Opening salvoes of high-level bombing and cruise missiles fired from submarines have been the pattern of every huge attack by US-led British forces for more than a decade.

There are eerie echoes in the attacks on Libya of Tony Blair's first war – Operation Desert Fox against Saddam Hussain's military apparatus in 1998 – as well as subsequent US and British attacks on Afghanistan and Iraq.

There are echoes in particular of the 1999 Kosovo war, provoked by a humanitarian crisis played out on the world's television screens, albeit – as is often forgotten – a war not supported by any UN resolution.

American, British, French and other Nato aircraft soon ran out of genuine military targets, whose list was extended to include Slobodan Milosevic's state television station, economic and industrial centres and transport infrastructure including bridges.

After weeks of bombing, less than a handful of Serbian tanks were destroyed – that is how difficult it was for pilots to find the targets. The destruction of Serbia, combined with a population increasingly intolerant of Milosevic's regime, finally led to his arraignment at the UN tribunal in The Hague.

Independent analysts say that while the topography of the Balkans, criss-crossed by valleys and mountains, is very different from Libya's desert, the problems facing those countries trying to end the violence on the ground – with the aim of regime change in all but name – are similar.

It soon becomes impossible to continue the campaign from the air or from submarine-launched missiles, however "smart" or accurate the bombs are.

If there are echoes of the Kosovo war in the initial operations against Libya any parallels in the endgame remain very uncertain. The remnants of the Yugoslav army cut their losses and withdrew from Kosovo. One question in Libya is whether enough of those in Gaddafi's elite forces believe his time is up.

Operations in Iraq in the 1990s, including no-fly zones, did not weaken the central core of Saddam's regime. Though the Kurdish north became an increasingly self-governing entity – there are some parallels, perhaps, with eastern Libya.

There is one clear echo, in particular, in the British government's approach to Gaddafi, 20 years ago. At the end of military action in the 1991 Gulf war, President George Bush encouraged the Shias of southern Iraq to rise up. Many did so and were crushed for their pains by Saddam's forces. David Cameron encouraged the rebels in Libya to continue their fight but without giving them any real means to help them on the ground. There is one way Britain and the US could be helping: intelligence officers and special forces could assist not only in identifying targets for bombers but in organising sabotage operations.