PART IIIThe Palaus: Gateway to the Philippines

Most American planners agreed by
early 1944 that the next important goal
in the increasingly successful war
against Japan was to secure a base in
the strategic triangle formed by the
Philippines, Formosa, and the coast of
China. Such a move would sever the
lines of communication between Japan's
home islands and her rich conquered
lands in the Netherlands Indies and
Southeast Asia. Moreover, the plan
envisaged sites for long range bomber
airfields, as well as a valuable base from
which future invasions, including the
ultimate assault of Japan itself, could
be mounted. After much debate over the
proper avenues of advance, the Joint
Chiefs of Staff agreed to a compromise
which would set in motion a two-pronged
attack along the two most practicable
routes of approach: one through
the Central Pacific, and the other along
the New Guinea-Mindanao axis originating
from the Southwest Pacific.
Both of these offensives were well
advanced by the summer months of
1944. By a series of amphibious landings,
General Douglas MacArthur's
Southwest Pacific Area forces had
reached the western extremity of New
Guinea. As a result, the island was
neutralized as a base for enemy operations,
and the way was cleared for a
move against Mindanao (See Map 1).
In the Central Pacific, meanwhile,
troops controlled by Admiral Chester
W. Nimitz, Commander in Chief, Pacific
Ocean Areas (CinCPOA) had
seized Saipan and consolidated their
hold on the Marianas. When these two
avenues of attack converged in a pincer
movement on the Philippines, the

--51--

planned encirclement of bypassed Japanese
bases would be complete, and the
Central Pacific for all practical purposes
would be turned into an American
lake. First, however, thought had to
be given to the safeguarding of
MacArthur's invasion route north from
New Guinea.

Some 530 miles directly east of
Mindanao lay Japan's main bastion in
the Western Carolines, the Palau Islands.
General MacArthur believed that
he could not mount an amphibious
campaign against the Philippines unless
this potential threat to his lines of communications
was eliminated. It appeared
that land-based aircraft could
not neutralize this danger, for the
enemy stronghold was too far distant
from newly-acquired bases for sustained
and effective air attacks. Permanent
neutralization of the Palaus, Pacific
planners decided, could be gained
only by amphibious assault.

Although three excellent targets
stood out in the Western Carolines--the
Palaus' airfields and anchorages, Yap's
air base, and Ulithi's exceptionally
spacious and deep anchorage--the high
level planners envisioned, at first, only
the seizure of the Palaus. This undertaking
was given the rather prophetic
code name of Operation STALEMATE,
for revisions, postponements, and drastic
changes characterized it right up to
the moment of actual consummation.
Before the campaign initiated by
STALEMATE was ended, all three of
the targets were to be included in its
operation plans, although only the islands
of Peleliu and Angaur in the
southern Palaus and the Ulithi Atoll
actually would be invaded.

As Admiral Nimitz later explained,
the reasons for STALEMATE were
twofold: "first, to remove from
MacArthur's right flank, in his progress
to the Southern Philippines, a definite
threat of attack; second, to secure for
our forces a base from which to support
MacArthur's operations into the
Southern Philippines."2
On the same day proposed for the landing on Peleliu,
infantry units of the Southwest Pacific
command would assault the island of
Morotai in the Moluccas, thus securing
MacArthur's left flank and providing
him with a suitable airfield site for
land-based aircraft to support his invasion
armada mounting from New Guinea.

Whether or not the Palau Operation
was a necessary prerequisite for
MacArthur's return to the Philippines
remains a matter of unproductive speculation.
Except for those who participated
in it, Peleliu largely remains a
forgotten battle, its location unknown,
its name calling forth no patriotic
remembrance of self-sacrifice or gallant
deeds as do the battles of Guadalcanal,
Tarawa, and Iwo Jima. For the Marines
who stormed ashore on Peleliu, however,
the strategic value of the island
may not have been clear, but duty was.
They had been given a job to do, and
they went ahead and did it. As Major
Frank O. Hough, a veteran of the fighting
on "Bloody" Peleliu, commented:

Whatever might have been, the Marines
hit the Peleliu beaches on 1.5 September
1944, and history records that nine days
after the assault phase was declared at an

--52--

Strategic Situation to February 1945

--53--

end, MacArthur invaded Leyte. For better
or for worse, his flank had been secured,
and with the action which followed the
Pacific War entered a new and decisive
phase.3

As the westernmost extremity of the
vast Carolines Islands chain, which
spans some 33 degrees of longitude
across the Pacific Ocean just north of
the equator, the Palaus lie roughly 500
miles from both the Philippines to the
west and New Guinea to the south, and
240 miles from Yap to the east. This
remoteness, especially from the rest of
Micronesia, long retarded the islands'
development and delayed knowledge of
their existence to the outside world.

Although Ruy Lopez de Villalobos is
generally credited with the discovery of
the Palaus in 1543, the first recorded
visit to the island was made in 1712
by Spanish missionaries. Afterwards,
Spain was to maintain a shadowy claim
of ownership over the Palaus and the
rest of the Western Carolines; yet she
made no real attempts at the economic
development or social improvement of
them. Except for visits by English
ships in 1738 and 1791, the Palaus remained
unknown to the Western World
until the middle of the 18th Century
when trading ships plying the Chinese
market rediscovered them.

By 1885, Spain's long failure to develop
the Western Carolines encouraged
Imperial Germany, anxious at this time
for overseas colonies to supplement her
rapidly growing industrial factories, to
land naval forces at Yap and take possession.
This challenge to Spanish
sovereignty proved fruitless, for a neutral
arbitrator soon disallowed the
Germans' claim to the disputed islands.
In 1899, however, Spain suddenly decided
to withdraw completely from the
Pacific area; she wanted no more territorial
losses such as she had suffered in
the Spanish-American War. As a result,
she sold the Carolines, MarshalIs, and
Marianas to the Germans, who immediately
began to exploit the islands with
vigor. By 1914, this exploitation had
provided the Palaus with a telegraph
station and modernized transportation
facilities. In addition, the mining of
phosphates and the production of copra
had been initiated.

At this point, the outbreak of World
War I gave Japan a golden opportunity
for expanding into the Central Pacific.
Quickly joining the Allies, she organized
naval expeditions and set about

--54--

seizing Germany's Pacific possessions.
This energetic land-grab was more or
less legitimized after the war, when the
new League of Nations granted Japan
a mandate over the former German
colonies north of the equator. After
their abrupt withdrawal from the
League in 1935, the Japanese continued
exercising a de facto sovereignty over
the Palau Islands, as well as the rest of
the mandated islands.

Geographically, the Palaus consist of
several large islands and well over a
hundred smaller ones, extending generally
in a northeast-southwest direction for nearly 100 miles
(See Map 2).
Except for Angaur in the south and two
small atolls in the north, the whole
group lies within a great encircling
coral reef which is largely a barrier
reef on the west and a fringing reef on
the east. The maximum width between
the outer reefs is about 20 miles, and
the whole island group covers approximately
175 square miles. All of the
islands are irregularly shaped and most
are hilly, but they vary greatly in physical
character, ranging from flat atolls
in the north to volcanic central islands
and, finally, to coral-limestone islands
in the south.

Lying only a few degrees above the
equator, the Palaus have a humid and
hot climate typically equatorial, and the
seasons are monotonously uniform and
unchanging. In any month, the rainfall
is rarely less than 4 inches, and the
mean monthly temperature is seldom
less than 80 or more than 82 degrees
Fahrenheit. While temperatures are
not excessively hot, the relative humidity
(82%) remains high at all times
and is most discomforting and debilitating. Also typical of equatorial conditions
are the threats to health caused
by dengue and dysentery; strangely
enough, however, malarial mosquitoes
are not present in the Palaus.
During the fall season (September-November), westerly winds predominate,
and there are usually three heavy
thunderstorms a month, while typhoons
are an ever-present threat. In addition,
these fall months normally have 18 to
20 rainy days, the average rainfall for
any one month being just over 10
inches. Visibility is usually good, however,
with mean monthly amounts of
cloud cover varying from four-tenths to
six-tenths. Fogs are rare and mists
infrequent.

The natives inhabiting these equatorial
islands are basically Micronesians,
a racial blend of the lighter Polynesian
and the darker Melanesian stocks.
Physically, however, Palauans most
nearly resemble the Malay people of the
Netherlands Indies, probably because
of interracial mixing that occurred as
the result of an eastward seaborne immigration
of the Malays. The Palau
language shows obvious Malayan influences
also. In fact, Americans found
great language and cultural differences
between the people of the Western
Carolines and those whom they encountered
in Micronesia.

Like other native ethnic groups in the
Pacific islands, the Palauans suffered a
population decline following the coming
of the white man, usually as a result of
his diseases. From an estimated 40,000
in 1800, the number of Palauans had
shrunk to a pre-World War II total of
6,500. An estimated 20,000 Japanese
civilians, who had emigrated from the

--55--

Palau Islands

--56--

Home Islands prior to the war, lived in
the Palaus. As a result, a certain intermingling
of Japanese and Palauan blood
lines occurred.

While the natives enjoyed an adequate
food supply due to the islands'
staple taro crop, large quantities of rice
had to be imported from the Home
Islands each year to feed the numerous
Japanese living there. Fish from the
surrounding waters, of course, provided
an important dietary supplement. The
only agricultural export produced by
the natives was copra, but the extensive
phosphate deposits on Angaur and
Peleliu supplied the Palaus' most valuable
export. Trade between the various
islands and the outside world was restricted
by the Japanese almost solely
to the Home Islands.

The principal islands in the Palau
chain from north to south are Babelthuap,
Koror, Arakabesan, Malakal,
Urukthapel, Eil Malk, Peleliu, and
Angaur. Larger than all others combined,
Babelthuap has a rugged interior
with heights up to 800 feet, and is covered
with a typical rainforest growth.
Just north of the large island lies
Kossol Passage, a valuable naval anchorage
because of its spacious reef enclosed
area with a coral and sand
bottom. Centrally located and near the
best anchorages and harbors, the town
of Koror on the island of the same name
is just to the south of Babelthuap. Under
Japanese rule, it functioned as the
commercial, administrative, and communication
hub for the island group, as
well as governmental headquarters for
the entire mandated territory. It was,
however, the southernmost islands,
Peleliu and Angaur, upon which the
attention of the American planners
came to focus.

Located just inside the southwest tip
of the huge Palau reef, Peleliu is an
oddly shaped island with two elongated
arms of land. Often described as resembling
the claw of a lobster, this coral-limestone
island is approximately six
miles long, is aligned in a north-south
direction, and has a maximum width of
slightly more than two miles. The relatively
flat and wide southern section
contrasts sharply with the northern
elongated arm which is dominated by
an irregular series of broken coral
ridges, narrow valleys, and rugged
peaks. The key terrain from a military
viewpoint, this ridge system derived its
name from the 550-foot Umurbrogol
Mountain. Literally honeycombed with
natural caves, a nightmare of crags,
pinnacles, and coral rubble, this type
of terrain lends itself well to defensive
tactics (See Map 3).

To the east, Peleliu's other peninsula
soon tapers off into a series of smaller
islets, separated from each other and
the longer northern arm by a complex
of swamps and shoal coral. This eastern
arm of land extending out from the
southern portion of Peleliu is virtually
separated from it by a tidal coral flat
choked with mangroves. The southernmost
part of the island, on the other
hand, terminates into two promontories
with a cove between. The southwestern
promontory, sometimes called Ngarmoked
Island, is larger and more rugged
than the southeastern one, which is
connected to the mainland only by a
narrow spit of sand.

The island is heavily wooded with a
thick scrub jungle growth, and on the

--57--

thin topsoil of the Umurbrogol ridges
grew a sparse, scraggly vegetation that
cloaked the contours beneath and defied
all attempts of pre-invasion aerial
reconnaissance. A dense tropical growth
thrives along most of the island's
shores, with mangrove swamps bordering
the northeastern beaches. The island
has no rivers or lakes, and except
for a few swamps, its soils drain within
a few hours after a heavy rainfall. For
their water supply, Peleliu's inhabitants
depended chiefly upon rain water stored
in cisterns.

Amphibious planners found no dearth
of suitable beaches on Peleliu, for landings
were feasible at almost any point,
providing the reef was passable. Along
the east coast is a narrow reef which
borders the shoreline, except to the
south where small bays occur, and to the
north where the reef lies 1,200 to 5,000
yards offshore. On the western side of
Peleliu, there is a broad, shallow reef
shelf, varying in width from over a mile
in the north to 400 yards in the south.
The outer part, somewhat higher than
the inner portion, was strewn with
boulders. At a few points, there are
breaks in the reef, where restricted
channels permit passage of small boats
at high tide. The northern part of the
reef is from 1,400 to 1,600 yards offshore,
while in the south it averages
500 yards. During the fall months, the
west shores of Peleliu receive only a
light to moderate surf, and the mean
range of its tides is from 3.3 to 3.9 feet.

The beaches on the western side, the
best in terms of amphibious assaults,
are extensive. Composed of coarse textured
coral sands, they are trafficable
at all times, particularly when wet.
Their surface is generally rough and
rubbly, with much coral debris lying
about. The slope of the beaches is usually
moderate to steep, and passage
inland encounters, in general, only
moderately rising wooded areas.

The main military value of Peleliu,
and of the Palaus, lay in its southern
lowlands, where the Japanese had already
built two unusually good runways
in an X pattern. Surfaced with hardpacked
coral, this airfield was suitable
for bombers and fighters, and was
served by ample taxiways, dispersal
areas, and turning circles. A scrub
jungle, interspersed with wild coconut
trees and an occasional grassy clearing,
flanked the field on both the west and
south, while a dense mangrove swamp
bordered it on the east. To the north
was an extensive area of buildings, and
right behind them began the sharp
ridges of the Umurbrogol system, which
were to prove such an ideal position for
the defenders. Also of military interest
was the auxiliary fighter strip in the
process of being constructed on Ngesebus
Island, which lay off the northern
tip of Peleliu, connected by a wooden
causeway across a shallow reef to the
mainland.

The Japanese airfield, near the village
of Asias, was the central focus of
Peleliu's road system. From the airfield,
the West and East Roads ran up
the northern peninsula, flanking the
Umurbrogol highlands. In the north
where the ridges flatten out briefly,
these two roads converged into one that
continued to the northernmost tip of
Peleliu and the village of Akalokul, site
of a phosphate crushing plant and a
hand-operated, narrow-gauge railroad.

--58--

About half way up the West Road, near
the village of Garekoru, a trail angled
across the ridges to link up with the
East Road. From Asias, a road ran
northeast across the narrow causeway
and up the eastern peninsula to
Ngardololok, where the Japanese had
set up a radio-direction finder, a power
plant, and a few other military installations.
A southern extension of the
East Road served the promontories to
the south.

The other island attracting the attention
of American planners was smaller
and more compact than Peleliu. Angaur
is the southernmost of the Palau Islands
and lies outside of the complex of reefs
surrounding them. The island is composed
of raised coral and is shaped
somewhat like a half-moon, with its
concave side facing to the west. Approximately
5,000 yards north to south and
nearly 4,000 yards at its maximum
width, Angaur has an estimated area
of 2,000 acres. Its highest elevation,
about 200 feet, is in the more rugged
northwest corner, and there are steep
20- to 40-foot cliffs along much of the
shoreline. The remainder of the densely
wooded island, however, is almost flat,
and its capability of being readily transformed
into a heavy bomber site made
it a military objective worthy of seizure.
Barriers to overland movement were
the dense jungle growth, swampy areas
inland, steep cliffs, two small lakes
formed by water collecting in abandoned
phosphate diggings, and the broken
ridges of the northwest corner.

Several excellent beaches for landing
operations occur on Angaur, with movement
immediately inland hampered
only by the rainforest and thick undergrowth.
Where reefs fringe the coast,
they are generally narrow and drop off
sharply into deep water. A sheltered
water area exists on the west side near
the village of Saipan. The port and
trade center of the island, this village
was connected with the other coasts by
roads, trails, and narrow-gauge railway lines.

Two other potential targets, besides
the Palaus, also played an important
role in the evolution of STALEMATE:
Yap Island and Ulithi Atoll. Yap, actually
a cluster of islands grouped together
on a triangular reef, possessed
a well-developed and strongly garrisoned
Japanese airbase. None of Ulithi's
some 30 islands, on the other hand,
was considered suitable by Japanese engineers
for the construction of an airstrip,
and the atoll was only lightly
held. Ulithi, however, possessed an excellent
sheltered anchorage, and occupied
a central position in respect to other
Pacific islands the Americans had
seized or intended to seize. After its
capture, it was destined to become the
vital hub of naval operations in the
Western Pacific during the last days of
the war.

Initial Allied planning for the capture
of the Palaus started during the First

--59--

Quebec Conference (QUADRANT) in
August 1943. During this top level meeting,
a tentative date of 31 December
1944 was fixed for the assault on the
Palaus; the campaign would follow the
seizure of the Marshalls and Truk, but
precede the attack on the Marianas.
Subsequent strategic revisions, however,
provided for the bypassing of Truk
and the capture of the Palaus in September
following the occupation of Saipan,
Tinian, and Guam. This new schedule
was formulated by the Joint Chiefs
of Staff directive of 12 March 1944.

Preliminary steps, meanwhile, had
already been initiated by top Pacific
commands. A Marine general, passing
through Pearl Harbor on his way to the
front in January 1944, found the Planning
Section of CinCPOA Staff, headed
by Colonel Ralph R. Robinson, USMC,
far advanced in its preparation for a
future assault of Babelthuap. In fact,
the general noted that the planners
were utilizing the same landing area as
used by a Marine Corps Schools problem
in the thirties.6
A month later, Joint Intelligence Center, Pacific Ocean
Areas distributed a bulletin setting
forth what was then known about the
Palaus. This was little enough, for such
convenient intelligence sources as coastwatchers and trading ships' captains,
often available in earlier campaigns,
were totally lacking. Until the Americans
actually landed in the Palaus, any
terrain studies of the islands would
have to be made solely from aerial or
submarine reconnaissance.

Operation STALEMATE was formally
launched on 10 May, when Admiral
Nimitz issued the Joint Staff
Study for the Palau Operation. This
study contained the general organization
of the forces to be employed, the
allocation of ground, air, and naval
units, the scheme of maneuver, and the
logistic support plan. The date for the
landing was tentatively set for 15 September
1944. As copies came into the
hands of the assault and support echelons
concerned, detailed planning began
immediately. The planning for the Marianas
campaign was minutely scrutinized,
with a view of profiting from
previous errors and of eliminating all
unnecessary detail from the plans of
each subordinate command.

This flurry of activity among the
staffs of the various Pacific commanders
accelerated appreciably on 29 May,
when CinCPOA promulgated a warning
order envisioning the capture of the
entire Palau Group with a target date
of 8 September. This ambitious undertaking,
larger in scale than any previous
Pacific operation, would employ
four assault divisions, organized into
two corps.

--60--

Earlier, on 7 April, while in Pearl
Harbor in connection with the planning
for the Marianas Operation (FORAGER),
Major General Roy S. Geiger,
Commanding General, III Amphibious
Corps (IIIAC), had been forewarned
by Nimitz that his corps would participate
in the coming Palau campaign.
Immediately upon his return to Guadalcanal
and in spite of the scarcity of
available information, General Geiger
had his staff institute a study of the
Palaus, concurrent with its planning for
the close-at-hand Guam assault.

Just prior to embarking for the Marianas,
Geiger detached a provisional
planning staff from IIIAC and sent it
to Pearl Harbor, where it became operative
on 12 June. Initially headed by Colonel
Dudley S. Brown and charged with
the planning for the seizure of the
Palaus, this group was later redesignated
X-Ray Provisional Amphibious
Corps, and Major General Julian C.
Smith, who possessed sufficient rank and
seniority to sustain Marine Corps views
in subsequent planning conferences,
was placed in command. At this time,
General Smith was stationed in Pearl
Harbor as Deputy Commander, V Amphibious
Corps, and he was to fill both
positions for some time.

Because so many echelons had staffs
located in the Pearl Harbor area, planning
for the Palau campaign benefited
from a closer coordination between the
various assault and support commands
than was customary in similar operations,
Right from the start, however,
complications arose to plague the planners
and high echelon commanders. Unbeknown
to them, STALEMATE plans
were to wend an involved and tortuous
path and undergo numerous revisions
before actual consummation.

The troop basis for the Palau Operation
had been predicated upon the use
of units already slated for the Marianas,
a campaign that proved more difficult
and time-consuming than originally estimated.
As a result, units earmarked
for STALEMATE had become deeply
involved in the Marianas fighting. Unless
the landing was delayed, it would
be impossible to re-equip and ready these
forces in sufficient time to meet the
deadline of 8 September. Accordingly,
CinCPOA directed, on 29 June, that
such substitutions or improvisations be
made as necessary for the execution of
the Palau campaign.

Such last minute shifts of troop assignments,
however, did not resolve the
problem of insufficient forces. By early
July, planners were becoming disturbed
by reports that alarming increases in
the enemy forces garrisoning Babelthuap
and the other islands were occurring.
Doubts were voiced about the adequacy
of a two-division landing force
for the large island. After all, it had
taken three divisions 25 days to secure
the smaller and less rugged Saipan.

Questions were raised also about the
suitability of Babelthuap's terrain for
airfield construction, hitherto a contributory
reason for its being a target.
Peleliu, on the other hand, already had
a fine airfield and an auxiliary fighter
strip under construction on offshore
Ngesebus. Their seizure and rapid development
as a base for American
planes would permit neutralization of
the remaining Japanese-held Palau Islands

--61--

without the need of actually invading
them. In addition, the small
island of Yap, Palaus' nearest neighbor,
already possessed a good airbase and
was a much easier target than Babelthuap.

Although its anchorage facilities was
another reason for Babelthuap's capture,
the excellent and spacious fleet
anchorage at Ulithi Atoll was available
at little cost, as the Japanese had only
a handful of soldiers outposting it. The
substitution of Yap and Ulithi for Babelthuap,
with its unfinished airfields
and fair anchorage, would provide instead
a good operative airbase and a
superb fleet anchorage.

Other factors added complications to
the STALEMATE planners. Shipping
allocated to the Palau Operation was
heavily committed to the slow-moving
Marianas campaign, as were the available
fire support ships. Then in mid-June, the Joint Chiefs of Staff queried
the top Pacific commanders as to the
possibility of bypassing the Western
Carolines completely in exchange for a
speedup of the Pacific timetable and an
earlier strike at Formosa, or even Japan
itself. Only one answer was in the affirmative,
that of Admiral William F.
Halsey, but the changed strategic picture
in the Central Pacific at this time
did bring about a radical revision of the
proposed Palau Operation.

After a re-examination of the situation,
Nimitz cancelled the original Palau
concept in favor of a much less ambitious
venture. The southern islands of
Peleliu and Angaur would still be seized,
but the atolls of Ulithi and Yap, known
to be easier targets, would be substituted
for Babelthuap.

On 7 July, a new warning order was
forwarded to all subordinate commands,
replacing the earlier one of 29 May. The
overall operation, under the new designation
of STALEMATE II, was to be a
two-phase assault carried out by two
separate landing forces. Phase I would
consist of the capture of the Southern
Palaus and the neutralization of the
Babelthuap and Koror areas, while
Phase H would involve the seizure of
Yap and the Ulithi Atoll. The target
date for Phase I was postponed to 15
September 1944, thus coinciding with
the assault on Morotai, and the date for
the initiation of Phase II was established
tentatively as 5 October.

Overall command for the operation
resided in Admiral Halsey as Commander,
Western Pacific Task Forces.
The combat ships of his Third Fleet
were to cover the approach of the Joint
Expeditionary Forces to their objectives.
In addition, he was expected to
furnish naval support for the Southwest
Pacific Forces simultaneously assaulting
Morotai while, in return, General
MacArthur's air would aid in the preinvasion
softening up of the Palaus and
other air support missions.

Incidentally, out of this planning by
Central and Southwest Pacific air liaison
officers for STALEMATE II came
a most closely coordinated, integrated,
and far-reaching series of strategic air
support missions. The major objective
of the combined operation­gaining control
over the eastern approaches of the
Luzon-Formosa-China coast area--caused the air planners to widen the
scope of the proposed air activities to a
degree not encountered in any previous
Pacific amphibious undertakings.

--62--

The magnitude of Halsey's task is
still difficult to imagine. Upon his Third
Fleet fell the duty of transporting and
protecting the landing forces en route
to the target, furnishing the necessary
naval gunfire and air support, plus such
related support missions as supplying
the troops ashore after a beachhead was
secured. Before STALEMATE II was
over, every major command in the Pacific
participated in it, and it eventually
involved 800 vessels, 1,600 aircraft, and
an estimated 250,000 Navy, Army, and
Marine personnel. As the largest naval
amphibious venture thus far in the
Pacific, the attacking force alone included
14 battleships, 16 carriers, 20
escort carriers, 22 cruisers, 136 destroyers,
and 31 destroyer escorts, not
counting the numerous types of landing
craft or service ships, nor the support
ships for the Morotai landing. Supplying
such a vast and complicated assortment
of men and ships taxed the logistic
support of all available Allied commands.

In order to handle adequately the job
of shepherding the troop transports
and attached vessels to their destination,
plus fulfilling related support missions,
Admiral Halsey was forced to
divide his powerful Third Fleet into
two parts. He retained direct control of
the Covering Forces and Special Groups
(TF 30), and Vice Admiral Theodore S.
Wilkinson commanded the Third Amphibious
Force (TF 31). For direct
support of the landings, TF 31 was further
divided into the Eastern Attack
Force (TF 33), scheduled for the Yap-
Ulithi assaults, and the Western Attack
Force (TF 32), which would cover the
Peleliu and Angaur operations. Admiral
Wilkinson retained direct control of
TF 33, but delegated control of TF 32
to Rear Admiral George H. Fort. This
latter force was again divided into the
Peleliu Attack Group (TG 32.1, under
Fort's tactical control), the Angaur Attack
Group (TG 32.2, Rear Admiral
William H.P. Blandy), and the Kossol
Passage Detachment (TG 32.9, Commander
Wayne R. Loud), which had the
mission of sweeping the area free of
mines and organizing it as a temporary
fleet anchorage and seaplane base.

Although the U.S. Navy had the task
of transporting, protecting, and landing
the assault troops, the man designated
to control all ground action for
Operation STALEMATE was Major
General Julian C. Smith in his role as
Commanding General, Expeditionary
Troops. Immediate control would be exercised
by his subordinate Western and
Eastern Landing Forces. The Western
Landing Force and Troops, Major General
Geiger's IIIAC, would seize Peleliu
using the 1st Marine Division (Major
General William H. Rupertus) and complete
Phase I by capturing Angaur with
the 81st Infantry Division (Major General
Paul J. Mueller, USA). Phase II,
the seizure of Yap and Ulithi, was assigned
to the Eastern Landing Force and
Troops, commanded by Major General
John R. Hodge, USA. He had the XXIV
Corps, consisting of two infantry divisions
and, upon release by the Western
Landing Force and Troops, units of the 81st.

For backup, General Smith had as
floating reserve the 77th Infantry Division,
which would be embarked at Guam.
He also could call upon the newly-formed

--63--

5th Marine Division in area reserve,
should the need arise.

With the successful securing of the
objectives, General Smith's duties as
overall ground commander for STALEMATE
II would cease. At this time, the
defense and subsequent development of
the newly-acquired bases as major airfields
and fleet anchorages would become
the sole responsibility of Admiral
John H. Hoover, Commander, Forward
Area, Central Pacific Command.

Except for a few minor redesignation
in units and commanders, Phase I
plans remained unchanged until D-Day.
Upon his return from Guam on 15 August,
General Geiger assumed command
of X-Ray Provisional Amphibious Corps
which was then redesignated IIIAC,
and took over command of Western
Landing Forces and Troops from General
Smith, who then reverted to his
higher role as Commanding General,
Expeditionary Troops, Third Fleet.
Phase II, on the other hand, was destined
to undergo still another radical
revision due to startling developments
arising out of the far-sweeping support
actions of the U. S. Navy.

One portion of the Third Fleet's mission
was to "Seek out and destroy hostile
air and naval forces which threaten
interference with the STALEMATE 11
operations, in order to inflict maximum
damage on the enemy and to protect our
own forces."7
This provision for blunting
the enemy's potential to counteract
a landing was by this time standard
operating procedure in any amphibious
undertaking. This time, however, Halsey had ordered his naval officers to
seek out every opportunity for engaging
the Japanese major naval forces in a
decisive sea battle.

In his eagerness to close with the
enemy's surface fleet, Halsey made this
mission the primary one, overriding the
customary one of protecting the landing
force. His operation order clearly directed
this radical departure from accepted
amphibious doctrine by stating,
"In case opportunity for the destruction
of a major portion of the enemy fleet
offers itself or can be created, such
destruction will become the primary
task."8
Subordinate naval echelons, of
course, reflected this viewpoint. Admiral
Wilkinson directed his heavier warships
in the Fire Support Group to "Concentrate
and engage enemy task forces encountered.
Support the Covering Force
or provide striking groups if so directed."9
As in the recent Marianas campaign,
the covering naval forces for
STALEMATE II were on the lookout
for a decisive sea battle with the Imperial
Fleet rather than being primarily
concerned with the protection of the
amphibious landing forces.

In hopes of being in on just such a
decisive naval engagement, Admiral
Halsey personally led the strongest combat
component of the Covering Forces
and Special Groups, Vice Admiral Marc
A. Mitscher's Fast Carrier Task Force
(TF 38), out of Eniwetok Atoll on 28
August 1944 for strikes against the
Bonins, Palaus, Yap, and Mindanao.
Chichi Jima and Iwo Jima were struck
by carrier-launched aircraft on 31 August-

--64--

2 September, the Palaus on 6-8
September, and Mindanao on 9-10 September.
Everywhere the enemy's air
resistance proved surprisingly weak,
and the great success of the last strike
persuaded Halsey to shift his intended
follow-up attack on Mindanao instead
to the Central Philippines.

Exploiting the enemy's weakness by
pressing in close to the coast, the carriers
of TF 38 actually stationed themselves
within sight of the Samar Mountains
from 12-14 September, during
which time 2,400 sorties were launched
against the Visayas bases of the Japanese.
The phenomenal success of this air
attack, which had achieved tactical surprise,
proved dazzling. American pilots
claimed the destruction of some 200
enemy planes, the sinking or damaging
of many ships, and the infliction of tremendous
damage upon Japanese installations.
American losses in comparison
were minute: 8 planes in combat, 1
operationally, and 10 men.

Halsey could report to his superior
that the "Enemy's non-aggressive attitude
[was] unbelievable and fantastic."10
Later he would recall that "We
had found the central Philippines a hollow
shell with weak defenses and skimpy
facilities. In my opinion, this was
the vulnerable belly of the Imperial
dragon."11

This astonishing victory, coupled with
the lack of serious Japanese reaction,
prompted Halsey to send a dispatch to
Nimitz stating his belief that "the Palau
and Yap-Ulithi operations were
unnecessary to support the seizure of
the Philippines"12
and that an invasion
of the Leyte-Samar area be undertaken
at the earliest possible date using the
troops slated for STALEMATE II. Admiral
Nimitz passed on the recommendation
concerning Phase II to the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, but due to commitments
already made, he decided Phase I would
have to go through as planned.

From then on, events on the strategic
stage moved rapidly. In answer to a
Joint Chiefs of Staff inquiry about General
MacArthur's willingness to advance
Leyte's target date if given the troops
of XXIV Corps, his staff officers, took
it upon themselves--MacArthur was
maintaining radio silence on board a
cruiser off Morotai--to radio an affirmative
reply on 15 September.13

Word to this effect was immediately
relayed to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, then
in Quebec with President Roosevelt for
the OCTAGON conference. So impressed
were they by this dramatic
agreement between the top Pacific
Theater commanders that 90 minutes
after the dispatch was received they
were able to flash their approval. Thus
the XXIV Corps departed the Central
Pacific to play its important part in
the dramatic 'Liberation' campaign.14

To further compound the difficulties,
Halsey on the following day, the second

--65--

day of the Peleliu fighting, directed the
seizure of Ulithi "as early as practical . . .
with resources at hand."15
The only uncommitted force was the corps reserve,
a single regimental combat team
(RCT), and its removal from the immediate
area would leave the Marines
still battling desperately ashore to secure
Peleliu without any reinforcements
should they be needed.16
What resulted, however, when this happened,
will be narrated later in its proper sequence.

The thick veil of secrecy with which
the Japanese cloaked their prewar activities in the mandated Palaus revealed
an early awareness of the military potentialities
of the islands. Under the
League of Nations' terms, none could be
fortified, but Japan's extreme sensitivity
concerning them aroused suspicions.
As one American visitor stated, "Officials
and officers swarm here in such
numbers that the visitor does not draw
a breath without an appropriate note
being made in the archives."18
Here, it was, also, that a Marine colonel died
under very mysterious circumstances
in 1923, while traveling in the disguise
of a commercial trader.19

On the other hand, there was no concrete evidence of any extensive fortification
of the Palaus prior to World War
II. Harbors had been dredged, some
naval facilities erected, and an airfield
built, but the Peleliu airfield, while possessing

--66--

great military value, was equally
useful for peaceful civilian pursuits.

Immediately following Pearl Harbor,
however, the islands served as a jumping-off point for Japan's attack against
the Philippines. Out of its naval base
had sortied the small carrier task force
which launched the first air raids
against American forces in the Philippines,
while troops staged at the Palaus
for the later Philippines land campaign.
Afterwards, the islands came to be used
primarily as an intermediate staging
base and supply point for offensives
along the outer perimeter of the Japanese
advance. During the struggle for the
Solomons, thousands of Imperial soldiers
staged through the Palaus, utilizing
them as training and practice areas,
on their way to the front.

The Japanese high command, during
the early stages of the Pacific War, paid
slight attention to the ability of the
Palaus to defend themselves. The full
vigor of Japan's war effort was then
concentrated upon the outer fringes of
newly conquered territories, where
mounting Allied counterattacks absorbed
available Japanese troops and
war material in ever increasing
amounts. Any development of a strategic
inner defense line was deferred
until dramatic reversals in New Guinea,
the Solomons, and other points forced
the Imperial war planners to reassess
the hopeless battle on the outer perimeter.

Finding herself unable to match the
superior Allied air and naval strength,
Japan began concentrating her energies
upon the creation of a powerful defensive
bastion which would halt the Allied
advance and hurl it back. Accordingly,
in September 1943, the Imperial General
Headquarters (IGHQ) at Tokyo created
a second line of defense which embraced
the areas west of the Marianas-Carolines-Western
New Guinea line. It was
then decreed that this was the zone of
absolute defense where each Japanese
soldier would fight to the death.

Initial steps in girding this decisive
battle area for the eventual assault
called for bolstering the garrisons with
first-string combat troops. For the first
time in the Pacific War, IGHQ planners
were forced to draw upon the battle-ready
divisions of the Kwantung Army
in Manchuria. Maintained at peak combat
readiness, this unit served the purpose
of immobilizing the large number
of Russian troops in nearby Siberia,
thereby preventing their redeployment
to the European front for use against
Japan's ally, Germany. The needs of the
crucial Pacific sector, however, sent the
35th Division, among others of the
Kwantung units, hurrying southward.
The 35th arrived during March 1944 in
the Palaus, until then garrisoned only
by rear-echelon troops, but it was almost
immediately dispatched farther westward
to a more critical front, leaving
only one understrength regiment to defend
the island group.

Earlier in 1944, the American seizure
of the Admiralties and Marshalls had
brought all of the Carolines within effective
striking range of Allied land-based
bombers. In the face of this new
threat, the Combined Fleet transferred
its headquarters from the now highly
vulnerable Truk to the Palaus, which
would be used as a temporary forward
naval base until a permanent one could
be constructed in the Philippines. No

--67--

sooner had the Japanese settled down in
their new location, than a successful
carrier raid by the U. S. Fifth Fleet in
late March denied them the use of the
Palaus even temporarily.

This large scale air strike also spurred
the defensive efforts of the Japanese
Army and caused some drastic reshuffling
of troop assignments. Since an
American attack was believed imminent,
the 14th Division, already en route from
Manchuria, was dispatched with all possible
speed to the Palaus. Landing there
on 24 April, the 14th took over the responsibility
for the islands' defenses,
releasing the regiment of the 35th to
rejoin its parent organization already
committed to the fighting farther westward.

To handle the overall task of defending
the Central Pacific area, IGHQ had
established the Thirty-first Army with
headquarters in the Marianas. Its zone
of responsibility stretched along the Bonins-Marianas-Carolines
line of the strategic
area of absolute defense. The commanding
general was to have control
over all army units in the theater and
be directly responsible to the Central
Pacific Fleet, but his displeasure in being
subordinated to a naval officer precipitated a furious interservice squabble
which was smoothed over only when the
Navy and Army commanders orally
pledged each other not to assume complete
responsibility.

With the arrival of the hardened veterans
of the 14th Division on Babelthuap,
after a delay while their transports
evaded would-be American attackers,
an effective defense of the
islands approached reality. The 14th
was one of the oldest and best military
units in the Japanese Army, and its infantry
regiments, the 2d,15th, and
59th, all had excellent reputations. Its
commanding officer, Lieutenant General
Sadae Inoue, was made Commander,
Palau Sector Group, the organization
responsible to the Thirty-first Army for
the defense of all the Palaus, Yap, and
nearby islands. Military units already
based in the Palaus, such as the Sea
Transport Units (landing craft and
crews) of the 1st Amphibious Brigade,
and the service and support troops for
the Japanese forces in New Guinea,
passed to the control of General Inoue
as group commander, who later reorganized
them into the 53d Independent
Mixed Brigade (IMB). Inoue's orders
from the superior headquarters were
concise:

The Palau Sector Group Commander
will secure the Palau Islands ( including
Angaur) and the Yap Island area. . . .
The islands must be held to the very last
as the final position barring the enemy
from penetrating into the Pacific. Peleliu
and Angaur must be fortified as an important
air base.20

Within a matter of weeks after his
arrival, General Inoue successfully deployed
his units in scattered defensive
positions. Headquarters of both the division
and group, naturally, were located
on Koror, the administrative center of
the islands, and the major part of the
troops were deployed on nearby Babelthuap
where Inoue planned to make his
final fight.

As the main infantry force on Peleliu,
Inoue allocated the 2d Infantry. Its
commander, Colonel Kunio Nakagawa,
was designated Commander, Peleliu

--68--

Sector Unit, which also had artillery,
mortar, signal, and light tank units attached
to it. The 346th Independent Infantry
Battalion of the 53d IMB and the
3d Battalion, 15th Infantry, were also
assigned to Nakagawa's command to
bolster his combat strength. In addition,
the Navy had the 144th and 126th Antiaircraft
units, and the 45th Guard
Force Detachment, plus construction
units and the airbase personnel. In all,
Nakagawa had approximately 6,500
combat troops available for the defense
of Peleliu, and the service troops and
non-combatants brought his garrison
total up to about 10,500.

The Peleliu Sector Unit commander
confidently expected his troops to man
their assigned positions until death, for
the Imperial Japanese infantryman,
schooled in the strict Bushido code of
the warrior, prided himself on his tenacious
fighting ability without regard for
personal safety. The esprit de corps of
the 15th Infantry, whose 2d and 3d Battalions
were destined to be wiped out
during the fighting on Peleliu, was typical
of the Japanese fighting units. First
organized in 1884, the regiment was
presented its colors the following year
and covered them with great honor in
several hard-fought battles. More recently,
it had received a citation for a
battle in North China. As the regimental
commander reported:

All the officers and men carried in mind
the meaning of our sacred war, and the
leaders, burning with the will to be 'Breakwater
of the Pacific,' and feeling the obligation
of this important duty, and being a
picked Manchukuoan regiment that does
not expect to return alive and will follow
to the death an imperial order, devoted
themselves to the endeavor of being the
type of soldier who can fight hundreds of
men. . . .

Using all wisdom especially while
acquiring our antilanding training we will
overcome the hardships of warfare and
under the battle flag which displays our
battle glory we vow with our unbreakable
solidarity we will complete our glorious
duty and establish the 'Breakwater of the
Pacific.'21

Such was the caliber of the men
slated to fight to the last in a hopeless
struggle on Peleliu. About the only Japanese
lacking this fanatical viewpoint
were those portions of the naval garrison
consisting of the labor troops and
the Korean labor force. Most of these
noncombatants, however, were forced
by the combat troops to resist aggressively
the American attacks; only a few
ever succeeded in surrendering.

On Angaur, Inoue stationed the 59th
Infantry, less one battalion. Late in
July, however, most of these infantrymen
were withdrawn to strengthen
Babelthuap where the main attack was
expected, leaving only the 1st Battalion
as garrison. Its commander, Major
Ushio Goto, was then assigned as commander, Angaur Sector Unit. His remaining
garrison forces totaled some
1,400 men, including supporting artillery,
antiaircraft, mortar, engineer, and
service units.

Within easy reinforcing distance of
both Peleliu and Angaur were some
25,000 troops on the other Palau Islands,
many specially trained in amphibious
operations. Among the other
places under General Inoue's command,
only Yap was heavily garrisoned. As

--69--

late as 27 August 1944, American intelligence
officers reported its defending
forces as 8,000 to 10,000 men.22

Immediately upon assuming responsibility
for the defense of the Palau Sector
Group, General Inoue became bogged
down in that long-standing rivalry between
the Japanese Army and Navy.
The naval officers had regarded the
Palaus as their own private domain for
so long that the sudden arrival of a
lieutenant general, senior to their own
commander, aroused their excessive sensitivity
and displeasure.

The Army commander, right from the
start, was made to feel the Navy's resentment
over the new state of affairs.
Inoue found it practically impossible to
obtain civilian help in erecting fortifications,
for the Navy had already monopolized
all available labor and organized
the workers into pools to be used
for naval projects only. Nor would the
naval officers allow any Army personnel
to utilize their caves or installations.
As a result, Inoue had to drive his men
night and day in a frantic effort to prepare
adequate defensive positions
quickly. The situation became unusually
severe on Peleliu, where the Navy garrison
was commanded by a flag officer--who was, of course, senior to Colonel
Nakagawa. Finally, in desperation,
Inoue assigned his next senior officer,
Major General Kenjiro Murai, in nominal
command of the Peleliu garrison in
order to make any progress at all in
fortifying the island.

There was also another reason for
General Murai's presence on Peleliu.
Since the group commander considered
the island's airfields of prime importance,
he had selected his most able officer,
Colonel Nakagawa, to direct its defense.
As Inoue explained in a postwar
interview, he had assigned Murai to
Peleliu while leaving Nakagawa in actual
command for two reasons. First,
Inoue wanted to remove the pressure of
naval animosity from Nakagawa's
shoulders and second, as a form of insurance,
"to see that Colonel Nakagawa
didn't make any mistakes."23
This unusual arrangement proved unnecessary,
as later events indicated that all orders
right up to the bitter end of the fighting
were issued in Nakagawa's name.

Actually, the Palaus' defenses actively
entered into the strategic defense plans
of IGHQ only for the relatively brief
period from April to July 1944. During
this time, men and supplies were rushed
to the islands to hasten their preparations
for an expected imminent assault.
With the successful American attack
upon the Marianas, however, the greater
strategic value of the Philippines necessitated
the writing off of the Palaus and
their garrisons and the concentration of
all available strength in the Philippines area.

The overshadowing importance of the
Philippines also caused a lack of Japanese
air support for the Palaus, a serious
flaw in their defense preparations.
Most, if not all, of the planes already
in the Palaus were destroyed in the
Fifth Fleet's carrier raid of late March,
when jubilant American fliers claimed
a total of 168 aircraft destroyed. At any

--70--

rate, none of the Peleliu-based Japanese
airplanes survived the pre-invasion
bombardment; only a few float planes
at Koror escaped intact. Nor could replacements
be spared. By this time,
Japan's aircraft reserves were becoming
limited. Besides, all available planes
were being hoarded for the planned decisive
battle to be forced with the Americans
in the Philippines.

Even though written off by IGHQ
strategists, the doomed Palaus garrisons
were expected to conduct a tenacious
defense in the event of American
attack, thereby delaying utilization of
the coveted airfields by the invaders.
Besides, combat losses to the assaulting
units would delay their reemployment
in future campaigns. Time, a most precious
commodity in war, would be
gained by the Japanese for perfecting
defenses in more strategic areas.

By July 1944, also, the point had
finally been driven home to the Japanese
high command that a blind adherence
to the usual doctrine of attempting
to annihilate the invaders on the beach
was futile. Recent battles involving
American amphibious assaults against
well-fortified beaches revealed that the
Americans' ability to unleash a devastating
preparatory bombardment made
total reliance upon beach defense useless.

Only one limited success stood out.
Instead of uselessly expending his forces
in suicidal Banzai counterattacks, the
Japanese commander at Biak had prolonged
the fighting substantially by having
his men dig in, thus forcing the
Americans to rout out each defender
in a long, bloody, mopping-up campaign.
This successful innovation, the protracted
resistance on Saipan, and the
long list of failures of Japanese commanders
in attempting to hold the
beachline, undoubtedly spurred the
IGHQ planners to undertake a detailed
study of the problem.

As a result, IGHQ decided in July
1944 on a new approach, and orders to
employ new tactics in protracted ground
battles were circulated to all Japanese
commands in the Pacific. Briefly, these
tactics involved the preparation of a
main line of resistance far enough inland
from the beach to minimize the
effects of the pre-invasion bombardment,
the organization of a defense in
depth designed to wear down the attacking
forces, and the hoarding of sufficient
reserves to mount successful
counterattacks at the appropriate times.

On 11 July 1944, General Inoue issued
"Palau Sector Group Training for Victory,"
a document incorporating the
new defensive concepts of IGHQ. His
instructions revealed a departure from
Japanese tactics employed earlier in the
Pacific war and a unique attempt by the
Japanese to profit from past errors.
Inoue's instructions emphasized that
victory would depend upon "our thorough
application of recent battle lessons,
especially those of Saipan,"24
and that the "ultimate goal of this training
is to minimize our losses in the severe
enemy pre-landing naval and aerial
bombardment." Among other things,
Inoue urged the holding back of sufficient
reserves in prepared defensive
positions inland to permit a massive

--71--

counterattack and the destruction of the
invaders in one fell swoop before their
beachhead became secure. In deploying
these reserve troops for the attack,
careful attention was to be given so that
there "will be no rapid exhaustion of
battle strength," and the soldiers were
to advance "at a crawl, utilizing terrain,
natural objects and shell holes."
As a last resort, he instructed the "construction
of strong points from which
we can cover our airfields up to the last
moment, regardless of the situation,"
and it was Inoue's contention that "if
we repay the Americans (who rely
solely upon material power) with material
power it will shock them beyond
imagination."

As it turned out, Peleliu was where
the battle was joined and the wisdom
of Inoue's defensive tactics tested. Basically,
the Japanese planned their troop
and weapon dispositions on the island
for a defense in depth. The resulting
defense system was well organized and
carefully integrated, and it possessed
great inherent strength and flexibility.
The enemy utilized the rugged terrain
to construct mutually supporting defensive
positions, and Peleliu was divided
into four sectors, each manned by a
reinforced battalion, with another one
in reserve.

Regardless of which beaches the
Americans chose to land on, they would
be resisted by the major portion of Colonel
Nakagawa's available forces. Swift
redeployment of his troops would be
possible, since the Japanese commander
had the advantage of interior lines to
operate over. Nor would naval or air
attempts at interdiction prevent this
concentration, for the earlier American
air raids had been utilized by the Japanese
to provide actual troop training
in advancing under fire. Detailed plans
dealing with proposed counterattacks
were prepared and rehearsed. A few infantry
companies were even reorganized
into special counterattack units, rather
than in the conventional platoons. Most
companies also had several teams of
two to three men prepared to infiltrate
and to knock out attacking tanks.

To forestall an invasion of Peleliu, all
potential landing beaches were heavily
mined with mine belts often extending
100 yards or so inland. Offshore obstacles
were erected, anti-tank barriers
constructed, and barbed wire strung.
Everywhere, the dominating terrain
was utilized for the placement of artillery,
previously zeroed-in on the
beaches, to wreak havoc among the assaulting
troops. All defensive positions
took full advantage of man-made and
natural cover and concealment, while
yet dominating all invasion approaches
(See Map 3).

Peleliu's southwestern beaches, where
the American assault actually came, were
typical of the Japanese beach defense
preparations. The natural offshore obstacles
there were augmented by the
effective positioning of tetrahedron-shaped
tank obstacles, strung barbed
wire, and over 300 single and double-horned
anti-invasion mines. The beaches
themselves and all routes leading inland
were strewn with tangled barbed wire
and land mines, as well as with huge
aerial bombs adapted to serve as mines.
To prevent advancing infantrymen
from working their way through the
obstacles on the beaches under the covering
fire of their tanks, long antitank

--72--

trenches running roughly parallel to the
beaches were dug.

These antitank ditches, as well as the
beaches, were covered by fields of fire
from pillboxes and gun casemates, located
in dominating positions and all
linked together in a system of mutual
cover and support. The casemates
mounted 37mm or 47mm antiboat and
antitank guns, and were made of reinforced
concrete with coral packed
against the sides and over the top.

Just to the north of the beaches, a
natural fortress formed by a prominent
coral hill was riddled with covered rifle
pits and pillboxes, each large enough
for two or three infantrymen armed
with rifles or automatic weapons. Near
the base of the cliff was a reinforced
concrete casemate housing a 47mm gun
which could provide enfilade fire on approaching
amphibious waves or interdictory
fire on the beaches. Peleliu's
southwestern promontory and a small
island, a few hundred yards offshore,
were used for the location of anti-boat
guns and machine guns to furnish enfilade fire.

On the flat terrain farther inland
from the beaches, the defense consisted
of direct fire against advancing troops
from well-camouflaged pillboxes and
other defensive positions, while observed
artillery and mortar fire could
be laid down from the dominating ridges
to the north of the airfield. Dug into
these ridges were pillboxes and a casemate
for a 75mm mountain gun, which
commanded the entire southern portion
of the island. At least one steel-reinforced
concrete blockhouse had as many
as 16 mutually supporting automatic weapons.

If the invaders survived the landing
and were able to consolidate the beach;
head, the Japanese planned to fall back
to previously prepared defensive positions
that commanded the ground between
them and the attacking forces.
If all else failed and the secondary line
of defense was overrun and the commanding
ground seized, last ditch resistance
would center around the extensive
cave fortifications that literally
honeycombed the rugged terrain of
northern Peleliu. Below is a description
of the area by a former Marine, who
was wounded in the fighting:

It was this high ground which made
Peleliu so perfectly adaptable to defense-in-depth, for it was neither ridge nor
mountain but an undersea coral reef
thrown above the surface by a subterranean
volcano. Sparse vegetation growing in
the thin topsoil atop the bedrock had concealed
the Umurbrogol's crazy contours
from the aerial camera's eye. It was a
place that might have been designed by a
maniacal artist given to painting mathematical
abstractions--all slants, jaggeds,
straights, steeps, and sheers with no curve
to soften or relieve. Its highest elevation
was 300 feet in the extreme north overlooking
the airfield-islet of Ngesebus 1,000
yards offcoast there. But no height rose
more than 50 feet before splitting apart in
a maze of peaks and defiles cluttered with
boulders and machicolated with caves. For
the Umurbrogol was also a monster Swiss
cheese of hard coral limestone pocked beyond
imagining with caves and crevices.
They were to be found at every level, in
every size--crevices small enough for a
lonely sniper, eerie caverns big enough to
station a battalion among its stalactites
and stalagmites.25

--73--

Map 3: Japanese Defense Plan E.L. Wilson

--74--

The Umurbrogol ridges were, of
course, the key to a successful defense
of Peleliu, and the Japanese made the
utmost use of its rugged terrain. They
developed the natural caves that existed
practically everywhere or blasted others
into the almost perpendicular cliffs in
order to deploy their troops and locate
their weapons for a last-ditch stand. If
driven from prepared positions, enemy
soldiers could take refuge in the abundant
natural cavities in the ridges, and
by sniping from and defending every
cave, crack, or crevice large enough
for a man to squeeze into, could tenaciously
prolong the resistance.

Due to bitter inter-service rivalry,
both the Army and the Navy independently
developed their own caves. The
Navy, with the help of the 214th Naval
Construction Battalion and a tunnel
construction unit, was able to build
some rather elaborate underground installations.
These were located mainly
in the north of Peleliu and consisted
for the most part of tunnels, ranging
from single ones up to networks of 10
or more. The hollowed-out chambers
usually measured 10 feet across and 6
feet high, often with separate rooms
for food and ammunition storage, living
quarters, and medical facilities.
Some even had the benefits of electric
lights, ventilation systems, and wooden
floors. Designed primarily as shelters
against air and naval bombardment,
these underground positions had no prepared
defenses against the onslaughts
of attacking infantry/tank teams.

The Army's caves, on the other hand,
while not so large, elaborate, nor ingeniously
constructed as those of the
Navy, were built and prepared for prolonged
land combat. Whenever practicable,
two or more staggered levels
were constructed, and the multiple entrances
led to tortuous passageways
within a single huge tunnel system,
where any number of safe refuges would
protect the occupants from the concussive
effect of bombing and shelling and
provide cover from direct fire. Every
effort, of course, was taken to camouflage
skillfully all cave openings, while
still preserving protection and clear
fields of fire. Siege defense preparations
consisted of jamming every nook and
crevice with food and ammunition and
building troughs to collect the water
dripping from overhead stalactites.

Tactical reasons alone determined the
location of the Army's caves. Fortifications
were built, weapons sited, and
soldiers deployed in order to provide
a mutually interlocking system of concrete
pillboxes, entrenchments, gun emplacements,
and riflemen's positions
dominating the strategic areas. Near
every important artillery or mortar emplacement
were other underground
dwellings housing automatic weapons
to provide protective fire. Communication
trenches or tunnels connected these
mutually supporting locations, while
observation posts often were placed on
top of the ridge in a natural limestone
cavity or crevice. The approaches to
vital installations, such as command
posts, were covered from all angles by
fire from cleverly located caves half way
up the surrounding ridges. At most
strategic points and in the final defensive
area were numerous smaller underground
positions designed to provide
interlocking support fire from small
arms. These were intended to be held

--75--

to the death, and no escape routes had
been provided for their occupants.

With their final defensive positions
prepared, the Japanese garrison on Peleliu
could view the future only gloomily.
After July, when the Palaus were
written off by the Imperial high command,
whose attention was centered on
the approaching decisive battle in the
Philippines, even the receipt of the more
essential supplies dwindled to a mere
trickle due to shipping losses by attacks
from American submarines and aircraft.
The future prospects seemed dim indeed.

The Americans had the choice of either
assaulting the islands or bypassing
them, thereby allowing the Japanese
garrison to degenerate into a state of
combat ineffectiveness through lack of
supplies and food. If the invasion came,
then the enemy soldier faced the dilemma
of either surrendering or waging
a bitter fight to the death. No hope of
relief or reinforcements could be expected.

After communications with the
Thirty-first Army's headquarters on
Saipan ceased in August, the Palau Sector
Group was reassigned by IGHQ, for
administrative purposes, to the Southern
Army which controlled operations
in the Philippines, and operationally to
Headquarters, Combined Fleet. When
advance intelligence indicated an imminent
American assault, it was the
Southern Army that notified General
Inoue on 3 September as to the probable
time and place of the landing. A
few days later, Japanese intelligence
officers estimated the size of the attacking
force to be probably a division. Just
before the actual invasion, the Japanese
learned that the assault force commander
was Major General Julian C. Smith.

General Inoue immediately notified
all of the forces under his command
that the long awaited opportunity to
annihilate the Americans was near at
hand. But as late as 8 September, Palau
Sector Group Headquarters thought
the carrier strikes might be just feinting
actions, with the main assault coming
elsewhere. When the heavy calibered
shells of the American battleships began
falling on 12 September, however,
Inoue knew, without doubt, that
the decisive moment had arrived. With
great eloquence, he informed his command
of the approaching battle:

This battle may have a part in the decisive
turn of tide in breaking the deadlock
of the 'Great Asiatic War.' The entire
Army and people of Japan are expecting
us to win this battle. There will never be
another chance as these few existing days
for the people living in the empire to repay
the emperor's benevolence again. Rouse
yourselves for the sake of your country!
Officers and men, you will devote your life
to the winning of this battle, and attaining
your long cherished desire of annihilating
the enemy.26

Footnotes

1.
Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived from:
Maj Frank O. Hough,
The Assault on Peleliu
(Washington: HistDiv, HQMC, 1950),
hereafter Hough, Assault on Peleliu;
Isely and Crowl, U.S. Marines and Amphibious War;The War Reports of General of the Army George C. Marshall--General of the Army H.H.
Arnold--Fleet Admiral Ernest J. King
(Philadelphia and New York: J.B. Lippincott Company, 1947),
hereafter War Reports with appropriate originator;
Robert Ross Smith,
The Approach to the Philippines
The War in the Pacific--U. S. Army in World War II
(Washington: OCMH, DA, 1953),
hereafter Smith, Approach to the Philippines;
USSBS (Pac), NavAnalysis Div,
The Campaigns of the Pacific War
(Washington, 1946), hereafter USSBS (Pac), Pacific Campaigns;
Samuel Eliot Morison, Leyte: June 1944-January 1945--History of United States
Naval Operations in World War II, v. XII
(Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1958),
hereafter Morison, Leyte;
Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate, eds.,
The Pacific: Matterhorn to Nagasaki--The Army Air
Forces in World War II, v. V (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1953),
hereafter Craven and Cate, The Pacific.
Where location citations for documentary sources for this part
are missing, the material is in the following
files of the Archives, Historical Division, Headquarters
Marine Corps: Palaus Area Operations; Peleliu Monograph and Comment File; Unit Historical Report.

16.
"In explanation of Halsey's decision,
3dPhibFor's serial 00314 of 11 Nov1944 (p. 8)
notes that Halsey acted after receiving a report
of the local situation. Further, the RCT was
not expected to depart until 21 September and
Halsey provided for the use of the RCT in
Peleliu prior to that date if the situation required."
RAdm E. M. Eller ltr to Hd, HistBr,
G-3 Div, HQMC, dtd 18Jul66, in Peleliu Comment
File, hereafter Eller ltr.