Promising to “smash” Venezuela’s government during a “maximum pressure March,” Trump has imposed crushing sanctions that force Venezuela to spend three times as much as non-sanctioned countries on coronavirus testing kits.

By Leonardo Flores

During his State of the Union address this February, President Trump promised to “smash” and destroy the Venezuelan government. His vows were followed by a renewed threat of a naval blockade on the country, which is an act of war under U.S. and international law. Next, the State Department excitedly announced that the “Monroe Doctrine 2.0” will be “fleshed out in the weeks and months to come,” declaring a “maximum-pressure March” against Venezuela.

These threats have been backed up by concrete policies and actions. Russian oil company Rosneft, one of the world’s primary purchasers of Venezuelan oil, has seen two of its subsidiaries sanctioned by the US in less than one month for doing business with Venezuela. The State Department telegraphed its move in February, singling out oil companies Rosneft, Reliance (India) and Repsol (Spain). Chevron, the biggest U.S. oil company still working in Venezuela, has been warned by the Trump administration that its license to operate in the country (which exempts it from the sanctions) will not be renewed.

Since 2015, the U.S. government has sanctioned 49 oil tankers, 18 Venezuelan companies, 60 foreign companies and 56 airplanes (41 belonging to state airliner Conviasa and 15 belonging to state oil company PDVSA), but this is the first time they’ve gone after foreign oil companies. By targeting Rosneft Trading and TNK Trading (the two Rosneft subsidiaries), the United States makes it next-to-impossible for those firms to continue trading in Venezuela oil, as shipping companies, insurance companies and banks will refuse to work with them.

The effects of the sanctions are most noticeable in Venezuela’s health sector, which has been decimated over the past five years. The US measures have impeded banks from carrying out financial transactions for the purchase of medical supplies. What’s more, they have caused a 90% decrease in Venezuela’s foreign income earnings, depriving the health sector of much needed investment.

Were it not for the solidarity of China and Cuba, which sent testing kits and medicine, Venezuela would be woefully ill-equipped to handle the coronavirus. The sanctions are worsening an already dangerous situation, forcing Venezuela to spend three times as much for testing kits as non-sanctioned countries.

President Maduro has appealed directly to Trump to lift the sanctions in the name of fighting the global pandemic of coronavirus. His appeal will likely go unanswered, given the intensification not just in sanctions, but in the violent opposition’s acts of irregular warfare.

Although no direct connection can (yet) be made between this group and the Trump administration, it beggars belief that an operation requiring clearly significant logistical and financial costs would not have received support from at least one the many actors openly engaged in regime change: the Trump administration, the Duque administration in Colombia, the Bolsonaro administration in Brazil or the extremist right-wing opposition factions lead by Juan Guaidó.

There is already evidence that Venezuelan paramilitaries opposed to the Maduro government have received support and training in both Colombia and Brazil, not to mention the alleged millions of dollars spent by the U.S.to get Venezuelan military officials to turn on the government. In addition to supporting irregular warfare, the Trump administration is preparing for conventional warfare.

“Maximum pressure March” is timed to coincide with important negotiations in Caracas between the Venezuelan government and moderate sectors of the opposition. The two sides have set up a commission that will select new members of the National Electoral Council in time for this year’s legislative elections. One of Juan Guaidó’s allies, Henry Ramos Allup, leader of opposition party Acción Democrática (Democratic Action), came under fire from the extreme right for saying he will participate in the elections. The terror attack on the voting machines is unlikely to affect the timing of the elections, but without its system of electronic voting backed up by paper receipts and audits of the vote count, the results will be vulnerable to claims of fraud.

This is not the first time that the Trump administration has amplified its regime change efforts in response to negotiations between the Venezuelan government and the opposition. It did so in February 2018, when then-Secretary of State Rex Tillerson threatened an oil embargo and said he would welcome a military coup right as the two sides were about to sign a comprehensive agreement worked on for months in the Dominican Republic.

It happened again in August 2019, when the U.S. applied what the Wall Street Journal characterized as a “total economic embargo” in the middle of discussions between the Guaidó-led opposition and government. In both instances, negotiations fell apart as a result of U.S. government actions and statements.

Unfortunately, the Trump administration has made it clear it doesn’t care about what Venezuelans want. Instead, it continues to ramp up the pressure and might even be setting the scene for a military intervention – perhaps an October surprise to shore up Trump’s reelection bid.