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Synthetic biology ethics While some scientists are excited about the potential of synthetic biology to make designer organisms, others say such developments call for a new kind of vigilance to ensure such powerful new technology is not used for ill.

Debate over how much society should control life sciences research comes ahead of a public forum to be held tonight at the University of Sydney.

"There are huge pressures to move away from our current reliance on non-renewable resources for energy and materials, and to improve food sources and environmental quality," says synthetic biology expert Dr Jim Haseloff, who will address the forum.

"Synthetic biology can help us design organisms that can provide solutions to these problems."

Synthetic biology involves constructing living things using formal engineering principles, says Haseloff, an Australian, now based at the Haseloff Lab at the University of Cambridge.

The process includes building genomes from scratch, and could lead to new organisms that break down waste, as well as produce food, fuel, biomass, polymers and drugs.

Initially funded by academia, Haseloff says the field is rapidly moving into the commercial world, especially with funding from the biofuels industry.

Well-known scientist Dr Craig Venter is taking the lead in synthesising genomes of existing organisms.

While this is "cool stuff", says Haseloff, the holy grail is to design and construct completely new life forms.

He says there is a formidable challenge though, in modelling biological systems, which are characterised by highly complex genetic and cellular networks.

So far, says Haseloff, the largest purpose built organism only contains 10 genes.

His work in Cambridge involves peering inside living cells to understand how they work, and developing technology for the next leap forward in synthetic biology.

Call for controls

But synthetic biology's capacity to create life has some people worried about its potential for misuse.

"The life sciences now are in a situation similar to the situation that physics was in with the discoveries that enabled production and use of the first atomic bombs," says Dr Michael Selgelid, an expert in the ethics of synthetic biology from Monash University's Centre for Human Bioethics in Melbourne.

He says, like nuclear technology, synthetic biology is an example of a 'dual use' technology. While scientists' intentions may be good, synthetic biology can also be used to make weapons of mass destruction.

For example, says Selgelid, it could potentially be used to make a designer pathogen as deadly, untreatable and contagious as smallpox - or worse.

"You can think of a bad use for anything but the concern here is that the bad use is as bad as it gets. It's as bad as nuclear bombs," says Selgelid, who contributed to a recent report commissioned by the Federal government on 'dual use' research in the biological sciences.

Good record

Haseloff accepts that there could be negative outcomes from synthetic biology, but rejects any suggestion it could be as innately destructive as nuclear technology as "crazy".

He does not want to see such a potentially beneficial technology "ring fenced" on the basis of imagined fears.

And he says synthetic biology is already regulated, and society has a good record of controlling the negative effects of new technologies.

But Selgelid insists authorities do not routinely consider the potential for 'dual use' of life sciences research findings. He says recent events - including the creation of a deadly mouse pox virus by researchers in Australia, the synthesis of a polio virus by US scientists, together with the US anthrax attacks - have highlighted the possibility of a new generation of biological terrorism.

Guarding against biological terrorism

Selgelid says science policy and security experts are now suggesting scientists be made more aware about the potential for misuse of their research.

Organisations like the US National Research Council are calling for research institutions and/or governments to assess this potential.

Another suggestion is for scientific journals to vet research outcomes to avoid publicising discoveries that can be used in a negative way.

In extreme cases censorship by government could be appropriate, says Selgelid. He says while this is very unpopular with the scientific community, such censorship is accepted when it comes to discoveries with implications for nuclear weapons.

Unlikely problem

Haseloff says dangerous research in synthetic biology would not be likely to be licensed in the first place, and it is unlikely that researchers could make a deadly human pathogen by accident.

If they did, he would expect scientists to censor this research themselves.

But Selgelid is not so sanguine. He says the experience with mouse pox in Australia, is a salutary lesson, even though it does not involve synthetic biology per se.

In that case, says Selgelid, researchers were trying to genetically modify a mouse pox virus to create an infectious contraceptive that could be used in pest control.

But they were surprised when they created a strain of mouse pox so virulent it could even kill mice vaccinated against mouse pox, he says.

Selgelid says some are now asking if oversight of this experiment was adequate, and whether its findings should have been published, as they provide a blue print for creation of other super-virulent pox viruses that affect humans.

Life sciences research with dangerous implications cannot always be predicted at the outset, says Selgelid.