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September 7, 2013

Tactical gap- Prithvi

Indian Army yet to find a role for surface-to-surface missile, Prithvi

It stands 8.5 m tall. Its 1,000-kg warhead packs a formidable punch.
And it can hit targets at a distance of 150 km with uncanny accuracy. It
is the Indian Army's latest gizmo. And yet, like truculent children,
the generals are unhappy with Prithvi, the home-made, single-stage,
liquid-fuelled battlefield support surface-to-surface missile (SSM),
developed by the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO).
While
the Jalandhar-based 60 Heavy Artillery regiment is gearing up to induct
the new weapon system and master the launch sequence, the fact is the
army had not even asked for Prithvi. Indeed, the top brass is still
debating the deployment and operational role of the Scud-like missile.
"They
have given us a glove that doesn't fit our hand," says a former general
who inducted the nuclear-capable SSM into the army. DRDO, however,
touts the missile- designated the SS-150 with a variable 40 km-150 km
range and costing Rs.1.50
crore-as an ideal weapon to "take out" large enemy troop concentrations,
devastate air bases, hit ammunition dumps, and headquarters well behind
the border, DRDO officials claim that with a choice of three types of
warheads-a monolith high-explosive, pre-fragmented and sub-munition
cluster-Prithvi is versatile enough to strike all these. And, with a
lighter warhead, of about 500 kg, its range can increase to 250 km. This
version, designated SS-250, was test-fired on August 18.
In fact,
during the Iran-Iraq war, even when they were not tipped with mustard
gas, Scuds-a primitive version of Prithvi-were regarded as weapons of
terror, especially by the civilians trapped in cities. Such missiles
have also shown their effectiveness in military encounters, particularly
in the Afghan imbroglio.
While India may not target Pakistani
cities, Prithvi, even with a conventional warhead, could become a terror
weapon. With a great element of surprise, and hardly any counter to it,
the independent SSM battery could be used with devastating effect
during war. It could augment artillery as well as air strikes. Or it
could be used independently to disrupt the enemy war machine.
In
fact, according to defence analysts, many of Pakistan's strategic
military targets are vulnerable to the Prithvi SS-150. These include the
crucial Kamra and Chaklala air bases, the Lahore airfield, the command
head quarters at Bahawalpur and the Suk-kur Barrage. In addition, the
radar station at Badin can be rendered inoperative, giving Indian forces
a dramatic edge in any future conflict (see map). But despite nine test
launches-with just one failure-the successful deployment of Prithvi by
next year appears to be a remote possibility. It has yet to undergo user
trials.
However, even if it were deployed as scheduled, the army
would not be able to use it effectively. Mainly because the means of
getting real-time information about targets 100 to 150 km behind enemy
territory are still limited. For instance, the country has no exclusive
military satellites which can be used to spy on troop movements, nor a
remotely-piloted vehicle (RPY), which could fly behind enemy lines and
relay television pictures of troops build up. Only the air force, with
its six MiG 2 5 Rs.and few
other' spotter' aircraft, is capable of conducting deep aerial
reconnaissance missions. Hence, optimally to employ the Prithvi battery,
there would have to be a targeting collaboration between the army and
the air force.
The army is also uncomfortable with the liquid
propulsion of Prithvi. Unlike a solid-propellant engine which is ready
to fire and can be stored indefinitely, liquid propellant has to be
filled up close to the time of the launch. The army is also wary of
handling the highly toxic liquid propellant so close to the border
during wartime. Many officers have wondered why DRDO did not go in for a
solid-propellant engine. "We were looking for a thrust vector control
and are using liquid engines, at least until our solid thrust vector
control is ready," says former DRDO chief, Dr V.S. Arunachalam. In fact,
according to DRDO officials, a solid fuel version of Prithvi is also on
the anvil.
Moreover, after the controversial exit of the
high-profile Dr V.S. Arunachalam and the elevation of Dr A.P.J. Abdul
Kalam as DRDO head, the army is worried that the missile programme could
retard, leaving the service with an under-developed weapon. And with
the US extending the Missile Technology Control Regime to cover Prithvi
in June this year, Bharat Dynamics Limited, which is slated to
manufacture the SSM, may fail to churn out the required numbers due to
the restrictions on some critical components.
Experts estimate
that to make Prithvi viable, the army should maintain a stockpile of at
least 300 missiles, to cater for war wastage reserves and to sustain at
least a 15-day operation. Prithvi also pinches the army's already
squeezed budget. According to one estimate, the cost of raising the
specialised equipment to support one battery-including the quartet of
Tatra 8x8 tractor, erector, launcher (TEL) vehicles, the liquid
propellant refill vehicles, the high pressure vehicle, the missile
reload vehicles and an assortment of computer-based command and control
systems-alone would cost Rs.10 crore. The missiles would cost another Rs.400 crore.
But
even at that cost, it is cheaper and, perhaps, more effective than a
squadron of modern deep-penetration bombers. Says Major Shankar Bhaduri
of the Indian Defence Review: "The cost is not important. As a piece of
technology, you have to give it full marks. It is now the army's job to
fit it in its arsenal and have a clear concept of how to use this weapon
system." And that is one challenge that the men in uniform are still to
rise up to.