Senate Testimony On The Future Of Afghanistan

Testimony of U.S. Coordinator for the Future of
Afghanistan before the Senate Committee on Foreign
Relations

Statement by Ambassador Richard N. Haass
Director of Policy Planning Staff, Department of State and
U.S. Coordinator for the Future of Afghanistan Before
the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations December 6,
2001

Mr. Chairman:

I am pleased to have this opportunity
to testify before the Committee on Foreign Relations in my
capacity as U.S. Coordinator for the Future of
Afghanistan.

Our aims in Afghanistan are well known to the
American people and this Committee. We seek to bring about
an Afghanistan that is free of terrorists, that no longer is
a source of poppy, and that allows its citizens -- including
an estimated five million refugees and an unknown number of
internally displaced persons -- to return to their homes and
live normal lives in which opportunity comes to replace
misery.

Today, nearly three months after the horrendous
attacks of September 11, and some two months after coalition
military operations in Afghanistan commenced, we can all
take considerable satisfaction in how much progress we have
made towards the realization of these goals.

I say this
fully aware of all that remains to be done. Moreover, it is
difficult to exaggerate the difficulties still before us.
Afghanistan and its people have experienced more than two
decades of occupation and war. An entire generation has
grown up knowing little but violence. Economic mismanagement
and drought have added to the hardship. As already noted,
millions of Afghans are either refugees or displaced.
Millions of Afghans, including most girls, have been denied
the chance to go to school. When you add to this the
political and religious intolerance that was at the core of
Taliban rule, you have a picture of suffering that is
extraordinary.

Still, I view the future with some
confidence. This stems first and foremost from the great
success of the coalition's military operations. The Taliban
regime no longer exists; its remnants along with those of
its al-Qaida backers are reduced to a last stand in Kandahar
and to hiding in caves. This military victory is the basis
for all else that we may try to accomplish in
Afghanistan.

A second reason for guarded optimism is the
behavior of the Afghans themselves. What we have witnessed
recently could not be more different from what took place
when the Mujahadeen defeated the Soviets in 1989. Then,
civil war and reprisals were the norm; the ultimate result
was the Taliban. Today, Northern Alliance soldiers are
acting with discipline; reprisals and atrocities appear to
be notably absent. Moreover, we have seen at Bonn a
remarkable demonstration of Afghans of all stripes --
insiders and exiles, northerners and southerners, Pashtuns
and Tajiks and Hazaras and Uzbeks, men and women -- coming
together to forge a common political future. There is no
better proof than the "Agreement on Provisional Arrangements
in Afghanistan pending the Establishment of Permanent
Government Institutions" just reached in Bonn.

A third
reason for my relatively upbeat assessment is the behavior
of Afghanistan's neighbors and others with influence.
Again, the contrast with the past is telling. One reason
for Afghanistan's trials and turmoil during the last decade
was the competition between and among outsiders for
influence on the inside. This time, countries appear to
understand that restraint is necessary if a stable
Afghanistan -- one that denies sanctuary to terrorists, one
that doesn't export drugs, one that can take back refugees,
one willing to live in peace with its neighbors -- will
materialize. This, too, was demonstrated at Bonn. We are
seeing less of the historic "great game" and more
cooperation for the greater good.

A fourth and final
reason for my optimism today is the attitude of the
international community. In 1989, in the wake of the Soviet
military withdrawal, much of the international community,
including ourselves, decided to limit their involvement in
Afghanistan. The reasons were not arbitrary; to the
contrary, one motivation was to respect the strong Afghan
tradition of independence from foreigners. Yet Afghanistan
clearly needed help to deal with its political, economic and
security- military challenges. This time around, the help
will be there.

Future success, though, will depend on
translating this potential into accomplishments. This will
require continued, sustained effort in three areas: the
political/diplomatic, the humanitarian/economic, and the
military/security.

The Political/Diplomatic Front

The
U.S. Government has for some time sought to promote a
viable, broad- based, and representative Afghan political
alternative to the Taliban. We knew that helping to create
such an alternative was both desirable -- it would help
persuade Afghans to shift their allegiances away from the
Taliban -- and necessary, as the world needed an Afghan
partner to work with on matters ranging from relief and
recovery to reconstruction and security.

Towards this end,
we have been active diplomatically. Much of this has been
done in collaboration with and support of the United
Nations. U.S. officials (including Ambassador James
Dobbins, who led our delegation in Bonn) have promoted our
aims in Afghanistan at meetings of the 6 plus 2, the Geneva
initiative, in multilateral fora, and in countless bilateral
meetings with Afghan parties, other governments, and
representatives of international organizations. Diplomacy
has made a difference.

Much of this effort culminated over
the past ten days in Bonn. The results of the Bonn meeting
of the representatives of what were the four principal
Afghan opposition groups are impressive by any yardstick. A
broad based, representative government is in sight.
Assisted by the able chairmanship of Lakhdar Brahimi, the
Special Representative of the UN Secretary General for
Afghanistan, the delegates agreed to a political road map
charting Afghanistan's political course for the next two to
three years and beyond. At the start of this road map is
the creation of an Interim Authority, a 30 person
institution (to be chaired by Hamid Karzai) that will on
December 22 come to be the sovereign representative of
Afghanistan. This body will provide a partner for the
entire international community as it endeavors to enhance
Afghanistan's security and provide humanitarian and economic
assistance for the country's recovery and rehabilitation.
What will follow within six months will be the convening (by
former King Zahir Shah) of an emergency "loya jirga," a
large council of many of Afghanistan's key citizens. This
gathering will lead in turn to a transitional administration
and a second loya jirga to decide constitutional matters.
At the end of the process a legitimate Afghan government is
to emerge through processes designed to give the Afghan
people a real voice and vote.

Relief, Recovery, and
Reconstruction

As just noted, prospects for political
progress are predicated in significant part on an improving
humanitarian and economic context. This has been the case
for some time. Indeed, the international community, with
the United States in the lead, has provided generous amounts
of relief to the people of Afghanistan over the past several
years. The liberation of the country's north, the area of
most severe humanitarian crisis, has eased the plight of the
people, and further improvements in the security situation
there will have dramatic impact. Although we still have a
great deal to accomplish, it is now possible to envision an
end to the era when relief dominated efforts by the
international community toward Afghanistan.

By definition,
relief is just that - a stop gap. The challenge is to move
as expeditiously as possible along the humanitarian
continuum to recovery and reconstruction projects. Already,
a number of international meetings have been convened toward
these ends, including a meeting of senior officials convened
in Washington on November 20 by the United States and Japan.
A second meeting of senior officials is scheduled for
mid-December in Brussels, and a conference at which donors
will pledge assistance is to gather in Tokyo in January.
These meetings will take place under the co-chairmanship of
a steering group consisting of the United States, Japan, the
European Union, and Saudi Arabia.

The nature and scale of
the effort will be determined not just by the generosity of
the donor countries but also by Afghanistan's needs and
absorptive capacity. The necessary detailed assessments are
being conducted by the United Nations Development Program,
the World Bank, and the Asian Development Bank.

Although
the planning for Afghanistan's recovery and reconstruction
is necessarily in its early stages, a good many of the
principles which will inform it can already be
anticipated.

* The effort will be comprehensive, ranging
from so-called quick impact projects (demining, local road
rehabilitation, provision of seeds, renovation of water
supplies, reopening schools, etc.) to longer term and larger
undertakings in the areas of agriculture, household and
light industry, infrastructure modernization, education, and
health. Resettlement of refugees and the internally
displaced will be an ongoing priority.

* Another priority
will be to discourage the production of poppy. This will
likely require focus on alternative economic development as
well as eradication and border controls.

* Also a
priority will be improving the situation of and prospects
for girls and women. Not only do girls and women constitute
an estimated 55-60% of the country's population, but they
were denied educational and employment opportunity in the
Taliban era. To deny them a significant role in
Afghanistan's future would be equivalent to drawing a line
down the middle of the country and ignoring all those on one
side of the line.

* Recovery and reconstruction must be
done with and not to Afghans. This requires involving not
only women in the planning and implementation of
these efforts but involving also the Afghan diaspora in
addition to elements of civil society who have remained in
the country.

* Reconstruction will be an Afghan mainly but
not an Afghan only endeavor. Afghanistan is more likely to
improve if the immediate region also fares well
economically. In addition, Afghanistan's neighbors are more
likely to support and cooperate with international efforts
to promote Afghanistan's stability if they participate in
and benefit from the process.

* Last, recovery and
reconstruction will require a sustained, generous effort by
the international community. We are clearly looking at a
total of many billions of dollars over many years. It is
both right and necessary that the United States be prepared
to do its share. The Administration looks forward to
consulting with this Committee and the Congress as our
planning on the scope and scale of what we will do becomes
more refined.

The Military and Security Front

The
immediate military challenge is to continue to prosecute the
war against al-Qaida and the Taliban. This entails bringing
about the liberation of Kandahar, the last remaining Taliban
stronghold, and then rooting out Al-Qaida and Taliban forces
wherever they may be hiding. Again, this will be something
accomplished by the U.S.-led coalition in conjunction with
Afghans.

Security arrangements also need to be made and
implemented for liberated areas, especially Kabul. The
agreement signed in Bonn calls for an international security
force to help Afghans provide near-term security in Kabul
and the surrounding areas. The signatories to the agreement
have also asked the international community to help train a
pan-Afghan security force. The United States military
involvement in Afghanistan will continue to be focused on
our primary objective of destroying al- Qaida and routing
out the Taliban.

There are a number of questions still to
be determined about an international security force,
including its mandate; size; capability; composition;
command arrangements; and precise area of deployment. These
and related issues will be discussed among U.S. officials,
the Afghan Interim Administration, the UN, and troop
contributors. One thing is critical, however, it must do
nothing that would in any way inhibit the coalition from
carrying out the primary objective of ridding Afghanistan of
terrorism.

Guiding Principles

Mr. Chairman, as already
stated, the United States and the international community
face considerable challenges before we can be sure we have
made Afghanistan a country free of terrorists and drugs. It
will take time and resources to help Afghans create a
society in which the citizens of Afghanistan can return home
to a life of security, economic opportunity, and greater
freedom. We do not harbor unrealistic goals of perfection,
but we do believe it is both desirable and necessary to work
with Afghans and others in the international community to
make Afghanistan a viable society.

The role of the
international community is and will remain critical. Yet it
must remain limited. This is not East Timor. Afghanistan
is not to be a UN or international trusteeship. Indeed,
many of the details of a future Afghan society, economy, and
political system must be devised and implemented by Afghans
themselves. They will have the principal and final say
about how to blend the traditional and the modern, the
central and the local, the national and the tribal.

We
need to be clear about our time horizons. The U.S.-led
coalition effort will not be ended until its mission is
completed. Then, however, coalition forces will be prepared
to depart. This is as it should be. But we should not be
thinking about exit strategies when it comes to assisting
the Afghans with their political, economic, and security
challenges. An engagement strategy is what is needed.

We
need to be prepared for tactical setbacks. Progress will
not always be linear. Attacks by individuals or small
groups of terrorists or Taliban sympathizers could continue
for months or years to come. Some disagreement and even
infighting among the Afghans is to be expected; not everyone
is likely to endorse the emerging order. Eradicating drugs
will be an ongoing challenge, as will persuading Afghans to
give up their arms. Yet these and other tactical challenges
should not preclude what should be a strategic trajectory of
progress.

Last, we must keep in mind why we are involved
in Afghanistan. We want and need to succeed, in part
because we do not want to contemplate having again to deal
with the consequences of a failed, pariah Afghanistan. At
the same time, history and conscience argue for doing a
great deal to give the people of Afghanistan a new lease on
life. What we now have is an historical rarity -- a second
chance -- to do right by ourselves and others. American
foreign policy at its best combines the strategic and the
moral. Afghanistan is a chance to demonstrate just
this.

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