United States v. Gaudet

ORDER REGARDING TESTIMONY OF JENNY G. AND STATE COURT
JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION

GEORGE
Z. SINGAL UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.

Before
the Court are Defendant William Gaudet's Comprehensive
Motion in Limine as to the issue of the
admissibility of Jenny G.'s prior testimony (ECF No. 45)
and the Government's request to admit Defendant's
prior conviction regarding Jenny G. (ECF No.
93).[1]
For the reasons explained below, the Court DENIES
Defendant's motion to exclude Jenny G.'s testimony
and GRANTS the Government's request to admit the prior
judgment of conviction.

In the
present case, Defendant is charged with crimes involving
unlawful sexual contact with his minor daughter,
T.G.[2]
Defendant was previously tried and convicted in state court
with sexually abusing a different daughter, Jenny G., when
she was 12 and 16 years old. The Government is seeking to
admit both Jenny G.'s testimony at the state trial and
the judgment of conviction.

Testimony
of Jenny G.

As this
Court has previously indicated, Jenny G.'s testimony does
not pose any hearsay or Confrontation Clause problems because
she is deceased and she was cross-examined at the prior
judicial proceeding by counsel for Defendant. See
Fed.R.Evid. 804(b)(1). However, Defendant “continues to
object to the admission of any statement by Jenny G. pursuant
to [Federal Rules of Evidence] 413, 414, 404, or 403.”
(Def.'s Resp. to Court Order (ECF No. 94), PageID # 439.)
After careful consideration, the Court concludes that Jenny
G.'s testimony is admissible pursuant to Federal Rule of
Evidence 413.

Rule
413 provides, “In a criminal case in which a defendant
is accused of a sexual assault, the court may admit evidence
that the defendant committed any other sexual assault.”
Fed.R.Evid. 413(a). “Sexual assault” is defined
under the Rule to include any crime involving contact without
consent between any part of the defendant's body and
another person's genitals or anus, or contact without
consent between the defendant's genitals or anus and
another person's body. Fed.R.Evid. 413(d)(2)-(3). The
Court readily determines that Defendant has been accused of a
“sexual assault” in this case, namely, unlawful
contact with T.G.'s genitals. See Fed.R.Evid.
413(d)(2)-(3); see also Gov't's Proposed
Jury Instructions, Proposed Instruction #1 (ECF No. 84),
PageID # 226 (suggesting that Defendant is accused of
violating Maine law prohibiting touching the genitals of a
person under the age of 13).[3] The Court also determines that
Jenny's G.'s testimony that Defendant rubbed her
unclothed breast when she was 12, and rubbed her vagina and
rubbed his penis on her leg when she was 16, constitutes
evidence of “any other sexual assault” within the
meaning of Rule 413. See Fed.R.Evid. 413(d)(1),
(2)-(3); 18 U.S.C. § 2246(3) (defining “sexual
contact” prohibited under chapter 109A to include
“the intentional touching, either directly or through
the clothing, of the . . . breast . . . of any
person”). Therefore, Jenny G.'s testimony is
admissible, including as evidence of Defendant's
propensity to commit the charged offenses, pursuant to Rule
413.

The
Court further determines (1) pursuant to Federal Rule of
Evidence 401 that the evidence that Defendant previously
sexually abused one of his own daughters is highly relevant,
and (2) pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 403 that the
probative value of this evidence is not substantially
outweighed by a danger of unfair prejudice. See United
States v. Joubert, 778 F.3d 247, 254 (1st Cir. 2015)
(determining that the district court did not abuse its
discretion in admitting testimony that the defendant had
previously abused children other than the named victim and
noting that courts have admitted testimony about prior abuse
“where that testimony showed that the defendant sought
a similar type of sexual gratification”). For these
reasons, the Court DENIES Defendant's Motion to the
extent it seeks to exclude Jenny G.'s testimony about the
incidents of abuse by Defendant.

Judgment
of Conviction

The
Court also GRANTS the Government's request to admit
Defendant's state court judgment of conviction for
sexually abusing Jenny G. The conviction is admissible
pursuant to Rule 413 for the same reasons her testimony
regarding the incidents of abuse is admissible under that
Rule. See United States v. Majeroni, 784 F.3d 72,
75-76 (1st Cir. 2015) (noting that Rule 414's allowance
for the admission of evidence of other incidents of sexual
abuse grants the trial court discretion to admit evidence of
a prior conviction). The Court similarly determines that the
judgment of conviction is relevant and that its probative
value is not substantially outweighed by a danger of unfair
prejudice considering that the conviction can permissibly go
to Defendant's motive, intent, and propensity, among
other uses.

In
summary, the Court (1) DENIES Defendant's Motion to the
extent he seeks to exclude Jenny G.'s testimony regarding
the incidents of abuse by Defendant when she was 12 and 16
years old; and (2) GRANTS the Government's request to
admit Defendant's judgment of conviction for the offenses
against Jenny G. These rulings are made WITHOUT PREJUDICE to
Defendant renewing his objections at trial outside the
presence of the jury.

SO
ORDERED.

---------

Notes:

[1] The Court has previously ruled on
other aspects of Defendant's Motion. (ECF No. 78.) The
Government has not separately moved to admit the prior
conviction but made the request in its Supplemental Response
to Defendant's Motion in Limine. (ECF No. 93.) The Court
set a deadline for Defendant to ...

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