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Chapter 06: The Syllogistic

Fri, 09/05/2014 - 15:12 | Virginia

CHAPTER VI: THE SYLLOGISTIC

To this point, the term
"reason" has been left undefined. This is not because such a
definition is unimportant, but rather because an adequate definition of
"reason," as became apparent in the last chapter, poses many problems.
Most philosophers seem to agree on the value of reason, but here the agreement
ends. When it comes to defining "reason" they go in numerous
directions, each definition laying the foundation for a different theory of
knowledge. Following these various definitions through in their important
implications and comparing them to one another, in order to evaluate them, is
an extremely exhaustive business. To avoid this difficult procedure, it is
simpler to take the term "reason" and set certain limits on it. In
this manner, one restricted use can be examined in detail and then used as a
gauge for appraising other definitions.

If the term
"reason" is limited only to acts of the mind that involve reasons,
reasoning can then be appropriately defined as the ability to use reasons, to
search for reasons, to understand reasons, and to apply reasons. In this
definition, reasoning implies the ability to use reasons just as swimming
implies the ability to move through water. Acts of the mind which involve no
reasons would not fall under this definition.

This definition conforms, in
many ways, to commonsense. When the term "reason" is used to refer to
activities or processes which involve no reasons at all, it does violence to
the appropriateness of the word. Thinking or communicating which uses no
reasons (ASD) is not reasoning, and those who do not offer reasons for their
opinions should not consider themselves as "reasoning." The term
"reason," by this definition, is restricted to thinking and
communicating that in some manner involves "reasons."

According to this definition,
not all thinking is necessarily reasoning. Some thought processes do not
involve reasons. A good deal of confusion is eliminated if these processes are
called something other than "reasoning."

Not all thinking necessarily
involves reasons, but much thinking does. Mental activity, at certain levels,
involves multitudes of reasons employed at such a rapid rate that one is almost
unconscious of using them. A decision that can be made in a split second can,
on analysis, be shown to involve dozens of separate reasoning acts. For
example, in an impending auto accident, numerous alternatives can be weighed in
a flash and often trouble can be avoided. Many reasons were involved in the
decision as well as reflexive response. Reasoning with reasons is an important
aspect of human thought.

Reasoning, as defined, comes
naturally to people. It is so natural that it is impossible for a normal adult
NOT to reason. Reasoning is there but it is not always conspicuous. If
reasoning were painful, it would be obvious to all, but instead it is a simple,
easy, natural part of the thinking process that demands little attention and so
can easily pass unnoticed.

Reasoning is natural, but
many question whether reasoning is always adequate. An adequate reason is one
that justifies its conclusions. Not all reasons qualify as adequate. Anyone can
think up a reason but it does not mean that the reason is okay. A child might
insist he was late for dinner because he was shipwrecked on a desert island.
Since he was only gone 45 minutes, one might have genuine cause to doubt the
sufficiency of this reason, and ask what he was really doing.

The question whether reasons
are adequate or inadequate echoes the problem examined by Aristotle when he
distinguished between genuine and sham reasoning. He noted that there was a
resemblance between fair and unfair reasoning so that the sham could appear as
genuine and that the ignorant could thereby easily be deceived. He then made it
his business to discover rules and laws that would distinguish sound from
unsound reasoning. In the process of doing this he became the first logician,
(He did not use the term "logic. Rather he called it
"analytics"). Logic is the science which attempts to discover the rules
which distinguish adequate reasons from inadequate reasons. Any attempt to
learn the difference is, by definition, a study of logic.

However, if logic is to
distinguish sufficient from insufficient reasons there must be some way to
detect and define "reasons" and here Aristotle made his real
discovery. He found that, in the last analysis, reasons provide middle terms of
syllogisms and the ability to reason (ASD) is nothing more than the ability to
syllogize. This can be proven to be so because whenever a "reason" is
explicitly given, for a particular conclusion, a syllogism can always be found.
It is not always a valid syllogism, but then reasons are not always sufficient.

The middle term of a
syllogism provides the answer to the question: "Why?" When someone
asks "Why?" and is answered, "Because…", he is being
supplied with a reason, or a middle term of a syllogism. The middle term makes
it possible to understand the principle that guide the conclusion or justifies
the action intended. To ask "Why?" is to ask for the reason.

A cause is also a middle term
or reason. Those who seek causes are actually using syllogisms backwards. They
already have the conclusion, and if the middle term (or cause) can be
discovered, there is enough information to form a syllogism and thus discover
the general principle which governs the conclusion. This principle can then be
used to deduce further conclusions and predict future events. Where there is no
middle term, there is no cause.

The value of the syllogism is
that it shows, in a stylized form, the manner in which people reason. From two
propositions, which are known independently of each other, it is possible, if
they have a common middle term, to reach a new proposition that was previously
unknown. The syllogism provides us with a method of moving from the known to
something new. In this manner, humans develop knowledge.

Examining the reasoning
process aids in understanding the nature of reason.

Syllogisms come in different
figures, moods, and kinds. The variations and inter-relations of these
syllogisms become continuously more complex as the subject is pursued. Logic,
in this respect, is much like mathematics. Some even maintain that mathematics
is a branch of logic. Whether or not such a connection is established, there is
still an analogical relation. Both sciences seem to offer limitless
possibilities for professionals and yet, in both sciences, the elementary
aspects are also important and useful to the average person. In mathematics,
addition, subtraction, multiplication, and division are needed for business
management. In logic, sound rules of reasoning are needed for the management of
everyday living. It is not necessary to go into the vast complications of
syllogistics logic in order to learn to reason more validly any more than it is
necessary to become adept in Calculus to balance a checkbook.

There is one important
difference between math and logic which creates enormous difficulties for
anyone writing about logic or about syllogistic thinking. Math is taught to everyone,
beginning in the first grade. In writing about mathematics, it can be assumed
that educated adults are familiar with and consent to basic mathematical
terminology and fundamental principles. In logic, none of these assumptions is
possible.

In logic, almost the opposite
is true. In writing for educated adults, one can assume that there is no basic
terminology that solicits common consent and that there is radical disagreement
about fundamental principles. This means that although educated people, because
they are educated, are involved with some of the more advanced logical
problems, these problems cannot be intelligently discussed until those involved
first agree upon some elementary terminology and assent to some basic
principles.

The first step in developing
profitable knowledge about syllogistic logic is to learn to recognize
syllogisms. Little that is relevant about syllogistic logic can be said until
people learn to detect the legions of syllogisms that cram the mind.

Although syllogizing comes
naturally, recognizing the process must be learned, and to do this, one must
take syllogisms one at a time. It should be emphasized, however, that each
syllogism is only one in many and when we use syllogisms in our reasoning we
use them in sets and multiples of sets.

In learning to recognize
syllogisms, it helps to distinguish practical syllogisms from theoretical
syllogisms. For example:

THEORETICAL SYLLOGISM

Major Premise: Rattlesnakes are
poisonous snakes.

Minor Premise: Poisonous
snakes are to be carefully avoided.

Conclusion :Rattlesnakes are
to be carefully avoided

PRACTICAL
SYLLOGISM

Major Premise: Rattlesnakes
are to be carefully avoided.

Minor Premise: This snake in
my garden is a rattlesnake.

Conclusion: This snake in my
garden is to be carefully avoided.

In many ways the practical
and theoretical syllogisms are alike. Both have a major premise, minor premise,
and a conclusion. Both have three terms, each term being used twice which means
that both have a common subject, a common predicate, and a common middle term.
In both, the basic rules of validity are, for most purposes, the same. Because
of these similarities, many textbooks make no particular effort to distinguish
the two. From a real-world point of view this is a mistake because it is through
differentiating the practical from the theoretical syllogism that the values
and use of syllogistic logic becomes apparent. It also helps in recognizing syllogisms
in action.

The distinction between the
theoretical and practical syllogism lies in the minor premise. In both cases,
the major premise is a generality. In the theoretical syllogism, the minor
premise and conclusions are also generalities. In the practical syllogism, the
minor premise is a fact and the conclusion is also a fact.

In theoretical reasoning,
generalities containing common middle terms are related to each other in such a
manner as to obtain new generalities. In the example given, the two premises
are two separate bits of knowledge. One might know that all poisonous snakes
should be avoided without being aware that rattlers are poisonous. On being
informed that rattlesnakes are poisonous, a middle term is supplied and the
deduction is quickly made that rattlesnakes should be carefully avoided.

In practical reasoning, a
generality is related to a specific object. In the example, the generality just
given, the generality deduced theoretically is applied to a specific object,
i.e., to the snake in my garden. Here again, two bits of knowledge, known
independently, are related by means of a middle term to reach a conclusion.
This conclusion, however, is practical rather than theoretical. It applies to a
specific snake in a specific garden at a specific time and it warns me, a
specific person, to be careful.

From theoretical reasoning, new
principles and generalities can be deduced from previously formed generalities,
and consistencies and inconsistencies can be detected. From practical
reasoning, principles can be applied to specific objects and events, and
generalities can be tested for soundness. Both the practical and theoretical
work together in the reasoning process. Through one, speculation and new
knowledge are possible. Through the other, generalities are applied and tested.
Theoretical and practical reasoning complement each other. Any attempt to limit
reasoning to one or the other distorts an understanding of syllogistic
thinking.

The above two example were
expanded into full syllogistic form to make the middle term more recognizable.
In everyday thinking, syllogisms are usually condensed into what logicians call
enthymemes, and would be stated this way:

Theoretical Syllogism condensed:

1.
Rattlesnakes are to be carefully avoided because they are poisonous.

Practical Syllogism condensed:

2. This snake in my garden is
to be carefully avoided because it is a rattlesnake.

In learning to recognize
syllogisms in ordinary language, it is necessary to be able to identify enthymemes,
because this is the way syllogisms usually occur. The presence of
"because," "for," "therefore," "hence,"
"since," and "if" are the most obvious indications of
enthymemes. There are also more subtle ways of condensing syllogisms. Sometimes
there is no indicator at all, but the reasoning is obvious for the context. For
example, in the World Book Encyclopedia article on rattlesnakes, it is stated:

"The larger rattlers
rank among the most dangerous of snakes. They should be carefully
avoided."

This is an enthymeme which
could be stated with the reason more clearly indicated, without changing the
meaning:

"Larger rattlers should
be carefully avoided because they rank among the most dangerous of
snakes."

This enthymeme can be
expanded into a theoretical syllogism roughly equivalent to the example given
previously.

Major Premise: All snakes
that rank among the most dangerous of snakes should be avoided.

Minor Premise: Larger
rattlers rank among the most dangerous of snakes.

Conclusion: Larger rattlers
should be avoided.

These are different ways of
saying the same thing. To expand all our reasoning out in full syllogistic form
would be time consuming, tiresome, and stilted. However, it is of great
advantage to know how to do so, as will be explained in more detail later,
because, by expanding syllogisms, inconsistencies and unexpected assumptions can
be discovered.

The above examples are simple
and obvious. Once these simpler reasonings become familiar, more refined
reasoning can be analyzed the same way. Sometimes interesting emphasis can be
discovered which could have otherwise passed unnoticed. For example, Alexander
Hamilton says,

"The Constitution is the
solemn compact between the society at large and each individual. The society,
therefore, cannot without breach of faith and injustice refuse to any
individual a single advantage which he derives under that compact…"(+2)

There is more than one
syllogism here. The main one can be expanded in this manner:

Major Premise:
Breaking solemn contacts is unjust.

Minor Premise:
Refusing any individual rights which he derives under the Constitution is the
breaking of a solemn contract.

Conclusion: Refusing
any individual rights which he derives under the Constitution is unjust.

By expanding the syllogism in
this manner, Hamilton's argument becomes more clear and can be examined more
objectively. He used this argument to defend the right of ex-Tories who were,
in several instances, being deprived of due process of law. Even though he disapproved
of much change, he defended their rights as citizens once the treaty had been
ratified, because to do otherwise would violate the Constitution and would
therefore be unjust. In this manner he took the conclusion of the theoretical
syllogism above as the major premise of a practical syllogism and proceeded to
put his theory into practice.

Major Premise:
Refusing any individual rights which he derives under the Constitution is unjust.

Minor Premise:
Depriving Waddington of due process of law is refusing an individual rights
which he derives under the Constitution.

Conclusion: Depriving
Wadding of due process of law is unjust.

Following the above
reasoning, Hamilton risked his political future and took on the unpopular task
of defending Waddington in the suit under the Trespass Act brought by the widow
Rutgers. Here is an example of theoretical and practical reasoning in a genuine
historical situation. Hamilton both theorizes and puts his theory into
practice. Although, to perform this reasoning, it was not necessary for
Hamilton to expand it into a full syllogistic form or even to know that it
could be so expanded, he did, in fact, reason syllogistically and through his
reasoning was able to put theory into practice.

Many critics say syllogistic
logic is too abstract. Those who hold these objections maintain that the
syllogism separates thought from action and knowledge from reality. Exactly the
opposite is true. It is through syllogisms that abstractions are applied to
practical actions and human knowledge is integrated with reality. It is through
being able to identify theoretical and practical syllogisms that this integration
becomes noticeable.

In the practical syllogism,
the major premise is a principle, or generality of some kind. The minor premise
is a fact. The syllogism unites the principle and fact, through a middle term,
to reach a conclusion that is a fact or specific course of action. In expanding
practical syllogisms, it is more enlightening to use the terms
"principle" and "fact" than it is to use the terms
"major" and "minor" premise.

Down to earth terminology
makes it easier to recognize syllogisms in applying our own thoughts to our own
actions, e.g.:

Principle: Always
drive on the right side of the road.

Fact: This
is the right side of the road.

Conclusion: I
shall drive on this side of the road.

Principle: Always
stop at a red light.

Fact: This
is a red light.

Conclusion: I
shall stop at this red light.

Principle: Always
signal your intention before turning.

Fact: I am
getting ready to turn.

Conclusion: I
shall signal my intention.

Everyone who is driving a car
uses practical syllogisms all the time. Each action that is guided by a
principle is a syllogistic act and drivers follow hundred of these principles
every time they get behind the wheel.

In the above examples, one is
usually aware of the principle, but the fact is so obvious that it is easy to
discount its importance. However, if the fact cannot be determined, the
conclusion cannot follow. If you cannot tell the right side from the left side,
you cannot choose to drive on the right side even though you might wish to
follow the principle of "always drive on the right side." It is the
same with the red light. If you have no way of telling whether the light is red
or not, the principle is of little value. It does little good to know that the
speed limit is 60 miles per hour (principle) if your speedometer (minor
premise) is broken. The road sign tells the speed limit. The speedometer tells
the actual speed you are going. These are your two premises. It is your
decision whether you stay within the speed limit or decide to break it. It is because
you can syllogize that you are responsible for the conclusion that you reach.
To study what would happen if people were unable to formulate the syllogism just
given is one method of examining how important practical syllogisms actually
are. It is through syllogisms that deliberate thought is translated into
deliberate action and it is a serious mistake to reject a study of syllogistic
logic on the grounds that it is abstract, useless and impractical.

Each profession has guiding
principles that are put into effect through a syllogistic act. The medical
profession is a good example.

Principle: Always
check to see if a person is allergic to penicillin before giving a penicillin
shot.

Fact: I need
to give THIS PERSON a penicillin shot

Conclusion: I
will first check to see if this person is allergic to penicillin

Principle: Never
give penicillin to a person who is allergic to it

Fact: This
person is allergic to penicillin.

Conclusion: I
shall not give this person penicillin.

Learning any profession means
learning a special set of rules and skills. It means also learning to relate
all of the information into a hierarchy of knowledge so that it is known when
to do what and how much of it to do. This is the syllogistic process in action.

Those who insist that
syllogisms are too abstract to be practical simply do not know how to recognize
syllogisms. Syllogisms are the essence of practicality. In order to be
practical, one must use syllogisms, because through syllogisms one puts
knowledge into practice. By examining the syllogistic form the importance of
BOTH principle and fact becomes clear. BOTH premises are equally important to
the conclusion. The recipe may call for two cups of flour (major premise), but
if the cook is unable to distinguish flour from salt (minor premise), the
conclusion could be most unappetizing. The fact and the principle are distinct
from each other but depend on each other for the conclusion. Through the
syllogism abstractions are applied to events and theoretical knowledge is put
into practice.

Sometimes it is argued that
syllogisms are mere tautologies, i.e., they do not bring new knowledge, but
simply go round and round in circles with what is already known. There is a
sense in which this criticism has some validity because Truth is presented in
an "as if" absolute. In this absolute sense, perhaps it can be argued
that all knowledge is tautological. However. In the physical world in which we
limited humans live, syllogisms do bring new knowledge to those who are finite.
It is for finite humans that reasoning is of value.

For example, say that
"J" bought a ticket number 4568 for a new car at a raffle. A few days
later, his friend "K" heard over the radio that number 4568 was the
winning number. You have here a syllogism:

Major Premise:
Ticket 4568 is the winning number.

Minor Premise:
"J" has ticket 4568

Therefore: "J"
has the winning number.

This major and minor premise
are two pieces of information that taken together means that "J" wins
the car, but separately neither piece of information is of great value.
"K" may know that 4568 is the winning number and "J" may
know that he has ticket 4568. Unless they pool their knowledge, there is no
middle term and there is no conclusion. If one should mention to the other, a
middle term is supplied and a conclusion -- new to them -- suddenly occurs. The
conclusion is definitely new to the people involved although the absolute sense
it is not new knowledge to one who possesses absolute knowledge.

If we were born with absolute
knowledge, there would be no need to reason. It is due to our finite condition
that reasoning can advance knowledge and provide new information. To reject the
understanding of "reason" that can be gained through studying
syllogisms because in an <u>absolute sense</u> reasoning right
prove to have a tautological character is foolish for finite beings, the very
ones who benefit from reasoning.

Another common objection to
study of the syllogism comes from people who maintain that the syllogism is an
artificial construction and is not used in actual thinking. This has already,
to some extent, been refuted. Syllogisms exist whether they are expanded in
full form or not. Expanding a syllogism does not create the syllogism. It is
just a means of recognizing it. Syllogism is not a rare case that crops up once
or twice in a lifetime. The mind is syllogising all the time and the examples
are so profuse that it is difficult to decide which ones to choose best
illustrate the profusion.

At all levels of living,
people syllogize. Consider shopping. Shopping is a learned skill* and requires
much deduction:

Principle: Each
pound of apples in the store at this time costs 30 cents.

Fact: I wish
to buy this pound of apples in this store at this time

Conclusion: I
must pay 30 cents.

Principle: Always
buy oranges with bumpy skins.

Fact: This
orange has a bumpy skin.

Conclusion: I
will buy this orange.

Principle: Always
buy bandaids when the supply is low.

Fact: My
supply of bandaids is low.

Conclusion: I
shall buy bandaids.

Principle: Always
buy tennis shoes at XXXX.

Fact: I wish
to buy tennis shoes.

Conclusion: I
will go to XXXX.

These examples skip a few
steps, but close examination will show the necessary middle terms intact.
Without the middle term, it would be impossible to shop. We would not know what
we needed or have any criterion for choosing one thing over another.

Most work involves the
applying of previously learned principles to fresh events (facts). Working out
principles that apply to the job at hand is part of learning that job. The
skills developed will be in proportion to one's ability to apply the reasoning
involved. Skill is reason put to work.

Principle: Leave
the house at 7:30 AM.

Fact: It is
7:30 AM.

Conclusion: It
is time to leave.

Principle: Answer
the phone when it rings.

Fact: The
phone is ringing.

Conclusion: I
will answer the phone.

Principle: Send
Statements Out on Friday.

Fact: It is
Friday.

Conclusion: I
will send statements out.

Principle: The
customer is always right.

Fact: This
is a customer.

Conclusion: He
is right.

Principle: Coffee
Break is at 10:15 AM.

Fact: It is
10:15 AM.

Conclusion: It
is time for coffee break.

The number of examples that
could be given are endless. Every rule or guide, no matter how insignificant it
might seem, requires a syllogism before it can be intelligently applied.

The syllogism is used
copiously in actually thinking, but it is usually condenses, as mentioned
before, to an enthymeme. It is in this reduced, contracted form that one must
learn to recognize syllogisms in conversation, discourse, and practical action.
Once the syllogism is spotted, it can be expanded into full syllogistic form.
The explicit and exact expanding of an enthymeme requires more knowledge of
logic than has been presented to this point, but each enthymeme can be expanded
and, rather than distorting the meaning, such expansion, if properly conducted,
can be used to clarify understanding of the reasoning involved.

Arguing whether reasoning is
or is not syllogistic is a moot question. All reasoning, that involves reason,
is by its nature syllogistic. Whenever a reason is given for a conclusion, an
enthymeme is automatically formulated which can be expanded, if desired, to a
full syllogism.

The advantage of the
syllogistic discovery is that syllogisms demonstrate, in a simple manner, the
structures of reasoning, thus making it possible to discern from individual,
virtually self-evident examples, how the reasoning process works.

Such an examination, if
pursued, leads naturally to the next step, because, on experimenting with the
syllogistic form, it becomes apparent that some arrangements of the syllogism
differ drastically from others. Some are consistently valid and others are
consistently invalid. For example:

Example 1

All dogs are animals.

Lassie is a dog;

Therefore, Lassie is an animal.

Example 2

Some dogs are male.

Lassie is a dog.

Therefore, Lassie is male.

A person does not need to
study logic to know that syllogism 1 is valid and syllogism 2 is invalid. Both
syllogisms have a middle term, that is a "reason" is presented. However,
one conclusion is justified and the other is not. This leads normally to the
decision that some reasoning is adequate and some is inadequate.

At this point a distinction
is drawn between "right" and "wrong" reasoning. A
syllogistic study becomes a rational ethic.

If there is a "right
way" that leads to sound reasoning versus a "wrong way" that
leads to "sham" reasoning, then a responsibility arises. Right
reasoning should be pursued as the way to truth and wrong reasoning should be avoided
as foul fighting. This leads to the third step which is an attempt to discover
rules that distinguish adequate reasoning from inadequate. These rules become a
normative logic. They specify what a responsible reasoner should and should not
do.

Normative rules discovered in
this manner can be conveniently classified in four categories*: The first
category is symbolism. The syllogistic relation does not exist between words or
between emotions and images triggered by the word, but between meanings and the
words. The words themselves are only symbols of the meaning. A distinction
needs to be drawn between words, image-emotion response, and meaning; if words
are to symbolize a genuine syllogistic relation, rather than merely to trigger
a reflex.

The second category is
closely related to the first and involves the problem of equivocation. Each of
the three terms in the categorical syllogism is used twice. For the syllogism
to be valid, the meanings must be used unequivocally. Changing meanings in the
middle of a reasoning process can destroy the validity of the conclusion. Some
method of definition, or coming to terms, is needed to avoid equivocation.

The third category is the
form. If the formal conditions of relating the terms are violated, the
syllogism is automatically invalid. Over-generalization and arguing beside the
point are invalid forms and conclusions reached by this method are unjustified.

The fourth category is
"Truth." If a syllogism is to be sound and reasoning useful, the
truth value of the premises needs to be known. One cannot expect true
conclusions from false premises.

From these four categories,
the four basic rules of right reason listed at the end of Chapter Three can be
drawn:

Arguing beside the point is
wrong;</li>

Equivocation is
wrong;</li>

Overgeneralization is
wrong;</li>

Lying is wrong.</li></ul>

These rules are the four
basic rules of syllogistic logic. Each rule will be examined in more detail in
later chapters.

The above explanation of
reason, the middle term, the syllogism, and the basic rules of right reason is
one interpretation of "syllogistic logic." In the following chapters,
this interpretation of logic defined as common-sense syllogistic logic.
"Reason," defined as the ability to syllogize by means of a middle
term, will be referred to as the common sense understanding of reason.

It must be emphasized that,
in the history of Western Philosophy, the above "common sense"
rendition of syllogistic logic is ONLY ONE INTERPRETATION AMONG MANY and the
above syllogistic definition of reason is ONLY ONE VERSION among numerous theories
of rationality and causality that have been presented to mankind over the
centuries. Just as there have been different, even diametrically opposed,
versions of the term "dialectic," so, too, have there been different,
even opposed definitions of "reason" and uses of the term
"syllogistic."

To examine and to do justice
to all of the various theories of rational thought that have been influential
in the forming of the world as it is today would require many volumes. The
following comments and examples are given only for the purpose of demonstrating
that there have been different theories and that the difference involved have
been significant.

Aristotle, as has been mentioned,
is usually credited as being the first philosopher to discover the
"syllogism", and as such he is usually called the Father of Formal
Logic. He defines "reasoning" and "syllogizing" in almost
identical terms; eg.:

"Now reasoning is an argument in which
certain things being laid down, something other finds these necessarily coming
about through them."

"A syllogism is discourse in which,
certain things being stated, something other than that what is stated follows
of necessity from there being so."

He further makes a
distinction between genuine and sham reasoning, and in one way or another,
asserts as necessary to sound reasoning each of four basic rules of common
sense and fair play as previously defined. To this point his logic can be
equated with the common sense syllogistic logic as defined above. However,
Aristotle did not consistently apply this definition or always use the basic
rules he himself stated. He was a child of his time, as we all are, and he
mixed many metaphysical misconceptions of his day with the basic logical rules
in such a manner that it is difficult to separate one from the other. Many of
his definitions are inappropriate and lead to hopeless confusion if
consistently applied to philosophical problems. From the vantage of two thousand
years of progress, it is possible to look back on those mistakes and wonder how
people failed to notice them, but such has been the story of human development.
The fallacies of the past are always easier to detect than the illusions of the
present. What is important to recognize now is that Aristotelian logic is a
collection of both monumental discoveries and monumental mistakes. As it
stands, it can neither be totally accepted nor totally rejected.

So many inconsistencies can
be found in Aristotle's writings that a judicious selection of his statements
could yield opposed logical theories, one supporting what the other rejected.
If so interpreted, the very first anti-Aristotelian logician would have been
Aristotle himself.

Some early writers did not
appreciate the extent of the inconsistencies within Aristotle's theories and
attempted to preserve as sacrosanct everything he said. Others were aware that
the Organon needed revision and began
the task of reconstructing logic along versions of their own. This reformation
was needed if logic was to progress as a science, but, in the early
intellectual climate, more heat than light was often generated, and many
attempts to refine logic were less, rather than more, enlightened.

As a result, early
Dialecticians had no uniform "syllogistic logic" to guide their
dialogs. Those who had copies of Aristotle emphasized what seemed to them
important at the moment. Others learned by word of mouth. Much of the material
discussed under the heading of "logic" would not be considered
"logic" at all according to the commonsense approach. Each teacher,
each school had its own interpretations, and the fact that the course might
have had the same title did not mean that the same subject was being taught.

Material used for teaching
"logic" in the past centuries is now, for the most part, extinct. To
gather some of the older meanings of syllogistic logic, one has to try and work
it out from passing comments of philosophers whose works have been preserved.
Most comments along this line reveal enormous misconceptions about syllogistic
logic from the "commonsense" point of view. The middle term, the
relation of reason to syllogizing, and the elementary rule of fair play were in
many instances either ignored or curiously distorted.

Each philosopher's stance in
this matter is different, holds its own significance, and needs to be examined
in and for itself. At the risk of distorting some of the finer things
philosophers were trying to say about reason in general, a few quotes will be given
to show some of the strange ideas of reason, logic, and the syllogism that have
been more or less assumed traditionally.

Martin Luther, born in 1483,
almost 500 years ago, had little regard for rationality in any form. He said
Reason is "the devil's greatest whore," [5] "…it is the devil's
handmaid and does nothing but blaspheme and dishonor all that God says or
does." [6] Luther had little patience with scholastic science or
Aristotelian logic. He called Aristotle an "…urchin who must be put in a
pig-sty or donkey's stable." [7]

In about the same historical
period and riding the tide of anti-scholasticism of the time, Peter Ramus, born
in 1515 in Picardy, gained celebrity by defending the daring thesis - -
"Everything that Aristotle taught is false." [8] He began publishing
logic texts of his own, producing over 59 distinct works. His
"anti-Aristotelian logic" became quite popular, particularly in the
Scottish universities, and some evidence exists to indicate that Milton's works
were influenced by Ramus' method.

A few years later, 1561, Sir
Francis Bacon, the philosopher whose "name has become a symbol of the
inductive method in science," was born in London. He believed that the
logic being taught at the time was of little value. He said:

"The logic now in use serves rather to fix and give stability to the
errors which have their foundation in commonly received notions that to help
the search after truth. So it does more harm than good."

Rene Descartes, a Frenchman
born in 1596, and known in mathematics as the inventor of analytic geometry, is
often referred to as the "Father of Modern Philosophy." He published
21 rules of reason, but specifically rejected the "rules" of
"percepts" as he called them, of the syllogism. He said,

"It may perhaps strike some with surprise that here, where we are
discussing how to improve our power of deducing one truth from another, we have
omitted all the precepts of the dialecticians, by which thy think to control
the human reason…as we wish to be particularly careful lest our reason go on
holiday while we are examining the truth of any matter, we reject those
formulae as being opposed to our project, …

"But, to say a few words more, that it may appear still more evident
that this style of argument contributes nothing at all to the discovery of the
truth, we must note that the Dialecticians are unable to devise any syllogism
which has a true conclusion, unless they have first secured the material out of
which to construct it, i.e., unless they have already ascertained they very
truth which is deduced in that syllogism. Whence it is clear that from a
formula of this kind they can gather nothing that is new, and hence the
ordinary Dialectic is quite valueless for those who desire to investigate the
truth of things. Its only possible use is to serve to explain at times more
easily to others the truths we have already ascertained; hence, it should be
transferred from philosophy to Rhetoric."

John Locke, the English
philosopher of "common sense" and the philosopher often referred to
here as the Father of the American Revolution, was born in 1632. He agreed with
Descartes that the syllogism was of little value. What he had to say will be
quoted at length because he so well expresses the prejudice against syllogistic
logic that is still prevalent today, over three hundred years later:

There is one thing more which I shall desire to be
considered concerning reason, and that is whether syllogism, as is generally
thought, is the proper instrument of it and use the fullest way of exercising this
faculty. The causes I have to doubt are these:

First, because syllogism serves our reason but in one
only of the fore-mentioned parts of it, and that is to show the connexion of
the proofs in any one instance, and no more; but in this it is of no great use,
since the mind can perceive such a connexion where it really is as easily, nay,
perhaps better, without it.

If we will observe the actings of our own minds, we
shall find that we reason best and clearest when we only observe the connexion
of the proof, without reducing our thoughts to any rule of syllogism. And
therefore we may take notice that there are many men, that reason exceedingly
clear and rightly, who now not how to make a a syllogism. He that will look
into many parts of Asia and America will find men reason there perhaps as
acutely as himself, who yet never heard of syllogism nor can reduce any one
argument to those forms; and I believe scarce anyone every makes syllogisms in
reasoning within himself. Indeed syllogism is made use of on occasion to
discover a fallacy hid in a rhetorical flourish or cunningly wrapped up in a
smooth period and stripping and absurdity of the cover of wit and good
language, show it in its naked deformity. But the weakness of fallacy of such a
loose discourse it shows, by the artificial fort

[…]

David Hume, born in 1711,
seven years after Locke died, is usually classified with Locke and George
Berkley as the famous trio of British Empiricists. In his experimental method
of reasoning, Hume specifically denied the value of a middle term in reasoning.
He said,

"We can thus form a proposition, which contains only one idea, so we may
exert our reason without employing more than two ideas, and without having
recourse to a third to serve as a medium betwixt them. We infer a cause
immediately from its effect; and this inference is not only a true species of
reasoning, but the strongest of all others, and more convincing that when we
interpose another idea to connect the two extremes."

These readings reveal that
either the writers did not understand syllogistic logic from the common sense
point of view (ASD) or else they were taught a decadent rendition of logic in
their schools. The men just quoted are rated as some of the most intelligent
men of their age. One can assume that if they had been taught the important
basics of common sense syllogistic logic in a clear manner with proper emphasis
on each of the basic syllogistic rules that they would never have developed the
misconceptions displayed in the above quotes. If Luther had been taught that a
"reason" is a middle term of a syllogism and then shown by means of
the practical syllogism how the precepts of Christ are thus put into action, he
would never have defame "reason" as he did. The split between
"faith" and "reason" that caused so much agony among
Christians in the following centuries would never have become so serious.

If Peter Ramus had been more
careful about testing the truth of his premises, he would not have called his
logic "anti-Aristotelian." His contribution to logic was to take many
of the Aristotelian precepts and state them more clearly. His method was based
on clear concepts, sound judgments, valid inference, and conclusive proof. It
is indicative of the temper of the time that he could call such an approach to
logic "anti-Aristotelian" and claim that "everything Aristotle
said was wrong." Many of the points that Ramus identifies as
"anti-Aristotelian" are exactly the same points rejected by present
day "anti-Aristotelians."

If "logic," as
taught to Sir Francis Baco, was used to "fix and give stability to errors" rather than to help the
search after truth, then he was right in concluding that it did more harm than
good. However, this does not in any manner prove that the type of
"logic" taught to him in the school he attended was common sense
syllogistic logic as previously defined in this chapter. One is left wondering
rather, what kind of "logic" he was taught that actually hindered the
search

How was the subject taught.

The quotation from Rene Descarte
is even more curious than the logic of Peter Ramus. Descartes said that in
improving the power of deducing one truth from another, he motted all the
precepts of the dialecticians. He does not say what those "precepts"
were so one cannot test what would happen to deduction if they actually were
omitted, but from his statement where he "deduced one truth from
another" reveals that he does not understand the basic syllogistic
structure where two truths (two premises) are required for a deduction.

Furthermore, Descartes
obviously did not, in his educational background, have sufficient knowledge of
syllogistic reasoning to recognize how a syllogism does bring new knowledge.
Whether this was a fault of the Dialecticians of his time who failed to demonstrate
how to recognize and use syllogism or the fault orf Descartes who failed to
understand how syllogisms actually work, would be difficult to discover at this
late date. However, it is clear that Descartes' misconception of the value of
the syllogism has had much to do with the neglect of syllogistic logic in the
centuries that followed.

The strangest story of all is
that of John Locke. He is perhaps o all the popular philosophers the best
defender of the four basic rules of syllogistic logic and common sense. He
advocated clear ideas, he abhorred equivocation, he insisted on sound
reasoning, and he was concerned with the truth of the judgments on which that
reasoning was based. How did he ever get such a queer understanding of the
syllogism? This must be one of the greatest mysteries of philosophy. His
misconceptions of syllogistic logic are so blatant that one is at a loss to
know how to explain them. Aristotle never maintained that one had to know he
was using a syllogism in order to syllogize any more than a nutritionist
insists that a person must know the formula for vitamin C in order to avoid
scurvy. People who have never heard the term "syllogism" syllogize
all the time and are able, in many respects, to distinguish sufficient from
insufficient reasoning. If a study of "logic" does not enhance this
ability then something is wrong with the method of teaching, not with the
syllogism.

David Hume seems to put the
lid on all the above misunderstandings of syllogistic logic when he tries to
eliminate the middle term altogether. The comment of his, quoted above, is only
a footnote [13], and yet this is the key to understanding his philosophy. He
was attempting to build a philosophy of "reason" without a middle
term or "reason." Because people of those days were so confused on
the relation between syllogizing and reasoning they could not spot the exact
trouble, but they knew that David Hume was doing something unsettling. If the
logicians of that day had been more aware that a "reason" is the
middle term of a syllogism, they would have known better how to answer David
Hume, and the history of philosophy would have been much different.

With this background, it is
not surprising to find that by the time Hegel became interested in philosophy,
he had decide that "logic" needed reconstructing. The condition of
"logic" at his time was deplorable. He had two alternatives: One, he
could have turned to the basic "common sense logic" (ASD) that was
inherent in Arsitotle's Organon and
extracted it in a more clear form, or he could do what he actually did, and
that wad to continue the tradition, now well established, of rejecting
syllogistic logic and "Aristotle," only this time to do a thorough
job. Hegel chose the second course. He was like his predecessors in that he
said he rejected Aristotle. He was different from those before him in that he
actually did build a "logic" that genuinely rejected the basic
Aristotelian precepts of common sense and fair play.

Following the impact of
Hegel's radical reconstruction of "logic," the history syllogistic
logic (ASD) has been wondrous strange. On the one hand, the impact of the
scientific method established habits of thinking and methods of research that
are definitely syllogistic common sense (ASD). On the other hand, a recognition
of the relation between syllogistic logic and scientific method became buried
under and avalanche of metaphysical muck. The clear and distinct common sense
idea of reason, envisioned for a glorious moment by the Founding Fathers,
failed to find the philosophical justification needed to bring their idea into
the visible spectrum as a definite philosophy of reason.

The history of syllogistic
logic after Hegel's dialectical reconstruction became more confusing, not less.
Few books, specifically on syllogistic logic, have been written in the United
States. One of them, titled THE SYLLOGISTIC PHILOSOPHY, was published by
Francis Ellingwood Abbot in 1906. His object was to establish a scientific
philosophy and he sacrificed everything to promote his faith in science. He
felt he had built a philosophy superior to Kant or Hegel because it was free of
from idealistic suppositions, so he said. He is one example of a
"syllogistic philosopher," but, by "syllogistic
philosophy," Abbot meant that human knowledge is based on the
"threefold Reality of Universals as its Constituent Molecules: 1.
Objective Reality in the Real Genus, or Universal of the First Power; 2.
Subjective Reality in the Ideal Concept, or Universal of the Second Power; and
3. Objective-Subjective Reality in the Real-Ideal World, or Universal of the
Third Power."14

Abbot's definition of
"syllogistic philosophy" is clearly different from the common sense
definition of syllogistic philosophy formerly established in this chapter.
Although the word used is the same, the meaning is drastically different. When
theorists indignantly reject "syllogistic philosophy" it is important
to know exactly which syllogistic philosophy they have in mind. A rejection of
Abbot's "syllogistic philosophy" would be a different thing than a
rejection of the "common sense syllogistic" (ASD).

In 1917, James Edwin
Creighton, sage professor of Logic and Metaphysics in Cornell University,
published an Introductory Logic. He defines logic as, "…the science of
thought, or as the science which investigates the process of thinking."15
Logic, he says, "…is the science which treats of the operations of the
human mind in its search for truth."16 Although his logic would probably
be described as "syllogistic" by present day standards because the
bulk of his work is devoted to the syllogistic form and the syllogistic rules,
ye he does not recognize these syllogistic rules as a guide to right thinking.
He says that "…it is the business of logic to show us the organic
structure of thought."17 Consequently, he insists that "…logic can
not be regarded as an art, in the sense that it furnishes a definite ser of
rules for thinking correctly."18 "…Logic, it seems to me, cannot be
regarded as an art like photography or even like medicine; for it is not
possible to lay down definite rules for the guidance of thinking in every
case."19 He says on the other hand a few pages later, "The business
of logic, as we have seen, is to discover the laws of thought and to show the
differences which exist between real and imaginary knowledge."20

Creighton, although a
professor of logic, seems apologetic about his role. In one breath he lays down
the "laws of thought" and "rules of the syllogism" and in
another he seems to be saying that it is perfectly all right to violate those
laws and still reason correctly. He does not seem to appreciate the
contradiction in what he is saying, and does not sufficiently elaborate the
point. Is he saying that lying is acceptable to correct reasoning? One can
equivocate, argue beside the point, and over-generalize and still be thinking
correctly in some cases because thought is organic in structure? If it is all
right to do this in some cases, how does one know it is all right for one to
lie or when one should tell the truth? These are the questions that are
Important and yet they are by-passed as if they were not even there.

Other logicians have
attempted to avoid the difficulties Creighton encountered by limiting the
definition of logic to questions concerning only the form. Most modern logicians
follow this plan. Cohen and Nagel, recognized as the foremost authorities on
formal logic, put it this way.

"Logic has sometimes been defined as the normative science which studies
the norms distinguishing sound thinking from unsound thinking. The reader is
prepared now to appraise such a definition, and consequently to regard such a
characterization as inadequate…Because traditional logic has stressed this side
of logical forms, it has failed to consider such forms with sufficient
generality and has neglected to undertake a study of all possible formal
structures." [21]

Logic is the autonomous
science of the objective though formal conditions of valid inference. [22]

"An old tradition defines logic as the science of the laws of
thought…But at present it is clear that any investigation into the laws or ways
in which we actually think belongs to the field of psychology." [23]

Whether "traditional
logic" actually has stressed the norms distinguishing sound thinking from
unsound thinking is debatable. Evidence has already been presented to place
this assertion in question. However, concentrating, as modern logician have
done, on the purely formal conditions of valid inference has been exceedingly
fruitful in developing the science of mathematical logic and discovering
implications of implications. A calculus of classes, a calculus of
propositions, truth tables, quantification, set theory, and so forth
demonstrates that a purely formal logic has endless possibilities.

However, if logic is limited
only to the form, the problem of truth, equivocation, and symbolism are then,
it would seem, no longer part of logic. What happens to the science of correct
thinking or right reason? Is it no longer a science? What happens to
reasoning" What happens to the American experiment based on reason? Is it
now an experiment based on psychology? If so, which psychology? Logicians have
become so involved with the intricacies of mathematical logic, that they have
failed to see the importance of what is not being done and have ignored the
basic rules of reasoning applicable to the average voter in a society that is
attempting to govern itself through "reason" rather than chance,
manipulation or violence.

Formal mathematical logic is
important, but what happens when it becomes the only form of logic? How does
mathematical logic answer the new dialectical logic of Hegel, or the
dialectical materialism of Marx, Engles, Lenin, Stalin, and Mao based on a
Hegelian dialectic? Most important of all, how does a mathematical logic define
"reason" and how does such a definition fit into the future of
America?

Since mathematical logicians
are interested only in form they restrict "syllogistic logic" simply
to the formal relation between terms in so ar as they can be expressed
mathematically. In this narrow, form interpretation of the "syllogistic
logic," mathematical logicians acknowledge that the formal rules are
valid, but they assign the significance of the syllogism to a minor role. In
the Basic Writings, Bertrand Russel, who is known as one of the giants in
mathematical logic, said in his chapter on Aristotle, "I conclude that
Aristotelian doctrines with which we have been concerned in this chapter are
wholly false, with the exception of the formal theory of the syllogism, which
is unimportant." [24]

The numerous interpretations
and evaluations of logic, both syllogistically and dialectical, explain to some
extent the various definition and theories of reason that have been held in the
philosophies of mankind. If people are genuinely serious in their efforts to
develop rationality, to become more reasonable, to live a life of reason, then
these differences need more serious examination. By comparing an assortment of
definitions of reason with each other, it becomes clear that people do not always
agree on what reasoning is or what it does.

Some identify "reason'
with mathematical calculation. For example, Stuart Hampshire says in the Age of
Reason "…the 17th century
can properly be called in the history of philosophy, the Age of Reason, because
all the great philosophers of the period were trying to introduce the rigor of
mathematical demonstration into all departments of knowledge, including
philosophy itself."25 This runs counter to the Platonic idea of
"reason," in which mathematics was of the "understanding"
and "reason" was a higher faculty of the soul. In the Republic,
Socrates was asked, "For you surely would not regard the skilled
mathematician as a dialectician?" and Socrates answers, "Assuredly not,…
I have hardly ever known a mathematician who was capable or reasoning."
[26]

There are differences. Some
consider reasoning a purely physical operation of the brain. Nathan Court, a
Professor Emeritus of Mathematics at the University of Oklahoma said in his
book "Mathematics in Fun and Earnest," "…to reason is to perform experimental work mentally, the outcome of
each step in the chain of experiments being known to the reasoner from previous
experience…The steps in the proof are nothing else but physical operations
performed mentally, 'in the imagination'…we are able to perform these
successive steps because we know the outcomes of each step from previous
experience."[27}

Others would agree with
Epictetus (a Greek Philosopher) who said, "Rational creatures… are by nature fitted to share in the society of
God, being connected with Him by the bond of reason." [28] This view
of reason is by no means restricted to the Ancients. Celestine Bittle, a
non-conformist contemporary philosopher and logician says, "The rational activities of intellection and
volition, being spiritual, proceed from the soul alone, but with an extrinsic
dependence on the sense and the nervous system."
Some believe that reason and logic are opposed to freedom. Henri Bergson, an
outspoken irrationalist, said, "It
is the essence of reasoning to shut us up in the circle of the given."30
D.T. Suzuki, in "Zen Buddhism and Psychoanalysis" says, "Responsibility is logically related to
freedom, and in logic there is no freedom, for everything is controlled by
rigid rules of syllogism."31 On the other hand, people like Barbara
Ward, an English writer on economics and political affairs, believes that
freedom and reason are interdependent on each other. She says, "When, however, in history transcends their
material drives by reason, by enlightenment and by their search for the idea,
the blind necessities are held at bay. The puppets no long jerk and dance. For
a time a breath of freedom blows through society." [32]

Some believe that reason
opposes religion. In the "Lilies of the Field," William Barrett has
the sad-looking restaurant proprietor say to Homer, "Faith. It is a word for what is unreasonable. If a man believes in an
unreasonable thing, that is faith." [33] Homer ponders this remark and
thinks to himself that "He had a
full life. He had many things. He is free like the lilies in the field. It was
a strange thing. As this Spanish man said, it wasn't reasonable." [34]

Others believe the opposite,
that faith is impossible without reason. Thomas Paine, for example, said,
"It is only by the exercise of reason that man can discover God."34
Wesley, the found of Methodism said, "It is a fundamental principle with
us that to renounce reason is to renounce religion, that religion and reason go
hand in hand, and that all irrational religion is false religion."35

Leo J. Trese, author of
"The Faith Explained," says, "But adult faith is based on
reason; it is not a frustration of reason…The man who has satisfied himself, by
the use of his reason…is not going against reason—on the contrary he is
following reason."36

Some believe that reason is
an instrument or a tool that man uses to acquire knowledge. Jacque Maritain, a
French philosopher and one time ambassador to the Holy See says, "The
philosopher's work is to acquire knowledge; his tool, reason. Therefore the
philosopher before he begins his work must examine reason to discover the use
he should make of it."37 Others believe "reason" is something
else. J.B. Baillie, a translator of Hegel's "Phenomonology of Mind,"
says in his introduction, "Reason is the open secret of the world, because
it opens all secrets. It makes the world after its own image, because it finds
its own likeness in the face of the world."38 Hegel says that
"self-consciousness is reason…"39 and goes further to say, "Reason
is the conscious certainty of being all reality This is how Idealism expresses
the principle of Reason. Just as consciousness assuming the form of reason
immediately and inherently contain that certainty within it, in the same way
idealism also directly proclaims and expresses that certainty. I am I in the
sense that the I which is object for me is the sole and only object, is all
reality and all this is present."40 Herbert Marcuse in "Reason and
Revolution" says, "Reason…is but the totality of nature's and man's
capacities."41 He says also says "Reason is the veritable form of
reality in which all antagonisms of subject and object integrated to form a
genuine unity and universality."42 He states in various other places that
reason is an "object historical force."43, that "there is only
one reason but that different stages occur in its realization"44, and that
reason cannot govern reality unless reality has become rational in
itself."45

There are a variety of ways
of viewing reason and rationality. The renowned psychologist, Carl G. Jung, in
<u>Man and His Symbols</u> defines "feeling" as rational
rather than emotional. He says, "feeling as I mean it is (like thinking) a
<em>rational</em> (i.e., ordering) function, whereas intuition is
an <i>irrational</i> (i.e., perceiving) function."46 George
Santayana, the American materialistic philosopher who wrote a five volume
<u>Life of Reason</u> said, "Religions are many, reason one.
Religion consists of conscious ideas, hopes, enthusiasms, and objects of
worship; it operates by grace and flourishes by prayer. Reason, on the other
hand, is a mere principle or potential order, on which, indeed, we may come to
reflect, but which exists in us ideally only, without variation or stress of
any kind."47 Eric Fromm, in <i>The Sane Society</i> contrasts
reason to intelligence. He says, "Reason is man's faculty for
<em>grasping</em> the world by thought, in contradiction to
intelligence which is man's ability to <em>manipulate</em> the
world with the help of thought. Reason is man's instrument for arriving at the
truth, intelligence is man's instrument for manipulating the world more
successfully; the former is essentially human, the latter belongs to the animal
part of man."48

At the beginning of this
chapter, it was shown how a "reason" functions as the middle term of
a syllogism and a parallel was drawn between reasoning and syllogizing. The
syllogism was show to be a stylized method that is useful because it
demonstrates the reasoning process at work and helps illustrate the importance
of the basic rules of right reason. This view of reason was defined as the
common sense idea of reason and this interpretation of the syllogism was
defined as common sense syllogistic logic.

It has also been shown that
this common sense interpretation of reason and of syllogistic logic has not
been the only interpretation of these terms. Actually in the history of
philosophy, at a verbal level, the common sense idea of reason and logic (ASD),
if one does by the writings of the major philosophers, has played only a minor
role. At a nonverbal level, much common sense has always been apparent, but
when philosophers have put their philosophy into words they have continuously
presented descriptions of reason and syllogizing that are, in major points, at
variance with common sense (ASD).

Many modern writers seem to
assume that the common sense syllogistic logic represents the idea of reason
that has been held consistently for centuries. They do not take time to study
for themselves what really has happened, which is an entirely different story.
Those who urge a revolution in logic, a new civilization, a new world based on
the rejection of the "old" reason manage to maintain an aura of
confidence by simple expedient of remaining ignorant of the history of logic.
Every thing they advocate has been tried over and over again. The only thing
new they offer are new excuses for avoiding the work required to educate and
develop the habit of using the rules of right reason.

Educated common sense
syllogistic logic that lays full stress on all four rules of right reason has
not often been tried on a large scale. The Founding Fathers of the United
States are examples of exceptions to that generality and they were eminently
successful. To blame all of the evils of history common sense syllogistic and
Aristotle's ethic of right reason can only be accomplished by those who have
already given up common sense and right reason or those who prefer their own
illusions to the work of genuine scholarship.