According to this link: http://www.cgsc.edu/CARL/nafziger/939JXAB.PDF, a 1939 IJA armored division had 1,283 trucks, excluding all other motor vehicles (unless I made a mistake adding). The IJA 3rd Armored Division's composition is listed at the top of the link, though I don't know as of what date it is accurate, and I didn't have time to add up all its trucks.

According to this link, http://www.cgsc.edu/CARL/nafziger/939JXAA.PDF, based on the TOEs in the other document an IJA mechanized division like the 1st Guards would have had about 1,600-1,700 trucks assuming there was no numerical difference between "Guards" and standard formations.

I'm a little tired of my fellow members taking pot shots at Draco on every little point he makes. You ridicule him at every turn. I think it's time to show him a little respect. You keep demanding him to provide sources, sources, sources!
I think it's time to give credit where it is due. If any of you want to challenge him on the statement, I personally will come to his support with a multitude of proof!
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These figures are for Operation Ko-Go, the first phase of Ichi-Go. They do not represent the entire operation (which is what I referenced). Max Hastings in Retribution: the Battle for Japan, 1944-45 pg. 212 cites Japanese strength as 500,000 men and 100,000 horses.

What was more, through 1941 truck production in the German Reich was under 137,000 (136,991). So unless the discrepancy was somehow made up by a vast stock of captured vehicles, or unless Germany's Fascist cronies came up with the remainder, the figure of 600,000 trucks for Barbarossa is an impossibility.

German trucks were a minority in Barbarossa, most trucks were requisitioned in France, Belgium, etc, which caused enormous maintenace problems (like the captured British vehicles from Singapore in Burma)

It is difficult to believe that a tank div. used fewer trucks than a mechanized division and that either would use about 10% of the total of vehicles (not only trucks) available in Ichi Go for a 1/2 million men.

I was not talking about typical divisions but about vanguard divisions in Barbarossa. The 2,000 trucks per Panzer division is mentioned in Soviet Storm: Barbarossa, where they also explain that the Germans succeeded where the Soviets failed in part because the Soviets had more tanks than trucks in a division, while the Germans had many more trucks than tanks. Soviet tanks soon ran out of fuel, ammo, spares, etc,

Even with your average figures, it is obvious that if a single Panzer division uses 1,522 trucks and Germany used 600,000 trucks and 625,000 horses for 3 million men for the beginning of Barbarossa (plus over a million horses during the same offensive, mostly from the 10 million captured), the 15.500 trucks and 100,000 horses for a half million Japanese troops is ridiculous (the smaller the number of trucks, the many more horses which have to be used to haul the same load).

According to http://forum.warthunder.com/index.ph...ation-ichi-go/
and to wiki
the IJA used 800 tanks, 12,000 vehicles (trucks, tractors, cars, motorcycles) and 70,000 horses for Ichi Go (even worse than the figures above). Since You don't like my figures, How many trucks do You think supplied the 3rd tank division?

I was not talking about typical divisions but about vanguard divisions in Barbarossa.

What exactly do you mean by 'vanguard divisions?' Presumably a concept you have just created in an attempt to justify your unending errors. In any case, permit me to remind you what you actually said, which was :-

A single Panzer division used thousands of trucks in Barbarossa. A single infantry division used over a thousand trucks and 20,000 horses hauling supplies (including food and water for the horses and their handlers)and guns.

Even with your average figures,

Who mentioned 'average' figures? I referred to 'establishment figures' which in this case means a German infantry division at full strength in June 1941.

I really do wish that, when people with more knowledge than you take the time and trouble to correct your more extreme errors, you would at least do them the courtesy of actually reading their posts, instead of simply seeing what your personal prejudices want to see.

Are you still maintaining that this imaginary 'vanguard' infantry division you have dreamed up really had 20000 horses and over a thousand trucks, or is this simply yet another case of posting irrelevancies in an attempt to conceal your lack of accurate knowledge?

Despite ridiculous Japanese production of planes, spares, pilots, mechanics, etc, despite ridiculous shipping and trucking capacity, despite the allies having dozens of established airfields in Burma and dozens more in India and China (while the Japanese just moved into airfields in Thailand and Burma) and despite the IJN being extremely weak in the Indian Ocean the first 3 months of 1942, You conclude than the IJAAF has fewer problems deploying, maintaining and supplying several hundred planes and the IJA deploying and supplying several divisions than the allies do deploying and supplying 100 each fighters and twin engine bombers and a similar number of divisions (although, traditionally fewer divisions are required to defend than to attack). with their unlimited resources.

Unlimited resources. pretty funny.

You refuse to accept that even under perfect conditions, your fleet of 18 Hurricanes will never be at 100%. Not during peacetime, and certainly not during war.

German trucks were a minority in Barbarossa, most trucks were requisitioned in France, Belgium, etc, which caused enormous maintenace problems (like the captured British vehicles from Singapore in Burma)

Checking with Nigel Askey's "Operation Barbarossa: The Complete Organizational and Statistical Analysis" pg. 93 indicates that the Germans had approximately 150,100 trucks allocated to deployed combat units (150 divisions) in the USSR. This is the number that most correlates with the 15,500 used by the IJA formations in Ichi-Go (17 divisions).

Roughly estimating, that means there were almost exactly 1,000 trucks for each division, not all of them German-made (this number is probably diluted when Germany's allies are factored in as they cannot have been expected to provide much in the way of motor transport on their own), while every IJA division in Ichi-Go had about 912.

Now, there were still many more trucks in rear-supply and support units during Barbarossa (and Ichi-Go), but these were not directly attached to the combat divisions.

It is difficult to believe that a tank div. used fewer trucks than a mechanized division and that either would use about 10% of the total of vehicles (not only trucks) available in Ichi Go for a 1/2 million men.

That was me counting up the TOE for a 1939 tank division, and it was late so I might have made a mistake (I counted a few times so I think it's accurate). The Guards divisions were what would be called "robust" organizations and had more attached to them than the standard division.

Then again, I already posted sources stating what the standard Axis infantry divisions had in the way of truck transport, so this discussion should be moot.