Usually I post recent links, but on this occasion only link 3 is recent. 1 and 2 are new to me, and while I found link 4 some time ago, it’s always a good time to publicise a link to Foucault speaking.

Comments

On 1 and 2, very interesting reading of Kierkegaard with regard to a soft analytic approach to epistemology, or that seems to me to be the best way to describe it. Good work though I have some reservations. Lockhart takes Kierkegaard to be writing in a way which continues a problem noted by Aristotle, that we may say we understand and respect a moral principle, and we do indeed understand (knowing), but not put this into practice and do not know we are failing to put it into practice (ignorant). Lockhart takes Kierkegaard’s explanations of Christianity in his ‘pseudonymous’ works to be examples of this, since the invented author explains Christianity without understanding. An interesting framing for Kierkegaard, but his pseudonyms know they do not understand Christianity and say so, even while trying to discuss it. In addition, I find that Lockhart makes too sharp a distinction between the fully Christian position in Kierkegaard and the pretended non-comprehension in the pseudonymous texts. We cannot understands the pseudonymous voices without understanding Kierkegaard’s fully Christian message, which has many non-religious aspects with regard to the nature of subjectivity, universality, infinity, and the absolute .

3. A good discussion of the regard for the welfare of the poorest in classical liberal and libertarian texts. A useful distinction is made between classical liberal/neo-classical liberal instrumentalism with regard to property rights as part of liberty and absolutist libertarians (Ludwig von Mises, Ayn Rand and Murray Rothbard) who make property rights absolute. One problem is that Zwolinski and Tomasi confuse the issue of public reason and concern for the poorest. Public reason refers to the way of thinking formed by John Rawls’ A Theory of Justice (1971), in which principles of law and government action can only be justified if they can be grounded on an appeal to what can be justified through public agreement on rational grounds, that is what informed public opinion can support when using reason. Rawls had a famous difference principle, which stated that inequality could be justified if benefits the poorest. However, there could be public reason which appeals to overall welfare of the whole population, rather than the welfare of the poorest. Another problem is the non-dstinction between voluntary action to asset the poorest and state action, through the tax and benefit system, and mate additional means. This is apparent when Zwolinski and Tomasi do not make clear that Smith and Locke favour some non-voluntary pursuit of public goods. Another problem is that Murray Rothbard and Ayn Rand may be influential on libertarian movements (though Rand hated libertarian groups not under her thrall), but they were poor thinkers whose writing does not stand much scrutiny. Another problem is too sharp a distinction between classical or neo-classical liberalism and libertarianism. Humboldt and Bastiat are in the classical liberal era, but refer to the rejection of all state action beyond the most strict limitations of the nightwatchman state. In some ways, the distinction is not sharp enough, as in the above unclarity about voluntary and state action.