Country Details

Israel

Shalem v. Twenco Ltd, Israel, Supreme Court, 2006.The appellant wife sought a declaration that under the joint ownership rule, she owned half the rights in a residential apartment that was registered in her husband’s name only, and her interest in the apartment was protected against attachment by her husband’s creditors. The court held that date spouses satisfy conditions of the joint ownership rule (sound relationship, united efforts) is the relevant date for “purely family assets” like the residential apartment in question. But not until a “critical date” in the marriage, or when the marriage faces a real danger to its continuation because of a serious crisis between the spouses, does joint ownership of other rights and liabilities crystalize. Here, because the appellant’s marriage had not reached such a “critical date,” her interest in the apartment was protected against attachment.

State of Israel v. Ben-Hayim, Israel, Supreme Court, 2006.The accused, a male manager of a branch of the Postal Authority, was convicted of unbecoming conduct under the Civil Service (Discipline) Law for sexually harassing a female temporary employee at his branch. The parties reached an agreement under which the accused was disciplined with severe reprimand, loss of one month’s salary, and reduction of one grade for a period of a year. The court held that the disciplinary measures should be significantly stricter, considering that the accused deliberately abused his authority, had considerable influence over the victim’s professional future, was twenty years older than the victim, and was aware that the victim had recently lost her father and was emotionally vulnerable.

Migdal Insurance Company Ltd v. Abu-Hana, Israel, Supreme Court, 2005.The court held that loss of earnings damages for minor children should be based upon the national average wage. Factors that might warrant deviation from this presumption include the child’s age, when there is a real chance the child would have worked in another country, and other concrete characteristics of the injured child. Here, because the child in question was injured when she was only five months old, assumptions regarding her future were inappropriate.

Taha Najar v. State of Israel, Israel, Supreme Court, 2005.The appellant, a Bedouin man, was convicted for murder with malice aforethought for killing his sister after she insisted that she would travel to Egypt alone. The appellant claimed that his charge should be reduced as the killing was the result of provocation. He further argued that the court should take into account that he was defending his family honor, as it was unacceptable in Bedouin culture for unmarried women to travel alone. The court ruled that no argument of “family honor” as a motive for killing someone will be allowed by a court in Israel. The human dignity of the victim and the sanctity of life take precedence over family honor.

Ruth Nahmani v. Daniel Nahmani, Israel, Supreme Court, 1996.A married couple was unable to conceive child naturally. They underwent in-vitro fertilization in Israel for purposes of implanting the fertilized ova in a surrogate mother in the United States. Before the ova could be implanted in a surrogate mother, however, the husband left the wife. The wife applied to the Israeli hospital for release of the fertilized ova, intending to move forward with the surrogacy plan in the United States. The husband opposed the release of the ova. The court held that the husband was estopped from opposing the surrogacy procedure, because he had consented to it and the wife reasonably relied on his consent by going through with the fertilization process. In addition, Jewish heritage is a cornerstone of the Israeli legal system, which values the procreation of children. Relatedly, the right to have children under Israeli law is secondary to the desire not to have unwanted children.

Israel Women’s Network v. Government, Israel, Supreme Court, 1994.Three men were appointed to the boards of directors of Government corporations when neither board was comprised of any women members at the time of appointments. The court found each appointment unlawful under s. 18A of the Government Corporations Law (Amendment No. 6) (Appointments), which required ministers to appoint, “in so far as it is possible in the circumstances of the case, directors of the sex that is not properly represented at that time on the board of directors of the corporation.” As a result, the court set aside each of the three appointments without prejudice.

Dr. Naomi Nevo v. National Labour Court, Israel, Supreme Court , 1990.The petitioner challenged a pension rule requiring women to retire at age 60 while requiring men to retire at age 65. The court held that the rule was discriminatory, because it treated women differently from men where there was no relevant difference between men and women such that the rule served a legitimate purpose. In addition, the fact that the Male and Female Workers (Equal Retirement Age) Law, which corrected the difference, came into force subsequent to the judgment of the lower court did not preclude a showing of discrimination prior to the law coming into effect.

Shakdiel v. Minister of Religious Affairs, Israel, Supreme Court, 1988.The petitioner, a female resident of Yerucham and an Orthodox Jew, was disqualified from the local religious council because of a stated tradition of not appointing women as members of religious councils. The court found, however, that although the religious council provided services that were religious in character, the qualifications of the council were solely dictated by the general legal system. Thus, the exclusion of the petitioner based upon her gender was discriminatory.

Barriya v. The Kadi of the Sharia Moslem Court, Israel, Supreme Court, 1955.The aunt of three children applied to a Moslem Religious Court to be appointed as their guardian. The children’s mother argued that she was entitled to the guardianship under the Women’s Equal Rights Law. The mother, believing that the religious judge (the Kadi) would apply religious law and disregard the Women’s Equal Rights Law, applied for an order staying or setting aside the proceedings of the religious court. The court held that the issue was not ripe for review, as there was no indication that the Kadi would disregard civil law and rely only upon religious law. The order in which the Kadi decided to proceed was a matter of procedure with which the court would not interfere.