These Santa Ana defendants
won their initial trial, and got a detailed written
decision. (This is not an appellate case.)

Because
it is not an appellate case, this decision cannot
be cited as precedent in California courts, except
maybe before the same judge who wrote it.
But there is nothing stopping defendants elsewhere
from using the same arguments used here, or from
citing the same published cases the decision
relied upon.

On January 12, 2009 and April 2, 2009,
defendants [Murray] and [Lori A.] are

alleged to have violated Vehicle Code (hereafter
VC) section 21453(a) for failing to stop at red
signal lights in the City of Santa Ana at the
intersections of Bristol and Edinger northbound
and Dyer and Pullman westbound, respectively.
The signal lights were of part of an automated
enforcement system — commonly known as red light
cameras — installed pursuant to VC 21455.5 et.
seq.; and the result of a contractual agreement
between the city and Redflex Traffic Systems,
Inc., entered into in December, 2002 and amended
and extended in February, 2008.

At trial, defendant [Murray] alleged that
the charge should be dismissed because the city
did not give a 30 day warning notice of the
camera's installation for enforcement at Bristol
& Edinger, pursuant VC 21455.5(b). Defendant
[Lori A.] contended in limini at her trial that
the Santa Ana police officer should be precluded
from testifying in the matter because the
contract's compensation clause violated the
statutory mandates of VC 21455.5(g)(1) &
(2). [As of 2013 see VC 21455.5(h).] While
the Court generally agrees with these
contentions, it is compelled to declare - on its
own motion - that the contract between the Santa
Ana and Redflex is contrary to terms of a law
designed for the protection of the public, which
prescribes a penalty for violation; is illegal
and void, and that no action may be brought to
enforce it. The Court also finds that Santa Ana
violated the "public announcement" requirement
of VC 21455.5(b). Therefore, the Court enters
verdicts of not guilty in these matters.

The
Public
Announcement

In the
contract's initial recitals, Santa
Ana and Redflex
agreed that vehicle code violations in general
pose a serious threat to the lives and property
of residents of and visitors to the city, and
violations of VC 21453 have been shown to
possess a significant risk to life and property.
On May
27, 2003, Santa Ana Police Chief
Paul Walters and Lt. (now Deputy Chief) Tony
Levetino, conducted a public press announcement
at the intersection of Harbor and McFadden,
regarding the installation of the first red
light camera.(fn.1)

(fn.1)At
the public briefing, these Santa Ana Police
officials told the public that the red light
cameras would save the city innumerable lives;
that no dollar amount could be put on the
benefits that would occur; that research has
shown it will make the community much safer,
and that the purpose is to make the streets
safer and avoid accidents, not to make money.
Nothing in this opinion should be taken as an
inference that this Court doubts the sincerity
of these recitations and representations.

Reporters from
the Orange County Register and the Los Angeles
Times were present; and these papers thereafter
published articles regarding the announcement.
This public press briefing qualifies as a legal
public announcement. (cf. People vs. Squire, 15
Cal.App.4th 775,782 (1993)).

At the briefing, Chief Walters announced
the completion of the first week of successful
operation of the system; which had been
activated 442 times during the first 5 days of
operation from May 19-23. He stated that the
city officially began its 30 day warning period
on May 19th and that warning notice letters
(pursuant to VC 21455.5(b)) were being sent out.
Effective June 19th, the chief indicated that
the system would begin to issue real traffic
citations. VC 21455.5(b) states: "The local
jurisdiction shall also make a public
announcement of the automated enforcement system
at least 30 days prior the commencement of
the enforcement program" (emphasis added).
In another case interpreting VC 21455.5 et.
seq., the court has held that statutes must be
construed to ascertain and give effect to the
Legislature's intent; and to give the words of a
statute their usual and ordinary meaning,
(Leonte vs. ACS State & Local Solutions,
Inc., 123 Cal.App.4th 521, 528-7 (2004)). The
public announcement here which was made after
the warning period commenced, and only 24 days
prior to the actual enforcement program, was
legally insufficient. On this basis alone, the
verdict of not guilty must be entered.

Advanced publicity engendered by a public
announcement serves the purpose of

deterring the violative driving conduct,
legitimizes the law enforcement tool in
question, and lessens intrusiveness by reducing
surprise, fear, and inconvenience. (People vs.
Squire, supra). While not a DUI checkpoint, a
traffic device which flashes a bright camera
light at a driver deserves similar
considerations. The public announcement herein
was not only legally untimely, it created
factual problems as well. On May 27th, Chief
Walters announced that "when the yellow light
comes on, you have 4.4 seconds before it turns
red". Yet it has been adduced in court that the
only yellow light of that duration in Santa
Ana's automated system is at the original
Harbor/McFadden intersection; which has been
increased to 4.5 seconds, none of the other 18
intersection approaches currently in operation
(with the possible exception of Harbor &
Warner, where the speed limit is 45 mph) have a
yellow signal which exceeds 4.0 seconds. Today,
July 8,
2009, in addition to the above
cases, there are 13 red light camera cases set
for trial in Department C54, Central
JusticeCenter.
In 8 of the 13, the Defendant is alleged to have
been behind the limit line at a red light for
less than the .4 seconds. In still 2 others, the
violation time would have been an impossible to
discern .08 and .09 of a second.(fn.2)

Therefore, none of these
10 cases would have been before the court if the
yellow light duration was of the time stated at
the only public announcement on the subject,
versus the duration the yellow lights actually
are on at the intersections. While there
was never any requirement for such a statement,
that it was made at all has additional bearing
on the issue of Notice, as will herein be set
forth.

The
Contract
and the Warning Notice

This
opinion has discussed the automated enforcement
system as a whole. That is because this Court
does not necessarily agree with other respected
conclusions which would appear to require a
separate 30 day warning period as a matter
of law for each camera at each
intersection. For example, the very definition
of "intersection" (VC 365) is the area embraced
by the boundary lines of the highways which join
each other. There would seem to be no logic
basis for parceling out notices for each 1/4th
approach to the intersection itself.(fn.3)

(fn.3)
On the other hand, this Court doesn't
subscribe to the fear that every time a new
intersection is added to the automated camera
system, then a new public city council meeting
has to be held. VC 21455.6 clearly states that
the initial hearing is for "authorizing the
city... to enter into a contract for the
use of the system" only (emphasis
added).

This
divergence
does not resolve the fundamental notice
question. The Santa

Ana/Redflex
contract specifically defines "Warning Period"
as "the period of thirty (30) days after the
Installation Date of the first intersection
approach". Not surprisingly then, at the public
announcement, Chief Walters said: "They'll be a
one month period and the subsequent ones, if
they're within that one month period, they'll be
a warning. If not, if they're after the first
month of warning, then they'll be issued
citations unless we decide otherwise.
Administratively we could, but technically by
the law after the first month warning then any
that we install we can issue citations right
from the start".

Eighty-four years ago, in Fleming vs.
Superior Court (OrangeCounty),
196 Cal.
344, 349 (1925), the Supreme Court upheld the
constitutionality of speed trap laws which had
been enacted two years earlier. As the Court in
People vs. Sullivan, 234 Cal.App.3d 56, 58
(1991), stated, the Fleming court observed that
the Legislature "clearly expressed its
conviction that the presence of traffic officers
actually patrolling the highways would have a
most salutary effect in securing the observance
of each and all of the regulations imposed upon
drivers of vehicles upon the public highways."
Originally, the speed trap law related solely to
a section of the highway within the vision of a
law enforcement officer who calculated the speed
of a vehicle by the time it took for the vehicle
to enter and exit the section.

For several years though, the law has
additionally prohibited law enforcement officers
from testifying about the speed of a vehicle
when "enforcement of the speed limit involves
the use of radar or any other electronic device
that measures the speed of moving objects." (VC
40802, et. seq.). Thus such evidence is excluded
in court proceedings, unless the prosecution
prima facie (i.e. as a condition precedent)
generally establishes the appropriate training
of the officer, the reliability of the
electronic device, and that a traffic and
engineering survey has been conducted which
justifies the speed limits on posted signs that
drivers would pass by. In other words, the law
requires the driver to be put on notice when he
sees a speed limit sign, that a reliable
electronic device can be used to show he is in
violation of the vehicle code. On the other
hand, the basic statutory faith in an overt
police presence remains, VC 21455.5 establishes
its own statutory procedure for the use of an
electronic device to detect red light
violations; and it also requires as a condition
precedent that "prior to issuing citations
under this section a local jurisdiction
...shall commence a program to issue warning
notices for 30 days" (emphasis added). In this
Court's opinion, this is really quite similar in
scope and intent to basic speed trap
legislation.

At the public announcement, the Chief
correctly observed: "If you think about it, in
order for us to put someone out here 24 hours a
day, seven days a week, you would need 5 around
the clock full time officers that did nothing
else. And the fact that they can't watch or
record the same type of evidence that you could
get; they can't possibly humanly do what
technology can do." This Court finds nothing
wrong with new electronic tools to monitor
traffic; which will reduce accidents and save
lives. However, when the law favors "the
presence of traffic officers actually patrolling
the highways" (Fleming, supra), then statutory
notice requirements like those in VC 21455.5
take on an enhanced significance and must be
strictly obeyed.

In Santa Ana, these notice requirements
were to be virtually eliminated. Thus the
following exchange at the press conference:

Chief Walters: "The other
thing you have to remember is, these are not
permanent; these can be moved. If we determine
that this is no longer a high accident location,
in a year or two we'll move it to another site.
But we have 20 systems that we can move to
wherever the need is in the city; the whole idea
again is to change the way people behave".

Question: "So basically,
the key here that's different is that you have a
floating red light camera program?"

Chief Walters: "Yes, very
much so".

Generally speaking, the terms of a
contract may not be contradicted by evidence of
any prior agreement or contemporaneous oral
agreement. However, where the validity of an
agreement is the fact in dispute, evidence
relevant to that issue will not be excluded.
Further, the parole evidence rule does not
exclude evidence which establishes the
illegality of the agreement. Finally, the parole
evidence rule is not applicable to a controversy
as to the meaning of a writing between a party
to the writing (here, Santa Ana) and a stranger
to the writing (here, the defendants). (Code of
Civil Procedure section 1856; Pecarovich vs.
Becker, 113 Cal.App.2d 309, 314-15 (1952)). The
statements by Santa Ana police officials are
therefore relevant, material and admissible to
determining whether or not the contract in
question complies with the warning notice
requirements of VC 21455.5 on which it is
founded.

Whenever a statute is made for the
protection of the public, a contract in
violation of its provisions is void. (Firpo vs.
Murphy, 72 Cal.App. 249, 253 (1925)). Here, VC
21455.5 et. seq., was enacted to allow automated
system enforcement of VC 21453 violations; which
are punishable by a statutorily designated fine
of $100 (plus penalty assessments) (VC
42001.15). A contract contrary to terms of law
designed for the protection of the public and
prescribing a penalty for violation is illegal
and void, and no action may be brought to
enforce it. A court should, on its own
motion, refuse to entertain an action when its
illegality appears as a matter of law from the
whole case before the court. (Civil Code section
1667; Industrial Indemnity Company vs. Golden
State Company, 117 Cal.App.2d 519, 527 (1953)).

In the instant case, the evidence shows
that Santa Ana created a contract for

enforcement of red light violations which
expressly provided for only a single warning
notice and at a time when only one of a
contemplated 20 red light cameras existed. The
evidence additionally shows that it was the
intent of the city not to issue further warnings
for other cameras installed after the first 30
days even though it knew that was within its
lawful administrative powers. Finally the
evidence shows a plan by the city to use the
cameras as a floating enforcement program so
that installations and enforcement could occur
at any signalized intersection in Santa
Ana at any time and
literally without any warning.(fn.4)

(fn.4) Of course, a member of the
public who did have notice of potential
enforcement from the original public
announcement would find himself with almost
1/2 a second less time to make it through a
yellow tight. At 40 mph, the speed limit at
the intersections of all but one of today's
cases set for trial, this would be over 23
feet, or about 1-1/2 car lengths of yellow
light time which turns red, instead.

Whether or not 30 day warning notices are
required for every signalized installation, this
set of circumstances is so completely contrary
to any reasonable interpretation of VC 21455.5's
notice requirements as to compel this Court, on
its own motion, to declare the contract as
unenforceable as a matter of law. On this basis,
the defendants are entitled to a verdict of not
guilty.

Compensation

The Santa Ana/Redflex contract provides
for a monthly fee for each functioning approach
containing a red light camera operating system
in the city. This 'flat rate" is consistent with
VC 21455.5(g) [As of 2013 see VC 21455.5(h)],
which states that compensation cannot be based
on the number of citations or percentage of the
revenue generated. However, in its
"Miscellaneous Provisions" section, the contract
provides Santa Ana
with "the option to renegotiate" the
compensation, "if the City determines it is
unable to recover its costs..." Defendant [Lori
A.] contends that this effectively negates the
requisite flat rate, because it provides an
incentive for Redflex to generate as many
citations as possible so that the fees received
from the city don't get renegotiated and
reduced.

The defendant is wrong in this factual
assertion. Under the "Standards of

Performance" section of the contract,
"Contractor warrants that its camera systems
will detect and capture all red light violations
that occur..." One can't generate more than
100%.As seen from
the short time in the red in several of the
aforementioned cases, Redflex does its job well.
However, Santa Ana's
contractual
plan to move cameras to different locations "if
we determine this is no longer a high accident
location" does itself put the compensation issue
directly into question. It's simply a matter of
common sense to state that if violations are
decreasing, then so are accidents. Therefore,
the contract contemplates moving a red light
camera which is no longer generating sufficient
revenue to another signalized intersection —
again, without any warning -- and a concomitant
opportunity to renegotiate the amount of
compensation required. Giving the words of VC
21455.5(g) [As of 2013 see VC 21455.5(h)] their
usual and ordinary meaning, (Leonte, supra) the
contract fails because it potentially violates
both the number of citation and percentage of
revenue proscriptions of the section.(fn.5)

(fn.5) To be
distinguished — especially in today's economic
times — is language which would allow for
termination of the contract if Santa Ana
determined it was unable to recover its
costs. This Court sees no legal problem
from this possibility, but this is not present
in the contract's "Termination" section. As
presently agreed, a change based on
circumstances which by necessity mean less
money just gives Santa Ana an opportunity to
seek different monetary circumstances and
concessions. This is exactly what is to be
avoided by VC 21455.5(g). [As
of 2013 see VC 21455.5(h).] Termination,
rather than renegotiation, would be consistent
with the sincere statements of the police
officials at the public announcement; see ft.
1.

For this reason, the
compensation section violates the mandate of VC
21455.5, and the defendants are entitled to a
verdict of not guilty.