Iraq War: Reflecting on losses and gains 10 years later

March 20 2013

Rossiyskaya Gazeta

Fyodor Lukyanov

On the 10th anniversary of the beginning of the U.S. invasion of Iraq, the costs of the war have already been widely accepted: thousands dead, billions spent, and anti-Western sentiment in the Middle East. Expert Fyodor Lukyanov discusses what was gained from the war — from humbled U.S. ambitions to new policy tactics in Russia.

Ten years ago, without the backing of the UN Security
Council, the United States began a large-scale military operation in Iraq. The
invasion, which was undertaken to demonstrate America's ability to control
global processes and (if necessary) redirect them, had the opposite effect.

Thousands of Americans perished not during the lightning
strike itself, but in the subsequent years of "nation building." As
for the number of Iraqis killed, no one knows; the smallest estimate runs into
the tens of thousands. In addition, the overthrow of Saddam Hussein played into
the hands of Iran — the sworn enemy of the United States.

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The hundreds of billions of dollars spent on the campaign
added to America’s not insignificant economic problems. Even the country’s
credibility was undermined — regardless of whether the top brass consciously
lied about Hussein's alleged stockpile of nuclear weapons or just believed the
reports because they wanted to.

In terms of non-proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction, the result was also the reverse of what was intended: leaders
nurturing thoughts of developing a "bomb" were hurried into action,
certain in the knowledge that it was the only safeguard against ending their
days on the end of a rope.

The democratization of the Middle East — initially forced
upon Iraq but later springing up spontaneously during the "Arab
spring" — is disheartening. Tuned into the mood of the general populous,
the new regimes are vociferously anti-Western.

All this is generally acknowledged and barely challenged,
even by those who 10 years ago welcomed deliverance from the "most brutal
dictator in the world." But let's take a look at the other side of the
war: what has the world gained from it?

First of all, it dealt a blow to U.S. haughtiness: on the
eve of the Iraq War, in the wake of 9/11, the country harbored serious
pretensions about becoming a global empire. Obama's relative and unusual
restraint (for a U.S. president) is the fruit of the Iraqi misadventure.

The Iraq War restored the rightful role of the UN
Security Council in international politics. When the U.S. decided that it did
not require the sanction of a higher authority, it seemed that the UN's
political function had ceased to exist: henceforth, strong and confident
nations would simply ignore it.

However, it soon became clear that the lack of
legitimacy, which only the Security Council could have granted, was an
insurmountable factor. Then U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld believed
his "coalition of volunteers" could adequately fill the role of NATO,
but the legal vacuum paralyzed its ability to act.

Regimes can be toppled, but without the formal
authorization of an official body, nothing sustainable will take their place.
Even under the Bush administration, Washington was forced to reconsider its
attitude toward the U.N. as a meaningless burden.

Today, the Security Council
and other UN institutions are imperfect and subject to justified criticism
from various quarters, but a practical, viable alternative has yet to be
suggested. In the past 10 years, we have observed on more than one occasion the
power of the U.N. in helping to break a deadlock.

The Iraq War threw the political differences between the
two shores of the Atlantic into sharp relief. Europe's heavyweights sat the
contest out. A decade later, no one would say that the trans-Atlantic alliance
suffered fatal damage — bygones remain bygones (recall that the U.S. even
called for a boycott of all things French).

However, it is clear that NATO will
no longer police the world as it once did, since most member countries are only
capable of purely symbolic participation, if that.

As the search for a new mission for the alliance continues,
NATO seems to favor the option of becoming a regional military organization
charged with resolving issues in its immediate geographical vicinity — i.e.,
Europe and the Atlantic.

For Russia, this is not good news. The "immediate
vicinity" is presently the South, but attention could turn eastward.
Fortunately, Europe's military capabilities are on the wane, while the U.S. is
increasingly looking further afield to Asia.

In the Kremlin's eyes, the Iraq War is a milestone for two
reasons. First, it significantly weakened the belief that Western policy is
far-sighted, prudent, and rational. From the very beginning, Moscow warned that
it would end in failure, but the White House turned a deaf ear.

Second, Russia is committed to augmenting its capabilities,
in case of further developments. The strong do as they please — including
trampling all over international law. As a result, Russia now proceeds from the
assumption that anything is possible; this means that Russia should be both
careful and combat-ready. This is a tactic, not a strategy. Even so, it could
serve some purpose in the future.

Fyodor Lukyanov is the chairman of the Presidium of the
Council for Foreign and Defense Policy.