There are two distinct but related problems. The first is that the EU as currently constituted lacks an investor of last resort. The second is that it lacks any means to ensure that internal current accounts imbalances do not become a political problem.

There is a variety of possible reforms that would solve these problems. A European treasury not subject to silly "debt brakes" would solve both problems, but may be politically unpalatable. Repealing the GSP and Art. 123 would solve the investor of last resort problem, but not (necessarily) the current accounts imbalances. A Bancor-type arrangement would solve the internal current accounts problem (or rather, signify political acceptance of the existence of otherwise unsustainable imbalances), but would not solve the problem that the GSP circumscribes the states' ability to perform investor of last resort functions.

Finally, the physical economy of Europe (in particular the periphery) has the problem that thirty years of neoliberal brain rot (twenty in the case of Eastern Europe, but with much weaker countervailing pressures) have rendered large swathes of Europe into a wasteland, industrially speaking.