Soviet SALT Cheating: The New Evidence

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At the very time proponents of arms'control agreements with the
Soviet Union are urging rat ification of SALT II and progress at
the START fiegoti- ations at-the expense.of rigorous verification
standards, there is new evidence of-Soviet violation of the 1972
SALT I Antiballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty. -Instead of-protesting
this Soviet'cheating, the Reagan Administration ha's been
strangely.silent and theiCongresshas ignored the unambiguous signs
of Soviet nuclear warfighting preparations. Recent photograp.hs
taken by a U.S. surveillance satellite on a rou- tine sweep of the
eastern Soviet Union r eveal thel construction of an im- mense
radar system deep inside the Soviet Union north of the Mongolian
border. -Thisnew radar system is targeted toward Alaska and uses
advanced "phase-array" technology which will enhance Soviet
abilities to predict impa c t areas of incoming warheads and
improve tar'get handling capabilities 'for ABM battle-management.
Construction of-the fiew radar complex with a transmitter building
almost 500 feet long and 300 feet wide violates the ABM Treaty.
Article I prohibits any A B M system for' territorial defense;
Article II defines radars with an ABM role to apoly to this type of
system; Article VI proscribes deployment "in the future 6fradars
for early warning of strategic missile attack except at locations
along the 'periphery o f... the national territory and oriented
outward." (TEmphasis added.) This new radar system has clear ABM
battle-managemen t capabilities; it is almost identical with large
missile trackifig radars now being tested at Pechora in the Soviet
Northwest, at L y aki close to the Caspian Sea and two other
locations. It closes the gap of coverage against incoming U.S.
land- and sea-based missiles targeted against-eastern Soviet
territory arid, together with already existing radar sites,- will
soon enable the Soviet s to mount a formidable-antiballistic
missile defense against a retaliatory strike by the United States.
When combined with growing Soviet first-strike capabilities against
U.S. land-based ICBMs and vigorous Sovie'E preparations for civil
defense, it becom e s apparent that the Soviets are on the verge of
acquiring all major element 's for the potential to wage nuclear
war against the United States at tolerable costs. 'An effective
Soviet ABM capability will expose the United States to Soviet
nuclear blackmai l and jeopardize U.S. ability to counter Soviet
threats to strate-. gically vital regions of the world.

This new evidencereinforces longstanding concerns about
systematic Soviet violations of the ABM Treaty. Battlefield
management radars are

2

the long leadtime component of any ABM defense system and the
Soviets seem to have gained a great deal of experience in this
field since 1975 when they installed an ABM-X-3 radar in the
Kamchatka impact area for their ICBM tests. Over the years, the
Soviets have a l so been upgrading their surface-to-air (SAM)
bomber defense systems--now presumed to perform an ABM role. Since
the Carter Administration, the Soviets repeatedly have tested
various types of SAM missiles in'a discernable ABM mode at
altitudes above 100,00 0 feet and have deployed thousands of less
capable SA-5 missiles around-Soviet cities. These illegal ABM
activities and the development of an anti-tactical ballistic missle
system clearly point to a Soviet decision to subvert the ABM Treaty
shortly after s igning it.

Refusals to acknowledge these Soviet treaty violations point to
the perennial dilemma of what to do after detecting cheating. The
Administra-. tion is doingitself and the country no favor by
refusing to acknowledge the mounting evidence that the Soviets are
developing a capability which seriously erodes strategic stability
and will soon permit the Soviet Union to break out of the ABM
Treaty. The Administration should document and publicize Soviet ABM
activities and Treaty violations. It should a ccele- rate the U.S.
ballistic missile defense (BDM) program. Unless Moscow can refute
the evidence that its radar and weapons programs are not de- signed
for an ABM role, the U.S. should abrogate the ABM Treaty.