EA-05-176 - Kewaunee (Dominion Energy
Kewaunee Inc.)

FINAL SIGNIFICANCE DETERMINATION FOR A YELLOW FINDING
AND NOTICE OF VIOLATION (NRC INSPECTION REPORT 05000305/2005018);
KEWAUNEE POWER STATION

DDear Mr. Christian:

The purpose of this letter is to provide you with the final results
of our significance determination of the preliminary Greater Than Green
finding which was described in NRC Inspection Report 05000305/20050011,
issued October 6, 2005. The finding involved the potential impact of
turbine building flooding scenarios on multiple safety related equipment
trains that are used to reach and maintain safe shutdown of Kewaunee
Power Station (KPS), owned and operated by Dominion Energy Kewaunee,
Inc. (Dominion). Specifically, the KPS design may not have been adequate
to prevent the loss of safety function for the auxiliary feedwater (AFW)
system, 480 and 4160 volt electrical busses, and the emergency diesel
generators (EDGs). The inspection finding was assessed using the Significance
Determination Process (SDP) and preliminarily characterized as Greater
Than Green, (i.e., a finding of greater than very low safety significance
resulting in the need for further evaluation to determine significance
and therefore the need for additional NRC action).

In a telephone conversation with Mr. Tom Kozak of my staff on September
13, 2005, Mr. Michael Gaffney of your staff requested that a Regulatory Conference
be held for this issue. Accordingly, a Regulatory Conference was scheduled
and held on November 8, 2005, to discuss any revised or new information
associated with the original risk analysis, and any other information
related to the finding. The Regulatory Conference summary, including
presentation slides, is available electronically for public inspection
in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publically Available Records
(PARS) component of NRC’s document system (ADAMS), accessible from
the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public NRC Library).

During the Regulatory Conference, your staff presented an overview of
the finding, corrective actions implemented to address the finding, and
the methodology and results of your internal flood risk assessment of
the finding. The Regulatory Conference also included detailed D. Christian
discussions regarding five aspects of your original risk assessment
for the finding, that the NRC considered may represent non-conservatisms,
as documented in our October 6, 2005 inspection report, and the results
of your revised risk assessment which was completed to address each of
these aspects. At the conclusion of the Regulatory Conference, the NRC
determined that additional information and analysis was necessary for
three aspects of your revised risk assessment. These three aspects included
the initiating event frequency for floods induced by circulating water
expansion joint failures, the human error probabilities associated with
the isolation of the fire protection system sprinklers, and the success
criteria used for some of the evaluated scenarios. Subsequent to the
conference, your staff provided additional information relative to these
three aspects and a final revised risk assessment. This information was
considered in our final significance determination.

After considering the information developed during the inspection, and
the additional information you provided prior to, during, and in response
to our questions at the Regulatory Conference, the NRC has concluded
the inspection finding is appropriately characterized as Yellow (i.e.,
an issue with substantial importance to safety, that will result in additional
NRC inspection and potentially other NRC action).

You have 30 calendar days from the date of this letter to appeal the
staff’s determination of significance for the identified Yellow
finding. Such appeals will be considered to have merit only if they meet
the criteria given in NRC Inspection Manual 0609, Attachment 2.

The NRC has also determined that the failure to provide adequate design
control to ensure that the design of KPS prevented turbine building flooding
from impacting multiple safety related equipment trains needed to achieve
and maintain safe shutdown of the plant, is a violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, as cited in the enclosed Notice
of Violation (Notice). The circumstances surrounding the violation are
described in detail in Inspection Report 05000305/2005011. In accordance
with the NRC Enforcement Policy, the Notice is considered an escalated
enforcement action because it is associated with a Yellow finding.

You are required to respond to this letter and should follow the instructions
specified in the enclosed Notice when preparing your response.

Because plant performance for this issue has been determined to be in
the degraded cornerstone band, we will use the NRC Action Matrix to determine
the most appropriate NRC response for this event. We will notify you,
by separate correspondence, of that determination.

In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a
copy of this letter, its enclosure, and your response will be made available
electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room
or from the Publicly Available Records (PARs) component of the NRC’s
document system (ADAMS), accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html
(The Public
NRC Library).

During an NRC inspection conducted from April 15 through September 6,
2005, a violation of NRC requirements was identified. In accordance with
the NRC Enforcement Policy, the violation is listed below:

Title 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, "Design Control," requires,
in part, that measures be established to assure that the design basis
for safety-related functions of structures, systems, and components
are correctly translated into specifications, drawings, procedures,
and instructions.
Further, Criterion III requires that the design control measures shall
provide for verifying or checking the adequacy of designs.

Kewaunee Updated Safety Analysis Report, Section B.5, states, in part,
that Class 1 structures, systems, or components are to be protected against
damage from the rupture of a pipe or tank resulting in serious flooding
or excessive steam release to the extent that the Class 1 function is
impaired.

Contrary to the above, as of June 2005, the licensee failed to implement
design control measures to ensure that the design basis for safety-related
functions of some Class 1 systems and components were correctly translated
into specifications, drawings, procedures, and instructions. Specifically,
the licensee failed to ensure that the
safety-related function of the auxiliary feedwater pumps, the 480 volt safeguards
buses, the safe shutdown panel, the emergency diesel generators, and the 4160
volt safeguards buses, each Class 1 systems or components, would be protected
from serious flooding or excessive steam releases as a result of random or
seismically induced failures of non-Class 1 systems in the turbine building.

This violation is associated with a Yellow Significance Determination
Process finding.

Pursuant to the provisions of 10 CFR 2.201, Dominion Energy Kewaunee
Incorporated is hereby required to submit a written statement or explanation
to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk,
Washington, DC 20555 with a copy to the Regional Administrator, Region
III, and a copy to the NRC Resident Inspector at the Kewaunee Power Station,
within 30 days of the date of the letter transmitting this Notice of
Violation (Notice). This reply should be clearly marked as a "Reply
to a Notice of Violation; EA-05-176" and should include for each
violation: (1) the reason for the violation, or, if contested, the basis
for disputing the violation or severity level, (2) the corrective steps
that have been taken and the results achieved, (3) the corrective steps
that will be taken to avoid further violations, and (4) the date when
full compliance will be achieved. Your response may reference or include
previous docketed correspondence, if the correspondence adequately addresses
the required response. If an adequate reply is not received within the
time specified in this Notice, an order or a Demand for Information may
be issued as to why the license should not be modified, suspended, or revoked, or why such other action as may be proper should
not be taken. Where good cause is shown, consideration will be given
to extending the response time.

If you contest this enforcement action, you should also provide a copy
of your response, with the basis for your denial, to the Director, Office
of Enforcement, U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001.

Because your response will be made available electronically for public
inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the NRC’s document
system (ADAMS), accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams/html, to the extent
possible, it should not include any personal privacy, proprietary, or
safeguards information so that it can be made available to the public
without redaction. If personal privacy or proprietary information is
necessary to provide an acceptable response, then please provide a bracketed
copy of your response that identifies the information that should be
protected and a redacted copy of your response that deletes such information.
If you request withholding of such material, you must specifically identify
the portions of your response that you seek to have withheld and provide
in detail the bases for your claim of withholding (e.g., explain why
the disclosure of information will create an unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy or provide the information required by 10 CFR 2.390(b)
to support a request for withholding confidential commercial or financial
information). If safeguards information is necessary to provide an acceptable
response, please provide the level of protection described in 10 CFR
73.21.

In accordance with 10 CFR 19.11, you may be required to post this Notice
within two working days.