Technical, geopolitical, or transformative: what future for the Eastern Partnership?

In most Eastern Partnership countries, elites are prepared to adopt EU templates as long as they do not undermine their interests and affect their survival strategies. The EU needs a change of strategy.

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A media conference at the 2015 Eastern European partnership held in Riga. Demotix/Aziz Karimov. All rights reserved.At a time when the fourth Eastern
Partnership summit is taking place in Riga, the EU’s eastern policy stands at a
crossroads. Over the past six years, the EU’s technocratic approach has yielded
only limited results.

On the one hand, major progress has been achieved in
terms of integration with the EU. Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine are now associated
countries and the EU has lifted Schengen visa requirements for Moldovan
citizens travelling with biometric passports.

On the other hand, despite
progress in these areas, the outlook for democratisation has grown bleaker in
most Eastern Partnership countries, economic
transformation has been chaotic at best, and poverty and inequality are on the
rise. In essence, the
EU’s approach (focusing on dialogue with governments and narrow circles of
experts) seems increasingly disconnected from the general public and has not
favoured broader societal and political change in the region.

In addition, it
has unleashed a massive reaction from the Russian authorities, for whom the
Eastern Partnership is just a geopolitical instrument that does not speak its
name. Support for the Russian-led Eurasian Economic Union is on the rise in
many Eastern Partnership countries, including Georgia which was the first
country to experience Russian backlash in the “common neighbourhood”. Clearly
the EU should now move away from its narrow technocratic approach and toward a
broader transformative agenda in the Eastern neighbourhood.

A technical offer with geopolitical implications

In contrast to the European Neighbourhood
Policy (ENP), the Eastern Partnership (EaP) is based upon legally binding
commitments taken by partner countries. The Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade
Areas (DCFTA) in particular, but also the visa liberalisation process, require
massive legal approximation with the acquis
communautaire and EU and international standards. Thus, the Eastern
Partnership clearly has major implications in terms of anchoring partner
countries to the EU’s legal framework, norms and practices – especially for the
three countries that signed an association agreement with the EU in June 2014.

This explains the Russian view that the
EU’s functional and low-key approach is underpinned by the Union’s geopolitical
interests and desire to expand its influence beyond its eastern borders. In
essence, Russia has used its massive geopolitical leverage to thwart the EU’s
low-key policies in the ‘common neighbourhood’. This was made possible by the
fact that the EU has struggled to properly factor key elements inherited from
the Soviet past into its policies, namely the role of Russia as a regional
hegemon and the multifaceted and complex interdependencies that still link
post-Soviet countries together. At a time when it was moving toward the
conclusion of Association Agreements, the EU’s Eastern policy was thus caught
in a geopolitical trap as a result of Russia’s countervailing actions.

Clearly, the EU has to take better account of
regional realities in its policies. This is especially important at a time when
Russia is increasingly pushing associated countries toward fragmentation by
using breakaway regions and conflict zones as pressure points. In light of
these developments, the EU should not focus its policies solely on legal
approximation with its acquis, as
this focus is at odds with partner countries’ most urgent security needs; it
should also pay increased attention to state-building in the region. The grants
promised at the Riga summit to support state-building in Ukraine, as well as
the deployment of an advisory mission (EUAM) on civilian security sector reform
in the country, are welcome signals in this respect. Overall, the Eastern
Partnership should be given a higher
political profile, with strong leadership by the High Representative.

Technical or transformative: whose Eastern
Partnership?

The
EU’s technical approach has another major flaw: it ignores the domestic constellation
of actors and post-Soviet practices. In most Eastern Partnership countries,
elites are prepared to adopt EU templates as long as they do not undermine
their interests and affect their survival strategies and rent-seeking
practices. Yet the very fact that EU rules are adopted (and in some cases
applied) does not mean that Eastern Partnership countries are moving closer
toward becoming societies with widespread political and civic participation and
increased citizen control over elites. In a similar vein, the Association Agreements
signed with Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine should not be viewed as successes per se or as an end goal.

In
order to effectively foster systemic reforms (and not just formal adoption of
EU templates) in Eastern partnership countries, the EU needs to address two
interconnected shortcomings which may hamper the effective implementation of Association
Agreements.

First, the EU needs to review the way in which it conducts its
policies, be more inclusive and adjust to local and societal concerns. It needs
to address the lack of awareness of its policies among the general public in
partner countries. Most citizens have only a vague idea of the concrete
implications of far-reaching agreements that have been signed with the EU.

Second, while it has prioritised dialogue with governments (especially during
the negotiations on Association Agreements), the EU needs to engage with a
broader range of stakeholders and empower drivers of change in order to ensure the
effective implementation of commitments.
In Eastern Partnership countries, there is little (if any) experience of
including civil society in policy dialogue, and much
remains to be done in terms of engaging local civil society in the monitoring
of EU-Eastern Partners relations. In addition to the support it already
provides to capacity-building in state institutions, the EU should also pay
attention and provide increased support to the private sector.

The
Eastern Partnership summits should not be assessed only in terms of their
ability to publicise ‘rewards’ and key milestones in relations with partner
countries. If the Riga summit is assessed only in terms of further progress in
EU integration, it may be seen as yet another missed opportunity. Yet the
summit (followed by the European Neighbourhood Policy review) may also signal
the need for a novel EU approach based on a broader transformative agenda and which
is better attuned to societal expectations in the region.

This article is based on a paper titled "Escaping geopolitical
entrapment: the EU’s Eastern policy in light of EU-Russia rivalry", which
will appear in "Unrewarding Crossroads? The Black Sea Region amidst the
European Union and Russia" policy essays collection by Sofia Platform.

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