JinnahMissionTalksApril4th

CMP(5) Jinnah's discussions with the
Cabinet Mission on April 4 1946, before the Plan was issued

Document included

Record of Interview between Cabinet Delegation, Field
Marshal Viscount Wavell and Mr. Jinnah on Thursday, 4 April 1946 at 10
am (full text)

The
India Office's secret official records were declassified and published
in 1977 in 'The Transfer of Power 1942-7', Volume VII The Cabinet
Mission 23 March - 29 June 1946, Eds., Nicholas Mansergh and Penderel
Moon.

April 4th 1946 meeting(full text) -
48 page 118

Record of Interview between
Cabinet Delegation, Field Marshal Viscount Wavell and Mr. Jinnah on
Thursday, 4 April 1946 at 10 am

The
Delegation invited Mr. Jinnah in the first place to give them his
reasons why he thought it better for the future of India that India
should have a Pakistan.

Mr. Jinnah said that throughout her
history from the days of Chandra Gupta there had never been any
Government of India in the sense of a single Government. The Muslim
Moghul Empire had had the largest control but even in those days the
Mahrattas and the Rajputs were not under Muslim rule. When the British
came they gradually established their rule in a large part of India
but, even then, India was only one-third united. The big States and
sovereign States were constitutionally and legally already Pakistans.

The
only limitation of this is the Paramount Power of the Crown. The effect
of Paramountcy is that the Paramount Power in the last resort maintains
internal order in the States but as a counterpart of this has a duty to
prevent gross maladministration. Nowadays we talk of British India and
say India is one. Mr. Jinnah considered that that could not stand
examination for a moment. India is really many and is held by the
British as one.

Now we have strong Hindu-Muslim tension. This
began to develop at the first transfer of a small amount of power about
1906. The British Government to meet it gave separate electorates. The
same troubles arose at the time of the Montagu-Chelmsford reforms and
the British Government gave a constitution which they thought best
suited to India. In the discussions of 1930-35 no agreement could be
reached on the communal question and the British Government gave a
decision. No doubt the present constitution was an advance and gave
more contact with power than ever before, but it showed that the grave
apprehensions of Muslims had come true. In the 1935 discussions the
Muslims insisted that Sind should be separated and the Frontier made a
full Province so that there would be at least four Muslim majority
Provinces. All this was decided by the British Government.

Now we
have come to the stage when the British Government say they will give
complete independence to India inside or outside the Empire. To whom is
the government of this sub-continent, with its fundamental differences,
to be transferred? It is no use saying "transfer power and we will
settle who exercises it afterwards." The question is how to transfer
power.

The differences in India are far greater than between
European countries and, compared to those, are of a vital and
fundamental character. Even Ireland provides no parallel.

The
Muslims have a different conception of life from the Hindus. They
admire different qualities in their heroes; they have a different
culture based on Arabic and Persian instead of on Sanskrit origins.
Their social customs are entirely different. A Hindu will wash his
hands after shaking hands with a Muslim. No Hindu will let Mr. Jinnah
have a room in his building. Hindu society and philosophy are the most
exclusive in the world. Muslims and Hindus have been side by side in
India for a thousand years but if you go into any Indian city you will
see separate Hindu and Muslim quarters. They have different names and
use a different calendar. The Hindus worship the cow and even today in
certain States a 10-year sentence is imposed for killing a cow. This
means nothing to the Muslims. You cannot make a nation unless there are
essential united factors.

How are you to put 100 millions of
Muslims together with 250 millions whose way of life is so different.
No Government can ever work on such a basis and if this is forced upon
India it must lead us to disaster. No Government can survive unless
there is a dominant element which can provide a "steel frame". At
present this frame is provided by the British who have always retained
the key posts. It is true that this is beginning to cease but already
the consequences are apparent. Only one Indian has been a Chief
Justice, Sir Shadi Lal in the Punjab. The post of Chief Presidency
Magistrate in Bombay has always been held by a British officer because
the situation there is so delicate that an un-impartial officer can
cause great trouble.

The present Government of India is, of
course, not a Parliamentary Government but is a bureaucratic system
under which ultimately the British are responsible. Indians can vent
their feelings in the Central Legislature but it is powerless. The
British could never have run the administration without their own
officers in the key positions in the Civil Service, the Police and the
Army. Little progress has been made in the Indianisation of these key
posts. It has already become difficult because Hindu officials
everywhere(of this there is unimpeachable evidence) have both sympathy
and feeling for the Hindus and Muslim officials for the Muslims. Every
day this is noticeable and becoming more prominent.

Therefore you
must have a "steel frame" for an independent India. Mr. Jinnah could
see
none and had therefore definitely come to the conclusion, after years
of experience that there is no other solution than the division of
India. Any scheme for this has obvious objections which can be raised
against it. But there must be division so that in each of the two parts
there will be a dominant community which can provide the "steel frame".
Where you have three Muslims and one Hindu your "steel frame" is there.

Sir S. Cripps asked whether 51 per cent. Muslims to 49 per
cent
of others would provide a "steel frame". Mr. Jinnah said that there
would then be no "steel frame". You must choose the area with a clear
and dominant majority. It need not necessarily be as high to three to
one. If there were no "steel frame", the Civil Service, the Police and
the Army would not stand loyally to the Cabinet and the Legislature and
the State could not survive. Fortunately, in India the Muslims have
their homelands and so let us divide India.

Sir S. Cripps asked
whether Mr. Jinnah thought the difference between the Hindu and the
Muslim in Bengal was greater than the difference between the Pathan and
the Muslim in Sind. Mr. Jinnah said that the fundamentals were common
to Muslims all over India. He had traveled everywhere and he knew. The
Muslims believed in one God. They believed in equality of men and in
human brotherhood. The Hindus believe in none of those principles.
Wherever a Muslim goes in India he would not say that everyone
understood him but a very large body of Mussulmans do. Even in the
remote rural areas of Bengal the Muslims understood him.

Mr.
Alexander asked whether the difference was essentially racial or
religious. Mr. Jinnah said that he readily admitted that 70 per cent.
of Muslims were converts from Hindus. A large body were converted
before any Muslim conqueror arrived. Muslim missionaries came from
Arabia and converted large numbers of Hindus, not singly but by whole
sub-Castes together, 10 to 20 thousand people at a time. These Muslim
converts were made outcasts by the Hindus. They were thrown out of
every department of social life. Therefore you find millions who have
stood for centuries under the umbrella of a totally different
civilization of their own. There are in India two different
civilizations with deep roots side by side. They are totally different.
The only solution is to have two "steel frames", one in Hindustan and
one in Pakistan.

His Excellency the Viceroy said that he thought
that Mr. Jinnah had once agreed with him that from the point of view of
practical economic considerations one India would be desirable if that
were possible. Mr. Jinnah said that if he had said that it was only in
the sense that it was an ideal but an impracticable ideal like a world
federation. Sir S. Cripps said that a federation of Europeans for
example was quite different. That was bringing together separate
sovereign States but India already had common governmental
institutions.

Mr. Jinnah said that this unity was not a unity
of the people. It was imposed by the British Government. He agreed that
common railways, customs, and so forth were convenient but the question
was by what Government would those services be controlled. If we have
Pakistan and Hindustan it does not follow that they will be in
isolation. He certainly contemplated treaties and agreements governing
such matters. As soon as the fundamentals of Pakistan are agreed to
these things can be settled.

The Secretary of State said that up
to a point he accepted the view that India was united at present by
British control and by the British Army, Navy and Air Force. But he
would not go so far as to say that it was solely so united. He thought
that Hindus and Muslims had not only acquiesced in but had cooperated
in supporting that unity. The Cabinet Mission had come to decide the
ways and means by which the domination of British authority in India
was to come to an end. Therefore they had to decide in whose keeping
the repository of force is to be given. What they wanted to know was
whether there was any agreement as to the repository to which this
power should be transferred.

In pursuance of that we ask
Congress, the Muslim League and the Princes whether they themselves can
work out an agreed solution. The Congress say "unite India" as the
solution, but do also say that they cannot compel any large section.
The Rulers say they might join an all-India federation. Mr. Jinnah,
however, says there must be two Indias with nothing more than treaties
and agreements between them. The British Government consider that if
they were to withdraw their forces and their Government from India they
are entitled to know what the situation in India is. Will they find
themselves faced with a major head on collision between the two main
communities? If we can find no answer except that situation we shall
have to consider what we shall do, but it should be understood that the
British would not stay here to pull chestnuts out of the fire.

The
Cabinet Mission also came as the representatives of one of the world's
great powers. They had to look at the position in India as part of the
world situation and they had a vital interest in the preservation of
peace in this large area of the world. They were entitled to ask
whether India would be able to stand up for itself in the world. It
would not be able to stand up at all at sea and as a land power only to
some extent.

Therefore the British Government presume that they
will be invited to assist in India's defence since the logic of events
will make this necessary. We shall then have to consider the conditions
on which we should be prepared to do this and we might expect some
return, for example, India's help in the defence of adjacent
territories, such as Malaya, Burma and Ceylon. But also there must be a
solution of India's affairs which makes effective provisions for
India's own defence against external aggression, and the British
Government are entitled to know whether the new set-up in India will be
of a kind with which we can in practice co-operate.

The Cabinet
Mission are not here to dispute as to whether there should be one or
two Indias. They ask the Muslims and the Hindus to consider these
matters but, before they do withdraw, the British wish to find out how
far the Hindus and Muslims are agreed. If they were to withdraw before
an agreement and when India was still in its present state, the
consequences would be disastrous. He therefore thought that before the
British withdrew the greatest possible efforts should be made by
Indians to reach agreement amongst themselves. Mr. Jinnah said that the
Muslim League started on the basis that there was going to be Hindustan
and Pakistan, [?each] one of them a completely sovereign State. As
regards defence, he contemplated, of course, that some arrangement
should be made between the two but this could only be on the basis of
two sovereign States with treaty relations. The same sort of relations
subsisted between the United Kingdom and the Dominions.

His
Excellency the Viceroy pointed out that the Indian case was different
in that the defence of the North-East Frontier required defence in
depth which must be organized in both States. Mr. Jinnah said that only
made it the more inevitable that there should be suitable treaty
relations between the two. The Viceroy said that no two foreign States
had ever made successful mutual arrangements in peace time for their
defence, and Sir S. Cripps pointed out that in the case of the
Dominions there were Prime Ministers Conferences and common foreign
policy all of which operated under the nexus of allegiance to the
Crown.

Mr. Jinnah said that they must assume that they would be
handing over power to responsible people. The Muslims had not decided
that they would have nothing to do with the British Commonwealth. It
might be in the mutual interests of Pakistan and Great Britain for them
to remain within it. It was an accepted basis that Hindustan and
Pakistan must have common defence arrangements, but he could not agree
to any machinery which would derogate the sovereignty of Pakistan.

Sir
S. Cripps said that a treaty derogated from sovereignty but Mr. Jinnah
contented that a treaty was a voluntary exercise of sovereignty which
remains unimpaired since the treaty could be terminated. It was pointed
out that the United Nations Organization involved the permanent
surrender of sovereignty.

The Secretary of State asked Mr.
Jinnah why he objected to work in with some all-India machinery for
defence. Mr. Jinnah asked what sort of machinery was envisaged. Sir S.
Cripps said some common organization with a secretariat, Chiefs of
Staff, and which had a machinery by which policy and administration
could be concerted. It would be an advisory body except in so far as
there were agreement. The United Nations Organization has executive
authority but only where there is agreement on the Security Council.
Mr. Jinnah said he saw no reason why Pakistan and Hindustan should not
join the United Nations and uses its machinery.

The Secretary
of State said that the Mission was here to explore the position. They
were exploring the possibility of Pakistan and its viability both in
peace and war. If Mr. Jinnah could not convince the Delegation of the
defensibility of Pakistan he was rather driving the Mission into the
solution of handing over authority to a United India. Mr. Jinnah said
that if he had not convinced the Delegation he could not do so. He
could not agree to anything which would derogate from the sovereignty
of Pakistan. He was not there to persuade the Cabinet Mission or as a
plaintiff. India was neither united not divided -it was a British
possession. Great Britain proposed to transfer power; he had been asked
to say how he thought this could be done. The only way in his opinion
it could be done with safety was by division. On certain matters he
could say that he would make agreements.

Sir S. Cripps said,
could Mr. Jinnah not suggest the content of a treaty? For example,
would Mr. Jinnah agree that there should be provision for mutual
defence? Mr. Jinnah said that he would agree to defensive alliance. Sir
S. Cripps said, would he agree to mutual consultation in regard to
foreign policy? Mr. Jinnah said that would naturally be covered. Sir
Stafford asked what the position was about inter-running communications
of all kinds. Mr. Jinnah said that could be arranged. He was not able
to express any view about sea customs.

Sir S. Cripps said that
if we were to try to persuade the Congress to meet Mr. Jinnah's views
it would be important to specific on these matters, but Mr. Jinnah said
that he could not consider anything more unless a proposal was made to
him. The Government and the Congress had powerful secretariats which
could do that kind of work better than the Muslim League.

His
Excellency the Viceroy asked Mr. Jinnah what were the boundaries of
Pakistan as he(Mr. Jinnah) conceived it. Mr. Jinnah said that he wanted
a viable Pakistan which would not be carved up or mutilated. He drew
the line on the five Provinces, but said he was quite willing to
consider mutual adjustments. But Pakistan must be a live State
economically. He was not insisting on including a large number of
Hindus in Pakistan but if it were said to him that only the number of
heads could be considered, he could not agree to that. Sir S. Cripps
said that on any principle of self-determination the counting of heads
must be a primary factor.

The Secretary of State pointed out
that the inclusion of any considerable area in which there was majority
of non-Muslims might very well not strengthen but weaken the viability
of Pakistan. Mr. Jinnah said that he was not opposing the view but said
that suppose it were suggested that Calcutta should be added to Bihar
he
would say that that was an impossibility. He contemplated that there
would be territorial adjustments, but he could not agree that Calcutta
could be taken away merely because it was a Hindu-majority city. Much
of the Hindu population of Calcutta was not indigenous but brought
there from outside. Sir S. Cripps said that the Hindus might say it was
impossible for them to live without Calcutta but Mr. Jinnah replied
that they had Bombay and Madras and could have a new port in Orissa.
Pakistan without Calcutta would be like asking a man to live without
his heart.

He did not want to keep Hindus in Pakistan against
their will and they could migrate but he could not reduce the area of
Pakistan below the point on which the State could live. Sir S. Cripps
pointed to the danger that if there were large Hindu elements they
would form a dominant political element making for instability because
the Muslims would be divided amongst themselves on social and economic
questions and the Hindus might secure the balance. Areas like Burdwan
might develop a secessionist movement.

Mr. Jinnah said that he agreed
that areas like Burdwan, if they were not essential to the economic
life, could go into Pakistan[?Hindustan]. In reply to a suggestion that
Calcutta should be a free port through which goods would enter both
countries free of duty and administered by a condominium, Mr. Jinnah
asked what examples of this there were in the world. The cases of
Danzig, Shanghai and Fiume were mentioned but Mr. Jinnah pointed out
that all these had been imposed and maintained by force. What he wanted
was a nucleus Muslim territory surrounded by sufficient additional
territory to make it economically viable.