NATO Enlargement

November 9, 2001 –
May 5, 2003
RS21055

This report provides a brief summary of the last round of NATO enlargement. The report
analyzes
the key military and political issues in the debate over seven prospective members named at NATO's
Prague summit. It then provides an overview of the positions of the allies and of Russia on
enlargement, citing the effects of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, on the United States.
It concludes with a discussion of recent legislation on enlargement. This report will be updated as
needed. See also CRS Report RS21354 , The NATO Summit at Prague, 2002 , CRS Report RL30168,
NATO Applicant States: A Status Report , and CRS Report RS21510 , NATO's
Decision-Making
Procedure .

RS21055 -- NATO Enlargement

Updated May 5, 2003

Summary

This report provides a brief summary of the last round of NATO enlargement.
The report analyzes the key military and political issues in the debate over seven prospective members named at
NATO's
Prague summit. It then provides an overview of the positions of the allies and of Russia on enlargement, citing the
effects
of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, on the United States. It concludes with a discussion of recent
legislation on
enlargement. This report will be updated as needed. See also CRS Report RS21354, The NATO Summit at
Prague, 2002,
CRS Report RL30168, NATO Applicant States: A Status Report, and CRS Report RS21510,
NATO's Decision-Making
Procedure.

Background

Congress is now considering enlargement of NATO, an issue addressed at the allied summit in Prague, in November 2002.
During the last round of enlargement, the Senate voted 80-19 on April 30, 1998, in favor of admitting Poland, the
Czech
Republic, and Hungary to NATO. (A two-thirds Senate majority is necessary to admit new states because
enlargement is
considered an amendment to the original North Atlantic Treaty.) Other members of the alliance followed suit, and
the three
countries became members in March 1999. It was the fourth time that NATO had admitted new states, with
membership
increasing from the original 12 to 19 today.

At the previous NATO summit in April 1999, the allies underscored that they were open to further enlargement. They
created a Membership Action Plan (MAP), outlining structured goals for candidates, such as ending the danger of
ethnic
conflict, developing a democratic society with transparent political and economic processes and civilian control of
the
military, and pledging commitment to defense budgets to build military forces able to contribute to missions from
collective
defense to peacekeeping. (1)

At Prague, on November 21, 2002, the current members' heads of state designated the three Baltic states (Latvia, Lithuania,
and Estonia), Slovenia, Slovakia, Bulgaria, and Romania, as prospective members.

The Current Debate

In 1998, the congressional debate over NATO enlargement covered such issues as costs, mission, and qualifications of the
candidates. The issue of costs has now seemingly been put to rest because entry of Poland, the Czech Republic, and
Hungary does not appear to have required extra U.S. funds. Most observers believe that the three countries have
contributed
to stability in Europe, and have made significant political contributions to the alliance in such matters as enhancing
NATO's
understanding of central and eastern Europe, Russia, and the Balkans, given the history of the new members'
involvement
with these regions. Militarily, their contribution is less apparent; each of the three contributes forces to the
NATO-led peace
operations in the Balkans, and is building forces to defend its borders. Pentagon officials believe that Poland has
made the
greatest strides in restructuring and modernizing its military, and that the Czech Republic and Hungary have made
considerably less progress. (2) It should be noted that
a period of years is normally necessary to rebuild a military that has had
an authoritarian tradition and convert it to one having civilian control, purge it of old-guard elements, reform its
training,
and purchase equipment compatible with a new set of allies.

There has been some sentiment that NATO should delay invitations to candidate states until democratic processes are firmly
entrenched. For example, the recent Hungarian government of Victor Orban was criticized for an ethnic "status law"
that
some interpreted as cloaking Hungarian aspirations for territory from neighboring states having Hungarian
minorities. (3)
Others reject such sentiments, noting that Orban was freely elected, and dismissing the status law as nothing more
than a
passing example of nationalist politics before a close election. Nonetheless, it is possible that the period between
naming
candidate states for accession negotiations at Prague in November 2002 and the moment when current NATO
member
governments decide whether to admit those candidates (such as the vote in the U.S. Senate), could see debates over
whether
each candidate continues to meet criteria for democracy, particularly if there is an election bringing in a government
that
member states view as extremist. The North Atlantic Treaty does not contain a provision for expelling or
disciplining a
member state.

Another factor for consideration could prove to be a prospective member's efforts to persuade its people that NATO
membership is desirable. Slovenia held a referendum on March 23, 2003; 66% of those voting, 66% supported
NATO
membership, despite popular opposition to the war in Iraq that approaches 80%. No other candidate state intends
to hold a
referendum on NATO membership.

The essence of the current enlargement debate is over qualifications, with no apparent consensus. Of an original nine
candidates, two candidates, Albania and Macedonia, did not receive invitations at Prague. (4) Each of these countries is
small, with comparably small militaries potentially capable of specialized functions, such as transport or medical
care, for
example, but only minimally capable of building forces able to contribute to high-intensity conflict. In the view of
some
observers, to adhere to the letter of the military qualifications outlined in the 1999 summit communiqué,
requiring new
members to contribute to missions from peacekeeping to collective defense, would be tantamount to excluding their
entry.

Many participants in the debate favor different standards that, in their view, reflect the current political situation in Europe,
where Russia is no longer a military threat but ethnic conflict, nationalism, and terrorism are a danger. In such
circumstances, they contend, political stability and a modernized military at least able to contribute to border defense
and to
peace operations are an appropriate standard. Secretary of State Powell seemed to suggest such a standard in his
confirmation hearing when he stressed a need for candidates to modernize their militaries, and to strengthen their
democratic structures. (5)

An opposing view is that NATO should first clearly define its mission, above all with an agreement on what types of
out-of-area threats, such as terrorism, proliferation, or a disruption of the flow of oil, should be met with a possible
military
response. At that point, enlargement should be considered, with a determination about which prospective members
might
contribute to the mission. Some observers, also hesitant about enlargement, note that the United States flew over
60 percent
of combat missions in the Kosovo conflict. They prefer prospective members that could relieve the U.S. burden.

Yet another view is that there is no clear dichotomy between collective defense (high-intensity conflict undertaken in
response, for example, to the attacks of September 11, 2001) and collective security (peace operations and
humanitarian
assistance). In this view, countries contributing to peace operations assist in building stable societies and preventing
"black
holes," such as Bosnia or Afghanistan, where terrorism may take root. Countries involved in peace operations, then,
are
contributing to the prevention of terrorism, and thereby to collective defense.

The terrorist attacks against the United States on September 11, 2001, are affecting the enlargement debate. A likely part of
the enlargement debate will be how prospective members might contribute to the conflict against terrorism or act
to stem the
flow of weapons of mass destruction. NATO seemed partially to settle one aspect of the debate over its mission
shortly
after the attacks when member states invoked Article V, the alliance's collective defense clause, to come to the aid
of the
United States in the conflict against terrorism. Previously, the European allies had resisted any statement that Article
V
should be invoked in an out-of-area action against terrorism. At a NATO ministerial meeting in Reykjavik in May
2002, the
allies agreed that they must be able "to carry out the full range of... missions, ... to field forces wherever they are
needed,
sustain operations over distance and time, and achieve their objectives." (6)

However, not all member states have sufficiently mobile or appropriately trained forces for the current tasks in Afghanistan
and Iraq, for example. Few allies besides the United States have special forces or mobile, large-formation combat
forces
with the potential to contribute meaningfully to such conflicts. At the same time, a number of allies have an
intelligence
capability, transport, medical units, and political influence that might assist in such conflicts.

As the terrorism conflict unfolds, current members may examine how prospective members might be able to contribute.
Contributions might include political influence and support, for example in the United Nations or with Russia or
Muslim
states, and not necessarily military potential. They might also examine the level of internal security in the candidate
countries and ability to control borders, disrupt terrorist financial networks or apprehend terrorist suspects on their
soil.
Elements of the MAP that emphasize an end to corruption may be increasingly underscored, given the
post-September 11
importance of preventing money-laundering, and combating a black economy.

The alliance experienced sharp divisions over whether to use military force against Iraq. In January 2003, Bush Administration officials applauded the decision of the 7 candidate states (and others) to sign a letter that, in general,
endorsed the U.S. position on Iraq; some candidates state representatives complained that they had been bullied by
the
Administration into signing the letter. Six of the seven candidate states joined the coalition. Slovenia was the
exception,
but allowed overflight by U.S. and UK forces. The failure to achieve consensus in the North Atlantic Council over
how and
whether to aid Turkey in the event of an attack by Iraq exposed serious divisions in the alliance. (7) The fractious debate in
the NAC led some Administration officials and Members of Congress to raise the issue of changing NATO
decision-making
procedures. (8)

Views of the Allies

The debate over enlargement is quite different in 2001 than it was in 1998. In 1998, several European allies strongly
supported enlargement. Today, most member states couch discussion of enlargement in careful terms.

Most member states agree that Slovenia is politically qualified for membership; in addition, Hungary urges Slovenia's
membership, once NATO criteria for entry are met, for strategic reasons. Hungary is not contiguous with any other
NATO
state. Slovenia's entry into the alliance would provide Hungary with a land bridge to Italy, a clear advantage given
neutral
Austria's refusal during the Kosovo war to permit NATO overflights to Hungary. Slovakia is a credible candidate
in some
NATO capitals, given the return in September 2002 elections of key elements of its reform government. Some
northern
European allies, such as Poland, strongly support membership for the Baltic states; they contend that the Baltic states
have
met OSCE and EU political guidelines for democracy, and cite the three countries' work to build stability in the
region and
to establish better relations with Russia. U.S. officials state that the Baltic states have made the most progress in
meeting
MAP requirements, although there is some criticism of how Latvia has handled sensitive documents.

Italy, Greece, and Turkey are strong supporters of Bulgaria's and Romania's entry. They contend that these two countries
can contribute to stability in the Balkans, where Europe's greatest security needs lie. Critics counter that Romania
and
Bulgaria continue to suffer from corruption in their governing structures, and that each must make stronger efforts
to
modernize its military. Bulgaria has also had a succession of governments that have followed an uncertain course
towards
political and economic reform.

The views of the Russian government play a role in the debate. Putin's softer rhetoric against NATO enlargement since the
September 11 terrorist attacks has allayed concerns that his government would strongly oppose enlargement. It is
possible
that Putin now views a unified front against terrorism, in part due to Moscow's ongoing conflict in Chechnya, as
more
important than potential divisions with the allies over enlargement. The Duma and much of Russia's military and
intelligence bureaucracy remain adamantly opposed to enlargement, which they view as a U.S.-led effort to move
a military
alliance closer to their territory. Officials from allied states often counter such an argument by underscoring that
enlargement's purpose in large part is to ensure stability in Europe, and that the addition of new member states
provides
stability, and therefore security, to Russia's west. Putin may also view the entry of Estonia and Latvia into NATO
(and the
EU, in 2004) as a means to protect Russian minorities in those countries, given NATO and EU strictures over the
treatment
of ethnic minorities.

Congressional Views

In the spring of 2003, both the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the Senate Armed Services Committee began
hearings on enlargement. Some individual Members have expressed their views, and relevant legislation has been
introduced. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee produced a report on enlargement, together with the
Resolution of
Ratification (Executive Report 108-6), the instrument on which the Senate will vote to give its advice and consent
to
revision of the North Atlantic Treaty.

In the 107th Congress, Rep. Shimkus and others introduced H.Con.Res. 116, which calls for NATO invitations
to the Baltic states for membership at the 2002 summit, as long as they satisfy the alliance's qualifications. It passed
by
voice vote on October 7, 2002.

On October 24, 2001, legislation was introduced in both Houses supporting further enlargement. Representative Bereuter
introduced H.R. 3167, the Freedom Consolidation Act of 2001; Speaker Hastert and others cosponsored the
bill. An identical Senate bill, S. 1572, with cosponsors including Senators Durbin, Lieberman, Lott, Lugar,
and
McCain, was also introduced. The bill recalled and approved legislation of the four previous Congresses that urged
enlargement and provided funding for particular candidates. The bill designated Slovakia as eligible to receive U.S.
assistance under section 203(a) of the NATO Participation Act of 1994 (title II of P.L. 103-447). This section gives
the
President authority to establish a program of assistance with a government if he finds that it meets the requirements
of
NATO membership.

In the 107th Congress, Representative Gallegly introduced H.Res. 468, which described NATO as key to U.S.
interests in Europe and encourages a continued path of improving relations with Russia. It strongly urged invitations
to
membership for the 7 countries ultimately invited at Prague. It passed the House 358-9 on October 7, 2002.

The Senate Foreign Relations Committee marked up the Resolution of Ratification on April 30, 2003. The Resolution is
the instrument on which the Senate will vote to give its advice and consent to admission of the candidate states.
The
Committee's report accompanying the Resolution reviews the strengths and weaknesses of the candidate states,
assessing
their political, economic, and military policies. It also reviews NATO's mission and capabilities, relations with
Russia, role
in the Balkan wars, and the Prague NATO summit.

Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld has stirred NATO waters by suggesting the presence of an "old" and "new" Europe, the
former consisting of such countries as France and Germany, the latter consisting of recent new members and
candidate
states. Secretary Rumsfeld has suggested that the alliance's future belongs to the United States and the "new"
Europe, with
the "old" Europe increasingly marginalized. European critics, some of them in the candidate states, oppose such
a
categorization, noting that Germany has the largest economy in Europe, and that only France, with Britain, has a
military
able to move its forces considerable distances for engagement in combat. These critics express concern that a
divided
NATO will not be effective in confronting threats that face each member state. (9)

Next Steps

Accession negotiations between NATO and the candidate states were completed on March 26, 2003, and the candidate state
governments signed protocols that have been sent to the 19 member states, each of which will follow its
constitutional
procedures to amend the North Atlantic Treaty to admit new members. All 19 members must agree on a prospective
member's qualifications for it to enter NATO. The Bush Administration would like for the Senate to vote on
enlargement
before that August 2003 recess. NATO hopes to admit the successful candidates in May 2004.

4. (back)For a review of developments in 9 states
seeking admission to NATO, see CRS Report RL30168, NATO Applicant States:
A Status Report, by [author name scrubbed], [author name scrubbed], and [author name scrubbed].