Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)

Further Reading

TESTIMONY OF DR. KENNETH ALIBEK

CHIEF SCIENTIST AT HADRON, INC.

Congressman Hunter, Congressman Weldon, and members of the
Subcommittees, thank you for the opportunity to discuss the issues
of biological weapons and biological defense preparedness with you.
I am in a rather unique position to discuss these issues, since I
developed biological weapons for the Soviet Union for nearly twenty
years, until my defection in 1992. When I left the Russian
biological warfare program, I had been serving for four years as
First Deputy Director of Biopreparat. Biopreparat, the civilian arm
of the biological weapons program, comprised over half of the
entire program’s personnel and facilities. At that time, I
was responsible for approximately 32,000 employees and 40
facilities. Since arriving to the United States, my personal and
professional goal has been to make the greatest contribution I can
to eliminating the danger of biological weapons.

WHAT ARE BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS?

Biological weapons are weapons of mass destruction (or mass
casualty weapons, to be precise, since they do not damage nonliving
entities) that are based on bacteria, viruses, rickettsia, fungi,
or toxins produced by these organisms. Compared to other types of
weapons (nuclear, chemical or conventional), biological weapons are
unique in their diversity. Dozens of different agents can be used
to make a biological weapon, and each agent will produce a markedly
different effect. These differences in effect are shaped by various
properties of the particular agent, such as its contagiousness, the
length of time after release that it survives in the environment,
the dose required to infect a victim, and of course the type of
disease that the agent produces.

Although most people think of biological weapons as
anti-personnel weapons, some biological weapons are designed to
destroy crops or livestock. In the future, it is theoretically
possible that new types of biological weapons will be produced
that:

damage military equipment by causing corrosion

degrade different types of plastics used in equipment,
computers, etc.

render fuels useless.

Biological weapons formulations are of two types: a liquid or a
dry powder. For most agents, the liquid form is easier to produce,
but the dry form stores longer and disperses better when deployed.
The basic steps for creating a liquid biological weapon are:

obtaining a sample of the microorganisms to be used

culturing the microorganisms until there is enough for a
weapon

concentrating the culture to make it strong enough for a
weapon

adding certain ingredients to stabilize the culture.

For a dry weapon formulation, this liquid culture is dried out
and then ground up into microscopic particles. For toxin weapons,
the toxin must first be extracted from the source—either the
liquid bacterial culture or a plant or animal—and then
concentrated.

Biological weapons are relatively inexpensive and easy to
produce. Although the most sophisticated and effective versions
require considerable equipment and scientific expertise, primitive
versions can be produced in a small area with minimal equipment by
someone with limited training.

Biological weapons can be deployed in three ways:

contamination of food or water supplies, which are then
ingested by the victims

release of infected vectors, such as mosquitoes or fleas,
which then bite the victims

creation of an aerosol cloud, which is then inhaled by the
victims (or, if the targets are plants, the cloud then settles on
and infects the plants).

Since the U.S. has highly effective water purification systems,
contamination of the water supply is the least effective method for
disseminating a biological weapon in this country. Contamination of
food supplies would most likely be used in a terrorist rather than
a military attack, since it is difficult to contaminate enough food
to gain a military advantage. Release of infected vectors is not
particularly efficient for either military or terrorist purposes
and entails a high probability of affecting those producing the
weapons or living nearby.

By far, the most efficient and effective mode for applying
biological weapons is creation of an aerosol cloud. Such a cloud is
made up of microscopic particles and is therefore invisible. It can
be produced in several ways, all of which involve either an
explosion (a bomb or a bomb within a missile) or spraying (usually
involving a special nozzle on a spray tank). The effectiveness of
the cloud is determined by numerous factors, such as the amount of
agent that survives the explosion or spraying, and the wind and
weather conditions. The primary result of an effective cloud is
simultaneous infections among all those who were exposed to a
sufficiently dense portion of the cloud. In addition, agents that
can survive for a long time in the environment will eventually
settle, contaminating the ground, buildings, water and food
sources, and so on. In some cases, these sediments can form another
dangerous aerosol cloud if they are disturbed.

THE USSR’S BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS PROGRAM

Although the Soviet Union was a party to the 1972 Biological and
Toxin Weapons Convention, it continued a high-intensity program to
develop and produce biological weapons through at least the early
1990s. The size and scope of this program were enormous. For
example, in the late 1980s and early 1990s, over 60,000 people were
involved to varying degrees in the research, development, and
production of biological weapons. Hundreds of tons of anthrax
weapon formulation were stockpiled, along with dozens of tons of
smallpox and plague. The total production capacity of all of the
facilities involved was many hundreds of tons of various agents
annually.

The Soviet Union’s biological weapons program was
established in the late 1920s. Prior to World War II, research was
conducted on a wide variety of agents. By the beginning of the war,
the Soviet Union was able to manufacture weapons using the agents
for tularemia, epidemic typhus, and Q fever, and was also working
on techniques for producing weapons using the agents for smallpox,
plague, and anthrax. My own analysis of a tularemia outbreak among
German troops in southern Russia in 1942 indicates that this
incident was very likely the result of the USSR’s use of
biological weapons. There was also a suspicious outbreak of Q fever
in 1943 among German troops vacationing in the Crimea.

World War II brought several advances for the Soviet biological
weapons program. First, the USSR gained access to German industrial
techniques and machinery for manufacturing large-scale biological
reactors and other industrial equipment. Second, the Soviets
obtained valuable information from the Japanese biological weapons
program. This information gave the Soviet program an instant boost
in its development.

After the war, the Soviet program continued to expand and
develop. In many cases, it closely shadowed the U.S. biological
weapons program. While the pre-war list of weaponized agents
included tularemia, epidemic typhus, and Q fever, the post-war list
was expanded to include:

smallpox

plague

anthrax

Venezuelan equine encephalomyelitis

Glanders

brucellosis

Marburg infection.

Numerous other agents were studied for possible use as
biological weapons, including:

Ebola

Junin virus (Argentinian hemorrhagic fever)

Machupo virus (Bolivian hemorrhagic fever)

yellow fever

Lassa fever

Japanese encephalitis

Russian spring-summer encephalitis.

Techniques and equipment were developed and refined for more
efficient cultivation and concentration of the agents. Methods for
producing dry weapons formulations for a number of agents were also
developed. In addition to weapons to affect humans, a number of
weapons to affect crops and livestock were developed using such
agents as:

psittacosis (affects fowl)

ornithosis (affects fowl)

Rinderpest virus (affects cattle)

African swine fever virus (affects swine)

wheat stem rust spores (affect wheat crops)

rice blast spores (affect rice crops).

During this post-war period, which lasted until the signing of
the 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, the Soviet Union
also formulated its doctrine regarding the production and use of
biological weapons. In the Soviets’ definition, "strategic"
weapons were those to be used on the deepest targets, i.e. the U.S.
and other distant countries; "operational" weapons were those
intended for use on medium-range targets, nearer than the strategic
targets but well behind the battlefront; and "tactical" weapons
were those to be used at the battlefront. Biological weapons were
excluded from use as "tactical" weapons, and were divided into
"strategic" and "operational" types. "Strategic" biological agents
were mostly lethal, such as smallpox, anthrax, and plague;
"operational" agents were mostly incapacitating, such as tularemia,
glanders, and Venezuelan equine encephalomyelitis. For both types
of weapons, use was envisioned on a massive scale, to cause
extensive disruption of vital civilian and military activity. The
Soviets also established so-called mobilization capacities:
facilities whose peacetime work was not biological weapons
production, but which could rapidly begin weapons production if war
was imminent.

It is important to note that, in the Soviets’ view, the
best biological agents were those for which there was no prevention
and no cure. For those agents for which vaccines or treatment
existed—such as plague, which can be treated with
antibiotics—antibiotic-resistant or immunosuppressive
variants were to be developed. This is in sharp contrast to the
philosophy of the U.S. program (terminated in 1969 by President
Nixon’s Executive Order), which stringently protected the
safety of its biological weapons researchers by insisting that a
vaccine or treatment be available for any agent studied.

After the Soviet Union became a party to the 1972 Biological and
Toxin Weapons Convention, internal debate ensued about the fate of
the existing biological weapons program. The end result was that
the program was not dismantled, but further intensified. During the
period 1972-1992, the focus of the program was expanded. In
addition to continuing previous types of work (developing improved
manufacturing and testing techniques and equipment; developing
improved delivery means for existing weapons; and exploring other
possible agents as weapons), new emphasis was placed on:

conducting molecular biology and genetic engineering research
in order to develop antibiotic-resistant and immunosuppressive
strains and to create genetically combined strains of two or more
viruses

studying peptides with psychogenic or neurogenic effects as
possible weapons

testing all of the facilities considered part of the
"mobilization capacity" to verify their readiness.

During this period, the Soviet program not only caught up with
the U.S. program (which was halted in 1969), behind which it had
lagged by about five years, but it became the most sophisticated
biological weapons program in the world by far.

However, as the Soviet Union weakened during the late 1980s and
early 1990s, and as more and more detail was revealed regarding the
Soviet biological weapons program, the West put increasing pressure
on the Soviets. In 1991, a series of trilateral visits were
conducted among the United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet
Union. Note that the Soviet program still existed when these visits
took place; the Soviets covered up the evidence as best they
could.

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, in early 1992, Russian
President Boris Yeltsin signed a decree banning all biological
weapons-related activity. Considerable downsizing in this area did
indeed occur, and included destruction of existing biological
weapons stockpiles. However, there still remains doubt that Russia
has completely dismantled the old Soviet program.

Certainly, now that the Cold War is over and U.S.-Russia
relations have changed markedly for the better, Russia presents far
less of a military threat to the U.S. However, it would not be
prudent to consider that Russia presents no military threat
whatsoever. In addition, biological weapons technology can possibly
proliferate from Russia to other countries less friendly to the
U.S. For these reasons, it is important that we continue to analyze
the situation with biological weapons in Russia.

There are three main reasons that I am concerned about possible
biological weapons research and development in Russia today. First,
many of Russia’s former biological weapons facilities have
never been subjected to international inspections or even visits by
foreign representatives. Second, Russia continues to publicly deny
the size or even existence of many aspects of the former Soviet
program. And third, among Russian scientists’ published work,
there are many studies I feel are dual-purpose or even outright
offensive biological weapons work.

PROLIFERATION OF BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

Of course, Russia is not the only biological weapons threat we
face. A number of other states are known or suspected to possess
biological weapons. Terrorist groups also present an increasing
threat; the Aum Shinrikyo cult in Japan was working on biological
weapons, and Osama bin Laden’s organization apparently has
biological weapons as well. The extent of the threat is no
surprise. Biological weapons have a number of very attractive
features for both military and terrorist uses: Their killing power
can approach that of nuclear weapons. They destroy only people,
leaving infrastructure intact. They are relatively inexpensive to
make. A small-scale biological weapons attack using a common
disease organism, such as tularemia or plague, can be masked as a
natural outbreak. The raw material—disease-producing strains
of microorganisms—is fairly easy to obtain. And the
techniques and equipment that are used in ordinary biotechnology
research and production can be used for biological weapons.

Since the Soviet Union and Russia had the most sophisticated and
powerful biological weapons program on earth, Russia presented and
presents a great proliferation threat. I should note that, to the
best of my knowledge, the Soviet Union and Russia have not exported
actual weapons strains of microorganisms. However, there are a
number of other ways that proliferation can occur.

The first is by experienced scientists traveling or moving
abroad. For example, I have unconfirmed information that some
scientists from the Kirov facility visited North Korea in the early
1990s. In addition, numerous scientists who used to work for the
biological weapons program are now living abroad. Many of these
scientists live in the U.S. and in Europe, but others have gone to
Iran and other countries where their expertise can be put to
nefarious use.

A second type of proliferation involves scientists from other
countries being brought to the proliferating country for training
in biotechnology, microbiology, and genetic engineering techniques.
For instance, for years Moscow State University provided such
training to scientists from dozens of countries, including Cuba,
North Korea, Eastern Bloc nations, Iran, Iraq, Syria, and
Libya.

A third form of proliferation involves private companies selling
scientific expertise. For instance, I have a flier from a company
that advertises recombinant Francisella tularensis bacteria
with altered virulence genes. Ostensibly, these organisms are being
offered for vaccine production; the flier also notes that they can
be used as genetic recipients and to create recombinant
microorganisms of biologically active agents. The authors of the
flier also express willingness to form cooperative ventures to
which they will contribute their genetic engineering knowledge. The
director of this company used to work for the USSR’s
biological weapons program.

A fourth type of proliferation occurs when the proliferating
country sells equipment that can be used in biological weapons
production. An example of this is the planned sale by Russia of
large fermenters to Iraq after the Persian Gulf War. Similarly, in
1990, Biopreparat was negotiating the sale of equipment to
Cuba.

The fifth kind of proliferation consists of published scientific
literature. Just by reading scientific literature published in
Russia in the last few years, a biological weapons developer could
learn how to genetically engineer vaccinia virus and then transfer
the results to smallpox; how to create antibiotic-resistant strains
of anthrax, plague, and glanders; and how to mass-produce Marburg
virus and Machupo virus. The billions of dollars that the Soviet
Union and Russia put into biotechnology research are available to
anyone for the cost of a translator.

I must emphasize the complexity of the proliferation issue for
biological weapons. In many cases, the same equipment and knowledge
that can be used to produce biological weapons can also be used to
produce legitimate biotechnological products such as vaccines and
antibiotics. Thus, we cannot forbid the export of most of the
relevant knowledge and equipment. Given the current economic
situation in the states of the former Soviet Union, the incentive
to sell these wares without regard to their eventual use is great
both for the government and for individual scientists and
businessmen.

OUR PREPAREDNESS FOR MILITARY AND TERRORIST BIOLOGICAL
ATTACKS

The ultimate goal of biodefense is to prevent suffering and loss
of life, thereby rendering biological weapons ineffective. We must
first be able to identify that an attack has occurred. This
involves developing equipment to detect a biological attack and
diagnostic equipment to identify the weapons agent, as well as
providing training to hospital and health department personnel in
recognizing and reporting the signs of a biological attack. Once an
attack has been identified, we must be able to treat the disease
or, better yet, prevent symptoms from developing.

I have a number of particular concerns regarding U.S. military
preparedness for biological attack.

Detection

Currently available detection equipment can identify four
biological agents. The planned improved version will be able to
detect "at least eight agents". A system to be fielded in 2002
will presumably be able to detect more than eight agents, though
I have seen no specific number. Yet there are dozens of agents
that could potentially be used as biological weapons. Our current
systems that identify four or eight agents essentially serve as
instructions to potential attackers to use agents other than
those specific four or eight, to evade our detectors. Are there
any plans to develop a "universal" detector that is not limited
to specific agents?

How and where will point detection equipment be deployed in
the field? Is this equipment portable? The area in which
biological attacks could take place on a battlefield is very
large.

In my opinion, the most useful detection equipment would be a
portable, nonspecific detection system that could
be easily positioned anywhere on the battlefield (e.g., each
platoon could have one) and would detect at least the fact of a
biological attack, even if it is incapable of identifying the
specific agent. Detectors capable of rapidly identifying the
specific agent, such as those we are currently developing, could
be used after the fact of the biological attack has been
established by the nonspecific detector.

How will the information provided by these detectors be used?
Instantaneous detection (which is not currently available) might
serve as a signal to troops to don protective gear, but detection
with any delay (such as we have now) would not serve this
purpose. At most, it would signal medical personnel to administer
any available urgent prophylaxis, obtain appropriate medical
supplies, and brace themselves for the onslaught of illness.

Protective equipment

What is the strategy for deploying protective equipment? Do we
plan to have personnel use this equipment all the time (which is
not realistic)? Only after an attack has been detected (when it
may cut the number of casualties somewhat, but would not
eliminate them)? Or some criteria between these two
possibilities?

What procedures are in place for large-area decontamination
(for persistent agents) and deratization (for agents that will
infect the local rodent population)? (Presumably we do not plan
to have soldiers wear their gear for an indefinite time after an
attack.) Do we have any research and development being done in
this area?

Medical countermeasures

There are a substantial number of additional vaccines under
development. Are we planning to develop vaccines against all
possible agents? As it stands now, the development and
administration of specific vaccines simply serve as instructions
to our potential attackers to use an agent against which the
troops are not vaccinated.

Do we plan to vaccinate servicemen against all possible
weapons agents? Against most of them? What are the criteria by
which we will decide to vaccinate our troops against particular
agents? How will we accommodate changing threat situations, given
that vaccines take weeks to months to reach full
effectiveness?

Given personnel turnover in the military, what are our plans
to keep all of our troops vaccinated?

What are the costs inherent in these mass vaccination
programs, including the costs of continually vaccinating new
recruits? (As I understand it, the costs of the anthrax
vaccination program alone are staggering.)

What are the potential health effects of multiple
vaccinations?

How do we plan to deal with the problems of vaccination
refusal and public relations, which we are already experiencing
with the anthrax vaccination program and which are sure to
multiply exponentially with additional vaccinations? When a
servicemember refuses to be vaccinated and is subsequently
discharged, what does it cost us in terms of the cost of that
servicemember’s training and his/her experience?

Do we have any plans to develop vaccines or medical
countermeasures against genetically altered forms of the various
agents, including antibiotic-resistant and vaccine-resistant
strains?

RECOMMENDATIONS

We need to revise our understanding of the biological weapons
threat in order to develop an adequate defense. Rather than
responding to specific threats, which are variable and can change
rapidly by virtue of biotechnology, we should develop measures that
are sufficiently broad-spectrum to address potential biological
threats before they exist. Although vaccination and traditional
medical countermeasures (e.g. antibiotics) are all we have to
counter the biological weapons threat at present, I believe it
would be a far better use of our resources to develop new treatment
and urgent prophylaxis methods, particularly those that are broad
spectrum in nature. Similarly, I believe our detection and
consequence management approaches should be broad-spectrum in
nature.