This
new Electronic Briefing Book is based on a collaboration
between Proceso
magazine and the National Security Archive and launched
on March 2, 2003.

The collaboration grew out of a shared desire to publish
and disseminate to a wide audience newly-declassified documents
about the United States and Mexico. Each month, Proceso
magazine will publish an article by the Archive's Mexico
Project director, Kate Doyle, examining new documentary
evidence on a chosen topic. The series - called Archivos
Abiertos (or, Open Archive), will draw from U.S. and
Mexican declassified records on a range of issues that could
include, for example: drug trafficking and counternarcotics
policy, Mexican presidential elections, human rights cases,
immigration, U.S. training of the Mexican military, NAFTA
negotiations, the role of the press, peso devaluations,
and state repression during Mexico's "dirty war."
On the same day that Proceso's article appears in
Mexico, the National Security Archive will post an Electronic
Briefing Book on its web site, containing an English-language
version of the article, a link to Proceso's
web site, and all of the declassified documents
used for the piece, reproduced in their entirety.

When the United States government considered the rebellion in
Chiapas, it did so through the twin lenses of its primary national
interests: money and power.

The Zapatista uprising - which exploded on January 1, 1994, the
eve of the inauguration of the North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA) - challenged an image of Mexico that had been peddled
for months in the halls of the U.S. Congress in an effort to gain
approval for the historic trade pact. According to the NAFTA lobby,
Mexico was a modern, youthful nation, eager for change, and unencumbered
by the chains of its own history, the centuries of rural poverty
and oppression.

But if the events of 1994 were a shock to the inflated expectations
of American investors, for U.S. military and intelligence planners
they offered the advantage of a window in to an institution known
for its supreme secrecy, silence and resistance to public scrutiny:
the Mexican armed forces.

It was an institution that was (and remains) resolutely closed
to American engagement. The history of post-war security relations
between the United States and Mexico is a tale of frustration
on the part of U.S. military officials at their inability to penetrate
the Mexican army as they had other allied militaries in the western
hemisphere. Unlike many of its Central and South American neighbors,
Mexico's Defense Secretariat (Secretaría de la Defensa-SEDENA)
consistently rejected the swollen grant aid packages of weapons
and equipment that the United States offered throughout the Cold
War, thereby enabling it to preserve its sense of independence
and distance from the colossus to the north.

Reading through hundreds of declassified cables, reports and
intelligence analyses produced by the Defense Intelligence Agency
during the first twelve months of the rebellion (and obtained
by the National Security Archive Mexico Project through the Freedom
of Information Act), one learns very little about the social,
political or economic factors that lay behind the Zapatista uprising.
But the documents are replete with new and interesting details
about the Mexican military.

As Mexico marks the tenth anniversary of the rebellion, the country
finds itself poised to challenge for the first time in modern
memory the army's refusal to open itself to civilian scrutiny
and influence. Archivos Abiertos offers these notes on
the tale of the military's role in the uprising as a contribution
to a new era of transparency in Mexico.

Know
Thy Enemy

Washington's professed surprise at the Zapatista uprising is
belied by two years of reports by Pentagon officials on suspicious
and clearly subversive activities in Chiapas.

Although the Mexican government publicly portrayed early encounters
with rebels in 1992 and 1993 as counternarcotics operations or
contacts with Guatemalan guerrillas who had crossed the border
to foment unrest, declassified DIA documents paint another picture.

In April 1992, for example, U.S. defense attachés reported
on a secret directive circulated by the Defense Secretariat's
Intelligence Section placing military units on alert due to what
it called "a national series of crimes." The directive
dubbed common criminals and narcotraffickers as the perpetrators,
but noted that "some of them may have been executed by clandestine
organizations or militants to fulfill their ideological ends."
Among the evidence of subversive activities mentioned in the document
were "training camps discovered in the state of Chiapas "

The first reference to the Zapatista army in U.S. defense documents
occurred shortly after the clash between military and rebel forces
in late May 1993, when SEDENA sent more than 3,000 soldiers into
Chiapas on what it characterized as a civic action mission. The
embassy's Defense Attaché Office (DAO) described massive
maneuvers in the Ocosingo valley using "light armored vehicles,
helicopter bombing support, and infiltration of parachute troops
into hard to access areas."

Discussing Chiapas Senator Antonio Melgar's unusual request to
the government for an increased military presence in his state
to curb "Guatemalan guerrilla activities," the DIA named
a Mexican rebel group as the real guerrillas, "tentatively
identified as the Zapatista National Liberation Front (FZLN)"
in a cable dated June 14, 1993.

The DAO wrote, "The Defense Secretariat maintains a curious,
yet predictable, silence on military operations conducted over
the past two weeks against possible guerrillas in Chiapas. To
date, the military has only publicly admitted to light casualties
and the completion of civic action projects in the region."
When a public bulletin was issued by SEDENA claiming to have conducted
civic action and counternarcotics activities in the area, the
DIA quoted an Excelsior newspaper article that referred
to the "great hermetic secrecy" maintained by senior
military officials about what was happening in Chiapas.

A secret intelligence assessment from the State Department's
Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) written on January 3
helped explain the regime's refusal to acknowledge a rebel presence
before January 1. For some time before uprising, wrote an INR
analyst, the activities of radical indigenous groups in Chiapas
had triggered anxiety "at the highest level of the Mexican
government." The government maintained a strict silence on
the matter, however: "Concern over the impact of political
unrest on NAFTA led Salinas to downplay reports last spring of
an incipient insurgency in the conflict-ridden state of Chiapas
following the murders of several soldiers."

On January 10, the Pentagon referred to the Mexican military's
anger at official silence about the Zapatistas, observing that
"Though the armed forces have been aware of the guerrillas'
existence in Chiapas, they feel that they have been prevented
from eradicating them. Eradication efforts would have entailed
military operations that may have proven politically suicidal
for the government."

Military
Incompetence

After several confused early assessments of the uprising, the
DIA issued a secret intelligence forecast on January 5, containing
a relatively accurate portrayal of what was happening:

(C/NF) Further insurrectionist violence is likely to occur
in southern Mexico in the coming months.

-- The 1 January incident demonstrated highly professional
planning, leadership, and operational competence of the rebel
Zapata Army of National Liberation (EZLN) that took control of
four towns in Chiapas.
-- The rebels are probably operating from sanctuaries along the
Guatemala-Mexico border. Their sources of funding and equipment
are not known.
-- The pervasive poverty in the region will probably provide the
rebel cadre ample opportunity for inciting the local peasantry
to further acts of violence.

(C/NF) While the insurgents are not strong enough to face
the Mexican army, neither is the army capable of eradicating the
rebels in hiding. The government will seek to restrain the army
to avoid local complaints of army human rights abuse. A stand-off
with recurring violence could frighten foreign investors and embarrass
the government, affecting presidential elections in August. The
government will beef up security in the region, and could be tempted
into repressive tactics.

The incompetence and unpreparedness of the Mexican armed forces
in facing the rebels was a recurring theme in the American documents.
U.S. defense experts observed that the military had no real counterinsurgency
capabilities, did a poor job gathering intelligence and failed
to comprehend the crucial role of public relations in "selling"
their operations to the Mexican people.

The army also misrepresented its capabilities to combat the Zapatistas,
even to its allies in other military institutions. During a briefing
given in January 1994 by senior Mexican army officers for foreign
military attachés, the Mexicans claimed to have been monitoring
the situation in Chiapas since 1983 and said they had compiled
a complete list of names of individuals suspected of ties to the
insurgents. The DAO's political section commented skeptically
on the information in a cable written January 27:

Judging by our information from other sources, the Mexican
military's claims either to having had such extensive knowledge
of the EZLN and its membership prior to the outbreak of hostilities
or to having reliably obtained additional names for that list
since January 1 should be heavily discounted. We know, for example,
that the military asked through many channels - including non-governmental
sources - for contributions of names of suspected or possible
members, supporters or contacts of the EZLN, and that among the
lists given them was the entire list of Dominican priests in Chiapas;
the names of all Mexican priests regardless of location in the
country who attended the 1968 church meeting in Medellín,
Colombia, which was the beginning of the Liberation Theology movement;
and all of the foreign-born Catholic priests, friars, and nuns
who have worked in Chiapas since the beginning of Bishop Samuel
Ruiz' incumbency as Bishop of San Cristobal (he has been Bishop
there for more than three decades). We have learned reliably that
all of these names are now on the Mexican military's list of known
EZLN members. [ ] We have been told that the military has
no way of knowing whether or not most of the people on its list
are, in fact, in any way involved or connected.

Faced with the mounting realization that its troops were ill-equipped
to combat the rebels, SEDENA began to introduce critical changes
into doctrine, training and operations in an effort to improve
both its public image and its fighting capability in the field.
On the publicity front, for example, the DAO reported on April
21 that the army recognized that the Zapatistas had trounced its
own feeble efforts to win Mexicans' hearts and minds: "The
military is in the process of addressing this rather severe shortcoming
by sending public relations exchange teams abroad in an effort
to develop a more meaningful, positive relationship with the media."

"Talking to the press goes against the institutional nature
of the Mexican army," wrote the DAO one week later, but "for
the first time the Army is attempting to put a human face on the
institution."

Reflecting what U.S. defense planners called in August 1994 "the
military's determination to remedy the deficiencies revealed by
the Zapatista rebellion in January," the Mexican army created
new counterinsurgency units, conducted anti-guerrilla exercises
in other areas of potential conflict around the country (such
a 1,500-man training exercise in Guerrero in June), and bought
expensive new equipment designed for low-intensity conflicts such
as the rebellion in Chiapas.

Among the purchases were four stealth aircraft - the Schweizer
"Condor" plane, a motorized glider designed to provide
covert surveillance capability - and Israeli-made "Aravas,"
used for intelligence collection.

In a cable sent to Washington on June 20, 1994, the DAO offered
an extensive analysis of the prospects for violence as national
elections neared. It also observed some of the changes that had
been made by the military institution since the uprising began:

1. The Mexican military has developed, and is prepared to
execute on order, an offensive contingency plan for Chiapas.
It has existing strategic plans for mobilization throughout
the national territory.
2. The Mexican military is updating doctrine to better prepare,
strategically and tactically, to fight a protracted guerrilla
war.
3. The Mexican military is rebuilding elements of its force
structure to better fight the same type of internal enemy.
4. The Mexican military is upgrading its equipment to support
the above mentioned doctrinal and organizational changes.

Foreigners
to the Rescue

Throughout the conflict, the Mexican government claimed to have
evidence of "external support" for the Zapatistas -
including ties to Guatemalan rebel groups, Nicaragua's Sandinistas,
the FMLN of El Salvador, and even remnants of Argentina's former
guerrilla fighters - but was never able to prove its case convincingly.

Despite the government's insistence that the guerrillas were
receiving extensive foreign aid, U.S. defense officials repeatedly
discounted such contacts, pointing out that it was in the regime's
interest to make the Zapatista army appear a more formidable threat
than it actually was.

A DIA cable of January 27, 1994, for example, included a Mexican
report on having intercepted the radio communications of Guatemalan
guerrillas fighting alongside Zapatista rebels. In a comment by
the political section of the Defense Attaché Office, the
embassy told Washington that the report should be disregarded.

Intelligence collected on communications between Guatemalan guerrillas
operating near the border with Mexico, explained the cable, indicated
that they were almost always conducted in Mam or other
Indian dialects, "yet Mexican army signals intelligence units,
like their civilian Mexican intelligence agency counterparts,
have no personnel who speak or understand any of these languages.
[ ] The Mexican military is trying through a variety of means
to show that the EZLN force it now combats is a bigger than life
underground group of vast international connections. A good portion
of the Defensa claims to substantiate that image have been
patently incorrect "

What the Salinas government did not publicize was the
extent of foreign support received during the protracted conflict
by the Mexican Army. It began with the American weapons and military
equipment provided under U.S.-Mexican drug enforcement programs,
but included critical assistance from the armed forces of Britain,
Chile, Argentina and Guatemala, among other countries.

Neighboring Guatemala was a special case. Three days after the
Zapatistas burst onto the scene, Salinas called his counterpart
in Guatemala directly to discuss his concerns of URNG (Guatemalan
National Revolutionary Unity-Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional
Guatemalteca) involvement in the rebellion. President Ramiro
de León Carpio offered to help with intelligence about
rebel movements, and Salinas sent a team of civilians and military
personnel to Guatemala that night for security briefings - led,
according to a January 4 U.S. defense cable, by Lt. Col. Edgar
Ricardo Bustamante Figueroa, head of Presidential Security and
a known expert on the URNG.

The talks were followed on January 6 by a meeting at the headquarters
of Guatemalan Military Zone 22 in Playa Grande between Gen. Miguel
Godínez (then chief of Mexico's VII Military Region) and
a group of Guatemalan commanders, including Army Chief of Staff
José Luis Quilo Ayuso, the head of the notoriously brutal
intelligence section of the Guatemalan army (D-2), and Guatemala's
chief of operations.

These meetings and others led to extensive cooperation and communication
between the two militaries, as they exchanged intelligence information
about their respective insurgencies, reciprocated with visits
between border military detachments, and carried out coordinated
counterinsurgency operations. Beginning in early 1994, the Mexican
army even sent officers to attend the infamous Kaibil jungle operations
course in the Petén (a class so demanding, wrote one U.S.
defense officer on April 27, 1995, that one group of Mexican officers
"was not physically able" to complete it).

According to U.S. documents, in addition to the ongoing assistance
from the Guatemalan armed forces, the Mexicans received extensive
help from other foreign militaries:

-- According to a DIA document dated May 11, 1994, soldiers from
the British Army provided Mexico's First Military Police Brigade
with training on their base at Military Camp One in Mexico City,
designed to address Mexican military shortcomings in mine warfare.

-- Israel and Spain were among other countries that sent security
personnel to Mexico to provide training to army and police forces,
according to the same document.

-- The DIA reported on November 28, 1994, that in preparation
for the inauguration of the new PRI (Institutional Revolutionary
Paty-Partido Institucional Revolucionario) governor of
Chiapas in December, the Mexican military stepped up aerial surveillance
over rebel-held territory, resupplied its units, and enlisted
the assistance of the Chilean military to train Mexican soldiers
in counter-guerrilla operations.

-- In late 1994, retired Argentine military officers were reported
to be advising the Mexicans in urban guerrilla warfare, to which
the DIA commented on December 5, "The Argentine military
has kept a watchful eye on the developments of the Mexican uprising
in Chiapas. [ ] They feel that [the] failure of the Zapatistas
would act as a deterrent for any potential Argentine internal
political violence and would be in the best interests of Argentina."

The Zapatista rebellion did not completely change the way the
Mexican armed forces operated, but - as one lengthy State Department
report observed in May 1995 on what it called "the Chiapas
effect" - the military had decided in the course of the uprising
that it needed to create a true combat capabilities.

"In many ways, the Mexican Army in modern times has functioned
more as a highly disciplined police and rescue squad, combating
narcotics trafficking and providing medical assistance and emergency
rescue facilities, than as a combat force."

With new doctrine, operations and public relations, the armed
forces might, at least, be ready for the next insurgency to come.

Note: The following documents are in PDF format.You will need to download and install the free Adobe
Acrobat Reader to view.

In a directive circulated internally by Mexico's Defense Secretariat
regarding an increase in recent "subversive" actions
carried out by the radical group Partido Revolucionario Obrero
Clandestino Unión del Pueblo y el Partido de los Pobres
(PROCUP-PDLP), an early reference is made to insurgent training
camps in the state of Chiapas. Although the document portrays
recent developments as part of "a national series of crimes,"
the military is clearly concerned with what appear to be mounting
insurgent activities around the country.

Source: Released to National Security Archive under the Freedom
of Information Act
August 1996, Request Number 13413

Two recent confrontations between the Mexican military and "Tzetzal
Indians and Guatemalan guerrillas" near Ocosingo result in
several casualties and reveal for the first time the presence
of an armed, organized insurgent force in Chiapas. The document
reports that eight Mexicans and two Guatemalans were apprehended
in the clash, along with weapons, ammunition, radio transceivers
and subversive propaganda. In addition, "the army discovered
a complete city, constructed of wood, which the guerrillas utilized
for conducting simulated attacks."

Source: Released to National Security Archive under the Freedom
of Information Act
August 1996, Request Number 13413

The first DIA document to identify the Zapatistas by name, it
reports that Chiapas senator Antonio Melgar has requested increased
military presence in his state - a request that might have seemed
unusual several months prior, but reflects the growing militarization
of the southern states. Although Melgar explains his call for
additional troops as an attempt to prevent Guatemalan guerrilla
activities from spreading across the border, the report cites
the existence of a Mexican rebel group, "tentatively identified
as the Zapatista National Liberation Front (FZLN)."

Source: Released to National Security Archive under the Freedom
of Information Act
August 1996, Request Number 13413

Despite the growing turmoil in Chiapas, the Mexican military
continues to downplay the extent of the unrest, maintaining a
"curious, yet predictable silence" on recent events.
The U.S. defense attaché sorts through various conflicting
reports to provide Washington with a timeline of encounters between
the army and suspected guerrillas during May and June, including
a government offensive in the region using over two thousand troops,
light armored vehicles and helicopters, and the "infiltration
of parachute troops into hard to access areas."

Source: Released to National Security Archive under the Freedom
of Information Act
August 1996, Request Number 13413

A military action in Chiapas, described by the government as
a drug bust, reveals the escalation of violence in the area. For
seven hours on October 3 and 4 "helicopters bombed and searched
the area around Ocosingo," supposedly after military aircraft
had been fired upon.

Source: Released to National Security Archive under the Freedom
of Information Act
August 1996, Request Number 13413

Dated January 26, this is a corrected cable was originally transmitted
on or immediately after January 1st when the Zapatistas launched
their rebellion. In the heavily censored document, the DIA reports
that guerrillas have captured four towns in Chiapas in a "coordinated,
well-planned and executed" action, and have called for a
general Indian uprising. The DIA suggests the group may be led
by Central American guerrillas and notes that local officials
have been "overwhelmed" by the uprising.

Source: Released to National Security Archive under the Freedom
of Information Act
August 1996, Request Number 13413

A heavily excised account of a telephone conversation held on
January 3rd between Mexican President Carlos Salinas and Guatemalan
President Ramiro de León following the uprising of the
Ejército Zapatista de Liberación Nacional (EZLN).
Referring to the Guatemala guerrilla coalition Unidad Revolucionaria
Nacional Guatemalteca (URNG), Salinas states that there are "signs
of URNG involvement with the EZLN." In response, De León
pledges to send a group of "URNG experts" - civilian
and military personnel - in support of Salinas and to hasten a
planned visit to the Mexican capital so the two heads of state
might more promptly discuss these "issues of mutual interest."
The document was likely written by the Defense Attaché
Office (DAO) in Guatemala City.

Source: Released to National Security Archive under the Freedom
of Information Act
Request Number 13817 (Can't find this request number in the info
sent by NSA)

An analysis by the DIA and Defense Intelligence Warning System
(DIWS) predicts that the rebellion in southern Mexico will spread,
aided by the "pervasive poverty of the region" and the
"highly professional" organization of the EZLN. The
DIA notes that neither the insurgents nor the army are powerful
enough to fully defeat the other, but that continued violence
"could frighten foreign investors and embarrass the government,
affecting the presidential elections in August."

Source: Released to National Security Archive under the Freedom
of Information Act
August 1996, Request Number 13413

Army chiefs from Mexico and Guatemala meet to "exchange
information about their respective insurgencies" and to discuss
the possibility of the EZLN retreating across the Guatemalan border,
where Mexican government authorities fear they will find "sanctuary"
among the rebel groups and civilian communities of northern Guatemala.
The meeting takes place at the headquarters of Guatemalan Military
Zone 22 in Playa Grande between Gen. Miguel Godínez, chief
of Mexico's VII Military Region, and a group of Guatemalan commanders,
including Army Chief of Staff José Luis Quilo Ayuso.

Source: Released to National Security Archive under the Freedom
of Information Act
August 1996, Request Number 13413

This document makes clear that the government knew of the existence
of a rebel force in Chiapas, yet publicly denied that knowledge
despite repeated press reports on guerrilla activity over the
past year and a half. The document also describes the Mexican
government's conflicted response to the emergence of the EZLN.
The government is unwilling to negotiate with the guerrillas because
"to publicly acknowledge the guerrillas' existence would
in some way legitimize the guerrillas' organization." At
the same time, the government is concerned with the public image
of the army, still tainted by memory of the student massacre of
1968, and has consequently urged the army to show restraint in
dealing with the EZLN. The armed forces, meanwhile, chafe at being
prevented from simply "eradicating" the rebels.

Source: Released to National Security Archive under the Freedom
of Information Act
August 1996, Request Number 13413

A retransmission of an intelligence assessment by the State Department's
Bureau of Intelligence and Research on the Zapatista uprising,
originally written on January 3. According to the report, the
rebellion triggered concerns at the "highest level"
of the Mexican government about the activities of indigenous groups
in the country. The analyst notes that the uprising was preceded
by repeated clashes during 1993, yet "concern over the impact
of political unrest on NAFTA led Salinas to downplay reports last
spring of an incipient insurgency in the conflict-ridden state
of Chiapas."

Source: Released to National Security Archive under the Freedom
of Information Act
June 2002, Request Number 24104

A summary of a briefing given by the Mexican Defense Secretariat
to foreign defense attachés. The Mexican army claims it
has followed the situation in Chiapas since 1983, and has compiled
a list of those suspected of having connections with the insurgents.
In an ominous sign of the possibility of protracted low-intensity
warfare, an army general acknowledges the difficulty in "ferret[ing]
out small pockets of resistance," yet notes the army is reluctant
to pull out of towns it currently controls.

Source: Released to National Security Archive under the Freedom
of Information Act
August 1996, Request Number 13413

In a heavily censored document, the DAO doubts the reliability
of Mexican military intelligence on the Zapatistas. Although the
army claims to have compiled a list of suspected members of the
EZLN, the report notes that the military has indiscriminately
included dozens of irrelevant names, such as lists of priests
who attended the 1968 church meeting in Medellín, foreign-born
members of the clergy, and prominent members of any rural organizations
in Chiapas that have the word "Zapata" in their titles.

Source: Released to National Security Archive under the Freedom
of Information Act
August 1996, Request Number 13413

Reacting to Mexican army claims to have intercepted a radio signal
that proves the involvement of Guatemalan guerrilla groups with
the EZLN, a DIA analyst notes that these reports are "unsubstantiated"
and should be seen within an overall pattern of military attempts
to exaggerate the threat presented by the Zapatistas. "The
Mexican military is trying through a variety of means to show
that the EZLN force it now combats is a bigger than life underground
group of vast international connections. A good portion of Defensa
claims to substantiate that image have been patently incorrect,
and this might be one of them."

Source: Released to National Security Archive under the Freedom
of Information Act
August 1996, Request Number 13413

A translation of an article that appeared in the Mexican newspaper
El Heraldo de México that provides a list of names of Catholic
clergy members said to be involved in the Chiapas insurgency.
A DIA analyst comments that the article reveals the Mexican government's
attempts to implicate the Catholic leadership, yet notes that
these allegations are unsupported and that it is furthermore "logical"
that priests should show concern for their impoverished indigenous
congregations.

Source: Released to National Security Archive under the Freedom
of Information Act
August 1996, Request Number 13413

Document 16
February 17, 1994Uprising in Chiapas Forces Mexican Government to Redirect Military
and Police Resources
Army Intelligence and Security Command, secret intelligence analysis
(extract)

The Mexico section of this threat analysis by the Army Intelligence
Threat Analysis Center reveals ongoing structural changes in the
Mexican military. In response to the uprising the government has
"diverted many police and military units from their regular
missions and assigned them to counterinsurgency duty in Chiapas."
The analyst predicts that, should the rebels continue to successfully
defend themselves, the changes may prove permanent. And there
may be further change: according to the report, the army and the
Mexican intelligence agency CISEN (Centro de Investigación
y Seguridad Nacional) had only limited intelligence of the rebels
prior to January 1, and were taken by surprise by the uprising.

Source: Released to National Security Archive under the Freedom
of Information Act
August 28, 1996, Request Number 16809

A translation of an article on the Mexican army published in
the newspaper Excélsior. The article provides the historical
roots for the hermetic nature of the military in order to explain
current tensions between the military and the government - visible,
for example, in disagreements over how to deal with the EZLN uprising.
The DIA analyst pronounces the article "excellent" and
hopes the army leadership will take the author's advice, which
includes establishing better relationships with the media and
civil society.

Source: Released to National Security Archive under the Freedom
of Information Act
August 1996, Request Number 13413

According to U.S. defense sources, Mexican military leaders are
angry over how the Salinas government has handled the situation
in Chiapas. While the government has repeatedly blamed the military
for not adequately predicting the EZLN uprising, senior army officers
charge that they did provide information, yet the government failed
to act accordingly.

Source: Released to National Security Archive under the Freedom
of Information Act
August 1996, Request Number 13413

Stung by widespread public support for the EZLN, press reports
of human rights abuses, and government insinuations of inadequacy,
the Mexican army makes its first attempts at improving public
relations by inviting reporters to visit a military base in Chiapas.
A DIA analyst comments that these outreach efforts are significant
and reflect the military's new awareness of the importance of
public opinion. "[T]he army belatedly realized that whether
or not they were succeeding in their efforts in Chiapas was irrelevant
when the EZLN appeared to be winning the political battle at home
and abroad."

Source: Released to National Security Archive under the Freedom
of Information Act
August 1996, Request Number 13413

Tensions continue to rise in Chiapas as the government and rebels
fail to reach a conclusive settlement. The CIA observes that ranchers
and "other vested interests" in the region consider
Salinas administration tactics "appeasement of the rebels,"
and suggests that renewed fighting will exacerbate pressures on
the government and the ruling Institutional Revolutionary Party
(PRI).

Source: Released to National Security Archive under the Freedom
of Information Act
August 1996, Request Number 13414

This heavily excised document reveals that several countries,
including Britain, Israel and Spain, are providing counter-insurgency
training to the Mexican army and police. The British army, for
example, are giving the military's First Military Police Brigade
mining and countermine training at their base at Military Camp
One in Mexico City.

Source: Released to National Security Archive under the Freedom
of Information Act
August 1996, Request Number 13413

Despite the cease-fire, which prohibits flights over EZLN-held
territory, the Mexican government beefs up its military capacity
by purchasing four "stealth" aircraft designed for covert
surveillance. "The Mexican government took delivery of this
aircraft after the Chiapas uprising. This uprising may have influenced
the GOM [government of Mexico] to provide additional funding for
military purchases."

Source: Released to National Security Archive under the Freedom
of Information Act
August 1996, Request Number 13413

An incident reveals that the Mexican military has apparently
used Israeli-made aircraft for surveillance in Chiapas. "The
Mexican air force has been using two of their Israeli procured
'Arava' aircraft for [intelligence] collection in the state of
Chiapas," and report that their planes have been fired on
with anti-aircraft missiles. A DIA analyst notes that the true
extent of the EZLN's weapons is still unknown.

Source: Released to National Security Archive under the Freedom
of Information Act
August 1996, Request Number 13413

As the presidential elections of August 21 near, an analyst discusses
various scenarios for the eruption of political violence, especially
in Chiapas. Until now the government has proceeded cautiously,
fearing a voter backlash, but might seek to wipe out the EZLN
by force after the elections, "believing it will have six
years to recover from any adverse publicity." The army, the
analyst notes, "would willingly initiate the campaign [in
Chiapas] given the opportunity." The document offers insight
into the country's delicate balance of forces, including the growing
deployment of the military in Chiapas as it prepares for a protracted
guerrilla war, the extension of counterinsurgency training to
units not usually deployed for this purpose, the growing strength
of Mexico's political opposition, and tensions following the March
assassination of presidential candidate Luis Donaldo Colosio.

Source: Released to National Security Archive under the Freedom
of Information Act
August 1996, Request Number 13413

As rural violence spreads to the southern states of Oaxaca and
Guerrero, President Salinas and presidential candidate Ernesto
Zedillo suggest several legal and security initiatives, such as
increasing the penalty for possession of arms and coordinating
the actions of various branches of the police. Meanwhile the EZLN
has called a national convention to discuss issues such as the
use of civil disobedience and a transition to democracy.

Source: Released to National Security Archive under the Freedom
of Information Act
August 1996, Request Number 13414

Document 26
October 28, 1994[Increasing Tensions in Chiapas may Result in Further Violence]
Defense Intelligence Agency, secret intelligence report

Further indication of military upgrades in response to the EZLN.
As the contested results of the gubernatorial elections in Chiapas
raise tensions in the state, the military increases its activities,
including more military overflights and the purchase of over 60
French-made armored personnel carriers. "This acquisition
highlights the military's determination to remedy the deficiencies
revealed by the Zapatista rebellion."

Source: Released to National Security Archive under the Freedom
of Information Act
August 1996, Request Number 13413

The Mexican army receives counterinsurgency training from the
Chilean military in preparation for further violence in Chiapas.
The army also carries out aerial surveillance flights, conducts
more thorough searches at military checkpoints, and has been placed
on full alert.

Source: Released to National Security Archive under the Freedom
of Information Act
August 1996, Request Number 13413

According to news reports, the Mexican government reportedly
sent a delegation to Buenos Aires in March to request information
about counterinsurgency methods used during Argentina's Dirty
War. Now the Argentine minister of defense publicly states that
no "active" members of the Argentine military are working
as advisors to the Mexican military, thus suggesting by implication
that retired officers - precisely those implicated in the terror
of the 1970s and '80s - are advising the Mexican army.

Source: Released to National Security Archive under the Freedom
of Information Act
August 1996, Request Number 13413

An update on military movements in Chiapas mentions that non-governmental
organization (NGO) representatives who had previously been stationed
at all military checkpoints in Altamirano have now left. "They
were not a welcome addition to these points, from the military
point of view."

Source: Released to National Security Archive under the Freedom
of Information Act
August 1996, Request Number 13413

In an indication of continuing cooperation between the two militaries,
the U.S. defense attaché in Guatemala reports that the
Mexican army has requested that the Guatemalans provide information
and assistance in dealing with the EZLN insurgents. The attaché
notes that, "without a doubt, the Guatemalan will dedicate
major resources to keeping track of the problem, and will not
hesitate to beef up their forces along the frontier if it
appears that the conflict in Chiapas will drift over into Guatemala."

Source: Released to National Security Archive under the Freedom
of Information Act
August 1996, Request Number 13413

A naval officer claims the situation in Chiapas might be resolved
the same way guerrilla groups were pacified in Guerrero in the
1970s: through increased communications to make local inhabitants
"feel like part of the country." In response, a DIA
analyst flatly discards the idea that the situation in Guerrero
was resolved in such a peaceful fashion: "rather, it was
a harsh military campaign conducted by the Mexican military which
reintegrated the region. Some believe that the only thing holding
the lid on Guerrero is the memory of the Mexican army's bloody,
albeit small, counter-guerrilla campaign."

Source: Released to National Security Archive under the Freedom
of Information Act
August 1996, Request Number 13413

A report that appears to come from the DAO in Guatemala provides
further evidence of the increased cooperation between the Mexican
and Guatemalan armies. Guatemalan units have been assigned to
reinforce the border in case fighting resumes between the Mexican
army and the EZLN. "If any armed EZLN forces do cross into
GT [Guatemala], they will be combated by the GT army."

Source: Released to National Security Archive under the Freedom
of Information Act
August 1996, Request Number 13413

Even as it increases its presence in the area north of Chiapas,
the military fears it will be difficult to defeat the EZLN through
force. Yet some sectors, suspecting that unrest in Chiapas has
contributed to the country's severe economic crisis, have begun
to lean toward a military solution. "That perception - that
the military offers an easy, short-term, quick solution to Chiapas's
woes - is misguided and unrealistic."

Source: Released to National Security Archive under the Freedom
of Information Act
August 1996, Request Number 13413

After a nationally televised presidential address in which President
Ernesto Zedillo announces the government will pursue and capture
EZLN leaders, the army begins increased deployments in Chiapas.
A DIA analyst notes the army has long been frustrated with the
cease-fire and speculates that the government's change in tactic
may reflect an effort by Zedillo to reward his new Secretary of
Defense, Gen. Enrique Cervantes Aguirre, who - in a speech yesterday
- "pledged [the military's] unswerving loyalty to the President."

Source: Released to National Security Archive under the Freedom
of Information Act
August 1996, Request Number 13413

As part of the government's attempt to capture EZLN leaders,
the army begins to step up operations. Defense attachés
visit and comment on troop movements within Mexico City, preparing
for deployment to "unknown locations."

Source: Released to National Security Archive under the Freedom
of Information Act
August 1996, Request Number 13413

The Guatemalan air force is patrolling the frontier area to search
for EZLN members who have crossed the border, and Mexico and Guatemala
have coordinated plans to bolster each side of the border with
increased troops.

Source: Released to National Security Archive under the Freedom
of Information Act
August 1996, Request Number 13413

A description of a Defensa-led visit by foreign army and air
force attachés to various sites in Chiapas, including the
abandoned rebel headquarters at Guadalupe Tepeyac and a refugee
camp. The visit reveals the Mexican military's increased attention
to public relations, largely in response to the EZLN's effective
public denunciation of army abuses.

Source: Released to National Security Archive under the Freedom
of Information Act
August 1996, Request Number 13413

A heavily excised document that provides further evidence of
the close cooperation of the Mexican and Guatemalan militaries.
"The Guatemalan army units stationed along the Mexican frontier
in the Petén enjoy an excellent relationship with reciprocal
visits being carried out on a regular basis between the various
border detachments."

Source: Released to National Security Archive under the Freedom
of Information Act
August 1996, Request Number 13413

Another heavily censored document, this one reporting the participation
of Mexican officers in a Kaibil (special operations) training
program inside Guatemala in response to the EZLN uprising. Some
of the Mexican officers "are not physically able to complete
training."

Source: Released to National Security Archive under the Freedom
of Information Act
August 1996, Request Number 13413

This extract of a long analysis of the Mexican armed forces looks
at how the emergence of the EZLN has affected changes in the military.
While the army proved woefully unprepared for the uprising, its
members nevertheless resented and felt humiliated by the cease-fire
declared by Salinas. In the months that followed, the army's long
distrust of the media proved a hindrance, as the army could count
on "few or no friends in the media" to counter widespread
reports of human rights abuses. Its poor performance in the face
of the Zapatista uprising has prompted the army to cultivate better
relations with the press, to investigate human rights abuses committed
by troops, and to create new counterinsurgency units.

Source: Released to National Security Archive under the Freedom
of Information Act
June 2002, Request Number 24114