Covid-19 will alter Indian political life

The coronavirus pandemic (Covid-19) has the potential of
not just redefining the rules and the balance of power in the international
system, but altering the contours of Indian political life.

The scale of the pandemic, the national lockdown, the
economic crisis it has already generated, and the fact that every citizen –
irrespective of class, caste, geography, gender, age, religion – is affected,
admittedly to varying degrees, makes Covid-19 the most significant event in
recent Indian history.

If society is affected, and if the economic structure is
altered, it cannot but have an impact on the way political competition takes
place, and on the political choices people make in the months and years ahead.
While the situation remains uncertain and fluid, four key variables will
determine what Indian politics will look like once the crisis subsides.

First, how India manages Covid-19 will be the defining
legacy of Prime Minister (PM) Narendra Modi. It is no longer Kashmir or the Ram
Temple or the Citizenship (Amendment) Act or welfare measures or demonetisation
or Goods and Services Tax that will be the dominant element in how Modi is
remembered in history. To be sure, these issues matter – and may even play a
partial role in electoral outcomes and have long-term consequences. But it is
whether India manages to minimise the fallout of the pandemic, with limited
cases and casualties, or succumbs to it on a mass scale, with a devastating
loss of lives, that will be the central element of Modi’s prime ministership.
It is whether India manages to, in the wake of the health crisis, reduce the
economic consequences, provide social security support and rebuild its core
sectors – or whether it enters a long period not just of contracted growth but
perhaps even sustained recession that will define Modi’s governance record. If
he manages to lead India out of this pandemic relatively successfully, Modi
will have sealed not just the 2024 election – but etched his name as a heroic,
almost war-time, PM. And, if he fails, nothing else he does will be able to
mitigate the damage from this crisis.

Two, the crisis will strengthen the power of the Indian
State. It has shown that at a time of grave public emergency, the government is
essential. Many fervent supporters of free markets have often argued for the
retreat of the State and confining it to essential law and order functions,
while leaving the private sector to take over other functions. This never
happened in India, even though liberalisation opened up key sectors, rightly,
for private sector participation. And private sector firms, including in health
care, have a role in battling Covid-19.

But it is the government that is at the heart of the
response. From getting Indians from abroad back home to determining the
duration of a lockdown and implementing it, from deciding on the testing
strategy for Covid-19 to embarking on extensive contact tracing of all those
possibly infected, from allocating (what appear to be inadequate) funds to ramp
up health infrastructure to announcing relief measures for the economically
disadvantaged, from leveraging private sector support to representing India’s
point of view internationally, it is the State which is responding to the
crisis. All these measures are legal and necessary, but they will enhance its
power and role beyond the crisis. The era of big government is set to return.

Three, the crisis has the potential to redefine the
nature of Indian political discourse. Growth and welfare have mattered in
shaping electoral contests – but religion and caste have been key drivers in
determining political choice. This is not always negative, for identity-based
mobilisation, especially of marginalised caste groups, including Dalits, has
given them representation. But in this process, issues of public interest have
often receded. Political leaders believe that they can win elections without
needing to deliver better governance outcomes if they can get the religious or
caste arithmetic right. Citizens often do not demand better public service
delivery – and end up making choices based on either older parochial loyalties
or abstract emotional appeals.

But this crisis may force both the political system and
citizens to recognise that issues such as health cannot be marginal, but are
central. The Aam Aadmi Party’s victory in Delhi is an early indicator of this
trend, where its perceived record on health and education helped it win the
support of a cross-section of voters. But Covid-19 has now shown the
indispensability of public health systems and the need to invest in a more
healthy society and prepare better. No national election in India has been
fought on education or health or social safety; voters have not decided their
choices based on which party promises to invest more funds in building State
capacity. But it is hard to imagine that in the future, political parties can
go to voters without an agenda on health – or that citizens will not demand
better services.

Finally, the entire episode will strengthen Indian
federalism. The role of state governments has been critical in the battle
against Covid-19. The constitutional division of powers has meant that not all
decisions happen at the same time, slowing down responses in different
geographies. Some states have done better than others. There have been
coordination issues between the Centre and states and among states.

But the crisis has brought home the indispensability of
India’s federal compact. A centralised, unitary structure would have struggled
even more to deal with the emerging realities, given India’s spread, and
specific local realities. The fact that there is an administrative apparatus
that percolates down to grassroots, through state governments and panchayats,
has helped and will be an asset in this long battle.

Covid-19 will shape the legacies of governments and
leaders; it may alter how elections are fought, what citizens demand and what
political parties will need to deliver; and it will re-establish the primacy of
the government in everyday lives.