Think about how a large terrorist
operation might be able to cripple a city for days or weeks, and how will you
counter that threat. Will that be different from countering dramatic changes in
weather or catastrophic climate change? How might you want to modify the
current Risk Assessment and Vulnerability Analysis as well as Mumbai Disaster
Management Plan to better respond to the situation?

Unfortunately, I do not have any better answers this time around as well. A
part of the story from last year repeated again in that all modes of
communication, first the mobile phones and then landlines, got jammed quickly.
The blasts have shut
down Western Suburban line, which carries over 2.5 million people every
day. The fact that the blasts all occurred on the Western line during rush hour
indicate that the intention of the terrorists was not just to inflict large
number of casualties, but to also disrupt the lifeline, as the suburban railway
system is popularly known, of Mumbai. As a result, there has been an increased pressure on
roads which were by all accounts, understandably, in a state of chaos. It
is not clear to me how soon the railway could start functioning completely, but
at least partial
services have resumed now.

Personally, this is a reminder that I should perhaps start thinking more
carefully about counter-terrorism than just an intellectual interest. More
updates later.

UPDATE (07/12): Amit Varma has a thoughtful
post on Guardian blog about possible backlash, especially from those who
may want to exploit this sad incident for political purpose.

UPDATE (07/13): John
Robb has some thoughts on the Bombay blasts. See the excellent discussion in the comments
section as well. Salsabob says:

The sustained terror of having those
seven bombs explode individually in a well thought-out random way over a
3-month time period could have greatly impacted the security beliefs of that
system’s users and providers resulting in a greatly destabilized train system
in Bombay, possible in India, and would have greatly increased sustained
worldwide fear of such attacks. As it is now, without a repeat (very unlikely;
for they probable “shot their wade”), the incident will be a historic footnote
in India’s struggle with GGs and likely soon to be less thought about in the
rest of the world than either the Madrid or London bombings.

Perhaps, as suggested, the potential
direction that GGs are headed is away from the symbolic to the systemic target.
However, further evolution may occur when strategies begin to fully recognize
that the critical systempunkt is not a system's nuts n’ bolds, but the world
belief systems (i.e. sense of personal security) of the soft targets that use
or provide the system.

I think that Salsabob is forgetting that bombing has been used by the
terrorists in Mumbai for at least past 13 years, as
this timeline would show. Also remember that several
bomb blasts have taken place in Delhi over the last decade, the Diwali blast of last year being the most destructive
of them all.

One has to think of how the 2006 bombings differed from 1993,
or a series of bombings in 2002- 2003 bombings. In
1993 the targets of attack were all financial centers in Mumbai all targeted within
two hours of each other: The Bombay Stock Exchange, Air India Building, Century
Bazaaar, and ten other places. In 2002-2003, there were several different
bombings which targeted buses, trains and restaurants over a period of several
months. The 1993 bombings were a response to the 1992-1993 demolition of the
Babri Masjid and the subsequent riots in Bombay. The
2002-2203 bombings were apparently a response to the 2002 riots in Gujarat.

In 2006, there is no apparent casus belli. It is not clear yet if
the organizations responsible for previous Bombay bombings [Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT) and Jaish-e-Mohammed]
and are responsible for the current bombings, but they are
certainly the top suspects. If it is confirmed that the same group of
people behind the deadly bombing in Delhi in 2005 was responsible for the current Bombay bombings, then this incident would only highlight the inability of the
intelligence and security operations further. The fact that the targets in both
of these attacks have been heavily crowded areas suggests that the intent was
to maximize casualties, and not just disrupt the daily lives of people. In that
sense, John Robb's thinking about systempumkts
is extremely apt.

UPDATE (07/14): Patrix points towards
this post by Atanu.
I understand and share the frustration of not being able to do anything to
respond to the attacks immediately. My frustration however is quite different
from that expressed by Atanu. The fact of the matter is no expert that I know
would be able to give a straight answer as to how to respond to these attacks,
as there is no simple answer. I have written previously that terrorism
poses a rather difficult challenge that quite frankly nobody knows how
"to solve". Today's terror groups operate as much more decentralized
networks, often passing critical information and supplies through sophisticated
communication systems and supply chains, making it extremely difficult to
identify who exactly masterminded operations, and from where.
Conventional military tactics are unlikely to yield any fruits. We need a
different tactical response. Very likely, this will require us to reevaluate
our geo-political realities, and rethink what we mean by security and defense.