therefore things are
thus, it must unavoidably be granted (even by the most obstinate
atheist,) either that all plants and animals are originally the work of
an intelligent being, and created by him in time; or that, having been
from eternity in the same order and method they are now in, they are an
eternal effect of an eternal intelligent cause, continually exerting
his infinite power and wisdom; or else, that, without any self-existent
original at all, they have been derived one from another in an eternal
succession, by an infinite progress of dependent causes. The first of
these three ways is the conclusion we assert: the second, (so far as
the cause of atheism is concerned,) comes to the very same thing: and
the third I have already shown, (in my proof of the second general head
of this discourse,) to be absolutely impossible, and a contradiction.
4thly. From the original of motion. Supposing it was possible that the
form of the world, and all the visible things contained therein, with
the order, beauty, and exquisite fitness of their parts; nay, supposing
that even intelligence itself, with consciousness and thought, in all
the beings we know, could possibly be the result or effect of mere
unintelligent matter, figure, and motion; (which is the most
unreasonable and impossible supposition in the world;) yet even still
there would remain an undeniable demonstration, that the self-existent
being, (whatever it be supposed to be,) must be intelligent. For even
these principles themselves [unintelligent figure and motion] could
never have possibly existed without there had been before them an
intelligent cause. I instance in motion:--It is evident there is now
such a thing as motion in the world; which either began at some time or
other, or was eternal. If it began at any time, then the question is
granted, that the first cause is an intelligent being; for mere
unintelligent matter, and that at rest, it is manifest could never of
itself begin to move. On the contrary, if motion was eternal, it was
either eternally caused by some eternal intelligent being, or it must
of itself be necessary and self-existent; or else, without any
necessity in its own nature, and without any external necessary cause,
it must have existed from eternity by an endless successive
communication. If motion was eternally caused by some eternal
intelligent being, this also is granting the question, as to the
present dispute. If it was of itself necessary and self-existent, then
it follows, that it must be a contradiction in terms to suppose any
matter to be at rest: and yet at the same time, because the
determination of this self-existent motion must be every way at once,
the effect of it could be nothing else but a perpetual rest. Besides,
(as there is no end of absurdities, when they once begin,) it must also
imply a contradiction, to suppose that there might possibly have been
originally more or less motion in the universe than there actually was:
which is so very absurd a consequence, that Spinoza himself, though he
expressly asserts all things to be necessary, yet seems ashamed here
[52] to speak out his opinion, or rather plainly contradicts himself in
the question about the original of motion. But if it be said, lastly,
that motion, without any necessity in its own nature, and without any
external necessary cause, has existed from eternity, merely by an
endless successive communication, as [53] Spinoza, inconsistently
enough, seems to assert: This I have before shown, (in my proof of the
second general proposition of this discourse,) to be a plain
contradiction. It remains, therefore, that motion must of necessity be
originally caused by something that is intelligent, or else there never
could have been any such thing as motion in the world; and consequently
the self-existent being, the original cause of all things, (whatever it
be supposed to be,) must of necessity be an intelligent being.
From hence it follows again, that the material world cannot possibly be
the original self-existent being: For, since the self-existent being is
demonstrated to be intelligent, and the material world plainly is not
so, it follows that the material world cannot possibly be
self-existent. What some have fondly imagined concerning a soul of the
world, if thereby they mean a created, dependent being, signifies
nothing in the present argument: But if they understand thereby
something necessary and self-existent, then it is nothing else but a
false, corrupt, and imperfect notion of God.
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[48] Oracles of Reason, p. 186. See also my Letter to Mr Dodwell, with
several answers and replies concerning the natural immortality of the
soul.
[49] If, with one of Cicero's dialogists, they would infer that the
whole [of the world] must have understanding, because some portions of
it are intelligent--we may retort with the other speaker in Cicero,
that, by the same argument, the whole must be a courtier, a musician, a
dancing-master, or a philosopher, because many of the parts are such.
Mr Toland's Letter; motion essential to matter.
[50] Scio fuisse philosophos quosdam, eosdemque viros doctos, qui
corpora omnia sensu prædita esse sustinuerunt; nec video, si natura
sensionis in reactione sola collocaretur, quomodo refutari possint. Sed
etsi ex reactione etiam corporum aliorum, phantasma aliquod nasceretur,
illud tamen, remoto objecto, statim cessaret. Nam, nisi ad retinendum
motum impressum, etiam remoto objecto, apta habeant organa, ut habent
animalia; ita tantum sentient, ut nunquam sensisse se
recordentur.--Sensioni ergo, quæ vulgo ita appellatur necessario
adhæret memoria aliqua, &c.--Hobbes Physic. cap. 25. sect. 5. See also
Nos. 2 and 11 of the Appendix to a Collection of papers which passed
between Mr. Leibnitz and Dr. Clarke.
[51] See Mr Boyle, of Final causes; and Mr Ray, of the Wisdom of God in
the creation; and Mr Derham's Physico-Theology.
[52] Spinozæ Ethic. Par. I, prop. 33, compared with part II, prop. 13,
lemma 3.
[53] Corpus motum, vel quiescens, ad motum vel quietem determinari
debuit ab alio corpore, quod etiam ad motum vel quietem determinatum
fuit ab alio, et illud iterum ab alio, et sic in infinitum.--Ethic.
par. II, prop. 13, lemma 3.
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Proposition IX. That the self-existent being must be a free agent.
IX. Proposition IX. That the self-existent being must be a free agent.
The self-existent and original cause of all things, is not a necessary
agent but a being indued with liberty and choice. The contrary to this
proposition is the foundation and the sum of what Spinoza and his
followers have asserted concerning the nature of God. What reasons or
arguments they have offered for their opinion I shall have occasion to
consider briefly in my proof of the proposition itself. The truth of
which appears--
1st. This a necessary consequent of the foregoing proposition. In that
it is a necessary consequence of the foregoing proposition. For
intelligence without liberty (as I there hinted) is really (in respect
of any power, excellence, or perfection,) no intelligence at all: It is
indeed a consciousness, but it is merely a passive one; a
consciousness, not of acting, but purely of being acted upon. Without
liberty, nothing can, in any tolerable propriety of speech, be said to
be an agent, or cause of any thing. For to act necessarily, is really
and properly not to act at all, but only to be acted upon. What
therefore Spinoza and his followers assert, concerning the production
of all things [54] from the necessity of the divine nature, is mere
jargon and words, without any meaning at all. For if, by the necessity
of the divine nature, they understand not the perfection and rectitude
of his will, whereby God is unalterably determined to do always what is
best in the whole, (as confessedly they do not, because this is
consistent with the most perfect liberty and choice,) but, on the
contrary, mean an absolute and strictly natural necessity; it follows
evidently, that when they say God, by the necessity of his nature, is
the cause and author of all things, they understand him to be a cause
or agent in no other sense than as if a man should say, that a stone,
by the necessity of its nature, is the cause of its own falling and
striking the ground, which is really not to be an agent or cause at
all; but their opinion amounts to this, that all things are equally
self-existent, and consequently that the material world is God; which I
have before proved to be a contradiction. In like manner, when they
speak of the intelligence and knowledge of God, they mean to attribute
these powers to him in no other sense than the ancient Hylozoicks
attributed them to all matter; See a very remarkable passage of Mr
Hobbes, cited above page 53. that is, that a stone, when it falls, has
a sensation and consciousness, but that that consciousness is no cause
at all, or power of acting; which kind of intelligence, in any
tolerable propriety of speech, is no intelligence at all: And,
consequently, the arguments that proved the supreme cause to be
properly an intelligent and active being do also undeniably prove that
he is likewise indued with liberty and choice, which alone is the power
of acting.
2dly. Proved farther from the arbitrary disposition of things in the
world; with an answer to Spinoza's arguments for the necessity of all
things. If the supreme cause is not a being indued with liberty and
choice, but a mere necessary agent, whose actions are all as absolutely
and naturally necessary as his existence, then, it will follow, that
nothing which is not, could possibly have been; and that nothing which
is, could possibly not have been; and that no mode or circumstance of
the existence of any thing could possibly have been in any respect
otherwise than it now actually is: All which being evidently most false
and absurd, it follows, on the contrary, that the supreme cause is not
a mere necessary agent, but a being indued with liberty and choice.
The consequence, [55] viz. that if the supreme cause be a necessary
agent, then nothing which is not, could possibly have been; and nothing
which is, could possibly either not have been, or have been different
from what it is: This, I say, is expressly owned by Spinoza to be the
unavoidable consequence of his own opinion. And, accordingly, he
endeavours to maintain, that no thing, or mode of existence of any
thing, could possibly have been in any respect different from what it
now actually is. His reasons are; (1) because [56] from an infinitely
perfect nature, infinite things in infinite manners, must needs
proceed; and (2.) [57] because, if any thing could possibly be
otherwise than it is, the will and nature of God must be supposed
capable of change; and (3.) [58] because if all possible things in all
possible manners do not always and necessarily exist, they never can
all exist; but some things, that do not exist, will still always be
possible only, and never can actually exist; and so the actual
omnipotence of God is taken away. The first of these arguments is a
plain begging of the question; For, that an infinitely perfect nature
is able indeed to produce infinite things in infinite manners, is
certainly true; but that it must always actually do so, by an absolute
necessity of nature, without any power of choice, either as to time or
manner or circumstances, does by no means follow from the perfection of
its nature, unless it be first supposed to be a necessary agent; and
also, that in mere necessity there must be all (or can be any) variety.
Both which suppositions are the very question begged that was to be
proved. The second argument, is (if possible) still weaker: for how
does it follow, if God, according to his eternal unerring purpose and
infinite wisdom, produces different things at different times, and in
different manners, that, therefore, the will and nature of God is
changeable? It might exactly as well be argued, that if God (according
to Spinoza's supposition, does always necessarily produce all possible
differences and varieties of things, therefore his will and nature is
always necessarily infinitely various, unequal, and dissimilar to
itself. And as to the third argument, (which is mere metaphysical
trifling,) it is just such reasoning as if a man should argue, that if
all possible [eternal] duration be not always actually exhausted, it
never can be all exhausted; and that therefore so the eternity of God
is taken away; which sort of arguing every one at first sight discerns
the weakness of.
But whatever the arguments were, and if they were never so much more
plausible than they really are, yet the assertion itself, viz. that no
thing, or mode of existence of any thing, could possibly have been made
in any respect different from what it actually is; is so palpably
absurd and false, so contradictory to experience and the nature of
things, and to the most obvious and common reason of mankind; that of
itself it immediately, and upon the first hearing, sufficiently
confutes any principle of which it is a consequence. For all things in
the world appear plainly to be the most arbitrary that can be imagined;
and to be wholly the effects not of necessity, but of wisdom and
choice. A necessity indeed of fitness; that is, that things could not
have been otherwise than they are, without diminishing the beauty,
order, and well-being of the whole; there may be, and (as far as we can
apprehend) there certainly is. But this is so far from serving our
adversaries' purpose, that, on the contrary, it is a direct
demonstration that all things were made and ordered by a free and wise
agent. That, therefore, which I affirm, contradictory to Spinoza's
assertion, is, that there is not the least appearance of an absolute
necessity of nature, (so as that any variation would imply a
contradiction,) in any of these things. Motion itself, and all its
quantities and directions, with the laws of gravitation, are entirely
arbitrary; and might possibly have been altogether different from what
they now are. The number and motion of the heavenly bodies have no
manner of necessity in the nature of the things themselves. The number
of the planets might have been greater or less. Their motion upon their
own axes might have been in any proportion swifter or slower then it
now is. And the direction of all their progressive motions, both of the
primary and secondary planets, uniformly from west to east, (when by
the motion of comets [59] it appears there was no necessity but that
they might as easily have moved in all imaginable transverse
directions,) is an evident proof that these things are solely the
effect of wisdom and choice. There is not the least appearance of
necessity, but that all these things might possibly have been
infinitely varied from their present constitution: and (as the late
improvements in astronomy discover) they are actually liable to very
great changes. Every thing upon earth is still more evidently
arbitrary; and plainly the product, not of necessity, but will. What
absolute necessity for just such a number of species of animals or
plants? or who, without blushing, dare affirm, [60] that neither the
form, nor order, nor any the minutest circumstance or mode of existence
of any of these things could possibly have been in the least
diversified by the supreme cause?
To give but one instance. In all the greater species of animals, where
was the necessity for that conformity [61] we observe in the number and
likeness of all their principal members? and how would it have been a
contradiction to suppose any or all of them varied from what they now
are? To suppose indeed the continuance of such monsters, as Lucretius
imagines to have perished for want of their principal organs of life,
is really a contradiction. But how would it have been a contradiction
for a whole species of horses or oxen to have subsisted with six legs
or four eyes? But it is a shame to insist longer upon so plain an
argument.
It might have been objected with much more plausibleness, that the
supreme cause cannot be free, because he must needs do always what is
best in the whole. But this would not at all serve Spinoza's purpose.
For this is a necessity, not of nature and fate, but of fitness and
wisdom; a necessity, consistent with the greatest freedom and most
perfect choice. For the only foundation of this necessity is such an
unalterable rectitude of will, and perfection of wisdom, as makes it
impossible for a wise being to resolve to act foolishly; or for a
nature infinitely good, to choose to do what is evil: Of which I shall
have occasion to speak more hereafter, when I come to deduce the moral
attributes of God.
3dly. The same proved also from final causes. If there be any final
cause, of any thing in the universe, then the supreme cause is not a
necessary but a free agent. This consequence also, Spinoza acknowledges
to be unvoidable: And therefore he has no other way left, but, with a
strange confidence, to expose all final causes, [62] as the fictions of
ignorant and superstitious men: and to laugh [63] at those who are so
foolish and childish as to fancy that eyes were designed and fitted to
see with, teeth to chew with, food to be eaten for nourishment, the sun
to give light, &c. I suppose it will not be thought, that when once a
man comes to this, he is to be disputed with any longer. Whoever
pleases, may, for satisfaction on this head, consult Galen de Usu
Partium, Tully de Natura Deorum, Mr Boyle of Final Causes, and Mr Ray
of the Wisdom of God in the Creation. I shall only observe this one
thing; that the larger the improvements and discoveries are, which are
daily made in astronomy and natural philosophy, the more clearly is
this question continually determined, to the shame and confusion of
atheists.
4thly. From the finiteness of created beings. If the supreme cause be a
mere necessary agent, it is impossible any effect or product of that
cause should be finite. For since that which acts necessarily, cannot
govern or direct its own actions, but must necessarily produce whatever
can be the effect or product of its nature, it is plain, every effect
of such an infinite uniform nature acting everywhere necessarily alike,
must of necessity be immense, or infinite in extension: and so no
creature in the universe could possibly be finite; which is infinitely
absurd and contrary to experience. Spinoza, to shuffle off this
absurdity, expresses the consequence of his doctrine thus: [64] that,
from the necessity of the divine nature, infinite things (meaning
infinite in number,) in infinite manners must needs follow. But whoever
reads his demonstration of this proposition, can hardly fail to
observe, (if he be at all used to such speculations,) that if it proved
any thing at all, it would equally prove, that from the necessity of
the divine nature, only infinite things (meaning infinite in extension)
can possibly arise; which demonstration alone is a sufficient
confutation of the opinion it was designed to establish.
5thly. And from the impossibility of an infinite succession of causes.
If the supreme cause be not a free and voluntary agent, then in every
effect, (for instance, in motion,) there must have been a progression
of causes in infinitum, without any original cause at all. For if there
be no liberty anywhere, then there is no agent; no cause, mover,
principle, or beginning of motion anywhere. Every thing in the universe
must be passive, and nothing active; every thing moved, and no mover:
every thing effect, and nothing cause. Spinoza indeed, (as has been
already observed,) refers all things to the necessity of the divine
nature, as their real cause and original; but this is mere jargon, and
words without any signification; and will not at all help him over the
present difficulty. For, if by things existing through the necessity of
the divine nature, he means absolutely a necessity of existence, so as
to make the world and every thing in it self-existent, then it follows
(as I have before shown) that it must be a contradiction in terms, to
suppose motion, &c. not to exist, which Spinoza himself is ashamed to
assert. But if, therefore, by the necessity of the divine nature, he
means only the necessary following of an effect from its cause, or the
cause necessarily producing its effect; this necessity must still
always be determined by something antecedent, and so on infinitely. And
this, Spinoza (though sometimes he seems to mean the other and equally
absurd sense) expressly owns in some places to be his meaning. [65]
There can be no volition, saith he, but from some cause, which cause
must likewise be caused by some other cause, and so on infinitely.
Again; will, [66] saith he, belongs to the nature of God no otherwise
than motion and rest do; so that God can no more properly be said to
act by the liberty of his will than by the liberty of motion and rest.
And what the original of motion and rest is, he tells us in these
words: [67] every body in motion, or at rest, must have been determined
to that motion or rest by some other body, which must itself likewise
have been determined by a third; and so on in infinitum. And thus,
since motion is not, in any one of its stages of communication, a
necessary self-existent being, (because the body moved may always,
without a contradiction, have been imagined to be at rest, and is
supposed not to have motion from itself, but from another;) the opinion
of Spinoza plainly recurs to an infinite succession of dependent beings
produced one from another, in an endless progression, without any
original cause at all; which notion I have already (in the proof of the
second general head of this discourse) demonstrated to imply a
contradiction. And since, therefore, there is no other possible way to
avoid this absurdity, but by granting that there must be somewhere a
principle of motion and action, which is liberty, I suppose it by this
time sufficiently proved that the supreme cause must be a being indued
with liberty and choice.
From That liberty is not in itself an impossible and contradictory
notion. what has been said upon this head, it sufficiently appears,
that liberty is not in itself, and in the very notion of the thing, an
absolute contradiction and impossibility, as the pleaders for necessity
and fate contend that it is, and place the chief strength of their
argument in that supposition. For, that which actually is, is certainly
not impossible. And it has already been proved, that liberty actually
is, nay that it is impossible for it not to be, in the first and
supreme cause. The principal argument used by the maintainers of fate
against the possibility of liberty, is this: That since every thing
must have a cause, [68] every volition or determination of the will of
an intelligent being must, as all other things, arise from some cause,
and that cause from some other cause, and so on infinitely. But now,
(besides that in this sort of reasoning, these men always ignorantly
confound moral motives with physical efficients, between which two
things there is no manner of relation; besides this, I say) this very
argument really proves the direct contrary to what they intend. For
since every thing must indeed have a cause of its being, either from
without, or in the necessity of its own nature; and it is a plain
contradiction (as has already been demonstrated) to suppose an infinite
series of dependent effects, none of which are necessary in themselves
or self-existent; therefore it is impossible but there must be in the
universe some being whose existence is founded in the necessity of its
own nature; and which, being acted upon by nothing beyond itself, must
of necessity have in itself a principle of acting, or power of
beginning motion, which is the idea of liberty. It is true, this
argument proves only the liberty of the first and supreme cause, and
extends not indeed to any created being; but it evinces in general
(which is sufficient to my present purpose) that liberty is so far from
being impossible and contradictory in itself, that on the contrary it
is impossible but that it must really be somewhere; and this being once
established, it will be easy to show hereafter, that it is a power
capable of being communicated to created beings. Of which, in its
proper place.
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[54] Ex necessitate divinæ naturæ, infinita infinitis modis sequi
debent--Ethic. par. I. prop. 16.
[55] Alii putant Deum esse causam liberam, propterea quod potest, ut
putant, efficere ut ea quæ ex ejus natura sequi diximus; hoc est, quæ
in ejus potestate sunt, non fiant: Sed hoc idem est ac si dicerent quod
Deus potest efficere, ut, ex natura trianguli, non sequatur ejus tres
angulos æquales esse duobus rectis.--Ego me satis clare ostendisse
puto, a summa Dei potentia, omnia necessario effluxisse, vel semper
eadem necessitate sequi; eodem modo ac, ex natura trianguli, ab æterno
et in æternum sequitur ejus tres angulos æquari duobus rectis.--Ethic,
par. 1, schol. ad prop. 17. Omnia ex necessitate naturæ divinæ
determinata sunt, non tantum ad existendum, sed etiam ad certo modo
existendum et operandum; nullumque datur contingens.--Demonstrat. prop.
29. Si res alterius naturæ potuissent esse, vel alio modo ad operandum
determinari, ut naturæ ordo alius esset: ergo Dei etiam natura alia
posset esse quam jam est.--Prop. 33. demostrat. Quicquid concipimus in
Dei potestate esse, id necessario est.--Prop.35. Deum non operari ex
libertate voluntatis.--Corol. ad prop. 32. Res nullo alio modo, neque
alio ordine, a Deo produci potuerant quam productæ sunt.--Prop. 33.
[56] Ex necessitate divinæ naturæ, infinita infinitis modis sequi
debent.--Prop. 16.
[57] Si res alterius naturæ potuissent esse, vel alio modo ad operandum
determinari; ut naturæ ordo alius esset: Ergo Dei etiam natura alia
posset esse quam jam est.--Prop. 33. demonstrat.
[58] Immo adversarii, [qui negant, ex necessitate divinæ naturæ, omnia
necessario fluere,] Dei omnipotentiam negare videntur. Coguntur enim
fateri, Deum infinita creabilia intelligere quæ tamen nunquam creare
poterit: Nam alias; si scilicet omnia, quæ intelligit crearet, suam,
juxta ipsos, exhauriret omnipotentiam, et se imperfectum redderet. Ut
igitur Deum perfectum statuant, eo rediguntur, ut simul statuere
debeant ipsum non posse omnia efficere, ad quæ ejus potentia se
extendit.--Coroll. ad prop. 17.
[59] Nam dum cometæ moventur in orbibus valde eccentricis, undique; et
quoquoversum in omnes coeli partes; utique nullo modo fieri potuit ut
cæco fato tribuendum sit; quod planetæ in orbibus concentricis motu
consimili ferantur eodem omnes.--Tam miram uniformitatem in planetarum
systemate, necessario fatendum est intelligentia et consilio fuisse
effectam.--Newton. Optic. page 345.
[60] Res nullo alio modo, neque alio ordine, a Deo produci potuerunt,
quam productæ sunt.--Spinoza, ut supra.
[61] Idemque dici possit de uniformitate illa, quæ est in corporibus
animalium, viz. necessario fatendum est intelligentia et consilio
fuisse effectam.--Newton. Optic. page 346.
[62] Naturam finem nullum sibi præfixum habere; et omnes causas
finales, nihil nisi humana esse figmenta.--Appendix ad prop. 36.
[63] Oculos ad videndum, dentes ad masticandum, herbas et animantia ad
alimentum, solem ad illuminandum, mare ad alendum pisces, &c.--Ibid.
Nullas unquam rationes circa res naturales a fine, quem Deus aut natura
in iis faciendis sibi proposuit, desumemus.--Cartes. Princip. par. 1. §
28.
[64] Ex necessitate divinæ naturæ infinita infinitis modis seque
debent.--Ethic. par. 1. prop. 16.
[65] Unaquæque volitio non potest existere, neque ad operandum
determinari; nisi ab alia causa determinetur, et hæc rursus ab alia; et
sic porro in infinitum.--Prop. 33. demonst.
[66] Voluntas ad Dei naturam non magis pertinet quam reliqua naturalia;
sed ad ipsam eodem modum sese habet, ut motus et quies. Deus non magis
dici potest ex libertate voluntatis agere, quam dici potest ex
libertate motus et quietis agere.--Coroll. ad prop.32.
[67] Corpus motum vel quiescens, ad motum vel quietem determinari
debuit ab alio corpore, quod etiam ad motum vel quietem determinatum
fuit ab alio; et illud iterum ab alio; et sic in infinitum.--Ethic.
Par. 11. prop. 13. lemma 3.
[68] Mens ad hoc vel illud volendum determinatur a causa, quæ etiam ab
alia determinata est, et hæc iterum ab alia, et sic in
infinitum.--Spinoza Ethic. par. II, prop. 48.
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Proposition X. That the self-existent being must be all-powerful.
X. Proposition X. That the self-existent being must be all-powerful.
The self-existent being, the supreme cause of all things, must of
necessity have infinite power.--This proposition is evident, and
undeniable. For since nothing (as has been already proved,) can
possibly be self-existent, besides himself; and consequently all things
in the universe were made by him, and are entirely dependent upon him;
and all the powers of all things are derived from him, and must
therefore be perfectly subject and subordinate to him; it is manifest
that nothing can make any difficulty or resistance to the execution of
his will, but he must of necessity have absolute power to do every
thing he pleases, with the perfectest ease, and in the perfectest
manner, at once, and in a moment, whenever he wills it. The
descriptions the scripture gives of this power, are so lively and
emphatical, that I cannot forbear mentioning one or two passages. Thus,
Job ix. 4:--"He is wise in heart, and mighty in strength;--which
removeth the mountains, and they know it not; which overturneth them in
his anger. Which shaketh the earth out of her place, and the pillars
thereof tremble. Which commandeth the sun, and it riseth not; and
sealeth up the stars. Which alone spreadeth out the heavens, and
treadeth upon the waters of the sea. Which doth great things past
finding out, yea and wonders without number." Again: "Hell is naked
before him, and destruction hath no covering. He stretcheth out the
north over the empty place, and hangeth the earth upon nothing. He
bindeth up the waters in his thick clouds, and the cloud is not rent
under them. The pillars of Heaven tremble, and are astonished at his
reproof. He divideth the sea with his power, and by his understanding
he smiteth through the proud. Lo, these are part of his ways, but how
little a portion is heard of him? But the thunder of his power, who can
understand?" Job xxvi. 6. So likewise, Isaiah xl. 12:--"Who has
measured the waters in the hollow of his hand, and meted out Heaven
with the span; and comprehended the dust of the earth in a measure; and
weighed the mountains in scales, and the hills in a balance. Behold,
the nations are as a drop of the bucket, and are counted as the small
dust of the balance; behold, he taketh up the isles as a very little
thing. All nations before him are as nothing, and they are counted to
him less than nothing, and vanity. To whom then will ye liken God, or
what likeness will ye compare unto him?" But I do not urge authority to
the persons I am at present speaking to. It is sufficiently evident,
from reason, that the supreme cause must of necessity be infinitely
powerful. The only question is, what the true meaning of what we call
infinite power is; and to what things it must be understood to extend,
or not to extend.
Now, in determining this question, there are some propositions about
which there is no dispute; which therefore, I shall but just mention.
As,
1st, Of working contradictions. That infinite power reaches to all
possible things, but cannot be said to extend to the working any thing
which implies a contradiction: As, that a thing should be and not be at
the same time; that the same thing should be made and not be made, or
have been and not have been; that twice two should not make four, or
that that which is necessarily false should be true: The reason whereof
is plain; because the power of making a thing to be, at the same time
that it is not, is only a power of doing that which is nothing, that
is, no power at all.
2dly. Or natural and moral evils. Infinite power cannot be said to
extend to those things which imply natural imperfection in the being to
whom such power is ascribed; as, that it should destroy its own being,
weaken itself, or the like. These things imply natural imperfection,
and are by all men confessed to be such as cannot possibly belong to
the necessary self-existent being. There are also other things which
imply imperfection in another kind, viz. moral imperfection; concerning
which, atheism takes away the subject of the question, by denying
wholly the difference of moral good and evil; and therefore I shall
omit the consideration of them until I come to deduce the moral
attributes of God.
But some other instances there are, in the question about the extent of
infinite power, wherein the principal difference between us and the
atheists, (next to the question, whether the supreme cause be an
intelligent being, or not,) does in great measure consist. As,
1st. Of the power of creating matter. That infinite power includes a
power of creating matter. This has been constantly denied by all
atheists, both ancient and modern, and as constantly affirmed by all
who believe the being, and have just notions of the attributes of God.
The only reason which the atheists have, or can pretend to allege, for
their opinion, is, that the thing is in its own nature absolutely
impossible. But how does it appear to be impossible? Why, only because
they are not able to comprehend how it can be: For, to reduce it to a
contradiction, (which is the alone real impossibility,) this they are
by no means able to do. For, to say that something which once was not,
may since have begun to exist, is neither directly, nor by any
consequence whatsoever, to assert that that which is not, can be, while
it is not; or that that which is, can not be, while it is. It is true,
we who have been used to converse only with generations and
corruptions, and never saw any thing made or created, but only formed
or framed, are apt to endeavour to conform our idea of creation to that
of formation, and to imagine, that as in all formations there is some
pre-existing matter, out of which a thing is formed, so in creation
there must be considered a pre-existing nothing, out of which, as out
of a real material cause, a thing is created; which looks, indeed, very
like a contradiction. But this is only a confusion of ideas, just like
children's imagining that darkness is some real thing, which in the
morning is driven away by the light, or transformed into it; whereas
the true notion of creation is not a forming something out of nothing,
as out of a material cause, but only a bringing something into being
that before had no being at all, or a causing something to exist now
that did not exist before, or which, without this cause, would not have
existed; which no man can ever reduce to a contradiction, any more than
the formation of any thing into a shape which it had not before, can be
reduced to a contradiction.
But further: The creation of matter is a thing not only not impossible
in itself, but what, moreover, even by bare reason, is demonstrated to
be true. For it is a contradiction (as I have shown above) to suppose
matter necessarily existing.
2dly. Of the power of creating immaterial cogitative substances. It is
possible to infinite power to create any immaterial cogitative
substance, indued with a power of beginning motion, and with a liberty
of will or choice. This also has been always denied by all atheists;
and, because it is a proposition of the greatest consequence to
religion and morality, therefore I shall be particular in endeavouring
the proof of the several parts of it.
First, It is possible to infinite power to create any immaterial
cogitative substance. That there can be such a thing as a cogitative
substance, that is, a substance indued with consciousness and thought,
is granted by all, because every man's own experience convinces him
that he himself is such a substance. Further: That if there be, or can
be, any such thing as immaterial substances, then it is most reasonable
to believe that such substances as are indued with consciousness and
thought [properties the farthest distant from the known properties of
matter, and the most unlike them that can possibly be imagined,] are
those immaterial substances; this also will, I think, be granted by all
men. The only point, therefore, that remains to be proved, is, that
immaterial substances are not impossible, or, that a substance
immaterial is not a contradictory notion. Now, whoever asserts that it
is contradictory, must affirm, that whatever is not matter is nothing,
and that to say any thing exists which is not matter, is saying that
there exists something which is nothing; which, in other words, is
plainly this: That whatever we have not an idea of, is nothing, and
impossible to be; for there is no other way to reduce immaterial
substance to a contradiction, but by supposing immaterial to signify
the same as having no existence; and there is no possible way to prove
that, but by saying we have no idea of it; and, therefore, it neither
has nor can have any existence. By which same argument, material
substance will in like manner be a contradiction; for of that also,
(viz. of the substance to which solidity belongs,) we have no idea. But
supposing it were true (as it is indeed most false,) that we had a
clearer idea of the substance of matter, than we have of immaterial
substance, still by the same argument, wherewith an atheist will prove
immaterial substance to be impossible, a man born blind may demonstrate
irrefragably that light or colour is an impossible and contradictory
notion, because it is not a sound or a smell; for the power of seeing
light or colour is, to a man born blind, altogether as incomprehensible
and absolutely beyond the reach of all his ideas, as either the
operations and perceptions, or even the simple essence of a pure
immaterial substance of spirit, can be to any of us. If, therefore, the
blind man's want of ideas be not a sufficient proof of the
impossibility of light or colour, how comes our bare want of ideas to
be a demonstration of the impossibility of the being of immaterial
substances? A blind man, they will say, has testimony of the existence
of light: Very true; so also have we of the existence of immaterial
substances. But there is this further advantage on our side in the
comparison, that a blind man, excepting the testimony of others, finds
not, by any reasoning within himself, the least likelihood or
probability, no not in the lowest possible degree, that there can be
any such thing as light or colour; but we, besides testimony, have
great and strong arguments, both from experience and reason, that there
are such things as immaterial substances, though we have no knowledge
of their simple essence; as indeed of the substance even of matter
itself (its simple substance, considered as abstract from, and as the
foundation of that essential property of solidity,) we have no idea,
(for to say that extension is the substance of matter, is the same way
of thinking, as to say that existence, or that duration, is the
substance of matter.) We have, I say, great and strong arguments both
from experience and reason, that there are such things as immaterial
substances, though we have no idea of their simple essence; even the
very first and most universal principle of gravitation itself, in all
matter, since it is ever proportional, not at all to the surfaces of
bodies, or of their particles in any possible supposition, but exactly
to the solid content of bodies, it is evident it cannot be caused by
matter acting upon the surfaces of matter, which is all it can do, but
must (either immediately or mediately) be caused by something which
continually penetrates its solid substance. But in animals, which have
a power of self-motion, and in the perfecter sorts of them, which have
still higher faculties, the thing is yet more evident; for we see and
feel, and observe daily in ourselves and others, such powers and
operations and perceptions, as undeniably evince themselves either to
be the properties of immaterial substances; or else it will follow,
that matter is something, of whose essential powers (as well as of its
substance itself,) we have altogether as little idea as we have of
immaterial beings; and then how are immaterial substances more
impossible than material? But of this, more hereafter.
From Of the immateriality of human souls. what has been said on this
head, it will be easy to answer all the objections, that have been
brought by any atheists against the notion of human souls being
immaterial substances, and distinct from body. See my letter to Mr
Dodwell, with the four defences of it. For since it is possible there
may be such things as immaterial substances; and since, if any such
substance can be, there is all the reason in the world to believe that
conscious and thinking substance is such, these properties being the
most remote from the known properties of matter, that are possible to
be conceived; the foundation of all the objections against the
immateriality of the soul is entirely taken away. I shall not here
tarry to consider the objections in particular, which have been often
and fully answered by learned pens, but shall only mention one, on
which all the rest depend, and to which they may all be reduced; and it
is this: [69] That seeing the only means we have of perception, are the
five senses; and these all plainly depend upon the organs of the body,
therefore the soul, without the body, can have no perception, and
consequently is nothing. Now (besides that these very senses or
perceptions, however they may be obstructed by bodily indisposision,
and so do indeed depend upon the organs of the body as to their present
excercise, yet in their nature are really entirely distinct powers, and
cannot possibly, as has been* before shown, be absolutely founded in,
or arise from, any of the known properties or qualities of matter;
besides this, I say;) of him that thus argues, I would only ask this
one question: are our five senses, by an absolute necessity in the
nature of the thing, all and the only possible ways of perception? and
is it impossible and contradictory that there should be any being in
the universe, indued with ways of perception different from these that
are the result of our present composition? or are these things, on the
contrary, purely arbitrary; and the same power that gave us these, may
have given others to other beings, and might (if he had pleased) have
given to us others in this present state, and may yet have made us
capable of different ones in another state? If they be purely
arbitrary, then the want of these does by no means infer a total want
of perception: but the same soul, which in the present state has the
powers of reflection, reason and judgment; which are faculties entirely
different from sense; may as easily in another state have different
ways even of perception also. But if any one will contend, that these
senses of ours are necessarily the only ways of perception; still the
soul may be capable of having these very same ways of perception at any
time restored to it. For as that which sees, does not cease to exist,
when, in the dark, all objects are removed; so, that which perceives,
does not necessarily cease to exist, when, by death, all organs of
perception are removed. But what reason can any man allege, why he
should imagine these present senses of ours to be necessarily the only
ways of perception? Is it not infinitely more reasonable to suppose,
that this is a mere prejudice arising from custom, [70] and an
attending to bare sense in opposition to reason? For, supposing men had
been created only with four senses, and had never known the use of
sight, would they not then have had the very same reason to conclude
there were but four possible ways of perception, as they have now to
fancy that there are but five? and would they not then have thought
sight to have been an impossible, chimerical, and merely imaginary
power; with absolutely the same reason as they now presume the
faculties of immaterial beings to be so? that is, with no reason at
all. One would think, men should be ashamed therefore to be so vain,
as, from their own mere negative ignorance, without any appearance or
pretence of any positive argument, to dispute against the possibility
of the being of things, which (excepting only that they cannot frame to
themselves an image or notion of them,) there is a concurrence of all
the reasons in the world to persuade them that such things really are.
And then, as to the difficulty of conceiving the nature and manner of
the union between soul and body, we know altogether as much of that as
we do of the nature of the union or cohesion of the infinitely
divisible parts of body, which yet no man doubts of. And therefore our
ignorance can be no more an argument against the truth of the one, than
it is a bar to our belief of the other.
Secondly. Of induing creatures with the power of beginning motion. It
is possible to infinite power to indue a creature with the power of
beginning motion. This is constantly denied by all atheists; because
the consequence of it is a liberty of will, of which I shall have
occasion to speak presently. But that the proposition is true, I thus
prove. If the power of beginning motion be in itself a possible thing,
and also possible to be communicated; then a creature may be indued
with that power. Now, that the power of beginning motion is in itself a
possible thing, I have already proved, by showing there must
necessarily be somewhere a power of beginning motion; because otherwise
motion must have been from eternity, without any external cause of its
being; and yet it is a thing that has no necessity of existence in its
own nature. So that, if there be not somewhere a principle or power of
beginning motion, motion must exist, without any cause or reason at all
of its existence either within itself, or from without, which, as I
have before shown, is an express contradiction. Wherefore, a principle
or power of beginning motion there must of necessity be somewhere or
other; and consequently it is not in itself an impossible thing. I add;
as a power of beginning motion is not in itself an impossible thing,
because it must of necessity be in the supreme cause; so neither is it
impossible to be communicated to created beings. The reason is plain;
because no powers are impossible to be communicated, but only those
which imply self-existence and absolute independency.--That a
subordinate being should be self-existent or absolutely independent, is
indeed a contradiction; but it is no contradiction; to suppose it
indued with any other power whatsoever, separate from these. I know,
the maintainers of fate are very confident that a power of beginning
motion is nothing less than being really independent, or being able to
act independently, from any superior cause. But this is only a childish
trifling with words. For a power of acting independently in this sense,
communicated at the pleasure of the supreme cause, and continued only
during the same good pleasure, is no more a real and absolute
independency, than the power of existing, (which I suppose the
defenders of fate are not so fond to make a continual creation, as they
are to make the power of self-motion a continual external impulse;) or
than the power of being conscious, or any other power whatsoever, can
be said to imply independency. In reality, it is altogether as hard to
conceive how consciousness, or the power of perception, should be
communicated to a created being, as how the power of self-motion should
be so, unless perception be nothing else but a mere passive reception
of impulse, which I suppose is as clear that it is not, as that a
triangle is not a sound, or that a globe is not a colour. Yet no man
doubts, but that he himself, and all others, have truly a power of
perception. And therefore in like manner, (however hard it may be to
conceive, as to the manner of it, yet since, as has been now proved, it
can never be shown to be impossible and expressly contradictory, that a
power of self-motion should be communicated,) I suppose no considering
man can doubt but that he actually has also a power of self-motion. For
the arguments drawn from continual experience and observation, to prove
that we have such a power, are so strong that nothing less than a
strict demonstration that the thing is absolutely impossible, and that
it implies an express contradiction, can make us in the least doubt
that we have it not. We have all the same experience, the same marks
and evidence exactly, of our having really a power of self-motion, as
the most rigid fatalist could possibly contrive to require, if he was
to make the supposition of a man's being indued with that power. There
is no one thing that such a man can imagine ought to follow from the
supposition of self-motion, which every man does not now as much feel
and actually experience in himself, as it can possibly be imagined any
man would do, supposing the thing were true. Wherefore to affirm, not
withstanding all this, that the spirits, by which a man moves the
members of his body, and ranges the thoughts of his mind, are
themselves moved wholly by air, or subtler matter inspired into the
body, and that again by other external matter, and so on, as the wheels
of a clock are moved by the weights, and those weights by gravitation,
and so on, without a man's having the least power, by any principle
within himself, to think any one thought, or impel his own spirits, in
order to move any member of his body. All this is so contrary to
experience and the reason of things, that, unless the idea of
self-motion were in itself as evidently and clearly a contradiction, as
that two and two should make five, a man ought to be ashamed to talk at
that rate. Nay, a man of any considerable degree of modesty would even
in that case be almost tempted rather to doubt the truth of his
faculties, than take upon him to assert one such intolerable absurdity,
merely for the avoiding of another. There are some, indeed, who,
denying men the power of beginning motion, would yet seem in some
manner to account for their actions, by allowing them a power of
determining motion. But this also is a mere ludicrous trifling with
words; for if that power of determining motion be no other in a man
than that which is in a stone to reflect a ball one certain way, this
is just nothing at all. But if he has a power of determining the motion
of his spirits any way, as he himself pleases, this is in all respects
the very same as the power of beginning motion.
Thirdly, Of the possibility of induing a creature with freedom or
liberty of will. It is possible to infinite power to indue a creature
with freedom or liberty of will. It might suffice that this is at once
proved by the same arguments, and in the same method, as I just now
proved self-motion, or a power of beginning motion, to be possible,
viz. because liberty must of necessity be in the supreme cause; (as is
at large proved in the ninth general head of this discourse;) and
therefore cannot be impossible and contradictory in the nature of the
thing itself, and because it implies no contradiction to suppose it
communicated, as being no harder to conceive than the fore-mentioned
power of beginning motion; and because the arguments drawn from
experience and observation are stronger on the one side of the question
than those arising merely from the difficulty of our apprehending the
thing, can be on the other. But forasmuch as this is the question of
the greatest concern of all in matters both of religion and human life,
and both Spinoza and Mr Hobbes, and their followers, have with great
noise and confidence denied it; I shall therefore (not contenting
myself with this,) endeavour to show, moreover, in particular, the
weakness of the principal arguments by which these men have pretended
to demonstrate, that there cannot possibly be any such power in man as
a liberty of will. As to the propriety of the terms, whether the will
be properly the seat of liberty or not?--is not now to the purpose to
inquire; the question being, not where the seat of liberty is, but
whether there be at all in man any such power, as a liberty of choice
and of determining his own actions, or on the contrary, his actions be
all as necessary as the motions of a clock? The arguments by which
Spinoza and Mr Hobbes have attempted to maintain this latter side of
the question, are all plainly reducible to these two.
1st. That, since every effect must needs be produced by some cause,
therefore, as every motion in a body must have been caused by the
impulse of some other body, and the motion of that by the impulse of a
third; so every volition, or determination of the will of man, must
needs be produced by some external cause, and that in like manner be
the effect of some third; and consequently, that there cannot possibly
be any such thing in nature as liberty or freedom of will.
2dly. That thinking, and all its modes, as willing and the like, are
qualities or affections of matter; and, consequently, since it is
manifest that matter has not in itself a power of beginning motion, or
giving itself any manner of determination whatsoever, therefore it is
evident likewise, that it is impossible there should be any such thing
as freedom of will.
Now, An answer to Mr. Hobbes's and Spinoza's arguments against the
possibility of liberty. to these arguments I oppose, and shall
endeavour briefly to demonstrate, the three following propositions.
1st. That every effect cannot possibly be the product of external
causes; but there must of necessity be somewhere a beginning of
operation, or a power of acting, without being antecedently acted upon;
and that this power may be, and is, in man.
2dly. That thinking and willing neither are, nor can be, qualities and
affections of matter, and consequently are not included under the laws
thereof.
3dly. That even supposing the soul not to be a distinct substance from
body, but that thinking and willing could be, and were indeed, only
qualities or affections of matter, yet even this would not at all
affect the present question, nor prove freedom of will to be
impossible.
1st. That there must be somewhere a beginning of operation. Every
effect cannot possibly be the product of external causes, but there
must of necessity be somewhere a beginning of operation, or a power of
acting without being antecedently acted upon; and this power may be,
and is, in man. The several parts of this proposition have been already
proved in the second and ninth general head of this discourse, and in
that part of this tenth head which is concerning the possibility of the
power of self-motion being communicated to created beings. I shall not
therefore here repeat the proofs; but only apply them to Spinoza's and
Mr. Hobbes's arguments, so far as is necessary to show the weakness of
what they have said upon this head, in opposition to the possibility of
liberty or freedom of will. Now, the manner of their arguing upon this
head, is this. That every effect must needs be owing to some cause; and
that cause must produce the effect [71] necessarily, because, if it be
a sufficient cause, the effect cannot but follow; and if it be not a
sufficient cause it will not be at all a cause of that thing. Thus, for
instance, [72] whatever body is moved, must be moved by some other
body, which itself likewise must be moved by some third, and so on
without end. That the will, [73] in like manner, of any voluntary
agent, must of necessity be determined to some external cause, and not
by any power of determining itself, inherent in itself; and that
external cause must be determined necessarily by some other cause,
external to it; and so on without end. From all which it evidently
appears, that all that these men urge against the possibility of
freedom extends equally to all other beings (not excepting the Supreme)
as well as to men; and Spinoza in express words confesses it. [74] )
Wherefore, consequently, whatever noise they make of the strength and
demonstrative force of their arguments, all that they say amounts at
last to no more but this one most absurd conclusion; that there neither
is anywhere, nor can possibly be, any principle of motion, or beginning
of operation at all; but every thing is caused necessarily, by an
eternal chain of dependent causes and effects, without any independent
original. All their arguments, therefore, on this head are already
answered in the second and ninth general heads of this discourse;
(where I proved that there must of necessity be an original,
independent, and free principle of motion or action; and that, to
suppose an endless succession of dependent causes and effects, without
any original or first and self-actuating principle, is supposing a
series of dependent things to be from eternity produced by nothing,
which is the very same absurdity and contradiction as to suppose things
produced by nothing at any definite time; the ability of nothing to
produce any thing being plainly the same in time or in eternity.) And I
have moreover proved, ex abundanti, in the foregoing part of this tenth
head, that the power of beginning motion is not only possible and
certain in itself, but also possible to be communicated to finite
beings, and that it actually is in man.
2dly. That thinking and willing neither are nor can be affections of
matter. Thinking and willing neither are, nor can be, qualities or
affections of matter; and consequently are not concluded under the laws
thereof. That it is possible there* may be immaterial substances, the
notion not implying a contradiction in itself, hath already been shown
under the present general proposition. Further, that thinking and
willing are powers entirely different from solidity, figure, and
motion, and if they be different, that then they cannot possibly arise
from them, or be compounded of them, hath likewise been already proved
under the eighth general head of this discourse. It follows, therefore,
that thinking and willing may possibly be, nay, that they certainly and
necessarily are, faculties or powers of immaterial substances; seeing
they cannot possibly be qualities or affections of matter, unless we
will confound (as some have done,) the ideas of things; and mean by
matter, not what that word in all other cases signifies, a solid
substance capable of division, figure, and motion, and of whatever
properties can arise from the modifications of these, but substance in
general, capable of unknown powers or properties entirely different
from these, and from whatever can possibly result from these. In which
confused sense of the word, could matter be supposed never so capable
of thinking and willing, yet, in that sense, (as I shall show
presently,) it would signify nothing at all to the purpose or advantage
of our adversaries. In the meantime, how great an absurdity it is to
suppose thinking and willing to be qualities or affections of matter,
in the proper and usual sense of the word, may sufficiently appear,
without any foreign argument, from the senselessness of Mr. Hobbes's
own explication of the nature and original of sensation and
consciousness. The immediate cause of sensation, [75] saith he, is
this; the object, or something flowing from it, presseth the outermost
part of the organ, and that pressure is communicated to the innermost
parts of the organ, where, by the resistance or reaction of the organ,
causing a pressure outwards contrary to the pressure of the object
inwards, there is made up a phantasm, or image; which phantasm, [76]
saith he, is the sensation itself, Again; the cause of sensation, [77]
saith he, is an object pressing the organ, which pressure is by means
of the nerves conveyed to the brain, and so to the heart, where, by the
resistance or counterpressure of the heart, outwards, is made an image
or phantasm which is sensation. Now, what is there in all this, that
does in any the least measure tend to explain or make intelligible the
real and inward nature of sense or consciousness? The object, by
communicating a pressure through the organ to the sensory, does indeed
raise a phantasm or image, that is, make a certain impression on the
brain; but wherein consists the power of perceiving this impression,
and of being sensible of it? or what similitude hath this impression to
the sense itself, that is, to the thought excited in the mind? why,
exactly the very same that a square has to blueness, or a triangle to
sound, or a needle to the sense of pain; or the reflecting of a tennis
ball to the reason and understanding of a man. So that Mr. Hobbes's
definition of sensation,--that it is itself, the inmost and formal
nature of it, nothing but the phantasm or image made in the brain by
the pressure communicated from the object,--is, in other words,
defining blueness to be the image of a square, or sound the picture of
a triangle, or pain the similitude of a sharp-pointed needle. I do not
here misrepresent him in the least. For he himself expressly confesses,
[78] that all sensible qualities, such as colour, sound, and the like,
are in the objects themselves nothing but motion; and, [79] because
motion can produce nothing but motion, (as likewise it is evident that
figure and all its possible compositions can produce nothing but
figure,) therefore in us also the perceptions of these sensible
qualities are nothing but different motions. If, then, the phantasm,
that is, the image of the object made in the brain by figure and
motion, be (as he says,) the sensation itself, is not sensation bare
figure and motion? and are not all the forementioned absurdities
unavoidable consequences of his opinion?
Mr Hobbes (as I have elsewhere observed,) seems, indeed, not to have
been altogether unaware of this insuperable difficulty, but he
industriously endeavours to conceal it from his readers, and to impose
upon them by the ambiguity of the word phantasm. Yet for a reserve, in
case he should be too hard pressed, [80] he gives us a hint, that
possibly sensation may be something more, viz. a power of perception or
consciousness naturally and essentially inherent in all matter, only
that it wants the organs and memory of animals to express its
sensation; [81] and that, as a man, if he were supposed to have no
other sense but seeing, and that so ordered as that his eyes were
always immoveably fixed upon one and the same object, and that also
unchangeable and without any the least variety, such a man could not
properly be said to see, but only to be under an unintelligible kind of
amazement: So all unorganized bodies may possibly have sensation or
perception; but, because for want of organs there is no variety in it,
neither any memory or means of expressing that sensation, therefore to
us it seems as if they had no such thing at all. This opinion, I say,
Mr Hobbes mentions as possible, but he does it with such hesitancy,
diffidence, and sparingness, as shows plainly that he meant it only as
a last subterfuge to recur to, when he should be pressed with the
fore-mentioned absurdities, unavoidably consequent upon the supposition
of sensation being only figure and motion. And, indeed, well might he
be sparing, and, as it were, ashamed of this subterfuge. For it is a
thing altogether as absurd as even the other opinion itself, of thought
being mere motion; for what can be more ridiculous than to imagine that
matter is as essentially conscious as it is extended? Will it not
follow from that supposition, that every piece of matter being made up
of endlessly separable parts, (that is, of parts which are as really
distinct beings, notwithstanding their contiguity, as if they had been
at never so great a distance one from another,) is made up also of
innumerable consciousnesses and infinite confusion? But it is a shame
to trouble the reader with so much as the mention of any of the
numberless absurdities following from that monstrous supposition.
Others, therefore, who would make thinking to be an affection of
matter, and yet are ashamed to use either of the fore-mentioned ways,
contend that God, by his almighty and supreme power, indues certain
systems of matter with a faculty of thinking, according to his own good
pleasure. But this also amounts to nothing; for (besides the absurdity
of supposing God to make an innumerable company of distinct beings,
such as the particles of every system of matter necessarily are, to be
at the same time one individual conscious being; besides this, I say,)
either our idea of matter is a true and distinct idea, or it is not: If
it be a true and distinct idea, that is, if our idea (not of the
substance of matter, for of simple substance we have no idea, but if
our idea of the properties which essentially distinguish and denominate
the substance,) be a right idea, viz. that matter is nothing but a
solid substance, capable only of division, figure, and motion, with all
the possible effects of their several compositions, as to us it appears
to be, upon the best examination we are able to make of it, and the
greatest part of our adversaries themselves readily allow; then it is
absolutely impossible for thinking to belong to matter, because
thinking, as has been before shown, cannot possibly arise from any
modification or composition of any or all of these qualities. But if
any man will say that our idea of matter is wrong, and that by matter
he will not here mean, as in all other cases, a solid substance,
capable only of division, figure, and motion, with all the possible
effects of their several compositions, but that he means substance in
general, capable of thinking and of numberless unknown properties
besides; then he trifles only in putting an ambiguous signification
upon the word matter, where he ought to use the word substance. And, in
that sense, to suppose thinking, or any other active property, possible
to be in matter, as signifying only substance in general, of whose
powers and capacities we have no certain idea, would make nothing at
all to the present purpose, in our adversaries' advantage, and is at
least not a clearer and more intelligible way of talking than to
attribute the same properties to an immaterial substance, and keep the
idea of matter and its properties clear and distinct. For I affirm,
3dly. That if thinking and willing were qualities of matter, yet
nevertheless liberty might be possible. That even supposing (in these
men's confused way,) that the soul was really not a distinct substance
from body, but that thinking and willing could be, and were indeed only
qualities or affections of matter; yet even this would not at all
affect the present question about liberty, nor prove freedom of will to
be an impossible thing. For, since it has been already demonstrated,
that thinking and willing cannot possibly be effects or compositions of
figure and motion, whosoever will make thinking and willing to be
qualities or affections of matter must suppose matter capable of
certain properties entirely different from figure and motion. And if it
be capable of properties entirely different from figure and motion,
then it can never be proved, from the effects of figure and motion
being all necessary, that the effects of other and totally distinct
properties must likewise be necessary.
Mr Hobbes, A shameful fallacy of Mr. Hobbes and his followers.
therefore, and his followers, are guilty of a most shameful fallacy in
that very argument, wherein they place their main and chief strength:
for, supposing matter to be capable of thinking and willing, they
contend that the soul is mere matter; and, knowing that the effects of
figure and motion must needs be all necessary, they conclude that the
operations of the mind must all therefore be necessary; that is, when
they would prove the soul to be mere matter, then they suppose matter
capable not only of figure and motion, but also of other unknown
properties: and, when they would prove the will, and all other
operations of the soul to be necessary, then they divest matter again
of all its unknown properties, and make it mere solidity, indued only
with figure and motion again. Wherefore, distinguishing their ambiguous
and confused use of the word matter, they are unavoidably reduced to
one of these two concessions: If, by matter, they mean a solid
substance indued only with figure and motion, and all the possible
effects of the variations and compositions of these qualities, then the
soul cannot be mere matter, because, (as Mr. Hobbes himself confesses)
figure and motion can never produce any thing but figure and motion;
[82] and consequently (as hath been before demonstrated,) they can
never produce so much as any secondary quality,--sound, colour, and the
like,--much less thinking and reasoning; from whence it follows, that
the soul being unavoidably a substance immaterial, they have no
argument left to prove that it cannot have a power of beginning motion,
which is a plain instance of liberty: But if, on the other hand, they
will by matter mean substance in general, capable of unknown
properties, totally different from figure and motion, then they must no
longer argue against the possibility of liberty, from the effects of
figure and motion being all unavoidably necessary, because liberty will
not consist in the effects of figure and motion, but in those other
unknown properties of matter, which these men can no more explain or
argue about than about immaterial substances. The truth therefore is,
they must needs suppose thinking to be merely an effect or composition
of figure and motion, if they will give any strength to their arguments
against liberty; and then the question will be, not whether God can
make matter think or no, (for in that question they only trifle with a
word, abusing the word matter, to signify substance in general,) but
the question will be, Whether figure and motion, in any composition or
division, can possibly be perception and thought; which (as has been
before said) is just such a question as if a man should ask, Whether it
be possible that a triangle should be a sound, or a globe a colour. The
sum is this, if the soul be an immaterial substance, (as it must needs
be, if we have any true idea of the nature and properties of matter;)
then Mr Hobbes' arguments against the possibility of liberty, drawn all
from the properties of matter, are vain, and nothing to the purpose;
but if our adversaries will be so absurd as to contend that the soul is
nothing but mere matter, then, either by matter they must understand
substance in general,--substance indued with unknown powers, with
active as well as passive properties, which is confounding and taking
away our idea of matter, and at the same time destroying all their own
arguments against liberty, which they have founded wholly on the known
properties of matter, or else they must speak out, (as they really
mean,) that thinking and willing are nothing but effects and
compositions of figure and motion, which I have already shown to be a
contradiction in terms.
There are some other arguments against the possibility of liberty,
which men, by attempting to answer, have made to appear considerable;
when in reality they are altogether beside the question. As for
instance, those drawn from the necessity of the will's being determined
by the last judgment of the understanding; and from the certainty of
the divine prescience.
As to the Of the will being necessarily determined by the last judgment
of the understanding. former, viz. the necessity of the will's being
determined by the last judgment of the understanding: This is only a
necessity upon supposition; that is to say, a necessity that a man
should will a thing, when it is supposed that he does will it; just as
if one should affirm, that every thing which is, is therefore necessary
to be, because, when it is, it cannot but be. It is exactly the same
kind of argument, as that by which the true church is proved to be
infallible, because truth cannot err; and they who are in the right
cannot possibly, while they are so, be in the wrong. Thus, whatever a
man at any time freely wills or does, it is evident (even upon
supposition of the most perfect liberty,) that he cannot (at that time)
but will or do it, because it is impossible any thing should be willed
and not willed, (whether it be freely or necessarily,) or that it
should be done and not done, at the same time. The necessity therefore
of the will's being determined by the last judgment of the
understanding, is (I say) only a necessity upon supposition,--a
necessity that a man should will a thing, when it is supposed that he
does will it. For the last judgment of the understanding is nothing
else but a man's final determining, (after more or less consideration,)
either to choose or not to choose a thing; that is, it is the very same
with the act of volition. Or else, if the act of volition be
distinguished from the last judgment of the understanding, then the act
of volition, or rather the beginning of action, consequent upon the
last judgment of the understanding, is not determined or caused by that
last judgment, as by the physical efficient, but only as the moral
motive. For the true, proper, immediate, physical efficient cause of
action is the power of self-motion in men, which exerts itself freely
in consequence of the last judgment of the understanding. But the last
judgment of the understanding is not itself a physical efficient, but
merely a moral motive, upon which the physical efficient or motive
power begins to act. The necessity, therefore, by which the power of
acting follows the judgment of the understanding, is only a moral
necessity, that is, no necessity at all, in the sense wherein the
opposers of liberty understand necessity, for moral necessity is
evidently consistent with the most perfect natural liberty. For
instance, a man entirely free from all pain of body and disorder of
mind, judges it unreasonable for him to hurt or destroy himself; and,
being under no temptation or external violence, he cannot possibly act
contrary to this judgment, not because he wants a natural or physical
power so to do, but because it is absurd and mischievous, and morally
impossible for him to choose to do it; which also is the very reason
why the most perfect rational creatures, superior to men, cannot do
evil, not because they want a natural power to perform the material
action, but because it is morally impossible, that, with a perfect
knowledge of what is best, and without any temptation to evil, their
will should determine itself to choose to act foolishly and
unreasonably. Here, therefore, seems at last really to lie the
fundamental error both of those who argue against the liberty of the
will, and of those who but too confusedly defend it; they do not make a
clear distinction between moral motives and causes physically
efficient, which two things have no similitude at all. Lastly, if the
maintainers of fate shall allege, that, after all, they think a man,
free from all pain of body and disorder of mind, is under not only a
moral but also a natural impossibility of hurting or destroying
himself, because neither his judgment nor his will, without some
impulse external to both, can any more possibly be determined to any
action, than one body can begin to move, without being impelled by
another: I answer, this is forsaking the argument drawn from the
necessity of the will's following the understanding, and recurs to the
former argument of the absolute impossibility of there being anywhere a
first principle of motion at all, which has been abundantly answered
already.
Some ingenious and able writers have spoken with much confusedness upon
this head, by mistaking (as it seems to me) the subject of the
question, and wherein the nature of liberty consists.
For it being evident, that a free agent cannot choose whether he shall
have a will or no will,--that is, whether he shall be what he is, or
no; but (the two contradictories of acting or not acting, being always
necessarily before him,) he must of necessity, and essentially to his
being a free agent, perpetually will one of these two things, either to
act or to forbear acting: this has raised in the minds, even of some
considerate persons, great doubts concerning the possibility of
liberty.
But this difficulty (if it be any difficulty,) arises merely from not
apprehending rightly what liberty is. For the essence of liberty
consists--not in the agent's choosing whether he shall have a will or
no will; that is, whether he shall be at all an agent, or no; whether
he shall be what he is, or no; but it consists in his being an agent,
that is, in his having a continual power of choosing, whether he shall
act, or whether he shall forbear acting: Which power of agency or free
choice, (for these are precisely identical terms and a necessary agent
is an express contradiction,) is not at all prevented by chains or
prisons; for a man who chooses to endeavour to move out of his place is
therein as much a free agent as he that actually moves out of his
place. Nor is this free agency at all diminished by the impossibility
of his choosing two contradictories at once; or by the necessity that
one of two contradictories must always be done. A man that sits,
whether he be or be not a free agent, cannot possibly both sit and rise
up at the same time; nor can he possibly choose both to act and not to
act at the same time. Not, for want of freedom, but because the
exercise of that very freedom, his freely choosing the one, does itself
necessarily make the contrary to be at that time impossible. Nor does
freedom of will in any manner suppose a power, in the agent, of
choosing whether he shall will at all, or no. For a free agent may be,
and indeed essentially every free agent must be, necessarily free; that
is, has it not in his power not to be free.
God is, by necessity of nature, a free agent; and he can no more
possibly cease to be so, than he can cease to exist. He must of
necessity, every moment, either choose to act or choose to forbear
acting; because two contradictories cannot possibly be true at once:
But which of these two he shall choose, in this he is at perfect
liberty; and to suppose him not to be so, is contradictorily supposing
him not to be the first cause, but to be acted by some superior power,
so as to be himself no agent at all.
Man also is, by necessity, (not in the nature of things, but through
God's appointment) a free agent: And it is no otherwise in his power to
cease to be such than by depriving himself of life.
The necessity therefore of continually choosing one of the two, either
to act or to forbear acting; (which necessity, nothing but a free agent
can possibly be capable of; for necessary agents, as they are called,
can neither chose to act, nor to forbear acting; they being indeed no
agents at all:) the necessity, I say, of continually choosing one of
the two, either to act or to forbear acting, is not inconsistent with,
or an argument against, liberty; but is itself the very essence of
liberty.
The other argument The certainty of divine fore-knowledge not
inconsistent with the liberty of men's actions. which I said has also
frequently been urged against the possibility of liberty, is the
certainty of the divine prescience. But this also is entirely besides
the question. For if there be no other arguments, by which it can be
proved antecedently, that all actions are necessary, it is certain it
can never be made to appear to follow, from prescience alone, that they
must be so. That is, if upon other accounts there be no impossibility,
but that the actions of men may be free; the bare certainty of the
divine fore-knowledge can never be proved to destroy that freedom, or
make any alteration in the nature of men's actions: and consequently
the certainty of prescience, separated from other arguments, is
altogether besides the question concerning liberty. As to the other
arguments usually intermingled with this question, they have all, I
think, been answered already. And now, that the bare certainty of the
divine fore-knowledge (if upon other accounts there be no impossibility
for the actions of men to be free,) can never be proved to destroy that
freedom, is very evident. For bare fore-knowledge has no influence at
all in any respect; nor affects, in any measure, the manner of the
existence of any thing. All that the greatest opposers of liberty have
ever urged, or can urge, upon this head, amounts only to this; that
fore-knowledge implies certainty, and certainty implies necessity. But
neither is it true, that certainty implies necessity; neither does
fore-knowledge imply any other certainty, than such a certainty only as
would be equally in things, though there was no fore-knowledge.
For (1st.) The certainty of fore-knowledge does not cause the certainty
of things, but is itself founded on the reality of their existence.
Whatever now is, it is certain that it is; and it was yesterday and
from eternity as certainly true, that the thing would be to-day as it
is now certain that it is. And this certainty of event is equally the
same, whether it be supposed that the thing could be fore-known or not.
For whatever at any time is, it was certainly true from eternity, as to
the event, that that thing would be: and this certain truth of every
future event would not at all have been the less, though there had been
no such thing as fore-knowledge. Bare prescience, therefore, has no
influence at all upon any thing; nor contributes, in the least, towards
the making it necessary. We may illustrate this in some measure by the
comparison of our own knowledge. We know certainly that some things
are; and when we know that they are, they cannot but be: yet it is
evident our knowledge does not at all affect the things, to make them
more necessary or more certain. Now fore-knowledge in God is the very
same as knowledge. All things are to him-as if they were equally
present, to all the purposes of knowledge and power. He knows perfectly
every thing that is: and he knows whatever shall be, in the same manner
as he knows what is. As, therefore, knowledge has no influence on
things that are; so neither has fore-knowledge on things that shall be.
It is true, the manner how God can foresee future things, without a
chain of necessary causes, is impossible for us to explain distinctly:
though some sort of general notion we may conceive of it. For, as a man
who has no influence over another person's actions, can yet often
perceive before-hand what that other will do; and a wiser and more
experienced man, still with greater probability foresee what another,
whose disposition he is perfectly acquainted with, will in certain
circumstances do; and an angel, with still much less degrees of error,
may have a further prospect into men's future actions; so it is very
reasonable to apprehend that God, without influencing men's wills by
his power, yet by his foresight cannot but have as much certainer a
knowledge of future free events, than either men or angels can possibly
have, as the perfection of his nature is greater than that of theirs.
The distinct manner how he foresees these things is indeed impossible
for us to explain: But so also are numberless other things, which yet
no man doubts the truth of. And if there were any strength in this
argument, it would prove, not against liberty, but against prescience
itself. For if these two things were really inconsistent, and one of
them must be destroyed, the introducing an absolute and universal
fatality, which evidently destroys all religion and morality, would
tend more of the two to the dishonour of God, than the denying him a
fore knowledge, which upon this supposition would be impossible, and
imply a contradiction to conceive him to have; and the denying of which
would in such case be no more a diminution of his omniscience, than the
denying him the power of working contradictions, is taking away his
omnipotence. But the case is not thus. For though we cannot indeed
clearly and distinctly explain the manner of God's foreseeing the
actions of free agents, yet thus much we know, that the bare
fore-knowledge of any action that would upon all other accounts be
free, cannot alter or diminish that freedom, it being evident that
fore-knowledge adds no other certainty to any thing, than what it would
equally have though there was no fore-knowledge. Unless therefore we be
antecedently certain that nothing can possibly be free; and that
liberty is in itself absolutely an inconsistent and contradictory
notion, (as I have above shown that it is not,) bare fore-knowledge,
which makes no alteration at all in any thing, will not be any way
inconsistent with liberty; how great difficulty soever there may be in
comprehending the manner of such fore-knowledge. For if liberty be in
itself possible, the bare foresight of a free action before it be done,
is nothing different (to any purpose in the present question,) from a
simple knowledge of it, when it is done: both these kinds of knowledge,
implying plainly a certainty only of the event, (which would be the
same though there was no such knowledge;) and not at all any necessity
of the thing.
For (2dly,) as fore-knowledge implies not any other certainty than such
as would be equally in things, though there was no fore-knowledge; so
neither does this certainty of event in any sort imply necessity. For
let a fatalist suppose, (what he does not yet grant,) that there was in
man, (as we assert,) a power of beginning motion, that is, of acting
freely; and let him suppose further, if he please, that those actions
could not possibly be fore-known; will there not yet, notwithstanding
this supposition, be in the nature of things the same certainty of
event in every one of the man's actions, as if they were never so fatal
and necessary? For instance; suppose the man, by an internal principle
of motion, and an absolute freedom of will, without any external cause
or impulse at all, does some particular action to-day; and suppose it
was not possible that this action should have been foreseen yesterday;
was there not nevertheless the same certainty of event as if it had
been foreseen? That is; would it not, notwithstanding the supposed
freedom, have been as certain a truth yesterday and from eternity, that
this action was an event to be performed to-day, (though supposed never
so impossible to have been fore-known,) as it is now a certain and
infallible truth that it is performed? Mere certainty of event,
therefore, does not in any measure imply necessity: and consequently
fore-knowledge, however difficult to be explained as to the manner of
it, yet, (since it is manifest it implies no other certainty but only
that certainty of event which the thing would equally have without
being fore-known,) it is evident that it also implies no necessity.
And now having, as I hope, sufficiently proved both the possibility and
the real existence of liberty, I shall, from what has been said on this
head, draw only this one inference, that hereby we are enabled to
answer that ancient and great question, [Pothen to kakon:] What is the
cause and original of evil? For liberty implying a natural power of
doing evil, as well as good; and the imperfect nature of finite beings
making it possible for them to abuse this their liberty to an actual
commission of evil; and it being necessary to the order and beauty of
the whole, and for displaying the infinite wisdom of the Creator, that
there should be different and various degrees of creatures, whereof
consequently some must be less perfect than others; hence there
necessarily arises a possibility of evil, notwithstanding that the
Creator is infinitely good. In short, thus: All that we call evil is
either an evil of imperfection, as the want of certain faculties and
excellencies which other creatures have; or natural evil, as pain,
death, and the like; or moral evil, as all kinds of vice. The first of
these is not properly an evil; for every power, faculty, or perfection,
which any creature enjoys, being the free gift of God, which he was no
more obliged to bestow than he was to confer being or existence itself,
it is plain the want of any certain faculty or perfection in any kind
of creatures, which never belonged to their nature, is no more an evil
to them than their never having been created or brought into being at
all, could properly have been called an evil. The second kind of evil,
which we call natural evil, is either a necessary consequence of the
former, as death to a creature on whose nature immortality was never
conferred, and then it is no more properly an evil than the former; or
else it is counterpoised in the whole, with as great or greater good as
the afflictions and sufferings of good men, and then also it is not
properly an evil; or else, lastly,--it is a punishment, and then it is
a necessary consequent of the third and last sort of evil, viz. moral
evil. And this arises wholly from the abuse of liberty, which God gave
to his creatures for other purposes, and which it was reasonable and
fit to give them for the perfection and order of the whole creation;
only they, contrary to God's intention and command, have abused what
was necessary for the perfection of the whole, to the corruption and
depravation of themselves. And thus all sorts of evils have entered
into the world, without any diminution to the infinite goodness of the
creator and governor thereof.
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[69]
--Si immortalis natura animæ est,
Et sentire potest secreta a corpore nostro;
Quinque (ut opinor) eam faciendum est sensibus auctam:
Nec ratione alia nosmet proponere nobis,
Possumus infernas animas Acheronte vagare.
Pictores itaque; et scriptorum secla priora.
Sic animas introduxerunt sensibus auctas.
At neque seorsum oculi, &c.--
Nec sensus ipsi seorsum consistere possunt
Naribus atque manu, atque oculis, atque auribus, atque
Lingua; nec per se possunt sentire, nec esse.
Lucret. lib. 3. Oson gar estin archon energeia he somatike delon hoti
tautas aneu somatos adunaton husarchein hoion badizein aneu
podon.--Aristot.
[70] Has tamen imagines [mortuorum,] loqui volebant; quod fieri nec
sine lingua, nec sine palato, nec sine faucium, laterum, pulmonum vi et
figura potest. Nihil enim animo, (speaking of such as attributed to
spirits the same power, and senses only, as they saw men indued with in
this present state,) videre poterant: ad oculos omnia referebant. Magni
autem ingenii est, revocare mentem a sensibus, et cogitationem a
consuetudine abducere.--Cicero Tuscul. Qu. 1.
[71] Quicunque unquam effectus productus sit, productus est a causa
necessaria. Nam quod productum est, causam habuit integram, hoc est,
omnia ea quibus suppositis effectum non sequi intelligi non possit: ea
vera causa necessaria est.--Hobbes Philosophia prima, cap. 9.
[72] Corpus motum vel quiescens, ad motum vel quietem determinari
debuit ab alio corpore, quod etiam ad motum vel quietem determinatum
fuit ab alio, et illud iterum ab alio, et sic in infinitum.--Spinoza
Ethic. par. II. prop. 13. lemma 3.
[73] Unaquæque volitio non potest existere, neque ad operandum
determinari, nisi ab alia causa determinetur, et hæc rursus ab alia, et
sic porro in infinitum.--Id Ethic. par. I. prop. 32. demonstr. I
conceive nothing taketh beginning from itself, but from the action of
some immediate agent without itself; and that therefore, when first a
man had an appetite or will to something, to which, immediately before,
he had no appetite or will, the cause of his will is not the will
itself, but something else not in his own disposing.--Hobbes's Debate
with Bishop Bramhall, p. 289. In mente nulla est absoluta sive libera
voluntas; sed mens ad hoc vel illud volendum determinatur a causa, quæ
etiam ab alia determinata est, et hæc iterum ab alio, et sic in
infinitum.--Spinoza, Ethic. par. II. prop. 48.
[74] Hinc sequitur, Deum non operari ex libertate voluntatis.--Ethic.
par. I. coroll. ad prop. 32.
[75] Ex quo intelligitur, sensionis immediatam causam esse in eo, quod
sensionis organum primum et tangit et premit. Si enim organi pars
extima prematur; illa cedente, premetur quoque pars quæ versus
interiora illi proxima est; et ita propagabitur pressio, sive motus
ille, per partes organi omnes, usque ad intimam.--Quoniam autem motui
ab objecto per media ad organi partem intimam propagato, fit aliqua
totius organi resistentia sive reactio, per motum ipsius organi
internum naturalem; fit propterea conatui ab objecto, conatus ab organo
contrarius. Ut, cù m conatus ille ad intima, ultimus actus sit eorum
qui fiunt in actu sensionis; tum demum ex ea reactione aliquandiu
durante, ipsum existant phantasma; quod, propter conatum versus
externa, semper videtur tanquam aliquid situm extra organum.--Hobbes de
Sensione et Motu Animali.
[76] Phantasma est sentiendi actus.--Id. Ibid.
[77] Causa sensionis est externum corpus sive objectum quod premit
organum proprium; et premendo, (mediantibus nervis et membranis,)
continuum efficit motum introrsum ad cerebrum et inde ad cor; unde
nascitur cordis resistentia et contra-pressio seu antitupia, sive
conatus cordis liberantis se a pressione per motum tendentem extrorsum;
qui motus propterea apparet tanquam aliquid externum: atque apparitio
hæc, sive phantasma, est id quod vocamus sensionem.--Leviathan. cap. 1.
[78] Quæ qualitates omnes nominari solent sensibiles, et sunt in ipso
objecto nihil aliud præter materiæ motum, quo objectum in organa
sensuum diversimode operatur. Neque in nobis aliud sunt, quam diversi
motus. Motus enim nihil generat præter motum.--Leviathan, cap. 1.
[79] See Four Defences of a letter to Mr. Dodwell.
[80] Scio fuisse philosophos quosdam, eosdemque viros doctos, qui
corpora omnia sensu prædita esse sustinuerunt. Nec video, si natura
sensionis in reactione sola collocaretur, quomodo refutari possint. Sed
etsi, ex reactione etiam corporum aliorum, phantasma aliquod
nasceretur, illud tamen, remoto objecto, statim cessaret. Nam nisi ad
retinendum motum impressum, etiam remoto objecto, apta habeant organa,
ut habent animalia; ita tantum sentient, ut nunquam sensisse se
recordentur.--Sensioni ergo, quæ vulgo ita appellatur, necessario
adhæret memoria aliqua, &c.--Hobbes' Physic. cap. 24, sec. 5. See also
No. 2 and 11 of the Appendix to a collection of papers which passed
between Mr Leibnitz and Dr Clarke.
[81] Itaque et sensioni adhæret proprie dictæ, ut ei aliqua insita sit
perpetua phantasmatum varietas; ita ut aliud ab alio discerni possit.
Si supponemus enim esse hominem, oculis quidem claris, cæterisque
videndi organis recte se habentibus compositum, nullo autem alio sensu
præditum, eumque ad eandem rem eodem semper colore et specie sine ulla
vel minima varietate apparentem obversum esse; mihi certe, quicquid
dicant alii, non videre videretur.--Attonitum esse, et fortasse
aspectare eum, sed stupentem dicerem, videre non dicerem. Adeo sentire
semper idem, et non sentire, ad idem recidunt.--Id. Ibid.
[82] Motus nihil generat præter motum.--Leviath. cap. 1.
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Proposition XI. That the supreme cause and author of all things must of
necessity be infinitely wise.
XI. Proposition XI. That the supreme cause and author of all things
must of necessity be infinitely wise. The supreme cause and author of
all things must of necessity be infinitely wise. This proposition is
evidently consequent upon those that have already been proved; and
those being established, this, as admitting no further dispute, needs
not to be largely insisted upon. For nothing is more evident than that
an infinite, omnipresent, intelligent being, must know perfectly all
things that are; and that he who alone is self-existent and eternal,
the sole cause and author of all things, from whom alone all the powers
of all things are derived, and on whom they continually depend, must
also know perfectly all the consequences of those powers, that is, all
possibilities of things to come, and what in every respect is best and
wisest to be done: And that, having infinite power, he can never be
controlled or prevented from doing what he so knows to be fittest. From
all which, it manifestly follows, that every effect of the supreme
cause must be the product of infinite wisdom: More particularly; the
supreme being, because he is infinite, must be everywhere present; and
because he is an infinite mind or intelligence, therefore wherever he
is, his knowledge is, which is inseparable from his being, and must
therefore be infinite likewise; and wherever his infinite knowledge is,
it must necessarily have a full and perfect prospect of all things, and
nothing can be concealed from its inspection: he includes and surrounds
every thing with his boundless presence, and penetrates every part of
their substance with his all-seeing eye: so that the inmost nature and
essence of all things are perfectly naked and open to his view, and
even the deepest thoughts of intelligent beings themselves manifest in
his sight. Further, all things being not only present to him, but also
entirely depending upon him, and having received both their being
itself and all their powers and faculties from him; it is manifest
that, as he knows all things that are, so he must likewise know all
possibilities of things, that is, all effects that can be. For, being
himself alone self-existent, and having alone given to all things all
the powers and faculties they are indued with; it is evident he must of
necessity know perfectly what all and each of those powers and
faculties, which are derived wholly from himself, can possibly produce:
and seeing, at one boundless view, all the possible compositions and
divisions, variations and changes, circumstances and dependences of
things; all their possible relations one to another, and their
dispositions or fitnesses to certain and respective ends,--he must,
without possibility of error, know exactly what is best and properest
in every one of the infinite possible cases or methods of disposing
things; and understand perfectly how to order and direct the respective
means, to bring about what he so knows to be, in its kind, or in the
whole, the best and fittest in the end. This is what we mean by
infinite wisdom. And having before shown, (which indeed is also evident
of itself,) that the supreme cause is moreover all-powerful; so that he
can no more be prevented by force or opposition, than he can be
hindered by error or mistake, from effecting always what is absolutely
fittest and wisest to be done: it follows undeniably, that he is
actually and effectually, in the highest and most complete sense,
infinitely wise; and that the world, and all things therein, must be
and are effects of infinite wisdom. This is demonstration à priori. The
proof à posteriori, of the infinite wisdom of God, from the
consideration of the exquisite perfection and consummate excellency of
his works, is no less strong and undeniable. But I shall not enlarge
upon this argument; because it has often already been accurately and
strongly urged, to the everlasting shame and confusion of the atheists,
by the ablest and learnedest writers both of ancient and modern times.
See Galen de Usu Partium; Tully de Natura Deorum; Boyle, of Final
Causes; MrRay, of the Wisdom of God in the Creation; Mr Derham's
Physico-Theology. &c. I shall here observe only this one thing; that
the older the world grows, and the deeper men inquire into things, and
the more accurate observations they make, and the more and greater
discoveries they find out, the stronger this argument continually
grows; which is a certain evidence of its being founded in truth. [83]
If Galen, so many ages since, could find, in the construction and
constitution of the parts of a human body, such undeniable marks of
contrivance and design as forced him then to acknowledge and admire the
wisdom of its author; what would he have said, if he had known the late
discoveries in anatomy and physic, the circulation of the blood, the
exact structure of the heart and brain, the uses of numberless glands
and valves for the secretion and motion of the juices in the body,
besides several veins and other vessels and receptacles not at all
known, or so much as imagined to have any existence in his days; but
which now are discovered to serve the wisest and most exquisite ends
imaginable! If the arguments against the belief of the being of an
all-wise creator and governor of the world, which Epicurus, and his
follower Lucretius, drew from the faults which they imagined they could
find in the frame and constitution of the earth, were so poor and
inconsiderable, that, even in that in fancy of natural philosophy, the
generality of men contemned and despised them as of no force; how would
they have been ashamed if they had lived in these days, when those very
things which they thought to be faults and blunders in the constitution
of nature, are discovered to be very useful, and of exceeding benefit
to the preservation and well-being of the whole? And to mention no
more: If Tully, from the partial and very imperfect knowledge in
astronomy, which his times afforded, could be so confident of the
heavenly bodies being disposed and moved by a wise and understanding
mind, as to declare that, in his opinion, whoever asserted the
contrary, was himself [84] void of all understanding; what would he
have said if he had known the modern discoveries in astronomy?--the
immense greatness of the world, (I mean that part of it which falls
under our observation,) which is now known to be as much greater than
what in his time they imagined it to be, as the world itself, according
to their system, was greater than Archimedes's sphere?--the exquisite
regularity of all the planets' motions, without epicycles, stations,
retrogradations, or any other deviation or confusion whatsoever?--the
inexpressible nicety of the adjustment of the primary velocity and
original direction of the annual motion of the planets, with their
distance from the central body and their force of gravitation towards
it?--the wonderful proportion of the diurnal motion of the earth and
other planets about their own centres, for the distinction of light and
darkness, without that monstrously disproportionate whirling of the
whole heavens which the ancient astronomers were forced to
suppose?--the exact accommodating of the densities of the planets [85]
to their distances from the sun, and consequently to the proportion of
heat which each of them is to bear respectively; so that neither those
which are nearest the sun are destroyed by the heat, nor those which
are farthest off, by the cold; but each one enjoys a temperature suited
to its proper uses, as the earth to ours?--the admirable order, number,
and usefulness of the several moons, (as I may very properly call
them,) never dreamt of by antiquity, but now by the help of telescopes
clearly and distinctly seen to move about their respective planets, and
whose motions are so exactly known, that their very eclipses are as
certainly calculated and foretold as those of our own moon?--the
strange adjustment of our moon's motion about its own centre once in a
month, with its motion about the earth in the same period of time, to
such a degree of exactness, that by that means the same face is always
obverted to the earth without any sensible variation?--the wonderful
motions of the comets, which are now known to be as exact, regular, and
periodical, as the motions of other planets?--lastly,--the preservation
of the several systems, and of the several planets and comets in the
same system, from falling upon each other, which, in infinite past
time, (had there been no intelligent governor of the whole,) could not
but have been the effect of the smallest possible resistance made by
the finest æther, and even by the rays of light themselves, to the
motions (supposing it possible there ever could have been any motions)
of those bodies?--what (I say,) would Tully, that great master of
reason, have thought and said, if these and other newly discovered
instances of the inexpressible accuracy and wisdom of the works of God,
had been found out and known in his time? Certainly atheism, which then
was altogether unable to withstand the arguments drawn from this topic,
must now, upon the additional strength of these later observations,
(which are every one an unanswerable proof of the incomprehensible
wisdom of the Creator,) be utterly ashamed to show its head. We now
see, with how great reason the author of the Book of Ecclesiasticus,
after he had described the beauty of the sun and stars, and all the
then visible works of God in heaven and earth, concluded, chap. xliii,
v. 32, (as we, after all the discoveries of later ages, may, no doubt,
still truly say,) "There are yet hid greater things than these, and we
have seen but a few of his works."
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[83] Opinionum commenta delet dies, naturæ judicia confirmat.--Cic.
[84] Coelestem ergo admirabilem ordinem incredibilemque constantiam, ex
qua conservatio et salus omnium omnis oritur, qui vacare mente putat;
is ipse mentis expers habendus est.--De Natura Deorum, lib. 2.
[85] Planetarum densitates fere sunt, ut radices diametrorum
apparentium applicatæ ad diametros veros, hoc est, reciproce ut
distantiæ planetarum a sole, ductæ in radices diametrorum apparentium.
Collocavit igitur Deus planetas in diversis distantiis a sole, ut
quilibet, pro gradu densitatis, calore solis majore vel minore
fruatur.--Newton. Princip. lib. 3, prop. 8.
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Proposition XII. The supreme author of all things must be infinitely good, just,
and true.
XII. Proposition XII. The supreme author of all things must be
infinitely good, just, and true. Lastly; the supreme cause and author
of all things must of necessity be a being of infinite goodness,
justice, and truth, and all other moral perfections, such as become the
supreme governor and judge of the world. That there are different
relations of things one towards another, is as certain as that there
are different things in the world. That from these different relations
of different things there necessarily arises an agreement or
disagreement of some things to others, or a fitness or unfitness of the
application of different things or different relations, one to another,
is likewise as certain as that there is any difference in the nature of
things, or that different things do exist. Further, that there is a
fitness or suitableness of certain circumstances to certain persons,
and an unsuitableness of others, founded in the nature of things and in
the qualifications of persons, antecedent to will and to all arbitrary
or positive appointment whatsoever, must unavoidably be acknowledged by
every one who will not affirm that it is equally fit and suitable, in
the nature and reason of things, that an innocent being should be
extremely and eternally miserable as that it should be free from such
misery. There is, therefore, such a thing as fitness and unfitness,
eternally, necessarily, and unchangeably in the nature and reason of
things. Now, what these relations of things, absolutely and necessarily
are in themselves; that also they appear to be, to the understanding of
all intelligent beings except those only who understand things to be
what they are not, that is, whose understandings are either very
imperfect or very much depraved; and by this understanding or knowledge
of the natural and necessary relations of things, the actions likewise
of all intelligent beings are constantly directed, (which, by the way,
is the true ground and foundation of all morality,) unless their will
be corrupted by particular interest or affection, or swayed by some
unreasonable and prevailing lust. The supreme cause, therefore, and
author of all things, since (as has already been proved,) he must of
necessity have infinite knowledge, and the perfection of wisdom, so
that it is absolutely impossible he should err, or be in any respect
ignorant of the true relations and fitness or unfitness of things, or
be by any means deceived or imposed upon herein; and since he is
likewise self-existent, absolutely independent and all-powerful; so
that, having no want of any thing, it is impossible his will should be
influenced by any wrong affection, and having no dependence, it is
impossible his power should be limited by any superior strength,--it is
evident he must of necessity, (meaning, not a necessity of fate, but
such a moral necessity as I before said was consistent with the most
perfect liberty,) do always what he knows to be fittest to be done;
that is, he must act always according to the strictest rules of
infinite goodness, justice, and truth, and all other moral perfections.
In particular, the supreme cause must, in the first place, be
infinitely good; that is, he must have an unalterable disposition to do
and to communicate good or happiness; because, being himself
necessarily happy in the eternal enjoyment of his own infinite
perfections, he cannot possibly have any other motives to make any
creatures at all, but only that he may communicate to them his own
perfections, according to their different capacities, arising from that
variety of natures which it was fit for infinite wisdom to produce; and
according to their different improvements, arising from that liberty
which is essentially necessary to the constitution of intelligent and
active beings. That he must be infinitely good, appears likewise
further from hence; that, being necessarily all-sufficient, he must
consequently be infinitely removed from all malice and envy, and from
all other possible causes or temptations of doing evil, which, it is
evident, can only be effects of want and weakness, of imperfection or
depravation. Again, the supreme cause and author of all things, must in
like manner be infinitely just; because, the rule of equity being
nothing else but the very nature of things, and their necessary
relations one to another; and the execution of justice being nothing
else but a suiting the circumstances of things to the qualifications of
persons, according to the original fitness and agreeableness which I
have before shown to be necessarily in nature, antecedent to will and
to all positive appointment, it is manifest that he who knows perfectly
this rule of equity, and necessarily judges of things as they are; who
has complete power to execute justice according to that knowledge, and
no possible temptation to deviate in the least therefrom; who can
neither be imposed upon by any deceit, nor swayed by any bias, nor awed
by any power,--must, of necessity, do always that which is right,
without iniquity, and without partiality; without prejudice, and
without respect of persons. Lastly, that the supreme cause and author
of all things must be true and faithful, in all his declarations and
all his promises, is most evident. For the only possible reason of
falsifying, is either rashness or forgetfulness, inconstancy or
impotency, fear of evil, or hope of gain; from all which [86] an
infinitely wise, all-sufficient, and good being must of necessity be
infinitely removed; and consequently, as it is impossible for him to be
deceived himself, so neither is it possible for him in anywise to
deceive others. In a word, all evil and all imperfections whatsoever
arise plainly either from shortness of understanding, defect of power,
or faultiness of will; and this last, evidently from some impotency,
corruption, or depravation; being nothing else but a direct choosing to
act contrary to the known reason and nature of things. From all which,
it being manifest that the supreme cause and author of all things
cannot but be infinitely removed, it follows undeniably that he must of
necessity be a being of infinite goodness, justice, and truth, and all
other moral perfections.
To this argumentation a priori, there can be opposed but one objection
that I know of drawn on the contrary, a posteriori, from experience and
observation of the unequal distributions of providence in the world.
But (besides the just vindication of the wisdom and goodness of
providence in its dispensations, even with respect to this present
world only, which Plutarch and other heathen writers have judiciously
made,) the objection itself is entirely wide of the question. For,
concerning the justice and goodness of God, (as of any governor
whatsoever,) no judgment is to be made from a partial view of a few
small portions of his dispensations, but from an entire consideration
of the whole; and, consequently, not only the short duration of this
present state, but moreover all that is past and that is still to come,
must be taken into the account; and then every thing will clearly
appear just and right.
From this account of the moral attributes of God, it follows:
1st. The necessity of God's moral attributes consistent with perfect
liberty. That though all the actions of God are entirely free, and
consequently the exercise of his moral attributes cannot be said to be
necessary, in the same sense of necessity as his existence and eternity
are necessary; yet these moral attributes are really and truly
necessary, by such a necessity, as, though it be not at all
inconsistent with liberty, yet is equally certain, infallible, and to
be depended upon, as even the existence itself, or the eternity of God.
For though nothing is more certain (as has been already proved in the
ninth proposition of this discourse,) than that God acts, not
necessarily, but voluntarily, with particular intention and design,
knowing that he does good, and intending to do so, freely and out of
choice, and when he has no other constraint upon him but this, that his
goodness inclines his will to communicate himself and to do good; so
that the divine nature is under no necessity but such as is consistent
with the most perfect liberty and freest choice; (which is the ground
of all our prayers and thanksgivings,--the reason, why we pray to him
to be good to us and gracious, and thank him for being just and
merciful; whereas no man prays to him to be omnipresent, or thanks him
for being omnipotent, or for knowing all things:) though nothing, I
say, is more certain than that God acts, not necessarily, but
voluntarily; yet it is nevertheless as truly and absolutely impossible
for God not to do (or to do any thing contrary to) what his moral
attributes require him to do; as if he was really not a free but a
necessary agent. And the reason hereof is plain: because infinite
knowledge, power, and goodness in conjunction, may, notwithstanding the
most perfect freedom and choice, act with altogether as much certainty
and unalterable steadiness, as even the necessity of fate can be
supposed to do. Nay, these perfections cannot possibly but so act;
because free choice, in a being of infinite knowledge, power, and
goodness, can no more choose to act contrary to these perfections, than
knowledge can be ignorance, power be weakness, or goodness malice; so
that free choice, in such a being, may be as certain and steady a
principle of action as the necessity of fate. We may, therefore, as
certainly and infallibly rely upon the moral as upon the natural
attributes of God; it being as absolutely impossible for him to act
contrary to the one as to divest himself of the other; and as much a
contradiction to suppose him choosing to do any thing inconsistent with
his justice, goodness, and truth, as to suppose him divested of
infinity, power, or existence. The one is contrary to the immediate and
absolute necessity of his nature, the other to the unalterable
rectitude of his will: The one is in itself an immediate contradiction
in the terms, the other is an express contradiction to the necessary
perfections of the divine nature. To suppose the one, is saying
absolutely that something is, at the same time that it is not; to
suppose the other, is to say that infinite knowledge can act
ignorantly, infinite power weakly, or that infinite wisdom and goodness
can do things not good or wise to be done: All which are equally great
and equally manifest absurdities. This, I conceive, is a very
intelligible account of the moral attributes of God, satisfactory to
the mind, and without perplexity and confusion of ideas: I might have
said it at once, (as the truth most certainly is,) that justice,
goodness, and all the other moral attributes of God, are as essential
to the divine nature as the natural attributes of eternity, infinity,
and the like. But because all atheistical persons, after they are fully
convinced that there must needs be in the universe some one eternal,
necessary, infinite, and all-powerful being, will still, with
unreasonable obstinacy, contend that they can by no means see any
necessary connexion of goodness, justice, or any other moral attribute,
with these natural perfections; therefore, I chose to endeavour to
demonstrate the moral attributes by a particular deduction, in the
manner I have now done.
2dly. Of the necessity of God's doing always what is best and fittest
in the whole. From hence it follows, that though God is a most
perfectly free agent, yet he cannot but do always what is best and
wisest in the whole. The reason is evident; because perfect wisdom and
goodness are as steady and certain principles of action as necessity
itself. And an infinitely wise and good being, indued with the most
perfect liberty, can no more choose to act in contradiction to wisdom
and goodness than a necessary agent can act contrary to the necessity
by which it is acted: it being as great an absurdity and impossibility
in choice, for infinite wisdom to choose to act unwisely, or infinite
goodness to choose what is not good; as it would be in nature for
absolute necessity to fail of producing its necessary effect. There was
indeed no necessity in nature, that God should at first create such
beings as he has created, or indeed any beings at all; because he is in
himself infinitely happy and all-sufficient. There was also no
necessity in nature that he should preserve and continue things in
being after they were created; because he would be as self-sufficient
without their continuance, as he was before their creation. But it was
fit, and wise, and good, that infinite wisdom should manifest, and
infinite goodness communicate itself. And therefore it was necessary
(in the sense of necessity I am now speaking of,) that things should be
made at such time, and continued so long, and indued with various
perfections in such degrees, as infinite wisdom and goodness saw it
wisest and best that they should. And when and whilst things are in
being, the same moral perfections make it necessary that they should be
disposed and governed according to the exactest and most unchangeable
laws of eternal justice, goodness, and truth; because, while things and
their several relations are, they cannot but be what they are; and an
infinitely wise being cannot but know them to be what they are, and
judge always rightly concerning the several fitnesses or unfitnesses of
them; and an infinitely good being cannot but choose to act always
according to this knowledge of the respective fitness of things; it
being as truly impossible for such a free agent, who is absolutely
incapable of being deceived or depraved, to choose by acting contrary
to these laws, to destroy its own perfections, as for necessary
existence to be able to destroy its own being.
3dly. Of the impossibility of his doing evil. From hence it follows,
that, though God is both perfectly free, and also infinitely powerful,
yet he cannot possibly do any thing that is evil. The reason of this
also is evident. Because, as it is manifest infinite power cannot
extend to natural contradictions, which imply a destruction of that
very power by which they must be supposed to be effected; so neither
can it extend to moral contradictions, which imply a destruction of
some other attributes as necessarily belonging to the divine nature as
power. I have already shown that justice, goodness, and truth, are
necessarily in God; even as necessarily as power, and understanding,
and knowledge of the nature of things. It is therefore as impossible
and contradictory to suppose his will should choose to do any thing
contrary to justice, goodness, or truth, as that his power should be
able to do any thing inconsistent with power. It is no diminution of
power not to be able to do things which are no object of power: and it
is in like manner no diminution either of power or liberty to have such
a perfect and unalterable rectitude of will as never possibly to choose
to do any thing inconsistent with that rectitude.
4thly. That liberty is not in itself an imperfection, but a perfection.
From hence it follows, that liberty, properly speaking, is not in
itself an imperfection but a perfection. For it is, in the highest and
completest degree, in God himself: every act, wherein he exercises any
moral attribute, as goodness, justice, or truth, proceeding from the
most perfect liberty and freest choice; without which, goodness would
not be goodness, nor justice and truth any excellencies; these things,
in the very idea and formal notion of them, utterly excluding all
necessity. It has indeed been sometimes taught, that liberty is a great
imperfection; because it is the occasion of all sin and misery: But, if
we will speak properly, it is not liberty that exposes us to misery,
but only the abuse of liberty. It is true, liberty makes men capable of
sin, and consequently liable to misery; neither of which they could
possibly be, without liberty. But he that will say every thing is an
imperfection, by the abuse whereof a creature may become more unhappy
than if God had never given it that power at all, must say that a stone
is a more excellent and perfect creature than man, because it is not
capable of making itself miserable, as man is. And, by the same
argument, reason and knowledge, and every other perfection, nay even
existence itself, will be proved to be an imperfection; because it is
that without which a creature could not be miserable. The truth
therefore is; the abuse of liberty, that is, the corruption and
depravation of that without which no creatures could be happy, is the
alone cause of their misery: but as for liberty itself, it is a great
perfection; and the more perfect any creature is, the more perfect is
its liberty; and the perfectest liberty of all is such liberty as can
never, by any ignorance, deceit, or corruption, be biassed or diverted
from choosing what is the proper object of free choice, the greatest
good.
5thly. That the highest moral perfections of rational creatures do not
exclude natural liberty. From hence it follows, that though probably no
rational creature can be, in a strict philosophical sense, impeccable,
yet we may easily conceive how God can place such creatures, as he
judges worthy of so excellent a gift, in such a state of knowledge and
near communion with himself, where goodness and holiness shall appear
so amiable, and where they shall be exempt from all means of temptation
and corruption; that it shall never be possible for them,
notwithstanding the natural liberty of their will, to be seduced from
their unchangeable happiness in the everlasting choice and enjoyment of
their greatest good: Which is the state of good angels and of the
saints in heaven.
Lastly; That the grounds of all moral obligations are eternal and
necessary, and depend not on any laws. From what hath been said upon
this head, it follows that the true ground and foundation of all
eternal moral obligations, is this; that the same reasons, (viz. the
fore-mentioned necessary and eternal different relations which
different things bear one to another: and the consequent fitness or
unfitness of the application of different things, or different
relations, one to another, unavoidably arising from that difference of
the things themselves;) these very same reasons, I say, which always
and necessarily do determine the will of God, as hath been before
shown, ought also constantly to determine the will of all subordinate
intelligent beings. And when they do not, then such beings, setting up
their own unreasonable self-will in opposition to the nature and reason
of things, endeavour (as much as in them lies) to make things be what
they are not, and cannot be; which is the highest presumption and
greatest insolence imaginable: It is acting contrary to their own
reason and knowledge; it is an attempting to destroy that order by
which the universe subsists, and it is also, by consequence, offering
the highest affront imaginable to the creator of all things, who
himself governs all his actions by these rules, and cannot but require
the same of all his reasonable creatures. They who found all moral
obligations ultimately in the will of God must recur at length to the
same thing; only with this difference, that they do not clearly explain
how the nature and will of God himself must be necessarily good and
just, as I have endeavoured to do. They who found all moral obligations
only upon laws made for the good of societies, hold an opinion which,
(besides that it is fully confuted by what has been already said
concerning the eternal and necessary difference of things,) is moreover
so directly and manifestly contradictory and inconsistent with itself,
that it seems strange it should not have been more commonly taken
notice of. For, if there be no difference between good and evil,
antecedent to all laws, there can be no reason why any laws should be
made at all, when all things are naturally indifferent. To say that
laws are necessary to be made for the good of mankind, is confessing
that certain things tend to the good of mankind, that is, to the
preserving and perfecting of their nature; which wise men therefore
think necessary to be established by laws. And if the reason why
certain things are established by wise and good laws is, because those
things tend to the good of mankind, it is manifest they were good
antecedent to their being confirmed by laws: Otherwise, if they were
not good antecedent to all laws, it is evident there could be no reason
why such laws should be made, rather than the contrary; which is the
greatest absurdity in the world.
AND The conclusion. now from what has been said upon this argument, I
hope it is in the whole sufficiently clear that the being and
attributes of God are, to attentive and considering minds, abundantly
capable of just proof and demonstration, and that the adversaries of
God and religion have no reason on their side, (to which they would
pretend to be strict adherers,) but merely vain confidence, and great
blindness and prejudice, when they desire it should be thought, that,
in the fabric of the world, God has left himself wholly without
witness, and that all the arguments of nature are on the side of
atheism and irreligion. Some men, I know, there are, who, having never
turned their thoughts to matters of this nature, think that these
things are all absolutely above our comprehension; and that we talk
about we know not what, when we dispute about these questions. But
since the most considerable atheists that ever appeared in the world,
and the pleaders for universal fatality, have all thought fit to argue
in this way, in their attempts to remove the first foundations of
religion, it is reasonable and necessary that they should be opposed in
their own way, it being most certain, that no argumentation, of what
kind soever, can possibly be made use of on the side of error, but may
also be used with much greater advantage on the behalf of truth.
2. From what has been said upon this argument, we may see how it comes
to pass, that though nothing is so certain and undeniable as the
necessary existence of God, and the consequent deduction of all his
attributes, yet men, who have never attended to the evidence of reason,
and to the notices that God hath given us of himself, may easily be in
great measure ignorant of both. That the three angles of a triangle are
equal to two right ones is so certain and evident, that whoever affirms
the contrary affirms what may very easily be reduced to an express
contradiction; yet whoever turns not his mind to consider it at all,
may easily be ignorant of this and numberless other the like
mathematical and most infallible truths.
3. Yet the notices that God has been pleased to give us of himself are
so many and so obvious,--in the constitution, order, beauty, and
harmony of the several parts of the world,--in the frame and structure
of our own bodies, and the wonderful powers and faculties of our
souls,--in the unavoidable apprehensions of our own minds, and the
common consent of all other men,--in every thing within us, and every
thing without us; that no man of the meanest capacity and greatest
disadvantages whatsoever, with the slightest and most superficial
observation of the works of God, and the lowest and most obvious
attendance to the reason of things, can be ignorant of Him, but he must
be utterly without excuse. Possibly he may not, indeed, be able to
understand or be affected by nice and metaphysical demonstrations of
the being and attributes of God, but then for the same reason he is
obliged also not to suffer himself to be shaken and unsettled by the
subtile sophistries of sceptical and atheistical men, which he cannot
perhaps answer, because he cannot understand; but he is bound to adhere
to those things which he knows, and those reasonings he is capable to
judge of, which are abundantly sufficient to determine and to guide the
practice of sober and considering men.
4. But this is not all: God has, moreover, finally,--by a clear and
express revelation of himself, brought down from heaven by his own Son,
our blessed Lord and Redeemer, and suited to every capacity and
understanding,--put to silence the ignorance of foolish, and the vanity
of sceptical and profane men; and, by declaring to us himself, his own
nature and attributes, he has effectually prevented all mistakes which
the weakness of our reason, the negligence of our application, the
corruption of our nature, or the false philosophy of wicked and profane
men, might have led us into;--and so has infallibly furnished us with
sufficient knowledge to enable us to perform our duty in this life, and
to obtain our happiness in that which is to come. But this exceeds the
bounds of my present subject, and deserves to be handled in a
particular discourse.
__________________________________________________________________
[86] Ouk estin ou heneka an theos pseudoito.--Komide hara ho theos
haploun kai alethes en te ergo kai en lugo. Kai oute allous exapata,
oute kata phantasias, oute kata logous, oute kata semeion pompas, outh
hupar oud' onar.--Plato de Repub. lib. 2, sub finem.
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________
A
DISCOURSE
CONCERNING
THE UNCHANGEABLE OBLIGATIONS OF
NATURAL RELIGION
AND THE
TRUTH AND CERTAINTY
OF THE
CHRISTIAN REVELATION.
__________________________________________________________________
BEING EIGHT SERMONS PREACHED AT THE CATHEDRAL
CHURCH OF ST. PAUL, IN THE YEAR 1705, AT THE
LECTURE FOUNDED BY THE HONOURABLE
ROBERT BOYLE, ESQ.
__________________________________________________________________
BY SAMUEL CLARKE, DD.
LATE RECTOR OF ST. JAMES'S, WESTMINSTER.
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________
TO THE
MOST REVEREND FATHER IN GOD,
THOMAS,
LORD ARCHBISHOP OF CANTERBURY, AND PRIMATE OF ALL ENGLAND;
SIR HENRY ASHURST, BARONET;
SIR JOHN ROTHERAM, KNIGHT, SERGEANT AT LAW;
JOHN EVELIN, ESQ.
TRUSTEES APPOINTED BY THE HONOURABLE ROBERT BOYLE, ESQ.
THIS DISCOURSE
IS HUMBLY DEDICATED.
__________________________________________________________________
THE PREFACE.
I SHOULD not have presumed to publish these papers in vindication of
natural and revealed religion, after so many excellent discourses
already written upon that subject, had I not thought myself obliged to
it, in order to pursue more fully the design of the honourable founder
of this lecture, and to answer the expectation of the most reverend and
the honourable trustees appointed by him. The honourable Robert Boyle,
Esq. was a person no less zealously solicitous for the propagation of
true religion, and the practice of piety and virtue, than diligent and
successful in improving experimental philosophy, and enlarging our
knowledge of nature; and it was his settled opinion, that the
advancement and increase of natural knowledge would always be of
service to the cause and interest of true religion, in opposition to
atheists and unbelievers of all sorts. Accordingly he, in his
life-time, made excellent use of his own observations to this purpose
in all his writings, and made provision after his death for carrying on
the same design perpetually. In pursuance of which end I endeavoured,
in my former discourse, to strengthen and confirm the arguments which
prove to us the being and attributes of God, partly by metaphysical
reasoning, and partly from the discoveries (principally those that have
been lately made,) in natural philosophy. And in the present treatise I
have attempted, in a plainer and easier method, to establish the
unalterable obligations of natural religion, and the truth and
certainty of the Christian revelation. If what I have said, may, in any
measure, promote the interest of true religion in this sceptical and
profane age, and answer the design for which this lecture was founded,
I have my end.
It may perhaps be expected, that I should take some notice of certain
remarks which have been published upon my former sermons. Had the
author of those remarks entered into the merits of the cause, or
offered any considerable reasons in opposition to what I had laid down,
I should have thought myself obliged to give him a particular answer;
but since his book is made up chiefly of railing and gross
misconstructions, and all that he pretends to say, by way of argument,
depends entirely upon supposition of the truth of the Cartesian
hypothesis, which the best mathematicians in the world have
demonstrated to be false, I presume it may be sufficient to show here
the insincerity of that author, and the weakness of his reasoning, by a
few brief observations.
The only argument he alleges against me, in his whole book, is this:
that if we know not distinctly what the essence of God, [87] and what
the essence of matter is, wé cannot possibly demonstrate them at all to
be two different essences.
To which I answer: It is plain we know not the essences of things by
intuition, but can only reason about them from what we know of their
different properties or attributes. Now, from the demonstrable
attributes of God, and from the known properties of matter, we have as
unanswerable reasons to convince and satisfy us that their essences are
entirely different, though we know not distinctly what those essences
are, as our faculties can afford us, in judging of any the certainest
things whatsoever. For instance: the demonstrable attributes of God
are, that he is self-existent, independent, eternal, infinite,
unchangeable, incorruptible, intelligent, free, all-powerful, wise,
just, and good: The known properties of matter are, that it is not
necessary or self-existent, but dependent, finite; (nay, that it fills
but a few very small and inconsiderable portions of space,) that it is
divisible, passive, unintelligent, and consequently incapable of any
active powers. Now nothing can be more certain and evident, than that
the substances to which these incompatible attributes or properties
belong, or the essences from which they flow, are entirely different
one from the other, though we do not distinctly know what the inmost
substances or essences themselves are. If any man will think a mere
hypothesis (the Cartesian or any other,) concerning the inmost nature
of substances to be a more satisfactory discovery of the different
essences of things than we can attain by reasoning thus from their
demonstrable properties, and will choose rather to draw fond
consequences from such hypotheses and fictions founded upon no proof at
all, than to make use of such philosophy as is grounded only upon clear
reason or good experiments,--I know no help for it, but he must be
permitted to enjoy his opinion quietly.
The rest of the book is all either an indecent and unreasonable
reviling of the learned Mr Locke, from whom I neither cited any one
passage, nor (that I know of) borrowed any argument from him; and
therefore is altogether impertinent: or else it consists of gross
misrepresentations of my sense, and very unfair constructions and false
citations of my words, of which I shall presently give some instances.
The first 8, and the 35th and 36th pages of the remarks, are spent in
attempting to prove, that, if we do not first know what the essence of
God, and what the essence of matter is, (that is, if the Cartesian
hypothesis or fiction concerning the essences of spiritual and material
substance be not granted to be true,)--there is no way left by which it
can be proved at all that the essence of God and matter is not one and
the same: To which I have already given an answer, viz. that, from the
demonstrable attributes of God, and from the known properties of matter
(being incompatible with each other,) we have as absolute certainty of
their essences or substances being different, though we do not
distinctly know what those essences are, as our faculties enable us to
attain in any metaphysical question; for incompatible properties can no
more possibly be in any unknown than in any known subject.
Page 12.--The author of the Remarks asserts, that Des Cartes and his
followers have mathematically proved that the essence of matter
consists in length, breadth, and depth: And upon this confident
assertion, his whole book depends in every part. To this, therefore, I
answer, that that hypothesis is really so far from being mathematically
proved to be true, that, on the contrary, he cannot but know (if he
knows any thing of these matters,) that the greatest mathematicians of
the present age, men confessedly greater in that science than any that
ever lived before them, have clearly proved (as I before said) that it
is absolutely false. [88] And not to take the least notice of this
throughout his whole book argues either great insincerity or great
ignorance.
I had affirmed, that to imagine an eternal and infinite nothing was
being reduced to the necessity of imagining a contradiction or
impossibility: For this he argues against me (Remark. pag. 14,) as if I
had asserted, that it was possible to imagine an eternal and infinite
nothing, whereas I asserted that it was impossible, and an express
contradiction so to do: This is great insincerity.
I had charged the Cartesians with being unavoidably reduced to the
absurdity of making matter a necessarily-existing being. In citing this
passage, (Remark, pages 14 and 15,) he ridiculously represents me as
saying that this absurdity consisted in making extension necessary;
though he knew that in that very passage I supposed matter and
extension to be entirely different things: This likewise is great
insincerity.
I have said, that the idea of immensity was an idea that no way
belonged to matter. Instead of this, he cites me asserting,
senselessly, (Remark, page 15,) that extension no way belongs to
matter; as if that which is not immense or infinite, is, therefore, not
extended at all: This is the greatest disingenuity in the world.
Remark, page 15.--He says, I am sure this author cannot produce one, no
not one Cartesian, that ever made matter a necessarily-existing
being,--that ever contradicted himself in words upon this
subject,--that ever was mightily, or not mightily, or at all perplexed
with what Mr Clarke calls his argument;--nay, that ever heard of that
thing he calls his argument. Why are they thus misrepresented and
imposed upon? To this I answer: it had been sufficient to make good my
charge, to have shown, that, from the Cartesian hypothesis, it
followed, by unavoidable consequence, that matter must be a
necessarily-existing being, though the Cartesians themselves had not
seen that consequence. Yet I cited, moreover, a passage out of Regis,
wherein it is plain he perceived and owned that consequence. But,
because the Remarker seems not satisfied with this, and pretends to
triumph here with great pleasure and assurance, I will for once comply
with his challenge, and produce him another, and that an
unexceptionable Cartesian, even Des Cartes himself, who was greatly
perplexed with the argument I mentioned, and was unavoidably reduced to
make matter a necessarily-existing being, and at the same time did
contradict himself in words upon this subject. It was objected to Des
Cartes by some very learned men, that [89] if extension and matter were
the same thing, it seemed to them to follow, that God could neither
possibly make the world finite, nor annihilate any part of matter,
without creating, at the same time, just as much more to supply its
place. To this he answers; [90] that, according to his hypothesis, it
does indeed imply a contradiction to suppose the world to be finite, or
to suppose God annihilating any part of matter; but yet he will not say
God cannot do it, or that God cannot cause that two and three shall not
make five, or any other contradiction whatsoever: Is not this making
matter a necessarily-existing being, to own that it is a contradiction
to suppose God annihilating it, or setting bounds to it? Is not this
contradicting himself, for a man to affirm (as Cartes does in all his
writings,) that the world was created by God, and depends upon him, and
yet at the same time to declare that it implies as plain a
contradiction to suppose any part of matter annihilable by the power of
God, as to suppose that two and three should not make five? Is not this
really a ridiculing of the power of God? And was not Des Cartes,
therefore, greatly perplexed with the argument I mentioned? And is not
an hypothesis, from which such consequences unavoidably and confessedly
follow, a fine land-mark of distinction between spiritual and material
substances? and whatever opposes this hypothesis, [91] a depriving us
of the means of proving the existence of the one only true God?
The Remarker humbly desires his reader (page 16,) to be persuaded that
he is of no particular sect in matters of philosophy, but only of the
party of truth wherever he meets with it. Yet the same man had declared
before, (page 12,) that he believed Des Cartes had mathematically
proved his hypothesis; and takes not the least notice of its having
since been fully confuted by mathematicians confessedly far more
eminent in that science than Des Cartes was. This is a very singular
mark of impartiality, and of being addicted to no party in matters of
philosophy.
Speaking of the Cartesian argument drawn from the idea of God, I had
used these words:--Our first certainty of the existence of God arises
not from this, that, in the idea we frame of him in our minds, or
rather in the definition that we make of the word [God,] as signifying
a being of all possible perfections, we include self-existence: but,
&c.--meaning, that, according to that argument, self-existence was
rather made only a part of the definition of the word than proved to be
a real attribute of the being itself. Instead of this the Remarker,
(pages 17 and 19,) by a childish misunderstanding of the syntax of the
sentence, and referring the particle [or] to a wrong member of the
period, cites my words in a quite different manner: as if I had said,
in the idea we frame of God in our own minds, or rather in the idea we
frame of him in the definition that we make of the word, &c. and he is
very facetious (pages 17 and 19,) in ridiculing this framing of an idea
in a definition, which he calls, as it truly is, a real piece of
nonsense. But when, upon the review, he finds himself the true and only
author of it, for want of understanding grammar, I suppose it will make
him more modest and careful.
He accuses me (Remark, pages 18, 20, &c.) of not understanding the
Cartesian argument drawn from the idea of God. I confess myself very
ready to submit to this charge; and I can show him much more learned
writers than either of us, who have likewise [92] not understood that
argument. If he does understand it, he will do the world a very
acceptable piece of service to make it out.
What he says in his 21st, 22d, 23d, and 24th pages, is such a heap of
misconstructions, and so entirely void of sense, that I confess I
cannot at all tell what he means.
From my using the word mere matter, he concludes (page 29,) that I
imagine there is another sort of matter which is not a mere bare, pure,
incogitative matter; and that these terms necessarily import this
sense. Whereas, in every one of the places he cites, it is as express
and evident as words can make it, that by mere matter I understand the
matter of which the world consists, not as opposed to another sort of
matter, but either as opposed to motion and to the form of the world,
or as considered by itself, and without the government and direction of
a supreme intelligent mind. This, therefore, is the highest degree of
insincerity.
He charges me, (pages 4 and 29, and 30,) with making a translation
quite different from Spinoza's sense and words. How I could
mistranslate what I did not translate at all, I understand not: but
whether I have misrepresented Spinoza's sense, or no, (as I think I
have not,) this I can only leave to the learned world to judge.
I reduced Spinoza's opinion to this, that the material world, and every
part of it, with the order and manner of being of each part, is the
only self-existing or necessarily-existing being; and this I think is
as clearly contained in the words I cited from him [93] as any thing
can be. Here the Remarker asserts (page 30,) that Spinoza never taught
this doctrine; nay, that he taught the quite contrary. To prove which,
he cites a passage, where Spinoza affirms, that [94] all who have in
any degree considered the divine nature, deny that God is corporeal.
Now, this also is extremely insincere; for, had this author cited here
the whole sentence of Spinoza, as he had cited it before in his 26th
page, it would have appeared evidently, that Spinoza, by denying God to
be corporeal, meant only fallaciously to deny his being any particular
piece of matter, any [95] finite body, and of a certain figure. For,
that he believed infinite corporeal substance, that is, the whole
material universe, to be God, (besides the places I had cited from
him,) he in express words acknowledges, [96] in a passage which this
very author cites in the 4th page of his remarks; and he maintains it
at large through the whole of that very scholium [97] from whence the
remarker has with the greatest insincerity taken the present objection.
But, besides; suppose Spinoza had not explained himself in this place,
and had in this single passage contradicted what he had plainly taught
throughout the rest of his book, would this have been any just reason
to say that Spinoza never taught the doctrine I imputed to him? nay,
that he taught the quite contrary?
He charges me (page 32,) with arguing only against the accessories of
atheism, and leaving the essential hypothesis in its full force; nay,
with confirming and establishing (page 11,) Spinoza's atheism. It
seems, in the opinion of this author, that proving the material world
to be, not a necessary but a dependent being, made, preserved, and
governed, by a self-existent, independent, eternal, infinite mind, of
perfect knowledge, wisdom, power, justice, goodness and truth--is
arguing only against the accessories of atheism, and that the essential
hypothesis of atheism is left untouched, nay, confirmed and
established, by all who will not presume to define the essence of that
supreme mind according to the unintelligible language of the schools
and the groundless imagination of Des Cartes concerning the substance
or essence of matter and spirit. I confess it appears to me, on the
contrary, that the essence of atheism lies in making God either an
unintelligent being, [such as is the material world,] or at least a
necessary agent, [such as Spinoza makes his one substance to be,] void
of all freedom, wisdom, power, and goodness; and that other
metaphysical disputes are only about the accessories; and that there is
much more ground, on the other side, to suspect that very hypothesis,
of which this writer is so fond, to be favourable to the atheist's main
purpose. For if, from Des Cartes's notion of the essence of matter, it
follows (as he himself, in the places now cited, confesses in express
words,) that it implies a contradiction to suppose the material world
finite, or to suppose any part of matter can be annihilated by the
power of God, I appeal to this author, whether this does not naturally
tend to make men think matter a necessary and self-existent being?
He charges me (page 33,) with falsely accusing Spinoza of making God a
mere necessary agent; and cites a passage or two out of Spinoza,
wherein that author seems to assert the contrary. The words which I
cited from Spinoza do as clearly express what I charged him with, as it
is possible for any thing to be expressed; for he asserts plainly, [98]
that from the power of God all things proceed necessarily; that all
things are determined by the necessity of the divine nature; that
whatever is in the power of God must necessarily exist; that things
could not have been produced by God in any other manner or order than
they now are; and that God does not act by a liberty of will. All this
the Remarker very insincerely passes over, without the least notice.
And the words which he cites out of Spinoza do not at all prove the
contrary to what I asserted. For when Spinoza says, [99] that God alone
is a free cause, and that God acts by the laws of his own nature,
without being forced by any; it is evident he does not there mean a
freedom of will, but only fallaciously signifies, that the necessity by
which all things exist in the manner they do, is an inward necessity in
the nature of the things themselves, in opposition to any force put
upon them from without; which external force, it is plain indeed that
[the to pan] the whole universe (the God of Spinoza) cannot be subject
to; because it is supposed to contain all things within itself. But,
besides, supposing (as I said before) that Spinoza had directly
contradicted himself in this one passage, how would that have proved my
charge against him to have been false?
He says (page 34,) that I am guilty myself of what I groundlessly
imputed to Spinoza, viz. of making God a mere necessary agent; namely,
by affirming that there is a necessary difference between good and
evil, and that there is such a thing as fitness and unfitness,
eternally, necessarily, and unchangeably in the nature and reason of
things, antecedently to will and to all positive or arbitrary
appointment whatsoever. This, he says, is a groundless and positive
assertion, and plainly imports the eternal necessary co-existence of
all things as much as Spinoza's hypothesis does. Is not this an
admirable consequence? because I affirm the proportions of things, and
the differences of good and evil, to be eternal and necessary, that
therefore I affirm the existence of the things themselves to be also
eternal and necessary? because I affirm the proportion, suppose between
a sphere and a cylinder, to be eternal and necessary, that therefore I
affirm the existence of material spheres and cylinders to be likewise
eternal and necessary? because I affirm the difference between virtue
and vice to be eternal and necessary, that therefore I affirm men, who
practise virtue or vice, to have existed eternally? This accusation
shows both extreme ignorance, and great malice, in the author of the
remarks.
I had used these words, (Demonstrat, page 8:)--"How an eternal duration
can now be actually past, is a thing utterly as impossible for our
narrow understandings to comprehend, as any thing that is not an
express contradiction can be imagined to be; and yet, to deny the truth
of the proposition, that an eternal duration is now actually past, is
to assert something still far more unintelligible, even a real and
express contradiction." Instead of this, the Remarker, (page 39,)
citing my words, with extreme disingenuity leaves out one half of the
sentence and makes me to say, absolutely, that something is still far
more unintelligible than that which is utterly impossible to be
understood. Such gross misrepresentations as these, in leaving out one
part of a sentence, to make the rest nonsense, can very hardly proceed
but from want of honesty.
Lastly, (page 41,) he says, that in my Sermons there is not one
argument offered to prove, against Spinoza, that God is a spirit. I
persuaded myself, that the proving God to be a being absolutely
distinct from the material world, self-existent, intelligent, free,
all-powerful, wise, and good, had been proving him to be a spirit. But
it seems no proof is of any force with this author, if it be not
agreeable to the Cartesian philosophy, in which alone he seems to have
any knowledge. To this, therefore, I am not obliged to trouble either
myself or the reader with giving any further answer.
__________________________________________________________________
[87] Note--That in this whole question, the word essence is not to be
taken in the proper metaphysical sense of the word, as signifying that
by which a thing is what it is; for in that sense the attributes of God
do constitute his essence; and solidity, or impenetrability, is the
essence of matter. But essence is all along to be understood as
signifying here the same with substance.
[88] See Sir Isaac Newton's Principia, page 384 and 402. Edit. tertia.
[89] Quæro an a Deo fieri potuisset ut mundus esset finitus?--Epist. ad
Cartesium68, partis primæ. Nondum illud possum concoquere, eam esse
inter res corporeas connexionem, ut nec mundum Deus creare potuerit
nisi infinitum, nec ullum corpus in nihilum redigere, quin eo ipso
teneatur aliud paris quantitatis statim creare.--Epist. 5. partis
secundæ.
[90] Puto implicare contradictionem ut mundus sit finitus.--Cartes.
Epist.69, partis primæ. Mihi autem non videtur de ulla unquam re esse
dicendum, ipsam a Deo fieri non posse. Cum enim omnis ratio veri et
boni ab ejus omnipotentia dependeat; ne quidem dicere ausim, Deum
facere non posse ut mons sit sine valle, vel ut unum et duo non sint
tria; sed tantum dico, talia implicare contradictionem in meo conceptu.
Quod idem etiam de spatio, quod sit plane vacuum, &c.--Epist. 6, partis
secundæ.
[91] Remark, page 25.
[92] See Cudworth's System, page 721, &c.
[93] Præter Deum nulla dari neque concipi potest substantia.--Spinoza
ethic. par. prop. 14. Una substantia non potest produci ab alia
substantia.--Prop. 6. Res nullo alio modo neque alio ordine a Deo
produci potuerunt quam productæ sunt.--Prop. 33. Ad naturam substantiæ
pertinet existere.--Prop. 7.
[94] Omnes qui naturam divinam aliquo modo contemplati sunt, Deum esse
corporeum negant--Ethic. par. I. prop. 15. Schol.
[95] Per corpus intelligimus quamcunque quantitatem longam, latam, et
profundam, certa aliqua figura terminatum; quo nihil absurdius de Deo,
ente scilicet absolute infinito, dici potest.--Ibid.
[96] Substantiam corpoream quæ non nisi infinita concipi potest, nulla
ratione natura divina indignam esse dici potest.
[97] Schol. ad prop. 15. par 1.
[98] A summa Dei potentia omnia necessario effluxisse. Omnia ex
necessitate divinæ naturæ determinata sunt, &c. Quicquid concipimus in
Dei potestate esse, id necessario est. Res nullo alio modo, neque alio
ordine, a Deo produci potuerunt quam productæ sunt. Deum non operari ex
libertate voluntatis.
[99] Sequitur, soum Deum esse causam liberam. Deus ex solis suæ naturæ
legibus, et a nemine coactus, agit.
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________
A
DISCOURSE
CONCERNING
THE UNCHANGEABLE OBLIGATIONS OF
NATURAL RELIGION,
AND THE
TRUTH AND CERTAINTY OF THE
CHRISTIAN REVELATION.
__________________________________________________________________
Isa. v. 20. Wo unto them that call evil good, and good evil; that put
darkness for light, and light for darkness; that put bitter for sweet
and sweet for bitter.
Rom. i. 22. Professing themselves to be wise, they became fools.
1 Cor. ii. 10. But God hath revealed them unto us by his spirit.
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________
HAVING, The introduction. in a former discourse, endeavoured to lay
firmly the first foundations of religion, in the certainty of the
existence and of the attributes of God, by proving, severally and
distinctly:--
That something must needs have existed from eternity, and how great
soever the difficulties are, which perplex the conceptions and
apprehensions we attempt to frame of an eternal duration, yet they
neither ought nor can raise in any man's mind any doubt or scruple
concerning the truth of the assertion itself that something has really
been eternal:
That there must have existed from eternity some one unchangeable and
independent being, because, to suppose an eternal succession of merely
dependent beings, proceeding one from another in an endless
progression, without any original independent cause at all, is
supposing things that have in their own nature no necessity of
existing, to be from eternity caused or produced by nothing; which is
the very same absurdity and express contradiction as to suppose them
produced by nothing at any determinate time:
That that unchangeable and independent being, which has existed from
eternity, without any external cause of its existence, must be
self-existent, that is, necessarily-existing:
That it must of necessity be infinite or everywhere present; a being
most simple, uniform, invariable, indivisible, incorruptible, and
infinitely removed from all such imperfections as are the known
qualities and inseparable properties of the material world:
That it must of necessity be but one; because, to suppose two, or more,
different self-existent independent principles may be reduced to a
direct contradiction:
That it must necessarily be an intelligent being:
That it must be a free and voluntary, not a necessary agent:
That this being must of necessity have infinite power, and that in this
attribute is included, particularly, a possibility of creating or
producing things, and also a possibility of communicating to creatures
the power of beginning motion, and a possibility of induing them with
liberty or freedom of will; which freedom of will is not inconsistent
with any of the divine attributes:
That he must of necessity be infinitely wise:
And lastly, that he must necessarily be a being of infinite goodness,
justice, and truth, and all other moral perfections; such as become the
supreme governor and judge of the world.
It remains now, in order to complete my design of proving and
establishing the truth and excellency of the whole superstructure of
our most holy religion, that I proceed, upon this foundation of the
certainty of the being and attributes of God, to demonstrate in the
next place the unalterable obligations of natural religion, and the
certainty of divine revelation, in opposition to the vain arguings of
certain vicious and profane men, who, merely upon account of their
incredulity, would be thought to be strict adherers to reason, and
sincere and diligent inquirers into truth; when, indeed, on the
contrary, there is but too much cause to fear that they are not at all
sincerely and really desirous to be satisfied in the true state of
things, but only seek, under the pretence and cover of infidelity, to
excuse their vices and debaucheries which they are so strongly inslaved
to that they cannot prevail with themselves upon any account to forsake
them: And yet a rational submitting to such truths, as just evidence
and unanswerable reason would induce them to believe, must necessarily
make them uneasy under those vices, and self condemned in the practice
of them. It remains therefore, (I say) in order to finish the design I
proposed to myself, of establishing the truth and excellency of our
holy religion, in opposition to all such vain pretenders to reason as
these, that I proceed at this time, by a continuation of the same
method of arguing, by which I before demonstrated the being and
attributes of God, to prove distinctly the following propositions:--
I. That the same necessary and eternal different relations that
different things bear one to another, and the same consequent fitness
or unfitness of the application of different things or different
relations one to another, with regard to which the will of God always
and necessarily does determine itself to choose to act only what is
agreeable to justice, equity, goodness, and truth, in order to the
welfare of the whole universe, ought likewise constantly to determine
the wills of all subordinate rational beings, to govern all their
actions by the same rules, for the good of the public in their
respective stations: That is, these eternal and necessary differences
of things make it fit and reasonable for creatures so to act: they
cause it to be their duty, or lay an obligation upon them, so to do,
even separate from the consideration of these rules being the positive
will or command of God, and also antecedent to any respect or regard,
expectation or apprehension, of any particular private and personal
advantage or disadvantage, reward or punishment, either present or
future, annexed, either by natural consequence, or by positive
appointments, to the practising or neglecting those rules.
II. That though these eternal moral obligations are, indeed, of
themselves incumbent on all rational beings, even antecedent to the
consideration of their being the positive will and command of God, yet
that which most strongly confirms, and in practice most effectually and
indispensably enforces them upon us, is this, that both from the nature
of things, and the perfections of God, and from several other
collateral considerations, it appears, that as God is himself
necessarily just and good in the exercise of his infinite power in the
government of the whole world, so he cannot but likewise positively
require that all his rational creatures should in their proportion be
so too, in the exercise of each of their powers in their respective
spheres: That is, as these eternal moral obligations are really in
perpetual force merely from their own nature and the abstract reason of
things, so also they are moreover the express and unalterable will,
command, and law of God to his creatures, which he cannot but expect
should, in obedience to his supreme authority, as well as in compliance
with the natural reason of things, be regularly and constantly observed
through the whole creation.
III. That, therefore, though these eternal moral obligations are also
incumbent, indeed, on all rational creatures, antecedent to any respect
of particular reward or punishment, yet they must certainly and
necessarily be attended with rewards and punishments; because the same
reasons which prove God himself to be necessarily just and good, and
the rules of justice, equity, and goodness, to be his unalterable will,
law, and command, to all created beings, prove also that he cannot but
be pleased with and approve such creatures as imitate and obey him by
observing those rules, and be displeased with such as act contrary
thereto; and, consequently, that he cannot but some way or other make a
suitable difference in his dealings with them, and manifest his supreme
power and absolute authority, in finally supporting, maintaining, and
vindicating effectually the honour of these his divine laws, as becomes
the just and righteous governor and disposer of all things.
IV. That consequently, though, in order to establish this suitable
difference between the fruits or effects of virtue and vice, so
reasonable in itself, and so absolutely necessary for the vindication
of the honour of God, the nature of things and the constitution and
order of God's creation was originally such, that the observance of the
eternal rules of justice, equity, and goodness does indeed of itself
tend, by direct and natural consequence, to make all creatures happy,
and the contrary practice to make them miserable; yet since, through
some great and general corruption and depravation, (whencesoever that
may have arisen, the particular original whereof could hardly have been
known now without revelation;) since, I say, the condition of men in
this present state is such, that the natural order of things in this
world is an event manifestly perverted, and virtue and goodness are
visibly prevented, in great measure, from obtaining their proper and
due effects in establishing men's happiness proportionable to their
behaviour and practice; therefore it is absolutely impossible, that the
whole view and intention, the original and the final design, of God's
creating such rational beings as men are, and placing them in this
globe of earth, as the chief and principal, or indeed (may we not say)
the only inhabitants, for whose sake alone this part at least of the
creation is evidently fitted up and accommodated; it is absolutely
impossible (I say) that the whole of God's design in all this should be
nothing more than to keep up eternally a succession of such short-lived
generations of men as at present are, and those in such a corrupt,
confused, and disorderly state of things as we see the world is now in,
without any due observation of the eternal rules of good and evil,
without any clear and remarkable effect of the great and most necessary
differences of things, and without any final vindication of the honour
and laws of God in the proportionable reward of the best, or punishment
of the worst of men. And consequently it is certain and necessary,
(even as certain as the moral attributes of God before demonstrated,)
that, instead of continuing an eternal succession of new generations in
the present form and state of things, there must at some time or other
be such a revolution and renovation of things, such a future state of
existence of the same persons, as that, by an exact distribution of
rewards or punishments therein, all the present disorders and
inequalities may be set right, and that the whole scheme of providence,
which to us who judge of it by only one small portion of it, seems now
so inexplicable and much confused, may appear at its consummation to be
a design worthy of infinite wisdom, justice, and goodness.
V. That, though the indispensable necessity of all the great and moral
obligations of natural religion, and also the certainty of a future
state of rewards and punishments, be thus in general deducible even
demonstrably, by a chain of clear and undeniable reasoning, (yet in the
present state of the world, by what means soever it came originally to
be so corrupted, of which more hereafter,) such is the carelessness,
inconsiderateness, and want of attention of the greater part of
mankind; so many the prejudices and false notions imbibed by evil
education; so strong and violent the unreasonable lusts, appetites, and
desires of sense; and so great the blindness, introduced by
superstitious opinions, vicious customs, and debauched practices,
through the world,--that very few are able, in reality and effect, to
discover these things clearly and plainly for themselves; but men have
great need of particular teaching, and much instruction, to convince
them of the truth and certainty, and importance of these things; to
give them a due sense, and clear and just apprehensions concerning
them; and to bring them effectually to the practice of the plainest and
most necessary duties.
VI. That, though in almost every age there have indeed been in the
heathen world some wise, and brave, and good men, who have made it
their business to study and practice these things themselves, and to
teach and exhort others to do the like, who seem therefore to have been
raised up by providence as instruments to reprove in some measure, and
put some kind of check to the extreme superstition and wickedness of
the nations wherein they lived: Yet none of these have ever been able
to reform the world with any considerably great and universal success;
because they have been but very few that have in earnest set themselves
about this excellent work; and they that have indeed sincerely done it
have themselves been entirely ignorant of some doctrines, and very
doubtful and uncertain of others, absolutely necessary for the bringing
about that great end; and those things which they have been certain of
and in good measure understood, they have not been able to prove and
explain clearly enough, and those that they have been able both to
prove and explain by sufficiently clear reasoning, they have not yet
had authority enough to enforce and inculcate upon men's minds with so
strong an impression as to influence and govern the general practice of
the world.
VII. That therefore there was plainly wanting a divine revelation to
recover mankind out of their universally degenerate estate, into a
state suitable to the original excellency of their nature; which divine
revelation, both the necessities of men and their natural notions of
God gave them reasonable ground to expect and hope for, as appears from
the acknowledgments which the best and wisest of the heathen
philosophers themselves have made, of their sense of the necessity and
want of such a revelation, and from their expressions of the hopes they
had entertained that God would some time or other vouchsafe it unto
them.
VIII. That there is no other religion now in the world, but the
Christian, that has any just pretence or tolerable appearance of reason
to be esteemed such a divine revelation; and therefore if Christianity
be not true, there is no revelation of the will of God at all made to
mankind.
IX. That the Christian religion, considered in its primitive
simplicity, and as taught in the Holy Scriptures, has all the marks and
proofs of its being actually and truly a divine revelation that any
divine revelation, supposing it was true, could reasonably be imagined
or desired to have.
X. That the practical duties which the Christian religion enjoins, are
all such as are most agreeable to our natural notions of God, and most
perfective of the nature, and conducive to the happiness and well-being
of men: That is, Christianity,--even in this single respect, as
containing alone, and in one consistent system, all the wise and good
precepts (and those improved, augmented, and exalted to the highest
degree of perfection,) that ever were taught singly and scatteredly,
and many times but very corruptly, by the several schools of the
philosophers; and this without any mixture of the fond, absurd, and
superstitious practices of any of those philosophers,--ought to be
embraced and practised by all rational and considering deists, who will
act consistently, and steadily pursue the consequences of their own
principles; as at least the best scheme and sect of philosophy that
ever was set up in the world, and highly probable, even though it had
no external evidence, to be of divine original.
XI. That the motives, by which the Christian religion enforces the
practice of these duties, are such as are must suitable to the
excellent wisdom of God, and most answerable to the natural
expectations of men.
XII. That the peculiar manner and circumstances with which it enjoins
these duties and urges these motives, are exactly consonant to the
dictates of sound reason, or the unprejudiced light of nature, and most
wisely perfective of it.
XIII. That all the [credenda, or] doctrines, which the true, simple,
and uncorrupted Christian religion teaches,--(that is, not only those
plain doctrines which it requires to be believed as fundamental and of
necessity to eternal salvation, but even all the doctrines which it
teaches as matters of truths,)--are, though indeed many of them not
discoverable by bare reason unassisted with revelation, yet, when
discovered by revelation, apparently most agreeable to sound
unprejudiced reason, have every one of them a natural tendency, and a
direct and powerful influence, to reform men's lives and correct their
manners, and do together make up an infinitely more consistent and
rational scheme of belief than any that the wisest of the ancient
philosophers ever did, or the cunningest of modern unbelievers can
invent or contrive.
XIV. That as this revelation, to the judgment of right and sober
reason, appears even of itself highly credible and probable, and
abundantly recommends itself in its native simplicity, merely by its
own intrinsic goodness and excellency, to the practice of the most
rational and considering men, who are desirous in all their actions to
have satisfaction, and comfort, and good hope within themselves, from
the conscience of what they do; so it is moreover positively and
directly proved to be actually and immediately sent to us from God, by
the many infallible signs and miracles which the Author of it worked
publicly as the evidence of his divine commission, by the exact
completion both of the prophecies that went before concerning him, and
of those that he himself delivered concerning things that were to
happen after, and by the testimony of his followers, which in all its
circumstances was the most credible, certain, and convincing evidence,
that was ever given to any matter of fact in the world.
XV. And lastly, that they who will not, by such arguments and proofs as
these, be convinced of the truth and certainty of the Christian
religion, and be persuaded to make it the rule and guide of all their
actions, would not be convinced, (so far as to influence their hearts,
and reform their lives,) by any other evidence whatsoever; no, not
though one should rise on purpose from the dead to endeavour to
convince them.
I might here, Of the several sorts of deists. before I enter upon the
particular proof of these several propositions, justly be allowed to
premise, that, having now to deal with another sort of men than those
against whom my former discourse was directed, and being consequently
in some parts of this treatise to make use of some other kinds of
arguments than those which the nature of that discourse permitted and
required, the same demonstrative force of reasoning, and even
mathematical certainty, which in the main argument was there easy to be
obtained, ought not here to be expected; but that such moral evidence,
or mixed proofs, from circumstances and testimony, as most matters of
fact are only capable of, and wise and honest men are always satisfied
with, ought to be accounted sufficient in the present case: Because all
the principles indeed upon which atheists attempt to build their
schemes, are such as may, by plain force of reason, and undeniably
demonstrative argumentations, be reduced to express and direct
contradictions. But deists pretend to own all the principles of reason,
and would be thought to deny nothing but what depends entirely on
testimony and evidence of matter of fact, which they think they can
easily evade.
But, if we examine things to the bottom, we shall find that the matter
does not in reality lie here. For I believe there are in the world, at
least in any part of the world where the Christian religion is in any
tolerable purity professed, very few such deists as will truly stand to
all the principles of unprejudiced reason, and sincerely, both in
profession and practice, own all the obligations of natural religion,
and yet oppose Christianity merely upon account of their not being
satisfied with the strength of the evidence of matter of fact. A
constant and sincere observance of all the laws of reason and
obligations of natural religion, will unavoidably lead a man to
Christianity, if Christianity be fairly proposed to him in its natural
simplicity and he has due opportunities of examining things and will
steadily pursue the consequences of his own principles. And all others,
who pretend to be deists without coming up to this, can have no fixed
and settled principles at all, upon which they can either argue or act
consistently, but must of necessity sink into downright atheism, (and
consequently fall under the force of the former arguments,) as may
appear by considering the several sorts of them.
1. Of the first sort of deists: And of Providence. Some men would be
thought to be deists, because they pretend to believe the existence of
an eternal, infinite, independent, intelligent being; and, to avoid the
name of Epicurean atheists, teach also that this supreme being made the
world: though [100] at the same time they agree with the Epicureans in
this, that they fancy God does not at all concern himself in the
government of the world, nor has any regard to, or care of, what is
done therein. But if we examine things duly, this opinion must
unavoidably terminate in absolute atheism. For though to imagine that
God, at the creation of the world, or at the formation of any
particular part of it, could (if he had pleased,) by his infinite
wisdom, foresight, and unerring design, have originally so ordered,
disposed, and adapted all the springs and series of future necessary
and unintelligent causes, that, without the immediate interposition of
his almighty power upon every particular occasion, they should
regularly, by virtue of that original disposition, have produced
effects worthy to proceed from the direction and government of infinite
wisdom: though this, I say, may possibly by very nice and abstract
reasoning be reconcileable with a firm belief both of the being and
attributes of God, and also with a consistent notion even of providence
itself; yet to fancy that God originally created a certain quantity of
matter and motion, and left them to frame a world at adventures,
without any determinate and particular view, design, or direction; this
can no way be defended consistently, but must of necessity recur to
downright atheism, as I shall show presently, after I have made only
this one observation, that as that opinion is impious in itself, so the
late improvements in mathematics and natural philosophy have discovered
that, as things now are, that scheme is plainly false and impossible in
fact. For, not to say, that, seeing matter is utterly incapable of
obeying any laws, the very original laws of motion themselves cannot
continue to take place but by something superior to matter, continually
exerting on it a certain force of power according to such certain and
determinate laws; it is now evident, beyond question, that the bodies
of all plants and animals, much the most considerable parts of the
world, could not possibly have been formed by mere matter, according to
any general laws of motion. And not only so, but that most universal
principle of gravitation itself, the spring of almost all the great and
regular inanimate motions in the world, answering (as I hinted in my
former discourse,) not at all to the surfaces of bodies, (by which
alone they can act one upon another,) but entirely to their solid
content; cannot possibly be the result of any motion originally
impressed on matter, but must of necessity be caused (either
immediately or mediately) by something which penetrates the very solid
substance of all bodies, and continually puts forth in them a force or
power entirely different from that by which matter acts on matter:
Which is, by the way, an evident demonstration, not only of the world's
being made originally by a supreme intelligent cause, but moreover that
it depends every moment on some superior being, for the preservation of
its frame; and that all the great motions in it are caused by some
immaterial power, not having originally impressed a certain quantity of
motion upon matter, but perpetually and actually exerting itself every
moment in every part of the world. Which preserving and governing
power, whether it be immediately the power and action of the same
supreme cause that created the world, of him without whom not a sparrow
falls to the ground, and with whom the very hairs of our head are all
numbered; or whether it be the action of some subordinate instruments
appointed by him to direct and preside respectively over certain parts
thereof; does either way equally give us a very noble idea of
providence. Those men, indeed, who, merely through a certain vanity of
philosophising, have been tempted to embrace that other opinion, of all
things being produced and continued only by a certain quantity of
motion, originally impressed on matter without any determinate design
or direction, and left to itself to form a world at adventures; those
men, I say, who, merely through a vanity of philosophising, have been
tempted to embrace that opinion, without attending whither it would
lead them, ought not, indeed, to be directly charged with all the
consequences of it. But it is certain, that many, under that cover,
have really been atheists; and the opinion itself (as I before said)
leads necessarily, and by unavoidable consequence, to plain atheism.
For if God be an all-powerful, omnipresent, intelligent, wise, and free
being, (as it hath been before demonstrated that he necessarily is), he
cannot possibly but know, at all times and in all places, every thing
that is; and foreknow what at all times and in all places it is fittest
and wisest should be; and have perfect power, without the least labour,
difficulty, or opposition, to order and bring to pass what he so judges
fit to be accomplished: and consequently it is impossible but he must
actually direct and appoint [101] every particular thing and
circumstance that is in the world, or ever shall be, excepting only
what by his own pleasure he puts under the power and choice of
subordinate free agents. If, therefore, God does not concern himself in
the government of the world, nor has any regard to what is done
therein, it will follow that he is not an omnipresent, all-powerful,
intelligent and wise being; and, consequently, that he is not at all.
Wherefore the opinion of this sort of deists stands not upon any
certain consistent principles, but leads unavoidably to downright
atheism; and, however in words they may confess a God, [102] yet in
reality and in truth they deny him.
If, Human affairs not beneath the regard of Providence. to avoid this,
they will own God's government and providence over the greater and more
considerable parts of the world, but deny his inspection and regard to
human affairs here upon earth, as being too minute and small for the
supreme governor of all things to concern himself in; [103] this still
amounts to the same. For if God be omnipresent, all-knowing, and
all-powerful, he cannot but equally know, and with equal ease be able
to direct and govern, [104] all things as any, and the minutest things
[105] as the greatest. So that if he has no regard nor concern for
these things, his attributes must, as before, be denied, and
consequently his being. But, besides, human affairs are by no means the
minutest and most inconsiderable part of the creation: For, (not to
consider now, that excellency of human nature which Christianity
discovers to us,) let a deist suppose the universe as large as the
widest hypothesis of astronomy will give him leave to imagine, or let
him suppose it as immense as he himself pleases, and filled with as
great numbers of rational creatures as his own fancy can suggest; yet
the system wherein we are placed will at least, for ought he can
reasonably suppose, be as considerable as any other single system; and
the earth whereon we dwell as considerable as most of the other planets
in this system, and mankind manifestly the only considerable
inhabitants on this globe of earth. Man, therefore, has evidently a
better claim to the particular regard and concern of providence than
any thing else in this globe of ours; and this our globe of earth as
just a pretence to it as most other planets in the system; and this
system as just a one, as far as we can judge, as any system in the
universe. If therefore there be any providence at all, and God has any
concern for any part of the world, mankind, even separate from the
consideration of that excellency of human nature which the Christian
doctrine discovers to us, may as reasonably be supposed to be under its
particular care and government as any other part of the universe.
2. Of the second sort of deists. Some others there are that call
themselves deists, because they believe, not only the being, but also
the providence of God; that is, that every natural thing that is done
in the world is produced by the power, appointed by the wisdom, and
directed by the government of God. Though not allowing any difference
between moral good and evil, they suppose that God takes no notice of
the morally good or evil actions of men; these things depending, as
they imagine, merely on the arbitrary constitution of human laws. But
how handsomely soever these men may seem to speak of the natural
attributes of God, of his knowledge, wisdom, and power, yet neither can
this opinion be settled on any certain principles, nor defended by any
consistent reasoning; nor can the natural attributes of God be so
separated from the moral but that he who denies the latter may be
reduced to a necessity of denying the former likewise. For since (as I
have formerly proved,) there cannot but be eternal and necessary
differences of different things, one from another, and, from these
necessary differences of things, there cannot but arise a fitness or
unfitness of the application of different things or different relations
one to another; and infinite knowledge can no more fail to know, or
infinite wisdom to choose, or infinite power to act, according to these
eternal reasons and proportions of things, than knowledge can be
ignorance, wisdom be folly, or power weakness; and consequently the
justice and goodness of God are as certain and necessary as his wisdom
and power;--it follows unavoidably, that he who denies the justice or
goodness of God, or, which is all one, denies his exercise of these
attributes in inspecting and regarding the moral actions of men, must
also deny, either his wisdom, or his power, or both; and, consequently,
must needs be driven into absolute atheism: For though in some moral
matters men are not indeed to be judged of by the consequences of their
opinions, but by their profession and practice, yet in the present
case( [106] it matters not at all what men affirm, or how honourably
they may seem to speak of some particular attributes of God; but what,
notwithstanding such profession, must needs in all reason be supposed
to be their true opinion; and their practice generally appears
answerable to it.
For, Profane and debauched deists not capable of being argued with.
concerning these two sorts of deists, it is observable, that as their
opinions can terminate consistently in nothing but downright atheism,
so their practice and behaviour is generally agreeable to that of the
most openly professed atheists. They not only oppose the revelation of
Christianity, and reject all the moral obligations of natural religion,
as such, but generally they despise also the wisdom of all human
constitutions made for the order and benefit of mankind, and are as
much contemners of common decency as they are of religion. They
endeavour to ridicule and banter all human as well as divine
accomplishments; all virtue and government of a man's self, all
learning and knowledge, all wisdom and honour, and every thing for
which a man can justly be commended or be esteemed more excellent than
a beast. They pretend commonly, in their discourse and writings, to
expose the abuses and corruptions of religion; but (as is too manifest
in some of their books as well as in their talk, they aim really
against all virtue in general, and all good manners, and against
whatsoever is truly valuable and commendable in men. They pretend to
ridicule certain vices and follies of ignorant or superstitious men;
but the many very profane and very lewd images, with which they
industriously affect to dress up their discourse, show plainly that
they really do not so much intend to expose and deride any vice or
folly, as on the contrary to foment and please the debauched and
vicious inclinations of others as void of shame as themselves. They
discover clearly, that they have no sense at all of the dignity of
human nature, nor of the superiority and excellency of their reason
above even the meanest of the brutes. They will sometimes in words seem
to magnify the wisdom, and other natural attributes of God, but in
reality, by ridiculing whatever bears any resemblance to it in men,
they show undeniably that they do not indeed believe there is any real
difference in things, or any true excellency in one thing more than in
another. By turning every thing alike, and without exception, into
ridicule and mockery, they declare plainly that they do not believe any
thing to be wise, any thing decent, any thing comely or praiseworthy at
all. They seem not to have any esteem or value for those distinguishing
powers and faculties; by induing them wherewith God has "taught them
more than the beasts of the field, and made them wiser than the fowls
of heaven." [107] In a word; "Whatsoever things are true, whatsoever
things are honest, whatsoever things are just, whatsoever things are
pure, whatsoever things are lovely, whatsoever things are of good
report, if there be any virtue, if there be any praise;" [108] these
things they make the constant subject of their mockery and abuse,
ridicule and raillery. On the contrary, whatsoever things are profane,
impure, filthy, dishonourable, and absurd; these things they make it
their business to represent as harmless and indifferent, and to laugh
men out of their natural shame and abhorrence of them; nay, even to
recommend them with their utmost wit. Such men as these are not to be
argued with, till they can be persuaded to use arguments instead of
drollery: For banter is not capable of being answered by reason; not
because it has any strength in it, but because it runs out of all the
bounds of reason and good sense, by extravagantly joining together such
images as have not in themselves any manner of similitude or connexion;
by which means all things are alike easy to be rendered ridiculous, by
being represented only in an absurd dress. These men, therefore, are
first to be convinced of the true principles of reason before they can
be disputed with; and then they must of necessity either retreat into
downright atheism, or be led by undeniable reasoning to acknowledge and
submit to the obligations of morality, and heartily repent of their
profane abuse of God and religion.
3. Of the third sort of deists. Another sort of deists there are, who,
having right apprehensions concerning the natural attributes of God,
and his all-governing providence, seem also to have some notion of his
moral perfections also. That is, as they believe him to be a being
infinitely knowing, powerful, and wise, so they believe him to be also
in some sense a being of infinite justice, goodness, and truth, and
that he governs the universe by these perfections, and expects suitable
obedience from all his rational creatures. But then, having a prejudice
against the notion of the immortality of human souls, they believe that
men perish entirely at death, and that one generation shall perpetually
succeed another, without any thing remaining of men after their
departure out of this life, and without any future restoration or
renovation of things. And imagining that justice, and goodness in God,
are not the same as in the ideas we frame of these perfections, when we
consider them in men, or when we reason about them abstractly in
themselves, but that in the supreme governor of the world they are
something transcendent, and of which we cannot make any true judgment,
nor argue with any certainty about them: they fancy, though there does
not indeed seem to us to be any equity or proportion in the
distributions of rewards and punishments in this present life, yet that
we are not sufficient judges concerning the attributes of God, to argue
from thence with any assurance for the certainty of a future state. But
neither does this opinion stand on any consistent principles. For if
justice and goodness be not [109] the same in God, as in our ideas,
then we mean nothing, when we say that God is necessarily just and
good; and for the same reason it may as well be said that we know not
what we mean, when we affirm that he is an intelligent and wise being,
and there will be no foundation at all left on which we can fix any
thing. Thus the moral attributes of God, however they be acknowledged
in words, yet in reality they are by these men entirely taken away; and
upon the same grounds the natural attributes may also be denied. And so
upon the whole, this opinion likewise, if we argue upon it
consistently, must finally recur to absolute atheism.
4. Of the fourth sort of deists. The last sort of deists are those who,
if they did indeed believe what they pretend, have just and right
notions of God, and of all the divine attributes in every respect; who
declare they believe that there is one eternal, infinite, intelligent,
all-powerful, and wise being, the creator, preserver, and governor of
all things; that this supreme cause is a being of infinite justice,
goodness, and truth, and all other moral as well as natural
perfections; that he made the world for the manifestation of his power
and wisdom, and to communicate his goodness and happiness to his
creatures; that he preserves it by his continual all-wise providence,
and governs it according to the eternal rules of infinite justice,
equity, goodness, mercy, and truth; that all created rational beings,
depending continually upon him, are bound to adore, worship, and obey
him, to praise him for all things they enjoy, and to pray to him for
every thing they want; that they are all obliged to promote, in their
proportion, and according to the extent of their several powers and
abilities, the general good and welfare of those parts of the world
wherein they are placed, in like manner as the divine goodness is
continually promoting the universal benefit of the whole; that men, in
particular, are every one obliged to make it their business, by an
universal benevolence, to promote the happiness of all others; that, in
order to this, every man is bound always to behave himself so towards
others, as in reason he would desire they should in like circumstances
deal with him; that, therefore, he is obliged to obey and submit to his
superiors in all just and right things, for the preservation of society
and the peace and benefit of the public; to be just and honest,
equitable and sincere, in all his dealings with his equals, for the
keeping inviolable the everlasting rule of righteousness, and
maintaining an universal trust and confidence, friendship and
affection, amongst men; and, towards his inferiors, to be gentle, and
easy, and affable,--charitable, and willing to assist as many as stand
in need of his help, for the preservation of universal love and
benevolence amongst mankind, and in imitation of the goodness of God,
who preserves and does good to all creatures, which depend entirely
upon him for their very being and all that they enjoy; that, in respect
of himself, every man is bound to preserve, as much as in him lies, his
own being, and the right use of all his faculties, so long as it shall
please God, who appointed him his station in this world, to continue
him therein; that, therefore, he is bound to have an exact government
of his passions, and carefully to abstain from all debaucheries or
abuses of himself, which tend either to the destruction of his own
being, or to the disordering of his faculties, and disabling him from
performing his duty, or hurrying him into the practice of unreasonable
and unjust things: Lastly, that accordingly as men regard or neglect
these obligations, so they are proportionably acceptable or displeasing
unto God, who, being supreme governor of the world, cannot but testify
his favour or displeasure at some time or other; and, consequently,
since this is not done in the present state, therefore there must be a
future state of rewards and punishments in a life to come. But all
this, the men we are now speaking of profess to believe only so far as
it is discoverable by the light of nature alone, without believing any
divine revelation. These, I say, are the only true deists, and indeed
the only persons who ought in reason to be argued with, in order to
convince them of the reasonableness, truth, and certainty of the
Christian revelation. But, alas! there is, as I before said, too much
reason to believe, that there are very few such deists as these, among
modern deniers of revelation. For such men as I have now described, if
they would at all attend to the consequences of their own principles,
could not fail of being quickly persuaded to embrace Christianity. For,
being fully convinced of the obligations of natural religion, and the
certainty of a future state of rewards and punishments; and yet
observing, at the same time, how little use men generally are able to
make of the light of reason, to discover the one, or to convince
themselves effectually of the certainty and importance of the other; it
is impossible but they must be sensible of the want of a revelation; it
is impossible but they must earnestly desire God would be pleased, by
some direct discovery of his will, to make these things more clear and
plain, more easy and obvious, more certain and evident to all
capacities; it is impossible but they must wish God would be pleased
particularly to signify expressly the acceptableness of repentance, and
his willingness to forgive returning sinners; it is impossible but they
must be very solicitous to have some more particular and certain
information concerning the nature of that future state, which reason
teaches them in general to expect. The consequence of this, is; that
they must needs be possessed beforehand with a strong hope that the
Christian revelation may, upon a due examination, appear to be true.
They must be infinitely far from ridiculing and despising any thing
that claims to be a divine revelation, before they have sincerely and
thoroughly examined it to the bottom. They must needs be before-hand
very much disposed in its favour; and be very willing to be convinced
that what tends to the advancing and perfecting the obligation of
natural religion, to the securing their great hopes, and ascertaining
the truth of a future state of rewards and punishments, and can any way
be made appear to be worthy of God, and consistent with his attributes,
and has any reasonable proof of the matters of fact it depends upon--
is, really and truly, what it pretends to be, a divine revelation. And
now, is it possible that any man, with these opinions and these
dispositions, should continue to reject Christianity, when proposed to
him in its original and genuine simplicity, without the mixture of any
corruptions or inventions of men? Let him read the sermons and
exhortations of our Saviour as delivered in the gospels, and the
discourses of the apostles, preserved in their acts and their epistles,
and try if he can withstand the evidence of such a doctrine, and reject
the hopes of such a glorious immortality so discovered to him. That
there is now no consistent scheme of deism in the world. The heathen
philosophers, those few of them who taught and lived up to the
obligations of natural religion, had indeed a consistent scheme of
deism so far as it went; and they were very brave and wise men, if any
of them could keep steady and firm to it. But the case is not so now.
The same scheme of deism is not any longer consistent with its own
principles, if it does not now lead men to embrace and believe
revelation, as it then taught them to hope for it. Deists, in our days,
who obstinately reject revelation when offered to them, are not such
men as Socrates and Tully were; but, under pretence of deism, it is
plain they are generally ridiculers of all that is truly excellent even
in natural religion itself. Could we see a deist, whose mind was
heartily possessed with worthy and just apprehensions of all the
attributes of God, and a deep sense of his duty towards that supreme
author and preserver of his being,--could we see a deist who lived in
an exact performance of all the duties of natural religion, and by the
practice of righteousness, justice, equity, sobriety, and temperance,
expressed in his actions, as well as words, a firm belief and
expectation of a future state of rewards and punishments; in a word,
could we see a deist, who, with reverence and modesty, with sincerity
and impartiality, with a true and hearty desire of finding out and
submitting to reason and truth, would inquire into the foundations of
our belief, and examine thoroughly the pretensions which pure and
uncorrupt Christianity has to be received as a divine revelation,--I
think we could not doubt to affirm, of such a person, as our Saviour
did of the young man in the Gospel, that he was not far from the
kingdom of God; and that, being willing to do his will, he should know
of the doctrine whether it was of God. But, as I have said, there is
great reason to doubt there are few or none such deists as these among
the infidels of our days. This, indeed, is what they sometimes pretend,
and seem to desire should be thought to be their case. But, alas, their
trivial and vain cavils; their mocking and ridiculing, without and
before examination; their directing the whole stress of their
objections against particular customs, or particular and perhaps
uncertain opinions, or explications of opinions, without at all
considering the main body of religion; their loose, vain, and frothy
discourses; and, above all, their vicious and immoral lives,--show
plainly and undeniably, that they are not really deists, but mere
atheists; and consequently not capable to judge of the truth of
Christianity. If they were truly and in earnest such deists as they
pretend, and would sometimes be thought to be, those principles (as has
been already shown in part, and will more fully appear in the following
discourse,) would unavoidably lead them to Christianity; but, being
such as they really are, they cannot possibly avoid recurring to
downright atheism.
The sum is this: There is now [110] no such thing as a consistent
scheme of deism. That which alone was once such, namely, the scheme of
the best heathen philosophers, ceases now to be so, after the
appearance of revelation; because (as I have already shown, and shall
more largely prove in the sequel of this discourse,) it directly
conducts men to the belief of Christianity. All other pretences to
deism may, by unavoidable consequence, be forced to terminate in
absolute atheism. He that cannot prevail with himself to obey the
Christian doctrine, and embrace those hopes of life and immortality
which our Saviour has brought to light through the Gospel, cannot now
be imagined to maintain with any firmness, steadiness, and certainty,
the belief of the immortality of the soul and a future state of rewards
and punishments after death; because all the main difficulties and
objections lie equally against both. For the same reason, he who
disbelieves the immortality of the soul, and a future state of rewards
and punishments, cannot defend, to any effectual purpose, or enforce
with any sufficient strength, the obligations of morality and natural
religion, notwithstanding that they are indeed incumbent upon men, from
the very nature and reason of the things themselves. Then, he who gives
up the obligations of morality and natural religion, cannot possibly
have any just and worthy notion of the moral attributes of God, or any
true sense of the nature and necessary difference of things; and he
that once goes thus far has no foundation left upon which he can be
sure of the natural attributes or even of the existence of God;
because, to deny what unavoidably follows from the supposition of his
existence and natural attributes, is in reality denying those natural
attributes and that existence itself. On the contrary, he who believes
the being and natural attributes of God, must of necessity (as has been
shown in my former discourse) confess his moral attributes also. Next,
he who owns, and has just notions of the moral attributes of God,
cannot avoid acknowledging the obligations of morality and natural
religion. In like manner, he who owns the obligations of morality and
natural religion must needs, to support those obligations, and make
them effectual in practice, believe a future state of rewards and
punishments. And, finally, he who believes both the obligations of
natural religion and the certainty of a future state of rewards and
punishments, has no manner of reason left why he should reject the
Christian revelation, when proposed to him in its original and genuine
simplicity. Wherefore, since those arguments which demonstrate to us
the being and attributes of God are so closely connected with those
which prove the reasonableness and certainty of the Christian
revelation, that there is now no consistent scheme of deism left,--all
modern deists being forced to shift from one cavil to another, and
having no fixed and certain set of principles to adhere to;--I thought
I could no way better prevent their ill designs, and obviate all their
different shifts and objections, than by endeavouring, in the same
method of reasoning by which I before demonstrated the being and
attributes of God, to prove, in like manner, by one direct and
continued thread of arguing, the reasonableness and certainty of the
Christian revelation also.
To proceed therefore to the proof of the propositions themselves.
__________________________________________________________________
[100]
Omnis enim per se divûm natura necesse est
Immortali ævo summa cum pace fruatur.
Semota a nostris rebus, sejunctaque longe.
Nam privata dolore omni, privata periclis,
Ipsa suis pollens opibus, nihil, indiga nostri,
Nec bene promeritis capitur, nec tangitur ira.
Lucret. lib. 1. To makarion kai aphtharton, oute auto pragmata echei,
oute allo parechei; hoste oute argais, oute charisi sunechetai.--Laert.
in Vita Epicuri. Nor is the doctrine of those modern philosophers much
different, who ascribe every thing to matter and motion, exclusive of
final causes, and speak of God as an intelligentia supramundana; which
is the very cant of Epicurus and Lucretius.
[101] Quo confesso, confitendum est eorum consilio mundum
administrari.--Cic. de Nat. Deor. lib. 2.
[102] Epicurum verbis reliquisse Deos, re sustulisse.--Cic. de Nat.
Deor. lib. 2.
[103] Eisi gar tines hi nomizousin heinai ta theia, kai toiauta o logos
auta exephenen, agatha, kai dunamin echonta ten akrotaten, kai gnosin
ten teleiotaten, ton mentoi anthropinon kataphronein, hos mikron kai
heutelon onton, kai anaxion tes heauton epimeleias.--Simplic. in
Epictet.
[104] Deorum providentia mundus administratur; iidemque consulunt rebus
humanis; neque solum universis, verum etiam singulis.--Cic. de Divinat.
lib. 1.
[105] All' ouden tach? anisos eie chalepon endeixasthai toutoge, hos
epimeleis smikron eisi theoi, ouk epion e ton megethei
diapheronton--Plato de Leg. lib.10. Ei de tou holou kosmou ho theos hou
pimeleitai ananke kai ton meron auto8u pronoein; hosper kai hai technai
poiousi. Kai gar iatros tou holou somatos epimelethenai prothemenos,
ouk an ameleseie ton meron; oude strategos oueu' oikonomos, e politikos
aner ton gar meron ameloumenon, ananke cheironos to holon
diatithesthai.--Simplic. in Epictet.
[106] Quasi ego id curem, quid ille aiat aut neget: Illud quæro, quid
et consentaneum sit dicere, qui, &c.--Cic. de Finib. lib. 2.
[107] Job xxxv. 11.
[108] Phil. iv. 8.
[109] Kath' hemas gar he aute arete esti ton makarion panton; hoste kai
he aute arete anthropou kai Theou.--Orig. contr. Cel. lib. 4.
[110] Ita sit, ut si ab illa rerum summa, quam superius comprehendimus,
aberravercs, omnis ratio intereat, et ad nihilum omnia
revertantur.--Lactan, lib.7.
__________________________________________________________________
Proposition I.
I. Proposition I. The same necessary and eternal different relations
that different things bear one to another, and the same consequent
fitness or unfitness of the application of different things or
different relations one to another, with regard to which the will of
God always and necessarily does determine itself, to choose to act only
what is agreeable to justice, equity, goodness, and truth, in order to
the welfare of the whole universe, ought likewise constantly to
determine the wills of all subordinate rational beings, to govern all
their actions by the same rules, for the good of the public, in their
respective stations; that is, these eternal and necessary differences
of things make it fit and reasonable for creatures so to act; They
cause it to be their duty, or lay an obligation upon them so to do,
even separate from the consideration of these rules being the positive
will or command of God, and also antecedent to any respect or regard,
expectation or apprehension, of any particular private and personal
advantage or disadvantage, reward or punishment, either present or
future, annexed either by natural consequence, or by positive
appointment, to the practising or neglecting of those rules.
The several parts of this proposition may be proved distinctly, in the
following manner.
I. That there are eternal and necessary differences of things. That
there are differences of things, and different relations, respects, or
proportions, of some things towards others, is as evident and
undeniable as that one magnitude or number is greater, equal to, or
smaller than another. That from these different relations of different
things there necessarily arises an agreement or disagreement of some
things with others, or a fitness or unfitness of the application of
different things or different relations one to another, is likewise as
plain as that there is any such thing as proportion or disproportion in
geometry and arithmetic, or uniformity or difformity in comparing
together the respective figures of bodies. Further, that there is a
fitness or suitableness of certain circumstances to certain persons,
and an unsuitableness of others, founded in the nature of things and
the qualifications of persons antecedent to all positive appointment
whatsoever; also, that, from the different relations of different
persons one to another, there necessarily arises a fitness or unfitness
of certain manners of behaviour of some persons towards others; is as
manifest as that the properties which flow from the essences of
different mathematical figures have different congruities or
incongruities between themselves, or that, in mechanics, certain
weights or powers have very different forces, and different effects one
upon another, according to their different distances, or different
positions and situations in respect of each other: For instance; that
God is infinitely superior to men is as clear as that infinity is
larger than a point, or eternity longer than a moment; and it is as
certainly fit that men should honour and worship, obey and imitate God,
than on the contrary in all their actions endeavour to dishonour and
disobey him, as it is certainly true that they have an entire
dependence on him, and he, on the contrary, can in no respect receive
any advantage from them; and not only so, but also that his will is as
certainly and unalterably just and equitable in giving his commands as
his power is irresistible in requiring submission to it. Again: It is a
thing absolutely and necessarily fitter in itself, that the supreme
author and creator of the universe should govern, order, and direct all
things to certain and constant regular ends, than that every thing
should be permitted to go on at adventures, and produce uncertain
effects merely by chance and in the utmost confusion, without any
determinate view or design at all. It is a thing manifestly fitter in
itself, that the all-powerful governor of the world should do always
what is best in the whole, and what tends most to the universal good of
the whole creation, than that he should make the whole continually
miserable, or that, to satisfy the unreasonable desires of any
particular depraved natures, he should at any time suffer the order of
the whole to be altered and perverted. Lastly, it is a thing evidently
and infinitely more fit, that any one particular innocent and good
being should, by the supreme ruler and disposer of all things, be
placed and preserved in an easy and happy estate, than that, without
any fault or demerit of its own, it should be made extremely,
remedilessly, and endlessly miserable. In like manner, in men's dealing
and conversing one with another, it is undeniably more fit, absolutely
and in the nature of the thing itself, that all men should endeavour to
promote the universal good and welfare of all, than that all men should
be continually contriving the ruin and destruction of all. It is
evidently more fit, even before all positive bargains and compacts,
that men should deal one with another according to the known rules of
justice and equity, than that every man, for his own present advantage,
should, without scruple, disappoint the most reasonable and equitable
expectations of his neighbours, and cheat and defraud, or spoil by
violence, all others, without restraint. Lastly, it is, without
dispute, more fit and reasonable in itself, that I should preserve the
life of an innocent man, that happens at any time to be in my power, or
deliver him from any imminent danger, though I have never made him any
promise so to do, than that I should suffer him to perish, or take away
his life, without any reason or provocation at all.
These The absurdity of those who deny the eternal and necessary
differences of things. things are so notoriously plain and self-evident
that nothing but the extremest stupidity of mind, corruption of
manners, or perverseness of spirit, can possibly make any man entertain
the least doubt concerning them. For a man indued with reason, to deny
the truth of these things, is the very same thing as if a man that has
the use of his sight should, at the same time that he beholds the sun,
deny that there is any such thing as light in the world; or as if a man
that understands geometry or arithmetic, should deny the most obvious
and known proportions of lines or numbers, and perversely contend that
the whole is not equal to all its parts, or that a square is not double
to a triangle of equal base and height. Any man of ordinary capacity,
and unbiassed judgment, plainness, and simplicity, who had never read,
and had never been told, that there were men and philosophers who had
in earnest asserted, and attempted to prove, that there is no natural
and unalterable difference between good and evil, would, at the first
hearing, be as hardly persuaded to believe that it could ever really
enter into the heart of any intelligent man to deny all natural
difference between right and wrong, as he would be to believe that ever
there could be any geometer who would seriously and in good earnest lay
it down, as a first principle, that a crooked line is as straight as a
right one. So that indeed it might justly seem altogether a needless
undertaking to attempt to prove and establish the eternal difference of
good and evil, had there not appeared certain men, as Mr. Hobbes and
some few others, who have presumed, contrary to the plainest and most
obvious reason of mankind, to assert, and not without some subtilty
endeavoured to prove, that there is no such real difference originally,
necessarily, and absolutely in the nature of things; but that all
obligation of duty to God arises merely from his absolute irresistible
power, and all duty towards men merely from positive compact; and have
founded their whole scheme of politics upon that opinion: Wherein, as
they have contradicted the judgment of all the wisest and soberest part
of mankind, so they have not been able to avoid contradicting
themselves also; for, not to mention now, that they have no way to show
how compacts themselves come to be obligatory, but by inconsistently
owning an eternal original fitness in the thing itself, which I shall
have occasion to observe hereafter: Besides, this, I say, if there be
naturally and absolutely in things themselves no difference between
good and evil, just and, unjust, then, in the state of nature, before
any compact be made, it is equally as good, just, and reasonable, for
one man to destroy the life of another, not only when it is necessary
for his own preservation, but also arbitrarily and without any
provocation at all, [111] or any appearance of advantage to himself, as
to preserve or save another man's life, when he may do it without any
hazard of his own: The consequence of which is, that not only the first
and most obvious way for every particular man to secure himself
effectually, would be, (as Mr Hobbes teaches) to endeavour to prevent
and cut off all others, but also that men might destroy one another
upon every foolish and peevish, or arbitrary humour, even when they did
not think any such thing necessary for their own preservation: And the
effect of this practice must needs be, that it would terminate in the
destruction of all mankind; which being undeniably a great and
insufferable evil, Mr Hobbes himself confesses it reasonable that, to
prevent this evil, men should enter into certain compacts to preserve
one another. Now, if the destruction of mankind by each other's hands
be such an evil, that, to prevent it, it was fit and reasonable that
men should enter into compacts to preserve each other, then, before any
such compacts, it was manifestly a thing unfit and unreasonable in
itself that mankind should all destroy one another. And if so, then for
the same reason it was also unfit and unreasonable, antecedent to all
compacts, that any one man should destroy another arbitrarily and
without any provocation, or at any time when it was not absolutely and
immediately necessary for the preservation of himself; which is
directly contradictory to Mr. Hobbes's first supposition, [112] of
there being no natural and absolute difference between good and evil,
just and unjust, antecedent to positive compact. And in like manner,
all others, who, upon any pretence whatsoever, teach that good and evil
depend originally on the constitution of positive laws, whether divine
or human, must unavoidably run into the same absurdity: For, if there
be no such thing as good and evil in the nature of things, antecedent
to all laws, then neither can any one law be better than another, nor
any one thing whatever be more justly established and enforced by laws,
than the contrary; nor can [113] any reason be given why any laws
should ever be made at all: But all laws equally will be either
arbitrary and tyrannical, [114] or frivolous and needless, because the
contrary might with equal reason have been established, if, before the
making of the laws, all things had been alike indifferent in their own
nature. There is no possible way to avoid this absurdity, but by
saying, that, out of things in their own nature absolutely indifferent,
those are chosen by wise governors to be made obligatory by law, the
practice of which they judge will tend to the public benefit of the
community. But this is an express contradiction in the very terms. For,
if the practice of certain things tends to the public benefit of the
world, and the contrary would tend to the public disadvantage, then
those things are not in their own nature indifferent, but were good and
reasonable to be practised before any law was made, and can only for
that very reason be wisely enforced by the authority of laws. Only here
it is to be observed, that, by the public benefit, must [115] not be
understood the interest of any one particular nation, to the plain
injury or prejudice of the rest of mankind, any more than the interest
of one city or family, in opposition to their neighbours of the same
country. But those things only are truly good in their own nature which
either tend to the universal benefit and welfare of all men, or at
least are not destructive of it. The true state, therefore, of this
case, is plainly this: Some things are in their own nature good and
reasonable, and fit to be done; such as keeping faith, and performing
equitable compacts, and the like; and these receive not their
obligatory power from any law or authority, but are only declared,
confirmed, and enforced by penalties upon such as would not perhaps be
governed by right reason only. Other things are in their own nature
absolutely evil; such as breaking faith, refusing to perform equitable
compacts, cruelly destroying those who have neither directly nor
indirectly given any occasion for any such treatment, and the like: And
these cannot, by any law or authority whatsoever, be made fit and
reasonable, or excusable to be practised. Lastly, other things are in
their own nature indifferent; that is, (not absolutely and strictly so;
as such trivial actions, which have no way any tendency at all either
to the public welfare or damage; for, concerning such things, it would
be childish and trifling to suppose any laws to be made at all; but
they are) such things, whose tendency to the public benefit or
disadvantage is either so small or so remote, or so obscure and
involved, that the generality of people are not able of themselves to
discern on which side they ought to act; and these things are made
obligatory by the authority of laws, though perhaps every one cannot
distinctly perceive the reason and fitness of their being enjoined; of
which sort are many particular penal laws in several countries and
nations. But to proceed:
The An answer to the objection drawn from the variety of the opinions
of learned men, and the laws of different nations concerning right and
wrong. principal thing that can, with any colour of reason, seem to
countenance the opinion of those who deny the natural and eternal
difference of good and evil, (for Mr. Hobbes's false reasonings I shall
hereafter consider by themselves,) is the difficulty there may
sometimes be, to define exactly the bounds of right and wrong, the
variety [116] of opinions that have obtained even among understanding
and learned men concerning certain questions of just and unjust,
especially in political matters, and the many contrary laws that have
been made in divers ages and in different countries concerning these
matters. But as, in painting, two very different colours, by diluting
each other very slowly and gradually, may, from the highest intenseness
in either extreme, terminate in the midst insensibly, and so run one
into the other, that it shall not be possible even for a skilful eye to
determine exactly where the one ends and the other begins; and yet the
colours may really differ as much as can be, not in degree only, but
entirely in kind, as red and blue, or white and black; so, though it
may perhaps be very difficult, in some nice and perplexed cases, (which
yet are very far from occurring frequently,) to define exactly the
bounds of right and wrong, just and unjust, and there may be some
latitude in the judgment of different men and the laws of divers
nations; yet right and wrong are nevertheless in themselves totally and
essentially different; even altogether as much as white and black,
light and darkness. The Spartan law, perhaps, which [117] permitted
their youth to steal, may, as absurd as it was, bear much dispute
whether it was absolutely unjust or no, because every man having an
absolute right in his own goods, it may seem that the members of any
society may agree to transfer or alter their own properties upon what
conditions they shall think fit; but if it could be supposed that a law
had been made at Sparta, or at Rome, or in India, or in any other part
of the world, whereby it had been commanded or allowed, that every man
might rob by violence, and murder whomsoever he met with, or that no
faith should be kept with any man, nor any equitable compacts
performed, no man, with any tolerable use of his reason, whatever
diversity of judgment might be among them in other matters, would have
thought that such a law could have authorised or excused, much less
have justified such actions, and have made them become good; because,
it is plainly not in men's power to make falsehood be truth, though
they may alter the property of their goods as they please. Now, if, in
flagrant cases, the natural and essential difference between good and
evil, right and wrong, cannot but be confessed to be plainly and
undeniably evident, the difference between them must be also essential
and unalterable in all, even the smallest, and nicest, and most
intricate cases, though it be not so easy to be discerned and
accurately distinguished; for, if, from the difficulty of determining
exactly the bounds of right and wrong in many perplexed cases, it could
truly be concluded that just and unjust were not essentially different
by nature, but only by positive constitution and custom, it would
follow equally, that they were not really, essentially, and unalterably
different, even in the most flagrant cases that can be supposed; which
is an assertion so very absurd, that Mr. Hobbes himself could hardly
vent it without blushing, and discovering plainly, by his shifting
expressions, his secret self-condemnation. There are, therefore,
certain necessary and eternal differences of things, and certain
consequent fitnesses or unfitnesses of the application of different
things, or different relations one to another, not depending on any
positive constitutions, but founded unchangeably in the nature and
reason of things, and unavoidably arising from the differences of the
things themselves; which is the first branch of the general proposition
I proposed to prove.
2. That the will of God always determines itself to act according to
the eternal reason of things. Now, what these eternal and unalterable
relations, respects, or proportions of things, with their consequent
agreements or disagreements, fitnesses, or unfitnesses, absolutely and
necessarily are in themselves, that also they appear to be, to the
understandings of all intelligent beings, except those only who
understand things to be what they are not, that is, whose
understandings are either very imperfect or very much depraved. And by
this understanding or knowledge of the natural and necessary relations,
fitnesses, and proportions of things, the wills likewise of all
intelligent beings are constantly directed, and must needs be
determined to act accordingly, excepting those only who will things to
be what they are not and cannot be; that is, whose wills are corrupted
by particular interest or affection, or swayed by some unreasonable and
prevailing passion. Wherefore, since the natural attributes of God, his
infinite knowledge, wisdom, and power, set him infinitely above all
possibility of being deceived by any error, or of being influenced by
any wrong affection, it is manifest his divine will cannot but always
and necessarily determine itself to choose to do what in the whole is
absolutely best and fittest to be done; that is, to act constantly
according to the eternal rules of infinite goodness, justice, and
truth; as I have endeavoured to show distinctly in my former discourse,
in deducing severally the moral attributes of God.
3. That all rational creatures are obliged to govern themselves in all
their actions, by the same eternal rule of reason. And now that the
same reason of things, with regard to which the will of God always and
necessarily does determine itself to act in constant conformity to the
eternal rules of justice, equity, goodness, and truth, ought also
constantly to determine the wills of all subordinate rational beings,
to govern all their actions by the same rules, is very evident. For, as
it is absolutely impossible in nature that God should be deceived by
any error, or influenced by any wrong affection, so it is very
unreasonable and blame-worthy in practice, that any intelligent
creatures, whom God has made so far like unto himself, as to indue them
with those excellent faculties of reason and will, whereby they are
enabled to distinguish good from evil, and to choose the one and refuse
the other, should either negligently suffer themselves to be imposed
upon and deceived in matters of good and evil, right and wrong, or
wilfully and perversely allow themselves to be over-ruled by absurd
passions, and corrupt or partial affections, to act contrary to what
they know is fit to be done. Which two things, viz. negligent
misunderstanding, and wilful passions or lusts, are, as I said, the
only causes which can make a reasonable creature act contrary to
reason, that is, contrary to the eternal rules of justice, equity,
righteousness, and truth: For, was it not for these inexcusable
corruptions and depravations, it is impossible but the same proportions
and fitnesses of things, which have so much weight, and so much
excellency, and beauty in them, that the all-powerful creator and
governor of the universe, (who has the absolute and uncontrollable
dominion of all things in his own hands, and is accountable to none for
what he does, yet) thinks it no diminution of his power to make this
reason of things the unalterable rule and law of his own actions in the
government of the world, and does nothing by mere will and
arbitrariness; it is impossible, (I say,) if it was not for inexcusable
corruption and depravation, but the same eternal reason of things must
much more have weight enough to determine constantly the wills and
actions of all subordinate, finite, dependent, and accountable beings.
Proved from the original nature of things. For originally, and in
reality, it is as natural and (morally speaking) necessary, that the
will should be determined in every action by the reason of the thing,
and the right of the case, as it is natural and (absolutely speaking)
necessary, that the understanding should submit to a demonstrated
truth; and it is as absurd and blame-worthy, to mistake negligently
plain right and wrong, that is, to understand the proportions of things
in morality to be what they are not, or wilfully to act contrary to
known justice and equity, that is, to will things to be what they are
not and cannot be, as it would be absurd and ridiculous for a man, in
arithmetical matters, ignorantly to believe that twice two is not equal
to four, or wilfully and obstinately to contend, against his own clear
knowledge, that the whole is not equal to all its parts. The only
difference is, that assent to a plain speculative truth is not in a
man's power to withhold; but to act according to the plain right and
reason of things, this he may, by the natural liberty of his will,
forbear; but the one he ought to do, and it is as much his plain and
indispensable duty, as the other he cannot but do, and it is the
necessity of his nature to do it: He that will-fully refuses to honour
and obey God, from whom he received his being, and to whom he
continually owes his preservation, is really guilty of an equal
absurdity and inconsistency in practice, as he that in speculation
denies the effect to owe any thing to its cause, or the whole to be
bigger than its part. He that refuses to deal with all men equitably,
and with every man as he desires they should deal with him, is guilty
of the very same unreasonableness and contradiction in one case, as he
that in another case should affirm one number or quantity to be equal
to another, and yet that other at the same time not to be equal to the
first: Lastly, he that acknowledges himself obliged to the practice of
certain duties both towards God and towards men, and yet takes no care
either to preserve his own being, or at least not to preserve himself
in such a state and temper of mind and body, as may best enable him to
perform those duties, is altogether as inexcusable and ridiculous as he
that in any other matter should affirm one thing at the same time that
he denies another, without which the former could not possibly be true;
or undertake one thing at the same time that he obstinately omits
another, without which the former is by no means practicable: Wherefore
all rational creatures, whose wills are not constantly and regularly
determined, and their actions governed by right reason and the
necessary differences of good and evil, according to the eternal and
invariable rules of justice, equity, goodness, and truth, but suffer
themselves to be swayed by unaccountable arbitrary humours and rash
passions, by lusts, vanity, and pride, by private interest, or present
sensual pleasures; these, setting up their own unreasonable self-will
in opposition to the nature and reason of things, endeavour (as much as
in them lies) to make things be what they are not, and cannot be; which
is the highest presumption and greatest insolence, as well as the
greatest absurdity imaginable: It is acting contrary to that
understanding, reason, and judgment, which God has implanted in their
natures, on purpose to enable them to discern the difference between
good and evil;--it is attempting to destroy that order by which the
universe subsists;--it is offering the highest affront imaginable to
the creator of all things, who made things to be what they are, and
governs every thing himself according to the laws of their several
natures;--in a word, all wilful wickedness and perversion of right is
the very same insolence and absurdity in moral matters, as it would be
in natural things for a man to pretend to alter the certain proportions
of numbers,--to take away the demonstrable relations and properties of
mathematical figures,--to make light darkness, and darkness light,--or
to call sweet bitter, and bitter sweet.
Further: And from the sense that all, even wicked men, unavoidably have
of their being under such an obligation. As it appears thus, from the
abstract and absolute reason and nature of things, that all rational
creatures ought, that is, are obliged to take care that their wills and
actions be constantly determined and governed by the eternal rule of
right and equity: so the certainty and universality of that obligation
is plainly confirmed, and the force of it particularly discovered and
applied to every man by this; that, in like manner as no one who is
instructed in mathematics can forbear giving his assent to every
geometrical demonstration, of which he understands the terms, either by
his own study, or by having had them explained to him by others; so no
man, who either has patience and opportunities to examine and consider
things himself, or has the means of being taught and instructed in any
tolerable manner by others, concerning the necessary relations and
dependencies of things, can avoid giving his assent to the fitness and
reasonableness of his governing all his actions by the law or rule
before mentioned, even though his practice, through the prevalence of
brutish lusts, be most absurdly contradictory to that assent. That is
to say, by the reason of his mind, he cannot but be compelled to own
and acknowledge that there is really such an obligation indispensably
incumbent upon him; even at the same time that in the actions of his
life he is endeavouring to throw it off and despise it: For the
judgment and conscience of a man's own mind, concerning the
reasonableness and fitness of the thing, that his actions should be
conformed to such or such a rule or law, is the truest and formallest
obligation, even more properly and strictly so than any opinion
whatsoever of the authority of the giver of a law, or any regard he may
have to its sanction by rewards and punishments. For whoever acts
contrary to this sense and conscience of his own mind, is necessarily
self-condemned; and the greatest and strongest of all obligations is
that which a man cannot break through without condemning himself. The
dread of superior power and authority, and the sanction of rewards and
punishments, however, indeed, absolutely necessary to the government of
frail and fallible creatures, and truly the most effectual means of
keeping them in their duty, is yet really in itself only a secondary
and additional obligation or enforcement of the first. The original
obligation of all (the ambiguous use of which word, as a term of art,
has caused some perplexity and confusion in this matter,) is the
eternal reason of things; that reason, which God himself, who has no
superior to direct him, and to whose happiness nothing can be added nor
any thing diminished from it, yet constantly obliges himself to govern
the world by: And the more excellent and perfect (or the freer from
corruption and depravation) any creatures are, the more cheerfully and
steadily are their wills always determined by this supreme obligation,
in conformity to the nature, and in imitation of the most perfect will
of God: So far, therefore, as men are conscious of what is right and
wrong, so far they are under an obligation to act accordingly; and,
consequently, that eternal rule of right which I have been hereto
describing, it is evident ought as indispensably to govern men's
actions, as it cannot but necessarily determine their assent.
Now that the case is truly thus; that the eternal And from the judgment
of mens' consciences upon their own past actions. differences of good
and evil, the unalterable rule of right and equity, do necessarily and
unavoidably determine the judgment, and force the assent of all men
that use any consideration, is undeniably manifest from the universal
experience of mankind; for no man willingly and deliberately
transgresses this rule in any great and considerable instance, but he
acts contrary to the judgment and reason of his own mind, and secretly
reproaches himself for so doing: And no man observes and obeys it
steadily, especially in cases of difficulty and temptation, when it
interferes with any present interest, pleasure, or passion, but his own
mind commends and applauds him for his resolution in executing what his
conscience could not forbear giving its assent to, as just and right:
And this is what St. Paul means, when he says, (Rom. ii. 14, 15,) that
when the Gentiles, which have not the law, do by nature the things
contained in the law, these, having not the law, are a law unto
themselves; which show the work of the law written in their hearts,
their conscience also bearing witness, and their thoughts the meanwhile
accusing, or else excusing one another.
It Of that natural knowledge which Plato thought to be reminiscence.
was a very wise observation of Plato, which he received from Socrates,
that if you take a young man, impartial and unprejudiced, one that
never had any learning, nor any experience in the world, and examine
him about the natural relations and proportions of things, [or the
moral differences of good and evil,] you may, only by asking him
questions, without teaching him any thing at all directly, cause him to
express in his answers just and adequate notions of geometrical truths,
[and true and exact determinations concerning matters of right and
wrong.] From whence he thought it was to be concluded, that all
knowledge and learning is nothing but memory, or only a recollecting,
upon every new occasion, what had been before known in a state of
pre-existence. And some others, both ancients and moderns, have
concluded that the ideas of all first and simple truths, either natural
or moral, are innate and originally impressed or stamped upon the mind.
In their inference from the observation, the authors of both these
opinions seem to be mistaken; but thus much it proves
unavoidably,--that the differences, relations, and proportions of
things, both natural and moral, in which all unprejudiced minds thus
naturally agree, are certain, unalterable, and real in the things
themselves, and do not at all depend on the variable opinions, fancies,
or imaginations of men prejudiced by education, laws, customs, or evil
practices: And also that the mind of man naturally and unavoidably
gives its assent, as to natural and geometrical truth, so also to the
moral differences of things, and to the fitness and reasonableness of
the obligation of the everlasting law of righteousness, whenever fairly
and plainly proposed.
Some men, The most profligate men not utterly insensible of the
difference of good and evil. indeed, who, by means of a very evil and
vicious education, or through a long habit of wickedness and
debauchery, have extremely corrupted the principles of their nature,
and have long accustomed themselves to bear down their own reason by
the force of prejudice, lust, and passion, that they may not be forced
to confess themselves self-condemned, will confidently and absolutely
contend that they do not really see any natural and necessary
difference between what we call right and wrong, just and unjust; that
the reason and judgment of their own mind does not tell them they are
under any such indispensable obligations as we would endeavour to
persuade them; and that they are not sensible they ought to be governed
by any other rule than their own will and pleasure. But even these men,
the most abandoned of all mankind, however industriously they endeavour
to conceal and deny their self-condemnation, yet they cannot avoid
making a discovery of it sometimes when they are not aware of it. For
example, there is no man so vile and desperate who commits at any time
a murder and robbery, with the most unrelenting mind, but would choose,
[118] if such a thing could be proposed to him to obtain all the same
profit or advantage, whatsoever it be that he aims at, without
committing the crime, rather than with it, even though he was sure to
go unpunished for committing the crime. Nay, I believe there is no man
even in Mr Hobbes's state of nature, and of Mr Hobbes's own principles,
but if he was equally assured of securing his main end, his
self-preservation, by either way, would choose to preserve himself
rather without destroying all his fellow-creatures, than with it, even
supposing all impunity, and all other future conveniences of life,
equal in either case. Mr. Hobbes's own scheme, of men's agreeing by
compact to preserve one another, can hardly be supposed without this.
And this plainly evinces, that the mind of man unavoidably acknowledges
a natural and necessary difference between good and evil, antecedent to
all arbitrary and positive constitution whatsoever.
But Men's natural sense of eternal moral obligations, proved from the
judgment they all pass upon the actions of others. the truth of this,
that the mind of man naturally and necessarily assents to the eternal
law of righteousness, may still better, and more clearly, and more
universally appear, from the judgment that men pass upon each other's
actions, than from what we can discern concerning their consciousness
of their own. For men may dissemble and conceal from the world the
judgment of their own conscience; nay, by a strange partiality, they
may even impose upon and deceive themselves, (for who is there that
does not sometimes allow himself, nay, and even justify himself in that
wherein he condemns another?) But men's judgments concerning the
actions of others, especially where they have no relation to
themselves, or repugnance to their interest, are commonly impartial;
and from this we may judge what sense men naturally have of the
unalterable difference of right and wrong. Now the observation which
every one cannot but make in this matter is this; that virtue and true
goodness, righteousness and equity, are things so truly noble and
excellent, so lovely and venerable in themselves, and do so necessarily
approve themselves to the reason and consciences of men, that even
those very persons who, by the prevailing power of some interest or
lust, are themselves drawn aside out of the paths of virtue, [119] can
yet hardly ever forbear to give it its true character and commendation
in others. And this observation holds true, not only in the generality
of vicious men, but very frequently even in the worst sort of them,
viz. those who persecute others for being better than themselves. Thus
the officers who were sent by the Pharisees to apprehend our Saviour,
could not forbear declaring [120] that he spake as never man spake; and
the Roman governor, when he gave sentence that he should be crucified,
could not at the same instant forbear openly declaring that he found no
fault in him. [121] Even in this case men cannot choose but think well
of those persons whom the dominion of their lusts will not suffer them
to imitate, or whom their present interest and the necessity of their
worldly affairs compels them to discourage. They cannot but desire,
that they themselves were the men they are not, and wish, with Balaam,
that though they imitate not the life, yet at least they might die the
death of the righteous, and that their last end might be like theirs.
And hence it is that Plato judiciously observes, [122] that even the
worst of men seldom or never make so wrong judgment concerning persons
as they do concerning things, there being in virtue an unaccountable
and as it were divine force, which, whatever confusion men endeavour to
introduce in things by their vicious discourses and debauched
practices, yet almost always compels them to distinguish right
concerning persons, and makes them admire and praise just and
equitable, and honest men. On the contrary, vice and injustice,
profaneness and debauchery, are things so absolutely odious in their
own nature, that however they insinuate themselves into the practice,
yet they can never gain over to themselves the judgment of mankind.
They who do evil, yet see and approve what is good, and condemn in
others what they blindly allow in themselves; nay, and very frequently
condemn even themselves also, not without great disorder and uneasiness
of mind, in those very things wherein they allow themselves. At least,
there is hardly any wicked man, but when his own case is represented to
him under the person of another, will freely enough pass sentence
against the wickedness he himself is guilty of; and, with sufficient
severity, exclaim against all iniquity. This shows abundantly, that all
variation from the eternal rule of right is absolutely and in the
nature of the thing itself to be abhorred and detested, and that the
unprejudiced mind of man as naturally disapproves injustice in moral
matters, as in natural things it cannot but dissent from falsehood, or
dislike incongruities. Even in reading the histories of past and far
distant ages, where it is plain we can have no concern for the events
of things, nor prejudices concerning the characters of persons; who is
there, that does not praise and admire, nay highly esteem, and in his
imagination love (as it were) the equity, justice, truth, and fidelity
of some persons, and, with the greatest indignation and hatred, detest
the barbarity, injustice, and treachery of others? Nay, further, when
the prejudices of corrupt minds lie all on the side of injustice, as
when we have obtained some very great profit or advantage through
another man's treachery or breach of faith; ye [123] who is there,
that, upon that very occasion, does not (even to a proverb,) dislike
the person and the action, how much soever he may rejoice at the event?
But when we come ourselves to suffer by iniquity, then where are all
the arguments and sophistries by which unjust men, while they are
oppressing others, would persuade themselves that they are not sensible
of any natural difference between good and evil? When it comes to be
these men's own case to be oppressed by violence, or overreached by
fraud, where then are all their pleas against the eternal distinction
of right and wrong? How, on the contrary, do they then cry out for
equity, and exclaim against injustice? How do they then challenge and
object against Providence, and think neither God nor man severe enough,
in punishing the violators of right and truth? Whereas if there was no
natural and eternal difference between just and unjust, no man could
have any reason to complain of injury, any other than what laws and
compacts made so; which in innumerable cases will be always to be
evaded.
An answer to the objection drawn from the total ignorance of some
barbarous nations in matters of morality. There is but one thing that I
am sensible of, which can here with any colour be objected against what
has been hitherto said concerning the necessity of the mind's giving
its assent to the eternal law of righteousness; and that is, the total
ignorance which some whole nations are reported to lie under of the
nature and force of these moral obligations. I am not satisfied the
matter of fact is true; but if it was, yet mere ignorance affords no
just objection against the certainty of any truth. Were there upon
earth a nation of rational and considerate persons, whose notions
concerning moral obligations, and concerning the nature and force of
them, were universally and directly contrary to what I have hitherto
represented, this would be indeed a weighty objection; but ignorance
and stupidity are no arguments against the certainty of any thing.
There are many nations and people almost totally ignorant of the
plainest mathematical truths; as, of the proportion, for example, of a
square to a triangle of the same base and height: And yet these truths
are such, to which the mind cannot but give its assent necessarily and
unavoidably, as soon as they are distinctly proposed to it. All that
this objection proves, therefore, supposing the matter of it to be
true, is only this; not, that the mind of man can ever dissent from the
rule of right, much less that there is no necessary difference in
nature between moral good and evil, any more than it proves that there
are no certain and necessary proportions of numbers, lines, or figures;
but this it proves only, that men have great need to be taught and
instructed in some very plain and easy, as well as certain truths; and
if they be important truths, that then men have need also to have them
frequently inculcated, and strongly enforced upon them: Which is very
true; and is (as shall hereafter be particularly made to appear,) one
good argument for the reasonableness of expecting a revelation.
4. Of the principal moral obligations in particular. Thus it appears,
in general, that the mind of man cannot avoid giving its assent to the
eternal law of righteousness, that is, cannot but acknowledge the
reasonableness and fitness of men's governing all their actions by the
rule of right or equity; and also that this assent is a formal
obligation upon every man, actually and constantly to conform himself
to that rule. I might now from hence deduce, in particular, all the
several duties of morality or natural religion; but, because this would
take up too large a portion of my intended discourse, and may easily be
supplied abundantly out of several-late excellent writers, I shall only
mention the three great and principal branches from which all the other
and smaller instances of duty do naturally flow, or may without
difficulty be derived.
First, Of piety, or men's duty towards God. then; in respect of God,
the rule of righteousness is, that we keep up constantly in our minds
the highest possible honour, esteem, and veneration for him, which must
express itself in proper and respective influences upon all our
passions, and in the suitable direction of all our actions;--that we
worship and adore him, and him alone, as the only supreme author,
preserver, and governor of all things;--that we employ our whole being,
and all our powers and faculties in his service, and for his glory,
that is, in encouraging the practice of universal righteousness, and
promoting the designs of his divine goodness amongst men, in such way
and manner as shall at any time appear to be his will we should do
it;--and, finally, that, to enable us to do this continually, we pray
unto him constantly for whatever we stand in need of, and return him
continual and hearty thanks for whatever good things we at any time
receive. There is no congruity or proportion in the uniform disposition
and correspondent order of any bodies or magnitudes, no fitness or
agreement in the application of similar and equal geometrical figures
one to another, or in the comparing them one with another, so visible
and conspicuous as is the beauty and harmony of the exercise of God's
several attributes, meeting with suitable returns of duty and honour
from all his rational creatures throughout the universe;--the
consideration of his eternity and infinity, his knowledge and his
wisdom, necessarily commands our highest admiration;--the sense of his
omnipresence forces a perpetual, awful regard towards him;--his supreme
authority, as being the creator, preserver, and absolute governor of
all things, obliges us to pay him all possible honour and veneration,
adoration, and worship, and his unity requires that it be paid to him
alone;--his power and justice demand our fear;--his mercy and
placableness encourage our hope;--his goodness necessarily excites our
love;--his veracity and unchangeableness secure our trust in him;--the
sense of our having received our being, and all our powers from him,
makes it infinitely reasonable that we should employ our whole being
and all our faculties in his service;--the consciousness of our
continual dependence upon him both for our preservation and the supply
of every thing we want, obliges us to constant prayer;--and every good
thing we enjoy, the air we breathe, and the food we eat, the rain from
heaven, and the fruitful seasons, all the blessings and comforts of the
present time, and the hopes and expectations we have of what is to
come, do all demand our heartiest gratitude and thanksgiving to him.
[124] The suitableness and proportion, the correspondency and connexion
of each of these things respectively, is as plain and conspicuous as
the shining of the sun at noon-day; [125] and it is the greatest
absurdity and perverseness in the world for creatures, indued with
reason, to attempt to break through and transgress this necessary order
and dependency of things: All inanimate and all irrational beings, by
the necessity of their nature, constantly obey the laws of their
creation, and tend regularly to the ends for which they were appointed;
how monstrous then is it that reasonable creatures, merely because they
are not necessitated, should abuse that glorious privilege of liberty
by which they are exalted in dignity above the rest of God's creation,
to make themselves the alone unreasonable and disorderly part of the
universe!--that a tree planted in a fruitful soil, and watered
continually with the dew of heaven, and cherished constantly with the
kindly warmth and benign influence of the sunbeams, should yet never
bring forth either leaves or fruit, is in no degree so irregular, and
contrary to nature, as that a rational being, created after the image
of God, and conscious of God's doing every thing for him that becomes
the relation of an infinitely good and bountiful Creator to his
creatures, should yet never on his part make any return of those duties
which arise necessarily from the relation of a creature to his Creator.
Secondly. Of righteousness or the duty of men one towards another. In
respect of our fellow-creatures, the rule of righteousness is; that in
particular we so deal with every man, as in like circumstances we could
reasonably expect he should deal with us, and that in general we
endeavour, by an universal benevolence, to promote the welfare and
happiness of all men: The former branch of this rule is equity, the
latter is love.
Of justice and equity. As to the former, viz. equity; the reason which
obliges every man in practice, so to deal always with another as he
would reasonably expect that others should in like circumstances deal
with him, is the very same as that which forces him, in speculation, to
affirm, that if one line or number be equal to another, that other is
reciprocally equal to it. Iniquity is the very same in action as
falsity or contradiction in theory, and the same cause which makes the
one absurd makes the other unreasonable. Whatever relation or
proportion one man in any case bears to another, the same that other,
when put in like circumstances, bears to him. Whatever I judge
reasonable or unreasonable, for another to do for me, that, by the same
judgment, I declare reasonable or unreasonable that I in the like case
should do for him. And to deny this either in word or action, is as if
a man should contend, that though two and three are equal to five, yet
five are not equal to two and three. [126] Wherefore, were not men
strangely and most unnaturally corrupted by perverse and unaccountably
false opinions, and monstrous evil customs and habits, prevailing
against the clearest and plainest reason in the world, it would be
impossible that universal equity should not be practised by all
mankind, and especially among equals, where the proportion of equity is
simple and obvious, and every man's own case is already the same with
all others, without any nice comparing or transposing of circumstances.
It would be as impossible [127] that a man, contrary to the eternal
reason of things, should desire to gain some small profit to himself,
by doing violence and damage to his neighbour, as that he should be
willing to be deprived of necessaries himself, to satisfy the
unreasonable covetousness or ambition of another. In a word, it would
be impossible for men not to be as much ashamed of doing iniquity, as
they are of believing contradictions. In considering indeed the duties
of superiors in various relations, the proportion of equity is somewhat
more complex, but still it may always be deduced from the same rule of
doing as we would be done by, if careful regard be had at the same time
to the difference of relation; that is, if, in considering what is fit
for you to do to another, you always take into the account, not only
every circumstance of the action, but also every circumstance wherein
the person differs from you, and in judging what you would desire that
another, if your circumstances were transposed, should do to you, you
always consider not what any unreasonable passion or private interest
would prompt you, but what impartial reason would dictate to you to
desire. For example, a magistrate, in order to deal equitably with a
criminal, is not to consider what fear or self-love would cause him in
the criminal's case to desire, but what reason and the public good
would oblige him to acknowledge was fit and just for him to expect. And
the same proportion is to be observed in deducing the duties of parents
and children, of masters and servants, of governors and subjects, of
citizens and foreigners, in what manner every person is obliged, by the
rule of equity, to behave himself in each of these and all other
relations. In the regular and uniform practice of all which duties
among all mankind, in their several and respective relations, through
the whole earth, consists that universal justice which is the top and
perfection of all virtues: which, if, as Plato says, [128] it could be
represented visibly to mortal eyes, would raise in us an inexpressible
love and admiration of it; which would introduce into the world such a
glorious and happy state as the ancient poets have attempted to
describe in their fiction of a golden age; which in itself is so truly
beautiful and lovely, that, as Aristotle [129] elegantly expresses it,
the motions of the heavenly bodies are not so admirably regular and
harmonious, nor the brightness of the sun and stars so ornamental to
the visible fabric of the world, as the universal practice of this
illustrious virtue would be conducive to the glory and advantage of the
rational part of this lower creation; which, lastly, is so truly noble
and excellent in its own nature, that the wisest and most considering
men have always declared, [130] that neither life itself, nor [131] all
other possible enjoyments in the world, put together, are of any value
or esteem in comparison of, or in competition with, that right temper
and disposition of mind from which flows the practice of this universal
justice and equity. On the contrary, injustice and iniquity, violence,
fraud, and oppression, the universal confusion of right and wrong, and
the general neglect and contempt of all the duties arising from men's
several relations one to another, is the greatest and most unnatural
corruption of God's creation that it is possible for depraved and
rebellious creatures to introduce: As they themselves who practise
iniquity most, and are most desirous to defend it, yet whenever it
comes to be their own turn to suffer by it, are not very backward to
acknowledge. To comprise this matter, therefore, in one word; what the
sun's forsaking that equal course, which now, by diffusing gentle
warmth and light, cherishes and invigorates every thing in a due
proportion through the whole system, and on the contrary, his burning
up, by an irregular and disorderly motion, some of the orbs with
insupportable heat, and leaving others to perish in extreme cold and
darkness; what this, I say, would be to the natural world, that very
same thing, injustice, and tyranny, iniquity, and all wickedness, is to
the moral and rational part of the creation. The only difference is
this; that the one is an obstinate and wilful corruption, and most
perverse depravation of creatures made after the image of God, and a
violating the eternal and unalterable law or reason of things, which is
of the utmost importance; whereas the other would be only a revolution
or change, of the arbitrary and temporary frame of nature.
Of universal mutual benevolence. The second branch of the rule of
righteousness, with respect to our fellow-creatures, I said, was
universal love or benevolence; that is, not only the doing barely what
is just and right in our dealings with every man, but also a constant
endeavouring to promote, in general, to the utmost of our power, the
welfare and happiness of all men. The obligation to which duty, also,
may easily be deduced from what has been already laid down. For if (as
has been before proved) there be a natural and necessary difference
between good and evil, and that which is good is fit and reasonable,
and that which is evil is unreasonable to be done; and that which is
the greatest good, is always the most fit and reasonable to be chosen:
Then, as the goodness of God extends itself universally over all his
works through the whole creation, by doing always what is absolutely
best in the whole; so every rational creature ought, in its sphere and
station, according to its respective powers and faculties, to do all
the good it can to all its fellow-creatures. To which end, universal
love and benevolence is as plainly the most direct, certain, and
effectual means, as [132] in mathematics the flowing of a point is to
produce a line, or, in arithmetic, the addition of numbers to produce a
sum; or in physics, certain kind of motions to preserve certain bodies,
which other kinds of motions tend to corrupt. Of all which, the mind of
man is so naturally sensible, that, except in such men whose affections
are prodigiously corrupted by most unnatural and habitual vicious
practices, there is no duty whatsoever, the performance whereof affords
a man so ample pleasure [133] and satisfaction, and fills his mind with
so comfortable a sense of his having done the greatest good he was
capable to do, of his having best answered the ends of his creation,
and nearliest imitated the perfections of his Creator, and consequently
of his having fully complied with the highest and principal obligations
of his nature; as the performance of this one duty, of universal love
and benevolence, naturally affords. But further; the obligation to this
great duty may also otherwise be deduced from the nature of man, in the
following manner. Next to that natural self-love, or care of his own
preservation, which every one necessarily has in the first place for
himself, there is in all men a certain natural affection for their
children and posterity, who have a dependence upon them; and for their
near relations and friends, who have an intimacy with them. And because
the nature of man is such, that they cannot live comfortably in
independent families, without still further society and commerce with
each other; therefore they naturally desire to increase their
dependences, by multiplying affinities, and to enlarge their
friendships by mutual good offices, and to establish societies by a
communication of arts and labour, till, [134] by degrees, the affection
of single persons becomes a friendship of families, and this enlarges
itself to society of towns, and cities, and nations, and terminates in
the agreeing community of all mankind: The foundation, preservation,
and perfection of which universal friendship or society is mutual love
and benevolence. And nothing hinders the world from being actually put
into so happy a state but perverse iniquity, and unreasonable want of
mutual charity. Wherefore, since men are plainly so constituted by
nature, that they stand in need of each other's assistance to make
themselves easy in the world, and are fitted to live in communities,
and society is absolutely necessary for them, and mutual love and
benevolence is the only possible means to establish this society in any
tolerable and durable manner; and in this respect [135] all men stand
upon the same level, and have the same natural wants and desires, and
are in the same need of each other's help, and are equally capable of
enjoying the benefit and advantage of society, it is evident every man
is bound by the law of his nature, and as he is also prompted by the
[136] inclination of his uncorrupted affections, to [137] look upon
himself as a part and member of that one universal body or community
which is made up of all mankind, to think himself [138] born to promote
the public good and welfare of all his fellow-creatures, and
consequently obliged, as the necessary and only effectual means to that
end, to [139] embrace them all with universal love and benevolence, so
that he cannot, [140] without acting contrary to the reason of his own
mind, and transgressing the plain and known law of his being, do
willingly any hurt and mischief to any man, no, not even to those who
have first injured him, [141] but ought, for the public benefit, to
endeavour to appease with gentleness rather than exasperate with
retaliations; and finally, to comprehend all in one word, (which is the
top and complete perfection of this great duty,) ought to [142] love
all others as himself. This is the argumentation of that great master
Cicero, whose knowledge and understanding of the true state of things,
and of the original obligations of human nature, was as much greater
than Mr. Hobbes's as his helps and advantages to attain that knowledge
were less.
Thirdly. Of sobriety, or men's duty towards themselves; and of the
unlawfulness of self-murder. With respect to ourselves, the rule of
righteousness is; that every man preserve his own being, as long as he
is able, and take care to keep himself at all times in such temper and
disposition both of body and mind, as may best fit and enable him to
perform his duty in all other instances. That is; he ought to bridle
his appetites, with temperance; to govern his passions, with
moderation; and to apply himself to the business of his present station
in the world, whatsoever it be, with attention and contentment. That
every man ought to preserve his own being as long as he is able, is
evident; because what he is not himself the author and giver of, he can
never of himself have just power or authority to take away. He that
sent us into the world, and alone knows for how long time he appointed
us our station here, and when we have finished all the business he
intended we should do, can alone judge when it is fit for us to be
taken hence, and has alone authority to dismiss and discharge us. This
reasoning has been admirably applied by Plato, Cicero, and others of
the best philosophers. So that though the stoics of old, and the deists
of late, have, in their ranting discourses, and some few of them in
their rash practice, contradicted it, yet they have never been able,
with any colour of reason, to answer or evade the force of the
argument; which, indeed, to speak the truth, has been urged by the
fore-mentioned philosophers with such singular beauty, as well as
invincible strength, that it seems not capable of having any thing
added to it. Wherefore I shall give it you, only in some of their own
words. We men, (says [143] Plato, in the person of Socrates,) are all,
by the appointment of God, in a certain prison or custody, which we
ought not to break out of, and run away. We are as servants, or as
cattle, in the hand of God. And would not any of us, saith he, if one
of our servants should, contrary to our direction, and to escape out of
our service, kill himself, think that we had just reason to be very
angry, and if it was in our power, punish him for it? So likewise
Cicero; God, says he, [144] the supreme governor of all things, forbids
us to depart hence without his order: and though, when the divine
providence does itself offer us a just occasion of leaving this world,
(as when a man chooses to suffer death rather than commit wickedness,)
a wise man will then indeed depart joyfully, as out of a place of
sorrow and darkness into light; yet he will not be in such haste as to
break his prison contrary to law; but will go when God calls him, as a
prisoner when dismissed by the magistrate or lawful power. Again: that
short remainder of life, saith he, [145] which old men have a prospect
of, they ought neither too eagerly to desire, nor yet on the contrary
unreasonably and discontentedly deprive themselves of it: for, as
Pythagoras teaches, it is as unlawful for a man, without the command of
God, to remove himself out of the world, as for a soldier to leave his
post without his general's order. And in another place: unless that
God, saith he, [146] whose temple and palace this whole world is,
discharges you himself out of the prison of the body, you can never be
received to his favour. Wherefore you, and all pious men, ought to have
patience to continue in the body, as long as God shall please, who sent
us hither; and not force yourselves out of the world, before he calls
for you, lest you be found deserters of the station appointed you of
God. And to mention no more,--that excellent author, Arrian: wait,
saith he, [147] the good pleasure of God: when he signifies it to be
his will that you should be discharged from this service, then depart
willingly; but, in the meantime, have patience, and tarry in the place
where he has appointed you: wait, and do not hurry yourselves away
wilfully and unreasonably. The objections, which the author of the
defence of self-murder, prefixed to the Oracles of Reason, has
attempted to advance against this argument, are so very weak and
childish that it is evident he could not, at the time he wrote them,
believe in earnest that there was any force in them; as when he says,
that the reason why it is not lawful for a centinel to leave his
station without his commander's order, is because he entered into the
service by his own consent; as if God had not a just power to lay any
commands upon his creatures without their own consent: Or when he says,
that there are many lawful ways to seek death in; as if, because a man
may lawfully venture his life in many public services, therefore it was
lawful for him directly to throw it away upon any foolish discontent.
But the author of that discourse has since been so just as to confess
his folly, and retract it publicly himself. Wherefore, to proceed. For
the same reason that a man is obliged to preserve his own being at all,
he is bound likewise to preserve himself, as far as he is able, in the
right use of all his faculties: that is, to keep himself constantly in
such temper, both of body and mind, by regulating his appetites and
passions, as may best fit and enable him to perform his duty in all
other instances, For, as it matters not whether a soldier deserts his
post, or by drunkenness renders himself incapable of performing his
duty in it; so for a man to disable himself, by any intemperance or
passion, from performing the necessary duties of life, is, at least for
that time, the same thing as depriving himself of life. And neither is
this all. For great intemperance and ungoverned passions not only
incapacitate a man to perform his duty, but also expose him to run
headlong into the commission of the greatest enormities: there being no
violence or injustice whatsoever, which a man, who has deprived himself
of his reason by intemperance or passion, is not capable of being
tempted to commit. So that all the additional obligations which a man
is any way under, to forbear committing the most flagrant crimes, lie
equally upon him to govern his passions and restrain his appetites:
without doing which, he can never secure himself effectually from being
betrayed into the commission of all iniquity. This is indeed the great
difficulty of life, to subdue and conquer our unreasonable appetites
and passions. But it is absolutely neccessary to be done: And it is
[148] moreover the bravest and most glorious conquest in the world.
Lastly: For the same reason that a man is obliged not to depart
wilfully out of this life, which is the general station that God has
appointed him, he is obliged likewise to attend the duties of that
particular station or condition of life, whatsoever it be, wherein
providence has at present placed him, with diligence, and contentment:
Without being either uneasy and discontented, that others are placed by
providence in different and superior stations in the world; or so
extremely and unreasonably solicititous to change his state for the
future, as thereby to neglect his present duty,
The law of nature eternal, universal, and absolutely unchangeable. From
these three great and general branches, all the smaller and more
particular instances of moral obligations may (as I said) easily be
deduced.
5. And now this, (this eternal rule of equity, which I have been
hitherto discribing,) is that right reason which makes the principal
distinction between man and beasts. This is the law of nature, which
(as Cicero excellently expresses it) is [149] of universal extent, and
everlasting duration, which can neither be wholly abrogated, nor
repealed in any part of it, nor have any law made contrary to it, nor
be dispensed with by any authority; which [150] was in force before
ever any law was writen, or the foundation of any city or commonwealth
was laid; which [151] was not invented by the wit of man, nor
established by the authority of any people, but its obligation was from
eternity, and the force of it reaches throughout the universe; which,
being founded in the nature and resaon of things, did not then begin to
be a law, when it was first writen and enacted by men, but is of the
same original with the eternal reasons or proportions of things, and
the perfections or attributes of God himself, so [152] that if there
was no law at Rome against rapes at that time when Tarquin offered
violence to Lucretia, it does not therefore follow that he was at all
the more excusable, or that his sin against the eternal rule of equity
was the less heinous. This is that law of nature to which the reason of
all men, [153] everywhere as naturally and necessarily assents, as all
animals conspire in the pulse and motion of their heart and arteries,
or as all men agree in their judgment concerning the whiteness of snow
or the brightness of the sun. For though in some nice cases, the bounds
of right and wrong may indeed (as was before observed,) be somewhat
difficult to determine; and in some few even plainer cases, the laws
and customs of certain barbarous nations may be contrary one to
another, (which some have been so weak as to think a just objection
against there being any natural difference between good and evil at
all,) yet in reality this [154] no more disproves the natural assent of
all men's unprejudiced reason to the rule of right and equity than the
difference of men's countenances in general, or the deformity of some
few monsters in particular, proves that there is no general likeness or
uniformity in the bodies of men. For, whatever difference there may be
in some particular laws, it is certain, as to the main and principal
branches of morality, there never was any nation upon earth but owned
that to love and honour God, to be grateful to benefactors, to perform
equitable compacts, to preserve the lives of innocent and harmless men,
and the like, were things fitter and better to be practised than the
contrary. In fine, this is the law of nature, which, being founded in
the eternal reason of things, is as absolutely unalterable, as natural
good and evil, as mathematical, or arithmetical truths, [155] as light
and darkness, as sweet and bitter, as pleasure and pain: The observance
of which, [156] though no man should commend it, would yet be truly
commendable in itself. Which to suppose depending on the opinions of
men, and the customs of nations, that is to suppose that what shall be
accounted the virtue of a man depends merely on imagination or customs
to determine, is [157] as absurd as it would be to affirm that the
fruitfulness of a tree, or the strength of a horse, depends merely on
the imagination of those who judge of it. In a word, it is that law,
which if it had its original from the authority of men, and could be
changed by it, then [158] all the commands of the cruellest and most
barbarous tyrants in the world would be as just and equitable as the
wisest laws that ever were made, and [159] to murder men without
distinction, to confound the rights of all families by the grossest
forgeries, to rob with unrestrained violence, to break faith
continually, and defraud and cheat without reluctance, might, by the
decrees and ordinances of a mad assembly, be made lawful and honest: In
which matters, if any man thinks that the votes and suffrages of fools
have such power as to be able to change the nature of things, why do
they not likewise decree (as Cicero admirably expresses himself) that
poisonous things may become wholsome, and that any other thing which is
now destructive of mankind may become preservative of it.
6. Eternal moral obligations antecedent in some respect even to this
consideration, of their being the will and command of God himself.
Further yet: As this law of nature is infinitely superior to all
authority of men, and independent upon it, so its obligation, primarily
and originally, is antecedent also even to this consideration, [160] of
its being the positive will or command of God himself: For, [161] as
the addition of certain numbers necessarily produces a certain sum, and
certain geometrical or mechanical operations give a constant and
unalterable solution of certain problems or propositions; so in moral
matters there are certain necessary and unalterable respects or
relations of things which have not their original from arbitrary and
positive constitution, but are of eternal necessity in their own
nature. For example; [162] as, in matters of sense, the reason why a
thing is visible is not because it is seen, but it is therefore seen
because it is visible; so in matters of natural reason and morality,
that which is holy and good (as creatures depending upon and worshiping
God, and practising justice and equity in their dealings with each
other, and the like,) is not therefore holy and good, because it is
commanded to be done, but is therefore commanded of God, because it is
holy and good. The existence, indeed, of the things themselves, whose
proportions and relations we consider, depends entirely on the mere
arbitrary will and good pleasure of God; who can create things when he
pleases, and destroy them again whenever he thinks fit. But when things
are created, and so long as it pleases God to continue them in being,
their proportions, which are abstractly of eternal necessity, are also
in the things themselves absolutely unalterable. Hence God himself,
though he has no superior from whose will to receive any law of his
actions, yet disdains not to observe the rule of equity and goodness,
as [163] the law of all his actions in the government of the world, and
condescends to appeal even to men for Ezekiel xviii. the equity and
righteousness of his judgments. To this law, the infinite perfections
of his divine nature make it necessary for him (as has been before
proved,) to have constant regard, and (as a learned prelate of our own
has excellently shown, [164] ) not barely his infinite power, but the
rules of this eternal law are the true foundation and the measure of
his dominion over his creatures. (For, if infinite power was the rule
and measure of right, it is evident that goodness and mercy, and all
other divine perfections, would be empty words without any
signification at all.) Now, for the same reason that God, who hath no
superior to determine him, yet constantly directs all his own actions
by the eternal rule of justice and goodness; it is evident all
intelligent creatures, in their several spheres and proportions, ought
to obey the same rule according to the law of their nature, even though
it could be supposed separate from that additional obligation of its
being the positive will and command of God; and, doubtless there have
been many men in all ages, in many parts of the heathen world, who, not
having philosophy enough to collect from mere nature any tolerably just
and explicit apprehensions concerning the attributes of God, much less
having been able to deduce from thence any clear and certain knowledge
of his will, have yet had a very great sense of right and truth, and
been fully persuaded in their own minds of many unalterable obligations
of morality: But this speculation, though necessary to be taken notice
of in the distinct order and method of discourse, is in itself too dry,
and of less use to us, who are abundantly assured that all moral
obligations are, moreover, the plain and declared will of God, as shall
be shown particularly in its proper place.
7. The law of nature obligatory, antecedent to all consideration of
particular rewards and punishments. Lastly, This law of nature has its
full obligatory power, antecedent to all consideration of any
particular private and personal reward or punishment, annexed, either
by natural consequence or by positive appointment, to the observance or
neglect of it. This also is very evident; because if good and evil,
right and wrong, fitness and unfitness of being practised, be (as has
been shown) originally, eternally, and necessarily, in the nature of
the things themselves, it is plain that the view of particular rewards
or punishments, which is only an after-consideration, and does not at
all alter the nature of things, cannot be the original cause of the
obligation of the law, but is only an additional weight to enforce the
practice of what men were before obliged to by right reason: There is
no man, who has any just sense of the difference between good and evil,
but must needs acknowledge that virtue and goodness are truly amiable,
[165] and to be chosen for their own sakes and intrinsic worth, though
a man had no prospect of gaining any particular advantage to himself,
by the practice of them; and that, on the contrary, cruelty, violence,
and oppression, fraud, injustice, and all manner of wickedness, are of
themselves hateful, and by all means to be be avoided; even though a
man had absolute assurance that he should bring no manner of
inconvenience upon himself by the commission of any or all of these
crimes. [166] This likewise is excellently and admirably expressed by
Cicero: [167] Virtue, saith he, is that which, though no profit or
advantage whatsoever was to be expected to a man's self from the
practice of it, yet must, without all controversy, be acknowledged to
be truly desirable for its own sake alone. And, accordingly, [168] all
good men love right and equity, and do many things without any prospect
of advantage at all, merely because they are just and right and fit to
be done: On the contrary, vice is so odious in its own nature, and so
fit to be avoided, even though no punishment was to ensue, that no man,
[169] who has made any tolerable proficiency in moral philosophy, can
in the least doubt, but, if he was sure the thing could be for ever
concealed entirely both from God and men, so that there should not be
the least suspicion of its being ever discovered, yet he ought not to
do any thing unjustly, covetously, wilfully, passionately,
licentiously, or any way wickedly, Nay, [170] if a good man had it in
his power to gain all his neighbour's wealth by the least motion of his
finger, and was sure it would never be at all suspected either by God
or man, unquestionably he would think he ought not to do it; and
whoever wonders at this, has no notion what it is to be really a good
man: [171] Not that any such thing is possible in nature, that any
wickedness can be indeed concealed from God, but only, upon such a
supposition, the natural and necessary difference between justice and
injustice is made to more clearly and undeniably.
Thus far is clear. Yet it does not from thence at all follow, either
that a good man ought to have no respect to rewards and punishments, or
that rewards and punishments are not absolutely necessary to maintain
the practice of virtue in this present world. But now from hence it
does not at all follow, either that a good man ought to have no respect
to rewards and punishments, or that rewards and punishments are not
absolutely necessary to maintain the practice of virtue and
righteousness in this present world. It is certain, indeed, that virtue
and vice are eternally and necessarily different; and that the one
truly deserves to be chosen for its own sake, and the other ought by
all means to be avoided, though a man was sure, for his own particular,
neither to gain nor lose any thing by the practice of either. And if
this was truly the state of things in the world, certainly that man
must have a very corrupt mind, indeed, who could in the least doubt, or
so much as once deliberate with himself, which he would choose. But the
case does not stand thus. The question now in the general practice of
the world, supposing all expectation of rewards and punishments set
aside, will not be, whether a man would choose virtue for its own sake,
and avoid vice; but the practice of vice is accompanied with great
temptations and allurements of pleasure and profit; and the practice of
virtue is often threatened with great calamities, losses, and sometimes
even with death itself. And this alters the question, and destroys the
practice of that which appears so reasonable in the whole speculation,
and introduces a necessity of rewards and punishments. For though
virtue is unquestionably worthy to be chosen for its own sake, even
without any expectation of reward, yet it does not follow that it is
therefore entirely self-sufficient, and able to support a man under all
kinds of sufferings, and even death itself, for its sake, without any
prospect of future recompense. Here, therefore, began the error of the
Stoics, who taught that the bare practice of virtue was itself the
chief good, and able of itself to make a man happy, under all the
calamities in the world. Their defence indeed of the cause of virtue
was very brave: they saw well that its excellency was intrinsic, and
founded in the nature of things themselves, and could not be altered by
any outward circumstances; that therefore virtue must needs be
desirable for its own sake, and not merely for the advantage it might
bring along with it; and if so, then consequently neither could any
external disadvantage, which it might happen to be attended with,
change the intrinsic worth of the thing itself, or ever make it cease
to be truly desirable. Wherefore, in the case of sufferings and death,
for the sake of virtue; not having any certain knowledge of a future
state of reward, (though the wisest of them did indeed hope for it, and
think it highly probable;) they were forced, that they might be
consistent with their own principles, to suppose the practice of virtue
a sufficient reward to itself in all cases, and a full compensation for
all the sufferings in the world. And accordingly they very bravely
indeed taught, that the practice of virtue was not only [172]
infinitely to be preferred before all the sinful pleasures in the
world; but also [173] that a man ought without scruple to choose, if
the case was proposed to him, rather to undergo all possible sufferings
with virtue, than to obtain all possible worldly happiness by sin. And
the suitable practice of some few of them, as of Regulus, for instance,
who chose to die the cruelest death that could be invented, rather than
break his faith with an enemy, is indeed very wonderful, and to be
admired. But yet, after all this, it is plain that the general practice
of virtue in the world can never be supported upon this foot. The
discourse is admirable, but it seldom goes further than mere words: And
the practice of those few who have acted accordingly, has not been
imitated by the rest of the world. Men never will generally, and indeed
it is not very reasonable to be expected they should, part with all the
comforts of life, and even life itself, without expectation of any
future recompense. So that, if we suppose no future state of rewards,
it will follow, that God has indued men with such faculties, as put
them under a necessity of approving and choosing virtue in the judgment
of their own minds; and yet has not given them wherewith to support
themselves in the suitable and constant practice of it. The
consideration of which inexplicable difficulty ought to have led the
philosophers to a firm belief and expectation of a future state of
rewards and punishments, without which their whole scheme of morality
cannot be supported. And because a thing of such necessity and
importance to mankind was not more clearly and directly and universally
made known, it might naturally have led them to some farther
consequences also, which I shall have occasion particularly to deduce
hereafter.
Thus have I endeavoured to deduce the original obligations of morality
from the necessary and eternal reason and proportions of things. Some
have chosen to found [174] all difference of good and evil, in the mere
positive will and power of God: But the absurdity of this, I have shown
elsewhere. Others have contended, that all difference of good and evil,
and all obligations of morality, ought to be founded originally upon
considerations of public utility. And true indeed it is, in the whole,
that the good of the universal creation does always coincide with the
necessary truth and reason of things. But otherwise, (and separate from
this consideration, that God will certainly cause truth and right to
terminate in happiness,) what is for the good of the whole creation, in
very many cases, none but an infinite understanding can possibly judge.
Public utility is one thing to one nation, and the contrary to another:
And the governors of every nation will and must be judges of the public
good: And by public good they will generally mean the private good of
that particular nation. But truth and right (whether public or private)
founded in the eternal and necessary reason of things, is what every
man can judge of, when laid before him. It is necessarily one and the
same, to every man's understanding, just as light is the same to every
man's eyes.
He who thinks it right and just, upon account of public utility, to
break faith (suppose) with a robber, let him consider that it is much
more useful to do the same by a multitude of robbers, by tyrants, by a
nation of robbers: And then all faith is evidently at an end. For,
mutato nomine de te, &c. What fidelity and truth are, is understood by
every man; but between two nations at war, who shall be judge which of
them are the robbers? Besides: To rob a man of truth and of eternal
happiness, is worse than robbing him of his money and of his temporal
happiness: And therefore it will be said that heretics may even more
justly, and with much greater utility to the public, be deceived and
destroyed by breach of truth and faith, than the most cruel robbers.
Where does this terminate?
The manifold absurdities of Mr Hobbes's doctrines concerning the
original of right shown in particular. And now, from what has been said
upon this head, it is easy to see the falsity and weakness of Mr
Hobbes's doctrines, that there is no such thing as just and unjust,
right and wrong, originally in the nature of things; that men in their
natural state, antecedent to all compacts, are not obliged to universal
benevolence, nor to any moral duty whatsoever; but are in a state of
war, and have every one a right to do whatever he has power to do; and
that, in civil societies, it depends wholly upon positive laws or the
will of governors to define what shall be just or unjust. The contrary
to all which having been already fully demonstrated, there is no need
of being large, in further disproving and confuting, particularly,
these assertions themselves. I shall therefore only mention a few
observations, from which some of the greatest and most obvious
absurdities of the chief principles, upon which Mr Hobbes builds his
whole doctrine in this matter, may most easily appear.
1. First, then, the ground and foundation of Mr Hobbes's scheme, is
this, [175] that all men being equal by nature, and naturally desiring
the same things, have [176] every one a right to every thing, are every
one desirous to have absolute dominion over all others; and may every
one justly do whatever at any time is in his power, by violently taking
from others either their possessions or lives, to gain to himself that
absolute dominion. Now this is exactly the same thing as if a man
should affirm that a part is equal to the whole, or that one body can
be present in a thousand places at once. For to say that one man has a
full right to the same individual things, which another man at the same
time has a full right to, is saying that two rights may be [177]
contradictory to each other; that is, that a thing may be right, at the
same time that it is confessed to be wrong. For instance; if every man
has a right to preserve his own life, then [178] it is manifest I can
have no right to take any man's life away from him, unless he has first
forfeited his own right, by attempting to deprive me of mine. For
otherwise, it might be right for me to do that which, at the same time,
because it could not be done but in breach of another man's right, it
could not be right for me to do; which is the greatest absurdity in the
world. The true state of this case, therefore, is plainly this. In Mr
Hobbes's state of nature and equality, every man having an equal right
to preserve his own life, it is evident every man has a right to an
equal proportion of all those things which are either necessary or
useful to life. And consequently, so far is it from being true, that
any one has an original right to possess all, that, on the contrary,
whoever first attempts, without the consent of his fellows, and except
it be for some public benefit, to take to himself more than his
proportion, is the beginner of iniquity, and the author of all
succeeding mischief.
2. To avoid this absurdity, therefore, Mr Hobbes is forced to assert,
in the next place, that since every man has confessedly a right to
preserve his own life, and consequently to do every thing that is
necessary to preserve it, and since, in the state of nature, men will
necessarily have [179] perpetual jealousies and suspicions of each
other's encroaching, therefore just precaution gives every one a right
to endeavour, [180] for his own security, to prevent, oppress, and
destroy all others, either by secret artifice or open violence, as it
shall happen at any time to be in his power, as being the only certain
means of self-preservation. [181] But this is even a plainer absurdity,
if possible, than the former. For (besides that, according to Mr
Hobbes's principles, men, before positive compacts, may justly do what
mischief they please, even without the pretence of self-preservation,)
what can be more ridiculous that to imagine a war of all men against
all, the directest and certainest means of the preservation of all?
Yes, says he, because it leads men to a necessity of entering into
compact for each other's security. But then to make these compacts
obligatory, he is forced (as I shall presently observe more
particularly) to recur to an [182] antecedent law of nature, and this
destroys all that he had before said. For the same law of nature which
obliges men to fidelity, after having made a compact, will unavoidably,
upon all the same accounts, be found to oblige them before all
compacts, to contentment and mutual benevolence, as the readiest and
certainest means to the preservation and happiness of them all. It is
true, men, by entering into compacts, and making laws, agree to compel
one another to do what perhaps the mere sense of duty, however really
obligatory in the highest degree, would not, without such compacts,
have force enough of itself to hold them to in practice; and so,
compacts must be acknowledged to be in fact a great addition and
strengthening of men's security. But this compulsion makes no
alteration in the obligation itself, and only shows that that entirely
lawless state, which Mr Hobbes calls the state of nature, is by no
means truly natural, or in any sense suitable to the nature and
faculties of man, but, on the contrary, is a state of extremely
unnatural and intolerable corruption, as I shall presently prove more
fully from some other considerations.
3. Another notorious absurdity and inconsistency in Mr. Hobbes's
scheme, is this: That he all along supposes some particular branches of
the law of nature (which he thinks necessary for the foundation of some
parts of his own doctrine,) to be originally obligatory from the bare
reason of things; at the same time that he denies and takes away
innumerable others, which have plainly in the nature and reason of
things the same foundation of being obligatory as the former, and
without which the obligation of the former can never be solidly made
out and defended. Thus, he supposes that, in the state of nature,
before any compact be made, every [183] man's own will is his only law;
that [184] nothing a man can do, is unjust: and that [185] whatever
mischief one man does to another is no injury nor injustice; neither
has the person, to whom the mischief is done, how great soever it be,
any just reason to complain of wrong; (I think it may here reasonably
be presumed, that if Mr. Hobbes had lived in such a state of nature,
and had happened to be himself the suffering party, he would in this
case have been of another opinion:) And yet at the same time he
supposes, that in the same state of nature men are by all means obliged
[186] to seek peace, and [187] to enter into compacts to remedy the
fore-mentioned mischiefs. Now if men are obliged, by the original
reason and nature of things to seek terms of peace, and to get out of
the pretended natural state of war, as soon as they can; how come they
not to be obliged originally by the same reason and nature of things,
to live from the beginning in universal benevolence, and avoid entering
into the state of war at all? He must needs confess they would be
obliged to do so, did not self-preservation necessitate them every man
to war upon others: But this cannot be true of the first aggressor;
whom yet Mr Hobbes, in the place [188] now cited, vindicates from being
guilty of any injustice; and therefore herein he unavoidably
contradicts himself. Thus, again; in most instances of morality, he
supposes right and wrong, just and unjust, to have no foundation in the
nature of things, but to depend entirely on positive laws; that [189]
the rules or distinctions of good and evil, honest and dishonest, are
mere civil constitutions; and whatever the chief magistrate commands,
is to be accounted good; whatever he forbids, evil; that it is the law
of the land only which makes robbery to be robbery; [190] or adultery
to be adultery; that the commandments, [191] to honour our parents, to
do no murder, not to commit adultery, and all the other laws of God and
nature, are no further obligatory than the civil power shall think fit
to make them so; nay, that where the supreme authority commands men to
worship God by an image or idol, in heathen countries, [192] (for in
this instance he cautiously excepts Christian ones,) it is lawful, and
their duty to do it; and (agreeably, as a natural consequence to all
this,) that it is men's positive duty to obey the commands of the civil
power in all things, even in things [193] clearly and directly against
their conscience; (that is, that it is their positive duty to do that
which at the same time they know plainly it is their duty not to do;)
[194] keeping up indeed always in their own minds an inward desire to
observe the laws of nature and conscience, but not being bound to
observe them in their outward actions, except when it is safe so to do;
(He might as well have said that human laws and constitutions have
[195] power to make light be darkness, and darkness light; to make
sweet be bitter, and bitter sweet: And, indeed, as one absurdity will
naturally lead a man into another, he does say something very like it;
namely, that the [196] civil authority is to judge of all opinions and
doctrines whatsoever; to [197] determine questions philosophical,
mathematical; and, because indeed the signification of words is
arbitrary, even [198] arithmetical ones also; as whether a man shall
presume to affirm that two and three make five or not:) And yet at the
same time, some particular things, which it would either have been too
flagrantly scandalous for him to have made depending upon human laws;
as that [199] God is to be loved, honoured, and adored; [200] that a
man ought not to murder his parents; and the like: Or else, which were
of necessity to be supposed for the foundation of his own scheme; [201]
as that compacts ought to be faithfully performed, and [202] obedience
to be duly paid to civil powers: The obligation of these things he is
forced to deduce entirely from the internal reason and fitness of the
things themselves; [203] antecedent to, independent upon, and
unalterable by all human constitutions whatsoever: In which matter he
is guilty of the grossest absurdity and inconsistency that can be. For
if those greatest and strongest of all our obligations; to love and
honour God, for instance, or, to perform compacts faithfully; depend
not at all on any human constitution, but must of necessity (to avoid
making obligations reciprocally depend on each other in a circle,) be
confessed to arise originally from, and be founded in, the eternal
reason and unalterable nature and relations of things themselves; and
the nature and force of these obligations be sufficiently clear and
evident; so that he who dishonours God, [204] or wilfully breaks his
faith, [205] is (according to Mr Hobbes's own reasoning) guilty of as
great an absurdity in practice, and of as plainly contradicting the
right reason of his own mind, as he who in a dispute is reduced to a
necessity of asserting something inconsistent with itself; and the
original obligation to these duties can from hence only be distinctly
deduced: Then, for the same reason, all the other duties likewise of
natural religion; such as universal benevolence, justice, equity, and
the like, (which I have before proved to receive in like manner their
power of obliging from the eternal reason and relations of things,)
must needs be obligatory, antecedent to any consideration of positive
compact, and unalterably and independently on all human constitutions
whatsoever: And consequently Mr Hobbes's whole scheme, (both of a state
of nature at first wherein there was no such thing as right or wrong,
just or unjust, at all; and of these things depending afterwards, by
virtue of compact, wholly and absolutely on the positive and arbitrary
determination of the civil power;) falls this way entirely to the
ground, by his having been forced to suppose some particular things
obligatory, originally, and in their own nature. On the contrary, if
the rules of right and wrong, just and unjust, have none of them any
obligatory force in the state of nature, antecedent to positive
compact, then, for the same reason, neither will they be of any force
after the compact, so as to afford men any certain and real security;
(excepting only what may arise from the compulsion of laws, and fear of
punishment, which, therefore, it may well be supposed, is all that Mr
Hobbes really means at the bottom.) For if there be no obligation of
just and right antecedent to the compact, then whence arises the
obligation of the compact itself, on which he supposes all other
obligations to be founded? If, before any compact was made, it was no
injustice for a man to take away the life of his neighbour, not for his
own preservation, but merely to satisfy an arbitrary humour [206] or
pleasure, and without any reason or provocation at all, how comes it to
be an injustice, after he has made a compact, to break and neglect it?
Or what is it that makes breaking one's word, to be a greater and more
unnatural crime, than killing a man merely for no other reason but
because no positive compact has been made to the contrary? So that
[207] this way also, Mr Hobbes's whole scheme is entirely destroyed.
4. That state, which Mr Hobbes calls the state of nature, is not in any
sense a natural state; but a state of the greatest, most unnatural, and
most intolerable corruption that can be imagined. For reason, which is
the proper nature of man, can never (as has been before shown) lead men
to any thing else than universal love and benevolence; and wars,
hatred, and violence, can never arise but from extreme corruption. A
man may sometimes, it is true, in his own defence, be necessitated, in
compliance with the laws of nature and reason, to make war upon his
fellows: But the first aggressors, who, upon Mr Hobbes's principles,
(that all men [208] have a natural will to hurt each other, and that
every one in the state of nature has a right [209] to do whatever he
has a will to;)--the first aggressors, I say, who, upon these
principles, assault and violently spoil as many as they are superior to
in strength, without any regard to equity or proportion; these can
never, by any colour whatsoever, be excused from having utterly [210]
divested themselves of human nature, and having introduced into the
world, [211] contrary to all the laws of nature and reason, the
greatest calamities, and most unnatural confusion, that mankind, by the
highest abuse of their natural powers and faculties, are capable of
falling under. Mr Hobbes pretends, indeed, that one of the first and
most natural principles of human life [212] is a desire necessarily
arising in every man's mind, of having power and dominion over others;
and that this naturally impels men to use force and violence to obtain
it. But neither is it true, that men, following the dictates of reason
and uncorrupted nature, desire disproportionate power and dominion over
others; neither, if it was natural to desire such power, would it at
all follow that it was agreeable to nature to use violent and hurtful
means to obtain it. For since the only natural and good reason to
desire power and dominion, (more than what is necessary for every man's
self-preservation) is, that the possessor of such power may have a
larger compass, and greater abilities, and opportunities of doing good,
(as is evident from God's exercise of perfectly absolute power,) it is
plain that no man obeying the uncorrupted dictates of nature and reason
can desire to increase his power by such destructive and pernicious
methods, the prevention of which is the only good reason that makes the
power itself truly desirable: All violence, therefore, and war, are
plainly the effects, not of natural desires, but of unnatural and
extreme corruption; and this Mr Hobbes himself unwarily proves against
himself by those very arguments whereby he endeavours to prove that war
and contention is more natural to men than to bees or ants; for his
arguments on this head are all drawn from men's using themselves (as
the animals he is speaking of cannot do,) to strive about honours and
dignities, till the contention grows up into hatred, seditions, and
wars; [213] to separate each one his private interest from the public,
[214] and value himself highly above others, upon getting and
engrossing to himself more than his proportion of the things of life,
to find fault with each other's management, [215] and, through
self-conceit, being in continual innovation and distractions, to impose
one upon another by lies, [216] falsifying, and deceit, calling good
evil, and evil good, to grow envious at the prosperity of others, [217]
or proud and domineering when themselves are in ease and plenty, and to
keep up tolerable peace and agreement among themselves, [218] merely by
artificial compacts and the compulsion of laws; all which things are so
far from being truly the natural effects and result of men's reason and
other faculties, that, on the contrary, they are evidently some of the
grossest abuses and most unnatural corruptions thereof, that any one
who was arguing on the opposite side of the question could easily have
chosen to have instanced in.
5. Lastly; The chief and principal argument, which is one of the main
foundations of Mr Hobbes's and his followers' system, namely, that
God's irresistible power is the only foundation of his dominion, [219]
and the only measure of his right over his creatures; and,
consequently, that every other being has just so much right as it has
natural power, that is, that it is naturally right for every thing to
do whatever it has power to do: [220] This argument, I say, is of all
his others the most notoriously false and absurd; as may sufficiently
appear, (besides what has been already said of God's other perfections
being as much the measure of his right as his power is, [221] ) from
this single consideration, suppose the devil, (for when men run into
extreme impious assertions, they must be answered with suitable
suppositions,) suppose, I say, such a being as we conceive the devil to
be, of extreme malice, cruelty, and iniquity, was indued with supreme
absolute power, and made use of it only to render the world as
miserable as was possible, in the most cruel, arbitrary, and unequal
manner that can be imagined; would it not follow undeniably, upon Mr
Hobbes's scheme, since dominion is founded on power, and power is the
measure of right, and consequently absolute power gives absolute right,
that such a government as this would not only be as much of necessity
indeed to be submitted to, but also that it would be as just and right,
and with as little reason to be complained of, [222] as is the present
government of the world in the hands of the ever-blessed and infinitely
good God, whose love and goodness and tender mercy appear everywhere
over all his works?
Here Mr Hobbes, as an unanswerable argument in defence of his
assertion, urges, [223] that the only reason why men are bound to obey
God is plainly nothing but weakness or want of power; because, if they
themselves were all-powerful, it is manifest they could not be under
any obligation to obey; and, consequently, power would give them an
undoubted right to do what they pleased. That is to say; if men were
not created and dependent beings, it is true they could not indeed be
obliged to the proper relative duty of created and dependent beings,
viz. to obey the will and command of another in things positive. But
from their obligation to the practice of moral virtues, of justice,
righteousness, equity, holiness, purity, goodness, beneficence,
faithfulness, and truth, from which Mr Hobbes fallaciously, in this
argument, and most impiously in his whole scheme, [224] endeavours to
discharge them; from this they could not be discharged by any addition
of power whatsoever; because the obligation to these things is not, as
the obligation to obey in things of arbitrary and positive
constitution, founded only in the weakness, subjection, and dependency
of the persons obliged; but also, and chiefly, in the eternal and
unchangeable nature and reason of the things themselves: For these
things are the law of God himself, not only to his creatures, but also
to himself, as being the rule of all his own actions in the government
of the world.
I have been the longer upon this head, because moral virtue is the
foundation and the sum, the essence and the life, of all true religion;
for the security whereof all positive institution was principally
designed; for the restoration whereof all revealed religion was
ultimately intended; and inconsistent wherewith, or in opposition to
which, all doctrines whatsoever, supported by what pretence of reason
or authority soever, are as certainly and necessarily false, as God is
true.
__________________________________________________________________
[111] See Hobbes de Cive, c. 3. § 4.
[112] Ex his sequitur injuriam nemini fieri posse, nisi ei quocum
initur pactum. De Cive, c. 3. § 4. where see more to the same purpose.
[113] Manifestum est rationem nullam esse lege prohibendi noxas tales,
nisi agnoscant tales actus, etiam antecedenter ad ullam legem, mala
esse.--Cumberl. de Leg. Nat. page 194.
[114] Nam stoliditas inveniri quæ inanior potest, quam mala esse nulla
contendere, et tanquam malos perdere et condemnare peccantes?--Arnob.
advers. Gentes, lib. 2.
[115] Qui autem civium rationem dicunt habendam, externorum negant;
dirimunt hi communem generis humani societatem; qua sublata, justitia
funditus tollitur.--Cic. de Offic. lib. 3.
[116] Ta de kala kai ta dikaia. peri on he politike skopeitai, tosauten
echei diaphoran kai planen oste dokein nomo einai, phusei de
me.--Aristot. Ethic. lib. 1. cap. 1.
[117] Kleptein nenomisto tous eleutherous paidas, ho ti tis
dunaito.--Plutarch. Apophthegmata Laconica.
[118] Quis est enim, aut quis unquam fuit, aut avaritia tam ardente aut
tam effrænatis cupiditatibus, ut eandem illam rem, quam adspici scelere
quovis velit, non multis partibus malit ad sese, etiam omni impunitate
proposita, sine facinore, quam illo modo pervenire?--Cic. de Finib.
lib. 3.
[119] Placet suapte natura, adeoque gratiosa virtus est, ut insitum
etiam sit malis probare meliores.--Senec. de Benef. lib. 4.
[120] Joh. vii. 46.
[121] Joh. xviii. 88.
[122] Ou gar hoson ousias aretes apesphalmenoi tunchanousin hoi polloi,
tosouton kai tou krinein tous allous hoi poneroi kai achrestos theinn
de ti kai eustochon esti kai toisi kakois hoste pampolloi kai ton
sphodra kakon, eu tois logois kai dexais diarountai tous ameinous ton
anthropon kai tous cheirous.--Plato de Leg. lib. 12.
[123] Quis Pullum Numitorem, Fregellanum Proditorem, quanquam
reipublicæ nostræ profuit, non odit?--Cic. de Finib. lib 5.
[124] Quem vero astrorum ordines, quem dierum noctiumque
vicissitudines, quem mensium temperatio, quemque ea quæ gignuntur nobis
ad fruendum, non gratum esse cogant; hnnc hominem omnino numerare qui
decet?--Cic. de Legib. lib. 2.
[125] Ei gar noun eichomen, allo ti edei hemas poiein kai koine kai
idia, e umnein to theion, kai euphemein, kai epexerchesthai tas
chari9tas; Ouk edei kai skaptontas kai arountas kai esthiontas adein
ton humnon ton eis ton theon; Megas ho theos, hoti hemin pareschen
organa tauta di hon ten gen ergasometha; Megas ho theos, hoti cheiras
dedoken, &c.--Arrian. lib. 1. cap. 16.
[126] Nihil est unum uni tam simile, tam par, quam omnes inter
nosmetipsos sumus. Quod, si depravatio consuetudinum, si opinionum
vanitas, non imbecillitatem animorum torqueret, et flecteret quocunque
cæpisset; sui nemo ipse tam similis esset, quam omnes sunt omnium;--et
coleretur jus æque ab omnibus.--Cic. de Leg. lib. 1.
[127] Hoc exigit ipsa naturæ ratio, quæ est lex divina et humana, cui
parere qui velit, nunquam committet ut alienum appetat, et id, quod
alteri detraxerit, sibi assumat.--Cic. de Offic. lib. 3.
[128] Deinous gar an pareichen erotas, eiti toiouton eautes enarges
eidolon pareicheto, &c.--Plat. in Phæd. Quæ si oculis cerneretur,
mirabiles amores, ut ait Plato, excitaret sui.--Cic. de Offic. lib. 1.
Oculorum est in nobis sensus acerrimus, quibus sapientiam non cernimus;
quà m illa ardentes amores excitaret sui, si videretur!--Id. de fin. l.
2.
[129] Haute men oun he dikaiosune, arete men esti teleia; kai outh'
Hesperos outh' Heoos houto thaumaston.--Ethic. lib. 5. c. 3.
[130] Non enim mihi est vita mea utilior, quam animi talis affectio,
neminem ut violem commodi mei gratia.--Cic. de Offic. lib. 3. Detrahere
aliquid alteri, et hominem hominis incommodo suum augere commodum,
magis est contra naturam, quà m mors, quà m paupertas, quà m dolor, quà
m cætera quæ possunt aut corpori accidere, aut rebus externis.--Id.
[131] Kai to parapan zen, megiston men kakon, ton xumpanta chronon
athanaton onta, kai kektemenon panta ta legomena agatha, plen
dikaiosunes te kai aretes apases.--Plato de Leg. lib. 2.
[132] Universaliter autem verum est, quod non certius, fluxus puncti
lineam producit aut additio numerorum summam, quam quod benevolentia
effectum præstat bonum.--Cumberland. de Leg. Naturæ, page 10. Pari sane
ratione [ac in arithmeticis operationibus] doctrinæ moralis veritas
fundatur in immutabili cohærentia inter felicitatem summam quam hominum
vires assequi valent, et actus benevolentiæ universalis.--Id ibid. page
23. Eadem est mensura boni malique, quæ mensura est veri falsique in
propositionibus pronuntiantibus de efficacia motum ad rerum aliarum
conservationem, et corruptionem facientium.--Id. page 30.
[133] Angusta admodum est circa nostra tantummodo commoda, lætitiæ
matria; sed eadem erit amplissima, si aliorum omnium felicitas cordi
nobis sit. Quippe hæc ad illam eandem habebit proportionem, quam habet
immensa beatitudo Dei, totiusque humani generis, ad curtam illam fictæ
felicitatis supellectilem, quam uni homini, eique invido et malevolo,
fortunæ bona possint suppeditare.--Id. ibid. page 214.
[134] In omni honesto, nihil est tam illustre, nec quod latius pateat,
quam conjunctio inter homines hominum, et quasi quædam societas et
communicatio utilitatum, et ipsa charitas generis humani; quæ nata a
primo satu, quo a procreatoribus nati diliguntur,----serpit sensim
foras, cognationibus primum,----deinde totius complexu gentis
humanæ.--Cic. de Finib. lib. 5.
[135] Nihil est unum uni tam simile, tam par, quam omnes inter
nosmetipsos sumus. Quod nisi depravatio, &c. sui nemo ipse tam similis
esset, quam omnes sunt omnium.--Cic. de Legib. lib. 1.
[136] Impellimur autem natura, ut prodesse velimus quamplurimis.--Cic.
de Finib. lib. 3.
[137] Hominem esse quasi partem quandam civitatis et universi generis
humani, eumque esse conjunctum cum hominibus humana quadam
societate.--Cic. Quæst. Academ. lib. 1.
[138] Homines hominum causa sunt generati, ut ipsi inter se alii aliis
prodesse possint.--Cic. de Offic. lib. 1. Ad tuendos conservandosque
homines, hominem natum esse.--Cic. de Finib. lib 3.
[139] Omnes inter se naturali quadam indulgentia et benevolentia
contineri.--Cic. de Legib. lib. 1.
[140] Ex quo efficitur, hominem naturæ obedientem, homini nocere non
posse.--Cic. de Offic. lib. 3.
[141] Oute ?ra antadikein dei, houte kakos poiein oudena anthropon,
oud? an hotioun paschheupo auton.--Plato in Critone.
[142] Tum illud effici, quod quibusdam incredibile videatur, sit autem
necessarium, ut nihil sese plus quam alterum diligat.--Cic. de Legib.
lib. 1.
[143] En tine phroura esmen hoi anthropoi, kai ou deide heauton ek
tautes luein, oud' apodidraskein.----Theous heinai hemon tous
epimeloumenous. kai hemas tous anthropous en tou ktematon tois theois
einai.----Oukoun kai su an, tou sautou ktematon eiti auto heauto
apoktinnuoi, me semenantos sou hoti boulei auto tethnanai, chalepanoi9s
an auto, kai. ei tina echois timorian, timoroi o en. --Plato in Phæd.
[144] Vetat enim dominans ille in nobis Deus, injussu hinc nos suo
demigrare. Cum verò causam justam Deus ipse dederit, ne ille medius
fidius vir sapiens, lætus ex his tenebris in lucem illam excesserit;
nec tamen illa vincula carceris ruperit; leges enim vetant; sed tanquam
a magistratu, aut ab aliqua potestate legitima, sic a Deo evocatus,
atque emissus, exirit.--Cic. Tusc. Quæst. lib. 1.
[145] Illud breve vitæ reliquum nec avide appetendum sensibus, nec sine
causa deserendum est; vetatque Pythagoras injussu imperatoris, id est,
Dei, de præsidio et statione vitæ decedere.--Cic. de Senect.
[146] Nisi enim Deus is, cujus hoc templum est omne quod conspicis,
istis te corporis custodiis liberaverit; hue tibi aditus patere non
potest.----Quare et tibi et piis omnibus retinendus est animus in
custodia corporis; nec injussu ejus, a quo ille est nobis datus, ex
hominum vita migrandum est; munus humanum assignatum a Deo defugisse
videamini.--Cic. Somn. Scipion.
[147] Ekdexasthe ton theon; hotan ekei nos semene kai upoluse umas
tautes tes uperesias tot' hupoluesthe pros auton; epi de tou parintos
anaschesthe enoikountes tauten ten choran, eis hen ekeinos umas etaxen.
Meinate, me alogistos apelthete.--Arrian, lib. 1.
[148] Hoi men ara nikes heneka pales kai dromon kai ton toiouton,
etolmesan apechesthai.----Hoi de hemeteroi paides, adunatesousi
karterein, polu kallionos ena_a nikes.--Plato de Legib. lib. 8.
[149] Est quidem vera lex, recta ratio naturæ congruens, diffusa in
omnes, constans, sempiterna, quæ vocet ad officium jubendo; vetando, a
fraude deterreat.----Huic legi nec abrogari fas est, neque derogari ex
hac aliquid licet, neque tota abrogari potest. Nec vero aut per senatum
aut per populum solvi hac lege possumus.--Cic. de Repub. lib. 3.
fragment.
----agrapta kasphale theon Nomima;----
Ou gar ti nunge kachthes, all' aei pote
Ze tauta, ko?dei; oiden ex hotou' phane.
Touton ego ouk hemellon, andros oudenos
Phronema deisas', en theoi si ten diken
Dusein.--
Sophocl. Antigon. 464.
[150] Lex quæ seculis omnibus ante nata est, quam scripta lex ulla, aut
quam omnino civitas constituta.--Cic. de Leg. lib. 1.
[151] Legem neque hominum ingeniis excogitatam, neque scitum aliquod
esse populorum, sed æternum quiddami, quod universum mundum
regat.--Cic. de Leg. lib. 2.
[152] Nec si, regnante Tarquinio, nulla erat Romæ scripta lex de
stupris, idcirco non contra illam legem sempiternam Sextus Tarquinius
vim Lucretiæ attulit. Erat enim ratio profecta a rerum natura, et ad
recte faciendum impellens, et a delicto avocans; quæ non tum denique
incipit lex esse, cum scripta est, sed tum cum orta esset; orta autem
simul est cum mente divina.--Cic. de Legib. lib. 2.
[153] In judicio de bonitate harum rerum, æque omnes ubique
convenirunt, ac omnia animalia in motu cordis et arteriarum pulsu, aut
omnes homines in opinione de nivis candore et splendore
solis.--Cumberland. de Leg. Natura, page 167.
[154] Hoc tamen non magis tollit consensum hominum de generali natura
boni, ejusque partibus vel speciebus præcipuis, quam levis vultuum
diversitas tollit convenientiam inter homines in communi hominum
definitione, aut similitudinem inter eos in partium principalium
conformatione et usu. Nulla gens est quæ non sentiat actus Deum
diligendi, &c.--nulla gens quæ non sentit gratitudinem erga parentes et
benefactores, toti humano generi salutarem esse. Nulla temperamentorum
diversitas facit ut quisquam non bonum esse sentiat universis, ut
singulorum innocentium vitæ, membra, et libertas
conserventur.--Cumberland de Legib. Naturæ, page 166. Neque enim an
honorifice de Deo sentiendum sit, neque an sit amandus, timendus,
colendus, dubitari potest. Sunt enim hæc religionum, per omnes gentes
communia.----Deum eo ipso, quod homines fecerit rationales, hoc illis
præcepisse, et cordibus omnium insculpsisse, ne quisquam cuiquam
faceret, quod alium sibi facere iniquum duceret.--Hobbes, de Homine,
cap. 14. [Inconsistently enough with his own principles.]
[155] Nam ut vera et falsa, ut consequentia et contraria, sua sponte,
non aliena, judicantur: sic constans et perpetua ratio vitæ, quæ est
virtus; itemque inconstantia, quod est vitium; sua natura
probatur.--Cic. de Legib. lib. 1.
[156] Quod verè dicimus, etiamsi a nullo laudetur, laudabile esse
natura.--Cic. de Offic. lib. 1.
[157] Hæc autem in opinione existimare, non in natura ponere, dementis
est. Nam nec arboris nec equi virtus, quæ dicitur, in opinione sita
est, sed in natura.--Cic. de Legib. lib. 1.
[158] Jam vero stultissimum illud; existimare omnia justa esse, quæ
scita sint in populorum institutis aut legibus. Etiamne si quæ sunt
tyrannorum leges, si triginta illi Athenis leges imponere voluissent,
aut si omnes Athenienses delectarentur tyrannicis legibus, num idcirco
hæ leges justæ haberentur?--Cic. de Leg. lib. 1.
[159] Quod si populorum jussis, si principum decretis, si sententiis
judicum, jura constituerentur; jus esset latrocinari, jus adulterare,
jus testamenta falsa supponere, si hæc suffragiis aut scitis
multitudinis probarentur. Quæ si tanta potentia est stultorum
sententiis atque jussis, ut eorum suffragiis rerum natura vertatur; cur
non sanciunt ut quæ mala perniciosaque sunt, habeantur pro bonis ac
salutaribus, aut cur, cum jus ex injuriâ lex facere possit, bonum eadem
facere; non possit ex malo?--Id. ibid.
[160] Virtutis et vitiorum, sine ulla divina ratione, grave ipsius
conscientiæ pondus est.--Cic. de Nat. Deor. lib 3.
[161] Denique nequis obligationem legum naturalium arbitrariam et
mutabilem a nobis fingi suspicetur, hoc adjiciendum censui; virtutum
exercitium, habere rationem medii necessarii ad finem, (seposita
consideratione imperii divini,) manente rerum natura tali qualis nunc
est. Hoc autem ita intelligo, uti agnoscunt plerique omnes, additionem
duarum unitatum duabus prius positis, necessario constituere numerum
quaternarium; aut, uti praxes geometricæ et mechanicæ, problemata
proposita solvunt immutabiliter; adeo ut nec sapientia nec voluntas
divina cogitari possit quicquam in contrarium constituere
posse.--Cumberland de Legib. Naturæ, page 231.
[162] To horomenon, hou dioti horomenon ge esti, dia toupo horatai;
alla tounantion, dioti horatai, apo touto huromenon. [Note,--These
words are by Ficinus ridiculously translated videtur and visum est.]
Oukoun kai to hosion, dioti hosion esti, phileitai hupo ton theon; all'
ouk hoti phileitas, dia touto hosion esti.--Plato in Euthyphr.
[163] Kath' hemas gar he aute arete esti ton makarion panton; hoste kai
he aute arete anthropou kai Theou--Origen. Advers. Celsum. lib. 4.
[164] Dictamina divini intellectus sanciuntur in leges apud ipsum
valituras, per immutabilitatem harum perfectionum.--Cumberland de Leg.
Naturæ, page 343. Solebam ipse quidem, cum aliis plurimis antequam
dominii jurisque omnis originem universaliter et distincte
considerassem; dominium Dei, in creationem velut integram ejus
originem, resolvere. Verum quoniam, &c.----in hanc tandem concessi
sententiam, dominium Dei esse jus vel potestatem ei a sua sapientia et
bonitate, velut a lege, datam ad regimen eorum omnium quæ ab ipso
unquam creata fuerint vel creabuntur.----Nec poterit quisquam merito
conqueri, dominium Dei intra nimis angustos limites hac explicatione
coerceri; qua hoc unum dicitur, illius nullam partem consistere in
potestate quicquam faciendi contra finem optimum, bonum commune.--Idem,
page 345, 346. Contrà autem, Hobbiana resolutio dominii divini in
potentiam ejus irresistibilem adeo apertè ducit ad, &c.--ut mihi dubium
non sit, illud ab eo fictum fuisse, Deoque attributum, in eum tantum
finem, ut juri suo omnium in omnia patrocinaretur.--Id. page 344. Nos e
contrario, fontem indicavimus, e quo demonstrari potest, justitiam
universalem, omnemque adeo virtutem moralem, quæ in rectore requiritur,
in Deo præ cæteris refulgere, eadem planè methodo, qua homines ad eas
excolendas obligari ostendemus.--Id. page347.
[165] Dignæ itaque sunt, quæ propter intrinsecam sibi perfectionem
appetantur, etiam si nulla esset naturæ lex, quæ illas
imperaret.--Cumberland de Leg. Nat. page 281.
[166]
Aner dikaios estin, ouch ho me adikon,
All' hostis adikein hounamenos me bouletai.
Oud' hos ta aikra lambanein apescheto,
All' hos ta megala karterei me lambanon,
Hechein dunamenos, kai kratein azemios.
Oud' hos ge tauta p8anta diaterei monon,
All' hostis adolon gnesian t' echon phusin,
Einai dikaios, k' ou dokein heinai thelei.
Philemonis Fragmenta.
[167] Honestum intelligimus, quod tale est, ut, detractâ omni
utilitate, sine ullis præmiis fructibusque, per seipsum possit jure
laudari.--Cic de Finib. lib. 2. Atque hæc omnia propter se solum, ut
nihil adjungatur emolumenti, petenda sunt.--Id. de Inventione, lib. 2.
Nihil est de quo minus dubitare possit, quam et honesta expetenda per
se, et, eodem modo, turpia per se esse fugienda.--Id. de Finib. lib. 3.
[168] Jus et omne honestum, sua sponte est expetendum. Etenim omnes
viri boni, ipsam æquitatem et jus ipsum amant.--Id. de Legib. lib. 1.
Optimi quique permulta ob eam unam causam faciunt, quia decet quia
rectum, quia honestum est etsi nullum consecuturum emolumentum
vident.--Id. de Finib. lib. 2.
[169] Satis enim nobis, (si modo aliquid in philosophia profecimus,)
persuasum esse debet, si omnes Deos hominesque celare possimus, nihil
tamen avare, nihil injuste, nihil libidinose, nihil incontinenter esse
faciendum.--Id. de Offic. lib. 3. Si nemo sciturus, nemo ne
suspicaturus quidem sit, quum aliquid divitiarum, potentiæ,
dominationis, libidinis causa feceris; si id Diis hominibusque futurum
sit semper ignotum, sisne facturus?--Id. ibid.
[170] Itaque si vir bonus habeat hanc vim, ut, si digitis concrepuerit,
possit in locupletum testamenta nomen ejus irrepere, hac vi non utatur,
ne si exploratum quidem habeat id omnino neminem unquam
suspicaturum.----Hoc qui admiratur, is se, quis sit vir bonus, nescire
fatetur.--Idem. de Offic. lib. 3.
[171] Kan ei me dunaton eie tauta lanthanein kai theous kai anthropous,
homos doteon heinai, tou loeou heneka hina aute dikaiosune pros adikian
auten kritheie.--Plato de Republ. lib. 10.
[172] Est autem unus dies bene et ex preceptis tuis actus, peccanti
immortalitati anteponendus.--Cic. Tusc. Quæst. l. 5.
[173] Quæro si duo sint, quorum alter optimus vir, æquissimus, summa
justitia, singulari fide, alter insigni scelere et audacia; et si in eo
sit errore civitas, ut bonum illum virum, sceleratum, facinorosum,
nefarium putet; contra autem qui sit improbissimus, existimet esse
summa probitate ac fide; proque hac opinione omnium civium, bonus ille
vir vexetur, rapiatur, manus ei denique auferantur, effodiantur oculi,
damnetur, vinciatur, uratur, exterminetur, egeat; postremò jure etiam
optimo omnibus miserrimus esse videatur: Contra autem, ille improbus
laudetur, colatur, ab omnibus diligatur, omnes ad eum honores, omnia
imperia, omnes opes, omnes denique copiæ conferantur, vir denique
optimus omnium æstimatione, et dignissimus omni fortuna judicetur; Quis
tandem erit tam demens qui dubitet utrum se esse malit?--Idem. de
Republ. lib. 3, fragment.
[174] Cù m omnis ratio veri et boni ab ejus Omnipotentiâ
dependeat.--Cartes. Epist. 6, partis secundæ.
[175] Ab æqualitate naturæ oritur unicuique ea, quæ cupit, acquirendi
spes.--Leviath. c. 13.
[176] Natura dedit unicuique jus in omnia. Hoc est; in statu merè
naturali, sive antequam homines ullis pactis sese invicem
obstrinxissent, unicuique licebat facere quæcunque et in quoscunque
libebat; et possidere, uti, frui omnibus, quæ volebat et poterat.--De
Cive, c. 1. § 10.
[177] Si impossibile sit singulis, omnes et omnia sibimet subjicere;
ratio quæ hunc finem proponit singulis, qui uni tantum contingere
potest, sæpius quam millies proponeret impossibile, et semel tantum
possible.--Cumberl. de Leg. Nat. page 217.
[178] Nec potest cujus quam jus seu libertas ab ulla lege relicta eo
extendere, ut liceat oppugnare ea, quæ aliis eadem lege imperantur
facienda.--Id. p. 219.
[179] Omnium adversus omnes, perpetuæ suspiciones,----Bellum omnium in
omnes.--De Cive, c. 1. § 12.
[180] Spes unicuique securitatis conservationisque suæ in eo sita est,
ut viribus artibusque propriis proximum suum, vel palam vel ex
insidiis, præoccupare possit.--Ibid. c. 5. § 1.
[181] Securitatis viam meliorem habet nemo anticipatione.--Leviath.c.
13.
[182] See de Cive, c. 3. sec. 1.
[183] Unicuique licebat facere quæcunque libebat.--De Cive, c. 1. § 10.
[184] Consequens est, ut nihil dicendum sit injustum. Nomina justi et
injusti, locum in hac conditione non habent.--Leviath. c. 13.
[185] Ex his sequitur, injuriam nemini fieri posse, nisi ei quocum
initur pactum.----Siquis alicui noceat, quocum nihil pactus est, damnum
ei infert, non injuriam.----Etenim si is qui damnum recipit, injuriam
expostularet; is qui fecit sic diceret, quid tu mihi? quare facerem ego
tuo potius, quam meo libitu? &c. In qua ratione, ubi nulla
intercesserunt pacta, non video quid sit quod possit reprehendi.--De
Cive, c. 3, § 4.
[186] Prima et fundamentalis lex nuturæ est, quærendam esse pacem, ubi
haberi potest, &c.--De Cive, c. 2. § 2.
[187] See De Cive. c. 2 and 3.
[188] Ex his sequitur, injuriam nemini fieri posse, &c.
[189] Regulas boni et mali, justi et injusti, honesti et inhonesti,
esse leges civiles; ideoque quod legislator præceperit, id pro bono,
quod vetuerit, id pro malo habendum esse.--De Cive, c. 12. § 1. Quod
actio justa vel injusta sit, a jure imperantis provenit. Reges legitimi
quæ imperant, justa faciunt imperando; quæ vetant, vetando faciunt
injusta.--De Cive, c. 12. § 1. [In which section it is worth observing,
how he ridiculously interprets those words of Solomon, "Dabis servo tuo
cor docile ut possit discernere inter bonum et malum," to signify not
his understanding or discerning, but his decreeing what shall be good,
and what evil.]
[190] Si tamen lex civilis jubeat invadere aliquid, non est illud
furtum, adulterium, &c.--De Cive, c. 14. sec. 10.
[191] Sequitur ergo, legibus illis, non occides, non mæchabere, non
furabere, parentes honorabis; nihil aliud præcepisse Christum, quam ut
cives et subditi suis principibus et summis imperatoribus in
quæstionibus omnibus circa meum, tuum, suum, alienum, absolute
obedirent.--De Cive, c. 17. § 10.
[192] Si quæratur an obediendum civitati sit, si imperetur Deum colere
sub imagine, coram iis quid id fieri honorificum esse putant, certè
faciendum est.--De Cive, cap. 15. § 18.
[193] Universaliter et in omnibus obedire obligamur.--De Cive, c. 14. §
10. Doctrina alia, quæ obedientiæ civili repugnat, est, quicquid faciat
civis quicunque contra conscientiam suam, peccatum esse.--Leviath. c.
29. Opinio eorum qui docent, peccare subditos, quoties mandata
principum suorum, quæ sibi injusta videntur esse, exsequuntur; et
erronea est, et inter eas numeranda, quæ obedientiæ civili
adversantur.--De Cive, c. 12, sec. 2.
[194] Concludendum est, legem naturæ semper et ubique obligare in foro
interno, sive conscientia, non semper in foro externo, sed tum
solummodo, cum secure id fieri possit.--De Cive, c. 3.
[195] Quæ si tanta potentia est stultorum sententiis atque jussis, ut
eorum suffragiis rerum natura vertatur cur non sanciunt, ut quæ mala
perniciosaque sunt, habeantur pro bonis ac salutaribus?--Cicero de
Legib. lib. 1.
[196] De Cive, c. 6. sec. 11.
[197] Ibid. c. 17. sec. 12.
[198] Ibid. c. 18. sec. 4.
[199] Neque enim an honorificè de Deo sentiendum sit neque an sit
amandus, timendus, colendus, dubitari potest. Sunt enim hæc religionum
per omnes gentes communia.--De Homine, cap. 14.
[200] Si is qui summum habet imperium, seipsum, imperantem dico,
interficere alicui imperet, non tenetur. Neque parentem, &c. cù m
filius mori quam vivere infamis atque exosus malit. Et alii casus sunt,
cum mandata facta inhonesta sunt, &c.--De Cive, c. 6. sec. 13.
[201] Lex naturalis est pactis standum esse, sive fidem observandam
esse.--De Cive, c. 3. sec. 1.
[202] Lex naturalis omnes leges civiles jubet observari.--Ibid. c.14.
sec. 10.
[203] Legem civilem, quæ non sit lata in contumeliam Dei (cujus
respectu ipsæ civitates non sunt sui juris, nec dicuntur leges ferre,
&c.)--De Cive, c. 14. sec. 10. Pacti violatio, &c.--See de Cive, c. 3.
sec 3.
[204] See de Cive, c. 14. sec. 10.
[205] Est similitudo quædam inter id, quod in vita communi vocatur
injuria, et id quod in scholis solet appellari absurdum. Quemadmodum
enim is, qui argumentis cogitur ad negationem assertionis quam prius
asseruerat, dicitur redigi ad absurdum; eodem modo is, qui præ animi
impotentia facit vel omittit id quod se non facturum vel non omissurum
pacto suo ante promiserat, injuriam facit; neque minus in
contradictionem incidit, quam qui in scholis reducitur ad
absurdum.--Est itaque injuria, absurditas, quædam in conversatione,
sicut absurditas, injuria quædam est in disputatione.--De Cive, c. 3.
sec. 3.
[206] Ex his sequitur, injuriam nemini fieri posse, nisi ei quocum
initur pactum.--De Cive, c. 3. sec. 4. [Which whole section highly
deserves to be read and well considered, as containing the secret of Mr
Hobbes's whole scheme.]
[207] Itaque patet quod, si Hobbiana ratiocinatio esset valida, omnis
simul legum civilium obligatio collaberetur; nec aliter fieri potest
quin earum vis labefactetur ab omnibus principiis, quæ legum naturalium
vim tollunt aut minuunt; quoniam his fundatur et regiminis civilis
auctoritas ac securitas, et legum a civitatibus latarum
vigor.--Cumberland de Leg. Nat. page 303. Etiam extra regimen civile, a
malis omnigenis simul consideratis tutior erit, qui actibus externis
leges naturæ constantissime observabet; quam qui, juxta doctrinam
Hobbianam, vi aut insidiis alios omnes conando præoccupare, securitatem
sibi quæsiverit.--Id. p. 304.
[208] Voluntas lædendi omnibus inest in statu naturæ.--De Cive, c. 1.
sec. 4.
[209] In statu naturali, unicuique licebat facere quæcunque et in
quoscunque libebat.--Ibid. sec. 10.
[210] Si nihil existimat contra naturam fieri, hominibus violandis;
quid cum eo disseras, qui omnino hominem ex homine tollat?--Cic. de
Offic. lib. 3.
[211] Tade de dikaia oud' heinai top9arapan phusei;----gignomena techee
kai toi` nomois, all' ou de tine phusei.----Phaskonton heinai to
dikaiotaton, ho, ti tis an nika biazomenos. aben aseb ai te kai
staseis; hosen loben anbropon neain domosia polesi te kai idiois
oikois.--Plato de Leg. lib. 10.
[212] Homines libertatis et dominii per naturam amatores.--Leviath. c.
17. Nemini dubium esse debet, quin avidius ferrentur homines natura,
sua si metus abesset, ad dominationem quà m ad societatem.--De Cive, c.
1. sec. 2.
[213] Homines inter se de honoribus et dignitatibus perpetuo
contendunt, sed animalia illa [apes et formicæ] non item. Itaque inter
homines invidia, odium, bellum, &c.--Leviath. c. 17.
[214] Inter animalia illa bonum publicum et privatum idem est.--Homini
autem in bonis propriis nihil tam jucundum est, quam quod alienis sunt
majora.--Ibid.
[215] Animantia quæ rationem non habent, nullum defectum vident vel
videre se putant, in adminstratione suarum rerum publicarum. Sed in
multitudine hominum, plurimi sunt qui præ cæteris sapere existimantes,
conantur res novare; Et diversi novatores innovant diversis modis; id
quod est distractio et bellum civile.--De Cive, c. 5. sec. 5.
[216] Animantia illa verborum arte illa carent, qua homines alii aliis
videri faciunt bonum malum, et malum bonum; magnum parvum; et parvum
magnum.--Leviath. c. 17.
[217] Animalia bruta, quamdiu bene sibi est, cæteris non invident: Homo
autem tum maxime molestus est, quando otio opibusque maximè
abundat.--Ibid.
[218] Consensio creaturarum illarum brutarum, naturalis est; hominum
pactitia tantum, id est, artificiosa.--De Cive, c. 5. § 5.
[219] Regni divini naturalis jus derivatur ab eo, quod divinæ potentiæ
resistere impossibile est.--Leviath. c. 31. In regno naturali, regnandi
et puniendi eos qui leges suas violant, jus Deo est a sola potentia
irresistibili.--De Cive, c. 15. sec. 5. Iis quorum potentiæ resisti non
potest, et per consequens Deo omnipotenti, jus dominandi ab ipsa
potentia derivatur.--Ibid.
[220] Nam quoniam Deus jus ad omnia habet, et jus Dei nihil aliud est
quam ipsa Dei potentia, hinc sequitur, unamquamque rem naturalem tantum
juris ex natura habere, quantum potentiæ habet.--Spinoz. de Monarch.
cap. 2. [See also Tractat. Theolog. politic. cap. 16.]
[221] See Cumberland de Leg. Naturæ, locis supra citatis.
[222] See Hobbes, de Cive, c. 3. § 4.
[223] Quod si jus regnandi habeat Deus ab omnipotentia sua, manifestum
est obligationem ad præstandum ipsi obedientiam, incumbere hominibus
propter imbecillitatem. [To explain which, he adds in his note,]--Si
cui durum hoc videbitur, illum rogo ut tacita cogitatione considerate
velit, si essent duo omnipotentes, uter utri obedire obligaretur.
Confitebitur, credo, neutrum neutri obligari. Hoc si verum est, verum
quoque est quod posui, homines ideo Deo subjectos esse, quia
omnipotentes non sunt.--De Cive, c. 15. sec. 7.
[224] Ut enim omittam vim et naturam Deorum, ne homines quidem
censetis, nisi imbecilli essent, futuros beneficos et benignos
fuisse.--Cic de Nat. Deor. lib. 1.
__________________________________________________________________
Proposition II.
II. Proposition II. Though these eternal moral obligations are indeed
of themselves incumbent on all rational beings, even antecedent to the
consideration of their being the positive will and command of God, yet
that which most strongly confirms, and in practice most effectually and
indispensably enforces them upon us, is this; that both from the
perfections of God, and the nature of things, and from several other
collateral considerations, it appears, that as God is himself
necessarily just and good in the exercise of his infinite power in the
government of the whole world, so he cannot but likewise positively
require that all his rational creatures should in their proportion be
so too, in the exercise of each of their powers in their several and
respective spheres: That is; as these eternal moral obligations are
really in perpetual force, merely from their own nature, and the
abstract reason of things; so also they are moreover the express and
unalterable will, command, and law of God to his creatures, which he
cannot but expect should, in obedience to his supreme authority, as
well as in compliance with the natural reason of things, be regularly
and constantly observed through the whole creation.
This proposition is very evident, and has little need of being
particularly proved.
For 1st. That moral duties are the positive will and command of God,
proved from the consideration of the divine attributes. The same
reasons which prove to us that God must of necessity be himself
infinitely holy, and just, and good, manifestly prove, that it must
also be his will, that all his creatures should be so likewise,
according to the proportions and capacities of their several natures.
That there are eternal and necessary differences of things, agreements
and disagreements, proportions and disproportions, fitnesses and
unfitnesses of things, absolutely in their own nature, has been before
largely demonstrated. That, with regard to these fixed and certain
proportions and fitnesses of things, the will of God, which can neither
be influenced by any external power, nor imposed upon by any error or
deceit, constantly and necessarily determines itself to choose always
what in the whole is best and fittest to be done, according to the
unalterable rules of justice, equity, goodness, and truth; has likewise
been already proved. That the same considerations ought also regularly
to determine the wills of all subordinate rational beings, to act in
constant conformity to the same eternal rules, has in like manner been
shown before. It remains therefore only to prove, that these very same
moral rules, which are thus of themselves really obligatory, as being
the necessary result of the unalterable reason and nature of things,
are moreover the positive will and command of God to all rational
creatures; and, consequently, that the wilful transgression or neglect
of them, is as truly an insolent contempt of the authority of God, as
it is an absurd confounding of the natural reasons and proportions of
things. Now this also plainly follows from what has been already laid
down: For, the same absolute perfection of the divine nature, which (as
has been before shown) makes us certain that God must himself be of
necessity infinitely holy, just, and good; makes it equally certain,
that he cannot possibly approve iniquity in others. And the same
beauty, the same excellency, the same weight and importance of the
rules of everlasting righteousness, with regard to which God is always
pleased to make those rules the measure of all his own actions, prove
it impossible but he must likewise will and desire that all rational
creatures should proportionably make them the measure of theirs. Even
among men, there is no earthly father, but in those things which he
esteems his own excellencies, desires and expects to be imitated by his
children. How much more is it necessary that God, who is infinitely far
from being subject to such passions and variableness as frail men are;
and who has an infinitely tenderer and heartier concern for the
happiness of his creatures, than mortal men can have for the welfare of
their posterity; must desire to be imitated by his creatures in those
perfections which are the foundation of his own unchangeable happiness?
In the exercise of his supreme power, we cannot imitate him; in the
extent of his unerring knowledge, we cannot attain to any similitude
with himJob xl. 9. . We cannot at all thunder with a voice like him;
nor are we able to search out and comprehend the least part of the
depth of his unfathomable wisdom. But his holiness and goodness, his
justice, righteousness, and truth; these things we can understand; in
these things we can imitate him; nay, we cannot approve ourselves to
him as obedient children, if we do not imitate him therein. If God be
himself essentially of infinite holiness and purity; (as, from the
light of nature, it is of all things most manifest that he is,) Hab. i.
13. it follows, that it is impossible but he must likewise be of purer
eyes than to behold with approbation any manner of impurity in his
creatures; and consequently it must needs be his will, that they should
all (according to the measure of their frail and finite nature) be holy
as he is holy. If God is himself a being of infinite justice,
righteousness, and truth, it must needs be his will, that all rational
creatures, whom he has created after his own image, to whom he has
communicated some resemblance of his divine perfections, and whom he
has indued with excellent powers and faculties to enable them to
distinguish between good and evil, should imitate him in the exercise
of those glorious attributes, by conforming all their actions to the
eternal and unalterable law of righteousness. If God is himself a being
of infinite Mat. v. 45. goodness, making the sun to rise on the evil
and on the good, and sending rain on the just and on the unjust; Acts
xiv. 17. having never left himself wholly without witness, but always
doing good, given men rain from heaven and fruitful seasons, and
filling their hearts with food and gladness; it cannot but be his will
that all reasonable creatures should, by mutual love and benevolence,
permit and assist each other to enjoy in particular the several effects
and blessings of the divine universal goodness. Lastly, if God is
himself a being of infinite mercy and compassion, as it is plain he
bears long with men before he punishes them for their wickedness, and
often freely forgives them his ten thousand talents; it must needs be
hisMat. xviii. 24. 28. will, that they should forgive one another their
hundred pence; being merciful one to another, as he isLu. vi. 36.
merciful to them all; and having compassion eachMat. xi. 23. on his
fellow-servants, as God has pity on them. Thus from the attributes of
God, natural reason leads men to the knowledge of his will: All the
same reasons and arguments, which discover to men the natural fitnesses
or unfitnesses of things, and the necessary perfections or attributes
of God, proving equally at the same time, that [225] that which is
truly the law of nature, or the reason of things, is in like manner the
will of God. And from hence the soberest and most intelligent persons
among the heathens in all ages, very rightly and wisely concluded that
the best and certainest part of natural religion, which was of the
greatest importance, and wherein was the least danger of their being
mistaken, was [226] to imitate the moral attributes of God, by a life
of holiness, righteousness, and charity: Whereas in the external part
of their worship, there was nothing but uncertainty and doubtfulness;
it being absolutely impossible, without express revelation, to discover
what in that particular they might be secure would be truly acceptable
to God.
This method of deducing the will of God from his attributes, is of all
others the best and clearest, the certainest and most universal, that
the light of nature affords: Yet there are also (as I said) some other
collateral considerations, which help to prove and confirm the same
thing; namely, that all moral obligations, arising from the nature and
reason of things, are likewise the positive will and command of God: As
2. And from the consideration of the nature of God's creation. This
appears in some measure from the consideration of God's creation. For
God, by creating things, manifests it to be his will that things should
be what they are. And as providence wonderfully preserves things in
their present state; and all necessary agents, by constantly and
regularly obeying the laws of their nature, necessarily employ all
their natural powers in promoting the same end; so it is evident it
cannot but be the will of God, [227] that all rational creatures, whom
he has indued with those singular powers and faculties of
understanding, liberty, and free-choice, whereby they are exalted in
dignity above the rest of the world; should likewise employ those their
extraordinary faculties in preserving the order and harmony of the
creation, and not in introducing disorder and confusion therein. The
nature indeed and relations, the proportions and disproportions, the
fitnesses and unfitnesses of things, are eternal and in themselves
absolutely unalterable; but this is only upon supposition that the
things exist, and that they exist in such manner as they at present do.
Now that things exist in such manner as they do, or that they exist at
all, depends entirely on the arbitrary will and good pleasure of God.
At the same time, therefore, and by the same means, that God manifests
it to be his will that things should exist, and that they should exist
in such manner as they do; (as by creating them he at first did, and by
preserving them he still continually does, declare it to be his will
they should;) he at the same time evidently declares, that all such
moral obligations as are the result of the necessary proportions and
relations of things, are likewise his positive will and command. And
consequently, whoever acts contrary to the forementioned reasons and
proportion of things, by dishonouring God, by introducing unjust and
unequal dealings among equals, by destroying his own being, or by any
way corrupting, abusing, and misapplying the faculties wherewith God
has indued him, (as has been above more largely explained,) is
unavoidably guilty of transgressing at the same time the positive will
and command of God, which in this manner also is sufficiently
discovered and made known to him.
3. And from the tendency of the practice of morality to the good and
happiness of the whole world.The same thing may likewise further appear
from the following consideration:--Whatever tends directly and
certainly to promote the good and happiness of the whole, and (as far
as is consistent with that chief end,) to promote also the good and
welfare of every particular part of the creation, must needs be
agreeable to the will of God; [228] who, being infinitely
self-sufficient to his own happiness, could have no other motive to
create things at all, but only that he might communicate to them his
goodness and happiness; and who consequently cannot but expect and
require, that all his creatures should, according to their several
powers and faculties, endeavour to promote the same end. Now that the
exact observance of all those moral obligations, which have before been
proved to arise necessarily from the nature and relations of things;
(that is to say, living agreeably to the unalterable rules of justice,
righteousness, equity, and truth,) is the certainest and directest
means to promote the welfare and happiness, as well of every man in
particular, both in body and mind, as of all men in general, considered
with respect to society, is so very manifest, that even the greatest
enemies of all religion, who suppose it to be nothing more than a
worldly or state-policy, do yet by that very supposition confess thus
much concerning it; and, indeed, this it is not possible for any one to
deny: For the practice of moral virtues does [229] as plainly and
undeniably tend to the natural good of the world, as any physical
effect or mathematical truth is naturally consequent to the principles
on which it depends, and from which it is regularly derived. And
without such practice, in some degree, the world can never be happy in
any tolerable measure; as is sufficiently evident from Mr Hobbes's own
description of the extreme miserable condition that men would be in
through the total defect of the practice of all moral virtue, if they
were to live in that state which he styles (falsely and contrary to all
reason, as has been before fully proved,) the state of nature; but
which really is a state of the grossest abuse and most unnatural
corruption and misapplication of men's natural faculties that can be
imagined. For, since God has plainly so constituted the nature of men,
that they stand continually in need of each other's help and
assistance, and can never live comfortably without society and mutual
friendship, and are indued with the faculties of reason and speech, and
with other natural powers, evidently fitted to enable them to assist
each other in all matters of life, and mutually to promote universal
love and happiness; it is manifestly agreeable to nature, and to the
will of God, who gave them these faculties, that they should employ
them wholly to this regular and good end; and, consequently, it is on
the contrary evident likewise, that all abuse and misapplication of
these faculties, to hurt and destroy, to cheat and defraud, to oppress,
insult, and domineer over each other, is directly contrary both to the
dictates of nature and to the will of God, who, necessarily doing
always what is best, and fittest, and most for the benefit of the whole
creation, it is manifest cannot will the corruption and destruction of
any of his creatures, any otherwise than as his preserving their
natural faculties, (which in themselves are good and excellent, but
cannot but be capable of being abused and misapplied,) necessarily
implies a consequential permission of such corruption.
And this now is the great aggravation of the sin and folly of all
immorality; that it is an obstinate setting up the self-will of frail,
finite, and fallible creatures; as in opposition to the eternal reason
of things, the unprejudiced judgment of their own minds, and the
general good and welfare both of themselves and their fellow-creatures;
so also in opposition to the will of the supreme author and creator of
all things, who gave them their beings and all the powers and faculties
they are indued with: In opposition to the will of the all-wise
preserver and governor of the universe, on whose gracious protection
they depend every moment for the preservation and continuance of their
beings: And in opposition to the will of their greatest benefactor, to
whose bounty they wholly owe whatever they enjoy at present, and all
the hopes of what they expect hereafter, this is the highest of all
aggravations. The utmost ureasonableness, joined with obstinate
disobedience, and with the greatest ingratitude.
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[225] Ita principem legem illam et ultimam, mentem esse omnia ratione
aut cogentis aut vetantis Dei.--Cic. de Leg. lib. 2. Quæ vis non modo
senior est quam ætas populorum et civitatum, sed æqualis illius coelum
atque terras tuentis et regentis Dei. Neque enim esse mens divina sine
ratione potest, nec ratio divina non hanc vim in rectis pravisque
sanciendis habere.--Ibid.
[226] Vis Deos propitiare? Bonus esto. Satis illos coluit, qui imitatus
est.--Senee. Epist. 96. Kai gar an ein, ei pros ta dora kai tas thusias
apoblepousin hemon hoi theoi, alla me pros ten psuchen, an tis hosios
kai dikaios on tunchane. Pollo ge mallon, oimai, e pros tas poluteleis
tautas pompas te kai thusias.--Plato in Alcibiade, 2. Collitur autem,
non taurornm opimis corporibus contrucidatis, nec auro argentove
suspenso, nec in thesauros stipe infusa; sed pia et recta
voluntate.--Senec. Epist. 116.
[227] Mens humana non potest non judicare, esse longè credibilius, quod
eadem constantissima voluntas, à qua hominibus datum est esse, pariter
mallet ipsos porro esse et valere, hoc est, conservari et felicitate
frui, quam illo deturbari de statu, in quo ipsos collocavit----Sic
scilicet e voluntate creandi, cognoscitur voluntas conservandi
tuendique homines. Ex hac autem innotescit obligatio, qui tenemur ad
inserviendum eidem voluntati notæ.--Cumberl. de Leg. Nat. page 227.
[228] Dubitari non potest, quin Deus, qui ita naturalem rerum omnium
ordinem constituit, ut talia sint actionum humanarum consequentia erga
ipsos auctores, fecitque ut ordinaria hæc consequentia ab ipsis
præsciri possint, aut summa cum probabilitate expectari, voluerit hæc
ab iis considerari, antequam ad agendum se accingerent; atque eos his
provisis velut argumentis in legum sanctione contentis
determinari.--Cumberl. de Leg. Nat. page 228. Rector seu causa prima
rationalis, cujus voluntate res ita disponuntur, ut hommibus satis
evidenter indicetur, actus quosdam illorum esse media necessaria ad
finem ipsis necessarium; vult homines ad hos actus obligari, vel hos
actus imperat.--Id. page 285.
[229] Pari sane ratione (ac in arithmeticis operationibus) doctrinæ
moralis veritas fundatur in immutabili cohærentia inter felicitatem
summam quam hominum vires assequi valent, et actus benevolentiæ
universalis.--Id. page 23.
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Proposition III.
III. Proposition III. Though the fore-mentioned eternal moral
obligations are incumbent indeed on all rational creatures, antecedent
to any respect of particular reward or punishment, yet they must
certainly and necessarily be attended with rewards and punishments:
Because the same reasons, which prove God himself to be necessarily
just and good, and the rules of justice, equity, and goodness, to be
his unalterable will, law, and command, to all created beings; prove
also that he cannot but be pleased with and approve such creatures as
imitate and obey him by observing those rules, and be displeased with
such as act contrary thereto; and consequently, that he cannot but some
way or other, make a suitable difference in his dealings with them; and
manifest his supreme power and absolute authority, in finally
supporting, maintaining, and vindicating effectually the honour of
these his divine laws, as becomes the just and righteous governor and
disposer of all things.
This proposition also is in a manner self-evident.
For 1st, That the practice of virtue or vice must be attended with
rewards and punishments, proved from the attributes of God. If God is
himself necessarily a being (as has been before shown) of infinite
goodness, justice, and holiness; and if the same reasons which prove
the necessity of these attributes in God himself, prove moreover (as
has likewise been shown already,) that the same moral obligations must
needs be his positive will, law, and command, to all rational
creatures; it follows also necessarily, by the very same argument, that
he cannot but be pleased with and approve such creatures as imitate and
obey him by observing those rules, and be displeased with such as act
contrary thereto. And if so; then in the nature of the thing itself it
is evident, that having absolute power and uncontrollable authority, as
being supreme governor and disposer of all things, he cannot but
signify, by some means or other, his approbation of the one, and his
displeasure against the other. And this can no way be done to any
effectual purpose but by the annexing of respective rewards and
punishments. Wherefore, if virtue goes finally unrewarded, and
wickedness unpunished, then God never signifies his approbation of the
one, nor his displeasure against the other; and if so, then there
remains no sufficient proof that he is really at all pleased or
displeased with either, and the consequence of that will be, that there
is no reason to think the one to be his will and command, or that the
other is forbidden by him; which being once supposed, there will no
longer remain any certain evidence of his own moral attributes contrary
to what has been already demonstrated.
2. And from the necessity there is, that there should be some
vindication of the honour of God's laws and government. The certainty
of rewards and punishments in general may also somewhat otherwise be
deduced from their being necessary to support the honour of God and of
his laws and government, in the following manner. It is evident we are
obliged, in the highest ties of duty and gratitude, to pay all possible
honour to God, from whom we receive our being, and all our powers and
faculties, and whatever else we enjoy. Now it is plain likewise, that
we have no other way to honour God, (whose happiness is capable of no
addition from any thing that any of his creatures are capable of
doing,) than by honouring, that is, by obeying, his laws. The honour
therefore that is thus done to his laws, God is pleased to accept as
done immediately to himself. And though we were indeed absolutely
obliged, in duty, to honour him in this manner, notwithstanding that
there had been no reward to be expected thereupon, yet it is necessary,
in the government of the world, and well-becoming an infinitely wise
and good governor, that those who honour him he should honour; 1 Sam.
ii. 30. that is, should distinguish them with suitable marks of his
favour. On the contrary; though nothing that weak and finite creatures
are able to do, can in the least diminish from the absolute glory and
happiness of God, yet, as to us, the dishonouring, that is, the
disobeying his laws, is a dishonouring of himself: that is, it is, as
much as in us lies, a despising his supreme authority, and bringing his
government into contempt:--Now the same reason that there is, why
honour should be paid to the laws of God at all; the same reason there
is, that that honour should be vindicated, after it has been diminished
and infringed by sin: For no lawgiver who has authority to require
obedience to his laws, can or ought to see his laws despised and
dishonoured, without taking some measures to vindicate the honour of
them, for the support and dignity of his own authority and government.
And the only way, by which the honour of a law, or of its author, can
be vindicated after it has been infringed by wilful sin, is either by
the repentance and reformation of the transgressor, or by his
punishment and destruction. So that God is necessarily obliged, in
vindication of the honour of his laws and government, to punish those
who presumptuously and impenitently disobey his commandments. Wherefore
if there be no distinction made by suitable rewards and punishments,
between those who obey the laws of God and those who obey them not,
then God suffers the authority of his laws to be finally trampled upon
and despised, without ever making any vindication of it: Which being
impossible, it will follow that these things are not really the laws of
God, and that he has no such regard to them as we imagine. And the
consequence of this must needs be the denial of his moral attributes,
contrary, as before, to what has been already proved: And consequently
the certainty of rewards and punishments, in general, is necessarily
established.
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Proposition IV.
IV. Proposition IV. Though in order to establish this suitable
difference between the fruits or effects of virtue and vice, so
reasonable in itself, and so absolutely necessary for the vindication
of the honour of God, the nature of things, and the constitution and
order of God's creation, was originally such, that the observance of
the eternal rules of justice, equity, and goodness, does indeed of
itself tend by direct and natural consequence to make all creatures
happy, and the contrary practice to make them miserable; yet since,
through some great and general corruption and depravation,
(whencesoever that may have arisen,) the condition of men in this
present state is such, that the natural order of things in this world
is an event manifestly perverted, and virtue and goodness are visibly
prevented in great measure from obtaining their proper and due effects
in establishing men's happiness, proportionable to their behaviour and
practice; therefore, it is absolutely impossible that the whole view
and intention, the original and the final design, of God's creating
such rational beings as men are, and placing them on this globe of
earth, as the chief and principal, or indeed (to speak more properly)
the only inhabitants, for whose sake alone this part at least of the
creation is manifestly fitted up and accommodated; it is absolutely
impossible (I say) that the whole of God's design in all this should be
nothing more than to keep up eternally a succession of such short-lived
generations of men as we at present are, and those in such a corrupt,
confused, and disorderly state of things, as we see the world is now
in; without any due observation of the eternal rules of good and evil;
without any clear and remarkable effect of the great and most necessary
difference of things; and without any final vindication of the honour
and laws of God, in the proportionable reward of the best, or
punishment of the worst of men. And, consequently, it is certain and
necessary (even as certain as the moral attributes of God before
demonstrated,) that instead of continuing an eternal succession of new
generations in the present form and state of things, there must at some
time or other be such a revolution and renovation of things, such a
future state of existence of the same persons, as that, by an exact
distribution of rewards and punishments therein, all the present
disorders and inequalities may be set right, and that the whole scheme
of providence, which, to us who judge of it by only one small portion
of it, seems now so inexplicable and confused, may appear, at its
consummation, to be a design worthy of infinite wisdom, justice, and
goodness.
1. That, according to the original constitution of things, virtue and
vice are attended with natural rewards and punishments. In order to
establish a just and suitable difference between the respective fruits
or effects of virtue and vice, the nature of things, and the
constitution and order of God's creation, was originally such that the
observance of the eternal rules of piety, justice, equity, goodness,
and temperance, does of itself plainly tend, by direct and natural
consequence, to make all creatures happy, and the contrary practice to
make them miserable. This is evident in general; because the practice
of universal virtue is (in imitation of the divine goodness) the
practice of that which is best in the whole; and that which tends to
the benefit of the whole, must, of necessary consequence, originally,
and in its own nature, tend also to the benefit of every individual
part of the creation. More particularly; a frequent and habitual
contemplating the infinitely excellent perfections of the almighty
creator and all-wise governor of the world, and our most bountiful
benefactor; so as to excite in our minds a suitable adoration, love,
and imitation of those perfections; a regular employing all our powers
and faculties, in such designs and to such purposes only, as they were
originally fitted and intended for by nature; and a due subjecting all
our appetites and passions to the government of sober and modest
reason; are evidently the directest means to obtain such settled peace
and solid satisfaction of mind, as the first foundation, and the
principal and most necessary ingredient of all true happiness. The
temperate and moderate enjoyment of all the good things of this present
world, and of the pleasures of life, according to the measures of right
reason and simple nature, is plainly and confessedly the certainest and
most direct method to preserve the health and strength of the body. And
the practice of universal justice, equity, and benevolence, is
manifestly (as has been before observed) as direct and adequate a means
to promote the general welfare and happiness of men in society, as any
physical motion, or geometrical operation, is to produce its natural
effect. So that if all men were truly virtuous, and practised these
rules in such manner that the miseries and calamities arising usually
from the numberless follies and vices of men were prevented,
undoubtedly this great truth would evidence itself visibly in fact, and
appear experimentally in the happy state and condition of the world. On
the contrary; neglect of God, and insensibleness of our relation and
duty towards him; abuse and unnatural misapplication of the powers and
faculties of our minds; inordinate appetites, and unbridled and furious
passions,--necessarily fill the mind with confusion, trouble, and
vexation. And intemperance naturally brings weakness, pains, and
sicknesses into the body. And mutual injustice and iniquity; fraud,
violence, and oppression; wars, and desolation; murders, rapine, and
all kinds of cruelty,--are sufficiently plain causes of the miseries
and calamities of men in society. So that the original constitution,
order, and tendency of things, is evidently enough fitted and designed
to establish naturally a just and suitable difference in general
between virtue and vice, by their respective fruits or effects.
2. But that now in this present world, the natural order of things is
so perverted that vice often flourishes in great prosperity, and virtue
falls under the greatest calamities of life. But though originally the
constitution and order of God's creation was indeed such, that virtue
and vice are, by the regular tendency of things, followed with natural
rewards and punishments; yet, in event, through some great and general
corruption and depravation, (whencesoever that may have arisen, of
which more hereafter;) the condition of men in the present state is
plainly such, that this natural order of things in the world is
manifestly perverted. Virtue and goodness are visibly prevented in
great measure from obtaining their proper and due effect, in
establishing men's happiness proportionable to their behaviour and
practice; and wickedness and vice very frequently escape the punishment
which the general nature and disposition of things tends to annex unto
it. Wicked men, by stupidity, inconsiderateness, and sensual pleasure,
often make shift to silence the reproaches of conscience, and feel very
little of that confusion and remorse of mind which ought naturally to
be consequent upon their vicious practices. By accidental strength and
robustness of constitution, they frequently escape the natural ill
consequences of intemperance and debauchery; and enjoy the same
proportion of health and vigour as those who live up to the rules of
strict and unblameable sobriety. And injustice and iniquity, fraud,
violence, and cruelty, though they are always attended indeed with
sufficiently calamitous consequences in the general; yet the most of
those ill consequences fall not always upon such persons in particular
as have the greatest share in the guilt of the crimes, but very
commonly on those that have the least. On the contrary; virtue and
piety, temperance and sobriety, faithfulness, honesty and charity;
though they have indeed both in themselves the true springs of
happiness, and also the greatest probabilities of outward causes to
concur in promoting their temporal prosperity; though they cannot
indeed be prevented from affording a man the highest peace and
satisfaction of spirit, and many other advantages both of body and mind
in respect of his own particular person; yet in respect of those
advantages which the mutual practice of social virtues ought to produce
in common, it is in experience found true, that the vices of a great
part of mankind do so far prevail against nature and reason, as
frequently to oppress the virtue of the best; and not only hinder them
from enjoying those public benefits, which would naturally and
regularly be the consequences of their virtue; but oft-times bring upon
them the greatest temporal calamities, even for the sake of that very
virtue. For it is but too well known that good men are very often
afflicted and impoverished, and made a prey to the covetousness and
ambition of the wicked; and sometimes most cruelly and maliciously
persecuted, even upon account of their goodness itself. In all which
affairs the providence of God seems not very evidently to interpose for
the protection of the righteous. And not only so, but even in judgments
also, which seem more immediately to be inflicted by the hand of
heaven, it frequently suffers the righteous to be involved in the same
calamities with the wicked, as they are mixed together in business and
the affairs of the world.
3. That therefore there must needs be a future state of rewards and
punishments.Which things being so; (viz. that there is plainly in event
no sufficient distinction made between virtue and vice; no
proportionable and certain reward annexed to the one, nor punshment to
the other, in this present world:) And yet it being no less undeniably
certain in the general, as has been before shown, that if there be a
God, (and that God be himself a being of infinite justice and goodness;
and it be his will, that all rational creatures should imitate his
moral perfections; and he [230] cannot but see and take notice how
every creature behaves itself; and cannot but be accordingly pleased
with such as obey his will and imitate his nature, and be displeased
with such as act contrary thereto;) it being certain, I say, that if
these things be so, God must needs, in vindication of the honour of his
laws and government, signify at some time or other this his approbation
or displeasure, by making finally a suitable difference between those
who obey him, and those who obey him not; it follows unavoidably,
either that all these notions which we frame concerning God, are false;
and that there is no providence, and God sees not, or at least has no
regard to what is done by his creatures, and consequently the ground of
all his own moral attributes is taken away, and even his being itself;
or else that there must necessarily be a future state of rewards and
punishments after this life, wherein all the present difficulties of
providence shall be cleared up, by an exact and impartial
administration of justice. But now, that these notions are true, that
there is a God, and a providence, and that God is himself a being
induced with all moral perfections, and expects and commands that all
his rational creatures should govern all their actions by the same
rules, has been particularly and distinctly proved already. It is
therefore directly demonstrated, that there must be a future state of
rewards and punishments. Let not thine heart envy sinners, but be thou
in the fear of the Lord all the day long, for surely there is a reward,
and thine expectation shall not be cut off.--Prov.xxiii. 17 and 18.
4. Of the Stoical opinion concerning the self-sufficiency of virtue to
its own happiness. This argument is indeed a common one, but it is
nevertheless strongly conclusive and unanswerable; so that, whoever
denies a future state of rewards and punishments, must, of necessity,
by a chain of unavoidable consequences, be forced to recur to
down-right atheism. The only middle opinion that can be invented, is
that assertion of the Stoics that virtue is self-sufficient to its own
happiness, and a full reward to itself in all cases, even under the
greatest sufferings that can befal a man for its sake. Men who were not
certain of a future state, (though most of them did indeed believe it
highly probable,) and yet would not give up the cause of virtue, had no
other way left to defend it than by asserting that it was in all cases,
and under all circumstances, absolutely self-sufficient to its own
happiness; whereas, on the contrary, because it is manifestly not
self-sufficient, and yet undoubtedly the cause of virtue is not to be
given up; therefore, they ought from thence to have concluded the
certainty of a future state: That virtue is truly worthy to be chosen,
even merely for its own sake, without any respect to any recompense or
reward, must indeed necessarily be acknowledged; but it does not from
hence follow, that he who dies for the sake of virtue is really any
more happy than he that dies for any fond opinion, or any unreasonable
humour or obstinacy whatsoever; if he has no other happiness than the
bare satisfaction arising from the sense of his resoluteness in
persisting to preserve his virtue, and in adhering immoveably to what
he judges to be right, and there be no future state wherein he may reap
any benefit of that his resolute perseverance. On the contrary, it will
only follow, that God has made virtue necessarily amiable, and such as
men's judgment and conscience can never but choose, and yet that he has
not annexed to it any sufficient encouragement to support men
effectually in that choice. Brave indeed, and admirable, were the
things which some of the philosophers have said upon this subject, and
which some very few extraordinary men (of which Regulus is a remarkable
instance,) seem to have made good in their practice, even beyond the
common abilities of human nature; but it is very plain, as I before
intimated, that the general practice of virtue in the world can never
be supported upon this foot; it being, indeed, neither possible nor
truly reasonable that men, by adhering to virtue, should part with
their lives, [231] if thereby they eternally deprived themselves of all
possibility of receiving any advantage from that adherence. Virtue, it
is true, in its proper seat, and with all its full effects and
consequences unhindered, must be confessed to be the chief good, as
being truly the enjoyment, as well as the imitation of God; but, [232]
as the practice of it is circumstantiated in this present world, and in
the present state of things, it is plain it is not itself the chief
good, but only the means to it, as running in a race is not in itself
the prize, but the way to obtain it.
5. From whence the certainty of a future state is again concluded. It
is therefore absolutely impossible, that the whole view and intention,
the original and the final design of God's creating such rational
beings as men are, indued with such noble faculties, and so necessarily
conscious of the eternal and unchangeable differences of good and evil;
it is absolutely impossible (I say) that the whole design of an
infinitely wise, and just, and good God, in all this, should be nothing
more than to keep up eternally a succession of new generations of men,
and those in such a corrupt, confused, and disorderly state of things
as we see the present world is in, without any due and regular
observation of the eternal rules of good and evil, without any clear
and remarkable effect of the great and most necessary differences of
things, without any sufficient discrimination of virtue and vice, by
their proper and respective fruits, and without any final vindication
of the honour and laws of God, in the proportionable reward of the
best, or punishment of the worst of men: And consequently it is certain
and necessary, (even as certain as the moral attributes of God before
demonstrated,) that instead of continuing an eternal succession of new
generations in the present form and state of things, there must at some
time or other be such a revolution and renovation of things, such a
future state of existence of the same persons, as that, by an exact
distribution of rewards and punishments therein, all the present
disorders and inequalities may be set right; and that the whole scheme
of Providence, which to us who judge of it by only one small portion of
it, seems now so inexplicable and much confused, may appear at its
consummation to be a design worthy of infinite wisdom, justice, and
goodness. Without this [233] all comes to nothing. If this scheme be
once broken, there is no justice, no goodness, no order, no reason, nor
any thing upon which any argument in moral matters can be founded, left
in the world. Nay, even though we should set aside all consideration of
the moral attributes of God, and consider only his natural perfections,
his infinite knowledge and wisdom, as framer and builder of the world;
it would even in that view only appear infinitely improbable that God
should have created such beings as men are, and indued them with such
excellent faculties, and placed them on this globe of earth, as the
only inhabitants for whose sake this part at least of the creation is
manifestly fitted up and accommodated; and all this without any further
design [234] than only for the maintaining a perpetual succession of
such short-lived generations of mortals as we at present are; to live
in the utmost confusion and disorder for a very few years, and then
perish eternally into nothing. [235] What can be imagined more vain and
empty? What more absurd? What more void of all marks of wisdom, than
the fabric of the world, and the creation of mankind, upon this
supposition? But then, take in also the consideration of the moral
attributes of God, and it amounts (as I have said) to a complete
demonstration that there must be a future state.
6. Why the wisdom of God is not so clearly and plainly seen in his
government of the moral, as in the fabric of the natural world. It may
here at first sight seem to be a very strange thing, that through the
whole system of nature in the material, in the inanimate, in the
irrational part of the creation, every single thing should have in
itself so many and so obvious, so evident and undeniable marks of the
infinitely accurate skill and wisdom of their Almighty Creator, that,
from the brightest star in the firmament of heaven to the meanest
pebble upon the face of the earth, there is no one piece of matter
which does not afford such instances of admirable artifice and exact
proportion and contrivance, as exceeds all the wit of man (I do not say
to imitate, but even) ever to be able fully to search out and
comprehend; and yet, that in the management of the rational and moral
world, for the sake of which all the rest was created, and is preserved
only to be subservient to it, there should not in many ages be plain
evidences enough, either of the wisdom, or of the justice and goodness
of God, or of so much as the interposition of his divine providence at
all, to convince mankind clearly and generally of the world's being
under his immediate care, inspection, and government. This, I say, may
indeed at first sight seem very wonderful. But if we consider the
matter more closely and attentively, it will appear not to be so
strange and astonishing as we are apt to imagine: For as, in a great
machine, contriv ed by the skill of a consummate artificer, fitted up
and adjusted with all conceivable accuracy for some very difficult and
deep-projected design, and polished and fine wrought in every part of
it with admirable niceness and dexterity, any man who saw and examined
one or two wheels thereof could not fail to observe, in those single
parts of it, the admirable art and exact skill of the workman; and yet
the excellency of the end or use for which the whole was contrived he
would not at all be able, even though he was himself a skilful
artificer, to discover and comprehend, without seeing the whole fitted
up and put together: So though in every part of the natural world,
considered even single and unconnected, the wisdom of the great creator
sufficiently appears, yet his wisdom, and justice, and goodness in the
disposition and government of the moral world, which necessarily
depends on the connexion and issue of the whole scheme, cannot perhaps
be distinctly and fully comprehended by any finite and created beings,
much less by frail and weak and short-lived mortals, before the period
and accomplishment of certain great revolutions. But it is exceedingly
reasonable to believe, that as the great discoveries, which by the
diligence and sagacity of later ages have been made in astronomy and
natural philosophy, have opened surprising scenes of the power and
wisdom of the creator, beyond what men could possibly have conceived or
imagined in former times; so at the unfolding of the whole scheme of
providence in the conclusion of this present state, men will be
surprised with the amazing manifestations of justice and goodness which
will then appear to have run through the whole series of God's
government of the moral world.
This is the chief and greatest argument on which the natural proof of a
future state of rewards and punishments must principally be founded.
Yet there are also several other collateral evidences which jointly
conspire to render the same thing extremely credible to mere natural
reason: As,
1st. Of the immortality of the soul and the natural proofs we have of
it. There is very great reason, even from the bare nature of the thing
itself, to believe the soul to be immortal, separate from all moral
arguments drawn from the attributes of God, and without any
consideration of the general system of the world, or of the universal
order and constitution, connexion, and dependencies of things: The
immortality of the soul has been commonly believed in all ages and in
all places, [236] by the unlearned part of all civilized people, and by
the almost general consent of all the most barbarous nations under
heaven, from a tradition so ancient and so universal, as cannot be
conceived to owe its original either to chance or to vain imagination,
or to any other cause than to the author of nature himself: And the
most learned and thinking part of mankind, at all times and in all
countries, where the study of philosophy has been in any measure
cultivated, have almost generally agreed, that it is capable of a just
proof from the abstract consideration of the nature and operations of
the soul itself: That none of the known qualities of matter can in any
possible variation, division, or composition, produce sense, and
thought, and reason, is abundantly evident, as has been demonstrated in
the former discourse: [237] That matter consists of innumerable,
divisible, separable, and for the most part actually disjoined parts,
is acknowledged by all philosophers: That, since the powers and
faculties of the soul are the most remote and distant from all the
known properties of matter that can be imagined, it is at least a
putting great violence upon our reason to imagine them superadded by
omnipotence to one and the same substance, cannot easily be denied:
That it is highly unreasonable and absurd to suppose the soul made up
of innumerable consciousnesses, as matter is necessarily made up of
innumerable parts; and, on the contrary, that it is highly reasonable
to believe the seat of thought to be a simple substance, such as cannot
naturally be divided and crumbled into pieces, as all matter is
manifestly subject to be, must of necessity be confessed: Consequently
the soul will not be liable to be dissolved at the dissolution of the
body, and therefore it will naturally be immortal. All this seems to
follow, at least with the highest degree of probability, from the
single consideration of the soul's being indued with sense, thought, or
consciousness. I cannot imagine, saith Cyrus, [238] (in that speech
which Xenophon relates he made to his children a little before his
death,) that the soul, while it is in this mortal body, lives, and that
when it is separated from it, then it should die: I cannot persuade
myself that the soul, by being separated from this body, which is
devoid of sense, should thereupon become itself likewise devoid of
sense: On the contrary, it seems to me more reasonable to believe that,
when the mind is separated from the body, it should then become most of
all sensible and intelligent; thus he: But then further; if we take
also into the consideration all the higher and nobler faculties,
capacities, and improvements of the soul, the argument will still
become much stronger. I am persuaded, saith Cicero, [239] when I
consider with what swiftness of thought the soul is indued, with what a
wonderful memory of things past, and forecast of things to come; how
many arts, how many sciences, how many wonderful inventions it has
found out, that that nature, which is possessor of such faculties,
cannot be mortal: Again; the memory, saith he, [240] which the soul has
of things that have been, and its foresight of things that will be, and
its large comprehension of things that at present are, are plainly
divine powers; nor can the wit of man ever invent any way by which
these faculties could possibly come to be in men, but by immediate
communication from God: Again; though we see not, saith he, [241] the
soul of man, as indeed neither are we able to see God; yet, as from the
works of God we are certain of his being, so, from the faculties of the
soul, its memory, its invention, its swiftness of thought, its noble
exercise of all virtue, we cannot but be convinced of its divine
original and nature: And, speaking of the strength and beauty of that
argument, which, from the wonderful faculties and capacities of the
soul, concludes it to be of an immaterial and immortal nature; though
all the vulgar and little philosophers in the world, saith he, [242]
(for so I cannot but call all such as dissent from Plato and Socrates,
and those superior geniuses,) should put their heads together; they
will not only never, while they live, be able to explain any thing so
neatly and elegantly; but even this argument itself they will never
have understanding enough fully to perceive and comprehend how neat,
and beautiful, and strong it is. The chief prejudice against the belief
of the soul's existing thus, and living after the death of the body,
and the sum of all the objections brought against this doctrine by the
Epicurean philosophers of old, who denied the immortality of the soul,
and by certain atheistical persons of late, who differ very little from
them in their manner of reasoning, is this: That they cannot apprehend
how the soul can have any sense of perception, [243] without the body
wherein evidently are all the organs of sense; But neither can they any
better apprehend or explain how the soul in the body, [244] (that is,
the body itself, according to their opinion,) is capable of sense or
perception, by means of the organs of sense: And besides, this
argument, that the soul can have no perception, when all the ways of
perception that we have at present ideas of, are removed, is exactly
the very same argument, and no other, than what a man born blind might
make use of, with the very same force, to prove that none of us can
possibly have in our present bodies any perception of light or colours,
as I have explained more particularly in the former discourse. [245]
This consideration, The natural credibility of the soul's being
immortal of great use to the wiser heathens. of the soul's appearing in
all reason to be naturally immortal, afforded great pleasure and
satisfaction to the wisest and soberest men in the heathen world; was a
great support under calamities and sufferings, especially under such as
men brought upon themselves by being virtuous; filled them with great
hopes and comfortable expectations of what was to come hereafter, and
was a mighty encouragement to the practice of all moral virtue, and
particularly to take pains in subduing the body and keeping it in
subjection to the reason of the mind. First, it afforded great pleasure
and satisfaction to the wisest and soberest men in the heathen world,
from the bare contemplation of the thing itself. Nobody, saith Cicero,
[246] shall ever drive me from the hope of immortality; and, [247] if
this my opinion concerning the immortality of the soul should at last
prove an error, yet it is a very delightful error, and I will never
suffer myself to be undeceived in so pleasing an opinion as long as I
live. Secondly, it was a great support to them under calamities and
sufferings, especially under such as men brought upon themselves by
being virtuous: These and the like contemplations, saith Cicero, [248]
had such an effect upon Socrates, that when he was tried for his life,
he neither desired any advocate to plead his cause, nor made any
supplication to his judges for mercy; and on the very last day of his
life made many excellent discourses upon this subject, and a few days
before, when he had an opportunity offered him to have escaped out of
prison, he would not lay hold of it: For thus he believed, and thus he
taught; that when the souls of men depart out of their bodies, they go
two different ways; the virtuous to a place of happiness, the wicked
and the sensual to misery. Thirdly, it filled them with great hopes and
comfortable expectations of what was to come hereafter: O happy day,
saith the good old man in Cicero, [249] when I shall go to that blessed
assembly of spirits, and depart out of this wicked and miserably
confused world! Lastly, it was a mighty encouragement to the practice
of all moral virtue, and particularly to take pains in subduing the
body and keeping it in subjection to the reason of the mind: We ought
to spare no pains, saith Plato, [250] to obtain the habit of virtue and
wisdom in this life; for the prize is noble, and the hope is very
great. Again; having reckoned up the temporal advantages of virtue in
the present world, he adds: [251] But we have not yet mentioned the
greatest and chiefest rewards which are proposed to virtue; for what
can be truly great in so small a portion of time?--The whole age of the
longest liver in this our present world, being inconsiderable, and
nothing in comparison of eternity. And again; these things, saith he,
[252] are nothing, either in number or greatness, in comparison with
those rewards of virtue, and punishments of vice, which attend men
after death. And to mention no more places, they, saith he, [253] who
in the games hope to obtain a victory in such poor matters as
wrestling, running, and the like, think not much to prepare themselves
for the contest by great temperance and abstinence; and shall our
scholars, in the study of virtue, not have courage and resolution
enough to persevere, with patience, for a far nobler prize? Words very
like those of St. Paul, 1 Cor. ix. 24. Know ye not that they which run
in a race, run all; and every man that striveth for the mastery, is
temperate in all things? Now they do it to obtain a corruptible crown,
but we an incorruptible.
2. The argument for a future state drawn from men's natural desire of
immortality. Another argument which may be used in proof of a future
state, so far as to amount to a very great probability, is, that
necessary desire of immortality, which seems to be naturally implanted
in all men, with an unavoidable concern for what is to come hereafter.
If there be no existence after this life, it will seem that the
irrational creatures who always enjoy the present good, without any
care or solicitude for what may happen afterwards, are better provided
for by nature than man, whose reason and foresight, and all other those
very faculties, by which they are made more excellent than beasts,
serve them, upon this supposition, scarcely for any other purpose, than
to render them uneasy and uncertain, and fearful and solicitous about
things which are not. And it is not at all probable that God should
have given men appetites which were never to be satisfied; desires
which had no objects to answer them; and unavoidable apprehensions of
what was never really to come to pass.
3. Another drawn from men's conscience or judgment of-their own
actions. Rom. ii. 14, 15. Another argument, which may be brought to
prove a future state, is that conscience which all men have of their
own actions, or that inward judgment which they necessarily pass upon
them in their own minds; whereby they that have not any law, are a law
unto themselves, their conscience bearing witness, and their thoughts
accusing or else excusing one another. There is no man, who at any time
does good, and brave, and generous things, but the reason of his own
mind applauds him for so doing; and no man at any time does things base
and vile, dishonourable and wicked, but at the same time he condemns
himself in what he does. The one is necessarily accompanied with good
hope, and expectation of reward; the other with continual torment and
fear of punishment. And hence, as before, it is not probable that God
should have so framed and constituted the mind of man as necessarily to
pass upon itself a judgment which shall never be verified, and stand
perpetually and unavoidably convicted by a sentence which shall never
be confirmed.
4. Another drawn from man's being by nature an accountable creature.
Lastly, another argument, which may be drawn from right reason, in
proof of a future state, is this; that man is plainly in his nature an
accountable creature, and capable of being judged. Those creatures,
indeed, whose actions are all determined by something without
themselves, or by what we call mere instinct, as they are not capable
of having a rule given them, so it is evident that neither can they be
accountable for their actions. But man, who has entirely within himself
a free principle or power of determining his own actions upon moral
motives, and has a rule given him to act by, which is right reason, can
be, nay, cannot but be, accountable for all his actions, how far they
have been agreeable or disagreeable to that rule. Every man, because of
the natural liberty of his will, can and ought to govern all his
actions by some certain rule, and give a reason for every thing he
does. Every moral action he performs, being free and without any
compulsion or natural necessity, proceeds either from some good motive
or some evil one; is either conformable to right reason, or contrary to
it; is worthy either of praise or dispraise, and capable either of
excuse or aggravation: Consequently, it is highly reasonable to be
supposed, that since there is a Superior Being, from whom we received
all our faculties and powers, and since in the right use or in the
abuse of those faculties, in the governing them by the rule of right
reason, or in the neglecting that rule, consists all the moral
difference of our actions; there will at some time or other be an
examination or inquiry made, into the grounds, and motives, and
circumstances of our several actions, how agreeable or disagreeable
they have been to the rule that was given us; and a suitable judgment
be passed upon them. Upon these considerations the wisest of the
ancient heathens believed and taught that the actions of every
particular person should all be strictly tried and examined after his
death, and he have accordingly a just and impartial sentence passed
upon him: Which doctrine though the poets indeed wrapped up in fables
and obscure riddles, yet the wisest of the philosophers had a better
notion of it, and more agreeable to reason. From this judgment, saith
Plato, [254] let no man hope to be able to escape: For though you could
descend into the very depth of the earth, or fly on high to the
extremities of the heavens; yet should you never escape the just
judgment of the gods, either before or after death: An expression very
agreeable to that of the Psalmist; Psal. cxxxix. 8, 9.
These, I say, are very good and strong arguments for the great
probability of a future state: But that drawn as above, from the
consideration of the moral attributes of God, seems to amount even to a
demonstration.
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[230] Ei de me lanthaneton tous theous, ho men d?kaios theophiles an
eee, ho de adikos theomises----To de theophilei, hosa ge hupo theon
gignetai, panta gignetai hos oionte, arista.----Houtos hara hupolepteon
peri tou dikaiou andros, ean t' en penia gignetai, ean t' en nosois, e
tini allo ton dokounton kakon, hos touto tauta eis agathon ti
teleutesei zonti e kai apothanonti. Ou gar de hupo ge theon pote
ameleitai, hos an pro thumeisthai ethele dikaios gignesthai, kai
epitedeuon areten eis hoson dunaton anthropo homoiousthai theo.--Plato
de Republ. lib. 10.
[231] Ouk oida hopos m9akarious hupolabo tous methen apolausantas tes
aretes agathon, di auten de tauten apollumenous.--Dionys. Halicarn.
[232] Porro ipsa virtus, cum sibi bonorum culmen vendicet humanorum,
quid hie agit nisi perpetua bella cum vitiis; nec exterioribus, sed
interioribus; nec alienis, sed plane nostris et propriis?----Absit
ergo, ut quamdiu in hoc bello intestino sumus, jam nos beatitudinem, ad
quam vincendo volumus pervenire, adeptos esse credamus.--Augustin de
Civitate Dei, lib. 19. c. 4. Non enim virtus ipsa est summum bonum, sed
effectrix et mater est summi boni, quoniam perveniri ad illud sine
virtute non potest.--Lactant. lib. 3.
[233] Ita sit, ut si ab illa rerum summa, quam superiù s
comprehendimus, aberraveris; omnis ratio intereat, et ad nihilum omnia
revertantur.--Lactant. lib. 7.
[234] Non enim temerè , nec fortuito sati et creati sumns; sed profecto
fuit quædam vis, quæ generi consuleret humano; nec id gigneret aut
aleret, quod cum exantlavisset omnes labores, tum incideret in mortis
malum sempiternum.--Cic. Tusc. Quoest. lib. 1.
[235] Si sine causa gignimur, si in hominibus procreandis providentia
nulla versatur, si casu nobismetipsis ac voluptatis nostræ gratia
nascimur; si nihil post mortem sumus; quid potest esse tam supervacuum,
tam inane, tam vanum, quam humana res est, quam mundus ipse?--Lactant.
lib. 7.
[236] Et primum quidem omni antiquitate, &c.--Cic. Tusc. Quæst. lib. 1.
[237] Demonstration of the Being and Attributes of God. See also a
letter to Mr Dodwell, with the several answers and replies.
[238] Ou toi egoge, ho paides, oude touto popote epeisthen, hos he
psuche heos an en th9neto somati he z?; hotan de toutou apallage,
tethnek9en. Oude ge hopos , aphron estai e psuche epeiden tou Haphronos
somatos dicha genetai, oude touto pepeismai. All' hotan akratos kai
katharos ho nous ekkrithe, tote k9ai phronimotaton eikos auton
einai.--Cyrus apud Xen.
[239] Quid multa? Sic mihi persuasi, sec sentio; quum tanta celeritas
animorum sit, tanta memoria præteritorum, futurorum providentia, tot
artes, tantæ scientiæ, tot inventa; non posse eam naturam, quæ res eas
contineat, esse mortalem.--Cic. de Senectute.
[240] Quod et præterita teneat, et futura provideat, et complecti
possit præsentia; hæc divina sunt. Nec invenietur unquam, unde ad
hominem venire possint, nisi a Deo.--Idem. Tusc. Quoest. lib. 1.
[241] Mentem hominis, quamvis eam non videas, ut Deum non vides, tamen,
ut Deum agnoscis ex operibus ejus, sic ex memoria rerum, et inventione,
et celeritate motus, omnique pulchritudine virtutis, vim divinam mentis
agnoscito.--Id. ibid.
[242] Licet concurrant plebeii omnes philosophi, (sic enim ii qui à
Platone et Socrate et ab illa familia dissident, appellandi videntur;)
non modo nihil unquam tam eleganter explicabunt, sed ne hoc quidem
ipsum quam subtiliter conclusum sit intelligent.--Id. Ibid.
[243]
--Si immortalis natura animi est,
Et sentire potest secreta a corpore nostro;
Quinque (ut opinor) eam faciundum est sensibus auctam:
--At neque seorsum oculi, &c. Lucret. lib. 3.
Quod autem corpus animæ per se? quæ materia? ubi cogitatio illi?
quomodo visus? auditus? aut qui tangit? qui usus ejus? aut quod sine
his bonum?--Plin. lib. 7. Neque aliud est quidquam cur incredibilis his
animorum videatur æternitas, nisi quod nequeunt qualis sit animus
vacans corpore intelligere, et cogitatione comprehendere.--Cic. Tusc.
Quoest. lib. 1.
[244] Quasi vero intelligant qualis sit in ipso corpore.--Mihi quidem
naturam animi intuenti, multo difficilior occurrit cogitatio, multoque
obscurior, qualis animus in corpore sit, quam qualis cum exierit.--Id.
Ibid.
[245] Demonstration of the Being and Attributes of God, page 71.
[246] Sed me nemo de immortalitate depellet.--Cic. Tusc. Quoest. lib.
1.
[247] Quod si in hoc error, quod animos hominum immortales esse credam,
libenter erro; nec mihi hunc errorem, quo delector, dum vivo,
extorqueri volo.--Idem de Senectute.
[248] His et talibus adductus Socrates, nec patronum quæsivit ad
judicium capitis, nec judicibus supplex fuit, et supremo vitæ die, de
hoc ipso multa disseruit; et paucis ante diebus, cum facile posset
educi e custodia, noluit.----Ita enim censebat, itaque disseruit, duas
esse vias, duplicesque cursus animorum, e corpore excedentium, &c.--Id.
Tusc. Quoest. lib. 1. See also the passage of Sophocles, cited above.
[249] O præclarum diem, quum in illud animorum concilium cætumque
proficiscar, et quum ex hac turba et colluvione discedam!--Idem de
Senect.
[250] Chre panta poieinhoste aretes kai phroneseos en to bio metaschein
kalon gar to athlon, kai he elpis megale.--Plato in Phædone.
[251] Kai men ta ge megista epicheira aretes kai prokeimena athla ou
dieleluthamen.----Ti d' an en ge oligo chrono mega genoito; pas gar
outos geho en paidos mechri presbutou chronos pros panta oligos pou tis
an eie.--Plato de Republ. lib. 10.
[252] Tauta t9oinun ouden esti plethei oude megethei pros ekeina ha
tileutesanta hekateron perimenei.--Idem, ibid.
[253] Hoi men ara nikes heneka pales kai dromon kai ton toiouton,
etolmesan apechesthai.----Hoi de hemeteroi paides adunatesousi
karterein, polu kallionos heneka nikes.--Plato de Legib. lib. 8.
[254] Tautes tes dikes oute su mepote, oute ei allos atuches genomen9os
epeuxetai p9eregenesthai theon.----Ou gar amelethese pot' up' autes
ouch houto smikros on, duse kata to tes ges bathos; oudeu upselos
genomenos, eis ton ouranon anaptese; tiseis de auton ten proesekousan
timorian, ei t' enthade menon, heite kai en ade diaporentheis, eithe
kai touton eis agiotrron eti diakomistheis titon.--Plato de Legib. lib.
10.
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Proposition V.
V. Proposition V. Though the necessity and indispensableness of all the
great and moral obligations of natural religion, and also the certainty
of a future state of rewards and punishments, be thus in general
deducible, even demonstrably, by a chain of clear and undeniable
reasoning; yet (in the present state of the world, by what means soever
it came originally to be so corrupted, the particular circumstances
whereof could not now be certainly known but by revelation,) such is
the carelessness, inconsiderateness, and want of attention of the
greater part of mankind; so many the prejudices and false notions taken
up by evil education; so strong and violent the unreasonable lusts,
appetites, and desires of sense; and so great the blindness introduced
by superstitious opinions, vicious customs, and debauched practices
through the world; that very few are able, in reality and effect, to
discover these things clearly and plainly for themselves: But men have
great need of particular teaching, and much instruction, to convince
them of the truth, and certainty, and importance of these things; to
give them a due sense, and clear and just apprehensions concerning
them, and to bring them effectually to the practice of the plainest and
most necessary duties.
1. Men hindered from discovering and understanding religious truths, by
carelessness and want of attention. There is naturally in the greater
part of mankind such a prodigious carelessness, inconsiderateness and
want of attention, as not only hinders them from making use of their
reason, in such manner as to discover these things clearly and
effectually for themselves, but is the cause of the grossest and most
stupid ignorance imaginable. Some seem to have little or hardly any
notion of God at all; and more take little or no care to frame just and
worthy apprehensions concerning him, concerning the divine attributes
and perfections of his nature; and still many more are entirely
negligent and heedless to consider and discover what may be his will.
Few make a due use of their natural faculties, to distinguish rightly
the essential and unchangeable difference between good and evil; fewer
yet so attend to the natural notices which God has given them, as by
their own understanding to collect that what is good is the express
will and command of God, and what is evil is forbidden by him; and
still fewer consider with themselves the weight and importance of these
things, the natural rewards or punishments that are frequently annexed
in this life to the practice of virtue or vice, and the much greater
and certainer difference that shall be made between them in a life to
come. Hence it is that (as travellers assure us) even some whole
nations seem to have very little notion of God, or at least very poor
and unworthy apprehensions concerning him; and a very small sense of
the obligations of morality; and very mean and obscure expectations of
a future state. Not that God has anywhere left himself wholly without
witness; or that the difference of good and evil is to any rational
being undiscernible; or that men at any time or in any nation, could
ever be firmly and generally persuaded in their own minds that they
perished absolutely at death: But through supine negligence and want of
attention, they let their reason (as it were) sleep, [255] and are deaf
to the dictates of common understanding; and, like brute beasts,
minding only the things that are before their eyes, never consider any
thing that is abstract from sense, or beyond their present private
temporal interest. And it were well if even in civilized nations this
was not very nearly the case of too many men, when left entirely to
themselves, and void of particular instruction.
2. And by early prejudices and false notions. The greater part of
mankind are not only inattentive, and barely ignorant, but commonly
they have also, through a careless and evil education, taken up early
prejudices, and many vain and foolish notions, which pervert their
natural understanding, and hinder them from using their reason in moral
matters to any effectual purpose. This cannot be better described than
in the words of Cicero: If we had come into the world, saith he, [256]
in such circumstances as that we could clearly and distinctly have
discerned nature herself, and have been able in the course of our lives
to follow her true and uncorrupted directions, this alone might have
been sufficient, and there would have been little need of teaching and
instruction. But now nature has given us only some small sparks of
right reason, which we so quickly extinguish with corrupt opinions and
evil practices, that the true light of nature nowhere appears: As soon
as we are brought into the world, immediately we dwell in the midst of
all wickedness, and are surrounded with a number of most perverse and
foolish opinions, so that we seem to suck in error even with our
nurse's milk: Afterwards, when we return to our parents, and are
committed to tutors, then we are further stocked with such variety of
errors, that truth becomes perfectly overwhelmed with falsehood, and
the most natural sentiments of our minds are entirely stifled with
confirmed follies; but when, after all this, we enter upon business in
the world, and make the multitude, conspiring everywhere in wickedness,
our great guide and example, then our very nature itself is wholly
transformed, as it were, into corrupt opinions. A livelier description
of the present corrupt estate of human nature is not easily to be met
with.
3. And by sensual appetites, passions, and worldly business. In the
generality of men the appetites and desires of sense are so violent and
importunate, the business and the pleasures of the world take up so
much of their time, and their passions are so very strong and
unreasonable, that of themselves they are very backward and unapt to
employ their reason, and fix their attention upon moral matters, and
still more backward to apply themselves to the practice of them. The
love of pleasure is (as Aristotle elegantly expresses it, [257] ) so
nourished up with us from our very childhood, and so incorporated (as
it were) into the whole course of our lives, that it is very difficult
for men to withdraw their thoughts from sensual objects, and fasten
them upon things remote from sense; and if perhaps they do attend a
little, and begin to see the reasonableness of governing themselves by
a higher principle than mere sense and appetite, yet with such variety
of temptations are they perpetually encompassed and continually
solicited, [258] and the strength of passions and appetites, make so
great opposition to the motions of reason, that commonly they yield and
submit to practise those things which at the same time the reason of
their own mind condemns, [259] and what they allow not that they do;
which observation is so true of too great a part of mankind, that Plato
upon this ground declares all arts and sciences to have, in his
opinion, [260] less of difficulty in them than that of making men good;
insomuch that it is well, saith he, [261] if men can come to attain a
right sense, and just and true notions of things, even by that time
they arrive at old age.
4. And above all, by vicious habits and practices. But that which,
above all other things, most depraves men's natural understanding, and
hinders them from discerning and judging rightly of moral truths, is
this; that as stupid and careless ignorance leads them into fond and
superstitious opinions, and the appetites of sense overcome and tempt
them into practices contrary to their conscience and judgment; so, on
the reverse, the multitude of superstitious opinions, vicious habits,
and debauched practices, which prevail in all ages through the greater
part of the world, do reciprocally increase men's gross ignorance,
carelessness, and stupidity. False and unworthy notions of God, or
superstitious apprehensions concerning him, which men carelessly and
inconsiderately happen to take up at first; do (as it were) blind the
eyes of their reason for the future, and hinder them from discerning
what of itself originally was easy enough to be discovered. That which
may be known Rom. i. 19, &c. of God has been manifest enough unto men
in all ages, for God hath showed it unto them: For the invisible things
of him from the creation of the world are clearly seen, being
understood by the things that are made, even his eternal power and
godhead: So that they who are ignorant of him cannot but be without
excuse. But notwithstanding all the heathen world had so certain means
of knowing God, yet generally they glorified him not as God; neither
were thankful, but became vain in their imaginations, and their foolish
heart was darkened; and they changed the glory of the incorruptible God
into images of the meanest and most contemptible creatures; and
worshipped and served the creature more than the Creator, who is
blessed for ever: The natural consequence of which absurd idolatry, and
also the just judgment of God upon them for it was, that they were
given up to a reprobate mind, to uncleanness, and to all vile affection
to such a degree, that not only their common practices, but even their
most sacred rites and religious performances became themselves the
extremest abominations. And when men's morals are thus corrupted, and
they run with greediness into all excess of riot and debauchery; then,
on the other hand, by the same natural consequence, and by the same
just judgment of God, both their vicious customs and actions, as well
as superstitious opinions, reciprocally increase the blindness of their
hearts,Eph. iv. 18. 19. darken the judgment of their understandings,
stupify and sear their consciences so as to become past feeling, [262]
and by degrees extinguish wholly that light of nature in their own
minds, which was given them originally to enable them to discern
between good and evil.
Wherefore men have great need to be taught and instructed in matters of
religion. By these means it comes to pass, that though the great
obligations and the principal motives of morality, are indeed certainly
discoverable and demonstrable by right reason; and all considerate men,
when those motives and obligations are fairly proposed to them, must of
necessity (as has been fully proved in the foregoing heads) yield their
assent to them as certain and undeniable truths; yet under the
disadvantages now mentioned, (as it is the case of most men to fall
under some or other of them,) very few are of themselves able, in
reality and effect, discover those truths clearly and plainly for
themselves: But most men have great need of particular teaching and
much instruction, not without some weight of authority, as well as
reason and persuasion;
1st. To raise and stir up their attention,--to move them to shake off
their habitual carelessness, stupidity, and inconsiderateness,--to
persuade them to make use of their natural reason and understanding,
and to apply their minds to apprehend and study the truth and certainty
of these things: For, as men, notwithstanding all the rational
faculties they are by nature indued with, may yet, through mere neglect
and incogitancy, be grossly and totally ignorant of the plainest and
most obvious mathematical truths; so men may also, for want of
consideration, be very ignorant of some of the plainest moral
obligations, which, as soon as distinctly proposed to them, they cannot
possibly avoid giving their assent unto.
2. To give them a due sense, and right and just apprehensions
concerning these things,--to convince them of the great concern and
vast importance of them,--to correct the false notions, vain
prejudices, and foolish opinions, which deprave their judgment,--and to
remove that levity and heedlessness of spirit which makes men
frequently to be in their practice very little influenced by what in
abstract opinion they may seem firmly to believe: For there are many
men who will think themselves highly injured if any one should make any
doubt of their believing the indispensable obligations of morality, and
the certainty of a future state of rewards and punishments, who yet in
their lives and actions seem to have upon their minds but a very small
sense of the weight and infinite importance of these great truths.
3. To inculcate these things frequently upon them, and press them
effectually to the practice of the plainest and most necessary
duties,--to persuade them to moderate those passions,--to subdue those
lusts,--to conquer those appetites,--to despise those pleasures of
sense,--and (which is the greatest difficulty of all) to reform and
correct those vicious customs and evil habits which tempt and hurry
them too often into the commission of such things, as they are
convinced at the same time, in the reason of their own minds, ought not
to be practised: For it is very possible men may both clearly
understand their duty and also be fully convinced of the reasonableness
of practising it, and yet at the same time find a law in their
membersRom. vii. 23. warring and prevailing against the law of their
mind, and bringing them into captivity to the law of sin and death. Men
may be pleased with the beauty and excellency of virtue, [263] and have
some faint inclinations and even resolutions to practise it, and yet,
at the return of their temptations, constantly fall back into their
accustomed vices, if the great motives of their duty be not very
frequently and very strongly inculcated upon them, so as to make very
deep and lasting impressions upon their minds, and they have not some
greater and higher assistance afforded them than the bare conviction of
their own speculative reason.
For these reasons (I say) it is very fit, that, notwithstanding the
natural demonstrableness both of the obligations and motives of
morality, yet considering the manifest corruptness of the present
estate which human nature is in, the generality of men should not by
any means be left wholly to the workings of their own minds, to the use
of their natural faculties, and to the bare convictions of their own
reason, but should be particularly taught and instructed in their duty,
should have the motives of it frequently and strongly pressed and
inculcated upon them with great weight and authority, and should have
many extraordinary assistances afforded them, to keep them effectually
in the practice of the great and plainest duties of religion.
The great use and necessity of an order of preachers. And hence we may,
by the way, justly observe the exceeding great use and necessity there
is, of establishing an order or succession of men, whose peculiar
office and continual employment it may be, to teach and instruct people
in their duty, to press and exhort them perpetually to the practice of
it, and to give them all possible assistances for that purpose. To
which excellent institution, the right and worthy notion of God and his
divine perfections, the just sense and understanding of the great
duties of religion, and the universal belief and due apprehension of a
future state of rewards and punishments; with the generality even of
the meaner and more ignorant sort of people among us, are now possessed
of; is manifestly and undeniably almost wholly owing: As I shall have
occasion hereafter more particularly to observe.
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[255] Multis signis natura declarat quid velit;--obsurdescimus tamen,
nescio quomodo, nec audimus.--Cic. de Amicit.
[256] Si tales nos natura genuisset, ut eam ipsam intueri et
perspicere, eâ que optimâ duce cursum vitæ conficere possemus; haud
esset sanè quod quisquam rationem et doctrinam requireret. Nunc vero,
&c.--Cic. Tusc. Quoest. lib. 3. Nunc parvulos nobis dedit igniculos,
quos celeriter malis moribus opinionibusque depravatis sic
restinguimus, ut nusquam naturæ lumen appareat.----Simul atque editi in
lucem et suscepti sumus, in omni continuo pravitate, et in summa
opinionum perversitate, versamur; ut pene cum lacte nutricis, errorem
suxisse videamur. Cum vero parentibus redditi, deinde magistris traditi
sumus; tum ita variis imbuimur erroribus, ut vanitati veritas, et
opinioni confirmatæ natura ipsa cedat.----Cum vero accedit eodem, quasi
maximus quidem magister, populus, atque omnis undique ad vitia
consentiens multitudo, tum plane inficimur opinionum pravitate, a
naturaque ipsa desciscimus.--Ibid.
[257] heti de ek nepiou pasin hemin suntethraptai [hedone] dio kai
chalepon apotripsasthai touto to pathos, enkechrosmenon to
bio.--Arislot. Ethic. lib. 2. c. 2.
[258] Vitia de mercede sollicitant; avaritia pecuniam promittit:
luxuria multas ac varias voluptates; ambitio purpuram et plausum; et ex
hoc potentiam, et quicquid potentia ponit.--Senec. Epist. 59. Tode de
ismen, hoti tauta ta pathe en hemin hoion neura e merinthoi tines
enousai, sposi t9e hemas kai allelai; anthelkousin, enantiai oosai ep'
enanti_s praxeis.--Plato de Legib. lib. 1.
[259] ----Video meliora proboque, deteriora sequor.
[260] hedoxe de, kai nun eti dokei, ta men alla epitedeumata panta, ou
sphodra chalepa heinai; to de tina tropon chre gignesthai chrestous
anthropous, panchalepon.--Plato in Epinomide.
[261] Phronesin de kai aletheis doxas bebaioun, eutuches hoto kai pros
to geras parngineto.--Id. de Legib. lib. 1.
[262] Justos natura esse factos;----tantam autem esse corruptelam malæ
consuetudinis, ut ab ea tanquam igniculi extinguantur a natura dati,
exorianturque et confirmentur vitia contraria.--Cic. de Legib. lib. 1.
[263] Quidam ad magnificas voces excitantur, et transeunt in affectum
dicentium, alacres vultu et animo. Rapit illos instigatque rerum
pulchritudo.----Juvat protinus quæ audias, facere. Afficiuntur illi, et
sunt quales jubentur, si illa animo forma permaneat, si non impetum
insignem protinus populus honesti dissuasor excipiat. Pauci illam quam
conceperant mentem, domum perferre potuerunt.--Senec. Epist. 109.
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Proposition VI.
VI. Proposition VI. Though in almost every age there have indeed been
in the heathen world some wise and brave and good men, who have made it
their business to study and practise the duties of natural religion
themselves, and to teach and exhort others to do the like, who seem
therefore to have been raised up by Providence, as instruments to
reprove in some measure, and put some kind of check to the extreme
superstition and wickedness of the nations wherein they lived; yet none
of these have ever been able to reform the world with any considerable
great and universal success, because they have been but very few that
have in earnest set themselves about this excellent work; and they that
have indeed sincerely done it have themselves been entirely ignorant of
some doctrines, and very doubtful and uncertain of others, absolutely
necessary for the bringing about that great end; and those things which
they have been certain of, and in good measure understood, they have
not been able to prove and explain clearly enough; and those that they
have been able both to prove and explain by sufficiently clear
reasoning, they have not yet had authority enough to enforce and
inculcate upon men's minds with so strong an impression as to influence
and govern the general practice of the world.
1. There have, indeed, in almost every age been, in the heathen world,
some wise, and brave, and good men, who have made it their business to
study and practise the duties of natural religion themselves, and to
teach and exhort others to do the like: An eminent instance whereof, in
the eastern nations, the Scripture itself affords us in the history of
Job; concerning whom it does not certainly appear that he knew any
positive revealed institution of religion, or that, before his
sufferings, any immediate revelation was made to him, as there was to
Abraham and the rest of the patriarchs. Among the Greeks Socrates seems
to be an extraordinary example of this kind, concerning whom Plato
tells us, in his apology, [264] that he did nothing else but go
continually about, persuading both old and young, not to be so much
solicitous to gratify the appetites of the body, or to heap up wealth,
or to raise themselves to honour, or gain any outward advantage
whatsoever: as to improve the mind, by the continual exercise of all
virtue and goodness: Teaching them, that a man's true value did not
arise from his riches, or from any outward circumstances of life; but
that true riches, and every real good, whether public or private,
proceeded wholly from virtue. After him, Plato and Aristotle and others
followed his example, in teaching morality. And among the Romans,
Cicero, and in later times, Epictetus and Antoninus, and several
others, gave the world admirable systems of ethics, and noble moral
instructions and exhortations, of excellent use and benefit to the
generations wherein they live, and deservedly of great value and esteem
even unto this day.
2. Who seem to have been designed by Providence to bear witness against
the wickedness of the nations wherein they lived. So that I think, it
may very justly be supposed, that these men were raised up and designed
by Providence, (the abundant goodness of God having never left itself
wholly without witness, notwithstanding the greatest corruptions and
provocations of mankind,) as instruments to reprove in some measure,
and put some kind of check to the extreme superstition and wickedness
of the nations wherein they lived; or at least to bear witness against,
and condemn it. Concerning Job, the case is evident and confessed. And
for the same reason, some of the ancientest writers of the church have
not scrupled to call even Socrates also, [265] and some others of the
best of the heathen moralists, by the name of Christians; and to
affirm, that, [266] as the law was as it were a schoolmaster to bring
the Jews unto Christ, so true moral philosophy was to the gentiles a
preparative to receive the gospel. This perhaps was carrying the matter
somewhat to far: But, to be sure, thus much we may safely assert, that
[267] whatever any of these men were at any time enabled to deliver
wisely and profitably, and agreeably to divine truth, was as a light
shining in a dark place, derived to them by a ray of that infinite
overflowing goodness, which does good to all even both just and unjust;
from God the sole fountain of all truth and wisdom: And this, for some
advantage and benefit to the rest of the world, even in its blindest
and most corrupt estate.
3. But yet none of these men were ever able to reform the world with
any considerable success. But then, notwithstanding the most that can
be made of this supposition, it is certain the effect of all the
teaching and instruction even of the best of the philosophers in the
heathen world, was in comparison very small and inconsiderable. They
never were able to reform the world with any great and universal
success, nor to keep together any considerable number of men in the
knowledge and practice of true virtue. With respect to the worship of
God, idolatry prevailed universally in all nations; and,
notwithstanding men did indeed know God, so as to be without excuse,
yet "they did not like to retain him in their knowledge, but became
vain in theirRom. i, 21-28. imaginations, and their foolish heart was
darkened, and they changed the glory of the uncorruptible God into
images" of the vilest creatures; and no philosophers ever turned any
great number of men from this absurd idolatry, to the acknowledgment
and worship of the only true God. In respect of men's dealings one with
another, honour and interest, and friendship, and laws, and the
necessity of society, did indeed cause justice to be practised in many
heathen nations to a great degree; but very few men among them were
just and equitable upon right and true principles, a due sense of
virtue, and a constant fear and love of God. With respect to
themselves, intemperance and luxury, and unnatural uncleanness, was
commonly practised, even in the most civilized countries; and this not
so much in opposition to the doctrine of the philosophers, as by the
consent indeed and encouragement of too great a part of them. I shall
not enlarge upon this ungrateful and melancholy subject: There are
accounts enough extant of the universal corruption and debauchery of
the heathen world. St. Paul's description of it, in the whole first
chapter of his Epistle to the Romans, is alone sufficient; and the
complaints of their own writers abundantly confirm it. [268] The
disciples of the best moralists, at least the practisers of their
doctrine were, in their own lifetime, [269] very few, as too plainly
appears from the evil treatment which that great man Socrates met
withal at Athens: And at their deaths their doctrine in great measure
died with them, not having any sufficient evidence or authority to
support it; and their followers quickly fell back into the common
idolatry, superstition, uncleanness, and debauchery, of which the
character the Roman writers give of those that called themselves the
disciples of Socrates is a particular and remarkable instance. These
considerations (so very early did they appear to be true,) affected in
such a manner that great admirer of Socrates, Plato, that he sometimes
seems to give over all hopes of working any reformation in men by
philosophy; and says that a good man, [270] when he considers these
things, would even choose to sit quiet, and shift for himself, like a
man that in a violent hurricane creeps under a wall for his defence;
and seeing the whole world round about him filled with all manner of
wickedness, be content if, preserving his single self from iniquity and
every evil work, he can pass away the present life in peace, and at
last die with tranquillity and good hope. And, indeed, for many
reasons, it was altogether impossible that the teaching of the
philosophers should ever be able to reform mankind, and recover them
out of their very degenerate and corrupt estate, with any considerably
great and universal success.
1. Because they have been but very few that have in earnest set
themselves about that excellent work. In the first place, because the
number of those who have in earnest set themselves about this excellent
work have been exceeding few: Philosophers, indeed, that called
themselves so, there were enough in every place, and in every age: But
those who truly made it their business to improve their reason to the
height, to free themselves from the superstition which overwhelmed the
whole world, to search out the obligations of morality, and the will of
God their creator, to obey it sincerely themselves, as far as they
could discover it by the light of nature, and to encourage and exhort
others to do the like; were but a very few names. The doctrine of far
the greatest part of the philosophers consisted plainly in nothing but
words, and subtilty, and strife, and empty contention; as did not at
all amend even their own manners, much less was fitted to reform the
world. Their scholars, [271] as Aristotle excellently describes them,
thought themselves greatly improved in philosophy, and that they were
become gallant men if they did but hear and understand and learn to
dispute about morality, though it had no effect at all nor influence
upon their manners; just as if a sick man should expect to be healed by
hearing a physician discourse, though he never followed any of his
directions. Undoubtedly, saith he, the mind of the one was exactly as
much improved by such philosophy, as the health of the other's body by
such physic: And no wonder the generality of the common hearers judged
of their own improvement in philosophy by such false measures, when the
enormous viciousness of the lives of the philosophers themselves [272]
made it plainly appear that their art was not so much intended and
fitted for the reformation of men's manners, as to be an exercise of
wit and subtilty, and an instrument of vainglory: Excepting, perhaps,
Socrates and Plato, and some others of that rank, this account is too
plainly true of the greatest part of the philosophers. The argument is
too unpleasant to instance in particulars. Whoever pleases, may, in
Diogenes Laertius, and other writers, find accounts enough of the
lewdness and unnatural vices of most of the philosophers. It is a shame
for us, so much as to speak of those things, which were done of them,
not only in secret, but even in the most public manner. I shall here
only add the judgment of Cicero, a man as able to pass a right judgment
in this matter as ever lived. Do you think, [273] says he, that these
things (meaning the precepts of morality,) had any influence upon those
men, (excepting only a very few of them,) who taught, and wrote, and
disputed about them? No; who is there of all the philosophers, whose
mind, and life, and manners were conformable to right reason? Whoever
made his philosophy to be the law and rule of his life, and not a mere
boast and show of his wit and parts? who observed his own instructions,
and lived in obedience to his own precepts? On the contrary; many of
them were slaves to filthy lusts, many to pride, many to covetousness,
&c.
2. And those few of the philosophers, who did indeed sincerely
endeavour to reform mankind, were yet themselves entirely ignorant of
some doctrines absolutely necessary to the bringing about that great
end. Those few extraordinary men of the philosophers, who did indeed in
good measure sincerely obey the laws of natural religion themselves,
and make it their chief business to instruct and exhort others to do
the same, were yet themselves entirely ignorant of some doctrines
absolutely necessary to the bringing about this great end, of the
reformation and recovery of mankind.
In general: Having no knowledge of the whole scheme, order, and state
of things, the method of God's governing the world, his design in
creating mankind, the original dignity of human nature, the ground and
circumstances of men's present corrupt condition, the manner of the
divine interposition necessary to their recovery, and the glorious end
to which God intended finally to conduct them: Having no knowledge (I
say) of all this, their whole attempt to discover the truth of things,
and to instruct others therein, was like wandering in the wide sea,
[274] without knowing whither they were to go, or which way they were
to take, or having any guide to conduct them: And accordingly the
wisest of them were never backward to confess their own ignorance and
great blindness; [275] that truth was hid from them [276] as it were in
an unfathomable depth; that they were much in the dark, [277] and very
dull and stupid, not only as to the profounder things of wisdom, but as
to such things also which seemed very capable of being in great part
discovered: Nay, that even those things which in themselves were of all
others the most manifest, [278] (that is, which, whenever made known,
would appear most obvious and evident,) their natural understanding was
of itself as unqualified to find out and apprehend as the eyes of bats
to behold the light of the sun; that the very first and most necessary
thing of all, [279] the nature and attributes of God himself, were,
notwithstanding all the general helps of reason, very difficult to them
to find out in particular, and still more difficult to explain; it
being much more easy to say what God was not than what he was: [280]
And finally, that the method of instructing men effectually, and making
them truly wise and good, was a thing very obscure and dark, and
difficult to be found out: [281] In a word, Socrates himself always
openly professed, that he pretended to be wiser than other men only in
this one thing, that he was duly sensible of his own ignorance, and
believed that it was merely for that very reason that the oracle
pronounced him the wisest of men. [282]
Particularly they were very ignorant in what manner God might be
acceptably worshipped. More particularly; the manner in which God might
be acceptably worshipped these men were entirely and unavoidably
ignorant of. That God ought to be worshipped is, in the general, as
evident and plain from the light of nature as any thing can be; but in
what particular manner, and with what kind of service he will be
worshipped, cannot be certainly discovered by bare reason. Obedience to
the obligations of nature, and imitation of the moral attributes of
God, the wisest philosophers easily knew was undoubtedly the most
acceptable service to God: But some external adoration seemed also to
be necessary, and how this was to be performed they could not with any
certainty discover. Accordingly even the very best of them complied
therefore generally with the outward religion of their country, and
advised others to do the same; and so, notwithstanding all their wise
discourses, they fell lamentably into the practice of the most foolish
idolatry. Plato, [283] after having delivered very noble, and almost
divine truths concerning the nature and attributes of the Supreme God,
weakly advises men to worship likewise inferior gods, [284] demons, and
spirits, and dared not to condemn the worshipping even of statues also
and images, dedicated according to the laws of their country; as if the
honour they paid to lifeless idols could procure the favour and
good-will of superior intelligences; [285] And so he corrupted and
spoiled the best philosophy in the world by adding idolatry to that
worship which he had wisely and bravely before proved to be due to the
creator of all things. [286] After him, Cicero, the greatest and best
philosopher that Rome or perhaps any other nation ever produced,
allowed men to continue the idolatry of their ancestors; [287] advised
them to conform themselves to the superstitious religion of their
country, [288] in offering such sacrifices to different gods as were by
law established; and disapproves and finds fault with the Persian Magi,
[289] for burning the temples of the Grecian gods, and asserting that
the whole universe was God's temple: In [290] all which he fondly
contradicts himself, by inexcusably complying with the practices of
those men, whom in many of his writings he largely and excellently
proves to be extremely foolish upon account of those very practices:
And to mention no more, (for indeed those of a lower rank, the minuter
philosophers, as Tully calls them, are not worth mentioning,) that
admirable moralist Epictetus, who, for a true sense of virtue, seems to
have had no superior in the heathen world; even he also advises men to
offer libations and sacrifices to the gods, [291] every one according
to the religion and custom of his country:
And in what method God would be reconciled to returning sinners. But
still more particularly: That which of all other things, these best and
wisest of the philosophers were most absolutely and unavoidably
ignorant of, and yet which, of all other things, was of the greatest
importance for sinful men to know, was the method by which such as have
erred from the right way, and have offended God, may yet again restore
themselves to the favour of God, and to the hopes of happiness. From
the consideration of the goodness and mercifulness of God, the
philosophers did indeed very reasonably hope, that God would show
himself placable to sinners, and might be some way reconciled; but when
we come to inquire more particularly what propitiation he will accept,
and in what manner this reconciliation must be made, here nature stops,
and expects with impatience the aid of some particular revelation. That
God will receive returning sinners, and accept of repentance instead of
perfect obedience, they cannot certainly know to whom he has not
declared that he will do so; for though this be the most probable and
only means of reconciliation that nature suggests, yet whether this
will be alone sufficient, or whether God will not require something
further for the vindication of his justice, and of the honour and
dignity of his laws and government, and for the expressing more
effectually his indignation against sin, before he will restore men to
the privileges they have forfeited, they cannot be satisfactorily
assured; for it cannot positively be proved, from any of God's
attributes, that he is absolutely obliged to pardon all creatures all
their sins, at all times, barely and immediately upon their repenting.
There arises, therefore, from nature, no sufficient comfort to sinners,
but anxious and endless solicitude about the means of appeasing the
Deity. Hence those divers ways of sacrificing, and numberless
superstitions, which overspread the face of the heathen world, but were
so little satisfactory to the wiser part of mankind, even in those
times of darkness, that the more considering philosophers could not
forbear frequently declaring that [292] they thought those rites could
avail little or nothing towards appeasing the wrath of a provoked God,
or making their prayers acceptable in his sight; but that something
still seemed to them to be wanting, though they knew not what.
3. And other doctrines absolutely necessary in order to reform mankind,
the best philosophers were very doubtful and uncertain about. Some
other doctrines absolutely necessary, likewise, to the bringing about
this great end of the reformation of mankind, though there was indeed
so much proof and evidence of the truth of them to be drawn from
reason, as that the best philosophers could not by any means be
entirely ignorant of them; yet so much doubtfulness, uncertainty, and
unsteadiness, was there in the thoughts and assertions of these
philosophers concerning them, as could not but [293] very much diminish
their proper effect and influence upon the hearts and lives of men. I
instance, in the immortality of the soul, the certainty of a future
state, and the rewards and punishments to be distributed in a life to
come. The arguments, which may be drawn from reason and from the nature
of things, for the proof of these great truths, seem really (as I have
before shown) to come very little short of strict demonstration: And
accordingly the wisest philosophers (as has likewise been shown before)
did indeed sometimes seem to have reasoned themselves into a firm
belief of them, and to have been fully convinced of their certainty and
reality; even so far as to apply them to excellent purposes and uses of
life. But then, on the other hand, a man cannot without some pity and
concern of mind observe, how strangely, at other times, the weight of
the same arguments seems to have slipped (as it were) out of their
minds; and with what wonderful diffidence, wavering, and unsteadiness,
they discourse about the same things. I do not here think it of any
very great moment, that there were indeed some whole sects of
philosophers, who absolutely denied the immortality of the soul, and
peremptorily rejected all kind of expectation of a life to come;
(though, to be sure, this could not but in some measure shock the
common people, and make them entertain some suspicion about the
strength of the arguments used on the other side of the question by
wiser men:) Yet, I say,) it cannot be thought of any very great moment,
that some whole sects of philosophers did indeed absolutely deny the
immortality of the soul; because these men were weak reasoners in other
matters also, and plainly low and contemptible philosophers, in
comparison of those greater geniuses we are now speaking of. But that
which I now observe, and which I say cannot be observed without some
pity and concern of mind, is this; that even those great philosophers
themselves, the very best and wisest and most considerate of them that
ever lived, notwithstanding the undeniable strength of the arguments
which sometimes convinced them of the certainty of a future state, did
yet at other times express themselves with so much hesitancy and
unsteadiness concerning it, as, without doubt, could not but extremely
hinder the proper effect and influence which that most important
consideration ought to have upon the hearts and lives of men. I am now,
said Socrates [294] a little before his death, about to leave this
world; and ye are still to continue in it: Which of us have the better
part allotted to us, God only knows: [295] Seeming to express some
doubtfulness, whether he should have any existence after death, or not.
And again, at the end of his most admirable discourse concerning the
immortality of the soul; I would have you to know, [296] said he to his
friends who came to pay him their last visit, that I have great hopes I
am now going into the company of good men: Yet I would not be too
peremptory and confident concerning it. But [297] if death be only as
it were a transmigration from hence unto another place; and those
things, which are told us, be indeed true; that those who are dead to
us, do all live there: Then, &c. So likewise Cicero, speaking of the
same subject: I will endeavour, saith he, [298] to explain what you
desire; yet I would not have you depend upon what I shall say, as
certain and infallible; but I may guess, as other men do, at what shall
seem most probable: And further than this, I cannot pretend to go.
Again: Which of those two opinions, [299] saith he, [that the soul is
mortal, or that it is immortal,] be true, God only knows; which of them
is most probable, is a very great question. And again in the same
discourse, having brought all those excellent arguments before
mentioned in proof of the immortality of the soul; yet we ought not,
saith he, [300] to be overconfident of it: For it often happens that we
are strongly affected at first with an acute argument; and yet, a
little while after, stagger in our judgment, and alter our opinion,
even in clearer matters than these: For these things must be confessed
to have some obscurity in them. And again: I know not how, saith he,
[301] when I read the arguments in proof of the soul's immortality,
methinks I am fully convinced; and yet after I have laid aside the
book, and come to think and consider of the matter alone by myself,
presently I find myself slipt again insensibly into my old doubts. From
all which it appears, that notwithstanding all the bright arguments and
acute conclusions, and brave sayings of the best philosophers, yet life
and immortality were not fully and satisfactorily brought to light by
bare natural reason; [302] but men still plainly stood in need of some
farther and more complete discovery.
4. And those things which they were indeed certain of, yet they were
not able to prove and explain clearly and distinctly enough. Those
things which the philosophers were indeed the most fully certain of,
and did in good measure understand; such as the obligations of virtue,
and the will of God in matters of morality; yet they were never able to
prove and explain clearly and distinctly enough, to persons of
capacities, in order to their complete conviction and reformation.
First, because most of their discourses upon these subjects have been
rather speculative and learned, nice and subtile disputes, than
practical and universally useful instructions. They proved, by strict
and nice argumentation, that the practice of virtue is wise and
reasonable, and fit to be chosen, rather than that it is of plain,
necessary, and indispensable obligation; and were able to deduce the
will of God only by such abstract and subtile reasonings as the
generality of men had by no means either abilities or opportunities to
understand or to be duly affected by. Their very profession and manner
of life led them to make their philosophy rather an entertainment of
leisure time, [303] a trial of wit and parts, an exercise of eloquence,
and of the art and skill of good speaking, than an endeavour to reform
the manners of men, by showing them their plain and necessary duty: And
accordingly the study of it, was, as Cicero [304] himself observes,
unavoidably confined to a few, and by no means fitted for the bulk and
common sort of mankind, who, as they cannot judge of the true strength
of nice and abstract arguments, so they will always be suspicious of
some fallacy in them. None but men of parts and learning, of study and
liberal education, have been able to profit by the sublime doctrine of
Plato, or by the subtile disputations of other philosophers; whereas
the doctrine of morality, which is the rule of life and manners, ought
to be plain, easy, and familiar, and suited fully to the capacities of
all men. [305] Secondly, another reason why the philosophers were never
able to prove and explain clearly and distinctly enough, even those
things of which they were the most certain, to persons of all
capacities, in order to their complete conviction and reformation, was
because they never were able to frame to themselves any complete,
regular, and consistent system or scheme of things; but the truths
which they taught [306] were single and scattered, accidental as it
were, and hit upon by chance, rather than by any knowledge of the whole
true state of things; and consequently less universally convictive.
Nothing could be more certain, (as they all well knew,) than that
virtue was unquestionably to be chosen, and the practice of it to be
recommended necessarily above all things; and yet they could never
clearly and satisfactorily make out upon what principles originally,
and for what end ultimately, this choice was to be made; and upon what
grounds it was universally to be supported. Hence they perpetually
disagreed, [307] opposed, and contradicted one another in all their
disputations, to such a degree that St. Austin, somewhere out of Varro,
reckons up no less than 280 opinions concerning that one question, What
was the chief good or final happiness of man? The effect of all which
differences could not, without doubt, but be a mighty hindrance to that
conviction and general influence which that great truth, in the
certainty whereof they all clearly agreed, (namely, that the practice
of virtue was necessary and indispensable,) ought to have had upon the
minds and lives of men. This whole matter is excellently set forth by
Lactantius: The philosophers, saith he, [308] take them altogether, did
indeed discover all the particular doctrines of true religion; but
because each one endeavoured to confute what the others asserted, and
no one's single scheme was in all its parts consistent, and agreeable
to reason and truth, and none of them were able to collect into one
whole and entire scheme the several truths dispersed among them all,
therefore they were not able to maintain and defend what they had
discovered. And again, having set down a brief summary of the whole
doctrine and design of true religion, from the original to the
consummation of all things; this entire scheme, says he, [309] because
the philosophers were ignorant of, therefore they were not able to
comprehend the truth, notwithstanding that they saw and discovered
singly almost all the particulars of which the whole scheme consists:
But this was done by different men, and at different times, and in
different manners, (with various mixtures of different errors, in what
every one discovered of truth singly;) and without finding the
connexion of the causes, and consequences, and reasons of things, from
the mutual dependencies of which the completeness and perfection of the
whole scheme arises; whereas, had there been any man who could have
collected and put together in order all the several truths which were
taught singly and scatteredly by philosophers of all the different
sects, and have made up out of them one entire consistent scheme, truly
he would not have differed much from us Christians: But this it was not
possible for any man to do, without having the true system of things
first revealed to him.
5. And those things which they were able to prove and explain clearly
and distinctly enough, yet they had not sufficient authority to enforce
in practice. Lastly: Even those things which the philosophers were not
only themselves certain of, but which they have also been able to prove
and explain to others, with sufficient clearness and plainness,--such
as are the most obvious and necessary duties of life,--they have not
yet had authority enough to enforce and inculcate upon men's minds with
so strong an impression as to influence and govern the general practice
of the world. The truths which they proved by speculative reason wanted
still some more sensible authority to back them, [310] and make them of
more force and efficacy in practice; and the precepts which they laid
down, however evidently reasonable and fit to be obeyed, [311] seemed
still to want weight, and to be but the precepts of men. Hence none of
the philosophers, even of those who taught the clearest and certainest
truths, and offered the best and wisest instructions, and enforced them
with the strongest motives that could be, [312] were yet ever able to
work any remarkable change in the minds and lives of any considerable
part of mankind, as the preaching of Christ and his apostles undeniably
did. Nor does it appear in history [313] that any number of Socrates's
or Plato's followers were convinced of the excellency of true virtue,
or the certainty of its final reward, in such a manner as to be willing
to lay down their lives for its sake, as innumerable of the disciples
of Christ are known to have done. In speculation, indeed, it may,
perhaps, seem possible, that notwithstanding it must be confessed
philosophy cannot discover any complete and satisfactory remedy for
past miscarriages, yet the precepts and motives offered by the best
philosophers might at least be sufficient to amend and reform men's
manners for the future: But in experience and practice it hath, on the
contrary, appeared to be altogether impossible for philosophy and bare
reason to reform mankind effectually, without the assistance of some
higher principle: For though the bare natural possibility of the thing
cannot indeed easily be denied, yet in this case (as Cicero excellently
expresses it [314] ,) in like manner as in physic it matters nothing
whether a disease be such as that no man does, or no man can recover
from it; so neither does it make any difference whether by philosophy
no man is, or no man can be made wise and good: So that, without some
greater help and assistance, mankind is plainly left in a very bad
state. Indeed, in the original uncorrupted state of human nature,
before the mind of man was depraved with prejudicate opinions, corrupt
affections, and vicious inclinations, customs, and habits, right reason
may justly be supposed to have been a sufficient guide, and a principle
powerful enough to preserve men in the constant practice of their duty.
But, in the present circumstances and condition of mankind, the wisest
and most sensible of the philosophers themselves have not been backward
to complain, that they found the understandings of men so dark and
cloudy, their wills so biassed and inclined to evil, their passions so
outrageous and rebelling against reason, that they looked upon the
rules and laws of right reason as very hardly practicable, and which
they had very little hopes of ever being able to persuade the world to
submit to. In a word they confessed that human nature was strangely
corrupted; and they acknowledged this corruption to be a disease
whereof they knew not the true cause, and could not find out a
sufficient remedy. So that the great duties of religion were laid down
by them as matters of speculation and dispute, rather than as the rules
of action; and not so much urged upon the hearts and lives of men, as
proposed to the admiration of those who thought them hardly possible to
be effectually practised by the generality of men. To remedy all these
disorders, and conquer all these corruptions, there was plainly wanting
some extraordinary and supernatural assistance, which was above the
reach of bare reason and philosophy to procure, and yet without which
the philosophers themselves were sensible there could never be any
truly great men. [315]
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[264] Ouden gar allo pratton ego perierchomai, e peithon humon kai
neoterous kai p9resbuterous, mete somaton epimeleisthai, mete chrematon
proteron, mete allou tinos, houto sphodra, hos tes psuches, hopos hos
ariste estai; legon. hoti ouk ek chrematon he arete ginetai, all' ex
aretes chremata kai talla tagatha tois anthropois hapan9ta, kai edia
kai demosia.--Plato in Apol. Socrat.
[265] Kai hoi meta logou biosantes, Christianoi eisi, kan atheoi
enomisthesan; hoion en Hellesi men Sokrates kai Herakleitos, kai hoi
homoioi autois en barbarois de Abraam,&c.--Justin, Apolog. 2.
[266] Tacha de kai proegoumenos tois Hellensin ednthe he philosophia
tote. prin e ton kurion kalesai kai tous Hellenas; epaidagogei gar kai
aute to Hellenkon. hos ho nomos tous Hebraious eis Christon;
proparaskeuazei toinun he philosophia. proodopoiousa ton hupo Christou
teleioumenon.--Clem. Alexand. Strom.1.
[267] Ho theos gar autois tauta, kai hosa kalos lelektai,
ephanerose.--Orig. advers. Cels. lib. 6.
[268] Egregium sanctumque virum si cerno, bimembri
Hoc monstrum puero, vel miranti sub aratro
Piscibus inventis, et foetæ comparo mulæ. Juvenal, Sat. 13. See also
the places cited a little below.
[269] Sint licet perhonesti;--sed audire deposcimus quot sint aut
fuerint numero.----Unus, duo, tres.----At genus humanum non ex bonis
pauculis, sed ex cæteris omnibus æstimari convenit.--Arnob. advers.
Gentes, lib. 2. Da mihi virum qui sit iracundus, maledicus,
efficinatus, paucissimis Dei verbis tam placidum, quam ovem, reddam. Da
libidinosum, &c.----Numquis hæc philosophorum aut unquam præstitit, aut
præstare, si velit, potest?--Lactant. lib. 3. Para men tois Helletin
heis tis Phaidon kai ouk oida ei deuteros, &c.--Origen advers. Cels.
lib. 1.
[270] Tauta logismo labon, hesuchian echon. kai ta autou pratton, hoion
en cheimoni koniortou kai zales hupo pneumatos pheromenou, hupo
toichion hupostas horon tous allous katapimplamenous, anomias, agapa ei
pe autos katharos adikias te kai anosioin ergon. tonte enthade bion
biosetai, kai ten apallagen, autou meta kales elpidos ideos kai
heumenes apallaxetai.--Plato de Republ. lib. 6.
[271] All' hoi polloi tauta men ou prattousin; epi de ton logon
katapheugontes oiontai ailosophein, kai houtos esesthai stoudaioi;
homoion te piiountes tois kamnousin, hoi ton iatron akouousi men
epimelos; pioousi d' outhen ton prostassomenon, hosper oun oud' ekeinoi
eu hexousi to soma, houto therapeuomenoi; oud' houtoi ten psuchen,
houton philosophountes.--Arisyot. Ethic. lib. 2. cap. 3.
[272] Inclusos [philosophos] in angulis, facienda præcipere, quæ ne
ipsi quidem faciunt qui loquuntur, linguæ et quoniam se a veris actibus
removerunt, apparet eos exercendæ causa, vel advocandi gratia, artem
ipsam philosophiæ reperisse.--Lactant. lib. 3.
[273] Sed hæc eadem num censes apud eos ipsos valere, nisi admodum
paucos, a quibus inventa, disputata, conscripta sunt? Quotus enim
quisque philosophorum invenitur, qui sit ita moratus, ita animo ac vita
constitutus, ut ratio postulat; qui disciplinam suam non ostentationem
scientiæ, sed legem vitæ putet, qui obtemperet ipse sibi, et decretis
suis pareat? videre licet multos, libidinum servos, &c.--Cic. Tusculan.
Quoest. lib. 2.
[274] Errant ergo velut in mari magno, nec quo ferantur intelligunt;
quia nec viam cernunt nec ducem sequuntur.--Lactant. lib. 6.
[275] Ex cæteris philosophis, nonne optimus et gravissimus quisque
confitetur, multa se ignorare; et multa sibi etiam atque etiam esse
discenda?--Cic. Tusc. Quest. 3.
[276] En butho aletheia.
[277] Tui ergo te, Cicero, libri arguunt, quam nihil a philosophia
disci possit ad vitam. Hæc tua verba sunt, mihi autem non modo ad
sapientiam cæci videmur, sed ad ea ipsa, quæ aliqua ex parte cerni
videantur, hebetes et obtusi.--Lactant. lib. 3.
[278] Hosper gar kai ta ton nukteridon ommata pros to phengos echei to
meth' hemeran, houto kai tes hemeteras psuches ho nous pros ta te
phusei phanerotata panton.--Aristot. Metaphys. lib. 2. c. 1.
[279] Ton men ou poieten kai patera toude tou pantos eurein te ergon,
ka8i euronta legein eis pantas adunaton.--Plato in Timæo. Profecto eos
ipsos, qui se aliquid certi habere arbitrantur, addubitare coget
doctissimorum hominum de maxima re tanta dissensio.--Cic. de Natura
Deor. lib. 1.
[280] Utinam tam facilè vera invenire possem, quam falsa
convincere.--Id. ibid.
[281] Hepou euxamenos met' emou----Kai moi dusbatos ge tis topos
phainetai kai episkios; estin oun skoteinos kai dusdiereunetos.--Plato
de Republ. lib. 4.
[282] See Plato in Apologia Socratis.
[283] Lactantius observes that Socrates himself, at the conclusion of
one of the bravest discourses that ever was made by any philosopher,
superstitiously ordered a sacrifice to be offered for him to Æ
sculapius. But herein Lactantius was certainly mistaken; for Socrates
undoubtedly spake this in mockery of Æ sculapius, looking upon death as
his truest deliverance. Eipen, ho de teleutaion ephthenxato; O Kriton,
to Asklepio opheilomcn alektruona; alla apodote, kai me
amelesese.--Plato in Phoedone. Illud vero nonne summæ vanitatis, quod
ante mortem familiares suos rogavit, ut Æ sculapio gallum, quem
voverat, pro se sacrarent?--Lactant. lib. 3.
[284] Proton men, phamen, timas tas met' olumpious te kai tous tun
polin echontas theous, tois chthoniois an tis theois artia kai deutera
kai aristera nemon, horthotata tou tes eusebeias skopou
tunch8anoi.----Meta theou de tousde, kai tois daimosin hog' emphron
orgiazoit' an.----Epakolouthei d' autois hidrumata idia patroon theon
kata nomon orgiazomena..--Plato de Legib. lib. 4.
[285] Tous men gar ton theon orontes saphos, timomen; ton de eikonas
hagalmata hidrusamenoi, ohus hemin agallousi, kaiper apsuchous hontas,
ekeinous hegoumetha, tuus empsuchous theous pollen dia taut' eunoian
kai charin echein..--Plato de Legib. lib. 11.
[286] Ta Platoni houk apithanos men eiremena, ou men kai diethento ton
philosophon axios kan auto anastraphenai en te pros ton poieten ton
holon eusebeia, hen echren me notheuein, mede miainein te
eidololatreia.--Orig. advers. Cels. lib. 6.
[287] A patribus acceptos Deos placet coli.--Cic. de Legib. lib. 2.
[288] Item illud ex institutis pontificum et aruspicum non mutandum
est, quibus hostiis immolandum cuique Deo.--Id. ibid.
[289] Nec sequor Magos Persarum, quibus auctoribus Xerxes inflammâ sse
templa Græciæ dicitur, quod parietibus includerent Deos, quorum hic
mundus omnis templum esset et domus. Melius Græci atque nostri, qui, ut
augerent pietatem in Deos, easdem illos, quas nos urbes incolere
voluerunt.--Id ibid.
[290] Video te, Cicero, terrena et manufacta venerari. Vana esse
intelligis, et tamen eadem facis quæ faciunt ipsi quos ipse
stultisssimos confiteris.----Si libenter errant etiam ii, qui errare se
sentiunt quanto magis vulgus indoctum?--Lactant. lib. 2.
[291] Speidein de kai thuein, kai aparchesthai kata ta patria hekasto
prosekei.--Epict. cap. 38.
[292] See Plato's Alcibiades 2. throughout.
[293] Præterea nihil apud eos certi est, nihil quod à scientia
veniat;----et nemo paret, quia nemo vult ad incertum
laborare.--Lactant. lib. 3.
[294] Hemoi men apoganoumino, humin biosomenois; hopoteroi de hemon
erchontai epi ameinon pragma, adelon panti plen e to the.--Plato in
Apolog, Socr.
[295] Quod præter Deos negat scire quenquam, scit ipse, utrum melius
sit, nam dixit antè . Sed suum illud, nihil ut affirmet, tenet ad
extremum.--Cic. Tusc. Qu. lib. 1.
[296] Nun de eo iste hoti par' andras te elpizo aphixesthai agathous,
kai touto ouk men an panu diischurisaimen.--Plato in Phæd.
[297] Ei deu au oion apodemesai estin ho thanatos enthende eis allon
topon, kai alethe esti ta legomena, hos ara ekei eisi pantes hoi
tethneotes, &c.--Plato in Apolog. Socrat.
[298] Ea, quæ vis, ut potero, explicabo; nec tamen quasi Pythius
Apollo, certa ut sint et fixa quæ dixero, sed ut homunculus unus è
multis, probabilia conjectura sequens. Ultra enim quò progrediar, quam
ut verisimilia videam, non habeo.--Cic. Tusc. Qust. lib. 1.
[299] Harum sententiarum quæ vera sit, Deus aliquis viderit; quæ
verisimillima, magna quæstio est.--Id. ibid.
[300] Etsi nihil nimis oportet confidere. Movemur enim sæpe aliquo
acutè concluso, labamus mutamusque sententiam clarioribus etiam in
rebus; in his est enim aliqua obscuritas.--Id ibid.
[301] Nescio quomodo, dum lego, assentior, cum posui librum, et mecum
ipse de immortalitate animorum cæpi cogitare, assensio omnis illa
elabitur.--Id ibid.
[302] Credebam facilè opinionibus magnorum virorum, tam gratissimam
[animæ immortalitatem] promittentium magis quam probantimm.--Senec.
Epist. 102. Adeo omnis illa tunc sapientia Socratis, de industria
venerat consultæ æquanimitatis, non de fiducia compertæ
veritatis.--Tertullian de Anima.
[303] Profecto omnis istorum disputatio, quanquam uberrimos fontes
virtutis et scientiæ contineat, tamen collata cum horum [qui
rempublicam gubernant] actis perfectisque rebus, vereor ne non tantum
videatur attulisse negotiis hominum utilitatis, quantum oblectationem
quandam otii.--Cic. de Repub. Fragm.
[304] Est, inquit Cicero, philosophia paucis contenta judicibus,
multitudinem consulto ipsa, fugiens.----Maximum itaque argumentum est,
philosophiam quod neque ad sapientiam tendere, neque ipsam esse
sapientiam, quod mysterium ejus, barba tantum celebratur et
pallio.--Lactant. lib. 3.
[305] Oligous men onesen he perikalles kai upitetedeumene Platonos
lexis, pl onas de he ton eutelesteron hama kai pragmatikos kai
estochasmenos ton pollon didaxanton kai grapsanto9n; esti goun idein,
ton men Platona en chersi ton dokounton heinai philologon monon.--Orig.
Advers. Cels. lib. 6. Agroikoteron espon ho Iesous, To thelonti ton
chitona sou labein aphes kai to himation, biophelesteron kekineke ton
logon kai parestesen houtos enpon, e hos en to Kritone Platon, hou med'
akouein hidiotai dunantai, alla mogis hoi ta enkuklia pros tes semnes
Hellenon philosophhias memathekotes--Id. lib. 7.
[306] Ouk hoti allotria esti ta Platonos didagmata tou Christou all'
hoti ouk esti pante homoia, hosper oude ta ton allon.----hekastos gar
tis, apo merous tou spermatikou theiou logou to sungenes oron, kalos
ephthenxato. Hoi de tanantia autois en kurioterois eirekotes, ouk
epistemen ten apopton kai gnosin ten aneletton phainontai
eschekenai.--Justin. Apolog. 1.
[307] Nec quid defendere debeant, scientes; nec quid refutare.
Incursantque passim sine delectu omnia quæ asserunt, quicunque
dissentiunt.--Lactant. lib. 7.
[308] Totam igitur veritatem, et omne divinæ religionis arcanum
philosophi attigerunt. Sed aliis refellentibus, defendere id, quod
invenerant, nequiverunt; quia singulis ratio non quadravit; nec ea quæ
vera senserant, in summam redigere potuerunt.--Lactant. lib. 7.
[309] Quam summam, quia philosophi non comprehenderunt, nec veritatem
comprehendere potuerunt, quamvis ea ferè , quibus summa ipsa constat,
et viderint et explicaverint. Sed diversi ac diversè illa omnia
protulerunt, non annectentes nec causas rerum, nec consequentias, nec
rationes; ut summam illam, quæ continet universa, et compingerent et
complerent.--Lactant. lib. 7. Quod si extitisset aliquis qui veritatem
sparsam per singulos, per sectasque diffusam, colligeret in unum, ac
redigeret in corpus, is profecto non dissentiret à nobis. Sed hoc nemo
facere, nisi veri peritus ac sciens, potest. Verù m autem non nisi ejus
scire est, qui sit doctus a Deo.--Id. ibid.
[310] Platonis documenta quamvis ad rem multum conferant, tamen parum
habent firmitatis ad probandam et implendam veritatem.--Lactant. lib.
7.
[311] Quid ergo? nihilne illi [philosophi] simile præcipiunt? Imo
permulta, et ad verum frequenter accedunt. Sed nihil ponderis habent
illa præcepta, quia sunt humana, et auctoritate majori, id est, divina
illa carent. Nemo igitur credit, quia tam se hominem putat esse qui
audit, quam est ille qui præcipit.--Lactant. lib. 3.
[312] Eipoimi d' an aletheuein, tous dunethentas diatheinai tous
akroatas ton legomenon houto biountas, hos touton houtos echonton.
Diatithentai Ioudaioi kai Christianoi peri tou ap' ^ut8on kaloumenou
mellontos aionos. ----deiknuto houn kai kelsos e ho boulomenos, tines
dietethesan peri aionion kol8aseon, hupo ton tel9eton kai
mustagogon.--Origen. advers. Cels. lib. 8. Para men tois Hellesin heis
tis Phaidon, kai ouk oida ei deuteros, kai heis Polemoin, metabalontes
apo asotou kai mochtherotatou biou ephilosophesan; para de to Iesou, ou
monon tote oi dodeka, all' aiei kai pollaplasious hoitines genomenoi
sophronon choros.--Idem, lib. 3. Da mihi virum qui sit iracundus, &c.
Numquis hæc philosophorum, &c.--Lactant, lib. 3. See this passage cited
above.
[313] Sokr?tei men gar oudeis episteuthe huper toutou tou dogmatos
apothneskein. Ch9risto de to kai apo Sokratous apo merous gnosthenti ou
philosophoi oude philologoi monon epeisthesan, alla kai pantelos
idiotai kai doxes kai phobou kai thanatou kataphronesantes.--Justin.
Apolog. I.
[314] Nam si, consensu omnium philosophorum, sapientiam nemo
assequitur; in summis malis omnes sumus, quibus vos optimè consultum à
Diis immortalibus dicitis. Nam ut nihil interest utrum nemo valeat, an
nemo possit valere; sic non intelligo quid intersit, utrum nemo sit
sapiens, an nemo esse possit.--Cic. de Natura Deor. lib. 3.
[315] Nemo unquam vir magnus sine divino afflatu fuit.--Cicero.
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Proposition VII.
VII. Proposition VII. For these reasons there was plainly wanting a
divine revelation, to recover mankind out of their universally
degenerate estate, into a state suitable to the original excellency of
their nature: Which divine revelation both the necessities of men and
their natural notions of God gave them reasonable ground to expect and
hope for; as appears from the acknowledgments which the best and wisest
of the heathen philosophers themselves have made of their sense of the
necessity and want of such a revelation; and from their expressions of
the hopes they had entertained that God would some time or other
vouchsafe it unto them.
1. A divine revelation absolutely necessary for the recovery of
mankind. There was plainly wanting a divine revelation, to recover
mankind out of their universal corruption and degeneracy; and without
such a revelation it was not possible that the world should ever be
effectually reformed; for if (as has been before particularly shown)
the gross and stupid ignorance, the innumerable prejudices and vain
opinions, the strong passions and appetites of sense, and the many
vicious customs and habits which the generality of mankind continually
labour under, make it undeniably too difficult a work for men of all
capacities to discover every one for himself, by the bare light of
nature, all the particular branches of their duty; but most men, in the
present state of things, have manifestly need of much teaching and
particular instruction; if those who were best able to discover the
truth, and instruct others therein, namely the wisest and best of the
philosophers, were themselves unavoidably altogether ignorant of some
doctrines, and very doubtful and uncertain of others, absolutely
necessary to the bringing about that great end, the reformation of
mankind; if those truths, which they were themselves very certain of,
they were not yet able to prove and explain clearly enough to vulgar
understandings; if even those things which they proved sufficiently,
and explained with all clearness, they had not yet authority enough to
enforce and inculcate upon men's minds with so strong an impression as
to influence and govern the general practice of the world; nor
pretended to afford men any supernatural assistance, which yet was very
necessary to so great a work; And if, after all, in the discovery of
such matters as are the great motives of religion, men are apt to be
more easily worked upon, and more strongly affected, by good testimony,
than by the strictest abstract arguments; so that, upon the whole, it
is plain the philosophers were never by any means well qualified to
reform mankind with any considerable success; then there was evidently
wanting some particular revelation, which might supply all these
defects. There was plainly a necessity of some particular revelation,
to discover in what manner, [316] and with what kind of external
service, God might acceptably be worshipped. There was a necessity of
some particular revelation, to discover what expiation God would accept
for sin, by which the authority, honour, and dignity of his laws might
be effectually vindicated. There was a necessity of some particular
revelation, to give men full assurance of the truth of those great
motives of religion, the rewards and punishments of a future state,
which, not withstanding the strongest arguments of reason, men could
not yet forbear doubting of. [317] In fine, there was a necessity of
some particular divine revelation, [318] to make the whole doctrine of
religion clear and obvious to all capacities, to add weight and
authority to the plainest precepts, and to furnish men with
extraordinary assistances, to enable them to overcome the corruptions
of their nature: And, without the assistance of such a revelation, it
is manifest it was not possible that the world could ever be
effectually reformed. Ye may even give over, saith Socrates, [319] all
hopes of amending men's manners for the future, unless God be pleased
to send you some other person to instruct you. And Plato: Whatever,
saith he, [320] is set right and as it should be, in the present evil
state of the world, can be so only by the particular interposition of
God.
2. That it was agreeable to the dictates of nature and right reason, to
expect or hope for such a divine revelation. Since, therefore, there
was plainly and confessedly wanting a divine revelation, to relieve the
necessities of men in their natural state; and since no man can presume
to say that it is inconsistent with any of the attributes of God, or
unbecoming the wisdom of the Creator of all things, to supply that
want; to reveal to his creatures more fully the way to happiness; to
make more particular discoveries of his will to them; to set before
them in a clearer light the rewards and punishments of a future state;
to explain in what manner he will be pleased to be worshipped; and to
declare what satisfaction he will accept for sin, and upon what
conditions he will receive returning sinners: Nay, since, on the
contrary, it seems more suitable to our natural notions of the goodness
and mercy of God, to suppose that he should do all this than not; it
follows undeniably, that it was most reasonable and agreeable to the
dictates of nature to expect or hope for such a divine revelation. The
generality of the heathen world, who were far more equal and less
prejudiced judges in this matter than modern deists, were so fully
persuaded that the great rules for the conduct of human life must
receive their authority from heaven, that their chief lawgivers thought
it not a sufficient recommendation of their laws that they were
agreeable to the light of nature, unless they pretended also that they
received them from God. But I have no need, in this argument, to make
use of the examples of idolatrous lawgivers. The philosophers
themselves, the best and wisest, and the least superstitious of them
that ever lived, were not ashamed to confess openly their sense of the
want of a divine revelation, and to declare their judgment that it was
most natural and truly agreeable to right and sound reason to hope for
something of that nature. There is, besides the several places before
cited, a most excellent passage in Plato to this purpose; one of the
most remarkable passages, indeed, in his whole works, though not quoted
by any that I have met with, which therefore I think highly worthy to
be transcribed at large, as a just and unanswerable reproach to all
those who deny that there is any want or need of a revelation. It seems
best to me, saith Socrates [321] to one of his disciples, that we
expect quietly; nay, it is absolutely necessary, that we wait with
patience till such time as we can learn certainly how we ought to
behave ourselves both towards God and towards men. When will that time
come, replies the disciple, and who is it that will teach us this? For,
methinks, I earnestly desire to see and know who the person is that
will do it. It is one, answers Socrates, who has now a concern for you.
But in like manner, as Homer relates, that Minerva took away the mist
from before Diomede's eyes, that he might be able to distinguish one
person from another, so it is necessary that the mist, which is now
before your mind, be first taken away, that afterwards you may learn to
distinguish rightly between good and evil; for, as yet, you are not
able to do it. Let the person you mentioned, replies the disciple, take
away this mist, or whatever else it be, as soon as he pleases; for I am
willing to do any thing he shall direct, whosoever this person be, so
that I may but become a good man. Nay, answers Socrates, that person
has a wonderful readiness and willingness to do all this for you. It
will be best, then, replies the disciple, to forbear offering any more
sacrifices till the time that this person appears. You judge very well,
answers Socrates; it will be much safer so to do, than to run so great
a hazard of offering sacrifices, which you know not whether they are
acceptable to God or no. Well then, replies the disciple, we will then
make our offerings to the Gods, when that day comes; and I hope, God
willing, it may not be far off. And, in another place, the same author
having given a large account of that most excellent discourse, which
Socrates made a little before his death, concerning the great doctrines
of religion, the immortality of the soul, and the certainty of a life
to come, he introduces one of his disciples replying in the following
manner: I am, [322] saith he, of the same opinion with you, O Socrates,
concerning these things; that to discover the certain truth of them, in
this present life, is either absolutely impossible for us, or at least
exceeding difficult. Yet not to inquire, with our utmost diligence,
into what can be said about them, or to give over our inquiry before we
have carried our search as far as possible, is the sign of a mean and
low spirit. On the contrary, we ought therefore by all means to do one
of these two things, either, by hearkening to instruction, and by our
own diligent study, to find out the truth, or, if that be absolutely
impossible, then to fix our foot upon that which to human reason, after
the utmost search, appears best and most probable; and, trusting to
that, venture upon that bottom to direct the course of our lives
accordingly; unless a man could have still some more sure and certain
conduct to carry him through this life, such as a divine discovery of
the truth would be. I shall mention but one instance more, and that is
of Porphyry, who, though he lived after our Saviour's time, and had a
most inveterate hatred to the Christian revelation in particular, yet
confesses in general, [323] that he was sensible there was wanting some
universal method of delivering men's souls, which no sect of philosophy
had yet found out.
3. The unreasonableness of modern deists, in denying the want and use
of a revelation. This sense of the ancient and wisest philosophers is
much departed from by modern deists, who contend that there was no
want, no need of a revelation; that philosophy and right reason was of
itself sufficiently able to instruct and preserve men in the practice
of their duty; and that nothing was to be expected from revelation. But
besides what has been already intimated concerning the extreme
barbarity of the present heathen world, and what the philosophers, both
Greeks and Latins, have confessed concerning the state of the more
civilized nations wherein they lived; I think we may safely appeal even
to our adversaries themselves, whether the testimony of Christ,
(without considering at present what truth and evidence it has,)
concerning the immortality of the soul, and the rewards and punishments
of a future state, have not had (notwithstanding all the corruptions of
Christians) visibly in experience and effect a greater and more
powerful influence upon the lives and actions of men than the
reasonings of all the philosophers that ever were in the world: [324]
Whether credible testimony, and the belief and authority of revelation,
be not in itself as it were a light held to the consciences of stupid
and careless men; and the most natural and proper means that can be
imagined to awaken and rouse up many of those who would be little
affected with all the strict arguments and abstract reasonings in the
world. And, to bring this matter to a short issue; whether in Christian
countries, (at least where Christianity is professed in any tolerable
degree of purity,) the generality even [325] of the meaner and most
vulgar and ignorant people have not truer and worthier notions of God,
more just and right apprehensions concerning his attributes and
perfections, a deeper sense of the difference of good and evil, a
greater regard to moral obligations and to the plain and most necessary
duties of life, and a more firm and universal expectation of a future
state of rewards and punishments; than in any heathen country any
considerable number of men were ever found to have had.
It may The great necessity and use of divine revelation. here perhaps
be pretended, by modern deists, that the great ignorance and undeniable
corruptness of the whole heathen world has always been owing, not to
any absolute insufficiency of the light of nature itself, but merely to
the fault of the several particular persons, in not sufficiently
improving that light; and that deists now, in places where learning and
right reason are cultivated, are well able to discover and explain all
the obligations and motives of morality, without believing any thing of
revelation. But this, even though it were true, (as, in the sense they
intend, it by no means is; because, as has been before shown, there are
several very necessary truths not possible to be discovered with any
certainty by the bare light of nature; but) supposing it, I say, to be
true, that all the obligations and motives of morality could possibly
be discovered and explained clearly, by the mere light of nature alone,
yet even this would not at all prove that there is no need of
revelation: For, whatever the bare natural possibility was, it is
certain in fact the wisest philosophers of old [326] never were able to
do it to any effectual purpose, but always willingly acknowledged that
they still wanted some higher assistance. And as to the great pretences
of modern deists, it is to be observed, that the clearness of moral
reasonings was much improved, and the regard to a future state very
much increased, even in heathen writers, after the coming of Christ.
And almost all the things that are said wisely and truly by modern
deists, are plainly borrowed from that revelation which they refuse to
embrace, and without which they could never have been able to have said
the same things. Now, indeed, when our whole duty, with its true
motives, is clearly revealed to us, its precepts appear plainly
agreeable to reason; and conscience readily approves what is good, as
it condemns what is evil: Nay, after our duty is thus made known to us,
it is easy not only to see its agreement with reason, but also to begin
and deduce its obligation from reason. But had we been utterly
destitute of all revealed light, then, to have discovered our duty in
all points, with the true motives of it, merely by the help of natural
reason, would have been a work of nicety, pains and labour; like
groping for an unknown way, in the obscure twilight. What ground have
any modern deists to imagine, that if they themselves had lived without
the light of the gospel, they should have been wiser than Socrates, and
Plato, and Cicero? How are they certain they should have made such a
right use of their reason as to have discovered the truth exactly,
without being any way led aside by prejudice or neglect? If their lot
had been among the vulgar, how are they sure they should have been so
happy, or so considerate, as not to have been involved in that idolatry
and superstition which overspread the whole world? If they had joined
themselves to the philosophers, which sect would they have chosen to
have followed? And what book would they have resolved upon to be the
adequate rule of their lives and conversations? Or, if they should have
set up for themselves, how are they certain they should have been
skilful and unprejudiced enough to have deduced the several branches of
their duty, and applied them to the several cases of life, by
argumentation and dint of reason? It is one thing to see that those
rules of life, which are beforehand plainly and particularly laid
before us, are perfectly agreeable to reason; and another thing to find
out those rules merely by the light of reason, without their having
first been any otherwise made known. We see that even many of those,
who profess to govern their lives by the plain written rule of an
instituted and revealed religion, are yet most miserably ignorant of
their duty; and how can any man be sure he should have made so good
improvement of his reason, as to have understood it perfectly in all
its parts, without any such help? We see that many of those who profess
to believe firmly that great and everlasting happiness which Christ has
promised to obedience, and that great and eternal misery which Christ
has threatened to disobedience, are yet hurried away, by their lusts
and passions, to transgress the conditions of that covenant to which
these promises and these threatenings are annexed: And how can any man
be sure he should be able to overcome those great temptations, if these
mighty motives were less distinctly known, or less powerfully enforced?
But suppose he could, and that by strength of reason he could
demonstrate to himself these things with all clearness and
distinctness, yet could all men do so? Assuredly all men are not
equally capable of being philosophers, though all men are equally
obliged to be religious. At least thus much is certain, that the
rewards and punishments of another world, the great motives of
religion, cannot be so powerfully enforced, to the influencing the
lives and practice of all sorts of men, by one who shall undertake to
demonstrate the reality of them by abstract reason and arguments, as by
one who, showing sufficient credentials of his having been himself in
that other state, shall assure them of the truth and certainty of these
things. But, after all, the question does not really lie here. The
truth, at the bottom, is plainly this: All the great things that modern
deists affect to say of right reason, as to its sufficiency in
discovering the obligations and motives of morality, is only a pretence
to be made use of when they are opposing Christianity. At other times,
and in reality, they have no hearty regard for morality, nor for the
natural evidences of the certainty of a future state: They are willing
enough to believe that men perish absolutely at death; and so they have
no concern to support effectually the cause of virtue, nor care to make
out any consistent scheme of things, but unavoidably recur, in truth,
to downright atheism; at least, in the manners of most of them it is
too plain and apparent that absolute libertinism is the thing they
really aim at; and, however their creed may pretend to be the creed of
deists, yet almost always their practice is the practice of very
atheists.
4. Yet God was not absolutely obliged to afford men the help of such a
revelation. To return therefore to the argument: From what has been
said upon this head, it appears plainly that it is agreeable to the
natural hopes and expectations of men, that is, of right reason duly
improved, to suppose God making some particular revelation of his will
to mankind, which may supply the undeniable defects of the light of
nature: And, at the same time, it is evident that such a thing is by no
means unworthy of the divine wisdom, or inconsistent with any of the
attributes of God, but rather, on the contrary, most suitable to them.
Consequently, considering the manifold wants and necessities of men,
and the abundant goodness and mercy of God, there is great ground, from
right reason and the light of nature, to believe that God would not
always leave men wholly destitute of so needful an assistance, but
would at some time or other actually afford it them: Yet it does not
from hence at all follow, (as some have imagined,) that God is obliged
to make such a revelation; for then it must needs have been given in
all ages, and to all nations; and might have been claimed and demanded
as of justice, rather than wished for and desired as of mercy and
condescending goodness. But the fore-mentioned considerations are such
as might afford men reasonable ground to hope for some favour of this
kind, to be conferred at such time, and in such manner, and upon such
persons, as should seem best to supreme infinite wisdom; at least they
might well dispose and prepare men before-hand, whenever any doctrine
should come accompanied with just and good evidence of its being such a
revelation to believe and embrace it with all readiness.
Want of universality, no sufficient objection against the truth of a
revelation. It has been made use of by a modern author, [327] as his
principal and strongest argument against the reasonableness of
believing any revelation at all, that it is confessed there has been no
revelation universally owned and embraced as such, either in all ages,
or by all nations in any age. He pretends to acknowledge, that if the
doctrine of Christianity was universally entertained, he would not
doubt of its being truly a revelation of the will of God to mankind.
But since, in fact, there is no instituted religion universally
received as a divine revelation, and there are several nations to whom
the Christian doctrine in particular was never so much as preached, nor
ever came to their knowledge at all, he concludes, that what is not
universal and equally made known to all men, cannot be needful for any;
and consequently, that there never was any real want of a revelation at
all, nor any ground to think any further assistance necessary to enable
men to answer all the ends of their creation than the bare light of
nature. This is the sum and strength of this author's reasoning; and
herein all the deniers of revelation agree with him. Now, (not to take
notice here that it is by no means impossible but all men may be
capable of receiving some benefit from a revelation, which yet a great
part of them may have never heard of,) if these men's reasoning was
true, it would follow, by the same argument, that neither was natural
religion necessary to enable men to answer the ends of their creation:
For, though all the truths of natural religion are indeed certainly
discoverable by the due use of right reason alone, yet it is evident
all men are not indued with the same faculties and capacities, nor have
they all equally afforded to them the same means of making that
discovery; as these gentlemen themselves upon some occasions are
willing enough to own, when they are describing the barbarous ignorance
of some poor Indian nations. And, consequently, the knowledge of
natural religion being, in fact, by no means universal, it will follow
that there is no great necessity even of that, but that men may do very
well without it, in performing the functions of the animal life, and
directing themselves wholly by the inclinations of sense: And thus
these gentlemen must at last be forced to let go all moral obligations,
and so recur unavoidably to absolute atheism. The truth is: As God was
not obliged to make all his creatures equal, to make men angels, or to
indue all men with the same faculties and capacities as any, so neither
is he bound to make all men capable of the same degree or the same kind
of happiness, or to afford all men the very same means and
opportunities of obtaining it.--There is ground enough, from the
consideration of the manifest corruption of human nature, to be so far
sensible of the want of a divine revelation, as that right reason and
the light of nature itself will lead a wise and considerate man to
think it very probable that the infinitely merciful and good God may
actually vouchsafe to afford men some such supernatural assistance; and
consequently such a person will be very willing, ready, and prepared to
entertain a doctrine which shall at any time come attended with just
and good evidence of its being truly a revelation of the will of God.
But it does not at all from hence follow, either that God is absolutely
bound to make such a revelation, or that, if he makes it, it must
equally be made to all men; or that, since in fact it is not made to
all, therefore there is no reason to believe that there is any need or
any probability of its being made to any.
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[316] Nomothetes hostis noun kektetai, outote me tolmese kainotomon epi
theosebeian, hetiis me saphes echei ti, trepsai polin eautou.----meden
toparapan eidos, hosper oud' hon dunaton eidenai te thnete phusei ton
toiouton peri.--Plato in Epinomide. Ta gar de toiauta [theon
therapeias] out' epistametha hemeis, oikizontes te polin oudeni allo
peisometha ean noun echomen, oude chr9esometha exegete, all' e to
patrio Theo.--Plato de Republ. 4.
[317] To men alethes, o xene, dischurizesthai tauta houtos echein,
pollon amphisbetounton, Theou esti.--Plato de Legib. lib. 1.
[318] Touto de oun to meros phamen phusei kuriotaton, kai dunaton hos
hoion te malista kai arista mathein, ei didaskoi tis; all' oud' an
didaxeien, ei me Theos uphegoito.--Plato in Epinomide.
[319] Heita ton loipon chronon katheudontes diateleite an, ei me tina
allon humin ho Theos epipempseie, kedomenos humon.--Plato in Apolog.
Socratis.
[320] Eu gar chre eidenai, ho, ti per an sothe te kai genetai hoion
dei, en toiaute katastasei politeion, Theou moiran auto sosai.--Plato
de Republ. lib. 6.
[321] SOK: Emo`n me`n oun dokei kra'tiston einai, esuchi'an
e'chein.----anankaion oun esti peri`me'nein, e'os a'n tis ma'the os dei
pro`s Theou`s kai` pou`s anthro'pous diakeisthai. ALK. Po'te oun
pare'stai o chro'nos houtos, o So'krates; kai` ti's o paideu'son;
e'dista ga`r a'n moi doko idein touton to`n a'nthropon ti's estin. SOK:
Houto's estin, ho me'lei peri` sou; Alla` dokei moi, o'sper to
Diome'dei phesi` te`n Athenan Homeros apo` ton ophthalmon aphelein te`n
achlu'n, o'phr' eu gigno'skoi eme`n Theo`n ede` kai` a'ndra, ou'to kai`
sou dein apo` tes psuches proton aphelo'nta te`n achlu`n, e` nun
parousa tuncha'nei, totenikaut' e'de prosphe'rein di' hon me'lleis
gno'sesthai eme`n kako`n ede` kai` esthlo'n; nun me`n ga`r ouk a'n moi
dokes dunethenai. ALK: Aphairei'to, ei'te bou'letai te`n achlu`n, ei'te
a'llo ti; os ego` pareskeu'asmai methe`n a`n phu'gein ton up' ekei'nou
prostassome'non, o'stis pot' esti`n ho a'nthropos, ei'ge me'lloimi
belti'on gene'sthai. SOK: Alla` me`n kakeinos thaumaste`n o'sen peri`
se prothumi'an e'chei. ALK: Eis to'te toinun kai` te`n thusi'an
anaba'llesthai kra'tiston einai' moi dokei. SOK: Kai` orthos ge soi`
dokei; asphalesteron ga'r estin e` parakinduneu'ein tosouton ki'ndunon.
ALK: Tois theois de kai` stepha'nous kai` ta'lla pa'nta ta` nomizo'mena
to'te do'somen, o'tan ekei'nen te`n eme'ran elthousan ido; e'xei d' ou
dia` makrou tou'ton thelo'nton.--Plato in Alcibiade,2. [If it be
supposed that Socrates in this passage means himself, (which is very
difficult,) yet it nevertheless very lively represents the great sense
which the most considerate heathens had of their want of some
extraordinary instruction.]
[322] Emoi gar dokeis o Sokrates, peri ton toiouton isos hasper kai
soi; to men saphes eidenai en to nun bio e adunaton einai, e
pa9nchalepon te to mentoi auta [leg: ta] legomena peri auton me ouchi
panti tropo elenchein, kai proaphistasthai prin an pantache skopon
skopon apeipe tis, panu malthakou einai andros. [Note that Ficinus, in
his translation of this passage, as if the word ouchi was to be
repeated apo tou koinou with proaphostasthai, writes absurdly non
desistere, instead of desistere.] Dein gar peri auta hen ge ti touton
diapraxasthai; e mathein hope echei, e, ei tauta adunaton ton goun
beltiston ton Anthropinon Logon labonta kai duselenktotaton, epi touto
achoumenon, hoster epi schedias, kinduneuonta diapleusai ton bion; ei
me tis dunait asphalesteron kai akindunoteron, epi bebaioterou
ochematos, e Logou Theiou tinos, diaporeuthenai.--Plato in Phædron.
[323] Quum autem dicit Porphyrius, in primo de Regressu Animæ libro,
nondum receptum in unam quandam sectam quæ universalem viam animæ
contineat liberandæ, nondumque in suam notitiam eandem viam historiali
cognitione perlatum, procul dubio confitetur, esse aliquam, sed nondum
in suam venisse notitiam. Ita ei non sufficebat quicquid de anima
liberanda studiosissime didicerat, sibique, vel potius aliis, nosse ac
tenere videbatur. Sentiebat enim adhuc sibi deesse aliquam
præstantissimam auctoritatem, quam de re tanta sequi
oporteret.--Augustin. de Civitate Dei, lib. 10. c. 32.
[324] Ouk oligous, Hellenas kai Barbarous, sophous kai anoetous, mechri
thanatou agonizesthai huper Christianismou, hin' autou me exomosontai;
hoper oudeis huper allou dogmatos istoretai poiein.--Origen. advers.
Cels. lib. 1.
[325] Hoste meketi kata to palaion bracheis tinas kai harithmo leptous,
orthas peri Theou pherein doxas; halla muria plethe barbaron.--Euseb.
Demonstrat. Evangel. lib. 3. c. 3. Ai de tou Theou Christo matheteuthei
sai ekklesiai, sunexetazomenai tais hon paroikousi demon ekklesiais; os
phosteres eisin en kosmo, Tis gar ouk an homologesai, kai tous cheirous
ton apo tes ekklesias kai sunkrisei ton beltionon elattous, pollo
kreittous tonchanein ton en tois demois ekklesion. [Note, this passage
is both corruptly printed pollon instead of pollo, and also the sense
of it hurt by an imperfect translation.--Orig. advers. Cels. lib. 3.
Edit. Cant. p. 128.]
[326] See an excellent passage of Cicero to this purpose cited above.
[327] Oracles of Reason, page 197, &c.
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Proposition VIII.
VIII. Proposition VIII. There is no other religion now in the world but
the Christian that has any just pretence or tolerable appearance of
reason, to be esteemed such a divine revelation; and, therefore, if
Christianity be not true, there is no revelation of the will of God at
all made to mankind.
This proposition will easily be granted by all modern unbelievers; and
therefore I need not be particular in the proof of it.
Of the Mahometan religion. The Mahometan religion was founded by a
vicious person, proposes ridiculous and trifling doctrines to be
believed, was propagated merely by violence and force of arms, was
confirmed by no public and incontestable miracles, promises vain and
sensual rewards to its professors, and is every way encompassed with
numberless such absurdities and inconsistencies (as those who have
given us accounts of the life of Mahomet, and the nature of his
religion, have abundantly made out; and is sufficiently evident even
from the Alcoran itself;) that there is no great danger of its imposing
upon rational and considerate men.
Of the Jewish religion. The Jewish religion was founded wholly upon the
expectation of a Messiah to come: And the time of his appearance was
limited by such plain and determinate prophecies that what difficulties
soever there may be in computing the very nice and exact time of their
completion, or what different periods soever may be fixed from whence
to begin several computations; yet the time of their being fulfilled is
now, in all possible ways of computing, so very far elapsed, that if
the Christian doctrine be false, there is no supposition left, upon
which the Jewish religion can, with any colour of reason, be believed
to be true.
It being evident, therefore, that either the Christian revelation is
true, or else (how great want soever there may be of it) there is no
such thing as revelation at all;--it remains that I proceed to consider
what positive and direct evidence there is to prove the actual truth of
this divine revelation.
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Proposition IX.
IX. Proposition IX. The Christian religion, considered in its primitive
simplicity, and as taught in the Holy Scriptures, has all the marks and
proofs of being actually and truly a divine revelation, that any divine
revelation, supposing it was true, could reasonably be imagined or
desired to have.
The marks of a religion coming from God. The necessary marks and proofs
of a religion coming from God, are these. First, that the duties it
enjoins be all such as are agreeable to our natural notions of God, and
perfective of the nature and conducive to the happiness and well-being
of men. And that the doctrines it teaches be all such, as, though not
indeed discoverable by the bare light of nature, yet, when discovered
by revelation, may be consistent with and agreeable to sound and
unprejudiced reason; for otherwise no evidence whatsoever can be of so
great force to prove that any doctrine is true; as its being either
contradictory in itself, or wicked in its tendency, is to prove that it
must necessarily be false. Secondly, for the same reason, the motives
likewise, by which it is recommended to men's belief and practice, and
all the peculiar circumstances with which it is attended, must be such
as are suitable to the excellent wisdom of God, and fitted to amend the
manners and perfect the minds of men. Lastly, it must moreover be
positively and directly proved to come from God, by such certain signs
and matters of fact as may be undeniable evidences of its author's
having actually a divine commission: For otherwise, as no evidence can
prove a doctrine to come from God, if it be either impossible or wicked
in itself, so, on the other hand, neither can any degree of goodness or
excellency in the doctrine itself make it demonstrably certain, but
only highly probable, to have come from God; unless it has moreover
some positive and direct evidence of its being actually revealed.
The entire proof therefore of this proposition must be made by an
induction of particulars, as follows.
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Proposition X.
X. Proposition X. First, the practical duties which the Christian
religion enjoins, are all such as are most agreeable to our natural
notions of God, and most perfective of the nature, and conducive to the
happiness and well-being of men. That is, Christianity even in this
single respect, as containing alone, and in one consistent system, all
the wise and good precepts (and those improved, augmented, and exalted
to the highest degree of perfection,) that ever were taught singly and
scatteredly, and many times but very corruptly by the several schools
of the philosophers; and this without any mixture of the fond, absurd,
and superstitious practices of any of these philosophers; ought to be
embraced and practised by all rational and considering deists, who will
act consistently, and steadily pursue the consequences of their own
principles; as at least the best scheme and sect of philosophy that
ever was set up in the world; and highly probable, even though it had
no external evidence to be of divine original.
The proposition proved in the several instances of duty. This
proposition is so very evident, that the greatest adversaries of the
Christian institution have never been able to deny it any otherwise
than by confounding the inventions of men, the superstitious practices
of particular persons, or the corrupt additions of certain particular
churches or societies of Christians, with the pure and simple precepts
of the gospel of Christ. In all those instances of duty which pure and
uncorrupt Christianity enjoins, the proposition is manifest, and
altogether undeniable; the duties of love, fear, and adoration, which
the Christian religion obliges us to render unto God, are so plainly
incumbent upon us from the consideration of the excellent attributes of
the divine nature, and our relation to him as our creator and
preserver, that no man who considers can think himself free from the
obligations which our religion lays upon him to practise these duties,
without denying the very being of God, and acting contrary to the
reason and all the natural notions of his own mind. It is placing the
true and acceptable worship of God, not so much in any positive and
ritual observances, as in approaching him with pure hearts and
undefiled bodies, with unfeigned repentance for all past miscarriages,
and sincere resolutions of constant obedience for the future, in
praying to him for whatever we want, and returning him our most hearty
thanks for whatever good things we receive, with such dependence and
humility, such submission, trust, and reliance, as are the proper
affections of dutiful children: All this is plainly most agreeable to
our natural notions and apprehensions of God; and that the prayers of
sinful and depraved creatures, sincerely repenting, should be offered
up to God, and become prevalent with him, through and by the
intercession of a mediator, is very consonant to right and unprejudiced
reason, as I shall have occasion to show more particularly hereafter,
when I come to consider the articles of our belief. Again: The duties
of justice, equity, charity, and truth, which the Christian religion
obliges us to exercise towards men, are so apparently reasonable in
themselves, and so directly conducive to the happiness of mankind, that
their unalterable obligations are not only in great measure deducible
from the bare light of nature and right reason, but even those men
also, who have broken through all the bonds of natural religion itself,
and the original obligations of virtue, have yet thought it necessary,
for the preservation of society and the well-being of mankind, that the
observation of these duties, to some degree, should be enforced by the
penalties of human laws; and the additional improvements Mat. v. 16,
&c. which our Saviour has made to these duties, by commanding his
disciples to be, as it were, lights in the world, and examples of good
works to all men; to be so far from injuring others, that, on the
contrary, they should not indulge themselves in any degree of anger or
passion; to seek reconciliation immediately upon any difference or
offence that may arise; to bear injuries patiently, rather than return
evil for evil; to be always willing to forgive one another their
trespasses, as they all expect forgiveness at the hands of God; to be
kind and charitable to all men; to assist readily, and be willing to do
all good offices, not only to their friends, but even to their
bitterest enemies also; in a word, to raise their virtue and goodness
far above the common practice of men, extending their charity
universally in imitation of the goodness of God himself, who maketh the
sun to rise on the evil and on the good, and sendeth rain on the just
and on the unjust; these precepts, I say, are such as no unprejudiced
philosopher would have been unwilling to confess were the utmost
improvements of morality, and to the highest degree perfective of human
nature. In like manner, the duties of sobriety, temperance, patience,
and contentment, which our religion enjoins us to practise in
ourselves, are so undeniably agreeable to the inward constitution of
human nature, and so perfective of it, that the principal design of all
true philosophy has ever been to recommend and set off these duties to
the best advantage, though, as the philosophers themselves have always
confessed, no philosophy was ever able to govern men's practice
effectually in these respects: But the additional precepts, and the new
weight and authority, which our Saviour has added to his instructions
of this kind, teaching his disciples to governMatt. v. 28.
Matt. vi. 19, 24, &c. their very thoughts, desires, and inclinations,
to contemn and get above all the desires of this present world, and to
set their affections principally upon that which is to come; these are
the things which, when the Christian religion was in its primitive and
purest state, worked men up actually to such a pitch of cheerful and
generous obedience to the laws of God, and taught them to obtain such a
complete victory over the world, and over all the desires and appetites
of sense, as the best philosophers have acknowledged their instructions
were never able to do. Lastly, even those positive and external
observances, (the two sacraments,) which are instituted in the
Christian religion, as means and assistances to keep men stedfast in
the practice of those great and moral duties which are the weightier
matters of the law; even those positive institutions (I say) are so
free from all appearance of superstition and vanity, and so wisely
fitted to the end for which they were designed, that no adversaries of
Christianity have ever been able to object any thing at all against the
things themselves, but only against certain corruptions and
superstitions, which some who call themselves Christians, have,
directly in opposition to the true design of Christianity, introduced
and annexed to them. For what reasonable man can pretend to say, that
it is any way unreasonable or superstitious for every member of the
society to be solemnly admitted into his profession, by a plain and
significant rite, entitling him to all the privileges, and charging him
with all the obligations, which belong to the members of that society
as such? which is the design of one of the sacraments: Or that it is
unreasonable and superstitious for men frequently to commemorate, with
all thankfulness, the love of their greatest benefactor, and humbly and
solemnly to renew their obligations and promises of obedience to him?
which is the design of the other.
This a great evidence of a religion coming from God. Let now any
impartial person judge whether this be not a wise and excellent
institution of practical religion, highly conducive to the happiness of
mankind, and worthy to be established by a revelation from God; when
men had confessedly corrupted themselves to such a degree, that not
only the light of nature, and right reason, was altogether insufficient
to restore true piety; but even that light itself (as Cicero expressly
acknowledges) nowhere appeared. [328] Let any impartial person judge,
whether a religion that tends thus manifestly to the recovery of the
rational part of God's creation, to restore men to the imitation and
likeness of God, and to the dignity and highest improvement of their
nature, has not within itself an intrinsic and very powerful evidence
of its being truly divine. Let any one read the fifth, sixth, and
seventh chapters of St Matthew's Gospel, and judge if they do not, as
it were, set before his eyes such a lovely image and representation of
true virtue, as Plato said, could not but charm men with the highest
degree of love and admiration imaginable. [329] In a word, let any man
of an honest and sincere mind consider, whether that practical doctrine
has not even in itself the greatest marks of a divine original; wherein
whatsoever things are true, whatsoeverPhil. iv. 8. things are honest,
whatsoever things are just, whatsoever things are pure, whatsoever
things are lovely, whatsoever things are of good report; if there be
any virtue, if there be any thing praiseworthy; all these, and these
only are the things that are earnestly recommended to men's practice.
What wise precept was ever delivered by any philosopher of any sect
which is not more plainly laid down by our Saviour and his apostles?
And not only so, but enforced moreover with greater efficacy and
strength? founded upon nobler and more consistent principles? urged
with greater weight and authority? and pressed with more powerful and
affecting arguments? Nay, neither is this all the difference, even in
respect barely of the excellency of the doctrine itself. For the
philosophers taught indeed many excellent moral truths, but some upon
one occasion and upon one set of principles; some upon another; and
every one of them were mistaken in some instances of duty, and mingled
particular superstitions and false notions with their good
instructions, and built their doctrine upon no sure foundation of
consistent principles; and all of them (as has been before shown) were
very imperfect and deficient, and far from being able to make up an
entire and complete scheme of the whole duty of man in all cases. But
now, [330] to put together all the wise and good precepts that ever
were delivered by any wise men of any sect and in any age, to improve
and exalt every one of them to the highest possible degree of
excellency and perfection, to separate and lay aside all the
superstitious opinions and practices that had been mixed by all or any
of the different sects of philosophers, or teachers of religion in any
nation, with their respective moral instructions, and to supply all
those doctrines wherein both moral philosophy and the additional
institutions of all religions in the world had in the whole been
hitherto altogether deficient; and all this, in one plain, entire, and
regular system upon the foundation of certain and consistent
principles: This is the peculiar character of the Christian
institution; and all this cannot, with any colour of reason, be
imagined to have ever been done by any man but one sent immediately
from God: Upon this consideration alone, by all sincere deists (if any
such there be) who really are what they pretend to be, who believe the
being and attributes of God, and are firmly convinced of the
obligations of virtue and natural religion, and the certainty of a
future state of rewards and punishments, must needs, by their own
principles, be strongly inclined to embrace the Christian religion, to
believe, at least to hope confidently, that a doctrine so plainly
fitted to recover men out of their universally corrupt estate, and
restore them to the knowledge and favour of God, is truly divine; and
to entertain it with all cheerfulness, as what in itself has those
manifold marks of goodness and perfection which are themselves
sufficient, though not indeed to prove it demonstrably, yet to satisfy
a good man, that it cannot be any thing else than a revelation from
God, even though it had wanted all those outward proofs, [331] and
divine and miraculous testimonies, which shall hereafter be mentioned
in their proper place.
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[328] ----Ut naturæ lumen nusquam appareat.--Cic. Tusc. Qu. lib. 3. See
this passage cited before at large.
[329] Formam ipsam, et tanquam faciem honesti, quæ si oculis
cerneretur, mirabiles amores, ut ait Plato, excitaret sui.--Cic. de
Offic. lib. 1.
[330] Ouk hoti allotria esti ta Platonos didagmata tou Christou all'
hoti ouk esti pante homoia; hoster oude ta ton allon.----hekastos gar
tis, apo metous tou spermatikou theiou logou to sungenes oron, kalos
ephthenxato;----hosa oun para pasi kalos, iretai, hemon ton Christianon
esti.--Justin Apolog.1. Quod si extitisset aliquis, qui veritatem
sparsam per singulos per sectasque diffusam, colligeret in unum ac
redigeret in corpus, is profecto non dissentiret a nobis. Sed hoc nemo
facere, nisi veri peritus ac sciens, potest. Verum autem non nisi ejus
scire est, qui sit doctus a Deo.--Lactant. lib. 7.
[331] Sed si vel causa id efficeret, certissime philosopharentur, et
quamvis non posset divinis testimoniis illa defendere, tamen seipsam
veritas illustraret suo lumine.--Lactant. lib. 7.
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Proposition XI.
XI. Proposition XI. Secondly, The motives by which the Christian
religion enforces the practice of the duties it enjoins are such as are
most suitable to the excellent wisdom of God, and most answerable to
the natural expectations of men.
1. Of the acceptableness of true repentance, a motive to obedience. The
acceptableness of true repentance, in the sight of God, and the certain
assurance of pardon upon such repentance, which the Christian religion
affords us, is a most powerful and necessary motive to frail and sinful
creatures, to encourage and support them effectually in the practice of
their duty. It is indeed in general evidently most agreeable to right
reason, and to men's natural notions of God, to believe him placable,
and merciful, and willing to forgive. But since at the same time it
cannot be proved, by any arguments from reason, that God is absolutely
obliged to forgive, and it is confessedly evident that it becomes the
supreme governor of the universe to vindicate the honour and authority
of his laws and government, to give some evidences of his hatred and
indignation against sin, and sometimes, by instances of severity, to
prevent sinners from abusing his mercy and patience, no less than that
it is agreeable to his infinite wisdom and goodness to suffer his anger
to be by some means appeased: No motive in this case can be imagined
more expedient and powerful to encourage sinners to return to the
practice of their duty, and to persuade them to continue therein
immoveably for the future; nothing can be imagined more seasonable and
satisfactory to the mind of man, and >more agreeable to the
excellent wisdom of God, and worthy of the supreme and infinitely
merciful governor of all things, than such a positive declaration of
the acceptableness of sincere repentance, and such an authentic
assurance of pardon and forgiveness thereupon, as under the Christian
dispensation the divine goodness and mercy has found means to afford
unto us, in such manner as is at the same time abundantly consistent
with the honour and dignity of the laws of God, and with his
irreconcileable hatred against all unrighteousness and sin.
2. Of the divine assistance, as another motive to obedience. That
divine and supernatural assistance, which, under the Christian
dispensation, they who sincerely endeavour to obey the will of God,
have encouragement to hope for, upon all necessary occasions, is
another powerful motive to support men effectually in the practice of
their duty. The wisest of the philosophers were so far sensible of the
great corruption and depravity of human nature in its present state;
they were sensible that such was the carelessness, stupidity, and want
of attention, of the greater part of mankind; so many the early
prejudices and false notions taken in by evil education; so strong and
violent the unreasonable lusts, appetites, and desires of sense; and so
great the blindness, introduced by superstitious opinions, vicious
customs, and debauched practices through the world; that (as has been
before shown,) they themselves openly confessed they had very little
hope of ever being able to reform mankind with any considerably great
and universal success, by the bare force of philosophy and right
reason; but that, to produce so great a change, and enable men
effectually to conquer all their corrupt affections, there was need of
some supernatural and divine assistance, or the immediate interposition
of God himself. Now this divine assistance is vouchsafed to men under
the Christian dispensation, in such a manner, as (from what has been
already said concerning the judgment of the wisest of the ancient
philosophers in this matter,) appears to be undeniably agreeable to the
natural expectations of right reason, and suitable to the best and
worthiest notions that men have ever by the light of nature been able
to frame to themselves, concerning the attributes and perfections of
God. Luke xi. 13. If ye, says our Saviour, being evil, know how to give
good gifts unto your children, how much more shall your heavenly father
give the holy spirit to them that ask him? The effect of this divine
assistance evidenced itself in a very visible and remarkable manner in
the primitive times, [332] by the sudden, wonderful, and total
reformation of far greater numbers of wicked men than ever were brought
to repentance by the teaching and exhortations of all the philosophers
in the world. And even at this day, notwithstanding all the corruption
introduced among Christians, I think it can hardly be denied by any
unbelievers of revelation, but that there are among us many more
persons of all conditions, who worship God in sincerity and simplicity
of heart, and live in the constant practice of all righteousness,
holiness, and true virtue, than ever were found in any of the most
civilized nations, and most improved by philosophy in the heathen
world.
3. Of the clear discovery of future rewards and punishments, as another
motive to obedience. The rewards and punishments which the Christian
religion proposes, to obedience or disobedience, are a motive perfectly
agreeable to men's natural hopes and fears, and worthy of God to make
known by positive and express revelation. For since it is confessedly
suitable to the divine wisdom, to make variety of creatures, indued
with very different powers and faculties, and capable of very different
kinds and degrees of improvement, and since all rational creatures, by
reason of that natural liberty of will which is essentially necessary
to their being such, cannot but be capable of exalting and improving
their nature by the practice of virtue and the imitation of God, and on
the contrary of depraving and debasing their nature by the practice of
vice and alienation of themselves from God; it follows undeniably, (as
has been before shown by a more particular deduction,) that it is
highly agreeable to the light of nature and to right reason to suppose
that God, the supreme governor and disposer of all things, will finally
make a just and suitable distinction between his creatures, by the
distribution of proportionable rewards and punishments. Nevertheless,
both the truth itself of these final rewards and punishments was so far
called in question, and rendered doubtful and uncertain, by the
disputations even of the wisest philosophers that ever lived; and those
who did in general believe the truth and certainty of them, had yet so
very blind and obscure notions of what nature and kind they were to be,
having their imaginations strangely prejudiced with poetical fictions
and fabulous stories, that the setting this matter clear and right, and
the supplying this single defect in the light of nature, was a thing
highly worthy of divine revelation: It being plainly a very different
thing, and of very different force as to the influencing men's actions,
for men to be able to argue themselves into a reasonable expectation of
future rewards and punishments; and to be certainly assured of the
reality of them by express testimony of divine revelation. And
accordingly, by divine revelation in the gospel, this defect of the
light of nature is now actually supplied in such a manner; life and
immortality are so brought to light, and the wrath of God is so
revealed from heaven against all ungodliness and unrighteousness of
men, that this very thing, the clear and distinct and consistent
account which the gospel gives us of these final rewards and
punishments, (which, though indeed in themselves so absolutely
necessary, that without them no tolerable vindication could be made of
the attributes of God, yet neither by the light of nature, nor by any
positive institution of religion, excepting only the Christian, were
they ever so clearly and plainly represented to mankind, as to have
their full and proper effect upon the hearts and lives of men;) this
very thing (I say) the clear, distinct, and consistent account which
the gospel gives us of these final rewards and punishments, is itself
no contemptible argument of the truth and divine authority of the
Christian revelation. By the certain knowledge of these rewards and
punishments it is that the practice of virtue is now established upon a
sure foundation. Men have now abundantly sufficient encouragement to
support them in their choice of virtue, and in their constant adherence
to it, in all cases and under all circumstances that can be supposed.
There is now sufficient weight on the side of virtue to enable men to
conquer all the temptations of the devil, the flesh, and the world; and
to despise the severest threatenings, even death itself. This is the
victory that overcometh the world, even our faith. The only difficulty
in this matter, arising from the duration of the final punishment of
the wicked, shall be considered when I come to discourse of the
articles of our belief.
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[332] Da mihi virum, qui sit iracundus, maledicus, effrænatus,
paucissimis Dei verbis tam placidum quam ovem reddam. Da libidinosum,
&c.--Lactant. lib. 3. Para men tois Ellesin eis tis, &c,--Origen,
advers. Cels. lib. 1. See this passage cited above.
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Proposition XII.
XII. Proposition XII. Thirdly, the peculiar manner and circumstances
with which the Christian religion enjoins the duties, and urges the
motives before mentioned, are exactly consonant to the dictates of
sound reason, or the unprejudiced light of nature, and most wisely
perfective of it.
The proposition proved by particular instances. For what can be more
agreeable to the light of nature, and more evidently perfective of it,
than to have those duties, which nature hints at only in general,
explained fully and largely, and urged in particular, and inculcated
upon the meanest capacities with great weight and authority, and
exemplified in the lives of holy persons, proposed as patterns for our
imitation? What can be more perfective of the light of nature than to
have those great motives of religion, the rewards and punishments of a
future state, which nature only obscurely points at, described to us
most plainly, affectionately, and lively? What can be more perfective
of the light of nature, than to have the means of atoning for sin,
which nature discovers only the want of, plainly declared and exhibited
to us? What can be more perfective of the light of nature, than such a
discovery of the heinousness of sin and the necessity of holiness, as
the death of Christ and the purity of the gospel does make unto us? In
fine, what can more effectually perfect the religion of nature, than
the gathering together the worshippers of the true God into one body;
the causing them to enter into solemn obligations to live suitably to
their holy profession? The giving them gracious assurances that true
repentance shall be accepted for what is past, and sincere renewed
obedience for the future? The uniting them by a few positive rites in
one religion as well as civil communion, for mutual assistance and
improvement? And the establishing a certain order or perpetual
succession of men, whose constant business it may be to explain the
great duties of religion to persons of meaner capacities; to urge and
enforce the practice of them; to set before men the reasons of their
duty, and the necessity of it; to show them clearly and impartially the
danger of neglecting it, and the great advantage of performing it
sincerely; in a word, to instruct the ignorant, and to admonish the
wicked; to reclaim those that err, to comfort the doubting, to reprove
the obstinate; and to be instruments of conveying to men all proper
assistances, to enable them to perform their whole duty effectually?
If these things be the ordinances of one who came to contradict the
dictates of right reason, and not to perfect the law of nature, but to
destroy it; then let all wise men for ever forsake the assemblies of
Christians, and profess themselves again disciples of the philosophers.
But if these things be perfectly agreeable to nature and right reason,
and tend exceedingly to the supplying the deficiences there of; then
let none, under pretence of maintaining natural religion, revile and
blaspheme the Christian, lest they be found liars unto God.
An answer to the objection drawn from the division among Christians.
The many contentions, indeed, about opinions of great uncertainty and
little importance, which, to the very great scandal of Christianity,
have in several ages of the church been, with unreasonable zeal, kept
up, instead of promoting the universal interest of true practical
religion and virtue, have, it must be confessed, given some occasion to
the enemies of our most holy religion to blaspheme and revile both it
and the teachers of it. But though such things as these have indeed
afforded them too plausible an occasion, yet they have not given them
any just reason so to do: For the acknowledged corruption of a doctrine
or institution, in any particular part or respect, is by no means a
weighty or real objection against the truth of the whole: And there has
always been extant a sufficient rule to enable sincere persons, in the
midst of the greatest disputes and contentions, to distinguish the
doctrine which is of God from the opinions of men; the doctrine of
Christ having been plainly and fully delivered in our Saviour's own
discourses, and in the writings of his immediate followers the
Apostles, who cannot, with any reason, be imagined either to have
misrepresented it, or to have represented it imperfectly. But besides,
I think it can hardly be denied, even by our adversaries themselves,
but that in all times and places, wherein Christianity has been
professed in any tolerable degree of purity; whatever contentions and
disputes may have arisen about particular, and perhaps unnecessary
doctrines; yet the great, the most necessary, and fundamental doctrines
of religion, concerning God and providence; concerning the gracious
method of God's reconciliation with penitent sinners; concerning the
necessity of true piety, righteousness, and sobriety; concerning a
judgment to come, and the final reward of the righteous, and the
punishment of wicked men, in such a manner as will effectually
vindicate both the justice and goodness, the wisdom and honour of God;
these things (I say) have, notwithstanding all differences concerning
smaller matters, been nevertheless at the same time universally and
constantly taught, pressed and inculcated upon persons of all
capacities, by the earnest and continual preaching of all the ministers
of the gospel; with an effect infinitely more considerable and visible,
both in extent and duration, than by the teaching of any heathen
philosophers that ever lived: Which shows undeniably the excellency at
least, if not the divine authority of the Christian institution, in
this particular respect.
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Proposition XIII.
XIII. Proposition XIII. Fourthly; all the [credenda, or] doctrines,
which the true, simple, and uncorrupted Christian religion teaches,
(that is, not only those plain doctrines which it requires to be
believed as fundamental and of necessity to eternal salvation, but even
all the doctrines which it teaches as matters of truth,) are, though
indeed many of them not discoverable by bare reason unassisted with
revelation; yet, when discovered by revelation, apparently most
agreeable to sound unprejudiced reason, have every one of them a
natural tendency, and a direct and powerful influence to reform men's
minds, and correct their manners, and do together make up an infinitely
more consistent and rational scheme of belief than any that the wisest
of the ancient philosophers ever did, or the cunningest of modern
unbelievers can invent or contrive.
1. Of the one supreme God. That there is one only living and true God,
existing of himself, by the necessity of his own nature, absolutely
independent, eternal, omnipresent, unchangeable, incorruptible, without
body, parts, or passions; of infinite power, knowledge, and wisdom; of
perfect liberty, and freedom of will; of infinite goodness, justice,
and truth, and all other possible perfections; so as to be absolutely
self-sufficient to his own infinite and unalterable happiness: This is
not only the first and principal article of the Christian faith, but
also the first and most evident truth that the light of nature itself
teaches us, being clearly demonstrable, upon certain and undeniable
principles of right reason.
2. Of the only begotten son of God. That this supreme self-existent
cause and father of all things did, before all ages, in an
incomprehensible manner, by his almighty power and will, beget or
produce a divine person, styled the Logos, the word, or wisdom, or son,
of God; God, of God; [333] in whom dwells the fulness of Divine
perfections, (excepting absolute supremacy, independency, or
self-origination;) being the image of the invisible God, the Col. i.
15. Heb. i. 3. Apaugasma tes doxes autou. John i. 2. xvii. 5. Heb. i.
3. Rom. ix. 5. and John i. 1. brightness of his father's glory, and the
express image of his person, having been in the beginning with God,
partaker with him of his glory before the world was; the upholder of
all things by the word of his power, and himself over all, (by
communication of his father's glory and dominion) God blessed for ever:
This doctrine (I say) though not indeed discoverable by bare reason,
yet, when made known by revelation, appears plainly very consistent
with right reason, and (it is manifest) contains nothing that implies
any manner of absurdity or contradiction in it.
Indeed, if any men, pretending to be wise above and beyond what is
written, have at any time given such explications of the manner how the
son of God derived his being from the father, or have offered such
accounts of his nature and attributes, as can by any just and necessary
consequence be reduced to imply or involve any contradiction, (which
perhaps many of the schoolmen have but too justly been accused of
doing,) [334] such explications are, without all controversy, false,
and very injurious to religion. But as this doctrine is delivered in
Scripture I think there is nothing in it in any degree contrary to
right reason, as I have elsewhere endeavoured to show in a particular
discourse, to which I refer the reader.
Of the Holy Spirit. Now the same that is said of the son, may in like
manner, with little variation, be, very agreeably to right reason,
understood concerning the original procession or manner of derivation
of the Holy Spirit likewise from the father.
3. Of the creation of the universe. That the universe, the heavens, and
the earth, and all things that are therein, were created and made by
God, and this through the operation of his son, that divine word, or
wisdom of the father, by whom Heb. i. 2. Eph. iii. 9. Col. i. 16. the
Scripture says that God made the worlds, that by him God created all
things, that by him were all things created that are in heaven and that
are in earth, visible and invisible, whether they be thrones or
dominions, or principalities or powers; all things were created by him
and for him, and he is before all John i. 3. things, and by him all
things consist; that all things were made by him, and without him was
not any thing made that was made: All this likewise is very agreeable
to sound and unprejudiced reason. For that neither the whole, nor any
part of the world; neither the form, nor motion, nor matter of the
world, could exist of itself by any necessity in its own nature, is
abundantly demonstrable from undeniable principles of reason, as has
been shown in my former discourse: Consequently, both the whole world,
and all the variety of things that now exist therein, must of necessity
have received both their being itself, and also their form and manner
of being, from God, the alone supreme and self-existent cause, and must
needs depend upon his good pleasure every moment, for the continuance
and preservation of that being. Accordingly, if we set aside the
Epicureans, (whose absurd hypothesis has long since been given up even
by all atheists themselves,) and some very few others, who with no less
absurdity (as I have also at large shown) contended that the world was
in its present form self-existent and necessary, all the philosophers
of all ages, (even not excepting those who held the eternity of the
world,) have unanimously agreed in this great truth, that the world
evidently owes both its being and preservation to God, the supreme
cause and author of all things. And then, that God made the world by
the operation of his son, though this could not indeed be known
certainly without express revelation; yet is it by no means incredible,
or contrary to right reason. For, to the judgment of reason, it is one
and the same thing, whether God made the world immediately by himself,
or mediately by the ministration of a second principle. And what Plato
and his followers have said concerning a second Nous or mind, whom they
frequently stile Demiourgos the minister or workman by whom God framed
all things, proves undeniably thus much at least, that the doctrines
delivered in Scripture concerning this matter cannot be rejected as
inconsistent and irreconcilable with right reason.
4. Of the formation of the earth. Gen. i. 2. That, about the space of
6000 years since, the earth was without form and void, that is, a
confused chaos, out of which God framed this beautiful and useful
fabric we now inhabit, and stocked it with the seeds of all kinds of
plants, and formed upon it man, and all the other species of animals it
is now furnished with, is also very agreeable to right reason. For
though the precise time, indeed, when all this was done, could not now
have been known exactly without revelation, yet even at this day there
are remaining many considerable and very strong rational proofs, which
make it exceedingly probable, (separate from the authority of
revelation,) that this present frame and constitution of the earth
cannot have been of a very much longer date. The universal tradition
delivered down from all the most ancient nations of the world, both
learned and barbarous; the constant and agreeing doctrine of all
ancient philosophers and poets, concerning the earth's being formed
within such a period of time, out of water or a chaos; the manifold
absurdities and contradictions of those few accounts which pretend to a
much greater antiquity; the number of men with which the earth is at
present inhabited; the late original of learning and all useful arts
and sciences; the impossibility that universal deluges, or other
accidents, should at certain long periods have oft-times destroyed far
the greatest part of mankind, with the memory of all former actions and
inventions, and yet never have happened to destroy them all; the
changes that must necessarily fall out naturally in the earth in vast
length of time, by the sinking and washing down of mountains, the
consumption of water by plants, and innumerable other such like
accidents; these (I say) and many more arguments, drawn from nature,
reason, and observation, make that account of the time of the earth's
formation exceedingly probable in itself, which from the revelation
delivered in Scripture-history we believe to be certain.
5. Of the continual government of Providence. That the same God who
created all things by the word of his power, and upholds and preserves
them by his continual concourse, does also by his all-wise providence
perpetually govern and direct the issues and events of things; takes
care of this lower world, and of all, even the smallest things that are
therein; disposes things in a regular order and succession in every
age, from the beginning of the world to its final period; and inspects,
with a more particular and special regard, the moral actions of men:
This, as it is far more expressly, clearly, and constantly taught in
Scripture than in any of the writings of the philosophers; so it is
also highly agreeable to right and true reason: For, that an
omnipresent and infinitely wise being cannot but know every thing that
is done in every part of the universe, and with equal ease take notice
of the minutest things as of the greatest; that an infinitely powerful
being must needs govern and direct every thing in such manner, and to
such ends, as he knows to be best and fittest in the whole; so far as
is consistent with that liberty of will which he has made essential to
all rational creatures; and that an infinitely just and good governor
cannot but take more particular and exact notice of the moral actions
of all his rational creatures, and how far they are conformable or not
conformable to the rules he has set them; all this (I say) is most
evidently agreeable to right reason, and as has been before shown,
deducible from it.
6. Of paradise, and the loss of it by sin. That God, after the
formation of the earth, created man at first upright and innocent, and
placed him in a happy and paradisiacal state, where he enjoyed plenty
and abundance of all things without labour or sorrow; and that sin was
the original cause, that now on the contrary the very ground is cursed
andGen. iii. 17, 18, 19.barren for our sake, and in sorrow we eat of it
all the days of our life, that thorns also and thistles are brought
forth to us, and in the sweat of our face we eat bread, till we return
unto the ground: This likewise is very reasonable and credible in
itself, as appears, not only from the abstract consideration of the
nature of the thing, but also from the general opinion that the ancient
learnedest heathens entertained, upon very obscure and uncertain
tradition, that the original state of man was innocent and simple, and
the earth, whereon they dwelt, fruitful of itself, and abundant with
all plenty; [335] but that God, for the sin of man, changed this happy
constitution of things, and made labour necessary for the support of
our lives.
7. Of the flood. That in process of time, after the first entrance of
sin into the world, men by degrees corrupted themselves more and more,
till at length God, for the punishment of their sin and
incorrigibleness, [336] brought upon them a general flood, which
destroyed them all except a few persons, preserved for the restoration
of the human race, is a truth delivered down to us, not only by
authority of Scripture, but also by the concurrent testimony of almost
all heathen philosophers and poets: And the histories of all nations
backwards terminate in it; and, (which is the most remarkable thing of
all, because it is a demonstrative and ocular proof of the universality
of some such kind of dissolution,) the present visible frame and
constitution of the earth throughout, the disposition and situation of
the several strata of different kind of matter, whereof it is composed;
the numberless shells of fishes, bones of other animals, and parts of
all kinds of plants, which in every country and in almost every place
are, at great variety of depths, found inclosed in earth, in clay, in
stones, and in all sorts of matter; are such apparent demonstrations of
the earth's having been in some former times, and perhaps more than
once, (the whole surface of it at least) in a state of fluidity; that
whosoever has seen the collections of this kind made by the very
ingenious Dr Woodward and others, must in a manner abandon all use both
of his senses and reason, if he can in the least doubt of this truth.
8. Of God's revealing himself to the patriarchs, and giving the law to
the Jews. That God, after the flood, made particular revelation of
himself and of his will to the patriarchs, is a thing very credible in
itself, for the same reasons that I have before shown, in general, that
the expectation of some revelation from God was a reasonable and
probable expectation. And that, after this, God should vouchsafe, by
express revelation, to give a law to the whole nation of the Jews,
consisting very much in sacrifices, and in external rites and
ceremonious observances, cannot with any just reason be rejected as an
incredible fact; if we consider that such a kind of institution was
necessary, in those times and circumstances, to preserve that nation
from the idolatry and worship of false gods, wherewith the countries
around them were overspread; that those rites and ceremonies were
typical of, and preparative to, a higher and more excellent
dispensation; that the Jews were continually told by their prophets,
that their observance of those rites and ceremonies was by no means so
highly acceptable to God, nor so absolutely and indispensably insisted
upon by him, as obedience to the moral law; and that the whole matter
of fact, relating to that revelation, is delivered down to us in a
history, on which the policy of a whole nation was founded, at a time
when nobody could be ignorant of the truth of the principal facts, and
concerning which we can now have no more reason to doubt than of any
history of any ancient matter of fact in the world. The most
considerable and real difficulty, viz. Why this favour was granted to
that single nation only, and not to all the rest of the world likewise,
is to be accounted for by the same reasons which prove (as has been
before shown) that God was not obliged to make known the revelation of
the gospel to all men alike.
9. Of the other particulars of Scripture-history in the Old Testament.
That all the other particulars of Scripture history contained in the
Old Testament, are true relations of matter of fact, (not to insist now
on the many arguments which prove in general the antiquity,
genuineness, and authority of the books themselves,) will to a rational
inquirer appear very credible from hence, that very many of the
particular histories, and some even of the minuter circumstances also
of those histories, are confirmed by concurrent testimonies of profane
and unquestionably unprejudiced authors: Of which Grotius, in his
excellent book of the truth of the Christian religion, [337] has given
us a large collection: As particularly, that the manner of the
formation of the earth out of a chaos is mentioned by the ancientest
Phoenician, Egyptian, Indian and Greek historians; the very names of
Adam and Eve, by Sanchuniathon and others; the longevity of the
antediluvians, by Berosus and Manethos, and others; the ark of Noah, by
Berosus; many particulars of the flood, by Ovid and others; the family
of Noah, and two of every kind of animals entering into the ark with
him, mentioned by Lucian himself, as a tradition of the ancient
Grecians; the dove which Noah sent out of the ark, by Abydenus and
Plutarch; [338] the building of Babel, by Abydenus, the burning of
Sodom, by Diodorus Siculus and Strabo, and Tacitus, and others; several
particulars of the history of Abraham and the rest of the patriarchs,
by Berosus and others; many particulars of Moses's life, by several
ancient writers; the eminent piety of the most ancient Jews, by Strabo
and Justin; [339] divers actions of David and Solomon, in the Phnician
annals; some of the actions of Elijah, by Menander, and confessed by
Julian himself; the history of Jonah, under the name of Hercules, by
Lycophron and Æ neas Gazæus; and the histories of the following times,
by many more authors. Besides that (as learned men have upon exceeding
probable grounds supposed, [340] ) many of the most ancient
scripture-histories are acknowledged and asserted in the writings of
the poets, both Greeks and Latins; the true histories being couched
under fictitious names and fabulous representations.
10. Of God's sending his son into the world for the redemption of
mankind. That God, in the fulness of time, that is, at that time which
his infinite wisdom had fore-appointed, which all the ancient
prophecies had determined, and which many concurrent circumstances in
the state of the Jewish religion, and in the disposition of the Roman
empire, had made a fit season for the reception and propagation of a
new institution of religion; that God (I say) at that time, should send
his only-begotten son, that word or wisdom of the father, that divine
person by whom (as has been before shown) he created the world, and by
whom he made all former particular manifestations of himself unto men,
that he should send him, to take upon him our human nature, and therein
to make a full and particular revelation of the will of God to mankind
(who by sin had corrupted themselves and forfeited the favour of God,
so that by the bare light of nature they could not discover any certain
means by which they could be satisfactorily and absolutely secure of
regaining that favour;) to preach unto men repentance and remission of
sin; and by giving himself a sacrifice and expiation for sin, to
declare the acceptableness of repentance, and the certainty of pardon
thereupon, in a method evidently consistent with all necessary
vindication of the honour and authority of the divine laws, and with
God's irreconcileable hatred against sin; to be a mediator and
intercessor between God and man, to procure the particular assistance
of God's holy spirit which might be in men a new and effectual
principle of a heavenly and divine life; in a word, to be the Saviour
and judge of mankind, and finally to bring them to eternal life; all
this, when clearly and expressly revealed, and by good testimony proved
to be so revealed, is apparently agreeable and very credible to right
and true reason. As (because it is the main and fundamental article of
the Christian faith,) I shall endeavour to make out more largely and
distinctly, by showing, in particular, that none of the several
objections, upon which speculative unbelievers reject this doctrine, do
at all prove any inconsistency in the belief of it, with sound and
unprejudiced reason.
That it is not unreasonable to suppose God making a revelation of his
will to men. For, first, it cannot be thought unreasonable to be
believed in the general, that God should make a revelation of his will
to mankind, since, on the contrary, (as has been before proved at
large,) it is very agreeable to the moral attributes of God, and to the
notions and expectations of the wisest and most rational men that lived
in the heathen world.
That it is not unreasonable to believe, that God would appoint a
sacrifice or expiation for sin. Secondly, it cannot be thought
unreasonable to be believed, that in such a revelation, wherein God
freely proclaims remission of sin, and the acceptableness of
repentance, he should nevertheless have appointed such a sacrifice or
expiation for sin, as might at the same time be a sufficient testimony
of his irreconcilable hatred against it. For though, by the light of
nature, it was indeed exceeding probable and to be hoped for that God
would forgive sin upon true repentance, yet it could not be proved that
he was absolutely obliged to do so, or that he would certainly do so.
On the contrary, there was reason to suppose, that, in vindication of
the honour and dignity of his laws, he would require some further
satisfaction and expiation. And accordingly we find the custom of
sacrificing to have prevailed universally over the heathen world in all
ages; which, how unreasonable soever an expectation it was, to think
that the blood of beasts could truly expiate sin, yet thus much it
plainly and undeniably shows, that it has been the common apprehension
of mankind, in all ages, that God would not be appeased, nor pardon
sin, without some punishment and satisfaction; and yet at the same time
they had good hopes, that, upon the repentance of sinners, God would
accept some other satisfaction instead of the destruction of the
offenders. It is therefore plainly agreeable to right reason, to
believe that God, in vindication of the honour of his laws, and for a
testimony of his hatred against sin, should appoint some sacrifice or
expiation for sin, at the same time that he forgives the sinner upon
his true repentance.
Thirdly, That it is not unreasonable to believe, that a mediator should
be appointed between God and man. It cannot be thought unreasonable to
be believed, that a mediator or intercessor should be appointed between
God and man, through and by whom the prayers of sinners may be offered
up, so as to be acceptable in the sight of God. It is well known, the
generality of the wisest heathens thought it agreeable to reason to
make use of subordinate intelligences, demons or heroes, by whom they
put up their prayers to the superior gods, hoping, that, by the
mediation of those intercessors, the unworthiness of their own persons,
and the defects of these prayers might be supplied, and they might
obtain such merciful and gracious answers to their prayers as they
could not presume to hope for upon their own account. Wherein though
those pagans laboured indeed under very great uncertainty, in doing a
thing for which they had no sufficient warrant, and in using mediators
whom they neither knew distinctly to have any being, nor could they
however have any good security that such mediation would be acceptable
to the supreme God; yet, at the same time, this undeniably proves, that
it is by no means inconsistent with right reason, to believe that a
mediator may by divine authority be appointed between God and sinful
men, to be their intercessor and advocate with a justly offended God.
Fourthly, Of the objection drawn from the dignity of the person whom we
believe to be our mediator and redeemer. The greatest real difficulty
in this matter, to the judgment of right reason, seems to arise from
the consideration of the dignity of the person whom we believe to have
given himself a sacrifice and propitiation for the sins of mankind,
viz. how it is possible, that the only-begotten son of God should be
incarnate and become man; how it is conceivable that God should
condescend so far as to send, and the son of God condescend willingly
to be sent, and do such great things for his creatures; and, above all,
how it is consistent with reason, to suppose God condescending to do so
much for such frail and weak creatures as men, who, in all appearance
seem to be but a very small, low, and inconsiderable part of the
creation. And here indeed it must readily be acknowledged, that human
reason could never have discovered such a method as this, for the
reconciliation of sinners to an offended God without express
revelation. But then neither, on the other side, when once this method
is made known, is there any such difficulty or inconceivableness in it
as can reasonably make a wise and considerate man call in question the
truth of a well attested revelation, merely upon that account; which,
indeed, any plain absurdity, or contradiction in the matter of a
doctrine pretended to be revealed, would, it must be confessed,
unavoidably do. For as to the possibility of the incarnation of the son
of God, whatever mysteriousness there confessedly was in the manner of
it, yet, as to the thing itself, there is evidently no more
unreasonableness in believing the possibility of it, than in believing
the union of our soul and body, or any other certain truth which we
plainly see implies no contradiction in the thing itself, at the same
time that we are sensible we cannot discover the manner how it is
affected. Again, as to the incredibility of the doctrine, that God
should make so great a condescension to his creatures, and that a
person of such dignity as the only begotten son of God should vouchsafe
to give himself a sacrifice for the sins of men: He that duly
considers, how it is no diminution to the glory and greatness of the
father of all things, to inspect, govern, and direct every thing by his
all-wise providence through the whole creation; to take care even of
the meanest of his creatures, so that not a sparrow falls to the
ground, or a hair of our head perishes, without his knowledge; and to
observe exactly every particle, even of inanimate matter in the
universe; he (I say) who duly considers this, cannot with reason think
it any real disparagement to the son of God, (though it was indeed a
most wonderful and amazing instance of humility and condescension,)
that he should concern himself so far for sinful men as to appear in
their nature to reveal the will of God more clearly to them, to give
himself a sacrifice and expiation for their sins, and to bring them to
repentance and eternal life. The greatest enemies and deriders of
Christianity have asserted things, far more incredible, to have been
done upon far less occasions; witness what Julian the apostate [341]
thought fit to believe concerning Æ sculapius's coming down from
heaven, and conversing upon earth in a visible form, only to teach men
the art of healing diseases. And modern unbelievers, who seem willing,
in the contrary extreme, to deny God's having any regard, or taking any
care in any respect, for the welfare and happiness of his creatures,
are forced, if they will go about to give any account or explication of
things, to invent much more incredible hypotheses, dishonourable to
God, and utterly inconsistent with his divine attributes. Indeed, if we
will consider things impartially, so far is it from being truly any
diminution of the greatness and glory of God, to send his son into the
world for the redemption and salvation of mankind, that, on the
contrary, it is a means of bringing the very greatest honour to the
laws and government of God that can be imagined. For what can be
imagined more honourable, and worthy of the supreme lord and governor
of all things, than to show forth his mercy and goodness, in forgiving
the sins of frail and fallible creatures, and suffering himself to be
reconciled to them upon their true repentance; and yet at the same time
to cause such an expiation to be made for sin, by the sufferings and
death of his own son, in their nature, as might be abundant evidences
of his irreconcilable hatred against sin, a just vindication of the
authority and dignity of his laws, and a sufficient and effectual
warning to deter men from sin, to create in them the greatest dread and
detestation of it, and for ever to terrify them from venturing upon
wilful transgression and disobedience? It is true, no man can take upon
him certainly to say, but God, by his absolute sovereignty and
authority, might, if he had so pleased, have pardoned sin upon
repentance, without any sacrifice or expiation at all. But this method
of doing it by the death of Christ is more wise and fit, and evidently
more proper and effectual to discountenance and prevent presumption, to
discourage men from repeating their transgressions, to give them a deep
sense of the heinous nature of sin, and to convince them of the
excellency and importance of the laws of God, and the indispensable
necessity of paying obedience to them; forasmuch as it shows us, that
at the same time that God was willing to save the sinner, yet, lest
encouragement should be given to sin by letting it go unpunished, he
did not think fit to forgive the transgressions of men without great
sufferings in our nature, and to put away the guilt of our sins but
upon such difficult terms as the death of his own son. So that in this
dispensation, justice, and mercy, and truth, are met together;
righteousness and peace have kissed each other. And by how much the
greater the dignity of the person was, who gave himself thus a
sacrifice for the sins of men, of so much the greater weight and force
is this argument to deter men for the future from sin, and to convince
them of the necessity of obedience. Wherefore, so far is it from being
true, that the consideration of the dignity of the person suffering is
a real objection against the credibility of the doctrine, that, on the
contrary, that very consideration contains the highest vindication
imaginable of the greatness, and honour, and authority of the laws of
God, and at the same time the greatest possible instance or expression
of his mercy and compassion towards men, agreeable to our natural
notions of his divine attributes. And then, as to the last part of this
difficulty, viz. how it can be consistent with reason, to suppose God
condescending to do so very great things for such mean and weak
creatures, as men are, who in all appearance seem to be but a very
small, low, and inconsiderable part of the creation; forasmuch as the
whole earth itself is but a little spot, that bears no proportion at
all to the universe; and in all probability of reason, the large and
numberless orbs of heaven cannot but be supposed to be filled with
beings more capable than we to show forth the praise and glory of their
Almighty Creator, and more worthy to be the objects of his care and
love. To this part of the difficulty, I say, the answer is very easy:
That the mercy and love of the infinitely good God is extended equally
over all his works; that, let the universe be supposed as large, and
the rational creatures, with which it is furnished, as many and
excellent as any one can imagine; yet mankind is plainly the chief,
indeed the only inhabitant for whose sake it is evident this our globe
of earth was formed into a habitable world; and this our earth is, as
far as we have any means of judging, as considerable and worthy of the
divine care as most other parts of the system; and this our system as
considerable as any other single system in the universe; and finally,
that, in like manner as the same divine providence, which presides over
the whole creation, does particularly govern and direct every thing in
this our lower world, as well as in every other particular part of the
universe; so there is no real difficulty to right reason, in conceiving
that the same divine logos, the word or messenger of the father, who,
in various dispensations, according to the particular needs and
exigencies of mankind, has made various manifestations of God, and
discoveries of the divine will, to us here upon earth; may also, for
ought we know, have to other beings, in other parts of the universe,
according to their several capacities or wants, made different
manifestations of God, and discoveries of his will, in ways of which we
can know nothing, and in which we have no concern; there being nothing
in this at all contrary to the nature of God, or the condition of
things.
Fifthly, Of the objection drawn from the Christian revelation not being
in fact universal. and lastly, if any one thinks it unreasonable to be
believed, that God should send his Son into the world for the
redemption of mankind, and yet that this appearance of the Son of God
upon earth should not be till the later ages of the world; and after he
has appeared, yet his appearance not be made known equally to all
nations; such a one must likewise, for the same reason, affirm, that it
is unreasonable to believe the necessity and obligations even of
natural religion itself, because it is plain all men are not furnished
equally with the same capacities and opportunities of understanding
those obligations, and consequently no deist can, consistently with his
own principles, make this objection against the truth of Christianity.
He must likewise, for the same reason, affirm, that God is obliged in
all other respects also to make all his creatures equal; to make men
angels; to indue all men with the same faculties and capacities as any,
at least to make all men capable of the very same kind and the same
degree of happiness, and to afford to all of them all the very same
means or opportunities of obtaining it: In a word, he must assert that
infinite wisdom cannot reasonably be supposed to have a right of making
variety of creatures in very various circumstances; which is an
assertion palpably most absurd, in experience false, and a very unjust
diminution of God's sovereignty in the world. But besides, though the
redemption purchased by the Son of God is not indeed actually made
known unto all men, yet as no man ever denied but that the benefit of
the death of Christ extended backwards to those who lived before his
appearance in the world, so no man can prove but that the same benefit
may likewise extend itself forwards to those who never heard of his
appearance, though they lived after it.
11. Of the other particulars of scripture-history contained in the New
Testament. That the history of the life of Christ, contained in the New
Testament, is a true relation of matters of fact, (not to insist here
on the testimony of his disciples and followers, which shall be
considered hereafter in its proper place,) will to a rational inquirer
appear very credible from hence, that very many particulars of that
history are confirmed by concurrent testimonies of profane and
unquestionably unprejudiced authors. That, before the coming of our
Saviour, there was a general expectation spread over all the eastern
nations, that out of Judea should arise a person, who should he
governor of the world, is expressly affirmed by the Roman historians,
Suetonius [342] and Tacitus. [343] That there lived in Judea, at the
time which the Gospel relates, such a person as Jesus of Nazareth, is
acknowledged by all authors, both Jewish and pagan, who have written
since that time. The star that appeared at his birth, and the journey
of the Chaldæan wise men, is mentioned by Chalcidius the Platonist.
[344] Herod's causing all the children in Bethlehem, under two years
old to be slain, and a reflection made upon him on that occasion by the
emperor Augustus, is related by Macrobius. [345] Many of the miracles
that Jesus worked in his life-time are, as to matters of fact,
(particularly, his healing the lame and the blind, and casting out
devils,) expressly owned by the most implacable enemies of
Christianity, by Celsus and Julian, [346] and the authors of the Jewish
Talmud. And how the power of the heathen gods ceased after the coming
of Christ is acknowledged by Porphyry, who attributes it to their being
angry at the setting up of the Christian religion, which he styles
impious and profane. Many particulars of the collateral history,
concerning John Baptist, and Herod, and Pilate, (not to mention the
famous testimony concerning Jesus himself, because it is by some
suspected not to be genuine, notwithstanding it is found in all the
ancient copies,) are largely recorded by Josephus. The crucifixion of
Christ under Pontius Pilate, is related by Tacitus; [347] and divers of
the most remarkable circumstances attending it, such as the earthquake
and miraculous darkness, were recorded in the public Roman registers,
[348] commonly appealed to by the first Christian writers, as what
could not be denied by the adversaries themselves. Then, as to the
resurrection and ascension of Christ; these depend on the general
proofs of the credibility of his disciples' testimony, and other
following evidences, which will be considered hereafter in their proper
place.
12. Of the day of judgment, and Christ the judge. That God has
appointed a day, wherein he will judge the world in righteousness, by
that person whom he has ordained, in order to reward every man
according to his works; is a doctrine perfectly agreeable to right
reason, and to our natural notions of the attributes of God; as may
appear more particularly from what has been before said concerning the
necessity and certainty of another life after this; and is evident from
the opinion of all the wiser heathens concerning this matter. Nor may
it perhaps be altogether impertinent to observe here, that the poets,
both Greek and Latin, have unanimously agreed in this one particular
circumstance, that men after death should not have judgment passed upon
them immediately by God himself, but by just men appointed for that
purpose.
13. Of the resurrection of the body. That, in order to this final
judgment, not only the soul shall survive the dissolution of the body,
but the body itself also shall be raised again; this doctrine, though
not indeed discoverable with any kind of certainty by the bare light of
nature, because the belief of the soul's immortality (for ought that
appears to reason alone) is sufficient to answer all the purposes of a
future state, as far as is discoverable merely by the light of nature;
yet this doctrine (I say) of the resurrection of the body, when made
known by revelation, evidently contains nothing in it in the least
contrary to right reason: For, what reasonable man can deny but that it
is plainly altogether as easy for God to raise the body again after
death as to create and form it at first? Some of the Stoical
philosophers seem to have thought it not only possible, but even
probable: [349] And many of the Jews, who had no express revelation
concerning it, did yet believe it upon an ancient tradition, as appears
from all their writings, and particularly from the translation in the
last verse of the book of Job, which according to the Seventy runs
thus: So Job died, being old and full of days, but it is written that
he shall rise again with those whom the Lord raises up. [350] The only
real difficulty in this doctrine seems to arise upon putting the
supposition of one body's being turned into the nourishment, and
becoming part of the substance of another, so as that the same parts
may equally belong to two bodies, to both of which it shall
nevertheless be absolutely impossible that the same parts should be
restored. But this objection, as great and principal a difficulty as it
is, is really but a great trifle. For there does not at all appear any
absolute necessity, that, to constitute the same body, there must be an
exact restitution of all and only the same parts. And if there was any
such necessity; yet even still without making that hard supposition
(which Grotius and others have done, [351] ) that God by a miraculous
providence always interposes to prevent the parts of one human body
from incorporating with and becoming the nourishment of another, (for I
cannot see any sufficient ground to deny, but that it may be possible
in nature for barbarous cannibals, if any such there be, to subsist for
some time and live wholly one upon another, if deprived of all other
sustenance;) without any such hard suppositions as these (I say,) it is
easy to imagine many ways by which the resurrection of the same body,
properly speaking, shall nevertheless be very possible; and the whole
foundation of this, and all other difficulties of this kind, concerning
the parts, and forms, and magnitudes, and proportions of our future
bodies, be entirely taken away.
Of the resurrection of the same body. As first, No man can say it is
improbable, (and they who have been most and best versed in
microscopical observations think it more than probable,) that the
original stamina, which contain all and every one of the solid parts
and vessels of the body, not excepting even the minutest nerves and
fibres, are themselves the entire body, and that all the extraneous
matter, which, coming in by way of nourishment, fills up and distends
the minute and insensible vessels, of which all the visible and
sensible vessels are composed, is not strictly and properly part of the
body. Consequently, while all this extraneous matter, which serves only
to swell the body to its just magnitude, is in continual flux, the
original stamina may continue unchanged, and so no confusion of bodies
will be possible in nature. There may be made many very considerable
observations, concerning the determinate figure into which every
respective body unfolds itself by growth; concerning the impossibility
of the body's extending itself, by any nourishment whatsoever, beyond
that certain magnitude to which the original vessels are capable of
being unfolded; and concerning the impossibility of restoring by any
nourishment any the smallest vessel or solid part of the body that has
at any time happened to be mutilated by any accident; all which
observations, often and carefully made, will seem very much to favour
some such speculation as this.
Secondly, It may also be supposed otherwise, not without good
probability, that in like manner as in every grain of corn there is
contained a minute insensible seminal principle, [352] which is itself
the entire future blade and ear, and in due season, when all the rest
of the grain is corrupted, evolves and unfolds itself visibly into that
form; so our present mortal and corruptible body may be but the exuviæ,
as it were of some hidden and at present insensible principle,
(possibly the present seat of the soul,) which at the resurrection
shall discover itself in its proper form. This way also, there can be
no confusion of bodies possible in nature. And it is not without some
weight that the ancientest writers of the church have always made use
of this very similitude; that the apostle St Paul himself alleges the
same comparison; and that the Jewish writers seem to have had some
obscure glimpse of this notion, when they talked of a certain
incorruptible part of the body; though these latter indeed explained
themselves very weakly and unphilosophically.
Many other ways perhaps may be imagined, by which the same thing may be
explained intelligibly. But these speculations are nice and subtile,
and neither needful nor proper to be enlarged upon in this place. Only
the bare mention of them shows the manifold possibility of the doctrine
of the resurrection, against the objections of those who would have it
seem contradictory.
14. Of the eternal happiness of the blessed, and the eternal punishment
of the damned. Lastly, That after the resurrection and the general
judgment, wherein every man shall be judged according to his works,
they that have done well shall go into everlasting happiness, and they
that have done evil, into everlasting punishment, is a doctrine in
itself very credible, and reasonable to be believed. Concerning the
everlasting happiness of the righteous there is no dispute, it being
evident that God in his infinite bounty may reward the sincere
obedience of his creatures, as much beyond the merit of their own weak
and imperfect works, as he himself pleases. But the everlasting
punishment threatened to the wicked has seemed to many a great
difficulty; since it is certain, from our natural notions of the
attributes of God, that no man shall be punished beyond the just
demerit of his sins. Here, therefore, it is to be observed, first that
no man can say, it is unreasonable that they who by wilful and stubborn
disobedience to their almighty creator and most merciful benefactor,
and by the habitual practice of unrepented wickedness, have, during the
state of trial, made themselves unfit for the enjoyment of that
happiness which God has prepared for them that love and obey him,
should be eternally rejected, and excluded from it. Thus much, the
wickedest of men are willing enough to believe: And if bare deprivation
of happiness was all the punishment they had reason to fear, they would
be well content to sit still in their wickedness. But is it at all
agreeable to reason to believe, that the punishment to be inflicted by
the final wrath of a provoked God upon his most obstinate and
incorrigible enemies, should be merely such a thing as is in its own
nature less dreadful and terrible than even those afflictions which by
certain experience we see in this present life fall sometimes upon such
persons with whom God is not angry at all? Is it agreeable to reason to
believe, that God, who (as is evident by experience) suffers the very
best of his own servants, for the punishment of their sins, or even
only for the trial of their virtue, to fall sometimes under all the
calamities and miseries which it is possible for the cruellest and most
powerful tyrants to invent and execute, should punish his most
obstinately rebellious and finally impenitent creatures, with nothing
more than the negation of happiness? There must, therefore, in the next
place be some sensible and positive punishment, besides the mere
negative loss of happiness. And whoever seriously considers the
dreadful effects of God's anger in this present world, in the instance
of the general deluge, the overthrow of Sodom and Gomorrah, the amazing
calamities which befel the whole Jewish nation at the destruction of
Jerusalem, and other such like examples; in some of which cases, the
judgments have fallen upon mixed multitudes of good men and bad
together; (not to mention the calamities which sometimes befal even
good men by themselves;) whosoever, I say, seriously considers all
this, cannot but frame to himself very terrible apprehensions of the
greatness of that punishment which the despised patience of God shall
finally inflict on the impenitently wicked and incorrigible, when they
shall be separated and be by themselves. And then, as to the duration
of this punishment, no man can presume, in our present state of
ignorance and darkness, to be able truly to judge, barely by the
strength of his own natural reason, what in this respect is or is not
consistent with the wisdom, and justice, and goodness of the supreme
governor of the world, since we neither know the place, nor kind, nor
manner, nor circumstances, nor degrees, nor all the ends and uses of
the final punishment of the wicked. Only this one thing we are certain
of, that the justice of God will abundantly vindicate itself, and all
mouths shall be stopped before him, and be forced to acknowledge the
exact righteousness of all his judgments, and to condemn their own
folly and wickedness; forasmuch as the degrees or intenseness of the
punishment which shall be inflicted on the impenitent shall be exactly
proportionate to their sins, as a recompense of their demerit, so that
no man shall suffer more than he has deserved. [353] This being once
clearly established, the difficulty about the duration of the
punishment will not appear so insuperable to right reason: For nothing
can be more evident than that God may justly banish the wicked
eternally from his kingdom of glory, and from that happiness which is
his free and undeserved gift to the righteous; and the positive
punishment which shall be inflicted upon them in that state of eternal
rejection shall undoubtedly be such, and so proportioned to men's
deserts, as the righteous judge will then make appear before men and
angels, to be just, and wise, and necessary, and such only as becomes
the infinitely wise and good lord and governor of the universe to
inflict. The wisest of the heathen philosophers, without the help of
revelation, have taught, and did believe it agreeable to right reason,
that the punishment of the incorrigible should be [aionios] without any
determinate or known end; [354] and we cannot tell how many wise
designs God may serve thereby. We know not but that as God has now
discovered to us in some measure the fall and punishment of evil
angels, to be a warning to us, so he may hereafter use the example of
the punishment of wicked and incorrigible men, to be a means of
preserving other beings in their obedience. And many other
considerations there may possibly be, very necessary to enable us to
judge rightly concerning this matter, which, in this present state, we
have no sufficient means of coming to the knowledge of.
Thus, all the credenda, or doctrines, which the Christian religion
teaches; (that is, not only those plain doctrines which it requires to
be believed as fundamental and of necessity to eternal salvation, but
even all the doctrines which it teaches as matters of truth;) are, in
the first place, though indeed many of them not discoverable by bare
reason unassisted with revelation, yet, when discovered by revelation,
apparently most agreeable to sound and unprejudiced reason. [355]
Every one of them has a direct tendency and powerful influence to
reform men's manners. In the next place, every one of these doctrines
hasa natural tendency, and a direct and powerful influence to reform
men's lives, and correct their manners. This is the great end and
ultimate design of all true religion; and it is a very great and fatal
mistake to think that any doctrine or any belief whatsoever can be any
otherwise of any benefit to men, than as it is fitted to promote this
main end. There was none of the doctrines of our Saviour, (as an
excellent prelate of our church admirably expresses this matter [356] )
calculated for the gratification of men's idle curiosities, the busying
and amusing them with airy and useless speculations; much less were
they intended for an exercise of our credulity, or a trial how far we
could bring our reason to submit to our faith: But, as, on the one
hand, they were plain and simple, and such as by their agreeableness to
the rational faculties of mankind, did highly recommend themselves to
our belief; so, on the other hand, they had an immediate relation to
practice, and were the genuine principles and foundation upon which all
human and divine virtues were naturally to be superstructed.
Particularly, what can be a more necessary and excellent foundation of
true religion than that doctrine which the Christian religion clearly
and distinctly teaches us, concerning the nature and attributes of the
one only true God, without any of that ambiguity and doubtfulness,
those various and inconsistent opinions and conjectures, those
uncertain and oft-times false reasonings concerning the nature of God,
which, notwithstanding the natural possibility of discovering very many
of the attributes of God by the light of true reason, did yet in fact
overspread the greatest part of the heathen world with polytheism or
atheism? What can be so certain a preservative against idolatry, and
the worship of false gods, as the doctrine, that the universe, the
heavens, and the earth, and all things contained therein, are the
creatures and workmanship of the one true God, and have a continual
dependence upon him for the preservation of their being? What can be so
sure a ground of true piety and reliance upon God, as the clear
Christian doctrine concerning providence, concerning God's perpetually
governing and directing the issues and events of all things, and
inspecting with a more especial regard the moral actions of men? Which
doctrine was perplexed by the philosophers with endless disputes. What
can be so just a vindication of the goodness of God, and consequently
so necessary in order to our maintaining in our minds worthy and
honourable notions concerning him, as the doctrine that God created man
at first upright, and that the original of all evil and misery is sin?
The want of a clear knowledge of which truth extremely perplexed the
heathen world, and made many recur to that most absurd fiction of a
self-existent evil principle. What can be a more proper motive to piety
than the doctrine that the deluge and other remarkable calamities which
have befallen mankind, were sent upon them by God's immediate
direction, as punishments for their wickedness? What can be a greater
encouragement to the practice of holiness, than the doctrine that God
has at several times vouchsafed to make several particular revelations
of his will to men, to instruct and support them more effectually in
that practice? But above all, what doctrine could ever have been
imagined so admirably fitted in all respects to promote all the ends of
true religion, as that of the incarnation of the Son of God? Which way
could men have been filled with so deep a sense of the mercy and love
of God towards them, and have been instructed in all divine truths in a
method so well accommodated to their present infirmities, as by God's
sending his only-begotten Son, to take upon him our nature, and therein
to make a general revelation of the will of God to mankind? How could
the honour, and dignity, and authority of the laws of God have been so
effectually vindicated, and at the same time so satisfactory an
assurance of pardon upon true repentance have been given unto men, as
by this method of the son of God giving himself a sacrifice and
expiation for sin? What could have been a more glorious manifestation
of the mercy and compassion of God, and at the same time a more
powerful means to discountenance men's presumption, to discourage them
from repeating their transgressions, to give them a deep sense of the
heinous nature of sin, and of God's extreme hatred and utter
irreconcilableness to it, and to convince them of the excellency and
importance of the laws of God, and the indispensable necessity of
paying obedience to them, than this expedient of saving sinners by the
sufferings and death of the son of God, and by establishing with them a
new and gracious covenant upon the merits of that satisfaction? How
could men be better encouraged to begin a religious life, than by
having such a mediator, advocate, and intercessor for them with God, to
obtain pardon of all their frailties, and by being assured of the
assistance of the Spirit of God, to enable them to conquer all their
corrupt affections, and to be in them an effectual principle of a
heavenly and divine life? In fine, what stronger and more powerful
motives could possibly have been contrived to persuade men to live
virtuously, and to deter them from vice, than the clear discovery made
to us in the gospel of God's having appointed a day, wherein he will
judge the world in righteousness, every man according to his works, and
that they who have done well shall be adjudged to everlasting
happiness, and they that have done evil to endless punishment; of which
the light of nature afforded men but obscure glimpses? And may we not
here, upon the whole, appeal now even to our adversaries themselves,
whether, in all and every one of these doctrines, there be not a more
powerful, a more effectual method laid down, for the reforming human
nature, and obliging the whole world to forsake their sins, and to lead
holy and virtuous lives, than was ever taught before; nay, or than was
possible to have been contrived by all the wit of mankind? This is the
great and highest recommendation of the Christian doctrine; this is
what to a well disposed mind would well nigh satisfactorily prove, even
without the addition of any external testimony, that the revelation of
Christianity could not possibly but come from God, seeing that not only
all its practical precepts, but even all its articles of belief also,
tend plainly to this one and the same end, to make men universally
amend and reform their lives, to recover and restore them to their
original excellent state, from the corruption and misery which had been
introduced by sin, and to establish upon earth the practice of
everlasting righteousness, and entire and hearty obedience to the will
of God; which would have been the religion of men (had they continued
innocent) in paradise, and now is the religion of angels, and for ever
will be the religion of saints in heaven. Vain men may value themselves
upon their speculative knowledge, right opinions, and true and orthodox
belief, separate from the practice of virtue and righteousness; but as
sure as the gospel is true, no belief whatsoever shall finally be of
any advantage to men, any otherwise than only so far as it corrects
their practice, hinders them from being workers of iniquity, and makes
them likeLuke, xiii. 7. unto God.
Lastly, And all of them together make up the most consistent and
rational scheme of belief in the world. all the doctrines of the
Christian faith do together make up an infinitely more consistent and
rational scheme of belief than any that the wisest of the ancient
philosophers ever did, or the cunningest of modern unbelievers can
invent or contrive. This is evident from a summary view of the
fore-mentioned scheme of the Christian doctrines, wherein every article
has a just dependence on the foregoing ones, and a close connexion with
those that follow; and the whole account of the order and disposition
of things, from the original to the consummation of all things, is one
entire, regular, complete, consistent, and every way a most rational
scheme: Whereas the wisest of the ancient philosophers, that is, those
of them who hit upon the greatest number of single truths, and taught
the fewest absurdities, were yet never able to make out any universal,
entire, and coherent system of doctrines, [357] and scheme of the whole
state of things, with any manner of probability: And the cunningest of
modern deists, (besides that they must needs, in their own way, believe
some particular things stranger, and in themselves more incredible,
than any of the fore-mentioned Christian doctrines,) cannot, in the
whole, as has been before shown, frame to themselves any fixed and
settled principles upon which to argue consistently; but must
unavoidably either be perplexed with inextricable absurdities, or
confessedly recur to downright atheism. There have indeed, even among
Christians themselves, been many differences and disputes about
particular doctrines: (But, excepting such as have intolerably
corrupted the very fundamental doctrines, and even the main design
itself of the whole Christian dispensation; of which there are too many
instances in writers of the Romish church especially;) these disputes
among Christians have not been, like those among the philosophers, de
rerum summa, concerning the whole scheme and system of things, but only
concerning particular explications of particular doctrines; which kind
of disputes do not at all affect the certainty of the whole religion
itself, [358] nor ought in reason to be any manner of hindrance to the
effect which the plain and weighter, and confessedly more important
fundamental doctrines ought to have upon the hearts and lives of men.
__________________________________________________________________
[333] Theos ek Theou, in contradistinction to Autotheos.
[334] It is not to be denied but that the schoolmen, who abounded in
wit and leisure, though very few among them had either exact skill in
the Holy Scriptures, or in ecclesiastical antiquity, and the writings
of the ancient fathers of the Christian Church; I say, it cannot be
denied but that these speculative and very acute men, who wrought a
great part of their divinity out of their own brains, as spiders do
cobwebs out of their own bowels, have started a thousand subtilties
about this mystery, such as no Christian is bound to trouble his head
withal, much less is it necessary for him to understand those niceties
which we may reasonably presume that they who talk of them did
themselves never thoroughly understand; and, least of all, is it
necessary to believe them.--Archbishop Tillotson. Sermon concerning the
Unity of the Divine Nature. It were to be wished, that some
religionists did not here symbolize too much with the atheists, in
affecting to represent the mystery of the Christian trinity as a thing
directly contradictory to all human reason and
understanding.--Cudworth's System, page 560.
[335] To palaion pant' en alphiton kai aleuron plere, kathaper kai n8un
koneos; kai krenai d' errheon, hai men hudatos galaktos d' allai; kai
omoios hai men melitos, hai d' oiou, tines d' elaiou; upo plesmones, d'
hoi anthropoi kai truphes, eis hubrin exep9eson. Zeus de misesas ten
katastasin, hephanise panta, kai dia ponou ton bionapedeixe.--Calanus
Indus apud Strabon. lib. 15.
[336] Epei de he tou theou men moira exetelos egigne o en autois, pollo
to thneto kai pollakis anakerannumene, to de anthropinon hethos
epekratei, tote Theos ho Theon Zeus, ate dunamenos kathoran ta toiauta,
ennnoesas genos epieikes athlios diatithemenon, diken autois epitheinai
bouletheis, &c.--Plato in Critia sive Atlantico.
[337] Lib. 1. c. 16, and lib. 3. c. 16, where see the citations at
large.
[338] Deukalioni phasi peristeran ek tes larnakos aphiemenen deloma
genesthai, cheimonos men eiso palin enduomenen, eudias du
apoptasan.--Plutarch: utrum Terrestria an Aquatica animantia plus
habeant Solertiæ.
[339] Oi de [Mosen] diadexamenoi, chronous men tinas en tois autois
diemenon dikaiopragount9es, kai theosebeis hos alethos ontes; Hepeit',
&c.--Lib. 16.
[340] See Stillingfleet's Origin. Sacræ, lib. 3. cap. 5. and Bocharti
Phaleg. et Vossius de Idololatria.
[341] Ho gar Zeus ex eautou ton Asklepion; egennesen eis de ten gen dia
tes heliou gonimou zoes enephenen; outos epi ges ex ouranou poiesamenos
proodon, enoeidos men peri ten Epidauron ephane.--Julian.
[342] Percrebuerat Oriente toto vetus et constans opinio esse in fatis,
ut Judæa profectirerum potirentur.--Sueton.
[343] Pluribus persuasio inerat, antiquis sacerdotum libris contineri,
eo ipso tempore fore, ut valesceret Oriens, profectique Judæa rerum
potirentur.--Tacit. lib. 21.
[344] See the place cited by Grotius, de Veritate Christian
Religionis.--Lib.3. c. 14.
[345] Cum audisset [Augustus,] inter pueros quos in Syria Herodes rex
Judæorum intra bimatum jussit interfici, filium quoque ejus occisum;
ait, melius est Herodis porcum esse quam filium.--Macrob. lib. 2. cap.
4. [A testimony so very remarkable and pertinent, that it is strange
how Grotius could omit to mention it in the place now cited.]
[346] See the places cited by Grotius, de Veritate Christ. Rel. lib. 2.
cap. 5.
[347] Tiberio imperitante, per procuratorem Pontium Pilatum, supplicio
affectus erat.--Lib. 15.
[348] Eum mundi casum relatum in arcanis vestris habetis.--Tertullian.
Apol.
[349] Delon hos ouden adunaton kai hemas meta to teleutesai, palin
periodon tinon eilumenon chronou, eis ho nun esmen apokatastesesthai
schema.--Chrysippus, citat. a Lactant. lib. 7.
[350] Gegraptai de auton palin anastesesthai, meth' on o Kurios
anistesi.--Job42. ult.
[351] De Veritate Rel. Chr.--Lib. 2. c. 10.
[352] Hemeis men oun hou phamenoto diaphtharen soma epanerchesthai eis
ten ex arches phusin, hos oude ton diaphtharenta kokkon tou sitou;
legomen gar, hoster epi tou kokkou tou sitou egeiretai stachus ohuto
logos tis enkeitai to somati. aph' ou me phtheiromenou egeiretai to
soma en aphtharsia.--Origen. advers. Cels. lib. 5.
[353] Rev. xiv. 10. shall be tormented with fire and brimstone, in the
presence of the Holy Angels, and in the presence of the Lamb.
[354] Hoi de an doxosin aniatos echein dia ta megethe ton hamartematon,
toutous he prosekousa moira rhiptei eis ton Tartaron, hothen oupote
ekbainousi.--Plato in Phd. Hosper su kolaseis aionious nomizeis, houto
kai hoi ton hiexon ekeinon exegetai teletai te kai mustagogoi.--Cels.
apud Origen. lib. 8. Hoi de adikoi pampan aionios kakois
sunezontai.--Id. ibid.
[355] Ta tes pisteos hemon, tais koinais ennoiais archethen
sunagoreuonta.--Origen. advers. Cels. lib. 3.
[356] Archbishop Sharp's Sermon before the Queen on Christmas day,
1704.
[357] Diversi ac diverse omnia protulerunt non annectentes nec causas
rerum, nec consequentias, nec rationes; ut summam illam, quæ continet
universa, et compingerent et complerent.--Lactant. lib. 7.
[358] Sed perturbat nos opinionum varietas, hominumque dissensio. Et
qua non idem contingit in sensibus, hos natura certos, putamus; illa,
quæ aliis sic, aliis secus, nec iisdem semper uno modo videntur, ficta
esse dicimus. Quod est longe aliter.--Cic. de Legib. lib. 1.
__________________________________________________________________
Proposition XIV.
XIV. Proposition XIV. Fifthly, As this revelation, to the judgment of
right and sober reason, appears of itself highly credible and probable,
and abundantly recommends itself in its native simplicity, merely by
its own intrinsic goodness and excellency, to the practice of the most
rational and considering men, who are desirous in all their actions to
have satisfaction and comfort and good hope within themselves, from the
conscience of what they do: So it is moreover positively and directly
proved to be actually and immediately sent to us from God, by the many
infallible signs and miracles which the author of it worked publicly as
the evidence of his divine commission, by the exact completion both of
the prophecies that went before concerning him, and of those that he
himself delivered concerning things that were to happen after; and by
the testimony of his followers, which in all its circumstances was the
most credible, certain, and convincing evidence, that was ever given to
any matter of fact in the world.
First, The Christian revelation is positively and directly proved to be
actually and immediately sent to us from God, by the many infallible
signs and miracles which the author of it worked publicly as the
evidence of his divine commission.
Of the life and character of our Saviour, as an evidence of the truth
of the Christian revelation. Besides the great excellency and
reasonableness of the doctrine considered in itself, of which I have
already treated, it is here of no small moment to observe, that the
author of it (separate from all external proof of his divine
commission) appeared in all his behaviour, words, and actions, to be
neither an impostor nor an enthusiast. [359] His life was innocent and
spotless, spent entirely in serving the ends of holiness and charity,
in doing good to the souls and bodies of men, in exhorting them to
repentance, and inviting them to serve and glorify God. When his
bitterest enemies accused him, in order to take away his life, they
could not charge him with any appearance of vice or immorality. And so
far was he from being guilty of what they did accuse him of, namely, of
vain-glory and attempting to move sedition, that once, when the
admiring people would by force have taken him and made him their king,
he chose even to work a miracle to avoid that, which was the only thing
that could be imagined to have been the design of an impostor. In like
manner, whoever seriously considers the answers he gave to all
questions whether moral or captious, his occasional discourses to his
disciples, and more especially the wisdom and excellency of his sermon
upon the mount, which is as it were the system and summary of his
doctrine, manifestly surpassing all the moral instructions of the most
celebrated philosophers that ever lived; cannot, without the extremest
malice and obstinacy in the world, charge him with enthusiasm.
Of the miracles of Christ as the evidence of his divine commission.
These considerations cannot but add great weight and authority to his
doctrine, and make his own testimony concerning himself exceedingly
credible. But the positive and direct proof of his divine commission
are the miracles which he worked for that purpose; his healing the
sick,--his giving sight to the blind,--his casting out devils,--his
raising the dead,--the wonders that attended his crucifixion,--his own
resurrection from the dead,--his appearance afterwards to his
disciples,--and his ascension visibly into heaven.
These, and the rest of his stupendous miracles, were, to the disciples
that saw them, sensible demonstrations of our Lord's divine commission:
And to those who have lived since that age, they are as certain
demonstrations of the same truth, as the testimony of those first
disciples, who were eye-witnesses of them, is certain and true.
To the disciples that saw them, these miracles were sensible and
complete demonstrations of our Lord's divine commission, because they
were so great, and so many, and so public, and so evident, that it was
absolutely impossible they should be the effect of any art of man, of
any chance, or fallacy; and the doctrine they were brought to confirm
was of so good and holy a tendency, that it was impossible he should be
enabled to work them by the power and assistance of evil spirits; so
that, consequently, they must of necessity have been performed, either
immediately or mediately by God himself.
Of miracles in general. But here, because there have been many
questions raised, and some perplexity introduced by the disputes and
different opinions of learned men, concerning the power of working
miracles, and concerning the extent of the evidence which miracles give
to the truth of any doctrine, and because it hath been much
controverted, whether true miracles can be worked by any less power
than the immediate power of God; and whether, to complete the evidence
of a miracle, the nature of the doctrine pretended to be proved thereby
is requisite to be taken into the consideration or no; it may not
perhaps be improper, upon this occasion, to endeavour to set this whole
matter in its true light, as briefly and clearly as I can.
1st, That in respect of the power of God, all things are alike easy.
then; In respect of the power of God, and in respect to the nature of
the things themselves, absolutely speaking, all things that are
possible at all, that is, which imply not a direct contradiction, are
equally and alike easy to be done. The power of God extends equally to
great things as to small, and to many as to few; and the one makes no
more difficulty at all, or resistance to his will, than the other.
That therefore miracles ought not to be defined by any absolute
difficulty in the nature of the things themselves to be done. It is not
therefore a right distinction to define or distinguish a miracle by any
absolute difficulty in the nature of the thing itself to be done; as if
the things we call natural were absolutely and in their own nature
easier to be effected, than those that we look upon as miraculous; on
the contrary, it is evident and undeniable, that it is at least as
great an act of power to cause the sun or a planet to move at all, as
to cause it to stand still at any time: Yet this latter we call a
miracle; the former not. And to restore the dead to life, which is an
instance of an extraordinary miracle, is in itself plainly altogether
as easy as to dispose matter at first into such order as to form a
human body in that which we commonly call a natural way. So that,
absolutely speaking, in this strict and philosophical sense, either
nothing is miraculous, namely, if we have respect to the power of God;
or, if we regard our own power and understanding, then almost every
thing, as well what we call natural, as what we call supernatural, is
in this sense really miraculous; and it is only usualness or
unusualness that makes the distinction.
2. What degrees of power God may have communicated to created beings is
not possible for us to determine. What degrees of power God may
reasonably be supposed to have communicated to created beings, to
subordinate intelligences, to good or evil angels, is by no means
possible for us to determine. Some things absolutely impossible for men
to effect, it is evident may easily be within the natural powers of
angels; and some things beyond the power of inferior angels may as
easily be supposed to be within the natural power of others that are
superior to them; and so on. So that, (unless we knew the limit of
communicable and incommunicable power) we can hardly affirm, with any
certainty, that any particular effect, how great or miraculous soever
it may seem to us, is beyond the power of all created beings in the
universe to have produced.
That therefore a miracle is not rightly defined to be such an effect as
could not have been produced by any less power than the divine
omnipotence. It is not therefore a right distinction to define a
miracle (as some very learned and very pious men have done,) to be such
an effect as could not have been produced by any less power than the
divine omnipotence. There is no instance of any miracle in scripture,
which, to an ordinary spectator, would necessarily imply the immediate
operation of original, absolute, and underived power: And consequently
such a spectator could never be certain that the miraculous effect was
beyond the power of all created beings in the universe to produce.
There is one supposition, indeed, upon which the opinion of all
miracles being necessarily the immediate effects of the divine
omnipotence, may be defended; and that is, if God, together with the
natural powers wherewith he hath indued all subordinate intelligent
beings, has likewise given a law, or restraint, whereby they be
hindered from ever interposing in this lower world, to produce any of
those effects which we call miraculous or supernatural: But then, how
certain soever it is, that all created beings are under some particular
laws and restraints, yet it can never be proved that they are under
such restraints universally, perpetually, and without exception: And,
without this, a spectator that sees a miracle can never be certain that
it was not done by some created intelligence. Reducing the natural
power of created beings to as low a degree as any one can desire to
suppose, will help nothing in this matter; for, supposing (which is
very unreasonable to suppose) that the natural powers of the highest
angels were no greater than the natural powers of men, yet, since
thereby an angel would be enabled to do all that invisibly, which a man
can do visibly, he would even in this supposition be naturally able to
do numberless things which we should esteem the greatest of miracles.
3. All things that are done in the world, are done either immediately
by God himself, or by created intelligent beings; matter being capable
of no laws or powers. And consequently there is, properly speaking, no
such thing as the course or power of nature. All things that are done
in the world are done either immediately by God himself, or by created
intelligent beings; matter being evidently not at all capable of any
laws or powers whatsoever, any more than it is capable of intelligence,
excepting only this one negative power, that every part of it will, of
itself, always and necessarily continue in that state, whether of rest
or motion, wherein it at present is; so that all those things which we
commonly say are the effects of the natural powers of matter and laws
of motion, of gravitation, attraction, or the like, are indeed (if we
will speak strictly and properly) the effects of God's acting upon
matter continually and every moment, either immediately by himself, or
mediately by some created intelligent beings: (Which observation, by
the way, furnishes us, as has been before noted, with an excellent
natural demonstration of Providence.) Consequently, there is no such
thing as what men commonly call the course of nature, or the power of
nature. The course of nature, truly and properly speaking, is nothing
else but the will of God producing certain effects in a continued,
regular, constant, and uniform manner; which course or manner of acting
being in every moment perfectly arbitrary, is as easy to be altered at
any time as to be preserved. And if (as seems most probable,) this
continual acting upon matter be performed by the subserviency of
created intelligences appointed to that purpose by the supreme Creator,
then it is as easy for any of them, and as much within their natural
power, (by the permission of God,) to alter the course of nature at any
time, or in any respect, as to preserve or continue it.
That therefore a miracle is not rightly defined to be that which is
against the course of nature or above the natural powers of created
agents. It is not therefore a right distinction to define a miracle to
be that which is against the course of nature, meaning, by the course
of nature, the power of nature or the natural powers of created agents;
for, in this sense, it is no more against the course of nature for an
angel to keep a man from sinking in the water, than for a man to hold a
stone from falling in the air by overpowering the law of gravitation;
and yet the one is a miracle, the other not so. In like manner, it is
no more above the natural power of a created intelligence to stop the
motion of the sun or of a planet, than to continue to carry it on in
its usual course; and yet the former is a miracle, the latter not so:
But, if by the course of nature, be meant only (as it truly signifies)
the constant and uniform manner of God's acting, either immediately or
mediately, in preserving and continuing the order of the world, then,
in that sense, indeed, a miracle may be rightly defined to be an effect
produced contrary to the usual course or order of nature, by the
unusual interposition of some intelligent being superior to men, as I
shall have occasion presently to observe more particularly.
The unreasonableness of those who deny the possibility of miracles in
general. And from this observation we may easily discover the vanity
and unreasonableness of that obstinate prejudice which modern deists
have universally taken up against the belief of miracles in general:
They see that things generally go on in a constant and regular method;
that the frame and order of the world is preserved by things being
disposed and managed in an uniform manner; that certain causes produce
certain effects in a continued succession according to certain fixed
laws or rules; and from hence they conclude, very weakly and
unphilosophically, that there are in matter certain necessary laws or
powers, the result of which is that which they call the course of
nature, which they think is impossible to be changed or altered, and
consequently, that there can be no such thing as miracles: Whereas, on
the contrary, if they would consider things duly, they could not but
see that dull and lifeless matter is utterly incapable of obeying any
laws, or of being indued with any powers; and that, therefore, that
order and disposition of things, which they vulgarly call the course of
nature, cannot possibly be any thing else but the arbitrary will and
pleasure of God exerting itself and acting upon matter continually,
either immediately by itself, or mediately by some subordinate
intelligent agents, according to certain rules of uniformity and
proportion, fixed indeed, and constant, but which yet are made such
merely by arbitrary constitution, not by any sort of necessity in the
things themselves, as has been abundantly proved in my former
discourse: And, consequently, it cannot be denied, but that it is
altogether as easy to alter the course of nature as to preserve it;
that is, that miracles, excepting only that they are more unusual, are
in themselves, and in the nature and reason of the thing, as credible
in all respects, and as easy to be believed, as any of those we call
natural effects.
4. Some effects prove the constant providence of God, and others prove
the occasional interposition either of God himself, or of some
intelligent being superior to man. Those effects which are produced in
the world regularly and constantly, which we call the works of nature,
prove to us, in general, the being, the power, and the other attributes
of God. Those effects, which upon any rare and extraordinary occasion,
are produced in such manner that it is manifest they could neither have
been done by any power or art of man, nor by what we call chance, that
is, by any composition or result of those laws which are God's constant
and uniform actings upon matter, these undeniably prove to us the
immediate and occasional interposition either of God himself, or at
least of some intelligent agent superior to men, at that particular
time, and on that particular account. For instance, the regular and
continued effects of the power of gravitation, and of the laws of
motion; of the mechanic, and of the animal powers; all these prove to
us, in general, the being, the power, the presence, and the constant
operation, either immediate or mediate, of God in the world. But if,
upon any particular occasion, we should see a stone suspended in the
air, or a man walking upon the water, without any visible support, a
chronical disease cured by a word speaking, or a dead and corrupted
body restored to life in a moment; we could not then doubt but there
was an extraordinary interposition either of God himself, in order to
signify his pleasure upon that particular occasion, or at least of some
intelligent agent far superior to man, in order to bring about some
particular design.
5. Whether such interposition be the immediate work of God, or of some
good or evil angels, can hardly be discovered merely by the work
itself. Whether such an extraordinary interposition of some power
superior to men be the immediate interposition of God himself, or of
some good angel, or of some evil angel, can hardly be distinguished
certainly, merely by the work or miracle itself; because it is
impossible for us to know, with any certainty, either that the natural
power of good angels, or of evil ones, extends not beyond such or such
a certain limit, or that God always restrains them from exercising
their natural powers in producing such or such particular effects.
That there is no reason to suppose all the wonders worked by evil
spirits to be mere delusions. It is not therefore a right distinction,
to suppose the wonders which the scripture attributes to evil spirits,
to be mere præstigiæ, sleights, or delusions. For if the devil has any
natural power of doing any thing at all, even but so much as the
meanest of men, and be not restrained by God from exercising that
natural power, it is evident he will be able, by reason of his
invisibility, to work true and real miracles. Neither is it a right
distinction to suppose the miracles of evil spirits not to be real
effects in the things where they appear, but impositions upon the
senses of the spectators; for, to impose in this manner upon the senses
of men, (not by sleights and delusions, but by really so affecting the
organs of sense as to make things appear what they are not;) is to all
intents and purposes a true a miracle, and as great an one, as making
real changes in the things themselves.
6. How we are to distinguish miracles worked by God, for the proof of
any doctrine, from the frauds of evil spirits. When therefore, upon any
particular occasion, for instance, when at the will of a person who
teaches some new doctrine as coming from God, and in testimony to the
truth of that doctrine, there is plainly and manifestly an
interposition of some superior power producing such miraculous effects
as have been before mentioned; the only possible ways by which a
spectator may certainly and infallibly distinguish whether those
miracles be indeed the works, either immediately of God himself, or
(which is the very same thing,) of some good angel employed by him,
and, consequently, the doctrine witnessed by the miracles be infallibly
true and divinely attested; or whether, on the contrary, the miracles
be the works of evil spirits, and consequently the doctrine a fraud and
imposition upon men: The only possible ways (I say) of distinguishing
this matter certainly and infallibly, are these:--If the doctrine
attested by miracles be in itself impious, or manifestly tending to
promote vice, then, without all question, the miracles, how great
soever they may appear to us, are neither worked by God himself, nor by
his commission; because our natural knowledge of the attributes of God,
and of the necessary difference between good and evil, is greatly of
more force to prove any such doctrine to be false than any miracles in
the world can be to prove it true: As, for example, suppose a man,
pretending to be a prophet, should work any miracle, or give any sign
or wonder whatsoever, in order to draw men from the worship of the true
God, and tempt them to idolatry, and to the practice of such vices as
in all heathen nations have usually attended the worship of false Gods,
nothing can be more infallibly certain, than that such miracles ought
at first sight to be rejected as diabolical. If the Deut. xiii. 1, &c.
doctrine attested by miracles be in itself indifferent, that is, such
as cannot by the light of nature and right reason alone, be certainly
known whether it be true or false; and, at the same time, in opposition
to it, and in proof of the direct contrary doctrine, there be worked
other miracles, more and greater than the former, or at least attended
with such circumstances as evidently show the power by which these
latter are worked to be superior to the power that worked the former;
then that doctrine which is attested by the superior power must
necessarily be believed to be divine: This was the case of Moses and
the Egyptian magicians. The magicians worked several miracles to prove
that Moses was an impostor, and not sent of God; Moses, to prove his
divine commission, worked miracles more and greater than theirs, or
else (which is the very same thing,) the power by which he worked his
miracles restrained the power by which they worked theirs, from being
able at that time to work all the same miracles that he did; and so
appeared evidently the superior power: Wherefore, it was necessarily to
be believed that Moses's commission was truly from God. If, in the last
place, the doctrine attested by miracles be such as, in its own nature
and consequences, tends to promote the honour and glory of God and the
practice of universal righteousness amongst men, and yet, nevertheless,
be not in itself demonstrable, nor could, without revelation, have been
discovered to be actually true, (or even if it was but only indifferent
in itself, and such as could not be proved to be any way contrary to or
inconsistent with these great ends,) and there be no pretence of more
or greater miracles on the opposite side to contradict it; (which is
the case of the doctrine and miracles of Christ;) then the miracles are
unquestionably divine, and the doctrine must, without all controversy,
be acknowledged as an immediate and infallible revelation from God:
Matt. xii. 25. Because, (besides that it cannot be supposed that evil
spirits would overthrow their own power and kingdom,) should God, in
such cases as these, permit evil spirits to work miracles to impose
upon men, the error would be absolutely invincible; and that would, in
all respects, be the very same thing as if God worked the miracles to
deceive men himself. No man can doubt but evil spirits, if they have
any natural powers at all, have power to destroy men's bodies and
lives, and to bring upon men innumerable other calamities; which yet,
in fact, it is evident God restrains them from doing, by having set
them laws and bounds which they cannot pass. Now, for the very same
reason, it is infinitely certain that God restrains them likewise from
imposing upon men's minds and understandings, in all such cases where
wise, and honest, and virtuous men would have no possible way left by
which they could discover the imposition.
The difference between those who teach that the immediate power of God
is, or is not, necessarily requisite to the working of a miracle, is
not very great at bottom. And here at last the difference between those
who believe that all miracles necessarily require the immediate power
of God himself to effect them, and those who believe created spirits
able to work miracles, is not very great. They who believe all miracles
to be effected only by the immediate power of God, must do it upon this
ground, that they suppose God, by a perpetual law, restrains all
subordinate intelligent agents from interposing at any time to alter
the regular course of things in this lower world; (for, to say that
created spirits have not otherwise a natural power, when unrestrained,
to do what we call miracles, is saying that those invisible agents have
no power naturally to do any thing at all.) And they who believe that
subordinate beings have power to work miracles must yet of necessity
suppose that God restrains them in all such cases at least where there
would not be sufficient marks left, by which the frauds of evil spirits
could be clearly distinguished from the testimony and commission of
God.
And now, from these few clear and undeniablo propositions, it evidently
follows;--
1st. The true definition of a miracle: That the true definition of a
miracle, in the theological sense of the word, is this--that it is a
work effected in a manner unusual or different from the common and
regular method of providence, by the interposition either of God
himself, or of some intelligent agent superior to man, for the proof or
evidence of some particular doctrine, or in attestation to the
authority of some particular person. And if a miracle so worked be not
opposed by some plainly superior power; nor be brought to attest a
doctrine either contradictory in itself, or vicious in its
consequences, (a doctrine of which kind no miracles in the world can be
sufficient to prove;) then the doctrine so attested must necessarily be
looked upon as divine, and the worker of the miracle entertained as
having infallibly a commission from God.
2. The strength of the evidence of our Saviour's miracles. From hence
it appears, that the complete demonstration of our Saviour's being a
teacher sent from God, was, to the disciples who saw his miracles,
plainly this: That the doctrine he taught, being in itself possible,
and in its consequences tending to promote the honour of God and true
righteousness among men; and the miracles he worked being such that
there neither was nor could be any pretence of more or greater miracles
to be set up in opposition to them,--it was as infallibly certain that
he had truly a divine commission as it was certain that God would not
himself impose upon men a necessary and invincible error.
3. Concerning the objection, that we prove in a circle the miracles by
the doctrine, and the doctrine by the miracles. From hence it appears,
how little reason there is to object, as some have done, that we prove
in a circle the doctrine by the miracles, and the miracles by the
doctrine. For the miracles, in this way of reasoning, are not at all
proved by the doctrine; but only the possibility and the good tendency,
or at least the indifferency of the doctrine, is a necessary condition
or circumstance, without which the doctrine is not capable of being
proved by any miracles. It is indeed the miracles only that prove the
doctrine, and not the doctrine that proves the miracles; but then, in
order to this end, that the miracles may prove the doctrine, it is
always necessarily to be first supposed that the doctrine be such as is
in its nature capable of being proved by miracles. The doctrine must be
in itself possible and capable to be proved, and then miracles will
prove it to be actually and certainly true. The doctrine is not first
known, or supposed to be true, and then the miracles proved by it; but
the doctrine must be first known to be such as is possible to be true,
and then miracles will prove that it actually is so. Some doctrines
are, in their own nature, necessarily and demonstrably true, such as
are all those which concern the obligation of plain moral precepts; and
these neither need nor can receive any stronger proof from miracles
than what they have already (though not perhaps so clearly indeed to
all capacities,) from the evidence of right reason. Other doctrines are
in their own nature necessarily false and impossible to be true; such
as are all absurdities and contradictions, and all doctrines that tend
to promote vice; and these can never receive any degree of proof from
all the miracles in the world. Lastly, other doctrines are in their own
nature indifferent, or possible, or perhaps probable to be true; and
these could not have been known to be positively true, but by the
evidence of miracles, which prove them to be certain. To apply this to
the doctrine and miracles of Christ. The moral part of our Saviour's
doctrine would have appeared infallibly true, whether he had ever
worked any miracles or no. The rest of his doctrine was what evidently
tended to promote the honour of God, and the practice of righteousness
amongst men: Therefore that part also of his doctrine was possible and
very probable to be true; but yet it could not from thence be known to
be certainly true, nor ought to have been received as a revelation from
God, unless it had been proved by undeniable miracles. And the miracles
he worked did indeed undeniably prove it to be the doctrine of God.
Nevertheless, had his doctrine in any part of it been either absurd and
contradictory in itself, or vicious in its tendency and consequences,
no miracles could then possibly have proved it to have been true. It is
evident therefore that the nature of the doctrine to be proved must be
taken into the consideration, as a necessary circumstance; and yet that
only the miracles are properly the proof of the doctrine, and not the
doctrine of the miracles.
4. Of the pretended miracles of Apollonius and others. From hence it
follows, that the pretended miracles of Apollonius Tyaneus, Aristeas
Proconnesius, and some few others among the heathens, even supposing
them to have been true miracles, (which yet there is no reason at all
to believe, because they are very poorly attested, and are in
themselves very mean and trifling, as has been fully shown by Eusebius
in his book against Hierocles, and by many late writers; but supposing
them, I say, to have been true miracles,) yet they will prove nothing
at all to the disadvantage of Christianity: Because they were worked
either without any pretence of confirming any new doctrine at all; or
else to prove absurd and foolish things; or to establish idolatry and
the worship of false Gods; and consequently they could not be done by
the divine power and authority, nor bear any kind of comparison with
the miracles of Christ, [360] which were worked to attest a doctrine
that tended in the highest degree to promote the honour of God and the
general reformation of mankind.
To return therefore to the argument. The miracles (I say) which our
Saviour worked were, to the disciples that saw them, sensible
demonstration of his divine commission. And to those who have lived
since that age they are as certain demonstrations of the same truth as
the testimony of those first disciples, who were eye-witnesses of them,
is certain and true: Which I shall have occasion to consider presently.
Secondly. Of the fulfilling the prophecies, as an evidence of our
Saviour's divine commission. The proof of the divine authority of the
Christian revelation is confirmed and ascertained, by the exact
completion both of all those prophecies that went before concerning our
Lord, and of those that he himself delivered concerning things that
were to happen after.
Of the prophecies that went before, concerning the Messiah. Concerning
the Messiah it was foretold, (Gen. xlix.10.) that he should come,
before the sceptre departed from Judah: And accordingly Christ appeared
a little before the time when the Jewish government was totally
destroyed by the Romans. It was foretold that he should come before the
destruction of the second temple, (Hagg. ii. 7.) The desire of all
nations shall come, and I will fill this house with glory, saith the
Lord of hosts; the glory of this latter house shall be greater than of
the former: And accordingly Christ appeared some time before the
destruction of the city and temple. It was foretold that he should come
at the end of 490 years, after the restoring of Jerusalem which had
been laid waste during the captivity, (Dan. ix. 24.) and that he should
be cut off; and that, after that, the city and sanctuary should be
destroyed and made desolate: And accordingly, at what time soever the
beginning of the four hundred and ninety years can, according to any
interpretation of the words, be fixed, the end of them will fall about
the time of Christ's appearing, and it is well known how entirely the
city and sanctuary were destroyed some years after his being cut off.
It was foretold that he should do many great and beneficial miracles;
that the eyes of the blind (Isa. xxxv. 5.) should be opened, and the
ears of the deaf unstopped; that the lame man should leap as an hart,
and the tongue of the dumb sing;--and this was literally fulfilled in
the miracles of Christ,--the blind received their sight, and the lame
walked, the deaf heard, &c. (Matt. xi. 5.) It was foretold that he
should die a violent death, (Isai.liii. throughout,) and that not for
himself, (Dan. ix. 26.) but for our transgressions, (Isai. liii. 5, 6,
and 12.) for the iniquity of us all, and that he might bear the sin of
many;--all which was exactly accomplished in the sufferings of Christ.
It was foretold, (Gen. xlix. 10.) that to him should the gathering of
the people be, and (Psal. ii. 8.) that God would give him the heathen
for his inheritance, and the utmost parts of the earth for his
possession;--which was punctually fulfilled by the wonderful success of
the gospel, and its universal spreading through the world. Lastly, many
minuter circumstances were foretold of the Messiah,--that he should be
of the tribe of Judah, and of the seed of David, that he should be born
in the town of Bethlehem, (Mic. v. 2.) that he should ride upon an ass
in humble triumph into the city of Jerusalem, (Zech. ix. 9.) that he
should be sold for thirty pieces of silver, (Zech. xi. 12.) that he
should be scourged, buffeted, and spit upon, (Is. l. 6.) that his hands
and feet should be pierced, (Psal. xxii. 16.) that he should be
numbered among malefactors, (Is. liii. 12.) that he should have gall
and vinegar offered him to drink, (Psal. lxix. 21.) that they who saw
him crucified, should mock at him, and at his trusting in God to
deliver him, (Psal. xxii. 8.) that the soldiers should cast lots for
his garments, (Psal. xxii. 18.) that he should make his grave with the
rich, (Is. liii. 9.) and that he should rise again without seeing
corruption, (Psal. xvi. 10.) All which circumstances were fulfilled to
the greatest possible exactness, in the person of Christ: Not to
mention the numberless typical representations which had likewise
evidently their complete accomplishment in him. And it is no less
evident, that none of these prophecies can possibly be applied to any
other person that ever pretended to be the Messiah.
Of the prophecies that Christ himself delivered concerning things that
were to happen after. Further, the prophecies or predictions which
Christ delivered himself, concerning things that were to happen after,
are no less strong proofs of the truth and divine authority of his
doctrine, than the prophecies were which went before concerning him. He
did very particularly, and at several times, foretel his own death, and
the circumstances of it, (Matt.xvi. 21.) that the chief priests and
scribes should condemn him to death and deliver him to the Gentiles,
that is to Pilate and the Roman soldiers, to mock, and scourge, and
crucify him, (Matt. xx. 18 and 19.) that he should be betrayed into
their hands, (Matt. xx. 18.) that Judas Iscariot was the person who
would betray him, (Matt. xxvi. 23.) that all his disciples would
forsake him and flee, (Matt. xxvi. 31.) that Peter particularly would
thrice deny him in one night; (Mar. xiv. 30.) he foretold further, that
he would rise again the third day, (Matt. xvi. 21.) that, after his
ascension, he would send down the Holy Ghost upon hi sapostles, (John
xv. 26.) which should enable them to work many miracles: (Mar. xvi.
17.) he foretold also the destruction of Jerusalem, with such very
particular circumstances, in the whole 24th chapter of St Matthew, and
the 13th of St Mark and 21st of St Luke, that no man who reads
Josephus's history of that dreadful and unparalleled calamity, [361]
can without the greatest obstinacy imaginable, doubt of our Saviour's
divine fore-knowledge. Lastly, he foretold likewise many particulars
concerning the future success of the gospel, and what should happen to
several of his disciples; he foretold what opposition and persecution
they should meet withal in their preaching; (Matt. x. 17.) he foretold
what particular kind of death St Peter should die; (Job xxi. 18.) and
hinted, that St John should live till after the destruction of
Jerusalem; (Job, xxi. 22.) and foretold, that, notwithstanding all
opposition and persecutions, the gospel should yet have such success as
to spread itself over the world; (Matt. xvi. 18. xxiv. 14. xxviii. 19.)
all and every one of which particulars were exactly accomplished,
without failing in any respects.
Some of these things are of permanent and visible effects, even unto
this day; particularly the captivity and dispersion of the Jews through
all nations, for more than 1600 years; and yet their continuing a
distinct people, in order to the fulfilling the prophecies of things
still future: This (I say) is particularly a permanent proof of the
truth of the ancient prophecies: But the greatest part of the instances
above mentioned were sensible and ocular demonstrations of the truth of
our Lord's doctrine only to those persons who lived at the time when
they happened: The credibility of whose testimony, therefore, shall be
considered presently in its proper place.
Objections answered. But before I proceed to this, it may not be
improper in this place to take notice of some objections which have of
late been revived and urged against this whole notion, both of the
prophecies themselves, and of the application of them to Christ. The
sum and strength of which objections is briefly this.
That all the promises supposed to be made to the Jews before Christ's
time, of a Messiah, or deliverer, were understood and meant of some
"temporal deliverer" only, who should restore to the Israelites a mere
worldly kingdom, "without the least imagination of a spiritual
deliverance," or of any such Saviour as is preached in the New
Testament.
That, consequently, "all the prophecies" in the Old Testament, applied
to Christ by the apostles in the New, are applied to him in a sense
merely "typical, mystical, allegorical, or enigmatical;" in a sense
"different from the obvious and literal sense," by "new interpretations
put upon them not agreeable to the obvious and literal meaning of those
books" from whence they are cited: That is to say, that the prophecies
were all of them intended concerning other persons, and other persons
only; and, therefore, are falsely and groundlessly applied either to
Christ in particular, or in general to the expectation of any such
Messiah as should introduce a spiritual and eternal kingdom.
That there are several passages, cited by the apostles out of the Old
Testament, which are either not found there at all, or else are very
different in the text itself from the citations alleged; and
consequently, are, by the apostles, either misunderstood or misapplied.
That even miracles themselves "can never render a foundation valid,
which is in itself invalid;--can never make a false inference
true;--can never make a prophecy fulfilled, which is not
fulfilled;"--can never make those things to be spoken concerning
Christ, which were not spoken concerning Christ: And, consequently,
that the miracles said to have been worked by Christ could not possibly
have been really worked by him; but must, of necessity, together with
the whole system, both of the Old and New Testament, have been wholly
the effect of imagination and enthusiasm, if not of imposture.
Now, in order to enable every careful and sincere reader to find a
satisfactory answer to these, and all other objections of the like
nature, I would lay before him the following considerations.
1. I suppose it to have been already proved in the foregoing part of
this discourse, that there is a God, and that the nature and
circumstances of men, and the necessary perfections of God, do
demonstrate the obligations and the motives of natural religion; that
is, that God is a moral as well as natural governor of the world.
Whoever denies either of these assertions is obliged to invalidate the
arguments alleged for proof of them in the former part of this book,
before he has any right to intermix atheistical arguments and
objections in the present question: It being evidently ridiculous in
all who believe not that God is, and that he is a moral judge as well
as natural governor, to argue at all about a revelation concerning
religion, or to make any inquiry whether it be from God or no.
2. As God has in fact made known even demonstrable truths, [362]
natural and moral truths, not to all men equally, but in different
degrees and proportions to such as have a disposition and desire to
inquire after them; so it is agreeable to reason and to the analogy of
God's proceedings, to believe that he may possibly, by revelation and
tradition, have given some further degrees of light to such as are
sincerely desirous to know and obey him; so that they who will do his
will may know of the doctrine whether it be of God: As our natural
knowledge of moral and religious truths in fact is, so revelation
possibly may further be, as it were a light shining in a dark place.
3. It appears in history, that the great truths and obligations of
natural religion have, from the beginning, been confirmed by a
perpetual tradition in particular families, who, though in the midst of
idolatrous nations, yet stedfastly adhered to the worship of the God of
nature, the one God of the universe. And by the nation of the Jews
(notwithstanding all their corruptions in practice, yet in the system
and constitution of their religion) has the same tradition been
continually preserved: Whereby they have been as it were a city upon a
hill, a standng testimony against an idolatrous world.
4. Among the writings of all, even the most ancient and learned
nations, there are none but the books of the Jews, which (agreeably to
the above demonstrated truths concerning the God of nature, and the
foundations of natural religion,) have, exclusive of chance and of
necessity, ascribed either the original of the universe in general (an
universe full of infinite variety and choice,) to the will and
operation of an intelligent and free cause, or given any tolerable
account, in particular, of the formation of this our earth into its
present habitable state.
5. But in these books there is not only (in order to prevent idolatry)
a full account (agreeable to the principles of natural reason,) how the
heavens, and the earth, and all things therein contained, are the
creatures of God, but, moreover, an uniform series of history from the
infancy of mankind, consistent with itself, and with the state of the
Jewish and Christian church at this day, and with the possibilities of
the predicted series for the future, for several thousands of years.
Which consistency with the possibilities of such predicted future
events could not be by chance (as I shall show presently,) but is
itself a great and standing miracle.
6. In these books, agreeably to the hopes and expectations naturally
founded on the divine perfections, God did from the beginning make, and
has all along continued to his church or true worshippers, a promise
that truth and virtue shall finally prevail; should prevail over the
spirit of error and wickedness, of delusion and disobedience: That the
seed of the woman should bruise the serpent's head: (Gen. iii. 15.)
That among her posterity should arise a deliverance from the delusion
and power of sin, by which Satan should be bruised under their feet:
(Rom. xvi. 20.) That, in particular, from the seed of Abraham, and from
the family of Isaac, and from the posterity of Jacob, and from the
house of David, should arise the accomplishment of all God's promises
to his church, and all the blessings included in God's covenant with
his true worshippers. That at length the earth should be full of the
knowledge of the Lord, as the waters cover the sea, (Is. xi. 9.) that
the kingdoms of this world should become the kingdoms of the Lord:
(Rev. xi. 15. Dan. vii. 27.) That in the last days, unto the mountain
of the Lord's house, the seat of his true worship, should all nations
flow; (Is. ii. 2.) That God would create new heavens and a new earth;
(Is. lxv. 17.) wherein dwelleth righteousness; (2 Pet. iii. 13.)
wherein the people should be all righteous, and inherit the land for
ever: (Is. lx. 21. lxv. 25. xi. 9. 1. 26.) Should be all holy; (Is. iv.
8.) even every one that is written among the living. [363] That God
would set up a kingdom, which should never be destroyed, but stand for
ever; (Dan. ii. 44.) and that the saints of the Most High should take
the kingdom, and possess the kingdom for ever, even for ever and ever,
(Dan. vii. 18, 22, 27. Is. chap. lx.)
7. All the great promises, therefore, which God has ever made to his
church, to his people, to the families or nations of his true
worshippers, are evidently to be all along so understood as that wicked
and unworthy persons, of whatever family, or nation, or profession of
religion they be, shall be excluded from the benefit of those promises,
shall be cut off from God's people; and worthy persons of all nations,
from the east, and from the west, and from the north, and from the
south, shall be accepted in their stead. That is to say; in like manner
as the promise was made originally, not to all the children of Abraham,
but to Isaac only, and not to both the sons of Isaac, but to Jacob
only; and among the posterity of Jacob, all were not Israel which were
of Israel, but in Elijah's days, seven thousand only were the true
Israel; and in the time of Isaiah, though the number of the children of
Israel was as the sand of the sea, (Is. x. 22.) yet a remnant only was
to be saved, (Rom. ix. 27.); and in Hosea God says, I will call them my
people which were not my people, and her beloved which was not beloved,
(Hos. ii. 23. Rom. ix. 25.) So it is all along evidently to be
understood, that the children of the promise, in the literal sense,
according to the flesh, the visible church, or professed worshippers of
the true God, are but the type or representative of the real invisible
church of God, the (Rom. ii. 28. iii. 7 and 9. iv. 12.) true children
of Abraham, in the spiritual and religious sense, the saints of the
Most High, who shall possess the kingdom for ever, even for ever and
ever, (Dan. vii. 18.) even every one that is written among the living.
(Is. iv. 3.)
8. It being evident that God cannot be the God of the dead, but of the
living; and that all promises made to such worshippers of the true God
as at any time forsook all that they had, and even life itself, for the
sake of that worship, could be nothing but mere mockery if there was no
life to come and God had no power to restore them from the dead: This
(I say) being self-evident, it follows necessarily, that when the time
comes that the promised kingdom shall take place, the dead must be
raised, and the saints, which have died in the intermediate time, must
live again, and stand in their lot at the end of the days, (Dan. xii.
13.) When God styles himself the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob;
(Exod. iii. 6, 16.) and said to Abraham, I am thy exceeding great
reward, (Gen. xv. 1.) and I will--be a God unto thee, and to thy seed
after thee, (Gen. xvii. 7.) and I will give the land unto thee, and to
thy seed after thee, (Gen. xvii. 8, 13, 15, 17.) and repeated the very
same promises to Isaac, (Gen. xxvi. 3.) and to Jacob personally, (Gen.
xxviii. 13.) as well as to their posterity after them; (Deut. i. 8.)
and yet gave Abraham none inheritance in the land, though he promised
that he would give it to him and to his seed after him, (Acts vii. 5.)
but Abraham himself sojourned only in the land of promise as in a
strange country, dwelling in tabernacles with Isaac and Jacob, the
heirs with him of the same promise, (Heb. xi. 9.) who all confessed
that they were strangers and pilgrims on the earth, (Heb. xi. 13.) and
Jacob particularly complained that the days of the years of his
pilgrimage had been few and evil; (Gen. xlvii. 9.) and, in blessing
Isaac and Ishmael, God promised to make Ishmael fruitful, and to
multiply him exceedingly, (Gen. xvii. 20. xxi. 18.) so that he should
beget twelve princes, and God would make him a great nation, and
multiply his seed exceedingly, that it should not be numbered for
multitude; (Gen. xvi. 10.) and yet in the very same sentence expressly,
by way of opposition, and of high and eminent distinction, declares
that, notwithstanding all this, yet his covenant, his everlasting
covenant, he would establish with Isaac: (Gen. xvii. 19, 21.) When all
this (I say) is considered, the inference of the apostle to the Hebrews
cannot but appear unanswerably just, that these patriarchs looked for a
city somewhat more than temporal, even a city which hath foundations,
whose builder and maker is God; (Heb. xi. 10.) and that they who said
such things declared plainly that they sought a country, a better
country, that is, an heavenly; (Heb. xi. 14, 16.) and that for this
reason God was not ashamed to be called their God, because he had
prepared for them a city. And if this inference was necessarily true
concerning the patriarchs, who confessed that they were strangers and
pilgrims on the earth; (Heb. xi. 13.) much more concerning those who
were tortured, not accepting deliverance, (Heb. xi. 35.) must it needs
be true that the only possible reason of this their choice was that
they might obtain a better resurrection.
Other notices in the Old Testament, that the worshippers of the true
God, in every age of the world, should at the end have their lot in the
kingdom promised to the saints of the Most High, are, the translation
of Enoch, (Gen. v. 24.) that he should not see death; (Heb. xi. 5.
Wisd. iv. 10. Eccles. xliv. 16. xlix. 14.) and the taking up of Elijah
into Heaven, (2 Kings ii. 11, Eccles. xlviii. 9. 1 Macc. ii. 58.)
Allusions to it at least, if perhaps not direct assertions, are the
words of Job, (Job xix. 25.) I know that my Redeemer liveth, and that
he shall stand at the latter day upon the earth: And though after my
skin, worms destroy this body, yet in my flesh shall I see God. [364]
And those of Isaiah: Thy dead men shall live; together with my dead
body shall they arise. A wake and sing, ye that dwell in dust; for thy
dew is as the dew of herbs, and the earth shall cast out the dead. (Is.
xxvi. 19.) And your bones shall flourish like an herb. (Is. lxvi. 14.)
And that passage in Hosea: I will ransom them from the power of the
grave; I will redeem them from death. (Hos. xiii. 14.) O death, I will
be thy plagues; O grave, I will be thy destruction. And that in
Ezekiel: Behold,--the bones came together, bone to his bone; and-- the
sinews and the flesh came up upon them, and the skin covered them
above;-- and the breath came into them, and they lived, and stood up
upon their feet;----Behold, O my people, I will open your graves, and
cause you to come up out of your graves, and bring you into the land of
Israel. (Ezek.xxxvii. 7, 8, 10, 12.) Again: The words of Isaiah; The
righteous perisheth, and-- is taken away from the evil to come; He
shall enter into peace: (Is. lvii. 1, 2.) What more natural
signification have they than that which the Book of Wisdom expresses,
ch. iii. 1, 3. The souls of the righteous are in the hand of God;--They
are in peace. And what but the future state can the conclusion of
Isaiah's prophecy reasonably be referred to? Behold, I create new
heavens and a new earth;--As the new heavens and the new earth which I
will make shall remain before me, saith the Lord, so shall your seed
and your name remain. And-- all flesh shall come to worship before me,
saith the Lord. And they shall go forth and look upon the carcases of
the men that have transgressed against me: For their worm shall not
die; neither shall their fire be quenched, and they shall be an
abhorring unto all flesh, (Is. lxv. 17. lxvi. 22, 23, 24.) In like
manner; Whom does God speak of by Ezekiel, when he says, the sons of
(Ezek. xliv. 15, 16.) Zadock, that kept the charge of my sanctuary,
when the children of Israel went astray from me; [365] [which went not
astray when the children of Israel went astray, (Ezek. xlviii.
11.)]--they shall enter into my sanctuary. And to what do the following
words of the same prophet most naturally refer? [366] Every thing shall
live whither the river cometh:--And by the river, upon the bank
thereof, on this side and on that side, shall grow all trees for meat,
whose leaf shall not fade; neither shall the fruit thereof be consumed:
It shall bring forth new fruit according to his months, because their
waters they issued out of the sanctuary; and the fruit thereof shall be
for meat, and the leaf thereof for medicine. Still more strong is that
allusion in Daniel; I beheld till the thrones were cast down, [till the
thrones were placed,] and the ancient of days did sit:--A fiery stream
issued and came forth from before him; thousand thousands ministered
unto him, and ten thousand times ten thousand stood before him: The
judgment was set, and the books were opened. (Dan.vii. 9. 10.) But the
following words of the same prophet are direct and express. Many of
them that sleep in the dust of the earth shall awake, some to
everlasting life, [every one that shall be found written in the book,]
and some to shame and everlasting contempt. And they that be wise shall
shine as the brightness of the firmament; and they that turn many to
righteousness, as the stars for ever and ever.--But go thou thy way,
till the end be; for thou shalt rest, and shalt stand in thy lot at the
end of the days; (Dan. xii 2, 3, 13.) Can any one, who considers these
texts, with any truth or reason affirm that all the promises supposed
to be made to the Jews before Christ's time were meant of some
"temporal" deliverance only, "without the least imagination of a
spiritual deliverance?"
9. There are in the Old Testament many intimations, and some direct
predictions, that all the great promises of God, made to his true
worshippers, shall receive their final accomplishment by means of a
particular person, anointed of God for that purpose; who, after the
reduction of all adversaries, shall set up the everlasting kingdom. The
seed of Abraham, in which all the nations of the earth were to be
blessed, (and, in like manner, the seed of the woman, which was to
bruise the serpent's head,) might originally, with equal propriety, and
in as reasonable and natural a sense of the words, be understood to
signify (what St. Paul afterward asserts it did signify, [367] ) in the
singular sense, a particular person, as, in the plural sense, a number
of persons. The Shiloh which was to come, and to whom the gathering of
the people was to be, (Gen. xlix. 10.) (the promise laid up in store,
ta apokeimena auto, as the LXX render it,) by its opposition in the
text to the terms sceptre and lawgiver, most naturally signifies a
single person who was to reign; and, by the gradation in the words of
the text, somewhat of superior dignity to that of a sceptre and a
lawgiver. The words of Balaam:--(Num. xxiv. 17, 19.) I shall see him,
but not now; I shall behold him, but not nigh: There shall come a star
out of Jacob, and a sceptre shall rise out of Israel;--out of Jacob
shall come he that shall have dominion;--are words so put in his mouth,
as most properly and obviously to describe a much greater person than
perhaps he thought of, a much greater person than one who should smite
the corners of Moab, and destroy all the children of Sheth. Again; that
the words of Moses:--(Deut. xviii. 15.) The Lord thy God will raise up
unto thee a prophet from the midst of thee, like unto me, unto him
shall ye hearken;--were not meant barely of Joshua, or of "a succession
of prophets," but of one who should have as eminent a legislative
authority as Moses, may reasonably be gathered from the occasion of
their being spoken, not merely by Moses, upon a general reliance and
trust that God would provide him a successor, but by God himself, upon
the people's desiring in Horeb,--saying, Let me not hear again the
voice of the Lord my God, neither let me see this great fire any more,
that I die not: Then the Lord said, They have well spoken:--I will
raise them up a prophet from among their brethren, like unto thee, and
will put my words in his mouth, and he shall speak unto them all that I
command him: And it shall come to pass, that whosoever will not hearken
unto my words which he shall speak in my name, I will require it of
him. (Deut.xviii. 16, 17, 18, 19.)--And that the words were anciently,
long before the application of them by the writers of the New
Testament, thus understood, and not concerning Joshua, or a succession
of prophets, appears from those additional words at the conclusion of
the book of Deuteronomy:--(Deut.xxxiv. 9, 10.) Joshua, the son of Nun,
was full of the spirit of wisdom; for Moses had laid his hands upon
him--But there arose not a prophet since in Israel, like unto Moses,
whom the Lord knew face to face.--The prediction of Isaiah is still
clearer:--(Is. ix. 6, 7.) Unto us a child is born, unto us a Son is
given, and the government shall be upon his shoulders; and his name
shall be called Wonderful, Counsellor, the mighty God, the everlasting
Father, the Prince of Peace: [368] Of the increase of his government
and peace there shall be no end, upon the throne of David and upon his
kingdom, to order it, and to establish it with judgment and with
justice from henceforth even for ever: The zeal of the Lord of Hosts
will perform this. Again:--(Is. xi. 1, 3, 6, 9.) There shall come forth
a rod out of the stem of Jesse.--He shall not judge after the sight of
his eyes, neither reprove after the hearing of his ears: But with
righteousness shall he judge the poor, and reprove with equity for the
meek of the earth; and he shall smite the earth with the rod of his
mouth, and with the breath of his lips shall he slay the wicked.--The
wolf also shall dwell with the lamb, &c.--They shall not hurt nor
destroy in all my holy mountain; for the earth shall be full of the
knowledge of the Lord, as the waters cover the sea. And (Is. xlii. 1,
3, 4.--Matt. xii. 17.) Behold my servant,--mine elect, in whom my soul
delighteth: I have put my spirit upon him:--A bruised reed shall he not
break:--He shall bring forth judgment unto truth:--till he have set
judgment in the earth, and the isles shall wait for his law. The
prophet Jeremiah no less plainly:--(Jer.xxiii. 5, 6.--xxxiii. 15, 16.)
I will raise unto David a righteous branch, and a king shall reign and
prosper, and shall execute judgment and justice in the earth:--And this
is his name whereby he shall be called, THE LORD OUR RIGHTEOUSNESS. And
Ezekiel:--(Ezek.xxxiv. 23, 25.--xxxvii. 22, 23, 24, 25.--Hos.iii. 5.) I
will set up one shepherd over them, and he shall feed them, even my
servant David;--And I will make with them a covenant of peace, &c.--One
king shall be king to them all;--neither shall they defile themselves
any more with their idols;--and they all shall have one shepherd; they
shall also walk in my judgments,--and my servant David shall be their
prince for ever. By Haggai is the same predicted:--(Hagg. ii. 6,
7.--Heb. xii. 26.) Yet once, it is a little while, and I will shake the
heavens and the earth,--And the desire of all nations shall come. [369]
And by Zechary:--(Zech. ix. 9, 10.--Matt. xxi. 5.) Behold, thy king
cometh unto thee: He is just, and having salvation; lowly, and riding
upon an ass, and upon a colt, the foal of an ass:--He shall speak peace
unto the heathen; and his dominion shall be from sea even to sea, and
from the river even to the ends of the earth. And by
Malachi;--(Mal.iii. 1.) The Lord whom ye seek shall suddenly come to
his temple; even the messenger of the covenant. But most expressly of
all by Daniel:--(Dan.vii. 13, 14.) I saw in the night visions, and
behold one like the Son of Man came with the clouds of heaven, and came
to the ancient of days, and they brought him near before him: [370] And
there was given him dominion, and glory, and a kingdom; that all
people, nations, and languages, should serve him: His dominion is an
everlasting dominion, which shall not pass away; and his kingdom that
which shall not be destroyed. And the anointing of the Holy One, this
prophet calls (Dan. ix. 24.) the sealing up of the vision and prophecy,
and the finishing of transgression, and the making an end of sins, and
the making reconciliation for iniquity, and the bringing in
ever-lasting righteousness. [Do all these things denote nothing but
"temporal" deliverance, "without the least imagination of a spiritual
deliverance?"] And in the words next following, he is styled, by name,
Messiah. (Dan. ix. 25.) Know, therefore, [vtd know also] and
understand, that from the going forth of the commandment to restore and
to build Jerusalem, unto the Messiah the Prince, shall be seven weeks.
[371]
10. Concerning this Messiah, in the setting up of whose kingdom all the
promises of God terminate, it is clearly predicted in the Old Testament
that he should arise particularly from the tribe of Judah, from the
family of David, and in the town of Bethlehem.
The first of these particulars is expressed in those emphatical words
of Jacob:--(Gen. xlix. 8, 10.) Judah, thou art he whom thy brethren
shall praise,-- thy father's children shall bow down before thee:-- The
sceptre shall not depart from Judah, nor a law-giver from between his
feet, until Shiloh come, [LXX, heos an elthe ta apokeimena auto, till
the accomplishment of the promises which God has laid up in store for
him,] and unto him shall the gathering of the people be. To which the
writer of the Chronicles seems to refer, when he says:--(Chr. v. 1, 2.)
The genealogy is not to be reckoned after the birth-right; for Judah
prevailed above his brethren, and of him came the chief ruler, [Heb.
and from him was it prophesied the ruler should arise.] And the
Psalmist,--(Ps.lx. 7. cviii. 8.) Judah is my lawgiver.
The second is expressed in that promise to David,--(2 Sam. vii. 16.)
thine house and thy kingdom shall be established for ever before thee,
[LXX, enopio`n mou, before me;] thy throne shall be established for
ever. Which words might, indeed, of themselves be understood concerning
a succession of kings in the house of David: But that God had a further
and a greater meaning in them, he very clearly explains by the
following prophets. By Isaiah:--(Is. xi. 1, &c. compare Rev. iii. 7. v.
5. xxii. 16.) there shall come forth a rod out of the stem of Jesse,
and a branch shall grow out of his roots; and then follows through the
whole chapter a glorious description of an everlasting kingdom of
righteousness, over both Jews and Gentiles. By Jeremiah;--(Jer. xxiii.
5.) I will raise unto David a righteous branch, and a king shall reign
and prosper, and shall execute judgment and justice in the earth:--And
this is his name whereby he shall be called, the Lord our
righteousness. By Ezekiel;--(Ezek.xxvii. 23, 24, 25, 26.) they shall be
my people, and I will be their God; and David my servant shall be king
over them, and they all shall have one shepherd;--and my servant David
shall be their prince for ever; Moreover I will make a covenant of
peace with them; it shall be an everlasting covenant. And by
Hosea:--(Hos. iii. 4.) The children of Israel shall abide many days
without a king and without a prince, and without a
sacrifice:--Afterward shall the children of Israel return and seek the
Lord their God, and David their king, and shall fear the Lord and his
goodness in the latter days.
The third particular is expressed in those words of Micah:--(Micah, v.
2. Mat. i. 6.) But thou Bethlehem Euphratah, though thou be little
among the thousands of Judah, yet out of thee shall he come forth unto
me, that is to be ruler in Israel; whose goings forth have been from of
old, from everlasting. After the passages now cited out of the
foregoing prophets, what can be more jejune than to understand these
words of Micah concerning Zorobabel only as having been of an ancient
family?
11. In the books of the Old Testament it is expressly predicted, that
the kingdom of the Messiah should extend not over the Jews only, but
also over the Gentiles. The (Gen. xii. 3. xviii. 18. xxii. 18. xxvi. 4.
xxviii. 14.) promise made to Abraham, and so often repeated to him, and
to Isaac, and to Jacob, that in their seed should all the nations of
the earth be blessed, is thus opened and explained by the
prophets.--(Is.xi. 10.) There shall be a root of Jesse, which shall
stand for an ensign of the people; to it shall the Gentiles seek, and
his rest shall be glorious.--(Is.xlii. 1, 6. Matt. xii. 18.) Behold my
servant--in whom my soul delighteth,--he shall bring forth judgment to
the Gentiles;--I will--give thee for a covenant of the people, for a
light of the Gentiles. (Is.xlix. 6.) It is a light thing that thou
shouldst be my servant to raise up the tribes of Jacob, and to restore
the preserved of Israel; I will also give thee for a light to the
Gentiles, that thou mayest be my salvation unto the end of the earth.
(Is.lvi. 6, 7, 8.--John x. 16.) Also the sons of the stranger, that
join themselves to the Lord,--even them will I bring to my holy
mountain, and--mine house shall be called an house of prayer for all
people. The Lord God, which gathereth the outcasts of Israel, saith,
yet will I gather others to him, besides those that are gathered unto
him. (Ezek. xlvii. 22.) The strangers that sojourn among you,--shall
have an inheritance with you among the tribes of Israel. (Mal. i. 11.)
From the rising of the sun, even unto the going down of the same, my
name shall be great among the Gentiles; and in every place incense
shall be offered unto my name, and a pure offering; for my name shall
be great among the heathen, saith the Lord of Hosts.
12. Concerning the same Messiah, of whom so great things are spoken,
and whose kingdom is to be an everlasting kingdom, it is still
expressly predicted by the prophets that he should suffer and be cut
off. Concerning the very same person, who (with respect to his coming
to reign, and to introduce the everlasting jubilee or rest to the
people of God, (Heb. iv. 9. sabbatismo's.) is styled Messiah the
prince; (Dan. ix. 25.) concerning the very same person, I say, it is in
the very same sentence expressly predicted that he should be cut off,
but not for himself, (Dan. ix. 26.) [Heb. and the people should not
then be his; unto him should not then the gathering of the people be.
(Gen. xlix. 10.)] For which reason, and also because the words can with
no tolerable sense be applied to any other person, and because moreover
the connexion of the whole prophecy leads to the same interpretation;
the fifty-third chapter of Isaiah likewise is most justly understood to
be spoken of the Messiah: There shall come forth a rod out of the stem
of Jesse; (Isa. xi. 1.)--with righteousness shall he judge the poor:
(Isa.xi. 4.)--Behold my servant--mine elect in whom my soul
delighteth;--he shall not cry, nor lift up, nor cause his voice to be
heard in the street; a bruised reed shall he not break, and the smoking
flax shall he not quench; he shall bring forth judgment unto truth.
(Isa. xlii. 1, 2, 3.--Behold, my servant shall deal prudently; (Is.
lii. 13.) Surely he hath born our griefs;--he was wounded for our
transgressions; he was bruised for our iniquities:--He is brought as a
lamb to the slaughter, and as a sheep before her shearers is dumb, so
he openeth not his mouth: He was taken from prison and from judgment,
and who shall declare his generation?--For the transgression of my
people was he stricken; and he made his grave with the wicked, and with
the rich in his death:--When thou shalt make his soul an offering for
sin;--my righteous servant shall justify many, for he shall bear their
iniquities:--He was numbered with the transgressors, and he bare the
sin of many, and made intercession for the transgressors. (Is. liii. 4,
&c.)
13. All prophecies of blessings to the worshippers of the true God,
expressed either as being to happen in the latter days, or in words
which imply a lasting duration, are in reason to be understood as
having reference to the times of the promised kingdom of the Messiah,
of whom it is expressly said, that he shall bring in everlasting
righteousness, (Dan. ix. 24.) and that his dominion is an everlasting
dominion which shall not pass away, and his kingdom that which shall
not be destroyed. (Dan. vii. 14.) Some prophecies of this kind are
direct and express. Others, beginning with promises of particular
intermediate blessings, and proceeding with general expressions more
great and lofty than can naturally be applied to the temporal blessing
immediately spoken of, are most reasonably understood to have a
perpetual view and regard to that great and general event, in which all
God's promises to his true worshippers do centre and terminate, and of
which all intermediate blessings promised by God are justly looked upon
as beginnings, types, pledges, or earnests.
14. For since, from the express prophecies before cited, of the
Messiah's everlasting kingdom of righteousness, it appears that God had
in fact a view to that, as the great and general end of all the
dispensations of providence towards his true worshippers from the
beginning; and no prophecy of the Scripture is of any private
interpretation, (2 Pet. i. 20.) (that is, the meaning of prophecies is
not what perhaps the prophet himself might imagine in his private
judgment of the state of things then present,) because the prophecy in
old time came not by the will of man, but holy men spake as they were
moved by the Holy Ghost; there may, therefore, very possibly, and very
reasonably, be supposed to be many prophecies, which, though they may
have a prior and immediate reference to some nearer event, yet, by the
spirit of God, (whom those prophecies which are express show to have
had a further view,) may have been directed to be uttered in such
words, as may even more properly and more justly be applied to the
great event which providence had in view, than to the intermediate
event which God designed as only a pledge or earnest of the other: For
instance; suppose these words of Daniel,--I beheld till the thrones
were cast down, [till the thrones were placed,] and the ancient of days
did sit:--A fiery stream issued and came forth from before him;
thousand thousands ministered unto him, and ten thousand times ten
thousand stood before him; the judgment was set, and the books were
opened: (Dan. vii. 9, 10.) Suppose (I say) these words were spoken
concerning the slaying of a wild beast, or the destruction of a
temporal empire, (ver. 11.) yet what reasonable man, who had ever
elsewhere met with any notices of a judgment to come, could doubt but
the destruction there spoken of was therefore expressed in those words,
that it might be understood to be the introduction to the general
judgment? The exact and very particular description of a resurrection,
in the 37th of Ezekiel, supposing it to be indeed spoken of a temporal
restoration of the Jews, yet who can doubt but it was so worded with
design to allude to a real resurrection of the dead? The words of
Micah: Thou, Bethlehem, though thou be little among the thousands of
Judah, yet out of thee shall he come forth unto me, that is to be ruler
in Israel; whose goings forth have been from of old, from everlasting:
(Micah, v. 2. Mat. ii. 6.) Supposing it possible they could be spoken
of Zorobabel, yet, if afterwards there should arise out of Bethlehem
one in whom were found all the other prophetic characters of the
promised Messiah, who could doubt but the words were intended either
solely, or at least chiefly, of the latter? The words of Jeremiah:
(Jer. i. 7.--vi. 5.) Babylon hath been a golden cup;--the nations have
drunken of her wine, therefore the nations are mad: Flee out of the
midst of Babylon,--be not cut off in her iniquity:--My people, go ye
out of the midst of her, and deliver ye every man his soul from the
fierce anger of the Lord. Who, that considers the nature and character
of the Babylon in Jeremiah's time, and compares it with the nature and
character of the Babylon described by St John, can doubt but the spirit
which influenced Jeremiah foresaw and intended to allude to that
Babylon which had (Rev. xvii. 4.) a golden cup in her hand full of
abominations, (ver. 2.) and the inhabiters of the earth have been made
drunk with the wine of her fornication, (ch. xviii. 3, 4.) and the
kings of the earth have committed fornication with her:--Come out of
her, my people, that ye be not partakers of her sins, and that ye
receive not of her plagues: For the words of Jeremiah are more strictly
applicable to this latter Babylon than to that in his own time. Again;
The words of Isaiah:--(Is. vii. 14.--Matt. i. 23.) Behold, a virgin
shall conceive and bear a Son, and shall call his name Immanuel, that
is to say, God with us. Supposing Isaiah himself could possibly at that
time understand them concerning a son of his own, concerning a son to
be born of a young woman afterwards, who at the time then present was a
virgin; and that his being styled Immanuel meant nothing more than
that, before this child was grown up, Judah should be delivered from
the then threatened incursions of Israel and Syria; (all which,
notwithstanding the seeming connexion of the words in the place they
stand, is very difficult to suppose;) yet, if afterwards any person,
comparing the solemn introduction wherewith the words are brought in,
"Hear ye now, O house of David; is it a small thing for you to weary
men, but will ye weary my God also? therefore the Lord himself shall
give you a sign; behold a virgin shall conceive," &c. If any one, I
say, comparing this solemn introduction with the promises repeated to
the house of David in other passages of the prophets, that there should
be born unto them a Son who should (Is. ix. 7.--Ezek. xxxvii. 25.) sit
upon the throne of David and upon his kingdom for ever, and of the
increase of whose government and peace there should be no end;--and
considering, moreover, the character of this promised Son, that he
should (Dan. ix. 24.) finish transgression, and make an end of sins,
and make reconciliation for iniquity, and bring in everlasting
righteousness: If a person, considering and comparing these things,
should in his own days find a son really born of a virgin, attested to
by numerous miracles, and by God's command named Jesus, (which is
synonymous to immanuel, a potent Saviour or God with us,) because he
(Matt. i. 21.) should save his people from their sins, that is, should
(Dan. ix. 24.) make reconciliation for iniquity, and bring in
everlasting righteousness; Could such a person possibly entertain the
least doubt, whether God, who sent Isaiah to repeat the fore cited
words to the house of David, did not intend thereby to describe, if not
wholly and solely, at least chiefly and ultimately, this latter
saviour? In like manner; suppose those great promises to David, (2 Sam.
vii. 13, 14, 16.) concerning the establishment of the throne of his Son
for ever, were by David, and the prophet himself that delivered them,
understood (te idia epilusei, as St. Peter speaks,) concerning Solomon,
and a succession of kings in his family; yet, when following prophecies
clearly and expressly declared, that out of the root of Jesse should
arise a Messiah who should reign for ever, no reasonable man can doubt,
but that the former and less clear prophecy was likewise intended of
God, and therefore rightly applied by the apostles of Christ to the
same purpose? To give but one instance more: Suppose the words, (Ps.
xvi. 10.) Thou wilt not leave my soul in hell, neither wilt thou suffer
thy Holy One to see corruption, were by David spoken concerning
himself, (which, however, can by no way be proved,) yet who, that
(Acts. ii. 30.) knew David himself to be a prophet, and that had
compared the other prophecies concerning the (Is. xi. 1, &c.) branch
out of the roots of Jesse, the (Ezek. xxxvii. 24.) one shepherd of
Israel, even God's (ver. 25.) servant David who should be their prince
for ever, and yet was to be (Dan. ix. 26.--Is. liii. tot.) cut off
before he should reign for ever; and that had himself seen (as St.
Peter did) and actually conversed with Christ risen from the dead; who,
(I say) in these circumstances, could possibly doubt but that (2 Sam.
xxiii. 2.) the spirit of the Lord which spake by David intended the
fore-mentioned words should be understood of, and applied to Christ?
And the like may be said concerning some other prophecies which are
vulgarly supposed to be applied typically to Christ.
15. It is not agreeable to reason, or to the analogy of Scripture, to
suppose that the Jews, before our Saviour's time, could have a clear
and distinct understanding of the full meaning, even of the express
prophecies, much less of those which were more obscure and indirect;
when both were intended to be only as it were a light shining in a dark
place. [372] But thus much is evident, that the Jews, both before and
in our Saviour's time, had from these prophecies a general expectation
of a Messiah, [373] and that this Messiah was to be, not merely a
"temporal" deliverer, but 'vytsr, Pater futuri seculi, the head of the
future state, as well as of the present. Nor does it at all appear that
our Lord's disciples, when they (Luke, xxiv. 21.) thought he would have
redeemed Israel, or when they (Acts, i. 6.) asked if he would at this
time restore again the kingdom to Israel, I say, it does not at all
appear that they expected merely a "temporal" kingdom, but their error
was in expecting a present kingdom; and therefore our Lord's answer to
them, is not concerning the nature but the time of the kingdom. And the
modern Jews, at this day, who to be sure have entertained no
prejudicate notions from the New Testament writer's interpretation or
application of prophecies, have (I think) still an universal
expectation, that the Messiah shall be their prince in the future state
as well as in the present.
16. When Jesus Christ, by (John x. 25.) the works which he did in his
father's name, and (John v. 36.) which his father gave him to finish,
had proved himself to be sent of God; (which truth the apostles
likewise confirmed by their testimony, by their works, and by laying
down their lives, not for their opinions, which possibly erroneous and
enthusiastic persons may sometimes sincerely do, but in attestation to
facts of their own knowledge) and it appeared, moreover, that there was
wanting in him no circumstance, no sine qua non, no character,
appropriated by any of the ancient prophets to the promised Messiah, he
had then a clear right to apply to himself all the prophecies, which
either directly spoke of the Messiah, or which, through any
intermediate events, pointed at him, and were applicable to him.
17. The application of this latter sort of prophecies to Christ is not
allegorical. It is not an allegorical application, much less an
allegorical argument or reasoning. But they are applied to him, as
being really and intentionally, in the view of providence, the end and
complete accomplishment of that, whereof the intermediate blessing was
a pledge or beginning.
18. The application of this latter sort of prophecies to Christ, was
never by reasonable men urged as being itself a proof that Jesus was
the true Messiah. Nay, the application of the most direct and express
prophecies whatsoever, (unless when the characters be so particular as
not to be at all compatible to different persons, or the marks of time
be very definite and exact,) has not of itself the nature of a direct
or positive proof, but can only be a sine qua non, an application of
certain marks or characters, without which no person could be the
promised Messiah. Many men were of the seed of Abraham, and of the
tribe of Judah, and of the family of David, and born in Bethlehem of
Judea, and suffered, and were cut of; and yet neither any nor all of
these characters could prove any man to be the promised Messiah, but
the want of any one of them would prove that any man was not he. The
proof of Jesus being the Christ were (John v. 36.) the works which his
father gave him to finish. The application of direct and express
prophecies to him is nothing but such a congruity of marks or
characters as removes all objections by which an adversary would
endeavour to prove that it was not he. Ought not Christ (Luke, xxiv.
26.) to have suffered these things, and to enter into his glory, is not
proving from his sufferings, that Jesus was the Christ; but removing
the objection, by which some were apt to infer from his sufferings that
he could not possibly be the Christ. The application of indirect
prophecies to him is only a giving of further light from the analogy
and conformity of the Old Testament to the New, by way of illustration
and confirmation, to such as have been before convinced by the direct
proofs. The proof, therefore, of the truth of Christianity does not
stand upon the application of prophecies; but the works by which Christ
proved himself to be sent of God gave him a right to apply to himself
the prophecies concerning the Messiah; and the marks or characters of
the promised Messiah, given by the prophets, were so many tests by
which his claim was to be tried. "Miracles," indeed, "can never render
a foundation valid, which is in itself invalid; can never make a false
inference true; can never make a prophecy fulfilled, which is not
fulfilled; can never mark out a Messias, or Jesus for the Messias, if
both are not marked out in the Old Testament:" But miracles can give a
man a just and undeniable claim to be received as the promised Messiah,
if the prophetic characters of the Messiah be applicable to him: And
this it is by which Jesus was proved to be the Christ.
19. From what has been said concerning the application of indirect
prophecies, it is easy to observe the nature and use of types and
figures, and allegorical manner of speaking; that these were much less
intended to be ever alleged for proofs of the truth of a doctrine; and
yet, in their proper place, may afford very great light and assistance
towards the right understanding of it: An instance or two will make
this matter obvious. There is a very remarkable passage in the epistle
to the Galatians, where the apostle himself styles the thing he is
speaking of, an (Gal. iv. 24.) allegory; that is, he draws an argument,
a simile. The allegory, or similitude, he makes use of is not alleged
by him as a "proof" of the truth of the doctrine he is asserting, but
as a proof of the falseness and groundlessness of a particular
objection urged by the unbelieving Jews against it: The doctrine the
apostle asserts (both in the epistle to the Romans and in this to the
Galatians,) is, that Christians of the Gentiles, who imitate the faith
and obedience of Abraham, (being circumcised with the circumcision--of
Christ, Col. ii. 11.) are equally capable of being admitted to the
benefit of God's promises to his people, as the Jews of the literal
circumcision, who were lineally descended from that patriarch. In
opposition to this, the Jews alleged, that since to the Israelites
confessedly (Rom. ix. 4.) pertained the adoption, and the glory, and
the covenants, and the giving of the law, and the service of God, and
the promises; since theirs, confessedly, were the fathers or
patriarchs, to whom all the promises of God were originally made, it
could not possibly be true, nor consistent with the promises of God
made to their fathers, that these Israelites, who had been all along
the peculiar people or church of God, should at last be rejected for
not receiving the gospel; and that believers from among the Gentiles of
all nations should be received in their stead. Now, in reply to this
objection, the apostle argues with the greatest justness and strength,
from the analogy of a like case acknowledged by themselves, in which
the reason of the thing was the same, even from the analogy of God's
method and manner of proceeding in the giving of those very original
promises to the patriarchs, upon which this prejudice of the Jews was
founded. (Gal. iv. 21. &c.) Tell me, says he, ye that desire to be
under the law, do ye not hear the law? That is, will ye not attend to
the analogy of God's method of proceeding, in those very promises on
which ye depend? For it is written, that Abraham had two sons, the one
by a bond-maid, the other by a free woman: But he who was of the
bond-woman, was born after the flesh; but he of the free woman, was by
promise: Which things are an allegory, &c. That is to say, even
originally, the promise was not made to all the children of Abraham,
but to Isaac only, which was, from the beginning, a very plain
declaration that God did not principally intend his promise to take
place in (Rom. ix. 8.) Abraham's descendants according to the flesh,
but in those who, by a faith or fidelity like his, were in a truer and
higher sense the children and followers of that Great Father of the
faithful. In like manner, and for the same reason, the promise was not
made (Rom. ix. 10.) to both the sons of Isaac, but to Jacob only; and,
among the posterity of Jacob, all (Rom. ix. 6.) were not Israel, which
were of Israel. What ye (Gal. iv. 21.) yourselves, therefore, saith St.
Paul, who are so desirous to be under the Mosaic law, cannot but
acknowledge to have been originally and always true, the same is true
(ver. 29.) now. What was true concerning the two sons of Abraham, and
likewise concerning the two sons of Isaac, who were the patriarchs with
whom God's covenant was originally made, is, by continuance of the same
analogy, true concerning the covenant established with the families,
and with the nation of the Jews, descended from those patriarchs; it is
true concerning the church of God through all successive ages; it is
true concerning the (Gal. iv. 25.) Jerusalem which now is, and
concerning that which is to come. As (ver. 22.) Abraham had two sons,
the one by a bond-maid, the other by a free woman: And as (ver. 30.)
the son of the bond-maid, though, according to the flesh, no less truly
his natural descendant than the other, yet was not to be co-heir with
him, who, by the promise of God, was appointed to inherit: So, says the
apostle, the (ver. 25. 26.) Jerusalem which now is, and is in bondage
with her children, the visible earthly church, which received the
external ceremonial law from Mount Sina, is not, by that outward
general denomination, entitled to the eternal favour of God: But the
Jerusalem which is above, which is the mother of us all, of all who, by
true faith and sincere obedience are pleasing to God; this heavenly
Jerusalem, this spiritual invisible church or city of the living God it
is, to which all the promises of God, made in all ages to his church,
are, in reality, originally and finally appropriated.
From this remarkable instance, it is well worth observing, by the way,
that when the apostles are supposed to argue with the Jews ad hominem,
the meaning is, that arguments alleged by the apostles to the Jews in
particular, differ from arguments brought to the Gentiles, in this; not
that they were at any time arguments drawn from things acknowledged by
the Jews, and in themselves otherwise inconclusive; but that they were
drawn, justly and strongly, from things well known among the Jews,
though what the Gentiles were strangers to.
The correspondences of types and antetypes, though they are not
themselves proper proofs of the truth of a doctrine, yet they may be
very reasonable confirmations of the foreknowledge of God; of the
uniform view of providence under different dispensations; of the
analogy, harmony, and agreement between the Old Testament and the New.
The words in the law, concerning one particular kind of death, (Deut.
xxi. 23.) He that is hanged is accursed of God, can hardly be conceived
to have been put in upon any other account than with a view and
foresight to the application made of it by St. Paul. (Gal. iii. 13.)
The analogies between the (Exod. xii. 22. 46. Johni. 29. xix. 36. Rev.
i. 5.) Paschal Lamb, and the Lamb of God slain from the foundation of
the world; between the Egyptian bondage and the tyranny of sin; between
the (1 Cor. x. 1, 2.) baptism of the Israelites in the sea and in the
cloud, and the baptism of Christians; between the (Heb. iii. 15.-9. iv.
1, 2, 3. 1 Cor. x. 1-11.) passage through the wilderness, and through
the present world; between (Heb. iv. 8. 9.) Jesus [Joshua] bringing the
people into the promised land, and Jesus Christ being the captain of
salvation to believers; between the Sabbath of rest (Heb. iv. 5. ix.
1.) promised to the people of God in the earthly Canaan, and the
eternal rest promised in the heavenly Canaan; between the (Numb. xxxv.
25. 28.) liberty granted from the time of the death of the High Priest,
to him that had fled into a city of refuge, and the redemption
purchased by the death of Christ; between the (Heb. ix. 25.) High
Priest entering into the holy place every year with blood of others,
and Christ's (Heb. iv. 12, 24, 26.) once entering with his own blood
into heaven itself, to appear in the presence of God for us; these (I
say) and innumerable other analogies, between the (Col.ii. 17.) shadows
of things to come, the (Heb. x. i.) shadows of good things to come, the
(Heb. viii. 5.) shadows of heavenly things, the (Heb. ix. 9.) figures
for the time then present, the (Heb. ix. 23.) patterns of things in the
heavens, and (Heb. ix. 2.) the heavenly things themselves; cannot,
without the force of strong prejudice, be conceived to have happened by
mere chance, without any foresight or design. There are no such
analogies, much less such series of analogies, found in the books of
mere enthusiastic writers, much less of enthusiastic writers living in
such remote ages from each other. It is much more credible and
reasonable to suppose, (what St. Paul affirms,) that (1 Cor. x. 6.)
these things were our examples; and that, in the uniform course of
God's government of the world, (Ver. 11.) all these things happened
unto them of old for ensamples, and they are written for our
admonition, upon whom the ends of the world are come. And hence arises
that aptness of similitude, in the application of several legal
performances to the morality of the gospel, that it can very hardly be
supposed not to have been originally intended. As (1 Cor. v. 6, 7, 8.)
know ye not that a little leaven leaveneth the whole lump? Purge out
therefore the old leaven, that ye may be a new lump, as ye are
unleavened. For even Christ our passover is sacrificed for us.
Therefore let us keep the feast, not with old leaven, neither with the
leaven of malice and wickedness, but with the unleavened bread of
sincerity and truth. Again; (Phil. iii. 3.) we are the circumcision,
which worship God in the spirit, and rejoice in Christ Jesus; and have
no confidence in the flesh. And (Col. ii, 13, 11.) you being dead in
your sins, and in the uncircumcision of your flesh, hath God quickened
together with Christ:--In whom also ye are circumcised with the
circumcision made without hands, in putting off the body of the sins of
the flesh, by [the Christian, the spiritual circumcision,] the
circumcision of Christ. And (1 Cor. ix. 13, 14, 8, 9, 10. 1 Tim. v.
18.) do ye not know that they which--wait at the altar, are partakers
with the altar? Even so hath the Lord ordained that they which preach
the gospel should live of the gospel.--Say I these things as a man? or
saith not the law the same also? for it is written in the law of Moses,
thou shalt not muzzle the mouth of the ox that treadeth out the corn.
Doth God take care for oxen? or saith he it altogether for our sakes?
Some applications of texts out of the Old Testament are mere allusions;
that is, nothing more is intended to be affirmed than that the words
spoken in the Old Testament are as truly and as justly applicable to
the present occasion as they were to that upon which they were
originally spoken. Of this kind I think is that of St. Matthew:--(Matt.
iii. 17.--Jer.xxxi. 15.) Then was fulfilled that which was spoken by
Jeremiah the prophet, saying, in Rama there was a voice heard,
lamentation and weeping, and great mourning; Rachel weeping for her
children, and would not be comforted, because they are not. Thus
likewise St. Paul:--(2 Cor. viii. 13, 14, 15.) I mean not that other
men be eased, and you burdened; but by an equality; as it is written he
that had gathered much, had nothing over; and he that had gathered
little, had no lack. Again:--(Is. vi. 9.) What Isaiah says of the Jews,
(supposing he did not speak there prophetically, though the solemnity
of the introduction makes it much more reasonable to believe he did:
But, supposing he spake of the Jews in his own time,) Go and tell this
people, hear ye indeed, but understand not; and see ye, indeed, but
perceive not; make the heart of this people fat, and make their ears
heavy, and shut their eyes; lest they see with their eyes, and hear
with their ears, and understand with their heart, and convert and be
healed: was (Matt. xiii. 14.) fulfilled, was verified, was equally
true, equally applicable to the Jews, in our Saviour's days. Of the
same kind seems to be (Matt.viii. 17.) St. Matthew's explication of
that passage in (Is. liii. 4.) Isaiah; Surely he hath borne our griefs
and carried our sorrows. The sense of the words in the prophecy is what
St. Peter expresses:--(1 Pet. ii. 24.) Who his own self bare our sins
in his own body on the tree. And the Apostle to the Hebrews:--(Heb. ix.
28.) Christ was once offered to bear the sins of many. Yet St. Matthew
says:--(Matt. viii. 16, 17.) He healed all that were sick, that it
might be fulfilled which was spoken by Esaias the prophet, saying,
himself took our infirmities, and bare our sicknesses. His meaning is,
Christ healed diseases in such a manner, that even in that sense also
the words of Isaiah were literally verified. To give but one instance
more; (Matt. xiii. 34, 35.) All these things, (saith the evangelist)
spake Jesus unto the multitude in parables,--that it might be fulfilled
which was spoken by the prophet, saying, I will open my mouth in
parables, I will utter things which have been kept secret from the
foundation of the world: That is, the words (Ps. lxxviii. 2.) of the
psalmist were as properly, as truly, and as justly applicable to the
things which our Lord spoke, as to the occasion upon which they were
originally spoken by the psalmist.
To such as are accustomed only to modern languages, and understand not
the nature of the Hebrew and Syriac speech, it may seem very
surprising, that, in the (Matt. viii. 17.--xiii. 35.) two
last-mentioned passages, the citations are introduced with these words,
That it might be fulfilled which was spoken by the prophet, saying, &c.
But all who understand those languages well know, that the phrase
answering to these expressions, hina plerothe, that it might be
fulfilled; mean nothing more than, hereby was verified, or, so that
hereby was verified, or the like. And they who understand not the
languages may yet easily apprehend this, by considering the nature and
force of some other expressions of the like kind. As: (Jer.xxvii. 15.)
They prophecy a lie in my name, that I might drive you out. (Matt.
xxiii. 34, 35.) Behold, I send unto you prophets,--That upon you may
come all the righteous blood. With (Exod. xi. 9.--xvii. 3.--Numb.
xxxii. 14.--Ps. li. 4.--Jer.vii. 18.--Matt. x. 34, 35.) many other
passages of the same nature; where the words "that such a thing may
be," do not at all signify the intention, "to the end that it may be,"
but merely the event, "so that it will be." In the case of the most
direct and express prophecies of all, the words, "this was done, that
it might be fulfilled which was spoken by the prophet," never do, never
possibly can signify literally, that the thing was done for that end,
that the prophecy might be fulfilled; because, on the reverse, the
reason why any thing is predicted always is, because the thing was
(before that prediction) appointed to be done. Much more, therefore, in
the case of indirect prophecies, the words--this was done, that it
might be fulfilled which was spoken by the prophet--necessarily and
evidently mean this only, that the thing was so done, as that thereby
or therein was verified what the prophet had spoken.
20. It cannot, therefore, with any sort of reason or justice, be
inferred from such citations out of the Old Testament as I have now
mentioned, that the apostles either misunderstood, or enthusiastically
misapplied the writings of the prophets. Nor can any just argument be
drawn against the authority of the books of the Old and New Testament
from such topics as these; that the copies of the law, in the times of
the idolatrous kings of Judah and Israel, were well nigh lost, that
some texts cited out of the Old Testament by the writers of the New,
are not now found in the Old Testament at all; that other texts are
read differently in the Old Testament itself, from the citations of the
same texts recorded in the New, and the like: Which things have indeed
given occasion to weak and ridiculous writers to invent certain
senseless rules or regulations, according to which men may at any time
rightly make what wrong quotations they please: But, in truth, the
things themselves I am here speaking of are nothing but what must of
necessity happen in a long succession of ages.
When--(2 Chr. xxxiv. 14.) Hilkiah the priest (in the days of Josiah,)
found, in the house of the Lord, a book of the law of the Lord, given
by Moses; it is very probable, indeed, from the circumstances of the
history, that copies of the law were then very scarce, and that this
found by Hilkiah, was, to his surprise, an authentic or original copy.
But that the whole should have been at that time a forgery of Hilkiah,
is evidently impossible, because the very being and polity of the
nation, as well as their religion, was founded upon the acknowledgment
of the law of Moses, how much soever idolatrous kings might at certain
times have corrupted that religion, and caused the study of the law to
have been neglected. And in the very same book, wherein the account is
given of this particular fact, of Hilkiah's finding a copy [an
authentic copy] of the law, it is expressly and at large recorded how,
in a foregoing reign, the king--(2 Chr. xvii. 7. 8, 9.) sent to his
princes--to teach in the cities of Judah, and with them he sent Levites
and priests;--and they taught in Judah, and had the book of the law of
the Lord with them, and went about throughout all the cities of Judah,
and taught the people.
That, in length of time, some whole books should have been lost, is
nothing wonderful. There are several books expressly cited in the Old
Testament, of which we have now nothing remaining. That in the books
which remain there should sometimes, for want of infallibility in
transcribers, [374] happen omissions, transpositions, and various
readings, is still less to be wondered at. Nothing but perpetual
miracle could prevent it: They who have skill to compare, in the
original, certain passages in the books of Chronicles, with the
correspondent places in the books of Kings, or the 18th Psalm, with 2
Sam. c. xxii. which is a transcript of the same Psalm, or the 14thPsalm
with the 53d, which are also one and the same Psalm transcribed; and,
much more, they who can compare the Septuagint translation with the
original will be able to find instances of these things, and very often
also to see plainly how and whence they happened: (All which, far from
diminishing the authority of the books, are strong arguments of their
antiquity, and against their having been forged by Esdras, or any other
hand.) What wonder then is it, that among the numerous texts cited in
the New Testament out of the Old, one or two should now not be found in
our present copies of the Old Testament, and that some others should be
read differently in the Old Testament, from the citations of the same
texts recorded in the New? Or how does this at all affect the authority
of either, when much the greatest part of the texts cited agree
perfectly either in words or at least in sense; and the whole series,
harmony, analogy, connexion, and uniformity of both, compared with the
system of natural and moral truths, and with the history of the world
and the state of nations, through a long succession of ages, from the
days of Moses to this present time, shows that the books are not the
result of random and enthusiastic imaginations, but of long foresight
and design? for the spirit of enthusiasm is very hardly consistent with
itself through the writings of one single person. How then is it
possible that for 3000 years together, and pretending too (through all
that time) to an uniform series of predictions, it should happen never
to have fallen into such a track of expected events, as the nature and
truth of things and the situation of the kingdoms of the world should
have rendered absolutely impossible, and altogether incapable of any
farther, much less of any final completion?
21. I shall conclude this head with pointing at some particular
extraordinary prophecies, which deserve to be carefully considered and
compared with the events, whether they could possibly have proceeded
from chance or from enthusiasm. Some of them are of such a nature as
that they can only be judged of by persons learned in history, and
these I shall but just mention. Others are obvious to the consideration
of the whole world, and with those I shall finish what I think proper
at this time to offer upon this subject.
Concerning Babylon, "it was particularly foretold [375] that it (Is.
xiii. 17. xxi. 2.) should be shut up, and besieged by the Medes,
Elamites, and Armenians: That the river should be dried up: (Jer. l.
38. li. 36.) That the city should be taken in the time of a feast,
(Jer.li. 39. 57.) while her--mighty men were drunken; which accordingly
came to pass," when "Belshazzar and all his thousand princes, who were
drunk with him at the feast," were "slain by Cyrus's soldiers;"
(Cyropædia, lib. 7.) Also it was particularly foretold, "that God would
make the country of Babylon (Is. xiv. 23.) a possession for the
bittern, and pools of water; which was accordingly fulfilled by the
overflowing and drowning of it, on the breaking down of the great dam
in order to take the city." Could the correspondence of these events
with the predictions be the result of chance? But suppose these
predictions were forged after the event; can the following ones also
have been written after the event? or with any reason be ascribed to
chance? (Jer. l. 39.) The wild beasts of the desert--shall dwell there,
and the owls shall dwell therein: And it shall be no more inhabited for
ever; neither shall it be dwelt in from generation to generation: As
God overthrew Sodom and Gomorrah, &c. (Jer. li. 26. xxxvii. 64.) They
shall not take of thee a stone for a corner,--but thou shalt be
desolate for ever, saith the Lord:--Babylon shall become heaps, a
dwelling place for dragons, an astonishment and an hissing without an
inhabitant:--It shall sink, and shall not rise from the evil that I
will bring upon her. (Is. i. 19, 20, 21.) Babylon, the glory of
kingdoms,--shall be as when God overthrew Sodom and Gomorrah: It shall
never be inhabited; neither shall it be dwelt in from generation to
generation: Neither shall the Arabian pitch tent there; neither shall
the shepherds make their fold there: But wild beasts of the desert
shall lie there; and their houses shall be full of doleful creatures;
and owls shall dwell there.
Concerning Egypt, was the following prediction forged after the event?
Or, can it, with any reason, be ascribed to chance? (Ezek. xxix. 14,
15.) Egypt--shall be a base kingdom: It shall be the basest of
kingdoms; neither shall it exalt itself any more above the nations: For
I will diminish them, that they shall no more rule over the nations.
Concerning Tyre, the prediction is no less remarkable: (Ezek.xxvi. 14,
21.) I will make thee like the top of a rock; thou shalt be a place to
spread nets upon; thou shalt be built no more;--thou shalt be no more;
(Ezek. xxvii. 36.) The merchants among the people shall hiss at thee;
thou shalt be a terror, and never shalt be any more. (Ezek. xxviii.
19.) All they that know thee among the people shall be astonished at
thee.
The description of the extent of the dominion of that people, who were
to possess Judea in the latter days; Was it forged after the event? Or
can it reasonably be ascribed to chance? (Dan. xi. 40, 41, 42, 43.) He
shall come--with horsemen and with many ships, and--shall overflow and
pass over: He shall enter also into the glorious land, [and (ver.45.)
shall plant the tabernacles of his palace between the seas in the
glorious holy mountain;] and many countries shall be overthrown: But
these shall escape out of his hand, even Edom and Moab, and the chief
of the children of Ammon. He shall stretch forth his hand also upon the
countries, and the land of Egypt shall not escape. But he shall have
power over the treasures of gold and of silver, and over all the
precious things of Egypt; and the Lybians and Ethiopians [ksym] shall
be at his steps.
When Daniel, [376] in the vision of Nebuchadnezzar's image foretold
(Dan. ii. 38-44.) four great successive monarchies; was this written
after the event? Or can the congruity of his description with the
things themselves reasonably be ascribed to mere chance?
When the angel says to Daniel; (Dan. ix. 24.) seventy weeks [377] are
determined upon thy people and upon thy holy city, to finish the
transgression, and to make an end of sins, and to make reconciliation
for iniquity, &c. Was this written after the event? Or can it
reasonably be ascribed to chance, that from (Ezra, vii. 6, 7, 8.) the
seventh year of Artaxerxes the king, (when Ezra went up from
Babylon--unto Jerusalem with a commission to restore the government of
the Jews,) to the death of Christ; [378] [from ann. Nabonass. 290, to
ann. Nabonass. 788,] should be precisely 490. [70 weeks of] years?
When the angel tells Daniel, that (Dan. ix. 25.) threescore and two
weeks the street [of Jerusalem] shall be built again, and the wall,
even in troublous times [vvtsvq htym, but this in troublous times not
like those that should be under Messiah the prince, when he should come
to reign;] was this written after the event? Or can it reasonably be
ascribed to chance, that from the twenty-eighth of Artaxerxes, [379]
when the walls were finished, to the birth of Christ, [from ann.
Nabonass. 311, to ann. Nobonass. 745,] should be precisely 434 [62
weeks of] years?
When Daniel further says; (Dan. ix. 27.) and he shall confirm [or
nevertheless he shall confirm] the covenant with many for one week; was
this written after the event? Or can it reasonably be ascribed to
chance, that from the death of Christ, (anno Dom.33,) to the command
given first to St Peter to preach to Cornelius and the Gentiles, (anno
Dom. 40,) should be exactly seven [one week of] years?
When he still adds; (Dan. ix. 27.) and in the midst of the week
[$word$, and in half a week] he shall cause the sacrifice and the
oblation to cease, and for the overspreading of abominations he shall
make it desolate: Was this written after the event? Or can it with any
reason be ascribed to chance, that from Vespasian's marching into Judea
in the spring anno Dom. 67, to the taking of Jerusalem by Titus in the
autumn anno Dom. 70, should be [half a septenary of years,] three years
and a half?
When the same Daniel foretels a tyrannical power, which should wear out
the saints of the Most High, and they should be given into his hand
until (Dan. vii. 25.) a time and times and the dividing of time, and
(Dan. xii. 7.) again, for a time, [380] times, and a half: (Which can
no way be applied to the short persecution of Antiochus, because these
prophecies are expressly declared to be (Dan. viii. 26.) for many days
concerning (Dan. x. 14.) what shall befal thy people in the latter
days, for yet the vision is for many days, concerning (ch. viii. 17.)
the time of the end, (ch. viii. 19.) what shall be in the last end of
the indignation; concerning those who (ch. xi. 33.) shall fall by the
sword and by flame, by captivity and by spoil, many days; (ch. xi. 35.)
to try them, even to the time of the end, because it is yet for a time
appointed; concerning (ch. xii. 1.) a time of trouble, such as never
was since there was a nation; the time (ch. xii. 7.) when God shall
have accomplished to scatter the power of the holy people; (ch. xii.
9.) the time of the end, till which the words are closed up and sealed;
(ch. xii. 4.) to which the prophet is commanded to shut up his words,
and seal the book, for many shall run to and fro, and knowledge shall
be increased: even (ch. xii. 13.) the end, till which Daniel was to
rest, and then stand in his lot at the end of the days. When Daniel, I
say, foretels such a tyrannical power to continue such a determined
period of time; and St John prophecies that the (Rev. xi. 2.) Gentiles
should tread the holy city under foot, forty and two months, which is
exactly the same period of time with that of Daniel: And again, that
(Rev. xi. 3.) two witnesses clothed in sackcloth, should prophesy a
thousand two hundred and threescore days, which is again exactly the
very same period of time: And again, that the (Rev. xii. 6.) woman
which fled into the wilderness from persecution, should continue there
a thousand two hundred and threescore days: And again, that she should
(Rev. xii. 14.) fly into the wilderness for a time, and times, and half
a time; which is still the very same period: And again, that a wild
beast, a tyrannical power, (ch. xiii. 7.) to whom it was given to make
war with the saints, and to overcome them, was (ch. xiii. 5.) to
continue forty and two months, [381] (still the very same period of
time,) and to have (ch. xiii. 7, 8.) power over all kindreds, and
tongues, and nations, so that all that dwell upon the earth should
worship him: Is it credible, or possible, that ignorant and
enthusiastical writers should, by mere chance, hit upon such
coincidences of [occult] numbers? especially since St John could not
possibly take the numbers from Daniel, if he understood Daniel to mean
nothing more than the short persecution of Antiochus. And if he did
understand Daniel to mean a much longer, and greater, and more remote
tyranny, which John himself prophesied of as in his time still future;
then the wonder is still infinitely greater that in those early times,
when there was not the least footstep in the world of any such power as
St John distinctly describes, (but which now is very conspicuous, as I
shall presently observe more particularly,) it should ever enter the
heart of man to conceive so much as the possibility of such a power,
sitting, not upon the pavilion of heathen persecutors, but expressly (2
Thess. ii. 4.) in the temple and upon the seat of God himself.
But these prophecies, which either relate to particular places, or
depend upon the computation of particular periods of time, are (as I
said) of such a nature as that they cannot be judged of but by persons
skilled in history. There are some others more general, running through
the whole Scripture, and obvious to the consideration of the whole
world.
For instance; it was foretold by Moses that when the Jews forsook the
true God, they should (Deut.xxviii. 25.) be removed into all the
kingdoms of the earth; should be (Levit. xxvi. 33.) scattered among the
heathen, (Deut. iv. 27.) among the nations, (Deut. xxviii. 64.) among
all people from the one end of the earth, even unto the other, should
there be (Deut. iv. 37.) left few in number among the heathen, and
(Levit. xxvi. 39.) pine away in their iniquity in their enemies' lands;
and should (Deut. xxviii. 37.) become an astonishment, a proverb, and a
by-word among all nations; and that (Deut. xxviii. 65.) among these
nations they should find no ease, neither should the sole of their foot
have rest; but the Lord should give them a trembling heart, and failing
of eyes, and sorrow of mind; and (Levit. xxvi. 36.) send a faintness
into their hearts, in the lands of their enemies, so that the sound of
a shaken leaf should chace them. Had any thing like this in Moses's
time ever happened to any nation? Or was there in nature any
probability that any such thing should ever happen to any people? that,
when they were conquered by their enemies, and led into captivity, they
should neither continue in the place of their captivity, nor be
swallowed up and lost among their conquerors, but be scattered among
all the nations of the world, and hated by all nations for many ages,
and yet continue a people? Or could any description of the Jews,
written at this day, possibly be a more exact and lively picture of the
state they have now been in for many ages, than this prophetic
description given by Moses more than 3000 years ago?
The very same thing is in like manner continually predicted through all
the following prophets; that God would (Jer. ix. 16. Ezek. iv. 13.)
scatter them among the heathen; that he would (Jer. xv. 4. xxiv. 9.
xxix. 18. xxxiv. 17.) cause them to be removed into all kingdoms of the
earth; that he would (Ezek. v. 10, 12.) scatter them into all the
winds, and (Ezek. xx. 23. xxii. 15.) disperse them through the
countries of the heathen; that he would (Amos, ix. 9.) sift them among
all nations, like as corn is sifted in a sieve; that (Jer. xxiv. 9.
xxix. 18) in all the kingdoms of the earth, whither they should be
driven, they should be a reproach and a proverb, a taunt and a curse,
and an astonishment, and an hissing; and that they should (Hos. iii.
4.) abide many days without a king, and without a prince, and without a
sacrifice, and without an image, and without an ephod, and without
teraphim. And here concerning the predictions of Ezekiel, it is
remarkable in particular that they being spoken (See Ezek. i. 1. iii.
11. xi. 24.) in the very time of the Babylonian captivity, it is
therefore evident, from the time of his prophesying, as well as from
the nature and description of the thing itself, that he must needs be
understood of that latter (Tobit, xiv. 5.) "captivity into all places,"
which was to happen after the "fulfilling the time of that age" wherein
God was first to "bring them again" (out of the Babylonian captivity)
"into the land where they should build a temple," but not like to that
which afterwards (after their final return) should "be built for ever
with a glorious building." The fore-cited prophecies (I say) must of
necessity be understood of that wide and long dispersion which in the
New Testament also is expressly mentioned by (Luke xxi. 24) our
Saviour, and by (Rom. xi. 25.) St Paul.
It is also, further, both largely and distinctly predicted as well by
Moses himself, as by all the following prophets: that, notwithstanding
this unexampled dispersion of God's people, (Levit. xxvi. 44.) yet, for
all that, when they be in the land of their enemies, God will not
destroy them utterly; but (Deut. xxx. 1, 2, 3, 4.) when they shall call
to mind among all the nations whither God has driven them, and shall
return unto the Lord, he will turn their captivity, and gather them
from all the nations,--from the utmost parts of heaven,--(Deut. iv.
30.) even in the latter days: That (Jer. xxx. 11.) though he makes a
full end of all other nations, yet will he not make a full end of them;
but (Isa. x. 21, 22. vi. 13. Jer. xxiii. 3. Ezek. vi. 8, 9.) a remnant
of them shall be preserved, and return out of all countries whither God
has driven them: That he (Amos, ix. 9.) will sift the house of Israel
among all nations, like as corn is sifted in a sieve, yet shall not the
least grain fall upon the earth: That (Isa. xi. 11.-16. xxvii. 13.) the
Lord shall set his hand again the second time, to recover the remnant
of his people,--and shall set up an ensign for the nations, and shall
assemble the outcasts of Israel, and gather together the dispersed of
Judah, from the four corners of the earth: For (Isa. xliii. 5, 6. Jer.
xvi. 15. xxiii. 7, 8. xxxi. 8-12. xxxii. 37, &c. Ezek. xi. 15, 16, 17.
xx. 41. xxviii. 25. xxxiv. 12, 13. xxxvi. 24. xxxvii. 21. xxxix. 27,
28, 29.) I will bring thy seed from the east, saith the Lord, and
gather thee from the west; I will say to the north, give up; and to the
south, keep not back; bring my sons from far, and my daughters from the
ends of the earth: (Isa. xlix. 22. lx. 8, 9, 10. lxvi. 20.) Behold I
will lift up my hand to the Gentiles, and set up my standard to the
people, and they shall bring thy sons in their arms, and thy daughters
shall be carried upon their shoulders: (Isa. liv. 7, and the whole
chapter.) For a small moment have I forsaken thee, but with great mercy
will I gather thee; in a little wrath I hid my face from thee, for a
moment; but with everlasting kindness will I have mercy on thee. And
that these prophecies might not be applied to the return from the 70
years' captivity in Babylon, (which moreover was not a dispersion into
all nations,) they are expressly referred to the latter days, not only
by (Deut. iv. 30.) Moses, but by (Hos. iii. 4, 5.) Hosea, who lived
long after, (for the children of Israel shall abide many days without a
king, and without a prince, and without a sacrifice: afterward they
shall return, and seek the Lord their God, and David their king, and
shall fear the Lord and his goodness in the latter days;) and by
Ezekiel, who lived in the captivity itself, (Ezek. xxxviii. 8. xii. 14,
16.) after many days [speaking of those who should oppose the return of
the Israelites,] thou shalt be visited, in the latter years thou shalt
come into the land;--upon the people that are gathered out of the
nations;--in that day, when my people of Israel dwelleth safely,--thou
shalt come up against them,--it shall be in the latter days. These
predictions therefore necessarily belong to that age, when (Luke xxi.
24.) the times of the Gentiles shall be fulfilled, and (Rom. xi. 25,
29.) the fulness of the Gentiles be come in. And that, through all the
changes which have happened in the kingdoms of the earth, from the days
of Moses to the present time, which is more than 3000 years, nothing
should have happened to prevent the possibility of the accomplishment
of these prophecies, but, on the contrary, the state of the Jewish and
Christian nations at this day should be such as renders them easily
capable, not only of a figurative, but even of a literal completion in
every particular, if the will of God be so; this (I say) is a miracle,
which hath nothing parallel to it in the phenomena of nature.
Another instance, no less extraordinary, is as follows. Daniel foretels
(Dan. vii. 23.) a kingdom upon the earth, which shall be divers from
all kingdoms, (ver. 7.) divers from all that were before it, (ver. 19.)
exceeding dreadful, (ver. 23.) and shall devour the whole earth: That,
among the powers into which this kingdom shall be divided, there shall
arise one power (ver. 24.) divers from the rest, who (ver.8, 8. 20.)
shall subdue unto himself three of the first powers, and he shall have
(ver. 8. 20.) a mouth speaking very great things, and a look more stout
than his fellows. He shall (ver. 21.) make war with the saints, and
prevail against them; (ver. 25.) And he shall speak great words against
the Most High, and shall wear out the saints of the Most High, and
think to change times and laws; and they shall be given into his hand,
for a long season; even till (ver. 26. 27.) the judgment shall sit,
and--the kingdom under the whole heaven shall be given to the people of
the saints of the Most High. (Dan. xi. 36. &c.) He shall exalt himself
and magnify himself above every God, and shall speak marvellous things
against the God of Gods;--Neither shall he regard the God of his
fathers, (the God of Gods, as in the foregoing verse,) nor the desire
of women, (forbidding to marry, 1 Tim. iv. 3.) nor regard any God; for
he shall magnify himself above all: And in his estate shall he honour
[382] the God of forces; and a God [383] whom his fathers knew not
shall he honour.--Thus shall he do in the most strong holds with a
strange God, whom he shall acknowledge and increase with glory; and he
shall cause them to rule over many, and shall divide the land for gain.
Suppose now all this to be spoken by Daniel, of nothing more than the
short persecution under Antiochus Epiphanes; which that it cannot be I
have shown above: But suppose it were, and that it was all forged after
the event; yet this cannot be the case of St. Paul, and St. John, who
describe exactly a like power, and in like words; speaking of things to
come in the latter days, of things still future in their time, and of
which there was then no footsteps, no appearance in the world. The day
of Christ, saith St. Paul, (2 Thess. ii. 3, &c.) shall not come, except
there come a falling away first, and that man of sin be revealed, the
son of perdition, who opposeth and exalteth himself above all that is
called God, or that is worshipped; so that he, as God, [384] sitteth in
the temple of God, showing himself that he is God: Whose coming is
after the working of Satan, with all power, and signs, and lying
wonders, and with all deceivableness of unrighteousness. Again, (1 Tim
iv. 1, &c.) the spirit speaketh expressly, that in the latter times
some shall depart from the faith, giving heed to seducing spirits, and
doctrines of devils; [385] --forbidding to marry, and commanding to
abstain from meats, &c. St John, in like manner, prophesies of a wild
beast, or tyrannical power, to whom was given (Rev. xiii. 2, 5, 6, 7,
8, 12, 13, 14, 16, 17.) great authority, and a mouth speaking great
things, and blasphemies; and he opened his mouth in blasphemy against
God: And it was given unto him to make war with the saints, and to
overcome them; and power was given him over all kindreds and tongues,
and nations; and all that dwell upon the earth, shall worship him.--And
he that exerciseth his power before him,--doth great wonders,--and
deceiveth them that dwell on the earth, by the means of those miracles
which he had power to do.--And he causeth--that no man might buy or
sell, save he that had the mark of the name of the beast. And the kings
of the earth (Rev. xvii. 13, 15, 17.) have one mind, and shall give
their power and strength unto the beasts;--even peoples, and
multitudes, and nations, and tongues.--For God hath put in their hearts
[in the hearts of the kings,] to fulfil his will, and to agree, and
give their kingdom unto the beast, until the words of God shall be
fulfilled. The name of the person, in whose hands the (Rev. xvii. 3,
7.) reins or principal direction of the exercise of this power is
lodged, is (Rev. xvii. 5.) mystery, Babylon the great, the mother of
harlots, and abominations of the earth: (Ver. 2.) With whom the kings
of the earth [386] have committed fornication, and the inhabitants of
the earth have been made drunk with the wine of her fornication: And
she herself is (Rev. xvii, 6.) drunken with the blood of the saints,
and with the blood of the martyrs of Jesus: And (Rev. xviii. 23, 24.)
by her [387] sorceries are all nations deceived: And in her is found
the blood of prophets, and of saints, and of all that are slain upon
the earth. And this person, [the political person,] to whom these
titles and characters belong, is (Rev. xvii. 18.) that great city,
(standing (ver. 9) upon seven mountains,) which reigneth over the kings
of the earth.
If in the days of St Paul, and St John, there was any footstep of such
a sort of power as this in the world; or if there ever had been any
such power in the world; or if there was then any appearance of
probability that could make it enter into the heart of man to imagine
that there ever could be any such kind of power in the world, much less
in (2 Thess. ii. 4.) the temple or church of God; and if there be not
now such a power actually and conspicuously exercised in the world; and
if any picture of this power drawn, after the event, can now describe
it more plainly and exactly than it was originally described in the
words of the prophecy; then may it with some degree of plausibleness be
suggested that the prophecies are nothing more than enthusiastic
imaginations.
Thirdly; Of the testimony of our Saviour's disciples as an evidence of
the truth of the Christian revelation. The chief evidence of the facts
on which the truth and certainty of the Christian revelation depend, to
us who live now at this distance of time, is the testimony of our
Saviour's followers; which, in all its circumstances, was the most
credible, certain, and convincing evidence that ever was given to any
matter of fact in the world.
To make the testimony of our Saviour's followers a sufficient evidence
to us in this case, there can be required but these three things: What
things are requisite to make the testimony of our Saviour's disciples a
complete evidence. 1. That it be certain the apostles could not be
imposed upon themselves: 2. That it be certain they neither had nor
could have any design to impose upon others: And, 3. That it be certain
their testimony is truly conveyed down to us unto this day. All which
things are indeed abundantly certain, and clear enough to satisfy any
reasonable and unprejudiced person.
For 1. That the apostles could not be imposed upon themselves. That the
apostles could not be imposed upon themselves, is evident from what has
been already said concerning the nature, and number, and publicness, of
our Saviour's miracles: They conversed from the beginning with our
Saviour himself; they heard with their ears, and saw with their eyes;
they looked upon, and they handled with their hands of the word of
life, as St John expresses it, (1 John, i. 1.) They saw all the
prophecies of the Old Testament precisely fulfilled in his life and
doctrine, his sufferings and death: They saw him confirm what he
taught, with such mighty and evident miracles, as his bitterest and
most malicious enemies could not but confess to be supernatural, even
at the same time that they obstinately blasphemed the Holy Spirit that
worked them: They saw him alive after his passion, by many infallible
proofs; he appearing, not only to one or two, but to all the eleven,
several times, and once to above five hundred together. And this, not
merely in a transient manner, but they conversed with him familiarly
for no less than forty days, and at last they beheld him ascend visibly
into heaven; and soon after they received the Spirit, according to his
promise. These were such sensible demonstrations of his being a teacher
sent from heaven, and, consequently, that his doctrine was an immediate
and express revelation of the will of God, that, if the apostles, even
though they had been men of the weakest judgments and strongest
imaginations that can be supposed, could be all and every one of them
deceived in all these several instances; men can have no use of their
senses, nor any possible proof of any facts whatsoever, nor any means
to distinguish the best attested truths in the world, from enthusiastic
imaginations.
2. That the apostles could have no design of imposing upon others. It
is certain the apostles neither had nor could have any design of
imposing upon others. This is evident both from the nature of the
things they did and suffered, and from the characters of the persons
themselves: They confirmed what they taught by signs and miracles; they
lived according to the doctrine they preached, though manifestly
contrary to all the interests and pleasures of this present world; and,
which deceivers can never be supposed to do, they died with all
imaginable cheerfulness and joy of mind, for the testimony of their
doctrine and the confirmation of their religion. This, I say, is what
deceivers can never possibly be supposed to do: For it is very
remarkable the apostles did not lay down their lives for their
opinions, (which enthusiasts may possibly be supposed to do,) but in
attestation to facts of their own knowledge: They were innocent and
plain men, that had no bad ends to serve, nor preferment to hope for in
the world: Their religion itself taught them to expect, not dominion
and glory, not the praise of men, not riches and honour, not power and
ease, not pleasure nor profit,--but poverty and want, trouble and
vexation, persecution and oppression, imprisonments, banishments, and
death: These things are not the marks and tokens of impostors. Besides
the success and event of their undertaking, that plain and illiterate
men should be able to preach their doctrine to many different nations,
of different languages, and prevail also in establishing the belief of
it; that they should all agree exactly in their testimony, and none of
them be prevailed upon, either by hopes or fears, to desert their
companions, and discover the imposture, if there had been any; these
things plainly show that their doctrine was more than human, and not a
contrivance to impose upon the world. This argument is excellently
urged by Eusebius: Is it a thing possible to be conceived, saith he,
that deceivers and unlearned men, men that understood no other language
but their mother tongue, [388] should ever think of attempting so
extravagant a thing as to travel over all nations? and not only so, but
that they should be able also to accomplish their design, and establish
their doctrine in all parts of the world? Consider, moreover, how
remarkable a thing it is, that they should in no respect disagree one
from another in the account they gave of the actions of Christ. For if,
in all questions of fact, and in all trials at law, and in all ordinary
disputes, the agreement of several witnesses is always accounted
sufficient to determine satisfactorily the matter in question; is it
not an abundant evidence of the truth in this case, that twelve
apostles, and seventy disciples, and innumerable other believers, have
borne witness to the actions of Christ, with the most exact and perfect
agreement among themselves; and not only so, but have endured also all
kinds of torments, and even death itself, to confirm their testimony?
Again, that illiterate men, saith he, [389] should preach the name of
Christ in all parts of the world, some of them in Rome itself, the
imperial city, others in Persia, others in Armenia, others in Parthia,
others in Scythia, others in India, and the farthest parts of the
world, and others beyond the sea, in the British isles: This I cannot
but think to be a thing far exceeding the power of man, much more the
power of ignorant and unlearned men, and still much more the power of
cheats and deceivers. And again: No one of them, saith he, [390] being
ever terrified at the torments and deaths of others, forsook his
companions, or ever preached contrary to them, and detected the
forgery. Nay, on the contrary, that one, who did forsake his master in
his life-time, and betray him to his enemies, being self-condemned,
destroyed himself with his own hands. And much more to the same
purpose, may be found, excellently said by the same author, in the
seventh chapter of the third book of his Demonstratio Evangelica.
3. That the apostle's testimony had been truly conveyed down to us. It
is very certain, that the apostles' testimony concerning the works and
doctrine of Christ is truly and without corruption conveyed down to us,
even unto this day; for they left this their testimony in their
writings: Which writings have been delivered down to us by an
uninterrupted succession, through all intermediate ages. Their books
were all translated very early into several languages, and dispersed
through all parts of the world; and have most of them been acknowledged
to be the genuine writings of those whose names they bear, even by the
bitterest enemies of Christianity in all ages. Passages, containing the
most material doctrines, have been cited out of them by numberless
authors, who lived in every age, from the very days of the apostles
unto this time; so that there is no room or possibility of any
considerable corruption, such as might in any wise diminish our
certainty of the truth of the whole. In sum; there is no matter of fact
in the world, attested in any history, with so many circumstances of
credibility, with so many collateral evidences, and in every respect
attended with so many marks of truth, as this concerning the doctrine
and works of Christ.
Of the authority of the books of Holy Scripture. And here, by the way,
it is to be observed, that the peculiar authority which we attribute to
the books of Holy Scripture contained in the New Testament, is founded
in this; that they were written or dictated by the apostles themselves.
The apostles were indued with the miraculous gifts of the Holy Ghost,
at Pentecost: And this not only enabled them to preach the doctrine of
Christ with power, but also effectually secured them from making any
error, mistake, or false representation of it. And the very same
authority, that by this singular privilege was added to their
preaching, it is manifest, ought, for the same reason, to be equally
attributed to their writings also. Now, all the books of the New
Testament were either written by the apostles; or, which is the very
same thing, approved and authorized by them. Most of the books were
uncontrovertedly written by the apostles themselves, St Paul having
been made one of that number by a commission from heaven, no less
visible and sensible than that which was granted to the rest at
Pentecost. And those books which were written by the companions of the
apostles were either dictated, or at least approved and authorised by
the apostles themselves. Thus, Eusebius expressly tells us, that St
Peter reviewed and approved the gospel of St Mark, and that [391] it
was this approbation that authorised it to be received by the churches.
And Irenæus; that what St Mark wrote was dictated by St Peter; [392]
and that the gospel of St Luke was only a transcript of St Paul's
preaching. [393] And Tertullian in like manner; [394] St Mark was only
St Peter's scribe, and St Luke St Paul's. And Eusebius; that St John
[395] also reviewed the Gospels of St Mark and St Luke, and confirmed
the truth of them. And, to mention no more, the same historian tells
us, that (besides some smaller reasons drawn from some mistaken
passages in the book itself) the chief reason why the authority of the
Epistle to the Hebrews was questioned by some, was [396] because they
thought it not to be written by St Paul himself.
__________________________________________________________________
[359] Peusteon de auton, ei pote tis allos toioutos planos historetai,
praotetos kai epieikeias sophrosunes te kai tes alles aretes didaskalos
tois apatomenois gegonos aitios,, &c.--Easeb. Demonstrat. Evangelic.
lib. 3. c. 3.
[360] Dia ti ouchi kai bebasanismenos tou epangellom?nous tas donameis
exetasomen apo tou biou kai tou hethous kai ton epakolouthounton tais
dunamesin, etoi eis blaben ton anthropon, e eis hethon
epanorthosin.--Origen. advers. Cels. lib. 2.. Meson toinun sauton
stesas ton peri tou Aristeou ginomenon, kai ton peri tou Iesou
histor9oumenon, hide ei me ek tou apobantos, kai ton hopheloume_on eis
hethon epanorthosin kai eulabeian ten pros ton epi pasi theon, estin
eipein; hote pisteuteon men hos ouk atheei genomenois tois peri Iesou
hestoroumenois, ouchi de tois peri tes Prokonnesiou Aristeou. Ti men
gar boulomene he p9ronoia ta peri ton Aristean paradoxa epragmateueto,
kai ti hophelesai to ton anthropon genei boulomene, ta telik^uta (hos
oiei) epideiknuto, ook echeis legein.--Id. lib. 3.
[361] Very remarkable also is the history recorded by a heathen writer
of what happened upon Julian's attempting to rebuild the temple:
Imperii sui memoriam magnitudine operum gestiens propagare, ambitiosum
quondam apud Hierosolymam templum, quod post multa et interneciva
certamina obsidente Vespasiano posteaque Tito ægrè est expugnatum,
instaurare sumptibus cogitabat immodicis; negotiumque maturandum Alypio
dederat Antiochensi, qui olim Britannias curaverat, pro præfectis. Cù m
itaque rei idem instaret Alypius, juvaretque provinciæ rector; metuendi
globi flammarum prope fundamenta crebris assultibus erumpentes fecere
locum exustis aliquoties operantibus inaccessum; hocque modo, elemento
destinatius repellente, cessavit inceptum.--Ammian. Marcellin. lib. 22.
sub initio.
[362] See above, prop. vii. sec. 4.
[363] Or written unto life, rchyvm hvtvv So Dan. xii. 1. every one that
shall be found written in the book.
[364] The introduction to these words is very solemn: Oh! that my words
were now----graven with an iron pen and lead in the rock for ever. And
how they were anciently understood, appears from that addition to the
end of the book of Job in the LXX, ge'graptai de, auton palin
anastesesthai, meth' hon ho kurios anistesin. So Job died, being old
and full of days. "But it is written that he shall rise again with
those whom the Lord raises up."
[365] vny ,rvq The sons of righteousness.
[366] Ezek. xlvii. 9, 12. compared with Rev. xxii. 1, 2. He showed me a
pure river of water of life:--And of either side of the river, was
there the tree of life, which bare twelve manner of fruits, and yielded
her fruit every month, and the leaves of the tree were for the healing
of the nations.
[367] Gal. iii. 16. He saith not, and to seeds, as of many, but as of
one, and to thy seed; that is to say, in the promise to Abraham, the
Scripture uses the ambiguous word seed, not in the plural sense, but in
the singular sense.
[368] 'vyk phd' yvts 'd dnvk, Wonderful, Counsellor, [LXX, Megales
boules gagelos. as Mal. iii. 1, ho angelos tes diathekes XX .] the
Mighty, the Potent One, the Father of the age to come. [Vulg. Pater
futuri seucli. Compare Heb. ii. 5.]
[369] The Shiloh, unto whom shall the gathering of the people be. Gen.
xlix. 10.
[370] With reference to this it is, that Christ in the gospel
perpetually styles himself the son of man, and once the son of man
which is in [which in the prophecy is described as coming in the clouds
of] heaven, John iii. 13: And tells his disciples that they shall see
the son of man coming in the clouds of heaven, Matt. xxiv. 30. And the
high priest, that hereafter ye shall see the son of man sitting on the
right hand of Power, and coming in the clouds of heaven, Matt. xxvi.
64.
[371] Seven septendaries (or weeks) of years (as the word is used, Gen.
xxix. 27. That is to say, forty-nine years, the number of years
appointed until the jubilee, Levit. xxv. 8, 9, 10. Concerning the other
number of Daniel in this place I shall have occasion to speak
presently.
[372] See above, Prop. VII. 4.
[373] Percrebuerat Oriente toto vetus et constans opinio, esse in
fatis, ut Judæâ profecti rerum potirentur.--Sueton. Pluribus persuasio
inerat, antiquis sacerdotum libris contineri, eo ipso tempore fore, ut
valesceret Oriens, profectique Judæâ rerum potirentur.--Tacit.
[374] In some few places there is reasonable ground for a worse
suspicion. As, for instance, Psal. xxii. 16. where the sense most
evidently shows it ought to be read, and the LXX version shows it
anciently was read, k'rv or krv "they pierc'd my hands and my feet;"
the Jewish masters, in all their correct Hebrew editions, have written
it, k'ry "as a lion my hands and my feet;" which has no tolerable sense
at all.
[375] Prideaux Connection, part I, book ii. page 67. edit. fol.
[376] The fame of which was so early spread, that Ezekiel, who was
contemporary with Daniel, plainly alludes to it when he says of the
prince of Tyre, chap. xxviii. 3. thou art wiser than Daniel; there is
no secret that they can hide from thee.
[377] Weeks or septenaries, of years. Compare Gen. xxix. 27. Num. xiv.
34. Ezek. iv. 6.
[378] This and the following observation was extracted out of a MS.
communicated by Sir Isaac Newton; and was published in his life-time in
the foregoing editions of this discourse, with his express consent.
[379] Tois Hierosolumois, anokodomethe to teichos, ogdoo kai aikosto
tes Xerxou Basileias etei, meni ennato; telos de ton teichon labonton,
&c.--Josephus, Antiq. Judaic. lib. 11. cap. 5. Compare Nehem. v. 14.
[380] Three years and a half, or 1260 days, is, according to the
analogy of all the forementioned numbers, 1260 years.
[381] There has prevailed among learned men a very important error as
if the 1260 days, (or years) here spoken of, took their beginning from
the rise of the tyranny here described: Whereas, on the contrary, the
words of Daniel are express; that, not from the time of his rise, but
after his having made war with the saints, and from the time of their
being given into his hand, should be a time, and times, and the
dividing of time, chap. vii. 24, 25. And St John no less expressly
says, that the time, not of the two witnesses prophesying, (for in part
of that time they had great power,) but of their prophesying in
sackcloth, should be a thousand two hundred and threescore days, Rev.
xi. 3. And the persecuted woman, after her flight, was to be actually
in the wilderness, (and in her place there, of riches and honour,) a
thousand two hundred and threescore days, chap. xii. 6. Wherefore also
the forty and two months, (the very same period,) during which time
power was given unto the wild beasts to continue, (in the original it
is, poiesai, to do what he pleased, (Rev. xiii. 5.) evidently ought not
to be reckoned from his rise, or from the time when the ten kings
(chap. xvii. 12.) received power with him, but from the time of his
having totally overcome the saints, and of his being worshipped by all
that dwell upon the earth, ch. xiii. 7. 8.
[382] Gods protector, as it is in the margin of the Bible, or saints
protectors.
[383] Changing time and laws, ch. vii. 25. setting up new religions.
[384] It is therefore a Christian (not an infidel) power, that he here
speaks of.
[385] Doctrines, concerning dæmons, that is, ghosts or souls of (good
or bad) men departed. Epiphanius, citing this text, alleges the
following words, as part of the text itself; esontai gar, phesi nekris
latreuontes, hos kai en to Israel esebasthesan. "For they shall be,
says the apostle, worshippers of the dead, even as the dead were
anciently worshipped in Israel." And he applies the whole to the
worshippers of the blessed Virgin.--Hæres. 78. § 22.
[386] Have been led into idolatrous practices.
[387] Pharmakeia, (sophois pharmakois) Methods of making men religious
without virtue.
[388] Kakeino de pos ou meston ekplexeos, to planous aneras kai
idiotas, mete lalein mete akouein pleon tes patriou phones
epistamenous, me monon diansethenai tolmesai proelthein epi ten ton
ethnon hap8anton periodon, alla kai proelthontas katorthosai to
epitedeuma; Skepsai de, hopoion esti, kai to medena medamou diaphonon
exenenkein peri ton praxeon tou Iesou logon. Ei gar epi panton
amphignooumenon pragmaton, en te tois kata nomous dikasteriois, kai en
tais koinais amphisbetesesi, ton marturon sumphonia kuroi to
amphignooumenon; pos ouk an he aletheia kai epi tonde sustaie, dodeka
men onton Apostolon, ebdomekonta de Matheton, muriou te plethous touton
eksos, hapanton thaumasten sumphonian epidedeigmenon, kai marturesanton
ge tois hupo tou Iesou pepragmenois, ouk anidroti, dia de basanon
upomones, kai pases aikias kai thanatou.--Euseb. Demonstrat. Evang.
lib. 3. cap. 2.
[389] Keruttein du agroikous andras eis pantas to tou Iesou onuma, kai
tous men auton ten Rhomaion archen kai auten te ten basilikotaten polin
neimasthai; tous de ten Person, tous de ten Armenion, heterous de to
Parthon ethnos, kai au palin to Skuthon, tinas de ede kai ep' auta tes
oikoumenes elthein ta akra, epi te ten Indon phthasai choran, kai
eterous huper ton Okeanon parelthein epi tas kaloumenas Brettanikas
nesous; tauta ouk et' ego ge hegoumai kata anthropon einai, meti ge
kat8a euteleis kai idiotas, pollou dei kata planous kai goetas.--Id.
ibid. cap. 7.
[390] Oudeis te auton popote ta sumbanta tos proaneremenois tresas,
exeste tes hetairias, oudu antekeruxe tois allois, eis phos agagon ta
suntetheimana. Alla kai ho zonta prodounai tollesas auton, autocheiria
kath' heautou parachrema ten diken epespasato--Id. ibid.
[391] Kurosai te ten graphen eis enteuxin tais ekklesiais.--Euseb.
Histor. l. 2. c. 15.
[392] Marcus, discipulus et interpres Petri, quæ à Petro annuntiata
erant, edidit.--Iren. lib. 3. c. 1.
[393] Lucas, sectator Pauli, quod ab illo prædicabatur Evangelium, in
libro condidit.--Id. ibid. Vide et Tertullian. adv. Marcion, lib. 4.
[394] Licet et Marcus quod edidit, Petri adfirmetur, cujus interpres
Marcus; nam et Lucæ digestum, Paulo adscribere solent.--Tertull. adv.
Marcion. lib. 4.
[395] Hede de Markou kai Louka ton kat' autous euangelion ten hekdosin
pepoiemenon, Ioannen apodexasthai men phasin, aletheian autois
epimarturesanta;--Euseb. Hist. l.. 3. c. 24.
[396] Tines hezetekasi ten pros Hebraious, pros tes Romaion ekklesias
hos me Paulou ousan auten antilegesthai phesantes,--Id. lib. 3. c. 3.
__________________________________________________________________
Proposition XV.
XV. Proposition XV. Lastly; They who will not, by the arguments and
proofs before mentioned, be convinced of the truth and certainty of the
Christian religion, and be persuaded to make it the rule and guide of
all their actions, would not be convinced, (so far as to influence
their practice and reform their lives,) by any other evidence
whatsoever; no, not though one should rise on purpose from the dead to
endeavour to convince them.
That the evidence which God has afforded us of the truth of our
religion is abundantly sufficient. From what has been said, upon the
foregoing heads, it is abundantly evident that men are not called upon
to believe the Christian religion without very reasonable and
sufficient proof; much less are they [397] required to set up faith in
opposition to reason; or to believe any thing for that very reason,
because it is incredible. On the contrary, God has given us all the
proofs of the truth of our religion, that the nature of the thing would
bear, or that were reasonable either for God to give, or men to expect.
And unless God should work upon men by such methods, as are wholly
inconsistent with the design of religion and the nature of virtue and
vice, which we are sure he will never do, nothing could have been done
more than has already been done, to convince men of the truth of
religion, and to persuade them to embrace their own happiness. And
indeed no reasonable man can fail of being persuaded by the evidence we
now have. For if, in other cases, we assent to those things as certain
and demonstrated, which, if our faculties of judging and reasoning do
not necessarily deceive us, do upon the most impartial view appear
clearly and plainly to be true; there is the same reason why in moral
and religious matters we should look upon those things likewise to be
certain and demonstrated, which, upon the exactest and most deliberate
judgment we are capable of making, do appear to us to be as clearly and
certainly true, as it is certain that our faculties do not necessarily
and unavoidably deceive us, in all our judgments concerning the nature
of God, concerning the proper happiness of man, and concerning the
difference of good and evil. And if, in other cases, we always act
without the least hesitation, upon the credit of good and sufficient
testimony, and look upon that man as foolish and ridiculous, who
sustains great losses, or lets slip great opportunities and advantages
in business, only by distrusting the most credible and well-attested
things in the world; it is plain there is the same reason why we should
do so also in matters of religion. So that unless our actions be
determined by some other thing than by reason and right judgment, the
evidence which we have of the great truths of religion ought to have
the same effect upon our lives and actions as if they were proved to us
by any other sort of evidence that could be desired.
That the cause of men's unbelief is not want of better evidence to
prove the great truths of religion. It is true, the resurrection of
Christ, and his other mighty works, must, after all, be confessed not
to be such ocular demonstrations of the truth of his divine commission
to after generations, as they were to those men who then lived, and saw
him, and conversed with him. But since the matters of fact are as
clearly proved to us, as it is possible for any matter of fact, at that
distance of time, to be; since the evidence of this is as great, and
greater, than of most of those things on which men venture the whole of
their secular affairs, and on which they are willing to spend all their
time and pains: Since (I say) the case is thus: He that will rather
venture all that he can possibly enjoy, or suffer; he that will run the
hazard of losing eternal happiness, and falling into eternal misery,
rather than believe the most credible and rational thing in the world,
merely because he does not see it with his eyes, it is plain that that
man does not disbelieve the thing because he thinks the evidence of it
not sufficiently strong, but because it is contrary to some particular
vice of his, which makes it his interest that it should not be true;
and for that reason he might also have disbelieved it though he had
seen it himself. Men may invent what vain pretences they please, to
excuse their infidelity and their wickedness; but certainly that man
who can despise the authority both of reason and scripture in
conjunction; who can elude the plainest evidence of matter of fact; who
can be deaf to all the promises and kind admonitions of the Gospel, and
to all the threatenings and terrible denunciations of the wrath of God,
made known in good measure by the light of nature, and confirmed by the
addition of express revelation; certainly (I say) that man must have
some other reason for his unbelief than the pretended want of
sufficient evidence. Did men follow the unprejudiced judgment of their
own minds, and the impartial dictates of natural reason, the least
possibility of obtaining eternal happiness, or the least suspicion of
falling into endless misery, would immediately determine them to make
it the great study and business of their lives to obtain the one and to
avoid the other. If then we see men act directly contrary to this
natural principle, and almost wholly neglect these things, not only
when there is a fair appearance and probability of their being true,
which the light of nature itself affords; but also when there is all
reasonable evidence given of their being certainly true, by express
revelation in the Gospel, is it not very plain that such men are
governed, not by reason and the force of evidence, but by some other
very different cause of their actions?
But that wickedness and ungoverned lusts are the only causes of
obstinate infidelity. What that cause is, is very apparent from the
lives and actions of most of those persons who pretend want of evidence
to be the ground of their infidelity. Their lusts, their appetites,
their affections are interested: They are lovers of vice and
debauchery, and slaves to evil habits and customs; and therefore they
are not willing to discern the evidence which would compel them to
believe that which yet they cannot believe with any comfort so long as
they resolve not to part with their beloved vices. Their hearts and
affections are habitually fixed upon things here below; and therefore
they will not attend to the force of any argument that would raise
their affections to things above. They are enslaved to the sensual
pleasures and sinful enjoyments of earth; and therefore they will not
hearken to any reasonable conviction which would persuade them to
relinquish these present gratifications for the future and more
spiritual joys of heaven. The love of this present world has blinded
their eyes; [398] and therefore they receive not the things of the
spirit of God, for they are foolishness unto them: Neither can they
know them, because they are spiritually discerned. In a word, the true
and only reason why men love darkness rather than light, is, because
their deeds are evil.
And so long as men are under the dominion of their lusts, they would
not be convinced, though the evidence of religion was even much
stronger than it is. And this reason affords a sufficient account
indeed why men should be very unwilling to believe the doctrines of
Christianity. If they are resolved not to reform their lives, it is no
wonder they care not to discern the evidence of those truths which must
needs make them very uneasy in the midst of the enjoyment of all their
sinful pleasures. In this case, were the proofs of the truth of our
religion much stronger than they are, or than they can be imagined or
desired to be, yet still these men would be in the very same case, and
perpetually want stronger and stronger evidence. It is true, many men,
who now are conscious and willing to acknowledge that they act contrary
to all the reasonable evidence and convictions of religion, are
nevertheless very apt to imagine within themselves, that if the great
truths of religion were proved to them by some stronger evidence, they
should by that means be worked upon to act otherwise than they do: But
if the true reason why these men act thus foolishly, is not because the
doctrines of religion are not sufficiently evidenced, but because they
themselves are, without allowing themselves time for consideration,
hurried away by some unruly passions to act directly contrary to all
reason and evidence; it is plain (unless God should irresistibly compel
them) they might well continue to act as they do, though the evidence
of these things were really greater than it is. They are willing fondly
to imagine, that if they had lived in our Saviour's time; if they had
heard his preaching, and seen his miracles; if they had had the
advantage of beholding those mighty works which he performed for the
proof of his divine commission, as the Jews then had;--they should not,
like them, have rejected the counsel of God against themselves, but
with all cheerfulness have believed his doctrine, and embraced his
religion. They fancy they should immediately have become disciples of
Christ; and that the truths which he taught would have had a most
powerful influence upon the whole course of their lives. And if their
hearts and affections were not set upon this world, more than upon the
next; if they valued not the present sinful enjoyments of sense above
the expectation of the glory that shall be revealed, most certainly
they would do the same now. But if their hearts be set upon earthly
things, and their passions be stronger than all the arguments of
reason; if they do indeed so love the pleasures of sin now, as that
they cannot persuade themselves, by all the motives of religion, to
live like Christians, we need not doubt to affirm, that they might very
well have been in the same case though they had lived in our Saviour's
time. The Jews are a notorious and standing instance, how far
prejudice, envy, pride, and affection, are able to prevail over the
strongest convictions. When our Saviour began to preach that he was
sent from God to instruct them in their duty, they required a sign of
him, and they would believe him; but when he had worked so many
miracles, that even the world itself could not contain the books if
they should all be written, they persisted still in their infidelity.
When they saw him hanging upon the cross, and thought themselves secure
of him, they said, let him now come down from the cross, and we will
believe him: (Matt. xxvii. 42.) But when he arose out of the grave,
wherein he had lain three days, which was a much greater and more
convincing miracle, they grew more hardened and obstinate in their
unbelief.
Nay, not even tho' one should rise on purpose from the dead to convince
them. Others there are, who imagine that if they could but be convinced
of the truth of another world, by the appearance of one sent directly
from that unknown state, they would immediately become new creatures.
But if God should satisfy their unreasonable demands, by sending one on
purpose from the dead to convince them, there is little room to doubt,
but as they harkened not to Moses and the prophets, to Christ and his
apostles, so neither would they be persuaded by one rising on purpose
from the dead. They might indeed be at first surprised and terrified at
the appearance of so unusual and unexpected a messenger: But as wicked
men upon a bed of sickness, at the amazing approach of death and
eternity, resolve, in the utmost anguish of horror and despair, to
amend their lives and forsake their sins; but as soon as the terror is
over, and the danger of death past, return to their old habits of sin
and folly;--so it is more than probable it would be in the present
case. Should God send a messenger from the dead, to assure men of the
certainty of a future state, and the danger of their present
wickedness, as soon as the fright was over, and their present terrible
apprehensions ceased, it is by no means impossible or improbable that
their old vicious habits and beloved sins should again by degrees
prevail over them. Some there are, in our present age, who pretend to
be convinced of the being of spirits, by the powerful demonstration of
their own senses; and yet we do not observe that their lives are more
remarkably eminent for exemplary piety, than other good men's, who,
being convinced by the rational evidence of the gospel, go on in a
sober, constant, and regular exercise of virtue and righteousness.
It is not therefore for want of sufficient evidence That therefore to
make men judge rightly of the evidence of religion, it is absolutely
necessary, in the first place, that, laying aside prejudice, lust, and
passion, they become impartially willing to embrace all truth, and to
obey all reasonable obligations which shall at any time be made known
to them. that men disbelieve the great truths of religion; but plainly
for want of integrity, and of dealing ingenuously and impartially with
themselves, that they suffer not the arguments of religion to have that
weight and influence upon them, which in the judgment of right reason
they ought manifestly to have. So long as men permit their passions and
appetites to over-rule their reason, it is impossible they should have
due apprehensions in matters of religion, or make any right and true
judgment concerning these things. Men that are strongly biassed and
prejudiced even in worldly affairs, it is well known how hard and
difficult it is for them to judge according to reason, and to suffer
the arguments and evidences of truth to have their due weight with
them. How much more in matters of religion, which concern things future
and remote from sense, must it needs be, that men's present interests,
lusts, and passions, will pervert their judgment, and blind their
understandings! Wherefore, men that pretend to be followers of right
reason, if they will judge truly of the reasonableness and credibility
of the Christian revelation, it is absolutely necessary that, in the
first place, in order to that end, they become impartially willing to
embrace whatever shall, upon the whole, appear to be agreeable to
reason and truth, and grounded upon good evidence, without interesting
their lusts and appetites in the judgment; and that, before all things,
they resolve to be guided in all their actions by whatever rule shall
at any time be well proved to them to be the will of God. And when they
have put themselves into this temper and frame of mind, then let them
try if they can any longer reject the evidence of the gospel. If any
man will do his will, he shall know of the doctrine whether it be of
God. (Johnvii. 17.) For, them that are meek, God will guide in
judgment; (Ps. xxv. 8.) and such as are gentle, them he will teach his
way.
That men of such a disposition would think it their greatest wisdom to
be truly religious, even tho' the evidences of religion were much less
than they are. Indeed, men that are of this good disposition, willing
to be governed by reason, and not prejudiced by lusts and vicious
appetites, could not but give their assent to the doctrines of
Christianity, upon account of the very intrinsic excellency and
reasonableness of the things themselves, even though the external
evidence of their certainty had been much less than it at present is.
Nay, were there hardly any other evidence at all, than barely the
excellency and reasonableness, and natural probability of the great
truths of religion, together with the consideration of the vast
importance of them; yet even in that case it would be infinitely wisest
and most agreeable to reason, for men to live according to the rules of
the gospel. And though their faith extended no further than only to a
belief of the possibility of the truth of the Christian revelation, yet
even this alone ought in all reason to have weight enough to determine
reasonable creatures to live soberly, righteously, and godly. For is it
not plainly most reasonable, as an ancient writer expresses it, [399]
if each of the opposite opinions were equally doubtful and uncertain,
yet by all means to embrace and entertain that which brings some hope
along with it, rather than that which brings none? For on one side of
the question there is no danger at all of incurring any calamity, if
that which we believe and expect should at last prove false; but, on
the other side, there is the greatest hazard in the world, the loss of
eternal life, if the opinion which unbelievers rely upon should at last
prove an error. And again: [400] What say ye, O ye ignorant men, ye men
of miserable and most deplorable folly? Can ye forbear fearing within
yourselves that at least those things may possibly prove true which ye
now despise and mock at? Have ye not at least some misgivings of mind,
lest possibly that which ye now perversely and obstinately refuse to
believe, ye should at last be convinced of by sad experience, when it
will be too late to repent. Nor is this the judgment of Christian
writers only, but also of the wisest and most considerate heathens. We
ought to spare no pains, saith Plato, [401] to obtain the habits of
virtue and wisdom in this present life; for the prize is noble, and the
hope is very great. And Cicero: [402] They have gained a great prize
indeed who have persuaded themselves to believe, that, when death
comes, they shall perish utterly: What comfort is there; what is there
to be boasted of in that opinion? And again: If after death, saith he,
as some little and contemptible philosophers think, [403] I shall be
nothing, yet there is no danger that when we are all dead those
philosophers should laugh at me for my error.
But this is not our case. God has afforded us, as has been largely and
particularly shown in the foregoing discourse, many and certain proofs
of the truth of our religion; even as certain as any matter of fact is
capable of having. And we now exhort men to believe, not what is barely
possible, and excellent and probable, and of the utmost importance in
itself, but what moreover they have all the positive evidence and all
the reason in the world to oblige them to believe.
That God may require us to take notice of certain things, and to
inquire into them and consider them, at our peril. To conclude: No man
of reason can pretend to say but God may require us to take notice of
some things at our peril, to inquire into them, and to consider them
thoroughly. Any pretence of want of greater evidence will not excuse
carelessness or unreasonable prejudices, when God has vouchsafed us all
that evidence which was either fit for him to grant, or reasonable for
men to desire; or indeed which the nature of the thing itself to be
proved was capable of.
__________________________________________________________________
[397] Allois de, hose dunamis, apodeiktikos di eroteseon kai apokriseon
proserchometha; Oude legomen, (to meta chleues hupo tou Kelso
eiremenon) hoti Pisteuson, hon eisegoumai soi, touton einai huion
Theou, kan e dedemenos atimotata, e kakolasmenos aischista----Oude
phamen, taute kai mallon pisteuson.--Orig. advers. Cels. lib. 1.
[398] 1 Cor. ii. 14. Enioi upokechumenous echousi tous ophthalmous, kai
me blepontas to phos tou heliou. Houto kai su, o anthrope, echeis
upokechumenous tous ophthalmous tes psuches sou upo ton amartematon kai
ton araxeon sou ton poneron.--Theophil. Antioch. l. 1.
[399] Non purior ratio est, ex duobus incertis et in ambigua
expectatione pendentibus, id potius credere, quod aliquas spes ferat,
quam quod nullas? In illo enim periculi nihil est, si, quod dicitur
imminere, cassum fiat et vacuum; in hoc, damnum est maximum (id est,
salutis amissio,) si, cum tempus advenerit, aperiatur hoc fuisse
mendacium.--Arnob. adv. Gentes, lib. 2.
[400] Quid dicitis, O nescii, etiam fletu et miseratione dignissimi?
ita non tam extimescitis, ne sorte hæc vera sint, quæ sunt despectui
vobis et præbent materiam risus? nec saltem vobiscum sub obscuris
cogitationibus volvitis, ne, quod hoc die credere obstinata renuitis
perversitate, redarguat serum tempus, et irrevocabilis pnitentia
castiget?--Id. ibid.
[401] Chre panta poiin, hoste aretes kai phroneseos en to bio
metaschein; kalon gar to hathlon, kai he elpis megale.--Plato in Phæd.
[402] Præclarum nescio quid adepti sunt, qui didicerunt se, cum tempus
mortis venisset, totos esse perituros.----Quid habet ista res aut
lætabile aut gloriosum?--Cic. Tusc. Qu. lib. 1.
[403] Sin mortuus, ut quidam minuti philosophi censent, nihil sentiam,
non vereor ne hunc errorem meum mortui philosophi irrideant.--Cic. De
Senect.
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________
LETTERS
TO
THE REVEREND DR CLARKE,
FROM A GENTLEMAN IN GLOUCESTERSHIRE:
RELATING
TO THE FIRST VOLUME OF THE FOREGOING
SERMONS;
WITH THE DOCTOR'S ANSWERS.
__________________________________________________________________
THE FIRST LETTER.
"Reverend Sir,"
"I suppose you will wonder at the present trouble from one who is a
perfect stranger to you, though you are not so to him; but I hope the
occasion will excuse my boldness. I have made it, sir, my business,
ever since I thought myself capable of such sort of reasoning, to prove
to myself the being and attributes of God: And being sensible that it
is a matter of the last consequence, I endeavoured, after a
demonstrative proof, not only more fully to satisfy my own mind, but
also, in order to defend the great truths of natural religion, and
those of the Christian revelation which follow from them, against all
opposers; but must own with concern, that hitherto I have been
unsucessful; and though I have got very probable arguments, yet I can
go but a very little way with demonstration in the proof of those
things. When first your book on those subjects (which, by all, whom I
have discoursed with, is so justly esteemed,) was recommended to me, I
was in great hopes of having all my inquiries answered; but since, in
some places, either through my not understanding your meaning, or what
else I know not, even that has failed me, I almost despair of ever
arriving to such a satisfaction as I aim at, unless by the method I now
use. You cannot but know, sir, that of two different expressions of the
same thing, though equally clear to some persons, yet, to others, one
of them is sometimes very obscure, though the other be perfectly
intelligible: Perhaps this may be my case here; and could I see those
of your arguments, of which I doubt, differently proposed, possibly I
might yield a ready assent to them. This, sir, I cannot but think a
sufficient excuse for the present trouble; it being such an one as I
hope may prevail for an answer, with one who seems to aim at nothing
more than that good work of instructing others."
"In your Demonstration of the Being and Attributes of God Prop. VI.
[edit. 2d, p. 69 and 70,] you propose to prove the infinity or
omnipresence of the self-existent being. The former part of the proof
seems highly probable, but the latter part, which seems to aim at
demonstration, is not to me convincing. The latter part of the
paragraph is, if I mistake not, an entire argument of itself, which
runs thus; to suppose a finite being to be self-existent, is to say
that it is a contradiction for that being not to exist, the absence of
which may yet be conceived without a contradiction; which is the
greatest absurdity in the world. The sense of these words [the absence
of which] seems plainly to be determined, by the following sentence, to
mean its absence from any particular place. Which sentence is to prove
it to be an absurdity; and is this; for if a being can, without a
contradiction, be absent from one place, it may, without a
contradiction, be absent from another place, and from all places. Now,
supposing this to be a consequence, all that it proves is, that if a
being can, without a contradiction, be absent from one place, at one
time, it may without a contradiction be absent from another place, and
so from all places, at different times; (for I cannot see, that if a
being can be absent from one place at one time, therefore it may
without a contradiction be absent from all places at the same time, i.
e. may cease to exist.) Now, if it proves no more than this, I cannot
see that it reduces the supposition to any absurdity. Suppose I could
demonstrate, that any particular man should live a thousand years; this
man might, without a contradiction, be absent from one, and from all
places, at different times; but it would not from thence follow that he
might be absent from all places at the same time, i. e. that he might
cease to exist. No; this would be a contradiction, because I am
supposed to have demonstrated that he should live a thousand years. It
would be exactly the same, if, instead of a thousand years, I should
say, for ever; and the proof seems the same, whether it be applied to a
self-existent or a dependent being. What else I have to offer is in
relation to your proof that the self-existent being must of necessity
be but one: Which proof is as follows, in Prop. VII, [edit. 2d. p.
74,]--to suppose two or more different natures existing of themselves,
necessarily and independent from each other, implies this plain
contradiction; that each of them being independent from the other, they
may either of them be supposed to exist alone; so that it will be no
contradiction to imagine the other not to exist, and consequently
neither of them will be necessarily existing. The supposition indeed
implies, that since each of these beings is independent from the other,
they may either of them exist alone, i. e. without any relation to, or
dependence on the other; but where is the third idea, to connect this
proposition and the following one, viz. so that it will be no
contradiction to imagine the other not to exist? Were this a
consequence of the former proposition, I allow it would be
demonstration, by the first corollary of Prop. III, [2d ed. p. 26;] but
since these two propositions [they may either of them be supposed to
exist alone,] and [so that it will be no contradiction to imagine the
other not to exist,] are very widely different; since likewise it is no
immediate consequence, that because either may be supposed to exist
independent from the other, therefore the other may be supposed not to
exist at all; how is what was proposed, proved? That the propositions
are different, I think is plain; and whether there be an immediate
connexion, every body that reads your book must judge for themselves. I
must say, for my own part, the absurdity does not appear at first
sight, any more than the absurdity of saying that the angles below the
base in an isosceles triangle are unequal; which, though it is
absolutely false, yet I suppose no one will lay down the contrary for
an axiom; because, though it is true, yet there is need of a proof to
make it appear so.
"Perhaps, it may be answered, that I have not rightly explained the
words, to exist alone;' and that they do not mean only to exist
independent from the other; but that existing alone means that nothing
exists with it. Whether this or the other was meant, I cannot
determine; but, whichever it was, what I have said will hold. For if
this last be the sense of those words, [they either of them may be
supposed to exist alone;] it indeed implies that it will be no
contradiction to suppose the other not to exist. But then I ask, how
come these two propositions to be connected: That, to suppose two
different natures existing of themselves, necessarily and independent
from each other, implies that each of them may be supposed to exist
alone in this sense? which is exactly the same as I said before, only
applied to different sentences. So that if existing alone be understood
as I first took it, I allow it is implied in the supposition; but
cannot see that the consequence is, that it will be no contradiction to
suppose the other not to exist. But if the words existing alone,' are
meant in the latter sense, I grant, that if either of them may be
supposed thus to exist alone, it will be no contradiction to suppose
the other not to exist. But then I cannot see, that to suppose two
different natures existing, of themselves, necessarily and independent
from each other, implies that either of them may be supposed to exist
alone in this sense of the words, but only that either of them may be
supposed to exist without having any relation to the other, and that
there will be no need of the existence of the one in order to the
existence of the other. But though, upon this account, were there no
other principle of its existence, it might cease to exist; yet, on the
account of the necessity of its own nature, which is quite distinct
from the other, it is an absolute absurdity to suppose it not to exist.
"Thus, sir, I have proposed my doubts, with the reasons of them: In
which, if I have wrested your words to another sense than you designed
them, or in any respect argued unfairly, I assure you it was without
design. So I hope you will impute it to mistake. And, if it will not be
too great a trouble, let me once more beg the favour of a line from
you, by which you will lay me under a particular obligation to be,
what, with the rest of the world, I now am,
"Reverend Sir,
Your most obliged Servant, &c."
Nov. 4. 1713.
__________________________________________________________________
THE ANSWER TO THE FIRST LETTER.
"Sir,"
"Did men who publish controversial papers, accustom themselves to write
with that candour and ingenuity with which you propose your
difficulties, I am persuaded almost all disputes might be very amicably
terminated, either by men's coming at last to agree in opinion, or at
least finding reason to suffer each other friendly to differ.
"Your two objections are very ingenious, and urged with great strength
and acuteness. Yet I am not without hopes of being able to give you
satisfaction in both of them. To your first, therefore, I answer:
Whatever may, without a contradiction, be absent from any one place at
any one time, may also, without a contradiction, be absent from all
places at all times. For, whatever is absolutely necessary at all, is
absolutely necessary in every part of space, and in every point of
duration. Whatever can at any time be conceived possible to be absent
from any one part of space, may, for the same reason, [viz. the
implying no contradiction in the nature of things,] be conceived
possible to be absent from every other part of space at the same time,
either by ceasing to be, or by supposing it never to have begun to be.
Your instance about demonstrating a man to live 1000 years, is what (I
think) led you into the mistake; and is a good instance to lead you out
of it again. You may suppose a man shall live 1000 years, or God may
reveal and promise he shall live 1000 years; and, upon that
supposition, it shall not be possible for the man to be absent from all
places in any part of that time. Very true; but why shall it not be
possible? Only because it is contrary to the supposition, or to the
promise of God; but not contrary to the absolute nature of things,
which would be the case if the man existed necessarily, as every part
of space does. In supposing you could demonstrate a man should live
1000 years, or one year, you make an impossible and contradictory
supposition. For though you may know certainly, (by revelation,
suppose,) that he will live so long, yet this is only the certainty of
a thing true in fact, not in itself necessary: And demonstration is
applicable to nothing but what is necessary in itself, necessary in all
places and at all times equally.
"To your second difficulty, I answer: What exists necessarily, not only
must so exist alone, as to be independent of any thing else; but (being
self-sufficient,) may also so exist alone as that every thing else may
possibly (or without any contradiction in the nature of things) be
supposed not to exist at all; and consequently, (since that which may
possibly be supposed not to exist at all, is not necessarily existent,)
no other thing can be necessarily existent. Whatever is necessarily
existing, there is need of its existence in order to the supposal of
the existence of any other thing; so that nothing can possibly be
supposed to exist, without presupposing and including antecedently the
existence of that which is necessary. For instance; the supposal of the
existence of any thing whatever, includes necessarily a presupposition
of the existence of space and time; and, if any thing could exist
without space or time, it would follow that space and time were not
necessarily-existing. Therefore, the supposing any thing possibly to
exist alone, so as not necessarily to include the presupposal of some
other thing, proves demonstrably that that other thing is not
necessarily-existing; because, whatever has necessity of existence,
cannot possibly, in any conception whatsoever, be supposed away. There
cannot possibly be any notion of the existence of any thing, there
cannot possibly be any notion of existence at all, but what shall
necessarily pre-include the notion of that which has necessary
existence: And consequently the two propositions which you judged
independent are really necessarily connected. These sorts of things are
indeed very difficult to express, and not easy to be conceived but by
very attentive minds: But to such as can and will attend, nothing (I
think) is more demonstrably convictive."
"If any thing still sticks with you in this, or any other part of my
books, I shall be very willing to be informed of it; who am,"
"Sir, your assured Friend and Servant,
"S. C."
Nov. 10, 1713.
"P. S. Many readers, I observe, have misunderstood my second general
proposition; as if the words [some one unchangeable and independent
being] meant [one only--being,] whereas the true meaning, and all that
the argument there requires, is, [some one at least.] That there can be
but one, is the thing proved afterwards in the seventh proposition."
__________________________________________________________________
THE SECOND LETTER.
"Reverend Sir,"
"I have often thought that the chief occasions of men's differing so
much in their opinions, were, either their not understanding each
other; or else, that instead of ingenuously searching after truth, they
have made it their business to find out arguments for the proof of what
they have once asserted. However, it is certain there may be other
reasons for persons not agreeing in their opinions; and where it is so,
I cannot but think, with you, that they will find reason to suffer each
other to differ friendly; every man having a way of thinking, in some
respects, peculiarly his own.
"I am sorry, I must tell you, your answers to my objections are not
satisfactory. The reasons why I think them not so are as follow:
"You say; whatever is absolutely necessary at all, is absolutely
necessary in every part of space, and in every point of duration.' Were
this evident, it would certainly prove what you bring it for; viz. that
whatever may, without a contradiction, be absent from one place at one
time, may also be absent from all places at all times. But I do not
conceive that the idea of ubiquity is contained in the idea of
self-existence, or directly follows from it, any otherwise than as
whatever exists must exist somewhere. You add; whatever can at any time
be conceived possibly to be absent from any one part of space, may, for
the same reason [viz. the implying no contradiction in the nature of
things] be conceived possibly to be absent from every other part of
space at the same time. Now, I cannot see, that I can make these two
suppositions for the same reason, or upon the same account. The reason
why I conceive this being may be absent from one place, is, because it
doth not contradict the former proof [drawn from the nature of things,]
in which I proved only that it must necessarily exist. But the other
supposition, viz. that I can conceive it possible to be absent from
every part of space at one and the same time, directly contradicts the
proof that it must exist somewhere; and so is an express contradiction.
Unless it be said, that as, when we have proved the three angles of a
triangle equal to two right ones, that relation of the equality ofits
angles to two right ones will be wherever a triangle exists; so, when
we have proved the necessary existence of a being, this being must
exist everywhere. But there is a great difference between these two
things; the one being the proof of a certain relation, upon supposition
of such a being's existence with such particular properties; and
consequently, wherever this being and these properties exist, this
relation must exist too. But, from the proof of the necessary existence
of a being, it is no evident consequence that it exists everywhere. My
using the word demonstration, instead of proof, which leaves no room
for doubt, was through negligence, for I never heard of strict
demonstration of matter of fact.
"In your answer to my second difficulty, you say; whatsoever is
necessarily-existing, there is need of its existence, in order to the
supposal of the existence of any other thing. All the consequences you
draw from this proposition I see proved demonstrably; and consequently,
that the two propositions I thought independent are closely connected.
But how, or upon what account, is there need of the existence of
whatever is necessarily-existing, in order to the existence of any
other thing? Is it as there is need of space and duration, in order to
the existence of any thing; or is it needful only as the cause of the
existence of all other things? If the former be said, as your instance
seems to intimate, I answer, space and duration are very abstruse in
their natures, and, I think, cannot properly be called things, but are
considered rather as affections which belong, and, in the order of our
thoughts are antecedently necessary, to the existence of all things.
And I can no more conceive how a necessarily-existing being can, on the
same account or in the same manner as space and duration are, be
needful in order to the existence of any other being, than I can
conceive extension attributed to a thought; that idea no more belonging
to a thing existing, than extension belongs to thought. But if the
latter be said, that there is need of the existence of whatever is a
necessary being, in order to the existence of any other thing; only as
this necessary being must be the cause of the existence of all other
things; I think this is plainly begging the question; for it supposes
that there is no other being exists, but what is casual, and so not
necessary. And on what other account, or in what other manner than one
of these two, there can be need of the existence of a necessary being
in order to the existence of any thing else, I cannot conceive.
"Thus, sir, you see I entirely agree with you in all the consequences
you have drawn from your suppositions; but cannot see the truth of the
suppositions themselves.
"I have aimed at nothing in my style but only to be intelligible; being
sensible that it is very difficult (as you observe) to express one's
self on these sorts of subjects, especially for one who is altogether
unaccustomed to write upon them.
"I have nothing at present more to add, but my sincerest thanks for
your trouble in answering my letter, and for your professed readiness
to be acquainted with any other difficulty that I may meet with in any
of your writings. I am willing to interpret this as somewhat like a
promise of an answer to what I have now written, if there be any thing
in it which deserves one. I am,
"Reverend Sir,
"Your most obliged humble Servant."
Nov. 23, 1713.
__________________________________________________________________
THE ANSWER TO THE SECOND LETTER.
"Sir,"
"It seems to me, that the reason why you do not apprehend ubiquity to
be necessarily connected with self-existence, is, because, in the order
of your ideas, you first conceive a being, (a finite being, suppose;)
and then conceive self-existence to be a property of that being; as the
angles are properties of a triangle, when a triangle exists: Whereas,
on the contrary, necessity of existence, not being a property
consequent upon the supposition of the things existing, but
antecedently the cause or ground of that existence; it is evident this
necessity being not limited to any antecedent subject, as angles are to
a triangle; but being itself original, absolute, and (in order of
nature) antecedent to all existence, cannot but be everywhere, for the
same reason that it is anywhere. [404] By applying this reasoning to
the instance of space, you will find, that by consequence it belongs
truly to that substance whereof space is a property, [405] as duration
also is. What you say about a necessary being existing somewhere,
supposes it to be finite; and being finite, supposes some cause which
determined that such a certain quantity of that being should exist,
neither more or less: And that cause must either be a voluntary cause,
or else such a necessary cause, the quantity of whose power must be
determined and limited by some other cause. But in original absolute
necessity, antecedent (in order of nature) to the existence of any
thing, nothing of all this can have place; but the necessity is
necessarily everywhere alike.
"Concerning the second difficulty, I answer, that which exists
necessarily is needful to the existence of any other thing; not
considered now as a cause, (for that indeed is begging the question)
but as a sine qua non; in the sense as space is necessary to every
thing, and nothing can possibly be conceived to exist without thereby
presupposing space: Which, therefore, I apprehend to be a property or
mode of the self-existent substance; and that, by being evidently
necessary itself, it proves that the substance, of which it is a mode,
must also be necessary; necessary both in itself, and needful to the
existence of any thing else whatsoever. Extension indeed does not
belong to thought, because thought is not a being; but there is need of
extension to the existence of every being, to a being which has or has
not thought, or any other quality whatsoever.
"I am, Sir,
"Your real Friend and Servant."
London, Nov. 28. 1713.
__________________________________________________________________
[404] See the conclusion of the Answer to the Seventh Letter.
[405] Or mode of existence.
__________________________________________________________________
THE THIRD LETTER.
"Reverend Sir,"
"I do not very well understand your meaning, when you say that you
think, in the order of my ideas I first conceive a being, (finite
suppose,) to exist, and then conceive self-existence to be a property
of that being. If you mean that I first suppose a finite being to
exist, I know not why; affirming necessity of existence to be only a
consequent of its existence; and that, when I have supposed it finite,
I very safely conclude it is not infinite; I am utterly at a loss upon
what expressions in my letter this conjecture can be founded. But if
you mean that I first of all prove a being to exist from eternity, and
then, from the reasons of things, prove that such a being must be
eternally necessary, I freely own it. Neither do I conceive it to be
irregular or absurd; for there is a great difference between the order
in which things exist, and the order in which I prove to myself that
they exist. Neither do I think my saying a necessary being exists
somewhere, supposes it to be finite; it only supposes that this being
exists in space, without determining whether here, or there, or
everywhere.
"To my second objection, you say: That which exists necessarily, is
needful to the existence of any other thing, as a sine qua non; in the
sense space is necessary to every thing, which is proved (you say) by
this consideration, that space is a property of the self-existent
substance; and, being both necessary in itself, and needful to the
existence of every thing else; consequently the substance of which it
is a property must be so too. Space, I own, is in one sense a property
of the self-existent substance; but, in the same sense, it is also a
property of all other substances. The only difference is in respect to
the quantity. And since every part of space, as well as the whole, is
necessary; every substance consequently must be self-existent, because
it hath this self-existent property; Which since you will not admit for
true, if it directly follows from your arguments, they cannot be
conclusive.
"What you say under the first head, proves (I think,) to a very great
probability, though not to me with the evidence of demonstration: But
your arguments under the second I am not able to see the force of.
"I am so far from being pleased that I can form objections to your
arguments, that, besides the satisfaction it would have given me in my
own mind, I should have thought it an honour to have entered into your
reasonings, and seen the force of them. I cannot desire to trespass any
more upon your better employed time; so shall only add my hearty thanks
for your trouble on my account, and that I am, with the greatest
respect,
"Reverend Sir,
Your most obliged humble Servant."
Dec. 5. 1713.
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THE ANSWER TO THE THIRD LETTER.
"Sir,"
"Though, when I turn my thoughts every way, I fully persuade myself
there is no defect in the argument itself, yet, in my manner of
expression, I am satisfied there must be some want of clearness when
there remains any difficulty to a person of your abilities and
sagacity. I did not mean that your saying a necessary being exists
somewhere, does necessarily suppose it to be finite, but that the
manner of expression is apt to excite in the mind an idea of a finite
being, at the same time that you are thinking of a necessary being,
without accurately attending to the nature of that necessity by which
it exists. Necessity absolute, and antecedent (in order of nature) to
the existence of any subject, has nothing to limit it; but, if it
operates at all, (as it must needs do,) it must operate (if I may so
speak,) everywhere and at all times alike: Determination of a
particular quantity, or particular time or place of existence of any
thing, cannot arise but from somewhat external to the thing itself. For
example; why there should exist just such a small determinate quantity
of matter, neither more nor less, interspersed in the immense vacuities
of space, no reason can be given; nor can there be any thing in nature
which could have determined a thing so indifferent in itself, as is the
measure of that quantity, but only the will of an intelligent and free
agent. To suppose matter, or any other substance, necessarily-existing
in a finite determinate quantity, in an inch-cube for instance, or in
any certain number of cube-inches and no more, is exactly the same
absurdity as supposing it to exist necessarily, and yet for a finite
duration only; which every one sees to be a plain contradiction. The
argument is likewise the same in the question about the original of
motion: Motion cannot be necessarily-existing, because, it being
evident that all determinations of motion are equally possible in
themselves, the original determination of the motion of any particular
body this way rather than the contrary way, could not be necessary in
itself, but was either caused by the will of an intelligent and free
agent, or else was an effect produced and determined without any cause
at all, which is an express contradiction; as I have shown in my
Demonstration of the Being and Attributes of God.
"To the second head of argument I answer: Space is a property (or mode)
of the self-existent substance, but not of any other substances. All
other substances are in space, and are penetrated by it, but the
self-existent substance is not in space, nor penetrated by it, but is
itself (if I may so speak) the substratum of space, the ground of the
existence of space and duration itself. Which (space and duration)
being evidently necessary, and yet themselves not substances, but
properties or modes, show evidently that the substance, without which
these modes could not subsist, is itself much more (if that were
possible) necessary. And as space and duration are needful, (i. e. sine
qua non,) to the existence of every thing else; so, consequently, is
the substance to which these modes belong in that peculiar manner which
I before mentioned.
"I am, Sir,
"Your affectionate Friend and Servant."
Dec. 10, 1713.
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THE FOURTH LETTER.
"Reverend Sir,"
"Whatever is the occasion of my not seeing the force of your
reasonings, I cannot impute it to (what you do) the want of clearness
in your expression. I am too well acquainted with myself to think my
not understanding an argument a sufficient reason to conclude that it
is either improperly expressed, or not conclusive, unless I can clearly
show the defect of it. It is with the greatest satisfaction, I must
tell you, that the more I reflect on your first argument the more I am
convinced of the truth of it; and it now seems to me altogether
unreasonable to suppose absolute necessity can have any relation to one
part of space more than to another; and, if so, an absolutely-necessary
being must exist everywhere.
"I wish I was as well satisfied in respect to the other. You say, all
substances, except the self-existent one, are in space, and are
penetrated by it: All substances, doubtless, whether body or spirit,
exist in space; but when I say that a spirit exists in space, were I
put upon telling my meaning, I know not how I could do it any other way
than by saying such a particular quantity of space terminates the
capacity of acting in finite spirits at one and the same time, so that
they cannot act beyond that determined quantity. Not but that I think
there is somewhat in the manner of existence of spirits in respect of
space, that more directly answers to the manner of the existence of
body; but what that is, or of the manner of their existence, I cannot
possibly form an idea. And it seems (if possible) much more difficult
to determine what relation the self-existent being hath to space: To
say he exists in space, after the same manner that other substances do,
(somewhat like which I too rashly asserted in my last,) perhaps would
be placing the Creator too much on a level with the creature; or,
however, it is not plainly and evidently true: And to say the
self-existent substance is the substratum of space, in the common sense
of the word, is scarce intelligible, or at least is not evident. Now,
though there may be an hundred relations distinct from either of these,
yet how we should come by ideas of them I cannot conceive. We may
indeed have ideas to the words, and not altogether depart from the
common sense of them, when we say the self-existent substance is the
substratum of space, or the ground of its existence: But I see no
reason to think it true, because space seems to me to be as absolutely
self-existent as it is possible any thing can be: So that, make what
other supposition you please, yet we cannot help supposing immense
space, because there must be either an infinity of being, or (if you
will allow the expression) an infinite vacuity of being. Perhaps it may
be objected to this, that though space is really necessary, yet the
reason of its being necessary, is its being a property of the
self-existent substance, and that it being so evidently necessary, and
its dependence on the self-existent substance not so evident, we are
ready to conclude it absolutely self-existent, as well as necessary;
and that this is the reason why the idea of space forces itself on our
minds, antecedent to, and exclusive of (as to the ground of its
existence) all other things. Now this, though it is really an
objection, yet it is no direct answer to what I have said, because it
supposes the only thing to be proved, viz. that the reason why space is
necessary is its being a property of a self-existent substance; and
supposing it not to be evident that space is absolutely self-existent,
yet, while it is doubtful, we cannot argue as though the contrary were
certain and we were sure that space was only a property of the
self-existent substance. But now, if space be not absolutely
independent, I do not see what we can conclude is so; for it is
manifestly necessary itself, as well as antecedently needful to the
existence of all other things, not excepting, (as I think) even the
self-existent substance.
"All your consequences, I see, follow demonstrably from your
supposition, and, were that evident, I believe it would serve to prove
several other things as well as what you bring it for: Upon which
account, I should be extremely pleased to see it proved by any one;
for, as I design the search after truth as the business of my life, I
shall not be ashamed to learn from any person, though at the same time
I cannot but be sensible that instruction from some men is like the
gift of a prince; it reflects an honour on the person on whom it lays
an obligation.
"I am, Reverend Sir,
"Your obliged Servant."
Dec. 16. 1713.
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THE ANSWER TO THE FOURTH LETTER.
"Sir,"
"My being out of town most part of the month of January, and some other
accidental avocations, hindered me from answering your letter sooner.
The sum of the difficulties it contains, is (I think) this: That it is
difficult to determine what relation the self-existent substance has to
space. That, to say it is the substratum of space, in the common sense
of the word, is scarce intelligible, or, at least, is not evident; that
space seems to be as absolutely self-existent as it is possible any
thing can be: And that its being a property of the self-existent
substance, is supposing the thing that was to be proved. This is
entering indeed into the very bottom of the matter, and I will
endeavour to give you as brief and clear an answer as I can.
"That the self-existent substance is the substratum of space, or space
a property of the self-existent substance, are not perhaps very proper
expressions, nor is it easy to find such: But what I mean is this: The
idea of space (as also of time or duration,) is an abstract or partial
idea, an idea of a certain quality or relation, which we evidently see
to be necessarily-existing; and yet, which (not being itself a
substance,) at the same time necessarily presupposes a substance,
without which it could not exist; which substance, consequently, must
be itself (much more, if possible,) necessarily-existing. I know not
how to explain this so well as by the following similitude: A blind
man, when he tries to frame to himself the idea of body, his idea is
nothing but that of hardness. A man that had eyes, but no power of
motion or sense of feeling at all, when he tried to frame to himself
the idea of body, his idea would be nothing but that of colour. Now,
as, in these cases, hardness is not body, and colour is not body; but
yet, to the understanding of these persons, those properties
necessarily infer the being of a substance, of which substance itself
the persons have no idea: So space to us is not itself substance, but
it necessarily infers the being of a substance, which affects none of
our present senses; and, being itself necessary, it follows that the
substance which it infers, is (much more) necessary.
"I am, Sir,
"Your affectionate Friend and Servant."
Jan. 29, 1713.
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THE FIFTH LETTER.
"Reverend Sir,"
"You have very comprehensively expressed in six or seven lines, all the
difficulties of my letter, which I should have endeavoured to have made
shorter, had I not been afraid an improper expression might possibly
occasion a mistake of my meaning. I am very glad the debate is come
into so narrow a compass; for I think now it entirely turns upon this,
whether our ideas of space and duration are partial, so as to
presuppose the existence of some other thing. Your similitude of the
blind man is very apt, to explain your meaning, (which I think I fully
understand;) but does not seem to come entirely up to the matter. For,
what is the reason that the blind man concludes there must be somewhat
external, to give him that idea of hardness? It is because he supposes
it impossible for him to be thus affected, unless there were some cause
of it; which cause, should it be removed, the effect would immediately
cease too; and he would no more have the idea of hardness, but by
remembrance. Now, to apply this to the instance of space and duration;
since a man, from his having these ideas, very justly concludes that
there must be somewhat external, which is the cause of them;
consequently should this cause (whatever it is) be taken away, his
ideas would be so too: Therefore, if what is supposed to be the cause
be removed, and yet the idea remains, that supposed cause cannot be the
real one. Now, granting the self-existent substance to be the
substratum of these ideas, could we make the supposition of its ceasing
to be, yet space and duration would still remain unaltered; which seems
to show that the self-existent substance is not the substratum of space
and duration. Nor would it be an answer to the difficulty, to say that
every property of the self-existent substance is as necessary as the
substance itself, since that will only hold while the substance itself
exists: For there is implied, in the idea of a property, an
impossibility of subsisting without its substratum. I grant the
supposition is absurd: But how otherwise can we know whether any thing
be a property of such a substance, but by examining whether it would
cease to be, if its supposed substance should do so: Notwithstanding
what I have now said, I cannot say that I believe your argument not
conclusive; for I must own my ignorance, that I am really at a lose
about the nature of space and duration. But did it plainly appear that
they were properties of a substance, we should have an easy way with
the atheists; for it would at once prove demonstrably an eternal,
necessary, self-existent being; that there is but one such, and that he
is needful in order to the existence of all other things: Which makes
me think that though it may be true, yet it is not obvious to every
capacity; otherwise it would have been generally used as a fundamental
argument to prove the being of God.
"I must add one thing more, that your argument for the omnipresence of
God seemed always to me very probable. But being very desirous to have
it appear demonstrably conclusive, I was sometimes forced to say what
was not altogether my opinion; not that I did this for the sake of
disputing, (for besides the particular disagreeableness of this to my
own temper, I should surely have chosen another person to have trifled
with;) but I did it to set off the objection to advantage, that it
might be more fully answered. I heartily wish you as fair treatment
from your opponents in print, as I have had from you; though I must
own, I cannot see, in those that I have read, that unprejudiced search
after truth which I would have hoped for.
"I am, Reverend Sir,
"Your most humble Servant."
Feb. 3, 1713.
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THE ANSWER TO THE FIFTH LETTER.
"Sir,"
"In a multitude of business, I mislaid your last letter; and could not
answer it till it came again to my hands by chance. We seem to have
pushed the matter in question between us, as far as it will go; and,
upon the whole, I cannot but take notice, I have very seldom met with
persons so reasonable and unprejudiced as yourself, in such debates as
these.
"I think all I need say in answer to the reasoning in your letter is;
that your granting the absurdity of the supposition you were
endeavouring to make, is consequently granting the necessary truth of
my argument. If space and duration remain, [406] even after they are
supposed to be taken away; and be not (as it is plain they are not)
themselves substances, then the substance, [407] on whose existence
they depend will necessarily remain likewise, even after it is supposed
to be taken away; which shows that supposition to be impossible and
contradictory.
"As to your observation at the end of your letter, that the argument I
have insisted on, if it were obvious to every capacity, should have
more frequently been used as a fundamental argument for a proof of the
being of God, the true cause why it has been seldom urged, is, I think,
this; that the universal prevalency of Cartes's absurd notions,
(teaching that matter [408] is necessarily infinite and necessarily
eternal, and ascribing all things to mere mechanic laws of motion,
exclusive of final causes, and of all will, and intelligence, and
divine providence from the government of the world;) hath incredibly
blinded the eyes of common reason, and prevented men from discerning
him in whom they live, and move, and have their being. The like has
happened in some other instances. How universally have men, for many
ages, believed that eternity has no duration at all, and infinity no
amplitude? Something of the like kind has happened in the matter of
transubstantiation and (I think) in the scholastic notion of the
trinity, &c.
"I am, Sir,
"Your affectionate Friend and Servant."
April 8. 1713.
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[406] Ut partium temporis ordo est immutabilis, sic etiam ordo partium
spatii. Moveantur hæ de locis suis, et movebuntur (ut ita dicam) de
seipsis.--Newton Princip. Mathemat. Schol. ad Definit. 8.
[407] Deus non est æternitas vel infinitas, sed æternus et infinitus;
non est duratio vel spatium, sed durat et adest. Durat semper, et adest
ubique; et, existendo semper et ubique, durationem et spatium,
æternitatem et infinitatem, constituit. Cum unaquæque spatii particula
sit semper, et unumquodque durationis indivisibile momentum, ubique;
certè rerum omnium fabricator ac Dominus, non erit nunquam nusquam
omnipræsens est, non per virtutem solam, sed etiam per substantiam; nam
virtus sine substantia subsistere non potest. In ipso continentur et
moventur universa, &c.--Newton. Princip. Mathemat. Schol. General. sub
finem.
[408] Puto implicare contradictionem, ut mundus [meaning the material
world] sit finitus.--Cartes. Epist. 69. partis primæ.
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THE ANSWER TO A SIXTH LETTER,
BEING PART OF A LETTER WRITTEN TO ANOTHER GENTLEMAN, WHO HAD PROPOSED SEVERAL
OF THE SAME OBJECTIONS WITH THE FOREGOING.
Sir,
You will give me leave, without any preface or apology, to propose
directly the best answer I can to the objections you have offered.
There are but two ways by which the being, and all or any of the
attributes of God can possibly be proved. The one, a priori, the other
a posteriori.
The proof a posteriori [409] is level to all men's capacities; because
there is an endless gradation of wise and useful phenomena of nature,
from the most obvious to the most abstruse; which afford (at least a
moral and reasonable) proof of the being of God, to the several
capacities of all unprejudiced men, who have any probity of mind: And
this is what (I suppose) God expects (as a moral governor,) that moral
agents should be determined by.
The proof a priori is (I fully believe) strictly demonstrative, but
(like numberless mathematical demonstrations,) capable of being
understood by only a few attentive minds, because it is of use only
against learned and metaphysical difficulties. And, therefore, it must
never be expected that this should be made obvious to the generality of
men, any more than astronomy or mathematics can be.
This being premised in general, I proceed to particulars.
Concerning the notion of self-existence I explain myself thus: Of every
thing that is, there is a reason which now does, or once or always did,
determine the existence rather than the non-existence of that thing. Of
that which derives not its being from any other thing, this reason, or
ground of existence (whether we can attain to any idea of it or no,)
must be in the thing itself: For though the bare proof, by
ratiocination, that there cannot but exist such a being, does not
indeed give us any distinct notion of self-existence, but only shows
the certainty of the thing; yet when once a thing is known, by
reasoning a posteriori, to be certain, it unavoidably follows that
there is in nature a reason a priori, (whether we can discover it or
no,) of the existence of that which we know cannot but exist. Since,
therefore, in that which derives not its being from any other thing,
the ground or reason why it exists rather than not exists, must be in
the thing itself, and it is a plain contradiction to suppose its own
will, by way of efficient cause, to be the reason of its existence, it
remains that absolute necessity (the same necessity that is the cause
of the unalterable proportion between 2 and 4,) be, by way of formal
cause, the ground of that existence. And this necessity is indeed
antecedent, though not in time, yet in the order of nature, to the
existence of the being itself: Whereas, on the contrary, its own will
is, in the order of nature, subsequent to the supposition of the
existence of the being; and therefore cannot be the formal cause of
that existence.
Nothing can be more absurd than to suppose that any thing (or any
circumstance of any thing) is, and yet that there be absolutely no
reason why it is, rather than not. It is easy to conceive that we may
indeed be utterlyignorant of the reasons, or grounds, or causes of many
things. But, that any thing is; and that there is a real reason in
nature why it is, rather than is not; these two are as necessarily and
essentially connected as any two correlates whatever, as height and
depth, &c.
The scholastic way of proving the existence of the self-existent being,
from the absolute perfection of his nature, is husteron troteron; for
all or any perfections presuppose existence, which is petitio
principii. But bare necessity of existence does not presuppose, but
infer existence. That which exists by absolute necessity of nature will
always (whether you will or no) be supposed or included in any possible
idea of things, even where you never so expressly endeavour to exclude
it; just as the proportion between 2 and 4 remains included in the very
terms wherein any man would endeavour expressly to deny it.
To exist at all, and to exist everywhere, are one and the very same
thing, where the cause or ground of the existence is not either
confined to, or operates only in, some particular place. For 2 and 4 to
have at all a certain proportion to each other, and to have that same
proportion everywhere, is the very same thing; and the like is true of
every thing that is necessary in itself. To suppose (as you suggest)
that the self-existent being may be limited by its own nature, is
presupposing a nature, or limiting quality: Whereas, in this case, here
must nothing be presupposed; no nature, no quality whatsoever, but what
arises (and consequently everywhere alike) from a necessity absolute in
itself, and antecedent (in the order of our ideas) to any nature,
place, quality, time, or thing whatsoever.
When I say that necessity, absolutely such in itself, has no relation
to time or place; my meaning is, that it has no relation to, or
dependence upon, any particular time or place, or any thing in any
particular time or place; but that it is the same in all time, and in
all place. What you mean by time and place being finite, I understand
not: The schoolmen's notion of time's depending on the motions or
existence of the material world, is as senseless as the supposing it to
depend on the turning or not turning of an hour-glass. The same also is
true of place.
Infinite space is infinite extension; and eternity is infinite
duration. They are the two first, and most obvious, and simple ideas
that every man has in his mind. Time and place are the sine qua non of
all other things, and of all other ideas. To suppose either of them
finite, is an express contradiction in the idea itself. No man does or
can possibly imagine either of them to be finite; but only, either by
non-attention, or by choice, he attends perhaps to part of his idea,
and forbears attending to the remainder. All the difficulty that has
ever arisen about this matter, is nothing but dust thrown by men's
using words (or rather sounds only) in their philosophy, instead of
ideas. And the arguments drawn from the jargon of the schoolmen, will
equally prove every axiom in Euclid to be uncertain and unintelligible.
They who remove the idea of infinity, (or of a being whose attribute
infinity is,) by supposing space to be nothing but a relation between
two bodies, are guilty of the absurdity of supposing that which is
nothing to have real qualities. For the space which is between two
bodies is always unalterably just what it was; and has the very same
dimensions, quantity, and figure, whether these, or any other bodies be
there, or anywhere else, or not at all; just as time or duration is the
same, [410] whether you turn your hour-glass, or no; or whether the sun
moves, or stands still; or whether there was or was not any sun, or any
material world at all.
The schoolmen's distinctions about spirits existing in ubi, and not in
loco, are mere empty sounds, without any manner of signification.
To set bounds to space, is to suppose it bounded by something which
itself takes up space, and that is a contradiction: Or else that it is
bounded by nothing, and then the idea of that nothing will still be
space, which is another contradiction. Beings which exist in time, and
in space, (as every finite thing must needs do,) presuppose time and
space: But that being, whose existence makes duration and space, must
be infinite and eternal, because duration and space can have no bounds.
Not that duration and space are the formal cause of that existence,
but, that necessary attributes do necessarily and inseparably infer or
show to us a necessary substance; of which substance itself we have no
image, because it is the object of none of our senses: But we perceive
its existence by its effects, and the necessity of that existence by
the necessity of certain attributes, and by other arguments of reason
and inference. To suppose space removed, destroyed, or taken away,
amounts to the absurd supposition of removing a thing away from itself:
That is, if in your imagination you annihilate the whole of infinite
space, the whole infinite space will still remain: and if you
annihilate any part of it, that part will still necessarily remain, as
appears by the unmoved situation of the rest: And to suppose it divided
or divisible, amounts to the same contradiction.
The objection of immensity being inconsistent with spirituality and
simplicity, arises merely from the jargon of the schoolmen, who (in
order to help out transubstantiation,) have used themselves to speak of
this and of many other things in phrases which had no meaning or ideas
belonging to them: By denying the real immensity and the real eternal
duration of God, they, in true consequence, (though it is reasonable to
suppose they saw not that consequence,) denied his being. The immensity
of space, (it being throughout absolutely uniform and essentially
indivisible,) is no more inconsistent with simplicity than the uniform
successive flowing of the parts of duration (as you most rightly
observe,) are inconsistent with simplicity. There is no difficulty at
all in this point, but a mere prejudice, and false notion of
simplicity.
As to spirituality; the individual consciousness of the one immense
being is as truly one as the present moment of time is individually
one, in all places at once: And the one can no more properly be said to
be an ell or a mile of consciousness, (which is the sum of your
objection,) than the other can be said to be an ell or a mile of time.
This suggestion seems to deserve particular consideration.
To the objection, that the supposing God to be really and substantially
omnipresent, is supposing him to be the soul of the world, I answer:
This is a great mistake. For the word soul signifies a part of a whole,
whereof body is the other part; and they, being united, mutually affect
each other as parts of the same whole. But God is present to every part
of the universe, not as a soul, but as a governor; so as to act upon
every thing in what manner he pleases, himself being acted upon by
nothing.
What you suggest about space having no parts, because it is infinite,
is a mere quibble indeed, and has nothing in it. The meaning of parts,
(in questions of this nature,) is separable, compounded, un-united
parts, such as are the parts of matter; which, for that reason, is
always a compound, not a simple substance. No matter is one substance,
but a heap of substances: And that I take to be the reason why matter
is a subject incapable of thought; not because it is extended, but
because its parts are distinct substances, un-united, and independent
on each other; which (I believe) is not the case of other substances.
The kinds of substance may perhaps be more and more different from each
other, than we, (at present,) for want of more senses, are aware of.
Matter and spirit is no other division than matter and not matter; just
as if one should divide the species of animals into horses and not
horses.
As to the question, why absolute necessity will not admit of the
existence of two distinct independent beings, as well as of different
attributes and properties in one independent being, I answer; absolute
necessity, in which there is nowhere any variation, cannot be the
ground of existence of a number of finite beings, however agreeing and
harmonious, because that (viz. number, or finiteness,) is itself a
manifest difformity or inequality. But it may be the ground or
existence of one uniform infinite being: The different attributes of
which one uniform being are not a variety of parts, or an
un-uniformness, (if I may so speak) of the necessity by which it
exists, but they are all and each of them attributes of the whole,
attributes of the one simple infinite being; just as the powers of
hearing and seeing are not inequalities or difformities in the soul of
man; but each of them powers of the whole soul.
As to the last argument you refer to, my meaning therein is this; that
it is a contradiction to suppose two (or more) necessarily-existing
beings, because each of them, by the supposition, being independent,
and sufficient to itself, though the other were supposed not to exist,
they thereby each of them mutually destroy the supposed necessity of
the other's existence, and, consequently, neither of them indeed will
be necessary or independent. For instance; if matter, or spirit, or any
other substance, could as possibly be conceived to exist without that
in which they all exist, as that in which they all exist can be
conceived to exist without them, then there would be
necessary-existence on neither part.
As to the question concerning the possible plurality of infinites; it
is certainly true that the infinity of space neither excludes finite
bodies nor finite spirits, nor infinite body, nor infinite spirit. But
it excludes every thing of the same kind, whether finite or infinite;
which is all that my argument requires. There can be but one infinite
space, and but one infinite time, and but one infinite spirit, (taking
spirit to mean a particular positive distinct substance, and not the
mere negative non-matter, of which there may be innumerable kinds;) and
if matter could be infinite, there could likewise be but one infinite
body, and so on. For one infinite, in all dimensions, exhausts always
the whole possibility of that kind, though it excludes not others.
The ubi of spirits being their perception only; and the omnipresence of
God being his infinite knowledge only, are mere words, without any
sense at all: And, by the like confusion, any thing may be said to be
any thing, and we have in us no principles of knowledge at all, nor any
use either of words or ideas.
"I am, Sir,
"Your assured Friend and Servant," &c.
__________________________________________________________________
[409] Rom. i. 20. The invisible things of him from the creation of the
world are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made,
even his eternal power and godhead.
[410] Eadem est duratio seu perseverantia existentiæ rerum; sive motus
sint celeres, sive tardi, sive nulli.--Newton. Princip. Mathem. schol.
ad Definit. 8.
__________________________________________________________________
THE ANSWER TO A SEVENTH LETTER,
CONCERNING THE ARGUMENT a priori.
"To the Reverend Dr***
"Your objection against arguing at all a priori, concerning the
existence and perfections of the first cause, is what many learned men
have indeed stuck at. And it being evident that nothing can be prior to
the first cause, they have therefore thought it sufficient to say that
the first cause exists "absolutely without cause;" and that therefore
there can be no such thing, as reasoning or arguing about it a priori
at all. But if you attend carefully you will find this way of speaking
to be by no means satisfactory. For though it is indeed most evident,
that no thing, no being, can be prior to that being which is the first
cause and original of all things, yet there must be in nature a ground
or reason, a permanent ground or reason of the existence of the first
cause: Otherwise its existence would be owing to, and depend upon mere
chance. And all that could be said upon this head would amount to this
only; that it exists, because it exists; that it therefore does and
always did exist, because it does and always did exist: Which the
followers of Spinoza will, with equal strength of reason, affirm
concerning every substance that exists at all.
"If the idea of an eternal and infinite nothing were a possible idea,
and not contradictory in itself; the existence of the first cause would
not be necessary: [411] And if the existence of the first cause was not
necessary, it would be no contradiction to suppose it either not to
have existed in time past, or to cease to exist at any time to come.
The existence therefore of the first cause is necessary; necessary
absolutely and in itself. And therefore that necessity is, a priori,
and in the order of nature, the ground or reason of its existence. For
that which exists necessarily, or in the idea of which existence and
necessity are inseparably and necessarily connected, must either
therefore be necessary, because it exists, or else it must therefore
exist because its existence is necessary. If it was therefore
necessary, because it existed, then, for the same reason, every thing
that exists would exist necessarily; and either every thing or nothing
would be the first cause. On the contrary, if the first cause does
therefore exist, because its existence is necessary, then necessity is
the ground or reason or foundation of that existence; and the existence
does not infer, (that is a priori, or in the order of nature and
consequence, antecede) the necessity of existing; but the necessity of
existing does on the contrary infer, (that is, a priori, or in the
order of nature, antecede) the supposition of the existence; which is
what I proposed to prove.
"The argument a posteriori is indeed by far the most generally useful
argument; most easy to be understood, and in some degree suited to all
capacities; and therefore it ought always to be distinctly insisted
upon. But forasmuch as atheistical writers have sometimes opposed the
being and attributes of God by such metaphysical reasonings as can no
otherwise be obviated than by arguing a priori; therefore this manner
of arguing also, is useful, and necessary in its proper place.
The eternity of God can no otherwise be proved, than by considering, a
priori, the nature of a necessary or self-existent cause. The temporary
phenomena of nature prove indeed demonstrably, a posteriori, that there
is, and has been from the beginning of those phenomena, a being of
power and wisdom sufficient to produce and preserve those phenomena.
But that this first cause has existed from eternity, and shall exist to
eternity, cannot be proved from those temporary phenomena; but must be
demonstrated from the intrinsic nature of necessary-existence. If the
first cause exists "absolutely without any ground or reason of
existence;" it might as possibly in times past, without any reason,
have not existed; and may as possibly in times to come, without any
reason, cease to exist. Can it be proved, a posteriori, that the first
cause of all things will exist to-morrow? Or can it be proved any
otherwise, than by showing that necessity is a certain ground of future
as well as of present existence? And if so, then the ground, or reason,
upon which the first cause now does, and hereafter always will, and
cannot but exist, is the very same ground or reason upon which he
always did exist: And, consequently, it cannot with truth be affirmed
that the first cause exists "absolutely without any ground or reason of
existence." It is true, indeed, there is no antecedent reason why
necessity is necessity. It is in itself essentially immediate; and it
is absurd to suppose that it can be perceived otherwise than
immediately and intuitively. Yet, I think, it is not an absurd question
to ask, why that which is now a necessary being must equally in all
past time have been, and in all future time continue to be, a necessary
being? And the answer to that question will express fully all that I
mean, by affirming the necessity to be the ground or reason of the
existence. When atheistical writers affirm that the material universe,
and every existing substance in particular, was eternal "absolutely
without any ground or reason of existence;" can this assertion be
confuted by him who shall himself affirm that God was eternal
absolutely without any ground or reason of existence? Or can it be any
other way confuted at all, than by showing that something must be
necessarily-existent, (else nothing would ever have existed;) and that
that which is necessarily-existent, cannot possibly be either finite or
moveable, or at any time capable of any alterations, limitations,
variations, inequalities, or diversifications whatsoever, either in
whole, or in part, or in different parts, either of space or time?
In like manner, the infinity or immensity or omnipresence of God, can
no otherwise be proved than by considering, a priori, the nature of a
necessary or self-existent cause. The finite phenomena of nature prove
indeed demonstrably, a posteriori, that there is a being which has
extent of power and wisdom sufficient to produce and preserve all these
phenomena. But that this author of nature is himself absolutely immense
or infinite, cannot be proved from these finite phenomena, but must be
demonstrated from the intrinsic nature of necessary existence. If the
first cause exists "absolutely without any ground or reason of
existence," it may as possibly be finite as infinite; it may as
possibly be limited as be immense. It may as possibly, in other places,
without any reason, not exist, as it does, without any reason, exist in
those places where the phenomena of nature prove that it does exist.
Can it be proved, a posteriori, that that governing wisdom and power,
which the phenomena of nature in this material world demonstrate to be
present here, must therefore be immense, infinite, or omnipresent? Must
be present likewise in those boundless spaces, where we know of no
phenomena or effects to prove its existence? Or can the immensity and
omnipresence of the first cause be at all proved any other way than by
showing that necessity of existence is capable of no limitation; but
must for the same reason be the ground of immense or omnipresent
existence, as it is the ground or foundation of any existence at all?
Again; the unity of God, (which, I think has always been allowed to be
a principle of natural religion, otherwise St Paul could not justly
have blamed the heathen as inexcusable, in that they did not like to
retain God in their knowledge, and that, when they knew God, they
glorified him not as God: The unity of God, I say,) can no otherwise be
demonstrated, than by considering, a priori, the nature of a necessary
or self-existent cause. The phenomena of nature which come within the
reach of our observation, prove indeed demonstrably that there is a
supreme author and director of that nature, or of those phenomena,
whereof we have any knowledge. But that this supreme author and
governor of nature, or of these phenomena, is likewise the supreme
author and governor of universal nature; cannot be entirely proved by
our partial and imperfect knowledge of a few phenomena in that small
part of the universe which comes within the reach of our senses; but
must be demonstrated from the intrinsic nature of necessary existence.
If the first cause exists "absolutely without any ground or reason of
existence," it is altogether as possible, and as probable, and as
reasonable, to suppose that there may, without any reason, exist
numberless finite independent coexistent first causes (either of like
nature and substance to each other, or of different nature and
substance from each other,) in different parts of the immense universe;
as that there should, without any reason, exist one only infinite,
immense, omnipresent, first cause, author and governor of the whole.
That there is, and cannot but be one, and one only, such first cause,
author and governor of the universe; is (I conceive) capable of strict
demonstration, including that part of the argument which is deduced a
priori The subject of the question is no trifle. If any sober-minded
man is persuaded, he can find any flaw in that demonstration, or cares
not to examine it, lest any of its consequences should prove
inconsistent with some other notions he may perhaps through prejudice
have imbibed, I should be very thankful to him to show how the unity of
God (the first principle of natural religion) can at all be proved by
reason a posteriori only.
Some such considerations as these, (I suppose) they were, or others of
the like nature, which moved Mr Limborch to write thus to Mr Locke:
"Argumentum desiderat vir magnificus, quo probetur ens, cujus
existentia est necessaria, tantum posse esse unum, et quidem ut id
argumentum à necessitate existentia desumatur, et a priori (ut in
scholis loquuntur,) non a posteriori concludat; hoc est, ex natura
necessariæ existentiæ probatur eam pluribus non posse esse communem."
To which Mr Locke replies; "Les theologiens, les philosophes, et
Descartes luy-meme, supposent l'unité de Dieu, sans la prouver." After
which, having suggested his own thoughts, he thus concludes. "C'est la,
selon moy, une preuve a priori, que l'Etre eternel independent n'est
qu'un."
"To argue, therefore, a priori concerning the existence and attributes
of the first cause, is no absurdity. For though no thing, no being, can
indeed be a priori to the first cause; yet arguments may, and must be
drawn from the nature and consequences of that necessity, by which the
first cause exists. Mathematical necessary truths are usually
demonstrated a prioriand yet nothing is prior to truths eternally
necessary. To confine, therefore, the use of term, argumentations above
such things only as have other things prior to them in time, is on y
quibbling about the signification of words.
"To the objection, that an attribute cannot be the ground or reason of
the existence of the substance itself, which is always on the contrary
the support of the attributes, I answer; that, in strictness of speech,
necessity of existence is not an attribute, in the sense that
attributes are properly so styled; but it is, [sui generis,] the ground
or foundation of existence, both of the substance and of all the
attributes. Thus, in other instances, immensity is not an attribute, in
the sense that wisdom, power, and the like, are strictly so called; but
it is [sui generis,] a mode of existence both of the substance and of
all the attributes. In like manner; eternity, is not an attribute or
property in the sense that other attributes, inhering in the substance,
and supported by it are properly so called; but it is [sui generis,]
the duration of existence, both of the substance and of all the
attributes. Attributes or properties, strictly so called, cannot be
predicated one of another. Wisdom cannot properly be said to be
powerful; or power to be wise. But immensity is a mode of existence,
both of the divine substance and of all the attributes. Eternity is the
duration of existence, both of the divine substance, and of all the
attributes. And necessity is the ground, or reason, or foundation of
existence both of the divine substance, and of all the attributes.
"I am, Sir,
"Your very humble Servant, &c."
FINIS.
__________________________________________________________________
Edinburgh: Printed by A. Allardice.
__________________________________________________________________
[411] Nothing, is that of which every thing can truly be denied and no
thing can truly be affirmed. So that the idea of nothing, (if I may so
speak,) is absolutely the negation of all ideas. The idea therefore
either of a finite or infinite nothing is a contradiction in terms.)
(For necessity of being, and possibility of not being, are
contradictory ideas.
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________
Indexes
__________________________________________________________________
Index of Scripture References
Genesis
[1]1:2 [2]3:15 [3]3:17-19 [4]5:24 [5]12:3 [6]15:1 [7]17:7
[8]17:8 [9]17:13 [10]17:15 [11]17:17 [12]17:20 [13]18:18
[14]21:18 [15]22:18 [16]26:3 [17]26:4 [18]28:13 [19]28:14
[20]29:27 [21]29:27 [22]47:9 [23]49:8 [24]49:10 [25]49:10
[26]49:10 [27]49:10 [28]49:10 [29]49:10
Exodus
[30]3:6 [31]3:16 [32]11:9 [33]12:22 [34]12:46 [35]17:3
Leviticus
[36]25:8 [37]25:8 [38]25:10 [39]26:33 [40]26:36 [41]26:39
[42]26:44
Numbers
[43]14:34 [44]24:17 [45]24:19 [46]32:14 [47]35:25 [48]35:28
Deuteronomy
[49]1:8 [50]4:27 [51]4:30 [52]4:30 [53]4:37 [54]13:1
[55]18:15 [56]18:16-18 [57]18:19 [58]21:23 [59]28:25
[60]28:37 [61]28:64 [62]28:65 [63]30:1-3 [64]30:4 [65]34:9-10
1 Samuel
[66]2:30
2 Samuel
[67]7:13-14 [68]7:16 [69]7:16 [70]22:1-51 [71]23:2
2 Kings
[72]2:11
1 Chronicles
[73]5:1-2 [74]17:7-9
2 Chronicles
[75]34:14
Ezra
[76]7:6-8
Nehemiah
[77]5:14
Job
[78]9:4 [79]19:25 [80]21:18 [81]21:22 [82]26:6 [83]28:28
[84]35:11 [85]40:9
Psalms
[86]2:8 [87]14:1-7 [88]16:10 [89]16:10 [90]18:1-50 [91]22:8
[92]22:16 [93]22:16 [94]22:18 [95]25:8 [96]51:4 [97]53:1-6
[98]60:7 [99]69:21 [100]78:2 [101]108:8 [102]139:8-9
Proverbs
[103]23:17-18
Ecclesiastes
[104]44:16 [105]48:9 [106]49:14
Isaiah
[107]1:19-21 [108]2:2 [109]4:3 [110]4:8 [111]5:20 [112]6:9
[113]6:13 [114]7:14 [115]9:6-7 [116]9:7 [117]10:21-22
[118]10:22 [119]11:1 [120]11:1 [121]11:1 [122]11:1
[123]11:3 [124]11:4 [125]11:6 [126]11:9 [127]11:9 [128]11:9
[129]11:10 [130]11:11-16 [131]13:17 [132]14:23 [133]21:2
[134]26:19 [135]27:13 [136]35:5 [137]40:12 [138]42:1
[139]42:1 [140]42:1-3 [141]42:3 [142]42:4 [143]42:6
[144]43:5-6 [145]49:6 [146]49:22 [147]50:6 [148]50:26
[149]52:13 [150]53:1-12 [151]53:1-12 [152]53:4 [153]53:4
[154]53:5-6 [155]53:9 [156]53:12 [157]53:12 [158]54:7
[159]56:6-8 [160]57:1-2 [161]60:1-22 [162]60:8-10 [163]60:21
[164]65:17 [165]65:17 [166]65:25 [167]66:14 [168]66:20
[169]66:22-24
Jeremiah
[170]1:7 [171]6:5 [172]7:18 [173]9:16 [174]15:4 [175]16:15
[176]23:3 [177]23:5 [178]23:5-6 [179]23:7-8 [180]24:9
[181]24:9 [182]27:15 [183]29:18 [184]29:18 [185]30:11
[186]31:8-12 [187]31:15 [188]32:37 [189]33:15-16 [190]34:17
[191]37:64 [192]50:30 [193]50:38 [194]51:26 [195]51:36
[196]51:39 [197]51:57
Ezekiel
[198]1:1 [199]3:11 [200]4:6 [201]4:13 [202]5:10 [203]5:12
[204]6:8-9 [205]11:15-17 [206]11:24 [207]12:14 [208]12:16
[209]18 [210]20:23 [211]20:41 [212]22:15 [213]26:14
[214]26:21 [215]27:23-25 [216]27:26 [217]27:36 [218]28:3
[219]28:19 [220]28:25 [221]29:14-15 [222]34:12-13 [223]34:23
[224]34:25 [225]36:24 [226]37:1-28 [227]37:7-8 [228]37:10
[229]37:12 [230]37:21 [231]37:22-24 [232]37:24 [233]37:25
[234]37:25 [235]37:25 [236]38:8 [237]39:27-29 [238]44:15-16
[239]47:9 [240]47:12 [241]47:22 [242]48:11
Daniel
[243]2:38-44 [244]2:44 [245]7:7 [246]7:8 [247]7:8
[248]7:9-10 [249]7:9-10 [250]7:11 [251]7:13-14 [252]7:14
[253]7:18 [254]7:18 [255]7:19 [256]7:20 [257]7:20 [258]7:21
[259]7:22 [260]7:23 [261]7:23 [262]7:24 [263]7:24-25
[264]7:25 [265]7:25 [266]7:25 [267]7:26-27 [268]7:27
[269]7:27 [270]8:17 [271]8:19 [272]8:26 [273]9:24 [274]9:24
[275]9:24 [276]9:24 [277]9:24 [278]9:24 [279]9:25 [280]9:25
[281]9:25 [282]9:26 [283]9:26 [284]9:26 [285]9:27 [286]9:27
[287]10:14 [288]11:33 [289]11:35 [290]11:36 [291]11:40-42
[292]11:43 [293]11:45 [294]12:1 [295]12:2-3 [296]12:4
[297]12:7 [298]12:7 [299]12:9 [300]12:13 [301]12:13
[302]12:13
Hosea
[303]2:23 [304]3:4 [305]3:4 [306]3:4-5 [307]3:5 [308]13:14
Amos
[309]9:9 [310]9:9
Micah
[311]5:2 [312]5:2 [313]5:2
Habakkuk
[314]1:13
Haggai
[315]2:6-7 [316]2:7
Zechariah
[317]9:9 [318]9:9-10 [319]11:12
Malachi
[320]1:11 [321]3:1 [322]3:1
Matthew
[323]1:6 [324]1:21 [325]1:23 [326]2:6 [327]3:17 [328]5:16
[329]5:28 [330]5:45 [331]6:19 [332]6:24 [333]8:16-17
[334]8:17 [335]8:17 [336]10:34-35 [337]11:5 [338]11:23
[339]12:17 [340]12:18 [341]12:25 [342]13:14 [343]13:34-35
[344]13:35 [345]16:18 [346]16:21 [347]16:21 [348]18:24
[349]20:17 [350]20:18 [351]20:18-19 [352]21:5 [353]23:34-35
[354]24:1-51 [355]24:14 [356]24:30 [357]26:23 [358]26:31
[359]26:64 [360]27:42 [361]28 [362]28:19
Mark
[363]13:1-37 [364]14:30
Luke
[365]6:36 [366]11:13 [367]21:1-38 [368]21:24 [369]21:24
[370]24:21 [371]24:26
John
[372]1:1 [373]1:2 [374]1:3 [375]1:29 [376]3:13 [377]5:36
[378]5:36 [379]7:17 [380]7:46 [381]10:16 [382]10:25
[383]15:26 [384]17:5 [385]18:88 [386]19:36
Acts
[387]1:6 [388]2:30 [389]7:5 [390]14:17
Romans
[391]1:19 [392]1:20 [393]1:20 [394]1:21-28 [395]1:22
[396]2:14-15 [397]2:14-15 [398]2:28 [399]3:7 [400]3:9
[401]4:12 [402]7:23 [403]9:4 [404]9:5 [405]9:6 [406]9:8
[407]9:10 [408]9:25 [409]9:27 [410]11:25 [411]11:25
[412]11:29 [413]16:20
1 Corinthians
[414]2:10 [415]2:14 [416]5:6-8 [417]9:8-10 [418]9:13
[419]9:14 [420]9:24 [421]10:1-2 [422]10:1-11 [423]10:6
[424]10:11
2 Corinthians
[425]8:13-15
Galatians
[426]3:13 [427]3:16 [428]4:21 [429]4:21 [430]4:22 [431]4:24
[432]4:25 [433]4:25-26 [434]4:29 [435]4:30
Ephesians
[436]3:9 [437]4:18 [438]19
Philippians
[439]3:3 [440]4:8 [441]4:8
Colossians
[442]1:15 [443]1:16 [444]2:11 [445]2:11 [446]2:13 [447]2:17
2 Thessalonians
[448]2:3 [449]2:4 [450]2:4
1 Timothy
[451]4:1 [452]4:3 [453]5:18
Hebrews
[454]1:2 [455]1:3 [456]1:3 [457]2:5 [458]3:15-19 [459]4:1-3
[460]4:5 [461]4:8-9 [462]4:9 [463]4:12 [464]4:24 [465]4:26
[466]8:5 [467]9:1 [468]9:2 [469]9:9 [470]9:23 [471]9:25
[472]9:28 [473]10:1 [474]11:5 [475]11:9 [476]11:10
[477]11:13 [478]11:13 [479]11:14 [480]11:34 [481]12:26
[482]16
1 Peter
[483]2:24
2 Peter
[484]1:20 [485]3:13
1 John
[486]1:1
Revelation
[487]1:5 [488]3:7 [489]5:5 [490]11:2 [491]11:3 [492]11:3
[493]11:15 [494]12:6 [495]12:6 [496]12:14 [497]13:2
[498]13:5 [499]13:5 [500]13:5 [501]13:6 [502]13:7 [503]13:7
[504]13:7-8 [505]13:7-8 [506]13:8 [507]13:12 [508]13:13
[509]13:14 [510]13:16 [511]13:17 [512]14:10 [513]17:2
[514]17:2 [515]17:3 [516]17:4 [517]17:5 [518]17:6 [519]17:7
[520]17:9 [521]17:12 [522]17:13 [523]17:15 [524]17:17
[525]17:18 [526]18:3-4 [527]18:23-24 [528]22:1-2 [529]22:16
Tobit
[530]14:5
Wisdom of Solomon
[531]3:1 [532]3:3 [533]4:10
1 Maccabees
[534]2:58
Sirach
[535]5:32
__________________________________________________________________
Index of Greek Words and Phrases
* To aeikineton theion men, kai logon echon kai emphron. : [536]1
* aionios: [537]1
* antitupia: [538]1
* apo tou koinou: [539]1
* Agenneton to pan kai anolethron: [540]1
* Agenneton to pan.--ex ou gar gegonen, ekeino proton tou pantos
esti.--To ge de pan genomenon sun pasi ginetai, kai touto ge de
adunaton--Ektos gar tou Pantos, ouden.: [541]1
* Agroikoteron espon ho Iesous, To thelonti ton chitona sou labein
aphes kai to himation, biophelesteron kekineke ton logon kai
parestesen houtos enpon, e hos en to Kritone Platon, hou med'
akouein hidiotai dunantai, alla mogis hoi ta enkuklia pros tes
semnes Hellenon philosophhias memathekotes: [542]1
* Aei ontos tou kesmou, anankaion kai ta mere autou sunuparchein.
Lego de mere ouranon, gen: [543]1
* All' hoi polloi tauta men ou prattousin; epi de ton logon
katapheugontes oiontai ailosophein, kai houtos esesthai stoudaioi;
homoion te piiountes tois kamnousin, hoi ton iatron akouousi men
epimelos; pioousi d' outhen ton prostassomenon, hosper oun oud'
ekeinoi eu hexousi to soma, houto therapeuomenoi; oud' houtoi ten
psuchen, houton philosophountes.: [544]1
* All' ouden tach? anisos eie chalepon endeixasthai toutoge, hos
epimeleis smikron eisi theoi, ouk epion: [545]1
* Apaugasma tes doxes autou: [546]1
* Autotheos: [547]1
* Allois de, hose dunamis, apodeiktikos di eroteseon kai apokriseon
proserchometha; Oude legomen, (to meta chleues hupo tou Kelso
eiremenon) hoti Pisteuson, hon eisegoumai soi, touton einai huion
Theou, kan e dedemenos atimotata, e kakolasmenos aischista----Oude
phamen, taute kai mallon pisteuson.: [548]1
* Anarchon kai ateleuteion: [549]1
* Haute men oun he dikaiosune, arete men esti teleia; kai outh'
Hesperos outh' Heoos houto thaumaston.: [550]1
* enopio`n mou: [551]1
* esontai gar, phesi nekris latreuontes, hos kai en to Israel
esebasthesan.: [552]1
* heos an elthe ta apokeimena auto: [553]1
* Ei gar noun eichomen, allo ti edei hemas poiein kai koine kai idia,
e umnein to theion, kai euphemein, kai epexerchesthai tas
chari9tas; Ouk edei kai skaptontas kai arountas kai esthiontas
adein ton humnon ton eis ton theon; Megas ho theos, hoti hemin
pareschen organa tauta di hon ten gen ergasometha; Megas ho theos,
hoti cheiras dedoken,: [554]1
* Ei de tou holou kosmou ho theos hou: [555]1
* Ei de me lanthaneton tous theous, ho men d?kaios theophiles an eee,
ho de adikos theomises----To de theophilei, hosa ge hupo theon
gignetai, panta gignetai hos oionte, arista.----Houtos hara
hupolepteon peri tou dikaiou andros, ean t' en penia gignetai, ean
t' en nosois, e tini allo ton dokounton kakon, hos touto tauta eis
agathon ti teleutesei zonti e kai apothanonti. Ou gar de hupo ge
theon pote ameleitai, hos an pro thumeisthai ethele dikaios
gignesthai, kai epitedeuon areten eis hoson dunaton anthropo
homoiousthai theo.: [556]1
* Ei deu au oion apodemesai estin ho thanatos enthende eis allon
topon, kai alethe esti ta legomena, hos ara ekei eisi pantes hoi
tethneotes: [557]1
* Eisi gar tines hi nomizousin heinai ta theia, kai toiauta o logos
auta exephenen, agatha, kai dunamin echonta ten akrotaten, kai
gnosin ten teleiotaten, ton mentoi anthropinon kataphronein, hos
mikron kai heutelon onton, kai anaxion tes heauton epimeleias.:
[558]1
* Ekdexasthe ton theon; hotan ekei nos semene kai upoluse umas tautes
tes uperesias tot' hupoluesthe pros auton; epi de tou parintos
anaschesthe enoikountes tauten ten choran, eis hen ekeinos umas
etaxen. Meinate, me alogistos apelthete.: [559]1
* Emoi gar dokeis o Sokrates, peri ton toiouton isos hasper kai soi;
to men saphes eidenai en to nun bio e adunaton einai, e
pa9nchalepon te to mentoi auta [leg: [560]1
* En butho aletheia: [561]1
* Epei de he tou theou men moira exetelos egigne o en autois, pollo
to thneto kai pollakis anakerannumene, to de anthropinon hethos
epekratei, tote Theos ho Theon Zeus, ate dunamenos kathoran ta
toiauta, ennnoesas genos epieikes athlios diatithemenon, diken
autois epitheinai bouletheis: [562]1
* Hemoi men apoganoumino, humin biosomenois; hopoteroi de hemon
erchontai epi ameinon pragma, adelon panti plen e to the.: [563]1
* Eipoimi d' an aletheuein, tous dunethentas diatheinai tous akroatas
ton legomenon houto biountas, hos touton houtos echonton.
Diatithentai Ioudaioi kai Christianoi peri tou ap' ^ut8on
kaloumenou mellontos aionos. ----deiknuto houn kai kelsos e ho
boulomenos, tines dietethes: [564]1
* En tine phroura esmen hoi anthropoi, kai ou deide heauton ek tautes
luein, oud' apodidraskein.----Theous heinai hemon tous
epimeloumenous. kai hemas tous anthropous en tou ktematon tois
theois einai.----Oukoun kai su an, tou sautou ktematon eiti auto
heauto apoktinnuoi, me semenantos sou hoti boulei auto tethnanai,
chalepanoi9s an auto, kai. ei tina echois timorian, timoroi o en. :
[565]1
* Enioi upokechumenous echousi tous ophthalmous, kai me blepontas to
phos tou heliou. Houto kai su, o anthrope, echeis upokechumenous
tous ophthalmous tes psuches sou upo ton amartematon kai ton
araxeon sou ton poneron.: [566]1
* Hepou euxamenos met' emou----Kai moi dusbatos ge tis topos
phainetai kai episkios; estin oun skoteinos kai dusdiereunetos.:
[567]1
* hedoxe de, kai nun eti dokei, ta men alla epitedeumata panta, ou
sphodra chalepa heinai; to de tina tropon chre gignesthai chrestous
anthropous, panchalepon.: [568]1
* heti de ek nepiou pasin hemin suntethraptai [hedone] dio kai
chalepon apotripsasthai touto to pathos, enkechrosmenon to bio.:
[569]1
* Hemeis men oun hou phamenoto diaphtharen soma epanerchesthai eis
ten ex arches phusin, hos oude ton diaphtharenta kokkon tou sitou;
legomen gar, hoster epi tou kokkou tou sitou egeiretai stachus
ohuto logos tis enkeitai to somati. aph' ou me phtheiromenou
egeiretai to soma en aphtharsia.: [570]1
* Hede de Markou kai Louka ton kat' autous euangelion ten hekdosin
pepoiemenon, Ioannen apodexasthai men phasin, aletheian autois
epimarturesanta;: [571]1
* hina plerothe: [572]1
* ho angelos tes diathekes: [573]1
* ho on: [574]1
* Ouk hoti allotria esti ta Platonos didagmata tou Christou all' hoti
ouk esti pante homoia, hosper oude ta ton allon.----hekastos gar
tis, apo merous tou spermatikou theiou logou to sungenes oron,
kalos ephthenxato. Hoi de tanantia autois en kurioterois eirekotes,
ouk epistemen ten apopton kai gnosin ten aneletton phainontai
eschekenai.: [575]1
* Oligous men onesen he perikalles kai upitetedeumene Platonos lexis,
pl onas de he ton eutelesteron hama kai pragmatikos kai
estochasmenos ton pollon didaxanton kai grapsanto9n; esti goun
idein, ton men Platona en chersi ton dokounton heinai philologon
monon.: [576]1
* Ouden gar allo pratton ego perierchomai, e peithon humon kai
neoterous kai p9resbuterous, mete somaton epimeleisthai, mete
chrematon proteron, mete allou tinos, houto sphodra, hos tes
psuches, hopos hos ariste estai; legon. hoti ouk ek chrematon he
arete ginetai, all' ex aretes chremata kai talla tagatha tois
anthropois hapan9ta, kai edia kai demosia.: [577]1
* Oudeis te auton popote ta sumbanta tos proaneremenois tresas,
exeste tes hetairias, oudu antekeruxe tois allois, eis phos agagon
ta suntetheimana. Alla kai ho zonta prodounai tollesas auton,
autocheiria kath' heautou parachrema ten diken epespasato: [578]1
* Ouk estin ou heneka an theos pseudoito.--Komide hara ho theos
haploun kai alethes en te ergo kai en lugo. Kai oute allous
exapata, oute kata phantasias, oute kata logous, oute kata semeion
pompas, outh hupar oud' onar.: [579]1
* Ouk oida hopos m9akarious hupolabo tous methen apolausantas tes
aretes agathon, di auten de tauten apollumenous.: [580]1
* Oukoun kai to hosion, dioti hosion esti, phileitai hupo ton theon;
all' ouk hoti phileitas, dia touto hosion esti.: [581]1
* Ho gar Zeus ex eautou ton Asklepion; egennesen eis de ten gen dia
tes heliou gonimou zoes enephenen; outos epi ges ex ouranou
poiesamenos proodon, enoeidos men peri ten Epidauron ephane.:
[582]1
* Ho gen, ouranon, kai Theous, kai p8anta ta en ourano kai ta en adou
kai upo ges hehapanta ergasamenos. : [583]1
* Ho theos gar autois tauta, kai hosa kalos lelektai, ephanerose.:
[584]1
* Ho poetes kai patertoude tou pantos: [585]1
* Oson gar estin archon energeia he somatike delon hoti tautas aneu
somatos adunaton husarchein hoion badizein aneu podon.: [586]1
* Ou toi egoge, ho paides, oude touto popote epeisthen, hos he psuche
heos an en th9neto somati he z?; hotan de toutou apallage,
tethnek9en. Oude ge hopos , aphron estai e psuche epeiden tou
Haphronos somatos dicha genetai, oude touto pepeismai. All' hotan
akratos kai katharos ho nous ekkrithe, tote k9ai phronimotaton
eikos auton einai.: [587]1
* Hosper su kolaseis aionious nomizeis, houto kai hoi ton hiexon
ekeinon exegetai teletai te kai mustagogoi.: [588]1
* husteron troteron: [589]1
* Hosper gar kai ta ton nukteridon ommata pros to phengos echei to
meth' hemeran, houto kai tes hemeteras psuches ho nous pros ta te
phusei phanerotata panton.: [590]1
* Hoste meketi kata to palaion bracheis tinas kai harithmo leptous,
orthas peri Theou pherein doxas; halla muria plethe barbaron.:
[591]1
* ----agrapta kasphale theon Nomima;---- Ou gar ti nunge kachthes,
all' aei pote Ze tauta, ko?dei; oiden ex hotou' phane. Touton ego
ouk hemellon, andros oudenos Phronema deisas', en theoi si ten
diken Dusein.: [592]1
* Ai de tou Theou Christo matheteuthei sai ekklesiai, sunexetazomenai
tais hon paroikousi demon ekklesiais; os phosteres eisin en kosmo,
Tis gar ouk an homologesai, kai tous cheirous ton apo tes ekklesias
kai sunkrisei ton beltionon elattous, pollo kreittous tonchanein
ton en tois demois ekklesion.: [593]1
* Aner dikaios estin, ouch ho me adikon, All' hostis adikein
hounamenos me bouletai. Oud' hos ta aikra lambanein apescheto, All'
hos ta megala karterei me lambanon, Hechein dunamenos, kai kratein
azemios. Oud' hos ge tauta p8anta diaterei monon, All' hostis
adolon gnesian t' echon phusin, Einai dikaios, k' ou dokein heinai
thelei.: [594]1
* Gegraptai de auton palin anastesesthai, meth' on o Kurios
anistesi.: [595]1
* Delon hos ouden adunaton kai hemas meta to teleutesai, palin
periodon tinon eilumenon chronou, eis ho nun esmen
apokatastesesthai schema.: [596]1
* Dein gar peri auta hen ge ti touton diapraxasthai; e mathein hope
echei, e, ei tauta adunaton ton goun beltiston ton Anthropinon
Logon labonta kai duselenktotaton, epi touto achoumenon, hoster epi
schedias, kinduneuonta diapleusai ton bion; ei me tis dunait
asphalesteron kai akindunoteron, epi bebaioterou ochematos, e Logou
Theiou tinos, diaporeuthenai.: [597]1
* Deinous gar an pareichen erotas, eiti toiouton eautes enarges
eidolon pareicheto, : [598]1
* Deukalioni phasi peristeran ek tes larnakos aphiemenen deloma
genesthai, cheimonos men eiso palin enduomenen, eudias du
apoptasan.: [599]1
* Demiourgos: [600]1
* Dia ti ouchi kai bebasanismenos tou epangellom?nous tas donameis
exetasomen apo tou biou kai tou hethous kai ton epakolouthounton
tais dunamesin, etoi eis blaben ton anthropon, e eis hethon
epanorthosin.: [601]1
* Ei me estai para ta aistheta alla, ouk estai arche kai taxis, all'
aei t8es arches arche. : [602]1
* Eipen, ho de teleutaion ephthenxato; O Kriton, to Asklepio
opheilomcn alektruona; alla apodote, kai me amelesese.: [603]1
* Heita ton loipon chronon katheudontes diateleite an, ei me tina
allon humin ho Theos epipempseie, kedomenos humon.: [604]1
* Eu gar chre eidenai, ho, ti per an sothe te kai genetai hoion dei,
en toiaute katastasei politeion, Theou moiran auto sosai.: [605]1
* Theos ek Theou: [606]1
* Theon asomaton apephens. : [607]1
* Kan ei me dunaton eie tauta lanthanein kai theous kai anthropous,
homos doteon heinai, tou loeou heneka hina aute dikaiosune pros
adikian auten kritheie.: [608]1
* Kosmos autos ex heautou aidios esti kai autoteles, kai diamenon ton
panta aiona.: [609]1
* Kakeino de pos ou meston ekplexeos, to planous aneras kai idiotas,
mete lalein mete akouein pleon tes patriou phones epistamenous, me
monon diansethenai tolmesai proelthein epi ten ton ethnon hap8anton
periodon, alla kai proelthontas katorthosai to epitedeuma; Skepsai
de, hopoion esti, kai to medena medamou diaphonon exenenkein peri
ton praxeon tou Iesou logon. Ei gar epi panton amphignooumenon
pragmaton, en te tois kata nomous dikasteriois, kai en tais koinais
amphisbetesesi, ton marturon sumphonia kuroi to amphignooumenon;
pos ouk an he aletheia kai epi tonde sustaie, dodeka men onton
Apostolon, ebdomekonta de Matheton, muriou te plethous touton
eksos, hapanton thaumasten sumphonian epidedeigmenon, kai
marturesanton ge tois hupo tou Iesou pepragmenois, ouk anidroti,
dia de basanon upomones, kai pases aikias kai thanatou.: [610]1
* Keruttein du agroikous andras eis pantas to tou Iesou onuma, kai
tous men auton ten Rhomaion archen kai auten te ten basilikotaten
polin neimasthai; tous de ten Person, tous de ten Armenion,
heterous de to Parthon ethnos, kai au palin to Skuthon, tinas de
ede kai ep' auta tes oikoumenes elthein ta akra, epi te ten Indon
phthasai choran, kai eterous huper ton Okeanon parelthein epi tas
kaloumenas Brettanikas nesous; tauta ouk et' ego ge hegoumai kata
anthropon einai, meti ge kat8a euteleis kai idiotas, pollou dei
kata planous kai goetas.: [611]1
* Kai ei boulei, paradeigmati si ti9ne ton gnorimon xenagess pros to
zeteuenon; phasi gar hoti kath8aper aition to soma tes hekastou
skias ginetai; homochronos deto somati he skia, kai ouch homotimos;
houto de kai hode ho kosmos parakolouthema esti to Theou aitio9u
ontos auto tou einai, k9ai sunaidios esti to Theo, ouketi de kai
homotimos. : [612]1
* Kai hoi meta logou biosantes, Christianoi eisi, kan atheoi
enomisthesan; hoion en Hellesi men Sokrates kai Herakleitos, kai
hoi homoioi autois en barbarois de Abraam,: [613]1
* Kai gar an ein, ei pros ta dora kai tas thusias apoblepousin hemon
hoi theoi, alla me pros ten psuchen, an tis hosios kai dikaios on
tunchane. Pollo ge mallon, oimai, e pros tas poluteleis tautas
pompas te kai thusias.: [614]1
* Kai men ta ge megista epicheira aretes kai prokeimena athla ou
dieleluthamen.----Ti d' an en ge oligo chrono mega genoito; pas gar
outos geho en paidos mechri presbutou chronos pros panta oligos pou
tis an eie.: [615]1
* Kai to parapan zen, megiston men kakon, ton xumpanta chronon
athanaton onta, kai kektemenon panta ta legomena agatha, plen
dikaiosunes te kai aretes apases.: [616]1
* Kath' hemas gar he aute arete esti ton makarion panton; hoste kai
he aute arete anthropou kai Theou.: [617]1
* Kath' hemas gar he aute arete esti ton makarion panton; hoste kai
he aute arete anthropou kai Theou: [618]1
* Kleptein nenomisto tous eleutherous paidas, ho ti tis dunaito.:
[619]1
* Kurosai te ten graphen eis enteuxin tais ekklesiais.: [620]1
* Meson toinun sauton stesas ton peri tou Aristeou ginomenon, kai ton
peri tou Iesou histor9oumenon, hide ei me ek tou apobantos, kai ton
hopheloume_on eis hethon epanorthosin kai eulabeian ten pros ton
epi pasi theon, estin eipein; hote pisteuteon men hos ouk atheei
genomenois tois peri Iesou hestoroumenois, ouchi de tois peri tes
Prokonnesiou Aristeou. Ti men gar boulomene he p9ronoia ta peri ton
Aristean paradoxa epragmateueto, kai ti hophelesai to ton anthropon
genei boulomene, ta telik^uta (hos oiei) epideiknuto, ook echeis
legein.: [621]1
* Megales boules gagelos: [622]1
* Nun de eo iste hoti par' andras te elpizo aphixesthai agathous, kai
touto ouk men an panu diischurisaimen: [623]1
* Noun pro kosoou einai, ouch hos chrono proteron autou onta, all'
hoti ho kosmos para nou esti, phusei proteros ekeinos kai aition
toutou. : [624]1
* Nous: [625]1
* Nous.: [626]1
* Nomothetes hostis noun kektetai, outote me tolmese kainotomon epi
theosebeian, hetiis me saphes echei ti, trepsai polin
eautou.----meden toparapan eidos, hosper oud' hon dunaton eidenai
te thnete phusei ton toiouton peri.: [627]1
* Oi de [Mosen] diadexamenoi, chronous men tinas en tois autois
diemenon dikaiopragount9es, kai theosebeis hos alethos ontes;
Hepeit': [628]1
* Hoi de adikoi pampan aionios kakois sunezontai.: [629]1
* Hoi de an doxosin aniatos echein dia ta megethe ton hamartematon,
toutous he prosekousa moira rhiptei eis ton Tartaron, hothen oupote
ekbainousi.: [630]1
* Hoi men ara nikes heneka pales kai dromon kai ton toiouton,
etolmesan apechesthai.----Hoi de hemeteroi paides adunatesousi
karterein, polu kallionos heneka nikes.: [631]1
* Hoi men ara nikes heneka pales kai dromon kai ton toiouton,
etolmesan apechesthai.----Hoi de hemeteroi paides, adunatesousi
karterein, polu kallionos ena_a nikes.: [632]1
* Ou gar hoson ousias aretes apesphalmenoi tunchanousin hoi polloi,
tosouton kai tou krinein tous allous hoi poneroi kai achrestos
theinn de ti kai eustochon esti kai toisi kakois hoste pampolloi
kai ton sphodra kakon, eu tois logois kai dexais diarountai tous
ameinous ton anthropon kai tous cheirous.: [633]1
* Ouk oligous, Hellenas kai Barbarous, sophous kai anoetous, mechri
thanatou agonizesthai huper Christianismou, hin' autou me
exomosontai; hoper oudeis huper allou dogmatos istoretai poiein.:
[634]1
* Ouk hoti allotria esti ta Platonos didagmata tou Christou all' hoti
ouk esti pante homoia; hoster oude ta ton allon.----hekastos gar
tis, apo metous tou spermatikou theiou logou to sungenes oron,
kalos ephthenxato;----hosa oun para pasi kalos, iretai, hemon ton
Christianon esti.: [635]1
* Oute ?ra antadikein dei, houte kakos poiein oudena anthropon, oud?
an hotioun paschheupo auton.: [636]1
* Pothen to kakon: [637]1
* Pasa ananke tonde kosmon, eikona tinos einai. : [638]1
* Para men tois Helletin heis tis Phaidon kai ouk oida ei deuteros,:
[639]1
* Para men tois Hellesin heis tis Phaidon, kai ouk oida ei deuteros,
kai heis Polemoin, metabalontes apo asotou kai mochtherotatou biou
ephilosophesan; para de to Iesou, ou monon tote oi dodeka, all'
aiei kai pollaplasious hoitines genomenoi sophronon choros.: [640]1
* Para men tois Ellesin eis tis: [641]1
* Peri tes ou pantos phuseos.: [642]1
* Peri tes tou pantos phuseos.: [643]1
* Peusteon de auton, ei pote tis allos toioutos planos historetai,
praotetos kai epieikeias sophrosunes te kai tes alles aretes
didaskalos tois apatomenois gegonos aitios,: [644]1
* Proton men, phamen, timas tas met' olumpious te kai tous tun polin
echontas theous, tois chthoniois an tis theois artia kai deutera
kai aristera nemon, horthotata tou tes eusebeias skopou
tunch8anoi.----Meta theou de tousde, kai tois daimosin hog' emphron
orgiazoit' an.----Epakolouthei d' autois hidrumata idia patroon
theon kata nomon orgiazomena.: [645]1
* SOK:: [646]1
* Speidein de kai thuein, kai aparchesthai kata ta patria hekasto
prosekei.: [647]1
* Sunechei ton kosmon harmonia. Tautes d' aitios ho Theos: [648]1
* Sokr?tei men gar oudeis episteuthe huper toutou tou dogmatos
apothneskein. Ch9risto de to kai apo Sokratous apo merous
gnosthenti ou philosophoi oude philologoi monon epeisthesan, alla
kai pantelos idiotai kai doxes kai phobou kai thanatou
kataphronesantes.: [649]1
* Ta Platoni houk apithanos men eiremena, ou men kai diethento ton
philosophon axios kan auto anastraphenai en te pros ton poieten ton
holon eusebeia, hen echren me notheuein, mede miainein te
eidololatreia: [650]1
* Ta de kala kai ta dikaia. peri on he politike skopeitai, tosauten
echei diaphoran kai planen oste dokein nomo einai, phusei de me.:
[651]1
* Ta tes pisteos hemon, tais koinais ennoiais archethen
sunagoreuonta.: [652]1
* Tas dunameis kai ta Organa kai tas horexeis upo Theou dedomenas,
anthropos, ouch hedones heneka dedosthai sumbebeken, alla: [653]1
* Tade de dikaia oud' heinai top9arapan phusei;----gignomena techee
kai toi` nomois, all' ou de tine phusei.----Phaskonton heinai to
dikaiotaton, ho, ti tis an nika biazomenos. aben aseb ai te kai
staseis; hosen loben anbropon neain domosia polesi te kai idiois
oikois.: [654]1
* Tacha de kai proegoumenos tois Hellensin ednthe he philosophia
tote. prin e ton kurion kalesai kai tous Hellenas; epaidagogei gar
kai aute to Hellenkon. hos ho nomos tous Hebraious eis Christon;
proparaskeuazei toinun he philosophia. proodopoiousa ton hupo
Christou teleioumenon.: [655]1
* To anarchon kai ateleuteton ou schematos kai tes kieseos pistoutai,
dioti agennetos ho kesmos kai aphthartos hete gar tou schematos
idea, kuklos houtos de pantothen hisos kai homoios, dioper anarchos
kai ateleuteeos, he te tes kineseos,: [656]1
* To horomenon, hou dioti horomenon ge esti, dia toupo horatai; alla
tounantion, dioti horatai, apo touto huromenon.: [657]1
* To men alethes, o xene, dischurizesthai tauta houtos echein, pollon
amphisbetounton, Theou esti.: [658]1
* To makarion kai aphtharton, oute auto pragmata echei, oute allo
parechei; hoste oute argais, oute charisi sunechetai.: [659]1
* To palaion pant' en alphiton kai aleuron plere, kathaper kai n8un
koneos; kai krenai d' errheon, hai men hudatos galaktos d' allai;
kai omoios hai men melitos, hai d' oiou, tines d' elaiou; upo
plesmones, d' hoi anthropoi kai truphes, eis hubrin exep9eson. Zeus
de misesas ten katastasin, hephanise panta, kai dia ponou ton
bionapedeixe.: [660]1
* To proton kinoun, akineton. : [661]1
* Ton men ou poieten kai patera toude tou pantos eurein te ergon,
ka8i euronta legein eis pantas adunaton.: [662]1
* Tode de ismen, hoti tauta ta pathe en hemin hoion neura e merinthoi
tines enousai, sposi t9e hemas kai allelai; anthelkousin, enantiai
oosai ep' enanti_s praxeis.: [663]1
* Ta gar de toiauta [theon therapeias] out' epistametha hemeis,
oikizontes te polin oudeni allo peisometha ean noun echomen, oude
chr9esometha exegete, all' e to patrio Theo.: [664]1
* Tautes tes dikes oute su mepote, oute ei allos atuches genomen9os
epeuxetai p9eregenesthai theon.----Ou gar amelethese pot' up' autes
ouch houto smikros on, duse kata to tes ges bathos; oudeu upselos
genomenos, eis ton ouranon anaptese; tiseis de auton ten
proesekousan timorian, ei t' enthade menon, heite kai en ade
diaporentheis, eithe kai touton eis agiotrron eti diakomistheis
titon: [665]1
* Tauta logismo labon, hesuchian echon. kai ta autou pratton, hoion
en cheimoni koniortou kai zales hupo pneumatos pheromenou, hupo
toichion hupostas horon tous allous katapimplamenous, anomias,
agapa ei pe autos katharos adikias te kai anosioin ergon. tonte
enthade bion biosetai, kai ten apallagen, autou meta kales elpidos
ideos kai heumenes apallaxetai.: [666]1
* Tauta t9oinun ouden esti plethei oude megethei pros ekeina ha
tileutesanta hekateron perimenei.: [667]1
* Tines hezetekasi ten pros Hebraious, pros tes Romaion ekklesias hos
me Paulou ousan auten antilegesthai phesantes,: [668]1
* Tous men gar ton theon orontes saphos, timomen; ton de eikonas
hagalmata hidrusamenoi, ohus hemin agallousi, kaiper apsuchous
hontas, ekeinous hegoumetha, tuus empsuchous theous pollen dia
taut' eunoian kai charin echein.: [669]1
* Tois Hierosolumois, anokodomethe to teichos, ogdoo kai aikosto tes
Xerxou Basileias etei, meni ennato; telos de ton teichon labonton,:
[670]1
* Touto de oun to meros phamen phusei kuriotaton, kai dunaton hos
hoion te malista kai arista mathein, ei didaskoi tis; all' oud' an
didaxeien, ei me Theos uphegoito.: [671]1
* Pharmakeia: [672]1
* Phronesin de kai aletheis doxas bebaioun, eutuches hoto kai pros to
geras parngineto.: [673]1
* Chre panta poiin, hoste aretes kai phroneseos en to bio metaschein;
kalon gar to hathlon, kai he elpis megale.: [674]1
* Chre panta poieinhoste aretes kai phroneseos en to bio metaschein
kalon gar to athlon, kai he elpis megale.: [675]1
* ge'graptai de, auton palin anastesesthai, meth' hon ho kurios
anistesin.: [676]1
* ouchi: [677]1
* poiesai: [678]1
* pollon: [679]1
* pollo: [680]1
* proaphostasthai: [681]1
* sabbatismo's: [682]1
* sophois pharmakois: [683]1
* ta apokeimena auto: [684]1
* to pan: [685]1
* te idia epilusei: [686]1
__________________________________________________________________
Index of Hebrew Words and Phrases
* 'vytsr: [687]1
* rchyvm hvtvv: [688]1
* 'vyk phd' yvts 'd dnvk: [689]1
* vny ,rvq: [690]1
* vvtsvq htym: [691]1
* vtd: [692]1
* k'rv: [693]1
* k'ry: [694]1
* krv: [695]1
* ksym: [696]1
__________________________________________________________________
Index of Latin Words and Phrases
* --Si immortalis natura animæ est,: [697]1
* Omnis enim per se divûm natura necesse est: [698]1
* à posteriori: [699]1
* à priori: [700]1
* A patribus acceptos Deos placet coli.: [701]1
* Ab æqualitate naturæ oritur unicuique ea, quæ cupit, acquirendi
spes.: [702]1
* Ad naturam substantiæ pertinet existere.: [703]1 [704]2 [705]3
* Ad naturam substantiæ pertinet existere. : [706]1
* Ad naturam substantiæ pertinet existere; hoc est, ipsius essentia
involvit necessario existentiam. : [707]1
* Ad tuendos conservandosque homines, hominem natum esse.: [708]1
* Adeo omnis illa tunc sapientia Socratis, de industria venerat
consultæ æquanimitatis, non de fiducia compertæ veritatis.: [709]1
* Alii putant Deum esse causam liberam, propterea quod potest, ut
putant, efficere ut ea quæ ex ejus natura sequi diximus; hoc est,
quæ in ejus potestate sunt, non fiant: Sed hoc idem est ac si
dicerent quod Deus potest efficere, ut, ex natura trianguli, non
sequatur ejus tres angulos æquales esse duobus rectis.--Ego me
satis clare ostendisse puto, a summa Dei potentia, omnia necessario
effluxisse, vel semper eadem necessitate sequi; eodem modo ac, ex
natura trianguli, ab æterno et in æternum sequitur ejus tres
angulos æquari duobus rectis.: [710]1
* Angusta admodum est circa nostra tantummodo commoda, lætitiæ
matria; sed eadem erit amplissima, si aliorum omnium felicitas
cordi nobis sit. Quippe hæc ad illam eandem habebit proportionem,
quam habet immensa beatitudo Dei, totiusque humani generis, ad
curtam illam fictæ felicitatis supellectilem, quam uni homini,
eique invido et malevolo, fortunæ bona possint suppeditare.: [711]1
* Animalia bruta, quamdiu bene sibi est, cæteris non invident: Homo
autem tum maxime molestus est, quando otio opibusque maximè
abundat.: [712]1
* Animantia illa verborum arte illa carent, qua homines alii aliis
videri faciunt bonum malum, et malum bonum; magnum parvum; et
parvum magnum.: [713]1
* Animantia quæ rationem non habent, nullum defectum vident vel
videre se putant, in adminstratione suarum rerum publicarum. Sed in
multitudine hominum, plurimi sunt qui præ cæteris sapere
existimantes, conantur res novare; Et diversi novatores innovant
diversis modis; id quod est distractio et bellum civile.: [714]1
* Argumentum desiderat vir magnificus, quo probetur ens, cujus
existentia est necessaria, tantum posse esse unum, et quidem ut id
argumentum à necessitate existentia desumatur, et a priori (ut in
scholis loquuntur,) non a posteriori concludat; hoc est, ex natura
necessariæ existentiæ probatur eam pluribus non posse esse
communem.: [715]1
* Atque hæc omnia propter se solum, ut nihil adjungatur emolumenti,
petenda sunt.: [716]1
* Cù m omnis ratio veri et boni ab ejus Omnipotentiâ dependeat.:
[717]1
* Coelestem ergo admirabilem ordinem incredibilemque constantiam, ex
qua conservatio et salus omnium omnis oritur, qui vacare mente
putat; is ipse mentis expers habendus est.: [718]1
* Causa sensionis est externum corpus sive objectum quod premit
organum proprium; et premendo, (mediantibus nervis et membranis,)
continuum efficit motum introrsum ad cerebrum et inde ad cor; unde
nascitur cordis resistentia et contra-pressio seu antitupia: [719]1
* Collitur autem, non taurornm opimis corporibus contrucidatis, nec
auro argentove suspenso, nec in thesauros stipe infusa; sed pia et
recta voluntate.: [720]1
* Concludendum est, legem naturæ semper et ubique obligare in foro
interno, sive conscientia, non semper in foro externo, sed tum
solummodo, cum secure id fieri possit.: [721]1
* Consensio creaturarum illarum brutarum, naturalis est; hominum
pactitia tantum, id est, artificiosa.: [722]1
* Consequens est, ut nihil dicendum sit injustum. Nomina justi et
injusti, locum in hac conditione non habent.: [723]1
* Contrà autem, Hobbiana resolutio dominii divini in potentiam ejus
irresistibilem adeo apertè ducit ad, &c.--ut mihi dubium non sit,
illud ab eo fictum fuisse, Deoque attributum, in eum tantum finem,
ut juri suo omnium in omnia patrocinaretur.: [724]1
* Corpus motum vel quiescens, ad motum vel quietem determinari debuit
ab alio corpore, quod etiam ad motum vel quietem determinatum fuit
ab alio, et illud iterum ab alio, et sic in infinitum.: [725]1
* Corpus motum vel quiescens, ad motum vel quietem determinari debuit
ab alio corpore, quod etiam ad motum vel quietem determinatum fuit
ab alio; et illud iterum ab alio; et sic in infinitum.: [726]1
* Corpus motum, vel quiescens, ad motum vel quietem determinari
debuit ab alio corpore, quod etiam ad motum vel quietem
determinatum fuit ab alio, et illud iterum ab alio, et sic in
infinitum.: [727]1
* Corpus motum, vel quiescens, ad motum vel quietem determinari
debuit ab alio corpore, quod etiam ad motum vel quietum
determinatum fuit ab alio, et illud iterum ab alio, et sic in
infinitum.: [728]1
* Credebam facilè opinionibus magnorum virorum, tam gratissimam
[animæ immortalitatem] promittentium magis quam probantimm.: [729]1
* Crucem ingenio figere, ut rem capiat fugientem captum.--Tam fieri
non potest, ut instans [temporis: [730]1
* Cum audisset [Augustus,] inter pueros quos in Syria Herodes rex
Judæorum intra bimatum jussit interfici, filium quoque ejus
occisum; ait, melius est Herodis porcum esse quam filium.: [731]1
* Da mihi virum qui sit iracundus, &c. Numquis hæc philosophorum,
&c.: [732]1
* Da mihi virum qui sit iracundus, maledicus, efficinatus,
paucissimis Dei verbis tam placidum, quam ovem, reddam. Da
libidinosum, &c.----Numquis hæc philosophorum aut unquam præstitit,
aut præstare, si velit, potest?: [733]1
* Dabis servo tuo cor docile ut possit discernere inter bonum et
malum: [734]1
* De mundo, et de his quos in mundo deos a Deo factos scribit Plato,
apertissime dicit eos esse cæpisse, et habere initium.--Verum id
quomodo intelligant, invenerunt [Platonici;] non esse hoc videlicet
temporis, sed substitutionis initium.: [735]1
* Denique nequis obligationem legum naturalium arbitrariam et
mutabilem a nobis fingi suspicetur, hoc adjiciendum censui;
virtutum exercitium, habere rationem medii necessarii ad finem,
(seposita consideratione imperii divini,) manente rerum natura tali
qualis nunc est. Hoc autem ita intelligo, uti agnoscunt plerique
omnes, additionem duarum unitatum duabus prius positis, necessario
constituere numerum quaternarium; aut, uti praxes geometricæ et
mechanicæ, problemata proposita solvunt immutabiliter; adeo ut nec
sapientia nec voluntas divina cogitari possit quicquam in
contrarium constituere posse.: [736]1
* Deorum providentia mundus administratur; iidemque consulunt rebus
humanis; neque solum universis, verum etiam singulis.: [737]1
* Detrahere aliquid alteri, et hominem hominis incommodo suum augere
commodum, magis est contra naturam, quà m mors, quà m paupertas,
quà m dolor, quà m cætera quæ possunt aut corpori accidere, aut
rebus externis.: [738]1
* Deum non operari ex libertate voluntatis.: [739]1 [740]2 [741]3
* Deus ex solis suæ naturæ legibus, et a nemine coactus, agit.:
[742]1
* Deus non est æternitas vel infinitas, sed æternus et infinitus; non
est duratio vel spatium, sed durat et adest. Durat semper, et adest
ubique; et, existendo semper et ubique, durationem et spatium,
æternitatem et infinitatem, constituit. Cum unaquæque spatii
particula sit semper, et unumquodque durationis indivisibile
momentum, ubique; certè rerum omnium fabricator ac Dominus, non
erit nunquam nusquam omnipræsens est, non per virtutem solam, sed
etiam per substantiam; nam virtus sine substantia subsistere non
potest. In ipso continentur et moventur universa, &c.: [743]1
* Deus non magis dici potest ex libertate voluntatis agere, quam dici
potest ex libertate motus et quietis agere.: [744]1
* Dictamina divini intellectus sanciuntur in leges apud ipsum
valituras, per immutabilitatem harum perfectionum: [745]1
* Dignæ itaque sunt, quæ propter intrinsecam sibi perfectionem
appetantur, etiam si nulla esset naturæ lex, quæ illas imperaret.:
[746]1
* Doctrina alia, quæ obedientiæ civili repugnat, est, quicquid faciat
civis quicunque contra conscientiam suam, peccatum esse.: [747]1
* Dubitari non potest, quin Deus, qui ita naturalem rerum omnium
ordinem constituit, ut talia sint actionum humanarum consequentia
erga ipsos auctores, fecitque ut ordinaria hæc consequentia ab
ipsis præsciri possint, aut summa cum probabilitate expectari,
voluerit hæc ab iis considerari, antequam ad agendum se
accingerent; atque eos his provisis velut argumentis in legum
sanctione contentis determinari.: [748]1
* Ea, quæ vis, ut potero, explicabo; nec tamen quasi Pythius Apollo,
certa ut sint et fixa quæ dixero, sed ut homunculus unus è multis,
probabilia conjectura sequens. Ultra enim quò progrediar, quam ut
verisimilia videam, non habeo.: [749]1
* Eadem est duratio seu perseverantia existentiæ rerum; sive motus
sint celeres, sive tardi, sive nulli.: [750]1
* Eadem est mensura boni malique, quæ mensura est veri falsique in
propositionibus pronuntiantibus de efficacia motum ad rerum aliarum
conservationem, et corruptionem facientium.: [751]1
* Epicurum verbis reliquisse Deos, re sustulisse.: [752]1
* Errant ergo velut in mari magno, nec quo ferantur intelligunt; quia
nec viam cernunt nec ducem sequuntur.: [753]1
* Est autem unus dies bene et ex preceptis tuis actus, peccanti
immortalitati anteponendus.: [754]1
* Est quidem vera lex, recta ratio naturæ congruens, diffusa in
omnes, constans, sempiterna, quæ vocet ad officium jubendo;
vetando, a fraude deterreat.----Huic legi nec abrogari fas est,
neque derogari ex hac aliquid licet, neque tota abrogari potest.
Nec vero aut per senatum aut per populum solvi hac lege possumus:
[755]1
* Est similitudo quædam inter id, quod in vita communi vocatur
injuria, et id quod in scholis solet appellari absurdum.
Quemadmodum enim is, qui argumentis cogitur ad negationem
assertionis quam prius asseruerat, dicitur redigi ad absurdum;
eodem modo is, qui præ animi impotentia facit vel omittit id quod
se non facturum vel non omissurum pacto suo ante promiserat,
injuriam facit; neque minus in contradictionem incidit, quam qui in
scholis reducitur ad absurdum.--Est itaque injuria, absurditas,
quædam in conversatione, sicut absurditas, injuria quædam est in
disputatione.: [756]1
* Est, inquit Cicero, philosophia paucis contenta judicibus,
multitudinem consulto ipsa, fugiens.----Maximum itaque argumentum
est, philosophiam quod neque ad sapientiam tendere, neque ipsam
esse sapientiam, quod mysterium ejus, barba tantum celebratur et
pallio.: [757]1
* Et primum quidem omni antiquitate, &c.: [758]1
* Etiam extra regimen civile, a malis omnigenis simul consideratis
tutior erit, qui actibus externis leges naturæ constantissime
observabet; quam qui, juxta doctrinam Hobbianam, vi aut insidiis
alios omnes conando præoccupare, securitatem sibi quæsiverit.:
[759]1
* Etsi nihil nimis oportet confidere. Movemur enim sæpe aliquo acutè
concluso, labamus mutamusque sententiam clarioribus etiam in rebus;
in his est enim aliqua obscuritas.: [760]1
* Eum mundi casum relatum in arcanis vestris habetis.: [761]1
* Ex cæteris philosophis, nonne optimus et gravissimus quisque
confitetur, multa se ignorare; et multa sibi etiam atque etiam esse
discenda?: [762]1
* Ex his sequitur injuriam nemini fieri posse, nisi ei quocum initur
pactum. : [763]1
* Ex his sequitur, injuriam nemini fieri posse, &c.: [764]1
* Ex his sequitur, injuriam nemini fieri posse, nisi ei quocum initur
pactum.: [765]1
* Ex his sequitur, injuriam nemini fieri posse, nisi ei quocum initur
pactum.----Siquis alicui noceat, quocum nihil pactus est, damnum ei
infert, non injuriam.----Etenim si is qui damnum recipit, injuriam
expostularet; is qui fecit sic diceret, quid tu mihi? quare facerem
ego tuo potius, quam meo libitu? &c. In qua ratione, ubi nulla
intercesserunt pacta, non video quid sit quod possit reprehendi.:
[766]1
* Ex necessitate Divinæ Naturæ, infinita infinitis modis (hoc est,
omnia quæ sub intellectum infinitum cadere possunt,) sequi debent.:
[767]1
* Ex necessitate divinæ naturæ infinita infinitis modis seque
debent.: [768]1
* Ex necessitate divinæ naturæ, infinita infinitis modis (hoc est,
omnia quæ sub intellectum infinitum cadere possunt,) seque debent.:
[769]1
* Ex necessitate divinæ naturæ, infinita infinitis modis sequi
debent: [770]1
* Ex necessitate divinæ naturæ, infinita infinitis modis sequi
debent.: [771]1
* Ex quo efficitur, hominem naturæ obedientem, homini nocere non
posse.: [772]1
* Ex quo intelligitur, sensionis immediatam causam esse in eo, quod
sensionis organum primum et tangit et premit. Si enim organi pars
extima prematur; illa cedente, premetur quoque pars quæ versus
interiora illi proxima est; et ita propagabitur pressio, sive motus
ille, per partes organi omnes, usque ad intimam.--Quoniam autem
motui ab objecto per media ad organi partem intimam propagato, fit
aliqua totius organi resistentia sive reactio, per motum ipsius
organi internum naturalem; fit propterea conatui ab objecto,
conatus ab organo contrarius. Ut, cù m conatus ille ad intima,
ultimus actus sit eorum qui fiunt in actu sensionis; tum demum ex
ea reactione aliquandiu durante, ipsum existant phantasma; quod,
propter conatum versus externa, semper videtur tanquam aliquid
situm extra organum.: [773]1
* Formam ipsam, et tanquam faciem honesti, quæ si oculis cerneretur,
mirabiles amores, ut ait Plato, excitaret sui.: [774]1
* Hæc autem in opinione existimare, non in natura ponere, dementis
est. Nam nec arboris nec equi virtus, quæ dicitur, in opinione sita
est, sed in natura.: [775]1