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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BANGKOK 000003
SIPDIS
STATE FOR EAP/MLS, NSC FOR WALTON
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/23/2019
TAGS: PGOVPRELKDEMTH
SUBJECT: PM ABHISIT AT THE ONE-YEAR MARK: A MOSTLY POSITIVE
POLITICAL REPORT CARD
REF: A. BANGKOK 3283 (A TOUGH YEAR)
¶B. BANGKOK 3129 (WEAPONS SEIZURE)
¶C. BANGKOK 3067 (RED SHIRTS SET THEIR SIGHTS)
¶D. BANGKOK 287 (THAKSIN STICKS FOOT IN MOUTH)
¶E. BANGKOK 2723 (ASEAN ROUNDUP)
¶F. BANGKOK 2587 (NEWIN,S FIEFDOM)
BANGKOK 00000003 001.2 OF 004
Classified By: Ambassador Eric G. John, reason: 1.4 (b) and (d).
SUMMARY AND COMMENT
-------------------
¶1. (C) One-year into his term as Prime Minister, Abhisit
Vejjajiva has lasted in office far longer than most political
prognosticators ever thought possible. Through this sheer
act of survival in the rough and tumble world of Thai
politics, he has confounded his detractors and rebutted -- in
the most effective way possible -- those who disparaged his
political instincts and discounted his mettle. Remaining on
top has come at a price, however, as Abhisit has had to
expend considerable energy tending to his fractious party,
appeasing rapacious coalition partners, and counteracting a
relentless opposition, an exhaustive undertaking that at
times has compromised Abhisit's ability to focus on carrying
out his agenda. As a result, the PM's overall political
report card for his first year was somewhat mixed, with his
high marks for efforts with Burma, Thailand's initiatives as
ASEAN Chair, the North Korean weapons seizure, and
aspirations for peace in the south outweighing the less
stellar ones for his management of relations with Cambodia,
the Lao Hmong repatriation, failing to deliver on southern
reconciliation efforts, and his inability to break Thailand's
debilitating political logjam. This is one of two cables
examining PM Abhisit's first year in office; REF A explored
his economic achievements.
¶2. (C) Comment: As the PM evaluates his first year in office,
he can take some comfort in knowing that his political future
is in many ways more secure than when he first assumed
office. There are clouds on the horizon to be sure,
including a likely January no-confidence vote in Parliament
and the prospect of more energized red-shirt protests in the
New Year, but Thaksin's recent political missteps (REF D) and
Puea Thai's decision to drop its support for the
constitutional reform effort means there is neither an
obvious trigger for elections in the near future, nor a huge
outcry for them. In fact, it is no longer outlandish to
suggest that Abhisit could manage to stick it out until close
to the natural expiration of his term in December 2011, a
notion that would have seemed laughable just months ago.
¶3. (C) Comment cont'd: From a USG perspective, on balance the
PM has been a reliable partner and has delivered a level of
stability -- lacking since the 2006 coup -- that has allowed
many of our bilateral initiatives to get back on track and
close to where they stood pre-coup. While there have been
exceptions to this rule -- most notably in the form of last
week's Lao Hmong repatriation -- U.S.-Thai relations have
largely been well served during this administration and we
suspect that will continue to be the case as long as PM
Abhisit remains in power.
POLITICAL GROUNDHOG'S DAY
--------------------------
¶4. (C) One-year into his term, Prime Minister Abhisit has had
little success translating his eloquent words about political
reconciliation into concrete action. Public opinion polls
have consistently shown that the Thai people are more
interested in progress on political reconciliation than just
about any other issue save the economy, and yet the PM has
failed to change the underlying political dynamic in any
appreciable way. Red-shirts still take to the streets with
regularity to protest the government, while the yellow shirts
wait in the wings, ever ready to assemble at the slightest
provocation. The PM has freely admitted that he has failed
to address the issue, telling a reporter on December 21 that
BANGKOK 00000003 002.2 OF 004
he had been "unable to tackle the political crisis."
¶5. (C) Of course, PM Abhisit does not have the capacity to
engineer reconciliation on his own. Former Prime Minister
Thaksin, like PM Abhisit, has also repeatedly paid lip
service to the idea of reconciliation, though his actions
have mostly suggested he is more interested in toppling the
Prime Minister. From his revolutionary rhetoric and tacit
support for violence in April, to his Times Online interview
and most recently his Cambodia gambit, Thaksin's actions have
consistently exposed his words about reconciliation as
hollow.
KEEP YOUR FRIENDS CLOSE AND COALITION PARTNERS CLOSER
--------------------------------------------- --------
¶6. (C) Aside from the never-ending political chess match with
Thaksin and his allies, one of the most consistent irritants
for PM Abhisit has been coalition management in general, and
the Phumjai Thai party in particular. As reported in REF F
and elsewhere, godfather of the Phumjai Thai party Newin
Chidchop has milked Phumjai Thai's Kingmaking role in the
coalition for all that it's worth. Phumjai Thai controls the
Ministries of Interior, Commerce, and Transport, and at times
has treated these ministries like bureaucratic ATM machines.
¶7. (C) The level of corruption in Phumjai Thai's bureaus has
been significant enough -- even by Thai standards -- to raise
eyebrows and partially sully the Prime Minister by
association. As Deputy House Speaker Apiwan Wiriyachai told
us December 22, no one questioned Prime Minister Abhisit's
credentials as a clean reformer. According to Deputy Speaker
Apiwan, the problem was that PM Abhisit and the Democrats
made a Faustian pact with Phumjai Thai to form the
government, and there was very little the PM could do to rein
in Newin's wheeling and dealing. Apiwan noted that Phumjai
Thai held all the cards, as any concerted effort by the PM or
the Democrats to bring Phumjai Thai to heel could cause
irreversible damage to the already fragile coalition.
¶8. (C) Despite all the headaches associated with managing
Phumjai Thai, the coalition appears to be on reasonably solid
footing moving into year two of the Abhisit administration.
Deputy Government Spokesman and Phumjai Thai stalwart
Suphachai Jaismut has told us repeatedly that although
Phumjai Thai was not always satisfied with PM Abhisit's
leadership, overall the party was eager to maintain the
status quo for as long as possible. The same could be said
for the Chart Thai Pattana party, the fourth largest party in
the coalition. Chart Thai Pattana MPs frequently disparage
PM Abhisit and the Democrats on one hand, while conceding
they have no interest in new elections on the other. Chart
Thai Pattana MP Chada Thaiset's comments to us December 8
reflected this dynamic. Chada told us that PM Abhisit failed
to do the dirty work necessary to keep the coalition running
smoothly and that the Democrats were unpleasant to work with.
Yet, when we asked him if he thought the coalition was in
danger of fragmenting, he told us he did not think so and
that he wanted to see the coalition stay together.
BURMA
------
¶9. (C) By most measures, Thailand acquitted itself favorably
on the Burma issue during PM Abhisit's first year in office.
He set a positive tone from the start, beginning with the
February lead-up to the ASEAN Summit when he met with Burmese
exiles and a group of 1990 Burmese MPs-elect. He has also
repeatedly delayed his plans for an official visit to Burma
pending the regime's willingness to authorize a meeting with
Aung San Suu Kyi (ASSK), and instructed the Thai Embassy in
Rangoon to engage more energetically in Rangoon with the
opposition NLD party. Perhaps most importantly, Thailand
demonstrated leadership on Burma policy as ASEAN Chair,
repeatedly pressing reluctant/recalcitrant members on issues
such as ASSK's release from prison.
BANGKOK 00000003 003.2 OF 004
ASEAN TENURE AND HUMAN RIGHTS
------------------------------
¶10. (C) Regrettably for Thailand, most people will likely
remember red-shirts breaching the security at the ASEAN
Summit in Pattaya far more readily than other aspects of
Thailand's tenure as ASEAN Chair. While there is little
question Pattaya represented a low point in the RTG's
chairmanship, the fact remains Thailand still managed to
carve out a legacy to be proud of on several fronts,
including the launch of the ASEAN Charter in February, and
its work championing a more aggressive posture on Burma.
¶11. (C) In October, at the 15th ASEAN Summit in Thailand,
ASEAN launched the ASEAN Inter-Governmental Commission on
Human Rights (AICHR), a landmark achievement given ASEAN
dynamics and the need for buy-in from "new ASEAN" members
Burma, Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam. Though it remains to be
seen just how effective the AICHR will prove to be, the very
existence of a human rights mechanism within the ASEAN
framework represented forward progress and provided a
foundation to build upon. Thailand also worked hard to place
civil society engagement at the center of its 18 month
Chairmanship of ASEAN, going so far as to use the term a
"people-centric ASEAN" as one of the themes of its
chairmanship. Other RTG initiatives were ASEAN Connectivity,
a plan that aims to intensify the idea of a SE Asian
community, and the promotion of a defense officials dialogue,
specifically in regard to disaster relief and peacekeeping
capabilities.
¶12. (C) Under PM Abhisit's leadership, Thailand announced its
candidacy for the United Nations Human Rights Council for the
term 2010-2013 and helped spearhead the adoption of the Terms
of Reference for the ASEAN Commission for the Promotion and
Protection of the Rights of Women and Children. Thailand
also appointed a new slate of commissioners to its national
Human Rights Commission, making it one of only four ASEAN
countries to have such a commission. Finally, Thailand
positioned itself as a leader on international initiatives to
combat violence and discrimination against women, a fact
probably best illustrated by the Ministry of Justice and
Princess Bajrakitiyabha Mahidol's proposed Draft UN Rules for
the Treatment of Women Prisoners and Non-Custodial Measures
for Women Offenders.
NORTH KOREAN WEAPONS SEIZURE
----------------------------
¶13. (C) As reported in REF B, on December 11 Thailand became
the first country to successfully carry out an air-related
interdiction of North Korean weapons. The RTG seized over 35
tons of North Korean arms in an action that both fulfilled
its obligations under UNSCR 1874, while simultaneously
underscoring Thailand's invaluable role as a strategic USG
partner on bilateral and multilateral issues. Thailand
seized the weapons despite an aversion to precedent setting
and meddling in the affairs of others.
CAMBODIAN KERFUFFLE
-------------------
¶14. (C) Relations between Thailand and Cambodia -- typically
strained under the best of circumstances -- fell to the
newest lows in recent memory under PM Abhisit. Cambodian PM
Hun Sen's public embrace of Thaksin triggered a round of
harsh back and forth rhetoric between Bangkok and Phnom Penh,
retaliatory Ambassadorial withdrawals, and accusations from
both sides of meddling in cross border domestic politics.
¶15. (C) While Hun Sen's decision to appoint Thaksin as an
advisor was clearly intended as a provocation, it was Abhisit
who allowed himself to be manipulated and drawn into a cross
border war of words. Notwithstanding the fact that Abhisit
received a temporary popularity boost as a result of
heightened cross border tensions, the decision to engage with
Hun Sen and Thaksin and "wallow in the mud with pigs" as some
BANGKOK 00000003 004.2 OF 004
pundits have said, has only served to elevate Thaksin's
profile while straining ties with Cambodia at the same time
Thailand is navigating complicated relationships with its
other neighbors. Thaksin's most recent visit to Cambodia was
met with substantially less rancor and acrimony in Thailand,
a possible sign that the RTG has recognized the perils of
overreacting, but the damage has already been done and
Abhisit will be hard pressed to improve relations with Hun
Sen anytime soon.
ABHISIT AND THE SOUTH
------------------------
¶16. (C) When PM Abhisit assumed office just over one year
ago, he repeatedly pointed to resolving the southern
insurgency as one of his administration's foremost
priorities. Right out of the gates, he developed a plan to
reinvest civilian officials with authority over the southern
insurgency, and considered lifting the draconian security
laws that allow security forces to detain and hold suspects
without charges or trial. He also launched a "Southern
Cabinet" to oversee relevant budget and policy issues, and
vowed to establish a new organization with overall
responsibility for the south. In addition, the PM signaled
he would consider a special administrative zone in southern
Thailand to deal with issues of governance, and noted that he
would entertain the possibility of "peace talks" to end the
violence. Unfortunately, none of Abhisit's initiatives has
translated into any visible changes on the ground yet.
JOHN