120. I would like to ask two questions about
what you have said and then go back to the point about the acquiring
of biological and possibly a small nuclear device. On the information
you have given already, Mr Hay talked about the retraining of
former Soviet scientists and said there are schemes for that to
happen. One of the first things that Mr Bush did when he came
to office was to cut that programme and that programme has not
yet been reestablished for funding to employ those unemployed
scientists from the former Soviet republics. The EU money has
also been cut quite dramatically. It is important that our record
shows the accurate picture of that, rather than what you suggested,
that there were well-funded programmes in existence to give these
people jobs. The truth is that a lot of these people are not unemployed
and many more will be unemployed soon. That ought to be established
on this record here. You, Dr Ranstorp, talked about $15 billion
being cleaned up in South America. If you are to believe what
the American Government is saying, that represents less than that;
that is just on the Al-Qaeda organisation. That represents less
than 1 per cent of the money that is being stopped from going
into circulation by the actions that have been taken by states
so far. I think there as to be, for the accuracy of this record,
some establishment of the facts behind what you have told us there.
I do not think it is fair for you just to say $15 billion is put
through a cleaning exercise in South America, without establishing
the credibility of that to this organisation. I think at some
stage you need to put the record straight on that.

On the issue of terrorist groups in particular,
I would be grateful if any of you could give any evidence at all
that there is a determined effort on the part of terrorist groupsand
Al-Qaeda in particularin trying to acquire biological or
chemical weapons or a weapons system already in existence, buying
some shells or whatever, possibly from the former Soviet Union
states, or a small nuclear device. I think you need to clear the
record regarding the two statements, first, and then answer that
question. I think the $15 billion is a very important issue.
(Dr Ranstorp) Let me declare, for the record, that
I was not saying that Al-Qaeda was generating $15 billion, I was
merely saying there seemed to be information, which is not verified,
which is speculation, about how much money is being laundered
in a particular area, unrelated to Al-Qaeda or any terrorist organisation;
merely, perhaps, to state that the tri-border area of Argentina
and, particularly, Paraguay and Brazil contain a lot of illicit
activity that may reflect the amount that I stated. Secondly,
let me say something about evidence pertaining to the desire of
Al-Qaeda to pursue chemical and biological weapons. There is a
separate, from the encyclopaedia of Jihad, manual or handbook
that deals with chemicalsonly with chemicals. The difficulty
is that those chemicals can also be used in conventional explosives.
Therefore, there is nothing to suggest that Al-Qaeda deliberately
has been seeking, from the information I have seen, chemical agents
to disperse as a weapon of mass destruction. Therefore, there
is still no clarity on the exact intent, nor the exact level at
which Al-Qaeda is seeking to try to develop and acquire these
things.

Mr Jones

121. In terms of the $15 billion you talked
about, what percentage of that is linked to Al-Qaeda in South
America? Is there any evidence that they are laundering money
for that grey area in South America?
(Dr Ranstorp) There is no evidence to suggest al-Qaeda's
link to any of the money that I mentioned, which is an estimate.
It is important to recognise that there are a lot of other radical
Islamic groups in Latin America. There have been arrests but there
have not been any arrests of any Al-Qaeda members. However, there
is cause for concern that Al-Qaeda may find it advantageous, given
the multinational linkages that exist in that area that fuse organised
crime groups with radical Islamic groups that have used terrorism.

Mr Hancock

122. Mr Hay, then I will ask my final question.
(Mr Hay) I have to pass on whether Al-Qaeda is trying
to provide these agents. I do not know, I do not have the sources
to draw on. In responding to your comment about the money that
was available for Russian scientists, yes, it is certainly true
that this is one of the first programmes that President Bush cut
when he came into office. I was not trying to imply that the money
available was in any way adequate. As I think I said earlier,
there is moneyquite a lot of moneyfrom the United
States and the EU that was made available, but I think this is
an issue that is being looked at again and I know that there are
a number of individual collaborative programmes which operate
between individual universities and Russian scientists. However,
the programmes that are available are probably not of the order
that we would like to see. I am very well aware that was one of
the programmes that was cut, but there is still funding available.

123. My last question is in relation to the
situation with regard to the United Kingdom and the MoD's role
here. Do you think, in any way, the MoD has been complacent with
regard to the use of biological and chemical weapons? Is that
complacency in any way borne out of the experience in Tokyo where,
despite the fact that a dozen people were killed and several hundred
if not thousands were injured in some way, the effects were nowhere
near as damning as people had first expected and, to a certain
extent, the anthrax situation in America has been one more of
a panic rather than a health-related one? Do you think the MoD's
response in the past has been sufficiently robust enough? Do you
think they are now beginning to learn some hasty lessons about
what they ought to do in future?
(Mr Hay) There are a number of points. I think the
traditional thinking, if you like, on chemical and biological
warfare had been large-scale attacks; if there was a threat from
biological warfare it was likely to be an over-flight with some
aircraft dispensing aerosols high up so that there would be significant
dispersion and many thousands, if not tens of thousands, of casualties.
I think what we have seen recently (when I say "recently"
I mean over the last 20 years) is that there are three documented
incidents in which chemical or biological agents have been used
in terrorist-type activity, which is relatively small in relation
to the use of explosives. So I think it is an indication that
these are things that are less likely to be used by terrorist
groups. I also feeland the anthrax incident in the United
States has indicated thisthat another view of these incidents
is that they have not been significant attacks on the military,
they have been incidents involving civilians. There is, perhaps,
a need to reflect on whether the resources available, if you like,
for dealing with emergencies in the civilian context outside the
military campaign are adequate and there is appropriate resourcing
for these situations. The final comment is, really, in context,
that these attacks have been low-grade, low-tech. There is certainly
a lot of anxiety and fear generated by them, not helped, I think,
by differing statements which have come out from different senior
people, suggesting, of course, it was weapons grade material and
then when you look at how the material was actually analysed it
is very difficult, from the information that was put out, to come
to the opinion that it could in any way be weapons grade because
there was insufficient information in the public domain. So I
think, for anything like this, there is a very clear need to have
one or two reliable sources that people are happy with and believe
in, and that the information is consistent. Otherwise I think
it generates considerable anxiety.

124. Professor Pearson, is it possible for you
to give an indication of whether you feel from your experience
of running Porton Down that we could actually defend ourselves,
or a sizeable chunk of the population, from such an attack?
(Prof Pearson) I think the first comment I would make
is a fairly obvious one from a former member of the Ministry of
Defence (and I suspect things have not changed) that the MoD has
always been, in respect of terrorist activities, in support of
the civil power. I do not think that has changed. I certainly
believe that from my past knowledge and from what I have read
since I retired (I have no contact with the MoD at this time nor
have had over the last six years, so I am six years out of date
as to what may have happened) that there is nothing to suggest
that the co-ordination of the response has decreased. I think,
certainly, what is available on the emergency preparedness websites
dealing with disaster shows that the co-ordination of events fits
in, but this is where we have to look at the difference between
a state delivered massive attack, which is what the MoD is primarily
concerned about, because they are concerned to protect the armed
forces if they are engaged in a war, and these rather smaller
activities which are not going to be militarily significant but
they can create immense panic. It is the ability of the Ministry
of Defence to give support to the Home Office to deal with these
more small-scale activities. I would just add that one of the
lessons we should learn from the focus of all of this is that
ballistic missiles are by no means the chosen means of delivering
chemical or biological agents. We should be very concerned about
covert delivery and all the other things we have been talking
about in relation to the attack in Tokyo and the anthrax attacks
in America. So it comes down, I suspect, to resources and the
ability of the Ministry of Defence to give support to the Home
Office if there is a series of low-level threats or actual use
in the United Kingdom.

Chairman: Thank you. We are coming on
later to UK preparedness.

Rachel Squire

125. Thank you, Chairman. All of you have referred
to the significance of this psychological fear. That is the phrase
you used, Dr Ranstorp. Professor Pearson, you talked about the
importance of the government sending the right message and how
loners can be encouraged by, particularly, some of the massive
media coverage and the possibility of mass anthrax attack. Mr
Hay, you spoke about how fear and anxiety was not helped by different
statements, and the importance of consistent information coming
out. I would be interested to hear your views in terms of managing
the information to the public. What sort of particular strategies
and practical measures can we adopt to stop the current fear and
anxiety but, on the other hand, not be accused of trying to conceal
important facts or important evidence from the public?
(Professor Pearson) I would certainly argue that what
one is looking for is a sea change in departments' response to
the media, in a sense, becoming much more pro-active rather than
having information drawn out of them in a particular circumstance.
I think it is terribly important to think about what you are saying
when you are making a statement. The last thing I would wish to
do is be critical of the United States, but when the statement
was made about the safety of the mail, I felt that was completely
the wrong message; the message should have been "We are taking
all possible steps to ensure that the workforce are not exposed."
Certainly the media coverageshowing the use of oronasal
maskscan be remarkably effective in countering a biological
hazardI emphasise biological hazard. That sort of approach
would, I think, have helped to reassure. It is terribly easy for
us to get confused about possible contamination from a few spores
of anthrax. I am acutely aware of Gruinard Island, off the coast
of Scotland, which was used for anthrax trials in 1942-43. The
Ministry of Defence quite rightly had a sign saying "Forbidden
Place. Keep Off. Dangerous". There was concern that people
going on to the island might have caught anthrax. I think that
was extremely unlikely because there was no way they would have
got enough anthrax to catch anthrax from that island even though
there were spores in a small area. The island was decontaminated
in 1986 and handed back to the original owners in 1990. The point
is thatand I do not know enough about what happened in
the United Statesthere can be very sensitive techniques
for detecting traces of anthrax. The technique that Porton Down
was using in Gruinard Island could detect three spores of anthrax
in a gram of soil. Three spores per gram of soil. To come anywhere
near, perhaps, catching anthrax you would need to inhale 8,000
to 10,000 spores. There is a big difference between trace contamination
- the world we live in is full of microbiological organisms. We
do not catch disease from one or two of them in the case of anthrax.
So it is that balance we do need to bear in mind, and it is that
sort of response that I think needs to be picked up should the
occasion merit. I think there is a real danger that if you hype
it up too much in advance you may get some loner saying "Let's
see what I can do". I think pro-active, at the right time
and to be prepared and certainly continue to put out the message.
The Scottish Home Office (although it is no longer called that)
for a long time has published advice about how to deal with possible
terrorist induced disease, which is to do it the way you deal
with any natural outbreak. That has been there for at least five
years. I think that reassured people that that possibility is
being addressed.
(Mr Hay) I do not disagree with anything that Graham
has said there. It is quite true that with anthrax you can get
exposed to a number of spores . There is evidence from published
scientific literature from the United States and others where
people have worked in tanneries and with goatskins and hides,
and there is anthrax in the air all the time. It is only once
you get above a certain threshold that you come down with the
disease. You can have a background contamination and it is not
really going to cause any problem, as far as we know from the
published evidence. So it is the way one puts out that message
that is very important. I think it is also true to say that the
Government talks about having a preparedness plan and that everything
is working, but it is also true to say that there is not a lot
of evidence in the public domain of just what that sort of structure
is. I think it would be helpful if we had at least, maybe, one
or two pages, if you like, just showing how the different departments
linked up and how the overall programme operated, so if necessary
someone could contact the relevant individual just to find out,
if they had a concern. I think there is a more general issue,
and if one is looking at biological warfare threat it is the need
to know that the services would respond appropriately. I think
if one is concerned about chemical and biological attack it is
actually the existing resources and services that one would rely
on. I think there is a need for improved disease surveillance.
Disease surveillance works extremely well in the UK but does not
work as well in other countries. I know the UK is interested in
working with the World Health Organisation to improve disease
surveillance worldwide. Techniques for rapid diagnosis of disease
are important and something that you want to know is continuing
and being funded. Vaccines. You do not know which biological agent
is going to be used against you and the question of whether we
should all be vaccinated or whether we should have some vaccines
is something that one might need to consider. Looking at different
treatment options, for many diseases there are not specific treatments,
it is just supportive; you are trying to maintain the individual,
so that the fluid balance is maintained. We need to work in that
area as well, and I think we need to know that this is continuing.
I think it is important to have a central message and to have
that put out from a reliable source, that this is going on. This
should carry on all the time, if you like, and be built on, and
not just at times of crisis, so that that standard information
is coming up on a continuing basis.

Chairman

126. I understand the sale of budgerigars and
parrots in America has increased very significantly to people
seeking a little assistance in detecting any chemical attack.
(Mr Hay) For the wrong reasons, I think, yes.

Chairman: I attended a seminar yesterday
addressed by Russian academicians who said that the Russian intelligentsia
were not remotely worried about opening letters with anthrax because
almost all their letters are pre-opened anyway before they arrive.
He was rather worried about some poor sergeant in the KGB who
was far more vulnerable than he was. We have two further short
blocks of questions, gentlemen.

Mr Jones

127. Last week we had the MoD policy director
who told us about the UK preparedness for terrorist attack; that
the MoD had responsibility for the sea and the air and the Home
Office had the responsibility for land-based attacks, and I think
he finally got to the point eventually when he phoned a friend
and said there was an un-named civil servant in the Cabinet Office
Civil Contingencies Secretariat who oversaw it all, and he was
quite dismissive about the appointment of a Tom Ridge character
in the UK to oversee home security. Talking about the purpose
for terrorist attack, particularly Graham Pearson's memorandum,
where he states that the response plan should be based on existing
plans to counter the outbreak of disease and accidental release
of chemicals, I have three related questions: one, is the UK government
organisationally and structurally well-prepared for terrorist
attack, and is that split that the MoD policy director outlined
between air and sea sensible, and are the current arrangements
in place for dealing with more unconventional attacks, for example,
disruption of information systems, or the suitcase bomb nuclear
device which is certainly talked about a lot?
(Professor Pearson) I am afraid I suffer from not
knowing what the current structure within the MoD is

128. Neither did he, so perhaps you have something
in common there!
(Professor Pearson)But certainly, at the time
that I was still involved with the MoD, there was a very useful
central focus to the policy dealing with nuclear, biological and
chemical, and that ensured that there were not any inconsistencies
in the way in which you respond to it, whether it is on the land,
sea or air. Within the UK, and the response to what the Home Office
needs, and this is partly why I raised the point earlier about
my concern about animal and plant outbreaks, I think the MoD would
say their concern has always beenand rightly sothe
protection of the armed forcesin other words, men and women,
not plants or animals, and I just wonder to what extent that particular
bit is dealt with and I would certainly encourage you to push
for that. Have I covered that?

129. You have, but what is your view in terms
of whether there is a need for a home and defence director or
someone to oversee and try and join this up? Certainly one thing
that was concerning us last week was this division between the
Home Office and the MoD split which certainly did not give a great
deal of confidence to me that there was this unnamed civil servant
somewhere who actually co-ordinated it. Are you confident that
it is actually joined up enough? You refer in your memo to dealing
with outbreaks of disease and accidental release of chemicals.
Are you confident that it is joined up enough in terms of responding,
for example, to something like September 11?
(Professor Pearson) One of the reasons why I say that
I believe the preparedness plan needs to be based on the existing
plan to deal with chemical accidents or these outbreaks is that,
by building on those, those accidents do happen from time to time
and you, therefore, have an organisation in being that can carry
out appropriate responses: you are not just sitting waiting for
some event at some uncertain time in the future. That is why I
very much believe that it is far better to build on existing capabilities
than to try to have some unique response. The MoD quite rightly
focuses, to my mind, on the chemical and biological weapon agentsthis
point again about nerve agents and mustardnot necessarily
a toxic chemical which might cause sufficient damage, and you
get into the need to look at the ability of detection, protection
and medical countermeasures to deal with these other materials,
which I think the MoD could quite rightly say is not part of their
basic remit but is a question of how you bridge that gap between
the civil sphere and the defence one.

130. Have you any thoughts about appointing
a director of home security or a minister in charge of home security?
(Professor Pearson) MoD used always to have a policy
focus which dealt with the military aid to civil power and that
tried to pull together all of the defence support. I have no knowledge
as to where that is in the present time and I think in a way it
comes down to, and this is probably your main thrust of the SDR
review, what is the world that we are living in? Is it a world
of more peace-keeping and, if you are dealing with defence forces
doing peace-keeping, are they likely to be exposed to this sort
of civil problem overseas and, therefore, is there a need to broaden
their ability to be able to operate not only in a traditional
military but also in the civil peace-keeping.
(Mr Hay) I do have the name of your unnamed civil
servant but it is pre 11 September. I can pass it across to you
later on. I am not quite sure what the protocol is here really.

Jim Knight

131. We did get a name eventually.
(Mr Hay) Well, it would be interesting to match them
up and see whether they are the same! Just to come back on the
questions you raise, if there were an attack with chemical or
biological agentsHeaven forbid that there should beit
would be the emergency services who would be the initial ones
in contact. They would be called to the scene, be it the fire
brigade or the police, and if there were casualties the ambulance
service would be there and individuals would be taken to hospital.
Then there would be a need for some accurate and prompt diagnosis
of what the particular problem was. If it was likely to be an
attack with a biological agent, the attack would probably have
happened and most of us would be unaware of it. Individuals would
not be because with all the biological agents there is usually
an infection that is going to occur and it happens sometimes after
exposure. In that situation, it would be astute doctors who would
identify the problem. If it is a communicable disease, then there
is legislation in the UK for dealing with that. I do not know
the details of that legislation but I understand that there are
plenty of powers for the relevant physicians concerned and for
them to take the appropriate action. Whether there is sufficient
resourcing for all of the emergency services and whether that
over-arching co-ordination works and is sufficiently funded, I
read in various statements that some individuals feel that that
is not the case. I think it is something worth considering. I
would also like to finish by echoing Graham Pearson's comment
about not just focusing on human diseases and things that affect
humans. Plant and animal diseases are so important and the foot
and mouth problems in the UK just exemplify that. It is instructive,
perhaps, that when the United States had biological munitions
which they destroyed under order from Richard Nixon in 1969, the
vast majority of their stockpile was two fungione which
attacked cereals and the other which attacked rice, so it is important
to think of this and to consider Graham Pearson's comments and
the relationship between MoD and others.

Chairman

132. There is a BA study group that said that
in 10 years a biological weapon could be devised that could distinguish
between racial groups. If that is true, that is pretty terrifying.
There are a few individuals who would be targeted in this country!
(Mr Hay) I am sure we all know individuals that we
would target.

133. I think you are all safe in St Andrew's,
Leeds and Bradford.
(Mr Hay) We are north of Watford! I think this is
an area that is a little bit outside my scientific field but I
do some work in the area and I think the prevailing view is that
that sort of technology is not good enough to allow that sort
of approach at the moment. There is so much genetic diversity,
if you like, in all of uswe are all a pot pourri of all
sorts of racesthat it is going to be probably quite difficult
to identify individualscertainly ethnic groups. You might
be able to tailor something else later on but the technology is
not sufficient to do that at present.

Chairman: That is very reassuring.

Jim Knight

134. Following on from Mr Jones' question, in
many ways you gave comfort in that you thought that the structures
in responding to an attack are more or less right but there may
be some tweaking needed in terms of funding and focus, but at
the same time the Secretary of State is wanting to add a chapter
to the SDR, so he sees a need to look harder at the asymmetric
threats that we saw on September 11, and I am sure we have the
right concepts, forces and capabilities to deal with them. Do
you think the Mod. is tackling the right issues with this extra
chapter? They are talking about publishing in spring or early
summer of next year: are they going about this with sufficient
urgency?
(Professor Pearson) I am afraid I have not seen enough
detail of what they are actually addressing to be able to comment.
I am sorry.
(Mr Hay) I have not seen the detail either but obviously
we would love to.

135. We have had what is a major event on September
11 and we have talked about it all morning. Clearly a response
is required, however comfortable we are about the structures.
Do you think we need something more quickly than the middle of
next year or can we afford the time to take the more measured
response?
(Mr Hay) I think it would be helpful maybe to have
a continuous output, if you like, so that one is aware of on-going
activity, to know where we are, and for you perhaps to identify
gaps that might need filling and issues that you would want them
to consider. I do not know the detail but I would like to see
it. The middle of next year seems a little bit ahead but they
may be wanting to reassure us that there is not any immediate
threat in the UK.

Patrick Mercer

136. Two very quick questions on international
controls. We have had a memorandum from you, Professor Pearson,
and a Guardian article of yours where you describe a "web
of assurance" to counter the threat of chemical or biological
attacks with four strands, three of which require international
action, but you say that the current Biological and Toxin Weapons
Convention regime lacks teeth and urgently needs to be strengthened
and you mention the United States' refusal to sign the protocol
strengthening the Convention. How robust is that web of assurance
at the present time?
(Professor Pearson) Thank you very much for letting
me talk on the web of assurance. You talked earlier about assets
and dealing with terrorist activities, and I wanted to pick up
that international criminalisation, making it a criminal offence
to work on chemical and biological weapons anywhere in the world,
is a good step forward and I am very pleased to see that this
Bill does extend the prohibitions in this country, and that was
certainly one of the elements of the web of assurance. The other
bit in the Bill which is extremely good is the control of dangerous
pathogens and the strengthening of that and I think those steps,
taken internationally as well as nationally, can help to make
it harder for terrorists or criminals to get these materials and
they can be prosecuted if they go for them. Coming back to the
web of assurance and the four strands and the lack of teeth in
the Biological and Toxic Weapons Convention. The states parties
to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention ten years ago recognised
that it did need to be strengthened and there have been ten years
of negotiation which have led to a draft protocol that over 50
of the 55 states engaged in the negotiations have said should
be enough to complete by this November. The United States on the
third day in July said "We reject that protocol", and
I personally have done an analysis, and I am happy to make copies
availablenot instantlyof the one I am holding up
to you that is entitled, "The US rejection of the Comporate
Protocola Huge mistake based on Illogical Assessments".
11 September has at least led to the United States revisiting
this subject, and President Bush has just issued a statement about
the biological weapons convention and how it might be strengthened.
I think that is very good; it is showing signs of the United States
re-engaging, moving forward, and next Monday, the Fifth Review
Conference of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention opens
in Geneva for three weeks to be attended by all the states parties
to that Convention, and I believe it is crucial that that review
conference does not fall into recrimination about the failure
of the protocol negotiation, but that it reinforces the norm that
biological weapons are totally prohibited and that it finds some
way to move forward, to consider the proposals made by the United
States, and to pick up where the protocol got to. I am in no doubt
at all that this is why biological weapons presents the greatest
danger of all the weapons of mass destruction, because it had
the weakest international prohibition regime. You have the NPT
and the Chemical Weapons Convention with their regimes with very
little on the biological side. You have the prohibition but with
no teeth, and that is one of the key things that needs to be rectified
because, under that, you can encourage other states to bring in
these national controls, such as in your legislation, the preparedness
and the determination to take action if anyone threatens or uses
biological weapons. While that is between states, it does extend
to nationals of states, and is well worth having. It is not the
complete answer but it is a useful adjunct.

Chairman: Thank you very much for your
presentations. We are all avid readers, so if you would care to
send us some of your relevant recent publications we would be
delighted to circulate them and read them very carefully. We appreciate
your contributions.