Project Warrior Studies are published by the Office of Air Force
History. The views expressed in this publication are those of the
author, and do not necessarily reflect the policies of the United States
Air Force or the Department of Defense.

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office,
Washington, D.C. 20402

--iv--

Foreword

The Strategic Air War Against Germany and Japan is part of a
continuing series of historical volumes produced by the Office of Air
Force History in direct support of Project Warrior. Since its
beginnings in 1982, Project Warrior has captured the imagination of
Air Force people around the world and reawakened a keener
appreciation of our fundamental purpose as a Service: to deter war,
but to be prepared to fight and win should deterrence fail.

Military history helps provide a realistic perspective on warfare.
Through the study of past events, we gain insight into the capabilities
of armed forces and, most importantly, a sound knowledge of the
policies, strategies, tactics, doctrine, leadership, and weapons that have
produced success in battle. Each of us, in broadening our knowledge of
air power's past, helps to maintain the most effective Air Force
possible, now and in the future.

LARRY D. WELCH, General, USAF
Chief of Staff

--v--

United States Air Force
Historical Advisory Committee
(As of January 1, 1986)

Preface

The history of American air power is very short indeed. Military
and naval histories span thousands of years. Military aviation history
is encompassed in the lifetime of a single individual. The birth of
powered flight is coincident with my own. In 1912 I got my first
glimpse of an airplane. I was standing on the fairgrounds of the annual
carnival in Manila, Philippine Islands, when a biplane beat its slow
pace across the sky. An aged Filipino standing nearby said, in
astonishment, "¡Muy grande pollo!" or "Very large chicken!" As a boy
of nine I was in full agreement.

I mention this only to make a point. Military conflict on land and
sea has been exhaustively reported and analyzed for centuries. The
processes are well understood. The general principles have been
distilled and tested. The experience and history of air war are in their
infancy. They are measured in a few decades, actually in the span of
my own lifetime. There has been only one major conflict involving
application of air power on a grand scale. And yet that air experience
has had a profound impact upon war, and upon nations in competition
and conflict short of major war. The impact of space power has no
history at all, but that impact may be even greater than the impact of
atmospheric air power. There is dispute over the relative merits of
historical experience and of abstract logic in the development of
effective combat forces. Military aviation strategists must make the
best of very limited historical experience and derive requirements
based upon logic and forecast.

This book seeks to recount the air experience and development

--vii--

before World War II, to describe the objectives, plans and effects of
strategic air warfare in Europe and in the Pacific, and to offer
criticism, opinion, and lessons of that great conflict.

In retrospect I find that I have been singularly fortunate in my
associations and assignments. I have been associated with many great
men and have been in position to observe great events. In the decade
before World War II, I had a priceless opportunity to work with Bob
Olds, Harold Lee George, Ken Walker, Don Wilson, and Muir
"Santy" Fairchild, under the guidance, inspiration, and benign
protection of the Commandant of the Air Corps Tactical School at
Maxwell Field, Col. John F. Curry. My associates also included Ira C.
Eaker, who combined great ability as a staff executive with superlative
leadership as Commanding General of the Eighth Air Force in
England. I worked under that superb airman, Carl "Tooey" Spaatz,
Commanding General, United States Strategic Air Forces in Europe. I
was caught up in the dedication and driving spirit of Henry H. "Hap"
Arnold, Commanding General, U.S. Army Air Forces, Air Member of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Commanding General, Twentieth Air
Force. And I had the special privilege of working for the greatest
soldier of our day, and perhaps of any day, a man of superb integrity
and highest character: Army Chief of Staff Gen. George Catlett
Marshall.

The observations contained in this book constitute a memoir, with
all the shortcomings of faulty memory, bias, personal viewpoint,
personal experience, and inadequate research that are implied in the
term. They lead to speculation on probable results of alternative
actions or conditions, and that speculation is likewise suspect because
it reflects personal judgment. But the compendium may lead others to
derive lessons and conclusions which fit into a broader mosaic.

--viii--

This work does not, of course, aspire to the dignity of "history."
Participants are notoriously poor historical observers. Participation
induces bias. But there should be some limited value to the viewpoint
of participants -- if their opinions are properly screened to eliminate
prejudice. After all, there is some virtue in the observation of the poet
who wrote:

The experts sit in serried rows
And fill the Plaza Toros full.
But only one there is who knows
And he's the one who fights the bull.

These memoirs will not earn the "bull's ear," but the perspective
is that of an aged matador.

Haywood S. Hartsell, Jr.
Hilton Head, South Carolina

--ix--

Acknowledgments

Since this is a personal memoir, I acknowledge my indebtedness
on two scores: to those who shaped the perspective through which I
viewed the events described in this book; and to those who helped in
the preparation of the book itself.

My perspective and outlook were deeply influenced by my first
commanding officer, Maj. Gen. Hugh J. Knerr, who prior to the war
served with the 2d Bombardment Group at Langley Field. He
impressed me as a dynamic and charismatic leader who imbued his
outfit with his own integrity, devotion, and patriotic loyalty to the Air
Corps. I owe a debt of admiration to Brig. Gen. Kenneth N. Walker
for his enthusiasm and his faith in bombardment; to Lt. Gen. Harold
L. George, whose perceptive prewar inquiry into the basic purpose and
nature of strategic air warfare colored my outlook for the rest of my
military career; to Maj. Gen. Donald Wilson for his method of logical
research into fundamental target systems; to Gen. Muir S. Fairchild
for his thoughtful approach to and appraisal of military philosophy,
particularly as it pertains to strategic air warfare; to Gen. Ira C. Eaker
for his dedication to performance as Executive to Gen. Henry H.
Arnold, and as Commanding General, Eighth Air Force, for his
courage and steadfastness of character in the harrowing first years of
the great trial of the Eighth Air Force in combat. His dedication to the
Air Force knows no equal. My outlook upon strategic planning and
the conduct of air warfare was influenced by my service under Gen.
Carl "Tooey" Spaatz and my admiration for his example of calm,
courageous common sense and good judgment. And, I pay tribute to

--x--

two great commanders for whom I worked and whose achievements --
through signally different methods -- I came to admire: General of the
Army George C. Marshall, the epitome of integrity and cool
dedication; and General of the Army Air Forces Henry H. Arnold,
whose dynamism drove men to accomplish the impossible in the
creation of the United States Air Force. All of these people influenced
my military perspective and formed my military outlook.

The creation of the book itself benefited from many who helped,
offered criticism, edited, and corrected the text. My gratitude to Maj.
Gen. Cecil E. Combs knows no bounds. He offered intelligent and
constructive criticism coupled with encouragement. His observations
and contributions were well founded; he was an active participant in
most of the events recorded in this memoir.
And I offer my thanks and acknowledgments to Lt. Gen.
Raymond B. Furlong, USAF, Ret., former Air University
Commander, and Col. Thomas A. Fabyanic, USAF, Ret., former
Chief, Military Studies Division, Air War College, without whose
enthusiastic support my previous books The Air Plan That Defeated
Hitler and Strategic Air War Against Japan, on which this memoir is
based, would probably not have been published. I especially appreciate
the assistance of a very special scholar, Dr. Robert F. Futrell, a gifted
professional historian who participated in the air war in the Pacific.
His acknowledged scholarship and willingness to edit and review this
manuscript have eliminated lingering fears of some gross error on my
part.

The present form of the memoir is a compendium of the books
mentioned above. This memoir has profited greatly from the talent
and skill of Dr. Richard H. Kohn, Chief, Office of Air Force History;
Col. John F. Shiner, Deputy Chief; and Dr. Joseph P. Harahan,

--xi--

Historian, USAF, who consolidated, rearranged, and improved the
sequential presentation of this book. Mr. Eugene P. Sagstetter, Office
of Air Force History, edited the final manuscript; Mr. Ray Del Villar,
USAF Directorate of Administration, Publishing Division, assisted
with maps and charts; and Sgt. Glenn B. Reynolds, USAF, typed the
final manuscript. Ms. Anne E. Johnson, Office of Air Force History,
designed the volume and guided it through the publication process.

I also acknowledge my indebtedness to Mr. Robert T. Finney and
Mrs. Irene P. Barnett of the Air University for editing an early edition
of this manuscript. Mrs. Barnett gave of her talents so thoroughly that
I feel she is better acquainted with this memoir than its author.

Finally, I express my gratitude to the editors of Air University
Review for permission to use extracts from my articles which it has
published, and to the editors of Air Force Magazine for permission to
use my article "The Plan that Defeated Hitler," which appeared in the
July 1980 issue.

H.S.H.

--xii--

The Author

MAJOR GENERAL HAYWOOD S. HANSELL, JR., USAF
(Retired), is a native of Atlanta, Georgia. A graduate of Georgia
Institute of Technology (1924), he entered the U.S. Army Air Corps in
1928. Trained as a fighter pilot, he flew in the Air Corps Aerobatic
and Demonstration Team (1932) led by Captain Claire Chennault. In
the mid-1930s Hansell specialized in strategic bombardment, teaching
tactics and doctrine at the Air Corps Tactical School from 1935 to
1938. Just prior to World War II, he went to Army Air Forces
Headquarters where he helped draft the fundamental war requirements
plan for the service. In 1942 he became Commanding General,
Third Bombardment Wing (B-26s), Eighth Air Force, in the European
Theater. Subsequently General Hansell commanded the First
Bombardment Division (B-17s), Eighth Air Force, and in 1944-45 the
XXI Bomber Command (B-29s), Twentieth Air Force, in the Pacific.
The latter command was one of only two long-range B-29 commands
conducting strategic air warfare against Japan. In 1946 he retired,
suffering from a physical disability. During the Korean War
(1950-53), the Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force recalled him to active
duty, assigning him as Chief, Military Assistance Program Headquarters,
USAF, and subsequently as Air Member Review Board, Weapons
Systems Evaluation Group, reporting to the Assistant Secretary of
Defense, Research and Development and to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
After four years as a senior program manager and advisor, General
Hansell retired again. He is the author of The Air Plan That Defeated
Hitler (1972) and Strategic Air War Against Japan (1980).