Meanwhile, the MCLE Board filed a complaint with the
Bar Disciplinary Counsel's Office pursuant to MCLE Rule 7.3(d).(1)
After an initial investigation by the Disciplinary Counsel's
Office, the matter was referred to the Clackamas/Linn/Marion
County Local Professional Responsibility Committee (LPRC) for
investigation. An LPRC investigator met with the accused and
told him that the PLF had no record of his having borrowed
certain CLE materials from it. The accused immediately changed
his story. He told the investigator that either he or his law
clerk had borrowed the tapes from the Willamette University
College of Law School library. The accused also told the
investigator that he had obtained the tapes in the same month
that he had listened to them and that he specifically recalled
listening to all of the tapes at the end of the reporting period,
because he did not like doing so.

The investigator attempted to verify the accused's
story by calling a librarian at Willamette. She discovered that
the library had none of the six audio tapes to which the accused
claimed to have listened. In fact, the library had never had
more than one or two CLE audio tapes in its entire collection.
In September 1996, the LPRC issued a report on its investigation,
disclosing the foregoing facts.

The Bar filed a formal complaint against the accused
in February 1997, charging him with violating DR 1-102(A)(3)
(conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or
misrepresentation) and DR 1-103(C) (requiring lawyers who are the
subject of a disciplinary investigation to respond fully and
truthfully to investigators). Before the hearing, the Bar took
the accused's deposition, at which he testified that he
personally had obtained some of the tapes from Willamette by
removing them from the shelves and signing his name on a
clipboard at the desk. He testified further that other tapes may
have been borrowed on his behalf from Willamette by his former
law clerk, Stewart.

At the disciplinary hearing, a Willamette law librarian
testified that the claimed tapes were never part of the library's
collection and that the tapes that the library did have were kept
"on reserve" and could be obtained only by request. The
librarian also testified that he and his supervisor had gone
through all of the sign-out sheets for CLE materials of any type
and did not find the accused's name listed anywhere.
Additionally, Stewart testified that she did not recall giving
the accused any CLE materials and that her own CLE records showed
that she had not listened to any CLE audio tapes at any time
during the accused's reporting period. When confronted with this
testimony, the accused continued to insist that he was entitled
to all the credits that he had claimed. However, he changed his
story again, asserting that he had attended some of the programs
-- he was not entirely sure which ones -- in person, rather than
listening to the tapes. In substance, he acknowledged that he
did not know where he had gotten the claimed audiotapes and that
he was only guessing as to when (or even whether) he may have
listened to them.

We find from the record that the foregoing historical
facts are established by clear and convincing evidence. We turn
to the question of what those facts mean, in light of the
violations charged.

We first consider the charge that the accused is guilty
of conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or
misrepresentation (DR 1-102(A)(3)). The accused asserts that the
worst that he can be accused of is keeping poor records and
relying on his memory in creating and submitting his CLE
compliance report. He continues to assert that he either
listened to all of the tapes that he said that he had listened to
or actually attended the programs at which those tapes were
generated and that the Bar cannot call him dishonest simply
because he is a poor record keeper. The accused also argues that
the focus of the complaint is misdirected, because he "cured" his
noncompliance, as he was entitled to do under the MCLE rules.
That, the accused seems to believe, should have ended the matter.
Finally, the accused argues that, inasmuch as his claims of
having listened to certain CLE tapes were incomplete on their
face (because they contained no specific dates when the CLE
activities allegedly were performed), those claims cannot
represent an intentional effort to mislead anyone.

We reject each of the foregoing arguments. As our
recitation of the historical facts shows, the proof that the
accused misrepresented his CLE activities in his report is clear.
The accused's own testimony shows that he did not believe the
accuracy of some of the details of his MCLE report, but he swore
to them nonetheless. The accused has told many different stories
concerning how he claims to have complied with the MCLE
requirements -- so many, in fact, that it is impossible to
believe any of them. All of the accused's various arguments are
designed to turn attention away from that pivotal fact. Whether
he is a good record keeper is irrelevant; he is not charged with
keeping poor records. The issue is whether the accused is
telling the truth concerning his CLE activities. We are
satisfied that he is not.

Neither is it pertinent that the accused ultimately
"cured" his MCLE deficiencies. He was required to do that in
order to keep his license to practice law.

The accused's final argument is perhaps the most
disturbing. He argues, in essence, that what he reported to the
MCLE Board was too vague to be a lie. It was not. The accused
reported that he had listened to specific CLE material during a
certain period of time. The degree of specificity that he used
may not have met the requirements of the MCLE Board, but his
report certainly alleged that specific and verifiable events had
occurred. As noted, the accused swore in the report that they
had. The evidence -- including the accused's own testimony --
shows that they had not.

We find the accused guilty of violating DR 1-102(A)(3).

We turn next to the charge that the accused violated DR
1-103(C) (failing to cooperate with the LPRC investigation). The
accused claims, without elaboration, that the LPRC witness at the
hearing "was unable to identify the titles of any of the tapes
which she was inquiring about or which were discussed. In the
context of this case her testimony is not clear and convincing
evidence that Accused was untruthful to her." That argument is
another diversion from the issue, and we reject it. The subject
of the investigation was clear: whether and when the accused had
listened to certain materials that the accused himself had
identified in his MCLE report. The accused's failure to
cooperate is equally manifest. His various false and misleading
stories hampered the investigation, as the accused had to know
that they would.

We find the accused guilty of violating DR 1-103(C).

We turn to the issue of sanction. In assessing an
appropriate sanction for violations of the disciplinary rules,
this court follows the template established in the American Bar
Association Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions (1991)
(amended 1992) (ABA Standards) and Oregon case law. See, e.g.,
In re Stauffer, 327 Or 44, 66, ___ P2d ___ (1998) (so holding and
illustrating process). Under the ABA Standards, the court
considers four factors: the duty violated, the accused's mental
state, the actual or potential injury sustained, and any
aggravating or mitigating circumstances. ABA Standard 3.0. We
address each of those factors in turn.

1. Duty violated

The accused's actions violated two separate duties that
he owed to the legal profession: the duty to deal honestly with
others, including his own professional organization, and the duty
to cooperate with a legitimate inquiry from the Bar concerning
whether he was complying with the Bar's disciplinary rules.

2. Mental state

Under the ABA Standards, an act is "intentional" if it
is done with a conscious objective or purpose to accomplish a
particular result. ABA Standards at 17. The accused acted
intentionally with respect to each of the violations in this
case. His purpose was to persuade the MCLE Board that he had
complied with MCLE requirements. Each time that he told a story
and each time that he changed it, he understood what he was
claiming.

3. Injury sustained

The accused argues that he did not intend to deceive
anyone, that he corrected his mistakes, that he did not make a
misrepresentation to any court or tribunal, and that no one was
harmed. We disagree. The MCLE Board, the Bar Disciplinary
Counsel's Office, and the LPRC all were harmed by being required
to conduct an extensive investigation that would not have been
necessary if the accused simply had told the truth at the outset.
The fact that those entities all are part of the Bar's
administrative apparatus does not make the harm less significant.
The Bar's work of administering the profession and protecting the
public with a relatively small staff depends to a significant
degree on the honesty and cooperation of the lawyers whom the Bar
regulates. Systematic dishonesty in a lawyer's dealings with the
Bar is destructive to the Bar's ability to carry out its vital
tasks.

4. Aggravating and mitigating factors

The accused asserts that there are two mitigating
factors: "restitution" (ABA Standard 9.32(d)) (in the form of
the accused's eventual compliance with the MCLE requirements) and
delay in bringing the proceedings (ABA Standard 9.32(i)). We
reject both. The accused's "restitution" was required by the
MCLE rules in order for him to be able to continue practicing
law. MCLE Rule 7.6. The accused's eventual compliance with the
MCLE requirements thus was in no sense a form of restitution. We
also find no unusual delay here, beyond that occasioned by the
accused's own tactics in changing his stories as the case
progressed.

The Bar asserts that several aggravating factors are
applicable: a dishonest or selfish motive (ABA Standard
9.22(b)); deceptive practices during the disciplinary process
(ABA Standard 9.22(f)); refusal to acknowledge the wrongful
nature of the conduct (ABA Standard 9.22(g)); and substantial
experience in the practice of law (ABA Standard 9.22(i)). The
Bar also asserts that another aggravating factor, viz., a prior
disciplinary record (ABA Standard 9.22(a)), is present, but we
decline to add that factor to the calculus. This court's earlier
decision, In re Wyllie, 326 Or 447, 952 P2d 550, on recons 326 Or
622, ___ P2d ___ (1998), was rendered by this court only after
the present case had been concluded at the trial panel level and
had been briefed to this court. That fact diminishes the
significance of that circumstance. In re Jones, 326 Or 195, 200,
951 P2d 149 (1997). We do find it to be appropriate, however, to
treat the suspension imposed in that case as the baseline to
which any suspension in the present case should be added.

A lengthy suspension is appropriate here. Indeed, ABA
Standard 5.11 indicates that disbarment generally is appropriate
when "a lawyer engages in * * * intentional conduct involving
dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation that seriously
adversely reflects on the lawyer's fitness to practice." Case
law from this court also demonstrates that this court takes a
particularly serious view of a lawyer's intentional use of known
false documentation in the lawyer's dealings with the Bar. See,
e.g., In re Morin, 319 Or 547, 878 P2d 393 (1994) (lawyer, who
defended ethics complaint by falsely claiming that he had
permitted a will to be witnessed improperly only once, when in
fact he had caused over three hundred wills to be improperly
witnessed, disbarred); In re Yacob, 318 Or 10, 860 P2d 811 (1993)
(lawyer who presented fabricated documents to the Bar in response
to an ethics complaint guilty of violating DR 1-102(A)(3) and DR
1-102(A)(4) and disbarred); In re Brown, 298 Or 285, 692 P2d 107
(1985) (lawyer prepared false affidavit for client in effort to
fend off investigation by the Bar; suspended for two years).

The accused's misconduct in this case is both less
serious and less clear-cut than was the conduct sanctioned in
Morin, Yacob, or Brown: Our unwillingness to believe any of the
accused's stories does not mean that we are satisfied, by clear
and convincing evidence, that he did not in fact listen to any of
the tapes. We have substantial doubts, but that is all.
Nevertheless, the accused's misconduct was very serious. The
accused has treated the MCLE reporting process and the LPRC
investigation cavalierly, continuing to this moment to ask, in
effect, "What's the big deal?"

Because of the seriousness of the accused's behavior,
we disagree with the trial panel's choice of a seven-month
suspension. Consistent with the ABA Standards and our case law,
we conclude that a significantly longer period of suspension is
appropriate. The accused is suspended for two years, with that
period of suspension to run consecutively to that which the
accused presently is serving as a result of this court's decision
in In re Wyllie.

The accused is suspended from the practice of law for
two years, with the period of suspension to run consecutively to
the period of suspension imposed on the accused in In re Wyllie,
326 Or 447, 952 P2d 550, on recons 326 Or 622, ___ P2d ___
(1998).